

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE AND MALAWI'S FOREIGN POLICY POSTURE
TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

Exploring the determinants of the foreign policy of Malawi, this case study focuses on the particular circumstance of economic dependence facing developing countries of economic dependence. Although Malawi is similar to other developing countries with regard to its economic dependence, it is very atypical in terms of its foreign policy of close relations with South Africa. This study tests the degree to which Malawi's economic dependence made it necessary for Malawi to pursue a policy of cooperation with South Africa.

The results of this study indicate that, although economic dependence is an important factor limiting the range of choice open to Malawi, it does not completely curtail Malawi's freedom of choice. Therefore, other factors have to be taken into account such as the idiosyncratic variable and domestic politics. Nevertheless, the advantage of emphasizing economic dependence is that it accounts for the special circumstances facing all developing countries and the resulting constraints on policy options.


RESUME

En examinant les determinantes de la politique etrangere de Malawi, cette etude concentre sur la circonstance particuliere de la dependance economique qui confront des pays en voie de developpement. Bien que Malawi soit semblable a d'autres pays en voie de developpement a l'egard de sa dependance economique, elle est tres atypique a l'egard de sa politique etrangere de bonnes relations avec l'Afrique du Sud. Cette etude met a l'epreuve jusqu'a quel point la dependance economique de Malawi a mis ce pays dans la necessite d'avoir une politique de cooperation avec l'Afrique du Sud.

Les resultats de cette etude indique que bien que la dependance economique soit un facteur decisif en limitant la sphere de choix de Malawi, elle ne restreint pas completement sa liberte de choix. Donc, on doit tenir compte d'autres elements comme l'element idiosyncratique et les politiques domestiques. Neanmoins, l'avantage en mettant l'accent sur la dependance economique est qu'il tient compte des circonstances speciales confrontant toutes les pays en voie de developpement et les contraintes sur le choix qui sont le resultat.

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Source: Malawi-Dialogue and Development,
(London, 1973).

PREFACE

With events moving so quickly in the region of Southern Africa, the study of the foreign policy posture of Malawi towards the most powerful and, at the moment, strife-torn country of the region, South Africa, is of automatic interest. The case-study approach is the best method for undertaking such a vast subject as the foreign policy of a developing state, particularly one located in such a complex region as Southern Africa. Despite the rapid flow of events and the changes in the political situation in Southern Africa in the past decade, Malawi has demonstrated a remarkable degree of consistency in its foreign policy. This consistency reflects the realities of Malawi's economic dependence, and the priority attached to Malawi's economic interests by its leader, Dr. Hastings K. Banda.

This study seeks to contribute to the understanding of the determinants of foreign policy by going beyond the tendency of previous studies to explain Malawi's foreign policy simply in terms of Dr. Banda's leadership. Although the influence of Banda on Malawi's foreign policy is taken into account, Malawi's economic dependence is seen to be the major determinant of the country's foreign policy by limiting the degree of choice available to Banda. Thus, Malawi's land-locked position made it necessary for it to cooperate with Portuguese-ruled Mozambique. When a Marxist Government took over in Mozambique after that country won its independence in 1975, Banda, for the same reason, still had to cooperate with Mozambique, even though Malawi was

oriented toward the West and Banda personally found communism very distasteful. Similarly, Malawi also had to cooperate with Rhodesia, even after UDI, because the majority of its migrant workers found employment there, and because it was an important trading partner. Although Malawi was less dependent on South Africa than on Rhodesia at the time of independence in 1964, the same argument holds true that cooperation was necessary.

In the first ten years of independence a significant shift occurred in which Malawi became more dependent on South Africa than on Rhodesia. This study acknowledges that, while economic necessity was partly responsible for this shift, it can also be partly attributed to Banda himself. As Malawi enjoyed economic growth during this period, the demand for capital goods increased, and the closest and cheapest source was South Africa. In addition, more and more of Malawi's migrant workers had to seek employment in South Africa as opportunities in Rhodesia diminished after UDI. Thus, there was a natural increase in economic exchange between Malawi and South Africa that was attributable to economic factors. However, the shift in dependence to South Africa was also due to Banda's desire to move the capital city to Lilongwe, and his willingness to accept South African aid after all other countries refused to provide financial support. Finally, the decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1967 clearly went beyond the realm of economic necessity.

Nevertheless, there were valid economic reasons for moving the capital to Malawi, and Banda has always acted in

the economic interests of the country. Since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the two countries have worked towards increasing their economic contacts, with some success. Malawi is also an active member of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference, whose goal is to promote development and economic independence from South Africa through integrated regional projects. Malawi has improved relations with Mozambique, and is cooperating with that country in the area of transport routes under the auspices of SADCC. Despite Malawi's membership in SADCC, it continues its policy of good relations with South Africa. Due to the present level of dependence on South Africa, it would be very difficult for Malawi to act otherwise. The economic costs of Zambia's policy of disengagement from South Africa and cooperation with national liberation movements should be a lesson to any future leader of Malawi.

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CHAPTER I

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Problem for Investigation

Malawi's foreign policy is of particular interest because it was the first, and still is the only, Black African state to have established formal diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1967. Malawi's policy of cooperation rather than conflict with South Africa has led to severe criticism from other African states, as this policy is seen to contradict the struggle to liberate Southern Africa from white minority rule. Nevertheless, it has come to be recognized that there is a very difficult dilemma posed for Black African states by the need to support national movements in Southern Africa as against the need to promote rapid economic development.<1>

This study seeks to understand the factors underlying Malawi's foreign policy posture toward South Africa. In seeking to explain Malawi's foreign policy toward South Africa, the tendency in earlier studies has been to rely solely on the idiosyncratic variable in respect of the personal preferences of Malawi's leader, Dr. H.K. Banda. While the idiosyncratic variable is no doubt important, particularly as it relates to the foreign policy of a developing state, reliance on this variable alone seems to be an oversimplification of reality. There are constraints on leaders stemming from the environment in which they function and the leadership variable is now recognized to be

not as salient as it once might have appeared.<2> Rather, the explanation for Malawi's unique foreign policy would seem to lie in its condition of economic dependence. The reality of Malawi's economic situation was such that Banda was subject to constraints posed by economic factors over which he had little control. This is not to argue that Banda had no choice or influence over Malawi's foreign policy, but that his choice was severely limited due to Malawi's economic dependence.

The main problem for investigation, then, is: To what extent did Malawi's situation of economic dependence on South Africa limit the range of foreign policy choices available to it? Despite the divergent views in the literature on foreign policy, there seems to be general agreement that for a developing, dependent state, external factors tend to dominate over internal ones, limiting the freedom of choice.<3> As well as falling under the classification of a "developing" state, implying a low level of development, Malawi's economic difficulties are also reflected in its small size (population: 6 million) and its position as a landlocked state. Malawi's close geographic proximity to the virtual regional "superpower" of South Africa, and the growing trade and aid links with that country, as well as the traditional flow of labour from Malawi to South Africa, have also played a significant role in its foreign policy.

While the arguments of this study are largely centered around an economic focus, domestic and international politics will also be taken into account as modifying

conditions influencing Malawi's foreign policy. These include the impact of decolonization in the region of Southern Africa, the emergence of Zimbabwe, and the struggle for national liberation from white rule. In order to strengthen the analysis of the degree to which Malawi's freedom of choice was limited, Malawi's policy options will be compared with those of Zambia, which for the past twenty years has pursued a policy of disengagement from South Africa, albeit unsuccessfully. While some would argue that Malawi should have followed a path similar to Zambia, it will be seen that, despite the fact that Zambia is economically more developed than Malawi, its policy of disengagement did not significantly lessen its dependence on South Africa. For Malawi to have pursued such a policy would have been economically ruinous.

It should be clear by this point that the focus of this study is, as Bahgat Korany refers to it, the "why" of Malawi's foreign policy; that is, the determinants of foreign policy, which in this case relate to Malawi's economic dependence on South Africa.<4> The study is not an attempt to investigate simply the "what" of foreign policy, which answers the question "What is foreign policy?"; nor is it an attempt to explain the "how" of foreign policy, that is, the decision-making process. An analysis of the decision-making process in the case of Malawi would not be very meaningful, since Banda acts as his own Foreign Minister and any question relating to foreign policy is decided upon by Banda himself. The central argument, then, of this case study will be that Malawi's foreign policy

posture toward South Africa has been a function of its economic dependence. Nevertheless, the role of leadership is also important, and should be taken into account in explaining Malawi's foreign policy.

Status of Scholarship

Surprisingly, although there is a respectable body of knowledge available on Malawi (see bibliography), none of it, unfortunately, deals with the specific relationship between economic dependence and foreign policy. This is probably a reflection of the fact that scholarship in general has been very limited in this area of study. Most of what has been written on Malawi deals primarily with the colonial period and the first ten years following independence in 1967; very little has been written since 1975. It would seem that the reason very little has been written on Malawi in the past ten years is perhaps related to the fact that the initial spark of interest in Malawi, following the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1967, has died down. This situation needs to be rectified, particularly in light of the fact that Banda is of a very advanced age (it is guessed that he is about 85), and that a leadership change with all its implications is inevitable within the next few years.

By far and away the most comprehensive body of work concerned with Malawi's foreign policy is Carolyn McMaster's Malawi - Foreign Policy and Development. It is a very thorough and well researched study which explores the

developments in Malawi's foreign policy from the late colonial period until 1974, when the book was published. Although the book is concerned with development, there is no systematic attempt to explore the relationship between foreign policy and development in a disciplined manner. Thus, McMaster tends to write in a descriptive rather than an analytical fashion, and one is left with the impression that she places more emphasis on the influence of Banda on foreign policy than is justified.

The criticism that too much emphasis is placed on Banda's influence, i.e. the idiosyncratic variable, can also be applied to the other works on Malawi's foreign policy. Indicative of this is Philip Short's solid work, entitled Banda, also published in 1974. The same criticism holds for a relatively more recent work, published in 1978 by David Williams, entitled Malawi: The Politics of Despair, as well as for various short articles dealing with the subject of Malawi's foreign policy that have appeared in several journals over the years. Thus, this study attempts to forge a new path in the analysis of Malawi's foreign policy by seeking to explore the relationship between economic dependence and foreign policy.

Conceptual Framework

One of the key problems in the analysis of the foreign policies of Third World states is how to develop approaches that are appropriate to the Third World. Central here is the criticism that conceptual models, which are formulated

with the developed countries in mind, are not applicable to Third World countries. The bureaucratic-politics model of Graham Allison<5> and the decision-making model of Richard Snyder<6>, are examples of approaches which have only a limited applicability to the Third World. The main reason for this is that most Third World countries lack a stable political-institutional setting<7>, which is an underlying assumption of both of these models. There are, of course, exceptions to this, as evidenced by Yaacov Vertzberger's application of the bureaucratic-politics model to the decision-making process in India during the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1959-1962.<8> Yet Vertzberger admits that most developing states lack the bureaucratic preconditions that would make the model "applicable"<9>. Amadu Sesay, in his "Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Critique", also argues that bureaucracies can be important for the larger, more developed African states such as Nigeria.<10>

a. Foreign Policy of Third World States

The first major breakthrough in terms of recognizing the need to distinguish between the foreign policies of developed and developing states was made by James Rosenau in his "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", which appeared in 1966.<11> Apart from differentiating developed from underdeveloped states, he also distinguished between small and large states, open and closed political systems, and penetrated and non-penetrated states. This classification would determine the "relative potency" of five independent variables, (1) idiosyncratic, (2) role, (3)

governmental, (4) societal, and (5) systemic (by which Rosenau means the external environment rather than the "system" as a level of analysis). For the small, underdeveloped state the idiosyncratic and systemic variables were, for him, the most potent.<12>

Although the significance of Rosenau's work cannot be denied, one is left wondering how the various variables interact with one another. Besides, he also fails to account for certain specific circumstances faced by developing countries.

One of Rosenau's models of foreign policy analysis has been recognized to be of some value in the study of Third World foreign policy. This is known as the adaptive model, whose focus is on a state's response to constraints (and opportunities) imposed by the internal and external environments. Since environmental constraints will vary from one state to another, the model entails an assessment of the state's economic and military capabilities, its geopolitical position, its size in terms of population and territory, and its internal political structure.<13> Importance is also attached to the will of the decision-making elite in terms of how and by what means it adapts to its environment.

Taken as it stands now, the adaptive model is about as ephemeral as Korany's "situation-role" model (see below). However, through the work of Rosenau, the model has been rendered more substantial. In Rosenau's recent article, "A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence"<14>, he builds upon his "Pre-Theories and

Theories of Foreign Policy" twenty years after it was originally written. In "A Pre-Theory Revisited", Rosenau notes that the original static "Pre-Theory" needs to be rendered dynamic in order to account for major global changes; perhaps the most important being the entry on the international stage of actors other than the nation-state.<15> This is not to say, however, that the nation-state is irrelevant but simply that the "Pre-Theory" did not account for the existence of other international actors.<16>

In brief, then, Rosenau posits a new world order of "cascading interdependence", a patterned disorder which is driven by (1) the authority crisis, (2) subgroupism, and (3) the enlargement of the analytic aptitudes of individuals. The "Pre-Theory" is rendered dynamic through the concepts of (1) authority relationships-roles, (2) aggregative dynamics and, of most interest to us, (3) adaptive mechanisms. Adaptive mechanisms relate to how the "parts" and "wholes" of the international system adapt to changes within an acceptable range of internal and external balances.<17> Rosenau elaborates four types of adaptive behaviour: (1) acquiescent adaptation, where "higher priority is placed on external rather than internal demands"; (2) intransigent adaptation, where internal considerations predominate over external demands; (3) preservative adaptation, "when both internal and external demands are extensive and defined as equally important"; and (4) promotive adaptation, where both internal and external demands are considered to be of minimal importance.<18> These are the means by which a

balance can be maintained between domestic and external constraints. This provides a useful conceptualization of the limited range of choice African states must work in because of constraints posed by the domestic and external environment.

Rosenau's adaptive model, which was suggested in an earlier work^{<19>}, was developed into a "theory" by Patrick McGowan and Klaus-Peter Gottwald in their article, "Small State Foreign Policies".^{<20>} Although there are some problems with their work, parts of it can be reformulated for the purposes of this study. McGowan and Gottwald begin by taking Rosenau's original distinctions of size and level of development and extending it to include small/large developed and small/large developing states. These independent variables are then employed to determine which of Rosenau's four types of adaptive foreign policy behaviour (the dependent variables) a state is likely to adopt. Since the study is concerned with African states, it is assumed that the foreign policy of these states will be characterized by acquiescent adaptation and promotive adaptation.^{<21>}

Before continuing on to look at attempts to devise approaches to foreign policy that take into account the special circumstances faced by developing countries, it is necessary to elaborate on Rosenau's distinction between small and large states as this is of particular relevance to Malawi. In distinguishing between small and large states it is also necessary to distinguish between small developed and small developing states as these distinctions have important

foreign policy implications. Maurice East, in his "Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models", notes that the main difference between small and large states in terms of foreign policy behaviour is the small "size and capacity of the organization charged with the primary responsibility for foreign policy."<22> The consequence for small states is that they are likely to have low levels of overall participation in world affairs; their attention tends to be focused on certain geographic areas, and they are more likely to be active in certain areas of policy, in particular, economic issues.

While East's distinction between small and large states is apt, he takes the distinction between small developed and small developing states to be of only secondary importance. However, as Robert Rothstein points out in his book, The Weak in the World of the Strong, the difference between the two in terms of their level of economic development cannot be overemphasized. While both small developed and developing states are dependent on foreign trade due to their small economies and markets, the dependence for developing countries is much more profound, involving far greater risks.<23> This is so because the developing states are in a much weaker position, as their trade tends to be highly concentrated and less competitive internationally. As Rothstein puts it, "What is at issue is not dependence but the quality and kind of dependence".<24> There are, besides, important differences between the older, small developed states and the newer, small developing states in terms of their political traditions and how they

relate to the international system. Thus, size alone is not an adequate variable unless it is considered in conjunction with other aspects, especially economic ones.

The above discussion on the relevance of size and economic dependence leads us to an important attempt to account for the special circumstances facing developing countries, in formulating approaches to foreign policy, as embodied in the book edited by Christopher Clapham, Foreign Policy Making in Developing States. The book reflects a newer body of literature which recognizes the importance of economic issues in analysing Third World foreign policy, which has come to be known as the "foreign policy of development".<25> Clapham places emphasis on a state's situation of economic dependence, which he argues will affect the nature of foreign policy and the range of foreign policy options available to the state.<26> He cites three major factors which can indicate the constraints on African states, their capabilities, and hence the degree of choice open to them. These include (1) the size of the state -- the smaller the state, the more likely its policy will be restricted to the immediate region; (2) the nature of the economy -- whether or not the state depends on primary products or a single crop, the size of the domestic market and the degree of dependence on external aid; and (3) the structure of domestic politics -- whether or not the leadership has had close cultural and personal links with the former metropole.<27> In addition, constraints on foreign policy as a result of economic dependence can be determined by an analysis of trade and aid flows.

A major shortcoming of Clapham's book is that it fails to provide a conceptual framework, so that there is no systematic analysis of the various regions touched upon in the book.<28> Nevertheless, the basic underlying approach is consistent with that of this study, and Clapham provides some very useful insights that can be used to show how economic dependence imposes constraints on foreign policy.

Two other important attempts to devise foreign policy approaches for Third World countries are worthy of brief note. The first one by Bahgat Korany, is based on the "situational-role" model, which posits that an actor will behave according to the situation he is confronted with at the domestic and international levels.<29> These two levels are linked by a third variable, which is the national role conception of the foreign policy-makers. Although Korany's model can be commended for its comprehensiveness, it is, by the same token, too all-encompassing and is difficult to operationalize. An earlier attempt is that of Franklin Weinstein, who devised a framework based on the uses or functions of foreign policy as an instrument for the preservation of independence, the promotion of economic development and the maintenance of political power.<30> The argument is similar in vein to that of a much more recent work, edited by John Stremlau, The Foreign Policy Priorities of Third World States, which cites enhanced national security and greater economic development as being the top priorities.<31>

The major weakness of Weinstein's approach is that it fails to take into account the variables (both internal and

external) which shape foreign policy. In a later work, however, Weinstein goes further to argue that the foreign policy of developing states boils down to the dilemma of how to maintain independence while at the same time promoting economic development.<32> This is important, as it underlines one of the major issues in the conduct of a developing state's foreign policy.

Very recently, a new work edited by Timothy Shaw and Olajide Aluko, and entitled The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy, provides an example of a radical approach to the study of Third World foreign policy. Its political economy approach is very similar in substance to the dependency school. However, whereas the dependency school largely ignores the question of foreign policy, the central focus of this study is foreign policy within a political economy framework. Since the level, mode and method of analysis of the political economy approach differs little from that of dependency theory, the reason for rejecting the approach will be dealt with in the section on economic dependency.

Thus, for this study, size and level of development can be stressed as important determinants of foreign policy, with economic dependence being the crucial independent variable. However, in order to emphasize the balancing act that Rosenau refers to between internal and external constraints, economic dependence can also be treated as a dependent variable in order to highlight the dilemma of choosing between rapid economic development, which necessitates economic dependence, and independence. Given

that economic dependence is the key external constraint, then depending on the orientation and attitudes of the decision-making elite, foreign policy behaviour will represent the limited choice between acquiescent, or promotive adaptation. This approach lends itself to comparison, so it can be seen that where Malawi chose rapid economic development, Zambia chose independence and self-reliance. This does not in any way diminish the argument that economic dependence limits the range of foreign policy choice available, because it will be seen that even where a country chooses independence (i.e., Zambia) this does not mean that the outcome will be lessened dependence.

b. Economic Dependence and Dependency

Since the concept of economic dependence is central to this study, it is essential to distinguish it from the notion of dependency. In its most general sense, economic dependence refers to the situation of a national economy that is significantly affected by its transactions with another national economy.<33> While the concept of economic dependence is based on an internationalist perspective, which perceives the international system as an aggregate of the states within it, the concept of dependency (and the radical political economy approach) is rooted in a transnationalist perspective of the interactions within a capitalist world economy. As Nye and Keohane point out, dependence, which implies asymmetrical relations, is distinct from interdependence, which implies symmetrical

relations of mutual dependence.<34> One area in which the dependence and dependency perspectives are similar is in their focus on the relational inequalities among actors.<35>

Essentially an out-growth of the radical and marxist schools of thought, dependency theory seeks to explain the workings of the contemporary world from a structuralist, historical and sociological perspective. It attempts to account for the world economy after World War II, when the former colonial empires are seen to be replaced by a form of neocolonialism whose essential nature is exploitative. Prominent dependency writers, such as Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Harry Magdoff<36>, have argued that neocolonialism was an inevitable outcome of capitalist development and is necessary for the very survival of capitalism itself.

According to dependency scholars, such as Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Arghiri Emmanuel and Fernando Cardoso<37>, the advanced capitalist nations are allied with elite elements within the periphery whose interests lie with the metropole rather than the periphery. Through the process of capitalist trade and investment, development in the peripheral economies is distorted, perpetuating the condition of poverty and underdevelopment. This is different from the traditional Marxist view, which saw capitalist penetration as a progressive force, not dissimilar to the modern diffusionist school.<38> The countries in the periphery, it is argued, are faced with a global economy in which prices are biased in favour of the rich and in which their economies are concentrated solely on

a few primary commodities. An essential ingredient of the dependency argument is that the periphery is exploited by the advanced capitalist countries, with most of the profits from investment in the underdeveloped countries flowing back to the rich.

There are almost as many critics as there are writers of dependency theory, and only a few of the central arguments need be commented upon here. Tony Smith, who has contributed several articles to the criticism of dependency theory, makes the point that the dependency school is just as inclined to be biased, ideological, deterministic and to distort evidence as the more orthodox theories of development it was designed to replace.<39> He also notes that dependency theory over-estimates the power of the international system in the affairs of developing countries and, by the same token, under-estimates the influence they have over their own affairs.<40> Robert Rothstein takes a similar line to that of Tony Smith's when he notes that although the developing countries' range of choice is severely circumscribed by their weak position, it can nevertheless have an impact on their affairs.<41> He also agrees with Smith on the ideological bent of dependency theory and the excessive emphasis on questions of guilt and responsibility.

Many of the critics who reject dependency theory do, however, accept the concept of economic dependence. They do not deny that the developing states are disadvantaged in many respects, but see their position in the international system in terms of power politics. As Rothstein puts it,

"...many or most of the problems of the underdeveloped countries can be adequately explained by fundamental differences in power and capacity".<42> Exploitation does not come into the equation, for that which is already a set power balance is not necessarily imperialism in the sense of exploitation. While there are many dimensions to the notion of what constitutes power, it can be defined as the capacity to control or influence the behaviour of others.<43> The basic material components of power are military and economic strength, which is in turn determined by size, location, the availability of resources and of arable land.<44> Most developing states are lacking in all or most of these criteria of power.

To say that the Third World's disadvantaged position is a function of its lack of power is not an attempt to say that economic factors are not important or that exploitation is not present in the world today. As Benjamin Cohen points out in his outstanding book, The Question of Imperialism, it is not a matter of the international system being exploitative by necessity due to the inherent nature of capitalism but that, since there are disparities of power in the system, the opportunity for exploitation exists.<45> The problem with dependency theory is that it confuses opportunity with necessity and thus treats dependence and exploitation as identical concepts. Cohen goes on to argue that any state will use its foreign policy to minimize dependence on others. The range of choice available to the state will depend on its power, which will determine its bargaining strength in the international system.

Klaus Knorr, in his book The Power of Nations, also emphasizes the role of bargaining power.<46> He also notes that imperialism may merely be the involuntary impact of a large society on a small society in an interdependent world. Since Knorr defines imperialism as the deliberate intent to establish a relationship of domination, then such interdependence would not be considered imperialism. The existence of inequality and disparities as a result of differences in power does not by itself constitute exploitation. As Knorr puts it, these conditions "simply spell power as seen from below".<47> However, to say that exploitation is not a necessary offshoot of capitalism is not to deny that certain pricing mechanisms and trade policies act to the detriment of the poor. This situation is behind the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The fact that these demands have not been successfully implemented is a reflection of the Third World's lack of bargaining strength which, as Cohen points out, depends on the possession of power.

c. Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy

The connection between the concept of economic dependence and bargaining in foreign policy is best captured in the work of Neil Richardson, Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence. This work also shows how the concept of economic dependence lends itself to an examination of dyadic relationships.<48> Richardson attempts to demonstrate that there is a causal relationship between economic dependence and foreign policy compliance. He

defines dependence as (1) a country's sensitivity to change due to a partner's decision, and (2) a country's vulnerability in terms of the longer-term costs brought about by the decision.<49> The assumption of a bargaining relationship is implicit in Richardson's description of compliant behaviour on the part of dependent states as "partial payment in exchange for the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to the dominant country".<50> As Bruce Moon puts it in his critique of Richardson, a bargain is reached between compliant behaviour in exchange for economic reward in the form of trade and investment.<51> In a second very recent critique of Richardson, Moon advocates dependency theory by arguing that the interests of the ruling elite in the periphery coincide with those of the core.<52> Moon can therefore argue that foreign policy behaviour of the developing state is a matter of consensus rather than compliance, as their interests are the same.

Richardson tests his concept by studying the voting patterns of dependent states at the United Nations. This constitutes a major weakness in his work, for he relies exclusively on U.N. roll-call votes to gauge foreign policy behaviour.<53> His assumption of a causal relationship between economic dependence and foreign policy compliance can also be questioned. The same conclusion can be reached in connection with economic coercion as well.<54> A recent study by Adrienne Armstrong is very similar to Richardson's in that she explores the relationship between economic dependence and compliance.<55> Unfortunately, she too

relies on voting patterns at the U.N. as an indicator of compliance.

A useful contribution of Armstrong's work, however, is that it demonstrates the relative facility with which economic dependence can be measured.<56> This can be done by measuring various aspects of trade and aid flows between the dominant and dependent states. By contrast, the measurement of dependency is much more difficult, if not impossible. This was evidenced in Patrick McGowan's effort to establish whether there is a relationship between economic dependence and poor economic performance in Black Africa.<57> Aside from the difficulty of finding meaningful indicators, he concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that economic dependence is associated with underdevelopment. An additional problem in the measurement of dependency is due to the subjective nature of the central notion of exploitation. If exploitation is defined as a process of "unfair" exchange<58>, it becomes very difficult to determine by what criteria exploitation could be measured. The notion of dependence, on the other hand, is concerned with a more objective examination of dyadic interactions.

Conclusion

Since the literature on the foreign policy of developing states is still in an experimental stage, it would seem that the best approach to take would be to combine the most successful efforts of other scholars. A useful starting point is Rosenau's basic distinction

relating to size and level of development in order to assess Malawi's position in relation to other states. Here the central argument of this study is consistent with Clapham's observation that economic dependence is a major determinant limiting the range of choice in a country's foreign policy by imposing considerable constraints on the decision-maker. This serves to downplay the idiosyncratic variable but does not altogether negate its importance in explaining foreign policy. Rosenau's adaptive model can be used to determine how Malawi responded to the classic dilemma noted by Weinstein between rapid economic development and independence. For Malawi, and other states in Southern Africa, not only was there the dilemma of economic dependence as against independence, but also between economic development and support for national liberation movements in the region. McGowan's acquiescent and promotive adaptation can be used to facilitate the comparison of Malawi's and Zambia's foreign policy toward South Africa. Finally, Cohen's and Knorr's point about the importance of bargaining strength can be analysed to see how this affected Malawi's relations with South Africa.

It would seem best to use the less value-loaded concept of economic dependence in the overall approach to the investigation of the foreign policy of Malawi as a small, underdeveloped country. By moving away from the transnational dependency perspective, it accommodates a study which proposes to investigate the relations between two states -- Malawi and South Africa. It is also an appropriate concept in exploring the extent to which

Malawi's range of choice and policy options was limited by its economic dependence, without going to the extreme, implicit in dependency theory, of claiming that there was no choice at all. Finally, the concept of economic dependence is appealing because of the relative ease with which it can be measured, using the criteria set up by Clapham and Armstrong

However, it will be seen that an analysis of trade and aid flows is not sufficient for a thorough understanding of the nature of Malawi's economic dependence on South Africa. Consistent with Clapham's approach, it will also be necessary to examine such variables as the nature of the economy and the structure of domestic politics. Although the broad but disciplined approach adopted here allows one to focus on economic dependence, it does not preclude taking other variables into account. Thus, the conditioning influence of political events within the region of Southern Africa will also be considered.

Organization of Study

Malawi's small size was pre-determined by arrangements among the great powers towards the end of the nineteenth century that led to the establishment of the British Protectorate of Nyasaland. Nyasaland's small economy was based primarily on agriculture, with a large African subsistence sector and a small European cash-crop sector. The limited opportunities for wage employment within Nyasaland led to a pattern of internal and external labour

migration which came to form an integral part of the social fabric of Nyasaland. Labour migration also served to incorporate Malawi within the economy of Southern Africa, and was the major source of its dependence on South Africa. Chapter II will elaborate on the nature of Malawi's economy as well as the internal political developments that led to Malawi's independence in 1964.

Malawi's small size, the nature of its economy, and its land-locked position served as immediate constraints on Malawi's foreign policy and severely limited its freedom of choice. Malawi's dependence on Portuguese Mozambique for its only transport route to the sea and on minority-ruled Rhodesia in the area of trade and labour migration meant that Malawi had no choice but to cooperate with these regimes. Thus, Malawi had to adapt to external constraints through an acquiescent foreign policy.

During the first ten years of independence, Malawi became increasingly dependent on South Africa as it decreased its dependence on Rhodesia. It will be argued in Chapter III that this shift in dependence on to South Africa was due to economic factors but was also partly due to internal factors such as the Cabinet Crisis and the budget deficit, and to the intervening leadership variable. Elements beyond Banda's control were Rhodesia's decision to decrease the number of non-Rhodesian Africans working in the country, thus forcing growing numbers of Malawians to seek work in South Africa; Malawi's growing need for capital goods, which came from the cheapest and closest source, South Africa; and Mozambique's decision to close its border

with Rhodesia in 1976, thus completely cutting off Malawi's trade with Rhodesia. The beneficiary of Rhodesia's loss of the Malawian market was South Africa. Areas in which Banda's influence intervened in Malawi's foreign policy were the decision to formalize economic ties through the signing of Trade and Labour agreements with South Africa, the decision to formalize political ties through the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1967, and Banda's decision to accept aid from South Africa to construct the new capital at Lilongwe. In terms of the problem of the degree to which economic dependence placed constraints on Malawi's foreign policy, it will be argued that, although Banda had to work within the framework of economic dependence, he nevertheless had a substantial influence on Malawi's foreign policy.

Chapter IV will account for the direct and indirect impact which regional developments had on Malawi's foreign policy. Throughout the period of study from 1964 to the present, Malawi's foreign policy has displayed a high degree of consistency based on the underlying primary importance attached to Malawi's national interest. Thus, there has been an evolution, but not revolution, in Malawi's foreign policy in response to the changes in the political balance of power in Southern Africa with the independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. However, South Africa remains militarily and economically dominant, and Malawi's policy of cooperation with South Africa has been vindicated by the moderation in the policies of Mozambique and Zimbabwe towards that country.

The comparison of the foreign policies of Malawi and Zambia in Chapter V serves to illustrate the dilemma between economic development and independence confronting newly independent African states. Zambia has adopted a promotive policy through its policy of disengagement and confrontation, regardless of the internal and external costs. Zambia had a greater freedom of choice than Malawi in its foreign policy due to its copper resources and the revenues they provided to implement the costly policy of disengagement. The damage which Zambia's policy has caused to its economy, and growing popular dissatisfaction with the costs involved, forced Zambia by the late 1970s to reverse its policy and it now is actively promoting trade with South Africa. Again, these developments serve to vindicate Banda's policy of cooperation with the colonial and minority regimes in Southern Africa.

Footnotes

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CHAPTER II

THE LEGACY OF COLONIAL RULE

Colonial rule had an important impact on the economic and political development of Malawi. This development, in turn, vitally influenced the nature of foreign policy that Malawi subsequently adopted. Particularly important was the legacy that colonial rule left behind in the economic arena. During the period of colonial rule a number of cash crops were introduced which formed the basis of Nyasaland's agrarian economy and the bulk of its exports. Patterns of internal and external labour migration established during the colonial period had far-reaching consequences as Malawians became dependent for their livelihood on work in Rhodesia and South Africa. The encouragement of labour migration through the colonial administration's introduction of a wage economy and taxation was the single most important legacy of colonial rule.

An additional factor affecting Malawi's economic development was the country's geographic inheritance. There was an absence of exploitable minerals and the economy was based largely on subsistence agriculture. The lack of minerals resulted in fewer employment opportunities and lower wages for Malawians, further encouraging the pattern of labour migration. Another geographic feature affecting employment opportunities was a shortage of arable land, which when combined with a large population, further contributed to labour migration. Furthermore, Nyasaland's land-locked condition meant that access to transport routes

and facilities was extremely difficult and costly. The difficulties relating to the high cost of transport of Nyasaland's bulky agricultural products had a detrimental impact on economic development.

Colonial rule also had a major impact on Nyasaland's political development. In a country where most livelihoods depended on subsistence agriculture, economic and political developments were closely intertwined. For example, the colonial government's severe conservation policies in response to serious problems of land shortage, soil erosion and low yields were extremely unpopular.<1> These conservation policies were politicized in the 1950s by the Nyasaland African Congress, which took advantage of the popular discontent to gain support in its drive for Nyasaland's independence. Economic and political developments came to a head during the period of Federation from 1953 to 1963.

The establishment of the Federation of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia was a political development which also had far-reaching consequences, both political and economic. Not only did opposition to the Federation push Nyasaland towards independence, but it brought about the return of Malawi's future leader, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Banda, who had left Nyasaland as a teenager to further his education and had spent many years in England practicing medicine, returned to Nyasaland in later life after years of exposure to Western values and beliefs. Banda's realistic and pragmatic nature had an important influence on the direction of Malawi's foreign

policy. The political instability which developed as a result of the struggle against Federation had a serious damaging effect on the economy. When Malawi gained independence in 1964, the economic situation was very grim, and served as an immediate constraint on Banda's freedom of choice. Many of the difficulties which Malawi faced at independence can be traced back to the colonial period.

The Protectorate of Nyasaland was established by the British Government in 1891. The impetus to establish the Protectorate came from competition over spheres of influence in Africa and the desire to protect the interests of Europeans who had already settled in Nyasaland as well as to facilitate the abolition of the slave trade. Although there were fewer Europeans in Nyasaland as compared to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), they nevertheless had a strong influence on the colonial government's policies and hence had an impact on Malawi's economic and political development during the colonial period. As in the rest of Africa, Nyasaland's borders were established rather arbitrarily but Nyasaland was more fortunate than other African states in that the dominant Chewa tribe was largely contained within Nyasaland. Nyasaland's borders in the north were settled through the Anglo-German Agreement of 1889, while its southern frontier was established through the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1891.<2>

The Development of Nyasaland's Agricultural Sector

The major and immediate impact of the establishment of colonial rule was the introduction of a monetary economy and the imposition of a European concept of land ownership. The European concept of private ownership of land did not exist in traditional African society, where the right of occupation rather than ownership was granted by tribal chiefs for the purpose of cultivation.<3> It was also traditional African agricultural practice to work the land until the soil became exhausted from over-cultivation and then to move to a new site. For this traditional system to work, it was vitally important that there be freedom of access to the land.<4> Thus, when the tribal chiefs "sold" their land to European settlers for trade goods or mere beads and trinkets, they did not realize that these transactions would be considered permanent, and that the Europeans would consider the land their private property.<5> The establishment of the European concept of land ownership was to have serious implications for the economy's future, for without the freedom to move from site to site, soil erosion was to become a major problem resulting in low crop yields.

The impact of the coming of the Europeans was felt most strongly in the south, where most of them settled due to the high quality of the land and easier access to transport routes. Since Europeans were present even before the establishment of the Protectorate, the impact of the new land practices had been felt before 1891. However, the

establishment of a monetary economy coincided with the arrival of the Protectorate, when taxes were imposed to pay for the costs of administration. Although the African people had the option of paying their taxes in kind, the Nyasaland Government, for reasons that are discussed below, was under pressure to encourage Africans to work as wage-earners on European estates. The taxes were begun in the south, where administrative headquarters had been set up at Zomba, and were extended to the north in 1895.<6>

Nyasaland's agricultural economy consisted of three sectors, the large subsistence sector, the European estate sector, and the African cash-crop sector. Up until 1903, the Europeans concentrated on coffee production, but with the collapse of the coffee industry in 1903, production was switched to cotton and tobacco.<7> In 1904, the British Cotton Growing Association was set up and a Department of Agriculture was established in 1909. Responsible for the promotion of African production, the Department made efforts to encourage Africans to cultivate cotton.<8> The result was that by 1924 the production of cotton had fallen largely into African hands.<9>

Meanwhile, the production of tobacco was carried out mainly by Europeans on their estates. The settlers also undertook the production of tea, and it is interesting to note that until 1908, when the Imperial Tobacco Company opened a factory in Nyasaland, most of the tea was sold to South Africa.<10>. Thus, South Africa was already considered a natural market for Nyasaland's goods. Africans were also encouraged by the settlers to grow tobacco, which

the settlers bought for very little and then sold for profit. While the estate and cash-crop activities took place initially in the Southern Province, by the 1920s they had begun to extend to the Central Province.

The chief obstacles to agricultural development at the turn of the century were the extremely high transport costs and the shortage of labour. To meet the latter problem, the settlers put pressure on the Government to adopt measures to induce Africans to work for cash. The first measure, taken in 1900, raised the tax which had to be paid by those Africans who did not work on a European estate for at least one month a year.<11> Since it was the Northern and Central Provinces which were the least developed economically, it was from these areas that people came to work in the Southern Province to earn wages in order to pay their taxes. Thus, a system of internal migration developed under the impetus of Government policies requiring the payment of taxes. Yet, just as the Government was instituting policies to relieve the problem of labour shortage, the problem solved itself with the influx of thousands of Lomwe refugees from Portuguese Mozambique into the Southern Province starting in 1900. The refugees were enticed to settle on European estates, where they were obliged to pay rent in the form of labour.<12> Thangata, as the system was called, was not without an element of coercion, for if the Africans refused to work, they faced the threat of eviction. In 1912, a measure was passed forbidding the immigrants from settling anywhere other than on estate land.<13> This contributed to the development of the tea and tobacco

estates, which came to dominate the economy by the 1920s.

The continued arrival of the Lomwe refugees meant that there was less pressure on native Nyasalanders in the Southern Province to work on European estates.<14> This enabled Africans living on Crown lands to concentrate on cotton production. By the 1920s, Africans had also begun to branch off into tobacco production, which they sold to the Europeans. This latter practice received encouragement from the Government, which in 1911 reduced the amount of tax an African had to pay if he sold certain cash crops to a European.<15> Unlike the Northern and Central Provinces, Africans residing in the Southern Province did not have to seek work outside the country, and up until the 1930s, when over-population became a problem, there was very little labour migration from this area.

The Pattern of Labour Migration

The influence of the continuing influx of the Lomwe into southern Nyasaland also had the effect of diminishing employment opportunities for the people from the northern and central parts of the Protectorate. Since the local people still had to pay taxes, and there was no chance of earning cash locally, they began to look outside the country for employment. Demand for labour in the mines of the relatively more industrialized countries of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was strong, and the wages were much more attractive than the low wages offered in Nyasaland. They therefore began to migrate to these countries, and thus

established a pattern of labour migration which became an accepted way of life and an integral part of the social fabric of Nyasaland.

Since labour migration was officially prohibited by the Government, under pressure from the settlers, labour recruitment took place through agents sent from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Recruitment for South Africa took place through the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (W.N.L.A.) or "Wenela", and for Southern Rhodesia through the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (R.N.L.B.).^{<16>} By 1914, there were about 10,000 Malawians working in mines in the Transvaal area in South Africa, and another 30,000 in mines in Southern Rhodesia.^{<17>} Although the Nyasaland Administration quickly found that it could not stop the flow of migrant labour, it did not change its policy toward migration until 1935. In that year, concern for the effects of labour migration on village life led to the establishment of a commission. The commission found that very little of the money earned by migrants was being sent home to families and that a significant number of men never returned home. As a result, the Governments of Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa reached agreement in 1936 to regulate the flow of workers, provide a guarantee for the return of remittances (part of which went to the Government), and to ensure the well-being of the workers whilst outside the country.^{<18>}

The Problems of Transport for Land-Locked Nyasaland

It has been noted that wages were higher in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and that this was one of the factors that encouraged migrant Nyasaland labour to move in that direction. There were a number of reasons for this, not the least of which was the high cost of transportation faced by Nyasaland settler farmers. The country is a sliver of good agricultural land, located along modern day Lake Malawi. It is 520 miles long and 50 to 100 miles wide. Most importantly, it is land-locked. Its neighbours, modern day Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania, are all, or they were at the beginning of the century, relatively poor agricultural states. They were not good markets for Nyasaland's crops nor were they areas through which anyone was eager to build major transportation corridors. As Nyasaland had no major mineral resources there was even less reason to build effective transportation corridors to the rest of the world. The resultant high cost of transporting goods to the outside world meant that to be competitive Nyasaland settlers had to offset the high transportation costs with low wages.

The issue of poor transportation was to become yet another means whereby Nyasaland became tied to both Southern Rhodesia and, ultimately, South Africa. On the internal level, the network of roads was developed at a very slow pace, and what construction did occur took place mainly in the southern region, where most of the economic activity was situated.<19> Although railroad construction began in the

southern region in 1907, a rail link to the coast of Beira in Mozambique was not completed until 1935. Nyasaland's railway development is rather unique in that, with the exception of Southern Rhodesia, its railway was the only one in British Africa that was privately owned, which meant that the railway's rate policies were beyond governmental influence.<20>

The very decision to construct the railway to the port at Beira was a reflection of the desire to assure Southern Rhodesia's access to the Indian Ocean rather than what was in Nyasaland's interest. From Nyasaland's point of view it would have been much more economical to construct a railway to the much closer Quelimane port, a suggestion that was overturned in favour of Beira, the port being developed for Rhodesia.<21> This decision was made by private individuals without consultation with the Nyasaland administration, nor was Nyasaland informed until after the fact that it would be expected to guarantee interest payments on the railway.<22> The debt which Nyasaland had to shoulder as a result of this decision, as well as ever-increasing freight rates, was to hinder its development considerably.

During the colonial period, Nyasaland developed more extensive economic links with Britain and Southern Rhodesia than with South Africa. Britain was Malawi's major trading partner in terms of both imports and exports. But trade links with South Africa were initiated during this period and were to gradually increase. One reason for the increase was the tendency to import from South Africa products which could be purchased there more cheaply.<23> Nyasaland

exported to South Africa those agricultural products which Britain did not want. The two World Wars also helped to expand Nyasaland's trade links with South Africa through the diversion of some trade to South Africa when trade with Britain could not be assured of safe conduct.<24>

The most important links between South Africa and Nyasaland, however, were based on migrant labour. During the colonial period, the majority of Malawian migrant labour was working in Southern Rhodesia. In 1936, 63% of Malawian migrant labour was working in Southern Rhodesia, while only 17% was working in South Africa.<25>

The Advent of Federation and Independence

The style of colonial rule in Nyasaland reflected the policies currently pursued by the British Government over various time periods. From 1891 to 1932 there prevailed direct rule, the result of which was a deterioration in respect for and authority of traditional tribal chiefs, as they were excluded from local administration.<26> From 1933 to 1953, when the Federation was established, a system of indirect rule was in effect, under which an effort was made to allow for some participation by the indigenous peoples in the running of the country's affairs. The idea of indirect rule had been advocated in the 1920s by Lord Lugard, colonial administrator in Nigeria, and in 1933 Nyasaland passed the Native Authority Ordinance, giving the native chief various administrative responsibilities in his local area.<27> Central to the policy of indirect rule was the

expectation of a steady devolution of political power until eventually, when it was deemed the African people were ready, self-government could be granted.<28> This expectation was essential in maintaining the goodwill of the African people, and the political difficulties of the 1950s can be directly accounted for by the loss of goodwill as Africans began to fear that the road to self-government was being blocked because of Federation. Although the Nyasaland Government was to continue the efforts to increase African participation in administration, as evidenced in the setting up of Provincial Councils in 1944 to consult African opinion<29>, these did not prove satisfactory. The main reason for African dissatisfaction was that the Government looked only to the traditional native chiefs as the authoritative representatives of African opinion, although in reality the chiefs had lost their authority, in the eyes of their people, during the period of direct rule. The chiefs owed what authority they had to the Government, and tended to be conservative and in favour of the status quo which was the basis of their power.<30> In fact, real leadership came from the educated Africans who formed separatist church movements and African Associations and were more credible representatives of more progressive African concerns.

As early as the first two decades of the twentieth century, African opinion manifested itself in various Church organizations and budding African Associations. While these groups, such as the popular Watch Tower movement, were ineffective as political agitators, they nevertheless served

as an important outlet for popular feelings.<31> The only serious threat to early colonial rule occurred in 1915 with the Chilembwe Rising. In 1915, John Chilembwe, a minister for a separate African church, in his outrage over the injustices visited on his people through the system of Thangata, staged a raid on a European farm with a group of his followers <32> The rebellion was quickly crushed. It was an isolated event, and failed to spark much of a reaction by either the separatist church movements or the African Associations.

The influence of the missions, such as the famous Livingstonia mission, was not insignificant for they provided the educated Africans who would later form the leadership of the African Associations in the 1920s and 1930s. Consisting mainly of pastors, teachers and clerks, these leaders did not challenge directly the colonial system but sought to work toward promoting the development and welfare of Africans.<33> As the Nyasaland Government failed to respond quickly enough to their grievances, a new group of men appeared -- civil servants, traders and farmers -- who, in 1944, brought the various African Associations together by forming the Nyasaland African Congress(NAC). Although they continued to work within the colonial context, they broadened their demands by seeking majority African representation in Government through constitutional means.<34> However, like the various Associations before it, the NAC was to remain largely ineffective until the 1950s, when the spectre of Federation provided the necessary political catalyst that turned the NAC into a mass movement.

The idea of amalgamation of Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia had been first suggested as early as 1915, but it had always been Southern Rhodesia that had been the main promoter of the idea. Although the settlers in Southern Rhodesia had originally favoured the idea of amalgamation with South Africa, the 1923 victory of Hertzog's pro-Afrikaner Nationalist Party and the discovery of the rich copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia served to sway opinion in favour of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia instead.<35> The complete acquisition of political power in South Africa by Afrikaners, with the victory of Malan in 1948, stamped out any remaining sentiment in favour of amalgamation with South Africa.

After the Second World War, the Government of Southern Rhodesia began to push strongly for the idea of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At a series of conferences at Victoria Falls in 1949 and 1951, the idea of "Federation" was introduced in the hope that the British Government would find this more acceptable. While the settlers were busy promoting the idea of Federation, Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were actively displaying their opposition to such an idea through such channels as the NAC. In order to appreciate the depth of African opposition to Federation it is necessary to understand the differences between Southern Rhodesia, on the one hand, and Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, on the other. In 1923, Southern Rhodesia had been granted internal self-government whereas Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were British territories governed up to the mid-1930s under the

principle of indirect rule.<36> As mentioned earlier, central to the principle of indirect rule was the expectation that, eventually, Africans would be granted self-government. It was no secret that Southern Rhodesia wished to achieve dominion status similar to South Africa; in fact, one of the main reasons for its pushing the idea of Federation was the hope that it would speed up the process of dominion status. One of the chief concerns of Africans, however, was the fear that their dream of eventual African self-government would be lost for ever if the Federation was established.<37>

Africans were opposed to Federation with Southern Rhodesia for other important reasons as well, such as their awareness, through their experiences as migrant workers, of the presence of racial discrimination. Although a colour bar existed in both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, there was no legalised discrimination as was the case in Southern Rhodesia.<38> The key arguments against Federation are summed up in a nutshell in a memorandum, written by Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda (who had been practicing medicine in England for almost 40 years after leaving Nyasaland) and Harry Nkumbula of Northern Rhodesia, to the British Government in 1951 and is worth quoting at length. It stated that Federation:

(a) would deprive the Africans of direct political and cultural ties with the United Kingdom... (b) would mean domination by Southern Rhodesia instead of guardianship by the United Kingdom... by virtue of her much larger European population... (c) would extend to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the policy of segregation and discrimination under which our fellow-Africans in Southern Rhodesia now legally suffer... (d) would, in fact, be only a thin edge of the wedge of amalgamation, since the Prime Minister of

Southern Rhodesia...has had recourse to the federal idea only on realization that his fond scheme of amalgamation was incapable of acceptance by the Africans...(e) would enable the European settlers of Southern Rhodesia to attain the status of Dominion,... the status of a dominion gave the European settlers of the Union of South Africa an imperium over the destiny of the Africans of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal and Zululand, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.<39>

Despite the extreme, widespread African opposition, the British Government nevertheless imposed Federation in 1953. It has been suggested that the main reason that Britain finally approved Federation was that it wished to rid itself of the expense of development grants and loans it had been giving economically-depressed Nyasaland in ever-increasing amounts.<40> Whatever the reason, Federation provided the political catalyst that turned the NAC into a mass nationalist movement that was no longer content to work within the colonial framework. The key leaders of the time, Henry Chipembere and Kanyama Chiume, wanted nothing less than the end of Federation and independence for Nyasaland. Chipembere and Chiume rightly felt that the NAC lacked respected leadership, and that an older person who had been successful in life would be better able to gain the respect of the people.<41> In their opinion, Dr. Banda, who had been watching and advising on developments in his native Nyasaland from England, would be the perfect leader for the NAC. Banda finally did return in 1958, and quickly succeeded in gaining the support of the people.

Prior to Banda's return, the younger leaders had been pursuing a policy of non-violent resistance to Federation. But, with the arrival of Banda, although he pointedly advocated negotiation, sporadic disruptions became more

frequent and culminated in the declaration of a State of Emergency in March 1959. The Governor of Nyasaland, in his report to the Colonial Secretary, claimed that he had heard through "reliable sources" of a meeting of the NAC in January 1959, at which Banda was absent, where the use of violence had been supported and an alleged plot to murder Europeans had been hatched.<42> Whatever the truth behind these allegations, the need to declare a State of Emergency forced upon the British Government the realization that African opposition could no longer be ignored. The Emergency was then followed by a series of constitutional arrangements that were to lead to the granting of independence in 1964. In 1961, elections were held, and the NAC, transformed into the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in 1959, received overwhelming support. It is significant to note that during the 1961 election, the MCP showed extreme intolerance of any budding opposition groups, an intolerance that was to be carried over into independence.<43>

Political and Economic Situation at Independence

Barely had Malawi finished celebrating the granting of formal independence in July 1964 than a serious split arose within the Cabinet. Opposition arose over how to manage the key issues that face a country at independence -- issues relating to both domestic and foreign policy. Divisions over these issues led Banda to dismiss most of his Cabinet and to assume responsibility for some of the important portfolios himself, such as Foreign Affairs. It seemed that

Banda had taken to the extreme the MCP slogan of "Unity, Loyalty, Discipline and Obedience"<44>, displaying intolerance of any opposition that had already been evident before independence. Thus, Banda replaced the autocracy of colonial rule with his own autocratic style. By 1965, Banda had put his personal stamp on the political make-up of Malawi, and this has remained unchanged up to the present day.

Although Federation had, in a sense, proven to be politically beneficial to Malawi in that it speeded up the coming of independence, at the same time it proved to be somewhat of a disservice to Malawi in economic terms. One of the main justifications for the inclusion of Malawi in Federation had been that it would be economically beneficial, but this did not turn out to be the case. The only major change that came about as a result of Federation was the inclusion of Malawi in a sort of customs union with Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Through this arrangement, preferential treatment was given to exports from Southern Rhodesia to Malawi, which was compensated for by intergovernmental transfers.<45> It has been suggested that Malawi would have raised more revenue through its own customs tariff and that the increased trade with Southern Rhodesia, as a result of the preferential arrangement, would have been diverted somewhat to cheaper sources of supply, such as South Africa.<46>

Aside from the trade arrangement, little else changed for Malawi in economic terms. A large proportion of the migrant workers continued to go to Southern Rhodesia as they

had before and little in the way of loans or investment went to Malawi. In 1958, the Federal Government received 62% of the loans from Britain; of the remaining 38%, Southern Rhodesia got 14%, Northern Rhodesia got 18%, while Malawi received only 6%.^{<47>} In terms of the distribution of investment, Southern Rhodesia never received anything less than 54% of total investment in any given year.^{<48>} Thus, little was done to promote industrial development in Malawi.

Conclusion

The period of colonial rule had a major impact on Malawi's economic development and helped shape the features of its economic dependence. As with many former colonies, Malawi remained closely tied with the mother country on both the economic and political levels after independence. The growing of specific cash crops for export, encouraged by the colonial government, were destined chiefly for Britain, and most of Malawi's supplies also came from that country. Malawi's poor mineral endowment meant that its agrarian-based economy had to rely chiefly on the export of tea and tobacco to bring in revenues. This dependence on one or two primary commodities for export is a feature common to many developing countries. The low prices which such commodities fetch on the international market makes it very difficult for these countries to earn foreign exchange to cover their imports. Malawi was no different in this respect and had the added disadvantage of being landlocked and small in size.

Malawi's largest source of revenues after agricultural exports came from remittances earned by migrant workers. The pattern of labour migration established during the colonial period was one of the most important legacies of colonial rule. Aside from the significant economic implications of having to travel outside the country to find work was the societal impact of labour migration. The need to work abroad came to be accepted as the normal way of life. It also led to the exposure of Malawians to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where the majority of workers went. Labour migration served to integrate Malawi into the economy of Southern Africa. Malawi's reliance on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa for work and remittances as well as for trade was an overriding feature of its economic dependence after colonial rule ended. During the colonial period, Malawi was more closely tied up with Southern Rhodesia than South Africa in terms of both migrant labour and trade, a pattern which was reinforced during Federation.

Malawi was further integrated into the region of Southern Africa during the colonial period through the system of transport. As a landlocked country Malawi had to rely on neighbouring countries for access to the sea. The dependence on a single rail route through Mozambique to Beira hindered Malawi's economic development. A road linking Malawi to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa only heightened Malawi's integration with the economies of these countries. Although Malawi was more dependent on Southern Rhodesia than South Africa during the colonial period, the period after independence was to witness a shift in

dependence from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa. South Africa was to become second in importance after Britain in terms of trade and loans, and first in importance in terms of migrant labour. While Malawi was dependent on South Africa to a degree at independence, this dependence increased in both political and economic terms after independence.

Footnotes

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- <13> Vail, p. 50.
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- <15> Tindall, p. 114.
- <16> Pachai, p. 121.
- <17> Ibid., p. 126.
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CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE AND MALAWI'S FOREIGN POLICY: 1964-1967

Introduction

Malawi was no different from most other African states at independence in the 1960s in that it was extremely dependent on its former colonizer, in this case, Britain. What distinguished Malawi from other African states was its conduct in the area of foreign policy. At independence, African states were faced with a number of choices in terms of the direction their foreign and domestic policies should take. African states were to find that their foreign and domestic policies were virtually inseparable. They could choose from a range of choices, including a pro-"West" or pro-"East" or non-aligned orientation, and they could choose between economic self-reliance or participation in the global economy. Malawi differed from most African states in that within this range of choice it took a strong anti-Communist stance and actively encouraged private initiative and foreign capital. Thus, Malawi stood out from among most other African states even before one begins to consider its controversial policy toward South Africa.

Yet it is important to distinguish between what a state says at the rhetorical level and what it actually does. While a state may denounce capitalism and espouse the virtues of self-reliance, it cannot ignore the fact of its economic dependence on its former colonizer. Of course,

though economic dependence is a feature common to all African states, its characteristics differ from one state to the next. If this were not so, then one would have to assume that, as economic dependence is a major determinant of foreign policy, all African states would conduct their foreign policy in the same fashion. This is clearly not the case and, while economic dependence may be a major determinant of foreign policy, one also has to look at domestic and leadership variables in order to help explain why a country chooses capitalism rather than socialism or adopts a pro-West stance as against non-alignment. The key issue to be dealt with in this chapter, then, is the extent to which Malawi's foreign policy was constrained by economic dependence, and at what point did leadership and domestic political variables become significant. In the case of Malawi's foreign policy, Banda's socialization in the United States and Britain, which left him very well-disposed to the Western world, had an important impact on the direction which it took.

Irrespective of foreign policy orientation, there is no doubt that economic dependence can seriously constrain what a country does and even says. Dr. Banda has been credited with being realistic in that, in appreciation of Malawi's economic situation, what he says has tended to coincide with what he has actually done. The most salient features of Malawi's dependence which Banda had to contend with at independence were Malawi's geographic location and its limited economic base. These can be said to constitute permanent features of its dependence, features that cannot

be changed regardless of who might be leading Malawi or what the nature of its domestic politics might have been. In the geographic realm the outstanding feature is Malawi's landlocked position and what was in 1964 its proximity to the mainly white-ruled states of Southern Africa: Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. The other permanent feature is Malawi's limited resource base and an economy based primarily on agricultural production which is at the mercy of such uncontrollable vagaries as weather conditions, international prices, and demand.

Malawi's trade and aid relations with other countries can be said to form the less permanent features of dependence because, given time, it may be possible to alter them. However, the possibility of diversifying one's trade and aid relations does not alter the fact of existent economic dependence. Under Banda, the tendency has been to shift Malawi's dependence on trade and aid from Britain to South Africa and that on trade and migrant labour from Rhodesia to South Africa. This shift in dependence is a reflection to some extent of Banda's policies, but it was also the necessary outcome of Malawi's economic growth and a change in its import needs. The increase in trade and labour migration to South Africa was, in part, the unavoidable result of Malawi's decreased dependence on Rhodesia. In this sense, Banda was only partially responsible for Malawi's increased dependence on South Africa. However, Banda's decision to accept South African aid for a new capital at Lilongwe and to establish diplomatic relations with that country goes beyond the realm

of economic necessity. Banda is responsible for moving this aspect of Malawi's foreign policy in that direction.

In order to understand the shift in dependence on to South Africa, this chapter will begin with an analysis of the characteristics of Malawi's economic dependence but it will also undertake an analysis of domestic and leadership variables in recognition of the need to understand how they interacted with economic dependence to culminate in the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1967. The priority which Banda placed on Malawi's economic interests above all else reflects the essential pragmatism and realism of his nature. It was Banda's realism and concern for Malawi's economic interests which was at the bottom of the clash between Banda and his ministers. There can be little doubt that, in the domestic realm, the Cabinet Crisis had an important influence on future developments in Malawi's foreign policy, and that it influenced the attitudes of the man in control -- Dr. Banda. In order to place Malawi's policy toward South Africa in the context of its overall foreign policy, other developments in Malawi's foreign policy will also be traced up until 1967.

The Characteristics of Malawi's Economic Dependence

The most immediate priority for Malawi at independence was to make up for the economic ground lost while the political goals of secession from Federation and achievement of independence were being pursued. The political instability that occurred during the struggle for

independence and the uncertainties over Federation did much to damage the economy, while in 1964 Malawi was hit by the worst depression since World War II.<1> If Malawi hoped to achieve political stability after winning independence, rapid economic growth was an absolute necessity. In recognition of this, Banda set out on an overall development strategy that involved the creation of an environment hospitable to foreign capital and the promotion of rapid export growth. A mixed economy was posited by providing for a major role for Government via the Malawi Development Corporation in commercial and industrial ventures.<2> The Government was also to play a major role in agriculture, and top priority was placed on the growth of agricultural production so as to increase exports.

A major constraint on Malawi at independence was its dependence on Britain for grants-in-aid to relieve Malawi's budgetary deficit on current account. Totalling L4.26 million in 1964<3>, the budget deficit was perceived to make for a sharp infringement on Malawi's newly gained independence. The deficit was the result of an increase in government services during Federation.<4> It was Malawi's aim that this form of budgetary dependence, which gave Britain greater potential leverage than other forms of aid<5>, be eliminated as soon as possible. Britain, too, was keen to ~~phase out~~ grants-in-aid over the first ten years after independence, mainly because of the fear that the open-ended nature of the commitment would make such aid self-perpetuating.<6> The need to eliminate the budget deficit and the desire to lessen Malawi's dependence on

Britain in this area was a major impetus behind the drive for rapid economic growth. In the meantime, however, this dependence on Britain was to have a direct impact on Malawi's policy toward the white-ruled states of Southern Africa.

Since one of the permanent features of Malawi's economic dependence is its limited resource base, the generation of rapid economic growth through increased exports had to be based on promoting greater agricultural production, especially tobacco. One only need consider the fact that agriculture accounted for over 90% of Malawi's export earnings to appreciate how important a role agriculture plays in its potential for development. The need to promote agriculture was also urgent at independence in light of the fact that economic life in the rural areas had been seriously disrupted due to the negative African response inspired by the Nyasaland African Congress to the colonial government's methods of enforcing new agricultural practices.<7> These early NAC policies were to come back to haunt Banda, as he now found it difficult to persuade Malawians to practice better agricultural methods and soil conservation. In addition to this difficulty, due to recession tobacco production had fallen from 43.5 million pounds in 1959 to 33.1 million pounds in 1964, while tea production fell from 31.5 million pounds in 1961 to 27.3 million pounds in 1964.<8>

As well as taking measures to improve agricultural production, a related necessity was the improvement of Malawi's transport infrastructure, which had been left in a

very unsatisfactory condition during the colonial period. At independence, the transport infrastructure was incapable of handling the increased volume of goods Malawi planned to produce, thus requiring widespread construction of new roads and the improvement of already existing ones.<9> Due to the low value-weight ratio of agricultural commodities<10>, it was essential that the cheapest possible transport services be located near agricultural activities. In recognition of this, plans were made for the extension of the already existing rail route to the agricultural lands of the central region.

Malawi's landlocked position was to serve as another major constraint in that it was entirely dependent on Portuguese Mozambique, through the railroute to Beira, for its trade with the outside world. During the colonial period the competitiveness of Malawi's agricultural products had been seriously disadvantaged by extremely high freight rates. Banda took measures to correct this situation by nationalizing that part of the railway line that lay inside Malawi and by making plans to have another line constructed to the Indian Ocean. Top on the list of considerations was that the route be cheap and efficient, leading Banda to decide on an additional line to Nacala, again through Portuguese Mozambique. Another important consideration in planning the new railway was that it should break the monopoly held by the original railway, through introducing competition into rail transport and thereby lowering freight rates.<11>

As well as being dependent on Mozambique for the

transport of its imports and exports, Malawi was also dependent on white-ruled Rhodesia, which, after Britain, was Malawi's second largest outlet for its exports. Malawi's long and close historical ties with Rhodesia were based initially on migrant labour but, largely under the impetus of Federation, trade links were extended through the preferential arrangement. This arrangement worked to the disadvantage of Malawi, as industrial activity was attracted to the relatively more developed Rhodesia, while industrial development in Malawi was neglected.<12> The free trade arrangement with Rhodesia also served as a disincentive to switch to lower-cost sources of supply. In addition, many of the commercial businesses and industries that did exist in Malawi were either Rhodesian subsidiaries or financed from Rhodesia.<13> Despite these disadvantages to Malawi, at independence the arrangement was confirmed by a formal trade agreement with Rhodesia in the interest of avoiding a sudden disruption of established trading patterns.<14>

Nevertheless, an important development priority was the promotion and protection of Malawi's indigenous manufacturing sector. Accordingly, Malawi pursued a policy of import substitution and was able to reduce the proportion of consumer goods imports from more than one half of total imports in 1964 to less than one third by 1973.<15> After ending the trade agreement with Rhodesia in 1965 (which partly had to do with political factors as well) Malawi's manufacturing sector enjoyed a high growth rate, leading to a significant decline in the volume of trade with Rhodesia. Along with the decline in the import of consumer goods as a

result of local production of beer, soft drinks, cheap textiles and footwear, there came an increase in demand for capital goods.<16> These capital goods, especially machinery, came from South Africa and, within ten years, South Africa had replaced Rhodesia as Malawi's second most important trading partner, even as it became the largest outlet for Malawi's workers.

Thus, the emerging pattern of a shift in Malawi's dependence on to South Africa came about as a result of economic growth which was independent of political factors. However, the key role that South Africa was to play in Malawi's final overall development strategy, and the shift of the traditional economic bias in favour of the Southern Region northwards -- through the construction of a new capital at Lilongwe -- were to increase Malawi's dependence on South Africa even more, and reflected, in part, political factors. In order to understand how these developments came about, it is necessary to turn to domestic factors.

The Interplay of Domestic Factors with Foreign Policy

Banda

It was clear to Banda at independence that, if the country was to undergo rapid economic development, large capital inflows were absolutely essential.<17> This required a hospitable environment for what was mainly Western capital, making impractical an openly hostile, anti-Western orientation. A favourable orientation toward

the West and Western capital perhaps came naturally to Banda, for he had studied and worked in the West for forty years, so that he already had a highly favourable attitude toward the West. The central feature of Banda's influence on Malawi's foreign policy was the priority he attached to Malawi's national interest -- primarily economic development. His overriding pragmatism and realism was in sharp contrast to the emotionalism and idealism of the pan-Africanist movement which had gained momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. Banda's pragmatic and realistic concern for Malawi's economic interests, along with his pro-West orientation, resulted in a unique influence on Malawi's foreign policy. In order to understand why Banda emerged so differently from other African leaders it is necessary to examine his life experience and the influence it played on his thinking.

One noticeable trait of Banda's character was his tolerance and moderation towards whites. Banda's acceptance of whites can be explained by the exposure he had to them since his childhood years. Born in 1898 in the central region of Malawi at Kasungu, Banda received his early education at the Scottish Livingstonia Mission. A member of the Chewa, the dominant ethnic grouping in Malawi, Banda was raised according to the conservative traditions of the Chewa. The morally strict and puritan outlook of the teaching Banda received from the missionaries also had an important influence on him. Around the age of 15, Banda followed the footsteps of many Africans before him and went to Southern Rhodesia to find work. He did not stay long in

Southern Rhodesia, however, but went on to South Africa, where he attended night school and taught Sunday school in the African Methodist Episcopal Church. At that time, although discrimination existed in South Africa, it was not as severe nor as entrenched as it was in Southern Rhodesia. The young Banda was able to experience the two systems of white rule and, in his eyes, South Africa compared favourably. This might have been a factor in Banda's strong opposition to Federation with Southern Rhodesia and his more ambivalent feelings toward South Africa. While in South Africa, Banda was influenced by the speeches of J.E. Kwegyir Aggrey, an American-educated Ghanaian, who preached a doctrine of moderation in race relations.<18>

Perhaps the most important period in terms of the formation of Banda's attitudes towards whites was his stay in the United States. Banda left for the United States in 1926 to continue his education. There he completed high school and went on to study pre-medicine. Before taking his M.D., Banda also received a degree in political science and history. While Banda was not blind to racial discrimination in the United States, he was fortunate in that he received a great deal of kindness and financial assistance from whites during his stay there. Thus, Banda, already influenced by the teachings of Aggrey, was in a position to be well-disposed towards whites in general. During his stay in the United States Banda was also deeply impressed with the American political and economic way of life. It is probably here that Banda developed his strong suspicion of communism, both from his schooling and the people he came in contact

with.

In 1937, after over ten years in the United States, Banda went to Edinburgh where he received a second M.D. so that he could practise medicine in Britain. The years Banda spent in Scotland were very important, for it was here for the first time that Banda became actively involved in African politics.<19> While in Scotland Banda joined the Presbyterian Kirk, an institution which accurately reflected his views on the value of hard work, individual initiative and respect for authority.<20> These conservative and pragmatic values which Banda held so dear emerged clearly in later years when Banda became leader of Malawi.

In 1945, Banda moved to London where he set up a successful and largely white practice, including a white secretary. Banda was very well accepted by the white community, of which he was a part, and was well in tune with British customs and habits. Banda also kept in touch with political developments in Africa, however, and while in London he became friends with Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah. In 1953, when Federation was established, Banda moved to Ghana, where he set up a new practice. Although Banda did not share Nkrumah's political views, he was impressed with Nkrumah's methods of political organization, in particular, the women's and youth leagues.<21>

When Banda returned to Nyasaland in 1958 to lead it out of Federation and into independence, he was already in his late fifties. During his life he had accumulated a series of experiences and influences which were by then deeply entrenched. The most important of these attitudes in

terms of their future impact on Malawi were his moderate feelings towards whites, his Western values and his hatred of communism, his staunch conservatism and his pragmatism and realism. Banda's experiences were sharply different from those of the younger African leaders who emerged in Nyasaland. They did not share Banda's moderation towards whites and, unlike Banda, tended to be more radical in their political outlook. This was to spell trouble for Malawi after independence, when differences between Banda and the younger leaders came to a head.

The Years of Transition and the Cabinet Crisis

In the years of transitional government from 1961 to 1963 prior to the establishment of independence, the primary foreign policy issue for Malawi was Portugal; South Africa did not become an issue until a couple of years after independence. When the Malawi Congress Party took effective control of the country after the 1961 elections, its policy was one of undisguised hostility toward Portugal.<22> One of the campaign promises of the 1961 elections had been that Malawi would support African national liberation movements in white-dominated Southern Africa. Yet, in 1962, Banda became the first African national leader to pay an official visit to Lisbon. It was clear that Banda, at least, had begun to realize that, if Malawi hoped to survive economically, it would have to win the goodwill of Portugal.

By the time Malawi gained independence in July 1964, its position regarding Portugal was quite different from

what it had been in 1961, a time when high political ideals were the order of the day. This change in policy was evident in Banda's address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1964:

Malawi, though sincerely and strongly believing that colonialism should be eradicated from every inch of our soil, though sincerely and strongly believing that it is the duty of every independent state to help those of our brothers still under the yoke of colonialism, finds it difficult to translate her beliefs, and wishes, into action, such as severance of all relations with Mozambique and Portugal. She is compelled by force of circumstances beyond her control to have dealings with Mozambique or Portugal; no one regrets this more bitterly than I do.<23>

Banda talked in a similar vein at the 1964 summit conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 1964: "I want to make it quite clear here at this conference that the geographical position of Malawi makes it impossible for me and my country to sever all ties, diplomatic, economic and cultural, with a certain power still controlling great portions of our continent".<24> This realistic attitude toward Portugal was confirmed in August 1964, when it was announced that Malawi was negotiating a trade agreement with Portugal.

The discussion so far has concerned initiatives taken under the influence of Banda himself. Although an outsider would have assumed that his Cabinet was in accord with the change in Banda's policy regarding Southern Africa, it became clear within a month of having gained independence that this was not the case. The differences came to a head when Banda's ministers confronted him as a unified bloc at a Cabinet meeting. The main event which precipitated the Cabinet Crisis was the negotiations with Portugal for a

trade agreement. If there had been any lingering hope among the ministers that Banda would decrease ties with the white South, that hope was clearly squashed by the announcement of trade negotiations with Portugal.

That differences of opinion between Banda and his ministers suddenly emerged at independence does not mean that divisions did not exist prior to that time. Indications of the direction in which Banda's policy was headed existed as early as 1962 when he paid an official visit to Lisbon. Yet the Cabinet ministers were astute enough to keep their differences quiet and to remain united so as not to jeopardize the country's chances of seceding from the Federation and gaining independence. Another factor that kept the ministers quiet was that in the area of negotiating with British civil servants and administrators over independence, Banda clearly had an advantage due to his years of lobbying on behalf of Nyasaland while he was practicing medicine in England.<25> This naturally put Banda in the limelight and gave him the influence to be more than just a figurehead leader in the fight against Federation.

A noteworthy aspect of the differences between Banda and his ministers was that the issues surrounding foreign policy could not be differentiated from those surrounding policies for development.<26> During the transition period prior to independence, the MCP was already responsible for Malawi's future development strategy, and one of the biggest differences between Banda and the rest of the cabinet was over the vital issue of transport links. As these links ran

through other countries, the issue was naturally one of foreign policy, as well. Banda and his ministers were divided over the question of construction of another rail link to the coast as an alternative route to Beira. While Banda sanctioned the construction of an additional rail link through Mozambique to Nacala, the Ministers favoured an alternative route through Tanzania to the port of Mtwara.

Yet to have constructed a rail link through Tanzania would have run counter to Malawi's need for rapid economic growth in order to generate revenue and overcome the budget deficit. Although a rail link through Tanzania might have lessened Malawi's dependence on Mozambique, it was extremely doubtful if Malawi could have won financial backing for such a project. A link to Tanzania would have been five times as long as one to Nacala, and would have covered more difficult terrain.<27> When Julius Nyerere of Tanzania offered Malawi the use of the port at Mtwara in 1963, the ministers were very enthusiastic about the idea. At about the same time secret talks were taking place between Tanzania and Zambia about the possibility of connecting Zambia's railway with that of Tanzania. However, for Malawi to export its bulky agricultural products through a transport link north-eastwards to avoid Portuguese territory would have been extremely costly, and such a transport link would have taken many years to build in any case.<28> Such an undertaking, whether by road or by rail, would have been extremely unfeasible at a time when what Malawi needed was the most rapid expansion possible of its economy. At any rate, since the TanZam rail link between Zambia and

Tanzania was not completed until 1975, a similar project in Malawi would have meant that it still would have had to depend on Mozambique until such time as a rail link to the north was complete. Thus, some form of accommodation with Portugal would still have been necessary.

The differences of opinion between Banda and his ministers over the issue of a transport link illustrate the divergent orientations within the MCP. While Banda tended to be conservative and Western in outlook, his younger ministers were more in tune with the radical, Pan-Africanist sentiments which prevailed at that time. The general tendency was for economic matters to be obscured in concerns over political ideals, and this was reflected in the desire of the ministers to withdraw as much as possible from white-ruled Southern Africa. However, there were times as well when Banda allowed political preference to take precedence over economic good sense. This was evidenced in the second event which precipitated the Cabinet Crisis, the issue over relations with China.

At the time, mainland China had not been recognized, and Banda invited both China and Taiwan to Malawi's independence celebrations. When Banda was approached by China with an offer of L6 million in aid in exchange for recognition of the mainland, Banda was extremely wary and considered the offer to be nothing short of a bribe.<29> Although Malawi did send a ministerial mission to Peking for further discussions, and, although the aid offer was increased to L18 million, Banda decided to turn the offer down.<30> Although it is not known what Banda's exact

reasoning was in turning down the Chinese offer, it is possible that he was suspicious of Communist influence and felt that it would lead to complications in his more advantageous economic ties with the West. While it is difficult to say whether it was Banda's indignation over what he considered to be a bribe or his anti-Communist sentiments that caused him to turn the offer down, it led to a confrontation on August 16 between Banda and his ministers. The aftermath of the Cabinet Crisis was that Banda fired three ministers and three others resigned in sympathy.

Although in the next few weeks the ministers based their campaign on foreign policy issues as they tried to gain support^{<31>}, there were also important domestic issues over which Banda and the ministers disagreed that helped to spark the Cabinet Crisis. Most immediate of these domestic issues was Banda's severe policy of fiscal restraint in order to limit government expenditure, which led him to cut the salaries of civil servants in 1964.^{<32>} There was also, however, bitterness over Banda's personal style of leadership, and disagreement over his policy on Africanization. Since returning to Malawi in 1958, Banda had not only been gaining the support of the people, but had also been working to gain control of the MCP organization and, by extension, the country as a whole. In 1963, the MCP passed a measure that required that all policy statements had to be approved by Banda first.^{<33>} Banda also gained control by surrounding himself with men who were loyal to him and who depended on him for their promotion. Banda

tended to be rather paternalistic in the way he treated his ministers who, having been the original organizers of the MCP, did not feel that Banda accorded them the recognition and respect they deserved.

In the area of Africanization, Banda's policy was that it should take place slowly, according to ability and experience, rather than Africanization for the sake of Africanization. This policy was particularly disappointing to the educated Africans, who had come to believe that they would replace expatriates in important positions after independence.<34> While it is true that there was a lack of skilled manpower in Malawi at independence, Banda's policy was not without political motivation. Banda's political support, based on his leading role in bringing Malawi out of Federation, was and continues to be derived from the rural, uneducated majority of the population. The ministers, especially Chipembere, on the other hand, derived their support from educated Africans situated mainly in the urban areas, such as Blantyre and Zomba in the Southern Region and parts of the Northern Region, where educational opportunities were greater. By keeping expatriates, who were prepared to support Banda to the end, in top posts in the police and army, Banda was able to maintain an impressive degree of political security.<35> With expatriates in charge of the army, Banda did not have to worry about the possibility of the army taking over.

The support which Banda enjoyed from the expatriate civil service served as a significant counterweight to the ministers.<36> What also turned the political balance in

Banda's favour was the support he enjoyed from the rural masses, and the fact that the Assembly was filled with loyal supporters of Banda. Also significant was the fact that the one person who could have effectively challenged Banda and rallied support, Chipembere, was out of the country at the time of the Cabinet Crisis, attending an Education Conference in Ottawa, Canada. Although he rushed home to attend the emergency sitting of Parliament in early September 1964, by that time it was already too late. At that sitting, Banda was given unanimous support. Although Chipembere, through his absence, could have saved his own position in the Cabinet, he made it clear, to his credit, that he stood by the former ministers:

I would like nobody to believe that I am an outsider in this matter. I was a member of a group of Ministers that approached the Prime Minister to begin with. Although certain things have taken place in my absence, on fundamental matters of principle I was present; everything began when I was here. So nobody should regard me as a man who is not involved. I am together with my friends. I was a participant at the delegation that went for the first time to see the Prime Minister, to approach him asking him to consider the possibility of making certain changes in the system of running this country.<37>

It is interesting to note that, unlike many other African states where ethnic differences play an important role in domestic politics, ethnic factors did not play a significant role in the Cabinet Crisis. Although Banda, along with over 50% of the population, was a Chewa, there is no evidence that Banda displayed any untoward favoritism toward the Chewa at the expense of the other ethnic groupings. The Malawi Congress Party, formally the Nyasaland African Congress, came about as a result of the uniting of various African Associations, from all over the

country, which did not claim to represent any one particular ethnic grouping. As noted in the discussion on Banda, the conflict between Banda and his ministers was based on glaring differences in their attitudes on fundamental issues, stemming from different life experiences. The Crisis came about as a result of disagreement over the basic direction Malawi should take rather than from ethnic differences. While it is true Banda enjoyed solid support from the Chewa, they also happened to be uneducated and from rural parts. At the same time, Banda was also supported by rural and less educated people who were not Chewa. The people Banda had to fear were those who were well-educated, who tended to concentrate in the cities.

In the aftermath of the Cabinet Crisis, a series of constitutional changes were set in motion that were to extend even further Banda's control over the country. In brief, these included the ability to determine who could be a member of the party and of Parliament and who could engage in business by requiring that all businesses have a licence, the extension of the power of the traditional courts and the right of Banda to disregard the verdict, and severe restrictions on the press and the right to imprison those who expressed disagreeable opinions.<38> In 1966, Malawi was declared a Republic with Banda, as President, and eventually Life President. In this fashion, all avenues for public dissent were effectively squelched.

The Cabinet Crisis also had an important impact on the direction of Malawi's foreign policy. It caused a severe strain in Malawi's relations with its African neighbours, in

particular, Zambia and Tanzania. The former ministers went into exile in Zambia and Tanzania, and Banda suspected that these countries were being used as a base for attacks on his leadership, a couple of which did occur over the next few years, albeit unsuccessfully. The tension in Malawi's relationship with these countries, along with the fact that Banda was not in tune with the Pan-Africanist OAU, led to Malawi's increasing isolation from Black Africa.<39> While Malawi was already economically dependent on the white South, it was thus pushed politically in the direction of Southern Africa, and particularly South Africa, as well.

Although Malawi's economic dependence on South Africa made it necessary for it to maintain the already existing relations with South Africa, it was not necessary that the expansion of these relations be encouraged or that they be formalized at the diplomatic level. This, however, is exactly what happened, and marks the point where Banda stepped over the line of necessity based on economic dependence. On the other hand, this is not to say that Malawi's economic dependence did not influence its relations with South Africa, for it was precisely Malawi's need for foreign capital that was to steer it into South Africa's arms.

Relations with South Africa:
Economic Dependence or Autonomous Choice?

There were two stages in the formalization of Malawi's relations with South Africa, the first culminating in the conclusion of Trade and Labour Agreements in March 1967, and

the second culminating in the establishment of diplomatic relations in September 1967. At the same time, Malawi was negotiating similar arrangements with Portugal, mainly to discuss the building of the new rail link to Nacala. Contacts with South Africa had actually begun in 1966, around which time Banda was to give voice to his policy of 'discretionary alignment' not only between East and West, but between North and South as well.<40> Banda's justification for the trade agreements was based on the argument that he was simply renewing already existing agreements:

We inherited trade agreement with the Government of the Republic of South Africa; we inherited labour recruitment agreement with the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association or Wenela; we inherited transport and communications, transit facilities through Mozambique to and from the sea, and in addition, Nyasaland Railways Company and the Trans-Zambezi Railways Company agreements with the Government of Portugal. These treaties, agreements and conventions are now out of date. The period over which they were valid under International Law has lapsed. Therefore, we have either to cease to trade with South Africa, stop our people from going to South Africa, stop using the Port of Beira and pass through Mozambique Territory from the sea or negotiate new treaties, new agreements and new conventions with the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of Portugal.<41>

While Banda's argument was justified in the case of Portugal, the negotiations with South Africa were clearly more than just the renewal of existing links. This was due mainly to negotiations with South Africa for the construction of a new capital at Lilongwe.

Since independence, Banda had pushed strongly to get financing for the movement of the capital from Zomba, in the Southern Region, to Lilongwe in the Central Region. The movement of the capital to Lilongwe, important in itself, was also highly significant in terms of foreign policy. It

was the inability of Banda to get funding for the project which led him to turn to South Africa and which ultimately tipped the balance in favour of establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa. The importance which Banda attached to the movement of the capital is evidenced by the fact that it was not a new idea, but one which had occurred to him as early as the years of Federation. The movement of the capital to a central location was central to Banda's vision of Malawi as a unified nation:

We have no longer a collection of tribes in this country now. We are a nation. Therefore we must think more of ourselves as Malawians and less, much less, as Nkondes, Tongas, Tumbukas, Ngonis, Chewa, Yaos, Nyanjas, Senas.<42>

Banda wanted the MCP to be seen as a national party, the administration of which could be most effectively carried out from a central location. There was the added dimension that a central location of the capital would facilitate the governing of the country in the region in which Banda enjoyed the most solid support. However, while it is true that the central region is dominated by the Chewa, who were solidly behind Banda, it is also true that Banda's support tended to come from the rural, less-educated population from all parts of the country. Even if ethnicity were a factor in moving the capital to Lilongwe, there were important economic reasons justifying the move. For example, it would help to correct the economic imbalance between the Northern and Southern Regions, and help to promote agricultural development in the potentially rich central region.<43> Lilongwe was also a suitable location for an international airport and was close to the intersection of the main

Central and East African air routes. In the Southern region, where most of the economic activity took place, there was severe land shortage and over-population. It was expected that by moving the capital, development would be stimulated in the less populated and less developed northern and central regions, which would encourage a population shift away from the densely populated southern region.<44>

When Banda turned to Britain for financing, however, he was turned down on the grounds that the project was uneconomic.<45> His appeals to other countries were equally unsuccessful. But it was South Africa which, for its own political reasons, agreed to help to finance the movement of the capital.

In March 1968, South Africa set up the South African Loans Fund, through which an initial loan of \$12 million was made for the new capital and an additional \$11 million was provided for the new railway to Nacala.<46> South African technical experts were provided, South African firms were awarded contracts for the construction of the capital, and private South African firms were encouraged to invest in Malawi.

The Trade Agreement also served to increase links between Malawi and South Africa by reinforcing already existing trade relationships between the two countries.<47> Under the terms of the agreement, some of Malawi's agricultural exports, such as tea, were allowed to enter South Africa duty-free, and South Africa guaranteed to import at least 500,000 pounds of tobacco each year.<48> Malawi also signed a Labour Agreement with South Africa

through which remittances were to be paid in Malawi rather than South Africa and the terms under which Malawians worked were improved. The result of the agreement was that remittances to Malawi increased from K2.80 million in 1967 to K4.76 million in 1970, and the number of Malawians working in South Africa increased from 35,693 in 1964 to 90,000 in 1971.<49> However, the increase in the number of Malawians working in South Africa was also due to the declining opportunity for work in Rhodesia after 1965. The Labour Agreement therefore served to confirm as well as encourage an already established pattern of labour migration. Thus, Malawi's traditional links with South Africa through labour and trade were reinforced, while additional links were established through aid and investment.

The most controversial of Banda's policies was undoubtedly the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1967. It is impossible to know whether or not South Africa put economic pressure on Malawi to establish diplomatic relations. It would seem to be plausible that the move was peculiar to Banda himself. What is known, however, is that South Africa proffered much economic bait before relations were actually established.

It should be remembered that it would not have been possible for Malawi to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa had it not been for South Africa's own desire to promote an outward policy for itself. South Africa's policy can be explained in terms of the international context. In the post-World War II era, numerous changes

developed in the external world which were to have a direct and negative impact on South Africa. These changes can be described briefly as the internationalization of the human rights issue, the achievement of independence by former colonies in Africa, and the tension surrounding the cold war conflict.<50> The focus of international attention on South Africa's policy of apartheid was to lead to the increasing isolation of South Africa from the rest of the world community. The process of decolonization which began in Africa in the late 1950s, coupled with the disturbing eruption of internal violence in South Africa in the early 1960s, was to make that country's growing isolation more poignant.<51>

South Africa reacted to this unfavourable situation by formulating a policy which was designed to improve its relations with the rest of the world. South Africa believed that the route through which its position in the world community could be improved would be by way of the development of relations with Black Africa.<52> Thus, the establishment of relations with Black Africa was not to be an end in itself, but a means through which South Africa's relations with the rest of the world, particularly the West, could be improved. As a result, Prime Minister Verwoerd, and then Vorster, came to promote a policy of 'dialogue' or 'detente' with the Black African states.<53> Malawi was to become the first black African state to establish formal diplomatic relations with South Africa.

Banda's own rationale for establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa represented an about-face from

the position he held prior to independence. As late as 1963, Banda was quoted as saying:

As an African nationalist, I hate the present regime and will have nothing to do with it when this country is independent. There will be no dealings between the Union of South Africa and independent Malawi.<54>

Banda's justification for his new policy was based on the belief that white South Africans feared Black Africa, and that the best way to eliminate fear and bring about change was through cooperation and by setting a good example:

it is our earnest hope that one day the Government of South Africa will be moved to abandon these present policies... not so much as a result of threats and disapproval voiced by other nations as by the example which Africa herself has set.... May I express the hope that as better understanding between the peoples of Africa grows and fear and suspicion subside, that the day may not be far off.<55>

Although Banda's beliefs in this area were likely sincere, the economic motive was never far behind, as evidenced in Banda's bid to find funding for the new capital. Since he first approached Britain and other Western countries for funds, it is clear that South Africa was approached as a last resort. Banda's moderate attitude towards whites also probably made it easier for him to approach South Africa. However, Banda would not have pushed for the new capital had he not believed that it was extremely important for Malawi's balanced economic growth.

Economic Consequences of Relations with South Africa

There were other long-term benefits which Banda hoped to derive from Malawi's relations with South Africa. These included the promotion of Malawi's tourist industry, and the

assurance of markets nearby for two major development projects: (1) a pulpwood plantation in the northern region and (2) the exploitation of bauxite deposits in the southern region.<56> Technological advance had made the exploitation of these deposits economically feasible.

The results in economic terms of Malawi's relations with South Africa are quite outstanding. It was mentioned earlier that, after UDI, Malawi's trade links with Rhodesia began to diminish. Yet Rhodesia remained Malawi's second largest trading partner until 1976, when Mozambique closed its borders with Rhodesia, thus cutting off Malawi's trade route through Mozambique's Tete Province to Rhodesia.<57> The only other country which could supply the products which had previously been received from Rhodesia was South Africa. Malawian imports from South Africa more than doubled over the period 1975-1980, from K52,787 in 1975 to K134,820 in 1980, while imports from Rhodesia decreased by over one-half during the same period from K25,733 in 1975 to K10,229 in 1980 (see Tables 1, 2, & 3 in Appendix).<58> South Africa has also replaced Britain as Malawi's most important supplier, although Britain is still Malawi's most important trading partner in terms of exports. As early as 1970, more than 50% of Malawi's total trade deficit of \$25 million was accounted for by South Africa.<59>

Although South Africa became an important source of financial assistance for the construction of the new capital and the railway to Nacala, Britain remains Malawi's chief source of aid. In 1979, total net receipts to Malawi from Britain amounted to \$73.4 million.<60>

It was mentioned that the number of Malawians working in Rhodesia also decreased after UDI, with only 10% of the total migrant workers in Rhodesia by 1972. Again, the country which picked up the slack was South Africa, and in 1972, there were 124,000 Malawians working in South Africa.<61> The remittances from migrant labour represented an important source of revenue for the Malawian Government, accounting for the third largest source of currency reserve after tobacco and tea.<62> The value of remittances from South Africa began to rise rapidly after 1970, when they were valued at K7.8 million, until they reached a peak in 1974 of K29.7 million, at which point South Africa was virtually the only source of labour remittances (see Table 4).<63>

Since 1974, however, despite the fact that Malawi's dependence on South Africa has greatly increased in terms of trade, there has been a marked decrease in the flow of migrant workers to South Africa. In 1974, when a plane carrying migrant workers home from South Africa crashed in Botswana, Banda temporarily halted all labour recruitment to South Africa. When recruitment was resumed in 1976, far fewer workers returned to South Africa, and since 1977 there have been fewer than 20,000 workers.<64>

This decline reflects structural changes that are taking place in Malawi's economy. Malawi's economy is being transformed from a predominantly subsistence form to one based on large-scale estate agriculture demanding wage labour.<65> This has been the consequence of an active government policy, and when the plane carrying workers

crashed in 1974 it gave the government an excuse to halt, although temporarily, the flow of migrant workers to South Africa. Although small holder agriculture accounts for over 85% of agricultural production, it accounted for only 25% of all exports in 1979.<66> Estate agriculture, on the other hand, while accounting for only 15% of total agricultural production, accounts for over two-thirds of all exports (see Tables 5 & 6).<67> Employment in the estate sector has greatly expanded, and between 1969 and 1978 it accounted for about 44% of total wage employment.<68> This helps to explain why the Malawian economy was able to absorb the returning migrant workers. In fact, Malawi finds itself in the paradoxical situation of having a shortage of labour at home while still exporting labour abroad.<69>

Conclusion

When Malawi achieved independence in 1964, Banda had to work within the constraints imposed by a country that was economically dependent. Such permanent features of economic dependence as its land-locked position, its limited resource base and its small size could not have been altered by anyone. The economic bias in favour of the Southern region, the budget deficit, the undeveloped transport infrastructure, and a single rail-link to Beira were other hard economic realities which had to be contended with. With his realistic concern for Malawi's national economic interests, it was clear to Banda that the only route to recovery was through rapid economic growth by the expansion

of agricultural exports.

As Malawi proceeded to develop, a pattern occurred whereby Malawi's dependence in the area of trade and labour migration shifted from Rhodesia to South Africa. This came about as a result of: a successful policy of import substitution, which meant that Malawi did not need to import as much from Rhodesia; an increased demand for capital goods, the cheapest and closest supply of which was South Africa; and a decision on the part of the Rhodesian regime to hire more of its own Africans in the mines, thus forcing Malawians to seek work in South Africa. Although later on Malawi succeeded in decreasing its dependence on South Africa in the area of labour migration, its dependence on South Africa in the sphere of trade and aid increased. This was partly the result of faster economic growth in Malawi and Mozambique's closure of the border with Rhodesia in 1976. However, while the above discussion demonstrates valid economic reasons for Malawi's shift in economic dependence to South Africa, economic dependence alone does not completely explain why this increased dependence on South Africa occurred.

Domestic political and leadership factors also have to be taken into account to explain why Malawi accepted South African aid to move the capital and why it established formal diplomatic relations. Banda's years of socialization in the United States and Britain, along with his pragmatic and realistic outlook, caused him to see Malawi in a different light from that of his ministers. For Banda, Malawi's economic interests came above all else, whereas the

ministers tended to favour political considerations such as their desire to disengage from Southern Africa. The Cabinet Crisis which resulted had an important influence on Malawi's foreign policy because it caused a strain in Malawi's relations with its Black neighbours, increasing Malawi's isolation and pushing it further in the direction of the equally isolated South Africa, not only on the economic level but on the political/diplomatic level as well.

Banda's decision to accept South African aid for the movement of the capital to Lilongwe did not come out of economic necessity but reflected an independent choice on his part. Nevertheless, independent choice or not, Banda never made a decision that might have undermined Malawi's economic interests. Indeed, there were important economic reasons for moving the capital, including the need to correct the traditional economic bias in favour of the Southern region. But the movement of the capital was also central to Banda's vision of Malawi as a unified nation rather than a mere collection of tribes. In this regard Malawi was more fortunate than other African states in that ethnic differences did not play a significant role in domestic politics. Thus, while there were sound economic arguments for moving the capital to the Central region, another leader might have abandoned the project rather than face the alternative of increased links with South Africa. The decision reflects an autonomous choice on the part of Banda rather than an act based on economic necessity brought about by economic dependence.

Similarly, while Malawi's economic dependence

dictated accommodation with South Africa, the decision to establish formal diplomatic relations cannot be justified solely on economic grounds. Although South Africa was a good, relatively cheap source of capital goods for Malawi's imports, these trade ties could have been maintained without diplomatic relations. Even if the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa was the price paid for funding for the capital, and there is no evidence that this was the case, again another leader might have balked at this choice. Certainly, Banda's moderate attitude towards whites made it easier for him to move closer to South Africa. Thus, Malawi's increased diplomatic interaction with South Africa was based partly on its economic dependence but was also partly due to domestic political and leadership factors.

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CHAPTER IV

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OF MALAWI'S
FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICAIntroduction

The need to assess Malawi's foreign policy in terms of the regional context is a reflection of the fact that Malawi was not operating in a vacuum, but was subject to influences from developments in the region of Southern Africa. Due to the status of South Africa as a virtual regional superpower, economic relations between the states of the region, on the one hand, and South Africa, on the other, are highly asymmetrical. South Africa remains the only fully industrialized country in the region, and it is an important source of employment, trade and transport links for many of the developing states in the region. The economic and military clout on the part of South Africa has meant that although certain developments have led to an important shift in the political balance of Southern Africa, they have not made for any fundamental change in the economic structure of the region.<1>

During the 1960s and up until 1974, a large portion of Southern Africa was under either rule by white minorities or colonial rule. Besides white-ruled South Africa and Rhodesia, whose government had made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, there were the Portuguese-ruled colonies of Angola and Mozambique. In the second half of the 1970s, however, a series of developments took place which led to the independence first of Mozambique, then

Angola and, finally, Zimbabwe in 1980. These developments have had an important impact on the policies of South Africa and the other states in the region, including Malawi. This chapter therefore examines the reaction of Malawi to the changes in Southern Africa and the direct and indirect impact which they had on Malawi's policy toward South Africa.

One noticeable feature of Malawi's foreign policy is that it has remained highly consistent in light of the dramatic developments that have taken place in Southern Africa. The constraints of economic dependence continued to be an important factor influencing Malawi's foreign policy. Economic realities made it necessary for Malawi to cooperate with colonial Mozambique and minority-ruled Rhodesia. Yet when Mozambique achieved independence and Zimbabwe won black-majority rule, the same underlying factor of economic necessity made it important for Malawi to attempt to improve its relations with these countries. There has been no revolution in Malawi's foreign policy, but an evolution based on economic expediency. As Malawi is no longer on the frontier of white-ruled Southern Africa, it has become Malawi's economic interest to improve its relations with its independent African neighbours.

Thus, Malawi's membership in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference does not contradict its policy of cooperation with South Africa, as both links are seen to be of economic benefit to Malawi. In fact, the wisdom of Malawi's policy of cooperation with South Africa has been vindicated by the moderation more recently evident

in the policies of Mozambique and Zimbabwe toward South Africa. Through its policy of destabilization, South Africa has demonstrated its economic and military clout, which led Mozambique in 1984 to sign an agreement with South Africa. This policy of destabilization has at the same time had a direct negative impact on Malawi through the disruption of its transport routes. It would appear that the economic benefits of Malawi's relations with South Africa have worn thin and that perhaps the time has finally come for a re-evaluation by the government of Malawi's foreign policy.

Malawi on the Frontier of White-Minority Southern Africa

Relations with Rhodesia

Although at Malawi's independence Portugal constituted the dominant foreign policy issue for Malawi, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Rhodesia in 1965 meant that, barely one year after independence, Malawi had to respond to what was perceived by Africa to be a crisis of major proportions. The fact of Malawi's close historical ties with Rhodesia, both politically and economically, and its geographic proximity to Rhodesia meant that Malawi could not remain immune to the consequences of UDI. It was not just Malawi's dependence on Rhodesia, however, that was to influence Banda's policies regarding UDI, but Malawi's dependence on Britain as well. Any rupture with Britain over its policy toward Rhodesia could have wrought serious economic consequences for Malawi.<2> The Rhodesian crisis was also important in that the policies which Banda

formulated on how to bring about change in Rhodesia directly influenced his posture toward South Africa and helped to intensify Malawi's isolation from the rest of Black Africa.

From the beginning Banda's overriding concern regarding the question of colonialism in Southern Africa was Malawi's economic well-being. This Banda had made clear even prior to UDI:

Malawi hates colonialism, I personally hate colonialism just as strongly as any other African Nationalist believes that colonialism is an evil which must be eradicated from every inch of our continent. But the geographical and economic position of Malawi limits and circumscribes our form of action on the fight against colonialism.<3>

Yet, while Banda was anxious to reiterate Malawi's stand against colonialism, he displayed more reticence when it came to singling out any particular country. However, at the 1964 OAU Summit meeting prior to UDI, Banda did support the resolutions carried against Rhodesia, although he indicated Malawi's inability to subscribe fully to them.<4>

Malawi's dependence on Rhodesia stemmed largely from the presence in that country of a majority of Malawi's migrant workers and also its prominence as Malawi's second-largest trading partner after Britain. Malawi's dependence on Rhodesia extended to other areas as well, such as a fairly significant level of Rhodesian investment in Malawi. In addition, nearly 80% of Malawi's international telecommunications traffic flowed through Rhodesia and all Malawian aircraft had to be serviced in Salisbury.<5> Therefore, even before UDI, Malawi was keenly interested in decreasing its dependence on Rhodesia, particularly in the area of trade. Malawi set about to do this through the

encouragement of its indigenous manufacturing sector via the promotion of import substitution. The decision to abrogate the trade agreement with Rhodesia after UDI was probably less of a response to UDI per se than a convenient opportunity to curtail an arrangement that, in any case, worked to the disadvantage of Malawi. However, it was not possible for Malawi to change its trading patterns overnight, which meant that there was only so much Malawi could do in the short term by way of sanctions against Rhodesia. Besides, Malawi also had to contend with hints from the Rhodesian government in 1965 about its readiness to expel foreign workers<6>, a development that would have created serious political instability in a country such as Malawi that had achieved independence only the previous year.

These economic considerations help to explain Malawi's reluctance to support OAU resolutions regarding Rhodesia that came after UDI. At the same time, however, Malawi also had to take into account its extreme dependence on the country that was directly responsible for Rhodesia -- Great Britain. Malawi's financial dependence on Britain for grants-in-aid to cover its budget deficit would have discouraged any leader from taking the strong stand against Britain which the OAU resolutions demanded. At the OAU conference in October 1965, its resolutions asked (1) Britain to suspend the Constitution of Rhodesia; (2) OAU members to withdraw from the Commonwealth as well as, to withdraw their bank accounts from all British banks if Britain failed to suspend the Constitution by December 15;

and (3) Britain to use military action against Rhodesia, failing which OAU was itself to apply force against Rhodesia.<7> Aside from his complete personal disapproval of the resolutions, Banda felt that Malawi's economic dependence on Britain called for moderation toward that country. He made it clear that he was only willing to give as much support as he was capable without hurting Malawi's economy:

The only way we can follow Britain's course, the only way we can follow Britain's action, is to support her morally. Because, let us be frank and honest with ourselves, we have no physical, economic or other means to do anything else....I would like to be honest with myself, with you my people, and with the world outside.<8>

While Banda was in accord with other African leaders over the regrettability of UDI, he differed sharply with other African leaders as to the methods of bringing about change in Rhodesia, particularly with regard to the OAU resolutions on Rhodesia.

The change from Malawi's previous willingness to support anti-Rhodesian resolutions was based on Banda's position that he was "no longer willing to endorse the anti-Rhodesian resolutions of the OAU since these resolutions had escalated to the point of openly condoning the use of force to establish African majority rule in Southern Rhodesia".<9> Banda refused to endorse resolutions that he felt were impractical due to the unlikelihood that they would be carried out by Britain or the African states. It was his view that Britain should be left alone to solve the Rhodesian problem through a gradual process.<10>

Banda's comments were particularly scathing with

regard to the resolutions on OAU military involvement:

Military force? African military force? OAU military force? let me really laugh again. What 'single country in Africa today...from north to south, east to west, has an army that can take on and beat the Rhodesian Army? Not one!

The Rhodesian army, next to the Army of the Union of South Africa, is the strongest and the most efficient...in the African continent, and I mean just that. Don't deceive yourselves.... It is all right to have all these uniforms...it is one thing to impress, but it is quite another on the battlefield.<11>

This attitude toward the impracticality of force reinforced Banda's conviction that the best route for solving the Rhodesian problem was through negotiation, not confrontation, a policy which was carried over into Malawi's dealings with South Africa.

The crisis over Rhodesia, so soon after Malawi's independence, greatly contributed to the development of a coherent policy toward the white minority regimes of Southern Africa that paved the way for Malawi's future relations with South Africa. Banda's Rhodesia policy, more than anything else, helped to increase Malawi's already growing isolation. Banda's blunt commentaries at OAU meetings, particularly with regard to the use of force, did little to endear him to the majority of African leaders. Yet, it is clear that any leader would have had to distance Malawi from resolutions such as the one calling for the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain, upon whom Malawi depended for its economic livelihood. Furthermore, Banda's decision to break off diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and Egypt in 1965, coupled with Malawi's growing isolation and the aftermath of the Cabinet Crisis, helped to

form the backdrop to the development of Malawi's policy toward South Africa.<12>

Malawi's policy with regard to the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia did not change from the position it had adopted before UDI. While Malawi supported sanctions, which were made mandatory for all United Nations members in 1966, it reiterated its position that, due to economic reasons, there was only so much support Malawi could provide. This view was expressed by Malawi's U.N. representative, Alec Nyasusu, in 1966: "To attempt to cut off all economic ties with Rhodesia would do us far more harm than it will do Rhodesia if other sources of supplies, other means of carrying on our essential export trade, are not available, but we can and will seek to reduce these ties".<13> Malawi was able to reduce its ties with Rhodesia with considerable success, mainly through the policy of import substitution and the development of an indigenous sugar industry; sugar, along with meat, had accounted for Malawi's most important imports from Rhodesia. A significant decrease in the number of Malawians working in Rhodesia was set in motion due to the Rhodesian government's efforts to provide more opportunities for Rhodesian Africans, which led to a number of Malawians being sent home in 1965.<14> This was done gradually, and did not have an adverse affect on Malawi, as Malawians were able to find work in South Africa.

Malawi could be said to have benefited to a certain extent from UDI as it encouraged the promotion of import substitution and led to a decrease in Malawi's dependence on

Rhodesia as an outlet for its workers. However, the decreased dependence on Rhodesia led instead to an increased dependence on South Africa, as Malawi was unable to absorb the workers returning home from Rhodesia. In the area of trade, the increased dependence on South Africa was more a reflection of Malawi's rising need for capital goods -- as it pursued a policy of import substitution -- which Rhodesia could not supply, rather than Rhodesia losing out to South Africa.<15> In addition, the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesian tobacco gave a direct boost to Malawi's tobacco exports, as it was able to move into markets formerly held by Rhodesia. When it was discovered in 1969 that some Rhodesian tobacco was being shipped out through Beira labelled as Malawi produce, Malawi imposed stringent controls on tobacco exports.<16>

Although Malawi's dependence on Rhodesia in 1964 was unpleasant, a rapid decrease in Malawi's links with Rhodesia would have disrupted the economy and hindered economic growth. For this reason, even after UDI, Malawi refrained from applying sanctions against Rhodesia, and continued with its policy of a gradual decrease in dependence through a policy of import substitution. Malawi was able to reduce its dependence on Rhodesia in the area of both trade and labour migration by virtue of local economic growth rather than by disrupting the economy. This demonstrates the high priority Malawi's foreign policy placed on the national economic interests of the country.

Relations with Portugal

Rhodesia's UDI had an important impact on Malawi's relations with Portuguese Mozambique as well. The imposition of sanctions led to a decrease in Rhodesia's use of Mozambique's railways and ports, resulting in a significant loss of transit revenues on which Mozambique's economy depended. (Again, South Africa was the beneficiary of this development, as Rhodesia came to rely on that country for its imports and exports.) In seeking to compensate for this loss in revenues, the Portuguese authorities were more than happy to encourage Malawi to increase its use of Mozambique's transit facilities through the construction of an additional rail link to Nacala.<17> For the same reason, Portugal was willing to help in the financing of the Nacala project. Nevertheless, it is likely that Malawi needed the use of Mozambique's transit facilities more than Mozambique needed additional revenues from Malawi.

The existence of this mutual, although clearly lopsided, interdependence was to be an important factor in Malawi's policy as instability in Mozambique increased with the growing strength of the nationalist movement led by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO. In addition to its economic dependence on Mozambique, the key to understanding Malawi's relations with Portugal and FRELIMO also lies in the country's geographic location on the dividing line between independent black Africa and the white-minority regimes of Southern Africa. The fact that Malawi's territory cut into Mozambique made Malawi

strategically significant to Portugal as a potential base for Mozambique guerrillas. Malawi's position on the border of white-dominated Southern Africa inflated Malawi's importance in the eyes of South Africa as well. Concomitantly, the independence of Mozambique following the Portuguese coup in 1974 led to a deflation of Malawi's strategic importance in South Africa's eyes, as the frontier between black and white Africa was pushed inexorably southwards.

Two stages in Malawi's relationship with Portugal and FRELIMO can be identified, the first from 1964 to September 1971, when FRELIMO activities were confined to north-eastern Mozambique, and the second from September 1971 to 1974, when FRELIMO gained strength and began to spread its activities to south-western Mozambique.<18> While during these two phases the interests of the Portuguese remained constant -- that is, they wished to suppress FRELIMO activities and prevent the guerrillas from entering Malawi -- the interests of Malawi changed and at times contradicted those of Portugal. In the first phase, the two dominant considerations which encouraged friendly relations on the part of Malawi with Portugal were of an economic and security nature. In the economic realm, Banda entered into negotiations with the Portuguese over an additional rail link to Nacala; he was also interested in developing the road link to Rhodesia, which ran through the Mozambique province of Tete.<19> In return for Portugal's cooperation and help in these economic matters, Banda assured Portugal that Malawi would not be used as a base for Mozambique

guerrillas.

Despite these assurances, however, Malawi's long and ill-defined border with Mozambique meant that, in practice, it was very difficult for Malawi's small army to prevent incursions by guerrillas fleeing Mozambique. Portuguese troops were also guilty of border violations in hot pursuit. While frequent incursions into Malawi's territory by Portuguese troops at times strained relations with the Portuguese authorities, Banda did not permit these incidents to interfere with negotiations over new transport links.<20> During this period, the negotiations for a new link to Nacala reached a successful conclusion, and its construction was completed in 1970. Several other agreements were also signed with Portugal in 1967.

The second major consideration in the period up to 1971 was that of Malawi's internal security. The threat to Malawi's security came from the possibility of attack from Malawian exiles, particularly those harboured in Tanzania. As FRELIMO's activities were also based in Tanzania, that country represented a common security threat for both Malawi and Portugal. A considerable amount of military cooperation therefore took place between Malawi and Portugal, including the presence of Portuguese naval patrols on Lake Malawi, which was viewed as the major infiltration route into both Malawi and Mozambique for exiles and guerrillas.<21> In October 1967, an attack did take place by one of Banda's former ministers and, as it turned out, the group was dressed in FRELIMO uniforms.<22> Banda had little difficulty in squashing the attack, which was the last of its kind.

So long as Portugal was able to retain full control over the situation in Mozambique, cooperation between Portugal and Malawi was guaranteed because of their mutual interest.<23> Once Portugal began to lose control after 1971, however, the grounds for cooperation became shaky. This development coincided with the growing strength of FRELIMO and its decision to reorient its efforts into Tete Province, which bordered along Malawi's Southern Region. FRELIMO's change in the area of operations was based on Portugal's decision to begin work on a huge hydroelectric project at Cabora Bassa on the Zambezi River. Financed by South Africa, the project was intended to supply electricity to South Africa and possibly Malawi as well. However, Malawi soon lost interest in the project after it realized it had enough hydroelectric potential of its own which it could exploit cheaply.<24> On the other hand, FRELIMO perceived Portugal's commitment to Cabora Bassa as a signal of its intention to remain in Mozambique for a long time, and the movement's goal therefore became one of preventing its successful completion.

What affected Malawi most about FRELIMO's decision to concentrate on Cabora Bassa was its related campaign to disrupt the road and railway routes supplying the dam.<25> These included the Beira-Tete rail link and the road linking Malawi with Rhodesia. Since by this time Malawi could rely on Nacala as well as Beira, the most serious problem for Malawi was the disruption of the road between Malawi and Rhodesia. This had a serious adverse affect on Malawi, as about 30% of its imports from Rhodesia and South Africa came

along this route.<26> Whereas earlier Malawi had been at the mercy of Portuguese authorities for transit facilities, increasingly FRELIMO began to take their place.

As well as causing serious transport disruptions, the reorientation of FRELIMO's operations also posed a serious threat to Malawi's security. Southern Malawi provided FRELIMO not only the shortest route from northern Mozambique to its operations in Tete, but also a convenient sanctuary from which to launch attacks on the Beira-Tete railway.<27> Malawi's limited capacity to prevent infiltration into its territory by FRELIMO guerrillas strained relations between Malawi and Portugal by leaving Malawi with little choice but to ignore the presence of guerrillas in its territory. Another reason for the difficulty in preventing Malawi from being used as a sanctuary by FRELIMO was related to the presence in Southern Malawi of thousands of people of Mozambique origin who had migrated to Malawi from Mozambique around the turn of the century. Their presence made for a fair degree of grassroots support for FRELIMO among the local population and facilitated the ability of its guerrillas to melt into the general milieu.<28>

The major source of contention between Malawi and Portugal in the period after 1971 was over Banda's policy regarding Mozambican refugees. In numerous speeches, Banda indicated that the people of Mozambique had a right to seek refuge in Malawi.<29> The presence of refugee camps in Malawi, however, irritated the Portuguese as it enabled FRELIMO to use them as operational bases from which to stage attacks against the Portuguese.<30> While Portugal objected

to the presence of refugee camps in Malawi, it was no longer in the same position as it had been in the first period in terms of putting Malawi under economic or military pressure. In this second period it was FRELIMO, not Portugal, which threatened Malawi's transit routes. In addition, FRELIMO also replaced the exiled ministers as the major threat to Malawi's security; Banda had by this time consolidated his position internally and the threat of attack had diminished as the exiled ministers lost momentum.<31> Although Malawi was still interested in cooperative relations with Portugal, the economic and security threat posed by FRELIMO meant that the need for tacit cooperation with the nationalist movement had acquired an increasing salience.

This need for accommodation with FRELIMO became an urgent necessity following the Portuguese coup in April 1974 and the granting of independence to Mozambique under FRELIMO leadership. Banda was quick to welcome the transfer of power to the new FRELIMO Government. In May 1974, Banda held talks with FRELIMO leaders, but it was already clear that the left-leaning leadership of Samora Machel was not overly sympathetic to Banda's policy of cooperation with Portugal and South Africa. Despite Banda's earlier efforts to cultivate good relations with FRELIMO in the period prior to Mozambique's independence, his previous overall policy of attempting to balance the interests of both FRELIMO and Portugal was to be a major impediment to improved relations with independent Mozambique.<32> However, economic interests made it necessary for both countries to cooperate at least at the economic level.

Malawi in Interdependent Southern Africa

The change in the balance of power in Southern Africa brought about by the emergence of independent Mozambique and Angola had major foreign policy implications which affected Malawi's relations with both South Africa and the Black African states. The immediate result of the independence of Mozambique was that Malawi's strategic significance for South Africa as a friendly Black African state on the frontier separating black and white Africa was removed. The loss of a buffer through the independence of the former Portuguese colonies, the emergence of pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Mozambique, and the psychological boost given to the liberation movements in Rhodesia all helped to lessen the political importance to South Africa of diplomatic relations with Malawi. Despite Banda's policy of accommodation with South Africa, the need for South Africa to contend with the vital issues affecting it in the mid-1970s, not least of which were negotiations for the independence of Zimbabwe, resulted in Malawi being pushed to the side.<33>

The independence of Angola and Mozambique had equally momentous implications for Malawi's relations with Black Africa. Although Malawi did not alter its overall policy toward South Africa, it made new efforts to improve its relations with Black African states. Malawi's new attitude toward Black Africa was reflected in the establishment in June 1974 of a separate ministry to deal with relations with other African states.<34> Signs of improved relations with

Tanzania and Zambia were evidenced in the visit to Malawi of a Tanzanian cabinet delegation in 1974 and Banda's first State visit to Zambia in January 1975. Although there remained important political differences, Malawi's main motivation for improved relations with these countries, especially Zambia, was economic in nature. During the visit by Banda to Zambia, the main emphasis of the talks was on trade, commerce and communications.<35> It was the mutual interdependence between Malawi and Zambia, as was the case between Malawi and Mozambique, which prevented Malawi from becoming completely isolated following the independence of the Portuguese colonies and the resultant decreased importance of Malawi in South Africa's eyes. Thus, cooperation among Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique was based on mutual economic interests, rather than common political goals.

The closure of the border between Zambia and Rhodesia in 1973 had led to an increased interest on the part of Zambia in the use of Malawi's road and rail links to the ports of Nacala and Beira. In 1974, Malawi and Zambia agreed to link up their rail systems. In Malawi, with Canadian financing, the railway was extended from Salima to Lilongwe and from Lilongwe to the Zambian border at Mchinji.<36> Similarly, Malawi became more dependent on Zambia following Mozambique's decision in March 1976 to close its borders with Rhodesia. This effectively closed the Blantyre-Salisbury road, and made it necessary for Malawi to develop alternative transport routes through Zambia and Botswana to South Africa.

Economic considerations also weighed with Mozambique to exercise restraint in its relations with Malawi. Mozambique's need for foreign exchange that it derived from the use of its transport facilities prevented Mozambique from exerting economic pressure on Malawi. Also, Mozambique's closure of the border with Rhodesia had led to increased use by Zambia of Mozambique's facilities via Malawi, thereby increasing the importance of transit revenue from Malawi and Zambia as well as South Africa.<37> Thus, the mutual interdependence among Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia on the economic level prevented Malawi from suffering an economic backlash due to Banda's earlier policy of cooperation with the white South prior to the independence of Angola and Mozambique.

At the same time, the economic interdependence among these countries has also prevented effective pressure being placed on Malawi to change its policy toward South Africa. Malawi could therefore persist with its policy of cooperation with South Africa without suffering any damage in its relations with its immediate neighbours in Black Africa. It was encouraged in this by the economic benefits which accrued to Malawi from the relationship with South Africa up until 1980. Besides, its semi-isolation on the political level after 1974 reinforced Malawi's conviction to persist with cooperation with South Africa. The only significant strain in Malawi's relations with South Africa after diplomatic relations were established in 1967 occurred in April 1974 when, following the crash of an airplane transporting Malawian workers back from South Africa, Banda

banned all further recruitment for South African mines. Although recruitment was resumed in 1977, the number of Malawians working in South Africa never reached the previous peak of 130,000 in 1974; there were only 12,000 Malawian migrant workers in South Africa in 1977.<38>

Although Malawi's dependence on South Africa for labour remittances decreased, this has been replaced by the growing importance of South Africa in the area of trade. In 1976, when Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia, trade between Malawi and Rhodesia was effectively halted. The country which filled the gap as a result of Rhodesia's loss of the Malawian market was South Africa. In 1976, South Africa eclipsed Britain as Malawi's main supplier. In 1977, 37% of Malawi's total imports came from South Africa, while only 19% came from Britain.<39> In the period between 1974 and 1977, Malawi's exports to South Africa doubled to 13 million Rand<40>, although trade between the two countries remained extremely lopsided. Malawi continued to receive aid from South Africa for various development projects, especially in connection with the new capital of Lilongwe, but South Africa was by no means Malawi's most important source of financial assistance.

Despite the changes in the political balance of power in Southern Africa brought about by the independence of Mozambique, Malawi's foreign policy continued to be dictated by the underlying concern for its economic interest. Relations with the Marxist regime in Mozambique were no less repugnant to Banda than had been relations with the colonial Portuguese authorities. Yet Malawi proceeded to attempt to

improve its relations with Mozambique and cooperated with Zambia on the economic level as well. The economic interdependence among these countries helped to prevent Malawi from becoming more isolated as it lost its position on the frontier of colonial and minority-ruled Southern Africa. The continued economic benefits which Malawi derived from its relations with South Africa made it impractical for Malawi to change its policy toward that country.

Impact of South Africa's Regional Policy on Malawi

Despite the huge impact which the independence of Angola and Mozambique had on South Africa, the economic dominance of South Africa in Southern Africa has meant that the independent states of the region have been far more vulnerable to policies initiated by South Africa than South Africa has been vis-a-vis their collective policies toward South Africa. Nevertheless, the change in the configuration of power in the region after the Portuguese coup forced South Africa to re-evaluate its position in Southern Africa.<41> The Soweto riots in 1976, the achievement of independence by Zimbabwe in 1980, and the recent disturbances during 1984 and 1985 have all helped to create a situation of instability and to increase South Africa's vulnerability.<42>

When P.W. Botha succeeded Vorster as Prime minister in 1978, a renewed emphasis was placed on closer regional ties in Southern Africa. A bold foreign policy initiative was

embodied in South Africa's plans for a "constellation of states". The major emphasis of this constellation was to be on economic cooperation^{<43>} in the hope that this would spill over into political and military cooperation as well. The idea of a constellation, however, received little support in Black Africa. It was perceived to represent a conscious strategy on the part of South Africa to use its economic clout to moderate revolutionary zeal and promote regional stability in the cause of its own interests.^{<44>} The constellation idea was also rejected because of South Africa's inclusion in it of the "independent" bantustans of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, which are not internationally recognized. For Black African states, acceptance of the constellation would have implied acceptance of South Africa's apartheid system.^{<45>}

The most important reason for the lack of progress toward South Africa's envisaged constellation was the independence of Zimbabwe and its decision, as a key economic player in Southern Africa, to join the ranks of the newly created Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The chief objective in the formation of SADCC was to reduce the region's economic dependence on South Africa through the coordination of specific projects, particularly in the area of transport and communications. The essential constraining nature of economic dependence was highlighted by Sir Seretse Khama, the late President of Botswana:

The first necessity in such a programme <Programme of Action> is to enlarge our freedom of choice. When there are no options the process of decision taking is an empty one.

There is need for choice of transportation routes and

communications channels, for choice of sources of energy, for choice of markets and of suppliers, for choice of investment sources and enterprise partners. We need to develop programmes to reduce one-sided dependence and to increase the options open to our national economies and governments. This need is probably greater and more urgent in southern Africa than anywhere else in the world. The fragmentation of our economies and their enforced integration into that of the Republic of South Africa have created an excessive national and regional dependence on that country which we seek to reduce.<46>

The Lusaka Declaration on 'Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation' and the Programme of Action both reflect the overriding aim to delink the region as much as possible from South Africa.

The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 and the establishment of SADCC created new and significant opportunities for Malawi. On the economic level Malawi was presented with the possibility of reducing its economic dependence on South Africa. On the political level membership in SADCC provided Malawi an opportunity to lessen its relative isolation by increased contacts with neighbouring states and to have a say in the future of Southern Africa.<47> Malawi was able to join SADCC despite its continued diplomatic relations with South Africa, perhaps a reflection of SADCC's pragmatic assessment of the harsh economic realities facing all states in the region.

In view of the historic economic relations between Malawi and Rhodesia, Zimbabwe's independence enabled Malawi to divert some of its trade from South Africa to Zimbabwe. Following UDI, Malawi's trade relations with Rhodesia had been radically reduced, and, after Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia in 1976, trade came to a virtual standstill. Both Malawi and Zimbabwe indicated an interest

in re-establishing former economic ties. Zimbabwe made the first move by sending a delegation to Malawi's independence anniversary ceremonies in July 1980. With their mutual interest in increased bilateral trade, relations continued to improve; in March 1981 a Zimbabwe Trade and Commerce delegation visited Malawi, and in April Dr. Banda sent a personal message of congratulations on the anniversary of Zimbabwe's independence.<48> An examination of the statistics shows that trade between Malawi and Zimbabwe increased. The value of Malawi's imports from Zimbabwe jumped from K12,662 in 1980 to K19,136 in 1982, and the value of Malawi's exports to Zimbabwe rose from K12,291 in 1980 to K16,618 in 1982 (see Table 7).<49> During the same period a downward trend was evident in the value of Malawi's imports from South Africa which declined from K131,487 to K117,131; however, Malawi's exports to South Africa doubled from K7,481 to K14,978.<50>

It seems clear that Malawi's foreign policy has been undergoing a slow but steady evolution. This does not mean that there has been a revolution in Malawi's foreign policy -- the underlying determinant remains Malawi's economic interests. But in order for Malawi's economic interests to remain intact, it has had to move with the times and respond to developments in Southern Africa. The evolution in Malawi's policy is best evidenced in Malawi's decision to join SADCC and to sign the Lusaka Declaration calling for reduced dependence on South Africa and repudiating the policy of accommodation with that country. Malawi has chosen to play an active role in SADCC and has pledged to

'stand "squarely behind the objectives and ideals of SADCC".<51> Despite Malawi's membership in SADCC, however, Malawi has made it clear that it is not about to reconsider its diplomatic relations with South Africa. Economic aid, albeit at a decreased level, continues to flow to Malawi from South Africa. Indeed, in 1982, Malawi's ambassador to Pretoria, Tim Mangwazu, reassured South Africa of its commitment to diplomatic relations. Malawi's membership in SADCC does not contradict its policy of cooperation with South Africa, as the reasoning behind both is the maintenance of Malawi's economic prosperity.

Malawi's more active role in SADCC was reflected in the holding of the 1981 conference in Blantyre. Malawi's interest in SADCC is clearly based on the economic benefits it feels can be derived from participation.<52> As a landlocked country, Malawi stands to gain from the expansion and improvement of Southern Africa's transport and communications facilities. Malawi saw economic dividends as early as 1982 when donor support was acquired for the improvement of the Nacala-Malawi Railway under the auspices of the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission.<53> The increased cooperation with Mozambique as a result of the project paid off politically as well, when diplomatic relations were established in 1981.

Malawi's interest in SADCC is also a reflection of the serious transport problems it has suffered since 1979 as a direct result of South Africa's policy of destabilization in Southern Africa. The 1980s have witnessed a pattern of events in which South Africa has tended to rely on its

military as much as economic clout in the pursuit of its regional policy. Where economic considerations have failed to elicit cooperation from the independent states, South Africa feels that its military clout can force moderation in the policies of its more radical neighbours. The main feature of this tactic has been to provide assistance to resistance movements in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The operations of the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM), with its attacks on economic installations<54>, have been so devastating economically that Mozambique was obliged to negotiate with South Africa in early 1984. Similar negotiations took place with Angola and, earlier, Swaziland.

The impact on Malawi of the disruption of Mozambique's transit routes has been extremely damaging. The situation Malawi finds itself in now is even worse than when FRELIMO was operating in Mozambique prior to independence. Malawi's transport costs have increased dramatically as a result of having to rely on a trade route through Zambia and Botswana to Zeerust in South Africa for its imports and exports. A route through Zimbabwe was not feasible because of a decision that transit traffic had to be carried by Zimbabwean transport companies.<55> As recently as the fall of 1984, Malawi still had to rely entirely on the route to South Africa for its imports and exports.<56>

The disruption of Malawi's transit routes through Mozambique has had such a disastrous effect that the possibility of linking Malawi's railway with the TanZam railway is now being considered as a viable alternative. If such a link is constructed, Malawi will have come full

circle since its independence in 1964. Clearly, only severe economic hardship could have brought Malawi to the point of considering a link with Tanzania since such a route would be very costly to build and be less efficient than the already existing routes to Nacala and Beira. It would appear that if Malawi's transit routes are not soon restored, Malawi will have to reassess the benefits of its relations with South Africa. Unfortunately, although South Africa is no longer aiding MRM as a result of the negotiations with Mozambique in 1984, it appears that the movement has gained a momentum of its own.

Conclusion

The negotiations between South Africa, on the one hand, and Angola and Mozambique, on the other, represent a vindication, in a sense of Banda's policy of cooperation with South Africa. South Africa has brought these countries to their knees through its policy of economic and military destabilization to extract their correspondence with its interests. As the chairman of the SADCC conference at Maseru, Peter Mmusi, acknowledged in 1983: "It is not much use to develop ports and pipelines, roads and railways and then to watch in silence as they are blown up....We cannot ignore the continuing, indeed escalating, acts of sabotage which are being directed at our member-states".<57> Banda had, however, demonstrated considerable foresight in terms of his recognition of the destructive potential of South Africa should it either feel threatened enough or be

desperate enough. As early as 1965 he had said:

The South African Army is the strongest, most efficient on our continent....If South Africa is attacked or is threatened to be attacked over South-West Africa, she will not think she is being attacked just to be expelled from South West Africa. No! she will think, feel and consider that she is being attacked in order to be wiped out of existence as a nation. And she will defend herself with all the means and resources at her disposal -- material and human.<58>

Banda's policy has also been vindicated in terms of his realistic appraisal of the constraints imposed on policy by economic dependence. This is reflected, in part, in the expressed aims of SADCC to reduce dependence on South Africa. His realism has come to be belatedly appreciated in the policies of even the more radical states such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Joachim Chissano, Mozambique's Foreign Minister, had stated:

We will never accept apartheid and have told the South Africans that. However, it has to be admitted that some countries have no choice. The ties which their former colonizers had established with South Africa involve their very infrastructures. These ties are such that it is now impossible to reject cooperation without disastrous consequences for our economies.<59>

Zimbabwe, which is heavily dependent on South Africa, has also had to face up to the difficult economic realities. It has done this by reassuring South Africa that it will not allow its territory to be used as a base for guerrilla activities against South Africa.

It is this new recognition of economic realities which has also helped to facilitate Malawi's inclusion in Southern African affairs. Malawi's membership in SADCC reflects a hard-headed assessment of the economic benefits that can be derived through participation in intra-regional affairs. This enables Malawi to balance a policy of

cooperation in relation to South Africa with an active involvement in SADCC. Malawi's present policy toward South Africa and SADCC can be compared to the balancing act that took place in its policy toward FRELIMO and Portugal before Mozambique's independence. Yet, at present it does not appear that any fundamental change is about to take place in Malawi's basic policy toward South Africa.

Footnotes

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CHAPTER V

**MALAWI AND ZAMBIA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES**

The foreign policies of Malawi and Zambia represent opposite extremes within the limited range of choice available to two small, land-locked and economically dependent African states. While there are certain similarities between the two countries, there have also been important differences between Malawi and Zambia. The most critical difference at the time of their independence was that Malawi had less room to manoeuvre and, hence, less freedom of choice than did Zambia. The next most important difference between the two countries was the nature of leadership, for the crucial decisions made at independence and beyond in Malawi were largely economically inspired, whereas in the case of Zambia they were in large part politically inspired. However, it was only because there were more choices open to Zambia due to its economic situation that the leadership there was often able to let political motives take precedence over sound economics.

As two newly-independent developing states, both Zambia and Malawi had to face the difficult dilemma of how to promote economic growth without undermining their newly won and fragile independence. As two independent African states situated on the frontier of minority-ruled Southern Africa, and hence directly affected by any developments in that region, they had to face an additional dilemma: whether to cooperate with the white - minority regimes,

which would be more consistent with a policy of economic growth, or to challenge these regimes by supporting the liberation movements and withdrawing economic ties from the region, which would be consistent with a policy of political and, hopefully, economic independence. There is a subjective element to this dilemma, and it is not the purpose here to make a value judgement as to which side of the dilemma might have been preferable. Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate why Malawi had less freedom than Zambia in choosing between a policy of cooperation and a policy of disengagement, a freedom based on the economic resources available to the two countries. While the outlook of the two leaders, Hastings Banda and Kenneth Kaunda, is certainly important, both leaders had to work within their respective constraining framework of economic dependence.

The foreign policies of Malawi and Zambia were necessarily intertwined with their domestic especially development, policies. The fact that both are land-locked made this reality even more poignant. As well as being land-locked, there were historical similarities between the two countries. Both had been former British colonies, known as Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and both had been unwilling members, from the African standpoint, of the Federation with Southern Rhodesia. The result was that when the two countries won their independence in 1964, their economies were integrated with the region of Southern Africa and both were highly dependent on Rhodesia and, to a lesser extent, South Africa. However, the nature of their dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa differed because of

the marked differences in the economies of Malawi and Zambia.

The major difference between Malawi and Zambia was that, while at independence Malawi was one of the poorest countries in Africa, Zambia was one of the richest. Zambia's wealth was derived from its rich copper resources, which accounted for 95% of the country's exports^{<1>}; compared with that, Malawi had no exploitable minerals. While it is true that Zambia was more dependent than Malawi on Rhodesia and South Africa in the area of trade (60% of Zambia's imports came from Rhodesia and South Africa)^{<2>}, Malawi was more dependent than Zambia on these two countries as outlets for its migrant labour. While the disadvantages of Zambia's copper industry were that it was owned by British and South African companies and that it depended on transport routes largely through Rhodesia, the key advantage was that copper was Zambia's greatest economic asset ^{<3>}, which gave Zambia substantial revenues. On the other hand, Malawi's agricultural commodities did not attract the prices which copper did on the international market. Whereas at independence Zambia enjoyed a capital surplus, Malawi suffered from the constraints of a budget deficit. If Malawi hoped to rid itself of this deficit, rapid economic growth was essential.

Thus, at independence Malawi's foreign policy was constrained by a lack of mineral wealth such as Zambia's copper, and by a budget deficit as compared with Zambia's revenue surplus. The revenues derived from copper provided Zambia with the capital required to effect the costly policy

of disengagement from Southern Africa. Zambia was also afforded more freedom of choice because of the availability of alternative transit routes; Zambia had access to more transit routes than any other land-locked country in Southern Africa <4>. As well as the rail links through Rhodesia to ports in Mozambique and South Africa, Zambia had access to the Benguela Railway through Angola, the Great East Road to Malawi linking up with the rail link to Beira, and the Great North Road to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Malawi had only its rail link through Mozambique to Beira and a road through Mozambique to Rhodesia and South Africa. Thus, although Zambia may have been more dependent than Malawi on Rhodesia and South Africa in the areas of transport and trade, Zambia had the advantages of its fully developed copper industry, the capital surplus it provided, and alternative, albeit more costly, transit routes. Zambia was also less dependent on Rhodesia and South Africa than Malawi as an outlet for its migrant workers. These advantages afforded Zambia a wider degree of choice than Malawi, which had a smaller economy with comparatively less potential. Malawi's budget deficit meant it had to fight for a greater degree of independence from Britain first, before it could afford the luxury of assessing its situation in Southern Africa, both in terms of disengagement and support to liberation movements.

The Politics of Economics: Zambia's Policy of Disengagement

The goal of Zambia's foreign trade policy, as elucidated in 1964, was "to establish mutually advantageous trading relationships with as many friendly countries as possible and to move right away from the heavy dependence on Southern Africa as a source, and a transit route, for imports and exports which was a feature of Zambia's pre-independence trading patterns."<5> The implementation of this policy of disengagement was to have far-reaching economic consequences for Zambia, involving many sacrifices which would have been out of the question for Malawi. The severe economic crisis which Zambia found itself in by the late 1970s was aggravated not only by the policy of disengagement, but also by the support it furnished to liberation movements and the retaliation which that support invited. This section discusses the details and costs of Zambia's policy of disengagement, while the next section compares Malawi's and Zambia's policy towards the liberation movements and the white-minority regimes.

From the start, a policy of disengagement is uneconomic by nature. Unlike a policy of diversification, which in terms of, say, transport involves finding as many cheap and efficient alternative routes as possible, disengagement involves finding alternative routes so that the original ones may be closed off. The overriding considerations in opting for disengagement were political, not economic.<6> In the case of Zambia, the result has been that it has had to pay a high price for its principles<7>, a

price that was to become progressively more expensive.

Originally, Zambia had intended to implement a process of gradual disengagement. Unlike Malawi, Zambia announced in 1964 its intention to cancel the preferential trade agreement with Rhodesia, and the trading arrangements that had existed with Portugal and South Africa, and to terminate labour recruitment through WENELA.<8> No other immediate drastic steps were planned at that time. The Rhodesian UDI, however, changed the situation overnight in the eyes of Zambia's leaders. Rather than continuing the policy of a gradual withdrawal of links, a rapid and immediate process of disengagement was introduced, regardless of cost. As a result of UDI, Rhodesia was to become Zambia's principal foreign policy preoccupation for the next fifteen years. One of the results of this preoccupation was the subordination of domestic economic growth to foreign policy goals.<9>

Although UDI, and the disengagement policy Zambia felt it must follow as a result of it, proved to be an economic disaster to the country, there were some benefits as well. The chief benefit to Zambia, domestically, was that it provided an excuse and an opportunity to mobilize the whole population in the pursuit of one common goal, disengagement. This was important in light of the costs and sacrifices that were to be endured to effect an immediate disengagement. UDI also served to attach priority to disengaging first from Rhodesia, on which Zambia was the most dependent in the region, and then to attempt disengagement from the rest of Southern Africa. The result, however, was that the more Zambia managed to decrease its dependence on Rhodesia, the

more it increased its dependence on the Portuguese territories and South Africa.

Zambia's dependence on Rhodesia was not limited to the area of transport for almost all of its copper exports; its copper industry was also dependent on Rhodesia's coal from Wankie and on electricity from the Kariba dam, situated on the Rhodesian side of the Zambezi River.<10> As part of Zambia's policy of disengagement, alternative sources would have to be found for the copper industry's requirements for coal and electricity supplies. While this would have been a desirable policy under any circumstances, the felt need to disengage from Rhodesia rapidly, and the decision to implement sanctions, meant that large amounts of capital had to be diverted to this purpose over a short period of time. This necessitated the inclusion in the budget after UDI of "contingency" planning to cover the costs of disengagement.<11>

In terms of finding alternative sources of coal and electricity Zambia had moderate success. In 1966, the Nkandabwe coal mine was opened, but it did not come close to meeting Zambia's needs. The Maambwa coal mine was opened in 1971 and it enabled Zambia to approach self-sufficiency in coal. In the meantime, however, Zambia was to suffer from acute shortages which, when combined with other problems associated with disengagement such as transport difficulties, resulted in a substantial decline in copper production.<12>

The decisions relating to finding alternative sources of energy are a good example of how political considerations

tended to override economic ones. Although the Kariba dam belonged to the jointly-owned Central African Power Corporation, the location of the power station on Rhodesia's side of the Zambezi meant that Rhodesia controlled Zambia's access to electricity. In its desire not to associate with the Central African Power Corporation, Zambia preferred a site on the internally located Kafue River. Despite the fact that the Kafue project would cost twice as much as a second Kariba power station on the Zambian side, and that the World Bank had offered to finance a major portion of the cost of the Kariba project, Zambia proceeded with the Kafue project instead.<13> In the end, however, when it was predicted that Zambia would be unable to meet its growing electricity needs, it was decided that Zambia could not afford to forego the economic opportunities provided by Kariba as well.<14>

In the area of oil supplies, disengagement came on the initiative of Rhodesia rather than of Zambia. When, as part of global sanctions Rhodesia's oil supplies were cut off, it retaliated by cutting off Zambia's oil supplies, all of which passed through Rhodesia. With the cooperation of Tanzania, the construction of a new oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Ndola in Zambia was undertaken, and it was completed in 1968. Although the pipeline was completed very quickly, Zambia had to endure shortages and the additional costs of alternative routes, including emergency airlifts, in the interim. The pipeline was to be just one of many examples of the vital role Tanzania was to play in assisting Zambia in its costly policy of disengagement.

The largest and most expensive undertaking in Zambia's efforts at disengagement, and one which required the close cooperation of Tanzania, was the construction of the TanZam Railway. From the start the economic rationale for the construction of the railway, in terms of such criteria as low cost and efficiency, was secondary in the minds of Zambia's leaders.<15> As Kaunda himself stated in 1963: "This railway is a political necessity. Even after Rhodesia wins majority rule, there will still be Mozambique and South Africa between us and the sea".<16> Zambia's initial lack of success in getting funding for the railway, preferably from Western countries, reflected the view that the railway was not viable economically. The World Bank, which had been commissioned to conduct a feasibility survey, questioned the need for the railway since Zambia already had access to adequate, cheap and efficient transport facilities through Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique.<17> The Bank's report also noted that the limited trade between Zambia and East Africa did not justify a new railway, that present port facilities at Dar es Salaam lacked the capacity to handle Zambia's exports without expensive improvements, and that the gauge of the Tanzanian railway was different from that of Zambia's.<18> These problems were all to come back to haunt Zambia, and hurt its economy, once the railway was finally completed in 1975.

Nevertheless, since political considerations were paramount at the time, Zambia continued to search for financing for the railway. When China came forward with an offer in 1965 to help build the railway, Kaunda, uneasy


about communist influence, was initially very cautious.<19> However, when efforts over the next two years to secure help from the West proved unsuccessful, and Nyerere displayed his willingness to accept the Chinese offer, an agreement was finally reached between China, Tanzania and Zambia for construction of the railway. China provided an interest-free loan of K286 million to be paid back in thirty years starting in 1973.<20> The only disagreement concerning the railway was between Tanzania and Zambia over whether the line should end in Dar es Salaam or Mtwara. Tanzania, for its own political reasons, preferred Dar es Salaam, while Zambia, unimpressed with assurances that the port would be equipped to handle the extra Zambian traffic, preferred the potential for development of Mtwara.<21> In the end, however, the Tanzanian preference prevailed.

In the post-UDI period, 1975 was still a long time off before the TanZam Railway could be completed. In the meantime, Zambia had to make do with expensive, inadequate and unreliable alternative routes. Essentially it meant that Zambia was only partially able to break away from its reliance on Rhodesia as a transport route. In an effort to make up the deficiency until TanZam could be completed, improvements were made to the already existing Great North Road to Dar es Salaam, and the Great East Road to Malawi. However, since use of the Great East Road meant that eventually Zambian traffic would have to go through Mozambique, the Great North Road was preferred for political reasons. This was despite the fact that it was over twice as long, that it was overloaded with traffic, that the rainy

season rendered it impossible to use at times and that its high accident rate had earned it the nickname "hell run".<22>

Rhodesia did not sit back and watch as Zambia attempted to disengage, particularly in view of the fact that the jointly-owned Rhodesia Railway received most of its revenue from Zambian copper. In 1966, a railway crisis developed when Zambia refused to transfer payments to the Rhodesian half of the Railway. In 1967, Zambia nationalized its half of the Railway, but this did not stop Rhodesia from holding up Zambian imports, hoarding wagons on its side of the border and insisting that payments be made in advance.<23> The disruption this caused to Zambia's copper exports, and the inadequacy of alternative routes, compelled Zambia to continue exporting copper through Rhodesia, as well as receiving imports through it. Thus, until 1973, when the border between Zambia and Rhodesia was closed, Zambian copper exports through Rhodesia never fell below a third of its total copper exports.<24> The railway crisis also demonstrated Zambia's extreme vulnerability in its early efforts at disengagement from Southern Africa.

There can be no doubt of the damage to Zambia's economy as a consequence of efforts at disengagement, sustained as it was by copper revenues. After UDI, resources had to be immediately diverted to finding new sources of coal and electricity, building a new pipeline and a rail route through Tanzania, and improving already existing routes. Even in these areas political considerations often prevailed. Contingency planning had to



be included in the budget towards offsetting higher import prices, costly fuel imports, and disrupted copper exports.<25> The political preoccupation with disengagement meant that Zambia's economic development suffered as a result (see Table 8). The decision not to continue with the gradual process of disengagement after UDI led to the distortion of economic development plans, the diversion of resources from immediately productive investment, and the permanent raising of the cost and price structure of the Zambian economy.<26>

Cooperation versus Confrontation:
Malawian and Zambian Approaches

The economic consequences of Zambia's policy of disengagement were worsened by its related policy of confrontation with the minority regimes of Southern Africa, which took the form of support for the national liberation movements. This was in sharp contrast to Malawi, which, with the exception in respect of FRELIMO, refrained from providing support for the national liberation movements, and cooperated openly with South Africa on both the political and economic levels. Although Malawi did take steps to decrease its trade with Rhodesia after UDI, it did so gradually and with the economic interests of the country in mind. It has been argued in this study that these differences resulted from the varying range of choice available based on economic resources. However, the differences in the overall approaches of the two leaders, Banda and Kaunda, also have to be taken into account.

The differences between Banda and Kaunda lie not in their shared desire for political change in Southern Africa, but in the means by which that change should come about. Up until independence, Banda had been quite vehement in his denunciation of colonial and white minority rule in Southern Africa. However, the economic realities confronting Malawi at independence caused Banda to alter his rhetoric and seek cooperation with Portugal and South Africa in the interest of promoting rapid economic growth. This policy of cooperation included promises to both South Africa and Portugal that Malawi would not lend support to national liberation movements. The exception of limited support to FRELIMO was a reflection of the realistic assessment of the growing momentum of the movement and the increasing inability of the Portuguese authorities to control it.

Rather than promoting violent change in Southern Africa, Banda has consistently favoured change through peaceful means. Banda was also concerned that were Malawi to support the liberation movements, whether directly or indirectly, it would be vulnerable to retaliation from militarily superior Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. As Malawi's delegate to the United Nations, Nyasulu, stated: "Let the advocates of force and violence think just for one moment not only of the horrors of violence and bloodshed but also of the practical difficulties lying in the way of effective resort thereto".<27> Banda did not feel that Malawi was in a position to afford to have its internal and external security threatened by harbouring liberation movements on its territory.

Up until 1965, Kaunda's outlook was very similar to Banda's in that he favoured negotiation and change through peaceful means.<28> In fact, in 1964, Kaunda made several offers to open diplomatic relations with South Africa. However, — he did not hide the fact that Zambia's embassy might be used in a subversive fashion, and his offers were therefore turned down by South Africa. When Malawi established diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1967, there were no conditions attached, and Malawi promised that it would not carry out subversive acts.

The political outlooks of Banda and Kaunda began to diverge, however, after Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence. From that point on, Kaunda's frustration over the stalemate in Rhodesia led him to advocate the use of force on the part of Britain to bring about change. Banda, on the other hand, was opposed to the use of force in Rhodesia. To this day, he has continued to hold to his view that violence is not a solution at any time or under any circumstances. When Prime Minister Vorster paid a state visit to Malawi in 1970, Banda said:

If we are ever going to solve the problem of black and white in this part of Africa...we have to start talking to each other. We have to visit one another's country....This may not solve the problem today, tomorrow, next week, next year, five years, ten years, even twenty. But believe me, I honestly and strongly believe that in the end it is the only solution to our problem.<29>

In contrast, Kaunda, although he continued to prefer change through peaceful means, came to believe more and more in the efficacy of armed struggle in the face of intransigent white-minority regimes. Thus, violence was to be the solution of last resort, if negotiations failed. This was

the view expressed in the OAU-endorsed Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, to which Malawi was not a signatory. The Lusaka Manifesto reflected the evolution that the thinking of Kaunda had undergone at that time:

We have always preferred...to achieve {the objective of liberation} without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible,...we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle....But while peaceful progress is blocked...we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors.<30>

The failure of South Africa to accept the Lusaka Manifesto led in 1971 to the adoption of the more militant Mogadishu Declaration, which advocated armed force as the only solution for Southern Africa. Of the Mogadishu Declaration, Kaunda stated that it had the "element and function of a final warning impressing...the need to negotiate in time..."<31>

Thus, while Kaunda was reconciling himself to the use of force, he did not exclude the option of negotiation. The period between 1974 and 1976 witnessed a series of initiatives on his part in cooperation with South Africa towards bringing about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. The failure of these initiatives, however, led to a further hardening of Kaunda's position as he became increasingly convinced of the inevitability of violence as the instrument of change in Southern Africa.<32> In light of the failure of the detente initiatives, Kaunda stated:

Even at this late stage, we allowed peaceful change to have an opportunity in Zimbabwe. The total breakdown of constitutional negotiations in Rhodesia has now demonstrated to all and sundry that nothing can be gained by a peace strategy as an approach to ending racism and colonialism which has led to conflict in Southern Africa. We have left no stone unturned in our determination to achieve majority rule by peaceful means. We invested a lot in the peace program as an instrument for beneficial change; that has failed. But we place this failure squarely on the shoulders of rebel leader Mr. Ian Smith and his henchmen....In the circumstances, Africa has no option left but to help intensify the armed struggle which is now in full swing. This is the gravest hour in the history of our subcontinent....The armed struggle is a just war against injustice which must be waged until victory is won....The whites in Rhodesia have made their choice, namely that they prefer change to come by violent means....they should not blame anybody except themselves for opting for a course that is clearly not in their interests and has the gravest consequences for non-racialism in Southern Africa.<33>

On the other hand, during all the various negotiations over political change in Southern Africa, Banda has remained more or less on the sidelines. One area, however, in which Banda and Kaunda have shared common ground is in their desire to present their countries as exemplary models of racial tolerance and majority rule.<34> This, they feel, will persuade the white - minority regimes that they have nothing to fear from black majority rule. This view has often been enunciated by Banda, the more enthusiastic proponent of persuasion:

We look forward to the day when the authorities in South Africa may be persuaded that the non-African has nothing to fear from the African and thereby be persuaded, through the examples set in other countries where harmony between the races is so amply demonstrated, that the time has come to abandon their concept of apartheid.<35>

Banda, however, has not been willing to go the next step beyond persuasion, which is to support the national liberation movements. In view of the retaliation and

sabotage of transport routes that Zambia has invited as a result of its support to the liberation movements, Banda's reluctance is understandable. Zambia, as the most strategically located independent state in Southern Africa, is also the most exposed, and this has increased the cost of its policy of support to liberation movements.<36> Zambia's borders lie along Mozambique, Rhodesia and Angola, all of which, until 1974, were theatres of guerrilla warfare. Zambia's support to liberation movements increased the threats to its internal and external security. Perceived to be a launching pad for guerrilla forces, Zambia was subjected to repeated border violations by Portuguese, South African, and Rhodesian forces in hot pursuit.<37> In addition to the border violations, the acts of sabotage on various transport routes served to damage Zambia's economy. It has been the belief of the Zambian leadership that a policy of confrontation would increase the cost of repression by the white - minority regimes.<38> However, the evidence would seem to suggest that the cost of confrontation has been higher for Zambia, which is in a very vulnerable position, than it has been for the minority regimes. Zambia has had to divert substantial resources to its expanding armed forces in order to offset the threat to its security.<39>

The Economics of Politics: The Deepening
Economic Crisis in Zambia

Zambia's two-pronged policy of disengagement and support to the national liberation movements has served to

multiply and intensify the crises that Zambia has faced.<40> Since UDI in 1965, the Zambian economy has undergone a steady decline, while the population has been subjected to increasing economic hardship.<41> The favourable economic situation which Zambia enjoyed at independence had reversed itself by the early 1970s, and Zambia's increasing international indebtedness was to reach crisis proportions by the early 1980s. The economic consequences of Zambia's policy of disengagement and confrontation, and the various setbacks to that policy over the years, tend to confirm the wisdom of Malawi's policy of cooperation.

The most difficult aspect of Zambia's policy of disengagement was the search for sources of imports outside of Southern Africa.<42> To enforce this policy the government introduced legislation which required that a specified list of imports had to come via Dar es Salaam. Although this did succeed in raising the cost of supplies for the Zambian populace, it did not succeed in substantially reducing imports from the south. As had been the case with Malawi, although Zambia succeeded in reducing its imports from Rhodesia, from 34% of the total in 1965 to 7% in 1969, imports from South Africa increased by about the same amount.<43> The difference between Malawi and Zambia, however, was that Malawi continued to decrease its imports from Rhodesia gradually through its policy of import substitution. The Zambian decision to apply sanctions against Rhodesia cost Zambia an estimated L20,000,000 a year for the first three years after UDI and, ironically, some of the extra supplies from South Africa were actually Rhodesian

goods that had been repackaged with new labels in Johannesburg.<44>

Zambia's vital mining industry remains dependent on South Africa for imports of mining equipment which is manufactured there.<45> Zambia's mining industry also depends on South African technicians and skilled workers. The economic necessity of continued trade with South Africa has diluted Zambia's policy of disengagement and confrontation and has required a series of discreet and "informal" contacts with South Africa.<46> This ambiguity in Zambia's policy toward South Africa has understandably frustrated Banda, who has been severely criticized for openly trading with South Africa. In response to one such criticism, Banda declared:

While they are criticizing me for trading with South Africa openly, they themselves are trading with South Africa secretly. While they are decrying South Africa, they are doing so on stomachs full of South African beef, South African butter, South African pork. Yes, they are doing so while their shops are full of South African consumer goods...they are doing so while employing South African White miners to mine their minerals, they are doing so while allowing South African financiers, industrialists to invest in their mines, their farms and their industry.... I treat them with utter contempt....I say they are moral and physical cowards and hypocrites....<47>

In view of Zambia's growing economic problems, the decision in 1973 to close the border between Rhodesia and Zambia was to seriously aggravate Zambia's economic difficulties. The consequences of the decision were to add to the growing voice of dissatisfaction among the Zambian populace. For political opponents of Kaunda, Malawi offered an alternative foreign policy stance in the face of the growing costs of Zambia's policy of confrontation.<48> The

growing reservations about the cost of Zambia's foreign policy and the strain of political pressure for change forced Kaunda in 1978 to reverse his previous policy and announce a partial reopening of the border with Rhodesia.<49> This allowed some vitally needed goods such as maize to be imported, and it facilitated the export of copper. It also allowed supplies for the manufacturing industry, mines, and consumers to come from the cheapest and closest source, South Africa and Rhodesia.<50>

Since the re-opening of the border with Rhodesia in 1978, imports from South Africa have increased dramatically. When Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, Zambian businessmen were encouraged to import their supplies from Zimbabwe and South Africa to help reduce the costs of consumer and producer goods.<51> Trade with South Africa more than doubled from 1979 to 1980, and in 1981 South Africa became Zambia's second largest source of imports after Britain, with its share of the Zambian market increasing from 11% in 1979 to 16% in 1981 (see Table 9).<52> Thus, although South Africa and Zambia remain hostile at the political level, Zambia has witnessed a reversal of its policy of disengagement from Southern Africa and has come closer in line with Malawi's policy of economic cooperation with South Africa. This reversal has been a direct result of the unbearable cost of Zambia's policy of disengagement and the need for Kaunda to bow to the pressure of public dissatisfaction. Zambia's increased trade with South Africa has represented a satisfactory turn of events for South Africa, as Zambia has always been considered a

very important market for South African goods.<53>

In the area of transport routes, Zambia's difficulties were not substantially lessened with the completion of the TanZam railway in 1975. The different gauges and inadequate port facilities at Dar es Salaam were to create major transport bottlenecks. In addition, the light nature of track construction has meant that freight cars can only be loaded to half their capacity.<54> Moreover, goods damaged at the port in Dar es Salaam or along the railway route cost Zambia K985 million between 1978 and 1980.<55> Further difficulties for Zambian transport resulted when the civil war, which erupted in Angola in 1975, closed off the Benguela Railway to Zambian traffic from 1975 to 1981. With the closure of the border with Rhodesia, Zambia came to be almost completely dependent on the TanZam Railway. This led to the opinion on the part of some Zambians that Tanzania had benefitted substantially as a result of Zambia's suffering<56>, and added to the pressure to re-open the border with Rhodesia in 1978.

Conclusion

Although Zambia had more resources which allowed it greater freedom of choice than Malawi, it is clear that the economic consequences of Zambia's policy of disengagement and confrontation have been overpowering. The tendency to subordinate national economic interests to political considerations has proved to be economically disastrous. In confronting the dilemma of economic growth versus economic

independence, Zambia has managed to achieve neither in its pursuit of the latter. In choosing the route of disengagement Zambia has sacrificed its economic prosperity and, for a variety of reasons, has failed to achieve the goal of economic independence. Malawi, on the other hand, was able to make significant economic gains throughout the 1970s.

If Banda had followed the advice of his cabinet ministers in 1964, who recommended various forms of disengagement from the white-ruled states, much as the policy Zambia followed, Malawi's economy would, in all probability, be in ruins today.

Footnotes

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- <15> Pettman, p. 116.
- <16> Hall, p. 211.
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- <19> Ibid., p. 214.
- <20> Pettman, p. 118.

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- <44> Hall, pp. 31-33.
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CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In response to the central question of this study as to the extent to which Malawi's economic dependence limited the range of foreign policy choices available to it, a qualified answer emerges. While it is clear that economic dependence acted as a major constraint on Malawi's foreign policy, Banda's role as leader of Malawi also played an important part in determining the direction of Malawi's foreign policy. The elite's close personal links with the former metropole is one of the factors which Christopher Clapham indicated had to be taken into account in analyzing the impact of economic dependence on foreign policy. This having been said, however, there can be no doubt that the additional factors Clapham lists as shaping the characteristics of a country's economic dependence, such as the size and nature of its economy, imposed constraints that would have limited the range of choice available to any leader in Malawi. Following the theoretical position of Benjamin Cohen, it would seem that Banda's limited range of choice also curtailed Malawi's bargaining strength, which had a constraining effect on Malawi's policy toward the white-minority ruled and colonial states of Southern Africa.

The fair degree of consistency which Malawi has displayed in its foreign policy is largely attributable to the harsh economic realities the country has had to face stemming from its economic dependence. The consistency in

Malawi's foreign policy can also be attributed to the priority which Banda attached to Malawi's economic interests.

In choosing the path of cooperation with South Africa, Banda placed priority on national economic growth. The nature of Malawi's economy being one of dependence on Portuguese Mozambique, settler Rhodesia and white-minority South Africa, the route to economic prosperity, repugnant as it may have been to a black nationalist, had to lie in a policy of cooperation with these regimes. Although Malawi's economic dependence has been the major determinant of its foreign policy, the influence of Dr. Banda has also been an important contributing factor. Banda's forty years in the West gave him a great respect for Western values as well as a deep suspicion of communism, particularly that form espoused by many modern African nationalists. Consequently, when faced with the realities of economic dependence on the white-minority regimes, he found it easier to lead his country in the direction of economic growth. Other contributing factors were internal and external developments, the latter of which were beyond Banda's control.

The pattern of Malawi's economic dependence can be traced back to colonial times, and even before. Malawi is land-locked, heavily populated and has an agriculturally-based economy with no exploitable mineral resources. The rich agricultural land which attracted white settlers to the region raised the demand for cheap labour and encouraged the process of internal labour migration.

The hut tax imposed by the administration forced Malawians to find cash-based jobs, and as there was little alternative employment opportunity in the form of mines, port facilities, and railroads, it was to the white farms that they moved. Within Malawi, the shortage of labour on the plantations in the Southern Region led to the implementation of legislation that further encouraged the southward trend in internal labour migration. However, the attraction of better wages in the mines of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa resulted in an increasing number of Malawians seeking work outside the country. The influx of the Lomwe from Mozambique into Southern Malawi further decreased the opportunity for wage employment inside Malawi and contributed to the growing numbers of Malawians working outside the country.

Although the economy was largely based on subsistence farming, a small number of Africans were encouraged to grow cash crops such as cotton and tobacco, which were sold to the Europeans who in turn sold the produce at higher prices. Tea was also introduced and became Malawi's second largest foreign exchange earner after tobacco. As a land-locked country, whose exports had to go through a single country, Portuguese Mozambique, the high cost associated with the export of Malawi's agricultural commodities was to hinder the country's economic development. Malawi's only rail link to the sea at Beira was not completed until 1935, and this monopoly situation caused Malawi to be subjected to ever-increasing freight rates.

Malawi's economic development during the colonial

period was further hindered by the pressures of a growing population on the land, which led to soil erosion due to the exhaustion of the land and poor cultivation methods practised by the Africans. The methods by which the administrative authorities attempted to introduce soil conservation were met by strong opposition on the part of the populace. This opposition served as a practical rallying point for the leaders of the NAC as they turned the opposition to Federation into a national movement. The fight against Federation led to the return of Banda after many years abroad and his emergence as the widely admired leader of Malawi.

The pattern of Malawi's economic dependence that was established during the colonial period was carried over into independence and served as a major constraint on Malawi's foreign policy. The framework of economic dependence within which Banda had to operate limited the range of foreign policy options available to Malawi. As a land-locked country extremely dependent on Portuguese Mozambique for its transport link to the sea, Banda was obliged to moderate his previously hostile rhetoric with regard to Portugal. The Cabinet split was a reflection of the difficult dilemma facing the leaders of a developing state, as suggested by Franklin Weinstein, in terms of how to reconcile the desire for economic dependence with the need for economic growth. For independent states in Southern Africa, this dilemma was intensified by the need to decide whether or not to support national liberation movements in the region. The cabinet ministers' preference for an additional rail link through

Tanzania indicated a higher priority for economic independence and disengagement at the expense of economic growth. However, such a costly and inefficient alternative would have undermined Malawi's economic growth for the sake of political considerations. In the aftermath of the Cabinet crisis, Banda's influence over foreign policy and Malawi as a whole became pervasive. That influence attached priority to Malawi's economic growth and the related necessity of cooperation with the white-minority and colonial regimes.

In any case, Malawi lacked the resources to absorb the higher economic costs and the structural disruptions that a rail link to Tanzania would have entailed. It appears that Banda's former cabinet ministers were overly optimistic about the freedom of choice available to Malawi at independence. Not only could Malawi's agricultural commodities not earn the revenues that Malawi might have earned had it been blessed with minerals, but Malawi inherited a budget deficit that served as a significant constraint on its independence. Only rapid economic growth would free Malawi from British grants-in-aid to cover the deficit. Moreover, even if an alternative rail link had been constructed, Malawi would still have had to moderate its rhetoric towards Portugal until the line was completed.

Although Malawi was more dependent on Rhodesia than South Africa in the area of migrant labour and trade at independence, this situation was to gradually change, partly as a natural result of Malawi's economic growth, but partly as a result of Banda's active promotion of economic links

with South Africa as well. The desire to promote Malawi's manufacturing sector through a policy of import substitution led to a significant reduction in imports, such as textiles and shoes, from Rhodesia. Rhodesia's UDI in 1965 provided Malawi the excuse to abrogate the preferential trade agreement with Rhodesia and gave a boost to Malawi's policy of import substitution. UDI also led to a significant decrease in the number of Malawians working in Rhodesia, and in this area South Africa was to pick up the slack. As the cheapest and closest source of capital goods, South Africa became the natural beneficiary of the demands of Malawi's growing economy.

However, although Malawi's economic growth led to a natural increase in trade with South Africa, Banda's decision to formalize these growing links through trade and labour agreements in 1967 also reinforced and expanded these links. The major factor behind Banda's decision to formalize economic links with South Africa was the need to find financing for the new capital at Lilongwe. The economic justification for the new capital was reportedly to correct the economic bias in favour of the Southern Region of Malawi and South Africa was the only country willing to finance the project. The result was that not only did Malawi increase its dependence on South Africa in the area of trade and migrant labour, but in the area of aid as well. Since 1974, however, Malawi has been able to decrease its dependence on South Africa in the area of migrant labour, as structural changes in the economy enabled Malawi to absorb some of the workers. Finally, the decision on the part of

Banda to establish formal diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1967 was a political act, and extends beyond the realm of economic necessity.

However, had it not been for Malawi's economic dependence, Banda would not have had to approach South Africa in the first place. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Banda agreed to establish diplomatic relations in exchange for funding for the capital, the need to approach South Africa demonstrates Malawi's lack of bargaining strength due to the limited range of choice stemming from its economic dependence. While this explanation appears to support Neil Richardson's thesis on the relationship between economic dependence and compliance, Malawi has not demonstrated consistently compliant behaviour toward South Africa. For example, Banda's decision to withdraw Malawi's migrant workers was not in the interest of South Africa as it had to find other workers to replace the Malawian workers. It is likely that the decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa was as much in response to Malawi's growing isolation among Black African states as a compliant gesture in exchange for financing for Lilongwe. It is also probable that Banda's decision to establish diplomatic relations stemmed from the moderation in his attitudes towards whites and South Africa's pro-West, anti-Communist stance. In terms of an appropriate theoretical approach to the study of the foreign policy of developing countries, the case study of Malawi demonstrates the utility of a framework that focuses on the economic dependence of these countries but is broad and

flexible enough to take due account of societal variables, pertaining to domestic politics, and of idiosyncratic variables, such as the personality factors.

Malawi's pragmatic foreign policy has remained consistent up to the present day. This policy of cooperation, rather than confrontation, and economic realism was evident in Malawi's refusal to apply sanctions against Rhodesia after UDI and Malawi's promise to Portugal not to harbour guerrillas on its territory when Portugal still had the upper hand in Mozambique. It has not been Malawi's foreign policy which has changed, but the political balance of power in the region of Southern Africa. The modifying factors of external regional developments has made it necessary for Malawi to adjust its policy to changing realities beyond its borders. To that change in the balance of power Malawi has responded in its usual pragmatic fashion. The underlying concern for Malawi's economic interests has remained dominant in its foreign policy. The Marxist regime which took over in Mozambique was no less repugnant to Banda than the former Portuguese colonial rule, but he maintained relations with Mozambique for the same underlying reason of economic necessity.

The efforts on the part of Malawi to improve its relations with its independent neighbours in the early 1970s was less a reflection of any revolution in its foreign policy and more an indication of the need to respond to the changing power realities in the region. The evolution in Malawi's foreign policy reflects both the growing interdependence in Southern Africa and the continued

economic and military dominance of South Africa. The formation of SADCC was a response both to the positive aspects of increased interdependence, but also the negative aspect of asymmetrical dependence on South Africa. Malawi stood to benefit economically from its membership in SADCC, particularly in the area of improvement to the region's transport infrastructure. Nevertheless, Malawi does not view its membership in SADCC as in any way contradicting its policy of cooperation with South Africa, and has reassured South Africa to this effect.

There can be no doubt that Malawi has benefited from its policy of cooperation with the white-minority regimes of Southern Africa. As a country that started with little, Malawi is today self-sufficient in food, is not heavily in debt compared to other developing countries, is fairly stable politically, and has done better economically than other developing countries considering its small size and geographic location. However, it would now seem that, as Malawi is no longer on the frontier of white-minority Southern Africa, the economic returns on Malawi's relations with South Africa are no longer as clear. South Africa's policy of destabilization and assistance to dissident movements, particularly MRM in Mozambique, has seriously damaged Malawi's economy due to the disruption of transport routes to the sea. The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 provided an important opportunity for Malawi to diversify its trade links, away from South Africa without hurting its economy, and trade with Zimbabwe has already increased substantially. However, Malawi's economic dependence on

South Africa would make it very difficult for any future government to break diplomatic relations with South Africa without inviting economic retaliation, particularly as diplomatic relations with Malawi are politically very important to South Africa. Nevertheless, the subsequent moderation in the policies of Zimbabwe and Mozambique towards South Africa has served to vindicate Banda's policy of cooperation with South Africa.

The comparison of the foreign policies of Malawi and Zambia towards South Africa highlights not only the dilemma such states face in choosing between economic development and independence, but also how they balance internal and external constraints as suggested by James Rosenau and elaborated on by Patrick McGowan and Klaus-Peter Gottwald. Although both states are land-locked, Malawi's small size and the nature of its economy meant that its range of choice was much more limited than that available to Zambia. The need to account for external constraints as a result of Malawi's economic dependence is suggestive of acquiescent adaptation and is reflected in Malawi's inability to pursue a policy of disengagement or to support national liberation movements in Southern Africa. The resources which Zambia derived from its copper exports enabled it to ignore both internal and external constraints by pursuing a policy of disengagement and support to national liberation movements indicative of promotive adaptation.

Although Zambia started out with a greater range of choice than Malawi, it has managed to curtail its freedom of choice due to the damage which its dual policy of

disengagement and confrontation has inflicted on its economy. Zambia has been unable to sustain the cost of that policy and is now increasing its trade with South Africa. There can be no doubt that resource-poor Malawi, had it pursued a policy of disengagement as the former cabinet ministers wished, would have been even less able than Zambia to sustain such a costly policy. The tendency on the part of Zambia's leadership to place political considerations above the economic welfare of the country has adversely affected Zambia's initial potential for economic growth. A policy of disengagement is in itself uneconomic as it implies opening up other links so as to close off already existing ones.

Zambia's decision to rapidly reduce its links with Rhodesia after UDI necessitated the mounting and immediate expenditure of revenue for new sources of coal, electricity, oil, and transport routes, and diverted resources away from productive investment. Malawi, on the other hand, made it clear that it would proceed with a gradual decrease in links with Rhodesia despite UDI, so as not to disrupt the economy unnecessarily. The high cost of Zambia's principles, and the sacrifices which the population had to endure, led to a growing voice of dissatisfaction with Zambia's policy of disengagement. The increased domestic pressure on Kaunda for change resulted in a reversal of policy with the opening of the border with Rhodesia in 1978 and the encouragement of trade with South Africa.

Zambia's related policy of confrontation has also helped to increase the cost for Zambia of disengagement.

Kaunda, unlike Banda, became increasingly convinced of the efficacy of force in bringing about change in Southern Africa. The policy of support to national liberation movements invited retaliation and acts of sabotage on Zambia's mining complex by Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African forces. It was exactly this kind of disruptive retaliation which Banda wished to avoid by not furnishing support to national liberation movements. Malawi's success in avoiding the economic crisis which Zambia now finds itself in as a result of its policy of disengagement and confrontation has confirmed the wisdom of Malawi's foreign policy.

The comparison of the foreign policies of Malawi and Zambia demonstrates the role that economic dependence plays in determining the varying degrees of choice available in the foreign policies of developing states. Malawi was not in as favourable an economic position as Zambia at independence and would have found it extremely difficult to endure the costs of disengagement and confrontation. Although economic dependence was not the sole explanatory variable determining Malawi's foreign policy, it is a major factor in explaining the constraints on the range of policy options open to Malawi. The nature of Malawi's economy, as well as its small size and land-locked position, are unchanging realities which cannot be ignored by any present or future leader of Malawi. Nevertheless, the role of Banda's leadership and the modifying influence of internal and external politics also have to be taken into account in explaining Malawi's foreign policy.

Although Malawi's increased dependence on South Africa is partly the result of Banda's foreign policy, a substantial amount of the enhanced dependence in the area of trade was unavoidable as economic development progressed and as interdependence increased. Malawi is at present so economically dependent on South Africa that any successor to Banda would find it very difficult to substantially change the direction of Malawi's foreign policy beyond the rhetorical, and possibly diplomatic, level. Any future attempt to disengage from South Africa could very well lead to threats of curtailment of aid to Malawi, of disruption of Malawi's imports from South Africa, in particular of capital goods, of severance of Malawi's only stable conduit to the outside world for its exports, or of withdrawal of work visas to thousands of Malawian migrant labourers.

Thus, in the event of a future change in leadership, the reality of Malawi's economic dependence would make it ~~unlikely that concrete changes will occur in Malawi's~~ foreign policy. It is possible that Malawi may take what Banda referred to as the hypocritical course of Zambia; that is, to publicly denounce South Africa but continue to send migrant workers and maintain trade links.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

Malawi's Exports and Imports by Country of Final
Destination and Origin
(Kwacha '000) (US\$1=1.357 Kwacha - 31 March 1984)

| | 1965 | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 |
|---------------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| U.K.: | | | | |
| Exports | 12,834 | 19,536 | 42,266 | 63,276 |
| Imports | 10,338 | 18,998 | 52,913 | 67,120 |
| Zimbabwe: | | | | |
| Exports | 2,766 | 3,130 | 7,436 | 11,299 |
| Imports | 14,861 | 15,505 | 25,733 | 10,229 |
| South Africa: | | | | |
| Exports | 1,128 | 1,708 | 5,604 | 6,780 |
| Imports | 2,181 | 8,968 | 52,787 | 134,820 |
| World Total: | | | | |
| Exports | 27,084 | 40,577 | 106,283 | 255,985 |
| Imports | 40,804 | 71,367 | 218,663 | 355,213 |

Source: World Bank, Malawi - Growth and Structural
Change: A Basic Economic Report - Statistical
Appendix, (1982).

TABLE 2

Malawi's Exports and Imports Expressed in Percentage Terms, 1965-1980

| | 1965 | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|
| U.K.: | | | | |
| Exports | 47.4 | 48.1 | 39.8 | 24.7 |
| Imports | 25.3 | 26.6 | 24.2 | 18.9 |
| Zimbabwe: | | | | |
| Exports | 10.2 | 7.7 | 7.0 | 4.4 |
| Imports | 36.4 | 21.7 | 11.8 | 2.9 |
| South Africa: | | | | |
| Exports | 4.2 | 4.2 | 5.3 | 2.6 |
| Imports | 5.3 | 12.6 | 24.1 | 37.9 |
| Other: | | | | |
| Exports | 38.2 | 40.0 | 47.9 | 68.3 |
| Imports | 33.0 | 39.1 | 39.9 | 40.3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Source: Table 1

TABLE 3Malawi's Imports from and exports to South Africa, 1964-1973

| | Imports from South Africa as percentage of total imports | Exports to South Africa as percentage of total exports |
|------|--|--|
| 1964 | 6 | 5 |
| 1965 | 5 | 4 |
| 1966 | 7 | 3 |
| 1967 | 8 | 3 |
| 1968 | 11 | 5 |
| 1969 | 14 | 3 |
| 1970 | 13 | 4 |
| 1971 | 11 | 5 |
| 1972 | 12 | 6 |
| 1973 | 18 | 5 |

Source: David Williams, Malawi: The Politics of Despair,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 294.

TABLE 4Earnings Remitted to Malawi by Migrant Workers, 1964-1974,
(Kwacha million)

| | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Total | 3.2 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 9.0 | 11.5 | 12.8 | 21.1 | 30.9 |
| From S.A. | 2.3 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 7.8 | 10.5 | 12.0 | 19.4 | 29.7 |

Source: David Williams, Malawi: The Politics of Despair,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 296.

TABLE 5

Composition of Malawi's Exports, 1964-1980 (K. Million)

| | 1965 | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 |
|--------------------------------|------|------|-------|-------|
| Smallholder Crops | 15.5 | 17.9 | 32.3 | 41.3 |
| Estate Crops | 10.6 | 19.7 | 65.2 | 154.1 |
| Manufactures and Other Exports | 1.0 | 3.0 | 8.9 | 30.6 |
| Total Exports | 27.1 | 40.6 | 106.3 | 226.0 |

Source: World Bank, Malawi - Growth and Structural Change: A Basic Economic Report - Statistical Appendix, (1982)

TABLE 6

Malawi's Exports by Main Commodities (% Share of Total)

| | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980* | Mean 1976-1980 |
|------------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------------------|
| Tobacco | 46 | 50 | 58 | 57 | 47 | 52 |
| Tea | 19 | 25 | 20 | 17 | 13 | 19 |
| Groundnuts | 8 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 6 |
| Sugar | 17 | 9 | 9 | 11 | 16 | 12 |
| Rice | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Cotton | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Other | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 13 | 7 |

* Estimate

Source: Malawi Government, Economic Report, 1981,
(Office of the President and Cabinet
Economic Planning Division), p. 12.

TABLE 7

Malawi's Exports and Imports by Country of Final Destination and Origin, 1978-1983 (\$U.S. Million)

| | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1982 | 1982 | 1983 |
|---------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Zimbabwe: | | | | | | |
| Exports | 1.56 | 1.56 | 15.21 | 22.53 | 14.68 | 13.79 |
| Imports | 7.08 | 5.81 | 15.80 | 22.02 | 16.88 | 18.55 |
| South Africa: | | | | | | |
| Exports | 8.06 | 10.54 | 9.11 | 13.61 | 13.63 | 8.99 |
| Imports | 129.28 | 165.96 | 163.96 | 115.98 | 105.99 | 59.27 |
| World Total: | | | | | | |
| Exports | 185.21 | 222.80 | 285.17 | 269.48 | 238.53 | 228.68 |
| Imports | 338.24 | 397.92 | 440.23 | 350.58 | 304.18 | 311.28 |

In Percentage Terms

| | | | | | | |
|---------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Zimbabwe: | | | | | | |
| Exports | 0.8 | 0.7 | 5.3 | 8.7 | 6.2 | 6.0 |
| Imports | 2.1 | 1.5 | 3.6 | 6.3 | 5.5 | 5.6 |
| South Africa: | | | | | | |
| Exports | 4.4 | 4.7 | 3.2 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 3.9 |
| Imports | 38.2 | 41.7 | 37.7 | 33.1 | 34.8 | 19.0 |
| Other: | | | | | | |
| Exports | 94.76 | 94.6 | 91.5 | 86.2 | 88.1 | 90.0 |
| Imports | 59.7 | 56.8 | 59.2 | 60.6 | 59.7 | 75.4 |

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook, 1985, pp. 264-265.

TABLE 8

Population, GNP and Growth Rates (1970-1979)
 (GNP rounded to nearest US\$ tens of millions
 GNP/capita rounded to nearest US\$10)

| | Malawi | Zambia |
|--------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Population (000) | | |
| Mid-1979 | 5,817 | 5,580 |
| mid-1980 | 5,951 | 5,766 |
| GNP at market prices (\$US m.) | | |
| 1979 | 1,260 | 3,000 |
| 1980 | 1,390 | 3,220 |
| GNP/capita (US\$) | | |
| 1979 | 220 | 540 |
| 1980 | 230 | 560 |
| Growth Rates % | | |
| Population (1970-79) | 2.9 | 3.1 |
| GNP/capita (1970-79) | 3.0 | -1.9 |

Source: Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983, (New York: Africana, 1984), p. C34.

TABLE 9

Zambian Trade with South Africa, 1978-1980 (Kwacha '000)
 {US\$1=1.591 Kwacha, March 31, 1984}

| | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
|----------------------|---------|-----------|---------|
| South Africa: | | | |
| Exports | 800 | 4,171 | 5,687 |
| Imports | 31,469 | 64,650 | 136,342 |
| World Total: | | | |
| Exports | 685,013 | 1,083,145 | 980,370 |
| Imports | 494,463 | 597,670 | 869,088 |
| Percentage of Total: | | | |
| South Africa: | | | |
| Exports | .12 | .39 | .60 |
| Imports | 6.4 | 10.8 | 15.7 |
| Other: | | | |
| Exports | 99.8 | 99.6 | 99.4 |
| Imports | 93.6 | 89.2 | 84.3 |

Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1983-1984,
 (London: Europa, 1984), p. 976.

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