

## **INFORMATION TO USERS**

**This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.**

**The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.**

**In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.**

**Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.**

**Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.**

**Bell & Howell Information and Learning  
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA**

**UMI<sup>®</sup>**  
**800-521-0600**



**Anschluss 1938: Austria's Potential for Military Resistance**

**Janice Festa  
Department of History  
McGill University, Montreal**

**March 1998**

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
and Research in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements of the degree of  
Master of Arts**

**©Janice Festa 1998**



National Library  
of Canada

Acquisitions and  
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale  
du Canada

Acquisitions et  
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

*Your file Votre référence*

*Our file Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-43863-5

Canada

## **ABSTRACT**

It has been sixty years since the Anschluss and yet, the question why the Austrian army did not provide some form of resistance is still pondered. This thesis examines the developments of the Austrian Army during the interwar period and focuses on the defence plans compiled by the Austrian Chief of the General Staff, Field Marshall Alfred Jansa. From the moment he assumed his position in the Federal Ministry of Defence, Jansa set out to create an Army capable of defending its borders against Nazi Germany. As long as he was Chief of the General Staff, he promised that any German attack would meet with Austrian military resistance.

This thesis considers an aspect of Austrian History, which English-language scholarship has largely neglected. This thesis provides a critical evaluation of the preparedness of the Austrian Army and the feasibility of resistance in March 1938.

## RÉSUMÉ

Il y a soixante ans déjà, l'Allemagne annexait l'Autriche. Depuis lors, une question demeure encore sans réponse: pourquoi l'armée autrichienne n'a-t-elle pas résisté aux troupes allemandes? Cette thèse examine l'évolution de l'armée autrichienne durant l'entre-deux-guerres et s'intéresse tout particulièrement aux plans de défense élaborés par le Chef d'État-major général, général Alfred Jansa. Dès son arrivée à ce poste au ministère de la Défense nationale, il tente d'organiser une armée capable de se défendre contre l'armée d'Hitler. Il promet qu'aucune attaque allemande ne se produirait sans résistance militaire aussi longtemps qu'il serait chef d'État-major.

En s'intéressant à un aspect de l'histoire autrichienne largement négligé par les études de langue anglaise, cette thèse présente une évaluation critique de l'état des préparatifs de l'armée autrichienne en mars 1938.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is with the utmost gratitude that I extend many thanks to the staff at the *Österreichische Staatsarchiv*, in particular to Dr. Manfred Fink (Director), Dr. Herbert Hutterer, Dr. Rudolf Jeřábek and Thomas Stockmayer, as well as the staff at the *Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes*, in particular to Siegwald Ganlgmair. Their suggestions and assistance, helped direct me to vital archival sources. The recommendations of Dr. Manfred Rauchensteiner, Director of the *Heeresgeschichtliches Museum*, Vienna, during my telephone interview were much appreciated.

In addition, I extend my appreciation to my supervisor and mentor, Professor Peter Hoffmann for his dedication and patience throughout my studies.

I would also like to thank the staff at the Washington National Archives and McGill's Inter-Library Loans.

Thanks must also be extended to my family, especially to my mother for her persistent encouragement, as well as France Bourassa and Mary McDaid, who always made time in her busy schedule for my many questions and queries.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Abstract          | ii  |
| Résumé            | iii   |
| Acknowledgements  | iv  |
| Introduction      | 1   |
| Chapter I         | Austria's Legal Position Following<br>World War I         |
|                   | A) Austria 1918   |
|                   | B) Brief History of the <i>Bundesheer</i> :<br>1918-1935  |
| Chapter II        | Austrian Foreign Policy: Italian and<br>German Influences |
| Chapter III       | Austrian Defence Plans                                    |
|                   | A) A New Army   |
|                   | B) Operation Case <i>DR</i>                               |
| Chapter IV        | A Shift in the Political Climate                          |
| Conclusion        |   |
| Bibliography      |   |
| Appendix          |   |
|                   | 1) Jansa Plan <i>DR</i>                                   |
|                   | 2) Magenheimer's Chart                                    |
|                   | 3) German Records of Austrian air force                   |
|                   | 4) Austro-Daimler ADGZ                                    |
|                   | 5) Weapons use  |
|                   | 6) Military units   |
|                   | 7) Weapons stock & orders                                 |
|                   | 8) Munitions stock & orders                               |
|                   | 9) Operation Case <i>DR</i>                               |
|                   | 10) Air force locations                                   |
| Glossary of Names |   |



Die kommenden österreichischen Soldaten  
sollen sich, wenn sie in der Geschichte  
nachblättern, ihrer Vorgänger nicht zu  
schämen brauchen:  
Im Februar 1938 waren Bundesheer und sein  
Generalstab voll bereit zum schwersten  
Kampfe anzutreten!  
Ehre ihrem Angedenken!

FML Alfred Jansa (1954)

Author's translation:  
Future Austrian soldiers should not be  
ashamed of their predecessors when they  
look back in history:  
In February 1938 the Austrian army and  
its General Staff were fully prepared to  
enter into a most difficult fight!  
Honour their memory!

## INTRODUCTION

Centuries of a shared culture, language and history make it difficult to believe that two brethren countries could ever face one another in military conflict over what had seemed for so long to be a common goal. However, in January 1933 Austria's big brother became the Nazi German Reich. No longer were their ideals of Anschluss in complete unison. Austria began a course of rearmament and plans for self-defence in the early 1930s culminating in the restoration of a General Staff, the implementation of a military service (*Wehrdienst*), and the preparation under the leadership of Field Marshal Alfred Jansa, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, of detailed plans of mobilization in the event of an entry of German troops into Austria.

Bundeskanzler Dollfuss, Chancellor of Austria from May 1932 - July 1934, gave birth to the idea of a policy of independence (*Unabhängigkeitspolitik*)<sup>1</sup> and devoted his short term of two years in office to the ideal of Austrian independence. He died in July 1934 during a failed Putsch attempt at the hand of National Socialists and as a martyr for Austrian independence. Dollfuss had not been alone in his

---

<sup>1</sup> Österreichische Staatsarchiv - Kriegsarchiv (KA) - Manuskript- und Nachlaßsammlung, B/655: 4, Alfred Jansa FML, "Aus meinem Leben: Kapitel X", pp. 7 and 12.

ambitions. Many Austrians saw themselves as the only true Germans and as the protectors of German culture from National Socialism.<sup>2</sup> As Austrians, they did not wish to succumb to National Socialism's law of blood, but were instead driven by a patriotic law which spanned the limits of their country.<sup>3</sup> However, others strongly felt the ties with their "German" brethren, and faced with a failing economy, high unemployment, provincial struggle against the idea of a "Red Vienna" (communist infiltration from its Eastern neighbours) and internal political conflicts, they saw an Anschluss with the German Reich as, ironically, the only means by which Austria could be saved.

Many historians have discussed the question whether the Anschluss was forced by a manipulative and overpowering neighbour or whether it was part of a greater ideology willed by a people.<sup>4</sup> It is not my aim in this thesis to reiterate the ideas and driving forces of Anschluss in general, rather I intend to focus on the military preparations of the Austrian army taken between the years of 1935 and 1938 in face of a

---

<sup>2</sup> Erwin Schmidl, "März 1938 in Österreich", in Truppendienst (27. Jg., Heft 1) February 1988, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Guido Zernatto, Die Wahrheit über Österreich (New York: Longmans, Green, 1938), p.19. "Für den Nationalsozialisten gibt es das Gesetz des Blutes, für den Österreicher das Gesetz der Landschaft".

<sup>4</sup> See section D in the bibliography of this thesis for a list of general works on the Anschluss.

potential invasion by the German army. This thesis will show the changes the Austrian army experienced during those crucial years, the roles played by Italy and Germany and the creation of the "Operation Case DR" (*Deutsches Reich*), otherwise known as the "Jansa-Plan"<sup>5</sup>, for the defence of Austria in the event of German military aggression threatening Austrian independence. A closer look at the details and preparedness of the Austrian defence system will enable an accurate evaluation of Austria's ability for military resistance to Anschluss in 1938.

I intend to prove by the facts outlined in this thesis that the Austrian army was sufficiently prepared for an initial resistance to German forces. Crucial to this study are Field Marshal (FML) Alfred Jansa's deployment plans of the Austrian army for "Operation Case DR" contained in the Federal Ministry of Defence (*Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung* or BMfLV) as well as the chapter he wrote in his memoirs as FML "Aus meinem Leben: Kapitel X", both held at the Austrian State Archives in Vienna. FML Jansa had been Military Attaché for Austria in Berlin prior to his posting as Chief of Department III. His plans and recollections are demonstrative of his knowledge of German rearmament and ambitions to annex Austria. He remained wary of Austro-German rapprochement and dedicated to the idea of Austrian independence at any cost.

---

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix 1.

In his plans Jansa was careful to outline the fact that he did not feel the Austrian army could resist the penetration of the German army for any long period of time.<sup>6</sup> However, he viewed the military defence of Austria as a strategy of *Zeitgewinn*, in which Austria would gain the time it needed to appeal for international aid in face of a situation threatening her survival. This idea is found in the concept of a *Bündnis-Krieg*. Austria would be unable to fight alone against a stronger, better armed Germany for any length of time; however, she would be able to hold off an advance of the German army for a short while if the support of another power was forthcoming. No additional support would mean, as Jansa put it: the extinction of Austria.<sup>7</sup> However, in 1938 Jansa stood by his belief that Austria would not remain alone.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> In "Das Bundesheer, die Grosse Unbekannte", in Wien 1938 (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1988), Manfred Rauchensteiner states that it was clear that the Austrian army could not fight for a long period of time against Nazi Germany, but that a delay of war, or *Verzögerungskampf*, was possible in order to obtain a military ally (*Bündnis*); p.81

<sup>7</sup> "richtig klipp und klar [...] daß Österreich, wenn es nicht in den ersten Stunden und Tagen einer europäischen Konflagration gelänge den Einbruch von Streitkräften in unser Land zu verhindern - unzweifelhaft ausgelöscht würde"; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 16.

<sup>8</sup> KA - Manuskript- und Nachlaßsammlung, B/655: 12, Jansa, "Mein Verhältnis zum Nationalsozialismus während meiner aktiven Dienstzeit", p. 2. In his transcript from 10 October 1945, FML Jansa wrote that the goal of the Austrian army was "die ganze Welt zum Aufhören [sic] und Eingreifen zu zwingen, um Hitler zu stürzen. Ich hatte die sehr begründete Erwartung, daß Österreich nicht allein bleiben werde".

The Austrian army did not need to be capable of defeating an incoming German army, but rather needed only be sufficient to create a large enough deterrent to the German decision to use military strength to annex Austria. Although Hitler made it clear that he was willing to use force to annex Austria if need be, the Chief of the German General Staff, Ludwig Beck, refused to devise military plans against his brethren country. It was Beck's opinion that Anschluss could not take place by military coercion as it would be seen as the "rape" of Austria rather than the "union" with Austria.<sup>9</sup> Anschluss would therefore proceed more easily under favourable political conditions. One could argue that neither power wished to face the other in military conflict. If this fact is accepted, then one may also conclude that - the opinion of Hitler aside - an aggressive German military invasion into Austria would have provoked discontent within the German army and perhaps resistance as well. FML Jansa counted on this as a factor favouring Austrian defence.<sup>10</sup> Hence, the army did not need to be strong enough to necessarily resist Germany, but strong

---

<sup>9</sup> Friedrich Fritz, Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich 1938 (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1968), p. 3. On 20 May 1937 General von Fritsch recorded Beck as saying "Die gewaltsame Besetzung ganz Österreichs dürfte aber so viele Kriegsmaßnahmen im Gefolge haben, daß auch beim Gelingen zu befürchten steht, daß das zukünftige deutsch-österreichische Verhältnis nicht unter dem Zeichen des Anschlusses, sondern des Raubes stehen wird."

<sup>10</sup> Der Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt vor dem Wiener Volksgericht (Vienna: Druck und Verlag der Österreichischen Staatdruckerei, 1947), p. 221. (Hereafter: Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt)

enough to exert the Austrian will to defend itself, i.e. to "bluff" the German Reich.<sup>11</sup> This in itself could prevent the German invasion.

---

<sup>11</sup> This manoeuvre was later used by Hitler at Berchtesgaden in February 1938 to compel Austrian Federal Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg to accept German demands. Hitler used the pretence that German forces were prepared at the border to march into Austria should the Chancellor refuse to sign the accord; Erwin Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 1994), p. 31f.

## CHAPTER I

### Austria's Legal Position Following World War I

#### A) Austria: 1918

Following its defeat in 1918, the Habsburg Monarchy was dissolved into succession states supposedly divided according to national lines. The former great Empire of Central Europe was left with just 28% of its previous area, or 83,835km<sup>2</sup>, and 22% of its former population, or 6 million. Austria was left with few options to secure her future survival; the most feasible being the reinstatement of the monarchy, albeit in an altered form, or Anschluss with its neighbouring fellow-Germans.<sup>12</sup> Views of the exact form in which an Anschluss would take place differed amongst the political factions.

In its founding law of 12 November 1918, Article 2 declared German-Austria (*Deutschösterreich*) to be a part of Germany. During secret talks between Austrian State Secretary Otto Bauer and German Foreign Minister Count Brockdorff-

---

<sup>12</sup> Zernatto, p. 50, sketches four possibilities for post-war Austria: Anschluss with Germany, the creation of a Danubian Federation, the restoration of the monarchy in an altered form or a neutrality (*Verschweizung*) of the country. He points out that proper economic conditions were not present for the Danubian Federation and that neutrality was a difficult option as Austria was surrounded by numerous powers with conflicting national interests.



Rantzau an agreement was signed on 2 March 1919 in Berlin. The agreement, in which German-Austria was to become a semi-autonomous member-state (*selbstständige Gliedstaat*) of Germany, outlined the method by which a rapid connection between the two countries was to be achieved. However, unlike the other successor states, German-Austria was subsequently denied its right to self-determination. Article 88 of the St. Germain-en-Laye Peace Treaty, imposed on 10 September 1919 by the Allied victor states, forbade the Anschluss of the two German nations.<sup>13</sup> Austria was sworn to avoid any action which would either relinquish her independence or threaten it in any way. In order to reinforce the convictions of the victors, German-Austria was forced to change her name and was henceforth referred to as the Republic of Austria.

The Treaty also had a scarring effect on the Austrian army, which since the armistice in November 1918 had been known as the Austrian *Volkswehr*. The *Volkswehr* was ultimately disbanded and an unrecognizable National army (*Bundesheer*) emerged from the restrictions of the Treaty. A ceiling of 30,000 men (including 1,500 Officers and 2,000 non-

---

<sup>13</sup> Gerechtigkeit für Österreich! Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch: Darstellungen, Dokumente und Nachweise zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Okkupation Österreichs (Vienna: Druck und Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1946), p. 19. (Hereafter: Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch)

commissioned officers) serving a minimum of twelve years<sup>14</sup> was placed on the army. Combined with the prohibition of a general military service, the army was composed of a higher income career military (*Berufsheer*). Due to the fact that Austria was economically weakened by the post-war system she was unable to support the numbers allowed by the Peace Treaty.<sup>15</sup> The high salary payments to these mercenary soldiers amounted to 67% of Austria's military budget and thus left minimal funds for the purchase of new weaponry, equipment and materials.<sup>16</sup> This proved detrimental to the morale of the soldiers as well.

In addition, the Treaty banned many forms of weaponry, such as poisonous gas (*Giftkampfstoffe*), tanks<sup>17</sup> and aircraft, as

---

<sup>14</sup> Six years were to be served in presence and the other six in reserve.

<sup>15</sup> During its first twelve years of existence the Austrian Army averaged 22,000 men, a far cry from the 30,000 allowed by the Treaty of St. Germain.

<sup>16</sup> Jansa blames this mercenary system (*Söldnersystem*), which consumed 60 million of the military budget's 90 million schillings, as a primary reason for lack of funds to purchase the required military equipment; KA - "Aus meinem Leben", p. 6. Field Marshal Hans Kubena, Head of Section I in the Federal Ministry of Defence, noted that in 1933 the military budget was just 5,7% of the Austrian state's expenses compared to 20-40% in other European states; "Konnte Österreich 1938 Widerstand leisten?" in Die Presse (Saturday, 19 April 1947), pp. 1-2.

<sup>17</sup> Under the conditions of the St. Germain Treaty the *Panzerwagenzug* in Carinthia, the *Panzerwagen* of the Viennese *Volkswehr* along with the Carinthian *Behelfs-Panzerzug XIII* were dissolved; 1918-1968: Die Streitkräfte der Republik Österreich (Vienna: Isda & Brodmann OHG, 1968), pp. 34-35.

well as the import and export of any form of weapons, ammunition or war materials.<sup>18</sup> Any construction or reconstruction of military fortifications was prohibited.<sup>19</sup> Austrian armament was limited to 34,500 rifles (each with 500 rounds of ammunition), 450 machine-guns (each with 10,000 rounds of ammunition), 60 light or medium mortars (each with 1,000 or 500 rounds of ammunition respectively) and 90 guns with a calibre lower than 105mm (each with 1,500 rounds of ammunition).<sup>20</sup> Specific guidelines regulated the production of arms, ammunition and explosives. An Inter-Allied Commission was set up to oversee compliance with Treaty restrictions.

As a result, the Austrian army was left with little capability to protect the integrity of its State. Instead it was conceived to be used solely for internal stability and no plans of mobilization - even for the defence of the country - could be pursued.<sup>21</sup> It was precisely this idea of the

---

(Hereafter: Streitkräfte)

<sup>18</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 4-5 and Erwin Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938 (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1988), p. 15.

<sup>19</sup> Erwin Steinböck, "Die österreichische Landesbefestigung von 1918 bis 1938", in Isabella Ackerl et al., eds., Politik und Gesellschaft im alten und neuen Österreich (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1981), p. 227.

<sup>20</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 4-5.

protection of internal stability which, in a country of political and economic turmoil, easily led to the abuse of the army as a political instrument for the governing party, reaching its peak in the February 1934 civil war.<sup>22</sup> Aside from the Peace Treaties, Austria relied on promises and guarantees, such as the Geneva Protocol of 4 October 1922, which professed the political independence and territorial integrity of Austria, for the protection of her borders.<sup>23</sup> During the following ten years she was committed to the observation of Treaty regulations and resolved to bring any violation to the forefront of the League of Nations<sup>24</sup>.

#### B) Brief History of the Bundesheer: 1918-1935

A temporary military force, the *Volkswehr*, was set up to replace the former imperial and royal (*k.u.k.*) army on 15

---

<sup>22</sup> Manfred Rauchensteiner, "Die Stellung des Bundesheeres in der Innen-und Aussenpolitik der Republik Österreich", in Zollner, ed., Österreichs Erste und Zweite Republik (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1985), p. 156.

<sup>23</sup> Peter Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938 und die Entstehung der Pläne zur Landesverteidigung", in Anschluß 1938: Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 14. und 15. März 1978 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981), p. 2 and Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch, pp. 19-20.

<sup>24</sup> Manfred Rauchensteiner considers the attitude within the army to have been influenced by the Social Democrats. Thus, the resulting opinion was that if the Treaty restrictions were respected, aggressive violations would be dealt with by the League: "dann eine Anrufung des Völkerbundes hätte untermauert werden sollen"; "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich", in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) (16. Jg., March 1978), pp. 108-109.

November 1918.<sup>25</sup> The early *Volkswehr* served a double function, namely the protection of the Carinthian and Styrian borders (alongside Yugoslavia), as well as the consolidation of the internal political situation.<sup>26</sup> Totalling approximately 58,000<sup>27</sup>, the *Volkswehr* received additional support from volunteer militia organizations (*Freiwilligenverbände*) throughout the country. A general military service law was enacted on 6 February 1919, empowering the state to call up to 24,000 men born between the years 1896-1900 for short-term service (4 months)<sup>28</sup>.

In compliance with its Treaty obligations, the *Volkswehr* was slowly disbanded and replaced by the *Bundesheer*.<sup>29</sup> The military decree (*Wehrgesetz*) of 18 March 1920 provided for provincial recruitment<sup>30</sup> and permitted recruits to remain politically active. The *Bundesheer* was to be structured as

---

<sup>25</sup> Streitkräfte, p. 33.

<sup>26</sup> Rauchensteiner, "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich 1918-1938", p. 108.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Streitkräfte, p. 35.

<sup>29</sup> On 10 November 1920 the transfer was complete. Three days later the Federal Ministry for Army Affairs (*Bundesministerium für Heereswesen*) was created, replacing the duties until then administered by the *Staatsamt*; Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>30</sup> The allotment or provincial recruitment was to be as follows: Vienna: 9,000, Upper Austria and Styria: each 4,000, Lower Austria: 6,500, Tirol and Carinthia: each 1,700, Burgenland: 1,500, Salzburg: 1,000 and Vorarlberg 600; Ibid., p. 37.

follows: six mixed brigades<sup>31</sup>, each containing two infantry regiments of 3 battalions, 1 bicycle battalion, 1 dragoon squadron, 1 artillery battalion (3 light batteries and 1 mortar battery), and 1 pioneer battalion.<sup>32</sup> In practice, however, each brigade differed from another, some containing more infantry or bicycle battalions than others.<sup>33</sup>

Command of the *Bundesheer* was not made clear by the Constitution, which stated that the National Council (*Nationalrat*) was to exercise its power over the army; however, this power was delegated to the Federal Government and, where permitted, to the Federal Ministry for Army Affairs. It was only with the constitutional change of 1929 that the supreme command of the *Bundesheer* was conferred upon the President, who at the time was Dr. Wilhelm Miklas. In case of emergency this right was passed to the Army Inspector (*Heeresinspektor*), later referred to as the General Troop Inspector (*Generaltruppeninspektor*).<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> Brigades were to number between 140-198 Officers and 4,250-5,350 men; *Streitkräfte*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> For example the 4th and 5th brigades contained 5 infantry battalions together, but had no bicycle battalion; whereas the 1st brigade had over 8 infantry battalions and the 2nd and 6th brigades each had 2 bicycle battalions; *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

In 1923 Major-General and Army Inspector Theodor Körner organized a border surveillance (*Grenzbeobachtung*) which would report on foreign manoeuvres in the bordering states. Austria was mainly concerned with the borders of Tirol<sup>35</sup> and Italy as well as those of Burgenland and Hungary and Carinthia and Yugoslavia (South Slav Kingdom until 1929). Border surveillance was not to be used as a form of planned border protection (*Grenzschutz*), as the Treaty of St. Germain had denied Austria the right to any such plans.<sup>36</sup> Under surveillance, information was to be collected and all questionable activity was to be reported to the League of Nations. Four threat-cases (*Bedrohungsfälle*) were anticipated: "T" = Czechoslovakia, "S" (later "J") = South Slav Kingdom, "I" = Italy and "U" = Hungary. A "DR" (*Deutsches Reich*) or German case was not foreseen and any preparations were explicitly disallowed by the Government of

---

<sup>35</sup> Disputes with Italy sparked in 1926-1927 over the South Tirol question and consequently the *Bundesheer* pursued talks with the Socialist *Schutzbund* and the National *Heimwehr* (militia groups) in the event Italian troops should invade Austria; Rauchensteiner "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich 1918-1938", p. 109 and Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938", p. 4.

<sup>36</sup> The only indication of some sort of employment of troops during this period is found in the "*Höchstkommando Kärnten*", formed in Carinthia, where, in 1925, the threat of an Italian-Yugoslavian conflict over Austrian territory was quite acute; Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938", p. 3.

Austria.<sup>37</sup> Border surveillance was succeeded by an attempt to instate guidelines for border protection; however, the lack of men in the *Bundesheer* combined with the Austrian army's poor material situation made any real operational use of the army impractical.

The end of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission on 31 January 1928 marked the beginning of a long struggle to modernize and improve the organization and mobility of the Austrian army. During this period camouflaged organizational and armament changes were made in preparation for a future army reconstruction. This was achieved in part through the acquisition of secret cache arms as well as the confiscation of arms from the socialist *Schutzbund* militia.<sup>38</sup> Erwin Steinböck attributes much of Austria's arms acquisitions to the efforts of Italy, who wished to secure her interests in the Danubian area.<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> Rauchensteiner notes in his article "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich", p. 108, that any action to protect their border against Germany was expressly disallowed, even under the threat of entry from the Munich communist organization.

<sup>38</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 16.

<sup>39</sup> Erwin Steinböck, "Die bewaffnete Macht Österreichs im Jahre 1938" in Anschluss 1938: Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 14. und 15. März 1978 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981), p. 1. In his article Steinböck alleges that the Italian Party Chief Benito Mussolini had as early as 1928-1929 sent a shipment to Austria containing 20,000 rifles and 500 machine-guns.



Aside from the procurement of arms, Austria needed to increase the status of the *Bundesheer*. A few months after his arrival in the Chancellory in May 1932, Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss appealed to the Geneva Disarmament Conference (fall 1932/spring 1933) for permission for a militia army (*Milizsystem*)<sup>40</sup>. It was ironically in a forum of avowed disarmament that the Austrian Government was enabled for the first time to reach its Treaty quota of 30,000 men. Although denied a militia, the Austrian army was granted the right to an assistance corps, known as *Militärassistenzenkorps*, and could enlist up to 8,000 men, *A-Männer*, for a period of six months in presence and six months in reserve<sup>41</sup>, after which they could become career military men, *B-Männer*. The first *A-Männer* arrived for duty on 11 September 1933.

Another change under the Dollfuss administration included the issuing of new uniforms resembling those of the former *k.u.k.* army and serving to arouse a sense of Austrian identity and tradition within the military. After Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933 the reports on armed formations was instituted to perform periodic checks on the

---

<sup>40</sup> Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938", p. 6.

<sup>41</sup> Due to their shorter service time and the fact that they were not considered career military men, the Austrian Government could save on salary expenses, thus enabling them to enlist a substantially larger number of men than previously.

strength and conduct of the military organizations within Austria. Although Manfred Rauchensteiner argues that this was done for reasons of internal security<sup>42</sup>, it clearly also points to Dollfuss's wariness and fear of the Nazi regime and his desire to have a more accurate account of the forces that would be available to the army should they be needed. Despite this fear, it was only after the appointment of FML Alfred Jansa in June 1935 that actual defence and mobilization plans for the threat-case "DR" (the entry of German troops into Austria) were developed. These plans will be referred to in detail in Chapter III.

---

<sup>42</sup> Rauchensteiner, "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich 1918-1938", p. 110.

## CHAPTER II

### Austrian Foreign Policy: Italian and German Influences

Facing bankruptcy and the rejection of the planned customs' union with Germany by the Hague Court in September 1931,<sup>43</sup> Austria was forced to re-think her foreign policy with respect to obtaining the necessary funds to secure her survival. Internal political tensions made any prospect of accord in the National Council (*Nationalrat*) seem quite difficult. However, three months following his assumption of the Chancellorship in a Christian Socialist Cabinet, Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss rallied enough support to have the Lausanne Agreement for a loan of 300 million schillings passed by the National Council on 23 August 1932.<sup>44</sup> In return the young democracy was to reaffirm its renunciation of any claims to an Anschluss with Germany.<sup>45</sup> Thus Dollfuss set a new agenda for his country making independence an integral part of Austrian

---

<sup>43</sup> Harry Ritter, "Hermann Neubacher and the Austrian Anschluss Movement, 1918-40" in Central European History (vol. 8; no.1: 1975), p. 358. Ritter notes its failure as the turning point in previous endeavours for Anschluss in Austria.

<sup>44</sup> Lajos Kerekes, Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini, Gömbös und die Heimwehr (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1966), p. 113 and Ludwig Jedlicka, Vom alten zum neuen Österreich (St. Pölten; Vienna: Niederösterreichisches Pressehaus, 1975), p. 490.

<sup>45</sup> Gerhard Botz, Der 13. März 38 und die Anschlußbewegung: Selbstaufgabe, Okkupation und Selbstfindung Österreichs 1918-1945 (Vienna: Dr.-Karl-Renner-Institut, 1978), p. 11.

foreign policy.

In January 1933 Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) came to power in Germany, bringing once again the notion of Austrian independence to the forefront in foreign politics.<sup>46</sup> Fearing the Nazi neighbour, the Austrian government made provisions to post officers along the border crossings of their potential enemy state.<sup>47</sup> Immediately all Austrian political parties, with the exception of the Austrian NSDAP, dropped Anschluss as part of their political platform.<sup>48</sup> Knowing that future elections would bring a large Nazi representation into the Cabinet, it was in Dollfuss's best interest to avoid new elections at any cost - even if that meant turning his back on democracy.<sup>49</sup> When, on 4 March 1933, the President Dr. Karl Renner as well as both deputies in Parliament of the Austrian House of Parliament resigned over the issue of an impending rail strike, Dollfuss was left with an opportune situation that enabled him to

---

<sup>46</sup> Hitler's objective to annex Austria was no secret. He professed the necessary unity of the two German nations on the first page of Mein Kampf (New York: Stackpole Sons' Publishers, 1939), p. 19.

<sup>47</sup> Schmidl, "März 1938 in Österreich", p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>49</sup> Predictions showed that new elections would see the disappearance of smaller parties and the emergence of the Nazi Party as a strong force. Unwilling to form a red-black coalition with the Socialists in order to avert Nazi rule, Dollfuss was compelled to suppress democratic elections; Kerekes, p. 130.

dissolve the Parliament and rule in accordance with the Enabling Act of 1917.<sup>50</sup> To support his authoritarian government Dollfuss formed the Patriotic Front (*Vaterländische Front*), an umbrella organization for militia groups loyal to an independent Austria, on 20 May 1933.<sup>51</sup>

Not surprisingly Dollfuss's action sparked displeasure within the Nazi Government in Germany. Hitler demanded elections in Austria, and when his demand was not heeded, he embarked on a violent propaganda campaign against Austria.<sup>52</sup> In a *Reichstag* speech on 26 May 1933 Hitler exclaimed:

The Austrian situation must be settled by means of an unequivocal course of violence, because the risk of a definite loss to Germany of 6 million people (who will follow a path of neutrality) is too large.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>51</sup> The Patriotic Front was originally thought of as an umbrella organization, but was later considered as a separate Austrian national organization; Zernatto, p. 79; Kerekes, p. 149 and Kurt Schuschnigg, Farewell Austria (London: Cassell, 1938), p. 181.

<sup>52</sup> Göring insisted to Mussolini that Germany intended to continue her propaganda campaign until new elections in Austria took place. In response, Dollfuss unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile his neighbour offering to include four Nazi party members in his Government under the leadership of Hermann Neubacher (as opposed to the Reich German Habicht) in return for the Reich ceasing its protests for new elections; Kerekes, pp. 138-139 and Ritter, p. 362.

<sup>53</sup> German version: "Die Lage in Österreich müsse man durch einen eindeutigen Kurs der Gewalt bereinigen, weil die Gefahr zu groß ist, daß Deutschland endgültig sechs Millionen Menschen verliert, die einem Verschweizerungsprozeß entgegengehen"; Ludwig Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1922 bis 1938", in Wissenschaft und Weltbild (22:1, 1973), p. 56.

Using the slogan "As long as Dollfuss remains in power, no German will visit Austria"<sup>54</sup>, the German Government passed an economically crippling law against Austria, demanding a 1,000 *Reichsmark* tax on German tourists wishing to visit Austria, the so-called "*Tausend-Mark-Sperre*", on 27 May 1933<sup>55</sup>. Armed conflicts between *Heimwehr*<sup>56</sup> members and National Socialists became commonplace. However, it was at the death of a Christian-German athlete and the injury of 29 others that, in view of public protest and out of concern for the internal safety of Austria, Dollfuss took the decision to outlaw the Austrian Nazi Party on 19 June 1933.<sup>57</sup>

On 1 May 1934 a new constitution, the "*Maiverfassung*", for an authoritarian *Ständestaat* was proclaimed. This action greatly pleased the Italians, especially Italian Government

---

<sup>54</sup> German version: "Solange Dollfuss am Ruder bleibt, kommt kein Deutscher nach Österreich"; Kerekes, p. 141. FML Alfred Jansa wrote in his memoirs, KA - "Aus meinem Leben", p. 4, that, had Dollfuss not been murdered, Hitler would have been unable to annex Austria without military conflict and that in fact he needed to kill Dollfuss in order to complete his plans of Anschluss: "Hitler wusste intuitiv, daß er Dollfuss morden musste; denn wenn Dollfuss gelebt hätte, wäre die deutsche Wehrmacht nicht kampflos nach Österreich eingebrochen."

<sup>55</sup> For more on the *Tausend-Mark-Sperre* in conjunction with Austrian willingness to sign the July Agreement of 1936, see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), Vol. V, p. 703f.

<sup>56</sup> The *Heimwehr* was a para-military organization based in the province of Tirol and ideologically anti-Marxist; Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1922 bis 1938", p. 52.

<sup>57</sup> Kerekes, p. 141.

Head Benito Mussolini, who, in keeping with his hatred of Social Democracy, had at numerous times encouraged the Austrians to establish a fascist form of government and wished to deter a rapprochement between Austria and Czechoslovakia.<sup>58</sup> However, fundamental differences with the Little Entente member-states<sup>59</sup> had made any alliance with France or Czechoslovakia unlikely, especially in view of Austria's refusal to officially denounce a Habsburg restoration, an issue of outmost importance to the successor states of the former Habsburg monarchy, as well as her unwillingness to cooperate with socialists and communists alike.<sup>60</sup>

Aware that the survival of an independent Austria

---

<sup>58</sup> Mussolini feared Vienna as a potential Bolshevik conspiracy centre. His fear dated from the Socialist uprising of 15 July 1927 in Vienna (see Schuschnigg, Farewell Austria, pp. 104-105) and turned to hatred following the "Hirtenberg weapon affair", when a shipment of illegal weapons had been sent from Italy via the Hirtenberg firm in Austria to Hungary. The weapons were found at the border and despite the fact that some were to remain in Austria, news of their transport was leaked and exposed in the 8 January 1933 edition of the Socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung*; Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938", pp. 6-7. As well, Mussolini did not wish to see Austria become an ally of the Little Entente and France - as this contravened Italian interests in the Adriatic; Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1922-1938", p. 51 and Streitle, pp. 40-41. Streitle bases his account on private letters exchanged between the Duce and Dollfuss in Mussolini-Dollfuss. Geheimer Briefwechsel (Appendix to Starhemberg, Memoiren Starhemberg, 2 ed., Vienna: 1949).

<sup>59</sup> The member-states of the Little Entente were Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia.

<sup>60</sup> Schmidl, "Der 13. März in Österreich", p. 3.

required the support of a foreign power<sup>61</sup> and committed not to follow the path of his Nazi German neighbour, Dollfuss had little choice but to adopt Italy as the guarantor of Austria.<sup>62</sup> Thus, forced to turn to Italy for support (militarily, politically and economically), he alienated parts of the population who believed in a common German identity and resented Italians for abandoning them in the First World War. Despite the existence of friendly relations among the politicians of the two states, it was clear to the Italians that a friendly atmosphere between the two populations would not be forthcoming.<sup>63</sup>

Italian commitment to Austrian independence and Italy's willingness to face a third power in military conflict to

---

<sup>61</sup> Due to the military restrictions placed on Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain, her location in Central Europe with open borders to potential "enemy" states and her petite size, it was clear that alone, she would be unable to withstand an attack. In his memoirs FML Jansa described the problems of Austrian geography and the lack of room for alternative defensive zones; KA - "Aus meinem Leben", p. 17.

<sup>62</sup> Despite differences over the South Tirol, Italy was the only power who was genuinely interested in the maintenance of Austrian independence.

<sup>63</sup> In a note to State-Secretary Guido Schmidt, the Austrian Minister to Italy, Egon von Berger-Waldenegg, wrote from Rome on 23 March 1937 regarding Mussolini's concern in face of popular reaction to Italians during a recent football game in Vienna. It was Mussolini's opinion that the Austrian population was generally hostile towards Italians; KA - NPA 584: Liasse Italien I/1, folio 600-601.



ensure Austria's integrity made Italy an ideal ally.<sup>64</sup> For Fascist Italy Austria held an important geographical position, which, for military and economic reasons alike, needed to be protected. Italy saw Austria as a "buffer zone" between the Reich and her interests along the Adriatic, not to forget those along the Brenner as well.<sup>65</sup> In fact, even prior to Hitler's seizure of power, the Italian Government began construction of the *Großglockner-Hochalpenstraße*, designed ultimately to aid the rapid mobilization of Italian forces along the Salzburg-Bavarian border.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, from a military viewpoint, Austria occupied a most important position

---

<sup>64</sup> In guarantee of the Lausanne Agreement, Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi openly spoke in Berne of Italian commitment to cross the Brenner border in the event of internal chaos or an Anschluss attempt in September 1932; Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1922 bis 1938", p. 55. During his visit to Rome in April and to Riccione in August 1933, Dollfuss was promised effective, military aid from Italy in the event of German aggression or an invasion from the Austrian Legion (a para-military organization of exiled Austrians committed to Anschluss with the German Reich from which rumours of a march on Austria circulated in the winter of 1932; Schuschnigg, *Farewell Austria*, p. 179) and Streitle, pp. 56-57.

<sup>65</sup> Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938", p. 5. As well, Dr. Emil Liebitzky stated during his testimony in the Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, p. 222, that for reasons of Italian security it was not in Italy's interest to have the German Reich along the Brenner border and placing pressure towards the Adriatic. When relations between Mussolini and Hitler improved towards 1936-1937, Germany put the Duce at ease by promises to relocate ethnic Germans living in the South Tirol, rather than seeking to reclaim the province in order to unite Germans; Documents on German Foreign Policy (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966), D:I, no. 199, p. 376f. (Hereafter: DGFP)

<sup>66</sup> Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938", p. 6.

with respect to Yugoslavia, with whom Italian relations had only slightly improved. Although the threat of military conflict did not seem as acute as it had in the mid 1920s, Italy did not abandon her plans to secure Austria's endorsement to cross through the provinces of Styria and Carinthia in the event of an Italo-Yugoslav conflict.<sup>67</sup>

Mussolini embarked on a path, which not only safeguarded Italian economic and political interests in the Danubian region, but stood as a testament to his conviction for Austrian independence. On 17 March 1934, Mussolini signed a series of agreements, known as the Rome Protocols, with Austria and Hungary. Included among the agreements was a secret protocol declaring that an improvement of relations between Austria and Germany was necessary in the interest of peace; however, the premise of any cooperation must be based on German recognition of Austrian external as well as internal independence.<sup>68</sup> Italian persistence and commitment to Austrian independence is further marked by her participation as a signatory power (along with France and Great Britain) in the Stresa Front Declarations in February 1934, September 1934 and April 1935. At their Stresa

---

<sup>67</sup> As early as 1930 talks between Chancellor Johann Schober and Mussolini hinted at a secret agreement designed to allow passage of Italian troops through Carinthia; Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1922 bis 1938", p. 54.

<sup>68</sup> Kerekes, p. 187 and Streitle, pp. 47-48.

meetings, the powers declared their conviction for the continued independence and integrity of Austria and resolved to meet for joint consultation if confronted with a threat to Austrian independence.<sup>69</sup>

In July 1934, in light of the attempted coup and assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, Italy mobilized troops along the Brenner and prepared to cross the border should German forces penetrate Austrian territory.<sup>70</sup> Mussolini's show of support, by means of his decision to mobilize Italian forces in 1934, was never forgotten by supporters of Austrian independence.<sup>71</sup> In fact, Mussolini's demonstration of force along the Brenner showed that Italian aid was not confined merely to agreements and false promises. Italy displayed a definite willingness to lend military support to her northern neighbour.

In spite of Italian willingness to mobilize and extend military aid to Austria, the Austrians displayed a general reluctance to accept Italian military intervention. Military Attaché to Rome, Colonel Dr. Emil Liebitzky was entrusted with the task of holding off Italian preparations for a "Plan 34"

---

<sup>69</sup> Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch, pp. 52-53.

<sup>70</sup> Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1922 bis 1938", p. 58.

<sup>71</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 4.

(later titled "Plan K"), referring to Italian plans for entry into Carinthia ("K"ärnten) in the event of an Italo-Yugoslav conflict.<sup>72</sup> During the July crisis days in Austria, the Klagenfurt post of the Austrian army reported its refusal on 3 August 1934 of an offer made by an Italian provincial governor for armed intervention.<sup>73</sup> Austrian apprehension about accepting Italian aid was not without justification. On the other side of her borders stood Yugoslav troops, ready to cross and join forces with Austrian SA-formations should Italian intervention be forthcoming.<sup>74</sup>

At several occasions during the months of July and August 1935, Italian troops were spotted on Austrian soil. These acts, whether accidental or not, caused concern in the Austrian Government, who asked Italian envoy Preziosi to inform his government of the incidents. As well, FML Jansa instructed Liebitzky to bring the matter to the attention of the Italian General Staff.<sup>75</sup> It comes therefore as no surprise that in his diaries Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo

---

<sup>72</sup> Rauchensteiner, "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich 1918-1938", p. 111.

<sup>73</sup> Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1922 bis 1938", pp. 58-59.

<sup>74</sup> Rauchensteiner, "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich 1918-1938", p. 111 and Ludwig Jedlicka, "Die außen- und militärpolitische Vorgeschichte des 13. März 1938" in ÖMZ (6. Jg., 1968), p. 77.

<sup>75</sup> KA - NPA 584: Liasse Italien I/1, folio 458-485.

Ciano recorded rumours allegedly originating from Schuschnigg that:

Italy's protection of Austria was incapable of practical realization, because, if one Italian soldier set foot on Austrian territory, the result would be an *union sacrée* against us.<sup>76</sup>

Clearly, employment of troops for Austria's defence would prove a fatal mistake for Italians.

With the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict in October 1935, Italian foreign policy towards Austria shifted. Opposed and sanctioned by the League of Nations for her actions, Italy was forced to look elsewhere for foreign support. The German Reich was the only power willing to condone Italy's imperialist aggression in Africa. Hitler used this opportunity to gain Italian friendship and generate closer relations. Although it is argued that Hitler hoped to achieve Italian approval for the Anschluss of Austria in return for his willingness to remain neutral with regard to Abyssinia, Germany's foreign policy documents indicate that in return for her countenance, Italy was to remain neutral when the Reich remilitarized the Rhineland.<sup>77</sup> Perhaps Hitler had hoped he would later receive Italian support for Anschluss as

---

<sup>76</sup> Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano's Hidden Diary: 1937-1938, (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1953), p. 80.

<sup>77</sup> James Burgwyn, "Italy, the Heimwehr and the Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936", in Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs (V. 38, 1985), p. 308 and DGFP, C:V, no. 113, pp. 151-152.

well. However, although Mussolini wished to improve Austro-German relations, he at no time was willing to relinquish the idea of Austrian independence. In a memorandum written by Italian Foreign Minister Fulvio Suvich, regarding a conversation in early 1936 between the German Ambassador in Italy Ulrich von Hassell and Mussolini, he stated:

With regard to the necessity of maintaining the independence of Austria, Herr von Hassell knew that we were intransigent. The Head of the Government added that Italy desired a normalization of relations between Germany and Austria. On the other hand, this meeting, at the present juncture, constituted a necessary *mise à point* against Czechoslovakia's attempts, which had the support of France, to draw Austria closer to herself.<sup>78</sup>

Predicting a German aggression by 1938, Mussolini continued to encourage and warn Austria of the necessity to rearm and prepare for a German action.<sup>79</sup>

In January 1936, Mussolini proclaimed the Stresa Front to be dead and buried.<sup>80</sup> Mussolini decided to pursue a

---

<sup>78</sup> DGFP, C:V, No. 5, p. 21. This point is stressed as well by Burgwyn, p. 312, who bases his opinion on Italian Archives ASMAE Affari politici.

<sup>79</sup> In a conversation on 12 August 1936, Mussolini warned the Austrian Military Attaché that the Austrians had 20 months to prepare their army: He warned that Hitler would not wait much longer to regulate the "question of the East": "das keinen Tag länger mehr warten würde, um die Tschechoslowakei zu erledigen und die Ostfragen zu regeln"; Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1918-1938", p. 60. Austrian Heimwehr leader, Prince Starhemberg, also noted Mussolini's urging to Austria to arm in Between Hitler and Mussolini: Memoirs of Ernst Rüdiger Prince Starhemberg (New York: Harper & Brothers' Publishers, 1942), p. 191.

<sup>80</sup> DGFP, C:IV, no. 485, p. 976.

reconciliation policy with Germany, the only power to condone his actions in Abyssinia, and he encouraged the Austrian Government to do the same. Mussolini's change of heart towards the German Reich was summed up by Hassell in his political report of 6 February 1936:

I see in Mussolini's new attitude to the Austrian question a first attempt to regain this pendulum position. Not, of course, that he has now suddenly become enthusiastic over the idea of an "Anschluss" or that he considers that the "German danger" on the Brenner no longer exists! But he does now realize that there are other more pressing dangers and believes that in the last analysis good relations with a Germany waxing strong would serve Italian interests better than maintaining the tension created in 1934.<sup>81</sup>

Further to Schuschnigg's visit to Prague 13-16 January 1936,<sup>82</sup> Hassell, stated in his memorandum of 20 January 1936 that Mussolini had encouraged the normalization of relations between Berlin and Vienna and had opposed the rapprochement between Austria and Czechoslovakia and her allies.<sup>83</sup> In fact, in a letter to Vienna dated 27 February 1936 Suvich demanded that the Austrians break off contact with Prague.<sup>84</sup> Mussolini was adamant in his policy aimed at the prevention of amicable relations between Austria and the Little Entente or French-satellite states. Due to strained relations between

---

<sup>81</sup> DGFP, C:IV, no. 545, p. 1110.

<sup>82</sup> DGFP, C:IV, no. 487, p. 980.

<sup>83</sup> DGFP, C:IV, no. 506, pp. 1013-1014. See also footnote 78.

<sup>84</sup> Burgwyn, p. 314. Burgwyn relies on information obtained in the Italian Archives ASMAE Affari politici.

Italy and Yugoslavia, the Duce stressed in a conversation with German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath on 3 May 1937 that any Austrian policy towards Prague was unacceptable, as, in his opinion, Austria would be brought into the democratic system, thus undermining the Rome Protocols,<sup>85</sup> which had proclaimed a policy of political and economic cooperation between Austria, Italy and Hungary.<sup>86</sup>

The years 1935-1936 revealed a notable improvement in Germany's international position, such as the Saar vote to return to Germany (January 1935), the re-establishment of a universal military service (March 1935), the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 1935), the remilitarization of the Rhineland (March 1936), the hosting of the 1936 summer Olympics, and rapid rearmament.<sup>87</sup> Accordingly, it seemed that German policy met with little resistance from the international community and thus furthered Austrian isolation. Aware that aid from other powers was not forthcoming, and unwilling to allow the passage of Italian troops across their border in order to come to their defence, Schuschnigg accepted Mussolini's encouragement and searched for a means of reconciliation with Germany. Unlike his predecessor,

---

<sup>85</sup> Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1948), p. 116.

<sup>86</sup> Streitle, pp. 47-48.

<sup>87</sup> Schmidl, "März 1938 in Österreich", pp. 2-3.



Schuschnigg sought to reach a compromise with Hitler and to avoid a "*Bruderkampf*"; whereas Dollfuss had been willing to defend Austrian independence even at the risk of open conflict with Hitler.<sup>88</sup>

Behind both Austrian and Italian foreign policy lay the belief that the threat to Austrian independence could only be alleviated if relations with the potential violator were normalized, i.e. that the most reliable guarantee of Austrian integrity would be by means of an Austro-German rapprochement, provided its foundation was built upon the firm recognition of Austrian independence.<sup>89</sup> Since Austria herself did not wish an open conflict with Germany, any attempts at a *modus vivendi* with the Reich were regarded favourably. Prince Starhemberg explained to the German Envoy to Austria, Franz von Papen, that Austria did not seek to oppose her German neighbour and had "only been driven into the anti-German front by an urge for her self-preservation and for keeping her independence."<sup>90</sup> Upon affirmation that Italo-Austrian relations would not be jeopardized by Austro-German

---

<sup>88</sup> Streitle, pp. 60 and 71 and KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 4. See also footnote 54.

<sup>89</sup> DGFP, C:V, no. 360, p. 601. As expressed by the Duce during the 6 June meeting between Schuschnigg and Mussolini at the latter's house at Rocca della Caminata. Also noted in Peter's *Amtsvermerk* in KA - NPA 583: Liasse Italien I/III, folio 791-793.

<sup>90</sup> DGFP, C:IV, no. 488, p. 984.

rapprochement, Schuschnigg signed the Gentlemen's Agreement of July 1936.<sup>91</sup> The main clauses of the agreement focused on the elimination of the press ban in both countries, Austria's recognition of herself as a "German" state, Hitler's recognition of Austrian independence, the participation of representatives of the "National Opposition" in the political responsibility and the granting of political amnesty to Austrian Nazis previously outlawed and imprisoned.<sup>92</sup>

Parallel to the political negotiations, military preparations under FML Jansa were taking place. There was however a general unwillingness in the political forum to address Austria's potential to defend herself against an aggressor. When the political battle was lost in February 1938, any consideration of military resistance as a feasible option was given up by politicians. FML Jansa never conformed to this opinion. Since his appointment as Chief of Department III in the Ministry of National Defence in June 1935, Jansa proceeded to carry out his duties to develop a reasonable

---

<sup>91</sup> Further on the July Agreement, see Das Juliabkommen von 1936: Vorgeschichte, Hintergründe und Folgen: Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 10. und 11. Juni 1976 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1977), and Gabriele Volsansky, Das "Juliabkommen": Der deutsch-österreichische Vertrag vom 11. Juli 1936 (Vienna: University Diss., 1995).

<sup>92</sup> The amnesty extended to 17,045 persons in Austria; Jedlicka, "Die außen- und militärpolitische Vorgeschichte des 13. März 1938", p. 78. For a detailed description of the clauses of the July Agreement see DGFP, D:I, no. 152, pp. 278f.

defence plan against potential aggressor states, including the German Reich. During this crucial period in the history of the First Republic of Austria, there was clearly a separate agenda between the political and military spheres which needs to be addressed when evaluating whether or not, had the political climate been different or a stronger political figure in the government been present, military resistance to German annexation was possible. A survey of Jansa's plans is therefore crucial to an accurate evaluation.

## CHAPTER III

### Austrian Defence: 1935-1938

#### A) A New Army

Prior to his post as Chief of Department III in the Federal Ministry of Defence, Field Marshal Alfred Jansa served as Military Attaché in Germany. He assumed this position upon personal appointment by the Chancellor, who entrusted Jansa with the mission of helping the Austrian envoy to create a reasonable understanding with Germany.<sup>93</sup> During his posting in Berlin 1933-1935 Jansa made an honest effort to realize the Chancellor's request; however, he felt that all his attempts were in vain.<sup>94</sup> As Military Attaché Jansa perceived the possibility of two occurrences: firstly that an understanding with Germany was impossible and that Austria would either be faced with battle or unconditional submission; secondly Jansa was aware of the German rearmament that had begun in 1933 and felt that as of 1939 German aggression was to be reckoned with.<sup>95</sup> Assuming his position in the Federal Ministry of Defence in June 1935, Jansa embarked on a personal mission to

---

<sup>93</sup> KA - Jansa, "Mein Verhältnis zum Nationalsozialismus während meiner aktiven Dienstzeit", p. 1.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Hochverratsprozeß gegen Guido Schmidt, p. 217.

do everything in his power with the limited financial means available to prepare for an expected German aggression.

Faced with a battle against time, Jansa quickly began to address the tasks which lay ahead of him. To meet the requirements of an army capable of defending its borders, Jansa's tasks were fourfold: the expansion of the Austrian army's manpower to war strength coupled with back-up support from a loyal militia, a reliable Executive (rural (*Gendarmerie*) and state police) and border police (*Zollwache*), a reorganization and modernization of the general structure of the army from brigades into divisions with motorized and armoured units along with the construction of a viable air force, an adequate supply of weapons and munitions, and lastly operation plans for border surveillance (*Grenzbeobachtung*) and defence (*Grenzsicherung*) in the case of an invasion by a neighbour power (in the case of Germany: "Operation Case DR").

Of primary concern to Jansa was to first find a way of bringing the military personnel up to war strength. In fact, during a private conversation with Liebitzky on 12 August 1936, Mussolini hinted at the urgency for an Austrian mobilization strength of 250,000 or 20 divisions by the spring of 1938. According to Mussolini, a stronger manpower would enable Austria to exert her political aspirations when Germany would eventually decide to settle the "Ostfrage" (eastern

question).<sup>96</sup> To pursue a policy of self-defence, Austria could no longer abide by the 30,000 man ceiling imposed by the Treaty of St. Germain. Thus, subsequent to the German announcement of a two year military service (*Wehrdienst*) on 16 March 1935, Austria used the term *Bundesdienstpflicht* on 1 April 1936 (for military service with a 12 month duration)<sup>97</sup>, attempting to tone down the military connotations of its actions.<sup>98</sup> Military service met with resistance within the Austrian government, in which fears were voiced as to the increased potential to include "unreliable" elements or members of the banned party groups within the army, thus detracting from its reliability as an element of government policy.<sup>99</sup> Although it is likely the fear was voiced against the banned socialist and communist groups, the possibility of National Socialists elements slipping through the system is

---

<sup>96</sup> Jedlicka, "Die außen- und militärpolitische Vorgeschichte des 13. März 1938", p. 78 and Jedlicka, "Österreich und Italien 1922 bis 1938", p. 60. See also footnote 79.

<sup>97</sup> On 10 February 1938, the service time was increased to 18 months.

<sup>98</sup> According to Jansa there were also legal reasons for the choice of title for the law; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 39. Additionally the country issued a memorandum of explanation of its actions to the Governments of England, France, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, Switzerland and Turkey. As its primary reason for breaking the treaty, the memorandum stated that its disarmament clauses had only been met by itself, but by none of the other signatories. Militär-Wochenblatt, 5 May 1936, Nr. 42, pp. 1891-1892.

<sup>99</sup> Ludwig Jedlicka, Ein Heer im Schatten der Partei (Graz: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1955), p. 130.

not to be excluded.

The benefits of conscription however were undeniable. By 1938 Austria could boast over 20,000 conscripts<sup>100</sup> (so-called *Dienstpflichtige Soldaten* or *D-Männer*).<sup>101</sup> Following their year of service, some men would remain in the army as *B-Männer* (longer serving army men), whereas others could have their service term as *D-Männer* prolonged up to 4½ years.<sup>102</sup> According to the Austrian war archives the military potential of the state had been increased threefold over the period of ten years, culminating in a total active manpower of 59,065 in 1938.<sup>103</sup> However, the entire mobilization force of the Austrian army totalled over 120,000 men.<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> Active stance.

<sup>101</sup> Actual numbers differ, ranging from 20,500; National Archives (NA) - Captured German Records (Microfilm Publication, T-78, Roll 456), to 21,800; Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 177.

<sup>102</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 27.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., pp. 187-188. The 1928 sum of military personnel amounted to 22,031. Most likely due to the particular details each author chooses to take into account (such as officers, army workers, and students) the active manpower figures differ in the sources. Steinböck's total does not take into account civil personnel and was amassed through the documents contained in the Austrian War Archives for the years 1937-1938.

<sup>104</sup> Jedlicka, "Warum hat das Bundesheer nicht geschossen" in Wien Aktuell (Heft 3: March, 1978), p. III. A more exact figure of 126,145 is given by Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 29 and Streitkräfte, p. 69. This figure is made up of a total of land force: 109,724, air force: 5,518 and replacement troops: 5,518.

Aware of the fact that some of Austria's most loyal elements were contained in voluntary militia groups (*freiwillige Milizen*), Jansa sought to unite them and employ them as an integral force in his defence plans.<sup>105</sup> In May 1936 all surviving militia groups were disbanded and united together as the *Frontmiliz* or Front Militia<sup>106</sup>, whose primary task would be the initial defence of the border, giving the Austrian army sufficient time to mobilize along its defence lines. According to Schmidl's estimates this portion of the militia, the *Jägermiliz*, could mobilize up to 42,000 men.<sup>107</sup> As well, Jansa intended to use part of the Front Militia, the *Standmiliz*<sup>108</sup>, within the country as a counter force to uprisings and disturbances.<sup>109</sup> A final portion of the militia, the *Sondermiliz*, was foreseen for air and transport

---

Records contained in the Austrian war archives dated 24 March 1938 indicated a total availability of 120,530 troops (mobilization stance and reserves), KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, "Erlaß des Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung (BMfLV): Aufmarschplan im Kriegsfall D(Deutschland)", folio 793.

<sup>105</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 19-20.

<sup>106</sup> On 14 July 1937 a federal constitutional law, or *Bundesverfassungsgesetz*, was passed directly incorporating the Front Militia into the Austrian army; Streitkräfte, p. 284.

<sup>107</sup> Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 59.

<sup>108</sup> The *Standmiliz* could mobilize 17,500 men with 31 Battalions; Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> During the February uprisings following the Berchtesgaden Accord in 1938, the 5th division was sent back to the province of Styria to prevent rioting. This is in direct opposition to Jansa's plans, which had not foreseen any army displacements in the event of internal uprisings.



protection as well as the defence of important factories. By 1938 the strength of the Front Militia was estimated at 60,000 with a potential to mobilize up to 100,000 men.<sup>110</sup> Coupled with army estimates, Austria should arguably have been able to mobilize over 180,000 men in March 1938.

Omitted from military calculations was another important and militant loyal force, present in Viennese and Lower Austrian factories; namely, the *Arbeiterschaft*, or working force. Their preparedness to bear arms for their nation was undeniable. On 23 February 1938 the socialist worker's paper, *Das Kleine Blatt*, printed a resolution signed by over 1 million workers<sup>111</sup> within a period of 48 hours, declaring their willingness to defend Austria against a German aggression.<sup>112</sup> According to Otto Horn, a member of the free unions and illegal Communists, an illegal conference was held on 7 March at the workers' residence in Floridsdorf. The work force declared itself prepared to resist National Socialist aggression and, until Schuschnigg's resignation on 11 March

---

<sup>110</sup> Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 59.

<sup>111</sup> A similar memorandum was signed by over 100,000 workers in April 1937; Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, p. 268. Clearly, resistance to National Socialism within the working class had not declined.

<sup>112</sup> It read: "daß sie bereit sind, jederzeit den Kampf für die Erhaltung eines freien und unabhängigen Österreich, in dem sie selber frei und unabhängig sind, zu führen"; in Rot-Weiss-Rot-Buch, p. 62.

1938, held demonstrations voicing their conviction.<sup>113</sup> Through acts of sabotage or of a general strike, this force would have presented a huge pressure point against German willingness to invade Austria.<sup>114</sup> However, Schuschnigg's *Standestaat* was unwilling to reach a compromise with the Socialists, fearing that by virtue of democracy their inclusion into the government system would create a precedent for more militant National Socialist representation as well.<sup>115</sup> Ironically, the nation's most loyal force was never given the proper consideration it deserved.

In a manpower comparison, Austrian army officials estimated a German army invasion to be of equal strength to Austrian mobilization figures. Ordered in November 1937 by Jansa, Lieutenant-Colonel Krische prepared a report comparing Austrian and German battalions, which points to equality on the Upper Austrian and Tirolian fronts, with a slight inferiority of Austrian strength in the area of Salzburg.<sup>116</sup> The report was based on information available from the

---

<sup>113</sup> Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, pp. 227-229.

<sup>114</sup> Leopold Horn, a spokesman in a metal factory, testified that within a few hours the entire city could be under general strike; *ibid.*, p. 230.

<sup>115</sup> By the July Agreement 1936, Schuschnigg had already opened his cabinet to the infiltration of less militant, or moderate Christian-Social, National Socialists.

<sup>116</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, "Aufmarschplan im Kriegsfall D(Deutschland)", folio 794-797.

operations' department along with that obtained through the intelligence department, relying on military conditions in south Germany with respect to troop distribution, formations, types of weaponry and preparedness.<sup>117</sup> In his memoirs Jansa confirmed his belief in the sufficiency of Austrian strength to match an expected German force. Representing the German invasion force into Austria would be the German 8th army, accompanied by 2 army corps, 1 armoured division and 1 militia division. Aside from a border protection of some 5,000 men, Austria could mobilize 7 infantry divisions, 1 armoured (*Schnelle*) division and 1 mountain brigade. In addition, the Front Militia stood at her disposal. Jansa felt the large German police force (which had been estimated at 40,000) could be met by the militia, rural police (*Gendarmerie*) and a portion of the previously disbanded republican *Schutzbund*.<sup>118</sup>

In actual fact approximately 105,000 men of the German 8th army marched into Austria in March 1938, in addition to a 12,000 man order police.<sup>119</sup> There is no question that German

---

<sup>117</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 77.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., pp. 87-88.

<sup>119</sup> Schmidl, "Die militärischen Aspekte des Anschlusses" in Stourzk and Zaar, Österreich, Deutschland und die Mächte (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1990), p. 297.

military strength was 8-10 times that of Austria<sup>120</sup>; however, Germany was required to maintain forces on its other fronts in the event of a third power aggression, however unlikely it may have appeared at the time. Clearly due to the strength of its neighbouring powers<sup>121</sup>, Germany would not have been capable of withstanding a two-front war in 1938.<sup>122</sup>

The role played by Italian willingness to provide military assistance to a threatened Austrian state was therefore crucial. Jansa took advantage of his invitation to the Italian manoeuvres in the fall of 1935 to meet with Mussolini and the Italian General Staff and petition Italy for aid in the defence of Austrian independence. His aim was to voice his conviction to establish an Austrian army capable of defending its borders and appeal for a loan (to be used only for the purchase of weaponry), the return of 1,000 confiscated World War I weapons presently being held unused in depots, and

---

<sup>120</sup> In the spring of 1938 Germany had 41 divisions and 1 brigade; Heinz Magenheimer, "Zur Entwicklung der Streitkräfte und Rüstungspotentiale in Europa 1933-1938" in ÖMZ (2/1978), p. 118. For a further comparison of the strength (both infantry and air force) of the European powers in 1938, see Appendix 2.

<sup>121</sup> See Appendix 2.

<sup>122</sup> A later statement by General Field Marshal Erich von Manstein confirmed the fact that in the case of war with Austria, Germany's other borders could not be well defended: "Wir hätten, wenn es zu einem Krieg gekommen wäre, weder unsere Westgrenze noch die polnische Grenze wirksam verteidigen können"; Jedlicka, "Die außen- und militärpolitische Vorgeschichte des 13. März 1938", p. 83.

Italian tanks.<sup>123</sup> On 6-9 April 1936 Jansa secretly returned<sup>124</sup> to Italy to present his defence plans to Mussolini and to further discuss Italian assistance. Jansa's trip proved profitable for the Austrian army, as he succeeded in gaining not only Mussolini's personal trust, but obtaining his commitment to send the old weapons to Austria<sup>125</sup>, to provide education for flight officers, to sell Italian tanks and aircraft on credit, as the Italians insisted that due to the Abyssinia conflict, they did not have the available funds to offer a loan, and, perhaps most important to supply 5 Italian armoured divisions (which would come to Austria's aid through the Brenner and Villach)<sup>126</sup> accompanied by air

---

<sup>123</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 25-28.

<sup>124</sup> In fact, there are no documents in the DGFP for this period relating to Jansa's visit and one can reasonably conclude that the Germans had no knowledge of his trip for one month. See also KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 41. Subsequent to his Rome trip, in May 1936 attempts to slander Jansa began to circulate. A German emigré press report in Prague claimed that Jansa was planning a military coup, in which Hitler would be instated as President. In fact, Jansa notes it was a propaganda attempt from German Propaganda Minister Dr. Joseph Goebbels to drive a wedge between Jansa and Schuschnigg. See KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 53.

<sup>125</sup> The first transport contained howitzers and cannons for a total of 150 weapons and munitions; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 42. The second shipment never arrived in Austria. Presumably the Italians yielded to German insistence after the Germans learned of the agreement; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 54.

<sup>126</sup> However, it should be noted that already by the end of 1936, the likelihood of Italian military participation in a war between Austria and Germany had dwindled. Mussolini now sought to protect Austria through his diplomatic relations with Germany, rather than through military might. Liebitzky's footnote to KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 45. In

support.<sup>127</sup>

Regardless of the five Italian armoured divisions, an actual comparison of manpower shows that the Austrian land forces would have been at comparable strength if not superior to their German counterparts. Nonetheless, prior to issuing an order to march into Austria, Hitler secured Mussolini's word that Italy would not provide any military assistance to Austria or resistance to an Anschluss<sup>128</sup>. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that intervention by a third power, such as Italy, would have shifted the balance from Germany's favour, perhaps even changing Hitler's decision to send the German army into Austria.

---

addition, the Duce relied heavily on the word of honour he had been given by Göring that no military action against Austria would be taken. Footnote to KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 57.

<sup>127</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 42-47; also for negotiations of five Italian divisions see Jedlicka, "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich 1918-1938", p. 114.

<sup>128</sup> In a letter to the Duce dated 11 March 1938, Hitler requested the Duce's consent for the German acquisition of Austria and affirmed that the Brenner border would not be breached; DGFP, D:I, No. 352, pp. 573-576. Shortly thereafter Hitler received confirmation from Philipp von Hessen that Austria was no longer of concern to Mussolini. Hitler's relief is apparent in his repetition to von Hessen that he would never forget what Mussolini had done: "Dann sagen Sie Mussolini bitte, ich werde ihm das nie vergessen." This passage is found in Niederschrift der Telefon-Gespräche held in the Archives of the Austrian Resistance (DÖW File Nr.2828), pp. 368-369, as well as Heinz Holldack, Was wirklich geschah (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1949), pp. 323-324.

Aside from sheer manpower, another important factor needed to be considered, namely the air force. Although it had grown substantially from the original 6 armed aircraft secretly sent to Austria from Italy in 1933, the Austrian air force with 5,518 men and two regiments strong, would have been no match for the German *Luftwaffe*. Sources estimated that Austria had between 92-95<sup>129</sup> usable airplanes: reconnaissance planes: 16 (24); fighters: 70 (72); and bombers: 6 (12).<sup>130</sup> The Austrian air force should have in fact been double its size, had orders been received on schedule and without manufactural defaults.<sup>131</sup> Suspiciously, despite the contractual clauses in the July Agreement 1936 and a scheduled arrival for 1 July 1937 of 6 Junker 86 bombers, the German shipment was delayed until 10/11 February 1938, at which time only three faulty airplanes arrived and were subsequently returned on 16 February.<sup>132</sup> Confronted with a German air force larger and more powerful than all its neighbouring

---

<sup>129</sup> Schmidl's estimates are not quite so generous. He estimates that only between 60-65 aircraft were actually fit for action; photo insert in Der Anschluß Österreichs and "März 1938 in Österreich", p. 5.

<sup>130</sup> Exact figures differ slightly according to sources, figures shown are taken from Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, pp. 163-164; whereas the figures quoted in brackets can be found in Streitkräfte, Appendix B/ Skizze 6. See Appendix 3 for a German assessment of Austrian aircraft.

<sup>131</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, pp. 163-165.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., pp. 63-64.

states (i.e. possible allies)<sup>133</sup>, the Austrian air force was restricted to a limited defence of military airfields as well as strategically important train stations. Any protection of civilian areas was inconceivable.<sup>134</sup>

Complying with Italian suggestions,<sup>135</sup> Jansa reorganized the 6 brigades of the Austrian army into 7 divisions<sup>136</sup>, one brigade (8th) and an armoured division and set out to modernize the battalions with motorized regiments. The goal of divisions 1 - 5 was to obtain 3 regiments with 3 battalions each, whilst the 6th division sought for 7 and the 7th division 6 battalions respectively.<sup>137</sup> In addition, each division received an infantry cannon unit<sup>138</sup>, a light artillery unit, a pioneer battalion, a telegraph battalion and

---

<sup>133</sup> Magenheimer, pp. 118-119. See also Appendix 2.

<sup>134</sup> Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 46.

<sup>135</sup> In a footnote to KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 8, Liebitzky noted that the conversion into divisions had been suggested numerous times by the Italians.

<sup>136</sup> Each division served a province: 1st: Burgenland; 2nd Vienna (as well as the Schnelle); 3rd Lower Austria; 4th Upper Austria; 5th Styria; 6th Tirol (and Vorarlberg); 7th Carinthia. The 8th brigade represented the province of Salzburg.

<sup>137</sup> In 1938 the 3rd division fell short of its expectations, containing only 7 battalions; Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 21.

<sup>138</sup> According to a German report (Nr. Geh89/38) in NA - Captured German Records, (T-78, Roll 456) dated 28 January 1938, the infantry cannon units were not yet set up in all divisions; it is unclear, however, how many units lacked them.



a reconnaissance unit.<sup>139</sup> The 8th brigade was to have both 4 battalions and brigades.<sup>140</sup> The fire power of the infantry battalions was to include 600 rifles, 27 submachine guns, 27 light machine guns, 4 light mortars, 4 infantry cannon and in the MG-Company, 16 heavy machine guns.<sup>141</sup>

The armoured division followed the Italian model with tank units, motorized infantry units and calvary regiments.<sup>142</sup> It contained five tank companies: 4 consisting of the 72 Italian light tanks (models Fiat-Ansaldo CV33 and CV35); whereas the 5th displayed Austro-Daimler's updated model ADGZ.<sup>143</sup> Although the tiny 2-man Italian models offered speed<sup>144</sup>, they were only a match for the German tank Mark I; Mark II and Mark III being of superior quality. However, the Austrian ADGZ was more advanced and afforded a

---

<sup>139</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 21 and Trauttenberg, p. 130.

<sup>140</sup> Streitkräfte, p. 53.

<sup>141</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 21.

<sup>142</sup> Erwin Steinböck, "Das österreichische Bundesheer in den Jahren 1937-1938" in Mitteilungsblatt der Kameradschaft (Nr. 85, March 1978), p. 16. As well, it contained the first tank company and a motorized pioneer company; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 9.

<sup>143</sup> Pictured in Appendix 4.

<sup>144</sup> During his discussions in Rome, Jansa stressed Austrian interest in a larger, heavier model tank armed with canons. The Italians, however, turned down his idea, insisting that speed would be the chief requirement in the next war; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 28.

greater fire power.<sup>145</sup> Unfortunately, in March 1938, the Austrian army had only 12 such models. With respect to the munitions' inventory for the 2 cm M35 tank weapon, the Austrian army had an adequate supply for approximately three days.<sup>146</sup>

The expansion plan (*Ausbauplan*) of the Austrian army intended for 20 infantry regiments with 60 battalions (by 1938 58 had been reached) as well as 3 independent watch battalions.<sup>147</sup> However, rapid development fostered many gaps

---

<sup>145</sup> Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 45.

<sup>146</sup> According to Steinböck, "Das österreichische Bundesheer in den Jahren 1937-1938", p. 16, the armoured division possessed 84 2cm M35 tank weapons; however in the appendix to his book Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 152, Steinböck recorded only 50 such weapons in the army's possession. An additional 44 were under the control of the Executive. It is therefore unclear how many of the armoured division's tanks were equipped with the 2cm M35. Nonetheless the munition inventory of the 2cm M35 in March 1938 stood at 39,620 rounds. Steinböck estimates that each weapon would require 120 rounds per day (see Appendix 5). As mentioned earlier, following Schmidl's argument, a reasonable calculation would assume double Steinböck's estimate. Hence, if the army's 50 weapons were fired an equal amount of times their firing power should have lasted just over 3 days. (This does not take into account ammunition that may have been allotted to the Executive; therefore the duration of firing power may still have been shorter).

<sup>147</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, "Erl. 100.200 - Mob/37: Übersicht über die Einheiten des stehenden Heeres im Mobilisierungsfalle 1938" and Streitkräfte, pp. 53-54. For a more detailed overview of the Austrian army forces in the event of mobilization in 1938, see Appendix 6.

in the divisions, in some cases with entire units missing<sup>148</sup> or up to one quarter of the appropriate strength (*Soll-Stärke*) lacking.<sup>149</sup> Mussolini voiced his immense disappointment upon learning that Austria had not recruited more than 15,000 conscripts in October 1936. In his opinion, the army needed to call up 80,000 men.<sup>150</sup> In an attempt to boost its reserves, the call up of *Ersatzmänner* (*E-Männer*), or those men who had no prior service and whose birth years fell between 1900-1914, was implemented on 2 February 1937 for a three month service period.<sup>151</sup> Striking as well was the apparent shortage of officers, despite an increase in officer appointments and courses offered.<sup>152</sup> Clearly Austria was

---

<sup>148</sup> German Military Attaché General Muff's annual report dated 31 December 1937 indicates units missing from the divisions and their inability to be brought to full strength; NA - Captured German Records (T-78, Roll 456): "Es fehlten überall noch ganze Formationen (Infanterieregimenter, Divisions-Infanterie-Kanonen-Abteilung, Pioneer-Batle) oder innerhalb derselben einzelne Unterabteilungen (Bataillone, Kompanien, Batterien)." See also, Streitkräfte, pp. 389-390.

<sup>149</sup> Erwin Steinböck, "Das österreichische Bundesheer in den Jahren 1937-1938" in Truppendienst (4/1976), p. 373 and Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 45.

<sup>150</sup> According to Liebitzky, Mussolini said: "Das ist ja viel zu wenig" and that it was "sehr schade!" He went on to tell the Austrian Military Attaché: "Die gute Stimmung der Jugend müsste viel mehr ausgenützt werden. Es müssten 80,000 Mann einberufen werden." Report from Liebitzky from Rome 12 August 1936; Appendix 9 in KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben".

<sup>151</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 27 and Streitkräfte, p. 52.

<sup>152</sup> Attention was drawn to the shortage of officers in the Austrian army in the German Militär-Wochenblatt (Jg. 121, Nr. 33/ 26 February 1937), p. 1959. As well a breakdown of the forces contained in the 5th division placed throughout Styria

lagging behind her capability.

A further factor in Austria's defence mechanism was its ability to equip the troops with adequate weaponry. Although the exact number of operational weapons and munitions remains unknown, Steinböck provides a detailed list of those remaining in the possession of the Austrian army in March 1938.<sup>153</sup> In accordance with the average daily ammunition usage rate, a calculation Steinböck created to evaluate the status of the Austrian ammunition for defence in 1938, one can evaluate the approximate number of days each weapon could have been used.<sup>154</sup> A careful evaluation of this rate, enables one to calculate an average ranging between 2-10 days of firing power depending on the weapon. However, Schmidl argues that this rate is in fact flawed and must be approached with caution. Firstly, he notes that not every weapon would require the same amount of ammunition per day - consider for example artillery placed along the border and defence lines, compared with that located in the hinterland. Secondly, he argues that a defender has a tendency to use more ammunition than the

---

in March 1938, shows that in some units there were up to 50 men per officer; NA - Captured German Records, (T-78, Roll 456).

<sup>153</sup> Appendices to Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938. See Appendix numbers 7-8 of this thesis for excerpts from Steinböck.

<sup>154</sup> Steinböck, "Die bewaffnete Macht Österreichs" in Anschluß 1938, p. 23. See Appendix 5 for a listing of his average daily usage rate for particular weapons.

aggressor and furthermore there is the inclination to use more fire power during the first days of combat.<sup>155</sup> With this in mind, one could imagine the average rate of fire power to be substantially higher at the front, especially for the 4th and armoured divisions, and thus rapidly depleted. It would not be unreasonable to assume that ammunition would last at most for half the time assumed by Steinböck; between 1-5 days (depending on the weapon). These tabulations prove that Jansa's own calculation of 2-3 days, based on his unquestionable knowledge of the army's forces at hand, are in fact likely the most credible.

A more detailed look at important defensive weapons illustrates Austria's dire condition in 1938. Although troops were well armed with Austria's modern rifles and machine guns, defensive positions lacked the more important obstacle mines (*Sperrminen*) and anti-aircraft artillery. With regard to quality, the 8cm M35 mortar was highly competitive, but in March 1938 Austria had manufactured only 4 such weapons.<sup>156</sup> Instead the army was forced to rely on the outdated 14cm M18 mortar.<sup>157</sup> With respect to anti-aircraft machine-cannon,

---

<sup>155</sup> Footnote 96 in Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 265.

<sup>156</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 153.

<sup>157</sup> In 1938 the army possessed 71 such weapons and the Front Militia 10; ibid., p. 153.

Austria's situation was destitute: on hand were 5 8cm M14 outmoded cannons. A shipment from the Swedish Bofor factory for 132 arms in the cannon series 32-34 was awaited between 18 November 1937 and 31 December 1938. Austria's defence fell short in March 1938, with only 28 4cm M36 cannons delivered by 9 March.<sup>158</sup> Austria's early recognition of the need for proper anti-tank defence resulted in the easily mobile 4,7cm M35 infantry cannon, which was superior to its German 3,7cm Pak 34 counterpart.<sup>159</sup> The army had 360 such cannons in its possession in addition to the 6 manned by the Front Militia.<sup>160</sup> Scheduled to reach the troops anytime, the army was in the midst of obtaining several more advanced weapons, such as the 15cm automatic cannon M15 with a 30,5cm mortar and the Bofor 15cm motorized howitzer M36 (*Kraftfahrhaubitze*).<sup>161</sup> In addition to awaiting several orders, Austria's intended defensive reconstruction was far from completion in March 1938.

Austria's potential in manpower, defence weapons and ammunition was stunted by the lack of funds allotted to the military budget. Without adequate funds, Jansa could not plan

---

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., pp. 55-56 and Streitkräfte, p. 257.

<sup>160</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 153.

<sup>161</sup> Streitkräfte, pp. 258-9.

for the proper establishment of housing units, clothing and weaponry.<sup>162</sup> Lack of weapons, helmets, fuel<sup>163</sup> and munitions best characterized the financially crippled army.<sup>164</sup> Jansa's testimony that the Austrian army had enough ammunition to last for 3 days of fighting at most is a clear indication of the lack of funds attributed to ammunition purchases by the government.<sup>165</sup>

Chancellor Schuschnigg defended Austrian policy at the time in his book The Brutal Takeover, in which he outlines the main factor in the deficiency of military funds to be the inability to overspend, as "a little country like Austria which, to keep its economy and international credit sound, had to ensure that its currency remained stable" and thus "could not afford to follow the German example and spend large sums

---

<sup>162</sup> In fact, in his December 1937 report, Muff described the Austrian army's poor lack of equipment, uniforms, etc, to such an extent that the army was forced to release the *E-Männer* (*Ersatzreserven*). As well Muff comments on the army's shortage in heavy artillery; NA - Captured German Records, (T-78, Roll 456).

<sup>163</sup> This was particularly a problem within the Austrian air force; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 67.

<sup>164</sup> In fact, in February 1938, Schmidl notes that approximately half the men assigned to the alarm stance were missing steel helmets; whereas almost all of them were missing gas masks; Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 59.

<sup>165</sup> In contrast Jansa notes the large gold funds that were seized by the Germans after Anschluss. In fact, Austria had savings of over 2,7 Million gold schillings, KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 75.

on armaments".<sup>166</sup> Whether allocated for armament spending or proper lodging and equipment for the troops, Jansa met with similar resistance when he petitioned the Finance Minister Draxler for additional funds. Jansa points out this terrible irony in his memoirs, that for many Austrian officials the stability of the Austrian currency was of far greater importance than the defence of the nation.<sup>167</sup> Nonetheless through careful budgeting, petitioning to other nations<sup>168</sup> and negotiations with Mussolini, Jansa devised a defence system within the army capable of meeting an aggressor state in battle - even if it was able to last only a short while.<sup>169</sup>

#### B) Operation Case DR

At the end of 1935 Jansa set out to devise defence plans

---

<sup>166</sup> Schuschnigg, The Brutal Takeover (New York: Athelum, 1971), p. 274.

<sup>167</sup> According to Jansa the "Sorge um den Wert des "Alpendollars" wurde höher geschätzt als die Existenz des Staates dem dieser "Alpendollar" zu dienen hatte"; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 39.

<sup>168</sup> In fact, as well as attempting to obtain old, heavy tanks or aircraft, Jansa solicited Britain and France to increase their wood purchases in Austria, in an attempt to aid her poor economy; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 58.

<sup>169</sup> As will be later discussed in Jansa's "Operation Case DR" plans, Austria's minimal fire power was taken into consideration by Jansa, who sought to have an army strong enough to resist against an aggressor just long enough to be recognized and aided by the major powers.



in the event of a foreign attack. For the first time in the Austrian Republic's history, plans for a defence against a German invasion were drafted.<sup>170</sup> Jansa began his plans for a *Fall DR*, or Case German Reich, with the firm recognition that any victory over the stronger neighbour state would be an impossibility. The sole purpose behind furnishing a resistance must be to avoid an overnight *fait accompli* of German annexation.<sup>171</sup> As well, while the army was to defend Austria with the intention to yield as little territory as possible, Jansa hoped to gain the sympathy of allied powers, witnessing the tiny Austrian nation struggling to retain its independence. In his memoirs he recalled:

The purpose for an Austrian fight could only be, that through a continuous and persistent fight, Hitler would not achieve overnight victory, but rather that the outcry and decisive arming of such a small nation in face of an attempted rape must win time for the major powers to make a decision and take action.<sup>172</sup>

Jansa's plans were consequently a policy of *Zeitgewinn*, or the gaining of time for political purposes.

---

<sup>170</sup> Rauchensteiner, "Das Bundesheer, die Grosse Unbekannte", p. 81.

<sup>171</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 33 and Schmidl, "März 1938 in Österreich", p. 6.

<sup>172</sup> The German reads: "Der Sinn des österreichischen Kampfes konnte nur darin liegen, ihn so laut, langandauernd und zähe zu führen, dass Hitler nicht über Nacht eine fertige Tatsache schaffen konnte, sondern dass der Aufschrei und das entschlossene Wehren eines kleinen Volkes bei seiner versuchten Vergewaltigung den Grossmächten die Zeit zu Entschlüssen und folgenden Taten gewinnen musste"; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 33.

Jansa originally considered a decisive battle along the river Enns, where the entire force of the Austrian army would be concentrated on a 30 kilometre deep defensive line between the Danube and the mountains; however, he quickly ascertained that this would prove a devastating and hopeless battle due to the weakness of Austria's munitions reserve and air force.<sup>173</sup> Additionally, it was felt that the immediate loss of the Upper Austrian capital Linz would have a negative effect on the morale of the Austrian people.<sup>174</sup> He therefore chose to develop a plan which would counter an invading army with a staggered system of defensive points<sup>175</sup>, forcing a minimal surrender of Austrian territory, gradually bringing the enemy to a halt and ultimately delaying an offensive towards Vienna.<sup>176</sup>

Under the title "Operation Plan *DR*", Jansa and the Chief of the Operations' Department, Colonel Moritz Basler, assembled numerous drafts of possible troop deployment within

---

<sup>173</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 32-33 and Fritz, p. 5.

<sup>174</sup> Fritz, p. 5.

<sup>175</sup> Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs", p. 13.

<sup>176</sup> Fritz, p. 6 and Schmidl, "März 1938 in Österreich", p. 6.

Austria in the event of a German invasion,<sup>177</sup> before deciding upon draft nine (originally drawn 20 May 1936).<sup>178</sup> Although German troops could also enter through Salzburg and the Tirolian border, the mountainous geography of the country made an entrance just west of Linz an ideal opening for troops wishing to advance on a direct path to Vienna. It was therefore between the border area of Schärding and Braunau that the Austrian Chief of Staff expected the majority of German forces to enter, and was thus prompted to concentrate Austrian forces in that area.<sup>179</sup>

Jansa's plan placed the entire West army (or divisions 5, 1, 3 and 2 along with an independent artillery regiment<sup>180</sup>) along the river Traun and provided for a 50 kilometre deep defensive line between the cities of Ebelsberg and Lembach.

---

<sup>177</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, "DR-Versammlung hinter der Traun-Gruppierung und Aufgaben im Großen", folio 825-838. Eight different sketches were drawn between January-February 1936.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., folio 805. See Appendix 9 for a copy of the sketch. Also see Appendix 1 for Jansa's hand drawn sketch of the West army's concentration in the area surrounding the river Traun.

<sup>179</sup> In fact, later events showed that Jansa had properly assumed the path of German troops; Steinböck, Österreich militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 89. Also Schmidl shows the bulk of German troops entering through Braunau and the area just north of Schärding; Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 162.

<sup>180</sup> The independent artillery regiment can be found on Jansa's plan, as *sAR* or *selbstständige Artillerieregimenter*, located just east of the 2nd division in the area of Sierning-Pachschallern-Pichlern.

The West army's responsibility was to bring the invasion of enemy troops to a halt with the least amount of territorial loss.<sup>181</sup> The 5th division would span the area between Lembach-Eckendorf-Kirchdorf an der Krems-Laarkirchen; the 1st Wels-Samersdorf-Neuhofen-Krems-Kremsmünster; and the 3rd Ebelsberg-Enns-St. Marien-Pucking. The 2nd stood as a reserve just east of the 1st and the 3rd at Niederneukirchen-Waldneukirchen-Wartburg.<sup>182</sup> In its defence of the Traun line, the West army was not to be sacrificed. They were to withdraw as far back as the river Enns, which was to be used as the second defensive line of the Austrian army. In the event that fighting along the Enns became desperate as well, the army was to withdraw southward into the high Austrian mountains. From the mountains small groups were to carry out flank attacks on the eastward marching German army.<sup>183</sup>

The armoured division would be positioned just north of the 3rd division, west of Linz. Accompanied by the 4th division it was to aid with the border protection, *Grenzschutz*. Centering around Ried im Innkreis-Riedau-Neumarkt im Hausruckkreis, the primary task of the 4th

---

<sup>181</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, "Aufmarschplan im Kriegsfall D(Deutschland)", folio 808.

<sup>182</sup> Fritz, p. 7.

<sup>183</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 34 and Jedlicka, "Warum hat das Bundesheer nicht geschossen?", p. IV.

division was to cover the West army<sup>184</sup>, strengthen the border protection along the river Inn, and defend the region along the rail line Linz-Wels in order to secure the unloading of arriving troops.<sup>185</sup> For this purpose Jansa set up the Wilhering-Pasching line just west of Linz. The group IR 14 (infantry regiment 14) was to offer immediate protection, so that transports arriving from the east could continue to use the Linz-Wels route and troops could be unloaded along the way.<sup>186</sup> While the armoured division required two days for mobilization, alarm status could take up to four days for the West army and ten days for full mobilization. For this reason, the clearly overburdened 4th division<sup>187</sup> was also instructed with the protection of the area surrounding the Traun region and Gmunden until the arrival of the first wave of West army troops.<sup>188</sup> In the event of a strong offence

---

<sup>184</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, folio 813.

<sup>185</sup> Jedlicka, "Warum hat das Bundesheer nicht geschossen?", p. III and Fritz, p 6.

<sup>186</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, folio 813-814.

<sup>187</sup> Schmidl considers that the task of the 4th division would have been impossible to carry out, as its mere 8 battalions would be faced with an initial force of 30 enemy battalions; Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 66. Schmidl, however, fails to take the assistance of the armoured division as well as the border protection forces of the Front Militia into consideration in his judgement. Nonetheless, though less dire, the situation was not favourable for Austrian forces.

<sup>188</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, "Weisungen f. d. Heereskörper", folio 906-909.

from enemy forces, the 4th division was to retreat southward into the area of Vöcklabruck and the armoured division eastward towards Linz.<sup>189</sup>

The main force of the 8th brigade was centred around the city of Salzburg and designed to defend the city area against an enemy attack across the Salzach, preventing a German advance in the direction of Attnang.<sup>190</sup> Should the invasion force be overpowering, the troops were to surrender the city and retreat first east and northeastward of the city and in a dire condition to retreat towards Ischl and Strasswalden, where they would meet up with the 4th division.<sup>191</sup> In addition, with the help of the militia, a portion of the 8th division (II/LAR 8 or second unit of the light artillery regiment 8) was assigned to hide and support the Carinthian 7th division around Pass Lueg and the Salzkammergut region and a second infantry regiment (I/IR 2) would defend near the Tirolian provincial border in Saalfelden.<sup>192</sup>

The defence area of the 7th division spanned the region

---

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., folio 813-814.

<sup>190</sup> Due to the art treasures it contained, the city was not to be submitted to firing or bomb attacks; Ibid., folio 866.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., folio 813 and 815 and Fritz, p. 6.

<sup>192</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, folio 815 and 915 and Fritz, p. 6.

of Pass Lueg-Radstadt-Schwarzach. It was to serve as a connection bridge between the forces in Lower Austria and those of the 6th division in Tirol. The blocking of Pass Lueg was of utmost importance, in particular to prevent a flank attack (on the West army) through Annaberg.<sup>193</sup> Should the division have expendable troops at its disposal, they were to be used as a thrusting force into the flanks of enemy troops moving either eastward (north of Pass Lueg) or southward (in northeast Tirol).<sup>194</sup> The Tirolian 6th division was to remain in and defend its regional area.

Offered as an additional troop support, an important feature in Jansa's defence plan was the proper deployment of blockades around land, water and railway border crossings as a *Gürtelraum* or buffer zone. Blockade commandos, *Sperrkommandos*<sup>195</sup>, composed of militia groups were appointed for this project. Their main task was to delay the border crossing of enemy troops into Austria and provide the West army with the time it required to mobilize along the Traun. The Danube crossing in the area of Engelhartszell was to be blocked with mines planted by a water blocking platoon,

---

<sup>193</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, folio 815.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., folio 808 and 815.

<sup>195</sup> The *Sperrkommandos* were made up of 75 defence and 24 machine gun groups, totally 1,238 men; Steinböck, "Die bewaffnete Macht Österreichs im Jahre 1938" in Anschluß 1938, p. 20.

*Flußsperrenzug*, aided by the patrol boat "Birago" and the motor boats "Traun" and "Wels", belonging the 4th Pioneer battalion.<sup>196</sup> Other types of blockades included mine fields, and the use of chemical weapons, such as mustard gas. Jansa devised a careful planning for tank obstacles, consisting of 3 meter long railway tracks inserted at an angle half way into cement blocks, added for this purpose into the make-up of the roadway and normally hidden under sheet metal.<sup>197</sup> Steinböck describes other defensive obstacles, such as *Stecksperrren*, cement blocks placed throughout the roads or *Wangensperren*, railway tracks stuck into cement blocks and overhanging into the road, placed behind one another along both sides of the road.<sup>198</sup> Supplementary use of barbed wire, mobile obstacles and mines was also common.<sup>199</sup> As well, cement bunkers for machine guns were standardized and the construction of fortifications had begun (yet was still far from completion in March 1938), containing 150 built-in cavities and 42 10cm M14 field howitzers.<sup>200</sup> Weapons remaining unused by the army, such as 40 World War I 14cm mortars, were planned for the

---

<sup>196</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, folio 927 and Fritz, p. 7.

<sup>197</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 36-37 and Fritz, p. 8.

<sup>198</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 71.

<sup>199</sup> As mobile obstacles, Steinböck lists *S-Rollen* and *H-Sätze*; ibid.

<sup>200</sup> Fritz, p. 8.



militia's border protection.<sup>201</sup>

The air force was to defend the important rail stations of St. Pölten, Amstetten, Selzthal and Schwarach-St. Veit, as well as the city of Vienna and the industrial area of Wiener Neustadt. A reconnaissance station (in Wels) and FLAMKna (air defence unit with machine cannon) were put under the command of the West army. No air protection was planned for the province of Tirol, due to the unavailability of proper landing bases.<sup>202</sup> A quick comparison of air forces in 1938 illustrates the gravity of the threat Austria faced if succumbed to an enemy air attack. Matched with her 6 fighter and 2 bomber squadrons, stood some 30-40 German fighter and 50-70 bomber squadrons.<sup>203</sup> Sadly, Austria's aircraft totals were better matched with Germany's squadron totals! Admittedly some of Germany's aircraft were older and perhaps non-deployable; however, its air superiority was unquestionable.

Jansa established two types of border defence; namely border surveillance and border protection. Border

---

<sup>201</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 36.

<sup>202</sup> KA - Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, folio 822 and 934 and Fritz, p. 7. Also for the set-up of air bases, see Appendix 10.

<sup>203</sup> Magenheimer, p. 119 and Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 90.

surveillance was designed to provide political authorities with a diplomatic opportunity when faced with a tense or uncertain situation; yet at the same time without provoking any retaliation or pretext for an undesirable aggression.<sup>204</sup> During a border surveillance, troops would be called upon to observe the area around the border and prevent the traversing of foreign troops (whether armed or unarmed); however the firing of any weapons was strictly forbidden.<sup>205</sup> The main task of border surveillance was handed over to the Front Militia in an attempt to use as little army troops as possible; thus minimizing any chance of counter measures.<sup>206</sup> Its main task in "Operation Case DR" was the protection of border bridge crossings over the rivers Inn and Salzach.<sup>207</sup> Furthermore, an order for border surveillance had the option of including the activation of defensive blockades and obstacles along with the degree of their urgency.

On the other hand an order for border protection entailed the automatic activation of all defence measures (including all blockades and the mobilization of troops) and authorized

---

<sup>204</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 37-38 and Trauttenberg, p. 134.

<sup>205</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 37-38 and Fritz, p. 7.

<sup>206</sup> For "Operation Case DR" 14 surveillance groups were assigned to the Mühlviertel region and 46 to Innviertel-Salzburg; Trauttenberg, p. 134.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

the use of force without warning against any armed individual (whether alone or in a group) who crossed the border.<sup>208</sup> A Front Militia force, the *Jägermiliz*, numbering some 18,000 men and positioned along the border was to carry out the bulk of immediate defence.<sup>209</sup> Due to the fear that Germany would first send motorized and armoured divisions to conquer the greatest amount of territory within a short period of time, the automatic activation of all blockades and obstacles (along roads, railway lines and rivers<sup>210</sup>) under the order of border protection was designed to have a stalling effect on advancing German troops, thus providing the army troops with mobilization time.

Once the order for border protection had been issued, troops mobilization commenced within 6 hours. Jansa's original estimates had allotted 2 days for the alerting of the active stance; however, by the fall of 1937 Jansa began to lose trust in the politicians and worried about receiving short notice for a mobilization order, thus he strove to

---

<sup>208</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 37-38.

<sup>209</sup> Fritz, pp. 8-9 and Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 87. Steinböck estimates that in addition to the initial force, there were over 17,000 reinforcements available to the militia.

<sup>210</sup> Blocking the infiltration of German troops by water, i.e. the Danube, had a supplementary task of preventing a right flank attack on the West army.

accelerate Austrian mobilization.<sup>211</sup> In fact, the alarm stance of border divisions 4 and 6 along with the 8th brigade could be reached within the first to second alarm day, with complete mobilization achieved by the sixth day. The entire West army (divisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and the SAR) along with the 7th division needed 2-4 days for their alarm stance and an additional 6-8 days for full mobilization. The armoured division would be in Linz by the second day and fully mobilized by the sixth.<sup>212</sup> Jansa's meticulously designed rail transportation plans for the Austrian army are a true testament to his dedication to "Operation Case DR";<sup>213</sup> nonetheless they contained one critical threat, namely that of disruption by air attacks.<sup>214</sup>

The uncertainty of Hitler's true commitment to actually bomb Austria was a factor in the Chief of the General Staff's mind when he devised his plans. In fact, almost ten years

---

<sup>211</sup> He scheduled the arrival of final transports to arrive within 5 days of mobilization and made provisions for a mobilization along the river Enns in the event of a lack of time; Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, p. 218 and KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 67.

<sup>212</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential, p. 88.

<sup>213</sup> Unlike "Operation Case DR", plans for mobilization against Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did not contain the transport studies and details allotted to the German invasion; ibid., p. 93.

<sup>214</sup> Trauttenberg, pp. 137-138 and Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 67. The *Standmiliz* was planned for the defence of overhead air attacks; KA - Appendix 6 in Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben".

later, Jansa testified at the trial of Dr. Guido Schmidt that he firmly believed, being the "Pearl of German cities", Hitler would never bomb the city of Vienna in order to "free the country".<sup>215</sup> To affirm his conviction, Jansa reminded the audience that in 1940 Hitler had averted the bombing of Paris as well. Furthermore, the huge negative psychological effect that a German bombing would have had on the Austrian population is undeniable.<sup>216</sup> In fact, in accordance with Germany's actual occupation plans for Austria, "Operation Otto", the air force was to be used mainly for the purpose of propaganda distribution and the occupation of air bases.<sup>217</sup> Therefore, it would be wise to conclude that any major or forceful air offensive upon Austria was unlikely.

An understanding of Austrian mobilization plans is only meaningful if compared side by side with that of its opposing army.<sup>218</sup> Assuming Austrian mobilization proceeded without complications, a contrast between the troop deployment of the

---

<sup>215</sup> The German reads: "Glauben Sie aber, daß Hitler Wien, die 'Perle der deutschen Städte', hätte zertrümmern lassen, um das Land zu 'befreien'"; Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, p. 222.

<sup>216</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 90.

<sup>217</sup> Nonetheless, bombers were also to remain prepared in the event of "special tasks"; Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, pp. 576-577.

<sup>218</sup> For a detailed comparison of the mobilization of the Austrian and German armies, see footnote 7 in Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, pp. 89-90.

Austrian and German armies beginning at 09:00 on 11 March 1938 can be properly evaluated. By its second alarm day, the Austrian 6th division in Tirol and Vorarlberg would be opposed by the German *Heeresdienststelle* 10. At the same time, just south of Salzburg in the area of Lofer, the Austrian 7th division and II/LAR 8 of the 8th brigade would be prepared, but initially face no opposition. Further north to the city of Salzburg, the 8th brigade would hurry to meet the German mountain brigade, entering already by the second day between Berchtesgaden and the region north of Freilassing. Although full mobilization could not be achieved immediately, the West army would have approximately three quarters of its forces in the area of Ried im Innkreis, Braunau and Schärding between the first and second days. It would be met with the arrival on the second day of the German 7th division between Simbach and Tittmoning and the 10th division between Passau and Rott, followed shortly by the 2nd armoured division, unloaded in the area of Vilshofen-Passau by the third day. Additional German divisions, the 17th and the 27th, would only begin loading in the cities of Nuremberg and Augsburg respectively on the second day and therefore would not reach their destination border areas of Vilshofen-Passau and Traunstein-Freilassing before the fourth day. During this period mobilization of the remaining portion of the West army would continue.

In the end, Austria would reach a mobilization stand of

106,000 men in addition to the 18,000 border protection militia. Facing them would be a German strength of 105,000 men represented by 5½ infantry divisions and 1 armoured division accompanied by a 40,000 strong police and SS force<sup>219</sup>. Despite its aggressor state's overpowering size, army comparisons indicate that Austria would have been not only well matched, but also timely mobilized to face an invading German army.

Events of the fall 1937 demonstrated Austria's preparedness to meet a German army in battle. Krische's comparison of the two armies<sup>220</sup> clearly indicated a balanced match between the powers (so long as Austria's munitions supplies lasted). Moreover, the fall manoeuvres and trial of the "Jansa Plan" in the forest area of Lower and Upper Austria (Waldviertel) depicted a skilled army full of enthusiasm and spirit.<sup>221</sup> In fact, Jansa hoped the manoeuvres would convince politicians of the Austrian potential to withstand a German invasion.<sup>222</sup> There is no question that by the end of 1937 Jansa's army was as ready as it could be within the

---

<sup>219</sup> 10 SS and 7 police battalions; Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 93.

<sup>220</sup> Referring to the earlier mentioned report ordered towards the end of November 1937 by Jansa comparing the strengths of the two armies.

<sup>221</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 77-78 and Schmidl, "März 1938 in Österreich", p. 7.

<sup>222</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 78.

limited financial means made available to it.



## CHAPTER IV

### A Shift in the Political Climate

With the army ready to defend its borders in 1938, we are left to answer the question: "What went wrong?" Unfortunately, no military action could be taken, or allied assistance called for, without a direct order from the country's political leaders.<sup>223</sup> By March 1938 any possibility of this had been dissipated. Prior to his decision to succumb to German pressure and resign on 11 March 1938, the Austrian Chancellor had faced a long month of turmoil and difficult decision making. Ever since he placed his signature on the July Agreement in 1936, Schuschnigg had decided, much like other European politicians of the time, to follow a policy of appeasement toward the German Reich.<sup>224</sup> Perhaps he sincerely believed that a few concessions and an honest attempt to abide by the agreement would secure Austria's independence. In addition, there tended to be a lingering, albeit illfounded, thought that Austria could perhaps "buy" her independence by means of participation in a campaign against

---

<sup>223</sup> Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 98.

<sup>224</sup> Schmidl, "März 1938 in Österreich", p. 8.

Czechoslovakia.<sup>225</sup>

For Jansa, however, there was never a question of compromising with the German Reich. He was well aware of Hitler's ambitions and strove to fulfil his duty of preparing a strong army, one capable of defending its border against an enemy attack<sup>226</sup> - even if the attack came from the German brethren. Like many Austrians, Jansa was not untouched by the prospect of facing Germans in an armed conflict. As he wrote in his memoirs:

That the conflict with Germany affected every single Austrian due to the shared language and culture, and, as well, many periods of history is obvious; I myself am no exception to this assertion. [...] It is necessary, however, to draw a dividing line between the Germany that we all loved and the the rest wickedly stirred up by National Socialism.<sup>227</sup>

Despite former ties, Jansa and the Austrian army were prepared to obey their duty and bear arms against former comrades to

---

<sup>225</sup> Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 62. There should never have been any doubt in the minds of Austrian politicians as to Hitler's true intentions. Firstly, he had outlined the annexation of Austria on the first page of *Mein Kampf* and secondly, it was a military necessity that Germany annex Austria prior to attacking Czechoslovakia; Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch, p. 66.

<sup>226</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 86.

<sup>227</sup> The German reads: "Dass der Konflikt mit Deutschland auf jedem einzelnen Österreicher wegen der Gleichheit der Sprache, der Kulur [sic] aber auch vieler Perioden der Geschichte schwer lastete ist selbstverständlich; auch mich selbst nehme ich von dieser Feststellung nicht aus. [...] Es galt aber einen Trennungsstrich zu ziehen zwischen dem Deutschland das wir liebten und dem alles Üble aufputschenden Nationalsozialismus"; ibid., p. 12.

prevent Austria's loss of independence.

In mid February 1938 Schuschnigg returned from Berchtesgaden faced with a coercive mandate, including several conditions recorded in point 8 that affected the military, such as the exchange of officers, regular conferences between the General Staffs and the dismissal of FML Jansa.<sup>228</sup> Hitler apparently wished not to risk an Austrian military resistance and recognized the urgency to eliminate the highly avowed pro-Austrian Jansa.<sup>229</sup> Germans were well aware of Jansa's opinion towards an Anschluss and his "Operation Case DR" plans.<sup>230</sup> As early as the fall of 1935 during the Hungarian manoeuvres, Jansa had used the opportunity of a car ride with the then German Chief of Staff Ludwig Beck to profess his conviction to do everything in his power to counter a German aggression with Austrian military resistance.<sup>231</sup> Due to the growing status of the Austrian military in 1938, the appointment of someone with a less adamant stance against the German Reich to replace Jansa as Chief of Staff was a

---

<sup>228</sup> DGFP, D:I, no. 295, p. 516.

<sup>229</sup> Trauttenberg, p. 138 and U.S. Military Intelligence Division Correspondence (MID Reports): 2540-213.

<sup>230</sup> Jedlicka, "Warum hat das Bundesheer nicht geschossen?", p. III. Information on Austrian border protection was contained in German War Records as early as 14 March 1936; NA - Captured German Records (T-78, Roll 457), "Österreich: Grenzschutz - Einrichtung."

<sup>231</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 32 and Fritz, p. 3.

necessity in order for any plans of a German invasion to proceed without military resistance.

Not surprisingly, the avoidance of military conflict was sought. By the same argument that Austrian troops would not have wished to fight against their German comrades, we must assume the sentiment was reflected amongst German troops as well.<sup>232</sup> Clearly, any use of military force would only work in their disfavour. General Ludwig Beck's warning against military action as a means to union with Austria was clear: it would be seen amongst the population as the "rape" of Austria rather than "Anschluss".<sup>233</sup> Moreover, it is probable that, by way of his demands at Berchtesgaden, Hitler also intended to spawn and exploit a military-political crisis within the Austrian government.<sup>234</sup>

Nevertheless upon Schuschnigg's return from Berchtesgaden, Austria still had one more chance to maintain its independence. When faced with news of the events at Berchtesgaden, President Miklas was shocked by the military threat that the Chancellor had been confronted with. It was

---

<sup>232</sup> The orders issued during the actual invasion by German forces instructed the troops to proceed without any violent incident; Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, pp. 576-577.

<sup>233</sup> Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, p. 32.

<sup>234</sup> Trauttenberg, p. 138.

Miklas' opinion that Schuschnigg should relay the entire conditions of the meeting to the population of Austria and to the world.

Shortly thereafter, upon learning of this conversation between Schuschnigg and Miklas during his February meeting with Miklas<sup>235</sup>, Jansa informed the President that a second option for Austria was still possible: the military stood ready.<sup>236</sup> Austria still had the chance to mobilize its army and oppose the Berchtesgaden extortion. Jansa believed that a clear resistance at this point still had the possibility of receiving at the very least Italian aid.<sup>237</sup> Discouraged, Miklas informed Jansa that a military resistance was not desired by the Chancellor and that, in accordance with the constitution, the President alone had no power to issue a deployment order.<sup>238</sup> Instead Schuschnigg chose a different course.

On 9 March 1938, during his renowned speech held in Innsbruck, Schuschnigg announced his decision to hold a

---

<sup>235</sup> Jansa met with President Miklas on 15 February in order to officially hand in his resignation; Jedlicka, Ein Heer im Schatten der Partei, p. 178 and Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, p. 220.

<sup>236</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 83.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., p. 84.

national referendum on the issue of Austrian independence.<sup>239</sup> He was determined by proving Austrian will for independence to Hitler, to alleviate further National Socialist encroachments upon his government and nation. It was ensured that the question be so phrased to appeal to all members of society with particular care taken not to alienate the socialist elements. During his speech Schuschnigg called out:

The watchword is: For a free and German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria! For peace and work and equal rights for all who affirm their faith in the people and the Fatherland.<sup>240</sup>

In so doing, the Chancellor would ensure victory in the referendum. Schuschnigg's policy was not well received by the Italians, who expressed displeasure with the Chancellor's strategy and warned him against further following this direction.<sup>241</sup> The warning remained unheeded.

Enraged with the Chancellor's blatant disregard for their Berchtesgaden accord and the fear that a vote for independence would shatter his plans for Anschluss, Hitler reissued his threat of military aggression if the referendum were not immediately cancelled. Unwilling to risk a military conflict, Schuschnigg yielded once again to German pressure. Being the sole individual responsible for a final decision, he was

---

<sup>239</sup> For a copy of Schuschnigg's speech, see Schuschnigg, Farewell Austria, pp. 316-317.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid. Also in Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch, p. 62.

<sup>241</sup> Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, p. 223.

incapable of issuing an order which might result in the shedding of Austrian blood.<sup>242</sup> In his words there would be no second 1866 nor a civil war.<sup>243</sup> Shortly after the referendum was cancelled, he fell victim one last time to Nazi Germany and was forced to resign. Hitler ordered the appointment of Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart, formally Minister of the Interior in Schuschnigg's cabinet, as Schuschnigg's successor; however Miklas had other intentions. Initially disregarding the German leader's ultimatum and risking the invasion of a 200,000 German army, Miklas sought to appoint General Troop Inspector Sigismund Schilhawsky.<sup>244</sup> It was only in face of the General's decline and additional protest that military resistance was no longer possible that Miklas placed his signature on the ultimatum<sup>245</sup>, thus sealing the fate of the First Republic.

It was already clear by the 11th that international aid was not forthcoming. Austria stood alone. Resistance at this point would have only had meaning as a symbolic protest.<sup>246</sup>

---

<sup>242</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 85.

<sup>243</sup> The German reads: "kein zweites 1866 und kein Bürgerkrieg!" Jedlicka, Ein Heer im Schatten der Partei, p. 180.

<sup>244</sup> Fritz, p. 15.

<sup>245</sup> Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, pp. 261-262.

<sup>246</sup> Fritz, p. 31.

Despite Miklas's original rejection of Hitler's ultimatum, however, the German leader did not immediately proceed with his threat. Even in the final hours, Hitler did not wish to proceed with a policy that risked any form of military resistance whatsoever. Patience and political circumstance would however alleviate any such fears.

Hitler was aware that the international situation was favourable and the occasion opportune for Germany to push for full annexation of the Austrian state. First, however, Hitler needed to secure Mussolini's neutrality. Despite recent relations, Hitler still felt the necessity to contact the Duce. Although Italy had previously refused aid to Austria<sup>247</sup>, there remained a fear, perhaps even a realization that Italians did not want a common border with Germany. As the Italian proverb read: "When the German eats breakfast in Innsbruck, he will be in Milan for lunch."<sup>248</sup> With Mussolini's back turned on Austria and the Allied powers in no

---

<sup>247</sup> According to President Miklas, Hornbostel contacted Rome, Paris, London and Prague and received negative responses to pleas for aid before the German ultimatum was signed; Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt, p. 262.

<sup>248</sup> The German reads: "Wenn der Deutsche in Innsbruck frühstückt, ißt er zu Mittag in Mailand"; KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", pp. 80-81. In fact, in the early March days, Liebitzky still believed in Italian determination to keep Germany from the Brenner border. Furthermore, according to Jedlicka, "Warum hat das Bundesheer nicht geschossen?", p. III, Italian troops had been on their way to the border area in March, reaching Sterzing and Tarvis, before their orders were rescinded.



condition to enter a military conflict over Austria, a country which they no longer felt bound to aid<sup>249</sup>, (clearly forgetting the agreements they had signed at the League of Nations and Stresa<sup>250</sup> expressing their commitment to Austrian independence), Hitler rapidly assembled an invasion plan.

The events of 11 March 1938 unwound with minor confusion. At 02:00 reserves of the birth year 1915 were called up to report for a weapons exercise. Three hours later, the 8th brigade received instructions for alarm stance around the area of the Laufen garrison. At 06:00 border surveillance orders had been given to the 4th division for the areas of Schärding, Braunau and Ried. Finally, directives for reconnaissance flights along the Salzburg-Lower Austrian borders were issued at 09:00. Oddly, at 10:30 the command for full border protection without the activation of blockade measures was given.<sup>251</sup> Although military action was not planned and plans

---

<sup>249</sup> This opinion that England had no commitments to take action in Austria was expressed by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain; Alfred Low, The Anschluß Movement 1931-1938, and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 417.

<sup>250</sup> The Stresa accord, though in practice nullified following Italian conflict in Abyssinia and the cessation of diplomatic relations between the powers, had called for a common resolution in the event of a threat to Austrian independence between Italy, France and England; Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch, p. 53.

<sup>251</sup> KA - Präs 16.495/38, "Bericht über die wesentlichen Ereignisse im ehem. BMfLV vom 23. Februar bis 15. März 1938", pp. 7-10.

for "Operation Case DR" had ceased as of the 23rd February, defensive measures were still being carried out in the final moments of the Republic's history - perhaps in the event that a last minute decision to resist would be made. Unquestionably, the Austrian army demonstrated its solid reliability, as it continued to follow mobilization orders against Germany.

At the same time, the Austrian manoeuvres were being met with similar steadily increasing troop deployment on the opposite side of the border, with a concentration around the Tittmoning and Passau-Simbach areas. It was only at 19:30 that the State Secretary for Military Affairs, General Wilhelm Zehner, announced instructions that German troops were not to be fired at upon crossing the border into Austria. The directive was passed on to the troops at approximately 20:00.<sup>252</sup> At the same time the announcement was made that the Schuschnigg Government had resigned. The Austrian National Socialist Seyss-Inquart was the new Chancellor.

As his first order of business Seyss-Inquart was forced to agree (over the telephone) to request immediate German military support against potential internal rioting.<sup>253</sup>

---

<sup>252</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>253</sup> For the telephone conversation, see Niederschriften der Telefon-Gespräche Görings mit Seyß-Inquart (DÖW File Nr. 2828).

Secured by Zehner's order to retreat and not fire any weapons, Hitler at last had the full security that German troops would not be met with military resistance when they entered Austria. At 05:30 on 12 March 1938 the first German troops crossed the border into Austria.<sup>254</sup> There is no question that the Austrian military threat had been an obstacle that was only too real.

The invading German forces met with no resistance, with the exception of an incident in Tirol, where unaware of previous orders to allow undisrupted passage, border guards refused entry to German police forces. This incident was ironically demonstrative of the reliability of Austrian forces to defend the border. In the end, German troops suffered only minor casualties through road accidents. Icy mountain road conditions took the lives of 25 German soldiers on the march to Vienna.<sup>255</sup> On 15 March 1938 the birth of the Great German Empire (*Großdeutschen Reiches*) was proclaimed and a *Wiedervereinigungsgesetz*, or reunification law, passed: Anschluss was complete. Hitler had achieved the *fait accompli*, which Jansa had invested three years of military preparations to prevent.

---

<sup>254</sup> KA - Präs 16.495/38, p. 13.

<sup>255</sup> Schmidl, Der Anschluß Österreichs, photo inserts between pp. 160-161.

## CONCLUSION

As historians, we have the benefit of evaluating the situation in hindsight and have a tendency to judge Austria's decisions more critically than did the statesmen of the time. Objections to the decisions made by Schuschnigg in his final hours in office tend to focus on his resolution not to risk the lives of Austrian soldiers, but ignore two important facts: firstly, he himself could not have known that even with Seyss-Inquart in full power, Hitler would proceed with a military occupation of Austria and secondly, the strength and dedication of the military did not necessary need to be sacrificed, but rather could have been employed as a "bluff", much like that used by Hitler at Berchtesgaden. One can only wonder if Hitler would remain faithful to his words of 1924 that Anschluss would be achieved at any cost - "even if it were harmful".<sup>256</sup>

In hindsight Jansa reiterates his affirmation that the military was fully prepared to face Germany. Its force may not have been sufficient to secure any form of victory; however, Jansa believed it to be strong enough to possibly deter a German decision to invade Austria and failing that to secure enough time for allied forces to mobilize and come to

---

<sup>256</sup> Hitler, p. 19.

Austria's aid. The evaluation of the Austrian military in this thesis demonstrates its ability, through careful and meticulous planning by the Chief of the General Staff, to defend Austria's borders for a minimum of two to three days.

For a critical evaluation of the overall military situation and the feasibility of Austrian resistance in 1938 four factors need to be considered: the quantity, equipment and weaponry of the military, the existence of functional defence plans, the desire to maintain independence and finally the prospect of foreign assistance. In the absence of any one of these factors, military resistance to a German invasion would not be conceivable.

In March 1938 the difference between Austria's available arms, equipment, weapons, armoured vehicles and aircraft represented a mere fraction of its intended growth. In fact, in some cases orders outnumbered actual existing amounts; for example, though 104 tanks were on hand, another 152 were awaited on order.<sup>257</sup> Additionally, the lack of funds attributed to army purchases by the Federal government had a constricting effect on weapons and munitions acquisitions. Nonetheless, this thesis has demonstrated that while Austria

---

<sup>257</sup> Appendices 5-7 in Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, pp. 150-162. For weapons and munitions orders, see also Appendix numbers 7-8 of this thesis.

had not achieved an ideal strength in March 1938, an adequate supply of manpower and weaponry had been reached. German armament may have far outweighed its Austrian counterpart in 1938; however, the reliability,<sup>258</sup> spirit and training of the Austrian soldiers was not to be ignored.

Since his acceptance of the position of Chief of the General Staff in June 1935, FML Jansa dedicated much of his time to the creation of plans for an "Operation Case DR". Careful thought was given to border protection, the use of blockades and obstacles and the deployment of army troops, as of 1937 to include former militia groups as well, titled the armed power of Austria, or *bewaffnete Macht Österreichs*. Jansa was not oblivious to the National Socialist infiltration in Austria and distrusted many of the politicians. Thus, he chose to keep his plans as secretive as possible. In fact, he noted that not even Schuschnigg was informed of all his actions.<sup>259</sup> Unlike the make-shift German invasion plans ordered by Hitler just days prior to Anschluss, Jansa's defence plans represented years of careful planning and

---

<sup>258</sup> Contrary to assertions that the Austrian army had been subjected to National Socialist infiltration, lie the facts that only 5% of soldiers were members of the "National Socialist Soldier's Ring" and that an enormous percentage (30-50%) of generals and officers were dismissed following the Anschluss; Schmidl, "März 1938 in Österreich", pp. 7 & 13, Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938", p. 26 and Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938, p. 37.

<sup>259</sup> KA - Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben", p. 13.

details of troop transportation and deployment lines. Clearly, Jansa's incredible preparations in this aspect would have worked in Austria's favour.

The lack of a united front within the Austrian Government to forcibly withstand German pressures was a common feature amongst the European powers. Memories of the First World War were only too vivid in the minds of the general population and no one was willing to sacrifice the "peace". Schuschnigg's government was incapable of continuing along the path of Dollfussian independence policies and opted instead for a policy of appeasement with the Reich. However, without a firm declaration to foreign powers that she wanted protection for continued independence, international commitment to aid Austria was not forthcoming.

Jansa holds steadfast to his conviction that resistance would have been a feasible option as late as February 1938 - and even perhaps most effective at that time as well. Austria could have drawn on the blackmail of Berchtesgaden as an example of Hitler's policy and, through a show of force, demonstrated her determination to fight for her independence. Austria would thus have been the first to renounce appeasement towards the Reich, rather than the first to succumb to its crushing tactics.

Jansa possessed an exemplary understanding of German ambitions towards Austria, dating from his posting as Military Attaché in Berlin. He was aware of the opposing forces and superior strength of his neighbouring nation and knew that Austria's only hope to maintain her independence in a war against Germany was by means of a *Bündnis-Krieg*. He spent much of his time as Chief of the General Staff seeking the aid of other nations in the impending event of an Austro-German conflict. He fostered close ties with the Italians, whom he believed to be likely candidates to offer assistance given their opposition to a common frontier with the German Reich. He gained Mussolini's confidence through his devotion to the survival of Austrian independence; however, Mussolini remained wary of the political aspirations within the Austrian Government. In the dying hours, he was unwilling to defend the independence of a nation, which itself was disunited in its will to preserve its independent existence. The words of Belgian Foreign Minister Spaack best illustrate the fate of the Austrian political course: "Woe indeed to small countries which chose to remain divided and disunited."<sup>260</sup>

Though Jansa's military intentions remained genuine, as well as those of his staff and the troops, doubts lingered in the minds of politicians. Without a firm commitment from the Austrian government, Mussolini was unwilling to jeopardize the

---

<sup>260</sup> Low, p. 429.



relations he enjoyed with the Reich. For Mussolini, the circumstances were a matter of "political realism".<sup>261</sup>

Disunited and alone, the government ignored the willingness of its military to resist and capitulated. Thus, without a united will amongst Austrian statesmen and without the firm commitment of foreign powers to defend Austrian independence, military resistance was doomed to failure.

---

<sup>261</sup> Ibid., p. 430.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### A. Bibliographical Sources

Low, Alfred. The Anschluss Movement, 1918-1938: Background and Aftermath: An Annotated Bibliography of German and Austrian Nationalism. New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1984.

Malina, Peter and Gustav Spann. Bibliographie zur österreichischen Zeitgeschichte 1918-1985: Eine Auswahl. Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1985.

Österreichische Bibliographie. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, ed. Vienna: Hauptverband des österreichischen Buchhandels, 1991, 1992, 1993.

Salt, Denys and Arthur Farrand Radley. World Bibliographical Series, v.66: Austria. Santa Barbara, Ca.: Clio Press, 1986.

### B. Primary Sources

#### 1) Archival Collections

*Staatsarchiv (Kriegsarchiv).* Vienna, Austria.

The Austrian State Archives contain material pertaining to Austrian plans of military defense (prepared by Field Marshal Alfred Jansa) in face of a German aggression, such as the "Erlaß des Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung", Op. Int. Z1 103/1938 - "Aufmarschplan im Kriegsfall D(Deutschland)" and the "Bericht über die Ereignisse im ehem. Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung vom 23. Februar bis 15. März 1938". In addition letters by FML Alfred Jansa including "Aus meinem Leben: Kapitel X" are contained in the Nachlass collection (NL B/655). Within the Staatsarchiv is the Vienna *Staatsbibliothek* which contains a large selection of Austrian military journals.

*Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes (DÖW).* Vienna, Austria.

The DÖW contains numerous articles pertaining to the

Anschluss movement, along with contributions from various authors to international Symposiums. In addition, the DÖW has a selection of primary sources relating to Anschluss, such as SD Reports on the arrest of FML Alfred Jansa and telephone conversations between Göring and Seyss-Inquart.

National Archives in Washington, D.C. and Maryland, U.S.A. The United States Archives contain a large collection of Captured German Records (in Maryland) along with the MID Reports of U.S. Military Attachés stationed in Austria and Germany in the interwar years.

Abkommen und Verträge des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes mit Österreich, Juli 1936-März 1938. (Berichte Papen, Keppler, div. Abkommen). DÖW File Nr.2863.

Berichte und Meldungen des SD vom 22.4.1938. Verhaftung des österreichischen Feldmarschall Jansa. Konfiskation von Akte des österreichischen Aussenministeriums, Gestapo Innsbruck. Widerstand in Steyr, 26.9.1938. DÖW File Nr. 3664.

Jansa, FML Alfred. "Aus Meinem Leben: Kapitel X" (Chef des Generalstabes der bewaffneten Macht). See Österreichisches Staatsarchiv - Kriegsarchiv, Nachlaßsammlung B/655 Nr. 4.

National Archives. Washington, D.C. Captured German Records. Microfilm Publication T-78, Rolls 455, 456, 457.

Niederschriften der Telefon-Gespräche Görings mit Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop und anderen, sowie Hitlers mit Landgraf Philipp von Hessen in der Zeit vom 11. bis 13. März 1939. Betreffend den Rücktritt der Regierung Schuschnigg und den deutschen Einmarsch in Österreich. (B Weisstück US-76) DÖW File Nr. 2828.

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv - Kriegsarchiv. Präs. 16495/38, "Bericht über die Ereignisse im ehemaligen BMfLV vom 23. Februar bis 15. März 1938".

—— Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung (BMfLV): NPA 166, Liasse Deutschland 4/1 1937-1938 (folio 417-623).

—— Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung (BMfLV): NPA 584 Liasse Italien I/I 1933-1937 and NPA 583 Liasse Italien I/III 1935-1938.

—— Manuskript- und Nachlaßsammlung. NL B/655: 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13. (FML Jansa)

—— Operationsabteilung: Internzahl 103/1938, "Erlaß des Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung: Aufmarschplan im Kriegsfall D(eutschland)", folio 1-1037.

U.S. Military Intelligence Division Correspondence, 1917-1941. (MID Reports): 2016, 2059, 2074, 2539, 2540, 2610, 2657.

## **2) Interviews**

Telephone interview conducted with Dr. Manfred Rauchensteiner, Director of the *Heeresgeschichtliches Museum und Militärhistorisches Institut* (Vienna), on March 1, 1996.

## **3) Journals, Newspapers**

Die Presse. (Vienna, Austria) Nr. 16, 1947.

Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen. (Austria) 1936-1938.

Militärwissenschaftliche Wochenblatt. (Germany) 1936-1938.

## **4) Published Sources**

British Documents on Foreign Affairs - reports and papers from the Foreign Office. Part II, Series F: Europe, 1919-1939. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1990.

Ciano, Galeazzo. Ciano's Hidden Diary, 1937-1938. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1953.

Der Hochverratsprozeß gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt vor dem Wiener Volksgericht. Vienna: Druck und Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1947.

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series C (Volumes III, IV, V) and Series D (Volumes I and II) 1937-1945. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1966.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Second Series: European Affairs. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1982.

Dokumentation zur österreichischen Zeitgeschichte, 1938-1945. Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 1971.

France. Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre 1939-1945. Documents diplomatiques français 1932-1939. Paris: Impt. Nationale, 1963-1986.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. New York: Stackpole Sons' Publishers, 1939.

Manstein, Rüdiger von and Theodor Fuchs. Manstein: Soldat im 20. Jahrhundert Militärisch-politische Nachlese. Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1981.

Muggeridge, Malcolm, ed. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers. London: Odhams Press Limited, 1948.

Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. (10 volumes) Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946-1948.

Papen, Franz von. Memoirs. London: A. Deutsch, 1952.

Schuschnigg, Kurt. Austrian requiem. London: Victor Gollancz, 1947.

——— Farewell Austria. London: Cassell, 1938.  
(Original Austrian title: Dreimal Österreich).

——— Im Kampf gegen Hitler: die Überwindung der Anschluß-idee. (The Brutal Takeover; the Austrian ex-Chancellor's account of the Anschluss of Austria by Hitler. New York: Atheneum, 1971.) Vienna: Amalthea-Verlag, 1988.

Starhemberg, Ernst Rüdiger. Between Hitler and Mussolini: Memoirs of Ernst Rüdiger Prince Starhemberg. New York; London: Harper & Brothers' Publishers, 1942.

——— Memoiren. (mit einer Einleitung von Heinrich Drimmel) Vienna; Munich: Amalthea Verlag, 1971.

Trial of the Major War Criminals. (42 volumes) Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947-1949.

Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and Control Law No. 10. (15 volumes) Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949-1953.

U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934 and 1938 volumes.

Zernatto, Guido. Die Wahrheit über Österreich. New York: Longmans, Green, 1938.

## C. Secondary Sources

1918-1968: Die Streitkräfte der Republik Österreich.  
Heeresgeschichtliches Museum (Militärwissenschaftliches Institut). Katalog zur Sonderausstellung im Heeresgeschichtlichen Museum, Wien 1968. Vienna: Isda & Brodmann OHG, 1968.

"Anschluß" 1938: eine Dokumentation. Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen Widerstandes. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1988.

Anschluss 1938: Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 14. und 15. März 1978. (Wissenschaftliche Kommission des Theodor Körner Stiftungs-Fonds und des Leopold Kunschak-Preises zur Erforschung des Österreichischen Geschichte der Jahre 1918-1938). Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981. (Contains Articles by: Peter Broucek, "Die militärpolitische Situation Österreichs 1938 und die Entstehung der Pläne zur Landesverteidigung" and Erwin Steinböck, "Die bewaffnete Macht Österreichs im Jahre 1938")

Berghammer, Maria, Susanne Empacher and Ingrid Reifinger. "Das Österreichische Bundesheer im März 1938: Österreichische Verteidigungsmassnahmen gegen einen deutschen Angriff 1935 bis 1938 - Der "Jansa-Plan" in Wien 1938. pp. 85-96.

Botz, Gerhard. Der 13. März 38 und die Anschlußbewegung: Selbstaufgabe, Okkupation und Selbstfindung Österreichs 1918-1945. Vienna: Dr.-Karl-Renner-Institut, 1978.

——— "Der ambivalente "Anschluß" 1938/39. Von der Begeisterung zur Ernüchterung." In Zeitgeschichte, 6 (1978/79), p. 91-109, also in: 14. Österreichischer Historikertag, Vienna: Verband Österreichischen Geschichtsvereine, Karl Werner, 1978, pp. 22-35.

Burgwyn, H. James. "Italy, the Heimwehr and the Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936" in Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs. V. 38 (1985), pp. 305-325.

Fritz, Friedrich. Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich 1938. Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, Heft 8. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1968.

Fröschl, Erich, ed. 1938 - Ursachen, Fakten, Folgen: was

können wir aus der Geschichte lernen?; Ergebnisse des Symposiums vom 14./15. Jänner 1988. Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1989.

Gerechtigkeit für Österreich! Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch: Darstellungen, Dokumente und Nachweise zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Okkupation Österreichs. Vienna: Druck und Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1946.

Görlich, Ernst Joseph. Die österreichische Nation und der Widerstand. Monographien zur Zeitgeschichte. Vienna; Frankfurt; Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1967.

Harris, Whitney R., ed. Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954.

Hoffmann, Peter. "Ludwig Beck: Loyalty and Resistance" in Central European History. v. 14 (Nr. 4) 1981, pp. 332-350.

Holldack, Heinz. Was wirklich geschah: Die diplomatischen Hintergründe der deutschen Kriegspolitik. Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1949.

Jedlicka, Ludwig. "Bundespräsident Wilhelm Miklas am 13. März 1938" in Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung. V. 71 (1963), pp. 492-498.

——— "Die außen- und militärpolitische Vorgeschichte des 13. März 1938" in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. 6 Jg. (1968), pp. 77-84.

——— Ein Heer im Schatten der Partei: Die militärpolitische Lage Österreichs 1918-1938. Graz: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1955.

——— "Österreich und Italien 1922 bis 1938" in Wissenschaft und Weltbild. (26 Jg., Heft 1), January-March 1973, pp. 45-61.

——— Vom alten zum neuen Österreich. (Fallstudien zur österreichischen Zeitgeschichte 1900-1975) St. Pölten: Verlag Niederösterreichisches Pressehaus, 1975.

——— "Warum hat das Bundesheer nicht geschossen? Die militärpolitische Vorgeschichte des 13. März 1938" in Wien Aktuell. Heft 3 (March 1978), pp. I-V.

Kerekes, Lajos. Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini,

Gömbös und die Heimwehr. Vienna; Frankfurt; Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1966.

Krausnick, Helmut. "Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler" in Vollmacht des Gewissens, Europäischen Publikation, ed., Frankfurt; Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1960, pp. 177-384.

Low, Alfred D. The Anschluss Movement, 1931-1938, and the Great Powers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985.

Magenheimer, Heinz. "Zur Entwicklung der Streitkräfte und Rüstungspotentiale in Europa 1933-1938" in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (Heft 2, 1978), pp. 116-125.

Maleta, A. and H. Haselsteiner, eds. Der Weg zum "Anschluß" 1938: Daten und Fakten. Vienna: Karl v. Vogelsang-Institut zur Erforschung der Geschichte der christlichen Demokratie in Österreich, 1988.

Parkinson, F. Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989.

Rauchensteiner, Manfred. "Das Bundesheer, die Grosse Unbekannte" in Wien 1938. Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien (110. Sonderausstellung) Wissenschaftliche Realisierung durch das Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes. 11. März bis 30. Juni 1988. Rathaus, Volkshalle. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1988, pp. 73-83.

——— "Zum operativen Denken in Österreich 1918-1938" in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. 16. Jg. (March 1978), pp. 107-116.

Ritter, Harry R. "Hermann Neubacher and the Austrian Anschluss movement, 1918-1940." in Central European History. Vol. 8, no. 4 (1975), p.348-69.

Safrian, Hans. "Österreicher in der Wehrmacht" in Wolfgang Neugebauer (Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes), ed., Österreicher und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1989.

Schmidl, Erwin A. Der "Anschluß" Österreichs: der deutsche Einmarsch im März 1938. Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 1987, 1988, 1994.



- "März 1938 in Österreich" in Truppendienst: Zeitschrift für die Ausbildung im Bundesheer. 27. Jg./Heft 1 (February 1988), pp. 1-14.
- Steinböck, Erwin. "Das österreichischen Bundesheer 1920-1938: Teil II: 1933-1938" in Feldgrau, Mitteilungen einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft, Fritz Wiener, ed., Jg. 8-13 (1960-1965).
- "Das österreichische Bundesheer in den Jahren 1937-1938" in Mitteilungen der Kameradschaft der schnellen Division des ehemaligen österreichischen Bundesheerer. Nr. 85 (März 1978), pp. 12-18; also in Truppendienst. Nr. 4 (1976), pp. 278-281; Nr. 5, 371-373; Nr. 6, pp. 455-457.
- "Die österreichische Landesbefestigung von 1918 bis 1938" in Isabella Ackerl, Walter Hummelberger and Hans Mommsen, eds., Politik und Gesellschaft im alten und neuen Österreich. (Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 60. Geburtstag) Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1981, pp. 227-251.
- Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938. Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1988.
- Stourzh, Gerald and Brigitta Zaar. Österreich, Deutschland und die Mächte: internationale und österreichische Aspekte des "Anschlusses" vom März 1938. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1990.
- Streitle, Peter. Die Rolle Kurt von Schuschniggs im österreichischen Abwehrkampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus (1934-1936). Munich: Tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988.
- Trauttenberg, Hubertus. "Die Abwehrvorbereitungen gegen einen deutschen Angriff im Bereich der 4. Division zwischen 1936 und 1938" in Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. Jg. 16, Heft 2 (1988), pp. 130-138.
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. Der gewaltsame Anschluß 1938: die deutsche Außenpolitik und Österreich. Vienna: Bundespressedienst, 1988.
- Zollner, E., ed. Österreichs Erste und Zweite Republik: Kontinuität und Wandel ihrer Strukturen und Probleme. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1985.

# **D. Additional Reading: General Works on Anschluss**

Brook-Sheperd, Gordon. Anschluss: The Rape of Austria.  
London: MacMillan, 1963.

Danimann, Franz, ed. Finis Austriae: Österreich, März 1938.  
Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1978.

Eichstädt, Ulrich. Von Dollfuß zu Hitler; Geschichte des Anschlusses Österreichs, 1933-1938. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1955.

Fuchs, Martin. Un pacte avec Hitler; le drame autrichien, 1936-1938. Paris: Plon, 1938.

Gehl, Jürgen. Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss, 1931-1938. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Kann, Robert A. and Friedrich E. Prinz, eds. Deutschland und Österreich. Vienna, Munich: Jugend und Volk, 1980.  
(Contains Articles by: Gerhard Botz "Das Anschlussproblem (1918-1945) aus Österreichischer Sicht" and Andreas Hillgruber "Das Anschlussproblem (1918-1945) aus Deutscher Sicht".)

Kreissler, Felix, ed. Fünfzig Jahre Danach - Der "Anschluß" von Innen und Außen gesehen: Beiträge zum internationalen Symposium von Rouen, 29. Februar-4. März 1988. (Veröffentlichung des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Instituts für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung) Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1989. (Contains Articles by: Gerhard Botz "War der "Anschluss" Erzwungen?" and Hanns Haas "Der Anschluss Österreichs und seine Bedeutung im System der Kollektiven Sicherheit".)

Luža, Radomir. Austro-German Relations in the Anschluss Era. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.


Reichhold, Ludwig. Kampf um Österreich. Die Vaterländische Front und Ihr Widerstand gegen den Anschluß 1933-1938. Eine Dokumentation. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1984.

Rosar, Wolfgang. Deutsche Gemeinschaft: Seyss-Inquart und der Anschluss. Vienna; Frankfurt; Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1971.

Schausberger, Norbert. Der Griff nach Österreich. Vienna; Munich: Jugend und Volk, 1978.


- Staudinger, Anton. "Die nationale Frage im Österreich der Ersten und Zweiten Republik" in Erich Zöllner, ed. Volk, Land und Staat: Landesbewußtsein, Staatsidee und nationale Fragen in der Geschichte Österreichs. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1984.
- Wagner, Dieter and Gerhard Tomkowitz. Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer: The Nazi Annexation of Austria 1938. (English Ed.) London: The Longman Group Ltd, 1971.
- Williams, Maurice. "Delusions of grandeur: the Austrian National Socialists." in Canadian Journal of History (University of Saskatchewan), vol. 14, no. 3 (December 1979), p. 416-36.
- Zentner, Christian. Heim ins Reich: der Anschluß Österreichs 1938. Munich: Südwest-Verlag, 1988.

## APPENDIX 1



Österreichisches Staatsarchiv - Kriegsarchiv. Manuskript- und Nachlaßsammlung. NL B/655: 4 (FML Jansa, "Aus meinem Leben: Kapitel X", Beilage 4)

## APPENDIX 2



Vergleiche der Land- und Luftstreitkräfte in Europa, Anfang 1938

Heinz Magenheimer, "Zur Entwicklung der Streitkräfte und Rüstungspotentiale in Europa 1933-1938" in ÖMZ (2/1978), p. 118.

## APPENDIX 3

Übersicht des Standes der Fliegerei des Österreichischen

Rechts mit 1. III. 1937.

| Nr. | Flugzeug-<br>Typ | Fabrikat,<br>Type.                               | Marke<br>des<br>Fliegezeug | Technische Angaben                        |                     |                |                |   |                |                    |                    | Verfü-<br>bare<br>Stück-<br>zahl | wo sind die Flugzeuge  |
|-----|------------------|--|----------------------------|---|---------------------|----------------|----------------|---|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|--|
|     |                  |  |                            | Motor und<br>HP                           | Armie-<br>rung      | Beman-<br>nung | Max.<br>gesch. | Steig.<br>gesch.<br>per Sek.                                  | Max.<br>Steig. | Aktions-<br>Radius | pers.<br>Gesch.    |                                  |  |
| 1.  |                  | Hopfer Mo-<br>noplan                             | HS 1033                    | Siemens-<br>Halske<br>SH-14 A<br>150 HP.  | .                   | 3              | 195            | $\frac{1000 \text{ m}}{4}$                                    | 5500           | .                  | 121                | 5                                | 3 Thalerhof, 1 Klagenfurt<br>1 Aspern, zur Schulung<br>Piloten, im Aufkl. und Jagd-<br>Flieger                       |
| 2.  |                  | ---  | HS 7333                    | Siemens -<br>Halske<br>SH-14 B<br>160 HP. | .                   | 4              | 190            | $\frac{1000 \text{ m}}{5}$                                    | 4500           | .                  | 117                | 4                                | 4 Thalerhof, zur Schulung<br>von Aufklärern  |
| 3.  |                  | Avro Rol.et<br>Co.Ltd. Lon-<br>don, Biplan       | AV 626                     | Armstrong<br>Siddley<br>275 HP            | .                   | 2              | 130            | $\frac{1525 \text{ m}}{5.8}$<br>$\frac{1050 \text{ m}}{14.5}$ | 5000           | 4 1/2 h            | 108                | 8                                | 2 Thalerhof<br>2 Klagenfurt<br>4 Aspern zur Aufkl. und<br>Jagdschulung   |
| 4.  |                  | De Havilland<br>Aire Kraft<br>Emp.Ltd.<br>Biplan | DH 82<br>Tiger<br>Heath    | Gypsy<br>III<br>120 HP.                   | .                   | 2              | 169            | $\frac{1525 \text{ m}}{10.5}$                                 | 5000           | 500 km             | 143                | 8                                | 3 Thalerhof<br>5 Hr.Neustadt zur Pil-<br>schulung für Fortgeschrit-<br>tene  |
| 5.  |                  | Ern.Breda<br>Societa It.<br>Biplan               | Breda<br>28                | Piglio<br>Stella 7<br>K-7<br>380 HP       | 2<br>Kg.            | 2              | 240            | $\frac{5000 \text{ m}}{16}$                                   | 7500           | 1000 km            | 200                | 8                                | 2 Hr.Neustadt<br>6 Thalerhof zur Fortbil-<br>dung von fortgeschrittenen<br>Piloten                                   |
| 6.  |                  | Caproni<br>Soc. It.<br>Milano                    | C-97<br>/100/7             | Romeo<br>Jupiter<br>500 HP                | .                   | 3              | 220            | .   | 6500           | 800 km             | 200                | 18                               | 12 Hr.Neustadt, Aspern<br>Wien Mil.Akademie<br>6 Thalerhof für Aufkl.  |
| 7.  |                  | Junkers<br>A.S.Monoplan                          | P-55<br>/P-75 ?/           | B.M.W.<br>Kornett<br>200 HP               | .                   | 3-5            | 240            | $\frac{1000 \text{ m}}{3.4}$                                  | 6300           | 785 km             | 215                | 3                                | 2 Flugzeuge für das<br>eine für den Kadett<br>Fl. Truppen, das für   |
| 8.  |                  | Focke -<br>Wulf<br>Brehmen                       | P-W                        | SH 14<br>165 HP                           | .                   | .              | .              | .   | .              | .                  | .                  | 4<br>/12 ?/                      | 1-2 Thalerhof<br>Hr.Neustadt zur Schul-<br>ung der Jagdpiloten   |
| 9.  |                  | Fiat Aero-<br>nautika It.<br>Turino<br>Monoplan  | Fiat<br>A-120              | Fiat<br>A-24<br>/700 ?/<br>HP             | 12<br>borben<br>4 ? | 2              | 248            | $\frac{5000 \text{ m}}{11.30}$<br>$\frac{6000 \text{ m}}{27}$ | 6800           | 7 1/2 h            | 200<br>min.<br>95  | 30                               | 20 Stück beim Aufkl. des<br>des 3-ten Fl. Regiments<br>4 St. zur Schulung in<br>Neustadt<br>6 St. Aufkl. Schuppen in |
| 10. |                  | Fiat Aero-<br>nautika<br>It.Firane<br>Diplan     | Fiat<br>CM20               | Fiat<br>20-AQ<br>410 HP                   | 2 MG<br>vorne       | 1              | 270            | $\frac{5000 \text{ m}}{16.30}$                                | 8500           | 2 h                | 241                | 10                               | Klagenfurt Jagdschulung  |
| 11. |                  |  | Fiat<br>A30H               | Fiat<br>A-30 B<br>600 HP                  | 2 MG.<br>vorne      | 1              | 370            | $\frac{6000 \text{ m}}{12.30}$                                | 8000           | 2 1/2 h            | 300<br>min.<br>195 | 16                               | 10-16 Thalerhof<br>4-6 Klagenfurt  |
| 12. |                  |  | Fiat<br>CM-32              | .   | .                   | .              | .              | .   | .              | .                  | .                  | 36                               | 1-6 Stück  |
| 13. |                  |  | Fiat<br>CM-40              | .   | .                   | .              | .              | .   | .              | .                  | .                  | 8                                | 4-6 Stück  |
| 14. |                  |  |                            | .   | .                   | .              | .              | .   | .              | .                  | .                  | 2                                | .  |
| 15. |                  |  |                            | .   | .                   | .              | .              | .   | .              | .                  | .                  | 4                                | .  |

## APPENDIX 4



*Abb. 20 Austro Daimler ADGZ (Kat. Nr. 175)*

1918-1968: Die Streitkräfte der Republik. (Katalog zur  
Sonderausstellung im Heeresgeschichtliches Museum)  
Vienna: Isda & Brodmann OHG, 1968.

## APPENDIX 5

| Munition (für)                      | Bestand<br>1938<br>Schuß | davon<br>1937<br>erzeugt | Tages-<br>verbrauchs-<br>rate | Bestand<br>je<br>Waffe                                |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| Leuchtpatronen                      | 670.000                  | 120.000                  | 20                            | 222   |
| 8 mm S-Patronen                     | 115.946.000              | 60.034.000               | 40<br>1080<br>4320            | 314 je Gewehr<br>8496 je LMG<br>33964 je SMG u. FlaMG |
| 7,7 mm u. 8 mm<br>sord-MG           | 590.000 (?)              | 20.000                   | 500                           | 2760  |
| 9 mm KP                             | 51.656.000 (?)           | 7.575.000                | 1120                          | 5553  |
| 12,7 mm sord-MG                     | 510.000                  | -                        | 500                           | 3541  |
| 2 cm Tankgewehr                     | 39.620                   | -                        | 120                           | 733   |
| 2 cm FlaMG                          | 132.000                  | 72.000                   | 1500                          | 16500   |
| 8 cm Minenwerfer                    | 224.000                  | 50.040                   | 120                           | 1131  |
| 14 cm -"                            | 4.092                    | -                        | 30                            | 372   |
| 4 cm FlaMG                          | 96.000(?)                | 42.000                   | 1500                          | 2623  |
| 4,7 cm M. 35/36<br>Infanteriekanone | 160.000(?)               | 63.000                   | 150                           | 564   |
| 7,5 cm Kanonen                      | 52.399                   | 24.805                   | 201                           | 651   |
| 8 cm Feldkanonen                    | 62.760                   | 6.326                    | 201                           | 773   |
| 10 cm Hauptstücken                  | 102.371                  | 48.447                   | 201                           | 616   |
| 10,4 cm Kanone                      | 20.000                   | -                        | 126                           | 600   |
| 15 cm ital.<br>Hauptstücken         | 3.012                    | -                        | 126                           | 251   |
| 15 cm osterr.<br>Hauptstücken       | 4.267                    | 1.500                    | 126                           | 251   |
| 17 cm Kanone                        | 400                      | -                        | 75                            | 200   |
| Handgranaten                        | -                        | -                        | insgesamt<br>43.623           |   |

Erwin Steinböck, "Die bewaffnete Macht Österreichs im Jahre 1938" in Anschluß 1938. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981, p. 23.



## APPENDIX 6

Gemeinsames Ministerium für Landesverteidigung  
Mobilisierungsabteilung

Übersicht.  
VERKEHRSPOLIZEI

**Verschluss!**

über die Einheiten des stehenden  
Heeres im Mobilisierungsfalle 1938.

(Erl. 100.200 - Mob/37).

- 20 Inf(AlpJg-, TJg-, TLsch-)Regimenter mit
- 58 " Bataillon im Vorhande.
- 3 selbst. Ilaone (FJgB 2, AJgB 4, Gardell),
- 1 abgetrennte UA (4.Kp/AJgB 4),
- 4 Kraftfahrjägerbataillon,
- 1 Panzerwagonbataillon (KdoKp, 1 StrPzKp, 4 Kl.KpfwKpn, HKp),
- 9 IKAabteilungen
- 9 L.Artillerieregimenter mit
- 71 L.Batterien,
- 1 selbst.artillerieregiment mit
- 6 n.Batterien,
- 2 Reiterregimenter mit
- 6 Reitergeschwadronen und
- 2 MG.Schwadronen,
- 2 Aufkl.Staffel,
- 8 Aufkl.Abteilungen,
- 15 PionierKpn (hievon 1 KraftfahrpionierKp),
- 2 BrückenKpn,
- 1 EisenbahnKp,
- 8 Baukompagnien,
- 4 Eisenbahnbaukompagnien,
- 7 halbe verkraftete Brückenkolonnen
- 1 Brückenbaukolonne,
- 7 leichte Feldseilbahneinheiten,
- 9 KFAbteilungen mit
- 41 Kraftfahrkolonnen,
- 1 Kraftwagen-Transportgruppe mit
- 29 Kraftfahrkolonnen,
- 20 Tel-(Funk-, TelAufkl)Kpn.

Anmerkung: Lr 1 - 7 mit 9 L.Btn.

Luftstreitkräfte und Luftschutztruppen sind nicht <sup>included</sup> inbegriffen.

17./11. 1937.

S O H N, Oberst o.h.

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv - Kriegsarchiv. Operations-  
abteilung: Internzahl 103/38, "Übersicht über die  
Einheiten des stehenden Heeres im Mobilisierungsfalle  
1938", folio 792.

## APPENDIX 7

Beilage 5

## WAFFENBESTAND UND WAFFENBESTELLUNGEN FÜR 1938\*

Der Bestand an Waffen wird mit dem 10. März 1938 angegeben. Unter bestellt sind jene Waffen angeführt, die zwar bestellt waren, aber erst zwischen dem 11. März und 31. Dezember 1938 auslieferbereit waren. Bei der Exekutive war die Umarbeitung der Gewehre der Sicherheitswache auf S-Munition im Gang, was in der Tabelle nicht berücksichtigt werden konnte. Die M 7/12 MG der Exekutive (mit Ausnahme der in den ADGP-Panzerwagen eingebauten) und der Frontmiliz verschossen noch M 93 Munition, desgleichen ein Teil der 8 mm FlaMG des Heimaftschutzes.

Die Frontmiliz war im Fall des Aufgebotes nicht nur mit Waffen aus ihrem eigenen Bestand, sondern auch mit solchen ausgerüstet, die ihr vom Bundesheer und der Exekutive zugeschoben wurden, was hier nicht darstellbar ist.

|                                      | Bundesheer<br>Bestand | Exekutive<br>bestellt | Front-<br>miliz |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| <i>Faustfeuerwaffen</i>              |                       |                       |                 |
| <i>Revolver</i>                      |                       |                       |                 |
| 7 mm Rast & Gasser                   | —                     | —                     | 30              |
| 8 mm M 98                            | 2.900                 | —                     | 193             |
| 11 mm M 70                           | —                     | —                     | 6               |
|                                      | 2.900                 | —                     | 229             |
| <i>Selbstladepistolen</i>            |                       |                       |                 |
| 6,35 mm diverse österreichische      | 30                    | 1.543                 | 4.283           |
| diverse deutsche                     | 25                    | —                     | 37              |
| 7,63 mm Mauser C/96                  | 3.200                 | —                     | 35              |
| 7,65 mm M 13 und M 34 Steyr Kipplauf | —                     | 11.600                | 3               |
| andere österreichische               | 40                    | —                     | 65              |
| diverse ausländische                 | —                     | 5                     | 34              |
| 8 mm M 7                             | 2.300                 | —                     | 109             |
| 9 mm M 12 Steyr                      | 16.385                | 5.342                 | 303             |
| andere österreichische               | 9                     | —                     | 53              |
| deutsche                             | 5                     | —                     | 190             |
| unbekannte Muster                    | —                     | —                     | 14.950          |
|                                      | 21.994                | 5.342                 | 22.848          |
| 27 mm Leuchtpistolen                 | 3.277                 | 800                   | 80              |
| Summe der Faustfeuerwaffen           | 28.171                | 6.142                 | 23.160          |

Beilage 5

151

|  | Bundesheer<br>Bestand | Exekutive<br>bestellt | Front-<br>miliz |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| <i>Gewehre</i>                             |                       |                       |                 |
| <i>Einzelwaffen</i>                        |                       |                       |                 |
| 11 mm M 73/77 Werndl                       | —                     | —                     | 162             |
| 27 mm Berdan Leuchtgewehr                  | 194                   | —                     | —               |
| 38 mm Gasgewehr                            | —                     | 184                   | —               |
|  | 194                   | 184                   | 162             |
| <i>Repetiergewehre</i>                     |                       |                       |                 |
| 8 mm M 95 und M 95A Mannlicher             | 21.863                | —                     | 65.063          |
| 8 mm M 95/31 und M 95/37 Mannlicher        | 139.000               | 2.136                 | 21.518          |
| 8 mm ältere Mannlicher                     | —                     | —                     | 7.349           |
| 7 mm M 14 Steyr („Mexikaner“)              | —                     | —                     | 52              |
| 7,92 mm deutsche                           | 3.400                 | —                     | 7.881           |
| andere ausländische verschiedenen Kalibers | 3.200                 | —                     | 311             |
|  | 167.474               | 2.136                 | 102.174         |
| <i>Selbstladegewehre</i>                   |                       |                       |                 |
| 8 mm österreichische                       | 29                    | —                     | —               |
| 7,92 mm ausländische                       | 5                     | —                     | —               |
| 8 mm ausländische                          | 5                     | —                     | —               |
|  | 39                    | —                     | —               |
| Summe der Gewehre                          | 167.701               | 2.136                 | 102.336         |
| <i>Maschinenpistolen</i>                   |                       |                       |                 |
| 9 mm M 32 (für 9 mm Steyr Patrone)         | —                     | 2.600                 | —               |
| 9 mm M 34 (für lange Mauserpatrone)        | 7.505                 | 691                   | 636             |
| 9 mm M 18/34 (für lange Mauserpatrone)     | —                     | —                     | 81              |
| 9 mm M 30 Versuchs-Maschinenpistolen       | 12                    | —                     | —               |
| 7,63 mm Mauser C/30                        | —                     | 10                    | —               |
| deutsche 9 mm                              | 4                     | 1                     | —               |
| Summe der Maschinenpistolen                | 7.521                 | 691                   | 717             |
| <i>Maschinengewehre</i>                    |                       |                       |                 |
| <i>leichte</i>                             |                       |                       |                 |
| 8 mm M 7/12 HandMG Schwarzlose             | —                     | 140                   | 257             |
| 8 mm M 30 leichtes MG                      | 3.764                 | 242                   | 20              |
| 8 mm österreichische Versuchs-IMG          | 2                     | —                     | —               |
| 7,92 mm deutsche leichte MG                | 4                     | —                     | 68              |
| andere ausländische Versuchs-IMG           | 7                     | —                     | —               |
|  | 3.777                 | 242                   | 345             |

Erwin Stienböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938. Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1988: Appendix 5: "Waffenbestand und Waffenbestellungen für 1938", pp. 150-153.

## APPENDIX 7

152

Beilage 5

|   | Bundesheer<br>Bestand | bestellt | Exekutive | Front-<br>miliz |
|---|-----------------------|----------|-----------|-----------------|
| <i>Flugzeug-Bord-MG (Beschaffung ab März 1938 von den Flugzeuglieferungen abhängig)</i> |                       |          |           |                 |
| starre 7,7 mm Lewis   | 11                    | —        | —         | —               |
| SAFAT   | 122                   | 25       | —         | —               |
| Vickers MK II   | 88                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 7,92 mm M 17 T 6—200  | 21                    | 110      | —         | —               |
| 12,7 mm SAFAT   | 110                   | 50       | —         | —               |
| 8 mm M 16 und M 16A Schwarzlose   | 15                    | —        | 21        | 1               |
| bewegliche 7,7 mm Lewis Mk III  | 30                    | —        | —         | —               |
| SAFAT   | 34                    | 40       | —         | —               |
| Vickers   | 4                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 7,92 mm M 15 T 6—220  | 58                    | 55       | —         | —               |
|   | 493                   | 280      | 21        | 1               |
| <i>Kampfwagen-MG</i>  |                       |          |           |                 |
| 8 mm M 37V Steyr Zwillings-MG   | 1                     | (72)     | —         | —               |
| 8 mm M 7/12 Schwarzlose   | 98                    | 11       | 26        | —               |
| 8 mm M 29 Madsen  | 1                     | —        | —         | —               |
|   | 100                   | 11       | 26        | —               |
| <i>schwere Maschinengewehre</i>   |                       |          |           |                 |
| 8 mm M 7/12 Schwarzlose   | 1.684                 | —        | 335       | 540             |
| ältere österreichische 8 mm sMG*  | —                     | —        | 12        | 11              |
| 7,92 mm deutsche  | 4                     | —        | —         | 12              |
| andere ausländische verschiedener Kaliber   | 5                     | —        | —         | 1               |
|   | 1.693                 | —        | 347       | 564             |
| <i>8 mm FlaMG</i>   |                       |          |           |                 |
| 8 mm M 7/12 Schwarzlose   | 719                   | —        | —         | —               |
| 8 mm M 7/12 Zwillings-FlaMG   | 48                    | —        | —         | —               |
|   | 767                   | —        | —         | —               |
| <i>überschwere MG</i>   |                       |          |           |                 |
| 2 cm Madsen Kampfwagen-MG   | 1                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 2 cm Oerlikon FF starres Flugzeug-Bord-MG   | —                     | 50       | —         | —               |
| 2 cm M 35 Tankgewehr S 18—100   | 34                    | —        | 30        | —               |
| S 18—300  | 16                    | 12       | 14        | —               |
| 2 cm M 36 FlaMG   | 36                    | 54       | —         | —               |
| 2 cm Versuch-FlaMG  | 8                     | —        | —         | —               |
|   | 95                    | 116      | 34        | —               |
| Summe der Maschinengewehre  | 6.925                 | 649      | 627       | 910             |

Beilage 5

153

|  | Bundesheer<br>Bestand | bestellt | Exekutive | Front-<br>miliz |
|--|-----------------------|----------|-----------|-----------------|
| <i>Werfer</i>  |                       |          |           |                 |
| diverse 5 — 5,25 cm Versuchs-Handgranaten- und Minenwerfer | 7                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 7,5 cm — 81 mm Versuchs-Minenwerfer                        | 9                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 8 cm M 33 Minenwerfer                                      | 238                   | 70       | —         | 6               |
| 8 cm M 35 Minenwerfer                                      | 4                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 9 cm M 17 Minenwerfer                                      | 60                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 14 cm M 18 Minenwerfer                                     | 71                    | —        | —         | 10              |
| 26 cm M 17a Minenwerfer                                    | 1                     | —        | —         | —               |
| Summe der Werfer   | 390                   | 70       | —         | 16              |
| <i>Flugzeug-Bombenabwurfmaschinen</i>                      |                       |          |           |                 |
| für eine Gesamttragkraft von kg                            | 18.602                | 56.420   | 480       | —               |
| <i>Geschütze</i>   |                       |          |           |                 |
| 3,7 cm M 15 Infanteriegeschütz                             | 12*                   | —        | 1         | —               |
| 3,7 cm M 30V Infanteriekanonen                             | 2                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 4 cm M 36 Fliegerabwehr-Maschinenkanonen                   | 36                    | 104      | —         | —               |
| 44 mm Versuchs-Infanteriekanone                            | 9                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 4,7 cm Versuchs-Infanteriekanone                           | 2                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 4,7 cm M 35 (M 35/36) Infanteriekanone                     | 360                   | 153      | —         | 6               |
| 7 cm L/26 C15 Schiffskanonen                               | 4                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 7 cm L/42 C 8 Küstenkanonen                                | 1                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 7,5 cm M 15 Gebirgskanone                                  | 88                    | —        | —         | 11              |
| 7,5 cm L/30 C 16 Schiffskanone                             | 1                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 7,5 cm L/18 C 33 Schiffskanone                             | 1                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 8 cm M 5 (M 5/8) Feldkanone                                | —                     | —        | —         | 28              |
| 8 cm M 5/37 Kasematkanone                                  | 2                     | 6        | —         | —               |
| 8 cm M 17 Feldkanone                                       | 81                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 8 cm M 18 Feldkanone                                       | 24                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 8 cm M 18/29 Feldkanone                                    | 1                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 8 cm M 14 Luftfahrzeug-Abwehrkanonen                       | 5                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 10 cm M 16 Gebirgshaubitzen                                | 42                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 10 cm M 14 Feldhaubitzen                                   | 55                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 10 cm M 14/37 Feldhaubitze                                 | 76                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 10 cm M 38 Feldhaubitzen                                   | —                     | 1        | —         | —               |
| 10,4 cm M 15 Kanonen                                       | 26                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 15 cm 149/12 M 914 Haubitzen                               | 12                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 15 cm M 14 (M 14/16) Haubitzen                             | 16                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 15 cm M 15 Autohaubitzen                                   | 23                    | —        | —         | —               |
| 15 cm M 38 Kraftfahrhaubitzen                              | 20                    | 10       | —         | —               |
| 15 cm M15 Autokanonen                                      | 2                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 15 cm M 15/16 Autokanonen                                  | 2                     | —        | —         | —               |
| 30,5 cm M 11/16 Mörser                                     | 2                     | —        | —         | —               |

## APPENDIX 8

Beilage 6

157

Beilage 6

**MUNITIONSBESTAND UND MUNITIONSBESTELLUNGEN FÜR 1938\***  
 einschließlich der Nahkampfs-, Spreng- und Nebelmittel

Es muß berücksichtigt werden, daß der Frontmitz auch die Munitionsbestände des Bundesheeres zur Verfügung standen. Von den für 1938 bestellten 8 mm S Patronen waren 15.000.000 für die Frontmitz vorgesehen. Die Zahl der S-Patronen der Exekutive ist unsicher. Bestand bedeutet am 10. März 1938, bestellt noch offene Bestellungen, die zwischen dem 11. März und dem 31. Dezember 1938 hätten effektiert werden sollen.

|                                       | Bundesheer    |            | Bestand   |           |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
|                                       | Bestand       | bestellt   | Exekutive | Frontmitz |
| <i>Munition für Handwaffen und MG</i> |               |            |           |           |
| 6,35 mm Pistolenpatronen              | —             | —          | 25.000    | 690       |
| 7 mm Revolverpatronen                 | —             | —          | —         | 1.408     |
| 7,63 mm Pistolenpatronen              | 187.000       | —          | —         | 860       |
| 7,65 mm Pistolenpatronen              | —             | —          | 340.000   | 1.030     |
| 8 mm M 98 Revolverpatronen            | 557.000       | —          | 20.000    | 8.915     |
| 8 mm M 7 Pistolenpatronen             | 648.000       | 10.000     | —         | 3.228     |
| 9 mm M 12 Pistolenpatronen            | 3.146.000     | 40.000     | 800.000   | 9.898     |
| 9 mm andere Pistolenpatronen          | —             | —          | —         | 6.031     |
| 9 mm M 34 Pistolenpatronen            | 51.665.000    | 4.000.000  | —         | 87.750    |
| 7,7 mm Gewehrpatronen                 | 1.029.000 (*) | 1.150.000  | —         | —         |
| 7,92 mm Gewehrpatronen                | 2.820.000     | —          | —         | 41.700    |
| 8 mm M 93 Gewehrpatronen              | 20.000.000    | —          | 2.600.000 | 4.634.871 |
| 8 mm M 30 S (und D) Gewehrpatronen    | 120.332.000   | 25.516.000 | 1.112.000 | 25.900    |
| 11 mm M 73 Gewehrpatronen             | —             | —          | —         | 8.597     |
| 12,7 mm MG-Patronen                   | 287.000       | 150.000    | —         | —         |
| 2 cm M 35 Patronen                    | 39.620        | 3.800      | 12.500    | —         |
| 2 cm M 36 Patronen                    | 78.627        | 81.000     | —         | —         |
| 27 mm Leuchtpatronen                  | 665.600       | 120.000    | —         | 1.432     |
| 38 mm Gaspatronen                     | —             | —          | —         | —         |
| <i>Werfermunition</i>                 |               |            |           |           |
| 5 cm M 33 Minen                       | 240.060       | 150.000    | —         | —         |
| 8 cm M 33 schwere Minen               | 900           | 17.680     | —         | —         |
| 9 cm M 17 Minen                       | 3.840         | —          | —         | —         |
| 14 cm M 18 Minen                      | 4.092         | —          | —         | 26.400    |
| <i>Geschützmunition</i>               |               |            |           |           |
| 3,7 cm M 15                           | —             | —          | 60        | —         |
| 3,7 cm M 30V                          | 40            | —          | —         | —         |
| 4 cm M 36                             | 61.000        | 70.000     | —         | —         |
| 44 mm M 28                            | 2.988         | —          | —         | —         |

|   | Bundesheer |          | Bestand   |           |
|---|------------|----------|-----------|-----------|
|   | Bestand    | bestellt | Exekutive | Frontmitz |
| 4,7 cm M 35                                     | 158.000    | 150.000  | —         | 540       |
| 7,5 cm Geschützmunition                         | 92.229     | 10.000   | —         | 1.046     |
| 8 cm Geschützmunition                           | 102.794    | 15.000   | —         | 2.688     |
| 10 cm Geschützmunition                          | 145.233    | —        | —         | —         |
| 10,4 cm Geschützmunition                        | 20.500     | —        | —         | —         |
| 15 cm 149/12 Munition                           | 3.012      | —        | —         | —         |
| 15 cm Munition für österreichische Haubitzen    | 10.500     | 6.188    | —         | —         |
| 15 cm Munition für Autokanonen                  | 400        | —        | —         | —         |
| <i>Handgranaten und Nahkampfmittel</i>          |            |          |           |           |
| M 17 Stielhandgranaten                          | 300.000    | 150.000  | —         | 131       |
| M 37 Aufschlagränder-Handgranaten               | 4.000      | 5.000    | —         | —         |
| 15 l M 18 Flammenwerfer                         | —          | —        | —         | 1         |
| 520 l M 35/38 Flammenwerfer                     | —          | 15       | —         | —         |
| <i>Sprengmittel</i>                             |            |          |           |           |
| 10 kg Sprengpatronen                            | 139.000    | 2.000    | —         | 16.892    |
| 0,5 kg Sprengbüchsen                            | 87.790     | 11.800   | —         | 14.227    |
| 1 kg Sprengbüchsen                              | 86.320     | 46.000   | —         | 21.509    |
| 1 kg Initial-Sprengbüchsen                      | 55         | —        | —         | 23        |
| 9 kg Sprengbüchsen für Schlauchminen            | 20         | —        | —         | —         |
| 19 kg Sprengbüchsen für Schlauchminen           | 115        | —        | —         | 93        |
| 25 kg Sprengbüchsen für Schlauchminen           | 48         | —        | —         | 12        |
| kg Sprengstoff insgesamt                        | 146.735    | 51.700   | —         | 32.402    |
| <i>Minen</i>                                    |            |          |           |           |
| Minenbüchsen                                    | 10.905     | —        | —         | —         |
| Sperrminen                                      | 9.330      | 7.320    | —         | 1.200     |
| M 35 (M 26) Grundminensystem                    | 1          | —        | —         | —         |
| M 38 Treibminen                                 | 1          | 27       | —         | —         |
| <i>Fliegerbomben</i>                            |            |          |           |           |
| 1 kg Elektron-Thermit-Brandbomben (österreich.) | 300        | 3.000    | —         | —         |
| (deutsche)                                      | 500        | 1.350    | —         | —         |
| M 36 Reizstoffbomben                            | 500        | 500      | —         | —         |
| 2 kg Brandbomben (italienisch)                  | —          | —        | —         | —         |
| Leucht- und Signalfbomben                       | 12         | 50       | —         | —         |
| Splitterbomben (italienisch)                    | 6.500      | 4.750    | —         | —         |
| 3 kg Leuchtbomben                               | —          | 100      | —         | —         |
| 10 kg Flüssigkeits-Brandbomben                  | 40         | 75       | —         | —         |
| Leucht- und Signalfbomben                       | 17         | 25       | —         | —         |
| Rauchbomben                                     | 4          | —        | —         | —         |
| Splitterbomben SC 10 (deutsch)                  | 550        | 2.250    | —         | —         |
| 11 kg Leuchtbomben                              | —          | 100      | —         | —         |
| 12 kg Kampfstoffbomben                          | 50         | 20       | —         | —         |
| Sprengbomben (italienisch)                      | 2.100      | —        | —         | —         |
| 20 kg Flüssigkeitsbrandbomben                   | 23         | 50       | —         | —         |
| Leuchtbomben                                    | —          | 25       | —         | —         |

Erwin Steinböck, Österreichs militärisches Potential im März 1938. Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1988: Appendix 6: "Munitionsbestand und Munitionsbestellungen für 1938", pp. 156-158.

## APPENDIX 8

158

Beilage 6

|                                   | Bundesheer |         | Bundes-<br>Fremde |        |
|-----------------------------------|------------|---------|-------------------|--------|
|                                   | Bestand    | Insatz  | Extrakt           | Fremde |
| 50 kg Minenbomben SC 50 (deutsch) | 100        | 400     | —                 | —      |
| Sprengbomben (italienisch)        | 650        | 400     | —                 | —      |
| 100 kg Sprengbomben (italienisch) | 90         | 45      | —                 | —      |
| 250 kg Minenbomben (deutsch)      | 10         | 180     | —                 | —      |
| Sprengbomben (italienisch)        | 20         | —       | —                 | —      |
| 400 kg Sprengbomben (italienisch) | —          | 36      | —                 | —      |
| kg Fliegerbomben insgesamt        | 92.594     | 129.940 | —                 | —      |
| <i>Kampfstoff-Einsatzmittel</i>   |            |         |                   |        |
| M 37 Reizstoffhandgranaten        | 60         | —       | —                 | —      |
| M 32 Reizrauchbüchsen             | 1.000      | —       | —                 | —      |
| M 34 Reizrauchbüchsen             | 21.120     | —       | —                 | —      |
| (M 38) Losmine                    | —          | —       | —                 | —      |
| <i>Nebelmittel und -geräte</i>    |            |         |                   |        |
| M 17 Nebelhandgranaten            | 480        | —       | —                 | —      |
| M 17/37 Nebelhandgranaten         | 320        | —       | —                 | —      |
| M 38 Nebelhandgranaten            | 100        | 50.000  | —                 | —      |
| 2 kg M 31 Nebelbüchsen            | 2.000      | —       | —                 | —      |
| 2 kg M 38 Nebelbüchsen            | 100        | 5.000   | —                 | —      |
| kleines M 32 Nebelgerät           | 40         | 2       | —                 | —      |
| leichtes M 38 Nebelgerät          | —          | 2       | —                 | —      |
| mittleres M 37 Nebelgerät*        | 2          | —       | —                 | —      |
| (M 36) Phosphorbidne              | 1          | —       | —                 | —      |
| schweres M 38 Nebelgerät          | —          | 1       | —                 | —      |
| (M 37) Krok Flugzeug-Nebelgerät   | 2          | —       | —                 | —      |

\* KA — Akten des Bundesheeres, Faxz. allgemeine Ziffern 71(6—11/1934, 67(1/1—1/5/1937, 67(1/5—2/6/1937, 71(3/1—6/1/1937, 67(3/5)—68(1/7/1938, 68(1/8—2/3/1938, 71(6—16/2/1938; Chef d. Gnt. Int.Zl/1935—1938, Int.Zl/1938; Koli 30(1/5/1936, 24(1/5/1937, 30(1/5/1937, 348/1937, 357/1938, Res—470L/1936; ka 137/1939, 48/1931, 97(5/4)—98(2/4/1932, 142/1934, 75/1935, 77/1935, 78/1935, 144/1935, 145/1935, 92/1936, 146/1936, 106/1937, 110/1937, 111/1937, 112/1937, 114/1937, 115/1937, 116/1937, 148/1937, 149/1937, 122/1938, 123/1938, 124/1938, 125/1938, 127/1938, 128/1938, 138/1938, 150/1938, 152/1938, 160/Mun.163/div.; Nals 1001—1500/1935; 106.000-Mob/1937; Oplnt 1—/1936, 101—250/1937, 251—/1937. KA — Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Bundesheeres, Nr. 29, 54.


\* Im März 1938 vermutlich noch nicht bei der Truppe

**APPENDIX 9**

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv - Kriegsarchiv. Operations-  
abteilung: Internzahl 103/38, "Gruppierung und Aufgaben  
im großen", folio 805.


zu 1

805

















**APPENDIX 10**

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv - Kriegsarchiv. Operations-  
abteilung: Internzahl 103/38, "Gruppierung und Aufgaben  
im großen", folio 823.

# SKIZZE


1:1,500.000

DR.





T.



o Uding

*Linzer Landwehr*  
13.9.70

12/9.77  
Rn

CHH  
Ju.

Beziehungsverhältnisse:

St. Peter 2,  
R. H. H. 1, 4, 5 + 1, 2, 5

Heimkehrer-Lösche in Bereiche der Hae  
Sonstige Heimkehr-Lösche im Zuge des Hae  
der selbst. LSt-Erfte.  
Die übrigen Verb. d. LSt-Erfte d. Hae

ist vom  
bereite  
unterziehen

Verlegung d. LSt-Erfte  
d. Jäger

Im Einfeld  
LSt-Erfte.





U.

Anmerkung 823  
In Einvernehmen mit dem Vize d. Lstr. Kpfe.

Verlegung d. Lstr. von Wals. nach Linz (Emm)  
d. Jäger von Graz überführt in  
den Infanterie-Regimenten  
Traun u. Emm. oder nach

U.



Anmerkung: 823

Im Einvernehmen mit dem H. d.  
L. v. H. p. e.

Verlegung d. Fok. von Wetz. nach Linz (Emm.)

d. Jäger von Graaz Vayerpirt ist  
den Jägerschein im  
Traun v. Enns oder nach  
Hr. Neustadt (Böhmen)  
ist vom Lde der LSt. Kräfte vorz.  
bereiten.

unterschieden den 1. Summeclids

Befehlsverpflichtung:

Box 152,  
R.H. & V. 1, 2, 5

Heimkehrer-Tiere im Bereich der Haarkörper dienen:  
Sonnige Heimkehr-Tiere im Bereich des Hiltel (Länder Lutz) dann  
der selbst. Lutz-Tiere.  
Die übrigen Tiere d. Lutz-Tiere dann, alle der selbst. Lutz-Tiere.

*Cils*  
JW.

13.9.7a

12/9.77

10.9. 37.

9/11/11



## GLOSSARY OF NAMES

- Attolico, Bernardo, Italian Ambassador in the Soviet Union 1930-1935, Ambassador in Germany 1935-1940.
- Basler, Moritz, Major-General in charge of the Operations' Department in the Austria Federal Ministry of Defence.
- Beck, Ludwig, Lieutenant-General, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, May 1935-1938.
- Berger-Waldenegg, Egon Freiherr von, Austrian Foreign Minister 1934-May 13, 1936; Austrian Minister in Italy May 1936-1938.
- Böhme, Franz, General of Infantry, Head of Austrian Intelligence Service.
- Ciano di Cortellanzo, Galeazzo, Count, Italian Minister of Press and Propaganda until June 1936, thereafter Italian Foreign Minister 1936-1943.
- Dollfuss, Engelbert, Austrian Federal Chancellor, Foreign Minister and Minister for Agriculture and Forestry May 1932-July 25, 1934, when he was assassinated; founder of the Fatherland Front in 1933.
- Draxler, Dr. Ludwig, Austrian Minister of Finance in Schuschnigg cabinet.
- Glaise-Horstenau, Edmond von, Director of the Austrian War Archives; Member of the Austrian Council of State; appointed Minister without portfolio July 11, 1936.
- Glasner, Johann, Major-General, *Präsidentialchef* in Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence.
- Goebbels, Dr. Joseph, German Propaganda Minister.
- Gömbös, Gyula de, General, Hungarian Minister President and Minister of National Defence; died October 6, 1936.
- Göring, Hermann Wilhelm, Field Marshal; President of the German Reichstag; Minister President of Prussia, Reich Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the *Luftwaffe*; appointed Commissioner for the Four Year Plan in October 1936.
- Grandi, Dino, Italian Ambassador in Great Britain, 1933-1939.
- Habicht, Theodor, former leader of Austrian N.S.D.A.P.
- Hassell, Ulrich von, German Ambassador in Italy November 8, 1932-February 17, 1938.
- Hitler, Adolf, *Führer* and Chancellor of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the German Army.
- Hornsbostel, Theodor, Head of Political Division in the Austrian Foreign Ministry.
- Hülgerth, Ludwig, Field Marshal, Vice Chancellor and Supreme Commander of the Front Militia.
- Jansa, Alfred, Field Marshal, Austrian Military Attaché in Berlin, 1933-1935; Chief of Austrian General Staff, 1935-1938.

Krische, Lieutenant-Colonel in Operations' Department of Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence.

Liebitzky, Dr. Emil, Colonel, Austrian Military Attaché in Rome.

Luchinsky, Eugen Ritter von, Major-General of the Austrian Army.

Muff, Wolfgang, Lieutenant-General, German Military Attaché in Austria.

Mussolini, Benito, Founder and Leader of the Italian Fascist Party; Head of the Government (Prime Minister) from October 1922, Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior, Colonies, War, Marine and Air; relinquished portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Colonies June 9, 1936.

Otto, Archduke, Prince of Habsburg, Pretender to the Austrian throne.

Papen, Franz von, German Minister in Austria on Special Mission directly responsible to Hitler with the personal rank of Envoy Extraordinary (Ambassador Extraordinary from July 1936).

Pariani, Alberto, Chief of the Italian General Staff.

Roatta, Mario, General, Head of Foreign Armies Department in the Italian War Ministry.

Schilhawsky, Sigismund, General Troop Inspector.

Schmidt, Guido, Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs from July 1936-February 1938; Minister for Foreign Affairs February-March 1938.

Schuschnigg, Kurt von, Austrian Federal Chancellor and Minister of National Defence from July 1934-March 11, 1938, also Foreign Minister from May 14, 1936.

Seyss-Inquart, Dr. Artur, lawyer by profession; closely associated with the Austrian National Socialist Party from 1931 onward, Minister of the Interior in Schuschnigg cabinet, February 15, 1938; Austrian Federal Chancellor, March 12, 1938.

Starhemberg, Ernst Rüdiger Prince, Austrian *Heimwehr* Leader; Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Security and Leader of the Fatherland Front until May 13, 1936.

Suvich, Fulvio, Under Secretary of State in the Italian Foreign Ministry until June 1936; Italian Ambassador in the United States from October 1936.

Vaugoin, Carl, Austrian Minister of Army Affairs.

Zehner, Wilhelm, General of Infantry in Austrian Army, State Secretary for Military Affairs in Schuschnigg cabinet.

Zernatto, Guido, General Secretary of the Fatherland Front, Christian Social Party, and Minister without portfolio in Schuschnigg cabinet.