Developing consensus: the globalisation of development assistance policies

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explains the increasingly homogenous institutional and policy framework of Official Development Assistance. Whereas multilateral actors like the World Bank or the issue of civil society involvement in development have been substantially researched and discussed, less attention has been paid to the institutions of bilateral donor agencies and the processes by which they arrive at common policy positions. It is of great importance to better understand how donors arrive at these consensus policy positions, essentially limiting development possibilities worldwide. Engaged with the literatures on world polity theory, development assistance, and social movements, this dissertation examines the social processes which explain this growing uniformity among major bilateral development assistance donor agencies. This research adopts a mixed-methods approach of both quantitative and qualitative methods to illustrate the working of world polity influences on nation-state donor agencies. Event history analysis techniques at the macro level are used to show the influence of world society on donor states, then the relationships identified in this quantitative analysis are used to frame two in-depth qualitative case studies on gender and security policy among three countries, Canada, Sweden, and the United States. My results show that despite different national contexts, there are common social processes and mechanisms of globalisation that promote conformity and isomorphism among donor countries. Five primary social processes are identified: (1) internalisation and certification; (2) donor agency embeddedness with civil society; (3) bureaucratic activism; (4) catalytic policy processes; and (5) assertion of donor autonomy from the rest of government. In contrast to most previous literature on world society influence on the nation-state, my findings show that these social processes result largely from individual agency and interactions that underpin the relationship of world society and the nation-state.

ABRÉGÉ

L'objet de cette thèse est d'expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles le cadre politique et institutionnel de l'aide publique au développement devient de plus en plus homogène. Si les organismes multilatéraux (comme la Banque mondiale) et la participation de la société civile dans le développement ont fait l'objet de nombreux débats et d'études approfondies, il en est tout autrement pour les institutions des organismes donateurs bilatéraux et les processus via lesquels ils aboutissent à une position politique commune. Il est donc primordial de mieux comprendre comment les donateurs parviennent à ces consensus politiques qui limitent avant tout les possibilités de développement dans le monde. À travers l'étude de la littérature portant sur la théorie de la politie planétaire, sur l'aide au développement et sur les mouvements sociaux, cette thèse examine les processus sociaux qui expliquent l'uniformité croissante parmi les principaux organismes donateurs d'aide bilatérale au développement. Cette recherche se fonde sur une approche méthodologique mixte, à la fois quantitative et qualitative, pour démontrer comment la politie planétaire influence les organismes donateurs des États-nations. Des techniques de macro-analyse des transitions sont employées pour montrer l'influence de la société mondiale sur les États donateurs. Les relations identifiées dans cette analyse quantitative sont ensuite utilisées pour formuler deux études de cas détaillées, l'une sur les politiques en matière d'égalité entre les sexes et l'autre sur les politiques de sécurité, dans trois pays : le Canada, la Suède et les États-Unis d'Amérique. Mes résultats montrent qu'en dépit de contextes nationaux différents, il existe des processus et des mécanismes sociaux communs propres à la mondialisation qui encouragent à la conformité et à l'isomorphisme parmi les pays donateurs. Cinq processus sociaux principaux ont été identifiés : (1) internalisation et certification ; (2) ancrage des organismes donateurs dans la société civile ; (3) activisme bureaucratique ; (4) rôle catalyseur des processus politiques ; et (5) affirmation de l'autonomie des donateurs par rapport au reste du gouvernement. Contrairement à la majorité de la littérature consacrée à l'influence de la société mondiale sur l'État-nation, mes observations révèlent que les processus sociaux qui renforcent cette influence sont en grande partie dus aux interactions et au pouvoir d'action individuels qui soutiennent la relation entre la société mondiale et l'État-nation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AWID	Association for Women's Rights in Development
CAD	Canadian Dollar
CCIC	Council for International Cooperation
CDPF	Country Development Programming Frameworks
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMM	Conflict Management and Mitigation
CPDC	Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pools
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CUSO	Canadian University Service Overseas
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
EAO	External Aid Office (Canada)
EU	European Union
GAD	Gender and Development
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
GOS	Government of Sweden
GPSF	Global Peace and Security Fund
GPSP	Global Peace and Security Program
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IGO	Inter Governmental Organisations
IGWG	Interagency Gender Working Group (US)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PGD	Policy for Global Development (Sweden)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PVO	Private Voluntary Organisations
SAREC	Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation
SEK	Swedish Kronor
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SSR	Security Sector Reform
START	Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force
SWAP	Sector Wide Approaches
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VOLAG	Voluntary Agencies
WAD	Women and Development
WID	Women in Development
WINGO	Women's International Non-Governmental Organisation

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The institutionalisation of foreign aid or development assistance as a responsibility of economically advanced democratic nation-states has occurred over the past sixty years with little fanfare (Lumsdaine 1993). Evolving from the provision of aid for the reconstruction of Europe in the years immediately following the Second World War, provision of development assistance to poorer countries is now a taken-for-granted function played by all major western democracies (Alesina and Dollar 2000). In 2007, this assistance amounted to more than $103 billion USD in foreign aid provided to developing countries by the 22 donor countries which comprise the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This substantial transfer of resources from donor to recipient countries is ostensibly guided by both recipient development objectives and donor policy priorities and has the potential to shape development outcomes in much of the world for the better or worse (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995). In recent years calls for aid that acknowledges the diversity of local contexts and experiences have not always been answered with unique solutions. Instead, the policy discourse of donors and other international organisations in the development assistance sector has increasingly referred to 'emerging global consensus' around development issues as diverse as water management, poverty reduction, governance, security-sector reform, and others (UNFPA 1994; ADB 1997; World Bank Group 2000; CIDA 2002a; USAID 2002b; World Bank Group 2002; UN 2003). Consensus of this sort has the potential to limit recipient country options for guiding their own development and has been seldom examined as a research problem in the development literature.

Few theoretical arguments tackle directly the question of why donors act alike or have similar policy priorities, but several possible explanations can be derived from relevant work on development and globalisation. First, donors could simply be enacting universalist discourses of development intended to dominate the developing world and reinforce the power of the North over the South (Escobar 1991; Ferguson 1994; Marchand and Parpart 1995; Parpart 1995;

Rojas 2001; Underhill-Sem 2002). Second, these similar policies could simply be reflective of humanitarian interests in promoting development globally (Lumsdaine 1993; Opeskin 1996). Finally, these similar policy models and priorities may be evidence of globalising influence on nation-states to adopt similar institutions and policies devised by the international organisations, experts, and civil society groups that comprise world society (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Lechner and Boli 2005; Hwang 2006). It is this latter perspective which I examine and test in this dissertation. The two former explanations have already examined the development assistance issue, and as such, I break new ground in the sociological literature on development by turning to world polity theory explanations to explore the question of the globalisation of development assistance policy.

To test this world polity perspective and explain the apparent consensus or striking similarity of policy models and priorities among development assistance donors, I concentrate on the primary nation-state level organisation involved in providing aid to the developing world: the bilateral donor agency. These agencies have not been a major research focus in the political sociology literature, although they have been examined more fully in other disciplines and development studies research (Broadhead and Pratt 1994; Rawkins 1994; Thérien 1994; Morrison 1998; Woods 2005; Black and Tiessen 2007; Brown 2007).

With this focus on bilateral donors, I use a two-fold research design with both quantitative and qualitative research methods. My study hinges on case studies of two specific policy issues which have been prominent in the development assistance sector in recent years: (1) gender (Chowdhry 1995; Parpart 1995; Rathgeber 1995; Snyder, Berry et al. 1996; Goetz 1997a; Razavi 1997; Elgström 2000); and (2) security (Nef 1999; Paris 2001; Smith 2001; King and Murray 2002; Jensen 2005). These vastly different development issues were selected as case studies because they have both prompted development assistance donors to adopt a common international agenda despite being driven by different underlying motivations and links to donors' national interests. In these case studies I demonstrate the common social processes at work within the politics of

development assistance that lead to common policy models and priorities despite diverse country contexts. First, I examine the diffusion and spread of the gender and development model at the global level using an event history analysis of all major development assistance donor countries over a period from 1968 through 2003. Then, using qualitative analysis of interview data collected on three different donor countries – Canada, Sweden, and the United States – I examine the gender and security cases separately to discern the common processes at work in each country. These countries were chosen because they represent different points on the donor spectrum when considering different characteristics of their foreign aid programs like generosity and motivation for giving. At the same time, each country also demonstrates mostly uniform positions on specific areas of development assistance policy. This variety of contexts will enable comparative analysis to understand how these contexts relate to common positions adopted by donors. Indeed, previous research has compared the different domestic contexts in these same countries to examine the politics of globalisation and its effects on the welfare state (Olsen 2002).   By searching for common processes and understanding how they unfold in different contexts, I aim to demonstrate how the influence of world society on the nation-state promotes common policy frameworks in the development assistance sector.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

My research addresses three main questions dealing with common processes at work on the interface of world society and the nation-state, the effect of individual agency on this interface, and role of civil society influence on this globalising process:

1. How does world society affect nation-state institutions and what are the processes that promote consensus or uniformity of policy and priorities among development assistance donor countries?

2. What role does individual agency play in mediating the interface of world society and the nation state?

3.	What role does civil society play in the spread of world polity models of development assistance?

These questions are united by their focus on the processes through which world society influences the nation state and promotes universal norms and models of world culture. The enactment of these world cultural policy models by nation-state actors is at the heart of the institutionalist perspective of world polity theory. Yet, without understanding the social processes which encourage and facilitate this enactment, the theoretical purchase of the world polity perspective is diminished. By identifying processes which promote consensus or uniformity of policy, arguments for how world society exerts influence on the nation state can be formulated. Indeed, I will argue that individual agency and civil society actors can both be expected to play a role in mediating this interface of world society and the nation-state through social processes of globalisation that encourage uniformity and consensus in the development assistance sector. By identifying these common processes and the role played in them by individual agency and civil society, my research will expand the understanding of how world society shapes common institutions among nation states.

Each of these research questions is also important to advancing the understanding of development assistance. This critical redistributive function of global politics is intended to play a significant role in improving the lives of billions of people in the developing world, and is expected to grow in magnitude in the coming years if recent statements by world leaders are any indication. For instance, the 2005 Group of Eight meetings saw the leaders of the world's richest nations commit to doubling aid to Africa by 2010. As such, it is of great significance to understand how growing homogenisation or consensus of development assistance policy and priorities arises because of its direct impact on these future increases in aid. If this phenomenon remains unexamined and unchecked the development options of many developing societies may become even more limited and curtailed to a narrow agenda pushed by the major western donor agencies and international organisations. With little analysis in either the development or sociological research literatures on how or why donors march in

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lock-step with uniform policies and priorities, my research contribution here has the potential to reveal important aspects of how this policy isomorphism arises, and as a result, how outside activists and other civil society groups might act to help reshape or diversify the development assistance agenda. Better understanding of why development assistance donors are so uniform in their foreign aid policies is critical to shaping aid in the future which is both better adapted to local contexts in developing societies and more responsive to the priorities of the people in those societies rather than an international agenda of rich donor societies.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE RESEARCH LITERATURE

In this dissertation, I make three important contributions to the research literature on development, globalisation, and world society in political sociology. I will briefly discuss each of these contributions here, explain them in more depth in Chapter Two's outline of my theoretical framework, and then revisit each in the concluding chapter.

First, apart from a study that examines the growth and emergence of development-oriented non-governmental organisations (Chabbott 1999), this will be the first major study to apply a world polity theory framework to the issue of foreign aid and official development assistance. This will add to a growing literature on the world polity and the globalisation of institutions and policies that result from it. By examining development assistance through a world polity lens, I add to both the depth of understanding of how world society and the nation-state relate and interact, and also expand the understanding of how and why development assistance donors function in such similar fashion despite different national contexts.

My second innovative contribution is working with a theoretical framework that synthesises from both the world polity literature and current research on contentious politics and social movements. As I outline in the next chapter, by adopting a framework which marries these two approaches, I am attempting to rectify some of the shortcomings of the world polity literature by

expanding on the explanations of how world society influence functions through common social processes. By identifying several shared social processes and mechanisms at work when world society influence is wielded upon the nation-state, I am providing a deeper understanding of what happens within nation-state institutions when they adopt and refine policy and institutional models promulgated in world society. This contribution will help to move the world polity literature from simply an institutionalist identification of the correlative relationships between nation-states and membership/participation in key international organisations and meetings, to a fuller explanation of how that membership and participation is implemented by the individual agency of officials and others. This contribution should provide for insights into the functioning of world society influence on nation-state actors not only in the development assistance sector, but also more generally in all aspects of the state's interface with world society. At the same time, by expanding on the research literature on the study of social mechanisms and processes in international politics, my research speaks to the social movements literature and the study of contentious politics by demonstrating that these mechanisms and processes can indeed be identified in contexts other than the contentious political action of movement actors.

Finally, my research findings are among the first to examine the problem of how globalisation has affected development assistance and made for a more uniform agenda of policies and priorities among major donors. By examining how this growing homogenisation of development assistance options has emerged, I will also be able to better explain how other stakeholders in the development assistance sector such as recipient governments and civil society groups can work within the existing world society frameworks to effect change within the development assistance agenda globally. This initial foray into understanding how the globalisation of development assistance has led to consensus and policy isomorphism will thus set the stage for possible future research into the activism and action required to ensure that development assistance functions to the benefit of billions of people in developing societies

globally rather than limiting their development options to a small set of donor priorities.

ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS

In the Chapter Two, I outline the theoretical framework on which my research is based. This chapter illustrates how I draw from three distinct research literatures to investigate the influence of world society on the development assistance sector. World polity theory provides the broad base upon which I build my inquiry into consensus and policy uniformity among development assistance donors, while aspects of both the post-development literature and the social movement literature on contentious politics are used to correct what I perceive as shortcomings in the world polity approach (Ferguson 1994; Crush 1995; Escobar 1995; Marchand and Parpart 1995; Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Tarrow 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999a; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Lechner and Boli 2005; Tarrow 2005; Meyer 2007). The synergies created by bringing together these diverse literatures in a new way enable me to examine globalisation and its influence on development assistance policy in a novel way as my study unfolds.

Chapter Three follows with a discussion of my research methodology. I adopt a mixed methods approach which uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis to examine my research questions. This mixed methods approach allows for me to capture the processes of globalisation at the macro, cross-national level, and then to explore these processes in more depth through qualitative case studies. In this way I capitalise on the strengths of both approaches and ensure a richer explanation of the processes I explore throughout the dissertation. This chapter summarises my approach to data collection and analysis for both quantitative and qualitative analyses, discusses some of the chief methodological challenges faced in my research, and outlines my methodological contribution in combining quantitative analysis of donor agencies with in-depth interviewing. This methodological discussion sets the stage for the analytical chapters that follow.

The first of the analytical chapters is Chapter Four, which presents the results of my quantitative macro-level analysis. I use event history techniques to

undertake a comparative cross-national look at the spread and adoption of women in development or gender and development as a priority among the universe of major development assistance donor countries and their donor agencies over time. Using a dataset which identifies event timing indicators and other critical historical events, and tracks other donor characteristics over a time period from approximately 1968 through 2003, I examine five hypotheses about how world society influences donor agencies to adopt a common approach to gender and development. My findings suggest the influence of world society on development assistance donors is strong, and agencies are subject to a number of channels through which this influence is exerted, including international conferences, the behaviour of other donors, and ratification of international treaties. These results provide a base upon which I build my qualitative case study analysis in the subsequent three chapters.

Chapter Five introduces the country context of the development assistance sector in Canada, Sweden, and the United States to explain the common basis upon which my qualitative case studies are based. I compare and contrast several common characteristics of the development assistance sector in these three case study countries to show how different domestic contexts may mediate the interface between the nation-state and world society as a prerequisite for understanding the social processes involved in promoting common policy agendas and institutional forms among bilateral donor agencies with diverse country context.

Building from the country contexts identified in Chapter Five, Chapter Six examines the processes at work in promoting the adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of a Women in Development or Gender and Development model of development assistance among the three case study countries. Based on data collected through in-depth interviews with donor agency officials and other development workers from each country, I provide evidence which suggests that common social processes at work in each case can explain why diverse donor agencies adopt very similar if not identical approaches to the issue of gender and development. In the gender case I identify three common processes which appear

to be largely responsible for the common approaches to gender and development and near consensus on the issue that is apparent in the development assistance community internationally: (1) processes of internalisation and certification of the gender and development issue as a priority; (2) processes of donor agency embeddedness with civil society; and (3) processes of bureaucratic activism on the gender issue within donor agencies.

Chapter Seven adopts the same methodological approach of in-depth interviewing to explore the second case study on security and development. I show how a commonly accepted approach to security issues in the development assistance sector has emerged over the past decade or so, and then identify two social processes evident in my case study countries that explain this phenomenon: (1) catalytic policy processes which drive donors to adopt positions on new issues to maintain their expected participation in international arenas; and (2) processes of donor autonomy from the rest of government, in particular from ministries of foreign affairs.

These qualitative cases are summarised in Chapter Eight with a more detailed discussion of the five primary social processes identified in my gender and security cases. I explore the different social processes in the opposite case to the one where I first identify them in an effort to demonstrate their broader validity and then discuss their applicability to the broader understanding of world polity influence on the nation-state.

Finally, in Chapter Nine, I situate my findings in relation to my wider theoretical framework, demonstrate how my results provide answers to my research questions, and summarise my ability to generalise from my findings to the broader question of world polity influence on the nation-state. I then discuss the challenges and shortcomings of my study and outline some potential future research directions that it raises.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Fundamentally, my research into policy consensus or homogeneity in the development assistance sector is focused on achieving a better understanding of institutional isomorphism among donor nation-states. Institutional isomorphism is the phenomenon of similarity of form and function of organisations – their homogeneity rather than diversity (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In the development assistance sector, institutional isomorphism can be seen in many different groups of actors: bilateral donor agencies, multilateral development banks, non-governmental development organisations, and even private sector consulting firms. In a span of less than 60 years, an entire organisational field has emerged in the development assistance sector in every major Western society of the world. The fact that this sector has emerged in all of these diverse states and cultures is interesting enough on its own, but the fact that they all resemble each other so closely is another matter altogether. Theoretical arguments about institutional isomorphism have focused on a number of factors which can contribute to the astounding homogeneity of institutional forms, both within a given state/society and between them. Chief among these arguments is the role of global cultural models and world society institutions/organisations highlighted by the world polity perspective on globalisation (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer 2007). Indeed, the institutional isomorphism within the development assistance sphere needs to be explained by examining both domestic and international forces operating at both macro and micro levels. Understanding how institutions have been formed in such a homogenous manner, will allow for greater insights into how they also come to share similar policy priorities and practices. This question is one which requires examination of the roles and actions of multiple actors in the development assistance process, application of theory which accounts for cooperation and consensus building in international politics, and exploration of these processes in the larger context of international development and globalisation. Responding to these requirements, I will situate the research that follows in later chapters within the world polity, development assistance, and social movement literatures.

Within these literatures there are three ongoing debates that my research will address: (1) debates on the nature of the world polity or world society and its role in globalisation and the spread of similar policies and institutions throughout the world; (2) debates on the nature and power of development assistance; and (3) debates on the influence and power of social movements on international processes. Each of these unresolved debates offers different perspectives that frame my research and the theories tested in my analysis. In this chapter I will discuss each of these three literatures and illustrate the aspects from each which have informed the theoretical framework for my research. I will then turn briefly to the application of that framework to the development assistance sector.

LITERATURE REVIEW

World Polity Theory

In recent years, the world polity or world society approach in political sociology has taken a neo-institutional tack which describes the world polity as a collection of organisations, states, and individuals which create and enact models of behaviour which are translated into policy and institutions throughout the world (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Meyer, Frank et al. 1997; Ramirez and McEneaney 1997; Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Berkovitch 1999b; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Hironaka 2002; Drori, Meyer et al. 2003a; Drori, Meyer et al. 2003b; Ramirez and Wotipka 2003; Lechner and Boli 2005; Drori 2007; Frank, Longhofer et al. 2007; Meyer 2007). World polity theory holds that the similarity of these institutional models explains the isomorphism between states and organisations in terms of citizenship, justice, educational systems, and even scientific advancement. The world polity or world society, in the form of international and intergovernmental organisations, thus exerts pressure on nation-states, domestic organisations, and individuals to move towards common goals and models of behaviour, and in effect leads to a globalisation of policy and institutional forms based on a common 'world culture' (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer, Boli et al. 1997;

Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer 2007). This institutionalist approach to global politics has both strengths and weaknesses.

Explaining diffusion remains one of the strengths of world polity theory. One of the primary focuses in this literature has been the repeated examination of the diffusion and spread of models, policies, and institutions throughout the diverse states and organisations of the world. For instance, research from this perspective has explained the spread of diverse policies and institutions ranging from the enfranchisement of women (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997) to the adoption of national environmental policies (Meyer, Frank et al. 1997) and the ratification of United Nations treaties (Ramirez and Wotipka 2003). This emphasis on diffusion purports to explain the factors influencing the spread of similar policy and institutional models throughout otherwise independent nation-states and organisations. Two factors which have been shown to consistently influence the degree of successful diffusion have been aspects of organisational embeddedness and policy density. Embeddedness refers to a country's level of involvement in international and inter-governmental networks and organisations – sometimes also referred to as the penetration of world society into a state (Schofer and Hironaka 2005). Density, on the other hand, refers to the existing prevalence of a model or institution in the community of nation-states. Research has suggested that one of the ways in which density functions is that a model or institution becomes so widely held in the international community that it becomes costly to the perceived legitimacy of nation states to not adopt or enforce a model (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Researchers have argued that embeddedness and density both positively influence diffusion and adoption of world polity models. This research has identified several factors which influence the spread of common behaviours and models in both the embeddedness and density categories, such as membership in specific international organisations (Hironaka 2002) and the influence of institutional forms in nearby countries on the outcome of diffusion (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997). This spread and refinement of policy models is due in part to "recursive processes" at work in the elaboration and change of the world polity (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997). The influence exerted between the world society and

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the nation-state is not unidirectional. These recursive processes reflect the change and influence that various actors exert on the world polity in response to the enactment of world cultural models. The interaction of enactment and recursive processes combine to further the diffusion of world cultural models.

This focus on diffusion has, however, sometimes neglected to offer detailed explanations of how these world-level institutional models develop in the first place. Researchers have argued that these 'world cultural models' are spread by the 'rationalised others' of the world polity – in most cases international associations, organisations, and epistemic communities that operate at the global level (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Meyer, Frank et al. 1997; Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Chabbott 1999; Hironaka 2002; Drori, Meyer et al. 2003b; Lechner and Boli 2005). Yet, the same research has seldom made detailed analysis of how an idea is transformed by these groups from discourse into practice and accepted as an institutional model or policy script at the global level (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Research explains the spread of a certain type of environmental regime, or of educational standards, but often fails to satisfactorily explain the genesis of such models (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

Another weakness which must also be accounted for when adopting the world polity/world society approach is the lack of emphasis on inter-institutional power imbalances between nation-states, between organisations, and between individuals (Finnemore 1996; Stinchcombe 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith 2000). If world polity research is taken at face value, one is struck by the lack of power relationships and the implicit neutrality in the politics of world society. North/South, East/West, rich/poor, and super-power/micro-state cleavages do not appear as a main consideration within the world polity explanations of globalisation and isomorphism in today's world. Indeed, although some research has shown that international inequalities are evident in the reach of world polity international organisations (Beckfield 2003), issues of neo-imperialism, conflict, and exploitation are most often disregarded within the world polity approach. World polity theorists have moved past the core/periphery power imbalances seen

as central to the world systems theory approach and in so doing have downplayed the issue of power more generally.

The final weakness of the world polity perspective to be considered is its preoccupation with explanations at the state level to the neglect of explaining similar phenomena at the organisational or individual levels. Although the most thorough article detailing world polity theory by Meyer and his colleagues (1997b) explains that the influence of world society functions at all three levels, most research in this literature has examined the state level. This leaves several gaps in the literature with the exclusion of much emphasis on organisations and individuals and their relationships to states and the 'rationalised others' of the world society. This over-emphasis on the state has also left holes to be filled when it comes to explaining the interactions of international organisations with states and other actors. The international and inter-governmental organisation ostensibly plays a crucial role in international norm or model formation, but the relations between these entities and the state, let alone with other organisations and individuals remains a little studied aspect of world society. By adopting a focus on the relationship between states and international and intergovernmental organisations, as has been done elsewhere (Finnemore 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), this shortcoming of world polity theory can be ameliorated.

Despite these weaknesses of the world polity approach, a neo-institutionalist approach holds great promise to explain politics of international phenomena like development assistance. World polity theory offers strong explanations for the spread of policy models to governments, and therefore will offer a reasonable explanation for the diffusion of increasingly similar development assistance donor institutions and policies; however, attention needs to be paid to issues of model genesis/norm formation, power imbalances, and the interaction of multiple actors involved rather than just states. At the most basic level, these norms and interest are generated through the rationalization of nature and society by different actors of modern society (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). Consequently, to fully understand the processes involved in the globalization of development assistance policies, it is necessary to explain how and from where

the norms and ideas that underpin policy emerge. This entails analysis of the power politics involved in the institutionalisation of these norms and the relationships between different actors involved at the civil society, state, and international organization levels. In my view, this treatment of norm formation is a weakness of the world polity perspective, but one which can be improved upon by adopting an approach that examines the social processes at work in the genesis of world models. This dissertation will proceed in this manner and expand on the world polity/world society perspective in ways similar to earlier research in international relations theory on norm creation (Finnemore 1993; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In this way I will directly examine both the actions of the 'rationalised others' and the donor agency representatives of the development assistance community to explain their role in both creating and spreading policy on both security and gender among northern donor countries.

The limitations of world polity approaches in recognising power and inequalities can also be ameliorated by adopting a modified institutionalist approach with a specific emphasis on disentangling and describing the power relationships and imbalances at play in world society. By specifically looking to explain the power behind the formation and spread of world models, and understanding the role played by imbalances in power between actors at different levels, the world polity institutional approach can be made to better reflect the power relations of international politics. This modified world polity or world society approach guides my research into the formation of global consensus around development assistance policy priorities and objectives. If world polity theories hold, then we should be able to convincingly discern the influence of intergovernmental and international organisations on the spread of both gender and security policy models to Northern development assistance donor agencies in the chapters that follow. If this influence can account for the similarity of policy perspectives adopted by the donor agencies, then understanding the mechanisms and social processes by which this influence is exerted will be a crucial component of explaining the formation of policy consensus in development

assistance. It is these mechanisms and processes which the subsequent chapters will explain.

Development Assistance

        The research literature on development assistance is drawn primarily from the disciplines of economics, political science, and anthropology. Sociologists have been less active in their study of the development assistance process. Some of the political sociology literature has examined international linkages and international influences on national development or on democracy promotion abroad (Evans 1979; Robinson 1996), but few sociologists have studied development assistance directly. The main debate within the development assistance literature regards the interests at play in determining development assistance outcomes. Two sides emerge on this debate. The more prevalent argument states that development assistance is provided by rich industrialised states of the North to serve their own national interests by promoting trade and investment relationships as well as geopolitical or neo-imperial concerns (Escobar 1988; Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Woods 2005). On the contrary, the second argument points to the moral underpinnings of development assistance and attempts to demonstrate that the national interests evident in providing development assistance are overridden by underlying moral and humanitarian concerns (Lumsdaine 1993; Opeskin 1996). Given the political nature of development assistance, it is unlikely that it is either purely a manifestation of national interest or of moral humanitarianism. Instead, it seems logical to expect development assistance to demonstrate instances and episodes of both motivations. The interplay between altruistic humanitarianism and national self interests becomes a critical political competition within development assistance. This competition is one which my research illuminates by explaining the processes through which donors and development practitioners arrive at common consensus positions of policy and development objectives.

        Aside from debates about the underlying motivations for development assistance, another political cleavage key to the issue relates to international

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inequalities, imperialism, and the North/South divide in global politics. Contrary to research that portrays development assistance as a manifestation of an overriding global humanitarianism, the focus on international inequalities stems from the influence of post-colonial and post-structural theory on development research (Said 1979; Esteva 1992; Crush 1995; Gardner and Lewis 1996). Through this lens, development assistance has been portrayed by some researchers as little more than a renewed manifestation of imperialism in the post-colonial world (Ferguson 1994; Crush 1995; Escobar 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). This perspective argues that the North has used its continuing power over the South to construct the 'Third World' as underdeveloped through the deployment of 'development discourse' which sought to reshape the South as a 'project' upon which Northern expertise could act. The South's underdevelopment was posed as the problem, while Northern development became the solution. This argument is at the heart of the post-development critique and, from the post-development perspective, development assistance was the concrete manifestation of development discourse in practice (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995). Examples of the negative impact of large-scale development projects and the biased research and policy of donor agencies are offered as evidence of the imperialistic and discriminatory approach of development assistance from this perspective. The solution of post-development researchers is a form of social change which is cognisant of local community and cultural traditions and structures rather than one which relies on outside conceptions of progress and advancement. The role of donors is thus diminished as the role for local 'grass-roots' organisations grows. This view of development assistance grew more popular in the late 1990s, but has also had its critics who accuse the post-development perspective of cultural relativism and of offering little in the way of solutions to the real problems of real people in the global South (Nederveen Pieterse 1998; Nederveen Pieterse 2000; Nederveen Pieterse 2001; Veltmeyer 2001).

The most important contribution of the post-development perspective on development assistance is its ability to draw attention to the issue of political

power. As Ferguson (1994) notes, development assistance was seen by many as a politically neutral process devoid of power. This is clearly not the case, as the imbalance between donor conditionality and recipient responses to it illustrates. Development assistance is a process where actors begin and end with unequal roles and power in the relationship. Thus, despite some of the failings of the post-development perspective, its chief contribution to the literature is to refocus researchers' attention on issues of power. By adopting this critical approach to power relations, my research counters the anaemic treatment of power by world polity theory discussed earlier.

In addition to the above mentioned suggestions, my study looks to fill three gaps that are readily apparent in the literature on development assistance: (1) Little attention paid to bilateral donor agencies; (2) Infrequent application of a comparative perspective on development assistance donors; and (3) Little treatment of the interface between civil society and donors. First is the lesser focus on bilateral development donor agencies of national governments. Much more has been written about the impact of and the institutional influence of multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund than about bilateral agencies (Bird, Mori et al. 2000; Stiglitz 2002). There do exist a few exceptions to this, including, research addressing both World Bank and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) development impacts in Lesotho (Ferguson 1994), a history of CIDA's role as Canada's donor agency (Morrison 1998), and a symposium on CIDA's recent policy directions (Black and Tiessen 2007; Brown 2007). Still, the bilateral agency has not been a focus of study in much of the academic literature on development. Second, little work directly compares the working of bilateral donor agencies, and instead the cross-national comparisons of development assistance have been mostly aggregated at the national level rather than examining donor institutions (Noël and Thérien 1995b; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Thérien and Noel 2000; Addison, Mavrotas et al. 2005; Woods 2005).[1] The comparative focus on bilateral development assistance

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[1] Again, a recent exception to this is a collection of essays on development assistance donors of the European Union: Stokke, O. and P. Hoebink (2005). *Perspectives on European development*

agencies which I will adopt in this project will thus make two contributions to the development assistance literature and fill a gap which has been overlooked for the most part in previous work. Finally, the relationship between civil society or NGOs and donors has not received as adequate treatment in this literature as it has in other political research (Bratton 1989; Tripp 1994; Booth and Richard 1998). Some work has examined how NGOs attempt to respond to perceptions of donor priorities, particularly within humanitarian crises (Cooley and Ron 2002), but few works directly examine the converse relationship of NGO influence on donor priorities and practices.

My research responds to all three of these gaps in the development assistance literature. Examining development policy consensus necessitates an approach which looks at bilateral donors in a comparative perspective and which treats the relationship between donors and civil society as a possible causal factor for policy formation. Furthermore, examining the social processes involved in building consensus on development assistance issues will respond to debates in the development assistance literature on the nature of power in the development sector and the motivations of donors for providing foreign aid.

It is evident that research on development assistance has mostly been conducted outside of the discipline of sociology in recent years. The subsequent chapters will bring development assistance into sociological focus with the application of theory from both the world polity and social movement literatures in political sociology. Applying these theories to development assistance will provide a framework for understanding the global and domestic influences on policy formation as well as the key role of influence of civil society and other donors. As the next section illustrates, this civil society and activist influence will be a significant component of this research.

Social Movements and Civil Society Influence

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co-operation: policy and performance of individual donor countries and the EU. London, Routledge.

One way that the treatment of civil society in the world polity and development assistance research literatures can be improved is by synthesising theory from recent work on social movements and transnational political contention (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005). In particular, examining the influence of movement organisations and civil society groups on national governments and inter-governmental organisations within a theoretical framework that explains the social processes underlying contention and influence makes significant strides towards filling gaps in both of these literatures. In the case of development assistance, there are specific social movement organisations, and NGOs/civil society groups that operate at national levels in both the developed and developing world, as well as transnational or International NGOs (INGOs).[2] Accounting for their influence on development assistance processes requires applying a social movements lens within this study. Important factors to consider here include: differences in national versus transnational social movement's influence on government/donor policy and action; the effect of transnational social movement organisations on norm creation and the formation of consensus on policy priorities as suggested by world polity theorists; the importance of different social mechanisms in shaping the policy consensus process; the effect of different national cultures/political environments on the degree of participation in and effectiveness of transnational movements; and the different roles played by social movement and civil society groups in the process of global politics.

Evaluating the differences in influence of national versus transnational social movement organisation on governments and donors is effectively the measurement of the success of these groups in shaping policy and practice by official bodies. In evaluating this success William Gamson's (1975) twofold

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[2] In the development assistance sector, the distinction between social movement organisations (SMOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and civil society organisations (CSOs) depends on the actions and aims of the organisations. While NGOs and CSOs tend to be interchangeable, not all NGOs or CSOs would be considered SMOs. An SMO implies either a form which has a mass membership drawn from the public or an organisation which actively engages in protest. In the development assistance sector there certainly are NGOs which have mass membership and engage in protests, but not all NGOs would meet these criteria. Therefore only a sub-set of development NGOs would be considered SMOs.

conceptualisation of movement success as either the creation of new benefits for its members/beneficiaries or the acceptance/recognition of the movement by its adversaries is a useful scheme. To evaluate the different effectiveness of national and transnational groups in shaping official development assistance policy and practice will therefore require a comparative examination of both benefits and acceptance. By examining these levels of success or failure, the question of civil society or movement influence on governments, which is poorly answered in world polity theory, will be made clearer.

Part of the influence of social movements and civil society on governments and on donors in the case of development assistance is also related to the role they play in norm creation or by framing the ideas and norms that underpin their interests (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996; Jasper 1997; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Within the context of world polity theory, these groups are often referred to as the 'rationalised others' of the world polity which craft and shape world models and norms. Unfortunately, this process is not well elucidated in world polity research and requires further explanation which can be found in social movement research on transnational movements and their influence on governments and international organisations (Tarrow 1998; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005). By framing their platform issues, and through contentious political acts ranging from outright protest to subtle lobbying and awareness campaigns, transnational movement groups work to shape international norms. In recent years, this has appeared in the development sector through efforts by groups to shape the global agenda on issues such as debt relief (Evans 1999; Leipold 2000; Michaelowa 2003) and more recently the Make Poverty History campaign on aid and poverty reduction (Lockwood 2005). The tactics and repertoires deployed by these groups to influence official agendas and to create international norms need to be better understood at the global level and it is by incorporating some of the explanations from social movements research that the influence of civil society and social movement organisations on governments and international bodies will be more fully explained.

To achieve this examination of the influence of civil society and movement organisations on development assistance donors and international organisations, my research borrows directly from social movement research on the social mechanisms and processes of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005). Mechanisms in this context refer to "events that alter relations among specified elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001). A series of these mechanisms can link together in a specific situation to form the basis of a social process, while different social processes can share some of the same mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005). This recent trend in research has identified manifold social mechanisms that are implicated in contentious politics across national contexts, issue areas, and history. These mechanisms include pathways such as certification, brokerage, scale-shift, internalisation, and modularity – all of which can be employed by civil society actors to achieve their aims. This approach has been criticised for simply describing how contentious episodes unfold rather than offering explanations of why, for being overly general in scope, and for obscuring complex historical contexts (Kjeldstadli 2004; Rule 2004; Simeon 2004; Welskopp 2004). Despite these criticisms, I contend that this approach can help to better explain the relational aspects of political phenomena like development assistance. Indeed, the subsequent chapters of this dissertation examine development assistance policy consensus formation to discern the similar mechanisms at work; however, my research argues that these mechanisms are not only the tools of civil society and social movement organisations, but instead of all the actors of the world polity. Disentangling the actors and their actions as different mechanisms are employed in promoting or inhibiting consensus formation on development assistance policy will therefore be a chief aim of my research.

By adopting a comparative approach, I am also able to examine how different national cultures and environments affect transnational participation. People in different countries have a different level of participation in international organisations and movements, with some countries' populations more fully

engaged in international networks than others. The features which influence this fuller participation have yet to be fully described in the social movement literature. Different factors that vary between nation states might account for different levels of transnational mobilisation and participation might include political opportunity and mobilising structures as well as receptiveness to movement frames. This variety of participation in transnational bodies is a variable of considerable importance in this study.

In sum, by combining the world polity and social movement literatures, the examination of transnational movement organisations and INGOs as norm creators, diffusers, brokers, and followers is possible. Examining the role played by these groups as actors in international processes and the creation of world models through ongoing debate and contention helps to fill the gap in world polity literature regarding the specifics of civil society participation in norm genesis and diffusion.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The development assistance sector has given rise to similar institutions and policies for foreign aid in almost every major donor country in the course of the past fifty years. To apply the theoretical insights from the three literatures discussed above, I will use a framework which synthesises from each to fill the gaps in world polity theory, test the application of world polity explanations on the development assistance case, and then identify the common mechanisms and processes at work which explain the conformity of policy in the global development assistance sector. Four aspects of the development assistance sector and its institutions will be central to my analysis: (1) Donor Policy Models; (2) International Actors; (3) Nation-State Donor Agency Structure; and (4) Individual Agency.

Donor Policy as World Cultural Models

World polity theory points to a series of universally applicable cultural models of norms and institutions to explain the striking similarity of structure and policy among the world's states and organisations (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer 2007). Development assistance is one example of these common institutional frameworks. As an international organisational field, development assistance now comprises an entire industry of donors, experts, consultants, firms, and NGOs. At the same time, this industry has concentrated its efforts on more and more similar development priorities and objectives. This focusing of development assistance has been the effect of the spread of similar policy models and standards for development aid promulgated by the international development community through international organisations, conferences, treaties, guidelines, and the sharing of best practices. This growing homogeneity leads to readily identifiable policy models for donors which adopt and apply common agendas to address specific topics in a relatively uniform manner in diverse developing country contexts. These common models can be seen in donor approaches to issues as divergent as the environment, micro-finance, governance, gender, and security. As an example of the culture models defined by world society through its interaction with nation-state, organisational, and individual actors, the adoption of these models will be the overall dependent 'variable' for the analysis that follows. The chapters that follow will illustrate how certain policy models come to be enacted, are institutionalised, and are recursively refined by development assistance donors. My findings will establish a clearer picture of the social processes at work in the globalisation of policies and institutions through world society, a deficiency of the existing world polity literature.

International Actors and the Influence of World Society

World polity and social movement literatures both highlight the impact of international organisations on nation-state policy factors. The influence of international actors is therefore a primary area of investigation in this dissertation. These actors of world society in the development assistance sector include a range

of organisations, both intergovernmental and international non-governmental. The spread of development as a concept in the twentieth century was reflected in a growth of organisations in this field which aim to promote and achieve development in poorer societies. This growth included the proliferation of development-oriented INGOs (Chabbott 1999), as well as the creation of a number of highly influential intergovernmental bodies that explicitly deal with development, like the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the World Bank's International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA), the regional development banks, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This wide array of international actors, in concert with internationally-oriented domestic development NGOs in donor states all work to exert influence on donors to implement specific policy models and to work on specific development priorities. As contributors to the discourse on development assistance, civil society and intergovernmental organisations interface with the nation-state donors to define and refine the standards and norms of development and work to craft the policy models that donors adopt. The world polity, development assistance, and social movements research literatures have all argued for the critical role that international organisations can play in shaping the policy directions and actions of the nation-state. Given this important role, the influence of these international actors and their relationship with donors will be a chief concern of the analysis in the chapters that follow. My results will demonstrate the critical role of international actors in the social processes which mediate donor agency adoption and institutionalisation of world polity models for development assistance.

Nation-State Donor Agency Structure and the Interface with World Society

Evidence from the world polity literature suggests that the nature of the domestic institutions can mediate the reflection of world society influences in policy (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Hironaka 2002). Applying this notion to the development assistance sector suggests that the presence of a donor agency would

be the first step to a nation-state expressing development assistance policy models. Taken further, it suggests some role for the structure of the development assistance donor agency in mediating the interface with world society. Different domestic institutional structures may therefore alter the amount of world polity influence evident in a given state. This consideration has not generated much attention from previous world polity research. Throughout this study, therefore, I will conceptualise donor structure along two dimensions: agency autonomy and locus of decision-making. These factors will measure the distance of the agency from central government control and the internationalisation of the agency. I will use the concept of agency autonomy to refer to the status of the institution as either a stand-alone agency/body within the government of the country (autonomous), or as a sub-unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (integrated). I will argue that the more autonomous a donor is from the central government bodies, the more likely it will be more amenable to adopting internationally-driven policy models. This greater distance in relation to the national self-interest inherent in foreign policy decision-making would therefore permit adoption of universalist world cultural policy models that might be contrary to donor self-interest.

The second structural characteristic, locus of decision-making, refers to the location of primary decision-making on issues of disbursement to countries on a bilateral basis within the organisation. When decisions are taken primarily at agency headquarters the donor would be identified as a "centralised" agency, and in contrast, when decisions are primarily taken in the field offices located in recipient countries points to a "decentralised" donor. Agency-wide policy decisions still tend to be centralised even in this second instance. Since the early-1990s, the OECD DAC has been promoting donor decentralisation of decision-making as a characteristic of more effective and locally-appropriate aid (OECD 2002b). Generalising from this DAC position, I will argue that donors already using decentralised decision-making structures indicate a willingness to adopt internationally sanctioned norms and principles for delivering aid, and thus a greater openness to world society influence. Using these factors, I have created a

typology of donor agencies which yields four distinct ideal types, shown in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1: **Donor Structure Matrix**

Locus of Decision-making

Agency Autonomy	Autonomous Centralised	Autonomous Decentralised
	Integrated Centralised	Integrated Decentralised

Throughout the chapters that follow, this structure matrix will be assessed for its influence on mediating world polity influence on donors. Although the ideal types are shown, the reality of donor structures is that they are fluid and will fluctuate over time and according to the situation. My analysis will assess the question of how donor structure influences the integration of world polity policy models into donor policy at the nation-state level. The autonomy and the decentralisation of an agency will be argued to make a difference in its interface with the world society, and therefore mediate its level of susceptibility to the outside influence, with greater autonomy and decentralisation leading to the most susceptibility to world polity influence. My findings on domestic structures and their ability to mediate world society influence will provide an innovative contribution to the world polity and development assistance literatures.

Individual Agency in the Spread of World Society Models

The neo-institutional world polity or world society approach tends to examine the spread of common policies and institutions at the macro international level, and discusses the impact of relationships between nation-states or between organisations. Some allowance is provided in the theory for the influence of individuals on these processes, but the research on the world polity has not focused strongly on individual experiences in these processes (Finnemore 1996). Within the development assistance sector these inter-governmental and inter-

organisational relationships are managed by individuals acting on behalf of the donor and on behalf of international actors. By focusing in several of the subsequent chapters on data gathered from individuals' experience working in the development assistance sector, I intend to examine in more detail the impact of the individual on the international interface of the nation-state and world society. This focus on individual agency will help to fill the gaps that exist in the world polity literature on the nature of the social processes behind the creation, spread, and refinement of globally applicable policy models and institutions.

CONCLUSION

Building on these three divergent literatures in the social sciences, this dissertation synthesises a view of the social processes surrounding the creation of international norms and consensus in development assistance. This theoretical framework is one which is cognisant of both international and domestic influences on the state and which aims to explain the mechanisms by which the world polity influences states to adopt common policy scripts and institutions. Combining world polity concepts of global cultural models with the thick description of contentious politics from the social movement literature, this research will offer a new approach to understanding development assistance. By adopting a comparative methodology that examines actors at multiple levels and across several countries I tease out the common social mechanisms and processes that underlie consensus building and norm creation in international politics. Are these processes influenced mostly by international or domestic pressures and actors? Is donor consensus motivated mostly by national self-interest or a broader humanitarianism? How are these processes influenced by domestic and international social movements and civil society? The strengths of the various literatures – for instance the focus on global models in world polity research, the focus on power and interests in the development assistance literature, and the focus on organisations' ability to influence politically contentious debates in the social movement literature –are all critical components of the synthetic theoretical framework I adopt to answer these questions. I have identified several

overlapping and complementary gaps and strengths among the three literatures, and the chapters that follow endeavour to maximise the synergies between them to fill these gaps and yield a strong explanatory framework for analysing development assistance and other international political processes. Bringing the influence of sociological theories to the study of development assistance will also work to broaden the development literature which has been dominated mostly by the economic and anthropological disciplines and by development practitioners.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

My study is a comparative analysis of the increasing global consensus and uniformity of development assistance policy and practices. In the Chapters that follow, I will explore case studies of two different policy issues, security and gender, across three donor-country contexts. These two issue areas appear unconnected, but over the past couple of decades they have both seized the collective imaginations of development assistance donor agencies and become areas of development intervention. The aim of my study is not to exhaustively explain gender and security in the context of development, but instead to explain how diverse donors have come to common positions and policies on these issues. I undertake a quantitative analysis of consensus formation in development assistance which examines the gender policy issue in a cross-national context using information on official development assistance financial flows and other donor data.[3] The results of this quantitative analysis will then inform the qualitative case studies of gender and security that follow. The countries under examination in the qualitative cases are Canada, Sweden, and the United States of America. These case studies consist of qualitative data retrieved from document content analysis and in-depth interviews with donor agency officials, members of movement organisations and NGOs, and other development practitioners. This mixed-methods approach allows me to examine the influence of world society on the nation-state at the cross-national level and then to bridge the gaps in that literature outlined in the previous chapter within the country-specific case studies.

My research methodology will thus use both quantitative and qualitative analysis in a comparative framework to provide evidence about the function of the world polity/nation-state relationship and the spread of common policy models in the development assistance sector. By using this mixed-methods approach, I am able to account for the limitations of both methods, at the same time as capitalising on the strengths of each. This chapter will outline my approach to using mixed methods, detail my quantitative and qualitative analyses, and discuss

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[3] No comparable quantitative analysis of the security issue was easily achievable at this stage because of data availability issues.

some of the methodological challenges that arose during the course of my research.

A MIXED METHODS APPROACH

The combination of cross-national statistical analysis and comparative case studies has been described as "the best way of dealing with the thorny problems of macrosocial analysis" (Huber, Rueschemeyer et al. 1993). Indeed there are several examples of research in political sociology that previously employed a mixed methods approach (Huber, Rueschemeyer et al. 1993; Schofer and McEneaney 2003; Ramos 2004). By applying a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate the relationship between world society and the nation-state in the development assistance sector, I benefit from the strengths of each, and limit the impact of their respective methodological weaknesses.

The strengths of employing comparative cross-national quantitative analysis include the ability to highlight the trends and relationships visible at the macro-level in the development assistance sector. Although limited to identifying statistically significant relationships between country characteristics and features, this aspect of my approach will allow for the testing of world polity theory hypotheses on the relationship between the nation-state and world society derived from extant world polity literature. This quantitative analysis will help to identify relationships and processes of interest; however, these broad relationships and processes will echo only the rough-hewn macro-level trends and fail to provide richer detail of how these relationships and processes function. This weakness of quantitative cross-national analysis can be rectified by pairing quantitative findings with qualitative data that can elaborate on some of these details. My quantitative findings will therefore provide a frame within which to explore these richer details in my qualitative comparative case studies.

Comparative case studies of two specific policy priorities in the development assistance sector will aim to identify common trends of social processes and mechanisms at work in mediating the interface between donor agency and world society. Building from the broad themes identified in the

quantitative analysis, my qualitative cases will illustrate the emergent themes and concepts shared and contrasted between three different donors and across the gender and the security cases. Data collected and analysed in the qualitative cases will help to thicken the descriptive and explanatory power of my quantitative findings, working to fill in gaps in the world polity tradition that exist when it comes to understanding the social processes that promote uniformity and homogenisation of institutions and policies at the global level. This approach will be one of the first attempts to use in-depth interviewing in a comparative framework with bilateral donor agencies as the unit of analysis.

By employing both a quantitative and qualitative lens on my research question, this dissertation provides insights at both the macro and micro levels into the working of world polity influence on the nation-state, and more specifically, into the processes involved in the globalisation of development assistance policy among major donor countries.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

I use quantitative cross-national analysis of the gender and development policy issue to demonstrate the extent to which consensus is evident across the full sample of major donor countries and to examine the factors responsible for this seeming uniformity at the macro level. The primary research question I ask in this part of the analysis is: what has been the influence of world society on foreign aid donor agencies and how has it functioned? Using event history techniques and a dataset of donor characteristics and gender policy event timings, I will employ a quantitative approach to answer this question and establish a macro-level framework within which to situate my qualitative cases.

Event History Analysis

To achieve this aim, I use event history analysis techniques of these issues across time using data I have compiled on gender policy adoption by donors, readily available data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows, as well as indicators for several other intervening factors (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997; Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002; Cleves, Gould et al. 2002). Event history

analysis measures factors which contribute to the rate of occurrence of a specific event. This technique has been employed several times previously in the world polity literature to assess the influence of world society on various nation-state institutions (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Hironaka 2002; Ramirez and Wotipka 2003; Frank, Longhofer et al. 2007). My analysis in the next chapter follows from this tradition and will examine the adoption of a WID/Gender policy or the creation of a WID/Gender unit by the major bilateral donors – the occurrence of either of these events is the dependent variable in my analysis. Measuring emerging consensus in this manner will allow me to test several hypotheses related to social mechanisms and processes which explain the success or failure of an issue to become one of consensus on the global stage. Hypotheses which I will test in this cross-national analysis include:

H1. *The greater number of donors who adopt a policy, the more likely other donors will be able to do so also.*

H2. *Higher levels of country membership in international organisations oriented towards a specific policy issue will increase the likelihood of donors to adopt a related policy.*

H3. *The ratification of relevant international treaties or the occurrence of high-profile international conferences addressing the issue will increase the likelihood of donors to adopt a related policy.*

H4. *The greater autonomy of a donor agency, the more likely it will adopt externally generated policy scripts*

H5. *The higher the level of aid as a proportion of GNI, the more likely the donor will adopt externally generated policy scripts.*

By testing these hypotheses related to consensus formation, I will be provided with a set of specific issues and relationships upon which to focus my examination in the qualitative case studies of both the positive and negative cases in each of the three countries under consideration. In this way, the quantitative

analysis will feed directly into the qualitative case studies and provide an overview of the global context in which the country cases are situated.

Data

I have compiled a dataset consisting of event timing, donor structure, international organisation membership, and domestic context variables for twenty-two member countries of the OECD DAC, as well as yearly time series of ODA disbursement levels for each country for the period of 1968 through 2003 (Roodman 2005; Paxton, Hughes et al. 2006).[4] I select 1968 as the commencement of the risk-set because this is when the first gender unit/policy was adopted by a donor (Sweden). A more detailed discussion of my dependent and independent variables can be found in the following chapter.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

My research will adopt a comparative approach which has been shown to offer great explanatory value in describing social processes at the international level (Moore 1967; Skocpol 1979; Evans and Stephens 1988; Huntington 1991; Rueschemeyer, Huber et al. 1992; Seidman 1994; Wood 2000; Goodwin 2001; Kohli 2004). The comparative lens will be focused on two types of comparisons: (1) between the two issue areas of security and gender; and (2) between national contexts of the three country cases. I will use 'method of agreement' comparisons between countries of both cases where the outcomes were similar (Van Evera 1997). By comparing these similar outcomes I will look for shared causal processes at work in each case. These comparisons will illustrate the commonality and uniqueness of the approach to both security and gender issues in each national context, with the aim of answering the question of what social processes account for increased consensus on development assistance. The cases

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[4] Event timing and donor structure variables were compiled on the basis of information gleaned from development assistance donor's websites, policy documents, and reports, as well as from OECD DAC peer review reports of each country. Data on country memberships in international women's groups is taken from: Pamela Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes, and Jennifer L. Green. 2006. "The International Women's Movement and Women's Political Representation, 1893-2003." *American Sociological Review* 71:898-920. Data on ODA disbursements is taken from a dataset created for: David Roodman, "An Index of Donor Performance," *Working Paper 67*, Center for Global Development, August 2005.

selected will examine the factors both promoting and inhibiting adoption of these concerns as donor consensus.

Policy Cases

The two cases of consensus formation I examine include the rise of the women in development (WID)/gender and development (GAD) agendas and the more recent focus on security as a key concern for development assistance. Both of these policy concerns saw widespread acceptance and adoption by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. For instance, the WID agenda came to prominence in the development community in the 1980s and grew directly out of Boserup's (1970) early academic research on women and economic development (Rathgeber 1990). Later, WID/GAD became the subject of several multi-donor policy statements in 1983, 1989, and 1998 indicating its broad acceptance among bilateral donor agencies (OECD 1999). Likewise, the security and development agenda and a renewed focus on Security-Sector Reform (SSR) – bringing donors efforts to bear on promoting development by building more effective security sectors in developing countries by improving national correctional, policing, judicial, and military systems – followed a similar path from an issue of limited research and little treatment by donors to one which was adopted in a consensus policy declaration by all major bilateral donors in 2004 (OECD 2004c; OECD 2004a). I will show that both the WID/GAD and SSR agendas can therefore be seen as issues that began as ideas in research and policy discussion which then became translated into consensus positions in development assistance that led to more uniform policies and practices, as well as major declarations of solidarity and agreement among diverse donors.

These cases were selected because, despite addressing disparate issues of gender equality and security, policy in both these areas has arisen in a manner that shows a common agenda among donors, the influence of international actors on donor agencies, and yet different underlying political motivations and links to national interest. As such, the two policy cases I select are comparable, but have distinct features which will help me to generalise to other development assistance

policy areas with which they share similarities. The gender case will provide findings which can help to better explain how common approaches to issues that are inspired by humanitarian motivations can arise, whereas the security case can help to illustrate why common policy models more closely linked to donor national self-interest come about. The consensus on these two issue areas is indicative of that found in other policy areas like aid effectiveness, governance, the environment, or education. Analysis of the social processes and mechanisms which help these policy models to evolve, should therefore help to explain the same processes at work on other development assistance policy agendas.

Selection of Country Cases

The sample for the interviews for my qualitative research consists of individuals working in the development assistance field for bilateral donor agencies, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations in three countries: Canada, Sweden, and the United States. Previous research in the political sociology literature has also compared these same countries for the purpose of understanding the differing impact of globalisation on the state (Olsen 2002). I selected these countries for two reasons. First, within the development assistance community globally they represent a spectrum of donor countries which vary according to the perceived motivations underlying their aid programs (ranging from internationalist humanitarianism to narrow national self-interest) and according to their respective levels of generosity as aid donors. Placement of each country on these spectrums is shown in Figure 3.1. Despite these different features, they still arrive at very similar policy positions on development assistance issues. This variation of domestic context will allow me to better understand how this context mediates the relationship of the state to world society.

Figure 3.1: Case Study Countries on Spectrums of Motivation and Generosity

The second reason I selected these countries was simply because they were all feasible for me to incorporate into my study within both time and funding limitations.[5] Selection of these countries allowed for comparative analysis evaluating the workings of similar social mechanisms in three different national contexts and in three differently structured donor agencies. Specifically, the main organisation studied in each country was its development assistance agency – the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in Canada, the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) in Sweden, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the United States. These main national donor agencies were selected because they deliver the majority share of official development assistance for the three case study countries and are most directly implicated in setting the policy directions for aid policy in each country. Furthermore, these bilateral donors have not previously been studied in comparative context in the sociological literature and therefore my study will innovate by adopting them as a focus of my analysis. I gained approval from these government agencies included in my study to interview their officials. Overall, my respondent sample includes 15 Swedish, 22 Canadian, and 4 American respondents, for a total of 41 respondents.[6]

Case Study Approach

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[5] If time and funding had not been a constraint, this study would likely benefit in richness from the inclusion of two other countries within my case studies: the United Kingdom and Japan. The UK was frequently referred to by my respondents as a very influential donor on the international stage. Japan would have been an interesting fifth country to compare because of its relatively high volumes of aid and its very different domestic context.

[6] The unbalanced nature of my sample is addressed later in this Chapter in the section on Methodological Challenges.

My qualitative case studies consist of document content analysis and data collected from in-depth interviews with individual respondents working in the development assistance sector in each country. These interviews were semi-structured but relatively open-ended with a base interview schedule that expanded or contracted where necessary through the use of informal probes to follow-up on earlier responses (Gorden 1998; Berg 2004). Questions focused on individual and institutional experiences in the development assistance sector, the relationships between people and institutions, and the various forms of international collaboration that occur in the development assistance community, related to the two policy issue areas of gender and security. I asked questions about the roles played by specific international organisations and other donor agencies, as well as the influence of domestic governments and activists. Interviews about individual experience within development agencies and organisations helped me to better understand the social mechanisms and relationships at work in policy making – aspects that cannot be fully understood simply from analysis of policy documents. The interview schedule was developed following several preliminary interviews with key informants (Gorden 1998). In addition, the issues raised in the interviews were also informed by the outcomes of the macro-level quantitative analysis. All interviews were conducted in English, recorded to digital file format, and fully transcribed. In each case I recruited respondents for interviews via a snowball sample approach, beginning with key gatekeepers in specific institutions and more broadly in the development assistance community. Interviews continued in each setting until I felt I reached an acceptable level of theoretical saturation as respondents were mostly echoing and reinforcing the themes I had already identified in previous interviews. I recruited respondents directly via telephone and e-mail communication to arrange for interviews that tended to take place either in the respondents' workplace, an acceptable alternate location, or over the telephone. Some interviews instead took the form of small group discussions when an individual felt I would benefit from hearing from one or more of their colleagues (Berg 2004). These group sessions were recorded and transcribed in the same manner as the interviews. Respondents received no

compensation for participation in the study, but many requested to be informed of the research results upon completion.

The data collected from these interviews was coded and analysed using a qualitative analysis program to examine causal relationships and emerging themes within the three country cases and within the overall study. Seventy-eight codes were identified. These codes were grouped into broader emerging themes which came to represent the features of domestic context and the mechanisms and social processes I identify in Chapters Six and Seven. Major mechanisms identified in the coding process were explored in more detail in memos to assist in my analysis and better understand the relationships between various codes and emergent themes and issues. These codes and themes will be compared and contrasted among the three countries and both within and between the two case study issues.

METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

Over the course of my research for this study, three notable methodological challenges emerged. One was the issue of data quality, related to my quantitative analysis. The other two, ethical concerns and access to respondents, emerged primarily in relation to my qualitative analysis. I will briefly discuss each of these challenges in this section and elaborate on their impact on my research findings.

Quantitative Data Quality

My initial intention with the quantitative analysis was to use historical data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows compiled by the OECD DAC to track the levels of spending of donors against both the gender and the security priority. By showing spending patterns that paralleled policy adoption, I had hoped to illustrate growing consensus on these issues. Regrettably, the comparability and validity of data on sector or priority spending in the OECD DAC's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) was not sufficient to allow for cross-national quantitative analysis over time. Indeed, the standardization of donor reporting to the DAC on the sectoral/issue-based distribution of their spending

had been lacking. As a result, it was necessary instead to turn to event history techniques to track the presence of a policy priority within each donor, and instead to use a previously compiled database of overall donor spending on ODA rather than the data available from the DAC (Roodman 2005). Furthermore, when compiling my event-history data it was not always easy to identify a specific date of initiation of a donor's gender policy or creation of a women or gender unit. Although this data had been compiled recently by the DAC Secretariat, requests to access this data were rejected. The DAC officials through whom I made this request refused to release the data on the basis of a promise of confidentiality to their donor members. Why donor countries would require the date when they first addressed women or gender in development to remain confidential is not immediately clear. In the end, I was left to compile these dates based on extant information in policy documents, reports, and online references. I believe the reliability of my data is high, given the OECD, international organizations, and donor sources on which it is based. Although my compiled data may not mirror exactly the confidential data held by the DAC, I believe because it was based on the best available data that it is indicative of the pattern of diffusion of the WID/GAD model, and does not invalidate my findings.

Ethical Concerns

During the design of my research, I did not expect any overwhelming ethical concerns. The entirety of my quantitative data was public domain information readily available from international organizations. However, the personal interviews with representatives of donor agencies and civil society groups did prove more challenging. Donor agencies and countries are identifiable in my research, but in order to preserve the confidentiality and anonymity requested by certain individual respondents it was decided to withhold the names of all respondents in my analysis. If I had not maintained the anonymity of all respondents, I could have found myself in the situation of accidentally revealing a respondent's identity through the details provided about him or her in my analysis. As such, the qualitative analysis that follows in Chapters Six and Seven

provide only as much information about respondents requesting anonymity as can reasonably be released without jeopardizing their identities. The differences between the countries regarding the confidentiality of their responses was notable: no respondent in the Swedish case requested anonymity or confidentiality and all allowed for their interviews to be recorded; only one respondent in the Canadian case requested anonymity, but still allowed for the interview to be recorded; and in the American case two respondents requested anonymity, with one of them refusing to be recorded altogether. These anonymous respondents led me to the decision of withholding the names of all respondents so that all data would be perceived as being of equal value. By attributing some quotations directly to named respondents, and withholding the names of others, I believe it would have allowed the validity of the conclusions drawn from each to be treated differently by my readers. I feel that this approach mitigated this challenge, and has led to a more standardized approach which does not hamper the presentation of the interview data and still preserves anonymity where requested.

Access to Respondents

It proved more difficult than anticipated to arrive at relatively equal samples of respondents for the qualitative case studies. Indeed, as I outlined above, the samples are unbalanced with a disproportionate number of respondents on the gender and the security cases representing Canada. This was due in part to the snowball sampling approach I used to form my sample, and also to what I can only identify as a differential level of tolerance and openness to participation in research by my targeted respondents. Indeed, in both Canada and the United States, donor agency officials approached to participate in the study were much more reticent than in Sweden. Indeed, only one targeted Swedish respondent declined to participate in my study, whereas in Canada and the United States a total of nine potential respondents declined to take part for reasons including 'time constraints', 'research fatigue', and 'reluctance to speak on the record.' I was able to overcome this difficulty in accessing respondents in Canada because of my previous professional experience with the Canadian International Development Agency and the contacts that I maintained from that time in my

career. Unfortunately, in the American case I was unable to overcome this limitation in the same way, and as a result my American sample is smaller than either the Canadian or Swedish cases. My decision not to pursue further American respondents was based primarily on this resistance, and the feeling that the data already collected in the American case confirmed most of the trends and themes seen in both the Swedish and the Canadian data – I felt as though I had reached a level of theoretical saturation where each additional interview was primarily confirming themes and trends already identified rather than adding additional ideas and concepts to my analysis

CONCLUSION

In the chapters that follow, the findings from both my quantitative and qualitative analyses are laid out in a complementary fashion, but not woven together in my write up because of the different nature of the narratives required to write up quantitative and qualitative research results (Ramos 2004). This required that I treat each set of findings separately, but allow for the quantitative macro level results to help guide some of my qualitative investigations. As such, the next Chapter establishes my macro-level quantitative findings and sets the stage for my qualitative case studies. The qualitative findings are then shown in Chapters Five and Six to help answer some of the questions raised by gaps in the quantitative findings. Finally, the social processes of globalisation that emerge in my findings are analysed in more depth in Chapter Eight to show how they have broader application in understanding the role of individual agency in mediating the relationship of world society and the nation-state.

CHAPTER FOUR: DIFFUSION OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICY

In this chapter I analyse the spread of similar development assistance institutions and policy among major Western industrialised countries over the past 50 years. In that time, development assistance has become a key component of the foreign relations of developed democracies and spawned international standards, organisations, and an entire industry of development experts, firms, and NGOs. Assisting the development of poorer societies has become a taken for granted role for all major industrialised democratic countries. Indeed, even countries which are transitioning towards higher levels of economic and political development in recent years are themselves beginning to offer development assistance funds to their less well-off neighbours.[7]

This chapter will explore the global growth in the past half-century of the institution of development assistance. It will examine world polity explanations of why development assistance donors have common institutional structures and, more strikingly, common policy priorities and objectives, despite disparate domestic contexts and national interests. Using event history quantitative analysis techniques, I will examine the spread of one example of common development assistance policy scripts among the major Western donor countries and test the influence of world polity factors to explain the institutional and policy isomorphism found among donors. Although only addressing a limited number of countries, my analysis will show that the spread of development policies among the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) resembles the diffusion of world polity models and norms seen in other sectors.

For the purpose of this analysis I will examine the spread of policy models addressing the area of 'Women in Development' (WID) or 'Gender and

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[7] For instance, in recent years some countries of the former Warsaw Pact have become ODA donors in their own right. Furthermore, more economically advanced countries in Asia like China, Thailand, and even India, have begun providing development assistance to some neighbouring countries.

Development' (GAD) as an exemplar case of the diffusion of policy priorities among aid donors. By analysing the timing of the adoption of WID or GAD policies or the creation of a dedicated WID/GAD unit, I will show how the international influences of the world polity played a role in the spread of development assistance policy and institutions. Building on the world polity and development assistance research literatures, this chapter will demonstrate how explanations of the institutionalisation of development assistance have been able to illustrate processes at the macro, cross-national level, but have offered little explanation for the social processes at the micro, institutional level of the actual workings of world polity influences on nation states. By examining the diffusion of the gender policy model at the macro level, I will thus illustrate gaps in the existing research and set the stage for the micro level comparative qualitative analysis that follows in later chapters.

BACKGROUND

Between 1961 and 2003, the proliferation of development assistance institutional architecture proceeded with great speed (Lumsdaine 1993; Chabbott 1999). Figure 4.1 below illustrates the growth trends in the number of donor agencies and of DAC members in the period from 1960 through 2005. In 1960 – despite aid having been provided for some years by the ministries of foreign affairs of select countries – there was no such thing as a bilateral donor agency; by 2003, there were donor agencies or specialised units dedicated to the provision of development assistance in nearly every major industrialised country across Western Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, the growth of the so-called 'Donor's Club' which is the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD grew at nearly the same pace – indeed, no major development assistance donor in Western Europe, North America, or the Asia/Pacific region is not a member of the DAC in 2007.

Presently, the DAC acts as a clearinghouse of all things 'development assistance' in the international community. Aside from tracking and accounting for the destination, amounts, and purpose of all Official Development Assistance

(ODA) funds globally, the DAC also plays a significant policy role as a forum for discussion and formulation of policy positions and 'best practices' in the development assistance community. The fact that all major donors are also members of the DAC highlights the extent to which this exclusive group plays a significant role in shaping the appearance and function of ODA institutions globally. One way in which this DAC influence occurs is the spread of common policy frameworks through the conduct of conferences and discussions on specific issue areas, the issuing of guidelines for donors to follow in different sectors, and through the policing of standards for donors through a peer review process.

Figure 4.1: Diffusion of Development Assistance Institutions and Policies Among DAC Member Countries

Source: Author's coding of OECD and specific donor agency in formation.

Although the DAC is not the only influence on the adoption of common donor priorities, it is clear in the literature on development assistance that donors have been swayed by distinct trends in the focus of aid throughout the years.

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Development assistance trends in the past have included focuses on: support for industrialisation, basic human needs, structural adjustment, human resource development, good governance, and even budgetary support. Now, early in the twenty-first century, western donor policy and practices appear to be increasingly similar and reflective of at least a rhetorical 'global' consensus on development objectives and practices. International organizations and donor agencies alike have peppered their development policy documents with mentions of this 'emerging global consensus' on a variety of issues ranging from water management and poverty reduction to governance and security-sector reform (UNFPA 1994; ADB 1997; World Bank Group 2000; CIDA 2002a; USAID 2002b; World Bank Group 2002; UN 2003).

As Figure 4.1 illustrates, one example of a common policy framework that has been adopted by nearly all donors is a focus on women or gender inequality in the development process. In 1970, only one Western donor had a dedicated WID unit, but by 2007, nearly all major donors have adopted some form of a WID/GAD policy or have a dedicated unit within their organisation to address WID/GAD concerns. Although the exact nature of a donor's gender policy and the details of its implementation may vary widely amongst the DAC members, the fact that they are nearly all engaged with the idea of improving gender equality through development assistance as an objective of their work is indicative of the trends towards conformity or isomorphism within development assistance institutions.[8] Similar evidence can be marshalled to point towards the spread of donor policy models in the areas of environment, human rights, civil society capacity building, governance, and security sector reform among many others.

The emergence and spread of development assistance as a foreign relations function of Western industrial democracy has been a phenomenon spanning only the last fifty years. Indeed the process continues still when newly emerging economies and countries transition towards 'developed' status, they are also becoming development assistance donors in their own right. Theoretical

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[8] For a more detailed explanation of the common features of donor gender policy refer to Chapter Six, a case study on gender and development policy in three donor countries.

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explanations in the research literature on development have done little to explore this trend, and therefore research in this area requires alternative approaches to explaining the spread of development assistance and the isomorphism found in policy and institutional frameworks among donor countries. I will first briefly touch on the existing literature on the emergence of and motivations for development assistance, and then turn to alternate frameworks which the analysis in this chapter will explore.

Previous Explanations of the Emergence of Development Assistance

In the recent literature on development assistance, there have been several explanations of the emergence of and motivations for providing development aid in the post World War II era. Two main viewpoints identifiable in the literature include: (1) National Interest and the Domination of the 'Third World': Some authors point to the importance of donor country national interest underlying the provision of aid and the insidious domination of the developing world by the power embodied in donor agendas (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Woods 2005); and (2) International Humanitarianism: Donors are seen to be acting on humanitarian or moral grounds in compassionate partnership with poorer societies of the developing world (Lumsdaine 1993; Pratt 1994c; Opeskin 1996). Looked at in historical perspective, development assistance has been influenced by both national interest and humanitarianism. It is reasonable to assume that no country's aid program can be characterised as wholly uninterested, nor can it be considered fully humanitarian. The complex politics of development assistance build in components of both of these explanations.

The main shortcoming of both these explanations is their inability to explain the appearance of nearly identical means of providing development aid in all the major industrialised countries of Western Europe, North America, and the Asia/Pacific. Even if common motivations of either national interest/domination or international humanitarianism underlie the provision of development assistance, these motivations fail to explain why donors have been so conformist in their provision of assistance, following trends of common institutional

structures and of common policy priorities or objectives in the face of disparate domestic contexts. To provide answers to these questions, I argue that it is necessary to turn to the literature on the world polity and globalisation from political sociology.

World Polity Explanations

World Polity theories of globalisation argue that common institutional and policy models proliferate globally as a reflection of the enactment of 'world culture' (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer 2007). This world culture is a prescriptive set of values, norms, and models that establish legitimate actors, actions, and interactions for states, organisations, and even individuals. Culture in this context does not refer to styles of dress, taste, or appreciation of the arts, but instead to a series of models that outline expectations of how actors (nation-states, organisations, or individuals) ought to appear or behave. The growth of world culture is a result of the interaction of states, international organisations, civil society, and academia/scientists to define and implement world polity scripts which are then enacted by actors at all levels. Governments take on these models and implement them as policy that shapes the nation-state to meet the norms for rational and progressive actors established by the world polity. The enactment of these models across diverse groups of actors leads to the isomorphism of policy and practice despite different local contexts (Schofer and McEneaney 2003). This institutional isomorphism is an inherent characteristic of the world polity, as world cultural models are deemed universally applicable and appropriate for all legitimate states, organisations, and individuals. Recent research on the world polity has examined the diffusion of different policies and institutions trans-nationally including the proliferation of environmental policy, the spread of women's political participation, and patterns of treaty ratification (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Hironaka 2002; Ramirez and Wotipka 2003). These quantitative analyses lend support to the relationship between the diffusion of policies and the enactment of world-level cultural models by nation-state actors.

I argue in this chapter that development assistance is simply another world polity institutional model intended to be adopted by donor and recipient countries alike. The principles, values, and organisational structures implied in the provision of foreign aid to developing societies are all reflections of world cultural norms of development assistance. Not only have all the major western democracies created development assistance machineries and a corresponding development assistance sector of experts, NGOs, and aid workers, but developing countries have equally developed means of receiving this aid both at the government and civil society level. This rapid creation and spread of the mechanisms of development assistance in the past half-century, I will argue, are direct evidence of world polity influences of globalisation, isomorphism, and growing conformity. Furthermore, this similarity does not end at the simple organisational structure and mandates of development assistance donors, but as this chapter will show, extends to more detailed policy models of development assistance.

Policy Isomorphism

Akin to institutional isomorphism is the presence of similar policies shared among diverse institutions/states. Once institutions are similarly modelled after one another, it seems natural that they would share some similarity in policy decisions and priorities. Yet, it may also appear unexpected to some that institutions from different countries operating under different political contexts, and with divergent goals might share the same policy priorities with great frequency. In the development assistance sector, policy isomorphism does appear frequently. Donor agencies share common goals, objectives, and policies that stem from common policy frameworks. Despite different political, societal, and cultural contexts, development assistance is carried out in most instances in a very uniform manner throughout the DAC donor countries. This similarity of policies is argued here to be a reflection of consensus (or consensus-like) agreements that encourage conformity between major donor states at the international level. These agreements yield similar policies in dissimilar contexts, and in turn

homogenise approaches to development assistance through the propagation of a limited menu of development assistance models, priorities, and parameters within which to operate.

Development assistance proves a challenge to donor institutions and their related organisational fields, as it is a sector rife with uncertainty regarding both goals and means to achieve them. 'Development' as a goal can mean many different things (Esteva 1992; Lumsdaine 1993; Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 1998; Woolcock 1998; Sen 1999; Stiglitz 2002), and therefore may prove a difficult target to achieve for many states and societies. Assisting in this development proves equally difficult, as there has yet been identified a single guaranteed driver/engine of development behind which donors can martial their resources and energies. Indeed, the story of development assistance over the past sixty years has been one of theories offered, tested, and often rejected about how to improve the lives of people and bring about 'development'. This remaining uncertainty about how to achieve the aim development may therefore lead to a greater propensity of development assistance institutions to emulate what others are also doing as a way of legitimating actions among a group of peers rather than adopting maverick approaches which may appear more risky. In this sense, the uncertainty inherent in the area of development assistance may increase institutional isomorphism and policy isomorphism in ways that appear to increase certainty about means and ends at the same time as they diminish the variety of efforts to promote development (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In this way, the promulgation of common world cultural scripts of how to institutionalise development assistance may be more readily mimicked than in some other more concretely delineated institutional field. Indeed, earlier world polity research has shown that mimicry and other so-called contagion effects can be shown to bear some responsibility for the spread of common institutions and models among nation states (Ramirez and McEneaney 1997; Jang 2003; Ramirez and Wotipka 2003).

Part of the tendency to emulate other donors may stem from the nature of the development assistance donors as a 'limited field' (DiMaggio and Powell

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1983). Even with the proliferation of these institutions, we still find only a limited number of donor agencies in the early twenty-first century – only 22 major development assistance donors compose the DAC among the 200-plus countries that make up the current international community. As such, these institutions have a very limited group of others from which to model behaviour, form, and policy. A small community of donors may therefore partially explain the high degree of institutional isomorphism in the development sector. As policy models proliferate to more states – sometimes referred to as greater density – states which have already adopted a certain position are liable to influence others to do so. When density of a policy model reaches a certain threshold a "tipping point" is reached after which comes a "norm cascade" in which states will adopt a policy or institution to seek greater legitimacy on the world stage (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This chapter's analysis will test the following hypothesis regarding policy density:

> **Hypothesis:** *The greater number of donors who adopt a policy, the more likely other donors will be able to do so also.*

International Organisations

One of the chief influences within the world polity is that of international organisations, whether intergovernmental or non-governmental. Evidence from earlier research has emphasised the rapid growth of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in the modern age and their role in spreading world cultural models (Boli and Thomas 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999b). INGOs are implicated in the spread of institutions and models ranging from environmental protection to population control policies and much more (Barrett and Frank 1999; Frank, Hironaka et al. 1999). Although INGOs are not the central force in the global system, they nonetheless actively influence nation-state actors and "lead states, individuals, and organizations to incorporate new purposes and goals in their constellations of interests and to abandon older purposes and goals that fall out of favour in world culture" (Boli 1999). As such, the INGO is a key aspect of the world polity that fills the role of "rationalized

other" offered by Meyer and his colleagues (1997) to denote those groups which generate the discourses that are refined to form world cultural models.

The world polity literature also points to the significant role played by inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) as institutions through which the cultural models of the world society propagate (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Meyer, Frank et al. 1997; Schofer and McEneaney 2003; Wotipka and Ramirez 2003). Chief among these is the United Nations, an organisation which with its numerous sub-bodies and affiliates has provided a structure through which nation-states coordinate on issues such as environment, food, health, development, and others. The UN system also provides a means of legitimating the state on the global level. All member countries of the UN are held to a common set of standards and expectations which essentially define the roles and responsibilities of the state in the modern era (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997). By being a member of many of these intergovernmental organisations, states are held to a standard of membership that indeed defines institutions and policies at the nation-state level and promote isomorphism and conformity. In the case of development assistance, a number of these organisations exist, most importantly the OECD DAC, World Bank, and the United Nations.

Within specific substantive issue areas, the influence of focused international organisations may be more relevant than the membership in a more broadly based organisation like the UN. For instance, in the area of environmental protection, the growth of the international environmental movement and role of international environmental organisations has been shown to influence the adoption of environmental policies and institutions (Meyer, Frank et al. 1997; Hironaka 2002; Schofer and Hironaka 2005). Other research has shown that the growth and influence of the international women's movement has affected women's political representation in parliaments throughout the world (Paxton, Hughes et al. 2006). The theorised influence of the women's movement and the growth of international feminist discourse on issues of women's involvement in society and on gender inequalities can thus be seen to operate at least partially through the influence of international women's organisations. This

influence operates through a nation-state's level of integration into these movements and organisations and can be termed its level of embeddedness in the actors that compose world society. In the case of the spread of WID/GAD policy among development donors, I will therefore include a measure of state membership in Women's INGOs (WINGOs), as a means of testing the following proposition regarding embeddedness;

> **Hypothesis:** *Higher levels of country membership in international organisations oriented towards a specific policy issue will increase the likelihood of donors to adopt a related policy.*

International Conferences and Treaties

Aside from actual membership in international organisations like the UN or the OECD DAC, world polity influence is also exerted by attention drawn to particular issues through the creation of international treaties on the matter or the conduct of high-level international conferences on the subject.

Treaties are perceived as a means of standardising nation-state approaches to an issue through embracing common definitions, expectations, and objectives. Throughout the lifespan of the United Nations, there have been many treaties that have been responsible for disseminating common concepts and norms throughout international law, particularly in the area of human rights. Notable examples include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Some world polity research has highlighted how the diffusion of treaty ratification throughout the international community itself can be considered a function of world polity influences (Ramirez and Wotipka 2003). At the same time, treaty ratification implies a common framework being applied in multiple nation-state contexts. In the case of the growth of WID/GAD policy in development assistance, the most influential treaty would be the CEDAW and its focus on protecting women's rights and furthering gender equality. Countries ratifying this treaty in the period after 1979

should be more likely to integrate some of its principles into their development assistance framework in the form of a WID/GAD policy.

Earlier research has also highlighted the extent to which UN conferences, for instance, can be considered a form of 'global ritual' through which principles and messages are disseminated and reinforced among nation state participants (Lechner and Boli 2005). Indeed, major UN conferences on the topics of environment, human rights, population, and women have had substantial impact on shaping global consensus on these subjects. In the case of the diffusion of WID/GAD policy, the influence of the four major UN conferences on women from 1975 through 1995 are the most salient, with these conferences progressively integrating the notion of women's rights as human rights more fully into development discourse with each meeting (Lechner and Boli 2005). Due to the high degree of attention drawn to women's issues and gender inequalities surrounding these conferences, I will argue that in the periods following each conference, countries should be more likely to engage with WID or GAD ideas and therefore be more likely to introduce a WID/GAD policy or unit within their donor agency.

Given the focus drawn to women's rights and gender inequality by CEDAW and the four UN conferences on women, my analysis will test for the influence these conferences and treaties had in the following hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis:** *The ratification of relevant international treaties or the occurrence of high-profile international conferences addressing the issue will increase the likelihood of donors to adopt a related policy.*

Domestic Factors

The common thread running through most research on the world polity has been the testing of international influences such as INGOs, treaties, and contagion effects. However, it has been less common for world polity research to focus specifically on domestic factors shaping nation-state interface with world cultural models. Some research has included a focus on the nature of nation-state structures as intervening factors on how world polity policy and institutional

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models are translated within the state (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Hironaka 2002). In the analysis that follows I will focus my analysis on two domestic aspects of the development assistance sector: donor agency structure and donor generosity.

Donor Agency Structure

In the previous chapter, I argued that donor structure can be viewed as consisting of two components: agency autonomy and locus of decision-making. Agency autonomy refers to the status of the institution as either a standalone agency/body within the government of the country (autonomous), or as a sub-unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (integrated). Locus of decision-making refers to the seat of primary decision-making regarding decisions related to ODA disbursement to countries on a bilateral basis. When these decisions are taken primarily at agency headquarters we identify a "centralised" decision-making type, and in contrast, when decisions are primarily taken in the field offices located in recipient countries are identified as "decentralised" donors. Agency-wide policy decisions still tend to be centralised even in this second instance.

I will argue in this study that donor structure can be a determining factor of influence of world polity policy models on a donor state. An integrated donor would be more likely to resist externally generated models that were possibly not in keeping with national interests, whereas a more autonomous donor may be more likely to adopt such models. Unfortunately, this argument has not been previously tested in the literature, and therefore my expectation is based on the reasoning that greater distance from policy-makers grounded in national interest would open an organisation to externally generated policies which are more universal in nature. The donor's decision-making locus may also mediate world polity influence, in that a decentralised donor may have greater exposure to world polity rationalised others, and therefore be more likely to adopt policy scripts than a centralised donor. Indeed, donor decentralisation has been advocated by the DAC for much of the last decade as a means of diminishing donor country national interests in devising effective development assistance programs that more

appropriately suit local conditions and priorities.[9] I will test the first of these relationships in this chapter's analysis:

> **Hypothesis:** *The greater autonomy of a donor agency, the more likely it will adopt externally generated policy scripts.*

Donor Generosity

Earlier research has shown that levels of donor generosity, aid measured as a proportion of national income, are directly related to domestic political structures such as the magnitude of the welfare state and state commitment to social democratic values (Noël and Thérien 1995a). Implied in the argument that development assistance can be seen to be in the more generous countries simply an externally oriented extension of the welfare state is an underlying motivation of humanitarianism. Given that higher generosity reflects greater humanitarianism, I will argue here that greater generosity also reflects more openness to outside ideas, therefore more susceptibility to world polity influence:

> **Hypothesis:** *The higher the level of aid as a proportion of GNI, the more likely the donor will adopt externally generated policy scripts.*

Diffusion of WID/GAD Policy in the Development Assistance Sector

Thus, by examining the world polity influences of density and embeddedness, along with the timing of treaties, the staging of major international conferences, and looking to key domestic factors within the development assistance institutions, my analysis will test the effects of the world polity on the nation-state. Testing the five hypotheses laid out above will provide insights into the working of the world polity and its interface with the nation-state in the development assistance sector. These insights will help set the stage for the qualitative analysis which follows in the next few chapters.

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[9] The decentralisation hypothesis is not tested here because of the great difficulty of collecting year over year data on each donor regarding its level of decentralisation. This information is not readily available in a comparable format dating back to the early years of many of these bilateral donor agencies.

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METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Method

Following other event-history analyses within the world polity literature (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Hironaka 2002; Ramirez and Wotipka 2003; Frank, Longhofer et al. 2007), this chapter uses an exponential or constant rate event history model to explain the rate at which a donor country is likely to adopt a WID/gender policy or unit. This model assumes that the transition from no policy to policy adoption is independent of time, and is dependent only on a vector of covariates (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997). This model takes the form:

$$\log[r(t)] = B'X$$

where r is the transition rate from origin (no gender policy or unit) to destination state (gender policy or unit), X is a vector of independent covariates, and B is a vector of coefficients for each covariate. By exponentiating both sides of the equation we yield the time to transition (r) and the relative effect on this time by each covariate ($\exp(B)$) (Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997). Model results demonstrate the influence of each covariate on increasing or decreasing the time between when a country enters the risk-set in 1968 after the advent of the first gender unit in Sweden (or at the year of the onset of aid provision for five later donors) and the adoption in each country of their own WID/GAD policy or unit.[10] The year 1968 was selected for the beginning of the risk-set for existing donors at that time, because I felt it was only reasonable to assume countries were at risk of developing their own WID/GAD policy or unit after the advent of the first WID/GAD unit.

Data

My dataset consists of event timing, donor structure, international organisation membership, and domestic context variables for twenty-two member

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[10] Event history analysis 'risk-sets' are the group of observations, in this case countries, counted as 'at risk' for the event to take place. When the event takes place, event history analysis acknowledges a 'transition' from 'origin' to 'destination state'. Five donors who began providing aid later than the rest of the DAC enter the risk-set at later dates: Ireland, 1974; Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, 1980; Greece, 1996.

countries of the OECD DAC, as well as yearly time series of ODA disbursement levels for each country (Roodman 2005; Paxton, Hughes et al. 2006).[11] The dataset covers a period from 1960 through 2003. My risk-set includes 22 countries, 20 experiences of transition, and a total time at risk of 418.5 country years.

The dependent variable in the analysis is the rate of transition for a donor country from the origin of the first donor WID/GAD unit in 1968 to its adoption of either a WID/GAD policy or the creation of the WID/GAD unit in its organisation. This information was compiled for each country using available information from current gender policy documents, evaluation reports, and OECD DAC Peer Review reports. The rate is measured by taking the duration in years between entry into the risk-set and the creation of a unit or establishment of a policy and then matching it with a dummy variable to indicate occurrence of the WID/GAD event – countries which have yet to experience the event are coded with a zero for those years prior to adoption. In the year a donor adopts a WID/GAD policy or creates a unit, the dummy is set to one and they exit the risk-set. Countries never experiencing a transition are right-censored and exit the risk-set in 2003.

To account for domestic socio-economic and political factors, I include controls for region. Previous research has demonstrated that regional differences can be found in aid provision, with the Scandinavian region of Europe providing a higher level of aid as a proportion of national income as a result of the greater integration of social democratic values into their state infrastructure, and the corresponding increased role for the welfare state (Noël and Thérien 1995a; Noël and Thérien 2000). Controlling for region allows me to account for regional similarities in foreign policy concerns, the nature of the welfare state, and socio-

[11] Event timing and donor structure variables were compiled on the basis of information gleaned from development assistance donor's websites, policy documents, and reports, as well as from OECD DAC peer review reports of each country. Data on country memberships in international women's groups is taken from: Pamela Paxton, Melanie M. Hughes, and Jennifer L. Green. 2006. "The International Women's Movement and Women's Political Representation, 1893-2003." *American Sociological Review* 71:898-920. Data on ODA disbursements is taken from a dataset created for: David Roodman, "An Index of Donor Performance," *Working Paper 67*, Center for Global Development, August 2005.

cultural influences that may be similar in nature. Region is accounted for as a categorical variable with rest of Europe as the reference category and Scandinavia, North America, and the Asia-Pacific as the other categories.

To test the effects of world polity factors on the adoption of gender policy, I include several covariates that reflect influence resulting from mimicry of other donors, international treaties and conferences, and international organisations:

The possibility of donor mimicry is measured through a measure of the overall density of the policy model on the global scale by a count of donors who have already adopted a WID/GAD policy or unit. This count variable is time-varying by year.

International influences of treaties and conferences are measured through two variables. The first is a timing variable that accounts for the year in which each donor country ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). This is a time-varying dummy variable with a reference category reflecting those countries not yet ratifying the treaty in any given year. The second variable accounts for the timing of significant international conferences. More specifically, it is a categorical variable that splits the risk-set into time periods that correspond with the four United Nations World Conferences on Women (Mexico City 1975, Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985, and Beijing 1995). This variable includes five categories reflecting the four periods immediately following the conferences and a reference category prior to the first conference.

The final world polity variable is a measure of embeddedness in the world polity as indicated by country-level memberships in a select sample of women's international non-governmental organisations (WINGOs) (Paxton, Hughes et al. 2006). Out of a possible 30 WINGOs in the select sample compiled by Paxton and her coauthors, countries in my dataset range in the number of memberships from 2 to 24. This is a time-varying covariate with data collected in select years. Following Paxton and her coauthors, I interpolated the missing values for years falling between these collection points (2006).

Finally, two measures are included in the models to account for factors relating to the differing characteristics of each country's development assistance programs. First, I include a measure of donor structure, specifically the autonomy of the donor body from the ministry of foreign affairs in each donor country. This is a dummy variable, where I have coded autonomous donors as one, and set integrated donors as the reference category. Second, I include a measure of overall donor generosity by including a time-varying covariate of ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) in constant 2004 USD (Roodman 2005). In the models this variable is logged to reduce skewness.

RESULTS

Results from the event history analysis of the rate of WID/GAD policy adoption are shown in Table 4.1 below. Results are provided in six models which combine the covariates of interest to test the hypotheses outlined above.

Model 1 includes the control for regional variation with the density measure count of WID/GAD policy adoptions or unit creation. The negative coefficient for the density measure indicates a decreased time at risk for countries as the global count of WID/GAD policies increases. This decreased time means an increased rate of adoption, and confirms support for the first hypothesis outlined above. The influence of WID/GAD policy density is significant at the $p<0.001$ level only in Model 1, and does not hold in later models. The regional control variable also indicates that in comparison to the rest of Europe, Scandinavian and North American countries experienced a faster rate of adoption with less time between entering the risk set and their adoption of the policy.

In Model 2, along with the regional control covariate I include the variables for both CEDAW ratification and the UN world conferences on women. Support for my second hypothesis regarding treaties and conferences is mixed in this model. Countries ratifying CEDAW are actually slower to adopt a WID/GAD policy than those that have not. This contradicts my expectations, but may be due to the fast rate of adoption demonstrated by those countries in the dataset that adopted policies in the 1970s and early 1980s before many countries

had yet ratified CEDAW. The conference variable shows that in the periods
following the conferences in Nairobi and Beijing, countries experienced a faster
rate of WID/GAD policy adoption than in the pre-1975 era. Findings for both
CEDAW ratification and the world conferences on women are robust and
consistent in later models.

Table 4.1: Exponential Models of Rate of WID/GAD Policy Adoption, 1968-2003

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Region (Europe)						
Scandinavia	-1.45**	-1.59**	-1.11*	-1.59*	-0.60	-1.41
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.79)
North America	-2.92***	-3.10***	-2.17***	-3.11**	-1.19**	-2.85**
	(0.52)	(0.64)	(0.40)	(0.70)	(0.37)	(0.94)
Asia-Pacific	-0.47	-0.57	-0.92*	-0.75	-0.11	-0.72
	(0.55)	(0.61)	(0.44)	(0.69)	(0.37)	(0.84)
WID/GAD Count	-0.19***			0.00		-0.03
	(0.05)			(0.12)		(0.12)
CEDAW Ratification (No)		1.72*		1.79*		1.86**
		(0.70)		(0.72)		(0.69)
World Conferences on Women (pre-1975)						
Mexico City 1975		-1.31		-1.32		-1.03
		(0.91)		(0.93)		(0.91)
Copenhagen 1980		-0.67		-0.69		-0.34
		(1.36)		(1.44)		(1.40)
Nairobi 1985		-2.99**		-2.89**		-2.59**
		(1.03)		(1.11)		(0.94)
Beijing 1995		-5.07***		-4.80**		-4.72**
		(1.08)		(1.57)		(1.47)
WINGOs Membership			-0.20***	-0.06		-0.03
			(0.04)	(0.06)		(0.06)
Donor Autonomy (No)					-0.18	-0.10
					(0.50)	(0.72)
Donor Generosity					-0.51	-1.02^
					(0.35)	(0.53)
Constant	5.05***	5.32***	6.03***	5.89***	0.38	-0.19
	(0.54)	(0.87)	(0.68)	(1.20)	(2.13)	(2.86)
Log Likelihood	-18.86	-14.54	-20.72	-14.28	-25.29	-12.69
Number of events	20	20	20	20	20	20
Number of countries	22	22	22	22	22	22
Country-years at risk	418.5	418.5	418.5	418.5	418.5	418.5

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories in brackets.
Notes: ^ significant at *p<0.1;* * significant at *p<0.05*; ** significant at *p<0.01* ; *** significant at *p<0.001*.

The final world polity influence of WINGO memberships is tested in Model 3. The WINGOs measure is significant at the p<0.001 level and is associated with an increased rate of policy adoption. The greater the number of nation-state WINGO memberships the more quickly it is likely to adopt a WID/GAD gender policy within its development assistance donor. This confirms the third hypothesis outlined earlier. Again, this result is not consistent across the remaining models, suggesting that WINGO memberships may be interrelated with other world polity measures.

Model 4 incorporates all three of the main world polity influence variables in a single model. Only the coefficients for CEDAW ratification and the world conferences on women are significant in this model. The coefficient for the world count of WID/GAD policies is reduced to almost zero, and the magnitude of the WINGOs membership coefficient is also diminished. This suggests that although related to the rate of policy adoption, these factors may also be closely related to the treaty and conference influences and are therefore subsumed by these factors when included together in a model.

Testing for the two hypotheses related to donor structure and generosity is included in Model 5. Although the direction of the coefficients for each variable is consistent with my prediction, neither is statistically significant. This result fails to confirm my hypotheses regarding structure and generosity.

Finally, incorporating all covariates, Model 6 illustrates the overall effect of each variable on the rate of WID/GAD policy adoption or unit creation by development assistance donors in the DAC. Results in this model are consistent with my earlier analyses, although North America is the only significantly different region once the donor structure and generosity variables are included, and the donor generosity variable does become statistically significant, but only at the 10% level. The world polity influences of treaty ratification and conferences remain statistically significant and consistent with prior models.

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DISCUSSION

Three main factors can be identified as playing some part in the diffusion and adoption of WID or GAD policies or functional units within the major donor countries of the OECD DAC: (1) Policy density and embeddedness in international organisations; (2) Influence of the international community through treaties and conferences; and (3) Domestic development assistance sector characteristics. I will briefly address each of these areas.

First, policy density and nation-state embeddedness in international organisations appear to be important determinants of the diffusion of world culture policy models. Though my results show mixed support for the hypotheses I outlined in both these areas, when taken on their own, both policy density and embeddedness appear to be salient factors in the diffusion of gender policy among the community of development assistance donors.

Measuring density as the count of donors already possessing a gender unit or policy allows us to convey the notion of a critical mass of donors adopting the idea and influencing their peers in doing so. The fact that the latter half of the donors considered in the analysis adopted a WID/GAD policy or unit in a ten-year period from 1992 to 2002, suggests that in the early nineties a critical mass of donors sufficient to cause a tipping point or norm cascade that caused the spread of the policy priority to the remaining DAC members (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, given that many of the most influential donors (Sweden, United States, United Kingdom, and Canada) had adopted a WID/GAD policy early on also may have influenced later adoption by some of the smaller donors.

The embeddedness of donors in the international women's movement also appears to have an effect on their expression of women's rights and gender equality in their development assistance donor policies. The spread of these values among donor institutions cannot be separated from the spread of similar principles throughout Western democracies in the last few decades, and as has been shown elsewhere, these principles are directly linked to the work of the international women's movement (Berkovitch 1999b; Berkovitch 1999a; Paxton, Hughes et al. 2006). Other international organisations could equally be

considered in playing a role in shaping donor policy. For instance, the rapid growth in the number and type of international development NGOs in the past century can also be expected to demonstrate some effect on donor policy (Chabbott 1999). However, because of the direct link of donor WID/GAD policy to values and norms championed by the WINGOs of the international women's movement, donor embeddedness in this type of organisation is the most relevant for this case.

Second, the influence on donors of the international community through treaties and conferences is another world polity factor that helps to explain the diffusion of common policies among diverse donors. The ratification of CEDAW in and of itself should be expected to shape donor institutions to include a women's rights or gender component, as the requirements of CEDAW set out expectations for government institutions in adopting countries to adopt special measures to combat gender inequality and discrimination against women. However, as suggested elsewhere, the implementation of international treaties following ratification does not always do justice to the spirit of the values and principles outlined within treaties (Ramirez and Wotipka 2003). Given that all but three of the donors included in my study ratified CEDAW in the 1980s, but more than half of the sample of donors did not develop a donor gender policy until later in the 1990s, the possibility of decoupling of CEDAW principles from actual practice needs to be considered. This decoupling, however, may have been rectified in large part by the renewed focus on women's rights and gender equality that surrounded the world conferences on women in Nairobi in 1985 and Beijing in 1995. What are some possibilities in how this influence was exerted? One possible explanation is that the donor role in supporting the attendance of many developing country NGO participants in parallel meetings to the Beijing conference may have helped to spur a donor focus on gender that was only weak in earlier periods. In addition, donor representatives included in the official government delegations to these conferences may have played a role in returning to the donor agency with greater motivation to adopt policy in the gender and development area. These possibilities also exist at less high profile international

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meetings on the gender topic, including the annual meetings of the DAC network on gender. Since 1981, the DAC has had an internal network of donors to discuss and explore women's issues and gender equality. On a smaller scale, these DAC network meetings can work to serve a similar function to donors that the UN conferences play at a national level.[12] As such, the role of both international treaties and conferences or meetings seem to have a role to play in the diffusion of common donor policies, whether at the national level or in terms of individual donor participation in some aspect of an international conference or meeting.

Finally, despite the weak statistical evidence illustrated above, my argument that the structure and level of generosity of the development assistance donor has an effect on the readiness of a donor to accept externally generated world polity policy models bears further investigation. With donor generosity showing marginal statistical significance, my assertion that the more generous donor – those associated with greater humanitarian motivations rather than national interest – will more quickly adopt the policy models of the world polity is not rejected. This argument, however, would only hold in the case of a world polity model which has underlying humanitarian motivations. In the case of a policy area such as security-sector reform like I address in Chapter Seven, this relationship may not hold because of the closer link of that policy model to the national interests of donor countries. In such an instance, I might expect the opposite relationship to hold true. Those donors with a greater degree of motivation linked to national interest – less generous, and possibly more closely linked to their ministry of foreign affairs – would then be more likely to adopt a world polity model derived from national interest values and norms.

The limitations of the event history methodology and the small sample of donor countries involved may be partially to blame for the inconsistent results shown above. Selection of the gender policy as the focus for the quantitative analysis may have been substituted for any number of other donor policy models including environment, governance, or even security sector reform; however,

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[12] Additional event history models run including only the regional control and a dummy variable to indicate the creation of the first DAC group on women indicates a significant relationship between the existence of this DAC group and the increased rate of policy adoption among donors.

these analyses were not pursued here for lack of sufficient event data. Results from analysis of these issues might highlight different factors, as nation-state interface with the world polity is liable to be different depending on the subject at hand.

The quantitatively measured relationships between variables representing different aspects of the world polity nation-state interface identified here do only a little to explain social processes at work in the world polity. The detailed interactions of the nation-state and the international community are in fact always person-to-person interactions involving officials, experts, and organisation representatives. As later chapters will demonstrate, these interactions account for the actual transfer of world cultural models from the world society to the nation-state level, and also to other organisations and individuals. Using the example of the creation of gender policies and units in development assistance donors has simply been a means of illustrating this process at the highest level. Drilling down into the actual interactions and human agency involved in taking policy decisions is the next step required in this research.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has illustrated the influence of the world polity on the development assistance sector. By showing that international organisations and conferences, other donors, and domestic contextual factors have shaped the adoption of gender policies among development donors, I have demonstrated that development assistance and its related policy priorities can be considered a manifestation of world polity institutional frameworks. Furthermore, my research shows that quantitative evidence of world society influence extends beyond the spread of large-scale institutional models such as development assistance to the lower level policy details expressed within these institutions. In this sense, the institutions and policies created, spread, and refined by the world society can be seen to have tiers of complexity, with more detailed policy models addressing certain sectors nested within broader institutional frameworks. This nesting of world society institutions and policies has not been explored previously in the

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literature, and this chapter's findings suggest it is a phenomenon that merits further investigation.

Additionally, the findings in this chapter highlight the complexity of modeling a social process such as this quantitatively at the macro international level, and arguably point towards the need for other research methods to flesh out in richer detail the processes at work in this situation. Indeed, the qualitative analyses which follow will attempt to illustrate these processes in greater detail by answering questions about the common social processes and mechanisms at work in the development assistance sector in several countries.

By combining the findings from the quantitative event history analysis of this chapter with the qualitative results that follow in the next four chapters, this study will demonstrate in greater detail the means by which world polity influences in the development assistance sector have led to greater consensus and conformity of policy among donors in recent years. However, before turning to two qualitative case studies in the gender and security areas, the next chapter will outline the development assistance sector context of the three countries included in those cases.

CHAPTER FIVE: COUNTRY CASE OVERVIEW

Since 1945 almost all major industrialised countries have developed an institutional framework and series of relationships for providing foreign aid to poorer countries. Striking similarity in the policies, practices, and institutions of foreign aid have emerged over that time between the major donors. In recent years, the increasing conformity of policy priorities among development assistance donors has emerged as a concern to recipient countries and civil society groups alike. Indeed, development assistance plays a large role in shaping the nature of development in many countries of the developing world and the impact of donor consensus on development priorities or conformity among donors about specific development objectives runs the risk of homogenising development assistance in a manner deleterious to concepts of locally appropriate and contextualised development.

Similar trends towards conformity and similarity of institutions and practices have been explored in earlier research on the international expansion and diffusion of similar models and common practices in areas like science, education, environmentalism, feminism, and even politics (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Meyer, Frank et al. 1997; Ramirez and McEneaney 1997; Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Berkovitch 1999b; Frank, Hironaka et al. 1999; Frank, Hironaka et al. 2000; Hironaka 2002; Drori, Meyer et al. 2003a; Jang 2003; Schofer and Hironaka 2005). This body of research highlights the influence of 'scripts' or 'models' created by international organisations and networks of experts of the world polity on the institutional isomorphism in each of these sectors. Still, little research has been done that actively investigates the social processes and mechanisms through which this world polity influence is exerted. In this light, the isomorphism of development assistance institutions and policies can also be seen as a reflection of world polity influences on the nation-state to adopt standardised models or scripts for providing development assistance; however, the processes through which this influence occurs requires further investigation.

To better understand the processes through which the influence of policy scripts of development assistance operated on nation-state actors, it is necessary to

first examine the major components which comprise what I will label here the 'Development Assistance Sector' in donor states. This chapter will briefly outline the salient components of this sector in the three country cases I examine using qualitative data in the next few chapters: Canada, Sweden, and the United States. I will consider four main components of the development assistance sector, and explore the underlying motivations for the provision of development assistance in each society. The four main components of the development assistance sector include: (1) the level of public support for development assistance; (2) the structure of the primary aid agency in terms of both decision-making and independence from the rest of government; (3) the degree of involvement of civil society in the development assistance endeavour; and (4) recent legislative frameworks which work to shape the delivery of development assistance in each country.

By exploring these four components of the development assistance sector in each case, I aim to establish the context in which my qualitative cases will be located and in which I will be able to identify and examine common social processes and mechanisms at work in the interplay of nation-state and world polity actors to arrive at conformity and consensus on development assistance at the global level.

CANADA

Brief History of Canadian Development Assistance

Canadian development assistance is based on contradictory motivations of helping assist worse-off countries and peoples and maintaining Canadian national interests (Pratt 1994b; Rawkins 1994; Morrison 1998; Otter 2003; Noël, Thérien et al. 2004). As Canada has no geographic proximity to the developing world, and no foreign colonial history, its direct ties to most countries of the developing world are limited. Aid provided by Canada originally began under the Colombo plan of the British Commonwealth, targeting post-war reconstruction and development in former British colonies of South and South-East Asia, partially to stem the spread of communism in the region. In 1960, the External Aid Office

(EAO) was formed as a branch of the Department of External Affairs to consolidate Canadian aid efforts. In the same year, Canada joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Then, in 1968, the Canadian International Development Agency was formed as a separate government agency tasked with managing Canada's official development assistance (Morrison 1998).

In 1961, before the formation of CIDA, Canada's bilateral aid was focused on 33 countries and amounted to 0.16% of GNP.[13] This expanded sharply several years after the formation of CIDA to 84 countries and 0.5% of GNP in 1976, and to an even greater number of countries in the 1990s and early 2000s (Pratt 1994a). In terms of ODA as a percentage of GNP, the commonly held measure of donor generosity among DAC donors, Canada has never exceeded the 0.5% reached in 1976 and again in 1988, and indeed Canadian aid levels have been consistently in flux since the 1970s. As such, Canada has never reached the 0.7% of GNP ODA target established by the UN, despite rhetoric outlining its desire to do so. These fluctuations in aid levels were not drastic in the 1970s and 1980s, but by the mid 1990s, drastic cutbacks in aid levels were underway to parallel austerity measures imposed on all Canadian governments by conservative spending policies in reaction to economic crisis and high public debt (Otter 2003). These cutbacks led to the lowest level of aid spending by Canada in more than 30 years when in 2001 ODA was only 0.22% of GNP (UNICEF 2007). Since 2002, the trend has been towards more aid, with the aid-to-GNI ratio reaching 0.34% in 2005, but declining somewhat in 2006 to 0.3% of GNI (OECD 2006a). At these levels, Canada's development assistance levels fall below the DAC average, and some research has criticised the current levels of generosity of the Canadian aid program as costing Canada any claim it had to being a leader in development assistance (Noël, Thérien et al. 2004).

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[13] Throughout this chapter I will refer to aid as a percentage of either Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross National Income (GNI). These are closely related measures, but are not the same. In earlier data, the OECD DAC collected this data as a measure of aid as a percentage of GNP. More recently, they have moved towards measuring aid as a percentage of GNI. Thus, the discrepancy in my use of the two measures reflects the timing of when the data was collected.

The motivations behind Canada's aid have also been in flux over the nearly 60 years of its operations. In the early years of aid, before the formation of CIDA, Canada's aid was more closely linked to commercial objectives, trade relationships, and foreign policy objectives – all tied to issues of national interest. After 1968 and the formation of CIDA, some research has pointed towards a departure from this national interest position and an attempt by CIDA to make Canadian aid truly benefit poor countries supported by lobbying from civil society (Lumsdaine 1993). However, after 1977, the interlinking of Canadian aid to its foreign policy and other national interests has for the most part characterised Canada's aid program (Morrison 1994; Pratt 1994a). In this respect, Canada's development assistance is underpinned both by altruistic humanitarian concerns and by promotion of Canadian interests. One example of this has been the proliferation of the aid program to more than 100 recipient countries in recent years, but at the same time the high level of tied aid in contrast to many other donors emphasises the concern with national interests.[14] For instance, in 2000, the OECD DAC reported that Canadian aid was 75% tied (OECD 2002a). In 2005, still 40% of Canadian aid was considered tied, nearly 15% more than the next closest DAC donor reporting these figures (OECD 2006b). Tied aid ensures that development assistance contracts and procurement end up tied to the donor economy and society. Canada's resistance to untying its aid protects those in the Canadian economy who benefit directly from the ODA program. In contrast, countries like the United Kingdom or Ireland (100% untied), and the Nordic countries (all greater than 95% untied) have entirely or almost entirely untied their aid, allowing more opportunity for aid funds to end up in recipient country economies. Thus, though Canada disburses its aid to many less-developed countries, some of this aid comes with ties back to Canada that support Canadian interests. Efforts in recent years to narrow the number of countries to which

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[14] Tied aid refers to ODA funds which require spending on contracts, services, and products originating in the donor country. It is a means of supporting the development sector in donor economies, and tying project outcomes in the developing world to Northern suppliers of expertise and goods. Tied aid has been heavily criticised by recipient countries and more recently by a larger group of OECD donors. Many donors have been moving towards the untying of aid in recent years.

Canada provides aid have also furthered the national interest motivations, given that many prioritised countries are those with some foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq) , economic (China), or diasporic (Philippines, Ukraine) tie to Canada rather than the poorest of poor countries. Recent quantitative analysis of trends in the destination of Canadian aid confirms the growing importance of self-interest as a motive (Macdonald and Hoddinott 2004).

Canada has therefore been a very inconsistent donor, both in terms of aid levels and in terms of motivations underlying its development assistance. This inconsistency will be seen in later chapters to reflect itself elsewhere in the Canadian aid program, particularly in terms of the adoption and application of development assistance policy scripts derived from World polity sources.

Canadian Public Support for Development Assistance

The Canadian public's support for development assistance has been relatively consistent in public opinion surveys but demonstrates a clear lack of awareness and understanding about the aid program (Noël, Thérien et al. 2004). Indeed, in a 2004 opinion poll conducted for CIDA, 78% of Canadians claimed to support Canada's aid program, marking consistency with previous studies that found 83% support in 2003, and 75% support in 1998 (Environics Research Group 2004). In 2002, 83% of the Canadian public was seen to support development assistance or the general principle of helping poor countries, however this ranked Canada only 13th in level of public support among the 22 Western donors of the OECD DAC (Fransman and Solignac Lecomte 2004). The Canadian public is thus relatively consistent in its support of aid; with approximately 4 in 5 Canadians supporting the principle of aid, however, this level of support is demonstrably lower than support shown by many European publics.

Furthermore, this support is marked by a general lack of understanding about the aid program, in particular about levels of Canada's generosity and correspondingly confusion about public support for changes to Canadian aid. In particular, the Canadian public seems to have little understanding about the

amount of aid Canada provides each year, with many in the public believing Canada to be more generous than it really is (Noël, Thérien et al. 2004). In 2004 for instance, polling evidence showed that Canadians believed on average that 5 cents of every dollar spent by the government went towards foreign aid. In 2002 this level was perceived at 10.5 cents, and in 1998 at 7 cents on every dollar (Environics Research Group 2004). The fact that Canadian aid spending is approximately only 2 percent of government expenditure highlights the fact that most Canadians are not aware of Canada's aid program commitments. This lack of awareness about actual aid expenditures is perceived by some to contribute to lower levels of support for increasing Canada's aid because the public believes Canada is more generous than it really is (Smillie 1998; Environics Research Group 2004; Noël, Thérien et al. 2004). Indeed, even after being informed of the actual levels of aid spending, only 43% of Canadians polled in 2004 supported an increase in aid, with another 43% favouring the status quo (Environics Research Group 2004). Furthermore, the Canadian public is more accustomed to hearing about the negative outcomes and failings of development assistance programmes than their successes, as most media attention in Canada is focused only on the problems with Canadian aid (Noël, Thérien et al. 2004). As such, Canadian public views on aid tend to be perceived as consistent in principle, weak in understanding, and not very supportive of increased generosity. This is in keeping with the assessment that in many donor countries the public is not strongly motivated to support and fight for more or better aid programs, suggesting that public support is indeed "a mile wide and an inch deep" (Smillie 1998).

Given that Canadian aid reached historic low levels in the 1990s and early 2000s, the low levels of support for increasing aid in the Canadian public, and the lack of awareness about actually spending levels did little to push Canadian politicians and governments to turn around the decline in Canadian aid. Domestic concerns remained consistently a greater priority to the public than foreign aid generosity (Noël, Thérien et al. 2004). This low level of support for aid increases led to a corresponding lack of political will among Canadian political parties and

governments to in fact make any dramatic increases in the level of Canadian aid spending. Despite evidence from the 2000 Canadian Election Study that showed 20% of Liberal party supporters favoured increases in aid spending, the Liberals in fact presided over the biggest decline in Canadian aid levels ever from 0.44% of GNP in 1991/1992 to only 0.22% of GNP in 2001/2002 (Noël, Thérien et al. 2004; UNICEF 2007). Even among supporters of Canada's most left-leaning major political party, the New Democratic Party, only approximately 40% supported an increase in aid. The fact that Canadian governments were able to cut Canadian ODA in terms of a percentage of GNP in half over the period of a decade, but that public opinion levels stayed relatively consistent, suggests the disconnect between public support and political will on aid (Otter 2003).

Thus, even though Canadian aid spending has been on the increase since the low in 2001/2002, there is no strong public or political commitment to making drastic steps towards achieving the tacit 0.7% goal for aid spending in the near future. The disconnect between public support and the reality of Canada's development assistance levels highlights the general lack of concern or involvement of the public in the official development assistance offered by Canada.

CIDA Structure

The Canadian International Development Agency is the primary conduit of Canadian ODA. CIDA is responsible for the expenditure of almost eighty percent of Canada's international assistance envelope (CIDA 2007). This amounted to just over $ 3.1 billion CAD in the federal government fiscal year 2005-2006 (CIDA 2006a). Although CIDA's structure appears to be in constant flux, the bulk of this funding is spent through three main programming arms at CIDA: (1) geographic programs; (2) multilateral programs; and (3) partnership programs. The geographic program branches are responsible for managing Canada's bilateral aid relationships with developing countries worldwide. As of 2007, there were four geographically defined bilateral branches within CIDA including Africa Branch, Americas Branch, Asia Branch, and Europe, Middle

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East, and Maghreb Branch. Additionally, in early 2007 a special Afghanistan Task Force was hived off from Asia Branch to accommodate the high level of effort dedicated to Canadian aid to Afghanistan. These branches are responsible for managing Canada's foreign aid programs in the countries under their respective regional purview. The Multilateral Programs Branch is responsible for managing Canadian assistance channelled through multilateral agencies such as the United Nations bodies, the regional development banks, and other multilateral international institutions. Finally, the partnership programs are focused on funding development activities primarily through the work of Canadian civil society groups and institutions.

CIDA is an agency of the Canadian government, and reports to the Minister of International Cooperation. Accountability for CIDA decision-making and spending rest with this Minister, and most major policy and programming decisions need ministerial approval before being implemented. The Minister for International Cooperation is, according to Canadian legislation, a Minister under the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and it is in fact the Minister of Foreign Affairs who is designated as controlling and managing CIDA (Government of Canada 1985). This relationship to Foreign Affairs has in recent years been somewhat arms-length, although earlier in the 1970s and 1980s CIDA was more beholden to direction imposed on it by the then department of External Affairs (Rawkins 1994). Indeed, in the 1970s, many CIDA managers were former External Affairs employees and the circulation of them into the agency ensured close ties between the two. The appointment of a former External Affairs manager as President of CIDA in 1977 is, indeed, noted as a major reason for altering CIDA's underlying motivations for aid to include Canadian economic benefit from that point forward (Pratt 1994c). Now in 2007, the relationship to Foreign Affairs is more consultative at the program level, with the aid programs regularly in contact with the country and regional desks within Foreign Affairs when it comes down to aid at the bilateral level. At the corporate policy level and in terms of strategic direction for Canada's development assistance, CIDA now plays a strong role in negotiating its place among Canada's foreign policy –

something demonstrated recently in CIDA's contribution to the 2005 foreign policy statement issued by the Government of Canada (Canada 2005). This relative independence from Foreign Affairs despite the official relationships prescribed in legislation make CIDA primarily an autonomous agency in the classification of agency autonomy outlined earlier.

In 2005-2006, CIDA employed approximately 1600 people, of which 114 were located in Canadian Embassies and High Commissions in recipient countries (CIDA 2006a). With only 7% of staff located in recipient countries, CIDA's decision-making structures are primarily centralised. In effect, most major policy directions and programming decisions for CIDA's aid take place at its headquarters in Canada's capital region. Despite rhetoric in recent years about increasing CIDA's field presence and making the field staff more central to policy and planning processes, the ultimate locus of decision making rests in Canada. This centralised structure is in part reflective of CIDA's decision-making and accountability requirements as an agency of the Canadian government and the necessity of having all major decisions and programmes approved by the Minister for International Cooperation. As such, it is difficult for even relatively small spending decisions at CIDA to be concluded in the field without the assent of the Minister. This need for accountability thus forces CIDA into adopting a centralised decision-making scheme when we consider the locus of decision-making as a characteristic of CIDA structure. In later chapters I will argue that, despite CIDA's relative autonomy, CIDA's centralisation makes it more resistant to adopting certain world polity scripts that do not meet with the prevailing directions of Canadian government foreign policy.

Canadian Civil Society Involvement in Development Assistance

Canada has a history of a high level of support for Canadian civil society involvement in development assistance both in terms of official development assistance and private giving to development-related civil society groups (Broadhead and Pratt 1994). Beginning with the creation of an NGO division in 1968 which provided aid to NGOs at a 3:1 matching ratio, by the late 1980s,

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Canada was one of the top three DAC donors in terms of both volume of and percentage of aid provided to NGOs (Broadhead and Pratt 1994; Thérien 1994). Nowadays, this support comes in two forms: (1) core support for NGOs; and (2) targeted support of specific NGO projects and programs. In 2004-2005 this amounted to more than $600 million CAD committed to the Canadian voluntary sector by CIDA throughout its different programming branches, approximately 6.9% of Canadian ODA (CIDA 2006b). More recently, however, Canadian development assistance provided through Canadian civil society organisations has been declining, particularly in terms of the core support offered to NGOs. Civil society groups are more frequently being required to cater their programmes to meet with CIDA priorities in developing countries, or are being sidelined altogether by shifts towards a greater emphasis on Sector-wide approached (SWAPs) or direct budgetary support. Indeed, Canadian Partnership Branch support to the voluntary sector has been in decline since 2000 (CIDA 2006b). This decline is due both to changing aid modalities at CIDA mirroring international trends towards more government-to-government aid, as well as problems perceived with aid effectiveness and accountability.

Part of the problems encountered with CIDA's relationship to Canadian civil society involved in development assistance has been its broad dispersion – with more than 750 organisations funded on an annual basis, creating what a DAC peer review described as a substantial administrative burden for CIDA as an organisation (OECD 2002a). These organisations include the entire spectrum of non-governmental agencies, including faith-based groups, Canadian arms of international NGO networks, academic institutions, think-tanks, and even professional associations. Overseeing and managing such a high number of organisations and their relations with all arms of CIDA creates a complex web of relationships and requirements for civil society groups to adapt to and maintain, as well as a distinct problem for CIDA to monitor and evaluate performance of all its NGO partners. This dispersion also poses problems for some Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in that they are at times made to compete for limited funds from CIDA, forcing all competitors to conform to CIDA's requirements and

priorities and perhaps stifling unique and innovative approaches that do not meet with CIDA's bureaucratic needs.

Indeed, Canadian civil society's influence on policy direction at CIDA and with the whole of the Canadian development assistance envelope may be limited by the dilution of civil society voices into such a large number of CIDA partners. Indeed, apart from the most sizeable Canadian development NGOs[15] and the national umbrella organisation for development civil society, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), it is difficult in recent years to see how Canadian NGOs attempt to influence the directions taken by Canada's aid. Some civil society groups have been actively involved in campaigns to lobby politicians and government to set and meet new aid commitments, as was seen in 2005's widely publicised 'Make Poverty History' campaign; however, most of the large number of voluntary sector groups involved in delivering Canadian development assistance hold little sway with the policies and directions taken at CIDA. In the past, some civil society influence was exerted on the organisation through the personal ties of CIDA officers and managers to civil society. Indeed, for a period that accompanied the expansion of CIDA in the 1970s, personnel recruitment relied heavily on individuals with civil society or NGO experience (Pratt 1994c). More recently, however, these personnel links to civil society have been less common, and indeed the flow of personnel has more frequently been from within CIDA outwards to civil society groups following retirement or career shifts for many senior CIDA officers.

Canada has indeed been generous in its support of Canadian civil society involvement in development assistance for many years; however the degree of embeddedness of CIDA within Canadian civil society is lessened to some degree by the diffuseness of the relationships it maintains with such a large number of organisations and the relative lack of influence that Canadian civil society has on policy or programming outcomes at CIDA.

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[15] Most of which tend to be Canadian satellites of larger international NGO networks. Examples include Oxfam, World Vision, CARE, Medecins sans Frontieres, and the Aga Khan Foundation.

Recent Legislative Mandate: Bill C-293

Apart from legislation already discussed mandating the Minister of Foreign affairs control over the management of CIDA, Canada's aid program has operated in a relative legislative vacuum for decades. Indeed, since its creation in the 1950s no act of parliament existed to outline either the objectives or the nature of Canada's aid program (Morrison 1998). In 2007, however, a private-member's bill was put before the Canadian parliament with multi-partisan support and a high degree of support from development-oriented Canadian CSOs. Bill C-293 - the *Official Development Assistance Accountability Act* or the 'Better Aid Bill' as it has been called by some civil society groups - outlines three requirements for Canada's ODA: (1) that it contribute to poverty reduction; (2) that it takes into account the perspectives of the poor; and (3) that it is consistent with international human rights standards (Canada 2007). In addition, the Bill also outlines reporting and accountability requirements for the Minister of International Cooperation. Because Bill-293 is still before the senate, it remains to be seen what impact it will have on Canadian development assistance. If the bill does pass the senate, the three requirements set forth in the act may not have a large impact on the type of aid provided by Canada, although the potential exists for some civil society organisations or concerned citizens to challenge aid decisions on the basis that they fail to meet the three requirements set out in the bill. If the act is brought into law, this will be one of the few examples of civil society in Canada successfully exerting their influence on the directions taken by Canada's development assistance program in recent years. The fact that it could only happen through political channels outside of the government (i.e. a private member's bill) suggests the limited scope for use of this sort of influence in the future.

The fact that for more than five decades Canada's development assistance has been conducted without a legislated mandate is a sign both of the low priority that governments have placed on it and the degree of relative independence the aid programme has had from the rest of the Canadian government.

Key Characteristics of the Canadian Development Assistance Sector

Based on this overview, four key factors will be shown to characterise the Canadian development assistance sector and its level of engagement with world polity scripts and norms about development assistance: (1) CIDA's low level of embeddedness in Canadian civil society, heavily influencing Canadian CSOs but not being influenced strongly in return; (2) the inconsistency of public support for development assistance and a corresponding low level of political will from government to make major changes or advances in development assistance; (3) CIDA's centralised but autonomous agency structure; and (4) the primacy of national-self interest motivations over humanitarian altruism as motivations for Canadian aid. These factors will be used to explain Canada's approach to integrating international influences on development assistance policy consensus into its own policies and to differentiate this approach from the American and Swedish cases.

SWEDEN

Brief History of Swedish Development Assistance[16]

Development assistance in Sweden emerged from campaigns for international solidarity in the late 1950s with oppressed populations in South Africa and later in French-Indochina. These campaigns were distinctly anti-colonial in nature and found broad support in Swedish student and academic groups who championed solidarity with these oppressed groups and contributed to efforts to improve the situation of the oppressed. As Sweden had little to no colonial past in the developing world, this solidarity with certain parts of Africa and Asia was based mostly on values of justice and equality. In contrast to many donor countries with former colonies, it was instead this motivation of solidarity that came to inspire Sweden's first efforts in the area of development assistance in the early-1960s.

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[16] The brief history that follows is derived primarily from: Anders Danielson, and Lennart Wohglemuth. 2005. "Swedish Development Cooperation in Perspective." Pp. 518-545 in *Perspectives on European development co-operation: policy and performance of individual donor countries and the EU*, edited by O. Stokke and P. Hoebink. London: Routledge.

In 1962 the Swedish government began to provide development assistance funds for technical assistance by creating its first aid agency, and provided financial assistance through the Ministry of Finance. This approach continued until the formation of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) in 1965, consolidating technical and financial assistance under one organisation. SIDA became the dedicated development agency in Sweden, and took responsibility for the delivery of Swedish foreign aid to a limited number of countries mostly in Anglophone southern Africa. The destination of Swedish aid paralleled many of the efforts of the international solidarity movements within Sweden at the time, and soon came to include parts of Indochina and eventually to a broader spectrum of West and East Africa, supporting liberation struggles there. By 1995 Swedish aid was provided to 114 countries in every region of the world (Danielson and Wohglemuth 2005). From 1989 to 1999, the amount of Swedish aid as a percentage of Swedish Gross National Product (GNP) exceeded the internationally agreed upon target for all donors of 0.7% in every year, and exceeded 1% in 1992 (OECD 2005a). Although initially focused primarily on economic development and the provision of technical assistance in areas of strength within the Swedish economy, Swedish aid started to integrate a focus on social development concerns such as health, education, and gender in the 1970s.

By the mid-1970s, Sweden was established as a generous donor focusing largely on social issues, but also supporting trends in development assistance such as structural adjustment. Questions began to emerge domestically about the efficacy and value of Sweden's generous aid program, particularly from the Swedish research community (Danielson and Wohglemuth 2005). As the result of this questioning, Sweden's government undertook to reform the delivery of Swedish aid by creating additional aid agencies specialising in particular sectors/types of aid provision. First, the Swedish Agency for Research Co-operation (SAREC) was created to focus on support to research on development both within Sweden and in developing countries. Subsequently, SWEDFUND was formed as an agency responsible for industrial cooperation, BITS was formed and given responsibility for delivery of Swedish technical assistance programs,

and then much later, in 1991 the Swedish International Enterprise Development Corporation (SWEDCORP) was created and responsible for private sector-related assistance. By 1992, including SIDA there were at least 5 agencies of the Swedish government established specifically for delivering development assistance, in addition to that provided through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others.

This disaggregated approach to aid delivery continued until 1995 with another government commission recommending the consolidation of aid efforts in the creation of a new agency combining SIDA, BITS, SWEDFUND, and SWEDCORP into the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation, known commonly as Sida – the use of lower case letters denoting its distinction from the earlier SIDA. Sida then became again the main delivery arm for Swedish aid, responsible for almost the majority of Swedish bilateral aid (country-to-country), while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained control over most multilateral assistance to UN agencies and the various development banks. Between 1995 an 2005, Sida delivered increasing amounts of aid by volume, but fluctuating as a percentage of GNI. In 2006 Sida exceeded the 1% of GNI ODA target again in 2006 for the first time since the mid-1980s, rebounding from a low of 0.78% in 2004 (OECD 2006b) and leading the DAC as the most generous donor in terms of aid-to-GNI ratio.

Swedish Public Support for Development Assistance

Support for development assistance within Swedish society is strong compared to many countries in the rest of Europe and in North America. For instance, in 2002, 91.9% of the Swedish public polled supported the Swedish aid program and the principle of helping poor countries (Fransman and Solignac Lecomte 2004). This strong support of development assistance stems from the heavy involvement of international solidarity movements in urging Sweden to offer aid to developing countries early on during the history of Swedish aid; additionally, Sweden is renowned as possessing one of the most liberal social-democratic welfare states in the industrialised world, and public support for ODA

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can be seen as an externally oriented outgrowth of Swedish support for the welfare state. Such support of the welfare support has been shown elsewhere to be a significant factor in explaining ODA levels of industrialised countries (Noël and Thérien 1995a). This interplay of domestic and foreign welfare has made the Swedish public consistently one of the most supportive societies in the world when it comes to their backing of a generous aid program founded on principles of humanitarian concern. For instance, in 2005 96% of Swedes polled felt it was either important or very important to help people in poor countries develop (the highest level of support in the entire EU), and 74% favoured an increase in aid spending (Eurobarometer 2005).

A corollary of the high level of support from the Swedish public is a relatively high degree of political will demonstrated by both government and opposition parties in Sweden. This political will can be seen in evidence from the 2006 parliamentary election campaign in Sweden where every major party but one publicly committed to the level of 1% of GNP as their ODA target, and the one dissenting party was committed to the internationally agreed upon standard of 0.7%. Political will measured as a degree of political party support for aid, therefore, is demonstrably high in Sweden. Further evidence of this political will is found in Swedish government decisions to continue to maintain high levels of aid, and indeed increase aid as a percentage of GNP to levels unmatched among the other DAC donors. As outlined above, the increases in aid over the course of the late 1990s, and indeed the high level of aid as a percentage of GNP demonstrate the extent to which governments in power have made sure to echo the support for development assistance evident in the Swedish public. High levels of public support for development assistance suggest a public that is more aware of foreign aid levels than we saw in the Canadian case. Political will to support development assistance thus combines with public support to provide a strong base of public and political wherewithal to prioritise aid as a major component of Swedish foreign policy and an outgrowth of the already firmly entrenched Swedish welfare state. I will explore the critical role this public support of and political will has played in establishing the institution of development assistance

in Sweden, and in opening Sweden to the possibilities of development assistance policy innovation through the adoption of world policy scripts and norms.

Sida Structure

The Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation or Sida is the primary agency of the Swedish Government responsible for bilateral development assistance – assistance provided from Sweden to various recipient countries. Sida is a government agency reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). As a government agency, Sida can work mostly independently of the MFA, but must operate under a framework of terms, conditions, and budgets set out by the government (Government of Sweden 2007b). In contrast to the Canadian case, although the Swedish Minister for International Cooperation is a part of the MFA, Sida does not report directly to the Minister. Instead, Sida's Director General is responsible to carry out the directives of parliament under with advisory support from the Board of Sida. The Board consists of ten members plus the Director General and includes members of parliament from several of the major parties as well as representatives from civil society, academia, and the private sector (Sida 2007b).

As of 2007, Sida consists of thirteen departments reporting to the Director General, and one evaluation and audit department that reports directly to the Board. The thirteen departments are split into three categories: (1) Regional departments covering the four main regions where Sida provides aid (Asia, Middle East, and North Africa; Africa; Europe; and Latin America); (2) Sector departments covering various thematic issues such as democracy, social development, the environment, or humanitarian assistance; and (3) Support departments focused on corporate needs such as human resources, finances, and policy development. Each department has a head who reports to the Director General (Sida 2007b). Together the thirteen department heads and the Director General comprise the management group within Sida. Overall, in 2006 the agency consisted of approximately 900 individuals, with 190 of those working overseas in field offices and embassies while the remainder were located at Sida

headquarters in Stockholm (Sida 2007a). With more than 20% of their workforce located in recipient countries, Sida is a somewhat decentralised organisation. However, ultimate decision-making responsibilities for country programs remain at headquarters in Stockholm. As such, Sida can only be considered partially decentralised in terms of the donor agency decision-making classification outlined earlier in this chapter.

Sida's relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is arms length, but the MFA does play a role in some of the policy direction provided to Sida – particularly as it relates to the terms and conditions under which Sida operates. In particular, the MFA plays a role in the Swedish government's overall policy for relations with the developing world and with other development agencies and international organisations, including Sweden's relationship to the DAC. Furthermore, the MFA also contains departments for development policy and methods which are responsible for crafting some aspects of Swedish development assistance policy. A recent example of this includes the August 2007 announcement by the Swedish Minister of International Cooperation of a new policy for country focus within development assistance which outlines and limits what countries Sweden will provide aid to and under which conditions (Government of Sweden 2007a). This new direction involves the limiting of Swedish bilateral assistance to 30 primary countries in an effort improve the "quality" and "effectiveness" of Swedish aid. Such policy decisions taken by MFA directly impact the nature and location of the work undertaken by Sida, but the main decision-making power over such direction rests within MFA. This is not to say that Sida does not have its own policy development functions, but they tend to be more at the thematic and sectoral level, rather than in strategic direction. Sida's relationship to the MFA thus can be considered only tacitly arms-length, as many of the fundamental decisions about development assistance in Sweden rest outside of the agency with the MFA. In this respect, Sida therefore needs to be considered at least a partially integrated organisation in terms of the agency autonomy classification illustrated above.

In terms of the donor agency ideal-types outlined earlier, Sida is most closely aligned with the integrated-decentralised type. The ramifications of this structure and their impact on Sweden's adherence to and adoption of world polity scripts of development assistance policy will be explored further in the next chapter.

Swedish Civil Society Involvement in Development Assistance

Sweden's development assistance includes the very active involvement of Swedish civil society organisations – both organisations oriented specifically around overseas development issues and those with broader domestic mandates. Indeed, Sida has a special relationship with a group of fourteen Swedish CSOs called the Frame Organisations (referred to as the SEKA funding mechanism in Swedish) (Danielson and Wohglemuth 2005; Sida 2007b). These groups are all umbrella organisations which include smaller Swedish CSOs as members, and provide them the opportunity to access Sida funding to conduct development programmes in the developing world and Eastern Europe. These frame organisations are constituted of labour-based groups with members including unions and trade groups, secular development networks with many development NGOs as members, politically affiliated groups tied to mainstream Swedish political parties, and finally religious-based organisations with direct ties to various Swedish churches. In keeping with the importance that Sida and the Swedish government place on delivering development assistance through civil society these framework groups receive nearly one tenth of the bilateral aid budget that Sweden channels through Sida. In 2006 this amounted to 1.187 billion SEK, of a total 15.7 billion SEK disbursed by Sida – over 13% of all Swedish ODA (Sida 2007b). Swedish civil society, and particularly the framework organisations, thus plays a significant part in delivering development assistance overseas.

Development assistance delivered by Swedish civil society groups can be seen in nearly every region of the developing world. Though there are few pre-existing relationships because of a colonial past, the spirit of humanitarian

solidarity that underlines Sida's development assistance is magnified even further in the work of civil society. Some groups are geared specifically at demonstrating solidarity with certain regions or countries, whereas others take a more broad-based approach geographically and in terms of sector involvement to undertake comprehensive development programming. Aside from Sida funding, several of the major development assistance CSOs in Sweden also mobilise funds and other support from individual and group memberships. Examples of this can be seen in both labour and faith-based CSOs. The bulk of the development assistance delivered by these groups – funded by government or otherwise – is aimed at collaborating with local civil societies in developing partner countries. It is very rare for Swedish CSOs to collaborate directly with recipient country government partners. Swedish development-related civil society therefore represents a significant actor in actually carrying out the development assistance process and linking Sweden to development assistance recipients throughout the world.

Domestically, Swedish civil society plays a strong role in influencing the Government of Sweden when it comes to policy and decisions related to development assistance and international relations with the developing world. Indeed, several of the framework organisations themselves undertake explicit campaigns to lobby the government and other competing political parties regarding key development assistance issues and priorities. Examples include: campaigns to change the way Sweden votes at the World Bank, campaigns to ensure that Sweden maintains the 1% of GNP ODA target, and campaigns to limit spending of Swedish ODA on security/military related programs. Of the four framework organisations included in my study, three were very actively involved in lobbying the government and other politicians/parties to influence Swedish development policy. Interestingly, however, little of this lobbying was directed at government officials within the bureaucracy. This is not to say there was not contact between officials and CSOs, but simply that officials tended not to be the target of lobbying efforts. Instead, campaigns were very much oriented towards politicians and the political process, as well as at mobilising public support towards these ends.

Despite not being the target of CSO lobbying efforts, one interesting feature of the Swedish government's development assistance machinery was the close personal ties of its officials to members of civil society. In fact, quite a few officials within Sida have some form of experience working previously in civil society.[17] Indeed, at the time of my research in Sweden, the Minister for international cooperation within the GOS was the former head of the Olaf Palme International Center, a prominent Swedish development CSO. This exchange of personnel between civil society and government plays an important role in the Swedish official development assistance sector, and arguably leads to a much closer relationship between government and civil society than seen in either of the other two cases I examine here. I will argue later in this study that this embeddedness within civil society needs to be considered a defining characteristic of the Swedish model of development assistance.

Recent Legislative Framework: Policy for Global Development 2003

One recent manifestation of the effective lobbying of Swedish civil society and the embeddedness of the donor agency is the Policy on Global Development of 2003. This piece of legislation outlines an updated set of terms and conditions for Swedish development assistance and situates development within a broader whole-of-government approach to poverty alleviation. The PGD not only confirms Sweden's existing humanitarian solidarity motivations for development assistance, but actually makes it official government policy. The whole-of-government approach extends these motivations in the name of policy coherence to ensure that other policy areas such as foreign relations, immigration, investment, trade and so on cohesively work to promote poverty reduction in the developing world. This policy coherence approach reflects international trends towards greater coherence promoted by several international NGOs and other prominent donors. The PGD was the outcome of a Swedish government commission called GLOBKOM established in 2001 for the purpose of examining

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[17] During my data collection in Sweden I interviewed two Sida officials who had this experience personally, but also heard mention of this exchange occurring in a rather commonplace manner.

Swedish government policy and its overall interaction with the issues of globalisation and poverty (Danielson and Wohglemuth 2005).

The most interesting outcome of the PGD has been the ability for both Sida and Swedish civil society to refer to a strong legislative mandate for development cooperation. Sida now has the ability to point towards legislation to justify its endeavours and make policy priority decisions based on the terms outlined in the PGD. At the same time, Swedish development CSOs are able to refer to the PGD to assert claims to the legitimacy of their objectives, and to police Sida's work by ensuring that its efforts are aligned with the spirit of development cooperation outlined in the PGD. Indeed, some civil society have already begun referring to the PGD to discourage Sida from expanding its support to security-related development cooperation that CSOs feel contravenes the humanitarian solidarity underpinning Swedish aid.

Key Characteristics of the Swedish Development Assistance Sector

In the chapters that follow, four key factors will be shown to characterise the Swedish aid sector and its openness to world polity scripts and norms about development assistance: (1) the degree of Sida's embeddedness in Swedish civil society and the amount of personnel exchange between governmental and non-governmental bodies; (2) a high level of public support for development assistance met with a correspondingly high level of political will from government and opposition parties alike; (3) the structure of Sida as a mostly decentralised and only partially autonomous agency; and (4) the importance of the underlying development assistance motivations of solidarity as a form of humanitarian altruism. These factors will be used to illustrate Sweden's approach to integrating international influences on development assistance policy consensus into its own policies and differentiate this approach from the Canadian and American cases.

UNITED STATES

Brief History of American Development Assistance[18]

American development assistance began in the years following World
War II with the Marshall Plan, focused on emergent European reconstruction. In
the years following the conclusion of the Marshall Plan in 1951, Congress created
several agencies under various pieces of legislation to unify American military,
economic, and technical assistance aid under a common approach. By 1960, with
a lack of public support and declining support in Congress for the ongoing
approach to foreign aid, reforming American foreign aid became an issue in the
1960 Presidential election. Thus, in 1961, the Kennedy administration launched
the process of reforming American foreign assistance, which ultimately yielded
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which was responsible for refocusing
American aid on the developing world, and for the creation of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). One of the major changes
implemented under the act was a new approach to long-term country-by-country
planning for development (USAID 2005b).

Over time, American assistance faced success and challenges. One of
these challenges was the distinct motivations underlying assistance, including the
different motivations between US official development assistance and US
Security-Supporting assistance (Lumsdaine 1993). American aid in the period
from 1961 through 1990 was frequently held to champion Cold War strategic
aims of national interest rather than humanitarian support of impoverished
countries. However, as Lumsdaine (1993) illustrates, if ODA is disaggregated
from security-related assistance, these motivations are more distinguished, with
an average of at least 41% of American ODA being linked provided to the
world's poorest countries. These competing motivations for aid continued into
the 1980s and 1990s when a greater emphasis on national economic interest was
put in place by the Reagan administration. Now, in 2007, strategic interests have
in a great way come to dominate the destination of American ODA following the

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[18] This brief history is primarily drawn from: USAID. (2005). "USAID: USAID History."
   Retrieved September 14, 2007, from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html.

advent of the Global War on Terror under the second Bush administration (Moss, Roodman et al. 2005). Since 2001, an increasing amount of ODA has been focused on countries linked to American military intervention overseas, or to countries with a perceived important role in combating terrorism. Indeed, the amount of American ODA delivered by USAID has declined from 50.2% in 2002 to only 38.8% in 2005, whereas that provided by the Department of Defense has increased to 21.7% from only 5.6% in 2002 (OECD 2006c). Arguably, the primary underlying motivation of American development assistance currently is a focus on protecting national interests and furthering foreign policy aims. This has become even more evident with the release of the USAID/State Department Strategic plan for the 2007-2012 period, where the first aim for both organisations is the promotion of peace and security, rather than poverty reduction (USAID and State Department 2007).

With national interest as the primary underlying motivation for aid, American development assistance is an interesting phenomenon when contrasted with other DAC donors to compare contributions. Despite relatively high levels of contribution in the 1950s and 1960s which exceeded the DAC median, American aid levels as a percentage of GNP have declined and remained relatively low since the 1970s. Over the course of the 1980s, American assistance ranked near the bottom of DAC donors in terms of the aid-to-GNP ratio. In that period, the US provided on average only 0.22% of GNP as ODA (Lumsdaine 1993). More recently, American ODA has fluctuated widely, reaching lows of only 0.1% of GNI in 1998-2000 and a high level of 0.22% of GNI in 2005 (OECD 2006b; OECD 2006c). This low level of giving in terms of percentage of GNI is misleading in terms of overall volume, as in 2005, the United States provided more than 25$ billion USD in ODA, the most of any donor. As such, the United States is both the most generous and least generous of donors in recent years - providing more aid by volume than any other country, but less as a percentage of its overall economic wherewithal. As I will show in later chapters, this contradiction in generosity has implications for the amount and type of

influence that American development assistance policies and directions have on the international development assistance community.

American Public Support for Development Assistance

American public support for development assistance has traditionally been much lower than many of the other DAC donor countries. In the early 1980s, only 50% of the American public favoured their country providing foreign aid (Lumsdaine 1993). By other accounts this support had risen to 54% in 1986, but then declined to an even lower 47% in 1995 (Otter 2003). Research shows that, in contrast to Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Japan, the United States public had the lowest level of support by nearly 30% (Otter 2003). In recent years, however, evidence points towards an increase of public support for aid, with 79% of Americans polled in 2002 supportive of development assistance, and with 65% of those polled in 2005 supportive of the US striving to attain the 0.7% aid-to-GNP goal established by the international community (Fransman and Solignac Lecomte 2004; PIPA 2005). This support can be disaggregated by major political party support, with supporters of the Democratic Party more likely to support attainment of the 0.7% goal (PIPA 2005). These widely varying results call into question both the American public's awareness and understanding of its aid programs, but also the methodology behind opinion polling on the subject (Otter 2003).

What can be gleaned from the relatively low level of support shown in earlier surveys, and the fluctuation in levels of support from different surveys, is that the American public does not appear to have a strongly vested interest in American development assistance. Indeed, like the Canadian case, polls show that the American public believes that their government is much more generous when it comes to foreign aid than it is in reality (Otter 2003). The fact that levels of support for aid were apparently increasing in the late 1990s at the same time as the American Congress was making substantial cuts to official development assistance, reaching its lowest ever levels in 1997 at only 0.09% of GNP, suggests a disconnect between public support of aid and the political will of the American

government. Isolationism in American foreign policy can explain the reduction in aid spending during this time, as can crisis in the international economy, but the levels of public support for aid in that period were increasing at the same time as aid levels shrank significantly. Not only does this highlight the disconnect between government and public, but it can also be taken as a sign of the power that the American Congress can wield from year to year on the American development assistance program due to its role in approving annual appropriations for aid (Otter 2003). A DAC peer review of American assistance highlighted the need to promote a better understanding and awareness of US development assistance to the public so that the true aims and outcomes of American assistance can be publicised rather than a focus on failures, shortcomings, and general cynicism about aid programs (OECD 2006c).

USAID Structure

USAID is a government agency which manages the largest portion of the American ODA envelope (OECD 2006c). USAID reports to a presidentially appointed Administrator who as of January 2006 also holds a position in the State department as the Director of Foreign Assistance, the equivalent of a Deputy Secretary of State (State Department 2007). As such, USAID and the State Department have a very close working relationship, and indeed USAID receives a high degree of foreign policy guidance from the State Department (OECD 2006c). Indeed, in 2007, USAID and the State Department revealed a joint strategic plan for a five year period, uniting under a common framework of goals and objectives (USAID and State Department 2007). Given this new joint approach, USAID's autonomy is limited, and therefore falls into the category of an integrated donor agency, despite the fact that it does ostensibly exist as a separate government agency. The close ties to the State Department limit the independence of USAID as an organisation.

USAID functions as a relatively decentralised development donor. Much of the decision-making authority on country programs rests in the field. This is reflected in the fact that approximately one third of USAID's almost 2400 directly

hired staff are located in the field offices in recipient countries (OECD 2006c). This decentralisation of decision-making on country programs is reflective of recent 'aid effectiveness' trends in the international donor community, but is something that has been present within USAID for many years.

USAID faces several challenges as a donor agency currently: the shrinking portion of American ODA actually managed by USAID, the formation of additional development assistance delivery arms like the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the growing role of the Department of Defense in American ODA delivery, all point to a diminishing significance for USAID as a donor. With its close relationship to the State Department and its decentralised decision-making at the country level, USAID proves to be an integrated by decentralised donor – something that I will argue limits its receptiveness to the adoption of world polity policy consensus.

American Civil Society Involvement in Development Assistance

American civil society involvement in development assistance is significant, both as implementers of American ODA and as participants in development assistance through private giving (OECD 2006c). USAID works closely with a number of large, well-funded development NGOs or Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs) as they are known at USAID. USAID's partnership with NGOs aims at supporting the entire spectrum of American non-governmental organisations including faith-based, educational, health, and cooperative groups. In 2005, USAID channelled approximately $2.4 billion to NGOs in both contracts and grants, whereas the same group received approximately $18.6 billion from private sources (USAID 2007a). This highlights an important feature of American civil society involvement in development assistance: the great reliance on private sources for funding. In particular, the existence of many large private foundations with significant endowments serve to provide a sizeable share of these private funds. Foundations like the Gates, Ford, Soros and others are all heavy contributors to private development assistance. The role of private funding does not diminish the role

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that USAID plays in partnering with American civil society groups, but it does put it in stark contrast with the amount of private funding available to some groups to implement development activities outside of official channels. As such, USAID's influence over these groups, and in turn, their influence over USAID must be considered within the shadow of the large amount of funding available to NGOs elsewhere. This lack of reliance on USAID for organisational survival in many cases diminishes the overall amount of embeddedness within civil society for USAID. However, on certain issues, the relationship with civil society is closer, and therefore degrees of embeddedness can vary.

Recent Legislative Framework

Apart from annual appropriations that are approved by the Congress and Senate, there is no notable recent legislative development for the traditional American development assistance program managed largely by USAID. Instead, the one interesting legislative development regarding American ODA is the creation of the MCC through the *Millennium Challenge Act of 2003* (MCC 2007). This parallel US government corporation was established ostensibly to create a 'new compact on global development' between developing and developed countries, but has not been clearly integrated into the broader program of American development assistance in a concrete manner (OECD 2006c). The most recent OECD DAC peer review of American ODA raises the possibility of the MCC creating a problematic duplication of requirements on recipient countries and working against the effectiveness of aid. The overall impact of the MCC on American aid programs is still to reveal itself, but in the three years since its formation, it has started to provide ODA funds to a limited number of countries that meet strict MCC criteria. The assistance provided by MCC, does, however, aim to support initiatives and development priorities set locally in these countries, which has been commended by some other DAC donors (OECD 2006c).

Key Characteristics of the American Development Assistance Sector

As we proceed to compare and contrast the American development assistance sector's engagement with and openness to world polity scripts of development assistance, it will be important to bear in mind the following key characteristics: (1) USAID's low level of embeddedness in civil society with a limited ability to influence American CSOs who fail to strongly influence USAID in return; (2) the inconsistency of public support for development assistance and a corresponding low level of political will from government to make major changes or advances in development assistance; (3) USAID's decentralised but integrated agency structure tying it closely to the State Department and broader American foreign policy and security objectives; and (4) the primacy of national-self interest – and most recently national security motivations over humanitarian altruism as motivations for American aid. These factors will all be shown to influence the US approach to integrating international influences on development assistance policy consensus into its own policies and differentiate this approach from the Canadian and Swedish cases.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the development assistance sectors in Canada, Sweden, and the United States have a high degree of similarity. At the root of the development assistance endeavour in each state is the function of delivering foreign aid to poorer countries throughout the world. To do so, these three states have evolved a complex system of development assistance institutions and relationships within society: In each country there is a certain amount of public support for development assistance. Each country has created and sustained for many years a government agency dedicated to the delivery of foreign aid abroad. In each case there is some degree of civil society involvement in development assistance. Finally, in each case, there has been some form of legislation aimed at shaping the outcomes of development assistance for the country. All of these similarities point towards a high degree of institutional, and in some cases, policy isomorphism. As only three of the 22 major donor countries of the OECD DAC,

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these cases are reflective of the great extent of conformity among donors when it comes to providing development assistance.

Table 5.1: Summary of Development Assistance Sector Characteristics

CHARACTERISTIC	CASE STUDY COUNTRIES		
	Canada	*Sweden*	*United States*
Public Support/ Awareness	Low	High	Low
Generosity	Low	High	Low
Motivations	National Interest	Humanitarian	National Interest
Civil Society Embeddedness	Low	High	Low
Donor Structure	Autonomous & Centralised	Integrated & Decentralised	Integrated & Decentralised

At the same time, examining the common components of the development assistance sector highlights the differences and discrepancies that exist between these donors. Beneath the veneer of common institutions and practices lies a measure of dissimilarity that derives from the extent to which certain practices, policies, and institutions are embodied or implemented. Table 5.1 above displays some of these differences. Public support for and awareness of development assistance is far and away higher in Sweden than in Canada or the United States. In terms of generosity, Sweden is much more generous than either Canada or the United States. In terms of state involvement with civil society in the development assistance process, Sweden and Canada have a much closer relationship to civil society than does the United States. As far as underlying motivations for providing aid, Canada and the United States are much more driven by securing national interests than is Sweden. Finally, CIDA stands out as a more autonomous but centralised donor agency in contrast to the integrated-decentralised forms seen in Sida and USAID. These differences demonstrate that even with a broadly similar mandate and function in each country, the development assistance sector of each operates in distinct manners. This

heterogeneity within institutions with ostensibly homogenous objectives will be shown in the chapters that follow to influence to a great degree the mechanisms and social processes at play in each case when it comes to the adoption and expression of similar world polity policy scripts for development assistance.

CHAPTER SIX: GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Chapter Four demonstrated women in development or gender and development policies diffused throughout the major donors of the development assistance community from the 1970s onwards. It is telling that all but one of the major donor agencies now have some form of policy or unit to address these issues in their work. This prevalence of the gender model highlights the relative homogeneity of the donor community when it comes to policy and priorities. Arguably, as Chapter Four's quantitative analysis demonstrated, these similarities are a reflection of the influence of world society on the nation-state and the adoption of world cultural models of development assistance by donors. Still, the processes through which donors arrive at, institutionalise, and refine these models require further investigation.

This chapter will examine the gender and development assistance case through qualitative analysis of interviews conducted with individuals working in this sector from three countries: Canada, Sweden, and the United States. Bearing in mind the development assistance sectoral context outlined in the previous chapter and the findings from the interview data, I will highlight several common processes and mechanisms evident in all three country cases, as well as account for some of the apparent differences. The commonalities, I will argue, are social processes and mechanisms dedicated to mediating the interface of nation-state institutions with the world society and directly influence the degree of uptake of world cultural models.

BACKGROUND

Gender Equality and Women's Rights as a World Society Model

World polity research has demonstrated the extent to which women's rights and gender equality have grown as a world cultural model over the course of the later twentieth century (Berkovitch 1999b; Berkovitch 1999a; Lechner and Boli 2005). This growth in support for women's rights across the globe corresponds to the expansion of the women's movement (Berkovitch 1999a;

Paxton, Hughes et al. 2006), greater support for gender equality initiatives by international organizations (Berkovitch 1999b), and increased attention paid to these issues at international conferences like the United Nations World Conferences on Women (Lechner and Boli 2005). The highlighting of women's issues during the UN Decade for Women (1976-1985) and surrounding the UN conferences also played a strong role in promoting the expansion of the women's movement and the formation of a large number of Women's International Non-Governmental Organisations (WINGOs) (Berkovitch 1999a). These factors were all instrumental in encouraging nation-states to protect women's rights and promote gender equality across a wide spectrum of issues, including addressing women's health, education, and economic opportunities. International organisations like the UN and the WINGOs of the women's movement collaborated along with governments to establish, refine, and institutionalise a normative model for women's rights and gender equality. World society's influence on the creation of this model was thus strong and wide-ranging.

As these norms encouraging greater protection for women's rights and increased acceptance of the notion of gender equality spread among governments, development NGOs, and international organisations, a concentration on development issues began to emerge as a significant component of the world cultural model. Berkovitch (1999a) argues that this was due to the coinciding of the UN Decade for Women with the Second United Nations Development Decade, leading to the framing of women's issues within the development context and a concurrent focus on both issues in the wider international community. Women's status and development status came to be viewed in the international community as inextricably linked, and gender became a primary concern for development assistance agencies and organisations worldwide (Lechner and Boli 2005).

Gender as a Development Concern

Some of the earliest manifestation of the combination of a women's rights model with development themes arose in academic theory on women in

development in the early 1970s. One of the first contributions to this approach was Ester Boserup's influential *Women's Role in Economic Development* (1970). Boserup showed that development processes had frequently marginalised women and prevented them from actively sharing in the benefits of modernisation. Highlighting this discrimination led to the emergence of what came to be known as the Women in Development or WID approach to development assistance. WID approaches focused on promoting means of securing women's increased participation in development processes and greater access to the benefits of modernisation (Benería and Sen 1981; Jaquette 1982; Rathgeber 1990; Goetz 1997b). Many donor agencies, international organisations, and development NGOs began in the 1970s to adopt WID approaches to redressing discrimination against women in their projects and activities. These efforts involved the creation of WID bureaus or directorates, WID policies, and the addition of separate WID initiatives to many development assistance programs (Goetz 1997b). Examples of projects included initiatives promoting women's income generation, vocational training, and provision of credit to women (Rathgeber 1990).

While sometimes effective at improving women's economic or educational opportunities, the WID approach was questioned over its inability to promote greater social and political empowerment for women. Critics of the WID approach began to call for a greater focus on the unequal power relations between men and women that still prevented women from participating as equal partners in all facets of life. From these criticisms emerged the next stage in addressing gender inequalities in the development assistance sector, the Gender and Development (GAD) approach (Rathgeber 1990; Rathgeber 1995; Goetz 1997b; Misra 2000; Rai 2002).[19] The most common solutions offered by the GAD approach tended to be either state or civil society focused. The GAD perspective argues that the state has the appropriate power to enforce equity measures that have the potential to fundamentally alter gender relations (Benería 2003). As for

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[19] The research literature on gender in development also includes the Women and Development or WAD school of thought which evolved in response to dependency theory. I have elected not to explore this approach in any depth as it failed to make any large impact on the development assistance sector and tended not to be addressed by donor agencies.

civil society, many GAD analyses have highlighted the fundamental role of women's movements both locally and transnationally in advocating for gender reforms to the development process. These solutions, though widely discussed in the academic GAD literature, were less easily adopted by development agencies (Rathgeber 1990; Parpart 1995; Rathgeber 1995). The notion of acting to purposefully change social relations was considered riskier and more difficult to implement than the sometimes more straightforward WID interventions.

Both the WID and GAD approaches were developed in academic discourses about very practical applications in the development process. These approaches were further refined in the interactions of gender experts, academics, and representatives of international organisations through ongoing discussion, experimentation, and application of theory on women and gender in development. In particular, the influence of the United Nations' World Conferences on Women has been highlighted as hallmark events in the development of the WID and GAD approaches (Goetz 1997b). Civil society also played a strong role in furthering both the WID and GAD approaches through the influence of such groups as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) or the Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID) (Parpart 1995). Furthermore, the networking of donor representatives in the OECD through the creation of a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) network on women, and subsequently on gender, also provided a fertile ground for interaction on and refinement of these ideas into institutional and policy models, including the release of DAC guidelines to aid agencies for integrating women and gender into development cooperation in 1983, 1989, and 1999 (OECD 1999).

Presently, most development agencies have a formal policy or organisational unit to address issues of women and gender in development (Winship 2004). One of the common features of these policies is the notion of 'mainstreaming' the issue of gender across an organisation's development initiatives (del Rosario 1997; Goetz 1997b; Jackson 1997). Mainstreaming refers to the integration of gender as a concern for all programs and staff, rather than simply relying on targeted initiatives or the work of gender specialists or experts.

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This approach to promoting gender equality has become widespread amongst development and other organisations globally, particularly after it was highlighted as a mainstay of the Beijing Platform for Action after 1995 (Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; Moser 2005; Moser and Moser 2005). Efforts to mainstream have been mixed, with critics pointing out that mainstreaming has encouraged instrumentalist arguments for promoting equality rather than advocacy for equality on its own merits (Razavi 1997; Moser and Moser 2005). Another criticism of the approach is that agencies may tend to focus more on the mainstreaming process itself rather than the actual empowerment of women or promotion of equality (Moser 2005). Constraints to mainstreaming have also been identified where – despite agencies having adopted a mainstreaming agenda – the implementation has been hindered by factors such as resistance from senior management, inconsistent training, and weak responsibility and accountability mechanisms within the organisation (Moser and Moser 2005). Other research has shown that the degree to which an organisation implements gender mainstreaming is determined by its interaction with transnational civil society, its openness to influence, and the resonance of the idea with its management elite (Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002). Mainstreaming a gender approach into development assistance organisations and activities remains a contentious issue in both academic and practitioner debates on gender.

Another recent shift in the GAD approach involves recognition of the need to focus on integrating men as partners for promoting gender equality and incorporating analysis of masculinities into the development process (Cornwall 2000; White 2000; Cleaver 2003). Proponents of this approach illustrate the hazards and shortcomings of a GAD approach which equates gender with women and which fails to take account of men's gender roles and responsibilities in shaping gender relations. This focus on men and masculinities has been highlighted as a particularly significant entry point for development assistance work on gender in relation to sexual and reproductive health, HIV/AIDS, and gender-based violence. Still, donor agencies have been somewhat slow to implement this focus on men and masculinities as a component of their gender

policy (Swiss 2000). Subsequently, donor funded programming with this focus has tended to be of limited scope and on a small scale.

Throughout the evolution from WID to GAD, and with the advent of gender mainstreaming and the focus on men and masculinities, gender and development has become firmly established as a de facto component of the broader development assistance sector. Common approaches to women and gender in development provide a strong example of the world cultural models highlighted by the world polity literature. The nesting of gender and development policy models in a broader institutional framework for development assistance promulgated by world society and the cadre of well-off donor nation-states exemplifies the phenomenon of policy isomorphism in the world polity. The application of this model, though widespread in acceptance, has been quite varied in implementation. The next section will examine the chief characteristics of the gender and development model and its application within the three donor country cases examined later in this chapter.

Donor Approaches to Gender in Development Assistance

As chapter four demonstrated, most of the major OECD DAC donor countries possess some form of gender policy or unit. In identifying the gender and development model as a nested component of a broader world polity prescription for development assistance institutions, it is necessary to highlight the chief characteristics of such a model. I will argue that three key points identify this model within donor and other development institutions: (1) A focus on gender and development through a corporate level strategy/policy; and/or a separate organisational unit or personnel dedicated to women/gender; (2) efforts to mainstream gender throughout agency programming; and (3) broadening of focus on gender away from a solely WID approach to incorporate a GAD perspective, possibly including a focus on men/masculinities. These characteristics are reflective of the DAC's *Guidelines for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Cooperation* (OECD 1999) and form a solid base for identifying a common model of gender and development among

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donors. I will use these characteristics as the basis for evaluating the adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of the gender and development model within the donor agencies of the three countries that compose my qualitative case studies. These features of the gender model will be assessed briefly in each case before turning to the interview data collected in each country to examine the social processes at work in the diffusion and implementation of the model.

CIDA

CIDA's engagement with issues of gender inequality in development stems from 1976, when it first adopted policy guidelines on WID (CIDA 1999). More than thirty years later, CIDA's policy on gender inequalities has gone through several incarnations and now focuses on the result of gender equality as the goal of CIDA's gender programming. In March 1999 CIDA published a revision to its Women In Development and Gender Equity policies (CIDA 1999). This revision heralded a shift on CIDA's part to a focus on gender equality rather than only women and gender equity. This change might seem on the surface to be little more than one of semantics, but at the root of the transition was – at least on paper – a concerted effort by CIDA to make its gender programming more effective by bringing it in line with the wider agency shift towards results-based management. In this sense, CIDA viewed 'gender equality' as a result, whereas 'gender equity' was a means to achieving said result. This indicated a significant shift away from a conventional WID approach to a focus more on altering gender relations within society typical of the GAD perspective – something that had been happening informally within the agency for some years prior to the release of the new policy (Rathgeber 1995). This GAD approach, however, has not progressed to the point of formalising any treatment of the men and masculinities issue in CIDA policy. Small initiatives have been funded addressing these concerns, but not in any coordinated manner.

Within this context, CIDA's 1999 policy outlines its rationale for working towards gender equality, illustrating the direct ties between the policy and the influence of both international treaties and Canadian domestic legislation.

Furthermore, it highlights the extent to which CIDA views gender equality as an integral part of all CIDA programming, and reinforces the need to undertake gender analysis in all CIDA planning and evaluation. In this sense, the policy very strongly encourages the mainstreaming of gender in CIDA's programs and policies, but does so without explicitly labelling the process as such.

In terms of personnel dedicated to the issue, gender equality is addressed within the organisation through a separate division in the Policy Branch aimed at addressing equality between women and men, and through the presence of gender specialists in each of the programming branches. Both of these groups act as acknowledged resource on gender issues within the agency, but all programming and planning conducted by others is expected to undertake some form of gender analysis, and is vetted against CIDA's gender policies prior to the approval of new initiatives. In this sense, responsibility for maintaining accountability for CIDA's gender equality policy belongs to everyone within the agency, but policing of this accountability tends to rest with the designated gender experts within each branch. In addition, gender resource persons are sometimes attached to many of the bilateral country programs in the field where CIDA's operations tend to be housed at Canadian embassies abroad. These local experts tend to be consultants contracted to CIDA, but are not officially part of the organisation. Similarly, at CIDA's headquarters in Canada, a large portion of gender equality work is conducted by Canadian consultants who specialise in gender equality. These outside resources complement CIDA's in-house gender expertise and make up for the lack of time that the in-house personnel sometimes have to address all gender equality work that emerges throughout the year.

On the international stage, CIDA has a reputation for being strongly committed to its work on gender equality (Rathgeber 1995; Angeles 2003). This leadership has been seen in CIDA's work with the DAC GenderNet and its predecessor working groups, as well as within many of the inter-donor working groups on gender found within recipient countries (Angeles 2003). However, in 2005, only 50% of its total sector allocable aid had gender equality as either a principal or as a significant objective of the funded initiative (OECD 2007a).

Though a higher percentage than many other DAC members, this was substantially less as a percentage than the figures reported for either Sweden or New Zealand. In this sense, CIDA is perceived as a leader on these issues without being one financially.

Revisiting the characteristics of Canada's development assistance sector discussed in the last chapter, it is clear that this leadership in gender equality does not stem from a high level of awareness within the Canadian public about Canada's ODA. The influence of the public or of Canadian civil society on this approach has been limited. This is due in part to the low degree of embeddedness that CIDA has with Canadian civil society, and to the low levels of public engagement on development issues in Canada. At the same time, gender equality is a development priority which falls squarely under the category of humanitarian rather than national interests, so contradicts CIDA's tendency towards protecting national interests through development. This contradiction, though, points out that CIDA's relative autonomy from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the rest of the Canadian Government may have allowed CIDA to expand its priorities in this area without an underlying motivation of national interest.

Overall, CIDA does demonstrate the presence of a gender and development approach resembling the three traits of the model outlined above. Indeed, CIDA's approach to gender equality in development assistance is clear evidence of the adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of the gender and development model offered by the world polity.

Sida

Gender equality was mandated by the Swedish parliament to become one of the main objectives of Swedish development assistance in 1996 after several decades of working on improving gender relations and women's position in developing societies since the first Swedish women in development policy of 1968 (ILO 2006). Sida's most recent gender equality policy was produced in 2005 and confirmed gender equality as a primary objective of Swedish aid (Sida

2005a). Highlights of the policy included: (1) a focus on gender equality concerning women and men, girls and boys; (2) a focus on integrating gender into all Sida programming and policies; and (3) a framework for undertaking gender analysis intended for use by all Sida employees. This policy was complemented by a manual for operationalising the concepts it laid out. When Sida officials have a question on applying the organisation's gender equality policies, they are supposed to consult the manual rather than turning to the in-house gender expertise as their first line of inquiry. The extent to which the use of this manual and policy combination has been effectively implemented is questioned by some within Sida, including the gender experts; however, it does present a well-refined and institutionalised system of promoting gender equality in Swedish development assistance.

Currently, even though gender is a major objective of Swedish aid, Sida has a very limited number of gender experts working at their headquarters in Stockholm. Indeed, in 2006, only two individuals were responsible for the overall gender equality file within the organisation. Thus, even though there was a definite expectation that gender equality concerns be integrated into all project planning and analysis, the actual human resources devoted to the issue were rather limited. Sida, instead, relied on the willingness and ability of all officers to understand and implement appropriate gender analysis in their day-to-day duties where needed. This is not to say that Sida fails to dedicate financial resources towards gender equality in its programming, as they are, in fact, one of the most prolific spenders on gender among the DAC donors, with more than 82% of their total sector allocable aid focusing on gender as either a principal or as a significant objective in 2005 (OECD 2007a). Instead, it suggests the extent to which gender has been mainstreamed into all programming and policy at Sida. The gender issue is expected to be addressed in all Sida initiatives and in all research and analysis. This focus on mainstreaming clearly reflects the gender and development model identified earlier in this section.

Mainstreaming of this magnitude is a reflection of the attempts to make gender a primary objective of Swedish development assistance, as well as a

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reflection of the importance placed on gender equality more broadly in Swedish society. Recalling that public support for aid and a high degree of involvement with Swedish civil society were two of the key characteristics of the Swedish development assistance sector identified in the previous chapter; it is unsurprising that domestic influence is strong. Domestic support for Sida's gender agenda is rooted in the influential social movements supporting liberal socialism in Sweden, of which gender equality and feminism have been key components. In addition, the women's movement in Sweden continues to be a vibrant and active force pushing for equality between men and women. Furthermore, the push for gender equality has been adopted more broadly in many of the active social movement organisations in Sweden, including both liberal religious-based groups and labour movements. Some of the connections between these movements and political parties have further reinforced the presence of gender equality on the political agenda in Sweden in a way not seen elsewhere in Europe or for that matter in North America (Allen 1996). It is therefore not surprising that Sida's 1996 mandate to make gender equality a primary objective was derived from parliament. This mandate is also understandable in light of the overriding humanitarian motivations for Swedish aid, as the gender approach taken by Sida has fundamentally altruistic aims of promoting equality as its goal.

As the first bilateral donor to adopt a WID policy in 1968, Sweden has been among the vanguard of donor work on gender. Sida's approach to gender equality in its aid programmes appears to share the fundamental characteristics of the world polity gender and development model outlined above. Sida's implementation of the model includes all three components: a policy or unit, a focus on mainstreaming, and a transition to GAD programming and possibly a focus on men.

USAID

USAID's engagement with women and gender has also been long in contrast to many donors. The Office of Women in Development was created in 1974 following a 1973 congressional amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act

(USAID 2006). This unit still exists presently, and according to USAID, it works actively to promote the integration of gender throughout USAID programs by assisting USAID missions in recipient countries as well as other units within the agency, by disseminating best practices on gender throughout the agency, by undertaking gender analysis of emerging development issues, and by creating programs to address those issues (USAID 2007c). The WID office is the primary unit for addressing gender issues throughout the organisation, but other subunits of the agency and USAID missions in recipient countries also have personnel tasked with working on gender issues. These individuals are not always solely gender experts, and may indeed have alternate responsibilities that they share with their gender-related duties.

In recent years, USAID has operated in the absence of an overriding gender policy or strategy. Instead, the aims of supporting women's empowerment in development and gender equality have been relegated to a sub-component of an objective of 'Transformational Development' in the recent State Department/USAID joint Strategic Plan for 2007-2012 (USAID and State Department 2007). This is not to imply that gender concerns and women's rights in the development process are not a priority for the agency; however, it appears that USAID's gender efforts tend to be more disaggregated across the agency than they might be in the presence of a corporate level strategy or policy. Indeed, individual programs, agency sub-units, and missions appear to be very active in this field, with an array of initiatives outlined in reports that compile USAID gender activities and report on them to the public (USAID 2006). In these reports, much of the focus appears to be on more WID-like activities of incorporating women into development initiatives and as beneficiaries of USAID programs. This approach to gender is therefore only loosely coordinated at the corporate level. One of the difficulties associated with this include the ability to accurately report on gender funding at an agency-wide level, with USAID being one of the only major DAC donors not to report on the gender component within its ODA disbursements (OECD 2007a). In fact, one study of USAID activities showed that gender was not being adequately incorporated into projects, with

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more than 40% of projects surveyed showing no mention of gender whatsoever (Snyder, Berry et al. 1996).

This disaggregate approach to gender is reflective of two aspects of the American development assistance sector. First, as USAID is a decentralised agency with much of the decision-making being taken at USAID mission in developing recipient countries, it is reasonable to expect decisions on gender programs and policy to be taken in the same manner (Elson and McGee 1995). In some respects, this decentralised approach should be interpreted as a very high level of gender mainstreaming because the responsibility of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment has been devolved to such an extent. Second, because of the close relationship of USAID to the State Department, it stands to reason that its corporate level priorities may be dominated by those shared between the two organisations; and more to the point, those that are of greater priority to American foreign interests rather than developmental interests (USAID and State Department 2007). Indeed, the joint Strategic Plan shared by USAID and the State Department clearly illustrates these close ties and arguably the deference that more purely developmental aims yield to broader foreign policy interests in recent years.

In contrast to the generally low level of embeddedness of USAID with American civil society, USAID's approach to gender equality can be characterised by a closer relationship to civil society. American civil society is closely involved in the delivery of USAID programs, and is therefore on the forefront of implementing its gender initiatives. At the same time, civil society is closely involved in assisting USAID to refine its approaches to gender, both through direct involvement in research and policy development, and through both informal and formal networking with the agency. For instance, one of USAID's sub-units – the Population Reference Bureau – has formed a formal network with American civil society groups: the Interagency Gender Working Group (IGWG). This group acts as an interface between USAID and American development NGOs working on in the population, health, and nutrition areas (IGWG 2007). This network involves more than 60 American civil society groups in active work

on developing new approaches and best practices on gender to be applied within USAID and its partners. In this way, the IGWG permits American civil society to undertake an active role in shaping some aspects of how USAID takes on the gender and development models of the world polity. Indeed, some of the work of the IGWG has made a point of placing focus on the issue of men and masculinities in reproductive health and HIV/AIDS programming – a focus which has translated into specific programming on these issues funded by USAID. In this way, American civil society, in conjunction with gender experts within USAID, have been able to push for approaches to gender that reflect the most recent theoretical developments in GAD discourse even in the absence of a strong corporate approach to the gender issue.

The USAID approach to gender and development therefore presents a contradiction in the degrees of its implementation of the common features of the world polity model discussed earlier: a gender unit is present, but a corporate level strategy is not; gender is mainstreamed to a large extent in the absence of a corporate level approach; and initiatives in much of the agency appear to be more closely tied to WID principles than more current GAD approaches, except where sub-units are pursuing GAD-like initiatives that even call for a focus on men and masculinities. As such, USAID can be seen to be both at the avant-garde and the trailing edge of gender and development approaches, reflecting only a partial adoption of the most current world polity standards on gender and development.

Social Processes Accounting for Policy Isomorphism in Gender and Development

The clear similarities in how three separate donors have chosen to address gender in their development assistance programs are striking. Despite the divergent contexts both broadly between countries and between their development assistance sectors, similar gender and development approaches emerged over time. What explains the homogeneity of the gender and development model as it has been applied in the three cases? How has world polity influence on the adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of these gender approaches

operated? As demonstrated in the previous chapter, some determinants of world polity influence can be seen at the macro level in terms of the timing of international conferences, the actions of other donors, and donor engagement with international organisations. Still, the common social processes and mechanisms which underline these relationships and mediate the nation-state interface with world society are in need of further exploration.

Following from work on social processes and mechanisms to explain the contentious politics of social movements (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005), I will examine the processes and mechanisms which explain how all three donor cases I examine here arrive at common approaches to gender in development assistance. My argument is that by identifying mechanisms at work in each case, I can provide a better explanation of how world polity influence on the nation state and the recursive process of world polity model refinement occur. In contrast to the earlier work in this approach, I will argue that these mechanisms and social processes can be used to explain not only contentious politics, but even the politics of consensus building and isomorphism within the world polity and the underlying differences that emerge between states.   It is in search of these common mechanisms that I turn to the qualitative analysis of my interview data collected from the three country cases.

DATA

Interview respondents were selected based on their occupying common functional positions within each country's development assistance sector, as well as through referral from other respondents. This snowball sampling approach does not provide for any random sampling that is consistent across the cases, but does allow for some degree of comparability. Not all functional equivalents were accessible to me in each case country, but where possible I attempted to achieve parity among the cases.[20] Respondents working on the gender issue in their own countries span the continuum from early in their careers to retired and from donor officials to civil society representatives.

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[20] For more information on methodological challenges faced when attempting to incorporate equivalent respondents between the three country cases, see Chapter Three.

As outlined earlier in Chapter Three, my interview schedule was loosely based on common themes, but was adapted to each individual to suit their role and experience in the development assistance sector in their country. This provided the flexibility to address certain issues in more detail with respondents for which that issue was more relevant, and avoided my squandering of interview time on questions which were less attuned to a respondent's experiences and role. Questions addressed two main areas regarding how common policy positions arise within different bilateral donors: external influences and internal factors. These two areas mirror broadly the results shown in Chapter Four, which suggest that the adoption of world polity models is the result of both international influences and of domestic structure and context. Most interviews were digitally recorded, and then transcribed. Transcripts were reviewed, and coded to examine emergent themes, ideas, and trends within the data.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS

Respondents related their experiences about two main categories of influence on how the issue of gender equality was being addressed, had been adopted or institutionalised, and was evolving within the donor agency in their country: external influences and internal dynamics. This section will provide evidence from the interviews to illustrate what was said about these two categories of influence and to outline the processes and mechanisms that emerge from the interview data.

Chapter Four showed that world society influence on the nation state can come in several forms, and involve a range of actors. I have conceptualised external influence as stemming from agencies and actors outside of the nation-state government, including both international and domestic external influences. Of these influences, I believe there are four main types of influences that merit investigation: international organisations, international conferences and treaties, other donor nation-states, and domestic civil society. Respondents were asked about each of these factors, and to consider the extent and nature of influence that each had on the manner in which gender equality policy and programming was

conducted within the donor agency in their country. Internal factors influencing the administration of gender policies and programs were discussed with respondents by asking them about the challenges, successes, and nature of the origins and implementation of gender policies within their country's donor agency.

From this discussion of external and internal influences, three identifiable and common social processes mediating the interface of donors with the world polity and directly contributing to the institutionalisation, and refinement of a gender and development model in their policy and programming were discernible in the data. First, I will show how a process of internalisation and certification of the gender and development model was caused by mechanisms common to all three donors by which internationally generated agendas became internalised and institutionalised within donor agencies. Second, I will demonstrate how the donor agency's relationship with and level of embeddedness within civil society had a direct influence on the extent to which the gender model implemented by the donor met with international expectations. Finally, I will provide evidence to illustrate how management resistance within agencies to the implementation of gender and development models was countered through a series of interrelated mechanisms that compose a process of bureaucratic activism. Each of these processes will be shown to have direct implications for explaining the similarities and differences found between CIDA, Sida, and USAID in the gender and development case and can be considered to be key factors in shaping the diffusion and institutionalisation of other world society institutional models globally.

Internalisation and Certification

The chief social process emerging from my interviews that accounts for the influence of other international actors on donor agencies can be described as one of internalisation and certification. This is a single process through which new norms/policy models are internalised within an agency by looking outwards to certify its legitimacy. This process combines a number of mechanisms that were described by respondents during the interview process, including: setting

and policing of standards by international actors; appealing to outside authorities to certify the validity of a model; and mimicking outright other donors and their approaches to development assistance. All three of these mechanisms combine in a process of norm/model internalisation and certification, which leads donors to adopt world polity models to varying extents. In the gender case, these mechanisms were found in each of the donor country cases.

Standards Setting/Policing and the Appeal to Outside Authority

Two interrelated mechanisms of the internalisation and certification process emerging from the interviews were standards setting/policing and something I will term the 'appeal to outside authority'.

Standards setting is a mechanism by which an international body comprised of a group of national actors agree to a set of norms or standards as a *de jure* approach to a situation expected to hold for all similar actors. The standards are then upheld and monitored by the same body or group through a mechanism of standards policing. The setting of standards can be highly formalised – such as those established under the auspices of the International Organisation for Standardization – or can be informally undertaken by the acknowledged clearinghouse/summit body for a sector.

In the case of the development assistance sector, bilateral donors come together in three venues which could be argued to serve a standard-setting role: the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the United Nations, and the World Bank. The DAC is open to membership by donors only, whereas the UN and the World Bank Group includes both donors and recipients. I will argue that the case of the development assistance sector suggests that the broader the membership of the standards-setting body, the less focused, concrete, and enforceable the standards set. As such, standards policing can be less fruitful for standards agreed upon in a more diverse setting, which may appeal to either ideologically motivated goals/objectives or to the lowest-common-denominator of policies. In contrast, those standards set and upheld by a smaller group may have more 'teeth' in the sense that nation-state adherents to a specific standard may

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face more focused repercussions or reprimand among their peers. Standards policing is thus the primary mechanism at the root of the process of the DAC Peer Review.   In this respect, the small group of Western donors (twenty-two countries) might be seen to have greater ability to police standards than say the entire global membership of the United Nations General Assembly.

Complementary to standards setting and policing is the 'appeal to outside authority'. This tendency to appeal to outside authorities is a mechanism for attempting to provide greater legitimacy to an impending policy shift or change. Development agency officials will follow this path when they are attempting to establish the case for a policy change or generate more support for these changes within the agency at the management level. By highlighting the experiences of or support for a policy model by a respected outside agency or individual, development agency officials borrow legitimacy from the perceived authority of that outsider.

This outside authority provides greater legitimacy in two ways: (1) by appealing to the development agency's preference for 'best practices': If someone else is already using this approach and it is deemed a success elsewhere, then the model gains greater credibility as a new approach to adopt; and (2) by appealing to the development agency's views on its deficiencies of expertise: in cases where an agency does not have in-house experience or expertise on an issue, it is much easier to accomplish related policy change if outside expertise/experience can be emulated/mimicked in an effort to leapfrog the perceived deficiencies. The appeal to outside authority can be especially useful to more junior officials tasked with making change within the agency, as it allows them to package credibility from outside to bolster their claims/advice to senior management who might otherwise adopt a more circumspect approach to the advocated policy model shift. The outside authority can be another bilateral development agency, an international organisation, the outcomes of an international conference, or an individual/consultant/researcher. It is not necessary for the outside authority to actually be engaged in any way with the

development agency, and indeed much appeal to outside authority is based on freely available policy documents and statements.

Respondents were asked about the influence of international organisations active in the development assistance sector and of relevant international conferences and treaties on their work on gender in development assistance. Targeted questions were raised in particular about the influence of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee and of the United Nations. As these organisations work to mandate some of the international standards for development assistance in the global community, it stands to reason that they would have direct influence on donors and, more specifically on donor gender policy. In particular, the work of the DAC's GenderNet to produce a standardised set of guidelines for donors on gender equality, to standardise gender equality reporting of ODA funds, and to ensure that gender is incorporated in other DAC activities and priority areas. The United Nations has also shown the potential to be influential in its recent addition of gender equality to the international development agenda in the form of one of the Millennium Development Goals.

Respondents tended to show mixed support for the idea that these international organisations had much influence on the donor agency's gender policy or day-to-day approach to addressing gender concerns. Not surprisingly, those individuals directly involved with interacting with these international organisations claimed a much greater amount of influence than those for whom the DAC or the UN are more distant entities. For instance, one Swedish respondent who participates actively within the DAC's GenderNet suggested that the influence of the DAC guidelines and gender network was:

> …in a way quite influential I would think. You know, those guidelines were also a part of the post-Beijing 1995 push and it affected everyone. I think at that time in particular the DAC […] provided a really good forum for people to talk about this. And, it inspired – well that is what it is supposed to do, it is supposed to inspire – you know, the members and even the observers and gender has really grown. Just like a lot of the other working parties and networks. To inspire them, you know, to do their own work, to look over their own policies and things like that [September 12, 2006a].

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This inspiration provided by the DAC network and guidelines also has a recursive component, as the DAC consists of donor members and their active contribution. The work of the DAC "inspires" the network members in their work for their home country's development agency.

This influence for the DAC guidelines, as well as other international factors was echoed by a Canadian donor official, who responded that:

> Well, on the policy side, they're talking about the corporate policy on gender equality. Umm, certainly, the work of the DAC, the donors together, and the UN have influenced the policy. We drew on the DAC guidelines on gender equality and the commitments from the Commission on the Status of Women, Beijing and the whole Beijing process. [October 4, 2006]

Referring here to the creation of the most recent CIDA gender policy in 1999, the work of the DAC, its guidelines, as well as the outcome of the Beijing conference and the UN's Commission on the Status of Women are all cited as influences.

Another CIDA respondent suggested the DAC plays a role in setting standards through the collaborative work of its networks and the creation of sets of guidelines:

> Well, first of all, as you probably know, the GenderNet is a group of donors who get together once a year and discuss pertinent issues to gender equality, but we also have a program of work […] explicitly focused this year on aid effectiveness of gender, related to the Paris Declaration, as well as revising the [DAC] gender equality guidelines, which will be deliverable over the next year or two. So, we all contribute to that work within the DAC. As well as, you know, the OECD DAC peer review mechanism reviews us as donors, so Canada's currently right now in the process of having a peer review of which gender equality is part […]. In terms of our individual donor policies, I'm just going back to last year […] when all the donors were asked to fill out a questionnaire on, you know, sort of what level of resources (this is for the evaluation part of the DAC) do we commit to gender equality? Do we have a policy? How many advisors do we have? (gender equality advisors in the field, gender equality specialists in the headquarters, etc. etc.) And so, in that way, the DAC collates information on what we're doing individually as donors and puts it together. [February 13, 2007]

This respondent also highlights the role for DAC standards policing. Referring to the DAC peer review process in which several donor members review the overall development assistance program of another donor to assess how it matches with

DAC guidelines and expectations, she underlines that the DAC can influence its members through its peer review oversight. Furthermore, the DAC's role as a clearinghouse for development assistance information, data, and best practices is suggested in her discussion of the collection of information from each donor member.

In contrast to most of the government donor representatives, civil society representatives showed little indication of the influence of the DAC on their work in gender and development, and perceived little influence of the DAC on the donor's approach to gender in their respective country. This is not to say that civil society representatives were not aware of the DAC, as many echoed concerns about the recent DAC agenda on aid effectiveness which appears to limit the role for civil society in some forms of development assistance. As such, the DAC's perceived influence can be seen to vary in different sectors, and the less closely an individual is to working directly with the organisation, the less likely they are to report its influence on their country's donor agency.

The UN's influence was deemed somewhat influential as far as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were concerned, but only to the point of drawing more international attention to the issue by reframing gender equality as a specific development goal in the MDGs. Most of the references to the influence of the UN pointed to international conferences, treaties, and the MDGs. This confirmed my earlier findings from Chapter Four which demonstrate that the adoption of an initial gender policy or unit had a close correlation with some of the major international conferences on women held by the UN in the past few decades. When assessing international influences of the UN, the discussion again and again turned to these conferences, and to the more recent Millennium Declaration, which outlined the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Aside from the quotation above where a Canadian aid official suggests that the Beijing conference and the overall process of preparing for it and responding to it, helped to shape CIDA's corporate level gender policy, other respondents also discussed the influence of prominent international conferences. An American respondent suggested that the outcomes of the International

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Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 and the Platform for Action from Beijing, along with the MDGs, have been a strong influence on gender mainstreaming at USAID:

> Sure, having [gender] be, you know, integrated into the Millennium Goals was really valuable. I think that the work - the gender integration for USAID - only moved forward because of ICPD and Beijing. That was a huge impetus for USAID to work more formally on this. [November 12, 2007]

When asked if this influence was due simply to the issue being prominently placed on the international agenda by these conferences or because of the actual commitments made by countries at the conference, she responded: "Both." Similar views echoed by a Canadian respondent suggest a two-fold means by which the international conference or declaration can influence donor nation-states: First, simply by bringing prominence to an issue on the international stage; and second, by international organisations policing a nation-state's adherence to commitments made at one of these conferences or by ratifying an international treaty. In this respect, the international conferences and their subsequent statements or treaties can be seen as influencing donors both through standards setting/policing and as an external referent to which they can refer to achieve greater justification for policies within their agencies.

At the same time, dependent on the individual context of the respondent, the influence of these events can also have perceived detrimental effects on a donor's gender policies and programs. For instance, one Swedish civil society representative suggested that the Beijing Platform for Action had been very influential on donors, but had also led them astray from the overall aims of promoting women's rights and empowerment:

> I would say that the Sida position is totally gender mainstreaming - and that goes for all donors. That is the position of [our organisation] as well. But you have to gender mainstream all activities, all programs, all projects. Ah, what we are trying to do is […] is going back to Beijing '95. The policy was not gender mainstreaming period. It was gender mainstreaming and continued support to women's organizations and the fight for women's rights. So it was not actually forced out of the agenda, but the big bilaterals like Canadian CIDA or Swedish Sida opted for just understanding the

Platform for Action as a gender mainstreaming agenda. [September 12, 2007b]

From this respondent's perspective, the donors have been overly influenced by the Beijing platform, to the extent that they have lost touch with the original aims of protecting women's rights. In this regard, the powerful influence that the outcomes of the Beijing conference had on donors seems striking. Both Canadian and Swedish donor agencies are accused here of appealing to the outside authority provided by the Beijing Platform for Action to such an extent that their gender programs have become bogged down in gender mainstreaming requirements.

Whether the conference outcome documents or the actual process of preparing for and taking part in the conference, these events and their outputs have the ability to shape donor enactment of gender policy. The fact that the MDGs refer to gender equality as a goal allows donors to appeal to outside authority and refer to the MDGs as a legitimating factor to justify their gender mainstreaming activities. These external referents are perceived as valuable by those working on gender within donor agencies, as they provide an external impetus for making internal progress towards gender equality.

Contributing to the internalisation and certification of the world polity gender model within donors, the DAC clearly has a strong role in setting standards for gender and development through its issuing of guidelines, and frequent meeting of the GenderNet to determine directions recommended for DAC members. These guidelines and expectations are then evaluated and monitored through the DAC Peer Review process, where all reports now include a focus on each donor's specific gender initiatives. Recommendations stemming from the Peer Review are then used to monitor a donor's subsequent performance within the DAC. In contrast, some of the standards setting done by the United Nations in this area has had less impact on donors, although the gender component of the MDGs is still deemed influential by some donors. Still, UN policing of progress towards the MDGs has been criticised, and is not perceived by donors as having a large impact on their gender work. Other standards setting though the UN include the outcomes of the Beijing Platform for Action, which

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given the substantial focus it placed on issues like mainstreaming, can be seen to be more influential than the MDGs.

At the same time as standards setting and policing by international organisations influences donors, donors also resort to appealing to outside authorities to justify internal decisions and changes. This appeal to outside authority was very clearly demonstrated in the use of the DAC guidelines to shape policy within agencies and the justification of new approaches to gender equality based on a reference to its place on the international agenda as demonstrated by a recent conference, declaration, or meeting.

Mimicry

Mimicry is closely related to the mechanism of appealing to outside authorities. By mimicking the policy models/approaches of other donors or organisations, development agencies can adopt a policy priority in a rapid manner without having to invest as much in the genesis of a new approach or idea as they would for a *sui generis* priority/model (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Agencies mimic those other donors or international organisations that they feel demonstrate success, expertise, or 'best practices' for a given development concern. Indeed, the adoption of new policy or objectives may reflect entirely a mode of work or policy designed, implemented, and then lauded elsewhere within the development community. By adopting mimicry as a policy development mechanism, donors are looking to what their peers are doing for solutions to common problems, rather than taking unique positions or approaches themselves. Indeed, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that this mimicry allows organisations to become more certain of the outcomes of their efforts and in the process promotes greater isomorphism within an organisational field or sector. Mimicry does not require a complete adoption of an approach or model created elsewhere, but can occur in degrees where a model is taken, adapted, and then implemented in a modified form. Donors that are mimicked tend to be those perceived as 'cutting edge' or 'leading the pack' in terms of policy innovations. Mimicry allows for trailing donors or followers to achieve similar results without the need to innovate.

Indeed, because of the small community of development donors, mimicry seems to be one of the most common mechanisms for spreading policy models and promoting consensus. In a policy environment that recently has lauded donor cooperation and collaboration, the likelihood of donor mimicry seems to be increased.

Based on my respondent data, mimicry played a substantial role in the gender and development models adopted and implemented by their agencies. Indeed, the results of my event-history analysis in Chapter Four suggest that policy adoption by other donors had an influence on speeding the initial advent of a gender policy or unit by donors. As such, respondents were asked specifically about how other donors and which other donors had possibly influenced the approach to gender within their country's donor agency. Not all respondents felt that other donors were very influential, but many discussed this influence at length. Within these responses, two main themes emerged: (1) certain donors are viewed as 'leaders' in the gender field and should be emulated; (2) the influence of other donors can be quite indirect, except through the DAC venue or through multi-donor collaboration.

These themes can be seen in the following response from a Canadian aid official who, when asked about the influence of other donors, stated:

> … if you mean specific bilateral donors, yes, we've shared tools. For example, the work that was done by Swedish Sida on the sort of tip sheet approach to prompting people about gender equality aspects across the host of different themes and sectors – we borrowed from them and adapted and did some of our own and we're still doing this kind of work. Likewise, you know, other donors may borrow from us in terms of modeling of some of our programming approaches. DFID [The United Kingdom's Department for International Development] adopted almost an identical sort of gender fund mechanism based on the work we had done. In Pakistan, we've been doing some work trying to do some collaborative work with the ADB [Asian Development Bank] on gender equality and trying to influence them as an institution, but also then, for example, doing a joint country assessment on general equality for Indonesia together... [October 4, 2006]

When probed to further elaborate on other donor influence on CIDA policy, this respondent continued:

Hmm, influenced by other donors on a gender equality policy. When I saw this question[21], I did put down the DAC and the UN, like, as a group. But in terms of specific bilateral donors, I think less so. At a country level, we might see a different picture, but, I can give you some examples where, yes, we have been the lead of a donor round table suggesting that we bring together the donors on gender equality or that there's analysis lacking in the PRSP and how we can address that as a group. On our work with the ADB, it's multiple donors with DANIDA and Norway. It's not just CIDA leading the charge, but I don't think we can take credit for always being the leader. So at a policy level, perhaps it's the broad, you know, like the UN and the DAC. When it comes to programming and tools and practices, then yeah, it's a sharing back and forth, but I can't point to one specific donor that I think has been particularly influential across the board […] a specific donor doesn't come to mind. At a country level, that might be a different picture, depending on the country. [October 4, 2006]

Here, the leadership of Sida on the gender issues through the tip-sheet approach is highlighted as behaviour to emulate, and one which was being mimicked within CIDA to assist in more effective gender mainstreaming. At the same time, CIDA is being portrayed as a leader in the field being emulated by Britain's DFID. Furthermore, influence at the macro policy level is not perceived as strong, but when it comes to collaborating on gender work, the influence of others can be felt. The ties built by working together with other donors can therefore be a significant influence.

Again, the idea of collaborating with others and the importance of discussion with other donors is raised by an American respondent:

There was a meeting that was funded by Gates, in Washington, that brought together different funders to talk about this important agenda [constructive engagement of men] and kind of think strategically about how to move forward. USAID was a participant, we presented on a panel with other donors. So there has been discussion with other donors, on this area of work and progress so far and how we can promote it further. […] The organizations that I remember were there were the World Bank, Swedish Sida, Canadian CIDA, and I think DFID might have been there as well. [November 12, 2007]

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[21] This respondent only agreed to an interview if they were able to see a basic list of questions in advance. This did not prevent me from exploring other topics and probing further on different responses.

Here, collaboration on a specific issue – the engagement of men in gender programming – brought together multiple donors to strategise over how to move ahead in that area. Sharing experiences between agencies appears here to play a role in the influence of other donors on gender policy.   Although not an explicit example of copying of other donors, this collaboration and sharing of best practices can indirectly lead to agencies emulating others.

Based on the above comments, donor mimicry and collaboration may be considered more of a dialogue than a unidirectional mechanism. Indeed, in situations where a donor agency is perceived as a leader, or the leader, in an area like gender – the perception of other donor influence may flow towards other donors rather than inwards. As a Swedish aid official noted when asked about whether other donors had much influence on Sida's gender policy:

> I don't think that they have been so involved or influential […] – no – I don't think so. Because from what I have read of others, I think ours is more progressive and goes a little bit farther. For example New Zealand contacted me in May or something for their revision or their writing of it [a gender policy], the first one. I know that has happened before with my predecessors as well, that they have been contacted by others. [September 12, 2006c]

Instead of Sida being influenced by others, the 'progressive' policy they already possess is seen to be influencing other donor agencies who attempt to emulate it. With donors who are newly developing gender policies looking to Sida as a model.   In this sense, a donor with a reputation for leadership on the gender issues is influential, but perhaps not influenced as much by other countries.

Mimicry within the community of donors in the gender field is clearly evident in the interview responses discussing the influence of other donors. Donors discussed the copying of specific components of another donors approach: CIDA's adoption of Sida's gender tip-sheets; Sida's adoption of DFID's help-desk approach; DFID's copying of a gender project format in Asia. Each of these provides an example of mimicry where the influence of other donors takes hold. Indeed, examining the spread of the gender policy or unit among donors at the macro level as I did in Chapter Four, the mechanism of mimicry would play a

significant role in explaining some of the influence of policy density demonstrated in my event-history models.

The process of internalisation and certification of the gender and development model was clearly demonstrated in responses from all three donor countries. Standards setting and policing was a strong influence on all three donors, as was the adoption of appealing to outside authority to justify new approaches to gender. Mimicry also played a role for both CIDA and USAID, while Sida was indeed reporting being mimicked by others. These three mechanisms all interrelate to encourage a process of internalisation by which donors take on an external model as their own and a process of certification which validates that model as acceptable, effective, and appropriate to their needs. The influences of the DAC, the UN, international conferences and treaties, and of other donors are strong determinants of the internalisation and certification process. In all three donor country cases examined here, an outwards-oriented perspective was used to enable and justify movement towards a common approach to gender and development.

Embeddedness within Civil Society

Based on Peter Evans' (1995) concept of embedded autonomy, I will define donor agency embeddedness within civil society as the extent to which the actions and objectives of the donor are linked to or engage with domestic development-oriented civil society. What level of influence does civil society have on donor policy and programmes? How open is the donor to civil society advocacy and input into the directions that development assistance policy takes? Indicators of embeddedness might include: the presence of active donor-led networks involving civil society and donor actors, levels of personnel-exchange between donor and NGOs, personal relationships between donor and civil society personnel, in-depth consultation of civil society stakeholders by donors during the policy development process, and openness to civil society advocacy on the part of donors. Higher degrees of embeddedness reflect a greater connection between the

donor agency and its domestic civil society. The less embedded the donor, the less sway its civil society will have on development assistance outcomes for that country.

Respondents were asked to assess the influence of domestic civil society organisations on their donor agency's gender policy. The focus was on domestic civil society, in particular the community of development NGOs in each country, but some respondents also touched upon international NGOs involved in this area and talked of their potential influence. On the whole, the amount of reported influence of domestic civil society varied widely, depending on the respondent and depending on the country involved. Indeed, those countries where a greater amount of involvement of civil society in the development assistance sector tended to report greater influence, and those without, less. However, one contradiction of this was the significant involvement of civil society in USAID's Interagency Gender Working Group (IGWG), and as collaborators with the agency's WID office. Here, USAID is working very closely with NGO representatives to collaborate on defining directions for both the donor and civil society to take on gender in the population and health fields. According to one respondent, this collaboration exerted influence in both directions:

> I think that we brought partners to the IGWG, who were doing innovative work and really could make technical contributions and help us in advocacy. But at the same time, we also are exerting our pressure as a funder on other cooperating agencies. [November 12, 2007]

This collaborative networking and sharing between donor and civil society had the effect of influencing USAID's directions on gender, but also gave the donor the opportunity to influence NGO partners and implementing agencies. This donor influence on civil society was achieved through the use of donor conditionalities and requirements imposed in contracts and requests for proposals.

The access of civil society to the Sida was also facilitated through a donor-NGO network on gender issues. Though less formalised than USAID's IGWG, this network was perceived by a Sida respondent as a space for:

> …sharing of information and sharing experiences and getting to know what is up, what is new, what is happening. […] Also to discuss, I mean whether

Sweden, our policy last year for example, to get feedback from them. [September 12, 2006c]

Here, the respondent suggests utilising the network for direct consultation of civil society partners on the new directions taken in Sida's gender policy. Having a pre-existing informal donor-NGO network facilitates this consultation and gives civil society the opportunity to provide input and influence on donor policy decisions. The informality of this network, consisting of the two Sida gender advisors and approximately 20 Swedish NGO representatives was highlighted by another respondent who takes part in the network and called it:

a strategic and undercover alliance, between internal Sida staff and the NGO sector. [September 12, 2006b]

The fact that Sida is engaging, even informally and inconspicuously, with critical voices from civil society is indicative of the potential influence of NGOs on the gender model adopted in Sweden. This influence, one respondent suggested, might also be further enabled by the fact that one of Sida's two dedicated gender advisors was a recent recruit from a Swedish NGO where they had previously been responsible for gender programming. This raises another issue of external influence through close ties to internal channels, something I will explore in the next section.

CIDA also had some experience recently of consulting with civil society on the directions to take on gender, but not in the form of a formal or informal network with civil society. However, the extent of influence might be questioned given the respondent's difficulty in remembering the incident:

You know, I'm racking my brain here. We had a round table with our previous Minister a year and a half ago […] on gender equality and we'd invited a number of civil society representatives, multilateral and bilateral to comment on our strategy paper back then and yeah, I would say, I mean, there are a number of organizations that throughout time, have had some impact. [February 13, 2006]

In contrast to responses such as these indicating a significant role for civil society influence on gender policy and approaches, some respondents felt there was less direct influence by domestic civil society on donor's gender work, and indeed

called into question the progress on gender made by NGOs. One Canadian aid official responded to a question about civil society influence with:

> No, they don't contact us about that. In fact, we are the ones that have to, quite often, force the issue. Civil society on gender is quite weak. At least the ones we're finding. I mean, and these are the best ones, and they're still weak. They don't have a gender specialist in a lot of cases and if they get one, they're like, "Well, look, we have a gender specialist." Well do something. Write a strategy. […] From that perspective they need quite a bit to move forward on that. [December 21, 2006]

A former Canadian official suggested that some advocacy had occurred, but it was not always consistent, and often CIDA turned around on these agencies, calling their approaches to gender into question:

> But, I would say that the pressures on the agenda, the advocacy kinds of pressures have come more from the development organizations that have picked up on the issue. In the earlier days that was, you know, groups like Oxfam and so on. I mean, they…and CUSO to some extent, but again, some of those groups didn't do so well internally in their own organizations and then CIDA would come back at them through the CIDA gender equality policy as applied to if you want our funding then we want to see this. [December 13, 2006]

Domestic civil society's influence was therefore quite conditional on the type of relationship that the donor has with civil society. If a network existed for the discussion and furthering of gender aims, then civil society was more likely to be perceived as influential. If consultations and advocacy were more limited or ad hoc, then the extent of civil society influence on gender policy was also likely to be perceived as such.

In this gender and development case study, it is clear that development assistance donors with existing formal or informal donor-NGO networks on gender equality were more likely to report being influenced by civil society. In turn, this civil society influence seemed to push donors towards a more fully implemented gender and development model incorporating all components of the world polity model I discussed earlier. The integration of donor-civil society networks on gender equality into donor work on the issue is a clear marker in the Swedish and American cases of a greater degree of embeddedness in civil society.

Development NGOs in both cases have access and opportunity to influence the outcome of donor work on the gender issue, and the donors appear to seek out and respond to this influence. In contrast, the Canadian case shows a relative detachment from civil society, and indeed, provides evidence of the donor shaping civil society agendas rather than vice versa. As a result, it seems that Canadian implementation of the gender and development model sometimes fails to integrate the most advanced forms of mainstreaming or gender theory on men and masculinities into CIDA's approach to gender.

Management Resistance and Bureaucratic Activism

Issues of management and personnel directly reflect the influence of human agency on the resistance to and implementation of gender programs within development assistance donor agencies. Within aid bureaucracies I will argue that this agency can indeed take the form of activism or advocacy on behalf of select issues and priorities. In discussing the challenges and successes of gender and development approaches, respondents frequently referred to several forms of bureaucratic activism tied to combating management resistance that had significant impact on the nature of gender programming in their country's donor agency. Four such mechanisms indicative of bureaucratic activism emerged from the interviews: gender champions, bureaucrat guerrillas and entrepreneurs, and personnel exchange. Before exploring each of these mechanisms in turn I will first outline the case for management resistance made by respondents.

As one respondent above already noted with the personal priorities of CIDA's senior management, the potential hurdle posed by managerial resistance to gender policies is a difficulty faced across development agencies. One consultant suggested that the extent of gender implementation in a program depends directly on the prerogatives of the program manager:

> It's not done systematically. I don't want to say it's haphazard, but it's, and
> it's not ad hoc, but it's a blend, like people know it's a professional issue
> that you have to respond to, but depending on a variety of factors, the
> managers and advisors will you know, apply it or go for it or not. So that
> goes from people who are totally resistant and you have people today in
> CIDA that, you know, have screamed even at me and sometimes, you know,

not just because it's me but because it was gender. To people who are like, you know, if they become manager it's like: "Now!" They want things now and it's great like they'll put, you know […] I've seen that. [December 14, 2006]

Another Canadian respondent, when discussing the initial advent of a WID policy at the agency suggested:

So, another thing I'm saying here right now is that a lot has depended on key individuals in key positions being interested in that agenda and being able…and saying, "We'll take it on." And, the other side of that is…and I think this is really underappreciated is the extent to which decisions are driven by management stuff, management concerns that then have a bad impact usually…often on policy. […] I've watched ridiculous decisions made by senior management that you know, where did this come from and it's against anything that might have been coming forward through a rational decision making process. It's just suddenly flipped from the top down […] It takes your breath away to watch this kind of crappy decision being made by whom, you don't know, and for what reasoning, you don't know. [December 13, 2006]

The potential impact of managerial decision-making on the application of appropriate gender polices and initiatives is perceived as substantial. Indeed, the comment above delineates a clear us and them relationship between those considered 'in-the-know' about gender issues and the management who have the power to make decisions about them.

This obstacle posed by management within agencies and their potential resistance or indifference to gender and development was echoed in all three agencies. One Sida official indicated that the successful implementation of Sida's gender policies was directly related to management leadership on the issue:

I would say that the success, in brackets, depends to a large extent on whether the management at the division, the head of the division or head of department has the interest and has the knowledge and can provide sort of managerial support. [September 12, 2006c]

Management within the agencies, whether at the divisional or at the corporate level are deemed by respondents to play a gatekeeper role in facilitating the implementation of gender initiatives, especially with recent focuses on mainstreaming of gender and making it the responsibility of all agency officials.

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One American civil society respondent extended the notion of management beyond the senior management of the donor agency to broader political circles, describing their advocacy efforts on women and girls in development assistance:

> We engaged at the top level, before there was this scandal with Ambassador Tobias. […] We actually met with him and his senior staff a number of times on this. However, overall, this administration has not shown itself to be strongly committed women's rights and empowerment. [July 26, 2007]

Those working in development assistance from the civil society side also identify the obstacle posed by senior management who give low priority to gender and development, and link that management to the political administration which appointed it. In this case, the one-time head of USAID, a political appointee, is portrayed as resistant to advocacy on the issue of women and girls in development despite multiple meetings on the subject.

To combat management resistance respondents identified several strategies of bureaucratic activism through which individuals and groups were able to further gender objectives within donor organisations. These included the work of gender 'champions' within agencies, bureaucratic entrepreneurialism, bureaucratic 'guerrilla' tactics, and the influence of personnel exchange with outside organisations.

Gender Champions

Champions are high profile or long-serving individuals within an agency tasked with shepherding an issue or initiative within the organisation. Having a champion to focus attention upon an issue, move forward a transformative shift in policy, or bend the ear of senior management within an agency relies on the determined leadership of that person to complement the efforts of others. The champion can be a very effective means of refocusing attention on a previously moribund issue, or one which is deemed in need of a reinvigoration of effort. It appears that the two key outcomes offered by effective championing of an issue within an organisation are: (1) increased organisational inertia and urgency

surrounding an issue; and (2) decreased resistance or indifference to an issue from others in senior management.

A gender champion is typically a senior management member who, although possibly not a gender expert, is respected within the agency and internationally, and takes on a sometimes unofficial role of promoting gender issues through both formal and informal channels. One respondent from CIDA emphasised the importance of these champions in recent years in bringing additional momentum to gender and development issues on the international agenda:

> I think that's given a renewed focus and like I say, it's been, in my view, had a lot to do with championing as well. You know there have been various champions in the multilateral institutions, but also in the donor agencies and you know the fact that we, at CIDA, have a champion, is giving us a whole lot more energy and attention and… Well, if you get the opportunity to speak to Diane, you'll be amazed by I think, by the dedication and motivation she has for making this work.

> [Would it be fair to say that the main advantage of the championing is essentially that it puts a voice for gender equality at the most senior management levels?]

> Yes. Yes. And also, so you know, there's obviously the corporate level as well as the international profile leadership, if you want to call it that. I mean, it's on a number of levels, but internally, she champions it. The Executive Vice-President champions it from the point of view of increased resources, looking at revamping the training that the agency receives on gender equality, and essentially ensuring that you know, whether it be CDPFs [Country Development Programming Frameworks] or memos that, you know, that gender equality is continuously there. [February 13, 2007]

Another CIDA respondent commented on the gender equality champion, suggesting that she was responsible for an increased focus on gender within the agency in the past year:

> I think a big change that I've noticed with CIDA is with the Executive Vice-President coming on board and being named the gender equality champion. She takes that role quite seriously, which is a good or a bad thing because she's a doer, she wants to change things but she also wants has very specific ideas and sometimes she is not always – sometimes she's pushing a little too hard I would say. It's an interesting relationship but her presence has actually been valuable and Africa Branch in May of this year, May 2006, we

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did a gender equality workshop, a pan-Africa one and the VP went to that and that really seemed to spur her on and she had a chance to listen to people in the field especially and that seemed to – she got a lot of ideas from the workshop report and the recommendations coming from the participants that she been trying to move forward and a lot of the stuff she's been pushing on now or you see in the draft strategy that she has developed very much comes from the workshop that we did and the recommendations coming out of that workshop.

[So the impact of having a champion like that, that has perhaps a little more leverage to focus on these issues - you've seen some positive benefits?]

Oh yeah, she can get people to listen...right…you need somebody high up that thinks it's important. I mean we have a policy, which is great. But if it's not being implemented or nothing is making sure if it's being implemented it has limited impact. [December 20, 2006]

Here, the respondent highlights the importance of exposing the gender champion to ideas, people, and experiences that can help to motivate and shape her action on behalf of gender equality within the agency. Furthermore, she highlights the importance of having a champion who can "get people to listen" and has clout with senior management and decision makers. Indeed, more recently at CIDA, following the departure from the organisation of the gender champion respondents are discussing above, the role has actually been taken on by the current agency President. It is too soon to evaluate what impact this has had on the implementation of CIDA's gender policies and initiatives.

The gender champion did not always need to be an individual with high profile or clout with senior management. In one example provided from experience within USAID, a respondent noted that champions can simply be recognisable and long-serving individuals working actively on gender issues within the organisation. The key combination she highlighted was the need for a champion to have resources behind them – financial backing to achieve specific aims.

The implication here is that champions can circumvent or subvert possible resistance or reluctance within senior management of an agency to move forward with a more progressive gender agenda. The responses above clearly illustrate the credit given to effective championing of the issue within CIDA and USAID, and

the substantial impact that this leadership on an issue provides. Whether from a senior manager, or a long-serving and respected expert on a topic, the championing of the gender issue has played significant role in the institutionalisation and evolution of the gender and development approach within donor agencies by playing a figurehead role among other bureaucrat activists and stemming management resistance to gender approaches.

Bureaucratic Entrepreneurialism

In some cases, the line between champion and another type of official working within these agencies can blur. Whereas gender champions tend to be officially acknowledged or appointed to the role within an organisation, it often occurs that an individual may attempt to advance the gender agenda in a more independent and unofficial manner. These instances include those where an individual is able to push forward a gender policy or program out of sheer effort and will despite either resistance or unawareness more broadly in the agency. One Swedish respondent highlighted how this can occur in an instance where a supportive manager and interested official coexist:

> Yes, it is the so called perfect mix of a head of division or in some cases head of department, who is interested and has some knowledge and who wants to promote this, and a program officer who has the same inspiration or whatever. So when they meet, that is when things happen. [September 12, 2006c]

The confluence of these two individuals permits the officer or gender advisor to push forward with policy and programming developments that, though not necessarily resisted or lauded by the agency, are at least tolerated. One respondent labelled this a form of bureaucratic entrepreneurialism, with progress being made off the work of one or two individuals in a way that was permitted but perhaps unconventional within the system.

Bureaucratic entrepreneurialism can be found in situations where aid agency officials take it upon themselves to advocate and push through policy reforms that as yet are not institutionalised within the agency. This internal advocacy appropriates outside information, experiences, and resources to make

gains within the organisation on a specific issue – even in the face of resistance from upper-level management and political staff. The entrepreneurial aspect of this behaviour is the 'self-starting' nature of the bureaucrat entrepreneur. This official has no downward pressure from his/her management to advocate for these policy changes, but instead takes it upon themselves to make changes for a perceived greater good. Individual effort therefore exerts unexpected influence in this situation on policy outcomes of the institution. The bureaucrat entrepreneur can gain prestige within the organisation if the reforms for which they advocate are eventually accepted and perceived within the organisation as her 'baby'. Bureaucratic entrepreneurialism requires an enabling environment of sufficient resources and opportunity structures within the organisation which permits the bureaucrat entrepreneur to operate openly. If these resources and opportunity structures do not exist, then such reforms may only take place in a situation of guerrilla bureaucracy.

Over a longer period of time, individuals who carve out an entrepreneurial niche for themselves *vis a vis* gender equality work in the agency become recognised as the resource to consult on the issues. One USAID gender advisor noted this:

> And in fact both of us have been in the same position in the same office, for a while. I think that it is very important because there is tremendous turnover and movement within USAID. And often an issue is carried forward because of an individual's commitment and connections and so the fact that there has been some stability, I think, has benefited the work of [the Agency]. [November 12, 2007]

When individual opportunities to promote gender equality are matched with a long-term dedication to the issue and latitude within the agency to achieve some results, these gender entrepreneurs can become valued assets within the corporate structure for the implementation of gender objectives and policies.

The important role of bureaucratic entrepreneurialism was most evident in the interviews in the discussion of the early stages of WID and GAD work at CIDA, as well as in the work of the IGWG at USAID. Self-starting individuals who act almost as internal activists within agencies to push forward the gender

equality approach appear to have played a significant role in shaping donor outcomes on gender and the widespread adoption of a gender model resulting from substantial world society influence.

Guerrilla Bureaucrats

When this entrepreneurialism crosses into actual actions or tactics that run contrary to the wishes of senior management or politicians, the transgression can take the form of what several respondents labelled 'guerrilla' tactics. Guerrilla bureaucracy can be seen in instances where officials undertake change or advocacy within the organisation which is not authorised or supported by management in the present environment. These actions take place without the knowledge of apex decision-makers with the intent of building momentum for change that will make the initiative/reform almost irresistible or difficult to ignore when they are revealed. It is possible that such action can make a change a *fait accompli* that cannot be resisted tactfully by management. The guerrilla bureaucrat is an advocate for a resisted or unpopular idea which cannot as yet be stomached by the mainstream decision-makers in the organisation, and therefore tries to bring the idea to the table in ways the subvert the current policy process to their own ends. The guerrilla aspect of these activities arises from the fact that they are conducted by small groups or individuals and tend to hold some element of surprise or ambush, hence likening them to guerrilla warfare. These tactics may be employed by the bureaucrat advocate as a form of internal advocacy/activism within an organisation or among a senior management that is perceived as resistant to change or resistant to adopt a new policy priority/direction. The distinction from normal bureaucratic activism/entrepreneurialism is the concealed nature of the activities.

A retired CIDA official detailed an instance early in her career when, following a talk on discrimination against women in the Canadian public service, a group of women within CIDA took it upon themselves to push for change within the agency:

Well the people who came to that [talk] said, "Gee, you know, this is really interesting. What could we do to kind of carry things on?" And out of that, I would have to say, I think, we started a few – it's almost like guerrilla action. You know, that's a word I would have to use. It comes out of the ways in which people, like me, had to work just to get things onto an agenda. Get it on the agenda. It was like working, doing things, when, in my old group back in Toronto, to get the attention by sometimes even embarrassment of leaders in government who were just not paying attention. So, anyway, one of the things that we did was Marcel Massé was the new President of CIDA and he said, "I want to meet with groups of employees." So the Executive Assistant of [a CIDA Vice President] said to me […], "Hey, I have to set up these groups, so, we could make an all women group and then talk about these issues." So we did that. Well, imagine when some men discovered that there was miraculously a group of women officers who were – one group was consisting of women officers. "Well, that's discrimination!!!" Of course they never cared about discrimination if it was in the other direction. So, we said, "Well, we're going to…" and we organized and we had this whole thing set up so that specific women were at that lunch meeting and he thought he was just going to have a little chat with the gals. We were going to raise specific issues that came out of, you know, which were then on the agenda from the UN report. So, again you're looking at […] things like the end of Women's Decade reporting stuff from the UN. So, that's what happened. […] Yes, after the lunch meeting and Massé was thunderstruck enough to say, "Well I guess you could write me something on this." Ok. So we did. [December 14, 2006]

By seizing on an opportunity in an innovative and unexpected manner, this group of women officers ambushed the CIDA President so that he was forced to respond with moving ahead the Women in Development agenda at the time. Despite resistance from male colleagues who were defiant about the prospect of an all-female group meeting with the President, this unexpected action was successful in circumventing some of the resistance within the agency to make an impact on senior management and provide impetus to further the gender agenda at CIDA. The guerrilla aspect of such an approach can be seen in the unexpected pathway through which this action managed to "get it on the agenda" despite perceived resistance.

This notion of unwanted or guerrilla action within the donor agency was highlighted by a Sida respondent who discussed the difficulty faced by regular program officers tasked with gender responsibilities over and above their day-to-day tasks in the face of resistant management:

> [T]hey have had to struggle towards their leadership in order to be able to be it. Maybe their leadership does not find it so necessary to put time into it. [September 12, 2006c]

The notion of the struggle involved to make gender work within their programs, suggests the need to work outside the accepted parameters or to disrupt the expectations of resistant individuals to facilitate furthering of gender equality approaches in their work. According to several of my respondents, this individual agency involved battling resistance and indifference within their donor agency is a critical component to making innovative progress on the gender issue.

In this case study, the most striking example arising from my interview data was the push by the group of women CIDA officials to orchestrate a situation where the then CIDA President could not but opt for asking them to come forward with a strategy on how to make CIDA a more equal workplace. This ambush was in the face of resistance from others within the organisation and totally unexpected from the perspective of senior management, but still yielded a positive outcome. Guerrilla bureaucracy like this can therefore be considered the most overt form of bureaucratic activism responsible for shaping gender and development approaches in development assistance donors.

Personnel Exchange

Throughout the interviews, one additional factor related to bureaucratic activism emerged as a significant consideration in the adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of gender models among all three donors: personnel exchange. Here I am referring not to the high levels of turnover reported in all three donor cases, but to the origins of the individuals who are brought into donor agencies to fill positions tied to gender equality concerns. The phenomenon of personnel exchange is appropriate here because it indicates the extent to which personnel being integrated into donors are bringing with them the perspectives and experiences of their work in other organisations, and which helps to shape new directions within donors. In all three donors this phenomenon was seen when individuals tasked with women in development or gender responsibilities were brought into the agency from a previous position with a civil

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society group, an international organisation, or another government body. In the case of Sida for instance, one of the two gender advisors had been freshly recruited from a major Swedish civil society group where she had been responsible for gender programming. CIDA also had gender advisors who had been integrated into the agency from previous roles with the Status of Women Canada (a government department dedicated to women's issues and equality), the United Nations, and even from former roles as independent gender consultants. USAID similarly demonstrated the transfer of people into its WID Office from previous work within the United Nations system. This phenomenon is partly a reflection of the need to hire people with gender equality expertise to undertake gender work and is therefore unsurprising, but is also indicative of the pathways through which the flow of standardised models, ideas, and norms of gender equality from the international organisations, civil society groups, and expert communities of the world polity into nation-state organisations can occur.

Personnel exchange can be seen where individuals have been exchanged, either formally or informally, between organisations – specifically between government and non-governmental organisations. Exchanged persons, those whom have moved from the civil-society sector, international organisations, or other government departments into the development assistance donor, carry with them the training, experiences, and frames which they have accrued in their former employ and bring them to bear on new situations and experiences in their new position and organisation. Personnel exchange might be expected to play a key role in policy reforms in two ways: (1) Exchanged persons have the potential to make easier 'targets' for outside advocacy, as they may prove more sympathetic to former colleagues and causes; (2) Exchanged persons bring an outsider perspective on internal matters that may make them better suited to adopt activist stances and support significant changes within an organisation. However, it must be noted that this may not be uniformly the case, as exchanged persons also may become less open to advocacy, and less willing to express an outsider perspective if they are in an environment that discourages/is less open to these

views. An organisation can therefore be more or less encouraging of personnel exchange.

Personnel exchange can flow both ways across the government/civil society divide, but functions similarly in both domains. Personnel exchange can also occur between intergovernmental and government/civil society organisations, with individuals moving fluidly between international organisations and national-level bodies. The international nature of the development assistance sector lends itself to high levels of personnel exchange. Trends include the movement of senior governmental officials into private sector and civil society positions later in their careers, as well as the movement of civil society workers into official government positions earlier in their careers in search of greater stability or compensation.

My gender case clearly established personnel exchange as playing a role in all three country contexts. Indeed, gender expertise accrued outside a donor agency is an asset which is apparently valued highly by donors who have brought individuals into their systems from civil society, international organisations, or other government departments. Once integrated into the agency these exchanged persons have the potential to play a key role in advocating for gender and development approaches which challenge the status quo within donors. In so doing, the exchanged individuals can play a key role in supporting bureaucratic activism on gender within a donor agency.

Bureaucratic activism is thus a complex process manifested with several different mechanisms. The most commonly reported and experienced forms of bureaucratic activism were the gender champion, the bureaucrat entrepreneur, and personnel exchange. All of these factors were evident in each of the donor country cases examined here. Guerrilla bureaucracy, on the other hand, was mostly demonstrated in the CIDA context, with a few mentions of the theme by Sida representatives. This less common, but highly interesting, form of bureaucratic activism also played a role in shaping gender and development approaches in those countries. On the whole, bureaucratic activism is the chief

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process by which management resistance to the adoption, institutionalisation, or refinement of a world polity model is abrogated.

CONCLUSION

This comparative case study of gender and development in three countries shows that there are three common social mechanisms which can be seen to account for some of the striking similarities within the application of gender and development models in each donor agency. By examining the responses of individual development assistance workers from donors and civil society in each country, I have shown that, regardless of different contexts implied in the development assistance sector in each case, these common processes and their related mechanisms underline the interface of donor agencies with world society and the models of gender and development it promulgates. The combination of processes of internalisation and certification, embeddedness within civil society, and bureaucratic activism can be seen to account for the influence of the world polity on donor uptake of gender and development models in the development assistance sector. More analysis of how these processes and mechanisms link together to intervene in the nation-state/world society interface is still required and will follow in Chapter Eight. First, however, I will turn to the case of security and development and look for similar common mechanisms at work in explaining the recent spread of security and development approaches among donors. Synthesising information on both cases will provide the basis on which I will be able to make assertions about how these mechanisms concatenate to form the social processes that have been absent in previous world polity explanations of isomorphism and globalisation.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SECURITY, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Before the 1990s, development assistance donors for the most part eschewed issues of security and conflict. When countries experienced conflict and insecurity, development assistance programs tended to be suspended, and the focus of international donors would shift to humanitarian assistance to stem crises. In the wake of the Cold War, and the growth in intra-state conflict in much of the developing world, the need for development assistance to re-examine its approach to dealing with societies in conflict emerged. Indeed, in recent years, an entire approach to addressing issues of security and conflict in development assistance has appeared in international development discourse. Approaches to human security, and later to security-sector reform, have become a distinct priority for donors and other international organisations. Like the case of gender equality explored in the previous chapter, the similarities among diverse donors on this issue of security and conflict in development are striking, particularly in relation to the influence of such organizations of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (UNDP 1994; OECD 2004a; OECD 2004c). Despite these similarities, this security and development model is applied to different degrees by various donors because of the different experience of processes and mechanisms at work within each donor context.

This raises the question again of what social processes facilitate the influence of world society on the nation-state. Are the processes similar to those seen in the gender equality case? Why have divergent donor agendas again found common ground around the security and development issue? What accounts for variance in the degree of implementation of world society models by donors? This chapter will examine these questions and explore the emergence and implementation of recent donor treatment of security and conflict as a development assistance priority. Interviews with donor and civil society

representatives from the three case study countries of Canada, Sweden, and the United States will be analysed to identify common mechanisms and processes at work in mediating the interface of world society and the nation-state. The commonalities and differences emerging from this data will be used to compare and contrast the three countries' approaches to integrating a security and conflict approach into their development assistance programs. I will show how, despite experiencing common social processes at work in each case, the overall implementation of security and development frameworks results from the interplay of those processes with donor agency structure and each country's specific contexts.

BACKGROUND

State Security as a World Polity Model

State security is arguably an inherent component of any viable nation-state. Indeed, definitions of statehood have included the notion of controlling the means of violence within society as a criteria (Mann 1984). Unfortunately, the state's security apparatus and related institutions have not been discussed widely as a world polity model in the literature. One exception is in relation to war, where institutions of war have been shown to emerge from world polity sources. For instance, the codification of the rules of war in the Geneva Convention has been shown to be the direct outcome of the cultural influence of the International Red Cross (Finnemore 1999). However, this is only one segment of security institutions of the state and more analyses are needed to determine the institutional framework for legitimate statehood shared by most nation-states and spread through world society. The broad prescriptive norms and expectations of statehood espoused by world society shape what it is to be a state and how the state should be structured (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Kim, Jang et al. 2002; Meyer 2007). These norms and expectations have been extended even to common approaches to development planning, out of which the concept and models of development assistance have emerged (Hwang 2006). With this structuring of states, and the spread of common planning frameworks to support development

came the adoption of common components of statehood, such as constitutions, citizenship, and central banks (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Meyer 2007). It can be argued, therefore that security institutions of the state including militaries, police, legal-judicial systems, and correctional systems could also be considered to stem from common, somewhat standardised, institutional frameworks of world society. The lack of effective implementation of these structures, and therefore the presence of intra-state conflict, has long been an explanation for the existence of weak states throughout the developing world (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Migdal 1988; Holsti 1996; Goodwin 2001). It is in this context, therefore, that state security and the security of individuals in society (human security) have become yet another focus of the world polity. In this context, world society's various organisations have addressed security in the broader context of not only war, militaries, and the police, but also legal/judicial and correctional/penal institutions. It is clear that the discourse on human and national security has evolved over a long period, and in more recent years – particularly following the end of the Cold War era in the early 1990s – has been absorbed into the broader discourse on international development and development assistance. The integration of security institutions and models into the standards and norms promoted by the world polity is something that has to this point been largely overlooked in world polity research. This chapter will contribute a better understanding of how security has evolved as a world polity model, and in particular demonstrate how issues of security have been integrated into world polity models of development assistance in recent years.

Security as a Development Concern

For many years following the advent of development assistance as an international discourse and institution, it was considered by many in development circles to be an apolitical tool of humanitarian support (Ferguson 1994). In this respect, development assistance was not commonly focused on working in areas of insecurity or conflict – partly because of the often complex political manoeuvrings this sort of work would entail, and partly because the main focus of

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development assistance in its early years was state-based economic development something that was typically compromised by insecurity.[22] By the conclusion of the Cold War and the beginning of transition towards democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, this tendency to avoid development assistance programming in countries and societies affected by conflict was beginning to be tested. In particular, the sharp increase in intra-state conflict in the developing world in the 1990s was seen as a driving force for the re-evaluation of the relationship between development and conflict or insecurity. Genocidal wars in Rwanda, Burundi, and Bosnia, as well as seemingly intractable intra-state conflict in Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the former Zaire all contributed to calls for a re-examination of international security frameworks, and gave the West pause to consider the potential vulnerabilities that might emerge from increased conflict in the developing world (Nef 1999). Furthermore, in some of these conflicts researchers and development practitioners have gone so far as to implicate development assistance as a potential contributor to the violence and insecurity – the Rwandan genocide is a key example (Uvin 1998; Uvin 1999; Andersen 2000).

One of the first key attempts to develop a framework for addressing the seeming increase in insecurity in the 1990s came in the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 *Human Development Report* subtitled "New Dimensions of Human Security" (UNDP 1994). This report outlined the concept of human security for the first time by a major international organisation. Human security was viewed as possessing four characteristics: (1) universality – it was applicable to all people everywhere; (2) interdependence – human insecurity in one place affects the entire world; (3) requires prevention early on rather than intervention after the fact – up-front investments in human security yield more

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[22] I am not implying that during the Cold War aid with specific political aims was not provided by the opposing sides. Indeed, the destination of much aid had particular political aims and goals underlying the tacit goals of development. Still, the development assistance sector has been criticised by others for ignoring or minimising these political motivations: See Ferguson, J. (1994). *The anti-politics machine: "development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.; and Escobar, A. (1995). *Encountering development : the making and unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

results than dealing with crises after they have happened; and (4) people-centred – it focuses on people and societies, and how to help them live in peace. In some sense, human security was posed in the report as a broad overarching concern for development that could entail any number of security threats experienced by people: disease, crime, hunger, unemployment, and even environmental or political hazards (UNDP 1994). The chief contribution of this concept to the development agenda was in attempting to frame security as an issue that dealt with people and their lives as a broad spectrum of security concerns, rather than focusing on traditional security concerns of states, territories, militaries, and so on.

Framing human security as a key element of human development, the UNDP emphasised that human security entailed two components: freedom from fear and freedom from want. In this respect, the concept provided very little precision in terms of its definition and also in terms of the initiatives needed to promote human security. This lack of precision would play a substantial role in the failure of human security to gain wide acceptance in the development assistance sector globally. Critics of the human security concept have pointed out these flaws, and suggested that the human security concept was motivated largely by a desire by the development community to obtain a part of the substantial political and financial resources traditionally dedicated to the conventional security sector (Paris 2001; King and Murray 2002). Indeed, the difficulties in precisely defining human security can be argued to have limited its overall implementation as a programming or policy priority in much of the development community. Despite efforts by several 'middle power' states to craft their foreign policies around a human security agenda and to establish a vibrant international community working on human security initiatives, human security failed to become a major contributor to new directions in development programming (King and Murray 2002). This failure for activities implementing a human security approach to coalesce around the concept is blamed directly on the concept's vague definition, which one critic stated "verges on meaninglessness" (Paris 2001).

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In the wake of the relative failure of the human security agenda to transform development thinking, the next trend in the evolving relationship between development and security has been a more recent focus on Security-Sector Reform (SSR) in the developing world (Smith 2001). The OECD DAC defines SSR as seeking to "increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law" (OECD 2004b). This SSR agenda is primarily an issue of improving the governance and accountability of security institutions in developing countries. The development community thus treats SSR primarily as a governance issue, aiming to improve the state and its ability to fight poverty and improve development through improved efficiency of the security sector. This yields SSR initiatives that span an entire range of possibilities: working to disarm and demobilise combatants, police training, judicial and legal reforms, professionalization of militaries, and improving overall security policy coherence (Smith 2001; OECD 2004b). Though SSR had been ongoing in several developing countries for most of the 1990s, the issue did not become more widely acknowledged as a development priority by donors until 2001 (Smith 2001). It was then that the group of major donors at the DAC first began to focus distinctly on SSR as a priority, culminating in the DAC High Level Meeting of 2004 which yielded a donor statement on SSR and Development Assistance (OECD 2004a; OECD 2004c; OECD 2004b). This consensus statement on development assistance and SSR was met the following year with a set of DAC Guidelines on how donors should best address SSR in their programming. Indeed, the aim agreed to by the donors within the DAC Guidelines is to "promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of development and poverty reduction" (OECD 2005b). This shift towards SSR in the development community evoked an embracing of some of the 'harder' aspects of security that had for a long time been taboo in the development assistance sector, and despite the consensus position reached on the importance of SSR, also sparked some dissent among donors when it came to the issue of

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redefining the terms of Official Development Assistance to possibly allow for military aid to count as official development assistance (ODA) (OECD 2004b).

Alongside this SSR agenda has come renewed calls for the development community to examine the impact of violent conflict on development efforts. This entails approaches which include 'conflict sensitive development' and the mainstreaming of conflict analyses into all development assistance programming and planning (UNDP 2005). By addressing conflict and insecurity as a critical concern of development, donors are encouraged to engage with security issues in all situations where deemed relevant. Indeed, recent calls for donors to engage on the conflict and security issue have emphasised two related concepts which underpin the motivations of donors to work on these issues: enlightened self-interest and collective security. Both of these call attention to the fact that insecurity in one country has security implications for other countries, and indeed the entire world. In this sense, it is in the donor's best interest to support security reform and conflict reduction in recipient countries not only to promote development, but also to ensure security of their home society. Stemming threats to international security is therefore framed as a motivation for donor efforts to develop states with flagging institutions and governance capacity (UNDP 2005). In recent years, this collective security approach has led to donor nations taking part not only in development activities in some failed and fragile states, but also to integrate development activities into broader military and diplomatic efforts in states for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding – Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan are a prime example of this approach (Maloney 2005). PRTs are intended to create local areas of increased security in which development NGOs and other organisations can operate to better reconstruction efforts; however, not all PRTs have successfully achieved these goals, and the NGOs involved are reported to be discomforted by the blurring of military and developmental objectives inherent in the PRT (Goodson 2005). This whole-of-government approach to security in development involved not only donor agencies, but also militaries and ministries of foreign affairs, and

has been lauded by the donor community as the most effective way to address security issues in development (OECD 2004b; OECD 2005b).

The evolution of thinking on security and development has thus progressed over the years from initial forays into human security into more specific efforts for SSR and for mainstreaming conflict in development, along with the adoption of whole-of-government approaches to development and security in post-conflict states. This evolution has been shaped not only by the actions of donors themselves, but also by the research community (Smith 2001), developing countries, and international organisations like the OECD and the UN. Indeed, these security concerns can be considered an integral component of development discourse in the Twenty-First century, and reflective of world cultural values of security and development that have been shaped by the rational others of the world polity. With this crafting of an identifiable model of security and development in world society has come the diffusion and adoption of such a model by development assistance donors. Indeed, like was seen in my earlier case involving gender and development, the spread and institutionalisation of security and development approaches among bilateral development assistance donors in recent years has been striking. Although not all donors have integrated and implemented SSR or whole-of-government approaches as a mainstay of their development assistance programming, different donor countries have adopted at least a partial emphasis on security and conflict in their development assistance, with many donor agencies at least adopting an agency policy on security/conflict and development. It is this adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of the security and development model by donors that my research aims to explain. How has world polity influence on donors functioned to encourage the spread of the security and development model commonly seen? What social processes and mechanisms are at work in mediating the spread of this model among donors? The next portion of this chapter will turn to these questions following a brief examination of how donors have specifically implemented this model.

Donor Approaches to Security in Development Assistance

Bilateral donors have integrated this security and development model into their development assistance programming in a number of ways. Three representative characteristics of this model that emerge in donor implementation include: (1) the adoption of an agency-level or corporate policy on security/conflict and development; (2) the creation of a targeted aid mechanism or unit within the donor agency addressing security and development; and (3) either programming in the SSR area, mainstreaming of conflict in development assistance programming, or adoption of whole-of-government approaches to development in post-conflict societies. All of these components are reflective of the security and development model outlined above, and are confirmed by their presence in the DAC's 2005 guidelines on *Security Sector Reform and Governance* (OECD 2005b). I will use these characteristics as the basis for evaluating the adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of the security and development model within the donor agencies of the three countries that compose my qualitative case studies. In this section I will assess each of these characteristics of the security and development model briefly in each case before exploring the interview data from each case to examine the mechanisms and social processes at work in the diffusion and implementation of the model.

CIDA

Despite having conducted development assistance programming in war-torn and post-conflict countries throughout much of its existence, CIDA did not have a specific policy position or apparatus to address conflict and development until 1996, when the Government of Canada's Peacebuilding Initiative was created. Subsequently, CIDA formed its Peacebuilding Fund and corresponding Peacebuilding unit in 1997 (Thibault 2003). This fund allocated approximately $10 million CAD annually to fund programs related to post-conflict peacebuilding – encompassing development programming that was focused on redeveloping areas of conflict and future conflict prevention. The mandate of this fund allowed for most any type of conflict and development programming, and funded projects throughout the world within a broad range of conflict-related initiatives, including

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even security-sector reform in the later years. More recently, the peacebuilding fund has been dissolved and the former peacebuilding unit has adopted a more narrow perspective on peace and security issues that focuses mainly on issues of human rights in conflict situations, and partners mostly with multilateral international organisations to implement its initiatives.

This peacebuilding initiative was part of a broader Canadian Government approach to peacebuilding; however, it never translated into a corporate level policy at CIDA. Indeed aside from the Peacebuilding fund and unit, the treatment of conflict, security and development at CIDA has been quite informal. Presently, there is no over-arching policy outlining CIDA's approach to security and development, although discussion with CIDA officials suggests that one could be in development. Peace and security and conflict prevention have been subsumed at the corporate level underneath the governance priority. There is not a specific unit for peace and security at the corporate level in the Policy Branch, but the former Peacebuilding Unit in Multilateral Programs Branch continues with an altered mandate as the Peace and Security Group. Within the Policy Branch, the conflict and security issue has been the responsibility of one senior analyst in recent years, who is tasked with monitoring the issue at the corporate level and with representing CIDA on the DAC's Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation (CPDC) Network. Canada has in the recent past chaired the CPDC based upon the strength of the individual occupying this position. The lack of an overall corporate policy to address these issues leads CIDA to address the conflict and security issues primarily in response to recipient country situations which require it. In this sense, CIDA's approach to security and development is a patchwork of initiatives in countries where CIDA happens to be programming that are experiencing or recovering from conflict. This treatment of issues on a case-by-case basis dependent on country context has seen recent initiatives in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti as prominent examples of CIDA's work in conflict and development.

In many of these cases, CIDA's contribution to development is simply a smaller piece of a Whole-of-Government Approach to failed and fragile states.

CIDA's contribution to PRTs in Afghanistan is a primary example of this, where cooperation and coordination both with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence underlie CIDA's PRT participation. The earlier peacebuilding initiative of the Canadian Government was subsumed in 2005 by a new initiative that has across-government involvement, but is located at and managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs: the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and its corresponding Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). START and the GPSF provide Canada's chief interface with the security and development agenda presently, although not all of the initiatives funded through the GPSF count towards Canadian ODA amounts as certain military initiatives contravene the strict requirements for ODA. A brief examination of the type of initiatives funded under the GPSF show it to be heavily engaged on the SSR issue, and that it goes even further to fund initiatives involving military procurement in some cases (DFAIT 2007). In this sense, DFAIT is addressing the 'hard' security topics as well as other issues of SSR, while CIDA has been focused on SSR through longer-term developmental and institution-building initiatives addressing the 'soft' side of security on a country-by-country basis. This relationship between CIDA and DFAIT has evolved in recent years subsequent to the rise of the SSR agenda on the world stage, and following the release of the DAC Guidelines on SSR in 2005

CIDA demonstrates two of the components of the world polity model outlined above. It had an apparatus for working on security and development initiatives, has conducted programming in the SSR area and has taken part in whole-of-government approaches to security and development. However, CIDA does not demonstrate a full adoption and implementation of the model in that it lacks a corporate level policy on security and development issues and it lacks a dedicated agency-level unit to address these issues at the corporate level. In the present situation where the lead on security and development issues and SSR in Canada rest with DFAIT, perhaps this partial implementation of the model and lower priority accorded to security issues can be understood as an institutional

constraint related to the broader policy environment in the Government of Canada.

Sida

In the 1990s, most donors began engaging with the necessity of programming in conflict areas given the rise of intra-state conflict in many countries of Africa and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. Sida also began examining the nexus of security, conflict, and development in the late 1990s. The first policy to address this area was prepared in 1999 as a result of growing awareness of Sida having to increasingly do two things: (1) deliver aid in areas embroiled in conflict or recovering from conflict; and (2) ensure that Swedish aid did not further contribute to conflict in these areas.

This first strategy document did little more than discuss the importance to Sida of the 'do no harm' perspective on aid which had emerged following the Rwandan genocide in the early 1990s. This viewpoint encourages a conflict analysis of any aid delivered in societies which are either conflict-prone or are recovering from a conflict to ensure that aid monies do not fuel conflict, foster rivalries, or otherwise unduly impact the security of communities in recipient countries. The do no harm approach focuses especially on the issues of fungibility and being able to track the use of development assistance funds, but also requires the analysis of conflict in an area to ensure that development assistance activities do not aggravate tensions or unintentionally align the donor with one party or another in an ongoing conflict. This 1999 effort to integrate a conflict perspective on Swedish aid was met with little fanfare and did not proliferate widely through the agency. At the time, the policy was authored by a single individual who was not a specialist on conflict or security issues, and there was no specific unit within the Sida organisation to address conflict as an issue.

The international growth in interest in the intersect of security and development assistance that followed over the course of the subsequent 5 years or so was partially the result of wider acceptance of the "enlightened self-interest" motivation for aid among Western donors, partially due to the worsening turmoil

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of intra-state conflict in many parts of the developing world, and partially due to the arrival on the international scene of high profile 'emergencies' in the form of Western military action in failed states like Afghanistan and Iraq. Given this context, security was highlighted as a central theme of promoting sustainable and equitable development in the 2003 Policy for Global Development (Government of Sweden 2003). As a result of this greater awareness and engagement with the interaction of conflict and development, Sida formed a separate unit to address the issue in 2005. Instead of the earlier situation where one officer authored a low-priority policy on conflict, the new Division for Peace and Security in Development Cooperation has five officers and a director working on the topic, and issued a much more comprehensive policy on security and development in late 2005. In this policy entitled "Promoting Peace and Security Through Development Cooperation" Sida examines security and development as an issue to be considered in all programming because of the linkages between poverty and insecurity (Sida 2005b). The policy identifies three approaches to development cooperation that are intended to permit development assistance to be delivered in a way that allows for development actors to work in and on conflicts instead of working around them. This entails three approaches to be integrated into all Sida programming: (1) Risk awareness; (2) Conflict sensitivity; and (3) Promotion of peace and security. By adopting these three approaches, Sida intends to mainstream conflict analysis in all of its development programming. And thus, although mainstreaming of security at Sida is still in its infancy, the priority accorded these issues has grown substantially over the past decade and now reflects much of the internationally agreed upon discourse on the subject created by the UN, DAC, and other international organisations.

As such, Sida's adoption of a security and development approach demonstrates several of the characteristics of the world polity discussed above, namely: a corporate policy, a security and development unit, and the mainstreaming of conflict analysis in development assistance. The extent of the implementation of the mainstreaming initiatives is still undetermined, but Sida programming in post-conflict countries like Afghanistan and Iraq are

understandably addressing these issues as a primary concern. All of these features of Sida's approach to security suggest the implementation of a recognisable world polity model for security/conflict and development within the organisation.

The international influence of broad donor trends towards increased conflict awareness has a large role to play in Sida's adoption of these issues as a going concern in recent years. Indeed, the adoption of a security and conflict perspective by Sida has not been without concern and hesitance from some Swedish civil society. Concerns about the use of aid monies for possible military purposes have been a major preoccupation of Swedish civil society when assessing what Sweden should do in the area of security and development, particularly given the expression of interest by the Swedish military to access aid funds for use in peace missions abroad (Thorsell and Weber 2006). Thus, the adoption of a peace and security approach to development cooperation has not been without some controversy within the Swedish development assistance sector – reflecting the inherent tensions between deriving policy from domestic concerns and embracing world polity scripts espoused by the international community.

USAID

USAID has addressed conflict and development issues since the early 1990s. In a significant policy statement from 2002, *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and* Opportunity, conflict featured prominently as a main pillar of American development Assistance (USAID 2002a)[23]. At present they address security and development issues through several approaches. The primary channel is through their organisational unit and a corporate-level policy on Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) which is mainstreamed as a cross-cutting program in the agency. The main focus of the CMM unit and policy is addressing issues of conflict prevention through assisting relevant country program field offices to mainstream conflict issues into their programming (USAID 2005a). The CMM group is also responsible for managing

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[23] This policy statement has subsequently been superseded by USAID's joint strategic plan with the US State Department.

USAID's relationship with the DAC CPDC Network, and plays a sometimes prominent role in the Network's activities.

The CMM Policy cites two main motivations for USAID addressing conflict and insecurity through its development assistance: enlightened self-interest and collective security. Indeed, the impact of contingent events related to the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 2001, and concerns about the growth of international terrorism feature prominently in the policy document to explain the reasons for USAID to focus on conflict and insecurity. In this respect, aid is seen as an instrumental tool in fighting international terror and insecurity. States experiencing the collapse of government and prolonged conflict are perceived as a breeding ground for insecurity that can spread globally. In this respect the CMM policy also broadens USAID's approach to conflict beyond conflict prevention to include post-conflict reconstruction and SSR. The CMM unit and policy are thus very clear representations of the features of the prototypical model for donor approaches to conflict and insecurity in development assistance.

Aside from the CMM group, USAID also has brought on board resource people to deal with the issue of Security-Sector Reform. The SSR advisor is tasked with assisting USAID field offices and country programs to develop specific SSR activities, as well as liaising with other government departments in the United States that have an interest and involvement in the SSR agenda. In this respect, USAID's work on conflict and insecurity is actually very closely tied to the broader agenda of the US government. For instance, security features prominently within the Strategic Plan for the US State Department & USAID 2007-2012 (USAID and State Department 2007). In addition, USAID's role in supporting American foreign policy on security also appears in the 2006 US *National Security Strategy* suggesting it will become more closely linked to the State Department to achieve these aims (United States Government 2006). As such, USAID's work on the conflict issues is linked very closely to a whole-of-government approach to security and development. When it comes to the security issue, USAID can be considered a policy receiver rather than a policy creator like

the State Department. This is not surprising given the large amount of other aid flows the US provides in the military and defence sectors that do not qualify as ODA, an amount that totalled approximately $16.8 billion in 2006 (USAID 2007b). As a matter of fact, when examining USAID's primary ODA recipients, we find that they closely mirror the top recipients of American military and defence assistance. In 2005, the top three recipients were Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel.

As a reflection of the world polity model of security and development outlined above, USAID's approach to conflict and development closely mirrors the trends seen in the broader donor community. Indeed, as the largest donor by volume of ODA in the world, the influence of the US on this model is significant. Still, other donors like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have preceded the US treatment of these issues, and to some extent the US is following their lead. Undoubtedly, the American approach to integrating a security perspective into their development assistance does demonstrate world polity influences, as well as strong influence from other US Government departments and priorities. The decentralised nature of American assistance means that this approach to conflict and insecurity will tend to be implemented on a country-by-country basis where relevant, but at the same time, a strong corporate policy on CMM has sharpened the US approach to insecurity in development assistance to tie directly to broader US foreign policy interests. The lack of autonomy of USAID on this issue in particular is highlighted by the recent restructuring attempts to bring USAID even closer to the State Department.

Social Processes Accounting for Policy Isomorphism in Security and Development

Similarly to the spread of common gender models among development assistance donors, the outlines of CIDA, Sida, and USAID above show some striking similarities of security/conflict and development approaches among donors. Although a comparison of the approach in these three countries shows both similarities and differences in the manner of their implementation of the

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security and development model, the broad acknowledgement accorded to security and development issues is consistent throughout. All three donors identify this issue as a priority to consider, indicative of a de facto consensus among donors on these issues. Still, as much as donors acknowledge the importance of the security and conflict issue in development assistance, the extent to which they implement policy and programming on the issue varies. Both Sida and USAID have dedicated policy units tasked with leading the organisation on these issues, as well as corporate level policies that accord a priority to security not seen in CIDA and its lack of policy guidance or unit-based leadership on security. Indeed, the manner in which CIDA actually addresses the security and conflict issue in its programming is limited by its lack of agency-wide policy strategy on the issue. Instead, the implementation of a security and conflict approach at CIDA is dominated by ad hoc instances of application in countries where it is required, but a relative absence of focus on these issues in other cases. Both Sida and USAID have this same context-based implementation – with a greater effort to address these issues in specific post-conflict societies – but also have a corporate approach to the issue which makes it applicable potentially in all cases, mainstreaming conflict through the agencies' efforts. CIDA lacks this mainstreaming approach on conflict. Arguably, the contradiction of the relative consensus of donors on the priority of security in development assistance and the differences in the extent to which a common approach to these issues is implemented is reflective of different social processes at work in each country's context.

Part of this difference can be accorded to the close link of the security and conflict issues to national interests in the foreign policy arena. Indeed, in contrast to gender, security and development concerns have a greater tie to donors' national interests and foreign policy concerns. Where gender equality initiatives are shaped more by underlying humanitarian motivations, security and development concerns have a less altruistic motivation. In such a case, do the same social processes work to promote common frameworks among donors, or are there different processes explaining this phenomenon? Development

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assistance had traditionally eschewed all things military or defence related, but no longer. In the international security agenda that has emerged in the wake of the Cold War and the more recent focus on combating terror, development has been accorded the ability to help stem some aspects of insecurity. At the same time, insecurity is seen as a major barrier to development. Failing or fragile states are therefore seen as a development assistance concern not only for the reasons of promoting human development, but also for stemming insecurity that has the potential to affect not only developing societies, but donor societies also. This notion of enlightened self-interest or collective security cannot be discounted as a key component of the renewed focus on security in the development assistance field. These motives bear consideration as I turn to the examination of data collected on this issue from interviews with development agency officials and civil society representatives in each of the three countries that compose my case study.

PROCESSES OF INFLUENCE ON DONORS

My interviews with development officials and civil society representatives working on the security and conflict issues within the development assistance sector in each of my three case-study countries yielded comparable results regarding the factors which influence donors to adopt a conflict and security approach in development assistance. Based on these interview results, I have identified two primary social processes at work in shaping the interface of donor agencies with world society and the resulting adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of a security and development model in their policy and programming. First, I will show how the common experience of catalytic policy processes help to shape a common agenda that is shared by donors and leads to adoption of common models of security and development. Second, I will demonstrate the important effect that the process of donor agencies asserting autonomy from the ministry of foreign affairs and the rest of government has in mediating the extent of implementation of a common world polity approach related to the security and development. Both of these processes will be shown to have direct implications

for explaining the similarities and differences found between CIDA, Sida, and USAID in the security and development case and I will argue that these processes can be considered to be key factors in shaping the diffusion and institutionalisation of other world society institutional models globally.

Catalytic Policy Drivers

The first process that was identified by respondents was something I will call Catalytic Policy Drivers. This process entails an outside discussion or working group activity which drives the internal development of policy within a donor organisation to meet a specific deadline or goal. For instance, work towards arriving at consensus on a set of guidelines, directives, or statement on a specific policy issue. This process is considered catalytic when it is the primary mover of internal policy discussion or change. In the absence of such an outside process, the donor organisation is unlikely to have a position or policy on a given issue. Because of the expectations that the country/organisation will come to the international table with a defined position, the outside policy discussions catalyze internal policy development. This may lead to the organisation undertaking work in new, previously untouched areas of policy priority. In such instances, the question of how dedicated or devoted an organisation is to initially work in a particular policy area may be called into question, as the main motivation for beginning work on an issue may indeed be simply to have a place at the table amongst its peers, or to not be left behind in an emerging area of concern. This is not to say that afterwards, the result of an outside catalytic policy process cannot be strongly supported policy institutionalised within an organisation. Indeed, an argument can be made that many new ideas may follow this trajectory within an organisation if the driving forces behind them are mostly external to the organisation.

In the development assistance sector catalytic policy processes have a number of international venues in which to originate. Chief among these is the DAC, followed by both the UN and the World Bank as alternate points of

catalysis. One Canadian respondent highlights the DAC's role in initiating policy discussion:

> The process itself is a great *accoucheur* [midwife]. It really helps the countries to actually make a position. Because the first positive impact is that as you reach a process, you suddenly realize that this is an issue which needs to be dealt with. So it forces you to think about your issue. But this is always done between policy branches. So the weakness of the DAC is that its work is not very visible. It's a highly specialized, close group. So generally, when the DAC takes a position and the minister agrees on the creation, it's then sent to the field and sent to the operational branches of the aid agencies and say, "behold, we have now seen the light and this is the way you shall do it in future". And this is how those shall do this now. And so because all the agencies suffer from the same problem, they don't, because of time pressures, have the time to actually make their position coming from the field of operations towards the policy branch, towards the DAC, so in that sense, the influence comes afterwards because top-down says, "this is the way you will be doing it". So in that sense, the process is important because it gets the policy branches and high management align on a common approach and then it's directed towards the field. [October 18, 2006]

Describing the DAC process as a midwife when it comes to policy development is suggestive of how preparing for and taking part in DAC discussions, meetings, and preparation of policy guidelines and directives can in essence deliver a new policy position to an agency where it did not exist previously.   In this respect, the DAC deliberations and preparation of standards for donors is viewed as catalytic in generating policy development and positions among donors.

Commenting on the influence of the DAC High Level Meeting declaration on Security Sector Reform from 2004, another Canadian respondent stated:

> I would say it has [influenced CIDA's policy], but I'm not sure it is so much the declaration itself as it is the process of preparing for the declaration. That we prepared a position for that, but we were working through these issues anyways. We ended up with the guidelines for CIDA, the best practices, and just generally how to approach these issues in CIDA and preparing for that, I think, benefited CIDA greatly, because we did not have our mind around what that looked like or what that should look like.

> [So without the knowledge that CIDA had to prepare for this process, CIDA probably wouldn't have been doing as much on the issue?]

I think we still would have been doing some things, but there wouldn't have been a driver. There wasn't a lever to say that you have to have this done by this time. And without those sort of external levers, it continues festering along for a while and there's no real demand internally to resolve it. So there's been lots of stuff for years on untying, but until they hit the lever of the DAC recommendation they didn't move on it. [April 11, 2006]

The description of the DAC process as a lever on Canadian policy suggests the external influence of the process of contributing to the DAC declaration on security and development had on CIDA. Describing CIDA's participation in the DAC process as a 'driver' which pushed the agency beyond its lack of internal demand to resolve the issues, illustrates the view of this respondent on the DAC's catalytic role in the security sector question. Without the DAC recommendations in this area, the respondent perceived no 'movement' on the issue within CIDA.

When questioned about the DAC's role in shaping the Canadian approach to security and development, another respondent suggested that despite Canada's past work on peacebuilding from a human security perspective, the DAC could be seen to help push CIDA's focus on security and development from its past focus on peacebuilding to a perspective more akin to the DAC position on SSR:

[Would it be safe to say that there wasn't much movement on developing a Canadian position on these issues before they came before the DAC?]

Yeah. Well, my predecessors…

[So there had been predecessors in that role at CIDA?]

There have been, had been called different things, had been under different titles, but there had been Canadians who had been working on [security issues] - because the peace building initiative had started earlier. So there had been a policy parallel to the peacebuilding programming and I had had a predecessor who had worked on it and they had worked on the first set of guidelines, but those were peacebuilding guidelines. You know, they were much more, they were focused… The first set were focused on peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. The second set was looking more at conflict avoidance, and security sector reform and it was broadening the debate and digging down a bit more into lessons learned and more constructive guidelines and…

[Ok. So there wasn't really any concrete Canadian position on…on the conflict and development issue? Like there's…before…you know 911….pushed it to the agenda.]

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No. There had been strong support for the guidelines and for peacebuilding and the peacebuilding initiative because Axworthy, while he was there had started the whole… There was the, you know, the human security fund and the peacebuilding fund and part of it was Foreign Affairs, part of it CIDA and… So certainly that had been the beginning, but it had been focused on certain types of programming and a certain part of the spectrum from you know, one end of peace to the other.

[So it would be safe to say that the DAC process, to some extent, drove Canada to maybe develop more of a position on these issues?]

Yeah. Yeah. [January 30, 2007]

This assertion that the DAC process was involved in shaping CIDA policy on the security and development issue lends support to my argument that donor participation in the DAC process of arriving at consensus on the security and development issue actually pushed donors to adopt positions simply so they would have something to bring to the table, and indeed so they could later be able to demonstrate that their new models for addressing security and development were in line with agreed upon international standards defined by the DAC.

An American respondent echoes this view on the DAC's catalytic role. Suggesting there was not an approach to security sector reform in USAID prior to the DAC declaration on the topic in 2004. Instead, the respondent suggests that the DAC guidance on security sector reform allowed for a number of diverse initiatives to coalesce into a "comprehensive program":

[So, I guess in the time that you've been with the agency – you're in a position which has interestingly enough formed by a reaction to the guidance from the DAC in 2004. In the time that you've been with the organization then, how have you seen the approach to security sector reform change within the agency?]

Well it's hard to say because there wasn't one beforehand. There were a number of different things and those things continue to exist. This program is really to follow on with what had been a 5 year program, supported through a civil society group called the National Democratic Institute to look at civil military relations. So that was sort of the experience the agency had specifically in a related topic in this area, but obviously we all held a long, deep, history providing rule of law programs that are related in conflict mitigation programs which are related and it's important to reintegration part of DDR program. So there were bits and pieces throughout the agency.

[And subsequent to the DAC guidance that has changed in what way?]

Well, it sort of coalesced into a more comprehensive program. [March 27, 2007]

In the view of this respondent, not only did the DAC declaration of April 2004 lead to this coalescing of a SSR program at USAID, but it also was a direct contribution to the creation of a SSR advisor position within the agency in August of that year. This direct connection between DAC influence and agency reaction through implementing policy and assigning human resources to the issue demonstrates this catalytic role of the international declaration and the process involved in arriving at a consensus position among donors.

The implication here is that the DAC and its guidelines can act as a catalytic external influence because donors know that they will be held to account for their activities in newly emerging priority areas such as Security-Sector Reform. This expectation of being policed on adherence to new DAC standards may explain the reason that donors activate policy development in areas that the DAC deems relevant priorities. One Swedish respondent who had formerly been seconded to the DAC discussed the DAC's role in this regard by highlighting the tenuous connection between DAC policy guidelines and the eventual scrutiny of the peer review process:

> Now the link between the policy development and the follow-up, that is peer reviews basically, is not clear. It might look so from the outside, but it's not a clear structure on how you're going to monitor the guidelines and the peer reviews. But you will find, say, in the last eight reviews, that there is some sort of – we've tried (when I say we, it's not Sida, sorry!) the [DAC] secretariat has tried to cover peace and security issues in a, well, sort of a systematic way. [September 13, 2006]

Despite the absence of a 'clear' link, this respondent does highlight a definite relationship between the DAC's priority setting and the policing of these priorities among donors. Where the peace and security issue quickly emerged in the DAC peer reviews to which the respondent was exposed in their time at the DAC. The catalytic process of DAC participation for donors thus appears to be inspired by a

notional expectation that donors will be scrutinized for their follow-up on specific issues of importance to the DAC.

The same Swedish respondent hinted at how some of this catalytic process of participation within the DAC might work, specifically by describing the role of individual experts participating on the behalf of donors in DAC working groups like the Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation network:

> It was also interesting to see how, sort of CPDC, has a lot of under groups formed around specific issues such as evaluation or whatever and what the role of the donors are there. That would give you a hint on how you think you actually influence this, because the dilemma in these groups – this is just my own position – is that some people get engaged in this [and] it becomes their own sort of *raison d'être*, and a group can sort of have a life of its own almost, and there is no clear end date, what are you supposed to deliver? There is also sort of, an over, I don't know, sometimes we over-emphasise the impact of results and best practice and so on. So I might contradict myself sometimes here, but in a way, you can view the process itself as having the interactions among the donors as really that's where you pursue the agenda. [September 13, 2006]

Suggesting that individual participants in the DAC groups have an independence and latitude to pursue issues that they take on at their own accord is reflective of the role for bureaucratic entrepreneurialism that was discussed in the previous chapter. Still, this respondent views the process of the interactions between the donors within the DAC venue as the chief area in which 'you pursue the agenda' or set priorities for the donor community.

This process of networking on the stage within international organisations is a key component of the catalytic policy process. Another Swedish respondent highlighted the importance of Sida participation in DAC networks and working groups, suggesting they have a noticeable influence on Sida policy in areas like poverty reduction and security:

> Yes, I would say very influential really. We just had a meeting last week, last Friday with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with all the people in DAC and various DAC networks and working groups and ah, a lot of people. And in some of these groups Sida in Sweden is very active. Even we chair, for example we are chairing the evaluation network and we will also be a chair of the working party of aid effectiveness from now. So and in some other groups we are very active.

[How has that translated into changes in Sida policy itself? Or has it?]

Yeah, it has been very influential. Like one example I can give is on the poverty. We used to be very active in the poverty network, poverty group, that presented guidelines on poverty reduction. These were very influential when Sida prepared its own strategy or what you call it, prospectus on poverty. That is just one example. I think on all or every area. For example, we had a new policy on Conflict, Peace and Development. I think that is also very influenced by the DAC, working group. And many and others as well.[September 11, 2006]

The influence of international organisations on nation-state actors within the world polity have been highlighted repeatedly in the literature. The evidence offered by the interview respondents in my three case countries helps to illuminate more deeply how this influence may function. The role of catalytic policy processes initiated within the DAC venue appears to be a powerful driver of policy development and adoption within the three donors I have studied here. Various mechanisms operate within this catalytic process including bureaucratic entrepreneurialism, networking, and both standards setting and policing. All of these mechanisms concatenate into a process which 'kick-starts' donors to initiate new or revise existing policy positions on the security and development issue to fall in line with international standards regardless of existing domestic wherewithal or priority attached to the issue. This process is a participatory one, in which donors actively shape the international agenda at the same time as they develop domestic responses and implementation plans to meet it. The DAC, therefore, is not simply an external force, a *deus ex machina* acting on donors, but instead is an interactive venue where donors indeed establish the external influences which then come to shape their own policy positions on the security and development issue.

Autonomy from Rest of Government

When discussing the security and development approach of donor agencies with interview respondents, the second process that emerged in the data was the nature of the agency's relationship to the rest of the government, especially the corresponding ministry of foreign affairs. In particular, respondents

identified issues related the relative autonomy that the donor agency in their country had from the rest of government. The level of autonomy from rest of government refers to the nature of the relationship between the bilateral donor arm of a state and the government apparatus. Part of this is due to donor agency structure: is the donor a sub-unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) or is it an arms-length agency reporting to its own minister or agency-head. Degrees of structural autonomy fill the continuum between these two extremes. Earlier in this dissertation I have argued that if a donor is less autonomous, its policy objectives and development assistance priorities are more likely to serve national interests of the donor rather than broader humanitarian concerns of development. Conversely, the more autonomous the donor, the more likely its motivations and priorities are to reflect more altruistic humanitarian interests. It stands to reason, therefore that autonomy from the rest of government can fluctuate depending on the policy issue: the more altruistic the issue, the greater the autonomy of the donor; the more politically sensitive or pertinent to national interests an issue, the less the autonomy of the donor. The degree of autonomy is constantly under negotiation and in flux depending on the topic at hand, and underlines the frequently referred to conflict that tends to exist between donors and MFAs or other government departments reported in many countries.

When respondents were asked about the relationship between the donor agency and the ministry of foreign affairs in case of security and development issues, respondents highlighted the delicate balance that existed in managing the relationship. When asked about USAID's relationship to the US State Department on this issue, one respondent stated:

> It's an interesting question, particularly right now, because we're undergoing this reform process and like every other donor, I think there are times where the development agency and the ministry of foreign affairs are closer together and farther apart and that tends to be cyclical and we are at the point in the cycle where we are much closer together and in fact, all foreign assistance now is being reorganized via our Administrator who is now dual-hatted as the Deputy Secretary of State. So there is interagency collaboration. There are interagency working groups that look at every single country where we're providing assistance and comment on

everything and they're not just security related assistance. At the moment, there's quite a bit of collaboration. [March 27, 2007]

This closer collaboration and the new dual roles for the USAID administrator were all relatively recent developments. The respondent continued:

> This is within the last year. And this is a tricky topic because the way the US security assistance in general is generally delivered in a way that creates operational partners to advance US interests. Security Sector Reform and security programming from a development perspective is interested in operational capability but really more so in developing host nation capacity to make decisions about their own security. So those 2 things are sometimes at odds and sometimes they are complementary. What our approach has been has been to point out that more often than not, they are complementary and that all of the operational training you can give, won't be sustainable unless it's done in line with the host nation's requirement and needs. [March 27, 2007]

These competing approaches highlight the tendency of the donor to approach security sector reform from the perspective of advancing recipient country interests, while broader security interests of the US government may or may not be complementary. These competing motivations highlight the tensions surrounding donor autonomy from the rest of government in the security and development area. Indeed, in the US case, the lack of donor autonomy from the State Department leads to implementation of a security and development approach which is at the basic level vested with US national security interests. This point was noted by the same respondent:

> [Would you say that when push comes to shove, that one or the other of those motivations tends to win out usually?]
>
> Well, I guess National Security Interests always wins.
>
> [Sure. I just wanted to make sure that wasn't just an assumption that I would make. Ok.]
>
> No. I mean. I suppose that it does come down to a case by case basis, but you know, again, given the legislative limitations and the different mandates of the actors on the donor side, responsible for providing related programming, you can have programs going on at the same time. I mean what we're working towards in our program is taking a comprehensive approach, you know, as the assessment through program design and delivery

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through monitoring and evaluation, but that's a long way off. In the military parlance of crawl, walk, run…we're crawling. [March 27, 2007]

This comprehensive approach the respondent addresses is a reference to the whole-of-government type of approach that is espoused in the world polity models discussed earlier in this chapter. The USAID approach to security and development is therefore very heavily influenced by the State Department and other interests in the US Government, and within such influence, very closely reflects the world model expectations set for donors. The relative lack of autonomy of USAID from the State Department, in this case, ensures adherence to a world polity model that very closely aligns with US national security interests.

The autonomy of the donor agency is also raised by a Swedish respondent, suggesting that it is the nature of the Swedish system to have the decisions made by the MFA while expecting Sida to dutifully implement them:

> Yes. And in a context like the Swedish where you have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with sort of policy issues and implementation should in theory be carried out by a Government office such as Sida, there is also that divide. There's been a lot of cooperation in this field, but there's also been some disconnects sometimes. That is, that can sometimes explain why it takes some time to implement policies. The logic in this, in the Swedish system is rather complex, it goes back a couple hundred years, about the theory that the ministry should be small and focus on instructions for the implementing agencies, who should then carry out, and they should be quite independent. But in the role of Sida, it's been slightly complicated sometimes. I don't want to overemphasise this, but, in an area like this and Human Rights, it's very hard to draw the line what's clear foreign policy and its implementation. I mean, you can argue that's the same with all the whole development cooperation field, but, this is quite, this becomes very clear. [September 13, 2006]

As the implementing agency, Sida is deemed by this respondent to be quite independent, but at the same time is a policy-receiving organization, rather than creating it s own policy and priorities. In this respect, the MFA plays an important role in the Swedish system to help set policy for the development assistance agency. This same respondent highlighted this close relationship in discussing the first Sida policy on conflict and development:

But the first policy was also sort of a platform for the cooperation between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida in this field. It provided input to what the Ministry then picked up as the policy area which they took forward into the DAC when [it] set up the first task force [on Conflict, Peace, and Development]....[September 13, 2006]

In the Swedish case, therefore, the role of the MFA in setting policy had a major influence on the nature of the Sida policy on conflict. Indeed, the main Swedish representative at the time on the DAC Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation was an officer of the MFA and not a Sida representative – highlighting the important role of the MFA in contributing to policy development in this area. This relationship still exists in the Swedish case, and Sida's Peace and Security group view their policy mandate as stemming not only from the Sida policy on those issues, but also more broadly with how the security and development issue have been framed in the 2003 Policy for Global Development.

A Canadian respondent echoed the importance of the autonomy from the Department of Foreign Affairs in shaping the response to security and development:

... I think the difference was that human security came through as more of a Foreign Affairs, purely diplomatic initiative, it wasn't viewed as responding to development issues, it was viewed as an external view from a Foreign Affairs type of perspective on sort of what needed to be done, but it wasn't bottom up, participatory, democratic, developmentally oriented etc. For the security stuff, because there is a broader discussion, and it wasn't so much of a unilateral push, there were a lot more pieces that came into it. And the question in my view as they were going through it was: "OK, we need to do more on security. The question is how incremental we need to be in what we're doing? We need to tie it to development because we know that even if we do all this conflict prevention stuff it's got to be tied to long term development to be sustainable. Our sustainability requires the conflict prevention, and basically the peace is a precursor to continuing." Anyway, so I think there was a lot more interest, and some of that was just the international discussions that were going on, and some of the failures of states in the 1990s that you started to see a little bit better example that unless you had the two together you were not going to make progress. [April 11, 2006]

According to this respondent, in the Canadian case the relative autonomy CIDA has from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade allowed the

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organization to sidestep the human security agenda to some extent because it was
perceived as not having a developmental orientation. At the same time, when the
move to address more conventional security issues rose to prominence on the
international agenda, this evolution of security and development concerns had
greater appeal to certain groups within CIDA as it was not branded as a Foreign
Affairs initiative in the early stages.

Another respondent highlighted how the divergent and competing interests
of different government departments influenced Canadian participation in the
international discussions at the DAC on security, development, and ODA:

> You know, you had the development view and then you had a foreign policy
> view - DND [Department of National Defence] didn't really, they weren't
> real players, but there were parts of Foreign Affairs who definitely wanted
> to see ODA opened up so that some of these peacekeeping, peacebuilding
> activities would be affordable. And so you have the spectrum and it was, it
> took a while. I mean, it took a long time and it was, certainly the final
> product was not as robust as… Yeah, it was a compromise…
>
> …and we were, we were certainly, we were in an awkward position because
> [Canada] was chairing and so [Canada] had to remain somewhat neutral, but
> then we had Canadians at the flag and we had that dynamic between CIDA
> and Foreign Affairs and CIDA had the lead on Foreign Affairs. So there
> was a bit on an internal pushing and shoving about coming up with a
> Canadian position. But it was a healthy debate and I think, you know, we
> ended up with a common position because of it. But certainly, we started
> off at ah… [January 30, 2007]

These divergent views and the 'pushing and shoving' involved in coming up with
a Canadian position, demonstrate the relative autonomy of CIDA on these issues
in contrast to USAID and Sida. That CIDA is at liberty to have a different
viewpoint than DFAIT and DND illustrates that its autonomy from the rest of
government in this case has actually enabled it to adopt a position which, in fact,
demonstrates a diminished level of implementation of the security and
development model outlined earlier in this chapter. Without DFAIT pushing
CIDA to adopt a strong system to implement the SSR agenda and other conflict
and development issues, CIDA has instead taken a very ad hoc approach to the
issue. One respondent suggested that CIDA had not taken these issues very
seriously, and attributed this partially to the absence of DFAIT or other

government department leadership on the issue, as well as the general lack of coordination between departments at the more senior level:

> So you know, in sum, I don't believe that we've taken the DAC guidance in this area very seriously even though we've participated in its development and um…a lot of that…some of that may be to do internally. It also has to do with the fact that other government departments really don't have a strong sense of what this DAC guidance is all about. I don't think the Department of Foreign Affairs fully, you know, [there's] a lot of rotation through there. You don't have a lot of continuity and certainly I don't believe the central agencies are fully up to speed on what the content of some of this stuff is and you know, there's only so many hours in the day. I've tried to kind of reach out and talk to people a little bit more, but the fora for these kind of things – it happens very well as I said, at the very senior levels of government, at the deputy minister level, maybe even occasionally at the DG level. It doesn't actually happen and its difficult to spontaneously get it going at the analyst level and it's kind of because we're tasked by other people to do other things, but we're also, we don't really have the authority to convene anything that has any kind of weight. So from an organizational behaviour perspective, I think that there's a lot of work that needs to be done here in terms of how organizations deal with politically sensitive issues in their ongoing discussions about choices. [February 6, 2007]

Identifying the frustrations that can face the donor agency analyst who does not feel senior management is leading on an issue, this respondent highlights the difficulties of managing the relationship with other government departments. This respondent's frustrations with the inability to achieve something that 'has any kind of weight' in the security and development area at CIDA is reflective of CIDA's indifferent treatment of the issue at the corporate level. Indeed, in Canada, DFAIT can arguably be seen to lead activity on the security and development issue – especially the SSR issue – through newly formed funds and organizational units within that Department. In this sense, CIDA's relative autonomy from the rest of government and DFAIT has allowed its senior management to avoid implementation of a rigorous approach to security and development at the same time that DFAIT has been very active in SSR as a means of furthering Canadian interests. In light of this autonomy, it is only in the very pressing or high profile country-by-country cases where CIDA's autonomy from DFAIT is diminished and a more comprehensive approach to security and

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development issues is taken – something demonstrated in recent research on CIDA's experience with programming in Afghanistan (Brown 2008).

Another respondent suggested that this relationship between CIDA and DFAIT became more difficult to address when the security and development agenda turned to issues that CIDA traditionally would not address such as improving military institutions in recipient countries. The role of communication between departments and the presence of key people who can expertly address the security and development issues was seen as helping to mediate these difficulties:

> There were actually security sector type issues, you know, developing policing and legal criminal law institutions and all of the kind of back-stopping institutions that are required to have a strong security sector. The complications started coming in when started to look at the military and we actually brought in a Lieutenant Colonel from DFAIT who came and worked as senior adviser on defence issues and because we were looking at the role of development in defence, the type of, you know the type of thing that's now happening in Afghanistan and with the PRTs and we were involved in the early days of trying to work out what would be the role of development in that and so, he was a very good liaison, with lots of experience and really opened up communications between the 2 departments.[January 30, 2007]

Another Canadian respondent echoed this reluctance of CIDA to enter into the SSR area in a intensive way, as there is a perception that it runs contrary to CIDA's 'culture' of developmentalism, and as such, much of the work on this in the Canadian system has fallen to DFAIT:

> In terms of Canada, Security System Reform is very much right now on the Foreign Affairs side of things and they have responsibility for advancing that area with the creation of START and the Global Peace and Security Fund. It has not, as I said, traditionally been part of the CIDA culture and so often when they [CIDA] talk about security, they talk about justice. So it's justice and security system reform. So we've done rule of law stuff, judicial capacity building, legal training. We've supported the policing missions, you know, where there's ODA eligibility components there. We've done those kinds of things, but we haven't we haven't, as I said, integrated this. [February 6, 2007]

From this perspective, CIDA has had the latitude to not integrate SSR concerns intensively into its programming and policy, and from a broader Canadian perspective this has been sufficient to meet international expectations on Canada,

as DFAIT has undertaken SSR work in a more intensive way. CIDA's autonomy from DFAIT in this regard has contributed to the decoupling of Canadian positions at the DAC from the actual implementation of work in the same area.

Autonomy from the Rest of Government, and in particular the respective ministries of foreign affairs, appears to have played a significant role in all three cases in determining the extent of the implementation of a recognizable world polity security and development model in each country. The lesser autonomy of the donor agency in both Sweden and the United States appears to have yielded a more effective and authentic application of the security and development model set forth in the DAC guidelines on the subject, whereas CIDA's relative autonomy from DFAIT and the rest of the Canadian Government has allowed CIDA to proceed with a much less-intensive, and less-comprehensive treatment of the issue within its overall policy and programming frameworks. In this respect, greater autonomy from the rest of government on these issues appears to encourage a decoupling of policy from practice. Canada did support and agree to the international declarations made at the DAC and contributed to the guidelines that subsequently followed, yet CIDA has not taken a strong stance on these issues internally. DFAIT has instead taken the lead on SSR issues, and despite not being a traditional aid implementing agency, is even funding programs in the area.

Greater autonomy from the MFA and rest of government appears in the cases examined here to permit a donor agency to deviate from a world polity model of development assistance that may be more in line with national interests rather than developmental or humanitarian concerns. This suggests the need to examine this process in the context of another priority that is fundamentally more humanitarian in nature and less directly linked to national interests. If we consider the gender and development case addressed in the previous chapter, this process of asserting autonomy can be seen to function as expected. CIDA's greater autonomy allows for a more liberal application of gender and development models, whereas USAID's lesser autonomy inhibits its approaches to gender. Sida, in contrast, is encouraged to pursue the gender models specifically because

of its lesser autonomy and the key place of gender equality values in Swedish public policy and national interests. A more thorough exploration of how these processes work in the two cases will be provided in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION

This comparative case study of security and development in three countries shows that there are common social processes which account for some of the striking similarities in the application of security and development models in each donor agency. At the same time, these processes can account for the distinct differences demonstrated among the three donors. Both the catalytic policy processes inspired by international activities within the DAC and the process of asserting agency autonomy from national governments are viewed by my respondents as shaping how their specific donor has taken up the recent move towards mainstreaming a security and development approach in development assistance. These processes, although less individually oriented than those explored in the previous chapter, highlight two more important processes which can help to explain the international influences of the world society on nation-state institutional and policy models. Considering the presence of catalytic events and declarations, or the mediating process of the internal autonomy of nation-state actors from the rest of government, both become significant explanatory processes to consider when attempting to discern the influence of world polity models on independent states. I will examine these processes, and those identified in Chapter Six, in more detail in the next chapter, offering some theoretical insights that stem from their identification as mediating processes in the interface between world society and the nation-state.

CHAPTER EIGHT: PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS

The cases examined in the previous two chapters clearly illustrate distinct social processes at work in mediating the interface of the nation-state with world society and facilitating the transfer of development assistance policy models to donor agencies. These processes are implicated in each of the countries included in my case study, but to varying degrees. In this respect, the processes I have identified as factors in shaping world polity model adoption are neither exclusive nor exhaustive explanations of how world society influences the nation-state. Instead, they each serve key functions in translating world polity models into domestic agendas and, I will argue in this chapter, are strong candidates to fill the gaps I identified earlier in world polity explanations of globalisation. These processes explain why it is that development assistance donors from diverse domestic contexts settle on relatively similar policies and institutions, and arguably can be expected to operate in a similar manner when examined in other cases of policy isomorphism. The aim of this chapter therefore is to re-examine these processes more closely in the context of my gender and security case studies, identify the mechanisms that compose them, and compare how they operated in each of the three case study countries and in the context of their development assistance sectors. From this examination, I begin to generalize about the function of these – and other – social processes as the missing component in world polity explanations of the diffusion of policy models which promote uniformity among nation-states.

GAPS IN WORLD POLITY EXPLANATIONS OF DIFFUSION AND UNIFORMITY

Much of the shortcomings from the research into world polity theory stem from a lack of depth in the explanation of how world society affects its constituent states, organisations, and individuals. This rests in part on the general tendency in the literature to opt for macro-level cross-national quantitative analysis as the method of choice. In this way, a great amount of evidence illustrates the correlation between policy and institutional model adoption and a number of

world society factors, including membership in international organisations, the timing of international conferences, and the actions of other nation-states (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer, Frank et al. 1997; Ramirez and McEneaney 1997; Ramirez, Soysal et al. 1997; Berkovitch 1999a; Boli and Thomas 1999a; Frank, Hironaka et al. 2000; Hironaka 2002; Jang 2003; Drori, Meyer et al. 2006; Drori 2007; Frank, Longhofer et al. 2007; Meyer 2007). What is missing in the existing explanations of world polity influence on diffusion and global uniformity is therefore a deeper understanding of how this influence occurs. In particular, the lack of focus on the individual agency and experience of the persons involved in these governments and organisations overlooks the active agency of the individual and groups on the adoption of these world polity models.

To fill this gap in the explanatory power of world polity theory, I have argued in this study to take inspiration from literature on the social processes and mechanisms at work in the contentious politics of social movements (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005). Though criticized for being overly simplistic and descriptive rather than explanatory (Kjeldstadli 2004; Rule 2004; Simeon 2004; Welskopp 2004), I believe that this approach can add depth to the explanations of globalisation and isomorphism of institutions and policies among nation-states in recent years. My qualitative case studies in the previous chapters have worked to identify processes that explain the phenomenon of homogeneity and apparent consensus among donors to test the theoretical innovation of synthesising from the literature on contentious politics to fill these gaps in the world polity literature.

SOCIAL PROCESSES EXPLAINING WORLD POLITY INFLUENCE

In this section, I revisit the five primary social processes identified in the previous two chapters. By looking at their applicability in both cases, I make the case for generalising more broadly from my cases to the majority of cases of world polity influence on the nation-state. I will examine each of these processes in the opposite case study to that in which they were identified in the previous chapters. As such, I will look at internalisation and certification, embeddedness

with civil society, and bureaucrat activism in the context of the security and development case, and conversely examine catalytic policy drivers and autonomy from rest of government in terms of the gender case.

Internalisation and Certification

The process of internalisation and certification was evident in the gender and development case discussed in Chapter Six. Through this process, donors were able to adopt an externally generated model that was validated as legitimate within world society and therefore legitimate for application in their domestic context. Three mechanisms coincided to varying extents to compose this process: standards setting/policing, appeal to outside authority, and mimicry. In this respect, the process of internalisation and certification depends on both internal and external actors to facilitate policy model adoption and refinement. International organisations like the DAC and the UN act as venues for standards setting and they then follow up on these standards by policing them through peer review and annual status reports on treaty and other obligations. Donor agency officials actively participate in activating the latter two mechanisms both by referring to outside sources of legitimacy to justify policy decisions and by copying approaches and techniques used elsewhere and deemed 'best practices' for achieving their aims.

The process of internalisation and certification appears in both of my case studies, though I dealt with it primarily in the chapter on the gender and development model. If we look at the security and development issue, all three donors demonstrate experience of a process of internalisation and certification with all three mechanisms of standards setting/policing, appealing to outside authority, and mimicry at work to varying degrees.

Again the DAC had a role to play in standards setting in the security area, with the creation of DAC guidelines on Security Sector Reform (SSR), the DAC created a set of expectations on its donor members to address SSR issues in their work and detailed how this work could best be achieved (OECD 2004a; OECD 2004c; OECD 2004b; OECD 2005b). One respondent who had worked with the

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DAC also highlighted the DAC role of beginning to police these standards by stating that all of the most recent DAC peer review reports had made certain to include a security and conflict component in their assessment of donor members. Indeed, examination of the most recent peer review reports for all three of my case study countries reveals a prominent focus on conflict and security in each (OECD 2005a; OECD 2006c; OECD 2007b). In this respect, all three donors were subject to expectations that they meet DAC standards on the security and conflict issue, and were already being assessed on their compliance and success at meeting these standards only a short number of years after the model rose to prominence on the DAC agenda. Similarly to the gender case, the DAC role in setting and policing standards appears to have had the same effect on donors in the security case. Internalisation of the security and development model begins with the standards set by the DAC and the later pressure that follow-up through the DAC peer review process exerts on each donor to show it is doing something in the security and development area.

The appeal to outside authority was a less-evident mechanism at work in the security and development case; however, I feel this can be explained because the security issue can be more closely linked to national interests and therefore requires less external validation or certification to be accepted within agencies. Respondents in all three cases referred to the DAC guidelines and to other work on the issue in the international community at the UN level and in academic circles, but these outside referents were utilised mostly as guidance for directions that would be taken in the agency, rather than as a means of validating or legitimising security and development approaches. In the case of a policy model more closely tied to national interests, it appears less likely that the mechanism of appealing to outside authorities is required to certify the model within the nation-state government structures.

Finally, evidence of mimicry – or the intention of mimicry – exists in the security and development case as respondents in all three case study countries emphasised the work of Great Britain's development assistance donor, the Department for International Development (DFID) on the security issue, and the

fact that it had worked to shape their approaches to security. The unanimous recognition of DFID as a leader in the security and development field was voiced by all respondents on the security and development issue. Indeed, DFID's leadership in this field caused other donors to look to them for examples of best practices in how to program on security and how to incorporate a conflict/security policy into their work. Notably, DFID's creation of Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) – a funding tool to coordinate British efforts to prevent conflict and assist in post-conflict situations – for Africa and for the rest of the developing world in 2001 was held up as the primary example for donors to follow in the security and development sector (DFID 2004). Indeed, the whole-of-government approach taken by DFID and the rest of the UK government in managing the CPPs has been emulated in both Canada and the United States as an approach to security, conflict and development. Canada's Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is an example of a development assistance apparatus that takes inspiration from the DFID CPPs, even though the GPSF is administered in Canada by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) rather than CIDA. By adopting approaches that are perceived as successful elsewhere and emulating the policies and programs of other donors on security and development issues, the three donors in my case study all demonstrate some level of mimicry involved in internalising and certifying their own approaches to the issue.

Thus, not only does the process of internalisation and certification feature in my gender and development case, but it is also reflected in the security and development case in a similar, although not as central, fashion. This process of internalisation and certification appears to be a key component of nation-state entities integrating world polity policy and institutional models into their systems and operations. Not only limited to influencing the mobilisation and framing of contentious politics as demonstrated in the social movement literature (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005), internalisation and certification is a process which suitably can explain the influence of world society on the nation-state. In the case of development assistance, bilateral donors clearly internalise and certify models promulgated on the international stage, leading to greater uniformity and

even consensus on policy priorities.   The function of this process requires individual agency within donor bodies. It necessitates an outward-looking viewpoint that examines and then chooses to integrate new approaches into the day-to-day operations and policy agendas of donors. It is this active agency by donor officials and others involved in the development assistance sector that is one of the missing components in most world polity explanations of institutional and policy isomorphism. These policy and institutional models cannot be internalised and certified within an organisation without the active hand of individuals making decisions to adopt, institutionalise, and refine new approaches to their work.

Embeddedness in Civil Society

The nature of donor relationships with civil society, particularly the process of a donor being embedded in the development-related civil society in its domestic constituency, emerged from my qualitative evidence as another social process that can account for the influence of world society on the nation-state to promote greater uniformity of development assistance policy. In contrast to the process of internalisation and certification however, the embeddedness of a donor in civil society does not emerge from both of my case studies. Indeed, respondents queried about civil society and the security and development agenda were uniform in their denial of much civil society influence on the approach taken to security and development issues. This is not to suggest that civil society were not interested in or engaged on the issues, as each country case provided evidence from civil society respondents who had strong views on the issue. NGO respondents in all three countries in fact discussed certain levels of discomfort with recent donor moves to incorporate security sector reform into their operations. Still, this discomfort evident in all of the civil society respondents was not to impact the approaches adopted by CIDA, Sida, and USAID.

In contrast to the gender and development case, where embeddedness in civil society appeared to contribute to the fuller acceptance of the model laid out in Chapter Six, the security and development case shows no such relationship. If

anything, given the views of resistance expressed by civil society respondents in each country, I would expect to find the opposite relationship if donors had strong ties to civil society on the security issue. In this respect, embeddedness with civil society should impact world polity model acceptance dependent on the point of view taken on that specific issue by civil society. In the development assistance sector, this – in my cases studied here – appears to vary depending on the relationship of a policy model to motivations of either humanitarian internationalism or national interest. It is no surprise that civil society is more broadly in favour of the humanitarian-inspired issue of gender equality and perhaps less enthused about the enmeshing of development assistance with conventional security concerns. Still, my evidence suggests that embeddedness with civil society can be very selective on the donors' part, as my civil society respondents were – for the most part – more vocal in their positions on security than on gender equality, but appear only to have had influence on the adoption of the gender model in the American and Swedish cases.

This selective influence via close ties to civil society is therefore a process which can only explain the adoption of certain world polity models. I will argue that if the model is more instrumental to national interests or less controversial to society at large, then it is less likely to be as susceptible to civil society involvement with the nation-state than an issue that has a broader humanitarian motivation and appeal. Further research to validate this assertion is necessary to be able to generalise about this relationship. It does suggest, however, that not all world polity institutional and policy models are equal in the eyes of the nation-state. Some tie more directly to national self-interest than others, while others can have a much more universal humanitarian appeal. Where the nation-state chooses to engage closely with civil society, consulting with them for advice and direction or working jointly with civil society to derive a new approach to an issue, the politics surrounding the policy model appear more likely to be detached from obvious national self-interest. This might explain the inability of civil society in my security case to influence donors much, whereas the influence of

embeddedness in civil society networks was very obvious in gender case in both Sweden and the United States.

Bureaucratic Activism

Individual agency mediating the interface of world society and the nation-state is nowhere more evident in my case studies than the process of bureaucratic activism. Here, donor officials have a direct effect on the type of world polity models that donors take on, refine, and integrate in their policies and programs. The mechanisms I identified in Chapter Six within the gender and development case included: champions, guerrillas, entrepreneurs, and person exchange. These four features of bureaucratic activism were evident in the gender case, and arguably two of the four can be seen in the security case based on my interview data. The two mechanisms which did not appear in the security case were the champion and the bureaucrat guerrilla. This may be due to the fact that – for the most part – there is not much management resistance within the three agencies I studied to the concept of addressing insecurity and conflict through development assistance. Even CIDA's relatively lacklustre adoption of the security and development issue does not on the surface appear to be due to management resistance, but instead can be blamed on a lack of strategy for integrating the issue more fully into CIDA's policies and programming. As such, the need for security champions or for unconventional 'guerrilla' approaches to expanding the security and development issue within these agencies is not there in the same way it appears in the gender case. This underlines the fact that not all social mechanisms involved in these processes are necessarily implicated in the process at all times, something illustrated elsewhere in the literature on contentious politics (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001).

The mechanisms of person exchange and bureaucratic entrepreneurialism are, however, evident in the security case. For example, several of the individuals I interviewed who were tasked with the security and development portfolio were brought into the donor agencies from outside positions of past experience in military and security work elsewhere with private firms, other government

departments, and international organisations. This previous work enables these security specialists to bring their experiences into the donor agency and then use it to promote new directions on the security and development issue. All respondents except one working directly on this file in each of the three countries studied meet this profile. It appears that with the recent turn towards expanded action on security and development within the bilateral donors that many of them turned to people with this outside expertise internalised them, and tasked them with pushing the agenda on the issue within the organisation to meet international expectations. It is at this level that the bureaucratic entrepreneurs emerge, as the people working on the security and development issue initially within these agencies appear to have to craft much of the momentum on the issue from their own energies. Indeed, the distinction between the success of pushing these models forward at Sida and at USAID and the relative failure to achieve a concrete position on the issue at CIDA appears to stem at least somewhat from ineffectual bureaucratic entrepreneurialism and partly from the decision of DFAIT to take the lead on these issues in the Canadian context.

In this respect, bureaucratic activism, the process of individual nation-state officials working actively to promote, expand, or institutionalise a particular policy agenda within their department or agency, appears also to be a key process in explaining how it is that nation-states come to adopt common models of the world polity. Although not as central to the security and development case as it appeared in the gender case, several of the bureaucrat activist mechanisms do appear in both instances, and arguably should be apparent in myriad other examples of world polity influence on the nation-state.

Catalytic Policy Drivers

The catalytic policy driver was very evident in the security and development case. An issue being placed on the international agenda at a meeting of donors or at a broader international conference has the ability to catalyse a response to a new issue among donors who have not yet addressed the issue sufficiently within their organisation. The catalytic policy driver also has the

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ability push a donor to revise and refine its approaches in order to take part in a new international effort on the issue. In this sense, it is less the actual meeting or conference that spurs policy model adoption and refinement, and more due to the actual participation of the nation-state in preparing for the international event. This preparation forces the government body to adopt a position where they may not have held one previously, or to revise a previous held policy to meet with ever-shifting international expectations. In my security and development case study this process was evident in that none of the three donors studied had a position on security sector reform before the issue came to prominence on the DAC agenda soon after 2001.

In the gender and development case, the catalytic policy process was also described in several instances by respondents when they discussed the influence of participation in the 1995 United Nations conference on women in Beijing and its two follow-up conferences in 2000 and 2005. Donor officials who took part in their countries' delegations to these conferences were required to take a fresh look at their existing gender policies and apply new directions in response to new expectations prior to participation in the conferences. In this respect, the influence of these conferences closely mirrors the process of standards setting and policing described earlier, but the main difference is that the process occurs in preparation for and during the participation in an international event. Still, the catalytic policy driver is not as influential in the gender case as in the security case because much of work on gender had already occurred in recent years.

Still, this process can be held to have an important role to play in the spread and development of new world polity models in the development assistance sector – particularly in cases where very few or perhaps even no donors have an existing position on a subject. The recent push towards donor harmonisation and aid effectiveness in preparation for the Paris Declaration provides a good example of this. Little to no work had been done previously on serious coordination amongst donors, yet participation in the international process of defining and refining aid effectiveness and harmonisation forced donors to adopt policies and that reflected these 'new' principles of development assistance.

Indeed, both the Swedish Policy for Global Development and CIDA's Strengthening Aid Effectiveness policy statement are outcomes of the catalytic policy drivers behind the aid effectiveness and harmonisation agendas (CIDA 2002b; Sweden 2003).

Autonomy from Rest of Government/Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Not to be confused with the feature of agency structure I identified earlier in the dissertation, the actual process of asserting autonomy from the rest of government or, in the case of development assistance donors, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, played a role in both the security and the gender cases. In the security case, CIDA, the lone donor that was able to assert their autonomy adopted a security and development approach that did not meet as closely with the international expectations in this field. In contrast, Sida and USAID were both less autonomous in this matter and their approaches to security and development more closely mirrored the international expectations which arguably were very near to national self-interest of their governments.

In the gender case, this process functions in a more complex manner, as greater autonomy asserted by CIDA permits a more full adoption of current gender and development trends, while lesser autonomy on the part of Sida and USAID have mixed outcomes. Sida, even though it does not exert much effort to distance itself from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has the gender policy and approach which most clearly mirrors the world polity model I delineated in Chapter Six. In contrast, USAID's close ties to the State Department appear to limit the extent of gender and development implementation at the corporate level within the agency. I will argue that this contrast again falls along lines of underlying motivations for the policy model involved. The gender and development model is something that primarily is motivated by more humanitarian or altruistic concerns. In this sense, gender equality is not seen to be fundamentally central to the foreign policy interests of most states. Indeed, it is this distance from overriding national self-interest that arguably makes the gender and development model something that is de-prioritised by USAID and its

relative lack of autonomy from the State Department. Sida, on the other hand, is very active on the gender and development front expressly because the gender equality issue is perceived as a central concern of the Swedish government both domestically and in its foreign policy. In this sense, for the Swedes, the gender and development model is central to national self-interests as a result of its humanitarian appeal. Sida is therefore pushed by its relative lack of autonomy from the Swedish MFA and the rest of the Swedish government to very actively promote gender equality and adopt a very progressive gender and development policy in keeping with Swedish domestic priorities.

This finding suggests that the results of the process of exerting autonomy from the rest-of-government or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the case of development assistance donors, is contingent on the nature of the policy or institutional model under consideration. If we categorise these models according to their centrality to national-self interest, it appears that more autonomy will enable fuller adoption of those models which are at greater distance from national interests and will permit lower levels of compliance with models that are more tightly linked to national interests. When national interest and humanitarianism overlap in development assistance, as they can be seen to in the case of Sweden and the gender and development model, then the lack of autonomy can in fact encourage the adoption of a more humanitarian aim for self-interested reasons.

Table 8.1: Summary of Processes Emerging from Qualitative Case Studies

Policy Model Case Study	Country	Processes				
		Internalisation & Certification	Embeddedness in Civil Society	Bureaucratic Activism	Catalytic Policy Drivers	Autonomy Asserted from MFA
Gender	Canada	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Sweden	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
	United States	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Security	Canada	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Sweden	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
	United States	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No

The five processes illustrated above are clearly implicated in facilitating the spread of common development assistance policies among bilateral donors, leading to a relative uniformity of policy on both the gender and security issues.

What this chapter has shown is that the processes are not all implicated equally in each policy model instance. Dependent on the nature of the policy model and its centrality to the national self-interest of the nation-states implicated, the five processes I have identified will be present in varying degrees to mediate the adoption and refinement of world polity models within the development assistance sector. Table 8.1 above shows whether a process is implicated in each country's experience of the two policy models included in my study. No country has all five of the processes implicated simultaneously, but each process emerged at one point during my qualitative analysis of my collected interview data.

CONCLUSION

Collectively, the processes that I have identified in my case studies of gender and security in the development assistance sector are suitable additions to world polity explanations of the spread and adoption of common policies and institutional frameworks among nation-states. Though not exhaustive in their explanation of the phenomenon of policy isomorphism among development assistance donors, these processes are clearly implicated in the interface of world society and the nation-state leading to greater uniformity among states. The five processes I have identified can arguably go beyond the development assistance sector to more broadly explain homogeneity of nation-state policies and institutions in other sectors – a matter for future research into this area. In addition, these processes raise concerns about the nature of the relationship between world society and the nation-state. This relationship is not as clearly delineated as past research might suggest, as delineating between world society and nation-state becomes increasingly difficult when you consider intergovernmental bodies and their role in the world society. The DAC under consideration here in my study is a prime example where disentangling what is world society and what is nation-state agency becomes difficult, and requires further investigation. Indeed, extending research on the world polity in these directions would surely unearth other social processes implicated in how world society influences the nation-state, organisations, and individuals, and perhaps

provide more insight into how nation-states, organisations, and individuals iteratively influence world society. I will address this question of the next steps for research on this topic in the final chapter of this dissertation.

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

With more than $103 billion USD of official development assistance in 2007, and many billions more in private aid transfers and remittances transferring from developed to developing societies on an annual basis for the purpose of development, it is undeniable that this assistance plays a significant role in shaping the relationship between North and South. The politics of aid are intertwined with trade, geo-political, and even cultural relationships between nation-states and undoubtedly have the potential to influence the lives of billions of people in developing societies. For this reason, the apparent movement towards a more uniform set of development assistance policy objectives has a bearing on the development of recipient societies and needs to be better understood. Donor rhetoric about 'emerging consensus' over recent years required unpacking, and the actual processes and pressures of globalisation at work among donor agencies needed to be examined. What has caused the striking similarity in approaches to development assistance among donor states? This dissertation has taken up this question, and by applying a theoretical framework drawing on research literatures in world polity theory, development assistance, and contentious politics, has demonstrated several of the social processes of globalisation at work in the development assistance sector. By applying both a macro-level quantitative lens and using two in-depth comparative case studies, I have been able to demonstrate the processes at work which account for the uniformity among development assistance donor agencies. By identifying specific social processes that account for policy isomorphism in the development assistance sector, I demonstrate that nation-state enactment of world society models is in large part the result of individual agency and interactions that have often been obscured in prior world polity research.

At the global level, my quantitative analysis of the adoption of a gender and development model among the full set of Western donor nations provided evidence of the direct influence of international conferences, organisations, and treaties on donor adoption of common approaches to development assistance. These findings confirm that world society influence on the institution of

development assistance can clearly be identified at the specific policy area level. This macro-level framework of world society influences set the stage for my qualitative investigation of social processes of globalisation at work in three countries and two policy areas. By using qualitative analysis of interview data from Canada, Sweden, and the United States, my research is able to demonstrate the presence of five social processes shared across these donors that reinforced their adoption of common approaches to addressing both gender and security in their foreign aid policy and programs. Evidence from both of these policy areas allows for generalisation to other development policy issues, as they each represent important instances of a common donor agenda on the international stage. These social processes of globalisation have not previously been identified in either the world society or development assistance literatures and prove to be one of the unique research contributions of my dissertation. In contrast to earlier world polity research which points towards enactment of world cultural levels at the macro level, my findings point to a much greater role for individual agency in the processes which promote nation-state enactment of these models and policies. Greater understanding of these and other similar processes will help us to better understand world society and its globalising influence on not only the development assistance sector, but indeed the entire universe of nation-state institutions.

In this concluding chapter I summarise my findings and contributions to research on globalisation and development assistance and also reflect on some of the broader implications of my research. I first revisit my research questions in light of my collective findings. Next, I discuss the innovative contributions of my study to the various research literatures engaged. Finally, I explore some potential directions for future research prompted by my study.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED

I began this dissertation with three main research questions that shaped my inquiry into globalisation in the development assistance sector. My research has responded to each of these questions, and my findings provide a clearer picture of

how the interface of world society and the nation-state is mediated by social processes of globalisation. In this section I will discuss each question and the answers to it provided by my research:

1. How does world society affect nation-state institutions and what are the processes which promote consensus or uniformity of policy and priorities among development assistance donor countries?

The question of how world society influences nation-state institutions and what processes are entailed in the globalisation of policy in the development assistance sector was central to my research. My findings, both quantitative and qualitative, suggest that world polity explanations of globalisation hold for the development assistance sector. Indeed, the influence of other donors, international organisations, international conferences, and international treaties all appear to compose this world society influence. At the macro level, this influence is suggested by the correlations of policy model adoption with the timing of international conferences, and with the influence of the actions of other donor agencies.

At the specific case study level, I have shown that several key social processes are at work in promoting common approaches to both gender and security. Processes of internalisation/certification, embeddedness with civil society, bureaucratic activism, catalytic policy drivers, and the assertion of autonomy from the rest of government were all shown to play a role in the adoption of mostly uniform approaches to development assistance. These processes and the related mechanisms of which they are composed mediate the relationships between nation-state and world society and revolve largely around the actions and perceptions of individual donor agency personnel. In this sense, the processes of globalisation that account for increased consensus and homogeneity of development assistance policy can be seen to function through the individuals that compose the institutions and organisations that compose the nation-state and world society. That these common processes and related

mechanisms appear relevant and responsible to the adoption of similar policy in divergent national contexts suggests their broader applicability in explaining processes of globalisation even outside of the development assistance sector.

2. What role does individual agency play in mediating the interface of world society and the nation state?

The processes and mechanisms I have identified act upon the nation-state to promote adherence to globally developed policy models, encourage the refinement of those models, and – in some sense – provide feedback to world society in the form of these refinements. A range of actors become implicated in these social processes of globalisation, including not only nation-state actors and international organisations, but also academic experts, consultants, private firms, and civil society groups. At the root of each, however, is some focus on the individual and the actions of individuals to facilitate each process. In this respect, I answer my second research question by highlighting the strong role for individuals with these organisational environments to work together to achieve adoption, institutionalisation, and refinement of these models. This focus on individual agency has not, previously, been a strong focus of the largely macro-level perspective on globalisation adopted by world polity researchers. In fact, this reduction of world polity influence to the level of individual agency contradicts the tendency of institutional theory to reject reductionism (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006).

3. What role does civil society play in the spread of world polity models of development assistance?

Finally, although my research shows that civil society can play a role in the spread of common policy models – more specifically, the degree of embeddedness or closeness between state institutions and civil society groups appears to mediate the adoption of certain policy models – the influence of civil

society was not as direct as I had originally anticipated it might be. The active lobbying or advocacy of development assistance donors by civil society groups appeared to have little reported effect on the policy decisions taken by donors. In this sense, the role of civil society in spreading the common models of development assistance was less than some of the literature on non-governmental organisations and the world polity might suggest it should be (Boli and Thomas 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999b; Chabbott 1999). This surprising outcome of my research suggests that, at least in the development assistance sector, the influence of civil society is less one of direct lobbying and advocacy and more likely to be one of individual networking and loose ties between donor officials and civil society representatives – including the influence of personnel exchange between civil society groups and donor agencies on a frequent basis.

On the whole, both my quantitative and qualitative findings allow me to answer all three of the research questions that guided this study. In exploring the processes of globalisation in the development assistance sector as a case for understanding world society influence on the nation-state, I have responded to each of these questions and in turn produced a dissertation which contributes to a variety of research literatures. It is to my contributions that I will turn in the next section.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

This dissertation makes a unique contribution to each of the research literatures with which I engage. My research reveals some of the social processes of globalisation that function through the interface of nation-state institutions and world society. By demonstrating how the development assistance sector has moved towards greater uniformity of policy objectives in the gender and security areas, I have revealed several of the processes and mechanisms through which globalising pressures are applied to the state. In this way, my dissertation makes several important contributions to the literatures on world polity theory, development assistance, and globalisation. In this section I will briefly elaborate on my contributions to each of these literatures.

World Polity and the Nation State

This dissertation contributes to research on the world polity in several ways. First, the world polity literature has not previously examined the development assistance sector as one of the institutional models implemented by nation states. Aside from some research which examined the role of development INGOs (Chabbott 1999), and other research on the issue of state planning (Hwang 2006), the world polity literature has mostly overlooked the issue of development as a manifestation of world society models. My research therefore makes a novel contribution to the literature by being the first to demonstrate that the development assistance sector appears to be yet another manifestation of world polity influence on the nation-state and other organisations. Indeed, my evidence suggests the development assistance sector reflects world polity policy models in the gender and security areas. This suggests it is acceptable to consider the entire development assistance sector to be subject to the institutional and policy pressures of world society to conform to a uniform approach to providing aid to the developing world.

This highlights my second contribution to the literature which suggests that, apart from simply spreading similar institutional forms and structures among nation states, world society is also responsible for the high degree of isomorphism of policy objectives within those institutions. This focus on policy similarity is something that has been identified in some of the world polity literature previously (Barrett and Frank 1999; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; Schofer and Hironaka 2005); however, I elaborate on the issue of policy isomorphism by showing the direct connection between the proliferation of policy models by world society actors and the role of individual agency by nation-state representatives in the adoption of common policy agendas by nation states in the development assistance sector. My focus on the social processes and mechanisms of globalisation, many of which revolved around individual actions and relationships, adds another layer of depth to the understanding of policy isomorphism and the world society's influence on the nation-state. I argue that

the influence of world society on the nation-state is palpable and real, but in effect is borne out by the actions of individual representatives of state institutions and their actual participation in relationships with individual representatives of other states and international organisations.

Development Assistance Motivations

A second original contribution of my research is to the limited literature on development assistance – in particular on the motivations which underlie the provision of foreign aid by well-off countries. The literature on aid has long established two primary polar opposites of motivation for donors: national interest and humanitarianism. The post-development perspective on development as an exploitative discourse can – in some sense – be grouped in with the latter. My research shows how the processes of globalisation and the mechanisms of which they are composed affect policy priorities distinctly when alternate motivations for assistance are at work, and that these global policy models can be at once motivated by both national and humanitarian interests. In this respect, the polar opposition of humanitarian and self-interest needs to be nuanced to allow for development objectives which can encompass both impulses. My research shows clearly that, in the case of Swedish development assistance policy, the gender and development approach appealed both to a humanitarian agenda and a national interest in gender equality which permeates Swedish society. In this respect, the different motivations for providing aid can be seen to vary widely even within a single country context or within a specific policy model. My research suggests, then, that although countries can be classified as being predominantly either nationally self-interested or humanitarian, that, in fact, these motivations need mostly to be considered as both/and rather than either/or propositions. It is for this reason that different processes of globalisation identified in my research can interact differently on the same policy model, as donor countries posses various motivations for a given objective. For instance, exerting autonomy from the rest of government in one case, may lead to the same globalising effect as failing to do so in another.

Social Processes and the Politics of Globalisation

My final contribution pertains to expanding the research literature on the world polity to account for social processes of globalisation. By adopting an approach similar to that found in the study of contentious politics of social movements (Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005), I have identified several social processes and mechanisms of globalisation that operate at the nation-state level to promote uniformity and homogenisation of policy models across states. These processes are composed of a number of interrelated social mechanisms which link with each other to form an identifiable process. This deepens the understanding of world polity influence and globalisation from simply a matter of macro-level correlations with organisation membership, international conference participation, and the actions of other states to include these effects through individual agency within the organisations and institutions of the nation-state. By showing that several common processes and mechanisms are identifiable in diverse country contexts and on different policy issues, I have been able to demonstrate that these social processes of globalisation are a key component of the explaining world society influence on the nation-state, and more specifically, can account for increased uniformity and homogenisation of nation-state policy priorities in areas like the development assistance sector. My research points to how these processes may function differently on issues of national-interest as opposed to issues of international humanitarian appeal. This contribution is significant, as it helps to deepen the explanatory power of world society perspectives on the politics of globalisation. Furthermore, my research contributes to the literature on contentious politics by demonstrating that the social processes and mechanisms identified in that literature have a far wider applicability in explaining political events than is implied in previous work.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

My examination of the globalisation of development assistance policy helps to fill some of the gaps in the explanatory power of world polity theory, but also raises other questions that warrant further research. Although there are

undoubtedly numerous directions in which my research could be expanded, three strike me as being most important for future research on this subject: (1) expanding my case studies to include information from other donor countries to validate my findings; (2) examining the actual impact of this globalisation of development assistance policy on the development options of recipient countries; and (3) examination of the same processes globalisation I have described here in other institutional and policy contexts. I will briefly discuss each of these possible research directions.

Additional Donors to Validate Qualitative Findings

One of the potential shortcomings of my study could be perceived bias in my limited sample for the qualitative cases. As such, I believe that my findings would be strengthened with the addition of one or two more donor countries to complement the existing three. This would permit comparison between an even broader spectrum of donor country contexts and allow me to integrate case study countries that represent different geographical regions. Indeed, the inclusion of the United Kingdom would be the most pressing addition to my study. Respondents in all three of the existing donor cases frequently referred to the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) as the donor they most often looked to emulate. This perceived role of DFID as a cutting-edge leader in the donor community would make the organisation a valued addition to my study. Other potential contexts that could be explored through the addition of additional donors would include how the processes I identified function differently in freshly minted donor agencies of recent acceded European Union members like Poland and the Czech Republic. Corroboration of my findings in alternate contexts would provide a deeper understanding of how the social processes which underline uniformity and globalisation of development assistance policy function.

Globalisation of Development Assistance Policy: Impact on the Developing World

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Globalisation's impact on the developing world is often regarded in light of trade, employment, and cultural considerations, but my research shows that the potential for globalisation to alter the development assistance agenda is also a concern for development worldwide. Throughout this study, I have argued that part of the rationale for studying the globalisation of development assistance policy as evidenced by growing uniformity of policy priorities among donors rests in its potential impact on development in recipient countries. The notion that a narrower international agenda of what makes 'good' development could potentially limit the development options and alternatives for billions of people in the developing world requires further investigation.

In the past, donors have been known to set strict conditions on aid that had a similar effect on development in recipient countries. Indeed, the Washington Consensus of the 1980s and its focus on macro-economic structural adjustment as the driver of development has already been shown to have negatively impacted countless lives throughout the developing world (Bradshaw, Noonan et al. 1993; Sparr 1994; Desai 2002). More recently, the so-called good governance agenda of donors has imposed new conditionalities and promoted a reduction in the overall number of countries to which donors provide aid in the name of focus and aid effectiveness (Munro 2005). The impact of these donor trends on development and the lives of people in many recipient country societies remains to be widely studied and merits further investigation.

Social Processes of Globalisation in the World Polity Nation-State Relationship

The final area where my study would benefit from further research in the future is on the issue of confirming the role and function of the social processes of globalisation that I have identified in other sectors of world society/nation-state interaction. My cases examined in the development assistance sector provide one example of how these processes and their related mechanisms work to shape nation-state policy and institutional structure. Examination of other institutions and policy frameworks to identify the same or similar mechanisms and processes at work would help to deepen the understanding of these processes of

globalisation. This could complement my research in a number of ways. First, by looking at an even more widely adopted policy framework or institution – something that not only rich states, but the majority of nation-states possess – like central banks, Internet regulations, national women's machineries, or health systems. By exploring globalising processes in these and other contexts, the evidence I have demonstrated from the development assistance sector might be extended to form a clearer picture of the common social processes at work in all aspects of the nation-state relationship with world society.

CONCLUSION

Development assistance is a commonly accepted function of every modern democratic nation-state. As a global institution, the funds transmitted annually by donors to recipients are a significant contribution towards development in poorer societies. The apparent increase in uniformity of the development agenda in recent years, therefore, was a phenomenon which merited examination to explain why and how this globalisation of development assistance policy was occurring. World polity explanations of globalisation and institutional isomorphism among nation-states offered a theoretical base upon which I was able to integrate influences from both the development assistance and social movement literatures to craft a research plan which would examine the processed of globalisation in the development assistance sector at both the macro cross-national and case study level. The results of both my quantitative and qualitative analysis point towards the influence of world society on the nation state to adopt development assistance institutions and common policies. The processes which underline the uniformity of approaches to both the gender and security issues in development assistance were found in diverse country contexts of three different major donors, and are illustrative of the functioning of the interface between world society and the nation-state.

World society as a global level and abstract concept becomes more concrete when viewed through the agency of individual officials and the relationships they maintain between their organisations and others. The processes

I have identified hinge on this active agency and underpin the influence of world society which has already been ably established in the political sociology literature. The contributions of this dissertation to the study of globalisation and of development assistance therefore highlight that although development assistance may be an arm of the foreign policy of all major donor countries, it does not occur in a vacuum away from international influences. Indeed, the common approaches adopted by donors are encouraged by the international development assistance community in an active manner and integrated into donor agencies by actions development workers in a very real way. Common processes of globalisation push donors to adopt similar approaches to gender, security, and a multitude of other policy models. In the end, the influence of world society on the nation-state and the corresponding phenomenon of a globalised development assistance agenda are strongly reinforced by the active participation of donors in this world society and the impact of common processes at work which encourage uniformity of development aims for them all.

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APPENDIX 1: QUANTITATIVE DATA

Main categorical variables for quantitative analysis in Chapter Four

Country	Region	Formation of Donor Agency/Unit	Gender Unit/Policy	CEDAW Ratification	Donor Autonomy
Australia	Asia-Pacific	1974	1976	1983	Autonomous
Austria	Europe	1974	1995	1982	Integrated
Belgium	Europe	1962	1981	1985	Integrated
Canada	North America	1968	1976	1981	Autonomous
Denmark	Scandinavia	1971	1987	1983	Integrated
Finland	Scandinavia	1972	1995	1986	Integrated
France	Europe	1992	2000	1983	Autonomous
Germany	Europe	1975	2001	1985	Autonomous
Greece	Europe	1999	2002	1983	Integrated
Ireland	Europe	1974	1996	1985	Integrated
Italy	Europe	1987	1998	1985	Integrated
Japan	Asia-Pacific	1974	1992	1985	Autonomous
Luxembourg	Europe	1985	1997	1989	Autonomous
Netherlands	Europe	1965	1986	1991	Integrated
New Zealand	Asia-Pacific	2002	2001	1985	Autonomous
Norway	Scandinavia	1968	1975	1981	Integrated
Portugal	Europe	2003	-	1980	Integrated
Spain	Europe	1988	-	1984	Integrated
Sweden	Scandinavia	1965	1968	1980	Autonomous
Switzerland	Europe	1977	1993	1997	Integrated
United Kingdom	Europe	1961	1988	1986	Autonomous
United States	North America	1961	1973	-	Autonomous

APPENDIX 2: QUALTIATIVE METHODS

I. Sample Interview Schedule:

Interview Schedule – Version 1.7 – October 4, 2006

CIDA – Gender Equality

Policy
CIDA's Policy on Gender Equality has been in place since 1999. How well has it been accepted within the agency? How do you think it is being implemented? Is it achieving its purpose?

What do you feel the future holds for CIDA's gender policy? Is a new policy in the works?

If so, can you describe the policy development process?

Gender at CIDA
What challenges does promoting gender equality at CIDA face?

Are sufficient resources being dedicated to gender at CIDA?

What have been the affects of gender mainstreaming at CIDA?

How far has CIDA moved from a WID and Gender Equity perspective to a true Gender Equality approach?

Has there been any successful examples of broader approaches to gender incorporating men/boys and masculinities into GE policy/programming at CIDA? Why or why not?

Outside Influences
How influential do you feel other donors have been on CIDA's gender policies?

How is gender equality policy & programming at CIDA influenced by international organisations? DAC, UN, etc.

How is gender equality policy & programming at CIDA influenced by civil society?

How is gender equality policy & programming at CIDA influenced by outside experts/consultants? academic research?

CIDA's Influence
How influential has CIDA been among other donors on GE issues and policies? On civil society?

II. Ethics Certificate:

McGill

Research Ethics Board Office
McGill University
845 Sherbrooke Street West
James Administration Bldg., rm 419
Montreal, QC H3A 2T5

Tel: (514) 398-6831
Fax: (514) 398-4644
Ethics website: www.mcgill.ca/research/compliance/human/

Research Ethics Board I
Certificate of Ethical Acceptability of Research Involving Humans

REB File #: 163-0206

Project Title: Developing countries: the globalization of development assistance policies

Principal Investigator: Liam Swiss   **Department:** Sociology

Status: Ph.D. student   **Supervisor:** Prof. K. Fallon

Granting Agency and Title (if applicable): SSHRC doctoral fellowship

This project was reviewed on __*28 February 2006*__ by

Expedited Review _____
Full Review ___x___

George Wenzel

George Wenzel, Ph.D.
Chair, REB I

Approval Period: _March 16, 2006_ to _March 15, 2007_

This project was reviewed and approved in accordance with the requirements of the McGill University Policy on the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects and with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct For Research Involving Humans

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*All research involving human subjects requires review on an annual basis. A Request for Renewal form should be submitted at least one month before the above expiry date.
*If a project has been completed or terminated and ethics approval is no longer required, a Final Report form must be submitted.
*Should any modification or other unanticipated development occur before the next required review, the REB must be informed and any modification can't be initiated until approval is received.

cc Prof. K. Fallon

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