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SPACE, HISTORY AND POWER: STORIES OF SPATIAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN THE PALACE OF KANO, NORTHERN NIGERIA, CIRCA 1500-1990

by

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The short title of my Ph.D. dissertation is,

Stories of social and spatial change in the palace of Kano

ABSTRACT

The dissertation records changes in the Kano palace landscape between 1500 and 1990. Patriarchal practices that shaped the initial palace layout at vernacular domestic and state levels are outlined. Royal women were secluded and male slaves occupied public household domains, state strongholds. Later increases in eunuchs' and slave women's powers and spaces are also recorded. The demise of slave women's political realms and the rise of an autocratic and militaristic male state structure following the Fulani jihad of 1807 are then detailed. Lastly, the impact of British imperialism on the landscape of male and female slavery is presented. Because male slaves were placed publicly, they were the main receivers and negotiators of colonial change, and their spaces underwent the most forceful change.

Throughout the analyses, landscapes are seen as politically created and communicative material structures. Examination of epistemological relations used in landscape analyses demonstrates important linkages between how field research is structured and relations of power.

RESUME

Cette thèse explique les changements qui ont eu lieu entre 1500 et 1990 dans le paysage du palais de Kano. On examine d'abord les moeurs patriarcales qui ont influencé l'aménagement initial du palais, à la fois aux niveaux domestique et fédéral. Ces moeurs ont mené à l'isolation des femmes de la royauté tandis que les esclaves asservis continuaient à occuper les espaces publiques palatals. Puis, on examine l'augmentation progressive des pouvoirs et des domaines des eunuqes et des femmes asservies, et la naissance d'un état masculin autocrate et militariste à la suite des guerres islamiques de 1807. Enfin, on démontre l'effet de l'impérialisme britannique sur le paysage de l'esclavage. Parceque les esclaves asservis occupaient une place publique importante, ils subissaient les changements coloniaux tout en les négociant; pour cette raison, leur domaine a subi le plus grand changement.

Au cours de cette analyse, on considère les paysages, créations politiques, comme des structures à la fois matérielles et communicatives. L'étude des relations épistémologiques dont on se sert dans l'analyse des paysages révèle des liens importants entre la manière dans laquelle la recherche est structurée et les relations de pouvoir.

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The research could not have been conducted without the support of the emir of Kano, His Highness Alhaji Ado Bayero. I am grateful to the emir for welcoming me into his household and for granting me several lengthy interviews. I am especially thankful for his patience with my many and changing requests. Special thanks are due to the entire palace community, many of whom allowed me to enter their personal compounds for mapping purposes and/or agreed to discuss palace history with me. I am especially grateful to Hajiyya Abba Ado Bayero, the second wife of the emir, who made her home my own and who became a close friend. I am also grateful to the royal builders, all of whom were interviewed either in the palace or in their homes.

The project initially arose out of correspondence with Mr. Woakes of the Department of Geology at Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in Zaria, Nigeria. I am grateful to Mr. Woakes for his constant support and efforts on my behalf. Many persons accommodated me in Nigeria and helped make my stay a productive and enjoyable one. These include the Kano State Housing Corporation, where I was initially posted. Abdullahi Shua'ibu, then Chief Estate Officer, was particularly helpful, and took great pains to orient me in the city and to obtain documents and other data regarding housing in Kano.[1] Abdullahi, Bashir Abdallah Fagge and Abubakar Wada (Chief Engineer at Bayero University Kano), later arranged for me to work in conjunction with the Kano State Urban Development Board, where Bashir Fagge was employed. I thank the then Director, Alhaji Kassim Ahmed, for his support and warm reception.

I later became a Fellow at the Kano State History and Culture Bureau. I am most grateful to Drs Sule Bello, Aliyu Musa, and Tijjani Garba, successive Directors of the Bureau during my tenure in Nigeria, all of whom welcomed me into the Bureau and arranged for my accommodation in the Bureau guesthouse. I am especially obliged to Dr. Garba who read portions of my work as it progressed and provided me with many constructive comments. Thanks are also due to the Chairman of the Bureau, the emir of Gumel, who consistently showed interest in my progress. His

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[1] Initially, the research focused on provision of low-income housing in Nigeria.

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support of the research was invaluable. Other members of the Bureau who helped me in various capacities include Auwalu Hamza and Alhaji Garba Sa'id, Chief Archivist of the Bureau. Alhaji Sa'id transcribed an important Arabic manuscript for me and spent several hours with me discussing his experiences of Kano city in the 1940s and 1950s. I also appreciate the friendship and insights of women in the Women's and Arts and Crafts Divisions, including Zaineb Gwadabe, Rykia and Kaltume Gana. Zaineb was particularly welcoming and became a close friend.

I am indebted to Mr. Jack Ashton (who I met through Abdullahi Shua'ibu), former Surveyor General of the Northern Region. Mr. Ashton advised me on the best sources of maps available for the Kano region made during the colonial period and arranged for me to meet with the Surveyor General of Kano State, Alhaji Sabo. I appreciate the assistance of Alhaji Sabo and the efforts of his staff to ferret out maps dating from the colonial period.

Part of my research required that I work in the National Archives and Arewa House (a research facility containing documents related to the northern region of Nigeria) in Kaduna. I am indebted to Arewa House for accommodating me in the researchers' quarters for almost 6 months and for allowing me to photocopy and bind theses from their in-house collection. I also appreciate discussions with the Director of Arewa House, Dr. Bashir Ikara, on socio-spatial linguistics.[2] While at the researchers' quarters at Arewa House, I met Zuwaqhu Bonat, a Ph.D. student employed full-time with the Centre for Social and Economic Research at ABU. Zuwaqhu spent hours reviewing my work, and made many constructive comments.

Several persons at the National Archives made my research there especially profitable. These included the Chief Archivist, Mr. Babalola, Usman Kutingi (head of the section where I worked) and Alexander. Alexander helped to piece together especially old colonial maps[3] so that I could photocopy them for re-drafting purposes. He also helped fill in light-coloured portions of colonial maps "lost" during the photocopying process. Abdu Lateef, employed with the Kano State

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[2] Dr. Ikara is a socio-linguist.

[3] Because of aging and the tropical climate, many pages of old documents had "shattered" into dozens of pieces.

Water Resources and Engineering and Construction Agency (WRECA) in Kano, worked painstakingly and carefully to re-draft the numerous and often highly complicated photocopied maps.

I am fortunate to have undertaken intensive Hausa language instruction under Francine Swets at the University of Leiden. Francine was extremely patient and proved to be one of the best teachers I have ever had. Her friendship made my two-month stay in Holland a most memorable one. I also thank the Royal Geographical Society in London for allowing me to access their archival collection and for giving me permission to reproduce several of their photographs (which I purchased) in this dissertation.

Because my proficiency in Hausa was insufficient to conduct interviews in Hausa alone, I worked with several Nigerian translators. I first worked with Ibrahim Garba, a former graduate student of Michael Woakes. Ibrahim was extraordinarily patient, prompt, hard-working and generous with his time and energy. Mrs. Umma Sabo transcribed tapes of some palace interviews, and Bashir Bebeji and Salisu Galadanci of the Kano State History and Culture Bureau served as translators in a few village-based interviews. For work conducted inside the palace, I am especially indebted to several children of the present day emir, and the late former emir, Alhaji Sanusi (1953–63), including Bashir, Zaineb, Hajiyaye, Bagadede and Ujudu. These persons are discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

There are many scholars, besides those mentioned above, who decidedly shaped the research. Those in Nigeria include Dr. Friedrich Schwerdtfeger, of the Department of Architecture at Ahmadu Bello University, as well as his colleague and Department Head, Dr. Hamman Tukur Sa'ad. Prof. John Lavers of the Department of History at Bayero University Kano deserves special thanks for the many hours he spent reviewing and discussing my work with me. I also benefitted from discussions with and input from his colleagues Drs Philip Shea and Bawuro Barkindo. Malam Bello Nuhu Ahmed and Mrs. Ruqayyatu Rufa'i, graduate students of Drs Sa'ad and Barkindo, respectively, were extremely helpful. Both allowed me to photocopy their theses and spent many

Marcone (the Graduate Secretary), Ann Kendricks (the Administrative Assistant) and Angie Mansi (Department Secretary) who assisted me in special ways throughout the dissertation work.

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[4] I am especially indebted to Ginette Lamontagne, then Assistant Director of McGill International, who provided immense guidance in writing a CIDA proposal from which CIDA monies were eventually obtained.

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Chapter 1.

Introduction

The dissertation explores the history of Hausa political culture through an analysis of the Kano palace landscape betweeen the years 1500 to 1990. Within this time span, four socio-spatial eras or *stories* are recognised. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the palace landscape of the Hausa period, circa 1500-1807 and changes thereto as a result of the Fulani-led Islamic jihad of 1807, respectively. Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the impact of British imperialism on the palace landscapes of male and female slavery, respectively.

This chapter contextualises the stories in a number of distinct ways: the palace is situated geographically and its historical origin is briefly traced. In addition, the contribution of the stories in relation to other contemporary works that deal with the Kano palace is summarised, and key regional and political economic background information for the stories are presented. The theoretical basis for *not* awarding "Islam" or "ethnicity" central explanatory powers is also outlined. Lastly, the two most important social relations that shaped the palace landscape, slavery and gender, are interrelated with the socio-spatial division of labour and patronage.

GIDAN RUMFA: ROOTING THE STATE IN ONE PLACE

Kano city is located in the northern portion of Hausaland, a linguistic subregion of present-day northern Nigeria and southern Niger (Fig. 1.1).[1] Dating of the remains of blacksmithing activities in the iron-rich hills of Kano city suggests that the city dates from the tenth century. By the twelfth century, the first walls of the city had been constructed (probably initially with hedges) and by the fourteenth century it had become a major focus of immigration by Islamic scholars, merchants and craftsmen of various ethnic descent from North and West Africa, including the Wangara (from Mali), Bornoans, Arabs, Tuaregs, Nupe and Kwararafa (Barkindo, 1983: 4). By the mid-sixteenth century, Kano was a well-established, cosmopolitan, highly sophisticated and economically important urban centre. It was a major regional terminus of trans-Saharan and West

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[1] The name Hausaland refers to the fact that Hausa is the dominant language spoken therein.

Figure 1.1 Map of present day Niger and Nigeria showing historical extent ofHausaland and the Sokoto Caliphate (compiled and modified from maps in Muffett (1971), Johnston (1967) and Last (1967).

African trade, and was an impressive industrial hub.

The building of the palace of Kano by King Rumfa (1463-99), more properly deemed Gidan Rumfa (lit. the household of Rumfa), was instrumental in establishing Kano as the locus of a larger regional polity. In particular, it provided a spatial focus for political activities that seem to have shifted between centres located further east (Last, 1983: 71). The placement thereby significantly re-textured the political geography of the region, and rooted the state to one place, facilitating development of an elaborate political culture (chapter 3).

Rectangular in shape, Gidan Rumfa was set amidst a specially built recti-linear walled suburb attached to the southern city walls and was built at the same time as the central city market, Kasuwar kurmi (Fig. 1.2)..[2] The shape, alignment and placement of the suburb and Gidan Rumfa were innovative spatially and reflected the heightened effects of Islam and Islamic clergy upon rulers in the region: the southern palace wall was aligned by mallamai (Islamic scholars) towards Mecca;[3] and the placement was promoted by Islamic clergy as a means of distancing the aristocracy and the state from what was seen as un-Islamic practices and magic in the city. The layout also reflected an affinity (through trade) with north African and European urban culture. As Last (1983: 68) points out,

> such a plan - castle, bailey and attached walled town with its mosque opening onto the market place - was...standard at this time in north Africa (at Tunis, for example) and Europe, and demonstrates the way in which Kano was very much part of the international world. Indeed in the mid-16th century, Kano was described as being one of the three main cities in Africa, on a par with Fez and Cairo.

Beside these rather general geographic facts about the palace, little research has been conducted on the *internal* socio-spatial organisation of the palace and how internal to state and

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[2] The concept of a suburb was novel but familiar to at least those Hausa persons engaged in trans-Saharan trade with north Africa and Europe (Last, 1983).

[3] Al-Maghili, the renowned Islamic scholar from Tlemcen (Algeria) who served as a senior Islamic counsellor to Rumfa during the early years of his reign, is believed to have been the architect of these spatial innovations (Lavers, 1980: 54). Al-Maghili was familiar with walled suburbs, the main city of Tlemcen was abutted by several, and like most Islamic scholars of the period, he would have known how to use the stars to align the palace axis towards Mecca (Lavers, 1990, pers. comm.).

Figure 1.2 The Kano palace as a walled suburb to the main walled city of Kano circa 1500. The main city market, known as <u>Kasuwar Kurmi</u> (lit. the market of the groves) was also built or at least enlarged by Rumfa. The city and suburb were entered through the city gates or <u>kofafe</u> (named in italics), each one guarded by a "king of the gate". A larger and more rounded wall extension was completer later in Rumfa's reign. Lavers (1980) infers from the roundedness that the Islamic scholar and state councillor from Algeria, Al-Maghili, had departed by this time; otherwise additional rectangular walled suburbs, more characteristic of North Africa, would have been constructed (modified from maps in Lavers (1980) and Moody (1969)).

regional developments. Contemporary research works treat the palace as an *exceptional* architectural form, distinct from vernacular households or gidaje, thereby divorcing the *forms* of everday aristocratic practices from those of the populus-at-large.[4] In addition, most studies of the Kano palace or region analytically de-link historical from spatial processes and meaning such that the dynamism and spatiality of the palace history are lost (below).

OTHER WORKS: PLACING THE RESEARCH IN CONTEXT

There are two contemporary works on the Kano palace, a Master's thesis in Architecture by Ahmed (1988) entitled, Kano Emirate palaces: an architectural and historical study and a Master's thesis in History by Rufa'i (1987), Gidan Rumfa: the socio-political history of the palace of the emir of Kano with particular reference to the twentieth century. Ahmed (1988) produces large format blue prints of the palace based upon a state government map[5] derived from aerial photographic data, which he refined using a limited number of field data.[6] His study is largely descriptive, however, and treats the palace plan in an historically, materially and socially rigid manner. The few buildings he identifies as "historical" are typically discussed in terms of who built them (thereby reducing history to authorship), while most other structures he apparently assumes always existed. His ahistorical approach results in purely subjective analyses of palace places. He recognises, for example, that the traditional residence of the present day king is located centrally in the palace, but uses only personal contemplative means to deduce that the placement represented some sort of male Mystical Centre;[7] the conceptual framework he uses to give the

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[4] Gida (sing.); gidaje (pl.).

[5] A Kano State Ministry of Works and Housing map published by the Lands and Surveys Division.

[6] This field methodology was also used in this study, but refined using other means (chapter 2).

[7] Ahmed develops a "theory of the Mystic Centre and supernatural abstraction" (127) which claims that the king has always been located in the exact centre of the palace, what he calls the Concentric Centre. This placement, according to Ahmed, not only served to protect the king but spatially signified a metaphysical truth, namely that the king was (and is) the Centre or "living heart from which and around which other life forms derive energy and sense of purpose" (128).

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palace structure meaning is uncoupled from palace myth or practice.[8] In addition, because the multi-layered and diachronous palace landscape is treated analytically as a single synchronous terrain, he is not drawn or able to uncover other kingly residences that were *not* placed centrally (chapters 3 and 4). The work of Ahmed transforms the palace into a categorically different type of architectural structure vis-a-vis vernacular households,[9] extending a romantic ideal found in other works that deal with the palace only in passing.[10] The argument that the palace is

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[8] This un-coupling is also evident in certain logical paradoxes in his work. He implies, for example, that the Concentric placement of the king *differs* fundamentally from the placement of male heads of households in vernacular settings *and* that the king's central placement expresses a mystical belief held by *all* Hausa that, "what goes around comes around - that is, all events in nature derive from (and revolve around) one [male] source" (130).

His predisposition towards idealist and contemplative analysis also results in historical inaccuracies. He claims, for example, that the palace was enclosed by a double wall "initially intended to isolate the palace and emir's followers from the then paganistic/nominally muslim rest of the community indigenous to Kano" (128). The evidence upon which he deduced the existence of this wall is unknown. He may have observed traces of the moats which once surrounded the old rectilinear suburb wall on aerial photographs and interpreted them to be relict markers of a second wall or palace enclosure (see chapter 3). He may also have inferred erroneously from field or aerial photograph data that the double wall enclosing the southern and western parts of the palace at one time extended completely around the palace. This double wall, however, consists of an older mud wall in back of a "modern" cement block wall erected in the 1950s to honour Queen Elizabeth's visit to Kano. The older mud wall has since been left to crumble. In late 1990, a similar cement block wall was built in front of the eastern palace wall.

[9] His understanding of the palace as an exceptional structure is made most explicit in his statement that Gidan Rumfa is more than the "normal Hausa compound on a much larger and grander scale" (128)

[10] Sa'ad (1981), in his dissertation on Hausa architecture, for example, classifies the palace as a so-called Muslim palace designed according to timeless, universal, and therefore static, Islamic tenets:

[Muslim] Palaces are modelled in the image of the Muslim paradise as depicted in the Koran and other Islamic scriptures. The Kano palace, for example, contains grand open spaces and extensive gardens where, in the past "wild animals used to roam" in captivity. The Soron Giwa (The Hall of Elephants) is said to have been built on the pasturage of palace elephants (350).

As the dissertation stories show, however, the location and amount of open space in the palace have changed dramatically over the last 500 years. The flower or leisure gardens Sa'ad alludes to, for example, are recent innovations modelled upon British colonial gardens, not paradise. In addition, the name Soron Giwa derives from the nickname of a renowned Fulani warrior and king (elephants being associated with military prowess) and not some mythical pasturage (chapter 4).

Sa'ad's fantastic vision of the past includes the present and, like Ahmed's (1988; Sa'ad was Ahmed's advisor) has a male-centric cast that is particularly evident in his description of the present palace landscape:

Even today the palace has, to a lesser extent, its exotic nature: pleasing greenery, graceful brooks of running water, charming flower gardens, elegant gazelles sprinting about, cute rodents gnawing plants, a harem full of lovely women; and colorful peacocks perched on zankwaye [pinnacles] of buildings. These are traits the palace environment shares only with the fabulous world of the aljanna [Islamic spirits]. (350)

There are, however, no brooks of running water (except the traditionally open sewage canals); the gardens post-date the 1940s (above); and there are no gazelles. As for rodents, there are gafiyya (giant rats) who are considered a nuisance. When periodically reaching intolerable levels, they are killed and fed to male prison labourers (chapter 5). In addition, the king currently supports relatively few young concubines, hardly a harem (chapter 6), all of whom Sa'ad presumably has never seen, "outside" adult men being forbidden entry into the inner household of the king.

somehow unearthly or extra-ordinary carries with it additionally a linguistic corollary, that is, that the word gida or household holds two categorically distinct meanings, one of the king (Gidan Rumfa or "household of Rumfa"); and the other for his subjects.[11] As will be shown, this distinction is a false one that obscures rather than refines our understanding of palace spatiality and Hausa political culture (chapter 3).

Although Rufa'i (1987) recognises (at least in her thesis title) that the palace is a gida, she, like Ahmed (1988) and Sa'ad (1981), commonly detaches palace places from their historical and material contexts. She treats slave titles and realms, for example, largely descriptively and in the present: this *Hausa* title means this in *English*, and this title-bearing slave lives here and fulfills this function today. Etymological and historical geographic analyses of the titles reveal, however, that present day titles represent only a fraction of what existed formerly; that the titles remaining today were linked to crucial pre-colonial (pre-1903) slave hierarchies and division of state and domestic labour; that the spatiality and meaning of these hierarchies and divisions changed over pre-colonial time; and that the present day degradation of palace life is tied to the colonial breakdown of the traditional political economy and culture and not merely colonial (and following

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[11] This semantic bifurcation is promoted indirectly by Last (1983) in his work on the political history of Kano, based upon a critical reading of an Arabic text of the Kano Chronicle. Although Last is writing in English, he preferentially utilises the Arabic phrase of the Kano Chronicle that describes the palace (dar Rumfa), rather than the Hausa phrase (Gidan Rumfa), which he uses in a purely dynastic sense.

Last presumably prefers the Kano Chronicle phrase because it conveys the earliest and therefore the most semantically pure sense of the palace (the Chronicle was written in at least the seventeenth century; see chapter 1), which might in turn provide clues into the palace structure. The usage implies, however, that there was little etymological evolution of the word present-day usage of the Arabic word dar, that the writers of the Chronicle were perfectly bilingual, that each successive contributor to the Chronicle did not change the previous text, and that the word dar relates to a particular spatial configuration distinct from a gida structure. Although his usage of dar raises these etymological and architectural questions, he does not address them. Moreover there is some doubt as to when the Chronicle was written, whether the first text of the Chronicle was written in Arabic and whether the Chronicle writers were fluent in Arabic (Last, 1983).

Last (1983: 68) compounds the linguistic problem by translating dar Rumfa into English as, "a palace or 'castle' (or casbah) with a new curtain wall built as an extension to the existing town defenses", when dar simply means "the house (or place) of". That is, dar contains the same dynastic or lineage implications as the Hausa word gidan. That dar is most closely related to gida (versus casbah, castle, and so on) is also supported by a mid-nineteenth century document written in Hausa by an Islamic scholar in which the palace is referred to as Gidan sarki (lit. the household of the king; see Ferguson, 1973).

Similar architectural implications are promoted unwittingly by the common English translation of Gidan Rumfa as "palace". This corruption has probably arisen out of the cumbersome nature of using Gidan Rumfa (or, Gidan sarki, lit. household of the king) in transliteral form. It is much more lengthy to speak and write "the household of Rumfa" or "the gates of the household of the king", for example, that "the palace" or "the palace gates".

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independence in 1960, Federal Military Government) restrictions on the salary of the king, as she suggests (chapters 3 through 6). She also conducts little spatial-historical interrogation of the political and economic relations that obtained between palace slaves and the aristocracy, within the slave community as a whole, and between royal slaves and the populus-at-large.

Both Ahmed (1988) and Rufa'i (1987), then, offer useful descriptive information about the present-day spatial and social organisation of the palace, but little understanding of previous landscapes and the dynamics of this landscape change. In addition, the way in which socio-spatiality of the palace functioned as a means of negotiating state formational processes and forces within and outside the region is not exposed. The stories in this dissertation thus expand upon former works by connecting the palace to historical regional events and the political culture and economy.

PLACING THE STORIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

The initial *Hausa* landscape and changes thereto following the Fulani *jihad*

Chapter 3 begins with an uncovering of the first palace landscape circa 1500. It demonstrates that the spatiality of the palace was in many ways congruent with the spatiality of vernacular households. These spatial *congruities* reflected shared patriarchal practices which were (and are) the basis of Hausa society, especially with respect to gender and the master-slave relationship. It was these congruities which enabled the palace to be effectively a house-hold. It is also shown that specific patriarchal structures of the household pre-figured or structured the development of the patriarchal state. In particular, male household activities and realms were constructed into state realms, resulting in what today appear to be spatial *incongruities* between the palace and vernacular households. Moreover the palace was linked to the city via especially privileged avenues. It was these incongruities and special connections that enabled the palace to function effectively as a house of state. Changes thereto during the Hausa period are then elaborated using field data in conjunction with information largely provided in the Kano Chronicle.

By the end of Hausa rule in Kano (1807), the polity of Kano was relatively well-defined and

consolidated geographically through elaborate state apparatuses, including a highly organised state bureacracy, military and paramilitary forces, civic infrastructures (such as the city walls and roads), and institutionalised, lavish shows of state authority. The largely urban-based state was maintained and expanded through increasing taxation amongst rural productive sectors (primary and industrial). Tensions arose, however, when taxation levels increased assymetrically in relation to productive capacities.[12]

Chapter 4 *begins* with the take-over of the Kano region and palace as a result of the Islamic jihad of 1807. The jihad leaders, consisting of Fulani Islamic scholars and clan leaders, promised qualitatively different and lower levels of taxation through a return to a "purer" form of Islam.[13] The organisational (religious) coherence behind these claims and their social force vis-a-vis extant economic and political tensions helps explain the empowerment of the Fulani (as a distinct ethnic group); why many Hausa throughout Hausaland participated in the overthow of what was predominantly Hausa leadership (although not all targetted regions were conquered nor all kings overthrown); and why there was relatively little resistance to establishment of a Fulani-led regional theocracy, the Sokoto caliphate.[14]

The Fulani did not alter state demands or substantially change regional productive levels

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[12] It is noted by Last (1983: 83), for example, that in the late seventeenth century, new walled towns were constructed that "were not so much centres of population as administrative centres, collecting taxes and organising cheap manpower for the army or for public works." Concomitantly, seven new kinds of taxes were instituted, including a market tax. Subsequently, market taxes were increased and extended to all citizens of Kano city, inciting the hatred of scholars (who traditionally had not been taxed) and the general populace. The high market taxes even resulted in Arab traders leaving Kano city en masse. Last (1983: 84) goes on to say that "Sultan Baba Zaki [1768-776] decided he had to clamp down hard on his officials, confiscating their property and forcing them to do military service. Not surprisingly he was the first Sultan to establish a personal bodyguard armed with guns, which presumably over-awed any dissent in the army or in the bureacracy."

Economic tensions were probably exacerbated by the fact that in the mid-1700s, Kano was made a vassal state of Borno (located to the east). The populace would therefore have been paying tribute not only to their "local" king, but to the Mai of Borno (Smith, 1983: 47).

[13] Purer in the associational sense; the new tax was to be linked directly (through formal juridical precedence) to regressive forms of taxation that characterised materially less-developed socio-economic forms of early Islamic caliphates (see, for example, Garba, 1986).

[14] The Sokoto caliphate was the theocratic end product of the jihad composed of the conquered states (or *emirates*), administered anew by Fulani leaders (or *emirs*) who, in turn, were loosely administered and guided by a central religious authority (or *caliph*) based in the northern region of Sokoto (chapter 4).

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or political economic organisation. In fact, the Fulani gradually *increased* state bureaucracies and apparatuses in line with precedents established during the Hausa period. The continuity in the demand profiles in some ways reflected the high degree of assimilation of the Fulani into Hausa culture.[15] For centuries prior to the jihad, for example, many sedentary Fulani settled in Kano city where they intermarried with the Hausa and adopted the language and adapted to the spatial forms of Hausa social organisation.[16] Household structures and practices of the city-based Fulani became largely congruent with their Hausa counterparts,[17] and Fulfulde seems to have been largely displaced.[18]

The ease with which the sedentary Fulani reproduced Hausa cultural forms is demonstrated clearly in the remarkable continuity of social organisation in the Kano palace landscape following the jihad (chapter 4). The Hausa slave-based avenues of state administration, for example, were largely maintained, and changes to state political organisation were effected by appropriating and moving through the elaborate institutions of control inherited from the Hausa (chapter 4).

Expansionary measures of the state, especially within military realms, eventually resulted in higher taxation levels (Garba, 1986; chapter 4). Increased taxation levels *in conjunction* with the fact that the Fulani administration was incapable of technologically augmenting existing levels of production, led to the re-emergence of "pre-Fulani" contradictions. Within the larger historical framework of this dissertation, then, the Fulani conquest is seen as a *local* and unsuccessful attempt to resolve in religious (moral) terms tensions that were fundamentally material

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[15] Assimilation of the Fulani into Hausa culture in Kano was apparently much stronger than that which occurred in other emirates, for example, Zazzau to the the south (see Smith, 1956).

[16] There is, however, some evidence of differences in the materials used in buidling. See, for example, Barth (1890).

[17] Kano city grew largely southward, away from the central city market. Taht the Fulni lived predominantly in the southern portions of the city reflects their relatively late arrival to the city and not necessarily a drive to form a separate cultural enclave (see Padon, 1973).

[18] Field data suggests that in Kano city, Fulfulde was maintained by and amongst the Fulani ruling class up through the mid-twentieth century.

(technological), political (the aristocracy versus rural producers) and economic (taxation versus productive levels) in nature.

This vision of the jihad has two important analytical implications.[19] First, the Fulani reformist movement is seen to have derived its power vis-a-vis the promise of lower taxation *within the context of* extant political tensions. Islam was thus used as a vehicle for specific political economic change (which later proved to be regressive) and later, for the rescindment of women's rights. It is therefore not treated as an ideal entity in and of itself. Similarly, Islam did not play a significant oppositional or transformative role during the colonial era. Although there were initially important Islamic resistance movements, these were soon rendered powerless by the superior military force of the British. Islam, as some ideal, is therefore not used as an explanatory force, but is typically contextualised within larger political economic frameworks.

Secondly, there is no evidence that the war was fuelled by ethnic tensions *per se*. The Fulani military leaders, for example, were supported by the majority of the Hausa populace. Rather, the power of the Fulani (as a distinct ethnic group) seems to have derived from their preferential involvement in regional Islamic reform movements. Ethnicity is therefore not called upon to explain the jihad or changes to the palace landscape during Fulani rule (chapters 4-6; Sa'id, 1978).[20]

The British conquest and the erosion of palace slavery

The British conquest of 1903 in many ways pre-empted any "final" solution to the tensions between the state and peasantry. The British did not work through the system to overcome local contradictions, but forcefully distorted, re-aligned and transfigured the region, a transformation

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[19] The Kano jihad has not typically been analysed in political economic terms, although there is ample evidence to support this interpretation. See, for example, the Kano Chronicle. Garba (1986), Last (1983) and Sa'id (1978).

[20] It is important to note, however, that the Fulani are made up of two strikingly different societies, the nomadic pastoralists and sedentary communities. The historical and present day inter-relations between these two groups, however, has not been studied, which precludes rigorous analysis of the jihad. Some of the Fulani clan leaders of the Kano jihad, for example, seem to have had greater affinities with one or the other community which would have significantly textured the political strategies used during and after the war. There is evidence that nomadic Fulani acted as carriers and negotiators of military intelligence (Sa'id, 1978).

which registered strongly within the palace (chapters 5 and 6). Unlike the Fulani, the British were cultural outsiders and active members of the "global" imperial capitalist economy and culture. The initial and fundamental motive behind their conquest was to link the productive base of Hausaland (and Nigeria and other Empire holdings as a whole) with British national interests, especially to realms of industrial production (Shenton, 1986; Sanusi, 1982).

In contrast to southern Nigeria, the British found northern Nigeria (the colonial *Northern Region*) to be exceptionally well-organised. The remarkable coherence of the region in large part reflected the cultural and political (including religious) integrity of the caliphate, and could be used as a tool through which regional colonial administrative change would be effected. Regional control required, however, the destruction of the theocratic aspects of regional rule. In this sense, the act of conquest was politically significant, *not* just because it established who were the respective victors and conquered, but because it corroded the religiosity of state leadership. That is, the caliph's fall from power in many ways contradicted and de-legitimated the fundamental Islamic precept of unity between state and religion (Ubah, 1985). His fall also opened up the possibility that the British could formally take the place of the caliph and thereby streamline their administrative efficiency. Such a re-placement would require, however, that the administrative machinery of the emirates be nominally maintained.

Towards this end, the Fulani leadership of each emirate was compelled to rule on behalf of the British Government.[21] This policy resulted in a two-tiered administrative structure, known as *Indirect Rule*, which furthered the breakdown of inter-emirate theocratic allegiances. Initially, Indirect Rule was used as a vehicle for legitimating British appropriation of 50% of local tax revenues, paid mainly in kind, with grains. After several years, however, the British desired to effect more "rational" control over taxation, which required greater knowledge of geo-political organisation.

Subsequent investigative forays of British officers into the countryside (formally known as

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[21] In colonial documents, the British government is typically referred to as "the Government".

touring), revealed that the territory was made up of non-contiguous and irregularly shaped political subregions. In addition, administration of the territories was limited primarily to the collection of taxes by Fulani clan leaders who had participated militarily in the jihad. Because these leaders, or hakimai, were city-based, collection was delegated to rural tax administrators, a cadre of slaves known as jakadu. It was also discovered that farmers commonly lived some distance from their farms and paid taxes to the jakada (sing.) who controlled the subregion wherein the farm was located, making it difficult to collect taxes.

The British seem to have been frustrated with what they found. The non-contiguity of the subregions and the non-payment of taxes to the head of the subregion wherein a farmer resided, for example, were seen to be administratively and spatially irrational and thereby obstructive of smooth taxation flows. The system of "taxation-administration" by jakadu on behalf of city-based clan leaders was also thought to promote irresponsible government (SNP/7/9/1538/1908). A massive re-structuring of the countryside into contiguous and similarly-sized subregions was consequently enacted. A selection of Fulani clan leaders and other traditional "chiefs" was then made, each one being assigned *direct* administration of one of these new territories, and ordered to live in their rural constituencies (chapter 5). The profound geo-political reorganisation of the aristocracy was the basis for what was formally deemed *Native Administration*.

In the name of the emirs and other nobility of the various emirates (now known as *Native Rulers*), taxation decrees were issued and the entire cultural fabric of the region was transformed. Within 15 years, trans-Saharan and regional West African trade emanating out of Kano had been largely broken down and re-routed to Britain via southern Nigerian ports. The breakdown was primarily accomplished through caravan tolls, construction of the railway (which short-circuited local and regional markets) and the intervention of World War I, when many North African regions became unsafe for trade.

By the 1920s, trade had been effectively re-directed southward to Britain and attention turned towards consolidating control over the amount, type and quality of agricultural and

industrical raw materials being exported. The British thus began dictating through imperial state research activities, such as those at the Imperial Institute, the kinds of seed crops to be grown. These dictates were enforced by law and supported by punitive measures. Cultivation of groundnuts for cash was also introduced and encouraged. Agricultural buying stations were established throughout the countryside, with Hausa merchants serving initially as the main middlemen. Local industries were also eroded so as to divert locally produced raw materials to Britain. In Kano, blacksmithing, cloth production, leather working and cloth dyeing were discouraged or proscribed and soon ceased to exist as mainstays of the economy (Bello, 1982).

The traditional political economy was transfigured further through monetization processes that tied regional production, labour and eventually consumption to the global capitalist economy. Monetization was achieved in a number of ways. The mandate that all taxes be paid in British currency, for example, displaced the practice and forms of in-kind payments as well as other regional currencies. The mandate also forced peasants into cash crop production, especially groundnuts (above). The need for hard currencies also drove many into waged labour, thereby rupturing traditional relations of patronage.

For almost ten years after the conquest, the British allotted the Native Rulers 50% of tax revenues, allowing them to maintain a semblance of traditional order and patronage. The right of the king (or emir) to receive and dispose of taxation as he pleased (within the traditional constraints of patronage) was subsequently shattered when the British authorities placed the king and, later, all members of the Native Administration, on salary (chapter 5).

Two related structural transformations within traditional political and cultural practices ensued. First, the monies that remained after remuneration of the Native Administrators created a reserve that the British claimed belonged to the "public", a concept unknown within, and antithetical to, patronage relations.[22] A Native Treasury for the monies was established and

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[22] As Garba (1986) explains, pre-colonial kingly disbursement of taxation and other revenues for such civil purposes as road and city wall building, was an ultimate form of patronage. Monies thus awarded were seen as a gift from the king and as a sign that the king was a benevolent provider. The revenues were not considered "public" in any de-centralised sense.

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religious malams (as the societal *literati*) were trained in book keeping. It was from these Native Treasury monies that Western-inspired infrastructures and institutions, including metalled roads, prisons, hospitals, schools and electricity were funded.

The comprehensive re-figuring of cultural and political channels re-inflected back into economic terrains. Metalled roads were instrumental to the existence of agricultural buying stations, and electricity and sewage facilities proved essential to the establishment of Western capitalist industries. Secondly, with less revenue available to the aristocracy (and especially the king), patronage abilities decreased dramatically. Tensions emerged between masters and slaves, exacerbated by the rise of waged labour relations.

These transfigurations, and especially the downfall of aristocratic patronage, were essential to the erosion of male and female slave realms in the palace, presented in chapters 5 and 6, respectively. The integrity of slavery to the traditional political culture of Kano emirate, especially in royal realms, is outlined below.

SLAVERY AND THE MASTER-SLAVE RELATION[23]

Slaves: uprooted *children* of patriarchal households

Research on slavery in the northern Nigerian region, and particularly in Kano, suggests that slaves did not form a significant proportion of the productive base.[24] It is also clear that Hausa slavery was fundamentally distinct from the highly repressive and degrading forms associated with the European trans-Atlantic slave trade of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries (Rodney, 1972).[25] In general, slavery in Hausaland seems to have been the means by which patriarchal households (including the palace) acquired extra labour under conditions of low population pressure. Slaves consequently participated in all forms of productive, reproductive,

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[23] The interpretations of master-slave relations and their intersection with gender relations (this section and the next, respectively) are taken from work in progress dealing with social relations and material-linguistic structures of households.

[24] Dunk (1986) effectively critiques a popular contention that there was a "slave mode of production" in northern Nigeria. See also Hill (1977).

[25] Rodney (1972) is still one of the best reference texts on the level of degradation represented in Western slavery.

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commercial and state activities, and were remarkably well integrated into the household structure (Shea, 1983; Hill, 1977).

Within the household, slaves were treated akin to children, irrespective of age.[26] An analysis of architectural plans suggests, for example, that since at least circa 1500, slave men lived in the same place as adolescent sons (chapter 3), and at least since the nineteenth century, male slave men, like male children of the household, were allotted their own plot of land and provided with wives. Additionally, if the slave family grew and if the slave owner was a person of means, the slave, like a free-born son, might be awarded a separate household.[27] Female slaves similarly shared many of the rights of daughters of the household patron and, if unmarried, typically lived in the inner household section with the free-born women.

Familial and patronage aspects of slavery are also reflected linguistically. *Slaves* (lit. bayi), for example, are commonly called yara (lit. children), and a male slave owner is also known as *father* (babba), especially to new slaves. Similarly, free-born persons can become bayin yarda or "slaves of agreement" to a male household patron (other than their own) through a formal request and submission to his authority. The protection and care of slaves was therefore not prescribed primarily through Islamic law, but through familial customs. Like children, slave labour and persons could be abused or honoured, depending upon the personality and means of their owners.[28]

The main qualitative difference between slaves and "real" children was that slaves were

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[26] Klein (1990) develops a descriptive typology of slavery based largely upon what activities slaves are engaged in. He also descriptively defines a "slave mode of production" as an economic system wherein slaves make up more than 50% of the productive base. One of the slave forms he derives (based upon the work of Miers and Kopytoff (1978)) is deemed *incorporative* and is a system in which slaves are integrated socially into households. This form is then counterposed with others. Although this category may appear to apply here, it does not. Slaves in Kano carried out a number of activities which transect almost all of the Klein's types, making his typology of limited analytical value.

[27] See also, Giginyu (1981), Hill (1977) and Yunasa (1986).

[28] In a 1990 international conference on slavery hosted by Arewa House in Kaduna (see, for example, Phillips (1990), a major debate centred on whether Muslims or Christian forms of slavery were historically better or worse. This was argued through citing the relative religious quality of slave treatment. The analysis presented here suggests that Islam (as an ideal moral code) was not as important in dictating the terms of Hausa slave relations, as were the "rules" of good patronage and the financial abilities and "character" of individual patrons. This helps explain the contradictory accounts of Barth (1890) and Imam Imoru (Ferguson, 1973) about the good and ill treatment of slaves, respectively, discussed more fully, below.

captured or were descended from a captured slave matrilineage. They also suffered some customary disabilities. For example, slaves could be sold. There were additional Islamic juridical distinctions; slaves could not sue or be court witnesses, nor could they be malams or participate in religious rituals, such as Friday prayers or slaughtering rams. In addition, murder of a slave person by a free person was not punishable by death (as would be the case for victims of free birth, but by blood money (Ubah, 1985: 26; Ferguson, 1973: 232). Even though slaves were called yara (children), they were never considered truly equal to free-born children. The word for freedom, for example, is 'yanci which, loosely transliterated means, "the state of being one of the [real] children".[29] That is, in the absence of kinship ties,[30] household integration would always be incomplete.

There was, however, a particularly empowering "disability". Slaves were those who were preferentially uprooted to carry out whatever task the master required away from the home. As Phillips (1990: 2) notes, in Hausaland,

...it is the free person who belongs, who is where he [sic] is supposed to be....
The slave is the alienated, uprooted, unattached person who can be removed most easily.

This uprootedness and *mobility* seems to have had two important social repercussions, particularly in Kano. First, it suggests that because slaves had many opportunities to leave, their allegiances had to be more finely cultivated than those of free-born family members. This cultivation helps explain the phenomenon described by Yunasa (1976: 13, 14) of pre-sale negotiations between *some* Kano slaves and prospective buyers:

In Kano, as in other places in Hausaland, a slave was sold only if he wanted his prospective buyer to be his master. If he did not like him he could say, "Do not buy me because I do not like you. You cannot maintain me. I shall be too expensive for you. But if you purchase me I will not stay with you." The buyer then had to look around for another one. On the other hand, a slave could signal to a buyer to come and buy him. "Come and purchase me, I like you. What is your

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[29] The social implications of the word 'yanci (freedom) are noted by Phillips (1990) who unfortunately translates 'yan (children) as "sons", thereby unwittingly inscribing a false and profound gender bias into his argument.

[30] There were various ways, however, of achieving kinship ties with slaves, which is elaborated upon more fully below.

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occupation? If you are a farmer, I too can farm." The purchaser then explained to the slave his occupation and what he would like his slave to do for him. He could ask the slave questions about what work he could do very well, what he liked and what he did not like and so on... The slave would, in turn, demand to know what sort of treatment he would be given, the hours of work, possibility of manumission and so on... A slave could refuse to be sold.[31]

Secondly, their uprootedness and mobility were undoubtedly means through which to acquire more geographically extensive (and thus strategic) knowledge. The cultivation of this knowledge became highly valued and gave slaves special powers, especially at the state level. Since at least the fifteenth century, for example, *male* slaves served as spies and military and paramilitary leaders as well as tax administrators and state councillors. The strategic knowledge and value of slaves led in turn to their use as political buffers between the king and his nobility. Male slaves were played off against nobility through shifting the numbers and allocations of state titles and related official duties between them.[32] Male slaves of state were consequently extremely powerful and, on occasion, organised effective rebellions against the king.[33]

There is also evidence that slave *women* had greater geographic freedom, although more limited than that of male slaves, which facilitated the acquisition of broader social knowledge and power. Field data show that royal concubines had access to the entire large domestic area of the

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[31] The quotes within the text are those of a number of informants of Yunasa, including a slave and a judge with juridical experience in slavery. His find is significant and at first seemed to me to be somewhat fantastic. I therefore questioned Madakin Kano (22.7.90), a leading nobleman in Kano, about the claims. Although he had no direct knowledge of these transactions, he stated that he found the idea of pre-sale discussions culturally very plausible.

It should be noted, however, that Yunasa also states (based not upon direct evidence, but presumptions) that these transactions were exceptional. These and other differences in transactions point to a whole sociology of slave organisation and status in Kano and Hausaland in general that has yet to be explored. Why, for example, were slaves relatively well-respected in Kano (see, for eg, Barth, 1890), whereas in other areas they were not (see eg, Ferguson, 1973: 231). What gave some slaves the right to question prospective buyers and not others: was it the age, beauty, strength, professional skills, etc; or because they spoke Hausa or a language for which there was an easily accessible translator (Yunasa, 1976: 14); and/or was it related to larger cultural and political economic factors. Labour in Kano, for example, was highly valued and mobile, and Kano was a cosmopolitan entrepot. Slaves would therefore have been in high demand. Perhaps their relative scarcity and mobility awarded them unique powers of choice that would have been untenable in other areas.

[32] That slaves played crucial roles as political stabilisers seems to be an extremely important and dynamic aspect of state formation, although it has not been recognised or discussed as such in the literature. It became of interest to this study after noting that data from the field and Kano Chronicle, in particular, showed large and continuous historical shifts in title allocations between free-born persons and slaves, especially during periods of crisis. The importance of slaves as political "buffers" was then verified in discussions with a leading title-holding member of Kano nobility, Madakin Kano (chapter 2).

[33] See the Kano Chronicle (Palmer, 1967).

palace whereas free-born wives were considerably restricted. Consequently, concubines wielded significant administrative powers (chapters 4 and 6). There is also linguistic and field evidence suggesting that prior to the Fulani jihad, slave women collected rural in-kind taxes (paid in grains; chapter 4). These findings lead to an important re-vision of the profile of women who directly served the state, at least prior to the jihad (chapter 4). In particular, they suggest that known female title-holders of state, especially Korama (who set grain volumes and prices in the main city market) were slaves.

Concubines and eunuchs: sexual and political ambiguities

Concubinage was traditionally a highly prestigious institution, essential to palace life and administration.[34] There were, however, several customary and juridical differences between concubine rights and those of domestic slave women, which point to ideological and practical ambiguities in what constitutes a free versus an enslaved person.

According to custom and law, concubines were domestic female slaves with whom the slave owner slept. Concubines were consequently awarded less labour-intensive duties and became semi-seclusion-bound. Their spatial restriction seems to reflect their closer familial ties to the household master (technically forged upon the birth of a concubine child), and was part of a household hierarchy of spatial privileges awarded to women: wives (free-born) were the most restricted, while domestic slave women had access to most places (chapter 6). In addition, concubine children, unlike children of domestic slave women, were *free-born*. That is, they acquired the birthright of the *father* (counter to normal matrilineal passage of birthright), making them equal juridically to children of the patron born by wives.

The quasi-free status of concubines and the switch-over in the birthright of their children leads to extreme complexity and *ambiguity* as to who was master (in the authoritative patronage sense) over whom. It also allowed domestic slaves to use their daughters or sisters as a form of

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[34] A slave owner carried the full financial burden of providing for his concubines and their children. These responsibilities largely restricted concubine-holding to wealthy or powerful men.

political capital with their masters. This ambiguity and the privileges attached to it are best

demonstrated anectdotally through a contemporary palace example:[35]

> A certain prince named Shehu[36] prostrates himself before the powerful title-
> holding slave Shamaki.[37] He does this *not* because Shamaki is powerful, but
> because Shehu's mother (a concubine) is Shamaki's sister. According to familial
> status rules of age (for Shehu and Shamaki now belong to the same extended
> family through kinship and not purely slavery), Shamaki is of higher status than
> the prince.[38]

A different kind of political-sexual ambiguity surrounded eunuchs who, by virtue of their

castration, were allowed to traverse the most prized of spaces, male and female. Eunuchs were,

however, castrated *males*. They resided in male places, held male names, and otherwise dressed

and lived as highly privileged (though celibate) men. During the time of Rumfa (1463-1499) they

guarded the treasury, for example, and dating from at least the pre-colonial Fulani period, they

oversaw arms production (chapter 4). There is also evidence that at least during the nineteenth

century, they disciplined and enforced the seclusion of women, slave and free. For all these

reasons, eunuchs are discussed and analysed throughout this dissertation in the context of *male*

slavery.

THE INTERSECTION OF GENDER AND MASTER-SLAVE RELATIONS

Slave ownership was predominantly a male prerogative which was sustained through the

gendered spatial division of labour. Women were secluded in the domestic inner portions of the

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[35] I am grateful to Dr. Tijjani Garba (6.90) of the Kano State History and Culture Bureau for providing me with these and other contemporary examples.

[36] Shehu is actually a son of the recently deceased emir Sanusi who was deposed in 1963 (chapter 5). He is therefore technically no longer a prince, although he would be treated as such by custom. I therefore retain the desciptor "prince" for the sake of narrative simplicity.

[37] Prostration is not technically correct. He actually would have partially kneeled, while delivering special greetings to Shamaki, keeping his eyes averted.

[38] An added social twist derives from Shehu's marriage to a free-born daughter of Shamaki. The daughter was free-born because her mother was free-born, slave status being matrilineal in non-concubine cases. Because of this marriage, Shamaki (a slave) became the father-in-law of Shehu (a prince).

In addition, all slave-master relations are annulled once the prince becomes a state title-holder. Then, Shamaki would prostrate himself before the prince.

household where they largely engaged in reproductive activities. In contrast, men traversed, "knew" and controlled all public or extra-domestic household places, including the battlefield and sites of state council (chapters 3 through 6). Such a spatial division of domestic, productive and state labour enabled men to reap and sow preferentially the benefits of economic exchange on a large scale. Men largely produced and sold agricultural and industrial products, for example, and controlled local and regional commerce.[39] The resultant and relative exploitation of women is evident in that men were much better able to *provide*, that is, to be patrons.[40]

Women legally could, and some women did, nevertheless own slaves, suggesting that at least a few women had means by which to provide. Female ownership of slaves shows that it was *not* that it was unlawful for women to own slaves, rather it was the *differential ability of men and women within the context of the gendered spatial division of labour to provide* that made it difficult for them to do so. The phrase "provider-provided for", which is more descriptively accurate of slave relations, is thus commonly used in the dissertation in place of the more gender-biased phrase, "master-slave", which implies that providers were only men (that is, "masters").

The more descriptive sense of the phrase "provider-provided for" also lends itself to a more exacting analysis of slavery as a form of patronage. In this sense, "providing for" is not only a social obligation as well as a source of prestige and power, but desirable for those who will benefit from it, whether they be women, slaves, children, the elderly and so on. Status and support thereby become mutual and interdependent in that masters are as dependent upon those for whom they provide (labourers, traders or caretakers) as those provided for are dependent upon the good will of their "father".[41]

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[39] Evidence of women's relative isolation from controlling the exploitative benefits of exchange at least within the palace, is evident in the "male" placement and control of the state treasury.

[40] Provision as a male preserve was linked ideologically to male interpretations of specific Islamic injunctions regarding provision for wives.

[41] This is not to suggest that the qualities of dependency were equal. Free-born men controlled the economy and therefore had far more latitude in which to abuse their dependents. That is, they had more options in choosing who they thought would please or support them. They could sell troublesome slaves, for example, or buy new slaves, wives, or concubines.

A NOTE ON THE KANO CHRONICLE

The Kano Chronicle is perhaps the most important resource document for those researching the political history of the Kano region, and was used extensively in the dissertation, especially in chapters 3 and 4. As Smith (1983: 31) points out,

> The Kano Chronicle differs from these royal skeletons [historical king-lists] in summarizing for each of the reigns that it reports a varying collection of pertinent incidents and information...
>
> In the absence of any comparable history of a pre-jihadic Hausa state, the Kano Chronicle is of special interest, since it records the contexts and processes by which the polity of Kano emerged, and situates its development neatly within its wider geo-historical milieu.

There are, however, several significant problems associated with the document which bear directly upon the dissertation work. First, no one knows who wrote it or when. There are also temporal gaps and some factual errors and omissions. A brief critical review of the historicity and historiography of the Kano Chronicle is outlined here so as to place and clarify these problems in relation to the dissertation.

The work of several scholars has shown that the Chronicle narrative is the product of several authors writing at different times, who collectively span more than two hundred years. All of them wrote in Arabic.[42] Although the narrative begins circa 1000AD, the first sections of the Chronicle were probably not written until the mid-sixteenth (Smith, 1983) or mid-seventeenth (Last, 1983) century. The last pre-colonial addition is known to have been commissioned in the late nineteenth century by emir Bello (1882-93). The time lag between the narrated events of 1000AD and when the events were described, that is circa 1600AD, helps explain why it is in this historical period that most of the inaccuracies occurred (Smith, 1983; Last, 1983).

Fortuitously, the greatest degree of historical exactitude, that is circa 1600-1893, coincides largely with the time period spanned by chapters 3 and 4 (circa 1500-1903). In particular, the timing of the landscape changes effected by specific kings that is presented in chapter 3, is based

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[42] At least three of the earliest manuscripts were written in Arabic (Smith, 1983).

upon the kingship periods listed in the <u>Chronicle</u>. That the <u>Chronicle</u> lists these kings in correct order means that although the exact timing of the landscape change may be incorrect, the authorship is not. In the absence of a superior reference text, this imprecision cannot be avoided, but should be taken into consideration when reading the text.

Chapter 2.

Landscape and *linguistic action*: a post-structuralist perspective

This dissertation employs a post-structuralist framework in which, counter to various structuralist perspectives, social and logical structures are not awarded separate ontological status or causal efficacy in and of themselves. Rather, structures are seen as socially created "rules by which human actions are guided", one of the most powerful being language (Kobayashi, 1989: 172).

This chapter explores the post-structuralist framework using Sartre's concepts of *being-for-others* and *linguistic action*, Kobayashi's (1989) application of the latter to landscape analysis, and Foucault's understanding of power as a positive and social phenomenon. The framework hinges on two separate but connected analytical realms of intersubjectivity that define and draw out more fully relations between space, history and power. The methodological implications and applications of the framework to the field research are also detailed and used as a base from which to critique other post-structuralist geographical works on landscape. The dissertation is shown to *enact* a new model of landscape analysis wherein I (as the viewer) am made visible. The model evokes a gendered epistemological framework that requires the researcher to relate inter-subjectively to the landscape and to empower those with whom s/he relates through cultivating inter-personal means of communication.

LANDSCAPE PRODUCTION AND RE-PRODUCTION: A POST-STRUCTURALIST PERSPECTIVE

In this study, landscape is defined as the "extension and collection of human activity in a material setting" that transcends the lived experience and physical, cognitive, and logical limits of individuals "inside" the landscape (Kobayashi, 1989: 164). Given this meaning, the *reproduction* of landscape is seen to depend upon the degree to which the various activities that structure the landscape are maintained collectively by "insiders", which implicates the choices and socio-political and material constraints of the players. Because these activities are social, they (and hence the landscape) are necessarily *communicative* (or structured) and therefore intelligible, provided that

the rules that order it are known.

Historical *changes* in a particular landscape are also intelligible, provided the social processes that produced and re-produced (or transformed) the rules over time are understood. Insight into these processes obtains from understanding the particular utility or empowering function of landscape structures or, as Kobayashi (1989: 174) states:

> The importance of analysing structure comes in knowing the role that it plays at the moment that it maintains order in history, for a structure's efficacy occurs in direct relation to its ability to maintain order. A structure is non-existent if unacknowledged, even if acknowledgement consists of denial or misunderstanding. A structure must be *known* [her emphasis] although this prerequisite does not give it the status of pure thought. In being known, or incorporated within the sphere of human action, it gains historical presence; however, at that very moment, 'history is already on the way to undoing it' (Sartre 1971, p.112).

Analytical re-construction of landscapes involves a different kind of landscape re-production. In this case there is a "viewer" placed analytically "outside" the landscape who is trying to "see" (and, at times, act within) extant social structures in order to abstract the landscape rules into literary form. This second form of landscape production is central to the dissertation work and implicates additionally *my* choices (as the viewer), theoretical pre-dispositions and material and social constraints. As Kobayashi (1989: 166) explains, this choice arises from the analytical process itself, in this case the notion of "landscape" being central. This is because:

> Understanding does not grasp the whole, but requires some form of conceptual abstraction, or *analysis* [her emphasis], to be communicated. We therefore make analytical statements about a synthetic world. The concept of landscape is a geographical tool used analytically to organize material reality perceptually and conceptually, denoting the total environment, but expressing it in a partial way. This partiality is the basis for some very difficult philosophical issues, because it follows that analysis must proceed on the basis of choices concerning what is to be abstracted from the total.

There are thus two distinct analytical forms of landscape re-production, corresponding to whether one is living "inside" the landscape or analysing the landscape from the "outside", each mirroring a different level of choice, or *reflexivity*. This awareness of the choices made in lived and literary landscape constructions, and the corollary that there is an infinitude of possible constructions, informs the title word, *stories*.

Cognizance of this infinity, however, does not imply that every story is as true or valid as any other. *Good* stories will provide and reflect a certain level of competence in communicating these different levels of production and reflexivity: at an objective level, the rules by which the landscape is shaped are clear and workable, while at a more subjective level, the character of those who reflexively shape and "view" the landscape is made plain.

Telling good stories therefore depends upon how well the theoretical framework captures the relational and reflexive qualities of existence. Kobayashi (1989) captures these qualities most effectively through theoretically linking landscape to formal language. This coupling is based upon Sartre's concept of *linguistic action*, which entails the social and material production of meaning, or *signification*. Signification in turn involves appropriating and structuring (or abstracting) concrete portions of the world as a means of communication. It is the communicative structure and power of landscape that makes it "a form of language" (Kobayashi, 1989: 171).[1]

These understandings of landscape and structure give the words *space* and *history* special significance. Space becomes an analytical category describing the personal and socio-political activities and processes through which we meaningfully *distanciate*[2] ourselves from, and structure ourselves in relation to, others and the world. Or, as Natter states succinctly, space is "the material embodiment of social relations".[3] Due to this processional and active sense of space, its adjectival, adverbal and verbal forms are used in the dissertation along with other nominal forms, including "spatiality", "spatial", "spatialising" and "spatialisation". *History*, then, becomes the temporal embodiment of materially created and contested meanings across and

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[1] Specifically, Kobayashi (1989: 172) writes:

We set the rules, change them, but also submit to them. They are materially real and exist as signification, through linguistic action, which includes both the production of formal language, and the production of landscapes...

[2] The word *distantiate* is derived from Buber's (1951) work entitled, "Distance and Relation" and describes the means through which we recognise and structure ourselves to be existentially separate from others and the nonhuman material world. The word implicitly connotes that establishing these relations requires a kind of spatial distancing.

[3] This definition was given verbally by Natter in a discussion following his paper (Natter and Jones, 1991) at the American Association of Geographer's annual meeting of 1991 (Miami).

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through space or place or, the changing "horizon of signification".[4] To analyse landscapes or "spatial history" compels discernment of the socio-political forces behind the various signifiers, which in turn requires conceptual bases for understanding *power*.

FOUCAULT AND THE *POSITIVITY* OF POWER

Perhaps more than any other contemporary social theorist, Foucault focusses upon the material and social struggles through which norms and rules are forged and made practicable and meaningful. His concern to examine these struggles through specific case studies makes his concepts uniquely real and plain. In <u>Discipline and punish</u> (1979), for example, he documents a dramatic shift from pre-nineteenth century forms of punishment in France and Britain, in which the body itself served as the repository and subject of judgement, to nineteenth century forms which treated the body as the ancillary vessel of the soul. In contrast to the publicity and bodily pain associated with pre-nineteenth century judgements, those of the nineteenth century were marked by swift and hidden executions as well as rehabilitation of the "soul" through institutionalising the body.

One of the most useful contributions of this and other works is his analytical and methodological treatment of power as a *positive* social phenomenon. By positive, Foucault means that power derives from a political forging of interlinked and synergistic material and social structures. In <u>Discipline and punish</u>, then, Foucault sees the justice system not as a *negative* force in which those in authority *punish* transgressors of rules, but as a *positive* or *enabling* structure that resonates ideologically and practically with other positive social structures or relations. With respect to nineteenth century judgements, for example, which might ordinarily be treated in a limiting manner as an actual prescriptive verdict, Foucault writes that

> [T]he sentence that condemns or acquits is not simply a judgement of guilt, a legal decision that lays down punishment; it bears within it an assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normalization...

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[4] This phrase is lifted somewhat out of context from a discussion of aspatial historical analyses by Natter and Jones (1991: 4).

> Throughout the penal procedure and the implementation of the sentence, there swarms a whole series of subsidiary authorities. Small-scale legal systems and parallel judges have multiplied around the principal judgement: psychiatric or psychological experts, magistrates concerned with the implementation of sentences, educationalists, members of the prison service, all fragment the legal power to punish (Foucault, 1979: 20-21).

Foucault thus treats judgements as "concrete systems of punishment...[that] are linked to a whole series of positive and useful effects which it is their task to support" (Foucault, 1979: 24).

Foucault's understanding of power compels a certain line of questioning. Specifically, questions about power relations are structured *relationally* to draw out how various players are *empowered*. Thus, when dealing with patriarchy and master-slave relations in the palace, questions were posed to invoke the social dynamics that make patronage stable. In what ways did social and political responsibilities vested in slaves, for example, serve (inadvertently or advertently) to cultivate loyalty? Obversely, how did the need for slave loyalty and labour lead to strategic loss or diffusion of direct control of the king, so that he was disempowered or dependent upon his slaves? In addition, what kinds of material benefits and privileges were derived by women (especially vis-a-vis slave men) so that women's "voluntary" participation in seclusion and dependency were assured? How did gender and slave relations intersect or re-inforce each other so as to strengthen patronage?. And how were the benefits and responsibilities of all players negotiated and transformed over time, leading to qualitative changes (or ruptures) in patronage relations? This viewing of power relations as *inter*-dependent, enabled me to understand the dynamics, assymmetries and incentives sustaining and colouring patronage in the palace more clearly and fully.

Foucault also makes it clear that analysis of the spatiality of cultural practices is essential to understanding the power relations through which these practices are constituted. In a critical assessment of scholars who viewed history aspatially, for example, Foucault writes that:

> [t]hey didn't understand that to trace the forms of implantation, delimitation and demarcation of objects, the modes of tabulation, the organisation of domains meant the throwing into relief of processes - historical ones, needless to say - of power. The spatialising description of discursive realities gives on to the analysis of related effects of power (Foucault, 1980: 70).

He cautions, however, that power and materiality are created and resonate through more than strictly productive or reproductive domains, traditional foci of structuralist Marxists:

> In reality, power in its exercise goes much further, passes through much finer channels, and is much more ambiguous, since each individual has at his [sic] disposal a certain power, and for that very reason can also act as the vehicle for transmitting a wider power. The reproduction of the relations of production is not the only function served by power. The systems of domination and the circuits of exploitation certainly interact, intersect and support each other, but they do not coincide (Foucault, 1980: 72).

This explicit recognition that power is reproduced through the *entirety* of everyday channels of social practice helped me to refine my line of questioning and my way of "seeing" spatiality. An important part of this new way of seeing involved investigating links between spatiality, visuality and power. That is, how did certain spatial configurations visually empower one group or person over others.[5]

When investigating Hausa women's seclusion, for example, it was necessary to explore the formal language and customary practices that support seclusion, relations between different forms of seclusion and social status, the changing visual and spatial aesthetics or qualities of seclusion across time and place, the reasons behind historical crises or changes in seclusionary tenets and so on. Seclusion was not seen simply as a means of exerting patriarchal control over social reproductive activities, but as an empowering institution with particular spatial and visual "accommodationist" aesthetics.

INTERSUBJECTIVE THINKING AND ENGAGEMENT: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Incorporation of these theoretical perspectives into the field work was conditioned by the notion of *intersubjectivity*. The word *intersubjectivity* is borrowed from Sartre (1957: 38) and implies the mutual identification and recognition of the "other" (in this case the *viewed*) and "self" (the *viewer*) through *praxis* or engagement. Intersubjectivity is therefore linked to the notion that

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[5] Awareness of visual empowerment draws not only upon the works of Foucault, but those of Cosgrove (1985) and Pollock (1988). Cosgrove demonstrates the links between spatiality, power and visuality most convincingly in his work, "Prospect, perspective and the evolution of the landscape idea" (1985). Here we see how the creation of linear perspective in late fifteenth century Italy was connected to larger political and historical geographic changes, namely the development of surveying techniques, the break-up and disbursement of feudal lands, and the rise of trans-Oceanic navigation and mercantile capitalism.

existence is fundamentally social and reflexive.

At the heart of intersubjectivity is Sartre's concept of "being-for-others" in which we are seen to become who we are only in relation to others. Sartre elaborates upon this being-for-others most clearly in reference to emotion, and particularly, shame:

> ...[S]hame...is in its primary structure shame *before somebody*. I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings to me; I neither judge it nor blame it... But now suddenly I raise my head. Somebody was there and has seen me. Suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am ashamed. It is certain that my shame is not reflective, for the presence of another in my consciousness, even as a catalyst, is incompatible with the reflective attitude; in the field of my reflection I can never meet with anything but the consciousness which is mine. But the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself *as I appear* to the Other.

> By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other... Shame is by nature *recognition*. I recognize that I *am* as the Other sees me...(1956: 302; his emphases)[6]

Acknowledgment that existence is fundamentally intersubjective and reflexive was operationalised in the field work in two distinct ways: through intersubjective "thinking" or an analytical pre-disposition to thinking *relationally* (discussed, in part, above); and, through intersubjective (or interpersonal) engagement with the landscape. These different levels of intersubjectivity are illustrated in Figure 2.1.

In Figure 2.1a, social relations are depicted as engagements between the *viewer* (or

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[6] It is essential to note that this concept of being-for-others is categorically different from Heidegger's notion of being-in-itself in which "being" is seen to be a force outside human control and which is empowered through the word "being". As Heidegger, 1959: 82) states, without the word being, *"There would be no language at all"* (his emphasis).

True understanding of being, according to Heidegger, comes only through historical investigation of its etymological roots, which reveals "being" to be the creative unfolding of existence which Greeks know in part as *physis*. When *physis* became translated by Romans as *natura*, being was lost. Western civilisation is therefore presently in a crisis of non-being that will only be overcome by re-discovering and living *physis*.

This metaphysical understanding of language and "being-in-itself" is tied to a kind of glorification of Greek thinking (considered to be the well-spring of his etymological analyses), which has spatial implications. The word "space" is seen to be a disempowering replacement for the Greek word *chora*, "which signifies neither place nor space but that which is occupied by what stands there. The place belongs to the thing itself." (Heidegger, 1959: 66). In this sense, there is an essentialist nature to space as that which imbues being-in-itself.

Thus Heidegger's understanding of both language and place is distinctly non-inter-subjective and elitist; only those who are enlightened about the quest for being have the possibility for salvation from non-being. He then shows that the German language (and thus the German people) best reveal "being". This is linked to the enlightened nature of German history and *chora*, used in turn to enhance and support Hitler's nationalist and fascist practices, leading to a glorification of Greek or classical motifs in architecture.

(a)

(b)

Figure 2.1 A diagrammatic representation of the relational-epistemological framework used in inter-subjective landscape analysis from within (a) *proximal* and (b) *remote* positions. The solid lines represent actual engagement between the two endmembers and the dashed lines represent reflexivity. The arrows on solid lines indicate that direction from which action was initiated, while the arrows on dashed lines indicate the direction from which choices are implicated. Thus, what is done to the material world reflects the choices of the viewer or viewer. However, the material world makes no choices (although it conditions the choices) and thus their can be no reflexive recognition by the material world of the viewer or viewed.

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researcher or "self") and the viewed (the human "other"), illustrated by a solid line. Through interaction their respective choices and values are made clear or reflexive. The content of questions I pose (as the viewer) to various informants in interviews, for example, mirrors my interests and knowledge, the way I think, my abilities, and so on, as much as the responses mirror the character and experiences of the informant. Similarly, the interaction of the viewed or viewers with the material world (lines B or C; Fig. 2.1a) mirrors their respective choices and values. Thus, my (the viewer's) decision to go to Nigeria "says" something about my life circumstances, research topic, constraints, economic situation and personality and so on, as much as the decisions of many secluded adult Hausa women to marry, bear children and rarely leave their married home reflects theirs. Relations between institutions[7] and the material world (line D) "speak" as much about the nature of the former as the latter. That the Canadian International Development Agency provided monies that helped me complete this study,[8] discloses its institutional priorities or agenda and the interpersonality of its staff, as much as the "needs" of Nigeria. It is important to note that in all these cases (A-D), the landscape consists of all players and that I (as the viewer) am analytically *inside* it.

In contrast, Figure 2.1b depicts a situation where due to particular cultural, historical, economic or political limitations, I (as the viewer) am unable to engage interpersonally with those who shape the landscape. Because I do not interact with the viewed (or other), I am left to work alone with "objective" material data. In this case, the landscape is "the material world". My analytical task then becomes a deduction of all the various levels of reflexivity shown in Figure 2.1a from the way in which the landscape is configured.

In reality, *both* analytical positions, which are logically and epistemologically inseparable, are required. The degree to which one or the other mode is used depends upon the possibility

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[7] I have represented institutions as the mid-way point between viewer and viewed so as to make clear the sociality or inter-personality of institutions.

[8] See the Preface.

for "inside" access, the availability of information and the kinds of information needed, each of which varied from dissertation "story" to "story".

Intersubjectivity as a *relational theoretical* stance

The historical remoteness of the early Hausa palace landscapes (circa 1500-1800), for example, placed me largely "outside" the realm of analysis and constrained me in very practical ways. There is no one alive who had first-hand experiences of this period with whom I could speak or interpersonally relate. In addition, almost 500 years have elapsed since the palace was built and many practical and material changes have cut across and obscured earlier landscapes. As a result, the initial focus of analysis was on observationally-derived "objective" data (Fig. 2.1b). Then, by assuming intersubjectively that social relations are carried spatially, that spatial relations are socially structured, and that socio-spatiality is structured politically, some of the earliest socio-spatial relations in the palace were deduced.

Aspects of palace spatiality were derived from a number of "objective" sources, including aerial photographs[9] and colonial and post-colonial government maps of Kano city and the palace.[10] Present day palace floor plans derived from secondary sources and field data were also used, along with field documentation of floor topographies and architectural types, and historical geographic field data of present day palace places and structures.[11]

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[9] The photos were purchased from from Kenting Air Photos, a Canadian company with an office in Kano which is the sole producer and distributor of aerial photographs in the Kano region. The politics of negotiating aerial photographic material was aided by the fact that the manager was good friends with a former Canadian colleague who taught sessionally at McGill.

[10] Copies of these maps were purchased or copied from repositories and archives of colonial and post-colonial maps, including the Map Division of the Lands and Surveys branch of the Kano State Ministry of Works and Housing (KSMWH) and the National Archives in Kaduna. In the former instance, I was assisted by Abdullahi Shua'ibu, who worked at the Kano State Housing Corporation, but was later posted to the KSMWH. He introduced me to Jack Ashton, a retired and middle-aged British expatriate who had worked in several divisions of the KSMWH (in all their varied institutional forms) before and after Nigerian independence (1960), and who directed me to the appropriate resource persons.

[11] These secondary sources included primarily Ahmed (1988) and Rufa'i (1987). Ahmed also generously provided me with copies of the large-format blue prints of the palace included in his thesis and took the time to pore over his maps with me in some detail. These two works, however incomplete, provided an exceptionally good foundation upon which I could construct my own present day palace plan and eventually move "backward" in time.

In particular, I copied Ahmed's main map which was then cut up into a series of sections large enough to be pasted onto 8.5 x 11 inch sheets of paper. These were easy to carry into the field where they were re-worked, expanded upon and corrected. Other copies of the 8.5 x 11 sections were used to chart historical data, architectural types (particularly the presence or absence of central

Several stages of analysis followed. First, I "subtracted" nineteenth century Fulani structures and cultural innovations from the maps to help uncover pre-Fulani organisation. What remained was then analysed relationally. The most prominent questions that informed the analysis were, *Where* are activities, institutions, objects and/or persons placed. How are these things organised spatially and did these places and placements change over time? Why do places or placements occur *here* and not *there*? How or in what way do specific spatial relations enable particular social relations, both in the palace and between the palace and "outside" world? Such relational questioning of the data showed, for example, that the palace was coupled to strategic city sites via special pathways and that the palace had originally faced northward towards the city.

What was known of the orientation and structure of the earliest palace landscape was then compared with a typology of vernacular Hausa households, derived from floor plans dating from the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries. The typology is important in that the social organisation behind the structure is well documented, especially a spatial division of labour based upon patriarchal gender and master-slave relations.

The comparison showed a level of *spatial* congruence between vernacular households and the palace, or what I call *allo-spatiality* (chapter 3). Using what I knew about the social significance of household structures, I was then able to deduce or "read" the social relations of the palace design.[12] *Differences* between the palace and vernacular household forms were also discerned and showed how patriarchal state structures emerged out of (or were pre-figured by) "male" sections of the household.

Additional details about gender and master-slave relations in the earliest landscape were derived from the vocabulary, etymology and discourse surrounding palace places, and led to the development of what I have called *socio-spatial linguistics*. Archaic signifiers, that is, words that

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columns versus vaulted roofs created in the mid-nineteenth century) and the heights and topographical profiles of certain palace buildings or regions.

[12] The congruence was also employed to contest claims that the palace is an exceptional architectural structure, inherent in the misleading English translation of the phrase Gidan Sarki as "palace" rather than the more literal sense of "house of the king".

no longer relate to the original signified, provided useful information about the location and locational content of particular places.

A particularly dramatic example of the socio-spatial utility of words arose out of my investigation of karofi. Although karofi literally means "dye pits", it was applied curiously to a cemetery. This designation was not queried by previous researchers and did not seem strange to young people in the palace. Discussions with elderly persons disclosed, however, that the site had formerly served as a large dye pit field. Historical investigation into spatial relations in the area revealed that the pits were probably linked to the main administrative center of concubines in the secluded women's realm, the placement suggesting that concubines managed the pits.

Similarly, clues into eunuch locations in the pre-Fulani period and the strategy of eunuch emplacement vis-a-vis other slaves, the king, women and the city-at-large were acquired by matching certain eunuch titles and responsibilities discussed in the Kano Chronicle with the residential locations of their nineteenth- and twentieth-century equivalents. Moreover, through linguistic and historical geographic interrogation of nineteenth century concubine titles, roles and placements (about which the Chronicle is largely silent), clues were acquired into the role of women during pre-Fulani times.

Intersubjectively or inter-personally analysing landscape

It would be impossible to interpret the meanings behind the spatial data presented above using only a positionally remote analytical stance (Fig. 2.1b). Evaluations would necessarily collapse into idealist contemplation. Although such contemplation might produce interesting analyses, they would largely be self-contained and self-referential, reflecting more of the structure-rules of the viewer than of the viewed.

Ideally, the structure-rules of the landscape should be "spoken" or engaged inter-personally with those who are part of it (Fig. 2.1a). In this way the experiences of those who live the rules are entertained and the viewer becomes drawn *practically* into the landscape, thereby experiencing personally the socio-spatial and political structure-rules of the landscape. This form

of interpersonal engagement and analysis is more open-ended and revealing, moving practically from myself (as analytically removed from, but engaged with, the landscape), to the persons with whom I view (and speak with regarding) the landscape, to the literary re-production of the landscape, and back again.

A combination of these two different analytical positions was used throughout the research. As I "moved" into contemporary landscapes, increasing emphasis was placed upon intersubjective or inter-personal analysis. A greater amount of inter-personal research on the Fulani period 1807-1903 (chapter 4) was conducted relative to that enacted for the earlier pre-Fulani period. The inter-personal character of the research was made possible by several elderly persons in the palace community who were the daughters, sons, grandaughters or grandsons of nineteenth century Fulani emirs. They shared with me some of their own stories about the character and deeds of their royal predecessors. Because these persons were alive at the turn of the century, they were able to identify and discuss pre-colonial palace structures portrayed in copies of archival photographs taken just after the British conquest of 1903.[13] Several of them took me on "field trips" to point out precise locations of the places in the photographs as well as other turn-of-the century structures, most of which no longer exist or have been altered substantially. The photographs were also used to help develop an "archaeology" of late nineteenth-century place names and slave titles and responsibilities.

The inter-subjectivity of the research enhanced my understanding of more remotely observed data (for example, the archival photographs) and allowed me to compile the data into distinct historical map "layers", each one representing a different pre-colonial Fulani kingship. These layers were incorporated with historical geographic information on palace and regional

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[13] While in London, on route to Kano, I visited the London Royal Geographical Society where I reviewed their archival photo collection on Kano. I consequently purchased a number of those related to Kano city and the palace taken by various British authorities and guests between 1903 and the 1930s.

Although some of the photographs were entitled, most of the built structures depicted in them were not identified. These photographs became the center of numerous group discussions and interviews and provided invaluable historical geographic data.

economic and political change (provided by informants and secondary sources) to infer changing nineteenth-century palace relations of space, history and power.

The map layer of the mid-1800s showed a dramatic expansion of male slave places and duties and a rise in the number of male slave titles, accompanied by a loss of women's socio-spatial privileges. When combined with regional political economic data, the landscape changes could be linked to territorial consolidation and a rise in regional prosperity which increased aristocratic wealth and kingly slave holdings. The most intense inter-personal analyses obtained in studies of the impact of British imperialism on the spaces of slave men and women (chapters 5 and 6, respectively). This is because many adult persons in the palace experienced the colonial period (1903-1960) and therefore potentially had stories to tell.

As in the studies of earlier historical periods, I used both analytical positions portrayed in Figure 2.1 to obtain socio-spatial data that could be periodised into map layers. Field mapping was integrated with discussion of the data with informants from different age-groups (below). This resulted in a refinement of the historical and spatial content of place names. As in the analysis of the Fulani period, several informants (young and elderly) offered to show me where particular objects or structures that were mentioned in interviews were located on the palace grounds. Many of these either no longer exist or had not been "seen" by me in the field.

Although I have discussed differences between the positionally remote and proximal analytical procedures and how these related to data anlaysis, the ways in which the procedures were negotiated within the palace community have not been detailed. This information is important, however, in that such negotiations illuminate the quality of the relations or engagement. This quality shapes the analytical revelations and mirrors reflexively the idiosyncracies, values and world views of the viewer (my self) and viewed (the informants), as well as the conditions of our respective experiences with the landscape (Fig. 2.1a). By revealing explicitly aspects of myself and my relationships with members of the palace community, not only the interpretation of "objective" facts is laid open to criticism, but the quality of the inter-relations comes under scrutiny. The

landscape stories are not taken as absolute objective truths, but as *authored* narratives. Baring of the reflexivity of the inter-personal research thus allows for refinement of field methodologies (the means by which we set out to know), which is necessarily linked to power.

THE PALACE FIELD WORK

The manner in which I *personally* react to and interact with the material world and the persons being interviewed (and vice versa) affects the content and quality of responses. Ideally, interpersonal engagements between the viewer and viewed should promote intersubjectivity, that is, understanding or mutual identification and recognition (above). The epistemological and practical framework of analysis should therefore allow for *communicative empowerment*, thereby revealing a more literal sense of the world *inter-viewing* (Fig. 2.1a): there should be *dialogue* with, and *involvement* of, the viewed in the process of information gathering and analysis; moreover, the inter-viewing should involve as many categorically different players as is possible, in this case, royalty, slaves, free persons, men, women, and so on. In this way, the viewed collectively weakens the power and formal authority of the viewer in constructing literary knowledge or re-presentations of the landscape, in which the viewed are implicated. Additionally, it is only through such communicative empowerment that the *specificity* of persons, places and times involved in landscape struggles can be elicited.[14]

The greater the congruence between the knowledge or experiences of the viewer and viewed (including formal language), the better the chances are that the landscape rules can be openly discussed, grasped and argued. Conversely, vastly different lived experiences and rules are difficult to bridge analytically and methodologically. These differences may not be cultural, but based upon class, gender, age and so on. Perfect or near perfect congruence in all of these

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[14] There is another nested level of intersubjective analysis or communicative empowerment that will not be elaborated upon here because it requires further refinement of figure 2.1 and would obscure rather than clarify the argument for different analytical positions or realms. It should be noted, however, that it involved engagement with *other* literary re-productions of the Kano region and Kano palace in academic and non-academic works by Hausa and non-Hausa persons. This included a thorough search for, and utilisation of, theses and dissertations within North American, British and Nigerian universities. Where possible, I spoke with the authors about their field work and my own. I was particularly interested in Hausa perspectives, for which honours undergraduate and post-graduate theses from Bayero University Kano and Ahmadu Bello University were particularly useful.

categories, and hence fully resonant or intersubjective understanding, is therefore rare.

A certain level of non-resonance is nonetheless desirable in that differences aid in analysis; taken-for-granted practices or objects may assume a new identity to those from a different gender and/or ethnocultural and economic background and reveal important "hidden" values or assumptions about the viewer and viewed.[15] Lived experiences and particular personality traits may also provide sensitivities that offset the negative "strength" of factors of difference. That is, awareness and utilisation of incongruities enrich analyses when they are treated as a heightened means for entertaining communicative empowerment. This critical utilisation of difference demands a sharpened sense of self-awareness.

As discussed above, the field work involved not only relationally uncovering and documenting historical socio-spatialites and power (Fig. 2.1b), but negotiating this knowledge and these interests with others (Fig. 2.1a). That is, the research involved an awareness of the qualities of "my" power as well the power of those in the landscape with whom I interacted. The struggle for communicative empowerment therefore formed a central part of the research. This struggle was predicated upon various layers of access to the palace community.

Palace access

My placement in the palace required a number of different kinds of negotiations. Physical access to the palace community, for example, was granted in a special audience with the emir, while social access was facilitated through my friendship with his second wife, Hajiyya Abba.[16] In many ways, Hajiyya Abba's home[17] became my own, allowing me to relax and feel rooted and to reap logistical benefits. There, I initially met or heard about potential informants and occasionally held formal interviews. Hajiyya and I also spent hours together in her home reviewing

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[15] The desirability of non-resonance derives from the fact that analysis is grounded fundamentally upon the recognition of difference.

[16] The way in which these contacts were made are discussed more fully in the Preface.

[17] Each wife has her own "place" or wole discussed in more detail in chapters 3, 4 and 6.

and discussing the field work progress and data. Her enthusiasm for the work infected others and, on many occasions, persons dropping in to greet her[18] became caught up in our discussions and stayed on to add their insights or just listen. Several lively group discussions began in this way. Hajiyya also took it upon herself to follow up on interesting aspects of the work on her own, such that her place became a kind of independent information source.[19] Lastly, it was through Hajiyya Abba that I met most of the palace translators with whom I would work, including her daughters Zaineb and Bagadede,[20] a son of the former emir Sanusi (1953-63), Ujudu Sanusi, and a daughter of the first wife, Hajiyaye.

Gender and the spatial and temporal limits of knowledge

Through the mapping process and contacts made at Hajiyya Abba's place, I met and developed a relatively good rapport with a number of persons from different age groups who agreed to work with me. Virtually every informant was interviewed in her or his home several times. At each successive session, questions were re-phrased so as to test the consistency of replies. Different informants were also asked the same question to obtain a broad spectrum of views and to understand the nature of the variation of answers provided.[21]

Through the questioning process, it became very clear that life experiences were gendered and had spatial and temporal limits that shaped decidedly the quality of individuals'

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[18] Slave women, clients, royal concubines and palace children are required customarily to greet the emir's wives on a regular basis.

[19] Yaya, for example, is very elderly and somewhat senile, but has clear memories about her life as a domestic slave (kuyangi) and then concubine in the palace. Although she would not speak with me (or any others) she spoke clearly and co-operatively with Hajiyya. This singular lucidity reflected her considerable appreciation of, and respect for, Hajiyya who had taken Yaya into her own place (as would a filial daughter) when Yaya's former quarters collapsed (see Appendix 2.1)

Hajiyya also took me on a "field trip" that required that she leave her place. Although she claimed that this was perfectly acceptable, she was most careful not to be seen by anyone, and was otherwise mindful not to be seen outside the doorway into her place. Furthermore, when the emir was in the premises, she was careful not to be seen even standing in front of the doorway.

[20] Both were married during my field season. Zaineb was not allowed by her husband to return to her maternal home (it would be improper to do so, except if she came home after giving birth, which she later did), and Bagadede moved to Lagos.

[21] Most data obtained in a first interview produced a rough sketch of events which contained numerous errors reflecting primarily a level of non-understanding between myself and the informant. It was in successive interviews, when I re-questioned or asked them to listen to summaries of their previous statements, that events and changes in palace organisation began to fall into place.

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knowledge. Women knew very little of the "outside" world and became quite flustered if pressed or even requested to do so. Conversely, men knew little about the women's realm and would become embarassed or refuse to answer if they were asked to elaborate upon it.

The gendered exclusivity of spatial experience was also reflected in the different names used by men and women to designate some of the palace buildings. Soron baki (lit. the hall of the mouth) inside the secluded women's realm, for example, was called as such by men only. By women, it is deemed Rumfar kasa (lit. the hut of earth).[22] In other cases, buildings having the same name were present in different gendered realms. The name Rumfar kasa, for example, is assigned not only to the building in the women's realm but to a structure inside a male slave realm.

Realisation that spatial knowledge was gendered led me to re-fine interview structures. Instead of first discussing a general topic of interest to the story-at-large (as decided by me), I discussed the personal history of the informant first, producing a short biographical sketch. Questioning was then channelled more effectively towards their interests and the particular realms in which they had lived and/or worked. The sketches also provided windows onto the processes through which political-economic changes of the colonial period (1903-1960) filtered down into individual lives. The sketches are presented in brief in Appendix 2.1 as a guide to the references cited in subsequent chapters and as a means of gauging the relative merit of an informant's knowledge vis-a-vis the quoted context.

Knowledge was also tempered by informant age and ancestral attachment to the palace. The lives of elderly Fulani royalty were structured practically around their royal ancestry, their matrilineage conditioning whom they could marry. These individuals knew stories extending up to the historical entry of their clan (the Sullubawa) into the palace in 1819. Most other persons knew spatial details relating only to their own life times.

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[22] This gender bias in word use is inadvertently re-produced by Rufa'i (1987) and Ahmed (1988). The former, a woman, used only "Rumfar kasa" to describe the structure while the latter, a man, used Soron baki.

The temporal limits of knowledge were also revealed in the age-specificity of some place names. The guard chamber Soron (lit. hall) Mai-Kwaron Kwatso, named after the guardswoman who lived there at the turn of the century, for example, was re-named Soron Isa after the guardsman appointed during the reign of emir Sanusi (1953-63). Similarly, the present day guardwoman's chamber Soron Uwani, was formerly known as Soron Kujeru (lit. hall of the chairs) during the 1930s when the hall was used as a stacking place for newly purchased Western-style chairs.

Once these differences in place-names were recognized and their practical significance was established, knowledge of them became an asset. Utilising the name of a particular place during the historical period in question, for example, helped persons from the appropriate gender and age-group to structure or remember the landscape.[23]

Gendered spatial qualities

The gendered patriarchal experiences of informants produced a distinctive spatial quality or aesthetic in male versus female realms. Because the women's realm "belonged" to a single man (the emir) its inhabitants functioned as a single and relatively unified community. My acceptance into Hajivya Abba's home thus entailed a kind of general acceptance of me by all household members (exceptions are discussed below). The area was also intensely guarded and vast (almost 1km²), reflecting the large number of women and children[24] as well as royal prerogative. Together, these factors made the women's realm an open, accepting and safe place for me, away from the "world of men".[25]

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[23] My historical knowledge of place names was in some cases a source of approval and amusement, initial prefaces to responses being, "She is really serious!" or "She is really trying!".

[24] In 1987, the population of the women's section was approximately 236 (Rufa'i, 1987: 234).

[25] This statement does not imply that Hausa men are any more offensive than others; rather that the spatial quality of the women's realm allowed for a high degree of cameraderie, relaxation and freedom, where I could sprawl anywhere, speak to anyone, dawdle, play, eat, whatever, with little harassment. Few in the West could claim to have experienced a similar sense of freedom and safety, a freedom about which many of the women were very consciously aware, albeit from a very different cultural perspective than my own.

In contrast, the "male" realms were located peripheral to the secluded domain (chapters 3-6) and were made up of several historically large, powerful and competitive male slave-led households, along with smaller relatively independent slave enclaves. The social fragmentation results in a weakened sense of community and had practical effects. It requires scores of "insider" contacts before proper inter-viewing procedures can be established, and many more interviews are needed to obtain a sense of the community as a whole.

I did not attempt to transcend this fragmentation for a number of reasons, and therefore did not enter and map individual slave households in detail. First, the lack of detail was compensated by an intensity of larger structural changes in the male slave realms, especially during the colonial and post-colonial period for which data were available. Thus the departure of one of the most powerful male slaves of state dan Rimi with his large household in 1907 required knowledge only of the general extent of the household and not the particularities of internal household organisation.

I was assisted by Muhammad Sidi Kwaru, a title-holding and Western-educated member of the title-holding slave household of Shamaki[26]Malam Kwaru helped me draw up a list of slaves from different households who had the in formation that I needed, and who he knew would co-operate with me. I chose a number of his suggested informants, who proved especially helpful. He also took me on an informative "field trip" of the southern male realm and discussed some of the study findings with me at some length.

"Difference" and the politics of field work

The community access gained through Hajiyya Abba helped bridge some of the cultural differences between myself, the palace community and Hausa society in general. Many in the community taught me such practicalities as how to eat and dress correctly, the proper greetings and demeanors required for addressing different status groups, and the reasons behind many

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[26] I met Malam Kwaru and his wife through my Polish neighbors and their friends at a pre-New Year's function at the Kano Lebanon Club. The unplanned nature and rather bizarre setting of this meeting was replicated many times in other situations where I would meet "co-operants" at quite unrelated social functions.

cultural norms and practices. This bridging between myself and others in the community involved discovering and negotiating our differences.

Contrary to what Westerners might expect, my "whiteness" did not serve as the paramount basis of my "difference". I was not venerated as a white woman, nor was skin colour used as a basis to exclude me from social functions. The lack of emphasis on skin color stems from the cosmopolitan history and experiences of Hausa, and particularly Kano Hausa (chapter 1). Arabs, also known as "whites", intermarry with Hausa and many reside in the city, where they have been integrated and important parts of the community since at least the fourteenth century. Even the euphemism baturiya or "white woman", by which I was identified initially in the palace and on the streets is less racial than what the transliteration implies. Black women friends from the United States or the West Indies and other women of colour who dressed or were seen to act as outsiders were also called bature (pl.), to the chagrin of at least one of them.

This is not to say that differences vis-a-vis the community did not exist, but rather that they arose primarily from a number factors other-than-racial. After meeting someone for the first time, for example, I was commonly questioned about my religious beliefs. The fact that I held no formal religious beliefs (and made this clear to others) elicited dismay and further questioning, resulting in a somewhat ginger construction of me as a "pagan", the possibility of such a status being largely inconceivable.[27]

I was also not married, another perceived shortcoming for which I was rather pitied. Because females are not considered to be "adults" until they marry and bear children (usually in their mid- to late- teens), my age group and status were also problematical or ambiguous. My singleness, in light of my "old age", was qualitatively different, making it difficult and somewhat

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[27] According to Islamic tradition, there are three "peoples of the book": Muslims, who follow the Qur'an; Christians, who have the Bible; and Jews, who possess the Torah, their respective enlightenment decreasing in that order. All others are "pagan" and are considered to be spiritually degraded.

frustrating for others to place or identify me.[28]

Furthermore, some of my cultural habits were seen as different. In particular, my outgoing and rather gregarious personality runs almost completely counter to the reserved decorum of "proper" Hausa women. My personality, as I was later to discover, was more akin to that of prostitutes and older "commoners", who are allowed to have joking and noisy relations with others. For the sake of acceptance and avoiding difficulties, I tried to temper my personality, although I was not always successful.

Cultural distance was perhaps most evident in my lack of fluency in Hausa.[29] Although this could not be bridged by translators, my friendships with them lent a certain legitimacy to my palace presence. In addition, their integral roles in the community, discussions with them about the quality and content of interviews, and my friendship with them generally gave me a much larger understanding of palace and Hausa ways than I would ordinarily have had, had I worked alone.

Although interaction with each translator and informant was unique, relations with categorically different groups of women and men were somewhat distinct. My relations with women were particularly different from those with men.

The women

The main social categories that make up the women's community include wives, concubines, domestic slave women, elderly royal women, elderly concubines and royal children. Each group carries a different name and distinct socio-spatial privileges (chapters 3-6). The quality of my interactions with various members of these groups is perhaps made most clear by the way in which I negotiated particular criticisms of me. These criticisms provided insight into the gendered cultural construction of me and the differences in our spatial experiences.

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[28] I met no other unmarried Hausa woman my age, all Hausa women being either married or divorced and actively awaiting re-marriage.

[29] I am moderately conversational in Hausa.

Young palace concubines, for example, reacted to me somewhat jealously and viewed me with suspicion.[30] I was a relatively young, unmarried woman moving about freely, which in their cultural context is quite threatening. One form of venting their feelings was to ridicule my at times culturally inappropriate actions or dress,[31] including the manner in which I walked, which was claimed to be overly seductive.[32]

Another form of jealosy arose out of my "belonging" to Hajiyya Abba's household. This was apparently felt by at least one of the guardswomen, whose traditional job it is to be on guard with "outsiders", and by a young divorced woman from the extended royal family.[33] The latter began

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[30] This reaction is formally accommodated by Hausa culture and is known as "kishi". Although it is usually exhibited by co-wives in a polygamous household towards one another, it also applies to a general suspicion of young women towards what is often perceived to be flirtatious behaviour by other young women. This broader application of the word kishi is hinted at by Yahaya (n.d.: 97) who writes that:

Kishi...is that strong feeling of hatred, jealousy or ill will which a woman entertains towards any other woman who flirts with, ogles at, loves or marries her husband, boy-friend or fiance. Kishiya is the co-wife. In other words, she is the one who entertains kishi against the other wife and vice versa... Another connotation of Kishiya as "opposite" is relevant. Baki Kishiya far na (Black is the opposite of white).

From what I saw and experienced of kishi, it seems to keep women from developing strong bonds of solidarity with one another. In cases where co-wives become friends, a man will often feel compelled personally, or at the prompting of his mother, to marry again, so as to maintain better household control.

[31] My most intense memory of this ridicule followed my return to the palace to greet the second wife of the emir after having embarked upon an intensive Hausa course at the University of Leiden, Holland. Unlike the first or second field season, I dressed traditionally in a long "wrapper" and head covering. As I passed a group of concubines and slave women chatting on a long bench along the edge of the main women's courtyard, I heard one of them say, "Look at that woman there, she is an idiot" (Ga ita can, sha sha sha ce). My pride was somewhat wounded and, knowing that they did not know that I was now minimally conversant in Hausa, I turned around and asked them in Hausa, "Who did you say is an idiot?".

Ostensibly they ridiculed me because I had not worn a proper head scarf, instead, simply placing a second shawl-like covering over my head, making me (in their eyes) look rather silly. On top of this, I was single, and the second cloth layer was for married women only. On top of this, in the inner confines of the palace, no visiting woman is supposed to wear this second head covering. This custom is a means of recognising the authority of the emir or king (see also Rufa'i, 1987).

[32] Some of the concubines and slave women complained to Hajiyya Abba (who became like a mother to me, in that she took great pains to protect and guide me) that I made yanga, which is a seductive and proud swaying of the hips when walking. Although this is acceptable within limits for younger single women, they felt it inappropriate for me (for reasons I could never fathom, except perhaps jealousy). I argued that I was completely unaware of this (which I was), that my hips are large (they are; and those of Hausa women are generally slender) and one leg is shorter than the other (also true), besides which I commonly became inadvertently caught up in the tightness of my wrapper making it difficult to walk smoothly. My yanga was thus unintentional. My claims, relayed through Hajiyya Abba seemed to satisfy their indignity, but I also tried very hard to walk with small sway-less steps.

[33] Any woman from the extended royal family who does not have a male patron due to divorce, death, illness, and so is are allowed to stay in the palace until her next marriage, or in the case of the elderly, until she decides to leave (or she dies).

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circulating rumours that I was a spy and came to several of my interviews and quietly looked on.[34]

Despite efforts to assuage these protective and jealous feelings, many of the younger women continued to snub me such that few of the concubines or slave women were interviewed. In fact, being a bit overly self-conscious, I generally avoided the concubines, however detrimental this was to the study.

A tension felt primarily by a few domestic slave women (kuyangi) stemmed from the fact that when I entered the palace, children would run up to greet me and hold my hand.[35] Some kuyangi complained to Hajiyya Abba that although the children could give their allegiance to anyone, they chose me; yet I had given them nothing in recognition of the value I placed upon this allegiance. Although I initially sulked over their criticism, rebelling against the thought that I owed anyone anything, I later compromised a bit by bringing the children candies from time to time. This compromise, which arose more from peer pressure than from conviction, relieved the tension and also made me re-evaluate the premises of Western friendship.[36] Only later did I realise that the tensions singularly reflected the almost total dependence of kuyangi upon patronage benefits for their survival.

Qualitatively different kinds of negotiations occurred with older and especially elderly women. There were certain interview practices, for example, that were seen as disrespectful.

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[34] This woman intially garnered the support of several women. Three of my friends and translators (all daughters of the emir), however, took it upon themselves to defend me. They apparently spent hours debating with them the possibility of my being a spy. I eventually aided my defenders indirectly by providing additional questions, such as "What kind of spy would be interested in the number of cows king Alu had circa 1900?".

[35] Their enthusiasm did not derive from my whiteness, as many Westerners might jump to conclude. The palace has for centuries entertained a cosmopolitan array of guests and today many so-called white persons enter the palace regularly. Rather, I enjoyed talking and playing with the children. In a society where children are supposed to play amongst themselves (being considered a nuisance in the presence of adults), this generated a positive response.

[36] Instead of me seeing that I was being given the honour of "providing for" a following, something which would then favorably reflect upon my power and economic competence, I saw their demands as burdensome and somewhat vulgar requests for "pay-offs". Friendship, to my Western mind, is largely a-economic, economic needs being met "outside" friendship. I began to realise that this thinking reflected my rootedness within an advanced capitalist society typified by a relatively large and waged middle class wherein economic relations are largely non-familial or patronage-related.

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Requesting especially elderly royal women to repeat themselves or to wait until I finished writing down what they had said was considered somewhat rude.[37] In addition, the sheer volume of questions exasperated or bored several elderly informants, some getting up without comment and walking out.[38] The seeming monumentality of the questioning arose in part when experiences or places mentioned in passing by informants (which were not on my mental or written list of questions) but which seemed crucial to my understanding of a particular aspect of the palace landscape, became the unintended focus of an interview. When inquiring into the number of cattle at the turn of the nineteenth century, for example, the existence of a title-holding pastoralist was mentioned. Questions about who he was, who he worked with, where he lived and so on then became central.[39]

Problems also arose inadvertently as a result of some elderly women discussing previous interview contents amongst themselves such that questions that had been discussed with one woman previously were known by several others. Then, when I asked one of these other persons a variation of the same question, they would refuse to answer, asserting that the question had already been answered. They saw my re-phrasing of questioning as a sign that I did not trust the

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[37] I remember one occasion in particular when Gogon Ita Gogo Mai-daki and Gogo Gandi took my translator (Hajiyaye) and myself on a tour of the northeastern portion of the women's realm so that they could show me some of the sites of early nineteenth century places that no longer exist. Gogo Mai-daki led the way talking and gesticulating at mounds of former built structures. I tried to write down and sketch as quickly as I could what was being said, but I was much slower than they. At one point I asked if they could wait because I was unclear on some things, but they ceremoniously ignored us.

By the time I had sketched satisfactorily what had been just pointed out, I looked up to find them in the near distance still elaborating, but mostly to themselves. Gogon Gandi returned and I again asked her to please re-point out the extent of a wall she had said existed previously. To my embarrassment, she rolled her eyes, raised her arms and prayed to Allah for patience and walked off. Hajiyya Abba later explained their behavior by pointing out their royalty: would I expect such attention to my needs from the Queen of England?

[38] After one particularly intense afternoon of discussions with Haj. Abba she lost her patience and said (and I paraphrase),

Do you know the difference between us a: d white people? You, if you hear a sound upstairs in the night, you will locate your torch, take a notebook, go upstairs and carefully search out and document the cause. Why?... We would cover our heads and pray to Allah that whatever it is, it be taken away.

Her story was repeated to me on two other occasions in the presence of several others who nodded or chortled approval.

[39] On several such occasions I was accused of going off on tangents: "Why was I wandering about like this?; I thought you wanted to know about X, but now you talk about Y?". They also recognised that my "wandering" meant they would be asked to sit through yet another session to complete X, and in the process of that, we would go off on yet another tangent.

other person.[40]

Older women also questioned indirectly the intrusive and impersonal quality of the "science" behind my endeavors, especially Hajiyya Abba and Mai-daki. My "scientific" *raison d'etre*, some of the structured interview methods, and the shortness of my stay, for example, were seen as evidence of my emotional and spatial detachment from the community.[41] Recognition that they preferred and perhaps wanted or needed me more as a friend than as a researcher eventually made my work difficult emotionally. This difficulty tied into my own transition from researcher-viewer to friend, which made it personally disconcerting to take out my notebook and begin another round of questions, or to ask their help in this or that academic task. A feeling of inadequacy arose from the fact that I knew that neither I nor the study could fill their expectations, which was heightened by a general sentiment amongst the women that history in-and-of-itself is uninteresting. My work began to seem somewhat apolitically removed from the landscape, being written for "purely academic" reasons.[42]

Lastly, there were internal palace politics that filtered down through the younger translators

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[40] One day after I interviewed Haj. 'yar Mai-tilas about palace pastoralism, for example, I interviewed Gogon Ita on the same subject. The interview began something like this:

. What can you tell me about where the palace cattle were kept and where they were milked?

You already asked Haj. 'yar Mai-tilas that question yesterday.

Yes, I know, but I am just wondering if you have something special or different to add.

It is as she said (hmpf; silence)

[41] Mai'daki had also recently been the main informant of a three-year study on Hausa women's poetry by an American woman who subsequently left. They often spoke of her departure with a sense of great loss, and was one of the reasons Hajiyya Abba cited for Mai'daki's reticence in participating in "my" study. Hajiyya nonetheless often cajoled her into joining in a particular discussion by asking her to verify or clarify certain historical points. Once Mai-daki became interested, however, she would elaborate to great length and with great clarity, enthusiasm and authority.

[42] The one-sidedness (at least in the short run) of the work prompted me to start looking into ways of publishing the dissertation results in Hausa. The idea was prompted by discussions with Hajiyya Abba who agreed to work with me (or whoever else was interested). However, there was little interest "outside" the palace and too little time to research funding possibilities in earnest.

Other complications related primarily to patronage arose. Hajiyya at times stipulated that she would first have to seek permission from the emir, which she never seemed to have time to do. On other occasions she declared that if she did work on a translation project, she could not be credited in print, as this would be a sign of being somewhat insubordinate and "showy", and therefore inappropriate.

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with whom I worked. Hajiyaye, for example, one of the translators (above), had not married the man decided upon by one of the elderly informants I was interviewing.[43] The marriage had been the subject of a rather heated palace debate with alliances formed across family lines. To express her continued disapproval, the informant refused to answer questions agreeably in the presence of Hajiyaye. After explaining the problem to me. Hajiyaye suggested that I find another translator when dealing with this particular woman, which I did.

. The men

Working with men required the assistance of male translators, women from the palace or from other "proper" backgrounds being barred from outside adult male company. I worked with a variety of young men. The most longstanding and patient was Ujudu Sanusi, a younger son of Sanusi, the recently deceased former emir of Kano (1953-63; chapters 5 and 6). I was also assisted greatly in the beginning by Bashir Ado Bayero, a son of a royal concubine. When interviewing persons who resided outside the palace, I was assisted by Salisu Galadanci, Bashir Bebeji and Auwalu Hamza (of the Kano State History and Culture Bureau) and Muhammad Nuraddeen (of the Kano State Urban Development Board).[44]

Throughout my interactions with male informants, I never felt the sense of intimacy that I did when working with women, although I developed casual friendships with most of the translators. The lack of intimacy probably stemmed largely from the fact that I was known to "belong" to Hajiyya Abba and the inner palace household. Moreover, the fact that there were dozens of individual slave households constrained me physically from knowing all of them on equal or intimate terms.

Lack of intimacy also derived from my historical interests and the age-specificity of historical knowledge that led me to interview mostly elderly male informants with whom there is

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[43] Hajiyaye, a daughter of the first wife took over after Zaineb left (above) and was a solid ally when "spy" rumours began circulating about me (above). She, too, however, married and left for a new home-bound seclusion near the palace. This problem of "immobilisation" following marriage did not occur with men.

[44] I met these men while serving as a Fellow in both organisations.

customarily a joking relationship. Additionally, because I interviewed only the male slaves who serve the emir (and not the women of the household who serve their slave husbands), we spoke in "male" spaces, including the small "male public" entrance halls into their personal household or in wide open public spaces. Both of these areas are peripheral to the secluded female realms, making me somewhat of a stranger or visitor in their households. Lastly, because I was not an integral part of their households and because I worked mainly with old men, I never met and had to negotiate differing expectations from a large number of age and status groups. In particular, I was not seen as a threat to the women of the household.

For the most part, the men seemed amused by my queries and persistence, and because of my age, treated me much like a grandaughter, as is the custom. Sallama, formerly one of the three most powerful slaves of state, for example, saw me regularly and with exceptional patience. His jocularity and somewhat raucous sense of humour (which would never have surfaced had he been my age) made it a pleasure to work with him. Although I greeted his wives and family regularly, I was never considered to be part of his family.

Madakin Kano, a leading member of nobility who lived outside the palace, was also exceptionally open and generous with his time, despite his many political and social commitments. Interviews with Madakin Kano, however, required substantially greater levels of protocol, including prostration, and traditional greetings befitting royalty and communication in Hausa only, despite his semi-fluency in English.

There were, however, at least two tensions with male informants that were known to me personally. The first tension surfaced with the "eunuch" Baba dan meshe, when he began to make and consistently break appointments following a preliminary interview. My translator at the time requested that I not pursue the issue and upon inquiry told me that a resident Secret Security Service member had frightened Baba with the rumour that I was a C.I.A. spy.[45] Although we

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[45] This spy accusation was apparently unconnected to the much earlier, but similar claim made by the young divorced woman in the women's realm (above).

argued with Baba (and the SSS member) that this claim was not true, Baba refused further interviews.

The emir also made himself increasingly unavailable for interviews from the middle of 1989 onwards, although this was not acknowledged formally. His avoidance of me probably derived from my moving into the palace in mid-1989 at the request of Haj. Abba, without she or I waiting for final permission from the emir, who was in Europe at the time.[46]

GEOGRAPHY AND LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS: PLACING THE WORK IN CONTEXT

The post-structualist stance of this study forms part of a reaction within a portion of the geographic community to early "culturalist" perspectives that treated landscapes as natural and/or super-organic entities (Jackson, 1989). Landscapes were seen to be best analysed through "neutral scientific" idiographic means. Cultural-personal biases and contexts of the observer were largely ignored, along with social and political processes and forces. Moreover, methodological considerations were commonly downplayed or unquestioned. The "material world" depicted in Figure 2.1a was thus seen to exist absolutely and non-reflexively (Fig. 2.2a).

As Kobayashi (1989) shows, early attempts to transcend culturalist understandings of landscape began in the 1960s. Two theoretical approaches were developed particularly well, but proved incommensurate philosophically. Idealist works argued and demonstrated effectively that explorations of personal perceptions of existence, the "geography of the mind" (Kobayashi, 1989: 167), were legitimate forms of landscape analysis. Idealists, however:

> ...assume a distinction between the "real" and the "perceived", or between nature and its mental image...Beneath this assumption is a Cartesian separation of epistemic traits from ontological status, or being, and a concomitant isolation of action, experience and thought into distinct realms that are not synthesized in accounting for the material production of both landscape and social conditions... Idealist humanism is thus open to the criticism that it fails to go beyond a critique of more mechanistic methods of explanation to provide a comprehensive philosophy of the world (Kobayashi, 1989: 167).

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[46] I was subsequently asked to leave. My decision to move into the palace arose partly because of problems with the house allotted to me through the emir (such as no locks on the doors). The inadequacies stemmed from difficulties with his subordinate office staff and councillors, not the emir himself. Nonetheless, my refusal to move into the house signified, rather disparagingly (according to the rules of patronage), a rejection of the emir himself.

Figure 2.2 Diagrammatic representation of epistemological frameworks used in (a) culturalist (b) authored and (c) certain post-structuralist interpretations of landscape. Absence of reflexivity and proximal inter-subjective analysis in (c) is seen by comparing (c) to Figure 2.1.

Marxist materialist approaches, in contrast, worked largely within structuralist frameworks that utilised absolutist or essentialist notions of space such that they,

> failed to recognize the importance of the quality of landscape, concentrating instead on the relations of production and social classes, presented in aggregate terms and determined by structures that originate outside human consciousness (Kobayashi, 1990: 168).

The inability of Marxist geographers to entertain socially *created* space and thereby include and transcend the individualism of the idealists, maintained an impasse that only since the late-1970s has begun to be overcome (Kobayashi, 1990: 168).

Some breakthroughs were made by those who saw landscapes as humanly *authored*. Landmark collections of these works include The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes (Meinig, 1979), which contains Samuel's notion of the "biography of landscape" and Meinig's idea of "reading the landscape". Moreover, the edited collection, The City in Cultural Context (Agnew et al, 1984) raised issues related to notions of *social* authorship of landscapes through discussions of urbanisation and city change.

Although these works entertained individual and social aspects of authorship, inter-relations between space and power, and aspects of reflexivity, are not developed or explored. The works nonetheless add subjective "lines" to the island-like culturalist depictions of landscape (Fig. 2.2b).

More recent breakthroughs have obtained in post-structuralist theoretical realms that developed out of the humanities as a whole. The concepts of reflexivity, intersubjectivity, heterotopias, recursivity, socio-spatialities, spatial ontologies, multiple voices, resistance, contestation and so on are now part of a general social science discourse that is used commonly to describe post-structuralist understanding of the diversity and social-political construction of landscape. The realisation that *place* is central to history has resulted in measured attempts to incorporate formal linguistic aspects of spatiality into geographic speech. Words and phrases such as standpoint, stance, marginal, positioning, distanciation, grounding and horizons of signification have become part of a new descriptive norm.

Within this perspective, landscapes are seen to be social and political creations. There is also an appreciation of some aspects of reflexivity implicated in landscape construction and the telling of landscape stories. Nonetheless, the way in which these post-structuralist terms and concepts are *used*, depicted diagrammatically in Figure 2.2c, is incomplete and gendered. Most literary re-productions of landscape are based, for example, largely on positionally *remote* forms of analysis. Few enter the landscape (compare Fig. 2.1a and 2.2c). There is little methodological and literary exposure of *who* is story-telling such that the "line" of reflexivity between the author of the narrative and the landscape is absent (compare Fig. 2.1b and Fig. 2.2c). Thus, although multiple voices are identified, almost none is inter-personally engaged. *Communicative empowerment* is, in fact, impossible, given the framework of Figure 2.2c, for there is no one "alive" with whom to speak and the author remains unreflexively "hidden". These absences preclude apprehending the specificity of "different landscapes" that occupy the same place and time (or *heterotopias*), or the multiple temporalities in the same place (or *simultaneities*).

The same absences pervade even the most recent works on post-structuralist and post-modernist landscape analysis, including those of Soja (1989), Harvey (1990) and Duncan (1990). In Postmodern Geographies, for example, Soja (1989) develops theoretically what he deems an "ontological spatiality" or a spatiality constructed through social and political processes. Through his materialist stance, he offers a *theoretical* antidote to idealist understandings of space, especially those within the recent works of Porteous (1990), Entrikin (1991) and others. Nevertheless, his promised "textual unfolding of an essential historical geography", remains largely a literary one.

Although Soja's two empirical chapters on the deconstruction of Los Angeles provide useful insights into the changing *placements* of various industries and military installations, for example, there is no sense of the *dynamics* of landscape production, either from an analytically remote or a proximal position (Fig. 2.1). Soja seems to sense this absence, but begs the question by appropriating Jorge Luis Borges' frustration (via numerous quotations from Borges' work on

the land of Aleph) with the limitations and thus failure of language. We are told that there is a multiplicity of forces, places and times which yield a seeming cacaphony of *simultaneities* and *heterotopias* that resist the successive linearity of time and place inherent in linguistic description. I am inclined to attribute his frustration to the overwhelming scale of analysis that he has chosen - the entirety of metropolitan Los Angeles - that disables him from engaging dialogically with the landscape, thereby forcing him to render a "theoretically informed regional *description*" (my emphasis; Soja, 1989: 1-2).

The large scale, the preponderance of "objective" and observationally-based data and the lack of dialogic engagment help explain the static quality of his landscapes. The lack of inter-personal research compels him to use a self-referential contemplative analytical framework, which also helps decipher his reliance upon largely white, Western male referents.[47]

Similarly, in The Condition of Postmodernity (1990), Harvey intertwines numerous already-spoken logical threads (spun virtually all by men) to describe a history of what he deems postmodernity. The postmodern landscapes of the '80s and '90s are painted as outcomes of social struggles informed by global capitalist interests and actions. Despite his insights and breadth of synthesis and his *theoretical* grasp of intersubjectivity and relational analysis, Harvey seems unable to grapple with cultural forces, which, operating under similar material contraints, have produced quite different socio-spatialities or landscapes. The specificity of such analysis would require intersubjectively *applying* his theoretical framework to what is real. His theoretical grasp of reflexivity or intersubjectivity (although impressive) is thus from afar, which similarly helps to decipher his contemplative and uncritical situation within white, Western and male worlds of social construction and meaning (Fig. 2.2c; see Massey, 1991).

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[47] Massey (1991) in her article "Flexible Sexism" similarly criticises the creation of "male" theoretical perspectives in geography that are propagated through the self-contained referentiality of male theorists. She observes that there are many white male "post-modernists" who use the concept of "multiple voices" in a relativistic manner, in which one voice is claimed to be equal to any other. She rightly asserts that this relativising process disempowers these new voices (which in many cases are decrying inequality or real alternatives to white, male and heterosexual values and practices) by reducing their claims to reflections of different preferences for specific intellectual flavours (see also Foster, 1983). Massey sees the singular timeliness of this white male celebration of relativism as a strategic move by men to re-assert their authority. That is, *they* know it is all relative, thereby obscuring their own relativity.

In contrast, little intersubjectivity (either in the remote or proximal analytical sense) is found in Duncan's book, The City as Text: the Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom (1990), despite its suggestive title. Where the Kandyan kingdom and palace are and why they are significant are never presented to the reader. Instead, Kandyan cosmology derived from secondary texts is related to spatial configurations on pre-given maps. Analysis is replaced by universalising and non-place-specific statements from secondary sources that give us no sense of the struggles behind myth and landscape construction.[48] His non-relational treatment of space, history and power, his concentration on secondary sources and his contemplative and non-dialogic methodological stance, disallows his self-stated goal to re-enact dialectically the construction of place. His "contestory reading" of the landscape collapses into a purely discursive field which, again, is white, Western and male-centred.

Perhaps the greatest methodological potential lies in the work of Cosgrove (1985; above), who relates epistemological questions of *how* we know what we know to visuality, spatiality and power. Although this work contains key methodological clues to how to elicit analytically relations among these three components, he stays for the most part positionally removed (Fig. 2.2c). Whereas his positioning in part obtains from an interest in historically remote periods, his contemplative gaze similarly rests uncritically upon on the universe of the white male "known". As illustrated in Figure 2.1 and the dissertation work, his work assumes a new potency upon entering the landscape and engaging inter-subjectively with those within.

Methodological direction was gained in this research by recent works and claims of feminist geographers who have begun to expose the ways in which women's knowledge is

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[48] In the chapter "Concretising the Sakran discourse", for example, one author's assertions that "the myth of Mt. Meru became a paradigm for the spatial organization of state, capital, and temple in much of Southeast Asia" and that "[t]errestrial space was structured in the image of celestial space" (48) are re-iterated uncritically with little sense of how this is and was made clear in the landscape. Similarly, he merely states that the "belief in the causal efficacy of parallelism was an important concept which structured the general, cultural Kandyan world view and as such was not seriously contested by any of the groups in the society." (49), without providing insight into why this was so.

qualitatively different from that of men.[49] Women's knowledge is seen to entertain more subjective and interpersonal realms, which undoubtedly derives in part from the intensely social nature of women's "reproductive" activities, such as child rearing, that require inter-subjective or relational forms of understanding and communicative empowerment. The relational quality of traditional women's work helps illuminate why those presently most effective in going "inside" landscapes have been women. An exemplary work is that of Cyndi Katz (1991) who worked with Sudanese children to develop various games that explore children's knowledge about the environment.

The epistemological model of this dissertation, then, refines the largely male-constructed and male-referential framework of landscape analysis and helps identify, validate and legitimate the contribution of women's knowledge to understanding and producing the landscape (Fig. 2.1). The traditionally male narrator, "hidden" from his literary production and the landscape, is reclaimed and identified, eroding the possibilities for hegemonic representations of "others". The application of the model to a case study of the Kano palace offers new inter-personal methodological directions in the analysis of landscapes, yielding innovative insights into inter-relations between space, history and power and the changing political culture of Kano.

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[49] These differences were vividly and forcefully made clear in the 1991 annual meeting of the American Association of Geographers in San Diego where a special session on "Feminism and the Construction of Geographical Knowledge" was held. The speakers discussed a number of aspects of the hegemony of the male voice in theoretical constructions. Many of the issues raised revolved around the more "subjective" or relational form of women's knowledge and the peripheralisation of this knowledge by the male-dominated academic community. This is revealed in part in the titles of some of the papers, which included: "In Whose Words? On Gender Identities and Speaking Positions", by Liz Bondi; "'No Man's Land': Victorian Women Explorers and Professional Geographic Knowledge", by Mona Domosh; and, "Woman on the Edge of Space: Feminist Theory and the Construction of Geographic Knowledge", by Cindi Katz and Sallie Marston.

Chapter 3.

Gidan Rumfa circa 1500 - 1800: royal "Hausa" house-hold and house of state

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter two historical layers of the palace are "unpacked" from the present day palace landscape, using aerial photographs, colonial archival maps, and historical geographical field data, in conjunction with historical descriptions of the palace from the Kano Chronicle and other primary and secondary sources. The first or original palace landscape (circa 1500) is exposed as well as one of the last *Hausa* landscapes (circa 1750), that is several decades before the Fulani conquest of Kano of 1807 (chapter 4). Through the process of historical unpacking, it will be shown that the spatiality of the palace was in many ways *congruent* with the spatiality of vernacular households, and that these spatial congruities reflect shared patriarchal practices, especially with respect to gender and master-slave relations. These *congruities*, presented in a typology of a typical Hausa gida or household, are what enabled the palace to be effectively a house-hold.

The typology is then used with aerial photograph, archival map and field data to infer that the palace was originally oriented northward and that this orientation was planned to facilitate especially privileged spatial linkages between the palace and the city and world-at-large. This orientation, together with the typology and field data, show that specific patriarchal structures of the household pre-figured and structured the development of the patriarchal state. The specifically male realms of vernacular households are, in the palace, enlarged and developed into state realms, resulting in what today *appear* as spatial *incongruities* between the palace and vernacular households. Other incongruities include the atypical siting of the king's personal chambers within the royal household. It was these privileged spatial connections and spatial *incongruities* which enabled the palace to also be a house of state.

Changes in the palace landscape following Rumfa's rule are then presented in a diagrammatic reconstruction of the palace circa 1750. The reconstruction forms the basis of

chapter 4, dealing with the Fulani jihad of 1807 and the subsequent Fulani occupation and restructuring of the palace. The reconstruction illustrates the fact that between 1500 and 1750, several religious sites were instituted; a large eunuch colony was established adjacent to the king's quarters; and a large walled field of dye pits was developed, all of which contributed to a contraction of women's spaces. The difficulty of dating many palace features necessitated a particularly intense exploration of spatial relations of the palace and city (derived using aerial photographs and archival and field maps) in their interplay with nineteenth century social relations (derived from field data).

THE SOCIAL AND SPATIAL ORGANISATION OF A GIDA

There is some architectural and etymological evidence that a strong spatial congruence between Gidan Rumfa and vernacular households has existed throughout the last few centuries. The floor plan of a gida believed to have served as Rumfa's home prior to his move into the new palace, for example, is ordered very similarly to house plans described and\or sketched in the 1850s by Barth (1890) and Imam Imoru.[1] These plans, in turn, are similar to those presented in contemporary studies of Hausa gidaje, some of which are over a century old, and the palace landscape circa 1800, as determined from a recent field study (below; Dmochowski, 1988; Moughtin, 1985; Schwerdtfeger, 1982; Sa'ad, 1981; Smith, 1954). This congruence implies that certain cultural values and practices are common to royalty and the community-at-large and have remained relatively constant.

An ideal typology of a gida that shows these shared spatial characteristics is presented in Figure 3.1. The most striking social aspect of household spatial organisation is that it is gendered. Women are in seclusion (kulle, lit. lock up) inside the largest part of the gida called the

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[1] A guide to the Gidan Makama Museum, Kano (1985) contains a floor plan of a portion of the house with the names and uses of some of the component parts of the house described in the text. Imam Imoru elaborates upon many social and spatial aspects of the gida in mid-nineteenth century Hausaland in Ferguson (1973).

Figure 3.1. A spatial typology of the gendered spatial realms of a Hausa ccmpound (developed from Dmochowski (1988), Moughtin (1985); A guide to the Gidan Makama museum, Kano (1985); Schwertdfeger (1982); Sa'ad (1981); Smith, 1954 and field work).

cikin gida (lit. stomach of the house)[2] where they carry out food production and other activities geared toward household reproduction. Their placement is the most private, separated from the male realms by a partition wall and located farthest from the household entrance.[3]

The spaces of men are located in front of the cikin gida, towards the public realm, with which they merge in a physical sense (see Sa'ad, 1981). This placement and spatial linkage with the public is most acutely embodied in the zaure, the entrance hall into the gida.[4] Here, men and boys from the gida gather with other male friends and neighbors to exchange news and/or eat. It is also the place where male, gida-based trade and craft activities such as blacksmithing and leatherworking are carried out, malams (male Islamic scholars) conduct Islamic teaching to men and boys, and important male aspects of religious ceremonies, such as marriage-related activities and naming ceremonies are held. There is also some evidence that, prior to colonial abolition of slavery, it was a place where male slaves resided.[5]

Two other important "male" spaces, both of which have names and functions that stress their public nature, are the kofar gida (lit. the gate into (or of) the house) and the shigifa. The kofar gida is a large open area attached to the zaure containing rooms for unmarried sons. It also served as a stable area in households that were rich or powerful enough to own horses. In homes of especially affluent persons, the kofar gida lodged slaves, for which reason it was also deemed, wajen yaran gida (lit. the place of the children of the house).[6] Married slave men residing in such

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[2] Cikin gida is more commonly translated as "inside the house". Work in progress shows, however, that "stomach of the house" carries in some ways a more accurate connotation, and is akin to the English word and concept of the hearth (or heart).

[3] The Post-script of this chapter discusses some of the difficulties and controversies surrounding the concept and practice of kulle or wife seclusion.

[4] In some places, the zaure is detached from the house (see e.g., Hill, 1977: 182).

[5] Imam Imoru discusses slave residence in the zauruka (pl.; zaure, sing.) of households of wealthy farmers (see Ferguson, 1973).

[6] From a discussion with Madakin Kano, 23.7.90.

The yara or children in this case refers to slaves or clients. There are many similarities in the rights and privileges of children and slaves (chapter 1; work in progress; also, see Hill, 1977).

a kofar gida would head their own household, which shared the same gendered social and spatial characteristics of the household-at-large, that is, it contained a zaure, kofar gida and cikin gida. The more public siting of slave women in the latter cikin gida indicates that they were of lower status than women in the innermost cikin gida.[7]

The shigifa is a passageway adjacent to the kofar gida used by women, children, slaves and servants to reach the cikin gida and was used as visiting and sleeping chambers by especially trusted male friends and relations (Fig. 3.1). The word shigifa is probably related etymologically to the verbs shiga (enter) and shige (pass by or go beyond) and implies a state of passage; that is, one has not yet entered the main house, the cikin gida.

The etymology and physical placement of the male realms in some sense imply that men are not *in* the home, but in a kind of crossroads that connects them with the knowledge and activities of the male world-at-large.[8] The physical links and fluidity between the male realms of the gida and the public are crucial, for they enable and signal male inhabitation or control over the public domain. Differences between the palace and vernacular gidaje are discussed in the section below.

THE KANO PALACE CIRCA 1500: A HOUSE-HOLD AND HOUSE OF STATE

Figure 3.1 may be somewhat misleading in that it obscures a high degree of variablity in the scale, quality and repetition of particular spatial units within gidaje. This variability largely

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[7] The relation between the degree of spatial seclusion and status is discussed more fully in chapter 6.

The presence of slave women in a "public" place contradicts the supposed moral promise for secluding women, presumably on an equal basis, and emphasises the role of domestic labour demands in diluting the "maleness" of slave spaces. That is, married slave women lived with their husbands so as to carry out effectively their work as mothers and wives. Thus what makes the kofar gida of a wealthy household "male" is that it is filled with men who serve the household master (mai-gida; lit. master of the house); slave women, for the most part, served their husbands or performed services for women inside the main inner female realm of the household.

It should also be noted that some very wealthy slave men had their own separate households *outside* that of their master. Although these latter cases were rare, according to spatial conventions, the kofar gida of their households would have contained nested slave households. In this case, the slave women of the outer kofar gida would be of lower status than the slave women in the cikin gida. I mention this, to emphasise that placement was was not purely a reflection of birthright, but of the power and ability to control or *place* people.

[8] The relationship between *socio-spatial* relations and language is discussed in more detail below and referred to as socio-spatial linguistics.

reflects differences in the wealth, status, and occupations of household or family heads.[9]

Households of wealthier persons may, for example, contain more than one zaure, and wealthy and\or particularly large extended households may have several entrance rooms or shigifa leading into the same or different sections of the cikin gida.[10] In addition, the kofar gida of wealthy and powerful persons may be especially large and house many slaves, for which reason it is deemed wajen yaran gida (above).[11] Moreover, the house size and building details were typically shaped or fitted to suit the professional needs of male family members. The doorways into the homes of merchants who used donkeys or head carriers, for example, were much wider than those engaged in leather work.[12] In this expanded sense of the gida, the palace can be considered as the most monumental of all gidaje in Kano that until the 1980s was maintained using the best quality traditional materials and the most skilled builders.

There are, however, unique socio-spatial aspects of palace organisation that indicate that it was not merely a household on a monumental scale, but a house of state. The male realms, for example, were oriented to facilitate an especially privileged spatial orientation between the palace and the city and world-at-large, discussed below.

The northern orientation and state realms of the palace

Aerial photograph and archival map and historical geographic field data, in conjunction with the ideal typology and descriptions of the palace from historical sources, show that the two northern "traditional" entrance halls or zauruka into the palace, and the slave realm into which they

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[9] Single-family households are headed by a single male head of household or mai-gida (lit. master of the household). In households containing several family units, the household head co-ordinates all family groups, each of the latter led by the husband or mai-ilayi (lit. master of the family; Schwerdtfeger, 1982).

[10] Where more than one immediate family unit is present, the cikin gida is formally divided (usually via a partition wall) into separate sassa (lit. sections), each ideally containing a miniature of what is present in the cikin gida of a single family gida. Each sassa would be entered through a different shigifa.

[11] The enlargement of the function of this house section allows formally for the socio-spatial accommodation of slaves and slave labour. The kofar gida thus is the locus for externally-derived labour which permits a refinement in the social division of labour.

[12] See Sa'ad (1982) for a fascinating description of the ingenious sculpting (and re-sculpting) of the household by house builders to fit the personal needs of male family members. Moreover these socio-spatial needs were interwoven with those of the local community, producing an especially fluid, or what Sa'ad called "organic" built environment.

lead, are original features of the first palace structure.[13] Settlement patterns in the adjacent city are continuous spatially with those of the northern region of the palace (Fig. 3.2a), an indication that the two regions probably developed contemporaneously.[14] No similar developments are seen in the east, west or south (see Fig. 3.2a,c). The two major pathways or avenues inside the northern region of the palace continue outside the palace to city sites that Rumfa created and/or which were particularly strategic to Rumfa's rule. The western pathway proceeds northward to the main city market instituted by Rumfa, known as Kasuwar kurmi (lit. market of the groves). The market was quite large and was one of the primary economic structures established by Rumfa which later led to Kano's regional economic ascendacy. Not only would this path have facilitated communication between the king and his designated market officials, it would have facilitated the flow of necessary market goods, especially grains, into the palace.

The other pathway leads eastward and would have linked up with a wide pathway encircling the inner portion of the main city wall used for defensive purposes (Fig. 3.2b,c). After the walls were expanded, later in the reign of Rumfa, the eastern pathway would have been a shortcut to the new gates built south of Kofar Wambai (see Fig. 1.2).[15] Both entrance halls would have been not only the most public of male meeting places, as in vernacular gidaje, but nodes along spatial avenues connecting the palace in crucial ways with the city and world-at-large.

Other evidence for a north-facing palace orientation is derived from the morphology of the northwestern entrance hall, while floor slopes steeply upward from the portal facing west (onto the

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[13] There are presently three gateways into the northern region of the palace. One was built using "modern" cement block during the reign of emir Sanusi (1953-63). The other two are built using traditional materials and designs. It is these latter which are deemed "traditional" in the text.

[14] Schwerdtfeger (1982) documents and discusses the gradual non-linear growth of households, a growth he deems "organic". Sa'ad (1981) expands this concept of organicity (which he calls "plasticity") to include the development of city wards or unguwoyi which grew, and were bounded by, smoothly continuous settlement lines.

[15] The smooth linearity of the paths is another indication that they formed part of the first palace landscape. It is also consonant with the continuity of the urban settlements pattern discussed above, which suggests that the social processes which produced them were similar and contemporaneous. This contrasts with some other main paths radiating out from the main market place (Kasuwar kurmi) the lines of which deflect slightly where they cross the former location of the fifteenth century city wall.

Figure 3.2. (a) A portion of a highly detailed map of Kano city re-drafted as accurately as possible from a 1932 colonial map (Kano State Ministry of Works and Housing, Lands and Surveys Division, Map Section, Map K.N.T 798). Note that south of the palace the city was sparsely populated and that the southern road noted in (a) does not lead to the palace directly, but towards intersections that circumvent the palace. The development of a road leading to the southern palace gate built in the mid-nineteenth century (Chapter 4) had thus not registered clearly in the landscape by this time. In contrast, the main roads ringing the palace to the north inflect inwards where they presumably connect with the entrance halls and pathways leading out of the palace. (b) Aerial photograph showing the Kano palace and Kurmi market (both instituted by Rumfa). Note that the road and settlement patterns within and outside the city are continuous (Kenting Air Services (Kano) 1984 composite of 1982 flight data). Colonial and post-colonial path developments include the square outlined mosque north of the palace, the linear tree-lined path leading to the "Native Authority" building south of the palace, the large rectangular prison east of the palace, and the tarred L-shaped road outside the western and southern palace edge. The air photo data seems to indicate that a southern road may have lead directly to the palace. The extent of this road line near the palace is obscured, however, by Native Authority buildings built during the 1930s. A view of this area prior to the building of the latter is seen in a. (c) Interpretive diagram based upon data in aerial photograph and archival maps showing the first suburb wall that surrounded Gidan Rumfa, built by King Rumfa. Also shown are the pathways connecting the palace with the central city market (Kurmi) and the city walls.

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public domain), to the much higher ground of the southern portal facing southward into the palace.[16] That the lowest portion of the floor is lower than all other palace structures implies that entrance hall is one of the oldest structures in the palace and that the entrance portal has always faced west.[17]

The palace pathways meet at a passageway in line with, and materially part of, a high partition wall spanning the width of the palace (Figs 1.2, 3.2 and 3.3). Comparison of the area north of this wall with the spatial typology of a typical gida (Fig. 3.1) suggests that the area was, in formal terms, the kofar gida. The kofar gida area is quite large and probably accommodated a large number of male slaves (and if married, their households) serving the king, in addition to the king's post-pubescent sons, much as it does today (compare Figs 3.1, 3.2c and 3.3).

These slaves fulfilled not only domestic duties, but important state functions. The Kano Chronicle states that Rumfa was the first king to appoint slaves (eunuchs) to offices of state, including the state treasury (Palmer, 1967). Nineteenth century data imply that most eunuchs lived in the central portion of the kofar gida slave community, which may have included Sarkin Bai (lit. king of the slaves), a member of the state council (below) and presumably the administrative head of all slaves.[18] Other data related to nineteenth century slave titles and locations indicate that the palace stables were administered by slaves living in the eastern portion of the kofar gida. Their siting next to the stables (below) and bordering the pathway leading to the city walls, undoubtedly

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[16] A western-facing entranceway is important in traditional Hausa practice (see Moughtin, 1985). The importance of this "facing west" is presumably one of the reasons that Last conjectures that the palace was originally entered via an entrance hall located in the west (pers. comm., 1990).

[17] Observation of relative ground levels was used to determine relative age dates of buildings throughout the palace. These differential levels result from the continual razing of buildings such that over the years new and physically higher-planed surfaces result and new structures become more elevated than those left standing in the area. This elevation process has produced many sunken doors, windows and floorscapes, especially in buildings known to have been built during the early nineteenth century. The most sunken structure is the floorscape of the westernmost northern entrance hall into the palace.

[18] The word bai is a contraction of the word bayi or slaves.

Figure 3.3. Gidan Rumfa landscape circa 1500, based upon aerial photograph, archival map and field data, in conjunction with the socio-spatial typology developed for vernacular gidaje (households). Prior to the Fulani conquest in 1807, the ward of Yelwa (lit. abundance) served as the main palace kitchen area and was home to powerful concubines who held titles dating from the 'Hausa' period. Although it is not known when these titles or Yelwa were instituted, a similar type of centrally-placed kitchen-ward would have been necessary. It is also shown as a reference place with which to compare the palace landscape circa 1800 in Figure 3.5.

facilitated the carrying out of their stable duties and military exercises (Figs 1.2 and 3.3).[19] The data also indicate that many other male slaves residing in the palace kofar gida, played crucial roles in day-to-day administration and potential defense of the royal household and state. The large size and large-scale accommodation of slaves in the kofar gida, and the involvement of slaves in a wide variety of state activities, are significant palace landscape features which point to the alteration of the house-hold structure to accommodate a refined and enlarged state division of slave labour.

The kofar gida is presently separated from the cikin gida by way of several entrance halls to the south, the first of which is built into the side of the partition wall. The general placement of the halls suggests that they are shigifa and, as such, were original parts of the first palace landscape, although their exact size, form and number may have varied.

Instead of each shigifa leading to a separate family unit, as in extended vernacular family households (above), or the shigifa being clustered together in front of a single-family cikin gida (as in the homes of particularly wealthy men), the palace shigifa are staggered along a northerly axis, separated by courtyards, and are guarded mostly by female slaves. Each of the passageways is known as a soron jakadiya (lit. hall of the guardswoman) and is considered to be her express terrain and, in a sense, property. Besides securing spatial control over the royal women and making it impossible for foreign men to enter the cikin gida, the halls probably served as the heavily guarded axes of a labyrinth leading to lateral court and counsel rooms, similar to those in existence during the nineteenth century (Fig. 3.3).[20] These rooms were the first spatially fixed sites of state, built to house the first (and all male) state council which Rumfa created. As

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[19] Field evidence shows that throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Shamaki (lit. stables), a title created by Kutumbi (1623-48) lived in the eastern kofar gida section. The strategic advantages gained by locating Shamaki next to the stables and along the road leading to the main city defenses and gates, suggests that the palace was originally planned to facilitate the linkage. This planned access implies, in turn, that other slaves with stable duties lived in the eastern kofar gida prior to the formal installation of Shamaki. Stable duties may have been the original basis of the military\state title Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida (lit. king of the horses of the middle of the house), the gida being that of Rumfa. During Shashero (1573-82), the title was awarded to a eunuch (see Palmer, 1967: 115).

[20] Unless the proper series of pathways into, out of, and between the shigifa is known (each hall has 4 or more doors and inner passageways), it is impossible to reach a particular room of state or the cikin gida.

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Sa'id (1978: 52) points out, the Council, known as the <u>Tara</u> <u>ta</u> Kano (lit. the nine of Kano):

> ...executed all the affairs of the state under the direction of the ruler. They were responsible for appointing new rulers and also for deposing those rulers who failed to perform the duties required of them. The creation of the council was an important landmark in the history of Kano. Prior to the coming of Islam, the Hausa rulers were complete autocrats [having]...no council to advise and check them...

The main room of council was probably <u>Soron fadanci</u>, a structure that was largely abandoned as a council chamber in the nineteenth century. Its existence during the reign of Rumfa is derived partly from socio-spatial linguistic evidence.[21] The word <u>fadanci</u>, for example, stems from the word "<u>fada</u>", which means "speaking" as well as "quarreling".[22] Within royal circles, however, <u>fada</u> was applied to the royal court session itself, which Rumfa formalised socio-spatially with the institution of the <u>Tara</u> <u>ta</u> Kano.[23] The development of this second meaning of "<u>fada</u>" is in turn linked to the expression "<u>kofar fada</u>" (lit. gate into the <u>fada</u>), which appears quite early in the <u>Chronicle</u> and which seems to refer to the open space in front of the room of <u>fada</u> in the <u>shigifa</u> area or, transliterally, the <u>soron fada</u>.[24] That is, the <u>kofar fada</u> existed (and was placed) only in relation to the <u>fada</u>, presumably housed in a special hall or chamber in the <u>shigifa</u>.

Thus, the <u>shigifa</u>, once an area for trusted male visitors in vernacular households, became the most important institutional meeting place for the aristocracy. One of the <u>shigifa</u> may also have

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[21] Whereas socio-linguistics pertains to alterations in the meaning of words as a result of changes in social organisation and experiences, socio-spatial linguistics is defined (rather loosely) here as changes in meaning that arise from changing social-spatial relations and experiences.

[22] These two meanings are differentiated phonetically through utilising different tonalities.

[23] This royal re-rendering or development of the word <u>fada</u> is also expressed in the word <u>fadawa</u>, which refers to court slaves or courtiers. The socio-linguistic link between royal <u>fada</u> and <u>fadawa</u> is especially obvious in the singular form ofthe latter, <u>ba-fada</u> which means transliterally, slave of the <u>fada</u> or royal court. In this case, the tonality of <u>fada</u> connotes quarreling.

[24] Kisoki (1509-1565), for example, is said to have conquered the town of <u>Bimin</u> N'guru whereupon he entered the ruling house, and "took his seat beneath the baobab tree at the <u>Kofan fada</u>". This location is then counterposed to the "<u>kofar bai</u>" (lit. the gate of the slaves), which presumably referred to the first gate leading into the slave or <u>kofar gida</u> area of the household (see Palmer, 1967: 113). Today, however, the phrase denotes the area in front of the palace itself. This latter development, in turn, seems to have inflected back onto the meaning of <u>fada</u>, giving rise to yet a third meaning of <u>fada</u>: the palace itself.

served as an important weapons depot,[25] east and adjacent to which was a royal stable,[26] similar to that which existed in the early nineteenth century (and still does, today). As alluded to above, the stable location was in line with the pathway leading to the city walls and gates, thus optimising travel time and space between the palace and main city defenses.

This stable placement *within* the shigifa area, however, differs from that of vernacular gidaje (see Fig. 3.1) and may have developed for practical reasons related, first, to the high slave population and resultant spatial limitations in the kofar gida and, secondly, to the new "free" space along the margins of the innovatively extended and extensive shigifa area to the north.[27] The atypical stable placement would also have reduced the risk of effective slave rebellion, in that it separated slaves in the kofar gida from the material means of staging a rebellion, the horses and armaments stored more safely in the inner female-guarded areas of the shigifa.[28]

The cikin gida: the socio-spatial organisation of the king's quarters and women

Although the socio-spatial organisation of Rumfa's domestic household generally reflected vernacular forms, it contained socio-spatial innovations developed specifically for royalty. Nineteenth century field data, in conjunction with data in the Chronicle, for example, indicate that unlike vernacular gidaje the turaka of the king was placed *away* from the public realm in the

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[25] Interviews with the current Madakin Kano suggests that arms were stored in one of the northern shigifa at least immediately prior to the Fulani period. This site was separate from the slave realm, probably reflecting a conscious strategic decision that was presumably just as appropriate circa 1500.

[26] The Kano Chronicle states that Rumfa began the custom of bringing spare horses to battle (Palmer, 1967: 112), which implies that by the reign of Rumfa, the household stable was well-developed (Palmer, 1967: 112).

[27] Dmochowski (1988) and Moughtin (1985) develop similar analyses of the social and spatial relations between the kofar gida and shigifa of the palace and vernacular gidaje, but only for the *southern* portion of the palace. Moreover, they do not entertain historical details. The southern portion of the palace developed, however, in the mid-nineteenth century during the Fulani era when a southern entrance hall, kofar gida and labyrinth area were created. These creations lent a bi-lateral spatial symmetry to the palace. Neither author, however, seems aware that theis area developed quite late or recognises or discusses the *northern* realm, presumably because they are currently "invisible", having been superseded by the administrative realms in the south.

[28] Royal slave rebellions were not uncommon and had nothing to do with slave oppression, as might be thought by those in the West. Rather, royal slaves filled many important military and state positions and became so powerful that they threated the king. In the reign of Kutumbi (1623-48), for example, one of his slaves (Dawakin Kwoshe) is said to have become so powerful that he left the palace and began to organise other slaves in rural areas to revolt. Kutumbi pleaded with him to return "with fine words" and apparently convinced him not to rebel. Similarly, at the end of the nineteenth century, the head of the eunuchs led an unsuccessful rebellion (Palmer, 1967: 118, 131).

southern part of the cikin gida.[29] The placement and socio-spatial organisation of the king's chambers appear to have been influenced by injunctions in The Crown of Religion Concerning the Obligation of Princes, a political text by the Islamic scholar from Tlemcen, Al-Maghili, upon Rumfa's request (see chapter 2).[30]

The siting of the king away from the public realm is alluded to in the common refrain, "THE HEIGHT OF AFFLICTION IS THE ISOLATION OF THE RULER FROM THE SUBJECTS" (Gwarzo et al 1974/77; c.f. Ahmed, 1988).[31] Similarly the passage "Don't move far from your coat of mail and your weapons" is reflected in the building of a storage room for chain mail inside the king's turaka.[32] Moreover he counsels the king to allow only the most trustworthy men to approach him, among whom should be Islamic scholars. This counsel reinforced the emphasis on siting the turaka away from the public, as well as its placement near a mosque attached to the household of a liman (Fika, 1978: 31).[33] To safe-guard at least the visual seclusion of the royal women, the liman probably entered and left the inner palace grounds on a pathway located in the eastern fields of the cikin gida, placed similarly to an escape route known to have existed in the mid-nineteenth century (Fig. 3.3; chapters 5 and 6). Lastly, Al-Maghili's counsel that the king should "hold a public audience daily so that women and children may approach" was probably carried out in a special audience chamber located at the northern flank of the turaka, facing the main

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[29] The location of the turaka is derived from inter-relating many bits of historical and socio-spatial data from the field, the Kano Chronicle and other primary and secondary sources. The jig-saw-like process of re-construction is detailed partly in this and following sections.

[30] Gwarzo et al (1974/77: 16) write that, "Al-Maghili's work, The Obligations of Princes is an example of a type of Islamic Political literature called "Mirrors for Princes". These essays describe the qualities and behaviour of good Muslim rulers and equate the welfare of the ruler with the welfare of his [state] domain." What is not recognised, however, is that his injunctions had specific spatial repercussions with respect to the organisation of the palace, discussed, in part, below.

[31] The king is also enjoined to surround himself with bodyguards, to only let those close to him physically who he can really trust, etc. Note that the capital letters in the quote are used in Gwarzo et al 1974/77.

[32] Field data shows that this room existed at least since the Fulani period, which when considered in tandem with Al-Maghili's injunction, implies that the room was a spatial precedent established by Rumfa. The location of the king's chain mail during the nineteenth and twentieth century is discussed in chapters 5 and 6.

[33] As Fika (1978: 31) explains, the latter was "a scholar official [who] usually accompanied military expeditions, serving as battlefield Imam and travelling judge".

settlement of women.[34] The chamber, known as <u>Soron</u> <u>baki</u> (lit. the hall of the mouth)[35] in the

nineteenth century, is presently under the care of a special concubine with the title <u>Mai-soron</u> <u>baki</u>

(lit. the master of the hall of the mouth; Fig. 3.3).[36]

Rumfa is said to have had one thousand concubines (Palmer, 1967: 112).[37] Although

some of these women may have resided in smaller rural palaces,[38] the number 1000 seems

greatly exaggerated in light of the residential space available in the <u>cikin</u> <u>gida</u>. An elderly royal

woman living in the palace at the turn of the twentieth century recalled, for example, that the <u>cikin</u>

<u>gida</u> felt quite crowded after the British conquest of 1903, when the number of concubines swelled

to one hundred and fifty upon their re-call from rural locations (chapter 5). The number one

thousand, almost seven times as high, may thus represent more of a myth that describes the

power and prowess of Rumfa as a "man" and ruler, rather than a true head count. Assuming that

the residential area for women inside the <u>cikin</u> <u>gida</u> was about one-third larger than at present,[39]

a more reasonable approximation and upper limit is 250 women.

Wives and concubines, having different Islamic juridical and social rights, presumably lived

in separate areas, as they do today. In contrast to vernacular compounds where the "place" or

<u>waje</u> of each wife consists of one or two rooms (see Fig. 3.1), each royal wife has her own large

[34] The location of <u>Soron</u> <u>baki</u> is derived from the fact that the present <u>Soron</u> <u>baki</u> dates from the reign of the Fulani king, Abdullahi (1855-83), who re-built the southern portion of the palace, including the <u>turaka</u>, according to what was known to have existed during previous Hausa regimes (chapter 4).

[35] The word mouth may refer to the fact that it was here that the <u>Sarki</u>, or king, spoke. The word <u>baki</u>, however, may also mean "black", perhaps in reference to the fact that the room was very dark. Imam Imoru (Ferguson, 1973) refers to this chamber as <u>Soron</u> <u>ciki</u>, or the hall of the stomach or inside.

[36] Details of her duties during the nineteenth century are described in chapter 6.

[37] See the post-script to this chapter concerning Rumfa and wife seclusion.

[38] Field evidence indicates that concubines were kept in rural palaces in the nineteenth century, which may also have been the case during the reign of Rumfa. The <u>Kano</u> <u>Chronicle</u> tells us, for example, that the palace of Dorayi (which still exists) was built during the reign of Rumfa's son and successor Abdulahi, supposedly for, and at the behest of, his mother (Palmer, 1967: 112). The palace eventually became a kingly palace, although it is not known when. (see Ahmed, 1988, for a description and plans of the Dorayi palace).

[39] A large portion of the <u>cikin</u> <u>gida</u> area became a public male domain in the mid-nineteenth century, thereby decreasing its size by about one-third (chapter 4).

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walled compound, similar in size and structure to a family household. The concubines live communally in walled wards or unguwoyi, each with a separate name connoting an aspect of shared identity. This identity-based ward system is analogous to that of the city, from which the designation "ward" may derive.[40] Moreover, an area where the internal pathway system led out of the female residential area (for example, at the interface between the latter and the eastern or western fields) was sealed off effectively by a soron jakadiya or "hall of a guardswoman". Like those in the shigifa area (above), these served as checkpoints against illicit entries or departures by women or men (Fig. 3.3). In the next section, data providing clues into socio-spatial features and innovations following Rumfa's reign are discussed.

CHANGES IN THE PALACE LANDSCAPE 1500-1750

Introduction

Few persons of the palace community claimed knowledge or insights in the pre-jihad palace landscapes.[41] This restricted sense of history stems partly from a rupture in the genealogical and ethnic continuity of the palace inhabitants as a result of the jihad, when the royal Hausa community was replaced by a community of Fulani.[42] There were, however, physical features for which relative age dates could be determined.

Aerial photograph and archival and field map data reveal that no new spatial avenues or pathways into the palace were developed until the "Fulani" period, following the jihad of 1807 (Fig. 3.2; chapter 4). This indicates that the entrance into the palace and the general placement and

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[40] The city of Kano was divided into wards or unguwoyi, made up of communities sharing a common identity and occupying adjacent attached compounds.

The social and spatial significance of wajojo and unguwoyi is explained in more detail in chapter 6.

[41] By "palace community", I mean those persons who, through, birth or circumstance, experienced life directly in the palace, either in the past or present. Madakin Kano, a high-ranking nobleman from the Yolawa clan who resides outside Kano city, for example, played in the palace as a child and now, as an elderly man, consults daily with the present day emir within the realms of state.

[42] This sentiment is also reflected in the work of Mack (1988: 58) where her main subject, the title-holding, elderly, royal woman, Ma'daki, states, "Before the Fulani came, I have no knowledge of that time". (Ma'daki was also the most reliable, and informative woman of this study).

sequence of male spaces remained relatively unchanged from circa 1500 to 1807. The longevity of these placements partly reflects the growing importance of the central city market to the state and royal household, and the continued advantages of using the eastern pathway to reach the city walls.[43]

The only addition to the shiqifa area recorded by the Chronicle is the building of an open religious court area near Soron fadanci for the Alkali (or Islamic judge) of Kano, during the reign of Kisoki (1509-65; Fig. 3.4).[44] A more permanent structure was built in the nineteenth century which indicates that the Islamic ideal of unity between religion and the state was incorporated more formally into the state realms. Other changes between 1500 and circa 1800 occurred in the cikin gida and were deduced from data in the field and the Chronicle (below).

The cikin gida

The dyeing pits and concubine organisation

A particularly intriguing discovery[45] in the women's realm is a walled area of cloth dyeing pits, presently serving as a cemetery, adjacent to the concubine ward of Yelwa (lit. abundance; Fig. 3.4).[46] That the site was used as a cemetery since at least the latter portion of the nineteenth century, and the lack of any collective memory about the institution or use of dyeing pits during the Fulani period, suggests that the pits were built and utilised prior to the nineteenth

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[43] Recall that the old city wall section to which the palace pathway led, had been abandoned upon enlargement of the city area. The former encircling road behind the abandoned wall section, however, continued to be used since it now provided the most expeditious route to reach the new wall section (refer to Fig. 1.2).

[44] Kisoki, the grandson of Rumfa, invited a certain Islamic scholar to be the Alkali of Kano: He refused, and suggested his brother Magumi. Magumi agreed, and built a portico at the Kofan [sic] Fada". From the socio-spatial linguistics analysis of the phrase kofar fada, discussed above, it is inferred that the portico was located in front of the place where fada was held, that is, Soron fadanci.

[45] The discovery is an academic one. Many elderly people know about the ruins but do not consider them particularly important. No young or middle-aged person, including the present day emir, however, was aware of these pits.

[46] Sa'ad (1985) claims that Yelwa was the original name of the palace. There is no indication, however, as to the source of this claim.

farm plots of female slaves

CIKIN GIDA

"wards" of concubines

KOFAR GIDA
slaves and
unmarried sons

dye pits

1

Islamic court

Soron fadana

CITY MARKET

Yelwa

2

Qur'anic school

silos

arms depot

eunuchs

Mosque

stable

Diko

dan Lawan

Turaki Mainya

Turaki Kuka

'yan Sin- tali

Sarkin Jarumai

The King

soron Jakadiya (guardswoman)

slaves

CITY WALLS

Mai-shika shikai

3

4

"places" of wives

0   60m

Figure 3.4 Diagrammatic reconstruction of the palace circa 1800. Note the cloth dye pit field adjacent to the concubine ward Yelwa.

century.[47] The fact that they are terms dyeing *pits* and not dyeing *pots*, indicates that they date from the mid-eighteenth century.[48] The location of the pits *inside* the palace suggests that they were used to supply the domestic dyeing (or re-dyeing) needs of the household.[49] The proximity of the dye pits to Yelwa also suggests that the two areas were connected in practice and perhaps physically via a passageway (Fig. 3.4). In this way, the female slaves who presumably worked the pits could be easily supervised by the main title-holding concubines in Yelwa, especially Uwar soro (below).[50]

Architectural eviden·ce in conjunction with interview data, indicate that food production was carried out inside a monumental structure called Soron tuwo (lit. the hall of porridge), located in the central part of Yelwa (Figs 3.4 and 3.5). Elderly informants recalled that Soron tuwo and Yelwa had "always" been there, indicating that they were present upon the Fulani conquest.[51] In addition, the roof of Soron tuwo is supported by an archaic "Hausa" pillar system that was common prior to the nineteenth century, but which became obsolete in the mid-nineteenth century (see Sa'ad, 1981).[52] A pre-Fulani age is further supported by the presence of special rooms

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[47] The pit area is currently called, karofi, which literally means dye pits. Although Rufa'i (1987) and Ahmed (1988) cite this name, they do not link it with actual pits, but assume that the karofi was always a cemetery. The oversight demonstrates that although the name karofi lost its original *signified* and took on a popular and new one, the word itself is an artifact that provides a clue to a past place.

[48] Although cloth dyeing in Kano began in the late fourteenth century (Frishman, 1977: 44), it was carried out in large dying pots. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, the somewhat fragile pots were replaced by more permanent, albeit immobile, dyeing pits lined with a form of traditional cement (John Lavers, 20.3.90).

[49] That the pits were used purely for domestic needs was suggested by John Lavers in a discussion with him in early 1990.

[50] Concubines performed less labour intense duties and served as administrators of the cikin gida. The wives were a leisure class (chapter 6).

[51] It is interesting to note that Soron tuwo is located in the exact center of the cikin gida. Whether this central placement had some special significance is not known. The southern part of the palace was in the early twentieth century, however, such that today, they are no longer central.

[52] Soron tuwo is the largest monumental, pillared structure in the palace.

The pillar and beam system was required in monumental structures, the size and number of pillars varying with the ground distance to be spanned. In the mid-nineteenth century, the system was replaced by a structurally more sophisticated "Hausa vaulting" technique (see Sa'ad, 1981).

Figure 3.5. (a) <u>Soron</u> <u>tuwo</u> (lit. the room of por:age), formerly the palace "kitchen", located in the concubir:ı ward, <u>Yelwa</u> (lit. abundance). It is the largest monumental pillared structure remaining in the <u>cikin</u> <u>gida</u>. (b) an inside view of <u>Soron</u> <u>tuwo</u> revealing the large pillared supports characteristic of pre-nineteenth century monumental structures. <u>Soron</u> <u>tuwo</u> was abandoned in the 1950s (chapter 6). Note that <u>Soron</u> <u>tuwo</u> is almost exactly centrally placed within the <u>cikin</u> <u>gida</u>.

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inside Yelwa built to accommodate spirits with Hausa identities (Rufa'i, 1987).[53]

Clues to exactly which concubines lived in Yelwa are derived from present day concubine titles and responsibilities that date from pre-jihad times (Mack, 1988) and which tie them to Yelwa (Rufa'i, 1987). Two of the most important titles are Uwar soro (lit. woman of the [king's] quarters) and Mai-kudanda (lit. master of the grain silos).[54] [55] Uwar soro was the most senior and powerful concubine, to whom all other concubines answered. An important part of her work involved supervising the distribution of foodstuffs (largely grains) in the palace.

The nature of Mai-kudanda's role in grain activities is less clear. The title lapsed after the death of the last Mai-kudanda, during the present emir's reign. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Fulani established a male slave hierarchy which assumed many grain-related administrative responsibilities (chapter 4). Thereafter, Mai-kudanda was charged with safe-keeping several grain stores located in Yelwa, and she supervised the measuring out of daily food portions to a cadre of administrative concubine assistants known as uwar wajeje (lit. women of the places).[56] The literal meaning of the title, the mid-nineteenth century grain duties associated with the title, and the mid-nineteenth century development of a male slave hierarchy with grain duties, imply that prior to the mid-nineteenth century, Mai-kudanda had assumed (or was given) full responsibility for the actual procurement and storage of the grains.

The grains were partly "free", derived from taxes paid in grains (collected by male jakadu

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[53] Those spirits are referred to as iskoki or pre-Islamic spirits and associated with various Hausa rituals. Iskoki were, in fact, distinguished by informants from aljannu, "Islamic" spirits discussed in the Qur'an. Most women informants pretended to know nothing about palace iskoki, presumably because such knowledge would signal irreligiosity.

[54] Kudanda commonly refers to a kind of adobe hut used for grain storage which is built atop large rocks or other objects to keep it off the ground, thereby keeping the silo contents free from insects and rodents. The actual word for grain silo, however, is rumbu.

[55] The roles of Uwar soro and Mai-kudanda are also discussed in Rufa'i (1987: 87-91). Some of her descriptions, however, are ahistorical. She is unaware, for example, that there was a whole cadre of uwar wajeje, taking the last remaining one (called Uwar waje) to be a high-ranking title-holder, which she is not. Mack (1988: 76) makes the same error of ahistoricism with respect to Uwar waje.

[56] There was one uwar waje (lit. woman of the place) per ward (of concubines) or waje (of a wife). Each uwar waje was responsible for reporting to Uwar soro the food needs of her particular waje or unguwa, and for collecting from her the daily food portions for her waje or unwguwa.

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or tax emissaries) and partly purchased from the central city market.[57] Assuming that prior to

the Fulani period women were more directly involved in grain supervision, and that the present

day market duties of female palace jakadu have some historical precedent,[58] it is not

unreasonable to suggest that the jakadu (slave messengers-guardswomen) were utilised by Mai-

kudanda to negotiate market grain purchases. The grains were probably carried back to the

palace by male head carriers who would then be directed as to how to store them in the silos.

During the nineteenth century, the grain silos were located in the northern apex of the

cikin gida such that they were as close as was possible (acceptable) to the source of male slave

labour in the kofar gida which would have stacked the grains as well as to the pathway which led

directly to the market (Fig. 3.4).[59] The strategic nature of the silo location suggests that they

were similarly placed during the reign of Rumfa (see Fig. 3.3).

The control that women exercised over grain procurement, storage and allocation during

pre-Fulani times was also reflected in the gendered organisation of the city market where grain

sales and prices were controlled by title-holding slave women (Mack, 1988: 74), headed by

Korama (Sa'id, 1978: 52).[60] The western palace pathway would not only have linked the market

and silos, in a spatial sense, but also connected women officials "inside" with those "outside" the

palace involved in grain activities. Furthermore, the probable grain-related market links between

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[57] See Garba (1986) for a discussion of taxation. That some of the grains were purchased is inferred from a similar practice in the nineteenth century, derived from field interviews. However, even if the grains were not paid for, the spatialisation of grain procurement discussed below is unchanged.

[58] Present day jakadu are commonly sent to market to purchase items for the secluded royal women (see chapter 6).

[59] Other evidence for the northern placement of the silos is found in an entrance chamber, known as Soron hatai (lit. hall of the grains), that previously led to a walled-off cluster of silos. Although the hall is all that remains at present, the silos having been torn down, its highly sunken floor level and the old style of pillar and beam architecture suggest that these features pre-date the Fulani period.

[60] Sa'id's source for this assertion is Alhaji Aminu Kano, a Kano politician and local historian. The latter's source of information is not, however, made explicit. The assertion of this claim is repeated by Sa'id (1983: 117) and others, e.g., Garba (1986: 69), who cite Sa'id (1978). The existence of Korama during pre-Fulani days was also brought to my attention by Hajiyya Rykkia, the divisional head of the Women's section at the Kano State History and Culture Bureau, although at the time I did not think to question her sources. Korama is mentioned in the Chronicle, however, although it does not specify her duties (see Palmer, 1967).

the royal concubines, jakadu and Korama, the linguistic equality of the name assigned to the male

tax collectors of the Fulani period (that is, jakadu), and the overall loss of women'2securits spaces

and privileges during the Fulani period have two historical implications: that pre-jihad tax-collectors

were wholly or partly made up of slave women; or at least, that female jakadu played a much

larger role in the collection, storage and distribution of tax-derived grains, both in the palace and

city market.

During the nineteenth century, the western portion of the palace was an open field divided

up into farm plots "owned" and farmed by domestic slave women or kuyangi (chapters 4 and 5).

The current belief that, prior to the British conquest, the area was a haven for Hausa spirits or

iskoki, suggests that the farm plots were present at least just before the Fulani period (Fig.

3.4).[61]

The eunuch colony and religious sites

Data from the field and the Chronicle show that several socio-spatial innovations in the

cikin gida developed after Rumfa's reign (Fig. 3.4). Many of these followed Muhammad Zaki's

(1582-1618) successful overthrow of Shashere (1573-82) and the related assassination of royal

eunuchs inside the palace mosque, including the title-holder, San Turaki Mainya Narai.[62] The

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[61] That these "Hausa" places existed after the jihad may reflect the strong role that Hausa or other royal slaves must have had in the Fulani aristocracy. These slaves were probably conscripted by Suleiman (the first Fulani king) whose decision to live in the palace was a belaboured political one. He knew his legitimacy in the eyes of his mostly Hausa subjects depended upon it (chapter 4). To occupy and run such a complicated house-hold and house of state, however, would have required the re-call of at least some of the main and lessor male slaves who had served the previous Hausa regime. Such a re-call would not have been completely unprecedented: palace slaves (except concubines who had borne the king children) were characteristically inherited by each succeeding king, providing a basis for stability and continuity in palace life and politics.

Part of the practical continuity provided by slaves would have involved a continuation of mystical practices associated with the Hausa spirit world, especially bori. (Rufa'i (1987) discusses some of these practices). Hausa slaves, especially those captured from the area during the jihad were thus undoubtedly instrumental in maintaining the structural and practical integrity of palace life and for re-instituting or retaining the places of and practices surrounding Hausa spirits.

[62] The Chronicle writes that after being defeated in the war with Katsina, Shashere (1573-1582) returned to the Kano palace. The title-holding eunuch San Turaki Mainya Narai (Narai is his actual name) overheard about a plot to overthrow Shashere. San Turaki therefore devised a plan. First, he told the king "Do not go outside your house, you or your Liman, today or you will be killed". Then, San Turaki, dressed up as the king, went to pray with nine of his personal slaves (eunuchs and slaves also had slaves, depending upon their power) and eighteen of those of the king. When the conspirators entered the mosque to kill the person who they thought was the king, San Turaki and his men fought back. Most of them, including San Turaki, were killed.

ease with which Muhammad Zaki overthrew Shashere prompted him to tighten security by building a colony of five eunuch compounds *inside the* cikin gida, *in* and along the southern flank of the turaka:[63] A compound *inside* the king's quarters was built for Sarkin Jarumai (lit. king of the brave ones), a military commander and member of the Tara ta Kano,[64] while four others were built for the title-holding eunuchs, 'yan Sintali, San Turaki Mainya (the title of he who was assassinated), Turaki Kuka and Mai-shikashikai.[65]

The martyred San Turaki Mainya Narai was then buried in the mosque where he was killed, and a new mosque was built slightly southeast of the former one, at the edge of the new eunuch settlement. Data in the Chronicle and from the field indicate that the eunuch colony and mosque existed throughout much of the 1600s and probably much of the 1700s (Fig. 3.4).[66] In contrast, the liman seems to have been displaced from the palace altogether, presumably for security reasons, his residence adjacent to the mosque being assumed by the new San Turaki Mainya (Fig. 3.4).[67]

Other religious sites were maintained or expanded, one of which was a Qur'anic study area built for the king's sons during the reign of Abubakr Kado (1565-73), and re-built and

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[63] The compounds would have been home to not only the titleholding eunuchs, but slave boys and eunuchs of less status.

[64] It is assumed that the build-up of the community entailed a slight northward shift in the extent of the turaka (see Fig. 3.4).

[65] The Chronicle states that all the eunuch compounds were built near the mosque and implies that the zaure or entrance hall of Turaki Mainya's house was especially close to the mosque (see Palmer, 1967: 116). Although these buildings were later abandoned, probably immediately after the Fulani jihad, they were later re-built on their former sites by Abdullahi (1855-83). Twentieth century British slavery proscriptions led to the demise of eunuchs such that by the 1940s, the eunuch compounds were largely abandoned and, for the most part, destroyed. Photos taken in 1903 of palace structures built by Abdullahi were found rather fortuitously in the photographic archives of the Royal Geographical Society, London. These were then identified on sight by several informants, especially Gogo Mai'daki, dan Meshe and Madakin Kano, and by description (by those with failing eyesight), especially Malam Dau (see chapter 4).

[66] The longevity of the settlement is derived from the fact that ruins of it were visible in the mid-nineteenth century when it was partly re-built by Abdullahi (1855-83; Palmer, 1967: 131).

[67] The Chronicle states that "The site for the mosque was changed", which field data shows involved a shift of about 15m to the southeast (Palmer, 1967: 116).

C.f. Ahmed (1988), who, based upon informant data, assumed that the present day mosque (the new one) was built by Babban Zaki (1768-1776).

enlarged during Bawa (1660-70; Palmer, 1967: 115, 121). Although there is in the Chronicle no

explicit reference to its exact location, there is indirect evidence that it was sited adjacent to and

west of the king's quarters (Fig. 3.4).[68] The site is close to the king's personal quarters, such

that he could easily oversee his sons' education.[69] The placement is also thematically congruent

with its proximity to the mosque and at least two compounds of religious scholars. The latter were

brought into the palace by Bawa (1660-70) and accommodated between the eunuch settlement

and turaka. One of them was Diko (also his longtime friend), and the other was Abdullahi,

introduced to the king through Diko.[70] Abdullahi was so respected by the king that he was

eventually offered the title of dan Lawan and became the palace muezzin. Thus, he assumed

much of the place and function of the former palace liman who had been displaced almost one

hundred years before by Muhammad Zaki. Field evidence shows that the eunuch colony and

religious sites were adjacent to the cloth dyeing pits (above; Fig. 3.4). The significance of all of

these landscape features is discussed below.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, two quite different facets of the palace were developed. First, the socio-

spatial *context* of the palace was investigated, to provide insights into the political culture of the

aristocracy (at domestic and state levels), as well as shared cultural values and relations between

the aristocracy and commoners. Socio-spatial *context* was taken to mean not only those areas

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[68] One of the structures which Abdullahi (1855-83) built during his re-construction of the southern cikin gida was a Qur'anic study area (chapter 4). Although it is not certain whether this structure was unique to the palace, the fact that he matched the functions and sites of buildings with historical precedents suggests that the study area "matched" the study area rebuilt by Bawa (1660-70).

[69] The Chronicle states that Kado (1565-73) came out early every morning during Ramadan to greet the princes and hear them read from the Qur'an (Palmer, 1967: 115).

[70] Due to the somewhat archaic language used in the Chronicles (or at least in Palmer's English version) it is not clear whether Diko lived in the palace, or merely had a room there. It is also not clear whether Diko originally met Abdullahi inside the palace (in which case it would seem that mallams generally had easy access into the palace), or somewhere in Kano city. It states, for example, that upon Diko hearing Abdullahi recite (where he was reciting is not clear) "Diko asked 'who is that man?' and was told it was Abdullahi, a stranger. The next morning Diko sent to Abdullahi, and when he came, took him to the Sarki and told him to read [portions of the Qur'an] to the Sarki...". What *is* clear, however, is that a house was later built for him inside the palace: "After the Sarki had listened he would not let him go away, but built him a house near to the gate of Turaki Mainya... During Ramadan, Abdullahi preached to the Sarki during the vigils." (Palmer, 1967: 122).

with distinct spatialities sited immediately adjacent to the palace, but analogous arrangements located in places completely severed from the palace, or *allo-spatialities*.[71] Aerial photographs and archival maps exposed connective spatial relations between the city and palace, and a comparison of the spatial layout of the palace with unconnected vernacular households revealed that certain social relations were shared between royalty and "commoners" (talakawa). The second facet involved developing a methodological interplay of social and spatial relations which helped uncover historical processes of political change and relations of power.

By using *context* and *interplay* (underpinned by the theoretical premise that social and spatial change are meaningful only in relation to each other), the apparently synchronous terrain of the palace was unpacked into different historical layers, two of which were presented diagrammatically.

The unpacking process began by deriving spatial *congruities* between Hausa vernacular households and the palace, and by relating these congruities to the shared patriarchal practices which shaped them. The most spatially potent practices included the gendered spatial division of labour and the master-slave relationship. These congruities are what enabled the palace to be effectively a house-hold.

Rumfa adapted his house-hold to accommodate state concerns. The zauruka or entrance halls became nodes along privileged avenues connecting the palace to the central city market and city walls; and the kofar gida was used as a site for developing a state and domestic slave division of labour. The placement of at least some of these slaves was carefully thought out. Slaves in charge of the stables were located on the path bordering the stables and leading to the city walls. The shigifa was extended or distended to form a female-guarded labyrinth of court and council chambers. This extended shigifa area provided the locus for the first council of state and a permanent staging ground for the development of an aristocracy. To guard against slave

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[71] Allo-spatiality, or separate spatialities occupying the same temporality compares analogically to the concept of diachronicity in landscapes which refer to different temporalities occupying the same "space".

rebellions, the palace arsenal and stables were located not in the kofar gida, as was characteristic of vernacular gidaje, but in the shigifa.

Data from the Chronicle were then interwoven with field data to show that soon after Rumfa's death, Kisoki (1509-65) established in the north an Islamic court, which seems to have been maintained by all subsequent kings, near the state council chambers of Soron fadanci. Soon thereafter, the southern portion of the cikin gida near the palace mosque was developed into a quasi-religious centre that included a Qur'anic school and households for Islamic scholars. The scholars probably entered the palace by a special pathway along the eastern palace fields to avoid direct interaction between the men and secluded women. After the successful coup of Muhammad Zaki (1582-1618), eunuchs were brought in to settle *inside* the cikin gida, in and close to the king's quarters, and a hiatus in the residence of the palace liman occurred for about one hundred years.

The Chronicle is remarkably silent about the socio-spatial organisation of the woman's realm, probably reflecting either the authors' disinterest or their inability to gain access to or discuss the areas with palace women. My field data indicate that within the cikin gida, concubines had substantial administrative and reproductive/productive responsibities. Besides the lavish care of the king, they dyed cloth and controlled the storage of grains. There is evidence that concubines were coupled to women grain officials in the city market, the go-between being the female jakadu.

The mobility of slave women was linked to substantial social responsibilities, empowerment and control. The intensity of concubine co-operation, administrative activities and interaction (such as that required for grain storage and cooking daily for hundreds of persons) seems to explain why concubines lived communally in wards. In contrast to slaves and concubines, royal wives, with the least social empowerment, were the most spatially bound and enshrined.[72]

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[72] An example of the "culture" of enshrinement is the customary requirement that concubines visit each royal wife on a regular basis at which time the concubines prostrate themselves and deliver greetings suitable to someone of high status.

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The historic construction of eunuch compounds in the cikin gida during the reign of Muhammad Zaki (1582-1618) must have altered the *political significance* of castration as a social practice. Prior to Zaki, eunuchs seem to have occupied the most important and trusted state offices and to have lived only in the male public domain (the kofar gida). Castration would therefore primarily have signified supreme submission and *political* allegiance to the king. In contrast, the residential introduction of eunuchs in the cikin gida, following the assassination of Shashere (1573-82), brought out the more practical advantages of castration: it assured the *sexual* loyalty of the eunuchs to the king vis-a-vis woman. The deployment of eunuchs fulfilling security functions inside the domestic sphere was probably instrumental in the historical development of two distinct cadres of eunuchs, those holding high military and state offices, and those serving the king in the cikin gida.[73]

The entry of eunuchs and the expansion of religious realms encroached upon the domestic "space" of women, leading to a contraction of their domain. The loss of space suggests that Islam and Islamic education had begun to be more formally entertained by the state, particularly the king and his sons. These stronger ties were also reflected in the trust awarded to Islamic scholars accommodated in the cikin gida. Women still retained their grain duties, and even entered into large-scale cloth dyeing (albeit technically on a domestic level), responsibilities which we shall see in chapter 4 seem to have been rescinded during the Fulani period.

POSTSCRIPT

The Kano Chronicle claims that Rumfa established Islamic wife seclusion, or kulle. Rumfa's role in *creating* and maintaining kulle, and its spatial corollary, the cikin gida, should be questioned on several grounds. First, the claim assumes that kulle was not known or practiced prior to Rumfa. Islam had, however, reached Kano during the fourteenth century, in conjunction with the fall of Mali and the rise of trade with Muslim north Africa. Wife seclusion, as practiced in

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[73] This conclusion does not imply that eunuchs had not historically entered the women's realm. It does suggest, however, that eunuch residence greatly affected the relative value and practices of eunuchs. This dichotomy in eunuch labour is documented more fully in chapter 4 for the nineteenth century.

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north Africa, would therefore have been familiar to many Hausa persons over one century prior to Rumfa's reign. At least some of those who emigrated from Mali (especially the Islamic scholars) and north Africa to Kano city, in addition to a few Hausa persons, presumably practiced wife seclusion.

Secondly, the claim asks us to believe that it is possible in a single generation to introduce, find ready acceptance of, and implement the literal "lock up" (kulle) of almost half the population. Although Rumfa's Islamic counsellors (especially Al-Maghili; chapter 1) may have stressed the importance of kulle, it seems more plausible to suggest that the practice of seclusion was already underway by the time he arrived and had been made possible by interlocking cultural factors, e.g., a strongly gendered spatial division of labour.

Thirdly, as Mack (1988:74) points out, prior to the Fulani jihad, "women were active in farming, marketing (several with titles controlled daily market grain prices), had the power to depose a leader, prohibit rulings and had ritual influence over the ruler of the pre-Muslim court". There were also Hausa women warriors. Thus not all women were secluded.

Mack uses this fact to take an extreme opposing view that it was the Fulani, centuries after Rumfa, who "established the custom of secluding wives" (1988: 74). Although this thesis has a surprisingly large following (Isa, 1980), it is untenable for the same reasons cited above. Namely, it would have been highly problematical logistically and politically to lock women up after a single war. Mack does not address the claims of the Chronicle, and her claim should be seen within the context of her research domain, largely urban women of the royal household where seclusion is a sign of special privilege. In contrast, the accounts of Imam Imoru and nineteenth century travellers indicate that many women - rural dwellers, slaves, and those of low status - were not secluded during the Fulani or any other period. These women were active in farming and petty trade, as well as prostitution and pre-Islamic religious practices. The exemplary pre-jihad women

cited by Mack were few in number and played mostly negative or regulatory roles.[74] They were not in positive or constructive seats of power and were therefore not as spatially unfettered as she implies. Similar observations are borne out today through the palace field work and my experiences in Kano city.

Part of the discrepancy between the extremes voiced by the Chronicle and Mack stem from the fact that kulle is not, and never has been, a static practice in time or place. As alluded to above, rural dwellers and the poor generally cannot afford the luxury of kulle. As Isa (1980) points out, "The idea of kulle influences the learned, the rulers, the wealthy and to some extent the middle class, because they can afford it and it enhances their status" (44). Interwoven with spatial and status differences are historical variations. The Chronicle suggests that kulle became particularly important during the religious tenure of Al-Maghili, the highly religious and powerful Islamic counsellor of Rumfa during the early years of his rule. One can speculate that following Al-Maghili's departure, the political religious pressures to accommodate the practice (which probably was never all-embracing) declined. Seclusion again became a political issue during the early years of Fulani rule. Although, as Isa (1980) points out, Shehu Uthman was criticised for allowing women too much spatial freedom,[75] in the long run, many pre-jihad political titles and responsibilities borne by women were removed (Mack, 1988).

And as Polly Hill (1977) somewhat simplistically reports, kulle became surprisingly important in some rural areas near Kano in the 1930s: "the reasons for the development of universal seclusion in most rural communities during the past few decades are unclear, though were it not for the high water table (which permits the building of many wells in house compounds) and the ubiquity of the donkey, it would not be possible for men, at no inconvenience to themselves, to excuse women from performing their traditional functions as

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[74] Isa (1980: 44) also implies that women held important titles and political positions in regions other than Kano, such as Kanem/Borno, Daura, and Zazzau. He also writes that "It can be argued that the rulers and the wealthy secluded their wives not only because Islam referred to it, but also because of their social status....".

[75] The Shehu was the most acclaimed leader of the Fulani jihad.

beasts of burden." Many women in Kano today have remarked to me that kulle appears to them to be on the rise, especially amongst the lower middle class of Kano city, although "outside" Islamic education for women is also increasing.

The Kano Chronicle is therefore perhaps best seen as a myth that illustrates a significant increase in the political role Islam played in the state during Rumfa's reign and that this was dramatised partly through the implementation of kulle on a very large scale (below). Since the time of Rumfa, the politics and manifestations of kulle have been highly variable. The houseplan of a typical gida (Fig. 3.1) should therefore probably be seen as a "Hausa" one that developed over centuries due to gender relations that preceded and infused Islam as practised in the region.

Chapter 4.

Engendering "space": state formation
and the restructuring of the Kano palace following the Fulani holy war, 1807-1903.

INTRODUCTION

In the early nineteenth century, five Fulani clan leaders, led by Usman dan Fodio, successfully waged what they deemed a jihad or religious war upon the major kings of Hausaland.[1] Most of Hausaland was conquered and re-structured geo-politically into an Islamic theocracy. The polity was administered loosely from Sokoto, a city to the north, by a new kind of centralised religious authority, called a caliph (chapter 1; see Fig. 1.1).[2] Territories formerly under the rule of Hausa kings were re-grouped into emirates,[3] with each leader deemed an emir.[4] In Kano emirate (Fig. 4.1), the new Fulani leadership took up residence in the main city palace where it attempted to articulate its ethno-cultural, political and personal needs with Hausa cultural practices and customs.

This chapter analyses the impact of the Fulani Islamic *jihad* upon the Kano palace landscape (inherited from Hausa aristocracy) during the pre-colonial period 1807 to 1903. The changing spatial organisation of women and slaves reveals clearly that the Fulani built upon the political framework of the Hausa and marginalised women economically and spatially. Male-based state and especially military apparatuses were elaborated, leading to a much more militarist and patriarchal state and house-hold structure. Based upon preliminary findings, the paper suggests that women's powers were rescinded as a means of negotiating the support of the clan leaders,

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[1] The clans included the Dambazawa, Danejawa, Jobawa, Sullubawa and Yolawa. Fika (1978: 14) also includes the Mundubawa, despite the fact that they did not participate militarily (see Ubah, 1985: 8). For "classic" works dealing with the jihad see Last (1966) and Adeleye (1971).

[2] The first caliph was Usman dan Fodio.

[3] The boundaries of these territories remained largely the same after the jihad.

[4] The word "emir" is derived from the Arabic phrase *Amir al-mu'minin* which translated loosely means, "leader of the [Islamic] community". This change in the designation of the political leader helped give religious legitimacy to the state and represented an important socio-linguistic break with the secular designation, "sarki" or king, although the latter is still used.

Katsina

Maradi

Damagaram

Sokoto

NIGERIA

Kano

Lagos

N

Dambatta

Hadejia

Sokoto

KANO

Nasarawa

• Wudil

Karaye

Gorka

Takai

Bornu

Kuluki

• Dal

Warji

Zaria

Ningi

0   30km

Figure 4.1 Sketch map showing approximate extent of Kano territory in the mid-nineteenth century (modified from Last, 1983: 87; Fage, 1969: 137 and Hill, 1977: 38).

male slaves of state and religious scholars. Calls for stricter seclusion of women, based ostensibly upon religious grounds, facilitated the disempowerment of women. Within a larger historical context, the eventual re-emergence of "pre-Fulani" economic and political tensions indicate that the *jihad* and Fulani rule represented an unsuccessful attempt to resolve in religious (moral) terms contradictions that were related fundamentally to more materially-based processes of state formation. Individual personality traits and political skills of each Fulani emir, can be derived from the particularities of specific landscape configurations, together with primary and secondary sources.

In all cases, social and spatial relations through time are deduced and related recursively, both methodologically and theoretically. The interplay of spatial and social data illuminates important tensions and changes in power relations and state formation during Fulani rule.

1807-1855: THE SOCIAL GROUNDING OF CHANGE

Suleiman (1807-19): the struggle for palace residence and the assertion of male spaces

The jihad forces in Kano were not coordinated by a single leader, but by several Fulani clan heads, in part a reflection of strong clan rivalry. After the jihad, each clan claimed the areas it had conquered as its own possession (Sa'id, 1978: 157). Following the fall of Kano in 1807, Sokoto appointed Suleiman, an Islamic scholar from the western portion of Kano city and a member of the Mundubawa clan, as emir.[5] The fact that the Mundubawa had not participated militarily in the jihad led to strong clan resentment amongst the military leaders of the jihad, especially Dabon Dambazau from the Dambazawa clan.[6] This culminated in their refusal to allow Suleiman to reside in the palace. Although the reasons for their resistance were formally couched

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[5] It is not clear where the other clan leaders resided, but it appears that Suleiman was the only candidate who came from the city, the centre of Hausa rule (see Sa'id, 1978: 157). He would have been quite familiar with aristocratic customs and politics, an advantage to anyone taking over the leadership. In addition, as part of the city's scholarly community, he would have been aware of, and possibly developed alliances with, urban forces involved in planning the overthrow of the Hausa regime (Islamic scholars are characteristically highly politicised). The political edge gained by city residence may have been key to the caliph's decision to appoint Suleiman. The impact of pre-jihad clan residence or provenance upon the geography of post-jihad politics in Kano has not, however, been recognised or studied explicitly.

[6] More formally known as Muhammad Dabo.

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in religious terms, they undoubtedly recognised the threat that palace residence posed to the possibility of their own clan achieving power; that is, it would award Suleiman legitimacy in the eyes of the Hausa populace and would solidify, in practical ways, his political privilege and authority over them.[7] Suleiman out-manouevered the opposition, and with the intervention of the caliph in Sokoto, moved into the palace, thereby re-establishing the palace as the centre of state rule (Palmer, 1967: 127-128; Sa'id, 1978).

The large-scale domestic and state responsibilites that Suleiman had assumed within a predominantly Hausa cultural/material setting necessitated his utilisation of at least some pre-existing Hausa political institutions and places. Within this context, Suleiman resuscitated the Tara ta Kano or Hausa state council and the administrative council or majalisa,[8] but with one notable difference: no slaves were allowed to hold royal titles, these latter being awarded to the main free-born Fulani military leaders of the jihad and, presumably, members of Suleiman's clan. The titles Madaki, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Mai-tuta, and Sarkin Bai of the Tara ta Kano, for example, were awarded to the Yolawa, Jobawa, Danejawa and Dambazawa clans, respectively, while the Sullubawa clan was awarded the title Galadima, a position held by Ibrahim Dabo, Suleiman's successor (Fika, 1978: 19, 20; Fig. 4.2).

Although the Tara ta Kano was now divided along clan lines and contained no slaves, it still functioned largely as a decentralised state council. Each council member was allowed to administer the lands his clan had conquered during the jihad, and each member was considered

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[7] According to the Chronicle, after Suleiman's appointment, he went to the house of the mother of one of the leading title-holding slaves and military leaders, Sarkin Dawaki where he was counselled that, "If you do not enter the Gidan Rumfa, you will not really be the Sarki of the city and country". (Palmer, 1967: 127).

[8] The political distinction between the majalisa and the Tara ta Kano in the history of Kano is not clear (see e.g., Ubah, 1985; Sa'id, 1978; Fika, 1978). The fact that the majalisa is also known as the majalisar sarki or the "council of the king" (versus "emir"), suggests that it pre-dates the jihad. Nineteenth- century evidence indicate that the majalisar sarki held daily court or fada to discuss the administration of the territory, whereas the Tara ta Kano was convened to decide upon especially important military, executive and judicial matters.

Figure 4.2 Clan membership in the <u>Tara ta</u> Kano or "Kano Nine" circa 1810.

Title	Clan	ca. 1500[1]
Madaki, "Master of the Horses"	Yolawa	2
Makama, "Weapons"	Jobawa	4
Sarkin Dawaki Mai-tuta, "King of the Horses and Master of the [war] Flag"	Danejawa	
Sarkin Bai, "King of the Slaves"	Sullubawa	6
Galadima	Mundubawa	1
Wambai	Sullubawa	3
dan Iya, "Son of Iya"	Danejawa (currently Sullubawa)	
Ciroma	Sullubawa	
S arkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida, "King of the Horses [in] the House Stable"	Sullubawa	8

[1] Order of title-holding importance of the original <u>Tara ta</u> Kano members, as instituted by King Rumfa, circa 1500. Numbers 5, 7 and 9 included *Sarkin Jarumai*, *Barde*, and *Turaki*, respectively (chapter 3), all of which were displaced from the council prior to the <u>jihad.</u>

a legitimate contender to the throne.[9]

Suleiman's adaptation of Hausa political institutions reflected a level of conservatism that was also expressed spatially. He introduced no new state structures,[10] for example, but continued to use Soron fadanci as the main meeting place of the state council, located in the shigifa area (chapter 3; see Fig. 3.4).[11] There, the Fulani nobility reported to and conferred with the emir twice daily regarding administrative and military matters, a consultation process known as "fada".[12] [13]

The women's realm underwent greater change. ⌣ Field data suggest that the kingly

[9] Suleiman must have been quite a competent and ambitious figure to have been nominated and made emir and to have remained in power until his death. He struggled successfully to enter and reside in the palace, for example, and as a result of Dabon Dambazau's opposition, confiscated the latter's territory and imprisoned him (Sa'id, 1978: 160-167; cf Palmer, 1967: 128). He also warred against Zaria, a major political force to the south, as well as those villages which resisted his authority. In addition, he utilised at least some titles and territories as means of pacifying potential political opponents. He awarded the title of Mai-unguwa Kutumbawa (lit. the leader of the ward of the Kutumbawa) to the defeated Hausa leadership of the Kutumbi lineage along with 100 villages, and he incorporated the leadership into the judicial council (1978: 17). The virulence and ingenuity of these tactics are, however, commonly downplayed in stories about the jihad, in which Suleiman is depicted as a calm saintly figure unconcerned with worldly politics (e.g., Dokaji, 1978; Sa'id, 1978; Fika, 1978).

[10] This conclusion is tempered by the fact that after Suleiman, a new dynastic lineage (the Sullubawa) came to power, substantially altering the landscape, erasing materially what Suleiman may have built. Present day members of the Sullubawa clan, still in power, claim that they know nothing of the time of Suleiman.

[11] According to Madakin Kano (26.7.90), the free-born state officials or hakimai who made up the royal court (majalisa), would congregate in the first northern jakadiya-guarded passage leading into the cikin gida from the north (that is, the second shigifa passageway) at about 8am. There, they wait until the emir arrived in Soron fadanci. The daily utilisation of this particular jakadiya-guarded passage as a waiting room for the hakimai, gave rise to its secondary name, Soron hakimai (lit. hall of the nobility), by which it is no longer known. The name Soron hakimai has, however, been assigned to the nearby dining hall, also known as soron cin abinci (the eating hall) and soron 'yan Fulani (the hall of the royal Fulani).

After the emir was seated, the hakimai would file in past a special eunuch guard known as Sarkin kofa and position themselves in a special configuration vis-a-vis the emir which inscribed their relative importance to him (see Rufa'i (1987: 175) for a diagram showing the present day seating arrangement). Fada was repeated later in the evening at about 4pm.

[12] It was the root word fada in "fadanci" that led me to hypothesize that that soron fadanci, prior to its present day use as a special gathering place for hakimai during Ramadan, was used historically for fada. This postulate was later supported by informant and other field data. It is also interesting to note that slave or servant courtiers serving the fada are known as fadawa, which can be loosely translated as "the people of the fada" (see Giginyu, 1981).

Also, see Rufa'i (1987: 150-159) for a very detailed and interesting description of fada during the early years of the twentieth century (although she does not qualify it as such). She defines fada as "a situation when the sarki sits on his royal seat or throne in the audience chamber (zauren fadanci - audience hall) surrounded by his councillors, leading men of state and leading slaves and servants to receive important visitors and to discuss all important issues that concern the people of Kasar Kano [lit. the land of Kano]" (150).

[13] Rufa'i (1987: 153) assumes that the present-day practice of holding full fada every Friday also applied historically. The weekly nature of present day meetings reflects colonial changes, however, particularly when the hakimai were forced into the countryside, making daily fada a practical impossibility.

turaka was re-built in the northern, more public portion of the cikin gida, corresponding to the siting of a vernacular turaka, and was greatly reduced in size (Fig. 4.3).[14] The practical exigencies of providing the emir with the security and services once rendered to him by eunuchs, were probably addressed spatially through re-assignment of the eunuchs to a traditional eunuch enclave in the mid-section of the kofar gida (chapter 3).[15] There is also some evidence that eunuch roles and titles were substantially reduced. Now that the the new turaka was positioned close to the state realms, the emir's access to the state realms, which were undergoing great political flux, was facilitated.

Furthermore, the quasi-religious male enclave in the cikin gida, including the eunuch residences, were abandoned, and women were removed from cloth dyeing activities (Fig. 4.3). These landscape alterations probably signalled a number of practical and political imperatives. First, the palace was an enormous structure that Suleiman, a neophyte to Hausa political culture, would have found quite difficult to "fill" and operate. The pits and male enclave, being the furthest from the entrance, would have been quite isolated and thus cumbersome to integrate and maintain. The pits required a certain level of skills that the in-coming women may not have known.

Abandonment of the male enclave may also have enacted a symbolic break with the supposed irreligiosity of the Hausa kingship, suggesting that the entire enclave would have been moved elsewhere; only the turaka, however, was re-built. That is, eunuchs and religious scholars were not resettled *inside* the cikin gida but were removed permanently to formal male realms in

[14] The location of the turaka was deduced from two main data sources and several logical assumptions. First, the Chronicle states that by the reign of Abdullahi 1855-83), the southern cikin gida had been long abandoned, although the exact time length of the abandonment is not known. Secondly, field data show that the turaka of Suleiman's successor, Ibrahim Dabo (1819-45), was quite small (in comparison with the former turaka) and was located in the north.

I then assumed that Suleiman initiated this socio-spatial break with the past for two reasons. Suleiman was supposedly the most religious of the Fulani leaders and therefore the most concerned to break with what were seen to be the kingly excesses of the Hausa. In addition, the strong resistance of other Fulani leaders against his palace residence implies that he may have been pressured to abandon the living quarters of the former kings.

[15] This is inferred from interview data related to the locations of those title-holding eunuchs who were known to have previously occupied compounds inside the cikin gida. Gogo Mai-daki (27.9.89), for example, mentioned that Turakin soro lived in the mid-section of the kofar gida, in the same area inhabited by the royal council member, Ka-sheka (which may be a derivative of the eunuch title Mai-shikashikai (chapter 3; Sallama 27.10.89). Moreover, Baba dan meshe and Gogo Mai-daki state that the mid-section contained many eunuchs.

Figure 4.3 Diagrammatic reconstruction of the palace circa 1850 showing changes implemented by Suleiman (1807-1819), Dabo (1819-46) and Usman (1846-55).

the palace or outside the palace altogether. Erasure of these key traditional male institutions and closure of the dye pits resulted in a more exacting spatial separation between men and women that likely reflected jihadist strictures regarding women's seclusion (chapter 1).

Ibrahim Dabo (1819-45): spatial conservatism and the establishment of dynastic rule

Following Suleiman's death, Dabon Dambazau, now 55 years of age, was again passed over by the caliph in Sokoto in favour of Ibrahim Dabo who was relatively young (about 28 years old), had been among the contingent that conquered Zaria (an important city to the south), and had served as the important title-holder and member of the Tara ta Kano, Galadima (Sa'id, 1978). Once again, dissatisfaction with Sokoto's appointment of Kano leadership broke out along clan lines, but this time it was marked by military revolts throughout the emirate (Said, 1978). The three main factions included those loyal to the younger brother of Suleiman (the Mundubawa),[16] the followers of Dabon Dambazau (the Dambazawa), and those aligned with Ibrahim Dabo (the Sullubawa). These clan-based political tensions were complicated by those that emerged along lines of ethnicity, e.g., the Hausa uprisings in Karaye, west of Kano (Fig. 4.1).

Dabo quelled this resistance and consolidated his territory within several years through comprehensive (and costly) military and diplomatic campaigns. In addition, military hardware was upgraded and frontier settlements or ribats were established to consolidate the territory (Garba, 1986; Sa'id, 1978: 168; Palmer, 1967: 128-129). He also replaced certain members of the Tara ta Kano (presumably those from the Mundubawa clan) with leaders from his own clan, the Sullubawa, five of the former clan representatives being retained (Fika, 1978: 20).[17] Clan rights were then restructured in a way which centralised Dabo's authority, ensured the dynastic rule of

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[16] Following his accession to power, Dabo gave Suleiman's brother his title of state, Galadima (Fika, 1978: 19).

[17] Fika (1978: 18) states that during Suleiman, "the leaders of the Fulani clans assumed for themselves the titles, property and powers of the defeated Habe [Hausa] regime. Territorial jurisdiction thus remained in the hands of the jihad commanders who had conquered the particular areas or in that of their descendants". He seems to later contradict himself, however, when he states that Ibrahim Dabo "redistributed the chief offices of state (inherited mainly from the Habe system) among the sons of the clan leaders who had been prominent in the jihad of Kano" and then, in another section, that four of the titles of the Tara ta Kano remained with the clan leaders who presumably held them during the time of Suleiman (Fika, 1978: 20; my emphasis). Thus, what it was that changed is not clear.

his clan and lineage, and pre-empted the power of Sokoto to appoint Kano leadership directly, thus substantially increasing Kano's political autonomy.[18]

Dabo also re-vitalised and integrated a portion of the largely inactive Hausa slave legacy into the new Fulani-based state bureaucracy. This move contained several strategic advantages. First, Hausa utilisation of slaves in state executive and bureaucratic functions was a centuries-old tradition acknowledged and understood well by the Kano constituency. It was therefore part of a social momentum which would, if re-worked properly, solicit broad-based political acceptance and support. Slave patronage was a patriarchal system which, when functioning correctly, provided both master and servant with considerable allegiance and power. Such a powerful and loyal slave community was probably crucial to quelling opposition to Dabo's establishment of dynastic rule. The re-empowerment of slaves was thus related to patriarchal re-centralisation and solidification of Dabo's authority.[19]

The re-institution of slaves occurred on several social and political fronts. Certain slave-based formalities and bureaucratic practices were re-introduced, which ritualised Dabo's authority over his subjects and other nobility, and formalised his personal, social and political distance from them.[20] To request an audience with the emir, for example, outsiders were made to go through a hierarchy of slaves and the now emir "sat on a throne guarded by a team of slave officials while all the counsellors prostrated [themselves] on the floor, forming a line on either side of the throne"

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[18] See Fika (1978) for a detailed discussion of how the Tara ta Kano was re-structured. Fika (1978: 19) also notes that Dabo had sought and received the caliph's permission to establish a more authoritarian regime, provided that appeals could be heard by the caliph.

[19] The slave- and clan-based politics of Dabo's rule strongly resisted the caliph's vision of a non-dynastic state (Sa'id, 1978: 166; Ubah, 1985: 6).

[20] The social distanciation afforded to the emir by these practices was congruent with that preferred by Dabo's re-institution of other Hausa kingship rituals. He wore the traditional Hausa ostrich feather slippers used by former Hausa kings, for example, and carried the traditional Hausa staff of office. He also invented a particular style of wrapping a turban that could be worn only by royalty (Fika, 1978: 19).

(Sa'id, 1978: 169).[21] Dabo re-crafted and re-weighted politically the administrative state council, or 'yan majalisa,[22] to contain the emir, the four non-royal clan leaders whom Suleiman had appointed to the Tara ta Kano, other Fulani nobiltiy, and the three most powerful title-holding palace slaves of the former Hausa regimes, dan Rimi, Shamaki,[23] and Sallama.[24] The inclusion of these particular slaves was important for a number of reasons. First, it compensated somewhat for their removal and exclusion from the Tara ta Kano following the jihad. Their dependence upon the emir for their status and livelihood meant that their allegiance to him was more assured, thereby decreasing the risk of his overthrow. This is not to say that the deepening of slave powers did not lead to a "new"[25] contradiction: it would now be easier for slaves to organise, perhaps with one or several nobility, against the emir, should they run into major conflict with him.

It was perhaps to mitigate this threat of slave revolt that dan Rimi (in the western kofar gida) was charged with administering nobility from the royal Sullubawa clan, whereas Shamaki

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[21] Sa'id unfortunately does not cite his sources. The implication that Suleiman had formerly allowed anyone to approach him whenever s/he desired, is implausible. Whether it was Suleiman or Dabo who actually began the utilisation of Hausa protocol, however, is less important than the fact that the rituals were re-introduced very early on in the Fulani period and that they provided political continuity with the past.

[22] This can be very loosely transliterated as "the children of the court", the word children ('yan) lending a familial sense to the court.

[23] The Kano Chronicle states that during the reign of king Kutumbi (1623-1648), the title Sarkin Shamaki (lit. king of the stable) was bestowed upon one of his slaves named Buayi, and the title Sarkin Dogare (below) was given to a slave named Gumki. Fika (1978) infers from these passages that it was Kutumbi who actually created the titles.

[24] The inclusion of slaves on the majalisa, is attributed to the influence of one of the most powerful state slave officials from the Hausa period, dan Rimi (Fika, 1978: 19). As a sign of their new-found political powers, the slaves donned alkyabba, special robes worn regularly only by important men of state (Madakin Kano, 27.7.90). The significance of being able to wear the alkyabba on a regular basis is intimated in A Guide to the Gidan Makama Museum, Kano (1985: 48) which states that "only the most superior person on any occasion can wear it."

Fika claims that seven additional titleholding slaves were also installed onto the council. Field data indicate, however, that at least one of the palace slave titles cited by Fika (Sarkin Hatsi) was not created until the reign of Dabo's son, Abdullahi dan Dabo (1855-83; below). This may suggest that some or all of the remaining six slaves were also added onto the majalisa during the rule of Abdullahi, or it may point to conflicting "stories" of different informants.

[25] The playing-off of slaves and nobility was not a new phenomenon, but part of an essential tradition of Hausa aristocracy that had historically helped ensure political stability (chapter 3).

(in the eastern kofar gida) administered nobility from non-ruling clans (Fig. 4.3).[26] Their powers

were thus heightened and balanced spatially so as to discourage rebellion. In this way, slaves not

only controlled access of the nobility to the emir, but the patronage benefits and military, political

and economic intelligence of the ruling and non-ruling clans were preserved by two spatially

separate slave families. This opposition provoked a *healthy* rivalry, much as there is today, each

group *looking out* for the other.

The relative ease with which Dabo established a slave-based and dynastic form of

authoritarian rule is attributed partly to the fact that, like Suleiman, a semblance of conservatism

was cultivated in the landscape through preserving the names and places of former Hausa slave

institutions and state realms. Soron fadanci (the hall of fada), for example, continued to

accommodate the state councils;[27] and the slaves dan Rimi and Shamaki continued to live in

their traditional households in the palace kofar gida (Fig. 4.3). This conservatism in the male

realms afforded a socio-spatial and linguistic constancy through which the new dynastic order

could be threaded.

The only additions that Dabo is known to have made to the palace landscape were Soron

makaranta (the study hall), located in the northern shigifa, next to Soron fadanci;[28] and, Soron

malam (lit. the room of the Islamic scholar),[29] contained in his new turaka (Fig. 4.3). The

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[26] This division of labour has given rise to what might be considered nicknames for Shamaki and dan Rimi, that is, Korau kan bayi and dan Fulanin bayi, respectively. The word Korau is derived from the word kora or *to drive away*. The former phrase thus implies military prowess and can be loosely translated as, *the brave person (who drives people away) who is also the head of slaves*. A loose transliteration of the latter phrase is *the son of the Fulani [who is a] slave*, which bestows upon him honorary Fulani ethnicity while still emphasising that he is a slave (Madakin Kano, 9.6.90; c.f. Fika, 1978).

[27] By Dabo's reign, these included the Tara ta Kano, the kingmakers council and the 'yan majalisa.

[28] The siting of soron makaranta corresponds generally to the inferred location of the sixteenth century Islamic court (see chapter 3).

In addition, Rufa'i (1987) claims that Dabo was responsible for building a different soron makaranta, located south of Yelwa. It was probably Abdullahi dan Dabo (1855-83), however, who built this room (below). I have therefore assumed that her informant, a palace slave named Musa Ando, was referring to the northern study area.

[29] Field evidence shows that what both Ahmed (1988) and Rufa'i (1987) refer to as Soron malam was part of a larger turaka complex of which they were both unaware (see Fig. 3). Today, some of the buildings of the latter form part of a compound recently vacated by the emir's second wife. It should also be noted that Ahmed (1988), in his thesis diagrams of the palace, mis-labels Soron makaranta, located in the shigifa area, as Turakar Dabo.

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placement of one study realm in the emir's personal quarters and the other within a well-established state realm expressed the Islamic ideal that social justice and the state not be separated from personal redemption. The religious places were "male", that is, they were located in male spaces, thereby serving and re-asserting male primacy over religion and the state. Dabo may also have built the small eating chambers near Soron fadanci for the royal sons and nobility, called Soron 'yan Fulani (lit. hall of Fulani children),[30] also known as Soron cin abinci (lit. the hall of eating food; Fig. 4.3).[31] His son, Usman, in contrast, changed almost nothing of the political or palace landscape.

Usman (1845-54)

In contrast to the drive and political vigour of Ibrahim, his successor and son, Usman is said to have been largely unconcerned with matters of state.[32] Palace myths related by present day palace women characterise him as a morally weak man who was squeamish at dispensing court judgements involving Islamically prescribed corporal punishments. These sentiments are similarly reflected in the Kano Chronicle (1967: 130) which states that,

> He could not bring himself to cut a man's hand off nor, because he was so pitiful, could he cut a robber's throat.[33]

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[30] The word children or 'yan connotes the ethnically privileged status of Fulani nobility.

[31] It is not known whether the chamber was a completely new innovation, or whether it was only the name of the chamber that was new, soron cin abinci possibly being the original Hausa name. Such a name change would reflect the new ethnicity of the rulers. The Hausa concubine tradition of cooking for many different groups of persons, the extraordinarily large size of the palace kitchen, and the need for a place to feed "outsiders", including important visitors, nobility, and male relations (chapter 5), suggests that in previous years, some form of eating hall existed in the shigifa area.

[32] Mal'daki and Haj. Abba, for example, compared him in name and personality to the much older and largely ineffectual Usman who was appointed emir in 1926, during the colonial period. This assessment is borne out by Barth (1890: 291) who, having visited emir Usman in 1851, compares him in unfavorable terms with his brother and eventual successor, who held the most highly regarded title of state council (Galadima), Abdullahi dan Dabo. Abdullahi, he writes,

> is far more intelligent, and also somewhat more energetic than his lazy and indolent brother 'Othman'... They were both stout and handsome men, the governor [the emir] rather too stout and clumsy... The ghaladima made some intelligent observations, while tl ↑ governor only observed that, though I had suffered so severely from extortion, yet I seemed to have still ample presents for him.

[33] These personal weaknesses are commonly assumed to have been a primary cause of the regional political instabilities that developed during Usman's reign, as well as the presence of widespread robbery in the city and along the major trade routes. Barth (1890), for example, writes that Usman "allows this excessively wealthy and most beautiful province, 'the garden of Central Africa' to be ransacked with impunity". A slightly more favorable version is given in the Chronicle (1967: 130) which states that,

Usman's lack of political initiative is reflected in the devolution of many state powers to his brother, Galadima Abdullahi dan Dabo, in the small number of changes he made to the palace landscape, and in their restriction to the women's realm. The best known change is the small complex built for his mother, Shekara, called dakin Shekara (lit. the room of Shekara; Fig. 4.3). Shekara became legendary as the concubine of Ibrahim Dabo whose three sons succeeded one another to the throne.[34] The historical prominence of building this room is shown by its mention in the Chronicle[35] and by the claim that Babban gwani, a renown historical figure in Hausa building, is said to have built the complex.[36]

Highway robbers were very numerous because Osuman was so good-tempered and merciful. This latter version is, in turn, chosen by other historians, such as Dokaji (1978) and Sa'id (1978), as the 'true' one. Sa'id (1978: 175), for example, writes that *Highway robbery became rampant because the Emir was so kindhearted and lenient towards the robbers to the extent that he could not order the amputation of their hands as provided by the shari'ah.*

Although Usman may have been weak politically, or just unconcerned with matters of state (including the corporal disciplining of thieves), the reasons for the political instabilities were undoubtedly more closely linked to larger-scale phenomena, such as the harsh devaluation of the regional currency (the cowry shell) that resulted from the increased sale of slaves in Sokoto to coastal palm oil plantations in the south (Sa'id, 1978: 183).

[34] These sons were Usman (1846-55), Abdullahi (1855-82) and Bello (1882-83).

Shekara was the free-born daughter of the emir of Daura who was taken captive by the emir. There are many different versions of how she arrived in the palace, one of which is that she escaped from seclusion in the Daura palace and, when her identity was discovered by someone close to the emir of Kano, was carried away by force to the Kano palace (Haj. Abba, 29.10.88).

[35] The Chronicle states, *The first act of his reign was to build a house for Shekara at Tafassa [the name of the concubine ward where she lived; see Fig. 3] with a big room the like of which was never seen before* (Palmer, 1967: 129).

[36] Traditional building was supported financially by patrons, the most beautiful work being taken to reflect favourably upon the skill of the builder as well as the generosity of the patron (Sa'ad, 1981). Fieldwork shows that there were three main groups of builders, those who built for the poor, the wealthy (mostly merchants) and royalty. The work of Sa'ad (1981) suggests that these three categories also reflected relative building skills, that is, the most skilled being contracted by the most wealthy, independent of the birthright, wealth or status of the builder or his family.

Babban gwani (lit. the great building genius; BG) was a particularly renowned builder whose origins are difficult to trace. Sa'ad (c.1985b: 256; 1981), for example, claims that BG was *a legendary nineteenth-century Zaria master mason...born in Katsina.... The epithet 'Babban gwani' [was] conferred upon him by...his revered patron Muhammad Bello, the Sultan of Sokoto (1817-1833). In contrast, Ahmed (1988: 162) states that BG was a master builder from Kura *who was assassinated on the instructions of Sarkin Gwari...in the very late fifteenth or early sixteenth century*. Malam Dau (11.89) and the elderly palace builder Layi-layi (22.1.90) agree that BG was from Kura, but that he lived in the mid-nineteenth century / *he exceptionally early date of Ahmed (1988) is unsupported by any other source). Layi-layi also claims that BG worked mostly in Kano, Bauchi and Katsina. Then, while in Kano, the emir of Bida sent for him and en route, had him assassinated out of jealousy (the emir desired the BG build only for him).

The different origins of BG suggest that the name BG, although originally rooted in a *real* person, attained regional mythical proportions. As such, his authorship may historically have been assigned to buildings not constructed by him per se, but which people desired to bestow with status. Thus whether Babban gwani actually built Dakin Shekara (although I think he did) is not as important as the fact that it is said that he built it. See Sa'ad (c.1985) for an analysis of building *geniuses* or gwani in Hausa culture and, in particular, Babban Gwani.

Usman's general retreat from state and religious responsibilities is additionally reflected in the building of his turaka *inside* the concubine ward of Yelwa, (Fig. 4.3).[37] This incursion into the spaces of women may alternatively have been done at the prompting of his brother, Abdullahi dan Dabo. As the real power broker in the administration, he may have convinced Usman to re-locate as part of a partial transfer of male places to the southern "female" portion of the palace, a plan that he carried out more fully upon his succession to the throne in 1855. That the siting of the turaka was not merely a retreat from the public domain, but part of a larger southward shift in palace organisation is reflected in the burial of Ibrahim Dabo in the southern dye pit area,[38] initiating its conversion into a cemetery.[39] The conversion process finalised women's exclusion from large-scale productive activities and may have been done upon the request of Dabo for the same reasons that he instructed Usman to establish a formal accession ritual (Adamu na Ma'aji In Sa'id, 1978: 169-170, 209), that is, to ground symbolically and practically the primacy of his lineage within the palace confines.[40] Alternatively, it may have been engineered by his brother and successor, Abdullahi dan Dabo, who would soon alter the southern landscape substantially.

ABDULLAHI dan DABO (1855-83): STATE EXPANSION AND THE PALACE RE-ORIENTATION

The rise of aristocratic wealth

The weaknesses of Usman as a leader probably exacerbated existing regional economic

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[37] I "discovered" the turaka of Usman just before I left Kano and did not have enough time to thoroughly document its history and spatial extent. The areal extent shown in Figure 3 was approximated using descriptions provided by some of the palace women along with the names and locations of present day buildings as place referents.

[38] Madakin Kano (21.7.90).

[39] Culling names of kings that died in the palace from the Kano Chronicle and assuming that these persons were buried traditionally in some central palace location, Rufa'i (1987: 131, 160) deduced that a cemetery "must" have existed in the palace since the time of Rumfa. Her stated data source is enigmatic, in that the Chronicle commonly does not elaborate upon where particular kings died. The only person whom informants report buried in the palace cemetery is emir Bello (1883-1892). Her data therefore do not demonstrate an early existence of a cemetery.

As will be recalled, in the late sixteenth century, San Turaki Mainya (chapter 3) was buried directly beneath the site where he was assassinated (the mosque). Burial at the site of death is more typical of traditional Hausa custom and may have been an early palace tradition as well (see Hill, 1972).

[40] The ritual, and some of the inconsistencies in sources relating to the "re-entry" tradition, are discussed in the section dealing with Abdullahi dan Dabo, below.

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and territorial tensions which his brother, Abdullahi, then inherited upon his accession to power. In 1855 and again in 1868 the Ningi (to the southeast) scored significant military victories inside the territory, disrupting Kano trade. Then, in the 1870s, Maradi (to the northwest) and Damagaram (to the north) raided within several miles of Kano city (Fika, 1978: 22; Sa'id, 1978: 232-233). Abdullahi reacted by conducting multi-faceted political and military offensives that continued throughout much of his reign. According to the Kano Chronicle, his most successful battles were fought in outlying areas southeast of Kano, especially in Warji, Kuluki, and near Dal, the Dal battle being led by his son, Yusufu (Fig. 4.1). These battles seem to have produced the surfeit of palace slaves that existed at that time.[41]

Although Abdullahi's 28 years of rule were militarily and politically uneven, agricultural production, industry and trade in the region grew. This rise in regional prosperity stemmed from many factors, especially the transfer of merchant activities to Kano from the nearby commercial centre of Katsina, now under constant attack by the Hausa kingdoms of Gobir and Maradi because of its northern location (Fig. 4.1; Fika, 1978: 23). Related to Kano's expanding economy was an increase in aristocratic wealth. Abdullahi found material expression the new wealth partly by acquiring and deploying slaves and eunuchs in new spatial and political realms.

The re-expansion of eunuch powers and realms

Eunuchs were historically considered the most reputable slaves, entrusted with the most confidential state and domestic tasks.[42] During periods of perceived political instability, the

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[41] All prisoners of war were, according to Islamic tradition, slaves. The Chronicle states that, "[a]fter a short time, the Sarki [king] attacked Warji again, and once more took many spoils. Kano was filled with slaves" (Palmer, 1967: 130). That many slaves came from Warji and other areas mentioned in the Chronicle is supported by the provenance of slave on a large farm and pastoral slave estate near the palace which was built by Abdullahi (see Giginyu, 1981).

There were apparently so many slaves at this time that Abdullahi devised a special form of scarification for all slave new-borns: three short slashes across either cheek, called uku-uku (lit. three-three; Salama, 18.7.90). The facial mark allowed for simple identification of his slaves, and is still common, although it is rapidly losing its prestige (chapter 6).

[42] As discussed in chapter 3, Rumfa was the first to appoint eunuchs to positions of state, including two on the Tara ta Kano (Sarkin Bai and Turaki Manya) and the treasury (Fika, 1978: 10). In addition, during the reign of Shashere (1573-82), the title Wambai (another member of the Tara ta Kano) was awarded to a eunuch (Palmer, 1967).

Other administrative and military positions held by eunuchs in the nineteenth are listed by Fika (1978: 10). Although some of the descriptions of their duties are correct, others are exaggerated. Sarkin kofa, for example, did not administer all gates into the

powers of eunuchs were increased relative to those of nobility such that the authority of each group within state structures waxed and waned over time. The trust awarded to eunuchs stemmed partly from their biological inability to produce a family that would care for and support them. They were thus much more dependent upon, and supposedly more loyal to, their masters compared to other slave men (e.g., Fika, 1978: 10).[43]

Following the establishment of Fulani rule, the powers and numbers of eunuchs dropped dramatically. During the reign of Suleiman all slaves (including eunuchs) who served on the majalisa and Tara ta Kano were replaced by free-born Fulani, and those eunuchs resident in the cikin gida were removed from the premises. Dabo altered this Fulani precedent slightly by appointing Sallama (the head eunuch), to the administrative state council (the majalisa), along with two other formerly powerful Hausa slave officials (above). Abdullahi, however, greatly intensified the state and domestic participation of slaves, especially eunuchs. It was probably Abdullahi who expanded the number of slaves on the majalisa from three (during Dabo) to ten, several of them eunuchs.[44] In contrast to what occurred in former Hausa regimes these men served only in administrative and military capacities and/or as state guards, not as official state councillors. This displacement of eunuchs probably stemmed from the large number of clan leaders who, having led the jihad, demanded representation upon the state council, thereby utilising all court titles, including those of slaves. The newness of the regime implies that tensions between nobility had not yet developed to such a point that slaves were required and inserted as political buffers.

Most eunuchs carried out either military and informal state advisory activities, or domestic

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city, but was the eunuch who guarded the royal council chamber where fada took place.

[43] Lavers (3.90) cautions, however, that because of their high status and powers, eunuchs were in a particularly advantaged position to develop another kind of "family", a loyal political following and clientage.

[44] At least one of the eunuchs within the majalisa held a military title (Ka-sheka, or chief scout; see Fika, 1978: 10), while another, Sarkin kofa (lit. king of the gate [into fada] daily stood guard while members of the majalisa filed into or out the hall of fada. Other slaves and eunuch members of the majalisa adjusted the king's throne, maintained the prescribed seating arrangements, answered spoken greetings on behalf of the emir, and ritually safeguarded the emir through blocking him from view when he sat down or stood up to leave (Madakin Kano, 16.6.90; 27.7.90).

duties. Domestic duties included lighting the emir's evening fire on cool nights,[45] carrying kola nuts to him in his chambers, and, most importantly, protecting the emir inside the cikin gida. Security functions seem to have become much more ritualised since its inception in the 1600s (chapter 3) and concentrated upon safeguarding the emir against bodily injuries (such as tripping or bumping his head) that he might suffer inadvertently while in the cikin gida. This protection was characterised by the Takawa sannu ("walk carefully"), a series of safety directives that the eunuchs sang processionally while following the emir when he moved from his turaka to other parts of the cikin gida.[46] The Takawa sannu was also sung when the eunuchs escorted the emir to the edge of the cikin gida and into the protective care of the dogarai, state bodyguards who assumed protective custody of the emir while he travelled outside the cikin gida.[47]

Domestic eunuchs tended to have a somewhat antagonistic or competitive relationship with the royal women, an antagonism made possible because eunuchs traversed the same spaces as women, a privilege earned upon their castration. One form of this antagonism was carried in their role as informants on inappropriate or improper behavior of a wife or concubine, which they would then report to the emir or Sallama (the head eunuch).[48] Any physical punishment deemed appropriate by the emir for the errant woman was meted out by Sallama.[49] The increased number of domestic eunuchs during the reign of Abdullahi suggests that antagonism between women and eunuchs increased.

The renewed recruitment of eunuchs indicates that Abdullahi felt threatened politically.

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[45] Baba dan moshe (2.9.89).

[46] As he walks they sing "walk carefully" and before he enters a doorway which is low-stooped, they sing, "bend down".

[47] Every morning eunuchs surrounded the emir in his personal quarters and ceremonially led him to the interface of the cikin gida and shigifa area, where he was given over to the dogarai, who then escorted the emir to the fada chambers. Later, upon re-entering the palace, the dogarai would re-hand over the emir to the eunuchs at cikin gida - shigifa interface.

[48] As Baba dan moshe (2.9.90) noted, "They were just looking for women to mis-behave".

[49] When the emir was praying, for example, the eunuchs formed two rows alongside him to guard against any woman passing within his view (Mai'daki, 2.9.89).

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This conclusion is congruent with the deposition of numerous free-born state officials[50] (one of whom was his son Yusuf whom he accused of attempting to overthrow him)[51] and his supposed assassination of the leader of the religious courts in Kano, the Alkalin Kano (Palmer, 1967: 131).

Eunuchs lived in various areas, depending upon the services they rendered. At least one of these places was instituted especially for them by Abdullahi. Eunuchs serving in military and informal advisory capacities lived mostly in the northern kofar gida (above) or in the household of Abdullahi's most trusted eunuch, Sallama, in the ward of Rimin kira,[52] northeast of the palace (see Fig. 4.8).[53] The high regard Abdullahi held for Sallama (Palmer, 1967: 131), in conjunction with the large number of Sallama's charges and the spatial restrictions upon residence in the

[50] These included five members of the kingmakers council (Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Mai-tuta, two Galadimas (in succession) and dan Iya), the state treasurer, and his leading religious counsel (Waziri). As the Chronicle notes, "The number of people that he turned out of office was countless. Hence the song "Son of Irahim, a pick axe as a physic to hard ground" (Palmer, 1967: 131)

[51] The Chronicle states simply that, "...Yusufu tried to stir up rebellion and was deprived of his office and had to remain in chagrin and poverty till he was penniless." The circumstances surrounding this supposed rebellion are touched upon in the Dawaki ta Kudu District Notebooks, Kano Provincial Office, in which it is indicated that in about 1870, Yusufu requested that Sokoto depose his father on the grounds that he was senile (Fika, 1978: 22, 28).

Sai'd (1978), using the oral accounts of Alhaji Mustapha Usman and Alhaji Umaru Dan Barde (about whom no details are supplied), offers a conflicting story. According to them, Malam Ibrahim Bazazzagi, the secretary to the emir and a man of non-royal status from Zaria, wrote nine letters to the Caliph in Sokoto stating that emir Abdullahi was unjust and should be removed from office. He signed these letters using Yusuf's name. Abdullahi was later given the letters by the caliph which led to Yusuf's deposition from office. The position of Galadima was then filled by Malam Ibrahim Bazazzagi, a dramatic departure from its traditional assignment to a prince (see Sa'id, 1978: 228-231 for details).

[52] Transliterally, this means, "the silk cotton tree of smithing" which probably referred to a particular tree in the ward under which smithing (black or white) took place. The ward name suggests that armaments and other iron-based needs (especially agricultural) of the king were produced here. Settlement patterns observed on aerial photographs show that Rimin kira was located quite strategically alongside the eastern pathway leading out of the palace and towards the city walls, but outside the walls of the city and suburb which date from Rumfa's reign. These spatial relationships suggest that the ward was created after the city walls were enlarged and the suburb wall was destroyed.

According to Madakin Kano, by the time of Aliyu (1896-1903), blacksmiths worked inside Sallama's house where guns were manufactured. Whether the building of Sallama's house and his jurisdiction over the blacksmiths post-dated creation of the ward, or whether the building of the house, ward and/or armament production were contemporaneous is not known. Development of the blacksmithing community is probably tied directly to Abdullahi's successful inducement of Sankara warriors to emigrate into Kano city. Many settled near the central market and took up blacksmithing (Garba, 1986; Jaggar, 1973).

[53] Malam Dau (4.11.89) and Sallama (27, 28.10.89).

Sallama was the head administrator of eunuchs who also arranged all official male audiences with the emir (Palmer, 1967). In addition, he safeguarded the palace stock of guns, bows and arrows and quilted armour within his personal compound, and turbanned new title-holders, slave or free (Sallama, 11.90; Madakin Kano, 9.6.90) which Rufa'i (1987) describes in detail. His title derives from the Arabic expression, 'sallama aleckum" (lit. peace be with you), called out before entering a doorway, in this case, the emir's personal chambers.

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palace kofar gida, indicates that the household provided much needed additional space for eunuchs, and was an expression of his esteem for Sallama.[54] The household was utilised as the main depot for the palace stock of bows and arrows, guns, the umbrella of state and the quilted armour for horses and the foot cavalry.[55] *Domestic* eunuchs, in contrast, were re-settled largely in the southern eunuch colony that had been abandoned by Suleiman.

Although the colony was re-sited in exactly the same place as its Hausa predecessor, it was categorically different: it was now part of a very large walled off area of the cikin gida converted into public male realms that replicated those in the north and that were connected to the "outside" public by a new southern gate (Fig. 4.4). In particular, the colony was in the shigifa, defined by four passageways, similar to that in the north. Between the first through third passageways (north of the colony) was a Qur'anic study hall and court and council chambers, and between the third and fourth passageways (south of the colony) were the mosque and eunuch compounds.[56] The distance between the latter two passageways was almost six times that spanned by their northern positional equivalents, reflecting the large size of the eunuch colony. Moreover, near the colony, Abdullahi built Kudanda,[57] a special two-roomed hall where candidates selected for state positions were officially turbanned and awarded a title by the head eunuch, Sallama (Figs 4.4, 4.5).

One of the rooms of Kudanda served as a state council chamber, while the other was used as an anteroom for state officials awaiting the arrival of the emir, similar to Soron hakimai

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[54] Assuming that the state bureaucracy was not particularly well-defined or large during Rumfa, an extra household at that time would have been unnecessary, implying in turn that Sallama's household outside the palace was not an original palace feature.

[55] That Sallama's household was outside the palace confines and was used to stock pile arms were probably key to the planning of an unsuccessful coup attempt by Sallama during the reign of Abdullahi's successor and brother, Bello (1883-1892; Palmer, 1967: 131; c.f. Rufa'i, 1987, who assumed that Sallama's house was made an arms depot only during the British colonial period).

[56] Just as in the north, the first passage bordering the shigifa and kofar gida was guarded by a male, whereas all others were guarded by lakadu, that is, the female guardswomen\messengers.

[57] A kudanda is typically a thatched cylindrical structure used for grain storage. In the palace, however, kudanda soom to be residences for palace spirits, for example, those in Yelwa and Babban gwani, or in the southern shigifa, a court room and turbanning chamber. Today, the name kudanda is no longer used to describe the latter. Instead, it is known as Soron hakimai and zauna lafiya (sitting peacefully), the only names used by Ahmed (1988) and Rufa'i (1987) to describe the structure.

Figure 4.4 Diagrammatic reconstruction of the palace circa 1890. Note the transformation of the southern palace into male public realms attached to the "outside" via a southern entrance.

Figure 4.5 The turbanning and council chambers known as Kudanda and Soron hakimai, respectively, located in the new southern palace shigifa (1903). Eunuch compounds and acacia tree in the background (Courtesy of the Royal Geographical Society, London, photographic archives, #068154).

Figure 4.6 Front wall of Soron cafe (lit. hall of [special] plaster), 1903 (Courtesy of the Royal Geographical Society, London, photographic archives, #068040).

and Soron fadanci, respectively, in the north. That Kudanda was administered by eunuchs, whereas its northern functional equivalents were under the jurisdiction of female jakadu (above), points to an erosion of the places and authority of guardswomen at this time. Two other state council chambers were built in the southern shigifa, north of the eunuch colony: Soron cafe (the hall with wall plaster),[58] and Soron giwa (the hall of the elephant; Figs 4.4, 4.6).[59] According to Madakin Kano (26.7.90), morning fada was held in one of the southern chambers, whereas the evening fada was conducted inside Soron fadanci.[60]

Eunuchs thus assumed a new political niche within the shigifa: they now served as state guards over the locus of state entitlements, making the turbanning process much more visibly secure. Their new place and duties would also have made them more visibly distinctive and powerful.

Like Soron fadanci, the southern state chambers doubled as Islamic Shari'a courts. To enable women to testify in court without being seen (an Islamic norm), a special room with a ground level window-like structure was built for them, abutting the southernmost jakadiya-guarded shigifa passageway (Figs 4.4, 4.7). Female litigants communicated to the court through the eunuch Kilishi who shuttled between the court and litigant "window", delivering the women's testimony and relaying court judgements or questions. Nearby, a Qur'anic study room (Soron makaranta; lit. the study hall) and a dining hall (Soron 'yan Fulani; lit. hall of Fulani children) were built, which in their position mirrored structures of the same name and function built by Ibrahim Dabo in the north (above).[61]

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[58] Cafe is a kind of high quality plaster, in this case decorated with geometric inscriptions (see Fig. 4.6)

[59] Soron giwa may have been built in honour of his father, Ibrahim Dabo, who, according to Hogben and Kirk-Greene (1966: 198) was known in praise songs as the "Bull Elephant". Abdullahi's authorship of Soron giwa was determined similarly by Sa'ad (1985: 13), Rufa'i (1987: 65), and Ahmed (1988: 68).

[60] Madakin Kano (26.7.90). Rufa'i (1987: 153) assumed that fada was held once weekly. This "tradition" probably began, however, only during the colonial period, when the nobility were forced to live in the countryside, thereby making daily fada with them a practical impossibility.

[61] Neither my own field data nor that of Ahmed (1988) or Rufa'i (1987) reveal clearly which emir built Soron makaranta or Soron 'yan Fulani. That Abdullahi opened and built-up most of the southern palace, however, suggests that they were built during his reign.

Figure 4.7 Northern portion of southern shigifa area revealing a portion of one of the eunuch compounds. Soron cafe, Babban soro, the female litigant chamber and the first jakadiya-guarded entrance into the shigifa, 1903 (Courtesy of the Royal Geographical Society, London, photographic archives, #068148).

The exclusion of Islamic scholars from the new southern settlement, the partial take-over of guardswomen's territorial responsibilities by eunuchs, the unprecedented insertion of royal eunuchs into what was now a shigifa area, the rotation of fada between council chambers in the northern and southern shigifa, and the socio-spatial centrality of the colony indicate several changes in the subregion since at least the eighteenth century: a larger separation between state and religious counsel; the erosion of women's spatial privileges; a perceived need for increased protection of the king; and a heightened role for eunuchs in domestic and paramilitary activities to ensure Abdullahi's dynastic and personal authority.

The non-eunuch male slave surplus and the southern kofar gida

A much larger military and paramilitary presence was inaugurated in the southern kofar gida where numerous slave bodyguards (dogarai) were settled northeast of the southern gate, along with a few 'yan silke or chain mail soldiers (Fig. 4.4).[62] [63] Historically, most dogarai resided in the nearby ward of Dogarai and were distinguished from other slaves by their white robes and turbans and staffs of office.[64] Most of the dogarai, at least during the early 20th century, were untitled subordinates of Sarkin dogarai (lit. king of the bodyguards), the titleholders

[62] Dogarai were responsible for the emir while he was outside the cikin gida and also accompanied him to the battlefield. Because dogarai typically surrounded the emir, the sighting of dogarai by the opposition was considered a sure sign that the emir's forces had been defeated (Madakin Kano, 16.9.90; c.f. Fika, 1978).

In a compilation of ward names by Padon (1973: 130), a ward called Dongarai is listed as part of a group of wards located to the south and east of the palace. The name and location correspond to the ward Dogarai, flanking the eastern wall of the palace which is shown on the 1971 map of the former Metropolitan Kano Planning and Development Board, entitled "Map showing unguwa [ward] boundaries compiled from L.G.A. [Local Government Area] survey maps" (1:4,800ft). This information conflicts with that of Ahmed (1988) who sketches and labels the ward, "Wudilawa", which can be loosely translated as "the people from the village of Wudil".

The location and name of Dogarai corresponds roughly with the ward of Dugerawa listed by Barth (1890) in 1851. The current spelling the latter would probably be Dogarawa, transliterated roughly as, "the people of the dogarai settlement".

[63] The location of the dogarai is inferred from many interviews, but primarily those with Layi-layi (22.1.90), dan Meshe (2.9.89), Gogo Maidaki (2.9.89) and Sallama (27.10.89). I have inferred that it was instituted at least 12 years prior to Aliyu's rule (late in Abdullahi's reign) in keeping with the fact that the area was well-established by the time of emir Aliyu (1894-1903), which is partly reflected in one of its name at that time, Lokon dogarawa. Moreover it is congruent with the fact that Abdullahi opened up and re-built the area and seems to have been particularly concerned for his personal safety (below).

[64] Sallama (28.10.89). See also, the Guide to the Gidan Makama Museum (1985: 20, 31), although all except one of the dogarai shown in the plates wear dark-colored turbans. Also, the plates show that some of the dogarai carried two staffs, one with a whip-like tail.

remaining in the ward of Dogarai (Fig. 4.8).[65] The development of a spatially distinct military community and its strategic location next to the entranceway indicates that Abdullahi desired intense security in the area, perhaps, in part, because his turaka had been re-located to the south (below). Esconced within the military community were messengers,[66] stable hands,[67] and a small enclave of pastoralists created by Abdullahi to look after a contingent of palace cattle.

The pastoralists

Milk formed a vital part the Fulani diet. It was used as a beverage, and to make yogurt, butter and fura da nono, a staple cereal grain beverage made with yogurt. Following the Fulani conquest, the regular procurement of sufficiently large amounts of milk for the palace inhabitants must have posed novel logistical difficulties. Prior to Abdullahi's rule, these problems were probably solved by bringing cattle that grazed on land in and near the city through the northern palace gates and into the open eastern fields, where they were milked.

During Abdullahi's reign slave-related pastoral activities were developed and streamlined, largely as a result of his military and political successes. The palace slave population had grown, and the number of persons seeking royal patronage had increased, including those whom Abdullahi had to entertain or impress, especially other Fulani leaders and Islamic scholars.[68] To accommodate slaves and facilitate the procurement of dairy goods, Abdullahi created a very large

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[65] According to Layi-Iayi (22.1.90), the titleholding dogarai officials near the turn of the twentieth century included Sarkin dogarai, Galadima dogarai, and Madakin dogarai. Only Makaman dogarai resided in the palace amidst approximately eight to ten dogarai households, totalling about 100 persons. This probably represents only a small proportion of the total number, which according to Sarkin dogarai (29.10.85 cited in Rufa'i, 1987: 99, 122), totalled about two hundred and fifty at the turn of the century, presumably most of whom lived in the ward of dogarai.

[66] Layi-Iayi (22.1.90).

[67] Sallama (27.10.89).

[68] Informants of this study stated that of all dairy products, butter was the most prestigious and thus constituted an essential ingredient in the highly varied repertoire of abincin sarakuna (lit. the food of aristocracy). As such, it could only be eaten by royal Fulani or important guests. Concubines and slaves were obliged to remove the cream from their milk portion and send it to Uwar soro in Yolwa. This conflicts with the claim of Imam Imoru that cream was not eaten by the Fulani "because they say it causes a fat stomach! Only their slaves drink it." (Ferguson, 1973).

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
Figure 4.8 Sketch map showing location of <u>Gandun</u> <u>Nassarawa</u>, <u>Gidan</u> <u>Nassarawa</u> and <u>Gidan</u> Sallama as well as the wards <u>Rimin kira</u> and <u>Dogarai</u> and major pathways near the palace. (Data for extent of <u>Gandun</u> <u>Nassarawa</u> from interviews with <u>Madakin</u> Kano (21.7.90) and NAK/SNP10/318P/1919 Map of Kano at 1:12,5000. Ward and pathway boundaries derived from Metropolitan Kano Planning and Development Board 'Map showing <u>unguwa</u> boundaries compiled from L.G.A. Survey maps' 11.5.71 at 1:4,800 and NAK/1932 Contour map of Kano City at 1:12,500).

pastoral slave estate, called Gandun Nasarawa (lit. the estate of victory) on nearby prime agricultural land, east-southeast of the palace, outside the city gate of Kofar Nasarawa (lit. the gate of victory; Fig. 4.8) and adjacent to a new palace, Gidan Nasarawa (lit. the house of victory; Palmer 1967: 130).[69] The appropriation of such a large and highly valued area of land dramatised Abdullahi's wealth and power, and the estate location optimised the distance that the cattle had to travel between the estate and the palace.

Royal pastoral activities were administered by the title-holding head slave on Gandun Nasarawa, Mai-shanu (lit. the master of the cattle).[70] Early every morning, Mai-shanu and his assistants led about 100 to 150 cattle from tethering places inside certain palace concubine wards, to be milked inside the open fields of the palace.[71] Thereafter the cattle were taken out through the southern palace grounds and entrance whereupon they presumably proceeded through the city gate of Nasarawa to Gandun Nasarawa, where they grazed. At sunset the cattle were brought back to the palace where they continued to graze in the eastern and western fields of the palace cikin gida, before being led to their tethering places in the concubine wards.

To facilitate Mai-shanu's dual responsibilities, he was awarded two households, one in the palace dogarai community[72] and a larger main household inside Gandun Nasarawa (Figs 4.4,

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[69] The slave estate extended from the city gates of Nasarawa and dan Agundi, eastwards to palace of Nasarawa, and southwards to encompass a special gandu where onions were grown, Gandun albasa (lit. the gandu of onions; Fig. 4; Madakin Kano, 21.7.90).

Corporal Dankawu Gandu, an informant of Giginyu, estimated that about 500 slaves worked on the gandu. Many of the slaves were captured from regions outside Kano, such as Warji, Yola, and Damagaram, as well as villages within the Kano region, for example, Garko, Jahun, Gurjiya, and Sankara (Giginyu, 1981: 111-112, 115, 140).

[70] Mai-shanu was a relatively low-ranking official whom should not be confused with the higher-ranking and free-born Fulani state official, Sarkin shanu (lit. king of the cattle). The latter was originally created by King Kutumbi (1623-48) and given the express task of collecting cattle tax from the nomadic pastoral Fulani (Garba, 1986).

[71] The locations of the tethering and milking places seem to have changed throughout time and are discussed in more detail in reference to the turn of the twentieth century in chapters 5 and 6.

[72] Sallama Dako (27.10.90) and Layi-layi (22.1.90).

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4.8).[73] These households, in conjunction with the proximal siting of the estate and new southern palace entranceway, streamlined socio-spatial relations between the two institutions and helped re-orient palace activities towards the south.

Sarkin hatsi, "king of grain"

Although milk was an important part of the Fulani diet, grains were the main staple. Prior to the jihad, palace concubines and jakadu (the guardswomen-messengers) appear to have controlled and administered grain procurement, storage and distribution, in conjunction with female officials in the central city grain market (chapter 3). Following the jihad, the authority of these women was largely removed,[74] which field evidence shows to have been partly due to Abdullahi's creation of a male slave hierarchy in the palace, which usurped concubine authority over grain procurement and storage.[75]

The male hierarchy was headed by Sarkin hatsi (lit. king of the grains) who was provided with a large and elegant compound located west of the military settlement of dogarai (Fig. 4.4).[76] Sarkin hatsi presumably lived with, and was assisted by, at least two title-holding subordinates, Galadima rumbu (lit. the Galadima of the grain silo),[77] and Sarkin tsani (lit. king of the [silo]

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[73] Giginyu (1981: 115-119) describes the gandu duties and household of Mai-shanu in some detail. He looked after the produce grown on the farm, for example, and saw that it was stored in the granaries. He also arranged the evening meals for unmarried slave men, which were eaten communally in his home at Gandun Nasarawa. In addition, he served as a middleman between the people of Gandun Nasarawa and Shamaki (the head of all palace slaves). Moreover he adjudicated cases between slaves on the gandu, the more problematic cases being handled by Shamaki. Giginyu (1981) was not aware, however, of the institutional and practical links between the estate (and Mai-shanu) and the palace.

[74] Both Garba (1986) and Mack (1988) refer to, but do not elaborate upon, the removal of women's authority in the city grain market.

[75] Sarkin hatsi (28.10.89).

The head concubine, Uwar soro, still retained authority over grain distribution and decisions regarding the amounts of grain required. There is also some twentieth century data that suggests that she also determined from which villages the grains should be obtained (Giginyu, 1981). That Sarkin hatsi and his men answered to a woman is, at least today, the basis of ridicule by slave men in the north, and seems to form a major criterion for differentiation within the male slave community.

[76] Sarkin hatsi is a traditional village title, the holder of which administered the harvest (Lavers, 20.3.90). It is thus not the institution itself, but its accommodation inside the palace, which was now.

[77] The word Galadima is a play on the state title of the same name. Assignment of state titles to other social group leaders such as musicians, builders and blacksmiths was a common organisational tool.

ladder). Field relations and informant data show that grain entry sites shifted from the north (facing the market) to the south. This "turning away" from the north indicates the decreased importance of the market as a major and legitimate grain source, suggesting in turn that Korama was dismissed from office at this time and/or that taxes on grain market sales were eliminated. That is, grain taxes and grains from royal estates would have entered the palace directly from the south.[78] The new entry directly is consistent with the southern residential location of King of Grains.

According to the present day Sarkin hatsi, the grains were stacked in the southern shiqifa area by male slaves, and sorted and carried to grain silos in the northern cikin gida by slave boys. Sarkin tsani would then climb up a large ladder placed upon the silo to be filled, lift up the thatch roof with a special hook so as to gain an overview, and direct the slaves as to the most appropriate place to stack the grain. Slave women, on behalf of the wives and concubines, weekly informed Galadima rumbu of their specific grain needs, whereupon Sarkin tsani and male slave assistants would extract and distribute the grains to them from the silos.[79] That Mai-kudanda now had to *inform* King of Grains of domestic grain needs, which he and his assistants would then fill, reveals a further erosion of women's economic and spatial powers.

The cikin gida

In what remained of the cikin gida, Abdullahi built a turaka on the site of its Hausa predecessor. The complex, known as Babban soro (lit. the big soro)[80] was several times more extensive those of the first Fulani emirs and contained special chambers for palace iskoki or

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[78] Villages from which the religious grain tax or zakat was collected, for example, included Wudil, Birnin Kudu, and Gwaram (Fig. 4.1). Most grains from the royal estates consisted of sorghum, and was used to feed the royal horses (see Giginyu, 1981).

[79] Sallama (26.10.89).

[80] The complex is also known as Soro (lit. the hall) which, within the semantic context of the palace, translates as "the hall of all halls". Many informants said that Soro was built by Babban gwani, the same builder who built the room for Abdullahi's mother inside Tafassa (Dakin Shekara) during the reign of Usman (above). In honour of his work and person, a portion of the Soro or turaka complex is named "Babban gwani" (see Fig. 4.4)

Hausa spirits.[81] It consumed a much greater proportion of the remaining women's spaces due to its very large size (above) and the 50 percent reduction in the cikin gida area. The western edge was two-storied with windows overlooking Yelwa, facilitating scrutiny (and thus control) of head concubine activities (Fig. 4.9). The upper storey also served as a special arsenal,[82] as well as the traditional depot for chain mail. The new southern turaka did not, however, re-place those of Usman or Dabo, which continued to serve as secondary chambers throughout the pre-colonial period. The personal and visual expansion of the emir's domain (especially vis-a-vis women), along with the creation and proximal placement of the arsenal, eunuch colony and military settlement to the south, suggests that Abdullahi was especially concerned or pre-occupied with maintaining political control at both household and state levels.

Although these *changes* expressed a high degree of direct male control over the socio-spatiality of women's domains, there were other more subtle manifestations of male dominion, involving habitual social processes. These included the ways in which women's settlements were created and named by and for men, and the practico-visual control over women gained by particular design features of the turaka. Abdullahi, like his father, worked rigorously to secure strategic kinship-based political allegiances through marriage ties. For this reason, he married the daughter of the caliph, and built the waje of Sokoto adjacent to the main stable to accommodate her (Fig. 4.4).[83] Abdullahi also built the concubine ward of Nasarawa (lit. victory; Rufa'i, 1987),

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[81] Although the turaka of his father, Ibrahim Dabo, continued to be used until the 1950s, that of his brother, Usman, was "re-absorbed" or physically re-incorporated into Yelwa. Today, only a few elderly persons are aware of its existence.

[82] The arsenal placement in some ways mirrored the position of that located in the northern shigifa inside the chambers of the guardswoman or jakadiya (chapter 3).

The placement of arms in the king's quarters is a tradition that probably derives from the time of Rumfa and the injunction of Al-Maghili, "Don't move far from your coat of mail and your weapons" revealed in The Crown of Religion Concerning the Obligation of Princes (Gwarzo et al 1974/77).

[83] The caliph at that time was Aliyu Babba, 1842-59. The marriage set an important political precedent followed by many emirs, for example, Aliyu (189-1903) and Usman (1919-26). In addition, Abdullahi Bayero married the grandaughter of Abdullahi dan Dabo's "Sokoto" wife, and the present emir married the daughter of the late Sokoto Sultan in 1973. In each case, the "bride of Sokoto" was awarded (or confined to) the waje of Sokoto.

As a form of reciprocation, he awarded one of his daughters to the Grand Vizier of the caliphate (Ibrahim b. Abdulkadir).

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
Figure 4.9 View of <u>Babban</u> <u>soro</u> (Abdullahi's <u>turaka</u>) and <u>Yelwa</u> (the head concubine ward) taken from inside open fields just west of <u>Yelwa</u> in 1903 (Courtesy of the Royal Geographical Society, London, photographic archives, #068041).

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probably to contain select women from the palace and/or slave estate of Nasarawa captured during one or more battles.[84]

Abdullahi used places in the former and "new" cikin gida in an accession ritual which he devised to emphasise the importance of the southern entrance and the legitimacy of male Sullubawa rule. The new emir was turbanned inside Kudanda. Then he traversed the southern wall of the cementery (through a breach) inaugurated with the burial of the first patriarch of the Sullubawa dynasty, his father, Ibrahim Dabo. He traversed another breach in the northern wall and proceeded to the former quarters of his mother in the ward of Tafassa,[85] and then into the study area in the former turaka of his father, Turakar Dabo.[86] The breaches were re-sealed after the emir's passage through them. The ritual thus re-enacted the "new entry" of the Sullubawa dynasty by spatially tracing out important markers of the first Sullubawa patriarch: his chambers, those of his concubine who supplied three subsequent kings to the throne, and his place of burial. This ritual has been maintained and expanded upon until the present day.[87]

By the time of Abdullahi's death, most positions of state authority were held by his sons and client-partisans. The entrenchment of Abdullahi's lineage and the largesse of his clientage threatened politically his successor and brother, Bello (1882-93). Consequently all of Abdullahi's sons were expelled from office, divorce of Abdullahi's daughters was demanded (marriages forged

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[84] Giginyu (1981) notes that many Fulani nobility removed slave women from the gandu to serve as concubines within their own households.

After Abdullahi's death, Nasarawa became home to concubines of variable provenance, and today is inhabited by elderly divorced and widowed Fulani women (chapter 5).

[85] Today the ward is known as Kacako.

[86] Refer to Figures 4.3 and 4.4.

[87] There are some inconsistencies between various sources which discuss the origin and format of the ritual. According to na Ma'aji in Sa'id (1978), for example, the ritual was started by Usman upon the request of his father. Because the turbanning chamber had not yet been built, the ritual would then have had to begin elsewhere. In contrast, Ahmed (1988) mis-interprets the name of one of the rooms used in the ritual (Soron Uwar Dabo) as "the room of the mother of [Ibrahim] Dabo", and deduces that it must have been Dabo who created it. Uwar Dabo, however, can also be translated as "the woman of Dabo", which in this case refers to the concubine of Dabo (the emir of Daura's daughter) who bore three princes who succeeded each other to the throne. Sa'id (1978), Rufa'i (1987) and Ahmed (1988) do not deduce the significance of the ritual, derived from linking Sullubawa primogeniture to the places used in the ritual.

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lineage-based political alliances), and insubordinate slave officials were killed or deposed.[88] Political authority of the *emir* over his slaves was also redefined and strengthened through prohibition of marriages of free women by slave men (Fika, 1978).[89] Bello's vigorous drive to establish control was inscribed in the landscape by construction of a third court chamber in the southern *shigifa* named after himself (Fig. 4.4).[90]

The initial political turmoil which these moves presumably bred was paralleled by a rise in state demands, especially taxation levels. Beside the enormous expense involved in re-establishing a new household and clientage (involving literally thousands of slave and free-born persons), the regional cowrie currency had dramatically devalued since the mid-nineteenth century and Sokoto was now calling for increased tribute. Taxation levels doubled and, in some cases, tripled, and tax collection intensified.[91] A much larger number of male slave *jakadu* were assigned to collect taxes, and firmer demands were made for taxes to be paid on time (Garba, 1986; Fika, 1978; Sa'id, 1978).

A costly civil war ensued upon Bello's death that led to a further spiralling of state needs and demands, which were later compounded by a rise in regional territorial conflicts. To the northeast, the *emir* of Hadejia claimed fertile eastern lands, and the kingdoms of Maradi and Damagaram to the north began raiding extensively and successfully in the Kano region, in 1898 reaching the city walls. The need to meet increased military and other expenditures with limited resources led to the successful establishment of gun manufacturing facilities in the household of *Sallama* (northeast of the palace) during the reign of Aliyu (1896-1903; Fig. 4.8). Before political

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[88] Fika (1978: 34) claims that by 1882, "eunuchs had been eliminated" from titled office. This is not, however, supported by field data. Of the ten "non-eunuch" slave title-holders listed by Fika (1978), for example, several were eunuchs, at least during the time of Aliyu (1896-1903) and Abbas (1903-1919). These included Salama, Ka-shoka, Turakin soro, and possibly, Kilishi.

[89] Marriages with free women increased the social status of male slaves and awarded their children legal free-born status, slavery being transmitted matrilineally.

[90] The new chamber was sited between the two built by Abdullahi and called *Soron Bello* (lit. the hall of Bello; Fig. 4.4).

[91] The dramatic rise in taxation rates paralleled a devaluation of the cowrie. Circa 1930 the cowrie to Spanish silver dollar exchange rate was 2,000: 1, whereas by 1880, the ratio was 5,000:1 (Garba 1986, 102).

and economic tensions related to taxation and territorial consolidation could be resolved, the French conquered Maradi and Damagaram and the British took over Hausaland.

CONCLUSIONS

Upon attaining power in 1807, the Fulani re-inhabited the palace and revived much of the traditional political culture of former Hausa rulers. They re-instituted the main Hausa state councils, titles and places in the shigifa that were tied to pre-colonial geo-political organisation of the territory. Although slaves were not allowed official state positions or titles, Dabo (1819-46) re-cultivated slave powers and loyalties through increasing their informal state advisory and administrative roles. Augmented slave powers helped entrench dynastic rule for the Sullubawa, increased the political authority of Kano vis-a-vis Sokoto, and re-vitalised the palace kofar gida as a major center of state administration. Socio-spatial and linguistic conservatism provided a sense of continuity through which change was effected and probably also reflected Dabo's pre-occupation with costly "external" problems, especially military consolidation of his territory and the establishment of frontier towns. Women were more strictly secluded from men and displaced from the places and activities of cloth dyeing.

A substantial rise in regional wealth during the reign of Abdullahi (1855-82) spurred growth in the male socio-spatial division of state and domestic labour, leading to a southward expansion and re-orientation of the palace. The southern portion of the cikin gida became a quasi-military zone that entrenched and elaborated upon state patriarchal structures and further corroded the powers and dominion of women. The domains of eunuchs, bodyguards and chain mail soldiers took up most of the southern spaces and formed the core of a new paramilitary and military community. Mai-shanu was esconced in the latter to govern pastoral activities in the palace and the newly created slave estate south of the palace, to which the new southern palace entrance was now connected. A much larger grain slave hierarchy led by King of the Grains occupied a large section of the western kofar gida. In contrast to the northern slave region, in which labour resided and was organised in three main patriarchal slave households (Shamaki, dan Rimi, and

Sallama), slave labour in the south was distinguished and defined *spatially*, reflecting a spatial refinement in the social organisation of slave labour. That is, slave labour became less tied to major slave "houses" and more autocratically organised vis-a-vis the emir. The economic pressures of regional inflation, new tribute demands from Sokoto and rising administrative and military expenses during and following Abdullahi's reign also help explain the upgrading of royal military capabilities through institution of gun manufacturing facilities northeast of the palace.

The expansion and refinement of male slave divisions of state and domestic labour during and after Abdullahi's reign substantially constricted women's skills, spatial privileges and powers. Most importantly, King of the Grain's appointment eroded women's authority over "outside" grain procurement and taxation and establishment of the cemetery and eunuch-guarded turbanning chamber indicate a growing displacement of women from important economic activities and civil service. Inside the cikin gida the male realms substantially increased, facilitating the surveillance and control of concubine activities. The exclusion of Islamic scholars from the new southern realm, the deployment of security forces in the south (the eunuchs, bodyguards, and chain mail soldiers), and the re-development of an arsenal in Abdullahi's turaka, suggest that while Islamic clergy had become peripheral to state rule, military apparatuses assumed greater importance. The changes also indicate Abdullahi's interest in his personal safety and in maintaining and expressing his dominion over state and domestic realms.

Although the *jihad* was fought partly to decrease taxation burdens of rural producers, the Fulani did little to change taxation types or levels. The palace landscape reveals that the Fulani built upon the political framework inherited from the Hausa. State and especially military apparatuses were elaborated upon, leading to a much more militarist and patriarchal state and house-hold structure.

The research raises questions as to why jihadists marginalised women economically and spatially. Preliminary findings that *Mai-kudanda* was probably tied organisationally to *Korama* suggest that popular male directives against women's activities and places stemmed from their

significant control over grain pricing and possibly tax collection along with institutional links to the Hausa aristocracy. Within a larger historical context, the eventual re-emergence of "pre-Fulani" economic and political tensions indicate that the *jihad* and Fulani rule represented an unsuccessful attempt to resolve in religious (moral) terms tensions that were fundamentally related to more materially-based state formational processes.

Chapter 5.

The Impact of British Imperialism on the landscape of male slavery: socio-spatial erosion of master-servant relations and the traditional state.

INTRODUCTION

The "master-servant" or "provider-provided for" dyad informed most power relations in Hausa society and, within male realms, was most consistently reproduced between male slaves and aristocracy. The slaves helped maintain domestic and state organisation and were awarded powers that at times rivalled those of nobility and the ruling family (chapters 3 and 4).

In this chapter, the socio-spatial effects of the nineteenth century British conquest on male slavery in the palace are chronicled. The record demonstrates how male slave titles, domains and responsibilities were eroded and/or re-structured to facilitate the cultural (including political economic) incorporation of the region into the British empire. The socio-spatial unevenness of the erosion of slave powers outlines the political agenda behind the colonial drive to abolish slavery, and reveals initial inconsistencies and crudeness of British understanding and control over Hausa political culture. The chronicling also shows that slaves and masters were commonly controlled by pitting one against the other, and that the "provider-provided for" relation was consequently usurped by capitalist relationss of wage labour, especially since independence. The resulting cultural transformation facilitated the incorporation of the region into the global capitalist economy, although the contours of patronage are still evident.

1903: THE PALACE TAKE-OVER

The conquest of Kano city in 1903 was decisive in establishing British colonial rule in the northern region of Nigeria, and was finalised with the take over of the Kano palace. At the time, emir Aliyu was returning to Kano from Sokoto where he had gone to greet the new Sarkin musilmi (lit. king of the muslims),[1] a close relation and friend. The British-officered West African Frontier Force (WAFF), made up of mounted infantry and foot soldiers, attacked the palace from the

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[1] Sarkin musilmi is the traditional title awarded the leader in Sokoto.

northeast, from where they eventually entered and made their way into the cikin gida.[2] Near the

northern boundary of the cikin gida, a "last stand" occurred in which all of the emir's forces left

behind to defend the palace were killed.[3] The soldiers then went on a mild rampage. Prayer mats

were burned, the large clay cooking pots and calabashes of the women's sections were shattered

or broken, a number of the massive hand-carved wooden doors were removed and carried away,

and many compounds were burned or vandalised (Mai-daki, 4.9.89).[4]

Upon hearing the news that Kano had fallen, emir Aliyu abandoned the army (for reasons

still disputed),[5] but was later captured by the Gobirawa in Illela and eventually handed over to

the British. The palace was made the temporary headquarters of the British, presumably because

it was the most easily defendable area in the city and because of its symbolic importance, both

to the population-at-large and to the British. It also provided a convenient place to quarter the

WAFF soldiers to keep them from causing any disturbances in the city (Muffett, 1964: 92).[6] Sir

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[2] Colonel Morland, who led the Kano attack, indicates that following his entry into the western uninhabited portion of the city through a breach created by cannon fire, he and his troops traversed the unsettled portion of the city. Thereafter,

> After forming up near the inhabited portion, no further opposition being met with, I marched and occupied the King's palace, which is a large series of buildings covering 50 acres, and surrounded by a high wall, and is in itself a stronghold." (Muffett, 1964: 92).

[3] There is some discrepancy between the data provided by different informants. Sarkin Kano (12.88) claims that the British entered from the southeast whereupon a heated squirmish occurred below a kind of tower that formed part of the personal arsenal in the turaka established by emir Abdullahi (1854-83; see chapter 4). In contrast, Madakin Kano claims that the palace was entered from the northeast and that they were greeted by intense resistance from the second floor of the soron jakadiya in the northern kofar gida that served as the main palace arsenal. Other data support the latter. Sarkin Kano perhaps refers to a secondary or even contemporaneous but smaller uprising that ensued after WAFF troops entered the palace.

[4] Malam Dau (18.11.89) pointed out adamantly that these soldiers were "black men, not white men". These "black men" were probably Tukurawa, followers of the late nephew of emir Aliyu, who had been defeated in the recent civil war and who lived along the Kano-Katsina border. The hostility of the Tukurists towards the Kano regime made them ideal recruits (John Laver, pers. comm. 20.3.90).

[5] There are conflicting accounts of why Aliyu left Kano, when he probably knew that the British would attack, and why he took so long to begin his return to Kano (see, for example, Muffett, 1964: 95-96 and Sa'id, 1978).

[6] Colonel Morland (in Muffett, 1964: 92) noted that "All soldiers and carriers being quartered inside the King's palace, I am able to prevent them getting loose in the town. No town taken by assault has ever been less looted and injured."

Muffett (1964: 98) notes further that,

> The discipline enforced by Morland was strict. Three soldiers broke camp in the Emir's enclosure [the palace] and killed a man in the market. The murderer was tried by Court Martial and summarily shot, executed for good measure in the presence of some of the chief men of Kano... [T]he execution was performed by half a belt being fired through a maxim,

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Frederick Lugard (who arrived shortly after the conquest) set up his office in one of the rooms of Babban soro, formerly the personal quarters of the emir (chapter 4; Fig. 5.1)

Abbas, the brother of emir Aliyu who had surrendered with his followers outside the city walls, was seen to be conciliatory to the British, and was therefore made emir.[7] Abbas was compelled to swear formal allegiance to the King of England and was given a staff of office in a British-style instalment ritual enacted in the southern shigifa, part of the traditional political and military stronghold of the palace.[8] The location of the ceremony was perhaps intended to signal the comprehensiveness of the British conquest and the related right of Britain to access and control former military realms. Abbas and his household were then allowed to take up residence in the palace. Despite British protestations that theirs was a rule which allowed tradition to flourish, key slave institutions and socio-spatial relations within the palace were continually eroded.

THE EROSION OF TRADITIONAL MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY COMMUNITIES

The defeat of the royal army, constituted, trained and administered by Shamaki and to a lesser extent by dan Rimi and Sallama (chapter 4), affected the slave community immediately. Besides the erosion of these three slaves' military powers, the chain mail soldiers were dismissed from the southern kofar gida area, the two palace arsenals were dismantled,[9] and arms production facilities that had been established by Aliyu in the ward and household of Sallama

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in which case the inhabitants of Kano must have been most impressed not only with the efficiency but also with the extravagance of spending 125 rounds on the execution of a single malefactor.

[7] Sarki Aliyu, by this time captured by the British, was exiled to Yola and later moved to several other locations before being finally settled in Lokoja.

[8] Mai-daki noted the location of the ritual, and later confirmed her claim using landmarks visible in a photograph of the event presented in Plate 46 in A guide to Gidan Makama Museum Kano (1985).

[9] Sarkin Kano (12.88).

Rufa'i (1987) claims that for British security reasons, the arsenal was re-placed in a house nearby the palace. The house to which she refers, however, was the home of Sallama, of which she was unaware. It is highly unlikely that the British would have been so unthinking as to re-place an arsenal at the main site of arms production. She is probably referring ahistorically to much later storage of ceremonial war gear used in official public spectacles.

Figure 5.1 (a) Emir Aliyu in exile with some of his wives and concubines in 1903 (courtesy of Prof. John Lavers, Bayero University, Kano) (b) Sir Frederick Lugard sets up his office inside the palace after the conquest in 1903 (courtesy of the Royal Geographical Society, London, photographic archives, #036967).

were disassembled (Fig. 5.2).[10]

The emir's bodyguards, or dogarai, in the southern kofar gida and nearby city ward of Dogarai (chapter 4) were also at first largely disbanded, even though technically they represented only a paramilitary organisation.[11] In 1909, several British officers argued that the dogarai would make a more effective policing body than the colonial police force that had been installed immediately after the conquest.[12] Dogarai were subsequently made paid employees of the Native Authority and were obliged to wear bright red and green plaid "traditional" robes, a kind of uniform by which the British could easily distinguish them.[13] Many re-claimed residence in the palace dogarai settlement.

The "new" dogarai not only protected the emir, they now policed the walled city, and many were sent to rural district headquarters.[14] They also accompanied the British on official tours of the districts, where they were expected to maintain prescribed protocol and order.[15] Although

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[10] The name of the ward, Rimin kira, literally means "the silk cotton tree of smithing". This, along with other strategic spatial relationships, initially suggested to me that some sort of smithing was carried out in the ward, a hunch later confirmed by interview data.

[11] In light of their large numbers and non-military nature, it is somewhat unfeasible to imagine that all inhabitants of the ward of Dogarai were exiled from the city. Instead, they probably were de-activated, with those in the palace until 1909 being sent out to join them. Moreover a few guards were probably maintained in order to secure the emir's safety, even if they were not considered technically to be dogarai (see also, Ubah, 1985).

[12] Backing for this policy was garnered initially in 1907 when the colonial police force was de-activated in support of the "Enforcement of Native Authority" proclamation which stressed the importance of the authority of traditional rulers (Fika, 1978: 135). A junior but very influential Resident, then in charge of Katsina Division (H.R. Palmer), advocated the devolution of policing duties to dogarai, suggesting that they wear native dress and be armed with bludgeons on the grounds that "the sight of a man in uniform armed with a rifle [as were the colonial police force] causes too much terror and alarm to villagers" (In Fika, 1978: 136). His views were supported by Resident Cargil in 1908 who advised that dogarai be re-instated to effect arrests, although they would nominally be held accountable to the emir (Ubah, 1985: 91).

[13] Dogarai traditionally wore simple white robes and turbans (see Plate 24 in A guide to the Gidan Makama Museum, Kano (1985)) and were humiliated by the new robes, perhaps as much because of their garish colours as by the defeat which they signalled. Emir Abbas is said to have personally modelled the robes in a successful attempt to cajole the bodyguards into wearing them (Sallama, 28.10.89). Whether or not this myth is "true", it demonstrates the powers which slaves possessed.

[14] "Native" policemen were not allowed to patrol British or "non-Native" (non-Hausa) black areas east of the city. These latter were patrolled by a separate British-officered police force made up largely of southern Nigerians (Ubah, 1985: 92).

[15] According to the informants of Ubah (1985: 119-120),

On arrival the whiteman would be conducted to his lodging. Chewing of kola nuts was forbidden in his presence, and he must be approached bare-footed, in the same way as one would approach a big native official. Then all dogs in the neighbourhood would be taken away to make sure that they did not bark and disturb

KURMI MARKET

dan Rimi
sets up rival
household,
1908

Kurawa

Rimin
kira

Disassembly of arms
production facilities, 1903:

Sallama exiled, 1926

Soron dinki

Daneji

Shamaki exiled,
1926

dan Rimi
exiled,
1926

Durumin
lya

arms depots
dismantled,
1903

Dogarai

Kabara

Dogarai and chain mail soldiers
disbanded, 1903;

Dogarai re-introduced, 1909

Slave exodus, 1925
Slavery "abolished," 1926

Tudun Wazirci

Wudilawa

0   300m

Figure 5.2 Changes in the landscape of male slavery, 1903-1926 (ward boundaries taken from "Map showing unguwa boundaries compiled from L.G.A. Survey maps", the Metropolitan Kano Planning and Development Board, 1971).

his peace, and people would be banned from passing within a hundred yard's radius of his lodging...

Assuming that the whiteman arrived in the evening, then the following morning business would start. He had, of course, arrived with an armed escort or, in later years, in the company of one or more dogarai and the emir's representative whose duty it was to give to the emir a full account of the tour. The dogarai would take their positions just outside the lodging to provide the officer with protection and ensure that the ban on noise making and on the movement of people were observed.

these changes in their duties *appeared* to expand their powers, as wage labourers, their allegiance was divided between two masters, the emir and the Native Authority. As they became diffused throughout the countryside, their palace and probably also their city-based numbers decreased.[16]

The dis-placement of the military and paramilitary communities indicated the defeat of the aristocracy. The visibility and continuity of the related spatial erosion made it clear to the populace-at-large that it was the British who ultimately controlled the means of protection and provision, the basis of patronage. The collapse of the superiority of aristocratic powers over patronage heralded the possibility for untraditional allegiances with the colonisers which, if realised, would further undermine traditional authority. The British undoubtedly discerned and played upon the political ambiguities presented to slaves with two masters to check the powers of slaves as well as those of the aristocracy.

THE RISE IN SLAVE POWERS AND PLACES, 1903-1919

Traditionally, most tax revenues were derived from rural agricultural producers, who generally paid an in-kind tax (usually grains) to the village head where they *farmed*, which might be a considerable distance from where they *resided* (Fika, 1978: 119). Slave tax collectors and administrators, known as jakadu, along with their slave assistants (yara), then collected these taxes from the village heads, forwarding them to the particular city-based nobleman to whom they normally reported, who, in turn, had the tax delivered to the palace. All those who collected and forwarded the taxes to the palace took a portion of the taxes as a commission for their services (Garba, 1986).

The traditional land divisions administered by the nobility were noncontiguous and

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[16] Additional slave men were recruited into the dogarai forces to fill all of these needs, especially given the increased demand for dogarai in the countryside. Most of these men would not, however, have resided in the palace. Thus, despite the appearance of greater numbers, dogarai were no longer assigned to traditional places nor placed under traditional control, but were co-opted into a British system and style of institutionalised control. The political tensions borne by these men, as slaves of the emir, and now also waged labourers, are evident in the 1922 Annual Report for Kano Province, which states that, "The District Officer complained that these yara [lit. children, but in this case referring to their subordinate positions] of the chief slaves, even after being recruited, place allegiance to their masters before that to the commander of the force" (Ubah, 1985: 91).

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irregular in size, reflecting the order and relative success of the Fulani clans that had conquered the Kano region during the jihad (chapter 4). The British found this system of land distribution and taxation to be chaotic, idiosyncratic and illogical, and the tradition of an urban-based nobility (or hakimai) and rural slave tax collectors and administrators to be irresponsible, corrupt and inefficient.[17] A re-organisation was begun in 1904 to rationalise the political system into "proper fiefs" or contiguous realms having similar sizes and shapes.[18] Three of these so-called "districts" were assigned to the three most powerful palace slaves of state, dan Rimi, Shamaki, and Sallama, as a concession to Abbas, who strongly opposed the re-organisation (Ubah, 1985; Fika, 1978).

These adjustments were soon dovetailed with other policies in an attempt to erode the practical basis of royal slavery, ostensibly in support of abolitionist principles. The three royal slave districts were eliminated in 1907, for example, and in 1908 the hakimai were forced to live in the countryside, in part to replace the rural slave administrators and tax collectors, the jakadu.[19]

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[17] In the 1908 Kano Province Annual Report, for example, it is explained by Major Festing, Acting Resident at the time, that

Although the Emirate had been from time immemorial farmed out as regards taxes to the different Sorakuna [lit. kings; one of the first terms used by the British to connote the nobility], these had never, with few exceptions, been resident in their districts, nor had they ever regarded the lands under their charge as anything but hunting grounds wherein to practice their slave raids and other methods of extortion. (NAK\SNP 7\472\1909)

[18] The number of these fiefs fluctuated over the first few decades as the British struggled to "make sense" of a system of land use and control which was based upon a completely different political system and set of values. The British also transplanted much of the vocabulary, and with it the concepts, of European aristocracy. Their expectations matched their language, which resulted in numerous confusions and cultural (including political-economic) pressures. This mis-meshing of language and cultural and political institutions, and the large-scale ramifications on social practice and experience forms the basis of work in progress, and has been addressed to some extent by Hill (1977).

[19] The following quote from the 1908 Kano Province Annual Report summarises the initial process and results of the geo-political re-structuring,

(2)...in accordance with Sir Frederick Lugard's instructions, Dr. Cargill soon after the occupation of Kano i.e. in 1903/04, set to work to divide up the Division as near as possible into homogeneal districts. This proved no easy task considering the unsettled state of the country, the numerous factions that had to be dealt with and the many traditions and customs that had to be broken... [Dr. Cargill] formed the Emirate into 8 large and 26 lesser districts, in all 34. The great problem...was...how...to distribute...the larger number of hereditary royal and other title holders and how to get rid of the numerous...unnecessary and even dangerous minor office-holders. To throw these out of power without giving them a chance of proving themselves capable of conforming to our methods was naturally not in accordance with our ideas of fairplay...With this in view, the larger districts were allotted to the most important title-holders...whilst the smaller tracts mostly round the city itself were delegated the minor Hakimai. (4) No attempt was at first made to make any of these chiefs live in their districts, though it was given out that in future they would be called upon to collect the tribute themselves and it was impressed upon all that the "Jakada system" was to cease. (5) During the tax collecting of '06/07 the first part of this rule was for the first time really enforced and all Headmen were driven out to their districts and held directly responsible for

Although these measures undercut royal slavery in the long run, in the short term, male slave powers and places increased. With the rural "exile" of the hakimai, which made it impossible for the emir to meet twice daily with the hakimai of his royal cabinet (chapter 4), dan Rimi, Shamaki and Sallama assumed the role of state council.[20] Interim information and news from the ruling and non-ruling clans was relayed to the three main slaves of state, making them the main conduits for regional political knowledge.[21]

Ostensibly in anticipation of difficulties the emir would face without his hakimai-based council, the Resident of the Province (Cargill) recalled three hakimai from their districts to be part of a somewhat ad-hoc advisory council. These included Waziri, Ma'aji (finance), Alkali (religious-legal administration), the Chief Imam, Ma'ajin Watari (supervisor of Kano city) and Magatakarda (personal secretary). The constituency and duties of the council, however, were crafted carefully to corrode the customarily intense bonds of fealty among the emir, nobility and slaves. High tensions were maintained, for example, when the judicial court of the emir was abolished, while Alkali was made solely responsible for the newly instituted District Courts (Ubah, 1985; Fika, 1978).

The profile of membership probably also eased slave resentment over the loss of their districts. In particular, Cargill awarded dan Rimi, traditionally the most trusted of slaves who attended personally to royal Sullubawa affairs (chapter 4), the leading free-born title of council,

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Government's and Emir's share of tribute, out share being handed over immediately to us through the Emir....(8) At the beginning of this year 1908, Dr. Cargill took in hand the redistribution of the districts. He summoned all the Headmen and Sub-district Heads before him and from his own personal knowledge of them individually and from events and reports during the last two years, he was able to redistribute them throughout the Division. His great aim was *naturally to make the districts really homogenous in every respect and at the same time to make each of a convenient size over which a competent headman with three to five Sub-heads and an Alkali's Court could preside.* (9) To summarise, the 34 districts were reduced to 14.... [my emphasis]

[20] Slaves had formerly been a part of state council during pre-jihad times. With the Fulani conquest, however, slaves were largely displaced. Although Abdullahi dan Dabo (1855-83) eventually re-introduced them onto council, they had no real authority and served mainly as supporters of the emir's policies and power (chapter 4). This contrast in pre-Fulani versus post-Fulani slave powers is rarely acknowledged in the literature.

[21] The District Heads (or hakimai) probably communicated with each other and the emir with the help of other slaves and/or bara (clients). Unlike jakadu, however, these persons did not administer tax assessment and collection. Acording to Ubah (1985:71),

each district head had a kind of agent or makkadas to represent him in the city, and matters relating to each district were communicated to the emir through the particular [palace] slave intermediary....recognized for the purpose. In this way, the [palace] slaves possessed a full grasp of both current affairs and administrative details.

Waziri. Abbas's son, Abdullahi, who held the title at the time, was subsequently given the lower title of Ciroma. Dan Rimi was freed in order to assume the title, and mandated to receive and to pay in colonial government shares of tax revenues, formerly the emir's responsibility. He also became the sole official channel of communication among the emir, the hakimai and colonial officials. Perhaps in protest over this appointment, Abbas allowed the title of dan Rimi to remain vacant.

Cargill's action was drastic not only because a free-born title was awarded to a slave (for which purpose he was freed), but because it disclosed publicly and pejoratively that the emir was politically helpless in the face of a more supreme master. For this and other reasons, the emir largely ignored his British-contrived council, and relied instead upon his other slaves, with whom traditional loyalties had been maintained (Ubah, 1985: 55-57).[22]

Meanwhile, the demonstrated control of the British over traditional state machinery awarded dan Rimi substantial prestige and status, making him a repository for the gifts of those seeking new or alternative patronage and enabling him, in turn, to provide for a large following. Enormous political tensions resulted amongst the aristocracy as well as between the aristocracy and slaves. Rival songs of ridicule were composed to the emir and dan Rimi by slaves loyal to one group or the other, and were sung publicly to downgrade one another.[23] Finally, dan Rimi moved out of his very large premises inside the palace to a establish a household in the city ward of Daneji (Fig. 5.2). More than one hundred and fifty persons from the northern kofar gida area followed him, including his large extended family and other lesser male slaves and their wives. The

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[22] Another of the British delegates to council, Ma'aiin Watori, placed in charge of city administration, also catered to the British, while Ma'aji, the treasurer who remained loyal to the emir, was deported by the British (see Ubah, 1935: 57).

[23] Malam Dau (18.11.89). See also Fika (1978) and Ubah (1985: 57), who writes that,

The new Waziri forgot all allegiance to the emir and completely identified himself with the British administration. Within a short while he built up a personal following which rivalled and behaved with arrogance towards that of the emir himself - or as Temple [a later Resident] claimed, the respective following of the emir and th Waziri abused each other in the streets of Kano. ... The people of Kano feared the Waziri for he wielded more powers than the emir: many sang his praise and flattered his pride in order to get his favours, even though they still regarded him as a man unworthy of his position.

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population of the northern palace region consequently thinned substantially.[24]

In 1909, Resident Temple revoked his predecessor's decision.[25] Dan Rimi was stripped of the title of Waziri; he was "re-made" into a slave; and emir Abbas was allowed to discipline him. Dan Rimi was made to strip down to his underclothes[26] and brought outside the city limits, where he was ridiculed publicly. His belongings were then seized and he was made to live in the slave quarters of the house he had established in Daneji. Abbas appointed another slave to fill the position and palatial place of dan Rimi[27] and some calm and order were regained.[28]

Although the demotion helped Abbas to regain control over his household and traditional following, his political weaknesses had been played out strongly and publicly inside the palace and city. The public now realised that Abbas and dan Rimi were equally subject to British authority, a sentiment evident in the popular rejoinder, "It is said that you [Abbas] were turbanned by the Governor; okay, so who did the Sultan of Sokoto [the traditional leader] appoint?",[29] leading one to say "no one" or "not Abbas". In other words, the traditional system of legitimation whereby the Sultan of Sokoto appointed leaders, had been undermined. Who was Abbas to fault the British with dan Rimi's appointment when he and dan Rimi owed their power to the same master? Both appointments were legitimate.

Although Temple gave Abbas authority to appoint his own council members, Abbas continued to rely primarily upon the three main title-holding slaves for state counsel. This reliance helped slaves to maintain and build upon their state powers. Abbas, though, given his strong

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[24] Sallama (27.10.89).

[25] There were many British officials who disagreed strongly with Cargill's initiatives (see e.g., Fika, 1978: 125).

[26] According to Mallam Dau (18.11.89), slaves wore a kind of loincloth under their clothes. By exposing this to the public (he was probably re-supplied with it), his slave status was laid bare.

[27] Malam Dau (18.11.89).

[28] C.f. Fika, (1978: 127) who writes that Waziri (dan Rimi) was demoted to his former title.

[29] This is a very loose translation of, "An ce kai nadin gwamna ne; To, wa Mahadi ya nada?" (Dr. Tijjani Garba, pers. comm., 6.90).

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colonial support, was able to control state slaves effectively. Colonial tolerance of these powers was to change during the reign of Usman.

<div align="center">1919-26: THE DECLINE OF SLAVE POWERS AND PLACES</div>

Introduction

Throughout the power shuffles of 1903 to 1919, the majority of male slaves continued to reside within the palace where they remained loyal to Abbas. This was so because royal slaves still benefitted from the system of royal patronage whereby they were entitled to, among other things, homes, clothing, food, farming tools and, for those most powerful, horses. They also shared in the overall prestige and power associated with royalty. The relatively good rapport that eventually developed between Abbas and British officials meant that royal slave men were preferentially chosen to fill a limited number of waged labour positions in the colonial "Native Authority", such as the dogarai (above).

The residential stability of the slave population began to change radically in the last year of Abbas' rule. The main problem stemmed from the fact that soon after Abbas took office, the British legislated the appropriation of fifty percent of state revenues for imperial coffers.[30] This situation seems to have been tolerable until about 1909, when the British began to place a progressive number of the nobility making up the Native Authority on salary remitted from a newly formed Native treasury (see e.g., Shenton, 1987; Ubah, 1986; Bello, 1982).[31] The possibilities of providing good patronage benefits out of traditional forms of taxation were eroded substantially.

Abbas appears to have worked around this dilemma through informal means, such as promises of patronage benefits in exchange for labour and some minor oversights on the part of

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[30] No tax revenues accrued to the British government during the so-called tax year of 1903/04, whereas they received one quarter of 1904/05 taxes. It was only in the 1906/07 tax year that the British retained fifty percent of revenues, with the added stipulation that they be paid in cash only, not cowries (the regional currency at the time). As the Resident explained,

Up till October 1906 it was the practice for Government to receive its share of the tax in bags of cowries which were disposed of by public sale; after that date the Emir was called upon to pay the Government share in cash. Government commenced receiving half share of the tax in April 1906. (NAK/SNP7-8/1538/1908)

[31] The Native Treasury was created in 1909. Some of the repercussions of instituting a public treasury are discussed below.

British officials. He was effective in delaying or buffering these changes because he was a strong and shrewd negotiator and because political economic changes affecting the emirate-at-large were in their infancy. His two successors, in contrast, reigned during times in which British policies indirectly and directly affecting slavery came strongly into play. Usman (1919-1925), in particular, was weak politically and unable to buffer colonial changes effectively or to play a more constructive role in colonial negotiations. It was the intersection of these strong "external" colonial forces and the "internal" personal weaknesses of Usman which led to a demise in traditional patronage and slavery during his rule and immediately thereafter.

1919-1926: the exodus

Usman was the ailing older brother of Abbas. Because of the 1908 British directive, Usman had lived out his political career in the rural district of Ringim and, like many other hakimai, became estranged from the sophisticated manners of his urban counterparts. By the time of his installation as emir, neither he nor his household knew much about palace protocol or rituals and were consequently derided by palace and birni inhabitants alike.[32]

Usman was also generally disliked. Besides being regarded as a "villager", he was seen as an unforgiving and insecure person who demanded large shows of obeisance and who was practically inept due to illness.[33] He was also seen as a miser, a reputation arising probably in large part from the decrease in traditional tax revenues available to him, compounded by the fact that, unlike Abbas, he seems to have had few "informal" political or economic resources at his disposal.

As a result of his weaknesses, dan Rimi, Shamaki, and Sallama were depended upon effectively to administer the emirate. This increase in slave authority strengthened the bonds of

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[32] Hajiyya Abba Ado Bayero and Mai-daki (24.10.89). Also, rural dwellers in general are characterized traditionally as uncultured, rather dull and stupid (see for example, Sa'ad (1981)).

[33] His physical weaknesses were the object of special scorn by several palace informants. It was explained rather sarcastically, for example, that Usman was not strong enough to ride a horse, and that he eventually became so weak that he had to be carried to his throne to meet with hakimai (Sallama, 27.10.89).

dependence between master and servant and was antithetical to the de-centralised form of political and economic control being forged by the British. Palace slaves became insouciant, in excess of what was customarily accepted,[34] leading to resentment by both the emir and British officials.[35] As Ubah (1985: 72) notes, British fears mounted "that slaves were literally trying to seize power".

In 1920, colonial officials conducted a strategic study of the palace slave system to determine its organisational structure, and bemoaned the fact that slaves of state had not been dismissed following Abbas' death. In 1921, Acting Lieutenant Governor Palmer and Governor Clifford lobbied to outlaw palace slavery as soon as possible (Ubah, 1985: 73). Finally, in 1925, British officials, mindful that Usman's ill-health and unpopularity made him politically ineffective, demanded that all of the most powerful titled slave officials be dismissed and exiled to rural royal estates or gandaye (Ubah, 1985). Sallama was sent to Gandun Gogel, dan Rimi to Gandun Zuri, Shamaki to Gandun Takai and Ciroman Shamaki (a subordinate of the latter) to Gandun Fanisau. Hundreds of other slaves accompanied them.[36]

Another official council made up of three hakimai was instituted by the British. Unlike the previous council, the emir was compelled to consult this one. A specific portfolio was conferred upon each of the official councillors: Waziri was placed in charge of judicial matters; Madaki was charged with administering the districts; and Sarkin Bai was made responsible for city administration, especially the development of British institutions, such as prisons and schools

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[34] Royal male slaves of the palace are, and have been historically notorious for their arrogance and power. Heinrich Barth (1890: 290), visiting the palace in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, wrote that,

Hundreds of lazy, arrogant courtiers, freemen and slaves were lounging and idling here [in the northern kofar gida of the palace], killing time with trivial and saucy jokes.

This tradition of "saucy joke" telling and other somewhat disrespectful behavior is still maintained by slaves in the northern palace kofar gida.

[35] If the three main state slaves disagreed with certain directives given to them by the emir, for example, they would refuse to have them carried out (Mai-daki, 24.10.89; 16.10.89).

[36] Mai-daki (24.10.89) and Sallama (28.10.89).

(Ubah, 1985: 74; NAK/KANPROF/4164).

Besides those who accompanied the main slaves of state into the countryside were hundreds of other slaves who had never liked the emir and/or those who no longer had confidence in his ability to provide.[37] The palace slave population declined dramatically. Subsequently, male villagers, in their usual search for work during the dry season, accomplished male slave tasks in exchange for patronage benefits and minimal cash emoluments or payment-in-kind, such as roof thatching, building and stable duties.[38]

At the same time (1925), many dogarai were recruited into a new "Native" police force, provided with new "modern" uniforms and re-named 'yan gadi (lit. children of the guards).[39] The 'yan gadi assumed courier and escort duties and were attached to railway stations and commercial centres throughout the districts (Ubah, 1985; Sallama 28.10.89).[40] Those dogarai who were not drafted continued to serve the emir in traditional and personal capacities. The creation of this two-tiered police force further extenuated allegiance to the emir and defined a military division of labour along more Western lines.

The decline of slavery was exacerbated in 1926, when the British set up a new tax structure which required all men over the age of sixteen to pay tax. At least on the nearby pastoral slave estate of Gandun Nassarawa (chapter 4), royal lands were relinquished to resident slaves, making them responsible for their own taxes (Giginyu, 1981). The benefits which had formerly accrued to the emir from these estates apparently were now insufficient to pay both labour and

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[37] This "exodus" was the most clearly re-called historical event of the elderly.

[38] Prior to the British conquest, roof thatching was also accomplished during the dry season, but by royal slave men from Gandun Nassarawa, and presumably other rural estates, who migrated into the palace following the harvest (see Giginyu, 1981: 139).

[39] Gadi is a Hausa rendition of the English word "guard". The word "children" is used commonly as a prefix to persons organisations to whom or which the "children" are subordinate. Yaran jakadu, for example, means "the children or subordinates of the slave administrators". The 'yan gadi were also known as 'yan doka (lit. sons [or children] of the orders).

[40] According to Sallama, the creation of the 'yan gadi was related to social tensions following World War I. Many royal slaves who had been drafted into war service (along with other non-Hausa Nigerian recruits) complained to the British Governor that they felt rejected and were idle. The British Governor responded in part by forming the 'yan gadi.

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taxes. Most slaves grew crops for subsistence in addition to farming cash crops. The latter were needed to generate monies for taxes which could now only be remitted in cash (that is, not in kind, with grains). Following Usman's death in 1926, the British continued to unravel the remnants of slavery, which might have had devastating consequences for the aristocracy had not a number of labour alternatives arisen during the reign of Usman's successor.

A NEW SLAVE MANDATE AND THE RISE OF "VOLUNTARY SLAVERY" AND SLAVE PLACES: 1926-53

The numbers and uses of royal slaves during the first twenty years of colonial rule were little affected by the slavery proclamations of 1901, 1904 and 1907. Although these collectively made slave trading and raiding illegal, abolished the legal status of slavery, made all children of slaves free, prohibited all transactions in slaves, and ruled that compensatory payments to slave owners for slaves freed in British-sanctioned courts were unnecessary (Hill, 1977: 200), the proclamations did not *prohibit* slavery *per se* (Hill, 1977). Slaves born prior to the conquest were bound legally into slavery.

The reasons for this generational exception were many. First, the small number of British staff made it impossible to enforce effectively a ban on slavery.[41] More importantly, the master-servant relationship, embodied intensely by royal male slaves, was central to political life and socio-spatial stability at domestic and state levels; it would have been impossible to prohibit slavery all at once, and even if it were possible, the state would have been seriously destablised. Moreover, the British needed the aristocracy both to justify and to legitimate their presence in the region, and as "Indirect Rulers" or administrators/negotiators of imperialist policies. Without royal slaves the aristocracy would be disrespected and ineffective. It was because of these concerns that the British tolerated, utilised and sometimes promoted slave powers during the first two decades of colonial rule.

By the 1920s the articulation of the local political economy with that of the British Empire

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[41] In 1907, for example, "[t]he average number of European staff, including police officers...was 7.5, and in 1914, there were only 3! (NAK/SNP7/9/1538/1908; NAK/SNP10/4/170P/1916).

had been "successfully" made. Traditional allegiances between slaves and masters had been weakened and replaced partly by more de-centralised relations of power. The traditionally slave-run army had been dissolved; the rurally-placed nobility had essentially replaced the rural slave administrators, or jakadu; and much of the machinery of the traditional state was now on salary, albeit below what was needed by the aristocracy to be proper patrons.

In addition, a significant number of slaves present during the conquest had probably died by the 1920s, being succeeded by children whose "freedom" was guaranteed legally by the early slavery proclamations (above). The state powers (and insouciance) of male slaves therefore seemed in excess of their value and were challenged forcefully in 1925 with the exile of the main slave officials of state. British command over slaves (and slavery) was exercised further, however, with the freeing of *all* remaining palace slaves in 1926.

Emir Abdullahi and the abolition of palace slavery

Following Usman's death in 1926, the British formally approved the appointment of Abdullahi Bayero, the eldest son of Abbas,[42] with two provisos: that he manumit all palace slaves,[43] that is, those who were present during the conquest;[44] and that he abolish all slave titles (Ubah, 1985; Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90). The latter was particularly crucial because male slave titles defined and shaped the socio-spatial roles and personal identities of royal slave men. This was achieved through the binomial structure and content of the titles. The first term typically

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[42] Abdullahi was a veteran survivor of British indirect rule and seems to have learned how to follow the path of least resistance:

it will be recalled that he was appointed Chiroma [by the British] in 1905, promoted Waziri a year after and then reduced to his previous rank in the district re-organization of 1907. Later an experiment was tried [by the British] under which he assumed control of the ten districts surrounding Kano city and with the creation of Bichi district in 1915 he was posted to that place as the district head. A confidential report on him in 1921 claimed that he had a reputation of being somewhat lazy and indifferent, but most political officers were satisfied with his devotion to duty. (Ubah, 1985, 75)

[43] Manumission was achieved (in British terms) through the newly established Native Authority court system, after which the freed person was issued an official "certificate of freedom".

[44] A telegraph from Lt. Gov. Palmer to the Kano Resident reads,

please convey my regrest to emir's family and council...also please have complete list of all emir's slaves made with view to complete manumission. (NAK/KANPROF 4164)

connoted the relative position of the bearer, and the second, the actual labour component. Moreover the initial terms formed part of a well-known political hierarchy that was defined quintessentially by titles of nobility, and which was replicated in all levels of the social formation. Thus Sarkin gini, (lit. king of the builders) and Sarkin dogarai (lit. king of the bodyguards), for example, headed the royal builders and bodyguards, respectively, and were at the political apices of administrative and labour hierarchies defined by other titles of nobility, such as Makaman gini (lit. the Makama of building), Madakin gini (lit. the Madaki of building), Makama dogarai (lit. the Makama of the bodyguards), and Madakin dogarai (lit. the Madaki of bodyguards).

The hierarchy directly under each of the main three slaves of state was defined similarly using binomial expressions, but with each of their personal titles defining the apex, in lieu of sarki or "king". Their subordinates were then entitled by couplets composed, first, of an aristocratic title, followed by the name of the slave official whom they served. Thus Sallama (lit. peace) was the title and leading member of his hierarchy,[45] and was assisted by Makaman Sallama, Madakin Sallama, and so on.

These entitlement structures ensured that a slave man's title connoted easily to a listener his role and status in the royal labour hierarchy. Without these nominal-practical definitions of slave obligations, the palace division of slave labour as well as the linguistic and political ties that structured master-slave relations would fade.[46]

The British undoubtedly recognised that the abolition of palace slavery would make it impossible for Abdullahi to maintain the image and practices of the "old order" within the political-economic confines of the new.[47] Abdullahi and his administrative body were on a restricted

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[45] The term Sallama also describes his role, albeit indirectly. That is, as the person in charge of arranging audiences with the emir, he was often required to enter the emir's chambers. Before crossing the latter threshold, he would say, "Sallama alockum" or peace be with you (chapter 4).

[46] Palace slaves today maintain that they were never stripped of their titles. To them, it is impossible to dissolve titled positions simply by issuing a mandate. Their attitude contrasts with the royalty who, like the British, maintain that slave titles ceased to exist during this period (Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90).

[47] The terms "old order" and "new order" are common vernacular descriptors of the pre-colonial and colonial periods.

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budget, the amount of which was too small to afford the wage labour needed to maintain the palace properly. There were also new kinds of infrastructures and services, requiring western forms of skilled labour and materials, and payment in foreign currency. British officials became concerned for a number of reasons. The inability of the aristocracy to reproduce a semblance of tradition might threaten the hybrid political order they had carefully forged and which optimised the economic benefits to Britain. Moreover, British colonial personnel generally admired and liked Abdullahi, and were personally and culturally pre-disposed towards maintaining an aristocracy.

Presumably for these reasons, Abdullahi was awarded regular salary increases[48] and allowed to conscript labour from the large prison adjacent to the palace, built during the reign of Abbas. No wages were required, only food was to be supplied.[49] Thenceforth many menial jobs, especially those related to building and stable upkeep, were carried out by prisoners.[50] The non-waged and interdependent nature of the new "provider-provided for" relation ironically mirrored that of slavery.

It also appears that some former slaves were retained, but placed on Native Administration payroll.[51] Thus, similar to the dogarai and Native Authority police force, they became waged labourers with their allegiances partitioned between the emir and Native Authority. There was yet another quite unexpected solution to the lack of labour, the "voluntary" return of "slaves".

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[48] In 1909, Resident Temple placed the emir on a fixed salary of £ 4,800 per annum (Ubah, 1985: 181). On the year of Abdullahi's accession in 1926, this was increased to £ 5,000 with a £ 1,000 establishment charge (NAK/KANPROF 4164), and in 1930, to £ 6,000 with a £ 2,500 establishment charge (Ubah, 1985: 182; see also Fig. 5.1). Establishment charges were to be used for what colonial officers deemed appurtenances of office as well as for the costs of Muslim festivities (below).

[49] Malam Dau (12.89).

[50] During pre-colonial time, slaves were so abundant that there was little need to access prison labour. Moreover prisons served largely as temporary shelters for those awaiting trial and prisoner turn-over was rapid (Mallam Dau, 18.11.89; c.f. Muffett, 1965). With British abolition of slavery, the need for prison labour increased. Slave labour was dwindling and the colonial government was embarking on a rising number of public works projects which required monies that were not forthcoming from the 50% share of tax revenues awarded to the Native Authority treasury. Obversely, prison labour had substantially increased following colonial re-definition of crimes, including the inability of persons to pay off debts, a growing problem in the new order (see Bello, 1982). The availability of steady prison labour supplies was further assured by the British practice of using prisons as places of punishment.

[51] This is deduced from interviews with royal slaves, such as the palace builders, who remained very active throughout the period of "exile" and who obtained set salaries.

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The rise of "voluntary slavery"

The "voluntary" return of many "slaves"[52] seems to have happened early on in Abdullahi's reign for a combination of reasons.[53] First, like Abbas, Abdullahi seemed to have had tremendous informal political and economic resources at his disposal. He was highly conciliatory with and thus well-liked by the British and he had many personal friends within British administrative circles (above).[54] In addition to their efforts to provide prison labour and increase Abdullahi's salary, British officials worked to ensure that Abdullahi came across to the public-at-large as a "real" and strong leader, despite his primary role as head administrator of British policies in the emirate.

An "establishment charge" was instituted in 1924,[55] for example, to help defray official overhead expenses such as maintenance of the palace stables. The funds were also used, however, to establish a tradition - the durbar. Although created initially for an elite gathering on the Race Course of the British Government Residential Area of Kano on the occasion of the historic 1925 visit of the Prince of Wales, it became a hallowed annual event held in the open fields in front of both palace slave realms, tethered to the religious festivals following Ramadan. The durbar was imported from colonial India and featured ceremonial horse charges by the emir's sons and nobility, as well as a parade of traditional leaders past a stand of important colonial

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[52] The word "slave" refers to those persons who rejected or utilised their slave lineage for political advantage. It is placed initially in quotation marks to connote their ambiguous legal status.

[53] This event was another watershed in the memories of elderly palace informants, although of less dramatic proportions than the slave exiles and "exodus" of the mid-1920s.

[54] Mai-daki (24.10.89), his sister, intimated that Abdullahi became increasingly congenial and subservient to British authority and culture, a sentiment re-iterated by several other informants.

[55] The "establishment charge", endorsed in 1924 by the Acting Governor (D.C. Cameron) and Secretary of State (J.H. Thomas), was awarded in recognition of the high overhead costs of the emir in securing what were deemed "appurtenances of office". A 1923 circular notes that these appurtenances were not the property of the emir, and that in the case of horses, the Native Authority should "set [each emir] up in business" by purchasing the horses of his predecessor. This 1936 memorandum re-espoused the 1923 circular in every detail (see KANPROF 1744).

officers.[56] Although leaders had traditionally been saluted by somewhat spontaneous ceremonial

charges during times of celebration, such as battle victories and accession rituals, this seems to

be been the first time that salutations were formalised and made into a public spectacle.

In addition, the _emir_ was invited (at the expense of the Native treasury), with the Sultan

of Sokoto, the _emir_ of Gwandu, and a small entourage, to visit England, where they were treated

to an eventful itinerary. They had an audience with King George V and visited the Zoological

Gardens (with Lord Lugard and Governors Gowers and Cameron), the Royal Mint, Barclay Bank,

Trafalgar Square, Piccadilly Circus, the Imperial Science Museum and Institute, Oxford Middle

School, and various manufacturers. A particularly memorable plant visit was to the town of Port

Sunlight, founded by Lord Leverhulne who held substantial vested interests in the oilseed

production of Kano and throughout West Africa (Shenton, 1987: 83-92). He also visited Lord

Lugard in his home in Surrey, where he was shown two of the doors removed from the palace

during the 1903 conquest (Lavers, 20.3.90, pers. comm.; NAK/KANPROF 1081/vII).

Upon his return, Abdullahi was awarded the insignia of C.B.E. by King George, and in

1946, the insignia C.M.G. (NAF/15/1939; NAK/KANONA 152).[57] The latter award was invested

publicly in a formal ceremony on the open ground north of the palace. These political activities

and connections lent a strength and progressiveness to Abdullahi's reign, and made him resonate

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[56] The first durbar was conducted in 1925 on the British race course outside Kano city and was intended to promote the
local aristocracy as a spectacle of power in honour of the historic visit of the Prince of Wales. A circular from the so-called Station
Magistrate dated 26.3.25 states,

All Europeans, Bompai and Nassarawa
Kano Durbar
The following notice is cirulated for general information as there appears to be some misunderstanding as
regards Invitations for the Durbar of chiefs [the _emir_ and nobility] to be held on the Race Course at 8a.m. on the
morning of the 18th April.
2. Please note that all who wish to attend should apply for a ticket to the Officer-in-Charge Durbar. This also
applies to the Fireworks Display on the evening of 18th April. A notice to this effect is posted at the Club. No one
will be able to attend either of these functions without a ticket.
3. The Dance on the evening of the 17th April will be given by His Excellency the Governor and invitartions to
this will be issued in the usual manner. (NAK/KAN/LA/140)

[57] The former title was awarded on his birthday, as inferred from a 5.6.34 telegraph from Lt. Governor Browne which
congratulates the _emir_ on his "birthday honour". The acronyms C.B.E. and C.M.G. refer to "Commander of the Order of the British
Empire" and "Companionship of the Order of St. Michael and St. George", respectively.

with all the traditional qualities of good patronage.

There seem to have been two major groups of persons who responded to Abdullahi's apparent strength. Wealthy and powerful persons (Hausa and Europeans) who needed him for political patronage would have bestowed gifts upon him, in traditional fashion, in proportion to their appreciation of and allegiance to him. Obversely, the poor and/or dispossessed needed his patronage for economic gain. One undoubtedly (and literally) fed the other.

The latter probably included slaves who left the palace in 1925 and 1926 (above) who would have suffered a series of economic setbacks in the late 1920s when revenues from groundnut and other cash crop production plummetted as a result of the global recession (Shenton, 1987). These were who had left the palace but who now found themselves unable to make it on the "outside". But there was another event which affected the non-resident royal slave community more directly. In 1935 the British burned down all the homes of slaves living and farming on nearby Gandun Nassarawa so as to expropriate forcefully and "cleanse" the area. It was their intention to incorporate the land into the "Government Reserved Areas" (Giginyu, 1981). The freed slaves who streamed back into the palace during Abdullahi's reign probably derived from both of these disadvantaged groups. Patronage, considerably weakened during Usman, was now re-vitalised within aristocratic life, and the problems of finding palace labour became less acute.

The effects of "abolition" and "voluntary" slavery in reworking the male slave landscape

The abolition of palace slavery in 1926, along with the earlier slavery proscriptions and the exile and exodus of palace slaves, were negotiated throughout the complex terrain of male slavery. Many dogarai, for example, had either deserted the palace grounds or been co-opted into the yan gadi (above) leaving no one to guard the southern or northern palace entrances or shigifa passageways. The large pool of slave labour needed for building maintenance was also not forthcoming. In addition, Sallama's household and city ward, located northeast of the palace, had deteriorated substantially, especially following the 1903 ban on arms production and Sallama's

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exile in 1925. Eunuch strongholds in the central kofar gida and southern shigifa were materially

and socially deteriorating as a result of the declining eunuch population.[58]

As slave numbers decreased, alternative "modern" labour sources were sought and the

composition and organisation of the male slave landscape changed. Native Authority policemen

were invited into the palace to patrol the now unguarded palace entrances and passageways.

Other forms of menial labour, such as roof thatching, continued to be carried out for minimal pay

by free-born men from nearby villages during the dry season.[59] Abdullahi also seized the spatial

opportunities presented by Sallama's absence to transform a portion of his domain into

guesthouses for leaders from other emirates in the province, including Hadejia, Kazaure and

Gumel (Sallama 27.10.89).[60]

Eunuch labour, especially in the domestic realm, was sought in the form of impotent or

hermaphroditic "men", a practice which has continued to the present.[61] The "head eunuch" of

the present emir, for example, was conscripted from the prison yard next to the palace where it

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[58] Although the slavery proscription prevented new slave (and thus eunuch) purchases, a short term solution to the problem of obtaining eunuch labour might have been the partial castration of some slave men present at the time of the conquest. It is assumed here, however, that the British forbade castration, but this is not certain: the absence of new eunuchs may also have reflected the disinterest of freed slave men in being voluntarily "castrated" or debilitated sexually. The latter may seem absurdly obvious, but according to one French official who participated in the occupation of nearby Damagaram, the high status and benefits of eunuchs provided incentive to at least some slave men to volunteer to be "castrated" following the French conquest (John Lavers, pers. comm. 20.3.90).

[59] The practice of using off-season labour began during Usman's reign (above). Although emoluments to these men were small, they would have been provided with substantial patronage benefits such as housing and food.

[60] The guesthouses also occupy a portion of the adjacent ward of Durumin Iya (lit. the fig tree of the [woman] Iya). The concept of formal guesthouses seems to have arisen in 1931 following the colonial formation of the Advisory Council of Chiefs, which required that northern leaders meet simultaneously in Kaduna, located south of Kano. As such the Lt. Governor circulated a memorandum to Provincial Residents inviting them to "submit proposals of any Chiefs [emirs] in your Province who desire to build and maintain a house in Kaduna or its environs". A memorandun circulated the following day informed them that "the Emir of Zaria has agreed to allocate to members of the Advisory Council such land as may be necessary for the erection and maintenance of houses outside Kaduna Township. No rent will be payable." (NAK/KANPROF 2589)

Guesthouses, however, had traditionally been unnecessary because emirate affairs were not conducted through centralised extra-emirate councils.

[61] The role of domestic eunuchs inside the women's realms is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.

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had been discovered that he "was not a man" (Asmau, 2.9.89).[62]

The largest and most striking re-ordering of male slave places began soon after Abdullahi's return from England in 1934.[63] Most of these changes occurred in the southern kofar gida and shigifa realms, and centred around the construction of a new Islamic (Shari'a) court and state council room,[64] named Rumfar kasa (lit. hut of mud; Fig. 5.3). The placement, function and socio-spatiality of Rumfar kasa reveal significant changes in traditional political culture tied to the development of Western structures and perspectives. These changes were especially detrimental to the realms of eunuchs and dogarai.

Rumfar kasa pre-empted the other religious and state fora in that it became the sole official venue for weekly British-designated meetings between the emir and his rural hakimai.[65] The traditional importance and prerogative of moving and rotating the place of council to different parts of the palace thereby ceased. The new spatial permanence in place in some ways reflected the rigid control exerted by the colonial regime over the organisation and placement of nobility.

The chamber was also located on the former site of the female litigants' chamber, which was consequently torn down and re-located slightly northward, thereby retracting the southern limit of women's realms (Fig. 5.3).[66] The more public location also contrasted markedly with those of pre-colonial courts which lay within the confines of the female-guarded portions of the shigifa, out of public view.

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[62] Alamai supervised palace construction workers and may have worked on Abdullahi's farming projects in the eastern fields of Shekar Gabas (lit. field of the east). The latter activity is inferred from the secondary name of Shekar Alamai (lit. field of Alamai) assigned to the fields during his tenure.

[63] Because most palace informants think of time mostly in terms of events, it was not possible to get exact dates for building construction. By utilising biographical data of informants, along with other bits of interview and archival data, however, it was derived that most of the changes occurred before 1942, and probably between 1934 and 1936.

[64] The double religious-state court function of Rumfar kasa reflected the Islamic unity of religion and the state and was typified in all other palace court rooms (chapter 4).

[65] These fora included Soron fadanci in the north, and Kudanda and the Sorayen Bello, cafe and giwa in the south (chapter 4).

[66] Sallama (28.10.89)

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Map (a) labels:

N →

Gidan Sarkun hatsi

cemetery

Soron gwa

Soran kofar kudu

Sora gwabje

Soron Ma-kwaron

Kudanda

female litigants

mosale

Soron Bello

dogarai

Gidan Turakun Soro

Gidan baba

Soron cafe

Babban soro

borrow pit

escape route

don Rimi

Kofar Kworu

Soron fadanci

stables

Kofar fatalwa

Shamaki

Map (b) labels:

N →

high wall placed around cemetery

re-aligned Soron kofar kudu, re-named Soron tuta

female jakodiya re-placed by male guard

female litigants chamber razed to build Rumfar kasa

re-aligned Soro gwabjeje, re-named Soron takalma

Kudanda enlarged, re-named Zauna lafiya

new female litigants chamber (converted later into public relations office)

partial demolition of dogarai quarters to build primary school

Soron cafe re-placed by Soron Ingila

no titled slaves

no titled slaves

new gate for Abdullahi's car

Soron fatalwa

consolidation of Qur'anic teaching for slave and free boys

Figure 5.3 (a) The landscape of male slavery circa 1925. (b) Changes to male slave places initiated by emir Abdullahi in the 1930s. Note that the linear vista is represented by a dashed line.

There is some evidence that this more public siting the <u>emir</u> and his court more publicly was done in part at the insistence of British officials. An extract from the "handing over notes" of Mr. H.O. Lindsell to Mr. f.M. Nead dated 1.5.33, for example, states that "The <u>emir</u> in response to a suggestion (made by His Honour and also mentioned by His Excellency) now occasionally sits in the open outside his House so as to be publicly accessible to all." (KANPROF 4164).[67]

The secluded placement and quality of the traditional court chambers were also eroded when <u>Soron cafe</u> was converted into a large reception hall for British officials and international visitors. Its international function and character were reflected in its new name, <u>Soron Ingila</u> (lit. hall of England).[68] Nearby, a small public relations office staffed by the personal secretary of the <u>emir</u> was instituted.[69]

Unlike the other courts, <u>Rumfar kasa</u> had an extremely large entranceway that faced southward towards the public domain. It was placed at the apex of a linear vista which allowed the <u>emir</u>, when seated on his throne, to see southward past the gate separating the <u>shiqifa</u> from the <u>kofar qida</u> (known as <u>Soro gwabieie</u>, or, literally, the big hall), and the southern entranceway, and into the city (Fig. 5.3). The linearity of the vista visually and practically linked the southern <u>shiqifa</u> with the more public <u>kofar qida</u> and, thereby, the <u>emir</u> with "the public".

The greater visual connectedness was experienced by all visitors who, upon entering the

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[67] The handing-over notes go on to say that "This was the practice of his father Abbas and is a welcome revival". The several informants who I questioned about this statement denied that Abbas met with the public. The British may be referring to the fact that initially, when Abbas presided over the religious courts, he would have occasionally met litigants inside <u>Kudanda</u>, which was at that time used as a religious and state council chamber (chapter 4). <u>Kudanda</u> was, however, an enclosed chamber facing to the west and would have been heavily guarded and inaccessible to the public.

In addition, although the handing-over notes state that public accessibility of the <u>emir</u> was a suggestion, the fact that the suggestion emanated from the British Governor of Nigeria (the highest ranked British official in Nigeria) would have made it somewhat compelling. These notes also mention that a similar and initial suggestion was made (but not taken up) in 1926, indicating that there was almost seven years of British lobbying for the change.

[68] Rufa'i (1987) claims that Abdullahi ordered this chamber to be completed before his return from England. The data seem to indicate, however, that it was built after his arrival. The function and some of the interior design details, for example, seem to have been inspired by his visit to Buckingham palace, which occurred during the latter part of his England stay (on 2 July 1934) and would not have been communicable to the builders from England (NAK/KANPROF 1081 v.II).

[69] Initially the room served as a chamber for female litigants, re-placing that demolished to accommodate <u>Rumfar kasa</u>.

kofar gida when the emir was seated in Rumfar kasa, were aware that they could be seen by him. This knowledge compelled them, out of respect and custom, to remove their shoes before they reached, or while inside the lateral corridors of, Soro gwabjeje. The latter was consequently re-named Soron takalma (lit. room of the shoes).[70]

The development of such an unobstructed view required that the southern entranceway and Soro gwabjeje (or takalma) be re-built and re-aligned, which was accomplished using British personnel, probably seconded from the colonial Public Works Department (below; Sarkin hatsi, 18.11.88; Sarkin gini, 22.11.88). The alignment was facilitated further by the broadening of the gate widths and heights to allow entry of motor vehicles. Abdullahi had purchased an automobile soon after his accession, and the British now used cars as their main mode of transport. A rather untraditionally-styled opening was cut into the northeastern palace wall to allow entry of Abdullahi's car, which was parked along the southern partition wall of the *northern* slave quarters (Fig. 5.3).[71]

Other structures which impeded the extent of the view, or which seemed unconnected with it, were altered appropriately. The detached entrance hall or zaure of the main eunuch settlement, now called Gidan Shettima (lit. the house of Shettima),[72] was demolished to allow

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[70] Any time that the emir is seated in any one of several audience chambers, everyone must steer clear of his line of view, unless they are expected and have been announced. They must also remain barefooted until the emir leaves the chamber, and if located within view, they must comport themselves in a submissive manner. Male and female guards are there to enforce these customs or to point out to visitors where the emir is seated.

[71] Before the emir left for England in 1934, he already owned a Crossley, which was in need of an overhaul. The emir was advised by British officials that, if time allowed, he should look into purchasing a new car while in England, one suggestion being a 20 H.P. Austin. The driver of the Crossley could apparently manipulate the bulb of the car horn to make it sound like the kakaki, a traditional horn played to announce royalty (NAK/KANPROF 2063).

[72] This eunuch settlement corresponds to that established centuries before for purposes of guarding the emir (chapter 3). During Abbas' reign, it was known as Gidan Baba (lit. house of the eunuch). Baba referring to his favorite eunuch. By Abdullahi's reign, however, a servant named Shettima resided there, presumably with freed eunuchs and male slave assistants. The services and titles of the latter were not dispensed with, at least in practice, despite the "abolition" (Mai-daki 4.9.89). The name of the compound consequently changed to Gidan Shettima, not to be confused with the Gidan Shettima next to the palace that was used by the British as their city residence (see Frishman, 1977).

Sallama (28.10.89) claims that a portion of the nearby eunuch colony, known as Gidan Mai-unguwa (not the title-holder of that name), which had been the residence of the eunuch Turakin soro, was also demolished.

for the expansion of Kudanda (now called Zauna lafiya (lit. sitting in peace) and the re-alignment

of its entranceways onto the vista axis. It was presumably also at this time that Zauna lafiya

became used solely for ceremonial purposes, namely, the turbanning of hakimai. Furthermore, a

high linear retaining wall was built around the cemetery, forcing the viewer's gaze along the

northerly-trending vista; deceased royalty thus became dis-integrated from the traditionally

secluded places of aristocratic rule (Fig. 5.3).

The re-ordering was re-inforced and extended southward to encompass the construction

of a British-style primary school for royal and neighboring children, northeast of Kofar takalma. The

two buildings were shaped rectangularly and placed so as not to obstruct the linear vista. One

of the school buildings was for boys, in back of which were dormitories for royal sons attending

the school, while the other was for girls.

To accommodate the new school building, part of the traditional paramilitary settlement

was razed, including the compound of Mai-shanu (lit. master of the cattle).[73] Those persons

displaced by the school were re-settled to other parts of the palace, and presumably the ward of

Dogarai (chapter 4).[74] In addition, the southern palace wall was moved approximately 30m

further south (in line with the newly aligned and re-built southern gateway). The latter was now

two-storeys in height and capped by a flag representing the Sullubawa clan, as a result of which

it became known as "Soron tuta" or "gate of the flag".[75] The use of a flag was quite untraditional

(flags only being borne into the battlefield), and may have been inspired by Abdullahi's trip to

England, his report of which noted the importance of flag-bearing atcp Buckingham palace and

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[73] Mai-shanu tended the cattle at Gandun Nasarawa and the palace (chapter 4). His changing role during the colonial period is discussed in mroe detail in chapter 6.

[74] Dogarai had, by this time, been stripped of public duties and now exclusively served as bodyguards for the emir and hakimai. According to Sallama (28.10.89), many of these men were consequently idle and felt restless.

[75] The gate was known as "Soron kudu" or "gate of the south" in the late nineteenth century (chapter 4).

the House of Parliament.[76]

Besides signalling the demise of the traditional paramilitary community, the school signified and allowed a socio-spatial transformation of slave children's education and lives. Slave children were now educated alongside "outside" and royal children. The dissolution of religious spaces promoting differences in birthright was replicated in the northern Kofar gida: whereas previously slave and free boys were educated in separate places, they were now educated together in the room that formerly had served only royalty, near Kofar fatalwa (lit. the gate of ghost). The close proximity of boys and girls also broke down the gendered spatial exclusivity of traditional Islamic education.[77]

The more southerly placement and southern orientation of Rumfar kasa, the visual connectedness of Rumfar kasa with other more public structures and areas southward along the vista, and the openess of the area to motor vehicles indicate that the southern shigifa realm, and Rumfar kasa in particular, had become more publicly accessible. The civic nature of the southern realms also intimate that the southern shigifa had become a formal extension of the kofar gida. By becoming more public, however, the area also became more "male" (see chapter 3). This change in gender helps explain why Abdullahi dis-placed the female litigants' chamber to the north (above); why he re-placed the female guardswoman or jakadiya who customarily guarded the passage adjacent to Rumfar kasa, with a male guard, upon the former's death (above);[78] and why Soron cafe (now Soron Ingila) could be converted into more of a public relations forum:

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[76] It was noted for example, that "On the arrival of the King [into Buckingham palace], the Union Jack was hoisted", and that at the House of Parliament "whenever the Lords are working the Union Jack is hoisted up" (NAK/KANPROF 1081 vii).

[77] Young girls were trained inside the cikin gida (chapter 6).

The education of royal children was likewise transformed. Not only were royalty now educated alongside slaves and outsiders, but the new training helped displace that provided by the state slave Sallama who apprenticed young royalty (especially boys) in the protocol and responsibilities needed in state administration.

[78] The guard woman, known as Mai-kwaron kwatso, was replaced by a man known as Mai-unguwa, not to be confused with the title-holder of the same name Baba dan moshe (1.9.89). Traditionally, female jakadu (sing. jakadiya) guarded the three innermost southern shigifa passageways between which were located the court chambers (chapter 4). With the replacement of the southernmost jakadiya with a man, the role of women in guarding places of state was eroded.

that is, the leading edge of the "male" kofar gida had shifted northward.[79] This merging of the

southern shigifa with the kofar gida realm is also implicated in the singularity and content of the

name assigned to the region, Kofar kudu (lit. gate of the south).[80]

By the end of Abdullahi's reign, the landscape of male slavery, especially in the southern

kofar gida, had been substantially eroded and re-worked to entertain some of the institutions and

spatiality of the new cultural and economic order. Throughout the re-building process, traditional

builders (led by the slave Sarkin gini (lit. king of building),[81] and adobe-based building materials

were employed, lending an appearance of tradition to what was clearly a dramatic Westernisation

of Hausa culture. The landscape changes reflected micro-cosmically the re-structuring of state

finance and the division of labour, outlined briefly, below.

Changing images and financing of the state: the political economic context of change

The socio-spatial erosion of male slavery was enabled *practically* by radical changes in

colonial images and financing of "traditional" state administration. As Ubah (1985: 183-186)

explains, Lugard had initially intended the "traditional" state or Native Authority to be defined

largely by the royal family and other nobility. Their respective salaries were made up of carefully

prescribed *proportions* of the total tax revenues allotted to the Native Authority (Fig. 5.4). Salary

allotments based upon revenue proportions continued until 1909 when the emir and his quasi-

state council (above) were allocated *fixed* incomes, which totalled less than the amount they had

received formerly. The resultant "surplus" was channeled into a Native treasury formed in the same

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[79] See chapter 3 which discusses the "maleness" or male control over public domains of households.

[80] That is, the entire area was assigned a single name. It was also domed a "gate" or "kofa", indicating that it was now part of the formal public space near the entrance or "gate" of the house, that is, the kofar gida (see chapter 3).

[81] Palace builders were led by a well-organised hierarchy of title-holding slave builders, the most important being Sarkin gini (lit. king of the builders). Despite the rhetoric of slave title cancellation, interview data shows that Sarkin gini and his title-holding assistants continued to maintain their titles (albeit informally) and administer palace building labour (by this time mostly prisoners). They were also called upon to recruit labour for colonial projects and to send some of their apprentices for training in the colonial Crafts School and Public Works Department.

Figure 5.4 Historic changes in remuneration of the aristocracy and the structure of the Native Authority Treasury. Note the switch-over to fixed salaries beginning in 1909. The figures cited are for the 50% portion of taxes allotted by the British to the Native Authority (modified from data in Ubah, 1985).

1905-06 (SIR FREDERICK LUGARD)

General Tax		Pastoral tax	
22%	principle chief (in this case, the emir)	35%	emir
17%	district heads	10%	ruga
6%	recognised office holders	5%	collectors
5%	village heads		

1908 (RESIDENT CARGILL)
25% emir
25% district heads

1909 (RESIDENT TEMPLE)[1]
£ 4,800 emir
£ 1,000 Waziri (chief counsel)
£ 360 Ma'aji (treasurer)
£   72 Liman (chief religious counsel)
£ 24 x 4 4 mallams (religious scholars)

1916 (RESIDENT PALMER)
All district heads placed on fixed salaries

1926
£ 5,000 emir

1930[2]
£ 6,000 emir

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[1] Native Authority tresury created to maintain "surplus". £1,000 of £6,000 surplus of 1909 invested in "education".

[2] In the 1930s, many Native Authority (N.A.) officials and other labour officially made civil servants with wages paid for from the Native Treasury. These persons include all district and village heads, all religious court officials, the chief religious counsel and muezzin, dogaral 'yan gadi and personnel involved in prison administration, education, land survey and medical and forestry workers. European officials seconded to the N.A. also paid for from N.A. monies.

year, thereby inaugurating concepts and practices surrounding "public monies" and "public works".[82]

In 1917, partly as a result of rising tax revenues, Resident Palmer extended the practice of fixed salary entitlements to all hakimai. This policy gave rise, in addition to stricter tax collection methods and higher tax rates and revenues, to spiralling surpluses which were eventually deposited in British-owned banks. Although Lugard had originally not intended for "public works" to be part of British rule, by 1918 he recognised that,

> the general tax assigned to the Native Administration affords, not merely the means of providing an adequate income for its officials, but also a fund by the aid of which the Native Administration can take direct part in such of the projects of Government as it is well fitted to co-operate in. It can build court houses and schools, and pay the Native staff. It can assist in Forestry work, and undertake Public Works of local importance, whether carried out by its own employees or executed by Governor and paid for out of its funds. In short, it can co-operate in the progress of Nigeria, according to its means and the state of development it has reached. (In Ubah, 1985: 183).

After World War I, monies were funnelled increasingly into road construction, enabling the emir, hakimai, colonial officials and others with vested interests to travel regularly and tour the emirate in automobiles. Motor vehicles also aided in the extraction of economic resources from the countryside, such as the collection of primary agricultural products at designated "buying stations". The entry of cars into the palace during the reign of Abdullahi was thus an extension and reflection of the means and increasing efficiency by which the region was accessed and controlled.[83] By the 1930s, sanitation, drainage and refuse disposal plans were implemented along with the largest electricity and water supply scheme in West Africa, all of which were

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[82] The 1909 "surplus" was chanelled into "education". See plates 55 and 56 of A guide to the Gidan Makama Museum Kano (1985), which shows a crowded geography lesson being conducted outside the city walls in 1913, and the first colonial Director of Education (1914), Hans Vischer, respectively.

[83] As a result of World War II, many lorries were lent to the "Free Fighting French Forces" in Chad such that acute shortages in motor vehicles in Nigeria resulted. This shortage led to formal complaints to the colonial government which outline the various cadres of motor vehicle owners and users which probably developed in the late 1930s. The Bank of British West AFrican, for example, requested a car for one of their clients, while a District Officer wrote directly to British suppliers, hoping to short-circuit the request process. Meanwhile, the emir of Kazaure complained of having to borrow a car from the emir of Kano and requested a car of his own, which he received. In addition, a prominent businessman, Ferris George, irately railed against the political privileges of his rival Joseph Raccah, who had two personal vehicles, while he had none. Many requests referred to the great need to access groundnut buying stations (KANPROF 3985).

extended into the palace grounds. Native Authority offices and courthouses were also constructed, with Soron Ingila and Rumfar kasa representing a small fraction of the new state and now "public" building. In addition, increasing pressures for "skilled" labour and "public" administrators and civil servants led to the development of Western educational facilities resulting in the building of numerous primary and secondary schools in the 1930s, of which Kano Middle School and the palace primary school were part.

In addition, palace prison labour was part of a much larger prison labour pool deployed for road and public works construction throughout the emirate. Although the Native Authority funded its own projects, most public works were inspired, designed and supervised by British personnel seconded from the colonial government Public Works Department. The Native Authority thus paid for British expertise out of monies from the Native treasury (Ubah, 1985: 184). It was this expertise which was drawn upon to re-structure Kofar kudu.

By the time of Sanusi's reign, the substantive political-economic interdependence of masters and slaves had largely broken down. "Space" remained only for those "slaves" who held waged labour positions funded formally by the Native Authority, or who could be maintained, in full or in part, by informal patronage benefits of the emir. Although Sanusi re-introduced slave positions and titles, the spatiality and content of male slave places continued to be transfigured to accommodate Western-inspired institutions and built forms, discussed below.

EMIR SANUSI (1953-63):
"SLAVE" CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE RISE OF ARISTOCRATIC PATRONAGE

Many informants agreed that as a result of Abdullahi's gentle nature and what they perceived as largely disinterest in traditional politics, his son and adjunct Sanusi, then Ciroma of Kano, became increasingly powerful. While numerous slaves returned voluntarily to the palace during Abdullahi's reign, many others drifted over to serve the household of Ciroma, where they received benefits befitting traditional royal patronage, such as homes, clothing and food. Ciroma thus had considerable slave support upon his accession to the throne in 1953. His popularity with

slaves, and their allegiance to him, was heightened further following the Queen of England's visit in 1956. Emir Sanusi, perhaps aware that the Queen would be particularly sympathetic to the traditions of aristocracy, pleaded that slave titles and responsibilities, but *not* slavery itself, be re-instated, and that the three main titled slaves of state be recalled from their places of rural exile. Titles were re-sanctioned soon thereafter, and Sallama, Shamaki and dan Rimi were recalled along with their title-holding assistants and families (Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90).[84]

This re-legitimation of slave offices took place, however, within a fundamentally different kind of state structure. These slaves were not embraced by the arms of patronage; they were incorporated into the Native Authority bureaucracy as civil servants. Palace staff and allegiances swelled at the expense of the public treasury, although relatively few traditional slave places or options remained. At the public's expense, for example, the traditional stronghold of Sallama outside the palace was converted partly into a guesthouse for visiting emirs (above). Sallama was consequently re-settled in the mid-section of the northern kofar gida, another former eunuch domain, presumably because eunuch numbers in the area had dwindled (Sallama 28.10.89; Malam Dau, 4.11.89). Shamaki's traditional quarters had also been taken over by others while he was in exile; he and his household were re-located to a house in the city ward of Kurawa (Sallama 28.10.89).[85]

The responsibilities of the three state slaves were also highly compromised. They were not allowed onto the state councils; they did not create or train the royal army; and they now dealt mainly with personal matters between royal and non-royal Fulani clans. The issues and realms upon which Sallama traditionally tutored the princes (chapter 4) were greatly restricted and increasingly peripheral to colonial concerns. Sallama was also not a eunuch. In addition, Shamaki now attended stables used mainly for ceremonial purposes, especially the India-inspired durbar.

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[84] Sallama noted that by the time of their re-call, the first generation of "exiles" had died and now successors had been appointed, despite their exile and the abolition of slave titles.

[85] See Figure 5.2 for the location of Kurawa. See also Ubah, 1985, 75.

Moreover, subordinates of slaves of state now performed menial labour (such as sweeping and carrying messages), while others were domestic servants and/or props to the spectacle of aristocratic authority (such as bodyguards and praise-singers). Despite their ambiguous and reduced stature, slave loyalties remained strong, probably because Sanusi seemed to have unrivalled powers. All continued to call themselves "bayin Sarkin" (lit. slaves of the King), assumed slave demeanors and mannerisms (for example, prostrating before royal family members), and had their children scarified facially with the uku-uku (lit. three-three).[86]

In the mid-1950s, a large dis-placement of male slaves occurred when the dual functions of the palace courts (religious and state) were split spatially into two. A large Native Authority court house was built east of the southern entranceway, and a similarly styled emirate council chamber was erected to the west (Fig. 5.5). Both structures were built on contract with European construction firms and, in contrast to other palace buildings, were made of cement blocks. The resultant bifurcation of court and emirate council realms emphasised dramatically the extent to which the traditionally theocratic state had been secularised. Moreover, it pointed to the separateness and pre-eminence of the colonially-created emirate council (above) in relation to the general council of hakimai, which continued to meet in Rumfar kasa on Fridays (c.f. Rufa'i, 1987: 153).

The emergence of these functions from chambers well within the palace confines to the palace edge was striking and underscored the rising public stature of state proceedings, promoted further by the positioning of the entranceways to face southward, away from the palace and into the city.[87] Nearby, the primary school was enlarged, and possibly along with Soron

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[86] Traditionally, three small whisker-like scars are made into either cheek of a slave infant, known as uku-uku (lit. three-three). According to Sallama, this custom was begun by Abdullahi dan Dabo (1855-83; chapter 4).

[87] In part, the public placement of the new emirate council chambers reflected the 1952 decision of the regional Northern House of Chiefs to abolish the status of emirs as sole Native Authorities that had been established in the 1933 Native Authority Ordinance. The system was democratised slightly by making it mandatory for the emirs to consult their councils, although Council decisions could still be reversed by the emir with the support of the Governor. This system was referred to as Emir-in-Council.

In an attempt to make the system even more publicly accountable, it was replaced by the Emir-and-Council system through the Native Authority Law of 1954 (see Ikara, 1985). This integration of conciliar changes with a growing national body politic was

new cement block wall section (visible from tarred roads) created for Queen of England's visit, 1956

row settlements

N →

don Rimi

three main slaves
of state return
circa 1957

Salama

emirate
council
chambers

police
barracks

Rumfar kasa

re-built primary school

court
house

cement block
office complex

Shamaki

row settlements

Figure 5.5 (a) Changes to the landscape of male slavery during the reign of Sanusi (1953-63) and Ado Bayero (1963-present). Rumfar kasa and linear vista shown for reference. (b) Palace landscape, 1990.

related to international events and tensions into which Nigeria was drawn, including the active role of Nigerians in World War II and the formation of an educated elite. These factors helped produce well-organised and nationalist opposition to colonialism, especially the administrative arm in the Northern Regions made up largely of the "traditional" aristocracy (see Coleman, 1971).

tuta,[88] was re-built in cement blocks.[89]

Conversion of the southern portion of the kofar qida into a completely open civic realm seems to have required increased security in the area. Dogarai were not deployed, however, as they now held few legal powers. Instead, Native Authority police were not only employed, but invited to *reside* in the area (Sallama, 29.11.91; Malam Kwaru, 28.11.89). Twelve identical and rectangular cement block barracks were subsequently built in an L-shape in back of the court house, parallel to but out of the sight line of the linear vista created by Abdullahi (Fig. 5.5).

Formerly, these police were attached to police headquarters located adjacent to the Native Authority Central Office. The latter was probably built during the mid- to late 1930s and was located immediately south of the southern palace gate.[90] That on-site barracks were built inside palace grounds signals an interesting twist in the realm of traditional patronage: a portion of a supposedly decentralised police force was made to live (and thus to some extent to depend upon) the household of the king. In this way a "modern" institution was co-opted into the traditional patronage system. The transfer was undoubtedly enhanced by Sanusi's younger brother and eventual successor, Ado Bayero (below), who was Chief of Police at the time (Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90).[91]

The building of these new structures entailed substantial re-ordering of the southern Kofar kudu. To accommodate the court and, somewhat ironically, the police barracks, the last remnants of the dogarai settlement were levelled, and behind the emirate council chambers, a portion of the

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[88] There is some discrepancy in informant data as to whether Abdullahi originally built (or re-built) Soron tuta in cement block, or whether he built it in mud and Sanusi re-built it in cement block. A blurry photograph dating from circa 1950 in A guide to the Gidan Makama Museum Kano (1985) seems to indicate that Soron tuta was originally built in cement.

[89] Those portions of the palace walls facing the route covered by the Queen in 1956, that is the western and southern sections, were also re-built in cement. The palace builders recall that the cement was called Raccah cement, suggesting that it was purchased from a subsidiary interest of Saul Raccah, a major Lebanese investor in the main cashcrop of Kano, groundnuts (see Shenton, 1987, although he claims that Raccah was Syrian).

[90] Archival maps show that the Native Authority Central Office was built in the mid-1930s and is directly in line with the southern vista established by emir Abdullahi (1926-53). The timing and connective spatiality of the Central Office and southern palace realms suggests that the Central Office was built as an administrative extension of the palace.

[91] A large number of Native Authority police were also used to escort the official vehicles of Sanusi, discussed below.

large compound of <u>Sarkin hatsi</u> (lit. king of the grains)[92] was razed. The large number of displaced persons were resettled in the eastern and western extremities of the southern <u>kofar gida</u>. The extensive brush that covered the southwestern and southeastern regions was consequently cleared, obliterating part of the palace hunting grounds. A partition wall was built between the southwestern region and the <u>cikin gida</u> (Fig. 5.4; <u>Sarkin hatsi</u>, 16.11.88; <u>Sarkin gini</u>, 22.11.88; <u>Sallama</u>, 28.10.89).[93]

The settlements were made up of several strings of attached adobe households arranged, in untraditional fashion, in linear rows and separated by large open spaces. The grid-like form of the settlements was chosen by colonial building engineers presumably, in part, to satisfy British officials, who strolled up and down the resulting corridors in a kind of inspection ritual that followed their weekly palace meetings with the <u>emir</u> (<u>Sarkin gini</u> 1.12.88). The upkeep of the new buildings in <u>Kofar kudu</u> was relegated to the Native Authority, thereby displacing and disempowering the royal hierarchy of traditional builders from nearly half the palace area (<u>Sarkin gini</u> 11.22.88).[94]

Less pronounced disruptions centred on the more formal accommodation of automobiles in the palace. Two cement block garages were built for official vehicles east of <u>Rumfar kasa</u> (along the western rim of the former eunuch colony), and in the northern <u>kofar gida</u>, a long linear covered motor passageway was constructed, called <u>Kofar mota</u> (lit. gate of the automobile). The passageway, also made from cement blocks, enabled vehicles to by-pass the northern slave settlement and proceed directly to the first guarded entrance of the northern <u>shigifa</u> (Fig. 5.5).

Whereas historically those who entered either of the two <u>dogarai</u>-guarded entranceways during pre-colonial days were scrutinized by slave inhabitants until they reached the first <u>shigifa</u>,

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[92] See chapters 4 and 6.

[93] At the turn of the century, the southwestern fields of the palace was used as hunting grounds for small game as well as wild deer and duiker (chapter 4).

[94] This hierarchy was composed of slaves bearing the conventional spectrum of "aristocratic" prefixes. Although they did not live in the palace, they were responsible for all palace building creation and supervision.

visitors and inhabitants were now partitioned into separate worlds; the utility of the community

realm as a kind of extended security check-point was discounted. Furthermore, the passageway

was constructed by bull-dozing a straight line path through Sallama's recently claimed compound,

cutting it into two halves and destroying a portion of its traditional non-linear internal spatial

organization. The smaller opening made in the north wall for Abdullahi's car was subsequently

closed (Fig. 5.5).

Increased accommodation of automobiles into the palace stemmed partly from Sanusi's

use of them to portray his wealth and prestige, and to promote further the *spectacle* of aristocratic

power. In particular, Sanusi purchased a Rolls Royce, and began the "tradition" of having his car

preceded by police escorts in vehicles with sirens sounding, and followed by at least two car

loads of dogarai, still wearing green and red robes and turbans (Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90; Kwaru,

28.11.89).[95] Thus, although Sanusi brought slaves out of exile and re-legitimated their titles, they

were not allowed to re-assume state powers, and many of their places were appropriated for

"civic" functions or as theatres for aristocratic spectacle. Moreover all were re-categorised and

salaried as civil servants, and many were utilised as menial labourers.

In 1960, Nigeria gained its independence. The colonial political order of Nigeria, based

previously upon dividing the country into three distinct ethno-geographic administrative

regions,[96] began to be questioned, along with the legitimacy and role of the "Northern"

aristocracy. Ensuing antagonisms between the independent national government and the

aristocracy led, in part, to the rather ignomonious deposition of Sanusi in 1963, following a federal

inquiry into his finances. He was re-placed by his ailing paternal uncle, Inuwa, who died after only

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[95] Malam Kwaru also noted that Sanusi's concubines were escorted by Native Authority police when one or more of them accompanied him on his travels.

The use of motored escorts was actually begun during the latter years of Abdullahi's reign, but consisted of a single police escort mounted on a motorcycle (Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90).

[96] Nigeria was composed colonially into the Northern, Western and Eastern Regions, which were inhabited primarily by persons of Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo descent, respectively.

ten months, having had no time to initiate any changes or complement those begun by his predecessor. Inuwa was succeeded by the thirty-three-year-old son of emir Abdullahi, Ado Bayero.

1963-PRESENT: EMIR ADO BAYERO AND POST-INDEPENDENCE CHALLENGES

Ado Bayero was the first emir to have experienced a full gamut of British schooling and to have consistently served in Western-derived colonial institutions. He was an alumnus of the Kofar Kudu primary school inside the palace and the Middle School and School of Arabic Studies in Kano city. Thereafter he graduated from Barewa College in Kaduna,[97] whereupon he worked for the Bank of West Africa and, later, the Native Authority as a clerk and the Development Secretary. In 1956, he was elected to the Northern House of Assembly and later served on the Board of the Northern Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation. He was then appointed Chief of Native Authority Police for Kano emirate and, in 1962, the Nigerian Ambassador to Senegal. In 1963, he was recalled from the latter post to become emir of Kano (Moousa-Booth and Dugurawa, 1988; Dokaji Kano, 1971).

In 1966, soon after his accession, independent Nigeria underwent its first military coup, after which the legitimacy of "traditional" leadership was challenged more forcefully. The three colonially-derived ethno-geographic regions were replaced by twelve states, and the Federal Military Government took over judicial, police and prison administration from the colonially-created emirate "Native Authorities" (Ikara, 1985). Native Authority Councils (that is, the emirate councils) throughout the newly formed states were dissolved and replaced with Local Government Councils (LGCs) and religious courts were made autonomous from the traditional juducial authority of the emirs. Membership of the LGCs was expanded to allow fuller representation of rural peoples, with two-thirds of the members being elected; emirs were made accountable to the Local Authority; and Local Government Councillors were granted administrative portfolios and held accountable to the federal government (Ikara, 1985). Although the powers of the "traditional" rulers dropped

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[97] Barewa College began in Katsina as Katsina College. After being re-sited in Kaduna, it was moved to Zaria. Regardless from which city the various alumni graduated, all are known as "Barewa boys".

precipitously, the appointed chairman of each Local Government Council was also a member of the largely defunct emirate council, such that some aristocratic control and political continuity were maintained (Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90).

While a large federal Secretariat for offices of federal ministries was constructed adjacent to the city gate of Nassarawa (lit. victory), the new emirate council chambers in Kofar kudu became largely moribund. Moreover, the new Qur'anic or Shar'ia court lost its legitimacy and was converted into an office building for nobility. According to the present emir, it also served as a liaison office for village people coming to Kano city in search of information regarding a higher court of appeal (Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90). The nearby police barracks were largely vacated and persons from other parts of the palace moved into them. Slave places in Kofar kudu, formerly re-placed by "civic" Native Authority realms, were now largely emptied of political purpose and obsolescent.

The powers and places of emirs were dis-placed further with the adoption of the 1979 Constitution. Local Governments were conferred constitutional recognition and guaranteed greater federal support, most importantly, financial support. The Constitution then placed traditional rulers under the executive arm of government, but only in an advisory capacity and at individual state levels (Ikara, 1985). Despite the dis-empowerment of the aristocracy, the federal government raised the salary of the emir in 1976 to N17,500 with an establishment charge of N17,500 and continued to fund the palace "slave" staff (Rufa'i, 1987: 190). These and other monies, along with the considerable informal political powers of the aristocracy, were (and are) used to support what is increasingly an *appearance* of traditional authority and slavery.

The most striking expression of the theatrical roles and places of male slaves occurs annually during the largest of palace spectacles, the India-inspired durbar (above). Shamaki adorns the palace horses in traditional war gear, he and Sallama retrieve the remaining quilted armour and spears from the various palace stores, and hundreds of palace musicians, jesters and praise singers don traditional instruments and/or costumes. On the appointed days, the

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ceremonial horse charges and parades are enacted within the open spaces immediately outside

the northern and southern slave realms. The seats of honour once reserved for colonial officers

have ironically been replaced by bleachers filled with Federal Military Government officials and

international diplomats. The rising scale and international exposure of this and other public

relations events have led many outsiders to believe that the aristocracy is still a vibrant power

base.[98]

On a more mundane level, dogarai still clothed in their colonial red and green "uniforms",

ceremonially attend to the emir, Shamaki tends the palace horses (now used only for ceremonial

occasions), and Sallama disciplines the royal children. Moreover, in the southern slave realms,

hakimai are still turbanned in Zauna lafiya, and they still meet with the emir in the various, but

largely defunct "state" chambers: that is, informally in Sorayen giwa, Bello and Ingila; on a weekly

basis in Rumfar kasa, according to colonial precedent; and occasionally, in the emirate council

chambers, a forerunner of the elected Local Government Councils of independent Nigeria.

Although these sites inscribe spatially historic attempts at making the aristocracy more publicly

placed and accountable, they also ironically trace out an outwardly bound path of departure

marking progressively the places from which the aristocracy fell from power.

While the emir's salary has not been increased since 1976 (Rufa'i, 1987: 109), the costs

of palace reproduction and a "royal" standard of living have risen considerably, due to rising real

costs, changing demand profiles, and the plummetting value of the national currency (the

Naira).[99] In large part, these dilemmas stem from the deepening attachments of the local

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[98] The enormity of national and international public relations duties is evident in the pamphlet entitled Souvenir of an Emir: a pictorial presentation which was printed in 1988 as part of the "Happy Silver Jubilee" celebrating the present emir's 25th year in power. Most of the book shows the emir talking with, or shaking the hands of, international and national leaders. The political support of national leaders is clearly seen in the first plate of the pamphlet, which features a full-size portrait of the present Military President, General Ibrahim Babangida, and by the fact that the pamphlet was published by the Directorate of Information, Ministry of INformation, Youth, Sports and Culture, Kano State, Nigeria.

[99] In 1985, one Naira equalled one U.S. dollar. By 1988, the value of the Naira decreased by an order of magnitude (10N = US$1) and in 1991, by a factor of 1.5 (15N = US$1).

A Native Authority Works Department letter to the Provincial Secretary in 1964 notes, for example, that a sum of L4,000 is required to re-wire the palace which at the time was "most unsafe and constitutes a danger to life". This cost is noted by the Senior

economy and culture with international and national capitalist interests and sectors, in the realms of production and consumption. The emir, for example, travels and shops internationally, and many of his older children study and/or travel abroad.[100] As a result, despite informal patronage benefits of housing, food and clothing, slave salaries are paltry.[101] Moreover, patronage benefits are meagre. Many homes in Kofar kudu and Kofar arewa are in a state of complete or partial collapse, and most home improvements are financed by the residents themselves. Food and clothing are disbursed rarely and the amounts are relatively trifling.[102]

Between 1979 and 1982, in an attempt to generate sufficient revenues and spatially streamline the political and economic contacts and interests of the emir, a large single-storey, L-shaped, pre-fabricated cement office complex was constructed on a last vestige of the southern eunuch colony.[103] The main office deals almost entirely with public relations, and is

District Officer of Kano who states that although £10,000 was allocated to palace upkeep in the 1962-68 Development Plan, within three months, over £8,000 of had been spent, such that when Ado Bayero came to power, less than £2,000 remained. Thereafter, the balance was spent, and another £2,000 was committed to repairs, £4,000 for re-wiring and £5,000 for the purchase of furniture. The Senior District Officer concludes that "Thus we can see then that the £10,000 in the Six Year Plan has been spent and that over-expenditure and future commitments total £21,000. This...excludes recurrent maintenance on the Emir's residences... Money has also been spent from the General Maintenance of Public Buildings' Votes" (NAF/15: 97).

Those concerns led the Provincial Secretary to officially comment to the Provincial Commissioner that "One of the constant difficulties which is being experienced by Kano N.A. [Native Authority] is to find sufficient funds to maintain adequately the various official residences of the Emir of Kano... [a]lthough a good deal of prison labour is used to try and keep these costs down." He states that before he can judge fairly the emir's requests for more funds, a "high-powered Board of Survey" be established "whose job it would be to value all the official buildings of the Emir of Kano and make recommendations". He then councils that "the five or six members should include by co-option or full membership an Engineer or Works Superintendent and a person skilled in the costing of mud buildings" (NAF/15: 99).

This was accepted by the Provincial Commissioner and later, the Native Authority Council, which then submitted the names of five persons who would help constitute the Board. Although none of those persons was an Engineer, the importance of one was impressed upon the Council who agreed subsequently to accept the Executive Engineer of the Native Authority. The Board was then commissioned formally.

[100] In 1987, the emir and his wives and concubines had one hundred and fourteen children (Rufa'i, 1987: 234).

[101] The few remaining royal builders, for example, each earn the present day equivalent of about $US 30 per month.

[102] See also Rufa'i, 1987: 116.

[103] The complex is attached to a new cement block residence for the emir (chapter 6), adjacent to which the emir recently installed a large satellite dish.

administered by the emir's private secretary,[104] whereas other rooms serve mainly as meeting halls for the emir and local, national and international male business and political associates. According to the civil engineer who was intimately involved in contract negotiations, the cost of the office complex totalled between 300,000 and 400,000 Naira.[105] Although the cost is striking, it was presumably built with the assumption that the paybacks would significantly exceed initial capital outlays. This articulation of the emir's economic and political capital with capitalist interests at-large, represents an historic and particularly focussed incursion of capitalist relations and values into the palace landscape.

Other revenue generating strategies have affected the labour profile of slaves. Many non-functional slave titles have been allowed to lapse, including Lifidi (the slave responsible for administering the helmeted soldiers), Shamaki Sallama (a high-ranking assistant of Shamaki), and san Kurmi (an official in charge of traditional prisons), their salaries presumably being re-directed to other personnel or services. Other slaves have been trained in skills linked to a Western-derived division of labour. Sarkin ruwa (lit. the king of water), at one time responsible for bringing the emir water in times of war, is the present emir's chauffeur, and Ciroman Sallama, at one time the high-ranking assistant to Sallama (and probably a eunuch), is now the emir's private secretary.

Perhaps the most radical, albeit partial, solution to the rising costs of palace reproduction was proposed recently by the emir: to convert Kofar kudu into a museum open to the public, the cost of conversion and upkeep being assumed by the federal government through the Federal Department of Antiquities (Sarkin Kano, 23.1.90). In all cases, what has been expended and expendable are the places, powers and incomes of male slaves.

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[104] The concept of a public relations office was begun by Abdullahi who established a small facility across from Soron Ingila. This office had earlier served as the female litigants chamber which replaced that demolished by Abdullahi when he built Rumfar kasa (Fig. 5.3).

[105] At that time, this amount of Naira equalled the same amount in U.S. dollars. N. Stephens was the contractor and George Aidi (a Syrian businessman not to be confused with the wealthy Hausa merchant of the same name) was the civil engineer.

When I left in July of 1990, another large addition was being constructed in cement blocks for religious scholars.

Although a number of slave titles and positions remain, slave loyalties have abated noticeably. Few slave children today, for example, are scarified facially with the marks of Kano slavery, and some slaves question openly the rules of slave lineage.[106] Moreover there seems to be at least some disagreement between slaves and aristocracy as to whether the slave strongholds ever "belonged" to the palace household.[107]

A cursory survey of the Kofar kudu row settlements shows that although many dogarai and waged slave labourers remain, only three policemen and their families reside in the police barracks, and the last vestige of the eunuch colony is home to only a single title-holding "eunuch", Turakin soro (chapter 3).[108] While Kofar arewa is made up of the households of Shamaki, dan Rimi, Sallama and lesser titled slaves, other residents are tied only indirectly (through lineage and profession) to the palace. These include a municipal Health Department official posted to the palace, and a palace gardener, driver and photographer who, along with several menial labourers, also work in the "outside" world. The remaining residential preserves of male slavery thus appear to be increasingly de-linked economically from palace-related labour and attached to the "outside" economy.

CONCLUSIONS

Royal male slaves and their aristocratic patrons strongly typified the "provider-provided for" dyad that dominated pre-colonial Hausa power relations. The dyad was politically, socially and economically synergistic and enabled a prestigious and refined division of state and domestic labour. The British recognised the integrity of royal slavery to traditional state formation and,

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[106] Sarkin gini (lit. king of the builders) claims proudly, for example, that his fore-father, Mai-nasara (lit. king of success) was a pre-colonial Fulani prince of the territory of Jama'are who was captured by Ibrahim Dabo (1819-45; chapter 4) and thence technically made a slave. Sarkin gini argues that because Mai-nasara was free royalty, and was captured wrongfully, he nor his progeny are slaves. He thus discounts or de-legitimates his slave status (despite his uku-uku), using a rather radical (in traditional terms) and hindsightful presumption. Whether this question of traditional birthright rules is novel or represents a much older complaint was not determined.

[107] Sarki Ado Bayero, for example, claims that Kofar arewa has never been part of the palace, but is a separate slave community, whereas slave informants considered the realm to be an integral part of the palace household (e.g., Sallama 29.1..89).

[108] Turakin soro, also referred to as dan ciki (lit. son of the stomach [or, inner palace chambers], is a hermaphrodite.

following their conquest of Kano in 1903, enacted a series of policies that attempted to destroy its foundation. In particular, royal slaves were pitted against the aristocracy and each other in ways which worked to colonial political advantage. Although British officers may not have recognised explicitly the strategic utility between spatiality and power, male slave places were re-figured in ways which effected an erosion of (and reflected the subsequent decrease in) their powers. This erosion deepened following independence in 1960 as a result of increased ties with the global capitalist economy and political culture.

There were several different *genres* of these re-figurations, each of which facilitated and reflected particular colonial (and later, post-colonial) cultural, political and economic strategies. From 1903 to 1907, for example, the British enacted measures to dissolve independent military capabilities of the state, which were controlled by male slaves. This *dissolution of power* was carried out and reflected spatially: palace arsenals and arms production facilities were *disassembled*; the small contingent of palace soldiers were *dispersed*; the slave-led army was *disbanded*; and the supreme military powers once awarded to the three main titleholding slaves of state were rescinded. Although these same three slaves, dan Rimi, Shamaki and Sallama were awarded jurisdiction over three separate rural districts during British geo-political "rationalisation" of the countryside, this rise in power was momentary.

Between 1907 and approximately 1925, slave powers were *streamlined into* the palace, which consequently became the stage for heated negotiations between the colonisers, the emir, other nobility and palace slaves. This phenomenon stemmed primarily from the forced emplacement of nobility into the countryside, in part to re-place the rural slave tax collectors or jakadu. Perhaps the most dramatic confrontation played out initially was that between the slave dan Rimi and the emir, relief from which was found through the withdrawal of dan Rimi from his extensive palace premises. Although the decision was soon repealed, it had been made clear to the public, and especially to the palace slave community, that even within the streamlined and *personal* terrain of the palace, the emir was not his own master.

Obversely, this streamlining of slaves into the palace was utilised by the emir to lessen his political alienation, especially that arising from the ruralisation of nobilty. In part, he relied heavily upon the three slaves of state for political intelligence and counsel. The consequent rise in slave powers was tolerated (although disliked) by British officials, as a concession to Abbas. Relations with the emir since the dan Rimi debacle had improved, and they saw that Abbas was able to manage his slaves with authority.

This palace localisation of slaves worked to great disadvantage, however, during the reign of his brother and successor Usman (1919-26) when, due to his physical and political weaknesses, slave powers increased somewhat uncontrollably. Ironically, British emplacement of nobility in the countryside was partly responsible for Usman's political weaknesses. His rurality probably impeded his ability to garner political and economic support from other nobility, and made him an object of derision in the palace. These factors, along with his relatively meagre salary, his excessive age, and rather brutish personality, made him practically incapable of providing.

In contrast to colonial disbandment of institutions under colonial control, and later localisation of slaves, the British now sought to defuse slave powers by *diffusion* of the main slaves of state throughout the countryside. Thus, in 1925, these men and their sizeable households were exiled to rural farm estates of the emir. Further diffusion resulted when other slaves, discouraged and disgusted with Usman's debilities, left the palace. Then, in 1926, palace slavery was abolished following colonial negotiations with Usman's soon-to-be successor, Abdullahi Bayero. Slave titles, which had structured and defined not only the division of state labour but personal slave identities, were annulled. These decisions, in conjunction with the 1926 mandate which universalised taxation among all men over sixteen years of age, pressured the emir into relinquishing at least a portion of his slave estates.

The series of crises which arose during 1925 and 1926 led to a partial integration of male slave labour into a western (colonial)-derived division of labour and the global capitalist economy.

In particular, some slaves became waged labourers or produced cash crops. This consequent economic and political independence of slave men enabled them to grasp social opportunities previously forbidden, especially the freedom to marry non-slave women.

The resultant labour loss to the palace would have threated the viability of the royal household and perhaps the colonial order, had not three labour "solutions" arisen during the reign of Abdullahi Bayero (1926-53). Each solution operated at a different socio-political level and entailed the further corrosion of male slave places. Prisoners were recruited from the nearby colonial prison and used as menial labour. The utilisation of this labour was linked with and reflected colonial (Western) ideas and practices surrounding prisons: specifically, that prisons were places of punishment, and that "free" exploitation of prison labour for civil works was legitimate.

Secondly, numerous slaves returned "voluntarily" to the palace, spurred on by a downturn in the global economy and by Abdullahi's ability (unlike Usman) to provide. The latter, in turn, was fed by the accommodationist nature of Abdullahi, and his many friendships with colonial officers, which secured strategic political and economic support from the British and international communities.

Waged labour was also utilised and developed. During the dry season, villagers were recruited to carry out menial tasks, and some slaves became salaried civil servants of the Native Authority. This latter possibility arose out of the restructuring of the Native Authority treasury, with "surplus" monies (or, the amount remaining after the aristocracy and other civil servants of the Native Authority received their salaries), being deemed "public" and fed into public expenditures and works. The privileged relations between the emir and the colonisers, and the emir and his slaves, respectively, allowed for the preferential enrolment of slaves into waged work both within Native Authority and other colonial projects.

Prison and waged labour thus involved the devolvement of slave tasks, formerly defined and sustained by entitled slave hierarchies (in which the master-slave relation inhered) onto

decentralised and colonially-derived and controlled divisions of labour. In this way, palace labour

became linked more directly to capitalist sectors and interests. These linkages were also evident

in "voluntary" slave labour. Although on the surface it appeared to re-produce traditional master-

slave relations, it emerged out of, and depended upon, economic crises generated from a

downturn in the global capitalist economy. It was also sustained by politically and economically

powerful capitalist patrons "external" to the traditional order.

The exile of state slaves and the concomitant institution of a new state council made up

solely of nobility, entailed the permanent removal of state functions from the overall repertoire of

palace slave (now waged or voluntary) responsibilities. What was most needed was menial labour

for physical reproduction of the palace and for ceremonial displays of aristocratic authority. Unlike

the dispays of ceremonial pomp and authority revived by Abdullahi dan Dabo (1855-83) which

arose out of and enabled his supreme rule, those of Abdullahi Bayero were produced increasingly

as ends in themselves, and masked the demise of aristocratic powers.

In sharp contrast to the negative and direct forces employed prior to 1926 to control the

old order, and slavery in particular, the policial and economic alienation of the emir from his slaves

following 1926 was much more subtle but pervasive. On the surface, workers worked and palace

life was re-produced, but on deeper social structural levels, these workers were dependent upon

an increasingly de-centralised organisational structure and division of labour, linked politically and

economically with the West.

This alienation was carried and reflected in the re-structuring of the male slave landscape

which ensued from the 1925-26 crisis period, and was part of the creation of colonially inspired

and designed public works in the city. Many of the western-style "public" social services and

infrastructures instituted or built in the city, such as metalled roads, pipe-borne water, electricity,

and schools, hospitals and prisons, were re-produced micro-cosmically in the palace. The

southern slave spaces of the palace, for example, were enlarged and re-spatialised into more

public arenas, using British colonial and Native Authority labour. A primary school was also

constructed and electricity and pipe-born water were introduced.

The image of the _emir_ as a "public servant" of the British Empire was also promoted. For this reason, a more publicly sited court room was built that was attached to a linear vista connected directly to the public. Visitors were now compelled to remove their shoes and to display proper subservience from quite an untraditionally long distance. Incongruously, visual-practical powers created by the vista reflected a loss of real aristocratic authority, a kind of drawing out of the _emir_ from the confines of traditional secrecy and prerogative to become more of a public display.

This "public" seat of rule required appropriation and re-figuring of slave places. The high portals of the two southern entranceways, which once enabled mounted nobility to enter without dismounting, were re-built to allow the entry of official British vehicles. The eunuch settlement was partly dismantled, the cemetery was walled, and the southern entranceways were re-aligned to create a north-south-trending linear perspective, at the apex of which was a court room presided over by the _emir_.

Sanusi's reign was marked a number of contradictions which underscored the inherent tensions of an aristocracy controlled from "above" and linked increasingly into western cultural forms and institutions. While aristocratic spectacle was heightened and the master-slave-based order had become largely obsolete, those titles of the key slaves of state were re-claimed legally through the intervention of the Queen of England. Those slaves who returned, however, did so as salaried civil servants. Although the presence of these slaves of state lent a kind of visual continuity with the past, their special skills and responsibilities were no longer legitimate or useful. Like other slaves of traditionally less importance, state slave allegiance degenerated into dependence upon the _emir_ for waged employment in the new order.

This final fall of state slaves from positions and places of prestige and power was obscured further by the large number of state-related building projects undertaken by Sanusi and his displays of aristocratic pageantry, all of which contained other levels of contradictions. While

emirate council and religious court chambers were made publicly accessible and were guarded by waged Native Authority policemen, their construction displaced the traditional military community. And while residential areas were built for displaced persons, the configuration of the settlement aided the military-like scrutiny of visiting British officials, and rigidified the "organic" growth patterns of household shape and size (chapter 3). Moreover, while both Native Authority police and dogarai escorted the emir in his travels, the emir travelled in a Rolls Royce, with sirens blaring.

The contradictions between the new and old orders were finalised and formally broken following independence in 1960. Sanusi was deposed in 1963, (ostensibly as a result of a federal inquiry into his finances)[109] and following the federal military coup (during the reign of Ado Bayero), aristocratic privilege and legitimacy were rescinded.

Several revenue-generating strategies were adopted by the new emir to help retain an appearance of royal prestige and power. Some titles were permitted to lapse, while others were attached to duties unconnected with the actual title meaning. More importantly, relations with local, national and international political and economic interests were streamlined into the palace via the pre-fabricated cement office complex built on a vestige of the former southern eunuch colony.

Paradoxically, the federal government continues to support the aristocracy minimally through salary provisions and maintenance expenditures which, in light of present day costs, are insufficient. This patronage may reflect the political and economic momentum of the aristocracy, the desire of the federal government to enact change through existing political structures, as well as the support of the aristocracy by the international political community.

The success in "providing for" the royal slave household has therefore been limited, and it has been slave powers, incomes and places that have been eroded. Many slaves derive few benefits from their attachment to the palace and are increasingly linking into the modern waged sector outside the palace. These economic and political pressures have led the present emir to

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[109] The results of the so-called Muffett Inquiry were never made public.

solicit the support of the Federal Department of Antiquities. Such an overture suggests that in future a large portion of the palace, and particularly the former male slave realms in the south, will survive as a federally supported and symbolic institution partially open to and funded by the public. Royal spectacle would thereby mirror that of Britain, perhaps the final political "solution" to the role of aristocracy bequeathed to them by their former overlords.

Chapter 6.

The impact of British imperialism on the palace landscape of female slavery

INTRODUCTION

Prior to colonial rule, there were three main palace slave realms that defined a gendered division of labour (chapters 3 and 4). Male slaves involved in matters of state, ensuring the personal safety of the emir, and the organisation of palace food production and distribution, lived in two realms peripheral to the cikin gida.[1] Within the interior of the palace or cikin gida (lit. inside of the house), female slaves (and to a much lesser extent, eunuchs) catered to the domestic needs of the emir and his freeborn family members.

Because male slaves held substantial powers, their territories became grounds for immediate, direct negotiations following the British conquest (chapter 5). In contrast, the spaces of slave women were affected much later and indirectly, largely in response to the deterioration of male slavery. The secondary changes were especially evident in colonial tolerance of concubinage, related to the non-threatening domestic positions of women in the state, and to the patriarchal nature of British directives and British and Hausa societies.

In this chapter, the pre-colonial characteristics and extent of slave women's places and labour in the cikin gida are outlined; changes in the socio-spatial relations of female slavery which occurred as a result of imperialism are mapped; and the function and state of female slavery in post-colonial Kano and what seem to be new kinds of female slave uses are explored. Such a gendered spatial analysis illuminates the very different histories, opportunities and relations of power which shaped the worlds of slave men and women.

PRE-COLONIAL SPACES OF SLAVE WOMEN IN THE CIKIN GIDA

There were two main categories of female slaves in the cikin gida, each of which assumed

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[1] For the sake of brevity and to underscore the gender of those directly serving the emir, I hereafter designate these areas "male" slave realms. But it should be noted that male slaves lived with their families (or other families, in the case of those recently captured) in personal compounds. Within the compounds, the spatial division of labour characteristic of vernacular households prevailed: men worked in "productive" endeavors and socialised outside the cikin gida while women worked largely inside the cikin gida where they were responsible for most domestic labour.

different responsibilities within the overall female slave division of labour. Concubines or sadaku were awarded relatively large living areas within the cikin gida. The second group comprised domestic slaves made up of jakadu or guardswomen-messengers, and kuyangi or menial labourers. While jakadu lived in the passageways that they guarded, many kuyangi resided in their own slave households outside the cikin gida and had small living spaces inside the cikin gida along with extensive work places. The different nature and qualities of these living and working places are discussed in detail below.

Sadaku

During pre-colonial times saduku, or concubines, were obtained through war,[2] as gifts from wealthy or powerful men, or from amongst the unmarried female slave population of the household. In all cases, the girl technically had to be a "slave", that is, she was either a prisoner of war (all prisoners of war being slaves) or was from a slave matrilineage. At the turn of the twentieth century, there were approximately 50 sadaku in the Kano palace.[3] The ownership of such a large number of concubines reflected the emir's political strength and personal virility.[4] The emir also awarded female slaves to nobility as concubines to effect or cement political ties.[5]

The spatial organisation of the cikin gida primarily structured and was structured by the social organisation of these women.[6] The majority of sadaku in the Kano palace lived in eight

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[2] All female prisoners of war were made into slaves, some of whom were chosen as concubines.

[3] This number does not include those sadaku in his appro-ximately six "country palaces". Some of the field data indicated that there were sadaku resident in those palaces as well. This become- a.' issue later when many appear to have returned to the Kano palace immediately after the British conquest.

[4] All wealthy and/or powerful men owned concubines for the same reasons, although in lesser numbers.

[5] The emir also gave his daughters away to noblemen (but for marriage) mainly for the same political ends. Sa'id (1982) for example, mentions the roles of various Kano emir's daughters in shaping Caliphate or local politics, although he unfortunately does not discuss them in depth or explicitly as such.

[6] There are three words used to describe concubines, sadaka, kwarkwara and ma-kulle (lit. she who is locked in). Sadaka, however, is the term most commonly used in Kano. Lovejoy (1990) claims that the word sadaka is etymologically derived from the Hausa words sa (to put) and d'aka (house). This, however, seems highly unlikely for two reasons. First, there is only one word for house and that is gida, not d'aka. He may have intended to correlate it with the Hausa word for room which is daki; however, even in this case the etymological congruence is slight. It is more probable that it is derived from the word sadaka which means alms, the difference between the two renderings being that the "d" in the word for concubine is hooked and that for alms is not. It was, in fact, not uncommon for a man to give his daughter to an Islamic scholar as a wife in lieu of cash alms (c.f. Smith, 1954). One can only

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densely populated "wards" or _unguwoyi_ (_unguwa_ s.) consisting of separate and largely unwalled "places" or _waje_ of co-resident concubines. These included _Yelwa_ (lit. abundance), Kacako, _Ka-iya_ (lit. you can do it), _Nassarawa_ (lit. victory), _Unguwar Uku_ (lit. ward of the three), _Unguwar bare-bari_ (lit. the ward of the Nupe), _Dutsen Babba_ (lit. the big hill), and Garko (Fig. 6.1).[7] A special subgroup of concubines called 'yan _soro_ (lit. children of the [emir's] room) lived in small rooms (_taskoki_) inside the _emir's_ extensive personal quarters, namely _Babban soro_ (lit. the big soro) and _Soron malam_ (the room of the Islamic scholar).[8] These latter oversaw the maintenance and upkeep of the _emir's_ rooms and were also used to summon those _sadaku_ with whom the _emir_ desired to sleep (Fig. 6.1). Other concubines, who had originally arrived as the companions and _kuyangi_ of a new wife - gifts from her father - stayed in the _waje_ (lit. place) of their mistress as her domestic servants. The four _wajeje_ (pl.) of wives were _Bayan dan soro_ (lit. behind the son of the soro), _Sararin garke_ (lit. the field of the herd of cattle), Sokoto, and _Unguwar Fulanin Uwargida_.[9]

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surmise that this practice became extended into non-religious and non-wifely realms.

[7] Most _unguwoyi_ are named after towns inside the present day borders of Kano state. These ward names probably refer to places conquered during and after the "religious" war at the turn of the nineteenth century from which female slaves were captured, some of whom would be made into concubines.

The ward and _waje_ names and locations were elicited from numerous interviews with many different persons, individually and in groups, especially Mai-daki, Gogon Ita Dambatta, Hajiyya 'yar Mai-tilas, Gogon Kahu, Hajiyya Abba Ado Bayero, and Sarkin Kano. The information was integrated with previously obtained map data and verified (where necessary) in the field with one or more of these persons.

In many cases, the field data differed from material presented in Rufa'i (1987). The differences seem to result from the ahistorical and aspatial treatment of ward and _waje_ production by Rufa'i (1987).

[8] The 'yan _soro_ were the least experienced and typically the youngest concubines. In many ways their tenure inside the _emir's_ quarters served as an intensive training period. Under the tutelage of Mai-soron baki, they learned the intricacies of palace protocol, how to adminsitor _tausa_ (traditional massage, a luxury afforded only by male royalty) and how to maintain the _emir's_ personal belongings. After these women bore children, however, they typically requested to be allowed to enter one of the concubine wards so that they could better attend to their families and become integrated into more "adult" concubine activities. In this way, the newly trained concubine might be released from her training grounds, providing space for new concubines.

[9] According to Islamic tenets, a man can have up to four wives. The traditional justification for concubinage (involving unlimited numbers of concubines) has also been religious, although this is becoming an increasingly contentious issue.

That the places of wives were _wajeje_ whereas those of the concubines were known as _unguwoyi_ is significant. The word _waje_ is used characteristically to indicate "ownership" by a single person, e.g., _Wajen_ 'yar Sokoto means the place of the "Sokoto" wife. Each _waje_ was, in fact, essentially a large single family compound built and organised to cater to the needs of a particular wife and her children. Smaller rooms therein were reserved for live-in _sadaku_ and _kuyangi_ and their children. In contrast, "_unguwa_" connotes a more communal and shared space, which belongs to the group, typical of the less personal, denser and less hierarchical spaces of the _unguwoyi_ of the concubines. This semantic difference underlines the lesser status of concubines, which was played out spatially.

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Figure 6.1 Diagrammatic reconstruction of the main places in the Kano palace landscape c. 1900. Note that the youngest concubines or 'yan soro lived inside small rooms within the emir's personal quarters. The places of the wives' are those which existed during the time of Abbas (1903-1919). Following the death of his third wife her waje was made into an unguwa for concubines, at which time it was presumably re-named Sararin Garke. Abbas never remarried, probably due in part to the large influx of concubines during his reign which resulted in a very dense population (see text). The compound of 'yar Fanisau also dates from the time of Abbas and is discussed in the text. Gidan Mal-Unguwa was probably named as such during the time of Abbas, its former name perhaps being Gidan Turakin soro (see text).

Royal concubines were organised into a complex hierarchy responsible collectively for administration and reproduction of palace life (Fig. 6.2).[10] Most administrative matters were overseen by three senior title-holding concubines, Uwar soro, Mai-soron baki and Mai-kudandan (below) who in many ways controlled the politics of the cikin gida.[11] They were assisted by a special group of concubine delegates, one selected from each unguwa and waje, known as uwar waje (lit. woman of the place), who served as a kind of lower cadre of administrators or managers.[12] Most of the heavier kinds of labour were carried out by kuyangi, jakadu and sadaku. The wives were generally treated as a leisure class and therefore engaged in none of the communal labour, except for the rotational cooking of the emir's food as prescribed by Islamic law.

The most powerful of the title-holding concubines was Uwar soro (lit. woman of the [emir's] room), who was ultimately responsible for all concubines, including the other title-holders.[13] Uwar soro also served as a kind of domestic secretary to the emir. Every day she met with him on a formal basis in a special room within his quarters called Soron baki (lit. the room of the mouth). There, after formally greeting him, she relayed news and messages from the female inhabitants (including births and deaths). Any replies, instructions or news from the emir to the cikin gida inhabitants would then be relayed only through her. It was also her duty to divide up gifts and meats sent to the women on behalf of the emir (and presumably other persons), which she then distributed to the various unguwoyi and wajeje through the iyayen wajeje. She also

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[10] The following discussion of cikin gida labour is founded upon discussions with Mai-daki, Gogon Ita Dambatta, Hajiyya Yar Mai-tilas, Hajiyya Abba Ado Bayero, Sarkin hatsi, Galadima rumbu, Sallama, Ya-ya, Baba dan Mosho, Malam Dau and Sarkin Kano.

[11] See Rufa'i (1987) for what is a somewhat more detailed discussion of female slave responsibilities. Rufa'i overlooks, however, the spatial and historical specificity of female slave roles and places. As a result, little attention is given to the socio-spatial integration of male slaves in the cikin gida, and certain female slave responsibilities and titles are omitted.

[12] The concept of an uwar waje of an unguwa may seem a bit confusing in light of the fact that an unguwa refers traditionally to a place containing two or more wajeje. Although the words unguwa and waje are typically distinct conceptually, their semantic use (like many Hausa words) varies with intentional context. In this case, uwar waje takes on a more general sense to mean a woman in charge of a place (waje) containing smaller places. A wife's section may conversely be known as an unguwa if it is especially large, like those of concubines.

[13] As will be shown, each title describes in short-form what work the holder does. Each title-holder is, in fact, addressed by her title and never by her name, i.e., she is known by what she does.

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Legend:

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═══════  concubines
• • • •  domestic slave men
────────  domestic slave women
  ?      probable hierarchical relation
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SARKI

↓

UWAR SORO

| UWAR KUYANGI
heavy labour

↓

KUYANGI | SARKIN HATSI
grain procurement
↓
GALADIMA

RUMBU
↓
SARKIN TSANI | MAI—KUDANDA
grain distribution
↓?

IYAYEN WAJEJE
administrators,
especially food
distribution | MAI—SHANU
pastoral duties

↓

untitled assistants | BABBAN JAKA-
DIYA
security, courrier

↓

JAKADU | MAI—SORON BAKI
upkeep of emir's
personal
chambers
↓
'YAN SORO |

Figure 6.2 Slave labour hierarchy under the head concubine, Uwar soro. Recall that sarki means "king" (modified substantially from Rufa'i, 1987: 119).

apparently counselled the emir on matters of state and was in charge of cooking for and thereby impressing important guests of the emir.[14]

The second senior concubine held the title Mai-soron baki (lit. master of Soron baki) which derived from the fact that she lived inside Soron baki (Fig. 6.2).[15] The latter was a round room which formed part of the emir's larger personal compound known as Babban soro for which she was entirely responsible. These responsibilities were many. First, she oversaw that his quarters were kept clean and that the emir was well served, especially while inside Soron baki, the main audience chamber for women. Perhaps her most important and "public" work was requesting ·audiences with the emir on behalf of women and formally escorting them to Soron baki upon the emir's consent.[16] In all of her duties she was assisted by 'yan soro whom she trained and administered (above). Moreover she and the 'yan soro were those sent to retrieve some of the more important armanents stored in the upper storey of one portion of the emir's chambers during times of war.

The third senior concubine was in charge of grain distribution and held the title of Mai-kudandan (lit. master of the kudandan; Fig. 6.2).[17] Mai-kudandan worked very closely with Sarkin hatsi (lit. king of the grains). The latter was the title-holding slave from the southern "male" realm who, along with his titled male slave assistants, received and organised grains brought into the palace from the "outside", i.e., from the royal estates and/or from the in-kind taxes of commoners, and had them carried and stored in the numerous grain silos located in the northern

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[14] Hajiyya Abba (23.1.90). This is also mentioned by Imoru (Ferguson, 1973).

[15] The name of this room, like many others, varies with the gender of the person. Soron baki is, in fact, the name used only by men. Women known it as Rumfar kasa, probably because there is a functionally similar court room located in the southern male realm with the same name. It is also sometimes called Soro in reference to the name of the emir's compound of which it forms a part and which needs no qualifier, e.g., Soron Sarki, that is, it is part of the soro. Imam Imoru also refers to this building in a more general sense as soron ciki, or room of the stomach, probably in reference to the fact that it lies within the cikin gida and that it is the most significant building therein (Ferguson, 1973: 209).

[16] These women included not only those who worked and/or lived inside the cikin gida but other women from the emirate-at-large.

[17] Kudandan typically refers to a kind of mud hut in which grain is stored and which typically rests upon large rocks to protect the contents from encroachment of insects.

periphery of the cikin gida proper (Fig. 6.1). He, in conjunction with Mai-kudandan, administered the actual distribution of the grains through the iyayen wajeje and kuyangi sent from each unguwa and waje.

The iyayen wajeje were technically controlled by Uwar Soro and were instrumental in looking after the needs of their respective waje. Besides their grain-related activities mentioned above, they were also responsible for collecting milk for their area. Every morning, the iyayen wajeje went to the easternmost part of Shekar gabas where they met the title-holding male slave Mai-shanu (lit. master of the cattle) and his untitled male slave assistants who daily milked approximately 100 of the royal cattle reserved for palace needs. These cattle were, for the most part, tied at night inside the easternmost wards of concubines and during the day (after milking) led southward through the palace to Gandun Nassarawa, a nearby slave estate (chapter 4). Every Friday the iyayen wajeje led the women from their respective waje or unguwa within the formal greeting procession to the emir seated in Soron baki.

Most concubine labour centred around the palace kitchen or Soron tuwo (lit. room of porridge) in the ward of Yelwa which served as the hub of food palace production and distribution (Fig. 6.1). The process through which the grains were prepared and used is discussed briefly below because it best characterises the way in which the division of slave labour employed in the cikin gida was used.

Every Friday about 100 taiki[18] of guinea corn were delivered to Yelwa, presumably by Sarkin hatsi and his men.[19] Mai-kudandan received the grains and distributed them to the main work force of sadaku in strict proportions which were carefully measured using three different sizes of calabashes. The sadaku then brought the grains to kuyangi working in Yelwa who

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[18] A taiki is a very large leather sack for carrying grains which is carried by pack animals. The sack has an opening along the middle of its main width, such that when the taiki is placed on top of the animals back with the opening facing upwards, it forms two adjacent large pocket-like spaces (see Ferguson, 1973: 324).

[19] The corn seems to largely have been purchased in the bimi. But there were probably additional sources of corn, including grains paid as taxes to the emir by those farming in areas near the city. The majority of the latter were presumably may have been stored in royal silos outside the palace (see Garba, 1986).

pounded the grain into flour. Some of these kuyangi were paid for their services. The wives would later send their uwar waje to collect their respective flour portions from Yelwa and then direct them as to what to cook for those in their section.

Most of the flour, however, was used inside Soron tuwo in the communal cooking of four special classes of foods: that of the malamai (Islamic teachers); 'yan Fulani (royal children and those elderly or divorced women of royalty who also lived inside the cikin gida); slaves (male and female); and guests of the emir. The food for each group of persons was slightly different in quality and was prepared by different categories of persons. Only wives and concubines prepared food for special guests of the emir; concubines cooked for the 'yan Fulani; kuyangi and concubines prepared the food of slaves; and kuyangi cooked for the malams. The foods were made in twelve large clay pots which were differentiated based upon which "class" of person to whom the food belonged, e.g., the emir's children (part of the 'yan Fulani), the ma-gina (traditional slave-builders living outside the palace), the stable slaves, the eunuchs, the malamai, the kuyangi, and so on. At the turn of the century the concubines and kuyangi were probably cooking for well over 500 persons three times a day.

All senior concubines lived in Yelwa, the political centre of the cikin gida.[20] To enter the ward one had to pass through an entrance hall that served additionally as a formal checkpoint guarded over and lived in by the administrative head of all palace kuyangi, Uwar kuyangi (lit. mother of the kuyangi). Nearby was the compound of the main overseer of female guardswomen, Babban jakadiya (lit. the big jakadiya; Fig. 6.2). Because she was head of defence in the inner palace, her presence undoubtedly tightened security in Yelwa. Kuyangi and jakadu had specific roles and places within the domestic division of labour.

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[20] Mai-soron baki had a kind of "second home" in Yelwa where her children lived. Rufa'i (1987) claims that Yelwa also contained special kudandan for palace spirits, a claim substantiated by Malam Dau. The few women I approached on this issue were either too young to know anything about them (many young women are little interested in palace history) or, in the case of older women, wary of discussing such issues with me. The latter were perhaps afraid that they would be seen as unislamic; although some spirits or aljannu are "Islamic", these seem to be "pre-Islamic".

Domestic slave women

Kuyangi

Kuyangi were primarily daughters of slaves already owned by the emir, especially those residing in the "male" slave realms of the palace. They could also be first generation prisoners of war who were not used by the emir as concubines. There were probably not more than 50 kuyangi inside the cikin gida immediately prior to the British conquest. All were under the jurisdiction of Uwar kuyangi (above; Fig. 6.2).

Kuyangi formed the lowest ranking group of slave women and were typically assigned the most strenuous kinds of labour that required them to be "outside". It was they, for example, who ground grains delivered to Yelwa, an activity usually done in open courtyards. They were also responsible for threshing grains stored in the palace grain silos (above), accomplished in large open spaces behind the ward of Ka-iya, called Shekar yamma. Clothes washing was also done by them. Moreover it was kuyangi (and jakadu, below) who were sent outside the cikin gida to relay messages to persons in other parts of the palace, city, emirate and even beyond, and to run errands, e.g., to the market. The official capacities of kuyangi and jakadu allowed them access to all areas in the palace except for the personal quarters of the emir.

The ability of these slave women to go "outside" was part of a general status hierarchy partly reflected in spatial terms, the size of realms being inversely related to status. The wives, having the greatest formal status, had the least spatial freedom, each one being restricted to the walled confines of her personal compound. Concubines, the next highest status group, were allowed to move anywhere in the residential areas of the cikin gida, while female slave women were allowed "outside" (see also Rufa'i, 1987). These status groups were defined in relation to the relative value which the emir placed upon the woman therein; those whom he secluded most severely were those whom he ostensibly valued the most.

Most kuyangi seem to have been young girls who were strong enough to thresh and grind

and old enough to know their way around the palace and city.[21] As domestic slave women, their husbands would have been royal slave men located in either of the peripheral male slave realms in the palace or other nearby royal slave estates. Marriage-related duties would have necessitated that most _kuyangi_ live, at least on a part-time basis, with their husbands. At other times, _kuyangi_ slept and ate in the foyers or entranceways of rooms leading into particular buildings belonging to the concubine or wife whom they attended. They were also awarded small farm plots in the western fields of the palace (Shekar yamma), the entrance into which was guarded by _jakadu_, discussed below.

Jakadu

The _jakadu_ (_jakadiya_ f.sing.), administered by Babban jakadiya (above), were probably no more than fifteen in number at the turn of the century. Jakadu generally worked alone and were responsible for guarding and policing several different kinds of areas peripheral to the inner confines of the _cikin gida_ (Fig. 6.2).

Most _jakadu_ lived and worked inside six passageways located within the two labyrinths which bordered the _cikin gida_ to the north and south (Fig. 6.3). The walled courtyards, open spaces and buildings that in conjunction with the passageways made up these labyrinth areas, were especially strategic realms associated with state and leisure activities of free royal men. The large royal stables were located here along with the places used by the _emir_ in his Qur'anic studies, a dining room used by royal male children and aristocracy, and the several court rooms used by the _emir_ in conducting both his Islamic court and daily royal court meetings with nobility and slaves. These strategically located _jakadu_ worked hard to ensure that no "undesirables" entered the administrative area or the _cikin gida_ and, that none of the wives or concubines left the _cikin gida_. They also made sure that certain protocol was observed, such as keeping persons out of the area when the _emir_ was present with his malams or noblemen, and ensuring that those

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[21] I have inferred their ages from the age profile of present day cadres of slave women, in addition to the physical exertion and strength required for their duties.

Figure 6.3 (a) One of the guarded passageways into the northern labyrinth. (b) A jakadu of the southern labyrinth. Note the large-scale door made of hand-worked iron strips. (c) The last unguarded southern passageway leading into the cikin gida, soron ban sarki (see Fig. 6.1). Note the magnificent adobe architecture and large-scale doors of all the passageways.

entering did not wear shoes (a sign of respect to the emir). Each jakadiya nightly closed and locked the two gates leading into and out of their passageways to ensure the safety (and purity) of cikin gida inhabitants.

Two other jakadu guarded passageways into "back-yard"-like areas that bordered the cikin gida to the west and east, known as Shekar yamma and Shekar gabas. It is important to emphasize that these areas were accessible *only* through these passageways. Most informants claimed that the jakadiya located in Shekar yamma mainly monitored the mood of spirits who lived there so as to safeguard the well-being of kuyangi while they farmed. Kuyangi had to request permission from the jakadiya before they could enter the area to work on their farm plots. The jakadiya who guarded the passageway into Shekar gabas provided access to a cluster of concubine wards, including Garko and Unguwar bare-bari (below), from the emir's personal quarters or Babban soro (above). This jakadiya also served as a kind of discretionary messenger to and escort for those concubines with whom the emir desired a rendevous. Moreover, it appears that both of the peripherally-placed jakadu guarded against "illegal" movements by palace women who might use the passageway to "wander" out of the cikin gida.

Lastly, about two jakadu were located amidst the cluster of grain silos located in the northernmost edge of the cikin gida proper. These jakadu protected the contents of the silos and appear to have been the least prestigious.

Jakadu seem generally to have been elderly women who had formerly served as kuyangi. Most had experienced marriage and had had children, traditional prerequisites for adulthood. Their age and experience signalled a kind of maturity and toughness required of them in their duties. The relative lack of "external" domestic demands also made it more possible for them to dedicate their lives to their work. This was necessary because they guarded and lived within the passageway areas on a constant basis, demands on time and space which would probably overwhelm a younger woman.

The spatial realms and roles of the jakadu were the most clearly defined because they

largely lived *and* worked in the same relatively small "space", called soron jakadiya (lit. room of the

jakadiya). Not all the work places of jakadu were spatially structured or composed, however, in

the same fashion. The main sorayen jakadu along the labyrinth were large and regal with huge

doorways enabling men to enter while still on horseback, a necessity for princes and nobility

entering and leaving the palace on a daily basis. In addition, they had relatively large and private

living quarters in recesses attached but peripheral to the main axes of the passageways. The

spaces of these women were also more.public in that men and women intending to visit the

labyrinth or cikin gida had first to greet the jakadu and pass their inspection, which typically

entailed giving them salutory gifts. Moreover, many of their workplaces assumed secondary state-

related functions. The second northernmost soron jakadiya, for example, became the main waiting

room for noblemen waiting to see the emir and as such was commonly known as Soron hakimai

(room of the noblemen; c.f. Rufa'i, 1987 and Ahmed, 1988), while the second floor of the soron

jakadiya just north of the latter contained the palace arsenal. The state functions of the soraye and

the public duties and revenues of these jakadu lent them special power and prestige.

In contrast, the sorayen jakadu located in the lateral areas of Shekar yamma and Shekar

gabas were smaller with much less massive doorways to allow only human passage. These

jakadu interacted primarily with women inside the cikin gida such that the material and social base

of their power was much smaller. Those jakadu guarding the grain silos entertained the least

prestigious work and home places of all, living in round huts and often sleeping outside on the

ground.

THE IMPACT OF BRITISH COLONIALISM ON THE "SPACES" OF SLAVE WOMEN

Concubines and the gendered bases of change: 1903-1925

Following the British conquest of Kano city and the palace, male slave realms underwent

a singularly intense re-ordering, reflecting the patriarchal nature of British imperialism and Hausa

society (chapter 5). In contrast to the direct and immediate change in male slave realms, female

realms in the cikin gida stagnated, and the population grew. Concubine numbers, particularly

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during the reign of Abbas, seem to have doubled. There is a number of probable reasons for the increase. First, the initial years of the conquest must have been very frightening ones, especially for those slaves inside the palace. For most of them, concubinage was a form of security; concubines were well taken care of and their male offspring had every chance of becoming emir (or king). Many slave men and women would therefore presumably have given their daughters as gifts to the emir.

Secondly, the emir had a number of country palaces in rural areas, at least some of which had resident concubines. The confusion and uncertainty surrounding the aristocracy for the first few years would likely have led the emir to consolidate his concubine holdings within the palace of Kano. This was in part the case with concubines resident in the palace of nearby Fanisau. There, some concubines apparently "misbehaved" and were punished by Abbas by having them brought back into the palace. They were then disbursed throughout all of the other concubine wards - except for the Uwar soro of that palace, 'yar Fanisau (lit. the daughter of Fanisau). She was set apart from the concubines in an unwalled compound near Kacako (Fig. 6.1). Despite the population increase, the socio-spatial organisation of concubines remained largely unchanged. The accommodation of "new" concubines without consequent changes in the political structure of female slavery, that is, additional women added into a socio-spatial status quo, points further to the peripheralisation of women in the processes of political negotiation and accommodation.

Continuity and change in the landscape of female slavery: 1925 and beyond

The first events to register forcefully in the cikin gida included the 1925 exile of male slaves and the concomitant male slave exodus. The decrease in male slave numbers was compounded further in 1926 when the British insisted that all palace slaves be freed and that slave titles be abolished (chapter 5). Moreover, in 1926, the British set up a new tax structure which required all men over the age of 16 to pay tax. At lease some of the slave men retreated to Gandun Nassarawa where the emir had relinquished land to his slaves, making them responsible for their own taxes through the farming of groundnuts and other cash crops (chapter

5).

Most kuyangi left, presumably to follow husbands, fathers, and uncles who had been forced or who had chosen to leave. Their departure and the subsequent hiatus in cikin gida life signalled yet another "passive" process propelled primarily by male directives, interests, options and actions. The farm plots of the kuyangi and the soron jakadiya leading to them became deserted. Other realms of kuyangi became largely abandoned. There was now, for example, almost no one to thresh the grains or provide the heavy labour required for food production.

The general hiatus that followed the colonial directives and exodus of 1925-26, in conjunction with disbursement of emirate lands to slave men, seems to account for the precipitous drop in the amount of grain that entered the palace at this time. The grain silos were gradually abandoned, eroding further the realms of jakadu and several of the main working places of Sarkin hatsi and his men.

The labour shortage which ensued in the cikin gida as a result of the slave exodus was solved in a variety of ways. Concubines and wives began to assume more of the work load, as is evident today. In addition, similar to solutions found in male slave domains, women seeking waged work during the traditional period of cin rani (lit. eating the dry season) were hired to thresh and grind grains inside Yelwa, and prison labour was conscripted to perform menial tasks, including clothes washing in Shekar yamma.

There was also a "voluntary" return of many slaves during the late 1920s and early 1930s (chapter 5),[22] which assisted in obtaining a sufficient labour pool. The "voluntary" return of slaves pointed to the need for patronage during difficult times, and led to a partial re-constitution of slave matrilineage and traditional forms of slavery.[23] On the other hand, an increasing number of male

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[22] This event seems to have been another watershed in the memories of many elderly persons in the palace, although of seemingly less dramatic proportions than the "exodus".

[23] Slave matrilineage is the traditional basis for determininng who is and who is not a slave and was customarily applied to all domestic slave women. That is, the child of a domestic slave woman was a slave, regardless of the birthright of the husband. This rule did not apply to concubines whose children were legally free-born.

"slaves" who were on the "outside" married "free" women, resulting in a loss in the numbers of royal slave labour. Since about 1926, the forces of matrilineal "exclusivity" of palace labour (leading to a kind of resurgence of traditional slavery) have been outweighed by the forces of "dissolution" resulting from outside marriages. The dissolution has been particularly evident in the realm of concubines whose numbers dropped from about 50 at the turn of the century (and 100 during the time of Abbas, above) to about 15 today. The spatial implications of these opposing social forces in the realms of domestic slaves and concubines in the cikin gida are discussed below.

The shrinking "spaces" of domestic slave women

As a result of the return of "volunteer" slaves and the concomitant legitimation of slave matrilineage, positions of kuyangi and jakadu (including Uwar kuyangi and Babban jakadiya) were re-established.[24] These women appear to have been (and to be) remunerated largely in traditional fashion, in the form of informal benefits and privileges associated with their positions.[25] There were not as many of them as in pre-colonial days, however, and several places of domestic slaves had by now become obsolete. The silos, for example, remained abandoned with consequently no need for jakadu to guard them, and the new kuyangi did not re-claim farm plots in Shekar yamma (Figs 6.1, 6.4).[26] In addition, the jakadiya in the easternmost passageway amidst the wards of concubines was abandoned, probably sometime in the late 1930s or '40s, as a result in the decline of concubinage (below). The jakadiya located in the southernmost soron jakadiya was, moreover, replaced by a man during Abdullahi's reign, ostensibly because the surrounding area had become more *public* and *male* (chapter 5). Outside female wage labour was still needed to supplement work done by kuyangi and prisoners were

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[24] It was not possible to determine if these positions were formal ones, such that they directly contradicted British proscriptions concerning slave titles, or whether these positions assumed informal proportions.

[25] This is deduced from present day domestic slaves who seem to rely primarily on "gifts" from their patrons, especially the emir and/or their mistress, and (in the case of jakadu) passers-by.

[26] The continued abandonment of these large fields cannot be accounted for. It may be related to the planting of orchards throughout most of the area by emir Abdullahi (1926-53; below).

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
Figure 6.4 The palace cikin gida circa 1990. Finely stippled areas are the domains of 'yan Fulani. Diagonally cross-hatched areas were not field checked and are based upon air photos and data presented in Ahmed (1988). See legend in Figure 6.1 for other symbols. Note that two walele of wives are located in former portions of the emir's quarters (see western coarsely-stippled area) built during Abdullahi's reign (1926-53); the eastern portion of those quarters is now inhabited by 'yan Fulani and one of the walele was recently vacated due to the death of his first wife. Only the small central area remains as the emir's personal realm.

required to carry out various menial tasks. The most striking changes occurred in the realms of the concubines, discussed below.

The wane in concubinage and the disappearance of concubine wards, 1919 - 1990

The dramatic rise in the number of concubines in the Kano palace during the reign of Abbas (above) was reversed during the reign of Usman. Besides the fact that many slaves left or were exiled from the palace,[27] there were probably very few persons who would give him their daughters. He was not respected as a leader or a patron.

The decrease in concubines ironically did not alter significantly during the rule of Abdullahi who, as mentioned above, was considered a good and strong patron. The overriding factor seems to have been the growing prevalence of somewhat revolutionary 'outside' marriages which removed many of the female children of returning slaves from the potential pool of concubines.[28]

This decline in concubines, beginning in about 1919, registered very strongly within the socio-spatial organisation of the cikin gida, a realm which concubines had dominated during pre-colonial times. Some wards were broken up into more than one area while others were razed, amalgamated or converted into other and 'new' kinds of places. And many buildings were abandoned.

The first ward to be affected was Yelwa. During the reign of Abdullahi, Yelwa split into two: a large southern portion remained the realm of concubines, with a large ratio of old to young,

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[27] Concubines were considered personal and permanent parts of the family of the emir, despite the fact that they were slaves. It would thus have been highly unlikely that concubines would have been amongst those who left. Or, if so, it would have been rare. Amongst slave women, then, the exodus affected mostly kuyangi and jakadu.

[28] Although technically a slave man could marry any woman, slave or free, traditionally this was not the case. As Imam Imoru stated (Ferguson, 1973: 230), "A freeborn woman, ya, will not consent to marry a slave unless she is a good-for-nothing" (see also Giginyu, 1981).

That this custom changed dramatically during the colonial period is substantiated in the work of Mack (1988: 55), where Mai-daki noted that,

When the Europeans outlawed slavery, the male slaves of the Emir married the [free-born] children of men from out there, from the bush, and of the town, and they brought them here. So it was that we could not seclude very many because there were no second-generation slaves.

while the smaller northern part was utilised by "outside" female wage labourers.[29] This latter

portion became a separate unguwa and was given the name Mil tara (lit. nine miles) in reference

to its seemingly long distance from the center of Yelwa (Fig. 6.4).[30]

In large part, this break-up was related to the fact that food was cooked for lesser

numbers of persons, slaves being increasingly made more responsible for procuring and cooking

their own food. Food was also no longer cooked communally inside Yelwa but in separate cooking

areas within each unguwa and waje. Subsequently, over the next few decades, Soron tuwo

became deserted and all the very large cooking pots were abandoned. Today, only malams,

guests, "kuyangi", and a few of the royal children, are cooked for in Yelwa, largely inside the

personal compounds of the title-holding concubines; all other slaves provide their own food.

Other unguwoyi were abandoned or disappeared altogether. Ka-iya, at one time the

largest unguwa of concubines, now became the preserve of old former concubines of Abbas,

called matan fada (lit. women of the palace). Other unguwoyi such as Garko and Dutse became

largely deserted and many of the buildings began to collapse. By the time of Sanusi's reign (1953-

63) Ka-iya had been abandoned and was razed. And by the time of the present emir (1963-),

Garko and part of Dutse were completely abandoned. To maintain some sense of community in

the area, part of Dutse was merged into Unguwar bare-bari (Figs 6.1 and 6.4).

Today, with the exception of Yelwa, no concubine wards exist. Concubines of the present

emir are relatively few in number (about 15 in total), and live in the wajeje of the wives, inside the

personal quarters of the emir (the 'yan soro) or in Yelwa. Moreover, the main title-holding

concubines (in Yelwa) are all "left-over" from previous emirs and at least two positions of title-

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[29] These women were known as 'yan Gindin turmi (lit. children at the base of the mortar) who came from nearby villages after harvest during the so-called period of cin rani (above). This contingent of women were those hired largely to replace the highly depleted stock of kuyangi labour.

[30] In this case, similar to that of Ka-iya, the Hausa employ a characteristic play on words: the area of waged labour now seemed distant from Yelwa. On the other hand, Mil Tara is an actual town located nine miles from Kano along the road to Katsina known as a place where wild silk is prepared (silk being a luxury of the rich). They then used the name to express this feeling of distance from what once had been (and felt) very close. It is especially interesting to note that the word "mil" is novel, derived from the English "mile". Its use demonstrates that those conquered were by this time *thinking* and *feeling* distances in ways which reflected a Western sense of space.

holding concubines have been dissolved.[31] There have, in fact, been no new title-holding

concubines for almost forty years and only one uwar waje remains, that of Yelwa.[32] Nonetheless,

not all concubine wards were abandoned or razed completely. Most of these and other non-

functional spaces, such as the grain silos, were appropriated for a number of purposes, the nature

of which changed over the years.

Re-structuring the cikin gida, 1926-1990; reflections of changing practices, perspective and power

Abdullahi seems to have used the opportunities presented by the dissolution of traditional

realms in the cikin gida to re-compose and re-structure the layout of the cikin gida in a "modern"

way. This involved two qualitatively different changes. He changed the style and increased the size

of his personal realms, and he introduced a spectrum of "Western" practices, buildings and visual

perspectives previously not experienced by most of the women. In all cases, however, it was

primarily Abdullahi, in conjunction with male British friends and officials, who initiated and

controlled the changes.

All of the alterations centred literally around a new, high-walled, long and linear courtyard

down the middle of the women's living space, parallel to the main axis of the palace (Fig. 6.4).[33]

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[31] The title of Mai-kudanda died out during the reign of the present emir. The last Mai-kudanda was inherited from emir Inuwa (1963) because she was childless. After her death, however, no successor was named and her keys to the dry goods store (which have assumed ritual importance) were given to Uwar soro and the last remaining Uwar waje in Yelwa. These latter two concubines were also inherited from Inuwa, Uwar waje being particularly elderly by the time who was inherited. Likewise, Mai-soron baki was inherited, but from Sanusi, after he was turned out of office in 1963 (chapter 5).

Uwar gida ma-kulle (lit. woman of the house of those [women] locked up) is another title that died out, presumably after Inuwa's death in 1963. She was traditionally the eldest concubine of a new emir and one who had been given to him previously by his father when he was still a prince. Upon being made emir, she became Uwar soro. Abdullahi stopped this tradition, presumably because there were no longer enough concubines to give away to all his sons. Thus, after the death of the present Uwar soro, who presumably was the Uwar gida ma-kulle of Inuwa, the title of Uwar soro may die out.

Concubine inheritance is contingent upon the fertility of a woman. Those concubines who do not produce children are not freed upon the death of their master, and in the case of the palace, are inherited by succeeding emirs. Thus, because Mai-kudanda, Uwar soro and Uwar waje never bore children, they experienced concubinage in three successive reigns.

[32] Because of the placement of uwar waje in Yelwa and her age, she has assumed a number of important functions that give her title heightened significance. Today, she is in many ways nearly as powerful as Uwar soro. Rufa'i (1987) places Uwar waje nearly on par with the other three titleholding concubines, and Mack (1988) seems to rank Uwar waje as equal to Mai-soron baki and Uwar soro, apparently unaware of the title of Mai-kudanda, which is now extinct.

[33] The courtyard became formally known as Sararin garke (lit. field of the cattle herds; not to be confused with the ward of the same name) in reference to the large open field which it replaced and in which cattle once grazed.

The resulting structure and new buildings (below) destroyed the loosely ordered urban-like setting of the women's settlement. More importantly, the courtyard was designed with its main visual apex inside Soron baki, now re-built as a large, two-storied structure.

The new courtyard was designed purposefully in part to allow Abdullahi to observe all those entering and leaving the palace confines from his new vantage point in Soron baki.[34] To many women, the palace grew smaller and they felt trapped. Mai-daki, for example, remembered that "we [women] really though the palace was shrinking". In addition, the emir could retreat into the second floor of Soron baki and peer into the women's settlements, which were now separated and compartmentalised by the courtyard walls into two visually exclusive halves (Fig. 6.4).[35] The utility of the second floor in heightening the visual control over women is evident in a practice of the present emir, noted by one of his daughters: the occasional scrutiny of the women's realms from his second storey perch using binoculars.

The visual control promoted by the new courtyard design was in many ways similar to that effected by the linear vista in the southern slave realm (chapter 5). In addition, the two courtyards were almost continuous: both were oriented along the same north-south axis in the palace centre; the southern male shigifa region was their only region of separation. The means of visual control was thus mirrored within male and female realms. Those controlled in the cikin gida, however, were women, whereas those in the south constituted a new and largely male public.

As part of the courtyard development process, the entire area between Yelwa in the south and Soron hatsi in the north was razed[36] and two very large two-storied structures "fronting" the courtyard were built as private chambers for the emir and his concubines (Fig. 6.4). This represented quite a striking increase in the personal space of the emir which had formerly been

[34] Sarkin gini; Mai-daki

[35] One of the daughters of the present emir, for example, said that her father occasionally peered into the women's realms from the second storey using binoculars.

[36] This included the grain silos and compound of 'yar Fanisau which were by now presumably deserted (see Fig. 6.1).

restricted to Babban soro and small areas near Kacako and in Yelwa, which continued to be used. Within these structures he established a British-style library, fireplaces, and a special kitchen in which to cook food for important British and other European guests. According to the dan Meshe, one of the two present day "eunuchs", these buildings were planned by Abdullahi in conjunction with one of his good friends who was a (male) British architect. The architect was even allowed inside the cikin gida to supervise the building. Thus, despite the "modern" touches, no women were invited into the planning process. Moreover, traditional builders were divorced from the planning process, a decisive breach in traditional practice, one which would increasingly became the norm (chapter 5; c.f. Sa'id, 1981).

A Qur'anic school for concubines and the emir's daughters was also established at about the same time that the British were emphasising the importance of schooling for girls (see Mack, 1988). Unlike the former place of religious instruction which at the turn of the century was located inside the waje (place) of the first wife, the new school belonged to no place. This de-linking of education from the hearths of women's households was an important step in cultivating colonial conceptions and practices of "public" places and practices that emanated from Western (colonial) forms of social institutionalisation.

The cultivation of Western institutions is also apparent in Abdullahi's acceptance and participation of "modern" medicine on behalf of cikin gida women. This was evident in his insistence that his wives and concubines give birth in the newly built City Hospital. By the end of his reign, only a few concubines gave birth traditionally in the palace and with a midwife. The incorporation of child birth into Western-derived institutions again de-linked women from the hearths of home and gave them new experiences of a more objective "public".

Late in his reign, Abdullahi, impressed by British gardens,[37] began British-style

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[37] For the first few decades of colonial rule, prisoners were employed in relatively large gardens where they produced vegetables for British consumption. The British also started a number of tree-planting initiatives, many later linked to windmill schemes, in order to procure local sources of fresh citrus and other tropical fruits. Most of these fruit trees and vegetable types were grown by Abdullahi in his new home garden.

gardening on a large-scale (at one point bringing in caterpillar tractors) inside the western and eastern fields of the cikin gida. His garden appropriated yet more of the traditional spaces of slave women and introduced farming for pleasure rather than necessity.

In the years following Abdullahi's reign, many of these changes were retained and elaborated upon. In particular, Sanusi made one of the rooms in the new personal structures fronting the courtyard a formal medical clinic. Later, during the present reign of Ado Bayero, (1963 -) the remains of the old concubine ward of Ka-iya were razed and a "modern", square-shaped, cement block health clinic was built. At present, another smaller Qur'anic school is being built in an abandoned portion of one of the new wards built by Abdullahi, called Dakata (Fig. 6.4; below). Bayero also tried to institutionalise and spatially formalise children's play by levelling and building a playground on the now abandoned ruins of the old concubine ward of Dutsen babba.[38]

Most of the remaining residential areas of concubines gradually became "wards"[39] of old concubines (i.e., matan fada), old or divorced royal women, (i.e., yan Fulani) and elderly help-mates or family members. Today, Nassarawa, Kacako, and Unguwar bare-bari (which now includes the former ward of Unguwar uku) are all populated primarily with elderly women. They also live in the new ward of Dakata, which was built specifically for old women by Abdullahi (1926-53).[40] There are not many of these women, however, and most buildings and places are crumbling and/or abandoned.

THE EXPANSION, "MOVEMENT" AND ABANDONMENT OF EMIRS' QUARTERS, c.1819-1990

The emir has traditionally lived inside the cikin gida. During the 19th century several of the emirs made changes in the location or type of structures in which they would live and sleep. Soron malam (lit. room of the Islamic scholar), for example, was built by Ibrahim Dabo (1819-

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[38] Within several months the playground equipment was broken and the place deserted. The children prefer to play "home-made" games, such as riding make-shift stick "horses", within the long corridor-like courtyard of the cikin gida.

[39] I retain the word ward, despite the absence of concubines, because it is what is used to describe these regions of elderly women.

[40] The building of Dakata required razing of the last set of grain silos in the palace.

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1846); Soron maje Ringim was made by Usman dan Dabo (1846-1855) and the largest and most regal, Babban soro, was built by Abdullahi dan Dabo (1855-1883; chapter 4). After Abdullahi dan Dabo, however, there were no new structures built until the reign of Abdullahi Bayero (1926-53). Then, as described above, Abdullahi expanded his realms horizontally and vertically along a long divisive courtyard that more than compensated areally for the abandonment of the small turaka of emir Usman (1846-55) in Yelwa (chapter 4).[41] Later, Sanusi (1953-1963) abandoned Soron malam (near Kacako; see Fig. 6.1), which is now largely in ruins. The colonial period thus saw the abandonment of many old places of the king and the building of many that were new.

After independence in 1960, most of the new places were re-cycled back into women's realms. Most of the new structures fronting the new courtyard built by Abdullahi Bayero, for example, were converted by the present emir into separate compounds for two of his wives and a compound for an elderly yan Fulani. An innovative and thoroughly nontraditional living area was then built for the king in the late 1970s, a "modern" cement block residence, cored by a western-style garden, located outside the realm of women and in the southern male slave realm. The residence, known as Sabon gida (lit. the new house) is connected to the cikin gida by a passageway and seems to be increasingly favoured. This invasion into the southern "male" slave realm represents a striking break with the traditional sense of place, especially that of the husband's place inside the home (cikin gida). It also helps to blur the boundaries between the exclusively male spaces of the southern realm and the more personal female spaces of the emir.

The reasons behind the unusual placement of Sabon gida are not known. One reason may be that it is coupled to the large pre-fabricated office complex (chapter 5) which would make it easier for the emir to conduct his business and to communicate and move quickly and personally amongst business associates and his private secretary. In particular, the traditional and rather lengthy protocol used by the palace community to arrange audiences with the emir would be conveniently short-circuited. That is, not only does the new residence remove the emir from

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[41] Turakar Usman seems to have been abandoned during the reign of Sanusi (1953-63).

the increasingly archaic and time-consuming rules and places surrounding audiences with the emir, the residence provides him a modern business and office setting in which a more Western spatial organisation and sense of protocol prevail (chapter 5). In light of the many "modern" business and political interests of the emir, this spatial arrangement would seem imperative.

The isolation of the emir vis-a-vis the cikin gida also promotes a sense of manly royal privilege. In contrast to the households of his wives and concubines, for example, his home has many modern amenities, including air conditioning, a nearby satellite dish and VCRs. If he had established this bastion of modernity amidst the cikin gida, he might have been pressured by his wives and concubines for similar provisions, thereby making it less feasible to maintain his rather singular standards. The male slave realms, however, are outside the womanly domain.

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE PLACES AND EMPLOYMENT OF SLAVE WOMEN TODAY

There are some interesting current survival tactics used by both slaves and aristocracy to slow the demise of female slavery, described above. One of these is quite current and relates to a number of slaves "voluntarily" returning to the emir probably in response to generally poor and insecure political-economic times resulting from the post-1982 global recession. It seems that male slaves who have come to claim what are now wage-paying positions, for example, are required to "prove" their slave matrilineage (Haj. Abba Ado Bayero, 1990). In contrast, slave women (who do not appear to be officially on payroll), are allowed to stretch their matrilineal slave qualifications, in order to meet the minimum requirements of female labour needed in the cikin gida.[42] Many of these women are economically marginalised and in special need of

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[42] Ya Dada, daughter of the present day Uwar kuangi, for example, had originally been given to a District Head (the colonial designation for hakimi or nobleman) by the emir as a concubine. She bore several children by him and thus became free after his death (a religious proscription). Despite her freedom she decided to return to the palace as a kuyanga under her mother. She thus rather illegally 're-made' herself into a slave. Another example is Daraba whose grandmother had served as the previous Uwar kuyangi. Daraba's mother had also been given by the emir to a District Head as a concubine. She had a son and was also freed after her husband's death. She then married again and had Daraba, but her husband also died. Daraba then chose to become a kuyanga even though she was technically the free daughter of a freed slave. A last case in point is Mero whose grandmother had been a kuyanga who married another slave. The son of the latter, however, married a free woman who gave birth to Mero. Mero married but later divorced and came back to the palace where she served as a kuyanga for several years, even though she is technically free. In 1990 she remarried and moved out of the palace.

patronage.[43] Despite the presence of "fake" domestic slave women, the qualifications of slave matrilineage for concubines remains firm. The emir, for example, recently attempted to take a woman from a male slave, but was turned down: although the father was a slave, the mother was not.

On the other hand, there are new "uses" for concubines outside the palace. Royal slave women are now being given to the new power brokers in Hausa society, wealthy Hausa (and mostly Kano) merchants. Three daughters of a single dogari (one of the traditional male slave bodyguards of the emir), for example, were given as concubines to three very wealthy and relatively powerful merchants of Kano, while the wealthiest merchant in Kano was recently awarded another concubine. Thus instead of concubines being exchanged amongst princes and nobility primarily to effect political bonds, concubines are being used mostly to forge economic ties.[44] And instead of concubinage signifying political strength, it now seems to signal primarily a man's wealth (virility being constant).

CONCLUSIONS

Prior to colonial rule, it was Hausa *men* (slave or free) who lived and ruled the outside world and who were expected to act directly in issues of war and state-level politics. The ability to control women and their "spaces" was a sign of male political prowess and virility, as epitomised in the institution of concubinage. Women were also used by men in concubinage (slaves) and marriage (free daughters) literally to create kinship-based political bonds. Differences between how males valued, used and controlled slave versus free women was expressed through different spatialisations based upon birthright. Wives, for example, were ostensibly the most valued and therefore the most confined.

The dominant forces that re-shaped socio-spatial relations following the British conquest

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[43] Hajiyya Abba implied that many women have come to earn monies needed to divorce their husbands.

[44] A very telling, recent and rather humorous attempt by the aristocracy to fashion economic ties with the merchant class was the recent invention of a completely fictitious title, Mai-kudu or "Master of money". This was "awarded" to a wealthy local merchant by the emir in 1990.

of Kano were mostly political economic ones, authored and propelled by and for Hausa and British men in their "spaces". Because Hausa men lived in and controlled "outside" public life and spaces, they were the main receivors and sculptors of colonial change. British proclamations, decrees and policies affecting slavery, land acquisition, taxation and the secularisation of the state, for example, were directed towards, and took place primarily in, male spaces.

Women were affected indirectly and peripherally. In 1925 and 1926, for example, the number of domestic slave women declined as many left to follow their husbands or other male family members affected more directly by British orders. In addition, because men desired to change the birthright of their children, they increasingly married free-born women so that the number of slave children plummeted. Concubines and domestic slave women were increasingly difficult to find and the spaces of concubinage were largely dissolved. The matrilineage of domestic slave women was consequently stretched in order to employ their much-needed labours in the cikin gida. Nonetheless, most places vacated by concubines were taken over by elderly royal women and concubines, and are now in disrepair.

The practice of maintaining and keeping track of slave matrilineage would probably have died out soon after the conquest had it not periodically proved to be mutually beneficial to the emir and royal slaves. Matrilineage (the traditional means through which slaves claimed patronage benefits) became crucial to the survival of royal slaves, for example, during the world depression and slump in cash crop prices of the late 1920s and 1930s. At the same time, the return of slaves assured the emir of a relatively large and voluntary source of palace labour. Once again, though, women slaves returned as a result of forces affecting mostly men. The 1926 head tax, for example, was exacted only on men, and it was men who also bore the onus of farming cash crops outside the palace, or working as wage labourers for tax monies (chapter 5). Men were burdened further by the Islamic tradition that men provide for the housing, food and clothing of wives.

Concubinage was never outlawed, despite the fact that concubines were slaves. This disregard probably stemmed from the fact that concubinage did not directly threaten British

policies, which promoted the creation of a free male class of landowners and wage labourers. Concubines seem to have been accepted as a "natural" (if exotic) and personal part of the emir's household.[45] Furthermore, concubines children were, according to Islamic law (and in every other social sense), free-born. Concubines were therefore not part of what was otherwise a matrilineally based system of slave production.

The plummetting number of concubines allowed for a spatial restructuring of the cikin gida during the 1930s and 1940s at which time the spaces of the emir and elderly were expanded and Western institutions and places, including gardens, fireplaces, a library, a medical clinic and schools were introduced. Most built changes rimmed a long, linear and divisive courtyard at the apex of which was Soron baki. The linearity of the courtyard and the two-storey structure and apical placement of Soron baki facilitated surveillance of palace women.

The enhanced visual-practical control afforded by the courtyard and Soron baki (also known as Rumfar kasa; see chapter 1) mirrors that afforded by the new courtyard and court built at almost the same time in the southern slave realm (Rumfar kasa; chapter 5). These new developments, accomplished using British expertise, imply that linear visuality provided the emir with a sense of power at a time when "real" traditional automony and authority had all but disintegrated.

This link between visuality and power is intriguingly similar to that forged by Foucault (1979) in his analysis of the Panopticon, a prison designed by Jeremy Bentham in 1791. The following description of Foucault's analysis could easily apply to the architectured surveillance of the public (in the south) or the palace women (in the domestic sphere), the utilisation of binoculars by emir in the domestic realm being particularly appropriate. The Panopticon consisted of:

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[45] British Governor Bernard Bourdillon, in an official British circular of 1936 entitled "Social relations with Moslem chiefs and their women folk", for example, encourages "European women" to visit the "harem" of the king on a frequent and informal basis. Th so-called harem was seen as a natural and important part of Hausa culture.

a large courtyard with a tower in the center and a set of buildings, divided into...cells, on the periphery....The inmate is not only visible to the supervisor, he is only visible to the supervisor; he is cut off from any contact with those in adjoining cells. 'He is the object of information, never a subject in communication'.

The hegemony induced by this spatial configuration was tied to the visual fact that the inmate was perpetually visible to the observer, while the inmate could not see if the guard was in the tower. The invisibility of the guard requires that the inmate behave "as if surveillance is constant. The architectural perfection is such that even if there is not guardian present the apparatus of power is still operative" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 188-189). Unlike the Panopticon, however, the linear vistas of the palace did not emerge out of Hausa culture, nor did they reflect real authority. Rather, they were more like stages (introduced by the British) upon which the emir could stand in order to watch the downfall of his world or, as in the case of the women, to distract his gaze inward, away from matters of state.

The dissolution of slave women's spaces was not calculated by British officials, but was rather due to decisions made in male realms for and by Hausa and British men. The peripheral manner in which women were treated is demonstrated most cogently in British tolerance of, and the changing present day uses of concubines as political collateral between the emir and merchant class. Perhaps to assuage the loss of real power, the British helped turn the gaze of the emir inward. If anything, the vistas today underline the political impotence of the emir.

Chapter 7.

Conclusions

This dissertation had presented and actively explored an intersubjective theoretical framework for the analysis of landscape (in general) and the Kano palace landscape (in particular). The framework is post-structuralist in that landscapes are treated as socially created communicative structures that politically order and give meaning to the world.

Literary re-production of the palace landscape has entailed inferring political relations and meanings in the landscape from present day material and social structures. One part of the analysis includes *thinking* intersubjectively, that is, being pre-disposed to seeing spatiality as a material reflection of negotiated social relations. This analytical part is primarily contemplative, and thus open to the criticism that it is self-referential. Self-referentiality results in singular authority over the literary re-production of landscape, producing a form of hegemony over those in the landscape.

"Hidden" self-referentiality is explicitly addressed in the study by *entering* and *engaging* intersubjectively with the landscape, and by describing qualitative aspects of the engagement and interviewing process. In this way, *my* differences or "otherness" relative to those in the landscape were made more transparent along with some of the personal biases, abilities and constraints that tempered my analytical choices. Additionally, the opinions, criticisms, interpretations, advice and co-operation of those in the landscape were sought and included in the analysis to allow for a *multiplicity* of voices to be heard and a larger amount of information on the *specificity* of places, histories and power to be obtained.

This way of interacting was then modelled typologically in terms of the reflexive and empowering qualities cultivated between the viewer, the viewed and the material world. The type of interaction and reflexivity (or existential relations) enjoined in other landscape studies were then deduced, similarly modelled typologically and compared with the typology used in this study (Figs 2.1 and 2.2). The comparison showed that different theoretical positions are connected to distinct

epistemological frameworks constituted by categorically different forms of existential relations. That is, how we structure what we know (or our epistemological framework) was shown to be integral to how we relate to others and the world. The models thus linked epistemology and power, and pointed to the necessity for employing new analytical conditions that draw upon more relational and less hegemonic ways of knowing (Fig. 2.1).

Using the intersubjective framework, a detailed historical geographic study of the present-day Kano palace landscape was then conducted. The study revealed numerous historical "layers" of structures and structural change, which were then divided into four "stories", each story constructed to show a different socio-spatial era of palace history. Although each story has its own conclusions regarding the era it represents, there are also conclusions to be made by inter-relating the stories. All stories show, for example, that the palace has historically been structured primarily by patronage, especially patriarchal gender and master-slave relations. The socio-spatial quality of patronage relations has mutated over time as a means of negotiating changing "external" (outside the territory) and "internal" state forces. The initial configuration of the palace landscape circa 1500 was, for example, shown to have been pre-figured by "internal" vernacular gender and master-slave relations that historically intersected and were shaped by "external" North African Islamic seclusionary principles.

Relegation of women to activities in the inner household socio-spatially constrained and largely excluded women from publicly sited, male, productive and state-related activities in or outside the household. The public positioning of men enabled a much more diverse division of male labour in and across different social groups, especially the nobility, state and domestic slaves, and Islamic clergy. The resultant diversity of the male domain and the differential positioning of men and women engendered tensions that were nested within the overall configuration of royal patronage. These tensions seem to have been what drove negotiations between "external" and "internal" state formational forces.

The spatial organisation and privileges of royal slave men enabled and configured one

of the most important series of patronage tensions and paradoxes that shaped the palace landscape and state. The tensions derived from a number of interlinked and apparently oppositional forces, at the heart of which was the struggle over the right or power "to provide". *Provision* can, in fact, be seen as a kind of *centripetal* force that materially and socially attracted a slave (at the household periphery) to the master (at the centre). This attraction produced a dependence which ironically ensured the loyalty of slaves, and in turn, was the basis for their investiture with most state responsibilities and powers. The intensity and longevity of slave loyalty was paradoxically proportional to the degree to which they were "provided for".

Within this dynamic of dependence-loyalty-responsibility-power emerged an oppositional or *centrifugal* force, namely that the more slaves were attracted and provided for, the greater their access to political and economic means by which to provide for themselves. Slaves granted substantial privileges and domains, for example, could support large numbers of clients (including nobility) whose services, tribute and allegiance enhanced these slaves' powers and places. A related contradiction inhered in the public positioning of slave men. On the one hand, their placement sequestered them away from royal women and connoted a certain level of household exclusion. On the other hand, it ensured a certain spatial independence from the king (that is, it placed slaves outside domestic scrutiny), gave them direct access to the public and thus independent economic and political capital, and facilitated their control over publicly sited state realms, including the military and treasury.

Successfully stabilising these forces over time and place was a vigorous art that was achieved in a number of ways. Troublesome slaves might be killed, demoted or transferred, which is what occurred on a large scale during the reign of Bello (1882-93; chapter 4). Or, if slaves were particularly powerful, they might be played off against other powerful slaves or nobility. Certain state council positions, for example, were shifted historically between nobility and slaves as a means of keeping the respective groups divided *and* loyal.

This playing off of different kingly clients was not always successful. The eunuch Sallama

led a revolt during the time of Bello (1882-93), which was probably fuelled by dissatisfaction with the harsh treatment of slaves and nobility loyal to Bello's predecessor, Abdullahi (1855-82; chapter 4). Sallama's revolt was undoubtedly facilitated by his placement outside the palace and his related control over arms production facilities. Shashere's assassination (1573-82; chapter 3) presumably involved a similar shift in slave allegiance towards rival nobility, allowing for the latter's clandestine entry into the women's realm. Such shifts could not have been achieved without fresh offers by rival nobility "to provide" for royal slaves in a manner superior to that of the king, giving rise once again to new versions of the same contradictions.

Ultimate slave patronage was awarded to eunuchs whose castration signalled complete corporeal submission (and thus loyalty) to kingly authority and service. In return, eunuchs held the most positions of state and power, heightening the "pull" between centrifugal and centripetal patronage forces.

An historic twist in the political function of eunuchs and the significance of castration undoubtedly occurred when a eunuch colony was established *inside* the cikin gida to guard the king against the kind of treachery enacted previously towards Shashere (1573-82). Whereas previously castration signified total bodily dedication to kingly service and authority, it now enabled, enforced and ensured sexual loyalty to the king vis-a-vis royal women.

The original siting of a residence for the palace liman next to that of the king indicates that Islamic clergy were trusted almost as much as eunuchs. The placement also reflects the "external" influence of the North African Islamic scholar, Al-Maghili, who encouraged the king to surround himself with religious councillors (chapter 3; Gwarzo, 1974/77). The addition of other clerical residences in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, along with a nearby religious centre for male royalty, and a religious court in the state shigifa area indicate a formidable rise in the trust and inclusion of Islamic clergy in state structures.

The proximity of "outside" men to the king following Rumfa's rule (chapter 3) indicates obversely a relaxation in the rules of seclusion through which women were controlled spatially,

and insinuates a certain tolerance of women's independence. This independence perhaps entailed a greater freedom to hear about and/or become involved in 'outside' economic and political activities, though they would still have remained within domestic confines. Such a conclusion is presaged and supported to some extent in the Kano Chronicle. It is said, for example, that 'Kisoki [1509-1565] ruled the town with his mother Iya Lamis and his grandmother Madaki Auwa, and Guli, the brother of Madaki Auwa.' (Palmer, 1967: 113).[1] These women would have been relatively elderly and therefore (by customary right) less seclusion-bound. It is also during the reign of Kisoki that we first hear of 'Madaki Koremma', which probably refers to the title-holding woman in charge of market grains, Korama.

It is only at the turn of the eighteenth century, however, that more formal and less age-bound inclusion of women in state council occurs. These women included Iya Gani, mother of Dadi (1670-1703) and one of his wives or concubines, Mariama, daughter of a rebellious king (who Dadi killed) awarded the female title of Maidaki. Of her, the Chronicle asserts simply that 'Maidaki Mariamma...was a great personage. There was no woman like her in the seven Hausa states' (Palmer, 1967: 123). Growth in the diversity of women's activities is likewise found in the discovery that women were producing dyed cloth by the mid-eighteenth century (chapter 3). The etymology of concubine titles also suggests that concubines and slave women assistants, in tandem with Korama (above) bore substantial control over grains collected as market taxes and/or grain tax collection in the countryside.

This close-knit domestic configuration of eunuchs, scholars and the king, accompanied by some political freedom for women, apparently persisted throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, during which time the state was consolidated territorially and politically. By the late eighteenth century, however, the growth in state apparatuses and demands resulted in taxation levels that chronically outstripped productive capacities. This tension formed part of a political crisis that was momentarily broken by the Fulani jihad of 1807, one premise of which was

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[1] Iya is a female title carrying some state responsibilities.

lower taxation rates.

Comparison of "Hausa" and "Fulani" landscapes reveals dramatic changes in the nested configurations of royal patronage of slaves, nobility, the clergy and women. These changes seem to have been driven primarily by the political imperative to secure the loyalty of the jihad leaders. Following the war, the main military clan leadership were granted the respective territories they had conquered and were awarded all formal state councillor positions and titles.

Other landscape changes were apparently driven by the need to procure popular support by acceding to alleged religious demands for a more exacting seclusion of women. Religious scholars and eunuchs were consequently disallowed residence inside the palace cikin gida.[2] But the disallowment was double edged. Besides signalling publicly an ostensibly superior moral stance, it also facilitated Dabo's entrenchment of dynastic rule, a move diametrically opposed to the spirit and tenets of the jihad (Sa'ad, 1978). That is, with the clergy now distanced from their traditionally intimate place of kingly influence, interference in Dabo's dynastic ambitions was muted. This conclusion is supported by the fact that although Abdullahi (1855-82) later re-instated the traditional eunuch colony, the traditional residences for the liman and other Islamic clergy serving the king were not.[3]

The resultant empowerment of Fulani nobility and distancing of religious clergy seriously curtailed the spaces and powers of male slaves of state whose knowledge and loyalty were indispensible to the transition to Fulani and (especially) Sullabawa dynastic rule. State slaves not only knew how to run existing political machinery, but politically buffered relations between rival nobility and the king.

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[2] To carry out this eviction implies that there was minimal resistance from, and perhaps even support from, the clergy themselves. While clergy in support of increased seclusion would have aided in their own exclusion, they would also have received increased support and power "outside" the palace.

The later re-building of religious centres outside the domestic realm (in the northern and southern shigifa areas) suggests that the new placements were re-cast as superior moral settings, that is, they were more properly esconced inside formal "male" boundaries of the state.

[3] Religious scholars did (and do) live, however, at the edge of the northern slave realm, near Kofar Kwaru.

Intricate and artful re-negotiations of patronage ensued. Field evidence shows that those spaces and powers lost to male slave were retrieved in ways that directly and indirectly effaced women's spaces and authority. The gendered transfers of power were enabled precisely because women's spatial and social loyalty were the most assured; that is, they had the least means by which to leave and/or provide for themselves. Women consequently had little 'centrifugal' force with which to negotiate their privileges, making their places and powers the easiest to re-claim and re-distribute.

The momentum for these gendered re-negotiations began in Dabo's reign (1819-46), when formal state council positions for male slaves dating from the Hausa period were resurrected and male slaves were accorded increased military and domestic duties. Later, during the reign of Abdullahi (1855-82), the number of informal slave positions on state council was increased substantially and Sallama and a large contingent of eunuchs were instated in the city ward of Rimin kira, wherein arms production facilities were subsequently upgraded and enlarged. Other slaves and eunuchs serving military, paramilitary and new domestic functions were settled in the southern half of the cikin gida, which was appropriated and walled off from women and tranformed into male household and state domains mirroring those in the north.

The appropriation process meant that when the eunuch colony was re-built, it was partitioned from the realm it was initially intended to safe-guard. For this reason, the gaze of eunuchs turned primarily southward to guard state council activities and turbanning events held in the new chambers of Kudanda and Soron hakimai. This re-contextualisation of site use produced new socio-spatial tensions: it empowered male slaves over nobility; and it infringed upon the duties and spaces of palace guardswomen (chapter 3).

The abrogation of women's spaces to men was facilitated by the previous withdrawl of women from domestic cloth dyeing activities just after the war, their work area being transformed into a cemetery used in an accession ritual re-enacting the entry of the Sullubawa patriarch, Ibrahim Dabo (1819-1846). Other women's activites were subsequently downgraded or curtailed.

A grain hierarchy under King of the Grain (Sarkin hatsi) was instituted to manage "outside" grain-related duties awarded formerly to royal concubines and domestic slave women. Grains were now received via the southern entrance, close to the new residence of Sarkin hatsi. The southerly re-orientation of grain reception and the rescindment of women's outside grain duties during Abdullahi's reign suggests also that it was he who recalled Korama from her official market grain duties.

Oppressive socio-spatialities were employed concomitantly *inside* the cikin gida that facilitated male surveillance over women's activities. The size and number of kingly residences increased considerably and windows in the main kingly chamber were sited strategically in a second floor overlooking the centre of concubine administration. Moreover, with the re-contextualisation of the eunuch colony, eunuchs concentrated their gaze outwards from the shigifa towards the nobility and other potential "outside" threats. Their domestic security duties became secondary and seem to have been reduced to ritually following the emir into and out of the women's realm and to guarding against threats that might arise from the "inside", that is, from the women.[4] That surveillance of women increased at this time suggests that there was perceived or real "internal" resistance from women.

The changing socio-spatialities between the king, clergy, nobility, male slaves and various categories of women "across" the Hausa and into the Fulani era provide useful clues into negotiations within and between different patronage realms and how these were gendered historically. At the same time, negotiations internal to royal patronage enabled and reflected "external" state formational forces and tensions, especially increased militarisation of the state, upgrading of military hardware, growth in the royal slave population, places and services, and devaluation of the regional currency. The economic pressures presumably exerted by these changes help explain why taxation levels increased soon after the conquest and why land and

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[4] This is not to say that eunuch surveillance of women did not exist historically; it may have. Given domestic eunuch reemployment in the shigifa, however, "external" guard duties shifted southward such that when eunuchs entered the cikin gida, the emphasis upon domestic surveillance became more central and repressive.

tax incentives were developed to encourage immigration of skilled labour into the Kano city region (chapter 4). These policies were apparently insufficient to fill state demands, which would have deepened during the politically tense rule of Bello and the subsequent civil war. Increasingly successful assaults on the territory and kingship were waged, any resolution to the state formational crises being pre-empted by British and French conquests of the region.

Comparison of the pre-colonial Fulani landscape to that following the British conquest reveals that the British materially and socially channeled colonial directives into the palace along the newly negotiated lines of power. The patriarchal nature of palace spatiality *and* British policies promoted articulation of British interests in the region and further accentuated and perpetuated patriarchal relations.

Many of the same channels were used for different political ends.To quash the military authority and independence of the king, for example, the arms production sites in Sallama's house were dismantled, the palace arsenals were removed, and the palace chain mail soldiers and bodyguards were disbanded. On the other hand, the slave places and power of Sallama, dan Rimi and Shamaki were initially increased. The power of dan Rimi grew to rival that of the king, prompting dan Rimi's insubordination to the emir and his eventual departure from the palace. Later political intrigues by the British involved the exile of dan Rimi along with Sallama and Shamaki when the powers of these slaves seemed to threaten British authority and change. Palace slavery was abolished subsequently by special decree, for similar reasons.

Still later, royal male slaves, technically freed by British proclamation, were hired preferentially as waged labourers of the "Native Administration", a new kind of "public" master funded by the new public "Native Treasury" instituted and controlled by the British. The British utilised many waged "slave" services, including the royal bodyguards, or dogarai. Royal powers of provision, and thus slave allegiance, were transferred to a "Native public" and the British government.

Royal patronage still carried substantial benefits to slaves, however, for which reason slave

matrilineages were cultivated and a large degree of economic, social and political dependence upon the emir was maintained. Nonetheless, the benefits offered by kingly patronage had been transformed. The emir's patronage now resided in and depended upon the quality of his support or patronage by the British. That is, the emir's power now obtained largely from his ability to foster a special relationship of clientage with the British.

Outside palace slave realms, similar "male" channels operated. The territory was re-ordered geo-politically and assigned to male nobility, for example, according to British prerogative, the aristocracy eventually being allotted fixed salaries. New councils for the emir were also created, and the emir and nobility were compelled to report to the British and to carry out British directives. The powers of nobility came to depend partly upon their co-operation with the British, such that kingly loyalty of nobility waned, and competitive struggles between the emir and rival nobility emerged. At a more vernacular level, it was men who were levied with new forms of taxation and who were eligible for most waged employment and land transfers.

In contrast to the pre-Fulani period, tax revenues outstripped state expenditures, which now consisted of tribute to Britain and waged remuneration of the Native Administration. "Public" monies of the Native Treasury burgeoned and, beginning in the 1930s, were funnelled into institutions and infrastructure tied to patriarchal capitalist economic initiatives and British forms of social control. Besides the railway (completed in 1911) and an extensive road network (begun in the first decade of colonial rule), a large hydro-electric dam was constructed that supplied electricity to new industries as well as the public. British-style schools trained future male administrators and labourers, while hospitals, veterinary clinics and abbatoirs promoted western hygienic standards, linked to controlling the quality of labour as well as livestock-related exports.

A number of these institutions filtered preferentially into the male slave terrains of the palace, displacing traditional slave enclaves and advancing the coupling of the local economy and culture to Britain (and to the West, in general). A primary shcool for the "Chiefs sons" was built in the southern slave realm, although its mandate was later enlarged to include the education of any

nearby children, male or female. Native Authority police were accommodated in barracks inside the southern slave realm and new roads and gates connecting the public to both slave areas were constructed.

These new forms of access and security were integral to colonial erosion of the customary secrecy surrounding traditional state deliberations and the emergence of a more decentralised and secular state. An important aspect of decentralisation involved rendering royalty more formally accountable to and viewable by the public. At the behest of the colonisers, a new publicly situated chamber for state council was constructed at the edge of the southern shigifa facing the new "public" (chapter 5).[5] Later, a second state council chamber connected directly to the public was built at the edge of the southern kofar gida alongside an Islamic courthouse, staging an historic palace separation of state and religious responsibilities.

The implementation of Western institutions in the palace and region necessitated the importation of "external" services and commodities, which escalated in the 1930s and 1940s, paralleling rises in foreign investment and Native treasury monies. New cultural standards of consumption emerged, especially among the political and economic elite, requiring increased amounts of foreign currency.

In light of the low salary of the emir (in international terms) and the relatively enormous size of the palace population, strong economic pressure to streamline palace costs resulted. Some slave offices were dissolved, while others were re-deployed within a more Western-style division of labour. Moreover, slaves were made increasingly more independent financially, leading many into waged labour outside the palace.

These pressures spiralled after the Federal Military Government revoked key aspects of aristocratic control over the region in the late 1960s and 1970s. The emir subsequently introduced

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[5] As noted in chapter 5, publicity was enabled by a linear visuality attached to the new chamber that extended southward into the "outside" public. Although the view somewhat enhanced the emir's control over visitors from a much larger distance than was traditional (the latter were now seen from afar and obliged to remove their shoes and maintain a submissive demeanor), the public were similarly and paradoxically empowered, that is, the visual access enabled public scrutiny of the emir.

a large office and residential complex in the southern male slave realm to cultivate national and international political and economic capital, displacing remnants of the eunuch colony. Other male slave realms became emptied of traditional functions and/or became stages for aristocratic spectacles.

Because women no longer held substantial powers, they lost little authority vis-a-vis male Islamic clergy, nobility or slaves. Given that the political economic tensions that fuelled the conquest stemmed from forces outside the territory, women's spaces would have been of little political utility. The powers and places of female slaves nonetheless declined, but for categorically different reasons. Domestic slave women left the palace to follow husbands who had been exiled or who had opportunities "outside" for land or waged labour. And, as male slaves preferentially married free women, fewer slaves were produced. This deterioratation of female slavery isolated royal women and shifted the domestic demographic profile towards the elderly.

Women's spaces were also used to experiment with Western built forms and institutions, such as a library, clinic, schools and fireplaces. This domestic accommodation of change outside the scrutiny and control of the colonisers signals the large degree to which Western cultural change and values began to be carried "internally".

Curiously, concubinage was never abolished nor were concubines put on salary. This inaction towards concubinage suggests that British officials saw the institution as a legitimate, although exotic, form of women's subordinate relationship to men. That is, concubine possession was a rightful and personal prerogative of the emir. Such acceptance of concubine ownership in fact shows a certain British "respect" for local ways.

In time, royal concubinage was used to forge kinship-like bonds with wealthy merchants, allowing royalty to "cross over" more easily into important commercial endeavors. Ironically, many large commercial businesses, still based upon traditional household structures, are formally designated "houses", pointing to a broad-based replacement of the superior and singular glory inherent in the "house of Rumfa", or Gidan Rumfa.

While all landscape stories show that male slave spaces were pivotal to re-figuring and accommodating state formational forces, there were crucial differences in the way in which political connections were spatially forged following the Fulani and British conquests. On the one hand, the Fulani conquest emerged out of local and regional tensions that filtered into and were played out and resolved *within* the confines of the Kano palace. The re-appropriation and patriarchal re-deployment of women's recently attained political economic spaces and powers were indispensable parts of the "internal" bargaining process.

In contrast, the British presence was kindled primarily by the "outside" need (engendered within the global capitalist economy) to secure new sources of raw materials, markets and production sites. The mandate and efficacy of British rule depended upon breaking down traditional geo-political organisation and rule and re-configuring it along Western patriarchal capitalist lines. Towards this end, the political and spatial contradictions inherent in palace patronage were played upon to generate tensions between the emir and his male slaves and nobility, and "male" political avenues in the palace landscape were dissolved and/or re-figured to receive and negotiate colonial interests and change. The spaces of women (previously degraded) were overlooked, peripheralised and/or used to experiment with and accommodate Western cultural practices. In contrast to Fulani rule, British rule effected a rupture in the traditional balance between centrifugal and centripetal social forces within royal patronage and reattached the "provider" and "provided for" to "external" and decentralised organisational forms.

The dissertation has therefore chronicled how competing levels of royal patronage materially drove, supported and transformed the structure-rules of the landscape. The chronicling reveals that it is not dependency *per se* within patriarchy that is disempowering; rather it is the way in which access to and control over external political and economic means "to provide" are materially and spatially configured. In particular, it was shown that women were not disempowered because they were provided for. They were disempowered because the socio-spatial and material avenues through which they might in turn provide for others or organise resistance to changes

they deemed undesirable were limited. The inclusion of spatiality within analyses of patriarchy thus helps to discern the dynamics behind maintaining women's subordination across different times and settings.

Appendix 2.1

Biographical sketches of informants[1]

WOMEN CO-OPERANTS[2]

<u>Hajiyya 'yar Mai-Tilas and Gogo Kahu</u>[3] (Aliyu, 1896-1903)

Both women are daughters of Aliyu, but had different mothers. <u>Hajiyya</u> was brought up by Abbas after the exile of her father and has lived in the palace all of her life.

<u>Gogo</u> Kahu was born before her father actually became <u>emir</u>. She married <u>Sarkin</u> Kahu (lit. the king of Kahu (a District) during the time of Abbas. She was brought back to the palace due to illness where it was discovered that she had leprosy. The leprosy was treated and cured using traditional medicines by women in the palace.[4] She returned to her husband by whom she bore two girls. Her husband later died and she stayed in his village for some time before returning to the palace during the reign of the present <u>emir</u>.

<u>Mai'daki</u> (Abbas, 1903-19)

After the palace was occupied by the British in 1903, one of <u>Sarki</u> Aliyu's young childless concubines fled into the <u>birni</u> with several others, their goods carried on camel back. They travelled rather aimlessly and, after some time, were forced to sell the camel to buy necessities. Soon after, Abbas was installed and the concubine returned to the palace. As she was childless,

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[1] The name of the <u>emir</u> in whose reign the respective co-operants was born is indicated parenthetically. This relative means of age-dating arises from the fact that most persons, expecially the elderly, guage time by events and not years, hours, seconds and so on.

[2] The pre-fixes, <u>'yar</u> (lit. daughter of), <u>Gogo</u> (Auntie), and <u>Hajiyya</u> are relatively interchangeable with respect to middle-aged and elderly women. Hajiyya is a term used to address a particularly distinguished (or elderly) woman, although technically it is a title given to a woman who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca (the <u>haj</u>), the counter part for men being "Alhaji".

An elderly royal woman, <u>Gogo</u> Gandi, probably also a daughter of Alu, was part of a field trip included <u>Haj. 'yar Mai-tilas</u> and <u>Gogo</u> Kahu. Although the field trip yielded useful information, I did not interview <u>Gogo</u> Gandi personally and therefore have no biographical data on her.

[3] These women, along with <u>Gogo</u> Dambatta Ita (below) were among the least co-operative and hostile. The brevity of their autobiographical sketches reflects their reticence to discuss their pasts with me.

[4] As a result of her treatments, her leperous condition seems to have been permanently arrested.

she became the new emir's concubine. Mai'daki was one of her children.

Mai'daki lived in the palace until her marriage to the emir of Katsina, Diko, sometime in the 1920s. She lived in the Katsina palace until Diko's death, sometime in the mid-40s, whereupon she returned to the Kano palace where she has resided until today.

'yar Kutisa (Yaya) (Abbas, 1903-19)

When Yaya's mother was a child she was captured by a dan sane (lit. the son of pickpockets), one of those nomadic slave dealers on horseback who kidnap children for the slave market. Abbas was out with his men when he saw the small girl seated in front of her abductor. He is said to have demanded her release, which was refused, whereupon the man was killed and the small girl taken to the palace. For months they tried to locate her parents, but were unsuccessful. She was given over to one of the male slaves to raise, was later married to a palace slave and gave birth to Yaya.

Yaya, as property of the emir was then given to Abbas' second wife, 'yar Makera (lit. the daughter of the [chief] blacksmith) as her domestic slave. Yaya recalled that 'yar Makera liberally used a whip to discipline her but always gave her plenty of food.

During the reign of Abdullahi, she desired to marry a certain Hassan, but the emir forbade it, and at the age of twelve, was made Abdullahi's concubine. Because Yaya was middle-aged and had no children at the time of Abdullahi's death, no one looked after her. She lived alone in what was formerly a kingly residential chamber known as Soron Malam (see Fig. 4.4) until Haj. Abba Ado Bayero brought her to live in a room of her compound.

Gogo Dambatta Ita (Abbas 1903-1919)

Daughter of Sarki (lit. king) Abbas, widow of Sarkin Bai (lit. king of the slaves; a traditional title of Fulani nobility) of Dambatta. She grew up in the palace and returned to it immediately after her husband's death.

Gogo Madaki (Abdullahi Bayero 1926-53)

Madaki is an elderly daughter of Sarki Abdullahi and was born while Abdullahi was still Wazirin Kano. She married Madaki Shehu Ahmed who died about six years ago. She now lives inside one of the new buildings of the cikin gida called Farin gida (lit. the white house; chapter 6).

Nani (Abdullahi Bayero 1926-53)

Younger sister of the emir. She married Sarki Karaye (lit. king of Karaye (a District)). After his death the present emir gave her to the Sarki's successor. He also died. The successor of the second Sarki then requested that she be given to him, but Nani refused. She thereafter came to live in the palace.

Haj. Abba Ado Bayero (Abdullahi Bayero 1926-53)

Second wife of the present emir. Hajiyya's maternal grandfather was emir Diko (the husband of Mai'daki). Diko had a daughter with a concubine who was Hajiyya's mother.[5] Her paternal grandfather was Diko's private secretary and her father served as the treasurer of the Katsina Native Authority.

Hajiyya is the most Western-educated of the wives. She was sent to Kano for primary school so as to accompany the daughter of emir Usman of Katsina. After finishing primary school she went on to complete Grade 3 (three years of post-primary education) in Kano. She then returned to Katsina where, as part of her studies, she taught for one year. Due to academic excellence, she was awarded a trip of nearly fifty days to England.[6] Afterwards she returned to Kano to finish Grade 2 (two more years of schooling) and was married in 1965 at the age of nineteen less than three weeks after her graduation.

Less than two weeks after being in the palace, she started teaching the concubines how to

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[5] Haj. Abbas mother was the sister (same mother and father) of Diko's successor, emir Usman.

[6] There was apparently an award program for Grade 3 female students throughout the federation. One student was chosen from each state. Hajiyya thus represented her state.

read and write Hausa.[7] She later expanded her curriculum to include Arabic, English, western cooking, and knitting. She is also a Girl Guide leader, she has helped several women in the palace set up their own businesses, such as talia (spaghetti) manufacture. She also runs a rotating traditional credit system for men and women and runs a small-scale informal bank for women desiring to set up savings. In addition, she runs several small-scale home-based business ventures, e.g., hand/body cream and sweets manufacture (especially alkaki).

Asmau (Sanusi 1953-63)

A concubine of the present-day emir.

Mero (Sanusi 1953-63)

Mero's grandmother was a kuyanga whose son (Mero's father) was a slave according to traditional lineage rules. Mero's father married a free woman (Mero's mother) which made Mero technically free. Mero eventually married but later divorced and moved back to the palace where she has become a kuyanga out of her own volition: according to traditional lineage rules, however, she is technically free. That is, she has assumed all the roles, responsiblities and mannerisms of a kuyanga and has placed herself under the direction of the title-holding head of the kuyangi, Uwar kuyangi (lit. mother of the kuyangi).

MEN CO-OPERANTS

Mallam Dau (Aliyu, 1896-1903)

Mallam Dau was a small boy when the British attacked the palace in 1903. He fled to the city ward of Madabo inside the walled city where he lived until Abbas was installed. Thereafter he returned to the palace and lived in the concubine ward of Kacako. He stayed in Kacako for about six years after which he moved permanently to a house nearby the palace in the ward of Kurawa.

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[7] None of the concubines, except one, had had any kind of education.

<u>Sallama Dako</u> (Abbas, 1903-19)

Sallama was born inside the palace in the household of <u>dan Rimi</u> in the western portion of Kofar Arewa (chapter 5). In 1926, when Sallama was about eighteen years old, Abdullahi Bayero (1926-53) recruited him into the Native Authority police force where he was assigned posts in the palace. He continued to work as a Native Authority policeman or 'yan doka (lit. children of the law); chapter 5) until about 1944, when he retired with the rank of corporal. Abdullahi then awarded him the office and title of <u>Mai-unguwa</u> (lit. master of the ward) whose main responsibility was collection of taxes from inhabitants of the the city wards of <u>Wudilawa</u> (lit. the people of Wudil [a village]) and <u>Dogarai</u> (lit. the bodyguards) and palace slave realms of <u>Kofar Kudu</u> (lit. gate of the south) and <u>Kofar Arewa</u> (lit. gate of the north). He maintained this title throughout Sanusi's reign, but was demoted to a messenger following Sanusi's deposition in 1963 (chapter 5). <u>Sallama</u> remained a messenger until about 1967 when the present <u>emir</u> appointed him <u>Babban zagi</u> (lit. chief of the mounted escorts), the titular head of the <u>zagage</u>[8], those slaves charged traditionally with escorting the <u>emir</u> on horseback. In 1972, he was awarded the title <u>Sallama</u>.

<u>Madakin</u> Kano (1914)

Madaki was born in the village of Dawakin Tofa and at age 5 began formal traditional Qur'anic schooling. In 1925, his father (<u>Madakin</u> Kano at the time) was recalled by the ailing <u>emir</u> Usman to replace the elderly <u>Sarkin Bai</u> on the colonial emirate council. His father moved with his family to the Kano city ward of <u>Yola</u>.

In 1929, he entered Kano Middle School after which he was conscripted into a teacher's training programme at Katsina Elementary Training Center. Between 1934-53, he taught Grade 3 at a variety of schools and served as Headmaster and Assistant Headmaster at a number of Kano city schools, including Dala, Shahuci, <u>Tudun</u> Wada, <u>Kofar Kudu</u> and Dandago. Between 1953-76. Sanusi appointed him the emirate organizer for the Adult Education programme initiated

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[8] <u>Zage</u> (sing.), <u>Zagage</u> (pl.).

by the Ministry of Education of the Northern Region. Also during this time, from 1953-66, he served as a member of the Northern House of Assembly, and in 1955 was made a member of a committe charged with auditing Public Account monies in the N.H.A. His N.H.A. constituency was Gabasawa. In 1976, he returied from Adult Education and from 1978-91 served as a member of the Health Management Board of Kano State. From about June through December 1981, he also served as a part-time Commissioner of the Local Government Service Commission which dealt with workers' employment (near Government house).

From December 1981 through December 1982, he served as a member of a Committe charged with creating more local governments in the state. Also in December 1981, he was made District Head in charge of Kano city and awarded the traditional title of Sarkin Shanu (lit. king of the cattle). In 1983, he was dismissed from office "due to politics", but was again made Sarkin Shanu in 1987. In May 1988, he was promoted to Madakin Kano.

Layi-Layi (1919)

Layi-Layi was born into the royal family of Dawakin Rano in Rano six months after the turbanning of Abbas in 1919. In the late 1930s, during the reign of Abdullahi, he came to live and work and because he was from lesser royalty, was employed as a bara (a servant) and not bayi (a slave).

At first he worked as a common labourer along with about fifteen others under the title-holding traditional builders of the palace. After about seven years Abdullahi recruited he and the others as prison wardens. He continued to work in this capacity after independence (1960) and up through 1967 when the Federal Military Government (FMG) assumed control over emirate prisons and courts in 1969. The FMG requested that he, along with other wardens, remain in their positions for a few years and train the new wardens. Layi-Layi consequently worked for four more years training the newcomers thereafter becoming a dogari, a position he still hold today.

Sarkin Hatsi (lit. king of the grains) Sani Abubakar (Usman, 1919-26)

Sarkin Hatsi's paternal uncle held a series of important grain-related slave positions that have no doubt aided in the current Sarkin Hatsi's understanding of palace history: he first served as Sarkin Tsani (lit. king of the ladder), was later promoted to Galadiman Rumbu (lit. the Galadima of the grain silo), then Sarkin Hatsi and finally dan Rimi, one of the three most powerful title-holding slaves of state.

Sani was born in the house of his parents in the south eastern portion of Kofar Kudu and weaned by his grandmother and other relatives in nearby quarters. When the primary school was built during the time of Abdullahi (chapter 5), the compound of his parents was razed whereupon he lived with in the nearby compound of his grandparents in Kofar Kudu. Sometime during the reign of Abdullahi, Sarkin Hatsi was given a job as a sweeper inside the palace grounds after which emir Sanusi (1953-63) made him his chief steward. The present emir initially assigned him to be the chief caretaker of the main throne chambers Soron Ingila (lit. the room of England; chapter 5) and later, Sarkin Hatsi.

Sarkin Gini (lit. king of the builders) Alhaji Ibrahim Mohammadu (Usman, 1919-26)

Sarkin Gini's forefathers were nomadic cattle-herding Fulani who were captured and made into slaves during the time of Ibrahim Dabo (1819-46). He claims that he is a direct descendent of a prince of Jama'are, in what is now called Bauchi state. This prince had gone out for a stroll and was captured and brought to Kano. His son was apparently taught the art of building, in which he must have excelled, for he was made Sarkin Gini. Since that time the title has remained in his family.

Alhaji baba dan meshe (Usman, 1919-26)[9]

Alhaji came to the palace from the nearby district of Dawakin Tofa at the age of about seven, less than one month after Abdullahi Bayero was turbanned in 1926. Due to "some kind of infection" during circumcision he was deemed a eunuch (baba) and thence allowed access into the cikin gida.

At first he resided inside the concubine ward of Yelwa (chapter 6) from where he escorted the emir's children to and from school. He claims that because he was constantly with women, he began to behave like a woman and was considered gay. This development was reported to the emir who attempted to cure him by assigning him heavy "male" work in the stables under the guidance of Shamaki, in whose household he also slept. His main duty was carrying head loads of manure out of the stables, which he claims made him very unhappy, but "I couldn't complain because the emir had given me the job". He also continued to escort Abdullahi's junior brothers to school. This drudgery apparently "cured" him of any signs of homosexuality.

His professional life blossomed anew when Abdullahi sent him to the British Governor's house to be trained as a steward.[10] For the next 1.5 years he trekked daily to the colonial Governor's house outside the city where he was taught how to make a western-style bed and how to use and maintain such things as tables, chairs, bathrobes, towels, bedding (sheets and blankets) and armchairs. Thereafter crates of the various items he had learned how to use began to arrive in the palace. According to dan Meshe, the things were sent by the British Resident and paid for out of Native Authority monies.

Following completion of his "course", he lived in the second floor of the northernmost soron

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[9] Alhaji granted me only two interviews. During the first one, Gogo Mai'daki entered and began disputing the veracity of his information. The bickering stemmed from the fact that both presented data on the southern slave area, but for different time periods such that the data seemed conflictual. Alhaji became rather disgusted and left. During our second interview we spoke mostly about his personal history. Thereafter someone from Kofar Arewa who served as an informant to the federal Secret Security Service (established in 1983 by President Babbangida to replace the Nigerian Security Service) told him that I was a C.I.A. spy after which he refused to keep our scheduled meetings (chapter 2). His rather lengthy biographical sketch is included because it provides interesting insights into how changes to the old order affected the life of a male slave and especially a "eunuch" (below).

[10] He claims that he was chosen because he, like eunuchs in general, were highly trustworthy and thus would not steal from the Governor's house.

jakadiya from which he departed every morning to make the emir's new bed and to bring him his food.[11] He served as the emir's trusted personal steward and right-hand-man until the death of Abdullahi in 1953.

Before Abdullahi died, dan Meshe pressured him to find him a job with the Native Authority. He knew that if a new emir came it would be difficult for him to find work: many people were jealous of his closeness with (and presumably power or access to) the emir, and Sanusi would undoubtedly allot slave positions from his own loyal slave following. Abdullahi consequently registered him with the Native Authority.

After the emir's death, dan Meshe was sent out of the palace to work as a messenger to villages with the Native Authority. He continued to stay in the palace in two rooms behind the royal court chambers of Soron Fadanci (lit. room of the fada; chapters 3 and 4). He disliked his menial job immensely, but "there was nothing he could do. I wasn't close to the emir". He remained a messenger throughout the reigns of Sanusi and Inuwa. He claims that the present emir, Alhaji Ado Bayero saw that he was old "and just abandoned me". He now lives in Kofar Arewa and is unemployed.

His Highness Alhaji Ado Bayero (1926-53)

See chapter 5.

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[11] At that time a separate kitchen for cooking the emir's food was made where the present farin gida is now.

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KANPROF 5405/S10 Mallam Ado Sanusi - (Emir's Son), personal file of, 1950-53

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[1] NAF is the acronym used for "Native Authority Files".

[2] KAN/LA is the acronym for "Kano Local Authority".

[3] The acronym KANONA is used to designate files from the "Kano Native Authority".

KANPROF 5305/s33 Kano City Council, Publicity Regarding, 1952

KANPROF 8379 New Building for Emir's Court, Kano, 1953-55

KANPROF 8424 Chiefs, Grading of, 1954

SNP[4] 7/9/1538/1908 Kano Province Annual Report for 1907

SNP 7/472/1909 Kano Province Annual Report for 1908

SNP 7/3835/1910 Kano Province Half-Yearly Report, ending 30th June 1910

SNP 7/951/1911 Kano Province Annual Report for 1910

SNP 7/1114/1912 Kano Province Annual Report for 1911

SNP 10/134P/1913 Kano Province Annual Report for 1912

SNP 10/2/98P/1914 Kano Province Annual Report for 1913

SNP 10/139P/1915 Kano Province Annual Report for 1914

SNP 10/4/170P/1916 Kano Province Annual Report for 1915

SNP 10/4/518P/1916 Kano Province Half-Yearly Report, ending 30th June 1916

SNP 179P/1918 Kano Province Annual Report No. 53 for 1917

SNP 10/7/1919 Kano Province Annual Report No. 56 for 1918

SNP 10/7/318P/1919 Kano Province Half-Yearly Report No. 57, ending 30 June 1919

SNP 10/9/120P/1921 Kano Province Report for 15 months ending 31 March 1921

SNP 9/548/1922 Kano Province Annual Report for 1921

SNP 9/12/635/1925 Kano Province Annual Report for 1924

SNP 17/18/k105/vl,ll Kano Province Annual Report for 1925

SNP 17/K105/vll Comments

SNP 17/k105/vll Kano Province Annual Report for 1926

SNP 17/8/k6892 Kano Province Annual Report for 1927

SNP 17/9043/vl Kano Province Annual Report for 1928

SNP 17/2/12004/vl Kano Province Annual Report for 1929

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[4] SNP is the acronym for the "Secretariat of the Northern Provinces", located in Kaduna.

SNP 17/14686v1/1930 Kano Province Annual Report for 1930

SNP 17/16687v1/1931 Kano Province Annual Report for 1931

SNP 17/18956v1/1932 Kano Province Annual Report for 1932

SNP 17/18956v2/1932 Kano Province Annual Report for 1932 and 1933

SNP 17/3/25673v1/1935 Kano Province Annual Report for 1935

SNP 17/27810/1936 Kano Province Annual Report for 1936

SNP 17/3/29652/1937 Kano Province Annual Report for 1937

SNP 17/13847/1938 Kano Province Annual Report for 1938

SNP 17/32098/1939 Kano Province Annual Report for 1939

SNP 17/34242/1941 Kano Province Annual Report for 1941

SNP 17/37005/1943 Kano Province Annual Report for 1943

SNP 17/39157/1944 Kano Province Annual Report for 1944

SNP 17/40234/1945 Kano Province Annual Report for 1945

SNP 17/41986/1946 Kano Province Annual Report for 1946

SNP 17/43495/1947 Kano Province Annual Report for 1947

SNP 17/45599/1948 Kano Province Annual Report for 1948

SNP 17/47602/1949 Kano Province Annual Report for 1949

SNP 17/7956/1952 Kano Province Annual Report for 1952

SNP 17/8328/1953 Kano Province Annual Report for 1953

SNP 17/8355/s1/1954 Kano Province Annual Report for 1954

SNP 17/8655/1954 Material for Annual Report

SNP 17/8635/1954 Statistics for Kano Province

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