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FRENCH-CANADIAN CONSERVATISM IN
PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE,
1873-1891.

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FRENCH-CANADIAN CONSERVATISM IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE

1873 -- 1891

Submitted to McGill University

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
1	Introduction.....	1
2	Sir George Etienne Cartier and the Origins of French-Canadian Conservatism.....	18
3	Economic and Social Conditions in French- Canada, 1873-1891.....	44
4	The Problem of the Leadership of the Party.....	72
5	The Roman Catholic Church and the French- Canadian Conservative Party.....	102
6	Party Organization.....	130
7	The Conservative Programme.....	163
8	The Critics of French-Canadian Conservatism.....	191
9	The Conservative Programme Fails of Adoption.....	214
10	The Decline of Conservatism.....	244
11	Conclusion.....	276
	Critical Bibliography.....	281

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The critical study of the history of Canadian political parties is comparatively new. Until the publication of Dr. Frank Underhill's provocative monograph on the development of national parties some three years ago,¹ the history of Canadian parties had appeared only as an incidental in the biography of some public man. Joseph Pope sketched, with the broadest of strokes, the Conservative party in his study of Sir John A. Macdonald. Substantially the same plan was followed by both Dr. Skelton² and by the late Sir John Willison³ in their biographies of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Of political chronicles there were, of course, a great number but they were usually apologetic in tone.⁴ Equally cursory have been the references made to Canadian political parties in the standard constitutional histories which have been content to assume rather than to examine.⁵ This neglect is a striking commentary on the unwillingness of Canadian scholars to grapple with the fundamentals of government for, in the parliamentary system under which we live, the political party is the driving force of government. While, therefore, a study of the French-Canadian Conservative party may traverse much of the ground covered in biographies, constitutional histories and so on, it does so with different emphasis and for a different purpose.

The basis of party in French-Canada lay in the needs and the aspirations of the French-Canadian community. It is not necessary, in examining the philosophical origins of party among French-Canadians to assume that they were exclusively idealistic or materialistic. Both undoubtedly played a large part, yet it was a combination of both rather than the predominance of one. Ideas had a large share in forming French-Canadian political factions for there is probably no community in North America

where ideas have larger sway than in Quebec. Indeed to the casual observer, some of the earliest French-Canadian efforts in the direction of the formation of parties appear to have no other basis than those supplied by abstract ideas. As late as 1877, when he was revamping the Liberal party, Wilfrid Laurier laid it down that the genesis of party was in the realm of the abstract idea.⁶ On the other hand, material difference has always been present in French-Canadian political divisions. It might be more accurate to state that they have been most potent, since the French-Canadian community displays and never more so than during the XIX century, all the variations between affluence and abject poverty. If we accept the materialistic interpretation of history without qualification, here is sufficient explanation for the rise of parties in French-Canada. In view of its unexplored possibilities the thesis is attractive,⁷ but in view of the peculiarities of the French-Canadian world it is not applicable without reservations which amount to the virtual negation of the thesis itself.

The basis of the party system was, on the other hand, much more broad. The needs and the aspirations of French-Canadians, provided with the machinery of parliamentary government, were the conditions that gave rise to the formation of political parties. As an agricultural people, the French-Canadians had needs that were peculiar to them. They were made the more conscious of their needs, by the presence in their Province of an English-speaking community which was different from them in occupation as well as in tradition and in language. His needs or more accurately speaking, the necessity of defending his way of life was impressed upon the French-Canadian by the fact it had been given a tangible form in a land-holding system and in a legal code which was indigenous.⁸ Language, traditions and religion, although in themselves, under normal circumstances, scarcely

the basis of parties, all tended to promote political division. Then there were the equally powerful, if less easily assessable forces of racial aspirations and ambition which may be conveniently summed up in the phrase, nationalism. It will be seen, therefore, that whatever French-Canada may have owed to foreign example, the basis of party division lay at home.

The historical genesis of political parties in French-Canada is more easy to trace. Their presence was suggested in the first and certainly was present in the second Parliament of the Province of Lower Canada. In the second Parliament, the seigneurs who had predominated in the previous House, gave way to advocates and notaries who were more representative of the French-Canadian electorate.⁹ These new parliamentarians had an outlook vastly different from that of their English-speaking colleagues and the harmony which had characterized the earlier gatherings of the Provincial parliament became progressively less conspicuous.¹⁰ Early in the XIX century party lines became sharply defined when the agricultural and the commercial interests entered into open conflict.¹¹ The unfortunate eruption of Sir James Craig into the controversy introduced two new elements which were destined to stultify much of this natural political development. In the first place, Craig set the disastrous precedent of Executive interference in the disputes of the political groups in the Assembly. Had he interfered to redress the balance between the two Houses of the legislature, his action would have been pardonable, but he interfered in a matter which was of concern to the Legislative Assembly alone. In the second instance, Craig's unconsidered action intensified French-Canadian racial consciousness and made nationalism a political force. Thereafter, normal political growth was impossible. It may be questioned whether a natural political

development within such an instrument of government as the Canada Act was attainable for, without complete responsibility, party government degenerates into unreality. Be this as it may, the bad feelings between French- and English-speaking Canadians in the 'twenties and the 'thirties put political emphasis elsewhere till the Rebellion of 1837 destroyed the old system in its entirety.

In the period following 1841, French-Canadian political parties, in recognizable form, emerged. By 1848 or 1849, many of the conditions that had militated against the emergence of parties had been mitigated. Nationalism was still a force, but its violent and exclusive spirit had been bent to cooperation with another race. The basis of cooperation had been directed towards the achievement of responsible government and the agent had been the Reform or Liberal party which was headed by Baldwin and by Lafontaine. It was thus as early as 1843 or 1844 that the French-Canadians had learned that the true foundation of party lay in the alliance of like-thinking men irrespective of nationality or of creed and had learned too that the character of party was essentially functional.¹² In the decade of the 'forties the Liberal group was disciplined by alternate periods of opposition and of office and their mettle tried by efforts to master the dangerous weapon of official patronage. Events in 1848 and in 1849 hastened the maturity of political parties in Canada. Whatever may have been the wider implications in the field of Imperial development of the passage of the Rebellion Losses Bill, its effect on the growth of parties was decisive. In giving his assent to this celebrated measure, the Governor General, Lord Elgin, threw the entire onus on his Liberal Ministry. His conduct not only compelled them to assume responsibility

for their propositions, it also gave an emphatic denial to the practice of Executive interference. Less formal, but nonetheless far-reaching, were the effects of events of the previous year on the French-Canadian Liberals. The entry of Papineau and his group of young admirers into political life and the example of insurgent European democracy forced the French-Canadians to reconsider their principles. In essence they were compelled to choose between evolution and revolution as a means to national progress. It was in that searching choice that French-Canadian Conservatism took form.

The terminology of biology has little place in historical investigation yet it may be pardonable to state that after 1849 the French-Canadian Conservative party was in embryo. It is incontestable that the old Liberalism had many of the attributes of the new Conservatism. The Liberal party as it existed after 1849 was essentially a party of moderates which, having achieved responsible government, was disposed to call a halt. The rise of the new radicalism thrust on them the defence of the institutions and traditions of the Province. An instance in point is the one referred to above, the winning of responsible government. In 1843 or 1844, the Liberals, then the extremists in the Province, while satisfied, ^{with} colonial status demanded complete self-government.¹³ In 1849, the new extremists, the Canada East radicals, or Rouges, as they were called, had passed far beyond mere parliamentary reform to the advocacy of separation from the Empire and of annexation to the United States. The Liberals of 1849 were substantial men to whom the maintenance of the existing order meant much. Thus, they criticized the seigneurial system as a hindrance to effective agriculture not as a glaring social injustice. They were also men to whom an appeal on racial or on religious lines met with no very warm response.

The moderate Liberals were forward-looking. They realized what the railway might mean to the Province and nearly every prominent member of the party was interested in the projection of one or more railways. Most of these same interests and attributes were found in French-Canadian Conservatism and understandably so, since the Liberal of 1849 was the Conservative of 1854. In that five-year interval the flux of Canadian political parties had become complete and it wanted only the genius of Macdonald to suggest the basis of a coalition among the cautiously progressive groups in the Province.

Two factors which conditioned the French-Canadian Conservative party and which condition almost every political manifestation in French-Canada remain to be considered: the French-Canadian electorate and French-Canadian nationalism. It is a truism that cannot be too often repeated that no party is greater than the people who form it. In French-Canada, the composition and the character of the electorate was peculiar. Thanks to the provisions of the Canada Act, the franchise was very wide, coinciding very nearly with the male population. The male population, however, was exceedingly unevenly divided between a large farming and labouring group and a relatively small professional class. A middle class, to use the expressive, if outworn, term, scarcely existed before the middle of the XIX century.¹⁴ The gap which normally would be assumed to lie between the two groups, was bridged by the fact that the professional men to a very considerable extent were drawn from the sons of the small farmers and of the workingmen of the Province.¹⁵ It was, of course, from the professional class, doctors, notaries and advocates, that the political leaders were drawn, as a glance through the Canadian Parliamentary Companion shews. The professional men were usually locally trained in one or other of the

classical colleges of the Province.¹⁶ This was the case even during the period following Confederation when, in consideration of the increase of wealth and the vastly improved methods of travel, it might be expected that foreign study would be common. The colleges, however, added to their courses of study to keep pace with the growing needs of the Province and the chartering of Laval as a university in 1854 made it less necessary for the young men to leave home. The education that was given in the colleges was excellent in its own way, although its emphasis on literary subjects no doubt helped to strengthen the predilection of the French-Canadian mind for abstraction and for dialectic.¹⁷ It is probable too that the colleges strengthened the Conservative point of view since the clergy who were the teachers were generally favourable to the party. It is doubtful whether this criticism could be directed against Laval University which appears to have had a very enviable reputation for cherishing the liberal spirit. The influence of this peculiar social stratification on the political parties was powerful. In the first instance it made the drafting of a generally acceptable programme a task of great difficulty since such diverse outlooks had to be satisfied. On the one hand there was the farmer and the town labourer who, whatever may have been the deficiencies of their formal education were hard-headed and insistent upon tangible returns. On the other hand stood the man educated in the classical college with the stamp of his schooling on him and disposed to resolve situations and problems in terms of ideas. The lack of equilibrium in such an electorate tended to make the life of the political parties precarious since nominal supporters were easily attracted by large promises and by new theories. It is probable that the character of the electorate favoured the multiplication of parties and the revamping of parties, both of which phenomena

were common in the post-Confederation age. The fact that the mass of the voters were relatively poor gave the control of patronage a very great political value and at the same time rendered the community liable to the grosser forms of corruption. The French-Canadian voter was certainly no more venal than his English-speaking fellow-citizen yet it is incontestable that bribery was practised on a large scale in some parts of Quebec. Though the day had long since passed when the French-Canadian voter could be victimized by the arts of the demagogue,¹⁸ he was fond of oratory and inclined to favour spectacular leadership. This preference undoubtedly put ability to speak at a premium and frequently led to the rapid advancement of men who had little to recommend them other than a platform style and an impressive presence.

Another powerful conditioning factor was that of nationalism. The forms and the ramifications of French-Canadian nationalism are many. In the early XIX century it was directed towards constitutional and political ends. In the hands of men like Papineau nationalism was synonymous with the recognition of a separate status for French-Canadians within the community of the British Empire.¹⁹ It is by no means certain that Papineau seriously entertained the formal separation of French-Canada from Great Britain for he was keen enough to realize that independence from Great Britain might very well mean annexation to the United States and the reputation of the United States in dealing with minorities was not encouraging. In the later XIX century French-Canadian nationalism took on a new form although the basic consideration, the necessity of maintaining national identity, remained as strong as ever. The winning of responsible government and, even more, the creation of the Canadian federal state, robbed nationalism of much of its political intransigence. The complete failure

of Papineau to capture support even in the exciting days of 1848 and 1849 and the equally complete failure of his followers, the Rouges, to win a place in Provincial life is the best proof of this. At Confederation, the Province of Quebec became for all practical purposes the political entity that the earlier nationalists had so earnestly desired. In Confederation too the French-Canadians found their rights guaranteed and their position within Confederation put on a most favourable basis.²⁰ During the thirty years after Confederation nationalism lost its ultra-political form and became identified with social and with economic progress. The utterances of men as far remote politically as Cartier and as young Laurier demonstrates this. Both recognized that the French-Canadian had won a position of political equality with their English-speaking fellow-countrymen; their task was, therefore, to increase their material prosperity.²¹ Thus national ambition and interest were translated into such tangible things as the opening of new country to settlement, the building of railways, the acquisition of the North-West and the raising of a protective tariff. The consequences of this new orientation were obvious. Both parties became closely associated with practical programmes that promised material returns and until the middle 'eighties nationalism in its political form was practically unknown.

The French-Canadian Conservative party was influenced from abroad. The improved communications that came in the middle of the century and the numbers of immigrants from the Old World made the British Provinces respond to foreign examples as they had never done so before. Important as these influences were, they have been largely unassessed by Canadian scholars with the consequence that they have surrounded their work with a sense of almost complete unreality.

The influence of Great Britain on the political development of French-Canada was of first importance. It was from Great Britain that the French-Canadians first received the grant of free institutions and the entire theory and practice of self-government. The French-Canadians were by no means ill-governed under the Old Régime. There is, however, a world of difference between a paternalism, even of the most enlightened character and a government in which free men formulate policies and assume complete responsibility for them. All this the French-Canadians received from Great Britain and the skill they have displayed in making use of the instrument thus placed in their hands does every credit to them and to their instructors. In the formation of their political parties the French-Canadians followed British models even to the adoption of the traditional names of Conservative and of Liberal. Both parties paid lip-service to the ideals of their prototypes and in the Conservatism of Chapleau there is a slight flavour of Disraeli's Tory Democracy. But Chapleau and his predecessors were too Canadian to attempt to make over extensively their party. French-Canadian Conservatism was a vigorous native growth which could not be readily bent to foreign example. The Liberals were more pliable. After two decades of playing with the dangerous tenets of Continental Liberalism in the later 'seventies they put away their youthful follies and became Liberals of the decorous English-School. At the hands of young Wilfrid Laurier, whose hours of enforced leisure in the Parliamentary Library had made him familiar with the principal works of the Whig historians, his party emerged a fairly accurate replica of mid-century English Liberalism. The final step was certainly logical for in it Mr. Laurier made himself over as Mr. Gladstone, with charming variations.

The influence that the United States exercised on the development of

Canadian parties is more difficult to assess. As the word is understood, its formal influence was small. Annexation disappeared from the political vocabularies of all the French-Canadian parties and with it went any desire to imitate United States constitutional modes. This does not mean that United States political practices were not widely followed. A case in point is caucus which crept into Canada in the early 'seventies and whose use had a certain vogue among French-Canadians. It might be hazarded that the caucus came into use only when the leadership of the party had declined to impotency. Other practices associated with United States usage were common, as, for example, the extensive use of patronage by the party in power. It may be questioned whether this practice was less American than North American for in the British Provinces Government had been accustomed to dispense favours for political support long before Andrew Jackson pronounced his famous dictum. Much the same thing could be said of the considerable use of bribery at election time. This too was North American in its scope and, indeed, would seem to be inevitable in a community where wealth is small.

More elusive still was the influence exercised by France. The connexion between France and her former colony is difficult to define, yet it was by means of it that French influence made itself felt in Quebec. At the time of Confederation, the relation was close, although in the succeeding decade it became less cordial. The conventional date for the resumption of close relations between French-Canada and France is 1855,²² when the French warship, la Capricieuse, visited Quebec. The event, following so close on the Crimean War when France and Britain were allies, aroused a good deal of interest throughout the Province and inspired Cr maize to

write, "le vieux soldat canadien." For very nearly the next twenty years the interest that new France manifested in old France was strong. It is not suggested that French-Canadians were particularly attracted by the government of the Second Empire, although they probably preferred it to that of the Republic or even to that of the July Monarchy. The most cursory glance at their newspapers shews that they were impressed by the material advances France made under the government of Louis Napoleon. The military successes of the Empire appealed to their racial pride; in the same fashion their religious sentiments were satisfied by the attitude of the Second Empire towards the Church. Some of the political accessories familiar to contemporary France were introduced into French Canada. Conspicuous among these was the newspaper with the militantly Roman Catholic point of view. In Canada the best representatives of "la bonne presse" were, perhaps, le Nouveau Monde and le Journal des Trois Rivières. To a number of French-Canadian journalists, the name of Louis Veuillot was one to conjure with. The "Catholic party" which was so mooted in the 'sixties and in the 'seventies had its germ in France where the Ultramontanes proposed political action to overcome the liberalizing tendencies of the later Empire.

That the regard of French-Canada for France was not dynastic, its attitude during the Franco-Prussian War best indicates. Early in the War, the city of Quebec was gaily decorated with tricolour flags in token of reported French victories.²³ Later, when the struggle was uncertain, l'Événement could write,

"..nous avons beau de dire et beau de faire, nous sommes faits aux circonstances, aimer notre sort ne conserver plus de regrets, mettre ailleurs nos espérances, la France reste pour nous la France.." ²⁴

The defeat of France produced an outburst of sympathy.²⁵ It produced also

a considerable subscription, amounting to over \$12,000, which was raised for the French wounded.²⁶

After 1870, France did not occupy such a large place in the thinking of French-Canadians that she had occupied before. The reign of the Commune in Paris seems to have discouraged French-Canadians, if opinion reported in the press may be taken as indicative. The amazing recovery that France made following the War does not seem to have caught the popular imagination, possibly because it was attended by a growing anti-clericalism that found its expression in the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1889. A glance through Sir Thomas Chapais, "Discours et Conférences", shews pretty clearly the opinion of the Conservative-minded French-Canadian on the course the Third Republic was following,

"..un seul mot peut résumer parfaitement l'état politique de la France; c'est le chaos.."27

It is probable, however, that it was not simply a divergence of opinion that caused French-Canada and France to drift apart. In the years that followed Confederation, the attention and the energy of French-Canada was absorbed at home and European influences receded.

It may be said, therefore, that although the development of political parties in French-Canada owed much to foreign example, it was example in detail, not in concept. This was emphatically true of the Conservative party. Provided with the framework of parliamentary government it evolved with a minimum of outside inspiration and of^{outside} example. It must always be kept in mind that Conservatism was, in its early days at least, more than a party, it had its attitude towards social questions; it had a fairly well-considered point of view with respect to economic problems.

In this examination of French-Canadian Conservatism, the study has been limited to the period between 1873 and 1891. The limitation has

been deliberate for the period comprises an epoch in the development of the party and an epoch in the development of Canada. By 1873, Conservatism had emerged from the confusion and from the contradiction of the early Confederation period. The death of Sir George Etienne Cartier had made the party more independent, more a party, than it had been when it was the personal following of Cartier. The twenty-year interval that followed exhibited Conservatism both in defeat and in victory. It also exhibited the party struggling to adapt itself to new conditions and to assimilate new ideas. Between 1873 and 1891, it is possible to see French-Canadian Conservatism in perspective.

- ¹Underhill, F. The development of National Political Parties in Canada.
Canadian Historical Review, December, 1935.
- ²Skelton, O.D. The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier.
The Century Company, New York, 1921.
- ³Willison, J. Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party.
Morang and Company, Toronto, 1903.
- ⁴Vide, for example, C. Langelier, Souvenirs Politiques.
- ⁵Vide, for example, The Constitution of Canada, W.M.F. Kennedy,
Oxford University Press, 1938.
- ⁶Laurier, W. Discours à l'Etranger et au Canada. p. 86.
Librairie Beauchemin, Montréal, 1909.
- ⁷For an exceedingly crude attempt, vide, The birth of Canadian Democracy,
by S.B. Ryerson, F. White, Toronto, 1937.
- ⁸The use of the term indigenous may be questioned. It will be recalled,
however, that ordinances of the Sovereign Council as well as royal
decrees emanating from France and the provisions of the Customs of
Paris comprised the body of law of New France.
- ⁹Christie, R. History of the late Province of Lower Canada. Vol. 1,
p. 126, gives the names of the members of the First Parliament.
Richard Northington, Montreal, 1866.
- ¹⁰Christie, R. ibid., Vol. 1, p. 271.
- ¹¹The open break occurred in 1807 and 1808 over the question of levying
taxes for local improvements.
- ¹²Papineau's position is pretty well shewn in the amendment he moved in
reply to the Address, 1848; vide, Turcotte "le Canada sous l'Union,
tome 2, p. 66.
- ¹³A good sample of the moderate Liberal outlook is to be found in Cartier's
speech to the electors of St. Denis in September of 1844; vide, Dis-
cours, p. 1.
- ¹⁴Durham, Report, p. 18.
- ¹⁵Durham, ibid., p. 19.
- ¹⁶The first of the classical colleges was founded at Nicolet in 1806;
vide, Douville, J.A. Histoire du collège-séminaire de Nicolet,
tome 2, p. 21.
- ¹⁷According to figures given by Douville, the College at Nicolet graduated
over 1500 men who entered the professions out of a total graduation of
4724 between the years 1803 and 1903.

- ¹⁸Durham, op. cit., p. 19.
- ¹⁹Fryer, C.E. Chapter X, Lower Canada, Section A, p. 235.
Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. 6.
Cambridge University Press, 1930.
- ²⁰This is the thesis of Sir Thomas Chapais', Cours d'Histoire du Canada.
- ²¹Laurier, W. Discours à l'Étranger et au Canada, p. 455ff.
- ²²Vide, for example, Vattier's Essai sur la mentalité canadienne française,
p. 252.
Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, Paris, 1928.
- ²³l'Événement, le 20 août, 1870.
- ²⁴ibid., le 28 août, 1870.
- ²⁵Mandements des Evêques de Québec, tome 6, p. 123.
- ²⁶de St. Maurice, F. le Canada et les Canadiens Français pendant la
guerre franco-prussienne, p. 72.
Québec, 1888.
- ²⁷Chapais, T. Discours et conférences, 1^{re} série, 1893, p. 246.

CHAPTER 2

SIR GEORGE ETIENNE CARTIER AND THE ORIGINS OF FRENCH-CANADIAN CONSERVATISM

No study of French-Canadian Conservatism would be complete without an examination of the position and of the influence of Sir George Etienne Cartier. Cartier was much more than the leader of the French-Canadian Conservative party; he was, in large measure, its designer and builder and in the twenty years of his active political life he left his mark impressed indelibly upon his creation. His influence upon the party and upon its philosophy was personal, for he was a man of strong character, a man of action much more than a man of reflection. An adequate estimation of Cartier's place in the history of French-Canadian Conservatism must, therefore, embrace an examination of much that is personal.

It was in Cartier's hands that political Conservatism became French-Canadian. It must always be remembered what his biographers have little stressed,¹ that Cartier was essentially French-Canadian. He was born in the almost exclusively French-Canadian Richelieu Valley; he was schooled in the French-Canadian atmosphere of the Montreal Seminary and he embraced the popular French-Canadian profession of law.² In this respect he stands in marked contrast to the other great French-Canadian political leaders; to Papineau who had about him much of the intellectual cosmopolitanism of the XVIII century, and to Laurier who was profoundly influenced by his early associations with English-speaking people. If, therefore, Cartier may be regarded as a representative French-Canadian, it must be added that he left the stamp of French-Canadian ideals and aspirations upon the Conservative party.

Until the later 'forties, Cartier's participation in active public life was small.³ Success in his legal work and his advocacy of railways probably explain Cartier's appearance as a parliamentarian in 1848. For

over a decade he had practised law in Montreal and had acquired a reputation as a successful and popular advocate. His interest in railway promotion brought Cartier into touch with the Montreal business world and with the Anglo-Canadian section of Canada East. In this respect, Cartier may be regarded as personifying the new Canada of the 'forties and as demonstrating the unsoundness of Lord Durham's famous generalization as to the antine^{um}ity of French- and of English-speaking Canadians. What Sir Thomas Chapais has so aptly called the "heroic age" of Canadian political life was rapidly passing away; rivalries of race were transforming themselves into rivalries of material interests; interest in sterile constitutional questions were surrendering to an engrossing attention to the development and to the exploitation of the vast resources of the Province. The passage of the Rebellion Losses Bill and the successful negotiation of the Reciprocity Treaty mark the beginning and the end of an epoch in Canadian history and it is not without significance that Cartier's active political career belongs to the period which followed 1854, rather than to the period which preceded 1849.

The year 1854 had its importance for Cartier personally since it marked approximately the date of his translation to Conservatism. It is a curious fact that the man who came to be regarded as the personification of all that Conservatism represented was, for a considerable period, a Liberal.⁴ While it is true that in the 'forties party names counted for little, it is probable that Cartier's adhesion to the moderate Liberal party was a matter of principle. In everything but name the Liberals were conservative and their unexceptionable programme of reform and their interest in legislation of a practical character was attractive to a young man on the threshold of his parliamentary career. In large measure,

Cartier was driven to embrace political Conservatism by the rise of younger and more advanced Reformers to a place of prominence in the years following 1846 or 1847. The foundation of l'Institut canadien; the return of Papineau from exile; the establishment of l'Avenir, all served to destroy the hegemony that the moderate Liberals had enjoyed, and to spread disturbing ideas borrowed from European republicanism and socialism throughout the Province. In their criticism of existing institutions, of the seigneurial system, of the Church, of government itself, the Rouges forced the Reformers to the defensive and prepared the way for the coalition of 1854. Between Cartier and some of the Rouge leaders there was much personal animus and faced by the disintegration of his party, Cartier was left the only alternative of joining the Liberal-Conservatives.⁵ His experience was by no means peculiar to himself. Francis Hincks, Baldwin's successor in Upper Canada, was driven slowly towards the new alignment by the pressure of the clear-Grit group. His progression as early as 1852 was remarked by no friendly eye,

".. on a remarqué que M. (et)? Mde. Hincks avaient une faiblesse pour la société tory, puisque tous les couples qui accompagnaient Mde. Hincks à l'église anglicanne étaient tories..."⁶

It is well to observe, however, that with the original and with its titular leader, Cartier had little sympathy and was careful to emphasise that his support was accorded only to the measures, not to the principle of the Coalition.⁷ Once the change had been made, Cartier's advance was rapid and by 1859 he had become the leader of the Conservative party in Canada East. Circumstances favoured Cartier. Among the French-Canadian moderates he stood almost alone, for the retirement of Lafontaine and the withdrawal of Morin and of Taché had left the group virtually leaderless.

It was against this background that Cartier's Conservatism was to

develop. It was a natural growth, the fruit of his observations and of his experiences and conditioned by his associations. It may be hazarded that books or reading played little part in turning Cartier to the Conservative party for his library was singularly poor in works on political theory.⁸ It might be added that Cartier's Conservatism developed gradually for there was the curious paradox in the man's make-up that though his physical energy was superabundant, his mind moved with some deliberation. There is, for example, a great difference between the tentative assertion of Conservative principles that are to be found in his speeches in the middle 'fifties, and the complete expression of them that was to come during the debates on Confederation. It is doubtful if Cartier ever embodied his creed in a formal statement or 'declaration,⁹ although his speeches are replete with the expression of Conservative principles upon specific topics. It is, therefore, from scattered references in speeches and addresses and in personal letters that we must reconstruct Cartier's political philosophy.

As might be expected, the roots of Cartier's Conservatism lay in his antecedents. He was a representative French-Canadian and his views were deeply coloured by the traditional outlook of his people. While it would be superficial to brand an entire people as either conservative or liberal in its point of view, it is nevertheless true that as a race, the French-Canadians are conservative and traditionalist in their attitudes.¹⁰ It would be strange if it was otherwise. As colonists they were the products of the Old Régime. Their heroic and, to an extent, their golden age, lay in the past.¹¹ When, therefore, their intellectual revival took place in the 'thirties and the 'forties of the last century, its leaders, the Garneaus and the Crémaizes, looked to the past for their inspiration.¹²

It is not fanciful to see in the motto of the provincial arms of Quebec je me souviens, a confession of faith of an entire people. In common with the majority of his countrymen, Cartier lived under this spell and it was instinctive for him to describe himself and his fellow French-Canadians, "... nous sommes Français d'origine, mais Français du vieux régime..."¹³ Just what effect a form of government has in determining national character might be difficult to estimate, but it would seem that the century of paternalistic administration under the French governors inclined the French-Canadians to an authoritarian rule. In this regard, Cartier was no exception especially when he himself came to personify the authority. He ruled his party with a strong hand and there is much to suggest that the political disaster that overtook him at the close of his career was occasioned by this historic desire to grasp at power.¹⁴ Somewhat akin to this respect for authority was, and is, a respect for law and a reliance upon the processes of law. In nothing did Cartier more completely represent his countrymen than in this as the safeguards he inserted in the British North America Act amply evidence. Perhaps the strongest and the most consistent force that has increased the conservative inclinations of the French-Canadians has been the Roman Catholic Church. The most superficial knowledge of the history of French-Canada fully attests the influence the Church has exercised in moulding French-Canadian life and in directing national aspirations. Cartier was a practising Catholic and there is no reason to suppose that he escaped the all-pervading influences that his Church exercised. Finally, there was the tendency in French-Canadian thinking, a tendency which the teachings of the Church reinforced, to regard society as an organism, a living body, which could not be cut off from its past nor violently reformed. This

tendency may be regarded as summarizing the essential quality of French-Canadian Conservatism, a vital force which drew its inspiration from an historic past.

There were, in addition, powerful personal and professional elements in Cartier's Conservatism. His family tradition and his profession alike inclined him towards an ordered way of life and to a respect for the past. The Cartier family, as is well known, was of middle class origin and had prospered greatly as grain merchants and factors in the Richelieu Valley. While it is true that the family numbered among its friends Papineau and Lafontaine and that the young Cartier was articled to Edouard Rodier, a well-known Montreal Reformer,¹⁵ it does not appear that these acquaintances made any great impression on the household's political views.¹⁶ Cartier's profession as well was calculated to give a conservative colouring to his ideas. Whatever may be the political profession of a lawyer, it is difficult to understand how he can escape from the traditionalist procedure of his calling, from its dependence on precedents; from its high task of maintaining an ordered and regulated society. If this statement is true in the general sense, it is much more true when applied to the legal man of French Canada. Together with the priest, the lawyer has become the guardian of those great conserving forces of nationality, language, religion and law. The presence of a large number of young French-Canadian advocates on the rebel side, during the troubles of 1837, by no means indicated a revolutionary tendency among them, but rather, as Lord Durham realized, a protest against the impossible social and economic system.¹⁷ Cartier made his mark in civil law and in the 'forties his principal work appears to have been land conveyancing.¹⁸ To the end the stamp of his profession remained on Cartier for he was always disposed to regard all

questions from the legal point of view. He treated each problem upon its merits rather than upon any broad consideration. "Lex dura est, sed lex" was an expression that revealed his training as truly as it expressed his outlook.

There was much also that was largely personal in the elements that went to make up Cartier's Conservatism. Many of these were of a negative character and had their origins in his exceedingly strongly-marked personality. Cartier was, for example, an anti-democrat, to use his own phrase. Cartier was an eminently successful man and, within the meaning of the term, a self-made man, and he had the exaggerated respect for society and for material possessions that men of that class frequently have.¹⁹ The ultra-democratic protestations of his opponents furthered Cartier in his dislike of the more popular forms of government. The antipathy Cartier bore the United States, a sentiment that he shared with his friend and colleague Macdonald, caused him to lay great emphasis upon the monarchy and upon the loyalties and the traditions that surround monarchy. As a man of property, he believed that property as well as popular rights should be represented in government. It was for this reason, rather than for the commonly assigned one, that Cartier opposed the scheme of representation by population. He did not fear an Anglo-Protestant majority from Upper Canada, but he did fear what the free-trade, agrarian radicals of the upper Great Lake regions might do to the banks, to the railways and to the wholesale houses of Montreal. No more interesting commentary on Cartier's Conservatism can be cited than his attitude on the problem of seigneurial tenure. In his view it was emphatically a matter of amendment and of reform,²⁰ for unconsidered changes were fraught with, "... des dangers .. des doctrines socialistes.." Here spoke the Conservative who

valued the reign of law, who insisted that institutions and property should be respected, but who also realized that reform was necessary, "... je ne suis pas de ceux qui croient que le tenure seigneuriale est le système le plus avaganteux.."

Cartier's Conservatism was not without its constructive aspects. These, his belief in the future of the Province of Canada, his efforts to improve the relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians and his willingness to sacrifice form when substance could be retained, mark him off from the mere reactionary. One of Cartier's biographers, deCelles, has called him, "an exaggerated Tory",²¹ but there seems to be little justification for the statement. Cartier held, as has been remarked, ideas which were scarcely in keeping with current trends on the North American continent, but to describe him as a "Tory" is to overlook the progressive elements in his political philosophy. Normally, one does not associate the name Cartier with the term "compromise". This is especially true of the younger Cartier, but it is well to note, that as he matured, that as he rose from the rank of private member to minister, he became more willing to mould principle to suit reality. Whether this progression owed anything to Macdonald's example would be difficult to determine, but, as a practical man, Cartier must have realized that it was only on a basis of generous compromise that a country such as Canada could be governed. This was, perhaps, the greatest single constructive element in Cartier's Conservative creed, and in it he approached most nearly his great English exemplars, Peel and Disraeli, who were ready to modify their programmes to the changing needs of Britain's economic and political life.

It would be easy to catalogue the very considerable programme of

progressive and forward-looking legislation with which Cartier's name is associated. Turcotte, his earliest biographer, summed it up well when he wrote, "... on a dû remarquer, en examination de ces actes, que deux idées .. dominaient en lui, améliorer nos lois et développer le commerce par les grandes entreprises publiques..."²² Cartier's Conservatism was of the sturdy XIX^{century}-sort that was eager to employ the latest expedients and devices to increase his country's well-being. The prosperity of the Province of Canada and the establishment of a federation of all the British Provinces were projects which not only stirred the imagination but which also appealed to the desire for material returns. Cartier's Conservatism was optimistic. As little as Macdonald was Cartier disposed to count the future costs if the immediate promise was good. Few men escape the limitations of their age or of their environment and if Cartier gave as an heritage to French-Canadian Conservatism a sincere belief in the greatness of Canada he also gave it a recklessness and an extravagance in the realization of that heritage.

As a man of affairs, Cartier was early confronted by the problem which is presented to all Canadian public men; the maintenance of harmony within a state which has not yet attained national unity. This is sometimes interpreted as involving the preservation of an equilibrium between the two dominant races in Canada and there is ample evidence that Cartier realized the importance of satisfying the aspirations of both French- and English-speaking Canadians. He was especially alert to the curiously paradoxical position in which his own people found themselves, a majority in the St. Lawrence Valley and a minority in Canada at large. Cartier realized that the Canadian problem was not only one of race with the attendant perplexities of language, tradition and religion, but of geo-

graphical and of sectional differences as well. Accordingly he was prepared not only to hold the balance even between French- and Anglo-Canadian, but to deal an even-handed justice to the protectionists of Montreal and of Hamilton and to the free-traders of rural Canada West. Thus he could denounce the extremists of both schools, "... les manufacturiers souvent demandent à être protégés à outrance. C'est une proposition absurde autant les idées sur la libre échange..."²³ The creation and the preservation of national unity became the cardinal principles in Cartier's Conservatism. It is only fair to assume that principle as well as expediency prompted Cartier to this view for, regarding society as an organism, he was bound to work for the attainment of harmony in the various phases of national life.

Such were the origins and the principles of Cartier's Conservatism. Most fundamental was, perhaps, the defence of the institutions and of the traditions of his own section of the Province. It was characteristic of the man that the term "defence" was capable of broad interpretation and that he would envisage federation as one of the safeguards of the particularism of his people. Then there were the practical and the forward-looking aspects of Conservatism as he saw them. Finally, there was Conservatism in its most comprehensive sense giving political unity to a sadly disunited state and ultimately supplying the machinery and the ideal for the creation of a dominion that would include all the British Provinces. Conservatism in Cartier's hands was not without its flaws--nor may one add, its contradictions--but it did supply a body of practice and a modicum of principle that endured during its author's life-time and survived his death by nearly a quarter of a century.

The Conservative party that Cartier was so instrumental in building

up in Canada East was, in many respects, a remarkable creation. It was, in fact, Canada East in microcosm since it was composed of both French- and English-Canadian elements and represented the views of the urban as well as the rural areas of the Province. It was remarkable in another respect as well, for the Conservative party in Canada East was a part of the larger Liberal-Conservative party which embraced both sections of the Province. The composition of, and the bonds between, the Conservatives of Canada East and the Conservative party at large call for a brief examination.

The conventional interpretation of the Liberal-Conservative alliance is too well-known to require repetition.²⁴ It is said that, under the sympathetic guidance of Macdonald, "the moderate elements" in Canada united in 1854 to form the Liberal-Conservative party. That there was a certain similarity in outlook and, perhaps in temperament, among those who were brought into alliance is undeniable, but the explanation stops far short of being complete. In the first instance it fails to throw light on the ground of common interest and mutual advantage that existed between the sections of the Province and in the second it fails to disclose the basis of understanding between French- and Anglo-Canadians in Canada East. An examination of the Liberal-Conservative party in the 'fifties shews that it was composed, in its Canada West element, of representatives from the rising towns of Hamilton, Toronto, Brantford and London together with representatives from the traditionally Loyalist areas east of Kingston.²⁵ The composition of the Canada East group was even more heterogeneous, for it embraced men from the metropolitan centres of Montreal and Quebec, from the English-speaking Eastern Townships and from the almost exclusively French counties along the lower St. Lawrence. That a community of interest

should exist between the urban areas of Canada East and West is fairly clear; the basis of alliance between the town-dwelling Anglo-Canadians and between the country-dwelling French-Canadians of Canada East is more difficult to trace.

This somewhat unnatural grouping was the product of external pressure. Throughout the 'thirties and the 'forties, Canada East was passing through a species of commercial and of social revolution. On the one hand, the French countryside became much less self-sufficing and, progressively, more dependent upon the manufacturing and distributing cities. The Eastern Townships and the new settlements along the Ottawa River in Argenteuil and in Pontiac Counties were, from their inception, closely connected with Montreal, and with the improvement of river and canal transport to the northwest and with the extension of the railway to the southeast the connection was much strengthened. On the other hand, the 'forties coincide with the completion of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes canals which were to assure Montreal and Quebec the commercial dominion of northeastern America. The rapid construction of railways in the United States between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic seaboard destroyed the dream of the empire of the St. Lawrence and compelled the businessmen and the bankers of Montreal to turn to their hitherto little regarded Province.²⁶ The appearance of political radicalism in Canada East in the form of the Rouge group and the growing power of the free-trading clear-Grits of Canada West served to drive the French- and the Anglo-Canadians of Canada East together. The coalescence of Rouges and Grits accompanied by attacks on the system of equal representation; upon the Bank of Montreal; upon the Grand Trunk railway, ultimately converted what had been a shifting coalition in 1854 into a strong alliance.²⁷ The part served by men like Cartier who had associations with both sections of the Canada East world in such a pro-

cess of re-alignment need not be emphasised. In a similar fashion Macdonald supplied the personal bond between the somewhat diverse elements of the Conservative party in Canada West.

In the early days of the Conservative party in Canada East, personalities played a large part. It must, therefore, have been a matter of congratulation to its well-wishers that its prominent men, both French and English, worked in harmony. It is only with the greatest reservation that much may be said of the early associations of Cartier and of his Anglo-Canadian colleague, Alexander Galt. Both men had considerable interests in the Richelieu Valley and both were connected with the St. Lawrence and Atlantic railway.²⁸ Their political connections are more easy to trace and by the end of the 'fifties Galt and Cartier were working in closest harmony. It was to Galt that Cartier owed his premiership in August of 1858,²⁹ and thereafter the Cartier Ministry proceeded with a programme of legislation that favoured the especial interests of the commercial men of Canada East. On fiscal matters, Cartier seems to have held no very pronounced views, but it is exceedingly significant that with the appointment of Galt as Inspector-General, the Ministry became distinctly protectionist.³⁰ It would not be difficult to produce additional evidence to support the contention that Galt and Cartier worked well together,³¹ and that during the pre-Confederation period, the influence of the Anglo-Canadian group was strong in the councils of the Conservative party. Under Cartier's direction, the Conservative party was a national party both in its general organization and in its sectional composition. Cartier was scarcely the Alexander Hamilton of the Province of Canada but he went far to produce a party that in its make-up, at least, was largely Hamiltonian.

The creation of the Canadian federation was, in many ways, the principal achievement of Cartier and of his Conservative party. In federation he succeeded in forming that larger state his optimism desired and his philosophy demanded and in the federal form of government he secured what he believed were adequate safeguards for the valued rights of his fellow French-Canadians. While it is true that Confederation was the exclusive accomplishment of no party still less of an individual, Cartier's Conservatives provided the discipline that kept Canada East within the federationist alignment.³² With the tentatives of Confederation, with the efforts of the British American League, for example, French-Canadians of whatever political stripe seem to have had little to do. In view of their recent struggle to gain their constitutional rights in the Province of Canada, it would have been strange had they evinced any especial regard for a larger union in which they would be a distinct minority. Even in the 'fifties when racial discord was somewhat mitigated and constitutional problems had somewhat receded, French-Canadian opinion was cool to the scheme of federation. It is true that as early as 1851 or 1852 le Canadien had discussed federation as an academic proposition,³³ but it was not till nearly a decade later that la Minerve gave the question favourable consideration. Individuals were equally cautious, although the volatile Joseph Cauchon had traversed the topic in the editorial columns of le Journal de Québec. Cartier's conversion to the federation movement came through his association with Galt, "... Lorsque je formai mon cabinet en 1858, j'adoptai le projet d'union fédérale de mon ami Galt..."³⁴ Thereafter, till the formation of the Great Coalition in 1864, which had federation as the principal item in its programme, Cartier supported the idea.

To French-Canadians, federation presented a situation that was charged

with uncertainty if not danger. In the first and most obvious instance, they were faced with the prospect of becoming a minority in the midst of an overwhelming Anglo-Protestant majority. There is reason to believe that once responsible government had been attained French-Canadians were not dissatisfied with their position in the Province of Canada.³⁵ The system of equal representation and the curious quasi-federalism that the double majority imposed made them very nearly the masters of their own section of the Province. In the 'fifties the inroads that the clear-Grits made in the ranks of the Canada West Conservative party gave Cartier and his lieutenants a very authoritative voice in the councils of the party.³⁶ Nor could French-Canadians easily forget that they had in Canada East an Anglo-Canadian minority which, while weak numerically, was strong in its wealth and in the sympathy it could arouse. Historically, French-Canadians had unpleasant recollections of previous federation projects, of the schemes put forward in the Canada Bill of 1822 and of the suggestions embodied in Lord Durham's Report. It was against these understandable prejudices and predilections that Cartier and the other French-Canadian apologists had to contend.

What was the direction that Cartier and his colleagues took to overcome this instinctive opposition? As early as 1858 when his government took up Galt's proposals for federation, Cartier skilfully directed his arguments to satisfy at once the apprehensions and the ambitions of his countrymen. Confederation, he claimed, would safeguard the legitimate aspirations of the French-Canadians by reasserting the guarantees as to the use of their language and as to the exercise of their religion.³⁷ It would also give them the complete mastery of their own section of the old Province. In all probability this last phase of the argument had a most

powerful appeal for, as French-Canadians were quick to grasp, with their own legislature operating within the constitution, they could go far to creating that sympathetic world their national aspirations so desired.³⁸

In the course of the debates on the Quebec Resolutions, Cartier advanced another argument which was directed possibly towards the younger, more nationally inclined French-Canadians. In the proposed federation Quebec was to be, in many respects, the key province. This was assured not only by constitutional guarantees but by its strategic position and by its wealth. It would be possible, therefore, for French-Canadians to take a leading part in the direction of national affairs.³⁹ With variations these were the general principles upon which Cartier recommended federation to his fellow-countrymen. It would be rash to assume that he won them over completely to his opinion, but he did succeed in holding together his parliamentary majority and in carrying the Resolutions.⁴⁰ In view of the approval expressed by French-Canadian historians, notably by Sir Thomas Chapais, Cartier's arguments have stood the test of over sixty years of operation; it can only be added that contemporary observation amply substantiates Sir Thomas's contention.

Any attempt to analyse the British North America Act and to see in it definite French-Canadian influences is hedged about with many difficulties. In the first instance, relatively little of the inner workings of the Quebec Conference has come down to us,⁴¹ and even the best efforts of modern scholarship have not thrown much light on the intimate operations of the Conference.⁴² In addition, there is reason to believe that in insisting upon certain guarantees and upon certain divisions of power, the French-Canadians did not stand alone, but received the support of some of the other minority groups. The very form of the constitution of

the new Dominion, that of a federal union, seems to have been insisted upon by the French Canadians. The formula on which Cartier based his appeals between 1858 and 1864 presupposed a federal rather than a legislative union.⁴³ It is not unlikely that upon this score Cartier had serious misunderstandings with Macdonald which may not have been composed till the final conference with the officials of the Colonial Office in 1866,⁷⁴⁴. Some clauses of the British North America Act which confer exclusive powers on the provinces as, for example, in regulating marriage probably had their origins with the French-Canadian representatives. It is generally assumed that the removal of divorce from provincial competence was also dictated by French-Canadian views. Whether the right of the provinces to legislate in matters of property law was confirmed in deference to Quebec opinion cannot be determined definitely. No clause of the entire Act so clearly illustrates the conflict of opinions than that governing education. The French-Canadians demanded and secured the exclusive control of the school-systems for the provincial governments, although they were willing to admit a modicum of supervision by the central government to satisfy the susceptibilities of the Anglo-Canadian minority of Quebec.⁴⁵ So far as can be discovered, the French-Canadians do not appear to have questioned the financial arrangements that played so large a part in the discussions of the federation project. Their silence must not be interpreted as indifference but rather that they were disposed to leave the settlement of such problems to Alexander Galt, the authority on fiscal matters.

It will be seen, therefore, that apart from insisting on the reassertion of the traditional guarantees, the French-Canadians made no demands for especial consideration. The federal union was as much desired by the

the Maritimers as it was by the people of Canada East. Quite as much as Quebec, although for different reasons, the Maritime Provinces were determined to retain for themselves the fullest freedom of action within the local sphere.

Cartier and his party had some difficulty in carrying their federation project through the Provincial Parliament. Dissent came, in the first instance, from their opponents the Rouges or Canada East Liberals. Numerically, the Rouges were weak, but they numbered in their ranks some extremely able parliamentary debaters, the two Dorions, Henri Joly and among their English-speaking associates Luther Holton the Montreal free-trader and Christopher Dunkin, the representative of the Townships.⁴⁶ Secure in his majority in the House, Cartier brushed aside criticism and passed the Resolutions. How far the Opposition was supported outside Parliament is difficult to determine, but in the old Rouge constituencies petitions were circulated calling for an appeal to the electors.⁴⁷ A much more serious problem was presented by waverers within the Conservative party. On March 7, François Evanturel, the member for Quebec County, protested against the Government's action in stifling debate.⁴⁸ Evanturel was placated, but three days later a serious defection took place, when Henri Taschereau, the representative from Beauce went over to the Opposition, "... this confederation is the ruin of our nationality in Lower Canada..."⁴⁹ Taschereau was followed by three other Conservatives, Duckett, Pinsonneault and Tremblay who cast their votes with the Rouges. This secession was the more serious since it was accompanied by similar defections outside Parliament, chiefly among the younger Conservatives such as L.O. David and Honoré Mercier. Again it is difficult to determine to what extent these defections were individual or could be regarded as symptomatic

of a general revulsion of French-Canadian opinion.

Many factors contributed to Cartier's success in the long struggle on federation but one may be noted especially. Cartier enjoyed the almost unqualified support of the Roman Catholic episcopate throughout Canada⁵⁰ and he was quick to make full use of the power which was thus conferred upon him.⁵¹ The close association of the French-Canadian Conservative party and the Church was by no means new. Cartier and his followers had experienced the advantages of clerical approval and in return had sponsored measures that the Church especially desired, ecclesiastical supervision of schools, incorporation of religious orders and so on. The Conservative party was scarcely the clerically controlled party that its opponents denounced it as being but it undoubtedly owed much of its political power to the countenance it received from the Church.

Such was the Conservative party of which Cartier was the builder and in some senses of the term the originator. He fulfilled admirably those more humble functions of party leader in that he personified the great body of his followers and gave expression to their strongly-felt, if illy-defined, views. Cartier satisfied some of the more exacting requirements of his office as well; he led rather than followed his party and he left the tincture of his personal views on the body of Conservative opinion. The active interest that French-Canadian Conservatives shewed in supporting policies of national development was, in large measure, a legacy of Cartier's. So too was the association of the party and the liberal element within the Roman Catholic Church. In a similar fashion Cartier's connection with Anglo-Canadians facilitated the political co-operation of both sections of the Canada East community. In other respects the influence that Cartier exercised over his party was less happy.

In the Confederation era, the Conservative party was a "south shore" party, that is to say, it drew its voting strength principally from the prosperous and long-established communities along the south shore of the St. Lawrence River. It was also a Montreal party or, more accurately speaking, its leaders, Cartier, Galt and Rose had large interests in Montreal. During Cartier's period of leadership, the Conservative party was popularly--and fairly properly--regarded as being especially favourable to the Grand Trunk railway. As the railway had its mainline along the south shore of the St. Lawrence and its main offices in Montreal, it was natural that there should be an affinity of interests. When it is recalled that many of the principal men of the Conservative party were either large shareholders or were directors of the Grand Trunk and that Cartier himself was for many years the Company's Canadian solicitor, it will be understood that the relations of party and railway were most intimate. While it is incontestable that the French-Canadian Conservatives were strengthened immeasurably by the possession of a well-defined territory and by enjoying the support of wealthy institutions, it implied a distinct limitation upon the party's claim to represent the people of the entire Province.

The French-Canadian Conservative party was fortunate in its inception for the 'fifties and 'sixties were decades of equilibrium in Canada East. The bulk of the population lived on the south side of the St. Lawrence as small farmers who had yet to learn the price of lack of specialization. The English-speaking element in the Province was considerable and was not then concentrated in the metropolitan areas. Within certain boundaries, the economic life of Canada was also in a condition of unusual stability for the Reciprocity Treaty had given the business man a fairly secure framework in which to build. The general temper even

extended to the public men of the Province. In the Confederation era, Cartier, Macdonald, Galt and the lesser figures were in their prime and, despite individual differences, had much the same point of view. Even the party's opponents, the Browns; the Dorions; the Laflamms, had a permanence and an ascertainable attitude of mind. An equilibrium within the country, a stability in leadership and an attitude of mind all made for well-being of the party in the days when its foundations both in its philosophy and in its practice were being laid.

- ¹The standard biographies of Sir George E. Cartier are those by Alfred deCelles (1907) and by John Boyd (1914); both are somewhat formal in character. A series of sympathetic studies of Cartier by men who knew him personally was published in the form of a centenary volume, Sir C.G. Cartier, 1814-1914. (Montréal. n.d.) In 1919, one of the contributors, Benjamin Sulte, printed his study independently with considerable additions.
- ²Boyd, J. Sir George Etienne Cartier. PP. 4-10.
The Macmillan Company of Canada; Toronto, 1914.
- ³Cooper, J.I. George Etienne Cartier in the period of the '40's.
Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1938.
- ⁴ibid.
- ⁵F. Hincks to A.T. Galt. Quebec, August 21, 1854.
Printed in O.D. Skelton's Life of Galt, p. 188-189.
- ⁶J. Cauchon to H. Lafontaine. Québec, le 19 juin, 1852.
Baldwin-Lafontaine Correspondence, V. 5.
- ⁷Discours de Sir G.E. Cartier. P. 48.
Speech in the Legislature, 20 September, 1854.
Sénécal et Fils. Montréal, 1893.
- ⁸A copy of Cartier's library catalogue, as it was prepared when his estate was broken up in 1873 is preserved in the Gagnon Collection, Bibliothèque municipale, Montréal.
- ⁹Cartier's earliest biographer, Turcotte, speaks of a political memoir that Cartier was understood to have in preparation. Since all trace of this work has disappeared, it is impossible to speculate upon its character, but it may be that in it Cartier formulated his political principles completely.
- ¹⁰Vattier, G. Essai sur la mentalité canadienne française; livre premier chapitre III.
Librairie Champion. Paris, 1928.
- ¹¹For example, Filteau, G. La naissance d'une race.
éditions del 'A.C.F.' Montréal, 1937.
- ¹²Garneau's Histoire du Canada published between 1845 and 1852 was, in every sense, a national epic designed to inspire the present by an appeal to the past.
- ¹³Discours de Sir G.E. Cartier. P. 390.
Speech delivered at Charlottetown, 8 September, 1864.

- ¹⁴One of the best estimates of Cartier was one of the most informal and came from the pen of William Workman who wrote to Macdonald shortly after Cartier's death in 1873.
 "... George Cartier is now gone. It is not right to speak disparagingly of the dead, but it must be admitted his manner, during the last few years became so rude, so domineering ... he became unpopular ... His 'aut Caesar aut nihil' manner also greatly alienated his English supporters....."
Macdonald Papers. Correspondence 1874-1876.
 W. Workman to Macdonald. Montreal. n.d.
- ¹⁵Public Archives of Canada. Internal Correspondence Lower Canada. Commissions of Advocates 1835.
- ¹⁶deCelles, A. Cartier. P. 6.
 Papineau and Cartier. Makers of Canada.
 (Morang and Company, Toronto, 1906.)
- ¹⁷Durham's Report. (Edition of Sir Charles Lucas). Vol. 2, p. 33ff.
 Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1912.
- ¹⁸Records of the Court of King's Bench; District of Montreal, 1839-1850.
- ¹⁹Discours. op. cit., p. 31.
- ²⁰ibid. P. 23. Legislative Assembly, le 25 juin, 1850.
- ²¹deCelles, A. Sir G.E. Cartier. (Canada and its Provinces) Vol. 15, p. 171.
- ²²Turcotte, L.P. l'Hon. Sir G.E. Cartier, p. 68.
 atelier typographique de Leger Brousseau. Québec, 1873.
- ²³Discours. op. cit., p. 641. Speech delivered at Quebec, 1869.
- ²⁴For example, W.S. Wallace, The Growth of Canadian National Feeling.
- ²⁵Underhill, F. Canadian National Parties.
 Canadian Historical Review. December, 1935.
- ²⁶The wider implications of the great economic changes of the period will be found in G.N. Tucker's excellent study, "The Canadian Commercial Revolution."
- ²⁷Underhill, F. A study in Canadian Radicalism
 Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Association, 1927.
- ²⁸Upon this aspect of the topic I corresponded with Dr. Skelton but he was unable to offer anything in addition to his remarks in his life of Galt.
- ²⁹Skelton, O.D. The Life and Times of Sir A.T. Galt, p. 236.
 Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1920.

- ³⁰Boyd, J. Sir George Etienne Cartier, p. 119.
- ³¹v for example, Skelton, op. cit., p. 431.
- ³²Statement made by Charles Boucher deBoucherville to Boyd.
op. cit., p. 212. Note.
- ³³Turcotte, L.P. Canada sous l'Union, tome 11, p. 358.
des presses du Canadien; Québec 1871.
- ³⁴. Sir G.E. Cartier 1814-1914, p. 27.
Librarie Beauchemin; Montréal (n.d.)
- ³⁵Discours de Sir G.E. Cartier, p. 503. Ottawa, 1 and 6 September, 1866.
- ³⁶Cartwright, R. Reminiscences, p. 5.
W. Briggs; Toronto, 1912.
- ³⁷Boyd, J. op. cit., p. 212ff, contains the text of Cartier's speech in translation.
- ³⁸deCelles, A. Cartier.
Canada and its Provinces, v. 15, p. 170.
- ³⁹Turcotte, L.P. op. cit. tome 11, p. 519.
- ⁴⁰Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the confederation of the British North American Provinces.
Division lists, pp. 1020, 1025, 1026.
Hunter, Rose and Co. Parliamentary Printers, Quebec, 1865.
- ⁴¹Among the Macdonald Papers in the Public Archives of Canada, are a considerable number of printed drafts of the B.N.A. Act but the marginal notes are disconnected and do not concern very important topics.
- ⁴²v. for example, Whitelaw's The Maritimes and Canada.
- ⁴³Confederation Debates. op. cit., p. 57.
- ⁴⁴Certain statements published by the Abbé Groulx in la Confédération canadienne. (imprimie au Devoir, Montréal 1918.)
appendices, pp. 249-251, suggest but by no means substantiate this.
- ⁴⁵The best accounts of the discussions on the subject of education during the Confederation debates, is to be found in Skelton's biography of Galt, p. 370 and pp. 401-405.
- ⁴⁶The exceedingly trenchant criticism of the proposed federation delivered by A.A. Dorion is to be found in the Confederation Debates, p. 248ff.
- ⁴⁷Confederation Debates, op. cit., p. 268.

⁴⁸ibid. 246.

⁴⁹ibid. 897.

⁵⁰Of the Bishops of Canada East, Mgr. Bourget of Montreal appears to have been alone in his criticisms of Confederation. V Groulx, La Confédération canadienne. Appendices, p. 252. Mgr. Bourget to his secretary, le 20 juin 1867.

⁵¹op. cit., p. 61.

CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN FRENCH-CANADA

The close relation of political and of economic development is a topic which would scarcely call for detailed study were it not that in Canada it has been almost entirely neglected. It is this neglect that probably explains the strong sense of unreality that permeates so many works on the political development of Canada.¹ It is most unfortunate that this has been so for there are few countries which demonstrate better than Canada the way in which successive stages of economic growth have been accompanied by parallel developments in government. Thus, throughout the early British period when the business life of the Colony was dominated by the great English commercial houses and by the Old Country merchants, it was natural that the Colonial Office should exercise a large measure of political control through its appointed representatives. It must always be remembered that Responsible Government in Canada was the sequel to and dependent upon the abolition of the old colonial system. In the twenty years that followed the repeal of the Corn Laws and the passage of the Rebellion Losses Bill, the business and the political life of the Province of Canada developed in remarkable harmony.² The formation of the Dominion and the acquisition of the prairie and coastal lands of the West destroyed this unity and from 1867 onwards till the end of the century, Canadians struggled to assimilate these vast accretions. In every sense, therefore, of that much misused term, Canada, after 1867 was in a state of transition. What was true of the whole was equally true of the parts, especially of Quebec. It was in this period that the Province was transformed from its feudal to its modern character. This transformation disturbed every phase of Provincial life and explains, to a large measure, the troubled course that politics ran in the generation after 1867.

The changes which were general throughout the Dominion were experienced in Quebec as well. With the Dominion and the Province so predominantly agricultural in character, anything which affected this industry was bound to make its repercussions widely felt. In the period following Confederation, Canadian farming underwent a process of specialization. This was most apparent, of course, in the West where the extension of the railway and the experimentation with early-maturing seed made wheat growing increasingly profitable. In the East, especially in Ontario, wheat-farming was still carried on, although mixed farming on a scientific basis was rapidly taking its place.³ In Quebec, movements in the direction of rationalized farming were slow. The Province was still suffering from the effects of the long-delayed abolition of seigneurialism. The later seigneurs had exhausted the soil with reckless forcing of grain crops and had made no effort to teach their tenants progressive methods of farming. Ignorance and lack of capital made it difficult for the French-Canadian farmer to reap the advantages the Commutation Act of 1854 had conferred on him. What advance was made was due to the stimulus of government and to the activities of agricultural societies which were themselves sponsored by government.⁴ Yet by the time that these efforts were making themselves felt, the day of wheat-farming in Quebec was nearly over and the farmer was compelled to turn to the more expensive dairy-farming or to the less stable truck-farming. A greater deterrent to improved farm methods was the steady decline in prices that was also a characteristic of the period.⁵ Wheat which had sold on the English market for \$1.75 a bushel in 1867 fell to .88 by 1890. To the French-Canadian farmer with his conservative outlook and his lack of some particularly well developed crop, this state of affairs spelled little short of ruin.

The transitional nature of the post-Confederation period was evidenced by the increase of manufacturing and by the concentration of manufacturing in cities and towns. In the Province of Quebec this produced most remarkable effects. Until the 'forties and probably till later, in some districts the population of the Province was predominately rural and almost completely self-supporting.⁶ Such industry as there was was scattered through the countryside or in the villages where local craftsmen followed hereditary occupations. The coming of the steamboat and of the railway completely altered all this. It not only drove out the old cottage industries by subjecting them to competition from outside sources, but it induced the surviving manufacturers to move to strategic points on river or on road. For example, the construction of the Richelieu Canal which gave unobstructed water communications between Montreal and New York marked the eclipse of the prosperous village communities of St. Denis, of St. Charles and of St. Antoine.⁷ The reverse of the process was apparent in nearby St. Hyacinthe which received its "impulse to progress" with the extension of the Grand Trunk railway.⁸ A comparison of Quebec and of Montreal in the period between 1840 and 1890 accentuates the foregoing observations. As the point of transfer between ocean and inland transport, Montreal rapidly outdistanced Quebec and the distance was materially increased with the coming of the railway. Montreal not only continued to be the junction point of east and of west, it became the junction of north and south travel since the building of the Victoria bridge gave the city access to the Hudson valley and to New York. Of course, there were other advantages that Montreal enjoyed in its race with Quebec. From the 'twenties it had been the banking and the financial centre of the Province and in the 'forties and in the 'fifties, when the tide of western immigration was

running strong, the city had a large labour supply available. This was a benefit that few American towns could boast. The appearance and the rapid growth of towns was, therefore, one of the most marked phenomena of the period and its bearing on the development of political parties in the Province must be kept constantly in mind.

The most serious consequence of the transformation that went on in the St. Lawrence valley was the migration of people from its farms to beyond its borders. This was, of course, not a phenomenon peculiar to the age or to the area, for all eastern America has witnessed successive westward movements of peoples. It is probable that from the early days of the French régime there was a fairly well pronounced westward drift of population from Tadoussac to Quebec and, from Quebec to Montreal. The causes of these early migrations are obscure, but it is probable that pressure of necessity much more than lure of adventure drove the French-Canadians afield. The land holding system of the colony which reserved large areas of the best land for private persons⁹ and the more pernicious system dividing the land in inheritance, forced the younger French-Canadians to seek new homes. This state of affairs was intensified under the early British régime when many of the seigneuries passed into the hands of Anglo-American owners who proceeded to exploit them for what they were worth as wheat lands. This was the fundamental cause of the great migrations of people from Lower Canada in the years that preceded and followed the Rebellion of 1837. The unwillingness of the seigneur to open new land for his increasing tenantry and the disinclination of the government to allow settlement in the Crown lands, literally drove the habitant out of the St. Lawrence valley. Lack of roads into the back country on the south shore of the St. Lawrence and the prohibitive terms asked by such large

land-holding agencies as the British American Land Company forced the habitant to look elsewhere.¹⁰ His attention usually turned towards the United States, the north shore of the St. Lawrence, or to the rapidly growing towns of the Province. It would be uncritical to explain the movement from the farms in terms of "land hunger" alone. The decline in the prices of farm products was another powerful motivating factor. The wages paid by the factories in the new towns were attractive to the farmer who saw relatively little money. Whatever may have been the cause the effect was everywhere apparent and the picture which Louis Fréchette drew of "un Canadien errant" was no figment of the poet's imagination.

The emigration of the French-Canadians extended throughout the entire XIX century. The political disturbances in Lower Canada in the later 'thirties coincided with the great period of expansion in railway building and in manufacturing in the north-eastern states.¹¹ By 1850 the tide of emigration was running strongly to the consternation of French-Canadian leaders both lay and clerical. The actual number of those emigrating is difficult to determine. The census returns of both Canada and the United States are misleading and calculations from other sources vary greatly. Writing in the Canadian Illustrated News in the early 'seventies, a member of the St. Jean Baptiste Society who had visited the United States put the number of emigrants at 500,000.¹² This seems an exaggeration, although it must be remembered that emigration had been in progress for over a quarter of a century and that whole families left the Province,

"... with the return of spring, the tide of immigration (sic) from Canada to the United States is setting in...Crowds will soon be passing through Montreal bound in the same direction.."13

The successive depressions of the 'seventies and of the 'nineties increased the emigration of French-Canadians to the United States and led to the es-

tablishment of settlements and colonies especially in New England. The losses to the Province of large numbers of its citizens reflected upon the government and was a favourite theme of criticism among Liberal and Nationalist politicians.¹⁴ The Conservatives tried to disarm their critics by a vigorous repatriation or colonization policy, but they cannot be said to have accomplished much. The trouble was too deep-seated and too universal to be eradicated by legislative palliatives.

Of greater significance politically was the movement of population to the north shore of the St. Lawrence river. This was begun in considerable numbers early in the XIX century when the county of Terrebonne was opened by the Masson family. In the years that followed Confederation settlement pushed rapidly up the Ottawa, the St. Maurice, the St. Charles and the Saguenay, following the traditional French-Canadian routes--the river valleys. The population of the north shore settlements increased rapidly from some 240,000 in the 'fifties,¹⁵ to over 253,000 by 1861,¹⁶ to 300,000 in 1871,¹⁷ to 365,800 in the 'eighties¹⁸ and to nearly 400,000 by 1891.¹⁹ The importance of these north shore settlements was enhanced by the fact that the cities of Montreal, Quebec and Three Rivers were vitally interested in their progress; the settlements were in reality northern extensions of the cities' population and commerce. The construction of such lines as the Northern Colonisation railway and the Quebec and Gosford gave the cities of Quebec and Montreal a direct connexion with their colonies. What might be described as "a north shore" point of view developed under the stimulus of capitalists like Sir Hugh Allan, politicians like Chapleau and religious and national leaders like curé Labelle. The north shore with its limitless area, its boundless forest wealth and its connexion with the west was regarded as, par excellence, the "French country".²⁰ It was not

for nothing that it was in this free forest country that M. Bourassa, the exponent of the later French-Canadian nationalism, should find his earliest supporters.²¹

In the period under discussion the attention of the people of the north shore was concentrated on decidedly material objects. They insisted on a more liberal policy with respect to the opening of the Crown Lands to settlement. As they were completely dependent upon communications with the outside world, they were protagonists of railways. In this regard, they met and overcame the strong opposition of the older settlements on the south shore of the St. Lawrence river which were served by the Grand Trunk railway. It is not too much to suggest that many of the constructive elements in the Conservative programme may be traced to the influence of these northern settlements.

The concentration of population in the towns and the cities of the Province had important political and social implications. This phenomenon was more observable in Montreal than elsewhere for there the growth of population was steady. The natural advantages that Montreal enjoyed were enhanced by the building of the railway and by the improvement of the canal system which gave the city access to the Hudson and the Ottawa valleys as well as to its eastern and western markets.* Apart from the very real setback that the city received when the preference on colonial wheat was abolished,²² Montreal enjoyed a large measure of prosperity. A very striking evidence of the good times the city experienced is shewn by the marked increase in population.²³ The character and the geographical distribution of the people of Montreal in the period was curious. Between 1852 and 1861 the population increased from 57,715 to 90,323, chiefly in consequence of the construction of the extensive Grand Trunk shops south-west of the city

and the building of the Victoria bridge.²⁴ More than one-half the population of the city was English-speaking and occupied what is at present the central part of the city, Griffintown and Point St. Charles. In the decades that followed, Montreal became more French-Canadian in character as a result of the filling up of what was known as "the old French east end"²⁵ by farmers and farm-workers from the surrounding country.²⁶ The building of the Montreal Colonisation and later the Quebec, Montreal and Ottawa railways did for eastern and French-Canadian Montreal what the construction of the Grand Trunk had done for the west of the city. The racial division had pretty well marked geographical boundaries²⁷ with St. Urbain Street and St. Lawrence Main to mark the point of junction.²⁸ Except for occasional and unfortunate incidents, English- and French-speaking Canadians seem to have lived on amicable terms.

The city of Quebec presented what may be described as the reverse of the picture. At the opening of the Confederation era Quebec was distinctly second to Montreal in wealth and in population.²⁹ The commercial houses and the banks had abandoned it and the railway had passed it by. Even the lumbering industry which had supported the city was steadily falling away before the competition of cheap lumber from the southern United States and the increasing use of iron and steel in construction work.³⁰ Thereafter the citizens of the place made repeated efforts to recapture some measure of prosperity by improving their harbour and by agitating for the construction of the North Shore railway which was designed to draw the trade of the west to Quebec. The Fates, in the form of geography, destructive fires and new inventions, were against them and the population of Quebec grew very slowly.³¹ Throughout the period, Quebec was the scene of labour disputes of a very serious character, the Irish and the French long-

shoremen fighting bitterly over the dwindling timber cargoes.³² The very appearance of the town was not prepossessing,

".. the streets are unpaved and muddy. The footpaths are covered with planks laid lengthwise...Two-thirds of the inhabitants are French. Of the English-speaking inhabitants more than one-half are Irish..."³³

Of working and of living conditions in the Province, it is difficult to speak except in broad generalizations. Both wages and prices were low, although the buying power of money was probably greater than it is today.³⁴ Writing at the beginning of the Confederation period, Bishop Oxenden observed that the cost of living in Montreal was about equal to that,

".. in an ordinary English town...House rents are high and so are all kinds of grocery (sic) and dress...Meat, poultry, fish are reasonable...fowls are remarkably cheap..."³⁵

His Lordship, of course, moved in a select circle and his opportunities, not to speak of his powers, of observation were limited. Wages in the Province varied from place to place but were generally steady throughout the period. In Montreal, unskilled labour received one dollar a day for a ten-hour day.³⁶ In busy seasons occasional labour was sometimes paid "seven shillings" a day,³⁷ but this was rare. Skilled labour received higher wages; freight conductors on the G.T.R. were paid as much as \$80 a month;³⁸ printers, in some shops, received \$16 a week. This compared very well with the salaries of the clerical staffs in offices. The wages of women fluctuated even within the same occupation; thus, in the shoe industry, pay for the women workers varied between \$1.50 and \$7 a week.³⁹ Outside Montreal, wages were generally lower. Printers in St. Hyacinthe received only \$9 a week.⁴⁰ In Quebec city, wages were lower than in Montreal but higher than elsewhere in the Province. A skilled workman received \$9 a week, although in the 'seventies the usual wages for printers had been \$6 a week.⁴¹ Unskilled labour in Quebec city was paid a dollar a day in

summer and .80 in winter in the happy consideration that the working day was shorter and that the labourer could always earn extra money by snow-shovelling.⁴²

Grossly inadequate as these wages appear in comparison with modern standards, they were accepted without demur. A study of the evidence laid before the Royal Commission in 1889 shews that relatively few of those who were examined complained of low wages; more usually they found fault with uncertainty of payment and inordinately long hours of work. The cost of food and of shelter, except in Montreal, was very low. A printer in Levis who had supported a family of four on \$6 a week in 1874 claimed that with economy "... he could buy his house..⁴³ In Quebec city a three-roomed house without water rented for \$3 or \$3.50 a month.⁴⁴ In Montreal rents were higher, ranging from \$6 a month upwards.⁴⁵ Other costs are less easy to determine. Fuel in the form of cord-wood was cheap and easy to procure although coal, even at \$5 a ton was prohibitive. The cost of food and clothing was the subject of much disagreement. The purveyors or the manufacturers of the articles in question asserted that they were cheaper than ever before; the consumers that they were dearer. Thus, one Montreal grocer stated that tea, coffee, sugar, spice and so on were cheaper than they had been "since 1857";⁴⁶ a manufacturer stated that "boots and shoes are certainly 25% cheaper than they were (in 1880)..⁴⁷ and in the opinion of a clothier "... the prices of workingmen's clothing are from 16% to 25% lower than they were in 1877..⁴⁸ The views of the purchasers were otherwise. An unskilled labourer believed that while wages had remained stationary "... the cost of living had increased 20%..⁴⁹ The foreman of the Quebec Gazette print shop was more specific, if less grammatical,

".. he could not save ten cents. He would have to live very meanly if he saved anything...Rent for the house in which I am living had been raised twice during the past five years.."50

Nevertheless, the wages paid to the Canadian workingman seem to have been sufficient.⁵¹ According to the testimony of the men themselves, in terms of real wages, the Canadian worker was quite as well off as the worker in the United States,

".. in the United States, a good hand gets about a dollar a day more...(but)..living is cheaper in Canada..rent half as dear,..ditto for butter, milk and vegetables.."52

Compared with what the farm labourer received, even the unskilled worker was well off, for at best~~the~~former rarely was paid more than \$8 a month.⁵³

The conditions under which the city worker lived were less satisfactory. His hours of work were long, for although the ten-hour day was in vogue, in some trades the sixteen-hour day was the rule.⁵⁴ This gave the workingman no time for recreation and little time for sleep, since he was forced to live far from his work. The house he lived in was the source of much complaint for it was at once too expensive, too small and too liable to overcrowding.⁵⁵ Its sanitary appliances were rudimentary or non-existent.⁵⁶ In Montreal the houses occupied by the workers were usually fitted with wooden drains which speedily became impregnated with sewage and were the breeding places of the epidemics which annually swept the city.⁵⁷ They were emphatically the cause of the great smallpox plague of 1885 which carried away over 3000 victims.⁵⁸ Another fruitful cause of disease, especially among children, was a complete disregard of care in the distribution of milk⁵⁹ and an equally complete absence of food inspection,

"in the markets..bad food..bad meat, and more especially rotten vegetables and fruit will be seen openly exposed for sale.."60

In spite of the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the Province, the progress of associations or unions among the working men was slow. Unions of a kind appear to have existed in Montreal and in Quebec among the printers from a very early date.⁶¹ They were, however, more in the nature of mutual aid societies, than of trade-unions as the term is understood to-day. The most extensive and probably the most successful of the early combinations of workingmen was "the Ship Labourers' Society" of Quebec city. The Society antedated Confederation,⁶² having been founded by the men who loaded timber on the ocean-going vessels. The Society was originally exclusively benevolent in character with no other purpose than to care for the sick, the maimed and the dependents of the longshoremen. Later it attempted to fix wages, to determine hours and to rule on conditions of work. These last efforts seem to have been crowned with such complete success that employers of labour occasionally attributed the decline of the port to the machinations of the Society,

".. I attribute it (the decline of Quebec) in part to certain societies of ship labour who wish to govern the labouring class... and increase wages... They have by this means driven away the ships and left the people nothing to do..."⁶³

The Ship Labourers' Society never seems to have been able to compose the differences of the Irish and the French-Canadian longshoremen as the destructive riots of the later 'seventies shewed. It had also to run the gauntlet of the religious authorities for the Church was on the alert to suppress anything in the nature of a secret society or a combination which might interfere with the rights of private property.⁶⁵

Of much greater importance in the life of the Province was the association of workingmen known as the Knights of Labour. The Knights of Labour organization was a direct transplantation from the United States and was a

forerunner of the now familiar industrial union. The Knights of Labour sponsored a large programme of social and of intellectual amelioration. In the Province of Quebec, the Knights enjoyed great popularity since they welcomed the unskilled as well as the skilled labourer and since their social programme satisfied the hunger of the city worker for recreation and companionship. Inasmuch as the Knights were a secret society, their exact numbers are difficult to determine. We are told that they were "strong" in 1876 but "strong" is a very vague term. In 1885, there were three lodges or "Assemblies" of the Knights, two in Montreal and one in Point St. Charles.⁶⁶ In the following year when Canada was formed into an autonomous "state" or "provincial" Assembly, there were twenty-two locals in the Montreal district with a membership of 4,246.⁶⁷ This was the largest membership the Knights ever achieved, thereafter they declined.⁶⁸ In one respect, the Knights succeeded in doing what no other labour organization has succeeded in doing either before or since. They united French- and English-speaking labour and for a period at least produced harmony where there had been considerable rivalry.⁶⁹

The success that the Knights achieved attracted widespread attention. In the eyes of the more liberal-minded employer the Knights were favourably viewed since a man who carried a Knights of Labour "travelling card" could be accepted as a skilful and reliable workman. Other well-wishers saw in the Knights an admirable moral force, "... the Knights have done more in the cause of temperance than any Temperance Society..⁷⁰ A Mr. J.T. Redmond, a Montreal bookseller, was even more complimentary,

".. it is an association that strongly favours temperance..it educates..there is nothing dangerous to the common good in any of its teachings..⁷¹

The critics of the Knights were not behind-hand in their charges. The

Knights were a secret society; they were Masonic; they were communistic. They denounced the efforts of the Knights to secure better working conditions,

"I like to be my own master. I do not like to be dictated to by others.."72

The press was equally critical of the Knights; the Week of Toronto characterized them as "the first appearance of political socialism on this continent"73 and published lengthy accounts of the manner in which the Knights fomented strikes.74

The political importance of the Knights was recognized, at least by the Conservatives. Macdonald, who was not the man to let votes go wandering, had a series of addresses prepared on appropriate topics in order that he might appear the friend of the workingman.75 In Quebec Chapleau seems to have been the principal link between the party and the Knights,

"..I have given to la Minerve the report ^{to} that part of your speech referring to the labour question. It is so very appropriate to the work we have done among the Knights of Labour..we have alienated them from the Rouges.."76

The best means of controlling the organization was also studied,

"..the G.T.R. are very powerful here and command an immense vote apart from the fact that they alone can control the vote of the Knights of Labour.."77

The waning influence of the Knights was observed,

"..Dansereau who is the adviser in partibus of the French Knights of Labour, informs me, on the best authority, that the French section of the Knights are seceding from the Irish on account of the latter's attitude on the Governor-General's and O'Brien's question.."78

In the later 'eighties, the Knights of Labour suffered a series of setbacks from which they never recovered. In the United States, the Knights were believed to have instigated the celebrated "Haymarket Riot" in Chicago. They were also encountering the strong opposition of the craft unions or-

ganized by the redoubtable Samuel Gompers. In Canada the Knights had fallen under the suspicion of the Roman Catholic Church. Early in 1886, the Archbishop of Quebec, Cardinal Taschereau, condemned the Knights as a secret order and an international society.⁷⁹ The force of the condemnation was somewhat mitigated by the intervention of Archbishop Gibbons who explained that the Church was not critical to the Knights⁸⁰ and who ultimately succeeded in having the Cardinal modify his charge.⁸¹ The Knights in Quebec did not recover their position and their members turned to the craft unions or drifted into the mass of unorganized labour. In the autumn of 1891, Eugene Powderley, the Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labour, visited Montreal, but his coming served to emphasise the extent to which the organization had fallen away, since only four local assemblies were in existence to greet him.⁸²

The progress of organization among the working people of Quebec in the post-Confederation era can scarcely be measured in the conventional terms of success or of failure. The movement was in its infancy and neither the industrialization of the Province nor the people themselves had progressed far enough to make combinations on occupational lines necessary. With the exception of the Ship Workers' Society, the early labour organizations were alien in origin and not readily adaptable to the peculiarities of the French Canada. The treatment that organized labour received at the hands of the politicians is, perhaps, the best proof of its impotence. The most astute party leaders of the day, Chapleau and Macdonald, were prepared to scheme "to hive" the labour vote; what they were not prepared to do was to modify the party programme to meet the real needs of the new industrial class.

Considered in terms of its many-sided character, the most important

change in the social fabric of Quebec in the period under review was the decline in numbers of the English-speaking population. As this topic has scarcely engaged the attention of historians or of sociologists, what is said here is tentative in character. At the outset, the investigator is confronted with difficulty in the uncertain quality of the evidence at his disposal. The census reports do not differentiate in any rational way French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians.⁸³ It is, therefore, next to impossible to arrive at any really accurate basis of comparison and any figures quoted must be received with reservation.

In the period previous to Confederation the numbers and the influence of the English-speaking people of the lower St. Lawrence valley was considerable. Writing at the end of the 'thirties, Lord Durham put down the English population of Lower Canada at about 200,000.⁸⁴ Some twenty years later they appear to have numbered 166,876 in a total population of 691,183. They comprised, therefore, a little less than one-quarter of the population and they do not appear ever to have risen above this proportion. It is well to remark that the English-speaking group was almost evenly divided between permanent residents of the Province and immigrants who had only recently arrived from Great Britain. Inasmuch as there was always a tendency on the part of the immigrants to move westward after a few years' residence in Montreal or in Quebec, the permanent English population was certainly less numerous than the official figures would suggest. Circumstances, however, tended to enhance the importance of the minority. They occupied certain well-defined and commercially important areas in the Province, in the cities of Montreal and of Quebec, in the Eastern Townships and in the new settlements on the Ottawa river. In the cities the English population was considerable. In the decade before Confederation, Montreal

had an English-speaking majority,⁸⁶ Quebec was less strongly English since in 1851 only some 15,377 of its 42,052 inhabitants were English-speaking. Ten years later of the 5,899 persons living in the town of Sherbrooke nearly 4,500 were English. In the Eastern Townships, the proportion of English-speaking people was large.⁸⁷ Their position in the area was strengthened by the fact that they controlled the local administration, enjoyed their own land-holding system and were in close touch with the United States whence they received constant reinforcements of population. The general character of the English-speaking population seems to have been high. Sir Richard Cartwright, who was not the man to squander praise, described the Canada East English in these terms,

".. I was much struck with the ability and the high standing of the English representatives of that Province (Canada East). There were, I think, some fourteen or fifteen of them all told, and more than half of them were men of very considerable note, and the rest decidedly above the average..."⁸⁸

In general, French-Canadian and English-speaking Canadians lived on good terms. They were, in fact, necessary to each other, the economic well-being of the Province depended on their cooperation and its political system demanded a united front against the Protestant free-traders of Canada West. A glance through the files of the Montreal Gazette in the 'fifties and in the 'sixties is sufficient to indicate that the dwellers of the lower St. Lawrence valley were united in interest, however much they may have been divided in race and in religion.⁸⁹ The alliance between Cartier and Alexander Galt was the living exemplification of the good relations of the two peoples. The English-speaking people had certain safeguards of a political and of a constitutional character. Thanks to a convention that dated back to the early 'forties, the English population of Canada East were assured some 15 of the 65 parliamentary representatives of the Pro-

vince.⁹⁰ At the time of Confederation what had been a mere agreement was erected into a species of guarantee by writing into the British North America Act a provision which enacted that the boundaries of the so-called "English counties" should not be subject to change without the consent of the members representing them.⁹¹ At the same time, safeguards were inserted into the Act to assure to the English-speaking Protestants the control of their schools.⁹²

In the three decades following Confederation, the numbers of the English-speaking population declined. The decline was relative, rather than absolute, for in spite of emigration to the United States and to other parts of Canada, there was a small increase. The increase, however, did not keep pace with the advance in the French-speaking population which mounted steadily till the end of the century. Although it is impossible to speak with any degree of certitude, it is probable that the English population declined from natural causes. The attraction that the west exercised was powerful and with the extension of the Canadian Pacific railway it became annually more accessible. The west was the goal of the immigrant and the Canadian Illustrated News ruefully noticed that of the 1700 immigrants that passed through the Montreal immigration sheds in the spring of 1873, only sixty remained in the Province of Quebec.⁹³ It is possible that the unskilled English-speaking urban worker may have felt the pressure of French-Canadian competition. The disturbances that were so marked in Quebec city in the later 'seventies were caused by the inability of the Irish and the French ship labourers to reach any satisfactory division of business.⁹⁴ There is evidence to shew, that even in some of the skilled trades in Montreal, the French-Canadian worker had pretty well displaced his English rival by the end of the 'eighties.⁹⁵ But, in general,

in the skilled trades, the English artisan continued to hold his own, especially if his trade was affiliated with the American Federation of Labour. The railway workers, with the exception of a small proportion of the employées of the Quebec, Montreal and Ottawa railway, seem to have been principally English-speaking Canadians or old-countrymen.

An examination of the movement of the English-speaking population within a specific area, namely, the Eastern Townships, is illuminating. The Townships, which lay between the seigneuries and the United States boundary on the south shore of the St. Lawrence river, were originally almost entirely English-speaking in their composition.⁹⁶ The inhabitants were immigrants from the British Isles and settled by the British American Land Company, or farmers who had crossed from the United States. Shortly after the Rebellion, the French-Canadians began to drift into the Townships by way of the river-valleys. Thus, Henry Taylor recorded at Kingsley,

".. Mr. Abercrombie informs me that there were, say, nigh two hundred families of French-Canadians settled in the Townships.."97

Even as far south as Stanstead he observed,

".. many French-Canadians have come here to find work. They get from 10 to 12 dollars a month and well found. One old man yesterday sent 70 dollars to his brother in the seigneuries; some of the labourers keep a horse and chaise to ride to service...on a Sunday.."98

In the later 'forties, French-Canadian infiltration into the Townships increased stimulated by the negotiations between the British American Land Company and the colonization society in Montreal.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, the sequence must be observed; the influx of the French-speaking people into the Townships was preceded by an exodus of the English. The fact that the English continued to depart as the French arrived does not in the least invalidate the statement; Messrs Sellar and Sait to the contrary not excepting.¹⁰⁰ The attractions of the west were just as great

for the Township farmer as they were for his neighbour in Vermont and abandoned farms in both areas testified the strength of the allure. There was this difference. In the Townships the farm was likely as not to be bought up by some thrifty French-Canadian; in Vermont it stood tenantless. It is possible that the desire on the part of the English-speaking farmer to move was accelerated by declining returns. There were few farmers in the Townships who did not have some secondary occupation in the form of a saw-mill, a brick-yard, a tannery or a blacksmith shop. In the 'seventies and in the 'eighties lumbering in the St. Lawrence valley fell on evil days and successive depressions took the profits out of small industries. In addition, the whole trend during the period was towards rationalization and concentration in business and lack of local demand and the competition of large industries, no doubt, forced many a farmer to close down his mill or shop. In view of the prevailing low prices of farm products it is not surprising that the more vigorous Eastern Township farmers turned towards the new west.

The decline in numbers of the English-speaking population had consequences for the French-Canadians. The knowledge that they need fear little in the way of criticism or of opposition from within the Province undoubtedly made some of the French-Canadian leaders militant and irresponsible. It is not probable that Mercier would have proceeded to the length he did, had he known that on such an issue as the Riel question he would encounter an hostile and numerous public opinion. It is certain, in more domestic matters, that the French-Canadian political parties lost materially as their English-speaking allies dwindled. It was more than men that were lost, although leaders of the calibre of Galt and Holton were valuable additions to any party. Party outlook and philosophy suffered, for the

presence of the representatives of the two races at party councils imposed a reasonableness upon all and provided an education in mutual forbearance.

Change marked also the general economic background of the period. It might be questioned whether a contemporary Canadian would have so characterized what took place. To him the three decades that followed Confederation were decades of almost unbroken depression and of continued disappointment. It was the Dominion's misfortune to begin its national life under these trying circumstances for the hard times which began in 1873 endured unbroken, save for temporary improvement, until 1896.¹⁰¹ The depression, or series of depressions, varied in intensity. The earliest, between 1874 and 1878, seems to have been the most severe. Thereafter, their destructiveness was less or Canadians were better prepared to endure them. The consequences of the depressions on the social and economic life of Quebec were peculiar. It might be assumed that a Province as completely given over to agriculture as Quebec was, and peopled by a race as thrifty and as self-disciplined as the French-Canadians were, would suffer relatively little. In point of fact, the reverse was the case. Quebec farming was overtaken by the depression when it was in the process of adjusting itself to the new demands of the XIXth century agricultural world. It was, therefore, ill-prepared to sustain the shock the business fabric of the country received. Moreover, the lumbering industry which rivalled farming in the number of persons it supported, was prostrated by the decline of the European and the United States markets.¹⁰² The consequences were disastrous since lumbering and its subsidiaries practically maintained Quebec City and the eastern sections of the Province. The Canadian manufacturer as well felt the effects of the depression in a lessening demand for his goods and in

increasing loan rate. Thus, it was against a background of straitened circumstances and of narrowing opportunities that much of Quebec's history after Confederation was to be enacted.

In view of the extensive and varied changes that went on in the Province of Quebec between Confederation and the turn of the century, a general summary is bound to be inadequate. The most important change within the Province was the movement of peoples into the northern and into the western sections of the Province. This occasioned not simply a change in equilibrium, but also a considerable alteration in outlook. As has been suggested, it was this movement into the spacious north country that gave French-Canadian nationalism its new orientation, turning it from its preoccupation with political and constitutional problems to those of a social and economic character. Observers, as far removed in viewpoint as Georges Vattier¹⁰³ and the late Armand Lavergne,¹⁰⁴ were one in recognizing this. Equally far-reaching in their consequences were the urbanization of the Province and the decline in influence of the English-speaking population. The political implications of these varied changes were sweeping. New needs and a new outlook produced alterations in the party programmes and policies. To a certain degree, the French-Canadian Conservative party was better able to meet them than was the Liberal since its constitution was elastic and since Cartier had accustomed it to championing new causes. Nevertheless, neither Conservative nor Liberal kept pace with the progress of change and one of the most usual political phenomena of the age was the appearance of new or schismatic parties. The problem that faced French-Canadian Conservatism was to adapt its philosophy and its practice to meet the new needs of the Province and of the Dominion.

- ¹For the two extremes in point of time vide J.C. Dent's The history of the last forty years and Sir Thomas Chapais' Cours d'histoire du Canada.
- ²Tucker, G.N. The Canadian Commercial Revolution.
- ³Landon, F. The '60's--a period of transition in Upper Canadian Agriculture. O.A.C. publication, 1937.
- ⁴Chapais, T. Three Centuries of Agriculture.
Canada and its Provinces, Vol. 16.
- ⁵Skelton, O.D. General Economic History 1867-1912, p. 179.
- ⁶a Canadian (Dr. de la Terriere?) A political and historical account of Lower Canada.
William Marsh and Alfred Miller; London, 1830.
- ⁷Allaire, J.B.A. Histoire de la Paroisse de St. Denis sur Richelieu, p.342.
imprimere du "Courris de St. Hyacinthe", 1905.
- ⁸Dominion Illustrated, Montreal, July 19, 1890.
- ⁹Kalm, P. Travels in North America, p. 529: p. 531.
Edited by A. Benson: Wilson-Erickson, N.Y., 1937.
- ¹⁰Rapport du comité spécial...pour s'enquérir des causes et de l'importance de l'emigration du Bas-Canada vers les Etats-Unis.
Louis Perrault, Montréal, 1849.
- ¹¹Royal, J. Histoire du Canada, p. 220.
librairie Beauchemin, Montréal, 1909.
- ¹²Canadian Illustrated News, July 4, 1874.
- ¹³ibid., May 5, 1877.
- ¹⁴Laurier, W. Discours à l'Etranger et au Canada.
- ¹⁵Census of Canada. 1851-1852.
- ¹⁶ibid., 1861.
- ¹⁷ibid., 1871.
- ¹⁸ibid., 1881.
- ¹⁹ibid., 1891.
- ²⁰Lavergne, A. Trente Ans de vie nationaux.
- ²¹Bourassa was elected for Labelle at the G.E. 1896.
(Canadian Parliamentary Companion, 1897.)

²²MacKay, R. Montreal Directory, 1849. Introduction.

²³According to the Canadian census for the appropriate years, the population of Montreal was as follows:

1852	57,715	1881	140,747
1861	90,323	1891	182,695
1871	107,225		

²⁴Canadian Census 1851-1852; Canadian Census 1861.

²⁵This statement was made to me by Dr. Lighthall.

²⁶The following indicate the growth of population in Montreal East:

1871	46,291
1881	67,506.

²⁷deMolinari, G. Lettres sur les Etats-Unis et le Canada, librairie Hachette et cie; Paris, 1876.

²⁸Grant, G.M. Picturesque Canada, Vol. 1, p. 112. Bolden Brothers, Toronto, 1892.

²⁹In 1852 the population of Quebec was 42,052 as compared to the 57,715 of Montreal.

³⁰Report of the Royal Commission on the relations of Labour and Capital in Canada, 1889, Vol. 2, p. 840.

³¹According to the Census the population of Quebec City was only 63,090 in 1891.

³²Gazette, Montreal, August 16, 1879.

³³Canadian Illustrated News, December 14, 1872.

³⁴Report of the Royal Commission on the relations of Labour and Capital in Canada, 1889, Vol. 1, p. 8.

³⁵Oxenden, A. My first year in Canada, p. 61. Hatchards, London, 1871.

³⁶Report, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 150.

³⁷The term "Shilling" was popularly applied to the Canadian twenty-cent piece which was minted for a short period during the 'seventies.

³⁸Report, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 151.

³⁹ibid., Vol. 1, p. 150.

⁴⁰ibid., Vol. 1, p. 189.

⁴¹ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1133.

- ⁴²ibid., Vol. 2, p. 778.
- ⁴³ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1135.
- ⁴⁴ibid., Vol. 2, p. 779.
- ⁴⁵ibid., Vol. 1, p. 86.
- ⁴⁶ibid., Vol. 1, p. 710.
- ⁴⁷ibid., Vol. 1, p. 714.
- ⁴⁸ibid., Vol. 1, p. 725.
- ⁴⁹ibid., Vol. 1, p. 86ff.
- ⁵⁰ibid., Vol. 1, p. 333.
- ⁵¹ibid., Vol. 1, p. 7.
- ⁵²ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1237.
- ⁵³_____, The Province of Quebec and European Emigration (sic), p. 108.
presses of l'Événement, Quebec, 1870.
- ⁵⁴The street-railway employees of Montreal had a sixteen-hour day. Report on the relations of Labour and Capital, Vol. 1, p. 152.
- ⁵⁵Report, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 814.
- ⁵⁶ibid., Vol. 1, p. 1.
- ⁵⁷ibid., Vol. 1, p. 643.
- ⁵⁸_____, Reports and Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Montreal, 1885.
Perrault Printing Company, Montreal, 1886.
p. 74, Report of Dr. Laberge, M.O.H.
- ⁵⁹Dominion Illustrated. May 14, 1889.
- ⁶⁰Canadian Illustrated News. August 10, 1872.
- ⁶¹Logan, H.A. History of Trade Union organization in Canada.
University of Chicago Press, 1928
- ⁶²The Ship Labourers' Society was chartered in 1862.
- ⁶³Report, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 1674.
- ⁶⁴ibid., Vol. 2, p. 840.
- ⁶⁵The Church was ready to intervene on the side of order ^{and} of property. In 1870 the Bishop of Montreal condemned a combination among sheefactory workers.

⁶⁶Records of Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labour.
1885.

Local 2436 Montreal	217 membership
Local 3484 Montreal	266 membership
Local 3852 Point St. Charles	213 membership

⁶⁷ibid., 1886.

⁶⁸ibid., 1887. In the Montreal district there were 38 locals with a membership of only 2522.

⁶⁹Report, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 155.

⁷⁰ibid., Vol. 1, p. 515.

⁷¹ibid., Vol. 1, p. 727.

⁷²ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1160.

⁷³the Week, April 1, 1886.

⁷⁴ibid., April 15, 1886.

⁷⁵The drafts for these addresses are to be found among the Macdonald Papers in the Public Archives at Ottawa.

⁷⁶Macdonald Papers. Chapleau Correspondence.
Chapleau to Macdonald October 17, 1886.

⁷⁷ibid., Chapleau Correspondence.
Chapleau to Macdonald; February 4, 1887.

⁷⁸ibid., Chapleau Correspondence.
Chapleau to Macdonald, May 21, 1887.

⁷⁹The pastoral was issued on June 10, 1886.

⁸⁰Journal of United Labour, 1886, p. 2070.

⁸¹ibid., 1886, p. 2356.

⁸²la Minerve, 1^{er} octobre, 1891.

⁸³In the earlier Canadian censuses, 1851, 1861 and 1871, the origins of the population were carefully noted. In later censuses this was not observed. Of course, racial origin has little to do with language, hence any estimation of the English and French population of Quebec must be vague.

⁸⁴Durham. Report on the Affairs of British America, p. 142, Appendix C.
(Lucas edition, Oxford University Press, 1912.)

⁸⁵Census of the Canadas, 1851-1852.

- ⁸⁶ibid., 'In 1851, the total population of Montreal was 57,715; of this 31,157 were English. In 1861 of the 90,323 people in the city 45,879 were English.
- ⁸⁷In 1851 the English-speaking population of the counties of Dorchester, Drummond, Megantic, Mississquoi, Shefford, Sherbrooke and Stanstead formed about 49.87% of the total.
- ⁸⁸Cartwright, R. Reminiscences, p. 8.
- ⁸⁹Gazette, Montreal, March 29, 1859.
"...the ties of race and of religion have been ineffectual to bind our merchants, manufacturers and mechanics to the chariot wheels of Western Grittism..."
- ⁹⁰Confederation Debates. Speech by Hector Langevin, p. 384ff.
- ⁹¹British North America Act, Chap. 5, Clause 80, Schedule 2.
- ⁹²ibid., Clause 93, subsection 2.
- ⁹³Canadian Illustrated News, May 31, 1873.
- ⁹⁴Gazette, Montreal, August 16, 1879.
- ⁹⁵Report, Royal Commission Labour and Capital.
- ⁹⁶Drapeau, S. le Colonisation du Bas-Canada, p. 107.
typographie Léger Brousseau, Québec, 1863.
- ⁹⁷Taylor, H. Journal, p. 71, October 30, 1839.
Wm. Conway and Son, Quebec, 1840.
- ⁹⁸Taylor, H. ibid., p. 24, September 24, 1839.
- ⁹⁹Cooper, J.I. "G.E. Cartier in the period of the 'forties."
Report of the Canadian Historical Association, 1938.
- ¹⁰⁰Sellar, R. and Sait, E.C. The Tragedy of Quebec and Clerical Control in Quebec both advance the same thesis; in the Townships the English-speaking inhabitants have been forced out deliberately by the French-Canadians and their priestly leaders.
- ¹⁰¹Skelton, O. General Economic History, Section 4.
- ¹⁰²The lumber trade in the St. Lawrence valley seems to have reached its apex early in the 'fifties, at least this was the opinion of competent observers in Quebec City.
- ¹⁰³Vattier, G. Essai sur la mentalité canadienne française, p. 31 and 32.
librairie ancienne Horacé Champion, Paris, 1928.
- ¹⁰⁴Lavergne, A. Trente ans de Vie nationale, p. 17.
Deom frère, Montréal, 1935.

CHAPTER 4

THE PROBLEM OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY

With the example of the great European dictatorships before us, the importance of the leader to the political party should not require great emphasis. Even in the more domestic atmosphere of Canadian political life, the party leader is a figure of great moment. He was especially so in the decades following Confederation when the Canadian world was changing so rapidly. Among the French-Canadians his importance was greatly enhanced by a factor which has been observed already, a well-marked preference for the man rather than for the idea.

There were other demands which the French-Canadians made upon their public men. They were required to be representative of the people they led. This meant, of course, that they should be French-Canadians, for a strong, if ill-defined, racial pride has always been one of their most marked characteristics.¹ It means too, that the party leader should personify the national mentality and morality. He must be also representative in the sense that he was symbolic. The extent to which French-Canadian political leaders have conformed to this standard is striking: Papineau summed up in his person the querulous democracy of the later XVIII century, Cartier the energy and directness of its prosperous middle years and Laurier the suave urbanity of the later Victorian Age. The party leader must be the interpreter of the ideas and of the ideals of his followers. It was his especial task to summarize; to simplify; to popularize. To perform these functions adequately, it was essential that the successful French-Canadian party leader should be an able public speaker. Quite frequently, the national predilection in this respect has advanced men who were fluent speakers and little more. It is a notable fact that of all the more prominent public men in the XIX century, Cartier

alone was unremarkable as an orator. Finally the French-Canadian party leader of the best type has been an originator of ideas, not the mere personifier of them. It was this faculty which characterized so preeminently Cartier, Mercier and Laurier and marked them off from the facile orators and politicians of which Quebec Province has produced so many. It is this power of evolving new political ideas and gradually attaching them to the general fund of accepted party principles that the party leader appears as the constructive statesman.

Much of what has been said of the value of the leader in French-Canadian political organization is capable of wider application. It is hard to conceive the Conservative party in Great Britain without Canning and Huskisson to give it its economic philosophy and imperial aspirations, Peel to reconcile it to reform and to teach it the value of compromise and Disraeli to root it in the prosperous, fecund middle-class. On the American continent as well, the party leader has been a figure of almost supreme importance. How much does the Democratic party in the United States owe to the revolutionary philosophy of Thomas Jefferson and to the democratic practice of Andrew Jackson? In an age and on a continent whose genius was rapid change, where institutions were not firmly rooted, the personality of a leader may well appear the only stable element in a chaotic world. This was the condition of Canada in the years following Confederation and the purpose of this chapter is to examine the men who aspired to the leadership of the French-Canadian Conservative party.

The years following Confederation saw Cartier still a great force in political life although circumstances of the period conspired to reduce his power. The formation of the Dominion introduced entirely new elements into the national life of Canada and, there was no statesman

who could feel that this position was secure. To men like Cartier who had grown up in the political world of the old Province of Canada, the problems of the new federation, of conciliation, of consolidation and of expansion must have presented unusual perplexities. In the solution of some of these problems Cartier bore an active part and was the victim of the criticism which even the successful solution of political problems frequently engenders.

The most serious problem, and the most fundamental, presented by the period to the political leaders was that of party alignment. The creation of the new political instrument in the form of the British North America Act, and the necessity of coalescing the parties of the old Provinces were problems which presented difficulties to all Canadian leaders but in an especial degree to Cartier as the leader of the French-Canadian Conservatives. His position became greatly complicated for he was called on to fill a dual, and sometimes conflicting rôle, that of representing the interests of his people at Ottawa and also of acting as the joint head of the Conservative party. In the latter capacity he was called on to share in the exceedingly perplexing task of assimilating the political groups from the other Provinces, and of conciliating his difficult tempered colleagues². We know too little of the later political life of the Maritime Provinces to speak dogmatically, but while there were groups calling themselves Conservatives in both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, they appear to have had little in common with the Liberal-Conservative party of Canada. Apart from the desire to promote the organic union of the British Provinces and from a lively, if not wholly disinterested concern in the extension of railways, the Conservatives had few bonds. Even the leaders Macdonald, Cartier, Tupper and Tilley knew each other only through their

efforts in the direction of Confederation. There were, of course, other active forces which were on more intimate relations, the railway promoters, the financial houses, the steam-ship lines which stood to make so much from the larger union. Nevertheless, these agencies which frequently provided the "means" that brought about Confederation were remote and gave little assistance to the political leaders in their attempts to fuse the political life of the Provinces.

In an especial way the French-Canadian Conservative party felt the impact of Confederation. After 1867, it became simply a section of a party which drew its support from the entire Dominion. To that degree it reflected the position of the French-Canadian people in the new Dominion. The decline in position was all the more serious, when, it is recalled, that, previous to Confederation, the French-Canadians were, numerically, the dominant group within the Conservative party.³ However much Cartier and his Conservatives may have gained in popular estimation by carrying Confederation, it is incontestable that they did so at the cost of their political position. That he was conscious of his waning influence is probable; indeed, in his biography of Galt, Dr. Skelton goes so far as to say that Cartier contemplated a new grouping which would include Galt and some of the Maritimers.⁴ This is as it may be, but in any estimate of Cartier, it must be had in mind that following Confederation he was in eclipse and that his party was no longer the leading partner in the Liberal-Conservative alliance.

Even within his own Province, Cartier's position was not as secure as it had been previous to Confederation. He was confronted with the great movements of population and with the equally great changes in occupation which coincided with Confederation. With his family holdings

in the Richelieu Valley and his own personal interests in Montreal, Cartier represented the views of what has been described as the "South Shore" admirably. He was, in consequence, less able to meet the demands

of the settlers in the new country north of the St. Lawrence,⁵ and his rashness in contesting Montreal East in 1872, shewed how little he understood the temper of the French-Canadian city-dweller. He was also out of touch with the new forces in ecclesiastical circles that were making themselves felt throughout the Province and especially in Montreal. Finally, as has been indicated, a certain criticism of Cartier's leadership was implied in the schism that took place in his party at Confederation. The formation of le parti national was soon to crystallize this latent opposition and to assert that neither Cartier nor his Conservatives any longer satisfied the aspirations of the French-Canadians.⁶

Equally damaging to Cartier's position and to the solidarity of his party was the recrudescence of racial and of religious strife which followed Confederation. However powerful the forces of self-interest may have been in creating the Liberal-Conservative party, there is little doubt that it was preserved principally by a careful balancing of its component parts. To the extent to which the party could minimize the strong centrifugal forces of provincialism and of denominationalism, it could survive. The first six years of the post-Confederation era saw this principle of compromise challenged in Quebec, in New Brunswick and in the newly-acquired territories of the Hudson's Bay Company.

The change in the ecclesiastical temper of Quebec will be dealt with at length in its appropriate place; here it can be considered only in so far as it constituted a challenge to Cartier's position as Conservative leader. Cartier's early death in 1873 spared him from the most hotly

contested battles of "la grande guerre *ecclésiastique*". He was, in fact, involved in only the preliminary skirmishes. Even here his participation was of accident rather than of principle. He was indirectly involved in the long and bitter quarrel between Mgr. Bourget and the Sulpicians over the division of the historic parish of Montreal. Cartier does not appear to have taken a personal part in the controversy,⁷ but his law firm managed the Sulpicians' business and represented them in the Courts. Nevertheless, Cartier was destined to suffer politically for the association. He incurred the displeasure of the Bishop and laid himself open to the criticism of some of his younger followers, who established le Nouveau Monde in opposition to la Minerve and who ultimately drew up le programme catholique with the avowed purpose of ridding the Conservative party of such "liberal" principles as Cartier represented.⁸ The immediate political consequences to Cartier were serious, and his biographers⁹ are probably correct in attributing his defeat in Montreal East in 1872, to the ecclesiastical influences which had been roused against him.¹⁰

Cartier's attitude with respect to the New Brunswick Schools controversy also cost him the good-will of many of his more clerically-minded followers.¹¹ Again, Cartier's share in the controversy was small. He defended the refusal of the Dominion Government to disallow the obnoxious provincial law.¹² His conduct was characteristic; as a lawyer he examined the legal position of the New Brunswick Roman Catholics and pronounced against them. Under the British North America Act, they had no guarantees for their schools and could, therefore, make no appeal to the Dominion Parliament. However sound Cartier's position may have been in point of law, as a piece of political manoeuvring it was extraordinarily inept, and it gave his enemies fresh indications of his indifference to national-

ism and of his unfriendliness to the interests of the Church.

Cartier had already been involved in a racial and religious controversy, the ramifications of which were to long outlast his lifetime, and were destined, so the conventional interpretation goes, to involve the Conservative party in irreparable disaster. This was the Red River Rebellion of 1869 and 1870, with its concomitants, the murder of Thomas Scott and the exile of Louis Riel and with its consequences, the creation of the Province of Manitoba. The events, as they took place on the banks of the Red River have been dealt with admirably by Dr. Stanley,¹³ but the negotiations and intrigues which succeeded them in eastern Canada are more obscure. In all of them Cartier played a large part. He was the first of the Canadian Ministers to be warned by Mgr. Taché in the midsummer of 1869 that trouble was threatening at Red River,¹⁴ and it was with him that the Archbishop chiefly dealt, when he was asked to return to the West in the spring of 1870.¹⁵ Later in the same year, Cartier was one of the Canadian Ministers who negotiated with the delegates, Judge Black and Father Ritchot who had been sent east by the Provisional Government. Indeed, it is probable that Cartier was the principal negotiator on the Government side, for Macdonald was unwell,¹⁶ and his indifferent command of French made it difficult for him to converse with Ritchot. The negotiations themselves seem to have taken place usually in Cartier's Ottawa house.¹⁷ In consequence of his activity, Cartier was enmeshed in one of the most perplexing of all Canadian controversies, that of the Riel amnesty. From the evidence at our disposal, it seems probable, that till March 1870, the Canadian authorities proposed to grant, or to secure from the Imperial Government, an amnesty to cover all acts of violence which might have been committed at Red River.¹⁸ The execution of Thomas Scott on

March 4, 1870, chiefly at the instigation of Riel, produced an extraordinary outburst of anger in English-speaking Canada, and made it politically impossible that Riel's name should be included in the amnesty. Although French Canada was not prepared to condone the execution,¹⁹ there was a general feeling that Riel had been especially marked out for vindictive treatment, and that in denying him an amnesty prejudice, rather than justice, was being satisfied.²⁰ To precisely trace Cartier's part in all this is next to impossible for the evidence at our disposal lacks Cartier's testimony.²¹ We are also on insecure ground when we attempt to trace Cartier's connexion with the Manitoba Act, the instrument of government under which the Red River settlement entered Confederation. His critics asserted that it was he who suggested the legal expedients contained in the Act, but modern scholarship has cast him in a less exacting rôle.²² As is well known, Cartier was returned for Provencher, a Manitoba constituency, after he had been defeated in Montreal East. That an ominous interpretation could be given the election is evident when it is realized that Cartier's return was secured only when Riel had been induced to withdraw. It does not appear, however, that Cartier obligated himself in any way.²³ The entire Red River episode considerably

damaged Cartier's position; he was regarded by a large body of French-Canadian opinion as having sacrificed the interests of the French-Half-Breeds and for having consented to the exile of their leader, Louis Riel.

There were personal factors which helped to undermine Cartier's position. His health began to fail, yet despite this, he was compelled to assume an increasingly large share in the practical work of government. During Macdonald's illness in 1870, Cartier not only carried on the work of his department, but led in the House of Commons. In the following

year, when Macdonald was absent in Washington, he performed that task again, although he was suffering from the first attacks of his fatal malady. He was also charged with some of the Government's most important legislation, the Manitoba Act and the act incorporating the Pacific railway company. By 1872, Cartier's health was so bad, that it was only with great difficulty that he could appear on the platform,²⁴ and his defeat on this occasion was due as much to his declining physical power as to the skill of his enemies.

The final blow to Cartier's power came in the long train of intrigues and of bargainings which preceded the initiation of the transcontinental railway project. Ultimately, some of the intrigues were made public under the name of "the Pacific Scandal." Of the extent of these revelations, Cartier knew little, for he had died before Huntington began the publication of his incriminating documents in the pages of the Montreal Herald.²⁵ The indictment of the Conservative leaders is too well known to require recapitulation. Cartier's share does, however, call for some examination since it throws a good deal of light upon the negotiations for the railway charter and upon the development^{of the} scandal. According to Macdonald's testimony, Cartier, who had been charged with the introduction of the project, was forced to promise that the railway would be constructed by an incorporated company liberally assisted by the government.²⁶ The assistance proposed was generous and, with the era of extensive railway building in the United States drawing to a close, there was a movement among railway builders and promoters to secure the cash and the land subsidies. Conspicuous among the railway promoters was Sir Hugh Allan, the shipping magnate who, in search for business for his vessels, had become interested in railway building in the Ottawa valley. Allan's own account of what

followed is one of the best commentaries upon the shrewdness and upon the unscrupulousness of predatory capitalism that has ever been penned.

"I saw that the decision must be ultimately in the hands of one man--Sir George Cartier, the leader and the chief of the French party. This party had the balance of power between the other factions....."

(Cartier had consistently blocked the building of a railway along the North shore of the Ottawa, fearing that it would damage the Grand Trunk: Cartier also favoured granting the charter of the transcontinental railway to Grand Trunk interests.)

"I saw in the French railway scheme and in the near approach of the general elections .. a sure means of attaining my object .. The plans which I proposed were in themselves the best for the interests of the Dominion.. but even in that view means must be used to influence the public, and I employed several young French lawyers to write it up in their own newspapers .. I subscribed a controlling influence in the stock of the newspapers .. I visited the Priests and talked to them and paid agents to go among the principal people to talk it up .. The scheme at once became popular and I formed a committee to influence the Legislature. This succeeded so well that in a short time I had 27 of the 45 .. and the electors of the ward of this city which Cartier himself represents, notified him that unless the contract of the Pacific railway was given in the interest of Lower Canada, he need not present himself for re-election .. "27

Allan was successful; he secured the charter and the nomination of a board of directors who were acceptable to him. It was from this group that Cartier and Macdonald received the large contributions towards their election expenses. Cartier's demands for additional amounts were understandable. He had to provide for the provincial and for the dominion parties and he had to fight his election in one of the most difficult constituencies in Canada.²⁸ Even his most bitter enemies never suggested that he profitted personally by the large sums of money that passed through his hands.²⁹ He was fortunate, perhaps, in dying on the eve of the revelations of the Scandal.

Despite the wealth of material at our disposal, it is difficult to

say much that is final about Cartier. His private life, and those intimate forces that so influence a man's actions, his professional success; his fortune; his friends are, even at this date, unknown to us. An almost indecipherable hand-writing minimizes the value of the few papers that survived the systematic destruction carried out by Sir John Rose and by Benjamin Sulte.³⁰ Yet it would appear that Cartier played the part of the political leader. In the years following 1854, he succeeded to a loose alliance of groups and of individuals; at the time of his death he left that party close-knit and conscious of its own purpose. He succeeded in the yet more difficult task of merging his French-Canadians with the larger Conservative party and retaining their identity. Cartier built well and his organization and programme survived him by a quarter of a century. There will always be debate as to Cartier's place in the hierarchy of Canadian public life. He was more a tactician than a strategist, and to that degree Macdonald's inferior. He lacked the vision and^{the} power of expression of Laurier. Cartier possessed, however, a quality of mind and a vigour of execution that raised him above the mere party politician. Contrary to the views of his biographers,³¹ Cartier's greatest years of accomplishment lay before Confederation. He did not live long enough to master the elaborate technique of governing the confederation he had been so instrumental in creating. Cartier's contemporaries were equally hesitant in pronouncing their opinions upon either his character or upon his success as party leader. His critics, such as the Montreal Witness, could write briefly but with asperity,

".. Sir George Cartier has trafficked too much with the Church of Rome, the Hudson's Bay Company and the Grand Trunk Railway to deserve the confidence of the people of Canada ... "

His friends were more expansive, but none of them appeared to realize the

tragedy of Cartier's tenure as Conservative leader; he left behind no successor.

It is true that Cartier did have a species of coadjutor, who it was generally agreed would succeed him, in the person of Hector Langevin. Even before Cartier's death, Langevin was popularly regarded as the heir-apparent³² and, when the Quebec Conservatives met in Montreal after Cartier's funeral, there was no one who could contest Langevin's claims. Langevin had much to recommend him, he was Cartier's old law student,³³ and political understudy.³⁴ He had even more powerful recommendations. He was a Quebec man and he brought to the Conservative party, therefore, the views of the ancient capital and of the lower river. When it is recalled that during Cartier's life-time, the Conservative party was looked upon as a Montreal party, it is easy to understand that, as the special representative of Quebec, Langevin had a very important place in its counsels. Langevin was also intimately connected with the ecclesiastical life of the Province of Quebec, one brother being the Bishop of Rimouski and another a Vicar General. How valuable these connections were to the party need hardly be emphasised. In fact, it is not improbable that Langevin's early inclusion may be attributed to his ability to manage the government's ecclesiastical business.³⁵ In addition, Langevin was an extremely able administrator, a characteristic in which he most resembled his old leader Cartier. While it does not appear that Langevin ever advanced in the cabinet beyond the rank of Minister of Public Works, his most inveterate enemies were compelled to admit his capacity.

When, however, Langevin's skills as an administrator and his abilities as a negotiator have been cited, almost his entire qualifications have been comprehended. He was no Cartier, and the dissimilarity was no

more observable³⁵ in Langevin's suppleness, or to be more precise, his lack of courage. A single example must suffice for a multitude of cases. Langevin was one of the first, and indeed, the only prominent Conservative, to subscribe to le programme catholique. That he may sincerely have believed in some of the principles contained in the programme is possible, but it must always be recalled that the programme was directed primarily against the school of liberal Conservatives of whom Cartier was the chief. In the dark days of the North-West Rebellion when the French-Canadian Conservative leaders were subjected to every sort of abuse, Langevin's courage failed him completely as his letters to Macdonald bear ample evidence.³⁶ It is, no doubt, unfair to judge a man's character by the quality of his letters, but among Macdonald's many correspondents, Langevin strikes the most unpleasant note. His letters reveal him as a man of little originality, a purveyor of low gossip,³⁷ and very much of a sycophant.³⁸ Although Macdonald seems to have had a personal liking for Langevin, he harboured no delusions as to his capacities,

".. Langevin got his C.B. for his services in Confederation, and there was nothing especially to entitle him to a second honour.. He has never been the head of the Government and has always accepted a subordinate position--and he still does. Besides when we were in Opposition, he was out of the House and declined to run in 1874...³⁹

Political misfortunes dogged Langevin. He had scarcely succeeded Cartier in the midsummer of 1873, when the revelations of the Pacific Scandal drove the Conservative party from office. Langevin was not the man to lead a forlorn hope, he retired from public life and did not re-enter it till the prolonged depression and the ineptitude of the Liberal administration made the return of the Conservatives relatively certain.⁴⁰ Even in the best days of National Policy prosperity, Langevin's command of the French-Canadian Conservatives was precarious for his weakness

raised up rivals in the person of Caron and of Chapleau. In fact, apart from quarrelling with his colleagues over the spoils of office and writing complaining letters to Macdonald, Langevin seems to have done little to justify his position as party leader.⁴¹ He made no contribution to Conservative policy, still less to its philosophy. Langevin was a parliamentarian. He had few contacts with the rank and file of the Conservative party and for the electorate, a few contractors excepted, he had little interest. For the rigorous task of party leadership he had few qualifications. He never really filled the position left vacant by Cartier, and, his withdrawal from political life, following the revelations of the Department of Public Works' inquiry, removed an incubus from the path of the Conservative party.

During the voluntary retirement of Langevin after 1874, a curious species of interregnum prevailed. The leadership was, in reality, put into commission and entrusted to the joint care of Rodrigue Masson and of Joseph Mousseau. Both were very minor figures, a circumstance which may explain their selection. As an individual, Masson was intensely interesting since as a man of private means and as a scholar of no mean ability he personified a tradition almost forgotten in Canadian political life. Masson was seigneur of Terrebonne, a medical doctor by profession, an historian by inclination and a politician only from a strong sense of duty.⁴² He had been Cartier's ally but had disapproved his laodicean attitude on the question of the New Brunswick schools and the very qualified support he gave Riel.⁴³ It is more than probable that Masson's selection as joint leader was an attempt to reconcile the restive ultra-Conservatives for Masson was a friend of deBoucherville and an adherent of the Catholic Programme.⁴⁴ His tenure of office was unremarkable if we except his not

ungenerous championing of Riel.⁴⁵ His colleague Mousseau was a slow heavy man both physically and intellectually. The fact that he was Chapleau's law-partner may partly explain his elevation.⁴⁶ It would be superfluous to remark that he left no impress on the Conservative party. He was an importunate beggar for jobs and favours and appears to have laboured under the permanent delusion that patronage was the solution for all difficulties.⁴⁷ Mousseau's subsequent connection with the dismissal of Lieutenant-Governor Letellier de St. Just will be discussed later, suffice it here to say that the episode indicated a strain of unsuspected vindictiveness in his make-up. It should be scarcely necessary to remark that the interregnum did not strengthen the Conservative party. It damaged the most essential condition of successful leadership, that of continuity. It encouraged ill-discipline and it raised a number of rivals to contest a position so weakly held.

Langevin's weakness as the Conservative leader, of course, encouraged rivals. The most important of these was probably Adolphe Caron. Caron was the heir to a great name in Quebec political life, and, in his own country, Quebec County, seems to have ruled with the unquestioned authority of a feudal chief. Young as Caron was, he represented a tradition as old as representative government itself, the local or territorial magnate who managed the political affairs of his district almost without supervision. He represented another, still older, tradition, transplanted from Great Britain, the man of private means in politics. However widely they might differ on political questions, men like Caron and Sir Richard Cartwright came from essentially the same class, and it is informing to observe, that in his memoirs,⁴⁸ where praise is so sparingly used, Caron is almost the only French-Canadian for whom Cartwright has a friendly word.

Like Langevin's, Caron's early advancement probably was occasioned by his ability to voice the interests of the Quebec district.⁴⁹ He also voiced the views of the more liberal elements in the Quebec episcopate in their struggles with the Jesuits and with the Ultramontanes of Montreal.⁵⁰ To that degree, and only to that degree, did Caron resemble Cartier.

Caron was primarily a second-rate figure, although an exceedingly attractive one. There was never a suggestion, so far as can be ascertained, of advancing him beyond the rank of Minister of Militia⁵¹ and in the years after Confederation the Canadian Minister of Militia was an ornamental piece. This does not mean that Caron was without certain practical ability. He managed the business of his Department ably and when the testing time came in the form of the North-West Rebellion of 1885, the administrative arrangements of the Militia Department left little to be criticized. In the work of transporting and of maintaining the North-West Field Force, Caron has received less than his due. At this critical juncture, Caron served his party in other ways as well. He was the author of an able pamphlet that defended the conduct of the Conservative government on the execution of Louis Riel.⁵² He was partly responsible, at least, for minimizing the contemplated vote of censure on the same subject in the House of Commons in the spring of 1886.⁵³ In fact, the excitement over the Riel episode seems to have brought out the best in Caron, and if he was not called upon to make the difficult decisions of Chapleau, he certainly shewed a high degree of courage. Yet personal courage is scarcely the principal attribute of a party leader, and it would be difficult to discover in all Caron's letters or speeches, a remark that was above the common-place or an idea that was original. Caron's actual position in the hierarchy of the Conservative leadership is difficult to apprise. His

letters to Macdonald indicate that he was at once an ally and a rival of Langevin's.⁵⁴ Until Chapleau began to aspire beyond the field of provincial politics, Caron criticized Langevin but when Chapleau entered the Dominion Cabinet in the 'eighties, Caron formed a tacit alliance with his erst-while rival, or more accurately speaking, began to criticise Chapleau.⁵⁵ Despite his manly qualities, a querulous note, almost feminine in its character, ran through much of what Caron said. He was, perhaps, the small man trying to fill the large position.

Late in his career, Caron attained a position of unusual importance. The death of Macdonald, the disgrace of Langevin and the withdrawal of Chapleau from active political life, all tended to bring Caron forward as the only French-Canadian Conservative of any consequence. Some critics have regarded Abbott's failure to include Caron in his Cabinet as a grave political blunder, and, Sir Richard Cartwright confidently asserts, that the slights shewn Caron by Abbott and by Mackenzie-Bowell cost the Conservatives Quebec and, therefore, victory in 1896.⁵⁶ This, like so many of the statements of Cartwright, requires further substantiation. Caron was never the calibre of a party leader and it bespeaks the parlous condition of the Conservative party that such a man should be appealed to in time of crisis. Ten years earlier, Macdonald, who was seldom mistaken in his man, wrote of Caron,

"... My colleagues, Caron are not worth a cent in counter-acting the tremendous efforts (of the Opposition), and with my failing strength and advancing years, I cannot do everything."⁵⁷

Of all the men who aspired to the mantle of Cartier, Chapleau was the most promising contender. In every sense of the word, Chapleau was Cartier's heir. Chapleau, like Cartier, was a Montreal man and to the end of his career represented the interests of Montreal in both the Pro-

vincial and Dominion governments. He also cherished those practices of liberal Conservatism that Cartier had done so much to establish. He was as he himself said, "de l'école de Cartier." He resembled Cartier in still other ways; he had much of his toleration and he was probably, of all the later leaders of the party, the one who was most acceptable to the English-speaking wing. Chapleau was, however, much more than an imitator of Cartier; he brought to the Conservative party ideas and views in keeping with those of the American Continent and with the XIX century. He also brought the interests and the views of the people who dwelt in the new communities north of the St. Lawrence River. It is not too much to say, therefore, that in the hierarchy of the Conservative leadership, Chapleau stood nearest to Cartier.

Chapleau's antecedents require a moment's examination. He came from Ste. Thérèse in Terrebonne county, one of the earliest of the "North Shore" settlements.⁵⁸ His professional associations with Montreal made it possible for him to represent the metropolitan area as well as the colonization district,⁵⁹ an unusual advantage to himself and to his party in view of the strong sectional prejudices of the Canadian electorate. Chapleau came from a working-class family, his father being a stone-mason.⁶⁰ This fact would call for no especial comment were it not that Chapleau was exceedingly proud of his origins and was prone to regard himself as the representative of the working-man. He was known to be friendly to the Knights of Labour, and during his tenure of office as Secretary of State in the Dominion government, Chapleau appointed the Royal Commission to investigate labouring conditions in Canada and authorized the study of labour legislation abroad.⁶¹ It was in this last regard that Chapleau made his most valuable contribution to Conservatism; he made it democratic.

Chapleau's professional success helped to advance him politically in his day; he was one of the most prominent criminal lawyers in the Province and there is little doubt that the celebrity he achieved in the Courts assisted him in Parliament. Yet Chapleau paid dearly for his professional standing and it could be said with truth that he never advanced beyond the successful criminal lawyer. He lay great emphasis on the individual; in fact, it could be said that with him every question began in the personal equation. He concerned himself with the question immediately in hand and valued the emotional appeal above a logical attack upon the problem under discussion. He was, of course, a great speaker and, in that regard, he followed the tradition of grand oratory of Papineau rather than of his master Cartier. Yet it is significant that Chapleau was more effective on the hustings than he was on the floor of Parliament.⁶² He was also more effective in the Quebec Legislative Assembly than he was in the Dominion House of Commons, for Chapleau was, as Sir Rudolphe Lemieux so justly observes,

"... Plutôt un tribun qu' un orator parlementaire .. son éloquence fulgurante qui enflammait .. les masses laissait froide et indifférente les Chambres des Communes ..."⁶³

Chapleau's professional success seems to have been the secret of his entry into political life. As a lawyer and as an editor he made a name for himself in Terrebonne County,⁶⁴ and in 1859 came forward as a supporter of Cartier. Just how loyal a follower of Cartier the younger Chapleau was will always be open to doubt. We know that as editor of le Colonisateur, he was closely associated with curé Labelle and L.O. David, both protagonists of "North Shore" settlement. Labelle and David were supporters of Sir Hugh Allan and "the Montreal and North-Shore Colonisation Railway" schemes, which were so strenuously opposed by Cartier. It is possi-

ble that Chapleau was "... one of those young lawyers and newspaper men..." referred to in Allan's celebrated letter "to a prominent United States Railway President." Be this as it may, in the elections of both 1867 and 1872, Chapleau had given his aid to Cartier defending the Confederation project,⁶⁵ and acting as the apologist for the first Dominion administration.

Chapleau was not without grave faults both temperamental and personal. In his later life he was the victim of recurring sicknesses that appear to have sharpened his already astringent temper. These illnesses probably explain his bickerings with his colleagues and his repeated threats of resignation. His correspondence shews that Chapleau could suffer with courage but not with silence. He had a proneness for female society and did little ^{to} discount the numerous stories that gossip spread of his adventures in this direction. His name was associated with more serious scandals. As a young Minister in 1874 he had been implicated in the so-called "Land Swap" that overturned the liberal Conservative administration of Ouimet.⁶⁶ The incident had no especial significance but it did leave the impression in the public mind that Chapleau's name was to be associated with sharp practices.

Chapleau's political career is interesting in itself and in the reflections it provides upon some important tendencies in the Conservative party. Chapleau entered the Provincial Parliament in 1867 as the representative of Terrebonne. From that point onward his advance was rapid; he became successively Solicitor General in 1873, Provincial Secretary in 1876 and Premier in 1879. In the provincial field, Chapleau had no equal; he effected a complete reorganization of the party and imparted sufficient impetus to carry it till 1886.⁶⁷ As a political organizer Chapleau justly

occupies a high place. In the Provincial General Elections of 1881 he carried 53 out of the 65 seats and six years later, in the face of the Riel agitation and the Nationalist triumph of 1886, he held Quebec for the Conservative party in the Dominion General Elections.⁶⁸ In the provincial field, Chapleau was much more than the dexterous politician. He was responsible for a forward colonization policy, for the completion of the railway between Quebec and Ottawa, and for the introduction of foreign capital into the Province. The year 1882, in which he entered the Dominion Cabinet marks the turning-point in Chapleau's career. Thereafter his influence steadily declined till by 1892 he was considered sufficiently harmless to be made the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec. In those later years, probably from after 1890, a curious change went on in Chapleau's political thinking, and he entered into tacit alliance with Laurier. Such political conversions are by no means rare, and had Chapleau's been an individual instance, it would have called for no comment. It was, however, accompanied by a considerable defection and, it is very probable that the Liberal victory in Quebec in 1896 was due, in large measure, to the defections within the Conservative party. Even a partial explanation of the transition is interesting but apparently a considerable number of Conservatives found in the policies and the principles of Liberalism a more satisfactory political philosophy than the outworn Conservatism of Sir Charles Tupper and his clerical backers could supply. It would be uncritical to attempt to minimize the personal factor that Laurier contributed, but to explain the victory of 1896 as a triumph of personality is superficial in the extreme.

It is not inappropriate at this point, to examine Chapleau's views

on Conservatism. What is said will be general, of necessity, for even less than Cartier did Chapleau attempt to crystallize his political views. This remark represents, indeed, one of the strongest elements in Conservatism as Chapleau understood it, namely, opportunism. Chapleau's views were kept in a state of flux deliberately since he was at all times prepared to trim them for immediate advantage. He was less inclined to compromise than Cartier and more willing to execute some sudden reversal of policy. The expression of it occurred repeatedly, as for example, in Chapleau's reiterated threats of resignation. The best example was given during the Riel crisis of November 1885 when Chapleau was pressed hard to head the French-Canadian opposition to the capital sentence. Chapleau was prepared to abandon the Government, but at the last he reversed his decision.⁶⁹ A more positive element in Chapleau's Conservatism was his robust faith in democracy. It would not be difficult to find many expressions of this in his speeches, but one must suffice. During the protracted campaign that followed the celebrated dismissal of the deBoucherville Government by Lieutenant-Governor Letellier de St. Just, Chapleau led the attack on the Lieutenant-Governor. In any contest between the people and the Crown, it is the will of the people that must triumph, "... Nous sommes les représentants légitimes du peuple..."⁷⁰ Here surely was a new clause in the Conservative creed, the will of the sovereign people. It is not for nothing that Chapleau was a strong admirer of Papineau. Just as Conservatism, in Chapleau's eyes, had little place for a superimposed sovereign authority, so it had little regard for institutionalism. This is best shewn in Chapleau's attitude towards the Church. Of the quality of Chapleau's Catholicism there can be no question but, he clearly regarded the tenets of the Church as having entirely an individual

application. There is nothing in his recorded speeches and letters to indicate, that, like Cartier, he saw in the Church the guardian of national mores, a great conserving force, or, like some of his contemporaries, regarded it as an almost supermundane power superior alike to governments and to peoples.⁷¹ It was this very quality of Chapleau's Conservatism that so roused that opposition which was to find its classical expression in the pamphlet, "le Pays, le Parti et le grand Homme." Chapleau's Conservatism not only constituted a sharp break, therefore, with the authoritarian and traditionalist Conservatism of Cartier, but was at odds with the ideas of some of the clerically-minded Conservatives who sought in the Church the stability which American institutions did not possess and which the parliamentary leaders failed to provide.

Some of the practices of Chapleau's Conservatism may be noted in passing. Just as Cartier had done, so Chapleau made Conservatism synonymous with great public undertakings. He was active in colonization in the Ottawa Valley, in the region which he was accustomed to call "our own North-West." Chapleau never forgot that he was a "North Shore" man; indeed, he was probably never allowed to forget, for he had at one time come under the influence of the redoubtable curé Labelle, the apostle of Colonisation.⁷² Just as Cartier's day, the Conservative party was deeply enmeshed in railway building projects, so in Chapleau's it was concerned in completing the railway from Quebec to Ottawa and latterly of selling it to the Canadian Pacific in an effort to make Quebec the eastern terminus of the transcontinental.⁷³ Another, and an exceedingly original aspect of Conservative policy was the attraction of foreign capital to the Province of Quebec. Chapleau was less interested in attracting foreign industries than foreign investments which might be used to stimulate local

industries. For this purpose he was instrumental in establishing le crédit foncier franco-canadien which facilitated the direction of French funds to Quebec. It was not without justice, that Chapleau who was the most French of all the Conservative leaders should have done the most in restoring the commercial bond between France and her former colony.

Such were the men who, in the generation following Confederation, tried to supply the leadership of the French-Canadian Conservative party. It can be said, with little fear of criticism, that no one of them succeeded in doing so adequately. It may be asked, could any man have succeeded in doing so, in view of the rapid changes that were in progress in Quebec and throughout the Dominion? In many respects the task of the leader of the French-Canadian section of the Conservative party was even more difficult than that of the Dominion leader. In theory he had to reconcile the aspirations of French Canada and the general tendencies of Canadian opinion. In practice he had to assist in the evolution of a political policy which would meet the needs of Canada at large and, at the same time, not outrage the views of any one section of the country or any one division of the people. In times of emotional crisis as, for example, during the autumn of 1885 it was literally impossible to find a bond between the provincial and the national, and the sectional leaders were compelled to choose which they would support. Thus, in 1885, the principal Conservative leaders, Chapleau, Caron and Langevin, elected to adopt what may be called the national as opposed to the provincial point of view. The practical difficulties of governing such a country as post-Confederation Canada, taxed, as has been seen, even Cartier. If, therefore, the veteran party leader found it difficult to mould his party to its new requirements, is it surprising that the men who followed him also failed?

The general inadequacy of its leaders had an unfortunate effect on the French-Canadian Conservative party. It deprived the party of men who could personify it and sum up its inarticulate purposes. The mass of Conservative electors had no one to whom they could look and in whom they could find an easily recognized symbol. That other important section of the French-Canadian electorate, the professional men, the products of the classical colleges, found no one who could appeal to their keen faculties. The party suffered in another sense. There was no one who could keep its policies and philosophies abreast of the times. In view of the rapid changes going on in Quebec, it would seem to be superfluous to emphasise this particular aspect of the leader. It would probably be wrong to suppose that the average Conservative subjected his leaders to any very vigorous diagnosis. He saw that they failed to fulfill his expectations and he turned elsewhere.

¹vide, for example, Vattier, G. Essai sur la mentalité canadienne française deuxième partie. Chapitre 4.

²He was also called on to manage difficult colleagues; Cartier to Galt, September 13, 1869. This letter is printed in Skelton's biography of Galt, p. 448.

³Dent, History of the Last Forty Years, p. 372-3.
George Virtue, Toronto, 1881.

⁴Macdonald Papers Miscellaneous; A. Cameron to Macdonald; Toronto, January 2, 1867.

⁵Montreal Gazette, July 5, 1873. Sir Hugh Allan "to a prominent American Railroad President". n.d.

⁶David, L.O. Histoire du Canada, p. 125ff.

⁷Boyd, J. The Life and Times of Sir G.E. Cartier, p. 311.

⁸Savaete, A. Vers l'Abime, tome 2, p. 117ff. Statement by F.X.A. Trudel.

⁹Boyd, J. op. cit., p. 317ff.

deCelles, A. Cartier, p. 84.

¹⁰la Minerve, le 3 juin 1873.

¹¹le Journal de Quebec, le 20 mai 1873.

¹²Cartier, G.E. Discours; Chambre des Communes le 29 avril 1872. P. 734.

¹³Stanley. The Birth of Western Canada.

¹⁴Journals of the House of Commons; Canada. 1874. Appendix 6, p. 10.

¹⁵ibid. Appendix 6, p. 16ff.

¹⁶ibid. Appendix 6, p. 33ff.

¹⁷ibid. Appendix 6, p. 36.

¹⁸ibid. Appendix 6, p. 70ff.

¹⁹ibid. Appendix 6; Evidence of Archbishop Taché. P. 16. Statement by Donald Smith, p. 93ff.

²⁰la Minerve, le 20 octobre 1870.

²¹op. cit. Appendix 6. Cartier's evidence does not appear.

²²Martin, C. The first "New" Province of the Dominion. Can. Hist. Rev., December, 1920.

- 23 Macdonald Papers. Correspondence with Lieutenant-Governor Archibald. September 4 to 13, 1872. These telegraphes were produced in the House of Commons and are to be found in the Debates 1875. Vol. 1, p. 81ff.
- 24 deCelles. Cartier (Makers of Canada). P. 85.
- 25 The first of the Allan letters appeared in the Montreal Herald at the beginning of July, 1873.
- 26 Macdonald Correspondence; Railway Papers. Vol. 5. Macdonald to the Governor-General, Lord Dufferin, October 9, 1873.
- 27 Montreal Herald, July 4, 1873. Sir Hugh Allan "to an American Railroad President". n.d.
- 28 Macdonald Papers; Railway Correspondence. Vol. 4. Macpherson to Macdonald, Chestnut Park, 17 September, 1872.
- 29 Cartwright, R. Reminiscences. Interview No. 18.
- 30 Macdonald Papers. Rose Correspondence. Rose to Macdonald, May 28, 1873.
- 31 deCelles, A. Cartier (Makers of Canada). P. 67ff.
- 32 Achintre, M.A. Portraits et dossiers parlementaires. Duverney frères; Montréal 1871.
- 33 Canadian Parliamentary Guide. 1881. P. 186.
- 34 Cooper, J.I. George Etienne Cartier in the period of the 'Forties. Report of the Canadian Historical Association 1938.
- 35 It was, for example, Langevin who secured the services of Taché as mediator during the Red River Rebellion. Or, for another example, Macdonald Papers. Letter Books, Vol. 2. Macdonald to Galt, Ottawa, January 8, 1881. "... I spoke to Langevin about getting an expression of opinion on immigration from the hierarchy.."
- 36 Langevin's state of mind is graphically reflected in Macdonald's note to him.
Macdonald to Langevin. Ottawa, November 13, 1885.
"Keep calm, resolute attitude--all will come right."
- 37 Macdonald Papers. Langevin Correspondence, Vol. 1.
Langevin to Macdonald. ____? July 30, 1882.
- 38 ibid. Langevin Correspondence Vol. 1.
Langevin to Macdonald. ____? May 18, 1877.
- 39 ibid. Letter Book 21
Macdonald to J.C.C. Abbott. Ottawa, July 23, 1879.

- ⁴⁰Canadian Parliamentary Companion. 1876, p. 228.
- ⁴¹op. cit. Langevin Correspondence, Vol. 2.
Langevin to Macdonald. Quebec, December 15, 1886.
- ⁴²Tassé, J. le 38me fauteuil.
Sénécal et fils; Montréal, 1891.
- ⁴³ibid. P. 65.
- ⁴⁴ibid. P. 67.
- ⁴⁵Langelier, Chas. Souvenirs Politiques. tome 2, p. 90.
Dussault and Proulx imprimerie; Québec, 1912.
- ⁴⁶Canadian Illustrated News. Montreal, 28 February, 1874.
- ⁴⁷Mackenzie-Bowell Correspondence.
Mousseau to Mackenzie-Bowell; Ottawa, April 17, 1872.
Begs that Bowell, as Minister of Customs, free one of
his constituents arrested for having harboured smuggled
goods.
- ⁴⁸Cartwright, R. Reminiscences.
- ⁴⁹Macdonald Papers. Caron Correspondence, Vol. 1.
Caron to Macdonald, Quebec, January 26, 1878.
- ⁵⁰ibid. Caron Correspondence, Vol. 2.
- ⁵¹Canadian Parliamentary Companion. Caron to Macdonald; Quebec ___?
August, 1888.
- ⁵²Caron, A. Discours sur la question Riel.
____? Québec. n.d.
- ⁵³op. cit. Caron Correspondence.
Caron to Macdonald, Ottawa, March 10, 1886.
"I saw Sir Hector .. and afterwards, Chapleau. Sir Hector
will do as you suggested. He will move the Previous Ques-
tion after Landry's motion.
- ⁵⁴ibid. Caron Correspondence, Vol. 1.
Caron to Macdonald; Ottawa, ___? October 1884.
- ⁵⁵ibid. Caron Correspondence Vol. 1.
Caron to Macdonald; Ottawa, July 15, 1880.
"The local session is over, Chapleau pulled through with
the sincere help of all friends..."

- ⁵⁶Cartwright, R. Reminiscences, 330ff.
- ⁵⁷op. cit., Miscellaneous Correspondence, vol. 2.
Macdonald to Tupper, Riviere du Loup, August 13, 1884.
- ⁵⁸Chapleau, A. Discours. Note by Editor, p. X.
Eusèbe Sénécal et fils, Montréal, 1887.
- ⁵⁹Macdonald Papers. Chapleau Correspondence, Vol. 2.
Chapleau to Macdonald, Ottawa, December 27, 1886.
".. it is from the Montreal Bench or Bar that the nominee should come .. the feeling in Montreal is intense about the undue preference given to Quebec in everything.."
- ⁶⁰Dansereau. Men of To-Day, "The Hon. J.A. Chapleau", p. 52.
_____? Montreal, n.d.
- ⁶¹Dominion Illustrated, Montreal, June 7, 1890.
- ⁶²Lemieux, R. Blake, Chapleau, Laurier, p. 58.
Proceedings and Transactions, R.S.C. Third Series.
Vol. 21, 1927.
- ⁶³ibid., p. 56.
- ⁶⁴Chapleau, J.A. Discours, p. X.
- ⁶⁵Dansereau, op. cit., p. 50.
- ⁶⁶The best account of the "Land Swap" within reasonable compass is contained in Canada and Its Provinces, V. 15, p. 177ff.
- ⁶⁷Canadian Magazine, February, 1897, "J.A. Chapleau".
- ⁶⁸Dansereau, op. cit., p. 60.
- ⁶⁹Macdonald Papers. Chapleau Correspondence.
Chapleau to Macdonald, Ottawa, November 12, 1885.
Also printed in Pope's Correspondence.
- ⁷⁰Chapleau, J.A. Discours.
Chapleau à Levis le 10 mars, 1878.
- ⁷¹ibid., discours prononcé le 6 septembre, 1883.
".. l'épiscopat a montré à toutes les époques de notre histoire un zèle digne de sa mission élevée.."
- ⁷²ibid., discours prononcé dans l'Assemblée législative le 10 décembre, 1875.
- ⁷³Dansereau. op. cit., p. 57ff.

CHAPTER 5

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE FRENCH- CANADIAN CONSERVATIVE PARTY

The place of the Church in the history of French-Canada is a topic which should require little introduction. It has been commented on fully by every observer of French-Canadian life from the XVII century onwards. One of the most penetrating writers on French-Canada, M. Georges Vattier, has given a lengthy chapter to what he describes as "l'importance capitale" of this subject.¹ And in his most recent study of Canada, André Siegfried very largely reiterates the statements he made in his earlier volume, "Canada, et la Question des deux Races" upon the place of the Church in French Canada and upon its importance in the lives of French-Canadians.² While admitting the justness of the observations of these authorities, it is not necessary to accept the thesis they advance to explain its origin. In Goldwin Smith's study, "Canada and the Canadian Question", it appears in its crudest form; French-Canada had its origins as a mission and has continued to develop as one.³ It may be permitted to dissent from this view; a rational examination of French-Canada under the Old Régime discloses that the Church was one influence among many; a study of history must convince us that nothing is inevitable; that only with reservation may explanations be found in origins. If the Church has become one of the prime factors in the life of French-Canada, it is for other reasons--her indigenous character; her ability to satisfy national aspirations; circumstances peculiar to Canada which have made denominational and linguistic boundaries co-terminus.

It would be strange if the influence of the Church which is admittedly so large in ordinary affairs should be less powerful in political life. It is not necessary to assume, as some commentators have done,⁴ a calculated invasion by the clergy. It is rather, ^{because of} ~~that~~ their character and

the peculiar circumstances of French-Canadian life that their views should carry weight in considerations of a political character. From the beginning of French settlement in the St. Lawrence Valley the Church shared actively in the work of government. Previous to the establishment of Royal Government the Superior of the Jesuits sat at the Council table and, when ecclesiastical affairs were regularised with the erection of the Vicarate, the Bishop took his place. Thereafter, the connection of the Church and of the administration has been close if not always formal. The substitution of British for French rule in 1763 made relatively little difference to the position of the Church. In fact, it may be said that it positively improved it. It raised the Church in the popular mind to the guardian and to the symbol of French-Canadian nationality. It guaranteed the Church her legal position and it freed her from the supervision of the government. These are considerations of which French-Canadians are conscious but, perhaps, not always willing to acknowledge. From the early XIX century onwards from the administration of Sir George Prevost at least, the close and formal association of Church and government was resumed.⁵ It would not be difficult to cite instances of active cooperation between the two powers in 1837 during the political dissensions of the Rebellion, in 1849 during the crisis of the Rebellion Losses Bill and the excitement of the Annexation movement, in the 'sixties during the controversies that preceded Confederation. By the opening of the post-Confederation period, therefore, the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec was secure in her legal position and in the attachment of her people and had behind her a long tradition of association with and cooperation in the work of government.

The most outstanding success the Church had achieved in the period

before Confederation and that she was to employ in the quarter century following was her adaptation to the system of representative and of responsible government. Under the early French and English régimes, when the government was in the hands of a small council, it was not difficult for the Church to make its views felt. It was possible also under the curious form of parliamentary but non-responsible government that was established in 1791, although with increasing difficulties as the conflict between the Church and the advanced Reformers in 1831 on the composition of the fabriques shewed. Following 1841, or more precisely, 1849, the problem of making its views understood by a popularly chosen and sovereign chamber was brought directly before the Church. It came with emphasis because the winning of responsible government coincided with the rise of the Rouge party in Canada East some of whose members were tinged with anti-clericalism.⁶ The Church met the problem by giving its countenance to the Conservative party. The presence of such men as party leaders as Cartier with their liberal views and their strong traditionalist instincts, greatly facilitated this process. They saw in the Church not only a powerful brake on the agencies of rapid change but also a great reservoir of conserving forces. So long as men of the Cartier school continued in their full strength, both Church and party probably benefited. As, however, Cartier's power waned after Confederation and as rivalry developed over leadership, the French-Canadian Conservative party suffered. In the first instance, there was a tendency to seek in the Church the direction that the political leader no longer supplied. In other words, it was the Church, not the leader, which was expected to supply the party's programme and policy. In the second instance, the close identification of the Roman Catholic Church with the

party produced a rift between the French-speaking and English-speaking Conservatives of Quebec. By the same token, it made it increasingly difficult for French-Canadians to work harmoniously with Conservatives from Ontario or from the new Western Provinces. Indeed, it produced rifts among the French-Canadians themselves, for there were those who opposed the active intrusion of the Church in political affairs. The purpose of this chapter is to examine, in detail, the influence of the Church on the French-Canadian Conservative party in the period following Confederation.

The consequences to the Conservative party might have been less unfortunate had the Church spoken with one voice, but the Roman Catholic Church was divided within itself. The conditions which produced these divisions and rivalries were in part local, in part doctrinal, in part the reflection of similar dissensions in the older European world. Throughout the nineteenth century the Roman Catholic Church was the battleground of contending forces, of liberalism and of reaction, of nationalism and of internationalism, of modernism and of traditionalism. These struggles were also fought out in Canada and to them were added the fires of strong personal antipathies. The struggle in Canada is frequently interpreted in the traditional terms of that of Gallican and of Ultramontane,⁷ but it had a much wider connotation. In addition it may be asked with what accuracy the term "Gallican" may be applied to any considerable body of French-Canadian clergy in the XIX century. It is, in fact, very difficult to establish a definition which will adequately cover them. Sir Wilfrid Laurier described them as "opportunists", but this term is at once too vague and too narrow.⁸ In some of their views they resembled that body of the early XIX century English Roman Catholic

clergy and laity who were called "Cisalpines".⁹ That is to say, they were prepared to accept the supremacy of the Pope in matters of doctrine and of discipline but were disposed to favour a large measure of local autonomy in administration and in liturgical order. But whatever name be applied to them the French-Canadian clergyman of the old school was easily recognized. He was primarily the parish priest, and the excellence of his ministrations were applauded even by his critics.¹⁰ Occasionally he was a scholar and an antiquarian, sometimes of the Falstaffian type of Abbé Paquin of St. Eustache. He was a staunch upholder of the constituted order, as his attitude in the trying days of 1837 shewed. It would appear that these priests, the products of the seminaries of Quebec and of Montreal, suited admirably the old unhurried Canadian world of the 'thirties and the 'forties. That they would be able to meet the demands of that new world that the railway, the newspaper and popular education were bringing in, shrewd observers had grave doubts.¹¹ In political matters, the priest of the generation before Confederation was a Conservative. His training made it difficult for him to be anything else and in Conservatism as interpreted by Cartier he found a political philosophy and a political practice that satisfied his intellect and met the requirements of his people.

It is scarcely necessary to seek the origins of Ultramontanism earlier than the XIX century. It is true that Laval held views that on the philosophic side were akin to those of the later age,¹² but it is difficult to understand how, without the example of the French Revolution as an intellectual and political movement and the general repudiation of all external authority in the 'twenties and the 'thirties, when Romanticism was at its height, Ultramontanism could have extended very far. In the

first instance, Ultramontanism was a state of mind, an effort to find in an historic institution, such as the Church, a stability in a world that was reeling through revolutions.¹³ In its larger aspects, therefore, Ultramontanism was an authoritarian reaction against the rapid and apparently purposeless changes of the century. It may be added that the authoritarian reaction knew no denominational boundaries; it was present in the Oxford Movement at its genesis and in the ferment that produced the disruption of the Church of Scotland. In the Roman Catholic Church, in which only the term could be properly applied, the Ultramontanes were those who looked to Rome for all inspiration and authority, and who deprecated local autonomy and individuality. The tremendous implications of the Ultramontane position were, apparently, not realized in Canada till the 'sixties and the 'seventies, when with the vast improvements in communications world influences were powerfully felt.

As the acceptance or rejection of the Ultramontane position was so conditioned by outlook, we are probably correct in seeking its earliest manifestations in individuals. Mgr. Bourget is usually regarded as the earliest exponent of Ultramontanism in Canada, but there is reason to believe that his predecessor, Mgr. Lartigue, favoured Ultramontanism at least in its doctrinal expression.¹⁴ The situation of Montreal, where French and English cultures were in such sharp juxtaposition, where the influence of the United States was so potent and where the Sulpician community was so powerful,¹⁵ may have inclined the early Bishops to secure their position by binding it closely to the supreme authority in their Church. Just what share their education had in forming this disposition of mind would be difficult to say. In the French-Canadian colleges of the period the influence of the clergy from old France was present.

Despite the investigations of Dionne,¹⁶ we know all too little of the effects of the coming of the French émigré clergy on the life of the Province. It is probable that the influence they exerted was entirely individual, but it is not without its significance that in both the Seminary of Montreal where Mgr. Lartigue received his training¹⁷ and in the College of Nicolet where Mgr. Bourget came as a young priest¹⁸ members of the émigré clergy occupied high positions. During Bishop Bourget's long episcopate the influence of Ultramontanism became exceedingly strong in Montreal and a force to be reckoned with throughout the Province. The external manifestations of the new order of things was at once apparent. There was an increase in the number of religious communities.¹⁹ Roman practices in liturgics were introduced and their use strictly enforced. The influence of the church wardens, the fabriques, was undermined and the authority of the Sulpicians, the great representatives of the old order, was attacked. The Bishop raised a host of enemies and, inasmuch as some of his reforming efforts necessitated the use of the civil authority, he became involved in political ferments of the most bitter character.

It would be incorrect to regard the struggle between the older and the new order in Quebec as one of philosophies alone. There were sectional factors of considerable importance. As an active force, Ultramontanism was strongest in the dioceses of Montreal and of Three Rivers. In the other diocese of the Province it made little headway. This was especially true of the arch Diocese of Quebec, where the influence of the Seminary and of the archbishops, Baillargeon and Taschereau, was strongly opposed to it.²⁰ In this, sectional rivalry between Montreal and Quebec came to accentuate the rift in the body ecclesiastic. A good example of

the way in which Church polity, sectional rivalry and political prejudice were intermingled was in the proposal to establish a university for French-Canadians at Montreal which should be independent of Laval. The success of the arch Diocese of Quebec and of Laval University in circumventing this effort on the part of the Ultramontanes of Montreal is not unfairly summed up by Savaete, "... ~~cependant~~, vu la grande influence de cette Université (Laval) au siège du gouvernement, personne n'a été surpris de la voir victorieuse..."²¹

Personal factors also entered into the conflict for Baillargeon and Taschereau, Bourget and Laflèche were all men of strong convictions. The prominent positions they occupied compelled the first two to place restraint on their utterances. To his credit Bishop Bourget was usually decorous in his official pronouncements, but secure in the obscurity of Three Rivers Mgr. Laflèche pursued a course of remarkable intransigence. He made grave charges against the character of Archbishop Tashereau; he defied his authority by countenancing the Catholic Programme; he attempted to undermine his position by pressing for the erection of Montreal into an independent arch Diocese. If the gossip of Langelier is to be credited, Bishop Laflèche treasured his animosity to the very last, for on his death bed he said, "... J'ai bien hâte d'être rendu de l'autre côté pour savoir si c'est Taschereau ou moi qui avait raison..."²²

What has been said of the controversy within the Roman Catholic Church has applied chiefly to the Church within the Province of Quebec. It remains to consider influences upon the Church which may be described as external and which favoured active political action. In Europe the authoritarian reaction which lay at the basis of Ultramontanism was translated into a politico-religious creed by the genius of deMaistre. We

are familiar today with political ideologies which have drawn their inspiration from the lucubrations of their founders, Communism from the writing of Karl Marx, Fascism from the conflicting teachings of Syndicalists and State Socialists, Nazism from the outpourings of *Mein Kampf*. In a far greater degree was deMaistre the founder of militant Ultramontanism. Having lived through the French Revolution and having seen the world that he knew fall in chaos about him, he took refuge, as men frequently do in such circumstances, in constructing an ideal society. Having witnessed the collapse of states and of political systems, he sought security and permanence in the supermundane, divine creation, the Roman Catholic Church. Like St. Augustine, in somewhat similar circumstances, he believed that human institutions, of their very constitution, must fail and that man could find peace only in attaching himself firmly to the ageless and living body of God, the Church. To deMaistre, the Church meant the Pope. The processes whereby he arrived at this far-reaching conclusion are obscure. It was an idea which he must have borrowed from an earlier age for there was certainly little in XVIII century thinking that would suggest the conception of the Pope-king. It was not without reason, therefore, that deMaistre entitled the summation of his studies, Du Pape.²³ In this volume he laid down propositions that had not been current in Europe for nearly a thousand years, the supremacy of the Church over every form of temporal government, the primacy of the Pope in all matters pertaining to the Church and, ipso facto, in all things spiritual or mundane. All authority, said deMaistre in effect, is gathered at the centre, it is generated there, the Church lives in virtue of what can be derived from the Pope. The implications of deMaistre's teachings were tremendous both to the organization of the

Church and to the relations of the Church with the State. Like Marx, deMaistre had provided a new political gospel. He had done more for he had established the philosophic and political basis for the dogma of Infallibility and had laid down the constitution of the Papal monarchy.

Like many another Utopia, deMaistre's designs probably would have been forgotten had there not been the practical genius to make them workable. In this instance, it was Louis Veuillot, the French journalist. Veuillot began his active career in a lawyer's office as a "libéral.. même voltarien.." and then plunged headlong into the frothy journalism of the July Monarchy. His progress into the ranks of the ultra-Conservatives seems to have been occasioned by the increasing liberality of his erst-while friends for, as M. Guizot, Count Montalembert and Mgr. Dupanloup advanced in the direction of reform and of toleration, Veuillot progressively retrograded. Ultimately he became the editor of l'Univers, and from that point forward preached what deMaistre had taught. His principal opponents were the liberal-Catholics, that brilliant group which sought to bring the teachings of the Church into harmony with XIX^{century} views on democratic institutions, on nationalist aspirations and upon the responsibility of the modern state for the well-being and the education of its subjects. Nevertheless, it was in his disquisitions upon the relations of the conscientious Ultramontane that his influence was most wide-spread. The duty of the devout citizen was to see to it that the Church enjoyed the most ample liberty, freedom to worship, freedom to teach, freedom to maintain and to extend her institutions. With these essentials secure, such things as governmental forms mattered little. Thus on the morrow of Louis Napoleon's coup d'état, Veuillot could write

".. nous ne sommes ni les vainqueurs^{urs} ni vaincus... Nous n'avons rien à dire, lorsque rien de ce que nous aimons pardessus tout

n'est attaqué ni menacé. Nous regardons passer les événements. Jamais ils n'offraient à l'intelligence chrétienne de plus grandes et de plus consolantes leçons...²⁴

Somewhat later Veuillot abandoned this embarrassing disinterestedness and advocated the formation of a Catholic party which should have for its prime purpose the defence of the interests of the Church. This was a practical suggestion that was to have far-reaching effects in America as well as in Europe. As the Roman Catholic Church became more and more uncompromising in its attitude towards the commonly accepted views and institutions of the century, it became increasingly difficult for the conscientious layman to cooperate with his fellow-citizens in the ordinary duties of civil government. The publication of the Syllabus in 1864 and the promulgation of the dogma of Infallibility in 1870 seemed to place insurmountable barriers between Roman Catholics and non-Roman Catholics.²⁵ From this dilemma, Veuillot's advocacy of a Catholic party seemed to offer a means of escape. It was in his hands that Ultramontanism was converted from a theory into a political force.

The application of this to Canada was immediate. It came with greater emphasis since nationality was associated with religion. In the Canada of the Confederation period, French-Canadian and Roman Catholic were almost interchangeable terms and events had recently taken place which could rouse the apprehensions of the French Canadian people. Outside Quebec on the Red River and in New Brunswick, the security of both their nationality and their Church was challenged. Within Quebec itself, there were developments in both Church and party which seemed dangerous. It was clear to some that there was room for organization on denominational and on national lines.

It may be said at once that formal political organization never

materialized, although the celebrated Programme catholique was, in some respects, an outline which the party was expected to follow. So much misunderstanding of the nature of the Catholic Programme has grown up it that it is necessary to examine it in detail. The Programme was drafted by a small group of laymen and clergymen in the spring of 1871.²⁶ All had made "soumission entière à la doctrine de l'Eglise" and all belonged "... de coeur et d'ame à l'école Ultramontane.." The principal members of the group were Alphonse Desjardins editor of l'Ordre, Magloire McLeod editor of Le Journal des Trois Rivières, Renault editor of le Courrier du Canada, A.B. Routhier a lawyer from Kamouraska, F.X.A. Trudel of Montreal and Canon Lamarche the censor of le Nouveau Monde. The group was much agitated by the division of opinion among Quebec Roman Catholics which was causing grave scandal and which, if unarrested, might do serious damage to the solidarity of French-Canada.²⁷ It is probable that events in Europe, the termination of the temporal power of the Pope, the disastrous fall of the Second French Empire and the reign of the Commune in Paris served to galvanize the little group into action. By their own statements they were uncompromising Ultramontanes and as their professions would indicate, many of them were journalists, the sedulous students of the methods of Louis Veuillot. What the group ultimately resolved upon was the revamping of the French-Canadian Conservative party along lines which would make it a trustworthy weapon for the Church. To this end, all liberal elements were to be expelled and the party built afresh.

The sequel was what might have been expected from the character of the group. From their discussions the following principle and its corollary emerged,

"La doctrine de l'Eglise, qui est infallible, doit être en

tout le criterium de la vérité.

"Or les principes et les droits que nous defendons sont conformés à la doctrine de l'Eglise.

"Donc ils sont vrais.

"Conséquemment, il est de notre devoir de nous efforcer d'établir de cette proposition d'une manière tellement claire...

At a later meeting this was further elaborated into a programme.

"1e. Adhésion entière à l'enseignement de l'Eglise catholique laquelle doit être ... le critérium de la vérité.

"2e. Pour les protestants liberté entière de leur culte et contrôle absolu de leurs affaires religieuses, ~~tels~~ que nous réclamons pour les Catholiques. ^{telles}

"3e. Attachement .. au parti conservateur que nous reconnaissons comme le seul parti dont les principes et les traditions puissent nous assurer la plénitude des nos droits religieux et nationaux.

"4e. Appui loyal donné aux chefs actuels de ce parti que nous reconnaissons comme ceux de tous les hommes politiques du jour, qui nous offrent le plus de garanties pour la défense des intérêts ci-dessus mentionnés."

The last proposition seems to have caused a good deal of discussion but it was at last subscribed to.²⁹ The propositions thereupon received the approval of the Bishop of Montreal, were redrafted by A.B. Routhier and appeared in le Journal des Trois Rivières. The near approach of the Provincial general elections produced some modification in the final form of the Programme which was published under a pastoral of Mgr. Laflèche on April 20, 1871.

The Programme as it appeared in its final form in le Journal des Trois Rivières, was a different document from the one that had been discussed by Trudel and his friends. In its widest implications it could be regarded as the constitution of a new party or, of a reformed Conservative party. Examined on its own merits, however, it is clear that the document was not much more than an elaborate statement of advice to

electors. This was the view taken by Bishop Bourget as is shewn by his circular to the priests and people of the Diocese.³⁰ Of course, in the hands of some enthusiasts like Trudel, the Programme was regarded as the foundation of a new order, but Trudel carried little weight and in 1873 was relegated to the Dominion Senate.³¹

The reception that was accorded the Catholic Programme varied exceedingly. Only in the dioceses of Montreal and of Three Rivers did it receive the approbation of the clergy. Elsewhere, in the arch Diocese of Quebec and in the dioceses of Rimouski and of St. Hyacinthe, it was regarded with active disfavour.³² In fact, Archbishop Tashereau was at pains to express his disapproval as his pastoral letter of April 24 indicated.

"Je crois devoir vous informer que ce programme ne m'a été fait connu^{que} par les journaux, et que, par conséquent, il a le grave inconvénient d'avoir formulé en dehors de toute participation de l'épiscopat..."³³

Later the Archbishop succeeded in getting an expression of disapproval from Rome.³⁴ Among laymen, the Programme found even fewer adherents. It was discountenanced by both parties³⁵ and with the exception of Sir Hector Langevin, it would be difficult to name one prominent public man who subscribed to it. As might be expected, it made more adherents in the Provincial party and attracted to its support such men as Masson and deBoucherville.

The comparative failure of the Programme to realize all that its originators had hoped of it is not difficult to explain. In the first place, the Programme did not command the support of the entire episcopate. The Programme also encountered the opposition of some of the most active members of the Conservative party--men like Chapleau and Angers were not disposed to have French-Canadian Conservatism lose its qualifying "liberal".

Finally, the Programme and much more, the large concept of a Roman Catholic party, which the Programme so imperfectly expressed, ran counter to the general ideas of French-Canadian Conservatives and Liberals alike.³⁶ It has been one of the strongest political instincts of French-Canadians never to give their allegiance to one party. The national feeling was too strong, although it remained for a Laurier to give it expression,

".. vous voulez organiser tous les Catholiques comme un seul parti sans autre lien .. mais n'avez-vous pas réfléchi que, par le fait même, vous organisez la population protestante comme un seul parti .. vous amenez la guerre, la guerre religieuse, la plus terrible de toutes les guerres..."³⁷

It would be rash to deny that the Church took no part in politics. The very constitution of the Church and the large place it occupied in the life of the Province compelled it to concern itself with political affairs. The problem of defending its interests in mixed society and under an instrument of government such as the Canadian federal constitution forced the Church to countenance the use of political parties to further its legitimate purposes. The Church was keenly alert to the dangers of its position and attempted to lay down rules to state its relations with the civil power and to govern the conduct of its ministers in dealing with that power. The official attitude of the Church on political questions was laid down by the various Provincial Councils and applied by the Bishops in their mandements and pastoral letters.

An examination of the pronouncements of the Provincial Councils suggests that the Church was much more concerned in purifying elections than in controlling them. The second Council of Quebec which was held in 1858 imposed neutrality on the clergy where questions which did not vitally affect the Church were involved. The fourth Council held in the

year following Confederation condemned the proposition that the Church had no concern with political life. In 1873, the fifth Council attacked liberal Catholicism. It would be difficult to find in these pronouncements much that could be taken exception to. It is true that several of them defined the relation of the Church to the State in somewhat exaggerated form and it is also true that in condemning liberal Catholicism, the Bishops struck deeply at freedom of conscience and of intellect but it must be recalled that the decrees of the Council were formal documents.

It is impossible to find in the mandements, the same breadth of statesmanship that is usually to be found in the decrees. This is not surprising since, in the composition of his pastorals, the Bishop had no critic but himself. In general the mandements and the official correspondence emanating from the arch Diocese of Quebec were moderate in tone.³⁸ Those that came from the Diocese of Montreal during Bishop Bourget's long episcopate were of a very different character. A certain piquancy was added to the Bishop's remarks since he was careful to counsel "... une sage reserve et une grande prudence.." and was fond of the aphorism, "omnia licet, sed non omnia expediunt." In them the Ultramontane position was laid down without compromise.³⁹ This applied not only to the Ultramontane view on the position of supremacy the Church occupied in relation with the State, but the position the individual held in respect to the Church.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, Bishop Bourget's pastorals contain little that can be interpreted as direct attempts to interfere in politics or to gain control of one or other of the parties. Again and again, the warning is given that although prudence demanded the selection of candidates who would respect the desires of the Church,⁴¹ neither individuals nor parties were to be favoured. In fact, it is probable that prejudice

has read too much into Bishop Bourget's pronouncements. What he sought to bring into operation was not a party but what goes today under the name of "Catholic Action."⁴² There is, however, one general criticism that can be levelled against many of the pastorals and mandements of the period. The differentiation between liberal Catholicism and Catholic Liberalism was not made clear and the condemnations directed against the erroneous ideas of the one might very well be misunderstood to condemn also the political practices of the other.

While it is possible to exonerate the episcopate from the worst charges of deliberate political manipulation that have been levelled against them, it is impossible to so exonerate the lower clergy. Even admitting the intimate share the average priest has in the life of his parish, it is difficult to justify the course pursued by many of them. In the middle 'seventies, especially in 1875 and 1876, a large number of the parish clergy took actively to politics. They placed their own interpretations on the mandements and declared that the episcopal censure of liberal Catholicism extended to Catholic Liberalism as well. In some of the counties, notably Berthier, there seems to have been a very nearly open defiance of episcopal authority.⁴³ In 1876, there occurred the celebrated bye-election in Charlevoix, in the course of which Sir Hector Langevin was returned with the aid of the clergy. Ultimately, Langevin's election was declared void on the grounds that "undue" influence had been employed and the activities of the priests was largely curtailed. The mission of Bishop Conroy to Canada and the appearance of the joint Pastoral of the Bishops in 1876 may be regarded as closing formally, if not in fact, the excursions of the parish priests into politics. The incident is of some importance for it suggests that it is impossible to sum up the policy

of the Church in a single generalization. The parish priest and the Bishop do not see always eye to eye, and the influence of the former, though irresponsible, is very great.

Our remarks hitherto have been directed principally to the struggle within the Roman Catholic Church itself. As the struggle progressed, however, it became increasingly involved in secular affairs. It became so chiefly in efforts to modify local government, that is to say, the parochial organization and to control education. In 1875, the Municipal Code was amended to give the force of law to such acts as Bishop Bourget's division of the Roman Catholic parish of Montreal.⁴⁴ By this act the power of the Bishop to erect canonical parishes and to endow them with the powers enjoyed by the civil parishes in so far as these extended to Roman Catholics was recognized. By the same enactment, the composition of the Fabrique, that is to say, the Church Wardens, was altered in order to give the Bishop greater authority. The sting of the Act lay in the marginal note, "Decrees amended by our Holy Father are binding." In the next year the law was again amended to make the provisions cited above applicable to all canonically erected parishes.⁴⁵ More far-reaching were the changes introduced into the educational machinery of the Province. The principal of division as between Roman Catholic and Protestant education that had been established previous to Confederation was left undisturbed but its organization was modified in order to give the Bishops more direct control over the Roman Catholic schools. In the year after Confederation, the supervision of education had been given to a Minister who was a member of the Provincial Cabinet⁴⁶ and who presided over the Council of Public Instruction.⁴⁷ Apparently this measure gave laymen too great authority in educational matters to suit the Ultramontanes and efforts were at once made to have it altered. In 1875 the opportunity

came when the deBoucherville administration, so friendly to the Ultramontane point of view, was in office.⁴⁸ By a series of amendments the Ministry of Public Instruction disappeared and its place was taken by a Superintendent of Public Instruction who was to be assisted by a Roman Catholic and a Protestant Secretary.⁴⁹ The composition of the Roman Catholic Council of Public Instruction was altered to include all the Bishops of the Province, their administrators or deputies.⁵⁰ This amendment to the Educational Act of 1868 is frequently quoted as a glaring example of clerical domination and as a resounding triumph of the Ultramontane point of view and for the group of Programmatists.⁵¹ Such an interpretation is possible, of course, but it completely leaves out of consideration the fact that the liberal Conservative administration of Ouimet, the year before⁵² had introduced a measure almost identical to that passed in 1875.

The repercussions of these later politico-religious activities were far-reaching. The immediate effect was to produce apprehension in the minds of some of the English-speaking non-Roman Catholic population. In December of 1875, while the debates on the Educational Act were still in progress, Huntington, the Post Master General of the Dominion Liberal government produced a minor explosion by denouncing the support the English-speaking Protestants had given the French-Canadian Conservatives. It was this unholy alliance of nearly a quarter century standing that had given the Ultramontanes their opportunity. Thereafter, the English-speaking population must stand with the French Liberals in defence of freedom of thought and freedom of speech. In the same month there was founded in Montreal the Protestant Defence Association. It would be difficult to determine just how wide-spread was the support from the Minority. The

ultra-Protestant press of Montreal like the Witness and the Liberal Herald gave the activities of the P.P.A. a wide publicity, but the body of English opinion does not seem to have been very deeply affected.

It was at this juncture that Sir Alexander Galt entered the discussion. In the midsummer of 1875 he had written to J.G. Robertson, the Treasurer of the deBoucherville government, asking that assurances should be given that the Government did not admit the pretensions of the Ultramontane wing of the hierarchy. Robertson's reply simply stated that the Government did propose to allow any infringements of the rights of Protestants and dissatisfied with this Galt turned to Macdonald. Macdonald's replies were characteristic;⁵³ he counselled delay,

".. Everything is to be gained by putting off the severance. Mind you ultramontaniam depends on the life of two old men, the Pope and Bishop Bourget (in Canada) .. there can be little doubt that the next pope will not be ultramontane .. old Bourget will disappear ere long and join Pio Nono and the coadjutor Fabre, a liberal in politics will readily become a liberal in matters ecclesiastical."

Compromise and diplomacy were two attributes that Galt's inelastic Caledonian mind was incapable of grasping. He turned pamphleteer and published in February of 1876 "Civil Liberty in Lower Canada."⁵⁴ Galt condemned the intrusion of any Church into politics and called on all men of liberal views "to resist the encroachments of the Church on the State..⁵⁵ Some two months later Galt returned to the attack in Church and State which he addressed to Mr. Gladstone.⁵⁶ On this occasion, Galt was more specific; he examined the relations of the Church in Quebec with civil society, commented upon the rising temper of the clergy with respect to schools, condemned the assaults made upon such liberal institutions as l'Institut canadien. He then turned to a study of the position of the Protestant Minority and concluded that in view of its declin-

ing numbers and in view of the attitude of some of the clergy, its position was worsened. Its only hope of safety lay in the use of the veto-power possessed by the Dominion government.⁵⁷

The most effective answer to Galt's attacks came from one of the younger English-speaking Conservatives, Thomas White.⁵⁸ White denied Galt's major, namely, that the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church had altered.⁵⁹ The struggle in the Province had been between Roman Catholics and with "the family disputes" of the Majority, the Minority could have no concern. White struck shrewd blows at Galt's plea for an alliance of Protestants and French-Canadian Liberals by demonstrating that the Liberals were quite as prepared as the Conservatives to meet the full demands of the Church.⁶⁰ "Their interest (that of the Minority) will be served by preserving that position of neutrality which has hitherto marked their conduct."⁶¹ White's pamphlet admitted no reply for, as he bluntly told Galt

".. if the position of Protestants is a hazardous one .. there is no public man on whom the responsibility rests more heavily than on yourself.." ⁶²

The years 1875 and 1876 marked the full extent of the Church's advance into active political life. The influence of Archbishop Taschereau supported by the Quebec Seminary and by Laval University made itself felt. Their position was greatly strengthened by the presence of the Apostolic Delegate, Mgr. Conroy, who came to Canada in 1877. In October the Bishops issued their joint Pastoral,ⁱⁿ which it did not retract their earlier pronouncements of 1875, declared that they never intended to allow the Church to take part in party politics nor to denounce individual candidates. The following year, 1878, Pope Pius was succeeded by Leo XIII and the attitude of the Roman authorities materially changed. The accession of the new Pope

went far to consolidate the successes that the Roman Catholic moderates in Quebec had won. Langevin's election was voided on the grounds of undue influence. Although Judge Routhier, one of the architects of the Programme, denied that the Civil Courts had jurisdiction over ecclesiastics for acts done in their spiritual capacity, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected this view of clerical immunity. A certain piquancy was added in the fact that the Judge who pronounced the decision of the Court was the brother of Archbishop Taschereau.

The consequences to the Conservative party of these differences within the Roman Catholic Church were immediate and unfortunate. Studied in perspective, the most serious was the appearance of a new ideology which challenged the appeal that the Conservative philosophy made. There is inherent in Roman Catholic polity the design of a new social order, as the Ultramontanes suggested and as the Programmatists tried so imperfectly to realize. The new ideology appealed the more strongly because it was both Roman Catholic and French-Canadian. It had in it none of the old principles of cooperation and of toleration that had so characterized the Conservatives of the Cartier school. The very fact that the new philosophy was uncompromising could be expected to go all the more urgently to the generation disallusioned by a lethargic party and by directionless leadership. The actual numbers who were drawn by this clerically-tinged Conservatism ^{were} ~~was~~ probably small, although it must be remembered that to the numerous professional class in Quebec an intellectual appeal is far more effective than it would be to a similar group elsewhere in Canada. The practical aspects of the struggle left behind a precedent and the Programmatists provided something of an organization for the discontented. The very fact that the Church was divided, and to that extent weakened,

made it less able to support the Conservative party. Therein the party lost one of its most consistent supports.

The influence of these difficulties within the Roman Catholic Church on the Protestant population of Quebec is difficult to ~~assess~~^{appraise}. Although English-speaking Conservatives seem to have lost some of the confidence they placed in their party, they continued to support it. It is more probable that other factors, such as the relative decline in numbers of the Minority had a large effect on their position within the Quebec Conservative party. Nevertheless, the party suffered as a consequence since it was deprived of a moderating group in its midst and of the services of a group that had many associations with English-speaking Canada.

This brings us to the last of the detrimental influences that may be ascribed to the close association of the Church and the Conservative party. In the eyes of many Conservatives outside Quebec, the French-Canadian Conservative party was nothing more than the engine of the priests. The bickerings among the clergy and the efforts of the Ultramontanes to make the Province of Quebec over in their image occupied inordinately large space in the press of the other Provinces. It was especially so in Ontario where ultra-Protestant sentiment was very strong. With an ineptitude that is difficult to understand one of the leading Conservative Journals, the Toronto Mail, began what can only be described as a deliberate campaign against the French Conservatives. It is superfluous to remark that such attacks destroyed confidence and one of the most serious challenges French-Canadian Conservative leaders had to face was the editorial column of the Mail. It was not hyperbole when Caron wrote to Macdonald that French-Canadian Conservatives were being destroyed in the house of their friends.

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- ²Siegfried, A. Canada. Section 2, Chapter 4, p. 65ff.
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- ³Smith, G. Canada and the Canadian Question. Chapter 2.
Hunter Rose and Company, Toronto, 1891.
- ⁴Siefgried, A. op. cit., p. 66.
- ⁵Chapais, T. Cours d'Histoire du Canada, tome 2, p. 11ff.
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- ⁶Ayearst, M. The Parti Rouge and the Clergy.
The Canadian Historical Review, December, 1934.
- ⁷As for example, Skelton's Life and Times of Sir A.T. Galt, chapter 15
or, Sir John Willison, Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party,
chapters 10 and 11.
- ⁸Colquhoun, A.H.U. Press, Politics and People.
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- ⁹Mathew, D. Catholicism in England, p. 146ff.
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- ¹⁰Lord Durham's Report, edition of Sir Charles Lucas, p. 138.
- ¹¹leCompte, Les Jésuites du Canada au XIXe Siècle.
tome 1, p. 38, quoting from "Les lettres des nouvelles missions du
Canada."
- ¹²deBrumath, L. Bishop Laval.
- ¹³l'Action française, v. 12, p. 109, (août, 1924)
ligue d'action française, Montréal, 1924.
- ¹⁴Pouliot, L. Trois grands artisans du diocèse de Montréal, p. 30, note 5.
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- ¹⁵Savaete, A. Vers l'Abime, tome 3, p. 92.
- ¹⁶Dionne, N.E. les Ecclesiastiques et les royalistes française réfugiés
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_____? Québec, 1905.
- ¹⁷Maurault, O. le Petit Séminaire de Montréal, p. 68ff.
libriarie L.J.A. Dermome lté, Montréal, 1918.
- ¹⁸Douville, J.A. Histoire du collège-séminaire de Nicolet, tome 1, p. 21.
libriarie Beauchemin, Montréal, 1903.

- ¹⁹Pouliot, L. op. cit., p. 33. The author gives a list of some seven or eight religious communities that were introduced into the diocese of Montreal between 1841 and 1865.
- ²⁰Savaete, A. op. cit., tome 3, p. 48, note.
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imprimerie générale A. Coté et cie, Québec, 1989.
- ²¹Savaete, A. ibid., tome 4, p. 336.
- ²²Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques, tome 1, p. 19.
Dessault and Proulx imprimeurs, Québec, 1909.
- ²⁴l'Univers. le 8 décembre, 1851.
- ²⁵It will be remembered that such was the thesis of Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet attack on the Vatican Council.
- ²⁶Savaete, A. Vers l'Abime, tome 2, p. 117ff.
statement by F.X.A. Trudel.
- ²⁷Savaete, A. ibid., p. 127ff.
statement by Magloire McLeod.
- ²⁸Savaete, A. ibid., Trudel's statement.
- ²⁹ibid., Trudel's statement.
- ³⁰Mandements et lettres pastorales .. de l'Eveque de Montréal. tome 6,
p. 455ff. Also the private letter to the clergy attached.
- ³¹Canadian Parliamentary Companion, 1876, p. 96.
- ³²Savaete, A. op. cit., Trudel's statement.
- ³³Mandements .. des Eveques de Québec.
- ³⁴Savaete, A. op. cit., tome 2, p. 245.
quotes a letter from Cardinal Patizi to Archbishop Taschereau,
Rome, August 4, 1874.
- ³⁵David, L.O. Histoire du Canada, chapitre XVI, p. 133.
librairie Beauchemin, Montréal, 1909.
- ³⁶David, L.O. ibid., p. 34.
- ³⁷Laurier, W. Discours à l'Etranger et au Canada, p. 100, 101.
Librairie Beauchemin, Montréal, 1909.
- ³⁸For example, Mandement of Archbishop Taschereau,
April 3, 1871.
Mandements ... des Eveques de Québec, 1870, 1876.

³⁹This was not so apparent in the earlier Mandements as, for example, July 25, 1867. "... Dieu a établi dans le monde la société religieuse et la société civile pourque d'un commun accord elles travaillent au bonheur des peuples.."

Mandements des Evêques de Montréal, tome 5, p. 237ff.

⁴⁰As a guide to Christian conduct the Bishop lay down the following:

".. ce qu'il y a à faire pour ne faire fausse route.

"1. Ecoutez Jésus Christ en écoutant l'Eglise .. chacun de vous peut et doit être dire dans l'intérieure de son âme, j'écoute mon Curé, mon Curé écoute le Pape, le Pape écoute notre Seigneur Jésus Christ qui l'assiste de son divin Esprit pour le rendre infallible dans l'enseignement et le gouvernement de son Eglise..

"2. Portez un religieux respect à tous vos pasteurs.

"3..

⁴¹circular to the Clergy on the General Elections, May 6, 1876.

ibid., tome 7, p. 153.

⁴²ibid., tome 5, p. 453.

Mandement, January 5, 1874.

⁴³Langelier, C. Souvenirs Politiques, tome 1, p. 22.

Quotes an undated letter from the Bishop of Sherbrooke to Archbishop Taschereau, "... les curés de Bertier ont désobéi publiquement et scandaleusement aux ordonnances des Conciles et des Evêques.."

⁴⁴Statutes of the Province of Quebec.

38 Vict. Cap. 29.

p. 145.

⁴⁵ibid., 39 Vict. Cap. 35.

⁴⁶ibid., 31 Vict. Cap. 10, p. 40.

⁴⁷ibid., 32 Vict. Cap. 16, p. 68ff.

⁴⁸Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Quebec, 1875.

p. 50, 26 Nov.; p. 134, ¹⁶Dec.; p. 178, 22 Dec.; p. 196, 24 Dec.

⁴⁹op. cit.

39 Vict. Cap. 15.

Section 1, subsections 1, 7 and 8.

⁵⁰ibid., section 2, subsection 11.

⁵¹Skelton, O.D. The Life and Times of Sir A.T. Galt, chapter 15.

⁵²op. cit., Journals, 1874-1875.

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- ⁵³Macdonald to Galt, Toronto, June 2 and June 8, 1875.
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- ⁵⁴Galt, A.T. Civil Liberties in Lower Canada, 16 pp.
D. Bentley and Co., Printers, Montreal, 1876.
- ⁵⁵ibid., p. 16.
- ⁵⁶Galt, A.T. Church and State, 41 pp.
Dawson Brothers Publishers, Montreal, 1876.
- ⁵⁷ibid., p. 34, "... the veto by the Federal Government is the palladium
of our Protestant liberties in Lower Canada.."
- ⁵⁸White, T. (Jr.) The Protestant Minority in Quebec in its political
relations to the Roman Catholic Majority.
- ⁵⁹ibid., p. 1.
- ⁶⁰ibid., p. 12.
- ⁶¹ibid., p. 18.
- ⁶²ibid., p. 3.

CHAPTER 6

PARTY ORGANIZATION

Properly considered, the study of the organization of a political party comprehends both its practices and its principles. Reduced to its simplest terms, the organization is nothing more than the party in nucleus. The connection of organization and of philosophy is more remote since, as has been demonstrated, the philosophy of partyism springs from a variety of sources. Nevertheless, the party organization does influence its philosophy in magnifying or in minimizing views and ideas.

An examination of the organization of the French-Canadian Conservative party is attended by considerable difficulties. In the first instance, it must be had in mind that the Conservative party functioned in two fields; in the Dominion and in the Provincial. The complications arising from this duality need only be mentioned to be appreciated. In the second instance, there was no formal party organization. There was nothing comparable to the Carlton Club in Canadian political annals. In the third place, the party leaders played a very important part in the organization of the party. In some respects, indeed, they were the party organization. The place of the leader in the machinery of party organization was further complicated by the fact that the French-Canadian leaders like Langevin and Chapleau were subordinated to the leader of the Liberal-Conservative party in the person of Sir John A. Macdonald. It was only during Cartier's tenure of office that the French-Canadian Conservatives could be said to be autonomous in any sense of the term.

In view of the many difficulties, this study may be tentative only. However, an effort will be made, at least, to clarify the essentials, the influence of the leader of the party, the relations of the Dominion and Provincial Conservatives.

Although the Conservative party had no formal organization, it was not entirely devoid of administrative machinery. The members of the Dominion and of the Provincial parliaments constituted a species of permanent framework that culminated in the party leaders and was capped by the leader of the Dominion-wide Liberal-Conservative party. The arrangement was hierarchical in composition but it was never very stable. There was always the tendency of the lower strata to push upwards to the great dislocation of the entire structure. Thus the political successes of Mr. Chapleau carried him into the ranks of those who represented Quebec in the Dominion Cabinet. His arrival was greeted with no applause and his departure left the Provincial party seriously weakened. His case, however, was not exceptional for there was always the inclination on the part of the ambitious and of the able to desert the local for the Dominion field where the stage was broader and where the returns, in the control of patronage, were greater.

So far as can be ascertained, the French-Canadian Conservatives never had anything in the nature of a permanent headquarters or a permanent secretariat. In the years that immediately followed Confederation, the Dominion Conservatives had a species of rallying point in Ottawa at what was called "la maison bleue". Cartier's old house on Metcalfe street was another favourite gathering-place of French-Canadian Conservatives, although by all accounts the assemblages that met at both these places were convivial rather than political in character. The secretariat was even more rudimentary. It is probable, that during his life-time, Cartier or his law-partner, Mr. Pominville, managed the business of the French-Canadian Conservative party. At a later date, the Quebec Conservatives had a treasurer in the person of Thomas McGreevy, the contractor and builder. When the exigencies of electioneering required it, some one of the Cabinet Ministers

undertook to oversee the general arrangements for the campaign. Thus, in 1887, when the days of French-Canadian Conservatism seemed to be numbered, Chapleau organized the Province. This does not seem to have been a permanent arrangement although Chapleau's success in the face of the most adverse circumstances would have warranted it. To what extent Chapleau controlled the machinery he directed can never be known, but it must be kept in mind that the party treasurer, McGreevy, was a Quebec man and closely associated with Sir Hector Langevin.

One aspect of party organization that baffles detailed delineation is the relation of the Dominion and of the Provincial Conservatives in Quebec. The relationship was close but quite informal. At times of crisis, the Conservatives "hunted in pairs"; in the crucial Provincial elections of 1886, Chapleau made no secret of the fact that he was giving Dr. Ross, aid of "... the higher power". In view of the very considerable influence possessed by the local government, it was to the political advantage of the Conservatives in the Dominion government to keep in power their friends in Quebec. More close to the life of the Province, the local party acted as a valuable means of liaison for the French-Canadian Conservatives at Ottawa. In this respect, the Conservative party in the Province more accurately and more readily reflected the changes of opinion than did the Dominion party. Circumstances frequently prevented the Provincial party from making the full use of this faculty.

In the absence of a formal organization embracing Conservatives in both the Dominion and the Provincial spheres, the leader of the Dominion party came to play a very important rôle. He was the key to the arch, to employ the hackneyed if graphic figure. When to this was added the strength and the magnetism of Macdonald's personality, the position of the Dominion

leader became one of supreme importance. He enjoyed, for example, large powers of initiation, or, to be more accurate, of supervision of the programmes of the Provincial parties and even over the choice of the Provincial leaders. In this last aspect of his function, Macdonald was responsible for the choice of Pierre Chauveau as the first premier of Quebec when, for various reasons, Cauchon was unacceptable.

"Allow me first to congratulate you on the very high position which has so naturally been your lot. You are at the helm of the ship; well, I have ^{done} the best way I can to paddle the smaller skiff. We little expected when on board the Alsatian that the latter responsibility would fall to me..."¹

The Dominion leader also possessed the power of dismissing, or at least demoting, his subordinates. The following letter throws light upon this particular function which is all the more striking when we recall that on the date it was written, Macdonald was no longer the Prime Minister.

"I need not tell you in what predicament I am. You know and have expressed the opinion that I must resign, and, of course I must do it as I intended, the very moment that Irvine deserted me..."²

It would be rash to suggest that every advance in the political hierarchy was dependent on the word of the general party leader, but it is probable that, in the event of doubt or of conflict, his advice was acceded to. The advice was by no means infallible. The elevation of Mousseau to the premiership of Quebec was practically dictated by Ottawa and yet, probably, a no more disastrous choice could have been made.

More astonishing was the power of supervision that the leader of the Dominion party exercised over Provincial legislation. This was not a mere form, for we find the concurrence of Macdonald sought in determining even financial policy,

"As our House reopens the day after to-morrow, and as I would like to present the financial statement as soon after the opening

as may be possible, may I ask if you have had time to look^{over} the draft act that I sent you? I feel that I shall have some difficulty in agreeing on a measure of taxation, if it be deduced that the tax therein suggested is unconstitutional..."³

It would not be unnatural that the Provincial ministers should seek the opinion of the Dominion party leaders when they were proposing new or radical legislation as, for example, when Chapleau sought Macdonald's advice upon the reform, or the abolition, of the Legislative Council. But it is unusual, to say the least, that ordinary legislation of an exclusively local character should be submitted to Ottawa. It implies an inferiority of position that, on many occasions, may have been galling and it suggests one powerful reason for the spread of the doctrine of provincial rights.

The absence of adequate organization of a conciliar character imposed another duty, less dictatorial, but none the less exacting, on the leader of the Dominion Conservatives, that of umpire. Of this numerous examples might be culled from Macdonald's correspondence. With such termagants as Chapleau, Caron and Langevin in office, Macdonald had a great deal to do in keeping the peace. As has been indicated, Chapleau and Langevin were most frequently at loggerheads and Macdonald was continually on the alert to keep relations between the two harmonious, if not happy. The distance Macdonald was forced to proceed is shewn graphically in the difficulty he had in persuading Langevin to attend a banquet given to Chapleau in Montreal.⁴ It is only just to add that these temperamental differences were not confined to the French-Canadian Conservative party. The Liberals had their personal troubles as well and much of Mackenzie's energy was spent disentangling the difficulties of his colleagues.⁵

A partial explanation of the large influence that the leader of the Dominion party exerted is to be found in the control he exercised over the employment of patronage. It was, in fact, over this very thing that the Quebec Ministers most frequently clashed. To keep their followings together some material attraction was necessary and this was supplied by their power to find employment, to award contracts, to give privileges. With touching confidence, Caron, Langevin and Chapleau carried their mutual rivalries to Macdonald. On the eve of the General Election of 1887, he divided the Province of Quebec into three sections, the district of Quebec which was entrusted to Caron, the district of Three Rivers which was reserved for Langevin and the district of Montreal which was placed under Chapleau's care. Within their respective areas the Quebec leaders exercised complete authority and had the unreserved disposal of patronage.⁶ Yet this arrangement was only temporary and scarcely were the elections over when the bickerings broke out again. Whether or not Macdonald deliberately cultivated bad relations among his Quebec subordinates, following the old principle of divide and rule, cannot be determined. Such a state of affairs would undoubtedly have strengthened his personal position but it would have placed great strain on the fragile machinery of party organization.

One of the most powerful forces that made for cohesion among the various French-Canadian Conservative elements was the newspaper. The history of Quebec journalism in this later period has waited long for its exponent and what is said here suffers in consequence. Throughout the XIX century the numbers of newspapers published in the Province of Quebec increased rapidly. At Confederation there were probably more newspapers published in the Province than there are at the present. Materials were not expensive and every job-printer was a potential pub-

lisher. To the rural community, or to the small-town community isolated from the metropolitan centres, the printer was very nearly as essential as the blacksmith. In addition, the material for editorship was not lacking in the numerous young professional men scattered throughout the Province. It would, in fact, be difficult to name a French-Canadian public man who had not some journalistic association--Chapleau with le Colonnasateur, Langevin with le Courrier du Canada and Mercier with le Courrier de St. Hyacinthe. The newspapers of Montreal and of Quebec were of a different character and la Minerve, le Journal de Québec or le Courrier du Canada were equal, if not superior, to any journal published in the Dominion. To all the newspapers, the breath of life was politics. Considering that their editors and frequently their publishers were aspiring politicians, this is not remarkable. Until the later 'seventies or the 'eighties, the French-Canadian newspapers were of a very high character, being more journals of criticism and of review than purveyors of news in the conventional ^{ion} form. Of course, the improvements in both communication and in transportation that so characterized the later XIX century had their effects on both the composition and the character of the French-Canadian press. The turning-point was probably the Franco-Prussian War, an episode that made a profound impression in Quebec. Thereafter, the French-Canadian press tended to follow, more and more, the contemporary trends of North American journalism.

The political influence that the French-Canadian newspapers exercised is difficult to estimate. Their scope was local and their circulation was small. This applied even to such important journals as la Minerve and le Journal de Québec. The scope of the newspaper was limited by its physical surroundings, means of gathering news were small and the means of distribut-

ing the newspaper were equally small. For instance, while the Montreal papers could gain an easy access to the southern counties and to the Townships by way of the G.T.R., it was not till the early 'eighties that they could penetrate to the settlements along the Ottawa valley with the construction of the Northern Colonisation Railway. The cost and the character of the newspaper tended to limit its circulation and hence its influence. The subscription rates of the Quebec newspapers were high; le Journal de Québec sold for \$6 a year.⁷ Its rival, l'Événement was somewhat less expensive, its rate being \$5.⁸ for the daily edition. Le Courrier du Canada, a semi-weekly, was priced at \$4.⁹ For the period four or five dollars represented a considerable sum of money, even for the comparatively well-to-do professional man. The articles the newspapers carried must have limited their circulation also for they were of a character that only a reader with a fair degree of education could understand. The editorials in le Nouveau Monde, dealing with the protective tariff were couched in such a form and such a language that more than a mere knowledge of the elements of political economy were requisite for their reading.¹⁰ La Minerve was cast in a more popular form, but even it must have been restricted to a relatively small class. It is more than likely that the Quebec newspapers in the 'seventies and 'eighties were designed to appeal to a professional group in the Province--the lawyer, the doctor and the clergyman. What influence they enjoyed outside that relatively restricted circle was accidental.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, it will be recognized that the problem of financing a newspaper was not easy. The difficulty was greatly enhanced by the fact that commercial advertising, the chief support of the modern press, was in its infancy. Under these circumstances, the

newspapers of the period under discussion looked to government contracts for printing to supply the deficiencies of a small circulation and of an absence of advertising.¹¹ It was at this point that the control of patronage played such a considerable rôle. During their long régime following 1867, the Conservative newspapers prospered while the Liberal and Nationalist press dwindled.¹² Yet, as soon as the control of patronage fell into Liberal hands, the Conservative newspapers failed. It is an illuminating consideration that la Minerve, one of the oldest newspapers in the Province, scarcely survived the defeat of the Conservatives by three years.¹³ Even during the heyday of Conservative power in the 'eighties, when both the Dominion and the Quebec Provincial administrations were in the hands of its friends, la Minerve found it difficult to pay its way, owing to the favours shewn to Sir Hector Langevin's le Monde.

It would be unwise, nevertheless, to discount completely the press as an agency in party organization. Its chief contribution was the way in which it magnified and extended the ideas of the party leaders. The newspapers were, in reality, the organs of individuals and a reading of the leader in la Minerve, or in le Monde, or in la Patrie would provide a pretty accurate impression of the views of Mr. Chapleau or of Sir Hector Langevin or of Mr. Joly. Strong as the personal emphasis was, it was mitigated, to a degree, by the widespread system of copying from other newspapers. Thus, in the column entitled "Correspondence", excerpts from half a dozen newspapers might be found. This practice redeemed in a measure some of the worst vices of parochialism.

Although demands were constantly made for formal organization,¹⁴ it does not appear that the machinery of Conservatism ever progressed far beyond the rudimentary stage described above. The personal was the de-

cisive factor, for, as has been demonstrated, Macdonald, the leader of the Liberal-Conservative party, was able to make his wishes felt in a most emphatic form in the Provincial sphere. It was the personal equation that governed the relations of Macdonald's lieutenants in Quebec. The practice of delegating authority led, ultimately, to what has been described as "the Balkanisation" of the Conservative party. The differentiation was not on racial lines but on lines laid down by the rivalries and jealousies of the party leaders.

The subordinate position occupied by the Provincial Conservatives is not to be explained wholly in terms of the distribution of patronage, still less in terms of a dominant personality. Certain clauses in the British North America Act tended to place the political machinery of the Province in a position inferior to that of the Dominion. Principal among these was the provision of the Act which made it possible for members of the Dominion parliament to occupy seats in the Provincial legislatures.¹⁵ The first effort, therefore, of those who sought to establish some degree of autonomy in Provincial spheres was directed against the system of dual representation or, as it was called, "the double mandate."

Viewed in the perspective of over sixty years, the "double mandate" was an intolerable drag on the initiative of the Provincial governments. Not only did members of the Dominion House of Commons and of the Senate have seats in the Provincial legislatures but frequently Dominion Ministers held portfolios in both parliaments. This was eminently the case in Quebec, where Sir George Cartier and Sir Hector Langevin, although Cabinet Ministers in the Dominion government, were also members of the Quebec administration. The other Provinces were subject to the same tutelage. Macdonald, at one time, contemplated entering the Ontario Legislature "with a view of keeping an eye on its legislation", to employ Sir

Joseph Pope's delightful euphuism.¹⁶ But even where supervision was not uppermost in men's minds, there were grave practical disadvantages. In the press of parliamentary business the interests of the Provinces were neglected in favour of those of the Dominion. Again and again, as the letters of Cartier give evidence, the meetings of the Quebec parliament were postponed, or important measures were laid aside in order that he might remain in Ottawa.¹⁷

Opposition to such a state of affairs developed quickly. The system of double representation ran counter to the entire Liberal theory of the constitution, in which the doctrine of Provincial autonomy was inherent. It roused the opposition of some of the more intractable Provincial leaders, notably of John Sanfield Macdonald, the premier of Ontario.¹⁸ The attacks on double representation were directed from the Dominion as well as from the Provincial parliaments. In the Dominion parliament, its most consistent opponent was David Mills, "the philosopher from Bothwell" as Macdonald was accustomed to call him. Mills introduced a number of resolutions into the House of Commons looking to the abolition of the "double mandate" before he was successful in carrying his point in 1873.¹⁹

In the Province of Quebec opposition to the scheme of dual representation developed early. It was not a party measure for the system roused the natural apprehension of the French-Canadians who had entered federation on the understanding that they should control their own affairs. Previous to 1874, motions to abolish dual representation had been carried in the Assembly by substantial majorities, only to be rejected by the Legislative Council.²⁰ In Quebec, the declared enemy of "the double mandate" was the redoubtable Marchand, the representative of one of the old traditionally Liberal constituencies in the Richelieu Valley. Marchand

was ably supported by some of the younger Conservatives, among whom the most outstanding was Chapleau. Taking advantage of the sympathetic attitude of Gédéon Ouimet, the Liberal-Conservative premier, Marchand and Holton introduced a measure that was calculated to prevent members of the Canadian House of Commons and of the Senate from sitting in the Quebec legislature.²¹ This was carried through the lower House on a vote of 31 to 18,²² but was so amended in the Legislative Council that the Assembly rejected the Bill when it was returned to them.²³ It was at this point that the Premier intervened, and succeeded in persuading the Assembly to accept the Bill as amended.²⁴ The consequence was a curiously anomalous situation whereby members of the Dominion parliament might sit in the Council although they could not sit in the Assembly.²⁵ The abolition of dual representation removed the physical connexion between the two legislatures; thereafter, when influence was exerted, it was exerted indirectly.

The very complicated relations that existed between the Dominion and the Provincial groups of French-Canadian Conservatives is best shewn by an examination of the so-called "Amnesty question". The ramifications of this question extended far beyond the domestic circle of party organization into the relation of French and English and into lofty reaches of imperial policy.²⁶ It is only the first of these considerations that need be discussed here. The amnesty question had its origins in the Red River Rebellion of 1869-1870 when certain acts of violence, culminating in the execution of Thomas Scott required a pacific solution. The solution was all the more difficult to find since in the East the Rebellion had stirred the old fires of racial and of sectarian hatred that made tempered discussion next to impossible.

The first reference to an amnesty was contained in Sir John Young's

proclamation on the very eve of the Rebellion,

"I do inform you ... I shall order that no legal proceedings shall be taken against any parties implicated in these unfortunate breaches of the law..."²⁷

The offer was reinforced in conversations which Bishop Taché, the Government's emissary, had with various members of the Cabinet in February of 1870. Between the Bishop and the Government, there was no formal understanding, although Taché believed,

"Tout fut dit en fait de façon de conviancre le prélat que s'il réussissait à calmer les esprits, on serait heureux d'oublier les faits malheureux qui avait pu produire avant son arivée au Fort Garry."²⁸

That the Bishop had some justification for this belief is indicated by the official letter he had received from the Governor-General,

"You are fully in possession of the views of my Government and the Imperial Government. In declaring the desire and the determination of Her Majesty's Cabinet you may safely use the terms of the ancient formula, that the right shall be done in all cases..."²⁹

Before Bishop Taché reached Red River the execution of Scott had taken place and a new and entirely unconsidered element was introduced quite un contemplated by the Canadian authorities. With his eye entirely on the local situation and on the advice of some of the most responsible persons at Red River, the Bishop made some exceedingly sweeping promises. He promised in the name of the Canadian Government,

"... that a complete and entire amnesty (if not already bestowed) will surely be granted before the arrival of the troops..."³⁰

In view, however, of the temper prevailing in the English Provinces when the shooting of Scott was made known, it was politically impossible for the Government to proclaim an amnesty.³¹ Accordingly, the Secretary of State for the Provinces, Joseph Howe, immediately informed Taché that he had exceeded his powers and that the faculty for granting an amnesty rested solely with the Queen. Some of the members of the Cabinet, notably

Cartier, held out the hope of an amnesty after an interval,

".. I must now intimate to you the surest way of securing this amnesty is that the population of Red River should accept the new order of things. The Queen will perhaps await this result before making known her clemency..."³²

The delegates of the Provisional Government who were at Ottawa in April and May of 1870 carried away the impression that an amnesty would proceed from the Imperial authorities. Cartier's own statements were explicit enough,

"Bear in mind that with Father Ritchot and with the archbishop, I always took the same ground--we both did--namely, that the question of an amnesty was not for us but for the Queen and the Imperial Government."³³

Cartier's irrepressible optimism led him to believe that such an amnesty could be easily procured. In this he was to be bitterly mistaken by the hardening of opinion in the English Provinces and by the attitude of the Imperial government.

In Ontario, and to a lesser extent in the Maritime Provinces, the execution of Thomas Scott raised to fever-heat the temper of a people already deeply outraged by the success of the half-breeds at Fort Garry. The city of Toronto was the centre of the agitation and was placarded with provocative notices, "Shall French Rebels rule our Dominion?" "Men of Ontario, shall Scott's blood cry in vain for vengeance?" The denominational cry was quickly raised and the Orange Order prepared for battle by expelling from its ranks its more temperate members including Hillyard Cameron, the Grand Master. The Ontario Liberals at once made political capital of this outburst and the Globe placed itself at the head of the agitation. It was due, in large part, to the carefully-managed campaign that was waged on the hustings and in the columns of the press, that the Sanfield Macdonald Government was turned out of office in December of 1871.

The triumphant Liberals made their peculiar contribution towards an equitable solution of the amnesty question by placing a reward of \$5000 on Riel's head. What took place in Ontario could not be overlooked.

The attitude of the Imperial authorities was unequivocal. From the beginning they regarded the difficulties that had developed in the North-West as purely Canadian problems. The views of the Manchester School still obtained and the tendency was to limit, rather than to enlarge, Imperial commitments. In addition there was the feeling that inasmuch as Canada had attained self-government, she must look to her own resources to settle her problems. This was the stand taken by Lord Granville, the Secretary of State for the Colonies to whom the Conservative Ministry turned in 1871. The Imperial government would not refuse to issue an amnesty, if the request had the unanimous support of the Canadian Cabinet.³⁴ The Imperial authorities would continue to refuse to grant an amnesty at the request of individual Ministers or groups of Ministers. This was substantially the answer of Lord Kimberley when he was approached by Mackenzie in 1874.³⁵ In view of the differences of opinion in the Canadian Cabinet a unanimous request was almost impossible to procure.

Events in both West and East were to further embarrass the Ministers. In October of 1871, Riel helped to frustrate a descent on Manitoba by filibusters from the United States. This placed the Government under a moral obligation to Riel and strengthened his claim for a general amnesty. Macdonald's actions were characteristic. He sent Bishop Taché \$1000 to give to Riel on condition that he would withdraw from British territory. The next development, however, was even more complicating. In September of 1872, Cartier was defeated in Montreal East but at Macdonald's behest a seat was found for him in Provencher, Manitoba.³⁶ Riel had been nomi-

nated for the riding, but withdrew in Cartier's favour,³⁷ thus again placing the Conservatives technically under obligation to him. Riel's subsequent history as a parliamentarian is curious. When Provencher was opened by the death of Cartier, Riel was elected and in the spring of 1874 appeared secretly in Ottawa. He signed the Members' Rôle but did not take his seat and in the midst of great excitement he was formally expelled from the House.³⁸

The position of the French-Canadian Conservatives throughout this protracted controversy was by no means easy. Public opinion in Quebec had moved round in favour of Riel and of a general amnesty in proportion as the temper of Ontario had risen. The French-Canadian press had made no effort to condone the execution of Thomas Scott,³⁹ but the racial and the sectarian cry raised by the English Provinces provoked a natural reaction. It was generally felt that the amnesty was denied Riel because he was the representative of a minority-people. The English-speaking extremists were branded as "ces Prussiens du Canada qui veulent tout absorber à leur profit."⁴⁰ The French-Canadian Ministers in the Dominion Cabinet naturally shared the views of their countrymen and, as has been seen, Cartier seriously compromised his position in an effort to procure an amnesty. Both Cartier and his successor Langevin⁴¹ were compelled by their membership in the Dominion Cabinet to temper their efforts and to keep in check their feelings, but men not so highly placed were under no such restraint. This was especially true of the clerically-inclined Conservatives who were outraged at the treatment that Bishop Taché had received. Masson, one of the joint-leaders of the French-Canadian Conservatives, no doubt reflected the opinion of a certain section of the Quebec public when he threatened to go into opposition if more vigorous steps were not taken

to procure relief.⁴² His associate Mousseau was equally emphatic although in this instance it is permissible to believe that his stand was dictated by hopes of political advantage rather than by dictates of conscience.⁴³ The vote taken on the Bowell-Schultz motion to expel Riel from the House of Commons shewed the temper of French-Canadians of whatever political stripe since not one supported the measure.⁴⁴ The Conservatives in the Quebec parliament could afford to be more outspoken. In 1874, when Ambroise Lépine, one of Riel's lieutenants was undergoing trial for his part in the Rebellion the Quebec Legislative Assembly passed a unanimous resolution praying that the Governor-General exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the condemned man.⁴⁵

The controversy on the subject of the amnesty throws an interesting light on the organization of the French-Canadian Conservative party. It demonstrates that it was the Provincial party which was most powerfully effected by and most speedily reacted to changes in public opinion. It indicates the difficult position in which the French-Canadian leaders in the Dominion parliament found themselves when issues of race or of religion were raised. The controversy over, the Amnesty does not suggest that there was a conflict between the Conservatives of the two parliaments, but it does suggest that the Provincial party could make its views powerfully felt. In successive crises, the Provincial party representing more accurately the opinion of the Province was to take a more decided course.

One of the most remarkable examples of the interrelation of the French-Canadian Conservative groups is to be found in the celebrated coup d'état of Lieutenant-Governor Luc Letellier de St. Just. The incident now is largely forgotten but, among contemporaries it aroused great attention both in Canada and in Great Britain.⁴⁶ For the purpose of this study,

the coup d'état is worthy of close examination for the way in which it demonstrates the close association of political organization and a phenomenon, previously noted, the tendency of the successful Provincial politician to pass into the Dominion parliament.

In its briefest form the history of the coup d'état was as follows.⁴⁷ On March 4, 1878, the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, Luc Letellier de St. Just, dismissed the Provincial Conservative Cabinet headed by M. deBoucherville on the grounds that he had not been informed of certain legislation his Ministers had proposed. Three days later, Sir Henri Joly, the leader of the Nationalist Opposition, formed an Administration. The general elections which Joly brought on almost immediately were not decisive, the Nationalists having a majority of one in the Assembly. In the meantime, cognizance of what had happened at Quebec was taken in Ottawa where Sir John A. Macdonald moved that the action of the Governor was

".. under the circumstances unwise and subversive of the position accorded the advisers of the Crown since the concession of the principle of Responsible Government."⁴⁸

The debate which followed and indeed almost every pronouncement the controversy occasioned was redolent with constitutional principles and precedents.⁴⁹ On a straight party vote, Macdonald's motion was lost 170-112,⁵⁰ but in the Senate a similar motion was carried 37-22.⁵¹ The principals in Quebec now had their positions outlined in petitions and memoranda addressed to the Governor-General.⁵² The uncontemplated success of the Conservatives in the general election of the summer of 1878 gave a new angle to the case. Early in the new session Mousseau, the French-Canadian Conservative leader, reintroduced Macdonald's motion and, after a heated debate, carried it by a large majority 136 to 51.⁵³ At this point the Governor-General intervened and when Macdonald advised him to

dismiss the Lieutenant-Governor, referred the entire matter to the Colonial Office. The Governor-General's action was dictated by the consideration that the federal form of constitution being unknown to British practice, there were no precedents to guide him in this instance.⁵⁴ The Colonial Office made no attempt to adjudicate the action of the Governor but contented itself simply with the declaration that in this instance, as in others, the Governor-General should follow the advice of his responsible Ministers. Upon the request of the Governor-General, the Cabinet made a review of the case again, with the same results and in July, Letellier de St. Just was removed from office. Deprived of its friendly executive the Nationalist Ministry found great difficulty in carrying on the work of government and in October, abandoned by some of its supporters, it fell. On its ruins, Chapleau formed his first Government.

The antecedents and the consequences of the coup d'état are considerably more noteworthy than the coup d'état itself. The antecedents are, in fact, the history of the Province of Quebec in microcosm and may be comprehended in three words; railways, depression, personalities. The original complaint that the Lieutenant-Governor levelled against his Ministers was their action with respect to the financing of the Q.M.O.O.R.R.⁵⁵ The railway, it may be remembered, was built by contributions from various sources, including grants from various "North Shore" municipalities, notably from the cities of Montreal and of Quebec and from the town of Three Rivers.⁵⁶ The depression of the 'seventies was seriously felt in all the Quebec towns and the "North Shore" municipalities sought to escape their obligation.⁵⁷ A certain point was given to their unwillingness to pay by the fact that when the Government took over the railway it altered the route which had been originally decided on. The Provincial authorities,

hard pressed for funds proceeded against the towns, not by the slow methods of the Courts,⁵⁸ but by direct legislative action. This the Lieutenant-Governor regarded as irregular, not to say unconstitutional, and protested to M. deBoucherville,

"I regret to state...that although M. deBoucherville did on most occasions take my advice in good part and generally approved of it... he...almost always acted as though he had never received it..."

The personal factor was present in large measure. Although the relations of Governor and chief Minister were good, as Letellier admits, the relation of Governor and Cabinet was not happy. This was true especially of the relation of Letellier with Chapleau and Angers, who headed what was graphically described as "...le hell-fire parti". Whatever may have been their private views, Chapleau and Angers were the Government leaders in the Assembly and as such were in charge of the obnoxious measures against the municipalities. Angers was a man of considerable force but of little tact, and his stand was already too well known; with respect to the municipalities he had said, "...il fallait les prendre à la gorge..."⁵⁹ It is probable that much of the genesis of the coup d'état arose from the imperious tempers of these two men who were political opposites.

There is one phase of the antecedents of the coup d'état which calls for especial notice, namely that the Lieutenant-Governor sought political advantage by the overthrow of the deBoucherville Cabinet.⁶⁰ Dissensions among the Conservatives and the approach of the Dominion general elections all lend a certain substance to this charge. A close examination of the Mackenzie Letter-books in the Dominion Archives at Ottawa reveals that if such a plan were entertained, Mackenzie knew nothing about it. He was not blind to the advantages that would accrue from the presence of a friendly Government in Quebec, but the evidence at our disposal does not lead us to

believe that he did anything to create such a government.⁶¹ Once Letellier had made his decision, Mackenzie gave him his full support,

"I am deeply sympathetic with you in your troubles on the Government and trust that all will go well with you for the future.

"I am very glad that you have obtained the assistance of Mr. Joly in forming a new administration. You could have no more honourable man or one who, to a greater degree, commands the confidence generally of the people of the Dominion..."⁶²

In the House of Commons, while excusing nothing, Mackenzie's support was equally forthright.

The sequence of events that preceded the dismissal of the deBoucherville Ministry are curious. The Lieutenant-Governor took his stand on constitutional grounds; that he, as the representative of the Crown had not been consulted in proposed legislation.⁶³ This was strange Liberal doctrine, as his critics were quick to point out. It would seem that Letellier made a serious strategic blunder in raising the constitutional issue for, as Mackenzie suggested, an unequivocal opposition to the Cabinet's railway policy would have been more popular and more easy to defend.⁶⁴ Yet even on his chosen ground, the Lieutenant-Governor made a number of false moves. At a later date Letellier insisted that he had no intention of driving the Conservatives from office; all that he desired was to bring the Government to a reconsideration of its railway and financial programmes. Despite this explanation, the memorandum of March 1st was tantamount to dismissal;⁶⁵ and in that he accepted deBoucherville's resignation without question is the best evidence that he so intended it. A serious disadvantage proceeded from this dismissal, the Lieutenant-Governor was forced to choose his new first Minister, since deBoucherville refused to advise.⁶⁶ The refusal made it impossible for any other Conservative to accept office and Letellier was compelled to turn to the

leader of the Opposition. These early errors pursued him throughout the entire controversy.

Of considerable interest was the action of Macdonald in 1878 and 1879 in the Dominion parliament. In calling attention to the Lieutenant-Governor's conduct he characterized it as

"...under the circumstances unwise and subversive to the position accorded to the advisers of the Crown..."⁶⁷

This scarcely constituted severe criticism or criticism based on high constitutional principles. In answering, Mackenzie attacked Macdonald on the score of triviality and of vagueness. It is the more curious, therefore, that the following year Mousseau introduced the identical motion that Macdonald had used. It is not probable that ineptness or short-sightedness caused Macdonald to couch his motion in the terms he did. There is evidence to suggest that Macdonald believed that Letellier had acted within his powers in bringing about the change of Ministry and much the more so, since he succeeded in getting Mr. Joly to assume responsibility for his actions. This impression is reinforced by the qualified approval that Macdonald gave Mousseau in his second attack on Letellier in the spring of 1879.⁶⁹ Macdonald was a man of few principles, but he had a regard for the traditions of Parliament which, in this instance, were sorely twisted for a party triumph. The statement of the partisan critic must be accepted only with reservations, but Langelier is probably not far from the truth when he states that Macdonald's hand was forced by followers from Quebec.⁷⁰

The issue raised by the Governor-General, the Marquis of Lorne, is a good illustration of the extent to which constitutional scruples could be driven. The Governor-General took his stand on the ambiguous wording of

the clauses covering the appointment and the dismissal of Lieutenant-Governors, which state in effect, that while the Lieutenant-Governor is appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council, "...he shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General..."⁷⁰ Lord Lorne shewed an aversion, understandable in a young man unused to the ways of the world, to making himself an accessory to what was manifestly a disreputable piece of political jockeying. There is more than a suspicion that in advising the Governor-General to reserve his decision till he had consulted the Colonial Office, Macdonald was serving his own ends, since he too had doubts as to the constitutional propriety of the proceedings. The reply of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Colonial Secretary, disposed of the problem with some emphasis,

".. that while under Section 58 of the Act, the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor is to be made, 'by the Governor-General-in-Council by instrument under the Great Seal of Canada,' Section 59 provides that '..a Lieutenant-Governor holds during the pleasure of the Governor General...', it must be remembered that other powers vested in a similar way in the statute, 'by the Governor-General' were clearly intended to be, and in practice are, exercised by and with the advice of his Ministers..."⁷¹

The last act of the drama was soon played out. Throughout the summer of 1879, political tempers in Quebec rose sharply and Chapleau, the new leader of the Conservative opposition, devised new tactics. In September the Legislative Council, which was strongly Conservative in complexion, rejected the Supply Bill, an almost unprecedented measure since the grant of Responsible Government. A motion, amounting to a vote of non-confidence, was carried in the Assembly and was accompanied by the secession of four Nationalist members including a Minister. The new Lieutenant-Governor, Dr. Robitaille, refused to grant Joly dissolution and the first Nationalist Ministry resigned. It was a characteristic termination to a controversy

which had been marked by unusual and arbitrary acts masquerading in the disguise of constitutional principles.

The 'eighties which marked the beginning of Conservative disintegration in Quebec saw the revolution in party organization complete. On the matter of railway policy, the Provincial party was able to impress its views on the Dominion Conservatives and to induce the Government to indorse those views. The elements of the incident have been discussed in detail in an earlier chapter, the financial difficulties of the Province of Quebec; the problem of the Provincial Railway; the necessities of the Canadian Pacific Railway.⁷²

The financial problems of the Province reached their peak in the early 'eighties. The effects of the long-continued depression of the previous decade were still felt, the demands made upon Government increased, yet public opinion was not yet ready to assume the necessary discipline of taxation. An examination of the financial state of the Province indicates that it was still living beyond its income. Occasionally, as in 1881-1882, the Treasurer could shew a surplus.⁷³ Such surpluses were more apparent than real, since they usually proceeded from some unusual revenue as, for example, the payment of \$554,146 due to the Municipal Loan Fund by the City of Montreal. Other surpluses were built up in the same fashion, sometimes by including among the current receipts the amounts realized from loans. Deficits were, however, more common and these recurring deficits, in addition to a rising indebtedness, made the financial position of the Province increasingly grave. Economy and retrenchment were preached but not practised and successive Treasurers were driven to raise new loans to meet past indebtedness and to cover current expenses. As the 'eighties drew on, there was an increasing disposition to look to the Dominion govern-

ment for the solution to this puzzle.⁷⁴

Whatever may have been the causes of the later accretions, it would appear that the origins of the Province's financial troubles lay in the acquisition of the Northern Colonisation and of the North Shore railways. The price paid for the lines was in excess of their actual value, but the close association of such interested parties as Sir Hugh Allan and as Thomas McGreevy with the Conservative party may be regarded as adequate explanation. Nor could the Province realize on its investment once the railway had been completed, for the action of the depression and the decline of certain branches of Canadian trade seriously damaged its business. Under these circumstances, the determination of the Chapleau Administration to dispose of the railway was probably motivated by sound economic considerations. Unfortunately for the Government, the Q.M.O.O.R.R. was the object of considerable solicitude among French-Canadians and the division of the railway and its sale to a private company was very unpopular. This applied especially to the disposal of the eastern division of the line between Montreal and Quebec which was leased to a private corporation.⁷⁵ It is, even at this time, impossible to trace in definitive form what followed. It is certain, however, that some of the Provincial Conservatives, or their backers, conceived the plan using the Provincial railway as a means of extracting money from the Dominion government. The fact that the railway had passed out of Provincial hands was no deterrent and the translation of Mr. Chapleau to the Dominion Cabinet seemed to render the moment auspicious.

At the time that the Quebec government was seeking some means of escape from its financial troubles, the Canadian Pacific Railway found itself in grave difficulties. The vigorous policy of expansion that the

railway had adopted in eastern Canada and on the Pacific coast had roused the active hostility of the G.T.R. and of certain United States railways. These Companies proceeded to "bear" C.P.R. stock on the London and on the New York markets till it reached the dangerously low figure of 48. To save the railway, in November of 1883 the Dominion government guaranteed the Company's loan of \$65,000,000. The next year the Company was forced again to come to the government for aid.⁷⁶ The Cabinet's position was most difficult, additional aids to the C.P.R. were unpopular yet on the completion of the railway hung the westward development of Canada. The Cabinet needed the support of every one of its followers yet during the debates on the Bill, the Quebec members were conspicuous by their absence. It was, in fact, only on the third reading that they were in their places and gave their support to the measure. Some days later, an additional aid to railways was proposed by which Quebec received nearly two and one-half millions of money by way of compensation for the construction of the Q.M.O.O.R.R. The charge was made at the time that the French-Canadian members had refused to vote the C.P.R. aids till Quebec had received consideration.⁷⁷ The presence of Quebec Provincial Ministers at Ottawa added force to the rumour that Quebec had successfully extracted her "black-mail".⁷⁸ Macdonald and his French-Canadian colleagues vigorously denied that there had been anything improper,⁷⁹ and a day later Sir Charles Tupper, the Minister of Railways defended the grants to Quebec on the grounds that the Province had obligated itself heavily for the construction of a railway whose service was Dominion-wide.

It is easy to magnify the importance of the incident.⁸⁰ The critics of the Conservative party and the critics of the French-Canadians have held it up as a glaring example of political duplicity and of racial amorality.⁸¹

Viewed superficially, the incident is capable of ominous interpretation. It must be recalled that at the period under discussion the Dominion Government was accustomed to employ subsidies and grants in aid to the provinces for partisan purposes. The pleas of the Quebec government for aid were well known at Ottawa, and there is nothing to indicate that the Dominion party leaders were hostile to the grants of such aids. Expediency, rather than principle ruled in such matters. It is difficult to understand why Quebec, which stood to gain so considerably by the completion of the C.P.R. should wish to jeopardize its success.

Such, in broad outline, was the organization of the French-Canadian Conservative party. Its strength lay in its elasticity and its weakness in its dependence on the personality of its leaders. It was a signal failure, though by no means confined to French-Canadians, that no attempt was made to coordinate the Provincial and the Dominion parties. Here, again, the contact was personal and hence likely to be uncertain. The most remarkable consideration that emanates from the foregoing examination is the gradual increase in strength and in independence of the Provincial Conservative group. It is remarkable because it seems to be symptomatic of a tendency to lay stress on the sectional rather than on the national point of view. The doctrine of provincial autonomy and of provincial rights had been anticipated in the relations of the two sections of the French-Canadian Conservative party.

- ¹Macdonald Papers. General Correspondence, 1867-1868.
Chauveau to Macdonald; Quebec, July 19, 1867.
- ²ibid. General Correspondence, 1874-1876.
G. Ouimet to Macdonald; Quebec, August 12, 1874.
- ³ibid. General Correspondence, 1878.
L.R. Church to Macdonald; Quebec, January 15, 1878.
- ⁴ibid. Langevin Correspondence.
Macdonald to Langevin; Ottawa, April 3, 1887.
Printed in Pope's Correspondence, p. 397.
- ⁵Alexander Mackenzie Papers. Letter Book No. 6,
Mackenzie to Thibideau; Ottawa, December 8, 1876.
"I requested Mr. Laflamme to go from Montreal to find out what the views of the friends were (on the Lieutenant-Governorship)... I never meant Mr. Cauchon's name to come forward...I received a letter from Mr. Joly...expressing the unanimous desire of the Liberal members of the Quebec parliament that Mr. Laframboise should be appointed..."
- ⁶Macdonald Papers. Letter Book No. 24.
Macdonald to Chapleau, Ottawa, January 21, 1887.
- ⁷Tétu, H. Historique des journaux de Québec.
des presses...de Léger Brousseau; Québec, 1875.
P. 23.
- ⁸ibid., p. 44.
- ⁹ibid., p. 32.
- ¹⁰Vide, for example, le Nouveau Monde, February-March, 1871.
- ¹¹In a fit of unrequited ardour the Montreal Herald on April 29, 1871, printed what it claimed was a list of printing contracts let in the previous year by the Corporation of the City of Montreal;

" <u>la Minerve</u>	\$1680.45,
" <u>le Pays</u>	\$ 592.28,
" <u>Herald</u>	\$ 20.00."
- ¹²According to the Witness of September 27, 1867, its rival le Nouveau Monde was being sustained by advertising from "the R.C. Colleges, the G.T.R. etc."
- ¹³Tarte, L. to W. Laurier: Ottawa, February 7, 1899.
Printed in Skelton's, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier.
Vol. 2, p. 174.
- ¹⁴Gazette, Montreal, January 8, 1874.
- ¹⁵British North America Act, Section 40, subsections 1 and 2.

- ¹⁶Pope, J. The Memoirs of...Sir John Macdonald.
Vol. 2, p. 20.
- ¹⁷Discours de Sir G.E. Cartier.
Cartier's speeches in favour of the system are to be found on pages 550 and 613.
- ¹⁸Pope, J. op. cit., p. 20.
- ¹⁹Mills introduced at least three proposals previous to 1873, November 1867, April 1869, March 1870.
- ²⁰Gazette, Montreal, March 31, 1874.
- ²¹Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec
1874, December 14, p. 30.
- ²²ibid., p. 67.
- ²³ibid., p. 153.
- ²⁴ibid., p. 196.
- ²⁵Statutes of the Province of Quebec.
1875, 37 Victoria, cap. 4.
- ²⁶Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada, Chapter 8.
- ²⁷Proclamation of Sir John Young; Ottawa, December 6, 1869.
Printed in "Report of the Select Committee",
Journals of the House of Commons, 1874, vol. 8, app. 6.
Note; Unless otherwise indicated the succeeding citations are from
the above-mentioned source.
- ²⁸Deposition of Bishop Taché.
- ²⁹Young to Bishop Taché; Ottawa, February 16, 1870.
- ³⁰Bishop Taché to Joseph Howe; St. Boniface, July 4, '70.
- ³¹Cartier to Taché. Private. Ottawa, July 5, 1870.
- ³²ibid.
- ³³Cartier to Macdonald; February 23, 1873.
- ³⁴Granville to Young; June 30, 1870. C.O. 43/157.
- ³⁵Campanon to Dufferin; December 10, 1874. C.S.P. Vol. 7, No. 11.
- ³⁶Macdonald to Archibald; Ottawa, September 4, 1872.
- ³⁷Macdonald to Archibald; Ottawa, September 12, 1872.

- ³⁸Journals of the House of Commons; Canada
1874, Vol. 8, pp. 68-71.
- ³⁹l'Opinion Publique and le Nouveau Monde le 9 avril, 1870.
- ⁴⁰l'Opinion Publique, le 8 septembre, 1870.
- ⁴¹Deposition of Sir Hector Langevin.
- ⁴²Deposition of Masson.
- ⁴³Debates of the House of Commons; Canada
1875, Vol. 1, pp. 135, 136.
- ⁴⁴Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec
1874-1875, Vol. 8, pp. 46-47.
- ⁴⁵Commons' Journals, op. cit., 1874, Vol. 8, pp. 68-71.
- ⁴⁶The most comprehensive and, at the same time, the most tempered contemporary account of the Letellier incident is to be found in the Dominion Annual Register, 1878 and 1879.
- ⁴⁷There is an accurate, if brief, account of the same incident in Canada and its Provinces, Vol. 15.1.
- ⁴⁸Debates of the House of Commons; Canada
1878, April 11.
- ⁴⁹The Letellier case was the excuse for an unusual spate of pamphlets. The most remarkable was that by Mr. Alpheus Todd, the Parliamentary Librarian, whose brochure, The Constitutional Governor, treated the question with such impartiality that it was quoted by both parties.
- ⁵⁰Journals of the House of Commons; Canada
1878. April 15
- ⁵¹Journals of the Senate of Canada
1878, April 17.
- ⁵²The documentary sources on the coup d'état are voluminous. The best edited are to be found in the Sessional Papers; Canada, 1879, No. 19. Unless otherwise indicated references are from this source.
- ⁵³Journals, op. cit., 1879, March 14.
- ⁵⁴Debates of the House of Commons; Canada
1879, April 3, statement made by Macdonald.
- ⁵⁵Statement of H.H. Luc Letellier de St. Just.
- ⁵⁶The town of Three Rivers contributed \$100,000 and the cities of Montreal and of Quebec \$2,000,000 to the railway project.
(Statutes of the Province of Quebec, 1875.
39 Victoria, cap. 11, Schedule A.)

- 57 A protest meeting in Montreal held in the old Bonsecours Market was denounced by the Gazette as "organized hypocrisy" and as "a Rouge Fiasco".
(Gazette, Montreal, February 7, 1878.)
- 58 Statement of H.H. Luc Letellier de St. Just.
Charge No. 5.
- 59 Casgrain, P.B. Letellier de St. Just, p. 239.
Darveau; Québec, 1885.
- 60 Collins, J. The Life and Times of the Right Honourable Sir John A. Macdonald, Chapter 22.
Rose Publishing Co., Toronto, 1883.
- 61 Mackenzie Letter-Books, No. 6, 1876-1878.
Mackenzie to Peltier; Ottawa, March 4, 1878.
- 62 ibid., Mackenzie to Letellier; Ottawa, March 13, 1878.
- 63 Statement of H.H. Luc Letellier de St. Just.
"Memorandum".
- 64 Mackenzie. Op. cit., to Peltier; Ottawa, March 4, 1878.
- 65 Statement of H.H. Luc Letellier de St. Just.
Letellier to deBoucherville, March 1, 1878.
- 66 Statement of Hon. C. deBoucherville.
- 67 Debates of the House of Commons; Canada.
1878, April 11, p. 1900.
- 68 ibid., 1879, April 3, p. 983ff.
- 69 Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques, tome 1, p. 106.
- 70 British North America Act. Section 5, clauses 58 and 59.
- 71 Hicks-Beach to Lord Lorne, July 3, 1879.
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- 72 The most satisfactory account of the entire transaction is to be found in the Dominion Annual Register, 1882, 1883, 1884.
- 73 Wurtele, J.S.C. Financial Statement, February 16, 1883.
- 74 ibid.
- 75 Dominion Annual Register, 1883.
- 76 ibid., 1884, p. 27.

- ⁷⁷Debates of the House of Commons; Canada.
1884, Vol. 2, p. 1568ff. Speech by Edward Blake.
- ⁷⁸The Week, February 28, 1884.
- ⁷⁹Debates, op. cit.
1885, Vol. 2, p. 1565.
- ⁸⁰Underhill, F. National Political Parties in Canada.
Canadian Historical Review, December, 1935.
- ⁸¹the Week, April 10, 1884.

CHAPTER 7

THE CONSERVATIVE PROGRAMME

One of the most outstanding characteristics of the French-Canadian Conservative party was its unwillingness to formulate and to crystallize. It will be recalled that its political philosophy was a mass of precedents, of traditions and of predilections which were never gathered into a clear-cut statement or formulated into a political creed. It depended very much on the outlook of the dominant leader; apart, of course, from some rather vague and generally held principles. In our present examination of the party's programme we will observe very much the same characteristics. The Conservative leaders seldom made what might be regarded as a general statement with respect to policy. On specific subjects, they spoke with some exactitude although it was typical of his party that Macdonald never made any general statement of policy with respect to such a fundamental matter as his fiscal programme. The English parliamentary tradition which was strong in Cartier, in Macdonald and even in Chapleau stood in the way of such a declaration. In this tradition, the determination of policy and the building up of a party programme was regarded, in large measure, as the especial prerogative of the party leader. The day was still far distant when the United States expedients of the national convention and the collectively-drafted programme was to be riveted on the necks of the Canadian political parties.

There was little that could be regarded as academic about the political programme of the French-Canadian Conservative party. The programme was, in the last analysis, an effort to meet the needs of the Province of Quebec and of the Dominion. In a generation that saw such rapid and indeed revolutionary changes in both these fields saw also corresponding changes in the party's programme of action. Accordingly, an examination

of the Conservative programme in the period after Confederation reveals great emphasis laid on the agencies of national expansion. In the provincial world, this was translated into extension of the field of colonization; the construction of roads and of railways, the exploration--and the exploitation--of natural resources, such as minerals and timber. In the sphere of Dominion affairs it is difficult to speak of a French-Canadian programme as differentiated from the programme of the general Conservative party. French-Canadians did have special interests, however, in western settlement, in the tariff and in the extension of the trans-continental railway. We may legitimately suppose, indeed we know positively, that they were able to bend the Dominion party's programme to suit these peculiar interests as, for instance, in determining the eastern terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The more inspired party leaders, like Chapleau, tried to do more than meet needs, they attempted to anticipate them and to make the party programme square with the new departures in French-Canadian nationalism. However much the older parliamentary figures like Langevin and Masson might talk of safeguarding the constitutional position of French-Canadians, the younger generation were concerned with more tangible considerations, the repatriation of Quebec, the opening of the rich, undeveloped country north of the St. Lawrence River, the retention by Quebec and by Montreal of their valuable positions as the entre-pôts for Canadian commerce. It would be interesting to speculate to what extent Cartier may be regarded as the originator of this national point of view, but there is no doubt of the posthumous benefits he conferred on his party by making it alert to them.

One of the principal items in the programme of the French-Canadian Conservative party, especially in its Provincial organization, was coloni-

zation. By this term the French-Canadian understood the settlement chiefly of native-born Canadians within the Province of Quebec or in the area immediately surrounding it. French-Canadian colonization was, therefore, almost entirely a local development, although certain aspects of it resemble the trans-Alleghany migrations in the old British Colonies on the eve of the American Revolution. Local in origin, it had an especial importance for Quebec or, as Langelier puts it, "... la colonisation a toujours été pour notre Province la question primordiale..."¹

Although colonization projects reached their highest development in the period following Confederation, the conditions that gave rise to them lay in an earlier period. It is arguable, indeed, that colonization, which, reduced to its simplest terms, was an effort to control the westward movements of peoples, was a phenomenon as old as European settlement in America. Nor, may it be added, have the conditions which gave rise to this westward drift of population very much altered; the desire to escape from the trammels of the appropriated and conservative east into the limitless possibilities and free life of the west. Under the French régime in Canada, there was an incipient westward movement as population spread from Tadoussac to Quebec and from Quebec to Montreal. In the early XIX century, owing to the declining productivity of the farm land in the lower St. Lawrence Valley, the drift of people increased. The direction of the drift somewhat changed; the majority of the migrants turned south into the United States, some sought the growing towns in Quebec and only relatively few took the traditional road to the West. The political unrest in Lower Canada during the 'twenties and the 'thirties, with the attendant depression in trade hastened the movement which, by 1840, had reached appreciable proportions.² The decline of the lumber-

ing industry in the lower St. Lawrence Valley³ was a powerful factor that swept away whole communities into northern Maine and, at a later date, to western Michigan.⁴ The rise of the New England mill towns and the rapid expansion of railways in the northeastern States attracted a large number of French-Canadians even from the relatively prosperous Richelieu Valley.

It was to check this "exodus" as the drift of population was popularly called,⁵ that the colonization movement was initiated. The initiators were an oddly conflicting group, the officials of the Roman Catholic Church and some of the younger, more nationally-minded members of the newly-founded l'Institut canadien.⁶ Father O'Reilley, the Roman Catholic Missioner at Sherbrooke in the Eastern Townships,⁷ appears to have been the first to suggest that the wandering elements in the Province could be induced to settle or, to use his phrase, "to colonise" the Eastern Townships. Supported by l'Institut and by l'Avenir, O'Reilley laid his plans before the Roman Catholic Bishops of Quebec and of Montreal.⁸ The Church gave its blessing and in mid-summer of 1849 l'association canadienne-française des Townships was formed in Montreal,⁹ and proceeded to place settlers in the township of Roxton.¹⁰ The corresponding society in the arch Diocese of Quebec turned its attention towards the Lake Aylmer region.¹¹ The close association of the Montreal colonisation society with l'Institut canadien and with the Rouge party, seems to have hindered the full co-operation of the Government¹² and it was not till 1851 that the Provincial parliament gave official countenance to the colonization movement.¹³ From that point forward till Confederation, a more liberal policy was adopted in opening the unappropriated Crown Lands to bona fide settlers.

Confederation gave a new impetus, but no new direction, to the colonization movement. Operating as they now did within a political instrument,

in the Province of Quebec, that they almost exclusively controlled, the French-Canadians could now follow their bent without hindrance.¹⁴ In 1874, colonization was formally written into the programme of the French-Canadian Conservative party when a well-coordinated policy of land settlement and of railway building was initiated. Though some of the provisions, especially in the matter of railway subsidies, was open to criticism, the measure had the approval of the Liberal Opposition.¹⁵ Less successful was the so-called "Homestead Law" of the following year which appropriated some \$50,000 to be used in expatriating Canadians.¹⁶ The general success or failure of these measures was less important than the fact that they had been attempted. The average French-Canadian elector came to associate the Conservative party with a vigorous colonization programme and with efforts to ameliorate some of the most serious weaknesses in the Province's social life. The Provincial government also gave assistance to schemes of immigration from Europe,¹⁷ especially to skilled artisans and to farmers,¹⁸ but this scarcely touched the colonization movement as it has been defined.

That the Conservative leaders shewed an unusual degree of wisdom in identifying themselves with the colonization movement can scarcely be over-emphasised. In many respects, colonization was the crystallization of the later XIX century nationalism.¹⁹ It struck its roots deep into French-Canadian life for it was primarily an organized attempt to keep a rural, farming people in the country and on their farms,²⁰ "... le peuple canadien est, avant tout, un peuple agricole, qu'il déserte le sol, et il devient aussitôt un étranger.." Colonization had another aspect which satisfied an instinct almost as fundamental as that mentioned above. The Church was deeply interested in the colonization movement. Her priests

had been among its originators²⁴ and throughout the succeeding period men like Labelle of Terrebonne had made their names synonymous with its extension.²² In the way it united the aspirations of both race and of Church, the colonization movement may be said to have raised French-Canadian nationalism to its transcendental form. It appeared to be the means whereby the French-Canadian could fulfil his apostolic rôle as some of them loved to describe it of gallicizing and of catholicizing the North American Continent. The failure of the French-Canadian settlements in the Canadian North-West to meet the competition of English-speaking immigration and the tragic aftermaths of the Red River and Saskatchewan Rebellions gave this highly exotic concept a far wider acceptance than it would have had under more normal conditions. It is interesting to note in passing that colonization provided the theme for a considerable body of literature, for instance, Gérin Lajoie's Jean Rivard and Loïs Hémon's more widely read Maria Chapdelaine.

During the long Conservative régime, the field of colonization was progressively extended. As we have seen in an earlier paragraph, the first areas opened for organized settlement were in the Eastern Townships. Previous to this efforts had been made to penetrate the "bois francs", that is, the unoccupied lands in the rear of the seigneuries in the neighbourhood of Sorel,²³ but they were sporadic in character. The Confederation era coincided with a change in the direction of colonization from the south to the north shores of the St. Lawrence River. The country near Ste. Thérèse in Terrebonne County had been occupied for some time²⁴ but it was not till the 'fifties and the 'sixties that it at all rapidly filled up.²⁵ Under the drive of L.O. David, Chapleau and Father Labelle,²⁶ this "north shore" area became the scene of great repatriation activities in the course of the next decade. A close examination

of the influences that made this country so appealing discloses an extraordinary diversity. There was a psychological attraction that must not be underestimated. It was a forest country and, therefore, made an unusually strong appeal to the pioneering instincts of the French-Canadians;²⁷ it was a country that was new and apparently without boundaries and as such roused that spirit of adventure which, as Vattier has observed, is almost a national trait.²⁸ There were more material attractions in the form of timber and of minerals. These last may not have appealed very much to the average colonist but they did to his moneyed backers. It is not without significance that closely connected with the "north shore" developments were the names of some of the most substantial men in the Province; Masson with Terrebonne, Allan with Argenteuil and Wright and Eddy with Ottawa and with Pontiac.²⁹ After Confederation, the Ottawa Valley became one of the most favoured regions for settlement.³⁰ So, to a lesser extent, became the other areas on the left bank of the St. Lawrence, the upper reaches of the St. Maurice, the Saguenay and the Lake St. John districts.

It is no part of this study to assess the degree of success or failure that attended these colonization projects. That they were popular among French-Canadians of all classes would be difficult to contest. That they represented one of the most typical manifestations of French-Canadian nationalism is a point on which there could be little argument. We have seen how the colonization movement became closely associated with the programme of the Conservative party; it now remains to examine the way in which certain ramifications of the movement also affected the party's programme.

Of the secondary effects of the colonization movement, the most im-

portant, was undoubtedly the impetus given to the building of railways. The appropriateness of this statement may well be challenged for the railway age anticipated the colonization era and the importance of railway construction far overshadowed that of colonization. Nevertheless, with respect to the Province of Quebec in the three decades that followed Confederation, the statement is substantially correct. The new areas which were opened to settlement were removed from the natural and ancient highways of the Province--the rivers. This was true in an especial way of the colonization districts north of the St. Lawrence River, in Terrebonne County, on the upper St. Maurice and in the Lake St. John Country. To these new settlements the railway was essential for existence as well as for extension. The construction of the railways into the new areas concerned other than the colonist; it attracted the eye of the capitalist, of the promotor and of the speculator. It was in this manner that the most powerful forces in the history of modern Quebec were brought into conjunction, those of economic and social nationalism and those of predatory capitalism.

One of the earliest of these colonization railways and the one which best of all represented the various interests concerned was the line on the north shore of the Ottawa between Montreal and Hull. The value of such a line had been long recognized and by a number of parties; by the settlers of Terrebonne County who wanted access to the Montreal market for their cord-wood and wheat; by the lumber companies in the Lachute neighbourhood; by the Montreal mercantile group.³¹ The latter were by far the most insistent and, experiencing sharp competition from Toronto firms in the older sections of Canada, the merchants turned to the new north and west.³² It was at this juncture that Sir Hugh Allan became

interested.³³ Sir Hugh's activities were multifarious but, in contemplating the removal of the terminus of his ocean steamship lines from Quebec to Montreal, it was logical that he should wish to connect them with the fabulous riches of the west.³⁴ Allan was alert, also, to the admirable strategic position a railway line from Montreal to Ottawa would occupy in the event of the construction of the transcontinental line. He at once secured a charter³⁵ from the Quebec legislature, a land subsidy from the same source,³⁶ a cash guarantee from the City of Montreal,³⁷ and began work. With the French-Canadian settlers, the project roused great enthusiasm³⁸ and Allan, who was nothing if not a good salesman, gave the railway the inspired title of "the Montreal Northern Colonisation." As he recounted in his letter, so frequently quoted, to the "prominent American Railway President", he stumped the country in the quest of funds and of good will.³⁹ He was attended by a devastating array of adverse circumstances. The Grand Trunk railway company, of course, opposed the scheme. Having failed to rouse Cartier and the older French-Canadian Conservatives, the Grand Trunk proceeded to influence the English press,⁴⁰ with the consequence that when Allan came seeking funds he found the London money market practically closed.⁴¹ The revelations of the Pacific Scandal further damaged Allan's credit and the depression of the "seventies brought the work of construction to a halt west of Grenville. The Montreal Witness summed up the brief troubled history, "... the beginning and the end of the Montreal Colonisation railway was champagne..."

The Montreal line was ultimately merged in a more ambitious project, that of linking Ottawa and Quebec by means of a trunk line. This line had been long in contemplation,⁴² but it was not till 1872 that construc-

tion was actually begun. The railway began under the happiest of auspices since it received the blessing of the archbishop of Quebec.⁴³ The blight of the depression settled on this railway also and in 1875 the Quebec government made the momentous decision of taking over both the Montreal Colonisation railway and the Montreal and Quebec line, of completing them under the Department of Public Works⁴⁴ and of operating them under the title of the Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa and Occidental.⁴⁵ It is doubtful if any single undertaking so strongly appealed to the French-Canadians as did this railway and it was speedily transformed into the symbol of the new French-Canadian nationality.⁴⁶ Unhappily, the railway too quickly became the symbol of the sectional differences in the Province. As a "north shore" undertaking it fired the rivalry of the older settlements on the right bank of the St. Lawrence and in the debates over its route it rekindled the latent hostility of Quebec and of Montreal. The railway had an even more extended significance since it was directly responsible for the coup d'état of 1878, for much of the Province's subsequent financial embarrassment and, in its sale, for the first serious loss in popularity that the Conservative party received. The railway was in operation by 1879 and, under government management, seems to have provided a satisfactory service.⁴⁷ The sale of the Q.M.O.O. Railway so generally regarded as "ce projet patriotique" was politically most inept,⁴⁸ but there were forces at work more potent even than public opinion.

The successful completion of the Q.M.O.O. gave an impetus to a large number of additional railway projects. The majority of these were designed to serve the needs of the new communities in the various sections of the Province. Thus railways were built, or at least were chartered,

into the country back of Quebec, into the timber-land south of Levis, into the fastnesses of Drummond-Arthabaska County,⁴⁹ into the Eastern Townships⁵⁰ and into the Gaspé Peninsula. That some of these new lines would answer very real needs is probable but many of them were planned from other motives. The large provincial subsidies, originally of land but later of money, had powerful attractions. Then, because the construction meant a boom to a community, it is more than probable that many of the lines were fostered by the party managers as a useful accessory to the mechanism of political patronage. The combination of depression, of easily gained subsidies and of an uncertain political situation explains the great increase of railway charters that was characteristic of 1874 and of 1875.⁵¹ Nor is it unlikely that the railway contractor and the railway promotor were slow in forcing the hands of members of the Provincial parliament. It is doubtful if any of the Mitchells or the Legges or the Seymours were ever as successful as Sir Hugh Allan had been in compelling Sir George E. Cartier to submit to dictation, but, after all, brigands of the stature of Sir Hugh were rare even in post-Confederation Canada. In time, as the rewards became progressively greater, the unholy alliance between the politician and the promotor became increasingly close as the revelations of the Bay of Chaleurs railway investigations in 1891 were to disclose.

In response to this general and wide-spread interest, how did the French-Canadian Conservatives adapt their railway programme? Of the service the railway could perform in the Province and of its value to colonization they were well aware and were prepared to use the resources of the government to further railway extension.⁵² Thus, as early as 1869 the first steps were taken in the formation of a railway policy⁵³ when it

was resolved to assist the railways already in the course of construction and, in particular, the Montreal Colonisation railway by means of land grants and of cash subsidies.⁵⁴ This plan was adhered to till 1874. By that year, the Government's programme was fully matured. It took the form of a cash subsidy of \$2,500 a mile for each mile of line completed⁵⁵ in addition to an especial loan to each of the Montreal Colonisation railway and to the Montreal and Quebec railway.⁵⁶ By the same act the practice of making land grants to the railways was discontinued. In view of the needs of the Province to secure competent, year-round transportation, the Conservative programme of state aid to the railways was sound. In fact, in view of the relatively small capital available within Quebec, it is difficult to see how the programme could be improved on. In abandoning the original system of land subsidies, the Conservative protagonists pointed out that they were defending the public domain from the encroachment of large interests. The practical working-out of the programme was more open to criticism. It undoubtedly gave great opportunities to the unscrupulous politician and to the capitalist. It also roused dormant sectional rivalries. It is possible that these considerations which, after all, are inherent in any scheme of state aid to railways, would have been less damaging had the Conservative party been in a more healthy condition. But, weakened as it was by indifferent leadership and torn by factional struggles, it had little power to control some of its less responsible rank-and-file. One of the most interesting facts⁶⁵ of the general railway policy was the gesture in the direction of government ownership. It is difficult to trace the antecedents of the move, but the principle of government ownership had been inherent in Conservative thinking for some time; the Intercolonial railway was built and operated

under the supervision of the Department of Public Works and it was part of Macdonald's original plan to have the transcontinental constructed by the government.⁵⁷ The resolve of the Quebec authorities to return to the system of private ownership of the railway is more easy to follow. The heavy cost of operation was one of the disposing causes, but the wishes of some of Mr. Chapleau's friends ^{were} ~~was~~ even more imperative. The railway was lost to the Province for a mere song.⁵⁸ The only group of the Conservative party which defended the retention of the line in Provincial hands was the small following of deBoucherville in the Legislative Council. It was only among the remnant of the Programmatists that any conception of the public weal survived. It is not without significance that disagree as the Nationalists might on details they had no criticism to offer against the general programme of the Conservative party with respect to railways.⁵⁹

Closely associated with railway construction and with the development of colonization was Provincial finance. The more closely the history of Quebec is studied in the XIX century, the more important is this subject seen to be. Within the strict usage of the term it may be improper to speak of a party's financial programme, but it is essential to have some division in which to study this most important phase of government.

Even the most superficial examination of the financial conditions of Quebec in the thirty-years following Confederation reveals a curious phenomenon--a wealthy Province⁶⁰ with an increasing revenue⁶¹ forced to rely on loans and on advances from financial institutions to meet its current expenditures.⁶² The prime cause of Quebec's financial plight, although it was not recognized till late,⁶³ was the inelastic character

of its chief source of revenue, the subsidy it received from the Dominion government.⁶⁴ In spite of the increase of population which multiplied the services the Government was called on to perform, the subsidy did not increase proportionally. The sources of revenue which the Provincial Government could tap were restricted. Some of these revenues, for instance, those derived from the sale of timber limits fluctuated considerably.⁶⁵ To systematic, or to direct taxation, the people of the Province were obstinately opposed. This was the crux of the entire financial problem; the Province must be disciplined to rational taxation, but this was a task no party dared undertake. The usual palliatives were suggested,

".. take a lofty and patriotic tone .. and say you will go to the country on the question of economy and retrenchment.." ⁶⁶

The advice was as futile as it was useless; both Conservatives and Nationalists preferred to drift.

The story of Provincial indebtedness is one of considerable complexity. Until the middle 'seventies, the Quebec Government kept a strict watch over finances and managed to live easily within its income. In 1873, the satisfactory settlement of the debt of the old Province of Canada seemed to put finances on a permanently sound basis.⁶⁷ This bright promise was speedily destroyed by the action of the commercial depression which reduced revenues materially⁶⁸ and which compelled the government to increase its grants to some of its departments, notably to education and to charities. The heavy expenses involved in assuming control of the Quebec, Ottawa railway could not be met out of the ordinary revenues and recourse was had to a loan, ".. as a temporary expedient.." ⁶⁹ From that point onward, the descent was easy. Nor was any effort made to differentiate loans which were negotiated to meet legitimate needs and loans which were incurred simply to provide additional revenue.

By 1882, the Province was indebted to the extent of some \$16,000,000.⁷⁰ In addition to these long-term loans were "temporary advances" usually secured from the Bank of Montreal at very high interest.⁷¹ Even during the prosperous years of the early 'eighties the debt continued to mount and, in 1887, was reckoned to be in excess of \$24,000,000.⁷² Nor did the change from Conservative to Nationalist administration produce any appreciable alteration since, during their four years of office, the Nationalists added some \$10,000,000 to the staggering load of indebtedness.⁷³ Arresting as these figures are, they actually give a conservative view of the situation for it was very difficult to estimate the exact amount of the temporary loans.

The conditions which produced this situation have been touched on already, an inelastic revenue; an increasing population; multiplication of services. The efforts of the Conservatives to meet the problems were along the lines of the old sterile solutions of economy and of retrenchment. Alarmed at their dwindling popularity, they made but one serious attempt to put into effect the only solution possible, increased and systematic taxation. In 1882, the Government placed a small tax on commercial corporations operating within the Province--street railways, telegraph companies and the like. The amount to be raised cannot be regarded as excessive since it was only \$200,000.⁷⁴ The measure failed to produce relief for the corporations either arrogantly refused to pay or tested the validity of the law in the Courts.⁷⁵ It remained for the Nationalist Treasurer, McShehyn, to revive the law and to derive a small revenue from it.

There was one source of relief in this financial enigma to which the Conservatives and their successors the Nationalists turned with impari-

ality. This was to the Dominion Government. It was pointed out with a good deal of justification that the Dominion subsidy was inadequate and that some amendment was in order. In the first instance there was no demand for an increase in the amount of the subsidy but, rather, the Province desired that the Dominion should assume some of its obligations. For example, in 1873, Ontario and Quebec at last having determined the division of their old provincial debt dexterously passed it over to the Dominion Government.⁷⁶ With the Pacific Scandal suspected, if not revealed, the central government was in no condition to resist the pressure of the local. The lesson was not lost and in the next decade Quebec was to force concessions from Ottawa in the matter of railway grants. In the 'eighties, the demands for "better terms" for Quebec came without disguise.⁷⁷ From that date onward, almost every provincial treasurer reiterated the demand for an increased subsidy. The demand did not go unheard, the subsidy was increased, grants were made to the provincial railway and in this way the sharpest voice of criticism was silenced. The consequences of these appeals to the Dominion Government were to be far-reaching. They gradually reconciled the Provincial Conservatives to the view that the ultimate solution of all problems lay outside the Province with the leaders of the French-Canadian wing of the Dominion party. The Provincial party lost its sense of responsibility, it lost its respect and, most serious of all, it lost the regard of the people of the Province.

It is at this point that it is most appropriate briefly to indicate some of the salient features of what may be called the larger programme of the French-Canadian Conservative party. In discussing this topic it is difficult to separate the programmes of the French Canadian and of the English-speaking Canadian Conservatives, but a few points in which

French-Canadians were particularly interested may be touched on.

From a relatively early date the French-Canadians were interested in tariff matters. This subject has been dealt with in some detail elsewhere;⁷⁸ here it is necessary only to discuss the more important features. The interest they manifested in the tariff seems to have sprung from two sources, the academic and the real. On the one hand, the younger French-Canadian intellectuals became concerned in the project of a self-contained, self-sufficing Canada. In this respect they joined hands with a somewhat similar group in English-speaking Canada, the Canadian National Party.⁷⁹ The French-Canadians realized that as a predominately^{re} agricultural country, Canada must remain dependent on Great Britain and the United States for many essential manufactured articles. In the campaign, therefore, for self-sufficiency, it was necessary that Canada should become a manufacturing country and the most easy way to achieve this end was by the institution of a protective tariff, behind which native industries could develop. The more far-seeing of the idealists were not prepared to rely wholly on the tariff, but wished to supplement it by a complete system of technical education and by a revived and rationalized form of apprenticeship. Among some of the younger French-Canadians there was a fear that in the new Confederation where success would be measured in terms of material progress, their fellow-countrymen, schooled so largely along classical and traditional lines, would fall behind. The best expression of this apprehension is to be found in Wilfrid Laurier's maiden speech in 1871 in the Quebec Legislature.⁸⁰ Point was given to these academic interests in fiscal matters by the conditions that prevailed in Quebec and throughout Canada in the decade that followed Confederation. The abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty with

the United States followed so speedily by the depression made itself felt with unusual force in Quebec. In consequence, there was a great increase in emigration, especially from among the younger men of the Province. The palliative of colonization proved ineffective since the farmer felt the slump in the price of food products quite as much as the working-man felt the decline in wages. The great manufacturers of Montreal and of Quebec were affected as well and during the middle 'seventies, the Redpath refineries in Montreal were forced to suspend operations. Under these circumstances, the plea for a planned economy, based on the security of an adequate tariff, received unusually favourable attention. The suspension, or the reduction of activity on great programmes of public work, such as the transcontinental railway, added the force of immediate example to the arguments advanced by the theorists of le Nouveau Monde and of la Minerve.

Since the French-Canadian Conservatives did not have a formal programme, it could scarcely be said that protection was written into it. It was undoubtedly favoured by them and the adoption of the National Policy satisfied the aspiration of all but the most logically minded. It would be a nice question to decide to what degree French-Canadian inclinations influenced the Conservatives in adopting the National Policy. It can be said, however, in making the protective tariff one of the cardinal points in the Conservative programme, Macdonald had the almost unanimous support of Quebec. To that extent, therefore, the interest of French-Canadian Conservatives in protection prepared a powerful section of public opinion for the impending change.

Whether the French-Canadians had as well defined programme with respect to railways as they did with respect to the tariff, is questionable. They did entertain, nevertheless, some strong views and in the peculiar

position they occupied, they were able to make their views felt. The active interest of French-Canadians in the general railway policy of the Dominion may be dated conveniently from the inauguration of the transcontinental line. It will be recalled that Cartier had piloted the original charter for the Pacific railway through Parliament and his association with the railway was passed on as a general heritage to his party.

A more rational explanation of the interest of French-Canadians in the transcontinental railway lay in geography. When the railway was originally projected, the eastern terminus had been left indefinite. In placing the end of steel at Lake Nipissing, Macdonald and his co-adjutors probably hoped that the long-standing rivalry between Montreal and Toronto would quickly carry the road farther to the east without cost to the Canadian government. The activity of Sir Hugh Allan and of his French-Canadian satellites in projecting the Northern Colonisation railway need only be cited to indicate that Macdonald had not misjudged his men. The expansion of the colonisation railway into the Q.M.O.O.R.R. shewed that French-Canadians realized the unrivalled boon that geography had conferred on them by giving them control of the river valleys by which the transcontinental line must descend to the sea. There was an easily understandable desire on the part of French-Canadians to secure for Montreal and for Quebec their historic positions as the great ports of entry for the commerce of Canada. It was to this end that the railway from Montreal to Quebec had been so carefully built and at such great expense.⁸¹ Had the railway been constructed simply to meet the demands of local traffic, its specifications would not have been set so high. It was intended from the beginning to be the eastern extension of the Pacific railway.

The political value of the Q.M.O.O.R.R. quite as much as its geographical was appreciated by French-Canadians. In the middle 'eighties when the cry for "better terms" was becoming insistent, the railway was used as a species of political blunderbuss to bring the Dominion government to terms. The financial condition of the Province was immediately responsible for what followed. By 1882, the charges on the debt were some \$850,000 annually, or about one-half the revenue of the Province. The sale of the railway did not bring very great relief, since only some \$7,600,000 was realized. It was at this juncture that the French-Canadian Conservatives recalled some of the provisions of the original Pacific charter which had provided a subsidy of \$12,000 a mile for a line built east from Lake Nipissing in the direction of Ottawa. In 1874, the Canada Central, an Ontario road which had been built from Lake Nipissing to Pembroke and thence to Ottawa, received the subsidy. The question was asked; why should not Quebec receive similar consideration for the lines built within the Province and with Provincial money to connect with the Canadian Pacific? The demands of the Province were put bluntly; on the line from Montreal to Ottawa the Province should receive the full subsidy of \$12,000 a mile, on the line between Montreal and Quebec \$6,000. The Dominion Government was not prepared to submit tamely to these demands from Quebec.⁸² Macdonald feared the precedent. It was, in fact, not till 1884, that the demands of the Province were met. In that year the Canadian Pacific syndicate approached the Dominion Government for additional loans. Both within and without Parliament the opposition to further aid was strong and the Government needed all its supporters to force the measure through the Houses. It was at this critical moment that the French-Canadian Conservatives presented their demands afresh and faced by the prospect of

losing the Quebec vote, the Government capitulated.⁸³

In the larger field of party programme, the incident mentioned above has little place. It is worthy of attention, however, for two considerations. In the first place, it shews the extent to which demoralization had proceeded within the ranks of the Conservative party. Interests within the Province of Quebec had forced the French-Canadian Conservative members of the Dominion Parliament into virtual rebellion. The Conservative party was no longer an organic unity guided by one head and working to one end. It had become a selfish alliance of warring factions. In the second instance, it demonstrated the incompetence of the later Conservative leaders who were, by their very ineptitude, forced to employ such expedients to secure revenues for the Province.

From what has been said of the French-Canadian Conservative programme, in its various phases, it will be seen that generalizations are difficult. That the programme was popular, especially with respect to railway building within the Province, to colonization and to the protective system, is incontestable. It might be added that not only was the tariff popular, it did every credit to its originators who turned vague sentiments into a digested programme capable of immediate application. The Conservative programme, in the three phases mentioned, was satisfying to the people of the Province since it made it possible for them to play their part in the national progress of the Dominion.

Other phases of the party's programme were less successful. In matters of finance, the record was far from satisfactory. Neither the party nor the leaders had the courage to grapple with this fundamental problem and during their long tenure of office they drifted from expedient to expedient. In justice, it must be added that in this the French-

Canadians were by no means unique for no political group in Canada has ever seriously attempted to put the financial house in order. The general break-down of the party's programme with respect to finance and the complete irresponsibility with regard to railways leads one to differentiate the early and vigorous programmes from the lethargic ones of a later day. In the programme there was little continuity and as time went on it degenerated into spasmodic efforts to retain a waning popularity.

- ¹ Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques, tome 1, p. 309.
- ² Morehouse, F. Canadian Emigration in the 'forties.
Canadian Historical Review, December, 1928.
- ³ Rapport du comité spécial pour s'enquêter des causes et de l'importance de l'emigration du Bas-Canada vers les Etats Unis, p. 46ff.
Louis Perrault, Montréal, 1849.
- ⁴ ibid., p. 5.
- ⁵ Father O'Reilley's letters, in which he coined the phrase, began to appear in the spring of 1848 in l'Avenir.
- ⁶ l'Avenir, le 15 avril, 1848.
- ⁷ Drapeau, S. Colonisation du Bas Canada, p. 109.
typographie de Léger Brousseau, Québec, 1863.
- ⁸ ibid., Drapeau, p. 110.
- ⁹ l'Avenir, le 27 mai, 1848.
- ¹⁰ ibid., le 27 juin.
- ¹¹ op. cit., Drapeau, p. 111.
- ¹² Cooper, J.I. G.E. Cartier in the period of the 'forties.
Report of the Canadian Historical Association, 1938.
- ¹³ Premier et second Rapport du comité spécial .. pour s'enquêter les causes qui retardent la colonisation des Townships d'Est.
Louis Perrault, Québec, 1851.
- ¹⁴ le Sage, S. "Historique de la colonisation". p. 106.
Rapport du congrès de la colonisation tenu à Montréal, 1898.
imprimerie de la Patrie, 1900.
- ¹⁵ Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques, tome 1, p. 49.
- ¹⁶ Canadian Illustrated News. February 13, 1875.
- ¹⁷ The Province of Quebec and European Emigration (sic)
presses of l'Evenment, Quebec, 1870.
- ¹⁸ Mitchell, M. Ottawa County.
_____? 1882.
- ¹⁹ le Sage, op. cit., p. 101.
".. la colonisation a toujours un caractère d'une oeuvre patriotique.."
"le colon est le patriote en action.."
- ²⁰ Royal, J. la Colonisation.
la Revue canadienne, 1866.

- 21 Drapeau, S. la Colonisation du Bas Canada, p. 109.
- 22 Robillard, E. la Colonisation, Dorchester Bellechasse.
 ? Québec, 1901.
 preface "... le pretre est le grand colonisateur.."
- 23 Mailhot, C.E. les Bois francs.
 Especially Chapitre 7.
 la cie d'imprimerie, Beauchemin.
- 24 As early as 1824, the abbé Ducharme had founded an agricultural college
 at Ste. Thérèse. (Frapeau, p. 395)
- 25 Drapeau, S. op. cit., p. 396.
- 26 ? le Canada et le curé Labelle.
 ? Paris, 1885.
- 27 Vattier, G. Essai sur la mentalité canadienne-française, p. 77.
- 28 Vattier, G. ibid., p. 76.
- 29 Tassé, J. la vallée de l'Outaouais, p. 131.
 Eusébe Sénécal, imprimeur-editeur, Montréal, 1873.
- 30 Langelier, J.C. le nord.
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- 31 Montreal Gazette, April 3, 1850. Review of Keefer's "The philosophy
 of Railways."
- 32 ? The Railway Interests of the City of Montreal, p. 5.
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- 33 Allan, H. "The Times" and its Correspondents on Canadian Railways.
 P. 1-2.
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- 34 ? The Montreal Northern Colonisation Railway, Yea and Nay.
 ? ? 1872.
- 35 Statutes of the Province of Quebec
 32 Victoria (1869) cap. 55, p. 223ff.
- 36 ? Report for exploration of the Montreal Northern Colonisation
Railway, p. 1.
 ? Montreal 1871.
- 37 op. cit., The Railway Interests of the City of Montreal, p. 3.
- 38 Montreal Gazette. February 17, 1872.

- ³⁹Allan, H. letter addressed "to a prominent American Railroad President" printed by the Montreal Herald, July, 1873.
- ⁴⁰The Times, April 4, 1875.
 "... no amount of argument can lead sensible people to put more money into railway projects in the Canadian Dominion.."
- ⁴¹Allan, H. op. cit., p. 21. Allan says that he was in London in 1874-1875, "... to effect arrangements for raising a certain amount of funds.."
- ⁴²Statutes of the Province of Canada,
 19 Victoria (1856) cap. 12.
- ⁴³le journal de Québec, le 19 juillet, 1872.
- ⁴⁴Statutes of the Province of Quebec,
 39 Victoria (1875) cap. 11, p. 13ff.
- ⁴⁵ibid., clause 1.
- ⁴⁶la Minerve, le 28 novembre, 1873.
- ⁴⁷Canadian Illustrated News, September 18, 1880.
- ⁴⁸Journals, Legislative Assembly, Quebec, p. 4ff.
 1882.
- ⁴⁹op. cit., Statutes, 32 Victoria (1869) cap. 52.
 p. 208.
- ⁵⁰ibid., 37 Victoria (1874) cap. 11, p. 13. Clause 1.
- ⁵¹In the Statutes of 1874, it is specified that over a dozen railways shall receive aid.
- ⁵²Journals, Legislative Assembly, Quebec, 1869.
 P. 4.
- ⁵³ibid., p. 72ff.
- ⁵⁴op. cit., Statutes. 37 Victoria Cap. 11, p. 13, clause 1.
- ⁵⁵ibid., clauses 14 and 15.
- ⁵⁶Robertson, J.G. Financial Statement, 1875, p. 32.
- ⁵⁷Pope, J. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Macdonald, p. 161ff.
- ⁵⁸The railway was sold to two different buyers; the "Western Section" to the C.P.R.; the "Eastern Section" to a syndicate. The price realized was some \$7,500,000.
 (Journals, 1882, p. 231-263). The railway probably cost in the neighbourhood of \$12,000,000.

- ⁵⁹Journals; Legislative Assembly, Quebec, 1874.
p. 186, 195.
- ⁶⁰In 1881 the value of real estate in the Province was estimated to be \$278,483,068 as against \$174,978,174 in 1868.
- ⁶¹In 1871, for example, the receipts were \$1,651,287.09. (Financial Statement 1871); in 1896 they were \$4,327,910.55 (Financial Statement 1896).
- ⁶²The first Provincial loan was negotiated in 1874.
- ⁶³Robertson, J.G. Financial Statement for the year 1884, p. 6.
- ⁶⁴The best study of Dominion-Provincial finance is contained in J.A. Maxwell's Federal Subsidies. (Harvard University Press, 1937).
- ⁶⁵E.G. The Budget Speech 1875, p. 7.
"... the receipts from Timber Limits were less owing to the stagnation of the lumber trade.."
- ⁶⁶Macdonald Papers. Letter Book 21.
Macdonald to Mousseau. Ottawa, 26 July, 1883.
- ⁶⁷Maxwell, J.A. Federal Subsidies, p. 56ff.
- ⁶⁸Robertson, J.G. Financial Statement, 1875, p. 7.
- ⁶⁹ibid., p. 4.
- ⁷⁰Previous to 1882, four long-term loans had been floated, two in London in 1874 for 800,000 and 860,000 respectively; one in New York in 1878 for \$3,000,000 and one in Paris for 878,600.
- ⁷¹Shehyn, J. Financial Statement, 1887, p. 33.
- ⁷²Shehyn, J. ibid., p. 7.
- ⁷³Hall, J.S. ibid., 1892, p. 8.
- ⁷⁴Wurtele, J. ibid., 1882, p. 30.
- ⁷⁵Wurtele, J. ibid., 1883, p. 40.
- ⁷⁶Maxwell, J.A. op. cit., p. 51ff.
- ⁷⁷Wurtele, J. op. cit., 1882, p. 47.
"... I think that the Province can fairly ask that their (sic) annual subsidy be increased.."
- ⁷⁸Cooper, J.I. Some early French-Canadian Views on Protection.
- ⁷⁹Wallace, S.W. The Growth of Canadian National Feeling.

⁸⁰Laurier, W. Discours, p. 455ff.

Discours prononcé en réponse au discours du trône le 10 novembre 1871.

⁸¹Robertson, J.G. Budget Speech, Quebec, 1875, p. 32.

⁸²At about this time Macdonald wrote to Tupper "... the C.P.R. will make its appeal this week .. I don't know how Parliament and Council will take it .. the Quebec M.P.'s (sic) have the line to Quebec up again.." (printed in Saunders "Life and Letters of Sir Charles Tupper," vol. 2, p. 47.)

⁸³the Week, April 10, 1884.

CHAPTER 8

THE CRITICS OF FRENCH-CANADIAN CONSERVATISM

The development of any institution and especially that of a political party may be studied profitably in reverse as well as obverse. The criticism of an opponent, however biased, has value since it gives the student additional material on which to base his judgments. If the criticism does no more, it may give the examiner some idea of the passions that old controversies engendered. Since, in the last analysis, a political party is no more than organized public opinion, it is necessary to study opposition groups in order to trace dissensions from the main stream of national thought.

In any study of the French-Canadian Conservative party an examination of its critics and of the criticisms they levelled against it is necessary for a proper understanding of the party. It is especially so in the post-Confederation period since some of the most trenchant criticism of Conservative policy came from within the party itself. As well, therefore, as studying the groups which were officially opposed to Conservative principles and practices, it is necessary to study some of the heresies which appeared within the party proper. It is worth while also, in examining the critics and their criticisms to ask to what extent did they contribute to the final eclipse of the Conservative party. This is a question to which no complete answer can be returned since it is obvious that few political parties fall simply, or principally, because of the criticism of their enemies. Nevertheless, in the success or the failure of the critics of Conservatism we are able to trace, in part, the fluctuations of public opinion throughout the Province.

The official critics of the Conservatives were, of course, the Liberals. The French-Canadian Liberal party has a longer and a more

easily traced history than has its rival. French-Canadian Liberals can trace an ancestry that dates back to the 'thirties and even to earlier decades of the century, for the antecedents of the party are to be found in the Reformers who supported Papineau in the years before the Rebellion. The first elements of the party's philosophy also dated from this period, since Papineau was able to bequeath to his successors some of his democratic ideas and some of the views he borrowed from the English Liberals.¹ It must not be supposed, however, that French-Canadian Liberals maintained these principles with consistency. In the later 'forties they turned almost entirely to Continental Liberalism for guidance and, for nearly a generation, forgot their English traditions till they were reasserted by Laurier, in 1877.² On its philosophic side, two traditions, mutually conflicting, lay at the basis of French-Canadian Liberalism, the constructive ideas of English Liberalism and the destructive ideas of Continental Liberalism. It would seem, therefore, that French-Canadian Liberalism owed much more to alien examples than did French-Canadian Conservatism which, as we have seen, in Cartier's hand was largely a native growth.

In much of the period under discussion, the triumphant tradition among French-Canadian Liberals was that drawn from the Continent of Europe and, more especially, from France. In the later 'forties, there took place in the life of French Canada a remarkable renaissance, the origins of which no scholar has attempted to assess as yet. In the younger professional group it roused a critical, progressive spirit that welcomed new ideas. The return of Papineau from his exile in the United States and in Europe in 1845 brought the new ideas, the foundation of l'Institut canadien in Montreal in 1844 provided the vehicle, and the appearance of l'Avenir in 1847, the mouth-piece of the new movement. The impact of ex-

ternal events, the liberal and nationalistic revolutions that swept Europe in 1848 gave the younger men an example and a name. They became known as the "Rouges" and some of them certainly deserved the title.

The mercurial character of the Rouge or advanced-Liberal group makes it dangerous to generalise with respect to its programme. As a group, the Rouges were democrats and strongly opposed to monopolies of every kind. "... démocrates par conscience et Canadiens par origine.." ran the opening lines of the group's manifesto in 1849. Some of them became republicans in the exciting days of 1849 when l'Avenir appeared under the startling sub-title, "Journal républicain publié dans les intérêts populaires." As a group, too, they were infected by the Annexationist virus as the columns of l'Avenir amply evidence. Thereafter it would be difficult to make statements which could include the entire party. Some of the most energetic Rouge leaders were anti-clerical, even anti-religious.³ There were in the ranks of the Rouge party, men who were not far removed from the European socialists. They were probably a minority of the group but they vigorously supported such projects^{as} the abolition of seigneurialism in Canada East and the Secularisation of the Clergy Reserves in Canada West. They joined with the anti-clericals in advocating "Mixed Schools" and the abolition of the tithe.⁴ The ideas of the Rouges on the problems of French-Canadian nationality were vague and conflicting. Previous to 1849, the Rouges and their press had been strongly nationalistic in character as their support of the colonisation movement indicates, but thereafter they turned as strongly to the advocacy of Annexation to the United States,⁵ which would have entailed the submergence of the French-Canadian in the larger North American world. Individual Rouges aspired to a species of internationalism that would have rejoined French Canada and old France by

the bonds of language and of intellectual achievement.⁶ On such an issue as Confederation, the Rouges could speak with a fairly unanimous voice. But again, the fatal inconsistency of the party was demonstrated because, while the Rouges had supported federation as an idea, they opposed it in practice. The attack that the Rouge leader, A.A. Dorion, made on the Quebec Resolutions may be taken as crystallizing the views of the party at large.⁷ He attacked the project because it threatened French-Canadian national existence, because it would deliver the Provinces to the exploitation of the great business houses of Montreal and of Toronto, and finally, because a federal state, composed of such incompatible and unequal elements as the British American Provinces would be a political impossibility. The arraignment was sweeping and not without penetration, but numerically, Dorion's followers were weak and, accordingly, his criticisms went unheeded.

The failure of the Rouges to arrest the progress of the federation movement was symptomatic of the general failure of the party. The heyday of Rouge successes was in 1854 when the group returned some nineteen or twenty members to the Provincial Legislature.⁸ Thereafter its supporters fell away and by 1867 it represented only a handful from Canada East. The group had suffered for its advanced and alien philosophy and its complete failure to make its theories square with prejudices and instinctive views of French-Canadians. The sum of the Rouges' unpopularity was complete when they allied themselves with the Grits of Canada West. In the eyes of the average French-Canadian, the Rouges had become not only rebels but traitors.

In the two decades that followed Confederation, the French-Canadian Liberals fell on evil days. Indeed, for a period, the party actually

disappeared, at least in name, from the roster of Quebec political organizations. At the end of the period, say by 1887, the metamorphosis was complete for by that time Laurier and Mercier had completely revamped the party's programme. The unpopularity of the Liberal party did not cease with Confederation. It was regarded uncritically as the party of the Socialist and of the free-thinker and suffered from the vigour of the Ultramontane Conservatives. By the clericals it was denounced as Liberal Catholic,⁹ as some of its members probably were and by the Conservatives as, "... cette association hybrid, le parti libéral, national, grit, réformiste..."¹⁰ The brief unhappy reign of the Commune in Paris provided the Conservative press with endless ammunition and for some time the terms "Communard" and "Rouge" were used almost interchangeably. Finally, the political and clerical attack became so unbearable that the Quebec Liberals entered into an uneasy alliance with the dissident Conservatives to form le parti national. It was hoped that a change in name would disarm its numerous opponents. To this end M. Louis Jetté, a Montreal lawyer, who had represented the episcopal interests in Bishop Bourget's contests with the Sulpicians, was chosen as leader. Although Jetté succeeded in defeating Sir G.E. Cartier in his constituency in Montreal East, it can scarcely be said that he rehabilitated the party in either the provincial or in the Dominion fields. In Dominion politics, le parti national hardly made a stir for the old Liberal party with the Dorions, the Papins and the Dessaulles continued without a pretense at disguise.

In one of his more caustic moods Chapleau said that for the French-Canadian Liberals, the "Pacific Scandal" was release on suspended sentence. For four years the party enjoyed the sweets of office and the advantages that patronage always confers on those who control it. Yet between 1874

and 1878, the Quebec Liberals accomplished very little. They continued to be unpopular in Quebec itself. The party could not live down its past and its present alliance with the Grits of Ontario and ^{with} the secessionists from Nova Scotia did not strengthen its position. The Quebec Liberals were also unpopular because they supported old and outmoded policies. Many of them were free-traders, like Holton and Huntington, or low tariff men, almost fatal fiscal policies to espouse in face of the rising note of protest of the Quebec farmer and smalltown manufacturer.¹¹ Fundamentally, it was a matter of personnel. The French-Canadian Liberals clung to the older men like the two Dorions and Laflamme who were tainted with ancient controversies and only grudgingly admitted to their counsels the younger men of the party of whom Wilfrid Laurier was the leader. They bickered with their Nationalist allies and succeeded in excluding them from the Dominion Cabinet.¹² They quarrelled among themselves for precedence and for four years there was a dismal procession of French-Canadian parliamentary leaders at Ottawa. It was not without an element of grim justice that Laurier was defeated in the bye-election in Drummond-Arthabaska on the eve of his elevation to the leadership of the French-Canadian group. Finally, the French-Canadians were at variance with their titular leaders, Mackenzie and Blake, as even the most cursory survey of the Mackenzie Letter Books gives ample and unhappy evidence. The old-fashioned French-Canadian Liberals had no place in the life of Quebec in the generation that followed Confederation and it remained in a state of political paralysis till Laurier gave them a new philosophy and a new membership.

A more formidable body of critics of the Conservative party were the Conservative members of le parti national. Le parti national was formidable, not so much because it was numerous but because it possessed a pro-

gramme and leaders which could appeal to the French-Canadian people. In some respects le parti national was better equipped to make the appeal than the Conservative party for it could satisfy their racial aspirations and conservative traditions in a more complete manner than could the official Conservatives who were bound to a larger group which was disposed to be hostile to any purely French manifestations. The genesis of le parti national has been suggested in a previous paragraph. It was in reality an alliance of moderate Liberals and of one-time Conservatives. The Liberal wing of le parti national was composed chiefly of those Liberals who desired to bring the party into harmony with the needs and views of French-Canadian life and to escape from the stigma of political radicalism and of denominational hostility which had become associated with the name of the old Rouge group. The Conservative element in le parti national was more interesting. As has been observed elsewhere, the Conservatives had suffered a number of defections on the eve of Confederation. After 1867, these defections continued for there were those who sincerely believed that in entering the new union French Canada placed her security in grave jeopardy. The actual number of these dissident Conservatives is difficult to place but, probably, it was not high. Unluckily for the Conservative party, some of the dissidents were men of ability, such as L.O. David, the historian and the collaborator with Chapleau in the advocacy of colonization, and as Honoré Mercier the lawyer journalist from St. Hyacinthe. It is probable that Mercier and David left the Conservative party for reasons other than the somewhat negative one expressed above. David, we know, was greatly interested in colonisation or, in repatriation projects and seems to have entertained sweeping programmes of

provincial amelioration which scarcely could have been taken up by the Conservative party.¹³

The programme of le parti national had all the strengths and weaknesses which are usually found in political programmes untested by practical application.¹⁴ On its positive side the Nationalist programme, advocated the establishment of industrial and farm schools, the extension of the colonisation areas and, ultimately, the erection of a high tariff in order to make Canada self-supporting. The Nationalists also demanded the vote by ballot and the abolition of the "double mandate" in order to secure a disinterested exercise of the franchise and in order to free the Province from the tutelage of the Dominion Government. Thereafter, the programme took flight into the realms of the ideal by pressing for the abolition of the Legislative Council, the amendment of the Dominion Senate by the application of the elective principle and the cessation of construction on the transcontinental railway, "... tant que le Nord-Ouest ne serait pas suffisamment colonisé..." The last clause kept odd company with the earlier ones which were designed to promote provincial and national expansion.

Fortunately for le parti national, it was not called upon to function in the larger sphere of Dominion administration and, accordingly, the more imaginative elements in its programme were not put to the test. Within the provincial field it did supply a very real need and a number of its projects were taken over by the Conservatives. A careful reading of French-Canadian journals and periodicals suggests that a number of these ideas for the improvement of the Province were the peculiar property of no one party or of no one group. The programme of improvement was most fully set out in the pages of l'Opinion Publique, the widely-

read, illustrated weekly which was edited by men of both parties. This was certainly true of one of the schemes for Provincial advancement, that of encouraging home industries and of its corollary, the establishment of a protective tariff.¹⁵ The advantages of the protectionist system to a state with nationalistic ambitions was seen by groups as far removed politically as the Rouges and the ultra-Conservatives and was supported by newspapers of such varying shades of opinion as le Nouveau Monde and le Pays. It would seem, therefore, on what might be called the economic and social side of their programme these early Nationalists undoubtedly voiced the desires of a considerable number of French-Canadians. It may be added that they gave emphasis to a point of view implicit in French-Canadian but till then little stressed by either of the older parties, namely, that the Province was the unit of action and that the logical method to affect national amelioration was through the agency of the Provinces. In this way le parti national gave impetus to a development which was to completely change the character of the Canadian federation, the struggle for provincial autonomy. Circumstances of the period, the relative decline in provincial revenues, the rising costs of colonisation projects and the heavy expense of railway building all compelled attention to the programme of the Nationalists. The great Nationalist triumph at the polls in 1886 is usually explained in terms of an outburst of national feeling against the Conservatives who had consented to the execution of Louis Riel; may it be suggested that the Nationalists were well advanced in popular opinion long before trouble broke out in the North-West in the spring of 1885.

Despite the potentialities implicit in its programme, le parti national probably would have been a long time in making its merits known had it not

been for the adroitness of its principal leader, Honoré Mercier. Mercier did not become the official leader of the party till 1883 but he had pursued a policy which was destined to destroy the Conservative party as an effective political machine. His career is, therefore, of unusual importance in any study of French-Canadian Conservatism. Previous to Confederation, Mercier had been a Conservative and had acted as the editor of le Courrier de St. Hyacinthe.¹⁶ In 1866, however, Mercier abandoned his party on the issue of Confederation seeing in it a danger to the safety of French-Canadian institutions and a reckless effort on the part of the Conservatives to retain power.¹⁷ The unwillingness of the Quebec Conservative leaders to defend the interests of their co-religionists in New Brunswick, brought Mercier into the ranks of le parti national¹⁸ and, in 1872, into the House of Commons as the Nationalist member from Rouville.¹⁹ Mercier's true sphere, as he was quick to recognize, was in the Quebec Parliament and after 1879 he confined his activities to Provincial affairs.

Mercier has suffered severely at the hands of historians. His French-Canadian biographers, of whom M. Robert Rumilly is a good example,²⁰ have been so laudatory as to be uncritical, while his English commentators, concentrating on the favours shewn the Roman Catholic Church and making much of the scandals attached to his name, have completely forgotten that Mercier was a reformer. There were confusing, and perhaps confused, elements in Mercier's make-up. He was sincerely attached to his Church and he was well aware of the tremendous political advantages that would accrue from drawing it to the national party. Hence his extraordinarily adroit settlement of the vexing controversy over the Jesuit property; hence too his employment of clergymen as, for example, the appointment of curé Labelle as Deputy Minister of Colonization. Mercier had strong reforming

tendencies, a proclivity that probably explains the following he won among the younger English-speaking group especially in Montreal.²¹ Mercier's critics have usually passed over his keen interest in education and his efforts to make the Quebec schools serve the needs of the rapidly changing Province by advocating compulsory education and by establishing night schools.²²

Mercier's contribution to le parti national and to the Liberal party which became its executor were considerable. In the first instance, he took over the amorphous and exotic party programme and made it thoroughly practical. In fact, one might go farther and add that he made the vague aspirations of nationalism solid and concrete. In assessing Mercier's career we have in past time given too much attention to his manipulations of the Riel controversy and too little to his road-building and to his interest in colonization. In his four years of office from 1887 to 1891, he gave his party the discipline and the cohesion that success alone can achieve. His greatest services to French-Canadian Liberalism was, of course, that he disarmed the Church by demonstrating to its ministers and to the Roman Catholic electors that the Liberal, no less than the Conservative party, had benefits which it could bestow. In this respect, Mercier's service was the complement of Laurier's.

In our previous remarks on the critics of the Conservatives, we have dealt with parties and groups which had a recognized position. It now remains to examine a third group of critics most of whom were with the Conservative party, but who disagreed with its policies or distrusted its leaders. The ancestry of this group, its activities and its influence is exceedingly difficult to assess for it scarcely had a separate existence and to the last it was much more an association of individuals than a

party. It was, in fact, as individuals that these Conservative critics were to achieve notice. They had even no name by which to call themselves for the title "Castor" which was applied to them in derision did not become general throughout the group. Our task, therefore, is to examine the work of individuals loosely associated by the negative bonds of dissatisfaction and of distrust.

As has been suggested, these critics of Conservatism had a mixed ancestry. In some respects, they could be regarded as the successors of the Programmatists who had set out to reform the Conservative party from within. This resemblance came more from individuals who belonged to both groups than from any similarity in programme. For example, F.X.A. Trudel who had been one of the drafters of le programme catholique was one of the leading lights of the Castors.²³ In fact, before the name "Castor" became current the group was called "le parti de Trudel."^{24,25} Trudel was an interesting figure in many ways typical of his generation and of his country, a lawyer with literary leanings and a politician with clerical proclivities.²⁶ He was the author of a curious work, forgotten now, "Nos Chambres hautes," a prolix and exceedingly learned defence of Second Houses. Trudel was, to use his own phrase, a Conservative of the Conservatives, out of temper with all compromise, a sincere monarchist and a sincere Catholic. He was essentially a brittle-minded man, strong in his prejudices and, "... at variance with his colleagues on many important subjects..." Another man of the same generation but scarcely of the same character was Sir Hector Langevin who passed uneasily from the Catholic Programme to the Castor group. More indicative of the critical temper of the Castors were the younger members of the group, such as Israel Tarte and Thomas Chapais. When he entered the Provincial Parliament in 1877,

Tarte was popularly regarded as "porte-étandard du parti ultramontain.." ²⁷
 In those days, Tarte was Sir Hector's righthand man in the Quebec District and the editor of le Canadien. The best representative of the Castor group and the unintentional author of the group's label was Thomas Chapais. ²⁸
 Chapais was the son-in-law of Sir Hector Langevin, a circumstance which may suggest one of the less advertised characteristics of the group. Other prominent Castors were the Honourable M. deBoucherville and Senator Bellerose. ²⁹

The programme and the policy of the Castors, if such terms may be applied to a loosely held body of ideas and prejudices, was largely an individual matter. Too frequently it degenerated into, "... une lutte malhonnête qu'injustifiable contre le gouvernement conservateur de Québec ...". ³⁰ On the constructive side the Castors had little to offer and an analysis of their programme as exemplified in addresses and in pamphlets shews that it was principally an attack on the Conservative leader Chapleau and on his Liberal converts Flynn and Pâquet. ³¹ The most positive element in the group's programme was, of course, its ultramontanism, and its most attractive features its loyalty to the old Conservative leaders like deBoucherville who had been pushed aside to make room for the more aggressive Chapleau. ³² It is probably not reading too much into occasional remarks and into ideas implied rather than expressed to see in the Castors the protest of the rural areas and of Quebec against the grasping exploitation of Montreal. This opinion is supported by the consideration that it was not till the 'eighties that the Castors became vocal or emerged as a group with an individual point of view. For the first time in June of 1883, ³³ the term "Castor" was applied to what "la Minerve" previously had called, "la clique de M. deBoucherville." ³⁴ The date would coincide with

Chapleau's power at its first apogee when he had made the unpopular sale of the Provincial railway and when as Secretary of State in the Dominion Cabinet he was controlling Quebec through the medium of his creature Mousseau.³⁵

It may be asked at this point; were the Castors anything more than the embodiment of discontent? To this question no definitive answer may be returned although some of them and some of their well-wishers looked on the group as the tentatives of a much more ambitious creation, a truly French-Canadian and Roman Catholic party. In his biography of Tardivel Mgr. Fèvre put the proposition forward in some detail.

".. les rouges ressemblent aux radicaux de France et forment l'aile gauche du parti libéral .. l'aile droite de ce parti se compose de libéraux modérés dans le gendre de Mercier.

"Le parti bleu se compose des tories des provinces protestantes et les soi-disant conservateurs de la province de Québec. Les bleus de Québec^{nt} sont conservateurs qu'en nom, imbus qu'ils sont d'idées libérales.

".. Pour les catholiques ^{puisque} ~~pour~~ ils espèrent qu'un jour prochain permettra d'organiser un groupe carrément catholique et pontifical ce sera le parti blanc, le parti castor..."³⁶

It should be unnecessary to remark that the Castors never attained the high destiny thus marked out for them. They never became the "Centrum" but remained a group moving uneasily on the fringes of political life. They numbered in their ranks men of sincerity and of considerable ability but they had no organization and no leader. In the Provincial General Election of 1883 the castors had in the field "Independent Conservative" candidates in the constituencies of Two Mountains, Vaudreuil and Jacques Cartier.³⁷ Their success was small although taken in conjunction with Mousseau's indifferent leadership they seem to have caused the Conservative party managers alarm.³²

Yet in spite of its apparent futility, the Castor group very nearly succeeded in bringing about a revolution in provincial politics by the formation of a union or coalition government. Through their association with both the official Conservative Government and with the Nationalist Opposition they were well adapted to affect such a project. The project of a coalition government had been a favourite with the French-Canadians since Confederation. It had been the subject of a lengthy examination by Oscar Dunn,³⁹ and had been discussed by newspapers of all shades of political opinion.⁴⁰ Of course, there was nothing very original in the proposition, for, at Confederation, Macdonald had declared against the old party system⁴¹ and in the formation of the first administrations in Ontario and in Quebec had made good his words. As Dunn pointed out in his pamphlet there was relatively little difference in policies between the Conservatives and the Nationalists and in the provincial field there could be no room for rivalry.⁴² For French-Canadians a coalition was exceptionally desirable since they had peculiar interests to guard and especial ambitions to fulfil. Although Conservatives and Nationalists both paid lip-service to the coalition idea, it was not till the Castors became a force of some consequence that the discussion was treated with any measure of seriousness.

Again it is probable that circumstances played a large part in the negotiations. The early 'eighties were trying days for both Conservatives and for Nationalists. In spite of Chapleau's resounding triumph at the polls in 1881, the Conservative party suffered a great loss in popularity in the sale of the Provincial railway, the Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa and Occidental. The fortunes of the Nationalists were at a low ebb and Mercier appears to have contemplated returning to his old law office in Montreal.⁴³

The financial condition of the Province was the cause of much concern and, in many ways, the time seemed most opportune for sweeping changes. Accordingly, both parties were in a mood to seriously consider what was put before them. It is difficult to say who initiated the proposals, but L.O. David, Mercier's Nationalist ally, and the friend of Chapleau and of Laurier, was certainly a leading spirit.⁴⁴ Chapleau was willing and in the course of an address at St. Lynn "... tendu la branche d'olivier.." According to Charles Langelier, who could have had no object in concealing the truth, Chapleau sincerely desired the formation of a coalition and was prepared to give the Nationalists three seats in the reconstructed Provincial Cabinet. But, as so frequently happens, it was the details that were difficult to settle. The Nationalists desired that Chapleau should withdraw from the Government "... en faveur d'un conservateur plus acceptable. M. Chapleau aurait accepté, peut-être cette condition, si' on avait pu mettre la main sur le conservateur.." ⁴⁵ Then there were elements in both parties which were utterly opposed to any form of coalition. This was especially true of the Nationalists, among whom the old Liberal group, headed by M. Henri Joly, the titular leader of the party and by M. Beaugrand, the editor of la Patrie, would have nothing to do with the proposals.⁴⁶ Early in 1883, Joly sent Beaugrand a letter which the Gazette published in translation;

".. I beg to ask you to go no farther in the discussion .. on the Coalition. Let us not follow the deplorable example of the Conservative party which appears not to understand that every blow aimed against its leaders falls on itself.

"I am apposed to a Coalition, but I am not ready to condemn my friends who consider it the last and the only remedy..."⁴⁷

Curiously enough, even after Joly's resignation as the Nationalist leader a few days later,⁴⁸ negotiations were not resumed. This came as a sur-

prise to the political prophets of the Gazette, who believed "... Mercier means the surrender of the Rouge party and the triumph of the principle of the fusion of parties..."⁴⁹ Although Langelier assures us that Laurier was favourable to the coalition,⁵⁰ it is probable that Liberal prejudices were too powerful for even him to disarm. The decision of the Nationalist Caucus which chose Mercier as leader gave him little choice, for it decided to oppose the Conservatives vigorously. Thereafter, Mercier was compelled to satisfy himself with unofficial proposals as, for example, when in mid-summer of 1883, he offered to serve with Mousseau.⁵¹ It would be rash to assert that these coalition proposals came to nothing; they may have failed of effect in 1883, but they provided the precedents for the Conservative-Nationalist alliance of 1886.

From the foregoing examination of the critics of the French-Canadian Conservatives, it is possible to draw some conclusions. It is clear, that well into the second decade after Confederation the Conservative party, both in principle and in practice, satisfied the needs of French-Canadians. In the provincial field, its tenure of office was unbroken if we except the brief Liberal administration of Sir Henri Joly which was installed as a consequence of Lieutenant-Governor de St. Just's coup d'état. In the Dominion field, the Conservatives continued strong in spite of the gratuitous unpopularity that came to them through such untoward events as the Riel amnesty controversy, the Pacific Scandal and the rising note of criticism with respect to the subsidies paid to the Provinces by the Dominion government. The general satisfaction that the party provided is best demonstrated in the relatively ineffective efforts of the earlier dissidents and of the tentative "Third Party" groups. That dissidents will appear and that third parties will arise in a body as large as the French-Canadian Conservative party was, and enjoying the long tenure of office that it en-

joyed, is almost inescapable. The best monument to the organic character of the party and to the extraordinary way in which it met the requirements of French-Canadian life was the manner in which such groups were either absorbed or disarmed. It would be superfluous, of course, to omit the benefits that the control of patronage offered and there is no doubt that in controlling, as they did, the Provincial and the Dominion governments for a quarter of a century, the French-Canadian Conservatives had an effective weapon to overcome opposition and to beat down discontent. Nevertheless, the lack of serious criticism cannot be explained in the control of patronage alone.

The rising note of criticism that attended the French-Canadian Conservative party after 1882 or 1883 by no means contradicts the statements made in the preceding paragraph. It may be suggested that altered conditions and the rise of an effective opposition made the Conservatives increasingly liable to criticism. The altered conditions can be dealt with here only in brief. The bad financial condition of the Province was probably the most serious for it had wide ramifications and stultified, to a large extent, the efforts of the Conservatives to develop their programme of Provincial improvement. It also led them into such unpopular expedients as the sale of the Provincial railway and involved them in questionable negotiations with the Dominion Government for additional financial aid. Financial stringency was general in the 'seventies and 'eighties and it accelerated the rise of a new type of French-Canadian nationalism that was deeply concerned with economic and social problems and which was out of temper with the sterile and political nationalism of former days. It was at this point that the lack of effective leadership in the Conservative party made itself felt. There was no one who

could mould the party programme to meet these new needs. In le parti national and in Mercier, the Province found a party and a leader which could suggest remedies and which could crystallize the vaguely defined, if tenaciously held, sentiments of the French-Canadians. In the larger province of Dominion affairs, Laurier played his part by recalling to the French-Canadian Liberal party its constructive policies. The failure of the coalition proposals of 1881 and 1883 reinforced what has been implied: Between the old order which Conservatism represented and the new order which Nationalism and Liberalism contained, there could be no reconciliation.

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- ¹⁶Legendre, N. "Men of To-day." Honoré Mercier, p. 114.
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- ¹⁷Pelland, J.O. op. cit., p. 9.
- ¹⁸ibid., p. 12.
- ¹⁹Legendre, N. op. cit., p. 115.
- ²⁰Rumilly, R. Mercier.
éditions du Zodiaque; Montréal, 1937.

²¹For this statement I have the authority of Dr. Lighthall of Montreal, who as a young professional man was attracted by the reforming and progressive elements in Mercier's programme.

²²Legendre, N. op. cit., p. 121 and 122.

²³The Dominion Illustrated. 2 January, 1890.

²⁴Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques. tome 2, p. 21.

²⁵Gazette, May 8, 1883. "... what we may call the Trudel party.."

²⁶op. cit., Dominion Illustrated.

²⁷Langelier, C., op. cit., tome 1, p. 48.

²⁸The term "Castor" as applied to the dissident Conservatives seems to have originated with the publication of the pamphlet, "le pays, le parti, et le grand homme." The pamphlet is usually attributed to Thomas Chapais.

²⁹la Minerve. le 12 mai, 1883.

³⁰ibid., le 7 juin, 1883.

³¹Castor. Le pays, le parti et le grand homme.
Gilbert Martin, Montréal, 1882.

³²ibid., p. 54ff.

³³la Minerve. June, 1883.

³⁴ibid. le 12 mai, 1883 "... une trahison....depuis d'un an, l'Honorable M. deBoucherville s'est mis en campagne contre le parti conservateur.."

³⁵David, L.O. Histoire du Canada. Chapitre 18, p. 151.

³⁶Langelier, C. op. cit. tome 1, p. 226, quotes from the biography of Tardivel.

³⁷Gazette. November 27, 1883.

³⁸ibid. November 12, 1883.

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⁴¹Pope, J. The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Macdonald.
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- ⁴⁷Montreal Gazette, January 8, 1883.
- ⁴⁸ibid., January 10, 1883.
- ⁴⁹ibid., January 19, 1883.
- ⁵⁰Langelier, C., op. cit., tome 1, p. 188.
- ⁵¹Montreal Gazette, January 23, 1883.

CHAPTER 9

THE CONSERVATIVE PROGRAMME FAILS OF ADOPTION

In previous chapters the history of the French-Canadian Conservative party has been traced and it has been suggested that, until the 'eighties, the Conservatives adequately met the needs of the Province of Quebec. The programme also harmonised with the general Conservative programme and in that way French-Canadians took their share in the progress of the Dominion. It has been suggested, as well, that after 1882 or 1883 the programme lost its attractiveness and by the end of the decade had been repudiated by the people of the Province. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the failure of the Conservative programme in detail.

The general causes of the repudiation of the programme were contained in the programme itself. The programme had been drafted to meet the material needs of the Province. It would be incorrect to say that it completely left out of consideration the racial and institutional aspects of nationalism, but it made little effort to emphasise them. That the Conservative programme had made no especial appeal to race is not surprising since one of the cardinal tenets of Conservative philosophy had been to minimise, as far as possible, everything that stood for separation. Nor had the Conservative programme made any conscious appeal to the other great force in French-Canadian life, the Church. It would be idle to assert that the French-Canadian Conservatives were indifferent to the Church, but they were not disposed to give it an undue prominence. This tendency, as has been seen, caused serious division within the party. The Conservative programme was loaded, therefore, heavily on the material side, a state of affairs which was to be of grave disadvantage to the party in issues in which either race or Church were involved.

During the later 'eighties, circumstances seemed to conspire to bring considerations involving both race and Church very much to the fore. There was a revulsion of popular opinion towards the older nationalism with its stress on race, language and creed. The North-West Rebellion and the execution of Louis Riel occasioned the rise of the National party which proceeded to exploit the indignation that was caused by the trial and the punishment of Riel. In the years that followed the Nationalists found other issues that could be linked up with some of the most deeply rooted sentiments of the French-Canadian, the settlement of the Jesuits' Estates, the championing of provincial rights and the active pursuit of reform.

With the causes and with the events of the second Riel Rebellion this study has little concern.¹ Suffice it to say that the fundamental cause of the revolt was the protest of a minority struggling to retain its identity. In that consideration the explanation of much of the later French-Canadian sympathy lies. The connexion between the rebellion on the Saskatchewan and political events in Quebec may seem remote, but the Saskatchewan rebels were Métis, French Canadian half-breeds and their leader was Louis Riel. Riel's share in the Red River Rebellion of twenty years previous had endeared him to a considerable number of French-Canadians as the champion of their national rights and his later vicissitudes won him the sympathy of many more. Circumstances surrounding his trial in 1885 for his part in the Saskatchewan Rebellion very nearly elevated Riel to the position of a national symbol and he at once became the centre of a politico-racial crisis.

The transformation of French-Canadian public opinion is one of the most curious phenomena that the later history of Canada exhibits. It

discloses also the depth of racial sentiment among French-Canadians and suggests the extent to which the Conservative party had failed to appreciate it.²

The news of the outbreak of the Rebellion found French-Canada as well as English-Canada unprepared and the first reaction of the French-Canadians was to condemn the appeal to arms and Riel's share in it. A good deal of sympathy was expressed for the Métis, and it was in this direction that opinion first softened.³ The Conservative press was much more adamant in its criticism of Riel than was the press of the Liberals or of the Nationalists. As late as June la Minerve could describe Riel as "le Mahadi du Nord-Ouest."⁴ While criticizing Riel's conduct during the Rebellion,⁵ and while condemning his attitude towards the clergy,⁶ la Minerve insisted on an impartial trial, "... justice pas de vengeance..."⁷ The French-Canadian press covered the trial very completely,⁸ and their comments on it were restrained. This last remark applies especially to la Minerve, le Monde and l'Etandard. The sentence passed on Riel was received with calmness, la Minerve professing to see, in his fall from orthodoxy, the explanation of his fate.⁹ An examination of the editorial comment at this time indicates that the French-Canadians expected an exercise of executive clemency for Riel or the appointment of a commission which would pronounce on his sanity. Towards the end of October, the Medical Board was nominated and it is not without significance that the first announcement of it appeared in the columns of le Monde, Sir Hector Langevin's recognized organ.¹⁰ Upon the decision of the Board the French-Canadians reposed much trust. It came, therefore, as a double shock when Riel was executed on November 15, 1885.

Expression of opinion was not confined to the press. Early in April

a motion had been introduced into the Quebec Parliament condemning the policy of the Dominion government, "... which they hold responsible for the blood shed..."¹¹ This motion was countered by an amendment which was carried 41 to 15 on a straight party vote. Two months later, the Dominion Government emerged successful from a trial in the House of Commons.¹² Unimportant as these episodes seem now, it is possible that they deceived Macdonald as to the true state of Quebec opinion and encouraged him to pursue a course which was to outrage the susceptibilities of French-Canada.

In forming any just estimate of the state of opinion in Quebec, it is necessary to take into account opinion in the other Provinces. In Ontario, the trial of and the sentence imposed upon Riel roused much of the old anti-French-Canadian and anti-Roman Catholic sentiment that had lain dormant for nearly three decades. The sentiment was whipped up by the irresponsible words of the Ontario newspapers. Riel was considered as "... blots and stains on our humanity which ought to be summarily removed."¹³ The attacks were then directed against the French-Canadians. Late in April, the Toronto Evening News denounced the French-Canadian regiments that had been despatched to the North-West as "... a mutinous, reckless, disorderly gang..."¹⁴ This was succeeded by an article entitled "French Aggression". The concluding sentence may very well be taken as summarising the attitude of the paper,

"... As far as we are concerned... Quebec could go out of Confederation to-morrow, and we would not shed a tear except for joy..."

It is not surprising that this article and its predecessor were made the subject of questioning in the House of Commons.¹⁵ As excitement mounted in November, when it was known that the Dominion Cabinet had Riel's sentence under consideration, the tone of the Ontario papers became more

menacing,

".. the French Canadians are now seeking to compel us to recognize their right to suspend the operation of the law...but let us.. assure them...that rather than submit to such a yoke, Ontario would prefer to smash Confederation into its original fragments, preferring that the dream of a united Canada should be shattered...than that unity should be purchased at the expense of equality..."¹⁶

And again.

"...the overthrow of the present Cabinet is to be followed by the planting of the French Ascendancy...then as Britons we believe that the Conquest will have to be fought over again, and Lower Canada may depend upon it that there will be no Treaty of 1763..."¹⁷

Outrageously provocative as these statements are, they came from no rural or small-town journals, but from the metropolitan press of Toronto. That they represented the views of Ontario cannot be doubted for the Mail, the Evening News and the Toronto Telegram had a wide circulation. With these as fair examples of Ontario opinion, is it to be wondered that Quebec reeled?

For the next month and a half, the Province of Quebec was the scene of unprecedented excitement. The execution of Riel was regarded as a deliberate affront to the French-Canadian race, an attack on the helpless representative of a small minority and a most glaring perversion of justice.¹⁸ The French-Canadians believed that the execution of Riel had been carried out for the purpose of gaining political advantage. Popular indignation was visited on the Quebec Conservative leaders, Caron, Langevin and Chapleau. They were denounced as traitors and branded as "les chevaliers de la corde." Excitement was soon translated into action and meetings were held throughout the Province. What took place in the country districts Armond Lavergne has left us a graphic picture,

"...je vis passer un traîneau portant un gibet où cinq corps étaient accrochés. Une foule immense ... suivait les malheureux pendus. On me dit les noms, sir John McDonald (sic), Chapleau,

Langevin, Tom Chase-Casgrain. Arrivés sur la place publique, ils furent dépendus et brulés sans merci-heureusement en effigie..."¹⁹

In Montreal popular excitement reached its peak and for a period there was danger of a clash between pro-Riel French and anti-Riel English. The students of Laval University paraded the city cheering the offices of the French papers that were favourable to Riel and hooting the English papers and the offices of la Minerve.²⁰ It was on the Champ de Mars, the forum of Montreal, that the last act was played out in the great gathering of November 22.²¹

That gathering was probably the most remarkable that Montreal had ever seen. It is impossible to give any accurate estimate of the numbers that assembled but they filled the entire square and surged about the stands that had been erected for the speakers. There were three stands and from them thirty-seven orators addressed the crowd. The most significant aspect of the meeting was the presence of a number of Conservatives among the speakers. The depth to which the gathering was stirred is indicated by Laurier, usually so guarded in his words, "... if he had lived on the banks of the Saskatchewan, he would have been one of the first to shoulder a musket to defend his property..."²² Lesser men appealed on more partisan grounds. Trudel compared Riel to Joan of Arc who had been burned "by the ancestors of the men who had hanged Riel." Mercier did even better; "... Riel their brother was dead, a victim of fanaticism and of treason..." He had died like a hero "... who like Christ had prayed to forgive His enemies..."²³ Mercier pointed the moral to his words, by calling on all men to join in the formation of a truly National party which would overthrow the Conservative government at Ottawa and the Ross administration in Quebec.

In assessing the extent of the excitement in Montreal, it is neces-

sary to recall that throughout the spring and summer of 1885 the city had been the centre of a violent smallpox epidemic.²⁴ The smallpox outbreak had been accompanied by considerable disorder and the people had been keyed up to a high pitch for months. This by no means discounts the understandable indignation felt by the French-Canadians and it accounts for, in part, some of the irresponsible violence that accompanied the Riel agitation.²⁵ It only need be added that when the Riel demonstrations promised disorder they were discouraged. Before the Champ de Mars meeting took place, Father O'Dowd the rector of St. Patrick's had advised his people to shun it.²⁶ In the diocese of St. Hyacinthe, Mgr. Moreau went so far as to prohibit the clergy from saying Mass for Riel and a similar prohibition appears to have been in force in the diocese of Rimouski.²⁷

The indignation which was demonstrated by the people of Quebec was reflected in the attitude of the French-Canadian Conservative members of parliament. The party, in both its provincial and dominion organizations was badly shaken by the execution of Riel. It is not improbable that the Dominion Cabinet Ministers, Langevin, Chapleau and Caron believed, up to the last, ^{they} that could prevent the capital sentence from being carried out. A careful reading of the editorial opinion in their newspapers, le Monde, la Minerve and le Canadien reinforces this view. They certainly made threats of resignation frequently and Chapleau actually prepared a memorandum on this subject.²⁸ The rank and file of the party, less bound by loyalties and more in touch with public opinion, was on the verge of revolt. On November 12, a group, headed by Girouard, the Member for Jacques Cartier and by Senator Trudel proceeded to call a meeting in Montreal.²⁹ There met in Montreal next day some twenty-three Conservatives, including

three Senators who proposed to warn Macdonald that in the event of Riel's execution it would be necessary for them, on grounds of conscience, to go into opposition. This motion was objected to by Ouimet and by Fortin on the grounds that it was unconstitutional to threaten the Ministry before its decision had been announced.³⁰ After some discussion, the following message was agreed to be sixteen of the gathering,

"Dans les circonstances, l'exécution de Louis Riel serait une acte de cruauté dont nous repoussons la responsabilité."³¹

Despite this, similar warnings and numerous petitions, the sentence was carried out.

Within Parliament the Conservatives also survived their trial. Realizing that the Opposition was divided, they took the initiative. On March 11, Philippe Landry moved an innocuous resolution,

"That this House feels it its duty to express its deep regret that the sentence of death passed on Louis Riel, convicted of high Treason, was allowed to be carried into execution."³²

There is evidence to point that this was part of a preconceived scheme to force a debate on a measure that was unexceptionable.³³ Be this as it may, Langevin immediately followed Landry, spoke briefly and then moved the previous question, thus precluding any amendment. The debate that followed appears to have satisfied the Conservative tacticians. In the first instance, the Liberal Opposition was shewn to be badly divided for, when the vote was taken on March 24, 23 Liberals voted with the Government. Included in this group were Alexander Mackenzie, the former Liberal leader and his Minister of Finance, Sir Richard Cartwright.³⁴ In the second instance, the debate enabled the French-Canadian Conservatives to justify themselves in the eyes of their constituents by casting their vote against the majority of their party. Some seventeen took advantage of the escape thus offered.

Even after this lapse of time and with the documents at our disposal, it is difficult to understand why Macdonald so gratuitously outraged Quebec opinion. That Riel was mentally unbalanced there can be little doubt as the Confidential Reports of the Insanity Commission gave ample evidence.³⁵ Nor were there lacking less formal warnings from the Quebec Ministers. It may have been that Macdonald sincerely believed that Riel deserved the death penalty and refused to entertain any plea for mercy. It is more probable, however, that careful balancings of political expediencies induced him and the Cabinet to decide it was wiser to risk losing Quebec than to lose the support of English-speaking Canada. The temper of Ontario was well known and in the later 'eighties, Ontario influence in the Dominion Cabinet was strong.

Nevertheless, a swift vengeance fell on the Quebec Provincial Conservatives. In 1886, the Nationalists introduced into the Legislature a resolution expressing the regret of the Province that Riel had been executed and condemning the French-Canadian Conservatives in the Dominion Government for having acquiesced thereto.³⁶ The Provincial Government side-stepped the issue by claiming that such a decision was outside its competence.³⁷ Opinion throughout the Province was hardening and in the summer of 1886 four Quebec bye-elections, two Dominion and two Provincial, were carried against the Conservatives. It was against this very threatening background that the Provincial parliament was dissolved in September of 1886.

In the ensuing contest, the Riel question was the predominant issue. With remarkable energy, Mercier stumped the Province with the assistance of Laurier. The Dominion Conservatives were in the field also bringing with them the powerful weapon of patronage. They trusted overly much to

that weapon,

".. If we are prudent and liberal during the next four days, we can be imprudent and despotic ... for another ten years' lease of power..."³⁸

The results of the elections were confused since some twenty-six "independent Conservatives" or "National Conservatives" were returned. On their attitude hung the fate of the Conservative Government. Their support was claimed by both parties for, as Langevin informed Macdonald, the Ross Government would be sustained,

".. unless the Nationalist Conservatives vote with the Liberals to overthrow it ... which is not likely..."³⁹

Dr. Ross, the Provincial premier was less optimistic and on January 19, in an effort to strengthen the Ministry, he retired in favour of L.O. Taillon. On January 27, the Provincial parliament met, Taillon was defeated on the choice of the Speaker and resigned. Two days later Mercier formed his coalition government of Nationalists and of Conservatives. While it would be idle to assert that the Conservatives had been defeated on a racial issue, it is true that their programme had given them little power of resistance where an issue involving race was raised.

In every sense of the word, the Government which Mercier formed in January of 1887 was a coalition. Organically it had little cohesion, since it was made up of old-time Nationalists and of Conservatives who had abandoned the party on the Riel issue. Apart from a hatred of the Conservatives who had acquiesced in the execution of Riel, the Coalitionists had little in common and a programme of action was essential to their union. It was essential also that the programme should be distinctive and, failing originality, the Nationalist Coalition developed those phases of the official Conservative programme that had been weak. Having secured a temporary triumph by an appeal to the racial and the religious senti-

ments of French-Canadians, they proceeded to consolidate their position by working up that very side of the Conservative programme which had been so neglected.

In the attainment of this the Nationalists were the authors of some extraordinarily astute moves. The first and, in some respects, the most successful was the settlement of the long-standing and thorny problem of the Jesuits' Estates. Not only did the Nationalists find a solution for what was a very real problem, they satisfied some of the more militant phases of French-Canadian nationalism and won the support of at least one section of the Church.

In its antiquity and complexity the Jesuits' Estates problem had no equal in the history of Canada. The genesis of the Estates, that is to say, of the Jesuits' real property, reached back very nearly to the beginning of French colonization when pious donors gave to the Society lands and seigneuries in order to enable it to carry on its task of education and of evangelization. The problem of the ownership of the properties was of a more recent date, being coincident with the cession of Canada to Great Britain. By the terms of the Capitulation of Montreal, the disposal of the property of the Jesuits was reserved for the King's pleasure.⁴⁰ The disposal remained for sometime in abeyance till in 1773 Pope Clement XIV, bowing before the winds of the prevailing rationalism suppressed the Society throughout the world.⁴¹ In Canada this produced an anomalous situation since, as British territory the enactments of the Holy See could have no effect, the Jesuits continued unsuppressed although they had been formally dispossessed of their property by the British government. Had Canon Law been in legal force, the effect of the decree Dominus ac Redemptor of 1773 would have been to transfer to the Roman

Catholic dioceses the property of the Society. As it was, the diocese through its Bishop laid claim to the property and, although in terms of law that claim was inadmissible, it was given a certain sanction by the renunciation in 1789 by the four surviving Canadian Jesuits of their property.⁴² It was in this curious fashion that the diocese of Quebec obtained claims on the Jesuit property. In 1800, on the death of the last Jesuit, Father Casot, the Executive formally took possession of the Estates. The Estates were not dispersed, but the revenue arising from them was devoted to a variety of purposes, principally educational. Thereafter, the possession of the Jesuits' Estates was the source of frequent friction between the Assembly and the Executive. Ultimately the Estates passed to the Province of Canada and the funds were devoted to Superior Education in Canada East. In 1867, the control of the Estates passed to the Province of Quebec and their administration to the Commissioner of Crown Lands.⁴³

The early moves to reopen the question of the ownership of the Estates are still obscure. It is usually assumed that the disposal of the old Jesuit College, or the Jesuit Barracks as they were called, in Quebec in 1873 brought the question to the fore.⁴⁴ In that year, one of the early Nationalists, L.O. David, raised the question in the legislature as to the indemnification of the Jesuits for the appropriation of their property.⁴⁵ This opened what la Minerve called "une question nouvelle".⁴⁶ At the same time correspondence passed between the government and the episcopate relative to the sale of the property.⁴⁷ The position of the Liberal Conservative Ministry of Gédéon . Ouimet was made more explicit in a letter from the premier to Cardinal Antonelli, the Secretary of the Propaganda,

"Les biens des Jésuites en vertu de la loi passée en 1856 sont devenus la propriété commune des catholiques et des protestants pour la fin de l'éducation supérieure... D'ailleurs, pourquoi remettre aux Jésuites ces biens en question? ... Quels sont leurs titres? ... La bulle de Clément XIV les a supprimés ... dans ce cas les biens des Jésuites ... devraient être administrés par l'Ordinaire du diocèse...⁴⁸

There is reason to believe, however, that the opening of the Estates question was not unpremediated. In 1842, the Jesuits had returned to Canada and had been established by Bishop Bourget in Montreal.⁴⁹ They had been the faithful auxiliaries of the Bishop in his efforts to make an Ultramontane preserve of his diocese. It is possible that he may have suggested that the Estates would supply the sinews of war for further attacks on the liberal clergy and their political allies, the Conservatives.⁵⁰ The fall of the Ouimet government did not bring an end to the negotiations for it is believed that with the deBoucherville administration the actual amount of compensation was arrived at, curiously enough, of \$400,000.⁵¹ During the succeeding years, any idea of restitution in kind was abandoned. In 1885, the Conservative government of J.J. Ross was on the eve of a settlement when for some reason the negotiations were broken off.⁵² By this time the Jesuits Estates settlement was a matter of practical politics. The principles to any settlement were also well defined; the Jesuits and their Ultramontane friends, the Archbishop of Quebec, the Protestant Committee of the Council of Public Instruction. This, substantially, was the situation when Mercier came into power in 1887.

Mercier's interest in the settlement of the Estates controversy was two-fold. As a practical man he wished to settle a question that had disturbed political life for over a decade.⁵³ As a man of affairs, Mercier desired to secure for the Province a clear title to the Estates

in order that they might be developed profitably.⁵⁴ These were the practical considerations that had been systematically evaded by his predecessors.⁵⁵ For the politician the settlement of the Estates problem had powerful attractions. A successful settlement would be a great coup for the Nationalist Coalition in view of the successive Conservative failures. Mercier realized also that the settlement of the question would go far to satisfy the racial and sectarian phases of nationalism. In addition to all these, there were probably reasons of a more personal character. Mercier had been a pupil of the Jesuits and there was a natural desire to do his old masters a good turn. He has told us that while he did not admit that the Jesuits had a legal claim to compensation, he believed that they had a moral claim.⁵⁶

The mechanics of the settlement were by no means simple. It was necessary first to incorporate the Society in the Province.⁵⁷ It was essential to give the Jesuits a legal position if they were to hold property. Incorporation was desirable also as a species of balon d'essai, in order to test public opinion. The incorporation measure ran a good deal of opposition from the Quebec episcopate and from the Archbishop. Early in April, Mercier laid his proposala before Archbishop Taschereau for his concurrence.⁵⁸ Upon application, the Archbishop found that only two of his brethren, the Bishops of Montreal and of Three Rivers, approved the proposed measure, the other eight

".. demandait que l'épiscopat de la province aie temps d'examiner et de discuter ... ensemble ce projet de loi et d'en référ^{er} au Saint Siège s'ils jugent à propos..."⁵⁹

This request Mercier was unwilling to accord,

"Je professe le plus grand respect pour nos vénérables prélats, mais je ne puis m'empêcher de dire que si on attend qu'ils soient tous d'accord, nous attendons longtemps..."⁶⁰

Having thus hustled the Bishops, Mercier proceeded rapidly in spite of an effort of Casgrain to move a six months' hoist.⁶¹ Mercier's pushing tactics seem to have struck an appreciative note and he touched a wider sympathy when he declared,

"...il ne faut pas écraser les petits pour exalter les grands. Ces pauvres religieux ne demandent que les droits civils dans la Province..."⁶²

The settlement of the Estates question proper was deferred till the following year. On June 27, 1888, Mercier introduced his famous resolutions.⁶³ The gist of the resolutions were "the full and complete concession of all the property which may have belonged to the Fathers of the Old Society ... in favour of our Province..." In the return for this surrender the Province was obligated to pay over to the Pope the sum of \$400,000 to be divided by him at his discretion.⁶⁴ At the same time the sum of \$60,000 was to be paid to the Protestant Committee of the Council of Public Instruction by way of compensation for the aids to Superior Education that had come from the revenues of the Jesuits' Estates. Two additional clauses are worth noting. The settlement was to be binding only when ratified by the Legislature and by the Pope and the amount of indemnity was to remain in the hands of the Province till the agreement was formally accepted by the Holy See. The ultimate division of the money by the Pope is not without interest. \$160,000 was awarded the Jesuits, a similar sum was paid to Laval University and \$10,000 went to each of the Roman Catholic dioceses of the Province with \$20,000 to the missionary Prefecture of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.⁶⁵ Regarding the Act in the terms of strict equity, there is little to criticize. The division of money between Roman Catholics and Protestants was not unjust in view of the proportion of the population. The inclusion of the Pope's name

as arbiter was, as Mercier explained, necessary if the division was to be accepted as just and as final by the Roman Catholic religious bodies.⁶⁶

The reception of the Act was most varied. Within the Province of Quebec its passage stirred hardly a ripple of controversy. The Bill went through its readings in the Legislature without the opposition of one of the English-speaking members. A few voices were raised in protest against some of Mercier's more extravagant language.⁶⁷ One English member found nothing to criticize in the principle although he judged the time inopportune, in view of the state of the Province's finances.⁶² The English press was equally unexacting; even the Montreal Witness, the Protestant watch dog, "refused to condemn what it could not praise." In general, it would appear that the Minority regarded the settlement of the Jesuits' Estates question as satisfactory and as not trespassing on any of their rights and privileges.

In the English-speaking Provinces and especially in Ontario, the Jesuits' Estates Act roused the strongest opposition. The attack was led by the Toronto Mail which declared, in effect, that if the Quebec English would not save themselves, Ontario would do it for them. With the animosities of the Riel controversy still strong, the Mail lost all sense of proportion and embarked on a bitter campaign against everything French and Roman Catholic. Efforts to rouse Quebecers to join the Equal Rights Association and kindred bodies having met with little success,⁶⁹ the Mail and its allies resolved on more forceful tactics.

It was proposed to move for the disallowance of the Provincial Statute by the Dominion government. To this end, on March 26th, 1888, Colonel O'Brien, a member for the Ontario constituency of Algoma, moved for an address to be presented the Governor-General praying for the disallowance

of the Jesuits' Estates Act.⁷⁰ Disallowance was asked because the Act lay beyond the power of the Provincial legislature in that it employed public funds for sectarian endowment, recognized the power of a foreign potentate to adjudicate in the domestic affairs of Canada and endowed the Society of Jesus, "... an alien, secret and politico-religious body..⁷¹" The debates on this extraordinary resolution extended over two days when it was voted down 188 to 13.⁷² Decisive as the defeat was, it was not final, for the "Devil's Thirteen", as Macdonald called the supporters of disallowance, carried their campaign outside Parliament. In the Ontario press, they found useful allies and by their appeals to prejudice and to racial hatred did much to dissolve the toleration that had been one of the chief bonds that united the French-Canadian Conservatives and the Conservatives from English-speaking Canada.

As an adroit political manoeuvre it is difficult to over-estimate the Jesuits' Estates Act. It went far to shew the French-Canadian cleric and layman that the Church had nothing to fear from the party which was the executor of the old French-Canadian Liberal group. The Act was also designed to the national pride and to the innate love of justice of the French-Canadians. The settlement was a skillful declaration in favour of the doctrine of Provincial Rights. This last consideration, perhaps, the most revolutionary since the conception of provincial or of local rights, struck directly at the heart of the Conservative ideal of the organic state.

That Mercier realized the tremendous weapon he had in his hand was apparent by his actions. In the very year of his advent to power, he summoned at Ottawa a conference of Provincial premiers, the purpose of which was to give form to the vague aspirations of provincial autonomy.⁷³

It was characteristic of Mercier's mentality that he should seek to translate into political action a principle of political philosophy.

The antecedents of the Interprovincial Conference were not unskillfully prepared. Early in March of 1887, Mercier communicated his intention to the Provincial government of Ontario.⁷⁴ Recognizing that while all the Provinces had grievances, the grievances were not all of the same form, Mercier made his appeal as broad as possible. The purpose of the Conference was to discuss "... two questions ... the autonomy of the Provinces and their financial relation with the Dominion."⁷⁵ In this fashion the charger of provincial rights was hitched to the somewhat overloaded cart of "better terms". That some such diversified appeal was necessary, the responses of the Provincial governments shewed. The Ontario government replied,

"We concur with what you say with regard to the autonomy of the Provinces. With regard to financial arrangements, this Province was satisfied with the provisions of the British North America Act, and would still prefer them, if the principle on which they were based was faithfully carried out by the Dominion Parliament."⁷⁶

The other Provinces were less disinterested and in October of 1887 there met at Quebec the premiers of five Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. The Conference met with the official sanction of the Quebec government since the principal items of its agenda, as outlined by Mr. Mercier to Sir Oliver Mowat, were incorporated in the Speech from the Throne.⁷⁷

The deliberations of the Interprovincial Conference were surrounded with much that was interesting. In formally opening the Conference, Mercier laid great stress on its peaceful and constructive character,

".. l'objet de cette réunion ne devait pas ^{être} regardé comme hostile ou antipathique aux autorités fédérales, cette conférence est exclusivement destinée ^à rechercher et à résoudre dans les intérêts

généraux de tout le Canada les difficultés que l'expérience a pu constater dans les relations entre le gouvernement fédéral et ceux des provinces..."⁷⁸

Most interesting was the effort that Mercier made to establish the historical continuity of the Interprovincial Conference with the Provincial Conference of 1864. This note was struck at the beginning.

".. vous avez compris ... qu'il n'est ni hors de propos, ni contre les intérêts généraux ... de réunir après vingt ans des représentants des différentes parties de la Confédération dans le but d'étudier certaines questions lesquelles à raison d'expérience de ces dernières années requièrent une solution pacifique..."⁷⁹

Mercier's speech gave a very fair exposition of the creed of the Provincial Rightist on its practical side. It will be observed that he assumed that the Dominion had its inception in the Quebec Conference of 1864 and, as the corollary to this, the only legitimate manner in which amendment could be made to the relationship then established, would be by means of a second gathering of the Provinces. It should be stressed, however, that Mercier had no idea of the Conference or of successive Conferences, usurping the functions of the Dominion government. The sole purpose of the Conference was to clarify the line of demarcation between the two powers, "... il désire assurer leur existence (les institutions fédérales) comme bon fonctionnement...", and to remove the obscurities of the British North America Act which favoured the increase of power by the Dominion parliament.⁸⁰ It is curious to observe that nowhere does Mercier state, although on several occasions he implies, the sovereign character of the Provincial governments.⁸¹ Mercier was no theorist, and although he could elaborate on an idea, he was neither original nor logical enough to follow it into its various ramifications. This lack of originality has been commented on before and need not be discussed further.

The deliberations of the Interprovincial Conference were ultimately

condensed into some twenty-two resolutions. The general import of the resolutions were, as might be expected, constitutional reform and financial revision. The resolutions affecting the constitutional relations of the Dominion and of the Provinces touched on a variety of topics, the abolition of the power of the Dominion government to disallow Provincial legislation,⁸² the reform of the Senate in order to make it a representative and provincial house,⁸³ the abolition of the clause in the British North America Act conferring residual powers on the Dominion government,⁸⁴ the power of amending Provincial constitutions to reside with the people of the Provinces, through their representatives in the local governments.⁸⁵ What must appear on first sight as a curious denial of the very theory on which Provincial autonomy was based was the proposal to have Provincial boundaries established by Imperial Statute.⁸⁶ This plank was inserted probably at the behest of the Ontario delegates whose Province had suffered from the map-making proclivities of Macdonald. The resolutions dealing with financial revision were complicated and need be noted only in passing. It was proposed to compute the subsidy paid the Provinces by the Dominion on the basis of population. Thus the Provinces were to receive a per capita grant based on the preceding decennial census.⁸⁷ In addition they were to receive certain grants in aid of government which were to be computed on the proportion rather than on the basis of absolute population.⁸⁸ The almost insuperable difficulties that attend any attempt to share wealth was indicated by the fact that special provision had to be made for Manitoba and for British Columbia.⁸⁹ The parentage of the various clauses is difficult to establish, but it seems that the clauses respecting constitutional reform were sponsored by Ontario and by Quebec; the clauses respecting financial revision by the other Provinces. Mowat

himself seems to have drafted the clauses dealing with disallowance and with Senate reform.

In the light of the later history of the Dominion, the consequences of the Interprovincial Conference were few. The reasons are not difficult to assess. In the first instance, not all the Provinces were present for British Columbia remained aloof. Even among the Provinces which met at Quebec there was no real unanimity.⁹⁰ Ontario was interested in improving her constitutional position; some of the other Provinces in "better terms". The Dominion government ignored the Conference and Mercier's attempt to secure Macdonald's presence was dexterously evaded.⁹¹ The tactics of the Dominion government rendered negative many of the efforts of the Conference. Macdonald ridiculed it as a "hive of Grits" and employed the whole machinery of patronage to withdraw support from it. One example must suffice. A.E. Davies, the premier of British Columbia, wrote to Macdonald concerning the Conference,

"Robson (the Provincial Secretary) will be guided by you as to the advisability of attending the meeting. We have discussed the Mercier telegram and fear that the real object of the meeting will be anti-Dominion. So far as we are concerned it will be left alone."

On the back of this letter Macdonald wrote,

"Robson is coming in the right spirit...and should be cultivated..."⁹²

Within Quebec, the consequences of the Interprovincial Conference were decisive. When the Resolutions came up for discussion in the Provincial parliament, the Conservatives found themselves in a difficult position. To accept the Resolutions would be to condemn the Conservative party and would be to condemn the principle of unity for which the Conservative party stood. On the other hand, to reject the Resolutions would be to reject the idea of provincial autonomy which was gaining such

a wide popularity in Quebec. It was the courageous, if undiplomatic, latter course that was adopted in the form of two amendments. The first was a blunt negative,

"That the British North America Act has given satisfaction... and that this Act assures the Provinces their autonomy."⁹³

This amendment was decisively defeated 17 to 31. A second amendment was more carefully phrased,

".. among the Resolutions some are fraught with great danger because they attack the fundamental principle of our constitution.. and tend to deprive us of the advantages of responsible government.. others do not bear on subjects of sufficient importance and their utility is not evident enough to justify amendment to our constitution..."⁹⁴

This amendment was more effective; one Nationalist voted with the Opposition and three refrained from voting.⁹⁵ The failure of the Conservatives to arrest the Resolutions was symptomatic of a Province-wide revulsion of opinion against their principal tenets. As Mercier and his colleagues were quick to point out, the Conservatives had striven to secure better financial terms for Quebec, but they had conspicuously neglected to safeguard the Province's political and constitutional position.

From this point forward, the Nationalists were able to develop their own programme. The Nationalist programme was not, as has been so frequently said, a programme based on denominational exclusiveness and upon race prejudice. Both had had their part in formulating the programme, but underlying even the most emphatic declarations of an extravagant form of nationalism were interests of a practical character. The defeat of the Conservatives in 1886 was occasioned by considerations other than those of the Riel controversy. An examination of the abundant campaign literature of the period supports this view. In "les Elections de 1886"⁹⁶ relatively little is said of the Riel troubles, but much of the inepti-

tude and the dishonesty of the Conservatives. An examination of Mercier's "Manifesto" reinforces the impression.⁹⁷ The points dwelt on are provincial autonomy, decentralization of Provincial administration and the re-organization of the departments. In the elections of 1890, the Nationalist appeals took the same form.⁹⁸ It was as a reforming and as a progressive administration that the Nationalists won the support of the younger men of the Province and for a period at least had the concurrence of the English-speaking Liberals of Montreal. Added to this the Nationalists did have aggressive and spectacular leadership. Against this the Conservatives had only a depressing coterie of sick men, bickering rivals and outworn politicians.

The failure of the Conservative programme was not a matter of a moment. It was, as has been suggested, progressive. Nor can the failure be ascribed to one cause. It is said that the Conservative programme failed because it did not satisfy the racial and the national pride of French Canada but we must remember that it had failed to meet the material needs of the Province. The French-Canadian elector who found nothing in Conservatism to solve the riddle of finance, or to stem the tide of emigration or to satisfy his national pride turned elsewhere.

- ¹The most recent and the most scholarly discussion of the second Riel Rebellion of 1885 is to be found in Stanley's Birth of Western Canada. (1936)
- ²David, L.O. Laurier. P. 39.
- ³l'Estandard. le 1e avril 1885.
 "... la voix du sang nous assigne vis à vis les minorités des autres Provinces, notamment celles qui sont nos coreligionnaires et nos soeurs d'origine..."
- ⁴la Minerve. le 3 juin 1885.
- ⁵ibid. le 13 juillet 1885.
- ⁶ibid. le 8 juin 1885.
- ⁷ibid. le 11 juillet 1885.
- ⁸Riel was tried in the later part of July in Regina before an English-speaking jury of 6 and a magistrate. The jury declared Riel guilty but brought in a recommendation for mercy.
- ⁹la Minerve. le 3 août 1885.
- ¹⁰le Monde. le 24 octobre 1885.
- ¹¹Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec
 1885. Vol. 19, p. 123, April 15.
- ¹²Debates of the House of Commons; Canada
 1885, p. 3213.
- ¹³Mail, Toronto, December 5, 1885.
- ¹⁴Toronto Evening News. April 20, 1885.
- ¹⁵Debates. op. cit.
 1885, pp. 1678-1679.
- ¹⁶Mail, Toronto, 23 November, 1885.
- ¹⁷ibid. 25 November, 1885.
- ¹⁸l'Electeur. le 25 juin 1885.
- ¹⁹Lavergne, A. Trente Ans de Vie nationale.
 Deom frère; Montréal, 1935.
- ²⁰Montreal Herald. November 17, 1885.
- ²¹The best accounts of the meeting on the Champ de Mars are to be found in the Montreal Star of November 23 and of the Gazette of the morning of the same day.

²²Gazette. 23 November 1885.

²³Herald. 23 November 1885.

²⁴ibid. September 29 1885.

²⁵ibid. September 30 1885.

²⁶ibid. November 23 1885.

²⁷ibid. November 29 1885.

²⁸Macdonald Papers. Chapleau Correspondence 1873-1885.
Chapleau to Macdonald; Ottawa, November 12, 1885.

²⁹For details vide, La Presse, le 13 novembre and the Montreal Star, 14 November, 1885.

³⁰Ouimet was O.C., the 65th Rifles, a French-Canadian regiment that had been sent to the North-West.

³¹Macdonald Papers. Coursol and others to Macdonald, November 13.

³²Debates of the House of Commons; Canada
1886, p. 160.

³³The note on which this assumption is based has been mentioned previously, "I saw Sir Hector as requested and later called on Chapleau. Sir Hector will do as you suggested. He will move the previous question and make a speech after the Landry motion." Macdonald Papers, Caron to Macdonald; Ottawa, March 31, 1886.

³⁴Journals of the House of Commons; Canada
1886. Volume 20, p. 73-74.

³⁵The reports of the Insanity Commission are printed in the Sessional Papers; Canada. Vol. 12, No. 43, but certain omissions were made in the telegrams despatched by the examiners. In the original telegrams Dr. Valade reported as follows:
"After having examined Riel in private conversation...I have come to the conclusion that he is not an accountable being that he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong on political and religious subjects which I consider well marked typical forms of insanity under which he undoubtedly suffers but on other points I believe him to be sensible and can distinguish right from wrong."

The R.N.W.M.P. surgeon, Dr. Jukes, also submitted two reports, one to Macdonald, the other to Dewdeny, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Territories. The latter report was printed with the following omission:

"That Riel differs systematically from the large majority of mankind in the views he entertains respecting certain questions relating to religious subjects or rather to certain spiritual phenomena such as Inspiration and Prophetic Vision in relation thereto must be admitted; on these subjects he cherishes illusions or hallucinations which vary materially in intensity under varying physical

and mental conditions; but diversities of opinion upon these and kindred subjects do not properly constitute insanity."

³⁶Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec.
1886. Volume 20, p. 67.

³⁷ibid. 1886, p. 77.

³⁸Macdonald Papers. Chapleau Correspondence.
Chapleau to Macdonald; ____? October 7, 1886.

³⁹ibid. Langevin Correspondence.
Langevin to Macdonald; ____? October 15, 1886.

⁴⁰Kingsford, W. History of Canada.
Vol. 4, p. 417ff. Contain the Articles of Capitulation.
Roswell and Hutchinson, Toronto, 1898.

⁴¹Savaete, A. Vers l'Abime. tome 1, p. 338, note.

⁴²Kingsford, op. cit., vol. 7, p. 287.

⁴³Sessional Papers. Quebec.
1874, No. 25.

⁴⁴Macdonald Papers. General Correspondence, 1873.
Ouimet to Macdonald; Quebec, October 9, 1873.
"... On my return...I wrote Mr. Langevin and acquainted him with all the subjects that I had the honour to call to your attention... 1st, the Jesuit Barracks..."

⁴⁵Gazette, Montreal, December 15, 1873.

⁴⁶la Minerve, le 11 décembre, 1873.

⁴⁷Savaete, A. op. cit., tome 1, p. 331.
Provincial Secretary to the Bishop, Oct. 18, 1874.

⁴⁸Savaete, A. Ibid., tome 1, p. 326.
Ouimet to Cardinal Antonelli; Québec ____? juillet 1874.

⁴⁹leCompte. Les Jésuites du Canada au XIX siècle, p. 34.

⁵⁰ibid. p. 317.
In 1871 and 1872, the finances of the Community were in such a desperate condition that they were nearly forced to sell the Church and the College.

⁵¹a Catholic. The Ultramontane Policy in Canada, p. 28.
____? ____? ____?

⁵²Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec
1888. June 28, p. 269.

Mercier quotes a letter from Archbishop Taschereau to J.J. Ross, January 2, 1885:

".. I am personally authorized by the Holy See to treat with the Government...and for reasonable compensation to settle the question of the ownership of the property..."

To this communication Ross made reply that if the Cabinet decided to reopen the question in the Legislature he would notify the Archbishop.

- 53 débats de la législature de la province de Québec
de l'imprimerie de L.J. Demers and frère; Québec, 1888.
1886. Mercier's speech, p. 1268.
- 54 The administration of the Estates under the Commissioner of Crown
Lands was not a success as an examination of the Commissioner's
Reports shew.
- 55 vide Guimet to Antonelli quoted above.
- 56 Débats, op. cit., 1886, p. 1264.
- 57 Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec
p. 1887, p. 296.
- 58 Débats, op. cit., 1887, le 2 mai, p. 951.
Mercier reads a letter addressed to him by the Archbishop dated le
22 avril, 1887, in which he refers to an interview "... il y a quinzaine
jours..."
- 59 ibid., p. 952.
- 60 ibid., p. 960.
- 61 ibid., p. 950.
- 62 ibid., p. 953.
- 63 Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec
1888, June 8, p. 285ff.
- 64 ibid., 1888, June 23, p. 273.
- 65 Savaete, A. op. cit., tome 1, p. 339.
- 66 Débats, op. cit., 1888, June 27, p. 1261.
- 67 ibid., 1888, June 27, p. 1270; speech by John Hall.
- 68 ibid., 1888, June 27, p. 1272; speech by Owens.
- 69 Mss., relating to the Jesuits' Estates agitation; Bibliothèque de
St. Sulpice, Montréal.

- ⁷⁰Journals of the House of Commons; Canada
1889, March 26, p. 199.
- ⁷¹ibid., clause 3.
- ⁷²ibid., 1889, March 28, p. 205.
- ⁷³Langelier, C., Souvenirs politiques, tome 1, p. 268.
- ⁷⁴Sessional Papers; Ontario
1887, No. 51.
Honoré Mercier to Oliver Mowat; Quebec, March 8, 1887.
- ⁷⁵ibid.
- ⁷⁶Oliver Mowat to Honoré Mercier; Toronto, March 15, 1887.
- ⁷⁷Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec
1887, March 16, p. 13.
- ⁷⁸Langelier, C. op. cit., tome 1, p. 283ff.
- ⁷⁹Langelier, C. ibid., p. 284.
- ⁸⁰Sessional Papers; Ontario
1887, No. 51, Mercier to Mowat; March 8, 1887.
- ⁸¹Journals of the Legislative Assembly; Quebec
1888, May 26, p. 65.
Resolutions of the Interprovincial Conference
Clause No. 5.
"The Lieutenant-Governor to have the same executive authority as
other Governors and Lieutenant-Governors of British Colonies."
Clause No. 7.
".. the Provinces to be competent to determine their own franchise.."
- ⁸²ibid., Clause No. 1.
- ⁸³ibid., Clause No. 4.
- ⁸⁴ibid., Clause No. 6.
- ⁸⁵ibid., Clause No. 12.
- ⁸⁶ibid., Clause No. 14.
- ⁸⁷ibid., Clause No. 17.
sub-clause B.
- ⁸⁸ibid., Clause No. 17.
sub-clause A.
- ⁸⁹ibid., Clause No. 17.
sub-clause C.

- ⁹⁰ In the autumn of 1887 the Toronto Globe in a series of articles made Ontario's position clear; the Province wished greater autonomy, but it would refuse to purchase it at the price of its financial stability.
- ⁹¹ Pope, J. The Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald.
P. 399-401.
Pope publishes the correspondence that passed between Mercier and Macdonald.
- ⁹² Macdonald Papers. General Correspondence, 1888.
A.E.B. Davie to Macdonald ____? ____? September, 1888.
Printed also in J.A. Maxwell's, Federal Subsidies, p. 99.
- ⁹³ Journals of the Legislative Assembly. Quebec.
1888, May 25, p. 64.
Amendment moved by Taillon and Lynch.
- ⁹⁴ ibid., 1888, May 28, p. 83.
Amendment moved by Flynn and Desjardins.
- ⁹⁵ ibid., p. 84.
- ⁹⁶ ____? Les Elections de 1886; situation politique et administrative de la province de Québec.
typographie de C. Darveau; Québec, 1886.
- ⁹⁷ Mercier, H. Aux électeurs de la province de Québec.
Montréal, le 26 juin, 1886.
- ⁹⁸ ____? Le gouvernement Mercier.
imprimée par Belleau and Cie; Québec, 1890.

CHAPTER 10

THE CONSERVATIVE DECLINE

The decline of French-Canadian Conservatism was not speedy but it was complete. It was in the middle 'eighties that the disintegration began and well over a decade was to elapse before the process was ended. In that time there was a brief interlude in the form of a Conservative revival but it only served to accentuate the party's decline. An examination of this decline discloses no single predisposing cause. It discloses, on the contrary, an epitome of the party's history, a bankrupt philosophy; a failure in leadership; progressive loss of popular support. The decline of the Conservatives was attended by a corresponding advance among the Opposition groups who developed an acceptable programme; found able leaders; conciliated public opinion.

The Nationalist régime from 1887 to 1891 affected the Conservatives adversely. On the one hand, the Nationalists gave the Province a vigorous and a popular administration. They gave it a spectacular administration as well and it is legitimate to suppose that this attracted a following. A case in point was the settlement of the Jesuits' claims which liquidated a very real problem, disarmed clerical critics and roused national pride. On the more material side, the Nationalist administration was not conspicuously successful. Both Mr. Mercier and his Treasurer Mr. Shehyn promised economies and far-reaching reforms,¹ but accomplished little. The visible benefits of the Nationalist régime were obvious, new colonization areas, extension of railways into the less accessible parts of the Province and the decentralization of administration.² Trivial as some of these measures seem in the face of the real difficulties which called for solution, they appealed to a large section of the Province as the returns for the General Elections of 1890 shewed. The question of the success or failure of the Nationalist programme is, in reality, beside the point, its importance lay

in that it gave expression to the two phases of nationalism, the political and the economic.

The challenge the Nationalists presented was recognized by the Conservatives. Writing to Sir Charles Tupper, who was the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Macdonald could say of the recent Nationalist success at the polls,

"... You will have seen that Mercier has swept Quebec...it does not bode well for the future..."³

Although the Nationalists did not invade the field of Dominion politics, their influence was powerful, as the plaint of a defeated Conservative candidate shews,

"...Had neither party used money, I would have carried by 600..Free trade hurt me some...The sole cause of my defeat was Mercier's influence and money. At the Provincial elections of last year, I publicly stigmatized him as the most corrupt and infamous man Canada ever knew. My stinging words were carried to him. Early in the contest, he wrote his friends I must be defeated...The funny work was principally done before the Election...One man sold himself for 100\$(sic)...scores for 10\$ (sic)...The county has a head-ache to-day..."⁴

It is not improbable that it was the strenuous part that Mercier took in the Dominion General Elections that prompted the Conservatives to turn on him so vindictively when the first rumours of scandal were bruted with respect to the Baie des Chaleurs railway.

If anything, the philosophy of the Nationalists was even more destructive than their tactics. The exponents of the Nationalist point of view were Laurier and Mercier. The inclusion of the former's name among the Nationalists need cause no surprise, since the Liberal element in the Nationalist party was strong. Laurier's great contribution to the body of political thinking of the Nationalists was his celebrated speech on "Political Liberalism" which he delivered in Quebec city in June of 1877.⁵ In the course of this address, Laurier cut contemporary French-Canadian

Liberalism from its revolutionary antecedents and from its inspiration, the Rouge Manifesto of 1848.⁶ He attached French-Canadian Liberalism strongly to what he called the constructive Liberalism of the English School.⁷ It is well to notice that Laurier suggested no slavish copying of the British prototype. He observed those temperamental variations which turn some men to precedent and others to experiment in the solution of practical problems and believed that therein lay the origins of Conservatism and of Liberalism.

"... voilà le sens réel, l'explication véritable et du principe libéral et du principe conservateur. Ce sont deux attributs de notre nature..."⁸

Of the two attributes, Laurier considered the liberal the more admirable since it made not only for personal freedom but also for national advancement.⁹ It was here that French Canada touched hands with XIX^{century} British Liberalism which Laurier regarded as the cause rather than the consequence of Britain's prosperity.¹⁰ It is a curious commentary on the oratorical and essentially uncritical character of Laurier's mind that he sought substantiation for his views in the writings of two of the most sonorous and most superficial exponents of liberal philosophy, Macaulay and Tennyson. In fact, Laurier came near to basing his creed on a passage from Macaulay's History of English, that describing the meeting of the second session of the Long Parliament.¹¹ The lyrical bouquet was provided by a lengthy exposition of "You ask me why." Laurier's address was saved from oblivion by the breadth of its conception rather than by the accuracy of its details. It was a triumph of generalities but it gave French-Canadian Liberalism a new orientation and a new theme on which infinite variations could be played.

One of the shrewdest passages of Laurier's address and the one which

was to prove most damaging to his opponents was the analysis of French-Canadian Conservatism.¹² Laurier noticed that historically the origin of the Conservative party was in the group of moderates who calling themselves "Liberals" followed Lafontaine. In the hands of Sir G.E. Cartier, the Conservative party had taken shape retaining at the same time much of the old-time Liberal colouring; its progressiveness, its comprehensiveness. In the period that followed the death of Macdonald, the Conservative party had changed,

".. le parti abandonna entièrement le titre de libéral...ses principes se sont modifiés comme son nom. Si M. Cartier revenait aujourd'hui sur la terre, il ne reconnaîtrait^{pas} son parti..."¹³

It was the Liberals who had succeeded to all that was living in the Conservative creed; as for the leaders of the contemporary party "ils ne comprennent ni leur pays ni leur époque..." It does not appear that at the moment Laurier's analysis was given any especial regard. But as the Conservative party became more and more torn by strife and as extremists sought to impose their views on the party, Laurier's speech came to serve as a bridge by which men passed from Conservatism to Liberalism as interpreted by Laurier. Whether this passage in the address was an inconsidered parenthesis or whether it was a profound realization of the essential similarity in character of Canadian political parties, it would be difficult to say. If it was "accidental",¹⁴ it was very brilliantly exploited.

Lesser men elaborated on the theme that Laurier had originated. A good example of the way in which this was done is furnished by Marchand's "Manifesto" of 1883.¹⁵ Marchand was a Liberal of the old school that had followed Joly and which coalesced with some misgivings with the Conservative Nationalists.

"... le parti libéral est étranger aux questions sociales...
Le libéralisme canadien est avant tout bon et sincère fédéraliste...
les libéraux conservent le culte de saintes choses...il est le
champion dévoué de notre liberté commerciale, de l'autonomie des
provinces..."

Here was Liberal doctrine couched in terms comprehensible to all and adapted especially for the Provincial auditory. A good many of Mercier's ideas bear the same hall-mark, although as a first-rate orator himself Mercier needed few suggestions from outside sources.

Mercier's contribution to the philosophy of French-Canadian Liberalism and Nationalism was more concrete. He closely associated the idea of provincial autonomy with the National party. This was a particularly shrewd and politically valuable move in view of the inclination of opinion within the Province.¹⁶ If Laurier shewed that Liberalism was constructive, Mercier shewed that it was Catholic and in reconciling the Church to his party Mercier performed a service of great worth. In addition to these topics, Mercier traversed a number of others, some of which lay outside the sphere of Provincial politics properly understood. Like many another public man of the period, Mercier was much attracted by the Commercial Union schemes of Erastus Wiman. It would have been difficult for Mercier and for his like-thinking French-Canadian friends to justify their position on historical grounds, since both Conservative and Nationalist parties had had strong protectionist leanings.¹⁷ Nevertheless, in espousing the cause of the low tariff men, Mercier acted as the spokesman for a considerable body of opinion, if the views of Chapleau may be credited.¹⁸ It is not probable that Mercier's advocacy of a change in Canada's national status won any large following. He may not have believed very deeply about it himself, for it is significant that the topic did not engage him till after his fall from power in 1891. Nevertheless, these new departures in

Nationalist and in Liberal political thinking gave the party's political philosophy an original and a progressive quality which had no counterpart in the philosophy of Conservatism.

The death of Macdonald in 1891 dealt the French-Canadian Conservative party a blow from which it never recovered. It should be superfluous to dilate upon the position that Macdonald held in the Canada of his day.¹⁹ He was not simply the Conservative leader; he was, in many respects, the personification of the country, even in his rash optimism and crude boisterousness. Macdonald's relations with his French-Canadian followers were unique. Despite the frequent outbursts of temper on both sides, he retained their loyalty and their personal affection. This is the more remarkable when it is recalled that Macdonald had few of the attributes which, on superficial view, might be expected to attach him to French-Canadians. He was no francophile and even in more trivial matters he had little to recommend him; although he could read French, he could not speak it with ease. Nevertheless, he retained the support and the confidence of French-Canadians, as no one of their own leaders did. The great weakness of Macdonald's ascendancy was that it was so largely personal; he could leave behind no one who could make the universal appeal that he made. The French-Canadian press followed the progress of Macdonald's illness with sympathy. The Conservative papers, while expressing concern, attempted to minimise the danger in which he stood, "... C'est un simple rhume que souffre le vieux chef..."²⁰, wrote la Minerve. It was more than that and in the death of Macdonald there perished too the last hope of French-Canadian Conservatism.

Macdonald's genuine popularity in French-Canada sprang from a variety of sources. It was generally believed that he was above sectarian and

partisan prejudices as, indeed, to a large extent, he was. More important, French-Canadians regarded Macdonald as being free from racial bitterness.²¹ They recalled that in the old days of the Province of Canada, he had stoutly opposed such assaults on their national security as the agitation for representation by population constituted. The more liberal-minded French-Canadians approved Macdonald's progressive views and his ambitious policies of national aggrandizement. To a considerable body of French-Canadian opinion, Macdonald was regarded as the best form of insurance their interests could have against pressure from the English Provinces and example from the United States.²² In justice to Macdonald it must be said that he usually tried to steer a course which would have the concurrence of French-Canadians. He well understood the political advantage of a Conservative Quebec and it may be suggested that he valued even more a harmonious and contented Canada.

It is probable that in the decade before his death, Macdonald's position in French-Canada was precarious. The new nationalism of the 'eighties could hardly support the champion of centralization and more spectacular issues such as the Riel agitation had left behind them an ugly sense of dissatisfaction. Moreover, there was developing in the English-wing of the Conservative party a spirit of hostility towards and a spirit of criticism of the French-Canadians. The personification of this was D'Alton McCarthy, one of the most brilliant, if erratic, of Macdonald's "young men".²³ McCarthy was supported by the Toronto Mail, the official Conservative organ in Ontario, which filled its columns with threats and denunciations that would have done credit to the Globe in its most anti-French, anti-Catholic days. These intercene dissensions the ageing Macdonald could not suppress and his French-Canadian followers were wounded daily

in the house of their friends. We have Chapleau's word for it that the most serious obstacle that the French Conservatives had to contend against was the attitude of the Mail and the utterances of McCarthy.

A second disaster overtook the French-Canadian Conservatives in 1891 in the disgrace of Sir Hector Langevin. Langevin was the titular head of the party in Quebec and his removal, following the parliamentary investigations into the working of his Department, left the Conservatives paralysed. Langevin occupied a large place in the public life of the day. He was the doyen of the Cabinet and, on the death of Macdonald, had been mentioned as his successor,²⁴ but age and the rumour of scandal caused Langevin to be passed over in favour of Sir John Abbott.²⁵ To Langevin was entrusted the very important rôle of Government leader in the House of Commons.²⁶ In view of these circumstances, the removal of Langevin was a serious shock to the fabric of Conservatism already shaken by the death of Macdonald.²⁷

A study of the scandal in the Department of Public Works calls for attention for two considerations; first, because of the information it gives on the operation of the Canadian government in the 'eighties and 'nineties; secondly, because of the light it throws on the intimate working of the Conservative party machine in Quebec.

The genesis of the Public Works scandal extended as far back into the past as the 'seventies²⁸ and sprang from the close association of Sir Hector Langevin, the Minister of Public Works, with Mr. Thomas McGreevy, a Quebec business man. In his own way McGreevy was a remarkable man, a successful contractor who had helped build the Parliament house in Ottawa and the "North Shore" railway in Quebec. McGreevy was a Conservative, the confidant of Sir Hector, the treasurer of the party within the Province and the Member for the English constituency of Quebec West. Numerous as

Mr. McGreevy's public cares were they by no means hindered his private enterprises for, in company with his brother Robert and an assortment of friends of wide, if doubtful, reputation, he continued in the contracting business. The McGreevy company secured some exceedingly lucrative contracts from the Public Works Department for deepening the harbour of Quebec, constructing docks at Levis and so on. The means whereby McGreevy and his associates secured the contracts were irregular to say the least. For example, when the construction of some harbour work at Quebec was advertised, the McGreevys organized several dummy companies to tender at a high figure and in this way to capture the contract for themselves. On several other occasions, the McGreevys received special consideration or information that could be regarded as confidential. It was charged that Sir Hector Langevin was responsible for these favours shewn the McGreevys.³⁰ The relations of Sir Hector and Thomas McGreevy were certainly most intimate; McGreevy lived with Sir Hector in Ottawa³¹ and apparently could easily have had access to Langevin's Departmental papers. It was well known that McGreevy was Sir Hector's political agent and the inference was clear that McGreevy had employed money dishonourably procured from the Department of Public Works to fight Langevin's political battles.³² These irregularities were made the subject of an examination by a Committee of the House and, although it could not be shewn that Langevin was deliberately accessory to them,³³ he was compelled to withdraw from public life. The revelations of the investigation shewed that there were forces in the body politic which, if they were secret, were powerful and that behind the imposing facade of parliamentary authority moved the decisive factors of aggressive and of predatory capitalism.³⁴

The plots and the counter-plots within the Conservative party that

the Public Works Inquiry revealed were exceedingly damaging to the party's reputation. Of the real antecedents of the revelations we know very little.³⁵ As the former ally of Sir Hector Langevin and as the editor of le Canadien, Israel Tarte was possessed of most of the secrets of the Quebec Conservatives; the charges which he preferred were, therefore, disturbing in the extreme. It would appear that the difference first developed in consequence of some obscure quarrel of Castor and of Liberal Conservative which Langevin was too weak or too apathetic to smother.³⁶ The controversy followed traditional lines; Langevin and the treasurer of the party, Thomas McGreevy, paired off against Tarte and Chapleau. A chance falling-out of the brothers McGreevy placed in Tarte's hands the compromising documents.³⁷ These documents Tarte shewed Macdonald and, failing to receive satisfaction "...again under the advice of some very important members of the Conservative party, I published the statements..."³⁸ Second only in devastating effect to the evidence of corruption and of gross inefficiency were these revelations of bad blood, plotting and intriguing within the Conservative party. The picture that was presented of the inner workings of the party was not attractive.

The disgrace of Langevin was a catastrophe for the French-Canadian Conservative party. Langevin himself carried little weight and it is inconceivable that he could have discharged the functions of party leader adequately. He was, however, an adroit parliamentarian and in his large family connexion he wielded an influence far in excess of his personal capabilities. Whatever his limitations may have been, he was the last Conservative leader of any stature or of any influence. His fall damaged the party's reputation in Quebec and turned the disallusioned younger men of the Province elsewhere. The revelations of intrigues and of feuds

within the party were equally unfortunate for they threw into unhappy contrast the amity and the solidarity of its opponents.

The unusual coincidence of a second scandal revelation in the same year intervened to save the Quebec Conservatives. In the autumn of 1891 investigations were begun into the activities of the Nationalist Administration, the consequences of which were quite as damaging to them and to the Liberals as the revelations of the Public Works investigations had been to the Conservatives. The specific charge laid against Mercier and his colleagues was the maladministration of subsidies to the Baie des Chaleurs Railway.³⁹ The Railway had been projected nearly a decade before to open the rich but inaccessible land on the south shore of the Gaspé to colonisation.⁴⁰ The first contractor, C.N. Armstrong, began work, became insolvent and gave way to another who followed the same dismal sequence. This was the state of affairs in 1890, when Mercier, who had been elected for Bonaventure, one of the Gaspé ridings,⁴¹ promised to complete the railway. The Company was reorganized, aid from the Dominion government secured and subsidies to the extent of \$280,000 voted by the Province. About this time, Armstrong presented an account for nearly \$300,000 which was ultimately scaled down to \$175,000 and paid by the Nationalist Minister of Public Works, Garneau. Out of this sum, Armstrong paid \$100,000 to Ernest Pacaud, the Nationalist campaign organiser and the editor of l'Événement.

Rumours of irregularities, that extravagance seemed to substantiate, had been rife for some time.⁴² The very rash participation of the Nationalists in the Dominion General Elections of 1891 invited retaliation⁴³ and in mid-summer of that year Sir John Abbott delivered his blow. Abbott acted with accustomed astuteness. A Bill was introduced into the House of Commons to give the Baie des Chaleurs Railway a Dominion charter, allowed

to pass unquestioned and then subjected to a searching examination in the Senate under Abbott's personal direction.⁴⁴ It was in the course of this examination that the extraordinary volutions and convolutions of contractor and of politician were brought out. The sum of \$100,000 that Pacaud had received was used to pay off promissory notes, that is, contributions to the election funds of various Nationalist politicians.

The reports of the Senate's Railway Committee produced great excitement. The Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, Angers, at once called upon Mercier for explanations.⁴⁵ Throughout the entire controversy, Mercier's conduct had been most inept, he had been in Europe when it opened and only grudgingly did he accept the Lieutenant-Governor's request for a judicial inquiry. A Royal Commission was, therefore, instituted and the Baie des Chaleurs and other transactions rigidly examined. The findings of the Commission exonerated Mercier personally from any knowledge of the Pacaud-Armstrong agreement although ^{they} stressed the fact that some of his Ministers were cognizant of it. On the strength of the Commission's findings, Angers dismissed Mercier and called on the Conservatives to form an Administration.⁴⁶

The findings of the various commissions and committees of inquiry into both the Department of Public Works and the Baie des Chaleurs scandals left behind voluminous reports. It is by no means certain, from an examination of the evidence thus laid before us, that in either instance were the guilty parties found or was justice equitably done. Sir Hector Langevin was much more the victim than the director of the system that disgraced him. He had fallen under the power of what can be described only as a gang of international rascals, who played upon his public position and his personal weaknesses. Very much the same may be said for Mercier. His

tremendous personal influence in Quebec was his undoing for it was used by interested parties for their own ends. Mercier was a poor man with a large appetite for pleasures and this pardonable weakness was the means of bringing him to submission. Even Pacaud himself was, manifestly, the mere stalking-horse for more unscrupulous persons and interests.

The consequences of the Baie des Chaleurs scandal were immediate. The least important, perhaps, was the temporary rehabilitation of the Conservative party in Quebec. The Liberal party throughout Canada was put in a most embarrassing position.⁴⁷ It had raised the cry of outraged virtue in attacking Langevin and almost at the same time it was confronted with evidence that one of its own Administrations was as corrupt and as venal as the Conservative.⁴⁸ The position of young Wilfrid Laurier was made exceedingly difficult, since, as a Quebecer and as an associate of Mercier, he was looked upon with distrust in the English Provinces.⁴⁹ The effects of the scandal were far-reaching in Quebec. The evidences of demoralization in political life were humiliating and, to a greater or to a lesser extent, both Conservatives and Nationalists were implicated. Only in the Liberals, in men like Joly, Marchand and Laurier did there seem any salvation for the political reputation of French Canada.

The Conservative revival which followed the downfall of Mercier was momentary. The beginning, however, was bright since both in the Province of Quebec and in Canada at large, circumstances seemed to favour the party. In Quebec, the administration of deBoucherville took the tide of popular indignation at the flood and, in the General Elections of 1892, scored a resounding triumph at the polls.⁵⁰ DeBoucherville may not have been a strong leader or a popular one, but his reputation as a man of sterling principles caught the imagination of the Province. At Ottawa, the Dominion

Conservative party was drastically overhauled and reformed by the vigorous new leader, Sir John Thompson.⁵⁷ Like deBoucherville, Thompson appealed more to the head than to the heart, but it is legitimate to suppose that had he lived, Laurier's success in 1897 would have been materially reduced.⁵² The inability of the French-Canadian Conservatives to consolidate the position after 1891 throws into higher relief the fundamental weaknesses of the party, its lack of leadership, its sectional antipathies, its bankruptcy as to policy, its egregious inability to measure the expressed needs of the Province.

This does not detract from the genuine efforts of the French-Canadian Conservatives to give the Province economic and progressive government in the short five years of their power. The progressive character of the Conservative^{administration} was shewn, not so much in any imposing programme of public works but in the manner in which it attacked the fundamental problem of the Province, finance. Upon assuming office the Conservatives found a most unenviable state of affairs. It was estimated that the Provincial debt stood at 24 millions, or nearly double what it had been when the Nationalists took office in 1887. DeBoucherville and his Treasurer, J.S. Hall, at once entered on a programme of comprehensive taxation.⁵³ The existing levies on commercial corporations which had been instituted by a former Conservative régime were extended and the scheme of licensing was enlarged to embrace members of the liberal professions, advocates, notaries, engineers and so on. A tax, more in keeping with modern views on the science of taxation, was the one laid on estates acquired by inheritance. While the regimen of taxation was admirable in conception, in detail there was much to criticize. For example, the taxes levied by the Conservatives and, for that matter, by their Liberal successors were indirect taxes. They lacked,

therefore, the disciplinary force which they should have had. They fell, moreover, on the urban population⁵⁴ and the countryman who certainly needed to have the desperate financial plight of the Province brought home to him escaped almost entirely. Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether any Government would have survived long an attempt to place direct taxes on the farmer in view of the deep-rooted prejudices of the class and in view also of the gross over-representation that the rural constituencies enjoyed in the Legislature.⁵⁵ The fact remains, however, that the Conservatives, during their brief tenure of office, initiated this most necessary of reforms and started the Province towards the enviable financial position it occupies today.

In spite, however, of its very real accomplishments, the Conservative régime in Quebec was weak because of the changes in and the rivalries of its leaders. Between 1891 and 1897, the Government had three premiers and as many reconstructed cabinets.⁵⁶ A succession of premiers, of course, weakened the government since it was impossible to provide that continuity of personality which is the life-blood of an administration. It was difficult also for the new leader to master the minutiae of party organisation. The tendency noted previously for able Provincial leaders to gravitate into the Dominion Cabinet obtained, although, in this period, motivation came from Ottawa, not from Quebec. In its desperate search for "strong men", the Dominion party bled the Provincial organisation white of its talent. Deprived of its leaders, the Provincial government leant heavily on the Dominion. This was doubly unfortunate, since it gave substance to the old Liberal accusation that the Provincial Conservatives were the creatures of Ottawa. It also made the Provincial government less able to stand alone after the fall of the Dominion Conservatives in 1897. The same

extraordinary uncertainty of tenure was observable in the executive branch of government as well. Chapleau left the Dominion Cabinet to assume the Lieutenant-Governorship of Quebec while his predecessor Angers took his place in the Cabinet.⁵⁷ The causes of these changes were, if anything, more damaging than the changes themselves. Among the leaders, there were strong antipathies and rivalries. The translation of Chapleau to the Lieutenant-Governorship was the signal for the retirement of deBoucherville since Chapleau and deBoucherville had been on uneasy terms since 1878 or 1879 when Chapleau had become the leader of the Provincial Conservatives. The retirement of deBoucherville lost the Conservative party a powerful moral force and a leader who carried great influence with the clerically-minded Conservatives.

Behind these changes in personnel were deeply rooted differences in political philosophy. The rivalry of Liberal-Conservative and of ultra-Conservative went on with deadly effect.⁵⁸ The accession of deBoucherville to the premiership was a triumph for the ultra- and the Castor-Conservatives. The return of Chapleau to the Province as its Lieutenant-Governor was as demonstrably a success for the Liberal-Conservatives and applauded, or deprecated, as such. The feud within the party was exceedingly destructive for it dissipated energies and squandered funds which could have been employed better in devising new programmes or in fighting the Liberals.⁵⁹ The effects on the party organization and especially on the party press was disastrous. Even in the 'nineties, we are considering newspapers which lived in virtue of the aid they received from governments or similar agencies. In Quebec, there was not enough patronage to go round all the newspapers of the diverse schools of Conservative thought. In consequence, some of the oldest and the most reliable party organs were allowed to de-

cline. With his usual perspicacity Chapleau saw the danger, even if he could suggest no remedy,

"...You see that all is not roses in our camp...We have not a single paper to give the ton those questions. La Minerve has no direction and la Presse will not assume the rôle of the party organ.. The fact is that unless la Minerve's affairs are settled at once it will disappear..."⁶⁰

La Minerve did not disappear at the moment, although it survived the downfall of its friends by only two years.⁶¹ There was another aspect to this political vendetta carried on within the party. While the Conservatives bickered, the Province moved on and they found themselves abandoned by the people they sought to represent. Ultimately this rivalry within the party achieved its final form in a species of schism which carried a considerable group of Conservatives into cooperation with the Liberals. It should be understood that this development came late and was precipitated by the pressure of external events.

The Dominion Government was also badly shaken by internal dissensions. In these French-Canadians were involved, not to the extent that they were in Quebec, but with more far-reaching consequences. The frequent changes in Conservative leadership that followed the death of Macdonald allowed personal ambitions and sectional rivalries to run unchecked. The intrusion of the Manitoba Schools' dispute into the Canadian parliament witnessed scenes of discord unrivalled, probably, in the annals of British legislatures culminating in the resignation of a group of Ministers on the eve of the Session. Previous to this there had been difficulties over the French-Canadian representation in the Dominion Cabinet. Langevin's withdrawal from public life left a gap that was not easy to fill. There were two possible candidates, Chapleau and Caron. Chapleau, however, preferred the retirement of Spencerwood in which position he drifted more and more into

association with the Liberals.⁶² Under the circumstances, Sir Adolphe Caron would have made an able leader had he not been touched by both the Public Works and the Baie of Chaleurs scandals. Because of this, and because of his championing of Sir Hector, Caron did not get on well with Sir John Thompson, although he retained his portfolio.⁶³ Through some oversight, the cause of which remains obscure, Caron was not included in Tupper's reconstructed Cabinet in 1897.⁶⁴ According to Sir Richard Cartwright, who was in a position to know what went on on the Liberal side, this oversight was fatal to the French-Canadian Conservatives since with Caron estranged there was no leader who could challenge Laurier.⁶⁵

Thus it was that the Conservative revival of the 'nineties failed to arrest what Chapleau termed "the malise" that had overtaken the party.⁶⁶ The revival was superficial in character, since not one of the weaknesses that had been growing in the Conservative body politic for over a decade were properly probed, much less removed. It might be said of the French-Canadian Conservatives, as it was said of the Prussians at Jena, it was the army of Frederick the Great grown forty years old.

It was during the 'nineties when the Conservative decline was most accelerated that Laurier's influence was powerfully felt. In another place the destructive effects of Laurier's interpretations of Liberalism were assessed; here it is necessary to touch on the equally powerful but entirely informal influence he exercised. He was personally popular with his opponents, especially with Chapleau. Circumstances conspired to place him in a position of unusual prominence; he was the leader of the Liberal party and in the event of a political turn-over, he would be the first French-Canadian premier of the Dominion. To a people as race-proud as the French-Canadians, the appeal on this score was nearly irresistible.

It was in anticipation of just such an appeal that Laurier had been chosen the Liberal leader in 1887.⁶⁷ Laurier could and did appeal as a young man to the sense of optimism and to the sense of justness that young men had. He was also completely free from the slightest suspicion of scandal and to a people who had seen their older leaders disgraced this was an attraction that could not be overlooked.

The quietus was given to the French-Canadian Conservative party by the Manitoba School dispute. With the genesis of the question, French-Canadians had little to do directly. It was primarily a Western problem although it was whipped into its aggravated political form by interested politicians from Eastern Canada. On the one hand, the dispute over the character of the Provincial schools went back to the distant days of the Manitoba Act when an effort was made to guarantee to the principal racial and sectarian groups the perpetuation of their schools.⁶⁸ One of the first acts of the Legislature was to establish a Board of Education on which French Roman Catholics and English Protestants were equally represented and to provide for the equal division of the Provincial grant to education. In the years that succeeded, the Province of Manitoba became more English and more Protestant in character. Writing at a slightly later period, Goldwin Smith could state,

".. the French yet cling to the hope of making the North-West their own...But the balance of destiny has clearly turned against them; as pioneers they are no match for their rivals, the Half-Breed is not a strong race nor is immigration doing much to recruit it.."69

As the English-speaking population increased it was given a larger representation on the Board of Education and a larger share of the Provincial grant; the essentially denominational character of the schools remained. As early as 1875, however, when the second Provincial elections brought the representatives of the new Eastern immigrants into the Legislature,⁷⁰

suggestions were put forward of substituting a non-sectarian Provincially controlled system for the existing order. The suggestion failed and it remained for outside influences to procure its amendment. The outside influences were applied by D'Alton McCarthy, fresh from the Jesuits' Estates controversy and from the struggles of the Equal Rights Association. Having failed signally to arrest the progress of "French aggression" and "Roman Catholic domination" in the sophisticated East, he turned to the vigorous West. Here McCarthy found a ready hearing in a constituency which had its grievances against Eastern Canada and against the Conservative party in the form of the "monopoly clause" in the C.P.R. charter and in the tutelage the banks exercised over the Western farmer. In Joseph Martin, the moving spirit in the new Liberal Manitoban government, McCarthy found an under-study who proposed the creation^{of} state-controlled, non-sectarian schools in which religious teaching should be banned. A vigorous protest from the Anglican clergy and laity of the arch Diocese of Ruperts Land produced certain modifications,⁷¹ although the principles of state-control and of state-supervision remained unaltered. Accordingly, in 1890, the Manitoba legislature established the new system of public, non-sectarian schools which were supported by assessment on all taxable property and by legislative grants and controlled by a Provincial Department of Education.

Of the very necessity of things the problem of the Manitoba schools became an issue in the Dominion parliament. The minority in Manitoba, headed by their clergy proceeded to call into operation the measures of redress which had been provided for them, appeal to the Courts, disallowance of the Provincial Act, remedial legislation by the Dominion government. Disallowance was at once ruled out.⁷² Therefore, appeal was made to the Courts. It was at this point that French-Canada became interested

since the school issue involved much more than an educational matter and challenged the very continuance of a race. An examination of the French-Canadian press shews that among the moderates the judicial approach was favoured. The action of the Supreme Court of Canada, therefore, in declaring the Manitoba Education Act ultra vires was, as the Gazette said, "hailed with general satisfaction."⁷³ The position of the French-Canadians was one of great delicacy. There was the strong natural desire to see justice done to the Manitoba minority, there was an equally natural unwillingness to invoke discipline on the part of the Dominion government and thus to outrage the widely held doctrine of Provincial rights. The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Imperial Privy Council to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court was received with great concern. The French-Canadian Conservatives had every reason to feel concern for, with the failure of the Courts to do them justice, the Roman Catholics of Manitoba began to press for remedial action by the Dominion government. Thus the question was brought directly into the political arena.⁷⁴

In 1893 and 1894, the political arena was in a state of unusual confusion. The Canadian world and the two parties were in transition with such new issues as Commercial Union and Imperial Federation and such new groups as the Patrons of Industry struggling for recognition. Thanks principally to their superior leadership and organization, the Liberals were in a better position to meet the crisis that the Schools carried. In June of 1893, the Liberals had met in Convention at Ottawa,⁷⁵ and although they may not have produced much in the way of a programme, they gave the party solidity and confidence. La Minerve surveyed the Convention with a jaundiced eye,

".. silence complet sur les questions brûlantes... Rien donc des écoles de Manitoba, pas la plus légère allusion..."⁷⁶

Confidence and solidarity were the very qualities that the Conservatives lacked and before the year was out they were thrown into further confusion by the death of Sir John Thompson. Thompson's death removed the last hope of a judicious settlement of the Manitoba Schools question and let loose the forces of dissension.

The dissensions within the Conservative party were now of a most serious character. The Quebec Conservatives who still suffered from the defection of Tarte and from his continued invectives^{which} called for the coercion of Manitoba in the interests of the Minority. A growing number of English-speaking Conservatives, following the lead of McCarthy, were determined to resist any attempt to over-ride the Manitoba Education Act. It was to this troubled heritage that Mackenzie-Bowell, the senior Conservative leader, succeeded. Bowell who was honest and conscientious, revolved on remedial legislation. In this he had the concurrence of his French-Canadian colleagues but delay in introducing the necessary relief measure caused Angers to resign from the Cabinet and Ouimet and Caron to threaten to follow suit.⁷⁷ This was slight earnest of what was to follow, for, in January of 1896, seven of the English-speaking Ministers resigned and forced Bowell to relinquish the premiership to Sir Charles Tupper. The substitution made little change in policy since Tupper was determined to proceed with a remedial bill which would provide Manitoba with a system of Separate Schools.

The position of the French-Canadian Conservatives was anomalous in the extreme. Their natural inclinations led them to support the remedial measure which promised relief for their co-religionists and compatriots. But there were other considerations; remedial legislation was an infringement on provincial rights; if Manitoba could be coerced why not Quebec?

While it is true that provincial autonomy was never formally included among the principles of French-Canadian political philosophy, there was a deep-seated distrust of any measure which would increase the power of the central over the local governments. The Liberal defence of provincial rights was unequivocal; with rare prescience Israel Tarte had seen to that,⁷⁸ hence they had the advantage of a policy that was at once popular and clear-cut. The arguments of the Liberal protagonists, especially of Laurier, disarmed the Conservatives who were whole-heartedly in favour of the Government's Bill, by pointing out that the measure was inadequate and by suggesting that a Liberal Government at Ottawa and a Liberal Government at Winnipeg could secure more by negotiation and by compromise than the Conservatives could by coercion.⁷⁹ Equally unequivocal was the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church authorities in Manitoba and in Quebec. The newly consecrated Archbishop of St. Boniface, Mgr. Langevin, gave his entire concurrence to the Government's Bill and was supported by the Quebec episcopate. While the language of the Collective Mandement issued by the Bishops was moderate,⁸⁰ some of them, in pastoral letters to their own laity, were provocative in the extreme. Most remarkable was the letter written by Father Lacombe to Laurier in the name of the Bishops, threatening clerical opposition should he continue to oppose the Government Bill.⁸¹ The Bishops were speaking a language of a past generation and the extravagance of their words seems to have stirred a resentment that was Province-wide. Within the Church itself it is doubtful if the Bishops had the full support of the lower clergy for, as Chapleau had observed some time previously,

".. the different Bishops must be seen and a common action determined on to control the lower clergy which is lost to us in a much greater measure than we are willing to admit..."⁸²

As the Conservative Government stumbled through the Special Session

of 1896 and then prepared to go to the country on the Bill, the conviction grew among French-Canadians that a Conservative victory would mean little short of clerical domination and a return of the dark days of 'seventies. To the liberal Conservatives success at the polls meant the triumph of the Castors and the destruction of those principles for which liberal Conservatism stood. The lead was given by Chapleau who declined to enter Sir Charles Tupper's Cabinet,

"I just returned from Newport (and) found your telegram asking my support in your task of forming an Administration...I regret having to decline. The reasons which induced me to quit active political life are still sufficient to keep me from it now,...

"My determination is irrevocable and I feel that my going to Ottawa, which I could not do for a couple of days would only cause you loss of valuable time. Better dispense with a conference which possibly would be painful and certainly useless to both of us.."83

It does not appear that in the General Elections the liberal Conservatives actively assisted the Opposition but it is indisputable that a nominally large Conservative vote was lost to the party.⁸⁴ Active cooperation certainly proceeded after the election for Laurier knew to whom he was indebted and he bestowed favour with remarkable impartiality. Dansereau, Chapleau's lieutenant, became the Post Master of Montreal and Chapleau himself would have received a second term as Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec had it not been for the determined resistance of the extremists among the Liberals.⁸⁵ Laurier's actions, indeed, roused a good deal of resentment in his old Rouge followers who could not endure compromise. Their protests were quickly stifled for in the membership of the first Liberal Cabinet only Geoffrion could be regarded as the representative of the old uncompromising Liberalism of French-Canada.

The nature of the Conservative debacle was not understood by contemporaries nor has it been critically appreciated by later students. At

the moment the Conservatives and their well-wishers were stunned. Archbishop Langevin wrote in haste to Sir Charles Tupper,

"I come to thank you for your noble efforts...Honor is safe. Let us hope for better days...I can hardly realize the calamity.."86

Sir Mackenzie-Bowell was more specific,

"I have not recovered from the surprise and the astonishment of the returns from Quebec. What does it mean? Have the people of that Province thrown off the influence of the Church, or did the desire for a French Premier counterbalance all other considerations?"87

Laurier's biographers have interpreted the events of 1896 entirely in the terms of a personal triumph for Laurier. So indeed it was, but to neglect the more concrete factors is to take a very superficial view of Canadian history. The French-Canadian Conservative party may have been overwhelmed in 1896 but Conservative principles continued, having been incorporated in Liberal polity. The success of the Provincial Liberal party in the following year reinforces this view. The Provincial Conservatives fell when the support from Ottawa was withdrawn but the Liberals who succeeded them made no substantial change in the programme of cautiously progressive government.

The title, "the decline of French-Canadian Conservatism", is perhaps something of a misnomer. It was less a story of a decline than a chronicle of successive failures to hold the allegiance of the Province. What was progressive and constructive in Conservatism survived in Laurier's Liberalism. It could, in fact, be argued that the party itself survived since the Liberal Government had many of the aspects of a coalition.⁸⁸ The Conservatives lost the support of the Province chiefly because their programme and their philosophy no longer met the requirements of either the Province or of the Dominion. Their opponents, on the other hand, kept abreast of public opinion; although not too far abreast as the abandon-

ment of Mercier and the silencing of the Rouges shewed. In the long process of decline, inadequate leadership played a large part. It was most clearly demonstrated in the failure of the party to capture the young men of the Province. This was also the failure of the Conservative party at large, as Macdonald had seen,

"I am a good deal discouraged as to our future--not that the country has gone, or is going against us--but because our Ministry is too old and too long in office. I am on the way to 76; Langevin is aged much and is inert and useless..he doesn't move in Quebec politics..Bowell is pretty hale yet he shews his age..I fear for Thompson's health..⁸⁹

The diagnosis was masterly but for one consideration the country had slipped away.

- ¹Shehyn, J. Financial Statement. 1887.
- ²____? le Gouvernement Mercier.
Belleau et Cie; Québec, 1890.
- ³Tupper Papers; Miscellaneous Canada. No. 3.
Macdonald to Tupper; Ottawa, June 23, 1890.
- ⁴Mackenzie-Bowell Papers.
C.C. Colby to Bowell; Stanstead, March 7, 1891.
- ⁵Laurier, W. Discours, p. 84ff.
- ⁶ibid., p. 97.
- ⁷ibid., p. 103.
- ⁸ibid., p. 89.
- ⁹ibid., p. 90. "... le principe du libéralisme réside dans cette soif
de bonheur que nous apportons avec nous dans la vie.."
- ¹⁰ibid., p. 93.
- ¹¹ibid., p. 88.
- ¹²ibid., p. 99.
- ¹³ibid., p. 101.
- ¹⁴In his otherwise penetrating study of Laurier, Mr. Dafoe makes the Riel
agitation "the fortunate accident of Laurier's career (p. 17). With
this opinion we differ.
- ¹⁵la Concorde, le 23 juillet, 1883.
- ¹⁶Pelland, J.O. Discours.. etc. de l'Hon. Honoré Mercier.
The most extensive expression of Mercier's views on the subject are
to be found on p. 397ff.
- ¹⁷Cooper, J.I. Some early French-Canadian Views on Protection.
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Nov., 1937.
- ¹⁸Macdonald Papers. Chapleau Correspondence, Vol. 2.
Chapleau to Macdonald. ____? Aug. 10, 1890.
- ¹⁹Macdermot, T.W.L. "The Political Ideas of Sir John A. Macdonald."
Canadian Historical Review, September, 1933.
- ²⁰la Minerve. le 29 mai, 1891.
- ²¹ibid., le 17 juin.
"...sir John n'a jamais cessé de poursuivre cette politique large,
équitable..et..essentiellement favorable au Bas-Canada.."

- ²²ibid., le 10 février, 1891.
- ²³As early as 1886, McCarthy began to attack what he called, "the Government's dirty policy" of acceding to the French-Canadians.
- ²⁴Gazette, June 9, 1891.
- ²⁵la Minerve. le 4 juin, 1891.
- ²⁶ibid., le 15 juin, 1891.
- ²⁷Cartwright, R. Reminiscences, p. 330.
- ²⁸The administration of the Public Works Department was subject to investigation by the Select Standing Committee of Elections and Privileges in 1891. The evidence laid before the Committee and the Reports thereon, are to be found in the Journals of the House of Commons, 1891, Appendix 1. Unless otherwise stated, the citations noted below are from this source.
- ²⁹Statement of Thomas McGreevy, p. 880.
- ³⁰Report of Sub-Committee "A", p. ivf.
- ³¹Statement of Thomas McGreevy, p. 956.
- ³²Report of Sub-Committee "A", p. ivff.
- ³³Even the critical minority report did not implicate Langevin, "... the evidence does not justify them (the Committee) in concluding that the Minister knew of the conspiracy, or that he willingly lent himself to its objects".
- ³⁴Cartwright, R. Reminiscences, p. 334.
- ³⁵Tarte's private papers appear to have been destroyed. He has been the subject of innumerable pamphlets but no really comprehensive or critical account of his place in Canadian life has appeared.
- ³⁶Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques, tome 2, p. 33ff.
- ³⁷Statement of Robert McGreevy, p. 243.
- ³⁸Debates of the House of Commons; Canada. 1891. Vol. 1. May 11. Israel Tarte.
- ³⁹The evidence of the Senate Committee and the findings of the Royal Commission are to be found in the Journals of the Senate; Canada, 1891, and in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Baie des Chaleurs Railway. Unless otherwise specified, citations appearing below are from these sources.
- ⁴⁰Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques, tome 2, p. 116-117.

- ⁴¹Canadian Parliamentary Companion, 1891, p. 272.
- ⁴²As early as May 14, 1890, the Gazette wrote,
 "...he (Mercier) came into power as the representative of a crime;
 his administration has been marked by a series of crimes against
 honest government.."
- ⁴³l'union libérale, le 13 février, 1891.
- ⁴⁴In his volume of reminiscences, Sir Richard Cartwright states that this
 was done deliberately in order to bring the investigations before an
 almost exclusively Conservative body and whose decision was "...a
 foregone conclusion.." (p. 308)
- ⁴⁵Gazette, Montreal, October 13, 1891.
- ⁴⁶The subsequent legal proceedings against Mercier are not german to this
 subject. Vide, Canada and its Provinces, Vol. 15, p. 204 and 205.
- ⁴⁷Cartwright, R. op. cit. p. 309.
- ⁴⁸Globe, Toronto, December 16, 1891.
- ⁴⁹Cartwright, R. op. cit., p. 331.
- ⁵⁰The Conservatives captured some 47 out of the 72 seats in the Assembly.
- ⁵¹Cartwright, R. op. cit., p. 332.
- ⁵²ibid., p. 343.
- ⁵³Financial Statement, J.S. Hall, May 20, 1892, p. 39.
 "...there is one course open..increased taxation.."
- ⁵⁴ibid., L.O. Taillon, December 21, 1894.
 Taillon realized the unfairness of the system,
 "...reduction should be made in favour of the commercial and business
 men.."
- ⁵⁵In the Provincial General Election of 1890, there were 72 candidates
 returned; of these only 11 represented urban constituencies, Quebec 3,
 Montreal 6, Sherbrooke 1, Three Rivers 1.
- ⁵⁶deBoucherville, 1891-December 1892; Taillon, 1892-April 1896; Flynn,
 1896-1897.
- ⁵⁷Canadian Parliamentary Companion. Chapleau was appointed Lieutenant-
 Governor in December, 1892.
- ⁵⁸Macdonald Papers. Chapleau Correspondence, Vol. 2.
 Chapleau to Macdonald, Ottawa, August 10, 1890.
 "...there are now three groups among the Conservatives of Montreal..
 That division has caused our English friends to form their own circle.."

- ⁵⁹ibid. Chapleau to Macdonald. _____? _____? 1890.
 "...the Conservative Association..has been killed by the contending factions of la Minerve and of le Monde.."
- ⁶⁰ibid. Chapleau to Macdonald, April 24, 1891.
- ⁶¹Tarte to Laurier; Ottawa, February 7, 1899. (translation)
 "...Here is the situation as I understand it. La Minerve..is at its last shift. It cannot last much longer.." Printed in Skelton's Laurier, Vol. 2, p. 174.
- ⁶²Canadian Parliamentary Companion, 1893.
- ⁶³ibid., 1897, p. 119.
- ⁶⁴Tupper, Charles, Recollections of Sixty Years. Chapter 16 makes no reference to the Cassell and Company, London, 1914, incident.
- ⁶⁵Cartwright, R. Reminiscences.
- ⁶⁶Macdonald Papers, op. cit.
- ⁶⁷Cartwright, R. Reminiscences, p. 274.
 Chapleau to Macdonald, June 4, 1888.
- ⁶⁸Manitoba Act, Clause 22.
- ⁶⁹Smith, G. Canada and the Canadian Question, p. 199.
 Macmillan and Company, Toronto, 1891.
- ⁷⁰Savaete, A. Vers l'Abime. Tome 7, p. 94.
- ⁷¹Savaete, A. ibid., tome 7, p. 88.
- ⁷²Gazette, Montreal, April 9, 1891.
- ⁷³ibid., October 29, 1892.
- ⁷⁴ibid., January 31, 1895.
- ⁷⁵Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques, tome 2, p. 212.
- ⁷⁶la Minerve, le 21 juin, 1893.
- ⁷⁷The Crisis took place in June, 1895.
- ⁷⁸Cartwright, R. Reminiscences, p. 346.
- ⁷⁹Skelton, O.D. The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol. 1, p. 469.
 Century Company, New York, 1922.
- ⁸⁰The Collective Mandement was read in the Churches on May 17.

⁸¹Printed in Skelton's Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol. 1, p. 470.

⁸²Macdonald Papers. Chapleau Correspondence, Vol. 2.
Chapleau to Macdonald, August 10, 1890.

⁸³Tupper Papers. Canada Miscellaneous, Vol. 4.
Chapleau to Tupper; Atlantic City, April 29, 1896.

⁸⁴A glance at the returns of the previous General Elections in Quebec is convincing;

	<u>1867</u>	<u>1872</u>	<u>1874</u>	<u>1878</u>	<u>1882</u>	<u>1887</u>	<u>1891</u>	<u>1896</u>
Conservative--	45	38	32	45	48	36	30	16
Liberal --	20	27	33	20	17	29	35	49

⁸⁵Tarte to Laurier; Ottawa, February 8, 1899.
Printed by Skelton, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 175.

⁸⁶Tupper Papers, Canada Miscellaneous, Vol. 4.
Archbishop Langevin to Tupper; St. Boniface, June 24, 1896.

⁸⁷Tupper Papers, ibid., Vol. 4.
Mackenzie-Bowell to Tupper; Ottawa, June 30, 1896.

⁸⁸Langelier, F. to Laurier; Quebec ___? December, 1896.
Printed in Skelton, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 169.

⁸⁹Tupper Papers, ibid., Vol. 3,
Macdonald to Tupper; Ottawa, June 5, 1890.

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

There was little that was heaven-born in French-Canadian Conservatism. It sprang as a vigorous plant from the rich soil of the St. Lawrence valley. Nor did French-Canadian Conservatism owe much to foreign inspiration. Its name possibly was borrowed from Great Britain but the theories on which it operated were native. French-Canadian Conservatism was not adventurous either in principle or in practice. It accepted the parliamentary system without question and very nearly without innovation. It accepted equally the social and economic structure of the country unreservedly. Yet Conservatism was not institutionalized negation. It was an active, constructive force which for a generation provided direction for the French-Canadian people.

The point of view that French-Canadian Conservatism presented was, perhaps, its most conspicuous contribution to Canadian life. The French-Canadian Conservatives envisaged a Canadian nationality and a Canadian nation. Recognizing the diversity of origin and of tradition of the peoples of the British Provinces, French-Canadians believed it was still possible to unite the heterogeneous mass by a common loyalty and in a common endeavour. They were at once too clear-sighted and too conscious of their racial antecedents ever to contemplate fusion, but they believed that unity of action could be obtained without the sacrifice of individual independence. To this end they postulated a loyalty which was to be the sum total of the old provincial and sectional loyalties. In the eyes of the older men like Cartier, the object of such loyalty was to be found in the Crown. In the view of the younger Conservative leaders it was to be found in the country itself. The difference of opinion on this subject may be regarded as symptomatic of the increasingly North American point of view of French-Canadians. Being practical men the Conservatives realized that sentiment

was not enough. They supported, therefore, a vast programme of public works nationwide in extent. In their opinion the physical union of the various sections of the Canadian federation by the construction of railways and by the imposition of a protective tariff which would promote national wealth would assist in the creation of that unity they so ardently desired.

As well as advocating the idea of national unity, the French-Canadian Conservatives gave practical expression to it in the organization of their party. Within the French-Canadian Conservative party was an English-speaking element whose wishes carried considerable weight in the councils of the party. In addition, the French-Canadians worked in close and in generally loyal collaboration with the Liberal-Conservative party whose constituency was the entire Dominion. Thus, there were brought together the most diverse elements within the discipline of a single party. To the extent that French-Canadians could cooperate with these other groups and sink their mutual differences, they gave concrete expression to the tolerance and to the forbearance they advocated.

French-Canadian Conservatism and the French-Canadian Conservative party was not without its distinct limitations. It was unimaginative. The most unhappy demonstration of this was provided by its inability to take control of and to profit by the strong feeling of national consciousness that pervaded the French-Canadian community. There was, as Cartier saw, a place for French-Canadian national consciousness and racial aspirations within the larger Canadian nationality: his successors had not the discernment nor the dexterity to realize upon it. Unimaginativeness was also shewn by the way in which the party allowed the great national enterprises to fall into private hands. This failure was ultimately fatal for the party had preached the advantage of controlling the resources of the

Province for the benefit of its inhabitants, yet they were surrendered to individuals for exploitation. Equally serious was the unawareness of the party to the great changes that were in progress throughout the Province of Quebec and the Dominion. Thus, although industrialization and urbanization was in rapid progress, neither the Conservative programme nor the Conservative organization were modified to meet these new conditions. In the later XIX century Conservatism was detached from some of the most powerful forces in national life and accordingly took on a character of unreality. It is not too much to state that the earlier Conservatism that Cartier had presided over had represented a body of opinion, a social and political view of society. The later Conservatism degenerated into little more than a parliamentary party.

Closely associated with the limitations of French-Canadian Conservatism were the causes of its failure. The defeat of the Conservative party can be accounted for without much difficulty, but the failure of Conservatism as political philosophy challenges the most searching investigation. Conservatism failed, principally because the view it advanced of the Canadian state was outmoded. Provincial autonomy and the doctrine of provincial rights which were so widely accepted in the 'eighties and in the 'nineties cut directly across the theories of national unity that Conservatism advocated. Its inadequate leaders and its antiquated organization were too content with old formulae and were too inelastic for the new Canadian world. The Canadian world had changed for, by the end of the century, Canada had passed, or was rapidly passing, beyond its first great constructive phase. French-Canadian Conservatism was admirably adapted, both in its philosophy and in its constitution, to fulfill the constructive

rôle; it was less well adapted for the task of criticism and of consolidation.

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHYMANUSCRIPTS

I. Baldwin-Lafontaine Papers; Correspondence. - (transcripts.)

Public Archives of Canada; Ottawa.

Although this collection of manuscripts covered an earlier period than that embraced in the present study, it provided a great deal of information that was useful by way of background and of introduction. The original composition and character of the French-Canadian bloc, the "Liberal" element in the Liberal-Conservative alliance, was shewn, as well as its increasing conservatism and its keen interest in economic matters. Less was said of personalities than was to be expected, for example, it is not till the 'fifties that Cartier begins to appear in the Correspondence.

2. Cartier Papers. Departmental and Official Correspondence.

Public Archives of Canada; Ottawa.

These Papers are almost entirely official and departmental in character. However disappointing, therefore, as sources of information on personal matters, the collection provides a strong testimony to Cartier's care and industry as a departmental head. They also tell something of the mendacity and importunity of the Canadian electorate in the '70's. An exceedingly interesting feature of the Papers are the notes and suggestions jotted down on letters by Cartier for the direction of his secretaries.

3. Elgin-Grey Correspondence. (1846-1852)

Published by the Public Archives of Canada; Ottawa, 1937.

Although the letters of Lord Elgin to the Secretary of State for the Colonies fall in a period anterior to that of this study, they form

an invaluable aid in tracing the antecedents of the Liberal-Conservative coalition of 1854. A study of the letters of 1848 to 1852 fortifies the belief that the old Liberal party of Canada East was forced into a position of increasing conservatism with the rise of the more radical Rouge, or ultra-liberal, group. The same group of letters makes abundantly clear the great changes that came over the business life of the Province during the middle years of Elgin's term of office and to that extent indicates that the party alliances of the next decade were the consequences of these fundamental economic and social changes.

4. Laurier Papers. Correspondence. 1870-1891.

Public Archives of Canada; Ottawa.

The Laurier Papers have not as yet been opened completely to the investigator, hence the letters which were consulted form but a fraction of the complete collection. The Correspondence which was consulted suggested that a very easy relationship existed between Laurier and some of the younger leaders of the Conservative party, notably Chapleau. They also suggested that Laurier and Mercier worked in fairly close collaboration especially before 1885. Some of the later letters indicated the difficulty Laurier and his French-Canadian colleagues had in breaking down the traditional prejudices of Quebec against Liberalism.

5. Macdonald Papers. Correspondence.

Public Archives of Canada.

The vast collection of Sir John A. Macdonald's correspondence covers almost his entire public career from 1844 to 1891. Included in the Correspondence are not only the letters received by Macdonald, but

drafts of letters in his own hand and voluminous notes to his secretaries. The Correspondence provides a veritable reference library upon all things connected with the Conservative party and with the political history of Canada in general.

6. Macdonald Papers; Letter Books.

Public Archives of Canada; Ottawa.

This collection of Macdonald's replies to his correspondents and instructions to his political lieutenants forms a most necessary and valuable supplement to the Correspondence. Macdonald's letters to his French-Canadian friends provide the best single source of information on the relations of the French-speaking and English-speaking wings of the Conservative party, the distributions of patronage and upon the exceedingly delicate problem of the authority of the national party leader.

7. Alexander Mackenzie Papers; Letter-Books.

Ottawa. Public Archives of Canada. Ottawa.

A curious, if indirect, commentary upon the years of Conservative opposition between 1874 and 1878, is provided by these Letter-Books. Mackenzie's references to the Conservatives, while critical, are never unfair. The chief value of the collection lies in the indications it gives of the great difficulties encountered by the Liberals in their efforts to organize Quebec and to find a popular figure which could counter the great, if posthumous, influence of Cartier. It is abundantly clear from the letters written to his French-Canadian colleagues that Mackenzie never understood Quebec problems nor Quebec personalities.

8. Mackenzie-Bowell Papers.

Public Archives of Canada; Ottawa.

They constitute the most complete collection of private papers consulted, embracing as they do correspondence, letter books and scrap books arranged chronologically and carefully tabulated. Although much of the correspondence and many of the letter books are concerned chiefly with departmental business, there is a genial note of harmony that runs through the communications that passed between Bowell and his French-Canadian colleagues. The merit of the Bowell Papers lies in the light they throw on the every-day workings of the Conservative administration.

9. The Papers of Sir Charles Tupper. Correspondence.

Public Archives of Canada; Ottawa.

The Tupper Correspondence is not primarily concerned with French Canada. There are, however, occasional references to events and to personalities in Quebec, especially during 1891, when the death of Macdonald and the disgrace of Langevin brought the matter of leadership to the fore. More pertinent are the references to Quebec views on fiscal problems and to French-Canadian responses to the programme of the Imperial Federationists.

COLLECTED LETTERS AND SPEECHES

1. Cartier.

Discours.....de Sir G.E. Cartier. Edited by Joseph Tassé

(Sénécal et fils, Montréal 1893.)

Although carefully collected in an effort to make Cartier appear the statesman and the orator, these speeches give an indication of Cartier's views on many topics and help us to form a just evaluation of the man.

The biographical notes are useful and fairly accurate. So far as can be judged, the text of the speeches has been carefully preserved. The value of such a collection which includes speeches delivered in a day when there were no reports of Parliamentary debates and when newspapers were ephemeral need not be over-emphasised.

2. Chapleau.

Discours de Sir J.A. Chapleau. Edited by A. deBonnetterre.

(E. Sénécal et fils, Montréal 1887.)

The chief limitation of this collection of addresses is their somewhat formal character for, on an effort to shew Chapleau to the best advantage, the editor has selected, to a large extent, speeches which were delivered on ceremonial and hence uncontroversial occasions. It is difficult, therefore, to discover Chapleau's views on the more pressing topics of the day. Incidentally, some of Chapleau's speeches contain a great deal of biographical material which, in view of our ignorance on many things concerning Chapleau, is invaluable.

3. Laurier, W.

"Discours à l'étranger et au Canada."

Librairie Beauchemin Lté; Montréal, 1909.

This collection of Laurier's speeches is fairly comprehensive. For the purposes of this study, it was especially valuable since it included Laurier's maiden speech in the Quebec Legislative Assembly in 1871 and his very important declaration with respect to political liberalism that he made in Quebec in 1877. The other speeches, while no doubt useful, scarcely fall within the interests of this thesis. A biographical sketch which introduces the collection is of no great moment in view of the abundant literature that has grown up around

Laurier. Of greater value are the notes which preface individual speeches and which explain the circumstances in which the speech was delivered.

3. Laurier.

Pacaud, L. Letters to my Father and Mother.

(Ryerson Press, Toronto 1935)

While this collection of letters is more a tribute to the long friendship between Laurier and Ernest Pacaud, there are some very shrewd comments upon Quebec and Canadian politics, especially in the critical years following 1891. There are also some interesting side-lights upon the relations of the party leader and the party press, in this instance upon the dealings of Laurier and of Pacaud who was the editor of l'Electeur. Brief as the volume is, read in conjunction with the Laurier Papers, it supplies a most valuable addition to our intimate knowledge of Quebec personalities and situations.

4. Macdonald.

Pope, J. Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald.

(Oxford University Press, Toronto 1921.)

This collection constitutes a representative and well edited selection of letters from the Macdonald Papers. The editor has, of course, been at pains to shew Macdonald at his best, but the Correspondence shews what the vast bulk of the Papers indicate, the understanding Macdonald had of Quebec affairs and the confidence that was placed in him by his French-Canadian colleagues. The explanatory notes which the editor has added are disappointingly brief especially when the reference is to some one of Macdonald's less well-known French-Canadian friends.

5. Mercier.

Biographie, discours, etc. ... de l'Hon. Honoré Mercier. Edited by J.O. Pelland.

(No publisher given. Montréal, 1890.)

The most useful section of this omnibus is the speeches and the excerpts from speeches. The editing has been done rather too carefully and some of Mercier's notable utterances on social reform and on Canada's national status have been deleted. The date of publication precludes some of Mercier's most arresting statements as, for example, his celebrated speech on the political future of Canada delivered in Sohmer Park in 1892.

6. Letters of Lord and of Lady Wolseley.

(Doubleday Page and Co., London, 1922.)

Some of the letters included in this volume were written from Canada in 1869 and 1870 when Wolseley was organising the Red River Expeditionary Force. The letters are exceedingly brief and consist chiefly of regimental small-talk and forecasts as to the probable success of the expedition.

DOCUMENTARY SOURCES(a) Governmental

1. The documentary material emanating from governments--Dominion, Provincial and Municipal--forms the most extensive and authoritative source for this study. The Parliamentary documents--Journals, Sessional Papers, Debates and Statutes--provide the necessary framework for the study of legislation and the expression of party policy. The Census Reports provide information concerning population and population movements. The reports of the debates of both the Dominion

Parliament and of the Quebec Legislature have been supplemented by references to newspaper ⁱfiles since the official reporting of debates began late. The various reports of the corporation of Montreal, especially those on public health, police and finance for the years 1885, 1886 and 1887, were found invaluable for an understanding of that crucial period.

2. Parliamentary Debates ... on Confederation.

(Hunter, Rose and Co., Quebec, 1865.)

This volume of the debates in the Canadian Provincial Parliament on the federation issue in 1865 is, in many respects, the most illuminating single document on Confederation. The speeches of the Conservative members from Canada East are invaluable as summarising the views of the party on the project. In the questioning of some of the French-Canadian Conservatives, it is possible to understand the criticism that crystalized in le parti national. The most trenchant criticism of the federation scheme came from Dunkin and Dorion whose speeches are recorded at length.

(b) Societies and Institutions

3. Reports of the Dominion Board of Trade¹ and of the Board of Trade of Montreal.²

These Reports provided a good commentary upon the state of business not simply in the Province, but in the Dominion as well; the Reports from the Montreal Board were, necessarily, of a more limited character. The comments and criticisms of the Boards upon fiscal and tariff matters may be regarded as expressing the views of the Conservative business community.

¹Abstracts of Proceedings at the Dominion Board of Trade, Montreal, 1870-1879 (various publishers).

²Reports of the Council of the Montreal Board of Trade, Montreal, 1863-1894 (various publishers).

4. (i) Mandements des Evêques de Québec (Vols. IV and V.)

Imprimerie générale, A. Côté, Québec 1889.

(ii) Mandements ... etc. ... publiés dans le diocèse de Montréal,

(various publishers; various dates.)

These official pronouncements constitute a guide to the opinions and the policies of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Inasmuch as Quebec was the primatial See, the mandements and circulars emanating from the Archbishops had a very wide application and frequently concerned matters which were of moment to the entire Province. The pronouncements of the Bishops upon political issues and especially upon Liberalism were of first importance to this study.

NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS

These constitute a many-sided source of information upon the political life of the Province. Before Government itself took up the task, the newspapers are our most easily available source of information on parliamentary debates and, indeed, on all the business of parliament. As recorders of political events and as indicators of public opinion the newspaper is without rival. The widespread custom of copying from other journals multiplied the services rendered for many of the rural papers so copied have vanished completely or have become exceedingly scarce. In no other source can the student capture the spirit of the age and place as he can in the newspaper of the Province.

(i) MONTREAL

1. l'Avenir and le Pays.

Although both these newspapers had disappeared before 1873, their influence remained among the more advanced Liberals. l'Avenir was, perhaps, the most provocative and the most critical paper published

in French Canada and while succeeding Liberal papers avoided its radicalism they retained something of its critical spirit.

2. l'Estandard.

An independent paper of Nationalist inclinations.

3. la Minerve was the great Liberal-Conservative newspaper of French Canada. In the period under investigation it was the recognized mouth-piece of Sir George E. Cartier and of Mr. Chapleau. la Minerve was well edited and while it was a party paper its editorial page was of a very high order, la Minerve "exchanged" extensively with rural and small-town papers in the district of Montreal and in this way provided information not otherwise available.

4. le Monde--a Conservative paper of clerical tendencies and generally regarded as representing the interests of Sir Hector Langevin and of the "Castor" wing of the Conservative party.

5. le Nouveau Monde represented the clerical and ultramontane point of view. Officially le Nouveau Monde was Conservative, but its policies and opinions had little in common with the accepted party programme.

6. la Patrie.

This was the official Liberal paper of the Montreal district and sponsored a mild programme of reform. la Patrie had none of the old radical and anti-clerical animus of the early Rouge papers and, politics apart, its views on current social and economic problems resembled very closely those of la Minerve and the moderate Conservative group.

7. la Presse succeeded to la Minerve's liberal principles but not to its Conservative party principles. la Presse was officially an independent Conservative paper.

8. l'Union liberale.

An ephemeral Liberal sheet.

(ii) QUEBEC.1. le Courrier du Canada.

The official newspaper of the Quebec district Conservatives. The editorial policy of the paper appears to have been directed by the party leaders and the paper's views were very largely stereotyped and uncritical.

2. l'Electeur was, perhaps, the strongest Liberal paper of the Quebec district. It was ably edited by Ernest Pacaud, the friend and confidant of Laurier. The paper very well represented Laurier's outlook with his conciliatory point of view.3. l'Evénement.

An independent.

4. le Journal de Québec.

Edited by the redoubtable Joseph Cauchon, le Journal was at one time the most influential newspaper in French-Canada. Owing to the extraordinary gyrations in Cauchon's political allegiance, le Journal did not support any party consistently: in the 'seventies it was Liberal, in the 'eighties it was Conservative. As the spokesman of the district of Quebec, le Journal was unrivalled and untrammelled by party.

5. le Nouvelliste.

An independent Conservative paper representing the outlook of the district of Quebec.

6. The Morning Chronicle.

Conservative English-language paper which spoke for the commercial group of the city.

(iii) LEVIS1. le Quotidien.

A moderate Conservative paper which was friendly to Chapleau and disposed to censure the ultra-conservatives and Sir Hector Langevin.

(iv) SOREL1. la Gazette de Sorel

This was an independent paper but which was in general sympathetic towards the Conservative party. la Gazette's chief preoccupation was the advancement of the farming interests and its editorials and leading articles constitute a useful commentary on farming conditions, in the counties along the south shore of the St. Lawrence.

(v) THREE RIVERS1. la Concorde.

The establishment of this Liberal paper in Three Rivers was regarded as an act of the most daring kind. The influence that la Concorde exercised would be difficult to estimate, but the paper was well edited and gradually made itself the spokesman of those persons and interests of the District which were dissatisfied with the policies of the Conservative government especially on railway policy.

2. le Journal des Trois Rivières.

This paper was one of the ultra-conservative sheets of the Province. It was strongly clerical in outlook and, along with le Nouveau Monde, was regarded as one of the leading representatives of la bonne presse. le Journal des Trois Rivières achieved a certain degree of notoriety by publishing the Catholic Programme but in other respects its editorial policy was conventionally Conservative.

MONTREAL1. The Gazette.

In the period under review, as now, the Gazette was the recognized spokesman of the business and commercial interests of Montreal.

The paper was strongly Conservative in tone although throughout the '80's it criticised the financial policies of the Provincial Conservative party. In general, the Gazette was well disposed towards the French-Canadians, even in the trying days of the later '80's.

2. The Herald.

The Herald was the organ of the English-speaking Liberals of the Province. It was also in an especial sense the organ of the English-speaking population and in that capacity could be very critical of the French Canadians as, for example, during the smallpox disturbances of 1885. The Herald was exceedingly alert in its rôle as critic of the Conservative party. It was in its columns that the confidential correspondence between Macdonald and Allan first appeared and at other times the paper published exposés of various kinds.

3. The Star.

In politics the Star was an independent Conservative paper. Its point of view was Dominion rather than Provincial and its interest in purely Quebec affairs was not as active as the Gazette's. When it did study local affairs, its tone was less moderate than that of the Gazette; Mercier had no more inveterate enemy in the Province than the Star.

4. The Witness.

Although advertising itself as an independent, the Witness was usually Liberal in politics. It was, in fact, much more ultra-Protestant than Liberal and the paper may be regarded as representing the views

of the extreme Evangelical wing of the Quebec minority. While its editorials were frequently trenchant, they were as frequently grossly biased and even more frequently personal verging on the slanderous.

ONTARIO

The Globe, The Mail.

The comments of the leading Ontario newspapers on Quebec affairs are not without interest. Although the two papers were poles apart politically, they were equally critical of Quebec and of French-Canadians. The opposition of the Globe to French-Canadian Conservatism is understandable, but the bitter attacks of the Mail upon their political allies in Quebec is more difficult to analyse. The hostile attitude of the Mail towards the French-Canadian wing of the Conservative party undoubtedly constituted one of the most dangerous threats Macdonald had to face.

PERIODICALS

1. The Bystander. (Toronto, 1880-1890.)

The Bystander was in its day perhaps the best conducted periodical in English-speaking Canada. Although the periodical represented an Ontario point of view, its references to Quebec and to Quebec political events were sympathetic. Even upon such controversial topics as the trial of Riel and the Jesuits Estates settlement, the Bystander could speak with insight and dispassion. Upon economic and commercial matters, especially those of the tariff and of reciprocity, the Bystander provided useful expressions of informed Canadian opinion.

2. Canadian Illustrated News. (Montreal.)

Dominion Illustrated. (Montreal.)

Both these periodicals were published by Desbarats, the publisher of

l'Opinion publique. The editorials and leading articles were much of the character as those which appeared in l'Opinion publique; the illustrations were distinctly inferior. Both periodicals were uncritical in character and their service to the present study was the light they provided on everyday happenings in the '70's and the '80's.

3. The Dominion Annual Register. (Ottawa, 1879-1886.)

The Annual Register provided an invaluable compendium of information on all things pertaining to Canada. Like its British prototype, the Dominion Annual Register had an appreciable Conservative bias. This was more marked in editorial comment than in presentation of fact. As a guide to political events in Quebec and throughout Canada, the Annual Register was very serviceable, since it traced in some detail even such involved occurrences as the Letellier coup d'état. Of equal value were the reports of Canadian economic and business conditions.

4. The Grip. (Toronto)

The Grip was the comic commentator of the period and in both text and illustration held up all phases of Canadian life to ridicule. In no sense was the Grip national; it was an Ontario and a Toronto viewpoint that was represented. Its comments upon Quebec events and personalities had a degree of venom in them that seriously militate against the periodical as an historical source.

5. l'Opinion publique. (Montréal)

This exceedingly well-edited weekly contained a great many articles of a topical character. A special feature of the magazine was the extended biographical study of some celebrity, as, for example, F.X.A. Trudel, one of the originators of the Catholic Programme. The utility of l'Opinion publique was much enhanced by a wealth of

of illustration which made it possible to visualize a number of events and persons.

6. la Revue canadienne. (Montréal, 1864-)

Throughout the period under review, la Revue was one of the most influential periodicals published in Canada. La Revue was moderate in tone and while professing no political creed was sympathetic to the Conservative party. La Revue's discussion of matters of current interest such as immigration into the North-West, railway policy and tariff form a most useful contemporary source for a study of French-Canadian opinion upon these matters.

BIOGRAPHY

1. Baldwin; Lafontaine.

Leacock, S. Baldwin; Lafontaine; Hincks.

Makers of Canada; Morang and Co., Toronto, 1907.

These brief studies provide an entirely sympathetic outline of the lives of Baldwin, Lafontaine and Hincks. The political situation in the Province is interpreted largely from the constitutional point of view and the commonly accepted version of the Liberal-Conservative alliance of 1854 is built up. The impact of the changing economic and social life of the Canadas upon politicians and upon party development is scarcely considered.

2. Wilson, G.E. Robert Baldwin.

(Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1933.)

This highly documented life of Robert Baldwin has performed a real service to Canadian historiography by making public a great deal of the Baldwin-Lafontaine Correspondence. Detail and documentation have rather obscured the interpretation of Baldwin as a reformer in poli-

tics and as a harmonizer of races. Baldwin's relations with Lafontaine and with the Canada East section of the Reform party are remarked on but not analysed. The political bankruptcy of the Reformers after the achievement of responsible government is indicated and the new combination with new ideals anticipated.

3. Cartier, G.E.

Boyd, J. Sir Georges Etienne Cartier, etc.

(Toronto, Macmillan Company of Canada, 1914.)

This book has been regarded for some years as the standard biographical study of Cartier. It does provide a useful outline of Cartier's public life, but it is completely uncritical of Cartier the man and shews little understanding of the political problems of the period in which Cartier lived.

4. Cartier, G.E.

Cooper, J.I. Georges-Etienne Cartier in the period of the '40's.

(C.H.A. Annual Report, 1938.)

In this study of Cartier as a young man an effort has been made to trace his career in his early years as an advocate and as a public man. The attempt was also made to analyse the forces and ideas which inclined him from his early Liberalism to Conservatism.

5. Cartier, G.E.

deCelles, A.P. Sir Georges Etienne Cartier.

Makers of Canada, Morang and Co., Toronto, 1907.

This is the most useful biography of Cartier that has yet appeared for the author has attempted not only a catalogue of his public labours but an analysis of his ideas. Cartier is shewn as he was, the personification of French-Canadian Conservatism with its love

of established order, its respect for law and its keen concern in the material well-being of the Province. The chief weakness of the study is the uncritical estimate of Cartier and the very real failure to penetrate into Cartier's private life.

6. _____? Sir G.E. Cartier. (1814-1914).
(Montréal.)

This little volume contains some excellent sketches of Cartier by men who knew him personally, his secretary Sulte, his friend Dansereau. The sketches provide a great deal of information upon the more intimate phases of Cartier's life which have been so largely ignored by his biographers. While the volume may add little to our knowledge of Cartier as the politician, it does add immensely to our understanding of him as the man.

7. Cartier, G.E.

Groulx, L. Les Idées religieux de Sir G.E. Cartier.

This can scarcely be classed as a biography, though it has a certain amount of biographical material. In this special study, the Abbé Groulx has examined Cartier's politico-religious ideas. While highly critical, the examination is fair, but the result of the examination leaves the student with a better grasp of the Abbé's opinions than Sir George's.

8. Cartwright.

Cartwright, R. . Reminiscences.

(William Briggs, Toronto, 1912.)

Despite its author's violent prejudices, this autobiography is perhaps the most valuable source of its kind on the Confederation and on the post-Confederation period. Cartwright's remarks on French-

Canadian Conservatism do not err on the side of generosity, but they are not inaccurate. His appraisal of parliamentary life in the '60's is of unusual service, since Cartwright knew the period personally. This account of the party's swift march to destruction following 1885 or 1886 is exceedingly penetrating.

9. Hammond, M.O. Confederation and its Leaders.

(McLelland, Goodchild and Stewart, Toronto, 1917.)

This series of biographical sketches of the "Fathers of Confederation" was evidently inspired by the fiftieth anniversary of the Dominion. The work, therefore, partakes a somewhat popular and entirely laudatory character and the individual studies appear to be based on no very deep research. The dramatis personae are parliamentary pieces and their private motives for supporting the project of union are (perhaps charitably) passed over.

10. Hincks.

Hincks, Francis. Reminiscences of his Public Life.

(Deysdale, Montreal, 1884.)

Much of this autobiography partakes the form of an apologia pro vita sua and is concerned with the sterile coalitions and compromises of the period between 1848 and 1854. While the names of French-Canadians are mentioned, it is only incidentally that much is said of the French-Canadian parties and of their views.

11. Galt.

Skelton, O.D. The Life and Times of Sir A.T. Galt.

(Toronto, 1920.)

This work provides an excellent study of the leader of the commercial and English-speaking group in Canada East. A study of Galt's earlier career makes it less difficult to understand the strong material basis

for the alliance between the English- and French-speaking conservative interests in Canada East. Galt's connexion with Cartier and the other Conservative leaders is implied rather than explained and the very important negotiations between Galt and Cartier in 1858 on the issue of confederation are passed over rather hurriedly. Galt's place in post-Confederation politics and his response to some of the vagaries of the Conservatives in the '70's are treated in a less arresting manner.

12. Pouliot, L. Trois Grands Artisans du diocèse de Montréal.

(éditions du Messenger canadien; Montréal, 1936.)

The centenary of the erection of the diocese of Montreal appears to have inspired this biographical study of the first three bishops of the diocese, Mgr. Lartigue, Mgr. Bourget and Mgr. Fabre. Brief as the biographies are, they include excerpts from private and official correspondence, a consideration which gives the volume an enhanced value. An examination of the views of Mgr. Lartigue and of Mgr. Bourget suggests that the latter was not the innovator he is sometimes believed to have been and that the ultramontane movement was not, in its origins, a post-Confederation development. Although Father Pouliot writes without prejudice, his preference for the ultramontane school is discerned by his silence on certain subjects.

13. Skelton, O.D.

Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

(Toronto, 1921.)

In this official biography, Laurier's life-history and the political background of the age in which he lived is penetratingly done. The estimation of Laurier's opponents, the Conservatives, is accurate and

impartial. The chapters dealing with the crucial years between 1890 and 1896 are especially useful, as indicating Laurier's steadily increasing personal popularity in Quebec and conversely, the decline of that of his opponents.

14. Willison, J.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal Party.

(Toronto, 1903, Morang and Company.)

The title of these volumes is somewhat of a misnomer, for Laurier's position as the leader of the Liberal party is not examined in an analytical fashion. The earlier chapters of the study provide a good running commentary on political affairs in Quebec but little attempt is made to understand the forces that made for the events.

Dafoe, J.W.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier--a study in Canadian politics.

(Toronto, 1922, Thomas Allan.)

This monograph provides a shrewd appreciation of Laurier as the statesman. The author concentrates his examination upon the larger aspects of Laurier's career and relatively little is said of his influence and of his difficulties in the provincial sphere.

15. Lavergne, A. Trente Ans de vie nationale.

(Deom frère; Montréal, 1935.)

This little volume claims recognition since the author carries his recollections back to the late '80's. His remarks on Laurier's broad tolerance and upon his willingness to affect a reconciliation with the moderate Conservatives are of importance. It is unfortunate that the author did not document his observations for, inasmuch as many are of a controversial character, they may be accepted only with the greatest degree of reservation.

16. Letellier de St. Just.

Casgrain, P.B. Letellier de St. Just.

(Darveau, Québec, 1885.)

As most official biographies, this volume is apologetic in tone and confines itself to a discussion of Letellier's public career. The bulk of the volume deals, as might be expected, with the so-called coup d'état, and pursues the constitutional aspects of the controversy at great detail. Yet upon this topic it adds little that is new and upon the antecedents of the struggle between deBoucherville and de St. Just, it has nothing to say.

17. Pope, J.

The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald, etc.

(J. Durie and Son, Ottawa, 1894.)

The official biography of Macdonald by his friends and secretary. The study, while containing a good account of Macdonald's public career, scarcely touches on the more personal side or on Macdonald's relations with his colleagues. Enough of Macdonald's personality is caught to make it possible to understand the great powers of attraction that he possessed and also enough of his toleration and even-handedness to enable the reader to understand why he so long held the allegiance of the vast majority of the people of Quebec. Written as close as it was to Macdonald's life-time, the Memoir does not attempt an appraisal of Macdonald, nor written by his secretary does it attempt a critical estimation of him.

18. Pope, J.

The Day of Sir John Macdonald.

(Chronicles of Canada.)

A popular version of the Memoirs in a much abridged form.

19. Mackenzie, Alexander.

Buckingham and Ross. The Life of Alexander Mackenzie.

Like most official biographies of Canadians, this volume provides a good chronicle of the subject's public life and a running commentary upon his parliamentary career. In other respects it is formal and quite uninformative of the forces and of the ideas which moulded Mackenzie's actions. Mackenzie's difficulties in securing adequate representation from Quebec in his cabinet are mentioned but not enlarged upon. Similarly, the Letellier de St. Just incident is mentioned but no attempt is made to indicate Mackenzie's connexion with it.

20. Mercier.

Rumilly, R. Mercier.

(les éditions du Zodiaque, Montréal, 1937.)

An entirely laudatory study of Mercier. The background of provincial social and political life is well built up and the lengthy excerpts from Mercier's speeches are of more service in determining his views than the author's exposition of them.

21. Legendre, N. Honoré Mercier.

(Men of Today. n.d. Montreal.)

An invaluable sketch of Mercier especially in its exposition of his views on education and on social reform. On the political side the account is more conventional, although there is the matter of interest in the account of the negotiations between Chapleau and Mercier for the formation of a union or national government as early as 1881 or 1882.

22. Buchan, J. Lord Minto.

(Thomas Nelson and Son; London, 1924.)

Although Lord Minto's tenure of office as Governor-General embraced a later period than is covered in this study, he was in Canada in the '80's as Lord Lansdowne's A.D.C. During this period, which is described in Chapter 4, he saw service in the North-West Rebellion and took a leading part in recruiting the force of voyageurs which was sent to the Sudan with the Gordon Relief column. Neither the excerpts from Lord Minto's journal on these occurrences nor his biographer's animadversions thereon are directly illuminating, though both pay unconscious tribute to the skill with which Macdonald maintained the outward aspect of harmony in his government during the trying years of 1885, 1886 and 1887.

23. Oxenden, A. My first years in Canada.

(Hatchards; London, 1871.)

The reminiscences contained in this volume are generally unremarkable. Although his duties as Bishop of Montreal must have brought the author into contact with many Canadian public men of the '60's and of the '70's, he says little of them. Upon political events in Canada he makes no comments and even his observations upon the country-side and on its people are vague in the extreme. There are a few references to living conditions and to prices in Montreal that are of some merit.

24. Preston, W.T.R. My Generation of Politics and Politicians.

(Rose Publishing Co., Toronto, 1924.)

Although the author claims an extensive acquaintance with Canadian public men and a large knowledge of national affairs as a consequence

of his long journalistic career, he seldom penetrates beyond the personal and scandalous. As a central Ontario Liberal, Preston cannot be expected to take a wide view of his Conservative opponents or a generous view of his French-Canadian fellow-citizens. His criticisms of the Conservative party and of its policies follow the conventional lines and his remarks upon French Canada are reminiscent of the Toronto Globe of seventy years ago.

25. Tupper.

Tupper, Charles. Recollections of Sixty Years.

(Cassells and Co., London, 1914.)

This memoir is a remarkable monument to its author's vitality and powers of memory. A strong note of self-justification runs throughout and parts of Tupper's career are adroitly passed over. Of his negotiations with the French-Canadian Conservatives in the various cabinet reconstructions of 1895, disappointingly little is said. In a similar fashion Tupper says little or nothing of his French-Canadian colleagues in the '80's when, as Minister of Railways, he was in charge of legislation affecting the C.P.R.

26. "The Life and Letters of Sir Charles Tupper." (Edited by E.M. Saunders.)

(Cassells and Co., London; 1916.)

The biographical details are commonplace and the letters add nothing specifically to our knowledge of Tupper relations with and opinions of his French-Conservative friends.

27. Viscount Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier's Life.

(Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1903.)

In these volumes of reminiscences, Lord Wolseley describes his Canadian experiences at the time of the Trent affair and at the time of the

Fenian Raids. Although Wolseley knew personally most of the public men of Canada, he has left behind no very clear picture of any one of them, even of Cartier the Minister of Militia and in 1870-1871, the acting Prime Minister. His animadversions on Canadian affairs are superficial to say the least and his extraordinary animus against the Roman Catholic or, at least, against the Quebec priesthood, materially reduces the value of the book as an impartial source. The very brevity of Wolseley's remarks on garrison life in Canada and especially in Montreal are disappointing.

HISTORIES

(a) CONTEMPORARY

1. Christie, R. History of the late Province of Lower Canada. V. 6.
(various publishers; 1848-1855.)

Although Christie's History covers a period earlier in point of time than that covered by this study, it provides a good deal of introductory material in the form of notes on persons and parties. As an active participant in many of the events that he records, Christie frequently wrote with strong personal animus but he never distorted. Valuable as his work is as a historical source, it is much more valuable as an expression of the views of the English-speaking community; the strong note of tolerance and the equally strongly manifested desire to cooperate with the French-Canadians provides an excellent commentary on the later period.

2. David, L.O. Histoire du Canada, 1867-1887.
(Librairie Beauchemin, Montréal, 1909.)

Although an active participant in much that he describes, David is generally fair to his political foes. As one of the leaders of le

parti national, David can provide a good deal of minutae upon the programme, the leaders and the early years of the organisation. In one respect, David's study is unduly critical, namely, in its treatment of the French-Canadian clergy.

3. Dent, J.C. The Last Forty Years: Canada since the Union of 1841.
(George Virtue, Toronto, 1881.)

Political in interpretation and journalistic in style these volumes have crystalized the view that the Union period was one of progressive constitutional reform which culminated in the British North America Act. The merit of the work is that it provides a detailed parliamentary chronicle interspersed with unexceptionable sketches of Canadian public men. While the author has no political bias, he expresses the English-Canadian point of view and his remarks upon French Canada and upon French-Canadians are shallow in the extreme.

4. Langelier, C. Souvenirs politiques.
(Dussault and Proulx, Québec, 1902.)

As a repository of political gossip these volumes have some importance. Langelier was an ardent Liberal and when he turned chronicler he continued to be a politician. Some of the character sketches and some of the personal recollections are useful but the study as a whole is completely uncritical. Langelier sometimes speaks as a Quebecois rather than a Liberal and in so doing he adds strength to the contention that sectional loyalties played a large part in the political life of the Province.

5. Royal, Joseph. Histoire du Canada, 1841-1867.
(Librairie Beauchemin, Montréal, 1909.)

This is a well-rounded account of Canada during the Union régime

written by one who knew the period. While the study adds little that is not already known, as an expression of the views of a French-Canadian Conservative it has distinct merits.

6. Turcotte, L.P. Canada sous l'Union.

(des presses du Canadien. Québec, 1871.)

In this study the author not only attempts a political chronicle but also tries to analyse the forces at work and to evaluate the period. Canada East is given especial attention and the study provides probably one of the best introductions to the later history of Canada. Turcotte had no political bias; though he appears to have had a much greater sympathy for the Conservative than for the Liberal he is never prejudiced. His efforts to apprise the results of colonisation projects and railway development form a useful source of contemporary opinion.

(b) GENERAL

1. Cambridge History of the British Empire. V. 6.

(Cambridge University Press, 1930.)

Among the general histories of Canada this volume is unsurpassed. It is, in fact, more than a general history for it might be accurately described as a series of monographs by recognized authorities on special topics in Canadian history. The volume provides as well a critical bibliography for each section. For the present study, the most valuable chapters of the Cambridge History were those which dealt with the economic and the political history of Canada following 1867. The chapter on the Lower Canadian Rebellion of 1837 provided an excellent introduction to the study of some of the earlier phases of French-Canadian nationalism.

2. Canada and its Provinces.

(Glasgow, Brook and Co., Toronto, 1914.)

This work extending into twenty-three volumes is composed of a series of exhaustive and generally authoritative studies on various aspects of Dominion and Provincial history. The series suffers from the shortcomings that are inherent in a work of a cooperative character. In general the monographs on the economic development of Canada and of the several provinces are admirably done; those on political history are less effective. This stricture applies to the sections that treat the political history of the Province of Quebec since 1867, which is little short of chronicle of events unrelated and unexplained. The sections on the institutional history of the Province of Quebec are, on the other hand, very well done and constitute one of the best and most easily available sources on such matters as municipal government; the constitution of provincial Courts of Justice; the procedure of the Provincial Parliament.

3. Chapais, T. Cours d'Histoire du Canada. tomes 5-8.

(Librairie Garneau, Québec, 1932-1934.)

In this series the author traces the history of French Canada from the Session to Confederation. The last four volumes, 5 to 8, which embrace the Union era provide a reliable and temperately written parliamentary chronicle. Sir Thomas does not analyse but he describes well and his accounts and discussions of the various party alliances is informative. The author's thesis is interesting, namely, that the British North America Act was the logical conclusion of over a century of struggle on the part of the French-Canadians for self-government. This is, in fact, more than the author's thesis, it was

the belief of the majority of French-Canadian Conservatives who saw in Confederation the creation of a larger Canada and at the same time the safeguarding of their own national institutions.

4. The Chronicles of Canada.

(Glasgow, Brooks Company; Toronto, 1914-1916.)

The value of this series as source material varies from volume to volume and from author to author. The volumes consulted in this study were Pope's Day of Sir John Macdonald, Skelton's Day of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Skelton's Railway Builders. These three volumes are authoritative, although the two biographies lose much by abridgement. The volume on Canadian Railways remains the best study on that subject yet produced.

5. The Makers of Canada.

(Morang and Company, Toronto, 1906-1911.)

Some of the studies contained in this series of biographies on prominent Canadians are of a very high order. Perhaps the best of the series and certainly the one employed most extensively in the present study was the monograph by deCelles on Sir Georges Etienne Cartier. The great merit of deCelles' study was the examination he made of Cartier's political ideas and of his opinions on current topics. Some of the other biographies, notably the study of Lafontaine, were of a much more conventional character.

(c) CONSTITUTIONAL

1. Egerton and Grant. Canadian Constitutional Development.

(The Musson Book Co., Toronto, 1907.)

The subtitle of this work very well explains its character, that of a collection of despatches and speeches that illustrate the consti-

tutional growth of Canada. The most serviceable section of the volume was that which dealt with Confederation and which contained a selection of speeches by Cartier and by Dorion the protagonist and opponent of the project. The arguments Dorion advances against Confederation are the more arresting because they summarize the views of the French-Canadians of both parties who were distrustful of the Confederation scheme.

2. Munro, J.E.C. The Constitution of Canada.

(Cambridge University Press, 1889.)

The inspiration for this work appears to have been the revival in imperial sentiment which was so manifest in Great Britain at the close of the XIX century. The author is, therefore, much concerned with the imperial aspects of what he describes as the "Canadian Constitution," i.e. the British North America Act. Perhaps the most useful section of the work was the section devoted to the pre-Confederation constitutions and the accompanying notes on them.

3. Kennedy, W.P.M. The Constitution of Canada.

(Oxford University Press, London; 1922, first ed.; 1938, second edition.)

This book is properly regarded as the most authoritative work on the constitutional history of Canada. As, however, only some seven of the twenty-five chapters of the book embrace the Confederation and the post-Confederation period, its actual service to this study was materially reduced. The author's preoccupation with the central as differentiated from the local governments also made the volume less applicable. For some reason, which is difficult to understand, the author has passed over several very important constitutional developments within the Province of Quebec--the dismissal of Lieutenant-Governor Letellier

de St. Just and the refusal of the Dominion Government to disallow the Jesuits' Estates Act.

PUBLICATIONS OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

1. Bulletin des Recherches Historiques.

(____; Lévis, 1895____)

The Bulletin des Recherches Historiques has a long and an honourable history which extends over forty years from its inception as the organ of "la Société des études historiques". Although many of the studies that appear in the Bulletin embrace a period anterior to that covered in this study, it occasionally publishes articles and biographical notices that are germane to the Post-Confederation era, as, for example, the article on the Knights of Labour by M.E.Z. Massicotte. A feature of the Bulletin that is of especial value is the emphasis it lays on local history and the studies it contains on methods of farming or on small industries or on towns and villages that have passed away.

2. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.

(University of Toronto Press; Toronto.)

Although primarily concerned with its studies in economics and in political science, the Journal frequently publishes articles of a more general character and covering the more recent periods in Canadian history. Recent developments in the Province of Quebec have received attention in the Journal and the historical background to these is useful.

3. The Canadian Historical Review.

(University of Toronto Press; Toronto, 1921--).

This periodical is the official organ of the Canadian Historical

Association and as such publishes monographs, special studies and documents on the history of Canada. The majority of the studies that appear in the Review illuminate a period anterior to that embraced by the present study and, accordingly, the service rendered by the Review is considerably diminished.

SPECIAL STUDIES

(a) CONSTITUTIONAL

1. Desjardins, L.G. Decisions of the Speakers of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Quebec.

(Published by order of the Legislative Assembly, 1902.)

This collection of the decisions of the Speaker is of value considering the peculiar position occupied by that officer in Quebec practice. A study of the decisions handed down by him and of the methods used in selecting him suggest that the Speaker is not the impartial referee that he is in Britain, but that he approximates more to the Speaker of the United States Congress or to the Speakers of the Colonial legislatures previous to the American Revolution.

2. Faucher de St. Maurice. Parliamentary Procedure ... rules and regulations of the Legislative Council ... and ... of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Quebec, 1868-1885.

(imprimerie général; Montréal, 1885.)

This sturdy volume contains a complete digest of the rules of procedure of both Houses of the Quebec Parliament. The volume suffers from an overabundance of detail for each rule is accompanied by a number of examples and precedents. Nevertheless, it remains an indispensable source for an understanding of the workings of the Quebec system.

3. _____. Manual of the Legislative Assembly of Quebec.

(Printed by C.F. Langlois, Quebec, 1885.)

The rules and procedures and precedents governing the actions of the Quebec Parliament form a curious but most illuminating source of information to the study of Provincial history. Although, in general, the commonly-accepted rules which guide the deliberations of all British legislatures are followed certain local peculiarities have been introduced which causes the Provincial legislature to assume a character of its own.

(b) DESCRIPTIVE

1. A Canadian (Dr. Lasalles de la Terrière?) A Political and Historical Account of Lower Canada.

(William Marsh and Alfred Miller; London, 1830.)

As an historical or an institutional study, this volume has little to recommend it, but as a description of Lower Canada and of its people, it is unrivalled. The picture it gives of the Province still largely untouched by alien influences and still retaining its old self-contained life forms an admirable basis for comparing conditions in French-Canada in the pre- and in the post-Confederation periods.

2. Grant, G.M. Picturesque Canada. (v. 2.)

(Belden Brothers; Toronto, 1882.)

As commentaries on the life of Canada of the day, these volumes have considerable value. Although only the "picturesque" and the prosperous aspects of French-Canadian life, the descriptions of the comfortable existence of the farmers in the older sections of the Province are fairly accurate. In a similar fashion, the accounts of lumbering and of mining are useful in shewing these industries as

they appeared to the people of the day.

3. Magnan, D.M.A. Histoire de la race française aux Etats-Unis.
(____? Paris, 1912.)

The sections of this study which treat of the movement of the French-Canadians into the United States are of service. The author suggests, and probably correctly, that the drift of French-Canadians southward has gone on for long and is traceable to no specific causes, although economic and political unrest have materially accelerated it. The attempt of the author to compute the number of emigrants is not very convincing and his failure reinforces the opinion that efforts in that direction are chiefly in the nature of guess-work.

4. deMolinari, G. Lettres sur les Etats-Unis et le Canada.
(Librairie Hachette et cie; Paris, 1876.)

An unusual degree of interest attaches itself to the descriptions of French-Canadian life as found in this volume. In general deMolinari saw with a kindly eye although he was unduly critical of the clergy. Untroubled by a desire to penetrate deeply into the life of Quebec, he was content to supply a series of pictures and of impressions. His descriptions of village life on the South Shore of the St. Lawrence are lively and are characteristic of the general prosperity of the communities in that region.

5. deTaurines, C.G. La nation canadienne.
(Plon, Nourrit et cie. Paris, 1894.)

This is one of the relatively few examinations of French Canada by a native of old France in the XIX century. It does not appear that M. deTaurines visited the country he elected to write about and many of his references to its people and their history is faulty. As a

commentator, the author rarely gets beyond the conventional and the easily ascertainable. The value of the book does not lie within but without, for it stands as a monument to the labours of Chapleau and of Mercier who strove to re-establish the relations of Old and of New France.

(c) ECONOMIC

1. Hedges, J.B. The Federal Railway Land Subsidy Policy of Canada.

(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1934.)

Although this monograph treats only of the Dominion's policy in granting land subsidies for railway construction in the West, the genesis of the policy is fully discussed. It reinforces the contention that much of the railway construction in Canada, as in the United States, was motivated by a desire to acquire the large grants of land quite as much as to supply the transportation agency. The interest of the Allans and of the Goulds in railway promotion is at once obvious. The opposition of Cartier to the subsidy scheme is explained and probably correctly, not on any grounds of far-sighted statesmanship, but simply as a friend of the Grand Trunk, he was unwilling to see the endowment of a rival railway.

2. Innis, H. Documents illustrative of the Economic History of Canada, 1783-1885.

(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1933.)

These documents running the whole gamut from governmental reports to newspaper prognostications form a very useful source on the later economic history of Canada. The value of the Documents is materially enhanced by the fact that they illustrate local and provincial developments as well as tracing more general national trends. Some

such differentiation is essential for a proper understanding of the economic life of this Province where the national and the local have been so inextricably mixed.

3. Innis, M.Q. An Economic History of Canada.

(Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1935.)

This is a useful study of Canada's economic history. The author, however, defends a thesis rather than making an impartial examination of her subject. That the economic history of Canada has been largely one of exploitation of successive staple products, is tenable, but the author makes it an inevitable principle. To a large extent she passes over local and provincial developments and she neglects, almost entirely, the influence of popular sentiment and of governmental policy on economic growth.

4. Logan, H.A. The History of Trade-Unionism in Canada.

(University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 1929.)

In this study the author has tried to trace the history of associations and combinations among Canadian workingmen. Inasmuch as the study embraces the whole Dominion it is not surprising^{that} local and provincial developments are passed over. In this respect Quebec suffers, not so much through lack of investigation but through lack of interpretation, for while there are numerous references to events in Quebec, there is little discussion of them. Only in the most formal fashion are conditions among the working people in Quebec dealt with and the peculiar problems presented by the presence of two races in the labour market is passed by in silence.

5. Maxwell, J.A. Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Governments in Canada.

(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1937.)

In this monograph the financial arrangements of the Dominion and of the Provincial governments are critically and incisively examined. It cannot be said that the analysis of the forces and needs which have caused the Provinces to apply for "better terms" has been as carefully or as sympathetically made. The efforts of successive Quebec administrations throughout the '80's to secure larger grants in aid were not caused by inefficiency or by corruption in provincial financing but by the increasing financial needs of the Province.

6. Myers, Gustavus. The History of Canadian Wealth.

(Charles H. Kerr and Company; Chicago, 1914.)

Perhaps the category of historical curiosity rather than that of serious study would be the proper one for this volume. The author's purpose is to trace and to expose the devious means whereby Canadian moneyed people acquired their wealth. An almost complete absence of references makes it next to impossible to trace the source of many of Myers' statements but he appears to have used some official documents of impeccable authenticity, for example, the Report of the Royal Commission on the relations of labour and of capital. His accounts of the financial and political dealings of Sir Hugh Allan and of Lord Strathcona certainly have a considerable element of truth in them, but the author's bias renders suspect every statement which cannot be substantiated from a more reputable source.

7. Porritt, E. Sixty Years of Protection in Canada, 1846-1907.

(Macmillan and Company, London, 1908.)

This volume traces the rise of protectionist sentiment and legislation in Canada from the early Union era. To that extent the book provides a useful guide to the fiscal and tariff history of Canada,

but it makes little attempt to analyse the forces economic and political that turned Canada towards protection. The author has confined his study principally to Canada West and has said little about the views of Canada East or of the Maritime Provinces. This neglect is unfortunate in both an examination of Canada during the Union régime and in the early years of the post-Confederation era when the economic nationalism that ultimately found expression in the National Policy was taking shape.

8. Skelton, O.D. General Economic History of Canada.

Reprinted from Canada and Its Provinces, this monograph provides, in many respects, the most authoritative examination of the economic history of Canada, in the national sense, that has been written. The political implications of the revolution in business and agriculture that coincided with Confederation has been carefully worked out and the inclination of the country towards a policy of high tariffs follows its growing sense of economic nationalism. The study is not exhaustive and less attention is given to the economic development of the individual provinces than is warranted but for a general statement this monograph is without parallel.

9. Tucker, G.N. The Canadian Commercial Revolution, 1845-1851.

(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1936.)

This monograph provides a useful variant to the generality of secondary sources of the early Union period, for it deals with the commercial life or, more accurately speaking, the commercial changes that took place in the Union era. An examination of Dr. Tucker's book gives weight to the theory that the Liberal-Conservative coalition of 1854 was as much an alliance of groups with simi-

lar economic interests as of groups with like political ideals.

10. Wood, L.A. Farmers' Movements in Canada.

(Ryerson Press; Toronto, 1924.)

In this account of the progress of associations and combines among Canadian farmers, the share taken by the Quebec farmers do not bulk large. This omission is curious since the Grange, perhaps the most influential of the early farmers' organizations, entered Canada by way of Quebec. Indeed, throughout the study, the especial interests of the Quebec farmer and of the Maritime farmer are passed over in silence and attention is given to the Ontario and Prairie Provinces farmers. Quite as serious as these shortcomings is the complete lack of references to the sources consulted.

11. Innis, H. Documents Illustrative of the Economic History of Canada.
1783-1885.

(University of Toronto Press; Toronto, 1933.)

These documents running the whole gamut from governmental reports to newspaper prognostications form a very useful source on the later economic history of Canada. The value of the Documents is materially enhanced by the fact that they illustrate local and provincial developments as well as tracing more general national trends. Some such differentiation is essential for a proper understanding of the economic life of this Province where the national and the local have been so inextricably mixed.

(d) EDUCATIONAL

1. Douville, J.A. Histoire du collège de Nicolet.

(librairie Beauchemin; Montréal, 1903.)

This examination of the history of the College of Nicolet is of un-

usual interest since Nicolet was the first of the "classical colleges." The history of the College is the history of the struggle of the French-Canadians to preserve their own system of education from alien influences. In this struggle, as the history of the College of Nicolet amply demonstrates, the clergy have played a very important rôle. The inclusion of a large number of letters from the Bishops of Montreal and of Quebec to the Superiors of the College give the study a value of more than usual importance.

2. Maurault, O. le petit séminaire de Montréal.

(librairie L.J.A. Derome lté: Montréal, 1918.)

In this brief study of the "little Seminary" of Montreal the history of the institution is traced from its beginning in the middle of the XVIII century. Of especial value is the author's disquisition on the courses of study and his account of the successive reforms in the curriculum designed to meet new needs. Of equal value are the biographical notes on the directors of the Seminary, many of whom were French.

3. Meilleur, J.B. Mémorial de l'Education du Bas-Canada.

(de Léger Brousseau; Québec 1876.)

This survey of Quebec schools is largely statistical in character. To that extent it gives a reliable account of the educational facilities of the Province in the '70's and may be regarded as a primary source on that little-known phase of Quebec history. The value of the work is enhanced by the brief biographical notices of provincial educators and by short historical studies of the various schools and colleges.

4. Richard, L. Histoire du Collège des Trois-Rivières.

(typographie du Journal des Trois-Rivières; 1885.)

The history of the College of Three-Rivers is interesting not only as the history of one of the Colleges of the Province but also as it indicates the struggle that was going on between the interests of the North and the South Shores of the St. Lawrence. Incidental to the central theme is included a great deal of interesting material concerning the early schools in Three-Rivers, their curricula and their fees.

5. ____? Souvenirs de fêtes jubilaires du Collège sainte-marie.

(Debrats et cie; Montréal , 1898?)

The most valuable part of this book is the historical background in which the beginnings of the College are traced. The part played by the Jesuit community in the life of Montreal is touched on and the close association between Bishop Bourget and the Jesuits is made clear. The various financial crises through which the College and the diocese passed are mentioned and the impression is strengthened that money troubles, quite as much as differences in matter of doctrine, lay at the root of much of the intercene rivalry that was so patent in the life of the Church in Montreal.

(e) HISTORICAL

Allaire, J.B.A. Histoire de la paroisse de St. Denis sur Richelieu.

(imprimerie du Courrier de St. Hyacinthe, 1905.)

The service rendered to the present study by this parochial history was only incidental. It provided, however, an extensive account of country and of village life at successive periods in the older and in the more prosperous sections of the Province. The revolutionary effects of new farming methods and the vast changes produced in the economy of the Richelieu countryside by the coming of the railway

are probably capable of generalisation.

2. Ayearst, M. The Parti Rouge and the Clergy.

(Canadian Historical Review, December, 1934.)

In this study the author attempts to trace the disharmony which developed between the advanced Liberals of Canada East and the Roman Catholic clergy. An unduly large part of the article is devoted to the often-told story of the Guibord Controversy and a very small part to an analysis of the forces that caused the increasing bad feeling between the Church and the Institut canadien. The political background of the period is sketched very freely and the attempt to work out the genesis of the Rouge party is marked by many generalisations.

3. Cooper, J.I. Some Early Quebec Views of Protection.

(Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, November, 1937.)

In this study the author has tried to trace the interest of French-Canadians in the formulation of the high tariff policy of Canada. Protectionist sentiment in Quebec was the product of post-Confederation French-Canadian nationalism and of the economic depression which swept Quebec, in common with the rest of Canada, in the 'seventies. While it would be extravagant to claim that the attitude of Quebec in favour of protection influenced Macdonald, it is incontestible that the French-Canadian mind was fully prepared for the adoption of the National Policy.

4. David, L.O. Le clergé canadien, sa mission ses oeuvres.

(____? Montréal, 1896.)

This is an examination of the part taken by the Roman Catholic clergy in the national life of French Canada. As a Liberal both in matters

of religion and of politics, M. David criticizes the clergy for their Ultramontane views and for their intrusion into politics. As an historical study the volume adds little to our knowledge but as an indication of the tendency of Quebec opinion to turn from the extreme views of some of the hierarchy, it has a great value.

5. Lecompte, E. Les Jésuites du Canada au XIXe siècle. Tome Ie.
(imprimerie du Messenger; Montréal, 1920.)

In this first volume of the history of the Jesuits in Canada in the XIX century, Father Lecompte traces the story of the Society from its reappearance in Canada in 1842 to the year 1872. Death prevented Father Lecompte from completing his history. The theme of the first volume is the restoration of the Jesuits and the reassumption of their educational and their missionary work. In consequence, there are few references to the larger ecclesiastical and political world and to the storms that swept over it. The value of the work lies principally in the information it gives on the character of the early Jesuits and upon their relations with their champion, Bishop Bourget.

6. Macdermott, T.W.L.

The Political Ideas of Sir John A. Macdonald.

(Canadian Historical Review, September, 1933.)

This represents the most recent and most careful evaluation of Macdonald by a critical but sympathetic hand. Only incidental to the general study was French-Canada mentioned and the influence of the French wing of the Conservative party discussed. The obverse of the design, Macdonald's broad toleration and wide views that made possible French-Canadian cooperation, is well brought out.

7. Morison, J.L. British Supremacy and Canadian Self-Government, 1839-1854.

(J.B. Gundy, Toronto, 1919.)

An impartial study of what may be called the background of the present study. If the presentation of the period is the conventional one, the progressive advance in autonomy and in responsibility, some new details have been added, the influence of British political ideas and parliamentary practices upon the adolescent colony. The part taken by French Canada in the process of emancipation is sympathetically dealt with, though the rôle of the French leaders, Viger representing the business commercial group, Lafontaine the moderate Liberals, Papineau the radicals, has been unduly minimized. The most serious shortcoming of the volume is the almost complete neglect of the part taken by economic and institutional forces especially in French Canada.

8. Pagnuelo, S. Etudes sur la liberté religieuse en Canada.

(C.O. Beauchemin et Valois, Montréal, 1872.)

As an historical study of the progress of religious toleration and of denominational independence in Canada, this work has considerable merit. As an expression of opinion by one of the Programmatists the volume is of great interest for it shews that the Ultramontane group in principle ^{were} ~~were~~ working for complete religious freedom irrespective of denomination. An examination of the study tends to support the contention that however narrow the interpretation given by the lower clergy in its original conception the Catholic Programme was not an ungenerous nor an illiberal statement.

9. Pope, J. Confederation.

(The Carswell Company, Toronto, 1895.)

This volume grew out of Pope's task of editing the Macdonald Papers

among which he found a great mass of documents relating to the Confederation negotiations of 1864-1867. The selection Pope made consists principally of drafts and notes made by Bernard, the Secretary of the Quebec Conference. Useful as the work is, much of its value is lost by the absence of the discussions that accompanied the various motions. The editor made little attempt to supply this deficiency by means of explanatory notes and the true character of the volume is, therefore, that of an unrelated undigested collection of documents.

10. Savaete, A. Vers l'Abime.

(____? Paris. n.d.)

This account of the intercession difficulties of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec in the period following Confederation was the work of a French scholar. The materials that M. Savaete employed were supplied by interested parties in Canada who were drawn from the Ultramontane and Ultraconservative schools. The work is exceedingly partisan but its merit lies in the great mass of documents and letters that it contains, many of which would not otherwise be available. So far as can be determined, Savaete did not alter the text of any of the papers he published and, indeed, in his capacity as editor he preserved an impeccable accuracy. His views, as differentiated from the documents, are, of course, open to the charge of great impartiality.

11. Stanley, G.F.G. The Birth of Western Canada, a History of the Riel Rebellions.

(Longmans, Green and Company; London, 1936.)

The subtitle gives a good indication of the contents of the book.

The impact of the troubles in the North-West on eastern Canada form a minor portion of the study. Nevertheless, Dr. Stanley's discussion of the negotiations which preceded the passage of the Manitoba Act, of the perplexing controversy over the Amnesty and of the serious division of the country on punishment of Riel are very fully dealt with as far as Parliamentary papers and documents are concerned.

12. Trotter, R.G. The Canadian Federation.

(Dent and Sons, Toronto, 1924.)

In this study an effort has been made to examine the various factors, internal and external, political as well as economic, that contributed to the federation movement in British America. The nature of the work precludes the examination of any one factor or aspect, hence French-Canada's interest and special position in the movement is touched upon only very briefly. So also is the part taken by the Conservatives of Canada East, though provocative references are made to the share that Alexander Galt and the Montreal business group had in carrying the party almost unanimously in favour of the Confederation project.

13. Underhill, F. The Development of National Political Parties in Canada.

(Canadian Historical Review, December, 1935.)

This exceedingly provocative monograph attempts to interpret the rise of political parties in Canada in terms of economic interest. Although the study abounds in dangerous generalisations, it has the merit of seeking to secure a more substantial basis for political alignments and policies than theories and personalities. In his attempt to demonstrate the "Hamiltonian" character of the Canadian political

parties, the author has completely neglected the provincial organizations and the subtle yet important relations between the local and the Dominion parties. In speaking of the French-Canadians, it does not appear that he has given any consideration to their peculiar position and to their special interests which transcend the loyalties of party.

14. _____. Le Canada et la Confédération canadienne.

(bibliothèque de l'Action française; Montréal, 1927.)

The sixtieth anniversary of Confederation appears to have supplied the inspiration for this group of French-Canadian scholars to appraise the worth of Confederation. In the monographs, "Les Canadiens-français et le développement intellectuel du Canada" by Edouard Monpetit and in "Les Canadiens-français et l'établissement de la Confédération canadienne" by the Abbé Groulx are two representative opinions. The thesis that the Abbé Groulx supports, that neither the French-Canadian people nor the French-Canadian Church were unanimously in favour of Confederation is supported by numerous excerpts from letters from various clergymen, notably Bishop Bourget.

(f) RACIAL

1. Bracq, J.C. l'Evolution du Canada français.

(librairie Plon, Paris, 1927.)

As a study of contemporary French-Canadian life this work has merit as witness the chapters on farming and upon the influence of commerce and of industry in changing character. As an historical study this work adds little that is new and the examination of sources has been scant in the extreme.

2. Garneau, F.X. Histoire du Canada.

(imprimerie de N. Aubin, Québec, 1845.)

No study of XIX century Canadian history would be complete without an examination of Garneau's work. As an historian Garneau has many faults but as the author of a national epic in the form of an history he demands careful attention. On its intellectual side Garneau formed the nationalism of the later XIX century by giving it an inspiration in an heroic past.

3. Moore, W.H. The Clash.

(J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., Toronto, 1918.)

A study of Canadian racial problems that evidently had its origins in the misunderstandings of the later war years. The various constituents and aspects of French-Canadian "nationalism" are sympathetically examined and a number of parallels drawn between French- and English-speaking Canada, generally to the advantage of the former. The book is scarcely critical in character and its value as an historical source is small.

4. Siegfried, A. The Race Question in Canada.

(Eveleigh Nash, London, 1907.)

In this early study of Canada and of the peculiar problems of Canada M. Siegfried laid great stress on the importance of the racial problem. As a native of old France M. Siegfried had an especial interest in French Canada and his examination of the Quebec community at the beginning of the XX century has great historical value, quite apart from the analysis he makes on the basis of this data. In reaching his conclusions it may be questioned whether M. Siegfried did not overemphasise the influence of the Church and underrate very seriously

economic and social factors in determining the character of French Canada.

5. Siegfried, A. Canada.

(Thomas Nelson and Sons, Toronto, 1937.)

In this recent volume on Canada, M. Siegfried has been more interested in the country's international position than in its internal composition. His approach has been statistical rather than historical and with the emphasis placed on the present position of Canada the utility of this volume to the historical student is not so great as was the utility of the former study in which a discussion of the race problem bulked so large. These general considerations have influenced M. Siegfried's remarks on French Canada and although he has given an accurate and a thoughtful appreciation of the French-Canadian position, it is the position of the French-Canadian in the XX century and not in the XIX.

6. Smith, G. Canada and the Canadian Question.

(Macmillan and Company, Toronto, 1891.)

This is one of the earliest examinations of Canada and of Canadian institutions by a pungent if not very penetrating critic. As a doctrinaire Liberal and as a "little Englander" Smith could be hardly expected to take a detached view of Canadian Conservatism and of the French Canadians. Smith had few followers in Canada and the merits of the study are, therefore, to be apprised on a personal basis.

7. Vattier, G. Essai sur la mentalité canadienne française.

(librairie Champion, Paris, 1928.)

In this study M. Vattier has attempted a sympathetic examination of

the people and of the institutions of French-Canada. As a psychological study the work has considerable merit but to the historian its chief interest lies in the careful examination of the people of Quebec and of their history. M. Vattier's thesis is by no means new, namely, that French Canada was to a large extent a Church colony, but the amount of illustrative material that he has cited is very valuable.

8. Wallace, W.S. The Growth of Canadian National Feeling.

(The Macmillan Company of Canada, Toronto, 1927.)

In its original form this little volume appeared as an essay in the Canadian Historical Review in 1920. It is much more the story of the "Canada First Movement" than a serious study of the complex structure of Canadian nationality. The author confines his examination entirely to Ontario and has little to say about national manifestations in the other provinces. Indeed he makes little effort to trace the reception of the "Canada First" ideal beyond Ontario. The great difficulties that stand in the way of the achievement of national unity in this country are to a large extent ignored.

PAMPHLET SOURCES

(a) POLITICAL

1. Bellingham, S. The Reasons why the British Conservatives voted against the deBoucherville Ministry.

(Lowell Printing and Publishing Company. Rouses Point, 1875.)

An attack upon the reckless financial policy of the Conservative administration.

2. "Castor" (Thomas Chapais?) Le pays; le parti et le grand Homme.

(Gilbert Martin, Montréal, 1882.)

A defence of the ultraconservative position and an attack upon Chapleau.

3. "a Catholic" The Ultramontane Policy.

(____? Montreal; 1889)

A defence of political Liberalism by an English-speaking Roman Catholic.

4. Chapleau, J.A. Speech at St. Laurent, Jacques Cartier County, 6 Sept., 1883.

(____? ____? ____?)

A spirited defence of the record of his government especially in the sale of the Provincial railway.

5. "Un vrai conservateur." Castorisme.

(____? Montréal, 1892.)

A denunciation of the Ultra-Conservatives by a moderate Conservative.

6. Desjardins, ____? M. Laurier devant l'Histoire.

(____? Québec. 1877.)

A Conservative reply to the address on political Liberalism.

7. Dessaulles, L.A. La grande guerre ecclesiastique.

(____? Montréal, 1873.)

An exposé of the dissensions reigning in Church-circles and a denunciation of the Ultramontanes.

8. Dunn, Oscar. L'Union des partis politiques.

(Désbrats, Montréal; 1874.)

An early plea for the creation of an united French-Canadian party.

9. Fabre, H. Confédération; Indépendence; Annexion.

(l'Événement; Québec, 1871.)

An early criticism of Confederation and an examination of alternatives.

10. Flynn, E.J. Le gouvernement provincial.

(____? Quebec, 1897.)

An apologia for the Conservative administration.

11. Galt, A.T. Civil Liberty in Lower Canada.

(J. Bentley and Co., Printers; Mongreal, 1876.)

A protest against the rising power of the Ultramontane school among the Quebec clergy and an energetic plea for an alliance between the English-speaking community and the Roman Catholic Liberals in defence of their common ideals.

12. Galt, A.T. Church and State.

(Dawson Brothers, Publishers; Montreal, 1876.)

The sequel to the pamphlet on Civil Liberties"; in this pamphlet Galt examines the development of Ultramontane views in Quebec and estimates the influence of those views on the public life of the Province.

13. Lafrance, C.J.L. Nos divisions politiques.

(L'Événement; Québec, 1873.)

A plea for a united French-Canadian party to withstand the pressure of the English-speaking group.

14. (Laureau, E.?) Libéraux et Conservateurs.

(____? Montréal, 1879.)

A denunciation of Conservatism based on the dubious origins of the party.

15. Laurier, W. Lecture on Political Liberalism.

(____? ____? ____?)

In some respects this lecture delivered at Quebec on June 26, 1877, is the most remarkable political pronouncement made in Canada; it severed Canadian liberalism from any connexion it may have had with Continental Liberalism and attached it firmly to British Liberalism.

16. "Luigi." (the abbé Pelletier?) Il y a du libéralisme et du gallicanisme.

(____? Montréal, 1873.)

A pointed attack on the alleged Gallican views of the Archbishop of Quebec and of Mgr. Cazeau, his Vicar-General.

17. Mercier, H. Discours prononcé par l'Hon. M. Mercier à St. Jean, Isle d'Orléans, le 6 sept., 1885.

(____? ____? ____?)

An attack upon the extravagance of the Provincial Conservative administration.

18. Mercier, H. le Patriotisme.

(____? Québec, 1883.)

An oratorical foot-note to Laurier's speech on Liberalism.

19. Paquin, E. La conscience catholique outragée.

(____? Montréal, 1882.)

An attack on the alleged liberal Catholicism of Laval University.

20. "a Roman Catholic." Remarks on a recent Pastoral Letter of Bishop Bourget.

(____? Montreal, 1876.)

A protest against the extreme Ultramontane views of Bishop Bourget.

21. Sait, E.C. Clerical Control in Quebec.

(Sentinel Publishing Co.; Toronto, 1911.)

A highly prejudiced attack on the influence of the Roman Catholic clergy.

22. Sellar, R. The Disabilities of Protestants.

(____? ____? ____?)

A very biased statement of the position of the Protestant minority

in Quebec especially in matters of local government.

23. Sellar, R. The Tragedy of Quebec.

(The Ontario Press; Toronto, 1910)

An uncritical account of the movement of the Protestant population from the Quebec countryside.

24. White, Thomas, Jr. The Liberal Conservative Party.

(Dawson Brothers; Montreal, 1874.)

A plea for Conservatism as the party of conciliation and of toleration.

25. White, Thomas, Jr. The Protestant Minority in Quebec in its Political Relations with the Roman Catholic Majority.

(Dawson Brothers Publishers; Montreal 1876.)

Reply to Galt's pamphlet on civil liberty and a defence of the English community's alliance with the French-Canadian Conservatives.

26. ____? Les tendances Libérales.

(____? Québec, 1874.)

A Conservative attack on "le libéralisme impie".

27. ____? La politique de la Province de Québec.

(l'Événement; Québec, 1875.)

An examination of the financial record of the Conservative government.

28. ____? Les Rouges et les Bleus devant le pays.

(____? Montréal, 1875.)

A comparison of the records of the two parties to the great advantage of the Conservative.

29. ____? Coup d'oeil sur le libéralisme Européen.

(____? Montréal, 1876.)

An attempt to associate French-Canadian political Liberalism with Liberal Catholicism and with the advanced Liberalism of the Continent.

30. ____? La protection combattue et refusée par le gouvernement libéral.

(____? ____? 1878.)

A Conservative exposé of the inconsistencies of the Liberal party on the protection issue.

31. ____? Les Contes de M. Mercier.

(____? ____? 1883.)

A Conservative denunciation of Mercier's failure to come to terms with Chapleau in the formation of a coalition government.

32. ____? The new "Parti national".

(____? ____? 1885)

A bitter attack on Mercier and on the Nationalists by an English-speaking critic.

33. ____? Mémoires sur la Coalition.

(Courrier de St. Hyacinthe. 1886.)

A version of the proposed Chapleau-Mercier alliance 1879-1882.

33. ____? l'Hon. M. Mercier; Sa Vie; Ses Oeuvres; Sa Fin.

(____? ____? n.d.)

A Conservative attack on Mercier and on the policies of le parti national.

(b) RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

1. Allan, Hugh. The "Times" and its Correspondents on Canadian Railways.

(Whitehead, Morris and Love; London, 1875.)

Extracts from Allan's correspondence with the "Times" on the subject of Canadian railway finance.

2. Flynn, E.J. Les Chemins de fer de la Province de Québec.

(____? Québec, 1897.)

An apologia for the forward railway policy of the Quebec government.

3. Laroche, L. Le Chemin de fer de Levis et Kennebec.

(____? Québec 1877.)

A piece of advertising for the railway by stressing its services to the merchants of Quebec.

4. Legge, C. Report of Exploration for the Montreal Northern Colonisation Railway.

(____? Montreal, 1871.)

A glowing prospectus of the railway and a panygeric upon the liberality of the Provincial government in land subsidy.

5. Legge, C. Report on the Montreal Northern Colonization Railway.

(Gazette Printing House; Montreal, 1872.)

Emphasises the value of the railway to the business life of Montreal both in opening the Ottawa Valley and also in giving Montreal connexion with the proposed transcontinental.

6. Legge, C. The Montreal Northern Colonization Railway.

(____? Montreal, 1874.)

Stresses the value to Montreal of the trade of the "back-country" in the Ottawa Valley.

7. Mitchell, M. The Ottawa Valley.

(____? Ottawa, 1882.)

Account of the resources of timber and of minerals to attract favourable attention to the Ottawa and Gatineau Valley Railway.

8. Seymour, S. The Value of Two Million Acres of Timber Land granted to the North Shore Railway of Canada.

(Augustin Côté; Québec, 1872.)

An optimistic prospectus for the Montreal and Quebec Railway enlarging

upon the potential value of the Provincial government's land subsidies.

9. Shanly, W. Rapport sur les routes rivales entre Maskinongé et Hochelaga.

(_____? _____? 1878)

Correspondence relating to the controversy over the railway routes into Montreal from the east.

10. _____? The Railway Interests of the city of Montreal.

(Gazette Printing House; Montreal, 1872.)

Attack on the G.T.R. "monopoly" of transportation in the vicinity of Montreal.

11. _____? The Northern Colonization Railway; Yea and Nay.

(Gazette Printing House? Montreal. 1872.)

A strong plea to support the Northern Colonization line in order to make Montreal the eastern terminus of the projected transcontinental.

12. _____? Prospectus of the Quebec and Lake St. Johns.

(Morning Chronicle; Quebec, 1875.)

Advantages to the lumbering and mercantile business of Quebec city by opening up the "back country".

(c) COLONIZATION

1. Drapeau, S. La Colonisation du Bas-Canada.

(typographie de Léger Brousseau; Québec, 1863.)

Traces the history of the colonisation movement in Canada East.

2. Langelier, J.C. Le Nord.

(I.P. Dery, libraire-editeur; Québec, 1882.)

Statistical inquiry into the potentialities of the "North Shore" with special reference to minerals.

3. Langelier, J.C. Esquisse sur la Gaspésie.

(____? ____? 1884.)

A complete examination of the region in the interest of the colonist.

4. Mallet, E. Discours sur la situation des canadiens - français aux Etats-Unis.

(____? Québec, n.d.)

Discusses the difficulties under which the Canadians in the United States labour.

5. deMontigny, B.A.T. La Colonisation.

(Beauchemin et fils, libraires-imprimeurs; Montréal, 1895.)

History of the colonisation movement with special reference to the rôle played by the Church.

6. St. Pierre, T. Les Canadiens des Etats-Unis.

(____? Montréal, 1893.)

An exposé of the unhappy conditions in which Canadians live in the United States.

7. (LeSage, L.?) La Province de Québec et l'émigration Européen.

The Province of Quebec and European Emigration. (sic.)

Published by order at l'Evénement; Quebec, 1870.)

Outlines the attraction of Quebec to the prospective European immigrant.

8. Tassé, J. La vallée de l'Outaouais.

(Eusébe Sénécal imprimeur-editeur, Montréal, 1873.)

A statistical survey of the Ottawa Valley in the Interests of the Northern Colonisation Railway.

9. Tassé, J. Discours aux canadiens-français émigrés.

(____? ____? n.d.)

Admonition to emigrants to preserve their national heritage.

10. _____? le Saguenay et le lac St. Jean.

(imprimé par ordre du Département de l'agriculture, Ottawa, 1879.)

Outlines the benefits of the north-east in an effort to offset the drift to the United States.

11. _____? The Eastern Townships.

(_____? Ottawa, 1881.)

A piece of settlement propaganda especially designed to attract the English immigrant.

12. _____? Constitution de la société de colonisation du diocèse d'Ottawa.

(_____? Ottawa, 1882.)

A typical example of a colonization society under ecclesiastical direction.

13. _____? Au Nord.

(_____? St. Jerome, 1883.)

A complete examination of the Ottawa country in the interest of the prospective colonist.

14. _____? Notre nord-ouest provincial.

(_____? Montréal, 1887.)

A plea for the French-Canadian to remain in his native Province and to develop his own "north-west", the upper Ottawa region.

15. _____? Le Canada et le curé Labelle.

(_____? Paris, 1885.)

An appreciation of the work of the "Apostle of Colonisation."

16. _____? Rapport du congrès de la Colonisation tenue à Montréal...1898.

(imprimerie de la Patrie; Montréal, 1900.)

A general survey of the various phases of the colonization movement.

