Ethics in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*: A Study in Mahāyāna Morality

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents. To my Mother, whose hard work and devotion to her children made it possible for them to grow up in Canada, with all the wonderful opportunites that has entailed. And to the memory of my Father, who always joked that he might "pass out of this world" before I finished this dissertation.

> Enough, Ānanda, do not sorrow, do not lament. Have I not explained that it is the nature of things that we must be divided, separated, and parted from all that is beloved and dear? How could it be, Ānanda, that what has been born and come into being, that what is compounded and subject to decay, should not decay? It is not possible. (D.N. ii.144)

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the ethics of Śāntideva, an Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker of the seventh century CE, particularly through his work, the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (*Compendium of Teaching*). This study therefore helps redress a significant imbalance in the scholarship on Buddhist ethics, which has up to now focused primarily on the morality of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition. The dissertation incorporates both descriptive and metaethical analyses to answer three questions: What is Śāntideva's moral theory, and how does it compare with other characterizations of Buddhist ethics? Can one moral theory adequately describe Buddhist moral traditions?

Through textual analysis and translations, this thesis offers a exegetical account of the moral thought in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, beginning with a description of Śāntideva's understanding of how to become a bodhisattva, the Mahāyāna spiritual ideal. I provide an analysis of Śāntideva's understanding of key moral concepts, with a particular focus on virtuous conduct (*śīla*), skillfulness (*kuśalatvā*), and merit (*puṇya*). I then test the assumption that Buddhist moral theory is homogeneous by comparing the results of this study with those of existing secondary literature on Buddhist ethics, and in particular, I respond to Damien Keown's position that Buddhist ethics can be considered a form of Aristotelian virtue ethics. I highlight those features of Śāntideva's thought that fit the framework of a virtue ethic, and then discuss the implications of those aspects of the tradition that are not well captured by it. In particular, I consider the utilitarian elements in Śāntideva's morality. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve these apparently conflicting styles of moral reasoning with the idea that there is a shift over the course of a bodhisattva's career from a straightforward virtue ethic to a kind of utilitarian hybrid of virtue ethics. I conclude the thesis with some reflections on the value of comparative ethics and the effort to develop a comprehensive moral theory to describe Buddhist traditions.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette dissertation porte sur l'éthique selon Śāntideva, un penseur indien du bouddhisme Mahàyàna du huitième siècle après Jésus Christ, particulièrement dans le cadre de son oeuvre intitulée *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (*Recueil d'enseignements).* Cette étude permet de rétablir l'équilibre concernant les connaissances académiques relatives à l'éthique bouddhiste, qui s'est jusqu'à présent essentiellement intéressée à la moralité selon la tradition bouddhiste Theravāda. Cette dissertation, grâce à des analyses tant descriptives que méta-éthiques, permet de répondre aux trois questions suivantes: En quoi consiste la théorie morale de Śāntideva? Comment cette dernière peut-elle être comparée aux autres représentations de l'éthique bouddhiste? Enfin, dans quelle mesure une théorie unique peut-elle rendre compte adéquatement des traditions morales bouddhistes?

Au moyen de l'analyse de textes et de traductions, cette thèse comporte un compte-rendu descriptif de la pensée morale contenue dans le *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, débutant par une exégèse de la manière envisagée par Śāntideva pour devenir un bodhisattva, l'idéal spirituel Mahāyānā. En outre, la vision de Śāntideva eu égard à la conduite vertueuse (*śīla)*, à l'habileté (*kuśalatvā)* et au mérite (*puṇya).* Par la suite, l'hypothèse de l'homogénéité de la théorie morale bouddhiste est testée par la comparaison des résultats de cette étude avec ceux contenus dans la littérature académique relative au domaine de l'éthique bouddhiste. Plus spécifiquement, des réserves sont apportées à la position adoptée par Damien Keown, à savoir que l'éthique bouddhiste peut être considérée comme une forme d'éthique aristotélicienne de la vertu.

Les éléments de la pensée de Śāntideva qui peuvent être intégrés au cadre conceptuel de l'éthique de la vertu sont mis en lumière, tandis que les implications de l'exclusion de certains aspects de cette tradition sont approfondies. En particulier, les éléments utilitaristes contenus dans la moralité selon Śāntideva sont examinés. Ensuite, une tentative est entreprise afin de réconcilier ces modes de raisonnement moral apparamment conflictuels avec l'idée qu'un changement se produit tout au long cheminement du bodhisattva, d'une pure éthique de la vertu à une sorte d'hybride d'éthique de la vertu teintée d'éthique utilitaire. Finalement, cette thèse s'achève par quelques réflexions sur l'importance de l'éthique comparative et sur l'effort requis afin d'aboutir au développement d'une théorie morale englobant l'ensemble des traditions bouddhistes.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

A	*Aṅguttara-Nikāya*
Apte	*Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary* by V. S. Apte
BCA	*Bodhicaryāvatāra*
BHSD	Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary
BR	Bendall and Rouse's (1990) English translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*
DN	*Dīgha Nikāya*
ŚS	*Śikṣāsamuccaya*
SN	*Suttanipāta*

Conventions

References to the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* will be given in parentheses. The first reference will be to the page and number in the Bibliotheca Buddhica (1970) edition of the Sanskrit text, followed by the page number in the English translation by Bendall and Rouse (BR). Thus "(260.4, BR 262)" means that the reference can be found on page 260, line four of the Sanskrit text, and page 262 of the English translation. All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated. References to P. L. Vaidya's 1961 edition will be indicated by "ŚS Vaidya," followed by page and line number.

References to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* will be indicated by the abbreviation "BCA," and will be followed by the chapter and verse number(s), e. g. 8. 108-110. Both the 2000 edition by Richard Mahoney and the 1988 edition in the Bauddha Bharati series (21) were consulted. References to the 1996 English translation or notes by Crosby and Skilton will be indicated by "BCA 1996" or "Crosby and Skilton 1996," followed by a page or chapter and verse reference, as applicable.

In this thesis the English translation of terms is given first, followed by the Sanskrit term in parenthesis. In contexts where it is appropriate to use the Pali, the language of the canon of the Theravāda tradition, the Pali term will be used instead of the Sanskrit, indicated in parentheses the first time the term appears, e.g: "(Pali *puñña).*" Where it is desirable to give both the Sanskrit and the Pali equivalent, both terms will be given in parentheses with a "P" indicating the Pali word and "Sk" indicating the Sanskrit word, e. g. (P. *puñña,* Sk. *puṇya).* Sanskrit terms like *bodhisattva, kārikā,* and *sūtra* that appear repeatedly throughout the thesis, and especially those like *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* that have entered the English lexicon, are italicized the first time they appear only.

Chinese words are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system, and Tibetan according to the Wylie system. I follow the convention with Asian names of putting the surname first.

Chapter One: Introduction

I Objectives

I a. Scope and Rationale

Buddhist studies has witnessed a growing interest in the field of Buddhist ethics in the last three decades, and particularly since 1994, when the first journal devoted solely to the study of Buddhist ethics appeared (*viz.*, the *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*). The aim of scholars working in this area is to offer a comprehensive description of the ethical thought and moral practices of Buddhism, in order to understand the role of ethics in Buddhist soteriology and Buddhist societies, and to situate this ethical tradition (or traditions) in a global context. Despite the fact that there are two major schools of Buddhism, the Theravāda and Mahāyāna,[1] the vast majority of research completed thus far has been directed toward understanding the ethics of Theravāda Buddhism, and to analyzing the Pali textual sources of this tradition. As a result, a number of substantial studies of Buddhist moral thought based on Theravāda sources have been done (e. g. Harvey 2000, Keown 1992, Saddhatissa 1970, King 1964, Tachibana 1926), but relatively little research has been focused on ethics in the Mahāyāna tradition. Further, although texts in Sanskrit provide a major primary source for understanding Indian Buddhism, from which the Theravāda and Mahāyāna traditions arose, very few studies have explicitly examined the moral content of any of the (mainly Mahāyāna) Buddhist

[1] The third school or "vehicle" (*yāna)* is Tantric or Vajrayāna Buddhism, historically the last school to develop. Although representing a combination of the Mahāyāna and Tantric traditions, Vajrayāna is not necessarily distinguished from the former, and I will not do so here. For an introduction to this tradition see "The Path of the Bodhisattva" in Williams: 1989.

scriptures available in Sanskrit.[2] It is clear that our grasp of the Buddhist moral tradition will be significantly deficient without a better understanding of Mahāyāna ethics, and that aspect of Buddhist ethics represented in the substantial and important body of Indian Buddhist Sanskrit literature.

With these considerations in mind, this dissertation examines the ethics of Śāntideva, an Indian Buddhist thinker and religious poet of approximately the seventh century CE, particularly through the Sanskrit text known as the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, (*Compendium*[3] *of Teaching*). Śāntideva's works have been identified as invaluable sources of information on the later Indian Buddhist tradition and Mahāyāna in general. The current Dalai Lama, for example, in his 1998 public teachings on this text, proclaimed it to be a "key which can unlock all of the teachings of the Buddha".[4] The *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Śāntideva's other existing, and better-known work, is a masterpiece of religious writing that has been especially influential in the Buddhism of Tibet. The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and *Bodhicaryāvatāra* together are important for understanding Mahāyāna ethics because they take the path of the Mahāyāna moral and spiritual virtuoso, the *bodhisattva*, as their object. Together, these texts have been identified as the best ancient authorities on the subject of the bodhisattva (Joshi 1967: 13 n36).

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[2] Generally speaking, Sanskrit Buddhist literature is associated with the Mahāyāna tradition, whereas Theravāda canonical literature is in Pali. However, a substantial amount of Indian Mahāyāna literature is no longer extant in the original Sanskrit, and exists only in Chinese and Tibetan translation. Many texts of the Indian Mahāyāna tradition relevant to Buddhist ethics have yet to be translated from Chinese. See David Chappell, 1996: 1,2.

[3] 'Compendium' was the translation for "*samuccaya*" (usually translated "collection") favoured by Bendall and Rouse, and upon consideration I follow their example. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* "compendium" means: a one-volume handbook or encyclopedia; a summary or abstract of a larger work; an abridgement; any collection or mixture. As the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is a kind of handbook for how to become a bodhisattva, as well as a collection of instructions from Mahāyāna *sūtras*, in this sense it indeed seems to be a "compendium of teachings".

[4] The Dalai Lama made this statement in his introduction to his teachings on the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* at Bodhgaya, India on December 15,1998.

Alhough several translations of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* exist (e. g. by La Vallée Poussin 1907; Schmidt 1923; Matics 1970; Batchelor 1979; Sharma 1990; Crosby and Skilton 1996; Wallace and Wallace 1997), and there have been some shorter discussions of the ethics presented in Śāntideva's works by Joshi (1967), Lopez (1990), Mitomo (1991), and Harvey (2000), the only translation of the *Compendium* into English was completed in 1922 by Bendall and Rouse, and there exist no systematic studies of the ethics in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.[5] As its name, *Compendium of Teaching*, suggests, this text consists largely of quotations and extracts from other Mahāyāna scriptures, many of which are no longer extant in the original Sanskrit. Because Śāntideva draws from more than one hundred texts in his compendium, his work serves as a kind of lens with which to focus on the vast array of Mahāyāna scriptures (*sūtras)*, while at the same time allowing us to take account of the diversity of those scriptures. Through these quotations, as well as twenty-seven verses (*kārikās*) written by the author himself, the text reveals important aspects of Mahāyāna ethics, such as the nature of merit and demerit, characteristics of the bodhisattva path, and the relationship between morality and other Mahāyāna philosophical views. As a result, the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is both an extremely rich source of information on the texts regarded as canonical by Mahāyāna practitioners in

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[5] In his seminal work, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics*, Damien Keown acknowledges the value of Śāntideva's works for describing Mahāyāna moral conduct. However, in his chapter on the subject he favours an analysis of the *Bodhisattva Stage (Bodhisattvabhūmi)* a section of the Cittamātrin *Yogācārabhūmi* (Williams 1989: 207), claiming that the latter text provides a more systematic presentation of the code of disciplinary rules. He further claims that the *Bodhisattva Stage* is a "more important locus for information on Mahāyāna *śīla* than either of the other two [i.e. Śāntideva's] works," but he provides no basis for this claim, other than the fact that the *Bodhisattva Stage* is more systematic(1992: 136). As I believe Chapter Three demonstrates, it is clear that the structure of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is highly systematic, so I have to question this claim. In any case, it is not apparent why a more systematic presentation of moral codes should necessarily make for a more *important* source for Buddhist ethics, especially since the statement of Mahāyāna ethics in the *Bodhisattva stage* is in places "somewhat radical," as Keown states (1992: 136). I discuss Keown's assessment of Mahāyāna ethics as based on the *Bodhisattva Stage* in Chapter Five, where I contextualize the ethics of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.

seventh century India, as well as what has been called a "major primary source for Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics" (Brooks 1991: 97). Charles Prebish has described the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* as two of the three major texts forming the basis of Mahāyāna ethics (Prebish 2000: 44).[6]

It is evident that the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* are important ethical texts that together provide an important perspective on Mahāyāna Buddhist morality during seventh century India. Building on translations and studies already available on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, the aim of the present work is to provide a broader understanding of the ethics contained in Śāntideva's works by systematically studying the moral thought of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.

I b. Questions to be addressed

The purpose of this dissertation is to delineate the moral position of a significant Indian Buddhist thinker. The task, as I have conceived it, incorporates both descriptive ethics and meta-ethics. Descriptive ethics is concerned with giving an account of moral prescriptions, norms, and values, and their application, whereas meta-ethics or analytic ethics involves the attempt to understand such judgements. I offer, then, an account of both first-order issues having to do with Śāntideva's views on what to do and how to behave, and second-order issues dealing with the concepts, methods, and reasoning underlying these views. In focusing on these two levels of approach, I have followed the

[6] The third text Prebish names is the (Mahāyāna) *Brahmajāla-sūtra*. While naturally concurring with Prebish on the importance of Śāntideva's works for understanding Indo-tibetan Mahāyāna ethics, I am suspicious of this claim with reference to the Mahāyāna tradition in general, since the BCA at least did not have a great deal of influence on East Asian Mahāyāna. See Brassard 2000: 10.

trend in research on Buddhist ethics away from simply describing and classifying moral injunctions, to including a meta-ethical analysis of Buddhist thought.

On the level of descriptive ethics, the analysis of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* begins with the question, how does the ideal Buddhist practitioner, the bodhisattva , behave? In answering this question, the moral development of a bodhisattva is traced, and the relative moral weight and status of monastic rules or precepts, the perfections (*pāramitās*) and other moral goods or values, (e. g. the *brahmavihāras*)[7] are considered. How these rules, perfections, and goods are supposed to be reflected in the bodhisattva's conduct is then described, and in particular I examine the instances in which a bodhisattva is said to transgress moral rules.

The overriding aim with regard to descriptive ethics is to contextualize moral norms and values within the overall structure of the Buddhist path, so that the place of morality in Buddhist soteriology is made clear. This question, of the relationship between ethics and enlightenment (*nirvāṇa*), has emerged as a key dispute in the literature. One can discern a division in scholarship between those (such as King 1964, Spiro 1970) who support the so-called ' transcendency thesis,' the idea that the Buddhist moral precepts have only instrumental value in achieving nirvāṇa, which is understood as a non-moral, nihilistic state. Other scholars, (such as Harvey 2000, Keown 1992, Dharmasiri 1989, Tachibana 1926) view nirvāṇa as a state of ethical perfection for which morality is not

[7] The *brahmavihāras* or so-called "divine abidings" or "immeasurables" are four qualities or states to be cultivated by Buddhists. They are loving-kindness (P. *metta*, Sk. *maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (P. *upekkhā*, Sk. *upekṣā*). See Harvey 2000: 103-109, and the study by Harvey Aronson (1980, *Love and Sympathy in Theravāda Buddhism*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).

only a means but a necessary part. Consequently, an important focus of my analysis is Śāntideva's understanding of the nature of nirvāṇa and the relationship of morality to this state. Because the Mahāyāna spiritual ideal is a being, the bodhisattva , who embodies compassion (*karuṇā*) and altruism, as well as insight (*prajñā)* it is apparent that morals cannot merely be of instrumental value for Śāntideva. In this sense the transcendency thesis is rejected from the outset. However, to understand the precise nature of the morality that characterizes the bodhisattva and the relationship of moral norms to the bodhisattva's enlightenment, I first offer a full description of the bodhisattva path as presented by Śāntideva in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Ch. 3). I then analyze his understanding of certain key concepts, such as the term normally translated as 'morality'(*śīla),* the notion of what it is for an action to be wholesome or skillful (*kuśala),* and the role and meaning of karmic fruitfulness or 'merit' (*puṇya)* (Ch.4). This examination of the meaning of moral terms forms the first essential step in the meta-ethical analysis of the values and reasoning behind Śāntideva's moral judgements (Ch.5).

The discussion of merit bears on the question of whether Buddhist morality can be characterized in terms of a 'kamma-nibbāna polarity' (Sk. *karma-nirvāṇa).*[8] This refers to a distinction some scholars have made between so called "kammic" ethics, aimed at accumulating merit in the hope of a better rebirth, and "nibbānic" ethics, oriented toward realizing enlightenment through meditation and

[8] The Pali terms are used because this is an idea that came out of studies of the Theravāda tradition, and is closely associated with the idea that morals are transcended in enlightenment. Thus the same scholars who support the transcendency thesis tend to see a disjunction between 'kammic' and 'nibbanic' ethics, *viz.,* King (1964) Spiro (1970). See Keown's treatment of this notion and the transcendency thesis in Chapter Four of *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics* (1992).

insight. I argue that because of the view that bodhisattvas accumulate and share karmic merit, Śāntideva's works do not support a bifurcation of ethics in this way (Ch.4).

In attempting to understand Śāntideva's moral reasoning, I closely examine the criteria by which Śāntideva judges an action right or wrong. Particularly relevant to moral reasoning are the circumstances in which a bodhisattva is enjoined, and in some cases duty-bound, to breach the moral precepts in order to benefit other beings. Such instances illustrate the Mahāyāna concept of "skillful means" (*upāya-kauśalya*), the nature of which is considered in detail (Ch.5). Scholars of Buddhist ethics have also disagreed about how best to formally characterize Buddhist moral thought in terms of western ethical theories. Suggested classifications have included non-hedonistic utilitarianism (Kalupahana 1976), a modified deontology (Dharmasiri 1989), situational ethics (King 1964), and more recently, a form of teleological virtue ethics (Keown 1997; Harvey 2000; Whitehill 2000). While the primary aim of the dissertation is to describe Śāntideva's moral position in Buddhist terms, armed with an understanding of the role of ethics in Śāntideva's soteriology, and with a clear articulation of the moral norms, concepts, and logic underlying his views, I also propose a formal characterization of Śāntideva's ethics in terms of western moral theories.

This effort to categorize Śāntideva in western moral terms raises an important methodological issue highlighted by Charles Hallisey in an article entitled "Ethical Particularism in Theravāda Buddhism" (1996). Hallisey has quite rightly asked us to think about whether the question, "What is the family of ethical theory to which Buddhism belongs?" is really the most fruitful one to pose (1996: 1). He wonders about the value of assuming that there can be a generic answer to such a question, and suggests that instead

we begin with the "common-sense expectation that any historical tradition worth its salt will inevitably display evidence that its practitioners and intellectuals have resorted to more than one moral theory" (1996: 2). Instead of looking for the moral theory that would best describe Buddhism, he advocates an approach which he calls "ethical particularism," that does not seek a unifying theory of Buddhist morality but takes it to be a complex and messy affair, and as such it is not something in which one should seek to find consistency. This implies that rather than searching for a single moral theory, one should look at thinkers, texts, and narratives as sources to flesh out the range and variety of types of moral views. One can use categories like 'consequentialism' and 'deontology' as heuristic devices for laying out the contours of ethics of different Buddhist traditions (1996: 5), but one should not seek a unified theory for Buddhist morality.

Taking Hallisey's position into consideration, I do not assume in this thesis that there will be one moral theory that will adequately describe all Buddhist traditions, though I do ask whether Buddhism, as reflected in the existing literature on Buddhist ethics, can be subsumed under one theory, given the result of this study on Śāntideva. My view is that there is no harm in such a quest, so long as one remains open to the possibility that no one ethical category may be sufficient to account for all the 'moral data' gathered. The point of Chapter Five will be to test the assumption that Buddhist morality is homogeneous by contextualizing and comparing the results of this study of Śāntideva's morality with that of the existing secondary literature on Buddhist ethics, and in particular, in response to Damien Keown's position that Buddhist ethics can be considered a form of Aristotelian virtue ethics (1992). I consider most seriously the proposal that Buddhist ethics be understood as a form of virtue ethics, and discuss the

implications of what appears to be a kind of utilitarianism in Śāntideva's thought. In my conclusion (Ch.6) I attempt to resolve these apparently conflicting styles of moral reasoning with the idea that there is a shift over the course of a bodhisattva's career from a straightforward virtue ethic to a kind of utilitarian hybrid of virtue ethics. I conclude the thesis with some thoughts on the value of comparative ethics and the effort, in defiance of 'ethical particularism,' to find one moral theory to describe Buddhism.

The overall question addressed by this dissertation is thus: What would Śāntideva's moral theory look like, and how does that compare with other characterizations of Buddhist ethics? Can one moral theory adequately describe Buddhist moral traditions ?

II Method

II a. Approaches to the study of Buddhist Ethics

One can discern in the scholarship three main approaches to the study of Buddhist ethics. The differences between these approaches are related to a debate over how best to study religious ethics, and also tend to correspond to the different types of scholars who engage the field. Probably the most common approach is what has been called 'holistic,' and is associated with historians of religions and, by association, Buddhologists. This orientation assumes that one should begin the comparative study of ethics by taking full account of differences among cultural traditions (Juergensmeyer, cited in Hallisey 1992: 279). It tries to place religious ethics within the context of the overall tradition, and within the appropriate historical and interpretive settings. It therefore seeks to understand ethics in terms of the religious tradition as a whole, and with

an eye to understanding the impact of ethical expressions on human history (Reynolds in Sizemore and Swearer 1990: 60). Religious ethics is thus conceived to exist at the intersection between religious thought and historical sociology (Sizemore in Sizemore and Swearer 1990: 91). Frank Reynolds is probably the most prominent advocate of the holistic approach to Buddhist ethics, but he is joined in his view by Donald Swearer (1979) and Harvey Aronson (1979), and in fact, much of the work done in Buddhist ethics to date would fall under this methodological heading.

A second approach relevant to the study of Buddhist ethics would come under the rubric of what Hallisey (1996) called "ethical particularism." These are studies which are also conducted by historians of religion, but which focus on the ethics of particular texts, thinkers, communities or periods without trying to make generalizations about the Buddhist morality as a whole. This approach has the advantage of identifying and taking account of developments and divergences within a religious system, and these studies thus highlight the problem of assuming systematic consistency across a tradition. In this sense particularist research redresses the major fault attributed to the holistic approach, which is that it requires the scholar to make problematic generalizations about an entire religious tradition. Much that is of relevance to the study of Buddhist morality in fact takes this more focused approach, although relatively few studies of this kind are done with the express purpose of understanding Buddhist morality. For example, studies of no-self, emptiness, the nature of *nirvāṇa, bodhicitta,* and translations of texts such as the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* or *Visuddhimagga,* are all potentially valuable sources for knowledge about Buddhist ethics, even if these sources do not directly address ethical issues. There are of course a few studies which have looked at the moral views of specific texts (e. g.

Burford 1991; Tatz 1986; Mitomo 1991), certain periods of time (e. g. Horner 1936; Kalupahana 1995), certain sects (e. g. Wayman 1991; Nakasone 1990) and personalities (Swearer 1979), and such work is important for founding and nuancing our understanding of Buddhist ethics as a whole. However, as Charles Hallisey himself pointed out in a review of the field of Buddhist ethics (1992), the danger of stressing historical variability or the views of a particular text or sect is that is can obscure the recognition of common presuppositions and lines of moral reasoning across Buddhism as a whole.[9] In fact, then, what makes particularism an advantage–that it avoids distorting generalizations–is also its weakness. Because Hallisey thought (in 1992) that the majority of research in Buddhist ethics was weighted toward studies of this kind, he concluded his survey by indicating the need for "large-scale accounts that adequately frame and connect these more limited discussions and that also connect the study of Buddhist ethics to ethical reflections elsewhere" (1992: 284).

As has already been noted, several of the major studies in Buddhist ethics which have offered assessments of the Buddhist tradition as a whole have primarily been based on Pali literature and/or the Theravāda tradition. This is true, for example, of S. Tachibana's *Ethics of Buddhism* (1926), H. Saddhatissa's *Buddhist Ethics* (1970), and Winston King's *In the Hope of Nibbana* (1964). While more recent comprehensive assessments of Buddhist ethics try to incorporate Mahāyāna traditions and texts, they are still predominantly founded on the Pali canon (e. g. Keown 1992; Harvey 2000). Consequently, and in contrast to Hallisey's (1992) view, I would argue that what is

[9] Hallisey's position in the 1992 review article apparently contradicts his 1996 call for ethical particularism in the study of Buddhist ethics, proving perhaps that he is right that we should not expect consistency of moral thinkers.

needed are more focussed studies of non-Theravāda, non-Pali texts, thinkers, sects, and communities, in order to provide solid groundwork for understanding the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna[10] traditions, and in order to then see if the generalizations about Buddhist ethics which are currently made hold up. This is the basic rationale for the current study of a Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker.

Hallisey's call for more research which links Buddhist ethics to ethical thinking in other traditions is in fact a call for more studies which take the third approach to the study of Buddhist morality. This method incorporates the study of Buddhist ethics within the comparative study of ethics, rather than Buddhist studies, and is more likely to be carried out by ethicists trained in western philosophy than by historians of religion or Buddhologists. This third approach is directed toward "appreciating the universals of ethical truth and ethical reasoning that underlie them" (Juergensmeyer, cited in Hallisey 1992: 279). Two studies which exemplify the 'comparative ethicist' approach are Ronald Green's *Religious Reason* (1978) and the seminal work by David Little and Sumner Twiss, *Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method* (1978). While Green used a Kantian perspective to offer an account of religious reasoning, far more influential has been Little and Twiss's book, in which they developed a typology to describe practical reasoning in different religious settings. With this approach the kinds of questions posed include: What type of moral reasoning forms the basis for the ethical judgements made in this tradition? How do we classify its ethics? What are the criteria used to judge good and bad, and right and wrong? With the answers to such questions the comparative ethicist will then describe the morality of a particular tradition within a universal scheme of moral

[10] See note 1.

reasoning. David Little's conclusion that Theravāda Buddhist ethics are a "religiously qualified form of extrapersonal or altruistic teleology" is an example of such a description (Little in Sizemore and Swearer 1990: 79).[11]

Since the publication of Little and Twiss's book, scholars in the field of Buddhist ethics have debated the relative merits of the holistic and comparative ethicist approach. Historians of religions, which include most of the scholars whose primary training is in Buddhist studies, tend to accuse the comparative ethicists of imposing western concepts and categories onto Buddhism, and of focusing on the rationale behind ethical thought at the expense of other aspects of religious expression. Comparative ethicists, on the other hand, see the historians' emphasis on morality as culturally embedded as falling into relativism. In an essay entitled "Comparative Religious Ethics as a Field" (in Sizemore and Swearer 1990), Russell Sizemore reviewed this debate. Sizemore rightly argues that while studies by ethicists offer Buddhologists the opportunity to gain valuable perspective on what they may assume is particular to Buddhism, such studies must necessarily be complemented by, and in fact based on the work of Buddhologists, since the types of ethical reasoning alone cannot fully account for the ethical 'data' of a tradition. For example, he points out that to explain why distributive justice is not a problem for Buddhism, David Little must go beyond his formal structure of ethical reasoning and explain this phenomenon in terms of the Buddhist notion of karma (Sizemore and Swearer 1990: 98). Sizemore further suggests that while the

[11] It is teleological because all norms of character and conduct are founded on their perceived role in furthering the goal of *nirvāṇa*. It is extrapersonal or altruistic because the goal includes consideration of the welfare of all beings, not just the moral agent. It is "religiously qualified" because the religious goal of *nirvāṇa* is thought more valuable than any material goal. See Sizemore in Sizemore and Swearer (1990, 95, 97).

ethicists can be helpful in highlighting logical tensions and inconsistencies within a tradition, there are also dangers in assuming that one type of moral reasoning can designate a whole religious system, since different texts, and one should add different communities in different historical periods, might employ different lines of moral justification and make different moral judgements. In the sense that both the comparative ethicist and the holistic approach are synchronic, and rest ultimately on trying to sum up an entire tradition, they suffer the same drawback. So it seems both methods must be supplemented by diachronic studies and research on particular texts, thinkers, and sects.

It is evident that none of these approaches alone would yield a satisfactory understanding of Buddhist ethics. As Sizemore's review of these methods suggests, the work of ethicists and that of historians are really complementary, because they ask different kinds of questions of the same material. If the holistic approach tries to reveal the connections among religion, ethics, and culture, the ethicist is concerned to discover the connections among religion, ethics and reason. Particularist studies are simply studies by Buddhologists that look at more focussed aspects of Buddhist ethics. Epistemologically one can see that the historian favours an empiricist view, which takes all human understanding as culturally and historically embedded, so that moral reasoning, like all forms of human reason, is socially constructed. The comparative ethicist approach, on the other hand, is aligned with formalism, and the idea that moral reasoning is "epistemologically autonomous" i. e., a distinct kind of reasoning which can fruitfully be compared to other types of reasoning, such as religious or prudential (Sizemore in Sizemore and Swearer 1990: 93). Despite this underlying philosophical dispute, in

practice these methods are not necessarily antagonistic, nor even mutually exclusive, as is evident from the studies available. Comparativists such as Little and Twiss who apply their typology of moral reasoning to Theravāda Buddhism rely on both particular studies of Theravāda as well as holistic characterizations of the religious tradition in order to make their moral analyses. On the other hand, Buddhist scholars who offer descriptions of Buddhist ethics as a whole frequently employ western ethical categories in their assessments. For example, Buddhist ethics have been classified as situational and instrumental by Winston King (1964: 72,113), as non-hedonistic utilitarianism by Kalupahana (1976: 60), a teleological virtue ethic by Damien Keown (1992), and a modified deontology by Gunapala Dharmasiri (1989: 27-30) and Richard Gombrich (1971). This suggests that a certain amount of 'ethical translation' is inevitable when a non-Buddhist category is used to approach Buddhism–a subject which will be addressed shortly–but in any case it indicates that Buddhologists using the holistic method seem to find it useful to use the terminology of philosophical ethics. And of course, the foundation of both of the these types of research is the work done on particular groups, historical periods, and texts. The real issue, then, is not which method should be used to study Buddhist ethics, but where and how to employ them most fruitfully.

In this thesis I enlist all three approaches. Using text-historical and philological methods common to Buddhist studies, I conduct a 'particular' study of Śāntideva, a Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker. I describe norms of conduct and character according to Śāntideva, in an attempt to outline the emic or indigenous moral categories at work. This is then used as the basis for an 'ethicist' study, in which I assess the possibility of describing Śāntideva's ethics within a broader scheme of moral reasoning. Here I search

for analogies between Śāntideva's moral views and western theories, in order to determine whether Śāntideva's morality could be adequately described using the standard western categories. The first step in this process is thus a descriptive exercise, in which a textual study is used to provide an account of moral prescriptions, norms, values and their application. The second step is a meta-ethical exercise, where I look at the meaning of moral terms and concepts and the type of moral reasoning in Śāntideva's work in order to provide an overall typology, while remaining open to the possibility that existing typologies are inadequate to capture Śāntideva's views. Finally, what might now be called 'Śāntideva's moral theory' is compared to existing secondary literature in Buddhist ethics in order to test the validity of the 'holistic' approach to Buddhist ethics. It is an attempt to answer the question: do the results of this research support the notion that Buddhism can be subsumed under one moral theory? These tasks and approaches thus form the content of four chapters:

Chapter 3:	Description of Śāntideva's ethics using textual analysis of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya.*
Chapter 4:	A meta-ethical analysis of the meanings and rationale associated with key moral concepts, *viz.,* virtuous conduct *(śīla),* skillfulness *(kuśala),* and merit *(puṇya).*
Chapter 5:	Assessment of Śāntideva's moral theory and comparison with available scholarship on Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics, with analysis of problems with the prevailing view that Buddhism is a form of virtue ethics.
Chapter 6:	Response to the question: are Buddhist ethics homogeneous?

Thus, the two principal methods used in this study are textual-philological and comparative.

II b. The method of comparison and the question of definitions

i. Comparison as method

The question of how to define terms like 'ethics,' 'morals' and 'morality,' is of course critical for a study like this one that is both implicitly and explicitly comparative. It is explicitly comparative in that one objective is to try to determine the most appropriate western ethical category (or categories) to describe the views of an Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker. Such work is also implicitly comparative in that it uses terms and categories which are derived from the western lexicon to translate terms and concepts from the Buddhist context. Determining the most appropriate translation for a given Buddhist term naturally involves comparing the meaning of the term being translated with those of the possible translations. For example, determining whether *puṇya* is best translated as 'merit' or 'karmically fruitful' inevitably involves considering the similarities and differences between what I understand to be the meaning of these terms. Insofar as not all of this comparative process is spelled out to the reader when a translation is provided, the comparison is implicit. It should also be noted that an implicit comparison is involved even when there is a decision to leave a term untranslated, as this suggests that there is no equivalent referent in the western lexicon. Thus there is both explicit and implicit comparison involved in framing the discussion in standard western vocabulary.

In utilizing the comparative method I believe a word of explanation, and a defence is required, for it is a technique that while frequently used is almost as often derided, and at the same time, almost never discussed at any length. Following the latter tradition, I do not propose to provide an in-depth discussion of the comparative method–

though I certainly believe Buddhist Studies scholars could benefit from one–but instead would like to reflect briefly on what I believe to be the two major issues involved. For this I am heavily indebted to the treatment by George Dreyfus in his *Recognizing Reality* (1997: 10-12), and to Jonathan Z. Smith's discussion in *Map is Not Territory* (1978: 240-264).

The first problem with this technique is illustrated by the very cutting critique summarized by the question, offered as response to the results of any given comparison: "and...so what?" (Smith 1982: 35). As Dreyfus points out, this question is most likely to arise when comparison consists merely in noting similarities between phenomena, in saying, "this is like that," as has unfortunately tended to be the case in comparative studies of mysticism. The quick response would be to argue that superficial and trivial comparisons can be avoided by being careful to describe differences as well as similarities. However, this is not enough, for the "so what" question highlights the deeper problem of value: what, after all, is the point of showing how two things are similar or different?

Jonathan Smith offers one answer. He states:

> The process of comparison is a fundamental characteristic of human intelligence. Whether revealed in the logical grouping of classes, in poetic similes, in mimesis, or other like activities–comparison, the bringing together of two or more objects for the purpose of noting either similarity or dissimilarity–is the omnipresent substructure of human thought. Without it, we could not speak, perceive, learn, or reason. (Smith 1978: 240)

That is, for Smith comparison is indispensable because it is a central feature of how we learn and discern, of how we understand anything and integrate that understanding into our existing knowledge. Language, for example, which is the medium

of much of what we call learning, plays on distinctions and discrimination: to invoke the Buddhist 'elimination' (*apoha)* theory of language, definitions rely on exclusion. To be able to distinguish and discriminate and exclude, we must compare. When in this thesis I try to describe Śāntideva's ethics according to western ethical categories, I will have to show why and how his morality fits one category and not another, or why no one western ethical theory is appropriate. I conceive of this as one way of learning about Śāntideva, and I assume that through this process I will deepen and enrich my understanding of Śāntideva's thought. So the primary response to the question, "Why compare?" is that it is in large measure through comparison that we come to know, integrate and articulate the knowledge of anything. To my mind, this is the fundamental rationale for the comparative method.

As further reflection on this question of "Why do comparison?" it should be clarified that the project of this dissertation is not, strictly speaking, to do a comparison of Buddhist ethics to western ethics: to draw parallels and analogies and highlight distinctions between Buddhist and western ethics for its own sake. Rather, I discuss comparison as method out of the recognition that in using western terms, notions and categories to discuss the ethics of a Buddhist thinker, there is necessarily a comparative dimension to the process. The overall task, however, should be understood in the context of what J. J. Clarke in *Oriental Enlightenment* (1997: 125) calls the "hermeneutic approach" to East-West philosophizing. In this so-called 'third wave' of comparative

philosophy,[12] the objective is to engage non-western thinkers and ideas in philosophical dialogue as part of the philosophical enterprise, and not just or primarily for the sake of comparing them. While there is awareness of the significance of historical and cultural differences in this approach, East and West are not absolutized, and thus rather than seeing Asian thought or traditions as Other, they are included within the "orbit of current philosophical debate" (125). George Dreyfus exemplifies this approach when he states, in the introduction to his recent book on Buddhist logic, that "one of our tasks as students of Asian thought is to present the material we examine so that it gradually becomes integrated in to the larger history of ideas. There is a need for presenting non-Western ideas in terms that can be related to the concepts of other cultures" (1997: 11). This is, to my mind, what scholars in the discipline of Buddhist ethics are in the process of doing: to use a musical metaphor, they are 'transcribing' Buddhist morality into a 'key' that non-Buddhists, for the most part, western thinkers, can recognize. This makes it possible for westerners to take seriously Buddhist moral insights and issues, and leads to a dialogue with Buddhist ideas such that they can be brought into contemporary discussions of ethics. To play on a phrase by Gerald Larson, the hermeneutic approach to comparative philosophy seeks to get away from talking *to* one another, and I would add, particularly *about* one another, in favour of talking *with* one another (cited in Clarke 1977: 126). The work of this thesis is in effect part of only the initial stage of such a dialogue, since the

[12] Clarke calls the first wave the stage of "universalism," which was characterized by the aim to synthesize Eastern and Western thought into a single world philosophy. This search for a perennial philosophy was largely displaced by a "comparative" stage in which much more narrowly defined and focused studies were completed, comparing individual thinkers, concepts and systems. Clarke emphasizes that the universalism, comparative, and hermeneutical stages express different aspects of the genre of comparative philosophy, but that there is considerable cross-over, both chronological and conceptual, among them (see Clarke 1997: 119-129).

primary aim is to provide a description of the ethics of one ancient thinker, rather than engage that thinker's ideas in current ethical debates, but I nonetheless see the results of this work as fitting in with the overall project of integrating Buddhist ideas into what Rorty calls "the conversation of mankind" (cited in Clarke, 1977: 125). The need to discuss comparison as method stems from the inevitable use of comparison in the process of coming to understand Śāntideva's views and expressing them in a manner that will be accessible to my contemporaries.

There are of course problems with comparison and with using western philosophical discourse to talk about non-western ideas, most obviously the danger of 'doing violence' to the subject of study through trying to force it into known but Procrustean categories. Comparisons are thus criticized for their tendency to subjugate the alien phenomenon to what is more familiar. While not wishing to diminish this problem of reductionism, I think one could argue that such hazards inevitably attend almost any kind of interpretation. Consider Dilthey's description of the hermeneutic path: "Interpretation would be impossible if [past] expressions of life were completely strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing strange were in them. It lies, therefore, between these two extremes" (Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, [Stuttgart 1926, rp.1958] Vol. VII, 255, cited in Smith 1978: 242). That is, interpretation is required when we encounter a phenomenon that seems odd: something that is not completely transparent to us. If the object seems entirely alien, we will have a difficult time understanding it at all. If it is completely familiar, it will require no interpretation. If it is neither completely foreign nor completely familiar, then it can and will need to be interpreted, and part of how we do that is through comparing and integrating it to what we already know. As Dreyfus says,

Dilthey's explanation of interpretation indicates that the main purpose of comparison is hermeneutical (Dreyfus 1997: 10).

When we see the hermeneutic path in this light, there are two obvious problems involved. One is that through the process of comparing and integrating the interpreted object we will overlook what is unique about it or overemphasize what is familiar, distorting what we are trying to understand. Post-Said students of a so-called Oriental tradition will be familiar to the point of paranoia with this risk, and one could think of numerous examples in the history of religious studies of texts or beliefs or rituals that have been misunderstood for this reason. On the opposite side of the hermeneutic path, we run the risk of irrelevance: of assuming the object is so foreign as to be incomprehensible and thereby irrelevant to us. Or, to nuance this danger somewhat, we might use a very cursory understanding of something quite alien to quickly categorize and dismiss it as an object of interest. One might point as an example to the tendency of some Buddhist scholars earlier in the century to virtually disregard Tantric (or Vajrayāna) Buddhism, based on the superficial view that it was a superstitious and morally corrupt version of 'original Buddhism.' If we are willing to boil the risks in interpretation down to two in this way–the risk of distortion and the risk of irrelevance–it would seem to me that in the case of Buddhist ethics, and perhaps Buddhist philosophy in general, that the risk of irrelevance is greater and the cost higher than the risk of distortion. Since on this view of interpretation we run the risk of distortion when we try to understand anything or anyone, the possibility of distortion in itself cannot be a reason not to study another tradition. Furthermore, the fact that non-western philosophies are largely ignored in the discipline of philosophy attests to the fact that we have already tried the route of not

trying to understand. This has not only left the impression that Indian thought is so foreign as to be unimportant to the history of philosophy, I would venture to say it has led in many cases to a distorted view of human intellectual history.[13]

This is not to undermine the possible 'iatrogenic' or physician-induced harm involved in attempting to understand traditions outside one's own, but it is the recognition that the risk of such harm should not be avoided given the alternative. It is true that the use of western vocabulary and categories will inevitably introduce etic concepts to the Buddhist material I examine, but as Dreyfus points out, this is inescapable if westerners are going to study non-western ideas (Dreyfus 1997: 12). We must put things 'in our own words' if we are to understand them, and in doing so we may get some things wrong. But as an interpreter I would rather be wrong than completely ignorant, and as the object of interpretation I would rather be misunderstood than ignored. It is for these reasons that I think the risks involved in attempting to understand Śāntideva are worth taking: I only have to trust he would feel the same about the risk of being misinterpreted.

Having said all that, it is still incumbent upon those of us studying non-western ideas to make every effort *not* to distort the material under view, and an important task in this regard is to be clear about the meanings of the terms and categories being used, and the assumptions underlying them. Thus the need to consider definitions.

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[13] See Clarke (1977, 112-115) for an overview of western philosophy's treatment of eastern thought.

ii. Definitions

As Richard King (1999) aptly points out in his genealogy of the terms 'mysticism' and 'religion,' one must be careful to try as far as possible to be aware of the kinds of assumptions at work in adopting western, or any of what one might call 'non-autochthonous' categories to approach or describe a tradition. He traces the influence of Christian theology in our tendency to assume that 'religions' must be soteriological, belief-centred, exclusive, and textual, and how these prejudices in turn have influenced and in many ways distorted our understanding of religious phenomena generally (King 1999: Ch. 3). Similarly, the importance of definitions is illustrated by his claim that the reason Indian and other non-western forms of systematic thought have tended to be excluded from the discipline of philosophy is because 'philosophy' is assumed to be a 'purely rational' exercise, whereas Indian systematic thought is believed to be culturally-specific and tainted by the theological and mystical (King 1999: 28).[14] The result is that Indian philosophy has not generally been considered 'real' philosophy, and in the western academy this has meant that it is generally studied and taught within departments of Religion, rather than within departments of Philosophy. Significant consequences such as these indicate that in a study of this kind, it is important to ask, "What assumptions are involved in adopting the category of ethics to approach Buddhism?"

To determine some of the assumptions behind the categories of ethics and morality, as well as to clarify their use and application in this dissertation, we will look at

[14] For examples of western philosophers who have included eastern thought in their philosophical horizons, see Clarke (1977, 116-119). Clarke argues that American philosophers have been more likely than their European counterparts to recognize the need to consider non-western views.

how these terms are commonly used in the field of philosophy, religious studies, and Buddhist ethics.

A review of some of the standard reference works for the field of religion and philosophy reveals the following. The term 'ethic' (Greek *ethikos)*, is from *ethos*, meaning 'custom' or 'usage'. Based on Aristotle's use, it also includes the sense of 'character' and 'disposition.' The Latin term *moralis,* from which we get the word 'moral,' was Cicero's translation for *ethikos*. Because of this equivalence the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' are often used synonymously, both in philosophy and Buddhist studies (Sizemore and Swearer 1990; Rachels 1993; Harvey 2000).

However, sometimes 'ethics' is used in a way that distinguishes it from 'morality,' in which case it can have one of two senses. It can either be used as a more comprehensive term than morality, making morality a subdivision of ethics, or it can refer to the philosophical study *of* morality (e. g. Sterba 1998: 1). The first sense defines 'ethics' very broadly to be the "systems of value and custom instantiated in the lives of particular groups" (Routledge: *s.v.* "Ethics").[15] 'Morality' is then taken to be a subdomain within ethics that can be defined and characterized variously, but is at the least associated with notions of right and wrong, guilt and shame, etc. The description of ethics in its very broadest sense, which covers everything from cultural rituals, conventions and habitual behaviours, to notions of right and wrong, largely falls within the realm of anthropology and is not generally what is meant by 'ethics' within the field of Buddhist ethics. It is more common to use 'ethics,' when distinguished from morality, in the second sense, as referring to the philosophical analysis of morality. Here ethics involves the systematic

and rational reflection on morality: the attempt to address questions like: What constitutes morality? What are moral principles? What gives beings moral status? What is the relationship between morality and reason? This kind of ethics is also called 'philosophical ethics,' 'theoretical ethics,' 'moral philosophy,' or 'moral theorizing,' and so for clarity when referring to the systematic analysis of morality I will employ one of these four terms. The word 'ethics' on its own will be taken to be synonymous with 'morality,' and both 'ethics' and 'morality' will be understood as the object of study of philosophical ethics.

The subject of morality (or ethics) can in turn be understood broadly or narrowly. At the most general level, the subject of morality is, as Socrates reportedly said, "how we ought to live" (cited in Rachels 1993: 1). This, as he said, is "no small matter," for it concerns notions of human well-being and what constitutes the best life for humans. In its more narrow sense morality is about assigning value to human conduct and determining how humans should act in regard to other individuals and society. In this way morality is associated with notions of right and wrong, blame and guilt, good and bad, etc. Sometimes, stemming from the Aristotelian use of *ethos*, this will include judgements about character.[16] The broad and narrow senses of morality are of course not unrelated, for an answer to the question of what constitutes 'the good life' will have implications for morality qua norms of conduct and character, and behaviour and personality norms can in turn depend on notions about human well-being.

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[15] In this section where I am referring to reference material, "Routledge" refers to the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

[16] For example, *s.v.* "Ethics" in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (p.414) and *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, by William L. Reese (1980).

The inconsistency as to whether morality in its narrower sense is strictly related to what has been called "other-regarding" action-guides and norms, or also includes norms regarding character and personality, is reflected in the use of the term 'moral.' According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* when used adjectivally 'moral' signifies concern with "the principles of right and wrong behaviour *and* the goodness and badness of human character"(emphasis mine). Thus the adjective 'moral' may indicate something about behaviour *or* character, or both, and clearly the scope of one's study will vary depending on the scope of one's understanding of morality.

The inconsistency in defining morality in turn appears to be related to a debate regarding how best to characterize morality. The question is, should morality be understood in terms of a function, such as social and interpersonal co-operation, or in terms of certain moral sentiments, "feelings or emotions central to moral agency," like blame or guilt (Routledge: *s.v.* "Moral Sentiments").[17] It seems reasonable that if one understands morals to be related primarily or exclusively to conduct and not character, one might be more inclined to characterize morality according to a function such as co-operation. It is further evident that if morality is characterized as a system of value judgements about conduct aimed at furthering social co-operation, the scope of one's study of morality will be very different if one characterizes morality in terms of moral sentiments, since this would lead one to focus on the emotions and feelings important for moral agency, and thus on character.

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[17] A third way of characterizing morality is by the supremacy of moral reasoning. This suggests that what is key about morality is that when one makes a reasoned decision about what one ought to do, that decision in principle holds sway over whatever other arguments may be presented against it. Whatever a society considers supreme in this way would thus be considered its morality (*s.v.* "Morality and Ethics" in Routledge).

Let us consider some of the implications of the definitions of ethics and morality at work in the field of Buddhist ethics. It might be noted, first of all, that many studies of Buddhist ethics do not make an effort to define these terms, and appear to assume–not unproblematically, I think–that we all know what we mean, and that we mean the same thing, when we use 'ethics' and 'morality.' Winston King's *In the Hope of Nibbana* (1964) and Sizemore and Swearer's *Ethics, Wealth and Salvation* (1990) are two examples. However, Damien Keown (1992) and Peter Harvey (2000), are more self-conscious in this regard and both cite the definitions developed by David Little and Sumner Twiss in their influential book, *Comparative Religious Ethics* (1978).

According to Little and Twiss, a moral statement is one that addresses problems of co-operation among humans: it gives an action-guide to individuals and groups for the sake of preserving or enhancing co-operation. Morality is thus "other-regarding," focussing on the effect of actions upon other people. Morals, so defined, may guide character, attitudes and emotions as well, but only insofar as these may affect co-operative behaviour (1978: 28-29).

The definition offered by Little and Twiss reveals a significant feature of the functional definition of morality. For to characterize morality by its function of social co-operation is not merely to say that co-operation happens to be one of the effects of morality, but is really a claim that social co-operation is what morality is *for*–as Little and Twiss in fact do claim (Routledge: *s.v.* "Morality and Ethics"). This implies that the ability of beings to get along well is an end in itself, it is the *telos* of morality, rather than either a fortunate side-effect of morality or the means to some higher goal. The assumption that co-operation is the function of morality will, or should, have a significant

effect on one's approach to Buddhist morality, for it suggests that either one should focus solely on those aspects of Buddhist teachings which bear obviously and directly on social co-operation, like, for example the precepts and the monastic rules, or, one should devote attention to explaining how those features of Buddhism that are treated as part of Buddhist morality are functioning to enhance social co-operation, and why such co-operation is valued by the tradition. However, the fact that neither Harvey or Keown felt compelled in their studies to do any of these things suggests that this understanding of morality is inadequate or inappropriate for the Buddhist context. It is telling, for example, that Harvey is forced to state that since the morally-significant category of what is unwholesome (*akuśala)* includes mental factors (such as covetousness, ill-will, and wrong view) which may have no direct effect on other people, since they do not have to be acted upon to be considered unwholesome, the notion of unwholesome goes beyond the realm of ethics–as he has defined it (Harvey 2000: 48,49).

This seems to be a strange way of proceeding. Assuming that the overall aim is to get a sense of what constitutes morality in a Buddhist context, if a concept or principle appears to be clearly important to Buddhist morality, i. e., to norms of conduct or character, and if this concept does not fit within one's definition of morality, it seems to me one should consider modifying one's understanding of morality, and not assume out of hand that that concept or principle is not ethical or moral. Consequently, I would argue that because much of what both Keown (1992) and Harvey (2000) include in their valuable work on Buddhist morality has no *direct* bearing on social co-operation, and certainly is not obviously taught *for the sake* of social harmony, it seems inappropriate to assume that the functional characterization of morality is sufficient. Some of the moral

concepts which both Keown and Harvey emphasize, but which would not fall easily within Little and Twiss's understanding of morality include the importance of intention (*cetanā* or *abhiprāya*), the notions of merit and demerit (*puṇya* and *pāpa*), and the idea of wholesome and unwholesome (*kuśala* and *akuśala).* Furthermore, since neither author discusses Buddhist moral concepts in the light of social co-operation, the Little and Twiss definition of morality seems clearly inadequate. As the work of both Keown (1992) and Harvey (2000) in fact suggests, character seems to be such a key aspect of Buddhist normativity, any definition of morality that excludes considerations of character or subordinates character norms to action norms does not seem fitting. For this reason, I hypothesize that morality in the Buddhist context must be taken to include normativity with regard to both conduct and character. For the purposes of this study, then, the narrowest definition of ethics as strictly about 'other-regarding action guides' is rejected in favour of one that includes both 'character-guides' and norms of conduct. The assumption that morality can be characterized in terms of the function of co-operation is also deemed unsuitable.

The broadest sense of morality as a response to 'how we ought to live' remains to be considered. This is the view that morality centres on a notion of human well-being, of what constitutes the best life for humans. Insofar as Buddhist teachings in general can be understood as a response to this question, all of Buddhist teachings could be considered relevant to morality. This explains why some scholars have proclaimed Buddhism to be an ethical system *par excellence*. Hammalawa Saddhatissa, for example, in one of the earliest and best-known studies of Buddhist ethics, stated that Buddhism can be said to provide the complete ethical study (1970: 4). He saw ethics as so central to

Buddhist teachings that the original title of his work was *Buddhist Ethics: The Essence of Buddhism* (1970: xvii). It is without doubt no accident that the first definition of ethics he offers is that of G. E. Moore, who rejected as inadequate the view that morality was restricted to what is good or bad in human conduct. "I may say that I intend to use 'ethics' to cover more than this...I am using it to cover the general inquiry into what is good" (Moore, *Principia Ethica* 1954, 2, cited in Saddhatissa 1970: 1). While Winston King (1964, 2) rejected the view that Buddhism was "purely and simply a moralism," he nonetheless felt compelled to respond to the idea, and quoted in this regard Ambedkar, who famously claimed "Buddhism *is* morality...it is morality itself which in Buddhism plays the basic role taken by the deity in other religions" ("Le Buddha et l'avenir du Bouddhisme" cited in King 1964: 3).

Thus, morality in what might be called its Socratic or ancient Greek sense largely overlaps with Buddhist teachings. Moreover, this broad definition of morality also overlaps with religion in general depending on how *that* is understood. For example, if we define religion as functioning to resolve the "ontological problem of interpretability," i. e., the problems of understanding life, death and suffering, as do Little and Twiss (1978: 56), or as being about what is of 'ultimate concern' as does Tillich, religion and morality are not easily isolated from each other, even though there may be aspects of religion which are not specifically moral and vice versa. It is clear, then, that scope of one's study of Buddhist morality will be considerably wider if one adopts the older, Socratic notion of morality.

Assuming again that the objective of studying Buddhist ethics is to get a sense of Buddhist morality broadly understood, one might well conclude that the Socratic

definition of morality is what should be adopted. Using the Socratic understanding of morality, though, there would seem to be no obvious distinction between Buddhist teachings and Buddhist morality. Then one might ask, what would distinguish a study of Buddhist morality from any given study of Buddhist thought or teaching? What I take to be unique about studies in Buddhist ethics, and this study in particular, is that they approach the Buddhist tradition with questions derived from the discipline of philosophical ethics.

The overall task of philosophical ethics, as I understand it, is to explain the relationship between standards and ideals of conduct and character, including reason, virtue, morals, etc, and what is considered 'the good life,' or human well-being. Any theory of ethics will articulate the relationship between these two things, which we might roughly call the relationship between right and good.[18] Put another way, philosophical ethics defines the relationship between morality understood as norms of conduct and character, and morality understood as how one ought to live. This, then, will be the overall aim of this thesis: to explain the relationship between Śāntideva's notion of 'the good,' which will presumably be associated with nirvāṇa, and conduct and character norms. This will involve doing a meta-ethical analysis of the meaning of moral terms, and addressing questions common to theoretical or philosophical ethics, such as what gives beings moral status, the scope of moral principles, and the attempt to define what constitutes morality for Śāntideva. It should be clear that because I am attempting to explain the moral theory at work in Śāntideva's thought, rather than advance a substantial moral view of my own, this is a work of philosophical rather than normative ethics.

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[18] *S.v.*. "Ethics: Religion and Morality" in the *Encyclopedia of Bioethics* and "Good" in Reese 1980.

We are now in a position to comment on the issue of whether the category of ethics is etic or emic to Buddhism. As is evident from the above discussion, if we define morality as the domain of 'how we ought to live, and why,' there is a sense in which it is not at all alien to the Buddhist tradition, and in fact Buddhism might legitimately be seen to provide the "complete ethical study," as Saddhatissa said. The category of philosophical ethics, however, is a different matter, for it appears that the systematic, rational reflection on morality, particularly defined as something distinguishable from other aspects of the tradition, does not seem to occur in Buddhist canonical or *śāstraic* (commentarial) literature. In stating this it should be emphasized that I am not saying that 'there are no ethics in Buddhism', but that philosophical ethics as an enterprise does not appear to occur: meaning that ancient Buddhist thinkers did not feel compelled to address the kinds of questions, as described above, which philosophers of ethics ask. I believe it may be the absence of ethics in this sense–systematic ethics–that may explain the view sometimes expressed, and sometimes implicit, that there are *no* ethics in Buddhism. Take, for example, the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, a reference book on religion and philosophy published in 1980, claiming to represent both Eastern and Western thought (Reese 1980). Of the thirty-six thinkers listed as significant in the history of ethical theory, not *one* is non-western, let alone Buddhist. This suggests to me not that the author is horribly biased, nor that non-western religions do not have ethics, but that that non-western traditions probably do not presume one can or should systematically think about morality in a way that separates it from other aspects of reality.

One reason philosophical ethics might therefore be understood to be an etic category is that like other Indian religious traditions, at least in the pre-modern

period, and so far as I am aware, Buddhism has not tended to divide moral reasoning from other types of reasoning. The Indian concept of *dharma*, for example, which is notoriously difficult to translate, could arguably be said to incorporate religious, moral, and legal teachings which are not easily teased apart, and so systematic thought regarding any of these categories is likely to include the other two. The relationship between religion and morality, and consequently reasoning about them, would most likely have to be described as a 'cosmic unity,' since the Indian worldview seems to conceive the moral and natural orders as one (*Encyclopedia of Bioethics*: *s.v.* "Religion and Morality"). Thus, my assumption is that theorizing about morality as separate from other aspects of religion will not be found in Śāntideva.

In saying that philosophical ethics is in this way an alien category I am not presupposing, as is sometimes done, that this is because Buddhism is a religion and therefore non-rational. It is important to clarify this point because the distinction between religion and ethical theorizing sometimes appears to be based on the idea that religion and faith are somehow opposed to rational inquiry. Note, for example, the presumed division between reason and philosophy on the one hand, and religion and faith on the other, in the following, in which the author discusses various challenges to philosophical ethics.

> Historically, various forms of religion and religious philosophy have also posed a challenge to the autonomy and validity of traditional ethics. The claims of faith and religious authority can readily be seen as overriding the kind of rational understanding that typifies traditional philosophical inquiry. (*Encyclopedia of Bioethics*: *s.v.* "Ethics")

From an Indian Buddhist perspective it is problematic to assume, as the above author has done, that faith and religion are antithetical to reason. The word that normally,

and rather misleadlingly, gets translated as 'faith' in Indian Buddhism is the word *śraddhā* (Pali*: saddhā*), which refers to the sense of confidence in the Buddhist teachings one derives from seeing their positive effects instantiated in its practitioners (Harvey 2000, 10). Saddhatissa consequently translates *śraddhā* as "confidence born of understanding" (1970: 35, cf. Rahula 1974: 8). While such confidence is supposed to be based on direct knowledge (Pali *abhiññā*) and personal experience rather than speculation, and is thus not purely rational, neither is it obviously or necessarily opposed to reason. In general, while Buddhism does place authority in the Buddha, his teachings (*Dharma*) and the community of Noble practitioners (*Saṅgha*), one is always enjoined to test out those teachings in one's own experience. This is the lesson of the *Kālāma Sutta (Kesaputta Sutta* in AN 3.7.65*)*, for example, and is a refrain heard throughout the suttas, perhaps most famously in the Buddha's injunction to "Be ye lamps unto yourselves" (*Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* 2: 26). Although the exact nature of faith in Buddhism is a complex issue, it clearly should not be assumed that philosophical ethics are foreign to Buddhism because Buddhism as a faith is irrational.

In fact, it is interesting to note that while those who do western ethical theory may find it unproblematic to contrast religious and moral reasoning, it appears that this is not the case for those whose expertise is religion. Russell Sizemore has pointed out that scholars in the field of religious ethics often find the precise distinction between religious and philosophical ethics difficult to define, and similarly debate in comparative religious ethics often centres on how to characterize religion and its relationship to philosophical reason (Sizemore and Swearer 1990: 58, 87). Given such difficulties, as well as the fact that Indian traditions appear not to divide religious, moral, and even legal

considerations, it seems unwise to take for granted that systematic thinking about morality will be separated from other types of systematic thought in Śāntideva's work.

Therefore, my claim is that philosophical ethics may be etic insofar as Śāntideva does not rationally reflect on morality in the way I will be doing in this thesis, but not because philosophical ethics is rational and Śāntideva is not. Śāntideva does not do philosophical ethics in the sense that he does not ask the same kinds of questions I will be asking: he does not analyze his own moral reasoning, for example, and he does not examine his use of moral terms (meta-ethical analysis). However, while the process of asking these sorts of questions may be etic, the subject of these questions is not. Again, if we see philosophical ethics as the attempt to explain the relationship between a view of the 'good' and norms of conduct and character, then though this activity may be foreign to Śāntideva, norms of behaviour, ideas about good character, and a sense of human well-being, are not. Because I think Śāntideva probably does have some ideas about the relationships between these things, I suspect there is a moral theory latent in his thought. By trying to articulate the precise relationship between these realms, I do not think I necessarily risk doing violence to the material, though I do think it will be important to be alert to the possibility that by 'doing philosophical ethics' as a distinct exercise, I may be importing through the back door a division between morality and other aspects of religion and philosophy that Śāntideva may not have thought possible. In particular, Śāntideva most likely does not separate moral reasoning from other aspects of religious life or religious reasoning. My assessment of Śāntideva's moral theory will therefore have to try to take account of the fact that moral theories usually assume a division between morality and religion which Śāntideva himself in all likelihood would not have made. By

employing the understanding of morality in its Socratic sense which actually overlaps with religion to a large extent, I hope to have side-stepped any obviously problematic divisions between religion and morality that would be alien to Śāntideva, but I am aware that this may not have deflected all of the misleading assumptions potentially lurking in moral theory.[19]

iii. Summary of definitions

To review, in this study I use 'morality' and 'ethics' synonymously to refer to that subsystem of values and customs concerned with notions of right and wrong, guilt and shame, good and bad. Of this subsystem I am interested in 'morality' understood in its wider sense, of that which is associated with normative guides to human conduct and character. I therefore understand the adjective 'moral' or 'ethical' to mean both concern with principles of right and wrong behaviour *and* the goodness and badness of human character; with the assumption that what is meant by good/bad and right/wrong will have to be refined according to Śāntideva's interpretation of the equivalent terms.

In terms of distinguishing religion and morality, the point was made that if morality (or ethics) is defined in the Socratic sense as pertaining to "the best way to live," morality will overlap with religion. Insofar as Buddhism, at least the teachings of Buddhism, can be understood as essentially a response to this question, then all of

[19] A question that deserves consideration in future research is this: If it is true that Śāntideva did not do philosophical ethics in the way I am, did he have a principled reason for this, or did he just not happen to do it? I suspect the answer lies in the fact that facts and values would not have been perceived as separate realms as they are for contemporary thinkers. Because the reality of facts, of 'what is' would not have been understood as separable from 'oughts', the realm of value, moral considerations would not be divisible from questions of ontology and epistemology. For further treatment of this idea see Clayton, 2001.

Buddhist teachings can in one way or another be considered ethics. On the other hand, if ethics is defined narrowly as the systematic and rational reflection on morality as distinct from religion (e. g. defined as that which pertains to other-regarding conduct, but not to the overall best life for humans), then one would find no ethics in Buddhism. I suggested that it is these two distinct ways of defining ethics that has lead to the existence of both the claim that Buddhism is a system of ethics *par excellence*, and at the same time that Buddhism has no ethics whatsoever.

The overall project of this thesis, then, is to do a study of Śāntideva from the perspective of philosophical or theoretical ethics, i. e., systematic and rational reflection on morality. As such, the overall question to answer is: For Śāntideva, what is the relationship between norms of conduct and character–that is, the kinds of motives, traits, and actions that are considered good or right, and 'the good' defined in terms of the overall well-being of humans. The answer to this will form the basis of my understanding of Śāntideva's moral theory, which will then be compared to the existing literature in Buddhist ethics in order to test the validity of homogeneous assessments of Buddhist morality.

II c. On textualism: translation and philological issues

More than one scholar has pointed out the rather heavy bias towards textual research within the academic study of Buddhism, and the problems with this tendency to locate religion in texts (e. g. see Schopen 1997; King 1999: Ch. 3). Gregory Schopen, for instance, has criticized other scholars of Buddhism for assuming that what is written in canonical texts reflects Buddhism as it was actually lived, rather than ideals and

normative paradigms. He suggests that this practice has led to a distorted view of the tradition which is unsupported or even contradicted by what is learned from non-textual sources, such as archeological and epigraphical evidence. He argues, for example, that by focusing on canonical sources we have underestimated the role of nuns in the Buddhist community, and by assuming that the Vinaya rules accurately described the way monks and nuns behaved, we have failed to obtain a full picture of their actual conduct as indicated by material evidence. The latter suggests that contrary to Vinaya injunctions, monks were in fact owners of property and important donors to the early *Saṅgha*.

While I agree with Schopen that we cannot unproblematically assume to know on the basis of texts what Buddhists, or other recipients of Buddhist texts, *actually* practiced, or even believed, it would be equally wrong to assume that texts *never* reflect actual belief and practice. This would be to "overstep the mark wildly," as Richard King says (1999: 71). Texts are one of many source materials for the study of religion, and though one cannot hope to fully understand a religious tradition on the basis of textual studies alone, as King points out, "equally one cannot hope to understand the actual religious beliefs and practices of the so-called world-religions without a grounding in the literature of those traditions" (King 1999: 71). This must also be the case for understanding a tradition's morality. Moreover, if Schopen is right to claim that canonical texts reveal "normative and carefully contrived ideal paradigms," insofar as I am interested in Śāntideva's moral views, i. e., his views on norms of conduct and character, a textual study should be, well, ideal. Since the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is primarily a collection of quotations selected by Śāntideva from canonical *sūtras*, it should serve as an excellent source for information on his ideals, norms and values. The question of whether

and to what extent Śāntideva, or other Buddhists, then or today live up to those ideals and values in practice is a matter for a different kind of study from this one. Thus I am not assuming to know how these ideals would have been instantiated in Śāntideva's, or any other Buddhist's, actual behaviour, but I am assuming that the content of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* do represent Śāntideva's thought and ideals, and that these texts are in this way an excellent source for understanding his morality.

While locating Śāntideva's moral thought in texts in this way, I am not, however, assuming that this reflects *all* of what we would consider his ethics, for in the broadest sense this would entail taking into account the full range of his religious and cultural customs and values, which would require detailed consideration of the Vinaya as well as ritual and social practices, among other things. In other words, there may be aspects of Śāntideva's morality that are not indicated in his writings, but a study of this extra-textual morality is well beyond the reach of the present work, which should consequently be considered a study of Śāntideva's morality through the lens of the texts attributed to him.

In terms of ancient languages, the text of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is extant in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese. In terms of modern languages there has been an incomplete translation into German, and complete translations into Japanese and English (Pezzali 1968: 76-80). The English translation, based on the Sanskrit manuscript, was completed by Cecil Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse in 1922. As a result, the existing English translation is dated and clearly in need of reworking in light of the many developments in Buddhist studies that have occurred since the 1920's. For the dissertation I have based my work primarily on the first edition of the Sanskrit text published by

Bendall (1970) which is compared with the second Sanskrit edition by P. L. Vaidya (1961), as well as, occasionally, the Tibetan translation (Otani Vol.102, n. 5335), which is thought possibly to reflect an older Indian text than the Sanskrit manuscript (Pezzali: 76). Rather than offering a complete new translation of this substantial text (166 folios, and over 300 pages in translation), only verses and passages which are central to understanding Śāntideva's moral stance have been translated. These were then analyzed for the use and meaning of critical ethical terms. As indicated above, such important moral concepts include compassion (*karuṇā*), merit and demerit (*puṇya and pāpa*), what it means for an action to be good (*kuśala*), the notion of the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*), and skillful means (*upāya-kauśalya*). The meaning of these key terms and ideas as found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* were then compared to those in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra.* Because I wanted take a step toward a diachronically sensitive study, I did not consult the Tibetan (or Chinese) commentaries on the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in my exegetical efforts, as I did not want to conflate Śāntideva's understanding of ethical concepts with that of later, non-Indian redactors. An examination of such commentaries and the changes in moral views they might indicate will remain for further studies.

In order to situate Śāntideva within Indian Buddhism and to begin to take account of historical variation in Indian Buddhist moral ideas, I have however compared Śāntideva's understanding to the meaning of these terms in texts such as the *Abhidharmakośa* (4th century CE). This is an influential *abhidharma* text, for which good translations and secondary sources exist. An Abhidharma text was chosen because of its careful explication of terms, and for relevance to ethics: as La Vallée Poussin indicated in *La Morale Bouddhique* (1927), the debates between the different Abhidharma schools are

"the closest Buddhism comes to the discipline of moral philosophy" (cited in Keown 1992: 3). In doing this analysis, I hope to have remedied some of the errors of past research, which can be criticized for failing to attend adequately to historical changes and developments in Buddhist moral thought.

As I am taking Śāntideva's text as representative of a seventh century Indian Buddhist thinker's views, a methodolical problem would appear to arise in my following the common practice of using the Tibetan translation to clarify the meaning of the Sanskrit text, since the earliest Tibetan translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is dated to around 800 CE (Bendall ŚS: v; Winternitz 1981: 340; Vaidya: Intro). Hence there would appear to be both cultural and temporal distance between Śāntideva and his Tibetan translators. However, as indicated above, Bendall believed that the Tibetan translation was based on an Indian manuscript that was actually older than the Sanskrit manuscript he used for his translation (ŚS: Introduction; Pezzali 1968: 76,77). If that is the case, and if Tārānatha is correct that the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* manuscript was compiled in or around the 7th century, if the Tibetan translation is actually *older* than this, then it could not be placed too long after Śāntideva himself, who as we have seen probably lived sometime during that century. While this would not clear up the problem of the cultural and linguistic distance between Śāntideva and his Tibetan translator, it would appear that they would at least have been near contemporaries.

Moreover, the difficulty with using the Tibetan version is in fact more a theoretical than practical problem. In most instances where the meaning of the Sanskrit text is difficult, the Tibetan text is also obscure, so the number of instances where I have had to rely on the Tibetan text to discern the meaning of the Sanskrit is very minimal. In

those instances where it was necessary to do so, I have treated the Tibetan version as a 'semantic hypothesis' which offers one (or more) possible meanings for the text in question but not necessarily the definitive one, much in the same way one might view a commentary. Georges Dreyfus, in his analysis of Dharmakīrti's thought in the light of the Tibetan tradition, views the Tibetan commentators on Dharmakīrti's work as highly informed interpreters, whose understandings should be respected as such, but not without question (1997: 8, 9). Similarly, I have adopted the view that the Tibetan translation represents one valuable opinion about the meaning of the Sanskrit text, but not the only one.

The passages and terms that became the focus of translation and analysis were chosen on the basis of their relevance to the overall task of determining Śāntideva's moral theory. That is, I focussed on those terms and sections of the text that appeared relevant to norms of conduct and character, as well as the overall goal of bodhisattvahood. Of course, my choice of morally-relevant notions was influenced by previous translations and existing work in Buddhist ethics, and the assumptions behind them. So, for example, because the terms *puṇya* and *pāpa* are often translated as "virtue and sin," or "merit and evil," they seem, *prima facie*, to be morally significant. However, had the common translation for these terms been "karmically fruitful and karmically unfruitful," as Lance Cousins (1996) has suggested, their moral importance would have been less obvious. Thus I have been unavoidably influenced by previous Buddhist scholarship in my choice of key terms and passages. Aside from trying as far as possible in my reading to remain open to what might be morally relevant to Śāntideva, in defining key terms I have used the following procedure. I have first tried to explain these morally significant terms on

their own terms, i. e., what they would mean to an Indian Buddhist, without using, initially and if possible, western ethical terms. I examine the context of each use, see how the term is used, and then try to classify it.

II d. The issue of Orientalism

I take seriously the insights reflected in the following statement by Alasdair MacIntyre:

> [I]t is an illusion to suppose that there is some neutral standing ground, some locus for rationality as such, which can afford rational resources sufficent for enquiry independent of all traditions. Those who maintained otherwise either have covertly been adopting the standpoint of a tradition and deceiving themselves and others into supposing theirs was just such a neutral stand-ground or else have simply been in error. [20]

In my approach I try to strike a balance between a romanticism, which would try to trasmit the timeless 'essence' of the Buddhist tradition, in this case ethics, and a scientific approach, which would claim to arrive at an objective understanding. As much of the literature on Orientalism convincingly shows, one of the problems[21] with the romantic approach is that it leads to projecting the self, or what is lacking in the self, onto the other, without sufficiently recognizing the distinctiveness, the so-called 'otherness' of the other. By contrast, an approach that has the pretense of 'objectively' revealing the other fails to see that one's understanding will unavoidably reflect aspects of oneself. In short, the flaw of the romantic is to read the self into the other without being conscious of doing so, whereas the objectivist fails to see that the other can and inevitably does reflect the self. As Loy states, "too much eagerness to accept what is in a text may overlook its

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[20] Alasdair MacIntyre, 1988. *Whose Justice, Which Rationality* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, p.367) cited in Dreyfus 1997: 9.

'otherness,' its radical challenge to our preconceptions and its ability to disrupt the self. The scientific approach falls into the opposite trap: by considering the text to be about someone else in some other time and place, the historian also manages to avoid being challenged by it" (Loy 1999). In this dissertation I attempt, so far as possible, to avoid both traps. In other words, I try to walk Dilthey's fine line of interpretation, drawn between recognizing the other as neither completely strange nor completely familiar.

In this effort to discriminate between what is unique about the other and a reflection of the self, it is of course important to be aware of the kind of motives and interests underlying one's study. The discipline of hermeneutics and particularly the influence of Gadamer has highlighted how important it is to be as aware as possible of our own prejudices, even while acknowledging the impossibility of being fully aware of them. Thus one should ask: Why are we as Buddhist scholars now interested in the moral aspect of Buddhism? The question becomes particularly pertinent when we consider that historians of religion in the first half of the twentieth century tended to leave ethics out of the study of religion.[22] So why might late twentieth century and early twenty-first century scholars be concerned with ethics? Ronald Green points to an answer when he posits that it is only in the Greco-Roman and perhaps Chinese religious traditions, that we see the separation of ethics from other aspects of religion (*Encyclopedia of Religion: s.v.* "Morality and Religion"). He suggest that the rational reflection on the human good that ethics represents may have arisen in these traditions partly as a result of the failure of

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[21] For a discussion of other problems with the romantic view of India, such as the promulgation of stereotypes and their influence on Indian self-understanding, see King 1999: 92-94.

[22] Reasons include the concern not to reduce religion to ethics, and the tendency to associate ethics with Kantian formalism. Since formalism is associated with rationalism, and rationalism tended to be rejected by historians of religion, ethics were not considered a valid area of study for historians. See Reynolds in Sizemore and Swearer 1992: 59.

older religious ideals. We might speculate, then, that one reason for the current flourishing interest in Buddhist ethics in the western academy might be the breakdown in older religious ideals, as evident in the notion that we have entered a 'post-Christian' age, and the prevalence of concern about the anti-foundationalism of post-modernity. At the same time, there are issues of global concern associated with the environment, globalization, and biomedical technologies that seem to cry out for a moral response. I would be disingenuous if I did not acknowledge my awareness that such social concerns have motivated my turn to ethics in Buddhism. However, while conceding this basis for my interest in Buddhist morality, I would never assume that an ancient Indian thinker necessarily has something direct to say, much less any solutions, to twenty-first century problems. I do assume, however, that Buddhism may have something interesting and possibly unique to say about ethics, and this the basis for my attempt to frame Śāntideva's thought in terms of a moral theory.

In this way this thesis, and I think in many ways the field of Buddhist ethics in general, can be viewed as an attempt to understand Buddhism, and particularly what we have come to call Buddhist texts and ideas, in a different way, *viz.*, from the framework of ethics. If Foucault is correct in saying that the nature of academic disciplines (and we may include here religious studies) is to "order multiplicities" and make "conceptual distinctions and derive universal abstractions from the heterogeneity and fluidity of what they purport to explain,"[23] then I would suggest that Buddhist ethics is in a certain sense simply another way of ordering the multiplicity of Buddhism(s). While the aim of this project is in part to recover emic categories and concepts, in some

[23] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (Harmondsworth 1977: 218-220), cited in King 1999: 68.

ways we can see that is not so much that the 'data' are new, but that they are being organized according to different questions. The precepts, the rules for monastics (*prāṭimokṣa)*, the nature of the bodhisattva vow and *bodhicitta*–these topics are not new to Buddhist studies, but the questions being asked of them are. I think Gadamer was correct in saying that it is "enough to say we understand in a different way, if we understand at all."[24] For this reason it is enough to hope that this thesis, and the literature being produced in the area of Buddhist ethics, counts as a new way of understanding these aspects of the tradition. I do not see myself as extracting the original meaning of the text, but as constructing a meaning based on a conversation with the text. To invoke the Buddhist principle of *upāya,* I view a study in Buddhist ethics as a kind of skillful means for understanding Buddhist ideas in a way relevant to certain present realities.[25]

[24] Gadamer, *Truth and Method.* (Crossroads, 1974: 264) cited in Dreyfus, 1997: 7.
[25] For a discussion of the hermeneutical model of conversation, see Wallace 2000: 83, and for a comparison between Jeffrey Stout's "bricolage" and Buddhist *upāya,* see Unno, 2000: 185.

Chapter Two: The text and its author

I. Śāntideva's dates and doctrinal affiliation

The exact dates of Śāntideva's life are not known, but historical evidence indicates he must have lived sometime between the last half of the sixth and the first half of the seventh centuries CE, at a time when Mahāyāna was becoming "the main spirit and source of cultural activity of Indian Buddhism" (Joshi 1977: 3). Broadly speaking, since Śāntideva is said to have been the pupil of Jayadeva, Dharmapāla's successor at Nālandā, he must not have lived before the time of Dharmapāla (c. 528-560) and not after about 800 CE, when the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is known to have been translated into Tibetan (BR: v; Winternitz 1981: 340; Vaidya: vii). Further indication of a *terminus ad quem* is the fact that Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* is quoted in the *Tattvasiddhi* of Śāntarakṣita, who flourished in the eighth century (Ruegg 1981: 82 n. 266). Aside from this, little can be said with certainty, and the evidence presented to support a given view tends to be ambiguous. Vaidya (1961: viii), for example, claims that the use of the name *Candrapradīpa* for the *Samādhirāja-sūtra* in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* suggests that Śāntideva lived *after* Candrakīrti, who knew the text as the *Samādhirāja* and is dated in the sixth century or seventh century (Winternitz 1981: 351; Ruegg 1981: 71). But since *Candrapradīpa* is the original name of the *sūtra* in question and *Samādhirāja* is the later name, one would more logically conclude, if anything, that Śāntideva came *before* Candrakīrti—a conclusion that would contradict all traditional chronologies of Buddhist thinkers (Sangharakshita 1985, 199). Equally ambiguous is Tāranātha's statement that Śāntideva lived during the reign of Śīla, the son of King Harṣa (c. 650), based upon which Tāranātha places Śāntideva in the middle of the seventh century. However, Bendall (ŚS

iii) points out that no king named Śīla is known to either Indian or Chinese sources. De Jong (1975: 179) further objects that Tāranātha's dates must be contradictory, since Śāntideva could not have been both a younger contemporary of Dharmapāla (c.530-560 CE) and born during the reign of the son of King Harṣa (c.650 CE). If Winternitz is correct, though, that Śāntideva was not a *contemporary* of Dharmapāla's but a pupil of Jayadeva, Dharmapāla's successor, then as Bendall says, the period indicated by Tāranātha might be possible, depending on how long one estimates Dharmapāla and Jayadeva to have lived.

Another hypothesis regarding the dates for Śāntideva has been proposed by B. Bhattacharya (1926, cited in De Jong 1975: 179). Bhattacharya suggests that Śāntideva must have lived after the departure of I-tsing and Hsüan-tsang from India, since neither pilgrim mentions him in his account, and before the departure of Śāntirakṣita for Tibet, since, as indicated above, the latter cites a verse from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* in the *Tattvasiddhi* and attributes it to Śāntideva. On this reasoning, Śāntideva would have flourished between 685 and 763 CE. As De Jong points out, these dates are based on the assumption that I-tsing and Hsuan-tsang would have mentioned Śāntideva had he been considered important, which, though not completely unreasonable, is not without question. It also assumes that Śāntarakṣita wrote the *Tattvasiddhi* before he left for Tibet in 763, which is also questionable. What we can say is that Śāntideva should not be dated after about 788 CE, when Śāntarakṣita is thought to have died (Ruegg 1981: 89).

Based on this sketchy evidence various dates for Śāntideva's life have thus been proposed: c. 650 according to Tāranātha, c. 691-743 according to Bhattacharya (in Krishnamacharya 1926: xvi), c. 685-763 according to Pezzali (1968), c. 700 according to

Ruegg (1981: 82), and c. 725-765 according to Saito (1996: 260). None of these dates can be considered conclusive.

In terms of Śāntideva's place within the history of the Mādhyamika school of Mahāyāna, with which he is aligned, Śāntideva probably figures within the middle period of the school's philosophical development. According to the scheme developed by Ruegg (1981) and Kajiyama (1982; cited in Saito 1996), the middle period was marked by the systematisation of the philosophical base laid down by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, and the development of a split between the followers of Buddhpālita (c.470-540?) and those of Bhāvaviveka (c.500-570?), based on the type of reasoning employed. The work of Candrakīrti, who followed Buddhapālita in favouring the *reductio ad absurdem (prāsaṅga)* method of reasoning, figures prominently in this second and middle phase of development. In its third and last period, the school witnessed a synthesis of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika views, and is represented particularly by Śāntirakṣita (c.725-788) and Kamalaśīla (c.740-795). As well as advocating doctrines and practices associated with the Yogācāra, these thinkers were heavily influenced by Dharmakīrti's logic and epistemology, and defended the need for independent inferences (*svatantra-anumāṇa*) in their reasoning. Śāntideva, however, rejects the doctrine of *pramāṇa* advocated by the logic school, and consistently relies on *reductio ad absurdem* arguments (*prasaṅga*) rather than the Svātantrika method of using an independent inference (*svatantra)* (Sweet, 1977: 14). Śāntideva also denies the characteristic Cittamātra theory of self-knowledge of mind (*svasaṃvedanā*) (see *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9: 17-22). Thus, doctrinally he can be considered closer to Candrakīrti and the middle period of Madhyamaka development than the late period (see Saito 1996: 260f.; Crosby and Skilton 1996: ix; ŚS 251). This would

agree with Tibetan doxographical literature, which places both Candrakīrti (c.600-650) and Śāntideva in the Prāsaṅgika (Thal'gyur ba) Mādhyamika school, versus the Svātantrika (Rang rgyud pa) Mādhyamikas of Bhāvaviveka (c. 490-570).

In considering Śāntideva's doxographical alignment it should be noted that there is some evidence that Śāntideva may have also been a Tantric practitioner. Someone with Śāntideva's nickname, 'Bhusuku,' is said to have composed Tantric songs, and Tantric texts within the *'Bstan'gyur* are attributed to a Śāntideva (Pezzali 1968: 44, 45; Śāstri 1913: 50,51). While most scholars[26] seem reluctant to see this as evidence that the Śāntideva who composed the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* may have been a Tāntrika, and are content to consider him a Mādhyamika, it is notable that both editors of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, Bendall and Vaidya, indicate that the author shows some Tantric influences (Bendall in ŚS: vi.; Vaidya: viii). Since there does seem to be some evidence for Tantric ideas in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (e. g. BR 238), I have not assumed that Śāntideva's alignment with the Madhyamaka precludes him from the influence of Tantric thinking, which was, after all, prevalent by Śāntideva's time (Ruegg 1981: 104). In a study like this one where I am trying to assess a Śāntideva's moral thought as a whole, it seems better to keep an open mind about the author's philosophical convictions than to overlook evidence in the name of doxographical tidiness.

[26] Such as Ruegg 1981: 82; Dutt 1960 and de La Vallee Poussin 1892, cited in Pezzali 1968: 44; s.a Brassard 2000: 17.

II. Śāntideva's Life

Śāntideva[27] is among the most prominent of the later Mahāyāna teachers (Winternitz 1981: 353). In the *Mahāvyutpatti* he is included in the list of great Mahāyāna teachers, along with Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, and Bodhibhadra (Vaidya: ix; Bendall ŚS: vi, xi). The earliest available accounts of his life are found in three sources: the *History of Buddhism in India* by Tāranātha, thought to have been written in 1608, Bu-ston's *History of Buddhism*, written between 1322-1333, and an account found in a fourteenth century Nepali manuscript published in 1913 by Haraprasād Śāstri. If these dates are followed, Bu-ston's would be the earliest account of our author's life. J. W. de Jong (1975) argues, however, that Haraprasād's Sanskrit text corresponds to the beginning of the *Viśeṣadyotāni*, a commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* found in the *bsTan'gyur*. Vibhūticandra, the reputed author of this commentary, is thought to have lived in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. Thus if de Jong is correct that the Tibetan text by Vibhūticandra and Haraprasād's manuscript refer to the same text, then the hagiography found in the text published by Haraprasād is the earliest account we have of Śāntideva's life.

According to this sacred biography, Śāntideva was born in Saurashtra, in modern Gujarat, as the son of a king named Mañjuvarman.[28] On the eve of the young prince's coronation, his mother (who according to Tāranātha is actually Tārā) bathes him in scalding hot water, and tells him that he will suffer even more tortures should he take up the throne. Thereby convinced to renounce the kingship, she saves him from the evils of

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[27] In the Tun-huang version of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* he is known Akṣayamati (Saito 1996: 258).
[28] The following is based on De Jong's (1975) translation of the Tibetan, and Haraprasād Śāstri's (1913) translation from the Sanskrit texts.

worldly life. She begs him go to Bhaṃgala to obtain the blessings of Mañjuvajra. So convinced, the young Śāntideva immediately rides off on a green horse to find this guru. After several days journey without eating or drinking, a young girl stops his horse and forces him to descend. She gives him food and water, and takes him to the master he is seeking, Mañjuvajra. There Śāntideva resides and studies for twelve years until he obtains a vision of Mañjuśrī. Upon receiving this vision the guru orders him to go to Madhyadeśa, where he enters the service of a king and adopts the name Acalasena. He bears a sword made of wood, hidden in a sheath.[29] Having become a favourite servant of the king, Acalasena arouses the jealousy of the other ministers, and they desire to be rid of him. They tell the king, "This Acalasena serves you with a sword of wood. How can he kill the enemies in times of war? You must examine his sword." His suspicion aroused, the king resolves to inspect the swords of all his officers, but when it comes time to see Acalasena's, Acalasena refuses. "My sword must not be seen by you," he warns, but the king insists. Acalasena defers to his wishes, but only if the king agrees to cover one eye with his hand. When the king views the weapon, the brilliant lustre of the sword causes the king's uncovered eye to fall to the ground. The king is not only surprised but also, curiously, pleased at this display of power. In Bu-ston's account, the king is so impressed by this feat he implores Acalasena to stay, but instead Acalasena promptly departs the kingdom and joins the great monastic University of Nālandā. There he acquires the name 'Śāntideva,' which literally means "lord of calm," on account of his high level of tranquillity. He studies the scriptures *(piṭakas)* and practises meditation diligently in all

[29] Katherine Young has pointed out that Acalasena's sword here may be symbolic of Mañjuśrī, who wields in his right hand the sword of discriminating wisdom, and the destruction of untruth (For a discussion of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī see Sangharakshita 1987: 470).

activities, and as a result he becomes known by the nickname 'Bhusuku,' because of his ability to achieve meditative concentration (*samādhi*) while eating (*bhuñjāna*), while sleeping (*supta*) and in his hut (*kuṭī*).[30]

After some time, the other monks at Nālandā want to test Śāntideva's knowledge, as he seems to do nothing but meditate. They decide they will test him during the community's annual period of recitation, during the month of Jayaishṭha. According to the Tibetan accounts, in an effort to humiliate him, a lofty 'lion's seat' (*siṃhāsana*) is prepared from which he is meant to teach, so high that it is virtually impossible to mount. But Śāntideva ascends it easily, and asks the assembled monks, "I have composed three texts, called the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, and the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. It is advisable to recite the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. But shall I recite something which was said by the seers [i.e. something old], or something that has followed from what they have said [something new]?" Surprised, they ask to hear something derived from the seers, something new. Śāntideva proceeds to recite the masterful *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. When he comes to the verse which is thought to summarise all of Madhyamaka thought, "When of the mind there is neither existence nor non-existence, then, with no mental object and through the absence of another realm, there is calm," Mañjuśrī appears in the air in front of Śāntideva. Both the bodhisattva and the newly revealed master then disappear from view, though in Bu-ston's account Śāntideva's voice can still be heard reciting the verses of his eloquent masterpiece. Seeing him no more, and full of remorse, the monks run to

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[30]*bhuñjāna-âpi prabhāsvaraḥ supta-âpi, kuṭīṃ tatopi tadevoti bhusuku-samādhi-samāpannatvāt bhusuku-nāmakhyatiṃ sanghe 'pi.* "Also in the sangha he was known by the name 'Bhusuku' on account of having obtained meditation in 'bhusuku,' i.e. since in eating, when he slept, and when in his hut (kuṭīṃ) he was brilliant (prabhāsvaraḥ)." See Haraprasād Śāstri, p.50. In Tibetan accounts Śāntideva's nickname is explained by the fact that his sole activities were "eating, sleeping, and defecating" (Crosby and Skilton, BCA 1996: ix).

examine his hut and there find Śāntideva's three works, which they then make known to the world.

The details and the exact chronology differ slightly in the three versions of the legend, but the major points are present in each: that Śāntideva was the son of a king who renounced the throne, that he studied under Mañjuvajra, that he was in the service of a king for a time, and that he was taken to be a common monk until the dramatic proof of his wisdom in the recitation of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Other than telling us that Śāntideva was most likely a north-Indian monk, a follower of the Mahāyāna who spent at least some of his life at the great monastic University of Nālandā, little can be derived from the legend about the historical Śāntideva (Williams in Crosby and Skilton 1996: viii). In the idea that Śāntideva was a great saint who was mistaken for an ordinary being, for example, we find a typical motif of Buddhist hagiography. Similarly there would seem to be echoes of the Buddha's life-story in his renunciation of kingship, and in the episode of the young girl breaking his ascetic-like fast and giving him food and water. The content of his texts indicate that he was likely a devotee of Mañjuśrī, the bodhisattva of wisdom. The nature of the works associated with him also suggest that he was both a man of great learning: an erudite scholar familiar with a substantial portion of the vast corpus which forms the Mahāyāna canon, and also a sensitive and eloquent religious poet, capable of composing in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* one of the most enduring works in Buddhist literature.

III. Śāntideva's Works

According to all three legendary accounts of his life, Śāntideva wrote three texts: the Bodhicaryāvatāra (Entrance to the Path of Enlightenment), Śikṣāsamuccaya, (Collection of Teachings) and Sūtrasamuccaya (Collection of Scriptures). Despite the fact that the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Bodhicaryāvatāra differ very markedly in style, and that the Sanskrit manuscript of the Śikṣāsamuccaya does not itself refer to Śāntideva, Śāntideva's authorship of both the Śikṣāsamuccaya and the Bodhicaryāvatāra has not been questioned. External evidence for his authorship of the former includes the fact that Prajñākaramati, in his commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, refers to Śāntideva as the author of both the Bodhicaryāvatāra and the Śikṣāsamuccaya (ŚS 1992: v, n.1). Also, the Tibetan version of the Śikṣāsamuccaya attributes both the verses and commentary of this text to Shi ba lha, or Śāntideva. Atiśa (also known as Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna) also attributes the Śikṣāsamuccaya to Śāntideva (ŚS 1992: iii, iv). Nariman (1972: 105) cites the similarity in doctrine as internal evidence for a common author, but since taking the moral ideal to be the bodhisattva is a pan-Mahāyāna position, more convincing is the presence of identical passages in the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya, and the fact that the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya share a similar vision of the bodhisattva's career.[31]

As to the *Sūtrasamuccaya,* the ascription of this third text to Śāntideva has been questioned because no such text has yet been found. The controversy arises in part over difficulties in how to interpret verses 105-106 of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra.* The two verses read:

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[31] That is, the bodhisattva path commences with the arousal of bodhicitta and adoption of bodhisattva vows, followed by the practice of the perfections (*pāramitās),* and concluding with the cultivation and transference of merit. See Ch. 5 IB. A comparison of key words and concepts in the BCA and ŚS might confirm that the same author wrote both texts, but this task remains for further research.

Certainly the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* ought to be examined repeatedly,
since there it teaches good conduct in detail
śikṣāsamuccayo 'vaśyaṃ draṣṭavyaśca punaḥ punaḥ ।
vistareṇa sadācāro yasmāt-tatra pradarśitaḥ ॥ 105 ॥

Now moreover, one should also see briefly the *Sūtrasamuccaya*,
And diligently [one should study] the second [*Sūtrasamuccaya*]
composed by the noble Nāgārjuna.
saṃkṣepeṇa-atha vā tāvat paśyet-sūtrasamuccayam ।
āryanāgārjuna-baddhaṃ dvitīyaṃ ca prayatnataḥ ॥ 106 ॥

P. L. Vaidya suggests that the *Sūtrasamuccaya* mentioned here might actually refer to the "collection of scriptures" *(sūtra-samuccaya)* which forms the commentary to the verses *(kārikās)* and the bulk of the text of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya.* Vaidya thus thinks that the *Sūtrasamuccaya* is not a third, separate, but as yet unfound text by Śāntideva, but rather refers to part of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya.* Winternitz (1981: 353) agrees that the attribution of a *Sūtrasamuccaya* to Śāntideva is a mistake, but thinks it is a result of a misreading of the above verse 106, which he interprets as a recommendation to study Śāntideva's *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and the *Sūtrasamuccaya* of Nāgārjuna. Bendall (ŚS 1992: iv) reviews various interpretations but concludes that either the verses support the existence of two texts (the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* by Śāntideva and the *Sūtrasamuccaya* by Nāgārjuna,) or three: the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and *Sūtrasamuccaya* by Śāntideva and a "second" *Sūtrasamuccaya* by Nāgārjuna. With this interpretation, which is as I have translated the verse, the word *dvitīyaṃ* (second) is an adjective for *"Sūtrasamuccaya."* On the former interpretation, according to Bendall (op.cit.) verse 106 would read, "let him look at the *Sūtrasamuccaya* which was composed by Nāgārjuna and which is his (the pupil's) second study." Here *dvitīyam* is an adjective for "study," which is understood.

I am inclined to favour the view that the above verses support the claim that Śāntideva did indeed write a third text called the *Sūtrasamuccaya*. This seems a more natural reading of the Sanskrit, since the referent for *dvitīyam* is expressed, and unlike the alternate reading does not contradict Tāranātha or the earliest extant account of Śāntideva's life, which also attributes three texts to him. The weakness of this position is of course that a *Sūtrasamuccaya* by Śāntideva has yet to been found, and on this basis, Ruegg concludes that the attribution is a mistake (1981, 84). However, given the ease with which Indian Buddhist texts disappear, as well as de Jong suggestion that the *Sūtrasamuccaya* of Śāntideva may be the *Viśvasūtrasamuccaya*, or *Mdo sde sna tshogs kyi mdo btus pa* listed as a Mahāśastra by Dpal-brtsegs, it seems to me likely that Śāntideva did create a second collection of sūtras.

As to the relative chronology of Śāntideva's works, in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (V. 105) Śāntideva recommends the study of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, indicating that the latter was written first. However, Crosby and Skilton (BCA 1996: xxxii) point out that because this verse does not appear in the earliest, Tun-huang version of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* it is not clear which text was composed first. Although there is thus no compelling evidence to say that the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* was written before the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, as Paul Williams says, there is something more aesthetically pleasing about the idea of Śāntideva composing the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* through the effort of trying to practice what he discovered in the process of building his *Collection of Teachings.*

IV. The text of the *Śikṣ āsamuccaya*

The text consists of twenty-seven *kārikās* or verses, and a collection of quotations from other scriptures, which are organised into nineteen chapters around the

verses. The extracts make up almost 95% of the text, and therefore it is normally said of this text that it displays considerable erudition on Śāntideva's part, but "little originality" (Nariman 1972: 100; Vaidya: Introduction.). Even the *kārikās* are not entirely original, including in some instances citations from older works. The citations themselves are not always Śāntideva's own derivation, as he sometimes uses what might be called 'stock quotes' (see ŚS Index I for citations marked *locus classicus*). This is in marked contrast with the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, which is invariably noted for its creative literary mastery, and reveals Śāntideva's undisputed brilliance as a religious poet. The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is however, very valuable as a systematic summary of technical Mahāyāna teachings, and it offers access to many texts that are otherwise no longer extant in Sanskrit. Bendall provides a list of the texts quoted by Śāntideva, numbering around 110. Since the majority of these are now available only in Chinese or Tibetan, one of the great values of this text is the evidence it provides for the extent of the Sanskrit Canon in Śāntideva's time.

Most scholars (Nariman 1972: 101; ŚS Vaidya: viii) take these quotations to be reliable, based on the care and exactitude Śāntideva displays when he cites from sources that we can verify.

The Sanskrit text edition by Cecil Bendall, first published for the Russian Bibliotheca Buddhica (St. Petersburg 1897; Reprint 1970 and 1992), is based on a unique Nepalese manuscript of the XIV or XVth century (Cambridge University Library, Wright Collection, Add. No. 1478). A second edition of the Sanskrit, based on Bendall's, was published by P.L Vaidya in 1961.

The Tibetan version of *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is in the *bsTan'gyur*, Mdo XXXI. This translation was completed in 816 and 838 CE by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, and Jñānasena. The Chinese translation was completed between 1004 and 1058 CE. The work is called the *Mahā-Saṃgīti-Bodhisattva-Vidyāśāstra* in the Chinese canon, and the author is named as Dharmayaśas or Dharmakīrti. Bendall notes that the Chinese translation is closer to the Sanskrit text than the Tibetan: whereas the Chinese will follow the Sanskrit in abridging quotations, the Tibetan will give citations in full, replete with repetitions (ŚS xxix; ŚS Vaidya: viii). The Tibetan version thus appears to represent an unabridged and presumably older version of the text, and for this reason Bendall relied on the Tibetan to produce his edition (Bendall in ŚS: xxix). The Chinese follows the Sanskrit in including an obeisance to Mañjuśrī at the end of the text, but this is missing in the Tibetan. In some instances, though, the Tibetan and Chinese texts exclude elements found in the Sanskrit (e. g. ŚS 269.10-270.7).

Though it would seem natural to assume that the quotations were collected by Śāntideva as commentary to the text's verses, it is not actually clear that the *kārikās* were written first. Bendall (ŚS: ii) felt rather that the verses were written concomitant with the author's reading of the Mahāyāna sūtras from which he quotes. Bendall in fact only realized there were identifiable verses from reading the Tibetan version of the text, and through La Vallée Poussin's work on *Bodhicaryāvatāra-Pañjika.*

V. Structure of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*

The text is divided into nineteen chapters. The chapter titles given in Bendall and Rouse's translation are helpful for indicating the chapter's subject matter in a very broad

way, but to glean the structure of the work one must look to the first and last lines of each chapter, which indicate the subject that will be or has just been discussed, as well as Śāntideva's introductory comments to the text, and his twenty-seven verses (*kārikās).* The main structure of the work is revealed in Śāntideva's assertion that the path of the bodhisattva is not contained only in the individual rules of discipline for monks and nuns found in the Vinaya, i.e. the *prātimokṣa.* Rather he says that one must also consult the *sūtras* and know their essential points. He then summarises these points as follows, in verse four (K. 4; 17.7-14):

> For the sake of all beings [there should be] renunciation of the self, the enjoyments, and the merit of the three times [past, present and future] /
> [Then one should] cultivate, purify and protect each of these[32]
> *ātmabhāvasya bhogānāṃ tryaddhva-vṛtteḥ śubhasya ca* ।
> *utsargaḥ sarva-sattvebhyas tadrakṣā śuddhi-vardhanam* ॥ 4 ॥

This verse serves both as a summary of the key features of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and what Śāntideva understands to be the essence of the bodhisattva path. Further, as Bendall indicates, this verse echoes the division of the work into a threefold explication of the protection, purification, and cultivation (*rakṣā, śudhi, vardhana*) of three phenomena:

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[32] ŚS 17.13,14. On this reading, "*tadrakṣā śuddhi-vardhanaṁ*" should be read as one compound: "*tad-rakṣā-śuddhi-vardhanaṁ.*" While *ātmabhāva* is usually taken simply as a synonym for *śarīra*, the body, it is apparent from the content of the text that Śāntideva is referring to mental and emotional qualities of the person as well, so the term 'self' seems more appropriate. Bendall and Rouse (ŚS *passim)* also favoured 'self' as the translation. See BHSD 92.

self, enjoyments, and merit, (*ātmabhāva, bhoga, śubha*).[33] Following this nine-fold division, the contents of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* can be charted as follows: [34]

Topic	**Chapter**	**Verse(s)**
Introductory	1	1 - 4
I. Protection (*rakṣā*)	2	5, 6
a. of self (*ātmabhāva*)	3 - 6	7 - 13
b. of enjoyments (*bhoga*)	7	14
c. of merit (*śubha*)	7	15, 16
II. Purification (*śuddhi*)		
a. of self	8 - 14	17 - 20
b. of enjoyment	15	21a
c. of merit	15	21b
III. Cultivation (*vardhana*)		
a. of self	16	22, 23a
b. of enjoyments	16	23b
c. of merit	16 - 19	24 - 27
Obeisance to Mañjuśrī	19	

[33] Cf. ŚS 18.8,9: "*tasmād-evam-ātmabhāva-bhoga-puṇyānām aviratam utsarga-rakṣā-śuddhi-vṛddhayo yathāyogaṁ bhāvanīyāḥ,*" which Bendall and Rouse render "Therefore the growth of purity should be fostered in due manner by constantly preserving thus the renunciation of self, goods, and merit" (20). However, this seems misleading. Rather it should be either "increases in the purification, preservation and renunciation of the self, the enjoyments, and merit ought to be promoted continually," or "the renunciation, preservation, purification and enhancement of the self, the enjoyments, and merit ought to be fostered continually." The latter seems to better reflect the content of the work.

[34] The fact that the nine-fold classification is also used by Vikramaśīla (or Vairocanarakṣita) in his *Śikṣākusumamañjarī*, a text which imitates the ŚS, suggests this nine-fold structure is valid (Bendall in ŚS, x). Although Charles Prebish correctly indicates that there are three parts to the text: the verses, Śāntideva's commentary, and the *sūtra* quotations, I think it is probably misleading to suggest that the text's structure is based on these three parts. First of all, the *kārikās* are actually embedded within the text: Bendall did not even realize there were separate verses until he consulted the Tibetan, so the text does not 'begin' with them as a separate item. Śāntidevas's own commentary forms a very minor portion of the text, and consists usually of a few sentences between scriptural passages. It certainly does not seem to form an "extensive" portion of the text, as Prebish suggests (Prebish in Keown 2000: 44).

Chapter Three: Summary of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*

Overall, the text can be understood as a kind of 'instruction manual' for bodhisattvas. In the opening chapter, Śāntideva proclaims "I will now explain the entrance into the discipline of the bodhisattvas, through the expressed sayings (here) assembled (*samuccita-ârtha-vākyaiḥ*)" (1.10, BR 2). Then, after disclaiming any originality or altruistic intent–ironic due to both the subject and the fact that the same opening verses appear in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (vv 1-4; BR 1,2)–Śāntideva sets up the basis for the compassion which grounds the path to *buddhahood*. This is the subject of the first kārikā (K. 1):

> Since fear and suffering are disliked by both others and myself,
> Then what is special about me, that I protect myself and not others?
> *yadā mama pareṣāṃ ca bhayaṃ duḥkhaṃ ca na priyam* |
> *tad-ātmanaḥ ko viśeṣo yat-taṃ rakṣāmi na-itaram* || 1 ||

With this first verse, Śāntideva establishes that since all beings dislike fear and suffering, there is no basis for privileging one's own suffering over others. Although a similar argument is repeated later in the text (BR 315-317) as well as in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (8: 101-103), it is significant that this basic foundation for altruism is the first thing posited. Then it is explained that if one wants to end this pain, which all experience, and achieve the highest happiness, after establishing one's faith, "the mind ought to be fixed on awakening" (K. 2). That is, one should establish bodhicitta , the "mind" or "thought of enlightenment" or the "awakening mind." Very generally, this attitude is the basis of the accumulation of all merit (*puṇya*), and is said to outweigh all other good qualities (*guṇa*) of the practitioners of the non-Mahāyāna (5.14, 9.10,11; BR

5,10). In order to produce bodhicitta one takes the bodhisattva vow, the essence of which is the resolve to follow the path of the Buddhas through endless rounds of rebirth in order to work for the welfare of all beings (BR 15, 24, 32).

With the wish to achieve enlightenment for the sake of helping other beings in place, one can embark on the path proper. As indicated, this path follows a three-fold division and applies to three phenomena. That is, one must protect, purify, and then enhance everything one has: oneself, one's resources or goods, and one's 'merit' or 'virtues.' In order to truly fulfill the altruistic foundation for this path, however, one first has to give up all forms of grasping (*parigraha*) or attachment (*upādāna*) to these things. Hence one must practice renunciation or offering (*utsarga*), in order to perfect giving (*dāna*).[35] Only by first realizing complete non-attachment to all of one's 'possessions,' both physical and psychological, will one be appropriately prepared to protect, purify and enhance them for the benefit of others. Śāntideva concludes his introductory chapter on the discipline of the bodhisattva with the statement from the *Ratnamegha sūtra*: "Giving is the wisdom of the bodhisattva" (34.5; BR 36).

[35] As Richard Hayes points out, in Indian Buddhist texts the word *'tyāga'* can signify both renunciation (*utsarga*) and giving (*dāna*), since in order to give one must give something up (Richard Hayes, personal communication).

I. Preservation

I a. Preservation in general and preservation of the self (*ātmabhava-rakṣā)*

With this kind of non-attachment in place, one is ready to embark on the process of protecting or guarding (*rakṣā).* Śāntideva describes guarding in general in the second chapter and verses five and six. Kārikā five offers the rationale that unless the self, goods, etc., are guarded, they will not be useful to others, and therefore will not be a real gift (*datta*). Thus we see the idea that to protect or guard the self, goods, and merit somehow makes them useful, something to be enjoyed (*bhoga,* K5b). The general means of preserving the self, goods, and merit is by never abandoning the good friend (*kalyāṇa-mitra*) and through observing (*īkṣaṇa*) the scriptures (K. 6). Together, these lead to a complete understanding of the true Dharma, which in turn is associated with the perfection of virtuous conduct (*śīla)* (42. 12,13; BR 43). The title of the chapter is thus "the complete understanding of the true Dharma with regard to the perfection of *śīla"*(44.15).[36] Consequently, taking care (*rakṣā)* of oneself and one's possessions in its broadest sense involves accepting the Buddha's teaching, which is equated both with studying it and by being careful about whom one spends time with. While the exact nature of the 'good friend' is not spelled out in great detail, it is clearly someone who helps one avoid violent and otherwise depraved actions, and who helps one to follow the bodhisattva's discipline (BR 37f). As the patient should follow the advice of a physician, the disciple should follow the advice of the good friend (BR 38).

The next four chapters (Chs. 3-6) and six verses (K. 7-13) are concerned with how to protect the self (*ātmabhāva*) specifically. If importance can be measured

[36] śīla-pāramitāyāṃ saddharma-parigraho.

quantitatively, this topic must be considered significant: it takes up almost a third of the text as a whole, and occupies more pages than any other topic (105 pages out of 320 of the translation). Of the four chapters in which the subject is presented, three (Chs. 3,4 and 5) deal with the kinds of phenomena that need to be avoided in order to protect the self, and one discusses how this protection is secured (Ch. 6). Guarding the self is achieved by abandoning that which is *anartha*, worthless or harmful, and what is fruitless (*niṣphala*). While Bendall and Rouse translated the term *anartha* with the word or "sin," or sometimes "evil," the word more literally means "useless," without value or purpose, as well as something unfortunate or harmful (Apte 77). While the translation "sin" is not entirely out of place, especially when its etymological roots in the Greek *hamartia* are considered, its association in contemporary use with the violation of Christian or Judaic divine law, makes the translation 'worthless' seems more appropriate. [37] The seventh verse provides further support for this, as it offers the summary explanation of how to avoid what is *anartha* as "shunning fruitless activity" (*niṣphala-spanda-varjanāt)* (K. 7; 118.3). In Chapter Four there is also a list of activities that are especially useless or harmful (*mahant anartha)*, called *āpatti,* meaning fault or transgression. These are what Bendall and Rouse called the "great sins" which, among other things, will lead one to sink down in the rounds of *saṃsāra* to rebirth in a lower realm (BR 62). However, as the nature of these activities is not different from the other forms of *anartha,* they will be treated as part of this subject.

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[37] One of the most common meanings of the Greek term for sin, *hamartia*, is 'fruitless,' from its association with an archery term for an arrow that misses its mark. This led to the sense of 'gone astray,' and came to be associated with the failure to achieve a standard, or the departure from righteousness or the law. In modern use, according to the *Concise OED,* the primary meaning of 'sin' is: "an immoral act considered to be a transgression against divine law" (from the Latin *peccare*). See Grundmann 1964: *s.v.* "hamartano, harmartēma, hamartia".

In surveying the quotations included in Chapters Three to Five, what counts as 'worthless' for Śāntideva, and what should therefore be avoided in order to take care of the self, can be placed into four categories. These categories are naturally interrelated and somewhat arbitrary, but are helpful as a heuristic to order the material. Keeping in mind the provisional, or perhaps what might more appropriately be called, 'skillful' nature of these categories, it can be said that as a practitioner one must watch or guard one's (a) mind or attitude, (b) conduct, (c) companions, and (d) impact on others.

In terms of guarding the mind, the novice bodhisattva *(ādikarmika bodhisattva)* should avoid an attachment to views, and opinions, and in particular, any notion of superiority to, or envy of, others (BR 53, 106). The perfections *(pāramitā)*, for example, turn to hindrances *(āvaraṇa)* when they become a source of pride by which one looks down on others, or result in ill-feeling and jealousy (90.6-18; BR 92). Especially harmful are wealth and honour *(lābha-satkāra)*, which lead to a number of negative states such as craving *(rāga)*, loss of mindfulness *(smṛti)*, and, depending on whether the desire for them is satisfied or not, elation or despondency *(unnāma-avanāma)* (104.17-105.5; BR 106, 107). In the same way, one must never disparage a Śrāvaka[38] or a Pratyeka-Buddha,[39] and particularly, one should never reproach another follower of the Mahāyāna (BR 100). Thus pride, conceit, disdain, arrogance–any mental state which sets one apart and above others—must be avoided. Instead of greed and envy, one should feel great joy

[38] A Śrāvaka ("hearer" or "disciple") is a follower of the Śrāvakayāna ("vehicle of the disciples"). These terms are used in Mahāyāna texts such as Śāntideva's to refer to non-Mahāyāna practitioners and their teachings (BHSD 535). Śrāvakas are considered by Mahāyānists to be part of the Hīnayāna or "inferior vehicle" (BHSD 620). D. Seyfort Ruegg (1992: 111-113) has recommended, and I concur, that modern scholars use the term 'Śrāvakayāna' instead of 'Hīnayāna' to designate pre or non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, because of the partisan and pejorative sense of the latter.

[39] Pratyekabuddha ("solitary Buddhas," or a "Buddha for himself alone") is an enlightened being who does not teach others the path to awakening (BHSD 379).

at another's success (*muditā*) (BR 54). Rather than criticizing others and pointing out their faults, one should show charity towards others' failings and instead focus on one's own (BR 102,103). Just as one should not view oneself as above anyone else, one must not distinguish one person from another,[40] but rather see all beings as teachers (92.4,5; BR 54). Similarly, because one cannot see another's thoughts, it is difficult to know another person's motives, so "one person should not measure another" (*na pudgalena pudgalaḥ pramātavyaḥ)* (100: 1 BR 102).

It is also important to avoid fatigue (*avasāda)* with regard to bodhicitta, which might lead to the loss of this fundamental mind-set (*bodhicitta-saṃpramoṣa).* Disparaging others on the Mahāyāna path, being deceitful and self centred, and dwelling on the length and difficulty of the path to awakening are some of the ways the practitioner may become weary and lose the aspiration for awakening (52.12l, 54.2; BR. 54, 55).

In these ways, the beginning practitioner carefully guards his mental states. In addition, he[41] must also watch his verbal and physical activity. To begin with, one must avoid thinking that study in general, or the Mahāyāna,[42] is a substitute for *śīla* or monastic rules *(prātimokṣa),* or that the perfection of wisdom can replace the development of the other five perfections (61.10,11; 97.7; BR 63, 99). So as well as

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[40] mā bhikṣavaḥ pudgalena pudgalaṃ pravicetavyaṃ (92.2,3).

[41] Although the text does occasionally refer to female Mahāyāna practitioners , because this is usually in the context of explaining how they might be reborn as men, it seems appropriate that when stylistic or grammatical context demand a gender that the masculine is used. See BR 164, 171. For descriptions of women as objects of lust to be avoided, see BR 77, 86.

[42] I am not exactly certain what Śāntideva means here by "study or Mahāyāna." "Study" perhaps refers to a merely intellectual approach to the Dharma, while "Mahāyāna" seems to suggest that one cannon rely only on the teachings, but must also know the teaching of the Śrāvakayāna.

avoiding the more obvious and serious transgressions such as the *pārājika* offenses,[43] of which stealing from the Saṅgha is especially noted as a "root fault" (*mūla-āpatti*), there are a number of other actions that are said to be unproductive (BR 60, 70, 71). One should avoid taking delight in society (*saṅgaṇikā-rāma*) and talk (*bhāṣyārāma*), since indulging in senseless chatter with worldly and ignorant people leads to negligence (*pramāda*) and contentiousness (*vivādamantra*) (104.17, 108.1, BR 106, 109). Thus it is important to avoid quarrels and strife, and also to avoid being infatuated either with actions (*karma*) or slumber (*nidra*) (104.2, BR 101, 107, 113). Instead one should find joy in solitude and silence, stay in remote places like the forest, and keep only good company (BR 106, 108, 114). However, renouncing the world and going to the forest without developing concern for others' welfare (*parārtha*) also must be avoided, for a bodhisattva actively works for the liberation of others (50.9; BR 105). As Śāntideva reminds us in verse seven: useless activity is whatever does not lead to the benefit of others (K. 7b).

As well as mental states the bodhisattva needs to be careful of the company he keeps. The "bad friends" (*akalyāṇa-mitra*) which one must avoid are described as those failed or obstructed in *śīla* (*śīla-vipanna*), failed in views (*dṛṣṭī*), failed in behaviour (*acāra*) and those failed in livelihood (*ājīva*). They are those who take delight in society (*saṃgaṇikārāma*), those who are indolent (*kuśīda*) and those who are turned away from awakening (*bodhiparāṅmukha*) (51.21; 52.4-11; BR 52). One should also stay away from those who have "evil ways"[44] (51.4; BR 51), who have bad conduct

[43] These are the very serious offenses that entail expulsion from the Order (Saṅgha). They are unchastity, stealing, taking life, and falsely claiming supramundane powers (i. e., falsely claiming to be a stream-entrant). See BHSD 342.

[44] The phrase is '*pratyaveta dharma,*' which more literally means "gone astray" (Apte 270).

or habits (*duḥśīla)* (48.4; BR 48), as well as people like drunkards, butchers, and giggling nuns, wrestlers, and "all other persons of that sort" (BR 48).

Included in the description of what is to be avoided in 'self-defense' are certain effects on other people. For example, just as the perfections can become hindrances if they lead to pride and self-glorification (*ātmānam utkarṣayanti*) (90.14,15), they are also a hindrance if they lead to ill-feeling among one's companions. If generosity creates agitation/"ill-feeling" (*aprasāda*) in others, or if the bodhisattva's own energy (*vīrya*) and concentration (*samādhi)* lead him to judge others as lazy and distracted, and consequently oppress them (*paṃsayanti)* (90.14), then this is to be avoided. Similarly, just as it is important for the practitioner not to become discouraged, he should also be careful not to discourage others, particularly in terms of their aspiration to be enlightened *(bodhicitta*).

Perhaps what is most emphasized in terms of the practitioner's impact on others is the use of skillful means, or, more literally, that he should avoid not using *upāya* when teaching (BR 54, 55). For example, teaching the doctrine of emptiness to those who are not ready for it is to be eschewed (BR 71). The emptiness teaching can frighten disciples, and thus make them turn away from their intention toward full enlightenment (*samyak-saṃbodhi-cittaṃ)* in favour of the Śrāvakayāna (60.19, 61.1; BR 63). One must know the disciple's disposition and adjust the teaching of the Dharma accordingly (BR 63). As well, although the text is not exactly explicit about this, presumably the kind of foolish talk that leads to strife and quarrelling is considered harmful or a waste of time not for the disciple but for all involved. In these ways, taking care of the self for Śāntideva also entails taking care of others.

Interestingly, this fairly extensive list of things to be avoided, which as already indicated occupies a significant portion (three chapters) of the text, is dealt with quite summarily in only one of Śāntideva's verses (K. 8):

> In terms of the self, what is protection? Abandoning what is worthless.
> How is all this obtained? By avoiding fruitless activity.
> *tatrâtmabhāve kā rakṣā yad anartha-vivarjanaṃ* ।
> *kena etal labhyate sarvaṃ niṣphala-spanda-varjanāt* ॥ 8 ॥

Śāntideva concludes the topic of preserving the self with a discussion of how one can perfect or, as Bendall and Rouse put it, "secure" (*siddhyet)* the avoidance of these wasteful activities through mental discipline (118.3; BR 117).[45]

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[45] In terms of how Śāntideva treats this subject in quantitative terms, it might be noted that in the verses and the scriptural quotations there is a curious discrepancy between the 'weight' accorded the topic of how to establish avoidance of wasteful activities (*anartha)* and examples of wasteful activities. Recall that other than the twenty-seven verses written by Śāntideva, and a few commentarial paragraphs and sentences in Śāntideva's own words, the text consists by and large of sūtra quotations. Whereas only one chapter (Ch.6, with twenty-four pages of text) deals with the issue of establishing the avoidance of *anartha*, six verses (Kārikās 8-13) are included in that chapter. By comparison, there is only *one* verse (K.7) for seventy pages of text in the other three chapters, dealing with examples of activities to be avoided. Since the text mostly consists of citations from scriptures, while the verse represent Śāntideva's own words, is this discrepancy because how to secure or avoid *anartha* required more elaboration on Śāntideva's own part, than examples of *anartha*? Was it because there was less *sūtra* material available on the topic of perfecting self-protection? It does seem to be the case that the explicit connection between mental discipline–a phrase I take to capture what is entailed by mindfulness, concentration and vigilance (*smṛti, samādhi*, and *samprajanya*)–and the ability to avoid harmful or wasteful activities is made by Śāntideva in his own words, rather than through scriptural quotations (e. g. see BR 117,118,120,121). Whether or not this is because this idea is not well represented in the Mahāyāna sūtras available to Śāntideva is not clear, although it is notable that Śāntideva repeats this connection between *śīla* (as well as giving, *dāna*) and awareness in chapter five of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. It is possible, then, that the idea that self-protection was achieved through avoiding *anartha* and *āpatti* was uncontroversial and thus required little explanation by Śāntideva. Consequently, he could make his case in one verse, and then let the *sūtras,* replete with examples of *anartha* and *āpatti,* speak for themselves. Then, because it is an idea that, for whatever reasons, Śāntideva felt compelled to explicate in his own words, in several verses he relays the importance of mental discipline for avoiding harmful and useless actions, relying on relatively few scriptural quotations. Of course the idea that *śīla,* and *samādhi,* as well as *prajñā (*wisdom or insight), are mutually supporting aspects of Buddhist discipline, and that mental discipline is a means to overcome negative qualities (such as the five. hindrances) would not have been new to Śāntideva. See for example Rahula 1974: 46; Gunaratna 1996: 43. For references to mindfulness (*smṛti)* and vigilance (*samprajanya),* see especially 118.4-14; BR 117; 120.7-16; BR 120, and Crosby and Skilton in BCA 1996, p. 31

Securing self preservation is fundamentally centred on mental discipline. Verse eight states that abandoning fruitless action "ought to be accomplished through constant mindfulness (*smṛti)*" (K. 8a). The determination (*ādara*) to practice mindfulness stems from the experience of great calm (*śama* or *śamatha)* (K. 8b). A calm, collected mind is also what allows the bodhisattva to see reality as it is (*yathābhūta)* (K. 9a), and through this perspicuity the bodhisattva feels great compassion (*mahākaruṇā)* for all beings, which then is what allows the bodhisattva to become fully awakened (119.11,12; BR 119). It is in this context that Śāntideva indicates an interrelationship between *śīla* and *samādhi*: *śīla* is conducive to concentration, and any act that leads to concentration is *śīla* (121.1) Furthermore, since the mind is the locus for good and bad qualities (*guṇa-doṣa)* (122.6,7; BR 121), "the doctrine of the bodhisattva simply amounts to the preparation of the mind: and that is a mind not unstable" (BR 123). With a stable and tranquil mind, one that 'turns away from external movement' and is not pulled hither and thither by desires, the bodhisattva will then have the kind of qualities that will attract people, such as good etiquette and pleasant, truthful, and harmless speech (K. 9, BR 123,125f). In this way, he will be able to "win over and become acceptable to worthy people" (K. 10). This is critical, because only by winning their confidence can a bodhisattva minister to the needs of sentient beings (BR 123). Therefore "with diligence one should avoid that by which beings lose confidence" (K. 12b). The remainder of the chapter discusses the more practical aspects of preserving the self, in terms of medicine for when the bodhisattva is ill (*glāna-pratyaya-bhaiṣajya)*, and food, shelter and clothing, which are called "permanent" or constant medicine (*satata-bhaiṣajya*) for everyday needs (127.14-143.16; BR 127-141). When begging for alms or accepting donations, a disciple should have

equanimity and keep in mind the purpose of food, which is to support the body and follow the noble path (BR 129f). With this in mind, complaining about the type or quantity of donated food is not endorsed, and even dropping hints in this regard is considered inappropriate. In the case of illness a disciple may sell his possessions (robe or bowl) if necessary and also consume normally forbidden foods (BR 133).

I b. Preservation of the objects of enjoyment *(bhoga)*

Besides the self (*ātmabhāva*), one must also guard the objects of pleasure or enjoyments (*bhoga)*[46] and merit or virtue (*śubha).*[47] This is treated in chapter seven and verses fourteen to sixteen. The 'objects of enjoyment' or 'consumption' in this case seem to primarily refer to the objects that a monastic would own: robes, a begging bowl, that which is received by alms, and offerings, as well as the offerings a monk might make, such as Dharma teachings. The preservation of these goods is essentially achieved through moderation (K. 14):

> "In all things one should do good deeds and know the limits."
> [Or: In all things the one who is doing good deeds should know the limits]
> From this precept, for such a one the protection of the pleasures is not difficult.
> *sukṛtārambhiṇā bhāvyaṁ mātrajñena ca sarvataḥ* ।
> *iti śikṣāpadād asya bhoga-rakṣā na duṣkarā* ॥ 14 ॥

Moderation, or literally knowing limits (*mātrajñā)*, and propriety (*yuktijñā),* begin with calming (*śamatha)*: that is, through the practice of calming or tranquility one has the

capacity to be moderate with the things one enjoys (144.2,3). A calm mind is important since actions must be well-considered *(susamīkṣita)* and well-done *(sukṛta)* if the enjoyments are to be protected. Whether gifts should be given or not depends on impact: receiving too much, for example can be a hindrance (BR 143). If giving or not giving *(tyāga-atyāga)* stands in the way of the awakening of oneself or others, it should not be done (144.6). Similarly, in the case of a bodhisattva whose power to benefit other beings is equal to or greater than one's own, if giving or not giving stands in the way of the recipient's skill *(kuśala)* which is equal to or greater than one's own, then it should not be done.[48] In other words, one must take into account the relative level of awakening of the recipient and consider the effect of one's gift on them, as well as on oneself. This seems to suggest a kind of hierarchy, whereby the needs of a higher level practitioner trump those of a lower one: if my gift to a bodhisattva would help me but serve as a hindrance on his road to awakening, then I should not give the gift. Note also that the perspective taken is both the bodhisattva as recipient of gifts and objects, such as alms and robes, and as giver of gifts, such as a Dharma teacher for monastic bodhisattvas and as a donor of material objects for lay bodhisattvas. A practitioner must be moderate in both roles: he has to watch that he does not keep more than he needs, but should not give more than is helpful (BR 143).

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[46] The verbal root of *bhoga* is *"bhuj"* which means "to eat or consume,"; as a noun it can mean, among other things, an object of enjoyment, a possession, a 'good'(Apte *s.v. "bhogaḥ").*

[47] The concept of merit *(śubha)* and its relation to karmic fruitfulness *(puṇya)* is discussed in the following section (Ch.3, I C), and extensively in Chapter Four.

[48]*adhikasatvârthaśaktes tulyaśakter vā bodhisatvasyâdhikatulyakuśalântarāyakarau tyāgâtyāgau na kāryāviti* (BR:144.6,7).

I c. Preservation of merit (*śubha-rakṣā)*

The protection of one's merit *(śubha)* is explained in verses fifteen and sixteen (K. 15, 16):

> Through freedom from thirst for the ripening of one's endeavours, merit is protected.
> One should not repent (one's actions), nor having done something, boast of it.
> *svārtha-vipāka-vaitṛṣṇyācchubhaṁ saṁrakṣitaṁ bhavet |*
> *paścāt-tāpaṁ na kurvīta na kṛtvā prakāśayet ||* 15 ||
>
> Beware of gain and honour; avoid arrogance always /
> The bodhisattva should have faith and eschew doubt about the Dharma.
> *lābha-satkāra-bhītaḥ syād unnatiṁ varjayet sadā |*
> *bodhisatvaḥ prasannaḥ syāddharme vimatim utsṛjet ||* 16 ||

Thus one's merit is guarded by neither regretting nor boasting about one's deeds, but by being non-attached to their results, as well as by avoiding wealth (*lābha*) pride (*satkāra*) arrogance (*unnatiṃ*), and doubt (*vimati).*

Commenting on the idea of 'freedom from thirst for the ripening of one's endeavours' (*svārtha-vipāka-vaitṛṣṇya),* Śāntideva quotes from the *Nārāyaṇa-paripṛcchā-sūtra*, which states that "just as one whose aim is the benefit, happiness, and welfare of all beings protects virtuous conduct (*śīla*)," similarly the only reason to guard one's virtue should be to "establish the way of the Buddha" (*budha-netrī-pratiṣṭāpana)*(147.3, 4; BR 146).[49] He should not guard virtue for his own sake, or to obtain power (*eśvarya)* to get to heaven, or to avoid hell. The only way to protect one's virtue is by having the path, awakening for the good of others as the motive for one's

[49] BR translate *buddha-netrī* as "Buddha's vision", but since *netrī* is "way" or "method", from *nī* (to lead), this must be an error. See BHSD 311; Apte 936.

actions. This goes so far as to imply watching one's previously abandoned *puṇya:* that is, even if one's previous acts were done without selfish motive, it is possible to compromise the karmic fruitfulness of such acts by later 'taking it up' or appropriating it. *(upāda).*

Thus one should be careful not to try to 'repossess' one's merit (*puṇya).*[50] Also, since giving away *puṇya* gives rise to *puṇya*, one should not desire the ripening of that, except for the benefit of others[51] (BR 146).

It is important to note here that three important terms–*puṇya*, *śīla* and *śubha*–which I have been translating as 'karmic fruitfulness,''virtue,' and 'merit,' respectively are all used synonymously in this context for this third thing that the bodhisattva should protect. As it appears here, this phenomenon that ought to be guarded seems to be one's 'good karma': that is, the idea seems to fit Cousins's (1996) understanding of *puṇya* as referring, adjectivally, to something "fortunate" or "happy," and when used substantively, to either "an act which brings good fortune" or "to the happy result in future of such an act" (Cousins 1996: 10). *Śubha,* similarly means "good fortune," "auspiciousness" and "happiness" (Apte 1561). Here one's auspicious acts and their fortunate consequences are guarded by having the right intention for doing so. Primarily, this appears to entail having an altruistic motive and a non-possessive attitude to one's actions and their results. So, for example, as soon as one tries to take possession of the happy consequences of one's deeds, by either mentally or verbally boasting about them, protection is compromised. Similarly, if you regret or have second thoughts about doing a good deed, the deed's merit is weakened (147; K.15b). On the other hand, sin or demerit *(pāpa)*–an act with unfortunate consequences–*should* be regretted, and announced to others, since taking possession of and responsibility for it causes those

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[50] *evaṃ purvotsṛṣṭasya api puṇyasya kleśavaśāt punarupādīyamānasya rakṣā kāryā* (147.18) Literally: there ought to be guarding [against] one reappropriating [?] previously abandoned good fortune because of the power of impurities.

[51] *puṇyadānād api yatpuṇyaṃ tato api na vipākaḥ prārthanīyo'nyatra parārthāt* (147.17,18).

consequences to dwindle. As Śāntideva, in one of the few comments on the verses made in his own words, says,

> For in many ways the Lord Buddha declares the salutariness
> of the hidden and the misfortune of what is exposed.
> *aneka-paryāyeṇa hi bhagavatā pracchanna-kalyāṇatā*
> *vivṛta-pāpatā varṇitā.* (148.2,3; BR147)

Śāntideva's principle is that in terms of the fortunate and unfortunate deeds and their consequences (*puṇya* and *pāpa)* whatever is "revealed" is destroyed: thus merit should be hidden and demerit made known. [52]

Supporting the need for freedom from selfish attachment to one's meritorious deeds, and overlapping with the means of guarding the self, is the recommendation to avoid wealth, honour, and arrogance, all of which would undermine the altruistic motive that should be the basis for the bodhisattva's actions (K. 16a). While having faith or clarity *(prasanna)* about the Dharma is also important, it is noted that rejecting scriptures that one does not know is one way of destroying merit, suggesting among other things, that faith in the Dharma does not entail having a closed mind (K. 16b; BR 147). As with guarding the self, pride is especially highlighted as problematic. Again echoing the requirements of self-guarding, the idea is that the bodhisattva must not see himself as anyone's 'better'. To lack respect for others, to be conceited *(abhimāna)* and fault-finding, and to fail to see others' good points, these are all 'acts of Māra'

[52] *tatra vivṛtasya kṣayo gamyate pāpasya daurmanasyena eva puṇyasya saumanasyena (*148.3). However, for one who is without covetousness, if one's fortunate or misfortunate deeds are proclaimed for the benefit of sentient beings, this does not lead to misfortune *([an]âpattiḥ sat[t]vārtham-nirāmiṣacittasya prakāśayataḥ).* .

(mārakarma) which should be shunned.[53] Instead, one should cultivate an attitude of friendship, affection, helpfulness, and protectiveness towards others (152.11-14; BR 152). By doing so one will be respectful and free from pride in relation to all beings (153.19; BR 152).

As a complement to the idea that the disciple protects his virtue through non-attachment to his deeds, that he is motivated by the welfare of others, and has sense of respect for and equality with all beings, the essence of the protection of merit is that all of one's acts must be directed toward the spiritual goal: "So the essence of the protection of karmic fruitfulness *(puṇya)* is the transference of merit to awakening" (158.6).[54]

II. Purification

II a. Purification of the self (*ātmabhāva-śuddhi*)

As with the first third of the bodhisattva path, most of the section of text dealing with purification deals with purification of the self. Of the total of five verses and eighty-seven pages of text on the topic of purification (K 17-21; BR 157-249), the purification of the self is the subject of two verses (Ks.18 and19) and eighty-two pages of text (Chs 8-14), as compared with one verse (K. 21) and only five pages of text (Ch.15) for both the purification of the objects of enjoyment and the purification of merit. The

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[53] Māra is the Evil One or tempter, the one who tries to hinder the Buddhas and bodhisattvas (BHSD 430). Since Māra literally means 'death,' it suggests that an 'act of Māra' is what keeps one in the cycle of birth and death, as Richard Hayes suggests there may be interesting parallels between *mārakarma* and the notion of 'mortal sins'(personal communication).

[54] BR translate *bodhipariṇāmanā* as "application of merit to Enlightenment," but Edgerton (BHSD 323), citing the same passage, renders it "development" or "ripening" of enlightenment. "Transference," "dedication" or "application of merit" are by far the more common translations, though it is interesting to note that a literal translation of 158.6 would be, "So the essence of the protection of karmic fruitfulness is the development of awakening," suggesting perhaps that becoming awakened and dedicating one's fortune for the good of others are the same thing. See Crosby and Skilton (BCA:11) and Hayes (2001: 4), Harvey (2000: 128), Nagao (1991: Ch.3).

rationale for self-purification is given in verses seventeen and eighteen (K. 17, 158.14,15; K.18; 159.19):

> The enjoyment of the purified self will become salutary /
> for beings, like well-cooked, pure rice.
> *śodhitasya ātmabhāvasya bhogaḥ pathyo bhaviṣyati* ।
> *samyak-siddhasya bhaktasya niṣkaṇasya iva dehinām* ॥ 17 ॥

> Just as a grain covered by weeds withers with diseases and does not flourish /
> so too the son of a Buddha who is choked with impurities does not develop.
> *tṛnac-channaṃ yathā śasyaṃ rogaiḥ sīdati naidhate* ।
> *buddha-āṅkuras tathā vṛdhiṃ kleśa-cchanno na gacchati* ॥ 18 ॥

Thus the purified bodhisattva is like a good bowl of rice, with all the stones and dirt removed, and the impure bodhisattva is like a field of weed-choked grain. Just as such a crop will only thrive and grow if the weeds are pulled, a practitioner must be purified of demerit (*pāpa*) and impurities (*kleśa*)(K. 19a; 160.2). If this is not done, it will lead to rebirth in a lower realm (*apāyaga)* (K. 19b; 160.3). The remainder of the discussion of self-purification concerns the method of eliminating *pāpa* and *kleśa.*

By far the bulk of this discussion centers on *kleśa.* Whereas the topic of *pāpa* takes up less than a whole chapter and only sixteen pages of text (Ch. 8, pp 158-174), *kleśas* occupies six chapters and sixty-nine pages (Chs 9-14, pp.175-244). The kinds of deeds referred to as *pāpa* are associated with acts that are *akuśala*, "unskillful" or "uwholesome" (e. g. 160.7,8), and are also the same kinds of mental, physical and verbal actions that one is advised to avoid as useless or senseless (*anartha)* in the process of

guarding the self.[55] For example, things done under the influence of "bad friends" (*pāpa-mitra)* and unworthy people (*anāryajana),* with a perturbed mind (*calacitta),* or out of jealousy or spite (*īrṣyā-mātsarya)* are all examples of *pāpa* (161.10,13-17; BR 159). Śāntideva explains four ways *pāpa* can be overcome (160. 5,7,8; BR 158). These are: the practice of self-denunciation (*vidūṣanā-samudācāra),*[56] the practice of the opposite (*pratipakṣa-samudācāra),* the power of amendment (*pratyāpatti-bala),* and the power of refuge (*āśraya-bala).*

As with the guarding of merit, the idea of "denunciation" is that rather than concealing his errors, the bodhisattva should make known all varieties of demerit (*pāpa)* or misdeeds (*duṣkṛta*) that he has committed (162.4; 163.12-14). To "practice the opposite" or "antidote" (*pratipakṣa)* means that one perseveres in acting skillfully even after doing something unskillful or unwholesome (*akuśala)* (160.8; BR 159). It also entails knowing the scriptures, keeping the precepts, visualizing and making offerings to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and by earnestly applying (*adhimukti)*[57] the doctrine of emptiness (BR 169-170). That is, if the bodhisattva understands the Buddha's teachings about causation and recognizes that there is no self or being or person, and that all is illusory, then he will see that things are also by their nature without impurity. By seeing this one does not suffer demerit (171.13-172.9; BR 168).[58] The power of "amendment" or

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[55] kāyavāṅmanasāṃ pāpa tridhātu caritam; 160.3 fn 3; BR 160.
[56] See BHSD 488.
[57] BR translate as "faith in the Void" (BR 168) but according to Edgerton "strong inclination, attachment; earnest, zealous application; Tib. *mo pa* "to be pleased with," "respect," "esteem"(BHSD 14).
[58] While this would seem to have obvious antinomian implications, Śāntideva does not appear to consider this or to interpret the emptiness of demerit or impurities to mean that they should not be avoided. The idea seems to be rather that by realizing that faults and demerit have no inherent nature, that they are also conditioned, one becomes in some way free of them.

"expiation" means accomplishing restraint through resolution.[59] Restraints such as abstaining from taking life, from taking what is not given, and from malice (*vyāpada)* are identified as particularly useful in eliminating all harmful (*anartha)* and hindered actions (*karmâvaraṇa*) (176.8, 177.1; BR 172).

In discussing the "power of refuge" Śāntideva focuses on the capacity of the aspiration for awakening (*bodhicitta)* to cleanse *pāpa (*177.14; BR 173). Bodhicitta is said to be "like a hell for the extinction of wicked actions" since through it all "bad deeds are burnt up" (BR 173). The section on purifying *pāpa* then concludes by suggesting that the bodhisattva, by virtue of being a Mahāyānist and presumably by force of having bodhicitta , should not be excessively remorseful or regretful for transgressions. By contrast, a Śravakayānist who repeatedly commits faults thereby destroys his 'collection of virtue' (*śīla-skandha)* (178.14-16; BR 174). Evidently for Śāntideva the 'mind of awakening' has great power to mitigate the force of demerit and faults (*pāpa, āpatti).*

Having thus described the elimination of *pāpa,* Śāntideva turns to the subject of removing impurities (*kleśa).* He explains in verse twenty:

> Be patient, endeavour to hear [the Buddha's teaching]; thereafter take refuge in the forest /
> Be intent on concentrating the mind; meditate on the impurities, etc. //
> *kṣameta śrutam eṣeta saṃśrayeta vanam tataḥ* I
> *samādhānāya yujyeta bhāvayed aśubhādikam* II 20 II

This verse and Śāntideva's gloss on it offers the key to the subsequent chapters. His commentary suggests the following path: first, one requires patience (*kṣama)* in order

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[59] "The power of amendment is obtained through accomplishing retraint on account of the determination or resolve for the restraint." *pratyāpattibalaṃ saṃvara-samādānād karaṇa-saṃvara-lābhaḥ* (160.8,9).

to have the energy or enthusiasm (*vīrya)* to hear the Buddha's teachings. Since it is through hearing the Dharma that one learns the means of concentration (*samādhi-upāya)* and the purification of impurites (*kleśa-śodhana-upāya),* one must therefore strive to hear (*śrutam eṣeta)* the Dharma. But concentration is difficult when one is in the company of others, so one should take refuge in the forest, and there focus on concentrating the mind (*samādhānāya yujyeta).* The result of a concentrated mind is the purification of impurities, so one ought to meditate on the impurities and so forth *(bhāvayed aśubhādikam)* (179.5-10; BR 175).

The chapters in the section on purifying the impurities (Chs. 9-14) are thus based on the preceding scheme: Chapter Nine lays out this path for purifying *kleśa* and then discusses the perfection of patience (*kṣanti-pāramitā*), which entails enduring unhappiness, bearing injuries inflicted by others, and perseverence in reflecting on the Dharma (178.11,12; BR 175). Chapter Ten deals briefly with the perfection of energy (*vīrya-pāramitā)* or enthusiasm for hearing the Dharma, which is based on the perfection of patience and is supported by an exposition of the benefits of desire for the Dharma (*dharma-kāma).* Chapter Eleven is about "praising the forest" (*araṇya-saṃvarṇanaḥ),* and chapters twelve, thirteen and fourteen are on various aspects of mind training.

As in the guarding of the self, the solitude of the forest is lauded as a place to overcome clinging to the world, where one can achieve happiness and tranquility and where one's desires are minimal (*alpecchā)* (196.6; BR 189). Here it is asserted that while study and reflection on the Dharma are important, they are not necessarily enough to eliminate greed, hatred, and delusion: in this case, one must retire to the forest (BR 190). In solitude one can develop restraint in mind, body and speech and thereby acquire many

good qualities (*bahuguṇa)* and become distinguished in merit (*puṇya-viśiṣṭa)* (193.15, 194. 11; BR 188,189). On the other hand, living in the forest is not in itself enough: after all, monkeys and birds and thieves also live there, and they do not have the qualities of a renunciate (*śramaṇa*) (198.4). The bodhisattva must therefore not only renounce worldly life, but also the clinging to self: the belief in the self, the idea of a self, the feeling of a self (BR 191,192). In this regard, the bodhisattva should follow the model of the plants and trees of the forest, which grow and live without a sense of self or a sense of possession (BR 193,195).

Chapter Twelve, called "mind preparation" (*citta-parikarma)* discusses the perfection of meditative absorption (*dhyāna)* and its necessity for attaining full awakening (BR 196).[60] This implies the ability to be tranquil (*śānta*) and 'collected' or concentrated (*samāhita),* without agitation or distraction in thought, body and speech (202.4-203.5; BR 196,197). The remainder of the chapter describes the antidotes (*pratipakṣa)* to the three principal *kleśas* of greed, hatred, and delusion (*rāga-dveṣa-moha)* (209.3,4; BR 202). The antidote to passion or greed (*rāga*) is to contemplate impurity (*aśubhā-bhāvanā),* especially of the body. *Rāga* seems here to be understood primarily in terms of physical lust, and for this the cure is to see the body as the collection of decaying organs, blood and bits that it is. In doing so one will surely overcome any attachment to one's own body or the desire for anyone else's (BR 202,203). The cure for hatred is loving-kindness or benevolence (*maitrī)* (212.9; BR 204). This can be cultivated through the meditation on loving-kindness (*maitrī-bhāvanā),* in which one first wishes for

[60] Here the term *dhyāna* is associated with focusing and calming the mind, but there is no explicit reference to the 'four *dhyānas*': i.e. the four stages of meditative absorption characterized by increasing levels of concentration and paring down of the contents of consciousness. See Crosby and Skilton, 1996: 75f.

the happiness and welfare of a loved one, then for an acquaintance, then a stranger, then one's fellow villagers, and then for the beings in the ten regions (BR 204). The antidote to hatred is also to apply or develop *(pariṇāma)* one's "root of good" *(kuśala-mūla)*[61] for the benefit of Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and then for all beings (BR 205-209). This is the practice of transferring merit *(pariṇāmanā),* which is a significant feature of Indian Mahāyāna and is the subject of the tenth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra.* The antidote to delusion or confusion *(moha)* is the teaching of conditioned co-arising *(pratītya-samutpāda-darśana)* (219.9; BR 209). By contemplating and understanding the conditioned nature of all phenomena, and by seeing the chain of causation just as it is, one will overcome ignorance, which is defined in terms of imputing to phenomena such notions as the idea of a self, or happiness, or possession, or permanence (BR 210, 211, 215).[62]

Chapter Thirteen describes the four foundations of mindfulness *(smṛti-upasthāna),* which one who is "diligent in thought" should undertake (BR 216)[63]. As in the two *Sati-paṭṭhāna Suttas* in the Pali Canon,[64] the four objects of mindfulness *(smṛti)* are the body *(kāya),* sensations *(vedanā),* mind *(citta),* and the objects of mind *(dharma).* Through mindfulness of the body, the bodhisattva should recognize its impurity and impermanence, and knowing this, "take comfort" in living *(jīvitenâśvāsaprāptaḥ)* without

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[61] The bodhisattva's "root of good" most likely refers to the arising of the awakening mind *(bodhicitta-utpāda),* though in other texts, such as the *Dharmasaṃgītasūtra,* it refers to the purification of one's intent *(aśaya-viśuddhi)* and renouncing the sense of "I" and "mine" *(ahaṃkāra-mamakāra-parityāga) S.v. kuśala-mūla,* BHSD 188.

[62] Interestingly, the description of the chain of causation as, "not born, not produced, not made, not composite," is the same as the description of nirvāṇa in the *Udāna sutta,* 8.3. (Cited in Walshe, Introduction to *DN:* 28). Yet in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* the chain of causation is also described as "not existing, empty, suffering, miserable" (227.3-6).

[63] *evaṃ karmaṇyacittaḥ smṛti-upastānāny avataret* (228.10).

[64] One is in the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the other in the *Majjhima Nikāya.* For a discussion of the practice of the four foundations of mindfulness in the Theravāda tradition, see, for example, Rahula 1974: 67-75.

clinging to its enjoyments. Knowing the body's impermanence, he does not do anything unmeritorious *(pāpa karma)* for the sake of living, but instead renounces all (230.3-5; BR 217).[65] Similarly, through mindfulness of sensations and thought, one should recognize their impermanence. The awareness of sensations should also be the occasion to cultivate compassion for beings who are dependent on pleasant sensations *(vedita-sukha-āśrita)*: in feeling a pleasant feeling, for example, the bodhisattva should feel compassion for those beings who indulge in passion but reject any propensity to passion in himself *(rāga-anuśayaṃ pratijahāti)* (232.12; BR 219). By contemplating the nature of mind or thought, one should recognize that thoughts are unstable, formless and invisible, and that the mind is therefore like an illusion *(māyā upamaṃ)* (236.2; BR 221). Through mindfulness of the "elements" or phenomena which are the objects of mind *(dharma)*, one should see that they are not the same as their cause nor different; not destroyed *(anuccheda)* and not eternal *(aśāśvata)* (238.10; BR 223). They are impermanent, insubstantial, conditioned, and empty *(śūnyaka)* (238.1,4; BR 222,223). In this way if their nature is known, all phenomena, even the impurities *(kleśa)*, are a source of awakening *(eṣām eva kleśānām avabodhād bodhiḥ)* (236.11).

While a thorough comparison of the function of the foundations of mindfulness practice in Mahāyāna and Theravāda contexts would naturally require a full-blown study of its own, it might nonetheless be noted that here, as in the Theravāda Buddhist context, *smṛti-upasthāna* is a form of insight meditation *(vipaśyanā)* whose purpose is to gain an understanding of the nature of reality 'as it is' *(yathābhūta)*, *viz.*, as

[65] Mindfulness of the body should also lead one to see its nature as "incorrigible," or pure *(anāsrava)* like that of the Tathāgata (230.7; BR 217). More literally *anāsrava* means "without depravity," or "without influx." See BHSD 112.

impermanent, without self, and suffering.[66] This is also true for Śāntideva, but in addition such mindfulness should also lead to the realization that *dharmas* and the processes that supposedly give rise to them are empty and illusory. This theme is elaborated fully in Chapter Fourteen, the final chapter in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* dealing with self-purification. Here Śāntideva states that complete self-purification (*ātmabhāva-pariśuddhi*) is said to come from a full realization of emptiness:

> Thus one whose mind is fit, and of whom there is the means to full awakening to destroy the ocean of suffering for the rest of the world in the ten districts... [such a one] ought to realize the emptiness of all phenomena. In this way the emptiness of the person is established, and from that, by cutting them off by the root, the impurities do not arise.
>
> *Evaṃ yogyacitto daśu dikṣu śeṣasya jagato duṣkha-sāgara-uddharaṇa-âbhisaṃbodhy-upāyo...sarva-dharma-śūnyatām avataret* । *evaṃ hi pudgala-śūnyatā siddhā bhavati* । *tataś ca chinna-mūlatvāt kleśā na samudācaranti* ॥ (242.1-6; BR 225)[67]

Similarly, with a quotation from the *Tathāgata-guhya Sūtra*, Śāntideva asserts that "Just as when a tree is cut at the root, all the twigs and leaves wither away; so Śāntamati, all impurities (*kleśa)* are quelled (*upaśāmyanti*) when one ceases to believe in a real personality (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*)" (242.7-9; BR 225). Supporting this quest, the remainder of the chapter consists in a detailed exposition of the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), the realization of which is thus associated with the perfection of wisdom (*prajñā-pāramitā)* (244.5; BR 226). The six elements (earth, water, fire, air, space, intelligence), the sense faculties and their objects and processes which make up a person (the so-called eighteen *dhātu*s), the agent of actions–all these are declared to be empty of any essential nature

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[66] For a discussion of the process and function of the foundations of mindfulness as understood in the Theravāda tradition, see Gunaratna 1996: 43-45.

[67] I have excluded the following portion of the sentence which Bendall and Rouse (and I) found "very obscure," and which was also omitted in the Tibetan. See 242 fn1 and BR 225 fn 1. The troublesome phrase is: *vyoma-paryanta-traikālya-sarva-dharma-vaśavartitvāya eva tu punaḥ.*

(svabhāva-virahita; niḥsvabhāvatā) (257.11, 244.10; BR 237,226*)*: they are recognized as these things by conventional name only *(na anyatra nāmaketāt)* (253.14; BR 234). Further, it is reiterated that since all elements of existence *(dharmas)* are empty, even the impurites, they also are a source of awakening. In this way, even the *ānantarya,*[68] the so-called five "deadly sins" are wisdom (257.11; BR 237). Since no dharma has essential nature *(aprakṛtika)*, all dharmas *are* awakening *(sarvadharmaḥ bodhih)* (257.10,12; BR 237).

II b. Purification of the objects of enjoyment *(bhoga-śuddhi)* and merit *(puṇya-śuddhi)*

Having dealt with the major topic of purifying the self, in one verse and chapter Śāntideva then describes how to purify the remaining two elements. The first line of verse twenty-one explains how to purify the objects of pleasure (K. 21a):

> By purifying right livelihood one will understand the purification of enjoyments.
> *bhoga-śuddhiṃ ca jānīyāt samyag-ājiva-śodhanāt* । (21a)

Thus to 'cleanse' the objects of pleasure one must purify the means of maintaining oneself, and, as indicated in the comments on this verse, this first entails not hoarding or accumulating *(saṃcaya)* these objects (267.10; BR 245). For the lay bodhisattva this means that enjoyments should be sought fairly *(samena)* and rightly *(dharmena),* and through right-livelihood, which means avoiding ways of making a living which cause suffering to others or are based on greed and deceit (267.12,13; BR 245). For his part, the

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[68] The term means something like 'immediacies,' and has the sense of an action or event characterized by immediate results, and is used to refer to five sins which are thought to bring immediate retribution. They are: killing one's mother or father, or an arhant, causing dissent in the Saṅgha, or "deliberately causing a Tathāgata's blood to flow" (BHSD 95,96). (Also mentioned at ŚS 60.5).

monk should not be deceitful or manipulative in seeking alms or donations: for example, if he sees a generous person he should not start dropping hints about his needs.[69] The bodhisattva, whether layperson or monk, should not be possessive or acquisitive, but share belongings generously (BR 246).

The third element that must be purified, merit or virtue (*śubha*), is here referred to with the word '*puṇya,*' again suggesting the synonymity of these terms.[70] The purification of *puṇya,* which I, following Harvey (2000: 17-19) have translated as 'karmic fruitfulness' or simply 'good fortune,' follows naturally upon self-purification, which as we have seen is ultimately based upon realizing the emptiness of self. Having realized emptiness, one can purify merit, because:

> From action whose essence is compassion and emptiness, [there is] the purification of *puṇya. //*
> *śūnyatā-karuṇā-garbha-ceṣṭitāt puṇya-śodhanam* || 21b ||

With this principle established, Śāntideva then explains the purification of *puṇya* in terms of the purification, and perfection, of generosity (*dāna)* and virtuous conduct (*śīla*). Giving (*dāna)* is pure if the motives or causes are pure, if it is free of a sense of "me and mine," i.e. free of the delusion of a self or owner, and if it is done without longing for its karmic ripening (270.10-12; BR 247). Keeping in mind the requirement that a gift must not be inappropriate in any way or bring harm to any being, the perfection of giving (*dāna-pāramitā)* means giving beings whatever they desire (271.9; BR 248). The second example of purifying *puṇya* is the purification of *śīla*, which is here equated

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[69] *na bodhisatvaḥ dānapatiṃ vā dṛṣṭvā nimittaṃ karoti* (268.6:BR 245). See BHSD 298f.

[70] It is clear that this section is referring to the third phenomena, previously called *"śubha,"* which the bodhisattva must purify, since the previous topic was purification of the enjoyments, and the next chapter turns to describing the three kinds of increase (273.11; BR 251).

with conduct (*caryā-pariśuddhi)* (273.4: BR 249).[71] The quality of *śīla* when it is purified is compared to a clear, open sky: it is calm (*śānta*), stainless (*vimala*), and unobstructed (*apratihata)* by dislike of any being (*sarvasat[t]va-pratigha)* (272.1-4; BR 248f). One way it is achieved is by meditation on all of the "best features" of emptiness.[72] The best features of emptiness include that it is not without generosity (*na dāna-vikala),* not without means (*upāya),* not without equanimity (*upekṣa),* sympathetic joy (*mudita),* and great loving-kindness (*mahāmaitrī).*[73] It is not without entrance to the knowledge of truth (*satya-jñāna-avatāra*), not without regard for beings in the aspiration for awakening (*bodhicitta-sat[t]va-âpekṣā),* not without mindfulness and vigilance (*smṛti-samprajanya),* or calming and insight (*śamatha-vipaśyana*). It is inherently peaceful (*upaśāntā svabhāvena*), but not content in impure acts (*anupaśāntā karmakleśeṣu).*[74] Meditation on these characteristics of emptiness is known as the perfection of meditative absorption (*dhyāna-pāramitā),* and through it wisdom is fully purified (*prajñā-pariśuddhi).*

The two examples given–*dāna* and *śīla*–are both actions or phenomena associated with 'good karma,' or positive karmic consequences, and both are examples of perfections (*pāramitā).* In this way they can be understood as examples of what gives rise to *puṇya*: good fortune or karmic fruitfulness. Such karmically fruitful behaviours are fully purified, and thus become perfections, when they originate in the knowledge of emptiness and the motive of compassion. Thus even what we might think of as 'good actions' are not 'completed' or perfected (*pāramitā)* if they do not have this foundation.

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[71] Bendall and Rouse translate *śīla* as "conduct" throughout this section (BR 248f).

[72] "He meditates in a state of absorption in which all of the best features of emptiness are produced." (*sarvākāravaropetaṃ śūnyatākārâbhinirhṛtaṃ dhyānaṃ dhāyati;* 272.11; BR 249).

[73] Along with compassion (*karuṇā)* these are the four "divine abodes" (*brahmavihāras),* which, according to both Theravāda and Indian Mahāyāna literature, are desirable mind-states to be cultivated.

[74] Ruegg (1981:84) discusses these.

III. Cultivation

III a. Cultivation of self and objects of enjoyment (*vardhana)*

The final aspect of the bodhisattva path is *vardhana*, the cultivation or enhancement of the self, goods and merit. Here again we find an imbalance in the treatment of these three, only in this case it is merit (*śubha)* rather than the self (*ātmabhāva)* that is the clear focus of attention. Wheras the cultivation of the self and objects of enjoyment are treated in one verse (K. 23) and two pages of text (274, 275; BR 251, 252), the cultivation of merit is the subject of four verses (Ks 24-27) and sixty-two pages of text (BR 253-315). Despite the fact that the bodhisattva would seem to have already accomplished the six perfections, which on some accounts should be the culmination of the path,[75] it seems according to the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* that he still has something left to do. In fact, Śāntideva introduces the topic of cultivation (*vardhana)* with the following verse (K. 22):

> The takers are many, and this [what the bodhisattva can offer] is trifling—what can be done with this? /
> And neither does it create great satisfaction; therefore, this ought to be developed.
> *gṛhītāraḥ subahavaḥ svalpaṃ ca idam anena kiṃ* ।
> *na ca atitṛptajanakaṃ vardhanīyam idaṃ tataḥ* ॥ 22 ॥

Śāntideva here indicates the rationale for the process of *vardhana* in proposing that the self, goods, and merit must be cultivated or increased because even if they are fully purified they cannot bring "great satisfaction" to other beings. This "great satisfaction," is Buddhahood (*atitṛpti buddhatvaṃ) (*273.15; BR 251), and the meaning of the verse, according to Śāntideva's comments, is that Buddhahood is not produced by

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[75] See Crosby and Skilton BCA: 30; Dayal 1970: Ch 5; Sangharakshita 1993: 443.

the purity of the Hearers' practice alone.[76] Since the accomplishment of the perfections is associated with the process of purification, this would suggest that for Śāntideva, the Śrāvakas had realized the six perfections, but that this was not enough, and that the bodhisattva must take the additional step of developing or cultivating himself, his objects of enjoyment, and most importantly, his merit.

The next kārikā explains how to cultivate the self and the objects of enjoyment. The self is developed through strength and non-laziness, which in turn are achieved through effort and various kinds of what one might call 'social service' (K. 23a). That is, the bodhisattva can increase his strength or vigour (*bala)* through helping weak creatures and having compassion for them. He protects them when they are fearful and cures them when they are ill. He aids those who are poor, and bears the burdens of the weary (BR 251f). Wealth or possessions are enhanced by giving them away, when the essence of this generosity is emptiness and compassion (K. 23b). This brief treatment of the cultivation of goods is concluded with a quotation from the *Vajracchedikā-sūtra:*

[76] *tan na śrāvaka-sādhāraṇena śuddhimātrena sat[t]vānāṃ janyata ityarthaḥ* (273.15; BR 251).

When a bodhisattva who has remained in the world for the benefit of others gives a gift, it is not easy to grasp the magnitude of the mass of his karmic fruit.77

yo bodhisat[t]vo'pratiṣṭito dānaṃ dadāti | tasya puṇya-skandhasya na sukaraṃ pramānam-udgrahītum iti

(275.12,13; BR 252)

III b. Cultivation of merit (*śubha-vardhana).*

Śāntideva then turns to the final topic of his work, the cultivation of merit (*śubha- vardhana).* Here again we find merit (*śubha)* and karmic fruitfulness (*puṇya)* being used interchangeably. This is said to be the root of all increases (*sarva-vṛddhīnāṃ mūla*) (276.3; BR 253). The remainder of the text, from the latter half of the sixteenth chapter through the nineteenth are devoted to describing the various ways to increase merit. Implicit in this process is the notion of transfering merit (*pariṇāmanā):* the idea that the bodhisattva can 'give away' or apply his merit for the benefit of other beings (e. g. BR 262f). A bodhisattva's 'root of good' or 'root of skill' (*kuśala-mūla)* is compared to the sun which can light all beings despite there being only one. In the same way, the bodhisattva alone can awaken and bring peace and delight to all beings (BR 258). What is first required is that one establish firm resolve (*vyavasāya*) and intention (*āśaya*), and that compassion be placed at the forefront of this effort (K. 24). To produce strong resolve the bodhisattva should remember how many previous births have been wasted through an inability to practice virtue/purify the mind, how these past lives were useless to both himself and others, but that now, by assuming a personality capable of producing the qualities of the Buddhas, he will be devoted to the awakening of all beings (BR 253f).

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[77] Note Bendall and Rouse's translation of *apratiṣṭito* as "without believing in anything" is inaccurate, as this term is used to describe a bodhisattvas who is not 'fixed' in nirvāṇa but rather remains in the world to help beings. See BHSD 48.

This resolve thus entails having great or universal compassion (*mahākaruṇā),* which is said to include all the qualities (*dharma)* of a Buddha (286.9; BR 260). Like the compassion with which the bodhisattva started the path to awakening, this compassion is produced by recognizing that pain and fear are as disliked and unwelcome to others as they are to the bodhisattva himself (287.11-13; BR 262).

Thus with resolution, intention and compassion in mutual support, one should then begin the accumulation of *puṇya (*289.11; BR 263). Verse Twenty-five lists the means by which this can be accomplished (K. 25):

> Always out of respect, the course of conduct of the bodhisattva *s*,[78] praising etc.,
> and the constant practice of faith, etc., [and mindfulness of loving-kindness and the Buddha, etc.,] ought to be done.
> *bhadracaryāvidhiḥ kāryā vandanādiḥ sadādarāt* ।
> *śraddhādīnāṃ sadābhyāsaḥ [maitrībuddhādyanusmṛtiḥ]* ॥ 25 ॥[79]

The bodhisattva's course of conduct includes confessing the unfortunate deeds of both oneself and others (*pāpa-deśanā),* and delighting in fruitful deeds (*puṇya-anumodanā)* (291.8,9; BR 265). It involves requesting teaching from the Buddhas (*adhyeṣaṇā)* and beseeching them not to abandon beings (*yācanā)* (290.2-4; BR 264).[80] It entails worshiping (*pūjānā)* the Buddhas with veneration and offerings (290.8-291.4; BR

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[78] For '*bhadracaryā*' as the bodhisattva's course of conduct leading to enlightenment, see BHSD 406a and 225b.

[79] "Praising etc" (*vandanādiḥ)* presumably refer to praising, worship, confession of misdeeds, rejoicing in merit, requesting the teaching, begging the Buddhas, and dedicating merit: the seven aspects of the Supreme Worship (*anuttara pūjā)* which are part of the culitvation of merit. It is not clear to me to what list "faith etc." (*śraddhādīnāṃ)* refers.

[80] The idea of 'begging the Buddhas not to abandon beings' may hark back to the story of the Buddha's enlightenment recorded in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta,* which suggests that if the Buddha had been so asked, he could have remained in the world teaching until the end of the age. One modern reading of *yācanā* and *adhyeṣanā* (requesting the teaching) understands them to be cultivating the practitioner's earnest desire for the spread of the Dharma. See Sangharakshita 1997: 450f.

264),[81] and making the ten great vows (*mahā-praṇidhāna)* or ardent wishes for the upholding of the Dharma, the worship of the Buddhas, and the welfare, happiness and awakening of all forms of sentient beings (290.11-295; BR 265-269). Although the worship of the Buddhas is said to produce far greater merit than the worship of a Pratyekabuddha, and even a small offering by a bodhisattva who has renounced worldly life is worth more than the greatest offerings of kings, the very best way to worship the Tathāgatas is to develop the aspiration for awakening (*bodhicitta)*, to understand the Dharma, and to develop great compassion for all beings (311.10, 312. 7-21; 313.7,8; BR 277-279). All of the skill or good (*kuśala)* and all root of good (*kuśala-mūla)* that accrues from this 'good conduct' is then to be applied for the benefit and ripening of all beings (*pariṇāmanā) (*296.1-11; 297.3; BR 268f).

Aside from cultivating *puṇya* by practicing good conduct, the constant practice of faith (*śraddhā*) is also enjoined (316.3,4; BR 283). 'Faith', which is also rendered 'confidence' or 'trust' is here defined as that faculty or power (*indriya)* by which one approaches noble persons, and that which gives one the capacity to refrain from doing what one ought not to do (316.7,8; BR 283). It is that by which one has confidence (*śraddhādhāti)* in transmigration (*saṃsārāvacarīṃ)*, and the ripening of the consequences of action (*sa karma-vipāka-pratiśaraṇe bhavati)*, and thus again through it one does not

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[81] Note that this description of *bhadracaryā*, some of which is derived from the *Bhadracarī-praṇidhāna-gāthā (Verses on the Vows of Good Conduct*, a portion of the *Gaṇḍavyūha sūtra)* corresponds to the various elements of a Mahāyāna liturgy known as the 'Supreme Worship' *(anuttara-pūjā)*. According to Crosby and Skilton this is a very old liturgy, probably dating as far back as the late second century CE, which occurs also in the BCA for the apparent purpose of rousing the awakening mind. What is interesting to note here is that whereas the 'limbs' of the Supreme worship occur at the beginning of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, in Chapters Two and Three, they occur here at the end of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, as part of the final aspect of the bodhisattva's training. Whereas the function of the liturgy in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, seems, according to Crosby and Skilton (BCA 1996), to be the "arising of the Awakening mind" (*bodhicitta-utpāda)*, in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* it is clearly for the purpose of accumulating *puṇya*. See BCA, Chapters 9-13.

commit misdeeds. One who has faith believes in the virtue of the bodhisattva (*bodhisat[t]va-cārika)* and does not desire any other path (*yāna).* The other faculties or powers that must be practised to produce merit are the faculty of energy or enthusiasm (*vīrya),* mindfulness (*smṛti),* concentration (*samādhi),* and wisdom (*prajñā)* (316.14,15; BR 283). Merit can also be increased by *'buddhādi-anusmṛti',* recalling and praising the good qualities of the three jewels, i.e. the Buddha, the teachings (*Dharma*), and the religious community (*sangha*) (318.3-324.9; BR 285-290).

Aside from faith and following the bodhisattva's course of conduct, verse twenty- six explains the essence of the increase of merit in terms of universal compassion:

> In short, the cause of the increase of merit [is] the mind of enlightenment,
> the spiritual gift of the Dharma, and the benefit of beings in all conditions.
> *sarvāvasthāsu satvārtho dharmadānaṇ nirāmiṣaṃ* I
> *bodhicittaṃ ca puṇyasya vṛdhihetuḥ samāsataḥ* II 26 II

The factors mentioned here–bodhicitta , the gift of the Dharma, and the concern for all beings–also comprise Śāntideva's ideal form of worship (*pūjā).* This means that in all circumstances the bodhisattva thinks of the welfare of beings: when he goes forth on the road he thinks of helping beings go forth on the road away from transmigration. When he sits down he conjures the wish that all beings may sit in the seat of wisdom. When he bathes or brushes his teeth he should think of cleansing beings of the stain of defilements (*kleśa-mala)* (348.17). All actions should in this way be the occasion for wishing the benefit of others (BR 307f). Teaching the Dharma in any form brings great merit (*bahu puṇya-skandha),* but in particular if a bodhisattva teaches the perfection of wisdom (*prajñā-pāramitā)* to another bodhisattva, this gift of Dharma becomes the root of good

(*kuśala-mūla)* for all disciples of the Dharma: Hearers and Pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas alike (352.2-5). Possessed of this root of good, in fact, it is impossible that the bodhisattva will turn away from full awakening (352.5,6: BR 311). In this way teaching the Dharma, and especially the Mahāyāna, is seen to be a source of enormous merit.

The final verse is a reminder of how all of these aspects of the bodhisattva path must rely on mental discipline in its various forms:

> Successful accomplishment of the proper efforts is from not abandoning vigilance;
> and through mindfulness, immediate awareness, and through deep thought.
> *siddhiḥ samyak-prahāṇānām apramādāviyojanāt* ||
> *smṛtyâtha saṃprajanyena yoniśaś-cintanena ca* || 27 ||

Thus here Śāntideva gives a reminder of a point he has emphasized throughout the text: that mindfulness and immediate awareness to all of one's actions and mindstates are necessary if one is to overcome defilements, avoid misdeeds, and cultivate wholesome qualities. Here he also adds the value of *yoniśas-cinta*, which usually refers to thought at a very profound or fundamental level. For example, this term is sometimes used in the context of thinking about *dharmas*, the basic elements of existence. Mental discipline, in all these various aspects, are thus necessary for realizing the 'religious efforts' or 'exertions' (*samyak-prahānāni)* here described.[82]

[82] The term *prahāṇa* can mean 'abandonment' from which Bendall and Rouse (313) perhaps derived "self-denial," but it can also mean 'exertion,' 'strenuosity,' 'religious exercise.' While it may refer to four aspects of right effort as part of the eightfold-path, as at 105.14 (BR 107), in this context it seems to refer to religious effort or exertion in general. See BHSD 389; Sangharakshita 1993: 158,461.

Śāntideva then offers a summary of the three efforts–*rakṣā, śuddhi,* and *vardhana*–which constitute his understanding of the bodhisattva path. Guarding (*rakṣā)* means that when qualities that are unwholesome (*akuśala-dharma)* and unfortunate (*pāpaka)* have not yet arisen, one forms the desire, the thought, and the vow (*chanda, citta, samyak-praṇidadhāti)* that they shall not arise (356.10,11). However, when these qualities have already arisen, one generates the wish for their abandonment (*prahāṇa)* in the process of purification (*śuddhi)* (356.12). When skillful or wholesome qualities, on the other hand, have not yet arisen, one generates the wish that they will arise, and when they have arisen, one desires that they remain and increase. This is known as cultivation (*vardhana)* (356.14,15). All three efforts must be maintained with vigilance (*apramāda),* because vigilance is the root of all roots of skill or wholesomeness (*sarva-kuśala-mūlānāṃ tan-mūlatvāt)* (356.14; BR 313f). Thus guarding means protecting oneself from unwelcome qualities, purification means resolving to eliminate unwelcome qualities, and cultivation is resolving to maintain and enhance welcome qualities.

Interestingly, it is after this apparent summary of the text that Śāntideva offers a way to cultivate bodhicitta, and a rationale and defense of compassion in the context of the doctrine of emptiness, through passages quoted from the *Tathāgataguhya-sūtra.* It is interesting too that much of this final section of the text overlaps with portions of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* in particular, the verses in the eighth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* that discuss the practice of *parātmasamatā,* 'the equality of self and other' (*viz.,* vv 90-119). In both texts it is suggested that by practicing the equality of self and other, the thought of awakening, bodhicitta , will become strong, thus the aim of the practice is to help the bodhisattva to firmly establish or "fix" (*dṛḍhi)* the altruistic attitude

(357: 16; BR 315; BCA 8: 89,90).[83] Whereas this appears to be presented more as a

meditation practice in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, with advice, for example that one should contemplate how everyone experiences happiness and suffering, in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* it is the rationale behind the equality of self and other which is explored and defended. Thus the final section of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* is a refutation of opponents of emptiness and a defense of emptiness-based altruism.[84]

In a style very much like that of the ninth chapter of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, and other Indian philosophical literature, the discussion occurs in a series of abbreviated arguments with potential opponents. After asserting the value of practicing the equality or sameness (*samatā)* of self and other, Śāntideva then offers a rationale for this equality by pointing out that since self and other exist only relatively, like the near and far shores of a river, there is no independent, self-existent being (357.17-358.2). If one were to object to the altruism implied by such a position and assert, "I don't suffer because of another person's pain," Śāntideva responds, "then why do you do things now to prevent your own future suffering?" (358.3,4). You cannot hold, he would say, that it is the same person that is you in the future, since a young man is not the same as an old one, and the body that exists now is not the same as the one that will exist in the future (358.5,6,11,12). Only something that is established (*sthita)* to be without changing states can be called self-existing (*svabhāva*)(358.14). Alluding to arguments made earlier in the fourteenth chapter, the idea is that because none of the aggregates (*skandhas)* that are understood in the Buddhist view to make up the self are unchanging or independently existing, there is no inherently existing and unchanging self. One might then suggest that if it is another person who is born in the next life, what then is the purpose of karmic fruitfulness (*puṇya)*? (358.7). That is, if I am not the same person in the future, what is the

point of collecting all this merit now, if the benefit actually goes to someone else who is not me, in the future?

The response to this objection is somewhat ambiguous. The next statement made is this: What is the purpose of a young man collecting wealth for the happiness of an old man? (358.8). This may be considered an extension of the same objection, or a response. As an objection it could mean that if the future self is a completely different person, there is no sense doing karmically fruiftul deeds and no sense accumulating wealth for the benefit of that other person. However, what appears to be meant by the statement is this: Just as it is natural to do things now to benefit yourself in the future, even though it is not the same person, you should work to benefit other beings besides yourself in the present.

In a series of moves, the principle that conditioned things are impermanent and not unitary is reaffirmed (359.8,11). Then the assertion is made that anything that is a continuum of events (*saṃtāna)* or a collection of things (*samudāya)*, being not unitary or permanent, is not fully real: such things are false, misleading (*mṛṣā)* (359.14,15). Implicit here is also the claim that this is exactly the kind of thing the self is: a collection of aggregates (*skandha)* and a continuum of consciousness events (*saṃtāna).* However, because of habit (*abhyāsa),* there is the notion of 'I' generated with regard to these things. So why not in regard to another being?[85] In other words, since the idea of the self, of 'I,' is just a habitual way of viewing the impermanent collection of material and mental parts we know as the self, then why not generate this idea towards other beings as well? Therefore, it is concluded, the world ought to be known as a collection of sense-spheres (*āyatana-saṃcaya*), but suffering (*duḥkha)* ought to be prevented even if it is not valid

(*aprāpta*).[86] That is, suffering, like all other phenomena, is not ultimately 'real' in the sense of being something permanent and inherently existing. Also, since suffering stems from our false notions of 'I' and 'mine' (*ahaṃkāra, mamakāra*), in this way suffering is 'unfounded,' (*aprāpta*) and unjustified (*ayuktam*) (360.3). But even though suffering is somehow illegitimate, it should be eliminated, or repulsed (*nirvartyaṃ*) to the best of our abilities, wherever it is found, either in oneself or others.[87]

Now, one might object that having compassion (*kṛpā*) for others in itself causes suffering, so why cause compassion to arise? (360.5). The response here is straightforward: having observed (*nirūpya*) the suffering of the world, how can the suffering that comes from compassion be considered much? (360.6). Those who have cultivated themselves in this way, such that the suffering of others is the same in importance as what is dear to them, for them alleviating the suffering of others brings happiness,[88] and there is great joy in their liberation (360.9) Liberation of the self alone would be without flavour, tasteless (*arasa*) (360.10). When one recogizes the self in the happiness of others, there is no room for jealousy, for the riches (*saṃpatti*) of others become the happiness of the self (360.13,14). The confession of unfortunate deeds (*pāpa-deśanā*) is the same for others or for the self, and similarly the joy in fruitful deeds (*puṇya-anumodanā*), and requesting and begging the Buddhas (*buddhâdhyeṣaṇayācana*) (361.1,2). Also in this way the application of merit (*pariṇāmanā*) happens completely, and from that karmic fruitfullness (*puṇya*) arises infinitely, like the realm of sentient beings (361.3,4).[89]

Therefore, having attributed 'selfhood' to all beings, one ought to give up the self for the sake of quelling the suffering of self and others (361.11,12). After all,

when the world is burning with the fire of duḥkha, what pleasure can there be in one's own happiness? If one's whole body is on fire, what pleasure is there in one unburnt nail? (361.15,16). The chief root of all sorrows is selfish grasping (*ātma-tṛṣṇā*), so destroy such grasping; abandon personal benefit (*svārtham*) for the sake of beings (361.17,18). Since desire (*icchā*) is known as the first emissary (*agradūtī*) of suffering, which ought to be conquered with every effort, do this by remembering the truth about the self (*ātma-tattva-smṛti*), and through the thought of conditioned arising (*pratītya-utpāda-cinta*) (362.1,2). Then, having abandoned the self in this way, one should undertake the good of all beings (*sarva-sattva-artham ācaret*) (362.7). The bodhisattva's vow is then reiterated (363.13,14):

> So long as there is a universe in space, I will remain, progressing
> in wisdom, doing the good of the world.
> *yāvad ākāśa-niṣṭasya niṣṭā lokasya saṃbhavet* ।
> *tāvat sthāsyāmi lokārthaṃ kurvan jñāna-puraḥ-saraḥ* ॥

With a reminder to be one's own teacher and the student of all beings, the text concludes with salutations and reverence to Mañjuśrī, the bodhisattva of wisdom (BR 319, 320).

Chapter Four: Analysis of key moral terms in *Śikṣāsamuccaya*

It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the understanding and use of terms in Buddhist ethics is in a frustrating state of divergence and inconsistency. One of the major barriers to any kind of systematic treatment of morality in Indian Buddhism has to be this problem, where there is lack of agreement and uniformity in the translation of important terms. With an eye to such difficulties, and based on the exegesis of the previous chapter, I attempt to define what Śāntideva means by certain key moral terms. I focus here on *kuśala*, *śīla*, and *puṇya*, three terms which refer to what are probably the most important moral concepts for Indian Buddhism. In order to get a sense for how moral ideas may have changed over time or between schools of thought, I have contrasted Śāntideva's understanding of these terms with what has been gleaned from previous work on Buddhist ethics. As indicated previously the majority of this work has been based on the Theravāda tradition and Pali canonical and commentarial material, so in most cases this will be the basis for comparison.

I. Kuśala

The treatment of this important term is a prime example of how inconsistency in translation contributes to confusion in understanding Buddhist ethics. It has been translated variously as "merit" or "morally good" (Dayal 1970: 61; Nagao 1991: 85,91), "virtue" or "good" (Keown 1992: 127,120) "happiness" (Brassard 2000), "healthy" (Hayes 1994: 20), "competent" (Warder 1970), and "wholesome," "skillful" or "wise" (Harvey 2000: 42). Though all of these translations may be correct and appropriate to their context, the significant semantic range naturally leads to confusion

when one is trying to get a specific sense for the role and significance of this concept in Buddhist morality. Moreover, since these translations are frequently used for other important moral concepts, such as *śīla* (sometimes also translated as "virtue" or "moral") and *puṇya* ("merit" or "happiness"), it becomes difficult to distinguish the different roles of these ideas in Buddhist morality. While it is true that Keown's (1992) analysis of this term is systematic and useful, it is embedded within a certain position regarding the nature of Buddhist ethics that seems to distort his presentation of *kuśala* somewhat-- a point I will return to shortly. To my mind Lance Cousin's work on the etymology and use of *kuśala* (Pali *kusala)* is helpful in clearing some of the confusion. In an article surveying the meaning of this term in Buddhist and pre-Buddhist sources, including the Pali canon and commentaries, as well as certain Classical Sanskrit and Buddhist Sanskrit texts, Cousins suggests the following history for the meanings of *kuśala/kusala*:

> 1. An original meaning of intelligent or wise, based on the oldest Pali and Sanskrit sources.
>
> 2. In the *Brāhmaṇas,* because of the importance of ritual knowledge to brahmins, this evolved to signify 'expert in ritual.' Pali sources followed suit, using *kuśala* to mean skilled in meditational practices and the kinds of behaviour that support meditation practices, such as virtuous conduct (Pali *sīla*; Sk. *śīla*). It also meant skilled in performing *dāna* (giving) and *yajñā* (sacrifice), and was associated with keeping precepts. Cousins argues that in Buddhist canonical sources to call a state or practice *kuśala* would indicate that it is produced by wisdom, and is conducive to awakening (*bodhi-pakkhiya).* In this sense *kuśala* is also usually associated with the term "blameless" (*anavajja),* meaning that an action that is *kuśala* would not

be criticized by a knowledgeable person. The basis for *kuśala* actions are said to be non-greed (*alobha*), non-hatred (*adosa*), and non-delusion (*amoha)*, the opposites of the three principal *kleśas*, and as such are supposed to yield healthy, stable mind-states and contribute to spiritual progress (Harvey 2000: 42).

3. In later Buddhist (and Jain) sources, *kuśala* became generalized to refer to "wholesome" or "good states" (Cousins 1996: 10). More specifically, he says it is defined as peace or happiness, and is considered to lead both to fortunate rebirth as well as contributing to the path to awakening (8).

In addition to these moral senses, *kuśala* can also to refer to proficiency or skill in an art or craft (4,8). Insofar as *kuśala* qualities or states are associated with a desirable or pleasant result *(iṣṭaphala; sukha-vipāka)* there is overlap with the term *puṇya (*Pali *puñña;* karmic fruition). However, Cousin's observes that in the Pali literature *kuśala* rather than *puñña* is used in connection with the spiritual path, and also occurs much more frequently.[90]

I do not detect any particularly novel uses of the term *kuśala* in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya.* In most cases *kuśala* seems to be used in the sense of 'wholesome' or 'good' in general, like other late Buddhist Sanskrit texts (Cousins 1996: 10). For example, harmful or unfortunate deeds *(pāpa)*, are associated with what is *akuśala* (160.8; BR 159), and *kuśala* can be destroyed by things like pride, gain, and honour (148.8-10; BR 147). If one teaches the perfection of wisdom *(prajñā-pāramitā)* to another bodhisattva, this teaching becomes the beginning or root *(mūla)* of *kuśala* for all disciples of the Dharma (352.2-5; BR 311). With this foundation of *kuśala,* the bodhisattva will not turn away from full awakening (352.5,6; BR 311). The bodhisattva's course of conduct

(*bhadracaryā)* is suppposed to give rise to both the foundation of *kuśala* and *kuśala* itself, which are then to be applied to benefit other beings (296.1-11; 297.3; BR 268f).[91] As we can see, some nebulous quality of 'goodness' or 'wholesomeness' could fit all of these instances.

The more particular meaning of 'skillfulness' seems to fit two particular examples from the text. In one instance, it is said that the bodhisattva who has a 'collection of virtue' or 'good habits'[92] (*śīla-skandha)* does not lose the desire for all *kuśala-dharma* (147.5,8,9; BR 146). Cousins (1996: 4,5) has suggested that the phrase *kuśala-dharma* usually refers to "skillful states" developed through meditation (Pali *jhāna)*, and this translation also seems to fit Śāntideva's use, especially considering the strong association he makes between the various aspects of mental discipline and *śīla* (e. g. BCA Ch.5; 121.1; BR 120). Similarly, the admittedly rather odd use of *kuśala* in the context of explaining when a bodhisattva should give gifts also suggests the meaning of 'skill'. Here it is said that:

> In the case of a bodhisattva whose power to benefit other beings is equal or greater to oneself, if giving or not giving stands in the way of their *kuśala* when it is equal or greater than one's own, then it should not be done.
>
> (144.5,6; BR 142)

The translation "skill" seems more apt in this instance than the more global quality of 'goodness' because of the sense that *kuśala* here is some kind of measurable ability to accomplish something. That is, Śāntideva suggests that in judging whether or not to give a gift, the bodhisattva is supposed to weigh both the overall capacity (*śakti*) of the recipient to help beings and his or her skill at doing so. Even more clearly than the first

example, the term *kuśala* in this instance seems to include the sense of utility or ability of some kind: the capacity to do something well; this is why 'skillfulness' seems to be the better translation.

To come to the point alluded to earlier, in his analysis of *kuśala* Damien Keown is very concerned to steer us clear of understanding *kuśala* to mean 'skillful'. However, it seems to me we have to be careful not to let what may be even very legitimate ideological or theoretical concerns blind us here. Keown is concerned that to translate '*kuśala*' as 'skillful' supports a particular understanding of Buddhist ethics, namely, one that sees ethics as merely having instrumental value on the Buddhist path. He warns: "this translation carries with it a specific implication for the nature of Buddhist ethics, namely that it is utilitarian" (1992: 119). But obviously we should not avoid such a translation if the word does in fact have a utilitarian or instrumental sense in some cases, since this does not necessarily imply an overall commitment to a utilitarian view of Buddhist ethics. As Cousin's suggests, "I am not convinced that a utilitarian implication does in fact necessarily follow [from this translation]. Skill, let alone wisdom, can be valued for more reasons than utilitarian ones" (1996: 1). As we have seen from this word's etymology, there is a clear sense that *kuśala* was used in the same way we use 'skill' or 'skillful,' in its association with ritual or meditational expertise, and the ability to do something well (e.g meditation practices, keeping precepts). There is a very clear sense of utility in the definition Keown himself offers:

> *Kusala* denotes those things that are to be pursued if enlightenment is to be attained. Its contrary, *akusala*, characterizes whatever is negative in this respect and is accordingly to be shunned. (Keown 1992: 116)

He then goes on to quote from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (i.58), in which the Buddha is said to have urged monks to abandon what is *akusala* because it conduces to woe and sorrow, and to cultivate what is *kusala* because it conduces to profit and happiness (cited in Keown, 1992: 116).

Now Keown objects to translating *kuśala* as 'skillful' because this word has only a non-moral, technical sense in English, and because it thereby contributes to the misunderstanding that morality is only instrumentally valued in Buddhism. That is, he sees it as helping to support what he calls the "transcendency thesis," which is the idea held by some scholars[93] that morality in Buddhism is merely the means to the end of nirvāṇa, and that morality is thus 'transcended' at the state of Buddhahood or arhantship[94]. It is because Keown thinks that translating *kuśala* as 'skillful' commits one to this reading of Buddhist morality that he argues so strongly against it. He argues, persuasively in this regard, that a Buddha or arahat is someone who exemplifies virtue at least in part because that being is characterized by *kuśala*, and that this indicates both that morality is *not* transcended in enlightenment, and that *kuśala* states or qualities are intrinsically related to the awakened state, and not merely instrumentally valuable. To understand *kuśala* as "skillful," he argues, carries the unavoidable implication that ethics in Buddhism is "exclusively a technical activity," and that what is called '*kuśala*' is only important in a utilitarian sense (Keown 1992: 118-120).

While agreeing with Keown in his rejection of the transcendency thesis, I have to disagree with what he takes to be implied by the idea of *kusala* as 'skillful,' for he

seems to make some unwarranted assumptions about our view of skills. He seems to think, for example, that 'skills' are necessarily of instrumental value only, and not intrinsically connected to the object or goal to which they are directed. But this is a rather odd assumption, for when we consider, for example, the various proficiencies a musician needs to be a skillful player—such as a well-trained ear, a sense of rhythm, dexterity, the patience and determination to practice—it is not at all obvious that such abilities do not have any inherent worth. Moreover it is clear that such skills are not merely incidental to the ability to play music well but are in fact essential to it: they help define what it is to be a 'good musician.' Thus I cannot see how understanding *kuśala* as 'skillful' automatically commits one to a utilitarian view of Buddhist morality. Similarly, I do not think this translation commits one to the transcendency thesis, for just as a fully awakened being is not thought to transcend or abandon *kuśala* states, we do not think of a skillful artisan or artist at the peak of his or her career as having transcended his or her skills. Rather, we think of them as having reached the height of their skill. Thus, the translation of *kuśala* as 'skillful' does not automatically lend itself either to utilitarianism or to the transcendency thesis. In fact, it seems to me to convey an important aspect of the concept of *kuśala* that is not obvious from alternate translations, such as 'good' or 'virtue':[95] namely, that *kusala* is used to refer to actions or states which are not only inherently 'healthy' or 'happy' due to being free of greed, hatred, and delusion, but also facilitate further happiness or wellness, and are conducive to nirvāna. For this reason I have to reject Keown's argument against the translation 'skillful.'

Having said that, I do acknowledge Keown's point that one problem with this translation is that the English term 'skillful', unlike *kuśala,* is usually not used in any

kind of moral contexts (1992: 119). Cousins responds to this problem by suggesting that "this only shows that Buddhist concepts are themselves unfamilar to ordinary English usage," and that "we should be cautious about adopting concepts with many hidden implications, deriving from a long history of European theological and philosophical debate" (1996: 2). In this regard, I think we might actually argue more strongly *for* the translation "skillful," because as a translation of *kuśala* it will bear very obvious moral connotations in a Buddhist context, but at the same time will not carry with it any conceptual baggage from the moral history of European thought. This of course cannot be said for the term "virtue." The translation "wholesome" seems also to be a good alternative, since it conveys the idea of something good in itself, as well as being conducive to health or happiness.

The challenge is thus to find a translation that encompasses the sense of skillful, intelligent, or expert in some way (in that it refers to states or qualities that lead to nirvāṇa and conduce to happiness) *and* 'good' in the moral sense and in the sense of inherently healthy or wholesome. Thus ideally we need a word that means both inherently valuable and good and instrumentally useful and intelligent. The difficulty in finding such a word may reflect the modern assumption that there is a gap between the realm of facts, or what we can know and in which we can develop expertise, and the realm of values and norms: a subject to which I will return in the conclusion of this thesis[96]. In the meantime, I would suggest that 'wholesome,' 'healthy', 'good' and 'skillful' are all acceptable, if separately not entirely satisfactory, renderings of the term *kuśala.*

In sum, I have argued that there are good reasons to translate *kuśala* as 'skillful,' and that this does not commit us to a utilitarian view of Buddhist ethics. I have

also suggested that in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, we can see examples of where *kuśala* can mean both 'skillful' and the more general idea of 'good'. As such there do not appear to be any innovative uses of this term in the Śikṣāsamuccaya.

II. Śīla

Based on translations, at least, what would appear to be the single most important term for understanding Buddhist morality is the word that is commonly translated as "morals," "moral virtue," "morality," or "virtue."[97] This is the term *śīla*, which literally means custom or habit, but, like the Greek term *ethos*, can also mean more generally character or disposition, and has the sense of good character or habitually good behaviour (Apte 1558; Monier-Williams 1079). Because the English words 'moral' or 'virtue' have similar meanings, we can see the sound basis for these translations. However, it seems to me problematic, not to mention confusing, to translate *śīla* as "morality" as is often done, particular in the context of studying Buddhist ethics, where frequently the goal is to try to understand where morality fits in the soteriological scheme. To assume that *śīla* is "morality" seems to artificially narrow and skew the inquiry from the outset, because *de facto* everything else is "not morality," and consequently other important aspects of morality may be missed. This may also result in giving undue important to *śīla.* In the interest, then, of casting as wide a net as possible, I would suggest that it is better to use a more narrowly defined understanding and translation of *śīla.*

A more precise understanding of what Śāntideva means by this term may be derived if we look at the use of the term *śīla* in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya.* Here it appears to have at least two distinguishable meanings. First, recall that *śīla* was sometimes used

synonymously with merit (*śubha)* and karmic fruitfulness (*puṇya)* for the third of the three things besides 'self' and the 'objects of enjoyment,' that one is to guard, purify, and cultivate. In the section on guarding, for example, *śīla, puṇya* and *śubha* were used interchangeably to refer to karmically positive or fortunate deeds and their consequences (See Ch. 3 I.c; BR 145-147).

However, *śīla* and *puṇya* are not always used synonymously: under the purification of merit, for example, *puṇya* is said to be purified through the cleansing and perfection of giving (*dāna)* and *śīla*, where *śīla* is glossed by the word 'conduct' (*caryā)* (273.4: BR 249). Śāntideva's claim was that *puṇya* becomes pure when *śīla* is purified through its basis in emptiness and compassion, and through meditating on the 'best aspects of emptiness' (*sarvākāravaropeta)* (K. 21b; see Ch. 3 IIb). Thus, *śīla* seems in this context to refer to actions that are 'fortunate' or karmically fruitful, and *puṇya* to refer to the fruitful consequences.

Now we have seen that *śīla* can be used interchangeably with *puṇya* to mean karmically fruitful deeds or the results of those deeds, or it can be distinguished from *puṇya* and refer only to the actions themselves, and not the consequences. As to what kind of conduct, exactly, the text is not terribly forthcoming. The word *caryā* used as a gloss for *śīla* may mean conduct in general, but can also refer specifically to the course of conduct of the bodhisattva (BHSD 226). There is also the claim that *śīla* is whatever action supports mental discipline, particularly mindfulness and immediate awareness. For example, under the topic of guarding the self, the importance of mental discipline was stressed, and Śāntideva, in his own words, indicated that:

> Whatever actions are the causes of *samādhi,* those are included under *śīla.*
> Therefore, one who seeks to gain *samādhi,* ought to cultivate the habit *(śīla)*
> of immediate awareness *(samprajanya)* and mindfulness *(smṛti);*
> so also one who seeks *śīla,* must make an effort with regard to *samādhi"*
>
> *ato 'vagamyate ye kecit samādhi-hetavaḥ prayogās te śīla-ântargatā iti /*
> *tasmāt samādhy-arthinā smṛti-saṁprajanya-śīlena bhavitavyam /*
> *tathā śīla-ârthinā âpi samādhau yatnaḥ kāryaḥ*
>
> (121.3-5; BR 120)

Thus anything that leads to concentrated awareness is included under *śīla,*[98] and *śīla* conversely conduces to *samādhi* (*śīlaṃ hi samādhi-saṁvartanīyaṃ*) (121.1; BR 120). Such a claim fits quite comfortably with common expositions of the Eightfold Buddhist Path, and the apparently very early division of this path into three mutually supporting factors: morality *(śīla),* concentration *(samādhi),* and wisdom *(prajñā)* (Pali *sīla, samādhi, paññā).*[99] In the context of this three-fold division *śīla* is described as essential for concentration, for the simple reason that it is difficult to have a calm and tranquil mind if one is plagued by remorse or worry about wrongs one has committed.

Apart from this and the statement at *kārikā* 21b that the purification of *śīla* is based in emptiness and compassion, Śāntideva says nothing else directly about the nature of *śīla* in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya,* although it is evidently something that can be accumulated or 'heaped', so that one can have a 'mass' or 'collection' of *śīla* (*"śīla-skandha")* 178.11, 178.16; BR 173, 174). It is also something that can be pure, as in "these are the blessings of one whose virtue is pure,"[100] or defective, since 'bad friends' (*akalyāṇa-mitras*) are weak or 'disabled' in *śīla* (*duḥśīla, śīla-vipanna)* (BR 52,48). Also, Śāntideva asserts that the Mahāyāna and the study of the perfection of wisdom *(prajñā-*

pāramitā) are not a substitute for it, as both *śīla* and the monastic rules (*prātimokṣa-vinaya)* are necessary for the path (BR: 63,71). This supports the conclusions of other scholars that *śīla* is not equivalent to the code of conduct for monastics found in the *prātimokṣa* (Prebish 2000: 37-40), and assuming that what Śāntideva means by "Mahāyāna" and the *prajñā-pāramitā* is essentially the teachings on emptiness, that merely knowing the nature of emptiness does not obviate the need for *śīla*. Perhaps the clearest overall statement about *śīla* comes from the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, where Śāntideva states that *śīla* is accomplished when one's aspirations are no longer directed to achieving worldly goals:

> When one has obtained a mind indifferent to worldy attachments,
> that is considered the perfection of virtue.
> *labhde viraticitte śīlapāramitā matā.*
>
> (BCA 5: 11)

All of this suggests that, apart from its overlapping use with *puṇya,* there does not seem to be any evidence to suggest that *śīla* for Śāntideva meant anything significantly different from how it has been understood in previous literature on Buddhist ethics based on Pali sources. *Śīla* in these contexts is described primarily as self-restrained, religiously-oriented behaviour or habits, and usually elaborated in terms of the five or ten precepts (*pañca-sīla, dasa-sīla*) and the three factors on the eightfold path associated with *śīla*, *viz.*, right speech, right action, and right livelihood.[101] Taking this into account, we can probably understand *śīla* to mean 'virtuous' or 'religiously good' acts or customary behaviour (*pratipatti)*, whether mental, verbal or physical (36.2; BR 38). The terms 'virtuous' and 'religiously good' are intended to reflect the fact that such

actions would not be based on worldly attachments, and are rather founded on compassion and wisdom. There is also a sense in which *śīla* implies *restrained* conduct, as for example is evident in the 'five *śīla*' or five precepts (*pañca-śīla)*, which are vows to "refrain from" taking life, taking what is not given, etc. The idea that *śīla* refers to 'restrained good conduct' would help distinguish it from *dāna*, generosity, which in some senses would represent the opposite of restraint in good conduct. This makes more sense of the list of perfections, since in normal parlance one would tend to undestand generosity as one aspect or virtue within morality, rather than separable from it.

Although there is no doubt that Śāntideva assumes the importance and value of the traditional precepts, such as to refrain from harming others, and from taking what is not given, from false speech, etc.,[102] his understanding of 'virtuous conduct' would also include actions which are part of the bodhisattva path as described in the nine-fold scheme as found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. We will consider how this compares with other descriptions of *śīla* in the Indian Mahāyāna tradition when we come to the next chapter.

In sum, it would appear that for Śāntideva, *śīla* refers to individual or habitual 'good deeds,' particularly those that imply restraint in some way. Such deeds or habits are 'good' or 'virtuous' because they are based in emptiness and compassion, and characterized in their ideal form by indifference to worldly things. When one's whole mentality has this quality, *śīla* is perfected. From its synonymous use with *puṇya* it also appears that *śīla* can be used to signify the positive or fortunate karmic results that are assumed to accrue from such behaviours.

III. Puṇya

To turn to the notion of '*puṇya,*' we have seen in the section on guarding merit (*śubha*: Ch.3 Ic) that Cousins' (1996) analysis of this term, which was based on Pali canonical sources and commentaries, was also applicable to the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. Cousins suggested that *puṇya* refers to something "fortunate" or "happy," as well as to "an act which brings good fortune" or "to the happy result in the future of such an act" (1996: 10). To reflect this sense of the positive 'ripening' (*vipāka)* of the karma of actions, I had followed Harvey in translating *puṇya* as something "karmically fruitful," "karmic fruition" or "a karmically fruitful act" (2000: 18). Its opposite, *apuṇya,* together with the synonym *pāpa,* refers to an act which is karmically unfruitful and leads to harmful or unhappy results, the unfruitful and unhappy consequences, or the characteristic of unfruitfulness and misfortune. We suggested that this understanding of *puṇya* seemed appropriate for the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, since *puṇya* was used synonymously with *śīla* as well as *śubha,* which literally means "good fortune," "auspiciousness" or "happiness," (146. 21; BR 14; 146, 253; Apte 1561). While both *puṇya* and *śubha* are commonly translated as "merit," Cousins has criticized this as misleading because of the sense that "merit" implies something "being deserved." Insofar as it is primarily the nature of the act itself as skillful or wise *(kuśala)* and well-intentioned, and not some outside force which is thought to determine whether there any positive (or negative) karmic results, the concept of "merit," Cousins argues, is inappropriate.[103]

In reviewing the function of *puṇya* in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, we can see that this understanding of *puṇya* fits well with Śāntideva's use. We saw that like *śīla* and *śubha*, *puṇya* is used to refer to the third thing besides the self and the objects of

enjoyment to be protected, purified and enhanced. That is, besides his own person and objects of pleasure, the bodhisattva guards, cleanses and then increases the benefits of all his deeds *(puṇya)* for the sake of awakening others. *Puṇya* is also talked about as something that can be accumulated or 'heaped': for example, when a bodhisattva gives a gift, or offers the teaching of the Dharma, this is said to bring a 'great mass of *puṇya*' *(bahu puṇya-skandha)* (351.15,16; BR 311; s.a 275.13; BR 252;). This of course makes sense if we think of *puṇya* as the 'good fortune' or 'fruitfull consequences' of the bodhisattva's actions. We also saw in the text that for Śāntideva the essence of guarding *(rakṣā)* or protecting *puṇya* is *bodhipariṇāmanā*, the transference of merit–the fortunate results of one's deeds–to all beings, for the sake of their awakening (158.6; BR 156). Since the motive behind an act determines to a large extent the amount of karmic benefit that arises, naturally if the motive is to give the benefits to others, the karmic fortune will be 'guarded.' For the same reasons, it makes sense for Śāntideva to say that *puṇya* is purified through "actions whose essence is emptiness and compassion" (K. 21b). In Śāntideva's thought there could be no purer basis for any deed than the understanding of emptiness and the concern to alleviate suffering. So, at the culmination of the bodhisattva path, when the bodhisattva has fully realized the truth that being conditioned and impermanent, the self is the same as the other *(parātmasamatā)*, and that therefore the suffering of others is the same as one's own, then at this point the benefits of his deeds "arise infinitely" or "endlessly,"[104] and the transference or application of *puṇya* to help other beings "happens completely"[105] (See Ch.3 IIIc; BR 315-317).

It is when we come to think seriously about the implications of this idea of "transfering merit,"[106] or "sharing karmic fruition" *(pariṇāmanā)* that we see apparent

differences between the role and understanding of *puṇya* in Śāntideva's work and the primarily Pali-based literature on Buddhist ethics. Such differences are highlighted when we consider the claim that the arhant (Pali *arahat)* has 'passed beyond' and 'abandoned' *puṇya* (Pali *puñña)* and *pāpa.*[107] Such statements are made in the *Suttanipātta* (Sn 520 and 636), one of the oldest books of the Pali canon. The contrast with what must be Śāntideva's view of *puṇya* becomes clear when we look at how this assertion has been interpreted. Using primarily canonical sources, Harvey offers two explanations.

At one level, he suggests, it refers to the fact that actions for the arahat[108] are all spontaneously wholesome, and there is no deliberation needed with regard to what is right or wrong. There is no clinging to, or no thought of, the karmic results of one's actions; thus one is 'beyond *puñña* and *pāpa*'. In fact, at the level of Stream-entrance[109] one overcomes karmic fruitfulness and unfruitfulness in this sense, since one is said to follow the precepts without thought for the karmic benefits of doing so (D.A. III 784 in Harvey 2000: 40). Following the precepts (*sīla*) has become spontaneous and habitual, and is done without desire for the reward. In this way the Stream-entrant is said to have destroyed the fetter of 'grasping at precepts and vows' (P. *sīla-bbata-parāmāsa*; Sk.*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa*).[110]

However, there is a second, more significant sense in which the arahat has gone beyond *puñña* and *pāpa*. This is that the actions of the arahat actually do not bear any good or bad karmic fruit, because only actions conditioned by craving are thought to have any karmic fruit (*s.v.* 86-87, cited in Harvey 2000: 44). Since the arahat is beyond craving, he therefore does not do any karmically 'productive' actions. Also, only deeds motivated by greed, hatred and delusion lead to the arising of karma in the future. Deeds

motivated by non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, on the other hand, *lead to the future cessation of karma* (good or bad) (A.I. 134-5, 263).[111] If one still has traces of greed, hatred, and delusion, then acts motivated by non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion lead to fortunate karmic results. Thus, for one who is not yet an arahat (including stream-entrants or other Ariya-puggalas), who still has some degree of craving and traces of the "three fires" *trividhāgni*, acts that are motived by non-greed, hatred and delusion are *puñña*, meritorious or karmically fortuitous. They also are conducive to the eventual cessation of karma altogether. This is the state of nirvāṇa: "that stopping of bodily action, verbal action and mental action by which one touches freedom" (S.IV.i32-3; cf A.III.415, cited in Harvey 2000: 44). For the arahat, karma ceases, and thus there is no more rebirth.

Harvey and others (2000: 43; Keown 1992; Rahula 1974: 8) are careful to point out that the fact that the arahat is 'beyond *puñña*' does not not mean that the arahat is beyond *morality* or virtue. They assert rather that the idea is that the arahat's actions are spontaneously good or wholesome *(kusala)*, because all roots of what is unwholesome *(akusala),* the defilements (P.*kilesa;* Sk. *kleśa)* have been eliminated.[112] An arahat is said to be virtuous, *(sīla-vā)*, but not *sīla-maya*: not "made of *sīla"* or not "consisting in *sīla,"* (M.II.26-27).[113] Following I. B. Horner, Harvey interprets this to mean that the arahat has perfected all aspects of the Noble Eightfold Path, and thus has nothing to add to this moral and spiritual perfection: he has "no addition to make to moral habit" (M. II: 226, cited in Harvey 45). Thus perfected, the arahat is naturally and effortlessly virtuous but without any attachment to precepts and vows.

In the abhidharma literature as well one finds a similar understanding of *puṇya.* For example, the view that the arahat is beyond *puñña* is explained in the fourth

chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (ABKb), in which Vasubandhu distinguishes between two kinds of wholesome or healthy karma (*kuśala-karma).* One form of *kuśala-karma* will lead to other kinds of wholesome karma (e. g. generosity, which can lead to a cycle of exchanging gifts with other beings) and a second kind does not lead to any kind of consequence or ripening (*vipāka).* This second kind of healthy karma is achieved when one has completely eradicated the "intoxications" or "contaminations" (*āsrava*) of sense-desire (*kāma),* craving for continued existence (*bhava),* misunderstanding (*avidyā)* and opinions (*dṛṣṭi).* When this is achieved, wisdom (*prajñā)* is fully realized and the person's actions are no longer considered karma, because their actions are not the cause of future consequences (*vipāka-hetu)* (ABK 2: 57 in Hayes 1994: 24, 25, 33). Because such a person generates no more karma, once his present karma is used or burnt up he is liberated from the cycle of rebirth. In this way, only people who lack wisdom, the so-called "foolish masses" (*pṛthagjana),* perfom deeds motivated by the desire for happiness and pleasure of the senses (ABKb 3: 28). This is the kind of deed that is called "meritorious" or fruitful (*puṇya-karma).* All such actions are considered healthy or skillful in some way (*kuśala),* since only skillful actions lead to pleasant results. Yet, not all skillful actions are karmically fruitful, because as we have seen the acts of an arhant who has wisdom produce no karmic ripening, fruitful or not (Hayes 1994: 25).

As we can see in both the Pali canonical tradition and abhidharma of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, puṇya* is understood to be necessary, but not sufficient for realizing nirvāṇa. *Puṇya* is essential because it is through 'good karma' that one is reborn as a human and in a situation which will allow one the opportunity to study Dharma. However, since nirvāṇa is thought to be beyond all rebirth, the actions of an arahat, a

liberated being, do not and *cannot* be thought to have the capacity to bring further karmic fruitfulness. Hence karmically fortunate acts–that is, acts which are essentially pure but still marred by traces of impurity (the *kleśas* or *āsravas*)–will tend to lead to happiness and to pleasant states, but have a limited role on the path. They cannot alone lead to complete awakening, which requires insight or wisdom (*prajñā*) as well, since insight is what is needed to completely destroy the ignorance which is the basis for all impure, and thereby karmically 'potent' actions. Another way of understanding it is that karmically fruitful acts are essential because they lead to fortunate rebirths, but since nirvāṇa is beyond all rebirth, *puṇya* must have limited value, and must therefore be transcended.

IV. Puṇya and its problematic 'application'

When we consider all of this in light of the understanding of *puṇya* in Śāntideva's work, a major doctrinal difference surfaces. For according to Śāntideva, by the time the bodhisattva has completed the stage of purification, he is supposed to be cleansed of both any unfruitful actions (*pāpa*), *and* the impurities (*kleśas*): through realizing the emptiness of the person, he is supposed to have "cut them out by the root."[114] Consequently, his actions should not generate any more karmic ripening at all and he should, according to canonical and abhidharmic views, go beyond *puṇya*. But if so, in what way could he also be understood to build up infinite masses of 'merit' and then "apply it completely to the ripening of beings"? In other words, if an enlightened being is not supposed to have any capacity for karmic fruitfulness, how can there be bodhisattvas

who endlessly create an abundance of karmic fruitfulness, which they then share with others?

If we look at how this issue has been dealt with in the scholarship on Indian Buddhist ethics, while we find an acknowledgement that the idea of 'sharing karmic fruition' is an important aspect of the ethics of the bodhisattva, there seems to be little discussion of the implications of this idea for the understanding the workings of karma, and how it indicates a shift in understanding the role of karmic fruition on the religious path. For example, in comparing the idea of *śīla* in Mahāyāna and Theravāda, Harvey points out that dedicating karmic fruitfulness "goes beyond" simply acquiring the kinds of wholesome qualities *(kuśala-dharma)* available through the practice of the Eightfold Path, but the possible implications of this are not pursued (Harvey 2000: 131). Similarly, in descriptions of the bodhisattva path that follow the ten "stages" or "grounds" *(bhūmis),* a bodhisattva is said to become a celestial being who is no longer born according to karma at the seventh *bhūmi* (Harvey 2000: 128-130; Lopez 1988: 200-202).[115] While it is apparent that compared to the Theravāda tradition, a different view of karma and karmic ripening must be at work in the Mahāyāna, neither Lopez nor Harvey mention this. Keown also indicates that the accumulation of *puṇya* is one of the distinguishing aspects of the Mahāyāna, but this subject attracts no attention in his comparative analysis of Theravāda and Mahāyāna ethics (Keown 1992: 137, 150) .

Upon consideration, it seems that an explanation for this doctrinal discrepancy might be found in the scholarship on merit transfer *(pariṇāmanā),* since this idea is obviously closely associated with *puṇya,* and tends to be considered a Mahāyāna development which later influenced Theravāda practice. A. L. Basham, for example, in

discussing the evolution of the concept of the bodhisattva, associates it and the doctrine of merit transfer with the rise of the Mahāyāna in India.[116] However, Gregory Schopen's scholarship throws into question the idea that merit transfer was ever a strictly Mahāyāna idea. His work on donative inscriptions indicates that the notion of transfering merit goes back at least as far as the third century BCE, and that this was a Śravakayāna as well as Mahāyāna practice (1997: 35-43).[117] Despite this, it does appear that at least in terms of doctrinal emphasis evident in texts, merit transfer is something that became much more important in the Mahāyāna tradition. Thus it is possible that explanations for the doctrine of merit transfer might offer clues for understanding how the notion of karma and karmic fruition may have altered over time.

Now of course the most obvious doctrinal issue that arises in connection with merit transfer is its apparent contravention of karma theory, and the idea that the consequences of an action will be experienced by the person, or in the Buddhist case more particularly, the consciousness continuum (*citta-saṃtāna),* who committed the action. In attempting to explain this phenomenon, some scholars have suggested that the idea of transferring merit reflects a general 'loosening' of the karma doctrine. Basham, for example, suggests that merit transfer was part of a "widespread reaction, evident also in Hinduism at the time, against belief in the rigid operation of karma," (1991: 37).[118] Such a reaction is reflected in the development of the devotional (*bhakti)* traditions, whose popularity may have contributed to the acceptance of merit transfer (Basham 1991: 44).

Some authors explain the doctrine of merit transfer as the logical outcome of the Mahāyāna doctrines of emptiness (*śūnyatā)* and mind-only (*cittamātra*). As both Harvey (2000: 28) and Williams (1989: 208) point out, in a context in which all is

understood to be empty and/or mind dependent, there are no inherent owners of karmic benefit. The transference of karmic fruitfulness is possible because it is 'empty' and does not 'really' or 'ultimately' belong to a particular being, which is a fiction in any case. Thus, in this sense, as Williams says, "the notion of transference of merit fits squarely within the ontology and spirituality of the Mahāyāna."

This helps us understand why the idea arose that one could 'give away' or apply *puṇya* for something other than one's own benefit. However, this does not explain why, if a bodhisattva has overcome the delusion of self, and eliminated the *kleśas* and *āsravas,* merit should continue to be generated at all, since according to the earlier tradition, as we have seen, actions that are pure and wholesome in this way are not supposed to lead to further karmic consequences, and are even said to lead to the cessation of karma. To highlight this problem, we need only consider that the above doctrinal explanation of merit transfer could equally, if not in a slightly different form, be generated from Theravāda views: that is, a Theravādin could equally well say that since persons *(pudgala)* and selves *(ātman)*, like all composite phenomena *(saṁskṛta-dharma)* are conditioned and impermanent, they are not the inherent owners of anything, and thus the positive karmic consequences of actions can be 'shared' because, like all conditioned arisings they do not 'belong' to anyone. On this analysis, one might understand the 'transfer of merit' as simply a rather nice metaphor to indicate what happens to the effects of good actions *(puṇya)*–so called 'good karma' when the illusion of self is overcome. Since both one's actions and their effects are no longer understood to be owned, they are 'shared,' and in this sense an awakened being can give away his or her 'merit.' But this leads us back to the problem, for if merit transfer is based in the idea of no-self in this

way, then why is it that arahats in the Theravāda tradition are understood to overcome or by-pass karma and its consequences, whereas bodhisattvas in the Mahāyāna accumulate and share it without limit?

Har Dayal in his remarkably comprehensive study of *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (1970) points in the direction of an answer, I think, in his observation of the increasing importance of *puṇya* in the Mahāyāna. He suggests that in the early period of the Mahāyāna it was simply the means of securing happy rebirths, as in the Theravāda tradition, but that in the later Mahāyāna the idea arose that *puṇya* itself could lead to awakening. He cites Śāntideva as having "substituted the 'transfer of *puṇya'* for the Perfection of Wisdom *(prajñā-pāramitā)* as the final goal of the bodhisattva's career," (ŚS 31.19; Dayal 1970: 189,190). *Puṇya,* he says, thus usurps the position of wisdom. He traces this breach of the "old and approved" doctrine of Buddhism, whereby merit and demerit were strictly personal, to the influence of the more socially oriented Hinduism, and the corresponding value the Mahāyāna tradition placed on social sympathy. As a result, "the Mahāyānist nearly abrogated the old law of karma and replaced it by the new gospel of *karuṇā"* (192). He goes on to compare the Theravāda understanding of karma to the Old Testament's demand: "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," while the Mahāyāna is likened to the New Testament's gospel of love as the supreme law.

The dated language and metaphors notwithstanding, I think Dayal's emphasis on the importance of *puṇya* in Mahāyāna is certainly, as we have seen, evident in Śāntideva's work. I would question, though, the idea that merit or karmic fruition *replaces* wisdom on the path to buddhahood. Rather, as the final section of the

Śikṣāsamuccaya indicates, Śāntideva views the two things as intimately connected and equally essential, since the limitless production of *puṇya* and its complete transference to other beings is based on the ability to fully recognize the truth about the self *(ātma-tattva)* and the 'equality of self and other' *(parātmasamatā)*, and these in turn are based necessarily on recognizing emptiness. However flawed and general the explanation, though, Dayal's analysis does go some way toward highlighting at least the prominence of *puṇya* on the bodhisattva path. For a more detailed explanation of this doctrinal development we can turn to Nagao Gadjin. Through his analysis of merit transfer we can glean both a clearer understanding of this notion, and an answer to our puzzle about *puṇya.*

In a short essay on the "Usages and Meanings of Pariṇāmanā," Nagao (1991) points out that the use of this phrase in Mahāyāna texts indicates that merit could be 'transferred' or 'directed' towards full awakening *(samyaksaṃbodhi)*, or in certain instances for the purpose of "coming back" to the world of saṃsāra. In both cases, the implication is that the bodhisattva directs his karmic benefits away from his own personal gain and towards the welfare of others–one by becoming a fully awakened being, the other by offering his karmic goods to the world of sentient beings. As an example of the latter, he cites Vasubandhu's commentary on a passage from the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* (XX-XXI, verse 11) in which it is said that a bodhisattva at the fourth stage *(bhūmi)* "tranfers the [37] aids to enlightenment to saṃsāra." Nagao then quotes Sthiramati's commentary on this statement, which explains that this means that the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment are normally thought to be the cause for liberation from saṃsāra, but they

can become the cause for being born again in saṃsāra if they are "embraced" (*parigṛhīta*) by the means (*upāya*) of compassion. Sthiramati continues:

> When a bodhisattva, through compassion, practices such 37 aids to enlightenment that are contrary and adverse (*vimukha*) to *saṃsāra,* because he practices them for the sake of benefitting sentient beings by virtue of his compassion, those 37 aids to enlightenment become non-contrary to *saṃsāra* and become the cause for coming face to face (*adhimukha*) with *saṃsāra;* thus, it is stated that he transfers [the 37 aids to enlightenment] to *saṃsāra.*
>
> (Nagao 1991: 87)

Thus what are supposed to lead to liberation from the cycle of rebirth become a cause for rebirth when they are 'transformed' or 'redirected' through compassion. Based on this passage Nagao suggests that *pariṇāmanā* is the method of 'directing' merit by which bodhisattvas can decide to be reborn in the world to work for the benefit of beings. So *pariṇāmanā* essentially reflects the intention behind fruitful actions which applies them for or literally 'bends' them towards (*pari* + *ṇam*) saṃsāra, towards sentient beings, or towards full awakening.

We can find examples of both 'merit-destinations' in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*: transfering merit to awakening (*bodhipariṇāmanā*) is said to be the essence of protecting *puṇya* (33.16; BR36 and 158.6; BR 156), and there is a long passage in the context of cultivating merit (*śubha-vardhana*) in which the skillfulness (*kuśala*) and the roots of skillfulness (*kuśala-mūla*) which result from the bodhisattva path are applied to help sentient beings in various ways (296.1-11; BR 268f). Though Nagao's analysis of *pariṇāmanā* is primarily (though not exclusively) based on texts and commentators from

the Mind Only (Cittamātra) tradition of the Mahāyāna, it would seem that Śāntideva's use of the concept is very similar.

Armed with a more precise understanding of the notion of merit transfer, we are still left with one problem: if *puṇya* is a type of karmic consequence, and beings with wisdom surpass karma, how is it that a bodhisattva can keep accumulating it? Again, Nagao provides assistance. He discusses the problematic case of Śrāvakas 'converting' to the bodhisattva path: such beings, he points out, would have practiced with the aim of getting out of the cycle of saṃsāra, and would have thus eliminated the impurities *(kleśas)* which cause rebirth. This difficulty, and the solution, are described as follows (italics mine):

> Now, a śrāvaka who has trained himself in accordance with the śrāvakayāna, has already eliminated *kleśas,* the cause for re-birth in this world. A bodhisattva, however, does not eliminate kleśas for the purpose of remaining in saṃsāra, that is, not entering into nirvāṇa..., *and his compassion is nothing but a sort of a kleśa retained by him.* Therefore, for the śrāvakas who have been trained to always aspire for nirvāṇa, there is no way to be reborn in this world, except by means of *pariṇāmanā.*
>
> (Nagao 1991: 88).

Nagao's idea that Śrāvakas need *pariṇāmanā* so that they can 'transfer' the fruits of their practice away from liberation and toward the benefit of sentient beings, and as bodhisattvas they can be reborn in saṃsāra by virtue of their compassion, which "is nothing but a sort of a kleśa" (!). Further to this point, Nagao elsewhere indicates that according to the same text *(Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra)* a bodhisattva is thought to be reborn from a number of causes other than karma or *kleśas*, such as by the force of his vow

(praṇidhāna), by force of his concentration *(samādhi),* or by force of a superhuman power *(vibhutva)* (Nagao 1991; 30, 31). All of these causes can be understood as aspects of forms of the bodhisattva's willingness to be born in the world of existence (*saṃcintya-bhavopapatti)* because of his great compassion for sentient beings. It is in this way that the bodhisattva's compassion can be understood as a "sort of kleśa." That is compassion functions like a kleśa in the sense that it is what keeps the bodhisattva in the saṃsāric world.

Now we are in a position to compare Śāntideva's understanding of the notion of *puṇya* with that of his canonical and abhidharmic predecessors. We can see that while the meaning is basically the same, the function is very different. Like its Pali equivalent, *puṇya* refers to karmic fruitfulness, but it is not something to be overcome or abandoned, but rather multiplied, since it equates to happiness and benefit for sentient beings. It is not just a stepping stone on the road to liberation from saṃsāra, but, as the means by which a bodhisattva helps sentient beings, the end goal of his or her path. When a bodhisattva is cleansed of all impurities and contaminants, he does not by-pass merit but rather completely 'transforms' and redirects it *(pariṇāmayati)* and thereby produces it without limit for the benefit of others. Furthermore, for Śāntideva, the bodhisattva's capacity to remain in saṃsāra is based on his understanding of emptiness, as we find explained in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (9: 52):

> Remaining in cyclic existence for the benefit of those suffering through delusion is achieved through freedom from the two extremes: attachment and fear. This is the fruit of emptiness.

Implicit in the idea that the bodhisattva can produce merit limitlessly and apply it to benefit others is the view that their actions do produce a kind of ripening (*vipāka)*, but, because of the association of karma with ordinary rebirth, these actions cannot be called "karma" and the results cannot be called "*karma-vipāka.*" Nonetheless, it seems to me that while it initially appeared that there may be a different understanding of karma functioning in this process, in fact, the law of karma, though officially 'empty,' appears quite intact. If karma is essentially an intention (*cetanā)*, as Vasubandhu tells us (Hayes 1994: 33), then the intention here is the will to remain in saṃsāric existence because of the '*kleśa* of compassion' for other beings. It is this karma, this intention, that ripens into *puṇya.* In the form of happiness, benefit, and good fortune–as the kinds of things that alleviate suffering–*puṇya* is an essential part of the bodhisattva's *telos.*

This altered role for *puṇya* in the bodhisattvayāna makes good sense when we conisider the Mahāyāna understanding of the relationship between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. One of the characteristic doctrines of the Mahāyāna tradition is the idea that the realm of cyclic existence and the state of liberation from suffering are in fact not different. This was very clearly asserted by Nāgārjuna, Śāntideva's famous predecessor, who stated:

> There is nothing whatsoever differentiating saṃsāra from nirvāṇa.
> There is nothing whatsoever differentiating nirvāṇa from saṃsāra.
> The limit of nirvāṇa is the limit of saṃsāra.
> Between the two there is not the slightest bit of difference.
> (MMK 25: 19,20, cited in Williams 1989: 69)[119]

Since the traditions of the Pali canon and Abhidharma did in fact view saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as separate realms, they held onto the goal of stopping or escaping saṁsāra, the world of rebirth. Since the Mādhyamika tradition equated the two, there was no need to stop samsara, only the need to realize or recognize the reality of liberation within it, and then help alleviate suffering wherever it is found. *Puṇya* for the earlier tradition was ultimately problematic, because like any karmic ripening it kept one hooked in the rebirth cycle. For Śāntideva it would not present this problem, for the aim is not release from rebirth. The central importance of *puṇya* to the bodhisattva is in fact revealed very early on in the text of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, where Śāntideva asserts that bodhicitta ought to be firmly established because it is the basis of the accumulation of *puṇya*.[120] Since it is clear that for Śāntideva, as for other Mahāyānists bodhicitta itself is critical, the importance of *puṇya* is very apparent. The only possible problem with *puṇya* is the assumption that it represents actions motivated by some trace of impurity. Śāntideva seems not to have held such an idea, since we have seen that for him *puṇya* only increases once the *kleśas* have been eliminated. Thus the change in the function of *puṇya* reflects a significant change in the understanding of the goal of the spiritual life.

In sum, I have argued that *kuśala* may be understood as 'skillful,' and that this does not commit us to a utilitarian view of Buddhist ethics. I have also shown that in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, we can see examples of where *kuśala* can mean both 'skillful' and the

more generally the idea of 'good'. As such there do not appear to be any novel uses of this term in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya.* The analysis of *śīla* revealed that for Śāntideva *śīla* refers to individual or habitual 'good deeds,' particularly those that imply restraint in some way. Insofar as such deeds or habits are based in emptiness and compassion, and marked by worldly indifference, they are 'good' or 'virtuous. When one's consciousness continuum *(citta-saṃtāna)* is characterized by this quality, *śīla* is perfected. *Śīla* can also be used synonymously with *puṇya* to refer to the positive or fortunate karmic results that accrue from such behaviours. Finally, I have argued that *puṇya* should be understood as the beneficial, fortunate consequences of an action or the fortunate act itself. I have posited that because of a change in the view of the relationship between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, that whereas in the Theravāda tradition *puṇya* is something to be overcome because it represents karmic ripening, in the Mahāyāna it is something to be cultivated. In Śāntideva's tradition the happiness and fortune that *puṇya* represents is the means by which the bodhisattva helps other beings. Among other things this suggest that the idea that there is a bifurcation between what some scholars have called a "kammic ethic" aimed at accumulating good karma and a "nibbanic ethic" aimed at awakening does not apply in Śāntideva's thought.

Chapter Five: Śāntideva's morality in context

Having now described in detail Śāntideva's ethics using the structure and terminology of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Ch. 3), and analyzed the central concepts of *śīla*, *kuśala* and *puṇya* (Ch. 4), I will now consider the question of how best to characterize Śāntideva's moral thought. In Part I will offer an overview of Śāntideva's moral theory, summarizing his view of the bodhisattva's development, and comparing this with other characterizations of Theravāda and Mahāyāna ethics. Here I highlight the various ways Śāntideva's morality may be seen as a kind of virtue ethic. In Part II I look at difficulties with this characterization. This will be couched in terms of a response to current scholarly assessments of Buddhist ethics, but in particular I critically reflect on the proposition by Damien Keown that Buddhist ethics can be considered analagous to Aristotelian morality. I look at evidence for other types of moral theory present in Śāntideva's works, and attempt to answer the question, can Buddhist morality be subsumed under one comprehensive moral theory? The conclusions of this analysis are presented in Chapter Six.

Since the purpose of this chapter is to contextualize the results of this study within the field of Buddhist ethics as a whole, a few comments are in order on the state of scholarship. A survey of the literature of Indian Buddhist ethics reveals that by far the most theoretically influential work in this area has been Damien Keown's *Nature of Buddhist Ethics* (1992), which argues, as we have seen in the previous chapter, very much against a utilitarian understanding of Buddhist ethics, and very much for an Aristotelian

view. His is certainly the most systematic and thoughtful treatment available, which presents a well-developed, virtues-based model for understanding Buddhist ethics primarily on the strength of evidence from the Pali canon and Theravāda commentaries. Peter Harvey's more recent, *An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics* (2000) is to date the most comprehensive work on Buddhist ethics available, attempting to incorporate the moral thought of all three vehicles of the tradition as well as address Buddhist responses to contemporary issues. It should also be noted that though there exist many studies of Mahāyāna texts that are potentially important for the study of Indian Mahāyāna ethics, because these are general textual studies and not attempts to understand Mahāyāna moral theory per se, I have focused my attention on the available systematic treatments of Indian Mahāyāna ethics.[121] These, however, are quite rare. Aside from Harvey and Keown, I have also relied on Donald Lopez's (1988) brief but excellent comparison between the bodhisattva figure and the Christian saint, and Mitomo's (1991) review of Śāntideva's morality in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Because the aim of this work is to provide and contextualize Śāntideva's moral theory, in my discussion I primarily address those authors who have attempted to assess the moral theory at work in Mahāyāna texts. As Keown's work is by far the most theoretically significant treatment of Buddhist morality available, I will focus on responding to his views in my analysis of Śāntideva's morality.

I. Śāntideva's morality

I a. Summary of Śāntideva's vision

To summarize Śāntideva's understanding of the bodhisattva path as evident in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, recall that for Śāntideva the bodhisattva's development

begins by reflecting on the following: if everyone similarly dislikes pain and fear, on what basis can one worry about one's own pain and not that of others? (K. 1) Implicit in this question is the concept of no-self (*anātman*), and the idea that because 'I' am empty of any inherent nature, there is nothing essentially distinctive (*viśeṣa*) about me that I can justify privileging my own pain over others.[122] This rhetorical question thus lays the foundation for the bodhisattva's altruism. From the outset (K. 2) the assumption is also made that because suffering is by its very nature unpleasant, one will desire the cessation of suffering and the "ultimate happiness" (*sukhānta*), and because there is no grounds to seek one's own happiness and not that of others, one should adopt the bodhisattva path to help *all beings* realize the end of suffering. To do this one should have faith in the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and establish the altruistic aspiration for awakening (*bodhicitta*).

Echoing a sentiment characteristic of the Mahāyāna,[123] Śāntideva then asserts that the path of the bodhisattva is not only found in the rules of monastic discipline (*prātimokṣa*), but also in key points of the Buddha's sermons (K. 3). The key points are that one must first willingly give up (*utsarga*) all of one's possessions for the sake of full awakening: one's resources and pleasures, the fruit of one's deeds, and indeed one's own body and self. Only then can one proceed on the path proper, which consists of guarding, purifying, and then cultivating these 'possessions' for the sake of others. Having thus established that one is embarking on this quest with the correct, altruistic motive, the first stage of the process can begin: guarding (*rakṣā*).

As we learn at the very end of the text, guarding or protecting the self etc., means preventing unwholesome (*akuśala*) and unfortunate (*pāpaka*) qualities that have

not yet arisen from arising in the first place (356.10,11; BR 314). The primary focus of this stage is the self (*ātmabhāva*), which naturally must be 'protected' or 'taken care of' in this way before it can be of use to others. This is achieved primarily through the study of Dharma, and by staying away from certain mental, physical and verbal behaviours that are considered worthless or harmful *(anartha, pāpa)*, and a waste of time *(niṣphala)*. It also involves avoiding the kinds of people, the so-called 'bad friends' *(akalyāṇa-mitra)* that reinforce such behaviours. The kinds of activities that should be avoided include those that cause dissent and quarrelling, support a sense of superiority over or envy of others, or that lead to increased craving and loss of mindfulness. Consequently, one should maintain only good company *(kalyāṇa-mitra)* or avoid socializing altogether, taking pleasure in solitude and silence. In order to succeed in avoiding all of these things mental discipline is required, so one must have a focused, attentive, and calm mind. Interestingly, protecting the self also requires eschewing behaviours that will have a negative impact on others, such as teaching the Dharma inappropriately. For example, one should clearly avoid teaching without attending to the level and emotional needs of the student, and particularly in a way that actually dissuades them from pursuing the Dharma (e. g. BR 55, 62f, 71). Because this failure to use 'skillful means' *(upāya-kauśalya)* is described in the context of what to avoid in order to protect the self, does this mean that it is harmful to the self or to them? Given the doctrines of *anātman* and conditioned arising it makes sense that protecting the self would involve protecting the other, but it is interesting to see how concern for the other is woven into the path from its inception, dissolving from the beginning the artificial border between self and other. To preserve the objects of enjoyment *(bhoga)* one has to exercise moderation in both giving and receiving, and

guarding the fruits of one's deeds is based on overcoming the desire to personally 'own' or experience the benefits (Ks 14,15).

The next stage on the path requires purification (*śuddhi)*, which entails eliminating the unwholesome and harmful qualities that have already arisen (365.12). Again the focus is the self rather than one's possessions or merit. Here one needs to eliminate *pāpa* and *kleśa,* which are like weeds impeding one's cultivation and flourishing (K. 17,18). *Pāpa,* as we have seen, is the opposite of what is fruitful and conducive to happiness *(puṇya).* These are harmful and senseless *(anartha)* deeds associated with unwholesome qualities *(akuśala-dharma),* and an unsettled mind *(calacitta)*(161.6-17; BR 159). Of the various techniques for eliminating *pāpa,* including confessing or making them known *(vidūṣanā),* practising the opposite *(pratipakṣa),* resolving that they be eliminated,[124] and "taking refuge" *(āśraya),* the latter is perhaps most revealing. This suggests that while a Śrāvakayāna practitioner is bound to destroy all of his good habits *(śīla-skandha)* if he repeatedly indulges in misdeeds *(pāpa),* the Mahāyānist who has cultivated bodhicitta is in no such danger, and need not be overly remorseful about his faults (178.14-16; BR 174). The idea seems to be that the force of an action that will lead to harmful or unfortunate consequences *(pāpa)* is mitigated by having as one's basic *raison d'être* the aim to achieve awakening for the sake of others *(bodhicitta).* In other words, if the overall motive for one's life is altruistic, then the harmful potency of individual 'bad actions' is lessened.

The removal of impurities *(kleśa)* is a more elaborate affair, as it is based on mind training *(citta-parikarma),* and requires the support of the perfection of patience *(kṣanti-pāramitā*), enthusiasm (*vīrya-pāramitā*), and a period of time in the solitude of the

wilderness (*araṇya)* (ŚS Chs 9-11). Eliminating the defilements is based on cultivating various aspects of mental discipline. Tranquillity and concentration (*śānta, samādhi)* are needed in order to perfect meditative absorption (*dhyāna-pāramitā),* which in turn facilitates contemplation of the antidotes to the three *kleśas* of greed, hatred, and delusion (ŚS Ch. 12). The practice of the four foundations of mindfulness (*smṛti-upasthāna)* is used to foster insight into impermanence, the cultivation of compassion, and, most importantly at this stage, the recognition that all the elements of existence *(dharmas)* are empty of inherent nature (*śūnyaka)* (R 219-223). This is the ultimate basis for the elimination of the *kleśas,* for when one has seen the emptiness of all phenomena, thereafter the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-śūnyatā)* will be realized. The *kleśas* will then be 'cut off at the root' and cease to arise (242.1-6; BR 225). Through recognising emptiness, and in particular through contemplating the various positive aspects of emptiness, wisdom or insight (*prajñā)* is fully purified and meditative absorption is perfected (*dhyāna-pāramitā).* When actions stem from the basis of this insight into emptiness as well as compassion, then the beneficial consequences of one's deeds (*puṇya, śubha)* will be fully purified (K. 21b, BR 247-249). With this wisdom one will bring fairness (*sama)* and justice (*dharma)* to one's means of livelihood and thereby purify the objects of enjoyment (K. 21a).

The focus of the final stage of the bodhisattva's career is cultivation or enhancement (*vardhana).* Now that the self is protected against potentially unwholesome and harmful qualities, and fully cleansed of impurities, one can concentrate on nourishing and increasing wholesome qualities (365.14,15; BR 313). The self is enhanced through the strength or power (*bala)* that comes through service to others, while objects of one's

pleasure are enhanced through generosity (K. 23) But the focus of the path shifts now to merit (*śubha),* for as we saw in the discussion of *puṇya* in the last chapter, this is the source of happiness and good fortune that the bodhisattva directs or transfers from his own gain to that of others (*pariṇāmanā). Puṇya* is cultivated in various ways, such as practising faith (*śraddhā*), conducting the seven-limbed *pūjā* known as the Supreme worship (*anuttara pūjā),* and through the exercise of various capacities or powers (*indriya)* such as enthusiasm, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom (K. 25; 316.14,15; BR 283). But the real cause of the increase of merit in all of these cases is the bodhisattva's altruistic aspiration for awakening (*bodhicitta),* his generosity with the Dharma, and his concern for other beings in every act that he does (K. 26).

In the final section of the text Śāntideva brings together the two essential components of the bodhisattva's awakening in his treatment of *parātmasamatā*, the equality of self and other. In the description of this technique for cultivating bodhicitta Śāntideva provides us with an explicit connection between recognising emptiness and realising compassion. That is, when one sees that self and other exist only relatively, like the two shores of a river, and that self, like all things, is conditioned and impermanent, one will see the truth about the self (*ātma-tattva),* and realize that all of one's suffering stems from grasping after and for that illusion. Once this illusion is cleared away, one will be able to see that all others are as much 'the self' as one's own body-mind complex, and in this way, the suffering of others, and the good of others, will become as much a concern as one's own good and happiness (362.7). In fact, it becomes more a concern, for after all,

When the world is burning with the fire of *duḥkha*,
what pleasure can there be in one's own happiness?
If one's whole body is on fire, what pleasure is there
in one unburned nail?
loke duṣkha-âgnitapte ca kā ratiḥ s[va]sukhe bhavet |
samantād dahyamānasya nakhâdāhe 'pi kiṃ sukham ||

(361.15,16; BR 317)

Through seeing one's true nature as empty, one will also see that there is no real happiness if others are in pain. Having realized this, one ought to endeavour to eliminate suffering wherever it is found, and vow to remain in saṃsāra, undertaking the good of all beings (*sarva-sattva-artham)* (362.7).

By means of this eloquent passage from the *Tathāgataguhya Sūtra*, Śāntideva concludes his text by offering us the basis for altruism in the truth of emptiness.

I b. Initial observations

Perhaps it should not be surprising that the threefold division of the path prescribed for the bodhisattva in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* echoes a much older description of Buddhist practice, found at verse 183 (or XIV.5) of the *Dhammapada*:

Not to do any evil,
to cultivate what is wholesome,
to purify one's mind:
that is the teaching of the Buddhas[125]

That is, to refrain from "evil" or fruitless deeds (*pāpa)*, to cultivate what is positive or healthy (P. *kusala)*, and to purify the mind; these are the three principal aspects of the Buddhist path. Śāntideva in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* might be understood to be

in some ways paralleling and extensively elaborating on this three-fold view of the teaching, using Mahāyāna terminology and placed in the context of the way to become a bodhisattva.

As with other lists in the Indian context, order is significant: whereas on the *Dhammapada* formulation the process culminates in purification, Śāntideva has reversed the second and third steps, indicating that for him the culmination of the path lies in cultivating what is skillful (*kuśala*), which in his case also means cultivating *puṇya*. This seems to be an indication of what Śāntideva felt to be the key difference between the paths of the Śrāvakayāna and the Mahāyāna. Somewhat surprisingly, unlike other views of the bodhisattva path,[126] this difference does not seem to be expressed in terms of the perfections (*pāramitās*), for Śāntideva seems to think that both Mahāyānists and Śrāvakas achieve the six perfections at the level of purification (See Ch. 3, and K.22). Rather, according to the bodhisattva path as articulated in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, the principal difference for Śāntideva between these two vehicles rests on the idea that the bodhisattva generates infinite karmic fruitfulness (*puṇya*) or merit (*śubha*) for the sake and benefit of all beings, whereas the Śrāvakayānist 'stops' at the level of purification. As indicated in Chapter Three, this would appear to also reflect differences in the Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna conceptions of the goal of the spiritual path, in that the Śrāvakayāna goal is to be liberated from saṃsāra and go beyond karma, and therefore karmic benefit or *puṇya*, whereas the Mahāyāna goal is to remain in the saṃsāric cycle in order to help beings by sharing karmic benefits.

The fact that Śāntideva appears to downplay the role of the *pāramitās*[127] points also to the fact that there appears to be a considerable amount of flexibility and

variation in the conception of the bodhisattva path in Indian Mahāyāna thought. This is evident if we compare Śāntideva's threefold path of guarding, purifying, and cultivating the self, enjoyments and merit, with the bodhisattva path presented in other Indian Mahāyāna texts. For example, according to Keown (1992: 138-142) and Dayal (1932: 196, 197), the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, and the *Dharmasaṃgraha* also divide the bodhisattva's virtuous conduct (*śīla*) into a threefold scheme, but the three components of the bodhisattva's conduct are temperance or restraint (*saṃvara)*, the accumulation of skillful qualities (*kuśala-dharma-saṃgrahaka)* and 'altruism' or rendering service to beings (*sattvānugrāhaka).* Very briefly, 'restraint' entails such things as world-renunciation and strict observance of the monastic rules (*prātimokṣa)* and training precepts (*śikṣāpada*). 'Accumulating wholesome qualities' involves mental discipline, praising others for their good qualities and vigilance regarding one's own faults, and 'altruism' includes various way of assisting, comforting, and awakening other beings. Although there is evidently overlap between the contents of this scheme and that of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya,* Śāntideva's focus on guarding against and purifying oneself of unwholesome qualities, and then cultivating karmic fruitfulness (*puṇya)*, is a somewhat different view of the path, at least structurally if not functionally, and suggests that there was probably no rigid scheme or consensus as to how the bodhisattva path should proceed. Supporting this view is the fact that Śāntideva does not make much reference to the so-called "stages" or "grounds" (*bhūmis*) of a bodhisattva's career. This seven (or ten)-fold scheme is featured in such texts as the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, and the *Mahāvastu* (Dayal 1932: 270-272), for example, but the characterizations of the stages vary across texts and Śāntideva, at least, appears not to

have found them to be very significant. This divergence suggests a certain amount of malleability in how the bodhisattva path was understood to proceed, and should caution us against overly rigid descriptions of this process.

I c. The paradoxical nature of Śāntideva's morality

> [I]t seems to be the curse of Indian mentality that whenever it soars too high it lands itself in absurdity: and so the whole fabric of the philosophy of Mahāyāna ends in Nothing. (Nariman 1972: 109)

G.K. Nariman was commenting on the difficulty of reconciling the 'active compassion' advocated by the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* with the 'nihilism' of the teachings of emptiness when he made this statement. Though disagreeing with its dismissive tone and the pejorative nature of his assessment, I do think it points to something quite important, and paradoxical, about Śāntideva's moral position.

As we can see from the above description of the bodhisattva path, 'the good' on Śāntideva's view is the state of enlightenment or awakening, of which we might say the epistemic component is insight *(prajñā)* and the practical or active component is compassion *(karuṇā),* sometimes expressed as 'means'*(upāya).* Thus 'ethics' (norms of conduct and character) could be said to include not only what is normally treated under Buddhist morality, such as the monastic rules *(prātimokṣa),* virtuous conduct *(śīla)* and perfections *(pāramitās),* but also insight *(prajñā)* into the nature of reality, because insight would have to be considered an equally important feature of an awakened, and therefore 'good' being. The reason one has to cultivate ethics, or cultivate a moral character, is the same reason one must cultivate insight into the nature of reality: because

of beginningless ignorance (*avidyā)* and craving (*tṛṣṇā),* and the almost infinite number of 'bad habits' (*duḥśīla)* that have accumulated as a result. The bodhisattva path prescribed by Śāntideva can thus be understood as both a path to and at the same time an expression of awakening.

This claim that the moral path is also an "expression of awakening" is very deliberate. Given the fact that an enlightened being is primarily, and in some ways, very simply one who is 'awake' to the true nature of things as empty, there is a sense in which absolutely nothing has to 'change' in order for a being to be enlightened. Because all of reality necessarily instantiates the true nature of things as empty, all things are a source or springboard for awakening: *including* the impurities (*kleśas)*, which are otherwise said to impede awakening. This leads to the paradoxical truth that both no beings and all beings are saved, and nothing and everything has to change. All beings are inherently liberated,[128] and yet in order to realize that one is already liberated, one must follow a path to liberation (!). Moreover, ultimately, there are no beings who are helped by compassion: liberated beings do not really exist (BCA 9: 106,107), because "everything is like space" (BCA 9: 154). As such, the effort to liberate beings...

> is made in delusion (*mohataḥ)*, but for the sake of quelling
> suffering, the delusion of what has to be done *(kārya-moha)*
> is not prevented (*na vāryate).*[129]

Śāntideva's position here is that although beings are a delusion, and their liberation is therefore not real, because the perceived need to eliminate suffering is real, the deluded effort is made. Furthermore, because they lack an essential nature (*aprakṛtika)*, even the most heinous of transgressions are also wisdom (*bodhi).* The

uprooting of the *kleśas* is thus said to be like, "a head cleft in a dream" (257.11; BR 237; BR 240). The need for morality, then, is ultimately an illusion.

Richard Hayes has suggested in an article on the *Abhidharmakośa* that the Abhidharmists stopped short of stating the conclusion that karma, merit and rebirth are delusions: a conclusion he believes (rightly?) to be entailed by their position that arhants do not accumulate karma or merit and are not reborn. He further suggests that this unwillingness to admit such conclusions was yet another example in the history of religions of "philosophical rigour and integrity being compromised by the perceived need to preserve a social institution" (Hayes 1994; 38). What is very interesting about Śāntideva (like other Mādhyamika thinkers) is that he very straightforwardly in some instances admits that karma and merit, beings and liberation are delusions. And yet he argues we must *still* eliminate suffering, even if it, and the beings who think they experience it, are "illegitimate" (*ayukti)*, invalid (*aprāpta)* and illusory (*mṛṣā)*: that is, not, ultimately real. Did he do this to ensure the preservation of the Buddhist social institution? Perhaps. There are some examples in his texts of a certain degree of concern of this nature. But I find myself not quite cynical enough to believe that Śāntideva did not believe that suffering by its nature, was something to be alleviated, no matter in whom it was found and no matter that there actually are no beings to relieve. This then I take to be the paradoxical essence of Śāntideva's moral thought.

I d. Śāntideva's moral theory

Armed with a synopsis of Śāntideva's understanding of the path to bodhisattvahood, we are now in a position to describe his moral theory. In a Buddhist

context the relationship between ethics and enlightenment is key to discerning a moral theory, since, as discussed earlier, a moral theory offers an explanation of the relationship between norms of conduct and character, and the good. For Śāntideva, as for other Buddhists, the good is nirvāṇa, a state of freedom from suffering, and on the Mahāyāna conception the good is understood to incorporate freedom from suffering not only for the individual, but for all sentient beings.

For Śāntideva, the way for an individual to realize this highest goal is by overcoming the habitual physical, verbal and mental behaviours that reinforce the barriers to nirvāṇa. The primary barrier to this state is delusion (*moha*), or a failure to see things the way they are, and for Śāntideva this implies a failure to see that they are empty of any inherent nature (*śūnya*). Aversion or hatred (*dveṣa*) and attachment or greed *(rāga, lobha)*[130] are what result from this failure to see the true nature of things. Together, greed, hatred and delusion form the three root poisons or defilements (*kleśa)* which block us from the state of freedom. Thus when one has realized freedom, one overcomes these three defilements. Eliminating delusion (*moha)* implies that one has insight (*prajñā*), and can see the true nature of things as empty. As we have seen, for Śāntideva such insight is the ultimate basis for compassion. Similarly, without hatred and greed, one is necessarily non-greedy and non-hating, traits which are positively expressed in qualities such as generosity and loving-kindness (Harvey 2000: 47). In short, Śāntideva's assumption appears to be that if one is without the delusion of self, and has eliminated the habits of mind, word and deed that arise from that illusion, one becomes 'selfless' in the altruistic sense of that term. As such, one who has realized the good or nirvāṇa (or *samyak sambodhi*), would be considered without fail 'good' in the moral sense.

In terms of the relationship between norms of conduct and character and the good,[131] we can see that virtuous conduct (*śīla*), the monastic vows (*prātimokṣa*), the perfections (*pāramitās*), including insight (*prajñā*), reflect how one who is free from greed, hatred, and delusion–and thus free from suffering–thinks and behaves.[132] One realizes or actualises this good by mimicking one who has realized it. The first step is to establish the same motive or mind-state (*citta*) as a Buddha: that is bodhicitta , the intention to become fully awakened not for one's own sake, but in order to benefit all beings. The next step entails guarding against unwholesome or 'unhealthy' (*akuśala*) qualities and harmful or fruitless actions (*pāpa*), which will impede this endeavour, and then eliminating such actions and the defilements (*kleśas*) that foster them. Thereafter one should cultivate healthy qualities (*kuśala*) and good habits (*śīla*) in their stead. The norms of conduct and character reflected in the precepts, the *pāramitās*, and *śīla* are thus something like a stencil made from a sketch of the liberated being, and one follows the precepts and cultivates the perfections or virtues in order to make oneself in the likeness of a Buddha. Thus, citing the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra,* Śāntideva says, "He [the bodhisattva] will walk in the path of a Buddha's conduct" (102.13; BR 104).

From this description we can see that there are a number of good reasons why Keown (1992: 230), Harvey (2000: 50) and others (Tatz 1986: 1; Whitehill 2000: 17) have suggested that the most appropriate western analogue to Buddhist ethics is a virtue or character ethic, and in particular, Aristotelian virtue ethics.[133] Briefly, and according to Keown, Aristotle's view was that the best life for humans, or human happiness (*eudaimonia*) consists in the exercise of virtues or "exellences" of character and intellect. 'Virtues' here are understood to be settled dispositions or attitudes that habitually lead to

good action, and include on the intellectual side theoretical wisdom (*sophia)* and practical wisdom (*phronesis),* and on the 'affective' or emotional side such virtues of character (*aretai ethikai*) as courage, temperance, and generosity (Keown 1992: 63,207-209). This view is considered 'teleological,' rather than consequentialist or utilitarian, because the virtues lead to a goal or *telos* with which they are intrinsically and not just instrumentally related.[134] As a form of moral reasoning virtue ethics is distinguished from utilitarian and deontological ethics in that the central questions are about character: the right is defined in terms of what a good person would *do,* rather than in terms of duty (deontology) or maximizing good consequences (utilitarian) (Rachels 1993: 160).

In comparing Buddhist and specifically Śāntideva's moral thought with that of Aristotle, we can see a number of parallels. Like Aristotle, Śāntideva presents a morality centred on developing certain traits and dispositions that are conducive to what he conceives to be the best life for humans. Skillful qualities (*kuśala-dharma)* are cultivated because they both lead to and in some ways participate in or instantiate the goal of "awakened virtue," as James Whitehill puts it (Whitehill 2000: 20). That is, just as Aristotle's virtues are intrinsically related to the *telos* or goal of happiness (*eudaimonia),* the skillful *dharmas* of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion are qualities or dispositions that enable one to realize liberation from suffering, but are not merely a means to that goal but are also constitutive of it. 'Virtuous character' in Buddhist terms would mean having a consciousness continuum (*citta-saṃtāna)* characterized by skillful dharmas (*kuśala-dharmas).* Overall, then, the focus of Śāntideva's thought seems to be on 'what kind of person should I be?' as with other forms of virtue ethics, rather than, 'What is the right thing to do?' as with modern moral theories like deontology and utilitarianism

(Rachels 1993: 160). We can see the importance of good character in Śāntideva's emphasis on role models and the significance of one's social circumstances. Particularly at the commencement of the spiritual path one is encouraged to stay away from certain types of people and associate with "good friends" (*kalyāṇa mitras),* who exemplify good conduct (*śīla)* (See Ch.3 under self-preservation). Even the injunction to spend time in solitude is understood in terms of weaning oneself from bad habits and cultivating good ones. This emphasis on social circumstances also echoes the stress placed on the community in the virtue ethics tradition (Whitehill 2000: 31). For all of these reasons, Śāntideva's moral theory might appropriately be described as a type of virtue ethics.

One might nuance this assessment by pointing out that because the bodhisattva's every act is directed to the benefit of other beings, such that even liberation from rebirth is given up for the sake of this cause, Śāntideva's bodhisattva shows a form of extreme or "radical altruism" (Young 2002). As such his moral theory may be understood as a 'supererogatory' character ethic. As Donald Lopez says in concluding his comparison between the Mahāyāna bodhisattva and the Christian saint, "The Bodhisattva and the Buddha live in eternal devotion, not to God but to others. If to give oneself freely and utterly to others is to be the Christ, then perhaps the Bodhisattva is closer to the Christ than to the saint" (Lopez 1988: 206). Like the *Imitatio Christi* traditions in Christian ethics wherein Christ is the model for behaviour, Śāntideva's morality is primarily based on the aim of cultivating the character and life of a bodhisattva. But whereas in Aristotle's tradition it is assumed that the virtuous life will lead to the virtuous person's happiness, there is clearly a sense that a bodhisattva willingly gives up his own happiness for the good of others.[135] As Charles Eliot put it, "The simple morality, to

pursue others' happiness *at the risk of sacrificing one's own*, is "the moral side of the doctrine of *anatta* and is insisted on throughout the ethical life of the Mahayana" (1935, 133). Śāntideva thus takes the bodhisattva to be someone who gladly takes on pain and suffering if it will benefit others (BR 256,257). He declares:

> I resolve to abide in each single state of misfortune (*apāya)* through numberless future ages: and as in one abode of misfortune, so in all such abodes belonging to the worlds, for the salvation of all creatures. And why so? Because it is better indeed that I alone be in pain, than that all those creatures fall into the place of misfortune.[136]

In order to indicate the radical altruism of Śāntideva's morality we might call it a supererogatory virtue ethic. [137]

II. Just one moral theory?

II a. Gradualism

While having just suggested that overall, Śāntideva's moral theory might be characterized in terms of a virtue ethic, what I want to do is highlight aspects of this tradition that lend support to Harvey's caution that probably no one western ethical theory is adequate to capture the complexity of Buddhist morality. Harvey suggests that "the rich field of Buddhist ethics would be narrowed by wholly collapsing it into any single one of Kantian, Aristotelian, or Utilitarian models, though it agrees with each in different ways," (51). Along with this claim, Harvey also proposes what he calls a "gradualist" perspective on Buddhist ethics. He suggests that rather than being "universalist" and holding that

moral prescriptions should be applicable to all people who can understand them, Buddhism is 'gradualist' in that some ethical norms apply to all Buddhists, such as the five precepts (*pañcaśīla*), but others are relevant only to those at a higher level of commitment to the spiritual path. He offers as an example the difference between monastic and lay practitioners, pointing to the fact that monks and nuns are required to take on over two hundred precepts, whereas lay people are usually only required to follow the five basic precepts. Even if we dispute the moral relevance of all of the monastic regulations, it is evident that moral norms are different for monastics and lay people: monastics are expected to be celibate, and take on more elaborate speech precepts, for example (Saddhatissa 1997: 80; Harvey 2000: 89).[138] Although Harvey does not identify it as such, the other obvious evidence for 'gradualism' in Mahāyāna Buddhism comes via the concept of "means" (*upāya)* or "skillful means" (*upāya-kauśalya)*, which in one form of the idea permits and in some cases enjoins bodhisattvas to transgress or overlook certain precepts, given certain conditions. As Keown has stressed (1992: 150), skillful means appears to represent an important development in the Mahāyāna tradition, but in surveying the treatment of this topic in the literature on Buddhist ethics, it seems to me that the significance of *upāya* for understanding Buddhist ethics is still unclear. In what follows, I would like to explore some of the implications of this notion for Buddhist moral theory.[139]

II b. The implications of skillful means

According to Harvey there are at least five different senses of 'skillful means': (1) the perfections (*pāramitās)* other than wisdom (*prajñā)*;[140] (2) the method by which a bodhisattva is able to dwell both in nirvāṇa and saṃsāra at the same time; (3) the

Buddha's or bodhisattva's adaptation of teachings to the level of the audience; (4) the ability of bodhisattvas to manifest themselves in ways perfectly adapted to the needs of sentient beings; and, most significant for this discussion, (5) the idea that precepts can be broken if compassion requires it (Harvey 2000: 134,135). It is this latter sense of *upāya* that supports a gradualist model of Buddhist morality, for the idea seems to be that at certain points in the bodhisattva's development, precepts must be followed strictly, but that later on—and at what point is not exactly clear—a bodhisattva may transgress 'ordinary' guidelines for conduct if wisdom or compassion demand it.

To give some examples of this concept, in the context of guarding the self (*ātma-rakṣā*), Śāntideva describes that at the beginning of the bodhisattva's program,

> One who is without doubt and steadfast in the training precepts
> accomplishes the novice stage, even if he formerly had
> unvirtuous habits.
>
> *adhimukticaryā śikṣāpadeṣv acalasya nirvicikitsasya*
> *duḥśīlapūrvasyâpi sidhyati* (139.16; BR 137)

Similarly we find in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (IV.1):

> The son of the Conqueror who has in this way grasped
> firmly the aspiration for the awakening mind, should
> constantly strive not to transgress the training.[141]

This verse appears in one of the initial chapters of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, in the context of "vigilance regarding the awakening mind" (*bodhicitta-apramāda*), so both suggest that Śāntideva takes a rather conservative approach to training precepts (*śikṣāpada*) at the beginning of a bodhisattva's career.

On the other hand, he also offers fine examples of the principle that precepts and ordinary moral prescriptions may be transgressed by a bodhisattva as a form of skillful means. In the section of purification of the self (*ātma-śuddhi)*, Śāntideva cites various *sūtras* that indicate that a bodhisattva may, for example, break the rules of chastity (BR 163), eat meat (BR 131f), steal (BR 140), and even kill someone who intends to commit a deadly sin (*ānantarya-karma)* (BR 164). He may also give gifts of intoxicants and even weapons (BR 248). Such transgressions are enjoined only if the motive is compassionate, and if the act will bring benefit to sentient beings.[142] Thus in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* Śāntideva states (5: 84b):

> Even what is proscribed is permitted for a compassionate person
> who sees it will be of benefit.
> *niṣiddham apyanujñātaṃ kṛpālor arthadarśinaḥ*

Similarly in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, Śāntideva quotes from the *Akṣayamatisūtra* where it is explained that if there is a greater benefit to beings, the bodhisattva should "discard" (*nikṣipet)* the instructions (*śikṣā*) (167.2; BR 164).[143] Śāntideva takes this to the point of saying that even a fault (*āpatti)* born in passion (*rāga)* is not a fault if it is a means (*upāya)* for the benefit of others (168.11; BR 164).[144]

What does this notion of skillful means imply for Buddhist moral theory? At the very least, as we have noted, it lends support to Harvey's observation that ethical norms can change over the course of the Buddhist practitioner's training. It also supports the view that Śāntideva's morality is a form of virtue ethics, since it suggests that virtue or character considerations take precedence over moral rules. We said previously that in virtue traditions, the moral rightness of an act is primarily determined by what a virtuous

person would do, in contrast with deontological traditions where rightness is determined by accordance with moral rules, and in utilitarianism where the consequences of action decide right and wrong.[145] In the examples of *upāya* it would seem that it is the character of the virtuous person that generates the norm, and not the moral rules that determine how the virtuous person behaves. If a bodhisattva's compassion dictates that ordinary moral rules—as those of the five precepts—be contravened, then so be it. On this understanding, we can see that the moral reasoning associated with *upāya* may be understood to fit quite well with the kind of moral reasoning at work in virtue traditions.

Yet there is a way in which the doctrine of *upāya* may also be interpreted along utilitarian lines. Although he ultimately wants to reject this perspective, Keown suggested in *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics* that "the concept of skillful means (*upāya-kauśalya)* seems susceptible to analysis along AU [Act Utilitarian] lines since rules are frequently disregarded if the subsequent benefit to beings is warranted," (1992: 185). That is, the notion of skillful means seems to indicate that there is a "principle of utility" at work in the Mahāyāna, by which actions are approved or disapproved depending on whether they contribute to or diminish the happiness of sentient beings. This would be analogous to Jeremy Bentham's principle of utility, which "approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question" (Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,* cited in Keown 1992: 167). Utilitarian morality is associated closely with consequentialism, since the rightness and wrongness of actions are determined by their consequences, and this in turn lends itself to a maximizing principle, such that the right action is the one that leads to the best

consequences (Hursthouse in Crisp and Slote 1997: 219). As Keown states, the fact that ordinary moral rules may be broken if they will lead to the benefit of sentient beings seems to suggest that just such a utilitarian principle is in effect. He further suggests that *if* skillful means is taken as normative in this way, then Mahāyāna may be understood as a kind of situation ethic that incorporates a "utilitarian hybrid" (1992: 230).[146]

Keown ultimately rejects this interpretation in favour of the Aristotelian, virtues approach to Buddhist ethics, and his conclusion is in part based upon his understanding that the examples of *upāya* in which bodhisattva's break precepts—what he calls "*upāya*$_2$"—can in fact be dismissed as merely symbolic expressions of the bodhisattva's altruism, and therefore not normative guidelines for behaviour. He argues that as the "provenance of the Buddhas and Great Bodhisattvas," skillful means was never intended to be followed by ordinary practitioners, and that it is therefore an expression of the extreme value the Mahāyāna placed on compassion, but not a behavioural standard to be adopted (1992: 159,160).[147] As such, he implies that its significance for Buddhist moral theory does not have to be taken into account.

In response to this dismissal, I think we need to ask what exactly it means to say that the bodhisattva's skillful breaking of precepts is not normative. While I would agree that this form of *upāya* certainly seems not to have been intended as a guideline for the new practitioner, because as we have seen, novice bodhisattvas are enjoined to follow the training precepts quite strictly, but on the other hand, would we say that because many of the precepts apply to monastics and not lay people that they are 'not normative'? No, because if we are interested in finding out the "nature of Buddhist ethics" we will consider all kinds of moral guidelines, even those that are not universal. This is where

Harvey's gradualist approach is helpful, as it acknowledges a progression and malleability in Buddhist morality. Keown's view, by contrast, seems to artificially disregard this important feature of Mahāyāna thought. Furthermore, his claim that *upāya*$_2$ was a doctrine only intended for bodhisattvas who had reached the highest or seventh stage (*bhūmi)* and is therefore not applicable to lower level bodhisattva's is clearly not true for Śāntideva, who for one thing does not use the idea of stages to explain the bodhisattva's development, and more importantly does not, so far as I am aware, include the proviso that a bodhisattva must have perfected insight (*prajñā)* and compassion in order to break precepts, as Keown claims (1992: 154).[148] As Chappell suggests (1996: 6):

> Even though the second way [*upāya*$_2$] is described with Mahāyāna hyperbole (language which Keown referred to as mythic), it does imply that there are different attitudes, perspectives, and different values involved in the Mahāyāna practice that were meant to shape and tone ethical decisions and behaviour at the highest level.

For these reasons I think we have to take seriously the implications of *upāya*$_2$ for Buddhist moral thought, which means we also need to consider Keown's suggestion that *upāya* may indicate that some form of utilitarian theory is present in (Indian) Mahāyāna.

Assuming then that we do need to consider what *upāya* indicates for Buddhist moral theory, we should be clear, first of all, that the fact that a bodhisattva will sometimes break precepts does not in itself undermine the view that Buddhism is a form of virtue ethics. As indicated previously, in a virtue ethic the character of the virtuous agent determines the actions most appropriate to a given situation, rather than given moral rules. In all of the examples outlined above, the bodhisattva's benevolence or compassion

(*karuṇā, kṛpā*) is what impels him to transgress the ordinary moral rules, and it is because of this virtuous motive, as well as the benefit the action is assumed to bring to beings (*sattva-artha*) that the action can be considered 'right'. Because it is the bodhisattva's virtue that ensures the moral rectitude of the act, it can be understood within the framework of a virtue ethic.[149] I think perhaps Keown has confused the skillful breaking of precepts with the utilitarian perspective that moral rules and guidelines are only instrumentally valuable as a means to an end. I would suggest instead that what '$upāya_2$' illustrates is that what is important about ordinary moral rules like the five precepts is that they tend to reflect the presence of, as well as help cultivate, skillful qualities like non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion (*arāga, adveṣa, amoha*), but that the rules themselves are only *guidelines* to behaviour to help one develop such qualities. The moral rules—the five or ten precepts, the *prātimokṣa*, and anything that might come under the training (*śikṣā*) of a bodhisattva—are therefore not necessarily or inherently indicative of skillful mind states, although normally one whose mentality is skillful will act in a way that accords with those rules. In this way, one who is a novice on the bodhisattva path will be enjoined to follow those guidelines closely, but one who has or is close to eliminating all unskillful mind states will sometimes transgress those guidelines if skillfulness demands it. Therefore, because the virtue of compassion and skillful or wholesome mind states (*kuśala-dharma*) are still very much present and accounted for even in a bodhisattva who breaks precepts, the breaking of precepts is not in any way a challenge to understanding Buddhism as a virtue ethic, and it is not this that should make us wonder if Buddhism is utilitarian. Where the examples of *upāya* do *not* seem to fit well within a virtue ethic framework, however, is the sense in which the bodhisattva appears to use the maximizing

of benefit to sentient beings as a criteria for the choice of action. The reason this feature of maximizing benefit is a problem for a virtue ethic should become clear when we look at Keown's clarification of the distinction between teleological ethics, like virtue ethics, and consequentialist ethics like utilitarianism.

According to Keown the key difference between consequentialist forms of moral reasoning, as is evident in utilitarianism, and a teleological ethic such as an Aristotelian virtue ethic, is that in a teleological scheme moral 'goods,' such as virtues, are not merely a means to an end, but bear an intrinsic relationship to the end or goal (*telos)* which is sought. Thus the Aristotelian virtues of justice, temperance, etc., are not just an instrumental means to the end of *eudaimonia*, but are inherently connected to it: they "participate in and *constitute* the end" (Keown 1992: 194). He similarly argues, persuasively, that the Buddhist 'virtues' such as the precepts and *pāramitās* similarly are not merely a means to the end of nirvāṇa, but are inherently 'good' and connected to this end, because (as I have just argued) they require and encourage skillfulness (*kuśalatvā),* or the absence of impure qualities (177). Utilitarianism, by contrast, is a moral theory in which the good is defined independently of the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good. The right is only instrumentally, not intrinsically related to what is good, and is determined solely by its capacity to maximize the good. The quality of the action itself, such as the nature of the motive, plays no role in determining rightness or wrongness (178). In this way the thinking is consequentialist, because the consequences of an act alone determine whether it is right or not.

Now when the examples of *upāya* become problematic from the perspective of a virtue ethic they indicate that the bodhisattva's choice of action is

determined not only by character or motive considerations, but by the consequences—usually by the benefit (*artha*) for beings. It seemed to be true of all the examples considered, for example, that in addition to the demands of compassion, the bodhisattva is enjoined to overlook precepts if it will bring benefit (*artha)* to sentient beings. Certain examples make this criterion even clearer. Consider the passage from *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, also cited by Keown (1992: 153), in which Śāntideva explains why hatred (*dveṣa)* is a much greater fault (*āpatti)* than passion (*rāga)* (164.12; BR 161).[150] Śāntideva explains that even though a bodhisattva might actually do some good to an individual by getting angry, he is nonetheless enjoined not to because of the danger of his losing compassion for other beings. If he were to lose his compassion for others, this would result in the loss of a "great chain of benefit for beings" so it should not be done[151] (164.14,15; BR 162). In other words, though a bodhisattva might help one being through anger, because this anger might jeopardise the foundation of his compassion, which might endanger his status as a bodhisattva, which in turn might lead to the loss of benefit to a great number of beings, this should not be done. Note that it is not simply that a bodhisattva should not get angry, or that anger might cause him to lose compassion, which would be the key factor if the bodhisattva's character or virtue were the only issue, but it is the fact that there will be an overall loss of benefit to beings that is the deciding factor. Nor is it simply that a bodhisattva should be compassionate and do whatever will help others, since this would mean that showing benevolence for one being is as good as benefiting many. There is a definite sense that the bodhisattva should try to maximize the benefits to sentient beings.

We saw a similar kind of weighing of benefits in the context of discussing the preservation of the objects of pleasure *(bhoga-rakṣā).* Moderation in giving and receiving was enjoined, and Śāntideva advised that

> In the case of a bodhisattva whose capacity to benefit other beings *(arthaśakti)* is equal or greater than one's own, when giving or not giving stands in the way of their skill *(kuśala-antarāya-kara),* which is equal or greater than one's own, then it should not be done. (144.6.7; BR 142)

Here, in the case of trying to decide whether it is appropriate to give a gift to another bodhisattva, a bodhisattva is supposed to measure the relative level of skillfulness of himself and the recipient, and their respective capacities to help others, and, presumably, decide the course of action that will least hinder whoever has the greater skillfulness and power to help. Whatever else this rather cryptic statement might mean, it is clearly not the case that the criteria for the right or better choice of action is solely the character of the bodhisattva, for the generosity of the gift-giving bodhisattva appears to be assumed. The overall benefit to other beings must also be considered, and there would appear to be some kind of effort to maximize this benefit.

This kind of injunction to measure who might be able to bring the most benefit to the most beings is also seen in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (V. 86,87), in an example of which discusses the conditions under which he should sacrifice his life for another.[152] After first teaching that the body should not be harmed because it is the only way to fulfil the wishes of sentient beings (V.86), Śāntideva says furthermore that a bodhisattva should not give up his life for someone else if the other person's disposition to compassion *(karuṇā-aśaya)* is not as pure as his own. But if the other person's disposition *is* as pure,

he *should* give his life, as then there will be no loss (*na parihā)* (V.87).[153] It seems clear that the idea in these verses is that compassionate bodhisattvas are valuable beings not just because compassion is an inherently good quality—though no doubt it is—but also that compassionate bodhisattvas help sentient creatures, and the more highly developed or purer one's compassion, the more beings one can help, and the more benefit one can be. So if it comes to deciding whether or not to sacrifice one's life, one should think about what the overall benefit or loss to beings this will incur. This too indicates that determining right and wrong (or better and worse) actions is not simply a matter of having the right motive, but also of weighing consequences.

What I think these examples suggest is that the concept of virtue ethics as it is generally understood, though in many ways a very useful framework, is not adequate to capture the kind of moral reasoning that actually occurs in Śāntideva's thought. As already indicated, what is distinctive about the moral reasoning of a virtue ethic is its focus on the character of the agent to determine right and wrong. With the examples given here, I would propose that the compassionate and skillful character of the bodhisattva ensures that whatever act he does will be right, but the exact course of action he will choose—the best course of action—will depend on what he perceives will maximize the benefit to sentient beings.

II c. The merit hierarchy

Another indication that there is more than just a virtue ethic at work is the idea of 'hierarchy of merit' that is an important factor in deciding one's course of action. In the Mahāyāna such an idea is apparent in the fact that bodhisattvas are in a sense

'worth more' than other beings because they are greater or better 'fields of merit' or'fields of karmic fruitfulness' *(puṇya-kṣetra)* than other types of beings. For example, it is said that if a bodhisattva gives even one stanza of the Dharma, this is worth more karmic fruitfulness *(puṇya)* than a lay bodhisattva giving any amount of jewels to the Buddhas (144.11-14; BR 143). As well, it is said that it produces far greater merit to worship a Buddha than a Pratyekabuddha, and moreover, the offering of even one small flower by a bodhisattva whose omniscience is "untramelled" is worth more than a mass of offerings as big as Mount Sumeru through all the ages of time by an ordinary being (BR 278). My favourite example of this kind of quantification of the karmic worth of beings is from the *Praśāntaviniścayapratihārya Sūtra*, cited by Śāntideva (83.20-84.5; BR 87):

> If, (O Manjuśrī), a young man or woman were to slay all the inhabitants of India and take their goods, and if another should cause hindrance to a Bodhisat[t]va whose mind is wholly set on good [*kuśala*],or hinders his root of merit [*kuśala-mūla-antārāya*], even when he is born as an animal, if it be but the depriving of a morsel of food: the second commits an immeasurably greater crime [*pāpa*] that the first. And how is this? The hindrance to roots of merit that might have resulted in the arising of a Buddha is established *(sthita).*

Though we might tend to want to dismiss such claims as merely hyperbolic or symbolic statements expressing the elevated spiritual status of the bodhisattva, I think this would be again to overlook an important feature of Buddhist moral reasoning, since for one thing the notion of a hierarchy of merit seems to have obvious and pervasive bearing on how Buddhists behave, particularly in the area of almsgiving.

For example, the Theravāda tradition also has the idea that there are varying amounts of merit associated with beings depending on their degree of spiritual accomplishment, and that for this reason it is better to give to the being higher on the

merit hierarchy. Such an idea is present in the Pali canon (*Majjhima Nikāya* III.255-7, cited in Harvey 2000: 21):

> While a gift to an animal yields a hundred-fold, and to an unvirtuous human a thousandfold, one to an ordinary virtuous person yields a hundred thousandfold, and one to a spiritually Noble person has an immeasurable fruit.

This leads to the idea that because the monastic Saṅgha symbolises and has members who are part of the Noble Saṅgha, it is a "field of merit," to which it is beneficial to donate. [154] Such donations lead both to fruitful karmic results and spiritual benefits (Harvey 2000: 21,22).

In the idea that one should give to the Saṅgha rather than someone else because it will be more karmically 'fruitful,' we seem to see an obvious example of utilitarian-style reasoning, because the idea seems to be that one should try to maximize the karmic benefits of one's actions. That is, it is a consequentialist criteria for the best action, since karmic fruitfulness and not the motives or any other intrinsic qualities of the action or agent determine the right or best course of action. As with the example of the bodhisattva giving gifts, it is not only the generosity of the agent that matters: to put it somewhat crudely, one also considers the karmic consequences and choose the recipient that will yield the best results.[155] This focus on the consequences of actions rather than the character of the agent of course do not fit well in a virtue tradition.

One might argue that this notion of a hierarchy of merit *does* still fit within the rubric of a virtue tradition, since the amount of karmic merit one is worth is determined by one's character: the purity or holiness of the Saṅgha members is what makes them fields of merit, for example (Harvey 2000: 22), and similarly it is the

perfections (*pāramitās)* and other skillful qualities of the bodhisattvas that make them stores of *puṇya*. So we might say that this weighing of karmic merit is built within the framework of a system based on cultivating virtue, the more virtue one has, the more merit one can generate. However, I would argue that a virtue ethic will not fully explain the kind of moral reasoning that occurs, because in the examples given above associated with *upāya* and merit-making, what determined the morally best choice was not simply the virtue of the agent but what was perceived to achieve the best consequences, either in terms of benefit to sentient beings or karmic merit. To put this another way, one of the criticisms of virtue ethics is that because of their emphasis on addressing the question "What sort of person ought I to *be*?" they fail to address adequately "What ought I to *do*?" in specific situations (Louden in Crisp and Slote 1997: 205). In other words, they are weak in the realm of applied ethics, because the focus on right motive or good character underdetermines what is the best action in a given context. If I am right in my view that there is a maximizing principle at work, such that bodhisattvas act so as to maximize benefits to sentient beings, and everyone should try to maximize karmic fruitfulness, then here we seem to have a way out of the problem virtue ethics faces, but one which is not obviously part of a virtue ethics tradition.

Chapter Six: Conclusions

I. What kind of moral theory?

What then does all of this imply for the nature of Śāntideva's moral theory?

Essentially, I think these observations support the idea that the moral thought expressed in Śāntideva's writings cannot be adequately captured by any simplistic category of moral theory. So for example, to call his morality a situation ethic, as Keown suggests might be possible (1992: 185-191), would not adequately convey the central importance of the gradual cultivation of certain character qualities in his thinking. Equally, to call it an Aristotelian-type virtue ethic would not capture the fact that there is a 'utilitarian aspect' to this morality, such that a maximizing principle seems to be in effect for the bodhisattva in certain cases, and in association with the concept of merit.

In saying that there is this 'utilitarian aspect' or feature to Śāntideva's morality, let me be clear that I am not saying it is equivalent to the moral theory associated with Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill. As part of his case for understanding Buddhist ethics as analogous to Aristotelian virtue ethics, Damien Keown argued against the view that Buddhism could be understood as utilitarian (1992: 175-184). He pointed out that Buddhist ethics are not utilitarian in the sense that the right is not defined independently of the good, because nirvāṇa is the good and what is right is intrinsically related to it. If this can be understood to be what formally defines utilitarianism, then I agree that Buddhist ethics (at least Śāntideva's) are not utilitarian. On Keown's view, with which I also agree, right acts are skillful (*kuśala),* and are right

by virtue of being skillful. Thus I am not claiming that Śāntideva's morality is utilitarian in this formal sense. Let me also be clear that by suggesting that there is a form of utilitarian reasoning present I am not thereby offering support for the so-called "transcendency thesis," or the idea that morality is somehow only instrumentally valuable in Buddhism.[156] As discussed in Chapter Four (Ch. 4. I), Keown associates this idea with a utilitarian reading of Buddhist ethics, but by suggesting that there occurs a utilitarian-style maximizing of benefit I am in no way suggesting that ethics are transcended in the state of enlightenment, and I fully support Keown in his rejection of this idea. As I have already suggested, when we are speaking about a bodhisattva whose every act is skillful and compassionate, who has eliminated greed, hatred and delusion, there is clearly a sense in which all of his actions are morally good. As such, morality could not be understood to have been 'transcended.' However, I am suggesting that for a skillful and compassionate bodhisattva the main question would be, "What will be the best thing for other beings?" and it is *then* that there is a weighing of consequences in terms of the benefit for sentient beings, and an effort to maximize those benefits. Insofar as the most beneficial course of action might entail transgressing precepts and rules which are in effect guidelines for how to become skillful, this form of skillful means is an important aspect of the bodhisattva's morality. Keown is therefore right to say that right and wrong in the Buddhist case are not determined by the consequences of actions, as in utilitarianism, but we should recognize that in the case of a bodhisattva whose motives are skillful (*kuśala)* and whose actions are therefore all right in this sense, there will be a kind of consequentialism that is used to decide the *best* course of action. The notion of a hierarchy of merit complicates things even further, since it is a concept that would effect decision making all along the spiritual

path, affecting monastics and lay people, bodhisattvas and non-bodhisattvas. And as I have argued, though the merit hierarchy may be explained in terms of virtues, the moral reasoning it yields has an element of utilitarianism.

II. Is Buddhist morality homogeneous?

Do the results of this research support the notion, reflected for example in Keown's work but arguably throughout the literature on Buddhist ethics,[157] that Buddhist ethics can be treated homogeneously? At first glance, it would appear not, for despite agreeing with Keown that a virtue ethic looks like the best overall analogue to Buddhist morality, the moral reasoning of a virtue ethic does not well reflect the presence of consequentialist forms of reasoning that appear particularly to be associated with the bodhisattva and the notion of *upāya*. So if Keown is right that the ethics of Theravāda Buddhism are more strictly speaking a virtue ethic, and if I am right that Śāntideva's morality, as well as being a type of virtue ethic *also* incorporates a utilitarian style effort to maximize benefits which is not explainable in terms of virtue theory, then there is a significant difference between the two moral theories. It was also observed that a rationale of maximizing good consequences is connected with the notion of karmic fruitfulness as well, and since this phenomenon exists also in the Theravāda tradition, it may be that Theravāda too shows this mix of moral reasonings.[158] But insofar as the principle of maximizing benefit to sentient beings is a distinctive feature of the bodhisattva path, it would appear to be more associated with the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition. Future research might look at whether and to what extent arahats, bodhisattvas and Buddhas in Theravāda traditions demonstrate this kind of moral reasoning.

There may however be an explanation for this inconsonant moral mingling. I pointed out earlier that Buddhist ethics may be more comparable to an "agent-based" form of virtue ethics: one which focuses on the motives or dispositions supporting actions to judge right and wrong (See section ID of this chapter, and Slote in Crisp and Slote 1997: 240). This would correspond to the Buddhist emphasis on skillfulness (*kuśalatvā)* as the criterion for determining if an action is right. It was also pointed out that one of the criticisms of virtue ethics is that because the distinction between right and wrong in virtue traditions is based on character considerations, virtue ethics do not tend to be very good at guiding right behaviour in specific situations, or resolving practical moral dilemmas. Basically, because virtue ethics centre on how people should be they are likely to underdetermine what people should do. In an example that is very interesting from the perspective of Buddhist ethics, Michael Slote considers an agent-based moral theory which judges right and wrong according to the motive of benevolence. He says that if you attempt to adjudicate good and bad actions in terms of the goal or telos of such benevolence—namely, human or sentient happiness—then what you appear to have is not so much an agent-based morality but *act utilitarianism*! He says this is what happens when you judge actions or motives in terms of how well they live up to the goal or *telos* of the motive, rather than how well they live up to the motive itself, which is what would be the case in a strictly agent-based morality. So what we may be seeing in Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics is a shift in the focus from motive as regulative, when cultivating skillfulness (*kuśalatvā)* is key, to the *goal* of the motive as regulative, which would occur when it could be assumed that the valued motive, skillful compassion, were intact. The *telos* of the bodhisattva is universal liberation, or the elimination of suffering (*duḥkha)* for

all beings. Taking into account the distinction between the Buddhist understanding of happiness and suffering and the utilitarian, secular notion of these things, the morality of the Mahāyāna Buddhist would look very much like act utilitarianism once the bodhisattva is at a level of spiritual development where the *telos* of universal happiness is the sole focus of his behaviour. This particularly Buddhist form of utilitarianism might occasion the breaking of precepts, but contrary to Christopher Ive's (1996: 3) suggestion that this form of skillful means may be actually outside the realm of the ethical,[159] on my understanding skillful means would have to be considered very much part of the bodhisattva's moral development, and in fact would indicate (if it really were *skillful)* the highest level of moral maturity. I leave it to further work to consider the exact nature of the distinction between the secular utilitarian understanding of happiness and the happiness involved in what we might call the 'spiritual utilitarianism' of the bodhisattva.[160]

This shift from motive to goal as regulative would correspond to the changed view of karma we saw in Chapter Four. There I traced what I believe to be a difference between Śāntideva and the earlier traditions of the Pali canon and Abhidharmists in their understanding of the role of karma. I showed that whereas karmic fruitfulness *(puṇya)* is ultimately seen as something to be overcome in the earlier traditions, in Śāntideva's Mahāyāna it is the means by which the bodhisattva alleviates suffering and spreads happiness to sentient beings. As such, it is something to be cultivated (*vardhana*) and shared with others. This corresponds with a changed understanding of the relationship between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, in that for Śāntideva and the Mahāyāna, awakening was no longer seen to entail escape from the cycle of saṃsāra,

because the distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa was no longer seen to hold. Consequently, the aim of liberation from the world of karma and saṃsāra, and thereby transcending even good karma (*puṇya),* was replaced with the universal ideal of helping all beings within saṃsāra. Such help takes many forms, including the ideal way of alleviating *duḥkha* through bringing people to the Dharma, or alleviating suffering and spreading happiness by accumulating and transferring (*pariṇāmanā)* karmic fruitfulness to others.

Given this assessment, what can be said about the perhaps natural tendency to want to treat Buddhist morality as if it is of one type? First of all, let me say something about the limitations of these conclusions. The systematic study of even Indian Mahāyāna morality, much less Mahāyāna morality in general, is in its very early stages. Relying on the work of Ono Hoodoo, David Chappell has pointed out, for example, that there are at least 200 texts dealing with bodhisattva precepts associated with Indian Mahāyāna ethics (Chappell 1996: 2). As most of these have yet to be translated, much less had their moral ideas described and analyzed, we need to acknowledge that extremely narrow scope of this assessment of 'Indian Mahāyāna ethics.' As Chappell says, "Given the broad sweep of so many texts and movements, and the lack of any institutional integration, it seems premature to broadly talk about 'Mahāyāna ethics' " (1996: 8). In this sense it is equally premature to evaluate whether Buddhist ethics can be understood to be homogeneous. Having acknowledged this fact, we can assess whether Buddhist ethics are homogeneous based on the limited studies that are presently available. As stated earlier, when we look for systematic or theoretical discussions of Buddhist morality the scope is even more narrow, for Damien Keown's book stands out as the only major treatment available.

Reflecting then on the results of this study in light of Keown's work on the canonical Theravāda, what emerges is a morality best characterized within the family of virtue ethics. The basis of character and behaviour norms in both Theravāda and Śāntideva's Mahāyāna is the idea that one should cultivate certain skillful *(kuśala)* qualities which by their very nature instantiate the *summum bonum*, the hightest good, of awakening. The norms of behaviour found in the five precepts *(pañcaśīla)* and other guidelines to virtuous conduct *(śīla)* as well as the rules for monastics *(prātimokṣa)*, the perfections *(pāramitās)* and practice of the 'divine abidings' *(brahmavihāras)* can all be understood as practices and guidelines which help one to cultivate these qualities and eliminate their opposite: the so-called roots of unwholesomeness *(akuśala-mūla)* (*viz.*, greed, hatred, and delusion). Because it is evident that the aims of these traditions is to have people be a certain way that is good rather than do certain right things, they can both be described as virtue ethics. However, this does not preclude the existence of other forms of moral reasoning, since both traditions show evidence of utilitarian-type reasoning in association with the notion of a hierarchy of merit, and the practice of merit-making. Furthermore, as regards the behaviour of bodhisattvas in Śāntideva's tradition, there seems to be an actual shift into a different 'moral mode' at the higher levels of spiritual development. At the point along the development of the bodhisattva where skillfulness can be taken for granted, the focus and criterion for action becomes the overall purpose of skillfulness, which is nirvāṇa or awakening. Since nirvāṇa for Śāntideva entails awakening for all sentient beings—in contrast with the individual liberation of the Theravāda—this telos is unlimited. It thereby lends itself to a maximization, and insofar as each act of the bodhisattva becomes a means to help as

many beings as possible, it resembles act utilitarianism. In this way, although the basis or foundation in virtue and the importance of good character is never negated, it is increasingly taken for granted as the bodhisattva develops, and the moral reasoning behind his behaviour comes increasingly to resemble utilitarianism. We might call this then a hybrid form of virtue ethics, or a "utilitarian analogue" to virtue ethics.[161] In either case we can conclude that the traditions of Buddhist ethics examined in scholarship thus far can be understood to fit within the same general category of virtue theory, but that this does not preclude the presence of other forms of moral reasoning, or different forms of virtue theory.

I began this thesis with a discussion of comparative methodology (Ch. 1), and with an argument for the inevitability of using this method in a subject such as Buddhist ethics. There I said that by virtue of trying to look at Buddhism from the perspective of morality one would inescapably become embroiled in using non-Buddhist categories like consequentialism, deontology, etc., and in the messy process of trying to gauge their applicability. To close I would like to offer some reflections on the value of such an exercise.

Given the complexity involved in trying to understand even the parameters of morality in a Buddhist context, much less deciding which moral theories are evinced, one might question the fruitfulness of this kind of comparative work. We might be better off adopting Charles Hallisey's (1996) particularist approach and not look for underlying moral principles or a consistent moral theory, but simply be content to report on various examples of morally interesting texts, thinkers and narratives. In response, I would argue such an approach misses what is heuristically the very productive process of engaging in

the comparative thought. For to consider the question, "What western moral analogue fits best with these ideas?" forces one to go a step beyond mere reporting and description. For example, in Chapter Three in I summarize the text of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* using emic categories, i.e. Śāntideva's structure and terms. While that summary is an essential step in comprehending Śāntideva, it in itself does not take us very far in understanding Buddhist morality. For as I argue in Chapter One, to "do Buddhist ethics" means attempting to understand Buddhist moral theory, which in turn means understanding the relationship between the good, or nirvāṇa, and behavioural and character norms and values. Naturally this entails describing what those norms and values are, but it goes beyond that to try and see norms and values in the context of their relationship to the overall goal of the Buddhist path. This is not easy, because it requires one to look closely at the use and meaning of important terms and concepts, and the rationale behind the norms and values–the aims of Chapters Four and Five of this work. I feel confident that this process has yielded a much richer grasp of Śāntideva's thought than would be the case had I stopped in effect after Chapter Three. The danger involved with the particularist approach as I see it is thus to prematurely end the investigative work, by assuming from the outset that because moral views are always complex that no consistency can be found, and is therefore not worth looking for. I trust that the results of this thesis demonstrate the value in pressing for this consistency and in searching for the moral logic behind the complexity. The method of comparative ethics and the search for a Buddhist moral theory are thus heuristically very valuable, in the literal sense that when conducted with an openness to complexity and difference, they facilitates one's own discovery of the

material. I hope that in turn the results of this work will facilitate the discovery of Śāntideva and advance our understanding of the morality of his tradition.

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