

**Capitalizing Courage:
Sanctions Assessment and the Outcome of the Outcome**

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Abstract

While sanctions proliferated after the Cold War, concerns remain about their effectiveness and humanitarian impact. In addressing these concerns, scholars have offered diverse frameworks generally emphasizing sanctions' design or application. This thesis argues that the proper focus of concern is conceptually prior to each of these. In fact, lacking political will has been characteristic of sanctions cases and the root of sanctions' failures. Significantly, the cost-benefit calculus informing policymakers' political will has been systematically incomplete. Sanctions are often judged on their lifting, in the country on which they were imposed, yet this unreasonably crops out broader sanctions' impact. Sanctions have an understudied capacity for creating vacuums filled by indigenous influences, for lastingly restructuring societies, and for affecting human capital, each in a manner obstructive of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. This has vital policy relevance given its impact on substantive international peace and security, the breach of which initially spurs sanctions. Contemporary efforts in Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, and South Africa are explored in illustration.

Résumé

Alors que les sanctions sont des outils politiques couramment utilisés depuis la fin de la guerre froide, des doutes quant à leur efficacité de même que leurs conséquences au point de vue humanitaire persistent. Un grand nombre d'experts se sont penchés sur la question, offrant divers cadres d'analyse axés soit sur la conception ou sur les procédés d'application de ces sanctions. Ce mémoire porte sur les lacunes de telles approches. Il met en lumière la nécessité de privilégier le rôle de la volonté des acteurs politiques responsable des sanctions, ce qui représente un obstacle antérieur à ceux communément scrutés. En effet, le manque de volonté politique caractérise et cause l'échec des sanctions. D'une manière significative, le calcul coût-bénéfice qui sous-tend cette volonté est systématiquement déficient. Les évaluations actuelles du succès des sanctions, limitée à leur efficacité ponctuelle (soit lors de leur échéance), ne permettent ni de prendre en compte leurs conséquences à long terme ni d'évaluer leur impact au-delà des frontières du pays visé. À la lumière des cas de l'Iraq, d'Haïti, de la Serbie et de l'Afrique du Sud, nous suggérons que les sanctions ont une capacité sous-estimée de créer des ouvertures susceptibles à être exploitées par des influences locales, de restructurer les sociétés de façon durable et d'affaiblir le capital humain, de telle sorte qu'elles entravent le processus de reconstruction de la paix. Ce dernier est un élément essentiel à la paix et la sécurité internationales – le prétexte même des sanctions.

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I. Introduction

In the wake of the Pact of Paris, the 1928 international treaty loftily renouncing international war, a group of Americans calling themselves the Committee on Economic Sanctions gathered to demarcate its replacement. Committee member John Foster Dulles, more than twenty years before his turn as US Secretary of State, drew uncannily on issues still testing sanctions policymakers today, difficulties of balance that the seventy years of theory and policy that followed have yet to resolve.

“In devising penalties, whether they be applicable to nations or individuals, there are two essentials to bear in mind. The penalty must be sufficiently *severe*, but also it must be sufficiently *sure* of application, to operate as a deterrent. Penalties which are excessively severe, or which are excessively costly to those who are asked to apply them, generally are ignored. This fact quickly becomes apparent with the result that wrong-doers proceed with impunity.”¹

The analysis came thirteen years after Woodrow Wilson, campaigning for the League of Nations in 1919, touted multilateral boycott as a “peaceful, silent, deadly remedy.”²

Already, the “deadly” part was ruffling humanitarian feathers; Dulles adds:

“There is another important consideration which is ignored by any plan for complete non-intercourse: that is the consideration of humanity. Measures of aggression are usually initiated by some military clique. The civilian population is more often the victim than a responsible moving party. I greatly doubt that, under such circumstances, the public opinion of the world would countenance measures which would require the wholesale starvation of a civilian population.”³

Awkwardly, this concern is followed in the committee’s 1932 book with three chapters tactically outlining the food dependency of Japan, Italy, and Germany, but the message is clear; already, in the year of Iraq’s independence and seventy years before protracted, controversial sanctions would end with “shock and awe” over Baghdad, sanctions scholars had their work cut out for them.

Soon the America-less League sanctions against Italy in defence of Abyssinia would meet an ignominious fate and, later, the Cold War would dent most hope for effective multilateral sanctions for forty years. Given model conditions, however, sanctions surged to the top of the foreign policy toolbox in the early 1990s. The Soviet veto on the United Nations Security Council was no longer a threat. China was desperate to mend fences abroad after its Tiananmen Square crackdown made it a pariah. This produced ideal circumstances for sanctions to thrive. Comprehensive sanctions on Iraq were quickly followed with a run of cases; in 1992, new Security Council sanctions were imposed on the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Liberia, Somalia, and Cambodia.⁴ Seven more new cases were imposed in 1994, a paradigm shift from the two Security Council cases of the previous four decades. With no competing superpower to play sanctions' spoiler, the US weighed in with myriad new unilateral sanctions cases. Surveys⁵ reported "almost half of the 125 unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States since World War I were initiated from 1993 to 1998."⁶ A 1997 report indicated that American sanctions were threatened or imposed sixty times between 1992 and 1995, against thirty-five countries making up forty-two percent of the world's population.⁷ Between 1996 and 2001, the US reportedly imposed new unilateral economic sanctions on states eighty-five times.⁸ The 1990s were deemed the "sanctions decade" by some scholars,⁹ evoked for one "sanctioning madness,"¹⁰ and compelled one American politician to try to dispel the notion of a "sanctions epidemic."¹¹

The sweeping new reliance on sanctions in the 1990s also bore out to an alarming degree issues Dulles worried about back in 1932. Sanctions against Iraq had been imposed under arguably unprecedented ideal conditions against a purportedly ideal target

with previously unthinkable speed, comprehensiveness, and consensus. Yet, they lingered through the entire decade, ostensibly requiring massive military intervention twice, occasioning two wars. Even in lowly Haiti, the poorest state in the western hemisphere when early-nineties comprehensive sanctions were imposed upon it, a coup-leading junta did not altogether bow to sanctions pressure. The threat of military intervention there, too, is seen as the policy-turner by even the most accommodating sanctions scholars.¹² Meanwhile, sanctions' sometimes devastating humanitarian impact drew report upon report pleading for change from non-governmental organizations and from branches of the very intergovernmental organizations applying the sanctions. It appeared that something had gone quite wrong. The puzzle drew public and scholarly attention as well as a late-1990s reactive push for effective sanctions that would not wreak humanitarian havoc. The 'smart' sanctions initiative, however, has fallen short of expectations, making the field's definitive work seem a mixture of forward-looking optimism and apologetic regret.¹³ This is despite large conferences held regularly bringing together a collection of thinking on smartening sanctions, i.e., sharpening sanctions effectiveness while keeping them humane.¹⁴

We have been left, then, with the most curious of policy instruments, one that retains a persistent appeal despite its ostensibly unimpressive record. The suggestion made in the following thesis is that scholars have leapt ahead of themselves in their feverish efforts to construct the perfect sanctions instrument. Indeed, without robust political will from the policymakers who ultimately apply the instrument, the most scrupulously crafted sanctions theory can remain only that. In fact, lacking political will is virtually characteristic of sanctions cases. It is also virtually characteristic of appraisals

of failed sanctions. This being the case, smart sanctions are at an even greater disadvantage than comprehensive ones in that their sensitivity and complexity demand an even greater amount of political will.

The obstructively nebulous concept of political will, then, seems a useful starting point in advancing the sanctions research agenda. After all, it is one conceptually prior to conventional sanctions analyses, which focus almost uniformly on design or application. Political will becomes less nebulous when we note that it is inevitably tied into the cost-benefit calculus policymakers consider in adopting policy. Significantly, it will be argued here, there is reason to believe that the cost-benefit calculus applied to sanctions has been incomplete; sanctions are often judged on the day they are lifted, in the country upon which they are imposed, whereas their policy-relevant effects may persist well beyond their lifting and even beyond the boundaries of their target. These additional effects, as we will see, are pertinent to the very conception of international peace and security towards which policy thinking has been quickly evolving post-Cold War and toward which it has been more forcefully compelled after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. International peace and security are increasingly intuitively linked to sustainable human development, advanced as it is by carefully considered peacebuilding and reconstruction post-conflict. This is all the more to the point in that the sanctions imposed after the Cold War, particularly the UN sanctions, have been virtually unvaryingly applied against developing, undemocratic states engaged in conflict. As I will argue in the following thesis, those effects too rarely left out of sanctions assessment may directly impact on the prospect of building peace and reconstructing states post-conflict and post-sanctions. This, I aim to demonstrate, may

already be the case in now-completed sanctions cases. It can lead to the ironic result of sanctions as they have been applied – again where lacking political will has been virtually characteristic – actually contributing to the very problems they have been imposed to solve. I will focus primarily on Iraq and Haiti, two states currently under reconstruction after sanctions and conflict, and I will draw further on other important examples in illustration, notably South Africa and Serbia and Montenegro.

II. The Framework Fracas: A Review of the Sanctions Literature

We begin with a review of the literature. This tour of the field's grander debates should serve to demarcate the foremost thinking on sanctions. The logic underpinning this review is that, where sanctions assessment is mishandled, those imposing and designing future sanctions are at a critical disadvantage. Tensions to be addressed and weaknesses to be redressed will be flagged throughout this review section. They will ground the subsequent discussion, which will privilege a long-term view of sanctions' impact with an eye to permitting a more faithful layout of the cost-benefit calculus facing policymakers with regard to sanctions.

The principal question preoccupying a majority of the foremost sanctions scholars, proponents and opponents alike, asks: why, if sanctions are so ineffective, do policymakers keep using them?¹⁵ The responses have tackled the question from all sides: that sanctions *aren't so* ineffective, that sanctions are a certain kind of ineffective but not the kind of ineffective most worrisome to policymakers,¹⁶ that policymakers don't keep using them,¹⁷ that strictly speaking it isn't policymakers who use sanctions,¹⁸ that effectiveness is second to cost and sanctions are cheaper than war,¹⁹ that "sanctions

almost always work, but not always the way one had expected,”²⁰ or that sanctions may be ineffective but no more than the alternatives.²¹ On the latter point, Hufbauer et al. look to an ancient sanctions case, the Athenian siege of Megara predating the Peloponnesian War. They cite Thucydides, who challenged, “Someone will say it was not right. But say, then, what was.”²²

The following sketches out challenges and responses of the most prominent and prolific of sanctions scholars, the 1990s having been a watershed period in the history of sanctions’ theorizing as well as of sanctions’ application. First, we will explore what theorists mean by sanctions. While scholars critique sanctions’ effectiveness at length, their evaluations turn on these definitions of their sanctions universes. This prefaces a look at competing sanctions mechanisms, i.e., how sanctions are thought to work and how their success or failure is measured by competing sanctions frameworks. Sanctions are collections of working parts. As such, sanctions paradigms vary on many fronts. They vary greatly across units of analysis, expectations, and final evaluations. These qualitative departures are worthy of study and critique in order to understand the instrument and ultimately improve it.

The Definition Dispute: A Sanctions Discourse Primer

We begin with a comparative look at sanctions definitions. This will illuminate the variety in sanctions thinking, set up some of the loci for controversy, and serve as an introduction both to the instrument and to a discussion of how sanctions are thought to work. The term “economic sanctions” can take in vast swaths of policy or represent a restricted niche of economic policymaking, depending on the sanctions theorist. Differences in definition are the subject of heated debate among sanctions scholars,

essentially debating preferences, but these definitions have direct implications for what a successful sanctions case is meant to look like and how it is evaluated. These definitions have clear implications for determinants of success and we will explore their implications shortly.

Generally marking one end of the spectrum is sanctions scholar David Baldwin. In a 1999/2000 journal article, Baldwin defined economic sanctions as “the use of tradeoff financial policy to influence other countries”²³ and confined his discussion to negative sanctions. This differs little from the broad framework he provided in 1985, in his seminal work *Economic Statecraft*, wherein, instead of speaking in terms of sanctions, he divided statecraft generally into four categories: propaganda, diplomacy, economic statecraft, and military statecraft.²⁴ Economic statecraft is defined as “governmental influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.”²⁵ Baldwin casts this broad net intentionally, he says, “as it must be if it is to subsume all of the economic means by which foreign policy makers might try to influence other international actors.”²⁶ In a long list of examples of economic statecraft, he includes import and export controls, quotas, dumping, and tariff increases.²⁷ His universe of analysis is thus exceptionally large and has drawn criticism from his peers.

Robert Pape, one critic of Baldwin’s wide universe, outlines a definition of sanctions narrower in terms of scope and expectations. Pape distinguishes economic sanctions from both trade wars and economic wars. “Economic sanctions,” for Pape, “seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political behaviour.”²⁸ This confines expectations to changes in the target’s offending policy. The goal here is preset, in contrast to Baldwin’s

more nebulous “influence attempt.” Pape’s definition explicitly sets “a change in political behaviour” as a requirement for success.

Game theorist Daniel Drezner’s interpretation of economic coercion, a term he uses interchangeably with economic sanctions and economic statecraft, is similar to Pape’s, while still displaying some important qualitative differences. “I define economic coercion as the threat or act by a nation-state or coalition of nation-states, called the *sender*, to disrupt economic exchange with another nation-state, called the *target*, unless the targeted country acquiesces to an articulated political demand.”²⁹ That the coercion attempt as defined here explicitly takes in only *articulated* political demands clearly has implications for what counts as a case of sanctions success and how success is measured. Drezner also goes on to include cases of inducements or carrots as well as negative sanctions in his universe of analysis. It is notable as well that Drezner’s emphasis takes in the *threat* of sanctions, even when they are not ultimately imposed, as an instance of economic coercion.³⁰

Margaret Doxey’s definition of international sanctions narrows the debate in that it rules out instances of economic coercion based solely on self-interest. Doxey outlines a normative approach that argues that sanctions are “a modality for defending standards of behaviour.”³¹ She says, “International sanctions are properly defined as penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or international obligations.”³² Implicitly rejecting neo-realist conceptualizations, Doxey explicitly distinguishes sanctions from “violent or nonviolent techniques employed specifically to further the interests of one or more states at the expense of others” and from economic warfare, or attempts to impair the military capabilities of states at war, hot or cold, with the sole objective of augmenting the chances of victory.³³

Some sanctions scholars include instances of economic compulsion vigorously rejected by others. Hufbauer et al., for instance, authors of the largest collection of sanctions case studies available, include expropriation cases in their sanctions universe. Robert Pape, on the other hand, rejects their justification that political disputes underpin international expropriations cases. Pape argues that political disputes also underlie trade disputes and that “if we were to include in the sanctions universe all international economic disputes that excite political interest in any of the negotiating states, the universe would become uncountably large.”³⁴

The implications of these variations in definition become clearer as they fan out into larger sanctions frameworks. The mechanisms elaborated from these and other sanctions definitions speak to what counts as a success and to specific prescriptions for sanctions design. In turn, these have implications for who sanctions impact, how, for how long, and to what purpose.

The Mechanism Mêlée: How Sanctions Work (or Don't) and How We Can Tell

The following explores two intertwined mechanisms underpinning all sanctions theory: that of how sanctions are thought to work and that of what can be called a success. Sanctions being complex instruments allowing for vast arrays of conceptual variation, this section is structured to emphasize major fault lines in the literature. Sanctions' broad purpose, in terms of whether they are to replace warfare or to act in conjunction with military threat or force is broached first. We also explore here how theorists diverge on scope; some measure sanctions as standalone policy instruments while others have them acting as part of a package. This is pertinent to the varied opinions about the goals and functions that sanctions are purported to fulfill, a look at

which will follow. Next, we will explore theorists' divergent preferences in terms of the units of analysis they favour in exploring how sanctions work; this element is exceptionally revealing of sanctions scholars' paradigms. Further elements set out to explain the alleged path from sanctions' stimulus to sanctions' success (or ultimate failure) will follow. Next, the divergent roles ascribed to humanitarian considerations are explored, leading into a look at smart sanctions to close out the literature review.

i) The Alternative to Warfare Debate

Whether a given sanctions instance is deemed a success by a given theorist is fundamentally related to what sanctions are presumed to be meant to accomplish. The spectrum of expectations here is staggering. The question as it is evaluated today is an existential one, even a clearly affective one to some theorists, given the early twentieth-century assignment of replacing war with some other instrument per Wilson and Dulles. Theorists differ significantly in the extent to which they hold sanctions to this standard. Often paralleling this debate is that of whether sanctions are meant to be acting alone in bringing about change. Each of these intertwining debates has clear consequences for evaluations of success and each are looked at here.

At one end of the spectrum in the debate on sanctions' place vis-à-vis warfare, theorists virtually rule out the prospect of calling sanctions successful where military force has accompanied them in attempting to change a target's offending policy. Jack T. Patterson heads into an examination of the 1990 pre-Gulf War sanctions on Iraq conceptualizing them as a "humane 'alternative' to war."³⁵ Patterson's aim is to "rescue" the instrument after, in his estimation, "economic sanctions and the United Nations Charter, rather than serving as the 'threshold for peace,' became a 'trap door to war,'" co-

opted by the first Bush administration and its supporters.³⁶ Patterson's research agenda includes the question "how can sanctioning bodies develop sanctions as an alternative to armed conflict and diminish their use as a precursor to war?"³⁷ Patterson eventually concedes, though, "however much one may wish that economic sanctions alone could [end] civil wars or reverse aggression, it is unlikely that they will do so. Their fullest effectiveness will likely come in combination with a larger package that contains either military threats or non-military alternatives."³⁸ As such, Patterson, while ascribing to sanctions the function of alternative-to-war, allows that sanctions in practice may need to be part of a package of instruments. This is in contrast to Pape, who also aligns himself with the alternative to warfare approach. Pape, though, commits himself to a much stricter achievement threshold; for him, sanctions must be evaluated as a standalone instrument, their success distinct from their interaction with companion instruments.

Pape's "aim is to address the independent usefulness of sanctions."³⁹ He argues, "the principle policy usefulness claimed for economic sanctions is [as] an alternative to force."⁴⁰ Pape argues that, as such, failing "to control for the role of force" is the "most serious possible methodological error in a study of economic sanctions" as the policy-altering effect of one must be judged separately from that of the other.⁴¹ Pape vehemently opposes regarding sanctions as one of several interacting companion policies – and thereby as part of a sum weightier than its parts – in any attempt to change a target state's policy. Not surprisingly, then, Pape argues that sanctions persistently fail and that "economic sanctions have little independent usefulness for pursuit of non-economic goals."⁴² As such, he counters a too-forgiving methodology with one prohibitively

difficult when he argues that it is “especially important to distinguish which type of pressure was responsible for a particular concession.”⁴³

Pape’s thinking illustrates two different conceptual extremes in sanctions thinking. The first is his explicit conceptual distinction between the roles of military force and economic sanctions. The second is a high standard for sanctions’ strength as a policy instrument. The latter has major implications for sanctions’ assessment. It is one end of a continuum judging sanctions successful according to whether: a) sanctions had influence; b) sanctions were a prime mover in influencing change; or c) sanctions acted alone to force change. Pape tends toward the most stringent end of this continuum. Rival theorist Kimberly Ann Elliott has accused him of putting up a “straw man” for easy dispatch.⁴⁴

Elliott responds directly to Pape. She rejects looking at sanctions alone and argues against expecting sanctions to serve as an alternative to warfare outright. She contends:

“[S]anctions are seldom expected to achieve ambitious foreign policy goals in the absence of other policy tools. Nor should they be. Sanctions can be effective only if they are part of an overall coherent policy including skilled diplomacy and, where appropriate, credible threats of additional force if compliance is not forthcoming.”⁴⁵

Elliot judges sanctions on whether they “*contribute* to foreign policy outcomes rather than whether they cause them.”⁴⁶ Compared to Pape, Elliott’s standard reaches the other extreme; she says, “In our analysis, sanctions do not have to be the only or even the primary factor in producing a positive foreign policy outcome.”⁴⁷

Moreover, she tempers the conventional alternative-to-force position, ascribing to sanctions in certain instances the function of serving as an “alternative to the *indiscriminate* use of force.”⁴⁸ Additionally, though, she offers:

“However, in situations that are sufficiently serious and where the foreign policy objective is important, the possibility must be clearly communicated to the target that force will be used if necessary – to enforce the sanctions, to strategically buttress their effects, or as a last resort if sanctions fail. Sanctions imposed as an alternative to force because the political will to use force is lacking are not likely to be credible and therefore are not likely to be successful.”⁴⁹

With the latter argument, Elliott moves toward the opposite end of the warfare-sanctions spectrum; she blurs any clear conceptual distinction between economic and military coercion. This argument holds that economic force can succeed only because it implicitly threatens military force. On this thinking, military force stands as the ultimate instrument on a continuum of coercion tools, with each tool reinforced by the risk of moving further forward along the continuum. As Drezner elucidates, “The causal argument in this school of thought is that what appears to be a sanctions success is actually the product of an implicit military threat.”⁵⁰ This evidently precludes measuring sanctions success outside the confines of military success. As Drezner continues, “Sanctions, therefore, are not a true cause of concessions, but merely an observable signal of military power.”⁵¹

Others array themselves more moderately along the spectrum between sanctions-as-alternative-to and sanctions-as-indicator-of military force. Depending on the policy goal, they blend sanctions into a mix of policy alternatives to be used together in coercion attempts or individually. Each speaks to pragmatism, but these theorists still vary in approach.

For one, Cortright and Lopez note that: “Some analysts suggested that sanctions seemed to be used as a way of softening public opinion for the subsequent use of force, as a first step toward war that crippled the targeted economy and psychologically

intimidated its population.”⁵² On this argument, sanctions are a facilitating prelude to military force.

Margaret Doxey partly represents this. She argues that, although early-twentieth century sanctions were meant to replace force, their evolution throughout the century set them up both to play the role of prelude/accompaniment to force and as its alternative. Doxey, though, privileges context, arguing, “sanctions can be an alternative to the use of force because war is either impossible or inadvisable.”⁵³ Here Doxey cites the Cold War context’s “balance of terror” wherein “economic measures were realistically the only direct weapons it was safe for western powers to use against the USSR.”⁵⁴ She also argues plainly that sometimes sanctions simply fit a situation in which warfare would be considered a disproportionate reaction to an offensive move by the target.

David Baldwin cites the cost of war as reason enough in many cases to use sanctions, even where sanctions might be less effective. “[E]conomic sanctions (or diplomacy),” says Baldwin, “may be preferable to military force even when they are less likely to achieve a given set of goals – provided that the cost differential is big enough.”⁵⁵ As such, Baldwin leans toward classifying sanctions as an alternative to war, but for pecuniary rather than ideological reasons. Moreover, Baldwin demands little of the instrument; sanctions’ function here is delinked from initiating change of any sort as Baldwin holds the cost of the instrument above conventional notions of effectiveness.

Others regard sanctions and warfare as competing alternatives for humanitarian reasons. Some even suggest that putting warfare at the peak of coercive alternatives is misplaced. On the one hand, economist Peter A. G. van Bergeijk calls sanctions the

world's "ultimate non-violent instrument."⁵⁶ James M. Murphy speaks similarly in arguing that:

"For democracies, which shrink from warfare and are not very good at controlling it once it starts, sanctions serve as a substitute for the limited military campaigns of the eighteenth century: an affordable means to make one's influence felt in the world without the costs and risks of armed conflict."⁵⁷

On the other hand, Lori Fisler Damrosch and Thomas G. Weiss, both privileging humanitarian considerations, question warfare's place above sanctions as an imposing policy alternative. They essentially turn the conventional question on its head and ask whether *warfare* might be a better alternative to *sanctions*. Weiss argues:

"The calculations are tortuous and the mathematics inexact. But the challenge is to determine whether the greatest good (or the least harm) for the greatest number over the longer term would be better served by rapid and vigorous military intervention to enforce legitimate international decisions rather than slow, not necessarily less violent, economic coercion."⁵⁸

Damrosch poses similar questions, speaking hypothetically to a type of case that may call for warfare rather than sanctions on humanitarian grounds:

"We might reasonably reach this justification if the absolute impact of economic sanctions on civilians were so deleterious as to jeopardize prospects for subsistence, and if the forcible option could reasonably be predicted to avoid such adverse effects."⁵⁹

We will turn to a closer look at the role of humanitarian considerations in a later section, but it bears noting here that Damrosch and Weiss illustrate yet further attempts to situate sanctions vis-à-vis military warfare.

ii) Goals and Functions

The debates over whether sanctions should be thought of as an alternative to warfare and whether they should be assessed as standalone foreign policy instruments are inherently key elements of sanctions assessment. However, each also speaks to a broader question about goals. What goals are sanctions expected to accomplish? And against

what goals are they fit to be measured? The former question speaks to theorists' frameworks, the latter to methodology, but each is fundamentally linked to how sanctions instances are understood and judged.

It bears noting here that the methodological question looms large in the debate on goals. This is because, as many theorists argue and as we will see, some of the goals ascribed to sanctions and taken into account by theorists in their sanctions assessments are unstated. Many theorists explicitly highlight the need to probe beyond stated objectives, openly contemptuous of theorists who stop short. As Alan Dowty has asserted succinctly, "the 'success' of sanctions depends on what goals they are measured against."⁶⁰ At base, the argument is tied to the relativist perspective that, if sanctions are designed according to a set of goals, be they articulated or not, they cannot and should not be judged against goals they were not intended to accomplish. Hufbauer et al., for instance, authored the most cited work in the literature, a comprehensive, two-volume study of over one hundred sanctions cases, finding a thirty-four percent success rate.⁶¹ They explicitly set aside domestic political considerations of sanctions senders.⁶²

Others reject this methodology. Doxey, for instance, argues, "Domestic pressures and coalition politics may be more influential than target behaviour. Nor are the true objectives of sanctions always publicly articulated. One needs to look beyond (or behind) the target-related goals set out in official statements."⁶³ Methodology here evidently has vast implications for pronouncements of success or failure.

The alternative-to-warfare debate often attends to the perspective that sanctions are supposed to *solve* something. The debate centres not simply on whether sanctions and military warfare can or should act together, but, in terms of goals, sanctions in this

debate are often framed as forces aimed directly at policy change. On this thinking, sanctions are directed toward serving “instrumental goals,” in the terminology of many theorists. But sanctions scholars variously ascribe a broader range or even an entirely separate set of functions or goals to sanctions. It stands to reason that the functions sanctions are perceived to have has large implications for sanctions assessment. If a theorist argues that sanctions are not actually meant to directly provoke policy change in a target state, then proof of the absence of policy change is misplaced in assessing that sanctions instance. Moreover, if a theorist claims policy change as only one among a range of sanctions functions, absent policy change alone does not spell defeat.

“Instrumental goals” generally have pride of place in sanctions assessment frameworks. Reversing territorial aggression, reversing a coup against a democratically elected government, these sorts of goals are what most people think of when they think sanctions. Many theorists, though, importantly match them up with, or even eclipse them with, other goals to varying degrees. David Cortright and George Lopez argue, “Analyses that focus too narrowly on instrumental objectives create a misleading impression of ineffectiveness and undervalue the broader political impact of sanctions.”⁶⁴ Pape is more blunt on this point saying, “The persistent failure of sanctions suggests that states’ reasons for employing them must lie elsewhere.”⁶⁵

Generally complementing or competing with the instrumental function ascribed to sanctions is the argument, approached differently by competing theorists, that sanctions serve *symbolic* or *expressive* goals. Since expressing something is ostensibly less difficult than changing something, this aspect of sanctions frameworks evidently has vast implications for where the threshold for sanctions success is expected to lie.

Sanctions, on this thinking, are symbols. While many theorists ascribe to sanctions this expressive quality, what sanctions are able to express and to whom they are expressing it varies from one theorist to the next.

For some, sanctions' expressive quality allows them to work by reinforcing international norms; this school of thought often argues that this is especially valuable where sanctions are imposed with regard to human rights violations. Here sanctions' expression is contrasted with the message that would be sent by doing nothing. Cortright and Lopez ascribe much power to this sanctions reasoning: "Regardless of whether sanctions achieve their immediate objective of changing policy within the targeted nation, the statement of support for principles of peace and human rights that they embody can have important long-term effects in reinforcing international norms."⁶⁶ They further cite the United Nations Association of the United States observing, "even if the prospects for bringing the transgressor to heel are dim, an operational sanctions regime is worth imposing in order to stigmatize, contain, and punish the offender and thus uphold international standards."⁶⁷ As I will argue shortly, however, there is a material flaw in lines of argument in favour of sanctions imposition that disconnect the instrumental and expressive functions of sanctions.

Kaempfer and Lowenberg conceive of sanctions' signalling function differently. On their analysis, sanctions expressive function may drive domestic groups *inside the target* to bring about change. By legitimizing their cause, sanctions may galvanize internal opposition and internal opposition forces may be encouraged to provoke the desired policy change themselves. This position is most frequently advanced with regard to South Africa. Kaempfer and Lowenberg submit:

“We have seen that the threats and signals conveyed by sanctions campaigns could have the effect of diminishing the level of apartheid in South Africa, not so much because of any negative impact of the sanctions on the incomes of specific groups in South Africa, but because of increases in the relative political effectiveness of black anti-apartheid groups.”⁶⁸

They later add, “sanctions signal foreign disapproval or threats to interest groups that back the target regime.”⁶⁹

Alternatively, sanctions expressive function is conceptualized less proactively.

On some thinking, sanctions serve as a means of “doing something.” This is often considered with regard to domestic publics in the sender state or with regard to allies. As Margaret Doxey elaborates:

“Their rationale may be found in domestic or image politics, particularly a desire to show sensibility to moral issues.... Sanctions make their own point when they are merely symbolic, intended to administer a public reproof, give the appearance of doing something rather than nothing and perhaps make the sender feel good.... So do those which are designed minimally to satisfy domestic opinion or to meet an ally’s expectations of ‘solidarity.’”⁷⁰

Makio Miyagawa puts the implications of having sanctions serve to placate domestic opinion into bold relief. He argues that this has important explanatory value in the case of the forty-four year-old sanctions against Cuba. Miyagawa reasons that “Only two weeks before election day in November 1960, President Eisenhower announced the US export embargo against Cuba, probably in an effort to help the Republican candidate, Nixon.”⁷¹

James Barber also speaks to the expressive “doing something” application of sanctions: “The purpose of sanctions here is to demonstrate a willingness and capacity to act. Negatively, the purpose may simply be to anticipate or deflect criticism.”⁷² On this thinking, explains Drezner, “sanctions are symbols, their effectiveness secondary.”⁷³

Pape is skeptical in treating the “doing something” notion of sanctions, in which the instrument is applied to placate domestic opinion, submitting that it may in actuality constitute the “American way of war.” Argues Pape:

“Policymakers may escalate in order to rescue their own prestige or their state’s international reputation, and rhetoric used to justify sanctions can demonize the target regime, making publics willing to resort to more extreme measures if sanctions fail. Sanctions may even be the ‘American way of war,’ which democratic leaders may sometimes adopt in order to ‘give peace a chance’ and thus disarm criticism of the use of force later.”⁷⁴

Longtime sanctions scholar Johan Galtung is equally cynical. He argues in *Peace by Peaceful Means*:

“Diplomatic sanctions isolate the actor with whom we need most dialogue. Economic sanctions are a slow way of killing everybody except those able-bodied males who may be killed by direct violence. The two together stigmatize a country as a pariah country, readying it as a recipient of ‘all necessary means,’ abetted by the mass media.”⁷⁵

Richard Haass altogether rejects the sanctions-as-expression current. He disagrees on normative grounds, saying, “Broad sanctions should not be used as a means of expression. Foreign policy is not therapy; its purpose is not to make us feel good but to do good. The same holds for sanctions.”⁷⁶

Whether sanctions aimed at directly promoting policy change can be so readily distinguished from their expressive functions is questionable, however. Sanctions may necessarily send signals while they coerce targets more tangibly. Importantly, though, there is a danger neglected by the literature in arguing the converse position -- privileging the deceptively easy, low-success-threshold, expressive function of sanctions over the more direct policy change function of sanctions. Thomas Weiss argues, “If sanctions are largely expressive and meant to signal international disapproval of a particular regime or its abusive behaviour, for example, the solidarity of states imposing them is itself an

indicator of success.”⁷⁷ This leap is regrettable, however; Weiss’s case may be a victory for multilateralism, but it is not a categorical sanctions success. Simply put, the expressive quality of the sanctions instrument is inherently linked to its instrumental capability. If sanctions’ standing on the latter aspect wanes to the extent that they are perceived to be halfhearted and inexpensive placeholders for robust action, the signal they send to domestic and foreign audiences alike is turned on its head. Cortright and Lopez, sanctions scholars and the vanguard of the smart sanctions literature, argue that sanctions’ symbolic purposes “may be especially significant in the arena of human rights, where political and moral norms are the foundation of policy and the activation of public opinion a key element of enforcement” regardless of whether the sanctions achieve their immediate policy changing objective.⁷⁸ This line of argument is flawed, however, in neglecting the inevitable conceptual convergence of the instrumental and expressive objectives of sanctions (it is also, incidentally, an important difficulty with smart sanctions, to be discussed later). Plainly, a policy widely perceived as lax levied against a state in the name of human rights abuses clearly does not send a human rights-affirming message to the world or to a sanctions target; it does just the opposite in signalling that human rights abuses are not important enough to merit considered, potentially costly, efficacious action. The same holds laterally across any range of ostensibly positive symbols one might list as well as across the range of expression targets one might cite. Imposing sanctions against a state can placate domestic publics trusting that their state is “doing something,” but only to the extent that sanctions, at least on occasion, actually do do something. The expressive function of sanctions instances, unlike the instrument’s immediate and more direct policy change function, necessarily associates sanctions

instances across time and space; it obliges looking at sanctions instances holistically. This is all the more true and the challenge posed here intensified in direct proportion to public awareness of perceived “cases gone wrong,” such as Iraq, which earned massive media attention. While sanctions imposed immediately post-Apartheid might have had the reputational capital to placate domestic constituencies lobbying for action elsewhere, publics may be less pliable to considering sanctions “doing something” once highly mediatized cases are seen as having failed. Thomas Weiss himself pointed out in 1999 that:

“In the late 1990s, Iraq is to sanctions what Somalia was to peacekeeping in the early 1990s. Good feelings and self-congratulations have given way to less Pollyannish notions about the pluses and minuses of economic and military coercion.”⁷⁹

It follows that the expressive function needs the instrumental function, and efforts to improve the instrument cannot neglect the direct policy change functions of sanctions. Eventually, where sanctions fail in their instrumental objectives, the reputational capital that drives their expressive goals runs out. The implication is that prioritizing sanctions’ expressive function in one’s framework for assessing sanctions instances is unsustainable over time.

For some theorists, mere punishment is a key goal of sanctions. To them, punishing a target justifies calling a sanctions instance a success however short it may fall of inducing any actual policy change.⁸⁰ Yet, the privileging of punishment brings up a humanitarian issue harkening back to John Foster Dulles’ concerns. Speaking to deterrence at one point, Hufbauer et al. inadvertently illustrate a current in the sanctions literature that can neglect the ethical implications and impracticalities of relying unitary-actor conceptions of states: “It is always difficult to know when a good thrashing of one wrongdoer deters

bystanders from committing similar misdeeds.”⁸¹ However, as we will see shortly, the sheer volume of variables at play in a sanctions instance, as well as the civilian toll sanctions can take, makes talk of good thrashings objectionable.

David Baldwin also privileges imposing costs. He likens sanctions to the cost of a bulletproof vest. On this, Baldwin tells a story by Thomas Schelling:

“[He] uses the example of whether it is worthwhile for one’s adversary to spend money on a bullet if one can protect oneself with the purchase of a bulletproof vest. Schelling concludes: ‘He has wasted his money if the vest is cheap, made a splendid investment if my vest is expensive, and if asked what he accomplished by buying his bullet should have the good sense to say that he imposed a cost on me, not that he hoped to kill me and was frustrated.’”⁸²

Baldwin adds, “Likewise, when a country using sanctions fails to gain compliance but succeeds in imposing costs for non-compliance, scholars should recognize that the sender imposed costs on the target, not merely that it hoped to gain compliance and failed to get it.”⁸³ Given the significance ascribed to this punishment function, Baldwin’s threshold for speaking in terms of sanctions success is exceptionally low. He further disconnects appraisals of success from policy change based on the costs incurred by a given sanctions sender. Speaking from what he calls a “logic of choice” perspective, Baldwin argues, “techniques of statecraft that involve excessive costs should not be viewed as successful, no matter what their effects.”⁸⁴ Regrettably, this treatment of the target as a unitary actor on which is imposed an indistinct cost neglects how the target’s leadership, inevitably armed with the power of its purse, is forced to redistribute its truncated resources, likely to its benefit internally. Suffice it to flag this issue now; we will return to its implications in the case studies to follow.

Baldwin, then, allows for instances of sanctions success without a mechanism converting the economic force of sanctions into a political instrument to provoke political

change. He is not alone in this, but in allowing sanctions to remain a primarily economic instrument rather than a primarily political one, he stands to one end of a spectrum of paths invoked to explain how economic sanctions are meant to work. The notion of the path allegedly traveled to sanctions success is clearly a crucial matter in explaining sanctions theory and assessment. We turn to it now.

iii) The Players and the Path: How Sanctions (Are Supposed To) Work

It bears noting that the paths that sanctions are assumed to follow cannot be directly compared. This is due to a wide divergence in the types of analysis sanctions scholars engage in when constructing their frameworks. As we will see, divergent thinking on the actors involved and on the primary level of analysis are chief markers of difference in sanctions theory. They form the most critical building blocks for all sanctions frameworks. Who is taken into account, whose attitudes and thinking processes are given texture, and which are neglected has direct bearing on how and whether a given sanctions case is thought to work. The level a theorist chooses merits justification, but does not always get it.

It becomes quickly apparent in exploring the sanctions literature that any comparative typology of how sanctions work must also broach why they do not. The literature, given the most common overarching question of why sanctions are still used if they are so ineffective, is rife with as much analysis of how sanctions fail as how they succeed. Fans and cynics alike set out how sanctions are meant to work and the variables and players they privilege. We turn to them now.

The study conducted by Hufbauer et al. has served as a sort of benchmark for post-Cold War sanctions analysis. Their 1990 study remains the broadest study of

sanctions ever assembled. It set out to gauge the success of 115 instances of sanctions; Hufbauer et al. ultimately claim that sanctions really had not been as ineffective as thought. Indeed, on their analysis, sanctions from the early twentieth century to 1990 exhibited a success rate of 34 percent. One would be hard-pressed to find a subsequent analysis of any length or importance not citing the work of Hufbauer et al.; it is likely the most cited work in all of the sanctions literature. Yet, they are less often criticized, which is surprising given a framework that assigns a comparatively high level of success to sanctions and that, as we will see, may well do so because it assesses sanctions on arguably narrow bases.

There are various intersecting continua within sanctions analysis. Each represents a different aspect of a theorist's sanctions ideology. We have seen a few of these in the above analysis. An example with particular reference to how sanctions are meant to work is a continuum representing the imputed character of sanctions. Some conceive of sanctions as strictly economic instruments while others envisage a mechanism converting the economic substance of sanctions into a political instrument. On this point, theorists also vary in the extent to which they separate the economic and political successes of sanctions. Theorists vary, too, in the range of players they privilege and, furthermore, in the extent to which each of their players are contextualized and how.

Explored in its details, Hufbauer et al.'s analysis is primarily quantitative and economic and shies from deep contextualization. There is an effort made to consider both the sender and the target, but without probing deeply into domestic groups within either. This applies in particular to the target side. Hufbauer et al. warn against "lopsided burden sharing"⁸⁵ within the sender state and counsel its government to "design

sanctions so as not to inflict unduly concentrated costs on particular domestic groups.”⁸⁶ Yet, in Hufbauer et al., it is notable that there is little worry of lopsided burden sharing by domestic groups within the target. Indeed, to the extent that the target situation is taken into account, it is often in the aggregate. Hufbauer et al. provide a list of economic and political measures they judge to affect sanctions’ success. Most of these political variables either explore the sanctions themselves (length of imposition, type, what companion policies are used) or are macro measures on a states-as-unitary-actors model (the level of international cooperation on the sanctions, the warmth of prior sender-target relations, the relative size of the two sides’ economies).⁸⁷ Two of these variables do look squarely at the target; however, despite the theorists’ claims to the contrary, neither of these target-related variables provides much information on the target’s context. For one, “the cost imposed on the target country” is “expressed in absolute terms, in per capita terms, and as a percentage of its Gross National Product.”⁸⁸ Evidently, none of these measures can tell us very much about the state of affairs within the target. An explicit attempt at texture is made, though, for the variable “political stability and economic health of the target country.” As we will see, however, this attempt at contextualization remains token. This point is not taken up by competing theorists, although it will become clear that it bears serious attention.

Hufbauer et al. argue, “The economic and political atmosphere in the target country is critical to the outcome of a sanctions episode.”⁸⁹ They continue, “Sanctions may be redundant, productive, or useless in pursuing foreign policy, depending on the economic health and political stability of the target country.”⁹⁰ These concerns are logically valid, but Hufbauer et al.’s follow-through is minimal. They claim to

“heroically put [the difficulties of such an enterprise] to one side in devising an index to describe the overall political and economic health of the target country throughout the period of the sanctions episode and in the hypothetical absence of sanctions.”⁹¹ As such, they elucidate a three-point scale meant to measure both the political health and economic stability of target country. These are labelled “distress,” “significant problems,” and “strong and stable.” Accordingly, aside from the obvious methodological difficulties associated with devising a credible cut-off mark between “significant problems” and “strong and stable,” there is no attempt to flesh out where a state’s weaknesses lie or to elucidate power relationships among players within a state. This, as will become clear in the case studies to follow, is open to considerable criticism in terms of sanctions assessment.

Yet, for the most part, this treatment is internally consistent with Hufbauer et al.’s broader framework. Therein, heterogeneous qualities within the target are not critical for analysis because sanctions success is not presumed to hang on them. For Hufbauer et al., the target is a unit. “In theory, the target country will weigh the costs imposed by the sanctions against the benefits derived from continuing its policies – the higher the net cost, the more likely it is that the target country will alter its policies.”⁹² They argue, “Whether that threat looms large or small depends very much on relative country sizes and trade flows.”⁹³ For Hufbauer et al., economic power passes through few filters in becoming political power apt to effect policy change. They argue in the closing section of their study, “The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that if sanctions can be imposed in a comprehensive manner, the chances of success improve. Sanctions that bite are sanctions that work.”⁹⁴ They argue that “the level of costs importantly determines the

success or failure of a sanctions episode,”⁹⁵ but pay little if any attention to how those costs are distributed. They do note that:

“At most, there is a weak correlation between economic deprivation and political willingness to change. The economic impact of sanctions may be pronounced, both on the sender and on the target, but other factors in the situation often overshadow the impact of sanctions in determining the political outcome.”⁹⁶

Yet, the elements Hufbauer et al. hold to mitigate sanctions’ success generally focus on sender-side issues of lacking resolve or sanctions imposed too timidly. Where target-side issues are broached, they are paid minimal concern and it is always to counsel against a “turning the screws” approach to sanctions imposition;⁹⁷ not striking swiftly, they argue, allows a target state to mobilize nationalism, change suppliers, and find new allies.

Looking at the Hufbauer et al. benchmark study first sets up potential lines of criticism along which most sanctions theorists converge and diverge. Players, degree of contextualization, and the economic/political character that sanctions are allowed to take on matter greatly.

At the opposite end of the sanctions’ decade, in his 1999/2000 analysis, David Baldwin nearly uniformly privileges sender-side analysis in his framework. He takes up the policymakers’ mantle, arguing, essentially, that sanctions theorists who speak in terms of ideals uselessly talk past the people actually in charge of imposing sanctions. His framework, drawing on the “logic of choice,” argues that “a successful policy choice is one that maximizes the utility of the policymaker in a given situation.”⁹⁸ Sanctions confront the costs of alternative policy options in a battle for policymakers’ attention and thinking of them otherwise is unreasonable on this argument. “The more (net) value a policymaker derives from imposing sanctions, the more successful they are.”⁹⁹ He fleshes out this value in terms of five dimensions of success capturing, he says, “most of

what scholars and policymakers want to know about sanctions.”¹⁰⁰ They are costs to user, costs to the target(s), stakes to the user, stakes for the target, and effectiveness. Effectiveness is further divided into scope, weight, and domain (“the number of people (countries, international organizations, etc.) affected by the sanctions.”¹⁰¹ “Thus,” he says, “the higher the degree of sanctions impact, the wider the scope, and the larger the domain, the more effective the sanctions are.”¹⁰² The “costs to the target” dimension, as illustrated earlier with the bulletproof vest analogy, does not differentiate between elements within the target, i.e., *who* pays the costs. Most striking, though, is Baldwin’s tendency to nearly completely obviate the notion of actually changing policy in the target. Indeed, the target’s role in Baldwin’s analysis is ambiguous.

Economists William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg conceive of sanctions costs in terms of opportunity costs and are determined to contextualize both the target and the sender. They liken their public choice theory approach to Katzenstein’s bureaucratic theory approach to international relations.¹⁰³ They cast individuals and groups within the states in question as their main players. The guiding premise is, “Foreign policy is shaped by individuals within nations, not by decisions made by anthropomorphized countries.”¹⁰⁴ They take Margaret Doxey to task for anthropomorphizing, citing such reasoning as: “If the economic costs of economic measures to their instigator(s) exceeds their economic costs to the target, there should surely be compensating political benefits for the former and/or additional political costs for the latter.”¹⁰⁵ This “anthropomorphizing” is present time and again in the literature.¹⁰⁶ On these accounts, the target acts as an indivisible unit and the sanctions applied to them are thought to be effective to the extent to which they wholly confront the whole target.

Kaempfer and Lowenberg counter this thinking at the level of analysis. They argue that both the imposition of sanctions and their reception in the target depends on individual decision-makers. Their focus is on politicians, voters, bureaucrats, and interest groups. As such, they broach both clauses of the overarching question. Why sanctions are increasingly being used is attributed, to some extent, “as a part of the general proliferation of special interest legislation that is endemic to majoritarian polities.”¹⁰⁷

Kaempfer and Lowenberg link the second part of the overarching question, on sanctions ineffectiveness, to the nature of such a complex policy formation mechanism. “The political effects of sanctions are complex, instrumental, and sometimes even perverse, depending on the configuration of domestic interest groups in the target.”¹⁰⁸ They outline a conception of sanctions wherein success may actually be an accident:

“[G]iven the high costs of... harmful sanctions and the complexities of internal interest group politics in the sanctioning countries, it would be nothing short of an amazing coincidence if the sanctions policy that emerged also happened to be the most damaging to the target.”¹⁰⁹

Further applying public choice thinking to the target, they argue, “the purely economic effects of sanctions are not necessarily conducive to achieving the desired politics results and, in general, will only do so if they are designed to selectively affect some interest groups in the target nation more than others.”¹¹⁰ Given this interest group focus, Kaempfer and Lowenberg, also put faith in the signalling function of sanctions; they argue that signals sent to certain groups within the target, even where economic effects are minimal, can alter particular groups’ political effectiveness by affecting their ability to mobilize collective action.¹¹¹ Here, they argue, “the important point is that sanctions have an impact through signals or threats that is unrelated to their market or income effects.”¹¹² They argue that the signals conveyed by sanctions to groups within target

nations might be “the most important impact of sanctions.”¹¹³ It bears noting here that this analysis dates from 1992, with the imprint of Nelson Mandela’s emancipation and global anti-apartheid mobilization still fresh.

Kaempfer and Lowenberg’s attention to the target is rivalled elsewhere, although not necessarily in the same terms or with such careful complementary attention to the sender. Indeed, as a general rule, the more unfavourable an assessment of sanctions is, the more likely that the theorist pays more attention to the target’s situation. Pape, speaking directly against Hufbauer et al.’s sanctions framework, argues that out of the 115 cases surveyed by Hufbauer, no more than “five are appropriately considered successes.”¹¹⁴ Pape pays greater attention to target state coping techniques, arguing:

“Most modern states... resist external pressure. Pervasive nationalism often makes states and societies willing to endure considerable punishment rather than abandon what are seen as the interests of the nation, making even weak or disorganized states unwilling to bend to the demands of foreigners. In addition, states that have modern administrative capabilities can usually mitigate the economic damage of sanctions through substitution and other techniques. Finally, even when such capabilities are lacking and ruling elites are unpopular, they can still often protect themselves and their supporters by shifting the economic burden of sanctions on to opponents or disenfranchised groups.”¹¹⁵

Pape argues that targets can be coerced either directly, “by persuading the target government that the issues at stake are not worth the price,” or indirectly, through the target population’s pressure or a revolt installing a more conciliatory government.¹¹⁶ Still, for Pape, sanctions strength is measured in such a way that we learn little of *how* the sanctions are to affect the target. For Pape, “the most important measure of the intensity of economic sanctions is aggregate gross national product over time.”¹¹⁷

Others, generally theorists prone to contextualizing the target particularly in terms of humanitarian issues, support a bargaining model of sanctions. This, according to David Cortright and George Lopez, is to be contrasted with a punishment model.

Thomas Weiss, who puts heavy emphasis on humanitarian considerations in his work on sanctions, advocates a carrot-and-stick approach to sanctions. Referring to cooperation theory, Weiss treats sanctions as a diplomatic tool requiring “that compliance be acknowledged and reciprocated.”¹¹⁸ He advocates easing pressure in response to partial compliance in order to gain further concessions;¹¹⁹ on this point, Weiss criticized senders of sanctions against Iraq for their intransigence.

The bargaining model was also taken up by Cortright and Lopez. These preeminent and prolific smart sanctions scholars privilege the texture of the target. Their framework has the political impact of sanctions ultimately depending on internal political dynamics within the targeted country. They urge focus on what domestic groups within the target stand to gain or lose from sanctions imposition and how sanctions will affect target opposition groups.¹²⁰ “To the extent that sanctions strengthen or encourage [domestic political opposition constituencies], they are more likely to achieve success.”¹²¹ Here, sanctions are hardly an economic instrument at all; on their bargaining model, the intensity of economic damage privileged elsewhere is immaterial. “[Sanctions’] impact comes not from the severity of the economic damage they cause, but from their ability to encourage dialogue and bargaining.”¹²² They say, in contrast to Hufbauer et al., “Their bite is determined not by an objective measurement of economic pain but by the subjective response of targeted political leaders.”¹²³ It bears noting, though, that this gives rise to a regressed threshold for sanctions success well short of policy change. “We judge sanctions a success if they had a positive, enduring impact on bargaining dynamics or if they helped isolate or weaken the power of an abusive regime.”¹²⁴

Middle East specialist Tim Niblock presents some unique lines of reasoning in his book on sanctions in Iraq, Libya, and Sudan.¹²⁵ His is an exploration of how sanctions *do not* work. Contextualization of the target here is deep while sanctions are judged on a broader basis than elsewhere. Niblock explores the relationships between Iraqi clans and commercial interests with the regime and the roles of these in terms of sanctions. He takes into account the thirty-year-long “ideological formation” of the Iraqi population under the Baa’ath Party in explaining the impact of sanctions on the popular consciousness.¹²⁶ He argues that Iraq sanctions were buttressing the Iraqi government by “weakening civil society and emphasizing state power.”¹²⁷ Most importantly in Niblock’s framework, however, is that this extreme contextualization of the target situation is combined with a broader assessment of sanctions. Where other sanctions scholars, as we have seen, ranged along a wide spectrum measuring sanctions against their economic punishment effects, their ability to open up a dialogue, their ability to change policy, and their norm-reinforcing potential, Niblock additionally looks at a bigger picture. Through his three sanctions case studies, Niblock purports to assess “the role of sanctions in fostering the creation of a stable international order.”¹²⁸ We will return to Niblock momentarily. Suffice it to note for now that his sanctions assessments are generally unfavourable.

iv) Humanitarian Considerations: Where The Civilians Fit In

The role ascribed to humanitarian considerations in sanctions cases provides other fault lines in the literature. While concern for civilian health and safety in sanctions cases, as we have seen, was flagged as early as the 1930s, the 1990s policy prominence of sanctions and their acute humanitarian impact, especially in Iraq, virtually made

humanitarian concerns a compulsory ingredient of new sanctions literature. No longer marginalized in sanctions theory, how to reconcile them within sanctions policy has become a major dilemma of sanctions scholars. Yet, the treatment of humanitarian concerns and their allotted place on the sanctions agenda differ. Where humanitarian concerns are given particular attention, they are treated at turns as either moral issues or practical issues. Put differently, there is deviation in the degree to which sanctions scholars keep sanctions effectiveness and their humanitarian impact conceptually separate.

On the morality perspective, theorists speak of the “moral obligation” of sanctions senders to ensure sanctions do not violate fundamental human rights.¹²⁹ Patterson’s sanctions working group concluded, “sanctioning nations must recognize the importance of universal human rights as a standard when judging the morality of the sanctions regime. The group recognized the importance and value of establishing global norms or ‘world order values’ for evaluating whether and how to impose sanctions.”¹³⁰ The language used on the morality perspective sometimes parallels that used in arguments for just war. International law specialist Lori Fisler Damrosch similarly concentrates on outlining “principled standards” upon which to judge the extent to which a given sanctions case is justified in generating humanitarian suffering.¹³¹

The outcome of these morality-based treatments of humanitarian considerations in sanctions application tends to be hard-to-measure cut-off points for humanitarian distress. Patterson, for instance, offers: “A line must be drawn when deaths are knowingly inflicted.”¹³² Damrosch, for her part, proposes, “A program of economic sanctions should not diminish the standard of living of a significant segment of society below the

subsistence level.”¹³³ Here, then, sanctions’ humanitarian impact and effectiveness are conceptually completely separate.

Others, though, root at least some of their attention to humanitarian considerations in pragmatism. Here, the conceptual convergence of effectiveness and humanitarian impact is a matter of degree; the role ascribed to avoiding injurious humanitarian impact in making sanctions effective differs in breadth.

For one, humanitarian considerations are sometimes seen as essential in the coalition-building process. Of the theorists falling into this category, Cortright and Lopez argue most strongly for it. Directly linking humanitarian concerns to sanctions effectiveness, they say:

“When sanctions cause severe humanitarian hardships and impose unacceptable suffering on the most vulnerable, political support for these measures declines, which may erode the international cooperation that is so vitally necessary for the effective implementation and enforcement of sanctions. Mitigating adverse humanitarian consequences is thus linked to the challenge of improving sanctions effectiveness. To be more effective, sanctions must also be more humane.”¹³⁴

Richard Haass similarly argues, “Mass hardship can also weaken domestic and international support for sanctions.”¹³⁵ Haass also argues that sanctions’ humanitarian impact is a practical matter in citing their “undesired effects” – “including strengthening the regime, triggering large-scale emigration, and retarding the emergence of a middle class and a civil society.”¹³⁶

Cortright and Lopez assert importantly that, “There is no direct transmission mechanism by which social suffering is translated into political change.”¹³⁷ They argue that a regime can “redirect the hardship onto isolated or repressed social groups while insulating power elites.”¹³⁸ This pushes the convergence between avoiding humanitarian hardship and effectiveness further along.

It does bear noting, however, that extreme humanitarian hardship is not a sanctions deal-breaker, even for those who argue that avoiding humanitarian suffering has some role to play in making sanctions more effective. Some sanctions scholars – among them Haass and Cortright and Lopez – emphasize who is to blame for humanitarian hardship. As Haass argues, “Sanctions... should not necessarily be suspended if the humanitarian harm is the direct result of cynical government policy, such as Iraq’s, that creates shortages among the general population in order to garner international sympathy.”¹³⁹ On this thinking, if the target government manipulates the sanctions regime to its advantage and contributes to humanitarian suffering, the sending government is absolved of humanitarian responsibility. This defies logic, however, in that it neglects that sanctions are routinely applied to oppressive, authoritarian states precisely because their leadership has acted in bad faith; it can hardly be surprising that the good faith demanded of those very leaders is not forthcoming. This weakness will be explored further in the case studies to follow.

James Murphy puts this paradox well, saying, “As pointed out by the House of Commons Committee on International Development in January 2000, the West is left in the curious position of needing Saddam’s cooperation to insure that sanctions work to his disadvantage.”¹⁴⁰ For their part, Cortright and Lopez spend one-tenth of their lengthy article in *The International Journal of Human Rights* arguing, “The most important causes of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq have been the actions of the government of Iraq.”¹⁴¹ As well as: “The Iraqi government has used the limited resources at its disposal to consolidate its power through military repression rather than to address the needs of children suffering from malnourishment and preventable disease.”¹⁴² Finally, though,

they are more flexible than Haass as they argue abruptly that UN Security Council members were not relieved of their responsibility in Iraq and that the UN had an obligation to adjust its policies.

The notion that effectiveness can in some capacity be tied to *avoiding* humanitarian hardship is by no means dominant in the literature. Indeed, it has often allowed that humanitarian hardship itself *promoted* sanctions effectiveness. This is evident in the predominant impulse in the literature, which sees a trade-off to be made between, as Thomas Weiss puts it, “political gain and civilian pain.”¹⁴³ Here, humanitarian considerations are concessions. Patterson, for one, in setting moral principles limiting sanctions, concedes that, “When extreme or complete sanctions are avoided, the time it will take for sanctions to be effective is further extended.”¹⁴⁴

Cortright and Lopez argue that this trade-off notion is misconceived and that the humanitarian-sanctions nexus in the literature is better viewed on a continuum.¹⁴⁵ They justify this by arguing that: “The issue of sanctions effectiveness and humanitarian impact are intimately interconnected.”¹⁴⁶ They say political gain and civilian pain cannot be analyzed separately. Their continuum is outlined as follows:

“On the one end of the scale, sanctions are expected to generate some level of inconvenience and discomfort within the targeted society to help persuade targeted political leaders to alter objectionable policies, but they do not cause widespread hardships. Toward the middle of the continuum, the bite of sanctions is intensified sufficiently to cause serious disruption within the targeted country and to induce compliance by regime leaders, but civilian suffering stays within ethically tolerable limits and does not threaten life or cause severe deprivation. At the far end of the continuum, sanctions pressures intensify beyond the point of necessary political impact and cause intolerable suffering among vulnerable populations.”¹⁴⁷

As is evident in their language, Cortright and Lopez eschew moving toward the far end of this continuum. “The art of sanctions statecraft lies in applying sanctions that are

sufficiently forceful to persuade targeted leaders to move toward political compliance while avoiding severe humanitarian impacts that undermine the viability of the policy and of the instrument itself.”¹⁴⁸ In other words, on this thinking, the humanitarian impact of sanctions has utility up to a point – what that point is is up for difficult debate – but severe humanitarian impact erodes sanctions effectiveness. “Sanctions,” they argue, “need only cause sufficient hardship and discomfort to motivate the targeted authorities to enter into a bargaining process.”¹⁴⁹

Cortright and Lopez’s conception of sanctions’ humanitarian impact is particularly salient as they are at the vanguard of the smart sanctions movement.¹⁵⁰ A prescriptive movement, smart sanctions have endeavoured to revolutionize the way the sanctions instrument is used. It epitomizes the burgeoning concern for humanitarian considerations in sanctions scholarship; we turn to it now.

Smart Sanctions: Promise Without Prowess?

Smart sanctions were a reaction to the deleterious humanitarian impact of sanctions seen, in particular, in Iraq and the other comprehensive sanctions cases of the 1990s. Smart sanctions scholars’ task is to design sanctions that avoid humanitarian suffering while being as effective or more so in effecting policy change. Cortright and Lopez’s edited volume *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (2002) has been called “the definitive resource on the subject.”¹⁵¹ Their copious efforts in promoting smart sanctions policy virtually qualify them as lobbyists; they have been called “the leading lights” in the debate.¹⁵² Yet, their work outlining smart sanctions remains suffused with defeats once sanctions are taken from looking good on paper into the actual policy environment; it is a collection of relatively mild achievements and disappointed “if

onlys.” In the section that follows, I outline the thinking behind smart sanctions, draw from the missed experiences as recounted by the movement’s strongest advocates themselves as well as other smart sanctions scholars, and then move into critique.

Cortright and Lopez speak of “twin impulses – to reduce unintended humanitarian consequences and enhance political effectiveness.”¹⁵³ On their definition:

“a smart sanctions policy is one that imposes coercive pressures on specific individuals and entities and that restricts selective products or activities while minimizing unintended economic and social consequences for vulnerable populations and innocent bystanders.”¹⁵⁴

They endeavour to alter the cost-benefit calculus of targeted elites in order to convince them to change tack through more effectively applied pressure.¹⁵⁵ Cortright and Lopez outline four types of targeted sanctions: financial sanctions (assets freezes and financial restrictions), boycotts of specific commodities, travel sanctions, and arms embargoes. With smart sanctions, there is an effort to move away from cookie-cutter comprehensive sanctions in favour of custom measures. “The design of each sanctions episode must be unique, based on a strategic analysis of the political, economic, and social dynamics of the targeted regime. The key to effectiveness is precise targeting and strategic selection.”¹⁵⁶

They make no promises of eliminating negative humanitarian consequences, arguing that sanctions inherently produce economic and social disruption, but they say that selective sanctions produce more limited hardship than comprehensive sanctions. Cortright and Lopez straightforwardly concede that their criteria for success are “rather modest;” in judging success, they ask three questions:

“Did sanctions help convince the targeted regime to comply at least partially with the senders’ demands? Did sanctions contribute to an enduring, successful bargaining process leading to a negotiated settlement? Did sanctions help to isolate or weaken the military power of an abusive regime?”¹⁵⁷

Beyond this relatively low threshold for sanctions success, they further temper expectations by arguing that: “By themselves sanctions cannot be expected to achieve major policy objectives. They are limited tools of influence.”¹⁵⁸

Yet, even on this minimal standard, sanctions success, and especially targeted sanctions’ success, is low. Cortright and Lopez apply their threshold to fourteen cases of United Nations sanctions from the period 1990 to 2001. The cases broached are Iraq, Yugoslavia (1992-5), Libya, Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and five cases of stand-alone arms embargoes against Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia (1998), and Ethiopia/Eritrea. They argue that five of these – Iraq, the first Yugoslavia case, Libya, Angola, and Cambodia – were at least partially effective. When the cases are broken down to take account of whether they were comprehensive sanctions or targeted sanctions, though, this five of fourteen success rate becomes a three of four rate for comprehensive sanctions. Cortright and Lopez point out that only two of ten targeted cases could be deemed successful. Indeed, none of the arms embargoes were deemed successes. Notably, one of these “partial successes” is Angola – however, scholars often qualify the Angola case arguing that sanctions against rebel group UNITA cumulated until they were virtually comprehensive.¹⁵⁹ That the first chapter of this work is entitled, “Targeted Financial Sanctions: Smart Sanctions That *Do Work*” provides an indication of targeted sanctions underwhelming record. Moreover, while this chapter praises the work of financial sanctions and progress of anti-money laundering efforts, notably in the United States with its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the need for cooperation and to keep ahead of the launderers is marked. Here Cortright et al., outline successes regarding offshore banking and the use of Specially Designated Nationals lists

by major banks. They also illustrate challenges. An ostensibly major impending problem is pointed out:

“the ‘disintermediation’ of banks, the replacement of traditional financial institutions by direct seller-to-buyer transactions via the Internet or other electronic means. The proliferation of cyberpayments, cybercredit, and other emerging forms of electronic money further complicated the task of implementing financial sanctions.”¹⁶⁰

It bears noting that Cortright and Lopez outline no problem-solving efforts for this problem, although contributor Richard Newcomb mentions that interdiction software can make electronic transfers easier to detect, not more difficult.¹⁶¹ Yet, while advances have been made in foiling international money laundering, ruses as simplistic as the use of false identities can still confound the vanguard of investigators.¹⁶² Some scholars point out similar enforcement problems with regard to travel sanctions. Richard Conroy cites enforcement problems with regard to the absurd *noms de guerre* used by Sierra Leonese junta members.¹⁶³ Human Rights Watch voices a similar concern with regard to travel sanctions and bank account freezes on Angolan rebel group UNITA:

“Part of the problem has been the lack of quality information provided to the UN by Luanda. Human Rights Watch has seen a 1998 list, which records names of UNITA officials like ‘General Tarzan,’ with no further details, such as age, passport details, and so forth. Such flimsy lists will not help the better implementation of sanctions.”¹⁶⁴

Tostensen and Bull illustrate how much further there is to progress with a remarkable account of smart sanctions against Afghanistan:

“If designated airlines are targeted, rather than instituting a general ban, identification problems arise. For instance, the travel sanctions imposed on the Taliban in Afghanistan simply refer to the target as any aircraft ‘owned, leased, or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban.’ Who are the Taliban? Are they an unambiguous entity? The majority of those who could arguably be included among the Taliban have never been photographed and their identity is not known internationally. In view of these difficulties it is somewhat surprising, therefore, that a background paper prepared by the UN Sanctions Secretariat of the Department of Political Affairs states that ‘the language of resolution 1267

(1999) is much clearer and better focused than that of previous resolutions imposing similar measures.”¹⁶⁵

Throughout the Cortright and Lopez volume, national legislation facilitating sanctions, or the lack thereof around the world, is explored at length. Policy recommendations are delivered for “putting more teeth in arms embargoes”¹⁶⁶ or properly using travel sanctions;¹⁶⁷ these accompany a look at 1990s sanctions cases explaining their limited effect, poor application, and countless violations. There is repeated acknowledgement throughout that, for these targeted sanctions to work, a concerted multilateral effort is absolutely necessary. Yet, little effort is directed toward recommending how to boost political will for sanctions – which, logically speaking, must be causally prior to sanctions design and implementation.

Another critique of Cortright and Lopez’s volume, and of smart sanctions generally, comes from Drezner. He notes in a book review, “Unfortunately, even if the implementers of smart sanctions become more sophisticated, smart sanctions are still likely to be a noble failure.” He points to a remark on arms embargoes made by contributor Michael Brzoska, that: “The increase in the costs of weapons procurement may lead to a major shift in government spending priorities and a consequent reduction in the economic well-being of the general population in the targeted state.”¹⁶⁸ With this and other such examples laid out in the volume, Drezner says, “In short, all sanctions impose costs on innocents.”¹⁶⁹ Indeed, taken further, we can see how this arms embargo example might even give a targeted government greater liberty and leverage than comprehensive sanctions in deciding which ill-favoured domestic constituency to shift the cost burden upon. And smart sanctions themselves may be de facto comprehensive when financial sanctions call for blocks on investment that naturally strike at private companies not

affiliated with the regime. Drezner also points out another of what he calls a “serious theoretical problem” with the smart sanctions concept: that “embargoes targeting a coterie of the regime’s supporters may merely reinforce group cohesion rather than weaken support for the government.”¹⁷⁰

Some categories of smart sanctions have earned facetious reproach from sanctions scholars. In a smart sanctions review article, Brzoska notes that participants in the Bonn-Berlin Process, two German Foreign Office-sponsored conferences on arms embargoes, agreed that travel bans are “little more than a nuisance to decisionmakers. Denying a targeted individual the freedom to shop in Paris or be treated in a hospital in London is not likely to induce major policy change.”¹⁷¹ Brzoska posits, “The danger with smart sanctions is that the naïve theory of ‘political gain through economic pain’ is substituted by a similarly naïve theory of ‘political gain through nauseating the powerful.’”¹⁷²

Richard Haass’s critique of smart sanctions, although flippantly worded, also bears emphasis. He writes, “‘Smart’ or ‘designer’ sanctions, which penalize leaders while sparing the general public, are only a partial solution. It is possible that Haiti’s military leaders were bothered by the fact their families could no longer shop in Florida.”¹⁷³ Haass illustrates the impression – and, as argued, impression counts – that targeted sanctions are weak measures. Haass adds as well, speaking to logistics, that “opportunities to employ effective sanctions with precision are rare. Gathering the necessary information about assets, and then moving quickly enough to freeze them, can often prove impossible.”¹⁷⁴ He adds that smart targeting is all the more difficult in the case of authoritarian states run by a few people. All of this, of course, assumes that political will is strong at the outset.

Drezner, a sanctions scholar himself, demonstrates that the 1990s support for comprehensive sanctions has not fully ceded to the smart sanctions bandwagon. He calls Iraq an exception and argues:

“If the goal of sanctions is containment, then a smart sanctions approach might make sense. If the goal is to compel a change in the target’s behaviour, then in the long run comprehensive sanctions might be the more humanitarian approach. Given that comprehensive sanctions impose more significant costs on the target state, they have the potential to induce quicker concessions than targeted embargoes.”¹⁷⁵

Drezner is not alone in privileging the older guard of comprehensive sanctions versus smart sanctions. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat hangs the decision on the nature of the targeted regime. She lists states with “democratic regimes, strong political oppositions and industrialized, atomized societies” as those for which partial measures may suffice.¹⁷⁶ However, she argues, “centralized economies, authoritarian regimes, rural societies and countries with weak political oppositions and no trade or capital market dependencies should probably be hit immediately with comprehensive sanctions.”¹⁷⁷ It bears noting here that the latter qualities are associated with each of the states deemed in breach of international peace and security against which UN sanctions have been imposed during their unprecedented post-1990 run -- Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia.

In sum, then, smart sanctions exemplify a move in sanctions thinking towards putting humanitarian considerations first and contextualizing the target in order to customize out more effective measures. However, it is worth noting that this may have come at the expense of contextualizing *the sender*; what is meant to drive senders to the necessary concerted action is left unclear. Smart sanctions elevate the importance of political will in advancing complex and costly policy recommendations, yet scholars

persistently neglect efforts to close the political will gap already apparent with comprehensive sanctions. Tostensen and Bull, after a lengthy critique of smart sanctions and the policy recommendations advanced at a long series of major conferences beginning in the late-1990s, are skeptical:

“Yet, the optimism expressed in some academic circles and among decision makers at national and international levels appears largely unjustified. While smart sanctions may seem logically compelling and conceptually attractive at face value, they are no panacea. The operational problems -- due to persistent technical inadequacies, legal loopholes, institutional weaknesses budgetary and staff scarcities, and political constraints -- are daunting.”¹⁷⁸

Each of these daunting operational problems are, at base, issues of political will. Smart sanctions’ policy recommendations themselves are not necessarily deficient, however, before closing the political will gap, recommending them may be.

III. Capitalizing Courage: Sanctions Assessment and the Role of Political Will

While most sanctions theorists decry the ineffectiveness of sanctions as a foreign policy tool, only a minority explicitly sees unfixable, inherent flaws. For most sanctions scholars, the failure of sanctions is attributed to varying degrees of misapplication. This vast stock of misapplication, though, is question begging. Indeed, if it is the norm that sanctions are poorly applied or not followed through, one wonders whether misapplication is not itself an inherent feature of the instrument. For instance, speaking to sanctions evasion, Hufbauer et al. aptly remark, “It could be said that a sieve leaks like a sanction.”¹⁷⁹ Although offered in jest, the sentiment suggests more of a rule than a collection of exceptions.

In general, save the economists Kaempfer and Lowenberg, theorists lament misapplication; they consistently hold out hope that the sanctions may have worked had

they been imposed properly or designed properly. As we have seen, this is a particular concern with smart sanctions. This is ironic because smart sanctions are a reactive project; they explicitly seek to redress flaws that have become apparent over time in conventional sanctions.

“Smart,” targeted measures seek to promote a laudable humanitarian agenda where those responsible for an offensive policy are targeted rather than the blameless masses they most often rule over. With smart sanctions, again and again, their design is praised and their regular failure attributed to poor execution. Cortright and Lopez say bluntly, “The experience of the 1990s confirms that sanctions have no chance of succeeding without a credible enforcement effort and concerted international cooperation. Whether sanctions are comprehensive or selective, general, or targeted, their political impact depends on effective implementation.”¹⁸⁰ Compared to comprehensive sanctions, smart sanctions may aim at controversially menial tasks – travel sanctions, for instance, being matters of inconvenience more than major policy-swaying threats; yet, even on those responsibilities they tend to founder. Most often, the missing link is political will. Issa Diallo, UN Special Envoy for Angola, made the point in 1999 with regard to the little being done to enforce the arms embargo against UNITA:

“There is a lack of political will. The financial assistance was there. The general way was there. But the political way was not there. And you can multiply the financial contribution made by ten. You will not be successful if the political will is missing.”¹⁸¹

This is scarcely revelatory; smart sanctions proponents themselves lament lacking political will for sanctions. I contend, though, that this is an inherent feature of the instrument as it is conventionally conceived. It is a function of the instrument’s breadth; non-participation is detrimental to economic coercion in a way that does not apply to

military coercion. Where warfare may prefer cooperation, sanctions applied to a hostile state toward a significant goal virtually *require* seamless multilateralism; multiplying the necessary players, though, introduces additional friction. Moreover, this is required without the arguable built-in constituency of a military-industrial complex to lend it a consistent voice. Sanctions success, in many of its incarnations, is inherently linked to strong political will. In coalition-gathering, in pressing for humanitarian considerations, in designing efficient sanctions with policy relevance, in quashing sanctions-busting, in keeping a consistent level of enforcement over time, and even in definitively *lifting* sanctions, political will rules. Its absence is a deal-breaker. Yet, sanctions scholars direct their prescriptive efforts at the instrument itself rather than at changing the causally prior and intervening political will environment. The effectiveness cart is put before the political will workhorse. Resolving this requires understanding how policymakers are thinking and what influences their will. For this, we can learn much from David Baldwin's analysis.

Taken as a framework whole, Baldwin's cost-privileging logic of choice perspective seems unsatisfactory. Surely, one might think, there must be more to sanctions than how much they cost; whether they achieve any substantive policy change must have some value in assessing sanctions success. Taken as suggestion, though, Baldwin's take on sanctions is extremely instructive. Arguing in terms of ideals, as he suggests, *is* insufficient, if only because a selected policy is ultimately the result of a favourable cost-benefit analysis. Baldwin reminds us of that cost-benefit analysis, although, to him, costs are a primarily economic concept. He reminds us of the choice policymakers have to make, although while not solving any substantive dilemmas about

sanctions. Still, though, looking to do the latter does require remembering the former. We can argue for changing the substance of sanctions in terms of who should be impacted, how, and why, but not without justifying every step along the way in terms of cost-benefit. Justifying choices in sanctions' substance requires casting them in terms of costs – justifying their costs and illuminating their benefits – because that is what ultimately recommends them. Any prescriptive analysis of sanctions must consider how to counteract the overarching political will issue; in order to do that, well before one can speak of smarter sanctions, one must smarten policymakers' cost-benefit analyses.

In so doing, we must recognize that casting “costs” in economic, short-run terms risks pointing us toward sub-optimal, inefficient policy choices because costs can be justifiably framed more broadly. It is also important to recognize that privileging the symbolic function of sanctions over the instrumental function ultimately works to the detriment of the instrument on both functions. Political will hardly seems consequential where sanctions are imposed to placate domestic constituencies; there, policymakers reap domestic or international benefits that appear to outweigh the costs of imposing sanctions. This is deceptive, however, as it is unsustainable over time. Sidestepping substantive amelioration of the instrument is not an option; the symbolism of sanctions is credit charged against sanctions' reputation for substantive competence.

In general, sanctions scholars' focus in assessing sanctions success does not extend beyond the day they are lifted. Patterson, for instance, argues in favour of sanctions over warfare citing war's challenging aftermath. He argues, “While sanctions and negotiated approaches demand patience, they may be viewed as an investment in the future when they translate into ‘cost- and time-effective solutions.’”¹⁸² Most do not

necessarily argue for an idyllic aftermath, but the aftermath itself is rarely a consideration. Some scholars occasionally look ahead, but their looks to the longer term are generally sporadic, too brief to be considered much more than offhand observations. Cortright and Lopez's ruminations on the effect of a sanctions-strengthened arms sector in South Africa is a commendable start; indeed, it is followed with a look at the sanctions-induced permanent loss of foreign-owned assembly plants in Haiti.¹⁸³ The glances at the long-term are quick diversions, however. Doxey also makes excellent points on the long-term, speaking more generally:

"It is only a partial answer to say that damage can be repaired after sanctions have been lifted. Sanctions can last for years and even the relatively short time they were in force against Haiti may have been too long, given the impoverished state of the country. Secondly, some damage is likely to be systemic and not easily reversed: erosion of the middle class and the criminalization of society seriously compromise the prospect of future stability. Thirdly, where donor governments make official funds available they are more likely to go to neighbouring states to offset collateral damage. Past experience of repairing post-sanctions damage in Zambia, Panama, and Haiti is not encouraging."¹⁸⁴

Here, again, though, these points are clipped gestures not followed through with or made central to the analysis. Thomas Weiss makes a short allusion to a remark made by Boutros Boutros-Ghali referring to the "long-term damage to the productive capacity of target nations" caused by sanctions."¹⁸⁵ Little effort is made to make assessments of long-term sanctions impact an organic, core part of a sanctions assessment framework. Weiss et al.¹⁸⁶ and Tim Niblock fortunately provide exceptions, but, here, too, one senses that there is more to be done. Niblock contends that "economic sanctions undermine the long-term political stability of states and regions."¹⁸⁷ This displays a distinctive focus on a goal outside the regular scope of sanctions assessment, although he uses it to call for an alternative to sanctions outright. Still, one senses that there is further to go substantively and prescriptively. Niblock's premise of stability remains limited and negatively defined.

Stability is a catch-all concept minimally satisfying in a political climate recommending a more holistic treatment of 'international peace and security,' as has become much more evident in the watershed three years since Niblock's work was published in March 2001.

A more suitable overarching concept against which to measure sanctions success is the very 'international peace and security' that broadly justifies their imposition by the United Nations. The term, however, calls for elucidating; after all, the utility of the conception of 'international peace and security' set down in the UN Charter in 1945 has been vastly altered since. Indeed, the paradigm of *human* security is both in line with the evolving United Nations and international community conceptualization and provides an innovative and compelling model upon which to examine sanctions impact. Human security provides a more holistic approach to framing international peace and security. Underlying it is an altered take on sovereignty that values the role and status of individuals within states, not the states themselves as unitary actors, in substantiating peace and security. On this view, states and individuals each contribute to the substantive security of the other. Put differently, the mutually reinforcing quality of the human security paradigm is evident in a late-1990s Canadian government report: "Building an effective, democratic state that values its own people and protects minorities is a central strategy for promoting human security. At the same time, improving the human security of its people strengthens the legitimacy, stability, and security of a state."¹⁸⁸

Notably, this view is not at odds with 'international peace and security' as the UN currently interprets it. According to Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, "In many ways the pursuit of international peace and security, the UN's primary *raison d'être*, has come to be synonymous with promoting and sustaining 'human security.'"¹⁸⁹ The Canadian

Department of Foreign Affairs, an early proponent of the human security concept, has concurred:

“The phrase ‘international peace and security’ implies that the security of one state depends on the security of other states. A human security perspective builds on this logic by noting that the security of people in one part of the world depends on the security of people elsewhere. A secure and stable world order is built both from the top down, and from the bottom up. The security of states, and the maintenance of international peace and security, are ultimately constructed on the foundation of people who are secure.”¹⁹⁰

The notion has taken hold outside the UN as well. World Bank President James Wolfensohn, noting that the world spends \$900 billion dollars annually on defence compared to \$50 to \$60 billion on development, said, “I suggested humorously the other day that if we spent \$900 billion on development, we probably wouldn’t need to spend more than \$50 billion on defence.”¹⁹¹

Moreover, the human security understanding of international peace and security, wherein issues within states, even issues of ostensible ‘low politics,’ become issues of global concern, adheres to the recent evolution in the justifications for sanctions themselves. David Lektzian charts changes in the reasoning states and IGOs imposing sanctions have provided pre- and post-1990.¹⁹² From 1914 to 1990, promoting democratization is listed as a rationale for imposing sanctions 12 times; in the much shorter time frame 1990 to 2003, this rationale accounts for 29 cases. Similarly, during the first 76 years measured, “human rights: emigration, dissident trials, amnesty” was cited 26 times; in the ensuing 13 years, it was used to justify sanctions imposition 17 times. It is clear, then, that there has been a paradigm shift in concepts of central international importance and that human security is plausible as an overarching concept in a discussion of sanctions.

Exploring sanctions with an eye to international security on the human security template also addresses the concern, flagged above, that humanitarian issues are oddly left out of the sanctions success calculus.

Smart sanctions theory was meant both to redress humanitarian harm and to make sanctions more effective by isolating their impact to a target's offending elite. It is notable, as discussed above, that smart sanctions have certainly not gained in effectiveness and that, at the same time, humanitarian concerns have not faded away. It is remarkable as well that, while humanitarian considerations are central to smart sanctions, they are not necessarily central to making smart sanctions effective. This is generally true of scholars not strictly subscribing to smart sanctions models as well.

In Cortright and Lopez's work of record on smart sanctions, contributor Anthonius de Vries argues out smart sanctions' purposes. He says, "Targeted sanctions are intended not to hurt innocent parties or cause 'collateral' damage, or at least to minimize its effects."¹⁹³ While a concerted effort to obviate it may be somewhat new with smart sanctions, the propensity to classify humanitarian harm as "collateral" is not. That there are human dignity issues in this classification is not contentious and it is presumably why de Vries couches his reference in quotation marks. But conceiving of humanitarian considerations as collateral, or parallel but secondary, to sanctions effectiveness is counterintuitive. The humanitarian impact of sanctions is regularly documented by humanitarian aid organizations; the most severe reports take account of increased maternal morbidity rates and infant underdevelopment. These are mere examples of long-term problems caused by an instrument with long-term reach affecting elements of society with significant roles to play in substantiating sanctions' articulated

goals, which have themselves evolved with the evolving conception of international peace and security. In other words, as in warfare and contra Patterson's discounting of the sanctions aftermath, these non-combatants play a central role in making effective sanctions effective substantively. In sanctions design, then, segregating their role truncates a reality wholly pertinent to sanctions' impact as well as to sanctions' effectiveness as policy-change instruments.

In a journal piece disparaging sanctions' ineffectiveness, Robert Pape writes of Nigeria's 1967 blockade of breakaway Biafra, "The blockade also led to the starvation of two million Biafrans, but this had little effect on the outcome."¹⁹⁴ The statement is striking, but the sentiment is not unusual. The outcome of sanctions cases is often unrealistically narrowly defined. In the following, I aim to lay the groundwork for exploring the outcome of those outcomes; without it, policymakers and scholars assessing sanctions instances will always risk incomplete assessments, necessarily skewing the cost-benefit calculus that informs policy decisions and policymakers' will to see them through. I begin by sketching out how sanctions work, proceeding holistically with an eye to the contemporary notion of international peace and security outlined above. Sanctions' potential and demonstrated impact into the long-term will form the core of this analysis. Examples from important sanctions cases will be drawn on in illustration. This exposition will transition into case studies of Iraq and Haiti.

IV. Reassessing Sanctions Assessment: Considering the Outcome of the Outcome

This exploration of the substantive workings of sanctions must be prefaced by addressing two methodological problems that have long distressed sanctions scholars.

The first and more superficial speaks to statistics. Sanctions, in isolating their target, also tend to cut off researchers from reliable statistics; after all, why should the sanctioned government of Iraq (for example) issue its budget for all to see or allow independent verification of its social indicators? It is not unusual for series of systematic data on a given country to have only “n/a” to show for a sanctions period. The target’s isolation ironically gives it a certain unusual licence to control its internal affairs on its own terms. This behaviour necessarily affects our approach in exploring the impacts of the instrument. Much of the evidence cited here will either be statistical, where it has been issued by an international, non-target party, or, necessarily, anecdotal, where the articulated phenomenon has been broached by a number of credible observers.

The second methodological issue, one of more impassioned debate among sanctions scholars, is the causal issue. How do we know what sanctions cause versus any of the other factors at work in the sanctioned environment? The question is particularly important in that the sanctions that interest us here, those imposed to counter breeches in international peace and security, are characteristically imposed on states already in conflict or distress. The issue is therefore not an occasional inconvenience – sanctions *necessarily* operate as one of a collection of major challenges facing a state; it is an inherent quality of the instrument. Sanctions never operate alone. The causal issue is the subject of heated debate among sanctions scholars, policymakers, and activists alike, yet we should not be cowed by its difficulty. Indeed, the reason for the difficulty only illustrates the importance of proceeding with the analysis.

To an extent, the question as it is often posed and the responses it generates generally exhibit a misreading of sanctions; sanctions should not be viewed as a

punishment patched onto a given state, the impact of which can be detached and examined separately. As will be illustrated in the following, sanctions pervade. In practice, the term impact is something of a misnomer in that it has the connotation of an undivided mass striking another, leaving each damaged but intact. More appropriately, sanctions are *suffused through* their target. Sanctions restructure states and societies, they alter relationships between state and societal actors, they create vacuums filled by forces already at work within states, they coalesce with extant challenges and propel societies to employ short-term coping strategies having long-term effects. Sanctions must be coped with and coping generally involves getting through by making use of what is already, to any extent, available. They do little so straightforward as “impact.” Rather, their activity is better described with terms like exacerbate, contribute, influence, encourage, foster, amplify, entrench, strengthen, and aggravate. This inherent function of sanctions will become clearer in the analysis of how sanctions operate, to which we now turn.

How Sanctions Work: The Holistic Account

Speaking most conspicuously against viewing sanctions as a monolith affecting a single group in a single place at a single time is sanctions’ tendency to foster a sort of fraternity of rogues. There is a certain ‘the more the merrier’ dynamic to sanctions that too often goes unrecognized, but which speaks directly to sanctions’ effect on the quantity and quality of effort demanded in building peace and security into the post-sanctions period and, it follows, to costs and benefits writ large. Offending states, themselves sanctioned and uncooperative, are evidently unlikely to cooperate in enforcing other sanctions regimes. Sanctions are never imposed on only one state at a time, giving sometimes seemingly disparate rogues greater incentive to collaborate. The

list of sanctioned states cooperating with one another can seem a collection of odd pairings caught in illicit alliances busting sanctions – Serbia-Somalia, Serbia-Liberia, Libya-North Korea, South Africa-Haiti, among others. As is a hallmark of sanctions on many levels, and as we will see throughout this analysis, sanctions-busting coping strategies feed and entrench interests that are difficult to dismantle post-sanctions and directly impact upon prospects and costs of peacebuilding.

Sanctioned states, where proper enforcement is hindered by uncommitted senders, are ironically freed from rules by their isolation. One 1993 journalistic account in *The Guardian* comically described the stunning quality of television programming in besieged Belgrade, with satellite-lifted movies shown around the clock by stations no longer bound by rules; “Not bad for entertainment in lonesome Belgrade, in lonesome Serbia,” chided journalist Petar Lukovic.¹⁹⁵ The same principle also applies to far more noxious activity and is multiplied through the sanctions fraternity. Sanctions-busting is a parallel industry creating or invigorating ties between offending states together ironically freed from rules by their collective isolation. Sanctions imposed in one location can foster relationships and contribute to insecurity well beyond its busted borders. A passage in R.T. Naylor’s comprehensive study on embargo-busting illustrates the point well. After noting that Serbia continued to trade military aircraft parts and expertise for oil with sanctioned Iraq and to cooperate with sanctioned Libya, he reports:

“In 1994, the Greek-flagged Maria (a.k.a. the Honduran-flagged Varna I), already notorious for carrying banned Serbian goods to Nigeria, ran out of fuel, water and food off the Seychelles. Aboard, the authorities discovered Serbian weapons bound for Somalia, also under a UN arms embargo. The Seychelles authorities impounded the arms, then quietly sold them off to a German broker who, undeterred by another UN arms embargo, peddled them to the Rwandan army then engaged in the ethnic cleansing of the country’s Tutsi minority.”¹⁹⁶

A non-paper commissioned by the US Embassy in Belgrade asserted in 2002 that Belgrade had sold cruise-missile technology to Libya and Iraq as well as 200 tons of Yugoslav Army stocks to sanctioned Liberia.¹⁹⁷ It is notable that the stocks were transferred through a state-controlled weapons export firm, after the end of sanctions on Serbia, illustrating entrenched network ties. Then-Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica confirmed as much, and dismissed its seriousness, in “stat[ing] that some arms smuggling was to be expected, given that the FRY was under sanctions for many years, and ask[ing] that the matter be kept in context.”¹⁹⁸ Indeed, the lingering ties are virtually to be expected given the way sanctions operate on the domestic level. To this we now turn.

Within sanctioned states, sanctions issue several common dynamics that speak directly to the potential for their policy-relevant effects to linger into the long-term. Examples from sanctions instances will be used to illustrate these and they are built upon in case study form later; we should be ever-mindful that these instances, as I have argued is characteristic of sanctions, have each necessarily suffered from lacking political will to some degree, thereby distorting their effects against conventional theory. Yet those ostensible distortions are directly relevant to any discussion of how sanctions work since, as I have argued, they are not aberrations; they are intrinsic to sanctions as we have known them.

Sanctions create vacuums. The vacuum created by the loss of external resources, goods, capital, and industry proliferates until other vacuums are opened up. One might be created by the loss of the middle class, another by the loss of community or state institutions, crises of confidence may create vacuums of faith; on the individual level,

individual vacuums may open as employment is lost, as conventional support systems collapse. Another set of vacuums may be created just as some are closed; some reports suggest that actions taken to remedy the resource vacuum can create a perceived vacuum of morality, which can in turn encourage a move to fundamentalist thinking. Each vacuum must be filled. This has certain implications in the sanctioned environment, which is typically a developing, authoritarian, centralized, corrupted state engaged in some sort of conflict. As sanctions-vacuums are filled, sanctions alter and restructure state, state-societal, and societal relations within the target state. States and societies adapt. And when they do, they do so by making use of the coping strategies available to them.

It is a mistake to presume that, when states do not change their policies as senders desire in response to sanctions, they are somehow immunized to them. In fact, examining sanctioned governments' conduct reveals a strong tendency to adopt defensive behaviour to stave off the effects they most fear from sanctions. Given the typical nature of the targeted governments – authoritarian, highly personalized within a singular leader, with a stark financial advantage over the populace, often intimately affiliated with the military, leading a developing state with a centralized economy – target leaderships are understandably generally consumed in the first instance with retaining their positions of power. Not only is this a reaction to be expected (although, as we will see further on, it appears to surprise some sanctions scholars), the leadership generally already has an infrastructure built up beneath it to combat challenges to its power. When pressed, leaderships of targeted states tend to rely on the tools at their disposal, shady as they may be, thus elevating certain figures at the expense of others.

Moreover, in constraining resources, sanctions, be they comprehensive or partial, provoke the need for new distribution decisions. Again given the typical nature of targeted states' leadership, wherein distribution decisions are made at the top swiftly and without requiring consultation, and given the regime's increased compulsion to act in its own defence against the effect of sanctions, these decisions inevitably reflect the regime's altered set of priorities. In an environment of constrained resources, keeping bases of power fed means redistributing from those not apt to threaten.

At the nexus of state and society, this translates into regimes' revamping or invigorating patron-client relationships in line with a sanctions-revised agenda of needs and priorities; the groups most able to fill the new set of needs will be favoured. This can mean coopting new societal actors into compromising roles, although it more often means promoting or formalizing the roles of extant allies (and sometimes liquidating the unhelpful). Networks are spread and meshed through select sectors of society. The groups privileged are often tied to, but not necessarily a formal part of, the regime. This means their presence persists into the post-sanctions period, and as, given a defensively skewed resource distribution, these groups have gained at the expense of progressively weakening unfavoured groups within the society, interests become entrenched. As such, they are difficult to dismantle even after sanctions are lifted, an ironic result given their policy-relevant impact on the prospects for successful peacebuilding post-sanctions. As we will see, this is illustrated in Haiti, as the sanctions era helped drug networks become entrenched and pose a serious threat to prospects for international peace and security in that country. In the reconstruction of Iraq as well, there is evidence to suggest that tribalism, the place of which was defensively elevated by the regime in sanctions-era

Iraq, has become a force entrenched in such a manner that it poses a drain on the reconstruction and inflicts difficult challenges on prospects for peace and security into the long-term. Two other now-lifted sanctions cases in particular -- South Africa and the former Yugoslavia -- provide salient illustrations to this point as well and are worth a look.

The anti-apartheid sanctions against South Africa tend to be held up as a shining example of a sanctions success in the public consciousness. Sanctions scholars, for the most part, tend to agree, although there is a small current among them that argue that the restrictive apartheid economy was its own downfall.¹⁹⁹ Yet the sanctions against South Africa spurred their own coping strategies, which have been less recognized as affecting international peace and security beyond their lifting. As alluded to above citing Cortright and Lopez, sanctions drove South Africa to develop a large-scale indigenous arms industry.²⁰⁰ South Africa had been dependent on arms imports to keep apartheid order and stir trouble in neighbouring states before the international community lashed out against apartheid with progressively wider ranging sanctions beginning in 1962. Thereafter, Pretoria was driven into a sort of forced import substitution industrialization until it could not only count on its domestic output for its own needs but was ranked among the top arms *suppliers*, arms embargo or not. In 1982, according to one estimate, South African arms exports totalled \$23 million; by the end of the decade, despite a much-emboldened sanctions effort from 1986 onwards, "the value had increased to \$500 million, with sales to more than 30 countries."²⁰¹ Explained *Southern Africa Business Intelligence* after apartheid had fallen:

"South Africa's arms industry was comparatively a mere hatchling when the United Nations imposed an international arms embargo upon it, almost 30 years

ago, because of internal apartheid tensions and its aggressive stance toward its neighbours. The embargo, which was lifted just over a year ago, saw a defiant response from South Africa, which rapidly became the world's 12th ranked arms supplier. The lesson was simple: wars are not conducted according to moral rules, at least one side in any conflict will buy arms from any seller."²⁰²

In fact, South African arms manufacturer Armscor's marketing slogan at the international air fair in Chile in 1984 was the unsettling 'Third World Weapons for Third World Countries.'²⁰³ Its advertisements boasted arms 'born of necessity, tested under fire' and 'combat-proven.'²⁰⁴ Indeed, the sanctions-era South African arms industry, free by its isolation, fed insecurity and conflicts worldwide, finding whatever customer it could to bring in foreign exchange. A post-apartheid report in *The Washington Post* makes plain the breadth of Pretoria's ruse:

"Diplomatic isolation, a UN embargo on arms sales to South Africa and an advisory against purchases from what was then a pariah regime did not stop South Africa's arms dealers from successfully plying their trade in Rwanda, Sudan, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Yugoslavia, Yemen, Jordan, Northern Ireland and Argentina, as well as to rebel movements in Angola and Mozambique."²⁰⁵

Signe Landgren credits the South African military support of Ian Smith's Rhodesia with helping that white minority government survive fifteen years of total international economic and military sanctions; in turn, he writes, "when this arms customer disappeared with the creation of independent Zimbabwe, South Africa's arms exports fell from an estimated 9 million [rand] in 1979-80 to a mere 1.4 million in 1981."²⁰⁶

Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch alludes to the character of the sanctions-era arms industry:

"[T]he need for secrecy arising from the imposition of international sanctions against the apartheid regime that was in power until 1994, South Africa's growing isolation during that period, and the instability of the southern Africa region had fostered a siege mentality in an industry whose apartheid-era arms exports mirrored the immorality of domestic policy."²⁰⁷

While the end of apartheid, most arguably assisted by sanctions, benefited the human security of South Africans immensely, it is well worth noting the sanctions-induced arms industry's impact not only beyond the states' border but beyond the sanctions period itself. In so doing, it becomes clear that sanctions on South Africa constituted an ironic challenge to regional and international peace and security years beyond the day they were lifted.

Developing the arms industry as a coping strategy in response to sanctions had several effects both consistent with sanctions coping behaviour generally and of interest to us here in their contribution to economic, peace and security costs over the longer, post-sanctions term. For one, given the strategic importance of the arms industry to Pretoria, both industrially and with regard to home defence, together with constrained resources under sanctions, the apartheid-era leadership made distribution decisions likely affecting human development into the long term. Resources were distributed away from the civilian economy to be channelled into the arms industry. This was the case with regard to skilled labour, wherein "the apartheid government sanctioned the movement of scarce skilled human resources away from more productive civilian uses, and by 1989 nearly two thousand scientists and engineers — over ten per cent of the total number of R&D personnel in the national economy — were employed by Armscor."²⁰⁸ Moreover, according to Human Rights Watch, "Armscor was also provided with a massive secret budget with which to circumvent sanctions."²⁰⁹ State funds were shovelled into strategic industries (such as arms and the SASOL petroleum-replacement scheme) at the expense of civilian sectors economy in what some analysts have deemed "misinvestment."²¹⁰ While each of these may have contributed on the short term to weakening Pretoria -- a

benefit -- over the longer term, it adds the costs of the effects of a boosted arms industry unconstrained by regulation and set-back human capital.

The second effect of Pretoria's use of arms development as a coping strategy is that the new sets of interests that were mobilized to fill the resource and strategic vacuums were entrenched and persist into post-apartheid, post-sanctions South Africa at the expense of international peace and security. Batchelor and Dunne note, "Total defence industry employment as a percentage of total manufacturing employment increased from less than one per cent in 1961 to over nine per cent in the late 1980s."²¹¹ Evidently, interests of such magnitude cannot be diverted over night. Indeed, *The Economist* noted, "In 1995-96, weaponry was South Africa's second-biggest manufactured export, earning a useful 1.03 billion rand. Some 50,000 jobs still depend on the industry."²¹² A *Washington Post* estimate put the employment figure higher in 1996, reporting, "Today, exports of defence equipment amount to about \$250 million. The defence industry employs about 75,000 people, with 15,000 of them related to exports, in about 800 private and public companies."²¹³

Moreover, a state needing to fund reconstruction after conflict may need to keep its best foot forward and may be not only unable but unwilling to moderate an industry no matter its questionable past; triumphant first post-apartheid President Nelson Mandela himself, to the dismay of some, would make appearances at international arms trade fairs to promote South African wares.²¹⁴ One observer noted, "The state-owned arms manufacturer, Armscor, and its sales arm, Denel, have positioned themselves as potential cash cows to the new government, which desperately needs large infusions of cash to rebuild schools, infrastructure, create jobs and build millions of homes for the

homeless.”²¹⁵ With such extensive immediate needs, and such vast interests tied into an industry built on networks, moves to reform fell short, having an impact on peace and security that should concern us here.

According to Batchelor, the South African arms industry grew in the five years post-sanctions:

“As a result of the ANC government's support, the value of South Africa's arms exports has continued to grow, albeit in a rather lumpy fashion, since 1994. In 1994 the value of arms exports in constant 1995 prices was R918m; by 1997 the value of arms exports had increased by nearly 30 per cent to R1166m. Since April 1994 South Africa has sold arms worth more than R3.3bn (\$Us600m) to 91 countries.”²¹⁶

More significant for the purposes of this analysis, however, was the discrepancy between articulated policy pledging reform and genuine change in terms of clients, illustrating difficult to dismantle entrenched interests. The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative noted that the “disturbing record of arms sales since April 1994 has fed the perception, domestically and internationally, that the ANC Government's foreign policy is haphazard and that South Africa has failed to become a restrained and responsible arms trader.”²¹⁷ The report also cited recent arms deals, saying they “suggest that maintaining jobs in the arms industry, and other economic considerations, are more important than the Government's stated commitment to human rights principles.”²¹⁸ Notably, the Initiative also contended that, controlling for defence subsidies, the net returns from South African arms exports were “relatively insignificant.”²¹⁹ The post-apartheid government pledged not to provide arms to areas of armed conflict. Yet, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, cited by Human Rights Watch, reported that:

“[F]ive of the top ten destinations for South African arms exports between 1996 and 1998 -- India, Colombia, Pakistan, Congo-Brazzaville, and Algeria -- had experienced some form of conflict during the same period. In addition, South Africa provided military assistance and weapons in 1998 to several of the major

participants in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a conflict marked by widespread, gross human rights abuses.”²²⁰

Once again evoking a sanctions fraternity of rogues, some reports had South Africa, both before and for a time after Mandela took power, acting as “major purveyor of weaponry to outcasts such as the military rulers in Haiti and nations under UN embargoes.”²²¹

Indeed, the Israel connection speaks further to this notion of sanctions-busting fraternity. Beginning in the mid-1970s, sanctions against South Africa drove illicit cooperation between South Africa and Israel, which, explains Mark Pythian, was “as isolated in the Middle East as South Africa was in Africa.”²²² Aside from Israel aiding South Africa in developing a defence electronics sector, the two countries collaborated on nuclear issues. For instance, South Africa allowed Israel to test its weapons in its isolated milieu, well away from the political powder-keg of its own relatively tiny territory.²²³ There is a certain irony, then, to the extent that South Africa provided such material assistance to Israeli nuclear proliferation, when sanctions effects are assessed with an eye to the overarching concept of international peace and security. That Israeli nuclear capability was a major justification provided by Iraq for refusing to submit to sanctions-imposed total disarmament at the peril of extending its own sanctions instance provides its own irony.²²⁴

The case of sanctions against the former Yugoslavia provides further support to the argument that sanctions vacuums are filled by noxious interests that remain obstructively entrenched post-sanctions. Scholars are divided on the extent to which sanctions played any role in ending the Balkan conflicts, but there is more agreement on the fact that sanctions nurtured a government-affiliated black market *nouveau riche*.

There is merit in considering the siege of Sarajevo a sort of microcosm for the effect that sanctions have generally; this is all the more plausible when we note that both Sarajevo under siege and sanctioned states generally are rife with actors profiting from evading the resource cap. Peter Andreas paints a colourful and relevant picture of that valley capital's nominal resource isolation during the war:

"In Sarajevo, for example, the city's social structure has been turned upside down: at the same time as many of the most educated professional technocrats have fled abroad, many who were previously on the margins of society have experienced rapid upward mobility thanks to their wartime roles and political connections. The daily Sarajevo newspaper, *Oslobođenje*, lamented during the siege that 'before our eyes, the new class is being born in this war, the class of those who got rich overnight, all former "marginals."' An enduring legacy of the war has been the criminalization of the city, as power and influence shifted during wartime to those most connected in the shadowy world of clandestine transactions."²²⁵

Meanwhile, in Serbia, resource constraints drew the FRY government to overtax the taxable, jeopardizing small private legitimate businesses.²²⁶ At the same time, sanctions empowered the targeted governments insofar as they developed strong relationships with the underground economy and came to exercise control over the black market. As Naylor puts it, "for gangsters, service to the state became one of the surest ways of securing cover for rackets."²²⁷ Cabinet members and leading politicians controlled the distribution of illicit goods and Milosevic and his coterie freely rewarded supporters with government monopolies.²²⁸ Phil Williams catalogues the government's activities within the underground economy, "created in large part by the imposition of sanctions:"

"Among the major activities were: trading in foreign currency; bribery and corruption to obtain permission to run small businesses; the use of monopolies to trade agricultural products; distribution of stolen cars; smuggling of cigarettes into Serbia and from Serbia into the European Union; control over gasoline imports; and complicity with Turkish trafficking organizations and Serbian officials allowing free passage of heroin to Western Europe. The problem arose

in large part from the existence of a seamless web between the state and private entrepreneurship, both legal and illegal.”²²⁹

Free in its isolation, Serbia became a throughway for traffickers exporting goods out to Europe. Naylor adds, “[T]raffickers in perfume, cigarettes and other heavily taxed goods made deals with the Serbian officials to import duty-free into Serbia, pay a kickback into Cyprus bank accounts, then use the Serbian underground trading nexus to smuggle them out to surrounding countries.”²³⁰ Speaking to both to the entrenchment of sanctions-era public criminal networks and the threat to regional peace and security they posed, Naylor, who puts Milosevic’s eventual concession down squarely to non-sanctions tactics, writes:

“That is not to suggest sanctions had no effect. They corrupted public officials in neighbouring states and progressively criminalized the Serbian economy. Out of the deals to link Serbian intelligence to professional smugglers emerged new networks dealing in stolen cars, cigarettes, arms, illegal aliens and heroin that were the scourge of Europe. Government functionaries who had begun smuggling to earn money to prop up the regime, continued to smuggle to prop up their own bank accounts.”²³¹

These dynamics’ impact on Serbia and the other former Yugoslav republics during the sanctions period should not be understated. That they propped up regimes they were meant to deter during the sanctions-era, likely prolonging sanctions on the reasonable assertion that conflict is driven by both greed and grievance, the negative effects of which were legion on ordinary citizens, should not be understated. Yet, we should pay particular attention, in the interest of redressing cost-benefit distortions, to their persisting policy-relevant effects post-sanctions.

While the Milosevic era nominally ended in 2000, the illicit networks that had webbed beneath him during the sanctions era remained, although the linkage is too rarely recognized by scholars and policymakers. Peter Andreas’ fascinating, innovative new work on the clandestine political economy of the Balkans argues that international

sanctions can “create an economic opportunity structure for clandestine traders that helps to criminalize the political economy of the conflict zone.”²³² These, he argues, encourage closer ties between political and organized criminal actors, enmeshing them into the post-sanctions term. Ironically, he notes:

“When the international community subsequently charges that organized crime and corruption are impeding postwar reforms, and applies pressure on local leaders to crack down on criminal networks (as has been the experience in Bosnia and Serbia), rarely is there any acknowledgment of having contributed to creating such an enormous crime problem in the first place.”²³³

Andreas’ point makes the salient case of Zoran Djindjic a particularly apt example of the sanctions-aided structure of post-sanctions Serbia.

Elected Serbian prime minister in January 2001, Djindjic was a reformist whose coalition was supported by 64 percent of the voting public.²³⁴ He had spearheaded the removal of Milosevic to the Hague. Western governments had been pressuring him to crack down on the leader of a smuggling group called the Zemun clan. On 12 March 2003, Djindjic was assassinated in Belgrade. Zemun’s leader, Milorad Lukovic, who had been appointed to lead the elite police Red Berets during the Milosevic era, handed himself into police in early May 2004. His trial for allegedly masterminding the attack is underway. Andreas, among others, has tied Lukovic’s noxious influence to his sanctions-busting role:

“The power of Lukovic and his associates can be traced back to the Milosevic era, when crime, business, and the state security apparatus became closely integrated in the effort to evade international sanctions, foster illicit business, and support the war efforts of the 1990s. Milosevic nurtured a symbiotic relationship between the state and organized crime -- a relationship that has outlasted the wars and Milosevic.”²³⁵

While the Djindjic assassination puts a face to the issue, the sanctions-propelled *nouveau riche* has cast broader doubts on reconstruction and peacebuilding in Serbia and

Montenegro. The International Crisis Group observed in a report dated 26 March 2004, “Serbia's economic elite complicates any effort to create discontinuity with the two previous governments.”²³⁶ In another report published four months after Djindjic’s death, International Crisis Group noted a dip in the post-assassination crackdown. It argued:

“The unwillingness to continue the crackdown reflects the power of the Milosevic-era financial structures that – with the rigid oversight once provided by the dictator removed – have transformed themselves into a new Serbian oligarchy that finances many of the leading political parties and has tremendous influence over government decisions.”²³⁷

Evidently, where sanctions-built entrenched structures inhibit reconstruction and security post-sanctions, this must be assessed as a cost of the sanctions themselves.

Yet, not all sanctions coping strategies are the stuff of gangster movies and international intrigue. Societies adapt, too. The most mundane of sanctions-shifted activity may also be the most destructive over the long-term. Sanctions lead members of society to devise coping strategies that may be the best they can manage in the moment, but exceedingly damaging over time, well beyond the sanctions’ lifting. Those who become under- or unemployed may turn to immediate solutions, the deleterious effects of which will persist well after sanctions are lifted, either on the individual level or at the level of institutions. At the individual level, people may take on roles difficult to shed post-sanctions. To take a simple example, many women, as a last resort, turn to prostitution to fill dire resource needs; however, prostitution is such a permanent disgrace to honour in some of the societies affected by sanctions that assuming an instant recovery to their *status quo ante* stature with their lifting is folly.

As will become most clear in the longer case studies of Iraq and Haiti, sanctions, particularly if they are applied over longer periods can induce a loss of human capital that

evidently imperils the post-sanctions environment in a manner directly affecting a given society's capacity for reconstruction and to contribute positively to peace and security. Health and healthcare may be permanently compromised for certain age cohorts within the targeted states. Schooling and training may be unavailable or made a lesser priority given new financial challenges, potentially stunting development and the capacity to manage a peaceful and secure reconstruction. Formal sector employment may be lost or insufficient for survival forcing employees to shift to precarious and sometimes dangerous work in the informal sector, often compromising a society's experience with civic institutions. Sanctions can roll back progress on a society's gender balance, diminishing women's capacity to contribute to the post-sanctions environment. Sanctions coping strategies can inadvertently damage the ecological environment and force altered production behaviour, each potentially diminishing the indigenous resource base so critical to building sustainable peace and security post-sanctions. Each of these and further societal effects are explored in the case studies to follow, Iraq and Haiti providing new insight into contemporary post-sanctions reconstruction projects.

Case Study: Iraq

On May 1, 2003, US President George W. Bush announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq from an aircraft carrier in the Pacific, flanked by a banner reading "Mission Accomplished." Three weeks later, in a stately room at the St. James et Albany Hotel in Paris, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, giving a pre-G8 Summit press conference to the Franco-American Press Club, warned that he might be interrupted during the question and answer session.²³⁸ His staffers, he explained, were ready with "scorecards" to inform him of the pending Security Council vote on lifting Iraq's

thirteen-year old sanctions. A few words into a reply about North Korea, he excused himself, bent around the podium, and said not without triumph, "Fourteen-zero, thank you very much!" Syria had abstained.

The first triumphant declaration, on the aircraft carrier, has been widely derided as premature, with combat deaths still a daily occurrence in Iraq at writing. Yet we should be circumspect as well about the second. The sanctions, imposed with record resolve in the Security Council in 1990 and revised after the 1991 Gulf War, affected all areas of daily life for thirteen years, through the formative age of nearly three-quarters of Iraq's young population.²³⁹ As we will see in the case study to follow, the sanctions imposed against Iraq had more than a fleeting impact on a particular country over a defined period of time. Sanctions suffused through Iraq's state and society, restructuring it, their effects posing challenges into the long-term and directly impacting prospects for the reconstruction and international peace and security generally. To neglect them in an assessment of sanctions effectiveness would be to misrepresent the sanctions instance and distort the cost-benefit calculus.

Given the task here of exploring a case of sanctions with the articulated intention of making long-term impacts an organic part of sanctions assessment, two caveats are in order. For one, very few analysts, as late as 2002,²⁴⁰ could have predicted not simply that Iraq sanctions would come to an end with an air and ground war, but that the immediate post-sanctions period would consist of an occupation and "a reconstruction effort that is costing ten times more per capita than the Marshall Plan."²⁴¹ It is well-worth keeping in mind, then, that the massive post-sanctions assistance that Iraq is now receiving, as well as the debt forgiveness yielded for it, was not preordained. While some of the long-term

impacts may be extrapolated to other cases, there is no cause, as was the case for Iraq itself, to expect “the largest postwar reconstruction effort ever undertaken”²⁴² or that other post-sanctions environments will not have to share more of the financial burden of their own reconstruction. At the same time, now that the US-led coalition has removed Saddam Hussein from power and initiated a major reconstruction project in Iraq, with all of the initial decisions that entails, there is the danger that unconsidered linkages between sanctions’ impact and the tasks at hand in Iraq in 2004 and beyond will equivocate causes. For instance, the decisions to demobilize the Iraqi armed forces, to so comprehensively excise Ba’athists from power, and to shut down a leading Shia militants’ newspaper were coalition decisions with wide-reaching effects for which sanctions cannot be held responsible. Given these circumstances, much of the impact documented here will explore late sanctions-period sources evidencing restructuring visibly not readily reversible as well as taking us judiciously into the occupation period.

The following explores the work of sanctions in Iraq, the vacuums they created, how they were filled, and argues that these impacts are policy-relevant and worth incorporating organically into any sound assessment of the sanctions case. I will explore both state and societal sanctions-induced coping strategies and their impacts on Iraqi human capital, civil institutions, and the entrenchment of the sanctions-era restructuring of Iraqi society, each arguably lasting into the long-term and bearing on prospects for reconstruction and international peace and security generally.

Sanctions opened a wide resource vacuum in Iraq. Indeed, some scholars argue that it sent a post-industrial society hurtling back to a pre-industrial age, summoning all the unique problems that such a backward leap would entail.²⁴³ Richard Garfield

estimated in 2000 that, “Throughout the 1990s, social conditions in Iraq have deteriorated to levels last experienced three or four decades ago.”²⁴⁴ Louise Cainkar, writing on the impact of the sanctions on women, noted that the apparent shift from post- to pre-industry felt to urban Iraqi women like a “time warp.”²⁴⁵ In 1987, despite seven years of war with Iran, Iraq’s standard of human welfare was ranked fifty-fourth, or “high-medium,” in the UN Human Development Report; the 1998 report, using 1995 data, ranked Iraq one hundred and twenty-eighth.²⁴⁶ In eight years, life expectancy had dropped seven years.²⁴⁷ Sanctions’ constraint on resources constrained rebuilding prospects after heavy bombing during the 1991 Gulf War air campaign. For instance, “the damage to Iraq’s electrical facilities reduced the country’s output of power to 4 percent of its prewar level. And nearly four months after the war, national power generation was only 20-25 percent of its prewar total, or about the level it was at in 1920.”²⁴⁸

As illustrated in other sanctions cases above, the resource vacuum opened by sanctions, and exacerbated by the resource influx necessary to rebuild after a devastating air campaign, forced the regime into new distribution decisions. Given the character of the regime, under the conditions of post-war sectarian rebellion, defeat in its errant resource-grab in Kuwait, and facing the prospect of a massive loss of influence, the defence-minded and increasingly skewed resource distribution that followed was to be expected. Those elements of society needed to retain power were rewarded while resources were redistributed away from the others, disproportionately civil society actors of utility to longer-term international peace and security prospects. Qais Al-Nouri notes the phenomenon, attributing it to politicking rather than need:

“Engineers and technical experts have received free cars, apartments, gifts of land, and other rewards for their contributions to the ‘national rebuilding

campaign.' At the same time, the state seems almost oblivious to the non-technical cadres such as teachers, doctors, and civil servants. University professors, for instance, have remained outside the limelight and have received none of these privileges.... These unequal rewards have no relationship to changed circumstances. As we have seen, it is these non-technical government employees who have been hardest hit by the embargo. They need assistance far more than the technocrats and artisans, who have generally been doing well."²⁴⁹

Abbas Alnasrawi, citing a Food and Agriculture Organization report, outlines the scope of the distribution program beginning in 1994, during the period of most constrained resources:

"[I]n October 1994 it decided to favor the military, the police and security and other elite forces with special monthly allowances and other privileges. Some of the privileges were extended to civil and military pensioners. While these privileges cover some 3.5 million people, the other 17.2 million Iraqis, or 83 percent of the population, were left out of the program of privileges....

"The decorated military personnel and party officials were granted salary increments ranging between 150 percent and 300 percent; they were offered to buy state land for home building at discounts ranging up to 80 percent of the price of the land; they were offered to purchase state agricultural land at discounts ranging up to 80 percent of the value of the land; public sector assets may be bought by these individuals, their wives and their children at discounts ranging up to 30 percent of the sale price. And in September 1995 an edict was issued which confined the sale of state and state-owned enterprise assets to those decorated individuals and the friends of the president and their families."²⁵⁰

That these moves, defensive coping strategies wholly in character with the regime, appear unexpected to some scholars speaks at best to a misreading and at worst to a lack of policy accountability. Meghan O'Sullivan, for instance, illustrates a current that holds the regime responsible for sanctions' restructuring effects, when it is responding not only rationally but predictably:

"The UN Secretary General also documented how the Iraqi government continuously failed to order the full amounts of nutritional supplements available for the most needy in Iraq, even in the face of UN urging. Instead, the regime gave priority to ordering commodities and equipment having value to the military and security apparatus – such as communications devices and electricity – at the expense of purely humanitarian procurements such as food, health, and educational resources."²⁵¹

A common line of reasoning of the blame Saddam school of Iraq sanctions assessment is that, as the Kurdish north not administered by the regime was also subject to sanctions, evidence of better humanitarian conditions in the north are meant to illustrate that taking care of the people under sanctions is possible, thereby indicting the regime, not sanctions.²⁵² While this is unsound on many grounds (that the Kurds received much NGO support, that the administrators in the north were not an offending regime, that the Oil-for-Food program was more generous per capita to the north²⁵³), it also illustrates a puzzling disregard for sanctions' functioning, wherein sanctions coping strategies are images of the character and tools of their users and where sanctions-created vacuums are filled by indigenous influences. Alan P. Larson, United States Under Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, disturbingly illustrated the same thinking in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on "The Future of Iraq" less than two weeks after sanctions were lifted.²⁵⁴ Yet given the manner in which sanctions characteristically work, arguments solely blaming the regime for what it did to its "own people," rather than sanctions' characteristic interaction with indigenous factors, are misplaced. On the contrary, the international community could not claim unfamiliarity with the character of the regime before it imposed sanctions. Indeed, in 1988, the year of one of the late-twentieth century's most egregious examples of a regime's cruelty to its "own people," *The Washington Post* mentioned Halabja in twenty-seven articles, *The New York Times* in twenty-four,²⁵⁵ and US President Reagan, speaking to the UN General Assembly on the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, named Halabja first on his opening "roll-call of human horror."²⁵⁶

The resource vacuum created by sanctions, and additional regime-created vacuums created in coping with it, which provoked their own coping from the population, led to ironic policy-relevant results in Iraq that are now bearing on post-sanctions reconstruction projects and prospects for peace and security. These include the deterioration of human capital and civic institutions. Four aspects of this will be explored here: education, health, skills loss, and the criminalization of Iraqi society.

Wrote Robert Fisk in 1998, "There used to be a popular expression in Iraq: that books are written in Cairo, printed in Beirut but read in Baghdad. Now in Baghdad, [CARE International aid worker] Margaret Hassan says cynically, 'the books are sold - for money to buy food.'"²⁵⁷ Indeed, education was a major priority of Saddam Hussein's regime pre-1990. Tim Niblock explains the results of Saddam's influence on this sector before sanctions:

"By the mid-1980s, there was a well-resourced and uniform educational system; enrolment rates, teacher-pupil ratios, and physical environment were among the best (if not the best) in the Arab world. Despite the damaging impact that the Iran-Iraq War had on the school system (e.g., large numbers of teachers drafted into the armed forces, dropping standards of teacher qualifications, and a sharp fall in government resources), illiteracy was rapidly being reduced. Adult illiteracy fell from 50 percent in 1977 to 20 percent in 1987. Over 5 percent of the state budget was still being spent on education at the end of the 1980s."²⁵⁸

During sanctions, Iraq's education budget dropped 90 percent, from \$230 million in 1991 to \$23 million in 2000.²⁵⁹ A 1998 UN report noted that illiteracy had actually climbed from 20 percent in 1989 to 40 percent in 1998.²⁶⁰ Richard Garfield reported that the number of primary school pupils failing to graduate rose from 17 percent in immediate post-war 1991-92 to 40 percent in 1993-4.²⁶¹ Just as school facilities were deteriorating, children were being pulled out of school to ease the resource burdens on their families, a short-term solution with long-term consequences. Meanwhile, universities operated in

damaging isolation, their facilities becoming outdated, cutting into Iraq's capacity for cultivating human capital. Reported Niblock, "Teachers and lecturers have steadily become more isolated from new developments in their subjects of specialization, not having the resources to travel abroad, the books and journals that could inform them of new developments, or the ability to obtain a visa in most other countries."²⁶²

Given these reports and that the vast majority of Iraq's population experienced sanctions from the vantage point of school age, there is evident cause for arguing that Iraq's capacity for contributing substantively to peace and security has been inhibited into the long-term. Fisk's aid workers lamented a "'lost generation,' a whole people who do not understand computers or the Internet, modern science or literature, who are losing their literacy."²⁶³ Gary Sick sounded the alarm in 2000, writing, "There is a real and urgent need to address these issues, since there is the imminent risk that an entire generation of Iraqi youth will be permanently harmed, with unpredictable and dangerous implications for the future of the country and the entire region."²⁶⁴ In the same vein, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Hans von Sponeck, who resigned in protest in 2000, called sanctions' impact on education an "intellectual embargo" creating an "educational situation which was not suitable to train the next generation of Iraqis in responsible leadership."²⁶⁵

Sanctions-influenced health and healthcare during the 1990s pose similar concerns. While nearly every piece of scholarship documenting sanctions humanitarian effects justifiably remarks on rising infant and child mortality,²⁶⁶ the vast majority of children survived the sanctions-era and bear directly on the quality of long-term/post-

sanctions human capital in Iraq. For instance, Nathaniel Hurd cites a September 2000 joint FAO/WFP document reporting that:

“[T]he existing food ration do[es] not provide a nutritionally adequate and varied diet...[is] lacking in vegetables, fruit and animal products and is therefore deficient in micronutrients.... Many households cannot afford to supplement their diet with an adequate variety of non-ration foods and intakes of micronutrients such as iron and vitamin A remain far below requirements.”²⁶⁷

In line with the progressive shift in the conceptualization of international peace and security to incorporating notions of human security, there is cause for attributing long-term policy-relevant costs to chronic malnutrition, even were it to, in all unlikelihood, be halted with an instant massive influx of adequate nutrition immediately post-sanctions. Indeed, a recent study suggests that childhood iron deficiency impedes development of cognitive function, that the impact is not necessarily reversible, and that, even given treatment, the gap between once-deficient and properly nourished children can actually widen over time.²⁶⁸ As such, sanctions impact on health in Iraq may have cut into human capital well into the post-sanctions period and, in stunting cognitive function, may have to an extent compromised security on the human security template.

Other health impacts, including those not affecting children, should be of concern for similar reasons. For instance, UNICEF estimated that the number of psychological and mental-disorder sufferers in Iraq grew steadily through the 1990s from 200,000 in 1991 to 510,000 by 1998.²⁶⁹ Moreover, the six-week Gulf War of 1991 and sanctions were blamed by the WHO for setting back healthcare in Iraq, once the envy of the region, at least fifty years.²⁷⁰ Furthermore, Akunjee and Asif in 2002 noted the worry that overreliance on the limited available medications could lead to antibiotic resistance over the long term, evidently affecting health and healthcare into the post-sanctions period.²⁷¹ It bears noting that, during this period of sanctions and the regime's marked effort to

defensively bait its coterie, the health budget suffered the same 90 percent drop during the 1990s as education did.²⁷²

Meanwhile, the healthcare sector provides an important example of the general sanctions-era decline in Iraqi human capital through skills' loss and expatriation. Niblock cites a UN Oil-For-Food programme estimate that 50 percent of the medical equipment in Iraq was obsolete or beyond repair.²⁷³ Medical training suffered, with 83 percent of health workers described as not having adequate training in a 2000 report of the UN Secretary General.²⁷⁴ Akunjee and Asif, focussing on the declining quality of training over more than a decade, declare, "Thus a generation of under-skilled, outdated and disillusioned doctors is being created."²⁷⁵ Many opted to leave the profession after training, given "the prospect of one in three nights on-call for a mere \$12 a month and a severe lack of further opportunity" and that they could find "less strenuous jobs elsewhere."²⁷⁶ Doctor's salaries were not high enough to secure survival alone; one doctor conceded to Niblock that "his main concern at work was to ensure that he did not miss the free hot lunch that the hospital provided."²⁷⁷ Mahdi writes of "the steady defection of skilled professionals, such as physicians, to the private sector, to non-related activities or to foreign lands."²⁷⁸

Yet the drain is not limited to the medical profession. Al-Nouri documents the coping strategies of government employees:

"Some have quit their more respectable positions and found employment as construction workers, while others earn their living by repairing tires and shoes, vending goods on sidewalks, and doing odd jobs. Such occupations were previously left to the uneducated. Shoe-repair, for instance, was regarded as so degrading that only members of low-status families would take it up. But this is no longer true, because these jobs yield more income than government employment. Well-educated college graduates in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities now are more satisfied with shoe-repair than with government jobs."²⁷⁹

Mahdi wrote, in 1998, that the “public sector is dangerously stripped of experienced and skilled professional staff, many of whom have left the country in search of better conditions,”²⁸⁰ arguing that it cut into rehabilitation prospects for the Iraqi economy. Arguably, however, these survival strategies pose broader problems, speaking to the deterioration of civic institutions and experience with them, of evident importance to reconstruction and broader notions of security well into the post-sanctions period. Moreover, the “astronomical rates of emigration of the professional middle classes,”²⁸¹ stripping Iraq of a conventionally strong constituency for leading reform, is not one easily reversed post-conflict and post-sanctions given immediate security and job prospects and the fact that they have had time to build lives elsewhere. Ironically, the very characteristics of the post-sanctions and post-conflict environment that they are needed to redress are the same ones keeping them away. Peter Ford, in an article simply entitled “Why Iraqis Abroad Are Reluctant to Return,” cites an estimate that, of the three million Iraqis living abroad, “at least 500,000 are fellow exiles waiting and watching but still reluctant to come home.”²⁸² By October 2003, one thousand had returned.²⁸³ While a UNHCR spokesman pointed to the security and humanitarian situations, an Iraqi Governing Council member blamed the comparative advantages of their new homes: “it’s not the security situation that keeps people away, it’s the salaries. People are earning a lot of money abroad, and here a cabinet minister gets \$500 a month.”²⁸⁴

While defection and moves to the private and informal sectors pose difficulties for long-term Iraqi human capital, other coping strategies may also have changed the capacity of the society for promoting peace and security over the longer run. Some scholars feared that sanctions might contribute to the criminalization of Iraqi society in

pushing previously law-abiding Iraqis into criminal activity while entrenching the roles of extant criminals. Niblock observed in 1997 that, while formerly a mark against family and individual honour, beginning over the course of the sanctions period, “most aspects of life in Iraq [were] governed by the payment and taking of bribes. This has become so routine that it no longer causes surprise or disapproval.”²⁸⁵ His description highlights how pervasive criminality had become by 1997:

“Soldiers at roadblocks expect to be given packets of cigarettes, apples, and the like – and motorists always carry stocks of these goods for that purpose. The police steal cars and then take bribes from the owners when the car is ‘found’ (often without its tires). University lecturers take money from students for ‘private lessons,’ which then affect their marks in examinations. Hospital doctors and nurses sell to the private pharmacies the subsidized medicines that the state makes available, leaving the hospitals even more depleted than before. Public services, such as telephone and electricity, are available only when a bribe is paid to the individual responsible for the connection.”²⁸⁶

Toby Dodge noted in 2000 that, by then, “even government-owned newspapers have reported a rising wave of violence and vandalism amongst the youth.”²⁸⁷ He notes as well that, “Prostitution, a hitherto unreported phenomenon, has now become a potent symbol of social decline.”²⁸⁸ Indeed, Iraq, once a near-model of Arab World gender equality, at least nominally, saw women forced into prostitution during sanctions to fill their individual resource vacuums.²⁸⁹ This drove the regime to condemn prostitution on penalty of death in 1994, the once-secular regime framing the law in Islamic terms.²⁹⁰ As well, after the Jordanian government complained to Baghdad about widespread prostitution of Iraqi women in Amman, the Iraqi regime imposed a law ordering a *mahram* escort – a male next of kin – for all women under forty leaving Iraq.²⁹¹

While further illustrating the extent of criminalization of Iraqi society, damage to Iraq’s human capital and the challenges it poses for post-sanctions peace and security, the *mahram* example also represents sanctions’ role in restructuring Iraq on multiple levels.

It alludes to setbacks in Iraq's gender balance, with women shunted backward into roles they had progressed beyond in 1970s and 1980s Iraq,²⁹² just as it intimates a defensive turn to Islam by the regime and a move to more fundamentalist readings of Islam in sanctioned Iraq.²⁹³ Indeed, sanctions had several restructuring effects likely to bear on the future, not least, as elsewhere, the establishment of a sanctions-profiteering *nouveau riche*, the flipside of those elements of civil society discussed above that were drawn into sub-optimal coping strategies.²⁹⁴ Graham Day and Christopher Freeman's March 2003 evaluation of the sanctions-busting suffusion of corruption through Iraq, webbing out from the regime, paints a picture similar to that painted above regarding Serbian sanctions imperilling reconstruction:

"The UN sanctions, for example, have resulted in a huge informal economy of smuggling and black-marketeering. By allowing corruption to spread through the tentacular reaches of the government and Ba'ath party, the regime has solidified its position both economically, through revenues, and politically, by binding ever more closely the 'coalition of guilt' which makes up the ruling circle and its associates."²⁹⁵

One structural impact in particular will be explored next, singled out for illustration here as its influence on the young post-conflict/post-sanctions era is decipherable in reports from the ground in Iraq.

The rise of tribalism in Iraq during the 1990s illustrates many of the sanctions dynamics discussed above. The increased use of tribal patronage by Saddam Hussein's regime represented a coping strategy using tools closest at hand; tribalism, bolstered by a threatened regime acting characteristically in its own defence, became the indigenous influence advanced to fill the sanctions-created resource vacuum. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that this strategy entrenched tribal patronage structures and

intensified tribal allegiances and, furthermore, that these are posing costly challenges for the post-conflict reconstruction project and for peace and security into the long term.

Saddam Hussein's relationship with tribalism pre-1990 was an ambivalent one. Himself a member of the Albu Nasr tribe, he stacked his ruling elite disproportionately with fellow tribesmen upon taking up power in Iraq. Yet, at that time, Saddam went to great effort to conceal his nepotist tribalism, concerned that reliance on tribes would diminish his modern, secular Ba'athist image; indeed, "in 1976, he made it an offence for public figures to use names showing regional or tribal affiliations."²⁹⁶ While some tribal patronage remained a limited covert aspect, particularly later, of Saddam Hussein's rule, tribalism did not become an explicit regime value and ruling priority until it was used defensively during sanctions. Dawisha explains that Saddam was "persuaded... of the the benefit of tribes and tribal values to his regime" in 1991 when he witnessed during the Shi'a rebellion "a number of southern Shi'i tribes which had been receiving benefits from Baghdad either sid[ing] with the regime or remain[ing] neutral. The lesson was not lost on Saddam Hussein."²⁹⁷ Once the rebellions of 1991 had been put down, the tremendous impact of sanctions on Iraq drove Saddam to significantly promote the strategy in defence of his threatened regime.²⁹⁸ With tribal patronage's success during the 1991 rebellions and sanctions then cutting absolutely if not relatively into resources available for regime security, Saddam was prompted "to counterbalance this decline in official institutions by developing a further network of patronage. In effect, he devolved responsibility for the provision of order to reinvigorated and recreated tribal networks and sheikhs," writes Dodge.²⁹⁹ Dawisha recounts the marked change:

"Over the following years, as the country sank into an abyss of endless economic woes and social disintegration, brought about by international

sanctions, Saddam Hussein, by word and deed, began elevating tribal identity to the forefront of Iraq's political and ideological concerns. In contrast to the earlier pre-crisis period, he was no longer coy about extolling the centrality of the tribe in Iraq's social structure or the virtue of tribal values and custom."³⁰⁰

Adds Andreas Wimmer, "Weakened over the past twenty years by war and a decade of international sanctions, the Ba'ath regime increasingly had to rely on local power brokers to ensure compliance and eliminate opposition."³⁰¹ Soon, Saddam's support for tribes was foisted into the public eye. He made appearances, broadcast on Iraqi television, happily visiting tribal celebrations as the guest of honour.³⁰² High-ranking Ba'athists competed to be seen at sheikhly funerals, a phenomenon previously unthinkable.³⁰³ Saddam began making statements in the 1990s, unimaginable in the 1970s, about all Iraq becoming "a single tribe [drinking] from a single cup"³⁰⁴ and that "the Iraqi tribes represented the true values of the nation, such as bravery and honour, in their purest form."³⁰⁵ The legislation barring the use of tribal affiliations in names was repealed.³⁰⁶

Baram writes of Saddam providing sheikhs "with arms and giving them more authority over their tribesmen, and... recognizing tribal legal traditions in the countryside."³⁰⁷ Government policies came to reflect conservative tribal proclivities, laws were enacted to crack down on what tribes viewed as the corrupt city ways; modernism and secularism were set aside in favour of nightclub and alcohol bans, new draconian punishments such as amputation for disorderly conduct, and a rising state reliance on religious symbolism to suit tribal tastes.³⁰⁸ Baram analyses the significance of the reversal, in essence a restructuring:

"By giving sheikhs land and cash gifts, and by offering farmers lucrative prices for their products to dissuade them from selling on the black market, the regime greatly enhanced the relative economic position of the tribal sheikh and other rural dignitaries. At the same time, however, hyperinflation, the result of the international embargo and the regime's socio-economic preferences, gradually ruined most of the salaried city educated."³⁰⁹

Significantly, there is evidence that this elevation of select sheikhs through tribal patronage was entrenched and is posing important challenges to building peace and security in the current reconstruction. The occupying coalition currently reconstructing Iraq has shown a tendency, at times an obligation, to rely on the old tribal structures elevated by the regime as they shape the future of Iraq.

In March 2003, Day and Freeman noted in *International Affairs*, "One of the main problems with dismantling Saddam Hussein's regime will be how to undo the corrupt and entangled tribal power structures it has encouraged, without completely demolishing existing governance networks."³¹⁰ From early on in the reconstruction process, the issue was evident on the ground in Iraq. Rajiv Chandrasekaran reported, in December 2003, the story of tribal sheikh Hamid Rashid Mahenna and American diplomat Keith Mines, responsible for the administration of Western Iraq and allocating reconstruction contracts to local companies. Mahenna drives a white Mercedes and owns a construction company in Anbar province.

"When Mahenna, who leads the Bu-Alwan tribe, heard that Mines was looking for a contractor to tear down the Ba'ath Party headquarters and build a park dedicated to peace, the sheik swung into action. He had his construction company -- one of several businesses he owns -- draw up four sealed bids for Mines, ranging from \$75,000 to \$120,000.

"As he handed over envelopes, Mines recalled him saying, 'I hope you'll be fair to me.'

"When Mines opened the bids, he was floored. Other contractors in Ramadi had offered to do the job for around \$20,000, he said.

"It was just way out of the ballpark,' he said.

"But Mines was reluctant to spurn Mahenna, a suave man with a physics degree and extensive political connections in Anbar. So Mines, who has the authority to issue contracts up to \$100,000 without higher approval, made an exception. Instead of choosing the lowest bidder, he called in Mahenna and began to negotiate. He finally bargained him down to \$35,000.

"When we have a tribal issue at stake, we do a controlled bidding process to make sure the contract goes to the right person,' he said....

“‘Dealing with the sheiks isn't easy,’ Mines said as he watched the car pull out of the parking lot. ‘But we don't have another choice.’”³¹¹

The account is anecdotal but not isolated. Indeed, three weeks after the Mahenna story was reported, *The Boston Globe* obtained a confidential 42-page internal US forces report confirming an explicit effort to expand the coalition's outreach to tribal sheikhs. The response to the report, according to unnamed American military and civilian officials, was said to be a “‘reconciliation strategy’ aimed at courting leaders of various Sunni tribes through money and political favours.”³¹² Related strategies said to be under consideration included, “establishing a tribal affairs office, posting liaison officers with major tribes, and recruiting new Iraqi civil defence units along tribal lines.”³¹³ However, the report's authors themselves warned against overdoing propping up the tribes, while scholars disparaged the plan as a short-term security measure undesirable and unsustainable over the long-term.³¹⁴ Kenneth Pollack speaks to this point, although without framing it as such, observing, “They have a history, for centuries, of providing their services to whoever pays them. Once you pull the tribal sheiks in, you can pull in the rest of the community.”³¹⁵ Dodge warns that, “Saddam, unlike the Coalition Provisional Authority, fully understood that these informal and highly personalized networks undermine the creation of an effective and transparent bureaucracy, and have a flexibility and resilience that makes them very difficult to root out.”³¹⁶ The reconstruction process, then, appears compelled to an extent in an unsustainable and costly direction in keeping with entrenched structures developed to fill a vacuum sanctions created. Assessments ending with sanctions' lifting would omit such influence, yet it evidently has significant long-term implications for peace and security generally.

The final effect of Iraq sanctions to be explored here extends beyond Iraq's borders, while keeping within the purview of the costs and benefits of interest to policymakers. Tim Niblock emphasizes that UNSC Resolution 687 reaffirming sanctions against Iraq after the Gulf War was couched in regional terms; the resolution described actions against Iraq as, for instance, "steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery."³¹⁷ The point is especially salient insofar as, where Iraqi sanctions have been deemed successful, it has generally been due to the notion that sanctions were a key component of a strategy of containment.³¹⁸ Given the evident importance to the policymakers of positive influence, peace, and security in the region generally, then, it is worth exploring sanctions regional impact in broadening our cost-benefit calculus. On this point, scholars have suggested that sanctions against Iraq dug into American and Western influence just as it fuelled resentment in the Arab World.³¹⁹ In 1998, as reported by Fisk, Dennis Halliday, the Oil-for-Food Programme head who resigned in humanitarian protest that year, worried about what extremism sanctions would spur. "If the world thinks that Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Minister, Tarek Aziz, are extremists, Mr Halliday said in New York, 'I don't dare to think what will come' after the suffering created by sanctions.'" While the statement was made about Iraqis, there is little reason not to have broadened the concern beyond its borders. Indeed, Osama bin Laden, in his first recorded statement after September 11, 2001, couched the terrorist attacks in part as avenging Iraqis' suffering under sanctions. More benignly, although of interest to US policymakers, sanctions diminished US influence and shifted regional alliances, just as it outraged the hearts and minds now so coveted. Explains Volker Perthes:

“Public opinion in general, in most Arab states except for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, is scandalized by the suffering of the Iraqi people; the demand for the removal of sanctions is popular and even some Gulf leaders — the most prominent being Sheikh Zayad, president of the United Arab Emirates — have openly proposed that sanctions be ended. Relations with the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman have been largely normalized; the same is true for Morocco — all states which during the Gulf War were unambiguously on the side of Kuwait.”³²⁰

As we have seen, then, there is cause for folding into an assessment of sanctions against Iraq effects extending beyond the time and space of the sanctions themselves. Sanctions impacts on the structure of Iraqi society, broad swaths of its human capital, and throughout the region will and are arguably contributing to its prospects for contributing to international peace and security well beyond their lifting.

Case Study: Haiti

A decade after its sanctions were lifted, Haiti is engaged in its own reconstruction project in partnership with the international community. Scarcely the regional social indicator model that Iraq once was, the half-island Caribbean state, victim to over thirty coups, has been the poorest state in its hemisphere during most of its two hundred-year post-colonial history.³²¹ Put starkly, “when [Jean-Bertrand] Aristide became Haiti’s first elected president in February 1991, half of the labour force was unemployed, half of all adults were illiterate, and one-third of the people lacked access to modern health services.”³²² Yet, as we will see, some of the same sanctions dynamics discussed regarding Iraq were at work in Haiti as well. Moreover, as in cases discussed above, there is now a post-sanctions period, the outcome of sanctions’ outcome, ripe for exploring.

General Raoul Cedras’ coup in September of 1991 ended Haiti’s brief interlude with democracy. Coming as it did only three months after the Organization of American

States' Santiago Declaration, a progressive commitment to defending democracy in the hemisphere, the OAS reacted swiftly with a trade embargo on Haiti.³²³ On October 11, 1991, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the coup and requesting that member states support the OAS resolution and impose economic sanctions against Haiti.³²⁴ In June of 1993, after twenty months of failed attempts at settlement, the United Nations Security Council, citing a threat to international peace and security, weighed in with its own sanctions on petrol and arms, mandatory for all member states. While these were suspended on the mistaken notion that the crisis was ending in late August, the UNSC imposed total sanctions on Haiti from May 1994 to Aristide's return that October.³²⁵

The sanctions' aim was to force the junta's hand and restore Aristide, and democracy, to Haiti. They were described as such in lofty terms by President Clinton: "The sanctions and their enforcement are an unprecedented defence of democracy in the Americas."³²⁶ Experts broadly agree that, while sanctions may have brought the *de facto* regime to the negotiating table, the threat of massive US military force was ultimately responsible for its defeat. In 1994, after a successful, Jimmy Carter-led, last-ditch effort at negotiated settlement, 20,000 troops arrived in Haiti and Aristide was restored to power. Yet, upon closer inspection, on many counts sanctions arguably generated and exacerbated their own challenges to post-conflict and post-sanctions international peace and security, not least in that they may have diminished the prospect of substantive Haitian democracy. The events of 2004 should not be viewed in isolation. That the very leader that sanctions were imposed to restore to power was himself jettisoned from Haiti in violence a decade later and vilified in the international community, the leader once

hailed as Haiti's Mandela now disparaged as its Mugabe,³²⁷ should be lent the context of sanctions' long-term effects. As we will see, sanctions imposed against Haiti speak further to the argument that their policy-relevant implications persist well into the post-sanctions period.

As illustrated above with regard to the former Yugoslavia, accepting that civil conflict is a function of greed as well as of grievance, it becomes clear that sanctions in Haiti may well have protracted the conflict by nourishing the incentive to continue it. Indeed, sanctions arguably reinforced the power of the military junta relative to the Haitian population, stifling the latter's capacity to oppose the *de facto* regime; at the same time, it enriched the junta, dampening the incentive for it to fold to international pressure. Meanwhile, the resource vacuum opened for Haiti generally was considerable. Haiti's GDP per capita, already an abysmal \$513 in 1991, dipped to \$437 in 1992 and to \$375 by the time sanctions were lifted in 1994, having fallen 25 percent during sanctions;³²⁸ it never recovered to 1991 levels and in 2002 had sunk to a lowly \$338, its lowest level on record.³²⁹ Gross National Income per capita, rising regularly at least since the early-1960s, fell an unprecedented 22 percent in 1992.³³⁰ Significantly, sanctions spurred restructuring throughout Haitian society as it coped to fill the vacuums they created. As we will see, these coping strategies may have diminished Haiti's capacity to cope successfully with democratic transition and posed particular challenges to building peace and security post-conflict. Examples of this are explored in the following. With regard to sanctions impact on peace- and security-building human capital, we first explore inadvertently restructuring societal coping strategies with regard to vacuums in industry as well as sanctions' long-term impact on Haiti's agriculture, environment, and civic

institutions. We will close with a look at sanctions-entrenched trafficking networks and their impact on post-sanctions Haiti.

Industry was restructured long-term with the sanctions-induced shrinking of the assembly sector, an engine that was previously one of the few brighter lights of the Haitian economy. According to Elizabeth Gibbons, “by January 1994, only 44 of the 145 garment factories operating in 1990 were still in business. As of May 1994, employment in the assembly industry sector declined to 8,000 jobs, less than a fifth of the 44,000 that existed in September 1991.”³³¹ This had wide-ranging impacts that lingered into the long-term and constrained the democracy the sanctions were meant to compel. To preface, assembly industry firms and jobs did not return to Haiti with the lifting of sanctions; by 1997, with sanctions having been ended for as long as they had been imposed, “the assembly sector provided only 21,500 jobs, far short of the 44,000 available in that sector before the military junta took over in 1991.”³³²

The closure of the assembly industries, for one, shifted the structure of employment, particularly in Port-au-Prince. “These industries were the single largest formal employment sector in the capital of Port-au-Prince, where alternative possibilities for supporting a family were virtually nonexistent.”³³³ Gibbons argues that with lost employment for workers depending on the assembly workers for their livelihood (food service staff, for instance), 200,000 would have become unemployed by the initial loss of the assembly jobs. Given the dearth of other opportunities, this would have shifted many into the untaxable informal sector. That the sector is untaxable posed post-conflict government revenue problems, but the loss of the sector became more problematic under international pressure for structural adjustment. “The motor of the Haitian modern

economy” pre-1991, the assembly sector was meant to be the motor behind structural adjustment.³³⁴ In the event, Aristide’s reluctance to impose structural adjustment caused major friction between the government and the international community, costing Haiti much-needed international funding.

It is worth noting that the shrinking of the assembly sector also restructured Haitian society in a manner arguably discouraging to democratic progress, in that it disproportionately affected women. Women made up eighty-percent of the sector’s workers, one-third of whom headed their own households.³³⁵ This was just one of several areas in which women were affected in a manner likely to shift the gender balance of power back in time, stifling women’s progress. One sanctions-amplified coping strategy, affecting children generally and girls in particular, was the system of *restavèks* (the stay-withs). The practice consists of rural families sending one or more of their children to act as domestic servants for urban families. Notionally working in exchange for room and board, *restavèks* are the last to be fed if at all, receive no education, and are subject to corporal and sexual abuse. According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, “*Restavèk* girls are sometimes called ‘*la pou sa*’, a Creole term meaning ‘there for that.’ They are accepted sexual outlets for the men or boys of the household.”³³⁶ Four out of five *restavèks* report having been beaten by their employers.³³⁷ Between 60 and 80 percent of *restavèks* are girls, some as young as four.³³⁸ The number of *restavèks* soared during the sanctions period from between 130,000 and 150,000 in 1991 to 250,000 in 1995.³³⁹ A 2002 figure estimated that one in every ten Haitian children is a *restavèk*.³⁴⁰

Notes the National Coalition for Haitian Human Rights:

“These children are such a common part of the social fabric that rare is the Haitian who has not had some association with a *restavèk*. Some have given

away a child or taken one in as a *restavèk*, or they know a family that has; others have been a *restavèk* themselves. This familiarity has affected the way most Haitians take these children for granted.”³⁴¹

The marked rise in children sent, in effect, into slavery evidently cuts deeply into a society’s human capital and its capacity for building peace and security.

While less tangible than statistics on the impact of a sector’s loss on structural adjustment, that women were forced to recede back into the home or into the vagaries of the informal sector, or that children had to be pulled out of school to supplement income, likely has untold if uncounted impact on fledgling democracy. Significantly on this point, as education was designated a developmental activity rather than a humanitarian one with sanctions’ imposition, it was not exempted from sanctions-era foreign aid cuts.³⁴² Gibbons signals the impact of this on Haiti’s human capital:

“When this unfortunate cohort finished high school in 1997, only 6.75 percent of those taking the baccalaureate exams passed; in 1991, 43 percent had passed.... [T]he embargo worsened an already bad situation for the creation of Haiti’s human capital; Haiti’s children can never regain years of lost or poor quality education. In reducing educational opportunities, the international community’s sanctions also reduced Haiti’s access to the global economy and its chances for a successful transition to democracy.”³⁴³

This, in tandem with the reduced access to proper sanitation, vaccination, and nutrition means that, quite apart from those sent into domestic slavery, this cohort of children may have been irrevocably stunted, reducing to an extent long-term prospects for tapping democratic capacity. Argues Gibbons, “For the remainder of their lives, these children’s mental development and capacity for learning will be diminished.”³⁴⁴

Sanctions’ environmental and agricultural impacts have also lasted into the long-term, scuppering some potential for effective democratic transition and longer-term security. The sanctions increased production of charcoal, both to recoup lost export revenue and to counter the fuel embargo. This accelerated deforestation and soil erosion

in tiny, mountainous Haiti, cutting into future resource potential. Predicts Gibbons, “The impact of the embargo’s damage to Haiti’s already fragile environment, and to its agricultural productivity, will be felt for decades to come, as fertile topsoil washes into the sea, dams, and irrigation canals.”³⁴⁵ It should be recalled, with flooding claiming thousands in Haiti just as the international community secured the political situation in 2004, that deforestation contributes to flood-risk and to the scope of damage flooding can inflict.

Agriculturally, the loss of animal vaccines cost Haiti a considerable proportion of its livestock, evidently diminishing its resource potential beyond the sanctions period. An otherwise containable epidemic of Newcastle disease reportedly claimed forty percent of poultry stocks during the sanctions period.³⁴⁶ More importantly, though, owing to the influx of food aid meant to lessen the humanitarian impact of sanctions, dependent households may have shifted their production behaviour in keeping with an artificial dynamic unsustainable over the long-term. Morrell et al. cite a World Bank study arguing that: “food aid programs can create dependency and shift the production behaviour of households; they also create the possibility of market distortions and the danger that lower food prices may reduce incentives for investment.”³⁴⁷

Given the fact that Haiti’s struggle for democracy was riven with conflict between the massive majority of poor and the minuscule minority of wealthy, sanctions destruction of the middle class (perhaps a misnomer in the Haitian context, but shorthand for the middle ground between bookend classes) could only fuel post-conflict class strife when the restored Aristide’s formidable and perilous task was to bridge them.

There is a risk, too, that sanctions stunted extant democratic institutions, thus saddling the returning national government with a prohibitive burden. Sanctions may have cut into public confidence in democratic governance, rather than strengthening it. It may also have diminished the returned government's capacity to fulfill already unfulfillably high expectations post-sanctions.

In theory, local government in Haiti, for a people with heavy local material needs, little experience with effectual leadership, and difficult access to their capital, has great potential. An Inter-American Development Bank official recounted the story of a successful recent Canadian electricity project in a southern Haitian town, attributing its success to the Aristide government having ceded control to local government. He told a journalist:

“This is exactly the model that we would like to replicate with the water loan,” Johnson told me. ‘Support good governance, support local government, and that's definitely linked to democracy. The people are to stand in relation to the state to the point where they're willing to trust enough to pay their water rates, which sounds like something automatic in Washington, DC, but in Haiti when you pay your water rate, you may or may not get water.’”³⁴⁸

The anecdote illustrates the broader profound need to build confidence in Haitian democratic institutions among ordinary Haitians in their day-to-day lives. Yet, there is a concern that sanctions damaged nascent confidence just as they hindered these institutions' capacity and development.

“Development aid pledged for decentralization and reinforcement of municipal and local government was suspended with the sanctions against the *de facto* government, undercutting legitimately elected mayors, the plurality of whom were representatives from the National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD) party under whose auspices President Aristide had been elected [with the vast majority having remained in office after the coup].”³⁴⁹

There is concern, too, that hamstringing local government risks increasing dependence on the NGO community at the cost of sustainable democratic development

long-term. As Chetan Kumar argues, “in the absence of a political process to absorb and manage it, economic assistance alone is not a reliable path to building lasting peace.”³⁵⁰ Sanctions, then, aside from cutting unjustifiably into Haitian capacity-building, may have hindered post-conflict recovery and stunted democratic advancement.

While literature deliberately isolating the sanctions period on the subject is wanting, there is some evidence that sanctions, while enriching the junta, also exacerbated the burgeoning drug problem that has so damaged Haitian chances for democracy, security, and foreign aid. A resource vacuum, in tandem with the autonomy of isolation, contributed to stretching out drug networks as the industry was decentralized and webbed through new privileged sectors of society; this spread was entrenched and its effects have persisted well beyond sanctions’ lifting. Moreover, given the nature of Haiti’s expanded role in the industry, as one of transshipment, this evidently bears on regional and international peace and security more broadly conceived.

The 1996 US State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report holds that, “Haiti’s weak economy and political instability, coupled with the effects of the three-year embargo, has also opened the country to drug trafficking.”³⁵¹ The 1995 report, citing data from 1994, called Haiti “an increasingly important transshipment point for the movement of South American cocaine to the US.”³⁵² While an evidently imperfect measure of how much actual trafficking was taking place, more cocaine was seized in the first half of 1994, 530 kilograms, than in each of the three previous years combined.³⁵³ Already a transshipment point for drugs under Jean-Claude Duvalier in the 1980s, trafficking through Haiti mushroomed by 2004 to the point that about eight percent of drugs entering the US passed through Haiti.³⁵⁴ During the sanctions period, reported

Howard French, trafficking was decentralized. While it had earlier been the “perk” of senior military officers, by 1993 further segments had been criminalized. “In the past, a handful of key figures led the trafficking; now, it is widely believed, officers down to the rank of captain have become economic powers in their own right,” reported French in 1993.³⁵⁵ It would appear that sanctions led to a certain democratization of drug trafficking in Haiti. Added French, “Diplomats and military experts say that the decentralization of drug trafficking can be seen in the smaller aircraft that have peppered the countryside with bales of drugs for months.”³⁵⁶ Sanctions shifted attention to drug trafficking as a means of survival, made easier as Haiti’s diplomatic isolation gave international drug authorities no one on the ground with whom to cooperate. Haiti was free in its isolation.

“‘The D.E.A. is very frustrated because they don’t have anyone to work with in Haiti,’ said Representative Charles B. Rangel, Democrat of New York and leader of the House Caucus on Drug Abuse. ‘The country has become just a free port for this kind of thing. It is hard to imagine a more undisciplined military than you have in Haiti, and the drug problem goes straight to the top.’”³⁵⁷

In a state with few alternatives, the turn to trafficking might have been expected. In a report a year later entitled “Even Wealthy Haitians Starting to Feel Pinched,” French writes:

“In times of unrest, people here have long been used to paying a premium to buy American dollars. Lately, however, even the local currency, the gourde, has become scarce, as nervous Haitians stow away whatever savings they have to wait out the crisis.

“Many say the scramble for cash is likely to get worse. A tightening of the international embargo announced this week will suspend all financial transactions with Haiti. This measure will end an estimated flow of \$200 million to \$300 million sent by Haitians living abroad to their families here each year.

“Since sanctions were first imposed shortly after the coup in September 1991 against Father Aristide, economists here say those funds, along with large profits from cocaine trafficking, are the only things that have kept Haiti’s economy afloat.”³⁵⁸

As such, sanctions may have reinforced what Senator John Kerry in 1993 called, “a partnership made in hell, in cocaine, and in dollars between the Colombian cartels and the Haitian military.”³⁵⁹ That sanctions played an important role in this is more persuasive to the extent that broadly similar, if less severe, conditions allowed Colombian drug traffickers to make their initial inroads into Haiti in the 1980s. As one Caribbean drug expert explains:

“[S]ince ‘the government of Jean-Claude Duvalier was about to collapse and US aid was no longer as generous as in the past, Colombian drug dealers were able, with some success, to make important inroads into the corrupt governmental system. Some officials in the government and the military took this opportunity to enlarge their income and in the process capitalized and accumulated hard currency as well.’”³⁶⁰

He also explains, “The period between 1987 and 1994 saw the diversification of market outlets, increased local production and consumption initiatives, and the political destabilization of Haiti.”³⁶¹ Although, again, literature specifically exploring drug trafficking through the sanctions period is lacking, there is some cause to believe that the sanctions experience honed trafficking dexterity. Notes I. L. Griffith, “[D]rugs are smuggled over the border from Haiti using the same techniques, routes, and resources used to smuggle oil into Haiti during the embargo.”³⁶²

While Aristide’s record on drug interdiction is disputed – reports range from praising his honest efforts to implicating him in narco-trafficking – it is clear that drug trafficking has ravaged the state and its institutions. A 2000 US News and World Report piece indicated that, “The scope of Haiti’s drug corruption is breathtaking. A U.S. official estimates that 90 percent of the police superintendents are tainted.”³⁶³

The 2003 State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report tells a similar story and gives the sense that, in Haiti, corruption begets trafficking, which begets more corruption:

“Haitian drug trafficking organizations continue to operate with relative impunity. The arrival of cocaine from South America is generally unimpeded, due to the [Haitian National Police]’s lack of human and material resources. Haiti’s roads are very poor, and the HNP has no air assets.”³⁶⁴

It bears noting that sanctions-aided development and entrenchment of complex drug networks in Haiti was not, as conventional theory would have it, unavoidable. The burgeoning of regionally destructive drug traffic was a function of a dearth in the political will of the international community in imposing sanctions. Argues Jonge Oudraat:

“Many states considered implementing and enforcing the sanctions regime to be a US problem, and made little effort to do it themselves. While mounting a naval blockade or closing the Haitian-Dominican border presented few technical or resource problems for the US, it did pose political ones. Consequent delays gave Haiti’s rulers opportunities to set up alternative supply routes, and to establish networks for the illegal trade in drugs and other contraband.”³⁶⁵

The emergence of broadened and emboldened drug networks in Haiti is not conceptually inherent to the instrument; it stems from their *de facto* characteristic of deficient follow-through, arguably based on distorted assessments of their costs and benefits and a misunderstanding of their capacity to thoroughly restructure.

In March 2004, after he was ushered into exile, contempt for Aristide was rife. The US administration itself issued cutting remarks. US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher was quoted saying, “We can’t spend our time running around the world and the hemisphere saving people who botched their chance at leadership.”³⁶⁶ This echoed US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s sentiment that Aristide was “an individual who may have been elected democratically but was not governing effectively or democratically.”³⁶⁷ Yet not all of this contempt was deserved. While Aristide, through

his post-sanctions turns at leadership, made various injudicious and reprehensible decisions, he had led a state facing serious challenges in its ability to engage successfully in reconstruction and democratic transition. As argued here, sanctions contributed to and exacerbated these challenges. To an extent, then, a measure of the amplified costs of post-conflict reconstruction, and of new intervention once that reconstruction collapsed, should properly be folded into the Haitian sanctions calculus.

V. Conclusion

In exploring the substantive outcomes of sanctions' hitherto imputed outcomes, temptation may be great to shrug our shoulders at the sepia-toned noble intentions of Wilson and Dulles. We may be ready to reluctantly remark that the sort of war they battled against was fought over long years, by young men on foot or dug into muddy trenches, with millions of casualties, snuffing out the better part of an entire generation of a country's best and brightest. Unsatisfied with an instrument meant to defend peace and security that virtually characteristically damages the foundation for peace and security over time, we may be ready to concede defeat and bend to force, to be satisfied with modern weaponry engineered to spare civilians to the extent possible, and accept that the international resolve necessary to end tyranny quickly by force is easier to obtain than that necessary to end it by gentler means. We might grudgingly admit that quick war may leave in tact a foundation for peace and security that lingering sanctions cannot. But this would not satisfy us, either, and rightly so.

Quite apart from the fact that quick war today could unleash weapons so fearsome they have never been used, the discussion here is not meant to irrevocably indict the sanctions instrument. We have seen that it is in sanctions' character to coalesce with

challenges already facing a society. We have seen that sanctions characteristically create resource vacuums, compelling defensive coping strategies from the typically authoritarian state leadership as well as from the society beneath it. We have seen that these coping strategies may beget new vacuums and that -- given the character of the state, the leadership's power over its constrained purse, and the autonomy it discovers in its isolation -- these vacuums are often filled by noxious indigenous influences. These influences, often clients of the state, can become entrenched and difficult to dismantle well after sanctions have been lifted, remaining a threat both into the post-sanctions period and beyond the boundaries of the sanctions target. It has been argued that these influences pose threats to human security over the long-run and that this has policy relevance given the increasingly evident role of human security in protecting and promoting sustainable international peace and security. Moreover, we have seen that sanctions and the coping strategies they incite may damage the human capital, nascent civilian institutions, and long-term resource base upon which sustainable peace and security are built, making reconstruction more problematic and likely more costly, both financially and politically. That, to an important extent, building peace and security post-conflict balances precariously on a given population's expectations and its patience, as is presently evident in Iraq and Haiti, compounds the problem. It bears noting that, given the typically authoritarian leadership's pre-existing infrastructure, and its general talent for preferential redistribution, many of these dynamics may as readily bear on partial sanctions as they do on comprehensive ones. All of these dynamics should call into question frameworks that argue that sanctions can act as opinion-softeners to compel sender populations to permit sending force or that argue that sanctions are primarily

symbols to be used to make normative gains. They should also temper arguments holding that sanctions can sustainably contain their targets.

The dynamics discussed here are characteristics of sanctions as we have known them, although they are seldom recognized as such. Sanctions have been characteristically, systematically misapplied because political will to apply them properly has been characteristically and systematically wanting. Fortunately, as I have argued here, this can be ascribed to the fact that the cost-benefit calculus informing policymakers' political will has characteristically been systematically incomplete. It has subscribed to a truncated reality wherein long-term impacts are left out of the analysis. Where they have been taken into account, it has generally been cursorily, not as an organic component of assessment. Yet, as we have seen, the costs of sanctions lethargy can bear imposing political, economic, and policy costs well into the long-term. Bringing this logic into the policymakers' cost-benefit calculus and aiming with it to redress the political will puzzle is a first step to improving sanctions' substantive outcomes, yet one too often leapt by scholars more interested in design and application.

Indeed, many of the policy recommendations made by sanctions scholars over the 1990s sanctions decade and beyond are impressive initiatives. Some propose better engagement and a serving of carrots to match sanctions sticks,³⁶⁸ a strategy that would help defeat the autonomy of isolation on the argument that today's threats require less isolation not more.³⁶⁹ Some suggest citizen verification of weapons control agreements, giving private individuals incentives to help fight sanctions-busting at the grassroots.³⁷⁰ Scholars have pushed for greater reconnaissance of target countries and have written about incorporating a mechanism for humanitarian assessment into sanctions design.³⁷¹

Others have advocated better reimbursement mechanisms for affected neighbouring states,³⁷² internalizing sanctions within national legislation,³⁷³ and creating new intergovernmental committees or institutions to create a more permanent and cohesive sanctions infrastructure.³⁷⁴ Many of these policy recommendations are highly worthwhile. Yet, all of them combat deficiency in the instrument, elementally a function of lacking political will, with solutions that inevitably require new outlays of will and resources without addressing the conceptually prior puzzle. That puzzle has been the focus of discussion here; without first solving it, we can travel little further than Wilson and Dulles' trenches.

Endnotes

- ¹ Clark, 1932, 18-9
- ² Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 9
- ³ Clark, 1932, 20
- ⁴ Niblock, 2000, 1-2
- ⁵ Conducted by two anti-sanctions American manufacturing coalitions, USA Engage and the National Association of Manufacturers.
- ⁶ Wright, 2001
- ⁷ Drezner, 1999, 7
- ⁸ Kristof, 2003
- ⁹ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, in title.
- ¹⁰ Haass, 1997, in title.
- ¹¹ Helms, 1999, in title.
- ¹² E.g., Elliott, 1998, 59.
- ¹³ Cortright and Lopez's *Targeting Economic Statecraft*, 2002
- ¹⁴ Tostensen and Bull, 2002, 379-80, provide a description of the breadth this movement: "Decision makers and experts held a series of conferences and seminars in the late 1990s to address the challenges involved in their development. Two conferences, sponsored by the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs and held in 1998 and 1999 at Interlaken, Switzerland -- referred to as the 'Interlaken Process' -- examined targeted financial sanctions. Another 1998 conference -- sponsored by the U.K. Department for International Development (DfID) and hosted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London -- also sought to refine the sanctions instrument. Yet another two conferences sponsored by the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany and organized in late 1999 and late 2000, in Bonn and Berlin, respectively -- by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) -- placed a special emphasis on targeted arms embargoes and travel sanctions. Most recently, the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University organized a workshop in New York on July 23, 2001, to deliberate on targeted financial sanctions, and it has since produced a manual for their design and implementation. The deliberations and findings of these conferences, plus other recent publications, represent the state of the art in the search for new ways and means of making sanctions 'smarter,' and include a series of policy recommendations."
- ¹⁵ E.g., Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 13; Baldwin, 1999/2000, 80; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 2, 72; Miyagawa, 1992, 87, 103; Bergeijk, 1995, 444-5
- ¹⁶ Pape, 1997, 109
- ¹⁷ Hufbauer et al., 1990/1990a
- ¹⁸ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 4-5
- ¹⁹ Miyagawa, 1992, 204
- ²⁰ Murphy, 2000, 7
- ²¹ Baldwin, 1999/2000
- ²² Hufbauer et al. 1990a, 4-5
- ²³ Baldwin, 1999/2000, 81, fn 13
- ²⁴ Baldwin, 1985, 13
- ²⁵ Baldwin, 1985, 31
- ²⁶ Baldwin, 1985, 40
- ²⁷ Baldwin, 1985, 40
- ²⁸ Pape, 1997, 93-4
- ²⁹ Drezner, 1999, 2-3
- ³⁰ Drezner, 2003a
- ³¹ Doxey, 1996, 9
- ³² Doxey, 1996, 9
- ³³ Doxey, 1996, 9
- ³⁴ Pape, 1998, 71
- ³⁵ Patterson, 1995, 90

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- ³⁶ Patterson, 1995, 90
³⁷ Patterson, 1995, 95
³⁸ Patterson, 1995, 95
³⁹ Pape, 1997, 92
⁴⁰ Pape, 1997, 105
⁴¹ Pape, 1997, 105
⁴² Pape, 1997, 93
⁴³ Pape, 1997, 105
⁴⁴ Elliott, 1998, 50-1
⁴⁵ Elliott, 1998, 58
⁴⁶ Elliott, 1998, 51
⁴⁷ Elliott, 1998, 51
⁴⁸ Elliott, 1998, 58, emphasis added
⁴⁹ Elliott, 1998, 58
⁵⁰ Drezner, 1999, 16-7
⁵¹ Drezner, 1999, 16
⁵² Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 10
⁵³ Doxey, 1996, 48
⁵⁴ Doxey, 1996, 48
⁵⁵ Baldwin, 1999/2000, 85
⁵⁶ van Bergeijk, 1995, 452
⁵⁷ Murphy, 2000, 7
⁵⁸ Weiss, 1999, 507
⁵⁹ Damrosch, 1993, 301
⁶⁰ Cited in Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 4
⁶¹ Hufbauer et al. (2nd ed.), 1990a
⁶² Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 41
⁶³ Doxey, 1996, 54
⁶⁴ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 15
⁶⁵ Pape, 1997, 109
⁶⁶ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 17
⁶⁷ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 17
⁶⁸ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 111-2
⁶⁹ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 154-5
⁷⁰ Doxey, 1996, 116
⁷¹ Miyagawa, 1992, 95*
⁷² Cited in Drezner, 1999, 12
⁷³ Drezner, 1999, 12
⁷⁴ Pape, 1998, 76-7
⁷⁵ Galtung, 1996, 269
⁷⁶ Haass, 1997, 80
⁷⁷ Weiss, 1999, 503
⁷⁸ Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 4
⁷⁹ Weiss, 1999, 507
⁸⁰ Murphy, 2000, 8, entrenches this attitude in his alternative to war argument, saying, after listing some symbolic and expressive functions of sanctions:
 "All these uses are ancillary to the principal benefit which sanctions are normally perceived to provide, namely the ability to impose costs on the objectionable policies of another state, without attempting to unseat its regime, occupy its territory or destroy its infrastructure – in short, without going to war."
⁸¹ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 36
⁸² Baldwin, 1999/2000, 91
⁸³ Baldwin, 1999/2000, 91
⁸⁴ Baldwin, 1999/2000, 90
⁸⁵ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 76
⁸⁶ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 103

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- ⁸⁷ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 40
- ⁸⁸ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 40
- ⁸⁹ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 46
- ⁹⁰ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 46
- ⁹¹ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 46
- ⁹² Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 47
- ⁹³ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 48
- ⁹⁴ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 102
- ⁹⁵ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 71
- ⁹⁶ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 94
- ⁹⁷ Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 101
- ⁹⁸ Baldwin, 1999/2000, 83
- ⁹⁹ Baldwin 1999/2000, 89
- ¹⁰⁰ Baldwin, 1999/2000, 89
- ¹⁰¹ Baldwin, 1999/2000, 89
- ¹⁰² Baldwin, 1999/2000, 89
- ¹⁰³ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 35
- ¹⁰⁴ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 6
- ¹⁰⁵ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 46
- ¹⁰⁶ Miyagawa, 1992, 18, as well, argues: "Total import embargoes should, obviously, be the most effective. With selective import embargoes, the more the embargoed goods contribute to the target's income, the more effective sanctions will be." Meanwhile, Patterson, 1995, 93, argues that: "When extreme or complete sanctions are avoided, the time it will take for sanctions to be effective is further extended."
- ¹⁰⁷ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 9. This argument was echoed later by Richard Haass, 1997, 75, who argues, "[The] frequency with which the US uses sanctions is also a result of increased influence, especially on Congress, of single-issue constituencies, notably human rights promoters, environmental, or ethnic or racially oriented causes."
- ¹⁰⁸ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 9
- ¹⁰⁹ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 163
- ¹¹⁰ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 119-20
- ¹¹¹ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 133
- ¹¹² Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 132
- ¹¹³ Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, 154-5
- ¹¹⁴ Pape, 1997, 93
- ¹¹⁵ Pape, 1997, 93
- ¹¹⁶ Pape, 1997, 93-4
- ¹¹⁷ Pape, 1997, 94. Further to this, Pape, 1997, 109, in suggesting future research, argues that sanctions: "may be more effective against societies with extremely uneven income distributions than against those with more income equality. A government subject to economic sanctions cannot defend the incomes of its supporters by shifting income from the masses if the masses had nothing to begin with." This, Pape suggested in 1997, was what might explain economic sanctions contribution to the fall of apartheid while Saddam Hussein was still standing. Here, then, rather than an ethic of power conflict between interest groups broadly construed, the relevant target context highlights the resource conflict between government clients and the masses.
- ¹¹⁸ Weiss, 1998, 502-3
- ¹¹⁹ Weiss, 1998, 503
- ¹²⁰ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 23
- ¹²¹ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 22
- ¹²² Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 28
- ¹²³ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 29
- ¹²⁴ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 203. Other notable sanctions scholars taking up the carrot-and-stick cause on sanctions include Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan, who argue for policies of "engagement" over isolation, and Tim Niblock.
- ¹²⁵ Niblock, 2001
- ¹²⁶ Niblock, 2001, 185

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- ¹²⁷ Niblock, 2001 185
¹²⁸ Niblock, 2001, 1
¹²⁹ Patterson, 1995, 90
¹³⁰ Patterson, 1995, 93
¹³¹ Damrosch, 1993
¹³² Patterson, 1995, 91
¹³³ Damrosch, 1993, 281
¹³⁴ Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 24; similar at Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 16
¹³⁵ Haass, 1997, 79
¹³⁶ Haass, 1997, 79
¹³⁷ Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 9
¹³⁸ Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 9
¹³⁹ Haass, 1997, 82
¹⁴⁰ Murphy, 2000, 12
¹⁴¹ Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 18
¹⁴² Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 20
¹⁴³ Weiss, 1998, 507; Weiss has also co-authored a book with this conjunction as its title, 1997
¹⁴⁴ Patterson, 1995, 93. Similarly, Miyagawa, 1992, 80-1, posited bluntly, "a certain amount of effectiveness may have to be sacrificed because of humanitarian considerations."
¹⁴⁵ Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 8-9; 2000, 26
¹⁴⁶ Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 8
¹⁴⁷ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 26
¹⁴⁸ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 26
¹⁴⁹ Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 29
¹⁵⁰ Drezner, 2003, 107
¹⁵¹ Drezner, 2003, 107
¹⁵² Cortright and Lopez, 2002, viii
¹⁵³ Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 2
¹⁵⁴ Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 2
¹⁵⁵ Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 2
¹⁵⁶ Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 18-9
¹⁵⁷ Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 6-7
¹⁵⁸ Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 15
¹⁵⁹ E.g., Brzoska, 2003, 529-30
¹⁶⁰ Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 32
¹⁶¹ In Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 58
¹⁶² E.g., in Tostensen and Bull, 2002, 386-7; Mack and Khan, 2000, 289. This was also communicated to me during an interview with Othmar Wyss, head of export controls at the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, conducted in Bern, Switzerland, on 9 April 2003.
¹⁶³ Cited in Tostensen and Bull, 2002, 391
¹⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch, 1999
¹⁶⁵ Tostensen and Bull, 2002, 393
¹⁶⁶ Brzoska in Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 125
¹⁶⁷ Conroy in Cortright and Lopez, 2002
¹⁶⁸ Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 126; Drezner, 2003, 108
¹⁶⁹ Drezner, 2003
¹⁷⁰ Drezner, 2003, 109
¹⁷¹ Brzoska, 2003, 531
¹⁷² Brzoska, 2003, 532
¹⁷³ Haass, 1997, 97
¹⁷⁴ Haass, 1997, 97
¹⁷⁵ Drezner, 2003, 109
¹⁷⁶ Jonge Oudraat, 2000, 118
¹⁷⁷ Jonge Oudraat, 2000, 118
¹⁷⁸ Tostensen and Bull, 2002, 402

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- 179 Hufbauer et al., 1990a, 74
 180 Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 209
 181 Human Rights Watch, 1999
 182 Patterson, 1995, 93
 183 Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 12
 184 Doxey, 1996, 109
 185 Weiss, 1998, 499-500
 186 Weiss, Thomas G., David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Larry Minear. 1997
 187 Niblock, 2001, 91
 188 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1999
 189 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 2004, 262
 190 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada), 1999
 191 *Christian Science Monitor*, 2004
 192 Lektzian, 2003, 25-6
 193 de Vries in Cortright and Lopez, 2002, 87
 194 Pape, 1997, 101
 195 Lukovic, 1993
 196 Naylor, 2001, 337-8
 197 International Crisis Group, 3 December 2002, 1
 198 International Crisis Group, 3 December 2002, 11
 199 E.g., Lowenberg, 1997; Levy, 1999; Schwartzman and Taylor, 1999
 200 Cortright and Lopez, 1997, 12
 201 Duke, 1996
 202 *Southern Africa Business Intelligence*, 1995
 203 Landgren, 1989, 176
 204 Landgren, 1989, 184
 205 Duke, 1996
 206 Landgren, 1989, 178
 207 Human Rights Watch, 2000
 208 Batchelor and Dunne, 1998
 209 Human Rights Watch, 2000
 210 Batchelor and Dunne, 1998
 211 Batchelor and Dunne, 1998
 212 *The Economist*, 1997, 42
 213 Duke, 1996
 214 *The Economist*, 1997, 42
 215 Olojede, 1997
 216 Batchelor, 1999
 217 Cited in Human Rights Watch, 2000
 218 Cited in Human Rights Watch, 2000
 219 Human Rights Watch, 2000
 220 Human Rights Watch, 2000
 221 Lippman, 1996
 222 Pythian, 2000, 3
 223 Pythian, 2000, 3
 224 O'Sullivan, 2003, 160, outlines Iraqi threat perception with regard to Israeli nuclear capacity:
 "Iraq has claimed on numerous occasions that it would accept monitoring of its weapons if similar mechanisms were imposed on all the countries in the region, including Israel. While one can debate the sincerity of these pledges, they do point to the fact that Iraq sees itself to be living in a dangerous region, where Israeli nuclear capabilities and Iranian nuclear pursuits are viewed as highly threatening. It is plausible – even probable – that Iraq also perceives its WMD capabilities as having offensive and coercive value. The willingness of the regime to suffer immense costs rather than comply with UN resolutions suggests that it equated its survival with the maintenance of its WMD programs. If that is the case, no matter how well-suited the sanctions were to the goal of

behavior change and regardless of whether all policy instruments were coordinated to achieve that end, the international community would not have been able to persuade Saddam Hussein to relinquish his WMD pursuits fully, completely, and voluntarily." A point similar to O'Sullivan's is made by Niblock, 2001, 104.

²²⁵ Andreas, 2004, 44

²²⁶ Adamovich, 1997, 6

²²⁷ Naylor, 2001, 359

²²⁸ Williams, 2001, 138

²²⁹ Williams, 2001, 138

²³⁰ Naylor, 2001, 360

²³¹ Naylor, 2001, 363

²³² Andreas, 2004, 49

²³³ Andreas, 2004, 49

²³⁴ *BBC Online*, 2003

²³⁵ Andreas, 2004, 48

²³⁶ International Crisis Group, 2004, 13

²³⁷ International Crisis Group, 2003, 17

²³⁸ I attended the press conference (Hotel Clarion St. James et Albany, Paris, France, 22 May 2003). The transcript is posted at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/20909.htm>

²³⁹ "According to data from 2001, 72 percent of the population is under the age of 25." United Nations/World Bank, 2003, 19

²⁴⁰ In late-June and early-July 2002, I was assigned the task by Newsweek Middle East Editor Christopher Dickey of canvassing some Iraq experts for their thoughts on whether an occupation was likely to be the outcome of the then-early talk of US action against Iraq. In telephone conversations, two of the foremost Iraq experts, Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution and Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, bristled at the idea. As late as the summer before the spring 2003 war, if not much later, the scope and character of the current reconstruction project was at best an extreme unlikelihood.

²⁴¹ Davison and Schapiro, 2004

²⁴² Davison and Schapiro, 2004

²⁴³ The United Nations/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment (October 2003) points this out with regard to water sanitation and healthcare, Iraq's modern sophisticated technology posing a greater challenge during sanctions than less sophisticated machinery would have. ("[T]he over-reliance on highly sophisticated mobile, integrated, and relatively small-scale but high-output water treatment technologies known as "compact units" proved very difficult to sustain during sanctions because of limited technical capacity and resources," section 3.40; "The health care system—a hospital-oriented, capital-intensive model that requires large-scale imports of medicines, medical equipment and even health workers—is inefficient and access is inequitable," section 3.14.)

²⁴⁴ Garfield, 2000, 16

²⁴⁵ Cainkar, 1993, 38

²⁴⁶ Cited in Niblock, 2001, 331

²⁴⁷ Using data cited by Niblock, 2001, 331. Life expectancy was 65 in 1987 and 58 in 1995.

²⁴⁸ Alnasrawi, 2003, 219 citing a 1992 study by Dilip Hiro

²⁴⁹ Al-Nouri, 1997

²⁵⁰ Alnasrawi, 2000

²⁵¹ O'Sullivan, 2003, 147

²⁵² E.g., Rubin, 2001, 102; Clawson, 2000. The title of the Clawson piece, "A Look At Sanctioning Iraq--The Numbers Don't Lie, Saddam Does," evokes the point made here.

²⁵³ Welch, 2002

²⁵⁴ Larson, 2003, demonstrates a peculiar tendency to obviate from sanctions, making cursory reference to them, while illustrating a contrasting readiness to point solely to the "burden of the Saddam regime" and "Hussein's misrule – corruption, plunder and the distortions of central state planning."

²⁵⁵ Lexis-Nexis search

²⁵⁶ *The New York Times*, 1988; see also, Schmemmann, Serge. "Iraq Acknowledges Its Use of Gas But Says Iran Introduced It in War," *The New York Times*, 2 July 1988, p. 3; and Sciolino, Elaine. "Shultz to See Iraqi on Reported Gassing of Kurds," *The New York Times*, 8 September 1988, A16.

²⁵⁷ Fisk, 1998

²⁵⁸ Niblock, 2001, 150

²⁵⁹ Roche, 2000.

²⁶⁰ Cited in Niblock, 2001, 151-2

²⁶¹ Garfield, 2000, 18

²⁶² Niblock, 2001, 76

²⁶³ Fisk, 1998

²⁶⁴ Sick, 2000, 60

²⁶⁵ Cited in Niblock, 2001, 152

²⁶⁶ Garfield's work, well-respected in the field, cites UNICEF: "A demographic survey run by UNICEF in 1999 provides the first reliable mortality estimates for Iraq since 1991. This study confirmed that the rate of mortality more than doubled (from 56 per 1000 births during 1994-89) among children under five years in the fifteen governorates of central/southern Iraq, to 131 per 1000 births, during 1995-99." Also, he writes, "A conservative estimate of 'excess deaths' among children under five since 1991 would be 300,000. While this number is far less than that claimed by the Iraqi government, it confirms that a grave and sustained rise in preventable deaths has occurred in Iraq." (Garfield, 2000, 17)

²⁶⁷ Hurd, 2003

²⁶⁸ *BBC News Online*, 2004. Cites a recently completed University of Michigan study of 191 Costa Rican children.

²⁶⁹ Cited in Niblock, 2001, 146

²⁷⁰ Akunjee and Asif, 2002, 250, citing WHO's Humanitarian Activities in Iraq under SCR 986, Geneva: WHO, April 1998

²⁷¹ Akunjee and Asif, 2002, 253

²⁷² UN/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, October 2003

²⁷³ Niblock, 2001, 146-7

²⁷⁴ United Nations, S/2000/2/8 (*Report of the Secretary-General on Resolution 1281*), para. 138, cited in Niblock, 2001, 147

²⁷⁵ Akunjee and Asif, 2002, 252

²⁷⁶ Akunjee and Asif, 2002, 251

²⁷⁷ Niblock, 2002, 179

²⁷⁸ Mahdi, 2002, 23

²⁷⁹ Al-Nouri, 1997

²⁸⁰ Mahdi, 1998

²⁸¹ Mahdi, 2002, 4

²⁸² Ford, 2003

²⁸³ Ford, 2003

²⁸⁴ Ford, 2003

²⁸⁵ Niblock, 2001, 174

²⁸⁶ Niblock, 2001, 174

²⁸⁷ Dodge, 2000, 8

²⁸⁸ Dodge, 2000, 8

²⁸⁹ Al-Ali, 2003

²⁹⁰ Baram, 2000, 10

²⁹¹ Al-Ali, 2003, 244

²⁹² This is broached in Cainkar, 1993, and Al-Ali, 2003. Sanctions' impact on the gender balance of power is marked but understudied. I explored it in a 2000 paper ("Sanctioning Disempowerment: The Gendered Impact of Sanctions") available upon request.

²⁹³ As noted in, e.g.: Niblock, 2001, 180-1; Baram, 2000; Dawisha, 1999; Al-Nouri, 1997; Chipaux, 12 November 1994

²⁹⁴ This *nouveau riche* features most notably in: International Crisis Group, 1 October 2002; Naylor, 2001; and Al-Nouri, 1997.

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- ²⁹⁵ Day and Freeman, 2003, 310
- ²⁹⁶ Dawisha, 1999, 563
- ²⁹⁷ Dawisha, 1999, 563. Tribal patronage's utility during the post-Gulf War intifadas, and its surge to explicit policy, is also noted by Baram, 1997.
- ²⁹⁸ Baram (1997, 13), citing reports from 1992 and 1993, notes that deputizing tribes to provide security "saved the regime the need to spread its troops thinly over the countryside." A similar point is made by Dodge, 2003, 109. This speaks to the notion of sanctions coalescing with extant indigenous challenges as sanctions limited the resources with which Saddam was able to quell instability in outlying areas.
- ²⁹⁹ Dodge, 2003, 108-9
- ³⁰⁰ Dawisha, 1999, 564
- ³⁰¹ Wimmer, 2003, 119
- ³⁰² Dawisha, 1999, 564. Also referenced in Baram 1997.
- ³⁰³ Baram, 1997, 12-13
- ³⁰⁴ Dawisha, 1999, 564
- ³⁰⁵ Wimmer, 2003, 119
- ³⁰⁶ Dawisha, 1999, 566
- ³⁰⁷ Baram, 1997, 20
- ³⁰⁸ Dawisha, 1999, 565
- ³⁰⁹ Baram, 1997, 20
- ³¹⁰ Day and Freeman, 2003, 309
- ³¹¹ Chandrasekaran, 23 December 2003
- ³¹² Bender and Glain, 15 January 2004
- ³¹³ Bender and Glain, 15 January 2004
- ³¹⁴ Bender and Glain, 15 January 2004
- ³¹⁵ Osnos and Spolar, 2 May 2004
- ³¹⁶ Dodge, 2003, 109
- ³¹⁷ Cited in Niblock, 2001, 102
- ³¹⁸ As discussed in Sick, 1998
- ³¹⁹ As discussed in O'Sullivan, 2003, 154
- ³²⁰ Perthes, 1998. A similar point is expressed in *The Economist*, 25 April 1998.
- ³²¹ Garfield, 1999, 10
- ³²² Garfield, 1999, 10
- ³²³ Malone, 1998, 62
- ³²⁴ Gibbons, 1998, 4
- ³²⁵ Gibbons, 1998, 4
- ³²⁶ Clinton, 1993, 2209
- ³²⁷ Germani, 2004; Hilton, 2004
- ³²⁸ World Bank World Development Indicators, GDP per capita measured in constant 1995 US\$, record goes back to 1960; percentage figure is cited in Pan American Health Organization, 1998, 316
- ³²⁹ World Bank World Development Indicators, GDP per capita measured in constant 1995 US\$, record goes back to 1960.
- ³³⁰ World Bank World Development Indicators, using current US dollars. World Bank definition: "Definition: GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad." Available at <http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/>
- ³³¹ Gibbons, 1999, 11
- ³³² Morrell et al., 1999, 129
- ³³³ Gibbons, 1999, 11
- ³³⁴ Gibbons, 1999, 10; Morrell et al., 1999, 129
- ³³⁵ Gibbons, 1999, 11
- ³³⁶ United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2002
- ³³⁷ Pan American Health Organization, 1998, 317
- ³³⁸ Pan American Health Organization, 1998, 317

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- ³³⁹ Pan American Health Organization, 1998, 317, cites the 130,000 figure; Gibbons, 1999, 21, cites the 150,000 and 250,000 figures.
- ³⁴⁰ National Coalition for Haitian Rights, 2002
- ³⁴¹ National Coalition for Haitian Rights, 2002
- ³⁴² Gibbons, 1999, 20
- ³⁴³ Gibbons, 1999, 20
- ³⁴⁴ Gibbons, 1999, 23
- ³⁴⁵ Gibbons, 1999, 13
- ³⁴⁶ Gibbons, 1999, 12
- ³⁴⁷ Morrell et al., 1999, 129
- ³⁴⁸ Kidder, 2003, 30
- ³⁴⁹ Gibbons, 1999, 35
- ³⁵⁰ Kumar, 1999, 390
- ³⁵¹ United States Department of State, 1997
- ³⁵² United States Department of State, 1995, 176
- ³⁵³ United States Department of State, 1995, 176. 157 kilograms had been seized in 1993, 56 in 1992, and 188 in 1991.
- ³⁵⁴ Caistor, 2004
- ³⁵⁵ French, 25 April 1993
- ³⁵⁶ French, 25 April 1993
- ³⁵⁷ French, 25 April 1993
- ³⁵⁸ French, 11 June 1994
- ³⁵⁹ Perez, 2000, 144
- ³⁶⁰ Michel S. Laguerre, cited in Griffith, 1997, 101
- ³⁶¹ Laguerre cited in Griffith, 1997, 75
- ³⁶² Griffith, 1997, 73
- ³⁶³ Robinson, 2000
- ³⁶⁴ United States Department of State, 2004
- ³⁶⁵ Jonge Oudraat, 2000, 112
- ³⁶⁶ Younge, 2004
- ³⁶⁷ Younge, 2004
- ³⁶⁸ E.g.: Haass and O'Sullivan, 2000; Mack and Khan, 2000; Niblock, 2001; O'Sullivan, 2003
- ³⁶⁹ O'Sullivan, 2003, 60.
- ³⁷⁰ Tostensen and Bull, 2002, 385; Mack and Khan, 2000
- ³⁷¹ E.g.: Tostensen and Bull, 2002; Mack and Khan, 2000; Niblock, 2001
- ³⁷² E.g.: Doxey, 1996; Brzoska, 2003
- ³⁷³ E.g.: Cortright and Lopez, 2002
- ³⁷⁴ E.g.: Cortright and Lopez, 2002; Tostensen and Bull, 2002; Jonge Oudraat, 2000; Niblock, 2001

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