

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ‘ILM AL-WAD‘ (8TH/14TH – 15TH/20TH CENTURY)

ORIGINS, CONTEXTS AND CANONS OF A SEMANTIC THEORY

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[Syme]: “Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? [...] Every concept that can ever be needed, will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten. [...] The Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect.”

George Orwell, 1984

إِنْ هِيَ إِلَّا أَسْمَاءٌ سَمَّيْتُمُوهَا أَنْتُمْ وَءَابَاؤُكُمْ مَّا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ بِهَا
مِنْ سُلْطَانٍ ۚ إِنْ يَتَّبِعُونَ إِلَّا الظَّنَّ وَمَا تَهْوَى الْأَنْفُسُ ۖ وَلَقَدْ
جَاءَهُمْ مِنْ رَبِّهِمُ الْهُدَىٰ (النجم: ٢٣)

*[They are naught but names yourselves have named, and
your fathers; God has sent down no authority touching them.
They follow only surmise, and what the souls desire; and yet
guidance has come to them from their Lord]*

Quran, 53:23

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Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the Islamicate discipline known as *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* (lit. “the science of positing,” which investigates the semantics of the parts of speech). In it, I present the first systematic analysis of the development of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, from its origins in the 14th century until its recent iterations in the 20th and 21st centuries. This science analyzes how terms come to convey their concepts and, in particular, how terms convey particular and individual concepts or universal and general ones. The original scope of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is to explain how terms, such as prepositions and pronouns, are posited in a universal way but ultimately convey particular and individual concepts. The solution that *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* provided in order to explain the semantic features of this group of terms was so influential that pre-modern scholars expanded the scope of the science so as to develop a complete semantic theory encompassing all parts of speech. The core semantic theory of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* emerged in its foundational text, ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī’s (680/1281-756/1355) *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*. Scholars such as al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (740/1339-816/1413), Mullā Jāmī (817/1414-898/1492), ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Qūshjī (d. 879/1474) and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’īnī (871/1466-943/1537) embarked on an exegetical campaign centered around al-Ījī’s short treatise, with the aim of providing coherence and clarity to what looked like an unfinished theory of semantics. Commentators and glossators addressed virtually every aspect al-Ījī’s sketch of the semantic theory, which, however, did not go unchallenged and raised numerous doubts and objections. This thesis will discuss how commentators and glossators attempted to establish the theory of *waḍ‘*, to define its principles and its technical vocabulary, and to fill in all the gaps in al-Ījī’s text.

By providing an unprecedented account of the main topics and themes of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* from its foundational text, through the rich and largely unexplored exegetical tradition of commentaries and glosses until the 19th century, and finally up to the developed evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in the

form of *madrasa* manuals and summaries in the 20th, I lay the ground for a new field of inquiry in Islamic studies, one that aims to integrate *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* fully into the complex and dynamic history of Islamic intellectual thought.

Resumé

Cette thèse se concentre sur la discipline islamique connue sous le nom de *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* (lit. « la science de l’imposition linguistique », qui étudie la sémantique des parties du discours). Ici, Je présente la première une analyse systématique du développement du *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, depuis ses origines au 14^{ème} siècle, jusqu’à ses récentes itérations au cours du 21^{ème} siècle. Cette science analyse comment les termes parviennent à véhiculer leurs concepts et, en particulier, comment les termes véhiculent des concepts particuliers et individuels, ou universels et généraux. La portée originale de *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* est d’expliquer comment des termes, tels que les prépositions et les pronoms, sont imposés de manière universelle mais véhiculent finalement des concepts particuliers et individuels. Les solutions fournies par le *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* pour expliquer les caractéristiques sémantiques de ce groupe de termes a exercé une telle influence que les érudits prémodernes ont élargi la portée de la science afin de développer une théorie sémantique complète englobant toutes les parties du discours. La théorie sémantique fondamentale du *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* a émergé dans son texte fondateur, c’est-à-dire *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya* de ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (680/1281-756/1355). Des érudits tels que al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (740/1339-816/1413), Mullā Jāmī (817/1414-898/1492), ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Qūshjī (m. 879/1474) et ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’inī (871/1466-943/1537) entreprirent une campagne exégétique centrée autour du court traité d’al-Ījī, dans le but d’apporter cohérence et clarté à ce qui semblait être une théorie inachevée de la sémantique. Les commentateurs et glossateurs ont abordé pratiquement tous les aspects de l’esquisse d’al-Ījī de la théorie sémantique, qui, cependant, n’est pas restée incontestée et a soulevé de nombreux doutes et objections. Cette thèse discutera de la manière dont commentateurs et glossateurs ont tenté d’établir la théorie du *waḍ‘*, de définir ses principes et son vocabulaire technique, et de combler toutes les lacunes du texte d’al-Ījī.

En fournissant un compte rendu inédit des principaux sujets et thèmes du *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* depuis son texte fondateur, à travers la tradition exégétique riche et largement inexplorée des commentaires et des gloses jusqu'au 19ème siècle, et enfin jusqu'à l'évolution du *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* sous forme de manuels et de résumés de madrasa au 20ème siècle, Je pose les bases d'un nouveau domaine de recherche dans les études islamiques, un domaine qui vise à intégrer pleinement le *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* dans l'histoire complexe et dynamique de la pensée intellectuelle islamique.

Acknowledgements

Writing a dissertation thesis on the historical development of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* has been a long, rather Dantean journey in which

“[...] I found myself within a shadowed forest,
for I had lost the path that does not stray
Ah, it was hard to speak of what it was
That savage forest, dense and difficult
Which even in recall renews my fear.”

Indeed, like the fictional Dante of the *Inferno* and the *Purgatory* I was far from alone in my travails, guided by my very own ever patient, ever knowing Virgil: my supervisor Professor Robert Wisnovsky, without whom the completion of this dissertation journey would never have been possible.

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Introduction

This dissertation focuses on the Islamicate discipline known as *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* (lit. *the science of positing*), which can be roughly rendered as *semantics of the parts of speech*, and offers a hereto unprecedented analysis of its development from its origins in the 14th century until its recent iterations. Unlike other branches of knowledge, such as logic, metaphysics, rhetoric, jurisprudence, etc., *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* cannot be translated into a discipline familiar to a Western reader since no equivalent science developed in the Western intellectual tradition.¹ The notion of linguistic *waḍ‘*, or *waḍ‘ al-lughā*, depends on the idea of the givenness of language. By “givenness,” it is meant that the relations between terms (*alfāz*), which belongs to the physical world (*al-khārij*), and their concepts (*ma‘ānī*), which belongs to the immaterial, intellectual realm (*al-dhihn* or *al-‘aql*) are not natural but determined, or posited, by a “positor” (*wāḍi‘*). The act of positing the relations between terms and concepts, and the forms that positing can assume, are at the core of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. This science analyzes how terms come to convey their concepts and, in particular, how such terms convey particular and individual concepts or universal and general ones. If terms such as ‘cat,’ ‘house’ or ‘human’ have been posited to convey general, universal concepts, and terms such as Zayd, John and Mary have been posited to convey particular, specific entities, there exists a large group of terms, such as ‘I,’ ‘this,’ ‘she,’ ‘who,’ ‘from,’ ‘to,’ which convey different concepts. That is, they signify different referents, which vary from one usage to another according to the context in which they occur. The original scope of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* was to explain how this last group of terms has been posited in a universal way while

¹ If one wishes to find a loose Western counterpart to the topics discussed in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, one could look at the analysis of indexicals or to the theory of indexicality that emerged in philosophy of language and semantics with the works of Charles Sanders Peirce in the 19th century and, more recently, in David Kaplan’s works on demonstratives, particles, and pronouns.

ultimately conveying particular and individual concepts. The solution that *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* provided to explain the semantic features of this group of terms was so impactful that pre-modern scholars extended the scope of the science to develop a complete semantic theory encompassing all parts of speech.

This dissertation project is indebted to Bernard George Weiss’ doctoral dissertation entitled *Language and Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of “Waḍ‘ al-Lughah” and its Development* (1966) and his subsequent works on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* (1976, 1985 and 1987), which first introduced and still constitutes the foundation of the Western study of this branch of knowledge. In his Princeton Ph.D. dissertation, Weiss introduced to the Western academic audience an account of a discipline called *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. His doctoral thesis can be divided into three main sections. In the first, Weiss presents the debate on the origin of the language according to pre-modern Muslim scholars, that is, the question about the “positor” of language (*al-wāḍi‘*). In the second, he discusses the notion of linguistic positing (*waḍ‘ al-lughah*) as it was analyzed by Muslim scholars in the introductions of their treatises and manuals of legal methodology (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). The third and last section is devoted to the discipline called *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, in which Weiss associates the notion of linguistic positing discussed in legal methodology with the emergence of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as a discrete discipline, and then offers a first sketch of the principles of this science, based mainly on a few late-18th/early-19th century treatises and manuals used in the *madrassa curriculum studiorum*. After his doctoral dissertation, Weiss published articles in 1976, 1985 and 1987, in which he discussed in more detail the main aspects of the theory of *waḍ‘* as sketched in the third section of his doctoral dissertation. In 2006, exactly forty years from his doctoral dissertation, Weiss authored the entry “*Waḍ‘ al-Luġa*” in the monumental *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics* edited by Kees Versteegh. To be sure, prior to Weiss, there is one mention of *‘ilm al-*

waḍʿ in the influential *Introduction à la théologie musulmane*, authored by Louis Gardet and George Anawati. In the appendix of Chapter 2 of Part One of the book, the authors provide the *curriculum studiorum* adopted by the university of al-Azhar according to Law n. 39 of 1930. The study of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* (here translated as “semantics”) occurs only in the third cycle of study in the Faculty of Arabic Language, that is, when the student is asked to choose a specialization in one of the three faculties, i.e., the Faculty of Arabic Language, the Faculty of Law, or the Faculty of Theology.²

Nonetheless, the impetus behind this dissertation project comes from Robert Wisnovsky’s 2004 article “The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentaries in Post-Classical (1100-1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Preliminary Observations.”³ In his article, Wisnovsky challenged the narrative of “decline” and “stagnation” of Islamicate intellectual history in post-Avicennian (or post-Ghazalian) period. In Western academia, the history of Islamicate intellectual traditions has been shaped by Orientalist tropes that see the East as a locus of origins (the origins of knowledge, arts, technologies etc.) followed by subsequent decline and stagnation, while development and innovation continue in the West. Through these tropes, the “golden period” of Islamicate intellectual history reaches its climax with the philosophy of Avicenna and virtually ends with al-Ghazālī’s criticism of it; what follows is a steady decline, in contrast to the light of the Renaissance that invests the West. Wisnovsky

² See Gardet, L. and Anawati, G., *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris: Vrin, 1948, pp. 135.

³ In his article, Wisnovsky offers the first list of commentaries, super-commentaries, glosses and super-glosses of the exegetical tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as well as list of the exegetical traditions of other rational sciences; see pp. 161-190. Wisnovsky also authored a series of articles (such as “Avicenna and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the *Ishārāt*” and “Avicenna’s Islamic Reception” in 2013, “Towards a Genealogy of Avicennism” in 2014, and “On the Emergence of Maragha Avicennism” in 2018), in which he shows the richness of the Avicennian exegetical tradition, especially in debates on ontology and metaphysics. Prior to Wisnovsky, the historian Marshall Hodgson, in his influential *The Venture of Islam* of 1974, pointed to the mistaken assumption that the post-Mongol period, symbolized by the sack and destruction of Baghdad, was a period of cultural and intellectual decline in the Islamicate lands, and considered, in very broad terms, the Ottoman, Safavid and Moghul empires as centers of thriving intellectual and cultural activity.

corrects this narrative by showing how the post-Avicennian (or Ghazalian) period constitutes an extremely rich, and yet undervalued, phase of intellectual development, in which scholarly production took largely the form of commentaries, glosses, super-commentaries and super glosses all the way up to the 20th century.⁴ The intellectual continuum preserved in the exegetical tradition from the post-Avicennian period up to the 20th century is the locus where scholars and researchers could find the original and innovative material to construe more accurate trends and narrative of the Islamic intellectual history. This dissertation responds to Wisnovsky's call, by reconsidering an intellectual tradition, that is, *'ilm al-waḍ'*, which emerged and was systematized well beyond Avicenna through commentaries, glosses, supercommentaries and superglosses, up to the 20th century. By casting light on the centuries-long tradition of *'ilm al-waḍ'*, I also aim to disrupt canonical narratives that have valued Islamicate intellectual history only as a mediator, by which classical Greek sciences were translated to Arabic and thence to Latin, and handed on to Europe. In fact, *'ilm al-waḍ'* is a

⁴ This call for reconsidering and challenging such narratives of decline and stagnation in favor of a new narrative that extends from Aristotle to Abduh is not limited, in Wisnovsky's view, to the philosophical disciplines, but should be extended to all rational disciplines, such as rational theology (*'ilm al-kalām*, *uṣūl al-dīn* and *'aqīda*), logic, rhetoric, dialectic theory and semantic theory. The publications of monographies, collective volumes and peer-reviewed journal issues on the post-classical Islamicate intellectual endeavor from the 11th to the 20th centuries in the last fifteen years has helped to correct old narratives, from the one side, and to foster new ones in almost all fields of study of Islamicate intellectual history, from the other side; see, for example, the recent work by Heidrun Eichner, *The Post-Avicennan Philosophical Tradition and Islamic Orthodoxy. Philosophical and Theological Summae in Context*. Martin-Luther-universität Halle-Wittenberg, Habilitationsschrift, 2009; Khaled El-Rouayheb (*Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic 900-1900*, Leiden: Brill, 2010; *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge University Press 2015; *The Development of Arabic Logic (1200-1800)*, Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2019); Asad Q. Ahmed ("Post-Classical Philosophical Commentaries/Glosses: Innovations in the Margins," *Oriens* 41, n. 3-4 (2013), pp. 317-348; *Palimpsests of Themselves*, University of California Press, 2022); Frank Griffel, *The Formation of Post Classical Philosophy in Islam*, Oxford University Press, 2021; Walter E. Young ("Mulāzama in Action in the Early *Ādāb al-Baḥth*," *Oriens* 44.3-4 (2016), pp. 332-385; "Al-Samarqandī's Third *Mas'ala*: Juridical Dialectic Governed by the *Ādāb al-Baḥth*," *Oriens* 46.1-2 (2018), pp. 62-128) Naser Dumairieh, *Intellectual Life in the Ḥijāz before Wahhabism*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2022; Peter Adamson's project and podcast *History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps* (accessible at <https://www.historyofphilosophy.net>). Most, if not all these recent studies place the exegetical tradition, that is, the *shurūḥ* and the *ḥawāshī*, of a given text as their common denominator.

rational science that is specific to the Islamicate intellectual landscape and which, unlike logic, metaphysics, natural philosophy etc., appears to hold no direct relation to other branches of Greek knowledge.

Even though a substantial amount of research has been recently conducted on the various branches of the post-classical Islamicate commentary tradition, our knowledge of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* has hardly increased since Weiss’ doctoral dissertation in 1966.⁵ Scholars and researchers in the different sub-fields of Islamicate intellectual history, such as logic, grammar, dialectics and rational theology (let alone the reception and interpretation of Avicennian philosophy) now have a far richer understanding of the evolution of a given science and its exegetical literature. This is also thanks to the painstaking work of publishing houses based mainly in Turkey, Iran and the Arab world, which continue to produce editions of foundational texts and their commentaries. As a result, scholars of these sub-fields of Islamicate intellectual history can now offer new narratives by exposing overlooked intellectual trends, and propose new interpretations of fundamentals theories and distinctions. Aside from Weiss’ work in 1966, no such work exists for the history of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. In other words, *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is still confined to the periphery of the central intellectual disciplines, such as grammar, logic, jurisprudence, philosophy and theology. The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to reinsert *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* back into the Islamic intellectual landscape by telling the story of the origin and evolution of a science,

⁵ My statement refers to the research and works published in Western academia. Of course, especially in Turkey and in the Arab world, there has been a growing interest in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in the last decade. This resulted mainly in the publication of Masters’ and PhD theses, as well as journal articles that focus on establishing a first edition of a specific work, and where the history of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is presented in a summarized manner. Moreover, in 2018 I was informed by Efe Murat Balıkcıoğlu in private conversation that a project on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* had been launched in 2017, supervised by Prof. Ömer Türker at Marmara University in Turkey. After an email exchange with Prof. Türker and his project coordinator in 2018, in which they kindly shared some details about the project, I could not find any research results coming out of this project.

from its inception around the mid-14th century up to its most recent developments in the 21st century. This dissertation undertakes to provide, for the first time, a systematic and comprehensive history of the exegetical literature, as well as of the main topics and themes of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, starting with its foundational text (that is, al-Ījī’s (680/1281-756/1355) *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*), through the vast and almost entirely unexplored exegetical tradition of commentaries and glosses that lasted until the 19th century, and finally up to the evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in the form of manuals and summaries in the 20th century. As will become clear to the reader throughout the dissertation, the story of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is not so much the story of the reception of its foundational text, but rather the story of a highly dynamic exegetical literature consisting in dozen if not hundreds of *shurūḥ* (commentaries) and *ḥawāshī* (glosses).

Focusing on the exegetical literature of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* forces the historian to confront with a unique set of challenges compared to those facing historians of other Islamicate exegetical traditions. This arises from the specific role that commentators and glossators had in constructing a science of *waḍ‘*. One of the tasks of a commentator is to participate in the scholarly discourse of a specific discipline and maintain its relevance to diverse audiences by focusing their exegetical effort on a specific foundational text that represents that discipline.⁶ Commentators and glossators within Islamic intellectual history had at their disposal a set of foundational texts to employ as tools for their exegetical *praxis*, which consisted in rephrasing, unpacking and explaining some parts of or the entirety of the original work, rearticulating the

⁶ As such, commentators in philosophy chose to comment on Avicenna’s *Ishārāt*, al-Kātibī’s *Ḥikmat al-‘Ayn*, or the more introductory *Hidāyat al-Ḥikma* by al-Abharī; commentators in logic chose to comment on al-Kātibī’s *al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya*, al-Abharī’s primer *Isāghūjī*, al-Taftāzānī’s *Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq*, or the more advanced *Maṭālī‘ al-Anwār* by al-Urmawī; commentators on rational theology and creed chose al-Ījī’s impactful *al-Mawāqif*, al-Ṭūsī’s *Tajrīd al-‘Aqā’id*, or the shorter *‘Aqā’id* by al-Nasafī, al-Ījī or al-Sanūsī; commentators in grammar chose Ibn al-Ḥājib’s *al-Kāfiya*, Jāmī’s *al-Fawā’id al-Ghiyāthiyya*, or the entry-level *al-Alfiyya* in verses by Ibn Mālik; commentators on dialectics chose Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī’s or al-Ījī’s *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-l-Munāẓara*; and commentators on rhetoric chose al-Sakkākī’s foundational *Miftāḥ al-‘Ulūm* and its corollary texts *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* by al-Qazwīnī and *Muṭāwwal* by al-Taftāzānī.

intentions of the author, evaluating the views or the concepts expressed in the text, sometimes by agreeing with and reinforcing the author's views, sometimes by refuting them in order to propose new original ones. Commentators on al-Ījī's *al-Risāla al-Waḍ'īyya* are no exception to this exegetical tradition. However, unlike commentators from other disciplines, the first commentators on al-Ījī's *al-Risāla al-Waḍ'īyya* did not have at their disposal a set of already existing textual tools with which to unpack the meaning of al-Ījī's compressed formulations. More importantly, unlike commentators dealing with logic, metaphysics, juridical methodology, grammar or rhetoric, commentators did not read al-Ījī's *al-Risāla al-Waḍ'īyya* against a broader tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍ'*, which meant that its principles were not as well defined and there were no canonical debates yet.⁷ In this respect, *ʿilm al-waḍ'* represents a peculiar phenomenon in the history of Islamicate thought, because it is primarily the work of commentators and glossators that made it a science, built up its principles, defined its vocabulary, established its aims and goals, and created bridges to topics discussed in cognate sciences, namely logic, rhetoric, grammar and juridical methodology.

The notion of linguistic positing (*waḍ'*) was of course not a novelty for al-Ījī and his commentators. Generations of scholars before al-Ījī, such as philosophers like al-Fārābī and Avicenna, grammarians like Sībawayhi, Ibn al-Ḥājj, Ibn Yaʿīsh, and Raḍī al-Dīn al-Astarābādī, or jurists like Abū Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Āmidī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī use the notion of *waḍ'* loosely to refer to cases of linguistic positing, and often distinguish between an original act of

⁷ The scholar of Islamicate intellectual history could argue that dialectic theory, that is, *ādāb al-baḥṭh wa-l-munāẓara* and its foundational text authored by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, represented a similar, and even earlier phenomenon than *ʿilm al-waḍ'*. However, it should be noted that *ādāb al-baḥṭh wa-l-munāẓara* finds its origins in the earlier juridical methodology, and more precisely in the discipline of *jadal* and *khilāf* (disputation and argumentation). Moreover, although al-Samarqandī's was the most influential text in theorizing dialectical theory, earlier attempts are to be found in Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī's *al-Irshād fī ʿilm al-Khilāf wa-l-Jadal*, or Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī's *Manshāʾ al-Nazar fī ʿilm al-Khilāf* and *al-Muqaddima al-Burhāniyya fī l-Jadal wa-l-Khilāf wa-l-Nazar*.

positing (*al-waḍʿ al-awwal*) and a secondary one (*al-waḍʿ al-thānī*) in order to explain figurative expressions, semantic developments in technical vocabulary, syntactical constructions, or the function of markers, like *tāʾ* for the feminine. They often discuss the notion of linguistic positing in relation to the origins of language. Although the identity of the original author, or positor (*al-wāḍiʿ*), of the relations between terms and concepts (that is, the issue of the origin of language) was mainly a theological dispute that did not directly affect semantic theory, the analysis of linguistic positing (*waḍʿ*) was a core notion that jurists treated extensively in their linguistic research into the premises in legal methodology (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). This was because the analysis of Arabic language, consisting in the analysis of the intrinsic relations between terms and concepts (i.e., signification and semantics), stemmed from the analysis of the Quranic language upon which the juridical exegesis is largely based. Jurists, since the time of al-Shāfiʿī, and Muʿtazili-Ḥanafī scholars in particular, took an interest in the notion of *waḍʿ al-lughā* as an essential element of the deriving of legal rulings from the Quran and the Ḥadīth. However, their conception of the notion of *waḍʿ* or *waḍʿ al-lughā* did not yet possess a technical apparatus; rather it was used to describe the nature of language in connection with general linguistic phenomena, such as homonymy, synonymy, metaphors and figurative expressions.⁸

The story of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* begins when, at some point in his intellectual career, and probably in connection with his works on rhetoric and juridical methodology, ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī composed a short treatise in which he placed the notion of *waḍʿ* at the center of his understanding of semantics. The treatise does not provide any definition of the notion of *waḍʿ*, nor any information about the subject that will be discussed. Instead, it plunges the reader into a technical and highly elliptical sketch of how terms have been posited to convey either

⁸ Cf. Weiss, second part of his thesis pp. 42-61. For jurists' discussion on metaphors see p. 75-79.

individual or universal concepts. From the short introduction to the treatise, all that the reader can grasp is that there is a group of terms that are posited in a universal way, but that the concepts they convey are particulars. Here al-Ījī lays down the conceptual tools that will be fundamental for the later development of his semantic theory: the act of positing (*waḍʿ*); the subject of positing, that is, the linguistic term (*mawḍūʿ*); the object of positing, that is, the concept (*mawḍūʿ lahu*); and the semantic context (*qarīna*). Unlike previous analyses of the notion of *waḍʿ*, al-Ījī adds modes or modalities that are applicable to these conceptual tools: universality or generality (*kulliyya* or *ʿumūm*), and particularity or individuality (*juzʿiyya* or *tashakhkhuṣ*). This gives al-Ījī the pretext to provide a new classificatory system of the main parts of language – that is nouns, verbs, derived nouns, prepositions etc. – based on the nature of their positing and their significata (*madlūlāt*), rather than on their syntactical functions (mainly the syntactical “governance,” i.e., *ʿamal*) as had been the case with the earlier grammatical tradition. This new semantically-oriented classification of the parts of speech prompts al-Ījī to add a few case studies at the end of the treatise, where he provides new solutions to previous (inconsistent) views held by grammarians, rhetoricians, and jurists regarding the semantic nature of prepositions, pronouns and some types of nouns. In so doing, al-Ījī placed his semantic theory of the parts of speech at the intersection of semantic puzzles discussed in logic, rhetoric, grammar, and jurisprudence. Al-Ījī’s immediate successors up until the mid-16th century understood the scope and the power with which a classificatory system based on semantics could analyze the foundations of language and signification. At the same time, they could not ignore the extreme terseness and opacity of al-Ījī’s formulations, which often resulted in misunderstandings and apparent self-contradictions. For this reason, scholars like al-Jurjānī (740/1339-816/1413), Jāmī (817/1414-898/1492), al-Qūshjī (d. 879/1474) and ʿIṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāʾinī (871/1466-943/1537)

embarked on an exegetical campaign centered around al-Ījī's short treatise, with the aim of providing coherence and clarity to what looked like an unfinished theory of semantics.

Commentators strove to unpack, extend and systematize al-Ījī's new semantic classifications of terms, often by importing similar notions and topics from the disciplines of logic, grammar, rhetoric and jurisprudence. This is where commentators attempted to establish the theory of *waḍʿ*, to define its principles and its technical vocabulary, and to fill all the crevices in al-Ījī's text. Soon enough, these early commentaries evolved from being paratexts to al-Ījī's treatise to becoming texts in themselves. That is, they themselves became the objects of a long exegetical strand of glosses, scholia and annotations, all the way up until the mid-19th century. The glosses on the commentaries authored by al-Qūshjī and al-Isfarāʾinī testify to a phase of expansion of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in two main intellectual milieus. For al-Qūshjī's commentary, it was the Azhari and Levantine milieus, and for al-Isfarāʾinī's commentary, it was the Iraqi and the Kurdish milieus. These two commentaries exemplify how the main focus of scholars from the 16th century onwards becomes the commentary, rather than the original text, and how paratexts become quasi-independent texts with their own exegetical traditions. However, with its plethora of glosses, superglosses, supercommentaries and annotations, the exegetical edifice that emerged from the two commentaries ended up saturating the exegetical space of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*.

By the second half of the 19th century, the sheer bulk and complexity of the commentaries and their glosses proved to be incompatible with the demand in the beginning and lower levels of the *madrassa* for summaries and primers in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The exegetical tradition thus came to a halt with the appearance of new versifications devised as aides-mémoire for beginning students. This period of transition led the way to the final phase in the literary history of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* with the proliferation of new manuals and digests for all *madrassa*

levels in the main intellectual centers, such as al-Azhar, Istanbul, Mosul and Baghdad, up to the 1950s. This does not mean that the foundational commentaries with their sets of glosses were discarded entirely. The existence and circulation of lithograph and movable-type editions of the two main commentaries by al-Qūshjī and al-Isfarāʾīnī, with at least one set of glosses each, in al-Azhar and in the Ottoman *madrasas*, indicates that they were still studied at the higher levels, and served as witnesses of the relevance of an exegetical tradition that had started four centuries earlier. Although manuals, summaries and primers continued to be used in *madrasas*, interest in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* declined from the 1980s until the first decade of the 2000s, when a neoclassicist intellectual movement led by a new generation of scholars – based mainly in Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Tunisia – embarked on a rediscovery and reevaluation of the Islamicate intellectual heritage, by editing or reprinting the fundamental texts of the rational or traditional disciplines, and by setting up reading and study sessions centered around these texts, both in person and through social media platforms. Just like they are doing with *ʿilm al-kalām*, *ḥikma*, logic and rhetoric, these neoclassicists are reintegrating *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* into their intellectual landscape, and raising it back to the important place it occupied in Islamicate intellectual tradition, unlike in Western academia, where interest in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* largely dissipated after Weiss in 1966.

Summary of the Chapters

In order to offer a comprehensive and systematic treatment of the history of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* from its inception up to its most recent developments, I divided this dissertation into five main chapters.

Chapter One, entitled “Locating,” offers a sketch of the historical evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* by looking at works on classifications of sciences, thesauri, and dictionaries of technical terms from the 9th/16th up to the 14th/21st centuries. The main goal of this chapter is to gain a better picture of the place of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* among the other sciences in the Islamicate intellectual framework. The chapter explores how pre-modern scholars, in different periods and intellectual milieus, construed and defined *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, and how they described the circumstances of its emergence, its main topics, its goals and its relations with cognate sciences, such as logic, *uṣūl al-fiqh*, rhetoric and grammar. This chapter will show that, contrary to a widespread assumption, *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* was not perceived as being a subsidiary discipline of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Rather, since its early development, it was understood as a foundational linguistic science whose semantic investigations had ties with the rhetorical sciences of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*.

The story of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* begins properly speaking in Chapter Two, entitled “Origins,” which focuses on the foundational text of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, al-Ījī’s *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*. This chapter will discuss the structure and content of this short treatise, by concentrating on formal aspects such as its transmission, its alleged title and its internal division and coherence, as they were construed by early commentators. The origins of al-Ījī’s semantic theory will then be analyzed in relation to two main works by al-Ījī on rhetoric and on the principle of jurisprudence. It will be shown that some formal features and theoretical aspects these two works correspond to those found in *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*. This leads to the conclusion that the dense and elliptical semantic theory sketched in al-Ījī’s short treatise may well originate from semantic puzzles and conundrums discussed in these other two works.

It was in fact al-Ījī’s dense and elliptical style that, in all likelihood, motivated his immediate successors to compose commentaries in order to elucidate al-Ījī’s new approach to semantics, from one angle, and to resolve some apparent inconsistencies that arose in the text,

from another angle. Chapters Three and Four are therefore devoted to presenting and analyzing the exegetical tradition that stemmed from al-Ījī's *al-Risāla al-Waḍ'īyya*. Chapter Three, entitled "Emergence and Formation," discusses the early exegetical attempts initiated by al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, who imports key notions of al-Ījī's semantic theory from his works on rhetoric. A more systematic exegetical approach to al-Ījī's foundational text emerges with al-Jurjānī's direct student, Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī, who is considered to be the author of the first full commentary. Al-Jurjānī's and Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī's exegetical approach sets the standard for the following generation of commentators (such as Mas'ūd al-Shirwānī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī), who critically engaged with their interpretations of the text. The formative period of the exegetical tradition on al-Ījī's text culminates with the two main commentaries authored by al-Qūshjī and 'Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā'īnī. These are the main subject of Chapter Four, entitled "Consolidation and Canonization." This chapter presents an analysis of the structure and content of these two commentaries, since they engendered, for different reasons, a massive exegetical superstructure of glosses, superglosses and supercommentaries up to the 19th century. This chapter shows that, with its clearer and more accessible formulation, al-Qūshjī's commentary initiated a scholastic activity mainly in the Azharī intellectual circles, whereas the complexity and intricacy of 'Iṣām al-Dīn's commentary became the main focus of the Kurdish (mainly Ḥusaynābādī) exegetes.

The two scholastic traditions stemming from these two commentaries reached their peak around the middle of the 19th century, when the exegetical activity centered on the two commentaries fades away in favor of versifications and shorter semi-independent treatises tailored for the *madrassa*'s lower levels. This turning point in the history of *'ilm al-waḍ'* is discussed in detail in Chapter Five, entitled "Transition and Evolution." This last chapter will focus on the spread of versifications specifically devised to meet the growing interest in *'ilm al-waḍ'* within

the beginning cycles of *madrasa* curricula. This phenomenon of simplification and summarization of the corpus of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is further witnessed by the composition of independent and semi-independent treatises or summaries (*mutūn* and *mulakhkhaṣāt*) in the main intellectual centers of the late 19th-early 20th century, by which I mean the Azharī, Ottoman and Kurdish scholarly circles. This marks the evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* into its final canonized form within the *madrasa* curricula, from the lower to the advanced levels, a form that was still in use in recent decades.

The project to tell the story of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* from the 15th until the 21st centuries has a twofold goal. First, it serves the non-specialist reader as a first, comprehensive introductory sketch of the history of this newly founded science in Islamicate intellectual history, a sketch that can serve as a reference work mentioning (almost) all major and minor works and authors related to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. Second, it serves the specialist reader as a bio-bibliographical repository on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* with references to the available literature, as well as a survey of the main topics debated by commentators and glossators throughout more than seven centuries of intellectual engagement with *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. I am hopeful that my preliminary efforts will encourage further investigations. I will consider my own work to be successful if non-specialists better recognize the importance of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* within the landscape of Islamicate intellectual history, and if specialists feel encouraged to investigate, say, the debate on the semantics of generic nouns and generic proper names in 18th-century Azharī circles. In other words, this thesis will achieve its goal if it serves as a map with which to navigate “the ocean” and “the streams” of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, as the 16th-century Ottoman polymath Ṭāshköprüzādeh put it.

CHAPTER ONE

LOCATING ‘ILM AL-WAḌʿ

This first chapter investigates the evolution and development of *‘ilm al-waḌʿ* as it emerges from sources external to the exegetical literature on al-Ījī’s *al-Risāla al-WaḌʿiyya* (= *Risāla*). The aim of this chapter is to test Bernard Weiss’ two claims that the codification of *‘ilm al-waḌʿ* as a science is represented by the emergence of *mutūn* and *khulāṣāt* (treatises and summaries) of *‘ilm al-waḌʿ* (which are semi-independent from the *Risāla* and its exegetical tradition) around the second half of the 19th century, and that this science emerged from the discipline of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.¹ It will do so primarily by showing how pre-modern Muslim scholars understood and construed *‘ilm al-waḌʿ* in their taxonomical system for organizing sciences. The accounts provided by these scholars contribute towards a clearer understanding of when *‘ilm al-waḌʿ* started to be recognized as a science *per se*, and its location within the wider Islamic intellectual landscape. Moreover, the same sources provide relevant data on the transmission of the *Risāla* and its relation to *‘ilm al-waḌʿ*.

In this chapter I analyze the entries devoted to the linguistic concepts of *waḌʿ* and *‘ilm al-waḌʿ* as they appear in compendia on classification of sciences, as well as thesauri, dictionaries, and bibliographical encyclopedias. The sources are presented and analyzed in a strict chronological order that helps to reveal the evolution of *‘ilm al-waḌʿ* in different periods and geographical areas. The chapter is thus divided into three sections that correspond to three main historical periods of Islamic intellectual history.

¹ The first claim is made in his “*‘Ilm al-WaḌʿ: An Introductory Account of a Late Muslim Philological Science*,” *Arabica*, t. XXXIV, 1987, p. 340. The second claim is made in his PhD dissertation *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of ‘Ilm al-WaḌʿ and Its Development*, Princeton University, 1966, p. 92.

The first section takes into account two important sources of the Timurid and Mamluk periods, respectively the *Taʿrīfāt* of al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī and *al-Muzhir* by al-Suyūṭī. In the entry of the *Taʿrīfāt* devoted to the technical term *waḍʿ*, al-Jurjānī does not make any clear reference to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* or al-Ījī's *Risāla*, but provides a general definition of *waḍʿ* as a linguistic concept. The first appearance of al-Ījī's *Risāla* and the semantic theory outlined in it appears instead later in the 9th/15th century, in the work of al-Suyūṭī. It will be shown how al-Suyūṭī's reference to the lemmata of the foundational text of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, as well as the discipline itself, were far from being canonized.

The second section takes into account six main sources composed during the Ottoman period, namely Mullā Luṭfī's *al-Maṭālib al-Ilāhiyya*, Ṭāshköprüzādeh's *Miftāḥ al-Saʿāda*, al-Kaffawī's *Kulliyāt*, Kātip Čelebī's *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, Sājaqlīzādeh's *Tartīb al-ʿUlūm* and al-Abyārī's *Suʿūd al-Maṭāliʿ*. The two Ottoman polymaths Mullā Luṭfī and Ṭāshköprüzādeh are the first to refer to a discipline called “*ʿilm al-waḍʿ*,” and make important claims about the emergence and development of this newly founded science. Al-Kaffawī's discussion of *waḍʿ* provides the first accurate and comprehensive overview of the semantic theory of *waḍʿ*, despite the absence of any direct reference to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*; a first attempt at mapping the exegetical *praxis* stemming from the *Risāla* is made by Kātip Čelebī in his *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*. It will be shown how despite the richness of the bibliographical data it provides, the exegetical literature stemming from the *Risāla* had not yet reached a full textual canonization. More data of the evolution and the place of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* emerge more clearly in Sājaqlīzādeh's *Tartīb*, where the semantic theory of *waḍʿ* and its technical vocabulary find full application. Finally, al-Abyārī's *Suʿūd al-Maṭāliʿ* is one of the latest witnesses that informs on the location and significance of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* among scholarly milieus of 13th/19th century Ottoman Egypt.

The third and final section is devoted to the sources of the Indian sub-continent, such as al-Tahānawī's *Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn* and al-Aḥmad-Nagarī's *Dustūr al-Ulamā'*, which despite the thorough and detailed knowledge of the semantic theory of *waḍ'* they display, seem to overlook the long exegetical tradition belonging to *ʿilm al-waḍ'*.

A warning to the reader. All references to and outlines of the specific features and technical aspects of the theory of *waḍ'* that I present in this chapter are not meant to explain, analyze or clarify this theory in any way. My emphasis in outlining the descriptions of the theory of *waḍ'* contained in these primary sources aims to show how the technical vocabulary of *ʿilm al-waḍ'* emerges, develops and ultimately integrates within the broad intellectual discourse of pre-modern scholars on classification of sciences and dictionaries of technical terms. The explanation of the core notions of *ʿilm al-waḍ'* will be provided in Chapters Two, Three and Four.

1.1 TIMURID AND MAMLUK PERIODS

One of the earliest sources in which one would assume to find an account of *ʿilm al-waḍ'* is the *Taʿrīfāt* by al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (740/1339-816/1413). The reason for such an assumption is al-Jurjānī's direct engagement with and production on the theory of *waḍ'*, in general, and on al-Ījī's *Risāla*, in particular. From the surviving biographical accounts and manuscript copies of commentaries on the *Risāla*, al-Jurjānī was the first to compose a set of glosses (though not a full commentary) on the *Risāla*. I will show in Chapter Three that al-Jurjānī discussed in some details the theory of *waḍ'* not only in his glosses on the *Risāla* but also in others works. Because of this, one would expect al-Jurjānī to provide an exhaustive account of the theory of *waḍ'* or of *ʿilm al-waḍ'* in his *Taʿrīfāt*. Instead, the entry on the technical term "*waḍ'*" relies on the widespread definition of the term: "*positing (al-waḍ'), in standard lexicographical usage (fī l-lughā), means to posit*

a term for a concept (*jaʿl al-lafẓ bi-izāʾi al-maʿnā*)”, while in technical usage (*al-iṣṭilāḥ*) it means “the specification of one thing by another thing (*takhṣīṣ shayʾ bi-shayʾ*), so that the latter is understood when the first is uttered or perceived.” Al-Jurjānī then specifies that the technical application (*al-iṭlāq*) of *waḍʿ* indicates the usage of linguistic terms (*istiʿmāl al-lafẓ*) as well as the intention expressing the concept (*irādat al-maʿnā*).² In al-Jurjānī’s definition of *al-waḍʿ* there is no suggestion that the concept of *waḍʿ* could represent an independent science or discipline. Moreover, he does not relate the linguistic concept of *waḍʿ* to any particular science, such as *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, logic or grammar, but he assigns it vaguely to the area in which the term *al-waḍʿ* applies, that is, linguistics (*ʿilm al-lughā*). The absence of a specific treatment of the semantic theory of *waḍʿ* and of any references to a science of *waḍʿ* – with which al-Jurjānī was familiar due to his expertise in *balāgha* and more importantly his glosses on the *Risāla* – suggests that by al-Jurjānī’s time a unitary and canonized theory of *waḍʿ* had not yet crystallized.

A clearer reference to al-Ījī and his *Risāla* within the broader context of linguistic and semantic topics is contained in a later source, *al-Muzhir fī ʿulūm al-lughā wa-anwāʾihā* by the polymath Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (849-911/1445-1505). In the introductory chapter of *al-Muzhir*, al-Suyūṭī states his intention to provide a comprehensive overview of the basic ontological questions about language. He starts the first question (*masʾala*) by examining the definition of language (*ḥadd al-lughā*); in the second question he approaches the question of the identity of the positor of language (*al-wāḍiʿ*) by taking into account the debate between *tawqīf* and *iṣṭilāḥ* and by surveying the main arguments and positions.³ He devotes the third question to the

² Cf. al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *al-Taʿrīfāt*, Miṣr: Maṭbaʿa Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1357/1938, p. 225-6; cf. also *idem*, ed. Muḥammad Ṣadiq al-Minshāwī, al-Qāhira: Dār al-Faḍīla, 2004, p. 211.

³ On this specific subject see my “Origine et Finalité du Language dans le Moyen Âge Islamique” in *Kervan – Rivista Internazionale di Studi Afroasiatici*, n. 13/14 – Luglio 2011, pp. 81-105.

underlying wisdom or rationale (*al-ḥikma*) inherent in the positing language, while the fifth question investigates the definition of positing (*ḥadd al-waḍʿ*). The following question examines the objects of the positing, namely what the positor posited (*mādhā waḍaʿa al-wāḍiʿ*), and in the seventh question al-Suyūṭī explores the question of the correspondence between concepts and terms, before moving to investigate the aim of the linguistic positing (*al-gharaḍ min al-waḍʿ*). In the eighth question, he addresses the question of whether the terms are posited for mental concepts or for external quiddities, while in the ninth, he continues the examination of the relation between terms and concepts, and more precisely why, or for what, the term is posited (*li-mā yūḍaʿ al-lafẓ*).⁴ It is at this particular juncture of his overview, in the ninth question, that al-Suyūṭī refers for the first and only time to al-Ījī and his *Risāla*, by reporting verbatim passages of the *matn* throughout the whole *masʿala*. In other words, the whole ninth question is represented by al-Ījī's *matn*.

Al-Suyūṭī neither quotes the short *Risāla* in its entirety, nor supplies the al-Ījī's claims with further clarifications or commentaries. Rather, he limits himself to report the section of the *matn* that deals with the main semantic classes established by al-Ījī. It seems that al-Suyūṭī is interested in two main classes of *waḍʿ*, 1) positing a term for an individual concept in itself and 2) positing a term for an individual concept by considering a general notion (*amr ʿāmm*), such that the notion shared among the individuals is also apprehended. Terms of the second class convey only one among the individual, single concepts falling under that common notion. For this reason, this class of *waḍʿ* is universal (*kullī*), while its object (i.e., the concept, *al-mawḍūʿ lahu*) is something individuated (*mushakhkhaṣ*). Individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) of one concept occurs only by means of the semantic context (lit. affiliation, *qarīna*) in which the term is uttered or

⁴ Cf. al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn, *al-Muzhir fī ʿulūm al-luġha wa-anwāʿihā*, ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad Jādd al-Maula, ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī and Muḥammad Abu al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1406/1986, vol. 1 p. 46.

used. Al-Suyūṭī also reports the classification introduced by al-Ījī to determine the semantic function of the other parts of speech: subjects, the *maṣḍar*, derived nouns (*mushtaqq*), verbs, particles and prepositions, as well as all types of pronouns, that is, personal, demonstrative and relative pronouns.⁵

Two points about this passage should be made. The first concerns the role of the theory of *waḍʿ* as it is presented in the *Risāla*. It is worth noting that al-Suyūṭī's quotation of the *Risāla* occurs in the *Muzhir* after the lengthy discussion of whether terms are posited for mental concepts or for external qualities and whether or not syntactical structures (*al-tarākīb*) are, like single terms, conventionally posited. The debate over the nature of syntactical structures like the verb-subject and subject-predicate constructions (such as “*qāma Zayd*”, *Zayd stood*, and “*Zayd qā'im*”, *Zayd is standing*) were not among the primary concerns of theorists of *waḍʿ*. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, the issue became central throughout the development of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as an independent discipline.⁶ In all likelihood, al-Suyūṭī realized the close relation between this issue and the semantic theory outlined by al-Ījī. It is likewise important to point out that al-Suyūṭī saw also a correlation between the *Risāla* and the linguistic theories discusses in the starting-points of numerous *uṣūl al-fiqh* manuals. This is evident if one looks at the questions (*masā'il*) that immediately precede and follow the text of the *Risāla* in the *Muzhir*. The *Eighth Question* discusses at length whether terms are posited for mental forms or external quiddities. Al-Suyūṭī's presentation of the topic relies exclusively on excerpts from the linguistic starting-points (*al-mabādī' al-lughawiyya*) of the manuals of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, where the theory of *waḍʿ* is

⁵ I will provide a translation, synopsis and analysis of the content and structure of the *Risāla* in the Chapter Two.

⁶ Cf. al-Suyūṭī, *al-Muzhir*, vol. 1, p. 42 ff.

central.⁷ The *Tenth Question* examines the nature of the relation between the term and what it signifies. *Uṣūliyyūn* and *mutakallimūn* were particularly interested in rejecting the view held by the Mu‘tazilī ‘Abbād ibn Sulaymān al-Ṣaymarī (d. ca. 249/863), according to whom the relation between terms and concepts is based upon a natural correspondence (*al-munāsaba al-ṭabī‘iyya*). Against this view, they advanced the theory that language was the product of a choice, based on the concept of *waḍ‘*.⁸ Al-Suyūṭī’s inclusion of the *Risāla* within the linguistic debates of *uṣūliyyūn* highlights the relevance of al-Ījī’s general semantic theory in the 9th/15th century Mamluk milieu of philologists and *uṣūliyyūn*, in which al-Suyūṭī operated. What is more, al-Suyūṭī may have perceived the potential of the semantic theory outlined in the *Risāla* to fill a gap in the semantic theories of simple terms held by *uṣūliyyūn* and grammarians. In his view, the *Risāla* offered a concise and yet widely applicable explanation of the semantic functions underlying terms and the concepts they conveyed. The classes of *waḍ‘* worked out by al-Ījī offered not only a general classification of nouns, verbs and prepositions from a semantic perspective, but it also explained the specific semantic functions of *maṣḍars*, derived nouns, all particles and all types of pronouns.

The second point concerns the textual transmission of the *Risāla*. Al-Suyūṭī’s quotation of the *Risāla* reveals two important discrepancies within the canonical text of the *Risāla*. The first regards the title of the *Risāla*. Al-Suyūṭī refers to this text simply as “one of his treatises on *waḍ‘*” (*risālatun lahu fī l-waḍ‘i*), which could indicate that, by his time, the *Risāla* was not yet known as *al-Risāla al-‘Aḍudiyya al-Waḍ‘iyya*. More importantly, al-Suyūṭī’s reference to the *Risāla* in these terms shows that neither the theory *al-waḍ‘* nor the science of *al-waḍ‘* were fully identified with al-Ījī’s *Risāla*, in contrast to the situation with al-Suyūṭī’s successors.⁹ The

⁷ The works quoted by al-Suyūṭī are Fakh al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s *al-Maḥṣūl*, Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī’s *al-Taḥṣīl*, al-Asnawī’s commentary on al-Bayḍawī’s *al-Minhāj* and al-Zarkashī’s *al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ*.

⁸ Cf. al-Suyūṭī, *al-Muzhir*, vol. 1 p. 47 ff.

⁹ It should also be noted that the uncertainty related to title of the *Risāla* has created some confusion in the history of its transmission. In particular, transmitters and cataloguers have often conflated this title with al-Ījī’s other short

second discrepancy is of more importance, and concerns the absence of any internal division of the text of the *Risāla*. As will be shown in the next chapter, the *Risāla* contains a brief opening statement in which al-Ījī announces his plan; this is followed by the *Introduction* (*al-Muqaddima*), the *Classification* (*al-Taqsīm*) and the *Conclusion* (*al-Khātima*), which in turns contains twelve *Reminders* (*Tanbīhāt*). As has already been stated, al-Suyūṭī's verbatim quotation stops abruptly at the end of the *First reminder* (*al-tanbīh al-awwal*). Also, al-Suyūṭī's quotation lacks both the short opening in which al-Ījī states the plan of treatise and the internal division of the *matn* into *Introduction*, *Classification*, *Closure* and *First Reminder*. In other words, the text as reported by al-Suyūṭī is presented as one that devoid of its original structure.

There are reasons to explain the differences between the lemmata of the *Risāla* as it appears in the *Muzhir* and the canonized version of the *matn*. Al-Suyūṭī might have deliberately chosen to alter the original text and suppress its internal headings, although the motives behind this choice seem unclear. Or, his quotation is faithful to the version of the *Risāla* that happened to be accessible to him at that time, and which did not contain any internal division or headings. This would indicate that by al-Suyūṭī's time, the text of the *Risāla* had not yet reached its canonical form and that scholars had access to multiple, uncanonized versions of the *matn*. The circulation of several variants of the *matn* contrasts with the relatively mature exegetical literature on the *Risāla* extant during the time of al-Suyūṭī's scholarly production. By the second half of the 9th/15th century, the main commentaries on the *Risāla*, such those of al-Jurjānī, Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī, Muḥammad al-Bukhārī, Mullā al-Jāmī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī

matn on *ādāb al-baḥth*, known as *al-Risāla al-ʿAḍudiyya fī l-Adāb*. Both texts are often entitled simply as *al-Risāla al-ʿAḍudiyya*. The similarity of their titles has created some confusion in modern manuscript catalogues. I have personally encountered several entries in the catalogues of manuscript collections of Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and India in which commentaries and glosses on the *Risāla al-ʿAḍudiyya fī l-Adāb* are mistaken for those on al-Ījī's *Risāla fī ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. This could indicate that the authors of these catalogue have usually considered the title *al-Risāla al-ʿAḍudiyya* to refer to al-Ījī's *Risāla fī l-waḍʿ*.

and ‘Alī al-Qūshjī, were probably circulating among the scholarly milieus of Mamluk and Ottoman lands. Now, if one of the main tasks of a commentator is to establish the correct lemmata of the *matn* and to flag its variant readings – and early commentators and glossators on the *Risāla* were no exception to this exegetical *praxis*, as I will show later –, then the witness of the *Muzhir* leads one to conclude that by the end of the 9th/15th century the lemmata of the *Risāla* had not yet reached their canonical form. Finally, the silence of a scrupulous bibliophile and encyclopedic mind like al-Suyūṭī’s concerning the exegetical activity on the *Risāla*, as well as his usage of an uncanonized series of lemmata of the text, both indicate of volatile character of the *Risāla* and the semantic theory it contained. The theory of *waḍʿ* outlined in the *Risāla*, at least it would seem for al-Suyūṭī, was not yet a fully independent *‘ilm*. Despite the presence of an exegetical tradition stemming from it, the semantic theory of the *Risāla* was seen as a corollary to the linguistic debates among *uṣūliyyūn* and grammarians.

1.2 OTTOMAN PERIOD

More detailed accounts of *‘ilm al-waḍʿ* emerge within scholarly circles of the Ottoman empire. One of the most well-known accounts of the evolution of the status of *‘ilm al-waḍʿ* and of al-Ījī’s *Risāla* is found in *Miftāḥ al-Saʿāda*, by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn Aḥmad Ṭāshköprüzādeh (901-968/1495-1561), which is generally considered to be among the earliest accounts referring to *al-waḍʿ* as a science. Ṭāshköprüzādeh however is not the first Ottoman scholar to list *‘ilm al-waḍʿ* in a classification of sciences. His elder contemporary, Luṭf Allāh Ḥasan al-Tūqādī, known as Mullā Luṭfī, (850?-900/1446-1494), provides a detailed and sophisticated entry on *‘ilm al-waḍʿ* in his *al-*

Maṭālib al-Ilāhiyya fī Mawḍūʿāt al-ʿUlūm al-Lughawiyya.¹⁰ In Mullā Luṭfī's taxonomy, the linguistic sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-lughawiyya*) occupy an overarching role that subsumes all other theoretical and practical sciences. Within the group of linguistic sciences, *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is given precedence over others, with the exception for the science of phonetic articulations (*ʿilm makhārij al-ḥurūf*) which he lists first. This precedence arises from Mullā Luṭfī's understanding of the subject-matter and scope of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, which deals essentially with word-formation and signification. Thus, once linguistic sounds have been established and selected, the positor of language (*al-wāḍiʿ*) chooses to put together those sounds to form linguistic terms (*alfāz*). Only then will he posit the substances of single instances of terms for single instances of concepts, in virtue of an individual positing (*waḍʿan shakhṣiyyan*). Following this general principle, Mullā Luṭfī introduces the main sub-classes of *waḍʿ shakhṣī*: [1] the positor posits a term by a specific positing for a specific object (*khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*), such as individual and general proper nouns, e.g., Zayd or Muḥammad; or [2] by a general positing for a specific object (*ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*), like in the case of relative and demonstrative pronouns, verbal nouns (*asmāʾ al-aʿfāl*), general verbs, particles, some adverbs;¹¹ or [3] by a general positing for a general positing, like in the case of general indefinite nouns, e.g., *a human, a cat or a three*.¹²

¹⁰ Cf. Şükran Fazlıoğlu, *Dil Bilimlerinin Sınıflandırılması*, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2012, which contains a critical edition of Mullā Luṭfī's *al-Maṭālib*. Contrary to what the title seems to imply, the *Maṭālib* is not limited to the classification of linguistic sciences, as it also includes a detailed list of religious and legal sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-sharʿiyya*). Mullā Luṭfī states this clearly in the introduction where he claims that he will explain the subject-matter of every linguistic, religious and legal science, their premises and their goals. Moreover, it would be safe to claim that he composed this work between 1481 and the date of his death, 1494, as he dedicated this work to the sultan Bāyezīd II (r. 1481-1512). This work has also been published under the title of *Risāla fī l-ʿUlūm al-Sharʿiyya wa-l-Lughawiyya*, ed. Rafiq al-ʿAjam, Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1994; this edition contains a commentary, *sharḥ*, on the same work that matches the self-glosses present in the Turkish edition.

¹¹ Mullā Luṭfī refers to adverbs that contains in themselves the concept of a particles, such as *ayna*, *ḥaythu* etc.; cf. *al-Maṭālib*, p. 18.

¹² The edition reads “aw yakūnu al-waḍʿu ʿāmmān ka-ʿāmmati al-nakirāt,” rather than “aw yakūnu al-waḍʿu ʿāmmān li-mawḍūʿi lahu ʿāmm,” which is more correct in the context; *ibidem*.

Once the three main classes of *waḍʿ shakhṣī* are established, Mullā Luṭfī sketches three corresponding semantic features that apply to terms. This results into the formation of synonyms (*mutarādif*), which obtain when several substances belong to one single concept; a semantically diverted term (*ism manqūl*), which obtains when different, mutual corresponding concepts belong to one linguistic substance; or like equivocal terms (*mushtarak*), which obtain when that mutual correspondence among concepts does not take place.

At this point, Mullā Luṭfī continues, the positor may establish other terms from those linguistic substances according to different linguistic patterns (*hayʾāt*). In this way, some types of those forms are posited for some types of concepts on the basis of the three classes of *waḍʿ* seen before. This is, in other words, the class of species positing, *waḍʿ nawʿī*, which Mullā Luṭfī explores in detail in his self-glosses on the *Maṭālib*.¹³ In this gloss, Mullā Luṭfī provides a full account of the three sub-classes of *waḍʿ nawʿī*. The first sub-class of *waḍʿ nawʿī* is the specific positing for a specific concept, that is, *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*. This sub-class includes the specific features (*aʿlām*) of the morphological voices (*ṣiyagh*) of verbs that belong to the forms that possibly apply to the construction of the radicals *f-ʿ-l*. All those specific features belong to the genera of morphological voices (*ajnās al-ṣiyagh*) that are proportionate (*mawzūna*) to those features. More importantly, the features of the morphological voices are apprehended by means of a universal general formula (*ʿunwān kullī*). This formula corresponds, in turn, to a concept that takes places in the composition of the three radicals, such as *f-ʿ-l*. The second sub-class is the general positing for the general concept, that is, *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, which pertains to the positing of the generality of the derived nouns. The third and last sub-class is the general positing for a specific concept, that is, *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, which applies to the generality of verbs. Verbs are posited by species (*bi-l-nawʿ*) by grasping an encompassing universal formula (*ʿunwān kullī shāmil*) for every specificity

¹³ The self-glosses are published in an appendix of the same edition of the *Maṭālib*, pp. 75-77.

(*khuṣūṣiyya*) of the ascriptions (*nisab*) to a subject expressed in verbs, e.g., “*aktubu*” (*I write or I am writing*). The object of positing, that is, the concept (*mawḍūʿ lahu*), in this case corresponds to the particular ascriptions (*nisab*) – which link the action expressed by the verb to the agent – , which are apprehended by means of that universal model that verbs convey.

In the remaining part of his account on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, Mullā Luṭfī attempts to lay down the fundamental principles of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The positor may establish a single linguistic form for several types of concepts by species positing, e.g., the morphological voice of the present tense that applies to both the present (*ḥāl*) and the future (*istiqbāl*), or the voice *maʿāl* that applies to the concepts of time and place.¹⁴ Conversely, the positor could establish many forms for one single concept, e.g., the morphological patterns of the past tense of verbs. Here, the positor establishes the three verbal patterns *faʿala*, *faʿula* and *faʿila*, which are posited to convey the notion of the relation (*nisba*) of an event to a time before the present time.¹⁵ Then, from another linguistic form, like the *maṣḍar*, the positor extracts the linguistic material (*mādda*) and applies it to one of the patterns posited previously in order to posit verbs, e.g., the verb “*ʿalima*” results from the *maṣḍar* “*ʿilm*”, the verb “*ḍaraba*” results from “*ḍarb*” etc.¹⁶ Another example is that of the imperative form. Here, the positor takes into account a pattern that conveys a single concept, that is the notion of command, which is shared by every verbal form. The positor establishes the forms “*ifʿal*,” “*ifʿil*” and “*uʿul*” in which verbs partake in order to express the notion of command. Mullā Luṭfī explains that this type of positing, namely the species positing (*waḍʿ nawʿī*), is characterized by the positor’s grasp of a universal encompassing criterion that is common to the linguistic forms and patterns that result from it. This criterion represents the notions (*mafhūmāt*) of the different linguistic forms that are grasped by a comprehensive

¹⁴ This example is provided in the glosses.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

universal (*kullī ijmālī*). In this type of positing, the focus of the positor is primarily on establishing linguistic forms and patterns that convey a single notion and that are shared among the specific terms, whereas the linguistic matter (*mādda*) becomes a secondary aspect.

Mullā Luṭfī's entry of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* shows a sophisticated and detailed for an author who lived in the second half of the 8th/15th, when the major commentaries on the *Risāla* had not yet been composed and integrated in the *madrasa* curriculum. What is more striking are Mullā Luṭfī's compressed and rather terse descriptions of the semantic classes of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, which demand from the reader an effort to reconstruct and unpack every category and class of *waḍʿ* presented. The few concrete examples that clarify the abstract descriptions of the functions of *waḍʿ* are found in the self-glosses.

More telling for the evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is the conclusive statement of the entry, where Mullā Luṭfī says that

“If the situation of the *waḍʿ* is as we mentioned it, then it needs fundamental rules that explain the quality (*kayfiyya*) of the *waḍʿ* and everything taken into account about it. Until now no comprehensive book has been composed (*lam yudawwan kitābun jāmiʿun*) that accounts for those rules, and it is my intention to compose one, God willing.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Cf. *Maṭālib*, p. 19. It is important to note that the colophon of two among the twenty-four witness copies, one of which is chosen as the basis to establish the critical text, reads as follow “*The Risāla Waḍʿiyya is completed by writing, collating and perusing, and it has been collated with the copy of the aforementioned late author, then he revised that (yuʿid hādhā?), so look at the noble glosses and the subtlest points that he added to this.*” The editor is aware of these two important variants of the colophon, but she does not attempt to establish a genealogy of the witness copies, which might reveal important data on the composition of the *Maṭālib* and the alleged *al-Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya* mentioned in the colophon. In all likelihood, Mullā Luṭfī composed an independent treatise on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, which would correspond to the entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, and added it to a revised version of the *Maṭālib*; or he composed a treatise

Nevertheless, Mullā Luṭfī adds a brief gloss to this closing statement in which he seems to identify *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* with the way it was presented in al-Ījī’s *Risāla*. He says:

“However, some treatises about *<‘ilm al-waḍ‘>* – in which some questions of those rules are sufficiently explored – have been composed; such as the treatise composed by the author of *al-Mawāqif*, and some other questions mentioned in the starting-points of logic (*mabādi’ al-manṭiq*).”¹⁸

The two passages are indicative of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*’s uncanonized status at its earliest stage of development, despite Mullā Luṭfī’s evident intention to consider it as a discipline (*‘ilm*) in its own right. More crucial for the understanding of the evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is Mullā Luṭfī’s reference to al-Ījī’s *Risāla* and to the starting-points of logic that discuss signification. Al-Ījī’s *Risāla* is understood here as one of the few treatises that explores questions of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* with some degree of completeness. This seems to suggest that Mullā Luṭfī is fully aware that one of the aims of al-Ījī’s *Risāla* coincides with one of those in the science of *waḍ‘*. This identification between *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and al-Ījī’s *Risāla* is, it would seem, the earliest in a classification of linguistic sciences, and informs Ottoman scholars’ incipient interest in and engagement with *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and al-Ījī’s *Risāla*. What is more, contrary to recent assumptions, some of the contents discussed in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* naturally belong, at least in Mullā Luṭfī’s understanding, to the topics discussed in the linguistic starting-points of logic, rather than to those discussed in *uṣūl al-fiqh*. The uncanonized status of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* may also be the reason why Mullā Luṭfī does not supply a clear division of

on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and progressively expanded it, firstly, with several entries on linguistic sciences and, later, with another section on theoretical and legal sciences.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

the subject-matter (*mawḍūʿ*), the scope (*gharaḍ*), the purpose (*ghāya*) and the principles (*mabādiʿ*) for this science, as he does for the majority of the entries on other sciences.¹⁹

Now, I claimed earlier that Mullā Luṭfī's placement of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as the second among all other linguistic sciences indicates the primacy he accorded to this newly founded science. This claim is substantiated when taking a closer look at the descriptions of the sciences that immediately follow *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The technical vocabulary used in the description of the subject-matter, the scope, the purpose, and the principles of sciences such as lexicography (*ʿilm al-lugha*), derivation (*ishtiḳāq*), morphology (*ṣarf*), syntax (*naḥw*) and semantics (*ʿilm al-maʿānī*) echo in many instances the technical vocabulary developed in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Lexicography is, for example, the science that explains the significata of the linguistic substance that belong to the specificities of terms (*madlūlāt jawhari khuṣūṣiyyāti al-alfāẓi*), as well as their particular forms and patterns extracted from those forms by species positing (*bi-l-waḍʿ al-nawʿi*).²⁰ Moreover, lexicographers investigate how the linguistic substances (*jawāhir*) of simple terms with their particular forms have been posited for the significata (*madlūlāt*) by means of the individual positing (*bi-l-waḍʿ al-shakhṣī*). Another example is found in the definition of the science of syntax (*ʿilm al-naḥw*) which emerges when

“The positor of language joins together some simple terms with some others in different ways and according to several conditions. He also posits, by means of species positing – because the act of positing is general while its object is specific – each sentence structure (*hayʿa*) that obtains from composite sentence

¹⁹ See for examples the description of *ʿilm al-lugha*, *ʿilm al-ishtiḳāq*, *ʿilm al-ṣarf*, *ʿilm al-naḥw* and *ʿilm al-maʿānī*.

²⁰ “*ʿilm al-lugha* [...] yubayyinu madlūlāti jawhari khuṣūṣiyyāti al-alfāẓi wa-hayʿātihā al-juzʿiyyati, wa-khuṣūṣiyyāti mā akhraja ʿanhā min al-ṣiyaghi al-mawḍūʿati bi-l-waḍʿi al-nawʿi.”

(al-tarkīb) for each composite of concepts related one with another (*al-ma‘ānī al-tarkībiyya al-nisbiyya*) [...].”²¹

Here, and in other instances, the technical vocabulary belonging to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, such as *waḍ‘ ‘āmm*, *waḍ‘ khāṣṣ*, *waḍ‘ shakhṣī* and *waḍ‘ naw‘ī* are pervasive and fully integrated within Mullā Luṭfī’s vocabulary of the linguistic sciences.²²

In his biographical work on the lives of Ottoman scholars, *al-Shaqā’iq al-Nu‘māniyya*, Ṭāshköprüzādeh recounts that after his initial education under Sinān Pāshā, Mullā Luṭfī, with Sinān’s recommendation, pursued his studies in mathematical sciences under none other than ‘Alī al-Qūshjī.²³ This event, according to Ṭāshköprüzādeh, took place when ‘Alī al-Qūshjī arrived in Anatolia in 877/1472.²⁴ ‘Alī al-Qūshjī and his entourage were welcomed within the intellectual milieus of Ottoman scholars, as al-Qūshjī’s appointments as a teacher in the Şahṇ-i Madrasa and

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 23; “Thumma inna wāḍi‘a al-lughati rattaba ba‘ḍa al-mufradāti al-mawḍū‘ati bi-ba‘ḍihā bi-anḥā’i mukhtalifati wa-aḥwālī shattan, wa-waḍa‘a waḍ‘an naw‘iyyan bi-an yakūna al-waḍ‘u ‘āmmān wa-l-mawḍū‘u lahu khāṣṣan li-kulli naw‘in min anwā‘i al-hay‘āti al-ḥāṣilati min al-tarkībi li-naw‘in naw‘in min al-ma‘ānī al-tarkībiyyati al-nisbiyyati [...].”

²² This entry is in all likelihood the first entry in which the theory of *waḍ‘* appears as an independent science in a classification of science. Works on the classification of sciences by Mullā Luṭfī’s immediate predecessors, such as Muḥammad Shāh al-Fanārī’s (d. ca. 839/1436) *Unmūdhaj al-‘ulūm*, and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Biṣṭāmī’s (d. 858/1454) *al-Fawā’ih al-Miskiyya fī l-Fawātiḥ al-Malakiyya*, that was completed in 844/1440, do not include neither a discussion on the theory of *waḍ‘* nor an entry on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. On Muḥammad Shāh al-Fanārī’s *Unmūdhaj al-‘ulūm* see Kemal Faruk Molla, “*Mehmed Şah Fenârî’nin Enmûzecu’l-‘Ulûm adlı serine göre Fetih öncesi dönemde Osmanlılar’da ilim analizi ve ilim tasnifi*,” *Dîvân İlmî Araştırmalar*, n. 18 (2005/1), pp. 245-273. On al-Biṣṭāmī’s *al-Fawā’ih al-Miskiyya* see Ömer Yağmur *Terceme-i Kitab-i Fevâ’ihü’l-Miskiyye fî’l-Fevâtihi’l-Mekkiyye*, Lisans Tezi, Istanbul University, 2007.

²³ Cf. Ṭāshköprüzādeh, Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā, *al-Shaqā’iq al-Nu‘māniyya fī ‘Ulamā’ al-Dawla al-‘Uthmāniyya*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1395/1975, p. 169.

²⁴ “[...] *lamma atā al-mawla ‘Alī al-Qūshjī bi-bilād al-Rūm* [...]” Ṭāshköprüzādeh does not specify whether the two scholars met during al-Qūshjī’s first visit in Istanbul as an emissary of Uzun Ḥasan after 847/1469, or in 877/1472, when al-Qūshjī definitively settled in Istanbul with his family and students. Cf. Fazlıoğlu, İhsan, “Qūshjī”, *The Bibliographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers, Springer Reference*, ed. Thomas Hockey et al., New York: Springer, 2007, pp. 946-948.

the Ayasofya Madrasa seem to indicate. Mullā Luṭfī's scholarly linkage to al-Qūshjī between 877/1472 and 879/1479, year of al-Qūshjī's death, might coincide with the former's first encounter and engagement with the new semantic science, *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*.²⁵ It is therefore with the arrival of al-Qūshjī – who had a deep knowledge of the Risāla and the implications of the theory of *waḍʿ*, evidenced by his commentary on the Risāla and his *ʿUnqūd al-Zawāhir fī l-Ṣarf* – and his influential teachings that Mullā Luṭfī, in particular, and the Ottoman scholarly milieu, in general, may have been introduced to the new science of *al-waḍʿ*.

A return to Ṭāshköprüzādeh shows that in his extensive encyclopedia of sciences *Miftāḥ al-Saʿāda*, he also provides a specific entry for *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The entry appears in the first branch (*al-shaʿba al-ūlā*) entitled “Concerning simple terms” (*fī mā yataʿallaq bi-l-mufradāt*), as part of the second ‘trunk’ (*al-dawḥa al-thāniya*) entitled “Concerning linguistic terms” (*fī ʿulūm tataʿallaq bi-l-alfāz*),²⁶ which is in turn contained in the first section (*al-ṭaraf al-awwal*) of *Miftāḥ al-Saʿāda*. Ṭāshköprüzādeh's choice to insert the entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* among linguistic sciences that deal with single terms is an indication that, by the first half of 10th/16th century, *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* was considered to be the science of the semantic functions of single terms, and their classifications

²⁵ It is nevertheless unclear whether al-Qūshjī had already composed his commentary on the Risāla and his *ʿUnqūd al-Zawāhir*, a work that contains a detailed section on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, before or after his arrival in Istanbul. I will show later on that the both works might belong to the last phase of al-Qūshjī's production, although the authorship of his commentary on the Risāla presents serious textual issues.

²⁶ From an epistemological point of view, it is interesting to notice the taxonomical approach of Ṭāshköprüzādeh's *Miftāḥ*: the section on linguistic sciences is followed by the third ‘trunk’ “On the sciences that investigate the second intelligibles (or intentions) within the mind” (*fī ʿulūm bāḥitha ʿammā fī al-adhhān min al-maʿqūlāt al-thāniya*). This section has entries on the sciences of logic, dialectics and *ars disputandi*. The following ‘trunk’, the fourth, entitled “On the science dealing with concrete beings” (*fī al-ʿilm yataʿallaqu bi-l-aʿyān*) lists the sciences of metaphysics, or philosophical theology, (*ʿilm ilāhī*), natural philosophy (*ʿilm ṭabīʿī*) and mathematical sciences such as geometry, theoretical astronomy, arithmetic (*ʿilm al-ʿadad*) and music. I do not provide a detail description of remaining parts of the book which deal with practical philosophy (*ḥikma ʿamaliyya*), religious and juridical sciences (*ʿulūm sharʿiyya*) and, finally, spiritual practices (*ʿulūm al-bāṭin*).

according to semantic categories. This conception of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is consistent with Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s choice to place *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* after the entry on *‘ilm al-lughā* (lexicography)²⁷ and before the entry on *‘ilm al-ishtiqāq* (science of derivation) and *al-ṣarf* (morphology), which are sciences that deal only with single terms. This also means that for Ṭāshköprüzādeh *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* has no pretention to being a linguistic science that investigates more complex linguistic compounds (*al-murakkabāt*). The analysis of the linguistic compounds, such as nominal and verbal sentences, belongs to sciences regrouped in the next branch entitled “Concerning <linguistic> compounds” (*fī-mā yata‘allaq bi-l-murakkabāt*), which includes syntax (*naḥw*), semantics of the syntax (*‘ilm al-ma‘ānī*), science of the linguistic embellishment (*‘ilm al-badī‘*) and poetics (*shī‘r*).

The entry here on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, compared to that in Mullā Luṭfī’s *Maṭālib* and to those devoted to other linguistic sciences of the *Miftāḥ*, is the shortest and briefest. In this entry Ṭāshköprüzādeh claims that *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is the science that investigates linguistic positing (*tafsīr al-waḍ‘*), and its classification into different classes and types, namely the pairs individual positing/species positing and general positing/specific positing (respectively *shakhṣī/naw‘ī*, *‘āmm/khāṣṣ*). Moreover, *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* elucidates the linguistic positing of subjects (*dhawāt*) and the linguistic configurations (*al-hay’āt*). This brief description of the subject-matter and the classes of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is, according to Ṭāshköprüzādeh, a sufficient exposition of the discipline. In his final statement Ṭāshköprüzādeh echoes Mullā Luṭfī in saying that despite its usefulness, *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is not yet a fully systematized science (*lam yudawwan ba‘du*). He also adds that the semantic theory outlined in al-Ījī’s *Risāla*, referred to as *risālatuhu al-waḍ‘iyya*, has explored only a small part (*nabdh*) of the subject-matter of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. In Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s own words: “it [i.e., the

²⁷ The section on lexicography is preceded by the section on phonetics and phonology (*‘ilm makhārīj al-ḥurūf*), which is in turn the opening section of this first branch.

Risāla] is a drop in an ocean and a drop in a river.”²⁸ Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s entry on ‘ilm al-waḍḍ’ parallels in many ways the one in Mullā Luṭfī’s *Maṭālib*: it clearly reinforces the idea that, during the first half of the 9th/16th century, al-Ījī’s *Risāla* was already identified with ‘ilm al-waḍḍ’.

This view on ‘ilm al-waḍḍ’ becomes clearer when looking at two claims made by Ṭāshköprüzādeh. The claim that ‘ilm al-waḍḍ’ has not yet been fully canonized, “*lam yudawwan ba‘du*,” must be understood in relation with his statement that the *Risāla* “is a drop in an ocean.” Al-Ījī’s *Risāla* certainly has the merit to explore new perspectives of semantics, although it does not exhaust them nor offers a complete account of ‘ilm al-waḍḍ’. Nevertheless, the semantic theory outlined in the *Risāla* becomes here an independent science that deserves to be counted among other traditional linguistic sciences. Like in Mullā Luṭfī’s case, Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s perception of ‘ilm al-waḍḍ’ mirrors its gradual shift from a general linguistic concept to a linguistic science on its own right.

The gradual evolution of ‘ilm al-waḍḍ’ that emerges from Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s *Miftāḥ* is confirmed by the extensive commentaries on the *Risāla* that, by Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s time, represented the core of the exegetical tradition on the *Risāla*. I stated above that some main commentaries were already circulating among Ottoman scholars. However, like Mullā Luṭfī and al-Suyūṭī, Ṭāshköprüzādeh neglects to mention this exegetical tradition stemming from the *Risāla*. His silence concerning this rich and established exegetical tradition is at odds with the detailed bibliographical knowledge displayed throughout the *Miftāḥ*, in which all entries devoted to other sciences and disciplines are supplied with extensive bibliographical references to the main works, their commentaries and glosses, which are taken to be representative of each

²⁸ Ṭāshköprüzādeh concludes the entry by stating that if he is granted time in his lifetime he will do full justice to this discipline.

science he discusses.²⁹ The absence of any reference to commentaries and glosses on the *Risāla* may thus indicate that Ṭāshköprüzādeh did not have access to the exegetical works on the *Risāla*.

There is however an indication that Ṭāshköprüzādeh was well informed about the development of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as it was discussed by commentators of the *Risāla*. This emerges more clearly by looking at the Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s knowledge of the technical vocabulary used in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, which resulted from similar topics in *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*. The classes of *waḍ‘* that he introduces in the entry of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* are not to be found in the *Risāla*, and al-Ījī never uses these formalized pairs of *waḍ‘ ‘āmm-khāṣṣ* or *shakhṣī-naw‘ī* to outline his semantic theory.³⁰ There are good reasons to believe that Ṭāshköprüzādeh was not unaware of the contents of the commentaries on the *Risāla* and might have had some knowledge of them.³¹ This can be seen in his usage of the technical vocabulary belonging to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in the definition of lexicography (*‘ilm al-lughā*), which precedes that on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. Here he claims that describes lexicography as a discipline that investigates the significations of simple terms with the formal patterns (*hay’āt*) that convey these significations – as well as the composition of these significations with

²⁹ Ṭāshköprüzādeh provides also detailed synopsis of the works and the main point of dispute among scholars that characterize each given science.

³⁰ Al-Ījī instead uses the formula *al-waḍ‘ al-kullī* (universal positing) in the *Introduction* to refer to demonstrative pronouns and the pair *waḍ‘ kullī-waḍ‘ mushakhkhaṣ* in two instances of the *Classification*. The classes *shakhṣī-naw‘ī* and *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* will instead become formalized only after al-Ījī as a result of commentators’ exegetical activity. As I will show in the next chapter al-Ījī seems to refer to the classes *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* in his commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā*.

³¹ Ṭāshköprüzādeh might have borrowed the technical vocabulary later developed in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* from the investigations of the semantic features of linguistic terms discussed in *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* and *al-bayān* as well as in the *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature, most notably in al-Ījī’s commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā* and the glosses by al-Jurjānī and al-Taftāzānī. He composed a commentary on al-Ījī’s rhetorical work *al-Fawā’id al-Ghiyāthiyya*, that is a summary of al-Sakkākī’s *Miftāḥ al-‘Ulūm* and al-Qazwīnī’s *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ*, in which al-Ījī refers to many aspects of the semantic of simple terms contained in the *Risāla* (see Chapter Two).

their particular patterns – that have been posited by individual positing (*bi-l-waḍʿ al-shakhṣī*).³² The technical vocabulary that Ṭāshköprüzādeh applies to the definition of *ʿilm al-lughā* matches with and echoes the conceptual tools that stem from the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* literature, like *al-waḍʿ al-shakhṣī*. It seems that Ṭāshköprüzādeh was aware of the conceptual development of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and felt free to use them beyond the limit of the discipline. With this in mind, Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s claim that *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* was “not yet a canonized science” confirms that all the aspects and implications of the topics of the *Risāla* had not been yet fully understood and investigated by his time. Nevertheless, the notions and the technical vocabulary developed within the exegetical tradition of the *Risāla* have had already a strong impact on the linguistic sciences cognate to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, and this will have a lasting impact up to the twentieth century.

Let us move further half a century in our chronological investigation of the evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, and examine another encyclopedist’s entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The famous historian, geographer and polymath Muṣṭafā b. ʿAbd Allāh Kātip Čelebī (1017-67/1609-57) also known as Ḥājjī Khalīfa, in his renowned bibliographical dictionary *Kashf al-Zunūn ʿan Asāmī al-Kutub wa-l-Funūn*, provides crucial textual data that are also problematic, concerning the exegetical activity on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Unlike al-Suyūṭī’s *al-Muzhir* and Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s *Miftāḥ*, the *Kashf al-Zunūn* is organized according to the books’ titles, rather than by subject matter; thus, the entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* coincides with the entry on “*Risāla fī l-waḍʿ*.”³³

Contrary to expectation, the first title listed in the entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is not al-Ījī’s *Risāla*, but rather a work by al-Jurjānī entitled *al-Risāla al-Mirʾāṭiyya*, known also as *Risāla fī taḥqīq*

³² [*ʿilm al-lughā*] bāḥithun ʿan madlūlāti jawāhiri al-mufradāti wa-hayʾātihā al-juzʾiyyati allatī wuḍiʿat tilka al-jawāhiru maʿahā li-tilka al-madlūlāti bi-l-waḍʿi al-shakhṣī wa-ʿammā ḥaṣala min tarkīb kulli jawāhirin jawāhirin wa-hayʾātihā al-juzʾiyyati ʿalā wajhin juzʾī wa-ʿan maʿānīhā al-mawḍūʿi lahā bi-l-waḍʿi al-shakhṣī.

³³ Cf. *Kashf al-Zunūn*, ed. Bayrūt: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, vol. 1, p. 898.

al-‘ilm bi-l-wajh wa-l-‘ilm bi-l-shay’ min dhalik al-wajh. Kātip Čelebī’s choice is unusual because al-Jurjānī’s treatise deals with epistemological topics related to logic and psychology rather than semantics.³⁴ Kātip Čelebī might have confused this treatise with another short treatise by al-Jurjānī entitled *al-Risāla al-Ḥarfiyya* that deals with the modes of signification of the particles (*ḥurūf*) and that echoes several notions and conceptual aspects used in the *Risāla al-Mir’ātiyya*.³⁵ This confusion might indicate that Kātip Čelebī did not have direct knowledge of content of the work and relied on second-hand description.

After al-Jurjānī’s work, Kātip Čelebī moves on to al-Ījī’s *Risāla* and lists its commentaries and glosses. He first introduces the commentary by Abū al-Qāsim al-Laythī al-Samarqandī, and adds that it is a *mamzūj* commentary, i.e., a commentary interwoven with the *matn*. Kātip Čelebī also provides further data about the completion of this commentary, which is 888/1483, as well as its *incipit*. He then lists the commentaries by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn ‘Arab-shāh al-Isfarā’īnī, by the famous ṣūfī poet Nūr Mullā Jāmī and, finally, by Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī, which, Kātip Čelebī claims, is a fine (*laṭīf*) commentary and, more importantly, the first and oldest (*awwal al-shurūḥ wa-aqdamuhā*). He also claims that several glosses and annotations (*ta’līqa*) were composed on this commentary, such as those by a certain Shaykh Aḥmad al-Rūmī,³⁶ some annotations by Mawlā ‘Alī al-Qūsījī, and the glosses by Mīr Abū al-Baqā’. Kātip Čelebī returns to the commentaries on the *Risāla* and claims that al-Jurjānī composed a set of annotations (*ta’līqa*) on it (*‘alā al-aṣl*); moreover, he claims that Muḥammad al-Shīrānisī composed a set of annotations

³⁴ This emerges from Ruloph Mach’s *Princeton Catalogue of Arabic Manuscript* in the *Yahuda* section, which lists this treatise among the works on logic. An edition with English translation of this short text can be accessed at <https://alkashkul.wordpress.com/2014/01/12/a-treatise-by-al-sayyid-al-sharif-on-knowledge-of-a-thing-by-a-means/> (last accessed 10 June 2017). See also R. Mach’s *Catalogue of the Yahuda* section p. 280, entry n. 3261.

³⁵ I will discuss al-Jurjānī’s gloss on al-Ījī’s *Risāla* in comparison with the *Risāla al-Mir’ātiyya* and the *Risāla al-Ḥarfiyya* in Chapter Three.

³⁶ For this information Kātip Čelebī relies on a report by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’īnī. However, he does not indicate the exact source of this information.

on al-Jurjānī's commentary (*sharḥ*) that were completed in 1016/1608. Kātip Čelebī concludes the entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* by referring to an anonymous commentary of which he provides the incipit, which runs as “*subḥān man anṭaqa bi-dhikrihi al-lisān tasbīḥan wa-tahlīlan.*”

As it emerges from this overview, the entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in the *Kashf al-Ẓunūn* differs from the ones seen so far, because it attempts to establish, likely for the first time, a comprehensive map of the scholarly production on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The titles listed in this entry were in all likelihood widely circulating and accessible to Kātip Čelebī throughout the 11th/17th century. Within fifty years after Ṭāshköprüzādeh the exegetical activity stemming from the *Risāla* had become firmly established and several sets of glosses and annotations on the main commentaries confirm the emergence of a lively and mature exegetical tradition.

Unlike his predecessors, such as Mullā Luṭfī, al-Suyūṭī and Ṭāshköprüzādeh, Kātip Čelebī does not say much about *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as a discipline. His entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* contains no statements that could indicate how he perceived *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, what type of science it is, its subject matter, scope and utility. There is however one passage in the *Kashf* that clarifies Kātip Čelebī's view of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. In the introduction, he devotes several pages to the classification and the description of all the sciences known during his time, and in this long list he places *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* between the science of lexicography, *ʿilm al-lughā*, and the science of derivation, *ʿilm al-ishtiḳāq*, just as Ṭāshköprüzādeh had done in the *Miftāḥ*.³⁷ This leaves no doubt that *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* was counted among the linguistic sciences.

Arguably, the most peculiar feature of Kātip Čelebī's entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is the richness of the bibliographical data that it provides. It is therefore safe to assume that by the mid-10th/17th century an exegetical tradition surrounding the *Risāla* was already well established in learned circles in the Ottoman empire. The existence of glosses on these commentaries further shows

³⁷ Cf. *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, ed. Bayrūt: Dār Iḥyā' al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, vol. 1, p. 14.

how the *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* tradition was in a period of expansion and steady development. However, despite the relatively rich biographical data provided in the *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, Kātib Čelebī’s list of commentaries and glosses is at odds with recent descriptions of the exegetical tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.³⁸ Most of the authors assigned to the commentaries and glosses described by Kātib Čelebī are the result of misattributions. For example, the commentary attributed to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī is in fact authored by al-Qūshjī; in turn, the glosses by al-Qūshjī on Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī’s commentary are not attested anywhere else, which makes one suppose that they never existed or were not transmitted or are also misattributed. Also, the glosses on Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī attributed to Kātib Čelebī’s contemporary Mīr Abū al-Baqā’³⁹ are in reality glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary. Another mistaken reference is to glosses by Muḥammad al-Shīrānisī on al-Jurjānī’s commentary. In fact, all the manuscript copies of the glosses by al-Shīrānisī are composed on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’īnī’s commentary and represent the most widespread set of glosses on this commentary.⁴⁰ Finally, the anonymous commentary for which Kātib Čelebī provides the *incipit* corresponds to the commentary that the manuscript tradition attributes to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī. Be that as it may, there are two possible reasons for the misattributions of works in Kātib Čelebī’s inventory. In compiling his list on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, Kātib

³⁸ See R. Wisnovsky “The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentaries in Post-Classical (1100-1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Preliminary Observations.” *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*. 47. 1 (2004). pp. 171-2. In Chapter Three, Four and Five I will provide the corrected lists of the commentaries and their glosses on the *Risāla*.

³⁹ According to Mach the author of these glosses is Abū al-Baqā’ Ayyūb b. Mūsā al-Kaffawī (d. 1094/1683), rather than Abū al-Baqā’ b. ‘Abd al-Bāqī al-Ḥusaynī, cf. Mach’s *Catalogue*, p. 294, entry n. 3425. Nevertheless, three collections of works on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, namely the codices Nurousmaniye 4508, 4509 and 4510, contain a long set of glosses attributed to Abū al-Baqā’ Ibn ‘Abd al-Bāqī al-Ḥusaynī on the commentary by Abū al-Qāsim al-Laythī al-Samarqandī (respectively at fol. 181b-249a, 156b-195a, 43b-93a). Kātib Čelebī might have confused the names of the authors of the two sets of glosses.

⁴⁰ Of course, Kātib Čelebī might have had access to a now-lost codex containing the glosses by al-Shīrānisī on al-Jurjānī’s commentary. However, the manuscript tradition makes no reference to al-Shīrānisī as a glossator on al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s commentary. Throughout my research of manuscripts catalogues on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* I have never found any reference to these glosses.

Čelebī might have reproduced mistaken reports and second-hand information that he did not personally verify – as was also the case for al-Jurjānī’s *al-Risāla al-Mir’atiyya* seen before. It could also be that Kātib Čelebī himself had viewed manuscript copies that were themselves wrongly attributed, probably as a result of the mistakes of the scribe who had mixed up the names and/or the *nisbas* of the authors.

As a general rule, however, it seems that Ottoman scholars showed a keen interest three of the classic commentaries on the *Risāla*, that of al-Qūshjī, Jāmī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn. The preference for these three classical commentaries emerges clearly in the work of the grand-vizier Muḥammad Rāghib Pāshā (1110-1176/1698-1763) entitled *Safīnat al-Rāghib*, in which the author collects a vast number of short treatises that cover virtually every science known at his time.⁴¹ The grand-vizier include a treatise under the title of *Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya* in which he puts together chosen passages (*muntakhab*) from these three commentaries, to which he adds an analysis of the terms posited for the names of Quranic *sūras* and books titles, two of the topics that are discussed in the classic commentaries.⁴²

A contemporary of Kātib Čelebī, the Crimean scholar Abū al-Baqā’ al-Kaffawī (1028-1095/1619-1684), author of the famous dictionary *al-Kulliyāt*, takes a more descriptive approach to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. The entry devoted to *al-waḍ‘* covers different technical applications of the term: *waḍ‘* is defined as the property of something that is pointed at with the senses (*al-ishāra al-ḥissiyya*) and as “specifying the term by a concept” (*takhṣiṣ al-lafẓ bi-l-ma‘nā*).⁴³ He then provides an overview of the different applications of the technical term *waḍ‘*, such as that made by

⁴¹ Cf. Rāghib Pāshā, *Safīnat al-Rāghib*, Būlāq: Dār al-Ṭibā‘a al-‘Āmira, 1255/1839.

⁴² *Ibidem*, pp. 613-625.

⁴³ Cf. *Kulliyāt* p. 934. In this last occurrence, al-Kaffawī relies on the definition given in al-Taftāzānī’s *al-Talwīḥ*. The *Talwīḥ*, in full *al-Talwīḥ ‘alā al-Tawḍīḥ li-matn al-Tanqīḥ*, is the major work on legal methodology composed by al-Taftāzānī and is a super-commentary on Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s self-commentary on *al-Tanqīḥ fī l-Ūṣūl*.

philosophers (*‘inda al-ḥukamā’*), in lexicography (*lughawī*), in law (*shar‘ī*), in the customary use of specialists (*‘urfī khāṣṣ*) and in popular custom (*‘urfī ‘āmm*). Despite the breadth of this description, al-Kaffawī does not at any time refer to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. He begins his excursus by discussing two main classes of *waḍ‘*, that is, the species positing and the individual positing (respectively *waḍ‘ naw‘ī* and *waḍ‘ shakhṣī*) and their subdivisions. He provides a short description of the species positing. This class obtains when the positor conceives of specific terms included within a universal notion (*fī ḍimni amr kullī*) and judges in a universal way (*kulliyyan*) that each specific term falls under that notion. Then, the positor determines that each term signifies *per se* (*bi-nafsihi*) a concept related to that universal notion.⁴⁴ Al-Kaffawī then lists three subclasses under the class of species positing. These are: [1] The class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, which includes the features belonging to generic morphological patterns (*a‘lām ajnās al-ṣiyagh*) of perfect and imperfect verbs, e.g., the patterns “*fa‘ala*” or “*yaf‘alu*,” as well as of all the possible forms occurring to the three radicals “*f-‘-l*.” [2] The class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, that is, the general positing for a specific concept. The generality of verbs (*‘āmma al-a‘fāl*) – e.g., the verb “*ḍaraba*” of the “*fa‘ala*” type, which expresses the relation (*nisba*) of an event to a subject in the past – belong to this class, since they are posited by grasping a universal and comprehensive marker (*‘unwān kullī shāmil*) to posit that each verb conveys a particular ascription (*nisba juz’iyya*) to a time and a subject. The object of positing in this case is a particular, namely the particular ascription conveyed by a verb, whereas the act of positing is general because it takes into account a universal criterion. [3] The class *‘āmm-‘āmm*, that is the general positing for a general concept. In this case the positor establishes universal rules (*qawā‘id kulliyya*) for general terms, in which specificity and particularity is not taken into account. To this class belong derived nouns (*mushtaqqāt*), e.g., the patterns of the

⁴⁴ “al-wāḍi‘u idhā taṣawwara alfāzan makhṣūṣatan fī ḍimni amrin kulliyyin wa-ḥakama ḥukman kulliyyan bi-anna kulla lafẓin mundarijin taḥtahu ‘ayyanahu li-l-dalālati bi-nafsihi ‘alā kādhā yusammā hādhā al-waḍ‘u waḍ‘an naw‘iyyan.” Cf. *Kulliyyāt* p. 934.

active and passive participles (such as *fā'il* and *maḥḥūl*), patterns of the diminutive (such as the form *fu'ayl*), forms that express relation, i.e., *al-mansūb* (such as the *yā'* for the *nisba* of relation), and the imperative patterns of verbs, e.g., "*if'al*." It is for these reason that, al-Kaffawī explain, these terms are not posited by their own specificity, but rather by universal principles.⁴⁵

Al-Kaffawī then describes the second main class, which is the individual positing (*al-waḍ' al-shakṣī*). This class obtains when the positor conceives of a specific term and a determined concept (*ma'nan mu'ayyanan*), which can be either a particular or universal concept. The positor determines that term for that specific concept or for everything that applies to, or is true of, that concept.⁴⁶ As with the previous category, al-Kaffawī lists three subclasses under this class. These are: [1] the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, which is the specific positing for a specific object. This class results when the positor conceives of a particular concept and determines the term corresponding to that concept. To this class belong individual proper names, such as Zayd, 'Amr, Maryam etc., whose external referents (*musammayāt*) are determined by their own nature and do not need a supplementary semantic context (*qarīna*) in order to convey their specific concepts. [2] The class *'āmm-'āmm*, which is the general positing for a general concept. Here, the positor conceives of a universal concept and determines a general term corresponding to it. To this class belong generic indefinite nouns (*nakirāt*), e.g., *a cat, a human, a tree* etc. [3] The class *'āmm-khāṣṣ*, in which the general positing is general, and the concept is specific. This class obtains when the positor conceives of a universal concept with which he apprehends all the possible particulars subsumed under that universal. He then determines the linguistic term for each of those particulars by means of a single comprehensive act of grasping (*mulāḥaẓa*

⁴⁵ It is worth noting that the discussion on the classes of *waḍ' naw'ī* of the *Kulyyiāt* seems to follow closely and sometimes verbatim the account provided by Mullā Luṭfī in his *Maṭālib* seen before.

⁴⁶ "wa-idhā taṣawwara al-wāḍi'u lafẓan khāṣṣan wa-taṣawwara ayḍan ma'nan mu'ayyanan imma juz'iyyan aw kulliyyan wa-'ayyana al-lafẓa bi-'ayni dhālika al-ma'nā aw li-kulli wāḥidin mim mā yaṣḍuqu 'alayhi dhālika al-ma'nā yusammā hādhā al-waḍ'u waḍ'an shakṣiyyan." Cf. *Kulyyiāt* p. 935.

ijmāliyya). To this class belong personal, relative, demonstrative pronouns, fixed verbal interjections,⁴⁷ prepositions and some complements. Al-Kaffawī concludes the entry on *waḍʿ* with an overview of two main questions closely related to the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* literature, namely the debate on the origin of the language and the debate over the nature of the relation between terms and concepts.⁴⁸

Two main aspects emerge from al-Kaffawī's entry on the term *al-waḍʿ*. The first concerns the absence of any references to or bibliographical data on the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* tradition. Despite his clear reference to the theory of *waḍʿ*, al-Kaffawī neither mentions *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as a discipline, nor locates it among other linguistic sciences. Nevertheless, the theory of *waḍʿ* described in the *Kulliyāt* does reproduce the main classes and classifications belonging to the exegetical tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The second concerns the status of the theory of *waḍʿ* outlined here. Overall, the content of al-Kaffawī's discussion of the theory of *waḍʿ* is quite sophisticated and comprehensive, as it covers all the main categories and classes of *waḍʿ* and applies them to most elements of language. This full application of the theory of *waḍʿ* to the description of the semantics of the parts of the speech shows that the theory of *waḍʿ* has become one of the different technical senses of the term *waḍʿ*, and that it has been fully integrated in the technical vocabulary of 11th-17th Ottoman scholars.

The next relevant source for understanding the evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is the encyclopedia of sciences entitled *Tartīb al-ʿUlūm* by the Ottoman scholar Muḥammad Abī Bakr

⁴⁷ Cf. Wright, I, p. 109-110; II, p. 296; Aryeh Levin, "The Category of *Asmāʾ al-Fiʿl* in Arabic Grammar," in *Proceedings of the Colloquium on Arabic Grammar, September 1-7, 1991*, ed. by Kinga Devényi and Tamás Iványi. *The Arabist: Budapest Studies in Arabic*, 3-4 (1991): 247-256.

⁴⁸ Generally speaking, this debate revolves around three positions, a) the term is posited for an external being, 2) the term is related to a mental concept, 3) the term is posited without any external or mental qualifications, while its application to both qualifications is still a literal usage (*istiʿmāl ḥaqīqī*), as opposed to the metaphorical one.

al-Marʿashī Sājaqlīzādeh (d. 1145/1733). In the first section on “*The discussion related to every science*”, a part of the first topic (*al-maqṣad al-awwal*),⁴⁹ Sājaqlīzādeh opens the division of linguistic sciences by regrouping them under three main entries, namely *ʿilm al-lughā*, *ʿilm al-ishtiḳāq*, and *ʿilm al-ʿarūd* (prosody). At first glance, *ilm al-waḍʿ* does not appear in the list of the linguistic sciences nor in any other account. However, a closer analysis of the content of the entry on *ʿilm al-lughā* reveals important evidence regarding the status of *ilm al-waḍʿ*. Sājaqlīzādeh begins the entry on *ʿilm al-lughā* by claiming that this is the science of individual positings for simple terms (*al-awḍāʿ al-shakhṣiyya li-l-mufradāt*). He then moves to a more technical presentation by discussing the different classes of positing. The first class, that is, the individual positing (*al-waḍʿ al-shakhṣī*) obtains by grasping the term in its individuality (*bi-shakhṣihi*) and then positing that term for a concept. The counterpart of this class is the species positing (*al-waḍʿ al-nawʿī*) that obtains by grasping the terms through a universal common notion (*amr kullī*) and then positing those terms for a concept. Examples of this latter class are, according to Sājaqlīzādeh, derived nouns (*al-mushtaqqāt*), compounds (*al-murakkabāt*)⁵⁰ and the figurative terms (*al-majāzāt*). More importantly, Sājaqlīzādeh provides details on the class of species positing when he claims that this class is explained or defined (*yuʿarrafu*) in the sciences of syntax (*naḥw*) and rhetoric (*balāgha*) more than in any other science.

Sājaqlīzādeh provides the example of the derived noun in order to clarify the second class of positing he is discussing. The concept of the active participle (*ism al-fāʿil*) is “*an essence in which the source of derivation subsists*” (*dhātun qāma bihā maʾkhadhu al-ishtiḳāqi*), such as “*ḍārib*” (*hitting*), in which two acts of positing are joined together. The first act of positing concerns the

⁴⁹ Cf. Sājaqlīzādeh, Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Marʿashī, *Tartīb al-ʿUlūm*, ed. Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Sayyid Aḥmad, Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya, 1408/1988, p. 119.

⁵⁰ It is unclear whether Sājaqlīzādeh refers to word compounds or sentence compound. I would prefer the second option because in following statement he claims that this class of waḍʿ is determined in the sciences of syntax (*naḥw*) and stylistics (*balāgha*), whose subject matter is the linguistic composition (*naẓm*) and its characteristics.

linguistic matter (*mādda*), namely the *maṣḍar* “*al-ḍarb*”; this obtains by individual positing and conveys the sense of “*something occurring to something else*” (*waqa‘a shay’un ‘alá shay’in*). Sājaqlizādeh flags that analysis of this type of positing belongs to lexicography, *‘ilm al-lughā*. The second positing concerns the configuration of the term (*hay’a*), which falls under the class of species positing. The concept expressed by terms such as “*ḍārib*” (*hitting*) is an essence in which the *maṣḍar* “*al-ḍarb*” subsists. The analysis of this type of positing belongs, according to Sājaqlizādeh, to the science of syntax (*‘ilm al-naḥw*), which analyzes the ascriptive compound (*al-murakkab al-isnādī*). In other word, syntax is interested in exploring how a notion is ascribed to another, e.g., how the assertoric proposition “*Zaydun qā’imūn*” expresses how the notion *standing* is ascribed to *Zayd*.⁵¹

Sājaqlizādeh also provides a quick overview of the question of positing with respect to the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dichotomy.⁵² Here he claims that the act of positing a term for a concept is what rhetoricians (*ahl al-balāgha*) refer to as literal positing (*al-waḍ‘ al-ḥaqīqī*). At this point of his discussion on *‘ilm al-lughā* Sājaqlizādeh operates an important distinction. In his view *‘ilm al-lughā* may apply to all linguistic sciences, but he distinguishes this from the science of positing single terms seen before, and calls the latter the science of the linguistic corpus, *‘ilm matn al-lughā*.⁵³ *‘ilm matn al-lughā*, continues Sājaqlizādeh, contains principles (*mabādī*) and objectives

⁵¹ Cf. *Tartīb al-‘Ulūm*, pp. 119-120

⁵² Sājaqlizādeh continues by giving an example of how the metaphorical sense is defined and its relation to the proper sense. The metaphor is what is in relation to the proper meaning together with a context hindering the concept of the proper meaning, such as in the sentence “*we took care of the rain*” (*ra‘aynā al-ghayth*). What is meant here is a concomitant (*lāzim*) of the word *ghayth*, which indicates the plants (cf. Lane’s *Lexicon*, voce *ghayth*, p. 2369, with the meaning of herbage that grows by means of the water of the sky). The word *ghayth* has been posited firstly by a proper individual positing for the rain (*maṭār*) and only secondly by a metaphorical featurative positing for the plants.

⁵³ For this important distinction Sājaqlizādeh relies on the definition that al-Taftāzānī works out in his influential commentary *al-Muṭawwal*. *‘ilm matn al-lughā* is not original to Sājaqlizādeh. It will be shown that this linguistic science also appears in al-Qūshjī’s *Unqūd al-Zawāhir*. The name *‘ilm matn al-lughā* is also present in an earlier source, that is al-Zamakhsharī’s treatise on prosody entitled *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm fī ‘ilm al-‘Arūd*. In the introduction to this

(*maqāṣid*), where the principles consist in knowing the conditions or status of the positing (*aḥwāl al-waḍʿ*). For this latter subdivision of *ʿilm matn al-lugha* he relies on ʿAlī al-Qūshjī’s *Unqūd al-Zawāhir fī l-Ṣarf*.⁵⁴

The principles of *ʿilm matn al-lugha* appear to be closely related to the semantic issues discussed in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The main focus of both sciences is analyzing and classifying the different types of positing that underly terms and their concepts, which equate to investigating the various situations of positing (*aḥwāl al-waḍʿ*). Sājaqlizādeh provides a clear indication that the principles (*mabādiʿ*) of *ʿilm matn al-lugha* correspond to nothing other than *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. He states that the most important works written on the principles of *ʿilm matn al-lugha* are al-Ījī’s *Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya* and the first section of al-Qūshjī’s *Unqūd al-Zawāhir*, which is exclusively devoted to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*.

The description and classification of linguistic sciences in Sājaqlizādeh’s *Tartīb* reveal a crucial evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* among 11th-18th century Ottoman intellectual circles. There are two main aspects concerning *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* that deserve to be highlighted. The first relates to the technical vocabulary and the semantic theory presented throughout the commentary tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Sājaqlizādeh’s discussion of *ʿilm al-lugha* and its sub-disciplines shows that the technical vocabulary belonging to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* has become an essential and natural component for describing the subject-matter of sciences outside of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Lexicography, *ʿilm al-lugha*, becomes here “the science of individual positing of single terms” (*al-awḍāʿ al-shakhṣiyya li-l-mufradāt*).

treatise al-Zamakhsharī provides a classification of the so-called literary sciences, *al-ʿulūm al-adabiyya*. These amount to twelve and *ʿilm matn al-lugha* occupies the first place, followed by *ʿilm al-abniya* (morphology), *ʿilm al-ishtiqaq* (derivation), *ʿilm al-iʿrāb* (inflection), *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, *ʿilm al-bayān* etc.; see *al-Qiṣṣ al-Mustaqīm fī ʿIlm al-ʿArūd*, ed. by Bahija Bāqir al-Ḥusaynī, Baghdād: Maktabat al-Andalus, p. 53.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Tartīb al-ʿUlūm*, p. 121. Sājaqlizādeh provides a general description of this work by al-Qūshjī. The *Unqūd al-Zawāhir* is divided into three main parts, the first part devoted to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, the second on the science of derivation, *ishtiqaq*, and the third on morphology, *al-taṣrīf*. Sājaqlizādeh also claims that every student should get a copy of this work, for its uniqueness in treating the three aforementioned topics (*fa-lam nara lahu naẓīran fī l-ʿulūmi al-thalāthati*).

Its subject-matter, as has been shown, overlaps with that of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. Moreover, Sājaqlizādeh’s description of lexicography’s subject-matter makes use of the classifications and categories that were developed in the tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*: *individual positing* (*al-waḍ‘ al-shakhṣī*), a term posited in *its individuality* (*bi-shakhṣihi*), *species positing* (*al-waḍ‘ al-naw‘ī*), *universal notion* (*amr kullī*), *configuration* and *matter* (*hay’a, mādda*). All constitute the main core of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*’s technical vocabulary developed throughout the commentary tradition stemming from the *Risāla*. The second aspect concerns the ontological status of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as it emerges from Sājaqlizādeh’s *Tartīb*. Although *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* does not explicitly appear among the linguistic sciences listed in the *Tartīb*, the semantic theory outlined in the *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* literature seems here fully absorbed by *‘ilm al-lughā*.

Nevertheless, this conflation of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* with *‘ilm al-lughā* does not mean that at this stage in Islamic intellectual history the former had totally dissolved into the latter. Sājaqlizādeh is careful to point this out when he claims that *‘ilm al-lughā* is an equivocal and general name that covers other linguistic sciences. Among these is the science that deals with the semantic positing of simple terms, that is the science of the corpus of language, *‘ilm matn al-lughā*. This sub-science is in turn divided into two branches, namely principles and objectives. The principles of *‘ilm matn al-lughā* correspond to the subject-matter that belongs to the tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, which investigates the nature of the semantic function underlying the term-concept relation. The final goals focus instead on the description and classification of terms and their meanings. Although the two branches of *‘ilm matn al-lughā* correspond in reality to two different sciences, it seems that in Sājaqlizādeh’s view they should be considered as parts of a general discipline, that of *matn al-lughā*.

It is worth noting that the semantic theory elaborated in al-Ījī’s *Risāla* and in al-Qūshjī’s *‘Unqūd al-Zawāhir* represents here the theoretical principles (*mabādi’*) that are prior to and

foundational for all further linguistic investigations, even those proper to lexicography. Sājaqlizādeh's insistence on referring to al-Qūshjī's *Unqūd al-Zawāhir* rather than the commentaries and glosses on the *Risāla* is not casual and might be the main source for his understanding of the status of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The *Unqūd al-Zawāhir* shows a similar classification of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* to that of Sājaqlizādeh's.⁵⁵ This new status granted to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is symptomatic of the relevance that this science has acquired in Ottoman scholarly milieus. Sājaqlizādeh's new understanding of the role of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* within *ʿilm matn al-lughā* is evidence that *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* comes to fill a gap within the scope of a much older and established science as *ʿilm al-lughā*. This is a crucial shift in the history of the evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, especially if it is compared to previous accounts on the status of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Ṭāshköprüzādeh and Kātip Čelebī construed *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as an independent science by locating it ideally between lexicography and *ʿilm al-ishtiqāq*. With Sājaqlizādeh, and most probably starting with al-Qūshjī's *Unqūd al-Zawāhir*, the status of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is entirely subverted so as to become a sub-discipline within the larger *ʿilm matn al-lughā*. This bestows *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* a sort of primacy among other linguistic sciences, as it investigates the very foundations (*al-mabādiʿ*) of what language is composed of.

The last account of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in an Ottoman-era classification of the sciences during the belongs to the Egyptian scholars ʿAbd al-Hādī Najā al-Abyārī (1236/1820-1305/1887 or 1821-1888).⁵⁶ His *Suʿūd al-Maṭāliʿ* is a short classification of the sciences on which he wrote a larger

⁵⁵ As will be shown in detail in Chapter Four, al-Qūshjī divides this work into three main *cruxes* (*ʿuqūd*), the first of which deals with the *mabādiʿ* of *ʿilm matn al-lughā* where a completed theory of *waḍʿ* is outlined.

⁵⁶ Al-Abyārī was educated in al-Azhar and wrote prolifically on *adab*, grammar, Sufism and *ʿaqīda*. He was close to the Egyptian Khedival family as he was first the preceptor of Khedive Ismāʿīl Pāshā's (1830-1895) sons and later appointed as personal imam and muftī by the latter's successor Khedive Tawfiq b. Ismāʿīl (1852-1892). Cf. *Al-Aʿlām*, Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, Bayrūt: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyyin, 2002, vol. 4, p. 173.

self-commentary entitled *Suʿūd al-Muṭālīʿ li-Suʿūd al-Maṭālīʿ*.⁵⁷ Al-Abyārī provides an entry for each science that was in all likelihood still part of the *curriculum studiorum* of his time. He describes the subject-matter, the scope and the main points of debate by paraphrasing, quoting or referring to the most representative works and manuals for each science. Among these entries, one is devoted specifically to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Before looking into the content of this entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, it is worth noting the position that *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* occupies in this list. It should first be mentioned that al-Abyārī's list of sciences is probably not the result of a random and arbitrary choice, but rather mirrors both the learning dynamics of a real - or ideal - teaching system, and the scholarly elites' conception of the organization of human knowledge. The first entry in the list is the one on *ʿilm al-tawḥīd*, a denomination that covers theology and more generally the *divinalia*,⁵⁸ followed by all the canonical Islamic sciences, such as *Ḥadīth*, *fiqh*, *tafsīr*, Qurʾānic recitation etc. This group⁵⁹ is then followed by the group of linguistic sciences, which includes syntax, morphology, science of derivation, *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, *ʿilm al-bayān* and *ʿilm al-baḍʿ*, lexicography, and prosody and science of rhymes (*al-qawāfī*). Interestingly, the science of *al-waḍʿ* is absent from this group, though it does appear later on, towards the end of the first half of the book. The entry on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is preceded by *ādāb al-baḥṭh* and *al-jadal* and followed by the entry

⁵⁷ The correct reading of the title is unclear as the author does not give any indication on how both words *m-ṭ-l-* should be vocalized. Modern catalogues' entries such as WorldCat and Harvard HOLLIS give the full title of the work as *Suʿūd al-Maṭālīʿ fī-mā Taḍammanahu al-Alghāzu fī Ismī Ḥaḍrati Wālī Miṣri min al-ʿUlūmi al-Lawāmiʿi*. Upon inspection of the printed version it emerges that this is the title of the short version of the work, while the self-commentary should read *Suʿūd al-Muṭālīʿ (?) li-Suʿūd al-Maṭālīʿ*. Both texts are printed together and the self-commentary is divided into two parts, the first of which ends with the entry on *Logic* and the second of which begins with the entry on *Ḥikma*. The short version of the text extends over sixteen pages in the published edition, while the self-commentary is divided into two parts and extends over about eight hundred and sixty pages; cf. *Suʿūd al-Muṭālīʿ li-Suʿūd al-Maṭālīʿ*, Būlāq: Dār al-Ṭibāʿa al-ʿĀmira, 1283/1866, 2 vols.

⁵⁸ The part of theology that discusses the *divinalia* explores also questions God's essence and attributes and its relation to creation. These discussions often overlap and are also treated in *ʿilm al-ḥikma*, philosophy, which often contains a separate section on *ilāhiyyāt*, pure *divinalia*.

⁵⁹ Al-Abyārī never refers to groups of sciences. However, it appears that he follows and underlying logic to regrouping together several sciences.

on *Logic*.⁶⁰ This contrasts with the place occupied by *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in the works of al-Abyārī’s predecessors like Ṭāshköprüzādeh and Sājaqlīzādeh, for whom *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* was undoubtedly construed as a linguistic discipline. If the list of sciences of the *Su‘ūd al-Muṭālī‘* mirrors either al-Abyārī’s actual understanding of order of human knowledge, or that of the *madrasa* curriculum, then *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is not to be counted anymore among the linguistic sciences. Rather, according to his view, *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is an independent science that finds its natural location after the studying of the *ars disputandi*, *ādāb al-baḥth* and *al-jadal*, and is also therefore a theoretical preliminary to the science of logic.

Al-Abyārī opens his entry on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* by discussing two widespread definitions of the linguistic term *waḍ‘*. According to the first and more general definition, the *waḍ‘* consists in “*determining some thing (shay‘) for a concept, insofar as when <that thing> is heard or perceived by the senses, the concept posited for it is understood from <that same thing>.*”⁶¹ Al-Abyārī points out that there is another definition provided by other scholars which describes *al-waḍ‘* as “*setting down a term for a concept*” (*ja‘l al-lafẓ bi-izā‘ al-ma‘ná*), which is only a sub-definition or a type belonging to the first definition. For this reason, the first and more general definition also covers simple and compound terms. Simple terms, al-Abyārī explains, are posited by individual positing (*al-waḍ‘ al-shakhṣī*), while compounds are posited by species positing (*al-waḍ‘ al-naw‘ī*).

Al-Abyārī clarifies further that the definition of *waḍ‘* might also refer to the twofold semantic function of terms and sentences according to the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dichotomy. This is the case when the definition of *waḍ‘* indicates that the concept understood from a term is either grasped *per se*, or by a semantic context (*immā bi-naḥsihi aw bi-qarīna*). In al-Abyārī’s view, this is

⁶⁰ The entry on *Logic*, the twenty-sixth, marks the end of the first volume of the work, while the entry on *ḥikma* marks the beginning of the second volume.

⁶¹ [*Al-waḍ‘*] *ta‘yyin al-shay‘ bi-izā‘ al-ma‘ná bi-ḥaythu matá sumi‘a aw-uḥissa fuhima min-hu al-ma‘ná al-mawḍū‘ huwa la-hu*. Cf. Al-Abyārī, *Su‘ūd...*, p. 468.

the definition favored by scholars (*al-muḥaqqiqīyn*). The subject-matter of *al-waḍʿ* according to this definition is to investigate “nouns that are determined for concepts with respect to their semantic determination” (*mawḍūʿuhu al-asmāʾ al-muʿyyana bi-izāʾi al-maʿānī min ḥaythu taʿayyiuniḥā*), while the ultimate scope of *al-waḍʿ* is knowing both the literal and figurative senses referring to all entities (*al-ashyāʾ*). It is only after the analysis of the different senses and definitions of *al-waḍʿ* that al-Abyārī clarifies that *al-waḍʿ* is an integral part of *ʿilm al-ʿarabiyya*.⁶²

Having discussed several implications of the definition of *al-waḍʿ*, al-Abyārī moves on a more theoretical discussion of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* proper. He opens his discussion by describing the function of the term “individual” (*al-shakḥṣ*). Scholars of *waḍʿ* (*ʿulamāʾ al-waḍʿ*), which in all likelihood refers to specialists in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, use the term “individual” to mean “that which has individuation” (*ma lahu al-tashakhkhuṣ*). Individuation, which is a central notion in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, is described here by al-Abyārī as “that by which a thing occurs <as it is>, so that the intellect refrains from assuming participation <of that thing with another thing> in an abstracting way (*mā bihi yaṣīru al-shayʾu bi-ḥaythu yamtanīʿ al-ʿaqlu ʿan farḍi al-shirkati farḍan intizāʿīan*).”⁶³ Individuation applies in fact to a specific notion by which the external existent (*al-mawjūd al-khārijī*) is determined in its specificity. This implies that individuation must be excluded for mental existents because they do not possess external, actual existence. Al-Abyārī moves onto a more descriptive analysis of the classes of *waḍʿ*. He first points to the object of the positing, the concept, which can be either something individuated (*mushakhkḥaṣ*) or a whole (*kull*), i.e., a set of individuals, and then goes on to present four classes of *waḍʿ*. The first is the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, that is, a specific positing for

⁶² The identity of this *al-shaykh* al-Jawharī is unclear. The possibility that al-Abyārī is referring to the famous 10th century lexicographer al-Jawharī author of lexicon *al-Ṣiḥāḥ* must be excluded, as al-Abyārī refers to this al-Jawharī as *shaykhunā*. In all likelihood, al-Abyārī is referring to the Azharī scholar al-Jawharī, author of a short *matn* on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. I will present this in Chapter Five. This claim does not necessarily imply that *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is itself, as an independent science, part of the linguistic sciences. Instead, al-Jawharī’s view seems to point out that *al-waḍʿ*, as a general linguistic notion discussed in the definitions provided by al-Abyārī, falls within *ʿilm al-ʿarabiyya*.

⁶³ Cf. al-Abyārī, *Suʿūd...*, p. 469.

a specific object, which is a distinct individual obtained by intellecting and apprehending it in its specificity, as occurs when the essence of, say, *Zayd* is conceived. This class includes all proper names, such as when the proper name *Zayd* is posited for that individual entity. The second class is the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, that is, a general positing for a specific object, which obtains when the object of positing (i.e., the concept) is intellected and grasped by conceiving a universal notion (*amr kullī*). To this class belong all demonstrative and personal pronouns (e.g., *hādha*, *dhālika*, *anā*, *huwa* etc.) as well as all prepositions (e.g., *min*, *ilá*). The third class is the *‘āmm-‘āmm*, that is, a general positing for a general object, which obtains when the term is posited for a general entity by intellecting it in its own generality, such when one conceives (*taṣawwara*) the concept of “rational animal” (*ḥayawān nāṭiq*) and then posits the term “human” (*insān*) for the former. The fourth and last class is the *khāṣṣ-‘āmm*, which obtains when the term is posited for a general notion by intellecting and grasping the specificity of some individual instance (*afrād*) of that general notion. Al-Abyārī is aware that this class of *waḍ‘* is one that has posed problems among theorists of *waḍ‘* who denied its validity, because the intellect cannot use the specificities (*al-khuṣūsiyyāt*) belonging to the individual concepts as a mirror, or a means, for grasping the universals under which the same specificities fall.

Having introduced all the classes of *waḍ‘*, al-Abyārī goes on a more detailed investigation of the second class of *waḍ‘*, the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, which, as will be shown later on, represents one of the main points of debate in the exegetical tradition of the *Risāla*.⁶⁴ The general axiom that defines this class of *waḍ‘* is the intellection of a common feature (*amr mushtarak*) among

⁶⁴ Before going into his analysis of the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Abyārī provides a very brief overview of the different senses of the “object of positing,” the *mawḍū‘ lahu*, that is the object for which a term is posited. The *mawḍū‘ lahu* is called *ma‘ná* (intention) when there is an intention directed towards that concept (*al-qāṣd ilayhi*) originating from the term that conveys it. The *mawḍū‘ lahu* is called *mafḥūm* (lit. *what is understood*) with regard to a strict understanding (*infihāmuḥu muṭlaqan*) of the *mawḍū‘ lahu*. Finally, the *mawḍū‘ lahu* is called *madlūl* (lit. *what is inferred* or the *significatum*) in case its understanding occurs by means of understanding something other than that *mawḍū‘ lahu*.

individual entities. A linguistic term is then determined for every single individuated instance (*afrād mushakkhkhaṣa*) in a way that only one single concept in its specificity is conveyed and understood from that common feature. An example of this class of terms are the demonstrative pronoun “*this*” (*hādhā*) or the preposition “*from*” (*min*). The common feature, however, will not be part of the concept conveyed and grasped together with the individual instance. Al-Abyārī warns that, contrary to what many scholars assume, the object posited for the term is not the concept that is true of (*al-ṣādiq ‘alā*) every single instance of the common feature notion. If this were the case, he argues, then the common feature would be the one used (*yu‘stamal fihi*) and understood from the term, which al-Abyārī has previously denied. Rather, the object of positing and the one used in speech (*al-mu‘stamal fihi*) is something individuated (*mushakkhkhaṣ*) among the individual instance (*afrād*) in its singularity, with the exception of the common feature (*al-qadr al-mushtarak*). Al-Abyārī explains this with the following example: the demonstrative pronoun “*this*” (*hādhā*) is posited for a general notion that corresponds to the concept of “*a single masculine individual thing pointed to*”, which is common to all the specific individual instances of “*this*.” This is the case because the positor has apprehended the common feature as an instrument or a means (*āla wa-wasīla*) to mediate a single individual instance included in that general notion conveyed by the term “*this*”. In this way, the positing is universal, while the object of the positing of the term “*this*” is a distinct individual. The concepts and the referents (*musammā*) of the term “*this*” in the phrase “*this man*,” “*this cat*” or “*this horse*,” have in common the general feature they all share, that is, the notion of “*a single masculine individuated referent*” (*al-mushār ilayhi al-mufrad al-mushakkhkhaṣ*), but each instance of “*this*” points to one concept in its specify. Al-Abyārī clarifies this explanation by claiming that the single instance of “*this*” (*hādhā al-mufrad*) is grasped by a general entity. This general entity is in turn the notion of “*a single masculine individuated referent*” that applies to or is true of (*al-ṣādiq ‘alā*) the general distinct

individual pointed to. To elucidate this in more concrete terms, al-Abyārī offers the following example: if we judge every Greek, (*al-rūmī*), as being white, with that feature, then we have grasped all the distinct individual Greeks like Zayd, ‘Amr etc. by a general notion which is “Greek” (*rūmī*); and we have judged that general notion as “being white”. Al-Abyārī explains the further division of this second class of *waḍʿ* by taking into account the universal notion that characterizes the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* of *waḍʿ*. The universal notion is divided into four sub-classes, namely the generic noun, the verbal noun (*maṣḍar*), the derived noun and the verb.⁶⁵

Al-Abyārī presents some further division of the four sub-classes of terms described above. To do so, he seems to rely on al-Ījī’s *Risāla*, for he begins this discussion by “*qāla fī l-‘Aḍudiyya*”. However, upon comparison with the *matn*, the text quoted by al-Abyārī is not to be found in the *Risāla*. Instead, the text that al-Abyārī reports is none other than al-Qūshjī’s commentary, as al-Abyārī’s quotation matches with the latter verbatim. This confusion might arise from a textual mistake in the *Su‘ūd al-Muṭālī‘*, in that the printed version has in all likelihood omitted the word *sharḥ* (commentary) before *al-‘Aḍudiyya*. Moreover, the absence of any explicit reference to al-Qūshjī’s commentary in the *Su‘ūd al-Muṭālī‘* poses some difficulties for the reader who wishes to identify the source of the quotation. Al-Abyārī’s lack of reference to al-Qūshjī’s commentary is possibly explainable by the wide circulation that this commentary had among pre-modern Azharī scholars, who attributed this commentary to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī.⁶⁶ Because of this fact, al-Abyārī might not have deemed it necessary to make explicit reference to

⁶⁵ Following the theorists of *‘ilm al-waḍʿ*, al-Abyārī explains that the sub-division of the universal notion is obtained by taking into account the signified, *al-madlūl*, which is the concept conveyed as the final result of the linguistic positing. When the signified of the universal notion corresponds to a simple entity, *dhāt*, the generic noun, *ism al-jins*, obtains; when it corresponds to an event, *ḥadath*, the *maṣḍar* obtains; when it corresponds to a compound, *murakkab*, out of an event and some other element, such as an essence, one related to the other, then two outcomes are possible. If the ascription between the event and the essence is construed from the viewpoint of the essence, then the derived noun obtains; while the verb obtains if the ascription is construed from the viewpoint of the event.

⁶⁶ Pre-modern Azharī scholars attributed this commentary to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī rather than to al-Qūshjī. I will discuss the possible reasons for this misattribution in Chapter Three.

the source of his quotation. In other words, al-Abyārī probably assumed that his reader was well aware of the exegetical literature on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, that is, enough to identify the “*qāla fī <sharḥ> al-‘Aḍudiyya*” with the al-Qūshjī’s commentary.⁶⁷

In the next discussion, al-Abyārī, echoing the claims of al-Ījī in the *Risāla*, analyzes the question of individuation (*tashakkhkhuṣ*) of this class of *waḍ‘*, the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. Following the scholarly tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, al-Abyārī states that this class of terms conveys individuation only by means of a determined semantic context (*qarīna mu‘ayyana*). More importantly, as in the previous discussion, the question of the context is evidently borrowed verbatim from the al-Qūshjī’s commentary even though no reference is made to it.⁶⁸ Al-Abyārī introduces three main types of semantic context that bestow individuation to the concept expressed by terms resulting from the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. The first type of context is the speech address (*al-mukhāṭaba*), which bestows individuation and determination to personal pronouns. Al-Abyārī explains that the intended concept of a pronoun (*al-ḍamīr*) is determined by this type of context which is nothing else than the speech act (*al-khiṭāb*). The *khiṭāb* consists in addressing the discussion to someone

⁶⁷ The quotation from the pseudo-al-Qūshjī starts from “*wa-ḥtimāl ba‘ḍu al-aqsāmi...*” on p. 75 to “*al-amru wa-ghayrihi*” on p. 77 in the edition attributed to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī. See Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, *Sharḥ al-Risāla al-‘Aḍudiyya fī ‘ilm al-Waḍ‘*, ed. Muḥammad Dhannūn Yūnus Faṭḥī, ‘Āmmān: Dār al-Faṭḥ, 1437/2016. Al-Abyārī uses the quotation from the pseudo-al-Qūshjī to show that the four sub-classes described above can be further subdivided into more sub-classes that describe the semantic function of other linguistic terms. An example of this are the nouns construed from the derived noun, *al-mushtaqq*. One might construe the subsistence of the event in the derived noun from the viewpoint of the occurrence of the event (*al-ḥudūth*), in which case the active participle, *ism al-fā‘il*, obtains; the same might be construed from the viewpoint of affirming (*al-thubūt*), in which case the adjective, *ṣifa mushabbaha*, obtains. The same might be construed from the viewpoint of the event affecting the subject, in which case the past participle, *ism al-maf‘ūl*, obtains; and likewise it might be construed as an instrument (*ālā*), to attain the event, in which case the noun of instrument obtains. Other sub-classes of the derived noun include the complements, such as the complement of place, which obtains when the derived noun is construed as a place where the event takes places, or the complement of time, which obtains when the derived noun is construed as a time frame. Finally, the elative and superlative obtain (*ism al-taḍdīl*), when the subsistence of the event in the subject is construed to describe intensification in relation to some other subject. Al-Abyārī ends his reports from al-Qūshjī with the sub-classes derived from the verb, which are divided by taking into account the time frame from which the three main verbal moods obtain, namely past, present and future.

⁶⁸ Cf. Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, *Sharḥ al-Risāla al-‘Aḍudiyya...*, pp. 79-80.

who is present. The second type of context is sense indicating (*qarīna ḥissiyya*), where the intended concept expressed by the term is indicated by one of the limbs of the body. The terms that find determination by this context are the demonstrative pronouns such as “*this*” and “*that*” (*hādha* and *dhālika*). The determination of the concepts conveyed by demonstrative pronouns will, he notes, take place necessarily by sensory pointing. The third type of context is based on mental pointing (*qarīna ‘aqliyya*), which is the case of relative pronouns. The determination of the concepts conveyed by relative pronouns, such as “*who*” (*alladhī* and *allatī*), is realized in the mind of the listener because the relative pronoun has a relation to the content of another sentence, i.e., the relative clause, which determines the concept conveyed by “*who*.” The relative clause functions as the *relatum* that bestows determination to the relative pronoun, on the condition that both speaker and listener have prior knowledge of its content. The determination is therefore substantiated by an act of association between the term, i.e., the relative pronoun, and the content of that sentence. Al-Abyārī provides the following examples for his classifications: the “*alladhī*” posited for subjects like *Zayd*, *‘Umar* etc. are determined by using a relative clause (*ṣila*), such as in the sentence “*he who was with us yesterday has come*” (*jā’a alladhī kāna ma’anā bi-l-ams*). The “*alladhī*” as such (*fī ḥadd dhātihi*) is true of (*ṣādiq bi-*) the “*alladhī*” of the relative clause, e.g., “*alladhī kāna ma’anā bi-l-ams*”, as well as with other relative clauses, because “*alladhī*” has been posited for all instances of relative pronouns. However, in the example above, the relative clause functions as the determinant of the concept intended by that specific “*alladhī*” in the moment of its usage to indicate one specific entity. This is the case because both the speaker and the listener have previously associated the content of the relative clause with the concept intended by the relative pronoun “*alladhī*”.

In the last part of his entry on *‘ilm al-waḍ’*, al-Abyārī introduces two appendices (*fā’idatāni*) that address two issues discussed in the exegetical tradition of the *Risāla*. The first

appendix corresponds to the content of the *Twelfth Reminder* of the Risāla and, like in the previous case, is borrowed with some minor omissions from the commentary of al-Qūshjī without explicit reference to it.⁶⁹ This first appendix focuses on the universality and particularity of terms within the context of linguistic positing, as opposed to its linguistic usage (*isti‘māl*). Al-Abyārī explains that using one term in place of another term does not alter the terms’ object, that is their concepts.⁷⁰ The second appendix concerns the names of sciences, books titles and books sections (e.g., *chapter*, *section* etc.). According to al-Abyārī, who follows the majority of specialists of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, these names fall under the class of individual positing, *al-waḍ‘ al-shakhṣī*, because names of this class convey a specific individuated entity, even if their usage applies to a multitude of concepts in different speech situations. Al-Abyārī explains that these names must not be considered as being proper generic nouns (*‘alam al-jins*), which fall under the class *‘āmm-‘āmm*, because the kind of determination implied in these names is not sufficient to attain that type of individuation that prevents semantic participation (*shirka*). In contrast to book titles and names of sciences, the significatum of proper generic names is a universal. Finally, al-Abyārī leaves open the question whether the names of the letters of the alphabet fall under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* or the class *‘āmm-‘āmm*.

⁶⁹ For the content of the *Twelfth Reminder* see Chapter Two.

⁷⁰ Al-Abyārī, following pseudo-al-Qūshjī, explains this with the following example: the sentence *jā’anī dhū mālin* (*a wealthy person has come to me*) might refer to a specific individual such as *Zayd*, which implies that the construction “*dhū mālin*” refers to a particular (*juz’i*) because it is employed for and applies to a particular individual. Another example is the following: if one assumes that, in a certain city, the memorization of the Qur’ān applies only to a specific individual such as *Zayd*, and someone claims “*alladhī ḥafīẓa al-Qur’ān fī hādhihi al-balda ḥāḍirun*” (*he who has memorized the Qur’ān in this city is now present*), then the relative pronoun will apply only to that specific individual because it is used here as a particular. However, al-Abyārī notes, it could be wrongly assumed that the terms “*dhū*” and “*alladhī*” in the examples function as individual signs (*‘alām shakhṣiyya*), because what is meant by them and what is meant by any proper individual sign do in fact coincide. This possibility does not, however, obtain, because the perspective taken into account for these terms, as for any term in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, is the process of the positing; thus, the object of the positing of “*dhū*” is a general entity (*amr kullī*), rather than a particular, even if in the examples above the term is used for a specific individual, *shakhṣ*.

In conclusion, the entry of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in al-Abyārī’s *Su‘ūd al-Muṭālī‘* is indicative of the status that this science had acquired in the classification of knowledge in the 13th/19th century Egyptian *madrasa* curriculum. The science of *waḍ‘* is construed as a discipline independent of the linguistic sciences, as was not the case for al-Abyārī’s Ottoman predecessors. If the classification of sciences in the *Su‘ūd al-Muṭālī‘* is a reflection of the order that students follow in their learning process, then *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* occupies a middle place between the dialectical sciences and the science of logic. In all likelihood, al-Abyārī, like other scholars of the Azharī tradition, considered the sciences of *ādāb al-baḥṭh* (and *al-jadal*), *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and *al-manṭiq* to form a sort of propaedeutic *trivium* to the study of philosophical theology and metaphysics (*al-ḥikma*).⁷¹ To this extent, *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* might have been considered an introductory science necessary to the science of logic because its subject-matter investigates not only the semantic functions underlying both simple and compound terms but also the underlying semantics of assertoric propositions, such as “X is Y” and the subject-predicate relation.

Compared to the entries of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in the works of his predecessors, the one provided by al-Abyārī is by far the most complete and the only one that makes explicit reference to exegetical scholarship stemming from the *Risāla*. His excursus of virtually all the main aspects of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is indebted to and relies exclusively on the al-Qūshjī’s commentary. Important portions of his entry on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, as has been shown, reproduce parts al-Ījī’s *Risāla* and al-Qūshjī’s commentary verbatim. Finally, it emerges that the commentary attributed to al-Qūshjī represented, at least for the Azharī scholars of 13th/19th century like al-Abyārī, the main textual

⁷¹ This new *trivium* might mirror the *trivium* of the Latin tradition which includes grammar, logic and rhetoric, in this order, or grammar, rhetoric and logic. It is however hard to understand why *ādāb al-baḥṭh* would precede *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. If *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is understood as the investigation of the semantic and the syntactical function of simple terms, then it should ideally take the place of grammar in the *trivium*.

reference concerning *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, and that the exegetical tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in 13th/19th Egyptian scholarly milieus evolved around this specific commentary. It will be shown in Chapter Four that this exegetical production in the form of glosses and super-glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary among Egyptian and North African scholarly milieus can be dated back to the 11th/17th century.

1.3 EARLY MODERN SOUTH ASIA

The history of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in the Islamic scholarly traditions of the Indian sub-continent must now also be examined. One of the earliest discussions of the semantic theory of *waḍ‘* is provided in thesaurus of technical terms *Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn wa-l-‘Ulūm* by the Indian scholar Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Tahānawī (fl. mid-12th/18th), who completed this work in 1158/1745. Al-Tahānawī’s entry on the term *waḍ‘* is divided into sub-paragraphs that explain the different technical senses of the term. Overall, the structure of the entry on *waḍ‘* echoes that of al-Kaffawī’s *Kulliyāt* and al-Abyārī’s *Su‘ūd al-Muṭālī‘*. Al-Tahānawī’s *Kashshāf* first provides a general sense of *waḍ‘*, namely the position of something in a place (*waḍ‘ shay’ fī makān*), which introduces an overview on the definition and ontological status of *waḍ‘* as understood by theologians and philosophers (*‘inda la-ḥukamā’*).⁷² He then turns to the sense of *waḍ‘* held by the lexicographers (*‘inda ahl al-lugha*), and discusses in detail the different types of positing. The discussion of the lexicographical *waḍ‘* contains an excursus on the question on the origins of the language and the epistemological issues deriving from the transmission of linguistic data. Differently from the *Kulliyāt* and the *Su‘ūd al-Muṭālī‘*, the long paragraph on the lexicographic sense of *waḍ‘* here

⁷² Cf. *Kashshāf*, ed. Rafīq al-‘Ajam, Beirut: Maktaba Lubnān Nāshirūn, 1996, p. 1794-5.

displays an internal sub-division into a *Classification* (*taqṣīm*) and *Reminder* (*tanbīh*) that clearly echoes the structure of al-Ījī's *Risāla* (see next chapter).

Turning to the content of the lexicographic sense of *waḍʿ*, the *Kashshāf* differs from the *Kullīyyāt* but is similar to *Suʿūd al-Muṭāliʿ* in many aspects. Al-Tahānawī provides a general definition of *waḍʿ* as “the determination of something to signify something other” (*taʿyīn al-shayʿ li-l-dalāla ʿalā shayʿ*), where the former might be a term or any other kind of sign, while the latter is a referent.⁷³

In what follows, al-Tahānawī introduces the main classes of *waḍʿ* under the sub-section entitled *Classification* (*taqṣīm*). This includes the individual positing (*waḍʿ shakhṣī*) – which is also called particular positing (*waḍʿ juzʿī*) or concrete positing (*waḍʿ ʿaynī*) – as well as the species positing (*waḍʿ nawʿī*), also called universal positing (*waḍʿ kullī*). The individual positing (*waḍʿ shakhṣī*) results from the determination of a term in its specificity and in itself (*bi-khuṣūṣihi wa-bi-ʿaynihi*) for a concept. The species positing (*waḍʿ nawʿī*) results instead from the determination of the term on the basis of a universal rule (*qāʿida kullīyya*).⁷⁴ Al-Tahānawī adds that the *waḍʿ nawʿī*

⁷³ Following the claim found in ʿIṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāʾīnī's *al-Aṭwal*, he adds that this is the strict sense of *waḍʿ* (*muṭlaq al-waḍʿ*) not a specific definition of positing a linguistic term for a concept. Al-Tahānawī evidently provides this specific definition by borrowing it from al-Jurjānī's glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Lawāmiʿ*, a commentary on al-Urmawī's *Maṭāliʿ al-Anwār*. Here al-Jurjānī distinguishes two senses of positing a term: the first is the determination of a term in order to signify a concept, while the second is the determination of a term in order to signify a concept *per se* (*bi-naḥsihi*) without any semantic context (*qarīna*) added to that determination. The first type of positing implies that the figurative meaning (*al-majāz*) belongs to species positing, because the species (*nawʿ*) of the positor of terms is aware of the relation between the literal and the metaphorical sense, while the individual positing of the metaphor is established only for some terms. In this second type of positing, there is no positing of metaphorical meaning, whether by species or individual, simply because the positor does not determine the term for a metaphorical concept *per se*, but rather by an individual or species context (*bi-l-qarīna al-shakhṣiyya wa-l-nawʿiyya*). The application of the term for a specific metaphorical meaning occurs analogically (*bi-l-munāsaba*), rather as a by-product of an act of positing. Al-Tahānawī explains that the determination of the derived nouns, like the active participle “*fāʿil*” (*doer*), results from a positing in order to signify their concepts *per se*, which is a species positing occurring by a universal rule (*bi-dābiṭa kullīyya*), e.g., each pattern (*ṣiḡha*) of the active participle is posited to convey the concept of a subject performing an act.

⁷⁴ Al-Tahānawī explains, quoting Taḥṭānī's *Lawāmiʿ*, that this type is called species (*nawʿī*), because the generality of the positing is considered from the perspective of the term alone. Al-Tahānawī explains further that this

is divided further into *waḍʿ lughawī* (lexicographic), *sharʿī* (legal), *ʿurfī* (customary) and *iṣṭilāhī* (technical).

At this point of his discussion, al-Tahānawī returns to describe the different classes of *waḍʿ* by relying on al-Jurjānī's glosses on al-Ījī's commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājj's *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahá*. According to al-Jurjānī, the positor might conceptualize a particular concept (*maʿnā juzʿī*) and determine for it one or more specific terms conceptualized as a whole or separately. This class of positing (*waḍʿ*) and its object of positing (*mawḍūʿ*) are both specific (*khāṣṣ*), in virtue of the specificity of that conception (*taṣawwur*). If instead the positor conceives a general concept (*maʿnā ʿāmm*), which includes relational or real particulars (*juzʿiyyāt iḍāfiyya aw ḥaqīqiyya*), he might determine one or more terms in two ways. In the first instance, he determines the term for that general concept, in which case both the positing and its object are also general, because they depend on the generality of the conception. In the second instance,

classification applies also to grammatical categories. To support this claim, he relies on al-Haddād's, or al-Hidād, glosses on Ibn al-Ḥājj's *al-Kāfiyya* who claims that particular positing (*waḍʿ juzʿī*) indicates only the positing of the term by its individual (*bi-shakhṣihi*) for a concept, such as personal and demonstrative pronouns, because these are posited by their individuals to apply to a determined subject. These differ from terms determined by the article as they are not posited by their individuals, e.g., "the man" (*al-rajulu*) is not posited by its individual but on the basis of a universal rule that applies to it and to its similar, so that when the article is added and the term is determined its positing will still be universal, not particular. Al-Tahānawī adds a further definition of *waḍʿ nawʿī*, this time relying on al-Taftāzānī's *Talwīḥ*. The latter distinguishes two types of *waḍʿ nawʿī*: the first occurs by establishing a rule indicating that each term occurring by a certain quality (*bi-kayfiyya*) would be determined to signify *per se* a specific concept, that is in turn understood from that term by determining that term for that concept. An example of this first type of *waḍʿ* would be to judge that each noun whose ending in *alif* or a *yāʾ* and is preceded by a *fathā* and followed by a *nūn* with *kasra*, indicates two units of a concept to which that ending attaches. This is, in other words, the grammatical rule for the dual. Al-Taftāzānī also claims this type of *waḍʿ* includes plurals, both sound and broken, determined plurals, diminutive forms, derived and compound nouns, the *yāʾ* of relation and, in general, everything that by its configuration (*bi-hayʾatihi*) signifies a concept. The second type of *waḍʿ nawʿī* occurs by establishing the rule that each term originally determined to signify *per se* a concept becomes determined by a specific relation to that concept when the context (*qarīna*) prevents the understanding of that concept. In this way, the concept is understood from the term by means of the semantic context rather than by the original determination. This is the case of metaphorical meanings that are not explicitly established by the positor. Overall, al-Taftāzānī concludes, the definition of *al-waḍʿ* includes the *waḍʿ shakhṣī* and the first type of *waḍʿ nawʿī*, and leaves out the second type which applies to metaphors.

he determines one or more terms for the specificities falling under that concept, as those specificities are known on the whole. In this second instance, the positing will be general because of the generality of the concept, while the object of positing, i.e., the concept, will be specific. The opposite of this last instance, in which a specific positing and a general object are taken into account, cannot obtain; this because the particular cannot be an outset (*wajh*) of the universal, as the mind cannot aim to the latter through the former. With this description, al-Tahānwī has introduced the three main classes of *waḍʿ*, respectively *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*.

Al-Tahānwī's interest in this topic is confirmed by the next account, which relies on ʿIṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāʾīnī's glosses on Mullā Jāmī's *al-Fawāʾid al-Ḍiyāʾiyya*.⁷⁵ ʿIṣām al-Dīn explains the categories of *waḍʿ* as follow: particular positing (*waḍʿ juzʾī*), also called specific positing (*waḍʿ khāṣṣ*) belongs to the act of grasping a particular object in itself, while universal positing (*waḍʿ kullī*), also called general positing (*waḍʿ ʿāmm*) belongs to the act of grasping a universal *per se* or a specific object by a more general model (*ʿunwān aʿamm*). Accordingly, ʿIṣām al-Dīn concludes, the first is called general positing for a general object (*waḍʿ ʿāmm li-mawḍūʿ lahu ʿamm*), while the second is a general positing for a specific object (*waḍʿ ʿāmm li-mawḍūʿ lahu khāṣṣ*).⁷⁶

Al-Tahānwī does not seem fully satisfied with al-Jurjānī and ʿIṣām al-Dīn's expositions of the classes of *waḍʿ*. To provide a more complete account, he calls into question what is offered on this by al-Taftāzānī and sums it up as follows: According to al-Taftāzānī, the attention of the positor at the time of the positing is directed to [1] the specificity of the term by the specificity

⁷⁵ I will say more on the *al-Fawāʾid al-Ḍiyāʾiyya* and its relevance for *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in Chapter Three.

⁷⁶ In this last class, al-Taftāzānī adds, the specificity of the individuated concept prevents semantic commonality. Moreover, the specificity of the term as it is conceived by the positor becomes necessary (*ḍarūrī*). The fourth class is opposite to the third class in which the specificities of the concepts are in reality universals, while the assumption of the terms occurs by including those specificities under a universal notion, rather than the specificities expressed by the terms.

of the concept, as it happens in positing proper names, e.g., Zayd, John or Maryam; or to [2] the specificity of the term for the generality of the concept, as it happens in positing a universal concept that might be predicated of many (*li-l-maqūliyya ‘alá al-kathra*), e.g. “man” (*rajul*); or to [3] the generality of the term for the specificity of the concept, so that one grasps a universal notion that contains many terms, e.g., the forms of the active participle like “fā’il” (*doer*) that are not considered and grasped in detail; or to [4] the term in its specificity posited by grasping a general notion for the single items of that notion in their specificities. In this last case, the object is not the general notion, but rather the specificities of it in detail. An example would be the determination of the demonstrative “this” (*hādhā*) in the phrase “this man,” which occurs by grasping a universal notion that is the concept of something point at specifically.

Of the four classes, class [1], [2] and [4] are identified as individual positing (*waḍ‘ shakṣī*), because the specificity of the concept is what is taken into account in the act of positing the term. Class [3], instead, is a species positing (*waḍ‘ naw‘ī*), because the generality of the concept is what is taken into account in the act of positing the term. Therefore, for class [1], both the positing and its object are specific (*al-waḍ‘ khāṣṣ wa-l-mawḍū‘ khāṣṣ*); for class [2] both are general (*al-waḍ‘ ‘āmm wa-l-mawḍū‘ ‘āmm*); for classes [3] and [4] the positing is general and the object is specific (*al-waḍ‘ ‘āmm wa-l-mawḍū‘ khāṣṣ*). To al-Taftāzānī’s overview, al-Tahānawī adds a reminder (*tanbīh*) in which he infers that the particular positing (*waḍ‘ juz‘ī*) applies to both *waḍ‘ shakṣī* and *waḍ‘ khāṣṣ*. Likewise, the universal positing (*waḍ‘ kullī*) applies to both *waḍ‘ naw‘ī* and *waḍ‘ ‘āmm*.

This comprehensive discussion of the classes and the functions of *waḍ‘* concludes with an appendix (*fā’ida*), in which al-Tahānawī scrutinizes al-Taftāzānī’s classes [3] and [4]. To these two classes belong the positing of the ambiguous nouns (which is another name for demonstrative pronouns) and the personal pronouns (*al-mubhamāt wa-l-muḍmarāt*). Al-

Tahānawī shows particular interest in the underlying process that characterizes the positing of terms such as the demonstrative pronoun “*this*” (*hādhā*). The demonstrative pronoun “*this*” is posited for each individuated referent. The positor begins by apprehending the notion of “*each single masculine referent*” by means of a general, universal notion that applies to all particulars under that notion. However, he does not simply posit the term “*this*” for that universal concept, but rather he does so for the particulars subsumed under it. In this way, the positing of the term is general, whereas the object is specific (*al-waḍ‘ ‘āmm wa-l-mawḍū‘ khāṣṣ*). More specifically, this is the case because the term applies only to the specificities subsumed in the universal notion. Therefore, when “*this*” is spelled out, the speaker does not intend just one of the referents that could be indicated in its vicinity, but rather intends to refer to one determined specificity of that notion (*la budda fī iṭlāqihī min al-maqṣad ilā khuṣūṣiyya mu‘ayyana*). Al-Tahānawī is aware that scholars have raised criticisms against this class. Some assimilated this class with class [3], and claimed that the specificities conveyed by a demonstrative pronoun obtain from a metaphorical usage of the term. Other scholars maintained that, although the term “*this*” is posited for a universal notion, the positor has imposed the condition that the term must be used only to convey particular concepts. Another group of scholars held that “*this*” is posited for multiple specificities as the result of multiple acts of positing, and is in fact an equivocal term (*mushtarak lafẓī*), like the term “‘ayn.” Al-Tahānawī explains that the positing of a demonstrative or personal pronoun occurs to specificities insofar as they are subsumed under the universal notion. Accordingly, any subject can be assumed under that universal notion, e.g., the subject Zayd can be a meaning or a referent of “*this*” insofar as a specific pointing relates to him. In this way that subject will be taken into account in both the positing and its object; the same follows for personal pronouns that are posited for each one of the concepts to which they refer, e.g., “*I*” for the speaker, “*you*” for the listener, “*he*” for the notion of “*single male specific absent referent*.” Al-

Tahānawī rejects the criticism that a demonstrative pronoun, according to this definition, would also indicate the universal notion conceptualized by the positor, and that the same would follow for the third-person pronoun. A demonstrative pronoun, he claims, requires, in accordance with the source of positing, a subject pointed at by sensory pointing which can only be a real particular (*juzʿī ḥaqīqī*). When the same pronoun is used for some other particular, the latter will take the place of the former, while the universal notion insofar as it is mentioned by that particular account is a particular that does not allow participation.

Al-Tahānawī interjects in the discussion in his own voice in order to reject all these objections and conclude that positing of class [4] differs from that of class [3] in two main ways. The first is that the specificities for which the derived nouns are posited are relational particulars (*juzʿiyyāt idāfiyya*), and these are universals in themselves. Thus, when the positor conceptualizes the notion of “*hitting*” (*al-dārib*), and determines a term for it, it follows that the positing and its object are general. Conversely, the specificities for which demonstrative and personal pronouns are posited are real particulars (*juzʿiyyāt ḥaqīqiyya*). The second is that the conception of both term and concept for derived nouns occurs by a general aspect, while in the case of demonstrative and personal pronouns the generality of the conception pertains only to the concept. Still, the positing for both is general, because that which is contemplated (*al-muʿtabar*) in the act of positing is the concept, not the term *simpliciter*.

There are several conclusions to be drawn from the entry on *waḍʿ* in al-Tahānawī’s *Kashshāf*. First, it clearly emerges from the previous account that al-Tahānawī’s entry on *waḍʿ* is by far the richest and the most comprehensive discussion of *waḍʿ* as a technical linguistic term and, more specifically, as a semantic theory. Throughout the whole entry, al-Tahānawī shows a full mastery of all the aspects of the semantic theory developed in the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* literature,

including all the classes and the categories of *waḍʿ* and how these are applied to grammatical categories. Accordingly, the vocabulary used throughout the entry perfectly corresponds to the technical vocabulary displayed in the exegetical tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. What is more, towards the end of his overview, al-Tahānawī himself engages in rejecting some criticisms raised against the semantic nature of pronouns. The second and more striking conclusion to be drawn is the absence of reference to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as an independent science and to al-Ījī's *Risāla* or any of its commentaries. The sources upon which al-Tahānawī relies for this detailed overview range from logic, to *balāgha*, to grammar, to *uṣūl al-fiqh*, all of them sciences cognate to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Moreover, the authors of these sources - except for al-Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzi -, such as al-Taftāzānī, al-Jurjānī, Jāmī and ʿIṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāʾīnī, have in common a shared interest in the theory of *waḍʿ* displayed in many of their works. More specifically, al-Jurjānī, Jāmī and ʿIṣām al-Dīn compiled three of the most widespread commentaries in the scholarly tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and became, together with al-Taftāzānī, the pivotal figures for the debates in the exegetical tradition on al-Ījī's *Risāla* up to the 13th/19th century. It is therefore hard not to notice the discrepancy between the level of expertise of al-Tahānawī's discussion on the subject matter of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and the absence of any references to the scholarly production on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. By the time of al-Tahānawī, the 12th/18th century, the classic commentaries and sets of glosses were circulating in the main intellectual milieus of the Islamicate world, and *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* was already a mature and fully developed science. One reason for the absence of mentioning *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* might be the relative lack of interest that scholars of the Indian sub-continent showed toward the exegetical tradition on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Although any conclusive explanation for this phenomenon is far from being established, this lack of interest seems to be confirmed by the absence of these scholars from the lists of commentators and glossators on al-Ījī's *Risāla*. The relative lack of interest of scholars of the Indian sub-continent in the exegetical tradition on al-

Ījī's *Risāla* might be explained by their preference to investigate and apply the semantic theories developed in the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* tradition within the cognate sciences, such as logic, *balāgha*, *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *adāb al-baḥṭh*. Their interest in semantic and theory of signification is beyond any doubt as it emerges from the vast Indian tradition of commentaries and glosses on al-Taftāzānī's *Muṭawwal*, on the study of terms and signification (*dalāla*) in the logical manuals such as al-Taftāzānī's *Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq wa-l-Kalām* and al-Bihārī's *Sullam al-ʿUlūm*, and on the linguistic premises of the *uṣūl al-fiqh* manuals such as al-Bihārī's *Musallam al-Thubūt*.⁷⁷

The last entry on *al-waḍʿ* in the Indian sub-continent scholarship belongs to the thesaurus *Dustūr al-ʿUlamāʾ* by al-Tahānawī's contemporary al-Aḥmad-Nagarī (fl. 12th/18th).⁷⁸ Al-Aḥmad-Nagarī discusses the term *waḍʿ* first within the linguistic and semantic contexts and then as a concept proper to philosophy. The general definition of *waḍʿ* that he provides is the one largely accepted by specialists in Arabic (*aṣḥāb al-ʿarabiyya*), who define *al-waḍʿ* as “the specification of something by something” (*takhsīṣ shayʾ bi-shayʾ*). In the following, al-Aḥmad-Nagarī introduces the four possible classes of positing, namely [1] both the positing and its object are specific, *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*; [2], both are general, *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*; [3] the general positing for a specific object, *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*; [4] specific positing for a general object, *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*.

⁷⁷ A more systematic study on the import of the semantic issues developed in the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* literature within this logical, rhetorical and juridical corpus is therefore necessary to understand the status of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in the scholarly tradition of the Indian sub-continent. An example of their interest in linguistic topics is the exegetical tradition on al-Bihārī's *Sullam al-ʿUlūm*, as well as in ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Lakhnawī's (1264-1304/1847-1886) commentary on al-Ījī's *Risāla fī Adāb al-Baḥṭh* entitled *al-Hadiyya al-Mukhtāriyya* in which the author discusses linguistic topics extensively throughout his introduction; cf. *al-Hadiyya al-Mukhtāriyya* pp. 6-76, in *Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Laknawī*, ed. Naʿīm Ashraf Nūr Aḥmad Karachi: Idārat al-Qurʾān wa-l-ʿUlūm al-Islāmiyya, 1419/1998, vol. 1. On al-Bihārī's *Sullam al-ʿUlūm* see Asad Q. Ahmed, *Palimpsests of Themselves*, University of California Press, 2022.

⁷⁸ Cf. Aḥmad-Nagarī (al-), ʿAbd al-Nabī b. ʿAbd al-Rasūl. *Dustūr al-ʿUlamāʾ*. ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī Bayḍūn, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1421/2000, vol. 3, p. 315-6.

Having outlined the three main classes of *al-waḍʿ*, al-Aḥmad-Nagarī provides a more detailed analysis of the different functions of the classes of *waḍʿ*, mainly based on al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī's glosses on the al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal*. The focus of al-Jurjānī's analysis is mainly centered on the third class of *al-waḍʿ*, the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*. This class of *waḍʿ* obtains when the positor conceptualizes specific entities with respect to an entity shared among them (*al-wāḍiʿu taṣawwara umūran makhṣūṣatan bi-ʿtibāri amrin mushtarakin baynahā*). He then determines a term for those specificities at once, as a result of single act of linguistic positing, rather than multiplying the positings for each and every specificity. Personal and demonstrative pronouns, such as “I”, “we” and “this” fall under this class. Al-Jurjānī explains that what is taken into account in this class of *waḍʿ* is a general concept (*al-muʿtabaru fī l-waḍʿi mafhūmun ʿāmmun*), while the object of the *waḍʿ* (the *mawḍūʿ lahu*) corresponds to the specificities belonging to single items of that general notion. The main scope of this class of *waḍʿ* is to explain how personal and demonstrative pronouns designate specific particulars in a literal way (*bi-ṭarīq al-ḥaqīqa*), rather than figuratively. Moreover, this class of *waḍʿ* also explains how these pronouns do not designate the universal notion to which each one of them belongs. Because these pronouns convey specific concepts in their literal sense, they cannot also convey the concept of the universal notion.⁷⁹

Al-Aḥmad-Nagarī concludes his report of al-Jurjānī with the remaining classes of *waḍʿ*, namely class [1], [2] and [4]. The latter, which corresponds to class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*, is considered to be unintelligible (*ghayr maʿqūl*). Al-Aḥmad-Nagarī seems to disagree with this conclusion and, speaking in own voice, maintains, in contrast to al-Jurjānī, that the class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm* might be a valid one. According to his view, the positor of language might conceptualize a particular in

⁷⁹ Al-Jurjānī gives a more concrete example of this when he claims that personal pronouns such as “I” and “you” do not respectively mean a vague speaker and addressee (*mutakallim mā, mukhāṭab mā*), but rather specific ones. In this way, it is possible to explain how a single term can convey a multiplicity of concept without recurring neither to homonymy or equivocation (*ishtirāk*) and not to multiple acts of positing for the same term.

order to extract a universal notion from it. He will then posit a term for that same universal notion. However, al-Aḥmad-Nagarī notes, the end result of the positing belonging to the class *khāṣṣ-‘āmm* class is reducible to the positing process underlying the general positing (*rāji‘ ilá l-waḍ‘ al-‘āmm*). As such the class *khāṣṣ-‘āmm* would be nothing else than a variant of the class *‘āmm-‘āmm*.⁸⁰

Finally, the entry on *al-waḍ‘* provided by al-Aḥmad-Nagarī parallels in many aspects the one of his contemporary al-Tahānawī. Just like al-Tahānawī, al-Aḥmad-Nagarī provides an overview of the main classes of *waḍ‘*. However, unlike his contemporary, al-Aḥmad-Nagarī does not mention two other important classes of *waḍ‘*, namely *al-waḍ‘ al-shakhṣī* and *al-waḍ‘ al-naw‘ī*, that are instead discussed in detail in al-Tahānawī’s *Kashshāf*. Another similarity of the entry on *al-waḍ‘* of the *Dustūr* with that of the *Kashshāf* is the absence of any reference to al-Ījī’s *Risāla* or its commentaries and glosses. Like al-Tahānawī, al-Aḥmad-Nagarī seems to be unaware of, or to disregard, the development of the theory of *waḍ‘* in the exegetical tradition stemming from the *Risāla*. Accordingly, neither entry on *al-waḍ‘* makes reference to the independent discipline known as *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. For al-Aḥmad-Nagarī, the semantic classes of *al-waḍ‘* seem to be limited

⁸⁰ The overview on the main classes of *waḍ‘* in this text is then followed by an analysis of the term *waḍ‘* in the philosophical context where it indicates the Aristotelian accident of position. Al-Aḥmad-Nagarī concludes the entry on *al-waḍ‘* with two sub-entries. In the first the author provides a definition of particular positing (*al-waḍ‘ al-juz‘ī*), which consists in grasping both the subject and object of positing, that is the term posited and the concept, by their own specificity. This results in a specific relation whose specificity is construed on the basis of the specificity of the subject and the object of that relation. The second and last sub-entry is devoted to the definition of universal positing, *al-waḍ‘ al-kullī*. Al-Aḥmad-Nagarī explains that this type of positing obtains by grasping the object of positing, that is, the concept, by means of a more general aspect (*bi-wajh a‘āmm*), as is the case for derived nouns. An example of this can be found in the active participle (*ism al-fā‘il*), which is posited for a subject in which an action subsists. Al-Aḥmad-Nagarī then concludes that the same process occurs for particles, personal pronouns and nouns of indication (*mubhamāt*), which equate to demonstrative pronouns. However, he does not offer an explanation on how particles and pronouns would at the same time fall under *al-waḍ‘ al-kullī* and class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* seen before. He tells the reader that a more detailed discussion of *al-waḍ‘ al-kullī* is contained in his *Jāmi‘ al-Ghumūd*, a commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s *al-Kāfiyya*.

and strictly related to *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*. This perspective emerges from al-Aḥmad-Nagārī’s usage of a unique source for his description of the function of the three classes of *waḍ‘*, borrowed from al-Jurjānī’s glosses on al-Taftāzānī’s *al-Muṭawwal*, where only some aspects of the semantic theory contained in the *Risāla* are discussed. Finally, despite the absence of clear references to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and to its exegetical literature, the linguistic definition of *waḍ‘* of both *al-Kashshāf* and *Dustūr al-‘Ulamā’* shows that scholars of the Indian sub-continent of the 12th/18th century construed many core elements of the semantic theory of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as being part of its cognate sciences of logic, *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*, and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. This might indicate that the scholarly tradition of the Indian sub-continent had a natural tendency to locate the semantic theory of *waḍ‘* within the scope of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*’s cognate sciences, rather than to consider it as an independent discipline. The absence of any text belonging to the *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* literature seems to further confirm this way of construing and locating the theory of *waḍ‘* within the broader organization of sciences. The absence of the *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* literature in *Dustūr al-‘Ulamā’* could also confirm the previous observation made about the *Kashshāf*; in the sense that scholars of the Indian sub-continent, at least until the second half of the 13th/18th century, were not aware of, or did not show particular interest in, the longstanding exegetical literature stemming from the *Risāla*.

Explicit references to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as an independent science and to al-Ījī’s *Risāla* within the scholarly tradition of the Indian sub-continent appear only later in the 14th/19th century, in the work of Ṣiddīq b. Ḥasan al-Qannawjī (1248-1307/1832-1889) entitled *Abjad al-‘Ulūm*.⁸¹ This work contains a classification of sciences in alphabetical order as well as entries of the most

⁸¹ Ṣiddīq b. Ḥasan al-Qannawjī, *Abjad al-‘Ulūm*, ed. ‘Abd al-Jabbār Zakkār, Dimashq: Manshūrāt Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Īrshād al-Qawmī, 1978, vol. 2, p. 569.

prolific authors and their work for each science. Al-Qannawjī provides a brief entry on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* which is based on Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s *Miftāḥ* and Kātip Čelebī’s *Kashf al-Zunūn*. However, al-Qannawjī does not provide the list of commentaries and glosses on the *Risāla*, but rather offers a brief outline of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* relying on a work entitled *Madīnat al-‘Ulūm*.⁸² This outline on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is not original to al-Qannawjī but is rather a verbatim report of Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s entry on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* of his *Miftāḥ al-Sa‘āda* seen previously.

CONCLUSION

It has been the aim of the chapter to trace the evolution of the semantic theory of *waḍ‘*, in general, and of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, in particular, through textual evidence external to the immediate exegetical literature of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. The chronological exposition of these sources has shown how pre-modern scholars have construed and located the theory of *waḍ‘* and science of *al-waḍ‘* within the broader context of the organization of sciences. Earlier sources, such as the entry on *al-waḍ‘* in al-Jurjānī’s *al-Ta‘rīfāt*, do not explicitly refer to an independent science called *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* or to a specific semantic theory and classes of *al-waḍ‘*. Although al-Jurjānī was one of the most influential figures in the exegetical tradition of the *Risāla* and wrote prolifically on many aspects of the semantic theory of *waḍ‘* in his juridical and rhetorical works, the entry on the linguistic concept *al-waḍ‘* in his *al-Ta‘rīfāt* provides only a general definition of what the linguistic positing consists of, while remains silent about the semantic classes developed in the

⁸² The title seems to indicate that, like al-Qannawjī’s *Abjad al-‘Ulūm*, this work also provides a classification of sciences. A manuscript copy of this work is preserved in Khudā Bakhsh Library, Patna, n. 2234. I could not access this copy; the *Catalogue of Arabic and Persian Manuscripts in the Oriental Library at (Bankipore) Patna*, vol. 21, p. 9, provides a full description of the content of the work and attributes it to a certain Irnīqī or Izniqī, a student of Qāḍī-zādeh Rūmī (931/1524). However, the work seems to reproduce verbatim the structure and content of Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s *Miftāḥ al-‘Ulūm*.

‘ilm al-waḍ‘ literature. A first clear reference to al-Ījī’s Risāla is found in *al-Muzhir* of the 9th/15th Mamluk polymath al-Suyūṭī, a work devoted to virtually all linguistic topics discussed in linguistic sciences. Here, while discussing several aspects of the relation between terms and concepts drawn from the *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature, al-Suyūṭī reproduces partially the *matn* of al-Ījī’s Risāla. However, no mention is made of a discipline called ‘ilm al-waḍ‘.

A clearer reference to ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ and its identification with al-Ījī’s Risāla emerges later between the second half of the 9th/15th century, with Mullā Luṭfī, and the first half of the 10th/16th, with Ṭāshköprüzādeh. Both start to recognize and construe ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ possibly for the first time as an independent discipline belonging to the realm of the linguistic sciences. Both entries have been argued to be crucial to the understanding of the evolution of ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ for two main reasons. The first depicts the unsystematic and evolving nature of ‘ilm al-waḍ‘, while glimpsing its potential implications for a general theory of semantics. The second recognizes al-Ījī’s Risāla to be the pioneering text of this newly emerging linguistic science; and in so doing, Mullā Luṭfī and Ṭāshköprüzādeh link the *matn* of the Risāla with an independent new science called ‘ilm al-waḍ‘. The identification of ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ with the al-Ījī’s Risāla is then emphasized by Kātip Čelebī’s *Kashf al-Zunūn*: the only source that provides bibliographical data on the emerging exegetical tradition of ‘ilm al-waḍ‘. The identification of ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ and al-Ījī’s Risāla becomes manifest more clearly later in the Ottoman scholarly milieu of the 12th/18th century, specifically in Sājaqlīzādeh’s *Tartīb al-‘Ulūm*. Sājaqlīzādeh’s understanding of ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ as the science that deals with the principles of ‘ilm *matn al-lugha* reveals the primary role of this science within the larger classification of linguistic sciences. That the semantic theory of waḍ‘ had become deeply rooted in the framework of the linguistic science is confirmed by Sājaqlīzādeh’s application of the technical vocabulary and the classes of waḍ‘ to the description of other linguistic sciences. This tendency of locating and construing ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ uniquely as a linguistic science is not

upheld by the late 13th-19th century Azharī scholarly tradition. That this is the case is evidenced by the classification of sciences of al-Abyārī's *Su'ūd al-Muṭālī*⁶, where *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is located between the sciences of dialectic theory, namely *ādāb al-baḥṭh* and *ʿilm al-jadal*, and the science of logic. This evolution in locating *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* may reflect a new way of construing and understanding *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* within the *madrassa* curriculum, where dialectics, semantics and logic seem to have become part of a new *trivium*.

Differently from the Ottoman and the Azharī approach, discussions of the theory of *waḍʿ* in the late scholarly milieu of the Indian sub-continent show a strong tendency to relate *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* to its cognate science. The examples of al-Tahānawī's *Kashshāf* and, to a lesser extent, that of al-Aḥmad-Nagarī's *Dustūr al-ʿUlamāʾ*, reveal that the semantic theory developed in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* was construed as a derivative topic belonging to the sciences of logic, grammar, *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. al-Tahānawī's extensive entry on the technical term *al-waḍʿ* thus clearly displays the pervasiveness of the semantic theory of *al-waḍʿ* within the scope of its cognate sciences. It is therefore because al-Tahānawī and al-Aḥmad-Nagarī's detailed descriptions of the classes and functions of *waḍʿ* are exclusively construed as topics naturally related to logic, rhetoric and *uṣūl al-fiqh* that no mention is made either to *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as a science *per se* or to al-Ījī's *Risāla*.

Finally, this chapter has aimed to elucidate that, contrary to what Weiss has assumed in his depiction of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, scholars from the 9th/15th up to the 12th/18th had already a sophisticated and detailed understanding of the science of *waḍʿ* as a discipline on its own right. Moreover, as it emerges from the same sources, pre-modern scholars were more prone to locate *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* within the framework of linguistic sciences, rather than exclusively that of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Certainly, as can be seen from several description of the term *waḍʿ* seen above, the semantic theory of *waḍʿ* has strong ties to and ramifications with the principles of jurisprudence, but this

is arguably not an exclusive relation between the two sciences. Logic, and critically *‘ilm al-balāgha*, appear to share in equal measure many of the topics discussed in the science of *waḍ‘*.

CHAPTER TWO

ORIGINS

In this second chapter, I take a closer look at al-Ījī's *Risāla* in an effort to understand its origins and the theoretical context from which it emerged. The main objective of this chapter is to uncover al-Ījī's motivations for composing the *Risāla* and, more specifically, the semantic issues that he aimed to solve. I will contend that the theory of *waḍʿ* outlined in the *Introduction* and the *Classification* sections of the *Risāla* attempts to set up the general semantic functions underlying the different parts of speech. I will go on to show that in the *Conclusion* section and in the twelve *Reminders*, the general theory of *waḍʿ* allows al-Ījī to resolve semantic issues relating to specific classes of terms – issues that al-Ījī inherited from the grammatical, juridical and rhetorical traditions.

I divide the chapter into three main sections. In the first, I discuss a few formal aspects of the *Risāla*, largely relying on the early commentators' claims about its title and structure. I move on to describe the content of each section of the *matn*. The second section focuses on a heretofore disregarded work by al-Ījī, entitled *al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya*, which is a critical summary of al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm*. The content and the structure of several passages in this work on *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* closely resemble the *Risāla*. I show that topics related to semantics and syntax discussed in *al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya* rely on the general classifications of *waḍʿ* that al-Ījī works out more systematically in the *Risāla*. In this respect, I maintain that the classes of *waḍʿ* outlined in the *Introduction* and the *Classification* of the *Risāla*, as well as the twelve case studies of the *Reminders*, have direct implications on al-Ījī's understanding of the theory of

maʿānī and *bayān*. A review of two major commentaries on *al-Fawāʿid al-Ghiyāthiyya* confirms the close relation between the semantic theory of the *Risāla*, with that presented in al-Ījī's work on *al-maʿānī* and *al-bayān*. In the third and final section, I take into account another work by al-Ījī that is generally neglected in Western scholarship: his commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib's influential manual of juridical methodology, entitled *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahá*. Al-Ījī's commentary on the linguistic premises of this treatise of *uṣūl al-fiqh* reveals crucial similarities with several topics discussed in the *Risāla*. In particular, the issue of the semantic function of prepositions discussed by Ibn al-Ḥājjib allows al-Ījī to provide a more cogent solution that echoes in many ways the semantic classes of *waḍʿ* outlined in the *Risāla*. Ultimately, this chapter attempts to show how the theory of *waḍʿ* sketched in the *Risāla* may have been conceived as an attempt to accommodate several semantic and syntactical puzzles which al-Ījī hinted at in his works on *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*.

2.1 AL-ĪJĪ'S RISĀLA: STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

Before discussing more closely the origins of the semantic issues discussed by al-Ījī in his *Risāla*, it is important to provide some information about the formal structure of the *matn*, a translation and, finally, a synopsis of the text. The translation and the synopsis will serve as the main basis for comparing it with two other main works of al-Ījī, his commentaries on al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm* and on Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahá*.

There is virtually no information on the composition and the early transmission of al-Ījī's *Risāla*. Neither in the *Risāla* nor in other available works does al-Ījī mention specific information that may shed light on the circumstances that led him to compose this short

treatise. What is more, in the form that has been transmitted by the scholarly tradition, the text of the *Risāla* is devoid of an incipit or an explicit that might inform us of circumstances in which al-Ījī composed it.¹ The sparse contemporary scholarship on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* has, however, posited a strict relation between *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. In his seminal study of the development of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, Bernard Weiss emphasized the dependence of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* on the *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature.² According to Weiss, the semantic theory advanced in the *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* literature emerged from the linguistic theories outlined in the preliminary section entitled *al-mabādī’ al-lughawiyya*, linguistic premises, found in *uṣūl al-fiqh* manuals.³ Weiss assumes that the composition of the *Risāla* and the emergence of its exegetical practice directly originated from the keen interest of legal theorists (*uṣūliyyūn*) in linguistic matters.⁴ The *uṣūliyyūn*, following the agenda laid down in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s *al-Maḥṣūl fī ‘Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh*,⁵ explored various aspects of the notion of language as *waḍ‘*, according to which language is construed to be conventionally posited and arbitrary in all its constituents. The linguistic notion of *waḍ‘* presented in the *mabādī’ al-lughawiyya* soon became a core element to the *uṣūliyyūn*’s juridical hermeneutics.⁶ More recently,

¹ All manuscripts, lithographs and printed versions of the *Risāla* that I could access are devoid of incipit or explicit.

² See his PhD dissertation entitled *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘ and Its Development*, Princeton University, 1966. The same author has published two seminal studies on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, “A Theory of the Parts of the Speech in Arabic (Noun, Verb and Particle): A Study in *‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*,” *Arabica* 23 (1984), pp. 23-36, and “*‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*: An Introductory Account of a Later Muslim Philological Science,” *Arabica* 34/3 (1987), pp. 339-56.

³ More recently, Nora Kalbarczyk has studied in more systematically the linguistic theories discussed in the *mabādī’ al-lughawiyya* section of major *uṣūl al-fiqh* treatise, with special emphasis on al-Rāzī’s *al-Maḥṣūl*; see Nora Kalbarczyk, *Sprachphilosophie in der Islamischen Rechtstheorie*, Boston-Leiden: Brill, 2018.

⁴ I have already pointed out to the inconsistency of this claim in Chapter One.

⁵ The structure of al-Rāzī’s *al-Maḥṣūl* will be followed by many theorists of *fiqh* across the four different legal schools. The impact of al-Rāzī’s *al-Maḥṣūl* emerges early in the first half of the 7th/13th century especially in Levantine and North-African intellectual circles, as can be seen in al-Āmidī’s *al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām*, Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā* and al-Bayḍāwī’s *Minhāj al-Wuṣūl*. The topics related to linguistics, semantics, epistemology and logic discussed in these manuals are heavily influenced in their presentation and content by al-Rāzī’s *al-Maḥṣūl*. The *al-Maḥṣūl* alone will have a profound impact on the legal methodology of Malikī scholars of North Africa, which emerges from Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfi’s (d. 684/1285) monumental commentary on *al-Maḥṣūl*, entitled *Nafā’is al-Uṣūl* and his commentary on his self-abridgment of *al-Maḥṣūl* entitled *Sharḥ Tanqīḥ al-Fuṣūl*.

⁶ Cf. Weiss *Language in Orthodox...* p. 41 ff.

‘Abd al-Razzāq Aḥmad Maḥmūd al-Ḥarbī’s monographic study on ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ entitled *‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘: Dirāsa fī Falsafat al-Lugha bayna Ulamā’ Uṣūl al-Fiqh wa-Ulamā’ al-Lugha*,⁷ provided a brief overview on the origins of the science of al-waḍ‘ and its roots, by pointing to the *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature as well as the sciences of logic, lexicography, rhetoric and stylistics (*‘ilm al-balāgha wa-l-bayān*).⁸

The *Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya al-‘Aḍudiyya*, otherwise known as *al-Risāla fī ‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, or simply *fī l-waḍ‘*, is a short *matn* that addresses topics of syntax and semantics that hinge on the concept of *waḍ‘*. The text is generally counted among the works of the Ash‘arī-Shāfi‘ī scholar ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 765/1356). As will be shown in Chapter Three, the *Risāla* is the point of departure for the development of a new science within the pre-modern Islamic intellectual history, called *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. The composition of the *Risāla*, its exegetical tradition and the consecutive constitution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* emerged within the long-standing scholarly tradition of Arabic linguistics, logic, rhetoric and juridical methodology. By the time of al-Ījī, all major branches of Arabic linguistics, such as grammar, lexicography, rhetoric and stylistics, were established scholastic traditions. In these highly specialized branches of linguistics, virtually all aspects of the Arabic language were the object of thorough scrutiny and analysis. In this respect, the linguistic concept of *waḍ‘* was not a novelty, to the extent that it was one of the core assumptions of the syntactical and semantic theories that were advanced in the literatures of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*, as well as in logic. Nevertheless, despite the relevance of the linguistic concept of *waḍ‘*, al-Ījī’s predecessors did not attempt to construct a unitary, systematic theory of *waḍ‘*, like that

⁷ Baghdād: Markaz al-Buḥūth wa-l-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, 2006.

⁸ The author provides only scanty textual data and general textual analyses to demonstrate the theoretical origins of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. The content of the *Risāla* and its large exegetical tradition are almost ignored by the author, who seems to be more interested in understanding the general concept of *waḍ‘* in its various application in pre-modern and contemporary linguistic theories.

sketched in his *Risāla*, let alone to compose independent treatises on it. From this perspective, the emergence of the new linguistic science called *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* out of the exegetical activity that surrounded the *Risāla* represents a phenomenon peculiar to post-classical Islamic intellectual history.⁹

Data on the composition of the *Risāla*, such as the place, the date, the circumstances of its writing, or its different recensions, remain unknown. This is in part due to the silence of the entries on al-Ījī in the bio-bibliographies and of the commentators on the *Risāla* regarding the composition and transmission of the text. The uncertainty surrounding the composition and transmission of the *Risāla* is exacerbated by the absence of an accurate chronology of al-Ījī’s scholarly output. However, some bio-bibliographical data available on al-Ījī’s life and works allows us to establish a tentative periodization of his most relevant works.¹⁰ According to Kātip Čelebī, al-Ījī’s most famous and widespread work on rational theology, *al-Mawāqif fi ‘ilm al-Kalām*, or *al-Mawāqif al-Sulṭāniyya*, was first dedicated to the Ilkhanid vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad (r. 727-736/1327-1336), the son of the famous vizier Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl Allāh al-Hamadhānī (d.

⁹ The emergence of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as a new science on the post-classical Islamic intellectual scene is compared to the emergence of another science and a new scholarly genre, that of the *‘ilm adāb al-baḥṭh wa-l-munāẓara*, the *ars disputandi* that stems from the science of rhetoric and the *jadāl* section contained in many treatises of logic and principles of jurisprudence. The *adāb al-baḥṭh* treatises which became part of the standard curriculum and received extensive commentaries and glosses are the treatise by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. first half of the 8th/14th c.) and the short manual by al-Ījī. On *adāb al-baḥṭh wa-l-munāẓara* see Miller, L. B., *Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through Fourteenth Centuries*, PhD Princeton University, 1984; Mehmet Karabela, *The Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-classical Islamic Intellectual History*, Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University, Montreal, 2011; Belhaj, Abdessamad, *Argumentation et Dialectique en Islam: Formes et Séquences de la Munazara*, Bruxelles: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2010; *Idem*, “*Ādāb al-Baḥṭh wa-l-Munāẓara*: The Neglected Art of Disputation in Later Medieval Islam,” *Arabic Science and Philosophy* 26/2 (2016), pp. 291-307; Young, Walter, “*Mulāẓama* in Action in the Early *Ādāb al-Baḥṭh*,” *Oriens* 43.3-4 (2016), pp. 332-385; Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2015 (see especially Part I “The Path of the Kurdish and Persian Verifying Scholars,” pp. 15-1128).

¹⁰ I establish this periodization following Reza Pourjavady’s study on al-Ījī’s life and works; see Reza Pourjavady, “The Legacy of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī.” In *Philosophical Theology in Islam*, ed. Ayman Shihadeh, Jan Thiele. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2020, pp. 337-370 (I am thankful to the author for sharing a draft version of this article before it was published).

717/1318).¹¹ Reference to this first recension of the *Mawāqif* appears also in Ḥamd Allāh al-Muṣṭawfī's (d. 744/1344) *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*, a work completed before 730/1330, a few years before al-Ījī's death. If this information is correct, it may be safely claimed that al-Ījī composed his first version of the *Mawāqif* between 727/1327 and before 730/1330. Al-Ījī subsequently revised the work and dedicated the second version to Abū Ishāq Īnjū (r. 724-758/1341-1356) under the title *al-Mawāqif al-Sulṭāniyya*.¹² Al-Ījī's commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahá*, a work on *uṣūl al-fiqh*, underwent, just like the *Mawāqif*, two recensions. The first recension was probably completed before 730/1330, as it is also mentioned in *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*. The second, and possibly final, recension was, like the first edition of the *Mawāqif*, dedicated to the vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn. Kātib Čelebī provides the exact date when al-Ījī completed the second recension of the *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, 26 Sha'bān 734/2 May 1334. His abridgment of Sirāj al-Dīn al-Sakkākī's (d. 555-626/1160-1229) *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm* entitled *al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya* is a commentary on the third section of the *Miftāḥ* that deals with *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, *ʿilm al-bayān* and *ʿilm al-badīʿ*. Like his previous two works, this one was dedicated to the vizier Ghiyāth al-Dīn, hence its title *al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya* (*Useful Points for Ghiyāth*), and was completed before 730/1330, as it also appears in *Tārīkh-i Guzīda*. The dates of the composition of al-Ījī's *al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya* and *Sharḥ al-*

¹¹ Cf. Kātib Čelebī, *Kashf...*, vol. 1, p. 898.

¹² The other theological works by al-Ījī are a self-abridgement of the *Mawāqif*, entitled *Jawāhir al-kalām* also dedicated to Ghiyāth al-Dīn; a work on *kalām* and *uṣūl al-fiqh* entitled *al-ʿUyūn*, completed before 23 Rajab 750/7 October 1349, as it is stated by the only known copy conserved in the Malik Library of Tehran, Ms. n. 1789/2; the *ʿAqā'id*, also known as *al-ʿAqīda*, or *al-ʿAqā'id al-ʿAḍudiyya*, composed, according to his student and first commentator of this work Iftikhār al-Dīn al-Dāmghānī (755/1373), in the last days of his life while he was imprisoned. According to Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (1025-1101/1616-1690), al-Ījī composed also corrective notes (*taḥrīr*) on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *al-Arbaʿīn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*, *al-Muḥaṣṣal* and *Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl*, a collection of extracts (*munkhatab*) on *al-ʿAyn fī l-manṭiq*, that is possibly Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī's *ʿAyn al-Qawā'id*, the logic section of his most widespread *ḥikma* manual *Ḥikmat al-ʿAyn*, and an exposé (*taqrīb*) of *al-Ṣaḥā'if*, possibly Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī's *al-Ṣaḥā'if al-Ilāhiyya*. Cf. Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī, *Ḥāshiyat ʿalá Sharḥ al-Dawānī ʿalá al-ʿAḍudiyya*, Ms. Nuruosmaniye 2126, fol. 2a.

Mukhtaṣar are relevant to make a case for dating the composition of the *Risāla*, as will be shown in the conclusion of this chapter.¹³

Despite the many uncertainties surrounding its composition and its transmission, the *Risāla* is one of the most widespread and studied texts of the pre-modern Islamic intellectual tradition. The short treatise was assimilated with other manuals and textbooks to the core of *madrasa* teaching system. The importance of the *Risāla* within the *madrasa* teaching system is confirmed, for example, by its presence in the *Majmūʿ Muhimmāt al-Mutūn*, a collection of multidisciplinary short works intended for teaching and memorization. The *Majmūʿ Muhimmāt al-Mutūn* represents the kernel of the basic *madrasa* education that all students were required to learn and memorize at the early stages of their education. It is unclear when the *Majmūʿ*, in its various recensions, was compiled and adopted within the institutionalized *madrasa* curriculum. Several lithographed copies of the *Majmūʿ* date as early as the first half of the 13th/19th century. Interestingly, the text of the *Risāla* already appears in these early copies of the *Majmūʿ*. Likewise, the presence of the *Risāla* in the most recent editions of this collection, such as *Majmūʿ al-Mutūn al-Kabīr* published in 1378/1958 in Cairo¹⁴ and *al-Majmūʿ al-Kabīr min al-Mutūn* published in 1426/2005,¹⁵ is a witness of the unchanged relevance of this treatise in contemporary *madrasa* circles.

Outside the tradition of *Majmūʿ Muhimmāt al-Mutūn*, the *Risāla* survives in numerous manuscripts, lithographs and printed editions. Nevertheless, the large number of manuscript witnesses of the *Risāla* and their relatively easy accessibility contrast with the absence of any

¹³ It is worth noting that al-Ījī did not revise his *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar* and *al-Fawāʿid* after Ghiyāth al-Dīn's execution in 736/1336. This means that both works remained unchanged until al-Ījī's death twenty years later.

¹⁴ Cf. *Majmūʿ al-Mutūn al-Kabīr*, al-Qāhira: Maṭbaʿat al-Istiḳāma, 1378/1958.

¹⁵ Cf. *al-Majmūʿ al-Kabīr min al-Mutūn*, ed. Kamāl Ḥasan Marʿī, Bayrūt: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1426/2005.

systematic inventorial study that might shed light on the oldest witness copies and the dynamic of their transmission. In the manuscript form the *matn* rarely exceeds a single folio, while in the lithographed and printed versions it rarely exceeds three or four pages. Because of its brevity, the *matn* has been often included in larger collections of works on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, most notably in volumes that contain one or more commentaries, accompanied by a set of glosses and super-glosses. The text is also found in collections of works on *ādāb al-baḥṭh*, logic and grammar. In its manuscript form the *Risāla* generally follows, or is followed by, one or more commentaries, or a set of glosses on those commentaries. In both lithographed and movable type prints, the text is often placed at the end of the volume, after the commentaries and their glosses, as well as other short and more recent *mutūn* on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.¹⁶ Conversely, in the few recent printed editions, the text is placed always before the commentaries and set of glosses.¹⁷

I have already mentioned that the exact title of the *Risāla* is far from being clearly established. The manuscript witnesses, the commentaries, glosses and the bio-bibliographies provide different titles of this treatise. The most widespread are *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*, *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya al-‘Aḍudiyya*, *al-Risāla al-‘Aḍudiyya fī (‘ilm) al-Waḍ‘*, *al-Risāla fī (‘ilm) al-Waḍ‘ li-‘Aḍud al-Dīn*

¹⁶ At the present stage of the research it is still unclear to me the reason why, in these particular printed formats, the *Risāla* is systematically placed at the end of the volume. Does this structure mirror the order in which the texts were taught? It would be surprising for the *madrasa* teaching practices to start from a more complex text, such as a set of glosses on a commentary, and next proceed to teaching the commentary, and lastly the actual *matn*. A tentative answer to this might be to point at the aforementioned volume *Muhimmāt al-Mutūn*. The study and memorization of the *matn* must have taken place at an earlier stage of the students’ education. By the time the students confront with the commentaries and the glosses, they were required a firm grasp and memorization of the *matn*. If this is the case, then the presence of the *matn* at the end of these volumes might have represented an *aide-mémoire*.

¹⁷ See for example the recent editions of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ al-Risāla al-‘Aḍudiyya fī ‘ilm al-Waḍ‘*, [Attributed to Abū al-Qāsim al-Laythī al-Samarqandī], ed. Muḥammad Dhannūb Yūnus Fathī, ‘Ammān: Dār al-Faṭḥ, 1437/2016; Ibn Sūda, *Ḥāshiyat ‘alā Sharḥ Risāla al-Waḍ‘*, ed. ‘Umar Aḥmad al-Rāwī, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2010; Ibn ‘Arafa al-Dasūqī, *Ḥāshiyat ‘alā al-Waḍ‘iyya*, [with al-Ḥifnī’s glosses], ed. Mur‘ī Ḥasan al-Rashīd, Bayrūt: Dār Nūr al-Ṣabāḥ, 2012.

al-Ījī, or simply *al-Waḍʿiyya*. The emergence of these variants is in all likelihood due to *al-Ījī*'s own omission and to the lack of any *incipit* or introductory statement preceding the *matn* in the majority of the available versions of the *Risāla*.

The *Risāla*'s association with the technical linguistic term “*waḍʿ*” is also likely to be attributable to later transmitters and commentators of the *Risāla*. By the time of *al-Ījī*, the linguistic concept of *waḍʿ* was not new to the technical vocabulary of lexicographers, logicians, rhetoricians and *uṣūliyyūn*. As has been shown in Chapter One, the general linguistic notion of *waḍʿ* and some of its technical aspects were widely accepted and canonized within scholarly circles at that time. I have shown that one of the technical senses of *waḍʿ* is the linguistic one, which indicated the act of positing a term for a concept. The notion of *waḍʿ* was not strictly limited to this technical sense, as emerges from the discussions of *al-Ījī*'s predecessors. To this linguistic sense of *waḍʿ* were also related two main discussions that naturally extended the primitive sense of the act of positing a term for a concept. The first investigated whether the nature of the origin of the relation between terms and concepts was natural, divine or human. In other words, this was the question of the origin of language and the identity of its positor, *al-wāḍiʿ*.¹⁸ The second discussed the ontological status of the meanings conveyed by terms, in other words, whether their referents are pure mental forms (*ṣuwar dhihniyya*), concrete external individuals (*aʿyān*) or some other kind of entity.¹⁹ The content of the *Risāla* does not deal with these different aspects emerging from the core notion of *waḍʿ*. In this respect, the *Risāla* does not investigate the nature of the relation between the two dimensions of a linguistic term. It

¹⁸ See my “Origine et Finalité...”

¹⁹ An overview of these two implications of the notion of *waḍʿ* is provided by *al-Suyūṭī* in *al-Muzhir*, see p. 38 ff., vol. I. *Al-Suyūṭī*'s overview is not limited to these two implications of the term *waḍʿ*. Here he opens his overview with the formal definition of *waḍʿ*. Relying on a vast number of sources, he then moves on to discuss questions such as “What has the positor of language posited?”, “Is it necessary to have a term for every concept?”, “What is the final goal of the act of positing?”.

focuses instead on the underlying semantic functions occurring between specific categories of terms, and deals with *how* each category of terms, such as particles, prepositions, nouns and verbs, come to convey universal or particular concepts within determined semantic contexts. The association of the general linguistic notion of *waḍʿ* with the content of the *Risāla* may have appeared misleading and unclear to early transmitters of and commentators on the *Risāla*. As shown in Chapter One, the first occurrences where the *Risāla* is identified with an independent and yet unsystematic science called *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* were two Ottoman sources, Mullā Luṭfī’s *Maṭālib al-Ilāhiyya* and Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s *Miftāḥ*, both composed more than a century after al-Ījī’s death.

Early commentators on the *Risāla* seem to be aware that al-Ījī did not provide his work with any of the titles above, nor did he intend to discuss the linguistic notion of *waḍʿ* in general terms.²⁰ The early exegetical activity on the *Risāla* echoes this, for example, when al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī refers to the *matn* simply as *al-risāla*. His student Khwāja ʿAlī al-Samarqandī (fl. mid-9th/15th) also refers to the *matn* simply as *al-risāla* without mentioning the notion *al-waḍʿ*, but instead mentioning the puzzles posed by particles and pronouns in language.²¹ Minor classic commentaries, such as the one by Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Dāʿī al-Bukhārī (fl. mid-9th/15th) also does not mention the notion of *waḍʿ* in the introduction of his commentary, but refers to the text as “*the intricate and well-arranged treatise (al-risāla al-mukhīla al-murattaba)*.”²²

²⁰ For the sake of brevity, I will use abbreviations to indicate the commentators’ names. Al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī = al-Jurjānī; Khwāja ʿAlī al-Samarqandī = Khwāja ʿAlī; Abū al-Qāsim al-Laythī al-Samarqandī = Abū al-Qāsim; Masʿūd al-Shirwānī = al-Shirwānī; ʿIṣām al-Dīn ʿArabshāh al-Isfārāʾinī = ʿIṣām al-Dīn.

²¹ Cf. respectively Princeton Yahuda 5997 fol. 2b. and fol. 144a.

²² Cf. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Dāʿī al-Bukhārī, *Sharḥ al-Risāla fī l-Waḍʿ*, al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya (Zakī) 92/41581, fol. 1b. I call these classic minor commentaries because, unlike the major ones, they did not elicit any sets of glosses and did not have a lasting impact on the development of the exegetical tradition on the *Risāla*.

In the introduction to his famous commentary, al-Qūshjī does not make any explicit reference to the notion *waḍʿ* in relation to the title of the *Risāla*, and refers to it simply as *al-risāla al-ʿaḍudiyya*.²³ It appears in fact that in all these early commentaries, the notion of *waḍʿ* appears neither immediately related to nor included in the scope and content of the *Risāla*. This is because early commentators may not have perceived the actual content of the *Risāla* to be a unitary text dealing specifically with the general linguistic notion of *waḍʿ* and its implications, as had been the case for al-Ījī's predecessors. After all, developing a comprehensive theory of *waḍʿ*, like that later developed throughout the exegetical tradition on the *Risāla*, was not among al-Ījī's original intentions, and early commentators construed the content of the *Risāla* in the same spirit; that is, being an analysis of the semantic functions of the main parts of the sentence, rather than a theory of *waḍʿ* itself. As will be shown later, early commentators' understanding of the content and scope of the *matn* echoes that of al-Ījī's own students who, in their commentaries on al-Ījī's *Fawā'id*, clearly convey the idea that the *matn* was not designed as a general linguistic theory of *waḍʿ*.²⁴

The use of the notion of *waḍʿ* to identify al-Ījī's *matn* begins to emerge in two other main commentaries that were composed in the second half of the 9th/15th century. The first is the commentary by Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī (fl. mid-9th/15th), allegedly completed in 888/1483, who refers to the *matn* as *risālat al-waḍʿ*. The second is the commentary by Masʿūd al-Shirwānī (d. 905/1499) who refers to the *Risāla* as "*al-risāla fī qawā'id al-waḍʿ*," "*The treatise on the rules of waḍʿ*."²⁵ The association between the content of the *matn* and the linguistic notion of *waḍʿ* seems therefore to become emphasized later in the second half of the 9th/15th century. This evolution

²³ Cf. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ*..., p. 47.

²⁴ On the works of al-Ījī's students al-Kirmānī and al-Abharī see the second section of this chapter.

²⁵ Cf. respectively Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, *Sharḥ al-Waḍʿiyya*, Nuruosmaniye 4508, fol. 39b, and Masʿūd al-Shirwānī, *Sharḥ al-Waḍʿiyya*, Nuruosmaniye 4508, fol. 88b.

is in line with the entries on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in Mulla Luṭfī’s *Maṭālib* and Ṭāshköprizādeh’s *Miftāh*, where *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, now seeing as coinciding with content of the *Risāla*, emerges as an independent yet unsystematic discipline.²⁶

The formal structure of the *Risāla* also sheds light on its composition. I have already shown that the *Risāla* contains neither an introduction nor an incipit that state the aim and scope of its content. I have also mentioned that in all likelihood, al-Ījī did not give the *Risāla* any specific title, and the title *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya* and its variants arose from later additions by transmitters and early commentators. If this is the case, then hints about the origins of the *Risāla* are to be found in the scanty but relevant information contained in the brief opening statement of the text. Al-Ījī begins the text by announcing the plan of the treatise, which will contain three main parts, a *Muqaddima*, a *Taqṣīm* and a *Khātima*, respectively *Introduction*, *Classification* and *Closure*. The announcement of the main plan is preceded by another statement that will later shed more light on the context from which the *Risāla* emerged. Al-Ījī claims that the text represents a *useful remark*, in his own words “*hādhihi fā’ida*,” lit. a *useful point*, rather than a short treatise, a *risāla*. Al-Ījī’s reference to the text as a “*fā’ida*” rather than a “*Risāla*” tells us something about the nature and the scope of the text. For in the pre-modern manuscript practice, a “*fā’ida*” often appears in the margins or at the end of the main text, or section of the main text, where the author, or the reader, indicates or introduces an additional explanation, or note to clarify or expand on the discussion in the main *matn*. Often, pre-modern scholars employed the exegetical

²⁶ The case of the commentary of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’īnī is also interesting. In the preamble that precedes the beginning of the commentary marked by the *ba’diyya* formula, he never refers to or hints at the title *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya* or the term *waḍ‘*. Instead, the preamble plays distinctively with words that echo the structure of the *Risāla*, such as *Muqaddima*, *Tanbih*, *Taqṣīm* and *Khātima*, as well as with core concepts discussed in the *matn*, such as *qamā’ir*, *ḥurūf*, *ishāra*, *qarīna*, *mukhāṭib*, *mawṣūl*. Cf. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’īnī, *Sharḥ ‘alā al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*, Istanbul: n.p., 1247/1857-8, p. 1.

tool of the *fāʿida* at the beginning or end of the codex that they studied and transmitted, i.e., as a gloss or scholium.²⁷

The reference to the *matn* as a “*Risāla*” therefore likely emerged from the work of early commentators. A hallmark in their exegetical practice is glossing al-Ījī’s opening statement “*hādhihi fāʿida*.”²⁸ I will take into account only the early, classic commentaries on the *Risāla* up to ʿIṣām a-l-Dīn al-Isfarāʿinī, as later commentators usually refer to the *Risāla* as “*al-risāla al-Waḍʿiyya*” on the basis of their predecessors’ exegesis. In his sets of glosses, al-Jurjānī explains that the opening statement “*hādhihi fāʿida*” aims to clarify the objective (*maqṣūd*) of the *matn*, which in his view might be the *Classification*, or either the *Introduction* or the *Closure* of the text. It is in this particular passage that al-Jurjānī refers to the *matn* as a “*risāla*.”²⁹ Early commentators, such as al-Jurjānī’s student Khwāja ʿAlī al-Samarqandī, make more room for the philological and lexicographical exegesis of this opening statement and conflate the meaning of “*fāʿida*” with that of “*risāla*.” Khwāja ʿAlī states that the meaning of “*hādhihi*” refers to the already known expressions (*al-ʿibārāt al-maʿlūma*) by which al-Ījī aims to convey the subtle points (*laṭāʿif*) contained in the *matn*. By displaying a kind of meta-exegetical approach, Khwāja ʿAlī explains that “*hādhihi*” refers to an individuated referent that can be pointed by the senses (*al-mushakḥḥaṣ al-mushāhad al-mushār ilayhi ḥissan*) – a definition of demonstrative pronouns that belongs to the technical vocabulary of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* later established by commentators. This is not, however, the case for this specific instance of “*hādhihi*,” as it appears in the beginning of the

²⁷ Moreover, Lane’s entry of the term “*fāʿida*” in the *Lexicon* hints to this specific understanding of the word: “*Utility as expressive of a meaning, or as contributing to the expression thereof, or as adding to a meaning previously expressed, of a word or phrase. And hence A meaning, or an import, of a word or a phrase; and particularly a complete meaning of a phrase [...];*” see Lane, *Lexicon...*, Part 6, p. 2470.

²⁸ On the philosophical *praxis* in post-Avicennian intellectual history cf. Robert Wisnovsky, “Avicennism and Early Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the *Ishārāt*”, *Oriens* (41) 2013, 349-378.

²⁹ Cf. al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Waḍʿiyya*, Nurusmaniye 4509, fol. 1b.

matn. The demonstrative pronoun “*hādhihi*” in this case refers instead to the actual composition of those statements of the *matn* and to the explanation of their single parts (*ajzā’ihā*). In Khwāja ‘Alī’s view, the demonstrative pronoun “*hādhihi*” is employed here to indicate the content of the *matn*, despite the fact that the definition of “*hādhihi*” entails the existence of some external entity that can be pointed at. This is the case because the statements of the *matn* could not be possibly pointed at in any way, as they are not ontologically instantiated (‘*adam taḥaqquqihā*). In Khwāja ‘Alī’s view, the “*hādhihi*” of the opening statement is “*intended to assert that to the treatise is a useful remark that includes all the three parts <of the matn> (namely, Introduction, Classification and Conclusion)*” (*al-maqṣūdu al-ḥukmu ‘alā al-risālati muṭlaqan bi-annahā fā’idatun mushtamilatun ‘alā al-ajzā’i al-thalātha*). In this way, one cannot understand this specific instance of “*hādhihi*” to signify any other determined entity (*amr mu‘ayyan*) that would prevent the reader from identifying the “*fā’ida*” with the “*risāla*.”³⁰

Abū al-Qāsim’s gloss on the opening of the *matn* is less articulate but, echoing Khwāja ‘Alī’s meta-exegetical approach, claims that “*hādhihi*” refers to “*the realized or intended treatise that, in virtue of its distinctiveness, takes the place of an ostensible referent*” (*al-risālatu al-muḥaqqaqatu aw al-munawwiyyatu al-munzilatu bi-tamayyuzihā manzilata al-mushāri ilayhi al-maḥsūsi al-mushāhadi*). Overall, in Abū al-Qāsim’s view, the meaning of “*fā’ida*” in the *matn* necessarily applies to the specific contents and concepts of the “*Risāla*,” but in a figurative way (*majāzan*).³¹ In a similar fashion, for al-Shirwānī the lemma “*hādhihi*” refers to the whole treatise (*al-risāla*), which comprises its specific statements or their concepts present to the intellect in a holistic way (*bi-l-ṣūratī al-ijmāliyyati*) as the result of what they refer to as sensory indication (*al-ishāra*).³² Lastly, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’inī, echoing al-Shirwānī, points out that “*hādhihi*” refers to the

³⁰ Cf. Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī, *Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*, Nurusmaniye 4508, foll. 62a-b.

³¹ Cf. Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, *Sharḥ...*, fol. 40b.

³² Cf. Mas‘ūd al-Shirwānī, *Sharḥ...*, fol. 88b.

arrayed concepts that exist within the intellection alone (*fi l-ta'qqul faqat*). This, however, could be the case if one assumes that this preamble (*al-dībāja*), namely the lemma “*hādhihi fā'ida*,” has some sort of precedence over the whole treatise itself and anticipates its contents.³³ These concepts would then be considered to exist also in articulated speech (*al-talaffuẓ*) and in actual writing (*al-kitāba*). Overall, following his predecessors, 'Iṣām al-Dīn also claims that the specific referent of this instance of “*hādhihi*” are the specific contents of the “*Risāla*,” which have come to replace the general referent of “*hādhihi*,” namely an ostensible referent. Finally, early commentators agree on identifying the lemma “*hādhihi fā'ida*” with the contents of the *Risāla*.³⁴

Returning to the *Risāla*, it has been previously mentioned that the whole *matn* is organized and divided into three main sections, that is, *Introduction*, *Classification* and *Conclusion*. The formal division of the text into these three parts became a point of debate between early commentators, and their discussion of the formal division of the *matn* reveals some important issues regarding the transmission and subsequent canonization of the text. The main point of debate between the commentators concerns a sub-section of the *Introduction*, which contains a *Reminder* (*Tanbīh*). This further dividing up the general structure of the *Risāla* puzzled early commentators, who called into question the different versions of the *Risāla* circulating during their time as well as

³³ 'Iṣām al-Dīn 'Arabshāh al-Isfarā'inī, *Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Waḍ'īyya*, Istanbul: n.p., 1274/1857-8, p. 2.

³⁴ As for the term “*fā'ida*,” the same commentators agree on two main lexical senses of the term, one lexicographical (*luġhatan*), which is what is gained from some knowledge or from some property (*mā ustufid min 'ilm aw mā*); the second is customary (*'urfan*), which indicates the kind of benefit that results from an action (*mā yatarattab min al-maṣlaḥa 'alā fi'l*). Despite this general agreement, early commentators question whether the lemma “*fā'ida*” or “*hādhihi fā'ida*” might also refer to a specific section of the *matn*. After inspecting possible alternatives, there is a general agreement that the statement must refer to all three parts of the text, given the immediately following lemma “*tashtamil 'alā muqaddima, taqṣīm wa khātima*.” These commentators agree on this definition and seem to refer to the same lexicographical definition of the term. Moreover, all commentators provide a detailed philological and lexicographical investigation of “*fā'ida*,” its derivation, its different senses and applications. Cf. Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 63a-64a; al-Bukhārī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 1b; Abū al-Qāsim, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 40a; al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ*..., p. 50; 'Iṣām al-Dīn, *Sharḥ*..., p. 2.

al-Ījī's own role in dividing up the *matn*. It should be stated that all commentators agree on the division of the *matn* into three parts. However, the presence of this *Reminder* in the *Introduction* has been subject of dispute among commentators from as early as al-Jurjānī's time.

In his glosses on the *Risāla*, al-Jurjānī points at the specific issue of the formal structure of the *Risāla*. His discussion occurs early in his commentary, after the lemma "*hādhihi fāʿida tashtamil ʿalā muqaddima wa-taqṣīm wa-khātima*." At this point, al-Jurjānī indicates the variant lemma "[...] *tashtamil ʿalā muqaddima wa-tanbīh wa-taqṣīm wa-khātima*", which is absent in the original *matn*, but can still be found in some extant copies of the *Risāla*. Al-Jurjānī is referring here to the *Reminder* that comes after the *Introduction*, since this divides the *Risāla* into four main parts rather than three. According to al-Jurjānī this variant is to be rejected for several reasons. He claims:

"In this way occurs in some copies (*fī baʿḍ al-nusakh*). However, this is incorrect at a formal level as well at a conceptual level (*lā lafẓan wa-lā maʿnān*). As for the formal level, <this is not correct> because if the *Reminder* were to be another section of the *Risāla*, then it would have been necessary to state afterwards 'The *Reminder*' (*al-Tanbīh*) with determination, like for all other sections. As for the conceptual level, <this is not correct> because what is discussed in the *Reminder* is something related to the content of the *Introduction* in every respect. <The *Reminder*, therefore,> is not another section of the treatise in such a way that the sections are four."³⁵

³⁵ Cf. al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ...*, fol. 1b.

Al-Jurjānī does not explain whether the variant version of the *Risāla* that he found in other manuscript copies should reflect al-Ījī original text, or is the result of a scribal mistake. Regardless, the relevance of this passage emerges through its informing us of the instability of the *matn* at the time of al-Jurjānī's composition of his commentary during the second half of the 7th/14th century. The circulation of different variants of the *Risāla* exhibiting different structures prompted the early commentators to devote some effort to establishing a reliable version of the *matn*.

This concern is echoed in the commentary of Khwāja 'Alī, who explains the variant as a copying mistake, given that the *Reminder* belongs to the *Introduction* and cannot therefore be considered an independent section.³⁶ Three other early commentaries, by Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, al-Qūshjī and al-Jāmī, also proceed in similar fashion. It is unclear whether their concerns are based on their access to these variant copies, or whether they are simply recapitulating al-Jurjānī's discussion. The three commentators agree that the inclusion of the *Reminder* as a separate section of the *matn* must be the result of the inattention of the scribe and that the *Reminder* naturally belongs to the *Introduction*. Moreover, following al-Jurjānī and Khwāja 'Alī, Abū al-Qāsim argues that if the *Reminder* were an independent section of the *matn*, it would have been introduced with its own title, i.e., *al-Tanbīh*, with the determinate article, just like *The Introduction*, *The Classification* and *The Conclusion*.³⁷

Al-Jurjānī's reasons for dismissing the variant structure of the *matn* were nevertheless contested by some commentators. This emerges in the commentary by al-Shirwānī, who claims that al-Jurjānī's dismissal of the *Reminder* is not convincing. In al-Shirwānī's view, al-Jurjānī's

³⁶ Cf. Khwāja 'Alī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 65a.

³⁷ Cf. Abū al-Qāsim, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 40b.

explanation of the formal inconsistency (*lafẓan*) proves only the dismissal of the form *al-Tanbīh*, with the definite article as in other sections of the *Risāla*, and shows that taking the *Tanbīh* as an independent section is inelegant (*ghayr mustahsan*), rather than the result of a mistake or an oversight. Al-Jurjānī's criticism at the conceptual level (*maʿnan*) seems instead to be inconsistent in al-Shirwānī's opinion. One should include the *Reminder* as part of the *Introduction*, considering the strict dependence of the former one the latter in content, because the content of the *Reminder* serves as the basis for the subsequent investigation undertaken in the *Classification*. The *Reminder* has to be presented as a particular case (*ʿalā wajh al-juzʿiyya*) of the *Introduction*, because its content serves to bridge (*irtibāṭ*) the preliminary remarks made in the *Introduction* with the general divisions of the *Classification*. For al-Shirwānī, al-Jurjānī's misplaced criticism of the *thêoria* arises from what he takes to be his narrow understanding of the division of, and the relation between, the different parts of the *matn* as actual independent units. According to what al-Jurjānī assumes erroneously (*ʿalā mā tawahhama*) to be division of the *matn*, the inclusion of the *Reminder* as a part of the *Introduction* occurs because the *Reminder* is taken as an actual part of the *Introduction* (*juzʿ bi-l-fiʿl minhā*). To put it philosophically, al-Shirwānī addresses the reader saying that

“You should know that the division of the treatise into the aforementioned sections belongs to the division of the whole (*taqṣīm al-kull*) – namely the analytical division <of the whole> (*taḥlīluhu*) into its parts (*ajzāʿ*) – rather than belonging to the division of the universal (*kullī*) into its particulars (*juzʿiyyāt*) – which <equates to> joining diverse and dissimilar qualifications to that universal.”³⁸

³⁸ Cf. al-Shirwānī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 89a.

This point of contention is discussed later in the commentary tradition, in particular in the commentary by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, who arbitrates between the positions of al-Jurjānī and al-Shirwānī. Before evaluating the different views, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn points out, like his predecessors, that the variant might be attributed to a scribal mistake, rather than to al-Ījī’s inconsistency in organizing and dividing up the *matn*. After outlining the two competing views, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn reinterprets al-Jurjānī’s position in an attempt to rescue it from al-Shirwānī’s criticism. He explains that al-Jurjānī’s dismissal at a formal level (*lafẓan*) of the variant division of the *matn* may be understood as follows: if the variant copy of the *matn* was in fact by al-Ījī, then one should excuse al-Ījī for not having used *al-Tanbīh*, rather than *Tanbīh*, in light of his usage of the definite terms *al-Muqaddima*, *al-Taqsīm* and *al-Khātima*. At the same time, the copy in which *Tanbīh* is not mentioned as a section does not require any justification of its validity. In other words, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn concludes, there is no valid reason to judge one copy to be more valid than the other and, as such, al-Shirwānī’s critique of al-Jurjānī is untenable. Moreover, in ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s view, al-Jurjānī’s point regarding the formal aspect of *Tanbīh* about the existence of the different variants

of the *matn* does not even constitute an infringement of the rules of Arabic (*bi-ḥasab al-‘arabiyya*).³⁹

Turning to the content of the *Risāla*, the following is a translation of the text:

This is a useful remark (*fā’ida*) that includes an Introduction, a Classification, and a Conclusion.

[1] *The Introduction*:

[1.1] The term is sometimes posited for an individual itself; and other times is posited for <an individual> by considering a general notion. This is because a common aspect is grasped among the individuated things.

[1.2] Therefore, one could claim: this term is posited for each of the individuated things in their specificity (*bi-khuṣūṣihi*), insofar as, <by that term>, only one <individuated thing> is understood and conveyed in its specificity, to the exclusion of the common aspect.

[1.3] <In this way>, the apprehension of that common aspect is an instrument for the act of positing, rather than the object <of positing> [i.e., the

³⁹ Cf. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, *Sharh...*, p. 4. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn seems to limit his rebuttal to the *lexis* aspect and never mentions or attempts to solve al-Shirwānī’s criticism of al-Jurjānī’s *thēoria* commentary. There is another similar point of debate among commentators that revolves around another variant of the lemma of the *Introduction*. Towards the end of the *Introduction*, al-Ījī provides an example of the ‘āmm-khāṣṣ class of *waḍ’*, where he claims that the object and the referent of the demonstrative ‘this’ (*hādhā*) corresponds to an ostensible individual referent, as it does not accept participation (*fa-inna hādhā mathalan mawḍū’uhu wa-musammāhu al-mushār ilayhi al-mushakhkhaṣu bi-ḥaythu lā yaqbal al-shirka*). Early commentators discuss the variant reading of “*mawḍū’uhu*”, which in some copies appears in the feminine form “*mawḍū’a*”, where the possessive pronoun “*hā*” is read as a *tā’ marbūta*, or simply as “*mawḍū’*.” Discussion of this variant reading is not to be found in al-Jurjānī’s glosses, and it seems to emerge only in the commentary of his student Khwāja ‘Alī and the classic commentaries. Another example of a variant reading occurs in the short *Tenth Reminder*, which runs as “*fi ḍamīr al-ghā’ib wa-fi kulliyatihi nazarun*.” Commentators point out the variant that occurs in some copies, which runs as “*fi ḍamīr al-ghā’ib wa-fi kulliyatihi wa-juz’iyyatihi [or shakhṣiyyatihi] nazarun*.”

concept]. <In this case>, the act of positing is universal, while the object of <positing> is an individuated thing.

[1.4] One case is the demonstrative pronoun ‘*this*.’ For, ‘*this*,’ for example, is the <term> posited, while its external referent is the individuated referent (*al-mushār ilayhi al-mushakkhkhaṣ*), in such a way that <the individuated referent> prevents <semantic> participation (*shirka*).

[1.5] *Reminder*: <Terms> that belong to this class convey individuation only by means of a determining context (*qarīna mu‘ayyina*), because the relation of the act of positing to the external referents (*musammayāt*) is coextensive.

[2] *The Classification*:

[2.1] The significatum of the term is either a universal or an individuated referent.

[2.1.1] <In> the first <case>, <the significatum> is either an essence – and <the corresponding term> is the generic noun;

[2.1.2] or it is an event – and <the corresponding term> is the *maṣḍar*;

[2.1.3] or it is an ascription between the two [i.e., the essence and the event].

This ascription can be considered from the side of the essence – and <the corresponding term> is the derived noun; or <it can be considered> from the side of the event – and <corresponding term is> the verb.

[2.2] <In> the second <case> [i.e., when the significatum of the term is an individuated referent], <the> act positing <for an individuated referent> is either individual or universal.

[2.2.1] <In> the first <case>, the corresponding term> is a proper noun (*‘alam*).

[2.2.2] <In the> second <case>, the significatum <of the term> is either:

[2.2.2.a] a concept in another <concept>, <so that the first concept> is determined by joining that other concept to it – and the <corresponding term> is the preposition.

[2.2.2.b] Or <it is> not <in this way>, <in which case> the context occurs in the speech act – <and the corresponding term> is the personal pronoun.

[2.2.2.c] However, if <the context> occurs in another way, it <can be> either <based on> the senses (*ḥissiyya*) – and <the corresponding term> is the demonstrative pronoun;

[2.2.2.d] or it <can be based on> the intellect (*‘aqliyya*) – and <corresponding term> is the relative pronoun.

[3] *The Conclusion* includes several reminders:

1. The three [i.e., personal, demonstrative, and relative pronouns] share the fact that their significata are not concepts in another <concept>, even if <their concepts> are obtained by means of another <concept>. Therefore, they <should be considered> nouns, rather than particles.
2. A reference based on intellection does not convey individuation. For the qualification of a universal by <another> universal does not convey particularity. <This is> unlike the context of the speech situation and <the one based on> the senses. For this reason, the two [i.e., the personal and demonstrative pronouns] are <considered> particulars, while <the relative pronoun> is <considered> a universal.
3. From this [i.e., from the *Classification*] you know the difference between the proper name (*al-‘alam*) and the personal pronoun, and the erroneous <view> of classifying them <as conveying> a particular concept, while excluding the demonstrative pronoun, on the assumption that <the demonstrative pronoun> is particularized (*yata‘ayyanu*) only by means of the context of the sense-based reference (*al-ishāra al-ḥissiyya*), while the significatum of the personal pronoun is determined by the act of positing <alone>.
4. From this [i.e., from the *Classification*], it is clear to you that the grammarians’ claim “*The particle is that which signifies in another <concept>*” means that <the

particle> is not independently comprehensible, contrary to the noun and the verb.

5. From the difference between the verb and the derived nouns you have understood that ‘*hitting*’ (*ḍārib*) does not satisfy the definition of verb; for the verb signifies an event, an ascription⁴⁰ to a certain substratum (*mawḍūʿ*) and the time <of the ascription>.
6. From it [i.e., the *Classification*] one understands the difference between the generic noun (*ism al-jins*) and the generic proper name (*ʿalam al-jins*). For the generic proper name, such as *Leo* (*Usāma*), is posited for a determined genus by means of its <linguistic> substance (*bi-jawharihi*). Conversely, the generic noun, such as ‘*lion*’ (*asad*), is posited for an undetermined entity; <the semantic> determination (*taʿyīn*) occurs only after, as a specific attribute to <the generic noun> (*maʿnan fīhi*) that results from <adding> the definite article.
7. The relative pronoun is the opposite of the particle. For the particle signifies a concept in another <concept>, and its realization and its intellection <occur> by means of that <other concept> in which <the particle’s> concept <is realized>. <Conversely>, the relative pronoun is an indefinite notion (*mubham*)⁴¹ that is determined by <another concept> in <the relative pronoun’s concept> itself.
8. The verb and the particle share the feature of signifying a concept insofar as it is realized in virtue of another concept (*thābitun li-l-ghayri*). From this perspective, that other concept is not realized in virtue of the concept <of the verb and the particle>. As such, <the concept> of the two [i.e., the verb and the particle] cannot be the subject of a statement.
9. The significatum of the verb is a universal concept that is sometimes instantiated (*yataḥaqqaqu*) in multiple essences (*dhawāt*), in such a way that it is admissible to ascribe it to a specific essence, so that it [i.e., the essence] is predicated by means of the verb. <This is> not the case for the particle, since the apprehension of the <particle’s> significatum occurs only by <the other concept> in virtue of which <the particle’s significatum> is apprehended, so that it [i.e., the particle’s concept] is not intellected in virtue of another different concept.⁴²
10. The universality of the third-person pronoun is something to be pondered.⁴³

⁴⁰ Variant: “*nisbatahu*,” its [i.e., the event’s] ascription.

⁴¹ Variant: + “[...] *ʿinda al-sāmiʿi*,” for the listener.

⁴² Another concept that is not its relatum.

⁴³ In some copies there is the following variant: “The universality and the particularity of the third-person pronoun is something to be pondered.”

11. <Regarding> ‘possessor of’ (*dhū*) and ‘above’ (*fawq*): their concepts are universals because they mean respectively ‘owner of’ (*ṣāhib*) and ‘height’ (*‘ulūw*). Even if they are only used <to convey> particular concepts – as <they> appear in annexation constructions (*li-‘urūd al-iḏāfa*) – they are not <strictly> particular concepts.
12. The variation of some terms in place of some others should not alarm you, since that which has been taken into consideration here is the act of positing (*al-mu‘tabaru al-waḍ‘u*).

In the *Introduction*, al-Ījī lays the basis for one of the core semantic issues of the *Risāla*, namely, his analysis of the semantic function of demonstrative pronouns and particles. The *Introduction* opens with a crucial distinction between two types of positing, [1.1] terms posited for certain specific individuated things in themselves, and terms posited also for certain individuated things by appealing to a general notion (*amr ‘āmm*), that is, a common feature (*al-qadr al-mushtarak*) between them. [1.2] This distinction allows al-Ījī to further explain that, in regards to terms posited by means of a common feature, the term conveys or signifies the concept of only one of the specific individuated things through its specificity (*bi-khuṣūṣihi*), to the exclusion not only of all others but also of that common aspect they share. [1.3] The common aspect, however, is not simply discarded from the semantic process, rather, as al-Ījī points out, it becomes a means or a tool (*āla*) for the act of positing. It is this type of positing that al-Ījī calls universal positing (*al-waḍ‘ al-kullī*) for something that has an individuated instantiation. [1.4] Al-Ījī applies this general rule to explain the case of the semantic function of demonstrative pronouns. What is named (*musammā*) and what is posited (*mawḍū‘*) of a demonstrative pronoun like “this” (*hādhā*) is an individuated referent (*mushakḥkhaṣ mushār ilayhi*). Because “this” is the result of this specific act of positing, the term, when it is used in real speech, prevents any semantic participation (*shirka*) with other instances of “this.” In *The Reminder* [1.5], al-Ījī introduces the notion of “determining context,” because there are many classes of terms that

belong to this type of positing, that is, terms posited by a universal act of positing for an individuated referent.

Starting from this general semantic principle that applies to demonstrative pronouns, al-Ījī follows a similar procedure for the semantic analysis of the different parts of the speech, which he outlines in the *Classification* [2]. It should be noted that the classification of the parts of the speech made here by al-Ījī does not conform to the traditional classification put forth by grammarians of his time, who generally agree on a general division between nouns, verbs and particles (*ism*, *fiʿl*, *ḥarf*) based on their formal syntactical functions. Here al-Ījī's takes another stand by accounting for the underlying semantic functions of the parts of the speech, when he considers the significatum (*madlūl*) as the basis for his classification of the parts of the speech.

Al-Ījī makes a first general distinction into two types [2.1], between terms whose significatum is either a universal (*kullī*) or something individuated (*mushakkhkhāṣ*). Terms whose significatum is a universal are further divided according to the nature of the universal. It can be [2.1.1] can be either an essence (*dhāt*), or [2.1.2] an event (*ḥadath*), or [2.1.3] an ascription, or relation, (*nisba*) between the two. This last group is further divided into two sub-groups, that is, an ascription construed from the perspective of the essence; or construed from the perspective of the event. With this first division, al-Ījī can now assign to each semantic category a specific part of the speech. The resulting semantic functions are: group [2.1.1] for generic nouns (*ism al-jins*); group [2.1.2] for *maṣdars*; group [2.1.3] respectively for derived nouns (*mushtaqq*), and for verbs (*fiʿl*). This virtually marks the first half of the *Classification*.

In the second half of the *Classification* [2.2] al-Ījī classifies significata that are individuated things, but whose act of positing can be either individual or universal. From this division, two main classes obtain. In the first class [2.2.1], both the act of positing and its significatum are individuated. The second class [2.2.2], that is, when the positing is universal while the

significatum is an individuated referent, recalls passages [1.2] through [1.5] of the *Introduction*. This class is more complex than the others because is further divided into four sub-groups. In the first sub-group [2.2.2.a], the significatum of the term is a concept that is realized in another concept. In the three remaining sub-groups, al-Ījī brings into focus the notion of “*determining context*” introduced in passage [1.5]. As such, the second sub-group [2.2.2.b], includes terms whose significatum is realized by means of a context that occurs in the speech act (*al-khiṭāb*). The context can however occur in something external to the significatum. In this way, al-Ījī points to the third sub-group [2.2.2.c], in which the significatum is determined by a sense-related context (*qarīna ḥissiyya*). Finally, the significatum can be determined by an intellect-related context (*qarīna ‘aqliyya*), which is the fourth sub-group. The resulting semantic classes that result from this classification are: group [2.2.1] for proper names (*‘alam*); group [2.2.2.a] for prepositions and particles; group [2.2.2.b] for personal pronouns; group [2.2.2.c] for demonstrative pronouns; group [2.2.2.d] for relative pronouns.

The general semantic classes discussed in the classification and the relations between them are the subject matter of the twelve *Reminders* that make up the *Conclusion*. Here al-Ījī provides more details and specific case-studies that help to further define the functions of each semantic class which he outlined in the *Introduction* and *Classification*.

- 1) The first reminder has two main aims. The first is to draw a clear distinction between pronouns and prepositions by accounting for the semantic function conveyed by the significata of the three groups of pronouns: personal, demonstrative and relative. The second is to expand the syntactic function of these pronouns. The three groups of pronouns fall under the same class of prepositions, that is, the *kullī-mushakkhkhaṣ*. Unlike particles, however, the three types of pronouns share the common characteristic,

namely, that their significata are not concepts conveyed by something else, as it is the case for prepositions. However, if their concepts happen by chance to be conveyed by something else, they ought to be considered as nouns (*asmā'*), rather than as particles. This is because all three groups of pronouns are still semantically independent (*mustaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*).

- 2) In the second reminder, al-Ījī draws a further distinction between the types of pronouns by appealing to what might be called the extension of individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*). As al-Ījī has stated in [2.2.2.d], relative pronouns obtain from an intellect-related context, which here he calls mental pointing (*al-ishāra al-‘aqliyya*). This kind of pointing, however, does not convey individuation to a concept. A relative pronoun does not convey any kind of individuated concept because, al-Ījī explains, the qualification of the universal by another universal cannot convey particularity (*taqyīd al-kullī bi-l-kullī la yufidu al-juz’iyya*). The same, however, is not the case for personal and demonstrative pronouns, because the contexts upon which they depend bestow individuation to their significata. In other words, unlike mental pointing, the sensory context and speech act context allow for conveying a determinate extension of individuation or particularization. In this way, al-Ījī can claim that personal and demonstrative pronouns ought to be considered as particulars, while relative pronouns remain universals.
- 3) In the third reminder, al-Ījī uses of the distinctions outlined in class [2.2] to highlight the status of demonstrative pronouns presented in passages [1.4], [1.5] and [2.2.2.c]. To do so, al-Ījī points to the distinction between groups [2.2.1] and [2.2.2.b], that is, between proper names and personal pronouns. Although they are both posited for an individuated concept, the act of positing of proper names is individual, while that of personal pronoun is universal. From this premise, al-Ījī points out that it is erroneous to assume that

personal pronouns are posited and used to convey real particulars (*al-juzʿī al-ḥaqīqī*⁴⁴), and, at the same time, maintain that demonstrative pronouns are posited for a universal concept, but are used to convey a particular one. This is a view that has led some scholars to erroneously conclude that the significatum of demonstrative pronouns is a universal that is determined only by the sensory-related context, rather than by the nature of its act of positing; while the significatum of the personal pronouns is determined by the nature of its act of positing, which confers particularity.

- 4) In the fourth reminder, al-Ījī stresses the importance of a crucial syntactical division, that is, the tripartition of the parts of the speech. The semantic functions put forth by al-Ījī in [2.2.2.a] do not violate the standard definition of the prepositions, which was widely accepted among scholars in general, and grammarians in particular: “*the prepositions is that which signifies a concept in something other.*” The particle is therefore not semantically independent (*lā yastaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*), unlike the concepts expressed by nouns and verbs.
- 5) The fifth reminder draws a further semantic distinction, this time between the derived noun (*al-mushtaqq*) and the verb, as both convey an action or event. Al-Ījī explains this by appealing to an example: the derived noun *ḍārib* (lit. *hitting* or *hitter* - an active participle) does not in any way fall under the definition of verbs, despite the fact that it conveys the concept of an action taking place. Derived nouns and verbs, however, fall under class same class, that is, they are posited for a universal concept by a universal act of positing. As seen in passage [2.1.3], verbs and derived nouns imply an ascription (*nisba*) between an essence (*dhāt*) and an event (*ḥadath*). They both also convey an event and an

⁴⁴ Although the term *ḥaqīqī* does not appear in the *matn*, many commentators add this qualification in glossing *al-juzʿī*. Classic commentators and glossators will discuss this topic by appealing to the distinction between real particular and relational particulars (*al-juzʿī al-iḍāfī*), which is, at the same time, a particular and a universal in itself.

ascription to a subject. Nevertheless, what distinguishes derived nouns from verbs is that verbs also convey the frame time (*zamān*) in which the action takes place, unlike derived nouns.

- 6) The sixth reminder establishes an important distinction within the class of nouns, that is, between the generic nouns (*ism al-jins*) and the generic proper names (*‘alam al-jins*). Al-Ījī appeals again to an example to clarify this difference. Generic proper names such as “Leo” (*Usāma*) is posited in virtue of its own essence (*bi-jawharihi*) for a determined genus, just like proper names of individuals, like *Zayd* or *John*, and therefore do not need any semantic context or external element to be determined. Conversely, generic nouns like “lion” (*asad*) are posited for an undetermined genus. The concept of a generic noun is determined only when the definite article “the” (*al-*) is added to it. The semantic determination provided by the definite article is therefore also a distinctive feature contained into the concept of “asad” (*al-ta‘yīnu huwa ma‘nan fīhi*). More specifically, both “*Usāma*” and “*asad*” do convey the concept of *lion*, but grammarians tend to classify *Usāma* as *‘alam jinsī*, that is, “a proper name applicable to every individual of the same kind,” and therefore as a subclass of proper names (*asmā’ al-‘alam*), which are considered determined nouns by their own essence.⁴⁵
- 7) The seventh reminder focuses on the difference between relative pronoun and prepositions. Although they belong to the same class, that is, the *kullī-mushakhkhaṣ*, al-Ījī claims that the relative pronoun is the opposite (*‘aks*) of the particle. He establishes the opposition as follows: the preposition signifies a concept in another concept, that is, the concept of the prepositions is obtained and intellected (*taḥaṣṣuluḥu wa-ta‘aqquluḥu*) insofar as is realized to be a concept in that other concept. An example of this is “*Zayd*

⁴⁵ Cf. W. Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, New York: Dover Publications, Second Edition, 2005, p. 107.

travelled from Basra” (*sāra Zaydun min al-Baṣra*), the concept of “from” (which conveys the concept of “beginning”) is obtained and apprehended insofar as it is a concept in “Baṣra.” The relative pronoun instead conveys an undetermined entity (*amr mubham*) for the listener. The concept of the relative pronoun is determined only through something else, i.e., the relative clause, which occurs to the relative pronoun. In this way, the relative clause becomes a concept that subsists in the concept of the relative pronoun and determines it.

- 8) In the eighth reminder, al-Ījī draws a parallel between verbs and particles. Although they belong to two different groups, namely, verbs belong to group [2.1.3], while prepositions belong to group [2.2.2.a], the two share an important characteristic, that is, they express a concept belonging to and predicated of something else (*thābith li-l-ghayr*). If prepositions and verbs are ascribable to a subject, the opposite cannot validly be the case. Because, as explained earlier, the concepts of verbs and prepositions are not semantically self-sufficient (*ghayr mustaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*) cannot constitute the subject of any assertoric predication (*khabar ‘an*).
- 9) The *Ninth Reminder* is related to the previous, because it discusses an important difference between verbs and prepositions. Although they share some relevant characteristic, prepositions and verbs differ from one another in terms of predication. The significatum of a verb is a universal that may be instantiated in multiple essences (*qad yataḥaqqaq fī dhawāt muta‘addida*), in such a way that it may be ascribed (*nisba*) to only a specific essence. The same cannot be said for the prepositions, because its significatum obtains only in relation to a specific concept in which the concept of the preposition is realized. In its particular instantiation, the concept of the preposition is apprehended only by means of its *relatum* (*muta‘allaq*). On the basis of this difference, the

relation between the concept of the verb and the essence to which it is ascribed appears to be more neutral than the relation between the concept of the preposition and the other concept in which it is realized. In other words, the semantic dependence (*ghayr mustaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*) of verbs is less rigid than the one proper to prepositions and, in virtue of this, al-Ījī explains why verbs can function as predicates for multiple essences, in contrast to prepositions.

- 10) The *Tenth Reminder* is the shortest of all the reminders, and al-Ījī's wording has an elliptical formulation; he says "*The universality of the third-person pronoun is something to be pondered.*" As al-Ījī evoked earlier in the *Classification*, all personal pronouns belong to class [2.2.2.b], that is, they are terms of the class *kullī-mushakhkhaṣ*, whose significata are determined by the speech context. However, here al-Ījī seems to concede the possibility that third-person pronouns possess a twofold semantic function, one related to particularity (*juz'iyya*), because their signified conveys individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*), and the other related universality (*kulliyya*), because they may convey a universal. The apparent semantic ambivalence of personal pronouns is not resolved, and al-Ījī's awareness of this leads him to suggest that his reader investigate the issue further.
- 11) In the eleventh reminder, al-Ījī returns to the issue of particles. In particular, he discusses the semantic feature of the preposition that resemble nouns, such "*dhū*" and "*fawqa*" (respectively, "*possessing*" or "*having*" and "*above*" or "*beyond*"). The concepts expressed by these nouns, in al-Ījī's view, is a universal, because they relate respectively to the concepts of "*ṣāhib*" (owner, possessor of) and "*‘ulūw*" (height, elevation). The two belong to group [2.2.2.a], even though they are not prepositions strictly speaking. Nevertheless, they are usually syntactically construed as part of a possessive annexation (i.e. the genitive construction, *iḍāfa*) and, in virtue of this, they are used only to express particular

concepts; e.g., “*fawqa al-ṭāwilati*” (*on the table*) or “*Zayd dhū mālin*” (*Zayd is a rich man, lit. is possessor of wealth*). Al-Ījī also reminds the reader that the concepts expressed by these prepositions resembling nouns are not particulars strictly speaking when they are analyzed from the *waḍʿ* perspective. They express full semantic particularity only in actual linguistic usage (*istiʿmāl*). In other words, the semantic ambivalence observed in third-person pronouns also applies to this type of preposition.

- 12) The *Twelfth* and final reminder discusses the variations of notions such as the universality of a concept, which conveys particularity, as in the cases of “*dhū*” and “*fawqa*” above. Al-Ījī emphasizes that these notions used throughout the classifications should not worry the reader or create confusion. The reason is that the vocabulary that is employed throughout the *Risāla* ought to be understood only within the scope of the semantic theory of *waḍʿ*, rather than the actual linguistic usage (*istiʿmāl*) of the parts of the speech in real speech situations.

2.2 ʿILM AL-WADʿ AND ʿILM AL-MAʿĀNĪ WA-L-BAYĀN: AL-ĪJĪ’S AL-FAWĀʾID AL-GHIYĀTHIYYA

The preceding overview of the structure and the content of the *Risāla* serves as a basis to draw some comparisons between the theory of *waḍʿ* and Arabic rhetoric, *al-balāgha*, and more specifically two of the three sciences that constitute *al-balāgha*, namely *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *ʿilm al-*

bayān, respectively the science of the semantics of sentences and the science of figurative expression. *‘Ilm al-badī‘*, the science of stylistic embellishment, will not be considered here.⁴⁶

Al-Ījī’s *al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya* was conceived as an abridgment of the longer *Miftāḥ al-‘Ulūm* by the Khwārizmian scholar Abū Ya‘qub Yūsuf b. Abī Bakr al-Sakkākī (555-626/1160-1229).⁴⁷ Al-Sakkākī’s *Miftāḥ* covers a wide spectrum of topics related to the linguistic sciences and it emerged as a unique work within the panorama of the Arabic linguistic tradition due to its structure and content.⁴⁸ The *Miftāḥ* contains three main sections followed by two appendixes. The first section is devoted to morphology (*‘ilm al-ṣarf*) which in turn contains chapters on phonology and the science of derivation; the second section deals with grammar (*‘ilm al-naḥw*); and the third section investigates *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī*, *al-bayān* and *al-badī‘*. The first appendix an excursus on the science of inference (*‘ilm al-istidlāl*), in which all figures of syllogism are discussed, while the second appendix discusses poetics and the inimitability of the style of the Quran, *i‘jāz al-Qur’ān*.⁴⁹

The heterogeneity of the content and the themes presented in the *Miftāḥ* puzzled pre-modern scholars, who were struck by certain formulations of al-Sakkākī, above all in the third

⁴⁶ The definition of these two branches of *‘ilm al-balāgha* has been the object of debate among pre-modern as well as contemporary scholars. According to S. A. Bonebakker these two terms appears for the first time in al-Sakkākī’s *Miftāḥ al-‘Ulūm* in which a clear distinction between the two discipline is not always clear. Moreover, the overall structure and themes of al-Sakkākī’s *Miftāḥ* was perceived as somewhat confusing and uncoherent due to many contradictory and unclear definition provided throughout the work. The rework of the structure and the contents of the *Miftāḥ* by al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī’s *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* and *al-Īdāḥ* might result from the exigence to systematize and provide a clearer approach to the analysis of the disciplines of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī*, *‘ilm al-bayān* and *‘ilm al-badī‘*. The systematization offered by al-Qazwīnī in his *Talkhīṣ* and *al-Īdāḥ* might explain his wide acceptance and the enormous exegetical activity that it elicited. For a general overview on *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* and *‘ilm al-bayān*, on al-Sakkākī’s *Miftāḥ*, al-Qazwīnī’s *Talkhīṣ* and its main commentaries see S. A. Bonebakker, “Al-Ma‘ānī wa ‘l-Bayān”, in EI2. For an updated study on al-Qazwīnī’s approach on *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī*, *al-bayān* and *al-badī‘* see H. Jenssen, *The Subtleties and Secrets of the Arabic Language: Preliminary Investigations into al-Qazwīnī’s Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ*, Bergen: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies – University of Bergen, 1998.

⁴⁷ For a more detailed discussion on al-Sakkākī’s life and work see W. P. Heinrichs, “Al-Sakkākī,” in EI2.

⁴⁸ I will refer here to the edition of ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Hindāwī, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1420/2000.

⁴⁹ For more details cf. Heinrichs, “Al-Sakkākī.”

section on *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*. Despite the scarcity of research done to date on the *Miftāḥ*, it may be said that the first and second sections on morphology and grammar adhere to the standards of the Arabic linguistic tradition and its classical authorities, such as Sībawayh, al-Mubarrad, Ibn Jinnī and al-Zamakhsharī. The section on *al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*, however, is more problematic, given the use of both terms together for the first time here in the *Miftāḥ* in order to indicate one unitary discipline. Moreover, the precise subject matter of each of these disciplines is not always clear due to the oft-overlapping nature of their definitions, as presented by al-Sakkākī.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, it appears that the main sources for *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān* in the *Miftāḥ* are respectively ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s (400-471/1009-1078) *Dalā’il al-I’jāz* and *Asrār al-Balāgha*, as well as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606-1209) *Nihāyat al-Ījāz fī Dirāyat al-I’jāz*, which is an epitome of both works of al-Jurjānī.⁵¹ It is important to note, following Bonebakker’s explanation, that the term “*ma‘ānī*” in the *Miftāḥ* does not indicate the study of poetical topics, as was the case for Ibn Qutayba’s (213-276/828-889) *Kitāb al-Ma‘ānī al-Kabīr* or Abū Ḥilāl al-‘Askarī’s (d. ca. 400/1009) *Diwān al-Ma‘ānī*, nor the study of the semantics of single terms. Instead, it refers to a study of syntactical rules that are relevant for the theory of literary and poetic composition, *naẓm*. According to Bonebakker, al-Sakkākī’s conception of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* has been directly influenced by al-Jurjānī’s theory of *naẓm*, which includes a specific understanding of the sense of grammar (*ma‘nan min ma‘ānī al-naḥw*), namely the principles of syntax.⁵²

⁵⁰ Bonebakker and Jenssen have also pointed at the difficulty to find an adequate translation for these two disciplines. Bonebakker’s chooses to render *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*, respectively as semantic of the syntax and science of the figurative expression.

⁵¹ Cf. Heinrichs, “*al-Sakkākī*,” and Bonebakker, “*Al-Ma‘ānī wa ’l-Bayān*.”

⁵² For other possible sources of al-Sakkākī’s *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* see Bonebakker, “*Al-Ma‘ānī wa ’l-Bayān*.”

Al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ* had a tremendous impact on the Arabic linguistic tradition.⁵³ Pre-modern muslim scholars showed particular interest in the third section of the work, which corresponds to *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, *ʿilm al-bayān* and *ʿilm al-badīʿ*, to the exclusion of the first section on general rules of syntax (*naḥw*), inflection (*iʿrāb*) and derivation (*ishtiḳāq*), as well as the two appendixes. Al-Ījī's contemporary al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (666-739/1268-1338) authored the most influential compendium of the third section of the *Miftāḥ* entitled *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ*. In this compendium, al-Qazwīnī reorganizes the structure and contents of the third section of the *Miftāḥ* and solves the inconsistencies and contradictions related to the division of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *ʿilm al-bayān*. Because of this, the *Talkhīṣ* became the standard *madrasa* manual on *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, *ʿilm al-bayān* and *ʿilm al-badīʿ*, engendering no fewer than sixty major commentaries. Among these commentaries, al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal* became the standard commentary taught in *madrasa* curricula. It in turn generated at least sixty-five sets of glosses, the most widespread and studied of which was that of al-Jurjānī.

Al-Ījī's *Fawā'id* is part of the exegetical trend initiated by al-Qazwīnī's *Talkhīṣ* and, like the latter, it focuses exclusively on the section of *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, *ʿilm al-bayān* and *ʿilm al-badīʿ*. The *Fawā'id* also generated a series of commentaries (though fewer than the *Talkhīṣ*), such as those by al-Ījī's students, Shams al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. 786/1384) entitled *Taḥqīq al-Fawā'id al-*

⁵³ See Smyth, William, *Persian and Arabic Theories of Literature: A Comparative Study of al-Sakkākī's Miftāḥ Al-ʿUlūm and Shams-i Qays' Muʿjam*, PhD Thesis, New York University, 1986; *idem*, "Controversy in a Tradition of Commentary: The Academic Legacy of Al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ Al-ʿUlūm*", *JAOS* 112/4 (1992), pp. 589-597; *idem*, "The Making of a Textbook", *Studia Islamica* 78 (1993), pp.99-115; *idem*, "The Canonical Formulation of *ʿilm al-Balāgha* and al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ Al-ʿUlūm*", *Der Islam* 72/1 (1995), pp. 7-24.

Ghiyāthiyya, Sayf al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Abharī (d. after 778/1376),⁵⁴ Iftikhār al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Dāmghānī (d. 775/1373-4),⁵⁵ Muḥammad b. Ḥājījī b. Muḥammad al-Bukhārī al-Saʿīdī (fl. 760/1359),⁵⁶ as well as those by ʿĪsā b. Muḥammad al-Ṣafawī,⁵⁷ the Ottoman scholar Ṭāshköprüzādeh,⁵⁸ ʿAbbās b. Ḥaydar Qummī Iṣfahānī (fl. 11th/17th)⁵⁹ and Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad al-Fārūqī al-Jawnpūrī (d. 1062/1652), entitled *al-Farāʿid*.⁶⁰

A close look at the *Fawāʿid* is necessary in order to establish a structural parallel with the *Risāla*. The general division of the *Fawāʿid* includes an introduction and two main sections (*muqaddima wa-faṣlayn*). The introduction, like that of al-Qazwīnī's *Talkhīṣ*, provides a general definition of the two disciplines of *al-maʿānī* and *al-bayān* in order to clarify their subject-matter, while the two sections, respectively on *al-maʿānī* and *al-bayān*, summarize the main topics discussed by al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ*.

The first section is divided into two main principles (*qānūn*), respectively on assertoric predication (*al-khabar*) and request (*al-ṭalab*), which correspond to the more general distinction between assertoric vs performative predication, namely *khabar* and *inshāʿ*. The first principle on assertoric predication discusses four main topics (*fann*), the first on ascription (*isnād*), the second on predicate and subject (*al-musnad* and *musnad ilayhi*), the third on positing of the two terms

⁵⁴ A copy of this work is available in Cairo's Dār al-Kutub, *Balāgha* 48. According to the catalogue of Dār al-Kutub, the colophon states that the author completed this work in 778/1376, while the manuscript witness was copied in 856/1452. Another copy is preserved in Hacı Selim Aga 1044. According to the colophon, this copy was completed the 21st of Shawwāl 882/26th of January 1478. A marginal note of the colophon states that the author completed the work in the middle of the month of Dhū al-Ḥijja 777/May 1376; see fol. 185a.

⁵⁵ Cf. Muʿīn al-Dīn Junayd al-Shīrāzī, *Shadd al-Izār*, p. 68.

⁵⁶ Cf. Pourjavady, *The Legacy...*, footnote n. 80.

⁵⁷ Cf. GAL II, p. 271, and Supp. II, p. 292. Copies are available in Qum Masjid Aʿẓam 639, and Feyzullah Efendi 1834.

⁵⁸ Printed in Istanbul: al-Maṭbaʿa al-ʿĀmira. 1314/1896.

⁵⁹ A copy is available in Qum Marʿashī 427.

⁶⁰ Cf. GAL Supp. II, p. 293. This is the Indian scholar Al-Jawnpūrī, author of the influential philosophical treatise *al-Shams al-Bāzigha*.

(*waḍʿ al-ṭarafayn*), the fourth on the positing of two sentences. These topics are in turn subdivided into types (*nawʿ*).⁶¹ The second principle on forms of request and interrogatives is instead divided into five types.⁶² The second main section on *ʿilm al-bayān* differs from the structure of the previous as it is divided into four basic fundamentals (*aşl*), namely the simile (*tashbīh*), figurative meaning (*majāz*), metaphor (*istiʿāra*) and metonymy (*kināya*).⁶³

At a formal level, there are striking similarities between some sections of the *Fawāʿid* and the *Risāla*. It is important to note that throughout the discussion of the first main section, al-Ījī discusses some points in detail, introduced as *tanbīh* or *tanbīhāt* (*reminder*)⁶⁴ and in some other cases, the conclusion of a specific point is marked by *khātima* (*closure*),⁶⁵ two terms that echo the section headings of the *Risāla*. More striking is the similarity between the *Risāla* and the third fundamental (*al-aşl*), in which al-Ījī discusses the topic of the metaphor (*al-istiʿāra*). The section contains an introduction (*muqaddima*), a series of classifications (*taqṣīmāt*), two reminders (*tanbīhān*) and a conclusion (*khātima*) which in turn contains three reminders.⁶⁶ The structure of the *Risāla*, with its *Introduction*, *Reminder*, *Classification* and *Conclusion* containing twelve *Reminders*, and the section on metaphor in the *Fawāʿid*, appear to be conceived with the same style of exposition in mind, since this structure is not found in any major works by al-Ījī.

⁶¹ In these typologies, al-Ījī discusses the different aspects related to each topic such as elision (*hadhf*) and affirmation (*ithbāt*), defined and undefined character of the noun, appositives (*tawābiʿ*), anteposition and postposition (*taqdīm* and *taʿkhīr*), copula and relation (*al-rabṭ* and *al-taʿalluq*), restriction (*qaṣr*), conjunction and disjunction (*al-waṣl* and *al-faṣl*), proximity and conciseness (*al-iṭnāb* and *al-ijāz*).

⁶² These includes formulation of hope and desire (*al-tamannī*), interrogation (*istifhām*), command (*amr*), prohibition (*nahy*), exclamation (*nidāʾ*).

⁶³ The discussion of *ʿilm al-badīʿ* follows directly from this section. This indicates that the reorganization of the *Miftāḥ* undertaken by al-Ījī and al-Qazwīnī placed the subject matter of *al-badīʿ* within that of *al-bayān*.

⁶⁴ See *Fawāʿid*, pp. 116, 121, 139.

⁶⁵ See for example pp. 124, 134, 142.

⁶⁶ Cf. *Fawāʿid* pp. 155-161.

The formal similarities between the *Fawā'id* and the *Risāla* suggest that the two works were in some way related, and that the *Risāla* may have been conceived as belonging to the *Fawā'id* as a semi-independent section or an appendix of it. If one assumes that the title *al-risāla al-waḍ'īyya* – or one of its variants – was a later addition that emerged from early commentators and transmitters, and that al-Ījī himself points to his *matn* as being simply a '*fā'ida*,' then this hypothesis becomes all the more plausible. Al-Ījī's "*fā'ida*" outlining the analysis of the semantic functions of simple terms – namely, the *Risāla* – may have been at some point a further addition, or an afterthought, to his *Fawā'id* (pl. of *fā'ida*) on the semantics of syntactical constructions.⁶⁷

There are further reasons to take this hypothesis seriously that go beyond these formal and structural similarities. The strict relation between the two works is, rather, confirmed by some crucial content-related similarities. One passage of the *Fawā'id* that hints at this is found in the discussion on the determinate and the indeterminate character of nouns (*al-ta'rif wa-l-tankīr*), as part of the discussion of ascription (*al-isnād*). For al-Ījī, the determination (*ta'rif*) of the terms that make up an assertoric statement

<occurs> in order to convey a piece of knowledge (*fā'ida*) by which it [i.e., the determination] conveys; for the judgement (*ḥukm*) – whether it consists in

⁶⁷ This close relation between *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* and the *Risāla* is confirmed by textual data found in Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī's commentary on the *Risāla*. In Chapter Three, I will show that a surviving holograph of this commentary points to this hypothesis. This manuscript witness indicates that Abū al-Qāsim's more famous *Risāla fi l-Istiʿāra* was originally conceived by the author as a supplement (*dhayl*) to his commentary of the *Risāla*.

conveying knowledge of the predication or of its concomitant⁶⁸ – the more specific it is, the less likely it will be to apply <to a broad range of referents in the real world>. And, conveying knowledge with a definite judgement will be stronger.⁶⁹

Al-Ījī explains this point by considering two statements, respectively “*something is an existent*” (*shay’un mā mawjūdun*) and “*Zayd b. ‘Umar is a skillful physician*” (*Zayd ibn ‘Umar ṭabībun māhirun*). The principle underlying the concept of determination appears to be the semantic dimension of a definite statement that should convey a precise piece of knowledge (*fā’ida*) for the listener inasmuch it matches with reality or mentally. The piece of knowledge conveyed by the first statement has a wide application, which implies vagueness and indefiniteness. It is the feature of indefiniteness and wide applicability that renders the statement not as useful as a definite one. Conversely, the second statement applies only to a lesser spectrum of existent beings, namely to a single individual. In virtue of this definitiveness, the second statement acquires stronger utility for the listener, even though it might fail to apply to a wider range of instances of reality. The difference in utility between a definite and an indefinite statement is more clearly put by al-Ījī’s student al-Kirmānī in his *Tahqīq al-Fawā’id al-Ghiyāthiyya*:

⁶⁸ The exact sense of al-Ījī’s formulation regarding the concomitant of an assertoric proposition is not entirely clear, because of its compressed and elliptical wording. Al-Kirmānī clarifies this by claiming that an assertoric proposition such “*Zayd is standing*” (*Zaydun qā’imun*) includes two assertoric propositions, one manifest (*ṣarīḥ*), that is, the ascription of “*standing*” to the subject, and the other implicit (*ḍimnī*), that is the speaker’s knowledge that Zayd is standing. The second, according to al-Kirmānī, is also an ascription, because the knowledge of that assertoric proposition is ascribed to the speaker. Cf. al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq*..., p. 310.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Fawā’id*, p. 116; “*al-ta’rīfu li-ifādati fā’idatin yufidu bihā, fa-inna al-ḥukma sawā’un kāna fā’idata al-khabari aw-lāzimihā, kullamā kanā akhaṣṣa fa-ḥtimālu wuqū’ihi aqallu fa-l-fā’ida fī ta’rīfihi aqwā.*” The beginning of the sentence differs in the *matn* reproduced in al-Kirmānī’s *Tahqīq*, p. 310, and Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s commentary, p. 52: “*al-ta’rīf li-ifādati fā’idatin yu’tadd bihā*” (*determination <occurs> in order to convey a recognizable piece of knowledge*).

“The more <the predication> increases in specificity, the more implausible it becomes, and the less likely it is to apply <to a broad range of referents in the real world>. As such, conveying a piece of knowledge with respect to that statement will be stronger [i.e., more useful as opposed to a general, vague statement]. <Conversely>, the more general <the statement> is, the more likely it will be to apply <to a broad range of referents in the real world>, <however> the utility of the piece of knowledge will be weaker.”⁷⁰

The following reminder (*tanbīh*) introduced by al-Ījī echoes one of the topics of discussed in the *Risāla* about definite and indefinite nouns. By means of determination, the speaker aims to convey a semantically determined concept (*mu‘ayyan*) as it is to the listener, which equates to indicating (*ishāra*) that specific concept to the listener. Conversely, through indetermination, the mind’s attention is directed towards the specific concept as it is, without grasping any determination (*ta‘yīn*) within the term. It seems that for al-Ījī, in both instances, the concept conveyed to the listener is a determined one. The understanding of the concept from the term is based upon knowing that the term has been posited for that concept (*al-‘ilm bi-waḍ‘ al-lafẓ lahu*). Knowledge of the positing, however, can only occur after the listener has conceived and discerned (*taṣawwur wa-tamayyuz*) that specific concept as distinct from all possible others. Al-Ījī’s view might seem at first contradictory, but his assumption seems to be that communicative speech (*khiṭāb*) occurs only when a concept is already known and conceptualized by the listener, whether the term is definite or not. The definite noun will function as an indication of the

⁷⁰ In the first statement, according to al-Kirmānī, there is no surprise (*istighrāb*), and for this reason the perceiving mind does not pay any specific attention to what hearing conveys by means of sense perception. Conversely, the mind pays specific attention to the second statement as it is less likely to be heard due to its specificity. Cf. al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq*, pp. 310-311.

listener's previous knowledge of that specific concept. Conversely, an indefinite noun does not indicate at any specific pre-knowledge of the listener. On the basis of this principle, al-Ījī continues, one knows the difference between “a lion” (*asad*) and “the lion” (*al-asad*), both referring to the same real essence (*ḥaqīqa*); what is conveyed by both (*mu'addan*) is unitary. If what is conveyed by either a definite or indefinite noun is one and the same, the distinguishing feature will pertain exclusively to how the two terms are construed (*i'tibār*) in the mind of the listener.

At this point of the discussion, al-Ījī evokes an objection that is similar to his discussion in the *Sixth Reminder* of the *Risāla*. He says:

“Thus, explain to me the difference between ‘the lion’ (*al-asad*) and ‘Leo’ (*Usāma*) and why it is claimed that the first is a generic noun while the second is a generic proper name.”⁷¹

Al-Ījī answers that ‘Leo’ signifies a determined concept in virtue of the substance of its term (*bi-jawhar lafẓiḥi*), which does not admit anything different than that determined concept. Conversely, the determination of ‘*al-asad*’ is understood only through the definite article ‘*al-*.’

Semantic determination (*ta'yīn*) seems to function in the *Fawā'id*, like the *Risāla*, as the distinguishing factor that underlies the semantics of the parts of the speech. Al-Ījī explains that if determination is conveyed by the substance of the term – as in the case of *Usāma* – then the concept conveyed is a proper noun. In case the noun is indefinite, determination will be conveyed by a particle, such as the determination bestowed by the article *al-* or the vocative ‘*yā*’

⁷¹ Cf. *Fawā'id*, p. 117.

(*al-nidāʾ*). If determination is not expressed by these two, then it will be conveyed via a context (*qarīna*), which might be in the speech situation; for example, it may be expressed by a personal pronoun. Determination will be conveyed by some sort of indicating (*ishāra*) that determined entity. This is the case when determination is expressed by a demonstrative pronoun (*ism al-ishāra*), e.g., “this” (*hādhā*). Indicating can also be a relation (*nisba*) that is known to the listener. Al-Ījī isolates two main types of relation. The first is ascriptive (*khābariyya*), and is expressed by the relative pronoun, e.g., “*alladhī*.” The second is not ascriptive, and is expressed by the first term of a genitive construction (*iḍāfa*). Definite nouns (*al-maʿārif*, sing. *al-maʿrifa*), in al-Ījī’s view, can therefore be reduced to these six classes: proper generic names, particles, personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, relative pronouns and the first terms of *iḍāfas*. How definiteness is conveyed by the different parts of the speech discussed here in the *Fawāʾid*, is similar to several passages of the *Risāla*, e.g., in the second half of the *Classification* (passage [2.2]) as well as in the *Third*, the *Sixth* and the *Seventh Reminders*.

This close relation between the *Risāla* and the *Fawāʾid* emerges even more clearly when looking at al-Kirmānī’s *Taḥqīq*. The first passage appears early in the commentary on elision and affirmation (*al-ḥadhf wa-l-ithbāt*), where al-Ījī explains that elision can occur to the subject, the predicate, the verb, the complement (*al-maʿfūl*) and all the related syntactical forms (*al-mutaʿalliqāt*),⁷² with the exception of the subject-agent (*al-fāʿil*). Al-Kirmānī discusses further the case of the verb. The verb is posited for an occurring or existing ascription (*nisba*), which is a particular determined concept (*al-muʿayyan al-juzʿī*), rather than a universal absolute (*al-muṭlaq al-kullī*). This ascription is considered to be a relation (*nisba*) that obtains only when the subject-agent is mentioned. Al-Kirmānī gives the example of the verb ‘*naṣara*.’ This verb, like all other

⁷² These include, for example, the circumstantial phrase (*ḥāl*) and the *tamyyiz*.

verbs, has not been posited for the relation of the action-event (*ḥadath*) to some unspecified subject, but rather to a determined one that must be mentioned right after the verb. In this way, as long as the subject-agent is not spelled out the verb's significatum and its concept will not be semantically complete. In the example '*naṣara Zaydun*,' the verb has been posited for a specific action, that is for a specific instance of '*naṣara*,' e.g., '*naṣara Zayd*,' '*naṣara Bakr*,' '*naṣara 'Amr*' etc., and as long as one of the subject-agents is not mentioned, the semantic function of the specific '*naṣara*' will be only partially realized. At this point of his commentary al-Kirmānī digresses into what appears to be a general semantic theory of the parts of the speech. He says:

[KT.1] "Here is a useful remark (*fā'ida jalīla*) that ought to be mentioned: the term is sometimes posited by a general positing for a general concept (*waḍ' 'āmm li-mawḍū' lahu 'āmm*) such as '*rajulun*' (a man). Some other times it is posited by a specific positing for a specific concept (*waḍ' khāṣṣ li-mawḍū' lahu khāṣṣ*), such as *Zayd*. Some other times <the term> is posited by a general positing for specific concept (*waḍ' 'āmm li-umūr makhṣūṣat*), such as '*this*' (*hādhā*), because its general positing <occurs> for each specific referent (*mushār ilayhi makhṣūṣ*); that is, it has been posited with respect to a general concept for specific concepts which fall under <that general concept>."⁷³

Al-Kirmānī further discusses the case of the class of *waḍ' 'āmm-khāṣṣ*, that is, the class that includes demonstrative pronouns and particles. He explains that what is meant (*al-murād*) by demonstrative pronouns such as '*this*' is not merely one among the potentially infinite things that one may point at when using that term. Rather, the object intended would be a something

⁷³ Cf. al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq*, pp. 284-5.

definite, which obtains only by considering demonstrative pronouns as falling under the class *wadʿ ʿāmm-khāss*. Particles and prepositions, e.g., “from” (*min*), fall under the same class of *wadʿ*, because they are posited by taking into account a general, universal concept, that is, the concept of “beginning” (*al-ibtidāʿ*), while conveying a specific particular concept. According to this perspective, the general concept is construed as a type of relation or ascription (*nisba*), e.g., the preposition “from” is posited by mean of the general concept of “beginning” (*ibtidāʿ*) in order to convey all specific instances of the concept “beginning” when the preposition “from” is used. The specific instance of the significatum of the preposition “from” (which still belongs to the general encompassing significatum of “beginning”) is not realized – neither in the intellect nor in external reality – unless the *relatum* (*al-mutaʿalliq*) to which the preposition attaches is mentioned. In this way, the full realization of one specific instance of the concept of ‘from’ is conditional upon apprehending the relation that occurs between the preposition and its *relatum*. For example, in the phrase “I travelled from Baṣra” (*sirtu min al-Baṣra*), the specific instance the concept of “beginning” conveyed by “from” is realized only when the preposition’s *relata*, i.e., “my travel” and “Baṣra,” occur. This specific instance of the concept of ‘from’ is different from those instances in phrases such as “I came from Damascus” (*jiʿtu min Dimashq*), or “*atat Maryam min al-maktaba*” (*Maryam came from the library*), etc. Similarly, the verb is posited for the relation of the event to a determined subject (*amr muʿayyan*). The verb will not convey its meaning as long as that subject is not mentioned. It may appear that for al-Kirmānī prepositions and verbs are assimilated under the same class of *wadʿ ʿāmm-khāss*, which would be in contradiction with al-Ījī’s classification provided in the *Risāla*.⁷⁴ Al-Kirmānī was likely aware of this, and goes on to discuss the difference between verbs and particles. Echoing the content of the *Eighth and Ninth*

⁷⁴ In the classification, al-Ījī clearly distinguished between verbs, which belong to the class of terms whose significatum is a universal construed as a ascription (*nisba*) from the perspective of the event, and particles, which belong to type of terms whose significatum is an individual object but by a universal positing.

Reminders, he alleges that the two differ from one another for two reasons. First, when the concept of the verb obtains, it obtains in itself (*fī nafsihi*), rather than in another (*fī ghayrihi*), as is the case for the preposition that are realized in their *relata*. Second, the verb also needs a relatum in order for its concept to be fully realized. Its relatum is the subject or the agent. However, unlike prepositions, the concept of the verb becomes a semantically complete ascription (*isnād tāmm mufīd*) when its only relatum is expressed: the phrase “Zayd walks” (*yamshī Zaydun*) conveys a complete ascription and, as such, is perfectly meaningful, whereas the phrase “from Basra” (*min al-Baṣra*), despite it conveys an ascription, is not perfectly meaningful, that is, is not perfectly “*mufīd*.”

A second passage of al-Kirmānī’s *Taḥqīq* points to the relation between the *Fawā’id* and the *Risāla* with even greater precision. While commenting on the section on definite and indefinite nouns seen before in al-Ījī’s *Fawā’id*, and more specifically on the difference between “*Usama*” and “*al-asad*,” al-Kirmānī adds:

[KT.2] In one of his short treatises on various questions about syntax (*fī rusayyila lahu fī masa’il shattān fī l-naḥw*), the author (i.e., al-Ījī) claims: “the difference between the generic noun (*ism al-jins*) and the generic proper name (*‘alam al-jins*). For, the generic proper name, such as *Leo* (*Usāma*), is posited for a determined genus by means of its <linguistic> substance (*bi-jawharihi*). Conversely, the generic noun, such as ‘lion’ (*asad*), is posited for an undetermined entity; <the semantic> determination (*ta’yīn*) occurs only after, as a specific

attribute to <the generic noun> (*maʿnā fīhi*) that results from <adding> the definite article.”⁷⁵

The passage that al-Kirmānī attributes to al-Ījī is a verbatim quotation from the *Risāla*, and more specifically from the *Sixth Reminder*. The passage is crucial for the data it provides on the early reception of the *Risāla* and the light it sheds on its origins in particular and on the development of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in general. It is worth noting that al-Kirmānī indicates the *Risāla* without mentioning any specific titles, but calls it “*rusayyila*,” a short treatise. This supports the previous hypothesis that the title *al-Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya* and the association of the technical term *waḍʿ* with this treatise occurred between the second half of the 8th/15th and the first quarter of the 9th/16th, i.e., more than one century after al-Ījī’s death. More important is the information provided by al-Kirmānī about the content of this short treatise. No reference is made to a discipline called *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* or to a semantic theory called *waḍʿ*. Al-Kirmānī construes the content of the *Risāla* as a series of various questions on grammar and syntax (*naḥw*), a claim that evokes the lack of cohesiveness of the *Risāla* itself. Al-Kirmānī’s perception of the contents of the *Risāla* fits well with the narrative introduced by Mullā Luṭfī and Ṭāshköprüzādeh referring to a not yet systematized or canonized (*lam yudawwan*) discipline called *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The lack of systematization of the new discipline is mirrored by textual discrepancies between the *matn* and al-Kirmānī’s quotation. The *Sixth Reminder*, as it appears in the majority of the versions of the *Risāla*, runs as follows: “*wa-minhu yuʿlamu al-farqu bayna ismi al-jinsi wa-ʿalami al-jinsi fa-inna ʿalama al-jinsi ka-usāma wuḍiʿa bi-jawharihi li-l-jinsi al-muʿayyanī wa-asad wuḍiʿa li-ghayri muʿayyanin [...]*”, while al-Kirmānī’s quotation of the same passage goes as: “*al-farqu bayna ismi al-jinsi wa-ʿalami al-*

⁷⁵ Cf. al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq*, p. 318.

*jinsi anna ʿalama al-jinsi ka-usāma wuḍiʿa li-taʿyīn*⁷⁶ *wa-asad wuḍiʿa lā li-muʿayyanin.*” The few variants occurring in al-Kirmānī’s rendition of the *Sixth Reminder* also supports the hypothesis that, at least in the last two quarters of the 7th/14th century, the *matn* was far from being firmly established, and that multiple variants were in circulation. The *matn*’s lack of cohesiveness that emerges from [KT.2] finds confirmation in classic commentaries, such as those by al-Jurjānī, Khwāja ʿAlī, al-Shirwānī, Abū al-Qāsim and ʿIṣām al-Dīn, who were engaged in fixing a more coherent series of lemmata for the *Risāla* by comparing the different variants that they had at their disposal.

These two passages from al-Kirmānī’s *Tahqīq* show the close relationship between the content of the *Risāla* and some topics discussed in *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*. Passage [KT.1] points to early concerns in the newly developed theory of *waḍʿ*. Like his teacher, al-Kirmānī was more concerned with discussing the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, which includes prepositions, particles and all types of pronouns, which is the main crux in the *Introduction* of al-Ījī’s *Risāla*. Furthermore, passage [KT.1] reveals important details on the codification of the theory of *waḍʿ*. By summarizing in a few lines the three main classes of *waḍʿ*, i.e., *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Kirmānī (and not his younger contemporary al-Jurjānī – *pace* Weiss⁷⁷) became one of the earliest canonizers of the central distinctions in the theory of *waḍʿ*.⁷⁸ As will be shown in the next section, the distinctions of the classes of *waḍʿ* was probably borrowed from one of al-Ījī’s other seminal works, his commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s *Mukhtaṣar*, on which both al-Kirmānī and al-Jurjānī composed glosses.

⁷⁶ The editor of the *Tahqīq* includes a variant found in two other witness copies that read “*muʿayyan*” rather than “*taʿyīn*”, which is closer to the text of the *Risāla*; see. p. 318 footnote n. 6.

⁷⁷ Al-Ījī’s *Risāla* is thought to have laid the groundwork for this set of distinctions, and al-Jurjānī is recognized as the first scholar who, in his commentary on the *Risāla*, outlined the set in its entirety. Cf. Weiss, *Language in Orthodox...*, p. 95.

⁷⁸ The other two are the classes *al-waḍʿ al-shakhṣī/al-waḍʿ al-nawʿī* and *al-waḍʿ al-tahqīqī/al-waḍʿ al-taʿwīlī* that will emerge more systematically in the later commentarial tradition (see Chapter Five).

Another text that further confirms the closeness of the *matn* of the Risāla to *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān* is the commentary on the *Fawā'id* by another direct student of al-Ījī, Sayf al-Dīn al-Abharī.⁷⁹ In his discussion of the semantics of the verb in his commentary, al-Abharī, like his contemporary al-Kirmānī, digresses into a detailed discussion on how the semantics of verbs differs from the semantics of prepositions. Following al-Ījī, al-Abharī explains that the significatum of the verb (*madlūl al-fi'l*) obtains only when its *relatum* (*al-muta'alliq*) is mentioned, where the *relatum* is the subject-agent (*al-fā'il*) to which the verb refers through an ascription (*nisba*). This, however, raises the question of how to differentiate between the semantics of the verb and that of the particle, because the significatum of the preposition, like the significatum of the verb, obtains by mentioning the *relatum* along with the ascription that bestows semantic completeness to the concept of the preposition. Al-Abharī replies that the significatum of the verb can be identified as a definite ascription (*al-nisba al-mu'ayyana*). This definite ascription is a universal notion (*amr kullī*), that is, an ascription to a subject (mentioned after the verb, e.g., *qāma Zaydun*) determined by species or type (*bi-l-naw'*), which is intellected *per se* (*yu'qal bi-nafsihi*). On al-Abharī's account, the universal notion expressed by this ascription signifies a concept in itself (*fī nafsihi*), i.e., self-sufficiently, even though its semantic determination (*ta'yīn*) is individualized by mentioning another concept (*al-ghayr*), that is, the subject of the verb. The significatum of the preposition, on the contrary, is a particular (*juz'ī*) that may be understood through its *relatum* that determines it (*muta'ayyin bihi*). For example, the preposition 'in' (*fī*) is posited for every particular notion conveying a qualification of place or time (*zarfiyya juz'iyya*), rather than the absolute or universal notion of qualification of place or time (*muṭlaq*). In such a

⁷⁹ Cf. Sayf al-Dīn al-Abharī, *Sharḥ al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya*, Hacı Selim Aga 1044, fol. 24b, l. 11-15. Another manuscript copy of the work is Fatih 4644 completed in mid-Muḥarram 908/July 1502.

case, the preposition can be said to signify a concept in another concept, namely in its relatum.

Al-Abharī continues:

[AS.1] This has been analyzed in a classification (*taqṣīm*) that the author mentioned in one of his appendices (*fī ba‘ḍ ta‘ālīqihī*), where he claims “The significatum of the term is either a universal or an individuated thing. <In> the first <case>, <the significatum> is either an essence – and <the corresponding term> is the generic noun; or it is an event – and <the corresponding term> is the *maṣḍar* or it is an ascription between the two [i.e., the essence and the event]. This ascription can be considered from the side of the essence – and <the corresponding term> is the derived noun; or <it can be considered> from the side of the event – and <corresponding term is> the verb. <In> the second <case> [i.e., when the significatum of the term is an individuated referent], <the> act positing is either universal, so that <the term> is posited for <an individual> by considering a general notion. This is because a common aspect is grasped among the individuated things. Therefore, one could claim: this term is posited for each of the individuated things in their specificity (*bi-khuṣūṣihī*), insofar as, <by that term>, only one < individuated thing> is understood and conveyed in its specificity, to the exclusion of the common aspect. <In this way>, the apprehension of that common aspect is an instrument for the act of positing, rather than the object <of positing> [i.e., the concept]. Or <the> act positing is particular, and in <this> second case <the corresponding term> is a proper noun (*‘alam*). In the first <case> [i.e., when <the> act positing is either universal], the significatum <of the term> is either a concept in another <concept>, <so that the

first concept> is determined by joining that other concept to it – and the <corresponding term> is the preposition; Or <it is> not <in this way>, <in which case> the context occurs in the speech act – <and the corresponding term> is the personal pronoun. However, if <the context> occurs in another way, it <can be> either <based on> the senses (*ḥissiyya*) – and <the corresponding term> is the demonstrative pronoun; or it <can be based on> the intellect (*‘aqliyya*) – and <corresponding term> is the relative pronoun.”

And then he claimed “The relative pronoun is the opposite of the particle. For, the particle signifies a concept in another <concept>, and its realization and its intellection <occur> by means of that <other concept> in which <the particle’s> concept <is realized>. <Conversely>, the relative pronoun is an indefinite notion (*mubham*) that is determined by <another concept> in <the relative pronoun’s concept> itself.”⁸⁰

This passage, like those of al-Kirmānī, is important for the origins of al-Ījī’s theory of *waḍ‘* and his *Risāla*. The classification (*taqṣīm*) to which al-Abharī refers in this passage of his commentary is in fact the text of the *Classification* of the *Risāla*. Just like al-Kirmānī, al-Abharī considers the semantic features of verbs and particles, and in general all other parts of speech, to be insufficiently explained in the passage of the *Fawāʾid*. The semantic functions and classes presented in the *Risāla*, by contrast, offer a more thorough and exhaustive explanation of the underlying functions of nouns, verbs and prepositions. In other words, the basic semantic functions of the parts of speech outlined in the *Risāla* lay the basis for the more detailed

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*.

semantics of the sentence discussed in *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*. Al-Abharī’s text is thus a further witness for how the content of the *Risāla* was seen as a supplement to the *Fawā’id*.

As far as I can tell, al-Abharī’s passage represents the earliest known witness of the text of the *Risāla*, since the draft of the commentary was completed in mid-Dhū al-Ḥijja 777/May 1376, only twenty years after al-Ījī’s death.⁸¹ Also noteworthy is the reference to the *Risāla* as a “*ta‘līq*,” an appendix, in this passage, rather than as an independent work or a treatise in its own right. Because the semantic theory of the *Risāla* and the one outlined in the *Fawā’id* are closely related, it is probable that the *matn* of the *Risāla*, or some very early version of it, was transmitted in the form of an appendix or supplementary note (hence *fā’ida*) together with al-Ījī’s *Fawā’id*. Al-Abharī’s text also presents a few textual differences with the canonized text of the *Risāla*, as it does not correspond verbatim to the *lemma* of the *Classification*. Al-Abharī’s text presents two important interpolations of two other passages from the canonized text of the *Risāla*. For the sake of clarity, I transcribe passage [AS.1] (right column) and the corresponding text of the *Risāla* (left column) to better isolate the two interpolations and the textual differences between the two texts; the text contained in brackets [] corresponds to the *Classification*, while the two interpolations are contained respectively in the intervals * _ * and ** _ **; missing portions of texts are indicated in brackets < _ >. The passage [AS.1] occurs at folio 24b, line 15 – folio 25a, line 4.

Al- <i>Risāla</i> al-Waḍ‘iyya	Al-Abharī’s Sharḥ al-Fawā’id (text [AS.1])
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⁸¹ The scribe of Hacı Selim Aga 1044, ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Yūsuf, completed the codex on Sunday 20th Shawwāl 883/25th January 1478, and adds that a note on the manuscript that he used indicates that al-Abharī completed the draft (*taswīd*) in mid-Dhū al-Ḥijja 777/May 1376. It is possible that the scribe copied the work from al-Abharī’s holograph. The note goes as “*wa-qad kataba (or kutiba) fī nuskhatihi al-farāgh min taswīdihi fī muntaṣaf dhī al-ḥijja sana sab‘a wa-saba‘in wa-saba‘amiā’a*.” This hypothesis would hold only if the possessive pronoun of “*nuskhatihi*” refers to al-Abharī himself, i.e., “*his copy*.” Moreover, al-Abharī must have completed the work after al-Ījī’s death in 756/1356, since he refers to his teacher with the formula “*raḥimahu Allāh*.”

<p>(التقسيم) اللفظ مدلوله إمّا كليّ أو مشخّص والأوّل إمّا ذات وهو اسم جنس أو حدث وهو المصدر أو نسبة بينهما وذلك إمّا أن تعتبر النسبة من طرف الذات وهو المشتقّ أو من طرف الحدث وهو الفعل والثاني فالوضع</p>	<p>(1) ويتحقّق ذلك بتقسيم ذكره المصنّف في بعض تعاليقه حيث قال [اللفظ مدلوله إمّا كليّ أو مشخّص والأوّل إمّا ذات وهو اسم الجنس أو حدث وهو المصدر أو نسبة بينهما وذلك إمّا أن يُعتبر من طرف الذات وهو المشتقّ أو من طرف الحدث وهو الفعل والثاني وضعه إمّا كليّ]</p>
<p>(المقدمة) * <اللفظ قد> يوضع لشخص بعينه <وقد يوضع له> بأمر عام وذلك بأن يعقل أمر مشترك بين مشخّصات ثمّ يقال هذا اللفظ موضوع لكلّ واحد من هذه المشخّصات بخصوصه بحيث لا يفهم ولا يفاد إلّا واحد بخصوصه دون القدر المشترك فتعقّل ذلك المشترك آلة للوضع لا أنّه الموضوع له * <فالوضع كليّ والموضوع له مشخّص وذلك مثل اسم الإشارة نحو هذا فإنّ هذا مثلاً موضوعه ومسمّاه المشار إليه المشخّص بحيث لا يقبل الشركة ></p>	<p>(2) * بأن يوضع لشخصه بعينه باعتبار أمر عامّ وذلك بأن يعقل أمر مشترك بين مشخّصات ثمّ يقال هذا اللفظ موضوع لكلّ واحد من هذه المشخّصات بخصوصه بحيث لا يفهم ولا يفاد به إلّا واحد بخصوصه دون القدر المشترك فتعقّل المشترك لكونه آلة وضع لا لكونه الموضوع له*</p>

<p>إِمَّا مَشْخَصٌ أَوْ كَلِّيٌّ فَالْأَوَّلُ الْعَلَمُ وَالثَّانِي مَدْلُولُهُ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ مَعْنَى فِي غَيْرِهِ يَتَعَيَّنُ بِانْضِمَامِ ذَلِكَ الْغَيْرِ إِلَيْهِ وَهُوَ الْحَرْفُ أَوْ لَا فَالْقَرِينَةُ إِنْ كَانَتْ فِي الْخَطَابِ فَالْضَّمِيرُ وَإِنْ كَانَتْ فِي غَيْرِهِ فَإِمَّا حَسِيَّةٌ وَهُوَ اسْمُ الْإِشَارَةِ أَوْ عَقْلِيَّةٌ وَهُوَ الْمَوْصُولُ. [</p>	<p>(3) [وَأَمَّا جَرِيٌّ وَالثَّانِي هُوَ الْعَلَمُ وَالْأَوَّلُ مَدْلُولُهُ إِمَّا مَعْنَى فِي غَيْرِهِ يَتَعَيَّنُ بِانْضِمَامِ ذَلِكَ الْغَيْرِ إِلَيْهِ وَهُوَ الْحَرْفُ أَوْ لَا فَالْقَرِينَةُ إِنْ كَانَتْ فِي الْخَطَابِ فَالْضَّمِيرُ وَإِنْ كَانَتْ فِي غَيْرِهِ فَإِمَّا حَسِيَّةٌ وَهُوَ اسْمُ الْإِشَارَةِ أَوْ عَقْلِيَّةٌ وَهُوَ الْمَوْصُولُ]</p>
<p>** {التنبيه السابع}: الموصول عكس الحرف فإنَّ الحرف يدلُّ على معنى في غيره وتحصُّله بما هو معنى فيه والموصول أمرٌ مبهم يتعين عنده بمعنى فيه. **</p>	<p>(4) ** وقال الموصول عكس الحرف فإنَّ الحرف يدلُّ على معنى في الغير وتحصُّله بما هو معنى فيه والموصول مبهم متعين بمعنى فيه. **</p>

The comparison between the two texts shows that the version the *Classification of matn* to which al-Abharī had access is a collage of passages from the canonized version of the

Classification, *Introduction* and the *Seventh Reminder*. In order to clarify this, I will refer to the division of the *matn* that I provided in the translation of the *Risāla* and compare it with al-Abharī's version of the *Classification* that I divided into four sections. Section (1) corresponds to the paragraphs of the *Classification* [2.1], [2.1.1], [2.1.2] and [2.1.3]. Section (2) corresponds to some variants of the paragraphs of the *Introduction* [1.1], [1.2] and [1.3]. Section (3) corresponds to the paragraphs of the *Classification* from [2.2] to [2.2.2.d]. Section (4) corresponds to the *Seventh Reminder*. In other words, the version of the *Classification* available to al-Abharī contains the lemmata of the canonized version in full, but it is interpolated by some variant lemma of the *Introduction*, and ends with the *Seventh Reminder*.

As emerges from this comparison, al-Abharī's quotation of al-Ījī's *Risāla* presents, like text [KT.2], important textual variants which corroborate the idea that, at least until the second half of the 8th/14th century, the *matn* of the *Risāla* had not yet been established in its canonized form. The textual similarities between the content of the *Risāla* and the *Appendix* referred to by al-Abharī show that these two texts are closely related or are even one and the same work. If the *matn* of *Risāla* and al-Abharī's *Appendix* are two different texts similar in nature and scope, then it is likely that al-Ījī may have composed the *Risāla* in the form of a *fā'ida*, as a revision of the content of the *Appendix*. In this scenario, there would be two similar texts circulating among al-Ījī's immediate disciples and successors. But, why a direct student of al-Ījī like al-Abharī preferred the *Appendix* over its revised version, that is al-Ījī's *Risāla* (or *fā'ida*), remains unclear. If the two texts are indeed taken to be one and the same, then the *Appendix* is the earliest surviving witness of the *matn* of the *Risāla*. Given that the *Appendix* composed by al-Ījī contains substantial differences in structure and wording when compared to the canonized text of the *Risāla*, it can be hypothesized that the canonized *matn* of the *Risāla* resulted from of a posthumous revision of the *Appendix* by al-Ījī's immediate successors, who edited it and

rearranged it into a proto-Risāla. In either case, the passage [AS.1] shows the dependence of the semantic theory of the Risāla on that of the *Fawā'id*, and that the former Risāla adds further aspects of the semantic functions of the parts of the speech that are only hinted at in the *Fawā'id*.

It has thus been proven that the *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* section of al-Ījī’s *Fawā'id* echoes a few semantic issues that al-Ījī introduces in different places of his Risāla. In parallel fashion, the *‘ilm al-bayān* section of the *Fawā'id* contains hints at semantic issues concerning the parts of the speech that match with those displayed in the Risāla.⁸² A promising locus where echoes to the Risāla may emerge is the second principle which deals with figurative meaning, *al-majāz*. The theory of figurative meaning is an investigation into the semantic features of both single terms and propositions. Al-Ījī’s opening of the section looks promising in this regard, as it provides a general definition of conventional signification as well as its origins. Al-Ījī follows the mainstream view that the signification of words is conventional (*dalālat al-alfāz bayyin annahā bi-l-waḍ‘*). This claim entails dismissing the other competing views of the origins of the language,

⁸² Al-Ījī, following al-Sakkākī, opens with a brief overview of the theory of conventional linguistic signification (*al-dalāla al-waḍ‘iyya*) applied to synonymous statements. He states that the clarity (*jalāl*) of different statements cannot be established by conventional signification, because knowing the linguistic positing (*al-waḍ‘*) does not entail understanding of the difference between synonymous statements. The listener will be able to grasp the difference between the synonymous statements only by mental signification (*al-dalāla al-‘aqliyya*), by which a term signifies a concept other than the one it was originally posited for. This is the case because the listener will grasp the related concepts (*muta‘alliqāt*) that extend beyond the concept conveyed by those statements. Al-Ījī provides a classification of the different types of significations: the term’s signification of its whole referent (*tamām musammāhu*) is the linguistic conventional one (*waḍ‘iyya*), which is called correspondence (*muṭābaqa*); the term’s signification of something other than the original concept is called mental (*‘aqliyya*); the term’s signification of a part of its referent is called inclusion (*taḍammun*); the term’s signification of a concept external to the referent is called implication (*iltizām*); see *Fawā'id*, pp. 144-145. Al-Kirmānī flags, firstly, a divergence between al-Ījī’s view on *iltizām* and that of al-Sakkākī by citing Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s view of these three types of significations displayed in his *Mukhtaṣar* and al-Ījī’s commentary on it, which is more precise (*adaqq*) than al-Sakkākī’s. Moreover, al-Kirmānī calls into question the view of logicians concerning the classification of the types of significations, which are sometimes conventional, as Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī claims in the *Maṭālī‘ al-Anwār*. Other times logicians claim that the first is conventional while the other two, namely *taḍammun* and *iltizām*, are mental; see al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq*, pp. 262-263.

that is, the naturalist theory maintained by a limited circle of scholars whose main representative is the Mu‘tazilite ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān al-Ṣaymārī (d. ca. 249/863).⁸³ Nevertheless, whether language’s origin is based on divine revelation (*tawqīf*), on the acts of divinely inspired humans (*ilhām*), or the act of uninspired humans (*iṣṭilāḥ*), linguistic signification is still conventional in nature.⁸⁴ Al-Ījī provides a definition of the technical sense of *waḍ‘*, which he uses here: “*positing means determining (ta‘yīn) a term per se (bi-nafsihā) for a concept.*”⁸⁵ Unfortunately, al-Ījī does not explore the theory of *waḍ‘* for the parts of the speech as he does in the *Risāla*, and limits his discussion to the *ḥaqīqa/majāz* dichotomy, which is also based on the concept of *waḍ‘*.⁸⁶ A closer parallel with one of the semantic issues discussed in the *Risāla* is contained in the third principle, concerning metaphor (*isti‘āra*).⁸⁷ While going through the different classifications of metaphors, or its elements, al-Ījī says:

⁸³ It worth noting that al-Ījī claims that ‘Abbād’s view, namely that between the term and the concept there is a natural correspondence in the way that the term conveys the concept by its own nature, is based on the claim of the experts of the sciences of derivation (*al-ishtiḳāqīyyūn*), according to whom the positor of language plays nonetheless a role in the formation of words. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first reference indicating a possible origin for ‘Abbād’s view. His naturalist theory was discussed by later grammarians, theologians and jurists, but none of these later sources claim that ‘Abbād view is based on the views of earlier or contemporary experts on the science of derivation. For the development of the theory on the origins of language see my “Origine et Finalité...”.

⁸⁴ The usage of the term *ilhām*, to indicate the alternate view to *tawqīf* is quite unusual. The dichotomy around which the debate on the origins of the language developed is *tawqīf/iṣṭilāḥ*, or *wahy/muwāḍa‘a*. The *ilhām*, or divine inspiration, is often used to indicate a middle ground between the views of *tawqīf* and *iṣṭilāḥ*, namely that humans are inspired by God to establish a linguistic norm that will be then form a given language. However, God has no particular role in assigning a term to a given concept, a role that is fulfilled by human beings; see my “Origine et Finalité...”.

⁸⁵ Cf. *Fawā'id*, p. 151.

⁸⁶ Al-Ījī adheres to the widespread view among scholars that literal meaning, *ḥaqīqa*, is the concept conveyed by the term, while figurative meaning, *majāz*, is a concept conveyed by the term’s concept. More specifically, he joins the concept of *waḍ‘* to that of *ḥaqīqa/majāz*: the former indicates a concept conveyed by a term with regard to the convention of the speech situation in virtue of the original act of pure positing (*ufīda bihi fī-iṣṭilāḥ al-takhāṭub li-mujarrad waḍ‘ awwal*), while the latter is not in virtue of that original act of pure positing but in virtue of a second, derivative, positing.

⁸⁷ I have pointed out above the close resemblance between the structure of this section with the corresponding section of the *Risāla*.

[IF.1] “The third <division>: the metaphorical term can be either a generic noun, in which case the metaphor is basic (*aṣliyya*), or something else, in which case the metaphor is derivative (*taba‘iyya*), such as in the case of the verb, because <the verb is used metaphorically> by means of (*bi-wisāṭa*) the infinitive (*maṣḍar*); <the metaphor> will occur with respect to the verb’s relation to dependent concepts (*muta‘alliqāt*) [...]. As for prepositions, their metaphoric function occurs by means of dependent concepts of <the prepositions’ primary> concepts, such as *adverbiality* (*ẓarfīyya*) and *beginningness* (*ibtidā’iyya*), because the <derivative concepts> are not <primary> concepts of the particles, but are the semantic concomitants (*lawāzim*) of <the particles’ primary concepts>. Otherwise <the particles> would be equal to nouns, because particle and noun are distinguished one from the another only from the point of view of meaning (*bi-l-ma‘nā*).”⁸⁸

[IF.2]: “Reminder: the verb signifies a relation (*nisba*) and suggests an event (*ḥadath*) and a tense, in the majority of the cases [...]. The particle, such as “in” (*fī*) has been posited for each specific *adverbiality* (*ẓarfīyya khāṣṣa*) <of place or time>; and even if the positing occurs through a general notion (*al-waḍ‘ bi-amr ‘āmm*), <the specific *adverbiality*> would be related (*‘ulliqat*⁸⁹) to <that general entity>.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Fawā'id*, p. 158-159.

⁸⁹ Al-Kirmānī’s commentary has the lemma *‘uqilat* instead of *‘ulliqat*. The reading *‘ulliqat* appears in the edition of al-Ījī’s *al-Fawā'id* as well as in al-Abharī’s commentary; cf. al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq*, p. 749; al-Abharī, *Sharḥ*, fol. 165b. I prefer the second reading, *‘ulliqat*, because the specific instance of the preposition attaches, or it is related to the general notion that includes all the specific instances of its concept, just as the same preposition requires a relatum (*muta‘alliq*) to which it attaches in order to convey and realize the specific instance of the concept it signifies.

Moreover, <that specific *adverbiality*> is obtained only by mentioning the relatum (*mutaʿalliq*).”⁹⁰

Al-Ījī’s main aim in these two passages is to clarify the working principles of metaphoric usage, when applied to verbs and particles. The metaphorical functions of simple terms are not discussed in the *Risāla*, yet these two passages of the *Fawāʿid* address similar issues related to the semantics of the verb and the particle that echo some of the conceptual principles outlined in the *Risāla*. More specifically, al-Ījī’s main concern in the texts of the *Fawāʿid* is to explain the metaphoric function of verbs and particles, that is their derivative, or secondary, semantic function, which result from a second act of positing (*al-waḍʿ al-thānī*). Conversely, the *Risāla* is mainly devoted to the original, or primary, semantic functions of the parts of the speech and their classifications, which corresponds to the first act of positing (*al-waḍʿ al-awwal*). Nevertheless, similarities emerge at the conceptual level between the two texts. Text [IF.1], for one, addresses the metaphorical function of the verb. Al-Ījī explains here that a verb can acquire a metaphoric function only through the concept supplied by the *maṣḍar*. The semantic dependence of the verb on the *maṣḍar* is not new in al-Ījī’s semantic theory, and finds a parallel in the *Classification* of the *Risāla*, where he establishes a dependence of the class of *maṣḍars* with that of verbs (see paragraphs [2.1.2] and [2.1.3] in the translation).⁹¹

A stronger similarity with the *Risāla* emerges in text [IF.2]. Here al-Ījī claims that the verb signifies a relation (*nisba*), which in turn requires an event (*ḥadath*) and a time (*zamān*). This definition of the semantic function of the verb perfectly matches the general definition found in the *Classification* as well as with the content of the *Fifth Reminder*, where the verb is said to

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 159-160.

⁹¹ See above paragraph 1.1. The semantics of the verb derives from construing the ascription between a essence and an event from the viewpoint of this latter, that covers the class of *maṣḍars*.

signify an event (*ḥadath*), a relation (*nisba*) to a subject and a time (*zamān*). Two main similarities also emerge in the discussion of the metaphoric use of particles. Text [IF.1] claims that prepositions are posited for some sort of universal concepts, such as ‘beginningess’ (*al-ibtidāʿiyya*), like in “from” (*min*), and “adverbiality,” like in “in” (*fī*). This claim is not expressly made in the *Risāla*, but it corresponds to the class *kullī-mushakkhkhaṣ*, which includes prepositions and all types of pronouns. In the same text, al-Ījī states that the distinguishing factor between particles and nouns lies in their semantic content (*tamāyuz al-ḥurūf wa-l-ism innamā huwa bi-l-maʿnā*), a point that al-Ījī makes more clearly in the *Risāla*, more precisely in the *Fourth Reminder*, where he establishes a neat separation between the semantics of the preposition and that of nouns and verbs, in terms of semantic dependence and non-dependence, (*ghayr istiqlāl bi-l-mafhūmiyya*). These two similarities regarding the prepositions emerge more clearly in text [IF.2]. Here al-Ījī makes the point that prepositions are posited by a general notion (*bi-amr ʿāmm*) for each specific instance instance of the preposition’s concept. He takes the example of the particle “in” (*fī*), which is posited for each specific adverbiality of time and place (*li-kull ṣarfīyya khāṣṣa*), e.g., “in class” (*fī l-ṣaff*) “in the mosque” (*fī l-masjid*), “in the morning” (*fī l-ṣabāḥ*) etc.; even though the positing to which that specific “adverbiality” attaches (*ʿulliqat*) comes about by the universal concept of “adverbiality.” As has been shown, this corresponds to a rewording of the terms, such as prepositions and all types of pronouns, that fall under the class *kullī-mushakkhkhaṣ*.

Lastly, the second part of text [IF.2], makes a crucial point about the semantics of prepositions that reinforces the parallels between the *Fawāʿid* and the *Risāla*. The specific “adverbiality” seen above cannot obtain, that is, it is not semantically complete, unless its *relatum* (*al-mutaʿalliq*) is mentioned. In this case, the derivative metaphoric concept of a specific “adverbiality” will not obtain (*la tataḥassalu*) unless the noun to which the preposition is related,

(hence its *relatum*) is also mentioned.⁹² In other words, the metaphoric concept of the particle occurs *per alium*. This equates to the preposition's semantic dependence on the noun that immediately follows it, that is the same dependence that al-Ījī establishes in the *First*, the *Fourth*, the *Seventh*, the *Eighth* and the *Ninth Reminders*, and which will be exemplified by the dichotomy “*mustaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*” or “*ghayr mustaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*”, semantic dependence vs. semantic independence.

That the passage [IF.2] must be understood against the background of the theory of *waḍʿ* outlined in the *Risāla* as well as al-Ījī's theory of *waḍʿ* is further confirmed by another passage of al-Abharī's commentary on the *Fawā'id*. In the commentary on this passage of the *Fawā'id*, al-Abharī first explains, following al-Ījī, that the semantics of prepositions is determined by the *relatum* that follows the particle, so that the concept of the particle cannot be semantically determined without that *relatum*. The discussion of the function of the particle gives al-Abharī the opportunity to delve into a detailed analysis of the theory of *waḍʿ*, in which he isolates the four main classes of *waḍʿ*:

[AS.2] The explanation of this is that there are four classes of *waḍʿ*. [1]

For, the act of positing and its object can be both general (*ʿāmm*), so that some general universal notions are intellected by means of a more general notion that includes them. The positing of the term for every single one of those notions occurs by taking into account a more general notion. This is like the positing of

⁹² Al-Kirmānī clarifies that, within this context, the *relatum* (*al-mutaʿalliq*) belongs to the particle, e.g. in the phrase “*Zayd is in the house*” (*Zaydun fī l-dāri*), “*the house*” (*al-dār*) belongs to the term “*in*” (*fī*) when the concept to be conveyed is that “*something is in the house*,” because the ascription between the preposition and the noun is determined and obtains only through the what is ascribed to the preposition (*al-mansūb ilayhi*); cf. al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq*, p. 749.

the morphological pattern “fā’il” for every pattern constructed on this model, such as “‘ālim,” “qādir,” “nāṣir” and so on, which are posited for a subject (*dhāt*) in which the source of derivation (*al-mushtaqq minhu*, i.e., the *maṣḍar*) subsists. <This occurs> by taking into account a notion that includes those morphological patterns, namely a pattern <fashioned> on that model which is posited for something in which the source of derivation subsists. Or like the pattern “maf’ūl” <that is posited> for every pattern signifying some thing to which the source of derivation occurs.⁹³ [2] The positing and its object can be a specific particular (*khāṣṣ juz’ī*), in that a specific notion is intellected. In this way, the term is posited for <that notion> in its specificity, like in the case of proper names. [3] The positing can be general-universal while its object is specific-particular, like in the case of personal, demonstrative and relative pronouns, insofar as they are posited for determined particular notions; because they are definite nouns (*ma‘ārif*). In fact, the definite noun (*ma‘rifa*) is that which is posited for a certain thing, but the act of positing <the definite noun> is general-universal, because <in this case> determined notions are intellected in a general universal way. Thus, the term is posited for every single one of those notions by taking into account that general notion. For example, “this” (*hādhā*) is posited for every determined referent (*al-mu‘ayyan al-mushār ilayhi*), contrary to the <actual> term “referent” (*mushār ilayhi*), because <the latter> is posited for a

⁹³ It is interesting to note that what al-Abharī is describing here resembles the species positing, *al-waḍ‘ al-naw‘ī*, rather than the class *waḍ‘ ‘āmm-‘āmm*. The species positing is usually mentioned in the exegetical tradition stemming from al-Sakkākī’s *Miftāḥ* and al-Qazwīnī’s *Talkhīṣ*, but it is not discussed in any systematic way within a general semantic theory of simple terms. The species positing will be fully integrated together with the individual positing, *al-waḍ‘ al-shakhṣī*, in ‘ilm *al-waḍ‘* later on with the emergence of semi-independent *mutūn* and epitomes (see Chapter Five).

certain subject that is pointed at. <This is also the case for> “I” (*anā*), which is posited for every determined individual through which the speech act (*al-takallum*) subsists, while the term “speaker” (*mutakallim*) is posited for a certain subject in which the speech act subsists. For this reason, all definite nouns (*maʿārif*), unlike the proper nouns, require a semantic context in order to signify, just like the equivocal term (*al-mushtarak*) <needs> that. The difference between the definite noun and the equivocal term is that, in the equivocal term, the positing is manifold (*mutaʿaddid*), while <in definite nouns> there is one and only act of positing. [4] The positing can be specific while its object is a general-universal, like in the case of the generic nouns (*asmāʾ al-ajnās*), such as the positing of “man” (*rajul*) for the genus of “men” (*rijāl*). Prepositions belong to the third class because their positing is general while their object is specific. The relatum <of prepositions> (*al-mutaʿalliq*) belongs to the fourth class, because its positing is specific while its object is general, as is the case for all generic nouns.”⁹⁴

This passage from al-Abharī’s commentary provides a full description of the four classes of *waḍʿ* that are not discussed in these terms by al-Ījī in the *Fawāʾid*. In text [IF.2], al-Ījī explains only how, within the context of the metaphor, the *adverbiality* of the preposition “in” can convey a specific instance of the concept of “in” falling under a more general concept of *adverbiality* of time and place. Starting from this premise, that is the general positing for a specific object, or the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Abharī expands his analysis to the other parts of the speech, and obtains the other three classes of *waḍʿ*, thereby laying out a full-fledged theory of *waḍʿ*. It should also be

⁹⁴ Cf. al-Abharī, *Sharḥ*, fol. 165b-166a.

noted that the classes of *waḍʿ* outlined by al-Abharī correspond only partially to those discussed in the *Introduction* and *Classification* of the *Risāla*. In particular, the canonical classes *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, are never presented in these exact terms in the *Risāla*. The three main classes of *waḍʿ* will be later canonized in the commentary tradition on the *Risāla* alone.⁹⁵ Because al-Abharī makes no clear reference to the *Risāla* in [AS.2], it is unclear whether he develops these class of *waḍʿ* simply on the basis of text [IF.2], or some other texts where al-Ījī discusses the same topics,⁹⁶ or if he is informed by the content of the *Risāla*, specifically the *Introduction* and the *Classification* (see text [AS.1] above). Nevertheless, text [AS.2], just like text [KT.1], confirms that the core classes of the theory of *waḍʿ* were systematized by al-Ījī's immediate disciple within the framework of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, and indeed was more than likely something inherited, not developed, by al-Jurjānī in his glosses on the *Risāla*.

2.3 UṢŪL AL-FIQH AND THE RISĀLA: PROLEGOMENA TO A SEMANTIC THEORY

It has been shown that passages from al-Ījī's *Fawāʾid* constitutes evidence of the development of a semantic theory outlined in the *Risāla*. There is, however, another work composed by al-Ījī, namely his commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *uṣūl al-fiqh* treatise *Mukhtaṣar*

⁹⁵ It is important to note that, unlike the majority of the commentators, al-Abharī considers the fourth class, that is, the *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*, to be admissible. Interestingly, in this outline al-Abharī describes all kinds of generic nouns as falling under this class, while for commentators on the *Risāla* generic nouns fall under the class *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*. The passage from al-Abharī's commentary represents a further confirmation that the canonical classes of *waḍʿ* predate al-Jurjānī, who, according to Weiss, was the first to systematize the three classes of *waḍʿ* into *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* in his glosses on the *Risāla*. See the case of al-Kirmani's *Tahqīq*, text [KT.1] above.

⁹⁶ See the next section which discusses the semantic theory of the *Risāla* in relation to al-Ījī's work on *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*.

Muntahá al-Wuṣūl, which sheds more light on the development of his semantic theory of *waḍʿ*.⁹⁷

It is in the section of the linguistic prolegomena (*al-mabāḍīʾ al-lughawiyya*) of his commentary on Ibn al-Ḥāḍib's *Mukhtaṣar* that al-Ījī clearly echoes several topics discussed in the *Risāla*.

A first point of comparison between the *Risāla* and the commentary on the *Mukhtaṣar* can be found in the discussion of technical vocabulary. One parallel emerges as early as Ibn al-Ḥāḍib's classification of the parts of the speech into nouns, verbs and particles; Al-Ījī explains here that the classification of simple terms (*al-laḥẓ al-mufrad*) into these three groups occurs:

[IS.1] “Either because <the term> is semantically independent, or it is not. The second case <corresponds> to the preposition. In the first case, <the term> may either signify by its form one of the three tenses, or it does not. The second is the case <that corresponds> to nouns, and the first case <corresponds> to verbs. In this way, the definition of every <noun> is known, in virtue of the inclusion of the equivocal term (*al-mushtarak*), that is the genus (*al-jins*) and <the

⁹⁷ The full title of Ibn al-Ḥāḍib's work is *Mukhtaṣar Muntahá al-Wuṣūl wa-l-Amal fī ʿIlmay al-Uṣūl wa-l-Jadal*. As the title makes clear, this is a self-abridgement of the author's *Muntahá al-Wuṣūl*. The *Mukhtaṣar* belongs to a series of treatises on *uṣūl al-fiqh* influenced by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *al-Maḥṣūl*, which discusses topics, such as linguistics, semantics and epistemology, that go beyond the ones treated in the classical *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature. This is shown by sections devoted to epistemology, theory of knowledge, theory of language, logic and dialectics that cover no less than seventy pages of the *Mukhtaṣar*; cf. *Mukhtaṣar Muntahá al-Wuṣūl wa-l-Amal fī ʿIlmay al-Uṣūl wa-l-Jadal*, ed. by Nazīr Ḥammādū, Bayrūt: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1427/2006, pp. 204-274. Like as al-Rāzī's *al-Maḥṣūl*, Ibn al-Ḥāḍib's *Mukhtaṣar* had a profound impact in the following tradition of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and engendered a rich and longstanding commentary activity, with no fewer than ninety main commentaries, among which al-Ījī's emerges as the most popular and the object of glosses and super-glosses. Al-Jurjānī's glosses on al-Ījī's commentary elicited in turn no less than twenty-five sets of super-glosses.

inclusion> of that by which each noun is distinguished from the other, which is the differentia (*al-faṣl*).”⁹⁸

The division of parts of speech that al-Ījī establishes here is based upon the dichotomy “*yastaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya/lā yastaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*,” which also appears in several *Reminders* of the *Risāla* as the main distinction between the semantic features of verbs and particles. Like in the *Risāla*, the dependence and independence of a term serve to classify the different parts of speech according to their semantic features, rather than their syntactical ones. This is conveyed by the notion of “(*ghayr*) *istiqlāl bi-l-mafhūmiyya*,” which emphasizes how comprehensible or intelligible a concept (*mafhūm*) is on its own, as opposed to requiring the other concepts that make up a sentence. However, the notion of “(*lā*) *yastaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*” is not al-Ījī’s original formulation. It was instead part of al-Ījī’s inherited technical vocabulary, which he then used to set forth his semantic theory, since it appears again in the *matn* of the *Mukhtaṣar* in the discussion of the preposition. The same notion, it is important to note, seems to appear in Ibn

⁹⁸ Cf. al-Ījī, *Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahá*, (with glosses by al-Taftāzānī, al-Jurjānī, al-Harawī and al-Jizāwī) ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismā‘īl, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1424/2004, vol. 1, p. 447. There is another edition of al-Ījī’s commentary edited by Fādi Naṣīf and Ṭāriq Yaḥyá, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1421/2000, which contains several typos and mistakes.

al-Ḥāḡib's *al-Īdāh*, a commentary on al-Zamakhsharī's *al-Mufaṣṣal*, a renowned work on morphology and syntax.⁹⁹

The discussion of syntactical compounds evokes a parallel between the two works of al-Ījī. Following Ibn al-Ḥāḡib, he distinguishes two types of compounds (*murakkab*), namely between sentences and non-sentences (*jumla wa-ghayr jumla*). For both authors, a sentence is what is posited to convey an ascription (*ifādat al-nisba*) and can occur only in two ways: between two nouns, or between a noun and a verb. In al-Ījī's view, to convey an ascription means in fact to provide the semantic determination of one of the two terms of the sentence in itself (*ta'yīn aḥad ṭarafayhā bi-ʿaynihi*). As al-Ījī affirms in *Eight and Ninth Reminders* of the *Risāla*, the particle covers neither the function of subject nor predicate. Moreover, al-Ījī makes an important distinction by correcting the widespread assumption that compounds such as "*ḥayawānūn nāṭiqūn*" (a

⁹⁹ The *Īdāh* might be at the origins of Ibn al-Ḥāḡib's new formulation, as most of the views held by Ibn al-Ḥāḡib in the *Īdāh* are reproduced verbatim in the *Mukhtaṣar*. Now, since the *Īdāh* does not explicitly refer to the *Mukhtaṣar*, it is plausible to infer that the latter was composed after the former and that the linguistic views expressed in the *Mukhtaṣar* are indebted to the *Īdāh*. Moreover, Ibn al-Ḥāḡib's formula occurs in his veiled criticism of al-Zamakhsharī's definition of the three parts of the speech. According to al-Zamakhsharī, who is in line with the classical view shared by the majority of grammarians, a noun is a term signifying a single concept conventionally. Ibn al-Ḥāḡib adds that according to al-Zamakhsharī, like many other grammarians, the noun in itself signifies a concept (*fi nafsihi*). It is in this particular section of the *matn* that Ibn al-Ḥāḡib introduces the notion "*yastaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*" to gloss al-Zamakhsharī's wording "*fi nafsihi*." Ibn al-Ḥāḡib claims that for a noun to signify "*fi nafsihi*" means that it is semantically independent, "*yastaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*," while the preposition is not independently comprehensible. Ibn al-Ḥāḡib provides an example for the case of the particle such as "*min*" and "*ilā*," which in virtue of their imposition as they indicate an itemized concept, need the mention of a noun related to them. Ibn al-Ḥāḡib's introduction of the notion "*yastaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*" may indicate the insufficiency of the traditional clause "*fi nafsihi*" to explain the semantic function of the parts of the speech; see Ibn al-Ḥāḡib, *al-Īdāh fi Sharḥ al-Mufaṣṣal*, ed. by Ibrāhīm Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh, Dimashq: Dār Saʿd al-Dīn, 1426/2005, vol. 1, pp. 12-13.

rational animal), “Zaydun kātibun” (Zayd is a writer)¹⁰⁰ or “ghulāmu Zaydin” (Zayd’s servant), in themselves do not convey any ascription between the two terms, because they have been posited not to convey a relation, but rather an individual essence, or an essence (*dhāt*), in such a way that the ascription will be understood from that essence only accidentally.¹⁰¹ Although these are not topics directly discussed in the *Risāla*, the vocabulary that al-Ījī uses here such as

¹⁰⁰ At this stage of my research, I find it hard to understand why al-Ījī does not consider this construction to convey an assertoric ascription (*nisba* or *isnad*) between subject and predicate. The example “Zaydun kātibun,” as a nominal sentence “*jumla ismiyya*,” should fall under the syntactical compound that indeed convey a *nisba* between the two terms. Otherwise, one should read the sentence as “Zaydun kātibun” (a writing Zayd), where “kātib” is an adjective modifying “Zayd,” rather than a predicate. However, this would not explain why al-Ījī is listing this example right after another example of the same grammatical structure. In his glosses, al-Taftāzānī points at the same problem, because the example above does in fact convey an assertoric ascription between two nouns – as al-Ījī wants the assertoric sentences to function –, namely between an active participle (*kātib*) and its subject-agent Zayd; see al-Ījī, *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, p. 646.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, p. 464. The discussion that follows the previous on echoes a crucial point in the debates at the intersection between language and metaphysics stemming from Avicenna’s *Maqūlāt*. Al-Ījī, following the lemma of Ibn al-Ḥājjib, discusses the four types of simple terms according to the concepts expressed by it. The first: a single term for a single concept encompasses two sub-categories. A) Many entities can participate in the notion of this term by being predicated of it affirmatively, and this is the case of the universal. However, a universal notion can apply differently to different entities, such as by intensity and weakness, and posteriority and anteriority. Al-Ījī provides an evocative example that explains this, that is “*such as the existence belonging to the Creator and to the creature, because the existence of the Creator is stronger and more prior, and it is called modulated (mushakkak); contrarily to this, it is called univocal (mutawāṭīʾ)*.” B) In case those entities do not share the term’s notion, the real particular (*al-juzʾi al-ḥaqīqī*) obtains. The second is the opposite of the first case, namely many terms for just as many concepts, called heterogeneous (*mutabāyin*). The third: one term for multiple concepts, which corresponds to the equivocal (*al-mushtarak*). The fourth: multiple terms for one concept, which corresponds to synonyms (*mutarādif*). Cf. *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, p. 467.

“*ifādat al-nisba*,” “*ta’yīn*” and “*dhāt*,” as well as the primacy accorded to the semantic perspective in which they are employed, can be better understood in relation to the *Risāla*.¹⁰²

The most relevant discussion appears in the section on particles and prepositions. According to Ibn al-Ḥāḥib, the definition of particles and prepositions (*ḥurūf*) borrowed from the grammatical tradition – which holds that particles such as the prepositions “*min*” and “*ilā*” are semantically not independent (*lā yastaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*)¹⁰³ – entails that particles signify a singular concept (*ma‘ná ifrādī*) on the condition that their *relatum* (*al-muta‘alliq*) is mentioned. That is to say, the condition for particles and prepositions to fully convey their concepts is the presence of a *relatum* that come immediately before or after them (e.g., *dhahabtu ilā l-madrasa*). This is not the case for nouns and verbs, which convey a concept by themselves, and are in this sense semantically independent. Ibn al-Ḥāḥib worries that this widely held definition falls short of explaining the semantic function of noun-derived particles and prepositions such as “*dhū*,” “*fawqa*” and “*taḥta*,” for these are not particles as such, but preposition-like nouns (*asmā*). Just

¹⁰² Echoes of the technical vocabulary are also present in the discussion on derived nouns, *al-mushtaqq*. Among the conditions under which the derived noun obtains, al-Ījī includes semantic agreement (*al-muwāfaqa fi l-ma‘ná*) between the derived noun and the base term (*aṣl*). The concept of the derived noun must in fact contain the concept of the base term, either accompanied by an addition or without it. The former is the case of the active participle “*ḍārib*” which signifies an essence to which the *maṣdar ḍarb* (*hitting*) belongs. Later in the same discussion, al-Ījī refers to two main groups of derived nouns, those which respect the rules of derivation (*iṭṭarada*) – such as active participles, adjectives (*al-ṣifāt al-mushabbaha*), superlative and elative forms, nouns of time, place and instrument – and those which do not, such as names of constellations. Al-Ījī uses the examples of “*al-qārūra*” (a long-necked bottle), “*al-dabarān*” (a star called *Eye of Taurus*, part of *Taurus* constellation) and other names of stars, as derived nouns that do not belong to any specific class of those systematized by grammarians. The reason for that, al-Ījī explains, is that in the first case the existence of the primal concept is included within the act of denomination (*tasmiyya*), so that what is meant is a certain essence insofar as the concept has a relation with that essence (*dhātun mā bi-‘tibār nisbatin lahu ilayhā*). In the other case the existence of the primal concept is a determinant and corroborating factor for the denomination, and is not included within the denomination, so that what is meant is a specific essence in which the primal concept occurs only in virtue of the specific feature of the essence; cf. *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, p. 611.

¹⁰³ It has been shown in a previous footnote that it was probably Ibn al-Ḥāḥib who, in his *al-Īdāḥ fi Sharḥ al-Mufaṣṣal*, first systematized the dichotomy *yastaqillu/lā yastaqillu bi-l-mafhūmiyya* as a semantic approach to solve problems arising from al-Zamakhsharī’s definition of nouns, which are said to fulfill their semantic function *per se*, *bi-naḥsihi*.

as prepositions like “*min*,” “*ilā*” and “*fī*” are used only in relation to a *relatum* that precedes or follows them, these prepositions-like nouns function in the same way. The presence of the *relatum* is however not *sine qua non* for their concept to fully obtain, because they are still to be considered as nouns (*asmāʾ*) and thus they retain their semantic independence. Ibn al-Ḥāḡib points to a potential resolution of this issue by way of defining particle-like nouns in terms of the act of positing (*waḍʿ*), rather than on the basis of their usage (*istiʿmāl*). This means that particle-like nouns such as “*dhū*” would originally be posited to convey the general concept of “possessor of” (*ṣāḡib*) in order to obtain a qualification for generic nouns (*li-yatawaṣṣala bihi ilā l-waṣfi bi-asmāʾi al-ajnāsi*). For this semantic function to be fulfilled and for the itemized concept to be conveyed, particles like “*dhū*” must also be followed by their *relatum*, a generic noun, as a second term of an *iḍāfa* (*al-muḍāf ilayhi*), e.g., “*Zaydun dhū mālin*” (*Zayd is wealthy*, lit. *Zayd is possessor of wealth*).

Al-Ījī seems to be aware of Ibn al-Ḥāḡib’s discussion, and analyzes the same question in a more systematic way. He divides it into three main stages: the statement of the question (*al-taqrīr*), the issue arising from it (*al-ishkāl*) and the solution (*al-ḡall*) as it is presented by Ibn al-Ḥāḡib. Al-Ījī explains in the statement of the question that the semantic function of particles as the grammarians would define them is fulfilled only when their *relatum* is mentioned. In this way, the preposition “*min*” and “*ilā*” respectively convey a singular concept of “beginning” (*ibtidāʾ*) and “end” (*intihāʾ*). The same does not apply to nouns and verbs, because the singular concepts of “beginning” (*ibtidāʾ*) and “to begin” (*ibtadaʾa*), taken respectively as a noun-*maṣḡar* and a verb, are conveyed by the terms themselves. The problem thus arises when one acknowledges that preposition-like nouns such as “*dhū*,” “*fawqa*” and “*taḡta*,” which are not prepositions in a strict sense since they derive from nouns, also require a *relatum* in an *iḍāfa* construction, that is, a term that follows, to convey their specific concepts. Therefore, it is

problematic to determine whether they signify as nouns or as prepositions.¹⁰⁴ One must also acknowledge that these particle-like nouns have been originally posited to be semantically independent in the same way that simple nouns are, because they each convey itemized concepts by themselves. This explanation leads inevitably to a conundrum wherein a specific class of particles, like “*dhū*” and “*fawqa*,” are posited to be semantically independent, like nouns and verbs, but the actual linguistic usage belies their semantic non-independence.

Al-Ījī reports Ibn al-Ḥāḥib’s solution (*ḥall*) to this dilemma, which consists in drawing a distinction between *isti‘mal*, the linguistic usage, and *waḍ‘*, the act of positing. Al-Ījī agrees that particles like “*dhū*” and “*fawqa*” are used (*ustu‘mila*), like “*min*” and “*ilá*,” only together with their *relata* on account of some reason (*li-amrin mā*). Despite this similarity, particle-like nouns would ultimately differ from particles like “*min*” and “*ilá*” when taking into account the dimensions of the act of positing. Following Ibn al-Ḥāḥib, al-Ījī explains that the positing of “*dhū*” to signify its singular concept (*fī waḍ‘ihi dāllatan*) is not subjected to the condition of mentioning any *relatum*, unlike the positing of “*min*” and “*ilá*.” This is the case because, by itself, “*dhū*” does convey the concept of “possessor of” as understood in all the singular instances of “*dhū*” (*‘inda al-afrād*). However, because of the *praxis* in its usage, “*dhū*” is posited to convey the concept of “possessor of” on account of a certain scope or an intention (*li-gharaḍ*). More specifically, the intention is to provide the description of a generic noun, like in the sentence “*Zaydun dhū mālin*” (*Zayd is wealthy*). It seems that the nature of the positing of these particles is twofold: like nouns, they convey their concepts by themselves, but they must fulfill a specific intention, that is the description of a generic noun. This second feature of the positing of “*dhū*” ultimately requires a *relatum* to be mentioned. Al-Ījī points out that following this line of thought, the second feature

¹⁰⁴ Following the previous debates among grammarians, *uṣūliyyūn* and rhetoricians, al-Ījī adds *amāma*, *quddāma*, *ayyu*, *ba‘ḍu*, *kullu*, *warā’a*, *qayda* etc.

must be admitted as not immediately evident from the analysis of the positing of “*dhū*,” because these particles are posited in the same way as nouns.

At some stage of his career Ibn al-Ḥāḥib was not fully convinced by this solution. Al-Ījī reports a quote from Ibn al-Ḥāḥib’s *Muntahá al-Uṣūl*, the unabridged and allegedly older version of the *Mukhtaṣar*. Here Ibn al-Ḥāḥib claims that this solution is problematic for particles and preposition like “*‘alá*,” “*‘an*” and especially for “*ka*” when it functions as a noun (*fi l-ismiyya*), that is when it conveys the concept of likeness and similarity, i.e., the concept of *mithl*. This seems to be the case because these particles, whether functioning as nouns or particles, convey one and the same concept. Though he eventually comes to settle for this solution, Ibn al-Ḥāḥib admits that the grammarians’ definition of the particle, and their approach to explaining the two cases of particles like “*min*” and “*dhū*,” is not strong enough to be convincing.

In al-Ījī’s view, neither does the explanation of the grammarians’ nor Ibn al-Ḥāḥib’s view solve the dilemma. Indeed al-Ījī rejects both grammarians and Ibn al-Ḥāḥib’s views, which he labels as sterile and arbitrary (*al-tamahḥul wa-l-tamahḥuk*). At this point, al-Ījī notes to his reader that his own solution ought to be taken as the truth (*ḥaqīqat al-ḥāl*). He claims:

[IS.2] You should know, firstly, a premise (*muqaddima*), which is: the term is sometimes posited by a general positing for specific things, like all the forms of the derived nouns and nouns of indications (*al-mubhamāt*).¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the positor of language claims “the form of the active participle stemming from every *maṣḍar* is <posited> for the subject in which the signified of the *maṣḍar* subsists, while the form of the passive participle <is posited> for the subject on whom <the signified

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Lane, *Lexicon*..., p. 260. The term *mubham* is another name to indicate demonstrative pronoun; another translation for *al-mubhamāt* could be ‘ambiguous nouns.’

of the *maṣḍar* falls.” What is known from this is the status of <terms like> “*ḍārib*” and “*maḍrūb*” without paying attention to their specificities. The same is the case when the positor of language claims ““*hādha*” is posited for each specific thing pointed at; “*anā*” is posited for each first person; “*alladhī*” is posited for every determined subject in general.” However, the positing of “*hādha*” is not like the positing of “*rajul*,” because the concept posited for the latter is general, while those others are posited with respect to a general concept (*ma‘ná ‘āmm*) for specific things that in turn fall under the general concept. Therefore, when ‘*rajul*’ applies to Zayd in his specificity, this is a figurative sense (*majāz*); but if what is meant <by “*rajul*”> is that general concept corresponding <to the term “*rajul*”>, then this is the literal sense (*ḥaqīqa*). Conversely, if by “*hādha*,” “*anā*” and “*alladhī*” are meant the specificities, then these are literal senses, because generality is not meant at all. In fact, no one says “*hādha*” <alone> to mean one of the many things that can be pointed at [i.e., without specifying which thing is indicated in the vicinity], and likewise “*anā*” does not mean a certain first person. If this is established, we claim that the preposition is posited with respect to a general positing – that is one type of ascription (*nisba*), such as “*beginning*” and “*end*” – for each determined “*beginning*” and “*end*” in its specificity. The ascription, however, is determined only by the subject-term of the ascription, so that the beginning that belongs to *Baṣra* is determined by *Baṣra*, while the *end* that belongs to *Kūfa* is determined by *Kūfa*. Therefore, as long as the *relatum* is not mentioned, the singular notion (*fard*) of that type <of ascription>, which is the signified of the preposition, will not occur neither in the intellect nor in the external reality (*lā fī l-‘aqli wa-lā fī l-khārijī*). <The singular concept> will thus occur only by means of

the subject-term of the relation (*al-mansūb ilayhi*) and will be grasped through its *relatum*. <This is> unlike what has been posited for the type <of ascription> itself, such as “beginning” and “end,” and unlike what has been posited for a certain essence with regard to a relation, such as for “*dhū*,” “*fawqa*,” “‘*alá*,” “‘*an*,” “*kāf*,” when by them one means the absolute concept of “height,” “departure,” “similarity” etc., because these are like “beginning” and “end.””¹⁰⁶

The resemblance between this passage of the commentary on the *Mukhtaṣar* and the semantic theory of particles, pronouns and derived nouns outlined in the *Introduction* and the *Classification* of the *Risāla* is crucial to the understanding of the origins of some core aspects of the theory of *waḍʿ*, even though the *Risāla* and this passage of the *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar* differ both in nature and scope. While the former is conceived as a general and yet concise semantic and grammatical theory, the latter is part of the linguistic prolegomena developed in the *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature which covers a wider spectrum of syntactical and semantic issues within some larger legal hermeneutics. Moreover, in the former, al-Ījī aims to sketch a general semantic theory that groups all types of terms from the *waḍʿ* perspective, while in the latter he is addressing one specific issue regarding grammarians’ definition of particles, and focuses on his own personal solution to the conundrum that Ibn al-Ḥājjib had evidently come short of solving.

Al-Ījī’s solution in text [IS.2] does not depart from the approach of the grammarians or Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s approach in all respects. The solution in fact builds upon the *waḍʿ/istiʿmāl* dichotomy proposed by Ibn al-Ḥājjib, by pushing the analysis and application of the concept of *waḍʿ* in its two modes, *ʿāmm* and *khāṣṣ*, even further. In so doing, al-Ījī obtains two general semantic classes, the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and the *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, which explain the semantic function that distinguishes

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, p. 659.

generic nouns from particles. The class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* now includes derived nouns, personal, relative and demonstrative pronouns and, more importantly, all types of particles. The *‘āmm-‘āmm* now includes all generic nouns that have a twofold semantic function, insofar as may convey a literal or a figurative sense. This is the case with “man” (*rajul*), for example, when it conveys respectively the general-literal sense of “man” and when it applies to actual individuals like Zayd.

Continuing Ibn al-Ḥāḥib’s discussion of the semantics of the particle-prepositions “*min*” and “*ilá*,” al-Ījī explains that the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* involves positing a term for a specific object. He further clarifies the nature of the general positing as that which stands for a general concept (*ma‘nan ‘āmmun*). This clarification might seem contradictory, because it entails that the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* involves positing a term by a general concept for a specific concept, and this is unlikely to be the most apt explanation for this class of *waḍ‘*. Al-Ījī does add a step in the formulation of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, by claiming that the general positing also entails a type of ascription (*naw‘ min al-nisba*), for which the *waḍ‘ ‘āmm* now stands. Within the general scope of the semantic function of particles, the *waḍ‘ ‘āmm* thus has a twofold semantic function, that of the general concept of the particle, and that of a type of ascription. In this way, particles and prepositions are posited for specific instances in their specificity by considering this twofold function of general concept and of their ascription. Moreover, the solution of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* includes the role of the *relatum* as the determinant factor for the particular instantiation of the preposition. al-Ījī’s recourse to the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* also has the advantage of preserving the role of the *relatum* (*al-mansūb ilayhi*). The *relatum* does not determine, as grammarians would prefer, the general concept itself, but rather that type of ascription subsumed in the *waḍ‘ ‘āmm*. As such the *relatum* will indirectly be responsible for only one specific instance of the concept of any particles to obtain. In other words, the preposition “*from*” (*min*) is posited by taking into

account the general concept of “beginning” (*ibtidāʾ*) as a type of ascription for only one determined instance of that general concept. This particular instance of “*min*” will occur only when the *relatum* (say, *al-Baṣra*) by being mentioned, determines one item or instance (*fard*) of that ascription (*nisba*). Particle-derived nouns such as “*dhū*” and “*fawqa*” undergo the same process. The nature of the positing from which they result guarantees that they convey respectively the general concepts of “possessor” and “height,” and a type of relation to a generic noun in an *iḍāfa* construction, with the generic nouns being the *relata* that semantically determine one specific instance of “*dhū*” and “*fawqa*.”

Finally, the discussion developed in [IS.2] finds traces in another section of the *Risāla*: the *Eleventh* reminder, where al-Ījī presents the same case of particle-like nouns. In this short and elliptical discussion, he explains that “*regarding “dhū” and “fawqa,” the particularity of their concept is a universal (juzʾiyyat mafhūmihimā kullī), because they mean ‘possessor’ and ‘height’; even though they are only used as particulars.*” Al-Ījī’s recourse to the example of “*dhū*” and “*fawqa*” is not accidental, and must be understood within the context of text [IS.2]. Accordingly, the topic of the *Eleventh* reminder reproduces in a more succinct way the conundrum solved in [IS.1] on the basis of the semantic classes previously discussed by al-Ījī in the *Introduction* and the *Classification*.

CONCLUSION

The scope of this chapter has been to provide textual data and analyses that shed light on the origins of al-Ījī’s *Risāla* and the various contexts from which it emerged. In the first section, I offered an overview of the content and structure of the *Risāla*, and argued that the title *Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya*, and its variants, as well as its association with a general outline of the theory

of *waḍʿ*, originate from commentators as early as al-Jurjānī. Moreover, the different internal divisions of the *Risāla* and its lemmata became the subject of debate among the same commentators, who attempted to establish a more coherent and canonical version of the *matn*. The somewhat unsystematic nature of the *matn* confirms my earlier claim in Chapter One that the textual differences between the canonical text of the *Risāla* and the passages found in al-Suyūṭī's quotations, point to the circulation of uncanonized versions of *matn* long after al-Ījī's lifetime.

In the second section, I highlighted parallels between al-Ījī's work on rhetoric, the *Fawā'id*, and topics discussed in the *Risāla*, and show how two commentaries on the *Fawā'id* authored by al-Ījī's direct students, al-Kirmānī and al-Abharī, also refer to the *Risāla*, thereby providing evidence of the early reception and systematization of its *matn*. I supplement this textual evidence by comparing another work by al-Ījī, namely, his commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *Mukhtaṣar*, in which I again show similarities between the discussion of the semantic function of the particles in the *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar* and that in the *Risāla*.

Based on the textual and historical data supplied throughout the chapter, I offer two scenarios that tell a more complete story about the emergence and composition of the *Risāla* that we have at present. The first is one in which al-Ījī composes an earlier version of the *matn* as an appendix (hence *ta'liq*; see [AS.1] above), to his *Fawā'id* before or around the year 730/1330. After this date, alongside his revision of his *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar* in 734/1334, al-Ījī also rewrote the *ta'liq* in a more structured and coherent form. With this revision, he achieved the final form of the text, conceived as an additional explanatory point (hence *fa'ida*) to his *Fawā'id*. It is during the revisions of the two works that al-Ījī found the semantic theory contained in the *fā'ida* useful for solving the semantic puzzles within Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *Mukhtaṣar*, thus explaining the similarities between the *Risāla* and text [IS.2]. On this interpretation, the *fā'ida*, that is, the *Risāla*, was

equally useful as a semantic theory in solving different puzzles from other works, one on *balāgha* and the other on *uṣūl al-fiqh*. The *matn* in its final form would therefore have been composed between ca. 730/1330 and 734/1334, and undergone a gradual shift from a *taʿlīq* to a *fāʾida*, finally culminating in a *risāla*. I offer evidence that the transition from a *fāʾida* to an independent *risāla* involved the active participation of al-Ījī's students, who transmitted the text separately from the *Fawāʾid*, and referred to the *matn* as a *rusayyila*.

The second scenario I present shows al-Ījī's students as having an even more active role in the canonization of the *risāla*. In this scenario, by the time of the composition of the *Fawāʾid* and the first version of the *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, before or around the year 730/1330, al-Ījī composed an appendix or an additional point, *taʿlīq/fāʾida*, both to supply his *Fawāʾid* with a general semantic theory of the parts of the speech and to solve the semantic puzzles of the *Fawāʾid* and *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*. After al-Ījī's death, the *matn* remains in the form that appears in [AS.1], at least until 777/1376 (or 778/1377), the date of completion of al-Abharī's commentary, after which one or more of al-Ījī's direct students reworked the *matn* substantially, thus creating the canonical text of the *Risāla*. This would explain why text [AS.1] differs from the canonical *Risāla* and, more importantly, why there is no evidence that any of al-Ījī's aforementioned students composed glosses or commentaries on the *Risāla*. According to this scenario, one or more of al-Ījī's students undertook these editorial changes to the *Risāla* between 777/1376 (or 778/1377), when al-Abharī completed his commentary on al-Ījī's *Fawāʾid*, and al-Jurjānī's death in 816/1413, since al-Jurjānī's glosses on the *Risāla* are a witness to a more canonized version of the *matn*, despite several textual issues brought up by al-Jurjānī regarding the lemmata.

Regardless of which of these two scenarios is more likely to be true, it is clear from this chapter that the *Risāla* and its semantic theory, in its various recensions, must be understood as dependent upon the more general semantic theory of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*. This perspective

is echoed almost two centuries after al-Ījī's death by Ṭāshköprüzādeh, who was well informed about the evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and the *Risāla*. In his discussion of semantic determination (*ta‘yīn*) in his commentary on al-Ījī's *Fawā'id*, he explains that this type of determination occurs in two different ways. One is determination by the substance of the term itself (*jawhar al-lafẓ*), as in the case of proper nouns, while the other is by some sort of particle-preposition (*ḥarf*). Determination of the second type is realized in different ways, for example by adding the article *al-*, or using the vocative (*nidā'*) *yā* followed by a noun. If these additional particles are not added to the noun, then determination might occur by means of the semantic context (*qarīna*). This type of determination takes place in speech (*fī l-kalām*), as is the case for personal pronouns. In other words, the semantics of personal pronouns is realized only within a speech situation (*al-mukhāṭba wa-l-mukālama*) between the speaker and the listener. At this point, Ṭāshköprüzādeh continues by saying

From his (al-Ījī's) claim “in a speech situation” someone has understood that the semantic context occurs in the very same term, to the extent that it generated confusion about the <way in which> the semantic context of the term occurs in speech. <For this reason> someone has understood this to be a conjecture (*fī quwwat al-wahm*), as if he had never given the author's *Risāla al-Waḍ'iyya* a close reading (*ka-anna lam yuṭāli‘ al-risāla al-waḍ'iyya li-l-muṣannif*), where the author claims ‘*then the semantic context occurs in the speech situation* [...]’.¹⁰⁷

Finally, this intimate relation between the *Risāla* and *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān* emerges from the collection of *madrassa* manuals *Majmū‘ al-Mutūn* mentioned at the beginning of this

¹⁰⁷ Ṭāshköprüzādeh, *Sharḥ al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya*, Istanbul: al-Maṭba‘a al-‘Āmira, 1312/1894, p. 57.

chapter. The short *mutūn* gathered in these collections aim to provide memorizable texts of virtually all disciplines for beginning students. In the various recensions, the *mutūn* are also arranged following the classical *madrasa* curriculum, which starts with the religious and juridical sciences, via the linguistic ones, and concludes with poetics. I contend that the order in which the *mutūn* are arranged is not the result of chance, but reflects an epistemological journey designed for *madrasa* students. It then becomes interesting to look more closely at the arrangement of the *mutūn*, which is as follows: *tawhīd*, *ḥadīth*, *fiqh*, *sharīʿa*, grammar, syntax, logic, *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, *ḥikma*, *ādāb al-baḥth*, prosody, arithmetic and *ʿilm al-miqāt*. The position of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* right after *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* is indeed not accidental. Rather, it indicates that, at least for pre-modern scholars, al-Ījī's *Risāla*, the only *matn* on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, was naturally related to a text like *al-Samarqandiyya fī l-Istiʿāra* by Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī (see Chapter Three for further evidence) and the *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* by al-Qazwīnī, two of the four main texts of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* studied in the *madrasa* tradition.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ In Chapter Three I will show textual evidence indicating that Abū al-Qāsim's treatise on the metaphor was originally conceived by its author as an appendix (*dhayl*) of his commentary on the *Risāla*. Another important point that awaits further investigation is the *matn* contained under the *ḥikma* section. The only *ḥikma* text which appears in the majority of the collection is a short work entitled *al-Maqūlāt al-ʿAshar*, probably by al-Sijāʿī, composed in poetic form. The work outlines all ten Aristotelian categories, without discussing them in the detail. There are several versifications of the ten Aristotelian categories, two of which received attention from commentators, namely the *Maqūlāt* of al-Sijāʿī and that by al-Bulaydī (1176/1763). To my knowledge, these works and their commentaries have not been the subject of any studies in Western academia. It is plausible to argue that many commentators and glossators, most of whom were Azharī scholars or associated with this institution, find in the *Maqūlāt* genre the room to discuss topics related to metaphysics that the discussion of the categories in the logic manual did not allow to. Of more interest for the present research is the relations and implication that the semantic theory of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* might have had with the topics discussed in the *Maqūlāt*, as the former was meant to be memorized right before the latter. One of the most prolific authors on these two works is the famous Azharī scholar Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār, who composed several sets of glosses on these *Maqūlāt* manuals. As an example, his glosses on both al-Sijāʿī and al-Bulaydī's *Maqūlāt* extended over three hundred pages in the edition of 1328/1910 by the Cairene al-Maṭbaʿa al-Khayriyya; on al-Bulaydī see El-Rouayheb, Khaled, "Bulaydī, Muḥammad al-Ḥasani", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three*, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson. Consulted online on 07 March 2018 http://dx.doi.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_25419. First published online: 2013.

CHAPTER THREE

EMERGENCE AND FORMATION

This chapter will look more closely at the emergence and early formation of the exegetical practice on the *Risāla*. In particular, the set of glosses authored by al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, and the first full commentary on al-Ījī's *Risāla* authored by al-Jurjānī's student Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī, set in motion the exegetical momentum that lays down the basis for the emergence of later, classic commentaries. In this early stage of the exegesis, al-Jurjānī's glosses and Khwāja 'Alī's commentary aim, first and foremost, to unpack and clarify the terse and elliptical style of al-Ījī's foundational text, from the one hand, and to critically evaluate his views and the internal inconsistencies of the *matn*, from the other hand. The first full commentary authored by Khwāja 'Alī sets up an exegetical agenda that is followed by his immediate successors, such as Jāmī, Mas'ūd al-Shirwānī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, and marks a crucial step into the formation of the exegetical *praxis* of 'ilm al-waḍ' that will climax with the commentaries of 'Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfārā'inī and 'Alī al-Qūshjī.

The chapter is divided into two main sections, where the commentaries in their chronological order are discussed in some detail. The first section focuses on the phase of emergence of the exegetical activity. This phase is characterized by al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī's unsystematic exegesis. Al-Jurjānī's gloss focuses only on specific aspects of the semantic theory of the *Risāla*. As the textual comparison will show, these glosses accompanied and were transmitted with the main text as marginal and interlinear annotations, and were probably not intended to be an independent work. The composition of Khwāja 'Alī's full commentary marks

instead the turning point for the emergence of a more systematic exegesis on the *matn*. Khwāja ‘Alī is considered by his successors the first commentator who painstakingly attempts to divide his dense and detailed exegesis of each lemma into a *lexis* and a *thêoria*, in order to establish a textual coherence of the *matn* and elucidate the intricate and, at times, discordant views expounded in it.

The second section will look at the extensive glosses and full commentaries that emerged from this early exegetical phase, and that constantly engages with Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentarial approach on the *matn*, as well as with his views and criticisms. This second stage of the formative phase is represented by the set of extensive glosses authored by Khwāja ‘Alī’s student, the famous poet and polymath Mullā Jāmī, whose adherence to the novel semantic theory of the *Risāla* resurfaces in his more influential work on grammar and syntax *al-Fawā’id al-Ḍiyā’iyya*. Other classic minor commentaries authored in the second half of the 9th/15th century witness this growing formative phase of the exegesis. This phase will culminate with the two commentaries authored by Mas‘ūd al-Shirwānī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī.

The second part of this section is devoted to assessing these two classic commentaries, which are markedly influenced by the exegetical agenda established by the works of Khwāja ‘Alī and al-Jurjānī. Al-Shirwānī’s and Abū al-Qāsim’s interest in al-Ījī’s new semantic theory responds to specific concerns that arise from different theoretical backgrounds. Whereas al-Shirwānī’s exegesis emerges against the backdrop of logical and strictly semantic concerns, al-Samarqandī’s commentary construes the theory of *waḍ‘* as a necessary preamble and the background for the semantic topics discussed in the tradition of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* and *al-bayān*. Finally, the formative stage of the exegesis represented by the commentaries of Khwāja ‘Alī, al-Shirwānī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī becomes crucial for the shaping of the following debates on al-Ījī’s semantic theory, which culminates with ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’inī’s and al-

Qūshjī's commentaries and the two scholastic traditions that emerged from them, and that will be discussed in Chapter Four.

3.1 The Emergence of the Tradition: Early Glosses and Commentaries

As chapters One and Two have shown, the lack of historical data represents the main obstacle for detailing the dynamics of the early transmission of and exegetical practice on the *Risāla*. It should be noted that al-Ījī's direct students, such as Shams al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Tabrīzī (d. after 756/1356), Sayf al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. after 778/1376) and Iftikhār al-Dīn al-Dāmghānī (d. 775/1373-4), seem not to have left any written commentaries or glosses on the short work of their teacher, despite their keen interest in engaging with al-Ījī's other works in *kalām*, *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *balāgha*. The apparent lack of interest displayed by al-Ījī's direct students to engage with the *matn* is at odds with their efforts to produce extensive commentaries on al-Ījī's corpus. According to Reza Pourjavady's "*The legacy of al-Ījī*", all four students produced extensive commentaries and glosses on virtually every work of al-Ījī, with the exception of the *Risāla*. Moreover, none of his direct students appear in any lists of commentaries of the *Risāla*, nor are they cited by later commentators. Nevertheless, as shown in Chapter Two, some of them, like al-Kirmānī and al-Abharī, had some direct knowledge of a text resembling the *Risāla*, and were in all likelihood actively involved in its transmission or systematization, which confirms the unsystematic nature of the *matn* at early stages.¹ This suggests that, at least in their eyes, the topics sketched in the short *Risāla* were a natural

¹ R. Pourjavady's article on al-Ījī's scholarly legacy indicates that according to Mu'īn al-Dīn Junayd al-Shirāzī's *Shādd al-Izār* al-Dāmghānī composed a commentary on the *Risāla*. However, I have not found this reference in the source indicated by Pourjavady. If the information supplied by Pourjavady is correct, then al-Dāmghānī should be considered the first commentator on the *Risāla*.

extension of related topics fully discussed in commentaries on al-Ījī's *al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya*, and glosses on al-Ījī's commentary on *al-Mukhtaṣar*. If one grants that none of al-Ījī's direct students were actively involved in the exegetical practice on the *Risāla*, then al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī is to be recognized as the first commentator on the *Risāla*. Because the historical facts concerning the exegetical tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* are far from clear, the primacy of al-Jurjānī's glosses was not recognized by later commentators and glossators. I will show here that commentators and glossators unanimously pointed to Khwāja ʿAlī al-Samarqandī as the first commentator on the *Risāla*, and for good reason. The impact of this first commentary on the subsequent commentary tradition should not be underestimated, since it emerges as a central text among his immediate successors such as Mullā Jāmī and virtually all classic commentators. The commentaries by al-Qūshjī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, al-Shirwānī and ʿIṣām al-Dīn therefore do not emerge in a vacuum, but often display a similar analytical *praxis* to, and a dependence upon, al-Jurjānī's glosses and, to a greater extent, Khwāja ʿAlī's commentary. Later glossators on the classic commentaries will be seen to pursue this exegetical agenda, and to act as the central moderators and arbitrators on the main points of dispute brought up in the classic commentaries.

3.1.1 Al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī: Unsystematic exegesis between *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and *balāgha*

Al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī was a prolific author well-versed in almost all disciplines of his time.² One of the disciplines in which he was particularly productive since the early stages of his career was *balāgha* and, in particular, the scholarly tradition of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *al-bayān* stemming

² For a recent bibliography of al-Jurjānī see Van Ess, *Die Träume der Schulweisheit: Leben und Werk des ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Ġurġānī (gest. 816/1413)*, Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz Verlag, 2013.

from al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm*³. Following this scholarly tradition, al-Jurjānī composed two of his most widespread works, the set of glosses on al-Taftāzānī's renowned *al-Muṭawwal*, and later in his career, his own commentary on al-Sakkākī's *al-Miftāḥ* entitled *al-Miṣbāḥ*.⁴ His keen interest in semantics and philosophy of language emerges not only from these extensive works on *balāgha*, but also from a number of short treatises, pamphlets and glosses composed throughout his teaching career. His glosses on the *Risāla* belong to this type of work and were probably authored during al-Jurjānī's teaching of the *matn*, although no historical data is available about their composition and transmission.

Nevertheless, the attribution of the glosses on al-Ījī's *Risāla* is well documented in the bio-bibliographical works on al-Jurjānī, and several surviving manuscript copies all attribute them to him. The glosses do not usually exceed two or three folios and are contained in collections of works on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, often together with manuals on logic and *ādāb al-baḥṭh*. Similar to the case of the *Risāla*, most of the surviving witness copies of al-Jurjānī's glosses lack both *incipit* and *explicit*, a feature says something about the nature and circumstances of their composition.⁵ It is in fact unclear whether these glosses were initially transmitted as marginalia of the copies of the *Risāla*, as a sort of exegetical apparatus, or were conceived as an independent

³ See Joseph Van Ess, "Jorjānī, Zayn-al-Dīn Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī", in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, url: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/jorjani-zayn-al-din-abul-hasan-ali>; last access 4 June 2017.

⁴ Al-Jurjānī's glosses on al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal* have been published several times since the second half of the 13th/19th century; here I rely on a new print edited by Rashīd Aʿraḍī, Bayrut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2007. Al-Jurjānī's independent commentary on the *Miftāḥ* has been edited by Yüksel Çelik as a PhD Thesis entitled *El-Misbāḥ Fī Şerh El-Miftāḥ*, Marmara University, Istanbul, 2009, based on an alleged holograph copy of the work. As I have mentioned in Chapter Two, a set of glosses on al-Ījī's *al-Fawā'id* is also attributed to al-Jurjānī, but these are in all likelihood authored by al-Jurjānī's son.

⁵ By this I mean all the copies that I could consult or locate in manuscript catalogues.

work separate from the *matn*.⁶ Although most of the extant copies consulted were transmitted independently from the *matn*, there are reasons to conclude that al-Jurjānī never conceived these glosses to be an independent work, and that they were studied and transmitted as marginal notes to the *Risāla*. The first reason concerns al-Jurjānī's fragmentary and sporadic exegetical *praxis*, which radically differs from the systematic and comprehensive commentaries composed by his successors, in that his glosses never reproduce the lemma of the *matn* in full and, more importantly, engage only with partial sections and specific topics of the *Risāla* (see below). The second concerns the textual differences between the extant witnesses of al-Jurjānī's glosses, as the different manuscript witnesses taken into account present substantial variants and discrepancies. An example of this emerges comparing al-Jurjānī's glosses contained in Princeton Yahuda 5997,⁷ Nuruosmaniye 4509,⁸ Majlis Shūrā 332/210716, University of Michigan 109⁹ and Yale Beinencke Ar. 550.¹⁰ Yahuda 5997 contains two sets of glosses both attributed to al-Jurjānī, namely folios 2b-3b, which I call set Y1, and folios 4a-5b, which I call set Y2. Similarly, Majlis Shūrā 332/210716 contains two sets of glosses attributed to al-Jurjānī, namely folios 90b-93a, called M1, and folios 98b-99b, called M2; finally, Beinencke 550 contains one set of glosses at folios 147b-149a, called K1. Upon comparison of the different witnesses copies it becomes

⁶ A study on many manuscript copies of the *Risāla* and the marginal glosses they contain might reveal important data on the transmission of its exegetical apparatus.

⁷ For other copies of this version of al-Jurjānī's glosses see Mach, Rudolph, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection, Princeton University Library*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 239; online access to Yahuda 832, fol. 364b-366b, is available at <http://pudl.princeton.edu/viewer.php?obj=cj82k735v#page/745/mode/2up>.

⁸ Fol. 1b-3a.

⁹ See pp. 115-118.

¹⁰ Cf. fol. 147b-149a, accessible at <https://brbl-dl.library.yale.edu/vufind/Record/3436769> (last accessed December 28, 2018). The text is contained in a collection of works of different nature, and also contains a witness of the *matn* at fol. 149a-150a. The colophons of both works do not contain the dates of completion, but the catalogue information indicates that the codex was copied in 931/1525. If this date also applies to the two works taken into account here, then this could be considered one of the oldest witness copies of the *matn* and al-Jurjānī's glosses.

evident that three groups of glosses can be isolated, a first group transmitted in University of Michigan 109, Nuruosmaniye 4509 and M1, which I call here group A; and a second group transmitted in M2 and Y1, called group B. The case of Y2 and K2, here group C, is more complex because these sets of glosses share many traits, but also reproduce glosses on the lemmata present in both groups and present glosses absent in A and B.

The unsystematic nature of al-Jurjānī's glosses is evidenced by the way in which they were transmitted in different codices, especially Majlis Shūrā 210716 and Yahuda 5997, which preserve different groups of glosses. This indicates that different sets of glosses, allegedly all authored by al-Jurjānī, were transmitted as marginal and interlinear annotations together with physical copies of the *Risāla*, and were copied independently from the *matn* only at a later stage by scholars or scribes. Mas'ūd al-Shirwānī confirms this hypothesis in his commentary on the *Risāla*, in which he makes extensive use of al-Jurjānī's glosses. In many instances where he critically engages with al-Jurjānī, al-Shirwānī usually introduces quotations of the glosses with “in some glosses of the Sayyid of the Verifiers” (*fī ba'd al-ḥawāshī li-sayyid al-muḥaqqiqīn*), as most classic commentators do. However, in at least four instances, al-Shirwānī introduces the glosses by “in some glosses written in the margins of the author's lemma” (*fī l-ḥawāshī al-maktūba 'alā qawl al-muṣannif*) or “it has been transmitted from the Sayyid of the Verifiers in some glosses on the author's lemma” (*qad nuqila 'an sayyid al-muḥaqqiqīn fī ba'd al-hawāshī 'alā qawl al-muṣannif*), which gives a clear idea on how al-Jurjānī's glosses were available to early commentators.¹¹ Al-Shirwānī's example clearly shows that different versions of al-Jurjānī's glosses were to be found as marginal and interlinear annotations on the *matn*, a customary practice in the exegetical practice of pre-modern Arabic exegetical tradition. This may also explain why, in several instances, the same

¹¹ See Nuruosmaniye 4509 fol. 208a, 216b, 217a, and 223b.

gloss present in groups A, B or C, does not refer to the exact same lemma, but to a nearby lemma on the same line. Al-Shirwānī, and his contemporaries like Khwāja ‘Alī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, al-Qūshjī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, thus prepared their commentaries by having at their disposal different copies of the *Risāla* supplied with different sets of glosses allegedly authored by al-Jurjānī. Finally, a further textual proof that confirms this hypothesis is found in a manuscript witness of the *Risāla* preserved in Princeton Yahuda 2990,¹² where the *matn* is supplied with several interlinear and marginal glosses that match those of al-Jurjānī’s, all of which are signed with the letter *sīn*, which likely refers to al-Sayyid, a.k.a. al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī.¹³

Al-Jurjānī’s glosses thus do not reproduce the *matn* in full, as would have been customary, by contrast, in comprehensive *sharḥ* on the *Risāla*. Accordingly, the exegesis of al-Jurjānī does not cover the *matn* in its entirety but focusses on specific sections. Glosses of groups A and B are distributed in the same way, in that they cover for the most part the lemma of the *Introduction* and the *Classification* rather than the *Conclusion*.¹⁴ More specifically, groups A and B as well as C give more room for the exegesis of the *Introduction*, where al-Ījī introduces the main theoretical basis to explain the development of type of *waḍ‘ ‘āmm-khāṣṣ* and its application to demonstrative pronouns. The analysis of the semantic classes outlined in the *Classification* are covered mostly

¹² Available at <https://catalog.princeton.edu/catalog/9947950813506421> (accessed on September 4, 2023).

¹³ A quick comparison of these glosses with the group of glosses A, B and C shows that those on the margins of Yahuda 2990 are close to, but reproduce only partially, those of group A. This further suggests that the transmission of al-Jurjānī’s glosses as marginal and interlinear annotations of the witness copies of the *Risāla* is far from being clearly established, which is due in all likelihood to al-Jurjānī’s own lack of a systematic exegetical approach in composing his glosses.

¹⁴ For example, glosses of group A generally cover the *Introduction* and *Classification* for 1^{1/3} folio, while the remaining 1^{1/2} folio covers the *Conclusion*. Similarly, group B cover the *Introduction* and *Classification* for one full folio, while only the verso of a folio covers the *Conclusion*. Differently from these two, Y2 is equally distributed, that is, one folio covers the *Introduction* and *Classification*, while the other folio covers the *Conclusion*.

by group A, with the exception of the last section, where the notion of semantic context (*al-qarīna*) is discussed by all three groups of glosses. Likewise, all three focus on the *First Reminder* where al-Ījī points at the different semantic nature of demonstrative, relative and personal pronouns and that of particles and prepositions. Other *Reminders* that elicit al-Jurjānī's attention in all three groups are the *Third*, in which al-Ījī draws a further semantic distinction between proper names (*ʿalam*) and personal pronouns; the *Sixth* in where a distinction between the semantic determination of generic and proper nouns is made; the *Seventh*, where relative pronouns are analyzed; the *Ninth*, where particles and verbs are distinguished in terms of the ascription (*nisba*) that they convey and their being subject to predication; and finally the *Tenth* in which the universality and/or particularity conveyed by the third-person pronoun (*ḍamīr al-ghāʾib*) is discussed.

Most of al-Jurjānī's glosses in all three groups do not exceed two to three lines and are generally devoted to clarifying the technical vocabulary used by al-Ījī and, more importantly, to explaining the succinct and often elliptical passages of the *matn*. There are however longer glosses in which al-Jurjānī digresses into specific aspects only hinted at in the *matn*. A long gloss present in group A and C focuses on the *lemma* of the *Introduction* that discusses further the notion of the mental apprehension of the notion of “common factor” (*al-qadr al-mushtarak*).¹⁵ Al-Jurjānī makes room to clarify what al-Ījī means exactly by “*al-qadr al-mushtarak*” in the context of *waḍʿ*, and explains that it refers a common factor shared by multiple single instances of a given concept. In the act of positing a term for a concept, the intellect of the positor of language

¹⁵ The same long gloss of group A appears, with minor variants, in group C but in the latter the gloss corresponds to the lemma “*dūna al-qadr al-mushtarak*” which occurs few lines later. This discrepancy between the lemma and the corresponding gloss is, in my view, a further confirmation of the unsystematic character of al-Jurjānī's glosses in that they may correspond to different lemma despite being essentially the same.

apprehends this common factor shared by multiple individual concepts as a tool (*āla*) with which to posit a given term. The term posited in this way will convey and express only one specific instance of that concept by means of a defining context (*qarīna*). Al-Jurjānī expands on the example given by al-Ījī for the demonstrative “this” (*hādhā*). He says that the positor of language grasps the concept of “every singular masculine referent” (*al-mufrad al-mudhakkar al-mushār ilayhi*), and assigns the term “*hādhā*” for every single instance grasped collectively. This equates to a general positing, because the concept conceived here is general, in that it corresponds to a factor shared among many instances; while the goal of the positing is to convey precisely each one of those specific instances. This allows al-Jurjānī to digress into the other class of *waḍʿ*, the *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, where the positor conceives a universal notion and posits an equally universal term for it, as in the case of the term “human” for the notion of *human being*. Al-Jurjānī neither discusses nor mentions the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, but makes some room to reject the *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm* class on the basis that grasping individual instances of a universal through universal notions is sufficient for the linguistic positing.¹⁶ The opposite, in al-Jurjānī’s view, does not seem to be the case because grasping an individual instance of a concept is not sufficient to posit a universal term. Group B does not cover the lemma of the *Introduction* in a similar fashion, but instead focuses more on the *lexis* of the lemma “*dūna al-qadr al-mushtarak*” and, more specifically, on the ways the lemma can be syntactically analyzed within the sentence in which it appears.

Glosses on the *Classification* in all three groups aim mostly to clarify al-Ījī’s wording by providing a clearer wording, as in the lemma on the particle, “*wa-huwa al-ḥarf*,” without digressing into a more elaborate discussion, as was the case for the *Conclusion*, where al-Jurjānī

¹⁶ The other two classes of *waḍʿ*, the *shakḥī* and *nawʿī*, do not seem to be central to the classification of *waḍʿ* of al-Jurjānī, as only group C contains a gloss in which al-Jurjānī explains that the *waḍʿ* *nawʿī* corresponds to *waḍʿ* *kullī* used by al-Ījī in the *Risāla*; see Yahuda 5997, fol. 4a.

focuses on the *First Reminder*. Here al-Jurjānī discusses further the inherent difference between all three types of pronouns and particles, in that although pronouns and particles do fall under the same type of *wadʿ* *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, the former group retains some partial semantic self-sufficiency (*mustaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*) due to the concepts they convey, which is fully realized only when a determined semantic context of the sentence occurs. It is in this sense, al-Jurjānī claims, that the first group might be assimilated to the class of nouns (*asmāʾ*), while the same semantic functions do not apply to a preposition, which is semantically dependent upon its relatum.¹⁷ All three groups of glosses discuss, with some variations, the *Sixth Reminder* where a distinction between generic nouns and proper generic names is drawn. Although groups B and C, unlike A, discuss at some length this distinction, groups A and C decline to go into further detail, referring instead to al-Ījī’s analysis of the issue in the section “*On Definition*” (*al-taʿrīf*) in his *Fawāʾid al-Ghiyāthiyya*. Likewise, all three groups present an identical gloss discussing at some length the *Ninth Reminder*, on the difference between verbs and particles, and on whether verbs and particles are amenable to being the subject or predicate of an assertoric judgement. Finally, all three groups contain, with some variations, glosses on the *Tenth Reminder*, on the question of universality and particularity conveyed by the third-person pronoun (*ḍamīr al-ghāʾib*) as well as on the *Twelfth*.

One important feature common to groups A, B and C is the content of an identical gloss on the *Ninth Reminder* mentioned above, where the semantic and syntactic features of verbs and particles serve as the rationale to draw a distinction between these two classes of terms.¹⁸ In this

¹⁷ The topic discussed in this gloss on the *First Reminder* gives al-Jurjānī the opportunity to digress into the topic of the *Second Reminder* without the need for reproducing any lemma. In this second part of this gloss, al-Jurjānī explains al-Ījī’s further distinction of the relative pronouns vis-à-vis demonstrative and personal pronouns, based upon the three types of semantic contexts in which each comes to conveying a distinct, individuated concept.

¹⁸ It should be noted that despite the similarity of content and wording, this gloss appears in group A in reference to the last part of the lemma of the *Eighth Reminder*, which runs as “*fa-mtanaʿ al-khabar ʿanhumā*,” while in groups B and C it appears in reference to the beginning of the *Ninth Reminder*, which runs as “*al-fiʿl madlūluhu [...]*.”

specific gloss, al-Jurjānī explains the twofold semantic nature of the verb, in that it conveys a universal concept, viz. the action or the event (*ḥadath*), as well as a complete ascription (*nisba tāmma*) to a specific subject, the latter being also a feature of the particle. But whereas in al-Ījī's view a verb, in contrast to a preposition, can function as a predicate, for al-Jurjānī this cannot be the case. Al-Jurjānī does not go on to clarify the reason why he disagrees with al-Ījī here, but refers back to his treatise on the elucidation of the semantics of the particle, in his words: “*risālatunā al-ma‘mūla li-bayān ma‘nā al-ḥarf*.” Al-Jurjānī is likely referring to a short treatise, which was later transmitted under the title of *al-Risāla al-Ḥarfīyya*, whose strict relation to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, in general, and to al-Ījī's *Risāla*, in particular, was acknowledged by later scholars.¹⁹

The *Risāla al-Ḥarfīyya* is often confused with another treatise by al-Jurjānī, entitled *al-Risāla al-Mir‘ātiyya*, since both revolve around the same theoretical investigation of the perceptive faculty (*al-baṣīra*) and its ability to grasp a given concept and its properties, as opposed to conceiving the same concept as a means to grasp its particulars and their properties in their totality. The reason for this confusion is also due to the similarity of both treatises' opening statements, where the same analogy of the mirror (*al-mir‘āt*) is evoked. In both texts, al-Jurjānī begins by drawing a similarity between the perceptive faculty and its objects of perception, and the relation of vision (*al-baṣar*) and its objects of vision. More specifically, al-Jurjānī draws a similarity between mental perception and a person who, while looking at an image in the mirror, focuses intentionally (*qaṣḍan*) and primarily on the image with all its properties, and perceives the mirror itself only secondarily. Conversely, that person may focus on the mirror itself and its properties, but perceives the image only secondarily. However, the *Mir‘ātiyya* is shorter and deals essentially with mental perception and intentionality strictly

¹⁹ For example, Kātip Čelebī's entry on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in his *Kashf al-Zunūn* seen in Chapter One.

within a theory of mind and knowledge. By contrast, the *Ḥarfīyya* uses the analogy of the mirror in order to discuss the semantic functions of verbs and prepositions, and in order to address the question of how the ascription contained in the concept of the verb, which links the action (i.e., the event) to a subject-agent, is similar to the ascription contained in the concept of the preposition, which links the concept of the preposition to its relatum in order to be fully realized. For example, in the sentence “*Zayd stood*” (*qāma Zaydun*) the verb conveys an ascription (*nisba*) of the event, that is, “*standing*” (*qiyām*) to a subject (*Zayd*), which fully realizes the concept conveyed by the verb. In the same way, in the sentence “*I travelled from Basra*” (*sirtu min al-Baṣra*), the preposition “*from*” conveys the concept of “*beginning*” (*ibtidāʾ*), as well as an ascription to its relata, namely to the verb (*sirtu*) and to the noun (*Baṣra*), in order to convey that specific instance of the concept of “*beginning*.” However, in virtue of the nature of their respective ascriptions, both verbs and prepositions cannot function as a subject of a sentence, but they differ one from the other because verbs can function as a predicate of a sentence, while prepositions cannot.²⁰

Aside from its relevance in assessing al-Jurjānī’s original analysis of the semantic functions of verbs and particles within a theory of mental perception, the *Ḥarfīyya* is a testament to the intimate relation between *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *al-bayān* and the emerging theory of *al-waḍʿ*,

²⁰ Al-Jurjānī’s application of the epistemological analysis of the two modes of mental perception discussed in the *Risāla al-Mirʾāṭīyya* to that of the semantic function of verbs and particles may have had repercussions on his analysis of the modality of being, as the same analogy played a role in the analysis of the ontological status of the contingent, *al-mumkin*. This emerges clearly in al-Qūshjī’s commentary on al-Ṭūsī’s *Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*, where the former uses the analogy of the mirror in commenting upon the lemma “*then, contingency may sometimes be an instrument for the act of intellecting, and other times it may be intellected with respect to its own essence*.” (thumma al-imkānu qad yakūnu ālatan fī l-taʿaqquli wa-qad yakūnu maʿqūlan bi-ṭibārī dhātihi). Al-Qūshjī deems necessary to introduce what appears to be a verbatim quotation of al-Jurjānī’s *Risāla al-Mirʾāṭīyya* on the modes of perceptions and the analogy of the mirror, which he then applies to the analysis of the status of the contingent, without making any references to al-Jurjānī. In all likelihood, the application of the analogy of the mirror from its epistemological framework to that of the modality of being is original to al-Jurjānī himself and, more precisely, to his famous glosses on al-Iṣfahānī’s *Tasḍīd al-Qawāʾid*, both of which served as the basis for al-Qūshjī’s commentary. I could not at this stage verify whether al-Jurjānī’s glosses on al-Iṣfahānī’s *Tasḍīd* contain the passage found in al-Qūshjī. Cf. al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-ʿAqāʾid*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Zārīʿī al-Riḍāyī, Qum: Rāʾid, 1393/2014, p. 360.

as stated in Chapter Two. The treatise, in fact, survives in numerous copies as an independent work in many codices, and was also embedded in al-Jurjānī's glosses on al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal*. There are reasons to conclude that the *Ḥarfīyya* was composed independently from the glosses on the *Muṭawwal* and was then later integrated to them, as the text presented in these glosses is introduced by the opening formula “*wa-Allāh al-musta‘ān, i‘lam anna [...]*” and the closing statement “*hādha kulluhu kalām waqa‘a fi-l-bayn,*” (*this whole is a discussion that occurred as an excursus*), both statements marking the presence of an independent, parenthetical text.²¹ The presence of the treatise in the glosses on the *Muṭawwal* represents al-Jurjānī's attempt to clarify a point in the discussion on the subordinate metaphor (*al-isti‘āra al-taba‘īyya*), which obtains when the metaphoric term is a verb, a derived noun, or a preposition.²² In basic metaphors, the object of the simile (*al-mushabbah bihi*) must necessarily be a non-derived term (*ism jāmid*), which is also semantically independent and can be the subject of predication (*maḥkūm ‘alayhi*). Verbs and prepositions cannot be used in basic metaphors because the concepts they convey are not semantically independent and cannot be the subject of predication. Al-Jurjānī explains that this feature of verbs and particles needs to be fully decompressed (*baṣṭ*) in his *Ḥarfīyya*. After he introduces the analogy of the mirror and its function within the theory of mental perception borrowed from the *Mir‘āṭīyya*, al-Jurjānī points out that the distinction between the two modes of perception might be clarified through the analysis of the semantics of the verb. In the verbal phrase “*Zayd stood*” (*qāma Zaydun*) and the nominal phrase “*The ascription of standing is to Zayd*” (*nisbatu al-qiyāmi ilā Zaydin*), we perceive the ascription of an action, namely “*standing*,” to a

²¹ See al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiya ‘alā al-Muṭawwal*, ed. Rashīd A‘raḍī, Bayrut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2007, p. 366 – 370.

²² This type of metaphor differs from basic metaphor in which the second term of the simile (*al-mushabbah bihi*) is a primitive or non-derived noun. It is also worth noting that the two texts introduced in Chapter Two, namely [IF.1] and [IF.2] where al-Ījī discusses some aspects of the semantic theory of the particle similar to those of the *Risāla*, occur in the same section on the metaphor.

subject, Zayd.²³ In the first example, we perceived the ascription as a condition or an instrument that conveys information about the subject and the action – in other words a *mirror* by which we grasp that the former is related to the latter. But the intellect cannot bring forth any judgements about that ascription, since it is contained or concealed within the concept of the verb. Conversely, in the second phrase, we can direct our attention to the notion of “*ascription*” itself, to the extent that our intellect can recognize it and pinpoint it. In this way, we can construe take the notion of “*ascription*” as subject or predicate of an assertoric judgement. Accordingly, in the first case, - e.g., “*Zayd stood*” (*qāma Zaydun*) - the ascription contained in the verb would equate to a semantically incomplete concept, while in the second it would be semantically self-sufficient.

Al-Jurjānī proceeds along the same lines to explain the lack of semantic self-sufficiency of particles, where he echoes al-Ījī’s assessment of the issue in his *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, in which he emphasizes that the ascriptions (*nisab*) of particles to their relata are intrinsic to their semantic functions.²⁴ Here al-Jurjānī points to the case of the concept of the preposition “*from*” (*min*), that conveys the concept of “*beginning*” (*ibtidā*). In the phrase “*the beginning of my trip is Basra*” (*ibtidā’u sayrī al-Baṣra*) the concept of “*beginning*” is perceived and grasped by the intellect intentionally, and therefore amenable to be a subject or predicate of a judgement. Conversely, in the phrase “*My trip is from Basra*” (*sayrī min al-Baṣra*) our intellect perceives the concept of the particle “*from*” (*min*), which conveys “*beginning*,” as a state (*ḥāla*) obtaining between the nouns

²³ It is unclear whether in the sentence “*nisbatu al-qiyāmi ilā Zaydin*” the subject is ‘*nisbatu al-qiyāmi*’ and the predicate is ‘*ilā Zaydin*,’ and should be translated as “*the ascription of standing is to Zayd*,” or “*nisbatu al-qiyāmi ilā Zaydin*” is a complex subject of a proposition, e.g., *nisbatu al-qiyāmi ilā Zaydin* [is P].

²⁴ In this case, the metaphor requires the second term of a simile (*al-mushabbah bihi*) to be grasped insofar as it is implicitly qualified and subject to predication, which is a feature that belongs to generic nouns. The concepts conveyed by generic nouns, unlike those conveyed by verbs and prepositions, are semantically self-sufficient (*mustaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*) and thus amenable to being subject to qualification and predication (*mawṣūf wa-maḥkūm ‘alayhi*). In al-Jurjānī’s view, the same idea regarding particles seems to be already present, though in a different wording, in Ibn al-Ḥājj’s *al-Mufaṣṣal*; see al-Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiya*..., p. 368.

“trip” and “Baṣra,” that is, as an instrument to grasp the relational status of these two notions. As such, the preposition “from” in the sentence “My trip is from Baṣra” (*sayrī min al-Baṣra*) would convey the sense of “my trip [starts] from Baṣra.” However, unlike the first phrase, in the second phrase the concept of *beginning* conveyed by the preposition *from* can be neither the subject nor the predicate of a judgement. Following al-Ījī’s suggestion in the *Risāla*, as in his other two works seen in Chapter Two, al-Jurjānī explains that this second sense of “beginning” conveyed by the preposition “from” is an example of *waḍʿ ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*. Here, the general concept of “beginning” taken into account in the act of positing the preposition “from” results in a type of ascription (*nawʿ min al-nisba*). However, in order to convey one particular instance of the concept of “beginning,” and not the general one, the ascription must be semantically determined only when the corresponding relatum (e.g., *Baṣra*) is also expressed. Through this clarification, al-Jurjānī explains that the semantic incompleteness of prepositions is due to a lack inherent in the concept conveyed by particles themselves, rather than to the positor’s deliberate choice to consider mentioning the relatum as a condition for the preposition to convey a full meaning. For al-Jurjānī, mentioning these relata should be considered merely an indispensable feature (*amr ḍarūrī*) proper to prepositions and particles.

At this point, al-Jurjānī returns to the issue of the verb, which clarifies his disagreement in the *Ninth Reminder* with al-Ījī’s claim that the verb is amenable to being a predicate in a proposition. Al-Jurjānī insists on the twofold semantic function of the verb: one conveys an event and is semantically self-sufficient; the other, which lacks semantic self-sufficiency, is a predicative ascription (*nisba ḥukmiyya*) that occurs between the agent and the event by conveying information about the ascription of one to the other. The predicative ascription of the verb is similar to the ascription contained in prepositions, since they both lack semantic self-sufficiency. The predicative ascription of the verb would therefore require its relatum, namely

the agent, that bestows semantic completeness to the ascription. On the basis of this emphasis of the nature of the predicative ascription of the verb, al-Jurjānī concludes that the verb, taken as a compound of of action-event *and* the specific ascription to an agent, cannot be considered semantically self-sufficient, and therefore not amenable to being the subject or the predicate of a proposition.²⁵

Al-Jurjānī's interest in this particular aspect of the semantic theory of al-Ījī is also echoed in his glosses on al-Ījī's commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *Mukhtaṣar*, more specifically in reference to al-Ījī's criticism of Ibn al-Ḥājjib's discussion of the particle discussed in the passage [IS.2] in Chapter Two.²⁶ In these glosses, al-Jurjānī rarely discusses semantic topics akin to those of his gloss on the *Risāla* in the section *al-mabādi'* *al-lughawiyya*. Rather, the discussion that most closely echoes the topics covered by al-Jurjānī in his glosses on the *Risāla* and in the *Risāla al-Ḥarfiyya* occurs in the glosses corresponding to text [IS.2], i.e., those in relation to al-Ījī's solution to the conundrum of the particle. In the gloss corresponding to the beginning of al-Ījī's *lemma* "First you should know a premise," al-Jurjānī presents, in more detail than his gloss on the *Risāla*, the three main classes of *wadʿ*: *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, *ʿāmm-ʿāmm* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, while discarding the *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*.²⁷ Among these, the third is given more room, because it discusses the semantic function of personal and demonstrative pronouns. The digression into the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*

²⁵ Cf. al-Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiya...*, p. 369.

²⁶ There are two main prints of these glosses, the older printed in Cairo by Maṭbaʿat al-Amīriyya in 1316/1898 (which contains two sets of superglosses by Mullā Ḥasan Čelebī al-Fanārī and by Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl al-Warrāqī al-Jizāwī), while the newer is edited by Shaʿbān Muḥammad Ismāʿīl, al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyya, 1393/1973, 2 vols. (which also contains the glosses by Mullā Ḥasan Čelebī al-Fanārī). Here I rely on a recent print, edition by Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ismāʿīl, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1424/2004, 3 vols., which is based on the older Cairene edition. This set of glosses is usually copied and printed together with al-Taftāzānī's glosses on the same commentary, which might suggest that both works are the result of the two scholars' encounter in the circle of Samarqand, where al-Jurjānī is said to have composed his longest works (See Van Ess, *Jorjānī...*).

²⁷ Cf. al-Ījī, *Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar...*, [al-Jurjānī's gloss], vol. 1, p. 663-5.

allows al-Jurjānī to expand al-Ījī's next *lemma* “and if you know that...,” which focuses on the semantics of particles, and discuss the topic just as he had done in the *Ḥarfīyya*. The style and wording of the two texts are strikingly similar, more so because of al-Jurjānī's peculiar digression into the issue of the predicability of particles and verbs – also seen in the *Ḥarfīyya* – is absent in al-Ījī's commentary.²⁸ Despite their relative faithfulness to the topics corresponding to [IS.2], al-Jurjānī's glosses also analyzes the topic of verbs and particles in a way that echoes the same epistemological dimension displayed in the *Ḥarfīyya*, a way that is, again, absent in al-Ījī's commentary. Throughout the glosses corresponding to the text [IS.2], al-Jurjānī pinpoints the role of the intellect's conception (*taṣawwur*) and focus (*mulāḥaẓa*) in the process of forming the three classes of *waḍʿ*, as well as the intellect's intentionality (*qaṣd*) and orientation (*tawjīh*) in regard to the issue of the predicability of verbs and particles, just as he had done in the *Ḥarfīyya*. Even though all three works approach the analysis of semantics from al-Jurjānī's distinct theory of mind and perception, his glosses on al-Ījī's commentary never draw upon the analogy of the mirror to clarify his views on the semantic functions of particles and verbs. This might indicate that these glosses precede the composition of the *Ḥarfīyya*, as well as the composition of his glosses on both the *Muṭawwal* and the *Risāla*.

Finally, al-Jurjānī's interest in composing glosses on the *Risāla* seems to be informed by the semantic puzzles akin to those he had explored in *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *al-bayān* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*, rather than by the impulse to provide a plainer exegesis of the *matn*. There emerges a strong intertextuality between the three works, on that arises from a shared emphasis on only a restricted number of points – such as the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and the issue of predicability of verbs and particles. This ultimately explains al-Jurjānī's selective and unsystematic exegetical *praxis* on the *Risāla*. Both the emphasis on these selected topics cognate to the semantic theory of the

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 666.

Risāla, and their analysis from an epistemological angle, resurface again in al-Jurjānī's *al-Miṣbāḥ fī sharḥ al-Miftāḥ*, his long commentary on al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ*, and in his later works completed in Samarqand after Shawwāl 803/May 1401.²⁹

3.1.2 The First Commentary: Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī

Al-Jurjānī's glosses on the *Risāla* address some crucial points of al-Ījī's semantic theory and, point to their implications within the scope of *'ilm al-ma'ānī* and *al-bayān* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Yet they have a limited exegetical scope that leaves many crucial aspects unexplored. This is likely the reason why his successors felt compelled to provide a more systematic and comprehensive explanation of the intricacies of the *matn*. It should not be a surprise that this gap was filled by one of al-Jurjānī's reported students, Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī. Unfortunately, biographical data on Khwāja 'Alī is extremely scarce, and he remains a figure that largely unknown in modern scholarship. His full name is far from being established in present day scholarship and has possibly been transmitted in different ways according to the geographical area where his biographical entry was written.³⁰ However, the few surviving pieces of evidence reveal an interesting intellectual profile and, crucially for the history of *'ilm al-waḍ'*, point to his role among different intellectual milieus of his time.

²⁹ Cf. al-Jurjānī, *al-Miṣbāḥ*..., p. 632, where al-Jurjānī makes again reference to the *Ḥarfīyya* in the analysis of the semantic features of verbs and particles. Other discussions that parallel the topics of the *Risāla* occur at p. 573 where al-Jurjānī introduces the classes of *waḍ' shakhsī* and *naw'ī* in relation to the term's self-determination, and p. 104 where the positing of the second-person pronoun is discussed.

³⁰ The few mentions of Khwāja 'Alī in Western academia are, to the best of my knowledge, Rescher, Nicholas, *The Development of Arabic Logic*, pp. 229-230, and El-Rouayheb, Khaled, *Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic 900-1900*, pp. 83-85.

It seems that Khwāja ‘Alī spent his early career between Samarqand and Herat, where he established himself as a teacher. This emerges from the brief biographical account of Mullā Jāmī, who claims to have studied under a certain Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī in Herat. Jāmī’s personal encounter with Khwāja ‘Alī occurred very early in Jāmī’s life and in a specific scholarly context. Jāmī reports that he studied the *Sharḥ al-Talkhīṣ* and the *Muṭawwal* by himself before reaching puberty, and that he focused all his scholarly energy on analyzing the *Muṭawwal* as well as its glosses, most probably those by al-Jurjānī. At this point, he joined the classroom (*al-dars*) of Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī, whom Jāmī considered one of the most learned scholars of his time and al-Jurjānī’s most brilliant disciple. Despite his praise for Khwāja ‘Alī, Jāmī could profit from his teachings only for forty days.³¹ Jāmī is one of the few sources to provide precise information about the Persianate context of Khwāja ‘Alī, who reappears in later Ottoman sources.³² Khwāja ‘Alī likely left Herat heading westward to Anatolia, where he was probably known as al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-‘Ajamī (al-Samarqandī), a *nisba* that refers to his Persian origins. The earliest biographical account that may confirm that Khwāja ‘Alī and al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-‘Ajamī are one and the same person is Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s *al-Shaqā’iq al-Nu‘maniyya*.³³ There, al-Mawla al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-‘Ajamī is said to have studied the sciences (*al-‘ulūm*) in his country under al-Jurjānī, and to have then moved to the Anatolian Ottoman lands, to the region of Kastamonu, where he was well received by Ismā‘īl Bēg.³⁴ Ṭāshköprüzādeh relates that he then moved to Edirne where he met Sultan

³¹ Cf. al-Kāshifī al-Wā‘iz al-Harawī, *Rashaḥāt ‘Ayn al-Ḥayāt*, ed. ‘Āṣim Ibrāhīm al-Kayyālī, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2008, p. 187 (This is the Arabic translation of al-Wā‘iz al-Harawī by Muḥammad Murād b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Qāzānī (d. 1352/1933)).

³² It seems Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī was originally from the district of Čākard-yazdeh in Samarqand and was also the teacher of Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī; see Reza Pourjavady, *Ketāb-shināsī Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī*, in *Ma‘āref* 19, n. 3, March 1381 Š., p. 184, where the author provides two other sources referring to Khwāja ‘Alī.

³³ Cf. Ṭāshköprüzādeh, *al-Shaqā’iq al-Nu‘maniyya*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Arabī, 1395/1975, p. 62.

³⁴ There has been an attempt to identify al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-Samarqandī with another al-Samarqandī, al-Sayyid ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, who died in the same year. He also appears in the same section of Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s *al-Shaqā’iq* (cf. p. 51), and is said studied in his country (probably Samarqand), where he reached a reputable status in the sciences of his

Murād II (805-855/1404-1451), who offered him the direction of the *madrassa* named after his grandfather Sultan Bayazid I in Bursa, where Khwāja ‘Alī attracted a large number of scholars. Khwāja ‘Alī is said to have lived, possibly in Bursa, through the reign of Sultan Mehmet II (1432-1482), and to have died in 860/1455-6.³⁵ Ṭāshköprüzādeh also provides a short list of Khwāja ‘Alī’s works, in which his commentary on the *Risāla* is not listed, but which includes his superglosses on al-Jurjānī’s glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s *Taḥrīr*, on al-Jurjānī’s glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn’s *Lawāmi‘ al-Asrār*, and glosses on al-Jurjānī’s commentary on the *Mawāqif*.³⁶ The later Ottoman scholar Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān al-Kaffawī (d. 990/1586) provides further details confirming the identity of Khwāja ‘Alī. In his entry on Mawlā Sayyid ‘Alī al-‘Ajamī, from his biographical dictionary *Katā‘ib A‘lām al-Akhyār min Fuqahā’ Madhhab al-Nu‘mān al-Mukhtār*, al-Kaffawī confirms

time and to have embraced Sufism. He then moved, like Khwāja ‘Alī, to the Ottoman regions but, differently from the latter, settled in Lārinda, where he is said to have reached the age of a hundred and fifty or two hundred years. Ṭāshköprüzādeh lists only one work of his, an incomplete Quranic commentary in four volumes, which is likely the commentary entitled *Baḥr al-Ulūm*, often misattributed to Abū al-Layth Naṣr b. Muḥammad al-Samarqandī (d. 373/983) who also wrote a Quranic commentary; see for example Junusdjon, Olimov, *Alaeddin Es-Semerqandī’nin Bahru’l-Ulūm, Adli tefsiri ve Kaynaklari*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ankara 2010, pp. 2-19. This tendency might be due to the entry provided by Ziriklī’s *A‘lām* (see vol. 5, p. 32) that refers to a certain ‘Alī b. Yahyā ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī al-Qaramānī (880/1475), which is in turn based on al-Baghdādī’s *Hadiyat al-‘Ārifīn* (cf. vol. 1, p. 733) who set the date of this al-Samarqandī to 860/1455, like that of Khwāja ‘Alī. This identification between the two al-Samarandīs should, in my opinion, be rejected unless further textual evidence emerges in the future, as the al-Samarqandī who composed the Quranic commentary does not share any traits with the figure of Khwāja ‘Alī presented by al-Jāmī. Moreover, I took Ṭāshköprüzādeh’s distinct entries on the two scholars to be reliable as they are often based on accounts close to the scholars’ life and time. An example of that occurs in the entry on al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-‘Ajamī al-Samarqandī, where Ṭāshköprüzādeh claims that his father saw al-Samarqandī’s autograph copy of al-Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf*, which was written in a fine and clear handwriting.

³⁵ This date is consistent with the claim that Khwāja ‘Alī studied under al-Jurjānī in Samarqand, as al-Jurjānī was forced to join the intellectual circles of the Timur in Samarqand in 1387, after the latter’s conquest of Shiraz where al-Jurjānī was based. It is therefore between the years between 1387 and al-Jurjānī’s departure from Samarqand in 1405, after the death of Timur, that the encounter between the two must have taken place. After this date Khwāja ‘Alī might have stayed in Samarqand for a while, but must have moved later to Herat, where he met the young Jāmī, who was born 817/1414 and who settled to Herat early in his life with his family.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, vol. 2, p. 1892.

Sayyid ‘Alī’s lineage to al-Jurjānī and Jāmī’s intellectual relation to him.³⁷ More importantly, al-Kaffawī claims that Khwāja ‘Alī’s sudden departure from Herat was caused mainly by his desire to join the scholarly circles of the more generous and accommodating Ottoman Sultans – who, he had heard, were eager to attract scholars from foreign areas –, but also for the socio-political instability in the Eastern Timurid regions.³⁸ This might ultimately explain Jāmī’s limited access to Khwāja ‘Alī’s teachings as well as the latter’s disappearance from the Timurid scholarly networks.³⁹

³⁷ Cf. Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān al-Kaffawī, *Katā’ib A’lām al-Akhyār min Fuqahā’ Madhhab al-Nu’mān al-Mukhtār*; this work was recently edited by Şafawat Kuwsā, Murād Shimshak, Ḥasan Ūzaz and Ḥadhīfa Jakar, Istanbul: Maktabat al-Irshād, 1438/2017, 3 vols., (*non vidi*). Another more recent edition has been edited by ‘Abd al-Laṭīf ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1439/2018, 2 vols. I could not access the Turkish edition and had to rely first on a manuscript held in Majlis Shūrā, n. 87847, second tome, fol. 167a-b; see also the Beirut edition, vol. 2, pp. 490-491. Al-Kaffawī adds also details about ‘Alī al-‘Ajāmī’s time as a teacher in Bursa, his encounter with Mehmet II and with the scholars of his court such as the famous Khōjahzādeh, and the latter’s critic Zeyrek. There is also an episode where Sayyid ‘Alī and Zīrak enter into a debate in the presence of Mehmet II, during which Sayyid ‘Alī dumbfounds his adversary. Al-Kaffawī also claims to have owned, studied and taught al-Sayyid ‘Alī’s autographed copy of al-Jurjānī’s glosses on the *Lawāmi’ al-Asrār*. Al-Kaffawī adds that before Jāmī’s encounter with ‘Alī al-‘Ajāmī, the former studied the *Sharḥ al-Talkhīṣ* and the *Muṭawwal* under Junayd al-Uṣūlī, an event that took place after Jāmī’s encounter with Qāḍīzādeh al-Rūmī (d. after 844/1440) – for the account of this last encounter al-Kaffawī provides a quotation from al-Harawī’s *Rashaḥāt* in Farsī. However, this chronology does not seem to be accurate, because the encounter between Jāmī and Qāḍīzādeh al-Rūmī reported in the Arabic version of the *Rashaḥāt* took place after the encounter with Junayd al-Uṣūlī and Khwāja ‘Alī; cf. al-Kaffawī, *Katā’ib*, fol. 167a.

³⁸ Cf. al-Kaffawī, *Katā’ib*, fol. 167b. It should be noticed that the story of Khwāja ‘Alī’s departure from the Timurid regions is similar to that of al-Qūshjī. However, I refrain from identifying Khwāja ‘Alī with al-Qūshjī. In his recent publication on philosophical exchanges in Ottoman circles, Efe Murat Balıkcıoğlu analyzes bio-bibliographical sources surrounding the philosophical court debates between Zeyrek and Khoja-zādeh, two leading scholars of the 9th/15th century. Balıkcıoğlu discusses a 17th-century miniature based on Ṭāshköprizādeh’s *Shaqā’iq* depicting an encounter between Zeyrek and Khoja-zādeh, in the presence of Sultan Mehmed II. The miniature depicts a third scholar sitting near the Sultan and debating with Zeyrek. The caption on the miniature indicates that this is the Persian scholar Mawlānā Sayyid ‘Alī. Balıkcıoğlu, in private exchange, is confident in identifying Mawlānā Sayyid ‘Alī with Khwāja ‘Alī, rather than al-Qūshjī; see Efe Murat Balıkcıoğlu, *Verifying the Truth on their own Terms: Ottoman Philosophical Culture and Court Debate between Zeyrek (d. 903/1497-98 [?]) and Ḥocazāde (d. 893/1488)*, Venice: Edizioni Ca’ Foscari, 2023, p. 55 (open access edition <https://edizionicafoscari.unive.it/en/edizioni4/libri/978-88-6969-644-2/>).

³⁹ If this hypothesis is correct, then Khwāja ‘Alī might have left Herat between the end of the first quarter and the beginning of the second of the 9th/15th century.

The identification of Khwāja ‘Alī with al-Sayyid ‘Alī may be indeed correct, as the biographical traits present in Khwāja ‘Alī’s account are consistent with those found in al-Sayyid ‘Alī’s, such as the strong intellectual lineage to al-Jurjānī originating in Samarqand and the expertise in the disciplines of logic, *balāgha* and *kalām* based upon the works of al-Jurjānī and al-Taftāzānī. If this is the case, then the author of the commentary authored by Khwāja ‘Alī is to be attributed to Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī, a.k.a. al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-‘Ajamī who died in 860/1455-6. It is his commentary that several sources consider to be the first and oldest full commentary, *sharḥ*, on the *Risāla*. Because no internal evidence are to be found in the commentary itself, only a few external references help to identify this commentary as Khwāja ‘Alī’s. One is, again, Kātip Čelebī’s entry on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* of his *Kashf al-Zunūn*, which explicitly refers to the commentary by Khwāja ‘Alī by pointing to it as the first and oldest commentary, while praising it as a fine (*laṭīf*) one. However, Kātip Čelebī does not provide additional information on the work, such as the incipit or any textual evidence that confirm the exact attribution of this commentary to Khwāja ‘Alī. Kātip Čelebī also points to a series of glosses written on this commentary, such as those by a certain Aḥmad al-Rūmī, by ‘Alī al-Qūshjī and by Mīr Abū al-Baqā’, the last two resulting from a mistaken attribution.⁴⁰ A more reliable and cogent reference to Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary can

⁴⁰ Kātip Čelebī refers to the existence of these glosses by relying upon a claim allegedly made by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, who is probably ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’īnī; see *Kashf al-Zunūn*, ed. Bayrūt: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 1941, vol. 1, p. 898. As I have already pointed out in Chapter One, the attribution of glosses of al-Qūshjī and Mīr Abū al-Baqā’ on Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary might be the result of a mistake. There are external evidence indicating that a certain Ḥamid b. Burhān al-Ghaffārī or al-Ghifārī composed glosses on Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī. These glosses were available to al-Kaffawī, one of the main glossators on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, who refers to these glosses in multiple instances in his own glosses; see for example Muḥammad Ibn Ḥumayd al-Kaffawī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Kaffawī ‘alā ‘Iṣām al-Waḍ‘iyya*, Istanbul: Maṭba‘at Būsnawī al-Ḥājj Muḥarram Afandī, 1277/1860-1, p. 169. The glosses of al-Ghaffārī on Khwāja ‘Alī are also referred to in a marginal note of al-Kaffawī’s glosses; see al-Kaffawī, *Ḥāshiya...*, p. 2. If al-Kaffawī’s reference is correct, then there exist at least two sets of glosses on Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary, one by Aḥmad al-Rūmī and the other by al-Ghaffārī. Interestingly, all three copies of Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary preserved in the Nuruosmaniye collections n. 4508, 4509 and 4510 contain, with minor differences, a set of glosses signed with *min-hu*, which might indicate that the glosses belong to the author of the work. It could also be the case that these glosses belong to one of the two previous glossators and that the signature was misattributed or confused during the phase of

be found within the commentary literature of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, more precisely in al-Kaffawī’s (1167/1754 or 1174/1760) glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, where the glossator establishes the system of internal quotations employed in ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary.⁴¹ Al-Kaffawī tells that ‘Iṣām al-Dīn uses the passive “*qīla*” to refer to the commentary by Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī, who is also referred to as the first commentator on the *Risāla (awwal shāriḥ)*. The matches of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s quotations of Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī with those of the witness copies attributed to Khwāja ‘Alī leave little doubt about the authorship of this commentary. On the basis of these correspondences, one can identify the commentary attributed to Khwāja ‘Alī al-Samarqandī as the one whose incipit is “*Naḥmaduka yā man khaṣṣanā bi-ma‘rifati awḍā‘i kalāmihi wa-‘ammanā bi-l-ishārati ilā muḍmiri dhālika al-kalāmi wa-marāmihi [...]*.”⁴²

transcription of the codices. All three manuscript witnesses also contain a few marginal glosses signed “*Ṣadr al-Dīn Zādeh*,” who might refer to the Ottoman scholar Muḥammad Amīn b. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirwānī (d. 1036/1627), on whom cf. al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-Athar fī A‘yān al-Qarn al-Ḥadī ‘Ashar*, ed. Bayrūt: Dār Ṣādir, n.d., vol. 3, pp. 475-6. Overall, this commentary seems to have received only three sets of glosses, namely Aḥmad al-Rūmī, al-Ghaffārī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Zādeh, none of which seem to be preserved in major collections of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* literature. It would be a desideratum to collect a larger number of copies of Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary in order to draw a clearer picture of its transmission and the glosses it elicited. I could not find at this stage biographical data on these glossators, with the exception of a few surviving works attributed to al-Ghaffārī, who also composed a set of glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary on al-Ṭūsī’s *Tajrīd* entitled *Ḥadā’iq Fawā’id*, preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Arabe 6815, fol. 174b-213b, where the full name of the author is given as Ḥāmid b. Burhān b. Abī Dharr Ghaffārī (the website meta-data transcribes it as Ghifārī) – which partially matches with the name that appears in al-Kaffawī’s glosses. He also composed a set of superglosses on Niẓām al-Dīn al-Khiṭābī or al-Khiṭābī’s (d. 901/1495) glosses on al-Taftāzānī’s *Mukhtaṣar al-Ma‘ānī*, his second commentary on al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī’s *Talkhiṣ al-Miftāḥ*; see Aghā Bozorg al-Ṭihrānī, *al-Dharī‘a ilā Taṣānīf al-Shī‘a*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Uṣūl, 1403/1983, vol. 6, p. 71, according to whom al-Ghaffārī was a contemporary of the historian Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Ghaffār al-Qazwīnī al-Ghaffārī (d. 949/1542) author of *Tā’rikh Nāgaristān* and probably hailing, like the latter, from Qazwīn. The only work by al-Ghaffārī published to this date is a treatise on *Ādāb al-Muṭāla‘a* in a collection of treatises on *Ādāb al-Muṭāla‘a*, see *al-Maṭālī‘ fī Ādāb al-Muṭālī‘* ed. by Aḥmad Ḥusayn al-Azharī, al-Qāhira: Dār al-Iḥsān, 2017.

⁴¹ Cf. al-Kaffawī, *Ḥāshiya...*, p. 4.

⁴² The oldest copy I could locate is Kiliç Ali Paşa 1033, fol. 11b-37b, achieved in Rajab 902/April 1497.

One of the main features of Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary is, aside from long and dense exposition, the presence of an *incipit*, introduction and short conclusion, which point to his intention to compose a systematic and comprehensive commentary. The length of the commentary varies according to the manuscript witness, and generally extends between fifteen and twenty-five folios, depending on the page format of the manuscript copies. In the long *incipit* composed in *saj‘*, which contains the customary eulogy and praise for the prophet Muḥammad, Khwāja ‘Alī hints at the core topics discussed in the commentary by playing with the polysemy of terms belonging, but not limited to the *Risāla*, such as “*khaṣṣanā*” and “*‘ammanā*,” which echoe the *waḍ‘ khāṣṣ* and *‘amm*; “*awḍā‘*,” plural of *waḍ‘*; but also those belonging to specific topics discussed in the *Risāla*, such as *al-ishāra*, *muḍmar*, *mushtaqq*, *maṣdar*, *‘alam*, *jins*, *ḥurūf*, *mawṣūl*, *aḥḥāl*, *asmā’*, *ḥukm* and ultimately *risāla*.⁴³ The content of the *ba‘diyya* is equally instructive of Khwāja ‘Alī’s understanding of the scope of the *Risāla* and its status. He places, probably for the first time, the content of the *Risāla* within the broader scope of the rational disciplines, and human knowledge more generally, as well as stresses its higher status and the need for it among learned people. Within this broader context, Khwāja ‘Alī cites the need of a commentary on al-Ījī’s *Risāla* and, more crucially, the need to solve the puzzles that it has posed to scholars (*ḥall mā ashkala ‘alā al-qawm*). This is because no one until his day has been able to untangle the knot posed by those puzzles (*wa-mā fataqa aḥad ratqahu ilā l-yawmi*) – a claim that clearly confirms that in Khwāja ‘Alī’s eyes al-Jurjānī’s glosses are deemed exegetically unsatisfactory.⁴⁴ The introductory statement tells more about the nature of these puzzles and, accordingly, about the scope of his commentary. Khwāja ‘Alī refers to the analysis of the semantics of particles, relative,

⁴³ Cf. Khwāja ‘Alī, *Sharḥ...*, Nuruosmaniye 4510, fol. 1b.

⁴⁴ Khwāja ‘Alī may also use a widespread *topos* of the exegetical introduction to justify his exegetical work. On the *topos* of untangling the knots see Robert Wisnovksy, “Towards a genealogy of Avicennism,” *Oriens* 42 (2014), pp. 323-363.

demonstrative and personal pronouns (*taḥqīq maʿānī al-ḥurūfi wa-l-mawsūlāti wa-asmāʾi al-ishārati wa-l-muḍmarāti*).⁴⁵ This claim indicates Khwāja ʿAlī’s selective understanding of the actual scope of the *Risāla*, an understanding that was probably informed by al-Jurjānī’s equally selective exegetical work on the theory of *waḍʿ*.

The commentary reproduces in full the *matn* and, like the classic commentaries composed after it, belongs to the *mamzūj* type, which means that the commentary is interwoven with the *matn* – although it often reproduces longer parts of the *matn* than later commentaries, which tend to abbreviate the *matn*. Khwāja ʿAlī makes considerable room to discuss the introductory statement of the *Risāla*, that is, “*hādhihi fāʾida*.” He first focuses on the analysis of the lemma “*hādhihi*” (*this*) by exhibiting an original meta-exegetical approach. He identifies the first lemma “*hādhihi*” as being the individuated referent sensory thing (*al-mushakkhkhaṣ al-maḥsūs al-mushāhad al-mushār ilayhi*) – which will become the technical definition for demonstrative pronouns in the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* literature. In this particular case, Khwāja ʿAlī claims, the sensory component of that definition is not satisfied, because the actual referent of the demonstrative pronoun is unrealized (*ʿadam muḥaqqaq*), and thus should be identified with the totality of statements that make up the three parts of the *matn* (i.e., *Introduction*, *Classification* and *Conclusion*), which do not possess any ontological status as individuals (*tashakkhkhuṣ*).⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Khwāja ʿAlī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 2a.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*. In what follows Khwāja ʿAlī reports the objection that the non-instantiation of the statements of the *mtan*, which implies that they cannot be pointed to with sense, would show that they are not individuated, to the extent that the employ of the demonstrative pronoun is not appropriate. Khwāja ʿAlī also devotes a long discussion on the lemma “*fāʾida*,” for which he prefers an analysis that favors a *lexis* approach, where he first supplies with the different senses of the lemma, such as the lexicographical sense (*luḡhatan*) – conveying “*possession*” (*māl*) – and the legal sense (*ʿurfan*) – conveying “*advantage*” (*maṣlaḥa*) resulting from an action as well the “*purpose*” (*ghāya*) of the agent. He finally provides different interpretations of how the senses of “*fāʾida*” apply to the lemma “*hādhihi*,” “*tashtamil*” and “*muqaddima*,” cf. fol. 3a-4b. The same *lexis*-approach is employed in the analysis of the lemma “*tashtamil*” and “*muqaddima*.”

In the commentary on the *Introduction*, Khwāja ‘Alī digresses further into the *lexis* of the lemma “*al-muqaddima*” by explaining how this should be understood in relation to the other sections of the *matn*.⁴⁷ In what follows, he attempts to clarify the broader theoretical context of the text, such as the division of the linguistic term (*lafẓ*) in relation to the positing and the object of positing. This analysis of “*lafẓ*” sets up the main framework of topics discussed later throughout the *matn*. He provides an analysis of “*lafẓ*” that shows its different definitions in lexicography and grammar. Khwāja ‘Alī points out that the definition of “*lafẓ*” can be conflated with the notion of communicative speech, *kalām mufīd*, because this latter seems to be consistent with the nature of the syntactical and semantic investigations presented in the *Risāla*. This is the case because of the grammarians’ emphasis on the topics (*mawḍū‘āt*) related to linguistic terms, such as *maṣḍars*, verbs, derived nouns, particles and pronouns.

It is within the analysis of *lafẓ*, and specifically of its relation to the individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) of the concept, that Khwāja ‘Alī introduces the four classes of *waḍ‘*. Like al-Jurjānī, he rejects the class *khāṣṣ-‘āmm* by appealing to the Jurjanian notion of mental mirror (*mir’āt*), that is, the intellect cannot construe the specificities of concepts as a mirror to grasp the universals under which they are subsumed. He presents a counter of a virtual objector (*wa-li-qā’il an yaqūl*) to the notion of mental mirror and the rejection of the class *khāṣṣ-‘āmm*. Just as the intellect considers the individual instances to being subsumed under the notion of a universal, in the same way it may consider the universals insofar as the individuated concept (*al-mushakhkhaṣ*) is an instance of them (*fard lahā*) and true of all these universals. In this way, it is plausible to posit a term for those universals that are true of the individuated concept, which is construed as a mirror that reflects these universals and is also true of all of them. To this Khwāja ‘Alī responds that the means (*wasīla*), or conceptual tool, to grasp these universal and to posit a

⁴⁷ The commentary of the *Introduction* covers folios 4a, l. 10-8b, l. 13.

term for them should be a notion that contains all of them, and that is common to all of them, because this notion is also true of that individuated concept. Therefore, the intellect would always appeal to a concept even more general than those universals.⁴⁸

More room is given to present the case of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. Here, Khwāja ‘Alī discusses further the role and function of the general notion (*amr ‘āmm*) in conveying its individuated instances. He explains this by appealing to the Jurjanian analogy of the mental mirror (*mir‘āt*) to reject the view of a group of literalist scholars, labelled as the *zāhiriyyīn*. According to them, terms like personal and demonstrative pronouns are posited for a general notion, but convey their particular concepts only metaphorically.

The analysis of the status of the general notion (*amr ‘āmm*) in the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* continues in the next lemma, where Khwāja ‘Alī to the role of the “common factor” (*al-qadr al-mushtarak*). Khwāja ‘Alī says here that the general notion coincides with the common factor, because it is the intermediary to grasp the individual instances of a concept. For example, the common factor, or the general notion, implied in the positing of demonstrative pronouns, such as “this” (*hādhā*, which belong to the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*) is “the individuated referent,” i.e., *al-mushār ilayhi al-mushakkhkhaṣ*. Khwāja ‘Alī explains that that the of “the individuated referent” can be understood in two ways. The first, it corresponds to each one of the instances of the general notion of “referent,” as well as to “individuated” as a qualification (*ṣifa*) for each one of these instances of the concept that one wants to convey in a speech act. The second, it corresponds to each one of the instances of the notion of “the individuated referent.” Understanding the general notion, i.e., the notion of common factor, in either of these ways leads to a conundrum, because the notion of “individuated referent” is also a general notion (just like the notion of “individuation,” *tashakkhkhuṣ*) that does not bestow individuation on the single itemized concepts (*afrād*), but

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, fol. 6a.

rather it needs another distinct notion of “individuation” or “determination” (*tashakhkhus* and *ta’yyun*), and so on *ad infinitum*.⁴⁹ Khwāja ‘Alī rejects this view and claims that the meaning of ‘determination’ is, by definition, that by which one individual is distinguishable from another; and the idea of distinguishing an individual *x* from an individual *y* cannot possibly occur by means of a universal concept. Moreover, he adds that if the notion of “determination” were an actual universal, then it would neither necessitate real particularity (*juz’iyya ḥaqīqiyya*), nor bring forth individuation (*tashakhkhus*). Therefore, in order to solve this conundrum, Khwāja ‘Alī concludes that the terms “determination” and “individuation” are posited for the idea of “*something by which an individual is distinguishable from another, which is grasped by a general thing, that is, the previous notion of that by which one individual is distinguishable from another.*” Analyzed in this way, the notion of “*the individuated referent*” that defines the concept of the term “*this*” conveys individuation and determination to all its single instances.⁵⁰

The commentary on the *Classification* is the largest part of Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary, largely focus on the *thêoria*. This is possibly due to the wide variety of topics discussed in the

⁴⁹ Khwāja ‘Alī explains that the generality of the notion of ‘*individuated referent*’ is based on the claim that the notions of ‘*individuation*’ and ‘*determination*’ are universals. This claim is based on a rebuttal of a view held by theologians. According to theologians (who maintain the non-universality of the notion of ‘*determination*’), if the universality of the notion of ‘*determination*’ that is shared among multiple instances of a concept were realized, then an infinite regress would occur, since another notion of ‘*determination*’ would be required to distinguish among the multiple instances. According to the rebuttal, the notion of ‘*determination*’ that applies to the single instances is accidental, and therefore that notion is universal, like the notion of ‘*essence*.’ In Khwāja ‘Alī’s opinion this way of establishing the universality or the non-universality of the notions ‘*individuation*’ and ‘*determination*’ is unsatisfactory (*ghayr murḍī*) and should be dismissed; cf. fol. 7a, l. 16 – 7b, l. 3.

⁵⁰ “*wa-l-ḥaqq anna lafza al-tashakhkhusi wa-l-ta’ayyuni mawḍū’un li-kulli mā yamtāzu bihi shakhṣun ‘an shakhṣin akhara malḥūzun bi-amrin ‘āmmīn huwa hādihā al-mafhūmu al-madhkūru ayy mā bihi yamtāzu shakhṣun ‘an shakhṣin akhara;*” cf. fol 7b, l. 5-7. In the rest of the commentary of the *Introduction*, Khwāja ‘Alī goes back to the *lexis* in order to establish the correct reading of the lemma “*mawḍū’uhu*,” which appears in the feminine form in other copies of the *matn*, and to assess how the word “*Reminder*” (*tanbīh*), and its content relate to the precedent discussion on the class ‘*āmm-khāṣṣ*’.

Classification.⁵¹ The outline of the topics covered in the *Classification* is given in the commentary on the word “*Taqṣīm*.” Here, Khwāja ‘Alī points out that the goal of this section of the *matn* is classifying of the linguistic term, according to the nature of its significatum (*maḍlūl*), that is, whether it is a universal or an individuated thing. He then lists the terms that belong to the first part of the *Classification*, namely, generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, derived nouns and verbs, since their significata are universals. Terms that belong to the second part of the *Classification* are proper names, prepositions, personal and relative pronouns, since their significata are individuated concepts. This division elicits an objection from an opponent, who considers the division to be erroneous. According to the objector, in passage [2.1] “*the significatum of the term is either a universal or an individuated thing*,” the definite article in the word “*the term*” (*al-lafẓ*) is used to encompass all the individuals of the genus “*term*” (*lām al-istighrāq*), which conveys a universal concept of “*term*.” This means that the lemma can be parsed as “*each term posited for a concept <has> a significatum that is a universal or an individuated thing*.” In this way, the universal term is divided into universal significata and individuated significata. This leads to a contradiction, since a universal is divided into itself and into something else, which fundamentally undermines al-Ījī’s classification. Khwāja ‘Alī responds that the basis for operate the division (*mawrid al-qisma*) is the term posited for a concept (since every term is, by its own nature, posited for a concept), and that the significatum of every posited term is either a universal or an individual. Therefore, the basis for operate the division is either the term posited for a universal significatum, or the term posited for an individuated significatum. The group of terms whose significata are universals do not belong the group of terms whose significata are individuated

⁵¹ *Ibidem* fol. 8b, l. 16 –16b, l. 17.

notions and vice-versa. Therefore, in the *Classification*, the basis for operate the division in one group does not include its counterpart (*qasīm*).⁵²

The commentary follows on the first classification, where the signified of the term is a universal, calls firstly for some *lexis*. Here Khwāja ‘Alī supplies syntactical clarifications for the correct reading and understanding of al-Ījī’s opaque wording. He then moves to clarify the notions of *essence* (*dhāt*) *event* (*ḥadath*), both of which convey universal concepts, and the compounds of the two by means of an ascription (*nisba*). The discussion on the status of the event-action is defined as “*that which subsists in another*” (*al-qā’im bi-ghayrihi*), and results in furthermore philosophical digressions on the status of the attribute and its substratum.⁵³ In the comments on the ascription (*nisba*) between subject-agent and event-action, Khwāja ‘Alī clarifies the four classes of terms that obtain: *maṣḍars* (corresponding to the *event*), generic noun (corresponding to the *essence*), derived nouns and verbs (corresponding to the compounds of the *essence* and *event*). These further clarifications serve also to defend the validity of this classification against, again, an objector who calls for the conflation of the generic noun with

⁵² *Ibidem*, fol. 9a-9b. Khwāja ‘Alī offers a detailed explanation of how the objector’s proof is based on a false syllogism of the first figure, in which the minor premise cannot be granted. It exceeds the scope of this overview to report and comment on this long passage; cf. fol. 9b, l. 5 – 10b, l. 10.

⁵³ Khwāja ‘Alī enters into the details of the discussion of the notion of *ḥadath*, and appeals to Farsi to clarify the question. In his view, the definition “*al-qā’im bi-ghayrihi*” is expressed in Farsi with *maṣḍars* such as those that end in *dāl* and *nūn*, like ‘*zadan*’ (to hit) and those that end in *tā’* and *nūn*, like ‘*kashtan*’ (to kill). There is also the case of the concepts of blackness and whiteness that do conform to the above definition of “*subsisting in another*,” even though their endings in Farsi do not correspond to the two above. Conversely, the concepts of verbs such as ‘*kardan*’, which ends in *dāl* and *nūn*, are similar to the ones mentioned above, but do not satisfy the criterion of “*subsisting in another*.” Khwāja ‘Alī explains this discrepancy by turning to a topic of natural philosophy, according to which the meaning of “*subsistence in another*” is that of state of dependence or subordination (*taba’iyya*) in a spatial locus (*taḥayyuz*). The concept of ‘*kardan*,’ however, conveys the notion of an essence that occupies a spatial locus fundamentally (*bi-l-aṣāla*), even though it can have a relation to some other essence occupying space, because this relation does not seem to negate the primary spatial locus, i.e., the fact of filling a specific place, insofar as it can be pointed at by the senses; cf. fol. 10b, l. 22 – 11a, l. . Khwāja ‘Alī digresses further into questions involving God’s attributes subsisting in His essence and the attributes of immaterial substances.

the derived noun, thus undermining the whole classificatory system.⁵⁴ Khwāja ‘Alī’s detailed justification on the soundness of this classification into four groups allows him to expatiate further the exhaustiveness of the classification to obtain other sub-classes of terms, such as the adjective (*al-ṣifa al-mushabbaha*), the passive participle, the noun of instrument, adverbs of time and place, elative and superlative forms and the tenses of the verb.⁵⁵

In the second part of the *Classification*, the significatum is an something individuated (*mushakkhkhaṣ*), whether it result from a universal or an individual act of positing. The two classes that result from it are the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* and the *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*. Khwāja ‘Alī is particularly interested, as one would expect from his claim in the *ba‘diyya*, in the first of the two classes, the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, which includes four classes of terms, i.e., prepositions and all three types of pronouns. Accordingly, he focuses on the semantic features that distinguish prepositions from all three types of pronouns. Khwāja ‘Alī identifies “*determination*” of the concept (*ta‘yīn*) as the main distinguishing feature between prepositions and all three types of pronouns. Determination of the concepts of prepositions occurs or obtains when a relatum that *completes* the concept of that particle is expressed. The determination of pronouns occurs instead by virtue of a specific semantic context, *qarīna*, that differs according to the types of pronouns.⁵⁶ The question of the determination of the prepositions and, more specifically, al-Ījī’s claim “*the concept of the particle is in another <concept>*” (*ma‘ná al-ḥarfi fī ghayrihi*), elicits a long excursus into particles’ semantic status, that is, their lack of semantic self-sufficiency (*ghayr istiqlāl bi-l-mafhūmiyya*). Here, Khwāja ‘Alī discusses how the notion of independence (*istiqlāl*) of an instantiated concept obtains in the act of intellection (*ta‘aqqul*). In order to clarify this notion, he appeals again to the Jurjanian analogy of mental mirror, and the intellect’s intentional vs subordinate (i.e., as a consequence,

⁵⁴ *Ibidem* fol. 11b – 12a.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem* fol. 12b.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem* fol. 13a.

tab'an) act of grasping (*mulāḥaẓa*). The shift towards the intellect allows Khwāja 'Alī to explain how semantic self-sufficiency and dependance (i.e. the pair *mustaqill* and *ghayr mustaqill bi-l-mafhūmiyya*) as well as the amenability to predication (i.e. the pair *maḥkūm 'alayhi* (or *bihi*) and *ghayr maḥkūm 'alayhi* (or *bihi*)), all apply to particles and prepositions. It is clear at this point that Khwāja 'Alī's explanation of how the class *'āmm-khāṣṣ* applies to particles, hinges upon al-Jurjānī's. This is even more apparent when he digresses into al-Jurjānī's theory of mental perception and intentionality as discussed in both the *Mirā'tiyya* and *Ḥarfiyya*.⁵⁷

Khwāja 'Alī's borrowing from al-Jurjānī's analysis of the class *'āmm-khāṣṣ* here, aims not only to explain the semantic function of prepositions and pronouns, but also sets up the basis for the rebuttal of two paradoxes. The first paradox assumes that a preposition like "from," for example, is posited for only one among the many specific instances of the concept of "beginning," (*ibtidā'*). This entails that in all other cases, the term would signify only in a figurative way (*majāz*). The second paradox assumes instead that the preposition "from" is posited for every single instance of the concept of "beginning." This entails that the particle signifies homonymously (*ishtirākan*) infinite instances of the same concepts through numerous acts of positing. This in turn leads to the absurdity that the positor must have conceived all the infinite specific instances of that concept, e.g., "from Basra," "from Kufa," "from Rome," "from Montreal" and so on. More importantly, the analysis of the class *'āmm-khāṣṣ* represents a criticism of the widespread view that a preposition, or a pronoun, are posited for a universal concept, and this universal includes all the specific instances of that preposition. However, when the preposition or the pronoun is used (*isti'māl fī*) in speech, only one specific instance is conveyed, with the exclusion of the universal. In order to work, the tenants of this view (like Ibn al-Ḥājjib) explain

⁵⁷ *Ibidem* fol. 13b-14a; in what follows at fol. 14b, Khwāja 'Alī rejects the criticism that his previous claim "the concept of 'from' is not a subject or a predicate of a phrase" would itself be a judgement of "from." This entails a contradiction by appealing to the issue of the predicability of the empty subject-terms.

that the specific instances of the universal concept obtain because the positor, at the moment of positing, has deemed that mentioning the relata of the prepositions, and restricting their use only to convey specific instances, are the *sine qua non* for these terms to fully convey their specific concepts. Khwāja ‘Alī responds that, even with this explanation, prepositions and pronouns would still signify their specific concepts figuratively rather than literally.⁵⁸

Khwāja ‘Alī’s commitment to the view of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* formulated by al-Ījī and revised by al-Jurjānī is far from uncritical. In the last part of the commentary on this section of the *matn*, he suggests that the division of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* into four classes of terms (i.e., particles, and three types of pronouns) is not exhaustive (*ghayr ḥāṣir*). This is because there might be terms that do fall under the class of *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* whose determination does not obtain by an external context (*qarīna*) – as it is the case for the three types of pronouns. Khwāja ‘Alī refers here to the names of the letters of the alphabet (*ḥurūf al-mabānī*), such as the letter *B* (*al-bā’*), and to the book titles, such as *al-Shifā’*. In these cases, names of letters or book titles cannot be specific terms posited for specific concepts, which fall in the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* like, for example, *Zayd*. This is so because there are many individual instances of, for example, the letter ‘b’ or Avicenna’s *al-Shifā’*. If they were the result of a specific positing for a specific concept, these terms would signify their many instances only figuratively – a solution that, like the previous case, Khwāja ‘Alī wants to avoid. Although he seems to have entertained the view that names of letter and book titles may fall under the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, Khwāja ‘Alī is aware that his may lead to a contradiction. Names of letters and book titles are proper names, and they fall under the group of proper generic nouns (*‘alam al-jins*). However, insofar as they apply to many particular instances, these names also fall under the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, without appealing to a semantic context

⁵⁸ See Khwāja ‘Alī, *Sharḥ*, fol. 14b-15a. This position seems close to Ibn al-Ḥājjib’s view criticized by al-Ījī in his *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, and discussed in Chapter Two. Apparently, al-Taftāzānī also subscribed to this position.

(*qarīna*) that pins down one of their particular instances. Khwāja ‘Alī cannot offer a clear solution to this case study, but claims to have discussed it with his contemporaries, who could not offer a valid solution to this puzzle. The criticism of this shortcoming of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* will nonetheless reappear throughout the commentary tradition and the more recent independent *mutūn*.⁵⁹

The commentary goes on to draw more detailed distinctions of the nine types of terms that result from this classification. These include generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, derived nouns, verbs, proper nouns, prepositions and the three types of pronouns. One main distinction is between the universal concepts signified by the first four, and the particulars signified by the remaining five. This distinction prompts the criticism of scholars who assumed that the term “*man*” or “*human*” (*insān*) in the assertions “*a human came to me*” (*jā’anī insānun*) – where “*human*” here refers to, say, Zayd – and “*Zayd is a human*” (*Zaydun insānun*) – where “*man*” is a species, i.e., “*human*” – is used in its literal meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) in both instances. Khwāja ‘Alī points to this falsity of this assumption by remarking that, in the second assertion, the term “*insān*” applies to a universal concept, as is intended by the nature of its positing; whereas, in the first assertion, it might apply to a particular when an external element bestows specificity to the concept of “*insān*” (here, the ascription of the verb “*to come*” to an individual subject).

Khwāja ‘Alī himself takes issue with al-Ījī’s classification. For example, he returns to the thorny issue of the self-sufficiency of the concept of verbs, and objects that al-Ījī’s inclusion of the verb among terms posited for a universal concept is not adequate. In Khwāja ‘Alī’s view, just

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, fol. 15b. Khwāja ‘Alī does not discuss the issue further, but seems to lean towards the approach of those experts in the linguistic custom (*ahl al-‘urf*) when, for such cases, they refrain from determining the existence of a universal or particular concept, but they only postulate that the term conveys only an individuated notion (*amr mushakhkhaṣ*).

as in al-Jurjānī's, the verb, construed only as action-event, conveys a universal and may function as predicate. However, when it is construed as a compound of an action-event *and* an ascription to a subject (al-Jurjānī's view), it seems to behave like prepositions do, and should be included in the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*.⁶⁰ The remaining part of the commentary on the *Classification* provides additional details concerning the nature of positing of each of these groups of terms. Here, Khwāja ‘Alī highlights further differences between them that reinforce al-Ījī's classificatory system.

The commentary on the *Conclusion* follows the exegetical approach that Khwāja ‘Alī has put into place in the two previous sections. He provides the *lexis* of the lemma “*al-khātima tashtamilu ‘alā tanbīhāt*” according to their appropriate syntactical construction in order to avoid misconstruals. Overall, the commentary on the twelve *Reminders* is devoted to presenting and unfolding in plain style the terse wording of the *matn*, yet some *Reminders* call for further clarifications.⁶¹ This is the case for the *Second Reminder*, where Khwāja ‘Alī explains that semantic determination (*ta’yīn*) and individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) in demonstrative and personal pronouns occur to the listener's mind when the listener apprehends the individuated concept conveyed by the term together with its external context (*qarīna*), which prevents semantic participation (*shirka*). Relative pronouns, unlike demonstrative and personal pronouns, are taken by al-Ījī to convey a universal despite the occurrence of a semantic context, which in this case consists in the relative clause (*ṣila*). However, relative pronouns, according to this reading of al-Ījī's view, fail to convey a particular concept, as he stated in the *Classification*. Khwāja ‘Alī points out this aporia (*ishkāl*) and attempts to resolve it by interpreting al-Ījī's wording in this reminder. He

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, fol. 16a.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, fol. 16b-22a.

says that, as al-Ījī claims here, the concept of the relative pronoun could refer to a universal, and that the context of the relative pronoun, which is the content of the relative clause (*maḍmūn al-ṣila*) does not convey particularity. This explanation agrees with al-Ījī's claims in this reminder that the qualification of a universal by another universal does not convey particularity. To resolve the aporia, Khwāja 'Alī resorts to a charitable reading of al-Ījī's wording and claims that the intent in this reminder is only to show the reader this fundamental difference between the nature of the concepts conveyed by demonstrative and personal pronouns, and the concepts conveyed by relative pronouns, rather than to make the claim that relative pronouns convey actual universal concepts.⁶²

The *Sixth Reminder* – where al-Ījī discusses the difference between the occurrence of semantic determination for generic nouns (*ism al-jins*) and proper generic names (*'alam al-jins*) – also prompts a remark from Khwāja 'Alī. He claims that al-Ījī's distinction is inconsistent with the definition of generic nouns of the *Classification*, where the definition of *'alam al-jins* is absent. He further explains that al-Ījī's digression about the issue of determination in this reminder is valid only if one subscribes to the view that generic nouns are, like proper generic names, posited for a quiddity as such (*al-māhiyya min ḥaythu hiya hiya*). The other view holds that generic nouns are posited for a quiddity with some kind of qualification, such as unity (*waḥda*). Accordingly, Khwāja 'Alī explains that al-Ījī's analysis lacks the crucial discussion on the implications of the first view that should revolve around the attribute of “*being previously known*,” (*al-maḥūdiyya*), which is inherent in proper generic names, like *Leo*, but absent in generic nouns, like *lion*.⁶³ Lastly, the *Eighth* and *Ninth Reminders* is where Khwāja 'Alī evaluates in

⁶² “al-zāhir anna al-murāda annahumā 'uddā juz'iyyaini wa-l-mawṣūlu kulliyyan tanbīhan 'alā al-farqī lā annahu kulliyyun ḥaqīqatan,” cf. fol. 17b, l. 15-16.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, fol. 19a-b.

more detail al-Ījī's position regarding the issue of the differences between verbs and particles, and the amenability of both to being a subject or predicate.⁶⁴

Despite its length, this overview on Khwāja 'Alī's commentary is not comprehensive, but provided only a few examples about work of the commentator on the *matn*, leaving out many relevant passages that deserve further investigation. The few examples show how his detailed and often laborious analysis and explanations of the lemma, based on the *lexis* and the *thêoria*, earned him the title of the Risāla's first commentator, *awwāl shāriḥ*, among later commentators and glossators. Accordingly, the exegetical *praxis* of Khwāja 'Alī mirrors several of the functions of the *taḥqīq* that developed throughout the post-Avicennian intellectual tradition, in that he analytically expands, evaluates and eventually corrects the views expressed in the *matn*.⁶⁵ Another important aspect of Khwāja 'Alī's commentary is the presence of several passages that evoke the protocol of inquiry which was widespread among pre-modern scholars' dialectic methodology. In many passages of his detailed digressions over the *matn*, Khwāja 'Alī presents what appears to be dialectical sequences introduced by the classic formulae "*fā-in qulta*," "*fā-in qīla*" or "*la yuqāl*" followed by the reply "*li-annā naqūl*," where he generally sides with and justifies al-Ījī's claims. These sequences, taken together with others where Khwāja 'Alī refers to scholars' competing views, and together with his own questioning of some aspects of *matn*, all seem attest to current debates revolving around the Risāla during his time. Overall, the importance of Khwāja 'Alī's commentary for subsequent exegetical literature is crucial, in that

⁶⁴ This is, by far, the most extensive commentary on all twelve reminders, as it covers folios 19b to 21a. It would exceed the scope of this section to give an account of it.

⁶⁵ Overall, Khwāja 'Alī's exegetical approach is characterized by several aspects of functions 1), 2), 3), 4), 5) and 6) of *taḥqīq*; see Wisnovsky, Robert, "Avicenna and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the *Ishārāt*." *Oriens*, no. 41, 2013, pp. 354-356.

his commentary sets a standard for the emerging classic commentaries, which again and again rely upon his wordings and interpretations.

3.2 Classic Minor Commentaries

The composition of Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary will profoundly shape the emergence and consolidation of the following exegetical practice, which is represented by the commentaries authored by al-Qūshjī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn. There are however a few commentaries that were also composed along these classic one between the second half of the 9th/15th century and the first half of the 10th/16th. This indicates the growing interest on al-Ījī’s *Risāla* and his new semantic theory of the parts of the speech. The commentaries authored by Jāmī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī and al-Shirwānī were composed in the same period as those of al-Qūshjī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, but, unlike these two, did not elicit a tradition of glosses, super-glosses or super-commentaries. Even if I label to these commentaries as classic minor commentaries, the importance and the impact of these commentaries should not be underestimated. Other classic minor commentaries that should be mentioned include that by Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd Shams al-Dīn al-Bukhārī, also known as al-Shaykh al-Bukhārī (d. ca. 850/1446 or 870/1465) a scholar who was active in the Mamluk and Ottoman regions;⁶⁶ a commentary

⁶⁶ The two different dates of death are given respectively by Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī’s *al-Ḍaw’ al-Lāmi’ li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsi’*, Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1412/1992, vol. 10, p. 20; and by Ibn al-Ghazzī’s (d. 1167/1754) *Diwān al-Islām*, ed. Sayyid Kasrawī Ḥasan, vol. 1, p. 262. Al-Sakhāwī’s entry is in all likelihood the oldest source containing an account of al-Bukhārī’s life, as the author was born in 831/1428 and died in 902/1497. However, in reference to al-Bukhārī’s obituary, he admits that the date of death is based on his own personal opinion (*azunn ḡannan*). The date provided Ibn al-Ghazzī could be more accurate, because, according to Kātip Čelebī’s *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, al-Bukhārī composed a commentary on Muḥsin al-Qayṣarī’s (d. 755/1354) *Jāmi’ al-Durar* on religious duties (*farā’id*), which he completed in Shawwāl 14th 867/July 2nd 1463; see Kātip Čelebī, *Kashf...*, vol. 2, p. 1252. The little information available about his life is reported by his contemporary, the historian and traditionist al-Sakhāwī (831/1428-902/1497) in his *al-Ḍaw’ al-*

attributed to a certain Ghars al-Dīn,⁶⁷ and another attributed to a certain al-Harawī, which survives in at least seven copies.⁶⁸

*Lāmi*⁶, according to whom al-Bukhārī's intellectual career started in his hometown Cairo, where he taught al-Taftāzānī's *Mukhtaṣar al-Ma'ānī*, and authored commentaries on Ḥanafī *fiqh* and works on theology. Later, al-Bukhārī settled in Damascus where attracted a number of students, until his death. Among his works, al-Sakhāwī mentions his commentary on *Durar al-Biḥār* on Ḥanafī *fiqh*, and a commentary Sirāj al-Dīn al-Sajāwandī's (d. 600/1203) *al-Sirājiyya*, a widespread didactic poem on *farā'id*. The entry provided by Ibn al-Ghazzī (d. 1167/1754) in his *Ta'rikh al-Islām* lists three main works authored by al-Bukhārī, which are a commentary on *al-Qaṣida al-Khazarjiyya*, a commentary on *al-Sirājiyya*, and a commentary on al-Ījī's *al-Risāla al-Waḍ'iyya*. I could locate three copies of the commentary on the *Risāla*, namely, al-Azhar, Zakī n. 41581-92, and n. 41581-93, and King Fayṣal n. 1456. The oldest of the three copies is Zakī 41581-92, completed in 1072/1661.

⁶⁷ Extant copies are available in a collection of commentaries on the *Risāla* preserved in Nuruosmaniye 4511, fol. 75b-88a, and Hamidiye 1265, fol. 156b-164a.

⁶⁸ These includes al-Azhar 16137.23, fol. 1b-15b attributed to Ḥusayn al-Ḥāfi al-Harawī; Tokyo Daiber n. 90 misattributed to 'Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā'ini; Feyzullah 1859, fol. 57a-79b attributed to 'Abd al-Karīm al-Māzandarānī; Maktabat al-Aḥqāf, Tarīm, Yemen (accessible at <https://ia801301.us.archive.org/zipview.php?zip=/33/items/M-00027/469-.zip>) attributed to Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Harawī; Vatican Ar. 1047, fols. 32b-41b, without attribution (accessible at https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.ar.1047); Vatican Ar. 1078; Ambrosiana B 30; British Museum II, 208. The witness copies of Vatican Ar. 1078, Ambrosiana and British Museum attribute the commentary to Mullā Muẓaffar al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Yazdī al-Harawī (cf. GAL II, 269 and GAL Supp. II, 289). The case of Feyzullah 1859 is particularly interesting and might provide some indication on the period of activity of the author. The manuscript contains a copy of Khwāja 'Alī's commentary, which begins on fol. 55b (a note in red ink on the top left-corner indicates that this is Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī's commentary "*the distinguished disciple of al-Jurjānī and first commentator on the Risāla, as claimed by 'Iṣām*" [i.e., 'Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā'ini]). Khwāja 'Alī's commentary stops abruptly at folio 56b as the main body of the page, and continues in the margins of the codex. Al-Māzandarānī's commentary begins on fol. 57a, and contains, in the margins, an abridgement of a commentary on the *Risāla* (*mukhtaṣar sharḥ al-risāla*) that begins on the same folio. Therefore, starting on fol. 57a, the codex contains al-Māzandarānī's commentary as the main text, an abridgement of an unnamed commentary, and Khwāja 'Alī's commentary. The author of the abridgement claims to have first embarked in composing the long version of the commentary, despite having a few opinions about it (*bi-qillat al-biḍā'a*), at the service of "[...] *the Sultān Ya'qūb Bahādur Khān*," who can be identified with the son of the Aq-Qoyunlu ruler Uzün Ḥasan, known as Sultān Ya'qūb b. Uzün Ḥasan, ruler of the dynasty until his death in 896/1490. If this abridgement is an abridgement of the long commentary reproduced in the main text, then it is plausible that this al-Māzandarānī (or al-Harawī, following the authorship of other copies) was active during the second half of the 9th/15th century, that is when all classic commentaries were composed.

3.2.1 Mullā Jāmī: The intersection between ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ and grammar

The presence of numerous witness copies in many manuscript collections indicates that the commentary of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī, known as Mullā Jāmī, was considered one of the most significant minor commentaries.⁶⁹ It is nonetheless difficult to classify this work because, like to al-Jurjānī’s glosses, Jāmī’s commentary contains neither an introduction, an incipit, nor an explicit, any of which might clarify the circumstances of its composition. The lack of these features leads to the conclusion that, like al-Jurjānī, the author composed a series of glosses on the margins of the physical copies of the *matn*, glosses that were later collected and formed as an independent text. Conversely, other features of the work, such as the complete reproduction of the *matn* in a *mamzūj* style, as well as the length of the several glosses, seem consistent with those of a comprehensive commentary.

Jāmī’s commentary is shorter than Khwāja ‘Alī’s and, unlike the latter, is equally balanced between the *Introduction* and *Classification* sections of the *matn*, while the commentary on the *Conclusion* is slightly. The content and wording of Jāmī’s commentary are undoubtedly based on Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary and often copy verbatim long passages from the latter. The

⁶⁹ On Mullā Jāmī’s life and work see Ertuğrul İ. Ökten, *Jāmī (817-898/1414-1492): His Biography and Intellectual Influence in Herat*, PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2007. A recent study by Ertuğrul Ökten focused on this commentary. The author is successful in offering an overview of the main topics of al-Ījī’s *Risāla* and its historical relevance. However, the author does not present the peculiar aspects of Jāmī’s commentary, nor its ties to the previous commentary tradition, such as the works of al-Jurjānī and Khwāja ‘Alī. The study is limited to the historical aspect surrounding the commentary and its authorship. Moreover, the author attempts to establish a relation of the commentary with Jāmī’s more influential grammatical work, *al-Fawā’id al-Ḍiyā’iyya* (see below). To do so, he discusses the section of *al-Fawā’id* where the notion of *waḍ‘* is discussed. However, the study is unsuccessful in locating several key passages of the *Fawā’id* in which al-Jāmī integrates central notions borrowed from al-Ījī’s *Risāla* (see below); cf. Ökten, Ertuğrul, ‘*Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī and the Ottoman Linguistic Tradition: Philosophy of Language and ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*’, in Thibaut d’Hubert and Alexandre Papas (eds.), *Jāmī in Regional Contexts*, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018, pp. 283-308.

commentary on the introductory statement of the *matn* exhibits similar interests to those of Khwāja ‘Alī, including the referent of “*hādhihi*,” its relation to the lemma “*fā’ida*,” the different definitions that apply to the term “*fā’ida*,” and how the following lemma “*tashtamil ‘alā muqaddima, taqṣīm wa-khātima*” correspond to the contents of the *matn*.⁷⁰ The commentary on the *Introduction* highlights the function of the terms posited by means of a general notion, *amr ‘āmm*. Jāmī, following Khwāja ‘Alī, divides the trms further into essential (*dhātī*), which applies to particles, and accidental (*‘araḍī*), which applies to all pronouns.⁷¹ The lemma “*al-qadr al-mushtarak*,” as with Khwāja ‘Alī, serves as the occasion for Jāmī to discuss in detail its intermediary function, that is, between a given term and specific conceptual instances falling under that shared notion (here he also cites the competing view of the *zāhiriyyīn* mentioned by Khwāja ‘Alī).⁷² Like Khwāja ‘Alī, Jāmī introduces at this point a description of the four classes of *waḍ‘*, from which he discards the class *khāṣṣ-‘āmm*. He then points out that the core of al-Ījī’s discussion in the rest of the *matn* revolves around the analysis of the *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, because both, in Jāmī’s view, involve the individuation of their respective concepts (*tashakhkhuṣ al-ma‘ná*), and thus require further clarification.⁷³

Jāmī’s commentary on the *Reminder* of the *Introduction* again reproduces verbatim passages of Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary. In this case, Jāmī copies the *lexis* regarding the term “*tanbīh*,” while providing only the gist of its content, namely, that it serves to remind the less insightful of the need for a semantic context for terms falling under the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ For all references to Jāmī’s commentary (= Jāmī, *Sharḥ*...). I rely on a recent unpublished critical edition contained in Can, Ayhan, *Abdurrahman el-Câmî’nin Şerhu’r-Risâleti’l-Vaz’iyye*, Hitit Üniversitesi, Çorum (Turkey), 2016; see pp. 52-54.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 55-56; Khwāja ‘Alī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 6b.

⁷² Cf. Jāmī, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 56-57.

⁷³ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 62-63.

Jāmī's commentary on the *Classification* – which is considerably shorter than Khwāja 'Alī's – as well as on the *Conclusion* both closely follow Khwāja 'Alī's exposition, reflected again in the many verbatim passages that Jāmī copies from Khwāja 'Alī. All of this copying leads to the conclusion that Jāmī's work stems partly from his transcription of his lessons under Khwāja 'Alī. Overall, the scope of Jāmī's commentary maps onto that of Khwāja 'Alī's, in that Jāmī offers neutral exposition of the *matn*. However, Jāmī aimed for a more disciplined summation of the topics treated in the *Risāla* and achieves this goal by advancing the *thêoria* as well as by resisting the temptation to digress into the lexicographical details and dialectical sequences that characterize Khwāja 'Alī's commentary.

Although Jāmī's commentary does not stand out as an original contribution to the development of 'ilm al-waḍ', his interest in the *Risāla* had some important repercussions in the cognate discipline of grammar. Jāmī's commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *al-Kāfiya*, entitled *al-Fawā'id al-Ḍiyā'iyya*, which was possibly composed later than his commentary on the *Risāla* as it is dedicated to Jāmī's son Ḍiyā' al-Dīn, was one of his most influential works.⁷⁵ The large number of glosses and superglosses as well as of early printed versions attest to the importance of Jāmī's *Fawā'id* in the development of Arabic grammar within the *madrassa* curricula.⁷⁶ The wide diffusion

⁷⁵ For the present case I refer to the critical edition by Usāma Ṭaha Rifā'i, Baghdād: Maṭba'at Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shu'ūn al-Dīniyya, 1403/1983, 2 vols.

⁷⁶ The most widespread sets of glosses on the *Fawā'id* are those authored by Jāmī's student 'Abd al-Ghafūr al-Lārī (d. 912/1506) and 'Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā'inī. For a list of the printed versions and the glosses of the *Fawā'id* see al-Ḥabashī, 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad, *Jāmi' al-Shurūḥ wa-l-Ḥawāshī*, Abū Ḍabī: al-Majma' al-Thaqāfi, 2004, vol. 2, pp. 1425-1433. It seems that the *Fawā'id* was particularly influential in the Mughal curricula, although the existence of a printed version of the commentary as early as the middle of the 13th/19th century in Istanbul and Cairo indicates that it was also integrated in these intellectual circles; cf. Robinson, Francis, "Ottomans-Safavids-Mughals: Shared Knowledge and Connective Systems." *Journal of Islamic Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1997, 151-184. For an overview of Jāmī's critical editions of the *Fawā'id* and its relation to previous commentaries on the Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *al-Kāfiya* see Larcher, Pierre, "Al-Fawā'id al-ḍiyā'iyya fī sharḥ al-Kāfiya de Ḍāmi ou quand un Poète se fait Grammarien pour son Fils." *Arabica*, no. 64, 2017, 237-248.

of the *Fawā'id* was not due to its originality, because, like Jāmī's commentary on the *Risāla*, the *Fawā'id* was effectively a compilation of previous commentaries composed on the *Kāfiya*, including Ibn al-Ḥājjib's self-commentary and that of Raḍī al-Dīn al-Astarabādhī (d. 688/1289).⁷⁷

Despite this lack of originality, Jāmī's *Fawā'id* was one of the earliest attempts to integrate the semantic theory of the *Risāla* into the science of grammar. In this respect, a few passages of the *Fawā'id* reveal the importance of several topics discussed in the *Risāla* and analyzed in its early commentaries. In his commentary on the lemma "*the word is posited for a concept*" (*al-kalimatu wuḍi'at li-ma'nan*), Jāmī explains that this implies that words are posited for simple concepts on the basis of an intentional act of positing. This excludes unattested roots (i.e., *muhmalāt*, roots devoid of meaning like *jasāqa*) and terms that signify by nature (*bi-l-ṭab'*), as opposed to convention. This in turn prompts one to investigate simple words that are posited for compound terms, rather than for a concept, such as the word "*sentence*" (*jumla*). Jāmī cites the response that there is no such a thing as a term that is posited for another term, whether simple or compound. Instead, there are terms posited for a universal notion whose single instances are also terms, e.g., *noun*, *verb*, *particle*, *sentence*. But Jāmī rejects this response. He points to terms that do relate back to specific terms, whether simple or compound (as in the case of the relative pronoun *who/whom* (*alladhī*), when it is used in a sentence, e.g., "*the one who came to me*" (*alladhī jā'anī*), to refer to, e.g., Zayd in a previous assertion such as "*Zayd is standing*"), as well as to the names of letters, book titles and Quranic *sūras*.⁷⁸ Jāmī's rebuttal of the response to the original criticism is linked to a similar discussion in his commentary on the *Risāla*, where the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* is mentioned. In the *Fawā'id*, he uses the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* to explain that

⁷⁷ Cf. Larcher, *Al-Fawā'id*..., pp. 8-11.

⁷⁸ These examples are also offered by ʿIṣām al-Dīn in his glosses on the *Fawā'id*, cf. ʿIṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāʿinī, *Ḥāshiya ʿalā al-Fawā'id al-Ḍiyā'iyya*, Istanbul: Dār Sa'ādat – Maṭba'a ʿUthmāniyya, 1309/1891, p. 13.

these types of terms fall under this specific type of *waḍʿ*. This also entails that the concept of these terms is not in reality a universal notion as stated in the previous response.⁷⁹

Another instance where the semantic theory of the *Risāla* was integrated into the grammatical context of the *Fawā'id* occurs with the definition of noun (*ism*). Ibn al-Ḥājib defines the noun as “a term posited for a concept in itself” (*lafẓun wuḍiʿa li-maʿnan fī nafsīhi*). Following another work of Ibn al-Ḥājib, *al-Īdāh*, Jāmī explains that the concept of any given noun is conveyed when considered in itself (*bi-iʿtibārihi*), rather than when considering something extraneous to it (*bi-iʿtibāri amrin khārijin ʿanhu*), as is the case with particles. However, Jāmī seems dissatisfied with this explanation. He digresses into the analysis of nouns and particles by appealing to the claim of a certain *muḥaqqiq*, whom he does not name, but who can reasonably be identified as al-Jurjānī. Jāmī’s long digression echoes al-Jurjānī’s distinction between concepts grasped in themselves and those grasped through another, as articulated in the *Ḥarfīyya* and *Mirʾātiyya*. However, al-Jurjānī grounds his discussion on the ontological distinction between existents that subsist *per se* vs through another (*mawjūd qāʾim bi-dhātihi/bi-ghayrihi*).⁸⁰ Only then does al-Jurjānī move onto the distinction between grasping an intelligible intentionally and *per se* (which is thus amenable to being the subject or the predicate of an assertion), and grasping an intelligible secondarily (i.e., as a means to grasp something other, in which case the same amenability does not hold). Applying this distinction to the case of nouns and particles comes next by appealing to the example of the concept of “beginning” (*ibtidāʾ*). When the intellect grasps the concept of “beginning” intentionally, it is as a noun. When the

⁷⁹ Cf. Jāmī, *Fawā'id*..., vol. 1, p. 168. One can see here the influence of Khwāja ʿAlī, who was supposedly the first who brought up the issue regarding the names of letters and book titles. However, I have not been able to identify such text.

⁸⁰ It might be the case that Jāmī is quoting a text by al-Jurjānī different, but closely related to, the *Ḥarfīyya* and the *Mirʾātiyya*.

intellect grasps it as as a state intervening between two nouns, it is as a particle.⁸¹ Jāmī's digression, which echoes his commentary on the Risāla, allows him to claim that the definitions of the noun and the particle, understood on the basis of this analysis, are still valid with respect to terms like "*dhū*" and "*fawqa*," which are considered nouns but behave like particles – again, a topic also discussed in his commentary on the Risāla.

A final instance of this integration of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* into grammar occurs in the section on definite and indefinite terms (*al-ma‘rifa wa-l-nakira*). Here Jāmī first defines determined terms (*ma‘rifa*), as nouns posited by a universal or particular act of positing (*waḍ‘ juz’ī wa-kullī*) to some entity that is indetermined in itself (*shay’un multabisun bi-‘aynihi*). Jāmī glosses determined terms as “<an entity> *per se*, semantically determined, known to and acknowledged by both speaker and listener.”⁸² In other words, whenever a certain entity comes to be qualified by “being-known” and “being-recognized” (*al-ma‘lūmiyya* and *al-ma‘hūdiyya*) and a term is posited for it, then a determined noun obtains. By contrast, if a term is posited for an entity without these qualifications, then an undetermined noun obtains. Starting from this basic distinction, Jāmī derives six main groups of determined nouns, of which only the first three are relevant here. Personal pronouns make up the first group, and these, Jāmī explains, are posited for determined individuated concepts (*ma‘ānī mu‘ayyana mushakhkhaṣa*) by considering a universal notion, for example, the single universal notion of the first person becomes the tool to grasp all of its single instances. Then, the term “*I*” (or *me*) is posited for all these single instances, so that only one of these would be understood in the speech situation.

Jāmī clarifies the whole process of positing personal pronouns by copying verbatim the following passage from the *Introduction* of the Risāla:

⁸¹ Cf. Jāmī, *al-Fawā'id*..., vol. 1, pp. 179-180

⁸² *Ibidem*, vol. 2, p. 149, “[...] ayy bi-dhātihi al-mu‘ayyanati al-ma‘lūmati li-l-mutakallimi wa-l-mukhāṭibi al-ma‘hūdati baynahumā.”

“[...] insofar as, <by that term>, only one < individuated thing> is understood and conveyed in its specificity, to the exclusion of the common aspect. <In this way>, the apprehension of that common aspect is an instrument for the act of positing, rather than the object <of positing> [i.e., the concept]. <In this case>, the act of positing is universal, while the object of <positing> is a specific individuated thing” ([...] *bi-ḥaythu la yufādu wa-lā yufhamu illā wāḥidun bi-khuṣūsihi dūna al-qadri al-mushtaraki fa-yuta‘aqqalu dhālika al-mushtaraku ālatan li-l-waḍ‘i lā annahu al-mawḍū‘u lahu, fa-l-waḍ‘u kulliyyun wa-l-mawḍū‘u lahu juz’iyyun mushakkhkhaṣun*).”⁸³

With personal pronouns, Jāmī is clearly applying the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* in order to clarify how and why these should be understood as determined terms. The second class includes all proper names (*a‘lām*), e.g., *Zayd* and *Usāma*. Here, Jāmī appeals to the same notions of *ma‘lūmiyya* and *ma‘hūdiyya* employed above, as well as in his commentary on the *Risāla*, in order to distinguish them from generic nouns (*asad*).⁸⁴ The third group comprises demonstrative and relative pronouns that fall, as Jāmī explicitly says, under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, because they are posited for determined concepts qualified by “*being-known*” and “*being-recognized*.”⁸⁵ However, as with personal pronouns, the positor of language first conceives a general concept of, say, an individuated referent (*al-mushakkhkhaṣ al-mushār ilayhi*), and only afterwards posits the term “*this*” (*hādhā*) for each and every specific instance of that general notion.

⁸³ *Ibidem*. This passage corresponds to passages [1.2] and [1.3] of the *Risāla* (see Chapter Two).

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, vol. 2, p. 150.

⁸⁵ Jāmī, like al-Ījī’s in the *Sharḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*, refers to these as *mubhamāt* because, he explains, demonstratives that are deprived of indication or pointing are undefined entities, *mubham*, just like relative pronouns are undefined when their syndetic clause, *ṣila*, is absent; cf. *Ibidem*.

3.2.2 The Commentary of Mas‘ūd al-Shirwānī

Of the four classic commentaries, the two authored by the 9th/15th-century scholars Mas‘ūd al-Shirwānī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Laythī al-Samarqandī are fundamental to understanding the development of the commentary tradition. This is despite the fact that, unlike al-Qūshjī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentaries, neither al-Shirwānī’s nor al-Samarqandī’s commentaries prompted the composition of glosses and superglosses.⁸⁶ A survey of the commentaries authored by al-Shirwānī and Abū al-Qāsim is nevertheless important for two

⁸⁶ There is however textual evidence that the commentary of al-Shirwānī engendered one set of glosses that are preserved in Nuruosmaniye 4508, fol. 250a-272b, Nuruosmaniye 4509, fol. 234a-249a, and Nuruosmaniye 4510, fol. 118a-139b. The attribution of these glosses is problematic, because in Nuruosmaniye 4508 they are attributed to ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, even though I could not find any textual evidence to confirm this attribution. Nuruosmaniye 4510 attributes them to al-Shirwānī himself. In this codex the glosses are copied immediately after al-Shirwānī’s commentary and the title on fol. 118a is “*Ḥāshiya ‘alā Sharḥ al-Waḍ‘iyya li-l-Mas‘ūd al-Shirwānī ayḍan lahu*,” which indicates that he composed self-glosses on his commentary. There is also textual evidence of a set of glosses on Abū al-Qāsim’s commentary preserved in Nuruosmaniye 4508, fol. 181b-249a, Nuruosmaniye 4509, fol. 157b-196a, and Nuruosmaniye 4510, fol. 43b-93b. These glosses are attributed to a certain Abū al-Baqā’ b. ‘Abd al-Bāqī al-Ḥusaynī, who was active in the first half of the 10th/16th century, because the colophons of Nuruosmaniye 4508 and 4509 report that Abū al-Baqā’ completed his glosses on Thursday 9 Rajab 925/July 7th 1519. Moreover, in his glosses, Abū al-Baqā’ makes reference to the glosses of the author, introduced by the formula “*qāla fī l-ḥāshiya quddisa sirruhu*.” Upon comparison, I have established that Abū al-Baqā’ refers to marginal glosses that are transmitted in most the witness copies of al-Abū al-Qāsim’s commentary and are signed with “*minhu*.” There is also evidence that helps to identify the intellectual milieu in which Abū al-Baqā’ was active. He authored a commentary on al-Jurjānī’s manual on logic *al-Kubrā* (both in Farsi), which he composed for Abū al-Faṭḥ Muḥammad Humāyūn, that is, Abū al-Faṭḥ Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Akbar, a.k.a. Sultan Akbar I (949/1542-1014/1605, r. 963/1556-1014/1605), the famous Mughal emperor (cf. *Mawsū‘at Mu‘allifī al-Imāmiyya*, Qum: Majma‘ al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 1420/2000, vol. 1, p. 477; for the extant copies this commentary see also Muṣṭafā Dirāyatī, *Denā*, vol. 6, p. 1002). If this information is correct, then Abū al-Baqā’ composed his commentary on al-Jurjānī’s *al-Kubrā* around the middle of the 10th/16th century, when Sultan Akbar ascended to power. There is another set of glosses also attributed to another Abū al-Baqā’ that should not be confused with this set of glosses. This second Abū al-Baqā’ composed a set of glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary, which was misattributed to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī (see Chapter Four). This second Abū al-Baqā’ is Abū al-Baqā’ Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. Khalaf al-Miṣrī al-Aḥmadī (d. after 909/1503), on which see the list of glossators on al-Qūshjī in Chapter 4 (according to Rudolph Mach this Abū al-Baqā’ may be Abū al-Baqā’ b. Mūsā al-Kaffawī (1094/1683), the author of *al-Kulliyāt*; see. Rudolph Mach, *Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscript (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection Princeton University Library*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1977, p. 294, number 3425).

reasons. The first is that al-Shirwānī and Abū al-Qāsim had different reasons for engaging with al-Ījī's semantic theory. Al-Shirwānī appears to be motivated by the connection between semantics and logic. Abū al-Qāsim, by contrast, seems to conceive al-Ījī's semantic theory strictly within the context of, and as a propaedeutic for, *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*. The second reason is that both commentaries, alongside al-Jurjānī's gloss and Khwāja ‘Alī's commentary, constitute the main sources of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn's commentary, which, as I will show in Chapter Four, represents the climax of the classic exegetical tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* which superseded the commentaries of his predecessors.

Let us first start with Kamāl al-Dīn Mas‘ūd al-Shirwānī al-Rūmī (d. 905/1499-1500). Al-Shirwānī was active during the 9th/15th century and studied with Faṭḥ Allāh al-Shirwānī (820/1417-891/1486), who was, together with al-Qūshjī, part of the circle of scholars led by Qāḍī-zādeh Rūmī (d. c. 844/1440) in Samarqand, and who, like al-Qūshjī, moved to the scholarly circles of the Ottoman regions, but later returned to Samarqand.⁸⁷ It is unclear whether Mas‘ūd al-Shirwānī travelled, just like his teacher Faṭḥ Allāh, to the Ottoman regions in search for patronage as his *nisba* “*al-Rūmī*” might indicate. He was active in the Khorasanian region, possibly in the city of Shirvān (hence his *nisba*⁸⁸) where he taught the rational sciences, but moved around the nearby centers of learning, since he is said to have been one of the teachers of the polymath and astronomer al-Birjandī (d. 931/1525) and (more importantly for the history of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*) of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā’inī, who was active mainly in Samarqand and Herat.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ On Faṭḥ Allāh al-Shirwānī see Ihsan Fazlioğlu, “Shirwānī,” in Hockey T. et al. (eds) *The Biographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers*, Springer: New York, 2007, pp. 1055-6; and Hasan Umut, “Theoretical Astronomy in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire: ‘Alī al-Qūshjī's *al-Risāla al-Faṭḥiyya*,” Montreal: McGill University, PhD Thesis, 2020, pp. 58 and 67.

⁸⁸ It is unclear whether Kamāl al-Dīn was native of Shirvān in Khorasan or, like his teacher Faṭḥ Allāh, from Shirvān in Azerbaijan.

⁸⁹ Cf. On al-Birjandī see Takanori, Kusuba “Birjandī,” in Hockey T. et al. (eds) *The Biographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers*, Springer: New York, 2007, p. 127. On his intellectual lineage with al-Shirwānī see Kātip Čelebī, *Sullam*

Despite the scarce information on his life and education, al-Shirwānī was known for his mastery of the rational sciences, mainly logic, *ḥikma*, *kalām* and *adāb al-baḥth*.⁹⁰ The works attributed to him are a set of glosses on a commentary on al-Kātibī's *Ḥikmat al-ʿAyn*,⁹¹ a widespread and glossed upon commentary on Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī's treatise on *adāb al-baḥth*,⁹² a set of glosses on the question of causation and accidents (*al-ʿilla wa-l-maʿlūl wa-l-aʿrāḍ*) from al-Jurjānī's commentary on the *Mawāqif*,⁹³ a set of super-glosses on al-Jurjānī's glosses on al-Taḥṭānī's *Lawāmiʿ al-Asrār*,⁹⁴ a short treatise on three topics on logic, *ḥikma* and *ʿilm al-kalām*,⁹⁵ and his commentary on al-Ījī's *Risāla*.

The commentary of al-Shirwānī is a complete *sharḥ* since it reproduces all the features of a full commentary, like that of Khwāja ʿAlī, and, like most classic commentaries, it is composed in *mamzūj* style. The commentary extends over approximately thirty to forty folios and is more

al-Wuṣūl ilā Ṭabaqāt al-Fuḥūl, ed. Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arnāʾūṭ and Ṣāliḥ Saʿdāwī Ṣāliḥ, Iṣṭānbul: Markaz al-Abḥāth li-l-Tāʾriḫ wa-l-Funūn wa-l-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya, 2010, vol. 4, p. 241. On ʿIṣām al-Dīn see Kātip Čelebī, *Sullam...*, vol. 2, p. 407 and vol. 3, p. 331.

⁹⁰ For some of his views on logic see Khaled el-Rouayheb, "Impossible Antecedents and their Consequences: Some Thirteen-century Arabic Discussions," *History of Philosophy and Logic*, 30 (3), 2009, 209-225.

⁹¹ Cf. Kātip Čelebī, *Sullam...*, vol. 3, p. 331. It is unclear on which commentary al-Shirwānī composed his glosses. At the present stage I have not been able to obtain a copy of these glosses. Nevertheless, the bibliographical information that I could gather does attribute to him a set of glosses on Shams al-Dīn al-Harawī al-Kharziyānī's (fl. ca. 845/1441) commentary, but also a set of glosses on the more widespread commentary authored by Shams al-Dīn Mubārak-Shāh al-Bukhārī (d. ca. 740/1340). A copy of the latter seems to be extant in al-Žāhiriyya Collection of Damascus n. 3126, and in Al-Ghāzī Khusrū Bek Collection of Sarajevo n. 2007.

⁹² The commentary has been recently edited in a MA Thesis, see Adem Güney "Kemâlüddīn Mesʿūd B. Hüseyin Eş-Şirvānī'nin (905/1500) Şerhu Âdâbi's-Semerkindi Adli Eserinin Tahkik Ve Değerlendirmesi" Sakarya Üniversitesi, 2010. Unfortunately, the author does not provide any information on al-Shirwānī's life and works. This commentary received a number of glosses, super-glosses and annotations; cf. al-Ḥabashī, ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad, *Jāmiʿ al-Shurūḥ wa-l-Ḥawāshī*, vol. 1, pp. 57-59.

⁹³ A manuscript copy is available in Maktabat ʿArif Ḥikmat (Medina) 240/107.

⁹⁴ Al-Shirwānī refers to "[...] that which we have written on the glosses of the commentary on *al-Maṭālī*" (*mā katabnā ʿalā ḥāshiyati sharḥi al-Maṭālī*) in his commentary on al-Ījī's *Risāla*; see Nuruosmaniye 4509, fol. 213b. A witness copy of this set of glosses is extant in the Yūsuf Aghā Collection in Konya n. 4939.

⁹⁵ Cf. University of Tehran n. 3430/9, fol. 238-243; and Majlis Shūrā, Ṭabāṭabāʾī n. 1231/57, fol. 163b-164b.

or less equally distributed over the three main sections of the *matn*, that is, *Introduction*, *Classification* and *Conclusion*.⁹⁶ Like previous commentators, al-Shirwānī includes an opening statement and a preamble. The opening statement, where the customary eulogy for God and Muḥammad is conveyed in *sajʿ*, displays the same wordplay on terms echoing the subject matter of the *matn* seen in the previous commentaries. The preamble contained in the *baʿdiyya* provides important information to understand al-Shirwānī's view of the nature of the subject-matter of *matn* and its general scope. For al-Shirwānī, as stated in Chapter Two, the general scope of the *Risāla* is to elucidate the rules governing the semantic positing of simple terms (*qawāʿid al-waḍʿ*). However, he has a more general and comprehensive conception of the scope and content of the *matn*, one that extends beyond Khwāja ʿAlī's selective understanding, which focused on the analysis of particles, prepositions and pronouns. As he says in the preamble, al-Shirwānī composed a commentary on the *Risāla* for at least two main reasons. The first is directly related to the extremely concise and elliptical nature of the *matn* itself ([*al-risāla*] *mūjizātun ghāyata al-ījāzi*), which calls for a more detailed, precise explication of its implications in order to unravel the subtleties of al-Ījī's expressions (*ḥallu daqāʾiqi ʿibārātihi*). The second is related to the immediately preceding exegetical literature on the *matn*. Al-Shirwānī points out that the previous commentaries were not successful (*lam yattaḥiq lahu*) in explaining plainly the content of al-Ījī's claims and were unable to solve his pointers (*ishārātuhi*), resulting difficulties for the reader. Despite using this widespread trope in the exegetical literature, al-Shirwānī addresses one author in particular. He does not hide his frustration with al-Jurjānī's glosses, which, because of their concise style, add nothing more than puzzles and obscurities to the *matn* and, what is worse, are barely understandable (*lā takādu tufhamu*).⁹⁷ Overall, al-Shirwānī's goal in

⁹⁶ Cf. Nuruosmaniye 4509, fol. 198b-231b; Nuruosmaniye 4508, fol. 88b-122b.

⁹⁷ Cf. al-Shirwānī, *Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya*, Nuruosmaniye 4509 fol. 198b.

composing his commentary, as he states in the conclusion of his preamble, is to offer a solution to the intricate claims of the *matn*, and also to clarify the points and criticisms raised by al-Jurjānī in his glosses. The content of al-Shirwānī's preamble seems therefore to illustrate his exegetical plan, in the sense that he aims to provide a better understanding of virtually all the rules governing the semantic positing while, at the same time, superseding the previous commentaries, primarily those by al-Jurjānī and in all likelihood the latter's student Khwāja 'Alī's, which are all deemed exegetically unsatisfactory.

In his comments on the opening lemma of the *Risāla*, al-Shirwānī focuses first on the sense of the word "*hādhihi*," and whether it refers to specific utterances (*'ibārāt makḥṣūṣa*) or to their corresponding concepts present in the intellect, and how "*hādhihi*" relates to the immediately following word "*fā'ida*."⁹⁸ In this passage, al-Shirwānī points out that the sense of "*fā'ida*" refers to multiple, different topics that are organized in a unitary way or by a unitary principle (*bi-jiḥa waḥda*). In an attempt to conceive the topics of the *matn* as a unitary discipline, he compares the topics of the *Risāla* to the logical rules (*al-qawānīn al-manṭiqiyya*) that make up the discipline of logic, since logic is referred to as a canon (*qānūn*) that one needs in order to obtain unknown notions from those that are known, by organizing them according to a unitary principle. More importantly, al-Shirwānī also rejects the claim that the treatise in general, and its denomination "*fā'ida*" in particular, cannot refer to the statements of the *matn* because these are accidents whose parts are not unitary and thus are not actually ontologically individualized (*fī l-wujūd*) – a view that appears to coincide with Khwāja 'Alī's *lexis*.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ In this first instance, al-Shirwānī explains, an allegorical ascription obtains (*ḥaml ta'wīlī*), while in the second an analytical ascription (*ḥaml taḥqīqī*) obtains.

⁹⁹ Cf. al-Shirwānī, *Sharḥ...*, fol. 199a. Another criticism against Khwāja 'Alī's *lexis* occurs in the next lemma "*yashtamil*."

The lemma “*tanbīh*,” as already mentioned in the previous chapter, becomes the locus where the variant, quadripartite version plan of the *matn* is discussed and, in al-Jurjānī’s case, ultimately discarded.¹⁰⁰ It was already noted in Chapter Two that in this specific case al-Shirwānī disagrees with al-Jurjānī’s justification for dismissing a quadripartite division of the *matn*. First, al-Shirwānī thinks that al-Jurjānī’s dismissal of the quadripartite division from the perspective of the *lexis* conveys only that the quadripartite version of the *matn* is inelegant (*ghayr mustahsan*), rather than impossible. Second, from the perspective of the *thêoria*, al-Shirwānī thinks that al-Jurjānī wrongly assumed that the *Reminder* is an actual part of the *Introduction* (*juz’ bi-l-fi’l*), while in his view its content has a direct connection (*lahu irtibāṭ*) to the topics covered in both the *Introduction* and the *Classification*.¹⁰¹ In what follows, al-Shirwānī clarifies that the *Classification* is the core subject-matter (*‘umda*) of the composition of the *Risāla*, and adds another evaluation of al-Jurjānī’s view regarding the relation between the parts of the *matn*. Al-Shirwānī asserts that al-Jurjānī sees the content of the *Classification* as the only objective (*maqṣūd*) of the *Risāla*, to the exclusion of the other two parts of the *matn*, that is, the *Introduction* and the *Conclusion*, neither of which is meant to be part of its intended objective (*ghayr maqṣūdayn*). Al-Shirwānī points out that al-Jurjānī’s selective understanding of the goal of the *Risāla*, one that focused solely on the *Classification*, resulted from what appears to be the main theme of *matn*, namely, explaining the positing of prepositions and the three types of pronouns. In al-Shirwānī’s view, the subject-matter of the *Risāla* is certainly represented by the *Classification*; however, the content of the *Introduction* and *Conclusion* are equally important, since the *Introduction* offers the foundations of the class *‘amm-khāṣṣ*, under which prepositions and pronouns are classified, while the *Conclusion* points to specific case studies (*aḥkām*) that are directly related to the *Classification*. In this respect,

¹⁰⁰ Cf. fol. 199b.

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*.

al-Shirwānī conceives the three parts of the *matn* as being co-dependent with each other in a more cohesive and structured way – a conception that reflects his broader understanding of the topic of the *Risāla* presented in the preamble as the “*rules of the semantic positing*,” rather than merely the analysis of the positing of prepositions and pronouns.¹⁰²

Throughout the commentary of the *Introduction*, al-Shirwānī follows the exegetical approach of Khwāja ‘Alī by providing lexicographical and syntactical points of specific lemma and the different way of reading this passage in order to avoid misunderstandings. In the subsequent passages, where al-Ījī introduces the classes *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Shirwānī points out that al-Ījī’s classification might lead one to assume that there are also the other two unlisted classes of *waḍ‘*, namely the class *‘āmm-‘āmm* and the more controversial *khāṣṣ-‘āmm*, to which he will return later. He also adds that the scope of the *matn* is limited to the analysis of the first two, while the existence of another class, such as the *khāṣṣ-‘āmm*, remains for now a possibility in *nafs al-amr* or in the intellect.¹⁰³ It is only after this clarification that al-Shirwānī specifies the theoretical background of the *Risāla* by providing two definitions of the notion of *waḍ‘*. The first, more general, definition is “*the determination of the term in correspondence with a concept*” (*ta’yīnu al-lafẓi bi-izā’i ma‘nan*), whereas the second, more specific, definition is “*the determination of the term in itself for a concept*” (*ta’yīnu al-lafẓi bi-naḥsihi li-ma‘nan*). While the first definition applies to the analysis of the dichotomy of *ḥaqīqa-majāz*, it is the second that better applies to the subject-matter of the *Risāla*, because this sense of *waḍ‘* represents the axis (*madār*) around which the notions of signification by coextension, inclusion and implication (*muṭābaqa*, *taḍammun* and *iltizām*) revolve.

¹⁰² Cf. fol. 199b, l. 17 – 200a, l. 11.

¹⁰³ Cf. fol. 200a.

Having clarified this, al-Shirwānī moves on to the lemma “<The term is sometimes posited> for an individual itself” (*li-shakhṣin bi-‘aynihi*) and focuses on the two different senses of the phrase “bi-‘aynihi,” which might either be glossed as “sometimes a term is posited for a certain existing individual” (*qad yūḍa‘u al-lafzu li-shakhṣin kā’inin bi-‘aynihi*), or “with respect to grasping it by itself” (*bi-‘tibāri mulāḥaḏatihi bi-‘aynihi*). Al-Shirwānī considers the second reading to be preferable, because it stresses a clear opposition (*muqābala*) between this lemma, which defines the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, and the next lemma “some other times <the term> is posited for it with respect to a general notion (or something general)” (*qad yūḍa‘u lahu bi-‘tibāri amrin ‘āmmīn*), which defines the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*.¹⁰⁴ Al-Shirwānī probably offers this clarification in opposition to al-Jurjānī. For al-Jurjānī the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* obtains when, for example, the essence of Zayd is conceived and the term “Zayd” is posited in correspondence to it. In al-Shirwānī’s view, al-Jurjānī’s explanation does not clarify what the *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* really stands for, because this description might equally apply to the other three classes of *waḍ‘* discussed, and, as such, the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* could in fact include all of the others, since in all the other classes the positor conceives a given concept and assigns a linguistic term to convey it.

¹⁰⁴ Al-Shirwānī’s *lexis* of this passage is relevant for the general understanding of the *matn* because both readings lead to crucial implications. The first reading would affect the reading of the next lemma “some other times [the term] is posited for it with respect to a general notion” (*qad yūḍa‘ lahu bi-‘tibāri amrin ‘āmmīn*), as the pronoun of “lahu” would then refer back to “*shakhṣin kā’inin bi-‘aynihi*,” so that the lemma would run as “some other times [the term] is posited for a certain individual with respect to a general notion.” In his opinion this reading prevents one to understand the difference between the *waḍ‘ ‘āmm-‘āmm* described here and the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* described in the immediately following lemma. The second reading is not exempt from criticism. Al-Shirwānī explains that this reading entails that the term of the class *‘āmm-‘āmm* cannot be posited for an individual by grasping it through a universal feature. However, this might be admissible when the universal is restricted only to an individual in *naḥs al-amr*. In this instance, the positing for an individual by grasping it in itself would include the positing of an individual by grasping it through a universal feature restricted to that individual. This inclusion, al-Shirwānī points out, is possible when that universal exists only with respect to that individual, in such as way the universal almost equates that individual. Cf. fol. 201a-b.

In his comment on the next lemma, al-Shirwānī discusses al-Ījī's claim that a term can be posited for an individual by a general notion, i.e., the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. Al-Shirwānī first explains that the general notion (*amr ‘āmm*) corresponds to a universal concept that applies to an individual and, more importantly, is considered an instrument (*ālā*) with which to apprehend that individual. In other words, the general notion corresponds to one universal concept (*mafhūm kullī*) that, in line with the view of al-Jurjānī, functions as a mirror (*mir’āt*) for its particulars in order to bring any kind of judgement (*aḥkām*) to bear upon these particulars. Al-Shirwānī shows a great deal of interest in clarifying the details of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* and the nature of the particulars discussed in it. The positing of a term for multiple particulars, which the intellect cannot encompass altogether in their specificities by one single act of positing, is realized only by grasping them through a universal feature, either essential or accidental, that is true of those particulars. As for the nature of the particulars themselves, al-Shirwānī points out that these can be either 1) finite or infinite real particulars (*juz’iyyāt ḥaqīqiyya*) that belong to that universal notion; or 2) relational particulars (*juz’iyyāt idāfiyya*), which entails that some are finite or infinite real particulars while some others are finite or infinite universals in themselves (*fī nafsihā*) included under the same universal notion; or 3) finite or infinite relational non-real particulars (*idāfiyya ghayr ḥaqīqiyya*).

The wording of the *matn* seems to indicate that al-Ījī has in mind only the first group of particulars. Al-Shirwānī stresses that this interpretation has consequences for third-person pronouns (*ḍamīr al-ghā’ib*) and relative pronouns (such as ‘*who*’), because these two types of terms can convey either universal or particular concepts, which he will investigate in the *Reminders*.¹⁰⁵ Here al-Shirwānī is interested in the claim that a term can be posited for one

¹⁰⁵ Cf. fol. 201b-202a. Al-Shirwānī tells the reader that he will investigate the consequences of this reading of the *matn* later in the commentary.

individual by grasping a universal feature that applies to it and that is also shared among all other individuals.¹⁰⁶ He concedes that the intellection of a feature shared among many individuals might not be sufficient to support the claim that a term is posited for every individual in their specificities. For this claim to hold, these individuals must also be grasped by means of that common feature. As such, one could rightly claim that positing a term for many individuals “by accounting for a general notion” (*bi-‘tibāri amrin ‘āmmīn*), as al-Ījī puts it, corresponds to positing a term for those individuals “by grasping them by means of a general feature” (*bi-mulāḥaḥaṭihā bi-dhālīka al-amri al-‘āmmī*). Al-Shirwānī wants to reject this parallel because, in his view, the intellect’s grasp of the general feature does not correspond to the intellect’s grasp of particulars, which means that grasping the particulars does not entail grasping the general, common feature. On this basis, he concludes that the positing of a term for particulars is possible only *after* the intellect has grasped the general, common notion that applies to all of them. Al-Shirwānī is aware that this conclusion will clash with the lemma “for each one of these individuals,” which is key for the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* to be realized. Al-Ījī’s wording clearly indicates that the positor must have grasped the particulars *before* deciding to posit a term for them. This is the case because the designation of “particulars” by “individuated things” (*al-ta‘bīru ‘an tilka al-juz’iyyāti bi-hādhihi al-mushakḥkhaṣāṭi*) is a kind of intellectual operation that must precede the act of positing a term for those individuals. Accordingly, if one does not concede this point, then the intellect’s grasp of the feature common to the individuals would have no role in the positing of a term and, as such, the core idea of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* would collapse.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Cf. The commentary on this lemma on fol. 202b.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. fol. 203a.

Al-Shirwānī offers a way out of this criticism by offering a charitable interpretation (*musāmaḥa*) of the lemma. He explains that al-Ījī’s wording “*<this is because> a common aspect is grasped among the individuated things*” may be interpreted to mean that the common aspect is intellected *and* that those individuals are grasped through that common, general aspect as a collective act of grasping (*mulāḥaẓa ijmāliyya*) at the same time. The collective grasping of the particulars is possible only if the intellect’s ability to encompass these particulars sharing the common feature is implicit in that same common notion. Only in this way the positor’s intellect grasps the common feature, as well as all the individuated things that belong to it, through a collective act of grasping in order to posit a term for them, as in the case of “*this*” or “*from*.”¹⁰⁸

After offering his interpretation of the class ‘*amm-khāṣṣ*, al-Shirwānī focuses on passage [1.2] “*Therefore, one could claim: this term is posited for each of the individuated things in their specificity, insofar as, <by that term,> only one < individuated thing> is understood and conveyed in its specificity.*” He first gives a lexicographical exegesis in order to unpack and clarify the sense and the scope of this specific section of the *matn* and in order to offer alternate readings of specific parts of the lemma.¹⁰⁹ Then he raises an issue that shows how the opacity of al-Ījī’s wording may lead to misconstruals and criticisms. He starts by saying that the goal of the class ‘*amm-khāṣṣ*, i.e., the positing of a term for multiple concepts, as al-Ījī presents it here, is for the speaker to convey only one specific concept among all other others and for the addressee to understand that single

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. fol. 203a-204a. As an example, al-Shirwānī, probably relying on Khwāja ‘Alī, indicates that this specific passage of the *matn* aims to reject the wrong assumption that the concept for which the term is posited corresponds simply to the notion of every instance of the common notion (*al-amr al-mushtarak*), and that, as such, the term would be employed to convey and understand these single instances. Al-Shirwānī points out that the notion of “*every single instance*” can be understood in two ways. One way is the totality of something constituted by the individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) of every single instance of those individuals *and* what is conjoined to that individuation. The second is to understand it as being exclusively what is conjoined to individuation.

specific concept. However, one may assume that sometimes the addressee will understand the very concept that the speaker wants to convey, while at other times he will understand another concept, or several concepts at once. Al-Shirwānī points out that al-Ījī added a *Reminder* to the *Introduction* in order to prevent this potential misconstrual, and in order to explain that terms posited by ‘āmm-khāṣṣ convey individual concepts in virtue of a specific context (*qarīna mu‘ayyana*) that bestows individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) to the concept that the speaker wants to convey.

However, al-Shirwānī then points out, a virtual objector might make the case that the lemma in question, even taking the previous *Reminder* into account, can be interpreted such that conveying and understanding a specific concept of a term belonging to the class ‘āmm-khāṣṣ (say, the term “*this*”) through a specific context do not necessarily imply that this one individuated concept in its specificity will be actually conveyed and understood as such. There is in fact the possibility that, in this scenario, the term could convey none of the individuated concepts for which it was posited. For example, demonstratives like “*this*” are used equally for universals and for particulars that cannot be physically pointed to during conversation. As such, the term would equally convey universal and particular concepts even by means of a specific context that conveys individuation. This interpretation of the lemma would clash with what al-Ījī’s original intended the class ‘āmm-khāṣṣ to comprise, and also nullify the main feature of this class, that is, the role of the specific context that provides individuations of the concepts. In an attempt to defend the consistency of the *matn*, al-Shirwānī responds that such a criticism cannot be granted, because it would be a forced interpretation of the lemma. Instead, the way that the

lemma in configured (*ḥaythiyya*) clearly indicates that a term that belongs to the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* conveys only one specific concept among many by means of the specific context.¹¹⁰

In his commentary on passage [1.3] “<In this case>, the act of positing is universal, while the object of <positing> is an individuated thing,” al-Shirwānī appeals to al-Jurjānī’s gloss on this specific lemma in order to clarify al-Ījī’s wording. He reports in full al-Jurjānī’s long gloss that explains in detail the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, then the class *‘āmm-‘āmm* (which in al-Jurjānī’s view was not presented here because it falls outside the scope of the *Introduction*), and finally the dismissal of the class *khāṣṣ-‘āmm*. Al-Shirwānī presents a criticism of al-Jurjānī’s view regarding the irrelevance of the class *‘āmm-‘āmm*. According al-Shirwānī, the class *‘āmm-‘āmm* is in fact presented in the *Classification* and should therefore be included in the scope (*gharaḍ*) of the *Risāla*, despite al-Ījī’s silence. He explains that the class *‘āmm-‘āmm* should not be considered as one of the main topics of the *Introduction* or the *Conclusion*, because al-Ījī never presents it there. The situation with of the *Classification* is more complex, because al-Ījī makes a case there for terms whose significatum is a universal, general concept. Al-Shirwānī points out that nowhere in the *Classification* does al-Ījī clearly refer to terms whose positing and concepts are both general or universal, but that al-Ījī nevertheless presents the case of terms whose significatum (*madlūl*) is a universal, without specifying further whether the positing of this term is either general or specific. In this respect, although he emphasizes that the main classes presented in the *Classification* are the *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Shirwānī indicates that al-Ījī left the reader to infer the obvious existence of the class *‘āmm-‘āmm* and the types of terms that should be counted in this class (e.g., generic nouns like ‘cat,’ ‘human,’ ‘tree’ etc.).

¹¹⁰ Cf. fol. 204a, l. 11–204b, l. 2. In the following lemma “to the exclusion of the common aspect” and “the apprehension of that common aspect is an instrument for the act of positing, rather than the object <of positing>” al-Shirwānī offers a *lexis* with special focus on the correct syntactical analysis of the different parts of the lemma.

In the course of this discussion of the classes of *waḍʿ*, al-Shirwānī digresses into al-Jurjānī's discussion of the class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*. Al-Jurjānī rejects the possibility of this class because the conception of individuated things (*mushakkhkhaṣāt*) cannot function as a mirror, or a tool, to grasp universal concepts. Al-Shirwānī offers a variant of al-Jurjānī's rejection of this class of *waḍʿ*. According to this view, the individuated concepts conceived in the act of positing include a universal that is different and more specific (*kullī akhaṣṣ*) than the universal concept conveyed by the term posited. This more specific universal functions as a means or a mirror to grasp the more general universal in the act of positing. This may be one way to make sense of the class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*, but this view does not concede that the individuated concepts can function as a mirror to posit a term that conveys a universal concept. Al-Shirwānī dismisses this critique of the validity of the class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm* as being a negligible proof, likely because the individuated concepts are not directly involved in the act of grasping their universals, which should be at the core of the class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*. On his account, neither rejection of this class of *waḍʿ* presents a good case (*lā yufīd*) to dismiss it. Al-Shirwānī points out that one could defend al-Jurjānī's rejection of this class by claiming that al-Jurjānī's conception of the class *ʿāmm-ʿāmm* includes also the class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*. This view is based on the notion that a universal concept can be a tool to apprehend a concept more general than that universal (*al-mafhūm al-kullī ālatun li-mulāḥaẓati mā huwa aʿammu minhu*), which relies on the principle that the more general can be defined by the more particular (*taʿrīf al-aʿamm bi-l-akhaṣṣ*). Al-Shirwānī claims in fact that al-Jurjānī is one of those scholars who tends to accept this principle, which was commonly held by ancient logicians (*madhhab qudamāʾ al-manṭiqiyīn*), in order to justify his rejection of the class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*, and to consider it equivalent to the class *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*.

Despite this justification, al-Shirwānī could not help but notice the underlying contradiction of al-Jurjānī's move, that is, the contradiction between his acceptance that the more specific (*al-akhaṣṣ*) is a tool to grasp or define the more general, and his denial that individuals can be a mirror, or a tool, with which to grasp the universal. According to al-Shirwānī, considering a more specific concept under a more general one is similar to considering individual concepts under a universal one. Al-Jurjānī's claim that the individuals cannot be used as a tool with which to grasp their universals may be justified by claiming that his idea of what is "individuated" (*mushakkhkhaṣ*) coincides with his idea of a real particular (*juz'ī ḥaqīqī*), which has a fundamental ontological independence (*mustaqill muta'aṣṣil al-wujūd*) and as such is not bound to anything else, making it impossible for it to serve as a tool or a means to grasp other concepts. Al-Shirwānī accepts this justification, but criticizes al-Jurjānī's wording. Al-Jurjānī's claim "*as is clear, the individuated things are not like this with respect to their universals*" (*wa-laysat al-mushakkhkhaṣātu ka-dhālika bi-l-qiyāsi ilā kulliyātihā ka-mā lā yakhfi*) is deemed insufficient to ground the dismissal of the class *khāṣṣ-ʿamm*, because it does not really convert to the idea that it is impossible for the universals to be grasped by means of their individuals.¹¹¹

Although al-Shirwānī focuses on criticizing of al-Jurjānī's dismissal of the class *khāṣṣ-ʿamm* and never presents this class in any detail, he nevertheless presents a plausible explanation of this class of *waḍʿ*. This consists in rejecting, like al-Jurjānī, the notion that a universal may be grasped by means of a real particular: al-Shirwānī dismisses the view that the intellect can analyze the notion of *Zayd* into its components (*ajzāʾ*) and thereby grasp the universals embedded in that notion, e.g., that *Zayd* is a substance, is an animal, is rational, is a human, is a male etc. For al-Shirwānī this operation of the intellect is not the grasping of a

¹¹¹ Cf. fol. 207a, l. 3 – 6: "wa-lamma kāna al-muddaʿá kawna hādhā al-qismi mustaḥīlan wajaba an yuḥmala qawluhu wa-laysat al-mushakkhkhaṣātu ka-dhālika bi-l-qiyāsi ilā kulliyātihā ka-mā lā yakhfi ʿalā annahu yastaḥīlu an yudraka al-kulliyātu bi-mushakkhkhaṣātihā li-yufida dhālika al-muddaʿá."

universal by means of a real particular that functions as a mirror, but rather the grasping of a universal *that is included within* (*fī ḍimni*) the grasping of that real particular. This differentiation between, on the one hand, an act of grasping by means of another concept and, on the other hand, an act of grasping that is included within the act of grasping of another concept, can help explain how the positor grasps a specific concept as a tool with which to posit a term that conveys a general universal concept, that is, the class *khāṣṣ-‘āmm*.¹¹²

The commentary on the *Reminder*, where al-Ījī points to the necessity of a context (*qarīna*) for the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* – in which al-Shirwānī equates the context to a preponderant factor (*murajjih*) –, clarifies how this sub-section of the *matn* supplements and completes the claim made in the *Introduction* regarding the terms falling under the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. Overall, al-Shirwānī considers the *Reminder* to be directed at readers who might overlook the implications of the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* presented the *Introduction*, even though the *Introduction*, in his view, clearly states that the speaker’s intention is not sufficient for this class of terms to communicate the individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) of their concepts.¹¹³

¹¹² Cf. fol. 207a, l. 6–9. The remaining lemma of the *Introduction* prompts only a *lexis* in which al-Shirwānī points to the correct reading of the *matn* and limits his intervention to unpacking al-Ījī’s wording in a clearer style; 207a, l. 6 – 208a, l. 8.

¹¹³ Cf. fol. 208a, l. 9 – 209a, l. 7. Al-Shirwānī presents a brief critique of al-Jurjānī’s interpretation of this lemma. Al-Jurjānī claims that terms falling under the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* should not be compared to equivocal terms, because equivocal terms result from multiple instances of positing the same term for different, unrelated concepts, whereas terms that fall under the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, such as ‘*this*,’ (as explained by al-Ījī) result from one instance of positing. However, al-Jurjānī concludes that terms falling under the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* satisfy the same criterion as equivocal terms (*fī ḥukmi al-mushtaraki*), since both *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* terms and equivocal terms need a context in virtue of which a specific concept is conveyed. Al-Shirwānī does not agree with al-Jurjānī’s conclusion because, in his view, the wording of the *matn* does not allow for this kind of equivalence. Moreover, al-Shirwānī points out that equivocal terms could also include derived terms (*alfāz mushtaqqā*), such as ‘*muḥammad*’ or ‘*aḥmad*,’ and that these terms result from one instance of species-positing (*waḍ‘ naw‘ī*) – that is the positing of a scheme (*hay’a*) for a concept, e.g., the scheme ‘*aḥal*’ to convey of a subject performing an action –, rather than from multiple instances of positings. It is important to notice here the early attestation of the *waḍ‘ naw‘ī* (which will also be mentioned by Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī – see the next section in this chapter). However, unlike later manuals and epitomes of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, this type of *waḍ‘*

The commentary on the *Classification* has the same exegetical approach as that on the *Introduction*, where al-Shirwānī evaluates the consistency of the various claims of the *matn*, clarifies them and, ultimately, engages with al-Jurjānī's interpretations. Al-Shirwānī questions first the nature of the classification, that is, whether this is a division of the universal (*taqṣīm al-kullī*), for which several, different qualifications are added to a universal nature (*ṭabīʿa kulliyya*); or rather a division of the whole (*taqṣīm al-kull*) into its parts. He concludes that, in the present case, the classification of the simple term, posited for a concept, belongs to the first category.

In the first half of the *Classification*, where al-Ījī lays out the classification of *essence*, *event* and *ascription* (i.e., between essence and event), which are the universal concepts conveyed by their linguistic counterparts – that is, generic nouns (*ism al-jins*) for the essence, *maṣḍars* for the event, verbs and derived nouns for the ascriptions between essence and event –, al-Shirwānī points out that this classification may lead to circularity and contradiction. He notes that if the notion of *essence* (*dhāt*) used by al-Ījī is that of “*that which subsists in itself*” (*mā qāma bi-naḥsihi*), then there are many terms whose significata are universals that refer to neither essences, nor events, nor ascriptions between these two. Therefore, al-Ījī should have provided a better qualification (*ḥaṣr*) for this classification that comprises terms conveying universal concepts. Al-Shirwānī also finds problematic al-Jurjānī's attempt to salvage al-Ījī's phrasing. Al-Jurjānī parsed the lemma “*essence*” as “*that which is not an event*” (*mā laysa bi-ḥadath*), which, in his view, refers to something more general than ‘*that which subsists in itself*,’ e.g., concepts referring to an essence like “*man*” (*rajul*) or “*garment*” (*thawb*), or to an accident, e.g., “*blackness*” (*sawād*) and “*whiteness*” (*bayāḍ*). Al-Shirwānī accepts in part al-Jurjānī's explanation of the lemma, but adds that the

is not discussed or defined in any detail and, more importantly, is not included in the formation of the classes of *wadʿ*.

correct way to parse this lemma is to define *essence* as “*that which is neither an event nor an ascription between the two*,” in order to avoid the mixing of the class of *essence* with the class of *ascription*, which would lead inevitably to inconsistencies in al-Ījī’s classification.¹¹⁴

In the commentary of the lemma “*or an ascription between the two*,” al-Shirwānī insists on the importance of sharply distinguishing between the notions of *essence*, *event* and *ascription*. He remarks that the definition of *essence* provided earlier, that is, “*that which is neither an event nor an ascription between the two*,” would imply that that the class of *essence* is determined by the class of *ascription*, and the class of *ascription* by the class of *essence*, which would again lead to circularity in this first part of al-Ījī’s *Classification*. At this point, al-Shirwānī proposes six more investigations (*abḥāth*) that show other inconsistencies and contradictions in al-Ījī’s classification.

In the first, al-Shirwānī points out that the notion of event (*ḥadath*) can be considered a subset of generic noun (*ism al-jins*), rather than a class *per se*. As such, the event should be considered both a subset (*qism*) of something, as well as a counterpart (*qasīm*) of the same class, which is absurd. In the second, al-Shirwānī points out that commentators have established that the ascriptions of the verb to an agent should be considered individual semantically dependent notions (*umūr shakhṣiyya ghayr mustaqilla bi-l-mafhūmiyya*), rather than universal semantically independent ones (*kulliyya mustaqilla bi-l-mafhūmiyya*). This contradicts al-Ījī’s classification where the verb is said to convey a universal concept. In the third, al-Shirwānī claims that, according to the commentators’ interpretation of the *matn*, verbs fall under the class ‘*āmm-khāṣṣ*, whereas al-Ījī’s classification suggests that they fall under the ‘*āmm-‘āmm* since they convey a universal concept. In the fourth, al-Shirwānī points out that al-Ījī’s classification of the simple terms is based on accounting for the term’s corresponding concept (*ma‘nan muṭābiqī*), which

¹¹⁴ Cf. fol. 209b, l. 3 – 12.

means that a generic noun conveys the notion of an essence, and the *maṣḍar* conveys the notion of an event. However, al-Shirwānī notes, the ascription between an essence and an event is not a coextensive concept for derived nouns (*mushtaqq*) and verbs, because, for example, species-*maṣḍars* and frequency-*maṣḍars* (*maṣḍar al-nawʿ wa-l-marra*) cannot be classified either as proper *maṣḍars*, or as proper derived nouns, or as proper verbs. Therefore, there might be some classes of terms that elude al-Ījī's *Classification*, rendering his classificatory system incomplete.¹¹⁵ In the fifth, al-Shirwānī detects another shortcoming of al-Ījī's classification: what is neither an event (*ḥadath*) nor an ascription between the event and the essence, is not necessarily a generic noun, as one would assume from the *matn*. This is because, for example, proper generic names (*aʿlām jinsiyya*), e.g., Leo (*Usāma*) – which al-Ījī classifies as being posited for particular concepts – and nouns of verbs (*aʿlām al-aʿfāl*), e.g., the fixed verbal forms “*ḥadhāri*” (*carefull*) and “*ṣah*” (*quiet!*), may fall under the class of essences, and thus convey universal concepts, which would undermine al-Ījī's classificatory system. In sixth and last investigation, al-Shirwānī notes another inconsistency of the *Classification*, this time in regard to *maṣḍars* and verbs. Al-Ījī claims that concepts that are related to another concept in which they subsist in order to fully convey their meanings is a definition that applies to *maṣḍars*, verbs and derived nouns. For al-Shirwānī, however, this definition is incorrect, because it does not apply to *maṣḍars* like ‘*kawn*’ (*being*) and ‘*ṣayrūra*’ (*becoming*). As such, contrary to what al-Ījī claims, this definition does not apply to all verbs and derived nouns, and it is therefore not comprehensive. These are all criticisms that inevitably undermine the grounds on which al-Ījī has based his classification of universal concepts, namely generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, verbs and derived nouns.¹¹⁶ Oddly, al-Shirwānī does

¹¹⁵ The commentary presents this criticism only opaquely. The discussion is presented in more detail in the glosses of the commentary (authored by al-Shirwānī himself or by his student ‘Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarāʿinī); cf. *Nuruosmaniye* 4508, fol. 259b, l. 18 – 260a, l. 10.

¹¹⁶ Cf. fol. 209b, l. 15 – 210a, l. 13.

not rebut these criticisms but relies on al-Jurjānī's interpretation, which attempts to save the *matn* from these internal contradictions.¹¹⁷

In the second half of the *Classification* where proper names, pronouns and prepositions are analyzed, al-Shirwānī is particularly interested in the implications of al-Ījī's lemma "[...] a concept in another <concept>, <so that the first concept> is determined by joining that other concept to it" (passage [2.2.2.a] in the translation), which is a definition of the semantic feature of prepositions and particles.¹¹⁸ This definition aims to explain how these terms convey a particular concept only when another semantically independent concept, that is, their relatum (*muta'alliq*), such as a noun, occurs. Al-Shirwānī points out that, conceptually, the same definition is also true of verbs, because the concept of the verb implies a relation to an external agent (*fā'il khārij*) that, in turn, determines the concept of the verb. As such, the concept of the verb is determined by joining some other concept to it. He points to this issue because on this definition, there would be no difference between the ways in which the concepts of prepositions and verbs are determined and convey their concepts.¹¹⁹

Al-Shirwānī moves on to the case of prepositions by raising a crucial objection. The significatum of prepositions, he says, must correspond to a real particular (*juz'ī ḥaqīqī*) for it to convey an individual concept (*shakhṣī*) – this is opposed to corresponding to a universal that is

¹¹⁷ Cf. in particular fol. 210a, l. 13 – 211a, l. 8, where al-Shirwānī reports, and then evaluates, al-Jurjānī's exegesis of this first part of the *Classification*, which is partially used to reject the first, the second and the third investigations, and offers his personal rebuttal to the other investigations. A detailed treatment of the rebuttal of each of the six investigations would exceed the scope of this overview of al-Shirwānī's commentary.

¹¹⁸ Al-Shirwānī briefly explains the context of this passage of the *matn*, namely the grammarians' claim (*qawluhum*) that the preposition or the particle "*signifies a concept in something else*." However, the idea that a concept posited for a term is in some other concept appears quite nonsensical for al-Shirwānī, who then explains that al-Ījī attempts to supply and rectify the grammarians' definition by adding that this concept is "*determined* [i.e., it conveys meaning] *by joining that other concept to it*." Cf. fol. 212a, lines 4-8.

¹¹⁹ Cf. fol. 212a, l. 8-ss.

shared by and true of many. At the same time, al-Ījī's claim that the concept of the preposition is “*determined by joining that other concept to it*” implies that the prepositions lack semantic self-sufficiency, as he himself clearly states later in the *Fourth Reminder*. This position, al-Shirwānī notes, clashes with the grammarians' and logicians' view that particularity only applies to concepts that are semantically self-sufficient. To resolve this, al-Shirwānī relies on and evaluates al-Jurjānī's discussion regarding the particularity of the particle presented in his glosses on al-Taḥṭānī's *Taḥrīr al-Qawā'id al-Manṭiqiyya*, which move along the same conceptual background of the *Risāla al-Ḥarfīyya*.¹²⁰ He raises some objections to al-Jurjānī's view¹²¹ and adds that the particularity of the particle corresponds to some kind of mental determination (*ta'yīn 'aqlī*) that is proper to the concept of the particle, when this concept is considered as a mirror or tool with which to grasp one of its specific instances. In this way, al-Shirwānī can justify al-Ījī's claim and al-Jurjānī's explanation of it when he says that the preposition “*from*” in the phrase “*Zayd's trip is from Baṣra to Kūfa*” signifies one specific, particular instance of “*from*” at a specific time from point A to point B, but does not signify the absolute concept of “*from*” nor Zayd's absolute trip from A to B.

After this discussion of the preposition, al-Shirwānī proceeds to analyze the three types of pronouns, which all belong to the class *'āmm-khāṣṣ*, but are each determined by a different context (*qarīna*), namely the speech-context for the personal pronouns, the sensory-context for demonstratives, and the mental-context for relative pronouns.¹²² Despite his overall agreement with al-Ījī and al-Jurjānī on this section, al-Shirwānī discusses two specific topics, respectively the status of the third-person pronoun (*ḍamīr al-ghā'ib*), like ‘*he*’ or ‘*she*,’ which anticipates the

¹²⁰ Cf. fol. 212b, l. 11-213a.

¹²¹ Cf. fol. 213a, l. 14-ss.

¹²² Cf. fol. 213b, l. 16-214a.

subject-matter of the *Tenth Reminder*, and the relative pronoun, which anticipates the topic of the *Second Reminder*. Like previous commentators, al-Shirwānī views the case of the third-person pronoun as problematic because terms like ‘he’ and ‘she’ can equally signify a particular or a universal. He first criticizes al-Jurjānī for neglecting to explain here why third-person pronouns should necessarily fall under the class ‘*āmm-khāṣṣ*’, when he provided just such an explanation in his glosses on al-Taḥṭānī’s commentary on Maṭāli‘ *al-Anwār*. There, al-Jurjānī claims that ‘he’ is posited for particulars that fall under the definition of “a single absent masculine subject” (*ghā’ib mufrad mudhakkar*). Al-Shirwānī notes that this definition may lead one to object that the positing of ‘*huwa*’ (*he*) for individual entities, as well as universal concepts grasped by a common feature that encompasses all of them, would imply that a thing also contains itself – an objection that al-Shirwānī rejects as far-stretch.¹²³

The case of the relative pronoun poses similar problems as that of the third-person pronoun.¹²⁴ In al-Jurjānī’s view, contrary to that of al-Ījī, there are cases when the relative pronoun signifies a qualified universal (*kullī muqayyad*).¹²⁵ Moreover, he highlights a similarity between the third-person and the relative pronoun, since they both fall under the class ‘*āmm-khāṣṣ*’, where the specific concept (*al-khāṣṣ*) can convey either a real particular or a universal concept. For al-Shirwānī this means that relative pronouns are posited for real particulars but may also apply figuratively to universal. Also, like the third-person pronoun, the relative pronoun is posited for real and relational particulars (*juz’i ḥaqīqī wa-iḍāfī*) by grasping a common feature that is true of all of them. However, al-Shirwānī is inclined to disregard al-Jurjānī’s

¹²³ Cf. fol. 216a.

¹²⁴ Cf. fol. 217a, line 15.

¹²⁵ He provides the following example: when someone hears that someone has come from Baghdad, and we tell him “*He who has come from Baghdad is a knowledgeable man*” (*alladhī jā’a min Baghdād rajulun ‘ālimun*), in this instance the relative pronoun “*alladhī*” is considered a universal, and more specifically a qualified universal.

interpretation in order to safeguard the consistency of al-Ījī's view, which does not hold that the third-person pronoun is posited for a real particular as well as a universal concept.¹²⁶

In the commentary on the *Conclusion* al-Shirwānī devotes considerable space to discussing each of the twelve *Reminders* because, as he claims, the goal of these reminders is to clarify the subject-matter of the core section of the *matn* (*ʿumdat al-Risāla*), that is, the *Classification*, where al-Ījī laid out the ruling principles (*aḥkām*) of his semantic theory.¹²⁷ Al-Shirwānī provides a particularly detailed discussion of issues that emerge from the *First*, *Second*, *Ninth* and *Tenth Reminders*.¹²⁸ His commentary on the remaining *Reminders* is devoted to unpacking, clarifying and contextualizing the claims of the *matn* through a balanced exegetical practice of *lexis* and *thêoria* as well as the evaluation of al-Jurjānī's glosses. There are however some instances in which al-Shirwānī cannot help but point out some inconsistencies between some claims made in the *Classification* and some claims made in the *Reminders*.

The *Fourth Reminder* is one such case. Here al-Ījī claims that the analysis of particles presented in the *Classification* clarifies the grammarians' view that particles "are concepts in something else" (*maʿnan fī ghayrihi*). He establishes a similarity between this definition and the notion of semantic dependence (*ghayr mustaqill bi-l-mafhumiyya*), which serves to distinguish particles and prepositions from nouns and verbs that are semantically independent. Al-Shirwānī brings up two criticisms to highlight al-Ījī's inconsistency. In the first place, he explains that a verb cannot possibly be semantically independent, because its concept is determined by an

¹²⁶ Cf. 2017b.

¹²⁷ Cf. fol. 218b, line 7.

¹²⁸ The *Ninth Reminder* discusses the universality of the concept of the verb and how it can be realized in different subjects by means of an ascription, in order to become, unlike prepositions, a predicate for the subjects to which the verb relates. I will not present a summary of the commentary of this *Reminder* because of its lengthy and detailed exposition in which al-Shirwānī presents and attempts to harmonize al-Ījī's claim with al-Jurjānī's opposing view presented in the *Ḥarfīyya*. The commentary on this *Reminder* occurs at fol. 227a, l. 1 – 229b, l. 17.

ascription to an external agent (*nisba ilā l-fā'il al-khārij*), according to his interpretation of the lemmata in the *Classification*. He adds that al-Ījī never really clarified in the *Classification* how nouns and verbs are semantically independent. In the second place, the sharp contraposition between prepositions and verbs articulated in this reminder clearly contradicts al-Ījī's claim in the *Eighth Reminder* where he says that the two share in one essential characteristic, that is, they signify a concept that is established for (read: determined by) something else (*yadullāni 'alā ma'nan bi-'tibāri kawnihi thābitan li-l-ghayr*).¹²⁹

Similarly, but in a more concise way, al-Shirwānī is critical of the content of the *Sixth Reminder* in which al-Ījī states that from the content of the *Classification* we can infer the difference between generic nouns (*ism al-jins*) like “*asad*” (lion) and generic proper names like “*Usāma*” (Leo). After explaining at length what kind of concepts these two classes of nouns convey and how these concepts are determined in the mind of the addressee,¹³⁰ al-Shirwānī flags that nowhere in the *Classification* has al-Ījī addressed the basis for such a distinction, which makes the distinction presented in this *Reminder* groundless.¹³¹

In the second part of the *Classification* al-Ījī classified prepositions and all three types of pronouns as being under the class *'āmm-khāṣṣ*, since they are terms whose significata are concepts in some other concept that is joined to them. Now, in the *First Reminder*, he specifies that the three types of pronouns share their mode of signification, in the sense that they are *not* concepts in something else – as is the case for the particle and the verb –, but rather are determined by something else, namely the contexts specific to each. Al-Shirwānī is particularly

¹²⁹ Cf. fol. 223a, l. 3-14.

¹³⁰ Cf. fol. 224a, l. 5 et ss.

¹³¹ Al-Shirwānī points out instead, by referring to al-Jurjānī's glosses, that the analysis of the generic nouns and generic proper names is to be found in al-Ījī's *Fawā'id*; cf. fol. 224b, l. 16 et ss.

careful to reinforce this distinction between pronouns and prepositions in order to avoid overlap between the two groups. This overlap may arise since both groups belong to class ‘āmm-khāṣṣ, as stated above. He explains that the concepts of pronouns, contrary to the concepts of prepositions, do not need to conjoin to their contexts in order to be fully realized. Al-Shirwānī’s emphasis on this point is crucial to safeguarding a basic difference between the two groups, namely that the concepts of pronouns are semantically independent, and as such should not be assimilated to the group of prepositions, but rather to the class of nouns.¹³² He explains further that the concepts of all types of pronouns are realized as they are meant by the speaker according to a specific context within the mind of the addressee, just as a homonym, e.g., the noun ‘ayn, is defined by a specific context in the mind of the addressee. For this reason, pronouns fall instead under the class of nouns (*asmāʾ*) rather than under the class of prepositions.

In the *Second Reminder*, where al-Ījī claims that mental pointing does not convey individuation and particularity for the relative pronoun, al-Shirwānī returns to the thorny question discussed in the *Classification* – for which he relied on, and ultimately discarded, al-Jurjānī’s explanation that the relative pronoun signifies both a universal and a particular.¹³³ Al-Shirwānī is aware that the lemmata of this reminder state that the relative pronoun conveys a universal concept, even when the mental context is realized – a view that contradicts al-Ījī’s claim in the *Introduction* about the necessity of a context that conveys particularity. Al-Shirwānī’s solution to these contradictory claims revolves around a correct qualification of the claim made in this reminder: the relative pronoun conveys a universal concept in the *naḥṣ al-amr* or in its own definition (*fī ḥaddi naḥṣihi*), without considering the nature of its positing, which is

¹³² Cf. fol. 219a, l. 3.

¹³³ Al-Shirwānī presents al-Jurjānī’s explanation a second time in his commentary on the lemma “the qualification of the universal by a universal [...]” cf. fol. 220a, line 2.

the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. This entails that the relative pronoun does not convey a universal concept when one considers that it is posited by grasping a universal notion shared among many entities.¹³⁴ However, when one analyzes the nature of the positing by which the relative pronouns are posited and how it signifies in an actual sentence, it follows that it conveys a particular concept.

In the commentary on the *Tenth Reminder* al-Shirwānī returns to the similarly thorny question of universality vs particularity as applied to the concept of the third-person pronouns (cf. above).¹³⁵ Following al-Ījī, who himself invites the reader to ponder this issue (*ta’ammal*), al-Shirwānī admits that despite al-Jurjānī’s clarification of this specific point, there is no solution to this conundrum, since the nature of these pronouns oscillates (*mutaraddid*) between conveying a particular or a universal concept. The intellect, al-Shirwānī explains, cannot consider the third-person pronoun to be a universal because its referent includes particulars and universals together, i.e., general notions that include all external and mental subjects. This is because among those particular and universal concepts there is no a unique concept posited for that pronoun as well as shared among all those particulars and universals. Likewise, the intellect cannot assign particularity to a concept that includes a vast array of particular and universal subjects. One way for al-Shirwānī to approach this conundrum is to point again to al-Jurjānī’s solution as discussed in the latter’s glosses on al-Taḥṭānī’s *Lawāmi‘ al-Asrār* (see above), where the third-person pronoun is said to be posited for both real as well as relational particulars (*juz’i idāfi*, which is a type of universal) by grasping a universal notion true of all of them – and as such it would fall under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, as al-Ījī intended it. In this way, al-

¹³⁴ Cf. fol. 220a, l. 8. In the remaining part of his commentary on this *Reminder*, al-Shirwānī discusses at length several issues related to the mental pointing and al-Ījī’s claim that qualifying a universal by another universal does not entail particularity; see fol. 220a, l. 14 – 221b.

¹³⁵ Cf. fol. 230a et ss.

Jurjānī sees no problem if this pronoun conveys both a real particular as well as a universal through a single act of positing, by grasping a common, shared feature between these two groups of concepts. In the same vein, al-Jurjānī sees no problem if we consider one term as conveying an individual as well as a universal, but through two distinct acts of positing, e.g., “*human*” may convey an individual even though it is posited for a universal concept. Al-Shirwānī remarks however that accepting such a solution would undermine the whole division between terms that convey particular concepts and terms that convey universal concepts, as al-Ījī presented it in the *Classification*, because terms of any class might at any moment potentially convey all universals, all particulars or both at the same time. As such, it seems that in al-Shirwānī’s view the conundrum about the third-person pronoun cannot be solved and, more importantly, its implications risk undermining one core aspect of al-Ījī’s *Classification*.¹³⁶

3.2.3 The commentary of Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī: ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ and balāgha.

Let us now turn to the commentary of Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī Bakr al-Laythī al-Samarqandī. As is the case with al-Shirwānī, the figure of al-Samarqandī has not been the subject of specific studies that shed light on his intellectual profile. Most of the bio-bibliographical sources provide little information about the area where al-Samarqandī was active, his intellectual lineage and the dates of his birth and death. The few sources available provide a list of his works such as a

¹³⁶ Cf. fol. 230b, line 8 – 231a, line 1.

set of glosses on al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal*,¹³⁷ a set of glosses on al-Iṣfahānī's *Maṭāli' al-Anẓār*,¹³⁸ a commentary on the widespread work of Hanafi substantive law (*furū'*) *Kanz al-Daqa'iq* by 'Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310) entitled *Mustakhliṣ al-Ḥaqā'iq*,¹³⁹ a set of glosses on al-Taftāzānī's *Talwīḥ*, a commentary on *al-Risāla al-Waḍ'īyya*, and a short treatise on the metaphor entitled *al-Risāla fī l-Isti'āra* (later known also as *al-Risāla al-Samarqandiyya*), which is likely his most widespread and commented-upon work.¹⁴⁰ Despite the lack of information on al-Samarqandī, a note transmitted with his commentary on the *Risāla* says that Abū al-Qāsim completed his commentary on Monday 4th Sha'bān 888/September 7th 1483.¹⁴¹ Therefore, it is likely that he was active throughout the second half of the 9th/15th century. This information is provided in Ḥājji Khalīfa's *Kashf al-Zunūn*, which also gives the incipit of the work as follows "*Al-ḥamdu li-Llāhi alladhī khaṣṣa al-insāna bi-ma'rifati awḍā'i al-kalāmi.*" Thus, there exists a substantial bio-bibliographical literature as well as extensive manuscript and printed traditions that attribute the commentary with this incipit to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī.¹⁴² However, there is also a significant manuscript tradition as well as several glossators who attribute it to 'Alā' al-

¹³⁷ These glosses were composed early in the career of Abū al-Qāsim (*fī 'unfuwān 'umrī wa ḥadātha sinnī*) during his study of *al-Muṭawwal* and al-Jurjānī's glosses, which he deemed sometimes prolix and tedious, under the supervision of his grandfather (*fī khidmati jaddī wa sayyidī wa-sanadī*), who remains unnamed but must have been a prominent intellectual figure of the 9th/15th century as Abū al-Qāsim's long praise and acclaim show.

¹³⁸ A witness copy of this set of glosses is contained in Şehid Ali Paşa 1596.

¹³⁹ The attribution of this work to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī is problematic because it seems to be based on a biographical entry contained in Ziriklī's *A'lām*, vol. 1, p. 65. Ziriklī, in turn, takes this information from Ḥājji Khalīfa's *Kashf*, vol. 2, p. 1516, who lists most of the commentaries on the *Kanz*, among which is one entitled *al-Mustakhliṣ* by a scholar named Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Qārī' completed in Rajab 907/January 1502. Ziriklī's attribution thus lacks substantive biographical evidence with which to justify his attribution of this work to Abū al-Qāsim. However, if we follow Ziriklī's entry, then the death date of Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī should be later than 907/1502.

¹⁴⁰ The work has been printed several times in lithograph, old print and modern editions, sometimes with a commentary and set of glosses. For a comprehensive list of the commentaries and their glosses see al-Ḥabashī, *Jāmi'*..., vol. 1, pp. 61-72.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Kātip Čelebi, *Kashf*..., vol. 1, p. 898.

¹⁴² It is very easy to find today that the reprint of the old prints as well as the new editions of this commentary are all attributed to al-Samarqandī.

Dīn ‘Alī al-Qūshjī. The attribution of the commentary with this incipit to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī is probably mistaken and might have originated at the same time as or immediately prior to the composition of Ḥājjī Khalīfa’s lists of commentaries on al-Ījī’s *Risāla*, that is, when copies of the work carrying scribal mistakes started to circulate. Ḥājjī Khalīfa does list al-Qūshjī as one of the commentators on the *Risāla* but unfortunately does not provide the incipit of his commentary, only stating that it is a set of annotations (*ta’līq*).

Aside from the numerous manuscript witnesses with this incipit attributed to al-Qūshjī, it is again the commentary of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn that helps to elucidate this issue. As stated earlier, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary makes extensive usage of the previous commentaries on the *Risāla*, namely Khwāja ‘Alī’s, al-Shirwānī’s and Abū al-Qāsim’s, and in this respect it can be considered as a super-commentary that surpasses all the previous commentaries in magnitude. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn often provides long quotations from these three commentaries that are not introduced with any explicit reference to their author by name, but rather by three verbs in the passive voice, namely “*qīla*” for Khwāja ‘Alī, “*ufīda*” for Mas‘ūd al-Shirwānī, and “*dhukira*” for Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī.¹⁴³ The comparison between Abū al-Qāsim’s quotations introduced by “*dhukira*” and the commentary attributed to him with the incipit “*Al-ḥamdu li-Llāhi alladhī khaṣṣa al-insāna bi-ma‘rifati awḍā‘i al-kalāmi*” does not produce any matches, which means that ‘Iṣām al-Dīn is referring to and using another, different text. Another piece of evidence in favor of the misattribution comes from the glosses on this commentary. As I will show in detail in Chapter Four, the commentary with this incipit prompted a large number of glosses and super-glosses up until end of the 13th/19th century and. More importantly, early glossators active between the

¹⁴³ The clarification of this quotation system is provided in al-Kaffawī’s glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn. More importantly, al-Kaffawī establishes the correct system of references on the basis of an account allegedly transmitted by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn himself in which he refers to al-Shirwānī as “*ustādhunā*” and Khwāja ‘Alī as one of the greatest students of al-Jurjānī; cf. al-Kaffawī, *Ḥāshiyat al-Kaffawī...*, p. 4, line 10.

11th/17th and 12th/18th centuries in the Levantine and Ottoman regions attribute it to al-Qūshjī, rather than to Abū al-Qāsim: this is the case with Ismā‘īl b. Muḥammad al-‘Ajlūnī (1086-1161/1676-1748), Abū al-Baqā’ al-Kaffawī (d. 1094/1683), Ismā‘īl b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥaydarī al-Kurdī and al-Sayyid Ḥāfiẓ Efendī Sīrōzī (d. 1269/1852).

This misattribution is further confirmed by the oldest collection of commentaries on the Risāla that are extant in the Turkish manuscript collections, such as the codices Nuruosmaniye n. 4508, 4509 and 4510. These three collections contain, with minor differences, the main classic commentaries and some set of glosses. Among the classic commentaries, one is attributed to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī. Most copies of this commentary are transmitted with identical marginal glosses and annotations, which likely indicates that the copies have a common, identical source. In most manuscript witnesses, the commentary attributed to Abū al-Qāsim opens with the incipit “*Subḥāna man anṭaqa bi-dhikrihi al-insāna tasbīḥan wa-tahlīlan [...]*” rather than the aforementioned incipit. The case of the Nuruosmaniye codices is not isolated, since a commentary with the same incipit is attributed to Abū al-Qāsim in al-Azhar 16137,¹⁴⁴ Tehran Millī 3512,¹⁴⁵ and King Fayṣal 1448-6.¹⁴⁶ Nuruosmaniye 4508 is particularly important because the scribe, a certain Aḥmad Efendī, who completed the copy on Wednesday 22nd Jumādā II 1084/October 4th 1673, claims to have utilized a manuscript copy of Abū al-Qāsim’s commentary completed in 959/1552, making it one of the oldest manuscript references to the commentary. The colophons of Nuruosmaniye n. 4510 and al-Azhar n. 16137 indicate that Abū al-Qāsim completed the commentary on Monday 4th Sha‘bān 888/September 7th 1483, which corresponds to the date given by Ḥājji Khalīfa.

¹⁴⁴ See fol. 16b-45b.

¹⁴⁵ See fol. 101b-144b.

¹⁴⁶ See pp. 168-211. It is important to notice that this was in all likelihood produced outside the Arabian Peninsula, as the script shows many elements of the *nasta‘līq* script widespread in the Ottoman and Iranian manuscript tradition.

There are, however, three other copies of the commentary that provide other contrasting data on the completion of the commentary. These are contained in Carullah n. 1354, Kiliç Ali Paşa n. 1033, and Velīyuddīn Efendi 2891, which are probably the oldest copies extant of the commentary.¹⁴⁷ The colophons of Carullah n. 1354 and Kiliç Ali Paşa n. 1033 indicate that, contrary to Kātip Čelebī's claim, the commentary was completed in early Muḥarram 889/February 1484 in Samarkand, and that Abū al-Qāsim collated it later in Šafar/March of the same year in Bukhara while sojourning in the *khānaqāh* named after the Sufi and poet Sayf al-Dīn al-Bākhārī (586/1190-659/1261) on his route to Mecca to perform pilgrimage. More interesting is the case of Velīyuddīn Efendi 2891, which the first folio asserts is a holograph. Unfortunately, this copy does not contain any incipit, and the colophon only states the copy was completed by the author. However, the colophon of a copy of Abū al-Qāsim's *al-Risāla fī l-Isti'āra* contained in Kiliç Ali Paşa 1033 (fol. 86a-95a) claims that this copy is a draft (*sawād*) by the author's hand completed and collated in Shawwāl 953/November 1546. By comparing the copy of the commentary in Velīyuddīn Efendi 2891 and the treatise on metaphor in Kiliç Ali Paşa 1033 it seems that both are written by the same hand, which corroborates the statement found on the first folio of Velīyuddīn Efendi 2891 claiming that it is a holograph. If both manuscripts are Abū al-Qāsim's authentic holographs, this means that Abū al-Qāsim was still alive and active during the middle of the 10th/16th century and, more importantly, that Abū al-Qāsim composed his commentary on the *Risāla* fairly early in his scholarly career.

The last piece of evidence that confirms that this commentary is actually Abū al-Qāsim's can be found again in 'Iṣām al-Dīn's commentary. Where the quotations introduced by "*dhukira*" do indeed match those of the text whose incipit is "*Subḥāna man anṭaqa bi-dhikrihi al-insāna*"

¹⁴⁷ The copy contained in Kiliç Ali Paşa 1033 was completed on Monday 8th Jumādā I 930/ March 14th 1524 in *dār al-salṭana* in Herat. The copy contained in Carullah 1354 was completed on Sunday 3rd Rabī' I 967/December 3rd 1559 in Maṣjid al-Ḥarām in Mecca. The copy in Velīyuddīn Efendi 2891, fol. 1a-26a, is undated.

tasbiḥan wa-tahlīlan [...].” This confirms that this was the text used by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, rather than the commentary beginning with “*Al-ḥamdu li-Llāhi alladhī khaṣṣa al-insāna bi-ma‘rifati awḍā‘i al-kalāmi.*” These pieces of textual evidence, taken together, correct this widespread misattribution that has been transmitted and reiterated throughout the centuries, and support the conclusion that al-Qūshjī might be instead the author of the commentary with the incipit “*Al-ḥamdu li-Llāhi alladhī khaṣṣa al-insāna bi-ma‘rifati awḍā‘i al-kalāmi,*” while to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī should be attributed the commentary with the incipit “*Subḥāna man anṭaqa bi-dhikrihi al-insāna tasbiḥan wa-tahlīlan.*”

Let us now turn to the commentary itself. In the introduction, al-Samarqandī follows other commentators in his wordplay with key notions of the theory of *waḍ‘*, a wordplay that also gestures at the discipline *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*. In the *ba‘diyya*, al-Samarqandī praises the *Risāla* and its author for making unprecedented contributions semantic theory. Al-Ījī’s contributions prompted al-Samarqandī to compose a full commentary during his advanced study of the rational and traditional sciences, likely *balāgha* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Al-Samarqandī claims that in his own commentary, he resorted to cherry-picking from old and new sources.¹⁴⁸ More interestingly, some copies of the commentary contain an additional paragraph of the *ba‘diyya*, which corroborates the rhetorical background of al-Samarqandī’s exegesis. Here he says that

“Since the classes of figurative terms (*majāz*) are in reality classes of terms whose usage is dependent on their original positing, and since the investigations

¹⁴⁸ “fa-sharaḥtuhā athnā’ ishtighālī bi-ṣṭiyād shawāridi al-‘ulūmi, ma‘qūlihā wa-mashrū‘ihā wa-ta‘alluqi bālī bi-rṭiyādi awābidi al-funūni uṣūlihā wa-furū‘ihā;” “wa-washshaḥtuhā bi-farā’ida iltqaṭtuhā min kutubi al-mutaqaddimīna wa-fawā’ida ntaqadtuhā min ta’līfāti al-muta’akhhirīna [...].”

into about metaphors discussed in books on *balāgha* are not extremely precise (‘*asīra al-ḍabṭ*’), I mentioned them in full detail following the style of the ancients and the proofs of the moderns in an appendix to the commentary on the *Risāla*.¹⁴⁹

This passage is relevant for two reasons. First, it indicates that al-Samarqandī likely construes the theory of *waḍ‘* to be preparatory for discussing the classes of *majāz*, and considers the semantic theory of the *Risāla* as a propaedeutic to the analysis of metaphor discussed in ‘*ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*. The second is that this additional paragraph appears to be a verbatim quotation from his treatise on metaphor. In all likelihood, the oldest version of Abū al-Qāsim’s commentary on the *Risāla* was composed before his treatise on metaphor, the latter serving as an appendix (*tadhyīl*) to his commentary. Only at a later stage did he revise his treatise on metaphor in order to make it an independent work.

As with previous commentaries, Abū al-Qāsim’s commentary on the opening statement of the *Risāla* is devoted to explaining of the different senses of “*fā‘ida*” and their implications, as well as the relation of the different parts of the *matn*, and the aforementioned issue of the variant structure with four sections as transmitted in some copies of the *matn*. The commentary on the *Introduction* begins with a discussion of two main senses of the concept of *waḍ‘*. The first sense is the determination of a term in view of a concept (*ta‘yīnu al-lafẓi bi-izā‘i al-ma‘nā*), which implies that a figurative term (*al-majāz*) is also posited for its figurative concept. The second, on the contrary, is the determination of a term *per se* for a concept (*ta‘yīnu al-lafẓi bi-naḥsihi li-ma‘nan*), which implies that figurative terms do not result from an actual positing, but from the presence

¹⁴⁹ This additional paragraph of the *ba‘adiyya* survives in the copies Kiliç Ali Paşa n. 1033 and Carullah n. 1354.

of a specific context (*qarīna*) in the sentence. Interestingly, Abū al-Qāsim refers to two types of contexts, the individual context (*shakhṣī*) and the species context (*nawʿī*), two qualifications that are also proper to the theory of *waḍʿ*, but that he does not explain here in detail. Al-Samarqandī claims that al-Ījī has in mind this second sense when analyzing of the positing of simple terms.¹⁵⁰ He then discusses the first distinction offered by al-Ījī, between a term posited for an individual considered on its own (*shakhṣun bi-ʿaynihi*) and an individual considered with a general notion (*bi-ʿtibāri amrin ʿāmmīn*).¹⁵¹ Abū al-Qāsim explains that the lemma “*bi-ʿaynihi*” in the first case does not imply the actual conception of the individual in our perceptive faculties, as would be the case when we conceive the essence of Zayd and we assign the name “Zayd” to that subject. He presents the example of an individual that we do not actually grasp, such as a fetus in the womb, but which we can still name. This name will count as a proper name and, as such, fall under the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*. He similarly reports the example that al-Jurjānī provides in his commentary on al-Ījī’s *al-Mawāqif*. According to al-Jurjānī, we can in fact assign a specific, proper name to an entity even if our intellect cannot grasp or perceive its essence, but know it only through some of its aspects. This act of positing will convey the concept sought by the speaker, and one of such cases is the proper name “God” (*Allāh*), which is posited for one specific essence of which we do not have an exact mental construct (*iʿtibār*). More interestingly, this question becomes, in al-Samarqandī’s view, relevant in the broader discussion about the status of the subject (*musnad ilayhi*) in rhetoric (*fī kutub al-maʿānī*).¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Cf. fol. 24b, line 10 - 25b. Abū al-Qāsim also explains the differences between the two definitions of *waḍʿ* and more importantly the status of the figurative expression (*majāz*) in the second definition of *waḍʿ* by citing the corresponding discussion in al-Taftāzānī’s manual of legal theory *al-Talwīḥ*, a commentary on Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa’s *al-Tanqīḥ fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*.

¹⁵¹ Cf. fol. 25a, line 8 et ss.

¹⁵² Cf. fol. 25a, l. 15-20. The discussion is not fully analyzed here, but it seems that this concerns the status of the predicate when it is a proper noun that renders its concepts present in the mind of the reader by itself, rather than by a context. The example proposed by al-Samarqandī is the Quranic verse “*Qul huwa Allāhu aḥadun*” (*al-Ikhlāṣ*, 1), where the predicate is a proper name.

One relevant passage in al-Samarqandī's commentary on the *Introduction* occurs in his discussion of al-Ījī's claim that "[...] *insofar as, <by that term>, only one < individuated thing> is understood and conveyed in its specificity, to the exclusion of the common aspect. [...] <In this case>, the act of positing is universal, while the object of <positing> is a individuated thing,*"¹⁵³ which introduces the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. Here, al-Samarqandī offers a digression into the question of whether or not the scope of positing a simple term for a concept is in order for the simple term to convey, or signify, the concept. The discussion raises a crucial question regarding whether or not the notion of conveying (*ifāda*) and signifying (*dalāla*) are proper attributes of a term. The digression is original to al-Samarqandī's commentary among all other classic commentaries in that it explicitly tethers itself to *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān*.¹⁵⁴ Al-Samarqandī states that al-Ījī's claim that a term posited by *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* conveys (*yufīd*) only one specific concept clashes with the accepted view among scholars that simple terms are not posited in order to convey their referents in an isolated way to the addressee, but must instead be embedded within a sentence. As such the attributes of conveying and signifying do not belong to terms, for otherwise a vicious circle would arise. Al-Samarqandī adds that for this reason most scholars agree on the view that simple terms are posited to convey composite concepts (*laysa li-ifādat musammayātihā [...] bal li-ifādat al-ma‘ānī al-tarkībiyya*), that is, phrases and sentences.¹⁵⁵ It is the rhetorician al-Sakkākī himself whose authority is invoked in order to clarify why the vicious circle would occur: the term's conveying of a concept depends on knowing that that term is specific to that concept; however,

¹⁵³ "bi-ḥaythu lā yufādu wa-lā yufhamu illā wāḥidun bi-khuṣūṣihi [...]; fa-l-waḍ‘u kulliyyun wa-l-mawdū‘u lahu mushakhkhaṣun" (this corresponds to passages [1.2] and [1.3] in the translation). Cf. fol. 25b, line 17 et ss.

¹⁵⁴ This long digression extends from folio 65b, line 17 to 26b, line 18.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. fol. 25b, lines 18-20. Moreover, al-Samarqandī attempts an early solution to this issue by drawing a distinction between the sense of conveying (*ifāda*) in the lemma and that in the definition accepted by most scholars. In the first, the sense of "*ifāda*" is none other than signifying (*dalāla*), while in the second is the realization (*taḥṣīl*) of the concepts of terms in the mind of the addressee.

the knowledge that a term is specific to a concept depends, in turn, on knowing the concept itself; thus a vicious circle occurs.¹⁵⁶ Al-Sakkākī does not offer a solution, which, al-Samarqandī reports, is instead presented by an unnamed scholar, who upon closer analysis turns out to be al-Taftāzānī in his *al-Muṭawwal*. His solution consists in holding that understanding a concept from a term is based on knowing the linguistic positing; however, knowing the linguistic positing depends on understanding the concept as a whole (*bi-l-jumla*) – and this solves the conundrum.¹⁵⁷ Despite al-Taftāzānī's authority, al-Samarqandī thinks his solution is shaky (*laysa bi-sadīdin*) since, in his view, the act of making the concepts present (*iḥḍār*) within the mind of the addressee as well as the act of informing the mind (*ikhṭār*) of them are subordinate to knowing the linguistic positing.

It is the close connection between his conception of the theory of *waḍʿ* and his attentiveness to *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* that prompts al-Samarqandī to claim that the same vicious circle may apply to the composite sentences (*al-murakkabāt*). If one considers that composite sentences, just like simple terms, are posited¹⁵⁸ for specific semantic structures (e.g., a nominal or a verbal sentence), then the same vicious circle arises. This means that sentence structures do not convey (*ifāda*) any meaning in the mind of the listener. To this, al-Samarqandī proposes the following answer: knowledge of the composite concepts (*al-maʿānī al-murakkaba*) depends on knowing the positing of simple terms for the concepts that make up those

¹⁵⁶ For the full discussion cf. al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm*, p. 221, line 7 et ss.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. fol. 26a, l. 6 et ss. For the full discussion in al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal*, cf. al-Taftāzānī, *al-Muṭawwal*, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Hindāwī, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1422/2001, p. 511, l. 15, et ss., which is presented in his discussion of the three types of significations, *dalāla waḍʿiyya*, *taḍammuniyya* and *iltizāmiyya*, echoing the analysis of the nature of signification presented in the logic manuals in the post-Avicennian tradition. In another marginal note it is said that this view is held by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his commentary on *al-Maṭālīʿ*.

¹⁵⁸ Here al-Samarqandī points out that they are posited by a species positing (*al-waḍʿ al-nawʿī*) without giving any explanations of what this type of *waḍʿ* implies. He will assess this class later in the commentary.

composites, rather than depending on knowing the positing of a composite for the concept of composition (*lā ‘alá al-‘ilmi bi-waḍ‘i al-murakkabi li-l-ma‘ná al-tarkībī*). Knowledge of the positing of simple terms, i.e., the relation between a term and a concept, is therefore sufficient to understanding more complex sentence structures.

But this solution leaves a doubt. If knowing the positing of simple terms of a sentence is sufficient for the composite concepts to convey meaning, then two sentences composed of the exact same terms would convey the same meaning – e.g., “*ḍaraba ‘Īsá Mūsá*” and “*ḍaraba Mūsá ‘Īsá*” would convey the same meaning.¹⁵⁹ To solve this, al-Samarqandī shifts towards the dichotomy of *taṣawwur-taṣdīq*. His premise is that the notion of “conveying meaning” (*ifāda*) designates the acquisition of knowledge about something, and not making something present to someone (*taḥṣīlu al-ilmi bi-l-shay‘, lā iḥḍāruhu*) – in this case a term that makes a concept present in the addressee’s mind. As such, if that thing corresponds to a conceptual notion (*ma‘ná taṣawwuri*), then conveying that concept is equal to acquiring its form in the mind of the addressee (*taḥṣīlu ṣuratihi fī dhihni al-sāmi‘i*). If that thing corresponds to an assertoric notion (*ma‘ná taṣdīqī*), then conveying that assertoric notion is equal to acquiring the assent in the mind of the addressee.¹⁶⁰ The predicative composites (*al-murakkabāt al-khabariyya*¹⁶¹) thus convey, or

¹⁵⁹ Cf. fol. 26a, line 13 et ss.; in all likelihood, this specific issue is discussed in the sections on the status of subject and predicate of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* manuals. Al-Samarqandī offers a rebuttal to this criticism, possibly reported from relevant passages of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* manuals, where the composite structure of the sentence (*al-hay‘a al-ta’līfiyya*) is brought up in order to counter the criticism. This solution seems to raise further doubts because, al-Samarqandī adds, the knowledge of the composite concept depends on knowing that the formal sentence structure is posited for a specific intention; in turn, the knowledge that the formal sentence structure is posited for a specific intention depends on knowing the positing of subject and predicate (*al-musnad ilayhi wa-l-musnad*). Finally, these three acts of knowledge, i.e., knowing the composite concept, knowing the positing of the formal sentence, and knowing the positing of subject and predicate, depend on knowing the whole composite concept (*al-‘ilm bi-majmū‘ al-ma‘ná al-murakkab*), in such a way that the same vicious circle reemerges.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. fol. 26b, lines 11-13.

¹⁶¹ The manuscript reads “*al-juz’iyya*,” while all other manuscript witnesses I have consulted read “*al-khabariyya*,” which seems the more appropriate reading.

signify, their concept in the sense that the addressee's mind acquires an assent about them. Therefore, the predicative composites are the scope for positing assertoric predications (*al-akhbār*). The vicious circle does not arise because conceiving of these concepts depends on knowing that the assertoric composites are posited for these concepts.¹⁶²

In his commentary on the remaining lemma of the *Introduction*, where al-Ījī presents the case of the demonstrative “this” (*hādha*) in order to exemplify the class ‘*āmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Samarqandī discusses two points related to the notion of “*masculine singular individuated referent*” (*al-mushār ilayhi al-mufrad al-mudhakkhar al-mushakkhaṣ*), which defines the demonstrative pronoun and applies to all its instances.¹⁶³ In the first, the notion of “*individuated referent*” is said to be a general universal (*mafhūmu al-mushāri ilayhi al-mushakkhaṣi kulliyun ‘āmmun*) that applies to and individualizes all the single instances of “this.” As such, there seems to be a conundrum: the very notion of “*individuated referent*” that should convey individuation to this class of terms is itself a general, universal notion that, by its own definition, cannot convey individuation. Here al-Samarqandī reports Khwāja ‘Alī’s solution, which first equates the universality of the notion of “*individuated referent*” with the universality of the notion of “*determination*” (*ta‘ayyun*). For Khwāja ‘Alī, each of the two terms “*individuation*” and “*determination*” (*tashakkhuṣ* and *ta‘ayyun*) is posited for the concept of “*that by which an individual is distinct from another*” (*mā bihi yamtāzu shakṣun ‘an shakṣin*), a concept that is grasped by a general notion. This general notion is, in Khwāja ‘Alī’s view, the very notion of “*that by which an individual is distinct from another*”. In this way, universality and generality for both terms are avoided. The same would apply to the notion of “*individuated referent*” conveyed by “this.” Al-

¹⁶² Cf. fol. 26b, lines 16-18.

¹⁶³ The same would apply to, for example, the notion of “*feminine singular individuated referent*” (*al-mushār ilayhi al-mufrad al-mu‘annath al-mushakkhaṣ*), which corresponds to the feminine demonstrative pronoun ‘*hādhihi*.’

Samarqandī reports Khwāja ‘Alī’s full discussion in which he rejects the theologians’ claim that for the universal notion of “*determination*” to convey determination one would need another distinct notion of determination and so on *ad infinitum*. A response to this, Khwāja ‘Alī adds, is to claim that determination that applies to its instances is only accidental (‘*araḍī*). However, since determination means “*that by which an individual is distinct from the other*” and distinction cannot occur by a universal notion, the response is not cogent.

Al-Samarqandī’s evaluation of the issue seems more nuanced. He claims that the notion of determination as understood here, i.e., the notion of “*that by which an individual is distinct from another*”, is a universal. However, the very conception of this notion prevents any other association with it (*yamna’u nafsu taṣawwurihi ‘an wuqū’i al-shirkati fīhi*), so that the notion simply applies to, or is true of, its individual instances (*yaṣdiqū ‘alā afrādihi*). Conversely, the very notion itself does not apply to, or is true of, “*that by which an individual is distinct from another.*” To clarify his point, al-Samarqandī makes a parallel between this notion and the notion of particular (*mafḥūm al-juz’ī*). The notion of particular is that whose very conception prevents any other association with it, and it is a notion that applies to, or is true of, its individual instances, but not of itself. Therefore, the notion “*this*” is that to which “*the individual pointed to*” applies, not the notion of “*this*” that allows for semantic participation (*al-qābil li-l-shirkati*) among all the individual concepts that “*this*” may convey.¹⁶⁴

The second point related to the analysis of the notion of “*this*” prompts an excursus into the classes of *waḍ’*. Having already discussed the *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and the ‘*āmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Samarqandī introduces the class ‘*āmm-‘āmm* but makes space for the rejection of the class *khāṣṣ-‘āmm* by

¹⁶⁴ Cf. fol. 26b, l. 21 – 27a.

relying on al-Jurjānī's rejection of it.¹⁶⁵ However, in an unusual move, al-Samarqandī introduces the analysis of the classes of *waḍʿ* by al-Ījī's student Sayf al-Dīn al-Abharī in his super-commentary on his teacher's commentary on the *Mukhtaṣar Muntahā al-Uṣūl*. In this al-Abharī was followed by an unnamed student, likely al-Kirmānī, in his commentary on al-Ījī's *al-Fawāʾid*.¹⁶⁶ In their view, which al-Samarqandī endorses (*hādhā aqrab*), a single term can be posited for a single concept, so that the positing is specific, while the concept may be either a universal or a particular. As such, four classes are derived: the *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, e.g., *Zayd*, the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, e.g., “*this*”, the *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*, e.g., “*human*,” and the *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, which here seems to overlap with the *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm* even though no example is provided. This analysis of the classes of *waḍʿ* rehabilitates the *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm* as an actual class of *waḍʿ*. Al-Samarqandī is aware that his agreement with the view proposed by al-Ījī's students, and his apparent dismissal of al-Jurjānī's widely accepted view, calls for some clarifications. Here he claims that a term may be posited for something individuated (*mushakhkhaṣ*) by either a specific or a general positing, namely the classes *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*. In the same way, a term may be posited for a universal notion (*mafḥūm kullī*) in virtue of either its own specificity (*bi-khuṣūṣihi*) or by considering that notion through a more general notion (*bi-ʿtibāri amrin aʿamma minhu*), namely the classes *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm* and *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*. Al-Samarqandī does not provide any further justification for his adherence to al-Abharī's and al-Kirmānī's classification of the classes of *waḍʿ* nor any further information about whether this has an impact on his analysis of the *Risāla* in which, it should be remembered, al-Ījī never explicitly set out the classes *ʿāmm-ʿāmm* or *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*.

Al-Samarqandī moves on instead to discussing the classes of *waḍʿ shakhṣī* and *waḍʿ nawʿī*. This was probably the first introduction of these two classes into the theory of *waḍʿ*. Before

¹⁶⁵ Cf. fol. 27b, l. 10-14.

¹⁶⁶ I referred to the text of al-Abharī in Chapter Two. The unnamed student who authored of the commentary on *al-Fawāʾid* is likely al-Kirmānī, whom I also referred to in the same chapter.

introducing the two classes by name, he presents a detailed description of both, with particular emphasis on the *nawʿī*. Here he says that just as multiple concepts may be conceived in a general way, and just as a term can be posited for each one of these concepts, multiple terms can similarly be conceived by a universal notion under which all these terms are subsumed, so that they are posited for a concept by a single instance of positing. In this way, the concepts posited for these terms by a single instance of positing, are also conceived in a general way (*bi-wajhin ʿāmmīn*). The example offered by al-Samarqandī is that of derived nouns, e.g., the form of the active participle “*fāʿil*.” The form “*fāʿil* of every *maṣḍar* is posited for an agent in which the significatum of that *maṣḍar* subsists (*ṣīghatu al-fāʿili min kulli maṣḍarin li-man qāma bihi madlūluhu*), e.g., “*knowing*” (*ʿālim*) is posited for an agent in which knowledge (*al-ʿilm*) subsists. In other words, these terms, i.e., the active participles, are conceived altogether by a general notion (the notion of the form “*fāʿil*”), whereas the concepts of these terms are conceived by a universal notion (the notion of “*an agent in which the significatum of a maṣḍar subsists.*”). As such, al-Samarqandī concludes, the positing of derived nouns is general for specific notions (*waḍʿun ʿāmmun li-umūrin makhṣūṣatin*), so that “*ʿālim*” conveys only the notion of an agent in which the significatum of the *maṣḍar* “*al-ʿilm*” subsists, and not the significatum of any other *maṣḍar*. Al-Samarqandī is aware that derived nouns, insofar as they convey a concept in its specificity, are comparable to demonstrative pronouns (*ka-asmāʾi al-ishārati*). However, from a semantic standpoint the two classes of terms should convey their concept in different ways. For this reason, al-Samarqandī says that in demonstrative pronouns the specificity of the concept is individual (*khuṣūṣu al-maʿnā shakhṣiyyun*), whereas excludes semantic plurality, while in derived nouns the specificities of their concepts are universals (*khuṣūṣiyyātu al-maʿāni kulliyyātun*) – that is to say, the specificity of the concept is species-related (*nawʿī*). This allows al-Samarqandī to provide a further general definition of these two classes of *waḍʿ*. The individual positing (*waḍʿ*

shakhṣī) occurs when the positor conceives a specific term or determined concept, whether particular or universal, in order to then establish that that term is posited for that concept or for what is true of that concept. The species positing (*waḍʿ nawʿī*), by contrast, occurs instead when the positor conceives of specific terms within a universal notion, and then decides by a universal criterion (*ḥukmun kulliyyun*) that each term subsumed under that universal notion is itself determined to signify some concept.¹⁶⁷

The introduction of the classes *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī* certainly creates the scope to differentiate between two different modes in which the specificity (*khuṣūṣ*) of concepts is conveyed by different types of terms. For someone like al-Samarqandī, who is interested in semantics primarily in the context of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, the introduction of the *waḍʿ nawʿī* does even more. For he asserts that figurative expressions (*majāz*) belong to this class of *waḍʿ* and as such they can be included in the general theory of *waḍʿ*, which was a point of contention for previous commentators.¹⁶⁸ In order to include the category of *majāz* in the theory of *waḍʿ*, al-Samarqandī operates a further division of the species positing (*waḍʿ nawʿī*) into two main senses. The first sense is the one discussed above. The second allows the positor to claim that when a term is determined to signify in itself a concept, then, if a context that prevents conveying that same concept is established, that term will also be assigned to some specific semantic extension related to that concept. In this way, that term will signify the specific semantic extension of that concept by means of that context, not by means of its original determination.¹⁶⁹ By expanding

¹⁶⁷ Cf. al-Samarqandī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 44b, l. 19-45b, l. 6. To the species positing al-Samarqandī adds also the plural endings, compounds and every term that signifies its meaning by its form.

¹⁶⁸ This obviously works if the definition of *waḍʿ* is “*determining a term for a concept*” avoiding the qualification “*in itself*” (*bi-naḥsihi*), which narrows down the scope of *waḍʿ* only to terms that signify their concept literally.

¹⁶⁹ “kullu lafẓin muʿayyanin li-l-dalālati bi-naḥsihi ʿalā maʿnan [...] fa-huwa ʿinda taḥaqquqi al-qarīnati al-mānīʿati ʿan irādati dhālika al-maʿná mutaʿayyanun li-mā yataʿallaqu bi-dhālika al-maʿná taʿalluqan makhṣūṣan, wa-dalla ʿalayhi bi-maʿnan an yufhama minhu bi-wāṣitāti al-qarīnati lā bi-wāṣitāti hādha al-taʿayyuni.” Cf. fol. 45b, l. 2-7.

the *waḍʿ nawʿī* to this second sense, which equates to how figurative expressions have been posited, al-Samarqandī makes room for all instances of *majāz* in the theory of *waḍʿ* and succeeds in classifying them under the *waḍʿ nawʿī*.¹⁷⁰

The introduction of *majāz* in this the analysis of terms posited by *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* also provides the scope to avoid any overlapping between the two classes of terms. In his commentary on the *Reminder*, al-Samarqandī points out that terms of the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* are semantically comparable to equivocal terms, rather than to figurative expressions. This is because, upon hearing an equivocal term or an *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* term, the listener will understand that all the concepts posited respectively for an equivocal term or an *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* term are what is intended (*al-murād*). For both types of terms, one specific concept will then be understood and singled out by means of a context. This is unlike figurative expressions, whose sense is determined in concomitance with a context determining that the sense is not the literal sense, but a semantic extension of the original concept. In order to avoid confusion that the similarity between the equivocal term and the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* term may produce, al-Samarqandī explains further how the two differ one from another. When someone hears “*this*” or an equivocal term like “*bat*,” without any specification arising from the speaker’s pointing at some item, any items

¹⁷⁰ Al-Samarqandī’s interest in the status of *majāz* within the analysis of *waḍʿ* is further confirmed in his commentary on the *Reminder*. In order to elucidate al-Ījī’s claim that terms posited by *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* convey individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) by means of a determined context (*qarīna muʿayyana*), he compares this class of terms to equivocal terms (*shabīh bi-l-mushtarak al-lafẓī*) and figurative expressions, which also need a semantic context in order to convey one specific concept among all those that they signify, but in different ways. Unlike equivocal terms, which presuppose multiple instances of positing, a term posited by the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* results from one single instance of positing. Al-Samarqandī goes on to say that an equivocal term signifies in itself, or *per se* (*bi-naḥsihi*) all the concepts it has been posited for, as opposed to figurative expressions, which do not signify *per se* their concepts. The mind of the listener who is aware of the positing will understand all these concepts by way of wavering between them and making them equivalent (*ʿalā sabīli al-taraddudi wa-l-tasāwī*). The concept among all those conveyed by the equivocal terms will then be determined by a context. Al-Samarqandī clarifies that the situation with the figurative expression is different, because when the listener hears a term, the figurative sense of that term will not be understood as the one intended (*murād*) unless in concomitance with its context – otherwise only the literal sense of that term will be understood as the intent of the speaker; cf. fol. 46a, l. 3-15.

can potentially be meant by that term, insofar as none of these items is more likely to occur to one's understanding than another. When, however, the specification of the speaker's pointing occurs, then the determination of one specific item is realized. The difference between “*this*” and an equivocal term is that the concepts of “*this*” are grasped by the positor and understood by the listener collectively as being included in a general notion, while the concepts of an equivocal term are grasped and understood in detail or distinctively (*bi-l-taḥṣīli*).¹⁷¹

The commentary on the *Classification* opens with a *lexis* on the different lemmata of the *matn*, in particular on the lemma “*taqṣīm*” and what is the subject of classification (*mawridu al-qismati*) intended by al-Ījī here, namely the term posited for a concept. The commentary on the first part of the *Classification*, where terms whose concept is a universal are presented, is merely explanatory and characterized by a *lexis* that aims merely at decompressing each lemma.¹⁷² Al-Samarqandī's *thēoria* is instead more prominent in the second part of the *Classification* where particles, prepositions and pronouns are discussed. As was the case with previous commentators, the main semantic aspects of prepositions and pronouns lay at the core of the commentary of this section.

¹⁷¹ The remaining commentary on the *Reminder* is devoted to discussing further distinguishing factors between equivocal terms and figurative expressions that revolve around the notion that equivocal terms signify their concept *per se*, whereas figurative expressions do not, since they do so by means of a context.

¹⁷² Cf. fol. 47a, l. 18 – 49a, l. 4. One relevant discussion in the first half of the *Classification* pertains to the classification and definition of the event as conveying a *maṣḍar*, which echoes aspects of the criticism brought up by al-Shirwānī. Here al-Samarqandī claims that the definition of *maṣḍar* as al-Ījī presented it requires a qualification, namely “*that which conforms to the verb that derives from it*,” which would exclude from this definition the nouns that are ‘*maṣḍarized*,’ e.g., *al-‘ālimiyya* (lit. *the fact of being knowing*), by adding the *yā*’ of the *maṣḍar*, and nouns of *maṣḍar* (i.e., *maṣḍars* that convey the same meaning of the verbs but which vary in linguistic form, e.g., the *maṣḍar kalām* from *takallama*, or *wuḍū’* from *tawadda’a*). But then the *Classification* would not be exhaustive since a group of terms like the names of *maṣḍars* would be left out. Al-Samarqandī solves this issue by pointing out that terms that are ‘*maṣḍarized*’ like *al-‘ālimiyya* are the product of an addition to a pre-existing term (*al-‘ālim*), which cannot be accounted for in al-Ījī's *Classification*, because the notion considered to be the source for the classification (*al-maṣsim*) is the simple term with respect to its unity (*al-laḥẓ al-wāḥid bi-tibār al-waḥda*); cf. fol. 48a, l. 9-19.

Overall, al-Samarqandī agrees with previous views that prepositions are posited for their specific concepts by construing a general notion, which is a type of ascription (*nisba*) between two other concepts, as in the sentence “*I departed from Basra*” (*sirtu min al-Baṣrati*), where the two concepts are the verb “*I departed*” and the proper name “*Baṣra*.” The general concept of “*beginning*” (*ibtidāʾ*) construed when positing “*from*” functions as a mirror (borrowing the notion of the Jurjānian mirror) to grasp the state between the two concepts of “*I departed*” and “*Baṣra*.” As such, the particular instance of the concept conveyed by “*from*” is conceived, and narrowed down only when the other two other concepts of “*departing*” and “*Baṣra*” occur. Al-Samarqandī explains this by recalling the notions of predicability (*ḥukm*) and semantic independence (*istiqlāl al-mafhūmiyya*). The concept of “*beginning*” corresponding to the term “*beginning*” (*al-ibtidāʾ*), when taken in a strict or absolute way (*muṭlaqan*), is an independent concept that the intellect can grasp *per se* (*bi-l-dhāt*) and may function as a subject or a predicate. If taken as a relatum (*mutaʿalliq*) to a specific concept, then the intellect can construe it in two ways. In the first way, there is a concept towards which the intellect directs its attention intentionally, which means that this concept is semantically independent and may be the subject or object of predication, as in the example: “*the beginning of the trip is Baṣra*” (*ibtidāʾu al-sayri al-Baṣratu*). In the second way, the intellect grasps the concept of beginning as a state (*ḥāla*) of the concept to which it relates, considers it as a tool (*āla*), and directs its intentional attention only toward the concept to which the notion of “*beginning*” relates. In this case, the concept of “*beginning*” is not semantically independent and cannot be taken as the subject or object of a predication. Of these three ways to construe the concept of “*beginning*” only the last one explains how prepositions like “*from*” are posited by means of a general notion and understood by the intellect to convey a specific

instance of the general concept of “*beginning*” or “*from-ness*” when each one of them relates to another specific concept.¹⁷³

It is probably the reference to the notions of predicability, semantic independence and ascription (*nisba*) that prompts al-Samarqandī to present six digressions mainly into the topic of verbs, in which he anticipates the topics of the *Eighth* and *Ninth Reminders* where al-Ījī draws important similarities and differences between prepositions and verbs.¹⁷⁴ One relevant digression is the second. Here, al-Samarqandī agrees with previous commentators’ view that complete verbs (*al-afʿāl al-tāmma*, i.e., verbs that convey an event and an ascription to a subject, as opposed to incomplete verbs like *kāna*), e.g., *ḍaraba* or ‘*alima*, like prepositions, are posited by a general positing for specific concepts, insofar as they include specific ascriptions (*nisab*). Al-Samarqandī explains, following al-Jurjānī’s view, that these types of verbs convey and signify two things, namely the event (*ḥadath*), which conveys a universal concept that is semantically independent, and the predicative ascription (*nisba ḥukmiyya*), which is construed as being a state (*ḥāla*) between the event and the agent-subject of the event. This means that the ascription is a

¹⁷³ Cf. fol. 48b, l. 20 – 49a, l. 16.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. fol. 49a, l. 17 – 52a, l. 5. The first and sixth (which oddly are one the repetition of the other) digression do not directly concern verbs and prepositions, but rather an issue that arises from al-Ījī’s earlier claim made in the *Classification* according to which the term whose significatum is a universal corresponds to an essence (*dhāt*), which in turns corresponds to generic nouns (*ism al-jins*). Al-Samarqandī claims that the lemma here is unclear, because if by universal al-Ījī means a universal concept (*mafhūm kullī*) without grasping its feature of ‘*being-known*’ (*maʿlūmiyya*), then the restriction to generic nouns is erroneous. This is because generic proper names (‘*alam al-jins*’), like *Usāma* (*Leo*), which also correspond to an essence, would then occupy a middle ground to the extent that they are also posited for, and convey, a universal concept that, instead, possesses the feature of ‘*being-known*.’ If instead by universal al-Ījī means something more general, then this more general concept should be part of the term posited for a universal concept (i.e., the essence). However, in this case the more universal concept that amounts to an essence would not correspond to the generic noun anymore. Al-Samarqandī anticipates that what al-Ījī means here is the first option, thus running into an issue of his classification of generic and proper nouns, on which he will comment in detail later on in the *Sixth Reminder*. The fourth investigation pertains to how verbs convey a tense by means of their form (*hayʾa*), while the fifth investigation returns briefly on the question of how prepositions convey an individuated concept.

means (*āla*) that connects the event to the external agent and, as such, it is semantically dependent upon its relata to convey specification, that is, it specifies how the universal concept represented by the event relates to a specific external agent represented by the subject of the verb. The similarity between prepositions and verbs emerges here more clearly. Al-Samarqandī adds in fact that prepositions like “*from*” (*min*) are posited by a general positing for each instance of the concept of “*beginning*” determined by its own specificity, in the same way as “*to hit*” (*ḍaraba*) is posited by a general positing for each specific ascription of the event (expressed by the verb) to an agent external to the notion of the verb, which cannot be omitted. Therefore, for both the preposition and the verb, the specification of the ascription that they imply is realized when their respective relatum (*mutaʿalliq*) is mentioned. In other words, al-Samarqandī adds,

“just as it is necessary for prepositions to mention their relata so that their concepts – that is, the specific ascriptions that operate in between the concepts external to the concepts of the prepositions <and the concepts of prepositions> – are understood, it is likewise necessary for complete verbs to mention their agents, in order to understand the ascriptions construed within the verbs’ concepts between the event internal to the concept and the subject external to it.”¹⁷⁵

In an effort to construe al-Ījī’s theory of *waḍʿ* within the context of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, al-Samarqandī claims that the previous analysis of the verb is expressed in a similar way

¹⁷⁵ Cf. fol. 49b, l. 16-20; “fa-kamā wajaba fī l-ḥurufi dhikru mutaʿallaqātihā li-yufhama maʿānīhā allatī hiya nisabun makhṣūṣatun min ḥaythu adātun fī-mā bayna al-maʿānī al-khārijati ʿanhā, ka-dhālika yajibu fī l-aḥqāl al-tāmmati dhikru fāʿilihā li-yufhama minhā al-nisabu al-muʿtabaratu fī mafhūmātihā bayna ḥadathin dākhilin fihā wa-mawḍūʿin khārijin.”

in al-Ījī's *al-Fawā'id* where he claims that "*the verb is posited for a realized ascription, namely an ascription that is realized only by that which is ascribed afterwards [i.e., the agent].*"¹⁷⁶

Al-Samarqandī remarks that this analysis of the verb, although plausible, is subject to further investigation (*maḥall baḥth*) for the following reason. The verb understood as a compound of *event-with-specific ascription to an agent* is not completely semantically independent, since it conveys an ascription that is characterized by particularity. For this reason, verbs are unlike generic nouns and *maṣḍars*, which convey exclusively universal concepts. The significatum conveyed by the event of the verb is however a universal, and therefore the verb's significatum should be considered primarily a universal. It is for this reason that the verb as a whole can function as a predicate, e.g., '*Zaydun qāma*' (*Zayd stood*), but cannot function as a subject like generic nouns or *maṣḍars* do. It is thus problematic that al-Ījī classified the verb in the group of terms that convey a universal concept. Al-Samarqandī attempts to offer a solution to salvage al-Ījī's view for placing the verb into the category of universals. The ascription *itself* (*naḥṣuḥā*), here construed as the realization of the universal event to a specific agent (*thubūtu al-ḥadathi al-kulliyyi li-fā'ilin makḥṣūšin*), can to be grasped by the intellect intentionally and essentially (*qaṣḍan wa bi-l-dhāti*). Now, the application of the verb's ascription to multiple agents would amount to have multiple realizations (*thubūtāt*) of the event to multiple agents, each distinct from the other, e.g., *ḍaraba Zayd*, *ḍaraba 'Amr*, *ḍaraba Muḥammad* etc. Al-Samarqandī adds the following explanation: "*the realization of <the event> for <the subject> in one part (or segment) of the past is different than the realization <of the event> for <the subject> in another part of that same past.*"¹⁷⁷ Considered in this way, al-Samarqandī sees no problem if these realizations (i.e., the

¹⁷⁶ "Al-fi'lu wuḍi'a li-isnādin muḥassālin, wa-huwa lā tataḥaṣṣalu illā bi-dhikri mā yusnadu ilayhi ba'dahu." Cf. also al-Ījī, *al-Fawā'id*..., p. 114, and al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq*..., p. 283-4.

¹⁷⁷ "Thubūtuhu lahu fī juz'in min ajzā'i zamāni al-māḍi ghayru thubūtihi lahu fī juz'in akhara." Another example is the following: the realization of the event to the subject within a particular is different from the realization within another particular.

ascriptions to one or many agents) are grasped by the intellect intentionally and, as a consequence, are not construed as being included within the concept of the verb, as they were initially understood. Consequently, the intellect may judge the ascription as a universal notion, just like the event. The key distinction made by al-Samarqandī here is that the intellect is applying universality to the ascription *itself* (*nafsu tilka al-nisbati*), rather than applying it to the ascription construed within the notion of the verb. In other words, the intellect can consider the ascription *itself*, which is still a part of the concept of the verb, as an independent notion and, therefore, amenable to be the subject of a judgement. With this in mind, al-Samarqandī does not see any contradiction in claiming that the significatum of the verb is a universal, since the intellect may *intentionally* consider the compound *event-with-‘ascription in itself’* to be a universal as a whole.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Cf. fol. 49a, l. 21 – 50b, l.1. The position adopted by al-Samarqandī will inevitably lead one to make the same claim about prepositions. Al-Samarqandī responds that the semantic dependence (*istiqlāl al-mafhūmiyya*) of both verbs and prepositions does not contradict that they may be qualified by universality and particularity, or by any other qualification. These qualifications are however confined within the limits of *nafs al-amr*. In fact, claiming that verbs and particles are semantically dependent on something else amounts, in al-Samarqandī’s view, to a kind of qualification. This is acceptable only when the intellect grasps or considers them intentionally and essentially. This inquiry into complete verbs and the ascription they convey is followed by the third inquiry on incomplete verbs (*al-af‘āl al-nāqisha*). Al-Samarqandī points out that incomplete verbs do not signify a notion subsisting in the agents they refer to (*marfū‘uhā*). As seen earlier, complete verbs convey the *event-with-ascription* to an external agent, where the significatum corresponds to the event. Unlike complete verbs, incomplete verbs, like *kāna* or *šāra*, convey something similar to the composite of *x-with-ascription* to an external agent, where the variable *x* may be either an event or a timeframe (*zamān*). In this case the composite of *x-with-ascription* cannot be considered to be the actual significatum of an incomplete verb, because verbs like *kāna* do not convey an event like “*ḍaraba*” does. Rather it would convey the timeframe of the ascription to an agent. Al-Samarqandī attempts to provide a better description of these verbs by claiming that “*they signify the realization of something external from their significatum to a subject*” (*dalālatuhā ‘alā thubūti shay’in khārijin ‘an madlūlihā ilā l-mawḍū‘*), namely that they are posited to determine an attribute (*ṣifa*) for an agent. With these types of verbs both the agent and the attribute are thus external from the significatum of the verb. For example, *kāna* does not signify something’s being and its existence in itself (*kawnu shay’in wa-wujūduhu fī nafsihī*), otherwise it would be a complete verb. This view on verbs, al-Samarqandī notices, corresponds to that of al-Jurjānī in his works on *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* and, more importantly, to al-Ījī’s definition in *al-Fawā’id*, where verbs generally signify a nexus, and require an event and a timeframe, even though some verbs may lack a notion of event, such as in *kāna*, or the temporal aspect, such as in the verbal expressions “*nī‘ma*” (*what a wonderful...*) and “*bi’sa*” (*what an evil...*). Understood as such, in the sentence “*kāna zaydun munṭaliqan*” (*Zayd was setting*

In the commentary on the remaining passages of the *Classification*, where personal, demonstrative and relative pronouns are discussed, al-Samarqandī sides with al-Ījī's view that these three classes of terms should fall under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. As the case for classic commentators did before him, al-Samarqandī makes room for a discussion of third-person pronouns (*ḍamīr al-ghā'ib*) and relative pronouns, anticipating topics covered in the *Seventh* and *Tenth Reminders*. The third-person pronouns and the relative pronouns present two main problems. First, in order to safeguard the coherence of al-Ījī's classification of pronouns into the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, third-person pronouns, such as “*huwa*,” and relative pronouns, such as “*alladhī*,” should be posited for and convey something individuated (*mushakkhkhaṣ*). However, as seen in previous commentaries, in some instances these pronouns may convey or refer back to a universal concept. This is particularly relevant for relative pronouns since they could be

off), the *musnad* would coincide with the predicate (*khavar*) “*setting off*,” while *kāna* would be a qualification for it (*qaydun lahu*). Al-Samarqandī distances himself from this analysis and sides with the position held by other scholars (possibly logicians), as well as al-Zamakhsharī and al-Kirmānī, who maintain that *kāna*, by its substance or root (*mādda*), signifies *being* associated to the agent, which translates to the ascription of being *x* to the agent (*nisbatu kawni shay'in ilā l-fā'ili*). Unlike the previous position, al-Samarqandī explains, in the sentence “*kāna zaydun munṭaliqan*” the *musnad* corresponds to *kāna*, while the predicate (*khavar*) “*munṭaliqan*” is a qualification of *kāna*. To clarify this point, al-Samarqandī adds the following: the concept of *kāna* in the sentence “*kāna zaydun qā'imān*” (*Zayd was standing*) includes the concept of being as well as its realization (*thubūt*) for Zayd in a timeframe. As such, being *standing* (*qā'imān*) is an attribute of Zayd, while the realization of *standing* (*al-qiyām*) for Zayd is an attribute of *standing* (*ṣifa li-l-qiyām*). Al-Samarqandī adds that al-Jurjānī, contrary to the view attributed to him earlier, recognized this specific analysis of incomplete verbs in his glosses on *al-Muṭawwal*, where he claims that the verb *ṣāra* (*to become*) conveys the concept of *transference* (*al-intiqāl*), while its predicate (*khavar*) cannot be characterized by the concept of *transference*, rather by “*that to which a thing is transferred*” (*muntaqil ilayhi*) that is a derivative concept from the concept of *transference* and a feature (*ḥukm*) of the concept of *transference*. Likewise, in the Quranic verse “*And God is all knowing*” (*kāna Allāhu ‘alīman*), the concept of *kāna* equates to the agent's persistence in knowledge, while the predicate “*‘alīman*” is an attribute that persists on the subject (*ṣifa mustamirran ‘alayhā*). Al-Samarqandī goes at great lengths in analyzing incomplete verbs because he wishes to demonstrate that, since verbs like *kāna* or *ṣāra* represent the *musnad* while the predicate (*khavar*) is a qualification of it, their concepts of *kawn* or *ṣayrūra* (i.e., their *maṣḍars*) are semantically independent, just like complete verbs are. Cf. fol. 51a, line 10 – 52b, line 4.

assimilated into the same class of definite nouns (*maʿārif*), thus undermining al-Ījī's classificatory principles. Second, by being definite terms *per se*, relative pronouns should also convey determination (*taʿayyun*) *per se* when employed in a speech situation, which would contrast with the previous claim that they may convey a universal, but also that they convey determination and individuation by means of a specific context expressed by the relative clause (*al-ṣila*).¹⁷⁹

Al-Samarqandī first tackles the issue of the third-person pronoun. He begins by presenting different views regarding the referent of the third-person pronoun. A third-person pronoun like “he” (*huwa*) may refer to a universal notion (*mafhūm kullī*). It may also refer to notions that are more general than the notion for which the third-person pronoun “he” is posited, which is “the singular masculine absent referent” (*al-ghāʾib al-mufrad al-mudhakkar*), such as thing (*shayʾ*) or concept (*mafhūm*). It may also refer to the instrument for grasping the posited concept (*ālā li-mulāḥaẓati al-mawḍūʿi lahu*) under which all the particular concepts, real or relational (*ḥaqīqī aw idāfī*), are subsumed, according to al-Jurjānī's view. Al-Samarqandī deems these definitions unsatisfactory. He points out that it is incorrect to claim that the third-person pronoun is posited for the concept “singular masculine absent referent” that corresponds to its determined particulars in the speech situation. He also rejects al-Ījī's view that the third-person pronoun is posited for a something individuated (*mushakkhkhaṣ*), as well as al-Jurjānī's position

¹⁷⁹ Cf. fol. 52a, l. 20 – 53b, l. 24. Before discussing relative pronouns in detail, al-Samarqandī criticizes a group of grammarians, as well as al-Taftāzānī, who claim that definite terms (*al-maʿārif*) are considered definite because of the determination they convey *per se* when are used in a speech situation, regardless of their original positing. In their view, these terms are posited for a universal concept that includes all the determined instances of that concept (*al-afrād al-mutaʿayyana*). The aim of positing personal pronouns like *anā* (I), just like other personal and relative pronouns, is for them to be employed (*istiʿmāl*) in real speech act as determined instances of that universal concept. In his critique, al-Samarqandī follows classic commentators on the *Risāla* who disprove this view by claiming that this would imply that these terms are in fact used as figurative expressions that have no baseline literal sense (*majāzāt lā ḥaqāʾiq laha*), which is absurd; cf. fol. 52a, l. 23 – 52b, l. 17.

mentioned earlier. It seems that these definitions do not solve the previous issue regarding the determined concept that third-person and relative pronouns ought to convey.

Al-Samarqandī offers instead the following definition: the third-person pronoun is posited by a general positing for that which the notion of “*singular masculine absent referent*” is true of (*li-kulli mā yaṣḍuqu ‘alayhi mafhūmu al-gha’ibi al-mufradi al-mudhakkari*) or, alternatively, for the notion of “*singular masculine absent referent*” to be employed for each item of which that concept is true (*li-yusta‘malu li-kulli mā yaṣḍuqu ‘alayhi*). In choosing this definition and expanding the applicability of the third-person pronoun through the notion of *miṣdāq*, al-Samarqandī offers a more general understanding that can apply to both universal and particular instances of the concept that apply to both third-person and relative pronouns. In this way he establishes a similarity between the definition of the third-person pronoun to the definition of other notions such as *universal*, *thing*, *concept* and *genus* (*kullī*, *shay’*, *mafhūm* and *jins*). All these notions, he explains, are true of something more general and, at the same time, are true of themselves. Al-Samarqandī explains this as follow: “*the notion of genus (al-jins), for example, is true of the universal that is a genus for the universals and is also true of itself, because it is a genus of its classes. In the same way, the notions of ‘concept,’ ‘universal’ and ‘thing’ are true of themselves.*”¹⁸⁰ Taken as such, third-person pronouns like “*huwa*” may convey a particular, as al-Ījī originally intended, as well as a universal, since the notion of “*singular masculine absent referent*” is true of a universal concept.

¹⁸⁰ “[...] Ka-mafhūmi al-jinsi, fa-innahu yaṣḍuqu ‘alā al-kullī alladhī huwa jinsun li-l-kulliyyāti wa-‘alā nafsihi, li-annahu jinsun li-aqsāmihi, wa-kadhā mafhūmu al-mafhūmi wa-l-kullī wa-l-shay’ taṣḍuqu ‘alā anfusiḥā.” The passage is very opaque and, unfortunately, al-Samarqandī does not expand upon this analysis of notions that are true of something more general and of themselves, but points to the reader to find the full discussion of this in his glosses on al-Iṣfahānī’s *Maṭāli‘ al-Anzār*, the most widespread commentary on al-Bayḍawī’s *Ṭawāli‘ al-Anwār*; cf. fol. 53b, l. 13-16.

Al-Samarqandī approaches the case of relative pronouns by returning to the notion of *miṣḍāq*. He previously stated that the relative pronoun may indicate the same universal notion for which it was posited (‘ayn *al-mafhūmi al-kullī*), or for the conceptual tool (*āla*) that serves to grasp the posited concept or something more general than that posited concept. For example, that for which the relative pronoun is posited may indicate the genus or a known thing (*al-ma’hūd*); as such, in the phrase “*alladhī dakhala fī māhiyyati al-ḥayawāni*” (*that which is included to the quiddity of animal*) the relative pronoun is used to indicate the notion “human” (*al-insān*). In this case the relative pronoun refers to a notion or an essence previously known, i.e., *human*, which is not a real particular (*juz’ī ḥaqīqī*), but can be considered a kind of particular of the notion “*that which*.”

Al-Samarqandī is aware that he needs to provide a better definition for the relative pronoun, one that would include universal and particular concepts based on the notion of *miṣḍāq*. If the notion of relative pronoun that conveys a particular corresponds to “*the notion an essence qualified by the content of a specific relative clause inasmuch as it is known to belong to it*” (*mafḥūmu dhātin mutṭaṣifatin bi-maḍmūni ṣīlatin makhṣūṣatin min ḥaythu hiya ma’lūmatu al-thubūti lahu*), because the relative clause is the content that bestows individuation on the relative pronoun, the same cannot apply to the relative pronoun that conveys a universal. Al-Samarqandī now adds that the concept posited for the relative pronoun corresponds to “*the notion of an essence known to be characterized by the content of a sentence inasmuch it is so*” (*mafḥūmu dhātin ma’lūmati al-ittiṣāfi bi-maḍmūni jumlatin min ḥaythu hiya ka-dhālika*). This notion of “*essence known to be characterized by the content of a sentence*” is true of itself (*yaṣḍuqu ‘alā nafsīhi*). This means that this notion is an essence (*dhāt*), which is a concept semantically independent, and known to be qualified by the description “*the relative pronoun is posited for it and for that which is true of it*.” This formula, al-Samarqandī concludes, equates to the concept posited for “*alladhī*” as

“the concept qualified by the content of the statement: the relative pronoun known and conceived by the addressee is posited for it” (*wuḍi‘a lahu lafzu al-mawṣūli al-ma‘lūmi al-mutaṣawwari li-l-sāmi‘i*). Understood in this way, the notion of “*alladhī*” is conceptually more general than in its original sense and while also being true of that more general notion to which it refers.¹⁸¹ With this analysis of both the relative and third-person pronoun, al-Samarqandī shows that the concepts and referents of these terms can be either a particular or a universal, but can still be considered as posited with one single act of positing and classified under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*.

The previous discussion regarding terms that are posited for and convey universal and/or particular concepts under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* prompts al-Samarqandī to engage with Khwāja ‘Alī’s view regarding the names of letters, sciences and book titles. In this concluding remark of his commentary on the *Classification*, al-Samarqandī reports verbatim the passage in which Khwāja ‘Alī states that al-Ījī’s limitation of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* to prepositions and the three types of pronouns is not exhaustive (*ghayr ḥāṣir*). Letters of the alphabet and book titles, in Khwāja ‘Alī’s view, should also be part of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* as prepositions and pronouns are, since he rejects the possibility of considering them to be generic concepts (*ajnās*), as well as the commonly held view (*ahl al-‘urf*) that these terms indicate an individuated item (*al-amr al-mushakkhāṣ*). Al-Samarqandī does not deny that these types of terms should fall under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, but he asserts that they cannot be assimilated to the way in which prepositions and pronouns convey their particular concepts. He explains that each letter, just like each book title, has its own unity and specificity (*waḥda wa-khuṣūṣiyya*) that does not change when they are uttered by different speakers. At best, al-Samarqandī notices, each letter or book title multiplies when different speakers utter the same letter or book title. This is based on the philosophical

¹⁸¹ Cf. fol. 53b, l. 16 – 21.

and theological principle that accidents, in this case the letter or the book title, is individuated by its substratum (*al-a‘rāḍ tatashakḥkaṣu bi-maḥāllihā*), so that the multiplication of the substrata entails the multiplication of the accidents. Al-Samarqandī provides two different possibilities for positing this type of term. For example, the letter *bā’* is either posited for the specific letter (*al-ḥarf al-maḥṣūṣ*), which remains unchanged whether it is uttered by Zayd, John, Mary etc.; or it is posited for each individual letter that subsists in different substrata. For al-Samarqandī the first option is the correct one. The second view is discarded because it would imply that only one specific instance of that letter would be conveyed to the exclusion of the common feature that is at the core of the positing process of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. If we say for example “*the bā’ is a labial consonant*,” we do not mean the one specific *bā’* just uttered among all the possible individuals, but rather the specific consonant *bā’*. Al-Samarqandī thus draws this distinction between the specific letter (*al-ḥarf al-maḥṣūṣ*) with its unity and the individual instances (*ashkhāṣ* or *mushakḥkhaṣāt*) when they are instantiated in real speech. The same reasoning applies to book titles. The statement “*what a wonderful book is the Miftāḥ al-‘Ulūm!*” (*nī‘ma al-kitabu Miftāḥi al-‘Ulūmi*), refers that specific composition, whether it is read by Zayd, John, or Mary. Understood as such, these groups of terms are considered to be nouns (*asmā’*) that, when uttered, are used for this specific letter or that specific book in every respect, regardless of the substratum in which they subsist, in such a way that they are considered literal terms (*ḥaqā’iq*), rather than figurative ones.

In the commentary on the twelve *Reminders* of the *Conclusion*, al-Samarqandī’s main objective is to unpack and expand on the lemma through *lexis* and *thêoria* in order to harmonize the claims made in the *Classification* with those in each *Reminder*, as well as respond to criticisms

and counterarguments, real or virtual, by relying on sources from the rhetorical tradition.¹⁸² One such case is the *Fourth Reminder* in which al-Ījī attempts to harmonize his view of particles and prepositions that fall under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* with the grammarians’ widely accepted definition “*the preposition signifies a concept in something else*” (*al-ḥarfū tadullu ‘alā ma‘nan fī ghayrihi*), which he paraphrases with “*the particle is not semantically independent*” (*lā mustaqillun bi-l-mafhūmiyyati*). Al-Samarqandī begins by parsing the definition offered by the grammarians and analyzes the different senses in which this can be understood, with special attention to the referent of the pronoun in “*ghayrihi*.” Quoting from al-Jurjānī’s *al-Risāla al-Ḥarfīyya*, he then

¹⁸² An example of this is the commentary on the *Sixth Reminder* where al-Samarqandī expands the *matn* and harmonizes it with al-Ījī’s rhetorical material views in his *al-Fawā’id*. In this reminder, al-Ījī claims that the analysis of terms presented in the *Classification* helps to clarify the difference between generic nouns and proper generic names (respectively *ism al-jins* and *‘alam al-jins*), insofar as proper generic names like Leo (*Usāma*) are posited for a determined concept in its own substance (*jawhar*), while generic nouns like lion (*asad*) are posited for an undetermined concept that may acquire determination (*ta’yīn*) through the definite article. Al-Samarqandī explains that both generic nouns and proper generic names are posited for a unified essence in the mind (*al-ḥaqīqa al-muttaḥida fī l-dhihni*), but a proper generic name like Leo signifies in its own substance that the essence is previously known and attested by the addressee, as is the case with proper names such as Zayd or Mary. Generic nouns, by contrast, do not signify the determined essence in their own substance, but rather by means of a tool, i.e., the definite article. To clarify the nature of generic nouns, he relies on a reminder contained in al-Ījī’s *al-Fawā’id* that tackles the question of definite and indefinite nouns. Definition (*ta’rīf*), al-Ījī claims, conveys a determined concept to the listener insofar as it is determined, and thus functions as an indicator of that determined concept as such. Indeterminateness (*tankīr*) causes the attention of the listener’s soul to turn (*iltāf al-naḥs*) towards a determined concept as it is without considering determination with respect to the term. Thus, understanding the concept in these two ways is based on knowing the positing of the term for the concept. However, al-Ījī points out that knowledge of the positing takes place only after the listener has conceived the concept and distinguished it in his intellect from all the other concepts. In other words, a linguistic exchange with the listener or the addressee is based on the latter’s previous knowledge and conception of the concept discussed, whether the term used is definite or indefinite. For example, in the statement “*the man has arrived*” (*jā’a al-rajulu*) there is an indication in the term “*the man*” to something already known by the addressee. This statement would equate to “*the man [whom you know] has arrived*” (*jā’a al-rajulu alladhī ta’rifuhu*), so as to indicate a determined man (*rajul mu’ayyan*). Conversely, in the statement “*a man arrived*” (*jā’a rajulun*) there is no indication in the term of a determined previously known man, but merely an indication of the essence of “man” known to the addressee. Al-Ījī’s view, al-Samarqandī reports, explains the difference between “*a lion*” and “*the lion*” (*asad* and *al-asad*), which convey the same concept essentially (*bi-l-ḥaqīqa*), but differ in what is considered (*al-i’tibār*), as in the first case the concept is not known by the addressee, while in the second case the determined concept is previously known. Cf. fol. 56b, l. 19 – 57a, l. 24; and al-Kirmānī, *Tahqīq...*, pp. 312-314.

digresses into a lengthy rebuttal of the view that prepositions are not semantically independent because the positor has made the mention of the preposition's relatum (*dhikr muta'alliqihi*) a necessary condition for the particle itself to convey its concept. This is opposed to the view shared by al-Ījī and most commentators for whom prepositions lack semantic independence by their own very nature and who consider the mention of their relatum to be a something necessary (*amr ḍarūrī*) in order for prepositions to convey their concepts.¹⁸³

The last noteworthy discussion in the section of the *Conclusion* is the commentary on the *Eighth Reminder* where al-Ījī claims that both verbs and prepositions convey a concept that is established for something else and thus they cannot be the subject of predication. Al-Samarqandī sides with al-Ījī and his predecessors because, he explains, the concept that is apprehended as being a state of another concept, that is the verb, or apprehended as being a mirror with which to recognize the state of another concept, that is the preposition, cannot be grasped intentionally (*bi-l-qaṣd*) and be semantically independent.

Overall, the commentary on the *Reminders* is a space where al-Samarqandī reinforces the views expressed in his commentary on the *Classification*, which constitutes the core part of his exegetical work where he tackles the more problematic aspects of al-Ījī's theory and provides original solutions to the main points of contention between classic commentators.

¹⁸³ Cf. al-Samarqandī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 57a, line 17 – fol. 57b. In this discussion and in what follows, al-Samarqandī reports verbatim al-Jurjānī's *al-Risāla al-Ḥarfiyya* in rejecting the view that the concept of the term 'from' coincides with the concept of beginning (*ibtidā'*) itself. Then, in order for the term 'from' to signify the concept of beginning, the positor mentions its relatum as a condition for the signification to be realized, which is a process of positing that does not take place in order for the term 'beginning' to signify the concept of beginning. As such, this view explains why the preposition 'from' does not convey its concept in full and, in virtue of this, it is characterized by a semantic dependence on its relatum.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSOLIDATION AND CANONIZATION

Chapter Three showed that the exegetical tradition on the *Risāla* began after the composition and the dissemination of al-Jurjānī's sets of glosses that accompanied and circulated with the *matn*. Al-Jurjānī's explanations and solutions to the semantic issues addressed in the *matn* called however for a more cogent and detailed analysis, and this prompted the emergence of more systematic and comprehensive commentaries, exemplified by al-Jurjānī's student Khwāja 'Alī al-Samarqandī, who was followed in turn by his student Jāmī and other contemporaries, mainly al-Shirwānī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī. These two commentaries engaged with and responded to al-Jurjānī's and Khwāja 'Alī's interpretations of al-Ījī's often opaque wording, and followed in many ways the exegetical approach of Khwāja 'Alī.

This chapter will show that the early exegetical activity will shape the following emergence of two main commentaries, the first authored by al-Qūshjī and the second by 'Iṣām al-Dīn al-Isfarā'inī. These two commentaries will mark the consolidation of the exegetical tradition, on one side, and inaugurate a long-lasting scholiastic activity in form of glosses and annotations, on other, which will establish the two commentaries as the exegetical canon of *'ilm al-waḍ'*. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses in detail the most widespread commentary attributed to 'Alī al-Qūshjī, and raises crucial aspects regarding its authorship. The second section is instead devoted to hereto unprecedented reconstruction of the scholiastic activity around this commentary up to the 15th/21st century. The third section focuses mainly on analyzing the commentary by 'Iṣām al-Dīn, which will emerge as the climax of the classic exegetical tradition, in that it engages with and incorporate views and interpretations of all previous commentaries. The fourth and final section will reconstruct the

development of the scholiastic activity on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, which will be seen to be a prerogative of a specific scholarly circle in a specific geographical area ascribable to the Kurdish intellectual lineage. Finally, the chapter will show that, on account of diverse features, the two commentaries and their two scholiastic traditions represents two main exegetical strands that establish the canon on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* up to the first half of the 13th/19th.

4.1. *‘Alī al-Qūshjī: from East to West, pseudo-commentary and works on semantics*

The previous overview of the commentaries from Khwāja ‘Alī to al-Samarqandī points to the consolidation of a sophisticated and complex exegetical praxis around crucial topics of the *matn*. These include the analysis of the *waḍ‘* *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* in its specific application to the cases of personal and relative pronouns, and the question of the universality vs particularity of the concepts of, for example, verbs and third person pronouns. This exegetical *praxis* intersected and developed alongside cognate intellectual traditions such logic and its epistemological inquiries, as in the case of al-Shirwānī, or those of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān* and the linguistic premises discussed in *uṣūl al-fiqh*, as in the case of al-Samarqandī.

These classic commentaries can be seen to establish a growing exegetical tradition that integrates itself in the long-standing exegetical traditions of the post-Avicennian period. The topics debated in these commentaries are deeply entrenched in and echo similar ones discussed in several traditions, including the logical tradition of the commentaries on al-Kātibī’s *al-Shamsiyya*; the rhetorical tradition of al-Sakkākī’s *Miftāḥ* and al-Qazwīnī’s *Talkhīṣ*; and the juridical tradition of al-Rāzī’s *al-Maḥṣūl* and Ibn al-Ḥājib’s *Mukhtaṣar*. This means that these early classic commentaries presuppose and require an expertise in topics specific to these other

intellectual traditions and, as such, they do not seem to conceive the theory of *waḍʿ* as a science or subject matter *per se*. In other words, at least at this stage of its development, the science of *waḍʿ* should not be construed as an exoteric discipline having its own place in the intellectual curricula, but instead as a set of highly specialized case studies on semantics with ramifications in cognate sciences, which find new room to be investigated and analyzed in the exegesis on the *Risāla*.

The wide circulation of al-Qūshjī's commentary was likely responsible for a wider standardization of the exegetical practice on the *Risāla* and on the theory of *waḍʿ* in at least some intellectual circles across the Islamicate world. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlī al-Qūshjī¹⁸⁴ was a polymath and author not only of a commentary on the *Risāla* but of other works of varying lengths on the same subject, the most widespread of which was his *al-ʿUnqūd al-Zawāhir fī l-Ṣarf*. Before delving into this and other works by al-Qūshjī, a closer look at his commentary is merited.¹⁸⁵ As mentioned in the previous section, the attribution of this commentary to al-Qūshjī is problematic. Beginning with the incipit “*Al-ḥamdu li-llahi alladhī khaṣṣa al-insāna bi-maʿrifati awḍāʿi al-kalāmi [...]*,” this commentary was seen to have been often misattributed to al-Samarqandī, despite the evidence highlighted in the previous chapter suggesting al-Qūshjī as the true author, given the immensity of the tradition, a majority of whose manuscript witnesses, copies, and glossators attribute this commentary to al-Qūshjī. It must then be sufficient to point to *The Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section)* in the *Garrett Collection* at Princeton University by R. Mach as

¹⁸⁴ For an overview on al-Qūshjī's biography see Fazlıoğlu, Ihsan, “Qūshjī,” in Hockey, T. et al. (eds.), *The Biographical Encyclopedia of Astronomers, Springer Reference*, New York: Springer, 2007, pp. 946-948. See also Hasan Umut, “Theoretical Astronomy in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire: ʿAlī al-Qūshjī's *al-Risāla al-Faṭḥiyya*,” Montreal: McGill University, PhD Thesis, 2020, in particular Chapter 2.

¹⁸⁵ I will be referring to the last edition of the commentary edited by Muḥammad Dhannūn Yūnus Faṭḥī, ʿAmmān: Dār al-Faṭḥ, 1437/2016.

likely the first modern scholar in Western academia to have noticed and corrected this widespread misattribution.¹⁸⁶ A likely contributing factor for this confusion is al-Qūshjī's full name, Abū al-Qāsim 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī Muḥammad al-Qūshjī, to which the *nisba* al-Samarqandī was often added, as he was a native of the Transoxanian city. Several copies of his commentary were likely transmitted under the name of Abū al-Qāsim [...] al-Samarqandī, omitting the other *nisba* of al-Qūshjī.

It is safe to assert that al-Qūshjī's commentary is the most widespread within the whole exegetical tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. It was one of the classic commentaries to be printed, often with sets of glosses, in the modern Arabic printing tradition, and it continues to be the object of new editions and reprints to this day.¹⁸⁷ Similar to the previous classic commentaries, al-Qūshjī's falls under the *mamzūj* type; it reproduces the *matn* in full, and in the preamble displays the same wordplay echoing key terminology of topics discussed in theory of *al-waḍ‘*, such as *khaṣṣa*, *awḍā‘*, *ḥurūf*, *mushtaqq*, *mawṣūl*, *muḍmar*, *ishārāt* etc. In the introduction, after praising al-Ījī's scholarly eminence and stressing the importance of his short work, al-Qūshjī claims that the *Risāla* needs a commentary that comprehends all of the text's important topics and analyses, and which enumerates them in detail.¹⁸⁸ The absence, in this brief introduction, of any references to previous commentaries is striking, and indicates that al-Qūshjī was either unaware of or disregarded altogether the previous commentators, most notably al-Jurjānī, Khwāja 'Alī, Jāmī and al-Harawī. Although it is plausible that al-Qūshjī never came across the commentaries of his contemporaries al-Harawī, al-Shirwānī and al-Samarqandī in Timurid scholarly circles, his silence regarding al-Jurjānī's, Khwāja 'Alī's and Jāmī's commentaries is puzzling. Unlike the

¹⁸⁶ Cf. p. 293-294, n. 3424.

¹⁸⁷ The commentary has been printed several times either in lithographic format or movable-type prints which systematically attribute it to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ...*, p. 46-7.

former figures, who likely never crossed paths with the author, these latter authors were all towering intellectual personalities in the scholarly circles of Samarkand and Herat of which al-Qūshjī was an established member and a habitué.

The introduction of his commentary offers another valuable piece of information that helps to shed light on the circumstances of its composition, as al-Qūshjī claims it to be a gift (*tuhfa*) for a certain Mughīth al-Dawla wa-l-Dīn al-Amīr ‘Abd al-Karīm. It is unclear whether this is al-Amīr ‘Abd al-Karīm Samarqandī,¹⁸⁹ a Timurid grandee under Abū Sa‘īd Mīrzā (854-873/1424-1469), or the *sayyid* ‘Abd al-Karīm b Muḥammad I Mar‘ashī al-Māzandarānī, a prince of the Mar‘ashī dynasty that ruled over Māzandarān from 760/1369 to the second half of the 10th/16th century, who himself ruled Āmul from 857/1452 until his death in 865/1461 and was involved in the regional wars for the control over Āmul and Sārī.¹⁹⁰ The scant biographical information available on the Mar‘ashī prince ‘Abd al-Karīm places him as a hostage held in Herat for a short period in 856/1452 before returning to Māzandarān in order to take power over the region.¹⁹¹ Contextually, the biographical sources on the life of al-Qūshjī show that he left Samarqand after the death of his patron Ūlugh Beg in 853/1449 to move to Herat, closely after which he also became associated with the intellectual circles of Jāmī. It is therefore not unlikely that al-Qūshjī

¹⁸⁹ I could not find any biographical information on this ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Samarqandī at this stage of my research, even after consulting a few colloques historians of the Timurid period.

¹⁹⁰ Prof. El-Rouyaheb, in private conversation, suggests that if the attribution to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī is indeed correct, then the dedicatee might be *sayyid* ‘Abd al-Karīm II Mar‘ashī who ruled Āmul until his death in 916/1510. The editors of the recent *Catalogue of the Arabic, Persian and Turkish Manuscripts of the Yahuda Collection of the National Library of Israel* identify the dedicatee as possibly ‘Abd al-Karīm Mar‘ashī I, cf. Wust, Efraim, *Catalogue of the Arabic, Persian and Turkish Manuscripts of the Yahuda Collection of the National Library of Israel*, ed. by Ukeles, R., Butbul, S., Salameh, K., al-Uzbeki, Y., trans. By Chipman, L., Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2016, vo. 1, p. 570.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Calmard, J., “Mar‘ashī”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, ed. by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 13 April 2020 http://dx.doi.org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0679.

and the prince ‘Abd al-Karīm met in Herat and initiated a friendship that could justify the dedication of the commentary, implying that the commentary could have been composed between 853/1499 and 856/1452.

More recent research has questioned the date of al-Qūshjī’s arrival in Herat. It appears, in fact, that he arrived ca. 863/1459, after Abū Sa‘īd took control of Samarqand. Recent research has also shed light on the two decades of al-Qūshjī’s life between the death of Ūlugh Beg and his encounter with the Āq-Qoyunlū’s ruler Uzun Ḥasan (d. 882/1478) in 9-10 Shawwal 876/20-21 March 1472 and 29 Dhū al-Ḥijja 876/7 June 1472.¹⁹² If, as this recent research has suggested, ‘Abd al-Karīm I and al-Qūshjī never met, the dedicatee may instead be ‘Abd al-Karīm II (d. 916/1510), grandson of ‘Abd al-Karīm I, whom al-Qūshjī also likely encountered at least on two occasions. The first encounter may have taken place early in the life of ‘Abd al-Karīm II, who spent the early years of his life in the military camps (*urdū*) of Abū Sa‘īd, the Timurid ruler and dedicatee of al-Qūshjī’s *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd*. The second likely took place around the time of al-Qūshjī’s encounter with Uzun Ḥasan in 876/1472 on his journey from Herat towards the Ottoman empire: amidst the internal battles the control over Māzandarān, the young prince, after a failed attempt to be enthroned, was taken to the court of Uzun Ḥasan between the end of 1460’s and the beginning of 1470’s. In lieu of precise dates, two periods emerge as possible candidates for the time in which al-Qūshjī composed his commentary. If the dedicatee is ‘Abd al-Karīm I, then the commentary was likely composed between 853/1499 and 856/1452; if the dedicatee is ‘Abd al-Karīm II, then the commentary was composed between the end of 1460’s and before Ramadan 877/February 1473 when al-Qūshjī permanently moved to Istanbul. This range shows, with

¹⁹² Cf. Umut, *Theoretical Astronomy...*, p. 79 et ff.; conversely, the more summarized reconstruction suggested by Okten dates the encounter in the spring of 873/1469 and claims that al-Qūshjī spent almost twenty years in Herat.

certainty, that al-Qūshjī's commentary was not composed during the last stage of his scholarly career in the Ottoman capital.

Let us now turn to the commentary. Like his predecessors, al-Qūshjī begins his commentary on the opening statement of the *matn* with the *lexis* of the *lemma* “*hādhihi fāʿida*,” focusing on the lexicographical analysis of the term “*fāʿida*.” The commentary moves on to explain the tripartite division of the *Risāla* and the relationship between the *Introduction*, *Classification* and *Conclusion* and the variant quadripartite division, the last division of which al-Qūshjī dismisses as a scribal error.¹⁹³ This section follows the previous exegetical tradition in many aspects, including its focus on the *lexis* of the introductory statement and the analysis of the different sections of the *matn*. There is, however, one important point to be noted. From the early passages of al-Qūshjī's commentary onwards, a striking similarity between al-Qūshjī's wording and Khwāja ʿAlī's wording is detectable. By closely comparing the two commentaries, it emerges that al-Qūshjī's comments are sometimes identical to passages found in Khwāja ʿAlī's commentary, and at other times they present the same ideas found in Khwāja ʿAlī's comments but in a more concise style. This similarity between the two commentaries is not restricted to the *Introduction*, but also emerges (with very few exceptions) when comparing the comments on the *Classification* and the *Conclusion*. By collating the two commentaries from beginning to end, the reader gets a general impression that al-Qūshjī's commentary is in every respect an abridged and simplified version of Khwāja ʿAlī's commentary.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Cf. al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 49-55.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. al-Qūshjī, *Sharḥ*..., p. 49-53 and Khwāja ʿAlī, *Sharḥ*, Nuruosmaniye 4510, fol. 2a, line 10 – 3a.

In the beginning of his commentary on al-Ījī's presentation of the two classes *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Qūshjī proceeds to explain two divisions of linguistic terms (*lafẓ*), one mental and the other according to the two modes of specificity and generality. Terms may be mentally divided into subject, object, and the act of positing (respectively *al-mawḍūʿ*, *al-mawḍūʿ la-hu* and *al-waḍʿ*). Likewise, terms can also be divided into general and specific (*ʿāmm* and *khāṣṣ*). Al-Qūshjī notices that these two modes apply only to the act of positing and the intellection of the object posited (*khuṣūṣu al-waḍʿi wa-ʿumūmihi wa-taʿaqqulu al-mawḍūʿi lahu kadhālika*). This initial division allows al-Qūshjī to introduce the four standard classes of *waḍʿ*: the first is the *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, such as the proper name “Zayd,” which is posited when the essence of Zayd is intellected; the second is the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, which is applicable to demonstrative pronouns; the third, the *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, refers to the intellection of general essences, as in the essence of “*rational animal*,” for which the generic noun “*human*” is posited; the fourth, that is the *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*, is dismissed by al-Qūshjī along with his predecessors on the basis that the specificities of an essence cannot reflect (*mirʾāt*) the universal concepts to which they belong.

Al-Qūshjī emphasizes that al-Ījī's decision to present only the classes *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* can be explained by two main reasons. The first being that the third class, the *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, is self-explanatory, while the fourth should simply be dismissed. The second reason has to do with the original scope of al-Ījī's *matn*, that is, “*the analysis of the concepts of particles, personal, demonstrative and relative pronouns*,” which, al-Qūshjī argues, is unrelated to the third and fourth classes. To a closer look, al-Qūshjī's understanding of the main scope of the *Risāla* coincides with Khwāja ʿAlī's one. As seen earlier, al-Qūshjī's commentary of the lemma is more of a rewording of Khwāja ʿAlī's one than an original one.¹⁹⁵ This also occurs in the next lemma where, in

¹⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 57-61; Khwāja ʿAlī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 5b, line 11 – 6b.

unpacking the notion of *wadʿ ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, al-Qūshjī partially rewords Khwāja ʿAlī’s analysis of the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and its reference to the Jurjānian notion of mental mirror, and discards Khwāja ʿAlī’s longer and more articulate discussion of the topic.¹⁹⁶

Al-Qūshjī begins his commentary on the first half of the *Classification* with a brief *lexis* of the sense of “*classification*” before clarifying that in the present case, the classification of linguistic terms is based on that which they signify (*madlūl*). Following al-Ījī, he then lays out the various classes of terms according to a first classification, that is, terms whose significatum is a universal (*kullī*) or something individuated (*mushakkhkhaṣ*). Terms whose significatum is a universal are generic nouns (*ism al-jins*), which signify an essence (*dhāt*); *maṣḍars*, which signify an event (*ḥadath*); derived nouns (*mushtaqq*) and verbs, which signify a composite (*murakkab*) of an essence and an event. Proper names, particles and the three groups of pronouns all belong to the second group that conveys an individuated concept.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ This is particularly true for the commentary on passage [1.4] “*One case is the demonstrative pronoun ‘this.’ For, ‘this,’ for example, is the <term> posited, while its external referent is the ostensible individuated entity [...],*” in which al-Qūshjī borrows most of Khwāja ʿAlī’s *lexis* and clarification of the passage while dismissing the more complex points in which Khwāja ʿAlī discusses, for example, the fact that the qualification of generality and universality cannot apply to the notion of individuation on the basis of the theologians’ demonstration that a quiddity qualified with determination (*taʿayyun*) is equal to that quiddity’s individuation, and as such it must be distinguished from all others. Moreover, al-Qūshjī’s borrowings appear more striking as he reports the same examples presented by Khwāja ʿAlī. This is the case for the last section of the commentary of the *Introduction* in which al-Qūshjī, having dismissed the lengthy and elaborate points of Khwāja ʿAlī, reproduces verbatim the summary (*al-ḥāṣil*) that clarifies the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*. The same is the case for the commentary on the *Reminder* of the *Introduction*. Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 62-68; Khwāja ʿAlī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 6b, line 13 – fol. 8b.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. *Ibidem* pp. 68-70; Khwāja ʿAlī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 8b, line 16 – 9a. To this al-Qūshjī adds a report of the following classification that pertains to the concept of term also borrowed from Khwāja ʿAlī. The concept is called “*mafhūm*” insofar as it is understood in general; it is called “*madlūl*” insofar as it is understood by means of understanding something else; it is called “*mawḍūʿ lahu*” insofar as insofar as a term is posited for it; it is then called “*maʿnā*” insofar as the intent of a term expresses a meaning. Likewise, al-Qūshjī brings up a criticism stating that the classification of the term as presented by al-Ījī is fallacious, because this classification is based on the source of the division (*mawrid al-qisma*), that is the linguistic term, which then includes itself and other elements, namely the universal and the individuated concepts. Therefore, the source of division cannot be itself included in the division, making

Despite his general agreement with al-Ījī's classification, al-Qūshjī discusses a criticism of al-Ījī's wording, one that stated that the universal conveyed by the generic noun is an essence (*dhāt*). Al-Qūshjī points out that for the *Classification* to be sound al-Ījī should have claimed that the universal significatum may be either an event alone (*ḥadath waḥdahu*), or a non-event alone (*ghayr-ḥadath waḥdahu*), rather than referring to an essence (*dhāt*). This is particularly relevant for the following passage where al-Qūshjī defines “event” as something subsisting in another (*amrun qā'imun bi-ghayrihi*), while “essence” is not glossed as something self-subsisting (*qā'im bi-nafsihi*) as one would expect, but rather as that which is neither an event nor a composite of an event and something else. In so doing al-Qūshjī attempts to keep the definition of generic nouns inclusive of all those universal concepts that do not fall under any of the other three divisions, namely essences, events, and the composites between an essence and an event. If the generic noun “man” (*rajul*) conveys a universal notion and does fall under the definition of a semantically independent concept and subsists in itself, the same does not apply to, for example, generic nouns that signify colors like *blackness* and *whiteness* (*sawād* and *bayāḍ*), as these are in fact semantically independent concepts, but are not essences that subsist *per se*.¹⁹⁸

the whole classification erroneous. This criticism and the rebuttal to it are also borrowed verbatim from Khwāja 'Alī's commentary, cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 70-72; Khwāja 'Alī, *Sharḥ...*, fol. 9a, line 20 – fol. 10a.

¹⁹⁸ This reformulation of the definition of the notion of *essence* leaves al-Qūshjī open to the following criticism: if the notion of *essence* equates to the notion of “a non-event alone”, then the composites of an event and a non-event, namely the derived nouns and verbs, would all fall under the division of *essence*. The reason for this is that the notion of “non-event alone” is true of and applies to an essence, a derived noun and a verb. As for the event (*ḥadath*), which is significatum by the *maṣḍar*, al-Qūshjī claims that this coincides with Persian terms ending in *dāl* and *nūn*, as in “*zadan*” (to hit), or ending with *tā'* and *nūn*, as in “*kashtan*” (to kill). Moreover, he adds that the definition “*amrun qā'imun bi-ghayrihi*” proper to the event/*maṣḍar* indicates how a qualification is peculiar to a qualified subject (*ikhtiṣāṣ al-nā'it bi-l-man'ūt*), or to dependence in a spatial location (*al-taba'iyya fī l-taḥayyuz*), namely the unification of two things when pointed to by the senses or the intellect. This definition applies to both material entities (*māddiyyāt*), e.g., when we point to Socrates with our limb, we point to both the subject-entity Socrates and his whiteness; and to immaterial ones (*mujarradāt*), e.g., when we point to God with our intellect, we point to both the subject-entity God and, say, His attribute of “*qudra*.” As for the previous cases, the entire discussion is summarized and often taken verbatim from Khwāja 'Alī, cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 73-74, Khwāja 'Alī, *Sharḥ...*, fol. 10b, line 10 – 11b.

Al-Qūshjī concludes that the divisions (*taqsīmāt*) of the universal concept should account for three types of concepts (*essence, event, and the composite*). However the classes (*aqsām*) of terms are four: generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, derived nouns and verbs. For the two classes of derived nouns and verbs, al-Qūshjī claims that both can include further sub-categories of terms. This is possible in virtue of the two definitions given for derived nouns and verbs. The derived noun is defined as a composite of an essence and an event, in which the concept of essence is construed as subordinating the concept of event. As such, terms like active participles (*ism al-fāʿil*), adjectives (*ṣifa mushabbaha*), passive participles (*ism al-mafʿūl*), nouns of the instrument (*ism al-āla*), complements of place (*ẓarf al-mazān*), complements of time (*ẓarf al-zamān*) and elatives (*ism al-taḍlīl*) will all be sub-categories of the derived noun. Conversely, the verb is defined also as a composite, in which the concept of event is instead construed as subordinating the concept of essence. As such, sub-categories of the verbs are the three tenses (*zamān*), as well as the two modes of the imperative (*amr*) or the prohibitive (*nahy*).

In the second part of the *Classification*, where al-Ījī discusses terms that are posited by individual positing for an individuated concept (*waḍʿ mushakḥkhaṣ - maʿnan mushakḥkhaṣ*) such as generic nouns, and those posited by a universal positing for an individuated concept (*waḍʿ kullī - maʿnan mushakḥkhaṣ*), such as prepositions, particles, and pronouns, al-Qūshjī limits his commentary to unpacking the different lemmata and providing further details for each class of terms presented. Here, like previous sections, al-Qūshjī's dependence on Khwāja ʿAlī appears even more clearly in his decision to supply alternatives to the technical terms as in the case of “*mushakḥkhaṣ*” and “*kullī*” with “*khāṣṣ*” and “*āmm*”, respectively, as well as in the examples, as in the case of the statement “*he who came from Baghdad is an eminent man*” (*alladhī jāʾa min Baghdād*

rajulun fāḍilun)¹⁹⁹ in order to clarify how determination occurs to relative pronoun such as “*alladhī*.”²⁰⁰

In the last part of his commentary on the *Classification* al-Qūshjī presents a criticism against al-Ījī stating that although first and second personal pronouns fall under the class of universal positing for an individuated concept (*waḍ‘ kullī li-mawḍū‘ la-hu mushakkhkhaṣ*), the same is not always the case for demonstrative, relative or third-person pronouns, as they can convey a universal notion, such as “*this*” for a genus (*jins*) in the sentence “*this is a universal*” (*hādha kullīun*) when discussing the notion of “*animal*.”²⁰¹ Al-Qūshjī counters this criticism (*qad ujība*) stating that, in many instances, demonstratives and relatives pronouns replace ostensible individuated things (*bi-manzilati al-mushakkhkhaṣi al-mushāhadi*), and are therefore often used metaphorically rather than literally. The case of the third person pronouns is more complex and, like most commentators, al-Qūshjī will tackle the issue in more detail in the *Tenth Reminder*.

In his commentary on the *Conclusion*, similarly to the previous two parts of the *matn*, al-Qūshjī operates more like a supplementer of Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary of each *Reminder* than as commentator in his own right. This editorial process emerges clearly in al-Qūshjī’s commentary on the *Fourth Reminder*, where al-Ījī discusses how prepositions and particles differ

¹⁹⁹ In Khwāja ‘Alī’s example the epithet “*fāḍil*” is replaced by “*‘ālim*.”

²⁰⁰ Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 77-79; Khwāja ‘Alī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 12b, line 15, 13b. It is interesting to notice that, similarly to the previous cases, al-Qūshjī completely omits Khwāja ‘Alī’s extensive detailed digression into the mode of signification of particles, prepositions and all three types of pronouns in which he relies on al-Jurjānī’s notion of the mental mirror to discard the opposite view that particles and prepositions are posited for universal concepts, but convey particular ones in the actual linguistic usage on the basis of a metaphorical process; see Khwāja ‘Alī, *Sharḥ*..., fol. 13b, line 2 – 15a, line 18.

²⁰¹ This example is suggested by al-Dasūqī in his glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary, which he misattributes to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī; cf. al-Dasūqī, *Hāshiya al-Dasūqī ‘alā al-Waḍ‘iyya*, ed. Mur‘ī Ḥasan al-Rashīd, Lebanon-Medeniyet (Turkey): Dār Nūr al-Ṣabāḥ, 2012, p. 183.

in their mode of signification from nouns and verbs, for which he appeals to the standard definitions “*ghayr mustaqill bi-l-mafhumiyya*” vs “*mustaqill bi-l-mafhumiyya*.” This is a *locus classicus* for commentators to analyze the mode of signification of particles and refer to the Jurjānian notion of mental mirror. However, Khwāja ‘Alī discusses the topic in detail in the *Classification*, while his treatment in this section is very short and elliptical. At closer look, al-Qūshjī’s discussion of the same topic of this *Reminder* is instead the longest and more detailed of his commentary, in which one can recognize a synthesis of Khwāja ‘Alī’s discussion and portions of al-Jurjānī’s *Mīr’ātiyya*.²⁰²

The striking resemblance of al-Qūshjī’s commentary to that of Khwāja ‘Alī’s raises questions about the evaluation of al-Qūshjī’s commentary within the history of ‘*ilm al-waḍḥ*’ in general, and the exegetical tradition of the *Risāla* in particular. For, it is difficult to understand how virtually none among the commentary’s many insightful glossators, likely aware of the *Risāla*’s exegetical tradition and the intellectual tradition in which they operated, noticed the resemblances between the two works. This silence, especially from Ottoman scholars, is even more puzzling given that both Khwāja ‘Alī and al-Qūshjī spent parts of their careers in the major intellectual centers of the Ottoman empire, where their works were extensively circulated, studied, and discussed.²⁰³

The silence of generations of scholars and glossators may suggest however that either al-Qūshjī or Khwāja ‘Alī was the true author of not one but both commentaries, such that the one currently attributed to al-Qūshjī is simply a more concise, paired down version of that attributed to Khwāja ‘Alī. In this case, Khwāja ‘Alī and al-Qūshjī may be the same person, as the

²⁰² Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 88-98; Khwāja ‘Alī, *Sharḥ*..., 13b, line 9 et ss.

²⁰³ In this sense, it is not surprising that most of copies of Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary are found in the manuscript collections of Turkish libraries.

name ‘Alī al-Samarqandī, minus the honorific title of “*khwāja*,” might in all likelihood apply to al-Qūshjī, who was also known as ‘Alī al-Qūshjī al-Samarqandī. This means that Khwāja ‘Alī may have authored both commentaries, namely an older long version, and a shorter one, probably after settling in Ottoman scholarly circles. This may explain why in some manuscript copies the commentary attributed to al-Qūshjī is referred to “*the short commentary*” (*al-sharḥ al-ṣaghīr*).²⁰⁴

If Khwāja ‘Alī is not the author of both commentaries, then al-Qushji’s commentary can only be understood as a clear case of plagiarism. The case for viewing the commentary as plagiarized, rather than misattributed over generations of scholarship, is reinforced through accounts of al-Qūshjī’s questionable integrity offered by his contemporaries, and by Jāmī in particular. During their turbulent relationship, Jāmī questioned his peer’s intellectual honesty, specifically with regard to the ideas expressed in al-Qūshjī’s theological *magnum opus*, *Sharḥ Tajrīd al-‘Aqā’id*.²⁰⁵ Strikingly, Jāmī is said to have claimed that in the passages of his commentary where al-Qūshjī “*supposedly expressed his own opinion, he still repeated the opinion of others.*”²⁰⁶ It is thus not impossible that al-Qūshjī came into contact with and studied Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary during his years in Samarqand or Herat, where Khwāja ‘Alī himself was a prominent member of the intellectual community.

It is nevertheless evident that al-Qūshjī’s commentary has been given far more attention and favor than that of Khwāja ‘Alī in the formation of the exegetical practice surrounding the Risāla. This preference may be explained by looking at the content and style of the two works.

²⁰⁴ Conversely, I could not find any references in manuscript witnesses or biographical entries that mention a long commentary, (*al-sharḥ al-kabīr*). The only mentioned is made by the Azharī scholar al-Ḥifnī (see next section) who in his glosses on the commentary, whose author he identifies with al-Qūshjī, refers to *al-sharḥ al-kabīr*.

²⁰⁵ Contrary to the picture drawn by Ökten, Hasan Umut has recently reconsidered some aspects of this problematic relationship between the two scholars and provided new textual evidence indicating that, in at least two occasions, Jāmī interceded in support of al-Qūshjī’s personal troubles; see Hasan Umut, “Theoretical Astronomy ...” pp. 86-91.

²⁰⁶ Cf. Ökten, *Jami: His Biography...*, p. 235.

As the previous synopsis has shown, Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary provides sophisticated and detailed treatments of virtually each of al-Ījī’s claims. His long digressions where he presents arguments, counterarguments, and criticisms, are characterized by meticulous discussions of technicalities within and even beyond the scope of the *matn*. Conversely, the straightforward and concise style of al-Qūshjī’s commentary rendered it more accessible to a broad readership and thus more favorable in the eyes of scholars and glossators, in particular those of the early Ottoman and later Azharī intellectual traditions, with the result that Khwāja ‘Alī’s masterful commentary fell almost completely into obscurity.

That being said, the possibility of authorial misattribution of the commentary cannot be entirely dismissed when comparing this commentary with al-Qūshjī’s important treatise on morphology, *‘Unqūd al-Zawāhir fī l-Ṣarf*.²⁰⁷ As mentioned in Chapter One, the *‘Unqūd al-Zawāhir* is a long work mainly on morphology (*ishtiqaq* and *ṣarf*) containing a brief discussion of the theory

²⁰⁷ Al-Qūshjī, *‘Unqūd al-Zawāhir fī l-Ṣarf*, ed. by Aḥmad ‘Afifī, Cairo: Maṭba‘a Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1421/2001. It should be noticed that the attribution of this work to al-Qūshjī is not certain, as it is based on a single report found in Ṭashköprüzādeh’s *al-Shaqā’iq* where he claims to have heard (*sami‘tu*) that this work was authored by al-Qūshjī; see the introduction of ‘Afifī, p. 153. For a recent study of the section of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* see Yildirim, Abdullah, *Vaz’ Ilmi ve Unkûdu’z-zevâhir (Ali Kuşçu)*, M.A. Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2007. This work elicited one commentary, authored by Mawlānā ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, who is ‘Abd al-Raḥīm b. Yūsuf al-Muntashawī (d. 1252/1836), known as Muftī-zādeh al-Mudarris, main teacher of the *madrassa* al-Fātiḥ, and also author of a treatise on Sufism entitled *Şinf al-Sayr wa-l-Sulūk* (cf. al-Baghdādī, Ismā‘īl Bāshā, *Hadiyya al-‘Ārifin*, Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basımevi, 1951-55, vol. 1, p. 565). The work is dedicated to the Ottoman Sultan Selim III (1761-1808), and therefore must have been composed before the death of the Ottoman Sultan. It should be noted that this is not a full commentary but covers only the *First knot* (*al-‘aqd al-awwal*) where *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is discussed. In his introduction, al-Muntashawī also provides relevant information regarding the status of *‘Unqūd al-Zawāhir* in his time. Despite the richness and the usefulness of its content, al-Muntashawī says that no one has yet attempted to compose a commentary on it – although, as already mentioned, his commentary covers only the first part of the work – and, more importantly, that only few, defective copies were available during his lifetime. For this reason, he felt the urge not only to compose a commentary but also to correct al-Qūshjī’s text. Finally, to do so, al-Muntashawī tells that he first corrected a copy (*ṣaḥḥaḥtu nuskhatan*) of *‘Unqūd al-Zawāhir* and only after he gathered together his own explanations to the difficult and obscure passages of the work did he then pen down his commentary, in order to achieve a clear and concise exegesis from which his students could profit; cf. al-Muntashawī, *Sharḥ ‘Unqūd al-Zawāhir*, Istanbul: s.d. (18--?), pp. 2-3.

of *al-waḍʿ* in the section entitled *Science of the Primary Matter of Language* (“*ilm matn al-lugha*”). Chapter One’s discussion highlighted how the conflation of the theory of *al-waḍʿ* within the larger classification of linguistic sciences was adopted by later Ottoman scholars such as Mullā Luṭfī and Sājaqlizādeh. As such, the *ʿUnqūd* might represent the first original attempt to reframe the theory of *waḍʿ* within the larger tradition of Arabic linguistic sciences and, more importantly, outside its own exegetical tradition.

The discussion of *al-waḍʿ* in the *ʿUnqūd* as covered in Chapter One clearly diverges from the content and structure of his commentary on the *Risāla*.²⁰⁸ Al-Qūshjī structures the whole section on the theory of *waḍʿ* into three main sub-sections where he presents three main pairs or classifications (*taqṣīm*) that correspond to different modes of *waḍʿ*, respectively the *waḍʿ shakhṣī* and *nawʿī*, the *waḍʿ ʿāmm* and *khāṣṣ*, and finally the *waḍʿ qaṣdī* and *ghayr qaṣdī*. In the first classification, al-Qūshjī explains that the individual positing (*waḍʿ shakhṣī*) occurs when the positor imagines (*yatakhayyalu*)²⁰⁹ a specific term while he conceives a determined, universal, or particular concept. This class includes proper names like *Zayd*, generic nouns like “*man*,” verbs like “*to hit*” and personal pronouns (*muḍmarāt*). The species positing (*waḍʿ nawʿī*) occurs when

²⁰⁸ The work is divided into three main parts, the first, as already said, on “*ilm matn al-lugha*,” the second on the science of derivation (*al-ishtiqāq*) and the third on morphology (*al-ṣarf*). The first section displays original features because, aside from the discussion of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, it contains sections “*On demonstrating the need of a linguistic positor*” (*ithbāt al-ḥāja ilā l-wāḍiʿ*), where the dichotomy *tawqīf* vs *iṣṭilāḥ* regarding the origins of language is discussed, “*On explaining the way in which language is established*,” which discusses the evaluation of the transmission of linguistic data; “*On the division of the posited [term]*,” which discusses the different classifications and typologies of terms such as singular and plural, equivocal and synonym, noun and adjective etc.; and finally “*On the division of the object of positing [i.e. the concept]*.” The content and structure of these sections is not peculiar to the Arabic grammatical treatises, but rather echo the those of the linguistic prolegomena of the *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature systematized by al-Rāzī in his *al-Maḥṣūl*. Thus, rather than being a mere compilation on linguistic topics, the *ʿUnqūd al-Zawāhir* strives to offer a distinctly original approach on the analysis of the foundations of language, in which one recognizes a logical progression from the semantics of simple terms and their features (*ʿilm matn al-lugha*), through the theory of root derivation (*al-ishtiqāq*) to, finally, the morphological features of each class of linguistic terms.

²⁰⁹ It is relevant to notice this shift in terminology and the usage of the verb “*takhayyala*” in the process of *waḍʿ* rather than the more common “*taʿaqqala*,” “*lāḥaza*” or “*taṣawwara*.”

the positor establishes a universal rule (*ḥukm kullī*) stating that every term that has a characteristic X would signify *per se* a concept Y, e.g., a triliteral noun that is changed into the pattern “*fu‘ayl*” will convey the concept of diminutive (*taṣghīr*). Moreover, the *waḍ‘ naw‘ī* includes all those terms that convey a concept by their linguistic form (*hay’a*), as is the case for plurals, derived nouns, verbs, and compounds.²¹⁰

The analysis of the *waḍ‘ ‘āmm* and *waḍ‘ khāṣṣ* deserves, in al-Qūshjī’s view, a premise that echoes in many aspects the aim and scope of the *Risāla*. According to the grammarians’ view personal, pronouns, demonstrative pronouns as well as nouns that signify a particular entity when the definite article (*lām al-‘ahd*) is added, are all posited for universal concepts.²¹¹ However, these terms have been posited with the aim of conveying specific instances of those universals. To resolve this apparent contradiction, grammarians held that at the moment of their positing, the positor established the following rule: these terms, despite being initially posited for universals, convey particular instances of their universals when used in a speech situation. On this account, grammarians resort to the notion of the figurative usage and assert that all these terms signify particulars figuratively (*majāzāt*) rather than literally (*bi-ṭarīq al-ḥaqīqa*). This is, in other words, the position held by Ibn al-Ḥājj and in some respect by al-Taftāzānī. Al-Qūshjī then adds that some verifiers (*ba‘ḍ al-muḥaqqiqīn*) – namely al-Ījī and those who adhere to his view – who disagreed with the previous view, offered a viable alternative solution (*wajh ḥasan*) to this conundrum.²¹² Al-Qūshjī explains this solution as follows: these terms are posited for each instance of their universal notions that are the ones grasped and contemplated by the positor in the act of linguistic positing. The positor who has grasped these universals also has a general

²¹⁰ Cf. al-Qūshjī, *‘Unqūd...*, p. 171-172 for more details on this first division of *waḍ‘*.

²¹¹ On the value of the definite article *lām al-‘ahd* see Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, vol. I, p. 269/C.

²¹² Al-Qūshjī does not name al-Ījī, al-Jurjānī or their followers by name, although it seems clear that this is the same views expressed in the *Risāla*. Al-Muntashawī confirms this in his commentary; see al-Muntashawī, *Sharḥ ‘Unqūd*, p. 54.

grasp of all their instances. In the process of positing these terms, these universals therefore function as a tool or a means to grasp the particulars they englobe. Al-Qūshjī concludes that these terms compare semantically to the homonyms (*al-mushtarak al-lafẓī*) as well as to common proper names, like Zayd or John, insofar as they are posited for and convey individual entities. With this premise al-Qūshjī lays out in fact the *status quaestionis* presented in the Risāla in order to distinguish between the well-known four classes of *waḍʿ* according to the two modes of *ʿāmm* and *khāṣṣ* that apply both to the act of positing (*al-waḍʿ*) and to its object (*al-mawḍūʿ lahu*).²¹³

The third and last pair is that of the *waḍʿ qaṣḍī* and *ghayr qaṣḍī*, which can be rendered as *intentional* and *unintentional positing*.²¹⁴ The intentional positing is not discussed in any detail, but it appears to be an umbrella class that includes the two previous pairs, insofar as the positor intentionally assigns a linguistic term or class of terms to a concept. Conversely, the

²¹³ Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 172-175. In this premise, al-Qūshjī discusses further details that follow from the solution offered, especially with regard to the issue of determination (*taʿyīn*) of terms to which this new solution applies, such as particles, demonstratives, personals pronouns, as well as nouns made definite by *lām al-ʿahd*.

²¹⁴ Al-Qūshjī claims that this novel classification of *waḍʿ* is presented by “our skillful master” (*shaykhunā al-naḥrīr*) who, according to al-Muntashawī, is to be identified with al-Taftāzānī, but he does not indicate the locus of al-Taftāzānī’s new classification. Upon investigation, I could not find any reference to this division of *waḍʿ* in al-Taftāzānī’s major works, such as *al-Muṭawwal*, *Mukhtaṣar al-Maʿānī*, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, his commentary on *al-ʿAqida al-Nasafiyya* or his commentary on Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa’s *al-Talwīḥ*. The *waḍʿ qaṣḍī* is briefly mentioned in his glosses on al-Ījī’s commentary on *Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā*, more precisely in reference to al-Ījī’s discussion of the different types of significations (*dalāla*). However, a comprehensive discussion of the pairs *qaṣḍī/ghayr qaṣḍī* cannot be found here; cf. al-Ījī, *Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā al-Uṣūlī*, vol. 1, p. 452. It seems that the disagreement over the soundness of the *waḍʿ ghayr qaṣḍī* that occurred between al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī emerged within the Quranic context, more precisely in the commentary tradition of al-Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf*. The text presented by al-Qūshjī here is a verbatim quote from al-Jurjānī’s glosses on *al-Kashshāf*; cf. al-Jurjānī, *Hāshiya ʿalā al-Kashshāf*, ed. Rashīd b. ʿUmar Aʿraḍī, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1437/2016, p. 231. The debate between the two scholars was recorded by later scholars who present the divergence over the *waḍʿ ghayr qaṣḍī* in other contexts, such as that of the *uṣūl al-fiqh* and grammar; see for example Shihāb al-Dīn al-ʿIbadī, *al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr ʿalā al-Waraqāt*, ed. Saʿīd ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and ʿAbd Allāh Rabīʿ, Cairo: Muʾassasa al-Qurṭuba, vol. 1, pp. 148-149; see also Muḥammad Ibn Walī al-Izmīrī, *Hāshiya ʿalā Mirʾāt al-Uṣūl*, Cairo: Dār al-Ṭibāʿa al-Bāhira, 1258/1842, vol. 1, p. 114; see also Ibn Amīr al-Ḥājj al-Ḥalabī, *al-Taqrīr wa-l-Taḥbīr*, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Maḥmūd Muḥammad ʿUmar, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999, vol 1, pp. 108, in which al-Ḥalabī confirms that al-Taftāzānī presents this classification of *waḍʿ* in his glosses on *al-Kashshāf*; see also Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār, *Hāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ al-Azhariyya fī l-Naḥw*, ed. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Khidīwiyya, 1284/1867, p. 42.

unintentional positing indicates that every term posited for a concept signifies either a noun, verb or preposition in itself. For example, in the phrase “*Zayd departed from Basra*,” *Zayd* is posited as a noun, “*departed*” is posited as a past tense verb, and “*from*” is posited as a preposition. In this way the three elements of the phrase become subject to predication (*maḥkūm ‘alayhi*), such that nominality is predicated of *Zayd*, verbality of “*kharaja*”, and prepositionality of “*from*”.²¹⁵

This brief overview of the *waḍʿ* section of the *ʿUnqūd* suggests that there is a marked difference between this and the content of al-Qūshjī’s commentary on the *Risāla*. The discussion of the whole theory of *waḍʿ* in his second and later work presents the three main pairs of *waḍʿ* and their main characteristics. Of the three pairs only one, the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, parallels with the content of his commentary on the *Risāla*, while the *nawʿī-shakhṣī* and the novel *qaṣḍī-ghayr qaṣḍī* are never evoked in his commentary. The *ʿUnqūd* does not contain any mention to the commentary on the *Risāla*, apart from a loose reference to al-Ījī’s novel class of *waḍʿ ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* that solves the issue of the semantics of prepositions and pronouns. More importantly, the relevant issues discussed at length in the commentary such as the third-person pronouns like, the relative pronouns and the two-folded semantic nature of verbs are never mentioned in the *ʿUnqūd*. These discrepancies between the two presentations of the theory of *waḍʿ* may raise doubts about authorship of either the commentary or the *ʿUnqūd* or may inform about al-Qūshjī’s different approach to the theory of *waḍʿ* in two different works.

²¹⁵ Cf. al-Qūshjī, *ʿUnqūd...*, pp. 176-179. It is important to note that al-Qūshjī presents the opposite view held by al-Jurjānī, according to whom the *waḍʿ ghayr qaṣḍī*, or the whole classification *qaṣḍī/ghayr qaṣḍī*, should be rejected. In al-Jurjānī’s view, terms signifying themselves, e.g., “*kharaja*” is a verb or *Zayd* is a noun, are not based on any instance of *waḍʿ* because this type of signification, i.e. a term that signify its own class, also applies to terms deprived of meaning (*al-muḥmalāt*). Thus, there would not be any difference between terms posited for a concept like “*kharaja*” and those deprived of concepts like “*jasaqa*” because both are posited by an instance of *waḍʿ ghayr qaṣḍī*. Moreover, al-Jurjānī rejects al-Taftāzānī’s view about the predicability of terms, e.g., “*Zayd* is a noun” or “*min* is a preposition,” as a feature of the *waḍʿ ghayr qaṣḍī* because in his view terms deprived of meaning might also be predicated, e.g. “*jasaqa* is a meaningless term” or “*Dayz* is a metathesis of *Zayd*.”

If al-Qūshjī's commentary does not stand out for its originality, it should nonetheless be credited for the dissemination of debates around the theory of *al-waḍʿ* from Central Asian scholarly networks to Ottoman scholarly circles. More importantly, later scholars who engaged with the *matn* found in al-Qūshjī's commentary a roomier exegetical space in which they could voice their views and debates, that the denser commentaries, such Khwāja ʿAlī's, could not offer.

4.2 The Exegetical Tradition of the Glossators on al-Qūshjī's Commentary

The commentary of al-Qūshjī had a decisive impact on the reception and subsequent flourishing of the exegetical tradition on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in the scholarly circles of the Ottoman Empire, specifically its Egyptian regions. The emergence of glosses and superglosses on al-Qūshjī's commentary extends roughly from the mid 16th to the 19th centuries and includes approximately twenty sets of glosses, some of which have become influential in the systematization of the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* tradition, specifically in the *madrassa* curricula. The following is a list of the glossators on al-Qūshjī's commentary:

1. Abū al-Baqāʾ Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Khalaf al-Miṣrī al-Aḥmadī (d. after 909/1503).²¹⁶
2. Aḥmad al-Yakshahrī (al-Yenishehrī?).²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Ms. in Berlin: Staatsbibliothek 5312; Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 882/5, and 883/2; Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 42, and 186 *majāmiʿ*; Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 14687 (49), and 45551 Bakhīt (115); al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 12; Beirut: American University of Beirut 812, fol. 20b-27a; Medina: Maktabat ʿArif Ḥikmat 80 (140)/2, fol. 19a-27a; for copies in Princeton Yahuda see Rudolph Mach, *Catalogue...*, p. 294, n. 3425. Mach is right in claiming that these glosses are not authored by Abū al-Baqāʾ b. ʿAbd al-Bāqī, who instead has glosses on the other commentary authored by Abū al-Qāsim al-Laythī al-Samarqandī; but he suggests that the author may be Abū al-Baqāʾ Ayyūb b. Mūsā al-Kaffawī (the author of the famous thesaurus *al-Kulliyāt*) without providing any textual reference for this attribution.

²¹⁷ Ms. in Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 216 *majāmiʿ*.

3. Yūsuf b. Muḥammad al-Ṣaghrā'ī (or al-Ṣaghrānī, or al-Ṣahrānī) al-Aṣamm al-Kurdī (d. 1003/1595).
4. Mullā Nūr al-Dīn 'Alī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī al-Harawī (d. 1014/1605).²¹⁸
5. Muṣṭafā Ṣafawī al-Qal'āwī (completed in 1119/1707).
6. Abū Bakr b. Siwār al-Kurdī Shanāmī (d. probably after 1107/1695).²¹⁹
7. Mullā Ilyās b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥaydar al-Ṣafawī al-Kūrānī (d. 1138/1726).²²⁰
8. Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad 'Ajlūnī (d. 1161/1748).²²¹
9. Ismā'īl b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥaydar al-Ḥusaynābādī al-Kurdī (d. after 1157/1743-44).²²²
10. Muḥammad b. Sālīm b. Aḥmad al-Ḥifnī or al-Ḥifnāwī (d. 1181/1767).²²³
 - i. Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-'Idwī al-Ḥamzāwī al-Azharī (1221/1806-1303/1886),
entitled *Taqrīrāt Rā'iqa wa-Taḥqīqāt Fā'iqa*.²²⁴
11. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Qādir b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Zākūr (d. 1176/1762).²²⁵
12. Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Mukarram al-Ṣa'īdī al-'Idwī (1112/1700-1189/1775).²²⁶

²¹⁸ Ms. in Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 113; Abazāh 6498; Baghdād: Awqāf 916 *dāl*; Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 7, and 4 *mīm*; Princeton: Yahuda 321, fol. 249b-266a; and 5030, fol. 47b-57a (attributed to Sayyid 'Alī al-Kharrūbī); Beirut: American University of Beirut, 812, fol. 28-45.

²¹⁹ Ms. Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 853. The glosses are listed to be on al-Qūshjī's commentary on al-Ījī's *Ādāb al-Baḥth*, however from the brief incipit it is evident that the main topic of the glosses is *'ilm al-waḍ'*. Moreover, the author claims to have incorporated some glosses by 'Abd Allāh b. Ḥaydar al-Ḥusaynābādī who died in 1107/1695-6.

²²⁰ Ms. in Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 111 Bakhīt 45547; Baghdād: Awqāf 6916; Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 29, and 6; Princeton: Yahuda 1088, fol. 98b-106a.

²²¹ Ms. Harvard Arabic Collection 218.

²²² Ms. in Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 890; Baghdād: al-Awqāf al-'Āmma 13202 *majāmi'*, and 4326. *Mawṣil*: al-Awqāf al-'Āmma (al-Madrasa al-Muḥammadiyya) 20/33 *majmū'*. Istanbul: Halet Efendi 507, fol. 64b-81b.

²²³ Printed: Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-Azhariyya, 1332/1914. Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-Khayriyya, 1322/1904 (with by 1) al-Samarqandī's commentary and 2) al-Dasūqī's glosses).

²²⁴ Printed: Cairo: no publisher, 1298/1881.

²²⁵ Ms. in KSA: Maktabat Mālik Fayṣal n. 1449-1.

²²⁶ Ms. in Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 32271-83, fol. 61a-105b; Library of Congress, Mansuri Collection, shelf n. 5-316.

13. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Munʿim b. Yūsuf b. Şiyām al-Damanhūrī (1101/1689-1192/1778), entitled *al-Daqāʿiq al-Almaʿiyya*.²²⁷
14. Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Mawṣilī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1200/1786).²²⁸
15. Muḥammad b. Muṣṭafā b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Şafawī al-Qalʿawī (d. 1230/1815), entitled *al-Jawāhir al-Şafawiyya*.²²⁹
16. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. ʿArafa al-Dasūqī al-Mālikī (d. 1230/1815).²³⁰
17. al-Sayyid Ḥāfiẓ Efendī al-Sīrōzī (d. 1269/1852), entitled *al-Ḥāshiya al-Jadīda ʿalā al-Qūshī (sic)*.²³¹
18. Yūsuf b. ʿAlī al-Şalārī (?).²³²
19. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Mīqātī al-Ḥalabī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 1222/1807), entitled *al-Shadharāt al-ʿAsjadiyya*.
20. Nūr al-Dīn ʿAlī Efendī ʿAbd Allāh Bek Yūnus Efendī al-Mawṣilī min Āl Muḥḍir Bāshī (d. ca. 1250/1834).²³³

²²⁷ Ms. in Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 84 *majāmiʿ* 4508; and 437 *majāmiʿ* 1896. UAE: Juma Almajid Center for Culture and Heritage source n.7, material n. 244876.

²²⁸ Ms. in Baghdad: Awqāf 12214/1.

²²⁹ Ms. in Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya (10) 5343 (holograph); and (11) 5400; Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 31.

²³⁰ Printed: Cairo: no publisher, 1275/1858; and 1332/1914. Fez: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Mawlawiyya, 1327/1909 (with by 1) al-Samarqandī's commentary and 2) Ibn Sūda's glosses). Ed. Marʿī Ḥasan al-Rashīd, Mardin (Turkey): Dār Nūr al-Şabāḥ, 2012 (with the matn and al-Ḥifnāwī's glosses).

²³¹ Printed: Āsitānah, 1277/1860.

²³² Ms. in Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 878 [in the incipit the author indicates that these are glosses on Khwāja ʿAlī al-Samarqandī's commentary. The catalogue of al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya attributes the commentary to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, see *al-Āthār al-Khaṭṭiyya fī l-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya*, vol. 3, p. 213].

²³³ Ms. Mawṣil: al-Awqāf al-ʿĀmma (Collection Dāʾud al-Jalabī), n. 8/12.

21. Muḥammad b. Saʿīd b. Muḥammad Amīn b. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Mudarris Muftī Baghdād (d. 1273/1857), titled *al-Hadiya al-Saʿdiyya li-Dāris Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya*.²³⁴
22. Muṣṭafā al-Zawārī (or al-Zawāwī) al-ʿAṭṭār (d. ?).²³⁵
23. Muḥammad al-Mahdī b. Muḥammad al-Ṭālib ibn Sūda (1220-1294/1805-1877).²³⁶
24. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Shirbīnī (d. 1326/1908).²³⁷
25. Dhākir ʿAwda al-Ḥamādī al-Ḥanafī (b.?), entitled *al-Khamāʾil al-Nadiyya*.

This list testifies to the fact that there were also a number of scholars active between the second half of the 10th/16th and the first half of the 11th/17th century who produced glosses on al-Qūshjī's commentary, and sets up the basis for the consolidation of the later exegetical tradition exemplified by Azharī scholars like al-Ḥifnī and al-Dasūqī in Egypt.

One of the earliest glosses on al-Qūshjī's commentary is attributed to a certain Abū al-Baqāʾ, who might be Abū al-Baqāʾ Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Khalaf al-Miṣrī al-Aḥmadī (d. after 909/1503 or 1050/1640),²³⁸ not to be confused with Mīr Abū al-Baqāʾ b. ʿAbd al-Bāqī al-Ḥusaynī (d. after 925/1519), who composed a set of glosses on Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī's commentary. All that is known about Abū al-Baqāʾ al-Aḥmadī is that though he eventually

²³⁴ Ms. in Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 886.

²³⁵ Ms. Istanbul: Esad Efendi 3016.

²³⁶ Printed: Fez: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Mawlawiyya 1327/1909 (with by 1) al-Samarqandī's *sharḥ* and 2) Ibn Sūda's glosses). Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Khayriyya 1322/1904 (with by 1) al-Samarqandī's *sharḥ* and 2) al-Ḥifnī's glosses). ed. ʿUmar Aḥmad al-Rāwī. Beirut (Bayrūt): Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2010. (with 1) the matn and al-Samarqandī's *sharḥ*).

²³⁷ Ms. in Library of Congress, Mansuri Collection, shelf n. 5-312; shelf n. 5-313.

²³⁸ The identification of this Abū al-Baqāʾ is uncertain. According to Brockelman, Abū al-Baqāʾ's date of death is 1050/1640, cf. Brockelman, *GAL* II, p. 268, S. II, p. 288. In his catalogue of the *Yahuda Collection*, Mach claims, against Brockelman, that the author of these glosses is probably Abū al-Baqāʾ b. Mūsā al-Kaffawī (1094/1683), the author of the famous dictionary *al-Kulliyāt* based on the entry found in *Osmanli Müellifleri* which lists a set of glosses on the *Risāla* among his works, cf. Mach, *Catalogue...*, p. 294. Unfortunately, *Osmanli Müellifleri* does not indicate the source of this information and therefore cannot be confirmed.

resided in Medina, he was probably born in today's Egypt and was a Shāfi'ī jurist and proficient in poetry, prosody, as well as *kalām* and philosophy.²³⁹ Abū al-Baqā'ʿs glosses are rather short, covering almost ten folios and focusing mainly on al-Qūshjī's commentary on the *Introduction* and the *Classification* of the *matn*, with only a few sparse glosses on the *Conclusion*.²⁴⁰ In this set of glosses Abū al-Baqā' is interested mainly in expanding and unpacking those passages of the commentary where al-Qūshjī discusses terms such as demonstrative pronouns and prepositions, namely those terms that al-Ījī classifies under the *waḍʿ ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*.

To the same period belong the glosses of al-Mullā ʿAlī al-Qārī al-Harawī, who is Nūr al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (930/1523-1014/1606). Al-Qārī al-Harawī was a Ḥanafī jurist, *ḥadīth* scholar and Quranic commentator who was well-versed in the rational sciences and composed most of his works in Mecca after relocating from his birthplace of Herat.²⁴¹ Al-Qārī al-Harawī's glosses are more extensive than Abū al-Baqā'ʿs and touch on virtually the entire *matn*, while unpacking and often criticizing al-Qūshjī's principal views presented in the commentary. More importantly, al-Qārī al-Harawī's remarks and pointers on al-Qūshjī's commentary often display a comparative approach, in the sense that that he makes extensive usage al-Jurjānī's glosses, al-Shirwānī's commentary, called "*al-Saʿīd bi-luṭf al-ḥaqq*,"

²³⁹ Among the works of Abū al-Baqā' al-Aḥmadī there is a commentary on *al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ* by al-Bukhārī entitled *al-Bārīʿ al-Faṣīḥ* started in 909/1503, a work on grammar entitled *Bahja al-Qawāʿid fī Naẓm Qawāʿid al-Iʿrāb li-Ibn Mālik*, a work on theology entitled *al-Muʿtaqad al-ʾImānī ʿalā ʿaqida al-Imām al-Shaybānī*, see Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām*..., vol. 6, p. 289; there are also two works on philosophy attributed to him, namely a treatise on physics entitled *Ṭaḥṣīl al-Gharāḍ fī Ḥaṣr Aqṣām al-Jawhar wa-l-ʿAraḍ* (Damascus: Dār al-Kutub al-Ṣāḥirīyya n. 1342) and a commentary on the *takhmīs* (poetic verse amplification) on Avicenna's *al-Qaṣida al-ʿAynīyya* by a certain Manṣūr al-Miṣrī, cf. Ḥājjī Khalīfa, *Kashf*..., vol. 2, 1347 (two copies of this work are Damascus: Dār al-Kutub al-Ṣāḥirīyya n. 10342, n. 5433, and University of Maryland, Bethesda, A2).

²⁴⁰ Cf. Ms. American University of Beirut n. 812, fol. 20b-27a. Al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn n. 13/2, fol. 1b-11b.

²⁴¹ For a general biography see Ziriklī, *Aʿlām*..., vol. 5, pp. 12-13; al-Qārī al-Harawī, *Minaḥ al-Rawḍ al-Azhar fī Sharḥ al-Fiqh al-Akbar*, ed. Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya, 1419/1998, pp. 15-19. Unfortunately, the glosses on al-Qūshjī's commentary do not appear in the lists of al-Qārī al-Harawī's works.

and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, called “*al-Mu‘taṣim bi-luṭf al-ḥaqq*.”²⁴² Compared to the later sets, these early glosses do not seem to have been composed independently from the commentary itself because, as the manuscript copies show, they have neither an introductory statement nor a prologue and begin with the *lemma* of al-Qūshjī’s commentary. This may indicate that originally, early sets of glosses were copied and read with the commentary itself and only at a later stage were transmitted as independent works. It is however later during the second half of the 11th/17th century that longer sets of glosses supplied with an introduction to elucidate the reasons for their composition start to emerge.

This is the case for the Damascene *ḥadīth* scholar al-‘Ajlūnī (in full, Ismā‘īl b. Muḥammad Jarrāḥ b. ‘Abd al-Hādī b. ‘Abd al-Ghanī b. Jarrāḥ Abū al-Fidā’ al-‘Ajlūnī [1087/1676-1162/1749]),²⁴³ who probably studied *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* with his teacher, the Damascene sufi and Shāfi‘ī scholar Mullá Īliyās al-Kūrānī al-Kurdī (1047/1638-1138/1726), who himself composed a short set of glosses also on al-Qūshjī’s commentary.²⁴⁴ In the introduction of his glosses, entitled *al-Ḥawāshī al-*

²⁴² Witness copies of al-Qārī al-Harawī’s glosses are al-Azhar n. 42649, al-Azhar n. 16137, foll. 57b-85a; the copy contained in American University of Beirut n. 812, fol. 27b-44a attributes this glosses to al-Sayyid ‘Alī al-Kharrūbī, who is probably the Algerian sufi and Maliki jurist Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Kharrūbī al-Ṭarābulī al-Sfāqsi (d. 963/1556). On his life and works see al-Kharrūbī, *Muzīl al-Labs*, ed. Jum‘a Muṣṭafā al-Faytūrī, Beirut: Dār al-Madār al-Islāmī, 1423/2002, pp. 27-34; unfortunately, the glosses on al-Qūshjī are not mentioned in the list of his works. If the attribution to al-Kharrūbī is correct, then this set of glosses must have been a minor work that did not enjoy much circulation.

²⁴³ On the life and work of al-‘Ajlūnī see al-Murādī, *Silk al-Durar*, Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-Mīriyya al-‘Āmira, 1301/1883, vol. 1, p. 159; also al-‘Ajlūnī, *Hilya Ahl al-Faḍl wa-l-Kamāl*, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Ḥusayn, Amman: Dār al-Faṭḥ, 1430/2009, pp. 7-18. Unfortunately, the glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary do not appear in the list of his works.

²⁴⁴ On Ilyās al-Kūrānī see al-Murādī, *Silk al-Durar*, vol. 1, pp. 282-283; and Ziriklī, *A‘lām...*, vol. 2, p. 8. Both biographical sources claim that al-Kūrānī’s glosses were composed on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, however I could not locate a copy of these glosses. There is a copy of a set of glosses attributed to a certain Mullá Ilyās al-Īrānī in American University of Beirut n. 812, foll. 13a-19a. Unfortunately, I could not locate any scholars with this name; it is plausible that the *nisba* “*al-Īrānī*” is a corruption of “*al-Kūrānī*”, or it is just a broader geographical denomination that includes Iranian Kurdistan. However, the Azharī glossator al-Ḥifnī (see below) refers to a certain Mullá Ilyās al-Kurdī, in all likelihood al-Kurānī, as well as to a certain *al-fāḍil al-Īrānī*, which might indicate that they are two distinct glossators.

‘*Asjadiyya*, al-‘Ajlūnī is probably among those few scholars who rightly attributes the commentary to al-Qūshjī and offers a brief biographical note on al-Qūshjī’s life and works.²⁴⁵ Before plunging into the denser sections of al-Qūshjī’s commentary on the theory of *al-waḍ‘*, al-‘Ajlūnī offers a detailed exposition of the introduction with a marked lexicographical approach. He offers grammatical and lexicographical analyses of terms employed by al-Qūshjī, often citing previous authorities such as al-Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf* and al-Jawharī’s *al-Ṣiḥāḥ* at great length.²⁴⁶ Similarly, most of al-‘Ajlūnī’s glosses on the beginning of the commentary are devoted to expanding the lexicographical analysis of the term “*fā’ida*” and “*lafẓ*” following al-Qūshjī’s commentary, and discuss the division of the term and concept into universal and individual (*kullī* and *shakhṣī*) only later.²⁴⁷ Most of al-‘Ajlūnī’s glosses cover the commentary on the *Introduction* in which he presents the classes of *waḍ‘* and makes room to contextualize the debates over the analysis of prepositions and pronouns that fall under al-Ījī’s new class of *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* as a response to the adherents of the opposite view, such as al-Taftāzānī who sees these terms as conveying universals.²⁴⁸ The glosses on the *Classification* are mainly devoted to analyzing the division of linguistic terms and concepts into universals and individuals as al-Ījī established it in the *Risāla*, and the subsequent division into generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, derived nouns, verbs, particles and prepositions. Here al-‘Ajlūnī is particularly interested in unpacking al-Qūshjī’s counterarguments to the critiques of the divisions of terms.²⁴⁹ The glosses end abruptly with the first half of the *Classification* and, in the only witness copy accessed, do not provide an explicit or closing statement by the author, which might indicate either that al-‘Ajlūnī did not complete

²⁴⁵ Al-‘Ajlūnī, *Ḥawāshī* (sic!) ‘*alā Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya al-‘Aḍudiyya*, Harvard University, Houghton Library Ms. Arab 218, fol. 88a-119b.

²⁴⁶ Cf. al-‘Ajlūnī, *Ḥawāshī*, fol. 88b-93b.

²⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, fol. 93b-102b.

²⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, fol. 103a-111a.

²⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, fol. 111a-119a

his glosses or that it is an incomplete manuscript copy. Overall, al-‘Ajlūnī’s set of glosses displays an effort to provide the reader with fully articulated lexicographical – and partially articulated theoretical – expositions of al-Qūshjī’s own explanations of the *matn*, and it seeks to expand his digressions by drawing from a vast pool of previous commentators such as al-Jurjānī, Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn and al-Bukhārī. Although al-‘Ajlūnī’s glosses are incomplete, they witness how the growing scholastic activity on al-Qūshjī’s commentary had already crossed the borders of Ottoman scholarly circles and began to be established in Levantine milieus.²⁵⁰

Two sets of glosses, one authored by Ismā‘īl al-Ḥusaynābādī, the other authored by Aḥmad al-Damanhūrī, were also produced in the same period. The first glossator is Ibrāhīm b. Ismā‘īl b. Ḥaydar al-Ḥusaynābādī al-Kurdī (d. after 1157/1743-44), one of most representative figures of the circle of Kurdish scholars who were active at the borders of the Ottoman and Safavid empires, mainly in the towns of Māwrān and Ḥarīr near Erbil and later to Baghdad, which profoundly shaped the Ottoman transmission and efflorescence of the rational sciences. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥusaynābādī was a member of the family of Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar al-Ḥarīrī, or Aḥmad Ḥaydarānī (d. 1080/1670) who established himself as the most prominent intellectual in the scholarly circles revolving around the city of Erbil, and, with his son Ḥaydar, initiated a scholarly family tradition that attracted students from outside Iraq. The scholarly fame of the family reached its peak with Ḥaydar’s three sons, namely Aḥmad, ‘Abd Allāh and Ibrāhīm, who

²⁵⁰ Al-‘Ajlūnī refers in many instances to a certain al-Aṣamm, who may be Yūsuf b. Muḥammad al-Ṣaḡhrā‘ī. Unfortunately, I could not locate any extant copies of this commentary. Moreover, al-‘Ajlūnī refers to other unnamed commentators by “*ba‘ḍ al-afādil*,” who may be either Khwāja ‘Alī or al-Shirwānī.

produced glosses and superglosses on the main scholastic works on philosophy, *kalām*, *ādāb al-baḥth*, grammar, rhetoric, and *‘ilm al-waḍ’*.²⁵¹

It is in all likelihood in this family scholarly environment that Ismā‘īl, son of Ibrāhīm, composed his glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary and, in doing so, diverged from most Ḥusaynābādī scholars who privileged ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary in their intellectual endeavor, as will be seen in the following section. Unlike previous sets of glosses, Ismā‘īl’s set includes an introduction that provides relevant information about its composition, where he also correctly attributes the commentary to al-Qūshjī and remarks on its value.²⁵² He further states that the commentary had wide circulation among critically minded scholars (*al-muḥaṣṣilīn*) and great relevance in the eyes of students (*al-muta‘allimīn*) despite the lack of an exhaustive exegetical apparatus to help clarify al-Qūshjī’s “lofty points and intents.” Ismā‘īl indicates that this inspired him to compose his glosses as a useful aide-mémoire (*tadhkira*) for his colleagues, and at the same time as a pedagogical guide (*tabṣira*) for students, in particular for his son Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ.

Ismā‘īl begins his glosses by offering a detailed and precise analysis of key passages of al-Qūshjī’s introduction before going on to discuss the introductory lemma of the *matn* (“*hādhihi fā’ida tashtamilu ‘alā [...]*”). He then goes on to unpack and evaluate the sense of the lemma “*hādhihi fā’ida*” as well as al-Qūshjī’s discussion of the division of the *matn*. The glosses on the commentary on the *Introduction* focus mainly on how the notions of generality and universality, and individuation and particularity apply to terms and concepts, as well as on how semantic

²⁵¹ For a detailed study on the Ḥusaynābādīs’ scholarly tradition see Florian Schwartz, “Writing in the Margins of Empires: the Ḥusaynābādī Family of Scholiasts in the Ottoman-Safawid Borderlands,” in *Buchkultur im Nahen Osten des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, eds. T. Heinzelmänn, and H Sievert, Bern: Peter Lang, 2010, 151-198.

²⁵² I could locate two witness copies of Ismā‘īl’s glosses on al-Qūshjī, namely Maktabat Jāmi‘at Ṣalāh al-Dīn 126/1, and Suleymaniye, Halet Efendi 507, fol. 64b-81b.

determination (*taʿyīn*) occurs to concepts and the ensuing four classes of *waḍʿ*.²⁵³ Ismāʿīl's glosses give more room to discussing al-Qūshjī's analysis of the validity of al-Ījī's division of terms into generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, verbs and derived nouns, a division that results from applying universality and individuation to the act of *waḍʿ* and to the concept as part of the process of word formation. The remaining glosses focus more on expanding key passages of al-Qūshjī's commentary that discuss the difference between proper and generic nouns as well as the semantics of personal pronouns.²⁵⁴ Finally, in the glosses on the *Conclusion*, Ismāʿīl offers more precise and detailed clarification of the most relevant points presented by al-Qūshjī in all the twelve reminders by unpacking arguments and their counters as brought up by the former.²⁵⁵

The glosses authored by Aḥmad al-Damanhūrī belong to another scholarly tradition, namely that of the Azharī scholars who will be seen to have established one of the richest exegetical traditions on al-Qūshjī's commentary. According to the bio-biographical data collected to establish the earlier list, the Azharī scholiastic tradition on the *Risāla* and its commentaries started to emerge in the second half of the 11th/17th century. One of the earliest glossators on al-Qūshjī's commentary is al-Ḥifnī, or al-Ḥifnāwī, followed by Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Mukarram al-Ṣaʿīdī al-ʿIdwī (1112/1700-1189/1775), the teacher of the other famous glossator al-Dasūqī. However, it seems that the Azharī scholars' interest in the exegetical tradition emerged a few decades before al-Ḥifnī's death, according to a commentary on al-Ījī's *matn* authored by ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Shubrāwī (1091/1681-1171/1758).²⁵⁶

²⁵³ Cf. Ismāʿīl al-Ḥusaynābādī, *Ḥāshiya*, Maktabat Jāmiʿat Ṣalāh al-Dīn 126/1, fol. 1b-16b.

²⁵⁴ *Ibidem* fol. 16b-25b.

²⁵⁵ *Ibidem* fol. 25b-35a.

²⁵⁶ There are at least two witness copies of this commentary, namely al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya n. 86 Ḥalīm 34280 (*non vidi*), and Library of Congress, Mansuri Collection shelf n. 5-290, fol. 1b-7a (*non vidi*).

Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Mun‘im b. Yūsuf al-Damānḥūrī (1101/1689-1192/1778) was one of the most eminent members of al-Azhar’s scholarly elites, whose theological doctrines were deeply influenced by the North African Ash‘arī tradition as embodied by the work of al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490) and his commentators.²⁵⁷ In the introduction of his glosses entitled *al-Daqā’iq al-Alma‘iyya*, al-Damānḥūrī refers to its author as al-Samarqandī but does not specify whether this is Abū al-Qāsim or al-Qūshjī. He then clarifies the circumstances of the composition of the glosses when he explains that upon reading the commentary, he recorded several explanations selected from those of expert scholars for fear that these could be lost, as well as to help students understand the commentary.²⁵⁸ The glosses cover virtually the entire commentary and allow for a more theoretical discussion rather than the lexicographical analysis advanced by previous glossators. Throughout the glosses al-Damānḥūrī confirms the original plan announced in the introduction. The glosses, more than Ajlūnī’s, often collect and report explanations from other works. Al-Damānḥūrī claims in fact to have also drawn on a vast array of sources including al-Jurjānī’s glosses, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s and al-Bukhārī’s commentaries and those of other unnamed glossators (*arbāb al-ḥawāshī*). In one instance he refers to the commentary of a certain al-Laythī, who is certainly Abū al-Qāsim al-Laythī al-Samarqandī. This reference might indicate that, at least in al-Damānḥūrī’s time, the misattribution of al-Qūshjī’s commentary to Abū al-Qāsim either had not yet occurred or was not well established. Of all these commentators and glossators, al-Damānḥūrī’s main source is a certain al-Harawī, likely the commentator Muẓaffar al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Yazdī al-Harawī, who is often cited to evaluate and further explain the

²⁵⁷ On the life and work of al-Damānḥūrī see Ahmed Ragab, *Medicine and Religion in the Life of an Ottoman Sheikh: al-Damānḥūrī’s ‘Clear Statement’ on Anatomy*, New York: Routledge, 2019; El-Rouayheb, Khaled, “al-Damānḥūrī, Aḥmad,” EI3, edited by Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson. Consulted online on 27 July 2020 http://dx.doi.org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_25838.

²⁵⁸ Cf. al-Damānḥūrī, *al-Daqā’iq al-Alma‘iyya ‘alā Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*, Juma Almajid Center for Culture and Heritage source n.7, material n. 244876, fol. 1b.

most crucial and problematic aspects of the classes of *waḍʿ* and their analysis in al-Qūshjī's commentary.

Al-Damanhūrī's glosses may witness the growing interest in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and, more importantly, the circulation of major commentaries and sets of glosses among the Azharīs. Despite his efforts, al-Damanhūrī's glosses did not set a standard in the scholastic tradition in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* for the Azharī scholars as they were not widely received. Instead, the two sets of glosses authored respectively by al-Ḥifnī and al-Dasūqī came to be the standard text in the mature stage of the exegetical literature on the Risāla between the 12th/18th and the 13th/19th centuries and, as such, represent al-Azhar's classics in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*.

The Shāfiʿī Azharī Muḥammad b. Sālīm b. Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn al-Ḥifnī or al-Ḥifnāwī (1101/1690-1181/1767) is one of this tradition's most prominent figures, a student of ʿAbd Allāh al-Shubrāwī, with whom he likely studied *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, and one who displayed a proficiency in both the traditional and rational disciplines.²⁵⁹ In the introduction to his glosses, al-Ḥifnī offers what is likely the first articulation of the commentary's incorrect attribution to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī. He then follows other glossators by explaining that he decided to write the work as a result of students' difficulties with the density of the commentary, and he also states his intent to draw on other works in the tradition.²⁶⁰ Faithful to his intention, al-Ḥifnī's glosses provide a meticulous *lexis* and lexicographical explanation, with some digressions into theological topics, of virtually every segment of al-Qūshjī's commentary. This attention to detail

²⁵⁹ For a full biography of al-Ḥifnī see Ziriklī, *Aʿlām...*, vol. 6, pp. 134-135; Ashraf Fawzī Ṣāliḥ, *Shuyūkh al-Azhar*, Cairo: al-Sharika al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1997.

²⁶⁰ Cf. al-Ḥifnī, *Ḥāshiya al-Ḥifnāwī ʿalā al-Waḍʿiyya*, ed. by Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Rashīd, Istanbul: Dār Nūr al-Ṣabāḥ, 2012 (which contains also al-Qūshjī's commentary and al-Dasūqī's glosses), p. 15.

is evident when he expands on al-Qūshjī's views using the classical dialectical protocol "*fa-in qulta*" or "*fa-in qīla*" followed by counterpoints and rebuttals introduced by "*ujiba*", "*qultu*" or "*ḥāṣil al-jawāb*," in keeping with the commentary's original dialectical framework. Al-Ḥifnī clearly relies on and engages with previous glossators in the exegetical tradition of the Risala outside of Azharī scholarly milieus, such as Yūsuf al-Aṣamm al-Kurdī, al-Qārī al-Harawī, Abū al-Baqā', Mullá Ilyās al-Kurdī, a self-commentary on one of the earliest versifications (*naẓm*) of the *matn* authored by Muḥammad al-Buhūtī al-Khalwatī (d. 1088/1677), as well as the aforementioned Mullá Iliyās al-Īrānī, or al-Kūrānī, and an unnamed *al-muḥashshī*. Three classic commentaries emerged as the main inspiration for al-Ḥifnī, namely those of al-Bukhārī,²⁶¹ al-Harawī and, for the most part, 'Iṣām al-Dīn, in his expansion upon the *thêoria* of the more intricate and problematic aspects of both al-Ījī's *Classification* and specific *Reminders* of the *Conclusion* and al-Qūshjī's commentary on them. Finally, al-Ḥifnī's glosses are also relevant to historicizing the aforementioned misattribution of this commentary to al-Samarqandī. On at least two occasions al-Ḥifnī refers to what the commentator, whom al-Ḥifnī refers to as al-Samarqandī, claimed in "*his large commentary*" (*sharḥuhu al-kabīr*).²⁶² This means that, at least by the 12th/18th century, when al-Ḥifnī was writing, scholars of his circle composed glosses on this commentary on the basis of the mistaken assumption that al-Samarqandī had composed a shorter and a larger commentary, unlike the immediately preceding scholars such as al-ʿAjlūnī and al-Damanhūrī, for whom the two commentaries were authored respectively by al-Qūshjī and al-Samarqandī. It is therefore plausible that this misattribution emerged during the lifetime of Kātip Čelebī in the 11th/17th century and became widespread, at least among Azharī scholarly circles, from the second half of the 12th/18th century onward.

²⁶¹ In the printed editions of the glosses the name appears as "al-Najjārī," but this is very likely a misprint for al-Bukhārī, because no commentators can be found under this name.

²⁶² Cf. al-Ḥifnī, *Ḥāshiya*..., p. 72 and p. 104.

The set of glosses authored by the other Azharī scholar Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. ‘Arafa al-Dasūqī al-Mālīkī (d. 1230/1815) is, together with al-Ḥifnī’s, one of the earliest and most widespread of the *‘ilm al-waḍ’* tradition in print within the *madrasa* curricula.²⁶³ Al-Dasūqī’s intellectual formation occurred almost exclusively within Azharī intellectual circles and, consequently, his place in the exegetical tradition on the Risāla emerges in this specific scholarly context.²⁶⁴ In fact, the composition of his glosses likely resulted from his study of the commentary with one of his teachers, the aforementioned glossator ‘Alī b. Aḥmad b. Mukarram al-Ṣa‘īdī al-‘Idwī, who himself composed a set of glosses on the same commentary.²⁶⁵ Al-Dasūqī admits the influence of his teacher’s commentary and teaching in the introduction where he claims that “*these are explicative notes (taqyīdāt) [...] that I extracted from the account of our master Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Aḥmad al-Ṣa‘īdī al-‘Idwī.*”²⁶⁶

Al-Dasūqī’s glosses are overall longer and richer in content than both his teacher’s and his predecessor al-Ḥifnī’s. On closer reading, it emerges that al-Dasūqī often borrows several glosses verbatim from al-Ḥifnī and, by his own admission, relies on al-‘Idwī’s own glosses, raising

²⁶³ One of the earliest printed versions dates back to 1275/1858 in Cairo, however I could not find any evidence of this printed version of al-Dasūqī’s glosses. Other printed editions are Cairo: Muḥammad Amīn al-Khānjī, 1329/1911; Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-‘Āmira, Ramaḍān 1347/March 1929, reprinted by Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth, n.d.; Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-Jamāliyya, n.d.; for the present case I refer to al-Dasūqī’s glosses published together with al-Qūshjī’s commentary and al-Ḥifnī’s glosses by Mur‘ī Ḥasan al-Rashīd, Istanbul: Dār Nūr al-Ṣabāḥ, 2012.

²⁶⁴ On the life and work of al-Dasūqī cf. ‘Abd al-Razzāq b. Ḥasan al-Bayṭār, *Ḥilya al-Bashar fī Tā’rikh al-Qarn al-Thālith ‘Ashar*, Damascus: Maṭba‘a al-Taraqī, 1964, vol. 2, pp. 1262-1264; Khalīl Mardam, *A‘yān al-Qarn al-Thālith ‘Ashar*, Beirut: Lajna al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 1971, p. 162-165.

²⁶⁵ On al-Ṣa‘īdī al-‘Idwī see Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Umar b. Qāsim Makhlūf, *Shajara al-Nūr al-Zakiyya fī Ṭabaqāt al-Mālīkiyya*, ed. ‘Abd al-Majīd Khayālī, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1323/2003, vol. 1, pp. 492-3.

²⁶⁶ Cf. al-Dasūqī, *Hāshiya...*, p. 15. Al-Dasūqī reiterates the same in the conclusion of his glosses, cf. p. 258. At this stage of the research, I could not closely compare al-Dasūqī’s glosses with al-Ṣa‘īdī’s in order to gain a better picture on how the latter’s glosses influenced the former.

questions about the degree of originality of his work.²⁶⁷ The introduction to his glosses covers in detail virtually every aspect of al-Qūshjī's commentary, while emphasizing the two pairs of modes *general-specific* (ʿāmm-khāṣṣ) and *universal-particular* (kullī-juzʿī) used to classify the linguistic term (*al-lafẓ*), as well as the different senses of the concept of *waḍʿ*. Especially in the first part of the *Classification*, where al-Qūshjī discusses the division of the linguistic term, al-Dasūqī is particularly interested in the syllogistic reasoning used by Qushji in the first part of the classification when explaining the division of linguistic terms, and he often unpacks Qushji's minor and major premises (*ṣughrá* and *kubrā*) to verify their conclusion (*natīja*) as valid.²⁶⁸ He goes on to defend and sometimes correct al-Qūshjī's interpretation of the *matn* by analyzing in detail the application of the modes of *kullī* and *mushakkhkhaṣ* to terms. In general, most of his glosses on this section are devoted to clarifying al-Qūshjī's claims and rejecting real or virtual criticisms (*i'tirāḍ*) by representing the counterarguments (*ḥāṣil al-jawāb*) or intervening in his own voice (*qultu*), as he does in the *Conclusion*.²⁶⁹ This is particularly the case for the *Third Reminder*, where the notion of semantic dependence (*istiqlāl al-mafhūmiyya*) is discussed with respect to particles, verbs, and nouns, and for the *Eighth* where the semantics of verbs and particles is fully analyzed.

Finally, although al-Dasūqī's set of glosses makes no pedagogical claims regarding its aims and goals its accessible presentation of the *matn* and the commentary and his scrupulous examination of arguments and their counters rendered it one of the standard textbooks of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* *madrassa* curricula.

To the same period of al-Dasūqī belong two extensive works. The first is the super-commentary by al-Ṣafawī al-Qalaʿāwī (in full Muṣṭafá b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān

²⁶⁷ Cf. al-Dasūqī, *Hashiya*, pp. 16-75.

²⁶⁸ Cf. *Ibidem* pp. 149-154.

²⁶⁹ Cf. *Ibidem* pp. 154-187.

al-Şafawī al-Qala‘āwī al-Shāfi‘ī [1158/1745-1230/1815]), entitled *al-Lālī al-Bahiyya* or *al-Jawāhir al-Şafawiyya*, a dense super-commentary (*sharḥ al-sharḥ*) that extends over one hundred folios.²⁷⁰ In this work, al-Şafawī al-Qala‘āwī attributes the commentary to Khwāja Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī, who is identified the author of “*the first commentary on the Risāla al-‘Aḍudiyya*.” The exegetical tradition on al-Qūshjī’s commentary peaks later in the century with another Azharī scholar Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-‘Idwī al-Ḥamzāwī al-Azharī (1221/1806-1303/1886)²⁷¹ who authored a comprehensive set of super-glosses engaging with the exegetical tradition on al-Ḥifnī’s glosses that reaches almost three-hundred pages in its printed lithographed version. Al-Ḥamzāwī is aware of the extensiveness of his work, stating in the introduction:

“These are noble notes and exquisite lofty analytical points on the glosses of the brilliant al-Ḥifnī [...] in which I laid down a summary of what the eminent scholars have penned down; and I embellished them a great deal with the concealed aspects of the investigations by arranging their principles and rectifying their contents; I ask God to bestow them with benefit for those who study them.”²⁷²

²⁷⁰ On al-Şafawī al-Qala‘āwī see al-Jabartī, *‘Ajā‘ib al-Āthār fī al-Tarājim wa-l-Akḥbār*, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Abd al-Raḥīm ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, Cairo: Maṭba‘a Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya bi-l-Qāhira, 1418/1998, vol 4, pp. 372-373; Ziriklī, *A‘lām...*, vol. 7, pp. 241-242. The exact title of the work is uncertain. Of the three extant copies consulted, two are entitled *al-Jawāhir al-Şafawiyya* (al-Azhar 5343/10 and 48542/127) while the other *al-Lālī al-Bahiyya* (al-Azhar 54002/11). Moreover, it seems that both the copy 5343/10 and 54002/11 are holographs (*‘alā yad mu‘allifihi*) completed on Friday 20th Dhū al-Qa‘da 1199/September 24th 1785, but the latter, unlike the former, does not contain any specific mention of the title in its *incipit*. It is however unlikely that al-Şafawī produced two different redactions of the same work at the same time. In all likelihood, one of these two copies is an earlier redaction of the other.

²⁷¹ On al-‘Idwī al-Ḥamzāwī see F. de Jong, “al-‘Idwī al-Ḥamzāwī”, in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 25 January 2021. First published online: 2012.

²⁷² “Hādhihi ta‘liqātun sharīfatun wa-taḥqīqatun fā‘iqatun wa-munīfatun ‘alā ḥāshiyati al-badri al-Ḥifnī [...] awda‘tu fī-hā khulāṣata mā ṣāṭara-hu al-afāḍilu wa-washshaḥtu-hā bi-jammin ghafirin min mukhaddarāti al-masā‘ili ma‘a taḥrīri mabānī-hā wa-tahdhīb ma‘ānī-hā as’alu Allāh an yaj‘alu fī-hā naḥ‘a ṭālibī-hā.” Cf. al-‘Idwī al-Ḥamzāwī,

Outside Azharī milieus, Ottoman and North African scholars did not remain silent on the growing discussions around the *matn* and its exegesis. In the same period, the Ottoman scholar al-Sayyid Ḥāfiẓ Efendī Sirōzī²⁷³ (or al-Sīrūzī) (d. 1269/1852) composed glosses spanning over one hundred pages entitled *al-Ḥāshiya al-Jadīda*, which was widespread among Ottoman *madrasa* curricula particularly in Istanbul where they were printed during its authors lifetime.²⁷⁴ The relevance of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in *madrasa* curricula among North African scholarly circles is instead exemplified by the over two-hundred-page glosses authored by the Mālikī Moroccan scholar Muḥammad al-Mahdī b. al-Ṭālib b. Sūda, or simply Ibn Sūda (1220/1805-1294/1877), a member of the renowned Moroccan family of the Banū Sūda.²⁷⁵

The scholiastic tradition on al-Qūshjī’s commentary, like that on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, reaches its climax around the middle of the 13th/19th century with these three glossators, namely al-‘Idwī al-Ḥamzāwī in the Azharī circles, Sirōzī in the Ottoman circles and Ibn Sūda in the Maghribī

Hādhihi Taqrīrāt Rā’iqa wa-Taḥqīqāt Fā’iqa, Egypt: s.n., 1298/1880-1, p. 2; an online version can be accessed at [https://iif.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:11062579\\$1i](https://iif.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:11062579$1i). Al-‘Idwī al-Ḥamzāwī achieved his glosses at the end of the month Rabī‘ II 1296/April 1879.

²⁷³ Very little information is available on the intellectual profile of Sayyid Ḥāfiẓ, on whom see Mehmet Tahir Bursali, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, ed. by A. Fikri Yavuz and İsmā‘īl Özen, Istanbul: Meral Yayınevi, 1975, vol. 1, p. 332; Richard L. Chambers, “The Education of a Nineteenth-century Ottoman Âlim, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa,” in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* Volume 4, Issue 4, October 1973, pp. 440-464; İbrahim Bayram, “Çerkeşşeyhizâde Mehmed Tevfik Efendi’nin Tevhîd Anlayışı,” in *Eskiye* 40 (Mart/March 2020), 219-242.

²⁷⁴ At this stage of the research, it is unclear if Sirōzī is opposing his “new” set of glosses to an older one. The glosses, together with the commentary and the *matn* were printed in Istanbul: Dār al-Ṭibā‘a al-‘Āmira, 1267/1850; Istanbul: Maṭba‘a al-Ḥājj Muḥarrām Efendī al-Būsawī, 1291/1874; Istanbul: n.p., 1305/1887.

²⁷⁵ Muḥammad al-Mahdī b. Muḥammad al-Ṭālib b. Sūda, *Ḥāshiya ‘alā Sharḥ Risāla al-Waḍ‘*, ed. by ‘Umar Aḥmad al-Rāwī, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2010. There is also an older print of the glosses, Fez: al-Maṭba‘a al-Mawlāwiyya al-Fāsiyya, 1327/1909. On Ibn Sūda see Zirikli, *A‘lām...*, vol. 7, p. 114. The history of the family and its genealogy are available at: <https://www.familiebensouda.com/origine-عائلة-ابن-سودة-نبذة-موجزة-عن-أصول-عائلة-ابن-سودة>.

circles, all three of whose glosses were adopted in *madrasa* curricula for the advanced study of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. These extensive sets of glosses, together with those by al-Ḥifnī and al-Dasūqī, covered virtually every possible aspect of al-Qūshjī’s commentary and the *matn* by leaving no stone unturned in their lexicographical and theoretical exegesis. The plethora of these glosses is such that they likely saturated the pedagogical needs of the *madrasa* curriculum, providing an amount of textual material too vast to be fully and steadily integrated in the teaching of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. The weight of such a massive scholiastic edifice risked not only to crushing the growing pedagogical endeavor of including *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* at lower levels of the *madrasa* curriculum, but also stalling further developments and investigations of the novel discipline by expert scholars. As Chapter 5 will reveal, the emergence of new, semi-independent, short manuals on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* emerged from this exegetical tradition to offer more accessible pedagogical tools for the *madrasa*, while the scholiastic practice on the commentaries of al-Qūshjī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn faded away around the middle of the 13th/19th century.

The scholiastic tradition has nonetheless recently resurfaced in the *madrasa* setups, thus enhancing a new interest in the *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* amongst modern intellectual circles. This is the case of the young Tunisian scholar Ḥātim al-Hammāmī (b. 1399/1979) who has held and published online a series of ten lessons on al-Qūshjī’s commentary (attributed to al-Samarqandī) on his YouTube channel starting on May 2014.²⁷⁶ As recently as 2018, for example, a new set of glosses entitled *al-Khamā’il al-Nadiyya* was published by the Falluja-based scholar Dhākīr ‘Awda al-

²⁷⁶ On his life and intellectual profile see <http://www.tasawof.com/sheikh/10>. The lessons are accessible at <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLOPkYCjygrd3NiMyT1Q29LT0vZS5Ig6tD>. The lessons on the commentary are unfortunately incomplete because, as the scholar has admitted, the contents of the commentary were too dense and demanding for the level of his students. For this reason, al-Hammāmī embarked on a complete set of lessons on *al-Khulāṣa fī ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘* authored by al-Dijwī (see next chapter), one of the most influential and widespread entry-level manuals on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.

Ḥamādī al-Ḥanafī (b. ?), the introduction of which indicates the recent state of affairs of scholarship on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*:

“There is no doubt that *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is among the important sciences and <scholarly> tools; and much has been written about it. However, it has been completely forgotten because of the small number of individuals interested in this discipline and the rarity of expert scholars. Knowledge has become farther than the Capella star and scholars have become rarer than red brimstone and red gold.²⁷⁷ Erudition has been confined [...] to the graves, and no one hopes for the resurrection of the dead-alive humanities [*al-adab*]. [...] Our scholars – the Sunnis of Iraq – have become martyrs, murdered by the occupants, or by the extremists and the militias; and have become emigres, forced by civil strife to flee the country.²⁷⁸ [...]

Among those works <on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*>, or rather the first – as I am not aware of a [similar] treatise before it – is the treatise of the Mawlā ‘Aḍud al-Milla wa-l-Dīn our master ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ījī, God hallow his secret, which many eminent scholars have commented upon, one of whom is the Mawlā Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī Bakr al-Laythī al-Samarqandī al-Ḥanafī [...], <who composed> a middle commentary of simple style and clear exposition, in which the author achieved excellent results and provided useful explanations. However, due to the lack of resources and because of the dimness of minds, the clear aspects of this

²⁷⁷ Al-‘Ayyuq; for a description of this small red star near the Pleiades cf. Lane, *Lexicon...*, p. 2199.

²⁷⁸ In all likelihood, by “occupant” (*al-muḥtall*) the author is referring to U.S. and Western military forces, while by “extremists” and “militias” (*al-ghulāt wa-l-milīshiyyāt*) he refers to terrorist groups that seized the control of vast regions of Syria and Iraq, such as *DAESH* or *ISIS* after the dissolution of Saddam Hussein’s power in Iraq and the Syrian civil war to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s presidency of Syria.

commentary have turned into inaccessible notions, and its well-defined remarks have turned into loose points; hence, what would you think about its concealed pearls and rare points?! To the extent that the commentary is almost a riddle, whose literal meanings cannot be distinguished from the figurative ones. Therefore, God the Almighty has paved the way to [understanding] this commentary by two distinguished scholars, namely the Mālikī Shaykh Muḥammad al-Dasūqī and the Shāfi‘ī Shaykh al-Ḥifnāwī [...]. Then, when God the Almighty blessed this poor weak ignoramus with teaching the commentary on the *Samarqandiyya* to some brothers, he wrote down some glosses on the aforementioned commentary and used them during teaching.²⁷⁹ It occurred to the pen to add <more notes> to those lines, so he put together an arrangement of essential points of those two sets of glosses [...]. Therefore, I took advantage of the rare points from those two glossators and noted their original observations; <and> I also added some precious points from the gems of <other> works and writings [...].”²⁸⁰

As this introduction indicates with some flourish, al-Ḥamādī is part of a growing 15th/21st century tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* which upholds the closeness remarked on by Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī in his commentary to the *balāgha* tradition. The elucidation of the relationship between these two disciplines is one reason this commentary is of note, as it also emerged in

²⁷⁹ It is unlikely that the author is referring to al-Samarqandī’s commentary on the *Risāla*. By *Sharḥ al-Samarqandiyya* he might indicate a commentary on al-Samarqandī’s treatise on the metaphor (*isti‘āra*), and more specifically ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, which is one of the most widely read commentaries on this work.

²⁸⁰ Cf. Dhākir ‘Awda al-Ḥamādī al-Ḥanafī, *al-Khamā’il al-Nadiyya ‘alā Sharḥ al-Samarqandī ‘alā al-‘Aḍudiyya fī ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*, ‘Ammān: Dār al-Nūr al-Mubīn, 2018, pp. 5-7. I could not find any biographical information about the author aside from his Facebook profile, accessible at <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100030344661677>.

Chapter 2 between al-Ījī's *matn* and his *al-Fawa'id al-Ghiyāthiyya*. Beyond this, its self-evident ties to both the Azharī exegetical tradition and the separate complementary tradition initiated with 'Iṣām al-Dīn's commentary, which al-Ḥamādī relies on throughout his glosses, suggest the various evolutions of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* throughout the 14th/20th and 15th/21st. The following section will examine these developments in detail and maintain a focus on 'Iṣām al-Dīn's commentary and its influence on the foundational scholastic tradition that followed from it.

4.3 'Iṣām al-Dīn 'Arabshāh al-Isfarā'inī: The Climax of the Exegetical Tradition

The previous sections have shown how the commentaries of Khwāja 'Alī, al-Shirwānī, al-Samarqandī and al-Qūshjī mark a turning point for the establishment of the exegetical tradition around the *Risāla*. The commentary authored by the polymath 'Iṣām al-Dīn 'Arabshāh al-Isfarā'inī (871/1466-943/1536) should be considered the last of the classic commentaries and, for its comprehensive approach, the apex of the classical exegetical tradition on the *matn*.²⁸¹

²⁸¹ On 'Iṣām al-Dīn's life and works see El-Rouayheb, Khaled, "al-Isfarā'inī, 'Iṣām al-Dīn", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three*, Edited by: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson. Consulted online on 03 February 2021. The list of works provided by el-Rouayheb does not account for 'Iṣām al-Dīn's commentary on the *Risāla*. For the present case, I will refer to the lithograph printed in Istanbul: n.p., 1274/1857, accessible at http://public-content.library.mcgill.ca/digitization/rbcs_isl_islam-ala-al-risalah_B753I59I81857.pdf. Moreover, to the list should be added the following works: a set of glosses on al-Bayḍāwī's Qur'ānic commentary up to *sūra al-A'rāf*, a set of glosses on a commentary (possibly al-Jurjānī's) on al-Ījī's *al-Mawāqif*, a commentary on al-Bayḍāwī's *Ṭawālī' al-Anwār*, a set of glosses on al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal*, a work on grammar with a self-commentary, a commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājjib's *al-Shāfiya*, a commentary on al-Ījī's treatise on *ādāb al-baḥth*, a commentary on al-Taftāzānī's logic section of *al-Tahdhīb*, a set of glosses on the *kulliyāt* of al-Taḥṭānī's commentary on al-Urmawī's *Maṭālī' al-Anwār* titled *al-Fawā'id al-Jalīla*, a treatise on the question "*Mā Anā Qultu*," this list is present in the codex British Museum n. 61 (University of Michigan n. 109), p. 69. Although a periodization of 'Iṣām al-Dīn's works is far to be established at this stage of the research, 'Iṣām al-Dīn composed his commentary after his extensive glosses on al-Taḥṭānī's commentary on *al-Shamsiyya* that cover the sections on conception (*taṣawwur*) and assent (*taṣdīq*); cf. al-Isfarā'inī, 'Iṣām al-Dīn, *Ḥāshiya 'alā al-Taṣawwurāt*, Istanbul: Dār Sa'ādat, 1307/1889.

‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary is the most detailed amongst these works, which are continuously called into question and evaluated throughout his text. Moreover, with its continuous references to the main manuals on grammar, logic, *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary also includes the two approaches that emerge respectively in al-Shirwānī’s and al-Samarqandī’s commentaries, the first with an angle towards logic and epistemology and the latter focusing on *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

Like his predecessors, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn refers to key notions in the theory of *al-waḍ‘* in the introduction of his commentary, such as *ḍamā‘ir*, *ishāra*, *ḥurūf*, *qarā’in* and *mawṣūl*.²⁸² Amongst the lemmata of the *Introduction* of the *matn* with which he begins his commentary, “*is sometimes posited*” (*qad yūḍa‘u*) is of note for allowing ‘Iṣām al-Dīn to first investigate different senses of the notion of *waḍ‘* in order to establish the one consistent with al-Ījī’s *matn*. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn narrows the notion of *waḍ‘* to two widespread definitions discussed by al-Taftāzānī in his commentary on *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* and his *al-Talwīḥ*. On the first definition the purpose of *waḍ‘* is to assign something, namely a term, to a concept (*ta‘yīnu al-shay‘i bi-izā‘i al-ma‘nā*), which would include the positing of figurative terms for their figurative sense (*al-majāz mawḍū‘ li-ma‘nāhu al-majāzī*). The second is to assign a term to signify a concept in itself (*ta‘yīnu al-shay‘i li-l-dalālati ‘alā ma‘nan bi-naḥsihi*), in which figurative terms are determined by a semantic context (*qarīna*) rather than a specific act of positing.²⁸³ He notes that these definitions are not of immediate relevance to the *Risāla*’s scope, adding that the notion of *waḍ‘*, such as *khāṣṣ* and *mushakkhkhaṣ* sketched out in the *Introduction* and the *Classification*, should be considered in the context of al-Ījī’s way of conceiving the positing of particles and pronouns (*ṣawwarahā al-muṣannif*), which is the core topic of the *Introduction* and the *Classification*. Al-Ījī’s novel division of the classes of *waḍ‘*, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn adds,

²⁸² Cf. al-Isfarā‘īnī, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 1-8.

²⁸³ ‘Iṣām al-Dīn discusses further the contrasting interpretations of the second definition discussed by al-Taftāzānī in his two works; see pp. 8-10.

departs from the two classic definitions discussed earlier and, on the contrary, fall under a theoretical division of the notion of *waḍʿ* (*aqsām ʿaqliyya*).²⁸⁴

It is from this novel approach on the classes and modes of *waḍʿ* that ʿIṣām al-Dīn presents and discusses the four standard classes of *waḍʿ* and how each class relates to the other. He then follows his predecessors in discarding the fourth class, namely *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*. He brings up al-Shirwānī's criticism of al-Jurjānī's denial of the class *khāṣṣ-ʿāmm*. Al-Jurjānī's denial is based on the view that an individuated concept cannot be a means to grasp a universal.²⁸⁵ Al-Shirwānī responds that a more specific notion (*al-akhaṣṣ*) might be conceived as a means to grasp a more general notion (*al-aʿamm*), as long as the more specific is not an individuated concept (*yaṣiḥḥu an yakūna al-akhaṣṣu alladhī lūḥiẓa bi-hi al-aʿammu ghayra mushakḥkhaṣin*). For example, the universal concept of *animal* may be grasped by means of the concept of *human*, and then the term *animal* would be posited for that universal concept. In al-Shirwānī's view, the more specific may thus function as a mirror to grasp some other general concept (*mirʾāt li-l-mulāḥazāti li-l-shayʾi*) and, in this way, it is necessarily correlated with that general concept (*murtabiṭa bi-hi*). ʿIṣām al-Dīn does not seem to fully agree with al-Shirwānī's criticism to al-Jurjānī's view. His response does not tackle al-Shirwānī's view that a more specific concept may be a means to grasp a more general one; rather, he points out that it is unclear how an individuated concept functioning as mirror to grasp a universal would be necessarily correlated to that universal.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁸⁵ Al-Kaffawī's glosses provides another example: it is possible to grasp a series of individuals, then extract (*ikhtirāʿ*) a universal concept that is true of each of them, and posit a term for that universal. However, he explains that extracting a universal by grasping those individuated concepts is not similar to grasping by a medium or a mirror to grasp some other concept, like al-Jurjānī's notion of the mental mirror. That universal, in al-Kaffawī's view, is simply construed within those individuals (*fī ḍimni hādhihi al-ashkhāṣ*); cf. al-Kaffawī, *Hāshiya...*, pp.29-30.

²⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 11-12. In what follows this discussion, ʿIṣām al-Dīn rejects al-Shirwānī's view that also propositional compounds such as "This is a human" (*hādha insānun*) and "Human is an animal" (*al-insānu ḥayawānun*) should be included in one of the four classes of *waḍʿ* or have their own special class; see pp. 12.

The commentary on the remaining passages of the *Introduction* is devoted to analyzing the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, namely terms that are posited to convey individuated concepts by means of a shared notion that applies to all of them. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn claims that this class of *waḍ‘* should not be limited to individuated concepts, but also to specific notions (*umūr mu‘ayyana*) that include both real and relational particulars, which are a class of universals, in order to include terms that may convey both a particular or a universal concept, such as the third-person pronoun.²⁸⁷ The key notion of conceptual determination (*ta‘yīn*) is here discussed at length because, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn notices, conveying specific concepts in this class of *waḍ‘* is crucial not only for every act of communication but also for the soundness of al-Ījī’s class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* in particular, and his whole semantic theory in general. The notion of positing does not coincide with the general idea of determining something, rather with determining a concept for someone else. Thus, if we determine a term for a concept only for ourselves, that act of positing and determination would be invalid, unless someone else is informed about it.²⁸⁸

This aspect is particularly true for terms belonging to the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn points out that the lemma in passage [1.1] “*this term is posited for each of the distinct individuated things in their specificity*” (*hādhā al-lafẓu mawḍū‘un li-kulli wāḥidin min hādihi al-mushakhkhaṣāti bi-khuṣūsihi*), which is the core notion for the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, is not sufficient to determine how these individuated concepts are conveyed by the term posited by a general positing. The lemma should clarify how the qualification of these individuated concepts occurs when they are characterized by the shared intelligible notion (*mawṣūfatun bi-dhālika al-ma‘qūli al-mushtaraki*). ‘Iṣām al-Dīn explains this with the following example: the referent of the term “*this*” (*hādhā*) is not the essence of an individual entity, as it is for a proper name (*‘alam*) like “*Zayd*,” but is instead

²⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 15

²⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 16-17.

an individual entity characterized by being pointed to. The intelligible general notion involved in the positing of terms in the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, he notices, has then a double role, the first as a medium to grasp the specificities of these individuated concepts, the second as a notion that qualifies these concepts (*taqyīduhā bihi*).²⁸⁹ *‘Iṣām al-Dīn* expresses some doubt about the nature of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. In his comment on the lemma of passage [1.2] “[...] *to the exclusion of the common aspect*,” he says that the common aspect can correspond to one among all the specificities for which a term like *‘this’* is posited. He thinks that the word “*the individuated things*” (*al-mushakkhkhaṣāt*) employed by al-Ījī to describe the concepts expressed by terms in the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* is ambiguous. In his view, it is more accurate to replace “*al-mushakkhkhaṣāt*” with the notion of “*single items*,” (*al-afrād*), since this notion includes the individuals, as well as the universals that are single items of the common aspect.²⁹⁰

After offering these original interpretations and further solidifying the distinction between classes of *waḍ‘* at a fine-grained level, *‘Iṣām al-Dīn* goes on in his commentary on the first half of the *Classification* to notions of *essence* (*dhāt*), *event* (*ḥadath*) and *ascription* (*nisba*) introduced by al-Ījī to lay down his classification of generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, verbs, and derived nouns as terms whose concept is a universal. After presenting debates on the definitions of

²⁸⁹ Cf. p. 18, “Fa-inna madlūla hādhā laysa dhāta al-mushakkhkhaṣi ka-mā anna-hu madlulu al-‘alami bal al-dhātu al-mushakkhkhaṣu min ḥaythu al-ittiṣafi bi-kawnihi mushāran ilayhi.” *‘Iṣām al-Dīn* continues the commentary with the analysis of the notion of “*each one*” (*kullu wāḥidin*) in the lemma of passage [1.1] “[...] *insofar as, <by that term>, only one <individuated thing> is understood and conveyed in its specificity [...]*” (*bi-ḥaythu lā yufādu wa-lā yufhamu illā wāḥidun bi-khuṣūsihi*) to further clarify how in the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* the concept conveyed by the speaker is only a determined one, and it is understood as such by the listener; cf. pp. 19-22.

²⁹⁰ Cf. p. 23; the rest of the comment of the *Introduction* is devoted to decompressing al-Ījī’s wording and evaluating his claims. *‘Iṣām al-Dīn* discusses at length the lemma in passage [1.5] “<Terms> that belong to this class convey individuation only by means of a determining context (*qarīna mu‘ayyina*), because the relation of the act of positing to the external referents (*musamayāt*) is coextensive,” which correspond to the *Reminder*. Here he engages with Khwāja ‘Alī’s and Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī’s debate over the differences between terms in the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* and equivocal terms (*al-mushtaraka*). It exceeds the scope of this overview to offer a detailed account of this passage; cf. p. 28-33.

essence and event by figures like al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Ḥājjib and al-Jurjānī, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn concludes that generic nouns should correspond to a quiddity (*māhiyya*), while the *event*, which is the class of *maṣḍars*, should be understood as some notion that subsists in something else (*ma‘nan qā’imun bi-ghayrihi*).

The analysis of the notion of *ascription* between *essence* and *event* is more complex, and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn devotes most of his commentary on the first part of the *Classification* to explaining how terms such as derived nouns (*mushtaqq*) and verbs (*fi‘l*) are determined and differ one from the other. Having explained al-Ījī’s view that the derived noun is a composite of an *ascription* (*nisba*) between an *essence* and an *event* in which the intellect prioritizes the *essence*, while the verb is the same composite but one in which the intellect prioritizes the *event*, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn argues that this claim is insufficient for distinguishing between the two composites. Because both the *essence* and the *event* are universal concepts, a composite of an *essence* and an *event* – e.g., the active participle *ḍārib*, in which the event is conveyed by the *maṣḍar* “*al-ḍarb*” and the essence is represented by the pattern “*fā‘il*” – is no different from another composite of *event* and *essence* – e.g., the verb *ḍaraba*, in which the event is conveyed by the *maṣḍar* “*al-ḍarb*” and the essence, the third-person pronoun “*he*,” is implied in the verbal pattern. On this analysis, al-Ījī’s classification is self-contradictory, since the class of *maṣḍars* overlaps with the class of verbs, given that both classes convey a universal concept and an event.

In order to resolve the contradiction that arises from al-Ījī’s opaque wording, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn highlights the main features that distinguish the class of *maṣḍars* from the class of verbs. He agrees with previous commentators that one distinguishing factor is that verbs signify a time (*zamān*) when the action takes place, whereas *maṣḍars* do not express a time. In addition to the temporal specificity provided by verbs, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn distinguishes between the two classes on the basis of other features that are not mentioned by al-Ījī. One feature is that the notion of

essence conveyed by derived nouns is either something totally absent (*ibhām*) – in the way that attributes and adjectives, such as “*ḍāḥik*” or “*abyaḍ*” express the notion of an indefinite essence –, or the notion of essence is not conveyed at all – in the way that nouns of place, time, or instrument, such as “*maktab*,” “*ṣabāḥ*,” or “*miṣbāḥ*” are derived nouns that do not convey the notion of essence. Another feature is that verbs are always determined in virtue of an essence (which is the subject that performs the action) and a complete ascription (*tamām al-nisba*) of an event to an agent. This is not always the case for derived nouns, because, whereas a term like “*ḍāḥik*” does convey an ascription to an agent, a term like “*maktab*” does not relate to any agent. A third feature is that derived nouns like “*ḍāḥik*” (conceived as a unitary composite of *essence-plus-event*) can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition, e.g., “*al-ḍāḥiku huwa Zaydun*” and “*Zaydun ḍāḥikun*.” Verbs (conceived as a unitary composite of *event-plus-ascription to an agent*) can only be the predicate of a proposition, e.g., “*Zayd yaḍḥaku*.” A fourth and final feature is that, in derived nouns, the notion of essence is included (*dukhūl al-dhāt*) in the term itself, which means that the intellect perceives the idea of an essence, as in the sentence “*Zaydun ḍāḥikun*,” whereas, in verbs, the focus is directed mainly on the event, because the ascription of the event to the agent remains latent until the subject is expressed, e.g., “*yaḍḥaku Zayd*.”²⁹¹

In the second part of the *Classification*, where al-Ījī introduces those terms that are posited by means of a universal positing for universal or individual concepts – these terms include proper names, demonstrative, personal, and relative pronouns, as well as prepositions –, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn focuses on the definition of prepositions as terms that convey “*a concept in another <concept>*” (*ma‘nan fī ghayrihi*), which means that the determination of their concepts occurs in association with another concept, i.e., their relata. For ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, al-Ījī’s wording is quite

²⁹¹ Cf. al-Isfarā’inī, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 33-48.

opaque, since it does not explain how the concepts of prepositions are actually grasped by the intellect when they are related to another semantically independent concept to which they attach. In order to unpack al-Ījī's claim, he draws on the notion of determination by association with something else (*ta'ayīn bi-nḍimām al-ghayr*). 'Iṣām al-Dīn draws the following analogy: if one considers Zayd's blackness, then the intellect determines the specific attribute of blackness insofar as is associated with a specific entity, namely Zayd. For 'Iṣām al-Dīn, this means that the determination by association with an attribute, such as blackness, does not occur in virtue of the attribute *per se*, but rather because blackness' determination by association with Zayd is an added feature. On the basis of this explanation, 'Iṣām al-Dīn thinks al-Ījī could have expressed his idea in a clearer way by saying that the concepts of prepositions “are apprehended by association with another concept” (*yutaṣawwaru bi-nḍimāmi al-ghayri ilayhi*).²⁹²

Next, 'Iṣām al-Dīn tackles the problem of why the concepts conveyed by prepositions are not intelligible *per se*. In order to explain this, he relies on al-Jurjānī's notion of the *mirror* (*mir'āt*), according to which these concepts are grasped by the intellect only secondarily and, unlike nouns and verbs, they do not involve an intentional act of grasping (*mulāḥaẓa qaṣḍiyya*). To highlight the idea that prepositions are not posited for particular instances, as is the case with proper nouns, al-Jurjānī argued that, because of their essentially undetermined nature, the mind can only intellect the concepts of prepositions in a relational sense. This means that the intellect apprehends the ascriptions (*nisab*) that occur between the concept of the preposition and the concept of its relatum, which is generally a noun, rather than apprehending the concept of the preposition in itself. 'Iṣām al-Dīn elaborates by saying that, in light of al-Jurjānī's analysis, a more accurate definition of the concept of preposition could be “that which signifies in another

²⁹² Cf. al-Isfarā'inī, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 50-51.

<concept> insofar as it occurs in the other <concept>” (*mā dalla ‘alá ma‘nan fī ghayrihi min ḥaythu ḥāṣilun fī ghayrihi*).²⁹³

Al-Jurjānī’s analysis of prepositions did not go unchallenged. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn defends this view against a number of criticisms, the strongest of which arises from Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī. Al-Samarqandī criticizes the view that prepositions are posited for individuated concepts (*al-ḥurūfu mawḍū‘atun li-ma‘ānin mushakkhkhaṣatin*) by arguing the following: in the sentence “my trip from Basra to Kufa is better than my trip from Kufa to Basra” (*sayrī min al-Baṣrati ilá l-Kūfati khayrun min sayrī min al-Kūfati ilá l-Baṣrati*), the two notions of beginning and end expressed respectively by the prepositions “min” and “ilá” are two universals, which contain various sorts of “beginning” and “end” (*ibtidā’āt wa-intihā’āt shattá*). Abū al-Qāsim adds that, since the two concepts are universal, there is the possibility that they do not apply to any particular instance contained in them. This is the case because universality is, by definition, “the possibility of assuming participation <among single instances>” (*al-kulliyyatu imkānu farḍi al-ishtirāki*), and this kind of possibility belongs to these two concepts with respect to their own essences (*thābitun li-hādhayni al-mafhūmayni naẓaran ilá dhātihimā*). Abū al-Qāsim takes the universality and the broad applicability of prepositions a step further by arguing that the same situation applies to verbs. The verb’s ascription to a subject corresponds to multiple possible ascriptions. For example, in the phrase ‘Zayd stood’ (*Zayd qāma*), there could be many possible instances of the ascription of “standing” to Zayd, e.g., when occurring in different contexts, such as ‘Zayd stood in the morning,’ “Zayd stood in evening,” or “Zayd stood at night.” Therefore, since the concept of the verb conveys an event, the time of that event and the ascription of that event to a subject, and these are all universal notions, Abū al-Qāsim is inclined to claim that the concept of the verb is a universal.

²⁹³ Cf. al-Isfarā’inī, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 52.

In the same way, since prepositions convey an ascription to another concept, and this ascription is a universal, he concludes that the concept conveyed by prepositions could also be a universal.

‘Iṣām al-Dīn replies that the notion of *beginning* conveyed by the preposition that occurs between the notion of “trip” in an absolute sense (*al-sayr al-muṭlaq*) and its relatum, i.e., *al-Baṣra*, is different from the notion of *beginning* that occurs between the particular notion of “trip” (*al-sayr al-juz’i*) and *al-Baṣra*, because in this second case the notion of *beginning* corresponds to the ascription. He explains that the ascription of a general notion to a different concept is just an ascription of an instance of that general notion to that concept (*nisbatu al-muṭlaqi ilā shay’in mubāyinin li-nisbati fardin minhu ilayhi*). On this basis, he concludes that the ascription changes with the change of the terms (*aṭrāf*) of the statements, whether these terms are universal or particular concepts, or different concepts. In this way, all the single ascriptions of the notion of *beginning* conveyed by the preposition “from” are particularized. The same explanation follows for verbs, because the ascription of *standing* to Zayd that occurs in past time in an absolute sense (*al-zamān al-māḍī muṭlaqan*) differs from the ascription of *standing* to Zayd that is specific to a particular morning in the past. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn concludes that all of these ascriptions are mental constructs (*umūr i’tibariyya*) that the intellect interpolates between one specific concept and another. In so doing the ascription that is interpolated between an absolute notion and another concept does not apply to, and is not identical to, the ascription interpolated between one instance of that absolute notion and another concept.²⁹⁴

Building on the principle that particles and pronouns belong to the same class of *waḍʿ*, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn clarifies the exact sense in which al-Ījī uses the notion of “context” (*al-qarīna*) when

²⁹⁴ Cf. al-Isfarāʾīnī, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 52-53.

arguing for the ability of pronouns to convey particular concepts. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn focuses on one particularly opaque phrase by al-Ījī in which he declares that a personal pronoun is distinguished from other pronouns on the basis of its context, which is necessarily a speech act. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn begins his elucidation of this claim by addressing the notably absent distinction between personal pronouns of the first, second and third persons. He reasons that al-Ījī’s thinking must entail that the determination of the three types of personal pronouns is dependent on the context which occurs in the speech (*fī l-kalām*). In the case of the second-person pronoun, the context issued by the speech act requires a conversation with the respondent of that act (*khiṭāban ma‘ahu*), while that of the first-person pronoun requires only the speaker. Lastly, the context that occurs in the speech determining the third-person corresponds to mentioning a pronoun that refers to someone mentioned earlier. As for other types of pronouns, namely demonstratives and relatives, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn raises no issue other than to note that he will discuss in the commentary on the *Tenth* reminder the fact that the latter kind of pronoun, similar to third person personal pronouns, may convey a universal concept.²⁹⁵

²⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 58. Towards the end of this section of the commentary, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn quotes a passage from al-Ījī’s *al-Fawā’id al-Ghiyāthiyya* to support al-Ījī’s claim here in the *matn* that demonstrative and relative pronouns do not convey their concepts on their own but need a context to do so. There al-Ījī claims that “*the determination [of the concept] is conveyed either by the substance of the term (jawhar al-lafz), as in the proper name, or in another way. <Determination can be conveyed> by a particle, such as the definition (ta‘rīf) provided by the article, or by the vocative particle, or in another way. <Determination can be conveyed> by the context, which can occur in the speech <as for> the personal pronoun, or in another way; namely, <it is conveyed> necessarily <by> a pointing to either the specific concept <that one wants to express> (al-murād al-mu‘ayyan), <as in the case of> the demonstrative pronoun; or by the assertoric relation previously known to <the listener>, <as in the case of> the relative pronoun. <Determination can be also conveyed> by the idāfa.*” Moreover, in the passage ‘Iṣām al-Dīn rejects the view proposed by Khwāja ‘Alī, who thinks that the classes of terms outlined by al-Ījī in the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* is not exhaustive, and it should include terms such as the names of the letters of the alphabet and book titles. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn responds that a given book, which is a composite of specific terms and sentences, multiplies only by the multiplication of those who read it. This type of multiplication is a specific philosophical point (*tadqīq falsafī*) that does not concern linguists of the Arabic language. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn adds that the name of a given book is posited for a unique entity that is grasped in its specificity, rather than being posited by a general act of positing. Therefore, book titles belong to the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*. Conversely, names of the letters of the alphabet are posited for universal notions that are true of many particulars, whether they are written or articulated.

In his commentary on the *Conclusion*, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn displays the same exegetical approach of this immediate predecessors and provides a detailed explanation of each of the twelve *Reminders*. If for some *Reminders* ‘Iṣām al-Dīn limits his exegesis to expanding on the *matn* according to his predecessors’ interpretations, for some others, like the *First*, *Second*, *Ninth* and *Tenth*, he provides a more accurate if oppositional analysis. In the commentary on the *First Reminder* ‘Iṣām al-Dīn opens with a relevant exposition that, though not present in the *matn*, highlights one point of contention between al-Ījī’s view and those who oppose it. Al-Ījī’s opponents propose to denote a definite term as a term posited for a specific entity (*taʿrīf al-maʿrifa bi-mā wuḍiʿa li-shayʾin bi-ʿaynihi*), a claim that ‘Iṣām al-Dīn considers correct and, more importantly, unsusceptible to the criticism from those who have already discarded al-Ījī’s semantical analysis of the pronoun types. He further critiques al-Ījī’s detractors by noting their unsuccessful attempts at engaging with the semantics of pronouns which may be posited for a potentially infinite number of referents, none of which can be intellected at the moment of positing. They arrive at this difficulty because their view holds that all definite, though not proper, nouns (*al-maʿārif*) and pronouns are posited for universal concepts with particular instantiations. As such, these critics commit themselves to the problematic conclusion that all pronouns with uncountable instances, including all three types of pronouns, convey particulars only by metaphorical reference to their universals. In order to avoid maintaining that pronouns are essentially devoid of any literal meaning, these thinkers must rethink their commitment to the universality of nouns and pronouns and likely adopt, as the only viable alternative, al-Ījī’s interpretation of these semantic units.²⁹⁶ ‘Iṣām al-Dīn thus reminds readers of the accuracy and superiority of this interpretation with particular regard to the tripartite classification of

²⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 60-61.

pronouns and particulars. He emphasizes that al-Ījī's wording is crucial to establish that, although concepts of both pronouns and particles belong to the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* class of *waḍ‘*, their respective relation to contextual or generally external notions are different. While the concepts of pronouns are obtained through another element or notion (*tataḥaṣṣalu bi-l-ghayri*), such as the context, particles' concepts are concepts in something else and, more importantly, are determined by another element or notion (*tata‘ayyanu bi-l-ghayri*).

In the commentary on the *Second Reminder*, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn explores al-Ījī's additional discussion of the relative pronoun and how it is determined by its context. In his *Classification*, al-Ījī stated that relative pronouns fall under the *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* class and are determined by the mental context (*al-qarīna al-‘aqliyya*), which is provided by the relative clause (*al-ṣila*). Al-Ījī backtracks from this understanding of the relative clause in the *Second Reminder*, where he argues that the intellect's determination of a universal relative pronoun by way of another universal – which is the mental pointing (*al-ishāra al-‘aqliyya*) provided by the relative clause – does not imply that this pronoun is individuated or particularized therein. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn attributes al-Ījī's wavering unease on this topic to the fact that in the two passages of the *Classification* and the *Second Reminder*, he erroneously and needlessly equivocates mental context and mental pointing when both may entail the particularization of concepts (although al-Ījī does not elucidate the reasons for this equivocation). ‘Iṣām al-Dīn therefore tries to salvage al-Ījī's claim by demonstrating why mental pointing cannot convey particularity proper, as is instead the case for sensory pointing (*al-ishāra al-ḥissiyya*). He explains that the relative pronoun, taken without the context that determines it, is a universal notion. When the pronoun is associated with a relative clause, it is qualified by the verbal aspect (*ḥadath*, i.e., the event) contained in the relative clause, which is also a universal notion. In the example “*the one who has hit*” (*alladhī*

ḍaraba), our intellect understands that the notion of “who” (*alladhī*) is determined by the action of “hitting” (*ḍaraba*).²⁹⁷ The mental pointing conveys only the assertoric ascription (*nisba khabariyya*) of the verb to the relative pronoun, and the latter remains a universal. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn thus generally agrees with al-Ījī that the mental pointing does not bestow particularity to the relative pronoun in any way. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn cannot however neglect a basic contradiction in the two claims. If in the *Classification* al-Ījī claimed that relative pronouns, which belong to the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, must convey an individuated concept in virtue of their context, here, in the *Second Reminder*, al-Ījī holds instead that relative pronouns convey a universal, on the principle that qualifying a universal (i.e., the relative pronoun) with another universal (i.e., the relative clause) will not convey individuation (*taqyīdu al-kullī bi-l-kullī lā yufidu al-tashakhkhuṣa*). ‘Iṣām al-Dīn solves the conundrum by stating that al-Ījī’s previous claim indicates only that the universal qualified by the other universal does not become an individuated concept (*lā yaṣīru al-muqayyad bi-mujarradi dhālika al-taqyīdi mushakhkhaṣan*). It is the case that individuation by this type of qualification may occur (*yaḥṣul*) if the mind shifts to an individual combined with a qualified universal. In ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s view, it is possible for the mind to shift from the qualification brought by the relative clause to an individuated concept that belongs to the significatum of the relative pronoun, on the condition that one knows or is aware that the relative clause is restricted to that individual. With this interpretation, concludes ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, mental pointing, which is the relative clause, would qualify the relative pronoun to convey an individuated concept.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁷ ‘Iṣām al-Dīn also adds another example in which the relative clause does not contain a verb. In the sentence “*the one who is a human*” (*alladhī huwa insānun*), the relative pronoun is qualified by humanity, which is also a universal concept. Just like the example in which the relative clause contains a verb, also in this case the relative clause does not convey individuation or particularization of the concept of the pronoun.

²⁹⁸ Cf. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 63–65. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn provides a further explanation of the relative pronouns and the relative clause in his commentary on the *Seventh Reminder*, where al-Ījī claims that particles are the opposite of relative pronouns, because the particle signifies a concept in something else and it is grasped by something else, whereas relative pronouns are abstract notions determined by a concept in themselves. He explains that the relative clause should be considered a concept in the relative pronoun, because the relative clause is complete only

In the *Ninth Reminder* ‘Iṣām al-Dīn tackles another problematic claim made by al-Ījī, that is, verbs differ from particles because they signify a universal concept and, in virtue of this, can function as a predicate. As such, because verbs signify universal concepts, their concepts are semantically independent. However, in the *Eighth Reminder*, al-Ījī claimed that the verbs and particles share an important feature, namely that they both signify concepts that are realized only in virtue of another concept. Because of this, one may conclude that verbs, like particles, semantically depend upon another concept. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn flags out these contradictions by pointing out that the *matn* conveys that the concepts of particles and verbs have the same features, and the reader would struggle to harmonize the contrasting views made in the *Classification*, the *Eighth* and the *Ninth Reminders* (*fa-iḥtajnā takallufāt kathīra fī kalāmihi*). He approaches his commentary on the *Ninth Reminder* by identifying al-Ījī’s motivation in this section as twofold. He begins with an explanation of the first of these goals, which is ostensibly to prove that an event, as part of a verb’s notion, need not only be a particular but in fact can be a universal. The contrary view against which al-Ījī intends to argue is, according to ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, based on the problematic principle that an event may be ascribed to an individuated concept. Such a principle is tenuous because only an individual event can subsist through an individuated

by means of its conjunction (*raṭb*) with the relative pronoun. Moreover, the intellection of the conjunction between the two depends on intellecting the relative pronoun, only when the latter is considered an abstract notion, rather than a determined one. Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 77-78. The commentary from the *Third* to the *Eighth Reminders* is overall devoted to discussing specific aspects of the *matn* and clarifying mistaken interpretations or assumptions that the reader may encounter. Moreover, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn attempts to correct some interpretations of some passages of these *Reminders* provided by his predecessors with particular emphasis on the correct reading of the *matn* and the implications that some faulty readings may involve; cf. pp. 66-86. Among these, the commentary on the *Eighth Reminder* deserves a particular mention for the articulate discussion and digression that ‘Iṣām al-Dīn has to offer. In this *Reminder*, al-Ījī stated that both the verb and the particle partake in one feature, namely that they both signify a concept that is realized in virtue of something else (*thābit li-l-ghayr*), while the inverse is not the case, namely that the other is realized because of their concepts. For this reason, al-Ījī concludes, both the particle and the verb cannot be predicated. Having expanded the *matn*, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn follows with a series of six investigations revolving around the previous principle stating that some concept or is realized in virtue of, or belongs to, something else as the proof to deny that that concept can be subject of a predication; see in particular pp. 80-86.

concept; therefore, the event may become individualized. Al-Ījī 's second motivation in this section is the establishment of his idea that unlike a particle, a verb can function as a predicate. This foregrounds what emerges as the core discussion of 'Iṣām al-Dīn's commentary on the *Reminder*, surrounding al-Ījī's view of the relationship of a verb to its potentially various subjects. He spends particular time on al-Ījī's claim regarding the concept of the verb that "*is sometimes instantiated in multiple essences, in such a way that it is admissible to ascribe it to a specific essence (qad yataḥaqqaqu fī dhawātin muta'addidatin fa-jāza nisbatuhu ilá khāṣṣin minhu)*).

'Iṣām al-Dīn explains further that the event, as being part of the concept of the verb, must necessarily be a universal to be ascribed to, or subsist in, different subjects. A particular, insofar as it is a single feature of an individual, could not be shared among many subjects.²⁹⁹ On the basis of this clarification, 'Iṣām al-Dīn rejects criticism brought up by al-Shirwānī that the realization of the verb in many subjects does not entail that the verb may actually be ascribed to one of those subjects. Al-Shirwānī notes in his critique that al-Ījī fails to demonstrate how the concept of the verb, as well as the concepts of those subjects, are semantically independent. Al-Shirwānī's criticism also entails that the event, as part of the verb's concept, cannot be a universal shared among many and, therefore, cannot be the predicate of each of these universals as al-Ījī argues. 'Iṣām al-Dīn disregards this by saying the universality of the concept of the verb carries (*yataḥṣib*) the very notion of semantic independence because there cannot be a universal that is non-independent (*kullī ghayr mustaqill*). This is, for al-Ījī as for 'Iṣām al-Dīn, the main distinguishing factor between verbs and particles.

²⁹⁹ It is important to notice that 'Iṣām al-Dīn indicates that the notion of "*being realized*" or "*instantiated*" (*yataḥaqqqa*) here means that the event subsists in these subjects, not that this event is true of them (*lā al-ṣidqu 'alayhā*); see p. 87.

Having established and refined al-Ījī's view of the relation between verbs and pronouns, 'Iṣām al-Dīn tackles the authors at times inconsistent discussion of verbs as they relate to and differ from particles. 'Iṣām al-Dīn begins his commentary on the *Reminder* by noting its departure from the views stated on this topic in the *Eighth Reminder*. There, al-Ījī maintains that verbs and particles both signify concepts realized in virtue of something else and therefore cannot be the subjects of predication. This may lead one to conclude that because their concepts are realized for some other concept, the concepts of verbs and particles are semantically non-independent. Conversely, al-Ījī's view in this *Reminder* is that the verb differs from the particle insofar as it conveys a universal concept and, because of this, can function as a predicate. For the same reason, the notion of the verb taken as a whole (*bi-tamāmihi*) cannot be subject of predication. Likewise, the ascription and the event, which are two integral parts of the notion of the verb, cannot be subject to predication, because the ascription, by being non-independent, prevents anything to be ascribed to the event. It then seems that, contrary to al-Ījī's own words, the concepts of the verb and the particle are not distinct in any way after all. As such, 'Iṣām al-Dīn remarks, one would struggle to interpret and harmonize the different, seemingly contrasting claims made in the *Classification*, the *Eighth* and the *Ninth Reminders* (*fa-iḥtajnā takallufāt kathīra fī kalāmihi*) regarding the difference between the verb and the particle.

To solve these inconsistencies 'Iṣām al-Dīn attempts to expand and harmonize the seemingly conflicting statements about verbs and particles made in the two *Reminders* with those in the *Classification*. To do so, he first relies on a discussion he presented in the *Eighth Reminder* in which al-Ījī demonstrated that both verbs and particles signify a concept considered to be realized in virtue of something else (*yadullāni 'alā ma'nan bi-i'tibāri kawnihi thābitan li-l-ghayri*). The key notion for al-Ījī and 'Iṣām al-Dīn is that this concept is realized in virtue of, or belongs to, some other concept (*thābit li-l-ghayr*), which renders that concept semantically non-

independent *per se*. For this reason, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn continues, verbs and particles cannot be the subject of a proposition (*lā yukhbaru ‘anhumā*). This is also the case because the goal of their positing is not to function as the subject of predication, rather to convey that their concept is realized by something else.

The last relevant *Reminder*, the *Tenth*, is the locus where commentators discuss the thorny question of whether the third-person pronoun is posited for, and signify, a universal or a particular concept. This ambiguity emerges from al-Ījī’s opaque claim “*Its [i.e., the third-person pronoun] universality is something to be pondered*” (*wa-fī kullyatihi naẓarun*), which contradicts the claim made in the *Classification* where all types of pronouns are said to convey a particular concept, since they all belong to the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. According to the first, the third-person pronoun is posited for all the particulars of a notion that has been previously mentioned, whether these particulars are real or this is similar to the notion entailed by the third person pronoun when it refers back to universal notions previously mentioned. According to the second, the pronoun is posited for individual particulars (*juz’iyyāt shakhiyya*) of a notion that has been previously mentioned, on the basis that the other personal pronouns, like first and second person, are posited for individuals.

‘Iṣām al-Dīn focuses on the lemma “*its universality should be pondered*” (*wa-fī kullyatihi naẓarun*), which leads him to claim that the third-person pronoun could be posited for a universal, and thus the pronoun would be a universal. Otherwise, the universal could be a figurative sense of the pronoun (*majāzan fīhi*), so that the pronoun’s concept would not be a universal but only a particular. This explanation is crucial for the interpretation of a variant reading of the *Reminder* which runs as “*its universality and its individuality should be pondered*” (*wa-fī kullyatihi wa-shakhṣiyyatihi naẓarun*), which would question the claim of the *Classification* where

all personal pronouns fall under the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* insofar as they convey individuated concepts. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn claims that, based on this variant, the third-person pronoun is qualified by universality and individuation on the basis that it refers sometimes to an individual and some other to a universal. This is so because, he says, “*its universality revolves around existence and non-existence*” (*kulliyyatuhu dā’iratun bayna al-wujūd wa-l-‘adam*). This means that if the universal is the actual concept posited for the pronoun, then it would be an actual existent (*mawjūd*); if, otherwise, the universal it is merely a figurative sense for it (*majāzan fihi*), as stated earlier, then it would be a non-existent. With this interpretation ‘Iṣām al-Dīn aims firstly to safeguard the status of the third-person pronoun as part of the class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, as it must be posited originally to convey particular or individuated concepts; and secondly to harmonize the claim made in this *Reminder* regarding the possibility for this pronoun to convey a universal. Therefore, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn must concede that, although all types of personal pronouns are posited to convey particular and individuated concepts, often the third-person pronoun is used to convey universals, but only in a figurative way (*bi-l-tajawwuz*).

This analysis of the issue allows ‘Iṣām al-Dīn to reject several claims made by his predecessors. The first is the position articulated by Abū al-Qāsim, in which the reason to inquire about the universality of the third-person pronoun is that the universal, insofar as it must be an individuated concept in the mind, may potentially be considered a particular. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn adds that no one, let alone al-Ījī, should be confused by such thought experiments to the extent of asking his readers to ponder them (*ta’ammul*).

Another is to reject al-Shirwānī’s criticism according to which, if the third-person pronoun is posited for both a particular and a universal, al-Ījī’s whole division of terms in the *Classification* could collapse. This is so because, if the third-person pronoun were also posited for

a universal, then it should be included in the *‘āmm-‘āmm* class together with generic nouns, *maṣḍars* and verbs. If it were otherwise posited also for a particular, then al-Ījī should have mentioned this duality of the third-person pronoun in the *Classification* and, in so doing, admit the mistake in his *Classification*.

A third and final criticism is directed against Khwāja ‘Alī, who claims that the concept of the third-person pronoun can be equally a universal or a particular because the pronoun is posited for real or relational particulars subsumed under a universal concept which in turn, refers to a notion used as a tool to grasp them all – a position similar to that of particles. At the same time, unlike ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, Khwāja ‘Alī rejects that any kind of figurative sense occurs when the pronoun conveys either a particular or a universal. Finally, Khwāja ‘Alī attempts to harmonize al-Ījī’s claim that the third-person pronoun conveys only real particulars (*juz’iyyāt ḥaqīqiyya*) made in the *Classification* with the claim made here about its universality and particularity. He does so by saying that al-Ījī’s choice in the *Classification* reflects his intention to follow the experts of Arabic language (*a’imma al-‘arabiyya*) who consider all types of personal pronouns to entail particularity and, as such, to be definite *per se* (*al-ma‘ārif*). This is the case because they define definite terms as terms posited for determinate object in an individual concept (*mā wuḍi‘a li-shay’in bi-‘aynihi*). However, for Khwāja ‘Alī, al-Ījī seems to have shifted his view in the *Reminder* where he admits that the third-person pronoun is characterized by both particularity and universality – which is ultimately the right position (*al-ḥaqq*) one should hold in his view.

For ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, Khwāja ‘Alī’s interpretation of al-Ījī’s intention to follow the Arabic experts and their definition of definite nouns is untenable. To support his critique, he sides with Abū al-Qāsim, who already rejected Khwāja ‘Alī’s interpretation by claiming that the sense of the experts’ definition of definite terms (*al-ma‘ārif*) is not necessarily to convey an individuated

concept (*mushakkhkhaṣ*). ‘Iṣām al-Dīn adds that their definition would rather indicate that definite terms are those characterized by determination (*ta’yīn*), whether their concept is a universal or a particular (*mā ‘tubira fīhi al-ta’yīnu sawā’an kanā kulliyyān aw shakhṣiyyan*). In this way ‘Iṣām al-Dīn discards the apparent contradiction highlighted by Khwāja ‘Alī in the *matn* and, more importantly, defends al-Ījī’s choice to consider all types of pronouns as inherently and originally posited for real particulars, rather than faithfully following and imitating the experts of Arabic language.³⁰⁰

This overview of the commentary authored by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn shows the richness and the complexity of the exegetical work put into place by its author to supersede and correct all previous major commentaries on the *matn*. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn confronts and calls into question the views and interpretations of his predecessors on issues raised from both *lexis* and *thēoria* standpoints that deserve to be discussed in detail. From the few passages presented above it emerges that ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s exegetical program is twofold: on the one hand, he aims to present a more complete and exhaustive commentary where he conveys his original interpretations of the *matn*; on the other hand, he is aware that an exhaustive commentary requires that he accounts for the whole previous exegetical tradition and its view pro or contra al-Ījī. All major views are analyzed and accepted or rejected based on his understanding and interpretation of the contents of the *matn*, making his commentary the pinnacle of the exegetical tradition that began by al-Jurjānī more than a century earlier. The tone of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s exegetical style may be summarized with a quote of the closing argument of his commentary on the *Eighth Reminder*: “After elucidating the matter, pay attention to who speaks; what he speaks about; to whom he speaks; in response to what he speaks; so we thank God for guarding us from such propositions; and to guide us in

³⁰⁰ Cf. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, *Sharḥ*..., pp. 89-91.

situations of error” (*wa-ba‘da wuḍūḥi al-ḥālī, unẓur ilá man qāla, wa-mā qāla, wa-li-man qāla, fī raddi mā qāla, wa-l-ḥamdu lillāhi ‘alá al-ḥamāyati ‘an mithli hādhā al-maqāli wa-l-hidāyati fī maqāmi al-ḍalālī*).³⁰¹

4.4 The Glossators on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s Commentary

The sets of glosses on this commentary are smaller in number than those on al-Qūshjī, as there are between thirteen and fifteen main sets of glosses that have been recorded or consistently transmitted on the marginalia of manuscript copies, none of which have been printed. This, however, does not mean that ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary received any less attention from or circulated less in the scholarly circles. Although it is correct that the stylistic conciseness and accessibility of al-Qūshjī’s commentary promoted its wider circulation in different regional scholarly circles, many of those glosses are markedly shorter and less original than those authored on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary. The previous overview has shown that, aside from being the longest of all the classic commentaries, ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary stands out for its richness and complexity. It is thus not surprising that most authors of these glosses painstakingly analyzed and expanded on virtually every part of the commentary, producing extensive and detailed sets of glosses. Here is a tentative list of the main glossators on the commentary:

1. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Astarābādī (d. 968/1560).³⁰²

³⁰¹ Cf. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn, *Sharḥ...*, 86. Some interlinear notes on the lithograph and witness copy King Saud University n. 7123, fol. 63/b indicates that the expression “*mā qāla*” refers to al-Shirwānī, while “*li-mān qāla*” refers to al-Jurjānī, and “*fī raddi mā qāla*” is al-Shirwānī’s response to Abū al-Qāsim.

³⁰² Ms. Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma n. 22779/2, 13815/2. Mawṣil: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma (Madrasat al-Šā’igh al-Jalabī) 18/22 [it is unclear whether these glosses are by al-Astarābādī or by Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥarīrī al-Kurdī, see below].

2. Maḥmūd ibn Sālīm al-Kaffawī (d. 990/1582).
3. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Sharānīshī al-Kurdī (d. ca. 1085/1674-5).³⁰³
4. Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar al-Ḥusaynābādī al-Kurdī al-Ḥarīrī (d. 1080/1669-70).³⁰⁴
5. Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynābādī al-Kurdī (1040/1626-1129/1717).³⁰⁵
 - i. Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar II (d. after 1129/1717).
 - ii. ‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥaydar (d. 1106/1695-96).³⁰⁶
 - iii. Shihāb al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Ḥaydar (d. after 1151/1738-9).³⁰⁷
6. ‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynābādī al-Kurdī (d. ca. 1107/1695).³⁰⁸
7. Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥarīrī al-Kurdī (fl. 11th/17th-12th-18th).³⁰⁹
 - i. Abū Bakr b. Muḥammad Mīr Rustumī (fl. mid-12th/18th)

³⁰³ Ms. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariya 113. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariya (Ambābī) 48545. Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 13827. Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 6, and 3 *mīm*. Mawṣil: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 124/22. Palestine: Birzeit University 185.

³⁰⁴ Ms. al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktabat al-Bābānīn 155 (cf. Maḥmūd Aḥmad Muḥammad, *Fihris Makhtūṭāt Maktaba al-Awqāf al-Markaziyya fī l-Sulaymāniyya*, Baghdad: Wizāra al-Awqāf wa-l-Shu’ūn al-Dīniyya, 1982-85, vol. 1, p. 446). Al-Sulaymāniyya: Jāmi‘at Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 52/1, fol. 1a-14b.

³⁰⁵ Ms. Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma n. 4331/1. Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 879/4; and 881/3. Istanbul: Baghtadli Vehbi Efendi 2104 (10). Ankara: Milli Kütüphane n. 18 HK 94/4, fol. 67a-117b (attributed to Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar). Palestine: Birzeit University 188. Al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn n. 52/4, fol. 50a-87b; and al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn no shelf number (cf. Maḥmūd, *Fihrist...*, vol. 4, p. 292, n. 15/38). Princeton: Yahuda n. 5997, fol. 31b-91a (attributed to Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar). KSU: Umm al-Qurā University, Maktabat al-Malik ‘Abd Allāh bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz n. 20663 (a preview of the manuscript can be accessed at https://dorar.uqu.edu.sa/uquui/pdf_viewer?Bitstream_id=53ec3845-c664-4f21-84a2-f10e86bc1c16&pdf_viewer= accessed June 28th 2021).

³⁰⁶ Ms. Istanbul: Nuruosmaniye 4494, fol. 112b-122a. Istanbul: Hamidiye 1265, fol. 38b-46a. In the introduction, the scribe, likely a student of the author of these glosses, claims that he gathered these annotations while studying with the master Kurd ‘Abd Allāh in 1062/1651. The name could be another version of ‘Abd Allāh al-Kurdī. Another copy is preserved in Princeton: Yahuda n. 5294, fol. 15/b-21/a; however, Mach attributes the glosses to a certain ‘Alī Girev, spelling the name as *Girev* rather than *Kurd*.

³⁰⁷ The two copies of Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad’s glosses that I could access contain several marginal annotations that are authored by the Ḥaydar’s three sons, signed respectively as Aḥmad *ibn al-muḥashshī*, ‘Abd al-Allāh *ibn al-muḥashshī* and Ibrāhīm *ibn al-muḥashshī*.

³⁰⁸ Ms. Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 13194, 4395/1, and 13824/3.

³⁰⁹ Ms. Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 879/1. Al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 52/3; and 323. Princeton: Yahuda 3094. Palestine: Birzeit University 186.

- ii. ‘Abd Allāh b. Khidr al-Kurdī (fl. 12th/18th).³¹⁰
8. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥaydar al-Ḥusaynābādī al-Kurdī (completed before 1104/1693).
9. Aḥmad b. ‘Uthmān (fl. 12th/18th?).³¹¹
10. Ibrāhīm b. Faḍl Allāh al-Sīwāsī Sharī-zādeh (fl. mid-12th/18th c.).³¹²
11. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥamīd b. Muṣṭafā al-Aqrimānī al-Kaffawī (d. 1167/1754 or 1174/1760).³¹³
12. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Nūr al-Dīn al-Qurshī al-Suḥaymī al-Qala‘āwī (d. 1178/1764).³¹⁴
13. Muḥammad Hibbat Allāh b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyá al-Tājī al-Bala‘ī al-Ḥanafī (1151/1739-1224/1809), entitled *Sharḥ alá al-Sharḥ*.³¹⁵
14. Muḥammad ‘Iṣma (or ‘Iṣmat) Allāh b. Ibrāhīm Ketkhudā-zādeh Ḥājji Čelebī (d. 1160/1747).³¹⁶
15. ‘Alī Muḥḍir Bāshī al-Mawṣilī (fl. 12th/18th c.)
16. Ṣālīḥ b. Aḥmad b. Yaḥyá b. Yūnus al-Sa‘adī Efendī al-Mawṣilī (1192/1778-1246/1830).³¹⁷

³¹⁰ Ms. Baghdad, al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma n. 13827/2. Probably a descendant of the Ḥusaynābādī family.

³¹¹ A set of glosses authored by a certain Aḥmad b. ‘Uthmān are preserved al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn n. 52/3, together with the sets of glosses by Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar, Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Kurdī.

³¹² Ms. Istanbul: Kilič Ali Pasha 882/901, fol. 2a-38a.

³¹³ Print: Istanbul: Maṭba‘at Busnawī al-Ḥājj Muḥarram Efendī, 1277/1860-1, accessible at <https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/islamic-heritage-project/catalog/40-990072020860203941>

³¹⁴ Ms. Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 13802.

³¹⁵ Ms. al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn n. 61/2; Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 13763, and 4333.

³¹⁶ Ms. Istanbul: Marmara University, İlâhiyat Fakültesi 490.

³¹⁷ Ms. Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 6881; and 13718; and 13187; and 4462. Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 879; Baghdad: al-Khizāna al-Ālusiyya, Maktaba Maṭḥaf al-‘Irāqī 8678/1. Mawṣil: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 14/6 (Madrasat al-Ṣā’igh al-Jalabī). KSA: Umm al-Qurá University, Maktaba al-Malik ‘Abd Allāh bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz n. 20578 (a preview is accessible at https://dorar.uqu.edu.sa/uquui/bitstream/20.500.12248/108843/1/b12143455_0.pdf).

17. Yaḥyá b. Ḥusayn al-Mazūrī al-‘Imādī (ca. 1145/1733-1248/1833).³¹⁸
18. Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-‘Aṭṭār Shaykh al-Azhar (1180/1766-1250/1835).³¹⁹
19. Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-‘Aṭṭār Shaykh al-Azhar (1180/1766-1250/1835) (third recension).³²⁰
20. Muḥammad b. Sa‘īd b. Muḥammad Amīn al-Ṭabqajalī (?) (d. 1273/1857), entitled *Ināla al-Marām fī Ḍāḥ Sharḥ ‘Iṣām*.³²¹
21. Shams al-Dīn ‘Abd Allāh b. Muṣṭafā al-Damlūjī al-Mawṣilī (d. 1259/1843).³²²
22. Muḥammad al-Ṣūfī (1281/1864-1352/1933).³²³
23. Muṣṭafā al-Rūmī (?).³²⁴

The crucial feature that emerges from this list of glossators concerns the scholarly region of origin. Aside from the case of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥumayd al-Kaffawī and Ḥasan al-‘Aṭṭār, the majority of these glossators hail from the Kurdish region of Turkey and Iraq, as their *nisba* al-Kurdī indicates. The reception that ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary received among these scholarly circles is not the result of a fortuitous episode, but is consistent with the broader reception and study of the so called “books of the Persians” among the Kurdish and Ottoman scholarly milieus

³¹⁸ Glosses mentioned in Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ b. al-Sayyid Šibghatallāh al-Ḥaydarī al-Baghdādī, *‘Unwān al-Majd fī Bayān Aḥwāl Baghdād wa-l-Bašra wa-Najd*, Baghdad: Dār Manshūrāt al-Bašrī, 1968, p. 135.

³¹⁹ Ms. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 131, and (Ambabi) 48546.

³²⁰ Ms. Alexandria: Maktaba al-Baladiyya al-Iskandariyya 4510 (possibly a holograph).

³²¹ Ms. Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 23166. Cf. Ahlwardt, vol. 4 n. 5317 (Petermann II 653).

³²² Ms. Baghdad: al-Khizāna al-Ālusiyya, Maktaba Maṭḥaf al-‘Irāqī 8650. Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Qādiriyya 876 [as marginal notes on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary]. Mawṣil: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma (al-Madrasa al-Muḥammadiyya) 19/2; and (Madrasat al-Šā’igh al-Jalabī) 14/7; and (Madrasat al-Šā’igh al-Jalabī) 17/22 *majmū‘*.

³²³ Mentioned in Sa‘īd al-Daywah-jī, *Ta’rīkh al-Mawṣil*, Baghdad (?): al-Majma‘ al-‘Ilmī al-‘Irāqī, 1402/1982, vol. 2, p. 200.

³²⁴ Ms. Princeton: Yahuda 5052.

that emerged during the 11th/17th century.³²⁵ The exegetical practice on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary seems to start just a few decades after his death with the glosses authored by a certain Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Astarābādī and Maḥmūd b. Sālīm al-Kaffawī in the middle of the 10th/16th century. One of the earliest and most widespread sets of glosses was authored by the Kurdish scholar Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Sharānīshī (also spelled al-Shīrānīshī or al-Shīrānīsī) (d. ca. 1085/1674-5) who was active throughout the 11th/17th century and authored sets of glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentaries on al-Taftāzānī’s *Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq*, and Abū al-Qāsim’s *Risāla fi l-Isti‘āra* respectively.³²⁶ Unfortunately little is known about al-Sharānīshī’s life and the intellectual circle he was part of, but in all likelihood his intellectual lineage belong to those of the Kurdish scholars of Iraq as he hailed from the village of Sharānīsh in the Dohuk Governorate in the Kurdistan region of Iraq; also notable is that he was likely the main intellectual figure in the madrasa *al-Ikhlāṣiyya* where he taught logic, rational theology, theoretical astronomy and *tafsīr*.³²⁷ Despite the extreme scarcity of biographical information, the numerous extant copies of his set of glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary indicate that this is his most relevant work and an influential one in the exegetical tradition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. According to Ḥājji Khalīfa, al-Sharānīshī completed his sets of glosses in 1016/1607. If his death occurred around 1085/1674-5, this means that he composed his glosses very early in his career. The set of glosses ranges between sixty and one hundred folios depending on the script and layout. In all likelihood, his glosses, like Jāmī’s, for example, were not conceived as independent works but were only transcribed and transmitted independently at a later stage, as they often

³²⁵ See in particular Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 26-59.

³²⁶ A copy of his glosses on the commentary on *Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq* is contained in Salīm Āghā 663 (see GAL 7:317); copies of his glosses on the commentary on *Risāla fi l-Isti‘āra* in contained in Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 34763, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya n. 30 *mīm*; Beirut: AUB 612; Istanbul: Laleli 2956.

³²⁷ Cf. Sharaf Khān al-Bidlīsī, *Sharafnāmeḥ*, al-Qāhira: Faraj Allāh Dhakī, 1950 (?), pp. 355-6.

appear in the margins of the commentary and lack any incipit or explicit. As for the content of the glosses, al-Sharānishī covers the commentary in its entirety and devotes his discussion to unpacking and amplifying the main passages where ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s wording is often concise. Another main feature of his glosses is to provide a detailed exposition of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s numerous quotes from other main commentaries in order to reconstruct in a clearer fashion the broader context of the claims, criticisms and rebuttals that are often presented elliptically in the commentary.

The period from the middle of the 11th/17th to the middle of the 12th/18th centuries witnesses the efflorescence of the exegesis on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary by the Kurdish scholars active in the centers of Mawrān (or Mawarān) and Ḥarīr, two villages near Mawṣil and Erbil, exemplified by the intellectual endeavors of the Ḥusaynābādī family and their students.³²⁸ The ancestor of the Ḥusaynābādī family, a certain Muḥammad b. Ḥaydar, settled in the Kurdish regions probably fleeing the Safavid oppression in Transoxiana during the 10th/16th century. The family established centers of learning in the villages of Mawrān and Ḥarīr between the end of the 11th/17th and the beginning of the 12th/18th centuries far from the intellectual circles of the capital Istanbul. Aḥmad ibn Ḥaydar (d. 1669-70), son of Muḥammad ibn Ḥaydar, emerged as an important intellectual figure in the region and was likely the first of the Ḥusaynābādī family to have composed a set of glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary.³²⁹ However, from the extant bibliographical data it seems that this set of glosses enjoyed only limited circulation and appears

³²⁸ For a brief sketch of the family’s scholarly circle later in Baghdad see Ibrāhīm al-Durūbī, *al-Baghdādiyyūn Akhbāruhum wa-Majālisuhum*, Baghdad: Maṭba‘at al-Rābiṭa, 1958, p. 35.

³²⁹ The author of this glosses is unmistakably Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad, not be confused with his grandson Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar II, as the colophon of Maktaba Jāmi‘a Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn n. 50/1 clearly indicates “[...] Aḥmad bin Ḥaydar al-qadīm al-Ḥarīrī [...]”

to be extant only in a few copies.³³⁰ These sets of glosses are like those of al-Sharānishī, devoid of any incipit or explicit, and then expand on some key passages of the commentary before concluding at the *Seventh Reminder*.

The set of glosses authored by Aḥmad's son, Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad (d. 1129/1717) appears to be more extensive than those of his father, as they cover the commentary in its entirety, and were likely conceived to be an independent work from the main commentary. Aḥmad ibn Ḥaydar also provides a long introduction where he refers to his glosses as “*noble useful remarks and lofty annotations*” that aim to clarify ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s opaque verifications (*taḥqīqāt mukhtaḥfiya*). From the introduction it also emerges that the glosses were likely composed to be taught and circulated among the teaching circles that Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad held in Mawrān and Ḥarīr (*jama‘ahā turāb aqdām al-ṭullāb [...]*) thereby “*disclosing the treasures of its pointers and explaining the hints of its claims [...]*.”³³¹ Moreover, Ḥaydar did not consider his glosses to be useful for beginner students, and instead addressed an audience with mastery of the *matn* and its commentaries. He states that his intent for the glosses is to be “*a memento (tadhkira) for those [students and aspiring scholars] who have a natural disposition towards right judgement and stay away from deviation and aberration; and as a guidance (tabṣira) for those who aspire to go beyond the low grounds of knowledge to reach the summit of perfection.*”³³²

³³⁰ See the bibliographical reference in the list above.

³³¹ “*‘idāḥan li-kunūzi ishārātihi wa-tibyānan li-rumūzi ‘ibārātihi,*” cf. Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn n. 52/4, fol. 49a.

³³² *Ibidem*. Overall, the glosses provide a detailed analysis of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s claims and views, which Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad often coordinates with ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s claims made in his glosses on Jāmī’s influential grammar manual *al-Fawā’id al-Ḍiyyā’iyya*, as well as a vast array of other manuals on sciences cognate to ‘ilm al-waḍ‘, such as those on logic (such as al-Jurjānī’s glosses on both commentaries on *Maṭālī‘ al-Anwār* and *al-Shamsiyya*), *balāgha* (such as al-Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-Talkhīṣ*), and *uṣūl al-fiqh* (mainly al-Ījī’s commentary on *al-Mukhtaṣar al-Uṣūlī* and its glosses by al-Jurjānī and al-Taftāzānī). Many references are also made to the previous classic commentaries, mainly those by al-Shirwānī and al-Samarqandī, as well as to glossators such as al-Sharānishī. It is interesting to note that Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad, before al-Kaffawī, identifies the system of quotations used by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn with the three verbs in the passive mood “*ufida*” to refer to al-Shirwānī, “*dhukira*” to refer to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī and “*qīla*” to refer to Khwāja ‘Alī. There are however two relevant features regarding this quote. The first is that Ḥaydar clearly states “*qāla fī l-hāshiya*”

This growing scholarly and exegetical activity inspired by Ḥaydar was inherited by his three sons Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn II, ‘Abd Allāh and Ibrāhīm who continued the family tradition mainly in the same region, according to the numerous marginal annotations signed respectively as Aḥmad *ibn al-muḥashshī*, ‘Abd al-Allāh *ibn al-muḥashshī* and Ibrāhīm *ibn al-muḥashshī*. Similar glosses often signed with the first name followed by Kurdī or al-Ḥaydarī are also very common in the manuscript and lithograph copies of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary.

To the same tradition belong the glosses attributed to a certain Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Kurdī, a grandson of Aḥmad and a student of his, whose extant copies display intense exegetical activity, given the numerous marginal annotations and superglosses composed possibly in a teaching environment.³³³ It was during this period that Ḥaydar’s students as well as

referring likely to ‘Iṣām al-Dīn himself, which might indicate that Ḥaydar had access to a copy of the commentary containing additional notes by the author. This is plausible because throughout the glosses Ḥaydar refers to other copies of the commentary (*wa-fī ba‘ḍ al-nusakh*) in which ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s wording appears to be different. The second concerns the identity of Khwāja ‘Alī, here also referred to as the first commentator and student of al-Jurjānī. It seems that Ḥaydar was not aware of the identity of Khwāja ‘Alī and, expressing some doubts, identifies him as al-Qūshjī (*la‘allahu huwa al-mashhūr bi-l-Qūshjī*). Cf. Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad, *Ḥawāshī...*, fol. 49/b.

³³³ The identity of Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Kurdī is unclear. One Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn is mentioned by a later heir of the Ḥusaynābādī family, Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ b. al-sayyid Ṣibghatallāh b. al-Ḥaydarī al-Baghdādī, heir of Ṣibghatallāh founder of the Baghdad branch of the family. In his intellectual biography on the Ḥusaynābādī family, he mentions Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn to be the “son of the daughter of our ancestor Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar.” He mentions Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn in two instances, the first in relation to Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad, where he says that Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn authored a set of glosses on Mīr Abū al-Faṭḥ’s glosses on al-Tabrizī’s commentary *al-Ḥanafīyya* on al-Ījī’s *Risāla fī ādāb al-baḥṭh*, and a set of glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary on the *Risāla*. Moreover, in this passage he emphasizes that Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn, despite being one of the most outstanding scholars in this generation, was considered to be an outsider of the family lineage because his mother married, contrary to the family custom, a man had no ties with the learned family (cf. p. 129). In the second instance, Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ claims to have composed a set of super-super-glosses on Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn’s super-glosses on Mīr Abū al-Faṭḥ (cf. p. 132). In the identification card of Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn n. 52/3 he is identified as Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Kurdī sibṭ Ibrāhīm al-Ḥaydarī, a grandson of Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad (fl. 1738). However, there is no textual evidence to support this attribution. The first identification seems to be more correct as it is supported by textual evidence found in Staatsbibliothek, Petermann I 679, 2/a, which preserves the glosses of Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn on Mīr Abū al-Faṭḥ, in which he claims to have studied with Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad; see Schwarz, *Writing...*, p. 160. More interestingly, in his glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn seems to be more aware than his teacher Ḥaydar about the textual issues

students of his sons, who came from the Anatolian regions as well as from the Safavid empire as far as Khorasan and Dagestan, engaged in copying and circulating the glosses and the scholia authored by the Ḥusaynābādī members.³³⁴ It is right after this period that the scholarly enterprise of the Ḥusaynābādīs splits into two branches. Two of the sons of Ibrāhīm b. Ḥaydar emerge as the main heirs of the intellectual lineage, namely Ismā‘īl b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥaydar, the author of a set of glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary, who continued the scholarly activity in Māwrān, and Šibghatallāh (d. 1188/1773-4) who settled in Baghdad.³³⁵ Although very little is known about the Mawrān and Ḥarīr branch of the family, the Baghdad branch, eventually known as al-Ḥaydarī, was initiated by Šibghatallāh and flourished in the Iraqi capital.

The thriving intellectual activity of the Baghdad branch, including attention paid to the corpus on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, emerges from the account of one of the heirs of the Ḥusaynābādī family, namely Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ b. al-Sayyid Šibghatallāh b. al-Ḥaydarī al-Baghdādī (1235/1820-1299/1882), who composed an intellectual biography of the family in his book *‘Unwān al-Majd fī Bayān Aḥwāl Baghḍad wa-l-Baṣra wa-Najd* completed in 1286/1869. In his detailed description of his masters and teachers, Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ claims to have studied *Ḥadīth* with Yaḥyá b. Ḥusayn al-Mazūrī al-‘Imādī, originally from North Kurdistan, who himself studied with a member of the Ḥusaynābādī family, ‘Āṣim b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥaydarī, likely a son of Ibrāhīm b. Ḥaydar, and who authored a set of glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary.³³⁶ To find Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ engaging with

regarding the reference of “*qīla*” to al-Qūshjī’s commentary. He says that in some copies he consulted he found references to al-Qūshjī, but he flags that most of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s quotations do not match with the wording of al-Qūshjī’s commentary; cf. Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Kurdī, *Ḥāshiya...*, al-Sulaymāniyya: Maktabā Šalāḥ al-Dīn n. 323, fol. 1/b., l. 11-12

³³⁴ Cf. Schwarz, *Writing...*, p. 160; for more details about the copying and dissemination of the Ḥusaynābādī corpus see pp. 162-168.

³³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 161.

³³⁶ Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ, *‘Unwān al-Majd...*, p. 135.

the corpus of rational sciences, one must turn to his teaching with Ibrāhīm b. Ḥusayn al-Ramkī, alongside whom he studied ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary with the glosses by Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad, Ḥaydar’s nephew Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Kurdī, and al-Sharānishī.³³⁷ Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ also studied the curriculum of the rational disciplines with Abū Bakr Mīr Rustumī al-Kurdī, who in turn studied with ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Chillī and with one representative of the family Muḥammad b. Khidr al-Ḥaydarī.

The presence of Mīr Rustumī in the Kurdish intellectual circles and centers of learning of Kurdistan and Iraq is crucial for understanding the development of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, in that Mīr Rustumī’s literary production on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* marks the shift from the scholastic tradition to the *madrasa*-manual tradition. Mīr Rustumī is the author of a series of super-glosses on Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn’s glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, and a short independent epitome on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* entitled *Khulāṣa*, with the self-commentary *Nihāya al-Was‘*. If Mīr Rustumī’s super-glosses belong to the classical exegetical tradition initiated almost two centuries earlier by the Ḥusaynābādīs, the short epitome on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* represents a new trend in the literary production of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* that emerges from the middle of the 12th/18th onwards, which makes room for more concise texts on the tradition which become, as the next chapter will detail, a mainstay of entry-level *madrasa* curricula.

The thriving exegetical activity during the 12th/18th to the 13th/19th centuries is exemplified not only by the interest of Mīr Rustūmī in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, but also by the long sets of glosses authored by scholars active in Iraq, and in particular in Baghdad, Mawṣil and Erbil. Among these

³³⁷ It is unclear whether this Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn is the same mentioned earlier, namely Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar’s grandson. Earlier, this Muḥammad was referred to as “son of the daughter of our ancestor Aḥmad b. Ḥaydar,” while here he is referred to as “the son of his [i.e., Ḥaydar b. Aḥmad’s] brother.” In other words, it is unclear whether Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn was the son of one of Aḥmad’s daughters or the son of one of Aḥmad’s sons, an unnamed brother of Ḥaydar; cf. Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ, *Unwān al-Majd...*, p. 139-40.

is Muḥammad Amīn al-Ṭabqajalī al-Baghdādī (1273/1857), mufti of Baghdad, whose extant super-commentary, entitled *Anāla al-Marām fī Ḍdāḥ Sharḥ ‘Iṣām*, ranges around two hundred folios;³³⁸ Yaḥyá b. Ḥusayn al-Mazūrī al-‘Imādī (ca. 1145/1733-1248/1833), an associate of the Ḥusaynābādīs and teacher of Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ, whose glosses were taught and studied in Baghdad. The glosses authored by Ṣāliḥ Efendī al-Mawṣilī (d. 1246/1830) are particularly revelatory of the Kurdish and Iraqi scholar on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, since in his introduction of this extensive set of glosses expresses strong criticism against his colleagues and previous glossators on *‘Iṣām al-Dīn*. These scholars, in his view, have embarked on discussing the commentary and even recommended him to write his own set of glosses on it while failing to grasp the explanation of the investigations discussed and analyzed by *‘Iṣām al-Dīn*. They were thus accused of having erred in their understanding of many passages of the commentary, so much so that they “*fell from the apex of verification to the lowest point of imitation*” (*min awjī al-taḥqīq ilá ḥaḍīḍi al-taqlīdi habaṭū*).³³⁹ It is unclear whether Ṣāliḥ Efendī is directing his criticism beyond or solely against scholars and students who taught, studied and transmitted the exegetical corpus of the Ḥusaynābādī-Ḥaydarī family in the Iraqi circles. Instead, Ṣāliḥ Efendī’s direct reference to the well-known trope of *taḥqīq* vs. *taqlid* may be very well a hint to a still very active engagement with the long-standing exegetical endeavor of the Ḥusaynābādīs. The heritage of the scholiastic tradition on *‘Iṣām al-Dīn*’s commentary in Iraq seems to reach its peak with Shams al-Dīn ‘Abd Allāh al-Damlūjī al-Mawṣilī (d. 1259/1843), who authored a set of glosses of more than one hundred folios, in which he clearly establishes a link with the previous intellectual tradition of glossators, among whom is Ṣāliḥ Efendī and his teacher ‘Alī Muḥḍir-Bāshī. Moreover, throughout the glosses he explicitly indicates his criticism against the interpretations of his teacher Ṣāliḥ Efendī as well as some

³³⁸ On the author and his family’s scholarly circle of Baghdad see Ibrāhīm al-Durūbī, *al-Baghdādiyyūn...*, p. 33.

³³⁹ Cf. Ṣāliḥ Efendī al-Mawṣilī, *Ḥāshiya...*, Umm al-Qurá University, Maktaba al-Malik ‘Abd Allāh bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz n. 20578, fol. 1b. This is a widespread *topos* in commentary introductions.

Ḥusaynābādīs such as Ḥaydar and Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn, as it appears from the marginal annotations “*Ṣāliḥ Efendī wa-fīhi radd ‘alayhi*,” “*Ḥaydar wa-fīhi radd ‘alayhi*,” or “*Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn wa-fīhi radd ‘alayhi*”.³⁴⁰

There are further examples of glossators outside the Ḥusaynābādī scholarly circles who authored the longer extant sets of glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary. It is in fact unclear whether some of these authors read and studied the Ḥusaynābādī’s scholiastic corpus on the commentary or authored their glosses within a different scholarly tradition, an aspect which can be clarified only by looking more closely at their intellectual biographies and to the transmission of the extant copies of their glosses. One of them is a near fifty-folio set of glosses authored by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Suḥaymī al-Qala‘āwī al-Miṣrī (d. 1178/1764), who is placed by his biography exclusively within Egyptian scholarly milieu.³⁴¹ More important are the extensive, and to date the only available in a printed lithograph, set of glosses authored by one of the most prolific authors of the 12th/18th century, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥājj Ḥamīd al-Kaffawī (d. 1167/1754 or 1174/1760). Little is known about the life and education of al-Kaffawī, and the sparse bio-bibliographical notices available affirm that he was active in Medina and was

³⁴⁰ I obtained this information from Naser Dumairieh and Bilal Orfali’s forthcoming critical edition and study of al-Damlūjī’s sufi work *Kaff al-Mu‘ārīḍ* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashreq). The authors have access to an uncatalogued copy of al-Damlūjī’s glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary that belongs to the private collection of the Damlūjī family. A member of the family, Prof. Salma Samar Damluji, a faculty member at the American University of Beirut, has given permission to digitize the codex in her possession. I received a digital copy of the manuscript only after the final submission of this chapter, and, unfortunately, I could not integrate more material from this important set of glosses. I am grateful to Naser Dumairieh for sharing a pre-print version of the introduction of the critical edition where the relevant passages of al-Damlūjī’s glosses are discussed. I am more grateful to Prof. Salma Samar Damluji for kindly sharing the digital version of the manuscript.

³⁴¹ Cf. al-Jabartī, *‘Ajā’ib al-Āthār fī l-Tarājim wa-l-Akhhbār*, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥīm ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, Cairo: Maṭba‘a Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1997, vol. 1, p. 428.

appointed *qadi* in Mecca, but died while holding a position of judge in Jerusalem.³⁴² This set of dense glosses ranges to two-hundred pages and makes use of a wide array of disciplines cognate to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, such as logic, grammar, rhetoric and *uṣūl al-fiqh*, but also cites the major sources of *‘ilm al-kalām* such as al-Iṣfahānī’s *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd* and al-Dawānī’s glosses on al-Qūshjī’s *Sharḥ al-Tajrīd* to expand on the more philosophical aspects of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s views.

Al-Kaffawī integrates and assesses claims and views from most classic commentaries ranging from Khwāja ‘Alī to Abū al-Qāsim al-Samarqandī and thus expands the range of the scholastic tradition on these commentaries. An annotation written by the same al-Kaffawī in the margins of the introduction establishes the system of quotations to be added to those employed by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn in order to identify the author of other sets of glosses on the previous classic commentaries. He informs the reader (*i‘lam annahu qawlī fī hādhihi al-ḥāshiyati [...]*) that “*qīla*” refers to al-Shirwānī, “*qad qīla*” to Shahri-zādeh, “*wa-laka an taqūlu*” to a certain Ṣadr b. Aḥmad al-Kurdī, “*yuqāl*” to Ḥāmid b. Burhān al-Ghaffārī (or al-Qaffārī), glossator on Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary, “*shana‘a al-mudaqqiq*” to al-Ḥarrūbī (or al-Kharrūbī), glossator on al-Qūshjī’s commentary, and “*qad yu‘taraḍu*” to Abū al-Baqā’, glossator on Abū al-Qāsim’s commentary.³⁴³ Al-Kaffawī aims not to compose a compilation of views with these intertextually referenced glosses, but to produce a set of glosses that matches the complexity of the commentary itself. Echoing widespread *topos* in the exegetical tradition, he states this clearly in his introduction, where he acknowledges the superiority of ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary over all others for the decisive proofs provided in it (*fāqa ‘alā sā’iri al-shurūḥi bi-l-adillati al-qaṭ‘iyyati*). Al-Kaffawī aims to weigh and evaluate ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s claims by distancing himself from the partisans of dialectic (*sha‘b al-qīl wa-l-qāl*) he dismisses. To do so, al-Kaffawī adds that he has placed himself under the

³⁴² Cf. Bursali, *Osmanli Müellifleri*, vol. 1, p. 380-381. Ismā‘il Bashā al-Baghdādī, *İdāḥ al-Maknūn...*, Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī 1945, vol. 1, p. 3.

³⁴³ Cf. al-Kaffawī, *Ḥāshiya...*, p. 2, marginal note.

authority of true judgement (*al-ḥaqq al-ḥaqīq*) even when it disagrees with the majority of opinions.³⁴⁴ Overall, al-Kaffawī's set of glosses offers among the most exhaustive expositions of both the commentary and its relevant exegetical tradition, which may explain why it was one of the few texts on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* available in print to Istanbul's *madrasas* as early as 1277/1860-1.

Finally, the primacy of ʿIṣām al-Dīn's commentary for the further development of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is exemplified by the two cases of Hibbat Allāh al-Tājī and Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār, who witnessed the thriving exegetical activity outside the Ḥusaynābādī tradition and the intense and unprecedented production of glosses and super-commentaries on the commentary. This is particularly true of the Damascene and *mufti* of Baalbek Hibbat Allāh al-Tājī al-Balaʿī (1151/1739-1224/1809), whose education and teaching activities took place during his frequent travels between Damascus and Cairo until early 1173/1759, and by the end of the same year from Damascus to the Ottoman centers of learning (probably Istanbul) and vice-versa. It is after settling in Damascus during this period that he is said to have composed most of his works, notably a to-date longest super-commentary (*sharḥ ʿalā al-sharḥ*) on ʿIṣām al-Dīn's commentary, at over two hundred and fifty folios.³⁴⁵ Among the extant manuscript copies attributed to the Azharī shaykh Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār (1180/1766-1250/1835) there are at least three sets of glosses on ʿIṣām al-Dīn's commentary. Two of these three sets range around seventy folios each, and do not contain any information regarding the circumstances of their composition, neither in the incipit

³⁴⁴ *Ibidem* lines 4-7.

³⁴⁵ On his biography cf. Khalīl Mardam Bek, *Aʿyān al-Qarn al-Thālith ʿAshar fī l-Fikr wa-l-Siyāsa wa-l-Ijtīmāʿ*, Beirut: Lajnat al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1391/1971, pp. 91-92. I managed to acquire a copy of the super-commentary, al-Sulaymāniyya, Maktaba Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn n. 61/2, but unfortunately, I was unable to read the long introduction as the digital images of the first two folios are out of focus. It would have been important to have access to what appears to be a long introduction to understand his reasons for writing such an extensive commentary, and the other sources used by Hibbat Allāh in composing it. It is also important to notice how the manuscript copies that I could locate are preserved in Erbil and Baghdad, which are usually the manuscript collections where most of the Ḥusaynābādī corpus is preserved.

nor in the explicit.³⁴⁶ More important is the third recension of his glosses, which are more extensive than the previous ones, exceeding one-hundred folios and containing a long and detailed introduction that sheds some light about their composition. Al-‘Aṭṭār initially mentions his decision to keep a collection of glosses on this commentary away from the public (*istamarrat taḥta ṭayy al-dafātiri*) until he resorted to them when he decided to teach the commentary again to some students. However, it seems that al-‘Aṭṭār’s mastery was not yet complete, as he claims to have later resumed studying the text with the glosses of his master Aḥmad b. Yūnus al-Khulayfī (1131/1719-1209/1795), a prolific author in most rational sciences such as logic, *ādāb al-baḥṭh* and *balāgha*, who was active exclusively in Azharī circles and studied the curriculum of the rational sciences with al-Shubrāwī, al-Ḥifnī, al-Damanhūrī and al-Ṣa‘īdī.³⁴⁷

Having completed a more detailed perusal of the commentary, al-‘Aṭṭār claims to have resumed the analysis of its contents and proofs a second time (*‘āwadtū marra thāniya al-naẓar fīhi*) in collaboration with scholars and their materials outside his circles (*ba‘ḍ al-fuḍalā’ al-qādimīn ‘alaynā wa-l-wāridīn ilaynā*). It is at this point that al-‘Aṭṭār likely composed a second recension of his glosses, as he claims to have collected and gathered the most valuable points on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary from these sets of glosses and other commentaries in order to pen a new work (*nazzamtū dhālika fī silki al-suṭūr al-bāhira*). Al-‘Aṭṭār then adds that he continued to work on his glosses from his departure to Istanbul from Cairo in early 1217/1803 until his return in 1228/1813, during which he laid down the basis for most of his works.³⁴⁸ It was during his itinerary in the intellectual centers of Istanbul, Palestine, Damascus and the Hijaz that al-‘Aṭṭār

³⁴⁶ See al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya n. 48546 (121), and n. 96292 (285).

³⁴⁷ Cf. al-Jabartī, *‘Ajā’ib*..., vol. 2, pp. 391-392.

³⁴⁸ He resided in Istanbul (twice), Shkoder, Damascus (twice) and Palestine, during this period. For a complete list of his works and dates of their composition see, Peter Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998 2nd edition, pp. 197-208. The timeline and geography of al-‘Aṭṭār’s intellectual production has been reevaluated in more detail by Frederick de Jong in “The Itinerary of Ḥasan al-‘Aṭṭār (1766-1835): A Reconsideration and its Implications,” in *Journal of Semitic Studies*, XXVIII/1 Spring (1983), pp. 99-128.

had the occasion to discuss his views with his peers and to gain access to sets of glosses that were unavailable among Azharī circles despite their evident awareness of their relevance (*wa-raʾytu hunāk ʿalā dhālika al-kitābi min al-ḥawāshī mā laysa bi-diyārinā wa-lam yaʿsun yajrī dhikruhu bi-asmāʿinā*). Only after he studied all the exegetical material, likely in Istanbul and Damascus, did al-ʿAṭṭār complete his final set of extensive glosses in Cairo circa 1228/1813.³⁴⁹

The introduction of al-ʿAṭṭār’s third recension of his sets of glosses is indicative of the exegetical process on the commentary outside the Ḥusaynābādī scholastic tradition. During a period of approximately ten years, al-ʿAṭṭār blended together the two main exegetical strands, the first of the Azharī and Levantine circles of glossators on al-Qūshjī’s commentary, and the second of the Ḥusaynābādī circles on ʿIṣām al-Dīn’s commentary. In this sense al-ʿAṭṭār’s sets of glosses represent the pinnacle of the exegetical tradition on ʿIṣām al-Dīn’s commentary. Although an analysis of this set of glosses exceeds the scope of this section, al-ʿAṭṭār’s exegetical work may be better appreciated and evaluated only by first comparing the different recensions one with another, and then analyzing in detail the novel material that he accessed throughout his journey and which he included in his final recension.

Conclusion

The aim of Chapter Three and Four has been to provide the first exposition of the classic commentaries on the *Risāla* and the subsequent exegetical tradition of glosses and super-commentaries that evolved out of the two commentaries authored by al-Qūshjī and ʿIṣām al-Dīn.

³⁴⁹ Cf. al-ʿAṭṭār, *Ḥāshiya...*, fol. 1b-2a. In his list of al-ʿAṭṭār’s works, Gran refers to another very short set of glosses of sixteen folios on ʿIṣām al-Dīn’s commentary dated 1814-15 extant in Ṭanṭā’s al-Aḥmadī Mosque, which al-ʿAṭṭār claims to have completed on his way back to Cairo. However, upon comparison with the catalogue, the manuscript n. 8 (558) contains a set of self-glosses on al-ʿAṭṭār’s didactic poem on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*; cf. al-Nashshār, ʿAlī Sāmī, *Fihris Makhṭūṭāt al-Masjid al-Aḥmadī bi-Ṭanṭā*, Alexandria: Maṭbaʿa Jāmiʿa al-Iskandariya, 1963, p. 96.

This overview of the structure and contents of classic commentaries has shown that, since its inception, the early exegetical tradition largely shared the same interests and concerns *vis-à-vis* the *matn*. Starting with Khwāja ‘Alī’s commentary and going up to ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s, the commentators’ exegetical agenda operated at two levels: on the one hand, they sought to provide a detailed *lexis* of the different lemmata supplied with lexicographical and philological comments and to discuss the textual variants as well as the formal structure of the *Risāla*. On the other hand, commentators felt obliged to unpack and evaluate key passages of the *matn*, mainly those in the *Introduction*, in the first part of the *Classification* and in some *Reminders*, in which al-Ījī discusses not only terms posited by the novel class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* but also other claims such as those regarding third-person pronouns and relative pronouns, especially when these were in apparent contradiction with other claims in another section of the *matn* or they challenged widespread views in other disciplines, such as logic, grammar, *balāgha* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. To solve inconsistencies or, at times, to provide more cogent proofs to challenge al-Ījī’s views, early commentators resorted to intertextuality by bringing into the discourse of the semantic theory of the *Risāla* extensive treatments of the same topics discussed in the main manuals of logic, *balāgha*, *uṣūl al-fiqh* and grammar, which became, from this point onwards, cognate sciences to *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.

Chapters Three and Four have also shown how, among all classic commentaries, those authored by al-Qūshjī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn became central to the development and maturation of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as a science in the curricula of the Islamic intellectual tradition. Al-Qūshjī’s concise and clear style of exposition was crucial for its dissemination in virtually all scholarly circles, but it was the Azharī circles as well the Levantine regions that emerged as the most creative in consolidating a mature exegetical practice that reached its peak by the middle of the 13th/19th

century, with the extensive glosses of Efendī Sirōzī, al-Ḥamzāwī and Ibn Sūda. ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary emerged, by contrast, for its complexity and richness of contents and, as was seen, it should be considered the highest point of the classic exegetical tradition, since it includes a thorough evaluation and discussion of virtually all previous commentaries. Contrary to the wide reception enjoyed by al-Qūshjī’s commentary, it appears that the exegetical activity on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s was, at least in the early stages, restricted to the Ḥusaynābādī scholarly circles in the Kurdish regions and later in Baghdad. They were likely the main figures responsible for disseminating and promoting this commentary. The thriving exegetical tradition put into place by the Ḥusaynābādīs quickly found its way out of the isolated Kurdish towns by means of both the numerous students who returned to the main intellectual capitals of the time, and the Baghdad branch of the family which, between the 12th/18th and the 13th/19th centuries, propelled the main scholarly endeavors in the Iraqi capital. Finally, the influence of the Ḥusaynābādīs’ exegetical production on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary reverberated outside Baghdadi and Kurdish circles, bringing the commentary and its glosses to the attention of a wider number of scholars in the milieus of the Levant, Egypt and the Hijaz, as the extensive sets of glosses by al-Kaffawī, Hibbat Allāh al-Tājī and al-‘Aṭṭār witnessed. If the overview on the classic commentaries up to ‘Iṣām al-Dīn has shown that a mature and systematic exegetical praxis was already in place already by the end of the 9th/15th century, the scholiastic praxis that ensued from the two commentaries by al-Qūshjī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn established two main strands that consolidated the exegetical tradition on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.

These findings call for a measured reassessment of Weiss’ claim that the crystallization and codification of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* occurred after the period of Ṭāshköprüzādeh in the late 9th/16th century and is restricted to the appearance of short epitomes and manuals from the mid-

13th/19th century onwards. Chapters Three and Four have shown that more attention must be paid to the intervening period, glossed over by Weiss' account of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*'s development, during which a series of innovative commentaries, glosses and super-glosses succeeded in consolidating the burgeoning field of inquiry into a *de facto* discipline akin to those rational sciences of logic, *balāgha*, *uṣūl al-fiqh* and grammar. In composing their extensive glosses on the two commentaries, al-Qūshjī, ʿIṣām al-Dīn and the numerous prolific and glossators operated in what is now a codified exegetical tradition on the *matn* which they helped to crystalize. The following concluding chapter will highlight the culmination of these centuries of effort in the form of teaching manuals and epitomes which, recognizing the discipline's significance, early modern scholars compiled as the baseline for *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*'s canonization and education to this day.

CHAPTER FIVE
TRANSITION AND EVOLUTION

Chapters Three and Four have shown the consolidation of the exegetical practice on the *Risāla* that coincides with ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary, considered by his immediate successors and later glossators to be the unsurpassed example of that exegetical tradition. The overview and analysis of the subsequent expansion of the exegesis on the two commentaries by al-Qūshjī and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn has then shown two main traditions of glossators emerging and consolidating into two intellectual and geographical areas, respectively the Azhari and the Levantine-Ottoman scholars, on the one side, and Kurdish scholars and their followers in centers of Baghdad and Mawṣil, on the other side. The two exegetical traditions were nevertheless developing one alongside the other and the boundaries between the two were often fluid, as glossators on one commentary often make reference respectively to al-Qūshjī or ‘Iṣām al-Dīn and their glossators in their own glosses. The two strands ultimately will be responsible for the crystallization and further canonization of the exegesis on the *Risāla* up to the mid-13th/19th, which virtually put an end to the exegetical tradition initiated by al-Jurjānī almost five centuries earlier.

In this last chapter I will reconstruct the last stage of the development of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* by looking first at later commentaries and versifications that were produced mainly during the late 12th/18th and the 13th/19th centuries, and which represent a phase of transition between classic exegesis and new didactic poems, in a period when the two scholiastic strands reached their full efflorescence. In the second section of the chapter, I will identify the turning point in the history of the discipline with the production of new *madrassa*-oriented manuals or *mutūn* and epitomes, from the second half of the 13th/19th up to second half of the 14th/20st century, which also represents a moment of partial rupture and subsequent evolution from the previous classic

exegetical tradition. Although the core conceptual notions of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* remain generally unchanged from the classic exegetical tradition, authors of manuals and epitomes undertook a reorganization of the whole theory of *waḍ‘* and implemented substantial additions to the standard classes of *waḍ‘*. The second part of the chapter will also show that the numerous manuals and epitomes, mainly in Ottoman and Azharī scholarly circles, responded to the growing demands to develop pedagogical tools for lower levels of *madrassa* curricula and marked the final stage of evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* into a well-defined and structured literary genre up until today.

5.1 Transition: Later Commentaries and Versifications

If ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary represents the climax of the classic exegetical tradition, while the two strands of glosses mark the consolidation and canonization of that tradition, there were also other later commentaries, from the 11th/17th century onward, that paralleled the main exegesis of the glossators. These commentaries often survive only in a few copies and may not have had a direct impact on the development of the discourse on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. Versifications of the *Risāla* started to emerge even earlier, in the 11th/17th century, but increased throughout the 12th/18th and 13th/19th centuries and were often authored by the same glossators on al-Qūshjī’s and ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentaries or by scholars who had ties with the intellectual milieus where the scholiastic tradition was more prolific, mainly al-Azhar. Below is a list of the later commentaries.

1. Muḥaffar al-Dīn al-Harawī (fl. 9th/15th c.).

2. ‘Abd al-Ḥayy b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Ashrafī Jurjānī (d. ca. 959/1552).¹
3. Aḥmad b. Muṣṭafā Tāshkuprīzādeh (d. 968/1578).²
4. ‘Uthmān b. Faṭḥ Allāh al-Rūmī Faḍlī (d. 1102/1691).
5. ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ‘Āmir b. Sharaf al-Dīn al-Shubrāwī shaykh al-Jāmi‘ al-Azhar (1091/1681-1171/1758).³
6. Yūsuf b. Sālīm al-Ḥifnāwī (d. 1178/1764).⁴
7. Ḥusayn b. Muṣṭafā al-Mūrawī Muftī-zādeh (d.?), entitled *Ḥawī al-Lawāzim*.⁵
8. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Afandī al-Sabbā‘ī (d. 1220/1805), entitled *al-Durra al-Muḍiyya ‘alā matn al-‘Aḍudiyya*.⁶
9. Muḥammad Efendī al-Almālī al-Qūnawī (d. 1278/1861), *Mashrabat al-‘Uyūn*.
10. Muḥammad Sa‘īd b. Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Jazā‘irī al-Ḥusnī (d. 1278/1861), entitled *Itqān al-Ṣun‘*.⁷
11. Yūsuf al-Ghazzī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1290/1873).⁸
12. ‘Abd al-Bāqī b. Maḥmūd b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Alūsī (d. 1298/1881), entitled *al-Fawa’id al-Sa‘diyya*.
13. Aḥmad b. Zaynī Daḥlān (1232/1817-1304/1886).
14. ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad al-Sulaymānī al-Santadajī al-Kurdī (d. 1304/1887).⁹

¹ Ms. Iran: Mashhad Ilāhiyāt 22762; and Mashhad Mudīr Shāne 64.

² Ms. Baghdad: Awqāf 9706/3.

³ Ms. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 86 (Ḥalīm) 34280. Washington: Library of Congress (Mansuri Collection) shelf n. 5-290, fol. 1b-7a.

⁴ Ms. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 23.

⁵ Ms. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 874 *majāmi‘* 43182.

⁶ Ms. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 16.

⁷ Printed: Beirut: Maṭba‘at al-Jarīda, 1308/1891.

⁸ Ms. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 1697-83322 *majāmi‘*; and 1861-92541 *majāmi‘*.

⁹ Ms. Baghdad: Awqāf 6462.

15. ‘Alam al-Dīn Abū al-Fayyid Muḥammad Yāsīn b. Muḥammad ‘Īsā al-Ūdī (or al-Ūdiq) al-Fadānī al-Makkī (1355/1936-1410/1989).
16. Al-Khiḍr b. al-Shaykh Maḥmūd Ḥammād al-Idrīsī (1331/1912-1407/1986), entitled *‘Unwān al-Naf’ fī Sharḥ Risālat al-Waḍ’*.¹⁰
17. Mullā Ḥajjī Efendī (d.?) *Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Waḍ’iyya*.¹¹
18. ‘Abd al-Awwal Qāḍī ‘Askar (d. ?).¹²
19. Ghars al-Dīn (d. ?).

Although these commentaries were not very influential on the development of *‘ilm al-waḍ’*, there are a few exceptions that deserve some attention, such as those authored by the Azharī scholars al-Shubrāwī, Yūsuf al-Ḥifnāwī and the later Yūsuf al-Ghazzī, as well as al-Jazā’irī’s *Itqān al-Ṣun’*. The commentary authored by the Azhar educated Yūsuf al-Ghazzī mirrors all the characteristics of the classic commentaries in its exegetical approach and contents, and, in this sense, it does not provide new points or perspectives to the exegetical tradition. Its originality can instead be found in the opening section where al-Ghazzī, before commenting on the *matn*, introduces his reader to three main problems (*masā’il*) that were not usually discussed in classic *‘ilm al-waḍ’* literature, but that will become often integral to the later manuals and epitomes. This first pertains to the question of the origins of language; here, al-Ghazzī provides a very brief account of the issue and sides with the view according to which language originated

¹⁰ Edited: Partial edition in Hamza Ousmane al-Ansari, *‘Unwān al-Naf’ fī Sharḥ Risālat al-Waḍ’. Ta’līf al-Shaykh al-‘Allāma al-Khiḍr al-Mashūr bi-l-Maḥmūd Ibn al-Shaykh Ḥammād al-Idrīsī (1331-1407) min Awwal al-Kitāb ilā Nihāyat Sharḥ Qawl al-‘Aḍud “li-istiwā’ nisbat al-waḍ’ ilā musammayāt, Dirasatan wa-Taḥqīqan.”* Malaysia: Al-Madinah International University, Masters’ Thesis, 2020.

¹¹ Ms. Istanbul: Hamidiye 1264, fol. 191b-203b.

¹² Ms. in Iran: University of Tehran 5/9183 (copied in Rabi’ awwal 1002 H).

both from God and human agency. The second is a brief overview of proposition compounds (*al-murakkab*) where he questions whether the nature of the copula in sentences like “*Zaydun qā'imun*” (*Zayd is standing*) is a feature grasped by the intellect (*‘aqliyya*) or rather the result of an instance of linguistic positing (*waḍ‘iyya*). According to the first view, if one knows the referent of “*Zayd*” and the referent of “*qā'im*,” upon hearing the previous compound, he would grasp that the notion of *qā'im* is affirmed for *Zayd*. Conversely, on the second view the structures of a propositional compound (*hay'a murakkab isnadī*) are posited by species positing (*waḍ‘ naw‘ī*) in order to convey that the notion of the predicate is true of the subject (*li-thubūti maḥḥūmi al-musnadi li-mā ṣadaqa al-musnadu ilayhi*). The third and longest investigation presents the definitions and analysis of the notions of intellect, mind, universal and particular (*‘aql, dhihn, juz‘ī, kullī*) and how the perception and existence of particular and universal concepts occurs in the mind in a way that is opposite to their ontological status in the external world.

The other commentary entitled *Itqān al-Ṣun‘* by al-Jazā'irī, elder brother of the more famous sufi scholar and Algerian military leader Emir ‘Abd al-Qādir, appears to be the only one printed among these later commentaries. The style and content of the commentary are similar to those of the main classic commentaries and, by al-Jazā'irī's own admission, he is heavily indebted to his predecessors, as most of the analysis and comments on the *matn* confirm. If al-Jazā'irī's commentary does not stand out for its original content, it is certainly unusual in two respects. The first relates to the scope of its composition, insofar as in his introduction al-Jazā'irī states that, despite the existence of many commentaries, most scholars of his time lacked eagerness and interest in the discipline, whose contents were accessible only to those who excelled in the rational methods and were experts in their fields. This motivated al-Jazā'irī to select and gather the most useful points and remarks from these commentaries, which he does

not name, not for his fellow scholars and peers but, he specifies, for his own children (*awlādī aflādhi kabidī*).¹³ The clear pedagogical scope is related to the second aspect, namely, the unusual circumstances in which the commentary was composed. Towards the end of the commentary al-Jazā'irī claims to have completed the commentary in 1268/1852, when he and his family were exiled and detained by the Napoleonic forces in Château d'Amboise (*wa-naḥnu usrā bi-aydī al-Fransīs bi-madīnati Anbuwāz*).¹⁴ This event refers to the exile and imprisonment of his brother Emir 'Abd al-Qādir with his family and followers, as a consequence of his surrender to General L. Juchault de Lamorcière. On this basis, it is possible to date the composition of the commentary between Dhū al-Ḥijja 1264/November 1848, when the family was transferred from Pau in southern France to Château d'Amboise, and 1268/1852, the date of completion and also of the end of the imprisonment. The commentary was thus composed specifically for continuing the education of his and his follower's children throughout this period and outside a scholarly set up like most, if not all, other commentaries were composed. It is unclear whether al-Jazā'irī reviewed the work after the end of the imprisonment, before it was printed in Beirut, when the family was allowed to relocate in Damascus where he and especially his brother 'Abd al-Qādir committed most of their time to scholarship.

The period of transition from the classic exegesis to the new *madrassa* manuals and entry-level epitomes, which brought *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* to the final stage of its evolution, is characterized by the emergence of didactic poems, namely *urjūza* or *manẓūma*. This literary genre, more than the later commentaries and the extensive set of glosses of the 13th/19th century, sheds light on this turning point in the history of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and its evolution as it

¹³ Cf. al-Jazā'irī, *Itqān al-Ṣunʿ*, p. 2.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 44.

shows both traits of continuity and rupture with the original *matn*. Below is an initial list of the extant didactic poems.

VERSIFICATION

1. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Ḥamawī al-Ḥanafī (completed in 969/1543).
2. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. ‘Alī al-Buhūtī al-Khalwatī al-Ḥanbalī (d. 1088/1677), entitled *Ladhdhat al-Sam‘ bi-Naẓm Risālat al-Waḍ‘*.¹⁵
 - a. C2: Muḥammad Amīn Futuwā Ḥamāh (?).¹⁶
3. Muḥammad Abū al-Ḥasan al-Sadīdī al-Maḥallī.¹⁷
4. Muḥammad b. Muṣṭafā b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Ṣafawī al-Qal‘awī (d. 1230/1815).¹⁸
 - a. Self-commentary.
5. Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-‘Atṭār Shaykh al-Azhar (1180/1766-1250/1835).¹⁹
 - a. Self-commentary.
 - b. Maḥmūd Shukrī b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ālūsī (1273/1854-1342/1924).
6. Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq b. Yūsuf al-Qūṣī al-Ḥajjājī al-Mālikī (1202/1788-1294/1877).²⁰
7. Muḥammad Bāqir b. Murtaḍā al-Yazdī al-Ḥāṣirī (1239/1823-1298/1880).²¹

¹⁵ Ed. Kāmil Ahmad Kāmil al-Ḥusaynī, Cairo (al-Qāhira): Dār al-Baṣā’ir, 2010 (with al-Dijwī’s *Khulāṣat ‘ilm al-waḍ‘*).

¹⁶ Ms: KSA: Maktaba Jāmi‘at al-Malik Sa‘ūd n. 7331, and n. 6902.

¹⁷ Ms. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 26.

¹⁸ Ms. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya n. 5400 (11).

¹⁹ Unofficial edition by Abū Muḥammad Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad al-Mujāhid, Medina: no publisher, 1439/2018; accessible at https://archive.org/details/brahimmd56_gmail_201801/page/n3/mode/2up. Printed: in *Risāla fī Mabādī’ ‘ilm al-Kalām*, ed. Muḥammad Rajab ‘Alī Ḥasan, Cairo: Dār al-Iḥsān, 2021.

²⁰ Ms: Dār al-Makhṭuṭāt bi-l-Jāmi‘a al-Qāsimiyya n. 996 *majmū‘*.

²¹ Ms. Qom: Mar‘ashī 2128/4.

8. Muḥammad b. Muṣṭafá al-Barzanjī (d. 1254/1838).
9. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Ālusī (d. 1290/1873).²²
10. ‘Alī b. Sulaymān al-Dimnatī (or al-Damnātī) al-Bujum‘awī (or al-Būjum‘āwī) (1234/1819-1305/1888), in *Ghurraṭ Ashḥar al-Anwār bi-Sharḥ Manẓūma Azhar al-Azhār*.²³
11. ‘Abd al-Malik al-Fatnī (or al-Patnī) al-Makkī al-Ḥanafī (1255/1839-1332/1913), entitled *‘Iqd al-Lālī*.²⁴
- a. C2: Self-commentary.
12. Muḥammad al-Bayyūmī Abū ‘Ayyāsha al-Damanhūrī (1263/1847-1335/1917), entitled *Nuzhat al-Sam‘ fī ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*.²⁵
13. Abū al-Sa‘ūd Muḥammad b. Mas‘ūd al-Kawākibī (d. 1348/1929).²⁶
14. Ma‘rūf al-Nuwhadī al-Kurdī (d. ?).²⁷

The emergence of didactic poems on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is a relatively early phenomenon in the history of the discipline, especially if one considers that one of the earliest (and now printed) versifications was authored in the 11th/17th century by the Egyptian Ḥanbalī scholar al-Buhūtī, entitled *Ladhdhat al-Sam‘ bi-Naẓm Risālat al-Waḍ‘*, on which he authored an extensive self-commentary. The versification counts almost one hundred verses in *rajaz*, and in the introduction al-Buhūtī states that he composed it for those who desire to memorize the *matn* and keep in mind its exact formulation. In this, al-Buhūtī’s versification is extremely faithful to the original *matn* because it reproduces not the only the formal division of the *Risāla* into

²² Ms. Baghdad: al-Awqāf al-‘Āmma 7019/5.

²³ Printed: Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-Wahbiyya, 1298/1880. On the author see Ziriklī, *A‘lām*, vol. 4, p. 292.

²⁴ Printed: Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-Sharafiyya, 1306/1888 (with the self-commentary).

²⁵ Printed: Cairo: Maṭba‘a Muḥammad Muḥammad Maṭar bi-l-Ḥamzāwī, 1911, with *al-‘Ibāra al-Jaliyya Sharḥ al-Fikra al-Saniya*.

²⁶ Ms. Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya 12.

²⁷ Ms. Maktabat Jāmi‘a Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn no number.

Introduction, Classification and Conclusion with its twelve *Reminders*, but each section is consistent with the contents presented by al-Ījī in his work.

The short *naẓm* in forty-five verses authored by the Azharī al-Şafawī al-Qala‘āwī later in the 12th/18th, exemplifies an instance of both rupture and continuity in the history of the discipline. The phase of continuity is represented by the author himself who, as seen in the previous chapter, composed one of the most extensive sets of glosses on al-Qūshjī’s commentary, while the rupture emerges in the content of his versification. If al-Buhūtī’s *urjūza* is faithful to the *Risāla* for its structure and content and was conceived as an *aide-mémoire*, al-Şafawī’s versification is likely the first expressly conceived for beginning students (*ja‘altuhā li-l-mubtadī*) and does not retain any resemblance to the original division of the *matn*. Rather, al-Şafawī first opens the *naẓm* with a definition of the notion of *waḍ‘* and then presents a new division of the first two classes of *waḍ‘*, namely *waḍ‘ naw‘ī* and *shakhṣī*, and for each he identifies three sub-classes by applying the modes of ‘*āmm* and *khāṣṣ* to the term (*lafẓ*) and the concept (*ma‘nā*), for a total of six classes of *waḍ‘*. This presentation of the classes of *waḍ‘* clearly departs from the standard tripartite division of ‘*āmm*-‘*āmm*, *khāṣṣ*-*khāṣṣ* and ‘*āmm*-*khāṣṣ* usually discussed in the classic exegetical tradition, which borrowed the *naw‘ī* and *shakhṣī* modes from logic and *balāgha* and usually discussed them marginally. It is only in the following verses that al-Şafawī presents in more detail the main aspects of the class ‘*āmm*-*khāṣṣ* and the types of terms grouped under this, such as the three types of pronouns, which the *Risāla* and its commentaries analyze respectively in the *Introduction* and the *Classification*. Having presented all classes of *waḍ‘*, al-Şafawī introduces the division of the term into universal and particular from which he derives the classification of generic noun, derived noun, verb and *maṣḍar*, which echoes closely the content of the first half of the *Classification*. To this he adds a further explanation of terms under the ‘*āmm*-*khāṣṣ*, with specific emphasis on the context (*qarīna*), which includes all types of

pronouns and particles; this mirrors the content of the second half of the *Classification*. The concluding verses of the *naẓm* are instead limited to a few case studies that echo those presented in the *Conclusion*. The original division into twelve *Reminders* that one finds in al-Buhūtī's versification, is here discarded and replaced with a concise presentation of the notion of semantic dependence of particles (*istiqlāl al-mafhūmiyya*), the issue of mental pointing pertaining to relative pronouns, the difference between generic nouns and proper generic names, and finally the two-fold semantic feature of the verb.

Similar to the case of al-Ṣafawī is the versification by al-Damanhūrī, completed in 1290/1873, in seventy verses, that at first glance maintains the same structure of the *matn*. Upon closer analysis, the *Introduction* of this didactic poem, unlike the *matn*, presents all three classes of *waḍʿ*, while the *Chapter (al-bāb)*, which corresponds to the *Classification*, echoes the content of the *Classification* but expands further topics such as the question of particles, verbs, and the class of pronouns that in the *Risāla* are discussed in the *Conclusion*. Finally, in the *Conclusion* of the *naẓm* al-Damanhūrī discards the division into twelve *Reminders* and focusses exclusively on the question of the difference between generic nouns and proper generic names.

The didactic poem authored by al-ʿAṭṭār, whose glosses on ʿIṣām al-Dīn represented the culmination and synthesis of the two scholiastic traditions, also marks the incipient phase of rupture and continuity with the classic exegesis of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. The versification counts over fifty verses and, like al-Buhūtī's, maintains the same structure and division of the *matn*. However, al-ʿAṭṭār's versification offers a few points of departure such as the presentation of all the classes of *waḍʿ* in the *Introduction*, with special emphasis on the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and the classes of terms subsumed under it, while leaving unsolved the issue regarding the names of letters, books and sciences (which were first brought up by Khwāja ʿAlī). While the length and complexity of

classic commentaries and his own glosses were the product of his scholarly research and destined for advanced teaching sessions, al-‘Aṭṭār’s versification, with its clear and concise style, targeted the audience of *madrassa* students at the entry level and, as such, marks the gradual assimilation of ‘*ilm al-waḍ‘* into the lower levels of education.

This phenomenon is emphasized by al-Ālūsī in the introduction of his commentary on al-‘Aṭṭār’s didactic poem, where he claims that of all the commentaries on the *Risāla* none in his view was successful in explaining the contents and clarifying the implications of the *matn*. For this reason, he does not hide a certain frustration towards the inelegant stylistic choices of non-Arab classic commentators (*mu’allafāt al-a‘ājim*) whose views and intents can only be grasped after a long examination and great effort from the reader, since these commentaries are filled with doubtful explanations and poor presentations. In al-Ālūsī’s view, this has inevitably forced students and scholars to discard these commentaries despite the time spent perusing them, leaving them empty handed as they failed to elucidate the crucial points of ‘*ilm al-waḍ‘*. The simplicity and accessibility al-‘Aṭṭār’s versification, just like those of his predecessors, emerges during this phase of the discipline as being a more reliable and suitable text to introduce ‘*ilm al-waḍ‘* to a wider audience, especially beginning students, but also to embark in a new exegetical praxis that attempts to cut loose from centuries of commentaries and glosses.

The versification that best represents the evolution in the theory and the literature of ‘*ilm al-waḍ‘* is that authored by the late-13th/19th Hanafi ‘Abd al-Malik al-Fatnī, *qadi* of Mecca, a scholar who was active in Hijaz, Cairo and Istanbul where he was also known to be a bibliophile, and one of the first intellectuals to be actively interested in journalism and printing as his

collaboration with the magazine *al-Jawā'ib* by Aḥmad Fāris Shidiyāq indicates.²⁸ His versification entitled *ʿIqd al-Lālī* extends over one hundred and fifty verses with an extensive commentary and, aside from being the longest and most detailed of all the versifications, is likely the earliest to be available in print, as it was published in Cairo in 1306/1888. There is no clear indication of whether the *naẓm* emerged from the Azharī scholastic tradition or the Ḥusaynābādī one, given the absence of any specific references in the preamble. It seems however that al-Fatnī's versification departs from the two main exegetical strands and, as he says in the preamble, decided to compose this versification after reading the *matn* itself and al-Qūshjī's *ʿUnqūd al-Ẓawāhir* with the commentary by al-Muntashawī.²⁹ The structure and content of al-Fatnī's versification presents a completely novel presentation of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* that, in some ways, echoes al-Ṣafawī's. The *naẓm* is divided into an *Introduction*, four *Investigations* (*mabāḥith*) and a *Conclusion*, a division that only in appearance mirrors the structure of the *Risāla*. Unlike the content of the *Introduction* of the *Risāla*, al-Fatnī's *Introduction* is devoted to the definition of the subject-matter and the scope of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as well as to presenting the classes of *waḍʿ*, namely *ʿāmm*, *khāṣṣ*, *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī*. As for the *Investigations*, the first presents the definition of the *waḍʿ* *shakhṣī* and is further divided into three sections, one for each class, namely *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*. The second *Investigation* is instead devoted to the *waḍʿ* *nawʿī* and, like the previous one, is divided into three sections, one for each class of *waḍʿ*, to which al-Fatnī adds a supplementary paragraph to analyze the *waḍʿ* *nawʿī taʿwīlī*, the class that groups metaphorical and figurative expressions. The fourth *Investigation* offers instead a brief presentation and definition of another class of *waḍʿ* called *waḍʿ ḍimnī*, a class usually discussed in *ʿilm al-maʿānī*.³⁰

²⁸ On his life see ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Ibrāhīm Abū Sulaymān, *al-ʿUlamāʾ wa-l-Udabāʾ al-Warrāqūn fī l-Ḥijāz fī l-Qarn al-Rābiʿ ʿAshar al-Hijrī*, Taif, KSA: Nādī al-Ṭāʾif al-Adabī, 1423/2002, pp. 67-70.

²⁹ Cf. al-Fatnī, *ʿIqd al-Lālī*, p. 3.

³⁰ This class is referred by al-Taftāzānī in *al-Muṭawwal* and ʿIṣām al-Dīn in *al-Aṭwal*; see al-Aṭwal, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Hindāwī, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1422/2001 vol. 2, p. 229.

The fifth and last *Investigation* is titled *On the Division of the Term (Taqsīm al-Lafẓ)* and mirrors the content of the first half of the *Classification* in the *Risāla*. Finally, the *Conclusion* fully departs from that of the *Risāla*, and contains eight points (*fawā'id*) on topics different from the case studies presented in the *Risāla*, such as the question of whether terms are posited for mental images or for external beings; the epistemological question on how the linguistic positing is known, which echoes the discussion usually presented in *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature; the analysis of universality and particularity; and the difference between verbs and derived nouns; the question on book titles and sections of books (*tarājim*), to list the most relevant.

If later commentaries were not particularly impactful on the evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* from a highly specialized linguistic science to a discipline taught to lower levels of *madrasa* curriculum, the emergence of didactic poems throughout the 13th/19th century responds to the growing demands to render *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* more accessible to beginning students before delving into the more complex exegetical and scholastic tradition. Didactic poems also mark a turning point in the transition and evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* within the *madrasa* framework. Authors of didactic poems attempt to remain faithful to some aspects of al-Ījī's foundational text, as in the structure and contents of their didactic poems. At the same time, they attempt to condense and implement new aspects of the theory of *waḍʿ* discussed in the long-standing exegetical tradition, namely the classes of *waḍʿ shakhṣī* and *nawʿī*, as well as the *taʾwīlī*, which are often given more weight than the standard classes of *waḍʿ*. Traits of continuity with the classic exegetical tradition, and rupture exemplified by the new aspects of *waḍʿ* reorganized in a new manner, will become essential features of the evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* embodied in manuals and epitomes specifically devised for lower levels of the *madrasa* curricula.

5.2 Evolution: New Manuals and Epitomes

If the consolidation and further canonization of the exegetical praxis of the glossators reached its highest point during the middle of the 13th/19th al-ʿAṭṭār’s synthesis of the two scholastic traditions, the exegetical tradition itself, with its plethora of glosses, super-glosses and the numerous folios of super-commentaries, seems to stall and fade away during the second half of the century when, as seen earlier, most of the didactic poems destined for the lower level of the *madrasa* education started to emerge. The need for new shorter commentaries and, more importantly, for didactic poems may be emblematic of an exegetical tradition that, due to its magnitude, had certainly become unmanageable for scholars, teachers and students in the *madrasa* set up who expressed a growing interest in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Certainly, the main commentaries and their glosses were still copied, studied and transmitted during this period but, as some scholars reported, the complexity of classic commentaries such as ʿIṣām al-Dīn’s were not deemed appropriate for the study of the discipline, except for the more advanced stages in the student’s career. In this scenario, it seems as if the four-century long exegetical tradition imploded under the weight of its own scholastic edifice and risked becoming a highly demanding scholarly exercise destined for a narrow circle of expert intellectuals who could navigate the minutiae and technicalities of the classes of *waḍʿ* and their implications. It is possible that scholars like al-Ṣafawī and al-ʿAṭṭār sensed this risk and attempted to salvage the discipline by making it accessible to a wider audience by means of didactic poems. In other words, these scholars were the first to make the transition from classic exegesis to a new formal approach to the theory of *waḍʿ* and in so doing they initiated a major development in the literary genre of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Versifications could however offer only a partial solution to the upcoming crisis of the discipline, insofar as they were conceived as an *aide-mémoire* to the students but

could not provide the precise analysis of all the classes of *waḍʿ* and its case studies that a *matn* could offer. On the basis of the versifications' initial attempts to reformulate the structure and content of the discipline, scholars and specialists on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* thus pushed this evolution in the discipline with the composition of new epitomes and manuals, as the following list illustrates.

NEW EPITOMES AND MANUALS

1. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-ʿAydarūs (1135/1722-1192/1778), entitled *Tashnīf al-Samʿ fī Baʿḍ Laṭāʾif al-Waḍʿ*.
 - a. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ujhūrī (d. 1198/1783).
2. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Ḥasan b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf b. Karīm al-Dīn al-Jawharī (1151/1738-1215/1801), entitled *Zahr al-Afhām fī Taḥqīq al-Waḍʿ wa-mā lahu min al-Aqsām*.³¹
 - a. Zayn b. Aḥmad al-Murṣafī (d. 1301/1884).³²
3. ʿAbd Allāh al-Najīb al-ʿAyntābī (d. 1219/1804).³³
 - a. Self-glosses.
4. Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Mīr Rustumī (al-Ṣūrī?) (12th/18th), entitled *Khulāṣat al-Waḍʿ*.³⁴
 - a. Self-commentary entitled *Nihayat al-Wasʿ*.
 - b. Self-commentary entitled *Biḍāʿat al-Najʿ*.³⁵

³¹ Printed: ed. Ṣafāʾ Ṣābir Majīd al-Baytānī, in *Majallat al-Bayān al-Adabiyya* n. 595 (February 2020), pp. 70-100.

³² Edited: ʿAlī Ḥashim ʿAlī Aḥmad, MA Thesis, Khartoum: Jāmiʿa Umm Darmān al-Islāmiyya, 1425/2004.

³³ Printed: ed. Timur Aşkan “Abdullah Necîb el-Ayıntâbî’nin er-Risâletü’l-Vaz’iyye Adlı Eserinin Tahkikli Neşri,” in *Tahkik İslami İlimler Araştırma ve Neşir Dergisi* 2/1 (Haziran/June 2019), pp. 31-80.

³⁴ The same text under the title *al-Lumaʿ fī l-Waḍʿ* is attributed to Abū Bakr al-Ṣūrī, cf. Muḥammad Yūsuf Idrīs, *al-Majmūʿ al-Waḍʿī*, Amman: Dār al-Nūr al-Mubīn, 2016, pp. 106-114.

³⁵ Ms. Baghdad: Awqāf 6880.

- a. Muḥammad Raḥmī Eḡini (or al-Akīnī) (1271/1855-1327/1909), entitled al-
‘Ujāla al-Raḥmiyya.⁴³
9. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn Shams al-Dīn al-Ambābī (or al-Imbābī) (1240/1824-1313/1896), entitled *Risāla fī Taḥqīq al-Waḍ‘*.⁴⁴
- a. ‘Abd al-Hādī Najā al-Abyarī (1236/1820-1305/1887), entitled *Zuhr al-Rawābī fī Tawḍīḥ Waḍ‘iyya al-Fāḍil al-Anbābī*.⁴⁵
10. Anonymous (possibly Aḥmad Shākīr b. Aḥmad al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Bakshahrī al-Istānbūlī, see below), entitled *al-Ṣaḥīfa al-Waḍ‘iyya al-Jadīda*.⁴⁶
- a. ‘Alī b. ‘Umar b. ‘Uthmān al-Āqshiharī (1285/1868), entitled *al-Daqā‘iq al-Muḥkama ‘alā al-Ṣaḥīfa al-Waḍ‘iyya al-Jadīda*.⁴⁷
11. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Khalaf (fl. 14th/20th), entitled *Khulāṣat ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*.⁴⁸
12. ‘Abd al-Khālīq al-Shubrāwī (fl. 14th/20th), entitled *al-Minḥa al-Ilāhiyya fī l-Qawā‘id al-Waḍ‘iyya*.⁴⁹
13. Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Ẓawāhirī (1289/1873-1365/1946), entitled *al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī ‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.
14. ‘Uthmān Ṣabrī b. Ismā‘īl al-Rizawī (d.?), entitled *al-Risāla al-Jadīda fī l-Waḍ‘*.⁵⁰

⁴³ Edited: Sürücü, Muhammed Şālih. *Eḡinli Mehmed Rahmi Efendi'nin el-'Ucāletü'r-Rahmiyye fī Şerhi'r-Rsaleti'l-Vaz'iyye Adli Eseri*. Istanbul: Marmara University, Masters' Thesis, 2017. Printed: in *Majmū'a al-Waḍ‘iyya*, Istanbul: Maṭba'a Şafā wa Anwar, 1311/1893.

⁴⁴ Ms. al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 22222-41, and 48549-134.

⁴⁵ Ms. al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya 8799-291.

⁴⁶ Printed: Istanbul: Maṭba'at Muḥarrām Afandī al-Būsnawī, 1281/1864 (in *Majmū'a fī l-mantiq wa-l-ādāb*). Ed. Shāmil Shāhīn, Damascus: Dār Ghār Ḥirā', 1427/2006 (in *al-Majmū' al-muntakhab min mutūn 'ilm al-waḍ‘*).

⁴⁷ Printed: Istanbul: Maṭba'at Muḥarrām Afandī al-Būsnawī, 1281/1864 (in *Majmū'a fī l-mantiq wa-l-ādāb*). Ed. Shāmil Shāhīn, Damascus: Dār Ghār Ḥirā', 1427/2006 (in *al-Majmū' al-muntakhab min mutūn 'ilm al-waḍ‘*).

⁴⁸ Printed: Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Sa'āda, after 1908.

⁴⁹ Printed: Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Sa'āda, 1925, second edition; Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Wājib, n.d.

⁵⁰ Ms. Princeton: Yahuda 1074, fol. 48a-50a.

a. *Self-commentary*.⁵¹

15. Aḥmad Shākīr b. Aḥmad al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Bakshahrī al-Istānbūlī (d. 1315/1897), entitled *Matn Namūdḥaj fī l-Waḍʿ*.⁵²

a. *Self-commentary*, entitled *Taṣwīr al-Waḍʿ*.⁵³

16. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī (1288/1871-1334/1916).⁵⁴

17. Muḥammad Amīn b. Muḥammad b. Khalīl al-Safarjilānī al-Dimashqī (d. 1334/1916), entitled *ʿIlm al-Waḍʿ* (in *al-Quṭūf al-Dāniya fī l-ʿUlūm al-Thamāniya*).⁵⁵

18. Muṣṭafá Badr Zayd (d. 1350/1931), entitled *Khulāṣa fī ʿIlm al-Waḍʿ*.⁵⁶

19. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. ʿĀmir al-Najjār (d. 1351/1932).⁵⁷

20. ʿAbd al-Qādir b. al-Sayyid Muḥammad Salīm al-Iskandarānī (d. 1362/1943), entitled *Ṣafāʾ al-Nabʿ fī ʿIlm al-Waḍʿ*.⁵⁸

21. Yūsuf b. Aḥmad al-Dijwī (1287/1870-1365/1946), entitled *Khulāṣat al-Waḍʿ*.⁵⁹

22. Muḥammad Dāwud al-Biyihhī (or al-Buyahī) (d. after 1369/1949-50), entitled *Risāla fī ʿIlm al-Waḍʿ*.⁶⁰

⁵¹ Ms. Princeton: Yahuda 1074, fol. 24a-47a.

⁵² Printed: Āsitāna: al-Maṭbaʿa al-ʿĀmira, 1305/1887. Ed. Shāmil Shāhīn, Damascus: Dār Ghār Ḥirāʾ, 1427/2006 (in *al-Majmūʿ al-muntakhab min mutūn ʿilm al-waḍʿ*).

⁵³ Printed: Āsitānah: al-Maṭbaʿa al-ʿĀmira, 1305/1887. Ed. Shāmil Shāhīn, Damascus: Dār Ghār Ḥirāʾ, 1427/2006 (in *al-Majmūʿ al-muntakhab min mutūn ʿilm al-waḍʿ*).

⁵⁴ Printed: ed. ʿAbd al-Ilāh Nahbān, in *Majalla Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya bi-Dimashq*, Ṣafar 1416/July 1995, pp. 451-472.

⁵⁵ Printed: Damascus: Maṭbaʿa Wilāya Sūriya al-Jalīla, 1313/1895.

⁵⁶ Printed: Cairo: Maṭbaʿa al-Ṣidq al-Khayriyya, 1347/1928.

⁵⁷ Printed: Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, n.d.; Kuwait: Dār al-Ẓāhiriyya, 1438/2017.

⁵⁸ Printed: in *Majmuʿa Tashtamil ʿalā Khamsa Rasāʾil*, ed. Murʿī Ḥasan al-Rashīd, Istanbul: Dār Nūr al-Ṣabāḥ, 2012; in *Majmuʿa Tashtamil ʿalā Khamsa Rasāʾil*, Istanbul: al-Maktaba al-Hāshimiyya, 2015.

⁵⁹ Printed: Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Nahḍa, 1915. Ed. Kāmil Ahmad Kāmil al-Ḥusaynī, Cairo (al-Qāhira): Dār al-Baṣāʾir, 2010 (with al-Khalwatī's *Ladhdhat al-samʿ*).

⁶⁰ Printed: Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Fārūqiyya al-Ḥadītha, 1369/1950; Kuwait: Dār al-Ẓāhiriyya, 1438/2017.

23. Fakhr al-Dīn al-ʿArnāsī (1327/1910-1391/1972), entitled *Risālat al-Waḍʿ*.⁶¹
24. Mullā Muḥammad Bāqir al-Kurdistānī Mudarris Balek (d. 1392/1972), entitled *al-Wajīza fī l-Waḍʿ*.
- a. *Self-commentary* entitled *al-Muḥammadī*.⁶²
25. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Sāmarrāʾī (1332/1913-1393/1973), entitled *Risāla fī Fann al-Waḍʿ*.⁶³
26. ʿAlam al-Dīn Abū al-Fayḍ Muḥammad Yāsīn b. Muḥammad ʿIsā al-ʿUdī (or al-ʿUdiq) al-Fadānī al-Makkī (1355/1936-1410/1989), entitled *Tashnīf al-Samʿ fī ʿilm al-Waḍʿ*.⁶⁴
27. Aḥmad Ḥilmī al-Qūghī (d. 1416/1996), entitled *al-Risāla al-Ḥilmiyya fī l-Qawāʿid al-Waḍʿiyya*.⁶⁵
28. ʿAbd Allāh b. Muṣṭafā b. Abī Bakr al-Harshamī al-Naqshabandī al-Kurdī (1333/1915-1420/2000), entitled *al-Muqtaḍab fī ʿilm al-Waḍʿ*.⁶⁶
29. Muḥammad Taqī al-Ḥakīm (1339/1920-1423/2002) entitled *al-Waḍʿ: Taḥdīduhu, Taqsimātahu, Maṣādir al-ʿilm bihi*.⁶⁷
30. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad b. Fātiḥ b. Sulaymān al-Mudarris (1323/1905-1426/2005), entitled *Khulāṣa fī l-Waḍʿ*.⁶⁸
31. *Idem*, entitled *al-Tibyān fī l-Waḍʿ wa-l-Bayān*.⁶⁹

⁶¹ Printed: No publisher: 1963. The personal website of the author is accessible at <http://seyhfahreddin.com/hayati.html>.

⁶² Printed: no place, no date. The author completed the two works in 1338/1920. The *matn* is printed with the commentary from a copy of the author's son.

⁶³ Printed: Istanbul: al-Maktaba al-Hāshimiyya, 2017, together with the author's *Tuḥfa li-l-khwān fī fann al-Bayān* and *Risāla fī l-Ḥikma (al-Maqūlāt al-ʿAshar)*.

⁶⁴ Printed: ed. Aḥmad Ḥusayn al-Azharī, Cairo: Dār Uṣūl al-Dīn, 1441/2019.

⁶⁵ Printed: ed. Ahmet Tekin, "er-Risāletu'l-Hilmiyye fī'l- Kavâ'idil-Vad'iyye" Adlı Risalesinin Haşiyesiyle Birlikte Edisyon Kritiği," in *Artuklu Akademi*, 2021/8 (1), 215-264.

⁶⁶ In *Majmaʿ al-Ashtāt*, Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-Waṭaniyya, 1410/1989.

⁶⁷ Printed: Baghdad: Maṭbaʿa al-ʿĀnī [1965?].

⁶⁸ Printed: in *Rasāʾil al-ʿIrfān*, ed. Muḥammad al-Mullā Aḥmad al-Kazanī, Baghdad: al-Dār al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Ṭibāʿa, 1978.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*.

32. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ‘Antar (1332/1914- d. before 1429/2008), entitled *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.⁷⁰
33. Kāmil Muḥammad Ḥasan (fl. 14th/20th), entitled *Mudhakkira fī ‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.⁷¹
34. Muḥammad Qādī-zādeh (d.?), *Risāla fī l-Waḍ‘*.⁷²
35. Muḥammad Dhannūn Yūnus al-Faṭḥī, (b.?) entitled *Qirā’āt fī ‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.⁷³

The list above shows how, aside from the early attempts to produce a new synthesis of the discipline by the Azharī scholars al-‘Aydarūs and al-Jawharī and their respective commentators, the production of new *mutūn* and epitomes reaches its climax between the second half of the 13th/19th and the first half of the 14th/20th centuries, mainly by authors active in Azharī circles. One of the earliest and most widespread manuals is the one authored by al-Mīr Rustumī who, as seen in the previous chapter, authored super-glosses on Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn al-Kurdī’s glosses on ‘Iṣām al-Dīn’s commentary and had a prominent role in the intellectual circles of Baghdad in close relation to the Ḥusaynābādīs. His epitome of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, on which he also wrote two self-commentaries, was likely composed to provide a pedagogical alternative to the mass of glosses authored by the Ḥusaynābādīs. The circumstances of its circulation and promotion as a new work on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* are revelatory of the turn and evolution in the development of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ, the same biographer of the Ḥaydarī family seen in the previous chapter, recounts that al-Mīr Rustūmī composed two short epitomes, one on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and the other on *‘ilm al-bayān*, which enjoyed wide circulation among the student circles

⁷⁰ Printed: Cairo: Dār al-Ṭibā‘ al-‘Arabī, 1367/1948 (second edition); Kuwait: Dār al-Zāhiriyya, 1438/2017 (reprint of the second edition).

⁷¹ Printed: Maṭba‘at al-Tawakkul, s.d. The author and the work belong to the Azharī tradition as it can be seen from the first page.

⁷² Ms. Princeton: Yahuda 1053, fol. 23b-24a. For other anonymous short treatises see Rudolph Mach, *Catalogue...*, p. 296.

⁷³ Printed: Beirut: Dār al-Rayāḥīn, 2018.

of Iraq. However, in an intellectual endeavor dominated by the Ḥusaynābādīs' scholastic tradition, his two epitomes could not initially find the favor and the reception they deserved. Al-Mīr Rustumī resorted then to a simple expedient. While teaching and disseminating his two works, he falsely attributed them to members of the Ḥusaynābādī and Ḥaydarī family, being aware of the eagerness of Iraqi students for such authors. He then disclosed himself as being the real author only once students showed interest in the two manuals and favor them over other works.⁷⁴

The epitome authored by Mīr al-Rustumī is deprived of any formal structure and division, rather it appears as a list definitions and short descriptions of how terms are grouped under the classes of *waḍʿ*. He opens first with the definition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, its subject-matter, which is the term with respect to the positing, its scope (*ghāya*), which is the knowledge of the linguistic positing, and finally the definition of the notion of *waḍʿ* in lexicography and as a technical term. The core of the epitome is represented by the description of the term (*al-mawḍūʿ*) and the concept (*al-mawḍūʿ lahu*). The term is classified as follows: it may be a single term conceived in its specificity by individual positing (*waḍʿ shakhṣī*), or may correspond to multiple terms grasped by a general notion by a species positing (*waḍʿ nawʿī*). The term posited by individual positing is then subdivided into the known subclasses of *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, *ʿāmm-ʿāmm* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*. As for the concept, the same classes *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, *ʿāmm-ʿāmm* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* are applied. Following this classification, al-Mīr Rustūmī provides the analysis of how linguistic terms fit into each class, with special attention to the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* subsumed under the *waḍʿ shakhṣī* that includes all three types of pronouns and particles, as it was the case for classic commentators. The new inclusion of the class *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* under the umbrella class *waḍʿ nawʿī*

⁷⁴ Cf. Ibrāhīm Faṣīḥ al-Ḥaydarī, op. cit., p. 145.

allows al-Mīr Rustūmī to include classes of terms, such as verbs, derived nouns, *maḍsars* and generic nouns etc., which al-Ījī included in the first half of the *Classification* and that created some disagreement among commentators and glossators. More importantly, the novel class *‘āmm-khāṣṣ* in the *waḍ‘ naw‘ī* allows also to include some grammatical categories such as the sound plural, the dual, the adjective of relation (*nisba adjective*) and the diminutive, that were never discussed in the classic exegesis, at least by commentators; or the inclusion of the structure of the nominal sentence (*hay’a al-murakkab al-ismī*) and figurative expressions (*majāz*). Finally, the epitome concludes with the definition of conceptual homonymity (*al-mushratak al-ma‘nawī*) lexical homonymity (*al-mushtarak al-lafẓī*) and synonyms.

Although al-Mīr Rustūmī’s epitome became the standard reference in Iraqi Kurdish scholarly circles of the Ḥusaynābādī tradition, there are other works that were composed much later on, such as the short *Risāla fī Fann al-Waḍ‘* by al-Sāmarrā’ī (d. 1393/1973), a short *matn* with a self-commentary by the polymath Mullā Muḥammad Bāqir active in the Kurdistan province of Iran, the more *fiqh*-oriented monograph by Muḥammad Taqī al-Ḥakīm (d. 1423/2002), and two short epitomes introducing two short manual on *‘ilm al-bayān* by the Kurdish polymath ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Mudarris (d. 1426/2005).

The shift from the classic exegetical tradition towards the evolution of the manuals and epitomes is a phenomenon that emerges even more clearly among the Ottoman scholarly circles. The early stage of this gradual transition and reformulation of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is witnessed by short manuals such as the one composed by Mullā Khalīl Si‘irdī (d. 1259/1843), or earlier by ‘Abd Allāh al-Najīb al-‘Ayntābī (d. 1219/1804). This transition is however better exemplified by two among the most widespread manuals of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, the first authored by a certain Ḥajar-zādeh (fl. mid-13th/19th) and the second by Ibrāhīm Eḡini (1247/1831-1311/1894), who both flourished during

the middle of the 13th/19th century and whose epitomes were printed as *madrasa* manuals already by the end of the century.

The short *matn* by Ḥajar-zādeh displays similar innovations that characterize previous epitomes and didactic poems but maintains some elements that echo the foundational *matn*. The text is divided into a short opening statement, a section on the division of the concept into universal and particular and a closing section that contains nine *Reminders*. In the opening statement, unlike the previous epitomes and didactic poems, Ḥajar-zādeh does not provide any definition of the notion of *waḍʿ*, nor a description of the subject-matter and the scope of the discipline itself, but briefly lists the different senses of the notion of *waḍʿ*, such as lexicographic, common sense, conventional and legal. Here he also provides a first division of *waḍʿ* with respect to the subject-term (*al-mawḍūʿ*) into *individual* (*shakhṣī*) and *species* (*nawʿī*). Each of the two classes are further divided, with respect to the concept, into particular and universal. Following these two divisions, Ḥajar-zādeh presents the standard classes of *waḍʿ*, namely *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-ʿāmm* for the case of the particular concept. To the class *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* belong proper nouns, proper generic names and patters of verbs. To the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* belong not only all three types of pronouns and particles, but also the particular ascriptions of verbs (*al-nisab al-juzʿiyya*) to a subject, sentence structure composites (*al-murakkabāt al-tāmma*), such as “Zayd is standing” (*Zaydun qāʿimun*), the annexation composites (*al-murakkabāt al-iḍāfiyya*), such as “Zayd’s servant” (*ghulāmu Zaydin*) and noun-adjective composites (*al-murakkabāt al-tawṣifiyya*), such as “a knowledgeable man” (*rajulun ʿālimun*). For the case of the universal concept, Ḥajar-zādeh provides only the class *ʿāmm-ʿāmm* that includes generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, the substance of verbs (*mawādd al-aḥḥāl*) and derived nouns. The remaining part of this section of the *matn* presents a further description of the universal and particular concepts that reiterates the previous classification

and, more interestingly, matches with the wording of the *Classification* in the *Risāla*. Finally, in the last section Ḥajar-zādeh chooses nine of the twelve original *Reminders* of al-Ījī's *Risāla* and reports them verbatim. Overall, the short *matn* witnesses in some ways, namely in the introduction of the novel *individual* and *species* positings, the evolution of the literary production on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, while in some others, such as the descriptions of universal and particular terms as well as the *Reminders*, it remains faithful to al-Ījī's foundational work. If Ḥajar-zādeh's presentation of the new classification of the classes of *waḍʿ* under the classes *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī* allows him to integrate more linguistic elements into the theory of *waḍʿ*, such as sentence structures and noun-adjective composites, he is nevertheless unclear in describing the classes of terms that belong respectively to both classes *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī*.⁷⁵

The widely influential manual authored by Ibrāhīm Eḡini offers a more complete and systematic treatment of virtually all aspects of the theory of *waḍʿ*. Eḡini divides his manual into an introduction (*muqaddima*), three enquiries (*maṭlab*) and a conclusion (*khātima*). The introduction describes the different senses of the notion of *waḍʿ* and, more importantly, the definition of the subject-matter of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and its scope. The sense of the notion of *waḍʿ* that better defines the subject-matter of the discipline is in Eḡini's view the customary sense (*al-ʿurfī*), that is, to consider something in place of some other insofar as the understanding of the former entails the understanding of the latter. The discipline of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* thus investigates the features of the customary positing by considering the modes of positing, namely the notions of generality, specification, individuality and species-ness (*ʿumūm*, *khuṣūṣ*, *shakhṣiyya*, *nawʿiyya*). Eḡini also provides a more precise definition of the scope of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* that departs from the

⁷⁵ A thorough explanation is only available by looking at the commentary authored by his student Rajab Efendī that is usually printed with the *matn*.

classic definition of “*knowing the positing of simple terms*.” The scope of ‘*ilm al-waḍʿ*’ consists in being able to discern one term from another, discern the subject-matters of lexicography, morphology, etymology and syntax from each other, discern one class of positing from another and, finally, discern the characteristics of the literal sense from features of the figurative sense (*tamyyizu amārāti al-haqīqati ‘an qarā’ini al-majāzi*). The scope of ‘*ilm al-waḍʿ*’, in Eḡini’s view, goes beyond the usual investigation of the semantics of simple terms and acquires a more fundamental status *vis-à-vis* other linguistic sciences.

Eḡini isolates the three main elements that belong to the notion of *waḍʿ*, namely the positor (*al-wāḍiʿ*), the term posited (*al-mawḍūʿ*) and the concept (*al-mawḍūʿ lahu*). The three investigations (*al-maṭālib*) that constitute the core of the work correspond each to one of these main elements. The first and third investigations are considerably shorter than the second. In the first Eḡini presents a brief overview on the question of the origin of language and the identity of the positor, while in the third he presents the status of the linguistic concept, which is divided into universal and particular. Unlike previous manuals that dedicated a section on the division of the concept and its corresponding linguistic classification, in this third investigation Eḡini presents another debate cognate to ‘*ilm al-waḍʿ*’, that is, whether the concepts conveyed by terms correspond to mental forms, or external entities, or quiddities as they are (*min ḥaythu hiya hiya*), or a combination of the first two options.

The whole theory of *waḍʿ* with its divisions and classifications is presented in the second investigation, which deals specifically with the concept of *waḍʿ* with respect to the posited term (*al-mawḍūʿ*). Unlike the division into ‘*āmm* and *khāṣṣ*’ proper to the *Risāla* and the classic exegesis, Eḡini’s main division of the positing of terms follows that of his immediate predecessors, consisting in the individual (*shakhṣī*) and species (*nawʿī*) modes of positing. These two modes seem to take precedence over the standard ‘*āmm* and *khāṣṣ*’ as it appears from their definitions:

the *shakhṣī*, Eḡini says, is “the determination of the term considered in its specificity for a universal or a particular concept,” while the *nawʿī* is “the determination of the term considered in its generality for a universal or a particular concept.” The modes *ʿāmm* and *khāṣṣ* are instead presented in the formulation of the classes of *waḍʿ* that ensue from the first division *shakhṣī-nawʿī*. As such, Eḡini presents and explains in detail the psychological process by which the positor, or the human being, grasps (*mulāḥaẓa*) the fundamental features of concepts, such as universality, particularity, specificity and generality, as well as common forms (*hayʾāt*) of terms in order to posit terms and their concepts in a definite class of *waḍʿ*. The end result of Eḡini’s classification expands considerably the scope of the *waḍʿ* classes to virtually every linguistic term as following table shows:

	Waḍʿ Shakhṣī	Waḍʿ Nawʿī
Khāṣṣ - Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper names - Proper generic names - Names of digits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Patterns (e.g., verbal patterns)
ʿĀmm - Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personal pronouns - Relative pronouns - Demonstrative pronouns - Prepositions - Fixed verbal interjections (<i>asmāʾ al-aʿfāl</i>) - Some types of adverbs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The generality of verbs (<i>ʿāmmat al-aʿfāl</i>, e.g., the verb <i>ḍaraba</i> belongs to the <i>faʿala</i> type and indicates a relation of an event to an agent in the past)

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Complete proposition compounds (e.g., <i>Zaydun qā'imun</i>) - Annexation composites - Noun-adjective composites - Definite nouns by the article for extra-mental determination (<i>lām al-ʿahd al-khārijī</i>) - First term of a definite annexation - Simple noun definite by the article encompassing a genus (<i>lām al-istighrāq</i>)
ʿĀmm-ʿĀmm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generic nouns - <i>Maṣḍars</i> - Substance of verbs (<i>mawādd al-aʿāl</i>) - Derived nouns - Names of <i>Maṣḍars</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tense of verbs - Ascription of verbs to a subject - Active and passive participles - Nouns of timeframe (e.g., <i>maghreb</i>) - Nouns of place - Nouns of instrument - Elative and superlative - Diminutive

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nisba adjective - Dual ending - Plural forms - Vocative particles
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These classes of *waḍʿ*, as Eḡini explains in the first additional remark (*fāʿida*) of the *Conclusion*, fall under a more general class of *waḍʿ*, namely, *purposive positing* (*waḍʿ qaṣḍī*). This encompassing class of *waḍʿ* has a counterpart called *purposeless positing* (*waḍʿ ḡhayr qaṣḍī*), in which terms are posited for themselves (*li-anfusihā*), rather than for a concept proper. This means that scholars who accepted the validity of this class, such as al-Taftāzānī, claim that in the sentence “*kharaja Zaydun min al-Baṣra*” (*Zayd left from Basra*) the verb “*kharaja*” is posited for a verb, the name “*Zayd*” is posited for a proper name, “*min*” is posited for a preposition, and “*Baṣra*” is posited for a proper name. Understood in this way, in the class of purposeless positing, the verb “*kharaja*” itself is the subject of positing, while “*verb*” is the object of positing, just as “*min*” is the subject of positing while “*preposition*” is the object of positing. This means that “*kharaja*” is posited in order to convey the concept of “*being a verb*,” and “*min*” is posited in order to convey the concept of “*being a preposition*.” Neither represents the purpose for positing those two terms, because, for example, the purpose for positing the preposition “*min*” is to convey the specific concept of “*beginning*,” rather than the idea of “*being a preposition*.” In this way, “*kharaja*” and “*min*” can be understood as proper names (*ʿalam*) for the respective category of verbs and prepositions which they refer to.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ This classification between *waḍʿ qaṣḍī* and *ḡhayr qaṣḍī* is better explained in the commentary *al-ʿUjāla al-Raḥmiyya* by Muḥammad Raḥmī Eḡini; see p. 67-68.

The remaining five remarks of the *Conclusion* briefly present topics that relate to the whole theory of *waḍʿ* discussed earlier and do not share any similarities with those of al-Ījī's *Risāla* or are discussed in the classic exegesis. One of these, the *Second*, discusses whether the four senses of *waḍʿ* presented in the *Introduction*, namely the lexicographical, legal, customary and conventional, become unified when a term signifies only one concept, e.g. the sense of the term *lion* (*asad*) would not differ in the four senses of *waḍʿ*. In the *Fourth*, Eḡini claims that linguistic positing implies signification (*dalāla*), but signification does not imply linguistic positing. Signification in fact can occur intellectually, as when one infers the presence of someone talking upon hearing a sound behind a wall; or by nature, as when someone emits the sound “*ahem!*” that indicates a cough and thus signifies chest pain. Finally, the *Fourth* presents the question of whether intent (*irāda*) is a condition for signification. According to most scholars, intent is not a prerequisite for signification to occur, contrary to what Avicenna and ʿIṣām al-Dīn maintained. Eḡini seems to side with the majority opinion, according to which intent is only a prerequisite in the process of linguistic positing (*waḍʿ*).

Finally, in the last remark, Eḡini provides a further division that applies to the significatum (*maḍlūl*) of terms, by appealing for the first time to the notions of semantic independence vs dependence (*mustaqill* and *ghayr mustaqill*), which were two of the core notions discussed throughout the classical exegesis. The significatum of a term is either a semantically independent concept (*mustaqill*) or a semantically dependent concept. Eḡini divides semantically independent concept into two subclasses: the concept can be either semantically independent essentially as well as conceptually (*dhātan wa mafhūman*), or just conceptually. In the first subclass, for example, the term “*kātib*” corresponds to two notions: an essence, i.e., a human, for which the concept of “*al-kātib*” is true (*mā ṣadaqa ʿalayhi*); and concept, i.e., something (*shayʾ*) to which writing (*al-kitāba*) belongs. In the second subclass, for example, the terms blackness

(*sawād*), whiteness (*bayād*), knowledge (*‘ilm*), and ignorance (*jahl*) are considered essences that are ontologically dependent and subsisting in their substrata (*dhawātuhā ghayr mustaqillatin fī l-wujūdi qā’imatun bi-maḥāllihā min al-jawāhiri*). However, from a conceptual standpoint, they are considered semantically independent because they are nouns (*asmā’*). Eḡini divides concepts that are semantically dependent also into two subclasses: they can be either semantically dependent essentially as well as conceptually (*dhātan wa-mafhūman*), or just essentially. The first subclass corresponds to the significata conveyed by prepositions and particles. The second subclass corresponds to all the ascriptions (*nisab*) that are construed between, for example, an accident or an action and an agent, e.g., the ascription of “writing” (*kitāba*) to an agent (*fā’il*) as in “*al-kātib*,” or the ascription of “blackness” (*sawād*) to an agent as in “*aswad*” (something black).⁷⁷

Further witnesses of the evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ’* in Ottoman circles are the short *Namūdhaj fī l-Waḍ’* authored by al-Bakshahrī (d. 1315/1897) with the self-commentary *Taṣwīr al-Waḍ’*, the pseudo-al-Bakshahrī manual titled *al-Ṣaḥīfa al-Waḍ’iyya al-Jadīda*, extensively commented upon by ‘Alī b. ‘Umar b. ‘Uthmān al-Āqshahrī (d. 1285/1868) and titled *al-Daqā’iq al-Muḥkama ‘alā al-Ṣaḥīfa al-Waḍ’iyya al-Jadīda*; as well as the longer *mutūn* by Fakhr al-Dīn al-‘Irnāsī (1327/1910-1391/1972) titled *Risāla al-Waḍ’*, and *al-Risāla al-Ḥilmiyya* by Aḥmad Ḥilmī al-Qūghī (d. 1416/1996).⁷⁸ The emergence of these short manuals and epitomes between the second half of the 13th/19th and the first half of the 14th/20th century coincides with the growing interest in and implementation of *‘ilm al-waḍ’* within the lower levels of *madrasa* education, as beginning

⁷⁷ These examples with further explanations are provided in the commentary *al-‘Ujāla al-Raḥmiyya*, pp. 70-71.

⁷⁸ The *matn* attributed to al-Bakshahrī titled *Namūdhaj fī l-Waḍ’* is almost identical to the anonymous work *al-Ṣaḥīfa al-Waḍ’iyya al-Jadīda*, with only the short introduction and a few brief passages distinguishing one from the other. In all likelihood the al-Bakshahrī is the author of both works, one being an earlier or later recension to the other. On al-Bakshahrī see Bursali, *Osmanli Müellifleri*, vol. I, p. 452; on al-Aqshahrī see Bursali, *Osmanli Müellifleri*, vol. I, p. 278.

students had not yet acquired the scholarly tools to understand the major classic commentaries accompanied by their sets of glosses. The transition of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* from the more advanced scholarly learning towards the lower levels of the *madrassa* curricula can be seen in the work of the Damascene Muḥammad Amīn al-Safarjilānī (d. 1334/1916) titled *al-Quṭūf al-Dāniya fī l-‘Ulūm al-Thamāniya*, completed in Rajab 1311/February 1894, which provides an overview of eight main sciences, namely morphology (*ṣarf*), syntax (*naḥw*), *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī*, *‘ilm al-bayān*, *‘ilm al-badī‘*, logic and *ḥikma*, which constitute the core of *madrassa* non-*naqlī* curricula.⁷⁹ The main feature of the work is the style employed by al-Safarjilānī, who discusses each discipline by questions and answers, from the more basic to the more complex topics. Following the same pedagogical approach, the section on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* is divided into three main parts, an introduction with questions and answers on the notion of *waḍ‘* and the discipline of *waḍ‘* proper, then the first investigation (*mabḥath*) on the *waḍ‘ shakhṣī* and the second on the *waḍ‘ naw‘ī*, both including all the topics and classes of *waḍ‘* discussed in other manuals of the same period. Moreover, an appendix to the work contains a set of practice questions (*taṭbīq al-‘ulūm*) which are examples of those presented to beginning students to pass their exam.⁸⁰

Overall, the previous manuals and epitomes have, with some variations, the same structure and they display the same division of the classes of *waḍ‘* adopted by Ḥajar-zādeh and

⁷⁹ On al-Safarjilānī see Ziriklī, *A‘lām*, vol. 2, p. 20.

⁸⁰ For the section on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* see al-Safarjilānī, *al-Quṭūf al-Dāniya fī l-‘Ulūm al-Thamāniya*, pp. 162-172. For the appendix see p. 318; in the introduction to the appendix, al-Safarjilānī explains that he composed this set of exams at the end of Rajab 1306/April 1889. In the same date al-Safarjilānī says that was examined by a committee of scholars in order to receive the title of *shaykh al-Islām*. The title would enable him to be appointed as a teacher for students who were in the Ottoman imperial military troops; as well as to appoint the head teachers in Istanbul. This examination was certified by the order of the *shaykh al-Islām* in charge as well as by the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II. Al-Safarjilānī adds also that he put together the exam questions on the different disciplines while he was evaluated by the committee on a section of al-Qazwīnī’s *Talkhīṣ al-Miftāḥ* with al-Taftāzānī’s *al-Muṭawwal*; see. al-Safarjilānī, *al-Quṭūf al-Dāniya...*, p. 318.

Eğini. The main feature that emerges here is the preeminence of *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī* types of *waḍʿ* under which the standard classes *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* are included. As in the case of the previous manuals, the main scope of both manuals is to provide a general definition of the notion of *waḍʿ*, then to provide definitions of the *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī* modes of *waḍʿ*, and, finally, to lay out a classification every term of the language in the ensuing six classes, that is *shakhṣī khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *waḍʿ nawʿī khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*.⁸¹ The classification of terms that that results from these works is, with minor changes and a few discrepancies, faithful to that of Eğini.

If the new epitomes and manuals issued in the Ottoman *madrassa* settings help us recognize and identify key formal and conceptual changes in the evolution of the science of *waḍʿ*, the *mutūn* authored by Azharī scholars are witnesses of the final stage of evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* into a fully formed *madrassa* discipline. The emergence of independent *mutūn* in Azharī circles is recorded around the same time as those of the Ottoman circles, such as those of Ḥajar-zādeh and Eğini in the second half of the 14th/19th century. One of the earliest independent works on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* is treatise authored by the Azharī polymath Shams al-Dīn al-Ambābī (or al-Imbābī) (d. 1313/1896) titled *Risāla fī Taḥqīq al-Waḍʿ*. For its structure and content, the treatise, unlike the manuals of his Ottoman contemporaries and the later Azharī manuals, cannot be considered as a proper *madrassa* manual that exemplifies the evolution of the literary genre. It is rather a general introduction to the classes of *waḍʿ* with specific case studies almost exclusively devoted to verbs and generic nouns. The treatise is divided into three main parts that mimic those of the *Risāla*, that is, *Introduction*, *Classification* and *Conclusion*; however, it departs substantially from

⁸¹ In his commentary, al-Aqshahrī devotes considerable room to expanding on each of the six classes of *waḍʿ* with detailed definitions and descriptions of the process of positing terms for each class by relying mainly on al-Jurjānī's glosses on al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal*, al-Qūshjī's *Unqūd al-Zawāhir* and ʿIṣām al-Dīn's works on grammar.

both the *Risāla* and his predecessors' manuals in many aspects. In the *Introduction* al-Ambābī presents the definitions of *waḍʿ* and the linguistic sense of *waḍʿ* in more detail. On the basis of the definition of linguistic positing, that is “to determine something vis-à-vis a concept” (*taʿyīnu al-shayʿi bi-izāʿi al-maʿnā*), al-Ambābī, like many contemporaries, devotes the rest of the section to discussing the status of *majāz*, and specifically whether figurative expressions should be considered part of original linguistic positing together with the literal sense (*ḥaqīqa*) assigned to terms. Al-Ambābī's presentation of the debate revolves around the competing views held by al-Taftāzānī in works on *balāgha* that contradict his view expressed in his juridical works. Overall, al-Ambābī seems to side with the view that figurative senses of terms should be counted in the primary act of linguistic positing. He concludes the section with a standard definition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, namely the rules of positing (*qawāʿid al-waḍʿ*). He then adds that its scope (*ghāya*) is to prevent some classes of positing being mixed with others (*al-amanu min ikhtilāṭi baʿḍi al-awḍāʿi bi-baʿḍin*), a claim that departs from the classic definitions of the disciplines which limited the scope of the discipline to the analysis of the positing of particles and pronouns. Al-Ambābī's main objective in the *Classification* and *Conclusion* seems to clarify how some types of terms, e.g. verbs, may be classified in different classes of *waḍʿ*. In the *Classification*, al-Ambābī adopts the newly developed division of classes of *waḍʿ* seen in the manuals of his contemporaries. The most fundamental classes of *waḍʿ* are the *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī*, each of which have three sub-classes, namely the standard *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* and *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*. The rest of the *Classification* is not devoted, as one may expect, to the analysis of particles, prepositions and pronouns, as was the case for commentators and glossators. Rather, this section discusses at length the positing of verbs and their patterns (*awzān*) in both the perfect and imperfect tenses and that of generic nouns (*ism al-jins*) and proper generic names (*ʿalam al-jins*). Following his explanation of each class of positing and that of the verbal patterns, al-Ambābī concludes that these should fall

under the class *waḍʿ nawʿī ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*, and not under the *nawʿī khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* as it is the case for his contemporaries like Eḡini. Similarly, al-Ambābī expresses doubts and diverges from his contemporaries' views regarding the classification of proper generic names (*ʿalam al-jins*). This type of nouns can either fall under the class *shakhṣī khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* as Eḡini claims, or the *nawʿī ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*. Likewise, al-Ambābī is doubtful about the classification of propositional compounds (*al-murakkabāt al-khabariyya*). Propositional compounds can either fall under the class *nawʿī ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* as in Eḡini's case, or the *nawʿī ʿāmm-ʿāmm*. In the *Conclusion*, al-Ambābī tackles the thorny question of the positing of generic nouns (*ism al-jins*) and proper generic names (*ʿalam al-jins*), and in particular how determination (*taʿyīn*) occurs to the concepts conveyed by these two types of terms. Overall, al-Ambābī's work displays idiosyncratic features from those of his contemporaries. Unlike Eḡini, al-Ambābī's aim is not to provide a complete classification of terms existing in the language in the newly developed system of classes of *waḍʿ*. The focus of his exposition of the classes of *waḍʿ* in both the *Classification* and the *Conclusion* seems to be limited to specific classes of terms, that is, verbs and proper generic names, as these, in his view and in his understanding of the classes of *waḍʿ*, are problematic and may fall under two distinct classes. In this respect, the treatise does not really qualify as a *madrasa* manual or a *précis* of *waḍʿ* theory as Eḡini's or Ḥajar-zādeh's manuals do; rather, it should be intended as an advanced work on *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* that presents case studies of problematic categories of terms and an analysis of their classification into a specific class of *waḍʿ*.

The manuals and epitomes that best represent the final stage of the evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* as an independent discipline of the *madrasa* system are those composed by the Azharī scholars between the second half of the 13th/19th century and the first half of the 14th/20th century. In their structure and content, these manuals and epitomes were specifically conceived

for different levels of the *madrasa* curriculum as they present definitions, classifications and case studies in a more organized and systematic style than al-Ambābī's treatise. The growing interest in and demand for 'ilm al-waḍ' in the Azharī *madrasa* system is seen in the rapid growth of the number of works authored and printed during this period. There are at least seven major manuals or epitomes issued from the Azharī scholarly circles that were immediately adopted in the *madrasa* curricula, the most widespread of which was the *Khulāṣat 'Ilm al-Waḍ'* by Yūsuf al-Dijwī. In what follows, the brief summary of structure and content of the most relevant and widespread Azharī manuals will show the final stage of the discipline's evolution into a relatively well-defined literary genre and, moreover, the diverse classifications of terms into the classes of waḍ' as the end result of the authors' approach on 'ilm al-waḍ'.

One of the earliest epitomes to be printed and adopted in the *madrasa* curricula is the *Khulāṣat 'Ilm al-Waḍ'* by 'Abd al-Raḥmān Khalaf, completed in 1334/1916. There is very scanty information on the author's life, except that he was a teacher in the secondary level (*al-qism al-thānawī al-niẓāmī*). The epitome is divided into an *Introduction*, seven *Investigations (mabāḥith)* and a *Conclusion*. In the *Introduction*, the author provides a more detailed description of the definitions of linguistic positing than his predecessors. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Khalaf distinguishes between two senses of conventional linguistic positing, namely the applied sense (*bi-l-ma'ná al-'amalī*) and the theoretical sense (*bi-l-ma'ná al-'ilmī*). The definition of the applied sense seems close to al-Ambābī's definition, that is "to determine something by something else, so that when the first is perceived the second will be understood by the one who knows that specification" (*ta'yīnu al-shay'i bi-l-shay'i matá udrika al-awwalu fuhima al-thāniyu li-l-'ālimi bi-l-ta'yīni*).⁸² The applied sense of positing seems to be more general than the theoretical one, because it includes not only

⁸² Cf. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Khalaf, *Khulāṣa 'Ilm al-Waḍ'*, Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Sa'āda, p. 5.

linguistic positing proper with its classes of *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī*, but also the positing of signs and symbols and, more importantly, the literal and figurative senses of terms (*ḥaqīqa wa majāz*). The positing of the figurative sense of terms (*majāz*) is often a point of debate especially among scholars of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and *balāgha*, such as al-Jurjānī, who denies a place for *majāz* in the linguistic positing, or al-Taftāzānī, who makes room for it in linguistic positing. The presence of *majāz* in the definition of linguistic positing is relevant as it allows ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Khalaf to introduce here, likely for the first time, a new pair of classes, namely the *waḍʿ taḥqīqī* and *taʿwīlī*, the former being the positing of terms for their literal senses, the latter being devised to include figurative senses and metaphors as it is based on semantic relations and semantic contexts (*ʿalāqa wa qarīna*). The addition of the *waḍʿ taʿwīlī* will appear more consistently in Azharī manuals and epitomes of the same period with the specific aim to assigning a particular class of *waḍʿ* to figurative senses and metaphors.⁸³ The first investigation discusses the division and classification of terms into particular and universal, which is, in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Khalaf’s view, merely propaedeutic or a digressional (*istiṭrādī*) for the following second investigation, that represents the core of the epitome where the main classes of *waḍʿ* are presented and discussed. Similar to the newly devised treatises and epitomes of the same period, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Khalaf’s *Khulāṣa* considers the main classes of *waḍʿ* to be those of the *shakhṣī* and *nawʿī*, both of which are then subdivided into their three standard sub-classes. The investigations from the *Third* to the *Seventh* are essentially devoted to specific case studies in order to classify terms in their class of *waḍʿ*. According to ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Khalaf’s classification the following table follows:

	Waḍʿ Shakhṣī	Waḍʿ Nawʿī
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⁸³ The applied sense includes also two other minor classes of *waḍʿ*, that is the *ifrādī* and *tarkībī*. The first refers to the positing of simple terms, while the second refers to terms composed of two terms such as a noun with its article or the vocative.

Khāṣṣ - Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper names (for present entities) - Proper generic names 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Patterns of verbs' tenses
ʿĀmm – Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personal pronouns - Relative pronouns - Demonstrative pronouns - Prepositions - Proper names (for non-present entities, e.g. unborn child) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verbs' patterns, e.g. the verb <i>ḍaraba</i> belongs to the <i>faʿala</i> type, insofar as they indicate a relation of an event to an agent in the past - Complete proposition compounds (e.g., nominal or verbal sentences) - Annexation compounds - Definite nouns by the article encompassing a genus (<i>lām al-ḥaqīqa</i>) - Definite nouns by the article indicating a single entity in the mental or extra-mental world (<i>lām al-ʿahd al-khārijī aw al-dhihnī</i>) - Diminutive - <i>Nisba</i> adjective - Dual ending

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Plural forms - Vocative particles
‘Āmm-‘Āmm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generic nouns - Substance of verbs - Indefinite nouns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Derived nouns - Maṣḍars - Nouns of maṣḍars - Composite nouns

When compared to Eḡini’s classification, one can notice several differences. The major one is the listing of a whole group of terms in the class *naw‘ī ‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, such as *nisba* adjective, duals, plurals etc., that Eḡini classifies as *naw‘ī ‘āmm-‘āmm*, to mention the most relevant. Another is ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khalaḥ’s detailed analysis of proper names, which leads him to differentiate between proper names for present entities, which fall under the *shakhṣī khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ*, and proper names for entities that are not immediately perceivable, which fall under the *shakhṣī ‘āmm-khāṣṣ*. These discrepancies in the conception and subsequent classification of terms in their classes of *waḍ‘* is ascribable to each author’s diverse approach to the understanding of the process of linguistic positing.

The evolution of ‘*ilm al-waḍ‘* into a science taught at all levels of the *madrassa* curriculum can be seen in two manuals conceived specifically for first-year students in the secondary level, the first by the Azharī teacher Muṣṭafá Badr Zayd titled *Khulāṣa fī ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*, a very short work printed on Rajab 1st 1347/December 13th 1928 that also provides a table summarizing the classification of each type of term discussed in the text. The second manual is entitled *al-Minḥa al-Ilāhiyya fī al-Qawā‘id al-Waḍ‘iyya* by the Azharī scholar and teacher ‘Abd al-Khāliq al-Shubrāwī (fl. 14th/20th), about whom very little is known. The manual was probably completed in the early

decades of the 14th/20th century, and it underwent at least three different editions, the last being particularly important as it was evaluated by the Azharī book examination committee and by the higher scientific council to be taught to first-year students in all colleges of the religious institution in Ṣafar 1342/September 1923.⁸⁴ Al-Shubrāwī organizes the manual with an introduction, in which he present the definitions of the notion *waḍʿ* as a general notion and as a discipline *per se*, a series of classifications (*taqāsīm*) that represents the core of the work, and a conclusion exclusively devoted to discussing the debate over the origin of language. The core part of *al-Miḥna* is structured as a series of classifications of *waḍʿ* starting with the pair *waḍʿ taḥqīqī-taʿwīlī*, the first pertaining to the terms that signify concept for which they have been posited, while the second is exclusive devoted to metaphorical and figurative usage of terms. The *waḍʿ taḥqīqī* is then further divided into the other main pair *waḍʿ shakhṣī-nawʿī*, each of them divided further into the standard tripartite couples *ʿāmm-ʿāmm*, *khāṣṣ-khāṣṣ* and *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ*. For each class, al-Shubrāwī provides a definition and the example of how some classes of terms belong to each class. Other classes of terms such as generic nouns, *maṣḍars*, derived nouns, verbs are presented further on in specific subsections as case studies that require specific discussions. Al-Shubrāwī's classification can be summarized as follow:

	Waḍʿ Shakhṣī	Waḍʿ Nawʿī
Khāṣṣ - Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper names - Proper generic names - Names books and sciences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verbal patterns - Derived nouns (according to some scholars' view)

⁸⁴ This notice appears on the front page of the third edition. Another note on the front page of the second edition says that manual had been already evaluated by the book examination committee, who added several annotations to the author's work.

<p>‘Āmm – Khāṣṣ</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personal pronouns - Relative pronouns - Demonstrative pronouns - Prepositions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verbal patterns, e.g. the verb <i>ḍaraba</i> belongs to the <i>fa‘ala</i> type, insofar as they indicate a relation of an event to an agent in the past tense - Generic nouns definite by the article <i>al-</i> - Annexation compounds - Verbal patterns indicating an ascription to an agent - Diminutive pattern - <i>Nisba</i> adjective - Dual ending - Plural patters - Vocative particles
<p>‘Āmm-‘Āmm</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generic nouns - Maṣḍars - Indefinite nouns - Derived nouns (according to some scholars’ view) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Derived nouns - Nouns of maṣḍars - Composite nouns

The manuals and epitomes by Azharī scholars in the first half of the 14th/20th century exemplify the final systematization of ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ within its *madrasa* framework. Manuals such as *al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘* by Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Ḍawāhirī, professor at the Aḥmadī

mosque in Tanta, the *Risāla fī ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘* by ‘Alī b. Muḥammad al-Najjār, teacher at the al-Azhar secondary school and professor in the Sharī‘a department, and the *Khulāṣa ‘alā al-Waḍ‘* by Yūsuf al-Dijwī, follow the structure and contents of those of their predecessors.⁸⁵ Among these works, al-Dijwī’s *Khulāṣa* appears to be the most widespread and utilized in the Azharī madrasa curricula. Its wide reception stems not only from the exhaustive nature of the work but also from al-Dijwī’s membership in the Azharī Council of Senior Scholars (*hay’at kibār ‘ulamā’ al-Azhar*). The work underwent two editions, the first in 23 Jumādā I 1338/13 February 1920 and the second in Rabī‘ I 1339/ November 1920 and was approved by the Azharī council of books to be adopted and taught in secondary levels (*al-qism al-thānawī*) in the department of religious studies.⁸⁶

Al-Dijwī’s epitome follows closely the structure of al-Shubrāwī’s work. The brief *Introduction* provides the standard definitions of the term *waḍ‘* and of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as a discipline. The main section of the work is titled *Categories of Positing* (*Aqsām al-Waḍ‘*) where al-Dijwī lays out four main divisions of *waḍ‘*, namely *shakhṣī-naw‘ī*, *taḥqīqī-ta’wīlī*, *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, and finally *kullī-juz’ī*. Al-Dijwī follows these classifications with specific case studies of classes of term, such as generic nouns, derived nouns, particles and prepositions. The closing section of the epitome is titled *Novel Summary* (*Khulāṣa Badī‘a*) in which al-Dijwī provides students with a comprehensive classification of terms in their own class of *waḍ‘*. The result of his summary isolates to seven classes of *waḍ‘* as in the following table:

	Waḍ‘ Shakhṣī Taḥqīqī	Waḍ‘ Naw‘ī Taḥqīqī	Waḍ‘ Naw‘ī Ta’wīlī
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⁸⁵ On al-Najjār see Muḥammad Khayr b. Ramaḍān Yūsuf, *Mu‘jam al-Mu’allifīn*, al-Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-Malik Fahd al-Waṭaniyya, 1425/2004, vol. 1, p. 466; on al-Zawāhirī see Zakī Muḥammad Mujāhid, *al-A‘lām al-Sharqiyya*, Bayrūt: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1994 [second print], vol. 1, pp. 354-355; on al-Dijwī see Mujāhid, *al-A‘lām...*, vol. 1, p. 422-423.

⁸⁶ The work has been recently reprinted by Kāmil Ahmad Kāmil al-Ḥusaynī, Cairo (al-Qāhira): Dār al-Baṣā’ir, 2010 (with al-Buhūtī’s *Ladhdha al-Sam‘ bi-Naẓm Risālat al-Waḍ‘*).

Khāṣṣ - Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper names - Proper generic names (according to some scholars' view) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Positing of proper names for a special entity, i.e., a father who names his unborn child. 	
‘Āmm - Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personal pronouns - Relative pronouns - Demonstrative pronouns - Prepositions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verbs (with respect to their form). - Generic nouns definite by the article <i>al-</i>. - Diminutive pattern. - <i>Nisba</i> adjective - Dual ending - Plural patterns - Vocative particles 	
‘Āmm- ‘Āmm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper generic names - Generic nouns - Maṣḍars - Names of Maṣḍar 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Derived nouns - Composite nouns - Verbs (with respect to their substance) - Propositional compound (subject-predicate or subject-verb compounds) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Figurative expressions - Metonyms

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Annexation compounds - Descriptive compounds (<i>murakkbāt tawṣīfiyya</i>) - Declarative compounds (<i>murakkabāt inshāʿiyya</i>) 	
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Following the standard practice of similar epitomes and manuals, this last part of the epitome concludes with an appendix in which al-Dijwī discusses five supplementary topics (*fawā'id*), the first on the difference between generic nouns and proper generic names; the second on the classification of book titles, sections of books and names of sciences; the third on the classification of definite nouns (*al-maʿārif*) by distinguishing whether they are posited for either external entities or mental ones; the fourth on intentional and unintentional positing (*waḍʿ qaṣdī* vs. *ghayr qaṣdī*); lastly, the fifth on the origin of language.⁸⁷

Two later Azharī manuals, authored respectively by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ʿAntar (1332/1914-d. before 1429/2008) and Muḥammad Dāwud al-Biyihhī (or al-Buyahī) both professors in the department of Arabic language at the same university, represent the ultimate stage of the evolution of the *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* literary genre. Both works appear to be the last published for the

⁸⁷ Cf. pp. 36-40.

Azharī *madrasa* curriculum, ‘Antar’s was published in 1367/1948⁸⁸ and al-Biyihhī’s in 1369/1950, and, unlike the previous ones, they are intended for third-year students. More importantly, the two works contain key features that help to get a better grasp of how *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* was intended to be taught and tested for students of Arabic language in their third year.

The manual by ‘Antar is the most exhaustive among all the previous works. Before beginning with the subject-matter of his work, ‘Antar provides a first short-list of the most relevant works on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, but he neither specifies the order in which these works must be studied nor in which class they should be taught. He lists al-Muntashawī’s *Sharḥ ‘Unqūd al-Zawāhir*, al-Suyuṭī’s *al-Muzhir*, al-Anbābī’s work on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, the two sets of glosses by al-Ḥifnī and al-Dasūqī on the pseudo-Qūshjī, al-‘Idwī al-Ḥamzāwī’s superglosses, the manuals authored by al-Dijwī and al-Najjār, the *Kullīyyāt* by Abū al-Baqā’ and *Safīnat al-Rāghib* by Muḥammad Rāghib Pāshā.⁸⁹ He will return to this list later, adding details about the works and their authors. The introduction to the second edition of the manual sheds light on the status of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* within the *madrasa* curricula and his motives to compose a new work. ‘Antar says in fact that in the years before the completion of his manual, the Azharī department of Arabic language, established in 1930, had charged him to teaching *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* for third-year students. However, he does not hide a certain dissatisfaction when he realized that the manuals available to him and his students were intended for first-year Azhar students in secondary-school in religious seminars (*ṭalbat al-sana al-ūlā min al-qism al-thānawī bi-l-ma‘āhid al-dīniyya*). ‘Antar goes on to say that these manuals and epitomes, likely those by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khalaf, al-Shubrāwī, al-Zawāhirī, Badr Zayd, al-Najjār and al-Dijwī, were all reference works adopted to teach *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* at a time when the discipline was still part of the curricula of the religious seminars, before

⁸⁸ This is the date of the second edition. In the introduction to this edition, the author says that the first edition was published by the department of Arabic language in 1359/1940.

⁸⁹ Cf. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ‘Antar, *‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*, p. 4.

being embedded in the curricula of the Arabic language department (*qabla an yunqala hādha al-‘ilm min-hā ilā kulliyya al-lugha al-‘arabiyya*). Deeming the works of his predecessors to be unsuitable for the level of higher education required in the third year, ‘Antar embarked in the composition of a new work that would be better suited to the scholarly level of his department, from the one side, and would be up to date with the formal and applied methods of teaching (*yusāyir rūḥ al-‘aṣr fī al-niẓām wa-l-taṭbīq*), from the other. To complete his manual and provide a balance between theoretical and practical aspects of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* (*jama‘tu bayna al-‘ilm wa-l-taṭbīq*), ‘Antar resorted to a vast array of sources in manuscript form, such as al-Anbābī’s treatise, as well as new and old printed texts, such as al-Muntashawī’s commentary on al-Qūshjī’s *Unqūd al-Zawāhir* and al-Dijwī’s epitome. ‘Antar goes on to say that before being printed, Ibrāhīm Ḥamrūsh (1297/1880-1380/1960), first dean of the department from 1350/1931 to 1363/1944, promoted the work and then submitted it to the scientific committee of the department, headed by Aḥmad Sharīt, who decided to adopt it as the reference work in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* and print it for the first time in 1359/1940.

The structure and content of the manual does not depart much from those of ‘Antar’s immediate predecessors, but it contains some peculiar features that are absent in other manuals and which reflect ‘Antar’s intention to provide both a theoretical and a practical approach to the study of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. The first section of the manual, titled “*The Sense of Positing Lexicographically and Conventionally*” (*Ma‘ná al-Waḍ‘ Lughatan wa-Iṣṭilāḥan*), provides the usual definitions of the notion of *waḍ‘* and focuses on its conventional sense, that is, to specify a term for a concept.⁹⁰ This leads ‘Antar to discuss the discipline in a more thorough way in the second section, titled “*Definition of ‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*” and to attempt a historical development of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*

⁹⁰ Cf. ‘Antar, *‘Ilm al-Waḍ‘*, pp. 5-9.

in the next section titled “*Origin of the Science of Positing and its Founder*” (*Nashā’ al-Waḍ’ wa-Wāḍi’uhu*), where he claims that the topics proper to ‘ilm al-waḍ’ were initially a prerogative of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, ‘ilm al-bayān and logic, but that they were organized into an independent science initially by Eastern scholars (*al-ulamā’ al-mashāriqa*) in their books on *balāgha*.⁹¹ In the next section, titled “*The Most Widespread Works on ‘Ilm al-Waḍ’*” (*Ashhar al-Mu’allafāt fī l-Waḍ’*), ‘Antar displays a thorough knowledge of ‘ilm al-waḍ’ literature as he expands on the previous list and divides works that were independent from al-Ījī’s *Risāla* (such as al-Qūshjī’s *Unqūd* and its commentary, al-Fattanī’s *Iqd al-Lālī* with its self-commentary, and the Azharī manuals by al-Anbābī and al-Dijwī) from the works belonging to the classic exegetical tradition on the *Risāla* (such as the pseudo-Qūshjī’s commentary with its glosses by al-Dasūqī, al-Ḥinfī and al-Sīrōzī’s *al-Ḥāshiya al-Jadīda*, which he attributes to al-Qūshjī himself, as well as the commentary by ‘Iṣām al-Dīn with its glosses by al-Shīranisī, al-Kurdī and al-Kaffawī).⁹² The next sections discuss the theory of waḍ’ and its classifications in more depth, and are opened by the section titled “*The Positor of Terms*” (*Wāḍi’ al-Alfāz*), where ‘Antar outlines the debate over the origin of language.⁹³ In the next section titled “*Classes of Waḍ’*” (*Aqsām al-Waḍ’*), rather than starting with the presentation of the standard classes of waḍ’, ‘Antar provides a detailed synoptic table containing the main technical terms that belong to the classes of waḍ’ discussed in the next sections.⁹⁴

The main classes of waḍ’ *shakhṣī-naw’ī* are introduced and briefly explained in the section “*Classes of Waḍ’ with Respect to the Term*” (*Aqsām al-Waḍ’ bi-l’atibār al-Lafz*). To clarify these first two classes, ‘Antar, departing from the elaborate theoretical presentation of his predecessors, provides students with a practical example – an analysis of *sūrat al-Naṣr* – by

⁹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

⁹² *Ibidem*, pp. 14-15.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 15-19.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 20-21.

classifying and explaining each term of the *sūra* within the classes of *waḍʿ shakhṣī-nawʿī* and *waḍʿ taḥqīqī-taʿwīlī*.⁹⁵ Having provided these examples, ʿAntar adds a subsection titled “*Practical Application*” (*Taṭbīq*), which consists in an assignment that students are asked to complete. The assignment is divided into two main questions: the first, in which students are asked to clarify whether the list of terms provided fall under *waḍʿ shakhṣī* or *nawʿī*; and the second, in which students are asked to analyze terms contained in short sentences and poetic verses.⁹⁶

The standard classes *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* are presented and analyzed in detail in the following section titled “*Classes of Waḍʿ with Respect to the Posited Concept or its Instrument*” (*Aqsām al-Waḍʿ bi-Iʿtibār al-Maʿnā al-Mawḍūʿ la-hu wa-Ālatihi*) and, similar to the previous section, a subsection titled “*Practical Application*,” consists of an assignment containing two questions; the first, in which students are asked to classify a list of terms in one of the three standard classes derived from the *ʿāmm-khāṣṣ* distinction; and the second, in which ʿAntar asks students to explain the difference between positing and usage (*al-waḍʿ wa-l-istiʿmāl*) for a list of words provided.⁹⁷ The other classes briefly evoked earlier, namely *taḥqīqī-taʿwīlī*, are presented in more detail in the section titled “*Classes of Waḍʿ with Respect to Conveying the Posited Concept*,” for which ʿAntar does not provide a subsection with exercises.⁹⁸

Following his predecessors, ʿAntar introduces the last substantial section of his manual with the division of terms whose referent is a universal or a particular (*Taqṣīm al-Lafẓ bi-Iʿtibār Maḍlūlihi ilā Kullī wa-Juzʿī*). More specifically, ʿAntar discusses terms whose referent is a universal and how these intersect with the classes of *waḍʿ* previously presented. As was standard in previous manuals and epitomes, he presents in detail case studies of specific classes of terms,

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 24-27.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 28-32.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 34-36.

namely, generic nouns, *maṣḍars* and names of *maṣḍars*, derived nouns, verbs, figurative expressions and metonyms, all of which convey universal concepts. Similar to the previous sections, this section on universal concepts supplies a subsection titled “*Questions and Practice*” (*Asʿīla wa Taṭbīq*) consisting of two main assignments, the first with four questions, regarding the main differences and commonalities between classes of terms analyzed in the previous case studies; and the second with three questions, where students are asked to analyze parts of Quranic and poetic verses according to their classes of *waḍʿ*.⁹⁹ The section on terms whose referent is a particular mirrors the previous one on universals, and lists case studies of personal pronouns, particles, nouns made definite by the article *al-*, the vocative, the dual, the plural, the diminutive and adjectives of relation (*nisba*), as well as propositional and annexation compounds, all of which convey a particular concept. This section is also supplied with a subsection titled “*Questions and Practice*” (*Asʿīla wa-Taṭbīq*) consisting of two main assignments, the first more theoretical and the other more practical, pertaining to the main classes of terms discussed earlier.¹⁰⁰ Finally, the manual closes with the standard case studies of book titles, books sections and names of sciences, to which ʿAntar adds a brief discussion on the *waḍʿ qaṣḍī/ghayr qaṣḍī*.

The manual authored by al-Biyihhī, also for third year students, is similar to ʿAntar’s and might be considered an abridged version of it. Al-Biyihhī divides the work into three main parts, an *Introduction*, two main *Chapters* (*Bāb*) and a *Conclusion*. The *Introduction* discusses definitions of *waḍʿ* in its general sense and as a specific discipline, its subject-matter and main scope, a brief overview of its emergence as a discipline independent from its cognate sciences,

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 36-48.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 48-59.

namely logic, *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *balāgha*, and, finally, a short survey on the question of the origin of language. The two *Chapters* present the standard classes of *waḍʿ* seen in ‘Antar’s manual, where *Chapter Two* is exclusively devoted to the division of terms with respect to the concept they convey, that is universals and particulars. As in ‘Antar’s work, to each of the two chapters al-Biyihhī adds an appendix titled “*Questions on what has preceded*” (*Asʿila ʿalá mā taqadamma*) and another titled “*Practical application*” (*Taṭbīq*) in which al-Biyihhī provides students with five assignments, which are close to the those presented in ‘Antar’s subsections.¹⁰¹

Following the same trend of other manuals from the same period, the *Conclusion* of the treatise discusses more thoroughly four sub-classes of terms that were debated among classic commentators, glossators, and authors of new manuals and epitomes alike, the first being the names of sciences and disciplines, such as “*grammar*” or “*jurisprudence*,” the second pertaining to book titles, the third pertaining book sections (*tarājim*), such as “*section*,” “*paragraph*,” “*chapter*” etc., and the fourth pertaining to the status of concepts posited for definite or indefinite nouns. As a help and support for students’ revision, al-Biyihhī adds a synoptic table summarizing the classification of terms in their own class of *waḍʿ* as follows.¹⁰²

	Waḍʿ Shakhṣī Taḥqīqī	Waḍʿ Nawʿī Taḥqīqī	Waḍʿ Nawʿī Taʾwīlī
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¹⁰¹ For example, in the first appendix of *Chapter One*, the student is asked to answer six questions on different topics, such as the definition, subject-matter and scope of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*; to provide the main differences between the different classes or divisions of *waḍʿ*; to classify groups of terms such as pronouns and prepositions and to mention the competing views of this class of terms and, finally, to elucidate the relation between two or more classes of *waḍʿ*. In the second appendix, al-Biyihhī provides the student with five assignments. In the first he asks the students to explain the type of positing under which some classes of terms fall, e.g. derived nouns, generic nouns, metaphors; in the second, to elucidate which terms or short sentences fall under the *waḍʿ shakhṣī* or *nawʿī*, i.e. the term *mujtahid* or the Quranic verse “*Innī waḍaʿtuhā unthā*” (Āl ʿImrān: 36); the third to provide three examples for each classes of *waḍʿ*, e.g. *waḍʿ shakhṣī*, *nawʿī*, *taḥqīqī* and *taʾwīlī*; the fourth to classify the class of *waḍʿ* of a list of terms and short sentences; and the fifth, to provide an example for some classes of *waḍʿ*, e.g. the *waḍʿ taḥqīqī nawʿī*, the *shakhṣī ʿamm-ʿāmm*, *nawʿī taʾwīlī* etc. Cf. al-Biyihhī, *Risāla fī ʿilm al-Waḍʿ*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁰² The table appears at p. 58.

Khāṣṣ - Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper names - Proper generic names (with respect to mental unity) - Names books, sections of books - Names of sciences 		
‘Āmm - Khāṣṣ	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personal pronouns - Relative pronouns - Demonstrative pronouns - Prepositions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verbs (with respect to their form) - Generic nouns definite by the article <i>al-</i> - Definite annexation compounds - Diminutive pattern - <i>Nisba</i> adjective - Dual ending - Plural patters - Vocative particles 	

‘Āmm- ‘Āmm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proper generic names (when apply to many) - Generic nouns - Maṣḍars - Names of Maṣḍar - Indefinite nouns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Derived nouns - Composite nouns - Verbs (with respect to their substance) - Propositional compound (subject-predicate or subject-verb compounds) - Indefinite annexation compounds 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Figurative expressions - Metonyms
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The assignments contained in the manuals by ‘Antar and al-Biyihhī represent a novel feature in the last stage of the evolution of ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ as a literary genre, one that offers a better understanding of students’ learning process in the *madrasa* curriculum. But they do not offer a full picture of what an actual examination on ‘ilm al-waḍ‘ would have looked like for students of third year. The manual of al-Biyihhī is the only among these to add another appendix containing a set of two 90-minutes practice exams and the actual final exam that students had to take at the end of their course. Of the two practice exams or mock tests, the first is supplied with an answer key, while the second has no answer key. Both practice exams, as well as the actual exam,

are structured in the same way, namely, they contain a theory part (*qawā'id*) and a practice part (*taṭbīq*). The theory part contains three questions, in which the student is asked to provide a detailed description of some classes of *waḍ'* with examples, while the practice part contains two questions in which the students is asked to parse short sentences, short Quranic or poetic verses, or lists of terms according to the classes of *waḍ'* learned throughout the manual.¹⁰³ To have a better picture of an actual final exam on *'ilm al-waḍ'*, here follows a transcription and a translation of the final exam.

كلية اللغة العربية

امتحان النقل من السنة الثالثة (١٣٦٤ - ١٩٤٥)

الدور الثاني (الوضع) الزمن ساعة ونصف

(١) أجب عما يأتي مع التمثيل:

(أ) إلى أي شيء ترجع شخصية الوضع؟ وإلى أي شيء ترجع نوعيته؟ وهل

هناك ارتباط بين شخصية الوضع وخصوصه؟ ولماذا؟

¹⁰³ Cf. al-Biyihī, *Risāla al-Waḍ'*, pp. 51-56. The two practice exams are both dated 1367/1947. This could mean that the actual exam went unchanged for a few years.

(ب) ما الوضع الخاصّ للخاصّ؟ وهل يتحقّق في كلّ من الشخصي والنوعي؟

(٢) بين وضع الموصولات والحروف على مذهب كلّ من المتقدّمين والمتأخّرين،

ولماذا عدل المتأخّرين عن رأي المتقدّمين؟ ما أثر هذا الخلاف؟ وأي الرأيين ترجّح؟ صور
الوضع على كلا الرأيين في مثالين.

(٣) بين وضع المصادر وأسماء الأفعال والمشتقات مع التوجيه والتمثيل.

التطبيق

(١) بين وضع الكلمات الآتية مع التوجيه:

صالح (علماً وصفة) - نمر - مجال (مصدراً ومكاناً) - عبقرى - أدب اللغة - جبيل -
رسائل - مشكور.

(٢) بين نوع الوضع فيما تحته خطّ قبل التركيب وبعد:

وَتَزَوَّدُوا فَإِنَّ خَيْرَ الزَّادِ التَّقْوَى (البقرة: ١٩٧).

وَأَجْعَلْ لِي لِسَانَ صِدْقٍ فِي الْآخِرِينَ (الشعراء: ٨٤).

Department of Arabic Language

Exam for Third Year of the year 1364/1945

Second Session (Wad') Duration: One and half hours

(1) Answer what follows with examples:

(a) Upon what is the individuality of *wad'* based? On what is the species-ness of *wad'* based? Is there a relation between the individuality of *wad'* and its specificity? Why?

(b) What is the specific *wad'* for something specific? Is this realized in the individual *wad'* as well as in the species *wad'*?

(2) Explain the positing of the relative pronouns and prepositions according to the view of the ancients and the moderns, and why the moderns refrained from the opinion of the ancients.

What is the effect of this disagreement? Which of the two views is the more preponderant?
Illustrate the notion of positing according to both views with two examples.

(3) Explain the positing of *maṣḍars*, fixed verbal interjections, and derived nouns with main case-studies and examples.

Practice

(1) Explain the positing of the following words with the case studies:

ṣāliḥ (as a proper name and an adjective) – *nimr* – *majāl* (as a *maṣḍar* and a place) – *‘abqarī* – *adab al-lugha* – *jubayl* – *rasā’il* – *mashkūr*.

(2) Explain the type of positing of what is underlined, before and after [being composed in a sentence]:

“Take the necessary provisions – surely the best provision is righteousness” (Quran, 2:197)

“Bless me with honorable mention among future generations” (Quran, 26:84).

Conclusion

The aim of this last chapter has been to elucidate the final stage of the evolution of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, and how it transitioned from a highly specialized exegetical tradition into a *madrassa* discipline with its own well-defined scholarly literature. The chapter has shown that, although

al-Ījī's foundational text was rarely commented upon throughout the 13th/19th century, later commentaries were not directly influential for the final evolution of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. Rather, later commentaries and, more importantly, didactic poems witness a phase of transition of the discipline towards the lower levels of *madrasa* education. In this, the composition of didactic poems likely provided new, more accessible, pedagogical tools for *madrasa* education that the classic exegetical and scholiastic traditions could not offer due to their magnitude and sophistication. Authors of didactic poems composed their work in the spirit of continuity with the pioneering texts of the tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, in *primis* al-Ījī's foundational *Risāla*, as well as in rupture from this tradition, by operating undertaking formal and content-related changes to the presentation of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. At a formal level, most authors of didactic poems opted for a more systematic presentation of the discipline by providing introductory explanations of the notion of *waḍʿ* and *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*, and then moved on to discussing the main classes of *waḍʿ*, eventually concluding their work with specific case studies that deserved more in-depth analysis. From the content point of view, authors gradually give preponderance to the classes of *waḍʿ shakhṣī-nawʿī*, and slowly introduce the notion of *waḍʿ taʿwīlī*. Although the classes of *shakhṣī-nawʿī* were evoked in earlier presentations of the theory of *waḍʿ*, as in the cases of Mullá Luṭfī's *al-Maṭālib al-Ilāhiyya* and al-Qūshjī's *Unqūd*, authors of didactic poems give greater weight to these two classes than the standard three pairs of *waḍʿ* stemming from the *waḍʿ ʿāmm* and *waḍʿ khāṣṣ*, as had been the case in the classic exegetical literature.

Manuals and epitomes composed from the second half of the 13th/19th century onwards emerge in the main scholarly circles of Iraq, Istanbul and Cairo, with one or more manuals that become more representative to the discipline of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ*. As such, the epitome authored by al-Mīr Rustumī, along with its self-commentaries, establishes itself as the main reference work

on *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* for the *madrasa* curriculum in the scholarly circles of Iraq influenced by the Ḥusaynābādī tradition; among the works authored by Ottoman scholars, those by Ḥajar-zādeh and, more importantly, by Ibrāhīm Eḡini become the most widespread in the teaching of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. It is however in the Azharī scholarly circles that the production of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* works seem to reach its peak, where the manuals by al-Najjār, al-Dijwī and ‘Antar stand out as the main works taught and studied in the second- and third-year *madrasa* curricula across the different departments of al-Azhar University.

Most, if not all, of these works appear to be quite influenced by the process of reshaping *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in didactic poems in order to meet the demands of lower levels audience of students in beginner levels. The second section of this chapter has in fact shown how these manuals and epitomes across the three main intellectual traditions of Kurdish Iraqi, Ottoman and Azharī *madrasas* all share formal structures and presentations of contents. A manual or an epitome adopted and studied in a second- or third-year *madrasa* curriculum follows a strict formal structure. Usually, the author opens with an introduction where definitions of the technical notion of *waḍ‘* and of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* are presented. Then, the core of work is represented by the second chapter where divisions or classes of *waḍ‘* are discussed in detail. This core chapter is usually, but not always, devoted to presenting four main classifications, that is, three classifications of *waḍ‘*, namely the *shakhṣī-naw‘ī*, which has now gained preeminence over the other classes, the *taḥqīqī-ta’wīlī*, which has been introduced to include the positing of *majāz* terms, the standard *‘āmm-khāṣṣ*, which remains unchanged from the classic exegesis, and the fourth pertaining to terms that signify a universal or particular concept. This last section usually contains sub-sections or appendixes (*fawā’id*) in which the author presents case studies of classes of terms that require further analysis, such as that of verbs, derived nouns, particles and prepositions, *maṣḍars* and other classes of terms. The closing chapter is devoted to discussing in

detail the classification of specific types of terms, such as the difference between generic nouns and proper generic names, generic nouns qualified with the definite article, names of the letters of the alphabet, book titles, book sections and names of sciences, and finally an overview of the question of the origin of language and in some cases an overview on the classes of *waḍʿ qaṣḍī*, an umbrella class that contained all of the former, and the *waḍʿ ḡhayr qaṣḍī*.

Finally, the manuals and epitomes that pervaded the *madrasa* curricula of Kurdish Iraqi, Ottoman and Azharī milieus from the end of the 13th/19th to the first half of the 14th/20th centuries set a standard in the tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* by providing a recognizable literary genre. The growing relevance of these works does not however imply that the classic tradition of commentaries and sets of glosses, such as al-Qūshjī's, ʿIṣām al-Dīn's, al-Dasūqī's, al-Kaffawī etc., was replaced or discarded. New manuals and epitomes filled a crucial gap in the evolution of a newly emerging discipline whose foundational text probed views on language and semantics and stirred the minds of generations of expert scholars. As *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* grew more and more popular and central alongside its cognate sciences of logic, *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *balāgha*, the intricacies and terseness of al-Ījī's pioneering *Risāla*, just like the depth and the technicality of its commentaries and glosses, proved to be a hindrance of grasping its semantic theory as a whole. Didactic poems and then manuals as well as epitomes supplied the pedagogical tools necessary to start delving into the more challenging exegetical tradition, by facilitating a learning process from the most basic to a more advanced grasp of the discipline up to this day.

Conclusion

The aim of this dissertation has been to offer the first systematic and comprehensive history of the science of semantics called *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, along with its exegetical literature. It has fulfilled this aim in two ways: first, by creating a coherent historical narrative of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* over a period of seven centuries, including the discipline’s emergence, canonization and evolution; and second, by presenting and analyzing the main topics of debate among scholars of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* with a focus on its fundamental theories and their evolution development in commentaries and glosses. By beginning with the foundational text of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*, al-Ījī’s *al-Risāla al-Waḍ‘iyya*, and reconstructing its vast and almost entirely unexplored exegetical tradition up to the final phase of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* in the form of manuals and summaries in the 20th century, this thesis has provided the necessary basis for the development of a new field of study and research in Islamic intellectual history. This conclusion will offer some reflections on the rich future of inquiry into *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* as a scholastic discipline, highlighting the potential research topics opened up by this dissertation and offering the suggestions for successfully approaching them.

Before doing so, it is worth offering some reflections about the development of this thesis, reflections that may offer insight into the challenges facing future scholars in this field. Given how new of this line of research is, it is inevitable that some important questions have been left unanswered and areas left unexplored. An ideally comprehensive study of the history of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* will take a more detailed approach to the historical and the theoretical dimension of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. That is, the status of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* could be studied in its varied historical contexts, by reconstructing not only, as this dissertation has, the major trends in the exegetical literature but also the transmission of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* through the scholarly careers of the authors and scholars

that engaged with it. More could have been offered from a theoretical standpoint as well, particularly with regard to the evolving debates concerning the classes of *waḍʿ* or the case studies on specific linguistic terms, as al-Ījī outlined them in the *Conclusion* of his *Risāla*.

These shortcomings may serve as a general starting-point from which the future study of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* may be undertaken. There are however several potential fertile points of inquiry raised in this dissertation that could generate specific research and projects moving forward. In numerous sections of the dissertation where I presented and commented upon key notions of the semantic theory of *waḍʿ*, I tried to emphasize how some of the topics, such as how the notions of universality and particularity, apply to terms, or how commentators analyze the structure of assertoric propositions (e.g., subject and predicate) within the theory of *waḍʿ*. These passages share the unifying theme, often repeated in the chapter's respective summary conclusions, that the concepts and concerns of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* distinctly and thematically overlap with those of the discipline of logic. One of the most promising avenues of future research, then, is an examination of how the semantic issues treated by logicians were imported by commentators and glossators into *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and, in turn, the ramifications of developments in *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* in the study of syllogistic and even of metaphysics (for example, in the later literature of the *Maqūlāt*, in which the discussion of the ten Aristotelian categories are used as a springboard for broader metaphysical inquiry). Indeed the fruitful crosspollination between *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* and other disciplines is not limited to logic or metaphysics. It was my contention in Chapter Two that the core of the theory of *waḍʿ* arises from debates on semantics in the literature of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*. I am confident that that a thorough investigation into the massive commentarial tradition on al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm* and al-Taftāzānī's *al-Muṭawwal* is required not only to better understand the background of numerous topics discussed in the exegetical literature of

‘ilm al-waḍ‘, but also the specific ways in which the semantic theory of *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī wa-l-bayān* is driven by the concerns of *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*.

It is my hope that this thesis sheds light on the highly original and idiosyncratic nature of the semantic theory developed in the exegetical literature. To this end, each chapter aimed to highlight the innovative nature the solutions to semantic issues offered by scholars in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘*. Now that these original aspects of the semantic theory of *waḍ‘* have been presented and paths for its future study have been offered, the question of comparative research should not be overlooked. This dissertation alone offers a substantive basis for a comparative study between the vastly developed semantic theories and philosophies of language in the Latin tradition, and those just now coming to be investigated in the Islamicate tradition. Such comparisons, while fruitful, require a healthy dose of skepticism for reasons both methodological and theoretical, which are by now well known to those brave enough to make them. My cautionary note will be limited, then, to discouraging any application of concepts that have become the currency of the philosophical tradition of the Latin West, such as nominalism and realism, to ostensible counterparts in the Islamicate tradition that is only very recently being systematically and rigorously explored. A more cogent and less reductive approach to comparative analysis will highlight not only similarities and points of departure between the two scholarly traditions in a focused and specific manner, but will also investigate the origins of overlap and distinctiveness within the broader purview of intellectual trends in the Latin West and Islamicate intellectual traditions respectively. In other words, I hope that a comparative study between, for example, the semantic theory of the Modistae and commentators in *‘ilm al-waḍ‘* will consider the latter more than a simple object of comparison.

Another exciting and even more delicate area of future investigation is a comparative study bridging pre-modern theories of semantics with contemporary topics in semantics and philosophy of language, both within and across the Latin and Islamic intellectual traditions. Of particular note would be a philosophical inquiry into what the authors in the tradition of *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* have to say in general about language, and whether such ideas can (or should) be framed by contemporary philosophers of language or semantic theory and linguistics (as for example the theory of indexicality, which appears to share many basic concerns and thorny resolutions with the theory of *waḍʿ*).

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