THE NIZĀRĪ ISMĀ'ĪLIS OF PAKISTAN: ISMĀ'ĪLISM, ISLAM AND WESTERNISM VIEWED THROUGH THE FIRMĀNS: 1936-1980

by

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Ismā'īlism Islam and Westernism in Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is aimed at examining the changing attitude of the Khoja Ismā'īlis in Pakistan toward themselves, and towards Islam and Westernization as viewed through the Firmāns of Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, the Āghā Khān III; and Karīm al-Ḥusaynī, the Āghā Khān IV.

Amongst the various attempts by Muslims to come to grips with developments in the modern world without forsaking their religious values, the responses of the Nizārī Ismā'īlis in Pakistan are one important example. The peculiarity and significance of the responses, however, appears to emerge from the very inner make-up of the respondent - the Ismā'īlī system of beliefs concerning the authority of the Imām.

ABSTRAIT

Auteur:	Diamond Rattansi
Titre de Thèse:	Les Ismāéliens Nizāris du Pakistan: l'Islam et le phénomène d'occidentalisation, d'aprè les Firmāns 1936-1980.
Département:	L'institut des études islamiques, l'université de McGill.
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Dans cette thèse, nous allons étudier d'une part l'évolution des Khoja Ismaéliens du Pakisatn au pakistan même et celle par rapport à l'Islam, ainsi que la phénomène d'occidentalisation, d'après les Firmāns de Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, l'Āghā Khān III et de Karīm al-Ḥusaynī l'Āghā Khān IV.

Parmi les différentes tentatives faites par les musulmans, pour s'adapter au monde moderne, sans pour autant abondonner leurs valeurs religieuses, celle des Ismāéliens Nizāris du Pakistan est significative. La particularité et la sens des réactions semblent surgir des tréfonds qui constituent la base de celui qui réagit - cette base étant le système Ismaélien des croyances concernant l'autorité de l'Imām.

ISMĀʿĪLISM, ISLAM AND WESTERNISM IN PAKISTAN

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The thesis is aimed at examining the Nizārī Ismā'īlis and their attempts to adjust to the impact of modernization in Pakistan as reflected in the Firmāns of ~~Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, the Āghā~~ Khān III (1877-1957); and Karīm al-Ḥusaynī, the Āghā Khān IV (1936-).

Set in the context of the political development of Pakistan, where the question of Islam's position in the modern world is constantly debated, this study is aimed at revealing how a significant Muslim group in Pakistan responds to the impact of both Islam and Westernization.

The exposure of the Muslims of India to the Western World elicited certain major trends amongst them. Firstly, there were those who directed their attention to the Islamic past with the purpose of idealizing the Faith to the extent that it appeared to contain all the good that the West came to possess so late in human history. This group maintained that the Muslims, through negligence and rigidity, had failed to conduct their lives in accordance with the ideals of Islam. Their attention was thus directed to defining Islam through the glorification of the Islamic past. Cantwell Smith terms this "movement in favour of the Islamic Culture of the past "[1] as "apologetic."[2] This trend is best reflected in Syed Amīr 'Alī's widely-read "Spirit of Islam."[3]

Many Muslims, however, felt that the Muslims themselves, while transmitting to the West the sciences which they themselves had mastered so well at one time, yet remained ignorant and weak at the present time. To regain what the Muslims had lost, these people felt that the Muslims must embrace thechanges introduced by the West, and that by doing so, a Muslim was merely reasserting what his Faith had always preached. Changes introduced through Western political and social ideas were, in fact, seen as a realization of Islamic ideals and not as a contradiction to them. This sort of attitude may, for convenience, be referred to as 'reformist'. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817-1898) and, later, the Āghā Khān represented the reformist attitude in India.

Both the apologetic and reformist tendencies in India, however, shared the view that Islam was not opposed to the Westernization of the Muslims' social and economic institutions. Thus, for the purpose of this study, the term, 'Modernism'[4] has been employed broadly to encompass both the apologetic and reformist tendencies among the Muslims of the Indian Sub-continent. Wherever there has been a need to specify a particular trend of thought, the phrase 'Modernist reformist' or 'Modernist apologetic' has been used.

There does not appear to have been a strong or an organized group in India advocating secularism - in the sense of being indifferent to religion while in the process of adopting changes. This attitude, being little represented by the Muslims in India, is not dealt with in this study.

On the other hand, there were those Muslims who shared the

'Modernist' trend of bestowing attention on the Islamic past and its ideals but who differed considerably in their attitudes towards Western ideas and culture. Their point of departure lay in the clearly defined intention of preserving the Islamic ideals and rejecting the alien and harmful influences of the West.[5] The changes to be introduced in a Muslim society, according to this position had to be geared not only towards purging it from all that was non-Islamic, but towards systematically bringing it back into the Islamic fold. The representatives of this attitude may generally be characterized as 'Traditionalists'.

Among the traditionalist Muslims, there are two distinct and significant groups in Pakistan. There are conservatives, who "understand their function to be, not reform or exploration, but the mastery, preservation and transmission of a law already fully rounded and understood".[6] While the conservatives depend entirely on the principle of taqlīd (according to which the legal opinions of the orthodox schools of law remain valid for all time), there is another group, the revivalist Muslims, who reject taqlīd and replace it with ijtihād (individual judgement), as a means for interpreting the Qurʿān and Sunnah. "They wish to rediscover and reaffirm the religious truth which centuries of interpretation and discussion have overlaid and obscured".[7] The revivalist movement is spearheaded by the Jamaʿat-i-Islāmi (the Islamic Society) which was founded by Abu-l-Aʿla Mawdudi (1903-1979).

One of the earliest effective expositions of the modernist reformist trend in the Indian Sub-continent is generally attributed to Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān. In response to the waves of Gladstonian Liber-

alism and Western Democracy that were influencing India[8], Sayyid Aḥmad Khān expressed his concern in regard to two matters:

1. The fear of Hindu domination which was readily attainable in a democratic system because the Hindus were the vast majority of the population[9]; 2. The backwardness of Muslims which he hoped to eliminate through their effective participation in the flowing stream of Western thought, this in turn to be achieved through education. The Aligarh College, which he founded, operated at the level of a Western Institution producing some of the first supporters of the demand for the political rights of the Muslims.[10] While a few of the supporters of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, such as Muḥsin al-Mulk and the Āghā Khān, founded the Muslim League which later came to spearhead the Pakistan Movement under Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnāh, some other supporters, such as Syed Amīr ʿAlī engaged in extensive apologetic writings idealizing early Islām and, at the same time, blaming the ʿUlamā' for the present low state of the Muslims.[11]

The Traditionalists, in turn, condemned the Modernists as heretics for abandoning God's will in favor of material interests.[12] On the one hand, the distance between the Modernist and Traditionalist attitudes kept on widening, but on the other, the two tendencies contributed significantly towards Muslim self-awareness; and, as a result, the political and the religious gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims widened.[13]

Tension between the Modernists and the Traditionalists, on the one hand, and between Muslims and Hindus, on the other, accompanied

the traumatic emergence of Pakistan in 1947.

The factors that actually led to the birth of the State of Pakistan do not seem to indicate that Pakistan was to have become an Islamic State,[14] although it can be safely assumed that the Pakistan movement which gained momentum only after 1936[15] "was inextricably bound up with the religious loyalties and commitments of the majority of its people."[16] Prior to 1936, the role of the Muslim League, the party which led the separatist movement, was confined to leading a struggle for procuring sufficient seats for Muslims in the Assembly on the basis of separate electorates.[17] Neither the objectives nor the intentions of the Muslim League[18] came at all close to defining what exactly is a Muslim Society or what exactly is the base - the Sharī'a - on which the Muslim Society was to be erected. The elections of 1936-1937, in which the Muslim League was heavily defeated in the Muslim majority provinces, indicate that the League did not receive the support of the Muslim masses.[19] Whatever may have been the actual motivations that operated behind the League's tactics after 1936-1937 in gathering Muslim mass support for the achievement of Independence, the history of Pakistan - in the post-Pakistan phase - came to be viewed "in a religious frame of reference"[20] by the Pakistanis.

Such a view of history implied that the struggle of Muslims throughout the history of the independence movement was justified by their having won an opportunity to carry out the application of

Islamic principles to their ultimate extent by creating an ideal Islamic Society.

Thus commenced a bitter struggle between the administators, who were often Western trained, and the traditionalists. The latter claimed to represent the aspirations of the people in their attempt to coin an Islamic Ideology for Pakistan. Unaware of the detailed formulations of the Shari'a[21] the modernists toiled to stretch the general Islamic principles in an attempt to make them nest together with the Western ideas of democracy, liberty, etc.[22] The traditionalists, particualrly the revivalists, who enjoyed great influence, extended the argument further to define the meaning of the terms 'Islamic State' and 'Islamic Society'.

The revivalists, under the banner of the Jama'at-i-Islami led by Mawlana Mawdudi,[23] viewed an Islamic Society as that society which is committed to following the Islamic ideals - the Divine Will - in its totality. In the interest of such an Islamic Society, mere verbal expressions of an individual's commitment or conformity are insufficient. Action must of necessity follow the intention.[24] Through the individual's and, so, the society's active participation in the observation of the religious rituals and practices, and the moral, social, political, and economic teachings of Islam, the Muslims could realize in this world the Divine Pattern, as revealed in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. In other words, the existence of his whole society depends on the commitment of both the individual and society to regulate the life of Muslims according to the Divine Pattern.[25]

The events marking the course of political history in Pakistan evidence the definite impact of the traditional attitude on the Muslims of Pakistan. At the constitutional level, the Government of Pakistan faced a major stumbling block in trying to reconcile general Islamic principles, which were embodied in the Objectives Resolution,[26] with modern democratic philosophy. The contrast between the divinely sanctioned revealed laws on the one hand, and man-made laws on the other, could not be contained.[27] The process of constitution-making appears to have, amidst the massive diffculties faced by the Government, caved in finally under the weight of religion and regional conflicts and, in 1956, Pakistan was declared an Islamic State.[28] This meant not only eliciting of proper responses from the population in terms of the revision of the educational system and the status and rights of minority groups, but a gradual and systematic reorientation of various Muslim groups towards accomodating traditional tendencies.

The present study focuses on one such group of Muslims in Pakistan, the Nizārī Ismā'īlis, to examine their responses and the attitudes which they took towards the dominant traditional attitude in Pakistan. This study, however, will not be concerned with the Ismā'īlis of the Northern Areas of Pakistan - also generally known as 'Badakshanis' or 'Mowlais'[29] - due to the fact of their not being converted from Hinduism. This makes a difference in the way they act, think, or behave.

The Nizārī Ismā'īlis are a sect within the Shī'a division of

Islam. The Shiʿa, who are in a minority in Pakistan, recognize ʿAli, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, as the first divinely appointed Leader (Imām) and the successor (Wasī) of the Prophet.[30] Furthermore, the Aʿimmah (the plural of Imām) are the guardians and the interpreters of the Qurʿān, and are appointed by Nass (which literally means 'by being explicitly named')[31] to guide the Muʿminīn (the believers) according to the needs and circumstances of the times.[32] For the Sunnis, however, the belief is that anyone who is elected to lead the Muslims at the congregational level is an Imām.[33] He need not be appointed by Nass nor is he entrusted with the power to inherit the divine authority of Allah and his Prophet through the preceding Aʿimmah. According to the Sunnis, the first Imām or Khalīfah was Abu Bakr, followed by ʿUmar bin Khaṭṭāb, ʿUthmān, and ʿAlī. The Shiʿa, while making a distinction between the position of a Khalīfah - who is a secular leader - and the Imām - who is both a secular and a spiritual leader - do not recognize the first three Khalīfahs as Imāms in the category of ʿAlī who was the first Imām. The theological, and hence the political, consequences of this distinction are far-reaching and are beyond the scope of what can be discussed here.[34]

Among the Shiʿi sects found in Pakistan, the Ithnāʿashariyya (Twelver Shiʿa) is the largest group, followed by the Ismāʿilis. The Ismāʿilis are again divided into Mustāʿalis (generally known as Bohora Ismāʿilis) and Nizāri Ismāʿilis. The latter believe that the present Āghā Khān IV, Shāh Karīm al-Ḥusayni, is the forty-ninth

in the line of Imāms - the direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, through his daughter, Fāṭimah.[35]

It was during the Fāṭimid-Ismā'īlī rule in Egypt (10th-12th centuries) and later from the 11th century with the establishment of Ismā'īlī power at 'Alamūt in Iran, and still later in the 19th century with the migration of the Āghā Khān I to India, that Ismā'īlism spread to India through a very effective system of Da'wa.[36] It aimed at converting individuals or groups through a process of translating the Ismā'īlī Doctrine into the religious terms already accepted by the converts.[37] In India, the converts were not discouraged from retaining many Hindu customs and rituals after coming within the Ismā'īlī fold. The process of conversion must also have necessitated involvement of various other factors which need not be of concern to us here. Two important developments, however, will be mentioned to indicate certain special features characterizing the Indian Nizārī Ismā'īlis during the early phase of British rule in India.

Firstly, a transcendental dimension was added to the concept of the Imām by a synthesis of aspects of the Hindu heritage of the converts, on the one hand, with their new Shi'i Islamic orientation, on the other.

In this context, Justice Arnauld, while presiding over the famous High Court Case,[38] known as the Khoja Case or the Āghā Khān Case, in 1866, elaborated the above development in his judgement. (The case is dealt with in some length in the next chapter where it is more relevant to the argument).

> What is Dasavatar? It is a treatise in 10 chapters containing (as, indeed, its name imports) the account of ten avatars or incarnations of Hindu God Vishnu; the tenth chapter treats of the incarnation of the Most Holy Ali ...
>
> On the other hand, it is precisely such a book as a Dai or missionary of the Ismaili would compose or adapt if he wished to convert a body of not very learned Hindus to the Ismaili faith. It precisely carries out what, it has already been shown, were the standing instructions to the Dai of the Ismailis, viz,to procure conversion by assuming, as in great part true, the religious standpoint of the intended convert. This is exactly what this book does: It assumes the nine incarnations of Vishnu to be true as far as they go, but not the whole truth, and then supplements the imperfect Vishnuvite system by superadding the cardinal doctrine of the Ismailis, the incarnation and coming manifestation (or Avatar) of the 'Most Holy Ali'.[39]

Secondly, the authority of the Āghā Khāns as the A'immah of the Nizārī Isma'ilis was officially recognized by the British Government through various channels, like those of court cases.[40] This helped considerably towards fostering the identity of the Nizārī Isma'ilis who had so far been shrouded in mystery.[41]

The Khoja Court Case of 1866 and its decision officially upheld the view that the Āghā Khān, recently arrived in India, was in fact the Imām about whom the Isma'ili Da'is had been preaching for the last centuries. His transcendental status did much to elevate the importance of the Firmans which were viewed by the community as divinely sanctioned advice, and which the Āghā Khān/Imām utilized to help direct his charges through the problems posed by Modernism.

Imām Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, the Āgha Khān III (1877-1957), vigorously supported the modernist trend, the effect of which was directly transmitted through the Firmāns. His unflinching support for modernism even after the partition of India indicates not only a growing distance between the attitude of the Nizārī Ismā'īlis and traditional Islamic tendencies, but also that their Islamic World View is diametrically opposed to the implications of a 'Muslim Society' or an 'Islamic State' as understood by the latter.

After the demise of the Āgha Khān III in 1957, the Gadi (throne) of the Imāmah passed on to his grandson, Shāh Karīm al-Ḥusaynī, the Āgha Khān IV (1936—). Under the Āgha Khān IV - Harvard graduate in Middle Eastern Studies - there appears to have been a gradual but noticeable change in the attitude of the Nizārī Ismā'īlis from out-right modernism to a cautious and accomodating modernist-traditional synthesis.

When Pakistan was born, a large number of Nizārī Ismā'īlis migrated from India, many of whom came to hold important jobs in banks and other commercial enterprises in their new homeland.[42] Those Ismā'īlis who already lived within the areas that formed Pakistan, stayed there.[43]

The available figures on the population of the Nizārī Ismā'īlis in Pakistan vary too much to permit more than mere approximation. The estimates range from six percent (of the total population of forty million)[44] to 200,000.[45] The significance of the group, however, lies in its economic and social activities. While five percent

of industrial investments are in their hands,[46] they are mainly a business oriented group. Proportionately, Hanna Papanek maintains, there are "...fewer poor and lower middle class families among Khoja Isma'ilis than in the general population and concomitantly more middle class and wealthy families."[47] She describes the Ismā'īlis as:

> A well-defined organized social unit, with its own houses of prayer, social welfare institutions and economic organizations....They had more child health centres, maternity hospitals, schools, than many comparable groups; their women were freer, and their children, especially girls, getting more education. Most men aimed to be self employed businessmen, rather than employees and many had succeeded in this.[48]

An inquiry towards the understanding of the social, economic and political activities of the Khoja Ismā'īlis in Pakistan would, undoubtedly, be of significance to a student of Modern Ismā'īlī History. The reason for not adopting the above approach in the present study lies in the fact that 'the activities of a group are always linked with, and certainly determined by, the attitude of the group towards itself and its surroundings.' In this study, an attempt is made to examine the changing attitude of the Khoja Ismā'īlis in Pakistan towards themselves, and towards Islam and Westernization as viewed through the Firmāns of Sulṭān Muhammad Shāh, the Āghā Khān III; and Karīm al-Ḥusaynī, the Āghā Khān IV.

Amongst the various attempts by Muslims to come to grips with developments in the Modern World without forsaking their religious values, the responses of the Nizārī Ismā'īlis in Pakistan are one important example. The peculiarity and the significance of the res-

ponses, however, appears to emerge from the very inner make-up of the respondent - the Ismā'īlī system of beliefs concerning the authority of the Imām. This study aims at showing how the modern situation has affected the Ismā'īlī belief system and especially views concerning the authority of the Imām.

SOURCES

1. FIRMĀNS

There is a limitation on the present study posed by the fact that not all the Firmāns of the period to be studied were available to me. I have had access to approximately 80% of the total number of Firmāns that would be relevant to a complete study of the problem at issue. Due to historical circumstances, the Ismā'īlis treat the Firmāns in the manner that they are least exposed to misrepresentation or misuse. Hence, Firmāns issued to individuals, and dealing with their individual problems - though significant for this study - are omitted. The available Firmāns, which are listed below are "collective" Firmāns (issued to the group as a whole and dealing with general matters).

The Firmāns may be issued directly to the group (Jama'at), in the form of an address by the Imām in person; or he may convey a Firmān through the leaders of the Jama'at.

A. THE FIRMĀNS OF THE ĀGHĀ KHĀN III: 1885-1957

Imām Sultān Muḥammad Shāh issued Firmāns mainly in Hindi-Urdu, Persian, and English. Many Firmāns were inaccurately translated on the spot into Gujarati by translators or secretaries who varied from place to place. Due to bad translations, some Firmāns appear to be inconsistent. For instance, the terms connoting different meanings such as dharam, Dīn, Madhab, etc, are used synonymously for religion or faith. Apart from that, the translations appear to

be missing the vividness of certain attitudes either prevalent or being introduced.

1. Kalām-e-Imām-e-Mubin. "Holy Firmans of Mowlana Sultan Muhammad Shah the Aga Khan". Bombay: Ismailia Association for India, 1950.
The Firmāns from 1886 to 1951 have been compiled in Gujarati in 2 volumes. Many of the 603 Firmāns in these volumes were issued for the Indian and Pakistani Jamaʿats.

2. Tālika and Messages. "Mowlana Hazir Imam's Talika and Messages." Mombasa: Shia Imami Ismailia Association for Africa, 1955.
This volume contains approximately 125 letters and telegrams in English, covering the period: 1923-1954.

3. Ruhānī Rāz. "The Firmans of Imam Sultan Muhammad Shah" Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan 1972.
This book contains about 50 extracts of Firmāns in Gujarati on the subject of spiritual awareness. These Firmāns do not go beyond 1908.

4. Firmān Mubarak. "Mowlana Hazir Imam's Firmans: 1952 Pakis-

tan Visit." Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1954.
Approximately twenty-five Firmāns are compiled in 100 pages. Since they were issued during the Āghā Khān's 1952 visit, they are indispensable for understanding the early phase of Ismā'īlī adjustment in Pakistan.

B. THE FIRMĀNS OF ĀGHĀ KHĀN IV: 1957-1980

5. Amulya Ratno. "Firman Mubarak of Mowlana Shah Karim al Husayni, 1957-1964." Mombasa: The Shia Imami Ismailia Association for Kenya, 1965. This volume contains 124 Firmāns, compiled in Gujarati.

6. Firmān Mubarak. "Mowlana Shah Karim al-Husayni's Pakistan Visit, 1964 and 1976." Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, u.d.
32 selected Firmāns have been compiled in English in 2 volumes. The Firmāns were issued in Karachi by the Āghā Khān IV, when he visited Pakistan in 1964 and 1976.

7. Firmān Mubarak. "Delivered in Bombay on 27th November, 1973." Vancouver: H.H. The Aga Khan Shia Imami Ismailia Association for Canada, u.d.

2. SPEECHES AND WRITINGS.

The following public speeches and writings of the Imāms also offer a valuable sources for understanding the Firmāns, and, hence, the attitude of the Ismā'īlis in relation to the wider group. Although hard and fast distinctions cannot be maintained in this study between the public speeches and the Firmāns, they are treated separately for convenience. While the Firmāns are directed at the Jama'āti level, the speeches and the writings operate at the public level in which the Jama'at may or may not be directly involved. The latter, at-least, supplement the study by offering an insight into the Firmāns.

1. Āghā Khān Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh. Message to the Nation of Pakistan and World of Islam. Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1968.

2. Āghā Khān Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh and Zakī 'Alī. Glimpses of Islam. Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1954.

3. Āghā Khān Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh. Address at the Session of Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islami (9-2-1951) Karachi: u.d.

4. _____ India in Transition, A study in Political Evolution. New York: Bennett, Coleman and Co., Ltd. The "Times of India" Office, 1918.

5. _____ The Memoirs of Aga Khan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954.

6. Āghā Khān Shāh Karīm al-Ḥusaynī. Speeches. Mombasa: Ismailia

Association for Kenya, 1963. Part I.

7. _____ Speeches. Part II (1958-1963). Mombasa: Shia Imami Ismailia Associations for Africa, 1964.

8. _____ Speech Delivered at the Annual General Meeting of the East African Muslim Welfare Society, Mombasa: (16-11-1957).

9. _____ The Choice of Muslims, Dacca: H.R.H. Prince Aga Khan Supreme Council for East Pakistan, u.d.

10. _____ Convocation Adress at Peshawer University of Pakistan (30-11-1967). Pakistan. 1967.

11. _____ With Pressmen, The Platinum Printers Ltd., Mombasa, 1958.

12. _____ "The Role of Private Initiative in Developing Countries" at Swiss-Amercian Chamber of Commerce; 1976, Zurich.

13. _____ The Muslim World. Yesterday Today and Tomorrow, Karachi: His Royal Highness the Aga Khan Ismailia Federal Council for Pakistan, u.d.

14. _____ "Speeches on Art and Architecture" Ismaili Mirror, October 1980. Karachi: Pak Ismailia Publication.

THESIS STRUCTURE

Ch. 1. Introduction. (Methodology, Sources, etc.)

Ch. 2. The Indian Phase: 1885-1936.

This period from the accession of Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, the Āghā Khān III, to the Imāmat until the advent of the concept of "Pakistan" provides the background against which the Nizārī Ismā'īlī attempt to adjust to the impact of Modernization is examined.

Ch. 3. The Pakistan Phase, Part I: 1936-1957.

These are the years in which the Pakistan State idea evolved; came to fruition; and in which the Pakistanis groped through uncertainty in search of a workable state ideology. The period from Pakistan's emergence until the demise of Āghā Khān III, in 1957, is marked by a sufficiently clear indication of the Ismā'īlī inclination towards Modernism.

Ch. 4. The Pakistan Phase, Part II: 1957-1980.

From the accession of Karīm al-Ḥusaynī, the Āghā Khān IV, to the Imāmat until his 1980 visit to Pakistan.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, London: Victor Gollanez Inc., 1946, p. 47.

2. Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History, New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1959, p. 97.

3. Syed Amir ʿAli, Spirit of Islam: A History of the Evolution and Ideals of Islam, with a life of the Prophet, London: Metheun, 1965.

4. Admittedly, the term 'Modernism' is used here in a fairly limited and specific sense. The term is meant to connote the need to adopt the changes introduced by the West while disclaiming any thought that Islam does not contain within itself the potentiality required to generate the changes. See Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern India. Some Modernists, however, saw the phenomenon of change as inevitable and consistent with the law of nature 'that change is reality'. As such, to participate in a rhythm of change was to escape the 'clutches of the past'. See Charles Adams, "Conservative Movements in the Arab World", Arab Journal, vol. IV (1967), p. 58. For further elaboration of the meaning of the term 'Modernism' in the context of the Indian Muslims, see Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan: 1957-1964, London: Oxford University Press, 1967; and Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Berkeley University of California Press, 1961.

5. For instance, Mawdudi expressed the fear that the inflow of the Western ideas and customs was 'leading the young men of the community away from true Islam'. See Charles Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", South Asian

Politics and Religion, ed. by Donald e. Smith, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 374.

6. Prof. Adams draws a fine distinction between the Conservatives and revivalists in "Islam in Pakistan", reprint from Modern Trends in World Religions, p. 48. By virtue of their common front against the intentions of the Modernists, they are categorized broadly as 'Traditionalists'.

7. Ibid., p. 51.

8. Aziz Ahmad, "Islam and Democracy in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent", Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia, ed. by Robert Spencer, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,p. 123.

9. For extracts from Sayyid Ahmad Khan's speech in response to the introduction of democracy in India, see R.Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, London: Faber and Faber, 1950, p. 30-31.

10. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p. 51.

11. Ibid., p. 41.

12. Adams, The Ideology of Mawdudi, p. 384.

13. Adams, Islam in Pakistan, p. 34.

14. Ibid., p. 40.

15. Although Muhammad Iqbal's (1873-1938) presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930 is taken by many Pakistanis as an indication of his vision of a separate Muslim State, no significant activity at the time seems to suggest that there was a vigorous movement towards that end. In 1933, some students at Cambridge University had coined the name 'Pakistan' for such a State. The letters of the word stood for Punjab, Afghan Province (i.e. North West Frontier Provinces), Kashmir, Sindh,

and Baluchistan, 'Pak' also means 'pure' and 'stan' means 'Land'. see Richard Weekes, Paksitan, London: Van Nostrand Co., 1964, p. 82.

16. Adams, Islam in Pakistan, p. 34.

17. Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, p. 41.

18. See 'The Objectives of the Muslim League' in Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, p. 41.

19. Smith, Modern Islam in India, p. 248-250.

20. Adams, Islam in Pakistan, p. 38.

21. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan', p. 38.

22. The country's first constitution of 1956 makes no attempt to realize the synthesis. See 'The 1956 Constitution' in Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1958, p. 330.

23. For details on the nature of the movement and the life-sketch of its founder, Mawlana Mawdudi, see Charles Adams, "The Ideology of Mawdudi", and also Freeland Abbott, "The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan", Middle East Journal, vol. II (1957), p. 39-40.

24. Smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 28.

25. Ibid., p. 18-19.

26. See 'Objectives Resolutions' in Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p. 142-143.

27. See Charles Adams, "Islam and the Public Philosophy in Pakistan", A paper presented at the seminar held at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, June 18-20, 1958.

28. Callard, Pakistan, p. 330.

29. See "Khojahs" in Reginald Edward Enthoven's The Tribes and Castes

of Bombay. Delhi: Cosmo Publication, 1975, and also John Norman Hollister, The Shia of India, London: Luzac and Co., 1953, p. 396.

30. Vaglieri, "Ali bin Abi Talib", E.I.^{2}, p. 381-386.

31. It also means, 'appointment by the divine decree'.

32. A. A. Fyzee, The Book of Faith, translated from Daʿāʾim al-Islam of al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, Bombay: 1974, p. 26.

33. S. Strothmann, "Shīʿa", Sh. E.I. , p. 350.

34. In the case of the Sunnī conservatives, the community is strictly governed by the divinely sanctioned law (Sharīʿa) whose custodians are the ʿUlamā' (those who have undergone a prescribed training at Madrasahs). For the purpose of unity and continuity of the community, the institution of the ʿUlamā' must guide the Muslims in all matters. It may be pointed out that the institution of ʿUlamā' is the product of the Abbasid's effort 'to provide an institutional basis for an ideological framework that could hold ʿAbbasi Society together and counteract the wide opposition movement whose ideology was Shīʿah'. Cantwell Smith, "The ʿUlamā' in Indian Politics", Politics and Society in India, ed. by C.H. Philips. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., p. 42.

35. Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, Āghā Khān III, The Memoirs of Aga Khan, London: Cassell and Company Ltd., p. 169-191.

36. R.Levy, "The Account of the Ismāʿīlī Doctrines in the Jamiʿal-Tawarikh of Rashid al-Din Fadlallah", Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, July 1950, p. 518. On the history of the Daʿwa "as it spread and developed" in Indian Sub-continent, see Azim Nanji's Ph.D thesis, The Nizārī Ismāʿīlī Tradition in Hind and Sind, submitted at the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University, 1972.

37. Levy, Jamī ʿal-Tawarikh, p. 518-519.

38. In 1866, a charge was laid against Shāh Ḥasan ʿAlī Shāh, the Āghā Khān I (who had migrated to India from Iran at around 1948), by some Khoja seceders who claimed that the Āghā Khān was not entitled to enjoy the powers afforded to him by the Khojas who, they maintained, were Sunnī and not Shīʿa. See Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Cases in the Muhammadan Law of India and Pakistan, London: Oxford University Press, 1965. p. 504.

39. Ibid., p. 538.

40. A similar charge was brought against Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, the Āghā Khān III, in 1906-8. See The Bombay Law Reporter, vol. XI, p. 409.

41. W. Madelung, "Khoja", E.I.^{2} p. 27.

42. See G. F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Initiatives, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

43. For instance, a large number of Sindhi Ismāʿīlis, Punjabi Ismāʿīlis, etc, are found in Pakistan. The regional traits correspondingly determine the languages and some social customs of the respective Ismāʿīlis. There is a continuous interaction between regionally acquired customs and general Ismāʿīlī customs and rituals. Usually the two are blended, thus reflecting the variations in the mode of understanding of and operating from the fundamental concepts of Imāmah; Nabuwwa, etc. For social analysis see Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social change in the Khoja Ismaili Community, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Boston: Harvard University, 1962.

44. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure of National Integration, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 27.

45. Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan: Its people, its Society, its Culture, New haven: Hraf Press, 1964, p. 95.

46. See G.F. Papanek, The Development of Entrepreneurship, Proceedings of American Economic Association, Dec. 27th, 1961, Table II.

47. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 17.

48. Ibid., p. III.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 1885-1936

The general Sunnī Muslim response to the collapsing Mughal rule and, later, to the advent of British supremacy in India in the 18th century is characterized mainly by their attempt at purifying Islam from Hindu and Christian cultural encroachments.[1] The continued emphasis on strict observation of Qur'ānic injuctions and traditions, prescribed by the Sunnāh,[2] became widespread and thus considerably affected a large number of Muslim groups who had retained Hindu customs and Sufi practices after conversion.[3]

Parallel, and probably in reaction, to the puritanical movement, there grew up a modernist outlook among some Muslims who argued that the degraded state of Muslims was not due to the lack of Imān (faith) in Islam, but was due rather to the refusal by the Muslims to accept changes introduced by the West.[4] The Modernists, such as Sayyid Ahmad Khān advocated the continued presence of the British in India to safeguard the backward and minority Muslims against the "Hindu economic and cultural stranglehold".[5] This would, Sayyid Ahmad Khān believed, enable the Muslims, in the meanwhile, to acquire sufficient education "to be socially and politically successful and at the same time committed to their (purified and reformulated) faith".[6] Thus the Modernist attitude generated "new scope" for Muslim thought.[7]

While some Muslim groups were gradually absorbed by the powerful puritanical current,[8] some other Muslim syncretic groups - parti-

cularly some Shi'i and Sufi groups - reacted by attempting to fortify the syncretic borrowings from Persian Sufism and Hindu Mysticism.[9]

The British provided the umbrella for the articulation of the identities of these minority Muslim syncretic groups through the British policy of encouraging the freedom of practice of religion in India.[10] Francis Robinson suggests that the British religious sensibility in India was probably due to the Evangelical religious background of the British Administrators.[11]

Thus, the British intervention in checking the growing puritanical influence through their policy of protecting the rights of the minority religious groups in India, probably also contributed towards the increased support of the 'Ulamā' for the Nationalist Movement of the Indian National Congress.

However, amidst the puritanical and modernist tendencies, the struggle of some Muslim syncretic groups, such as the Ismā'ilis, to define their identity resulted in occasional bitter factional conflicts within and sectarian clashes without.

In the early 19th century the Nizāri Ismā'ilis (generally called Khojas[12] in India) experienced a significant setback when some Khojas - who later came to be known as Bārbhāi - were excommunicated for refusing to participate in certain religious ceremonies, including that of paying dues to the Imām of the time.[13] In 1850, four members of the Bārbhāi group were killed during a conflict with some Khojas. The Khojas found responsible were given capital penalties by the British Government. They were, however, declared Shahīds

(Martyrs) by the Khoja community.[14]

Earlier in 1848, Ḥasan ʿAlī Shāh, the Āghā Khān I, had escaped from Persia and settled down in Bombay. He had been the governor of Qūm and Mahallat until differences between him and the Qajar Shāh of Persia, in 1838, led to his forced departure from Persia. At the time, the British were involved in encountering the Russian advance in Afghanistan. The Āghā Khān joined the British in their conquest of Afghanistan and, later, of Sindh with an intention of gaining control over Persia with the help of the British.[15]

In Bombay he undertook to crystalize the Khojas identity further by eliminating some prevailing Hindu customs such as that of inheritance[16] and some Sunnī burial and marriage customs.[17] In 1862, he circulated a paper in which he asked all Khojas "who wished openly to pursue the tenets of the sect in accordance with the established Imami Ismaili faith to sign their names on the paper"[18] In 1864, soon after, a Sunnī Mullah was turned out of a mosque located in a Khojas cemetery and was replaced by a Shīʿī Mullah.[19]

In 1866, the members of the Bārbhāī group challenged the identity of the Khojas in the famous Bombay High Court Case (Khoja Case). They claimed that the Khojas were Sunnīs and not Shīʿa and, as such, did not owe allegiance and religious dues to the Shīʿī Imām, the Āghā Khān.[20]

Sir Joseph Arnauld's verdict - that the Khojas were Shīʿī Imāmī Ismāʿīlis and "bound by the ties of spiritual allegiance to the hereditary Imams of the Ismailis"[21] - had a definite impact on

the Khoja attitude towards 1. the British, 2. the Ismā'ilis themselves and 3. other Muslims.

1. The British not only confirmed the Āghā Khān's absolute and divine authority but had earlier recognized Ismā'īlī loyalty to the British by granting the Āghā Khān the title of "His Highness", and a life pension of Rs. 3,000 per annum.[22] In this gesture the British probably sought an advantage by rallying support against those Muslims who resented the British rule.

2. The Khoja Ismā'ilis now felt at ease in their religious ethos. The group was confirmed further in its belief in the Āghā Khān both as the avatār (Manifestation of God) and the Nūr (light) of Allah, Muḥammad and 'Alī.

3. The other Muslim groups, particularly those whom the seceding Khojahs had embraced - and who posed an external threat to the already weakened Ismā'īlī ideological structure - were dealt with cautiously in fostering social relationships.

The early Firmāns of Imām Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh (1877-1957), the Āghā Khān III, begining from 1885 (when he ascended to the Imāmat at the age of eight) thus deal mainly with: 1. Defense of and emphasis on the divine powers of 'Alī and his ahl (descendants); thus he articulated the Ismā'īlī identity and its differences from various Muslim sects and tarīqahs (paths); 2. The attainment of spiritual or inner (Bāṭinī) happiness through the Ismā'īlī Tarīqah.[23]

The early Firmāns of the Āghā Khān are indicative of the influence upon him of his mother's - who was the daughter of the Qajar

Shāh, Fath ʿAlī Shāh, of Persia - traditional Shīʿī orientation.[24] However, his later training in Arabic, Persian, Shīʿī Theology and Calligraphy, on the one hand, and in science, English literature, Philosophy, and Poetry, on the other, had a profound impact on the formation of his attitude towards Islam and the West.[25] Praising his English teachers as 'broadminded', 'wise', and 'impartial',[26] he condemned his Shīʿī Muslim theologian-teacher as being:

> ...extremely learned, a profound scholar, with a deep and extensive knowledge of Arabic literature and of Islamic History, but all his learning had not widened his mind or warmed his heart. He was a bigoted Sectarian...If Islam had indeed been the thing he taught then surely God had sent Muhammad not to be a blessing for all mankind but a curse.[27]

His own experience of Western prosperity and elegance during his visit to London in his twenties as an invited guest to participate in Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee celebrations;[28] and his subsequent exposure to Western social life further convinced him of the urgent need for the Muslims to embrace the reforms which were being introduced by the British into India.[29] Thus, both the British and the Muslim reformists, such as Muḥsīn-ul-Mūlk,[30] saw in him a link between the two parties in the various conferences and deliberations[31] that involved the Muslim demand for separate representation in the British-initiated political reforms. Thus the Muslim League was founded in 1906 by Muḥsīn-ul-Mūlk and the Āghā Khān to represent the Muslims in demanding a fair share for themselves in the new social and political reforms brought about by the British.[32] The

British, however, deliberately encouraged the Muslims to form a communally based political platform to check the growing nationalist sentiment which was dominantly Hindu.[33]

The Āghā Khān stated his political and social views as follows: 1. Political independence should be sought through the process of evolution - and not through radical opposition - until such time as the Indians were united and capable of self-rule;[34] 2. Muslims must represent their separatist stand politically in the form of the Muslim League;[35] 3. Muslim conservatives must abandon the formalist practices of encouraging 'out-dated' customs of observing purdah (seclusion of women) and the "parrot-like method of teaching Qur'ān",[36] etc. Such views of the Āghā Khān aroused some reaction among both nationalist Muslims and Hindus, on the one hand, and conservative Muslims on the other.[37] His position however, did not become the focus of bitter attack by either the Indian Nationalist Muslims or the conservative Muslims. This fact may be the result of Muslim political conciousness not having then achieved an organizational status. The mildness in the reactionary tone can also be explained partly by the fact that the authority of the Āghā Khān as a Shī'i Ismā'īlī Imām transcended all the theological discussion involving the concepts of legitimate authority, such as, Ijtihād (independent reasoning), Ijmā' (consensus) etc;[38] his philanthropic contributions to various Muslim institutions, such as Aligarh;[39] his active participation in the Khilafat Movement;[40] and his moderate stand in attempting to unite Muslims and Hindus politically.[41]

In the Ismā'īlī context, the Firmāns in this period (1885-1936) were generally concerned with conveying the Āghā Khān's reformist objectives. The Firmāns that evidence the direction of the Ismā'īlī response towards the reforms are catagorized into two supplementary types.

1. The Firmāns that were concerned with the definition of Ismā'īlī identity. 2. The Firmāns that were aimed at directing the Ismā'īlī attitude towards adopting social and economic changes introduced by the British.

1. THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ RELIGIOUS RESPONSE:

As a result of the prevailing loose and syncretic ideological structure of the Ismā'īlis who lived in the fast-changing social and economic environment of British India, the practice of changing religious loyalty was not uncommon. Following the conversion of some Ismā'īlis to Sunnism in 1901, some members of the seceding group were killed by Khoja fanatics, as a result of which those responsible for the crime were excommunicated by the Āghā Khān.[42] In 1905, some members of the Āghā Khān's family, supported by certain Khojas, claimed that the Khojas were Ithnā'asharis and not Ismā'īlis; and as such, that they had inherited the right to share all the Khoja property and contributions with the Āghā Khān.[43] The Bombay High Court Case (called the Haji Bibi Case)[44] concluded in favour of the Āghā Khān and reconfirmed the beliefs of the majority of Khojas in the Imām of the time.[45]

Thus, in response to the continued adverse effect of sectarian

influences and the prevalent syncretic ritualism and customs on the implementation of his reform policies, the Āghā Khān attempted systematically to: A. Reinforce the Ismā'īlī traditional allegiance to the Imām of the time; and B. Eliminate many customs and practices that commonly characterized various similar religious groups like the Ithnā'asharis.

A. THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ CONCEPT OF IMĀMAH:

The Āghā Khān's descent was traced in the Firmāns from Muḥammad - through Fāṭimah and Hazrat 'Alī who was described, in a traditional Shī'ī manner, as possessing divine powers. The proof of his °Imāmah was taught to lie in the Qur'ān.[46] The Nūr (light) of Hazrat 'Alī was passed on to the Imām of the time - the Ḥāḍir (present) Imām[47] - whose divine guidance (Firmāns) has precedence over all other sources of guidance governing the lives of the Ismā'īlis.

> ...and if Qur'ān was self-sufficient (in guiding the mominīns), Hz. 'Alī would not have been appointed his successor...In view of new discoveries and many changes the Imām is always Ḥāḍir (present) to guide the mominīns in the best possible way...and so, whoever is the Imām of the time, his Firmāns ought to be obeyed. As times change, so do the Firmāns...[48]

Through analogies and persuasion the Firmāns argued that it is not only contrary to the fundamental Ismā'īlī principle but pointless to cling "to the Firmāns of the past Imāms", or "the Gināns (traditions) of the Pīrs (such as Sadr al-Dīn)", and not obey the Firmāns of the Ḥāḍir (present) Imām.[49] The Āghā Khān, through an analogy, explained:

> If your leg hurts and you cannot walk, a doctor's prescribed

> medicine relieves the pain. If you take the same medicine after two years when you have a headache, the pain will not be relieved...[50]

Without Imān (faith) the Firmāns are as helpless as one who can "take the horse to the pond but cannot force it to drink the water."[51] Similarly, the Firmāns emphasized that the survival of an army depends upon the colonel's unconditional obedience to the general.

The foundation of Imān is ʿaḳl (reason), and without ʿaḳl, Imān "becomes stagnant and ultimately perishes."[52] Therefore, the Firmān issued at Rajkot, in 1903, argued, "Fear the nādān (ignorant) as the Rasūl (Prophet) used to fear, and do not be carried away by them."[53]

Thus the Firmāns, during this period, were mainly concerned with defining the Ismāʿīlī religious identity through reinforcement of the doctrine of Imāmah which, in turn, enhanced the authority and infallibility of the Firmāns.

B. THE RELIGIOUS REFORMS:

With a view to unfolding the differences between the Nizāri Ismāʿīlis and other religious groups,[54] the Firmāns drew a distinction between worldly and religious activities.[55] While the former offered leverage for intercourse in business and other ventures, the latter were to be strictly safeguarded through the obligation of certain religious and social practices. For example, the practice of intermarriage between the Ismāʿīlis and non-Ismāʿīlis[56] was discouraged, and certain rituals (that invoked the mediation of forces

other than the Imām), such as, the visiting of the tombs of the Pīrs, parading of effigies,[57] and accepting tāwīz[58] (written verses of Qur'ān to ward off evil spirits), etc, were condemned. The Firmān issued at Karachi, in 1920, strictly forebade the Ismā'īlis to indulge in such rituals.

> Those who go to Hydershah's Kothī (residence) where rituals are performed, are doing harm...That is sinful. Neither the Pīr nor his grave is there. Even if there was a grave of the Pīr, it is not an Ismā'īlī practice...Even if there was once a (concept of) the grave in the Ismā'īlī faith, it is now impermissible. That is idol worship. Like that there are thousands of Kothīs. Of what use are they?...[59]

2. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS:

Politically the Āghā Khān advised the Ismā'īlis to remain loyal to the Government that ruled the country in which they lived. In the case of India the Ismā'īlī loyalty to the British was thus emphasized.[60] He also preached moderation and non-enmity towards the other faiths - "which", the Āghā Khān argued, "are essentially emanated from the same faith of Ādam." The Firmān, in Kacch, Nāgpūr (India), in 1903, stated:

> In the beginning there was only one Faith of Ādam, but as there was increase in the population, many religions came into being ...do not entertain enmity with them."[61]

He urged the Ismā'īlis instead to redirect their energies, for example, "in providing better sitting facilities in Jama'at Khānāh", "and giving the best education to the children"[62]

For the effective implementation of his Firmāns, he first established a network of hierarchical organizations - called Councils -

throughout India. A constitution was drafted, first in 1905, to govern the councils at the district, regional, and national levels. Their function was to channel the Imām's policies through their direct involvement in the activities and problems of Jamaʿats both at the individual and group levels. All issues ranging from divorce and property settlement to the distribution of grants, educational and family allowances, fell under the jurisdiction of the Councils concerned.[63]

EDUCATION:

The Firmāns on education were aimed at emphasizing the need for total eradication of illiteracy amongst the Jamaʿat through the acquisition of dūnyawī Taʿlīm (worldly education) in addition to dīnī Taʿlim (religious education).[64] More attention, however, was focused on the liberation of women from the clutches of tradition through education. Towards the realization of the former objective, the Ismāʿīlī schools were asked to collect fees from the rich while funding the education of the poor.[65] The Āghā Khān's policy of helping the poor Ismāʿīlis to acquire education by getting the rich to pay more was probably borrowed from the Jesuit Mission schools in India.[66]

The Firmāns on education vehemently argue that men and women are equal.[67] The Firmāns exhorted the parents to send their daughters to school. If financial strain posed a situation where a choice had to be made between "sending your daughter or your son to school, then first send your daughter to school."[68] The Firmān issued at

Bombay, in 1913, stated:

> We command the parents that they must send their daughters to school. We make this Wājib (cumpulsory) upon you...These girls will be able to earn their living in future and administer better care and guidance to their children...[69]

Emphasizing the need to introduce the educational standard set by the British Government into the Ismā'īlī schools, the Āghā Khān maintained that:

> ...if the schools do not receive grants from the Government, it means that the schools are not efficient, and in that case, I too will not offer grants.[70]

The employment of modern educational techniques, such as the "introduction of educational toys for children of the four and five years age group;" discussion sessions on child development;[71] etc, were also emphasized.

MARRIAGE

The Firmāns on marriage were concerned mainly with banning certain customs prevalent among the Ismā'īlis. The customs that came under the attack of the Firmāns were those concerned with encouraging infant marriages; stopping widows and divorcees from remarrying; keeping the brides at their parents home for a long period before allowing them to join their husbands;[72] and the bidding of high dowry prices for the brides;[73] etc.

The Āghā Khān, also introduced certain reforms to replace these prevalent and now forbidden Ismā'īlī marriage customs. He substituted the Nikāh (the Muslim marriage ceremony which also connoted

'social contract') for all the other marriage ceremonies. In Karachi, in 1920, the Āghā Khān stated:

> In our Madhab (faith) no customs or practices, except the Nikāh, is Wājib (obligatory). Ban all other ceremonies."[74]

The Āghā Khān, however, further simplified and at the same time dignified the concept of marriage by declaring that marriages could be performed in his presence.[75] Thus, the custom of performing marriages in the presence of the Imām, became a very prominent practice among the Ismā-ʿīlis. The Firmāns during this period also take a stand on the question of polygamy and marriages with widows and divorcees. While the Firmāns place some restrictions on polygamy, marriage with widows was considered to earn a sawāb (reward).

Although the following Firmāns were issued in Zanzibar, in 1905, they reflect the general Ismāʿīlī changing attitude towards social customs. Wherever the Muslim social practices were found convenient, they were introduced to replace the older customs.

> ...to marry a widow is good practice. Even the Prophet himself married nine widows...[76]

> Marriages with two wives is not allowed without a valid reason. If (God forbid) you do not have children from your marriage or if your wife is very ill, then only marry a second wife; but treat both your wives as equal as your two eyes are equal...Do not marry two wives for the sake of pleasure alone.[77]

The Institution of marriage served also to foster Pan-Ismāʿīlism amongst Khojas of different ethinic backgrounds. The Firmān issued, in Karachi, in 1920, stated:

> Do not think yourselves as Kucchī Jamaʿat. All the Ismaʿīlis are the same. Whoever is my Murīd (follower) - Kucchī, Kāthiawarī, Sindhī, and those who have become new murīds. ...are all brothers in Ismāʿīlī faith. Give your daughters to each other...you are all the children of the same parents...[78]

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES

The economic policies of the Āghā Khān, as reflected in the Firmāns, were concerned mainly with two areas; - migration and the right choice of trade. The migration of Ismāʿīlis in large numbers from the desert-like areas of Kucch and Kāthiawar, and crowded cities - like Bombay, to Burma, Africa, etc, became the major concern of the Firmāns on economic issues. In Bombay, in 1928, the Āghā Khān said,

> Wherever I go in Kāthiawar, I am making the same Firmāns that you should migrate to Rangoon, Burma and Africa.[79]

Along with migration, the Firmāns cautioned the Ismāʿīlis not to go into trade right away but to gain awareness of the economic environment in the new countries. In 1928, the Āghā Khān issued a Firmān at Bombay.

> ...first migration is an important factor. Then work for someone and later open your own business...[80]

In India itself, the Firmāns on economic issues emphasized the need for the Ismāʿīlī traders to keep abreast of modern developments in order to avoid destabilization. For example, in 1935, a Firmān issued to the Ismāʿīlis in Bombay who were involved with the horse-carriage transport buisness, advised them to switch to automobiles.

> Presently there are many cars in Bombay, and so you get together and buy cars. As times change, you too should change.[81]

The Firmāns, however, strongly emphasized that the purpose of becoming rich was to help others.

> ...To help a poor man and free his soul is equal to (or more) than 1,000 years of Ibādah (worship)...[82]

Charity was however meant to rehabilitate the poor and not to encourage total dependency, and , so, laziness was condemned amongst the Ismā'īlis.

> ...There is God but he will not throw money from the sky. You have hands, feet, and eyes to work with...[83]

Similarly, the Firmāns were concerned with many other social issues such as health. For example the Ismā'īlis were asked to be vaccinated against plague and small-pox; to open health clinics; and to establish sports and recreation centres;[84] etc.

Thus, the Ismā'īlī response, in the Indian scene prior to 1936 may be characterized essentially as a modernist-reformist movement. The nature of the Ismā'īlī reformist tendency was colored by its attempt to provide itself with a religious impulse through a systematic reformulation of the Ismā'īlī Identity.

The direction of the Ismā'īlī response, as reflected in the Firmāns, also indicates that until 1936, the need to stretch the definition of Ismā'īlī identity to accommodate general Muslim conciousness was not felt. This Ismā'īlī response probably mirrors the insignificance or non-existence of any Muslim Nationalist sentiment in the form of the Pakistan Movement.

Moderation towards other Muslims and towards Hindus; social and educational reforms to accommodate British policies, including the marriage customs, characterized the Ismā'īlī response in India. These social reforms were accepted as Islamic wherever a reference to the Muslim social practices could be made.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a detailed analysis, see Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, London: Victor Gollanez Ltd, 1946; Harlan O. Pearson, Islamic Reform and Revival in Nineteenth Century India: the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiyah, Ph.D. Thesis, Duke University. 1979; and Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

2. Pearson, Islamic Reform, p. 78.

3. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Culture, p. 211-212.

4. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p. 38.

5. Aziz Ahmad, Islam and Democracy, p. 124.

6. Christian W. Troll, "A Nineteenth Century Indian Muslim Restatement of Islam", Islam in Southern Asia, ed. by Dietmar Rothermand, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975, p. 44.

7. Donald E. Smith, "Emerging Patterns of Religion and Politics", South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. by D. E. Smith, Princeton: University Press, 1966, p. 23.

8. R. E. Enthoven, in his article on "Khojahs" in The Tribes and Castes of Bombay, Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1975, indicates that some Khojas from Punjab were beginning to incline towards Sunnism. p. 223.

9. Aziz Ahmad maintains that Khojas retained the "belief in the doctrine of metempsychosis...encouraged by Rashid al-dīn in 12th century." Through Sadr-al-Dīn, an Ismā'īlī Da'ī, the Ismā'īlis regarded Ādam and 'Alī as the Avatārs of Vishnu. Islamic Culture, p. 160-161.

10. Fayzi, Muhammadan Law, p. 532.

11. See the "Discussion" in Islam in Southern Asia, p. 42.

12. The term "Khojah", according to Madelung, is derived from the Persian word Khwādja, which means 'master'. "Khodja in the strict sense is the name of an Indian caste consisting mostly of Nizārī Ismā'īlis and some Sunnis and Twelver Shī'īs who split off from the Ismā'īlī community. In a looser sense the name is commonly used for the Indian Nizāris in general including some minor communities such as Shamsis in the area of Multan and some Momnas in Northern Gudjarāt." See "Khodja"; E.I.^{2}, p. 26-27. According to Enthoven, the term Khoja denotes some Ismā'īlī sub-groups such as Guptis, Lohanas, Momnas, Bhatias, and even Badakshanis (who are not Hindu convertees). See R. E. Enthoven, "Khojahs". Tribes and Castes of Bombay, p. 223.

13. Holister, The Shī'a of India, p. 364.

14. Ibid., p. 368.

15. For details on the migration of the Āghā Khān I to India, and his services to the British, see Navroji Dumasia, The Aga Khan and His Ancestors, Bombay: Bombay Times of India Press, 1939.

16. Holister, The Shī'a of India, p. 400.

17. According to Justice Arnauld's observation, based on the accumulation of evidence, "the Khojas have observed these practices from the beginning out of Takiah - concealment of their own religious views and adoption of alien religious ceremonies out of dread of persecution for religion's sake." The Court Judgement has been reprinted by Asaf Fayzi in Cases of Muhammadan Law of India and Pakistan, London: Oxford University Press, 1965. p. 504-549. For the above quotation see p. 539.

18. Ibid., p. 532.

19. Ibid., p. 534.

20. Ibid., p. 505.

21. Ibid., p. 545.

22. In 1842, Major Rowlison reports that the Āghā Khān had offered his cavalry services to relieve the British who he recommended, should "give further confidence to Shia party, and to show that we can still command the services of a not unimportant class of Muslim population." Again, in India, Sir Charles Napier wrote that he had sent the Āghā Khān to secure communications and "protect our line along which many of our people have been murdered by baloochis." See Dumasia, The Aga Khan, p. 35-48.

23. These Firmāns have been compiled under the title of Ruhānī Rāz (spiritual happiness), Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1972.

24. Āghā Khān, Sultān Muhammad Shāh, The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time, London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1954. p. 19.

25. Ibid., p. 18.

26. Ibid., p. 16.

27. Ibid., p. 17.

28. Ibid., p. 40.

29. In his speech to the Muhammedan Education Conference the Āghā Khān, for the first time, addressed the Muslims at large urging them to support British-introduced social reforms and not to be led astray by conservative Muslims. The speech is reproduced by Sirdār Iqbāl ʿAlī Shāh in The Prince Aga Khan, London: John Long Limited, 1933, p. 66-72.

30. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 66.

31. In 1906, the Āghā Khān led the Muslims in The Round Table Conference along with Lord Minto to demand separate electorates, through which the Muslims could elect their own representatives for the Municipalities, rural councils, and provincial and central legislative councils. He presided over the All-India Muslim Conference in 1929, and in the following year he again led the Muslims to another round table conference.

32. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, p. 66.

33. Francis Robinson, "Muslim Separatism in Nothern India in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century", Islam in Southern Asia, p. 39.

34. See Āghā Khān, Sir Sultān Muhammad Shāh, India in Transition, A Study in Political Evolution, New York: Bennett, Coleman and Co., Ltd. The Times of India Office, 1918.

35. See extract from his speech to the All India Muslim Conference at Delhi in Sirdār Iḳbal Shāh's The Prince Aga Khan, p. 73.

36. Speech to Muhammadan Education Conference, Sirdār Iḳbal Shāh, The Prince, p. 68.

37. Ibid., p. 65.

38. In this he differed from modernist-reformists such as Sayyid Ahmad Khān.

39. His concern for obtaining the status of a 'Recognized University' for Aligarh led him to raise huge sums to finance it. See Dumasia, Aga Khan, p. 183.

40. The Khilafat Movement in India was directed principally against the British and the proposed break up of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The Āghā Khān and Syed Amīr

ʿAlī went to Turkey on behalf of the Muslims of India to try to persuade Kemal Ataturk to preserve the Khilafat as a symbol of Muslim Unity. In India, however, the Khilafat Movement took a Pan-Islamic dimension implying extra-territorial loyalty to the community of Muslims. Gail Minault, however, maintains that the Khilafat Movement was "ambivalently Nationalist" aimed primarily at uniting "Indian Muslims Politically by means of religious and cultural symbols meaningful to all strata of Community". See "Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization." A Reinterpretation of Khilafat Movement", Islam in Southern Asia, p. 37.

40. Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, p. 87.

41. Memoirs, p. 76.

42. Sirdār Ikbāl Shāh, The Prince, p. 57.

43. See Bombay High Court Reports (1908) Suit No. 729, p. 12-18.

44. Haji Bibi was the Āghā Khān's cousin and the sister of Shahzādī - the first wife of the Āghā Khān whom he had earlier divorced. See "The Bombay Law Reporter", vol XI, 1908, p. 409.

45. See the case.

46. Kalām-e-Imām-e-Mubīn (vol. I) "Holy Firmāns of Mowlana Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh - the Āghā Khān", Bombay: Ismailia Association for India, 1950, p. 1-5.

47. Ibid., p. 8.

48. Ibid., p. 241.

49. Ibid., p. 190.

50. Ibid., p. 190.

51. Kalām -e-Imām-e-Mubīn, (vol. II) p. 32.

52. Ibid., (vol. I) p. 95.

53. Ibid., p. 217.

54. Ibid., p. 252.

55. "Do not have religious relations with other faiths. Only worldly..." Ibid., p. 240-242.

56. Ibid., p. 152.

57. "Those who make tā'but (effigies), they are Idol worshippers..." (Karachi 1-5-1920) Kalām (vol. II), p. 56.

58. Kalām (vol. I), p. 289.

59. Kalām (vol. II), p. 59.

60. Kalām (vol. I), p. 299. During the first World War he had advised the Ismā'ilis to remain loyal to the British. See Greenwall, H.H.The Aga Khan, p. 56-58.

61. Kalām (vol. I), p. 248.

62. "...If you love your dīn then think of such things as to how to organize better sitting facilities, and how children should get the best education." Ibid., p. 350.

63. For an interesting background on the functions of the Councils, see, Azim Nanji, "Modernization and Change in the Nizārī Ismaili Community in East Africa - A perspective," Journal of Religion in Africa, vol. 6, 1974, p. 123-139.

64. In a Firmān issued to the debating society at Karachi, the Āghā Khān asked the members not only to discuss religious topics but worldly issues as well. Kalām (vol. II) p. 54. "Besides Dīnī Tā'līm, Dūnyawī tā'līm is a necessity..." Ibid., p. 51.

65. Ibid., p. 18.

66. See Memoirs for the Āghā Khān's conversation with the Jesuit teachers. p. 16.

67. Kalām, (vol II), p. 128.
68. Ibid., p. 4.
69. Ibid., p. 18.
70. Ibid., p. 138.
71. Ibid., p.
72. Ibid., p. 14.
73. Ibid., p. 12.
74. Ibid., p. 44.
75. Ibid., p. 27.
76. Ibid., p. 83.
77. Kalām, (vol. I), p. 284.
78. Kalām, (vol. II), p. 42-43.
79. Ibid., p. 140.
80. Ibid., p. 140.
81. Ibid., p. 176.
82. Ibid., p. 72.
83. Ibid., p. 76.
84. The Firmāns concerning these have not been dealt with here. Many Firmāns dealing with health can be seen in both volumes of Kalām.

CHAPTER III

THE PAKISTAN PHASE, PART I: 1936-1957

SECTION I: Emergence of Pakistan

The nationalist movement in British India acquired a religious and, therefore, a communal undertone, in the second quarter of 20th century. This new development set Muslims and Hindus against each other.[1] Communalism, in the sense of loyalty to the membership of a group, became the rationale for the Muslim League's Pakistan Movement after 1936.[2]

Muslim Communalism, in the form of Muslim Political separate representation, as espoused earlier by Modernist Muslims such as Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, the Āghā Khān, Muḥsin-al-Mulk, and later by Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnah (a Shīʿī)[3] was initially aimed at safeguarding the political and social interests of Muslims against the Hindu majority in a democratic framework introduced into India by the British.[4] The Āghā Khān, in 1929, stated that the aims of the Muslim League were "purely political. The religious differences separating various sects of Muhammadans exist for all time as far as we can foresee."[5]

After the failure of the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) Muslim communalism was characterized mainly by increased antagonism towards Hindus. The Muslims felt that the Hindus had betrayed them when Gandhi called off the non-co-operation movement - which was a Joint Hindu Muslim pressure tactic against the British to demand swarāj

(home rule) and the restoration of the Khilafat in Turkey. Thus, Muslim communalism, in response to the external threat - Hinduism -, articulated a common Islamic identity among the Muslims.[7] This external threat, temporarily, camouflaged the existing theological and sectarian fissures in the Muslim community itself.[8]

Jinnāh exploited the situation[9] and set out to broaden the League platform by accommodating an emotionally based Muslim communalism to the political and legal categories of Western democracy in an effort to gain power for the Muslim League after 1936.[10] In 1939, the League fueled Hindu-Muslim antagonism through the circulation of the 'Pirpur Report' accusing the Hindu-dominated Congress of atrocities committed against the Muslims.[11] In 1940 the Muslim League resolved to demand "Independent States" made up of Muslim majority provinces.[12] Muslim communalism then began to be identified with "Muslim Nationalism" or "Islamic Nationalism."[13] Thus, the Pakistan Movement, in the sense of Muslim Nationalism, was not concerned with the detailed formulation of its political framework, but with the broad and emotionally based religious frame of reference to "foster in the Muslim people of India a sense of community, a feeling of belonging together which...had never before so intensely characterized the Muslims of that subcontinent at any time in their history."[14]

Many ʿulamā and Mowlana Mawdudi - the leader of Jamaʿat-i-Islami - vehemently opposed the Pakistan Movement. Mawdudi argued that the Pakistan idea implied Muslim loyalty to a "Western Phenomenon of Nationalism" and not to the Muslim Society governed by the Divine

Will - Allah's Will.[15] His objection was directed at the leadership of the Pakistan Movement - particularly Jinnāh. According to Mawdudi, Jinnāh and other Modernist Muslims were more dangerous than atheists because the former corrupted Islam from within by sapping "the very foundation of Islamic commitment"[16] and replacing it with material interests.

Some ʿUlamā' such as Shabīr Aḥmad Uthmāni, Mufti Muḥammad Shafīʿi and Iḥtisham al-Ḥaqq, who supported the Pakistan Movement, envisaged a state governed by the Sharīʿa[17] where they would acquire a renewed and important role as overseers of the implementation of Islamic ideals.[18] This group of conservative ʿUlamā' differed from the revivalist group under Mawdudi on the question of the source of interpretation of the Qurʿān and the traditions of the Prophet. The former's role was more that of preservers of a divine law already interpreted by the past legal schools (mainly Ḥanafī in Pakistan) and not that of reformers. The latter rely on reason and personal judgement for the interpretation of what they consider clear and simple Qurʿānic injunctions[19] and prophetic traditions which alone constitute Islamic ideals by which a Muslim society ought to be governed.[20] Both groups, however, are decidedly anti-western, anti-Hindu and puritanical. An ideal Islamic Society, accordingly, must be monolithic and free from internal diversity which is generally due to foreign influences. Peter Hardy quotes a Punjabi Muslim's vision of a Muslim State.

> A Muslim State may not mean a State in the Western sense of the word which the Indian Muslims have been accustomed to.

> It may mean a State governed by the Islamic Law as contained in the Holy Quran. It may mean the purging of the Indian Muslims of all un-Islamic influences which they have contracted on account of their close contact with the non-Muslim communities in India."[21]

When Pakistan emerged in 1947, a number of ʿUlamāʾ - who had opposed the creation of Pakistan, including Mawdudi - migrated to Pakistan where they undertook to define an Islamic State on which Pakistan could be patterned. Their enthusiasm not only clashed with the Government of Pakistan, administered mainly by Western educated Muslims, but reflected a Sunnī Sectarian bias.[22] Their vision of Islam and Islamic Society was, in principle, the equivalent of the Sunnī Islamic Society based on either Qurʿān and the traditions of the Prophet interpreted by individual Muslims (pious like Mawdudi)[23] or interpreted by one of the four legal schools, Hanafī, in the case of Pakistan.[24] Such a position undercut the cardinal Shīʿī principle of Imāmah which, according to Shīʿī Muslims, is the sole divinely authorized institution for interpreting the Qurʿān and, accordingly, for dispensing the law.[25]

The Modernist Muslims who believed that Islam is rational, humanitarian, liberal, and everything that a modern democratic state espouses, did not feel the need to formulate a criterion to determine who was a Muslim or what makes a society Islamic. In such a modern democratic state, the Muslims would be free to practice their faith.[26] This implied not only security and freedom for Muslim minority groups, such as the Shīʿa and the Ahmadiyyah, but also

for minority non-Muslim groups such as Christians and Hindus, in shaping their own religious orientations.[27]

Amongst the Muslims who opposed the Modernist vision of Islam, the revivalist group - Jama'at-i-Islami - has been the most organized, effective and appealing religio-political group in Pakistan.[28] According to Mawdudi, Pakistan was fought for in order to make it an Islamic State based on the Shari'a - the Islamic ideals as revealed through the Qur'an and exemplified by the Prophet of Islam. Thus, obedience to any authority other than God means "idolatory or associating partners with God (shirk)..."[29] Thus, a modern democratic state is antithetical to Islam, and the architects of such a State are Kafirs (unbelievers).[30] Thus his position implied that a state governed by divine law - interpreted by an 'alim such as he - should aim at purging all the non-conforming (therefore, un-Islamic) elements from the Muslim Society.

The contradiction between the two visions - one Democratic and one Islamic - of governing Pakistan became evident in the Objectives resolution[31] passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, and later incorporated in the 1956 Constitution of "Islamic Republic of Pakistan", as a preamble.

> Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam should be fully observed: Wherein the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah.[32]

The constitutional development in Pakistan thus reflected the

weakness of the Modernist administrators of Pakistan and the strength of the ʿUlamā' opposition. These elements are seen in the difficulty experienced in synthesizing two contrasting political philosophies - Democratic and Islamic - under a non-reconcilable category of Islamic Democracy. While Democracy delegates authority to people by people in order to evolve and formulate laws to govern the society for the benefit of each and every individual, the Islamic Political Philosophy according to Mawdudi, depends upon laws already formulated by God according to which Muslims must govern themselves at all times.[34]

> In the one there is the concept of a law made by men through the excerise of reason for the benefit of man, and in the other there is the divine fiat rising beyond human understanding and calling only for obedience.[35]

The strength of the ʿUlamā' under the Jamaʿat-i-Islami leader, Mawdudi, was violently articulated when, in 1953, they launched an anti-Ahmadiyyah movement demanding that the Ahmadiyyah be declared non-Muslims.[36] They demanded the members of the Ahmadiyyah group as such and in particular, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khān, who was at the time Pakistan's Foreign Minister, be removed from the important government posts.[37]

Consequently, the whole country was threatened with the eruption of Civil War on the question of the identity of the Ahmadiyyah - a Muslim sect founded in 1890 by Mirza Gulām Ahmad, who claimed to be a reformer and a Masīh (saviour) after the Prophet Muhammad. He also claimed to be the "reincarnation of Jesus and Lord Krishna."[38]

His claim, the 'Ulamā' maintained, violated the belief of the Muslims in Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (the finality or the Seal of Prophecy). The Ahamdiyya found mainly in Punjab, are a well-knit prosely-tizing group numbering about 200,000.[39]

The significance of the anti-Ahmadiyyah Movement, however, lay in the power which the Sunnī 'Ulamā' showed themselves able to wield.[40]

The court inquiry into the incident declared that "in the eyes of certain Sunni leaders all Shiahs were Kafirs (unbelievers) and some of the Shiah leaders were inclined to pay the same compliment to the Sunnis."[41] Consequently, the report argued:

> The net result of all this is that neither Shias or Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be Kafirs.[42]

SECTION II

A. THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ RESPONSE: 1936-1947

In the light of growing Muslim political conciousness in India, prior to its partition (1947), the Ismā'īlis under the leadership of the Āgha Khān aligned themselves with the Muslims.[43] Their pro-jection of Muslim political identity was not however to be enter-tained at the cost of putting at stake "Hindu-Muslim co-operation"[44]

or abandoning their loyalty to the British.[45] This triangular loyalty of the Āghā Khān diminished his influence in India's political life, thus isolating him from the changing Indian political scene.[46] This orientation partly caused[47] the diversion of his attention from the Indian scene to international affairs through 'The League of Nations' which elected him as its president in 1937.[48] His political and diplomatic interests thus took an international direction which exposed him further to the Western World and its political, social, and economic system.[49]

The Āghā Khān was profoundly impressed with life in the West[50] and desired to see the Muslims forge a comparative civilization.[51] In order to convince the Muslims about the superiority of Western values which they must adopt to modernize their institutions,[52] the Āghā Khān attempted to show that Islam embodied the same values. The Āghā Khān's few speeches and writings on Islam in general during this period reflect modernist apologetic and reformist trends. As a reformist he saw in Islam a means to better human life;[53] and, as an apologist, he defended Islam against what he called Western misconceptions based on conservatist manifestations of Islam.[54] He maintained that Islam as preached and practiced by the Prophet and the Muslims in the first century, including the Ummayyads, is the "World's finest Religion and Culture."[55]

In a forward to Qassim ʿAlī Jairozbhoy's Muhammad: A Mercy to all the Nations, published in 1937, the Āghā Khān described Muhammad as the incorporator of the universality of all the reli-

gions. Such a universal attitude, according to the Āghā Khān, was a derivation from the fundamental Islamic principle - Allāhu Akber (none is greater than Allah) - that "everything is maintained and sustained by Divine Power."[56] With the intention of indicating where the cause of failure to uphold this principle lay, the Āghā Khān argued that while the West had broken free from the authority of the "schoolmen of Europe" during the Renaissance through "intellectual revolutions", the Muslims were still under the spell of the ʿUlamā', clinging to the "non-essentials (furūʿāt)" among Muslim practices and, in doing so, they "have almost thrown out the Usulāt (essentials)."[57]

As an alternative to the authority of the ʿUlamā', the Āghā Khān maintained that the institution of ʿUlu 'l-amr (literally it means 'the possesor of command' and which refers to the authority of Imām and Caliph) was established to ensure that "the faith would ever remain living, extending, developing with science, knowledge, art and industry."[58]

> If, rightly, the Muslims have kept till now to the forms of prayer and fasting as practiced at the time of the Prophet, it should not be forgotten that it is not the form of prayer and fasting that have been commanded, but the facts, and we are entitled to adjust the forms to the facts of life as circumstances changed. It is the same Prophet who advises his followers ever to remain Ibnu 'l-waqt (i.e. children of the time and period which they were on earth)."[59]

Thus, for the Āgha Khān, Islam is "dynamic" and "humanitarian", with a potential to uplift the social and economic conditions of

"submerged classes", particularly in British India.[60]

In a defense to the criticism that Islam renders women non-entities, the Āghā Khān maintained that "their spiritual equality with men is absolute."[61] He accused the West of having, instead, denied the rights of inheritance for married women until 1882; "but", he continued, "the Muslim Women got full and equal rights to property one thousand and three hundred years ago, when the Muslim religion was founded."[62] On various occasions, the Āghā Khān expressed his distaste of British "snobbery" and racial policies which, according to him, probably caused his fourth wife's, Yvette Labrousse, conversion to Islam.[63]

Thus, his articulation of the Modernist interpretation of Islam and his interest in the social and political welfare of the Muslims of India, earned him considerable respect among the Modernist Muslims in India and, later, in Pakistan.[64] Thus, when Jawahar Lāl Nahrū - in 1935 - attacked the Āghā Khān as a heretic for pretending to be God while at the same time he lived in the West and served British interests and yet ironically was looked upon to lead the Muslims of India,[65] the Modernist Muslims, such as Iqbal, defended him by pointing out that he was a good Muslim by virtue of his adherence to the Kalimah (the Islamic witnessing formula).[66]

Between 1934 and 1939, the Firmāns issued to the Ismā'īlis in Bombay, Karachi, and Punjab, directed them to project an Islamic identity for the sake of Muslim unity. Accordingly, the Ismā'īlis were asked to visit Sunnī Mosques and mingle with other Muslims without

articulating any Shī'ī-Sunnī differences.

> I am very happy to learn that you go to the Mosques. You must go on every Friday and mingle with other Muslims...[67]
>
> To encourage Shī'a-Sunnī enmity is to weaken Islam. Forget who Yazid was. It is not our problem. We are all brothers who witness Kalimah - La Illaha Illa Allah (there is no God but Allah).[68]

Thus, the Ismā'īlis projected an Islamic identity socially and politically, but at the same time however, they re-emphasized the Ismā'īlī beliefs and practices.

In Bombay, in 1936, the Firmān asserted:

> Do not forget your old Madhhab (faith). The banks of a dam change but the water remains the same. The river never stops flowing. Similarly the silsilah (chain) of Imāmah never stops."[69]

Earlier, around 1930 the Ismā'īlis had employed the services of scholars such as W. Ivanow (a Russian), Asaf Fayzī (a Da'ūdī Ismā'īlī) and later; Jawād al-Masqatī (an Arab Ismā'īlī from Masqat), to examine documents on Ismā'īlī history and publish their works.[70] As a follow-up, the "Ismaili Society" was founded in Bombay, in 1949, with the following objective:

> The aim of the Ismaili Society is the promotion of independent and critical study of all matters connected with Ismailism, ...The Society entirely excludes from its program any religious or political propaganda or controversy...[71]

Much of the presently available literature on Ismā'īlism[72] was published under the patronage of the Ismaili Society in India, from 1946 onward.[73]

This development lent the Ismā'īlis significant theoretical leverage to break away from the pattern of a Hindu caste-like group, to whom history was insignificant, to become a historically concious group.[74] Thus, Ismā'īlis began to draw inspiration from history in the sense of maintaining continuity with the past. They used history to link the Hādhir (present) Imām with the past from whence the divine guidance must flow until eternity.[75]

In 1945, at the Ismā'īlī Mission Conference held in Dar-es-salaam (then, Tanganyka, East Africa),[76] the Āghā Khān suggested that since the Ismā'īlis were not grounded in Ismā'īlī Studies, they "must never reason with people who have no religion," because Islam and Ismā'īlism are based on Imān (faith).[77] He criticized those Ismā'īlis who sought to purge the Ismā'īlī prayer of Hindu concepts, such as Macch avtār (fish incarnate) and also replace phrases such as 'Alī Allah ('Alī is Allah) with 'Alī-un-Waliy-Allah ('Alī is the beloved of Allah). He explained that such terms and phrases have symbolical significance and, as such, should not be tampered with. He interpreted the concept of Macch Avtār as signifying that "when there was nothing but fish on earth, God stood as a witness..." With reference to the phrase 'Alī Allah he explained that although 'Alī was a "prisoner of the material world" during his physical existence, he was actually "the eternal that came from God and returned to God direct" [sic]--as a river formed of streams (mu'minīns) flows continuously to the ocean (Allah). Thus, he continued to emphasize the need to retain "some part of Hindu Mythology" which

"has a great deal of allegorical value."

> Similarly the Mythology of Hazrat Hussein's and Ali's supernatural acts should be considered and purely interpreted as allegorical."[78]

As a result of continued emphasis on Ismā'īlī syncretic identity against the growing Muslim conciousness in India, there appears to have been sporadic manifestation of some opposition from Sunnī and Ismā'īlī splinter groups against the Āghā Khān.

In 1937, an Ismā'īlī, Karīm Ghulām 'Alī - representing a group called the Khoja reform party[79] in an open letter to the Governor of Sindh, Sir Lancelot Graham, accused the Āghā Khān of misusing religion to accumulate wealth.[80] Greenwall reports that the accusations against the Āghā Khān did not stimulate much interest among the British or the Muslims.[81]

In 1946, however, as a consequence of Hindu-Muslim riots in the Punjab State of Kaparthala, some Muslims forcibly entered the Ismā'īlī Jama'at Khāna on suspicion that the Ismā'īlis were observing some Hindu practices.[82]

It may be significant to add that the Āghā Khān claimed to have converted a large number of Hindus to Ismā'īlism in the same year.[83] Whether Hindu converts who became Ismā'īlis and retained their Hindu customs aroused Muslim suspicion, or whether the Hindu converts were attracted to Ismā'īlism due to its already syncretic structure, needs to be examined.[84]

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS.

The Firmāns reflecting social and economic policies during

this period will be dealt with briefly here. As there is continuity in the Firmāns concerning the social and economic activities of Ismā'īlis in Pakistan, we will examine them in great detail later in this chapter.

EDUCATION: The Firmāns on education reflected an emphasis on free and compulsory education for all the Ismā'īlis.[85] While more emphasis was laid on girls' education, the Firmāns reflect a policy of helping more Ismā'īlī children to acquire elementary and secondary education rather than helping a minority to acquire university degrees.[86] The justification for adopting such a policy was given in the Firmāns which encouraged the Ismā'īlis to go into trade and commerce and not become subservient through the exercise of professions such as Law.[87]

> If three or four students can be helped to study up to the matric (approximately tenth grade) with the same amount needed to get one student through a B.A. program, then why not educate more children. Otherwise it is like making one person rich and ten persons poor. If a student intends to do B.A. in order to do a job...then how will you be rich? It is not by studying only that you will become rich, but by going into trade one becomes rich...[88]

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES: The Firmāns during this period continued to emphasize emigration to the African Coast (Madagascar, East Africa), Central Africa (Belgium Congo), South Africa, Burma, etc, for better trade prospects.

> Since fifty years we have been issuing the Firmāns that you must leave Kathiawar and go elsewhere ...those who listened and went to Africa are now prosperous.[89]

Significant change in the Āghā Khān's economic policy however, was evidenced during the Ismā'īlī celebrations of weighing their Imām in gold (in 1936)[90] and in diamonds (in 1946)[91] which originated from a Hindu custom of weighing Maharajahs (the Kings) against food, later to be distributed amongst the poor.[92] The Ismā'īlis, who had achieved considerable success in trade and commerce attributed the cause of their success to the Imām's directives.[93] In return, the Ismā'īlis, as an expression of gratitude, decided to offer the equivalent (in money) of the weight in gold[94] and diamonds[95] to the Āghā Khān.[96] The money thus accumulated was handed over to the "Golden and Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust" to be used for the "economic and educational welfare of the Ismā'īlis."[97]

Thus, the Āghā Khān's policy of redistributing wealth in this manner evidenced Western spiritual and idealist influence - in the sense of upholding the moral integrity and higher collective purpose of the group which is seen as a whole oragnic entity, an entity which Stanley describes as "Hedonistic Philosophy and German Practical Socialism."[98] Such a view of a society, as propounded by idealists such as Hegel was employed by the Facist regimes of Italy and Germany, in mobilizing their societies prior to the second World War. In India, at the time, Muslims such as Mawdudi and Mashriki too were influenced by the spiritual or idealist view of man and society. Greenwall seems to concede that the Āghā Khān too was greatly influenced by the German ideology.[99] In a letter to Fazl-e-Ḥassan, a Muslim leader in Punjab, in 1935, the Āghā Khān wrote that "Muslim States"[100] should evolve a moderate state socialist ideology "to be

implimented by the middle class and higher income groups to establish state-controlled health and education benefits extending to the poor."[101] He continued:

> The material superiority of the West has not impressed me so much as the greatest number of people who sacrifice every personal advantage for the advancement of some ideal...Nor is this spirit of self-sacrifice confined to the rank of believing Christians and Jews. Amongst the so-called Agnostics and Atheists, I have seen a wealth of true spiritual devotion. If only a little of it we could infuse into the hearts of Musalmans of India, we should be very different from what we are to-day...[102]

B. THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ RESPONSE: 1947-1957

When Pakistan emerged in 1947, a large number of Ismā'īlis migrated mainly to Karachi in Sindh and to East Pakistan.[103] The figures on the influx of immigrants to Pakistan were not accurately established.[104] Hanna Papanek reported that in Karachi alone the Ismā'īlī population more than doubled to about 25,000 and continued to grow rapidly. The entire Ismā'īlī population in East Pakistan, about ten thousand, was comprised of immigrants only.[105]

Many Firmāns, during this period (until 1952) were concerned with the rehabilitation of Ismā'īlī immigrants in Pakistan.[106] The Firmāns coming at a time when immigrants needed "social anchorage"[107] and material assistance, helped to foster Ismā'īlī communal identity, in terms of group loyalty in Pakistan in its early phase.[108] The Firmāns offered specific directives relating to the establishment of teaching projects ("to teach trade and commerce")[109]; industrial

homes; health centres; and housing facilities.[110] The immigrants were repeatedly encouraged to spread out into other provinces of Pakistan, such as Baluchistan; and not to crowd into large cities such as Karachi where economic prospects, according to the Āghā Khān, were too meagre in proportion to the growing population.

> Those of you who are Muhājirs (immigrants) ...and are not yet settled, should go towards Baluchistan...The rehabilitation committee should teach trade and home-industry skills to the immigrants...[111]

Hanna Papanek maintains that since migration for economic reasons had already become an Ismā'īlī trait, introduced in the early twentieth century by the Āghā Khān to rehabilitate the Ismā'īlis of the drought-stricken areas of Kacch and Kāthiawar in Gujarat, the emigration of Ismā'īlis to Pakistan was motivated mainly by economic prospects.[112] She supports her argument with the fact that Ismā'īlī "emigration did not extend to the entire family units," but to one member at a time.[113]

Greenwall indicates that the Āghā Khān, prior to partition, was somehow concerned about the possible infringement of Ismā'īlī interests in the Independent Nation States of India and Pakistan due to his continued loyalty to the British.[114]

However, when Pakistan came into being in 1947, the Āghā Khān described Pakistan's emergence as "the greatest child of Islam." His "message"[115] to Pakistan continued:

> We must, with all our energy, heart and soul, with faith in Islam and trust in God, work for the present and future glory

> of Pakistan...We must work for a better world, and be no more hypnotised by the dead glories of the distant past, or by the misfortunes of the near past."[116]

The Government of Pakistan, after the death of its founder, Quaid-e-Azam, Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnāh, in 1948, sought the Āghā Khān's political sympathy and his role as an investor in the country.[117]

Although the Āghā Khān expressed awareness of the ruinous implications of the developing rift between the "conservatists" and "progressives" and a compelling need to find a "middle path", he aligned himself with the Western-educated politicians by retaining his Modernist apologetic and reformist tendencies.[118] He intermittently cited both Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Syed Amīr ʿAlī as sources of Muslim inspiration in India.[119] Until 1952, the Āghā Khān condemned the ʿUlamā' as the cause of Muslim backwardness. They, according to the Āghā Khān, imported formalism into Islam from the Abbasids, and caused the division of Islam.[120] As an alternative to the ʿUlama's focus of attention, the Abbasids, he advocated that the Muslims focus their attention on the Ummayads for direction.[121]

> Islam...was dynamic, simple, clear during the glorious Omayyad period when the foundations of Islam were laid wide and deep... ask your historian...to concentrate on that glorious 100 years of Omayyad rule ...[122]

The irony of the Āghā Khān's turning to the Ummayads for inspiration, since the Ummayyads were the implacable enemies of ʿAlī and Shīʿī Muslims, suggests that the Āghā Khān not only distinguished religion from state but presupposed the extent of Ismāʿīlī

loyalty in acceding to his radical opinions.[123]

The Āghā Khān also attributed a spiritual dimension of Islam. By emphasizing the spiritual side of Islam and rejecting a doctrinaire interpretation of Islam, the Āghā Khān attempted to create an atmosphere favourable to the acceptance of a modernist attitude.[124]

> Formalism and verbal interpretation of the teachings of the Prophet are in absolute contradiction with his whole life history. We must accept this Divine message as the channel of our union with the 'Absolute' and the 'Infinite' and once our spiritual faith is firmly established, fearlessly go forward by self-sacrifice, by courage and by application to raise the scientific, the economic, the political and social position of the Muslims to a place of equality with Christians' Europe and America.[125]

Science, according to the Āghā Khān, is a process of understanding the laws of nature with a view to control them to serve mankind. Islam, being the religion of nature, puts Muslims in an advantageous position to unleash the power of nature through science. He asserted that science should be used to mechanize and increase production in order to develop the national economy.[126]

He warned that mere mechanization and capital investment were not sufficient for forging a sound national economy. Freedom for women and the need for Arabic as the national language to lessen the existing regional differences must be recognized by Pakistan as vital to its progress.

The Āghā Khān responded to the widespread Muslim attitude of restricting the role of women to domestic activities, thus affecting

their educational and social position. In his address to the "Pakistan Women's Association", he accused the Muslims of Pakistan of denying equal status to women by not allowing them to participate in national activities.[127] He warned that if women in Pakistan did not acquire the right and freedom to participate with men in the prayers (in the mosque), and in production, then, Europe and the other Asian countries would be much ahead of Pakistan. He exhorted them to agitate, if need be, to change the attitude of the men who "lock their women, when they go to Paris, rush to indulge in their horrible instincts and for that go to places where (like in every great city, even in Muslim countries) there are prostitutes and shows for encouraging sexual depravity." The Āghā Khān argued that the fear of the Muslims that freedom of women leads to immoral situations, as in the case of West, is unfounded.

> But that is not the life of the people. The overwhelming life of the people is happy family relations and far more devotion to children than you can possibly get out of 'purdah Nashin.'...Oh my sisters agitate, leave no peace to the men till they give you religious freedom ,...so that the habit of praying in public and self-respect and self-confidence becomes general amongst women. On that foundation of religious equality, you can then build social, economic, patriotic and political equality with men.[128]

When the Āghā Khān's modernist attitude was slightly resented by an Ismā'īlī,[129] in 1952, the Āghā Khān strongly defended his position by re-emphasizing that the Ismā'īlis were essentially Bāṭiniyūn (esoterists) and therefore against formalism. He argued that the

Muslims are faced with a choice of either adopting a "Western way of life in worldly and material things and keep the spiritual side of Islam" or governing their lives by "formalism of the past." In defending the Ismā'īlī choice he quoted a hadīth (saying of the Prophet):

> That then in Arabia if they give up one percent of the laws and customs introduced by the prophet they would be ruined, while the time would come that if they kept more then one percent of these laws and customs they would be ruined. [130]

He maintained, however, that the blind adoption of Western life had never been his policy because he had continously condemned the Western vices of "Alcohol and Tobacco. These are the evils of the West, but to choose between moral evil and moral good is the necessary part of the battle of the soul of each individual." [131] He was quick to indicate, however, that the "Worst vice of slavery of women in purdah, burqah and zenana where women are reduced to the moral insignificance of vegetables and physical wrecks, of diseases such as tuberculosis, etc," is found in some Muslim countries.[132]

Thus, until 1953, the Āghā Khān directed his attention towards defining the Ismā'īlī stand in relation to the controversy between the modernists and conservative revivalists over the role of Islam in Pakistan. Although Hanna Papanek maintains that there was an attempt by the Āghā Khān at purging Ismā'īlism of Hindu customs after the creation of Pakistan,[133] there is no indication that any significant changes in this regard were introduced prior to 1952.

After the anti-Ahmadiyya disturbances in Pakistan, in 1953, the Ismāʿīlī attitude evidenced not only a significant reorientation in accomodating some Muslim practices in place of Hindu rituals, but the Shīʿī sectarian and Modernist anti-ʿUlamā' emphasis underwent significant dilution.[134]

The Āghā Khān issued a statement – which appeared as an appendix to a booklet The Great Omayyads written by Mohammad A. Harris, published in 1954 - which briefly outlined the Ismāʿīlī attitude towards Sunnis.[135] It stated that although Ismāʿīlis are Shīʿa, they do not question the authority of the first three Caliphs since ʿAlī himself "co-operated" with them without any objection.[136] In the same year the Āghā Khān's "Memoirs"[137] were published. The "Memoirs", besides dealing with his role and experience of the changing Indian and International political scene, attempts to refute "the falsehoods that have gained credence."[138] With the intention of leaving no room for "gross fiction" about the nature of Ismāʿīlī beliefs in the Imām, the Āghā Khān devoted a whole chapter to "The Islamic Concept and My Role as Imam."[139]

The Āghā Khān distinguished two kinds of knowledge or experiences in a Bergsonian manner.[140] He defined "religious experience" as a direct or intuitive form of experience which is either acquired by or given by grace to men such as Jesus Christ, Hāfiz, Muḥammad, Zoroaster, Krishna, Buddha, etc. The Āghā Khān believed that any man can attain "the fruit of that sublime experience of the direct vision of reality which is God's gift and grace" through Islam.

This religious dimension of Islam formed one source of the Prophet's authority - the other being "secular, by the circumstances and accidents of his career."[141] The Shīʿa and the Sunnis, according to the Āghā Khān, although they differ on the question of succession to the Prophet - "the final messenger of God" - do not accuse one another of being non-Muslim.

> Fortunately the Koran has itself made this task easy, for it contains a number of verses which declare that Allah speaks to man in allegory and parable. Thus the Koran leaves the door open for all kinds of possibilities of interpretation... It leads also to a greater charity among Muslims, for since there can be no cut-and-dried interpretation all schools of thought can unite in the prayer that the Almighty in His infinite mercy may forgive any mistaken interpretation of the faith whose cause is ignorance or misunderstanding.[142]

In 1955, the Āghā Khān issued a statement from Cairo re-emphasizing that although Ismāʿīlis firmly adhere to their faith, they do not - "like some other sects" - "condemn ...brother Muslims who have other interpretations of the Divine Message of our Holy Prophet (s.a.s.)."

> I hope and believe and pray that Ismaʿilis may show their true Islamic charity in thought and prayer for the benefit and happiness of all Muslims, men, women and children.[143]

In the same year, a very significant book - Everliving Guide by Ḳasim ʿAlī Jāffer, who, later became the president of the Ismailia Association for Pakistan - was published.[144] It is one of the most widely-read books among the Ismāʿīlis in Pakistan. The author attemp-

ted to establish the necessity of divine guidance (Imām) of which mankind, since Adam - the first Prophet - was never deprived by God. He cited the Qurʿān and the traditions of the Prophet to argue that the last of the Prophets, Muḥammad, appointed ʿAlī, whose descendant is the Āghā Khān, the Imām of the Ismāʿīlis, to perpetuate the divine message for the benefit of mankind.[145] At the end of the book, he included some statements of the Āghā Khān reflecting the Ismāʿīlī belief concerning the finality of the Prophet of Islam; the need for an "Imam and Caliph" to ensure the continuity of faith; and the Ismāʿīlī respect for other Muslims.[146]

The significance of the book lay not only in its emphasis on the necessity of the Imām and his "Super-Human" attributes, but for the first time, the Imām's role was not derived from Hindu belief aspects of avatār (as seen in the second chapter) - within the Ismāʿīlī system.[147]

In 1950, the Āghā Khān introduced, into the Ismāʿīlī Duʿā[148] (prayer), some verses from the Qurʿān,[149] thereby replacing those verses which dealt with "the Hindu concepts of reincarnation of various forms of divinity."[150]

In 1956, however, the Duʿā, which was being recited in the Gujarati dialect, was in its entirety translated into Arabic, and more verses from the Qurʿān were added. This change in the structure of the Duʿā was a very significant move by the Āghā Khān, because the Duʿā - recited three times a day - by the Ismāʿīlis is an obligatory (Wājib) congregational prayer, similar in status to the salāt

(Muslim prayer which is observed five times daily by Sunnī Muslims). These changes in the Duʿā had a direct and effective impact on the Ismāʿīlī attitude towards Muslims and the relations between the two groups. To prepare the Ismāʿīlis to accept the new Duʿā, a Firmān was issued:

> The Duʿa will soon be translated into Arabic. Since the 8th century, that is to say the birth of our great religion, Arabic has been the language of Islam. It is probably the most beautiful and most complete of all languages spoken to-day. For this reason ...you should learn Duʿa in Arabic when it is ready.[151]

Similarly, some Gināns (a derivation of the Sanskrit word jnānā which means "contemplative or meditative knowledge")[152] with a high content of Hindu belief, tracing the descent of ʿAlī from Vishnu, were either dropped or altered. For example, in 1956, in Karachi, the Ginān tracing the descent of ʿAlī from the avatārs of Macch (fish) Kokub (tortoise), Shrī Rām, etc, was modified to incorporate Adam, Noah, Ibrahim, Issā (Christ), etc.[153] When one considers the extent of reverence that is attributed to the Ginānic tradition - comparable to the authority of the Firmāns and Hadīth - these changes signify a major step toward reorienting the Ismāʿīlī attitude in the changed circumstances.

Except for a few instances of Ismāʿīlī reaction against the changes which were directed mainly at local leadership for introducing the changes ignorantly,[154] the Ismāʿīlis generally rationalized the need to purge Hindu practices by explaining that the

Pīrs had been kind enough to make things easy for Ismā'īlis by allowing them to retain their Hindu customs in the beginning. These customs were now no more necessary, and the Ismā'īlis could return to "their original Islamic orientation of their faith."[155]

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES: The economic activity of the Ismā'īlis was one other area which helped to foster the Ismā'īlī identity and maintain its integrity amidst the problems of a regionally and ethnically torn Pakistan.[156]

Industrialization became the chief concern of the economic policy of the Āghā Khān whose experience in the West enabled him to keep in touch with "World Economic Trends."[157] He adhered strongly to the principle of "Capital Investment" and "Mechanization in an effort to increase production."[158] When he issued Firmāns, in 1952, on establishing Jute Mills[159] in East Pakistan with shares open to the public, he advised the traders to import "Machineries" with their highly valued Rupees (which in 1949 had not yet been devalued in relation to the Indian Rupee).[160] In one instance, Hanna Papanek reports that the Āghā Khān had advised the Ismā'īlī importers to hold on to imported goods (from Korea between 1947-1950) whose prices had dropped sharply. After the indroduction of control on all imports of consumer goods in Pakistan, Hanna Papanek maintains, the Ismā'īlī traders who heeded the Āghā Khān's advice sold their goods with huge profits.[161]

Frischaur maintains that the Āghā Khān also brought the Ismā'īlis into contact with the West and helped them find customers for their

fine silks, furnishings and other products.[162]

The Ismā'īlis, in 1954, again celebrated the "Platinum Jubilee" during which time they collected about 3 million Rupees. The Āghā Khān, responding to the gesture, urged the Ismā'īlis to invest the money with the goal of securing employment for every Ismā'īlī in both wings of Pakistan by 1960.[163] Even while the preparations for celebrating the 'Platinum Jubilee' were under way, the Āghā Khān in 1952, asked the Ismā'īlis in Pakistan not to wait until the celebrations were over to implement the economic reforms.

> It is essential for you to establish co-operative societies... Such co-operative socities will be able to borrow capital from the Platinum Jubilee Finance Corporation...with low interest. These days, there is no sense in waiting any longer for...improving your material conditions....You have contributed to Platinum Jubilee Fund generously. Why do you then wait for two years to invest it. Consider today is Jubilee. Every minute is Jubilee.[164]

Following the 'Platinum Jubilee' celebrations, a "Platinum Jubilee Finance Cooperation" was established to channel the funds - in the form of loans with low interest - to individual Ismā'īlis through Credit Co-operative societies, "Housing" societies, etc, numbering to forty-seven by 1956.[165]

The Corporation functioned with three objectives outlined by the Āghā Khān so that the Ismā'īlis could become "a model for all communities in Pakistan.[166]

1. Every Ismā'īlī to be self-reliant.
2. Every Ismā'īlī family to own a housing unit.

3. To encourage industrialization.

The Āghā Khān continued to communicate with the Ismā'īlī industrialists such as, Amīr Fancy, who had migrated to East Africa from India, in 1937, and then settled in Pakistan after its emergence, about economic policies aimed at involving more and more Ismā'īlis with textiles, export-import, steel mills (largest in Pakistan), Jute Mills, etc.[167]

Hanna Papanek maintains that "so far as is known no other community has developed an institution that even approaches it". She compared the income distribution in 1959 between general Muslims and Khojah Ismā'īlis in Karachi. She concluded that, while the income of 75 percent of Muslims was less than 200 rupees and 17 percent between the range of 200 to 400 rupees, the income of 25 percent of Khojah Ismā'īlis was less than 200 rupees; 45 percent between the range of 200 and 400 rupees and 30 percent above 400 rupees.[168]

Politically, the Firmāns directed the Ismā'īlis to be nationalist and to avoid being swayed by regionalism.[169] This helped significantly in defining the loyalty of the Ismā'īlis in India - to be loyal to their Government.[170] In 1952, in East Pakistan, the Firmāns, however, were directed at aligning Ismā'īlis with Bengal Nationalism through the adoption of cultural traits such as language, dress, etc.

> You have recently migrated to this country. It is very essential for you to abide by my Firmāns minutely. Look at my spiritual children in Burma who implemented my directives and, so, are much happier in this world...They implemented

> our Firmāns and identified themselves with Burmese; similarly, you too should think of yourselves as Bengalis. You are none other than Bengalis...It is essential for you to purge yourselves from all other foreign languages and customs...You have the same religion and, therefore, live whole-heartedly like Bengalese." [171]

Except for encouragement to demand more facilities from the Government, the Firmāns never attempted to direct the Ismā'īlis to align themselves with any political party in Pakistan.[172] This probably helped the Ismā'īlis, to some extent, to avoid becoming a target for the 'Ulamā'.[173] Hanna Papanek, however, believes that the Ismā'īlī habit of secrecy helped the group avoid ridicule.[174]

The difference in the explanations of the motive behind the creation of Pakistan before and after its emergence elicited a response amongst the Ismā'īlis to reorient their attitude toward other Muslims, the West, and themselves.

While there is continuity in the Firmāns concerning economic activity and the modernist projection of Islam, there is abrupt change, not only respecting the religious practices of the Ismā'īlis, but in the Ismā'īlī attitude towards other Muslims after the anti-Ahmadiyyah riots in 1953.

By using the divine role of the Imām, previously attributed to him, the Āghā Khān enabled the Ismā'īlis to accomodate a changing attitude within the Ismā'īlī structure, without rupturing the base.[175]

The purification of Hindu practices from Ismā'īlism in Pakistan narrowed the gap between Ismā'īlis and other Muslims. However, the

Āghā Khān's modernist approach, especially his economic direction, contributed to increased cohesiveness amongst Pakistan's Ismā'īlī community.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cantwell Smith defines Communalism in India as "that ideology which has emphasized as the social, political, and economic unit the group of adherents of each religion, and has emphasized the distinction, even the antagonism, between such groups; the word 'adherent' and 'religion' being taken in the most nominal sense. Muslim communalists, for instance, have been highly conscious of the Muslims within India as a supposedly single, cohesive community, to which they devote their loyalty..." For an excellent analysis, see his Modern Islam in India, London: Victor Golanez Ltd., 1946. Communalism as an ingredient of Muslim Nationalism had never been intensely manifested before 1936, because the Muslim League was, unlike the Indian National Congress, not a nationalist organization. See Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge: University Press, 1972, p. 227.

2. Smith, Modern Islam, p. 248.

3. Much has been written on determining to what branch of Shī'a exactly Jinnāh belonged. See Hector Bolitho, Jinnāh, Creator of Pakistan, New York: Macmillan and Co., 1954. See also Sheila McDonough, ed. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Massachusetts: Heath and Co., 1970.

4. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān expressed the fear in the following words: "The system of representation by election means the representation of the views and the interests of the majority of the population, and in countries where the population is composed of one race and one creed it is no doubt the best system that can be adopted. But, My Lord, in a country like India, where caste distinctions

still flourish, where there is no fusion of the various races, where religious distinctions are still violent,... the principle of election, pure and simple...would be attended with the evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations." R. Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, London: Faber and Faber, 1950, p. 30-31.

5. Harry Greenwall, H.H. The Aga Khan Imam of the Ismailis, London: The Cresent Press, 1952, p. 136.

6. Similar to the case of political development in Turkey - where the position of the Caliph, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, was being threatened by rising Turkish Nationalism - the Muslims of India felt that their Islamic Culture was being threatened by the British. They joined the Congress to demand two things. 1. Swarāj, i.e. home-rule for India, and 2. to revive the concept of Khilāfat in Turkey for the Muslims of India to draw inspiration from. In February, 1922, Gandhi called off the non-co-operation movement. See Smith, Modern Islam, p. 195-204.

7. Ibid., p. 207.

8. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of change, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980, p. 37.

9. Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Political Leadership and Institution Building Under Jinnah, Ayub, and Bhutto", in Pakistan: The Long View, ed. by Ziring, Braibanti, and Wriggins, Durham: Duke University Press, 1977, p. 24.

10. Cantwell Smith maintains that the report was exaggerated. See Modern Islam, p. 261.

12. Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, p. 41.

13. Charles J. Adams, Islam in Pakistan, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1959, p. 37.

14. Ibid., p. 34.

15. For an excellent analysis on Mawdudi's thought see, Charles Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi" in South Asian Politics and Religion. ed. by D.E. Smith, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

16. Ibid., p. 374.

17. Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India, p. 242.

18. Sheila McDonough, "The Religious Legitimization of Change Among Modernists in Indo-Pakistani Islam" in Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia, ed. by Bardwell L.Smith, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978, p. 43.

19. Charles Adams argues that the two sources of Islamic authority are "1. ...silent on many matters of concern to the Muslims and must be supplemented by some other principle of authority; 2. the fact that in addition to their clear commands the basic sources have a number of others, the exact meaning of which is doubtful and require interpretation; and 3. the fact that even clear commands must be understood in the light of whatever historical circumstances may prevail. See "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", p. 386.

20. Ibid.

21. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, p. 241.

22. Ibid., p. 242.

23. Aziz Ahmad, "Islam and Democracy in Pakistan", Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia, ed. by Robert F. Spencer, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971, p. 126.

24. M.Geijbels, "The Process of Islamisization in Pakistan" al-Mushir, Rawalpindi: vol. XXI, 1979 No.2, p. 31-51.

25. For a Shī'ī concept of Imāmah see Vaglieri, "Ali bin Abi Talib", E.I.^{2}, p. 381 and also A.A.Fyzee, The Book of Faith

translated from Daʿāʿim al-Islam of al-Qādī al-Nuʿmān, Bombay: 1974, p. 26.

26. Freeland Abbott, "Pakistan and the Secular State" in South Asian Politics and Religion, p. 360.

27. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957, p. 233.

28. Adams, Islam in Pakistan, p. 52-53.

29. Adams, The Ideology of Mawdudi, p. 382.

30. Ibid., p. 389.

31. Adams, Islam in Pakistan, p. 39.

32. Ibid.

33. For an analysis on the distinction between Democratic and Islamic political Philosophies, see Adams, "Islam and the Public Philosophy in Pakistan", in Political Forces in Pakistan, (Papers presented at a seminar held at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, June 18-20, 1958).

34. Ibid., p. 14.

35. Ibid., p. 14.

36. Adams, The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi, p. 376-377.

37. Callard, Pakistan, p. 204.

38. Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p. 260.

39. For a brief discussion on the history of Ahmadiyyah, see Cantwell Smith's Modern Islam, p.298. For the anthropological analysis of anti-Ahmadiyyah Movement in Pakistan, in 1953, see John Honigmann, "Intensional Orientation and National Unity" (A case study from Pakistan) A Review of General Semantics, 13:2 (Winter 1955-56), p. 108-115; and "Radical Opposition in National Culture,"

Davidson Journal of Anthropology vol. 1, No.2, 1955, p. 169-180.

40. Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961, p. 259-296.

41. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 37.

42. Ibid.

43. Kalām-e-Imām-e-Mubīn, p. 241.

44. Stanley Jackson, The Aga Khan, London: Odham Press Limited, 1952, p. 190. The Āghā Khān issued a Firmān directing the Ismā'īlis to live in peace with Hindus and Muslims; Kalām vol. II, p. 160. Between 1942 and 1946, the Āghā Khān had expressed his intentions of helping the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress to come to some sort of political compromise.

45. During the second world war, the Āghā Khān issued directives to the Ismā'īlis to be loyal to the British. Tālika and Messages, Mombasa: Ismailia Association for Africa, 1955, p. 5. Greenwall maintains that "Aga Khan wanted independence for India, but, most sincerely he wanted India to remain within the framework of the British Empire." See His Highness The Aga Khan Imam of the Ismailis, London: The Crescent Press, 1952.

46. Stanley Jackson indicates that the Āghā Khān was disappointed with the British for not granting him a piece of land in Sindh. See Aga Khan, p. 140. The British too, however, discouraged the Āghā Khān from representing Indian political interests in view of the rising nationalist and communal sentiments. See Willi Frischauer, The Aga Khans, London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1970, p. 110.

47. Frischauer, p. 110.

48. Navroji Dumasia, The Aga Khan and His Ancestors, Bombay: The Times of India Press, 1939, p. 268.

49. Greenwall, Aga Khan, p. 212.

50. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social change in the Khoja Ismaili Community, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis submitted to Harvard University, 1962, p. 151.

51. Qayyum A.Malik, H.R.H. Prince Aga Khan, Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1954, p. 59.

52. Ibid., p.59.

53. Sirdār Iḳbal ʿAlī Shāh, The Prince Aga Khan, London: John Long, Limited, 1936, p. 196.

54. See "Forward" in Al-Hajj Qassim ʿAlī Jairozbhoy, Muhammad: A Mercy to all the Nations, London: Unwin Brothers Ltd, 1937.

55. Malik, Aga Khan, p.

56. Agha Khan, Forward, p. 12.

57. Ibid., p. 13.

58. Ibid., p. 14.

59. Ibid., p. 15.

60. Iḳbal ʿAli Shāh, The Prince, p. 196.

61. Stanley Jackson, Aga Khan, p. 101.

62. Ibid., p. 101.

63. Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 145.

64. For non-Ismāʿīlī Modernist Muslims' impression of Āghā Khān, see Malik's, The Aga Khan. In Pakistan, the Āghā Khān came to be regarded as one of the founders of Pakistan, see Dawn, 12th July, 1957, Karachi.

65. Jawahar Lāl Nehrū, "His Highness the Aga Khan", Modern Review, vol.LVIII, No. 5 (Nov. 1935) pp 505-507.

66. Smith, Modern Islam, p.135.

67. The Firmān was mainly addressed to the Punjabi Ismā'īlis who were visiting Bombay on 26-2-1934. Kalām, vol. II, p. 160.

68. The Firmān was issued in Karachi on 26-1-1938. Kalām, vol. II, p. 246.

69. Bombay, 9-2-1936, Kalām, vol. II, p. 187.

70. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 239.

71. The aims of the "Ismaili Society" appear in most of its publications.

72. For instance, The Alleged Founder of Ismailism, 1948, by W. Ivanow; The Meaning of Religion (Risāla dar Haqiqat-i-Dīn), by Shihābu'd -dīn Shāh, tr. by Ivanow, 1947; On the Recognition of Imām (Fasl dar Bayān-i Shinākht-i Imām), ed. by Ivanow, 1949; Nasir-i Khusraw and Ismailism, 1948, by W. Ivanow; etc.

73. This does not imply that there were no works on Ismā'īlism published prior to 1946. Ivanow's articles and writings on Ismā'īlism appeared in various journals such as the Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, after 1930. For the list of Ivanow's writings, see Azim Nanji, The Nizārī Ismaili Tradition in Hind and Sind, Ph. D. Thesis, McGill University, 1972, p. 300. The interest shown by the Ismā'īlis themselves, in an organized fashion, to be directly concerned with the studies on Ismā'īlism reflects the need of the Ismā'īlis, in the context of growing Muslim conciousness, of defining their identity, Azim Nanji, however, attributes the cause of growing interest towards the Ismā'īlī Studies to the historical judgment of the Khoja Case. See p. 1 of his thesis.

74. Cantwell Smith in his introductory chapter to Islam in Modern History, Princeton: University Press, 1957, discusses the significance of History to Islam, Christianity,

Communism and Hinduism. He indicates that for a Hindu, salvation lies in transcending history - "the tangible world and its transient development remain but a veil that religious insight pierces to the motionless truth beyond." (p. 21).

75. Christianity, Judaism and Islam link their religious practices to the past with a purpose of not only emphasizing their historical continuity but discouraging any formation of the splinter groups - which is seen as a break from the normal historical development of a society to realize its ideals. For an excellent analysis of the significance of History in Judaism and Christianity see Edwin Burtt, Types of Religious Philosophy, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951.

76. From an extract published by Hikmat, a Canadian Ismaili publication.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Greenwall, Aga Khan, p. 209.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., p. 210.

82. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 78.

83. The Āghā Khān wrote in his Memoirs, p.4-5.

84. Earlier in 1923 and 1933, some Firmāns indicated that some groups of Hindu caste "Guptis" were converted to the Ismā'īlī faith. Kalām, vol. II, p.69.

85. Stanley Jackson, The Aga Khan, p. 163.

86. The Firmān was issued in Bombay on 10-3-1940. Kalām, vol. II, p. 290.

87. The policy was re-emphasized in East Africa in 1951. "The trouble now is that all the adventurous, advanced, ambitious young men are turning to these service professions instead of master professions of shop-keeping, traders, commerce etc.... The fathers who have got enough money to waste by making their sons servants as doctors, lawyers, dentists in England, should give that money as capital to those same boys and send them to Congo." Mūbārak Tālika and Messages, Mombasa: Ismailia Association for Africa, 1955, p. 18.

88. Kalām, vol. II, p. 29.

89. The Firmān was issued in Bombay, on 5-12-1945, Kalām, vol. II, p. 389.

90. For details see Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 119.

91. Stanley Jackson has devoted a whole chapter in his book, The Aga Khan, p.186-205.

92. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and social Change, p. 265. Frischauer, however, maintains that the Ismā'īlis "decided to perform the ancient ceremony of tula-vidhi, or weighing, which is of historic Aryan (Indo-Germanic) origin and supposed to ensure peace, health and prosperity to the person weighed." The Aga Khans, p. 119.

93. Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 119.

94. According to Stanley Jackson, 25,125 pounds were collected for the Golden Jubilee and 640,000 pounds for Diamond Jubilee. The Aga Khan, p. 176. (illustrations).

95. Ibid.

96. "The sums were contributed to Aga Khan unconditionally." Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 122.

97. Stanley Jackson, The Aga Khan, p. 191. See also Tālika and

Messages, p. 6.

98. Ibid., p. 167.

99. Greenwall, The Aga Khan, p. 212.

100. The Āghā Khān had proposed in the letter that the Muslim majority provinces should form autonomous states in a Federal India modelled on United States of America. See Malik, Aga Khan, p. 55-58.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social change, p. 14.

104. Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 160.

105. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 14.

106. Most of the Firmāns compiled under Firmān Mūbarak of Imām Sultān Muḥammad Shāh, published by the Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1952, are addressed to the "Rehabilitation Committee" on the issues related to migration.

107. "The major occupation of new and old residents of Karachi was to find work and housing, as well as some social anchorage under conditions of rapid social change." Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 11.

108. Ibid.

109. The Firmān on this regard was issued in Karachi, in 1952 Firmān Mūbārak, p. 23.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Hanna Papanek, leadership and Social Change, p. 13.

113. Ibid.

114. Greenwall, The Aga Khan, p. 197.

115. Message of H.R.H. Prince Aga Khan III to the Nation of Pakistan and World of Islam, Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan.

116. Ibid., p. 1.

117. Dawn, Friday, July 12, 1957, p. 5. Also see Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 175.

118. Āghā Khān's address to then Government leaders, including, the Governor General - Ghulām Muḥammad, the Finance Minister - Hatim Alavi, President of the Constituent Assembly - Tazimuddīn Khān, etc, is reprinted in Message of Aga Khan, p. 8-14.

119. The Āghā Khān recommended that Syed Amīr ʿAlī's The Spirit of Islam should be introduced in all educational institutions. Message, p. 14, and p. 52.

120. Message, p. 12.

121. Ibid., p. 11.

122. Ibid.

123. This Ismāʿīlī self-statement also indicates the extent of Ismāʿīlī concern for its Shīʿī identity in addition to the role of the Imām which enables him to order changes in long-accepted dogma.

124. Helene E. Ullrich, in the introduction to Competition and Modernization in South Asia, New Delhi: 1975, discusses the role of emphasis on spiritual dimension in accommodating modernist attitude.

125. Message, p. 3.

126. Ibid., p. 19.

127. Ibid., p. 47.

128. Ibid., p. 49-50.

129. The person's name was Azīz Kassam Devjī, according to an Ismā'īlī informant who was in East Africa at the time. He informed me that there was a group of Ismā'īlis involved in campaigning against the Imām.

130. Talika and Messages, p. 30.

131. Ibid., p. 31.

132. Ibid., p. 31.

133. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 178.

134. The speeches prior to 1953 and post-1953 were compared and found to support the supposition.

135. Mohammed A.Harris, The Great Omayyads, Karachi, G.N. Zakria, 1954.

136. Ibid., Appendix II, p. 25.

137. The Āghā Khān, The Memoirs of Aga Khan, London: Cassel and Company, 1954.

138. Ibid., p. 1.

139. Ibid., p. 160-191.

140. Henry Bergson (1859-1941), a French Philosopher, distinguishes two kinds of experiences. Direct experience and instrumental or indirect experience. The former corresponds to everflowing state of consciousness, elan vital - living, dynamic and growing. The latter reveals the world in its static, and therefore, illusive form. See his "Theory of Knowledge " in his Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. by T.E. Hulme, New York: 1949.

141. Memoirs, p. 170-173.

142. Ibid., p. 173.

143. Ismaili Bulletin, Ismailia Association for Pakistan, Karachi: vol. I, No. 10, July 1975.

144. Ḳassim ʿAlī M.J. Ever Living Guide, Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1955.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid., p. 44-52.

147. The author quotes the Qurʿān and the Prophetic tradition quite liberally in attempting to prove the divine necessity of the Imāmah.

148. The Duʿā is divided into six parts, beginning with Surāh al-Fātiha (the opening verse) and ending with the complete geneology of Imāms from Hz. ʿAlī to the present Imām - the Āghā Khān.

149. Kalām, vol. II, p. 471.

150. For instance the term Naklanki Avatār is used for the Imām in the old Duʿā. See Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 77.

151. A document lying in the Ismaili Library in Montreal.

152. Azim Nanji, Nizārī Traditions, p. 6.

153. For instance a Ginān with distinctly Hindu terminology such as "Macch (fish), Korub (tortoise), ...Shrī Rām,...you are the Truth" was replaced with "Oh Mawla (Lord), Adam, Noah, Ibrahim...Issa (Christ),...you are the truth..." The document recording the change was distributed by the Ismailia Association for Pakistan, in 1956.

154. Prof. Jawād al-Masqatī, at the time employed by the Ismailia Association for Pakistan, reported the incidents to the author.

155. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 78.

156. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Paksitan, p. 33.

157. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 184-189.

158. Message, p. 20.

159. The Firmān was issued in Dacca, in 1952, Firmān Mubārak, p. 55

160. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 184.

161. Ibid.

162. Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 114.

163. Ibid., p. 193.

164. The Firmān was issued in Karachi on 2-2-1952, Firmān Mubārak, p. 28-30.

165. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 268.

166. Ibid., p. 267.

167. Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 194-195.

168. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 16.

169. During the Platinum Jubilee Celebrations, The Āghā Khān, issued a Firmān in Karachi in 1954, Firmān Mubārak, p. 57.

170. "...Do not think yourselves as Hindustanis and Pakistanis at the same time...Two-sided loyalty is harmful..." This Firmān was addressed to the Ismā'īlis in Poona, in 15-1-1950. Kalām, vol. II, p. 452.

171. Firmān Mubārak, Dacca, 1952, p. 44.

172. Ibid., p. 49-55.

173. Most writers are in agreement that the eruption of anti-Ahmadiyyah riots in Pakistan was greatly motivated by the Political aims of Ahrar and Jama'at-i-Islami. See Kenneth

Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958, p. 200-208.

174. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 111.

CHAPTER IV

THE PAKISTAN PHASE, PART II: 1958-1980

SECTION I: Islam in Pakistan

A major task which confronted the emerging independent nations, such as Pakistan, was to evolve an ideological system in the form of a constitutional framework that would mobilize the society to create social, economic and political institutions. The process of constitutional development in Pakistan, from its emergence in 1947, was such an attempt at defining an ideology. Among the difficulties faced by the Muslims of Pakistan, - such as the population displacement due to mass emigration on both the sides; the physical and cultural gap between the various provinces that formed Pakistan, etc. - in evolving the constitution was the problem of defining the position of Islam in Pakistan and, so, in the Modern World.

Islam in Pakistan[1] continued to be emotionally powerful in unifying one group against the other, frequently serving to disguise social, political or economic issues.[2] While Muslims in India prior to its partition, were united against a real or imagined Hindu threat, the Muslims in Pakistan directed their fears against themselves, fears based on sectarian differences; regional centrifugal forces; political disagreements; and economic disparity. The political machinery first collapsed in 1953, following the anti-Ahmadiyyah agitation, when the Governor General, Ghulām Muhammad, dismissed the Prime Minister

Khwājā Nazimuddīn, and his cabinet. Ghulām Muhammad justified his decision by revealing that the "the cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with difficulties facing the country;"[3] In 1958, the military, under General Ayūb Khān, finally took over the control of Pakistan and banned all the political parties. Ayūb Khān lifted Martial Law in 1962. In the same year he lifted the ban on political parties such as Jama'at-i-Islami. Although 'Azīz Ahmad views Ayūb Khān's system of democracy from 1962-1969 as a purely secular development,[4] Ziring notes that Ayūb Khān was caught up in an ironical situation wherein he condemned the conservative Muslims and yet upheld Islam to unify the country.[5] This has been the paradox of every Government of Pakistan and of governments in other countries such as Egypt. The government has to uphold Islam, but it is confronted by opposition in the name of Islam on the part of people who claim to be more truly Muslim.

By focussing his attention on Islam as a cementing force and using it to quell the regional and ethnic differences, Ayūb Khān strengthened the influence of the 'Ulamā' in the realm of secular politics.[6] Ayūb was thus torn between a hard and fast nationalist ideology - which sounded too feeble to transcend Muslim consciousness and regional interests - and Islam - which was guarded by the 'Ulamā' and which, according to Ayūb, was synonymous with "bigotry and theocracy."[7]

As a secularist, Ayūb operated from the premise that "Islam had not prescribed any particular pattern of Government but left it

to the community to evolve its own pattern to suit its circumstances."[8] Ayūb thus introduced a political system to bypass the politicians - who, Ayūb believed, were the cause of instability in Pakistan. He introduced a political system of "Basic Democracies" to govern the people through the locally elected representatives of the people. The Basic Democracies were Union Councils, each consisting of a few (ten or twelve) elected members (Democrats) "excercising local government functions in a jurisdiction comprising about 10,000-12,000 people."[9] The Union councils, in turn, formed Councils at the district and provincial levels thus helping to forge a link between the people and the government without the mediation of the older politicians.[10]

As a Muslim, Ayūb Khān espoused a Modernist reformist trend in which Islam was essentially "a code of life and governed its moral aspects."[11] He argued that any "government, constitution or democracy would be Islamic if it worked in an Islamic spirit, forthat spirit was essentially progressive."[12] Ayūb declared that Islam was "the only force which can create and sustain a sense of Pakistani Nationality."[13] In order to spread his convictions that the Islamic Spirit was essentially progressive, liberal, etc, Ayūb introduced various measures such as the setting up of institutions to train 'Ulamā';[14] expressing his intentions to establish an Islamic University; and even modifying the 1962 constitution to accommodate the phrases such as "The Islamic Republic."[15] The Constitution of 1962 - in response to the 'Ulamā' reaction to the Government attempt at reforming the Muslim Family

Laws, by such steps as imposing restrictions on polygamy - incorporated a provision for the establishment of an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology.[16] The Advisory Council was to be linked with the Central Institute of Islamic Research which was established earlier, in 1960, with the following objectives:[17]

1. "To define Islam in terms of its fundamentals in a rational and liberal manner and to emphasize, among others, the basic Islamic ideals of universal brotherhood, tolerance and social justice."
2. "To interpret the teachings of Islam in such a way as to bring out its dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world."
3. To establish Islamic validity for legitimizing Government Reforms in the laws governing Muslim Families, the Banking System, etc.

With his ambivalent secularist—religious political philosophy and his acquired concentrated political power, Ayūb Khān forged ahead with promoting the country's economy based on Capitalism.[18] Capitalism - characterized mainly by the role of private initiative (or ownership) in the production, sales, and other factors relating to the business enterprise - has been, according to Hafiz Malik, provided with "A fertile seed-bed" by Islam in Pakistan.[19] Ayūb Khān was convinced that under the capitalist system inequalities of income would not only contribute to the growth of the economy through individual and private efforts but would help the strong economy at the upper level "spill" down and improve the economy of the lower-income groups.[20]

Ayūb anticipated that a capitalist-based economy and an Islamic basis of morality would combine to help minimize the self-seeking tendencies generally associated with a capitalist economy. Khalid bin Sayeed maintains that Ayūb's economic policy not only "resulted in the concentration of the economic and industrial Power in the hands of a small section of private sector,"[21] but also antagonized the regions against the Government.

> "The result of this policy of encouraging industrial concentration were twofold First, by 1968, the 22 largest families controlled 66 percent of industrial assets, 70 percent of insurance funds, and 80 percent of bank assets. In regional terms, this policy implied that in order to maximize growth, resources should first be invested in West Pakistan where the return was much higher than in East Pakistan where, because of relatively less developed economic infrastructure and relatively uncertain political conditions, returns were expected to be lower."[22]

Ironically, the economic and regional disparity contributed significantly to the enhancement of the role of Islam in Pakistan.[23] The ʿUlamā' and the Jamaʿat-i-Islami, whose influence was restricted mainly to the middle and the professional classes in the urban centres,[24] during the Ayūb regime, began to achieve widespread credibility.[25] Their oppositional role was mainly politically oriented. For example, the Jamaʿat-i-Islami directed its criticism at the Government by pointing out that 1. the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology was established to subvert the principles of Islam. 2. Jinnah's picture

which appeared on the Pakistani currency, was un-Islamic; and 3. the Government was negligent in implementing the system of Zakāt (annual tax of 2½ percent) and other Muslim practices such as Waqfs (endowments) as means of overcoming the widespread economic and social disparity.[26]

Earlier, during the elections in 1965, the Jama'at-i-Islami's motives had become evident when Mawdudi supported Miss Fāṭimāh Jinnāh against Ayūb. Although he had strongly advocated "that Muslim Women must be veiled, their domain is the home and the mixing of sexes socially is highly immoral and a sin,"[27] he defended his stand in the election as "an acceptance of a lesser evil."[28]

The final blow to Ayūb's regime came from Zulfikār 'Alī Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party. Bhutto, the son of an influential Sindhi landlord, received his education in Political Science and Jurisprudence from the University of California and from Oxford. Until 1965 he served Ayūb as a foreign minister. Bhutto claims to have dissociated himself from Ayūb at the time of the cease-fire agreement reached in Tashkent after the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Bhutto subsequently claimed that Ayūb acted as a traitor to Pakistan during the Tashkent talks.[29]

Thus, all the opposition parties, including the Jama'at-i-Islami and Bhutto's Peoples Party unitedly brought about the downfall of Ayūb whose reign has since been referred to by some writers, as one of the most accomplished "eras" for Pakistan.[30] Paradoxically, Islam was again used as the emotional base for the opposition to

legitimize their charges against the Government.

The Jama'at-i-Islami, whose influence had not yet penetrated to the peasants who formed 80% of the population,[31] advocated the need to revive the Islamic values which, it claimed, the Muslims had forsaken and thereby causing their own decay.[32] Bhutto, on the other hand, coupled socialism with Islam and called it Mussawat-i-Muhammad (the socialism practiced by Muhammad, Lit.'musawwah'means'to be equal'.) The People's Party came up with a slogan, "Islam is our Faith. Democracy is our Polity. Socialism is our Economy. All power to the People."[33] During the election campaign in 1970, Bhutto promised Rotī (food), Kapara (clothing), aur (and) Makān (shelter) to every Muslim.[34] Thus, he captured the majority of votes in West Pakistan. In 1971, during the civil war in Pakistan, East Pakistan separated itself from West Pakistan, which, it claimed, had exploited the Bengalis economically and politically.[35] The Jama'at-i-Islami and the 'Ulamā' blamed the successive Pakistani Governments, led by Modernists, for having diluted the ability of Islam to cement East and West Pakistan together.[36]

The Jama'at-i-Islami was also quick to point out that socialism was antithetical to Islam and continued to muster support on the basis of Islam. 'Azīz Ahmad, in agreement, noted that Islam was being used for political purposes by all the political parties in Pakistan.

> In the meantime all sections of society in Pakistan are responsive in various degrees to the pull of religion. All political parties pay at least lip service to Islam. There is not a single party which dare call itself secular; though

the programmes of most parties is by far and large secular Even Socialism in Pakistan is labelled 'Islamic'.[37]

Bhutto set about to carry out land reforms and the nationalization of industrial concerns to implement his socialist policies.[38] Through the curtailment of the influence of the landlords, businessmen, and the industrialists, he hoped to continue enjoying mass support. Through the indroduction of various religious measures he hoped to outsmart the 'Ulamā' and the Jama'at-i-Islami. He enrolled Mowlana Kausar Niyazī, formerly a member of the Jama'at-i-Islami, in his cabinet to administer religious affairs in Pakistan, such as, the providing of facilities to Muslims to perform Hajj (pilgrimage); Waqf (religious endowment); etc.[37] Various developments, however, during Bhutto's rule, swelled the influence of the Jama'at-i-Islami and the 'Ulamā' beyond the expectation of the People's Government and, in 1977, the military, under Zia-ul-Haqq, took over the country.

In 1972, Bhutto was forced to give in to the Jama'at-i-Islami on the question of the language issue. The Sindh Assembly in the same year had passed a language bill declaring Sindhī as the sole official language in the province. The Jama'at-i-Islami spearheaded the Muhājir (immigrants) agitation in support of Urdu language rights. It argued that making Sindhī official would mean the encouragement of provincialism in Sindh where Sindhī Hindus and Sindhī Muslims would unite against the very foundation of Islamic Pakistan.[40] In 1974, Bhutto, in response to the growing anti-Ahmadiyyah agitation,

declared Ahmadiyyah to be a Non-Muslim sect. Thus, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, a Muslim sect was declared Non-Muslim on the basis of dogmatic differences.[41]

To the leavening influence of the Jama'at-i-Islami was added an economic dimension. Bhutto's intervention in the business world, through the program of nationalization, resulted in a growing support, by shop-keepers, businessmen, and industrialists, for the conservatives and the revivalists.[42]

Thus the 'Ulamā' and the Jama'at-i-Islami joined hands with the National Awami Party and Jamiatul Ulama-i-Islam, under the platform of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and used even the mosques and Madrassahs to vent their discontent. Even Bhutto's conduct, such as the drinking of liquor, was exploited in a call to the Muslims to wage war "as a religious duty" against the un-Islamic regime.[43]

Sayeed reports how the 'Ulamā' and the Jama'at-i-Islami used Islamic slogans to overthrow Bhutto's regime:

> The slogan that inspired the processionists to face the police lathis or even bullets was the establishment of Nazam-i-Mustafa. This was powerful symbol because it combined the religion of Islam and the personality of the Prophet Muhammad.[44]

Martial law was declared in July, 1977, under Ziā-al-Haqq who declared "Imān (faith), taqwā (peity), and Jihād (struggle in the name of God)" to be the guiding principles for the people of Pakistan. The Jama'at-i-Islami welcomed Ziā's conservative and revivalist tendencies and supported him to carry out his policies to "Islamicize

Pakistani Society."[45] Sayeed states the intentions of Ẓiā as follows:

> One of the persistent themes in General Zia's pronouncements has been that all Pakistani Governments since the establishment of the country have waxed eloquent about how Pakistan as an Islamic State would enable its citizens to mold their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, but none of them took any concrete steps to translate this objective into legislative and administrative realities.[46]

Thus, Ẓiā introduced measures such as Zakāt (poor tax of two and a half percent), ʿUshr (agricultural tax), and punitive measures to deal with offences like drinking, adultery, theft, and false allegations. These measures, according to Ẓiā, were set up to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor in an Islamic Society.[47] Ẓiā's policy of legislating Islamic practices in order to eliminate the massive poverty in Pakistan, according to Sayeed, is too "modest" to be effective. Sayeed reports that there has been widespread discontentment not only from the Muslim minority groups, such as the Shīʿa, but also from the Modernist Muslims.[48]

The Muslim minority groups, particularly Shīʿī groups, in fear of losing their identity amidst the overwhelming Sunnī majority, have united to voice their demands to introduce Shīʿī Muslim practices. For example, Ẓiā's Government has waived the practices of Zakāt and Khums for the Shīʿī Muslims, who pay their dues to their Imām or his representatives and not to the State.[49] The Shīʿa-Sunnī differences are thus resurfacing and affecting, for example, the whole issue dealing with Zakāt and Khums, punitive measures, the teaching of

Islamiyyāt (Islamic Studies), etc.[50]

The Modernists have been alarmed at the intentions of the Military Government under Ziā to reduce what is, according to them, the dynamic and flexible spirit of Islam to a mere hard and fast code of conduct. Sayeed expressed the concern of the modernists by quoting Asghar Khān, the president of Tahrik-i-Istiqlāl (solidarity movement. Literally however, Istiqlāl means independence) and former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force.

> The face of Islam which Pakistan is presenting to the world and to our own people is of a religion concerned only with harsh punishments. To convert a great religion vitally concerned with the welfare of the human individual, into a mere penal code of crime and punishment is to do it a great disservice.[51]

Among those distressed by Ziā al-Ḥaqq's interpretation of Islam in addition to the Modernists and the minority groups, there are also the remanants of Bhutto's regime, such as the peasants and the People's Party members who again became landless and powerless and the Russian-instigated Baluchistan Nationalists whose base is located in neighbouring Afghanistan.[52] Amidst the growing discontent in the country the Jama'at-i-Islami has withdrawn its support for the Military regime[53] in order to project, one more time, 'the ray of hope in Islam of the past which lies in the future if not in the heaven.'

The Jama'at-i-Islami has been more consistent than the 'Ulāma' groups. The devotion with which its members operate is characteristically religious. Their whole world-view is translated into terms of the "perpetual struggle between Islam and Jahiliyah"[54] - which,

according to Mawdudi, meant the denial of God's Sovereignty and, so, the authority of Divine Guidance[55] - in the footsteps of the Prophet. The Prophet was viewed by Mawdudi as the embodiment of Divine Guidance which defined man's duties in shaping and determining his life in Muslim Society as a pious, obedient, and a dependent 'creature' of God on earth.

The leader of an Islamic State or Society must, therefore, reflect the spiritual qualities indicated in the Qur'ān and Sunnāh, in order "to make Islam a living reality in the changed circumstances of the present age."[56]

Thus, the task of a Muslim Government of such an Islamic State lay not only in the reconstruction of values as stated in Qur'ān and Sunnāh,[57] but also lay in checking the infiltration of Western secular tendencies and their related immoral values into the Islamic Society.[58] Mawdudi's emphasis on the Western malaise, however, appears to feature more dominantly in his writings than does the good that may come from the adoption of Western technology and science which he never appears to refute.

Almost every government of Pakistan has faced the charge that it was insufficiently Islamic. Islam has been held to be an ideology for the state, and the failure to realize that ideology and its implications have been a recurring basis for opposition to the government.

SECTION II: THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ RESPONSE: 1958-1980

The Ismā'īlī response to developments in Pakistan is characterized

mainly by its attempt to contain the process of change within the established religious framework. The religious framework provides the Ismā'īlis with a sort of a yardstick against which the changes in attitudes and behaviour are measured. This response involved a continous and renewed search for the Ismā'īlī identity in the context of the changing social and political definitions that Pakistan has been engaged in forging amidst the conflicting modernist and conservative-revivalist appeals.

The Firmāns and Speeches of the Āghā Khān IV will be categorized into two groups: A. those issued between 1957-1965 reflecting the Ismā'īlī attitude in the early phase of the Ayūb era, and B. those issued between 1965-1980 reflecting the Ismā'īlī attitude amidst the growing revivalist and conservative political influences in Pakistan.

A. The secularist and the modernist reformist engagements of the Martial Law Government under Ayūb during these years (1958-1965) were instrumental in facilitating the progress of the Ismā'īlis towards implementing their social and economic reformist programs. The need to reconstruct their religious parameters, in any except broad Islamic and Ismā'īlī terms - thus, aligning them with the Muslim Modernist attitude - was not strongly felt. However, the Ismā'īlī religious framework - especially the necessity of the Imāmah to guide the Muslims according to changing situations; the spiritual and moral aspects of Islam; etc. - was emphasized to sanction the changes which occured in the Ismā'īlī attitude.

B. The Modernist Ismā'īlī attitude, after 1965, is characterized mainly by its attempt to accommodate the revivalist and conservative tendencies of the time. This attempt to synthesize the contrasting modernist and traditionalist trends is reflected in the Ismā'īlī concern for self-examination. The seriousness with which the Ismā'īlis aim at examining their religious beliefs and practices with a view to articulating their 'unique, moderate and humanitarian' Shī'ī Muslim identity is thus a modern Ismā'īlī phenomenon. The Shī'ī Ismā'īlī traditional concept of the Imām - as the absolute Divine Authority - while sanctioning the adoption of changes, has reinforced its authority through the Imām's ability to direct the Ismā'īlis through social and political developments in Pakistan. Thus, the changes which took place among the Ismā'īlis are seen as being sanctioned by the leader who derives his authority to modernize the group from Shī'ī Islamic tradition.

A. THE CONSOLIDATING AND REFORMATIVE PHASE: 1958-1965

The Āghā Khān III, Imām Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, died at the age of eighty, on 11th July, 1957. The Pakistan Government declared that day as an official day of mourning, and flags throughout the country were lowered to half-mast. Various institutions and groups, including well-known 'Ulamā' such as Mowlana Iḥtishām al Ḥaqq, expressed condolences and paid high tributes to the Āghā Khān's dedicated and outstanding services to the Muslims of India in shaping their destiny.[59]

His grandson, Shāh Karīm al-Ḥusaynī, the Āghā Khān IV (1936-),

inherited the institution of the Imāmat, in 1957.

The Āghā Khān III, in his will, asserted the Shi'i Isma'ili tradition of appointing the successor of the Imām through the Nass (literally it means to be explicitly named) and thereby, re-emphasized the necessity of the Imāmah as a means of directing the changing Isma'ili attitude in the modern world. The will justified the choice - Karīm al-Ḥusaynī - in terms of his exposure to recent developments in the modern world and as one "who brings a new outlook on life to his office as Imām."[60]

The Āghā Khān IV was born in Paris, on 13th, December 1936. His father, Prince 'Alī Khān, until his death in 1960, was Pakistan's permanent representative at the United Nations Organization. His mother, formerly Joan Yarde Buller, known as Princess Tāj-al-Dawlāh among the Isma'ilis, is related distantly to the British Royal family through Lord Churston and the Duchess of Leinster.[61]

During the second World War, the Āghā Khān, at the age of seven visited Kenya where he was exposed to the Isma'ili way of life. He went to Le Rosey School in Switzerland where he was also taught Muslim History, Arabic, and Urdu, by Mustafā Kāmil.[62]

Later, the Āghā Khān joined the Engineering Department of Harvard University. At Harvard he switched into the Department of Middle Eastern and Iranian Studies where, at the time, Sir Hamilton Gibb, and Professor R.N. Frye (who later occupied the "Aga Khan Chair of Iranian Studies ") among others were involved in teaching Islamics.

Before resuming his studies at Harvard - from where he graduated with Honours in History, in 1958 - he visited the major world Ismā'īlī centres in Africa and Asia. In 1957 and 1958, the Ismā'īlis and the governments of the countries (which had recently achieved Independence or were at the verge of gaining it) where they lived welcomed him during the Takht-i Nashīnī (enthronement) ceremonies. The speeches during these ceremonies were mainly concerned with assuring the respective governments of his community's "secular" loyalty towards the development of their national programs. He indicated that the Ismā'īlis were not a political group but mainly a religious community whose social (health and education) and economic institutions (such as the Diamond Jubilee Trust) were geared to serve not only the Ismā'īlis but all the citizens of the country in which they operated.[63] The Āghā Khān asked the Ismā'īlis to preserve their religious identity which would help them significantly to face the impact of the abundant material wealth that would be generated with technological advancement.[64] He expressed his intention to devote his whole life to "guiding the community in all the problems which these rapid changes will bring in their wake."[65]

In a speech to the East African Muslim Welfare Association - which was founded by the late Āghā Khān III for the purpose of improving the living conditions of the Muslims in East Africa through education - he emphasized the need to teach Muslim History, Philosophy and Theology in order to cushion the questioning process resulting from the imparta-

tion of secular education to the Muslims.[66]

Thus, the Ismā'īlī dichotomy between secular loyalty and religious duty was an attempt at preserving the national status on the one hand and, on the other, their religiously based Pan-Ismā'īlī Islamic identity. In a message to the Ismā'īlis he said:

> As true Ismailis you must remember that you will always have two principal obligations. The first and paramount of these is your religious obligation to Islam and to your Imam. Your second obligation is a secular one. You must always be loyal to the country of your adoption and and to whatever Government is responsible for your security and well-being.[67]

While the divided Ismā'īlī loyalty generated some tension in the context of secular national states - such as Tanzania and Uganda, where racial loyalty could easily be identified with nationalist sentiment, during their post-independent phase,[68] Ismā'īlī religious loyalty did not seem to clash with the parent Islamic and national sentiments in Pakistan.[69]

In Pakistan, the Āghā Khān's Firmāns and Speeches during this period reflected a continued emphasis on modernist reformist trends of thought. The Āghā Khān, at a speech in Dacca, in 1958, maintained that although Pakistan would not have been conceived without Islam, the "Muslim inspiration must move with the times." He argued that the Muslims, in order to progress and eradicate "poverty and diseases" must "adapt and invigorate" the great Muslim traditions "in the light of the quite altered circumstances of to-day."[70] In this Muslim

capability to adjust without fear, the Āghā Khān maintained, lay the possibility to recapture past Muslim glory.[71]

The Āghā Khān, re-emphasizing his convictions in Karachi, at the Institute of International Affairs in 1958, warned the Muslims that if their social and economic conditions were not improved, then there would be danger of losing Islamic values for some other alien ideals. Thus, the Āghā Khān distinguished modernism from Westernism - in the sense that the former is essentially concerned with the knowledge, as such, of science and technology geared towards expanding the capability and the power of man to guarantee his survival; and the latter is just a cultural set up which has given impetus to science in modern history. Thus, modernism could be adopted by the Muslims in their own Islamic set-up without their necessarily adopting Western cultural and social values.

> If Islam aspires, as I believe she must, to recapture the glories of the past, she must be ready to adapt, I do not say abandon, her own traditions - to the entirely different circumstances of today. If we fail to do this, not only shall we fail to progress ourselves, but the younger generation will become disillusioned and fall prey to alien and materialistic creeds, which have nothing whatsoever in common with Islam.[72]

The Āghā Khān expressed his awareness of the difficulty the Government of Pakistan was facing in adapting the "Modern values and the pressures of the changing society to the basic ideals of Islam, to put modern democracy into the Islamic form."[73] The Islamic

values, he maintained, must not be seen as antithetical to material progress unless the latter became an "obsession."[74]

The Āghā Khān was thus convinced that there was not only no contradiction between religion and modernism,[75] but that "humanity cannot deal with present-day problems without the basis of religion."[76] The religion of Islam, according to the Āghā Khān, offered the spiritual or moral framework which furnished the Muslims with a direction for shaping the process of modernization.[77] The difficulty, or the problem, for the Muslims lay in "putting people in the situation where they have to chose between the one and the other."[78]

The Āghā Khān, during his address at the "Foundation Stone-laying Ceremony" for the Prince Aly Khan Library of Karachi University in 1958, maintained that through the assimilation of Islamic values, such as honesty, brotherhood, etc, the Muslims could again forge unity and power such as that which had "made us the rulers of the largest empire ever known."[79] If they were able to assimilate Islamic Values, he argued, the Muslims of Pakistan should then host activities such as student-exchange programs between the different provinces, scientific studies geared at tapping the country's resources such as solar energy, and the creation of a group of scientists who could be constantly in touch with the scientific developments in the West and be able to import them.[80]

During his 1964 visit to Pakistan, however, the Āghā Khān warned the Muslims that the mere importation of "tools and concepts" without

reconstructing the Muslims' art, architecture, thought, etc, would result in Islam being looked upon as "archaic, outmoded and senile."[81] Therefore, he urged, the Muslims must examine their history and modernize their conceptual tools before plunging into the future unbridled.

> I like to look backwards before going forwards rather than going forwards before ending up going backwards.[82]

THE RELIGIOUS RESPONSE:

The Firmāns addressed to the Ismailia Association for Pakistan during this period were suggestive of encouraging the students to pursue higher studies in Islamic and Ismā'īlī History in order to gain access to the "primary sources".[83] Earlier, in 1958, a Firmān had indicated that the purpose of learning history was to try "to understand the developments which had happened, so that you can explain to your children what is the meaning of Imām and what is the meaning of Faith."[84]

Thus, the Firmāns were mainly concerned with emphasizing the importance of observing the religious practices, strictly and regularly with a view to inculcating moral and spiritual values, without an attempt at introducing changes in them. The learning of the Qur'ān and the Gināns - which, as seen in the previous chapter, contained some Hindu mythological elements - was encouraged. The Gināns were described by the Āghā Khān as the "Wonderful Traditions" which needed to be preserved.[85] The Qur'ān and the Prophetic traditions, too, were referred to as a source of moral and social inspiration and as a

guide. The importance of the Akhbār (traditions) of the previous Imāms were also emphasized at a later stage and which will be seen later in this section. Thus, the Āghā Khān's syncretic approach was aimed not only at projecting the elasticity and the diversity of Islam and Ismā'īlism, but in articulating them as a culture with a strong humanitarian and, so, universal emphasis. The Firmān issued at Karachi in 1964 reflected the Ismā'īlī attempt at reinterpreting the religious world-view in the light of Modernist trends.

> My beloved Spiritual Children,
> I am very happy to see how well you are learning your Ginans and Quran, I would like you in your studies not only to look at what is written and what is compulsory upon Muslims, but I would also like you to take from its traditions, your own history, that which can help you in guiding your everyday lives, so as to live within the spirit of Islam. Quran says: 'Khalaqnakum Min Nafsin Wahidatin'. This means that God says to you He has made you out of one soul. This means that you are at all times brothers and sisters, that you can really act as a Jamat..."There is another tradition, a Hadith, which may or may not be absolutely a hundred percent correct, but again when you are reading your history I would like you to take from it that which will help you to live within the spirit of Islam....This Hadith says that the Prophet (s.a.s.) never took food without washing hands...This is a small matter, it is not compulsory upon Muslims, but nonetheless this is a habit which will help you in everyday life...This means to live honestly, to live purely, to know that you are brothers and sisters, to be available at all times when one or the other needs help, to be generous,...[86]

THE CONCEPT OF IMĀMAH:

The Firmāns, while providing the Ismā'īlis with leverage to evolve their own meanings of the concept of Imām - in the context of their religious beliefs and the effort of other Muslims in the surrounding society at reviving, conserving, and modernizing Islam -, redefined the role of the Imām in significantly general terms. The concept of the Imām linked the Āghā Khān spiritually with the Isma'ilis. Such a relationship, while extending to the metaphysical realms, was explained in terms of the human attrubutes of "love", "affection", etc. The necessity of the Imām was re-emphasized in the Firmāns in terms of the historic Ismā'īlī belief "since 1300 years" in the need for divine guidance to direct the activities of the Ismā'īlis at all times.

> For hundreds of years, my spiritual children have been guided by the rope of Imamat; you have looked to the Imam of the age for advice and help in all matters and through your Imam's immense love and affection for his spiritual children, his Noor has indicated to you where and in which direction you must turn, so as to obtain spiritual and worldly satisfaction.[87]

Earlier, the Ismailia Association for Pakistan, in a souvenir published during the Takht-i Nashīnī celebrations, in 1958, had restated that the belief in the Imām was fundamental for the direction of the community in the path of Allah.[88] It argued, based on the traditional philosophical concepts of change and changelessness,[89] that the world always changes and that the physical aspects of the last Prophet (of Islam) and the Imāms undergo change and are mortal, but their

spiritual aspect - the divine guidance - is eternal and changeless.[90] Thus, the official Ismā'īlī restatement implied that the Firmāns of the present Āghā Khān, in whom the Nūr (light) of God resides, were the Absolute source of authority commanding the absolute allegience of the Mu'minīn.

The spiritual significance of the concept of the Imām was thus conveniently employed to forge unity and purpose among the Ismā'īlis and to mobilize the group in effecting rapid and directed change. The Firmān issued at Rawalpindi, in 1964, stated:

> If you have an important amount of weight to move and you take a cart with one horse, you cannot move it. With one horse, facing forward and one horse facing backwards, you cannot move it ...Unless my Jamatworks together, works along the same lines, in the same direction, however much advice and guidance I give you ...there is no way by which we can help you to make the progress which I desire for each and every one of you.[91]

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS:

The Firmāns, during this period, evidenced an emphasis on ascribing to Islam the concern for improving the social and economic ("worldly") conditions of the Muslims.[92]

> But the real principle of Islam is that faith is logical. Islam would not be what it is if it were not logical... Islam means not only faith, but it means work, it means creating the world in which you can practice your faith to the best of your ability...[93]

Thus, the Āghā Khān when he took over the duties of the Imām earlier

in 1957, stated his aims to be "to continue...to do all in my power for the welfare and betterment of our community and its economic and financial institutions, maternity homes, boys' and girls' schools, hospitals, trusts..."[94], etc. The Āghā Khān, however, maintained that the social and economic reforms were to conform with the Government's needs and policies.[95] He assured the Pakistan Government that the Ismā'īlis would not involve themselves politically as a group, but that their social and economic contributions to the progress of the country would be significant.[96]

THE ECONOMIC POLICIES:

The Āghā Khān, in order to introduce the Ismā'īli traders to modern business and industrial promotional techniques, hired a group of German consultants, under Gerhard Kienbaum, first to gauge the economic situation of the Ismā'īlis, and then to recommend measures to improve it.[97] According to the Kienbaum team although the Ismā'īlis, were religiously dedicated and socially organized, they were mainly traders and so they needed a well-organized institution to help them incline more towards an industrially based economy. "The Industrial Promotion Services" (known as I.P.S.) was thus established, in 1962, in India, Pakistan, East Africa, etc, to transform the economic life of the Ismā'īlis. Recently the I.P.S. has been concerned mainly with directing its activities towards assisting the Pakistan Government in marketing research, feasibility studies of its economic projects, importing technical advisers, etc. Through the I.P.S,

numerous industrial and other commercial projects - such as textiles, tourism, export-import, mining, construction, etc, - were initiated with shares open to the public.[98]

The Āghā Khān in 1958 reminded the business communities in Pakistan to make certain that "the fruits of the advancement are not gathered by a few but fairly distributed over the whole nation."[99] The Āghā Khān seemed to be aware of the consequences of the gap between the rich and the poor in the recently-acquired independent nations, such as, Pakistan, where the problem of massive poverty is acute - and where the rich could become the focus of political agitation. In order not to let the Ismā'īlis exhibit excessively their economic well-being, he attempted to minimize the gap between the rich and the poor through his emphasis on creating a strong Ismā'īlī middle-class.[100] The Firmāns, thus, continously advised the Ismā'īlīs to save and not to "spend excessively" [101] nor live in a "luxurious or an expensive manner".[102] He even continued to encourage the Ismā'īlis, like his grandfather, to perform weddings in his presence in order to side-step the prevailing marriage ceremonies involving huge expenditures. Unfortunately, these Firmāns, having been issued through the Ismā'īlī Councils, are inaccessible. Excessive money, the Āghā Khān suggested, might be reinvested towards carefully planned expansion of Ismā'īlī businesses to minimize the risks.[103]

During this period the Ismā'īlis experienced a break-through in their traditional preoccupation with trade. Although Ismā'īlis

in Pakistan were advised earlier to go into industrial enterprises by the previous Imām in collaboration with the Government's economic policies, a large number of Ismā'īlis had continued to remain traders and shop-keepers. Consequently, many children of these petty traders and shop-keepers continued to be absorbed into the family businesses immediately after completing their primary level of education.[104] Thus, the Firmāns, in keeping up with the Government policies of trying to solve the economic problems of Pakistan through the expansion of industries indicated the need for more and more skilled manpower.

THE EDUCATION POLICIES:

Education has been a major concern for the Ismā'īlis in Pakistan. It is through education, the Āghā Khān maintained, that Modernization could be introduced to "equip" the Ismā'īlis with capabilities to face the difficulties.[105] Education was also seen as a means to go beyond "picking up facts" to the formation of sound integral character.[106]

> Strive to impart such education to the children that they may earn their rightful and proper place in the world because on it depends the sucess of their lives. It is an important requirement of life... so every effort must be made to impart to the Ismā'īlī children the right type of education.[107]

The Āghā Khān, thus seemed to be concerned with the image

of the community as projected through the mental attitude of the individual Ismā'īlis. In 1964, the Āghā Khān asserted that the individual Ismā'īlis could write to their Imām directly if they wished to do so, but there was "no point in washing one's dirty linen in public."[108]

Thus, the Āghā Khān, although he was aware of the impact of modern education on the Ismā'īlī religious beliefs and practices, a point which we will examine in the later Firmāns, he held that it was only through education that a man can become more rational and mobile and less dominated by his past social and cultural heritage.

> Man's position in society, wherever he may be, will depend less and less upon his cultural or family heritage and more and more on the power and development of his mind.[109]

Peace would thus reign in the world, where "every one of us is sufficiently educated to make a sound judgement on the national and world issues."[110]

Thus, several schools were established during this period, first of all to meet the needs of all the Ismā'īlī children, but eventually to extend facilities to all the communities.[111] The Ismā'īlī gesture of extending facilities beyond their needs was made also in response to Ayūb's policy of encouraging the private sector to contribute towards social and economic reforms in Pakistan.[112]

During the opening ceremony of the "Muhammadi Girls Academy", in Karachi, in 1962, the Āghā Khān said,

> I would like also to take the occasion of reminding you of the appeal which His Excellency the President made at the occasion of laying the foundation stone of our Aga Khan III Foundation School. At that time the President asked that private efforts should take more part in developing the social welfare institutions of this country. I hope that the President can rest assured that we will answer his appeal and for our part we will do as much as we can on the private basis to help the country to develop its welfare institutions.[113]

Thus, the Ismā'īlī response to events in Pakistan during this period can be summarized as an attempt at restating the Islamic ideals, as seen by the Ismā'īlis, in order to mobilize the group to bring about social and economic reforms. To this end the Ismā'īlis articulated a modernist attitude by which the Islamic and Ismā'īlī belief system provided moral and spiritual significance to the newly-acquired social and economic concepts.

B. THE ACCOMMODATING REFORMIST PHASE: 1965-1980

This period is characterized by the Ismā'īlī preoccupation with the articulation of an Ismā'īlī-Islamic identity through (i) restatement of the Ismā'īlī position in relation to the conflicting modernist and conservative-revivalist attitudes among the Muslims of Pakistan; (ii) contributions towards conserving and reviving the visual forms of Muslim art and architecture in the modern Muslim

context; (iii) re-definition of the religious concept of Imāmah in relation to the fundamental Islamic concepts of Tawhid (divine unity), Nubbuwwah (prophethood), Qiyāmah (life after death), etc; and (iv) the continued attempt to re-orient the social and economic thrusts of Ismā'īlī life towards contributing significantly to the welfare of the Muslims as a whole.

(i). Ismā'īlism, Islam, and Westernism.

The Ismā'īlī response, in relation to the conflicting modernist and traditionalist definitions of the position of Islam in Pakistan, is characterized by its attempt at reconciling the revivalist and the reformist trends. The apparent contrast between the Islamic traditions and modern Western economic and scientific development is, according to the Āghā Khān, due to people being unaware of the nature of the two tendencies. Through a proper understanding of both Western secular developments and the Islamic values of the past, the reconciliation between the two apparently constrasting trends would be possible. Thus, the Āghā Khān appears to have avoided making the real distinction between the religious values - which derive their significance from God - and the modern social, economic and scientific developments - which derive their existence from the human mind. The integration of morality based on religion with modern developments would protect Muslim society from following in the footsteps of Western society which had lost its moral foundations. The reconciliation, in the sense of rediscovering Islamic values and

reintegrating them with modern Western economic and scientific development would be possible, according to the Āghā Khān, through a critical examination and identification not only of the Islamic values of the past, but also of modern secular tendencies.

According to the Āghā Khān, Western Society, in its attempt at modernization, has ended up with secularization in which a morality based on religion has been replaced by excessive individual freedom and permissiveness.

The Āghā Khān in his address at the Peshawar University Convocation, in 1967, when he was given an honorary degree in Law, argued that although the Western countries, including Nothern America, were wealthy and so possessed "much that can be envied", they were facing "social and moral conflicts which are far more daunting than those known in Asia or Africa." Confronted by secularist challenges to their traditional values, a rising crime rate, broken homes, etc, they are questioning "whether they are any happier than before."[114]

Earlier in 1960, the Āghā Khān had criticized the Western press for its undue interest in the glamorous things and rumours surrounding the Āghā Khān - something it did for the purpose of sales promotion - rather than interest in the facts about Ismā'īlis and their organizations.[115] Having briefed the commonwealth society at Oxford University concerning the Ismā'īlī administrative structure, the Āghā Khān had pointed out that Democracy was a Western creation and not necessarily accepted - even by some of the Western countries - by the independent nations.

who were rather engaged in a search for their own identities and, so, their ideologies.[116]

For Pakistan, the Āghā Khān maintained (in his speech at the Sindh University in 1970) that historical circumstances were responsible for rendering the task of defining the concept of a Muslim State enormously difficult.[117] The prolonged British rule, the Āghā Khān argued, had replaced the Muslim concepts of State with "concepts which were Western in inspiration as well as practice."[118] This development in history had caused a "vacuum" and, therefore, an interruption in the evolution of the Muslim State machinery. The Muslims have thus experienced a polarization between the modernists who seek to copy the Western social framework to facilitate Western developed science and technology on the one hand and, on the other, the traditional leaders who turn their backs on the secular, but real, developments in the modern world. The Āghā Khān suggested that the secular and the religious leaders must both be well-grounded in secular developments as well as the Islamic religious and historical traditions. The Islamic traditional values, the Āghā Khān emphasized, are as great as the Western, and should be reconstructed "without becoming archaic." Thus, the Āghā Khān espoused a concept of a break in the continuity of Muslim history that has to be overcome. This would help, the Āghā Khān maintained, "to break finally with the immediate and largely alien past, and to rebuild on the foundations of our historic greatness."[119] The Āghā Khān advocated that the Muslims must introduce "the thought

of our great Muslim writers and philosophers" in all the educational institutions to inspire young Muslims to be creative. With that, he thought, the Muslims would be able to reconstruct Muslim thought without breaking with the past. Thus, the Āghā Khān seemed to be convinced that it was the mental attitude or the thought of an individual that determined his outlook on life. He strongly believed that it was only through the creation of a new group of Muslims, well exposed to the history of Muslim thought, that a dynamic Muslim society could be built.

> It is through the creation of such a new elite, inspired by, and widely read in everything related to our heritage, that there must come about a revival in Muslim thought."[120]

The Āghā Khān, while presiding at the Seerat Conference in Karachi, in 1976, exhorted the Muslims to search frantically for the indicators from Qur'ān and Sunnāh that show how to build a "modern and dynamic Islamic Society" in order to ward off "a foreign fleet of cultural and ideological ships which have broken loose."[121] While indicating the failure of the West to hold on to moral precepts that must govern human relationships under the pressure of growing materialistic tendencies, the Āghā Khān warned the Muslims not to be strictly monolithic. The strength and unity of the Muslims, according to the Āghā Khān, lies in recognizing the diversity in the Muslims' "ethnic and cultural backgrounds."[122] He also indicated that the Muslims, while working to build their society from the basic premises indicated in the Qur'ān and the teachings of the last prophet,

should "resolve the problems as successfully as our human minds and intellects can visualize."[123]

The Āghā Khān, thus, in addition to the divinely inspired indicators which should govern Muslim Society, could not avoid appealing to human reason and freedom which, he paradoxically condemned as the source of moral evil.

> I have observed in the Western world a deeply changing pattern of human relations. The anchors of moral behaviour appear to have dragged to such depths that they no longer hold firm to the ship of life. What was once wrong is now simply unconventional, and for the sake of individual freedom must be tolerated. What is tolerated soon becomes accepted. Contrarily, what was once right is now viewed as out-dated, old fashioned and is often the target of ridicule."[124]

To determine the place of human reason in the divine scheme is thus one of the fundamental problems of Modernist Muslim thought and of any position that advocates adaptation or change. For the Ismā'īlis, however, the contradiction between human reasoning and divine authority is being resolved through the divinely-appointed Imām. For the revivalists, the Jama'at-i-Islami, the divinely-appointed Imām is replaced by the individual Muslim acting according to his own tafaqquh (insight). In practice, however, Mawdudi thought that only his interpretation of Qur'ān and Sunnāh was right. Thus, the Ismā'īlis while in agreement with the revivalists regarding the need for ijtihād to interpret the Qur'ān and Sunnāh, differ in everything else. Beside the Qur'ān and Sunnāh, the Ismā'īlis regard the Ginans, and collections of

akhbār (traditions) of the previous Imāms, such as Pandayāt-e-Jawān Mardī, Shifā-e-Kāmilah, Sijillāt al-Mustansiriyā, Nahj al-Balāga, etc, as divinely inspired sources of guidance. The Firmāns of Hadir Imām, however, command the highest authority both in the temporal sequence and the metaphysical scheme.

While both the Ismā'īlis and the revivalists appear to be in agreement with conservatives in condemning Western social values, the three groups differ on the question of what Islamic values are to be revived or conserved. For the Ismā'īlis, the legalistic details and the Arab customs - which constitute a significant aspect of first century Islam - are not to be revived. According to the Ismā'īlis, the Islamic values to be revived could not be opposed to the modernization of a Muslim Society. In order for an Islamic society to compete with Western society in influencing the Muslim youth, the Āghā Khān emphasized that the Islamic values as manifested by the Prophet, such as honesty, generosity, "solicitude for the poor, the weak and the sick, his steadfastedness in friendship, his humility in success, his magnanimity in victory, his simplicity, his wisdom in conceiving new solutions for problems which could not be solved by traditional methods, without affecting the fundamental concepts of Islam...must enable us to conceive what should be a truly modern and dynamic Islamic Society in the years ahead."[125]

(ii). Ismā'īlī Contributions to Muslim Culture.

The Ismā'īlis have also significantly contributed to Muslim cul-

tural history through their involvement in defining the features of Muslim art and architecture in order to revitalize the symbolic significance of these parts of the cultural heritage in the modern Muslim environment. This activity grows out of a strong personal interest of the Āghā Khān in such things.

Since the impact of the environment, according to the Āghā Khān, on the attitude of both individuals and society is immense, it is important to choose and redirect the environmental forces to foster a healthy Muslim identity.[126] According to the Āghā Khān a healthy Muslim society, proud of its spiritual heritage,[127] and free from internal strife, could contribute immensely not only to its own social and economic progress but to fostering peace and tranquility in the world.[128]

The design of the buildings which shelter the schools, hospitals, families, businesses, etc, is one such area of attention which, according to the Āghā Khān, has been neglected in reflecting the "Islamic Cultural Heritage."[129] For the purpose of encouraging the Muslims to recapture patterns from the Muslim past and to integrate them into contemporary building structures, the Āghā Khān announced the "Aga Khan Award" patterned on the concept of the Nobel Prizes, in Karachi, in 1976.[130]

> The Aga Khan Award for Architecture is intended to encourage an understanding and awareness of the strength and diversity of Muslim cultural traditions which, when combined with an enlightened use of modern technology for contemporary society,

> will result in buildings more appropriate for the Islamic world of tomorrow.[131]

For the above purpose he also initiated a 11.5 million-dollar research programme at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University.[132] To administer and co-ordinate activities relating to the "Award-System," a Steering Committee and Masters Jury - manned by renowned scholars from different parts of the world - were established.[133] The Āghā Khān has already hosted seminars, between 1978 and 1980, on art and architecture in Paris, Istanbul, Lahore, Jakarta, Rabat, and ʿAmmān.[134]

The Āghā Khān, however, pointed out that he did not intend to copy the past[135] or to search for a single pattern exemplifying Muslim architecture.[136] While recognizing that the world was changing, the Āghā Khān emphasized the need to learn "from the past and whatever solutions we choose as to allow time, evolution and progress to orient us towards the future."[137] Change, the Āghā Khān maintained, without direction, in which the past is not merged with the present, is like "copying" and "mimicking" one another, and it will lose the sense of dynamism and creativity.[138]

Earlier, in 1976, in his address to the National Council of Culture and Arts, in Pakistan, the Āghā Khān had condemned those Muslim countries who "import the Western styles of architecture which are so often unsuitable and indeed unsightly..."[139]

Hundreds and thousands of new buildings are now being const-

> ructed in Muslim countries in the wake of great oil boom. How many of their designers have seriously studied or taken account of the spirit of Muslim architecture and adapted it to modern functional requirements.[140]

The Āghā Khān, in his address to the Asia Society, in New York, in 1979, defined some characteristic features of Islamic art and architecture, which were projected during the various deliberations and seminars on Islamic Art and Architecture. These findings, the Āghā Khān maintained, recognized that there does not exist a single definition of Islamic architecture, but that this architectural tradition "has reflected different peoples and climates, different times and materials ...that strength which comes from the diversity of the Islamic world." However, he continued, that there were some basic characteristic features articulated in the "Islamic design" which reflect the Islamic cultural values.

> In Islamic design the basic forms are balanced and ruled by geometry. There is a sense of stability, tranquility and equilibrium. And with serenity goes modesty. There is a lack of domination and pride. The superiority of man-made structures over natural environment is a concept alien to Islamic beliefs.[141]

Similarly, he argued, the Muslim architectural tradition reflects an attempt at establishing harmony between its traditions and nature in order, for example, to "preserve the ecological balance."[142] Calligraphy, he continued, which forms part of the decoration of Muslim architecture, "was a constant reminder of spiritual content

through its common design, the endless expression of the name of God."[143]

(iii). The Ismā'īlī Identity.

The Ismā'īlī religious identity, during this period, has evidenced a Shi'i Islamic emphasis through attempts at re-definition and re-examination of the fundamental belief concepts. While the emphasis on the Shī'ī aspects of Islam legitimizes the absolute authority of the Imām as the interpreter of Qur'ān and Sunnah, it enhances the sectarian tension between the Shi'i minority and a strong Sunnī majority in Pakistan. There has been, however, a continued attempt at minimizing the Ismā'īlī-Sunnī tension through the non-articulation of the Ismā'īlī sectarian religious beliefs and practices in public, on the one hand, and, on the other, the projection of Islamic identity through the expressed Ismā'īlī loyalty for Pakistan.

Under the Āghā Khān's initiative, several conferences and deliberations were hosted through the World Ismailia Associations - the institutions responsible for imparting religious education - to define the framework for evolving the outlines of the religious education syllabi.[144] Among the suggested courses to be incorporated in the teaching of religion, were studies in Qur'ān and Hadīth; the Islamic-Ismā'īlī fundamental belief concepts - Tawhid (Unity of God), Nubuwwah (prophethood) Imāmah, Qiyāmah (life after death), etc; - Study of the World Religions; Islamic-Ismā'īlī History and Theology; etc.[145] The study of the proceedings of these conferen-

ces - between 1975 and 1976 - could contribute significantly towards understanding the changing attitude of the Ismā'īlis in Europe, India, Syria, East Africa,etc, in the context of the respective political and social developments.[146] For the purpose of this study, however, it is significant to note that the Ismā'īlis in modern history have responded by attempting to forge their own identity and their point of view towards Islam. For example, the Āghā Khān, in an interview[147] with Geoffrey Barker took a stand concerning the Iranian revolution and asserted that he did not agree with the Ayatollah Khomeini on the current interpretation of Islam in Iran.

> ...I am concerned about the interpretation of Islam which is given. I think many Muslim leaders are concerned about that ...I am not convinced as Imam of the Ismaili community that that interpretation is the right one. Now seen from within Iran there may be a different attitude. I am saying today that law and order in the twentieth century can probably be achieved without the application of law as it is interpreted there.[148]

Parallel to the activities of the World Ismailia Associations, the Institute of Ismaili Studies was established, in London, between 1975 and 1977 with the purpose "of enhancing awareness of the spiritual, intellectual and cultural heritage of Islam, more particularly its Shia branch."[149] In a booklet, published by the Institute, the objective is stated as follows:

> The Institute of Ismaili Studies has been established under the patronage of the present Imam of the Ismaili Muslims,

> the Aga Khan, in order to encourage scholarship and learning in Islam and particularly the Shia branch of Islam and its Ismaili Tariqa (persuasion)."[150]

Inaugrating the Institute of Ismaili Studies, in 1977, the Āghā Khān emphasized that the Institute was primarily geared to benefit the Ismā'īlis through its "superior level" of religious education and through its other undertakings, including the writing of Ismā'īlī History.[151] In 1980, the Āghā Khān Foundation entered in an agreement with McGill University to encourage co-operation in the areas of Health and Islamic Studies. Co-operation in the latter area between the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University and the Institute of Ismaili Studies provides yet another dimension to the field of Ismā'īlī studies. Attributing historical significance to the Institute by relating it to past Ismā'īlī achievement during the period of Fatimid rule in Egypt when Al-Azhar (University) was founded in 909 A.D. - the Agha Khan said,

> ...not since the Fatimid period has there been in existence a Research Centre for Ismaili Studies, manned essentially by outstanding Ismaili men and women scholars. This is therefore a significant step in making it possible for my jamat to secure the fruits of Ismaili scholarship in the history, philosophy, theology and literature of Ismailism and Islam by virtue of an academic institution created by our own efforts and resources.[152]

In 1977, the Ismā'īlis initiated and facilitated the publication of a major work on Ismā'īlism, "The Ismā'īlī Contribution to Islamic

Culture,"[153] under the editorship of Sayyed Husayn Nasr, on the occasion of the centenary of the birth of the late Āghā Khān III.

Earlier, in 1970, a Firmān had insisted that the Ismā'īlis should understand Shī'ī Islam just as they would understand any other monotheistic religion. Since Shī'ī Islam "is a historical fact" it should not be hidden.[154] In an interview with Roger Priouret, in 1975, the Āghā Khān appeared to have ignored the metaphysical implications of the Imām's divine authority in directing the Ismā'īlis while defining the role of the Imām. Thus, the Āghā Khān seemed to have been convinced of the Western trend of bisecting the matters dealing with religion and those dealing with secular aspects. He defined the function of the Ismā'īlī Imām as being the interpreter of the Qur'ān at the spiritual level and as being of "assistance to the Ismā'īlis in their material life." He is not to function in the latter capacity directly, but in the sense that he helps them to follow the necessary institution for their material progress.[155]

> It is two-fold. The Imam must direct the Ismailis in the practice of their religion and constantly interpret the Koran to them according to our theology. On the spiritual plane the Imam's authority is absolute. Ismailis believe therefore that what the Imam says is the only true interpretation possible."[156]

Defending his role as Imām, i.e., as the religious leader who is also concerned with social and economic reforms, the Āghā Khān indicated that in Islam, unlike the West, there is no dichotomy between

spirit and matter.[157]

> The incongruity exists through your tradition, through your experience, the Augustanian interpretation, if one can call it that, of Christianity. Every Muslim no matter what sect he comes from, will tell you Islam is a way of life. If you read the Quran you will find that a very substantial part of Islam and Islam's teaching has to do with the individual's behaviour in society in totally secular matters - how you behave in your relations with other people in society."[158]

(iv). Social and Economic Policies.

The social and economic policies as reflected in the directives of the Āghā Khān have continued to exhibit a national and international dimension. In Pakistan, these policies have been significantly concerned with backing the Government in its efforts to implement social and economic programs through the activities of an Ismā'īlī institution known as the "Aga Khan Foundation." The Aga Khan Foundation was established in 1967 "to mobilize means and know-how from the Industrialized world, and to make these means and know-how available to developing countries."[159] The Aga Khan Foundation has recently been in collaboration with the World Bank, and United Nations Development Programs - which have also recognized the Foundation as a "co-operating organization."[160] Among the areas with which the Foundation is involved in Pakistan, agriculture, public health programs, energy development, educational programs, etc, feature prominently. The Āghā Khān, in an interview on television, in Pakistan, in 1981, however, identified two areas which he felt the Third World ought to be especially

concerned with, as he was himself, in order to improve the "quality of life."[161] These were the quality of the management of social and economic institutions and a sound economy to be achieved through the mobilization of resources and international collaboration.[162] One of the concerns of the "Aga Khan Foundation" has been to encourage, direct, and help the Ismā'īlī and non-Ismā'īlī students financially to continue to pursue higher studies in the Western countries in order to help the Government fill its need for skilled manpower to man social and economic institutions. Pakistan has suffered recently from the effects of drainage of skilled manpower from the country because of lucrative opportunities available elsewhere and also because of poor working conditions in Pakistan. Pakistan is a country which had plunged vigorously into the effort towards industrialization in order to elevate its economy. For this reason it has an extraordinary need for trained and skilled managers, technicians, scientists and workers. This year (1981) the Aga Khan Foundation announced 55 foreign scholarships to enable the students from countries such as Pakistan, to study at various institutions in Europe and North America. The Ismā'īlis hope in this way, through their active engagement in Pakistan's efforts to overcome its problems, to excercise effective influence on the attitude of the Government and the public.

EDUCATION:

In view of the political circumstances in the developing countries and their effects on minority communities like the Ismā'īlis -

for example, the confiscation and nationalization of their businesses,[163] and even the deportation of Ismā'īlis from countries such as Uganda and Burma[164] - a certain trend has emerged among the Ismā'īlis. The Ismā'īlis now appear to exercize more caution in carrying out their social and economic reforms in the countries where instability prevails. However, the trend emerging as reflected in the Firmāns, has also been aimed at diverting the community's attention from trade to the acquisition of professional skills through education. In 1976, the Āghā Khān issued a Firmān which stated:

> It is fundamental not only because of the potential impact of political problems upon your lives, but every time there is a shrinkage in the national economy, it is the stronger, more qualified, better placed individuals who can look to their future with equanimity.[165]

Along with the emphasis on education, the Āghā Khān cautioned the Ismā'īlis about its impact on the Ismā'īlī traditional structure. Earlier in 1958, the Āghā Khān, in an interview had maintained that it was "possible to live a modern life and at the same time live a truly religious life."[166] He had also, as seen earlier, during 1958-1965 period, espoused a similar position in his addresses on modernization in Pakistan. The Āghā Khān, however, appears to have been apprehensive about the impact of modernization on the religious traditions. The Western countries had already exhibited a dangerous trend towards the loss of religious values as modernization progressed. He cautions the Ismā'īlis to be helpful to the community in all the respects even if it meant giving up some freedom of thought or expression. He confessed that "learning means questioning;" but, he

argued, questioning "must be for the purpose of understanding, and understanding is a step towards improvement. This is what it should be and not simply an exercise in preparing oneself to question or weaken or destroy."[167]

HEALTH:

The Āghā Khān has been recently involved in building the 721-bed "Aga Khan Hospital and Medical College" complex in Karachi with the collaboration of national and international organizations such as the Pakistan Medical Association and the World Health Organization. The Aga Khan Hospital and Medical College, which has been accorded the status of a University by Ẓiā al Ḥaqq, is one of the largest health and medical projects in Asia. Its aim is not to "restrict its services to an urban minority but it should become the focus of a much broader effort to address health problems in even the most remote corners of the country."[168] The Āghā Khān, in his speech during the inaugration ceremony of the School of Nursing of the "Aga Khan University of Health Sciences" in Karachi in 1981, proposed to extend the medical facilities throughout the whole of Pakistan by linking the project with the health units, which are already in operation with the assistance of the "Aga Khan Health Services", and other medical services throughout the national health-care system in Pakistan.[169] As a means to train 110 nurses every year and a large number of doctors and medical staff, the Medical College has affiliated itself with the Western Universities of McGill, Harvard, McMaster,

etc.[170]

The impact of the Ismā'īlī involvement in a project of such magnitude is bound to affect the image of the Ismā'īlis in Pakistan. The avenue which is employed to channelize the process of modernization is very significant in the context of Pakistan where health-care is one area that equally concerns conservatives and revivalists.

Thus, Ismā'īlī contributions to the social and economic infrastructures of the country such as the Āgā Khān University of Health Sciences, the Industrial Promotion Services and the various educational institutions, have recently acquired national and international dimensions as well as recognition as humanitarian ventures. Within the Ismā'īlī context these institutions, with their capacity to absorb a large number of the elite Ismā'īlī class, also serve to cushion the impact of modernization. Reasserting his modernist and humanitarian convictions, the Āghā Khān said that the motives behind his health projects were:

> First of all, a commitment to the betterment of the conditions of life of the people in this country. Secondly, it represents an intimate collaboration between the East and the West, or let's say, the Islamic and the Non-Islamic world. It is in fashion to portray that relationship as one of potential conflict. It is my hope and prayer that this project will demonstrate the very opposite."[171]

ECONOMICS:

Earlier in 1976, the Āghā Khān had indicated at the Swiss-American Chambers of Commerce that he strongly believed in the significance

of the role of private initiative in the developing countries, such as Pakistan, where the problems faced by the governments are massive.[172] Through the Institution of the Industrial Promotion Services, founded by the Āghā Khān, in 1962, the Ismā'īlī communal economic ventures were being transformed into national enterprises, in which the government and the public owned shares jointly.[173] For example, the Āghā Khān, while persuading the business communities to import high-level management techniques,[174] also familiarized them with the joint venture of the Industrial Promotion Services and the Pakistan International Airlines to promote tourism in Pakistan. Both the P.I.A. and I.P.S., the Āghā Khān maintained, were concerned to direct the tourist industry in Pakistan towards evolving certain systems to safeguard the "sense of cultural identity of Pakistan" from being infiltrated with foreign cultural elements.[175] Citing the examples of other countries which suffered great hardships because of hastily promoted tourist industries the Āghā Khān said,

> There are many countries which have changed too hastily into what appears to be a lucrative pool of foreign exchange only to find that after a few years of mushroom growth, the cheap developers reap their own desolate harvest of unsightly buildings, polluted rivers and beaches, falling standards of service, decay and ultimate collapse with all its unhappy social consequences.[176]

Thus, the Ismā'īlī emphasis on the possibility of reconciliation between traditional and the modernist tendencies, is characteristic of the modern Ismā'īlī attitudinal response to the growing conservative-

revivalist influence in Pakistan.

The Ismā'īlī religious response in Pakistan, however, is characterized mainly by its articulation of Shī'ī Islamic identity against the predominantly Sunnī revivalism and conservatism. The Ismā'īlī Shī'ī emphasis also helps the Ismā'īlis to legitimize the changing Ismā'īlī attitude in Pakistan under the directives of their Imām. The Ismā'īlī religious base has not only provided leverage for social and economic reforms among the Ismā'īlis but has been exploited to orient the reforms in a way that would project the Ismā'īlī vision of Islam.

The Ismā'īlī attitudinal response is thus an attempt at defining the position of Islam in Pakistan and, so, in the modern world. In this attempt the Ismā'īlis have significantly accommodated the conservative-revivalist attitude within the Ismā'īlī modernist reformist tendencies in Pakistan.

FOOTNOTES

1. The phrase indicates the uniqueness of the nature of Muslim response in Pakistan and its attempt at defining the position of Islam in the modern world. The unique response, according to Adams, is due to "the connection between Islam and the Pakistan Movement...Pakistanis are self-consciously Muslims and are determined to impart a Muslim flavour to their state. It is not enough to have achieved a state of their own; the state must in addition be an Islamic State." See Islam in Pakistan, p. 37-38.
2. D.E.Smith, South Asian Politics and Religion, p. 22.
3. Callard, Pakistan, p. 22.
4. Aziz Ahmad, Islam and Democracy, p. 35.
5. Ziring, Ayub Khan Era, p.28.
6. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 27-37.
7. D.E.Smith, South Asian Politics and Religion, p. 45.
8. Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, p. 198.
9. Wheeler, The Politics of Pakistan, p. 149.
10. Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, p. 16.
11. Saleem M.M.Qureshi, "Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan, Pakistan since 1958, seminar held at the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University, 1964, p. 50.
12. Ibid.
13. D.E.Smith, South Asian Politics and Religion, p. 45.
14. S.M.Qureshi, Religion and Party Politics, p. 56-57.

15. Ibid., p. 57.

16. S.M.Ikram, "Religion in Pakistan," Pakistan Since 1958, seminar held at the Insititute of islamic Studies of McGill University, 1964, p. 5.

17. D.E.Smith, South Asian Politics and Religion, p. 32-33.

18. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 62.

19. For an interesting and detailed analysis of the relationship between Islam and Capitalism in Pakistan, see Hafiz Malik, "The Spirit of Capitalism and Pakistani Islam," Contributions to Asian Studies: Religion and Society in Pakistan, vol. 2. ed. by Aziz Ahmad, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971.

20. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 57.

21. Ibid., p. 62.

22. Ibid., p. 57.

23. Aziz Ahmad, Contributions to Asian Studies, p. 3-4.

24. Leonard Binder, Prospects for Pakistan, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1971, p. 11.

25. Qureshi, Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 53-54.

26. Ibid., p. 5.

27. Ibid., p. 54.

28. Ibid.

29. Since India's partition, the Kashmir - where the Muslims are in a majority and yet form an Indian State - issue has been the cause of the conflict between India and Pakistan. During the 1965 war, the Muslims of Pakistan believed that they were winning the war and, so, the Kashmir issue

would be resolved in their favour. The war, however, ended with the ceasefire agreement - called Tashkent Declaration drafted by the Soviet Union - between India and Pakistan. Ziring maintains that Ayub signed the Tashkent Declaration against Bhutto's advice. See Ziring, The Ayub Era, p. 66.

30. Ibid., p. 189.

31. Saghir Ahmad, "Islam and Pakistani Peasants", Contributions to Asian Studies, vol. 2. Religion and Society in Pakistan, p. 93-104.

32. Ziring, The Ayub Era, p. 47.

33. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 86.

34. Ibid., p. 88.

35. Ibid., p. 81.

36. See Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure of National Integration, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972.

37. Aziz Ahmad, Contributions to Asian Studies, p. 4.

38. For an excellent analysis of the Economic Development in Pakistan see Gilbert T.Brown, "Pakistan's Economic Development after 1971", Pakistan: The Long View, p. 172-216.

39. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 155.

40. Ibid., p. 154.

41. The Ahmadiyyahs, Sayeed maintains, had supported Bhutto's Peoples Party in the 1970 elections. Inspite of that, Bhutto could not but give in to the demands of the 'Ulamā'. Politics in Pakistan, p. 155.

42. Ibid., p. 159.

43. Ibid., p. 158-159.

44. Ibid., p. 159.

45. Ibid., p. 162.

46. Ibid., p. 181.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 182-183.

49. An Ismā'īlī leader from Pakistan informed the author that a growing number of Sunnī Muslims claim to be Shī'a in order to evade the Zakāt tax - which is to be deducted directly through the Banks.

50. Khalid Bin Sayeed wrote earlier that "attempts to Islamicize the constitution have often divided the people of Pakistan. Sunnis verses Shī'as is an old conflict,..." See "National Integration in Pakistan", South Asian Politics and Religion, p. 412. The Shī'a and Sunnī differ in everything except the general concepts of Islam, Allah, Qur'ān, Nubuwwah, etc; but even these concepts when defined evidence significant differences.

51. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, p. 183.

52. Ibid., p. 187.

53. Ibid., p. 173.

54. Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, "Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi: An Introduction to His Vision of Islam and Islamic Revival", Islamic Perspectives, ed. by Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, London: The Islamic Foundation, 1979, p. 373.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p. 371.

57. Ibid., p. 370.

58. Ibid., p. 366-367.

59. Dawn, July 12-14, 1957.

60. For the detailed extract of the will, see the Introduction to the Speeches of His Royal Highness: Prince Karim Aga Khan Imam-e-Zaman, Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1958.

61. See the Souvenir on Takht Nashīnī (enthronment) celebrations, Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1958, p. 17.

62. Ibid.

63. See the Speeches, Part I.

64. Speeches, p. 5.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 13-19.

67. Ibid., p. 35.

68. Nationalism in East Africa could be defined as African Nationalism; and in Burma as Burmese Nationalism. In both cases, the racial and ethnic cosciousness was enhanced against the non-native groups like the Ismā'īlis from India who had migrated, during the British rule, for commercial purposes.

69. Since Islamic Nationalism in Pakistan theoretically transcended ethnic and racial identities, the Ismā'īlī religious loyalty - which could be defined as Islamic-Ismā'īlī loyalty - did not generate tension at a racial or ethnic level.

70. Speeches, Part I, p. 61.

71. Ibid., p. 62.

72. Ibid., p. 52.

73. Speeches Part I, p. 39-40.

74. Ibid, p. 40.

75. See the Āghā Khān's "Interview" with Radio Pakistan, in 1960 Speeches of Mowlana Hazar Imam His Highness the Aga Khan, Part II, p. 47-50.

76. Ibid., p. 8.

77. Ibid., p. 48-49.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., p. 33.

80. Ibid.

81. The Choice of Muslims, a speech delivered by the Āghā Khān at Dacca, in 1964, Dacca: H.R.H.The Aga Khan Supreme Council for East Pakistan, u.d.

82. Ibid.

83. Speech of his Royal Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan at the Ismailia Association for Pakistan, Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1960.

84. Speeches, Part I, p. 43.

85. The Firmān was issued in Dacca, in 1960.

86. Farmān Mubarak: Pakistan Visit: 1964, Part I, Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, u.d. p. 11-12.

87. Ibid., p. 40.

88. Souvenir, p. 9.

89. While the problem of change and changelessness - in the sense of

describing the reality of the world - gained predominance in the history of ancient Greek Philosophy, it continued to feature prominantly in the history of Medieval and Modern Philosophy. See Fredrick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, New York: Image Books, 1962.

90. Souvenir, p. 9.

91. Farmān Mūbarak, Part I, p. 6.

92. Majority of the Firmāns between 1957 and 1965 were concerned with social-economic reforms. See Farman Mubarak Part I and II.

93. Speech at the Ismailia Association, 1960, p. 7-8.

94. See Introduction to the Speeches, Part I.

95. Speeches. Part I, p. 60.

96. Ibid.

97. Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 246.

98. Ibid., p. 247.

99. See the Speech, delivered by the Āghā Khān to the Federation of Chambers and Industries, Speeches, Part I, p. 46.

100. The Āghā Khān's intentions are reflected in his speech at the "Royal Commonwealth Society", at Oxford, in 1960. Speeches, Part II, p. 60.

101. Farmān Mūbarak, Part I, p. 47.

102. Ibid., p. 9.

103. Farmān Mūbarak, Part II. p. 52.

104. Speeches, Part II, p. 37.

105. Speeches, Part I, p. 33.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. Farmān Mūbarak, Part I, p. 32.

109. Ibid., p. 110.

110. Ibid., p. 105-106.

111. Ibid., p. 89-93.

112. Ibid., p. 90.

113. Ibid.

114. His Royal Highness Prince Aga Khan's Convocation Address at Peshawar University of Pakistan, Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1967.

115. Speeches, Part II, p. 52.

116. Ibid., p. 57.

117. "Convocation Address at the University of Sind", The Muslim World. Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow, Karachi: The Aga Khan Ismailia Federal Council for Pakistan, u.d.

118. Ibid., p. 16.

119. Ibid., p. 22.

120. Ibid., p. 20.

121. "Presidential Address at the International Seerat Conference", The Muslim World. Yesterday Today & Tomorrow, p. 25.

122. Ibid., p. 26.

123. Ibid., p. 28.

124. Ibid., p. 24.

125. Seerat Conference, p. 28.

126. The Āghā Khān's address to the first conference on Art and Archi-

tecture at Aiglemont, in 1978. See Ismaili Mirror, Karachi: Pak Ismailia Publication Ltd. October, 1980, p. 33.

127. Ibid., p. 41.

128. The Āghā Khān's address at the fourth seminar on "Symbols and Signs in Islamic Architecture", held at Rabat (Morocco), in 1979, Ismaili Mirror, p. 53.

129. Ibid., p. 45.

130. Ibid., p. 11.

131. Ibid., p. 17.

132. Ibid., p. 13.

133. Professor Titus Burkhardt, Dr. Mahbūb al Ḥaq, a Pakistani economist and the Director of Policy Planning and Program Development for the World Bank; Mazharul Islam from Bangladesh; and many other scholars from Japan, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, etc, form the "Master Jury". See the Ismaili Mirror, p. 15.

134. For extracts on deliberations, see Ismaili Mirror, p. 29-57.

135. The Āghā Khān's address at the second seminar on "Conservation" at Istanbul, in 1978, Ismaili Mirror, p. 43.

136. The Āghā Khān's address to the Asia Society, in New York, in 1979, Ismaili Mirror, p. 79.

137. See Ismaili Bulletin, Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, August, 1979, p. 7.

138. The Āghā Khān's speech delivered at the National Council of Culture and Arts, in 1976, Ismaili Mirror, p. 71.

139. Ibid.

140. See Ismaili Bulletin, vol. 5 No 9-11, May, June, July, 1979, p. 4.

141. Ibid., p. 79.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. The author of this work happened to represent Pakistan at the World Ismailia Associations Conferences on Religious Education at Nairobi in 1975 and 1976.

145. For the first time in the History of Modern Ismā'īlis, an attempt was made to examine and emphasize the teaching of Qur'an and Sunnāh to the children. The teaching of Ginān, Firmāns, Comparative Study of Religions, etc, however, was an attempt not only at unifying the Ismā'īlī religious beliefs system but also at articulating the Ismā'īlī syncretic identity.

146. For example, the comparison in the changing attitude of the Ismā'īlis in India and Pakistan could provide significant insight towards understanding the modern Ismā'īlī response.

147. See the Interview in The Age, an Australian News Paper, Melbourne. 1979.

148. Ibid., p. 13.

149. See the Preface to the "booklet" on The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London.

150. Ibid., p. 1.

151. See the Ismaili Bulletin, Dec, 1977.

152. Ibid.

153. S.H.Nasr, ed. Ismā'īlī Contribution to Islamic Culture, Tehran: I.I.A.P, 1977-78.

154. See the Ismaili Mirror, July 1980, p. 49.

155. The Interview was conducted in French and which has been inaccu-

rately translated into English from L'expansion No. 83. March 1975.

156. Ibid.

157. The Interview with Geoffrey Barker, p. 13.

158. Ibid.

159. Ismaili Mirror, March, 1981, p. 29.

160. Ibid., p. 44.

161. Ibid., p. 29.

162. Ibid.

163. When the Tanzanian Government adopted socialism, after its independence, in 1957, many Ismā'īlī businesses were nationalized. Similarly, during Bhutto's regime, the steel mills belonging to an Ismā'īlī, and the Āghā Khān schools, were nationalized.

164. In the cases of Uganda and Burma, the Ismā'īlis were forced to leave the countries.

165. Farmān Mubarak of Noor Mowlana Shah Karim al Husseini Hazar Imam, London: H.H.The Aga Khan Shia Imami Ismailia Association for U.K. u.d. p. 5.

166. Speeches, Part II, p. 48.

167. Farmān Mubarak of Hazar Imam, p. 19.

168. Ismaili Mirror, 1981, p. 34.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid, p. 18.

171. See "The Aga Khan Health Services", International Newsletter, No. 5. January, 1981, Karachi: Public Affairs Department, The Aga Khan Hospital and Medical College.

172. The Āghā Khān's address to the Swiss-American Chambers of Commerce, The Role of Private Initiative in Developing Countries, Zurich: Swiss American Chambers of Commerce, 1976.

173. Ibid., p. 6.

174. See the Ismaili Bulletin, March, 1978, p. 5.

175. The Āghā Khān's speech to Rotary Club in 1979. unpublished.

176. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

The Nizari Ismā'īlis and their attempt at adjustment to the impact of modernization as reflected in the Firmāns can best be understood as a response to the growing conservative and revivalist influence in Pakistan. The uniqueness of the Ismā'īlī response, which is characterized mainly by its Modernist Reformist emphasis, lies in the interaction between the nature of the belief system and the political forces in the country.

The position of the Imām in the Ismā'īlī belief system is central by virtue of its transcendental and divine aspects which are derived from both the Shī'ī and the Hindu syncretic borrowings of the community in the Indian Sub-continent. The official British recognition of the Imām's absolute authority in the late 19th century added the needed prestige and significance to the role of the Imām and thus, to the Ismā'īlis. Thus, "the Imām's powers and responsibilities could take almost any direction in both the religious and the secular spheres without being impeded by the historical limits of the role definition."[1]

The Imām, as a religious symbol, is capable of acquiring an infinity of possible meanings. These possibilities enable the Imām to relate to the requirements of changing situations, thus permitting the Ismā'īlis to justify the change in their mode of behaviour. As the source of religious guidance, the Imām becomes the focus of Ismā'īlī

attention, and everything else in the Ismā'īlī system of beliefs must be viewed strictly in terms of the Firmāns of the Imām and not in terms of the teachings of the Qur'ān, the Sunnāh, the Gināns, etc, alone. This focus on the Imām makes it much easier for the group to acclimatize to changing political, social, and economic situations. Thus, in their attempt at evolving Ismā'īlī beliefs and practices to accommodate the social and political forces of the environment, the Firmāns have encouraged great diversity within the Ismā'īlī system. This flexibility in the Ismā'īlī response, while contributing significantly to the group's survival, has made the task of defining the Ismā'īlī doctrine difficult. Since the Imām is seen as the focus of everything concerning Ismā'īlī beliefs and practices, it is the conclusion of this thesis that the term that could best be used to describe the Ismā'īlis in the modern world is, "the Imāmis" - which implies the fundamental belief of the Ismā'īlis that everything changes except the Nūr (spirit or light) of the Imām who is always available to guide the momināin.

The re-defined relationship between the Imām and the Ismā'īlis in the Indian Sub-continent thus provided the Firmāns with significant leverage to function as "divine commandments". The Firmāns, while deriving their power - in the sense of capability to mobilize the group - from the veneration of the Ismā'īlis for their Imām, were concerned mainly with secular developments. In this respect, the Firmāns mirrored not only the social and political developments

in India and Pakistan, but also a capability to sense the need for change in the context of the changing Indian and Pakistani political scene.

The general Muslim response to the collapse of Mughal rule and, later to the influx of the Western political and social thought and institutions was characterized mainly by their attempt to examine their own religion and history. The conflicting puritanical and modernist tendencies were the result of this Muslim self-examination which contributed significantly to the later growth of Muslim communalism and the separatist movement in the form of the Pakistan Movement.

The tension between the traditionalists, who enjoyed mass support, and the Western-trained modernists, who were to administer the country, resurfaced immediately after the creation of Pakistan. While the traditionalists demanded that Islam be the State Ideology, the modernists, unaware of the detailed formulations of Shari'ah tried to incorporate general Islamic principles into the western ideas of democracy, liberty, etc. The process of constitution-making in Pakistan was thus an attempt at reconciling the contrast between divinely-sanctioned revealed laws and man-made laws.

The events marking the course of political history in Pakistan however, evidenced the growing impact of the traditionalist attitude on the Muslims of Pakistan. This development not only implied the reorientation of the Muslims towards building an Islamic state and society, but added a new dimension to the politics of Pakistan

in the sense of causing the re-emergence of Shīʿi and Sunnī sectarian differences. The Ismāʿīlis, being a Shīʿi minority, were affected by this development. Their changing attitude is reflected through the Firmāns.

The power that the Firmāns wielded in introducing changes among the Khojas, even concerning their longheld traditional religious concepts, evidences the extent of the group's adaptability and its close-knit structure when confronted with external pressures. However the external pressure on the group ironically provided the leadership with the ability to resist internal agitation for the modern democratic decentralization of the group's decision making.[2] The increased social cohesion, however, due to the external threat, also elicited a higher level of economic productivity of the group.[3] Hanna Papanek maintains that the Ismāʿīlis have devised such an effective system to mobilize funds that the other communities have not been able to compete with their economic, social welfare, and education programs.[4] This economic and social prosperity, Hanna Papanek argues, has "resulted in gratitude for the Imām, and community ties were strengthened rather than impaired by an influx of new ideas."[5] She, however, argues that the introduction of new ideas "by a traditional authoritarian leader is bound to raise eventual difficulties."[6] The Imām, as seen earlier, being aware of the impact of modernization on religious traditions, has already begun to translate the narrow group loyalty into a wider national and humanitarian concern. Since

the Ismā'īlis differ from other Muslim groups in their emphasis on the necessity for a living Imam who provides guidance according to the needs of changing circumstances, new functions and expectations are generated to cushion the increased mobility, freedom, questioning, etc.

Another factor contributing to the Ismā'īlī attempt at cushioning the growing religious-secular gap resulting from modernization of the Ismā'īlī institutions, is a modification in the practice of takiah (dissimulation) which, Frischauer maintains, is still prevalent among the Ismā'īlis who "are reluctant to talk about many aspects of their highly esoteric religion."[7] However, Khalid Bin Sayeed maintains that the trading communities, such as Khojas, "have been modernized to such extent that they genuinely believe that Islam and modern commerce and industry coexist."[8]

In the context of the Indian scene, prior to 1936, the Ismā'īlī response is characterized essentially as a modernist-reformist movement. The nature of the Ismā'īlī reformist tendency is colored by its attempt at providing itself with a religious impulse through a systematic reformulation of the Ismā'īlī identity.

The direction of Ismā'īlī response, as reflected in the Firmāns, also indicated that, until 1936, the need to stretch the definition of Ismā'īlī identity to accommodate general Muslim conciousness was not felt. This Ismā'īlī response also mirrored the insignificance or non-existence of any Muslim nationalist sentiment in the form of the Pakistan Movement. However, in the light of growing Muslim

political consciousness in India prior to its partition in 1947, the Ismā'īlis aligned themselves with the Muslims through their projection of Muslim political identity without, however, reorienting their modernist reformist outlook or their religious identity. Their religious identity, while providing the motivation for mobilizing the group to implement their social and economic policies, significantly helped the Ismā'īlis to consolidate their position in the newly created Pakistan.

Until 1953, the Ismā'īlī modernist response in Pakistan is seen mainly as the representative of a reaction and opposition to the growing conservative-revivalists puritanical influence in the country. While there is continuity in the Firmāns concerning economic activity and the modernist projection of Islam after 1953, there is also an abrupt change, not only respecting some of the prevailing Hindu religious practices of the Ismā'īlis, but in the Ismā'īlī attitude towards other Muslims, particularly the 'Ulamā'. This change in the Ismā'īlī attitude in Pakistan evidences not only the Ismā'īlī awareness of the growing conservative and revivalist puritanical influence in arousing mass agitation - for example, against minority Muslim groups, such as, the Aḥmadiyyah - but also evidences the influence of the Firmāns on the Ismā'īlis in assimilating the newly introduced changes.

Thus, by using the divine role of the Imām previously attributed to him, the Āghā Khān III enabled the Ismā'īlis to accommodate

a changing attitude without rupturing the base. While the purification of Ismā'īlism from Hindu practices in Pakistan narrowed the gap between the Ismā'īlis and other Muslims, the Āghā Khān's modernist approach, especially in implementing his economic policies, contributed to increased cohesiveness amongst Pakistan's Ismā'īlī community.

The recent Ismā'īlī social and economic ventures aimed at benefitting the Muslims of Pakistan at large, in response to the appeals of the successive Governments, have significantly equipped the Ismā'īlis with ability to influence Government opinion. In the context of the recent developments in Pakistan where the Government is committed to adopting Islam as an ideology for the State, the Ismā'īlī commitment to assist the Government in implementing its social (health and education) and economic policies may be understood as the Ismā'īlī contribution to the Muslim attempt at defining the position of Islam in Pakistan and, so in the modern world.

This thesis has thus examined how the Ismā'īlis, as a minority Muslim group in Pakistan, while maintaining a sense of continuity with their religious history, have attempted to accommodate contemporary political forces in their thrust for modernization. Thus it is in the understanding of the religious beliefs of the Ismā'īlis that the nature of the changing pattern can be grasped. The Ismā'īlī belief system in which the Imām is the only authorized interpreter of Qur'ān and Sunnāh and therefore the absolute claimant to Ismā'īlī obedience, provides the Ismā'īlis a unique means of responding

to the impact of traditional Islam from the one side and of Western modernism from the other.

It may also be concluded that the Ismā'ilis, like other Muslim groups, emphasize Islamic cultural identity but not the Islamic religious unity.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 108.
2. Theodore P. Wright, "Competitive Modernization Within Daudi Bohra Sect of Muslims", in Competitive Modernization in India, ed. Helen Ullrich, p. 169.
3. See Richard G.Fox, Competition and Modernization in South Asia, p. 2.
4. Hanna Papanek, Leadership and Social Change, p. 323.
5. Ibid., p. 5.
6. Ibid., p. 6.
7. Frischauer, The Aga Khans, p. 10.
8. Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Islam and National Integration in Pakistan", South Asian Politics and Religion, p. 412.

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