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DRAHOMANIV'S PLANS FOR REFORM OF UKRAINE & RUSSIAN EMPIRE

## ABSTRACT

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### DRAHOMANIV'S PLANS FOR REFORM OF UKRAINE AND THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

This thesis examines M.P. Drahomaniv's concept of Ukraine and his plans for her future development within the framework of a reconstructed Russian Empire. The first chapter reviews the general conditions prevalent throughout all ethnically-Ukrainian territories from the beginning of the national revival until the entry of Drahomaniv as a leading figure in the intellectual milieu, and provides a brief biographical sketch. The second chapter discusses his analysis of the Ukrainian past and present, and his program for her future evolution. The third chapter deals with his theoretical proposals for the reconstruction of the Russian Empire, the means he urged to achieve this and his criticisms of Russian intellectuals and radical revolutionaries. The final chapter outlines the struggle with his Ukrainian contemporaries as a result of his liberal-evolutionary principles and his federal conclusion for the political future of the Ukrainian nation.

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UKRAINE AND THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

by

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	i
CHAPTER I . . . . .	1
CHAPTER II . . . . .	22
CHAPTER III . . . . .	44
CHAPTER IV . . . . .	65
CONCLUSION . . . . .	82
LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . .	89

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine M.P. Drahomaniv's concept of Ukraine and his plans for Ukrainian national evolution. Drahomaniv's belief in the existence of a Ukrainian "natsional'nost" (nationality) distinct from every other Slavic nationality arose out of his analysis of the Ukrainian historical past and his studies of Ukrainian folklore, especially folksongs.

Having established to his own satisfaction the existence of a Ukrainian nationality, he was determined to find a solution to the problem of Ukraine as a political entity. He realized that the greatest difficulties facing Ukrainians in this respect was the isolation of Ukrainian regions from each other, the denationalization of the élite and the lack of national consciousness among the peasantry. In addition to these factors, political and cultural connections with Russia in the past as well as during his lifetime (1841-1895), led Drahomaniv to believe that political separation from the Russian state or even a complete break in the ties with Russian culture was not possible.

Consequently, when hypothesizing on Ukraine's future development, he came to the conclusion that an autonomous, not independent, Ukraine within a newly-reconstructed Russian Empire based on federalism would be the best solution to the Ukrainian problem. Such a solution necessitated the formation of a program for a new All-Russian State in which the political, national and cultural rights of all the minorities would be guaranteed and safeguarded.

Drahomaniv developed such a program and criticized all those who disagreed with the theoretical proposals and the practical means he

suggested to achieve his goal. In doing so, he provoked counter-attacks on all sides by both Russians and Ukrainians. Russian conservatives denounced him as a radical socialist and for encouraging a dissatisfied youth to partake in terroristic activities. Ukrainian conservatives accused him of trying to Russify the Ukrainian community and undermining their efforts to obtain cultural concessions from the Russian government. Russian revolutionaries criticized him for emphasizing the national question to the exclusion of the more important socio-economic problems in the Russian Empire and of retarding progress in all spheres by propagating evolutionary rather than revolutionary principles. Ukrainian revolutionaries attacked him for his abiding concern with cultural questions and for his refusal to join any revolutionary party. Russian nationalists dismissed Drahomaniv as a "little Russian chauvinist" because they read only those writings in which he stressed the need for a solution to the Ukrainian national problem. Ukrainian nationalists regarded him as a "Ukrainian renegade" because he rejected wholeheartedly the idea of a politically independent Ukraine.

Drahomaniv's voluminous writings in Ukrainian and Russian have not been translated into any Western European language except for a relatively small number of selected writings which can be read in English in Ivan L. Rudnytsky's Mykhaylo Drahomanov. A Symposium and Selected Writings (New York, 1952). Secondary sources in West European languages are practically non-existent. There are only two analytical articles, one in French by A. Seelieb, "Le Maitre et son disciple I. Michel Dragomanoff" in La Revue Ukrainienne (July-Dec. 1915) and one in English

by D. Doroshenko, "Mykhailo Dragomanov and the Ukrainian National Movement", in The Slavonic Review (vol. XVI, no. 48, Apr. 1938).

In addition to these factors, any major study dealing with Drahomaniv directly is outdated. Only three studies were published in the 1950's, and two of these dealt with his literary views. Two more were published in the 1960's and one in 1971, all in the Soviet Union and all purporting to show that Drahomaniv's theories and activities were proof that Russian and Ukrainian democratic forces in the latter part of the nineteenth century fought in a common struggle against all forms of oppression and worked towards one goal - the destruction of autocracy, the carrier of class and national oppression. However, even R. Ivanova, in Mykhaylo Drahomaniv u suspil'no politychnomu rusi Rossii ta Ukrainy (Kiev, 1971), admits that Drahomaniv did not fully understand the problem of class struggle.

A number of articles in Russian and Ukrainian appeared in the 1960's, but with two exceptions, all discuss Drahomaniv as one of the few men of his time who tried to show Ukrainians the value of remaining tied to Russia both politically and culturally.

The special pleading of much of this literature and the scarcity of disinterested studies indicates that there is a need for an objective analysis of Drahomaniv's theories, of his role in the development of a Ukrainian national consciousness and of his criticisms of the Russian revolutionary movement of the later nineteenth century. Such a study is possible only on the basis of a survey of all of Drahomaniv's works, of his criticisms of both Russians and Ukrainians. Otherwise, one would be tempted to evaluate him as did those of his contem-

poraries who read only those polemics in which he denounced extremists of either one nationality or the other. Taken as a whole, his writings reveal that he was far from being the bigot he was often made out to be, and that his proposal for an autonomous Ukraine within a reconstructed Russian Empire was a realistic, if unrealized, approach to the question of Ukrainian political existence.

No primary sources and only a few secondary sources were available at McGill University libraries. Extensive use was made of the Slavonic Collection in the New York Public Library and the Library of Congress in Washington. A sincere expression of thanks is extended to the librarians in the McLennan Library for their assistance in obtaining whatever material was available at other Canadian and American universities.

Both Ukrainian and Russian have been transliterated according to the systems used by the Library of Congress. No translations have been provided for the terms "narodnost'" and "narod" since they have no unambiguous English equivalents and are, in any case, commonly used and understood by scholars. As to the problem of dating, it seemed most appropriate to use the Gregorian calendar inasmuch as Drahomaniv himself was opposed to the use of the Julian by Ukrainians.



## CHAPTER I

### DRAHOMANIV IN THE UKRAINIAN SETTING

In the course of the nineteenth century, the administrative territorial division of Ukrainian lands was confusing and complicated. The Eastern territories, which were populated by approximately twelve million Ukrainians, were under Russian rule. The Western territories, with a population of approximately three and a half million, were under Hapsburg rule.

In the Russian Empire, the system of gubernias (provinces) under governors was introduced. The left bank of the Dniepr included the provinces of Kharkiv, Poltava, and Chernihiv and were given the name Malorossia (Little Russia). The right bank included the provinces of Kiev, Podilia and Volhynia and were called the South-Western lands. Southern Ukraine included the provinces of Katerynoslav, Kherson and Tauria and were given the name Novorossia (New Russia).

In the Hapsburg Empire, Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia formed three distinct administrative provinces. The province of Galicia incorporated the territories of Galicia, which in the Kingdom of Poland before 1772 had been known as Red Ruthene, part of Podilia with the Polish principalities of Zator and Auschwitz and the Grand Duchy of Krakow. Subsequently, it was divided in order to distinguish Eastern Galicia which was ethnically Ukrainian, from Western Galicia which was ethnically Polish. Bukovina, which was the North-Western part of Moldavia before 1774 and under Turkish domination, was at first annexed to Galicia but became a separate crown land in 1861. Transcarpathia, which for centuries had been part of the Hungarian state, continued to be

dominated by the Hungarian oligarchy even after the creation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1867.

Throughout all these territories, the greater part of the Ukrainian population were peasants who remained serfs until 1861 in the Russian Empire and 1848 in the Hapsburg Empire. Both before and after the abolition of serfdom, the peasants were socially and economically dependent upon the great landowners. In the Russian Empire, these landlords were either Russian nobles or else Ukrainian nobles who, through intermarriage with Russians, education in Russian schools and service in the Russian armed forces, gradually became Russified and obtained the same privileges as the Russian nobility. In the Hapsburg Empire, Polish aristocrats in Galicia, German in Bukovina and Hungarian in Transcarpathia dominated the political, social and cultural development of the Ukrainian masses whose economic life and education were on a very low level.

Although Ukrainian society was predominantly agrarian, a small Ukrainian merchant class did exist, but in most of the cities they were forced to move to the outskirts while a number of Russian, Polish, German, Hungarian and Jewish merchants were brought into the centre of the city to replace them. To get ahead, the Ukrainian merchants, like the nobles, believed that it was necessary to adopt the language and culture of the foreigners who dominated Ukrainian territory.

If there were no ties between the peasants and the upper merchant classes as a result of the aristocratic tendencies of the latter and their denationalization, the peasants themselves were, by no means, a unified and coherent class. The divisions amongst them were due mainly to the differences in their religious affiliations. In Russian

Ukraine and in Bukovina, a large majority of Ukrainians were Orthodox. In Galicia and Transcarpathia, Ukrainians were predominantly Uniates (Greek Catholics of the Byzantine rite), but in Galicia, some Polonized Ukrainians also professed Roman Catholicism. Religious affiliation was closely related to national identification and consequently, whenever any attempts were made by Poles or Hungarians in the Hapsburg Empire to impose Roman Catholicism upon the Ukrainian population, strong resentment developed and the people began to seek salvation from their Orthodox compatriots in the Russian Empire.

Moreover, since Ukrainians were predominantly a rural people and the level of schooling and education was very low in rural areas, the majority were illiterate. Even amongst the urban population, where illiteracy was not so low, Ukrainians were not greatly affected for, in most cases, the residents of the cities and towns were non-Ukrainians. Consequently, Ukrainian national consciousness did not exist. It was only about the middle of the nineteenth century that Ukrainian national feeling was aroused, and this mainly in Galicia and Russian Ukraine.

As early as 1832 in Galicia, the "Ruthene trio" of M. Shashkevich, J. Holovatsky and J. Vahilevich advocated a Ukrainian literary revival. They were opposed to the use of the Polish language and spread propaganda among the Greek Catholic theological students in Lemberg (Lviv) for the introduction of their mother tongue in everyday life among the cultured classes. Although they stressed the fact that the Ruthenes were a people distinct from the Russians (whom they called Muscovites), they were denounced by the Poles as Russophiles bent upon union with Russia. Down to 1848, many Ukrainians supported a political union of Ruthenes

and Poles on the basis of equal rights, but with the outbreak of the upheavals in the Hapsburg Empire, the basis for such a union disappeared. In March 1848, when Polish nationalists petitioned the Emperor, they refused to mention Ruthene rights and aspirations, and categorically rejected the notion of a distinct Ruthene nation. Consequently, a petition to the Emperor was sent on 19 April from Lemberg demanding the use of Ukrainian language in schools and offices, the same educational rights and social status for the Greek Catholic clergy as enjoyed by other religions and access to all public offices. In addition, the Ruthenian National Council was founded in Lemberg as the first political organization to voice the rights of Ukrainian people living in Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Ruthene Hungary, demanding that these be united as a single Crown Land (Russinenland). However, the Poles persuaded the Austrian government that the Ukrainian population had treasonable sympathies towards Russia and that if Austria intended to retain her control over Galicia, the national aspirations of the Ukrainians should not be encouraged as their real aim was the union of the whole people in a single state with Kiev as their capital.<sup>1</sup>

It was not without grounds that the Poles made these accusations, for in its first proclamation on 15 May the Council declared that Ruthenians should wake up from their long sleep, unite and recreate their nation.

We belong to a great Ukrainian nation of fifteen million individuals, who speak the same language, have our own literature and peculiar institutions and, who at one time, were a glorious and independent nation, but because of various misfortunes and catastrophes fell under foreign domination and lost our independence.<sup>2</sup>

Its programme demanded equal rights of religion for Greek Catholics,

urged the development of national sentiment and the perfection of the Ukrainian language and demanded that Ukrainian be introduced into primary, secondary and higher schools and into the administration. Convinced that their political and religious rights and their national aspirations would be best guaranteed by imperial protection, the Galicians opted for constitutional means of reform and pledged fidelity to Emperor Ferdinand I. However, the Polish governor of Galicia, Count A. Goluchowski, was fairly influential at Vienna and due to his apprehensions about the activities of the Ruthenian National Council and his subsequent denunciations, it was forced to dissolve in 1851.<sup>3</sup>

Trusting Goluchowski's judgement, the Austrian government became more favorable towards the Poles and, in disappointment, the Ruthenians turned their hopes towards union with Russia. When a bill for the division of Galicia into a Ukrainian and a Polish province was rejected on 18 April 1866, the Russophile tendency was strengthened all the more. The attitude of the Russophiles to Polonization was exemplified by one of their leaders, Father Ivan Naumovych who, in a speech to the Galician diet said: "Placed before the choice, we prefer to drown in the Russian ocean instead of in the Polish swamp."<sup>4</sup>

But opinion was not uniform among the Ukrainian intellectuals in Galicia. Two parties developed. Because of their hostility to the Poles, the Russophile (or Moskvophile) faction was prepared for a political union with Russia. They were influenced by Panslavist propaganda coming from Russia and were enthusiastic about the role the Russian tsar might play in uniting and protecting all Slavic peoples.<sup>5</sup> The Ukrainian faction (or Narodovtsy) exhibited strong nationalistic tendencies and because they equated the Russian nation with tsarism and bureaucracy,

they opposed any kind of union with Russia. As a measure of expediency,<sup>6</sup> they would have been prepared to unite with the Poles instead. However, even the Populist Party regarded union with Poland disdainfully and never missed the opportunity to protest against Polish rule over Galicia.

Neither group evolved into a parliamentary political party. Both existed as literary or academic societies and there was no real difference in their socio-political thought. The Russophile Party was oriented towards Russian tsarism, the Ukrainian Party towards Austrian monarchy. The Ukrainian Party was in a better position to expand its influence for its members centered around a society called "Prosvita" (Enlightenment) whose main concern was to advance adult education and the national consciousness of the peasants.<sup>7</sup> Prosvita published popular books and texts for high school use believing this to be fully in accordance with the new Constitution of 21 December 1867 for the Austrian crown lands which proclaimed equality and liberty of all citizens and equal rights for all the peoples of Austria. However, once the Poles were assigned control of the administration of Galicia, they were reluctant to introduce the principles of equality and liberty and instead,<sup>8</sup> attempted to secure more rights for themselves than were their due. The division of Ukrainians into two hostile camps only played into the hands of the Poles.

The Ukrainians were represented weakly in comparison with the predominant Poles in both the Austrian Parliament and the Galician Diet and, consequently, the Poles began to demand the introduction of Polish language into the administration, the law courts and the schools. In 1868, they succeeded in obtaining control of education and in carrying

a resolution favouring the use of the Polish language in administration and law courts and demanding the autonomy of Galicia with wide powers for the Diet. Ukrainian representatives in Vienna drew up petitions arguing that the resolution was passed only because power in the Galician Diet rested with an artificial Polish majority which was being elected unfairly due to the restriction of Ukrainian representation and to the privileges of landholders and towns in the Galician Diet. The petitions were of no avail and the Poles managed to secure the creation of a special minister for Galicia and the appointment of a Pole. A new political organization of Galician Ruthenes, the Ruthenian Council, sent petitions once again to the Parliament at Vienna (21 March 1871) demanding equitable representation, direct election to Parliament and a Law of Nationalities for defence of a national minority against oppression by a majority. But Polish power in Galicia grew and it was evident that no compromise could be reached between the Poles and the Ukrainians.

Despite the continual successes of the Poles to dominate the Ukrainians in Galicia, the Ukrainians there were, nevertheless, better off than their compatriots in the Russian Empire to the East and certainly richer in hope. In the Russian Empire, from the 1830's, the large cities in the Left and Right Bank Ukraine became extensively Russified and Polonized respectively. The political problem of Ukraine was neglected until the beginning of the 40's when the works of the poet T. Shevchenko began to appear. In his poetry, Shevchenko drew a contrast between the Ukraine's glorious past and her miserable present, mercilessly condemned Russian tsarism and bureaucracy, and advanced ideas of human equality, social justice and Ukrainian national independence.

His works achieved great success among the intellectuals who organized a short-lived secret society in Kiev in 1845, by the name of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius.

In protest against the regime of Nicholas I and his formula of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality, the Cyrillo-Methodians developed a Ukrainian Slavophilism of their own type. Searching for paths towards the rebirth of their own nation, they envisaged a politically autonomous Ukraine within a free federation of all Slavic peoples, and put forth as their practical aim, propaganda for the social and cultural emancipation of the popular masses. <sup>11</sup> At first, the Russian government did not pay much attention to the Ukrainian national rebirth as it was of a literary and cultural character. But Nicholas could not afford to disregard the secret Brotherhood. Its members were arrested and exiled in 1847 and a general repression followed until the mid 1850's when Alexander II succeeded to the throne and instigated his liberal reforms.

By the end of the 50's, the Ukrainian intelligentsia started to take up cultural and social work once again in order to aid the rebirth of national consciousness. Groups consisting largely of university youth organized themselves into societies called "hromady" (communities) throughout the larger cities of Ukraine. Their efforts to found Sunday schools for adults and to develop Ukrainian literature came to be viewed as a movement by the name of Ukrainofilstvo (or Ukrainian Populism). <sup>12</sup>

The chief role in the rise of this movement, was played by those men who had been banished by Nicholas in 1847 but received amnesty from Alexander II. They gathered together around P. Kulish in St. Petersburg, but because of their bitter experiences, decided to avoid discussion



of socio-political problems and concentrate on national-cultural interests. As a result of the weakening of the censorship, Kulish was allowed to become editor of a new journal Osneva (The Foundation) which, during its brief existence (1861-1863), propagated a program whose main theme was that Ukraine had her own territory, history, culture, literature and language, and should therefore have every possibility for further national development.<sup>13</sup> Besides publishing works on historical themes, Osneva devoted a large place to ethnography, folklore, geography and language. These articles were intended to expose the essential traits of the Ukrainian nation and to emphasize its peculiarity, originality, and that which differentiates the Ukrainian national character from others. This was to prove incontestably the existence of the Ukrainian people as a nation.

N. Kostomarev published a number of studies on this question in Osneva where he analyzed the differences between the Ukrainian, the Russian and the Polish peoples. According to him, Ukrainians were characterized by individualism and historically had striven towards democratic institutions while the Great Russians were marked by collectivism, and a tendency towards autocracy and firm monarchy. Contrasting Ukrainians with Poles, Kostomarev stated bluntly that Poles were aristocratic while Ukrainians were democratic.<sup>14</sup> Despite the contradictions between these sets of characteristics, Osneva called for a closer coming together of all Slavic nations and for a systematic struggle for the free national development of all Slavic nations and specifically for the Ukrainians.

On the practical side, Osneva aided the hromady in the organization of Sunday schools by collecting funds and by publishing text

books for their use. However, both the Populists and Osnova desired to carry on their cultural work within the bounds of the law. They seemed even favourably inclined towards tsarism on the serf question, welcoming the reforms of 1861 and especially happy that Ukraine appeared to be first in the development of the capitalist system in the Russian Empire. 15

In response to propaganda distributed by Moloda Rossia in 1862, calling for the immediate destruction of the tsarist order, the Populists published a collective letter Otzyv iz Kiyeva (Response from Kiev) in which they denounced this group's revolutionary means of struggle and tried to show that there was no basis for equating themselves with these theoreticians of terror. In addition, they declared that "political separatism was an insane fantasy over which they could not even seriously deliberate because they regarded it as neither beneficial nor necessary". 16

At the same time that Ukrainofilstvo was developing on Left Bank Ukraine, a movement called "Khlopomanstvo" (peasant lovers) was developing on Right Bank Ukraine. The rise of this movement was closely connected with the preparations being made for the Polish insurrection of 1863. In order to be successful in their demands that Russia return all the territories seized in the three partitions of Poland (which would have included most of Ukraine), the Poles attempted to infiltrate the growing Russian radical groups and arouse Ukrainian peasants in order to gain their support. The Khlopomany rejected Polish historical claims, refused to join the insurrection and denounced Polish revolutionary activities as senseless. To show their strong opposition to the Poles, they began to wear Ukrainian national costumes, sing Ukrainian songs and go out into villages in an attempt to educate the peasants. The Poles regarded them as traitors to the Polish cause and

began to denounce them to Russian authorities, accusing them of being  
 17  
 dangerous revolutionaries.

As a result of the various developments between 1861-1863, culminating with the Polish insurrection, the Russian government found the pretext for suppressing the Ukrainian movement altogether. Speculating that behind the drive for a distinct Ukrainian language lay the desire to separate Ukraine from Russia, a series of measures were introduced against the usage of the Ukrainian language. First of all, the government suspended publication of Osnova, closed all Ukrainian-organized Sunday schools, and finally, issued an edict forbidding Ukrainian-language publications on the basis that the dialect used by the common people was nothing other than Russian language that had been distorted  
 18  
 by Polish influence. Consequently, the centre of activity moved to Galicia where, as a result of the constitution, Ukrainians had the legal right to speak and write in their own language. Ukrainians from Russia sent their works to be published in Galician periodicals and especially in the journal Pravda which was founded in Lviv in 1867. It was only with a weakening of the persecutions that the centre moved back to the Kievan Hromada.

Here, in the early 70's, a group of scholars and university youth who had become fascinated by the ethnography, economy and archaeology of Ukraine, formed the South-Western Section of the Imperial Russian  
 19  
 Geographical Society. Their activities included the publication of ethnographic and statistical information on Ukraine, the establishment of contacts with Galicians in Austria-Hungary, and the acquisition of editorial control of the newspaper Kievskii Telegraf. It was also as

a result of their efforts that an archaeological congress was organized in Kiev in 1874. A number of foreigners attended this congress and, favourably impressed by the scholarly works on Ukrainian topics, returned home to write articles very sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause. 20 Consequently, the Ukrainian leaders and organizers of the South-Western Section were denounced for their activities which were regarded as revolutionary and dangerous to Russian interests, and an official Commission was set up in St. Petersburg to study the Ukrainian movement.

The Commission recommended:

1. that the Ministry of Internal Affairs prohibit the import of all books in the Ukrainian language without special permission from the chief of the Department of Printing.
2. that it halt publication in the Ukrainian language of all original works and translations except historical sources, and those only on condition that they follow the rules of Russian orthography and be permitted by the Department of Printing.
3. that it prohibit all stage performances and lyrics to musical compositions in Ukrainian and all public lectures by Ukrainians because these aided the Ukrainian movement.
4. that it close Kievskii Telegraf because its editorial staff was dangerous to Russian interests.
5. that it subsidize (at the rate of 1,000 rubles per year) an anti-Ukrainian newspaper in Galicia, Slove, which could not exist without such a subsidy.

The Commission also advised the Ministry of Education

1. to instruct all school authorities to prohibit teaching in elementary schools of any subject in the Ukrainian language
2. to remove from libraries of elementary and secondary schools throughout Ukraine all books and pamphlets written in Ukrainian or by Ukrainians
3. to take careful inventory of teaching personnel in Kiev, Kharkiv and Odessa educational districts, and to transfer to Russian educational districts those harbouring Ukrainian views
4. to be very careful in the future, in selecting teachers in Ukrainian school districts

5. to expel suspected students as well as teachers

6. to accept as a general rule that teachers in Kharkiv, Odessa and Kiev educational districts must be Russians (Ukrainians could be employed in the St. Petersburg, Kazan and Orenburg educational districts)

7. to close for an indefinite period the Kiev Branch of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society and allow it to open in the future only on condition that no then active member be allowed to participate in its work <sup>21</sup>

It also recommended that the Third Section exile M. Drahomaniv and P. Chubyns'kyi because they were "incorrigible and positively dangerous agitators".

Thus, the means that it proposed in dealing with the Ukrainian movement were forbidding the usage of the Ukrainian language and removing the leaders of the movement from their centres of activity. These recommendations were approved and acquired the force of law (Ems Ukaz) on 18 May 1876.

This meant that Ukrainians would have to wait until the political situation changed or else join the Russian revolutionary movements in the hope that a solution to the Ukrainian national question would be found after a common victory. <sup>22</sup> There were some Ukrainians who joined Russian revolutionary groups, including men like D.A. Lizohub, Ya. V. Stephanovich, and A. Zheliabov; a majority, however, began to look towards Galicia and give it special significance for Ukrainian national growth. It was looked upon as a Ukrainian Piedmont, destined to play <sup>23</sup> for Ukrainians the role the Sardinia did for Italian unification.

Enthusiastic over the possibilities which Galicia could have in playing the leading role in a Ukrainian national liberation movement, and consequently, a strong proponent of close ties between Galicia and

Ukraine was Mykhaylo Petrovich Drahomaniv.

Drahomaniv was born into a family of well-to-do landed gentry on 6 September 1841 in Hadyach in the province of Poltava. In 1859, he entered the faculty of history and philosophy at the University of Kiev where he specialized in Roman History. As a student, he joined the Kievan Hromada and took part in the organization and teaching in Sunday schools for town workers in Podilia. Because of the emphasis he placed on the need to give the population at least a basic education, he settled the question of the importance of the language of instruction in this manner: "We decided to resolve that problem by teaching in both languages, in Russian and Ukrainian, only naturally more in the former since there are more books written in that language."<sup>24</sup>

But he believed that this situation was only temporary, due to the lack of books in the Ukrainian language. Moreover, though he defended the use of the Ukrainian language, he was very critical of Osnova's hatred of everything non-Ukrainian, especially their ideas on Russian literature which he regarded as much more highly developed than Ukrainian.<sup>25</sup> Because of his interest in educating the popular masses in Ukraine, Russian authorities began to view Drahomaniv suspiciously. They became even more suspicious after he voiced his disapproval of Count P. Valuev's circular of 1863 which denied the existence of any "Little Russian" language. Drahomaniv wanted to know why Russian authorities claimed that the Ukrainian language was no different from the Russian language unless they were afraid that learning in that language meant the beginning of moral separatism which, in turn, would become the embryo of political separatism?<sup>26</sup> In early 1863, Ukrainian-

organized Sunday schools were closed and the Kievan Hromada fell apart, its members finishing university and either leaving Kiev or else staying behind to plan out their futures.<sup>27</sup>

In 1864, Drahomaniv defended his thesis, pro venia legendi on the Emperor Tiberius, after which he was admitted as lecturer at University of Kiev (privat dozent). As a result of his interest in ancient history, religion and mythology, he became interested in Slavic history, and especially fascinated by the legends and folklore of Ukrainians. By 1867, together with friends, he began to collect Ukrainian folk literature for publication. In 1869, he and V. Antonovych began a collection of Ukrainian historical songs. In 1870, he successfully defended his Master's thesis on Tacitus and the Question of the Historical Importance of the Roman Empire, and was sent abroad by the university to pursue his studies on ancient history. While travelling throughout Europe (1870-1873), he collected materials for comparative comments on folklore themes to be used for the proposed historical songs and wrote articles for Russian journals about life and politics abroad.<sup>28</sup> In one of his articles for Vestnik Evropy "Vostochnaia politika Germanii i obrusenie", he proposed the idea that Russia's policy of Russifying her minorities made them more susceptible to non-resistance if attacked by Germany, and, in the end, assured the success of German imperialistic aims.<sup>29</sup>

In addition, he met Ukrainians in Galicia, became extremely interested in developments there, established contacts with them and urged them to form a Ukrainian literary and scientific society out of reach of tsarist censorship. This was achieved with the organization of

the Shevchenko Society in 1873.

Appointed assistant professor at the University of Kiev, Drahomaniv returned to Kiev in 1873, a socialist with a slight leaning towards anarchism.<sup>30</sup> The South-Western Section of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society began to publish Drahomaniv's and Antonovych's two-volume collection of Istoriicheskiia pesni maloruskogo nareda and had the first volume ready for the Archaeological Congress held there in 1874. Besides this work, Drahomaniv also wrote a number of articles in Kievskii Telegraf criticizing the local administration. Due to his criticisms, he was immediately disliked and was accused of advocating separation of Ukraine from Russia and union with Poland. This resulted in the demand for his resignation from his post at the university which he categorically refused to submit.<sup>31</sup> Instead, he took a vacation in Galicia which initiated a whole new series of denunciations against him. Looked upon as the instigator of Ukrainian political and cultural separatism, Alexander II ordered his dismissal from the university, adding the provision that he could teach only in a Great Russian university.

Seeing in this move the beginning of a campaign against the Ukrainian movement as a whole, the Kievan Hromada decided to send Drahomaniv abroad so that there he could defend the Ukrainian cause. This was done just in time as one of the measures of the Ems Ukaz of 1876 included his banishment from Ukraine.

Drahomaniv first went to Lviv but he was forced to take refuge in Geneva as a campaign against the Ukrainian socialist movement in Galicia had just begun and he was accused of being the head of a socialist conspiracy and an agent of the Russian government.<sup>32</sup>



From the time of his emigration, Drahomaniv bound both parts of Ukraine together. For Ukrainians in Galicia, he was representative of progressive circles in Russia and of progressive European thought; for Ukrainians in Russia, he demonstrated that there was a part of Ukrainian land beyond the boundaries of Russia within a constitutional state which came into contact with European politics and culture.<sup>33</sup> Being realistic, he believed that each part should give to the Ukrainian cause according to its circumstances. Since the political activities of Ukrainians within the boundaries were very restricted, they should provide the ideas while the Galicians could change these ideas into actions.<sup>34</sup> He realized that there were no real Ukrainian political parties in Russia, but rather, loosely organized and mainly literary clubs. In Galicia, the situation was not much different except that there, such clubs could work legally as they could not in Russia.

While in Geneva, Drahomaniv began to collect material for the journal that the Kievan Hromada had sent him abroad to publish, and in their honour, he called it Hromada (The Community). In it, he presented a program for an autonomous socialist Ukraine which he believed would be fulfilled in the form of a free federation of "hromady" throughout all of the country.<sup>35</sup> He saw no grounds for political separatism, convinced that the attainment of autonomy would solve the national question. For practical reasons he urged Ukrainians to work together with the Russian nation for democratic federal changes throughout all of the Russian Empire.

In addition, he published a number of articles in Russian describing the internal conditions in the Empire and calling for its complete reconstruction into a federation of autonomous regions corresponding

to the economic, geographic and ethnographic conditions. In all these publications, he championed the cause of political freedom for Russia, a liberal constitution and a parliamentary system, and national autonomy for the non-Russians of the Empire. He believed that a new socialist order would arise in Russia as a result of a lengthy evolution and gradual reforms, and not through revolutionary terror and individual assassinations.<sup>37</sup>

Drahomaniv also contributed to several Galician periodicals, advocating strong ties between Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. He urged Galicians to look towards Russia, first of all because a majority of Ukrainian population lived there and secondly, because:

no matter what the conditions are in Russia (and I am not about to say that it is comparable to Paradise), she exists and will continue to exist forever. No matter how she lives, she lives for herself and in her own fashion. Whatever she has, she has as a result of the work of her own intelligentsia. Any form of progress strengthens Russia and organizes the strength of her people and not of others.<sup>38</sup>

His heavy criticism of the politics of the various Galician parties gave rise to new political ideals which influenced a whole new generation of Galician intelligentsia to political activity.

Moreover, he did not confine himself to Ukrainian and Russian publications only. Intent upon informing the rest of Europe about the existence and the plight of the Ukrainian nation, he wrote several articles in other European languages, including Italian and French, describing conditions in Ukraine and protesting against the harsh measures taken against the Ukrainian movement.<sup>39</sup>

Because of his journalistic activity, Drahomaniv became a central figure in the socio-political life of Galicians and Ukrainians.

He developed his own ideas about a politically-oriented Ukrainian movement which had much influence on his contemporaries. Some accepted his views because they thought as he did, others, simply because they lacked political thought. Some also rejected his theories because they did not believe that he brought the idea of national liberation to its logical  
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conclusion.

To understand why some accepted while others rejected Drahomaniv's views, it is necessary to analyze his concept of Ukraine and his vision for its evolution. It is also necessary to examine his plans for the reconstruction of the Russian Empire which, together with his plans for Ukraine, form an integral part of his thought.

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## CHAPTER II

## CONCEPT OF UKRAINE

Drahomaniv believed that the only difference between the political evolution of the Ukrainian nation and that of various other European peoples was that at a time when most nations were forming states, Ukraine had been unable to. Drahomaniv recognized that the function of a state:

no matter whether it is formed voluntarily or by force, was and still is for human beings, a union for the purpose of defending its inhabitants from foreigners and for organizing its own affairs on its own territory in its own manner.<sup>1</sup>

In failing to form their own state, the Ukrainians fell under the domination of foreigners, namely Russians in Ukraine, Poles and Germans in Bukovina and Hungarians in Transcarpathia.<sup>2</sup>

However, he saw no reason for anyone to deny Ukraine the right to an independent national existence and saw no reason to deny that Ukrainians were a separate race simply because they had failed to form their own state. He argued that Ukrainians were a distinct Slavic tribe with their own peculiarities and marked with originality,

Cette originalite etait de nature a elever le peuple oukrainienne au rang d'une nation a part, se rattachant a la race slave comme par exemple la nationalite scandinave se rattache a la race germanique.<sup>3</sup>

According to Drahomaniv, many Poles and Russians claimed that Ukrainians were not a separate race, but part of either the Polish or the Muscovite narod. He believed that this theory could be disproven by physical anthropology which would show "that in physique, in the colour of eyes, and hair, in the structure of the face and skull, there is a difference between them and the Russians and Poles".<sup>4</sup>

The Ukrainian language, as well, was a distinct Slavic

language like both Polish and Russian and just as Russians could not understand Ukrainian, so too Ukrainians could not understand Russian.

*C'est une langue harmonieuse, gracieuse, et qui se distingue dans la famille des langues slaves par ce fait qu'elle s'adapte facilement a la musique.*<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, if a song were composed in pure Ukrainian, it would be filled with free and loving thoughts, whereas if it were coloured even a little with foreign words, then elements of slavery and debauchery appeared.<sup>6</sup>

After completing a geographical survey of songs throughout Ukrainian territories, Drahomaniv proclaimed that

political frontiers as opposed to ethnic ones, have very little effect on the diffusion of songs. Our songs form a distinct and integrated group, and this is one of the clearest signs of a crystallized and homogeneous nationality.<sup>7</sup>

Not only did these songs prove that the Ukrainian people still existed and formed a distinct race, so too did the customs and the collective character of the people. On this point, Drahomaniv agreed with Kostomarov's claim that as a result of their national character, Russians tended to found despotic institutions, Poles aristocratic and Ukrainians republican.<sup>8</sup>

He dedicated much of his attention to the study of folklore in an attempt to show that all these factors which differentiated Ukrainians from the other Slavs gave them the right to their own particular life. Ukrainians had an image of themselves and of some future better order which would be fulfilled when the general cultural level of existence had risen considerably higher from its present level. To understand what Ukrainians wanted and how they expected to solve their national problem, Drahomaniv believed that it was necessary to analyze the Ukrainian historical past and to examine why conditions had become

so intolerable. The mistakes of the past would not be repeated in  
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 the future.

Drahomaniv claimed that the history of the social life of the Ukrainian people and their views of the foreigners under whose domination they had lived and were living had not been shown in proper perspective. He accused Ukrainian historians of belittling their own history by being oblivious to its past glories and by being so objective that their works lent themselves to anti-Ukrainian interpretations.

Somehow Ukrainians are not in the habit of boasting about their own ancestral traditions, probably because their independence and their aristocracy disappeared so long ago and there has 10  
 been no one to teach them to take pride in their glorious past.

Drahomaniv's views of the past lent themselves to a much more sympathetic interpretation of Ukrainian history. First of all, he believed that for the people of any country to live well, it was necessary for them to stay in one place for a long time, live in peace and harmony with their neighbours and be willing to offer and accept mutual aid. Foreigners could not disturb them nor attempt to conquer what was not rightfully theirs. Such conditions had not prevailed in Ukraine. From very early times, the people suffered a great deal from barbarian invasions. After driving out the Khazars, the Pechenegs and the Polovtsi, Ukrainians were forced to move north as a result of attacks by the Tatars. It was only 200 years after their first incursions that the Tatars began to lose power and this decline was not due to any kind of resurgence of Ukrainian power but rather to the fact that the Tatars were basically herders and therefore, always fighting amongst ~~each other for~~ 11  
 better pasture land.



Then the Lithuanians conquered Ukraine, but in Drahomaniv's opinion, this was the best period of her history for it resulted in a free union of Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine in which an unspecified "old order" was restored. It allowed Ukrainians to push back south-wards towards the Black Sea and opened up great colonization possibilities.<sup>12</sup> This good fortune was not to last long. With the Union of Lublin in 1569, a real union between Poland and Lithuania was achieved. A greater part of Ukrainian lands became part of Polish territories without any national autonomy and the upper strata of the Ukrainian population was rapidly denationalized. Polish clothing, customs and language spread as did the Catholic influence. Polonization of the people showed the desire of the Poles not for federation but assimilation.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, dissatisfaction with Polish rule developed and grew. At the same time, difficulties arose as a result of the re-emergence of the Tatar raids.

From 1482, whether on the order of the Sultan or from habit, the Tatars overran Ukrainian territory annually for almost 200 years. How Ukrainians suffered can be seen from the attack in 1575 in which 55,000 people, 40,000 horses and 500,000 other animals were taken back to the Crimea.<sup>14</sup>

It was obvious that some form of defence against the Tatars and retribution against the Poles was needed. This was found with the organization of the Cossacks who, originally, were soldiers, all free and all equal, and concerned about how, both collectively and individually, they could live and die for what they considered right.<sup>15</sup> At first, they were small in number; nonetheless, they were very successful

against the Turks. The Polish magnates disliked them but did nothing to stop their development as they were performing a valuable frontier-defence service. However, the Cossack bands quickly expanded, became braver and more organized, and assumed an offensive position against the Turks. Moreover, they came to consider themselves as an independent military force and began to follow a policy independent of Poland.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, the Poles began to fear them and decided that it would be best to divide the Cossack units. Naturally, the Cossacks reacted and began forming unions with peasants for the common struggle against the centralizing tendencies of the Polish magnates.

Since Ukrainians could in no way imagine an independent existence under Poland, they turned towards Moscow and allied themselves with the Tsar. Khmel'nitsky, who signed the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654,<sup>17</sup> did not do it for love of Moscow but out of hatred towards Poland. Although the Ukrainians had the aid of Muscovy, they were unsuccessful in the war which followed because the Poles and Muscovites came to a common agreement to divide Ukraine between themselves. Poland took the right bank of the Dniepr, Moscow the left bank and Kiev. Paliy on the right bank, looked to Moscow for help, Mazepa on the left bank, to Poland.<sup>18</sup> The division in Cossack loyalties rendered a death blow to an autonomous Ukrainian development for after Paliy's victory, the Polish magnates and the Tsar took complete control of their respective Ukrainian areas. The population was enserfed, the Cossack elders became Polonized or Russified, and the Cossack organizations were progressively weakened until they were extinguished in 1775. Consequently, Drahomaniv

could not but view the union of Lithuania with Poland as disastrous, for it forced Ukrainians to ally themselves with Moscow under whose rule they suffered a fate if not worse, then at least no better than what they experienced under Polish domination.<sup>19</sup>

Drahomaniv believed that it was extremely important to question the validity of the interpretation of Ukrainian history between the 16th and 18th centuries and especially of the role and significance of the Cossacks, for he claimed, what was written and taught in schools was a perversion of the truth by Russian scholars. They attempted to show how Ukrainians suffered from and fought with Tatars, Turks and Poles until they returned to their own natural Muscovite tsars who satisfied all their needs. The idea that Ukrainians were dissatisfied with the Tsarist government was totally foreign to Moscow historians. Soloviev, for example, wrote that the Ukrainian population truly had suffered much, not from Muscovite tyranny, but from its own Cossack elders. Unintentionally, Ukrainian historians supported this perversion by emphasizing only the faults of the Cossacks and omitting their good points.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, it came out that the Cossacks were madmen and from their very origins, nothing but marauding hordes, desirous of perpetrating a wasteland around themselves. For 200 years, these pillagers stood in the way of a peaceful existence and it was left up to the Tsars to root them out and establish a new European order in Ukrainian social life.

If this interpretation was correct, Drahomaniv argued, one should question why the Cossack regiments on the Dniepr and Dniestr were destroyed and those on the Don preserved. Moreover, what had Ukrainians gained in the 200 years after the worthless Cossacks were overthrown

and replaced by the Muscovite European order? The first question he did not even attempt to answer. The second, he answered with a question of his own:

Why did they destroy those regional rights and elective governments that existed once in Ukraine when now, all intelligent people think that they can not get along without these regional rights and elective governments?<sup>21</sup>

Even the uneducated population remembered the Cossack order as a free society and regretted its destruction by Russian tsardom. In the songs of the 18th and 19th centuries, not only did Ukrainians lament the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich, but also the fate which befell them after the fall of Mazepa. In addition, these songs showed that the Ukrainian population understood its separateness from Moscow, both as a race and as a community almost in the same manner as it had understood its separateness from Poland in the 17th century, despite the fact that they<sup>22</sup> professed the same religion as the Muscovites.

Drahomaniv was extremely adamant about recounting this part of Ukrainian history because it showed

que l'histoire de l'Oukraine se caracterise par les aspirations du peuple vers des institutions republicaines et democratiques ... Si ce peuple n'a pas reussi a realiser son ideal, cela tient a la situation geographique du pays qui, d'une part se trouvait sur le passage des peuples nomades de l'Asie et, d'autre part, devait en meme temps exciter les convoitises des grands etats de l'Europe orientale. Telle est la cause principale de tous les desastres politiques de l'Oukraine.<sup>23</sup>

He placed great importance on the geographical factor, stressing that the history of each nation was conditioned by its geography. He considered a nation living in a country with clearly defined boundaries very fortunate, for its characteristics and possibilities could be understood even if its population were on a primitive level. But a nation living

on territory where geography gave it a complex task, required of its population a highly evolved consciousness, acute understanding and persistence. Almost all the Slavs, but especially the Poles, Belorussians, Great Russians and Ukrainians, had to cope with such an unfortunate situation.  
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How then would one determine what constitutes Ukrainian territory? Could one base it on the right of the conqueror over the conquered in which case Ukraine would cease to exist and would become either part of Poland or part of Russia? Obviously one could not, for conquest is a fact not a right. Could one base it then on the so-called essence of the people which might be its religion? In that case one would conclude that that section which professed Orthodoxy belonged to Russia while that which professed Catholicism to Poland. To answer this question, it would be necessary to ask the people who lived there their opinion. If they remembered properly, they would choose to be neither Polish nor Russian for they had not been so broken down by foreign rule and serfdom to have lost all feeling of "narodnost".  
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Consequently, the problem would be solved by admitting that Ukraine belonged to neither Poles nor Russians but to the nation which first inhabited the land and worked on it.

What then should one consider as the boundaries of this nation whose territory was divided amongst foreign kingdoms but whose population felt close ties with each other because of similarity of language and customs? Very simply, Drahomaniv defined Ukrainian territory as that territory inhabited by the same type of peasants as inhabited the former Cossack Ukraine.  
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Examining a map, he calculated that Ukrainian territory extended from the upper Tisza in the West to the Don and the

Kubanland in the East, and from the river Narev in the North to the Black Sea in the South.<sup>27</sup> According to these boundaries, the Ukrainian peasants had as neighbours, Poles from Bilostok to the Carpathians, Slovaks from beyond the Carpathians to Uzhorod, Hungarians from Uzhorod to Khust, Moldavians (Wallachians and Roumanians) from Khust to the mouth of the Danube, Bulgarians right near the mouth, Tatars, Bulgars, Turks, Greeks, Georgians along the Black Sea, Tatars in the Crimea, Circassians beyond the Kuban, Muscovites (Great Russians) from the bend of the Kuban to Novgorod Siverskyi and Belorussians further on.

More than 17,000,000 Ukrainians inhabited this territory; 14,239,129 in Russia, 2,312,000 in Galicia, 200,000 in Bukovina and 520,000 in Transcarpathia.<sup>28</sup> The majority of the population were peasants and did not have any concept of their own territorial state. That sort of idea was common in other races among the literate and the wealthy who in Ukraine had become Polonized or Russified.<sup>29</sup> This class of people had few ties with the peasants. Their connections now were more with the foreign authorities, for they had been educated in foreign schools. Their sense of community with their own people had been seriously weakened and they paid more attention to territorial boundaries and administrative divisions,

the ranks of the intelligentsia were diminished and more and more the integrity of the national-political ideal was lost. At the same time, the peasant masses were falling under the Polish and Muscovite systems of serfdom. Up to the 19th century, Ukrainian national consciousness lay dormant.<sup>30</sup>

It was only in the first three decades of the 19th century that a handful of Ukrainian intellectuals began to investigate what the social conditions of the Ukrainian peasants were like during the height of Coss-

ack power, and how highly they compared to their present situation.

Ideas sprang up about the return of Cossack freedom in Ukraine, about emancipation of the peasantry from serfdom and the need for education, and about the union of all Ukrainian lands and autonomy either within Russia or else in a united and free Slavdom.<sup>31</sup> In the 40's these ideas were voiced by the poet Shevchenko and by the secret Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. They did not become widespread, however, because of censorship and because in Russia, the desires of the Brotherhood were not understood. In the 50's and 60's, the Ukrainophiles made an attempt to develop a national program but because of the widespread reactionary and oppressive conditions the Ukrainian movement could not concern itself openly with political questions. As a result, "tout était perdu. On ne pouvait plus s'occuper que de la 'culture apolitique'."<sup>32</sup> Drahomaniv resented this cautious abstainment from all political activity and after carefully examining the situation, formulated his own socio-political program for Ukrainian national development and indicated the means to be used to achieve the goal.

It became apparent to Drahomaniv that it was dangerous to make nationality of primary importance in the Ukrainian question for from history he observed that the national idea was not a cure in itself for all social evils and that often it in fact led to great injustice. For example, the Germans' desire to rid themselves of French rule after Napoleon's conquest led them to consider their German nationality as the most important aspect of human personality and as a consequence, influenced their attitude to every other nationality. The Germans began to show hatred of everything French simply because it was French and

favour towards anything German simply because it was German. A German had to think only about being a German and preserving the peculiar national character or spirit which had been bestowed upon him either by God or by Nature. As a result, the idea grew amongst educated Germans that nationality was of primary importance in the development of a human being.<sup>33</sup>

At the same time, however, Drahomaniv was of the opinion that nationality should not be ignored altogether but that in the interests of human progress, it should not be placed on a pedestal and regarded as something sacred. He realized that this would be especially hard for Ukrainians who tended to over-evaluate nationalism in history and life due to the heavy oppression of their nationality. Nonetheless, he repeatedly urged cosmopolitanism in ideas and aims, nationalism in foundation and form.

We should stand for the idea that the most important thing is human and social progress and nationality only the basis, the form and means. Then we will serve the good and well-being of our people and together with this, its nationality; the defence and development of that which is good in it.<sup>34</sup>

Drahomaniv was opposed to the concept held by some Ukrainians that their nationalism was not threatening anyone, that others had nothing to fear for as soon as these nationalists had completed the defence of their nation, they would become firm supporters of cosmopolitanism. He pointed out that their nationalism was not all that peaceful and as proof advised Ukrainians to listen to the manner in which they themselves spoke about Russians, Poles and Jews. He urged nationalists to think of what would happen to these people should they find the means of taking



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the government into their own hands. For these over-zealous patriots, nationalism was synonymous with political separatism and Drahomaniv could not see anywhere the necessary force or groundwork for the political separation of Ukraine from Russia. On the contrary, he saw that they had common interests, for all Slavs, including Russians, were suffering under the government because of monarchical despotism, centralization and lack of self-government. Ukrainians in particular, he claimed, were suffering more due to the fact that neither the rights of man and citizen nor their nationality were recognized. Consequently, he discouraged Ukrainian attempts to form a state of their own or even some kind of dualism, like the Hungarians in Austria. Instead, he thought that a solution for Ukrainian autonomy should be sought together with educated Russians and members of other minorities of the Russian Empire by supporting ideas about autonomy and federalism rather than nationalism and separatism.

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Most of his ideas on autonomy and federalism he inherited from the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius which propagated Ukrainian, or rather Kievan, Panslavism instead of separatism. From this secret society he took the basic idea that the Ukrainian people constituted a nation and that they possessed sovereignty as well as equality of rank and worth with other nations of the world. In the political sphere, sovereignty meant a Ukrainian republic, separate and equal to other Slavic republics, and with equal right to join a Slavic federation. In the cultural sphere, it meant a Ukrainian culture, complete, absolute, non-restrictive by concepts of subordination to other cultures and capable of satisfying the needs of both the uneducated and the highly-trained

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echelons of the population. What he added was a much more detailed and comprehensive program for Ukrainian federalism which he called Vil'na Spilka (Free Union) and which was strongly influenced by Proudhon's principle: "Qui dit liberté, dit fédération ou ne dit rien. Qui dit socialisme, dit: fédération, ou ne dit de nouveau rien." <sup>38</sup> The final goal of the Ukrainian Free Union was to have been a socialist society of an anarchistic direction which was to have been achieved only after the attainment of political freedom by each of the regional political societies which would unite for joint action, to transform the Russian Empire. Drahomaniv summed up the aims of the Ukrainian Free Union

- I General civic aims: a) the rights of man and citizen - the indispensable condition for personal dignity and development.
- b) self-government - the basis for progress toward social justice
- II Specific national aim: Political freedom - as a means for the return of the Ukrainian nation to the family of civilized peoples. <sup>39</sup>

Once political freedom was achieved, then Free Union could work towards the attainment of at least certain basic social and economic measures which would reduce oppression to a minimum. These included alleviating the hardships of military service, tax reform, improving workers' conditions, developing co-operative or collective ownership <sup>40</sup> as opposed to private ownership, and equal opportunity for education. Drahomaniv believed that the Ukrainian masses as a whole considered some kind of action in these areas very important as even their songs indicated that "after several hundred years of foreign domination, the opposition of our people is more from social and economic motives than from national and political antipathies and sympathies". <sup>41</sup>

Still, all these changes would not have satisfied those who

desired complete socialism or as Drahomaniv called it, "hromadiivstvo" (communalism). As a final goal, the hromadiivtsi desired anarchy, by which term they meant a free federation of free communities formed of free individuals working for a common goal. They would work, as much as possible, towards the weakening of state authority by lessening the state's hold over every individual and by pressing for greater freedom for every individual in both word and deed, for every race, union and community. This would give them a real chance to work for truly meaningful changes in the making of a new society.<sup>42</sup>

How should Ukrainians look upon this goal? First of all, they had to realize that they constituted too large a group to form only one society. In order to remain truly free, they would have to organize themselves into a society of societies with complete freedom in all matters including the choice of uniting into an even larger federation. They would not find it that difficult to reach such an anarchistic goal for it was not unheard of in Ukraine.<sup>43</sup> For almost 200 years during the Zaporozhian Sich period, economic and military conditions of the Cossacks were very similar to those desired by Ukrainian socialists with the exception that although there was liberty, there was not enough equality.<sup>44</sup>

Drahomaniv believed that not only was Ukraine far from establishing an anarchistic order, but that the present order did not give the masses a chance even to think about their life properly, let alone try to change it. The institution of socialism in Ukraine would depend upon its establishment throughout the world, for only then there would be no need for soldiers and merchants, the pillars of aristocracy and wealth. In addition, religion would have to be replaced by free scientific

studies, for faith could only lead to disaccord among people, and the clergy could only strengthen the powers of the aristocracy, thereby increasing authority.<sup>45</sup> In Ukraine, however, where they had no state of their own, nor priesthood, aristocracy or merchantry (for these classes had been completely denationalized), the peasantry, who were the representatives of the Ukrainian narod, its traditions and desires, would gladly accept teachings about a new anarchistic order for this idea<sup>46</sup> corresponded to their way of life.

Secondly, Ukrainian socialists had to decide on the means to be used in working towards this goal. To understand what means Drahomaniv proposed and why, it is necessary to examine his theory of historical progress. According to this theory whose basic teaching was that nothing on this earth is constant (permanent) and standing (static), but rather changing (evolving) and moving (dynamic),<sup>47</sup> he viewed progress as the natural result of economic, social and political developments. Organic evolution was the basis for economic and social development, whereas political development depended largely on the manner in which the former two were evolving. Political changes, in comparison to social and economic, were much easier to achieve, as changes in the latter required<sup>48</sup> a total uprooting of the present order. Even geology and biology showed that changes took place slowly (the word revolution was replaced by evolution) and therefore, belief in the setting up of a new order as a result of a large uprising (revolution) showed the tendency to think naively in terms of political development rather than social and economic. It was possible for a minority (a majority has no need to revolt) to start a revolution by awakening the masses, possible to put an end to an old

order whose destruction had been prepared already on all sides by other, more natural means, it was even possible sometimes to bring about a new order, but it was impossible to uphold the new arrangement for "tradition (habit) and self-interest are more influential over people than word and reason."<sup>49</sup> Consequently, Drahomaniv viewed revolution as "a momentary and contained phenomenon, and only one aspect of the evolutionary process".<sup>50</sup>

This was not to say that he rejected revolution totally; on the contrary, he could not believe in the possibility of attaining the goal through peaceful means only.

In Ukraine, one can expect even less than anywhere else, that the upper and ruling classes will voluntarily give up their power and as a result, the common masses cannot get along without a revolution.<sup>51</sup>

Since the upper classes would not help the peasantry, as was obvious from their reluctance to speak the same language as the common masses, the latter would have to rely upon their own forces in the struggle for liberation of the Ukrainian narod. For Drahomaniv, this idea of the struggle of the peasantry by its own forces was merely a paraphrasing of the slogan of the First Internationale - the liberation of the working masses should be the task of the workers themselves - applied to<sup>52</sup> Ukrainian circumstances. But even once the peasants recognized their own strength, the goal would be easier to achieve if their activities were directed by educated people who, of their own free will, placed themselves completely at the service of the peasantry.<sup>53</sup> However, up to the present, the intellectuals were separated from the population because of their aristocratic tendencies. These new "changed-into-

aristocrats" were just as reluctant to use the Ukrainian language and to identify with the masses. But this problem could be solved easily by giving these intellectuals a little more humane upbringing. Then they would assume their proper role in the liberation movement as the propagators of a new order and of the means to be used by the peasants to achieve change.

According to Drahomaniv, the goals of all socialists were the same throughout the world, just as was theoretical knowledge; however, the approaches used by each country, race, group or individual should have been different just as was applied science.<sup>54</sup> Thus, Ukrainian socialists should look to the socialists in Western Europe and America, accept their ideas and in their own fashion, attempt changes in their own territories. First of all, they would have to see to it that their movement was free of all national exclusiveness and reaction which, in the case of Ukraine, meant a rejection of the idea of separatism. This would have been the sole realistic approach for, according to Drahomaniv, the demand for separation was practically non-existent, a "quantite negligeeable":

What sort of an idea is it which, during 20 or 30 years, has not found a single person ready to acknowledge it openly and courageously, prepared to sacrifice for it some of his ease, or his career, not to speak of his life.<sup>55</sup>

Ukrainian socialists, however, were dealing well with the problem of nationalism versus internationalism for until this time, they had not done anything which would have indicated their deviation from the ideas of new international socialism. One would not find amongst them that type of nationalism which desired to establish rule over another nation

or even that kind of nationalism which was occupied solely with members<sup>56</sup> of their own nationality.

Secondly, the socialists would have to see to it that the national problem would be tied in with the struggle for political reform, which in turn would be tied in with the program for socio-economic reforms. One of the major problems facing Ukrainians politically, was the fact that they were divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires and that within these empires, the various regions were isolated from each other. Ukrainians and Galicians regarded themselves as members of the same nation, yet each part had little contact with the other and the few people who tried and did establish contacts were not well-informed on political and national conditions.<sup>57</sup> Ukrainians in Transcarpathia were even in a stranger position vis-a-vis the Galicians, for although both were under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, their separation from each other was even more pronounced and the Ukrainians in Transcarpathia believed blindly in liberation by the Russian tsar. It appeared to Drahomaniv that the two were isolated from each other<sup>58</sup> by a "Chinese wall".

All these divisions made it that much harder for Ukrainians to form their own state, considering also that their chances of struggling and winning against both Russia and Austria were practically impossible. It might have been different had one of the two powers been able to extend its authority over all Ukrainian territories; however, such a situation seemed highly unlikely. Moreover, seeing that they could not place any hopes either on the Austrian or the Russian centralist governments, Ukrainians finally concluded that support for patriotic activity

had to be found "under their own noses" and that in each part, socialism  
59  
had to be spread progressively as conditions permitted.

Ukrainian socialists in Austria obviously would find their task easier than Ukrainians in Russia, for Austria at least had a constitution. Consequently, Ukrainians in Austria could attempt to organize a socialist party of workers and peasants in union with Poles and Jews, while in Russia, they would have to struggle first of all for political freedom. To attain political freedom, they would have to support the politics of the Galician socialists for only then would the rest of the world see that there was a numerous group of educated Ukrainian democrats vigorously pursuing a just cause:

Only when we show our strength in at least one part of our land, will Europe turn its attention towards us. It is naive to believe that people in general, even the most humane, will be concerned about others solely because they are being oppressed. Are a few only being oppressed? Usually, people are interested in those who fight back and to those only do they give help.<sup>60</sup>

Moreover, since history and the current practices of European nations showed that political and national autonomy was possible without separatism and since "only a world-wide cataclysm could tear away Ukrainians  
61  
politically from the Great Russians", Drahomaniv urged that Ukrainians, together with the other minorities and with the Great Russians as well, work towards the destruction of the tsarist system and the reconstruction of the Russian Empire.



## Chapter II. Footnotes

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3. M.P. Drahomanov, La littérature Oukraïnienne proscrite par le gouvernement russe, Geneva, 1878, p. 6. (Hereafter cited as Dragomanov, Littérature.)
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6. Drahomaniv, Novi pisni, pp. 96-97.
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8. Dragomanov, Littérature, p. 8.
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15. Drahomaniv, Propashchyi chas, p. 35.
16. Drahomaniv, Pro kozakiv, pp. 26-29.
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19. Drahomaniv, Propashchyi chas, p. 25.
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21. Drahomaniv, Propashchyi chas, pp. 9-11.
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29. Drahomaniv, Novi pisni, p. 14.
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## CHAPTER III

## RECONSTRUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Drahomaniv was extremely concerned about the future of Ukraine but his love for the Ukrainian people did not blind him to political realities. He recognized that the fate of Ukraine was inextricably linked with that of Russia. He believed that various Slav peoples had formed strong ties with the Russian people and that if these ties were broken, the individual Slav groups might face destinies less beneficial than remaining in connection with the Russians. Consequently, he worked toward some kind of a broad federal plan for the reconstruction of the Russian Empire which would be fully worthy of the new liberating ideas of the times and which could satisfy the interests of the various nationalities.

Since he supported freedom and equality among all nations, free development of learning and culture, and peace and brotherhood among nations, his program was based on the idea that the only rational path to a future and improved Russia lay in the destruction of autocracy and centralization, for these were the means that tsarism used to carry out political and national oppression. As a corollary, he propagated wide decentralization, a liberal constitution and a parliamentary system, in the hope that these reforms would bring about a solution to the problem that he personally considered of utmost importance -- the national freedom of Ukraine.

His proposed constitution Vil'na Spilka (Free Union), provided for the recognition of the State (by which he meant an All-Russian and East European Union) on the basis of human and civil rights and self-government.

In the clauses dealing with "the rights of man and citizen", his primary concern was for the individual since he believed that human freedom and worth were the highest values.<sup>2</sup> In the distribution of State powers, his greatest emphasis was on the lower levels reflecting his interest in decentralization. State powers were distributed as broadly as possible.

Affairs concerning the entire Russian State Union and legislation of the State as a whole were to be in the hands of two Councils: the State Council, chosen by electoral colleges in electoral districts; and the Union Council, elected by regional councils. The Chief of State was to be either an hereditary Emperor or an elected President of the All-Russian State Union for a fixed term. The State Assembly was to be composed of all the members of the State and Union Councils plus special deputies elected by regional councils so that the total number of special deputies and members of Union Council would equal the number of members of the State Council. The Constitution of the State was not to be amended without the approval of two-thirds of the State and Union Councils and ratification by the State Assembly.

Having dealt briefly with the higher organs, he concentrated on the clauses dealing with self-government. His main desire was that local self-government be effective, subject to the provision that representatives of the central State could override "only such decrees and acts by the agencies of local self-government as are contrary to the fundamental laws and common interests of the State union".

Local self-government was to be administered by communal (village and town), volost (group of villages), uyezd (district) and regional

assemblies. The communal, volost, and district authorities would administer the local public economy, public works, welfare, public elementary and secondary education, if possible; the regional council would legislate for and administer the regional public economy, public works<sup>3</sup> and welfare where they were beyond the means of a single district.

The most important feature of Drahomaniv's proposed constitution was his demand for a new territorial unit to replace the traditional Russian provinces. The new unit was to have been the region which, unlike the huge provinces, would provide no possibility for centralization. The basis for the division of the Russian Empire into regions was to be determined by geographic, economic and ethnographic factors. On the basis of these desiderata, Drahomaniv proposed the following regions: the Northern and Baltic regions, Lithuania, Poland, Belorussia, Polisia, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv, Moscow, Nizhni Novgorod, Kazan, the Urals, Saratov, Caucasia, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, the Cossack lands<sup>4</sup> (Don, Kuban, Terek) and Central Asia. Considering his concern for wide decentralization, his newly-proposed regions were scarcely more balanced or more rationally determined than were the old Russian provinces. An All-Russian program would come about as the sum of regional programs just as an All-Russian political organization would result from the alliance of regional organizations.

In accordance with Proudhon's teachings which Drahomaniv wholeheartedly supported, he saw any attempt to govern the All-Russian State through a central representative assembly without the recognition and safeguarding of the rights of man and citizen and without local self-government "as giving as little protection to the cause of freedom in

general and to the interests of Ukraine in particular as did the present organization of the Russian Empire!"<sup>5</sup> He stressed that the main problem for 19th century Russia was the need to destroy autocracy and to replace it with a constitutional system, for only political reforms could open the doors to true progress in the socio-economic sphere.

At the same time he warned Russian revolutionaries of the danger of forming programs of an exclusively Russian character, of speaking from the Great Russian nation about the Great Russian nation<sup>6</sup> only. He believed that the political movement would achieve far better and quicker results if an attempt were made to accommodate the non-state nations which would then do their utmost to help such a movement. Drahomaniv was especially interested in the positions taken by the various Great Russian parties vis-a-vis the national problem in Ukraine for he believed that the attitude of the Great Russians toward the Ukrainians was typical of the attitude of privileged nations toward plebeian nations and of all the plebeian nations in Eastern Europe, the Ukrainian had the largest and most energetic populace.<sup>7</sup>

Constitutional propriety and the question of balancing the multi-national character of the Russian State had little influence on the mainstream of Russian revolutionary thought in the latter 19th century. Among some groups the strongest influence was the Slavophile theory of the need to return to pre-Petrine "Holy Russia". Strongest of all were the theories of the various radical socialist revolutionaries who stated that Russia could leap forward to a classless and stateless society, skipping the "bourgeois parliamentary system" altogether. Drahomaniv criticized each of these trends. He saw the Slavophiles as reactionaries,

and the radical socialists as unrealistic. To him, both exemplified Great Russian particularism and narrowness while pretending to be international.

He was extremely displeased with the Russian Slavophiles because he believed that they had harmed the development of the Panslav idea, which had been first formulated and propagated by members of oppressed nationalities. The Russians had introduced "a spirit of narrow national pride, of Byzantine religious intolerance and of political servility."<sup>8</sup> Moscow Slavophiles were not Panslavists but Pan-Orthodoxists, viewing the Slavic question from a religious point of view. Their ideal was the past and especially the seventeenth century, a time at which they could equate Russia with Orthodoxy, the West with Catholicism, Catholicism with Jesuitism and Latinism, and consequently, promulgate the idea that there could never be peace between the Russian nation<sup>9</sup> and Latinism.

They did not formulate any kind of clear all-Slavic program, but rather concerned themselves with a forced religious union which they thought would lead to unity in government. In fact, it led to the exact opposite, for in Russia the concept that Orthodoxy, Russian nationality and the State were all synonymous resulted in the creation of a situation where Catholics, Protestants and Jews could no longer regard themselves as Russians. Consequently, national and state unity were weakened. The Slavophiles should have realized that in order to preserve<sup>10</sup> the unity of the State it was necessary to separate Church and State.

Later Slavophiles went even further to narrow the ideas of the old Slavophiles into a theory of military bureaucratic Russification



of Slavic and indeed non-Slavic peoples within Russia and beyond her boundaries, a theory which bordered on an all-absorbing dictatorial centralism.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, when the Russo-Turkish War broke out in 1878, and Russia went to aid the Balkan Slavs, the Slavophiles justified her position by claiming that all she desired was the political and social liberation of the oppressed Slavs. At the same time, they conveniently overlooked the fact that within her own territories Russia was choking all life and thought and was suppressing her minorities both politically and socially:

How can a government where there are class privileges, no basic elementary human immunities, a system of forced Russification of all non-Great Russian elements, supremacy of the Church, how can this type of government serve the cause of freedom and self-government for the Slavic and non-Slavic elements in Turkey?<sup>12</sup>

Whenever mention was made of the possibility of an autonomous Ukraine, Poland or Belorussia, the Slavophiles immediately proceeded to pacify the Russian people who, they thought, feared that the granting of autonomy would weaken the great and might power of Russia.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, although the Ukrainian movement was still weak politically, the Slavophiles were quite hostile to it for they saw the movement as a separatist one. For Drahomaniv, all these factors were merely proof of how insincere and pretentious the Slavophiles really were and how much more apt it would have been to call them Great Russophiles as opposed to Slavophiles.<sup>14</sup>

Even Herzen laughed at the Slavophiles for he pointed out that while German Hegelians claimed that God lived in Berlin, Moscow-Hegelians moved that God from the Germans to the Slavs and especially

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 to the Great Russians. He was convinced that the idea of Panslavism took on a much different form in Ukraine than in Russia. He praised Ukrainian Panslavists for propagating a federal union of Slavs in which each narodnost would retain its peculiarities. In their programs, there was no talk of breaking away from Russia but rather, the desire to join with other Slavs in a union under the sceptre of the Russian tsar. 16

Drahomaniv was a little apprehensive about Herzen's praise of the village obshchina, which he regarded as a leftover from Moscow Slavophilism, but on the whole, he was enthusiastic about Herzen. In the first place, Herzen had written the following about Ukrainian aspirations to freedom:

Ukraine was a Cossack republic at the basis of which were democratic and social foundations. If and when Ukraine ... decides that she desires to be neither Polish nor Russian, then in my opinion, the problem should be solved simply by recognizing her as free and autonomous. 17

Secondly, in his Kolokol, Herzen demanded, after the abolition of serfdom, political freedom, personal inviolability, freedom of speech, conscience, and nationality, demands that Drahomaniv considered of utmost and immediate necessity. Finally, Drahomaniv respected Herzen because of the authority with which he was treated by the population as a result of his refusal to remain silent about the most censored questions of the day. 18

He was also very interested in Herzen because the latter took a definite stand on the Polish question. Although Herzen believed that Poland, like Italy and Hungary, should have the right to self-government independent of Russia, he hoped that a free Poland would not break away from a free Russia. He felt assured that Russia and Poland could work

together hand in hand towards the establishment of a free social life. <sup>19</sup>

Drahomaniv was interested in the Polish question because he believed that to achieve anything in the Russian Empire subjugated nations had to be united. Like Herzen, he upheld the rights of the Polish nation to an autonomous life and saw separatism from Russia as harmful not only to the interests of Russia and Salvdom but to the interests of Poland itself. He always supported the uniting of Polish revolutionary strength with Russian in the struggle against autocracy and perpetually denounced the negative attitude of Polish nationalists to the political <sup>20</sup> and national concerns of Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Drahomaniv had no difficulty in deciding whether the rational road to autonomy for Poland should be separatism or federalism. Recognizing that Poland could not rely on her own strength to defeat Russia nor on foreign military aid, he declared that there was only one road for Poland - federalism. If Poles desired autonomy and political freedom, they would have to work with various other nationalities of the Russian Empire and make their impact on the Russian government by means of a clearly thought-out program. The program would have to be a federal one and recognize complete equality of all regions and nationalities. It would also have to be democratic for the democratic principle <sup>21</sup> carried to its logical conclusion would lead to socialism. If this program were followed then the Ukrainians would bear no grudge against the Polish population, but would oppose the subjugation of Poland as a contradiction of fundamental human rights and violation of the interest of the Slavs in general.

The majority of Polish nationalists were of the opinion that Poland's historic boundaries should be restored. This, according to Drahomaniv, meant that the part of Ukrainian territory under Polish rule would be denied the right to deal with its own destiny. Such an attitude caused a fair amount of antagonism between Ukrainians and Poles, an antagonism which was compounded by the fact that the Poles in Ukraine were the landowning class.<sup>22</sup>

During the Polish uprising of 1863, no Pole raised the question of the fate of the other nations within the boundaries of Poland, because the idea of dividing historic Poland among its nationalities had not yet found a sufficient number of adherents. Consequently, the Ukrainian population unequivocally expressed its desire not to unite in any way with Poland.<sup>23</sup> Drahomaniv did not receive Polish historic claims very warmly: "Whenever the question of historic Poland arises, you must either back off or else throw cold water on the Poles."<sup>24</sup> He justified the Ukrainians' refusal to join the uprising for he viewed the revolt as nothing other than an attempt by the landlords to restore their old privileges. Even the Polish peasants refused to support it, sometimes working openly against it, claiming that if the nobility and the bourgeoisie were fed up with the Muscovite yoke, they themselves were even more fed up with the yoke imposed upon them by their own shlachta.<sup>25</sup> Within this perspective it was easy for Drahomaniv to explain the failure of the Polish uprising.

According to Drahomaniv, the uprising for historic Poland finally destroyed the credit of Polish historic patriotism and prevented for quite a while the fulfillment of the legitimate demands of the Polish

narod as well as the establishment of political freedom and the urgently needed social reforms throughout all of the Russian Empire where central-<sup>26</sup>ization was intensified in the wake of the revolt. The failure of the uprising demonstrated the necessity of revolutionary groups to turn against all "centralizing-national-state policies" and to accept "federalist-international-popular" ones. It also indicated that Poland, like every other nation in the Russian Empire, was most likely to obtain political freedom through federalism rather than separatism.

It was precisely this emphasis on federalism which tied Drahomaniv to Bakunin. Drahomaniv was very sympathetic towards him because Bakunin's teachings were very similar to Proudhon's. His anarchism was opposed to the monarchic, constitutional and republican theories of his French contemporaries and regarded complete freedom of the individual as synonymous with the English expression "self-government". Drahomaniv concluded that, in its practical aspects, Bakunin's anarchism led to federalism.

Moreover Drahomaniv found Bakunin particularly appealing because, like Herzen, he addressed himself to the Ukrainian national question. After reviewing "Little Russia's" history, he declared that Ukrainians made a terrible mistake in the 17th century in accepting the protection of the Russian tsar who promised to preserve their freedom and their national autonomy. But since that time Ukrainians had been systematically and cruelly persecuted by a Russian "panslavic national government". Bakunin thought that since the population of Ukraine numbered about 15 million people, since they all spoke the same language, had the same customs and boasted of a great historical past,

...this nation (Little Russia), as well as Belorussia, should be an autonomous nation and should be allowed to enter an alliance with either Poland or Great Russia, but should not be under the hegemony of either one or the other.<sup>28</sup>

At the same time that Drahomaniv was sympathetic towards Bakunin because of the latter's cognizance of the national question and his attraction to anarchism, he was impressed by Lavrov because of his respect for learning and knowledge and his propagation of rationalism and positivism. However, his respect for Lavrov was quickly and seriously diminished due to the latter's disregard of national aspirations.<sup>29</sup>

Drahomaniv argued that Lavrov's journal, Vpered, had distorted the slogan of the Internationale - proletariat of the world unite - into proletariat of those nations under the Russian government become Russified.<sup>30</sup> He wondered why Vpered, when speaking of the prospects of a socialist order in the Russian Empire, did not mention the possibilities of forming political and social organizations in nations other than Russia and Poland. More specifically, he demanded to know why there could not be a Ukrainian socialist party in Russia if there was one in Austria. "After all, the Little Russians in Ukraine are practically in the same position with respect to the Great Russians as are the Ruthenians in Galicia with respect to the Poles".<sup>31</sup>

Since the Lavrovists were not willing to provide their equals in Russia with the means of organizing socialist propaganda among their populations in their own language, Vpered could not be, as it had hoped, an all Slavic socialist organ. Even if the national question was not of primary importance, a point which Drahomaniv conceded, it still constituted a part of the socialist question in its widest understanding and Lavrov should have realized that the oppressed nationalities in the

Russian Empire were one of the determining factors in the struggle for the liquidation of the feudal state order which was the preliminary to the socialist revolution which was to follow.

Although he might seem to have been more appreciative of Bakunin than of Lavrov, Drahomaniv was just as critical of both when they expressed their belief in the possibility of Russia passing into the socialist order immediately without first striving for "bourgeois political freedom". Both Bakuninists and Lavrovists were under the impression that constitutionalism would be detrimental to Russian interests because it would help the ruling class to strengthen its hold over the masses which, in turn, would give rise to the development of capitalism and the destruction of the village obshchina. Drahomaniv did not accept the theory of the non-bourgeois path of development, for his investigations of Russia's economic development showed that Russia had firmly set in upon the period of capitalism and therefore, confirmed that her future historical progress would not differ from other countries in Western Europe for whom capitalism was an inevitable stage before the triumph of socialism.

In propagating the need for political reform, without which he thought that talk about a socialist revolution was ridiculous, Drahomaniv tried to show that the liberal movement in Russia was growing according to the irresistible laws of history. Necessarily, Russia would follow a path of development similar to that of France before 1789:

si on étudie de près la crise en Russie et ses rapports avec les mouvements politiques de l'Europe, on verra que

ce n'est pas le socialisme proprement dit qui est engagé mais la question de la liberté politique et de l'abolition des restes du régime féodal. Si la Russie est à la veille d'une révolution, ce sera plutôt la révolution française de 1789-93 que de la commune du Paris de 1871.<sup>35</sup>

Consequently, one would have expected Drahomaniw to have been somewhat enthusiastic upon witnessing the beginnings of political parties at the end of the 70's and especially of Narodnaia Volia, whose first priority was the struggle for political freedom. However, he frowned upon Narodnaia Volia. They agreed that Russia should follow the West European pattern of abolishing absolute monarchy and accepting the parliamentary system. But they did not believe that the individual nationalities should be granted the right to determine their political relationship with the entire state. Instead, they proposed that the general Russian Assembly should decide the fate of these nationalities according to its own tastes.<sup>36</sup>

If they acted upon this proposition, then the efforts expended by these revolutionaries in attempting to establish a general Russian Assembly would have been just as useless as the energy expended by the French revolutionaries in 1789. They had not succeeded in their goals because they had merely exchanged royal autocracy for autocracy of the parliamentary majority. The revolutionaries would have to realize that real political freedom would be possible only in those countries where the system of centralization did not have too much force, such as Switzerland, England, Belgium, the former republic of Holland and the Scandinavian states.<sup>37</sup> In order to assure the success of a socio-economic revolution in Russia after the political upheaval, it would be necessary for all revolutionaries to accept the



principle of equality of all nations, historical and non-historical, as well as of the principle of the autonomy of regions, in short, of the federal principle. It would also depend on the ability of the central committee to distinguish between solidarity, which is essential, and centralization, which is superfluous and even downright harmful.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to the centralizing tendencies of Narodnaia Volia, Drahomaniv was extremely sceptical about the moral and practical value of their terrorist activities. Although he did not find it strange that tsarist officials were being attacked and murdered openly - indeed, he was surprised that in such terrible conditions of oppression, such incidents had not occurred earlier<sup>39</sup> - he could not justify political assassinations as a principle of revolutionary struggle.

In the given circumstances of lawlessness for which tsarism is responsible, one can excuse political terrorism and seek to understand its causes. As historians, we must recognize the good it has brought; it has forced all of Russian society to reflect on the reason for these assassinations. But it is inadmissible to glorify assassination, to present it as a pattern to be imitated, or to elevate it to the rank of a system...

Even if we leave aside the moral aspect of the matter, these killings have a negative political effect. They strike the government, but they do not overthrow it, and they offer nothing new in its place.<sup>40</sup>

The assassination of Alexander II - the goal upon which Narodnaia Volia concentrated - showed that the Russian revolutionary movement had evolved to the point where it was essentially political. Although some revolutionary circles in France applauded the assassinations, Drahomaniv could not do the same for he argued that there was a substantial difference between assassinations in Western Europe and those in Russia where "nous en voyons une série et, enfin, nous y découvrons une action systématisée."<sup>41</sup> Moreover, he wondered "Quelle valeur peut avoir l'assassinat d'une tête couronnée dans la lutte du travail contre le

capital, qui est le fond du mouvement socialiste?"<sup>42</sup> He believed that a political party, which should have had as its main goal large-scale changes, should not have been so taken up with terrorism and murder because the tendency was to forget that the main purpose of killing the tsar and his officials was not to eliminate evil individuals but to<sup>43</sup> eliminate an evil order.

Moreover, Drahomaniv blamed Narodnaia Volia for encouraging youth, and especially university students, to participate in illegal terroristic activities. Instead, they should have urged them to hold back from practical political agitation and to wait until such a time as they would know how to attack the enemy and defend themselves from it. Students, naturally, were opposed to the political order in Russia since it contradicted everything that they had been studying. But from the time that student agitation made its chronic appearance in 1857, the lack of any tangible results had shown that their efforts and sacrifices had been all in vain. In actively attempting to show their hatred of the existing system, "they only gave the Herods their chance to kill the masses of what were still only children."<sup>44</sup> Drahomaniv believed that youth should be interested in politics but that they should take active part only after they had finished their studies.

If Drahomaniv's main criticism of Narodnaia Volia was directed against their tactics and their blindness to the need of organizing political parties on a federalistic basis, then his criticism of Chernyi Peredel, which was led by Plekhanov and which called itself the organ of socialists-federalists, was directed against their hypocritical stand on federalism. They wrote about the absolute necessity of organizing

socialist parties on a federal basis, arguing that this was the only way that a normal development could be guaranteed to the various nationalities of the Russian Empire. They claimed that ethnographically, Little Russia, Belorussia, Poland, the Caucasus, Finland and Bessarabia were distinct nations and that therefore, they should be granted an autonomous development.<sup>45</sup>

However, in 1880, when a number of socialist emigrés circulated a more "radical" federal plan at a meeting in Geneva which stressed, among other things, that in the interests of socialism in Eastern Europe it would be better to organize socialist parties on the basis of natural regions (abolish existing traditional state boundaries and allow new boundaries to be determined on the basis of geographic, economic and national conditions), the most opposition to this plan was voiced by Chernyi Peredel.<sup>46</sup>

Plekhanov argued that there was no need for him to accommodate himself to the feelings of oppressed nationalities and that it was time to pass to the more important economic question. He supported the idea which proclaimed that socialism demanded of all small nations or tribes to unite with greater cultured nations, and to assimilate and develop under their influence.<sup>47</sup> The only nation which Chernyi Peredel deemed worthy of the recognition of independence was Poland and since Drahomaniv had expressed strong opposition to the historic patriotism of the Polish revolutionaries, Plekhanov claimed that he had looked at the uprising through the eyes of a Ukrainian peasant and consequently had misjudged it. Drahomaniv's reply was that when dealing with Poland and present Russia, Russian groups could give a fair and logical judgement

only when they could state clearly their position on the question of the plebeian nations of former Poland and present Russia, including Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine.<sup>48</sup> As a result of these discussions, Plekhanov called Drahomaniv a south-Russian nationalist, while Drahomaniv accused Plekhanov of being a vigorous supporter of great Russian centralism and chauvinism.

It was obvious then, that in devising a constitutional democratic theory for the Russian Empire with a maximum amount of attention devoted to federalist principles, Drahomaniv's purpose was that Ukraine receive autonomy. But merely devising a theory for the transformation of the Empire was not sufficient. He also had to demonstrate what means were to be used to achieve this goal. This was an extremely difficult task for him as his basic tendency was to support evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary methods. He himself stated that his political motto, the best political motto, was: "*Gutta cavat lapidem non vi, sed semper calendo.* - It is not by force that the drops of water wear away the stone, but by always falling."<sup>49</sup>

However, the situation in the Russian Empire forced him to recognize political revolution as a decisive factor in the changeover from one type of social order to another, but it never altered his opinion of the necessity of having a revolution preceded and prepared for by evolution in the economic and social spheres of life. Especially after the Russo-Turkish War, Drahomaniv was convinced in the necessity and inevitability of a revolution, for he saw that the smallest rights could be obtained only after the fall of Russian despotism and such a fall had not occurred anywhere yet without a revolution.<sup>50</sup> But even in the case of political

revolution, Drahomaniv was an exponent of "la cause pure exige des moyens  
<sup>51</sup>  
 purs aussi". Consequently, his suggestions on how to gain political  
 freedom consisted of an open declaration of one's ideas in the press, a  
 presentation of a series of declarations from all classes of society of  
 their opposition to despotism and an open attack on the system on the  
 part of legally-organized political groups formed from people of all reg-  
<sup>52</sup>  
 ions and of all nationalities. In addition, he had faith that the army,  
 under the leadership of its officers, would see all the evils that were  
 being perpetrated under the system that they were serving and would ren-  
<sup>53</sup>  
 der real aid in the liberation movement.

For the fulfillment of the socialist ideal, however, Drahomaniv  
 believed that it was necessary to have as large a proportion of the pop-  
 ulation as possible made aware of the goal. Herein lay the role of the  
 intelligentsia and especially of the students who were to organize groups  
 in order to learn and prepare themselves for the future as well as teach  
 the peasants and workers in small schools which, of necessity, would have  
 to have been secret. It was also necessary to build socialist parties  
 on a federal basis and to organize socialist propaganda in the languages  
<sup>54</sup>  
 of every nationality in the Russian Empire.

The means that he proposed for the reconstruction showed that  
 he supported to the greatest possible degree all legally-organized acti-  
 vities by Russian revolutionaries but condemned any conspiratorial and  
 Machiavellian tactics. At the same time, his criticism of their programs  
 showed that behind his desire to transform the Empire was the belief that  
 only general political freedom in Russia would create the conditions nec-  
 essary for the advance of the Ukrainian movement.

1. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaiia Pol'sha, pp. 105-106.
2. Rudnytsky, p. 73.
3. Translated in Ibid., pp. 195-199.
4. Ibid., p. 195.
5. Ibid., p. 199.
6. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaiia Pol'sha, p. 7.
7. Ibid., pp. 477-478.
8. Translated in Rudnytsky, p. 177.
9. Dragomanov, Sochineniia, p. 137.
10. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
11. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 1, p. 388.
12. M.P. Dragomanov, Turki vnutrennie i vnyeshnie, Geneva, 1896, p. 12.
13. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaiia Pol'sha, p. 165.
14. Dragomanov, Sochineniia, pp. 113-129.
15. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaiia Pol'sha, p. 73.
16. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, pp. 30-31.
17. Bahats'kyi, vol. 1, p. 13.
18. Pratsi ukrains'koho naukovoho instytutu, Arkhiv Mykhayla Drahomanova, vol. 1, Warsaw, 1938, p. 272. (Hereafter cited as Pratsi instytutu, Arkhiv.)
19. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaiia Pol'sha, pp. 76-77.
20. Ivanchenko, "Pluhutar", p. 179.
21. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaiia Pol'sha, pp. 483-488.
22. Ibid., p. 187.
23. Dragomanov, Sochineniia, p. 95.
24. Quoted in Ivanchenko, "Surmach pravdy", p. 145.

25. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaia Pol'sha, pp. 308-309.
26. Ibid., p. 221.
27. Ibid., p. 232.
28. Ibid., pp. 241-242.
29. Michael Hrushevsky, "Missiia Drahomanova", Ukraina, Bks. II-III (1926), p. 12.
30. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaia Pol'sha, p. 266.
31. Ibid., pp. 304-305.
32. Ivanova, p. 119.
33. E. Pyziur, "Konstitutsiyna prohrama i teoriia M. Drahomanova", Lysty do Priyateliv, vol. 160-2, no. 8-10 (1966), p. 7.
34. M.P. Dragomanov, Liberalizm i zemstvo v Rossii, Geneva, 1889, p. 44.
35. M.P. Dragomanov, Le Tyrannicide en Russie et l'action de l'Europe occidentale, Geneva, 1881, p. 4. (Hereafter cited as Dragomanov, Tyrannicide.)
36. Rudnytsky, p. 184.
37. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaia Pol'sha, pp. 369-370.
38. Translated in Rudnytsky, p. 192.
39. M.P. Dragomanov, Terrorizm i svoboda, Geneva, 1880, p. 5.
40. Quoted in Rudnytsky, p. 98.
41. Dragomanov, Tyrannicide, p. 12.
42. Ibid., p. 11.
43. Dragomanov, Terrorizm i svoboda, p. 5.
44. M.P. Dragomanov, Uchashchayasia molodezh i politicheskaya agitatsia, Geneva, n.d., pp. 1-6.
45. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaia Pol'sha, pp. 425-427.
46. Ibid., pp. 435-437.
47. Ivanova, pp. 118-122.
48. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaia Pol'sha, p. 476.

49. Quoted in Rudnysky, p. 117.
50. Dragomanov, Turki vnutrennie i vnyeshnie, p. 26.
51. Dragomanov, Tyrannicide, p. 2.
52. Dragomanov, Terrorizm i svoboda, p. 11.
53. Ivanova, p. 90.
54. Dragomanov, Istoricheskaja Pol'sha, p. 342.



## CHAPTER IV

## STRUGGLE WITH UKRAINIAN CONTEMPORARIES

We have shown in the previous chapter that Drahomaniv was very critical of the Russian revolutionaries for their inadequate treatment of the Ukrainian question. He believed that the existence of so many different nationalities in the Russian Empire should have made them aware of the importance of the national question. The lack of sympathy among revolutionary groups for the demand for Ukrainian autonomy alienated Drahomaniv and precluded his working intimately with any of them:

I can take a stand on 'Russian' affairs, both (Great) Russian in the ethnic sense and Russian in the political sense, only in so far as they affect our people. By the same principle I can, of course, have dealings with the Russian parties, but I cannot join any of them.<sup>1</sup>

Naturally, such an attitude made Drahomaniv susceptible to accusations of being a Ukrainian chauvinist, nationalist and separatist. Yet Drahomaniv was not a narrow nationalist or a provincialist. His denouncements were not directed solely against Russian revolutionaries, but extended to Ukrainians as well, those in Russia and Galicia whom he believed guilty of over-emphasizing the national question to the neglect of the socio-economic aspects of the liberation movement.

In Russian Ukraine, his attacks were directed mainly against the members of the Old Kievan Hromada to which he had belonged while in Kiev and which, after the Ems Ukaz of 1876, had sent him abroad to organize a free centre for Ukrainian propaganda. In Geneva, Drahomaniv carried out this task editing the journal Hromada, publishing a complete edition of Shevchenko's Kobzar (The Bard) and various other popular works,

and writing brochures and articles for both Russian and foreign periodicals on the problems of Ukrainian national autonomy. But his emigration created difficulties for the Kievan Hromada. Not only were its members faced with the necessity of financing Drahomaniv, they also had to take care of putting their own agents at the borders in order to get contraband literature across.

Supporting Drahomaniv became a divisive issue within the Kievan Hromada. By 1876 the number of young activist members in the organization began to make their presence felt. Their dreams of accomplishing practical political results by joining Russian revolutionary groups conflicted with the approach of the older members who aimed at extracting cultural concessions from the Russian government. The younger members begrudged Drahomaniv financial support for they doubted that pamphlets, brochures or proclamations could be of any benefit to the Ukrainian cause.<sup>2</sup> For his part, Drahomaniv rejected their view that the Ukrainian movement could advance only by turning to terrorism as a means of changing the political structure of Russia. He argued that even "a minimal program" - cultural work within the legal framework - would be beneficial to the Ukrainian population.<sup>3</sup> He believed that Ukrainians needed above all else an intelligentsia willing to work for the benefit of the narod, and that such an intelligentsia would come into being only after a fully developed Ukrainian literature had been created.<sup>4</sup> This cautious attitude exasperated the young members of the Hromada and made it difficult for the older members to get the money for Drahomaniv.

Gradually Drahomaniv's relations with the Hromada became strained and in the end he lost their support. The disaffection grew out of a

variety of issues. Drahomaniv's socialist ideas began to develop and strengthen once he was beyond the reach of Russian officialdom and censorship. Fearing reprisals should the police find any of his radical writings on their person, the Kievan Hromada began to dissociate from him and tried to persuade him to give up his publishing activities. After the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 the Hromada came to consider Drahomaniv's activities harmful to the Ukrainian cause. They thought that his writings would ruin their hopes of seeing the restrictions on Ukrainian literature lessened. They sent Drahomaniv less and less money and more and more letters explaining why they were no longer of any use to each other.

The Kievan Hromada declared that Ukrainians in Russia no longer required Drahomaniv's type of publications since they were mostly of a political nature and political publications could do more harm than good in the cause he was trying to serve. They pointed out that as an emigré he knew of contemporary needs only from newspapers and letters from his friends. They, on the other hand, could see everything that was happening and could judge better than he what would be in the interests of the Ukrainian people.<sup>5</sup> They proposed that he redirect his efforts and write more for foreign periodicals so that Europe would recall the existence of a Ukrainian "family".

Drahomaniv pointed out that he had been doing this all along and claimed that as a result of his endeavors the whole European and Russian world was beginning to notice the existence of the Ukrainian nation and recognize its plight. He could sympathize with the Hromada's fears of being compromised if they themselves published any political

material, but he could not understand why they expected those living beyond Russian boundaries to keep silent when they were free to express their ideas clearly and openly.<sup>6</sup> It was obvious to Drahomaniv that the Kievan Hromada was criticizing him unjustly, but he attributed this to a mistaken belief on their part that the Russian government could be influenced by what was written in the European press.<sup>7</sup> He hoped that they would re-evaluate their positions and recognize that, to a large degree, they themselves were responsible for hampering the work they expected of him. He claimed that the only reason why even more articles had not appeared in foreign periodicals was that the Hromada had failed to provide him with the materials, mainly books, he<sup>8</sup> needed for research.

The Kievan Hromada could no longer appreciate Drahomaniv's cultural and political program. They disagreed with his insistence that Ukrainians become acquainted with progressive Russian writings. Such a study, he thought, would help Ukrainian literature to develop along the same lines as had Russian literature - "democratic in ideas, and critical and realistic in style."<sup>9</sup> The Hromada argued that the greatest harm to Ukrainian intellectuals resulted from the fact that they had been educated by the Russian press which "changed its ideas with each season like women changed fashions". They suggested that young Ukrainian intellectuals should look to West European literature, not to Russian,<sup>10</sup> for enlightenment.

In his defence, Drahomaniv argued that he too had always desired Ukrainians to draw their culture directly from West European sources rather than from Moscow or St. Petersburg. He claimed, however,

that Russian literature would have a Europeanizing influence because<sup>11</sup>  
 it was imbued with an English and French spirit. Moreover, if  
 Ukrainian intellectuals desired to break all cultural ties with Russians,  
 they would have to know at least two or three West European languages,  
 and since the majority of Ukrainian intellectuals, including university  
 students, could not read German or French, let alone English, Drahomaniv  
 implored them to think "just how enlightened such a community would be<sup>12</sup>  
 if it rebelled against Russian literature as well".

In addition to propagating close cultural ties, Drahomaniv  
 also favoured close political ties between Ukrainians and Russians for  
 he believed that the spreading of Ukrainian national consciousness would  
 be possible only after the political administrative system in Russia  
 was destroyed. To achieve the latter, it was necessary for Ukrainians  
 to unite with Russians and, in a common struggle, achieve a new political<sup>13</sup>  
 order.

However, the Kievan Hromada began to think in terms of a south-  
 western federation of Slavs. Finding no sympathy from Russian liberals  
 for the Ukrainian cause, they could no longer envisage the creation of  
 a Slavic north-eastern (Russian) federation.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, they be-  
 came more and more dissatisfied with Drahomaniv's persistent appeals to  
 work together with Russians instead of against them, accused him of Russo-  
 philism and insisted that he had deliberately gone to Geneva to publish  
 the journal Hromada where he knew that it would "merely get lost among<sup>15</sup>  
 all the other Russian publications of the social revolutionaries".  
 In 1885, they finally disowned him and stopped sending any financial  
 support.

This set-back did not deter Drahomaniv. He turned his attention towards Galicia, and became familiar with all Ukrainian publications, as well as with individuals who could influence their direction. He contributed a number of articles to various journals outlining the social, political and national situation in Galicia and in Russian Ukraine, and described the role he thought Galicia was to play in the Ukrainian national movement.

First of all, he believed that literature and literary criticism played an extremely important role in the socio-political life of any nation. His tendency was not to separate the literary movement from the political, but to see it as an integral part of the entire political and social movement in Galicia.<sup>16</sup> Because he placed so much emphasis on literature as a means of educating the masses and because Ukrainian literature in Galicia was so underdeveloped, he claimed that Galician writers did not even know in what language they should publish - in the language of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which was a mixture of Polish, Latin and German elements, in the Great Russian language or in contemporary Ukrainian.<sup>17</sup> He urged Galicians to read Russian literature because "its worldly and democratic character would direct youth towards the 'demos' and the 'demos' being Ukrainian, Ukrainian national consciousness would develop automatically".<sup>18</sup> Drahomaniv realized that advising Galicians to acquaint themselves with Russian literature irked many Kievans who had come to equate Russian culture with the Russian state. However, he continued to maintain that the hostility of the Kievans to the Russian government should not extend to progressive Russian literature which was free of the faults they had correctly perceived in the Russian state.<sup>19</sup>

Drahomaniv claimed that if Ukrainian literature in Russia had been of any value, it was not due solely to popular Ukrainian instincts and traditions, but largely to the literary ideas of the progressive Russian community which had shown the path Ukrainian literature was to take to become useful to the Ukrainian populace. He thought that Ukrainians were acting foolishly when they refused to acknowledge as Ukrainian those writers who did not use the Ukrainian language. He was of the opinion that the content and the spirit of a work were of the highest value and not the language in which it was written. According to Drahomaniv, works written in Ukrainian were often of no benefit to the population at all for their authors were intellectuals who had adopted aristocratic tendencies and had become alienated not only from their narodnost but also from their narod.

He believed that all Slavs should accept the Russian language as the diplomatic tongue and as an obligatory subject in school even if they could not accept it as the exclusive language of teaching or as the official language in courts and in the administration. To him, All-Slavic interests were something quite different from the domestic and national interests of each nation. Moreover, it was his firm conviction that only in the Russian language and as citizens of an All-Russian State could Ukrainians have any influence on the actions of the state and have a voice in their own affairs as well as in all of Slavdom. Consequently, he told Galicians that:

Whoever sees treason or harm for specific Ukrainian matters in seeing the Russian language as an intermediary among all Slavs is being ridiculous. He should recall that this was one of the points in the program of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in 1847 which until now is still the

most intelligent thing produced by Ukrainian-lovers.

If many Ukrainians in Russia were rather hostile towards Drahomaniv because of his "Russophile" views, then very few in Galicia were overly sympathetic towards him.

Even before his final split with the Kievan Hromada, Drahomaniv had begun to criticize Galician leaders. He accused the two parties in Galicia, the Moskvofily (Russophiles) and the Narodovtsi (Populists), of a lack of realism, claiming that both parties had the desire to "ride the high horse of politics" and the tendency to dream up various plans for the future of Ukraine which were dependent upon the aid they might receive from European governments. Moreover, Galician intellectuals, instead of working towards educating the population on the rights of their nationality, were arguing over a definition of what constituted a Ruthenian. While the leaders were thus divided on political and theoretical problems, the Galician masses were choosing Poles as deputies to their own Diet.

The question "Who are the Ruthenians?" had been raised by the Poles. Drahomaniv believed they were to be answered in this manner:

It is for us to decide who are the Ruthenians. But for those of you specifically occupied with ethnography, it is sufficient to know that there are so many of us, that we feel different from you, desire a new, legal status for ourselves and a new means for educating ourselves.<sup>23</sup>

He argued that it was necessary for Galician politicians to increase and organize the strength of the masses and only then to think about formulating programs and uniting with foreign powers in an attempt to change their nation's status. Consequently, he was not surprised to see how little progress was being made in the political sphere, for



Galician leaders manifested "an absence of principles, inconsistency, lack of discipline, disagreements over strategic tactics" and, as a<sup>24</sup> result, achieved no results in their various schemes and experiments.

Although Drahomaniv did not hesitate to denounce either Populists or Russophiles, his criticism of the latter was far harsher, because he regarded them as enemies of progress. While they spoke of their desire for Galicia to unite spiritually with Russia, they themselves sympathized with reactionary circles in Russia whom the majority of Russians despised because their teachings were harmful to the interests of the Russian masses.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the Russophiles accepted considerable donations from the Russian government as an aid in publishing their journal Slovo (The Word). Consequently, Drahomaniv condemned the Russophiles and their tactics.

The Russophiles claimed that Drahomaniv was an organizer of secret societies, that he was responsible for spreading "rotten Western communism and socialism", and that his followers were "lost sheep and he their shepherd".<sup>26</sup> Not surprisingly, Drahomaniv decided to have nothing more to do with them.

On the whole, Drahomaniv was not as critical of the Populists because he believed that he could bring them over to his way of thinking. At first, the Populists fell under the influence of V. Barvinskyi who propagated what Drahomaniv termed "the cult of popular sanctities". This was an idea which regarded certain national traits as holy, "worthy of being placed on a pedestal". According to Barvinskyi, such traits included the national costume, religion (sometimes Orthodoxy was mentioned, sometimes the Uniate Church), the Cyrillic alphabet, the Julian

calendar and, finally, the Ukrainian language. In a most definitive manner, Drahomaniv showed the absurdity and irrationality of Barvinskyi's theory.<sup>27</sup> Drahomaniv did not deny that each nationality possessed certain unique traits but he asserted that much that was seen as national in the past was in fact common to all nations at a certain point in their growth or the product of a long established historical processes<sup>28</sup> that transcended national boundaries and national cultures.

Under the impact of "the cult of popular sanctities" theory, the Populist organ Pravda (Truth) began to emphasize nationalism above every other "ism" and, with its phrases about the "temperament and nature of the Russian people", started to sow the seeds of intolerance and hatred of the Great Russians amongst Galicians.<sup>29</sup> Besides this, the Populists, despite what their name suggested, exhibited anti-popular tendencies for, in describing the common peasant, they proclaimed:

Ah yes, gentlemen! You are always fighting for the rights of the khlop. You say: give him land. But you don't know the nature of our khlop. Give him land, leave him on his own - he'll lie down under a pear tree and sleep.<sup>30</sup>

Drahomaniv was extremely displeased with such attitudes and hoped that his exhortations might influence the Populists to change their views. First of all, he declared that their greatest fault was their over-emphasis on nationalism and their lack of interest in socio-cultural problems. He advised the Populists to re-evaluate their position on the Great Russian nation and its literature for it was from this peoples' progressive writers, especially from men like Turgenev, Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov, that they would learn to be realistic. Drahomaniv attributed their hostility towards Russian literature and

language to ignorance of the fact that the Russian masses were indifferent to nationalism because their boundaries had been decided long  
31  
ago.

By opposing the Populists' "nationalistic idiosyncracies" and by claiming that the Ukrainian movement could develop normally only in closest contact with the progressive movement in Russia, Drahomaniv gained himself enemies among the Populists as well. They accused him of trying to Russify the Ukrainian community. By 1876, however, a number of younger Populists, especially I. Franko and M. Pavlyk, were strongly influenced by Drahomaniv's pleas to serve the interests of the narod and often turned to him for advice. They remained members of the Populist Party and continued to write in its journals, but by the early 1880's they began to criticize the nationalistic views of the older members and to adopt and spread Drahomaniv's socialist ideas.

Drahomaniv, however, could not understand how these young "progressives" could remain in any kind of union with the Populists or publish any of their works in their journal unless they were opportunists lacking in moral principles. Franko tried to explain that circumstances sometimes forced them to make use of Populist organs and  
32  
that it was not a question of opportunism but one of tactical necessity. He felt that Drahomaniv's perpetual criticism of their mistakes was tactless for they were only beginners and entitled to make errors. Franko was convinced that some encouragement from time to time would have been more beneficial than constant admonitions.

Drahomaniv retorted that his sole concern was the formation of a group of people - hopefully the progressive youth - who would not toy with principles and with people who would work seriously and energetic-

ally for the good and well-being of the narod. His harsh criticisms resulted from his annoyance at the lack of progress in Galicia. He expressed his unwillingness to continue his friendship with Franko (although he would still advise him if the latter so desired) as long as he remained in the Populist camp and voiced his disappointment in the following manner:

I would be willing to wait until August for apples. Actually, I would be ready to die in May if only I could see its flowers in bloom - nay, just seeing the leaves would be sufficient, provided they were apple leaves and not God knows what else!<sup>33</sup>

It was not long, however, before the progressive youth became too radical for the older Populists. They endorsed Drahomaniv's socialist principles and attempted to propagate these ideas among the Galician peasants. The youth believed that the older Populists' concentration on nationalism reflected a lack of understanding of the real needs of the popular masses and convinced them of the superficiality of their Galician patriotism.<sup>34</sup> In 1889, they broke with the Populists and emerged as a small but formally-organized party - the Rusko Ukrainska Radikalna Partia (the Russ-Ukrainian Radical Party) - and in the early 1890's founded two journals, Narod and Khliborab (The Farmer).

The Radicals regarded Drahomaniv as their spiritual father and continued to rely upon his advice, which he was delighted to provide. On the organization of the Party, he recommended that the Radicals follow the English pattern of choosing a leader and leaving him with the freedom of initiative and the choice of his closest advisers. This,<sup>35</sup> he believed, was most in accordance with the laws of nature. On membership, he advised that the Party accept only those who had a steady

profession. He was strongly opposed to letting students join for he had little faith in their youthful radicalism. He claimed that students were always radical at some point, and that those who devoted their time to being radical reverted even faster to conservatism than those who spent their time studying.<sup>36</sup> Franko found Drahomaniv's comment interesting but totally unsuited for the Radical Party. First of all, he argued that if they did not accept students, they would have no party at all or else the formation of it would have taken place at some unknown time in the future. Secondly, he could not see what harm there was in making use of a person during the time that he was a student and still radical.<sup>37</sup> As to a program, he recommended that the Radicals follow the socialist movement in the West, but insisted that they not copy too closely the program of the French or German socialists. He suggested that they always keep in mind the practical needs of the population and make concrete demands, such as an eight hour working day,<sup>38</sup> so that the activity of the party would not become purely literary. He warned them against becoming anti-clerical and proposed instead that they propagate religious toleration and separation of Church and State.<sup>39</sup> He regarded agitation for the realization of the constitutional rights which, "although existing in theory, practically did not exist in Galicia", as their most important and immediate political duty.<sup>40</sup> Finally, he urged them to liberate themselves from the traditional prejudices against both Poles and Russians. The Radicals must realize that each nation had its good and bad features, the latter arising not from any national characteristic, but rather from the insufficient education of

41

those who manifested race hatred. He saw the necessity for Ukrainians, Galicians, Poles and Russians to work together instead of fighting against each other in order to achieve their common goal of liberation from oppressive regimes.

Before his death in 1895, Drahomaniv had one more opportunity to denounce political independence for Ukraine, an idea which he had always believed a practical impossibility. In 1894, Iu. Bachynskyi (who was a member of the Radical Party until the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party was formed) sent Drahomaniv a draft of his work entitled Ukraina irredenta. In it, he defended the political independence of Ukraine as a precondition to her economic and cultural development. He also proclaimed that after the attainment of political independence, a bourgeois Ukrainian state would decay and out of its ruins would emerge the final goal - Ukrainian social democracy.

42

Drahomaniv criticized Bachynskyi's work for being too doctrinaire. He claimed that he could not agree to an exclusively economic philosophy of history and politics because he regarded it as a form of metaphysics and because human life was much too complex to be explained by one element only. Secondly, he criticized Bachynskyi for factual errors and told him that if he corrected them, he would discover that his doctrine rested on shaky grounds. Thirdly, he accused Bachynskyi of adhering to Marxian doctrine, not because it was convincing, but because Marxian literature was easily available and relieved the "so-called intellectuals" from thinking on their own. Lastly, he denounced Bachynskyi's concept of a politically independent Ukraine because he

still saw no grounds for political separation from Russia, and because independence interfered with the process of internationaliza-  
tion<sup>43</sup> which clashed with his utopian dreams of a world where peace and brotherhood would prevail instead of war and hatred.

Footnotes. Chapter IV

1. Quoted in Rudnytsky, p. 112.
2. O. Riabynin-Skliarevskii, "Kiyivs'ka hromada 1870kh rokiv", Ukraina, Bks. I-II (1927), p. 146.
3. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, p. 429.
4. M.P. Drahomaniv, Lysty na Naddnyprians'ku Ukraïnu, Kiev, 1917, p. 115. (Hereafter cited as Drahomaniv, Lysty.)
5. Pratsi instytutu, Arkhiv, p. 289.
6. Ibid., pp. 270-272.
7. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, p. 439.
8. Pratsi instytutu, Arkhiv, p. 276.
9. Komyshanchenko, Materialy, vol. 3, p. 11.
10. Pratsi instytutu, Arkhiv, p. 29.
11. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
12. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, pp. 334-335.
13. P. Tuchaps'kyi, "Natsional'ni pohliady Drahomanova", Ukraina, Bks. II-III (1926), pp. 120-121.
14. Pratsi instytutu, Arkhiv, p. 29.
15. Ibid., p. 290.
16. I.S. Romanchenko, "Iz dniv borot'by", Vitchyzna, no. 9 (1966), p. 179.
17. Dragomanov, Sochineniia, p. 274.
18. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 1, p. 55.
19. O. Hrushevsky, "Drahomaniv i Halyts'ka molod' 1870kh rr.", Ukraina, Bk. VI (1926), p. 48.
20. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 1, pp. 120-142.
21. Dragomanov, Sochineniia, pp. 349-354.
22. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, p. 358.
23. Dragomanov, Sochineniia, pp. 310-320.



24. Ibid., p. 342.
25. Pratsi instytutu, Arkhiv, p. 214.
26. Romanchenko, p. 178.
27. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, pp. 358-364.
28. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 322-325.
29. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 304.
30. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 249.
31. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 83-93.
32. Romanchenko, p. 180.
33. Vseukraïns'ka Akademiia Nauk. Komisiia Zakhidnoyi Ukraïny, Materi-  
aly dlia kul'turnoyi i hromads'koyi istorii zakhidnoyi Ukraïny,  
vol. I, Lystuvannia I Franka i M. Drahomanova, Kiev, 1928, pp. 70-  
71. (Hereafter cited as Zseukraïns'ka Akademiia, Lystuvannia.)
34. Dragomanov, Sochineniia, pp. 463-464.
35. Vseukraïns'ka Akademiia, Lystuvannia, p. 349.
36. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, p. 545.
37. Vseukraïns'ka Akademiia, Lystuvannia, pp. 358-359.
38. Ivanchenko, "Surmach pravdy", p. 146.
39. Drahomaniv, Lysty, p. 84.
40. D.I. Doroshenko, "Mykhaylo Dragomanov and the Ukrainian National Movement", p. 663.
41. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, p. 397.
42. Iu. Bachyns'kyi, Ukraïna irredenta, Berlin, 1924, p. 97.
43. Ibid., pp. 176-182.

## CONCLUSION

It is obvious that as a result of his career as a publicist, a choice not of his own making, Drahomaniv became a controversial figure in both Ukrainian and Russian intellectual circles of various political leanings. His harsh criticisms of their goals and their methods provoked equally harsh condemnations of his own attitudes and proposals by his contemporaries. Sensitive to the range of these counter-attacks, he once reflected:

During my whole life I have always been attacked from at least two opposite sides at once, and I have even set for myself the criterion of regarding something as a failure if, on its account, I am only attacked from one side.<sup>1</sup>

It was almost inevitable that both his Russian and Ukrainian contemporaries would accuse him of being a "little Russian chauvinist" and a "Ukrainian renegade" respectively. Drahomaniv wrote about specifically Ukrainian matters in Ukrainian and about those dealing with Russia and her Empire in Russian, and each group tended to read only those polemics in its own language. Consequently, each side would have found him biased unless they examined what he had written in both languages.

To a large degree, Drahomaniv's evaluations of both sides were valid. He was correct in claiming that Ukrainians in Russia spent their time idealizing the past and attributing the sad fate which befell their "narodnost'" to the craftiness of their neighbours. He was also correct in believing that the miserable plight of the Ukrainian masses was due largely to the actions of the Ukrainian aristocracy.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, one could argue that Drahomaniv was extremely perceptive in

hypothetizing that "only a world-wide cataclysm could tear away the Ukrainians politically from the Great Russians."<sup>3</sup>

However, his attacks on intellectuals for directing their efforts towards winning cultural concessions from the Russian government and for abstaining from political activities were unjust. He himself had been forced into exile for "harbouring Ukrainian views" and he acknowledged that "in Russia, one cannot speak ... about any law. There one always has to be ready to defend his works, his views and his own person by means of a revolver."<sup>4</sup>

In the case of the Ukrainians in Galicia, Drahomaniv observed that living in constitutional monarchy put them in a better position than Ukrainians in Russia to develop a national consciousness even if the Poles encroached upon their constitutional rights. Correctly, he claimed that both existing parties in Galicia had adopted policies which would place the destiny of the Ukrainian narod in the hands of Polish landlords or Russian bureaucrats. To counter that eventuality, he played an important role in directing the organization and activities of the newly-founded Radical Party.

But he did not spare this party of progressive youth from upbraidings whenever he saw the need for them. He accused them of lacking steadfastness in principles and of being opportunists, and urged them "to stop playing games of parliamentary tactics with all parties and, instead, place most emphasis on attempting to bring over as many of the common masses as possible to their basic principles."<sup>5</sup> He criticized them for being much too concerned about affairs in their own territory, suggesting that they should take the initiative in organizing solidarity

between themselves and Ukrainians in Russia. Yet one wonders how he expected the Radicals to believe in the possibility of achieving solidarity when he himself warned them not to rely too much on Ukrainians "for they break their promises just as easily as they make them."<sup>6</sup>

Drahomaniv's judgements of Russian intellectuals and revolutionaries also displayed contradictions. One cannot but agree with his negative attitude towards the Moscow Slavophiles for, even in his own time, liberal elements in Russia were hostile to their teachings and regarded them as "chauvinists comparable to the Boulangists in France."<sup>7</sup>

With respect to the Russian radical revolutionaries, and especially Lavrov and Plekhanov, he was justified in saying that their programs showed a disregard for the national aspirations of the minorities in the Empire. But in criticizing the terrorist tactics of Bakuninists and Lavrovists, he showed not only his naivety but also the contradictory character of his own proposals as to the means to be used for reconstructing of the Russian Empire. His belief that changes in Russia could be attained by peaceful means assumed a certain willingness on the part of the Tsar and state officials to give up at least part of their power and acknowledge some of the demands of the revolutionaries. For a man who was so critical of the autocratic system and who saw exile as his only recourse, such an assumption was naive.

It can be argued that it was not so much naivety as Drahomaniv's ambiguous attitude towards force that prompted his contradictory statements about violent and non-violent methods. While perpetually denouncing Russian revolutionaries for their Macchiavellian tactics, he did not find it strange that they resorted to force and announced that

"nous applaudissons à tout tentative de défense armée de sa personne et de sa demeure contre les envahisseurs de la troisième section".

At the same time, his revulsion to violence prompted him to add that "nous ne prêcherons jamais l'assassinat occulte, pas même celui d'un espion, d'un chef de police secrète, d'un tyran".<sup>8</sup>

His determination never to glorify killings or to endorse terror as a system reflected his belief in the idea that large-scale changes could not be attained by assaults against the individuals who upheld an evil system. He was a proponent of evolution as opposed to revolution. Even his political motto - it is not by force that the drops of water wear away the stone, but by always falling - show that he could not envision revolution as a major factor in achieving social change. Yet one could easily argue that this attitude towards revolution represented wishful thinking, for, when faced with a state rigidly opposed to reform, Drahomaniv stated that in Ukraine the masses had no hope without revolution.

In addition to these contradictions, one can point out yet another. While consistently advocating that Ukrainians should unite with the Russians and, in a common struggle, work towards a common goal, he forbade them to join any Russian revolutionary party and insisted not only that they "pledge not to go outside of Ukraine," but that within Ukraine, "they stick to the corner where they grew up and with which they were most familiar."<sup>9</sup>

Nor would it be difficult to accuse Drahomaniv of inconsistency with his own preachings about the importance of scientific research and methodology. In attempting to prove the distinct character of the

Ukrainian people, the basis of his assertion of their right to an autonomous existence, his strongest claim to scientific evidence (although he was convinced that he had provided several scientific proofs) was that Ukrainian folksongs "form a distinct and integrated group, and this is one of the clearest signs of a crystallized and homogeneous

<sup>10</sup>nationality". Moreover, although Drahomaniv had a sound view of the historian as not only a purveyor of facts but also as an interpreter of facts, he himself, on occasion, failed in the basic task of marshalling reliable data. He gave, for example, dubious figures for the number of inhabitants throughout all Ukrainian territories. While in Russia, he sets the number of Ukrainians at 14,239,129, in Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, he sets their numbers at 2,312,000,  
<sup>11</sup>200,000 and 520,000 respectively.

Despite all these flaws, however, Drahomaniv's theories and activities showed that he was a well-balanced individual in comparison to a majority of his extremist contemporaries. Even Peter Struve described Drahomaniv as

the first sober and yet unflinching publicist among the Russian émigrés who firmly advocated the principle of the struggle for political and democratic institutions and rejected the very idea of 'social revolution' carried out by extra-legal violent methods.<sup>12</sup>

One should also examine the extent to which Drahomaniv's writings had any influence. If it seemed that his advice and exhortations had little effect on his contemporaries in Russian Ukraine, then in Galicia, the opposite was true. There, he became a central figure in socio-political developments. Russophiles and Populists hated him

and the clergy was afraid of him, but the progressive youth listened to him. And it was through them that Drahomaniv had an influence, albeit indirect, on Russian Ukraine as well. His hopes for the role that Galicia might play in the awakening of a national liberation movement in all of Ukraine were fulfilled.

Finally, it was largely due to Drahomaniv's political publications in Western European languages, including French and Italian, that Europe recognized the existence of a Ukrainian nation and became acquainted, to at least a small degree, with some of the problems facing the Ukrainian population in their struggle to survive as a separate nation.

That struggle would be neither brief nor easy: "with one blow of the horn, the walls of Jericho will not come falling down". Yet Drahomaniv's conscience was at ease for he believed that he had found a way of changing society's views, and once this was done, a change in the conditions under which Ukrainians lived would eventually come. This belief was in accordance with the goal that he expected each individual to set up for himself, a belief which he adopted from J.S. Mill:

each man must work in such a manner that, at death, he might say that at least a small part of the human condition was left in a better state than in which he found it.<sup>13</sup>

Footnotes, Conclusion

1. Quoted in Rudnytsky, p. 72.
2. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 1, p. 287.
3. Ibid., p. 29.
4. Drahomaniv, "Peredne Slovo", p. 58.
5. Drahomaniv, Lysty, p. 86.
6. Vseukrains'ka Akademiia, Materialy, p. 106.
7. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, p. 340.
8. Dragomanov, Tyrannicide, p. 2.
9. Drahomaniv, "Peredne Slovo", pp. 60-61.
10. Translated in Rudnytsky, p. 212.
11. Drahomaniv, "Peredne Slovo", p. 8.
12. P. Struve, "My Contacts and Conflicts with Lenin", The Slavonic Review, vol. xii, no. 36 (1934), p. 580.
13. Drahomaniv, Pratsi, vol. 2, p. 113.



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