

**Designed to Command: US Military Planning and Construction in Heidelberg, 1945-1960**

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## Table of contents

Abstract	i
Résumé	ii
List of figures	iii
List of acronyms	xii
Acknowledgements	xiii
Introduction 'This Will Build That'	1
Chapter 1 Continuity and Stability, 1945 - 1952	20
Chapter 2 Entanglement and Extension, 1945 - 1950	98
Chapter 3 Extension and Expansion, 1950 - 1953	151
Chapter 4 Agency and Expansion, 1951 - 1960	210
Epilogue 'Train, Display, Engage'	280
Bibliography	292

## Designed to Command: US Military Planning and Construction in Heidelberg, 1945-1960

### **Abstract**

This dissertation traces the trajectory of US military planning and building practices in Heidelberg between 1945 and 1960. This famed university city, virtually untouched by the war, was radically transformed by American military officials into the US military's European headquarters for the duration of the Cold War and beyond. I argue that the built environment was decisive in that effort and the broader construction of US military power after the Second World War. I elucidate this position by examining how military officials secured their exigent living and working conditions in the immediate post-combat period, utilizing confiscation and requisition legal precedents as they restructured their forces for military occupation. During this initial phase, Heidelberg's existing military facilities served a critical role in allowing administrative functions to shift and continue. As political and economic tensions increasingly entrenched American commitments in Europe, Heidelberg's military, commercial, and residential infrastructure continued to serve a critical role as an administrative center for American military operations. After the Federal Republic of Germany formed in 1949, this role expanded to new military facilities that continued to draw physical connections with existing Wehrmacht structures. But while these new buildings were completed, hostilities in Korea changed the character of the American presence in West Germany, requiring new and expanded planning and construction initiatives. As these efforts took hold in the early 1950s, a new partnership with German agencies was forged, requiring continuous negotiations and compromises as the US military presence rapidly expanded.

To interrogate these developments, I draw from political and military histories, German-American relations, and architectural and planning techniques. Through this combination, I register an active and crucial role performed by design and planning practices for military purposes and highlight a moment wherein those practices crossed institutional boundaries and took a militarized, rebarbative form.

## Résumé

Cette thèse retrace la trajectoire des pratiques militaires américaines de planification et construction à Heidelberg entre les années 1945 et 1960. Cette célèbre ville universitaire, pratiquement épargnée par la guerre, a été radicalement transformée par des officiers militaires américains au quartier général européen pendant et suivant la guerre froide. Je soutiens que l'environnement bâti était un agent décisif dans cet effort et dans la construction plus générale de la puissance militaire américaine après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Je démontre cette position en examinant comment les fonctionnaires militaires ont assuré leurs conditions de vie et de travail exigeantes dans la période qui a immédiatement les combats, en utilisant les précédents juridiques de confiscation et de réquisition alors qu'ils restructuraient leurs forces pour l'occupation militaire. Pendant cette phase initiale, les installations militaires présentes de Heidelberg ont joué un rôle essentiel en permettant aux fonctions administratives de se déplacer et de se poursuivre. Alors que les tensions politiques et économiques enraccinaient de plus en plus les engagements américains en Europe, les infrastructures militaires, commerciales, et résidentielles ont continué à jouer un rôle crucial en tant que centre administratif pour les opérations militaires américaines. Après la formation de la République fédérale de l'Allemagne en 1949, ce rôle s'est étendu à de nouvelles installations militaires qui ont continué à établir des connections physiques avec les structures présentes de la Wehrmacht. Tandis que ces nouveaux bâtiments étaient achevés, les hostilités en Corée ont changé le caractère de la présence américaine en l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, en nécessitant des initiatives nouvelles et élargies de planification et de construction. Lorsque ces efforts se matérialisaient au début des années 1950, une nouvelle collaboration a été forgée avec les agences allemands. Celle-là nécessitait des négociations et compromis continus pendant la rapide expansion de la présence militaire américaine.

Afin d'interroger ces développements, je m'inspire des histoires politiques et militaires, des relations entre l'Allemagne et les États-Unis, et des techniques architecturales et de planification. Grâce à cette combinaison, j'enregistre un rôle actif et crucial performé par la conception architecturale et pratiques de planification, servant à des fins militaires et mettant en évidence un moment où ces pratiques ont franchi les frontières institutionnelles et ont pris une forme militarisée et rébarbative.



## List of Figures

### Introduction - This Will Build That

- 0.1 Americans in Heidelberg, *Life Magazine*, July 21, 1947, front cover.
- 0.2 Ben Franklin Village sits peacefully under the protective muzzle of a tank of the 510th battalion. 30 July 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-510636.

### Chapter 1 - Continuity and Stability

- 1.1 Bombs Burst On The Marshalling Yards At Heidelberg, March 23 1945. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900 -2003. U.S. Air Force Number 81346AC.
- 1.2 Nazis retreating over the Neckar River blasted the center span of the ancient “Old Guard” bridge leading into Heidelberg. 3/31/45. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC203152.
- 1.3 Aerial View of the Damage Done to the City of Mannheim Before it Was Taken by the United States Seventh Army Troops, Germany. 4/5/1945. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-203306.
- 1.4 I.G. Farbenindustrie, Huge Chemical plant at Ludwigshafen, Germany, hit by Boeing B-17s. 13 Sept 44. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900 -2003. U.S. Air Force Number 55038AC.
- 1.5 LUDWIGSHAVEN CHEMICAL PLANT--Heavy concentration of high explosives bursts as Eighth Air Force heavies attack huge chemical and synthetic oil works across the river from Mannheim, Germany. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900 -2003. Air Force Number 54761AC.
- 1.6 Bomb Damage At Chemical Plant At Ludwigshaven, Germany. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900 -2003. U.S. Air Force Number 94170USAF.
- 1.7 War Theaters. RG 407: Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1905 - 1981. Folder 171, 225275010.
- 1.8 “Process of Personnel Readjustment, Flow of Units and Individuals,” *Redeployment: Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46* (Frankfurt-am-Main:Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), Chart III.
- 1.9 *You're Staging for the States*, [Pamphlet], America in World War Two: Oral Histories and Personal Accounts, 1945, 10-11.
- 1.10 “Redeployment Troop Departures from European Theater,” Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Public Relations Division, USFET Release No. 970, in Pfc. Herman J. Obermayer, Frankfurt, Germany, to Mr. and Mrs. Obermayer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, America in World War Two: Oral Histories and Personal Accounts, 7 January 1946.
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- 1.12 Map Showing Occupation Zones in Germany and Austria. 7/1945. RG 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services, 1919-2002. 17370299.
- 1.13 Greater Berlin. 1949. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 159082265.
- 1.14 Austria Zones of Occupation. 1946. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 159080793.
- 1.15 Western Europe - Principal Iron and Steel Areas, Iron Ore and Coal Deposits. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 175515286.
- 1.16 The Ruhr Areas. 1946. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 159080791.
- 1.17 Germany Production of Fuels by Districts 1937 and 1944. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 159080669.
- 1.18 Germany Wehrkreise. RG 407: Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1905 - 1981. Folder 148, 152951424.
- 1.19 Aerial View of Stetten Kaserne, HQ 508 Military Police Battalion. 17 May 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC- 343515.
- 1.20 Aerial View of Peterson Kaserne, Munich Military Post. 17 May 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-343517.
- 1.21 Aerial View of Henry Kaserne, HQ 29th Trans, Truck BN. 17 May 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-343516.
- 1.22 Aerial View of Warner Kaserne HQ IRO Area. 17 May 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-343522.
- 1.23 München: Haus der Kunst [Officers-Club], Parkplatzschilder für amerikanische Fahrzeuge, Abt. Staatsarchiv Freiburg W 134 Nr. 018810 Bild 1.
- 1.24 Through Routes in US Army Areas. RG 407: Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1905 - 1981. Folder 51, 148034552.
- 1.25 Stadtplan und Gebäude. 1830. Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg. ID: #190804.
- 1.26 Übersichts-Plan der Stadt Heidelberg und Umgebung [Map of the city of Heidelberg and surrounding area, 1906]. Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg. ID: H Heidelberg 12, 4-1711381.
- 1.27 Heidelberg: Fernsicht über die Stadt und den Neckar [Heidelberg: distant view over the city and the Neckar]. 1. März 1936. Abt. Staatsarchiv Freiburg. W 134 Nr. 008512 Bild 1. 5-147018.
- 1.28 Heidelberg: Sicht vom Philosophenweg auf die Stadt (Heidelberg: View of the city from Philosopher's Walk). 1. März 1936. Abt. Staatsarchiv Freiburg. W 134 Nr. 008499 Bild 1. 5-147006.
- 1.29 "Plan der Stadt Heidelberg," in Adreßbuch der Stadt Heidelberg mit den Gemeinden Ziegelhausen und Leimen sowie der Stadt Wiesloch. 1949.

- 1.30 Aerial View of Patton Barrack [Grendier-Kaserne]. 16 June 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 343927.
- 1.31 Aerial View of Campbell Barracks. 16 June 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-343928.
- 1.32 The Main Entrance of Headquarters Building USAREUR. 1959. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-565554.
- 1.33 An Overall View Showing the Parade Ground During the Ceremony Held for Rear Admiral Wilkes and Maj Gen Douglass. 18 April 1951. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-368898.
- 1.34 Lt. Colonel E.R. Whitehurst, "Our Army Hospitals, 130th Station Hospital, Heidelberg," *Medical Bulletin*, Vol. 2, no. 2, (Feb. 1947), 33.
- 1.35 The 130th Station Hospital Catholic Chapel at Heidelberg. October 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-355766.
- 1.36 The entrance to U.S. 130th Station Hospital, Heidelberg Military Post. 16 March 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-341952.
- 1.37 Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953* (Darmstadt, Germany: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), 37.
- 1.38 "7 EUCOM Sections to Quit Frankfurt," *Stars and Stripes*, January 10, 1948, 1.
- 1.39 130th Station Hospital, Aerial View. 7 July 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-345084.
- 1.40ab A shot of the outside of the old medical building at the 130th Sta[tion] Hosp[ital] in [H]eidelberg. 25 Nov 1959. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-568795, SC-568796.
- 1.41 *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 7, No. 4, (April 1950), front cover.
- 1.42 A new 200-man barracks building recently completed at Patton Barracks in Heidelberg. 20 Dec 1951. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-384377.
- 1.43 *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 8, No. 12, (December 1951), front cover.
- 1.44 *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 9, No. 5, (May 1952), front cover.
- 1.45 View of the new 130th Station building. 31 March 1953. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-426884.
- 1.46 Isometric Perspective, "Symposium: Medical Construction Plans," *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 8, No. 12, (December 1951), 552.
- 1.47 Aerial view of Flint Kaserne, HQ 1st Infantry Division, Bad Tolz, Germany. 18 May 1950. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-343526.

- 1.48 Aerial view of Panzer Kaserne, Murnau, Germany. 18 May 1950. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-343525.
- 1.49 Aerial view of Artillerie Kaserne, Murnau, Germany. 18 May 1950. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-343524.
- 1.50 Aerial view of Ludwig Kaserne, Darmstadt, Germany. 24 May 1950. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-343746.

## Chapter 2 - Entanglement and Extension

- 2.1 Howard and Shirley Katzander, "Tale of 3 Cities," *Stars and Stripes*, March 7, 1948, 5.
- 2.2 Hotel Bayrischer Hof. 1949. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 336095.
- 2.3 Interior View of Exchange, Heidelberg. 1949. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 336097.
- 2.4 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 86.
- 2.5 Kaiser Wilhelm Research Institute, Heidelberg. 10 June 1952. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 404408.
- 2.6 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 70.
- 2.7 City Map of Frankfurt with American military locations, 1946.
- 2.8 Town Plan Munich with American military functions, 1945.
- 2.9 City Map of Wiesbaden with American military locations, 1947.
- 2.10 Munich's City Hall Built By Kaiser Wilhelm In 1910 Now Houses The Allied Military Government. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900-2003. U.S. Air Force Number K3449.
- 2.11 Billet Assignment List No. 1, US Headquarters Berlin District. 17 July 1945. RG 319: Records of the Army Staff, 1903-2009.
- 2.12ad Model Apartment for American Dependent's of the American Army of Occupation Troops, Frankfurt. 26 Mar 1946. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 232513.
- 2.13 "Heidelberg Students Stage Protest," and "7,000 Students Jeer MPs In Munich Demonstration," *Stars and Stripes*, June 18, 1948, 12.
- 2.14 Federal Republic of Germany - States and Administrative Districts (and Berlin). RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 175515517.

- 2.15 Detail of Campbell Barracks (with Patton Barracks and Nachrichten Casern) from “Plan der Stadt Heidelberg,” in Adreßbuch der Stadt Heidelberg mit den Gemeinden Ziegelhausen und Leimen sowie der Stadt Wiesloch, 1949.
- 2.16 Newly Constructed Building, Heidelberg. 27 Jan 1950. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 338599.
- 2.17 Detail of Campbell Barracks with New Housing, Heidelberg. April 1951. Adapted from “Plan der Stadt Heidelberg,” in Adreßbuch der Stadt Heidelberg mit den Gemeinden Ziegelhausen und Leimen sowie der Stadt Wiesloch, 1949.
- 2.18 Military Police direct traffic and escort children across an intersection in dependents, housing area, Heidelberg, Germany. 28 July 1953. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 426831.
- 2.19 “Entwicklungsbeirat Konversion, Konversion Südstadt,” Projekt Stadt, Stadtentwicklung Consulting, Nov 2013, 7.
- 2.20 The dependents housing area near the U.S. Army in Europe Headquarters, Heidelberg. 17 November 1952. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 425056.
- 2.21 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 82.

### Chapter 3 - Extension and Expansion

- 3.1 “Location Plan - Troop Installations and Community Centers, Master Five Year Plan,” Engineer Bulletin No. 3, “Master Planning and Construction Programming,” Engineer Division, Headquarters United State Army, Europe, 8 November 1950, RG 549: Records of United States Army, Europe, 1942-1991, Box 987.
- 3.2 “Development Plan - Kasernes and Community Centers Master Five Year Plan,” Engineer Bulletin No. 3, “Master Planning and Construction Programming,” Engineer Division, Headquarters United State Army, Europe, 8 November 1950, RG 549: Records of United States Army, Europe, 1942-1991, Box 987.
- 3.3 “Consolidation Plan - Technical Facilities, Master Five Year Plan,” Engineer Bulletin No. 3, “Master Planning and Construction Programming,” Engineer Division, Headquarters United State Army, Europe, 8 November 1950, RG 549: Records of United States Army, Europe, 1942-1991, Box 987.
- 3.4 Aerial View of EES [European Exchange Services] Shopping Center and Headquarters Area Command Bus Station in Heidelberg, Germany. 18 Apr 1953. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC426886.
- 3.5 D. W. Dreyse, *May - Siedlungen: Architekturführer Durch Acht Siedlungen Des Neuen Frankfurt, 1926-1930* (Frankfurt am Main: Fricke, 1987), 21.
- 3.6 D. W. Dreyse, *May - Siedlungen: Architekturführer Durch Acht Siedlungen Des Neuen Frankfurt, 1926-1930* (Frankfurt am Main: Fricke, 1987), foldout.
- 3.7ab Demonstration in Front of American Housing Development. 3 July 1951. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-384335-SC-384336.

- 3.8 Letter from Otto Bartning to Construction Branch, Engineer Division, "List of experienced German Architects," 13 February 1952, in "Use of Architectural Engineer Firms," Construction Branch, Engineer Division, Headquarters European Command. 26 May 1952. RG 549: Records of United States Army, Europe, 1942-1991, Box 1101.
- 3.9 Joint German-American Musical Program by the Frankfurt Police band during the Opening of the new housing project "Von Steuben Siedlung", Frankfurt, Germany. 20 Sept 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-510643.
- 3.10 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014).
- 3.11ab "Proposed Alternate Housing," Grundrisstypen und Baubeschreibung für Austausch - Wohnungseinheiten in der Französischen Zone des Bundesgebietes, Der Bundesminister der Finanzen. 3 March 1953. RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.
- 3.12 Aerial View of EUCOM Headquarters, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg. 15 August 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-350695.
- 3.13 Aerial view of Campbell Barracks, showing the exits and approaches on the east side. 15 July 1958. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-365556.
- 3.14 The Heidelberg Military Post chapel located across the street from the U.S. Army in Europe Headquarters, at Heidelberg. 17 November 1952. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC- 425054.
- 3.15 The Post Chapel, Heidelberg Military Post. 1 February 1952. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-396166.
- 3.16 Dependent Housing Area. 15 Sept 1964. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-612585.
- 3.17 *Campbell Barracks: The Story of a Caserne* (Heidelberg: Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, 1994), 17.
- 3.18 Status of Family Housing - Calendar Year 1952. RG 549: Records of United States Army, Europe, 1942-1991. Box X.
- 3.19 Heilbronn Stadtplan. 1963. Historische Stadtpläne, Stadtarchiv Heilbronn.
- 3.20 Aerial view of housing area. August 25, 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-468927.
- 3.21 Stadt-Plan Fuerth, in *Beilage zum Adressbuch der Stadt Fürth 1905* (Fürth: Schmittner, [1905 ca.]; Köln: A.-G. für Mechanische Kartographie).
- 3.22 Aerial view of Nurnberg Post's Newly Completed Housing Project Near Post HQ. 5 April 1951. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-368866.
- 3.23 An aerial view of the housing area at Robinson Barracks. 23 August 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-468924.

- 3.24 An aerial view of the housing area at Ludwigsburg. August 25, 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-468921.
- 3.25 Aerial view of housing. August 25, 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-468928.

## **Chapter 4 - Agency and Expansion**

- 4.1 Arriving at the Heidelberg Air Field is Congressman Gerald R. Ford. 12 Aug 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-509583.
- 4.2 Col. E.J. Drinkert, Deputy Commanding Officer HACOM, with Congressmen after their tour of the Patrick Henry Dependent Housing Area near Heidelberg. 13 Aug 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-509590.
- 4.3 Mike and Nancy Holbrook, son & daughter of SGT & Mrs Frank W. Holbrook, takes distinguished visitor by the hand and go for a walk in Patrick Henry Village. 8 Sep 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-509603.
- 4.4 Col Charles F. McNair, Commanding Officer HACOM, and Rear Admiral John Will, Director of Personnel, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. 19 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466375.
- 4.5 Col Leckie is briefing the party prior to their tour of D.A. [Dependents Area] civilians quarters in Patrick Henry Village. 6 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466325.
- 4.6 Col McNair is orientating the gentlemen on Patrick Henry Village in Schwetzingen. 17 Nov 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-469150.
- 4.7 Shown here are the House Civil Service Subcommittee. They are visiting D.A. civilians quarters in Patrick Henry Village. 6 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466326.
- 4.8 Congressman George A. Shuford, a member of the House Committee of Veteran Affairs, and his family talk with a fellow family from North Carolina. 13 Aug 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-509591.
- 4.9 The U.S. Army in Europe Headquarters airfield in Heidelberg. 17 Nov 1952. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-425053.
- 4.10 Aerial view of Heidelberg airstrip. 2 Mar 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466123.
- 4.11 Luftbild: Film 100 Bildnr. 32. Landesvermessungsamt Baden-Württemberg: Landesbefliegung Baden-Württemberg 1968 - Luftbilder und digitales Orthophoto 1968. 2017-2021. 2-5939708.
- 4.12 Officers Club, Patrick Henry Village. Sept 1964. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-612584.

- 4.13ab "Proposed Alternate Housing, 2 Bed Room Unit," Guide Specifications for Construction of Alternate Accommodations for U.S. Forces, 26 February 1953, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Engineer Division Construction Branch, RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.
- 4.14 Dependent housing area, Landstuhl, Germany. 3 Sept 1964. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-612554.
- 4.15 "Austauschwohnungen für die Amerikanischen Streitkräfte, Wohnungen mit 2 und 3 Schlafzimmern," in Supplementary Program, Obörrregierungsrat Rocke, Federal Ministry of Finance to Mr. Zinn Garrett, Civil-Military Relations Officer US-HICOG. 20 March 1954. RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.
- 4.16a-f Grundrissstypen und Baubeschreibung für Austausch - Wohnungseinheiten in der Französischen Zone des Bundesgebietes, Der Bundesminister der Finanzen, Bonn. 20 April 1953. RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.
- 4.17a-d Basic Types and Description of Buildings for Substitute Dwelling Units in the British Zone of the Federal Territory and in the British Sector of Berlin, The Federal Minister of Finance, Bonn. 31 March 1953. RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.
- 4.18 Patrick Henry Village dependents housing under construction. 1955. Stadtarchiv Heidelberg.
- 4.19 Luftbild: Film 100 Bildnr. 32. Landesvermessungsamt Baden-Württemberg: Landesbefliegung Baden-Württemberg 1968 - Luftbilder und digitales Orthophoto 1968. 2017-2021. 2-5939708.
- 4.20 Aerial view of Patrick Henry Village looking west. 1955. Stadtarchiv Heidelberg.
- 4.21 Aerial view of Patrick Henry Village looking south. 1955. Stadtarchiv Heidelberg.
- 4.22 Capt Robert Avon's children Robert and Debby, look out the living room window from their new quarters at Patrick Henry Village, the US Army's housing development on the outskirts of Heidelberg. 29 March 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466131.
- 4.23 The delivery truck of the Heidelberg commissary delivers bread, milk, and cream to the dependents quarters of Patrick Henry Village. 29 March 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-4666133.
- 4.24 All over interior of QMC commissary at Kelley Barracks, Moehringen, Germany. 5 Aug 1953. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-461492.
- 4.25 View of meat counter of Heidelberg commissary store No 1. 4 Sept 1953. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-461562.
- 4.26 Self-service vegetable counter, HAC [Headquarters Area Command] Army Commissary Store No 1, Heidelberg, Germany. 11 Aug 1953. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-461510.
- 4.27 Construction work in progress at Patrick Henry Village. 29 March 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466130.



- 4.28 Inspecting dependent housing units in Patrick Henry Village. 29 Aug 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-510639.
- 4.29 Inside view of St. Ann's Chapel, Heidelberg, Germany. 19 Sept 1952. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-413485.
- 4.30 Exterior view of the new Patrick Henry Village chapel, Heidelberg. 13 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466356.
- 4.31 Interior view of the new Patrick Henry Village chapel, Heidelberg. 13 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466357.

## **Epilogue - Train, Display, Engage**

- 5.1 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 12.
- 5.2 The joint U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy field exercise, designated as "Exercise Rainbow," held in the U.S. zone of Germany September 11-18. 13 September 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-349719.
- 5.3 "Exercise Rainbow" - 11-18 September 1950. 12 September 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-349741.
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## List of acronyms

AHA/USPHS	American Hospital Association/US Public Health Service
BDA	Bund Deutscher Architekten (Association of German Architects)
BOQ	Bachelor Officers' Quarters
EES	European Exchange Services
ETO	European Theater of Operations
EUCOM	European Command
FHA	Federal Housing Authority
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
HICOG	High Commission for Occupied Germany
HMP	Heidelberg Military Post
NSC	National Security Council
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USFET	United States Forces, European Theatre

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intellectual model that continues to inspire. My parents have provided care and unrelenting support throughout. In several fundamental ways, the decisions they made long ago made this study possible. I dedicate this work to them.

## INTRODUCTION

### THIS WILL BUILD THAT

‘Good morning folks, this is Heidelberg here we’re coming into now, you know the old refrain, “I lost my heart in Heidelberg,” well I have a friend who lost both his ears here! Don’t get me wrong, it’s really a nice town, the people are warm and wonderful - when they’re not dueling. Seriously though, they treat you just fine, they don’t just give you the key to the city, they give you the bung-starter!’

Thomas Pynchon<sup>1</sup>

American military forces occupying Germany following the Second World War had to live and work somewhere. Later, in the 1950s, when the American military presence in West Germany expanded, more spaces had to be required. But in both cases Germany’s material conditions offered less than ideal options. Most German cities after the war were in physical ruin from allied air bombings, infrastructures linking cities were heavily damaged, food and other basic necessities were either in short supply or could not circulate due to those infrastructural breakdowns, and millions of displaced persons and refugees were desperately competing to find their own places of safety and security. Amid these (and other) prolonged conditions, this dissertation investigates the processes by which American military officials established their exigent living and working arrangements in occupied, and later West Germany, from 1945 to 1960. I argue that the built environment was decisive in establishing American military power in occupied Germany. Existing German facilities anchored the American presence in the immediate post-combat period, and later formed a base for military expansion in the 1950s that would last into the early twentieth-first century. In probing these developments, this dissertation aims to deepen our understanding of how design and planning techniques were embraced and reconfigured as a fundamental means to military power.

In order to investigate this process, I take American military developments in Heidelberg as a case study. Between 1945 and 1960, this quiet medieval city, famed for its castle and Germany’s oldest university, was radically transformed by the United States Army into the European

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Pynchon, *Gravity’s Rainbow* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 412.

headquarters for American military forces. Taking existing German military facilities as a point of departure, American officials seized, occupied, reconfigured, extended, and expanded the city's military offerings as they entrenched themselves, first making use of the city's existing structures, quickly rehabilitating and adding emergency structures to serve immediate, ad hoc needs, constructing their own buildings as their presence continued to grow, and finally expanding their position for long-term occupancy. These various developments were all undertaken in the fifteen year period following the war and included a wide range of construction activities, including building administrative facilities, troop and training areas, family housing, educational and medical facilities, and various commercial support services. By the end of the 1950s, Heidelberg was home to over 10,000 American military personnel, family members, and support staff.

Despite Heidelberg's transformation into a new military headquarters after the war, the city has received scant critical attention, although a more general American presence in the city was triumphantly alluded to in the popular press (figure 0.1).<sup>2</sup> In fact, American military activities in Germany after the war have remained an understudied subject more generally, with studies of its physical planning nonexistent.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, the immediate postwar period in Germany has not gone unnoticed. By far, the most extensive and sustained interest in post-war Germany has come from Cold War historians. For a long time the dominate narrative took a dialectical form of orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist understandings, in which historians' were primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with explaining how and why the allied war alliance broke down and who was

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<sup>2</sup> For a general history of the US military presence in Heidelberg, see Walter F. Elkins, Führer Christian, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> To be sure, there are numerous works that chronicle specific aspects of military-war developments, such as rearmament, nuclear weapons, military alliances, and the financial burdens of Western defense in West Germany. For a selection, see A. J. Birtle, *Rearming the Phoenix: U.S. Military Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950-1960* (New York: Garland, 1991); Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and Hubert Zimmermann, *Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy and West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950-1971* (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2002).



Figure 0.1 Americans in Heidelberg, *Life Magazine*, July 21, 1947, front cover.



responsible for the resulting Cold War.<sup>4</sup> Despite their differences, in these initial assessments, historians made two fundamental assumptions: the first was that the Cold War was a bipolar, "superpower" rivalry, with the United States and the Soviet Union each competing for control and spheres of influence; and the second was that Europe in general, and Germany in particular was the center of this conflict. Thus, while the initial division and occupation of Germany was understood as the result of its own aggression, its eventual partition into two highlighted the impossibility of the two superpowers (and to a lesser extent Britain and France) to jointly administer and rebuild a defeated and destroyed Germany into a unified, non-aggressor Germany.<sup>5</sup> Depending on their position, historians either framed the eventual division of Germany as a failure of the wartime grand alliance, or a strategic move by one of the powers to maintain control of their territory.<sup>6</sup>

Beginning in the 1980s, this framework was challenged on two fronts. The first challenge came from a new generation of historians who questioned the "American bipolar narrative," and attempted to decenter and expand understandings of Cold War events. As David Reynolds has noted, scholars - benefiting from newly opened government archives - began to challenge the perceived dominate role of American policy-makers, instead asserting a more active and intentional

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<sup>4</sup> In extremely condensed form, orthodox or traditionalist historians placed blame for both events on Stalin and a presumed Soviet desire for expansion. As Odd Arne Westad has noted, the very term "The Cold War" became immediately synonymous through these historians (and American policymakers) as "a period of Soviet aggression that was initiated by [the Soviet Union's] growing power in the latter stages of the war and which had become doctrine by 1947." The Western position quickly morphed from a specific anti-Stalinist to a more general anti-communist framework in the 1950s, before being challenged by a new - though smaller - group of revisionist historians beginning in the 1960s, who charged that US imperialism and capitalist requirements for expansion were the crucial issues to understanding Cold War developments, exemplified by the American Vietnam War. The so-called synthesis or consensus view came in the 1970s with realist or post-revisionist historians who read détente as a geopolitical balance of power between two superpower competitors. For a selection of literature detailing these developments, see John L. Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (1983): 171–90; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," *Journal of Peace Research* 23, no. 3 (1986): 263–77; Odd Arne Westad, "The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century," in Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Hans-Peter Schwarz, "The division of Germany, 1945-1949," in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, 133-153.

<sup>6</sup> For a critical reading of the second perspective, see Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

part played by their European - British, French, and German - counterparts.<sup>7</sup> After the dissolution of the bipolar, superpower world structure, this European focus was further expanded to a global scale, with scholars arguing that the Cold War project, as an elite Western project, “to a very large extent shaped both the international and the domestic framework within which political, social, and cultural change in Third World countries took place.”<sup>8</sup> Additionally, Third World elites, according to these scholars and not unlike the European narrative, developed active and self-interested agendas through their collaborative engagements with US and Soviet officials, thereby altering both US and Soviet courses of action.<sup>9</sup>

Simultaneous to this challenge by political and diplomatic historians, there was also a second challenge by social and cultural historians who countered the exclusive attention on high-level political and diplomatic activities of policymakers. Whereas the new Cold War historians had de-centered Germany’s (and Europe’s) significance by shifting to a more geographically expanded reading of political events, the new cultural historians shifted scholarship from institutional structures to cultural conditions and hitherto questions of agency. Studies on popular culture, mass consumption, sexual relations, and racial hierarchies investigated the cultural exchanges between

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<sup>7</sup> David Reynolds, “Probing the Cold War Narrative since 1945: The Case of Western Europe,” in Konrad Hugo Jarausch, Christian F Ostermann, and Andreas Etges, eds., *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation* (Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter, 2017), 67-82; Josef Becker and Franz Knipping, *Power in Europe?: Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1986).

<sup>8</sup> Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.

<sup>9</sup> Even as a relatively new subfield, the global cold war is already another one of those “vast” literatures. For broad overviews, see, Federico Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads,” *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 685–703; and Jeremi Suri, “Conflict and Co-Operation in the Cold War: New Directions in Contemporary Historical Research,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (2011): 5–9. For detailed studies, see, in addition to Westad’s *The Global Cold War*, idem., *The Cold War: A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017); Hal Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War in the Third World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2020). For challenges to the global perspective, see Anders Stephanson, “Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War,” in Simon Dalby and Gerard Toal, *Rethinking Geopolitics* (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Lawrence D. Freedman, “Frostbitten: Decoding the Cold War, 20 Years Later,” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 2 (2010): 136–44. At various moments, other historians have also suggested that German, European, and Third World leaders understood how to leverage their positions with their “patrons” for their own benefit. See, for example, Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 253.

American military forces and occupied German populations and the challenges for German authorities in reconstructing national identities after the Nazi regime.<sup>10</sup> For instance, historian Uta Poiger argued that certain American popular culture imports beginning in the 1940s, such as jazz and rock music, were considered threats by German elites because the music contained African-American influences that “undermined the respectability of German men and women.”<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Maria Höhn highlighted how sexual relations between German women and American soldiers shifted from resentment to unacknowledged tolerance, except for those “Women who transgressed racial boundaries,” which remained “unacceptable” for both Germans and US military officials.<sup>12</sup> Finally, Heide Fehrenbach has illuminated how American occupation policy was slow to acknowledge and allow, and later discouraged, American soldiers “to declare paternity” for children conceived between them and German women until the early 1950s. Even then, “mixed-race” children were the subject of various studies by German authorities and only grudgingly offered immigration rights to the US after intense activism efforts by African American organizations.<sup>13</sup>

The shift from complex political interactions to (equally complex) cultural exchanges enlarged understandings of postwar and Cold War Germany, revealing how everyday citizens,

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<sup>10</sup> To a certain extent, this literature exists within the larger and more complex field of twentieth century German history that has been extensively preoccupied with examining how Germany turned fascist, and how to grapple with its success in the aftermath of the Second World War. For recent overviews on these dynamics, see Konrad Hugo Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Pertti Ahonen, “Germany and the Aftermath of the Second World War,” *The Journal of Modern History* 89, no. 2 (2017): 355–87; Frank Biess and Astrid M Eckert, “Introduction: Why Do We Need New Narratives for the History of the Federal Republic?” *Central European History* 52, no. 1 (2019): 1–18.

<sup>11</sup> But as Poiger notes, this initial stance then shifted in the 1950s as these forms of music (and cultural production more generally) were reinterpreted as ideological tools against East German policies. See Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2000), 9.

<sup>12</sup> Maria Höhn, “Heimat in Turmoil - African-American GIs in 1950s West Germany,” in Hanna Schissler, ed. *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 145; also see Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). For an elaboration on these issues beyond Germany, see Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon, *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> See Heide Fehrenbach, “War Orphans and Postfascist Families,” in Frank Biess and Robert G Moeller, *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 187-188.

defeated and governed by foreign military governments, negotiated their way back to a normality. Despite these advances and innovations, which also highlighted a shift in archival material, when it came to the built environment, there was a curious consistency that social scientists and historians seemed to share - if they mentioned the subject at all.<sup>14</sup> In his theory of base politics, Alexander Cooley described the American military presence in Germany as “large garrison towns in Germany that look like imported American counties.” In an innovative study arguing that military family members served as “unofficial ambassadors” in promoting American democratic ideals, Donna Alvah described the additional “domestic dimension” of “facilities built for personnel and families - houses, schools, playgrounds, commissaries, gas stations, churches, clubs, skating rinks, beauty parlors - [that] gave military communities a suburban American air.” Discussing the complex transatlantic exchanges between Europeans and Americans that stretched back to the nineteenth century, Mary Nolan noted that “The United States military was one crucial conduit of American modernism, for bases with modern offices, tract housing, and supermarkets dotted Germany and Italy.” And in a section detailing West Germany’s road to political stability in the 1950s, Tony Judt noted how American “GIs spread across central and southern Germany ... with their military installations, bases, convoys, movies, music, food, clothes, chewing gum and cash.”<sup>15</sup>

In all of these descriptions - and we will come across others throughout the study - there are at least two commonalities crucial to this study. The first is that they are always offered in passing as the authors move on toward other concerns.<sup>16</sup> The second is that they are offered as factual statements without evidence. The strength and durability of these statements owes much from this

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<sup>14</sup> Whereas cold war (and military) historians rely on official government sources, cultural historians have utilized a variety of other source materials, e.g., Höhn’s use of city prostitution records and oral histories.

<sup>15</sup> Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012), 7; Donna Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946-1965* (New York: NYU Press, 2007), 33, 34; Mary Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 248; Judt, *Postwar*, 273-274.

<sup>16</sup> For example, in Judt’s case, immediately after the list he provides, he details the nostalgic Heimat, or homeland, cinema of the 1950s.

combination. By not offering any details of the built environment, by not defining what exactly they mean by the American suburbia import, and by casually referring to this supposed connection, overseas US military bases - in general - are simply accepted as one of many “American-style built environments,” exported to foreign soils.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, in this study I intend to slow down and pause on this assumed factuality with actual visual and textual sources that, I believe, will cast doubt on this view. In doing so, I do not want to imply that these accounts are entirely incorrect, but rather crucially incomplete. In their present forms, they produce a limited and distorted understanding that assumes a total power on the part of US military officials to impose their own objectives on foreign identities and in foreign lands. They also imply a motivation on the part of American military officials to prioritize certain civilian living conditions over military specific objectives. As such, they reveal nothing of how American military communities were physically planned and built, what those building practices actually produced, and who the active participants were in these endeavors. In this study I aim to examine these processes and correct these passing observations by understanding how a specific military community took form and how the built environment constituted military power in the making.<sup>18</sup> In the story I tell, what others have taken for granted is precisely what I try to explain.

This study attempts to cut across existing literature in several ways. On the one hand, I am resolutely focused on American military actions in Germany in the immediate postwar and early Cold War period. It was during this period that the American military actually established its military power in divided Europe and Germany, or, to say it differently, when the United States militarized

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<sup>17</sup> Paul A. Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,” *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (2011): 1356.

<sup>18</sup> Within architectural discourse these passing statements have found support for example in Mark Gillem’s study of American military bases in Italy, South Korea and Okinawa in the 1990s and early 2000s. Gillem utilizes aerial and figure-ground imagery to compellingly reveal how military base planning shifted from planning experts to security specialists at the turn of the twenty-first century, and as a negative consequence of American empire, but offers little insight into how US military bases were actually formed, beyond general statements referencing empire and asymmetrical legal agreements. See Mark L. Gillem, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

Europe. By limiting the spatial and temporal framework to US military activities in Germany immediately following the Second World War, I aim to focus on where and how that power making process unfolded in physical form, under specific conditions, and in its largest concentration. On the other hand, the study concentrates on a specific cultural form - the built environment - and how that form takes shape during this period, rather than more conventional military operations and procedures. My aim with this combination is to comprehend how building and planning practices were developed and deployed by military authorities. What I want to suggest is that the construction of the one constituted the building of the other (figure 0.2). By comprehending the crucial role the built environment played, we can enlarge and deepen our understanding of how US military power materialized. It is not simply an anodyne statement that the built environment reflected that power or was a “background” to it, but rather, to paraphrase Charles Maier from a different context, that it constituted a critical and decisive means in actually forming (and sustaining) that power.<sup>19</sup> The combination of a narrow American military focus with a specific, material instrument, locates an initial moment of formation, thereby opening new questions and insights into US military operations.<sup>20</sup>

In an effort to explicate this position, I frame this study through a series of distinct, parallel, or simultaneous signposts. The first is continuity, which I read in a dual aspect; first in linking

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<sup>19</sup> Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (2000): 807–31.

<sup>20</sup> Although there are few studies connecting architecture and planning procedures with American military activities, the larger connections between architecture-planning and military actions has recently received limited but insightful disciplinary attention. See, for instance, Donald Albrecht and Margaret Crawford, *World War II and the American Dream: How Wartime Building Changed a Nation* (Washington, D.C.: National Building Museum, 1995); Jeffrey W. Cody, *Exporting American Architecture, 1870-2000* (London: Routledge, 2003); Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso, 2007); Jean-Louis Cohen, *Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Building for the Second World War* (Montréal: Canadian Centre for Architecture, 2011); Samia Henni, *Architecture of Counterrevolution: The French Army in Northern Algeria* (Zürich: gta Verlag, 2017). Expanding the disciplinary scope to include urbanism and cities, as well as other governmental agencies, critical works include Jane C. Loeffler, *Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998); Jennifer S. Light, *From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); and David Monteyne, *Fallout Shelter: Designing for Civil Defense in the Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).



Figure 0.2 Ben Franklin Village sits peacefully under the protective muzzle of a tank of the 510th battalion. 30 July 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-510636.

between the different phases of American military activities, from combat to post-combat duties, and then occupation to defense activities, and second, in connecting American military activities to earlier German military developments. In both cases, the existing built environment stabilized operations, allowing for transitions and reconfigurations to take place as strategy shifts - from combat to occupation to defense - were developed and implemented. The use of existing military structures also meant that American military activity after the war was proceeding from German military developments during and prior to the war. This was especially the case with Wehrmacht rearmament, which intensified military construction beginning in 1936, disregarding the military restrictions imposed through the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The confiscation of German military facilities was not simply a change of hands and control between German and American forces, but rather highlighted that the US military was establishing its military position on German imperial and National Socialist foundations. Although this act could be read as a final crushing of German militarism, I suggest that the role Wehrmacht facilities played for American forces was a reactivation of military power, one that at various moments American officials somewhat surprisingly respected as their presence and activities expanded.<sup>21</sup>

From this sequential connection between American and German forces, arises the second crucial concept of entanglement. As a counter approach to comparative history, which takes the physical and-or temporal distinction between at least two entities - usually, though not always nation-

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<sup>21</sup> More broadly, continuity, as it relates to Germany's course of development during the twentieth century, has been a fundamental category for historians, connecting to the larger concept-thesis of *Sonderweg*, or special path, which after 1945, attempted to account for Germany's "peculiar" path toward fascism through various structural weaknesses, e.g., a weak middle class, a powerful pre-industrial elite, late nation-building, the absence of parliamentarism. After a series of critiques, later interpretations shifted the focus to explaining Germany's long westward orientation, which has itself been challenged. For an overview, see Jürgen Kocka, "German History Before Hitler: The Debate About the German *Sonderweg*," *Journal of Contemporary History* 23, no. 1 (1988): 3–16; idem., "Looking Back on the *Sonderweg*" *Central European History* 51, no. 1 (2018): 137–42; and Konrad Hugo Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10-12. For a reading of twentieth century Germany framed through "[t]he manifold contradictions between ruptures and continuities," see, Konrad Hugo Jarausch and Michael Geyer, *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). To be clear, in my reading of American military activities, although there is a clear and obvious rupture with military occupation taking form in spring 1945, the reactivation of the existing built environment, I argue, constitutes one form of continuity.



states - as a basis for study, entangled histories take the interactions between actors within a social setting as its starting point. The focus is on how these interactions unfold, taking into account the (formal) asymmetrical relations between different groups and the (informal) exchanges and influences between these parties. In occupying the entire southeast region of Germany (as well as the Bremen enclave and a portion of southern Berlin), American military forces found their activities interwoven with the German populace. As a military occupation, the asymmetry was explicit and during the occupation period, included the American seizure of German private and commercial properties, the control of German movement and organizing, and the rationing of basic goods, such as food. This power was only partially alleviated with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, and the concomitant founding of German federal agencies. The informal interactions during the occupation period were thereby institutionalized through various agencies as a new collaborative - though still asymmetrical - merger between Americans and Germans officials. An entangled framework registers the interactions between these officials, as well as the earlier exchanges between German citizens and American military officials.<sup>22</sup> In doing so, it also counters a reading of the period as the result of either American *or* German actions.<sup>23</sup> In my reading, the American military hand was very visible, but German hands also found ways to influence and shift developments according to their interests.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Overall, I read these social relations as a specific military-civilian entanglement primarily, and an American-German entanglement secondarily. See Catherine Lutz, *Homefront: A Military City and the American Twentieth Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) for a critical reading of military-civilian entanglements on US soil - Fort Bragg, North Carolina - although she employs the concept "civilian camouflage". For a national perspective during the first half of the twentieth century, see Anna Darice Miller, "The Army Post As Design Laboratory: Experiments in Architecture and Urban Planning, 1917-1948," 2012.

<sup>23</sup> For examples that privilege American actions, see Thomas A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); and James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).

<sup>24</sup> For an introduction to entangled histories and its relation-response to comparative history, see Jürgen Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," *History and Theory* 42, no. 1 (2003): 39-44; and Michael Werner, and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45, no. 1 (2006): 30-50.

Entanglement thus leads to the issue of agency. As William H. Sewell Jr. as observed, agency centers on the capacity “of exerting some degree of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree.” The extent of that transformation will depend on several factors, including the level of knowledge, collective organization, and access to resources that agents possess. In this study, these factors take varying forms at different moments. In general, I read an increasing though limited influence on the part of German actors in determining where and how American military forces established themselves in occupied and West Germany. Rather than a total, top-down framework that takes for granted the consensus and implementation of American political and military directives, this study draws out internal conflicts between American government authorities and cooperative counter-responses and ideas from German actors and authorities. To be clear, a military chain of command did exist, as did a government hierarchy, but they were not the only social relations in operation. In addition to vertical, top-down relations, there were internal, bottom-up, and external, horizontal relations, that affected the physical configuration and character of planning and building practices. Within these dynamics, Germans - individually and collectively - operated with varying degrees of influence. During the immediate post-combat phase of occupation, Germans were left to their individual networks in navigating their interests and concerns with American military officials. They almost always failed. Especially around issues of real-estate and the military policy of confiscation-requisition, a simple and clear hierarchy existed in which military objectives overrode German concerns. But just as entanglement was institutionalized with the formation of the Federal Republic, so too was agency, now collectively advanced through various German authorities and institutions. The collective knowledge and resources Germans controlled and offered - for instance, land, labor, and building expertise - were indispensable for military expansion in the early 1950s. Nevertheless,

there were limits to German agency, and locating those points and understanding why they occurred, is an important aim to this study.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, the fourth and fifth terms - extension and expansion - are more straightforward and aid in comprehending the consequences of continuity, entanglement, and agency. Both categories identify alternate physical configurations that register American military objectives, as well as German counter solutions. For military officials, extension was the preferred configuration. It consolidated personnel and activities around or near existing military facilities, creating a compact and manageable zone of command and control. Especially after the initial occupation period, in which scattered personnel and activities produced a breakdown of military readiness, extension provided a physical formula for reintroducing and furthering military preparedness. Extension was a derivative condition of continuity, which took the existing German military structures and facilities as a base for American military growth. Expansion was a further attempt to replicate that growth on a larger scale. In some instances, it achieved that goal. But in many other examples - including Heidelberg - expansion objectives brought to the fore differences and tensions with German authorities and interests (thus allowing for a specific examination of agency and entanglement). A common compromise that resulted from these issues was a bifurcation between military functions and living communities that allowed for an increase in military personnel at a manageable distance from strictly military functions. Thus, while extension utilized existing facilities as a base, expansion could either follow that model at a larger scale, or fulfill its size requirements by compromising ideal military consolidation.

In order to register the shifting significance of these themes in relation to each other and larger military developments, the narrative proceeds chronologically and analytically. Within this

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<sup>25</sup> William H. Sewell Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 143-145; also available in Gabrielle M. Spiegel, *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing After the Linguistic Turn* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 158-159. In general, the agency I see happening is that of German actors playing crucial roles in American military expansion in West Germany. For a somewhat similar intellectual reading on democratization, see Udi Greenberg, *The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

framework, the temporality of sequences and events identifies continuities and turning points that impacted military decisions and building activities; for instance, the formation of a new Federal Republic and subsequent funding for new, non-military construction, growing resentment among the German population around living standards, the outbreak of the Korean war, and the granting of full sovereignty. A chronological structure allows for a correspondence between these institutional changes and external events and specific design and planning ideas, including comprehending when certain plans were deployed, why certain schemes were initiated and adjusted, and where and how particular plans for expansion took form.

Additionally, I make use of comparative and formal perspectives in order to test specific developments in Heidelberg to more general conditions.<sup>26</sup> At the end of each chapter, I compare a specific project in Heidelberg to a larger development. For instance, in the first chapter I compare a new medical building in Heidelberg with existing military structures that surrounded it; at the end of the second chapter I compare Heidelberg's first new military housing development to contemporaneous suburban developments in the United States; I conclude the third chapter comparing later housing developments in Heidelberg to other military communities in the American zone of occupation; and in the final chapter I compare Heidelberg and other US military communities to British and French military housing developments in West Germany. In each of these cases, I make use of formal methods in order to register physical similarities and differences between American military design decisions and other authorities' actions.<sup>27</sup> These decisions then connect and confirm certain non-design motives and intentions, which provide a link between micro aspects of individual buildings, such as form, location, size, and program, and macro dimensions, such as legal, military, and financial constraints or pressures, that reveal design's entanglement with

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<sup>26</sup> On difference between comparative methods and comparative perspectives, see William H. Sewell, "Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History" *History and Theory* 6, no. 2 (1967): 218.

<sup>27</sup> Christopher Long, "Architecture: The Built Object," and Adrienne D. Hood, "Material Culture: the Object," in *History Beyond the Text: A Student's Guide to Approaching Alternative Sources*, ed. Sarah Barber and C. M Peniston-Bird (London: Routledge, 2009): 155-75, 176-98.

larger structural forces. Furthermore, although a clear homogeneity exists with the military buildings constructed, especially with regard to housing, the comparative and formal approach identifies important differences that occur within this uniformity, thereby opening up questions of context and agency not usually associated with military actions. Chronology and comparison render these shifts visible and register military processes *qua* historical processes.

Given this framework, there are several limitations worth mentioning. First, in light of occasional glances elsewhere, this study attempts nothing close to a comprehensive articulation of military building activities in all of Germany during the period under investigation. Outside of the initial formation of the four zones of occupation in 1945 and an alternate housing program initiated by German authorities in 1953, I do not consider British, French, or Soviet military activities. One reason for this omission is that American military officials did not appear to base specific building activity on the actions of the other military powers, but were rather the initiators of actions. I also do not attempt a comprehensive account of American military building practices during this period. Despite the continuously fluctuating numbers of personnel and facilities under their control, military officials embarked on a massive construction program in West Germany during the 1950s that resulted in tens of thousands of new structures, as well as a few thousand renovations to existing structures.<sup>28</sup> A detailed study taking all of this building activity into account would go far beyond the confines of a dissertation. Second, despite an obvious concern for military building activities, this study does not engage with what might be considered military architecture.<sup>29</sup> It rather concentrates

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<sup>28</sup> For a summary of these overall construction programs, see George W. Tays, *The US Army Construction Program in Germany, 1950-1953* (Historical Division, Headquarters, 1955); and David A. Lane, James J. Borrer, and George W. Tays, *The U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953-1957*, (Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, Headquarters, 1958).

<sup>29</sup> Examples of this sort include bunkers, air raid shelters, firing ranges, troop training facilities, Nissen huts, hangars, and fortress walls. For studies that examine the design of these types of structures, see Keith Mallory and Arvid Ottar, *Architecture of Aggression: A History of Military Architecture in North West Europe, 1900-1945* (London: Architectural Press, 1973); Paul Virilio and George Collins, *Bunker Archeology: Texts and Photographs* (New York, N.Y.: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994); and J. E. Kaufmann, H. W. Kaufmann, and Robert M. Jurga, *Fortress Third Reich: German Fortifications and Defense Systems in World War II* (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo, 2003).

on a series of building types that would fit just as easily into civilian, or at least non-military, building programs, such as housing, hospitals, and hotels. In this sense, the study confirms a rather concerning blurring between what constitutes strictly military functions and civilian architectural needs. Finally, the study does not engage the reception or everyday life of individuals who lived and worked in Heidelberg specifically, or occupied and West Germany more generally. The focus instead remains on comprehending an institutional building and planning process that, even within the limits established, quickly becomes complex on its own.

Notwithstanding these limitations, and although I focus on one specific city, I aim to make two general contributions. The first is to detail the dynamics by which American military power emerged in the immediate postwar period through the crucial role the built environment played in that effort. Despite the vast number of critical and popular works detailing the period, the absence of the built environment, I believe, limits our understanding of how the US military was actually able to function and what they actually produced in order to fulfill their institutional objectives. Chronicling what they built for themselves, how they drew on broad design concepts and adapted them for specific military conditions, is not, I would argue, a minor detail, but rather evidence of how they constructed a physical setting of power and control at a specific moment. In this study, that construction takes several forms and is accomplished by varied means, from an initial brute force to a later selective cooperation. A study of the built environment provides fertile entry into the dynamics and formation of those realities, while also providing a physical trace of their outcomes.

The second aim is to complicate the disciplinary emphasis on ideas imported into the field, by identifying a moment in which design and planning ideas traveled outward. Especially around the Second World War and the immediate postwar period, architectural historians have shed light into the myriad ways architecture drew on developments elsewhere. For instance, and in relation to military activities, in various works Beatriz Colomina has highlighted “the impact of World War II on architectural discourse ... and the recycling of military technologies, materials, and attitudes to

the reorganization of postwar space and lifestyle.” More recently, Daniel Barber has noted the significance of “knowledge from other fields” as a productive source in architecture’s experiments with energy technologies immediately following the war.<sup>30</sup> In this study I highlight a moment wherein design ideas and techniques travel in the opposite direction, leaving the confines of the design world and taken up by military officials, either directly or through consultation. Thus knowledge moved in both directions and, at least in this Second World War-postwar instant, simultaneously.<sup>31</sup> It is worth probing how this process occurred, which ideas military officials borrowed, and how they adapted techniques for specific military purposes.

This study chronicles the processes in which American military officials restructured Heidelberg into an administrative headquarters. In Chapter 1 I examine this restructuring within the larger shift from post-combat to military occupation conditions. Moving from spring 1945 to early 1952 and utilizing visual and textual sources, I argue that the existing built environment - Reichswehr and Wehrmacht structures - played a crucial role in Heidelberg’s redesignation as European Command. I end by examining one of the first new buildings initiated by US Army officials. Chapter 2 complements the significance of existing military structures by documenting the simultaneous seizure of commercial and residential structures in order to satisfy ancillary military functions. The entanglement and tension of this action produced a dual internal and external challenge to military functioning that was only slightly eased with the construction of a new - and also one of the first - military housing developments. However, this housing was not, I contend, motivated by a desire to reproduce or import American suburbia, but rather by military objectives in achieving greater command and control. At the very moment this new housing was completed, hostilities elsewhere dramatically altered the overall American military presence in West Germany. In Chapter 3 I address

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<sup>30</sup> See Beatriz Colomina, Annmarie Brennan, and Jeannie Kim, *Cold War Hothouses: Inventing Postwar Culture, from Cockpit to Playboy* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004), 10-11; also Beatriz Colomina, *Domesticity at War* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007); Daniel A. Barber, *A House in the Sun: Modern Architecture and Solar Energy in the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3.

<sup>31</sup> For a similar proposition during the interwar years, see Miller, “The Army Post As Design Laboratory.”

how military officials in Heidelberg responded to this change and how they envisaged a physically larger and longer military commitment both in Heidelberg, as well as West Germany. Rather than a complete reworking of planning and building practices, I identify an effort between 1950 and 1953 to maintain the same practices and techniques at a larger scale. Nevertheless, I also register greater input from newly created German agencies and an acknowledgement of specific contexts by military officials that created a more heterogeneous mix of military communities than one may assume. In Chapter 4 I dive deeper into institutional relations between Americans and Germans as military expansion gained momentum. From the early to mid 1950s, I highlight a more active and cooperative German role in determining where American military developments occurred, as well as an sustained effort to resolve German frustrations with the continuing holding of German properties by US military forces. But those efforts had limits. Military officials by this point had also developed and adjusted their own building specifications and requirements that were only marginally flexible within their own structures. As such, throughout the mid-1950s, continuous negotiations and compromises took place at the very moment that the American military presence was rapidly expanding. The cost of reaching agreements was not without consequences. Finally, in the Epilogue I turn more directly to military operations in an effort to understand what activities were made possible by the physical settings established.



## CHAPTER ONE

### CONTINUITY AND STABILITY, 1945-1952

News dispatches from the European theatre were evocative. “5,000 Planes *Pour* Bombs on Germans,” they reported on 7 July 1944. In October, “Bombers *Rip* Reich [as] 5,500 War Planes *Hurl* 10,000 Tons of Bombs on Key Targets.” And a few days later, “1,300 U.S. Bombers *Smash* at Cologne.” On 3 December, readers were informed of specific attacks by American Thunderbolts on rail yards at Heidelberg and Frankfurt. In January 1945, allied bombers again “*strafed* railroads near Heidelberg” with over “300 tons of explosives.” The following month, “1,300 U.S. Bombers *Pound* Reich.” And the month after that, “900 ‘Forts’ *Blast* Nuremberg Yards” while further south, “Munich is Bombed in 6,000-Plane Day.” In early March the results were reported: “Cologne Lifeless.” A couple days later, a communique listed “[f]ortified positions” in areas including “Mannheim and east of Heidelberg ... heavily attacked by medium and fighter-bombers.” The following week, American bombers again included Heidelberg on their target list, bombing and destroying a freight yard on the western edge of the city, as allied forces “flatten[ed]” the Ruhr region (figure 1.1). And finally, from the air to the ground, a report that American infantry “units [were] within three miles of Heidelberg,” and a final battle loomed.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, at the end of March 1945, when the American 63rd infantry division entered Heidelberg, they were shocked; the city was not *ripped*, *smashed*, *pounded*, *blasted*, or *flattened* from the war: it was business as usual.<sup>2</sup> “The university was intact, and the shops and banks stayed open while

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<sup>1</sup> “5,000 Planes Pour Bombs on Germans,” *New York Times*, July 7, 1944, 5; “Bombers Rip Reich,” *New York Times*, Oct 8, 1944, 1; “1,300 U.S. Bombers Smash at Cologne,” *New York Times*, Oct 18, 1944, 1; “Frankfort, Heidelberg Yards Hit,” *New York Times*, Dec 3, 1944, 4; “U.S. Bombers Smash at Saar Supply Line,” *New York Times*, Jan 19, 1945, 8; “1,300 U.S. Bombers Pound Reich,” *New York Times*, Feb 7, 1945, 5; “Cologne Lifeless,” *New York Times*, Mar 8, 1945, 1; “The Texts of the Day’s Communiques on Fighting in Various Zones,” *New York Times*, Mar 18, 1945, 2; Sydney Gruson, “Air Fleets Flatten Nazis Around Ruhr,” *New York Times*, Mar 24, 1945, 1; “The Texts of the Day’s Communiques on the Fighting in Various War Zones,” *New York Times*, 31 Mar 1945, 2. [Emphasis added.]

<sup>2</sup> *Combat Divisions of World War II (Army of the United States)*, [Pamphlet], *America in World War Two: Oral Histories and Personal Accounts*, 38.



Figure 1.1 Bombs Burst On The Marshalling Yards At Heidelberg. March 23 1945. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900 -2003. U.S. Air Force Number 81346AC.

the city changed hands. The *Buergermeister* and the city officials were at work, except for the police chief who had disappeared along with the men of his force.”<sup>3</sup> Here is how a correspondent for the *Chicago Daily Tribune* described the atmosphere in the city: “On the Hauptstrasse shops were open and apparently well stocked with luxury items. Well dressed throngs went about their business on the narrow sidewalks as casually as if the war had never swept near them.”<sup>4</sup> Although Wehrmacht soldiers briefly continued light fighting, including sniper fire after a failed parley with American officials, and later destroyed three bridges as they fled northeast across the Neckar river (figure 1.2), the city and its roughly 110,000 “well fed” inhabitants were about to survive the war in fairly good condition.<sup>5</sup>

The shock American troops may have experienced probably stemmed more from a comparison with their previous encounters, than actual Heidelberg conditions alone. For example, one of the two infantry groups that reached Heidelberg had previously combed through the twin cities of Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, about 15km to the northwest. This key industrial center had been bombed extensively, beginning in 1940 and largely in accordance with its “economic importance,” as detailed for nine pages in the 1944 target guide, *The Bomber's Baedeker* (figures 1.3-1.6).<sup>6</sup> Crucially, this “guide” focused on Germany’s war production capacities, cataloging

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<sup>3</sup> Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1975), 246. The *Oberbürgermeister* in question was Carl Neinhaus, who served in that position since 1929 and was a member of the Nazi party. Although he was removed from office in 1945, he found his way back to it in 1952. See Theodor Scharnholtz, “German–American Relations at the Local Level, Heidelberg, 1948–1955,” in ed., Thomas W. Maulucci and Detlef Junker, *GIs in Germany: The Social, Economic, Cultural and Political History of the American Military Presence* (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2013), 151.

<sup>4</sup> Seymour Korman, “Old Heidelberg Damaged but Little by War,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Apr 1, 1945, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Richard J. H. Johnston, “Historic Heidelberg Found Little Damaged After Telephone Parley for Surrender Fails,” *New York Times*, Mar 31, 1945. For a somewhat similar situation between American troops and the local population in Marburg at the end of March 1945, see John Gimbel, *A German Community Under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-52* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1961), 15-16.

<sup>6</sup> *The Bomber's Baedeker: (Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities)*, (London: 1944), 463-471. On the transformation of Baedeker guidebooks to an art historical tool to preserve European monuments, see Lucia Allais, *Designs of Destruction: The Making of Monuments in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 78-85; more generally, see Uta Hohn, “The Bomber's Baedeker - Target Book for Strategic Bombing in the Economic Warfare against German Towns 1943-45,” *Geojournal* 34, no. 2 (1994): 213–30.



Figure 1.2 Nazis retreating over the Neckar River blasted the center span of the ancient “Old Guard” bridge leading into Heidelberg. 3/31/45. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC203152.



Figure 1.3 Aerial View of the Damage Done to the City of Mannheim Before it Was Taken by the United States Seventh Army Troops, Germany. 4/5/1945. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-203306.



Figure 1.4 I.G. Farbenindustrie, Huge Chemical plant at Ludwigshafen, Germany, hit by Boeing B-17s 13 Sept 44. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900 -2003. U.S. Air Force Number 55038AC.



Figure 1.5 LUDWIGSHAVEN CHEMICAL PLANT—Heavy concentration of high explosives bursts as Eighth Air Force heavies attack huge chemical and synthetic oil works across the river from Mannheim, Germany. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900 -2003. Air Force Number 54761AC



Figure 1.6 Bomb Damage At Chemical Plant At Ludwigshafen, Germany.  
RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and  
Organizations, 1900 -2003. U.S. Air Force Number 94170USAF.



fourteen key industrial sectors, ranked in importance, and ultimately including over 500 German towns and cities in that effort. Nevertheless, actual military facilities, with a few exceptions in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich, were left off the list, and largely survived the war. In comparison to Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, analysis of Heidelberg's war contribution in the Baedeker guide only occupied half a page in the strategic bombing target book, highlighting three firms of marginal significance to the German war effort.<sup>7</sup> As a result, Heidelberg's military facilities, unregistered as significant targets for the Allied air forces, were, like the rest of the city and its people, about to survive the war intact.

In this initial chapter I take the fortuitous survival of Heidelberg's military caserns as a point of departure in order to trace how this initial condition mitigated the US Army's presence in Germany during, and immediately following, the war. Beginning with an initial confiscation policy that immediately secured operational requirements, and continuing to satisfy spatial and logistical demands through the chaotic occupation period, the military facilities in Heidelberg played a crucial and sustained role for American military operations in occupied Germany. The culmination of this significance became explicit when, in June 1948, Heidelberg was designated Headquarters, European Command, thereby transforming the city into the administrative center for all US military operations in Europe. Thus the university city on the Neckar, which barely received mention in strategic allied reports, was often unidentified on military maps, and was barely touched by the war, was somewhat inexplicably elevated to the highest level of American military command operations.

There were multiple factors that lead to the city's rise as an American military headquarters. First, and I would argue most significantly, was the favorable physical condition of the city's infrastructure and building stock - military, commercial, and residential. Second was the counter reality of destruction in almost every other German city. A third, later factor responded to postwar

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., Vol. I, 343. The three firms were H. Fuchs Waggon Fabrik A.G., located in the southern Rohrbach suburb, Stotz Kontakt G.m.b.H., speculated to be moving from Mannheim to Heidelberg, and Vereinigte Westdeutsche Waggonfabrik A.G., which may have been the target of the March 23rd attack.

tensions that pressed the United States to commit militarily to (Western) Germany and Europe longer than initially planned. In the first case, confiscated Reichswehr and Wehrmacht structures offered immediate and economical transitions from defeated German, to occupying American military personnel, thereby providing the US Army with facilities to initiate post-combat and occupation plans. This process occurred in numerous other cities, large and small, and in various other kinds of buildings. But unlike Heidelberg, almost all other cities carried greater security risks, or fewer infrastructures and facilities in working condition, or both.<sup>8</sup> By comparison, the new and well maintained military facilities in Heidelberg were complemented by equally available and functioning commercial and residential structures that supported auxiliary functions of various types (discussed in Chapter 2). Despite later geopolitical complications elsewhere that further entrenched American forces in Germany, Heidelberg's physical conditions continued to support the high-level administrative functions in the further transition from occupation, to what American officials called defense plans, further aided by its location - south of the Neckar, proximity to the French zone (and later border), central location to overall American troop build-up, and a manageable distance from the future eastern border.

In this chapter I trace the circumstances and events that eventually lead to Heidelberg's selection as a military headquarters and the concomitant policies and building practices that came with the new designation. I begin with the massive and frantic movement of transferring American troops out of the continent and the engineering requirements this large-scale venture entailed. I then chart territorial divisions and the dual challenge of initiating a functioning occupational structure and reestablishing a coherent and disciplined military-police force. During this time, Heidelberg was designated a district headquarters under a new organizational structure and its existing military facilities were reconfigured to accommodate an expanded senior staff as a military community.

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<sup>8</sup> Hans-Joachim Harder, "Guarantors of Peace and Freedom, The U.S. Forces in Germany, 1945–1990," in *GIs in Germany*, 41.

Lastly, I examine Heidelberg's rise to European headquarters, and the new construction initiated to update and consolidate the city's military position.

This is not the first study to chart US military activities and events in occupied Germany following the war. Cold war historians have scrutinized numerous political, diplomatic, and military details in efforts to understand how and why the wartime allied coalition broke down and how (and where) the Cold War began.<sup>9</sup> Within military history and international relations, scholars have offered sober accounts of global US military strength according to political and economic conditions and constraints.<sup>10</sup> More recently, social historians and social scientists have uncovered rich and complex interactions of cultural exchange, gender and racial developments, and critical issues around public health that complicate official and high-level accounts.<sup>11</sup> Despite these rich contributions, military building practices have remained astoundingly absent from any critical understanding of postwar developments in occupied Germany. In this chapter and the next, I address this issue by inserting buildings and the processes of their formation into US military

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<sup>9</sup> As Jeremi Suri notes, scholarship on the Cold War has become overwhelmingly massive, while continuing to expand "at a dizzying pace." For a diverse selection of key and innovative works, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Federico Romero, "Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads," *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 685–703; Jeremi Suri, "Conflict and Co-Operation in the Cold War: New Directions in Contemporary Historical Research," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (2011): 5–9; Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and *The Cold War: A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017.)

<sup>10</sup> Works germane to this study include, Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); and Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.)

<sup>11</sup> A work bordering the cultural and social with the military and political (although leaning toward the latter), is Thomas W. Maulucci, and Detlef Junker, *GIs in Germany: The Social, Economic, Cultural and Political History of the American Military Presence* (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2013.) Other works include Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Maria Höhn and Seungsook, *Moon Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010); Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2000); and Jessica Reinisch, *The Perils of Peace: The Public Health Crisis in Occupied Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.)

developments taking place immediately following the war. But I do not want to merely suggest that buildings represent another cultural artifact reflecting military actions and ideas. Rather, I claim that the built environment, and the existing military structures in particular, were critical instruments in anchoring the US military's presence in occupied Germany and, in particular, Heidelberg following the war. Existing structures played a stabilizing role for American personnel in the immediate post-combat period, offering space for military continuity from which new military structures could later be added. By the end of the decade, US military forces had reconfigured and extended their position from these foundations, and reconstructed Heidelberg into a military center.

## **Movement and Division**

Entering Heidelberg on 31 March 1945, American infantry troops encountered little resistance from the local population, who promptly surrendered and handed over city powers to army officials. Although the war in Europe continued, the local capitulation effectively transformed the American combat troops into occupation troops, whose duties immediately pivoted from wartime combat to post-combat control. Across defeated Germany, similar events unfolded over the next five weeks.<sup>12</sup>

Beginning in early May, the primary objective on the ground was to establish and maintain law, order, and communications through a series of military actions. These included disarming, demobilizing, and demilitarizing German forces, as well as establishing security borders and checkpoints at key junctions, patrolling streets after imposed curfews, and guarding surplus and sensitive sites from potential resistance-sabotage groups.<sup>13</sup> Initially, with 1.6 million American

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<sup>12</sup> Along with local German civilians, the Wehrmacht started surrendering one week before hostilities officially terminated on 8 May 1945, following orders from Admiral Karl Dönitz; Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 291. Certain areas saw continued, small scale resistance, such as Czechoslovakia and Berlin. By 17 June 1945, all resistance was defeated and the German High Command (Dönitz government) was fully dissolved; *The First Year of Occupation* (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), 4-17.

<sup>13</sup> *Reorganization of Tactical Forces, VE-Day to 1 January 1949* (Karlsruhe, Germany: Historical Division, European Command, 1950), 2.

soldiers on German soil, this new “carpet plan” proved highly successful, as soldiers covered every “nook and cranny” for any signs of resistance (primarily) in their zone of occupation.<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless, the conditions for this success were temporary, reflecting the tail-end of a combat-war strategy that was no longer necessary in Europe.

Further up the chain of command, the end of hostilities in Europe registered only as a transitional moment in a continuing war, which now prioritized immediate readjustment and redeployment of troops and materiel to the Pacific theatre of operation (figure 1.7). To affect this shift, the War Department in Washington, DC initiated full redeployment and readjustments plans on 12 May, whereby each American soldier in Europe was “readjusted” based on a point system.<sup>15</sup> Soldiers were calculated into one of four categories: Category I remained in Germany, Category II redeployed to the Pacific, Category III reorganized for either German occupation or war in the Pacific, and Category IV returned to the United States for discharge. The soldiers slotted into Category IV “scored” the highest number and were the most experienced troops, while those in the first three categories held varying, but lower, scores and experience levels. The rating system was thus a determining factor in the quality of military personnel retention in occupied Germany, with the least experienced soldiers - Category I - slated to remain.

Enabling this mass movement of troops and surplus equipment required large-scale and rapid (reverse) engineering, for which the the Office of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations (ETO) was assigned major responsibilities. Commanded by Major General C. R. Moore in Frankfurt, and starting with about 800 military personnel across seven divisions, Army engineers were tasked with dismantling the existing infrastructural system used to move troops and equipment into and across German-controlled territory, and reconstructing “the entire path along which a unit

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<sup>14</sup> Total US forces in Europe and the United Kingdom on V-E day totaled 3,069,000 personnel; *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>15</sup> The “Adjusted Service Rating” calculated each soldier according to time served overall, overseas, decorations and medals earned, and children under eighteen. For male soldiers the critical score for discharge was 85 points, while female soldiers required a critical score of 44. For a detailed elaboration of the rating system, see Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 328-329.




Figure 1.7 War Theaters. RG 407: Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1905 - 1981. Folder 171, 225275010.

moved during redeployment,” from any unit location (in Germany or Austria), to an initial assembly area, and then a port of embarkation - that is, a new, temporary infrastructure in the opposite direction (out of Germany or Austria) (figure 1.8).<sup>16</sup> In this new reconfiguration, assembly areas and ports of embarkation served the overall purpose of providing accommodations and facilities for troops and supplies, while also performing administrative readiness tasks before leaving Europe. The central assembly area was located near Reims, and consisted of eighteen sub-camps, ten of which included “winterized tents for living quarters and huts for mess halls and administrative buildings ... [along with] roads, walks, and hardstandings for vehicles.”<sup>17</sup> Once complete, the total capacity of the camps was 294,000 personnel. Soldiers departed from any of these sub-camps to one of five ports of embarkation, located in either Le Havre, Marseilles, Antwerp, or in Southampton or Glasgow, while a sixth port at Cherbourg was utilized for supplies and equipment. Again, each port consisted of sub-camps, or staging areas, as well as storage facilities for materiel. From Le Havre, the main destination was the United States, while Marseilles and Antwerp were primarily destined for the Pacific theater (figure 1.9).<sup>18</sup>

Numerous difficulties notwithstanding, this large-scale logistical operation provided the framework for the massive US military exodus out of Europe following the war.<sup>19</sup> In May 1945, 89,000 troops left the continent, followed by 313,000 in June, 391,000 in July, and 278,000 in August. After the war in the Pacific ended in August, the departures from Europe shifted solely to the

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<sup>16</sup> *Redeployment: Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), 68. For a complete organizational and personnel breakdown of the Office of the Chief Engineer at the end of the war, see C. R. Moore, *Final Report of the Chief Engineer European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945* (Paris, Herve, 1946), Appendix 2-H.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 77-80.

<sup>19</sup> One set of difficulties revolved around coordinating and timing, in which delays or changes in orders or instructions created ripple effects across several points. The other initial difficulty was that troops filled the camps before construction was completed. *Ibid.*, 66, 70.





Figure 1.8 "Process of Personnel Readjustment, Flow of Units and Individuals," *Redeployment: Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46* (Frankfurt-am-Main:Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), Chart III.





United States, reaching a peak of 400,000 departures in November 1945. By the end of the redeployment program in June 1946, over three million soldiers left the continent (figures 1.10-1.11).

The flip side to this impressive exodus was that the number of American troops in Europe in general, and occupied Germany in particular, dwindled continually and rapidly, effecting the quantity and quality of personnel available to continue the carpet plan and military occupation.<sup>20</sup> Redeployment created a dual impact on German occupation, in which the quality and quantity of military personnel remaining in occupied Germany underwent a dramatic downward reconfiguration, while the concomitant temporary infrastructure required in relocating soldiers out of Europe became the primary mission for engineers. As a result, the carpet plan to occupy and control activities in Germany and Austria became stretched, as fewer troops were available each month to cover the American-controlled territory. The result was a continual adjustment that required stationing smaller units of soldiers across the zone, thereby creating greater military decentralization and increased requisition demands.

Acknowledging these challenges as well as the overall shift in mission, in early July 1945 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, working from War Department instructions, finalized two operational changes. The first was the restructuring of the wartime Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) into the United States Forces, European Theatre (USFET).<sup>21</sup> Although most of the senior staff remained in place, the reorganization signaled the termination of a mobile, combat force which peaked to over three million by the end of the war, to a “static,” occupation force, whose target strength was (initially) 370,000. The USFET headquarters was based in Frankfurt, working out of the confiscated IG Farben building, with living accommodations in

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<sup>20</sup> For the monthly numbers of US military personnel remaining in Europe during this period (and later), see Table 4.2 in Lee Kruger, *Logistics Matters and the U.S. Army in Occupied Germany, 1945-1949* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 117.

<sup>21</sup> Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953* (Darmstadt, Germany: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), 23; Hans-Jürgen Schraut, “U.S. Forces in Germany, 1945 - 1955,” in Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) 153-160.




Figure 1.10 “Redeployment Troop Departures from European Theater,” Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Public Relations Division, USFET Release No. 970, in Pfc. Herman J. Obermayer, Frankfurt, Germany, to Mr. and Mrs. Obermayer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, America in World War Two: Oral Histories and Personal Accounts, 7 January 1946.




Figure 1.11 “Theater Strength on VE-Day,” Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Public Relations Division, USFET Release No. 970, in Pfc. Herman J. Obermayer, Frankfurt, Germany, to Mr. and Mrs. Obermayer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, America in World War Two: Oral Histories and Personal Accounts, 7 January 1946.

Höchst, a suburb on the city's western edge and home to a IG Farben company town, along with a rear echelon located in Paris.<sup>22</sup>

The second change was the final delineation of the American zone of occupation. This change was especially crucial in allowing military officials to restructure their forces around definitive territorial boundaries, establishing districts within those boundaries, and a hierarchical command structure of district headquarters. Since May, American troops had occupied areas in the north and further east, in what would later become the British and Soviet zones, as well as German territory tentatively agreed to become the French zone. In early June, American forces relinquished their positions in the northern British zone, including areas around Hanover, Braunschweig, and Westphalia, while retaining control of the Bremen enclave. By the end of June, they also retreated from the Soviet zone, which included positions in Wismar, a northern city on the Baltic Sea, and Magdeburg on the Elbe river. The final repositioning occurred in southwestern Germany, where disputes from February 1945 continued around the precise territorial composition of the French zone. It was only in June that the French finally accepted the boundaries of their zone, from which American troops fully retreated by 10 July.<sup>23</sup>

In addition to Germany's zonal division for military occupation, greater Berlin was also divided into four sectors for joint administration. The previous September and November, the Big Three outlined and agreed to the city's division; the eastern and central part of the city, including the

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<sup>22</sup> Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 269. IG Farbenindustrie was the largest chemical works producer in the world during the war, formed through a merger of several German chemical companies in 1925. Its largest industrial plants were located in Höchst and Griesheim, both on Frankfurt's western edge, and the company's administrative headquarters was the IG Farben building, designed by Hans Poelzig and completed in 1930. In addition to IG Farben, Frankfurt was home to several other industrial plants and was considered "the centre of Germany's chemical industry." For details, see *The Bomber's Baedeker*, 227-228.

<sup>23</sup> The French Provisional government's continuing attempts to renegotiate better territorial terms ultimately backfired as time passed and Eisenhower gained a greater appreciation of the strategic importance of certain areas, including Mannheim's port position on the Rhine, and the road link connecting Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, and Ulm (see figure 1.24). The French actually lost administrative control of Stuttgart and Karlsruhe with their final zone designation. See Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 306-308; *The First Year of Occupation, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46* (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), 28-31.

Pankow, Prenzlauerberg, Mitte, and Friedrichschain districts, was allotted to Soviet forces; the northwestern area, including Wedding, Tiergarten Charlottenburg, and Spandau, was initially intended for UK forces; and the southern portion of Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, and Neu-Köln, was to fall under US control. During the Yalta conference in February 1945, a French sector was also formed from the British controlled area.<sup>24</sup> Additional discussions to define the French boundaries were held at Potsdam in July 1945.<sup>25</sup> Once complete, the French sector occupied the northern area of the city.

By mid July 1945, Germany (and Berlin, Austria and Vienna) was divided and controlled by foreign military authorities (figures 1.12-1.14).<sup>26</sup> The British occupied the northwestern region, which included major cities, such as Bremen, Hamburg, and Hanover, as well as waterway access to the North Sea. More significant, this zone included the resource rich Ruhr region, which held one of the largest concentrations of coal and iron deposits in Western Europe and was understood to be the engine not only for future German economic development, but also for European economic

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<sup>24</sup> "The Work of the European Advisory Commission (January 1944–July 1945): a summary report," July 12, 1945, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I.

<sup>25</sup> For detail diplomatic discussions, see "The French zone of occupation and the French sector in Berlin," in FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I.

<sup>26</sup> Austria's division and control was similar to Germany's, with separate British, French, Soviet, and American zones and joint administration of Vienna; see figure 1.14 and "GERMANY: OCCUPATION: Zones of occupation in Austria" (Government Papers, The National Archives, Kew, 1945/01-1945/02). Accessed [February 06, 2022]. The first definitive statement between the Allied Powers on the division of Germany occurred in London on 12 September 1944, wherein it was agreed that defeated Germany was to be divided into three zones, according to its borders on 31 December 1937, and in which the Eastern Zone would be occupied by the USSR, the North-Western Zone by the United Kingdom, and the South-Western Zone by the United States of America. In all three cases, the occupying military forces were to be headed by a Commander-in-Chief, who was the supreme leader of the respective zone. See "United States of America--United Kingdom--Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of 'Greater Berlin,'" *The American Journal of International Law* 54, no. 3 (1960): 739–41, and "GERMANY: OCCUPATION: Agreement on zones of occupation" (Government Papers, The National Archives, Kew, 1943/12-1945/06). Accessed [February 06, 2022]. The fourth French, or Western Zone, was officially agreed upon on 5 June 1945; see United States, Department of State, *The Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany and Japan* (Washington: Dept. of State, 1945), 64. On the series of proposals and negotiations preceding the September agreement, see, Matthew D. Mingus, *Remapping Modern Germany After National Socialism, 1945-1961* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2017), 51-58. In addition to these divisions, Berlin was also divided into four zones, with the Soviet's controlling the eastern sector, the American's holding the southwestern region, the British zone above the American zone, and the French in control of the northwest portion. See Map 3 in Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953*, 25.




Figure 1.12 Map Showing Occupation Zones in Germany and Austria. 7/1945. RG 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services, 1919-2002. 17370299.






Figure 1.13 Greater Berlin. 1949. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 159082265.




Figure 1.14 Austria Zones of Occupation. 1946. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 159080793.

recovery (figures 1.15-1.17). The British thus appeared to strike gold by securing Germany's coal and iron reserves.<sup>27</sup> The Soviet zone bordered the British to the northeast, encircling Berlin, with waterway access to the Baltic Sea. After the United States agreed to hand the French portions of their zone, the Soviet zone became the largest of the four geographically. Whereas the Ruhr region operated as an industrial engine, the Soviet's captured Germany's agricultural wealth. The zone was the major supplier to the rest of Germany of basic grains, potatoes, and other select vegetables, as well as self sufficient in pork.<sup>28</sup> The French zone was constructed from both British and American controlled areas in the southwest and took an awkward ribbon shape of a totally landlocked, mostly rural area with smaller cities. Although the French were not satisfied with the area given to them, their zone did include the Saar region, another rich, though smaller, region of coal and iron deposits along the French-German border.<sup>29</sup>

After Eisenhower's two policy changes, the American zone of occupation also took form. Occupying southeastern Germany, the American zone was the second largest after the Soviet's, and was completely landlocked similar to the French zone (with the exception of the Bremen Enclave it administered in the British zone). In addition to bordering all three of the other zones, it also

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<sup>27</sup> The Ruhr region's significance during this time (and since the 1880s forward) cannot be sufficiently stressed; control and access to the coal and iron reserves were a major and continuous point of contention, especially between the British, French, and Soviets. During the Potsdam Conference the Ruhr was the subject of multiple briefing papers. See United States, Department of State, *The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945*, (FRUS: Diplomatic Papers. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 1960). For a detailed study of French attempts to control the region, see "France and the Control of German Resources," in Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 126-167. On the British zone of occupation, see Ian D. Turner, *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1989).

<sup>28</sup> For total percentages to Germany's overall agricultural production, see Frieda Wunderlich, *Farmer and Farm Labor in the Soviet Zone of Germany* (New York: Twayne, 1958), 19-20 (adapted from Matthias Kramer, *Die Landwirtschaft in Der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone: Produktionsmöglichkeiten Und Produktionsergebnisse* (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1951), 63-64; and United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany*, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Reports, European War, 65 (Washington: Morale Division, 1947), 264-265. On the Soviet zone see Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), and Filip Slaveski, *The Soviet Occupation of Germany: Hunger, Mass Violence and the Struggle for Peace, 1945-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

<sup>29</sup> On the French zone of occupation, see F. Roy Willis, *The French in Germany, 1945-1949* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1962).






Figure 1.15 Western Europe - Principal Iron and Steel Areas, Iron Ore and Coal Deposits. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 175515286.






Figure 1.17 Germany Production of Fuels by Districts 1937 and 1944. RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 159080669.

bordered the French and US zones in Austria, as well as Soviet-occupied Czechoslovakia to its east. It included few major cities, such as Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart, and lacked the industrial and agricultural wealth found in the other zones, except for iron ore deposits near Nürnberg in the east and Freiburg in the south. American officials were dismayed with the zone for two reasons: first, direct control of Germany's resources fell out of their hands; and second, any resources or communications brought into their zone, and the military exodus out of it, required transport through (and agreement with) another zone authority.<sup>30</sup>

Each Allied power now held, and was responsible for, its own zone of occupation, which, in addition to the unevenness of resources available, also contained somewhat uneven levels of destruction. By far the most concentrated regions of destruction were in the British and Soviet zones. In the British zone, the potential wealth of the Ruhr zone was counterbalanced by its immediate destruction, where every city and industry in the area was almost completely destroyed. In addition, housing in its other major cities, such as Bremen, Hamburg, Hannover, and Köln were also decimated.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, the Soviet zone experienced intense destruction in its major cities, including Berlin, Chemnitz, Dresden, Leipzig, Magdeburg, and Stettin. In both cases, the destruction resulted from sustained allied bombing, while the Soviet zone also experienced heightened destruction from ground forces.<sup>32</sup> By comparison, the French and American zones fared better,

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<sup>30</sup> Mingus, *Remapping Modern Germany*, 55; Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," *Foreign Affairs* 28, no. 4 (1950): 580–604. In the immediate post-combat period, supply lines ran from Bremerhaven in the north, to Frankfurt before splintering further south. As such, they ran through the British zone of occupation and, of later concern, perpendicular and close to the Soviet zone. Beginning in 1948, a new line of supply was authorized through France by General Lucius D. Clay, and later approved by the French in 1949. It ran west to east, beginning in Le Croisic and through various points in France before reaching West Germany. See Grathwol and Moorhus, *Building for Peace*, 84–87.

<sup>31</sup> For a powerful detailing of Hamburg's destruction, see W.G. Sebald, *On the Natural History of Destruction* (New York: Random House, 2003), 26–30.

<sup>32</sup> For differing accounts of allied bombing and destruction in Germany, see Ronald Schaffer, *Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jörg Friedrich, *Der Brand: Deutschland Im Bombenkrieg 1940–1945* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002); Enzo Traverso, *Fire and Blood: The European Civil War 1914–1945* (London: Verso, 2016), 112–118. For an overview of the resulting housing conditions, see Jeffry M. Diefendorf, *In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities After World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 125–130.

though not substantially. In the French zone, Saarbrücken, the key Saar region city, was heavily damaged. In the American zone, key industrial centers were heavily targeted and bombed, including Frankfurt, Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, Stuttgart, and Augsburg. Other cities, such as Munich, Nürnberg, Würzburg, and Kassel, also experienced major residential destruction.

On the ground accounts captured the state of destruction in the American zone. For example, working and traveling through the zone as a civilian advisor in the State Department's Central Control Council, James Pollock provided first-hand writings of his experiences for his family. In his account, Frankfurt, which he had previously spent two weeks living in 1928, was unfamiliar in July 1945.<sup>33</sup> Some functions, such as a hotel across the main train station, continued to operate, while most others, such as the train stations, were "a wreck." But among this uneven ruin, Americans had secured accommodations "which were magnificent ... Gardens, modern restaurant, pie a la mode!," which Pollock encouraged his wife to "Imagine ... in the midst of utter destruction."<sup>34</sup> In August, Munich's condition was detailed: "The Braun Haus, the Frauenkirche, the Opera, the Parliament Building are all in ruins." Nevertheless, the Rathaus still stood, along with a few museums, and there was still opportunity "to listen to an orchestra play Schubert in the old Fürstenhof cafe and eat coffee and donuts ... while everywhere in the neighborhood was destruction."<sup>35</sup> Stuttgart received a similar description: "You remember the beautiful castle and museums etc. in the center of Stuttgart - all gone!"<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Pollock was a political scientist at the University of Michigan. His expertise on Germany was requested in summer 1945, where he served under General Lucius D. Clay as special advisor. His first appointment lasted from July 1945 to August 1946. He returned to Germany for additional civilian assignments in 1947 and 1950. For the results of his activities, see James K. Pollock, ed. *Germany Under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents* (Ann Arbor: G. Wahr Pub, 1949).

<sup>34</sup> James K. Pollock, *Besatzung Und Staatsaufbau Nach 1945: Occupation Diary and Private Correspondence 1945-1948* Edited by Krüger-Bulcke Ingrid, (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 1994), 48.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 75.

Amid all this ruin, the one location that continued to impress Pollock was Heidelberg. In his first trip to the city on 24 July, which passed through Mannheim (“totally destroyed”), he noted, “Heidelberg was as picturesque as ever.” The following month, he enjoyed “a hot tub and rub ... in the Schloss Hotel,” and later, “after a good dinner ... [he] walked along the path which overlooks the town and over to the Schloss, just at sunset.” Of his Heidelberg experience, Pollock concluded thus: It is one of the great sights of the world and now an island of normal life in a sea of wreckage.”<sup>37</sup>

Military officials agreed. Two weeks after Eisenhower established the final boundaries of the American zone and reorganized the military under USFET, he enacted a subsequent move in an effort to stabilize and enforce military government, dividing the American zone into two districts. The first district was straightforward in its designation as the Eastern Military District, with headquarters located in Munich. The Western Military District had a more complex configuration, with a more surprising headquarters at Heidelberg (1.12).<sup>38</sup>

The Eastern Military District followed the existing political boundaries of the Bavarian state (Land Bayern) and its capital. Although Munich suffered considerable damage, it had also previously served as a military district headquarters for the German army, as well as headquarters for the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (figures 1.18-1.23). Despite the immediate war damage, there was enough working infrastructure and building stock such that the transition from a German headquarters to an American one “posed no problems.”<sup>39</sup> By comparison, the Western

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid. For a similar first person account, see *Herman J. Obermayer, France, to Arthur Obermayer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 20 Aug 1945, [V-mail], 2004, Available through: America in World War Two: Oral Histories and Personal Accounts, [Accessed February 06, 2022].*

<sup>38</sup> Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953*, 30. Military government at this point was a specific agency still in formation, having expanded from the initial German Country Unit, then US Group, Control Council for Germany, formed in London in autumn 1944. On 1 October 1945, it was redesigned as the Office for Military Government, United States, with the mission of reconstructing German civil affairs. See Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany* (New York, The MacMillan Company).

<sup>39</sup> Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, 311.



Figure 1.18 Germany Wehrkreise. RG 407: Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1905 - 1981. Folder 148, 152951424.





Figure 1.19 Aerial View of Stetten Kaserne, HQ 508 Military Police Battalion. 17 May 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC- 343515.



Figure 1.20 Aerial View of Peterson Kaserne, Munich Military Post. 17 May 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-343517.





Figure 1.21 Aerial View of Henry Kaserne, HQ 29th Trans, Truck BN. 17 May 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-343516.



Figure 1.22 Aerial View of Warner Kasernem HQ IRO Area. 17 May 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-343522.



Figure 1.23 München: Haus der Kunst [Officers-Club], Parkplatzschilder für amerikanische Fahrzeuge, Abt. Staatsarchiv Freiburg W 134 Nr. 018810 Bild 1.

Military District configuration prioritized infrastructural connections over existing political definitions. In the south, both Land Baden and Land Württemberg were divided in two, with their southern portions going to the French and their northern parts to the Americans. Similarly, in the north of the American zone, Land Hessen was divided between the French and Americans.<sup>40</sup> One of the primary motivations behind this district formation was to maintain full control of the road network linking Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, and Ulm, below which the American zone and district ended (figure 1.24).

Unlike Munich, Heidelberg's designation as a district headquarters was not an obvious choice. But the small city, home to Germany's oldest university, a castle dating to the early thirteenth century, and numerous other landmarks, had survived the war almost untouched (figures 1.25-1.28). Somewhat surprisingly, it was also home to three military complexes, all in good condition: Grenadier-Kaserne, Großdeutschland-Kaserne, and Nachrichten-Kaserne. All three caserns were located in the Kirchheim and Rohrbach districts, south of the city center (figure 1.29). They were all confiscated in early April, in line with the general policy for defeated Germany, in which all government, state, and military real estate, including that belonging to the National Socialist German Workers' Party and the Wehrmacht, as well as all affiliated agencies, were seized by Allied forces in their respective zones of occupation and used free of charge, and as long as needed.<sup>41</sup> The three facilities offered immediate accommodations and administrative space for military personnel, at a moment when engineers were solely focused on constructing the required network to move

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<sup>40</sup> The line separating the two zones was along the Main river, and thus in the case of Mainz, divided the city in two, (Mainz and Kastel) to the frustration of its inhabitants. See memo from Charles D. Hilles, Jr. to Dr. Conant, June 16, 1954, in folder, 322.1 Territorial Boundaries, 1953-1955, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn, NARA 466, Box 60.

<sup>41</sup> Confiscation policy was officially established as law by the Allied Control Council. For Nazi properties, see "Law No. 2, Article II, Volume I," issued on 10 Oct 1945; for Wehrmacht properties, see "Law No. 34, Article IV, Volume IV," issued on 20 August 1946. Both in Allied Control Authority, *Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee* (Office of Military Government for Germany. Legal Division, Jan. 1, 1945 - Feb. 28, 1946). See also Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany*, 119.








Figure 1.25 Stadtplan und Gebäude. 1830. Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg. ID: #190804.



Figure 1.26 Übersichts-Plan der Stadt Heidelberg und Umgebung (Map of the city of Heidelberg and surrounding area, 1906). Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg. ID: H Heidelberg 12, 4-1711381.



Figure 1.27 Heidelberg: Fernsicht über die Stadt und den Neckar  
(Heidelberg: distant view over the city and the Neckar). 1. März 1936. Abt.  
Staatsarchiv Freiburg. W 134 Nr. 008512 Bild 1. 5-147018.



Figure 1.28 Heidelberg: Sicht vom Philosophenweg auf die Stadt  
(Heidelberg: View of the city from Philosopher's Walk). 1. März 1936. Abt.  
Staatsarchiv Freiburg. W 134 Nr. 008499 Bild 1. 5-147006.




Figure 1.29 “Plan der Stadt Heidelberg,” in Adreßbuch der Stadt Heidelberg mit den Gemeinden Ziegelhausen und Leimen sowie der Stadt Wiesloch. 1949.[With details of Patton Barracks (left), Campbell Barracks (center), and Nachrichten Kasern (right).

personnel out of the continent and funding for any new construction was non-existent. With the priority for those remaining in Germany to find sufficient living and working conditions, Heidelberg's facilities fulfilled a crucial need.

Beyond their existence and condition in satisfying both requirements, the three caserns were also conveniently located in proximity to each other and outside of, though close to, the city center. In addition, the cooperation, or at least lack of resistance, from the local population, made working conditions in the city and the regional designation as headquarters an unexpected, but safe and convenient choice.

## **Military Facilities**

The oldest of the three facilities, Grenadier-Kaserne, was consolidated from two farmland properties on the northeastern edge of the Kirchheim district at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1903 a parade hall was constructed along with a parade ground, immediately south of a sandpit and bounded on the north and east by two rail lines. By 1914 a second building was constructed, followed by three more buildings between 1914 and 1923, and the parade ground expanded further south for the simply titled Neue-Kaserne, under the Imperial German Army. The Wehrmacht resumed construction in 1937 with nine new buildings located south and east of the existing structures for the renamed Grenadier-Kaserne. By 1941 the expanded site, occupying approximately 7.5 hectares, consisted of fourteen buildings, now on the western edge of a larger Heidelberg (figure 1.30).<sup>42</sup> Between 1945 and 1949, US personnel made only minor changes to the complex, instead using the existing buildings for billeting and administrative functions.

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<sup>42</sup> Gunnar Zehe, "Konversionsfläche Patton Barracks, Bürgerforum am 20.11.2014," Sachstand der Vorbereitenden Untersuchungen (VU)," [https://www.heidelberg.de/site/Heidelberg\\_ROOT/get/documents\\_E-1038031616/heidelberg/Objektdatenbank/12/PDF/Konversion/B%C3%BCrgerforum%20Kirchheim/12\\_pdf\\_Vortrag\\_NH\\_20141120.pdf](https://www.heidelberg.de/site/Heidelberg_ROOT/get/documents_E-1038031616/heidelberg/Objektdatenbank/12/PDF/Konversion/B%C3%BCrgerforum%20Kirchheim/12_pdf_Vortrag_NH_20141120.pdf).





Figure 1.30 Aerial View of Patton Barrack [Grendier-Kaserne]. 16 June 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 343927.

The transition from a Wehrmacht complex to a US Army casern occurred seamlessly at the second and main location, Großdeutschland-Kaserne. Originally built in 1936 to serve the Wehrmacht's 110th Infantry Regiment, the casern followed after Reichswehr examples, with several unique features. First, as the eventual name suggested, the complex was twice the size of other caserns, at 16 hectares. The larger size resulted from the vast, flat undeveloped farmland available south of the city, which allowed Dr. Ing. Dietrich Lang, working for the Wehrmacht Construction branch in Mannheim and using standardized plans, to supervise the layout and building of a larger complex. In total, twenty buildings were symmetrically arranged around a large, central parade grounds (figure 1.31). The main staff building had several special features. First, the center of the building was opened up at ground level to function as the main entrance into the complex. Despite the opening, the three-story hipped roof building measured 130 meters in length, almost double a conventional casern staff building. Second was the tall, cylindrical clock tower, which rose in the middle of the building. And third were the ornamental details, which included four soldiers from different eras of German history, on the main façade (figure 1.32). The rest of the buildings were more functional in appearance to accommodate core military duties (figure 1.33). For example, the two buildings flanking the main staff building included dining services and recreational rooms, as well as living quarters on the upper floors for staff workers. The buildings around the parade grounds served as billeting for soldiers in various units, while the building on the parade ground's western boundary served as a drill hall. Behind these buildings were two horse stables, a riding hall and a riding ring, two arms rooms, and a blacksmith.<sup>43</sup>

In addition to providing immediate accommodations for the initial American personnel, the casern also facilitated subsequent changes within American forces as well. After Wehrmacht soldiers

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<sup>43</sup> Melanie Mertens, "Kunst und Kaserne, Die Großdeutschlandkaserne in Heidelberg," *Denkmalpflege in Baden-Württemberg* v44, n4 2015, 209-211.



Figure 1.31 Aerial View of Campbell Barracks [Großdeutschland-Kaserne]. 16 June 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-343928.



Figure 1.32 The Main Entrance of Headquarters Building USAREUR. 1959. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-565554.



Figure 1.33 An Overall View Showing the Parade Ground During the Ceremony Held for Rear Admiral Wilkes and Maj Gen Douglass. 18 April 1951. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-368898.

deserted the city in late March, the complex served the US Sixth Army Group, between May and June 1945; after the 1 August announcement, designating Heidelberg as district headquarters, the casern became home for the US Seventh Army, which occupied the grounds from July 1945 to March 1946; this was followed by the US Third Army, which occupied the complex from April 1946 until March 1947.<sup>44</sup> In all of these cases, the casern served as a headquarters for military personnel. With its twenty buildings fully intact, Großdeutschland-Kaserne offered physical stability amid continuous organizational changes and personnel adjustments. No major rehabilitation effort was required and the buildings only necessitated minor alterations from their Wehrmacht origins. In fact, the most significant change to the casern between 1945 and 1948 was to its overall border, which was extended on its northeast corner to wrap around the one additional building in the area. The building, which had functioned under the Wehrmacht as an Officer's mess, was repurposed as the Command Building for American forces.<sup>45</sup>

Nachrichten-Kaserne, built less than one kilometer south of Großdeutschland-Kaserne in Rohrbach, was completed shortly after Großdeutschland-Kaserne in 1937. Despite being further from central Heidelberg, its location in the Rohrbach suburb was in a residential area. It was formed from a combination of three farmland plots and consisted of fifteen structures, which included eleven buildings. Unlike the symmetrical layout of Großdeutschland-Kaserne, the two main buildings at Nachrichten were placed in a row, parallel to the main street, while a third main building on the site's northern edge, was placed perpendicular to the street, forming a loose L-shape, while two smaller buildings, on the site's southern edge, were also placed perpendicularly to the main street. This configuration allowed for a separate entrance and exit, and two training grounds; one in the center of the site and the other in the rear, western end for military exercises. The complex functioned initially as a training ground for the Wehrmacht Signal Corps 33 for a few months, then,

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<sup>44</sup> *Campbell Barracks: The Story of a Caserne* (Heidelberg: Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, 1994), 1-5.

<sup>45</sup> Later designated as the Keyes Building, *ibid.*, 4.

from September 1939, various German units occupied the casern for brief periods, until, in 1941, it was converted into a military hospital. After nine months it was again converted to handle different military units and up to 1,500 soldiers.<sup>46</sup>

Unlike Großdeutschland-Kaserne, American forces made numerous changes to Nachrichten-Kaserne, converting it into a medical facility in summer 1945. From April to July, the casern served as troop lodging. On 15 July 1945, the 130th Station medical group was reassigned to the US Seventh Army in Heidelberg and relocated to Nachrichten-Kaserne from France the following month.<sup>47</sup> A series of minor rehabilitation projects followed, including painting the interiors of six buildings, the construction of clay tennis courts for “special service,” a new ramp from a sidewalk to a building, and the building of a stage and booth for an auditorium.<sup>48</sup> The complex’s capacity was further increased from an initial 400-bed set up, to 750 in early 1946.

A diagram of the complex from February 1947 details how the site transformed (figure 1.34). Two buildings (A and B) carried the bulk of the medical activities, with building A operating dental and orthopedic clinics, electrocardiography and otorhinolaryngology centers, x-ray and laboratory spaces, and a morgue; while building B served as wards on all four floors. An additional structure at the complex entrance served as the hospital headquarters office on the ground floor and lodging for nurses on the second and third floors (building P), while another served as a combined mess hall and officers club (building O)(figure 1.35). Additional functions in existing buildings included a gym and fire house (building C), a five-hundred seat theater, post exchange, library, two mess halls - one for Germans and another for enlisted personnel (building D), and a chapel (building

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<sup>46</sup> Lt. Colonel E.R. Whitehurst, “Our Army Hospitals, 130th Station Hospital, Heidelberg,” *Medical Bulletin*, Vol. 2, no. 2, (Feb. 1947), 31.

<sup>47</sup> “Opening and Closing of Hospitals,” Headquarters US Forces, European Theater, 3 September 1945, NARA RG 260, Box 18.

<sup>48</sup> “Hospital Program - U.S. Zone in Germany and Austria,” Construction Occupation Area - Hospital Construction, 31 March 1946, NARA RG 549, Box 981.




Figure 1.34 Lt. Colonel E.R. Whitehurst, "Our Army Hospitals, 130th Station Hospital, Heidelberg," *Medical Bulletin*, Vol. 2, no. 2, (Feb. 1947), 33.





Figure 1.35 The entrance to U.S. 130th Station Hospital, Heidelberg Military Post. 16 March 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-341952.

E)(figure 1.36). A series of buildings on the site's western side served additional medical and auxiliary functions; buildings M, L, and H housed several wards, while building G served as the surgical pavilion and a supply holding, and building I offered lodging for military personnel.<sup>49</sup>

All of these buildings were original Wehrmacht structures that American forces reconfigured following the war. The main reconfiguration to buildings G, H, L, M was a single-story corridor connecting the buildings, as well as a new single-story structure (building K), which was demolished by 1950. Two additional structures, built between 1945 and 1947, serving the Polish Guard (building J) and Red Cross (building N), were also demolished by 1950. Finally, all of these changes occurred within the existing boundaries of the original site of about 9.3 hectares.

The major changes at Nachrichten-Kaserne point to a more general policy pursued throughout the American zone, that aimed to provide medical services to military personnel using existing German facilities. For example, after American troops captured the city of Gießen (approximately fifty kilometers north of Frankfurt) in March 1945, the existing Wehrmacht hospital plant was redesignated, first as a German prisoner of war hospital and later as a 250-bed military hospital. Several structures were repaired from aerial bomb damage and new temporary structures, such as barracks, mess halls, and heating plants, were constructed.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, after the Kaufmaennische Spital in Vienna changed hands from the German Luftwaffe to American forces, the commercial hospital was designated the 110th Station Hospital in September 1945. It required a reconstruction program after suffering extensive damage from the war, including “new electrical and plumbing systems,” replacement of almost all windows, newly constructed mess halls, and further upgrades throughout the plant to bring it up to “high standards of medical care.”<sup>51</sup> Finally, the conditions in Berlin were especially severe. According to a 24 July 1945 memo from Major General

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<sup>49</sup> Whitehurst, “Our Army Hospitals, 130th Station Hospital,” 31.

<sup>50</sup> “Our Hospitals 388th Station Hospital,” *Medical Bulletin*, Vol. 2, no. 4, (Apr. 1947), 37.

<sup>51</sup> “Our Army Hospital 110th Station Hospital,” *Medical Bulletin*, Vol. 2, no. 6, (June 1947), 35.



Figure 1.36 The 130th Station Hospital Catholic Chapel at Heidelberg. October 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-355766.

J.H. Hilldring, to Lieutenant General Lucius Clay, the city failed to offer facilities “which even closely approximates the needs of a satisfactory hospital for U.S. Army personnel.”<sup>52</sup> By September 1945, the American outlook marginally improved, with possession of the Lichterfelde Bezirk in Berlin, which was initially occupied by the Soviet Army, and had suffered extensive damage from Allied aerial bombing. Its twenty-two buildings, enclosed by brick walls and iron fencing, required repair and restoration well into 1948.<sup>53</sup>

In all cases, the starting point for reestablishing medical services was through the confiscation of existing facilities. Relative to the other cases, Heidelberg’s transformation into a medical center, and the Nachrichten-Kaserne into a hospital complex, was more straightforward, as personnel were able to utilize existing, undamaged military structures in their reconfiguration plans. The casern’s physical condition required little attention and resources compared to facilities in other cities. Nevertheless, its full conversion into a hospital facility did require alterations specific to medical functions. In addition to the minor changes during the first year, these included a new dental clinic and “a complete obstetrical service” after dependents started to arrive in spring 1946.<sup>54</sup> By 1947 the complex was the primary medical facility for approximately 10,000 military and civilian personnel and their dependents, primarily in Heidelberg, but also including Mannheim and Karlsruhe, as well as French army personnel.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Memorandum for Lt. General Lucius Clay from Major General J.H. Hilldring, U.S. Group Control Council (USGCC), 24 July 1945, NARA 260, Box 18.

<sup>53</sup> “Our Army Hospitals: 279th Station Hospital Berlin,” *Medical Bulletin*, Vol. 2, no. 3, (Mar. 1947), 41. Germany’s civilian and university hospitals suffered similarly destructive fates, although their “antiquated” hospitals benefited from their pavilion plan layouts, “being dispersed and less intimately integrated than [American] towering structures,” which allowed for less disruption to the “whole system ... when one building was destroyed in an air raid.” See United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany*, 169-183.

<sup>54</sup> Whitehurst, “Our Army Hospitals, 130th Station Hospital,” 32.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

## Headquarters Command

Heidelberg's military ascension between 1945 and 1947 highlighted its favorable conditions over other locations, to include its geographic location in the middle of the American zone of occupation which provided easy transport northeast (Frankfurt), south (Stuttgart), and southwest (Munich), non-combative working relations with the local population, and ample military facilities to conduct occupation duties. Other cities were also important for a variety of reasons. For instance, Frankfurt was headquarters for the European theatre while Paris operated as rear echelon headquarters, Berlin was home to the Allied Control Council, Munich was also a military headquarters, and Stuttgart was a regional military headquarters. In the cases of Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart, the cities simply continued to serve as political, military, or economic centers. In Heidelberg however, the US military were constructing for themselves a new military headquarters. And by early 1947, they intended to solidify their actions.

Beginning in spring 1947, Heidelberg's military significance expanded. In general, its location gained significance as Cold War tensions were renewed by American officials.<sup>56</sup> Its location south of the Neckar river, far from the Soviet zone, and close to the French border was viewed positively in

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<sup>56</sup> The Cold War (or second cold war) as a renewal is generally eschewed by cold war historians. For example, although John Lewis Gaddis begins his influential "critical appraisal" of Washington's national security policy noting that "'containment' was much on the minds of Washington officials from 1941 on, and 'the difficulty was to mesh that long-term concern with the more immediate imperative of defeating the Axis,'" he never examines the actual role pre-war containment played again. See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4. Nevertheless, scholars have provided compelling detailed accounts to support the inevitability of renewed tensions, in which containment, first devised after World War I and the Russian Revolution, initially led by the French and British, and later taken up by the Americans after World War II, was the default position of western European capitalist states. See for instance Arno J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919* (New York: Knopf, 1967), 284-343. On the Cold War as an American political initiative, see Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Anders Stephanson, "Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War," in *Rethinking Geopolitics*, ed. Simon Dalby and Gerard Toal (New York: Routledge, 1998), 62-85; and, although he later emphasizes the Cold War as a Western elite project, Odd Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (2000): 551-65.

the unlikely case an evacuation from Germany was required. But it also gained a new significance from two parallel and converging tracks occurring elsewhere.

The first event was militarily focused and developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As part of a larger organizational restructuring effort, the US military initiated several moves and redesignations in their zone that aimed at an overall unification and consolidation of American forces in Europe, establishing more direct chains of command, and adhering more to peacetime occupation operations. In March 1947, a change in nomenclature was implemented, with the US Forces European Theatre (USFET), still based in the IG Farben building in Frankfurt, being redesignated as the European Command (EUCOM).<sup>57</sup> Under this new umbrella, a new structure followed, including the further division within the two military districts - renamed First Military District (Munich) and Second Military District (Heidelberg) - into military posts with regional headquarters (figure 1.37).<sup>58</sup> The administration of each military post area was the responsibility of the respective area post commander, which aimed to consolidate command protocols.<sup>59</sup> By November 1947, the new, simplified EUCOM structure was operational on paper. The corresponding physical change remained. Toward this, between March 1947 and June 1948, several moves took place. The most significant was the deactivation of the US Third Army which left Heidelberg, although the US Constabulary Force remained in the city and continued its police operations for another year, before relocating to Stuttgart.

Simultaneous to these military redesignations and relocations, a second economic track was put into motion. In January 1948, American and British officials formed a Bizonal Economics Council, whose chief aim was to consolidate and strengthen “the economic fusion of the US and

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<sup>57</sup> Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany*, 32.

<sup>58</sup> “The new military districts were not, as before, established for the purpose of administering military government, but for the purpose of administering newly established military posts.” Ibid., 41. Thus Heidelberg was now headquarters of the Second Military District, as well as a Military Post Headquarters (Heidelberg Military Post), which included Karlsruhe and Mannheim under its umbrella.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 41.




Figure 1.37 Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953* (Darmstadt, Germany: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), 37.

UK Zones.”<sup>60</sup> In this pursuit, several agencies were restructured and merged; most significantly, the Joint Export Import Agency, based in Höchst, was integrated with the Joint Foreign Exchange Agency, located in Berlin, under the new Joint Foreign Trading Agency, to be headquartered in Frankfurt. This new Bizonia created new spatial requirements. In order to make space for the personnel from Berlin, Frankfurt personnel were relocated to Heidelberg, beginning in February 1948. The move introduced an additional 1,500 military, civilian, and family member population to the city (figure 1.38). Along with their move, European Command headquarters also relocated from Frankfurt to Heidelberg, thereby elevating the city again, now as the seat for senior US military staff in Europe.<sup>61</sup>

Thus Heidelberg benefitted not only from local conditions, but also from regional and subnational developments. The economic move from Berlin to Frankfurt pointed to elevated tensions and risks in the former capital - culminating in the June 1948 blockade - but also the desire to establish a permanent economic capital aligned to American (and British) interests. With this, Frankfurt was reestablished as the economic center, while continuing to be home to American military personnel. It was also clear at this point, that it would not become the new political capital.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> The economic combining of the American and British zones was set in motion in July 1946 and reached detail agreement later that December with the Bizonal Fusion Agreement, which created the United Economic Area (Vereinigtes Wirtschaftsgebiet). The official aim was for “the economic unity of Germany as a whole.” On 8 April 1949, a Trizonal Fusion Agreement superseded the US-UK agreement, merging “the Western German zones of occupation.” The latter case coincided with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. For the Bizonal Agreement, see “Combined American and British Zones - Bizonal Fusion Agreement” and for the Trizonal agreement, see “Agreement on Basic Principles for Trizonal Fusion,” 91-92 and “Combined U.S.-U.K Zones and French Zone,” in Velma Hastings Cassidy, *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents* (Washington, D.C.: United States. Department of State, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1950), 91-92; 450-460; 481-485.

<sup>61</sup> “Bizonal Unity Strengthened,” *Information Bulletin*, (27 January 1948), 15; Jack Raymond, “U.S. Army Prepares to Quit Frankfurt,” *New York Times*, Jan 12, 1948, 6.

<sup>62</sup> Although General Clay alluded to this reality, Frankfurt officials continued to push for their bid. See “Bizonal Unity Strengthened,” on comments from Clay, and Omer Anderson, “Frankfurt, Bonn Push Capital Building Race,” *The Stars and Stripes*, August 26, 1949, 6, and Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Frankfurt Becomes Economic Magnet of Germany,” *New York Times*, Feb 16, 1948, 20, on Frankfurt. On constructing “a provisional government of a state-fragment” i.e. a divided West Germany, see John Elliot, “Constitution-Making at Bonn,” *Information Bulletin*, (Oct 5, 1948), 7-10, 29.





Figure 1.38 "7 EUCOM Sections to Quit Frankfurt," *Stars and Stripes*, January 10, 1948, 1.

By mid-1948 American military personnel had fully transitioned into an occupation force, in which Heidelberg, after several incremental steps, was established as the administrative center for American military personnel in Europe. Although the Berlin blockade began on 24 June 1948, it did little to alter the American direction and commitment in (western) Germany, which at this point, was already shifting from a short-term occupation, to a more indeterminate defense commitment.<sup>63</sup> To signal this new position, along with EUCOM restructuring and further development of military communities, more symbolic efforts were made, such as the renaming of Großdeutschland-Kaserne to Campbell Barracks on 23 August 1948, which pointed to a longer term military presence.<sup>64</sup> Less symbolically, American officials also took to continuing and expanding their presence through new building activity.

## **New Construction**

One of the sections that relocated from Frankfurt to Heidelberg in early 1948 was the Engineer Division. By this time, its major tasks had shifted from the redeployment efforts of 1945-46, to other duties, including troop education and training, and supply procurement and management. In terms of construction, its duties were overwhelmingly in maintenance, which accounted for approximately 75% of the division's construction efforts, and included rehabilitation of existing structures, such as bridges, barracks, and depots.<sup>65</sup> All of these projects, whether in Wiesbaden, Bremerhaven, Munich, or Stuttgart, were now submitted, reviewed, approved or rejected, and funded through Heidelberg. Now under the command of Brigadier General Don G. Shingler, the primary objective was in reestablishing fiscal discipline within the division, and more

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<sup>63</sup> Grathwol and Moorhus, *Building for Peace*, 51. On the Berlin blockade, see Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949*, (Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 363-410.

<sup>64</sup> *Campbell Barracks*, 2.

<sup>65</sup> "Quarterly Report of the Chief Engineer, European Command, 1 October -31 December 1947, Report No 41," Office of Chief of Staff, Engineer Division, United States Army, Europe, 15 January 1948, NARA 549, Box 983.

efficient management of resources, while also decentralizing project initiatives to post commanders in the newly designated military posts.<sup>66</sup> This was significant as military communities were being developed beyond improvisational, short-term efforts for strictly military functions, toward more planned, longer-term communities that could also serve a greater number of soldiers and family members' needs. Ultimately the post commanders were determined to know those needs, which included educational, recreational, commercial, and medical facilities, while headquarters was tasked with performing administrative checks and controls. As this shift took effect, it also became clear that satisfying these additional needs could no longer be supplied through confiscation alone. New construction was required.

One of the areas where new construction became necessary was in medical services. As we saw earlier, military officials had stitched together medical services from various existing and partially destroyed structures during their first two years. But these services were only sufficient in satisfying "an emergency operational need" under occupation conditions. By 1948, a more permanent commitment was now required. The challenges in establishing a new hospital construction program were summed up by Colonel Clifford V. Morgan, the deputy Chief Surgeon in the Medical Command, EUCOM, who noted that "the limitations of available structures, funds, time and talent never permitted the ideal design or results." He added that these deficiencies were further compounded by the fact that even since the hospital construction programs during the war, the "physical requirements for medical facilities had changed considerably," and by implication, the military and the Medical Command had fallen behind.<sup>67</sup> As such, a new hospital program cognizant

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<sup>66</sup> Grathwol and Moorhus, *Building for Peace*, 39-41.

<sup>67</sup> This was thus a reversal to developments described after World War I in Jeanne Kisacky, *Rise of the Modern Hospital: An Architectural History of Health and Healing, 1870-1940* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017), 235-237.

of recent medical advances and their physical design requirements was beyond the Medical Command's domain. Military officials required civilian expertise.<sup>68</sup>

“[W]e turned for guidance in modern trends of design to more recent studies and drawings compiled by the American Hospital Association and U.S. Public Health Service.”<sup>69</sup> The key resource was the May 1946 AHA issue of *Hospitals*, reprinted in 1952 with a one-page introduction by George Bugbee as *Elements of the General Hospital*. In his brief introduction, Bugbee, the executive director of the AHA, justified the publication as an effort to address “the constant stream of letters from urban and rural communities in the United States and foreign countries requesting technical assistance.” Although the agency had previously devised “suggested plans for hospitals of various sizes,” and additional auxiliary services, he noted “a wide variety of demand for elements of the general hospital,” that warranted, if not demanded, “a more convenient planning guide” for hospital administrators. Finally, he highlighted the collaborative effort in this endeavor, in which myriad specialists participated with “innumerable consultations” in search of “the most modern trends in hospital and health facility design.”<sup>70</sup>

The AHA/USPHS planning guide offered eighty suggested drawings, primarily organized by function, for instance, administration, nursing, surgical, and outpatient spaces, and secondarily by size, for example, 50-bed, 100-bed, and 200-bed layouts. Beyond the spatial configurations, which varied little, the drawings prioritized medical equipment and its placement. Whether it was a space

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<sup>68</sup> Clifford V. Morgan, “EUCOM Medical Treatment Facilities - Construction Plans,” *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 9, no. 7, (July 1952), 321. In addition to assistance with facilities, military officials were also desperate for medical expertise, including doctors, physicians, and dentists. See “Army Inaugurates Training Program in Overseas Hospitals,” *Modern Hospital* (May 1948); 70 (5), 188; “Doctors for the Army,” *Journal of American Medical Association*, (Sept. 25, 1948); 138 (4):296–297; and Howard A. Rusk, M.D., “Occupied Zones Sorely Need U.S. Physicians and Dentists,” *New York Times*, Oct 9, 1949.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> The specialists included “doctors, nurses, hospital consultants, dietitians, hospital architects, hospital administrators, technicians, manufacturers, and officers of the U.S. Public Health Service and other agencies.” See George Bugbee, *Elements of the General Hospital* (Washington: Federal Security Agency, Public Health Service, Division of Hospital Facilities, 1952), 3.

for laundry services, or an entire surgical wing, the equipment required to satisfy medical operations was the determining factor for figuring out the layout and sizes of rooms. The plans repeatedly pointed to a hierarchy that prioritized the placement of primary equipment, and then secondary equipment, before accounting for the number of bodies circulating around this combined machinery. The AHA planning guide thus offered “the constant stream” of diverse communities a standardized model from which to plan their medical facilities, detailing where to place each piece of medical equipment required for a new hospital. Implicitly, it confirmed what constituted a modern, up-to-date medical facility through the specific medical technology detailed.

What the planning guide did not (explicitly) detail was the overall form of hospital facilities. All of the model configurations were offered in plan drawings of specific functional areas, with either notational arrows or texts indicating connections to other medical areas. It was up to the requestors to organize the *Elements* according to their specific conditions. In May 1949, the Engineer Division undertook this task with a new ward building at the Nachrichten Kaserne site. As EUCOM headquarters - and recalling Col. Morgan’s assessment of medical conditions across the zone - the new building was not simply an effort to update Heidelberg’s immediate medical facilities, it was also intended to serve as a model for future hospital construction within the European Command.

The new building was situated within the existing casern and provocatively placed between the two main Wehrmacht buildings parallel to Karlsruherstraße (figure 1.39). The decision to remain within the existing boundaries was conceptually and fiscally reasonable in creating a concentrated zone of medical facilities. It also again highlighted the continuity between German Wehrmacht and US army operations, where the building actions of the former determined those of the latter. But with the new building, an additional level of continuity was also created. Whereas previously, American personnel had simply confiscated existing facilities for their use, by constructing a new building alongside the Wehrmacht structures, they now indicated a further determination to link their extension to the originally German structures. The decision to locate the new building in-



Figure 1.39 130th Station Hospital, Aerial View. 7 July 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-345084.

between the existing buildings extended this continuity to a physical connection, literally constructing a direct link with the Wehrmacht and bridging the pre-1945 divide (figures 1.40ab). As such, the existing buildings explicitly determined several conditions for the new one. For example, the overall length of the new building was restricted to the maximum horizontal distance between the two existing buildings. Although American officials could have accommodated space between the buildings, they instead chose (not without logic) to connect the new building on both ends to the existing buildings. This physical connection further determined the floor to ceiling heights for the new building, in order to match the existing floor levels. It also required a destructive act: creating openings in the existing buildings that would allow passage from one to the other. This in turn influenced, to a degree, the general layout, beginning with the double-loaded corridor of the new building (which was in accordance with AHA planning guides), that matched the general layout of the existing buildings.

In addition to these explicit physical constraints were implicit continuities. Although the new building's length was physically bounded, its width and height were negotiable. Yet here too, American officials followed the dimensions of the existing horizontal forms, respecting and matching their width and height in the new building. This accommodation to existing conditions produced a certain visual continuity between old and new, German and American, that was further enforced with the placement and dimensions of the windows, being identical across all three buildings.

These continuities and connections notwithstanding, there were obvious differences between the new American building and the two Wehrmacht structures. Although the latter were utilitarian military structures, the new building went considerably further in stripping away any superfluous features. The back of the building (west elevation), which faced the main Karlsruherstraße with its smooth continuous surface, presented a repetition of identical windows, both horizontally and vertically, obscuring any reading of program through the elevation. Vertically, the most plausible



Figure 1.40ab A shot of the outside of the old medical building at the 130th Sta[tion] Hosp[ital] in [H]eidelberg. 25 Nov 1959.  
RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-568795, SC-568796



conclusion one could draw was that whatever happened on one level, repeated itself on three other levels (which was not the case.) Horizontally, the building appeared symmetrically divided into three zones according to the window placement: both end zones comprised of six evenly spaced windows interrupted by a wider spacing before an additional six evenly spaced windows, while the middle zone consisted of three wider spaced windows. The vertical repetition terminated abruptly with the flat roof, which traversed the entire length of the building, and in stark contrast to the pitched roof and dormers on the Wehrmacht structures. The final distinguishing feature was the building's pristine whiteness. Against the pale grayish-brown of the outer buildings, and the surrounding greenery, the new building popped out like any other modernist structure.

The building's main elevation inside the casern maintained this differentiated austerity. The windows were standardized to one type and repeated both vertically and horizontally. A slight indentation in the middle of the building, along with greater spacing between windows on the left and right of it, created a simple horizontal symmetry, with nine windows extending out in both directions, and with the four windows in the middle placed in-between levels, indicating their placement within a stairwell. But the symmetry was immediately broken with an expanded street opening to the right, that connected to the main entrance under a canopy (figure 1.41).

In addition to these material differences, there was also a significant conceptual aspect to the new building. Aesthetically, the building rejected the utilitarian neoclassicism of its Wehrmacht neighbors in favor of a modernist utilitarianism. This approach was inline with a broader American government position at the time regarding official representation abroad. For example, as Jane C. Loeffler has noted in parallel developments, the State Department found architectural modernism especially useful as a "diplomatic tool" to promote American democracy through its embassy building program.<sup>71</sup> This "forward-looking" presence abroad countered an immediate past in which

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<sup>71</sup> Jane C. Loeffler, *Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America's Embassies* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), 6.




Figure 1.41 *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 7, No. 4, (April 1950), front cover.

neoclassicism was considered tarnished through its association with fascist building projects.<sup>72</sup> A little later, it also offered a distinct comparison with official Soviet architecture, which, since the 1930s, had reverted back to a historicist aesthetic.<sup>73</sup> For American government officials, architectural modernism, stripped of any “socialist-oriented political agenda,” and reformulated to notions of capitalism, democracy, and progress, offered a working alternative aesthetic.<sup>74</sup>

But as we have already seen, with military building there were limits to this approach. First was the reality that the vast majority of buildings occupied by American personnel were in fact already existing Wehrmacht structures, rather than new modernist buildings. Second was the manner in which the new building integrated itself to two of these existing structures in the medical complex, despite the aesthetic differences. A somewhat similar, though less contrasting, condition occurred on Patton Barracks the following year, when military engineers completed a new, 200-man barracks (figure 1.42). In a caption to a photograph, engineers highlighted the building’s new features in contrast to “old type” barracks, noting the new type of “windows running the entire length of the building, composition linoleum floor covering, 3/4 tiled kitchens, and modified showers.” Nevertheless, the barracks also maintained more conventional features, such as a pitched roof with dormers and symmetrical layout. The modest new features suggest that the difference in function and visibility - in this case between a hospital and a barracks - determined the degree to

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<sup>72</sup> In general the Nazi party rejected architectural modernism outside of certain industrial buildings, in favor of a conservative, “German” historicist style. This approach was associated with monumentality as well, which Sigfried Giedion and others began addressing in the early 1940s. See Sigfried Giedion, “The Need for a New Monumentality,” and José Luis Sert, Fernand Léger, and Sigfried Giedion, “Nine Points on Monumentality,” in *Architecture, You and Me: The Diary of a Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 25-39, 48-51. On Nazi architecture and its relations to architectural modernism, see Barbara Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985.) More generally, see Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.)

<sup>73</sup> Ron Theodore Robin, *Enclaves of America: The Rhetoric of American Political Architecture Abroad, 1900-1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 143.

<sup>74</sup> As Loeffler notes, modernisms’ embrace was far from unanimous and largely restricted to its diplomatic usefulness; government officials rejected modern artworks from Picasso, Matisse, and others as “communist propaganda,” while modern interiors and furniture, such as Knoll and Mies’ Barcelona chair, were replaced with more conventional options. Loeffler, *Architecture of Diplomacy*, 6, 67.



Figure 1.42 A new 200-man barracks building recently completed at Patton Barracks in Heidelberg. 20 Dec 1951. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-384377.

which newer military buildings engaged newer design aesthetics. With the barracks, it did not appear necessary to embrace new layouts or a more explicit reference to modernist aesthetics, since the building only served to house troops and no other civilian functions. In the case of the hospital, military officials were intentional in wrapping up-to-date medical treatments in equally new modernist aesthetics. With such a linking, the legitimacy of military medical services was confirmed through the newness of the building's appearance.<sup>75</sup>

In a brief description of the soon to be completed hospital, the April 1950 *Medical Bulletin* drew a direct line between the building's modernism, a modern Army, and modern medicine. After identifying the new building as "The most modern hospital building in the EC [European Command] ... [that] embodies all the features of modern Army and civilian hospitals in the United States," and describing the overall building as a "four-story building with a flat roof," it went straight to the basement, highlighting the four systems upon which the entire building operated: "an emergency electric plant, a heating plant, and a central oxygen system as well as central suction system." This was the fundamental equipment, requiring its own floor and maintenance personnel, that would allow the rest of the building to embody "modern" standards. Moving up one level, at ground level, was "the receiving, emergency, and locker rooms, out-patient department, the pharmacy, and an ambulance unloading platform." On the second floor was "the surgical ward with recovery and six private rooms for the seriously ill," while the third floor was dedicated to obstetrics services, including ten private rooms. Finally, the fourth floor was dedicated to a "surgical operating suite and a central sterile supply room." All of these modern advances were bracketed by deutsche marks and American dollars, as the description began by identifying the entire building project as a 1.4 million DM endeavor, and ended with a \$42,000 commitment of medical equipment.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> On the enduring relation between a new hospital as a good hospital, see David Theodore, "Towards a New Hospital: Architecture, Medicine, and Computation, 1960-75," (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2014), 279-280.

<sup>76</sup> "The Cover," *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 7, No. 4, (April 1950), Inside front cover.

The significance of the building was apparent as the cover image of the April *Bulletin*. Although medical buildings and complexes graced multiple cover issues in the early 1950s, almost all of these were aerial photographs of built structures. By contrast, the new building in Heidelberg was a rendering - the first for the journal - that anticipated its completion. Which was remarkably close: 31 March 1950 according to the inside description. Nevertheless, rather than wait for a photograph of the actual building, the editor, Clifford V. Morgan, opted for a black and white perspective rendering in order to showcase to readers what this “most modern hospital building” looked like. I hope the achievement is evident; American officials had progressed from utilizing existing facilities, which had required an assortment of rehabilitation efforts for their operations, to constructing their own, new facility, which, they claimed, housed the most up-to-date medical equipment for contemporary use. It was thus a moment in which American military officials showed multiple audiences, including themselves, that they were no longer operating in an improvisational manner, behind in their actions, but rather, progressing in line with the most advanced medical developments, ready to offer their personnel innovative medical services.

## **Conclusion**

It only took six months before the new building shifted from a celebrated achievement to a necessary but insufficient structure. In September 1950, a major expansion of military personnel in West Germany was announced, for which the new building now appeared inadequate. Seven months later, in May 1951, construction began on a newer building to accommodate this expansion. Like its predecessor, the newer building also graced the *Medical Bulletin* with a rendering while under construction, in order to “give the reader an idea of the functional beauty of one of EUCOM’s newest hospital plants,” while also occupying a second cover shortly after its completion (figures

1.43-1.44).<sup>77</sup> Unlike the first building, this newer structure was detached from other buildings while remaining inside the medical complex, further confirming the American approach to use the former German military plans as a base for future American expansion (figure 1.45). But whereas the first building had expressed this continuity through physical connection and extreme austerity, the newer, four-story, 250-bed building housed its even more modern hospital equipment in an even more modernist structure, with an asymmetrical vertical circulation core partially wrapped in curved floor-to-ceiling glass, large continuous horizontal glass stretching across the front and back façades, balconies with floor-to-ceiling glass openings on both ends, and a perpendicular 1,000 seat mess space on ground level (figure 1.46).<sup>78</sup> The new building immediately overshadowed its slightly older neighbor and highlighted how quickly aesthetic and medical changes could occur.

Nevertheless, the significance of the first new hospital building at Heidelberg should not be overlooked. It occurred at the tail-end of a complex sequence of events, beginning with the destruction and chaos of war, to the crisis of military occupation, massive movement and structural reorganization, slowly shifting toward a degree of stability and reestablished military command. In this chapter I have tried to move along these events and show how this progress was significantly anchored by existing physical structures, which further furnished physical additions by early 1950. In one sense, new construction of a hospital building signaled an end to complete and sole dependency on previous German building decisions, instead pointing to a new direction in which military officials constructed their own facilities according to their own objectives and standards. But as we have seen, they did not move too far away. In various ways, the new building was linked to those already in existence, which continued to be utilized by military personnel.

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<sup>77</sup> "Symposium: Medical Construction Plans," *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 8, No. 12, (December 1951), 549.

<sup>78</sup> Later in the decade, military officials would add another layer of continuity with color, painting all the buildings in the complex a rather drab reddish brown.




Figure 1.43 *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 8, No. 12, (December 1951), front cover.






Figure 1.44 *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 9, No. 5, (May 1952), front cover.




Figure 1.45 View of the new 130th Station building. 31 March 1953. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-426884.




Figure 1.46 Isometric Perspective, "Symposium: Medical Construction Plans," *Medical Bulletin of the European Command*, Vol. 8, No. 12, (December 1951), 552.

The new building was itself an index of larger realities in Heidelberg. By spring 1950, the military presence in the city expanded due to variously favorable conditions discussed earlier. Over the course of five years, US military activities were firmly established and consolidated in the caserns, with various supporting services immediately available or scattered throughout the city center. In both cases, the policy remained to utilize to the fullest extent the city's already available building stock. In each of the caserns, the rehabilitation of the existing structures provided updates and conveniences, for instance, billeting, recreational options, food and certain consumer services, as well as administrative, medical, and educational-training spaces. All of this forged reestablished military command in each of the three military locations.

Meanwhile, conditions in Heidelberg were themselves representative of the changes the US military's presence had taken in the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany. By summer 1950, military officials had established military posts across the American zone of occupation through the same means of confiscating existing caserns (figures 1.47-50). This eventually consolidated and decentralized their organizational structure, thereby stabilizing military procedures and command protocols across their zone. There were now eleven military post commands, including Berlin and Bremerhaven, commanded by eleven post commanders and senior staff.<sup>79</sup> Each managed the actions within their sub-area, including the rehabilitation of existing structures. This work stretched across all eleven military posts and over 60 caserns and mirrored - in degrees - the same updating occurring at Heidelberg. The project work included general rehabilitation, mess and recreational updates, establishing and expanding training and troop facilities and billeting, storage and utility upgrades,

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<sup>79</sup> The military posts were Augsburg, Berlin, Bremerhaven, Frankfurt, Garmisch, Heidelberg, Munich, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Wetzlar, and Würzburg.



Figure 1.47 (top left) Aerial view of Flint Kaserne, HQ 1st Infantry Division, Bad Tölz, Germany. 18 May 1950. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-343526.

Figure 1.48 (top right) Aerial view of Panzer Kaserne, Murnau, Germany. 18 May 1950. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-343525.

Figure 1.49 (bottom left) Aerial view of Artillerie Kaserne, Murnau, Germany. 18 May 1950. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-343524.

Figure 1.50 (bottom right) Aerial view of Ludwig Kaserne, Darmstadt, Germany. 24 May 1950. RG 111: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 - 1985. SC-343746.

and administrative and medical renovations.<sup>80</sup> All of these facilities and improvements provided space for the approximately 80,000 US Army personnel now occupying the American zone.

But it was fragile stability. The reliance on existing structures was reaching its limit on multiple fronts. Conflicts elsewhere, principally on the Korean peninsula but also on the American domestic front, gave new voice to certain government and military positions that advocated for an increased military presence in Europe and the Federal Republic. Advancing this position would entail massive new construction of both military and supporting facilities. Meanwhile, the establishment of a new West German government also gave voice to local interests that ran counter to further local American military build-up. As we will see in later chapters, Heidelberg was not immune from these developments. Nevertheless, as new urgencies disrupted the new stability, the city continued to offer American officials a continuous base from which to reconstruct and manage further organizational changes, thereby engendering its own status as military headquarters. In later chapters, we will see how new expansion conditions were further anchored around the processes and developments discussed in this chapter, and the subsequent tensions that arose with a new German agency that attempted to collaborate with these new circumstances. But first it is useful to revisit the 1945-50 period and examine the critically crucial complement to confiscation and continuity of military facilities, with the requisition and entanglement of commercial and residential buildings.

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<sup>80</sup> For a breakdown through 1951, see “Appendix B,” in George W. Tays, *The US Army Construction Program in Germany, 1950-1953* (Historical Division, Headquarters, 1955), 176-178.

## CHAPTER TWO

### ENTANGLEMENT AND EXTENSION, 1945-1950

Recalling his senior duties in occupied Germany from 1945 to 1949, Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay briefly recounted the “significant event” of April 1946 that brought American family members to the American zone in Germany. He noted the months of debate between senior staff in Washington before the War Department eventually approved the decision in which, within “a few months our dependents in Germany aggregated about 30,000 persons, scattered in many communities.” Despite the scattered nature of this endeavor, for which US military personnel now expanded their requisition demands for additional housing requirements, Clay finally noted a press correspondent’s remark “that our life in Germany had become a replica of American suburban life.”<sup>1</sup>

Various versions of this “replica” rhetoric have persisted into early twenty-first century studies of overseas US military communities. For historian Anni P. Baker, military commanders’ desires “to create replicas of American towns” ultimately resulted in a “caricature of the American suburbs, more perfect than the real thing.”<sup>2</sup> By this, Baker means to point to the special opportunities afforded to military personnel, whether in Germany, Japan, or elsewhere, in enjoying American (and select local) consumer goods and recreational activities within largely safe, enclosed, and self-sufficient “city-like bases.”<sup>3</sup> As with Clay’s news correspondent, Baker reads the initial

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<sup>1</sup> Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1950), 70-71. Clay held several senior military positions. He arrived in Europe from Washington, DC on 18 April 1945, after being appointed Deputy Military Governor, SHAEF by President Roosevelt on 31 March 1945. He also assumed the role of Deputy Commanding General, ETOUSA and Commanding General, US Group, Control Council. On 15 March 1947 he assumed command of the European Command as Commander in Chief, and Military Governor of the Office of Military Government for Germany (US) until leaving Germany on 15 May 1949, and retiring two weeks later.

<sup>2</sup> Anni P. Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 53, 56. In both her general study of US military bases and her specific study of the Wiesbaden community in West Germany, Baker acknowledges the distinct character of military housing, for example as “the German three-story apartment style” (54). Nevertheless, she discounts any influence this style of housing might hold in the construction of “Little Americas.” Throughout this study, I intend to give these (and other) structures a more prominent role.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

creation of these conditions with the dependent arrivals in spring 1946. By contrast, German political scientist Thomas Leuerer argues against a continuation between the initial occupation period immediately following the war and later expansion in the early 1950s. In Leuerer's assessment, "American suburban-style settlements" formed as a direct result of the Korean War and the inability of the "German market" to supply sufficient housing needs for military personnel. Despite these differences, both Baker and Leuerer recognize a stark contrast between the initial military communities identified by Clay and the press correspondent, and the later settlements beginning in 1949 that "transformed the small, decentralized military communities," to "largely self-sufficient" military communities.<sup>4</sup>

In this chapter I excavate an alternative configuration. Beginning with the US Army's entry into Heidelberg, I track the seizure of commercial and private real estate that allowed for the subsequent military occupation of the city to form. Rather than "a replica of American suburban life," I document an entangled, hybrid condition, wherein American military personnel and functions were inserted into already existing German structures and juxtaposed with German civilian functions in a "scattered" and ad hoc manner. This entanglement of American and German, military and civilian people, was a direct consequence of requisitioning policy, which fully accounted for Americans securing living and working conditions during the occupation period, and which paralleled the seizing of military facilities examined in the previous chapter. However, unlike the abandoned military structures located on the outskirts of the city, this literal existence in the city center, displacing local residents and placing military and civilian populations next to one another,

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<sup>4</sup> The compression of Leuerer's account requires correction. As we will see later in this chapter, new military housing construction began in spring 1949, across several military communities, and thus before (and unrelated to) hostilities that broke out on the Korean peninsula. Although Leuerer references both the 1950-1953 construction program (under which approximately 18,500 family housing units were built) and the continued 1953-1957 program (which added approximately 20,000 more family housing units), he identifies the 1953 continuation as both the critical response to the Korean War/US troop augmentation, and the establishment of "American suburban-style settlements." In this and later chapters, I attempt to uncompress and flesh out the details of these developments. See Thomas Leuerer, "U.S. Army Military Communities in Germany," in *GIs in Germany: The Social, Economic, Cultural and Political History of the American Military Presence*, ed. Maulucci, Thomas W., and Detlef Junker (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2013), 121-141, esp. 125.



had consequences, both externally between Americans and Germans, and internally around military control. Although local - grassroots and elite - pressures were exerted to address the lost housing and businesses, it was only after the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in spring 1949, and subsequent support for new American military construction, that new policy planning - relocation to the city's edge and connection to existing military structures - started to alleviate (though not terminate) both the external pressures and the internal breakdowns. This new build-up eventually replaced the piecemeal military existence in the city center, with a new military configuration on the edge - of both the city, and existing military facilities. As such, it satisfied both a primary and secondary objective for American officials: reestablishing military coherence and command, while (briefly) tempering tensions with the local community.

My account thus overlaps and counters with those of Baker and Leuerer; first in assigning greater significance to the immediate requisitioning policy and the introduction of dependents in spring 1946, and second in tracing subsequent housing and working conditions within a framework of continuity from these two policies.<sup>5</sup> That is, I read the seizing of housing and introduction of families as foundational precursors to later events. The most significant of these events was the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula beginning in June 1950, which resulted in the massive troop increases in West Germany announced three months later (discussed in the following chapter). What I show in this chapter, is that a significant amount of groundwork had already taken place before these events occurred, and that the later troop increases and concomitant building policies are better understood as an acceleration and expansion of these developments, than a rupture or change from them.

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<sup>5</sup> On both accounts my position aligns more with Susan L. Carruthers, in *The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016).

## Requisition and Entanglement

Simultaneous to and in concert with the confiscation of military properties discussed in the previous chapter, the US Army seized numerous commercial and private properties in Heidelberg as well.<sup>6</sup> Unlike the military facilities however, located on the outskirts of the city on open farmland, these non-military properties were all located in or near the more densely populated old city center (Altstadt). And by the end of summer 1945, a cluster of American personnel - both military and civilian - had settled in the city center, and especially around the old main train station area.


A variety of military services were inserted into existing structures either as a continuation of functions (e.g., swimming pools, hotels, and clubs) or as a reconfiguration of new functions (e.g., bus terminal, finance office, and army post office). Some were available for all military personnel, while others were restricted by military rank; some were shared by Americans and Germans, while others only served Americans. Through these combinations the city itself became reconfigured by and embedded with Americans, at once displacing and co-habiting beside Germans. We can gain a better understanding of the situation with a map of the city, intended as a guide for American newcomers to Heidelberg, published in the *Stars & Stripes* newspaper in early 1948 (figure 2.1).

The hotel was one of the most common commercial property types requisitioned. Especially in Heidelberg, where they survived the war, hotels and inns satisfied immediate accommodation needs, security concerns, and organizational continuities. There were twenty-seven operational hotels and thirteen inns in the city, ranging from the secluded Hotel Bellevue and Schlosshotel east of the castle, to the sixteenth century Hotel Ritter in the Altstadt, to the more contemporary cluster around the original main train station, such as the Grand Hotel, Hotel Holländer Hof, Hotel Schrieder,

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<sup>6</sup> Similar to confiscation policy, requisition policy carried over from the 1907 Hague Convention; see “Section III. - Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State, Article 52,” in *Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Conventions and Declarations between the Powers concerning War, Arbitration and Neutrality* (Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1915); for the differences between confiscation and requisition, see George W. Tays, *The US Army Construction Program in Germany, 1950-1953* (Historical Division, Headquarters, 1955), 1-2.

# HEIDELBERG



reply. The group has its own deck room, and phone equipment for students.

For eight life in Heidelberg, many clubs are available. There is the famous Heidelberg Student Club for EN at Stadthaus on Neckarstrasse. The club offers activities for couples in the Ossa Room. There are four shows Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday at 9 p.m. Closed Monday.

The Harmonie Club, at Theaterstrasse and Hauptstrasse, for first three grades, has four shows Wednesday and Saturday at 9 p.m., Blue Thursday at 8 p.m., Green Friday.

Offices and civilian clubs include the Stadtkassen, Casino, Leopoldstrasse near the Victoria Hotel, cocktail from 1:30 p.m. closed Tuesday; Melodien, on Melodienstrasse, open Saturday, available for private parties, telephone 4141; Europa Bar, in Europa Hotel on Leopoldstrasse, open nightly; Savoy Hotel Club, Bahnhofsstrasse and Burgstrasse, open nightly; Reichspost Hotel Lounge, tea served daily. The Schloss Hotel on Schloss Weissenhofweg is available for private parties, offers a bar and more. Telephone 4411 for reservation.

The Heidelberg Service Club, sponsored by Special Services, now on Hauptstrasse, is currently running in an old German mansion which may be returned shortly to the Germans. Its new location is not yet known, but wherever it is, the club will continue its many bar, dance, record programs, games, craft shop. German classes, bridge and fencing classes, and guided tours. The club has a wrapping service, a check room, shower room, extensive telephone service, movie ticket stand and information desk.

ESG has its usual number of conveniences set up for Americans here, including a well-stocked PX on the main street at 43 Hauptstrasse. Opposite the PX is the beauty parlor at Number 41 and a tailor shop, making uniforms and civilian clothes, next door at Number 42. Barber shops are located on Bahnhofsstrasse next to

- 1-Dependents School.
- 2-Victoria House, French Church, St. Elizabeth's Church, Protestantism.
- 3-Dependents Club.
- 4-Dependents Club.
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- 41-Dependents Club.
- 42-Dependents Club.

the Schröder Hotel, in the Hotel Europa and Special Service Club.

On Bahnhofsstrasse, at the town center, an ESG garage will take care of your car.

Another ESG installation is at 1 Hauptstrasse where films are developed and printed, passport photos are made and portraits painted.

There is a radio and watch repair shop at 38 Hauptstrasse, open Monday through Saturday.

A snack bar is operated at the Café Club.

The beverage store is located at 11 Hauptstrasse, and home deliveries of beverages are made if you phone 7782.

In the dependents department, the community is at Hauptstrasse near the Post office post, open Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m., 1 p.m. to 4 p.m., Wednesday, 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. to 4 p.m.

About 300 children attend the Heidelberg dependents school. The high school and elementary schools are at 10 Quindstrasse. For information on high school students telephone Milton Evans, 6281. Miss Mildred Furch (telephone 6281) is in charge of the elementary school.

A kindergarten, at 12 Mainstrasse, is run by L.A. Anne Bradford, telephone 6281.

School buses are provided.

In all, there are 208 schools of every variety to be divided among the newcomers. These are scattered throughout the city, and in small towns nearby. There will be no further requisitioning of German houses to accommodate the ESCM staffs and their families. Homes are allotted on the basis of rank and family size.

Churches for Americans are listed as follows:

Protestant: Providence Church, Hauptstrasse at Karl Ludwigstrasse.

Catholic: St. Elizabeth's Church, Hauptstrasse at Platz, Rm. 1.

Evangelical: St. Elizabeth's Church, Hauptstrasse at Platz, Rm. 1.

Evangelical: St. Elizabeth's Church, Hauptstrasse at Platz, Rm. 1.

Evangelical: St. Elizabeth's Church, Hauptstrasse at Platz, Rm. 1.

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Figure 2.1 Howard and Shirley Katzander, "Tale of 3 Cities," Stars and Stripes, March 7, 1948, 5.

Hotel Victoria, Hotel Europa, and Hotel Bayrischer Hof (figure 2.2). They were all requisitioned by American forces, with the accommodations near the castle catering to senior staff and high-level visitors, and those near the old train station occupied by various other personnel.<sup>7</sup> In addition to accommodations and dining services, the hotels also provided additional services, for instance, a military tribunal was established in the Hotel Schrieder, the Hotel Bayrischer Hof included a thrift shop, and a photo laboratory was setup in the Hotel Victoria.<sup>8</sup> Accompanying these functions, additional dining services near hotels and inns were also requisitioned. These took three forms: dining facilities for enlisted personnel, such as the Perkeo, Harmonie, and Stardust; similar services for officers at the Casino; and dining services open to both military personnel and civilians, for example the Stadtgarten and Molkenkur. All of these services were concentrated in the city center.

Additional properties in the city were requisitioned to satisfy auxiliary needs. Financial services were provided by American corporations such as American Express, Chase National, and Western Union, along with a military finance office.<sup>9</sup> Numerous entertainment venues, including the German Stadttheater, Capitol Theater, and the Odeon, catered to Americans, as did four US-operated theaters with various entry restrictions. Additional entertainment services overlapped with dining services and included the conversion of the Stadthalle (city hall) into the Stardust Club, which was, for a time, the largest nightclub for American troops in Europe and frequently hosted American civilians during their overseas tours.<sup>10</sup> Additional clubs requisitioned included the Oasis Room, Harmonie Club, Stadtgarten Casino, and various hotel bars. More practical services included three

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<sup>7</sup> The Schlosshotel in particular was reserved for high-ranking officials, accommodating a range of senior staff during the occupation period, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Chief of Staff of the Army Omar N. Bradley, and General Lucius D. Clay. See Harold Scarlett, "Guest House at Heidelberg," *Stars and Stripes*, December 17, 1950, 16.

<sup>8</sup> Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 80.

<sup>9</sup> The Chase branch (the third operational in Germany) opened in April 1948; "Chase Branch in Heidelberg," *New York Times*, Apr 1, 1948, 42.

<sup>10</sup> "GI Night Life Sampled: Touring U.S. Newspaper Executives Stop Over in Heidelberg," *New York Times*, Jul 5, 1946, 4.



Figure 2.2 Hotel Bayrischer Hof. 1949. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 336095.

barber shops, a transportation center, a car garage and auto repair shop, a post exchange (PX), and laundry and drying services (figure 2.3). Traveling westward, recreational facilities included both indoor and outdoor tennis courts and swimming pools, two gyms, a boat house with various sailing equipment, and bowling alleys.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, more remote facilities were requisitioned. These included storage facilities and buildings at the University of Heidelberg and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research, all north of the Neckar.<sup>12</sup> In all three cases, American military requisitioning signaled the continuation of already existing functions. The university started to reopen in November 1945, with the medical and theological faculties welcoming “1,030 German and foreign students,”<sup>13</sup> and in January 1946, it fully reopened “all five of its faculties.”<sup>14</sup> Several buildings were also reserved for American use and continued with educational purposes, operating as a dependents’ school for military family members’ children beginning in October 1946, as well as the University of Maryland’s overseas branch and the Army Education Center (figure 2.4).<sup>15</sup> The institute also continued its research functions, with approved German researchers allowed to continue their work beginning in June 1945, and American personnel operating a new aero-medical center and restarting the operation of a cyclotron (figure 2.5). In both cases, Americans and Germans worked in the facilities, though separately.

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<sup>11</sup> Howard and Shirley Katzander, “Tale of 3 Cities,” *Stars and Stripes*, March 7, 1948, 4.

<sup>12</sup> The Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft (Kaiser Wilhelm Society) was originally formed in 1911 in Berlin and after the war renamed the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft in 1948.

<sup>13</sup> “Heidelberg Schools to Reopen,” *New York Times*, Nov 11, 1945, 28.

<sup>14</sup> The five faculties were medicine, theology, philosophy, law, and science; “Heidelberg Formally Reopens,” *New York Times*, Jan 9, 1946, 14; also “Heidelberg Reopens,” *New York Times*, Jan 13, 1946, E8. The speed of the reopening backfired when it was later discovered that the university remained “a hotbed of nazism” among the faculty. The US Army responded with an investigation and removed ten faculty members and a dean. See Sydney Gruson, “U.S. Army Purges Heidelberg Staff,” *New York Times*, Mar 28, 1946, 17; Steven P. Remy, *The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University* (Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).

<sup>15</sup> According to the text accompanying the map, by spring 1948, approximately 300 dependents’ children attended the combined elementary-high school. “Army Derequisitions Heidelberg U. Building,” *Stars and Stripes*, August 31, 1952, 22.



Figure 2.3 Interior View of Exchange, Heidelberg. 1949. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 336097.



Figure 2.4 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 86.



Figure 2.5 Kaiser Wilhelm Research Institute, Heidelberg. 10 June 1952.  
RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 404408.



In addition to seizing these commercial properties, there was an even more extensive requisitioning of residential properties not detailed in the newspaper map. Entire apartment buildings, individual apartments, and single-family homes were requisitioned for American (or allied) military or civilian personnel, both of which occurred in a more piecemeal fashion based on immediate housing needs. In a three-month survey conducted by the Office of Military Government, it was reported that American personnel in the newly formed Württemberg-Baden area, which included Heidelberg, occupied 29,394 private rooms in November 1945, 42,002 the following month, and 43,361 by January 1946.<sup>16</sup> In March 1947, a specific Heidelberg survey was conducted at the city and district level, detailing the American occupation of residential property, categorized by rank. Outside of living quarters at Patton and Campbell Barracks, which housed approximately 1,200 enlisted personnel, the US military controlled 20 locations in the city that housed 1,100 personnel, including rooms for 329 Polish guards at 69 Quinkestrasse, and spaces for 13 British military personnel at two locations on Schnellbachstrasse. An additional 87 apartments across 35 locations housed another 157 unaccompanied officials. And another 583 residential units were requisitioned across 87 streets for personnel with family members.<sup>17</sup> In some cases, almost the entire street was seized and occupied by Americans; for example, on Bergstrasse, Americans controlled 48 unique addresses, on Rohrbacherstrasse, 44, and on Schroederstrasse, 36. On the other end of the spectrum, Americans requisitioned one to three residences on 41 streets, and only one property on 15 different streets. By early spring 1947, there were approximately 4,000 personnel occupying various housing in Heidelberg.

The pervasiveness of these actions garnered numerous and continued responses from Heidelberg citizens. Although they had limited official representation, they pursued direct and

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<sup>16</sup> Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 441. NB: Württemberg-Baden was an American Land created after the war, in existing until 1952, when Baden-Württemberg was created through a consolidation with other Lander.

<sup>17</sup> "List of Billets Occupied by U.S. or Allied Personnel," 12 April 1947, Office of Military Government Wuerttemberg-Baden, OMGUS, NARA 260, Box 332.

indirect pleas to remain in, or have returned, their properties. One citizen's efforts were representative. In a letter to military officials, Heidelberg resident Friedrich Buschmann detailed his resistance to "the nazi-regime from the beginning, counteracting ... all measurements [sic] and interventions of authoritative nazis," before describing his and his wife's serious illnesses, confirmed with an "enclosed medical certificate." The military's internal handwritten response on the top of his request simply read, "still refused," indicating that Mr. Buschmann's request was not the first attempt. Nor was it the last. He wrote again in March 1947 to plead his case, which again received a quick "No action" handwritten response.<sup>18</sup> This was only one of several hundred requests. In other examples, Heidelbergers leveraged contacts with acting mayors, religious leaders, and US senators, in a more or less similar manner: first describing their staunchly anti-Nazi position, then their admiration for democracy, and finally their (or a significant other's) failing health. Nevertheless, derequisitions during this period were extremely rare. But not impossible. On 24 October 1946, one Mrs. Enzinger was granted permission to continue to live in her house at 16 Zeppelinstrasse because she was "very sick." A similar fortune fell to a Mrs. Fuhrmann one month later.<sup>19</sup> But these were exceptions that confirmed the hierarchy of American-German relations.

Military requisitioning was thus the policy for securing living and working accommodations. It had two immediate implications. The first registered positively, in that it facilitated immediate transition of American military duties, from combat to occupation, by utilizing already existing facilities. This created an immediate (though temporary) stability, establishing a strict command hierarchy against potential governing voids or militant resurgences among the German population. But the second implication was more problematic: it highlighted the improvisational character and piecemeal outcome of military actions, that appeared to operate according to immediate and

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<sup>18</sup> "Applications for release of the house nr 3, Maulbeerweg, Heidelberg," 11 November 1946, Office of Military Government Wuertemberg-Baden, OMGUS, NARA RG 260, Box 331.

<sup>19</sup> "Extension of time for Mrs. Gustel Enzinger, 16 Zeppelinstr.,," 24 October 1946; and "17 Mönchhofstrasse, Heidelberg, Mrs. Fuhrmann," 16 November 1946, Office of Military Government, Real Estate Division, NARA RG 260, Box 331.

temporary needs, rather than developed plans. The quick appropriation of properties was thus coupled with an uncoordinated clustering of military operations and personnel within and at the center of a larger civilian community.

The result of these ad hoc actions was an entanglement, in which American military functions were juxtaposed with Heidelberger civilian activities, dispersing personnel within and across a broad range of the city's framework for daily life. This condition, firmly in place by late summer 1945, effectively defined the physical character of the occupation period in Heidelberg, whereby a variety of American-controlled activities, from lodging to scientific research, secondary education to daily military administrative functions, were inserted into German civilian environments and structures and scattered across the city area (figure 2.6). To state it another way: Heidelberg's intact buildings mitigated the US Army's wide-ranging operating procedures in the immediate post-combat period. American military functions and Heidelberger civilian activities had melded into each other to such a degree, that, according to military historian Oliver Frederiksen, "by the middle of the occupation the American community ... was barely to be distinguished except for the sign on the official installation buildings."<sup>20</sup>

Frederiksen was not referencing Heidelberg in particular, but rather a more general condition, which points to Heidelberg's entanglement not having been entirely unique. Similarly scattered and entangled conditions developed from the requisitioning of properties across cities under American control. Military maps of cities during this period reveal the details and degree to which American forces "merged" their existence into German city centers. For example, in larger cities, such as Frankfurt, Munich, and Wiesbaden, the same approach and effect occurred, in which individual buildings or parts of buildings across city centers were requisitioned for specific military use in an ad hoc manner, resulting in different versions of the same scattered presence found in Heidelberg (figures 2.7-2.9). In all three cases, there was a consistent seizing of properties in city

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<sup>20</sup> Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953*, 124.



Figure 2.6 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 70.




Figure 2.7 City Map of Frankfurt with American military locations, 1946.




Figure 2.8 Town Plan Munich with American military functions, 1945.



Figure 2.9 City Map of Wiesbaden with American military locations, 1947.

centers that prioritized immediate accommodation over military coherence. This created the same consequences of entanglement, where small clusters of military functions existed along one street, opposite or right beside a series of civilian functions; or individual military functions were loosely spread out across several neighborhoods and buildings (figure 2.10). But the maps also reveal that although there were, in these larger cities, identical functions in similar types of buildings, the improvisational approach created an even more scattered existence than in the smaller Heidelberg. The effect of aerial bombing on these cities, and its absence in Heidelberg, was again confirmed and factored into the physical organizations available to military personnel.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, the overall contours of occupation were similar and occurred simultaneously across the American zone, radiating out from buildings in the city centers, to residential properties on the outskirts (figure 2.11).

Nor were larger German cities the only areas entangled with American soldiers. As noted in the previous chapter, the “carpet plan” of occupation stretched military personnel far and wide, enveloping smaller towns as well. Within Württemberg-Baden alone, several cities equal or smaller in population to Heidelberg had private homes requisitioned for military use, including Bruchsal, Buchen, Mosbach, Pforzheim, Sinsheim, and Tauberbischofsheim in Baden; and Aalen, Bachnang, Böblingen, Crailsheim, Esslingen, Göppingen, Hall, Heidenheim, Nuertingen, and Vaihingen in Württemberg.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, in Heidelberg as elsewhere, Americans had inserted themselves into German cities in an improvised and forceful manner. This was, after all, a military occupation of a defeated, rather

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<sup>21</sup> See Fig 2 in Hohn, “The Bomber's Baedeker,” (217) for a comparison of the bomb damage on these cities.

<sup>22</sup> The 1939/1945 populations for the cities were as follows: Bruchsal - 89,572/-; Buchen - 45,043/75,00; Mosbach - 39,775/60,000; Pforzheim - 78,320/-; Sinsheim - 52,395/55,000; Tauberbischofsheim - 56,140/56,650; Aalen - 84,480/102,000; Bachnang - 53,579/64,000; Böblingen - 93,452/120,000; Crailsheim - 49,340/70,000; Esslingen - 106,110/130,000; Göppingen - 119,264/137,000; Hall - 42,146/65,000; Heidenheim - 62,281/74,000; Nuertingen - 73,336/90,000; Vaihingen - 46,330/51,000. Especially in cases of dramatic population increases, these (and many other) cities also housed refugees and displaced persons. For a full breakdown of population numbers, see, “Population Figures US Zone,” *Information Bulletin* (25 August 1945), 19-20.





Figure 2.10 Munich's City Hall Built By Kaiser Wilhelm In 1910 Now Houses The Allied Military Government. RG 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900-2003. U.S. Air Force Number K3449.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

US HEADQUARTERS BERLIN DISTRICT  
APO 755, U. S. Army  
17 July 1945

SUBJECT: Billet Asgmt List No. 1

TO : See Distribution.

The following named officers are assigned billets in Berlin District as follows:

RANK	NAME	ASN	BILLET	ASGNT
Ambassador	ROBERT MURPHY		19 Sprecht Str	USGOC
✓ Lt Gen	LUCIUS D CLAY	09319	46 - 48 Im Dol Str	USGOC
Maj Gen	OLIVER P ECHOLS	04713	14 Hohenzollern Str	USGOC
Maj Gen	C W HILL	06720	11 Klopstock Str	Hq Berlin Air Comd
Maj Gen	FLOYD L PARKS	010582	27 AM Sandwerder	US Hq ED
Brig Gen	STUART CUTLER	06926	3 Kleist Str	US Hq Comd BD
Brig Gen	C M HOVEY JR	016723	9 Schiller Str	Hq Berlin Air Comd
Brig Gen	HENRY MATCHETT	05503	20 Lima Str	US Hq ED
Brig Gen	ROBERT A McCLURE	06795	15 Hohenzollern Str	USGOC
Brig Gen	FRANK C MEADE	014777	24 Kleinen Wannsee	USGOC
Brig Gen	PAUL L RANSOM	04651	29 Lima Str	US Hq ED
	Distinguished Visitors		18 Kleinen Wannsee	USGOC

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PARKS:

*W. F. Smith*  
W. F. SMITH,  
Col., AGD,  
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Ea Individual named ✓
- 5 - CG US Gp CC
- 5 - CG Berlin Air Comd
- 10 - CG US Hq Comd
- 2 - Ea Staff Sec US Hq
- 15 - AG
- 5 - Masterwork

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED REGRADER ORDER 82-10-10 BY TAG PER 014777

US Group CC  
GM & D  
X-49

21-22-23-24-1-2-3  
20 RECEIVED  
19 17 JUL 1945  
18  
17 US Group C  
16 APO 752  
15-13-12-11-10-9

173A

Figure 2.11 Billet Assignment List No. 1, US Headquarters Berlin District. 17 July 1945. RG 319: Records of the Army Staff, 1903-2009.

than a liberated enemy. It was also assumed to be a temporary, short-term condition. The American military was following a pattern of military occupation on foreign soil, whereby military forces occupied defeated territories for only a short period of time.<sup>23</sup> And the Germans (reluctantly) cooperated, working off the same assumption.

### **Dependents and Stabilization**

But even in the short-term, the results were unsustainable. As we saw in the previous chapter, American personnel were in a constant state of flux after hostilities terminated, with military units being deactivated, reactivated, merged, and physically relocated on a continuous basis and across the American zone during the first year of occupation.<sup>24</sup> We also saw that redeployment impacted both the quantity and quality of soldiers stationed in occupied Germany, both of which were lowered as war time hostilities moved further into the past. Further deterioration occurred through the scattered placement across and within cities, as smaller, decentralized units, were still required to comb through the entire zone. In addition, the termination of non-fraternization policy between soldiers and the local populations (mostly young women) in October 1945, the economic imbalance wherein, for instance, cigarettes became a main currency on the black market, and the continuously changing policies of occupation - all of these realities combined into a military command breakdown.<sup>25</sup> The effect produced a dramatic morale problem, increased disciplinary actions, and substandard military practices.

Cognizant of these issues, the War Department attempted two corrective measures. The first was the introduction of family members in spring 1946. On the one hand, German cities at this time

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<sup>23</sup> Earlier examples included American military forces in Britain, French forces in Germany, and German forces in France.

<sup>24</sup> For a specific case related to Heidelberg, see *Mission accomplished: Third United States Army Occupation of Germany, 9 May 1945 – 15 February 1947* (unpublished, date unknown)

<sup>25</sup> On non-fraternization policy, see Ziemke, 321-327; on cigarettes as currency, see "Bought Cigarettes, German Held," *New York Times*, 23 Sep 1945, 12; "Army is Battling Cigarette barter," *New York Times*, Dec 27, 1946, 8.



remained in physical ruin with a housing crisis for those already present; compounded by millions more of recently displaced persons and refugees seeking shelter.<sup>26</sup> The resulting housing shortage was estimated at five million units. On the other hand, senior staff believed introducing American family members could reintroduce a level of discipline and morale among soldiers. “With the lure of family reunions,” Susan L. Carruthers notes, “the War Department hoped to arrest the unseemly exodus of trained personnel and improve the caliber of those who stayed on or were freshly recruited for occupation duty.”<sup>27</sup> The strategy of “domesticating the occupation” was to raise military occupation standards through a recalibration: maintaining or even attracting the more disciplined, professional soldiers, while removing the more lax and problematic. Introducing the families of military personnel was viewed as the best means for this domestication and improving relations with the local population by offering a positive example of American family values and American-style democracy.<sup>28</sup> Finally, according to Carruthers, it signaled “a significant entrenchment of uniformed U.S. power overseas.”<sup>29</sup> That is, despite the current (housing) crisis and devastation, and the end of war in Europe, American soldiers and their families were moving to Germany for the long-term.

In view of future events, it is difficult to disagree with Carruthers’ assessment. It is however worth examining the actual course of events in more detail. As early as September 1945, the War

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<sup>26</sup> For an overview of the German housing conditions after the war, see Jeffry M. Diefendorf, *In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities After World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 125-130; Hohn, “The Bomber’s Baedeker”.

<sup>27</sup> The source of the “family reunions” according to Carruthers came from pressure by higher ranking officials who were miserable and separated from their families, as opposed to younger/lower ranking military personnel who enjoyed their American status and financial advantage. See Carruthers, Chapter 8, “Domesticating Occupation” in *The Good Occupation*; quote from 268. See also Emily Lockett Swafford, “Democracy’s Proving Ground: U.S. Military Families in West Germany, 1946-1961,” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2014); Anni P. Baker, *Wiesbaden and the Americans 1945-2003: The Social, Economic, and Political Impact of the U.S. Forces in Wiesbaden* (Wiesbaden, Kulturamt-Stadtarchiv; 2004), 52-53; Martha Gravois, “Military Families in Germany, 1946-1986: Why They Came and Why They Stay,” *Parameters* 16, 4 (Winter 1986): 57-67.

<sup>28</sup> On the notion of military families as “ambassadors,” see Donna Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946-1965* (New York University Press, 2007.)

<sup>29</sup> Carruthers, *The Good Occupation*, 264. Cf. Leuerer, 123.

Department established a Special Occupational Planning Board charged with planning standards of living for occupation forces and dependents in the American zone. The following month it produced a scheme based on several assumptions: the occupation was to last five years; it would be paid by the Germans through reparations payments; the standard of living was to be at least equal to Army posts in the United States in 1937; and American forces were to utilize existing Wehrmacht facilities as much as possible.<sup>30</sup> For all of this, the board assumed 300,000 military personnel and 90,000 dependents in their planning estimates.<sup>31</sup> Later that month it requested potential sites for military communities from Army generals in the American zone, including Austria, from which 79 out of 112 were approved.<sup>32</sup> Following these approvals, applications from military personnel were requested and approved in March 1946, and the following month, on 28 April, 341 family members arrived at the port in Bremerhaven.<sup>33</sup> Other than the five-year timeframe, all of the assumptions were, in different and unintended ways, confirmed by subsequent developments.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> *The First Year of Occupation, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46* (Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), 112.

<sup>31</sup> The Occupational Troop Basis (OTB) was the minimum number of troops necessary to fulfill the occupation mission (in Germany and Austria) according to the War Department. A theoretical 404,000 was initially issued in 1944, reduced in January 1945 to 379,000 personnel, to be achieved one year after V-E day. In August 1945 it was reduced again to 370,000; and then 363,000. On 1 July 1946, it was 307,000, and during the first half of 1947, further reduced from 202,000 to 160,000. This general trend may not contradict Carruthers' account, but it does complicate it, as resources were continuously being reduced from the American zone during this period. For further differences within the War Department, see *Reorganization of Tactical Forces*, 1-9; also Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 334.

<sup>32</sup> *The First Year of Occupation*, 203. In early March 1946, 57 sites were reported as "approved military communities in Germany and Austria" for soldiers and their dependents. For a full list of sites, see "Communities Approved for Dependents," *Information Bulletin* (23 March 1946), 19.

<sup>33</sup> The initial application breakdown by rank was as follows: 415 applications from officers, 26 from enlisted personnel, and 8 from civilians. By June 1946, there were 2,467 officers dependents, 80 enlisted men dependents, and 59 civilian dependents. See *The First Year of Occupation*, 113. Also Gravois, "Military Families in Germany," 62.

<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, the War Department was not the only agency invested in these issues. Simultaneous working groups at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department, operating between May 1945 to March 1947, suggest an alternative position on establishing a US military presence around the globe, for which Germany only appeared marginally. See James F. Schnabel, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, V. 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947* (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State, 1996), 139-160. For an economically motivated influence in Europe, see Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966* (New York, Wiley, 1967).

Thus a dual strategy was initiated to reverse and correct the deteriorating standards. American military communities would begin consolidating American personnel and functions, and family members would incentivize or discipline a more professional soldier toward more appropriate or required military standards, and away from the freedoms of association with local populations. In both cases, the combined goal was reestablishing conformity and stabilization of military command.

But progress along both fronts was slow. Between spring 1946 and early 1948, in Heidelberg as elsewhere, far fewer family members arrived than anticipated, while adding strain to already existing housing shortages. The consolidation of military activities and personnel was also gradual, in large part due to the War Department's reluctance to provide any funding for new construction, and German authorities' already strained reparations payments. It was only after "considerable effort" from senior staff in Germany, that the War Department allocated additional funds for housing facilities, although not for new construction.<sup>35</sup> This limited assistance created only slightly different living conditions for Americans, where requisition remained the primary policy tool for post commanders in securing living quarters for military personnel and their dependents.

In some cases, the assistance allowed for small, one-off experiments, such as a "model apartment" in the Frankfurt area in spring 1946. According to a caption accompanying four official photographs, the apartment consisted "of [a] dining room, living room, double bedroom, single bedroom, bath, kitchen and hallway" (figures 2.12a-d). All of the furniture and appliances were further provided by the Army quartermaster "to supplant those German items, that are unsuitable or not at all available." Two kitchen photos reveal a double-sink, counter and storage space with a double window above, along with a refrigerator and four-top oven, while two living room photos display an assortment of seating options with a lamp, chandelier and one large horizontal window over a radiator atop linoleum flooring. The model apartment was at best an economical

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<sup>35</sup> *The First Year of Occupation*, 204; Grathwol and Moorhus, *Building for Peace*, 29-30.



Figure 2.12ad Model Apartment for American Dependents of the American Army of Occupation Troops, Frankfurt. 26 Mar 1946. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 232513.

compromise. But already with this ad hoc “model” a disparity between American and German living conditions presented itself, with basic comforts from kitchen cutlery, tables and chairs, hot and cold water, heat, and individual rooms for family members, guaranteed for the former, while unavailable, or at least in short supply, to the latter. Interestingly, this disparity occurred within the domestic-interior space, wherein the building façade was unchanged and similar to its neighbors, effectively hiding the renovated and improved interior for, and occupied by, American persons. Unlike the commercial facilities however, this residential model offered no signs, literal or figurative, of the American presence from the outside, thereby concealing Americans and their comforts, from German eyes. The modesty of the accommodations notwithstanding, the fact that it was documented by military personnel suggests that it was one of the better options available to newcomers. By March 1947, this unit was one of 106 units rehabilitated for American dependents in the Frankfurt area.<sup>36</sup>

## Extension

Efforts such as the “model apartment” in Frankfurt continued through 1948, with requisitioning policy accounting for how military housing was secured across the American zone. In Heidelberg additional stress was placed on existing facilities after the announcement in early January 1948 that European Command (EUCOM) staff were moving to the city from Frankfurt.<sup>37</sup> The move comprised seven EUCOM sections, including “200 officers, 550 enlisted personnel, 550 Army Department, Allied and neutral civilians and 300 dependent families,” with a news report noting that “some additional housing may be requisitioned from the German economy,” and “a small amount of construction [would] be needed to convert some buildings for office use.”<sup>38</sup> The moves started

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<sup>36</sup> Grathwol and Moorhus, *Building for Peace*, 31.

<sup>37</sup> “1,500 Seen In Move to Heidelberg,” *Stars and Stripes*, January 10, 1948, 1.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

the following month, and were completed by June 1948, when the additional 1,500 personnel fully relocated to the city.<sup>39</sup>

As we saw in the previous chapter, the EUCOM move was part of a larger, multi-city-agency restructuring, for which Heidelberg was designated as the headquarters for all US military operations in Europe. The tail-end of these moves also coincided with the start of the June 1948 Berlin blockade. Although the blockade has registered as a significant, global event, in this narrative, it signaled less of a shift from a limited occupation logic to a more open-ended defense strategy, than a confirmation and acceleration of policies already set in motion and moving toward “a significant military presence in Europe for the indefinite future.”<sup>40</sup>

In addition to these larger, regional concerns, there were more local and direct responses to Heidelberg’s new status. One week prior to the blockade, and in response to “some additional housing” requisitioned for EUCOM personnel, 2,000 Heidelberg students took to the street in protest. In coordination with other major cities - such as Munich, where 7,000 students demonstrated - the Heidelberg students marched through the city center in protest of their food and living conditions (figure 2.13).<sup>41</sup> The students directed their frustrations at both American and German authorities, presenting a petition to US Military Government and Baden-Württemberg officials.<sup>42</sup> Four months later, German workers also demonstrated against rapidly increasing living

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<sup>39</sup> “Bizonal Unity Strengthened,” *Information Bulletin*, (27 January 1948), 15.

<sup>40</sup> Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 146-149. See also Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 78. Cf. Grathwol and Moorhus, *Building for Peace*, 51.

<sup>41</sup> “Heidelberg Students Stage Protest,” and “7,000 Students Jeer MPs In Munich Demonstration,” *Stars and Stripes*, June 18, 1948, 12. The no-strike pledge by labor leaders ended in May 1947, as economic throughout the zone worsened. See Jack Raymond, “‘No-Strike’ Pledge Ends, U.S. Zone Told,” *The New York Times*, May 16, 1947, 9.

<sup>42</sup> Jack Raymond, “U.S. Unit Damaged in Heidelberg Fire,” *New York Times*, Jun 17, 1948, 14.

## British Offer Russ Help to Repair Bridge

BERLIN, June 17 (SAS)—Gen. Sir Brian H. Robertson, British military governor, today offered the Russians British engineers to help repair the closed Elbe River bridge on the Berlin-Helmstedt highway.

In a letter to Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, Soviet commander in Germany, Robertson said he believed the U.S., if invited, also would help speed the bridge's repairs.

Robertson said he was "as interested as the Soviet authorities that there should be a free, orderly and rapid communication" along this important highway, and "I wish to offer my cooperation in assisting the Soviet authorities to reopen a bridge crossing with the minimum of delay."

**Ferry Schedule**  
To "relieve congestion at the ferry used to cross the Elbe now, the Western Allies today adopted a special schedule for buses and trucks. Heavy vehicles traveling to Western Germany will be dispatched to arrive at the Elbe between 10 a.m. and 11:50 a.m. or between 2 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. Heavy vehicles en route to Berlin were scheduled to use the ferry between 1:15 p.m. and 4 p.m.

Moscow, a British spokesman revealed the British were turning back "defective" freight cars to relieve congestion caused on the Berlin route by Soviet inspection and detention.

## U. S., France Set Air Tests

WIESENSTEIN, June 17 (SAS)—Combined field exercises in bombing and strafing missions will be conducted tomorrow in the vicinity of Friedlandshagen by units of the U. S. Air Force and French air force, USAFCE announced.

The exercises, designed to train air crews in tactical problems, will be carried out by squadrons of the 8th Fighter Gp., 1st Air Div., of the French air force, and a B-29 squadron from Friedlandshagen.

Drumy bombs will be dropped in the target area by fighter aircraft. Bomb drops will be made by the B-29s.

The operation will be witnessed by Brig. Gen. J. F. McElroy, assistant chief of staff, A3 USAFCE, representing Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, USAFCE commander.

## Farewell Tribute Paid Abramowitz

ANSBACH, June 17 (SAS)—Six hundred soldiers of the EUCOM Signal School, both students and cadre, paraded in farewell tribute to Lt. Col. Pauline Abramowitz, school commander, who is leaving for assignment at Ft. Monmouth, N.J.

In a program made more colorful by an aerial parade of PTs of the 8th Fighter Gp., Maj. Gen. Jerry V. Maubach, chief signal officer of EUCOM, and Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn, commander of the 1st Div., joined in commending Abramowitz for his organization of the school. Abramowitz has been commended since the school's opening in November 1945.

Maj. Pauline S. McElroy, assistant commander, commended Abramowitz as commander of the school, which in nearly two years of operation has produced more than 6,000 soldiers.

An honorary contingent of the

## Heidelberg Students Stage Protest



Nearly 5,000 Heidelberg University students paraded the streets of the city in a demonstration protesting food and housing conditions. They presented petitions to U. S. Military Government and to the Westphalian-Baden parliament Wednesday.

## Berlin Council Seen at End

(Continued from Page 1)  
Frank L. Hawley, American commander, with the chair's permission, left the meeting and placed his deputy in charge of the American delegation.

Some minutes later, with the Kommandatura still in discussion, Col. Alexis Yeliseyev jumped to his feet, slammed his mouth closed and strode out of the chamber with the Soviet delegation trailing. Yeliseyev, the deputy Soviet commander, was taking the place of Maj. Gen. Alexander Koltsov, who is ill.

Gen. Jean General, French commander, who is chairman of the Kommandatura this month, called to Yeliseyev that no date had been set for the council's next meeting.

After the Russians left, General read into the record that the Russian without was illegal and rude, and he added that Hawley had left with the chair's permission.

In the past, commanders have left meetings and allowed their deputies to take over.

Hawley said after the meeting: "I think this is the end of the Kommandatura. But if any other thinks the British, Americans and French are going to be dead out of Berlin they have another thing coming."

However, an official British spokesman said he did not think the Kommandatura was dead. He said he thought the Soviet position was impractical and not planned.

The Kommandatura has jurisdiction over almost every activity in Berlin.

Without a functioning Kommandatura, city officials would have to deal directly with the occupation powers separately.

## UN Sending Guards To Enforce Truce

(Continued from Page 1)  
headed by John Cooper, a lieutenant of the security force.

Frank Bagley, head of the force, is already in Cairo with the staff of UN officials attached to Bernadotte's headquarters.

The guard detachment from Lake Success will supplement the force of American, French and British military observers already reporting the four-week truce. Their task will be primarily one of controlling convoys on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road.

One official said Bernadotte will

## 7,000 Students Jeer MPs In Munich Demonstration

MUNICH, June 17 (SAS)—Seven thousand students jeering for more food marched down Munich's main street today and held up traffic more than an hour while they demonstrated against British and the occupation authorities.

Military police with fixed bayonets tried to keep the crowd from entering Prince Bismarck Street. The demonstration jeered. While their leaders were ordering them to turn back, they took a short cut through a bombed building and surged out on the street a black ahead of the police.

Carrying a coffin and black banners with skeleton devices, the demonstrators paraded past the American officers' club at the Haus der Kunst shortly before Brig. Gen. Philip F. Gallagher, new EUCOM director of staff, was expected there for lunch. The students laughed uproariously when an MP before the building lost his cartridge, and began to shout, "We won't hurt you."

By this time, the MPs were confining themselves to keeping the crowds off the steps, and Capt. Vernon Shively explained that he only wanted the demonstrators to take an alternate route.

Lt. Col. Thomas F. Lanier, provost marshal, listened on the edge of 184 street before the Bavarian state ministry where leaders through a loudspeaker called for better relations. A. Ender, president of the Bavarian student organization, denied the rally was Communist inspired, but warned that the students would insist on redaction if they were not fed.

MP officials said there was no group between the fire and the student demonstration.

The structure was built in 1923-1928 with a gift of American funds.

## Mrs. Lana Topping Takes a Trip?

BERLIN, June 17 (SAS)—Reporters and photographers arrived here at 10:30 a.m. to cover the arrival of film star Lana Turner. The Panair de Berlin plane bringing her and her new husband, Henry J. Topping, was scheduled to arrive at 11 a.m.

Also on hand were officers representing EUCOM's Special Services.

BERLIN, June 17 (SAS)—Word was received from Paris at 10:15 a.m. that Mrs. Turner and her party were not aboard the Panair de Berlin plane.

BERLIN, June 17 (SAS)—Lt. Col. F. E. Jeffery, Special Services executive officer, announced at 5 p.m. the reason Lana Turner did not come was that "she did not wish to come here in a commercial airplane." He

## Bundist Kuhn Recaptured in French Zone

(Continued from Page 1)  
to marry him. Kuhn said he had seen neither the girl nor his wife since his escape, and announced he would stay with his wife.

From Prison, Munich police president, reported that two German investigators were sent to Bernadotte as a tip that Kuhn was lying there and found him.

Kuhn calmly explained that his only mistake was to not look on the black market.

He reported he obtained permission to open the chemistry laboratory, but was caught when he applied for the legal right to remain in the town.

Kuhn reported he applied under his own name and gave Munich as his former home. His request was forwarded to authorities here, who investigated.

His story of his escape from Dachau Feb. 3 was an anti-climax: "a door was opened, as I walked out," he said.

## Read About Bundists

With an excursion group, he visited past a guard at the front gate, a bus to Munich and a train to Bernadotte, where he remained. Kuhn said he was in the city in The Story and Stripes of the girl who was going to marry him and of his classification as a major offender under the death sentence law, he added.

Refusing to talk to German reporters, he remarked "everything for the Americans but nothing for the Germans."

## House Delays Draft Tilt '49

(Continued from Page 1)  
oppose the draft and have been critical of Army recruiting activities.

Fear of the temporary draft, a revival measure were introduced after the House voted 194-181 to delay the period of service from 24 months to 12. The amendment was sponsored by Rep. Frederick R. Keating (R-N.Y.), and drew enthusiastic support from both Republicans and Democrats.

When the House bill is passed, it will create a conference committee to work out differences between it and the bill passed by the Senate last week. The Senate bill calls for two years' service.

Figure 2.13 "Heidelberg Students Stage Protest," and "7,000 Students Jeer MPs In Munich Demonstration," Stars and Stripes, June 18, 1948, 12.

costs. In Mannheim 70,000 workers, and in Heidelberg 10,000 workers, stopped for one hour to demonstrate their continued frustrations with living conditions.<sup>43</sup> But it led to little immediate relief. American officials maintained their requisition policy to hold properties until suitable alternatives were presented, and even then, only to derequisition properties after those alternative properties were occupied and functioning.<sup>44</sup>

Instead, Heidelberger citizens had to wait until spring 1949 for signs of positive change. With the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany on 23 May 1949, expanded expenditures were made available to the occupying powers - Britain, France, and the United States (figure 2.14).<sup>45</sup> German authorities quickly opened a new funding source: capital expenditures within Class II Mandatory Expenditures. These capital funds covered the costs for new construction of permanent military facilities and structures, including

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<sup>43</sup> "Mass Against High Living Costs," *New York Times*, Oct 21, 1948. Mannheim was especially active in workers' protests, a large percentage of whom supported the Communist party. Additional workers' strikes there occurred in May 1947, November 1947, and June 1948.

<sup>44</sup> Between January 1948 and June 1950, American forces derequisitioned 6,228 properties across their zone, including 3,958 private houses, 375 apartment houses, and 167 hotels. See "Occupation Log," *Information Bulletin*, (September 1950), 82. From August 1951 to November 1952, an additional 1,428 properties were derequisitioned, including 1,113 private houses, 256 apartment houses, and 59 hotels. See "In and Around Germany - Army, HICOG Derequisition Buildings," *Information Bulletin*, (February 1953), 27. Nevertheless, by December 1953 the US military still controlled 16,500 properties in the Federal Republic of Germany. See David A. Lane, James J. Borror, and George W. Tays, *The U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program 1953-1957* (Historical Division, Headquarters, USAREUR, 1958), 14.

<sup>45</sup> The creation of the Federal Republic solidified the division of Germany into two, in which the eastern portion was aligned to the Soviet Union, and the western portion was aligned to the United States. In September 1949, West German alignment was further secured with the election of Konrad Adenauer over rival Kurt Schumacher, signaling a return to a political status quo over alternative or third way directions, a strong though complex alliance with other Western European countries and the United States, and an equally strong anti-communist stance. On Germany's division, see Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949* (Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and responses from Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War," Sixth Alois Mertes Memorial Lecture, Occasional Paper No. 16 (1996), and Charles S. Maier, "Who Divided Germany?" *Diplomatic History* 22, no. 3 (1998): 481-88. On Adenauer's complex relations with allies, see Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966*, (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, Incorporated, 2003.)






Figure 2.14 Federal Republic of Germany - States and Administrative Districts (and Berlin). RG 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1894 - 2002. 175515517.

housing.<sup>46</sup> There were two critical conditions to this new arrangement, the first was that deutsche mark funds would be available for a limited timeframe – until the Federal Republic of Germany became fully sovereign – and second, after the US military no longer required the various structures, they would “revert to German ownership and control.”<sup>47</sup> Implicit in the latter condition, and discussed further below, was the full convertibility of US military housing to acceptable German housing standards.

Thus, with new (German) funding finally came new (American) housing. In July 1949, the Construction Branch in the Engineer Division, quickly initiated new housing construction projects at select locations. The initiative had several objectives. First, it aimed to alleviate housing shortages across the zone, thereby responding to frustrations from the local populations, but more importantly, easing the transition for newly-arrived family members. Although the new construction was primarily housing, directly impacting residential property requisitions, commercial properties were implicitly understood to be next, thus reducing, temporarily, additional tensions with commercial property owners. The new housing, it was expected, would also further improve military morale and logistical concerns, building on earlier initiatives. New military housing, which in all cases were to be located near existing military facilities, would not only bring military personnel closer together and to work duties, but also closer to each other, which would further enforce military standards. Conversely, it would separate military personnel from local populations, reducing disciplinary issues, as well as training and logistical inefficiencies.

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<sup>46</sup> Class II Mandatory funds complemented two other funding sources; the first was occupation cost funds, which was established by the Allied Control Council in September 1945 in “*Proclamation No.2 - Agreement on Certain Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Germany, Section VI. Part 21.*” See Allied Control Authority, *Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee, Germany, Germany Volume I* (Office of Military Government. Legal Division, 1945). The second funding source was Class I Mandatory funds, directed by occupation forces at non-military functions, such as displaced persons and refugees. All of these funding sources were provided by German taxpayers under the umbrella *Besatzungskosten* (occupation costs) until full sovereignty in 1955, and paralleled additional, American fund allocations. See Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany*, 43-45.

<sup>47</sup> “Report on Germany,” United States, Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, (Jan 1-Mar 31, 1951), 55.

If requisitioning and dependent arrivals had created an entanglement since spring 1945, then summer 1949 was a first attempt of untangling what had evolved into the improvisational physical character of the occupation period. It was a moment of recalibration, in which an alternative military presence was slightly further removed from the local population, more centralized and consolidated around military functions and facilities, and perhaps most importantly, actually planned.

In Heidelberg, where Großdeutschland-Kaserne was now Campbell Barracks, the administrative headquarters for senior military staff, the area surrounding the barracks offered ideal conditions to test new planning ambitions motivated by military objectives. We can begin parsing out the new planning logic by referring back to a detail of the area with a 1949 map (figure 2.15). First, the site chosen for new housing construction was immediately north of Campbell Barracks, not only conducive to connecting working and living conditions, but also extending military activities, from a center, immediately outward (north). The land, which was requisitioned from a private owner, consisted of one rectangular plot of open farmland, with a small free-standing structure and sports field, and was bounded by existing rail tracks to the west, and Römerstraße, a main road connecting Heidelberg to the Rohrbach suburb, to the east.<sup>48</sup> Patton Barracks was only slightly further to the northwest, though somewhat awkwardly accessible by crossing the rail tracks at specific points. Although the hospital complex was further south, it was easily accessed by the north-south Römerstraße. New housing was thus being planned in connection to, and as an extension of, already existing military duties and facilities, signaling a shift from the entangled existence in the city, to a less (though still) entangled and more coherent and separated experience on the city's edge. In this new scenario, new housing extended from military occupation, as well as Wehrmacht foundations.

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<sup>48</sup> According to Theodor Scharnholtz, the acquisition of the land developed into a minor conspiracy between American military personnel and Heidelberg city officials, who were concerned with lending their support of the land requisition in public, for fear of public backlash. See Scharnholtz, "German–American Relations at the Local Level, Heidelberg, 1948–1955," 149–150.



Figure 2.15 Detail of Campbell Barracks (with Patton Barracks and Nachrichten Casern) from “Plan der Stadt Heidelberg,” in *Adreßbuch der Stadt Heidelberg mit den Gemeinden Ziegelhausen und Leimen sowie der Stadt Wiesloch*, 1949.

Groundbreaking occurring in mid-August 1949, with total costs estimated at 4.3 million DM.<sup>49</sup> The master planning followed the existing contours of the site and street pattern with nine buildings equally divided into three groups, with each building occupying a square perimeter around a center green space and the fourth, open side of the green space opened to Römerstraße. The German constructor, based in Mannheim, was applauded for reusing “crushed rubble,” that “was poured into wire-mesh frames to form walls 15 inches thick,” thereby reducing construction costs while increasing insulation.<sup>50</sup> The exterior walls were hollow pumice blocks (Bimsstein), while the interior walls were brick and plaster.<sup>51</sup> The buildings were completed in quick succession: two finished in December 1949, three in January 1950, and the remaining four the following month, and military families started moving into one of the 108 available apartments in March 1950 (figure 2.16). Later that March, a second set of new housing was initiated, followed by a third in early April, with total costs initially estimated at 12 million DM.<sup>52</sup> Phase two consisted of eight apartment buildings organized in two parallel lines of four, directly across Römerstraße and the first nine apartments. Although their overall dimensions were slightly larger, they were otherwise identical to the first nine buildings. The phase three buildings were also larger, and situated between Campbell Barracks to the south, and the first nine buildings to the north. They consisted of eleven buildings, nine of which followed the same ‘U’ configuration around a center green space as the phase one apartments, and an additional two, facing each other without the third ‘U’ connector. Both the

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<sup>49</sup> “Heidelberg Post Starts Work on Billet Units,” *Stars and Stripes*, August 21, 1949, 2.

<sup>50</sup> “EC Design for Modern Living,” *Star sand Stripes*, February 19, 1950, 15.

<sup>51</sup> Grathwol and Moorhus, *Building for Peace*, 75. According to Tays, the exterior walls were hollow cinder blocks; Tays, *The US Army Construction Program in Germany, 1950-1953*, 79. Both options were available, depending on the area. In 1951, the German standard brick was available at 1,000 units, 80.00DM per unit, while pumice hollow blocks were available at 100 units, at 95.00DM per unit. See *Engineer Construction Manual*, Engineer Division, Headquarters European Command, 1 January 1951, NARA RG 549, Box XX

<sup>52</sup> “25 Apartment Buildings Scheduled in Heidelberg,” *Stars and Stripes*, March 9, 1950, 2. The initial plan for twenty-five buildings was reduced to nineteen.



Figure 2.16 Newly Constructed Building, Heidelberg, 27 Jan 1950. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 338599.

second and third phases were completed in September 1950, adding 228 residential units, for a total of 336 units in twenty-eight new apartment buildings.<sup>53</sup>

We can see from a 1951 map of the area, that the buildings formed a housing zone immediately north of Campbell Barracks (figures 2.17). The settlement was not so much a difference from the surrounding area, but rather the only - at least initially - building activity in the area, besides the military barracks. As such, the new housing development was quite open to the surrounding area, to the extent that special security protocols were sometimes evoked as safety measures (figure 2.18).<sup>54</sup> In addition to the main street cutting through the new, expanded American community area, there were no barriers separating non-military or American individuals from utilizing the same sidewalks, streets, or green spaces. This highlighted the objective to make full use of existing German infrastructural systems, as well as, new construction not fully detangling Americans from Germans. Their intention to reduce new construction expenditure also had an inverse property: both Germans and Americans would utilize the same systems.<sup>55</sup>

In addition to Heidelberg, the Engineer Division introduced the Standard Type I housing apartment in summer 1949 across several other military communities.<sup>56</sup> The building was a three-story horizontal block with a reinforced concrete basement and gable roof attic (figures 2.19-2.20). It was planned as a permanent construction building and with the intention of convertibility from twelve apartments for American military personnel, to eighteen units for Germans (conversion of

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<sup>53</sup> "Heidelberg Readies Billets," *Stars and Stripes*, September 1, 1950, 5; "96 New Apartments Ready for Heidelberg Occupants," *Stars and Stripes*, September 15, 1950, 5.

<sup>54</sup> In general there were three configurations for military bases in West Germany: the first enclosed all facilities within a clearly demarcated barrier, e.g., Ramstein, Rhine-Main, Vaihingen (Stuttgart); the second enclosed military and commercial facilities inside a barrier, with housing and educational facilities outside of that barrier, e.g., Würzburg; and the third only enclosed strictly military facilities within a barrier, with housing, educational, medical, and commercial facilities open to the local area, e.g. Heilbronn, Bad Kreuznach. In the early 1950s, Heidelberg was in the third category, however by the late 1950s, with a later community development (discussed in chapter five), it also operated in the second category. Finally, in later years the more open configurations were adaptable according to security concerns.

<sup>55</sup> In Chapter 4 we will see the transformation and separation of these systems with later developments.

<sup>56</sup> Additional and identical new housing construction completed during this time included sites in Aschaffenburg, Hanau, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, and Munich. "EC Design for Modern Living," 15.





Figure 2.17 Detail of Campbell Barracks with New Housing, Heidelberg, April 1951. Adapted from “Plan der Stadt Heidelberg,” in Adreßbuch der Stadt Heidelberg mit den Gemeinden Ziegelhausen und Leimen sowie der Stadt Wiesloch, 1949.





Figure 2.18 Military Police direct traffic and escort children across an intersection in dependents, housing area, Heidelberg, Germany. 28 July 1953. RG 111-SC, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 426831.




Figure 2.19 “Entwicklungsbeirat Konversion, Konversion Südstadt,”  
Projekt Stadt, Stadtentwicklung Consulting, Nov 2013, 7.



Figure 2.20 The dependents housing area near the U.S. Army in Europe  
Headquarters, Heidelberg. 17 November 1952. RG 111-SC, Records of the  
Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC 425056.

the attic space to six additional units). The building was vertically subdivided into two even sections by a central firewall; each section was accessed by a front entrance connecting to a U-shaped, granite stairwell that either led down one level to the basement, or up to the apartments. In some variants, at the first landing after the entrance, the stairs also connected to a corridor that led to a rear exit (this was the case for the second and third phase apartments in Heidelberg). At the first, third and fifth landings, the stairwell connected to both apartment entrances, while at the mid-landings, it opened to oversized windows along the building's front elevation. Textual records describe this configuration as producing twelve apartments in total, six units per stairwell. The six exterior units of the building were three bedroom apartments with three exposures, while the six interior units were two bedroom apartments with two exposures, and separated by the firewall. In the attic there were twelve maid's quarters with single exposures from dormers and accessed through a corridor that ran stairwell to stairwell (thus breaking the firewall), along with two bathrooms, and two children's playrooms, each approximately 1,000 square feet, at each end of the building and with three exposures.<sup>57</sup> The conversion from American to German use was to occur with this attic space, where two additional end apartments could be reconfigured, along with four interior apartments in the center of the building. The firewall continued to the basement, thus dividing it into two separate spaces, their combination covering the entire footprint of the building. With the separation, each basement space had its own heating plant, as well as laundry and drying rooms, and six individual storage rooms.<sup>58</sup>

Type I apartments came in three sizes. On the first floors, the end three-bedroom apartments were 1,259 square-feet, while on the second and third floors, they were 1,450 square-feet (the difference came from the first-floor corridor connecting the front entrance to the rear exit); and all the interior two-bedroom apartments were 1,147 square-feet. According to a contemporaneous

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<sup>57</sup> The "free" maid service was actually subsidized by German reparations payments. We will see in the following chapter a drive to eliminate this service, which would, in turn, effect later apartment configurations.

<sup>58</sup> *The US Army Construction Program*, 79; "EC Design for Modern Living," 15.

report, the apartments opened up to a large living and dining space, partially divided by a built-in bookshelf and cabinet. The dining room was further connected to the kitchen through additional built-in cabinets and a sliding panel. The combined living and dining space measured 475 square feet (figure 2.21). In both the three bedroom and two bedroom apartments, the master bedroom measured about 220 square feet and the second bedroom about 150 square feet (the third bedroom was slightly smaller.) Both the kitchen and bathroom had terrazzo flooring and tile walls. The bathroom also had a combined bathtub-shower, one washbasin, toilet, and linen closet.<sup>59</sup>

### **Replica?**

Does this new building offering and shift from a scattered, requisitioned existence to a new, compact housing condition point to a “replica” of American suburbia? In this final section I want to compare some of the processes and consequences that allowed for both military housing communities and American suburban housing to develop in the late 1940s, and suggest that crucially different financial conditions, specific military policies, distinct master planning motives and circumstances, and uniquely formal-spatial qualities, developed with military housing communities. These differences, I contend, register a distinct physical configuration addressing uniquely military concerns, rather than a reproduction of developments in the United States.

In terms of financing, there were significant differences between housing production in the United States and US military housing in Heidelberg specifically, and West Germany more broadly. In the United States, suburban housing construction was primarily a speculative activity that, at least from the 1930s to the late 1960s, was heavily subsidized by the federal government. Under the 1934 National Housing Act, one of the explicit aims of the newly established Federal Housing Administration was the encouragement of working or middle-class home ownership in the United States. To make home ownership more accessible, new longer-term loans at lower monthly rates,

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.



Figure 2.21 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 82.

fully amortized were introduced to American home buyers, while guarantees against defaults and losses were offered to financial institutions.<sup>60</sup> In West Germany, none of these actors or financial tools existed. Military housing was fully government housing of a specific kind. As we already observed, funding for military housing originated with and was guaranteed by German federal authorities, and was directly channeled to American military officials in West Germany at quarterly intervals. Neither the FHA nor any American private building companies were involved in construction activities.<sup>61</sup> Nor was there any opportunity for home ownership. Instead, ownership and control rested with both the German state and American military officials. The land was purchased and leased from German authorities, while the construction, occupation, and maintenance was administered by American officials. Thus, whereas in the United States, where rhetoric repeatedly connected home ownership with (vague) notions of an “American dream” and upward mobility, for US military personnel in West Germany, all housing was of a rental, government type, with a housing allowance offered to personnel that matched the rent price.

Military policies also created further differences. Part of suburban growth in the United States in the late 1940s included government and private propaganda convincing citizens to move out of urban areas and resettle in newly constructed suburban communities. Homeownership and long-term loans implied residency in these homes and communities for an extended period of years, if not decades. Military service prevented any parallel development. Soldier assignments were (and

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<sup>60</sup> For a critical accounting of the extensive federal support given to the home building industry, see the classic study by Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 190-218; and Barry Checkoway, “Large Builders, Federal Housing Programmes, and Postwar Suburbanization,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 4, no. 1 (1980): 21–45.

<sup>61</sup> Military housing programs in West Germany (and Europe later) were also distinct from US military programs in the United States, where military officials coordinated their building efforts with private contractors and in accordance to FHA guidelines, most notably in the Wherry-Capehart programs. See report, Kathryn M. Kuranda et al., *Housing an Air Force and a Navy: The Wherry and Capehart Era Solutions to the Postwar Family Housing Shortage (1949-1962) Volume I, Main Report* (USAF-Navy CW, 2007). Available at: <https://www.denix.osd.mil/cr/planning/program-alternatives/mitigation-documents/wherry-report-2007/USAF-Navy%20CW%20Final%20Report,%202007.pdf>; and U.S. Army Environmental Center, *For Want of a Home: A Historic Context for Wherry and Capehart Military Family Housing* (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: United States Army Environmental Center, 1998).

remain) usually only three years, in which they received orders for work in a specific unit and location, before receiving new orders for another job, in another area. Thus a soldier and his family stationed in Heidelberg in 1950, who was offered military housing, would have only lived in an apartment unit with his family for a short period, before relocating somewhere else, according to military requirements. Thus, where the ideal of suburban living was grounding oneself in one, privately-owned (or mortgaged) home, military housing implied frequently moving from one rental apartment unit in one location, to another apartment and location every few years.

Military policies also created specific class and racial conditions. In terms of class, we can not speak of irreconcilable capital-labor conflicts as in the civilian world, but rather of a distinct officer-enlisted personnel divide, both managed by a strict chain of command and hierarchy within and between the two, ultimately determined by officials in Washington. Nevertheless, the differences in housing options in 1949-50 were marginal compared to developments in the United States, in part owing to the ongoing housing shortage (we will begin to see greater differences in later developments).<sup>62</sup> The highest ranking officials actually continued to live in requisitioned German housing, commuting from further distances, while lower ranking officials and enlisted personnel with families accepted new military housing near Campbell Barracks. In terms of racial segregation, in the United States there were distinct federal and financial policies undertaken to develop racially homogenous communities through manipulative and illegal tactics, such as red-lining and selective mortgage approvals in the 1940s and after.<sup>63</sup> By comparison, in 1948 President Truman officially desegregated US military forces through executive order. The immediate effect was perhaps unnoticeable since the vast majority of military personnel stationed in West Germany were white males, however, as the military presence in the Federal Republic grew in the 1950s and 1960s, and

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<sup>62</sup> For a study of North American working-class suburb developments during the first half of the twentieth century, see Robert Lewis, *Manufacturing Suburbs: Building Work and Home*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008.)

<sup>63</sup> Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 197-203. See also, Thomas J. Sugrue, *Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2014).

enlisted personnel became more heterogeneous, so too did the living conditions of different racial and ethnic personnel and families.

The location and relations between working and living also highlighted a curious reversal between American suburban communities that deconcentrated or dispersed populations, and military communities in West Germany, which consolidated them.<sup>64</sup> One popular idea in moving out of the city to the suburbs was separating working from living. In this configuration, a presumed separation between city and suburb occurred, in which work (initially) took place in the chaotic city, while living and family life occurred in the pleasant suburbs.<sup>65</sup> The new military housing also removed people from the city center, but it did so in order to tie them closer to work. New military housing was located on city outskirts precisely because military facilities and functions were already located there. Because of this new proximity between living and working, commuting was practically eliminated for personnel working on Campbell Barracks, and very short for those working on Patton Barracks or at 130th Station hospital. Private travel to and from work by car would have been extremely short, and in some cases, unnecessary. By comparison, private (and public) travel became more common and longer in the United States. For schoolchildren living in military communities the new situation was only slightly changed. Before new school construction was initiated in 1951 on an open field bordering the new housing and Campbell Barracks, they still required bus service across the Neckar to requisitioned university facilities. What had changed with the new housing was their pick-up and drop-off points, which were now consolidated to one or two stops on Römerstraße. Outside of school, and as figure 2.22 might suggest, the new housing area became a sort of playground in the absence of an actual, outside play area and sometimes required extra security protocols as it overlapped with more adult environments. For military spouses the change was more

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<sup>64</sup> On the relations between defense and urban dispersal, see Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 169; and Peter Galison, "War against the Center," *Grey Room* 1, no. 4 (2001): 6–33.

<sup>65</sup> On challenges to the city-suburb division, see Kevin Michael Kruse, and Thomas J Sugrue, *The New Suburban History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 4–6.



dramatic. Whereas previously they were in walking distances to German and American facilities either in the city or already developed residential areas, now, with the new housing they were more isolated. Any activity they wished to participate in outside of the home now required vehicular transport from the new residential area to another area. With the new consolidation of American personnel on the outskirts of the city, their existence aligned with a more conservative housewife role, comparable to American suburban stereotypes.<sup>66</sup>

The master planning for new housing reinforced military objectives to connect living and working conditions, and again pointed to a distinct and different approach to American settlements. In the United States in the late 1940s, the separation between working and living also required extensive new infrastructural development in rural, undeveloped areas, including new water and power networks, as well as new road and upgraded rail systems. These new infrastructures and homes were built simultaneously. In the United States, the federal government was willing to burden these costs. In West Germany it was not. Rather, the approach was to maximize the use of existing (German) infrastructure networks, which was continuing the same approach of utilizing existing Wehrmacht facilities noted earlier. This meant building in less remote areas than the city, but still taking advantage of already developed infrastructures. It also determined the overall configuration and density of military communities. In Heidelberg the existing infrastructure near Campbell Barracks was already developed, with power and water lines, as well as a basic street systems. These supported a series of new buildings, but also restricted their growth. For example, the rail system to the west and further north, the main north-south road connecting Heidelberg with Rohrbach, and Campbell Barracks to the south, defined a available zone and perimeter for new military housing. Thus the dual aim of locating housing near military facilities and utilizing existing infrastructures

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<sup>66</sup> One of the areas of increased activity was in women's club organizations. This soft power of cultural exchange extended to German-American clubs at numerous military locations, including Heidelberg. For an overview of these developments and activities, see Donna Alvah, "American Military Families in West Germany: Social, Cultural, and Foreign Relations, 1946–1965," in *GIs in Germany*, 161-185; also Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors*, 38-80.

created a different set of entanglements and initial conditions from the more open and isolated American suburban developments.

These master planning and infrastructure conditions also supported different types of buildings, although certain approaches to reduce costs also overlapped with American developments, albeit from different conditions and motives. In the United States, the primary residential building type constructed in the late 1940s was the single-family detached home. Within a suburban area the same individual structure or a limited number of group variations was repeated with similar exterior features, such as garage and landscaping, through standardized design and construction methods.<sup>67</sup> Contemporary suburban historians quickly identified this repetition and uniformity negatively, “as a crushing mass of conformity,” housing a homogeneous middle-class.<sup>68</sup> But in Heidelberg - and throughout the American zone of occupation - conformity was precisely what military officials sought. Nevertheless, the structures they uniformly repeated in 1949-50 were not single-family detached houses, but rather three story apartment buildings. This suggested a greater connection to earlier Weimar housing experiments, than to American suburban developments.<sup>69</sup> Although American officials made no direct reference to earlier German *siedlungen* experiments, they did emphasize a more general position, according to which “the maximum use of local construction methods, acceptable European building norms, and low cost building materials” were to be employed, in order to reduce American construction and maintenance costs as much as possible.<sup>70</sup> This position eliminated both the single-family detached home and the high-rise apartment building;

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<sup>67</sup> In the late 1940s the most significant example of modern design and construction techniques employed in residential building was Levitt and Sons; for an overview see Checkoway, “Large Builders,” 26-29.

<sup>68</sup> Later suburban historians have called many of these and other descriptions into question; see for example, Kruse and Sugrue, *The New Suburban History*, 3.

<sup>69</sup> For the most significant Weimar housing experiments, see D. W. Dreyse, *May - Siedlungen: Architekturführer Durch Acht Siedlungen Des Neuen Frankfurt, 1926-1930* (Frankfurt am Main: Fricke, 1987) and Susan R. Henderson, *Building Culture: Ernst May and the New Frankfurt Initiative, 1926-1931* (New York: Peter Lang, 2013).

<sup>70</sup> Construction - Germany, Circular Number 12, 8 October 1954, Headquarters United States Army, Europe, NARA RG 549, Box X, 7-8.

the former being too expensive in terms of construction materials and land requirements, while the latter required steel and modern equipment that was unavailable. More positively, it expressed similar concerns and ambitions with the earlier German experiments, most notably in ensuring abundant light and sun, and fresh air (*Licht, Luft, Sonne*) for all apartments. Notwithstanding any explicit reference to these ideas, the military housing master planning and forms mark a clear resemblance to earlier Weimar-era residential developments in several key areas, including: rigid geometrical site planning where buildings are generously spaced either parallel or perpendicular to each other; the horizontal form of buildings separated by, and sitting within, open green spaces that allow for uninterrupted natural light and air, while providing privacy in apartments; the horizontal forms (and densities) produced in part by the low number of floors which eliminated the cost of mechanical elevator systems and, combined with a rectangular form, reduced apartment access to two entries per stairwell per floor; apartments standardized to limited types; and finally, building features, such as windows, mass manufactured to specific dimensions that allowed for widespread use and reduced costs.<sup>71</sup> Some of these aspects, especially around standardization and reducing costs, also reflected the dominate approach for residential building in the United States, however they ultimately occurred within different physical contexts and for practically different reasons.

Perhaps the most interesting place to gauge if a reproduction of American suburbia was unfolding in military housing in West Germany in the 1940s is in the housing interior. To begin with, it is useful to recall Baker's observation of military communities being "more perfect than the real thing," as well as the 1946 Frankfurt model experiment. We saw in the Frankfurt example that the interior and its various accommodations, embedded within existing German structures, was the defining space that distinguished and separated American living standards from German conditions. I also want to suggest that Baker's general comment is most apparent in the interior as well; that is,

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<sup>71</sup> See figures 3.5-3.6 in the following chapter for a Weimar-era example.

the interiors of new military housing in 1949-1950 were actually better than equivalent offerings in the United States.

In terms of size, military interiors exceeded equivalent offerings in the United States. Recall from earlier that Type I apartment sizes ranged between 1,450 and 1,147 square feet. By comparison, the average Levittown house in Long Island (completed in 1947) ranged from 750 to 900 square feet, and the average FHA-insured mortgage home in 1950 measured 922 square feet.<sup>72</sup> The Type I interior was thus around 35% larger than FHA homes being built at the same time. Despite the apartment configuration and limited building resources, the US military was actually offering its personnel more spacious living interiors than civilian suburban homes in the United States. We can see from figure 2.22 how these larger spaces were furnished. In this idealized setting, a conventional living room setting allowed for several individual pieces of seating, generously spaced along the room's perimeter. Despite seven individual pieces around a center rug, along with a side table, the room does not appear crowded or tight. It rather appears slightly under-furnished, able to accommodate two large rugs, several lamps, and a variety of bulky seating. These larger spaces and generous furnishings suggest a continuity and expansion from the Frankfurt model apartment, wherein military officials were keen (and capable) to offer officers and enlisted personnel modern and above average living standards. In this first offering with the Type I, Baker's general observation, of a "more perfect than the real thing," seemed to be validated in the specifics of the interior.

## Conclusion

In this and the previous chapter, I have attempted to define the US military occupation through the seizure and utilization of existing German structures and show how these facilities served military operations. In the last chapter this took the form of confiscating Wehrmacht and

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<sup>72</sup> From a 1950 National Association of Home Builders study, quoted in Dianne Suzette Harris, *Little White Houses: How the Postwar Home Constructed Race in America* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 331n.52.

earlier Reichswehr facilities and continuing to use these military structures for new American purposes. Despite the massive movement of personnel and equipment, Heidelberg's physical conditions continued to satisfy and sustain military activities within its existing facilities and later, with new additions. In this chapter I unpacked a parallel and linked operation, in which the city's existing structures provided military officials and civilians various lodging, entertainment, and other ancillary functions in the city center. I argued these actions produced an entanglement in the city that created tensions between the physical proximity and distinct comforts of American military and German civilian actors. It was only through new funding streams provided by the new federal government that a change in conditions was pursued. In the immediate, these changes followed American terms, pursued in concert with military objectives. The new housing construction that finally began in 1949 was an explicit effort to satisfy these objectives at the lowest financial cost possible. The housing located out of the city and extending from existing military facilities was motivated by an effort to consolidate military duties and personnel while continuing to take advantage of existing infrastructure systems. The project was taken under specific conditions, differing from simultaneous developments in the United States, and ultimately paving the way for a unique, hybrid configuration and existence for US military personnel in West Germany.

As noted at the end of the previous chapter, the stability finally reached with new construction in 1950 was vulnerable to various new conditions. In Heidelberg, citizens whose properties had been seized continued to press for reversals and returns of their properties, initially pleading their cases directly to American officials, but now utilizing the state and federal agencies available to them. We will see in later chapters that despite these new pressures, military officials continued to hold the official policy that they would continue to hold these properties until they were no longer required. But with new funding for new construction finally taking place, a certain hope and expectation began to develop among German property owners that a turn toward

property returns had finally begun. But local conditions in Heidelberg could also be effected by circumstances and events on the other side of the globe. And after June 1950, they were.

## CHAPTER THREE

### EXTENSION AND EXPANSION, 1950-1953

*Washington, 11:30am, 29 June 1950.* Four days after war in Korea broke out, a group of National Security Council consultants, including George F. Kennan, were directed by President Truman to review “United States policy relating to the perimeter around the USSR.”<sup>1</sup> In Kennan’s understanding, the objective was to determine “what other points the USSR or its satellites might attack” and what the US response would be. “[T]he chief danger spots,” according to Kennan, “were Yugoslavia, Iran and Eastern Germany.” Other members concurred. Although it appeared with “the Korean situation that the USSR intended to avoid open involvement and did not intend to launch a general war,” a further “Soviet attack on either Iran or Germany,” according to Kennan, “would mean the USSR was ready for World War III.”<sup>2</sup> Later that afternoon in a follow-up meeting, members of the council reaffirmed an attack on either Yugoslavia and Josip Tito or Germany would confirm “the Russians were planning World War III.”<sup>3</sup>

Two days later, in a draft report the National Security Council offered a more sober assessment of Soviet intentions viz-à-viz Korean hostilities. Moscow neither intended a general war, nor direct conflict between Soviet and American military forces. “Its aim was rather to acquire strategic control over South Korea, and ... probe the attitude of the United States.” Overt military action was unlikely in Greece and Turkey; military aggression also seemed unlikely; and despite different circumstances, an attack on Yugoslavia seemed doubtful. In the case of Germany (and

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<sup>1</sup> George F. Kennan loomed large in Cold War-national security circles as the foremost expert on Kremlin strategy and intentions, since his “Long Telegram” from Moscow in 1946, and his “X” article in *Foreign Affairs* a year later. He later became a critic of expansionist US foreign policy. For two contrasting views, see Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) and John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011.)

<sup>2</sup> “Memorandum of National Security Council Consultants’ Meeting,” FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, (Thursday, June 29, 1950, Document 98), 559-561.

<sup>3</sup> “Memorandum of National Security Council Consultants’ Meeting,” FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, (Thursday, June 29, 1950, Document 99), 565-566.

Austria), the Kremlin would not advance forces if it did not want war. But it would test the boundaries of how far it could push in this region, and take full advantage of any opportunity to “embarrass” the United States.<sup>4</sup>

The following month, on 25 August, the NSC issued its report to President Truman. In the face of Moscow’s continuing “policy of expansion,” they argued, now was the time to act. This call to action acknowledged “the possibility of local conflicts” for which the “military capabilities of the United States are not adequate.” It was thus crucial that “military readiness ... be increased as a matter of the utmost urgency.” According to their assessment, Soviet military capabilities could dominate anywhere along its periphery, invade positions in Western Europe and the Middle East, or orchestrate “direct attacks” on the UK and Alaska. Finally, the Kremlin could carry out “limited-scale air attacks on the United States and Canada.” Apparently hostilities in Korea captured the “acute manifestation of the chronic world situation,” for which any of the other supposed scenarios could follow.<sup>5</sup> As such, the danger was that the United States (and its allies) would lose “vital political and strategic importance,” contracting its own global influence and economic potential. In order to counter Soviet aggression, the US needed to increase its “military and supporting strength ... and maintain [it] for as long as necessary ... to support U.S. foreign policy, to deter Soviet aggression, and to form the basis for fighting a global war should war prove unavoidable.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> “Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay),” FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Document 100, 572-575.

<sup>5</sup> On the exaggerated threat of Korean hostilities leading to war in Europe, see Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 151; on the global, long-term militarization consequences, see Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 26-32.

<sup>6</sup> “Report by the National Security Council,” FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Document 121, 647-648, 658.



On 9 September, Truman responded, approving “substantial increases in the strength of the United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe.”<sup>7</sup> The announcement was especially significant for West Germany, as it committed six full-strength Army divisions to the country, along with concomitant support staff and services and family members. The US Army presence in the Federal Republic, which had leveled to around 83,000 troops in fall 1950, was now set to mushroom to over 235,000 soldiers the following fall.<sup>8</sup> With this increase in population now set, a change in configuration was now required. New and expanded construction programs would have to be implemented for myriad functions: administrative work, training and troop facilities, depots and motor pools, engineer and chemical facilities, ordnance and quartermaster spaces, troop billeting and family housing, medical and educational functions, religious and commercial functions, and a general infrastructure undergirding all of these functions. In terms of family housing, the Planning Board section of the Engineer Division estimated an additional 4,000 family units would be required in the American zone over the next two years, costing 200,000,000 DM.<sup>9</sup> This estimate would require upward revision on several occasions, and by June 1953, over 17,000 family units were either complete or under construction.<sup>10</sup> An impressive figure that still did not match demand.

In this chapter I examine Heidelberg’s role and response to Truman’s troop augmentation announcement, identified through three housing proposals from fall 1950 to spring 1953. The first project was developed by engineers immediately after the announcement and served a dual function: it would not only address a massive troop expansion for Heidelberg Military Post, but also operate

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<sup>7</sup> Paul P. Kennedy, “Rise ‘Substantial’: Truman Bases Action on Recommendations Made by Bradley,” *New York Times*, 10 Sep 1950, 1. The equally important foreign ministers’ meeting occurred a few days later, in which Secretary of State Dean Acheson insisted to his European counterparts that they immediately agree to German rearmament as a condition for American military increases. See Marc Trachtenberg and Christopher Gehrz, “America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950: A Critique of a Myth,” in *Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War*, ed. Marc Trachtenberg, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.)

<sup>8</sup> *The US Army Construction Program*, 11.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

as a model for other military posts and commanders on how to implement expansion plans. But the results were mixed: various military posts did follow the guidelines as they initiated new construction, but the actual model for Heidelberg never left the page. Subsequently, Heidelberg Military Post shifted its attention from a major project responding to expansion, to smaller efforts, as military officials struggled to secure a proper site for expansion. A significant factor in this struggle related to a new German agency invested in where American expansion occurred. Local German officials now had a city, state, and federal governmental structure to support specific challenges in response to American expansion proposals, in what was now a collaborative effort between American military and German federal agencies. In Heidelberg, this new working condition caused delays, during which time military engineers revised and standardized planning and building practices in efforts to create more uniform procedures and building outcomes at greater economic efficiency. With housing, design consultants were invited to economize and improve the existing Type I housing offering. The resulting Types became the new military housing standard in the Federal Republic, from which later housing models adjusted minor details, toward further cost efficiencies. Throughout 1951 and 1952, these various revisions became reality as the US Army embarked on a massive construction program to accommodate troop and family member increases. In Heidelberg, after two previous failures, implementation finally began in 1952 on a limited scale housing extension program.

The troop augmentation announcement and response captures a critical turning point for American military personnel in West Germany. Politically, it confirms the “spillover effects” of local events - in this case war in Korea - that triggered action elsewhere - in this case Germany.<sup>11</sup> The decision to link events across the globe required numerous planning, including the articulation of the physical form an extended and expanded American military presence in the Federal Republic

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<sup>11</sup> According to Lorenz Lüthi there was also an east-west trajectory that “flowed from Asia toward the Middle East and Europe, and the Middle East toward Europe.” See Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, 2-3.

would take.<sup>12</sup> The aims remained remarkably consistent with building activities from previous years, but now, on a vastly larger scale. Although they were adapted to specific local conditions, the general objective was to build military communities - as much as possible - as extensions to military facilities and link them to existing infrastructures. In this way, military personnel would remain compact and consolidated around military functions. But larger troop sizes would require more and larger sites, which were simply unavailable where military officials preferred. The continuity of extending and expanding would have to be flexible according to specific conditions. In general, immediately extending out from existing military facilities could only occur at smaller scales, while massive expansion required disconnecting from already existent military (and other) areas.

One consequence of this new condition was a new insularity, in which American military communities were isolated from other built up areas. In this sense, a certain disentanglement between American and German populations took form, in which neither group was required to interact with the other, thus breaking from the previous experiences examined in chapter 2. However, in another sense, everyday entanglement between US soldiers and local citizens was simply transferred to American and German agencies and officials. The shift and expansion of defense introduced greater negotiations between military and elected officials that took on continuous exchange in order to resolve differences. Ultimately, compromises were made on both sides, the results of which altered the physical character of the American military presence in West Germany.

Although scholars have identified Korean hostilities as crucial to solidifying American military commitments in Europe, they have implied and assumed that American military expansion occurred in a straightforward manner and according to American plans. In this and the following chapter, I intend to show that the actual conditions of constructing US military expansion involved

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<sup>12</sup> The State Department ordered US military forces in Germany to develop plans for a second five year occupation in April 1950. Drew Middleton, "U.S. Drafts Plans to Occupy Germany for 5 Years More," *New York Times*, Apr. 23, 1950. At least since the Soviet blockade US officials had guaranteed European leaders that American troops would remain on the continent indefinitely; see Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 78.

a rather complex set of negotiations that produced heterogeneous physical configurations, according to both American and German interests and capabilities. In particular, German involvement was critical to the build-up taking on an isolated character. Although the continuity and extension approach that was initiated on a smaller scale in 1949 still played a role, after 1950 it existed alongside an increasingly larger and further removed new type of military community. In this chapter, I examine these complexities in relation to housing and largely from an American military framework. In the next chapter, I shift to German and American exchanges and a variety of building programs, including the final resolution responding to troop augmentation in Heidelberg.

## **Expansion Planning**

At the precise moment that the first housing program in Heidelberg was coming to completion in September 1950, the troop augmentation directive was announced, rendering the newly completed housing insufficient. Recall from the previous chapter that the completed housing was a response to several issues, including the arrival of dependents and tensions with the local population around housing shortages and requisitions, low personnel retention and disciplinary standards, and new, West German funding allocations. Except for the new funding, all of these issues existed over the course of the previous five years in a more or less manageable scale. For example, as Lucius D. Clay had noted, the arrival of dependents beginning in spring 1946 rose incrementally over the following four years to approximately 30,000 individuals. And according to a military personnel breakdown, on 1 January 1950 the total American personnel commitment in West Germany was 174,404, which was the lowest since the war.<sup>13</sup> By comparison, the augmentation announcement was massive and rapid, with an estimated 150,000 soldiers scheduled to arrive by

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<sup>13</sup> *The US Army Construction Program*, 12. N.B. The report records 83,394 Army personnel and 40,616 dependents.

spring 1951 along with the gradual arrival of more dependents following soon after.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the American presence in the Federal Republic was almost set to double in less than one year.

The September announcements did not necessarily blindside military officials however. In fact, various senior officials had been encouraging the new policies for several months. Already in April 1950, directives were issued for Army and Air Force commanders in Germany “to draft plans for a logistical development based on a further five-year occupation,” for which 60 million dollars were earmarked for the first year.<sup>15</sup> In early July, John J. McCloy, the High Commissioner for Occupied Germany (HICOG), advocated for increasing the military presence in Western Europe, despite “no reports indicating [Soviet] preparations for aggression,” and a general belief that “the Russians would [not] attack in Germany.”<sup>16</sup> The following month, Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, who was entering the post as new commanding general of the United States Army in Europe, rebuked the official Army position with his “purely personal” view that more American troops were

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<sup>14</sup> The first arrivals occurred on 28 May 1951, approximately 4,500 troops from the Fourth Infantry Division. A second group of equal numbers arrived three days later. Drew Middleton, “New U.S. Troops Due in Germany May 25,” *New York Times*, Apr 28, 1951, 5; and “U.S. Troops Reach Germany; Hailed as Guards of Liberty,” *New York Times*, May 28, 1951, 1.

<sup>15</sup> Drew Middleton, “U.S. Drafts Plans to Occupy Germany for 5 Years More,” *New York Times*, Apr 23, 1950, 1.

<sup>16</sup> “McCloy Says Europe Needs Troops But Doubts Attack in Germany,” *New York Times*, Jul 8, 1950, 5. With the establishment of the Federal Republic in May/September 1949, new agreements and agencies were required in the transition from military control to civilian control. For example, the Office for Military Government, headed by General Lucius D. Clay since March 1945, was eliminated and replaced by the US High Commissioner for Occupied Germany in May 1949, which was headed by former president of the World Bank, John J. McCoy. In his new role, McCoy was “the supreme United States authority in [West] Germany,” reporting directly to the Secretary of State, and having full authority of “all the governmental functions of the United States in Germany, other than the Command of the United States Occupation Forces.” France and the United Kingdom made the same changes. During the semi-sovereign phase (1949-1955), relations between West Germany and American, British, and French forces occupying the Federal Republic, were governed by the Occupation Statute, which established broad authoritative powers for the Federal Republic of Germany within specific limits. On Clay’s resignation and McCloy’s nomination and duties, see “Resignation of General Clay as Military Governor: Statement by President Truman,” “Nomination of John J. McCloy to be U.S. High Commissioner for Germany,” and “Summary of Developments in Change-Over to Civilian Control,” in Velma Hastings Cassidy, *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1950), 179-186. On the Occupation Statute, see “U.S., U.K., and France Reach Agreement on All Questions Relating to Germany: Communiqué,” and “Allied Powers and Responsibilities: Text of Occupation Statute,” also in Cassidy, *Germany, 1947-1949*, 88-91. On HICOG, see also Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955* (Princeton, NJ, Van Nostrand, 1957), 43-65.

required in Germany in order “to cope with an attack from the East.”<sup>17</sup> That same month, NATO officials recommended troops increases - both American and Western European - to defend the continent.<sup>18</sup> And later still that month, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer offered a three-point plan to protect West Germany, which included enlarging the American troop presence.<sup>19</sup>

Thus, when General Thomas T. Handy announced a new troop augmentation plan for Western Europe and West Germany on 24 September 1950 - following these various statements as well as Truman’s announcement earlier in the month - he simply formalized a new, but already familiar position among various military and government ranks. Nevertheless, troop augmentation required immediate action. For the Construction Branch section of the Engineer Division, based in Heidelberg since February 1948 and responsible for all aspects of military planning and construction policy for all Army building activities in West Germany, work began immediately.

Only a few days later that September, the Construction Branch initiated new schemes for EUCOM headquarters that were to further serve as models for all other community expansion projects. By early November their proposals were included in the Engineer Division’s annual *Engineer Bulletin*, making them available for all post commanders to address their troop augmentation needs. The *Bulletin* was a command-wide, instructional guide for military post commanders on the administrative procedures of setting up master plans and construction programming forecasts for their area commands. As such, it pointed to a new level of operational planning for military

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<sup>17</sup> Michael James, “Eddy Takes Command of Army in Europe; Says U.S. Forces Cannot Cope with Attack,” *New York Times*, Aug 19, 1950, 7.

<sup>18</sup> Benjamin Welles, “Six U.S. Divisions in Europe Sought,” *New York Times*, Aug 13, 1950, 21.

<sup>19</sup> Jack Raymond, “Adenauer Asks Protective Force in West Germany,” *New York Times*, Aug 26, 1950, 1. It is worth recalling that ever since the war had terminated, there were various American officials who advocated for a greatly expanded military presence in Europe-Germany. Military officials continued to advocate for larger forces even after Truman’s announcement, see e.g. “U.S. Force in Germany Inadequate to Clark,” *New York Times*, Sep 13, 1950, 17. A later report appears to indicate that across the Department of Defense and State Department there was unanimous agreement, and that Truman was rather late to fall in line; see Walter H. Waggoner, “Truman Bars Rise in U.S. Zonal Army,” *New York Times*, Sep 1, 1950, 1. Also note that military officials had continuously advocated a larger troop strength in Europe/occupied Germany since 1945.

communities that aimed to standardize procedures for planning and construction across the American zone.

Taking Heidelberg and Frankfurt as models, the proposals addressed three scales. First, the greater Heidelberg Area Command, which encompassed Heidelberg, Mannheim, Karlsruhe, and two smaller posts, was offered as a regional example of how to organize and standardize multiple, simultaneously occurring five-year expansion plans, divided into existing military expansion projects, and new dependents' construction, such as commercial, educational, housing, and religious functions (figure 3.1). Next, a master plan for a new housing community in Heidelberg was detailed, offering a breakdown of the types of housing to be built, as well as ancillary functions (figure 3.2). Finally, Frankfurt was used to direct consolidation procedures of existing materials in the reconstruction of various military facilities (figure 3.3). In this case, new consolidation policy pointed to larger, newer facilities concentrated along a city's periphery, reinforcing a new alignment out of the city center, while still remaining physically unconnected across military operations.<sup>20</sup>


The combination of these new guides highlighted a coordinated response to troop augmentation that solidified existing ideas and policies, rather than developing a new set of procedures. In fact, the *Bulletin* guides pointed to a general continuity in action on a larger scale. The housing proposal in particular revealed the intention to develop new military communities for augmentation primarily as expansions of existing military structures, which would further consolidate both military duties and personnel. New housing developments were to be planned near administrative functions and continue to take advantage of existing infrastructural networks. This combination placed them at the immediate edge of existing cities. This was precisely the objective in the first housing development in Heidelberg, which was now being reinforced and expanded with a second master planning proposal, ready to be employed across US military bases in West Germany.

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<sup>20</sup> Engineer Bulletin No. 3, "Master Planning and Construction Programming," Engineer Division, Headquarters United States Army, Europe, 8 November 1950, NARA RG 549, Box 987.









The master planning for a housing community - the Development Plan - highlights the extent of the continuity of expansion with a compact and efficient proposal for Heidelberg. The main site (Housing Community 'B') was an already standardized series of long strips of farmland plots subdivided by four parallel strips for circulation. The width of each plot allowed for two apartment blocks perpendicular to the plots' long side, which allowed for a rigid series of parallel apartment blocks. The family apartments were Type I buildings, while the bachelor officers' quarters (BOQ) were designated as standard 50-unit structures.<sup>21</sup> The second site (Housing Community 'A') was less straightforward. In addition to existing structures on the site, the overall available area to build was smaller, and the site's boundaries were more irregular than the main site. In addition, the choice of the two sites also meant that rail tracks bisected any immediate connection.

Engineers developed the scheme with an explicit aim at connecting a new housing community to existing military facilities, specifically Patton Barracks to the immediate east, but also the new exchange (shopping) services for military personnel immediately north (figure 3.4).<sup>22</sup> The map's emphasis was on this immediate connection, rather than highlighting the overall relation of new housing to the rest of the city, or even other military facilities in the area (for example Campbell Barracks or the 130th Station hospital).<sup>23</sup> Instead, the map zoomed into a specific area, highlighting

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<sup>21</sup> According to several documents, during this time there were only two types of BOQ: the four-story 68-unit Type and the two-story 34-unit Type. The space allocations were 120 square feet for a single bedroom and 180 square feet for a double bedroom. See *The US Army Construction Program*, 75-76.

<sup>22</sup> The new shopping area - Heidelberg PX (Post exchange) - was approved in February 1950 with a budget estimated at 535,000 DM. Construction began in late March and was completed in early fall 1950 (thus paralleling the first housing construction projects discussed in chapter two). With its completion, a new shopping center had formed for military personnel on the western edge of the city, consolidating most of the functions that had been scattered in the city center. The services included a commissary, "the post finance office, photo shop, watch and radio repair shop, tailor, barber, beauty shops, beverage store, branch APO and the American Express and Chase National Bank branches." See "EES to Build Shopping Center in Heidelberg," *Stars and Stripes*, February 19, 1950, 5.

<sup>23</sup> For Mark Gillem, the tendency of military planners to construct maps that "stopped at the border," thereby ignoring any surrounding context, points to an empire mentality, where the space around military installations goes unrecognized. See Mark L. Gillem, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 35-36.



Figure 3.4 Aerial View of EES [European Exchange Services] Shopping Center and Headquarters Area Command Bus Station in Heidelberg, Germany. 18 Apr 1953. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC426886.

how new construction would expand out from the existing military area. This focus was evidence that military officials were keen to continue their consolidation approach after the scattered, patchwork experiences of the late 1940s. With the new approach, the connection between working and living within compact boundaries would be maintained and expanded.

But the proposal also revealed subtle shifts in master planning aims. Although both the 1949-50 housing settlement and the November 1950 proposal worked within existing infrastructural systems, in the former, the development remained open to the surrounding area, while in the latter, the configuration adopted a more insular or contained character. One example of this difference was that traffic continued through the 1949-50 development via the north-south Römerstraße, which connected Heidelberg to Rohrbach. In the new proposal, throughway traffic was eliminated. The proposal was developed at an edge, rather than an in-between zone, and in a manner such that, even if the surrounding area was developed in the future (it was not), major circulation would most likely occur on its periphery, not through it.

This difference partially marked a change in scale between the two developments. When the 1949-50 program was completed, it comprised twenty-eight buildings with 336 units. By comparison, the new Heidelberg proposal, responding to the troop augmentation directive, called for eighty-eight buildings with 1,176 units for families, as well as twenty-one BOQ for up to 1,050 unmarried or lower ranking soldiers. This expanded military population called for a more consolidated master plan. It also allowed and required for programmatic expansion to accommodate basic needs, such as a new school and chapel. In the 1949 development, there was neither new construction for a school nor a chapel to the building program. Instead, children continued to bus through Heidelberg and across the Neckar to classrooms at the university, while small religious services were offered either at 130th Station or Patton Barracks. By comparison, in the 1950 proposal, both services were planned alongside housing. Both the chapel and school were placed near each other at the center of 'Housing Community 'A'', pointing to their mutual community

significance, immediately accessible and capable of fostering discipline and socialization (labelled 14 and 21, respectively, in figure 3.2).<sup>24</sup>

The most fundamental difference between the 1949-50 housing program and the November proposal was the new insularity that the latter produced. In the new plan, common services were provided or located immediately near the new housing community. American military personnel living in the new community were no longer required to interact with German civilians for everyday activities. Instead, the basic needs for an American military family were now taken into consideration during the planning phase and were intended to be built. This meant the (male) soldier would easily and quickly move between living to working, the wife would conveniently move from living to shopping, or, in initially rare cases, administrative work at one of the military facilities, children could walk to school and play in collective backyards, and the entire family could attend church services. None of these activities required interaction with Germans, and thus represented a turning point in which augmentation would at once expand the American population in West Germany, while simultaneously separating it from that local German population. There was a bit of irony in that this new American existence was contained in a master plan and building form that continued to resemble rigid Weimar housing developments, rather than American suburban settlements, in the same country, though physical removed from its people (figures 3.5-3.6).

But the November proposal for Heidelberg never materialized. Throughout 1951, Heidelberg Military Post (HMP) officials and Heidelberg city officials were unable to strike an agreement on securing the land. There were two possible reasons: either the existing owners - there were four individually owned agricultural plots - refused to sell the land to the city, or city officials rejected handing over the site to US military officials. It could easily have been a combination of the two, in which the owners refused to sell and city officials did not press them on their positions.

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<sup>24</sup> The placement of the chapel in the center of the development marks a clear difference to the postwar “freeway churches” noted by Dolores Hayden in, *Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820-2000* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2003), 174.

## WESTHAUSEN

Luftbild, 1932.



Figure 3.5 D. W. Dreyse, May - Siedlungen: Architekturführer Durch Acht Siedlungen Des Neuen Frankfurt, 1926-1930 (Frankfurt am Main: Fricke, 1987), 21.



Figure 3.6 D. W. Dreyse, May - Siedlungen: Architekturführer Durch Acht Siedlungen Des Neuen Frankfurt, 1926-1930 (Frankfurt am Main: Fricke, 1987), foldout.

Although for military officials the new site offered a compact expansion from Patton barracks, for Heidelberg agricultural producers, the new site would have destroyed the four plots, but also the surrounding plots with new development. It would have also created a massive American presence on the immediate edge of the city, albeit one poorly served by adequate transportation. Finally, the site itself was rather ill-planned with build-up on both sides of rail lines, and even more, immediately near a freight yard. City officials could make a convincing claim that the site was not suitable for a new massive build-up.

More generally, an aesthetic dimension for refusing to hand over land for American military build-up has been suggested. According to this argument, German authorities objected to building certain military structures too close to city centers because they considered such structures aesthetically unappealing and contradictory to “local housing standards.”<sup>25</sup> In particular they rejected barracks being built near more populated areas. It is not clear this was the case with the new housing proposal since the area already had military structures at Patton Barracks (built by Germans) and a freight yard.

In any case, housing in Heidelberg had stalled as German officials now took a stand in determining where new construction would occur. Thus an intriguing new condition had taken place. On the one hand, military planners developed plans that isolated and insulated military personnel from German locals. On the other hand, military officials planning for expansion were now coordinating their efforts with local German authorities. Entanglement appeared to take a new dimension, no longer occurring around the everyday activities of local populations, but now increasing between military and city and state agencies. We will see shortly another example in Heidelberg where the search for a new housing site hits a roadblock due to German and American

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<sup>25</sup> See David A. Lane, James J. Borror, and George W. Tays, “The U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953-1957,” Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, Headquarters, 1958, 42; and Grathwol and Moorhus, *Building for Peace*, 72.



differences, and in the following chapter uncover several episodes of this new collaboration in greater detail.<sup>26</sup>

One consequence in not securing a new site was that residential derequisitions did not proceed as quickly as Heidelbergers hoped they would. Despite new construction agendas, the US military continued to maintain that requisitioned residential properties would be returned only after new accommodations were supplied, meaning any hold up with securing land or delay in construction, would also push back the return of residential properties to German owners.

Throughout the year Heidelbergers voiced their frustrations with the slow movement of returns, aided by the local presses, and culminating in a protest. On 3 July 1951, and planned to coincide with American Independence celebrations, local citizens marched from Heidelberg to Campbell Barracks, passing through the newly constructed 1949-50 housing area, and stopping at the Command building on Römerstrasse (figures 3.7a-b).<sup>27</sup> The demonstration was singularly focused on residential requisitions with one of the main banners reading: “Exchange the requisitioned objects, take others.” Their pleas represented less a collective solution against requisitions, than short-term, individual fixes. Nevertheless, they were consistent, as an article later in the year noted that Germans in Heidelberg organized a “series of demonstrations ... demanding the return of the villas and other fine houses” that senior staff continued to occupy, most notably along the picturesque

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<sup>26</sup> Military officials did not always succumb to this new German agency. For example, in Heilbronn, about 60 kilometers southeast of Heidelberg, and about 50 kilometers north of Stuttgart, military officials planned two new housing areas in 1951 and 1952; the first was in-between a residential area of single-family homes and a former German Wehrmacht casern, originally built in 1935, and the second was immediately across from the first and diagonal to the casern. Military officials requisitioned 22 hectares of land, of which the second site occupied 16 ha. The city and German Federal Chancellery immediately objected to the project in May 1951 and again in August 1951, on the grounds that the city was given no say in the matter and would be losing a large area “of arable and gardening soil.” They also objected to the spacing between apartment buildings around a circle road, which they viewed as wasteful. Nevertheless, these objections went unanswered until January 1952, at which point they (along with an alternative site) were rejected by Army officials. Despite continued efforts by the Federal Chancellery to halt construction, military officials continued to ignore their requests throughout 1952. In March 1953, it was further confirmed that Army officials had authorized the cutting of trees, despite previous agreements to the contrary. For a full reporting of the exchanges between German and American representatives, see “322.3 Heilbronn - Stuttgarterstrasse housing project,” in Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, General Records 1953-55, NARA RG 466, Box 70. See figure 3.20 for an arial view of the housing project.

<sup>27</sup> Scharnholtz, “German–American Relations at the Local Level, Heidelberg, 1948–1955,” 154.



Figures 3.7ab Demonstration in Front of American Housing Development. 3 July 1951. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-384335-SC-384336.

Philosophenweg and Wolfsbrunnenweg across the Neckar in the Neuenheim suburb. Heidelbergers also voiced frustrations with recreational and entertainment facilities that remained in American control. But unable to come to an agreement on a new housing program in 1951, German-American relations in Heidelberg deteriorated around control of and access to buildings.<sup>28</sup>

This “series of demonstrations” captured another level of entanglement, wherein the growing frustration with American military policy was reaching a limit among the local German population. Unwilling to wait for actions at higher levels, the local Heidelberg population took to the streets, marching to EUCOM headquarters to have their voices heard directly. Along the way, they easily passed through new military housing, confirming not only the openness of the new housing area, but also the connection between the housing and the administrative headquarters. Demonstrating in front of one - the Command building - also immediately registered with the other - military housing. Although protests would have still been possible within the new housing proposal, the insularity and distance from administrative functions would have made it less effective. New planning was striking a new balance between consolidation and separation, community building and isolation.

### **Standardizing Practices**

Although housing construction in Heidelberg stalled in 1951, the Engineer Division continued to make numerous revisions to its planning and construction policies across the command, in their efforts to direct and manage the new and expanded building requirements.

The new policies were far-ranging and operative on multiple scales. For example, across the command, the acquisition of open land became a new, primary objective, shifting from the earlier confiscation and requisition focus on existing structures, such as residential, commercial, and

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<sup>28</sup> “Army Pentagon in Heidelberg to be Dissolved,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Dec 9, 1951, 26.

military buildings.<sup>29</sup> The need for greater open land reflected the greater land requirements to satisfy troop augmentation. But it also created new problems. In acquiring new open land, new construction was increasingly “located in the outskirts of communities or in isolated areas not served by existing public utility facilities.” Thus new policies were required to address increased public utility costs for housing. These included tougher negotiations with German authorities to secure land meeting American utility requirements and new source funding to provide minimum utility requirements (and the assurance that no funding would aid German communities).<sup>30</sup> There was also a clear internal tension between acquiring greater open land at further distances, with the continuing commitment to connect new housing communities to existing military facilities.

In acquiring open land and securing utility connections, new specifications for developing housing sites were provided. For site selection there was one overriding priority: maximum economy. This took two forms; first, in the preference of siting on state-owned property, which could be easily confiscated at no cost, as opposed to private or commercial property that required negotiation and payment; and second, utilizing the natural environment as fully as possible with regard to drainage and “other features ... in grading and the installation of utilities.” This was followed by recommended surveying procedures and site preparation guidelines, and then road and sidewalk construction techniques and parking configurations. Surface drainage through natural slopes was recommended, while water, gas, and electricity supply were to connect to city systems either directly (water) or via transformer station (electricity). All of these specific guidelines were offered as

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<sup>29</sup> Numbers for 1952 indicate the acquisition of 44 (29 confiscated) properties related to housing, commercial, industrial facilities and depots, and barracks, compared to 2,830 (686 confiscated) open land properties during the same period. “Recap of Acquisition and Release of Real Estate in Germany, January-December 1952,” NARA RG 549, Box 1102.

<sup>30</sup> “Construction Letter No. 10,” Engineer Division, Headquarters European Command, 15 May 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1101.

considerations, in which each individual case would have to negotiate between “military requirements and the desires of local German authorities.”<sup>31</sup>

This expanded activity also required new relations with various German building professionals. For the previous two years, the Construction Branch coordinated its building activities from a short list of six approved German architectural firms, compiled for area commanders requiring external assistance. In May 1952, an updated list was offered, expanded to 177 approved German architects offering their services. The new list again pointed to a new scale and speed of expansion enacted to satisfy troop augmentation and the degree to which this new phase required expertise beyond the military ranks. The updated “List of experienced German Architects” was followed by a “List of Construction Firms” and in both cases, they were organized according to the American area command, followed by “Construction Specialty,” “Category of Capacity,” and “Area of Operation” for the construction list, and the address and number of employees for the architecture firm list.<sup>32</sup> In the case of the architecture list, the need for external expertise forged a professional connection between the US Army and the Bund Deutscher Architekten (Association of German Architects) and more specifically, between the Construction Branch and BDA president, Otto Bartning, who was liaison between German architects and the Engineer Division, and who compiled the approved list earlier in the year (figure 3.8).<sup>33</sup> In both cases, the lists pointed to the need for building assistance, rather than design expertise. The Engineer Division provided the firms with standardized plans and constraints, from which the firms bid their services. The winning firm,

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<sup>31</sup> “Guide Specifications on Building Sites for Dependent Housing Developments,” Engineer Division, Headquarters, European Command, 21 May 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1102.

<sup>32</sup> “Use of Architectural Engineer Firms,” Construction Branch, Engineer Division, Headquarters European Command, 26 May 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1101; “List of Construction Firms,” Construction Branch, Engineer Division, Headquarters European Command, 1 July 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1102.

<sup>33</sup> After Walter Gropius moved the Bauhaus from Weimar to Dessau, the existing Henry van de Velde building in Weimar was reconstituted as the Bauhochschule (Building High School) with Otto Bartning named as its director. A leading figure in German expressionism and member of the Neue Sachlichkeit, he resigned in 1930, focusing on church design during the Nazi period. After the war he took a leading role in reconstruction planning as BDA president. See Layla Dawson, “The other Bauhaus,” *The Architectural Review*, Vol. 201, 1200, February 1997.

FEDERATION OF GERMAN ARCHITECTS BDA

The President

Frankfurt/M., 13 February 1952  
Liebigstrasse 53

Telephone: 72656

SUBJECT: List of experienced German Architects.

TO: US Headquarters EUCOM  
Engineer Division  
Construction Branch  
APO 403 US Army

German architectural firms listed in the inclosure would be interested in designing and in the supervision of building projects for the occupation forces. These firms have a background of years of experience, a well trained staff of assistants, and understand what the occupation forces require of an architect. Past work of these architects has proved to be of good quality and their office set-up can handle all requirements, even for the largest of projects.

I assure you that all member firms of BDA listed in the inclosure are capable of designing and carefully and skillfully supervising your projects. All architectural firms take over complete responsibility to meet all requirements of US military authorities as to the solution of technical problems and target dates.

Names of architectural firms are listed according to their residences in the various US Military post zones.

I recommend these architectural firms for your consideration.

Very respectfully

/s/ (Professor D.Dr.) Otto Bartning

Incl  
Lists of names of German  
Architects

Federation of German Architects  
The President

Figure 3.8 Letter from Otto Bartning to Construction Branch, Engineer Division, "List of experienced German Architects," 13 February 1952, in "Use of Architectural Engineer Firms," Construction Branch, Engineer Division, Headquarters European Command, 26 May 1952, RG 549: Records of United States Army, Europe, 1942-1991, Box 1101.

which was either the lowest bid or offered the quickest construction, then developed more detailed working drawings - schematic and construction sets - in coordination with the construction firms.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to developing new links with German building professionals, military engineers also sought assistance in rethinking their design approach to housing. Although the Type I apartment building reduced housing shortages across the command throughout 1950, increased labor and material costs, coupled with expanded housing needs, rendered the apartment building too expensive. But attempting to tackle the economization of housing and revising the apartment building along more efficient lines had proven too difficult a challenge for US Army engineers. In an initial revision in spring 1950, Engineer personnel attempted to revise the Type I, redesigning and building a new Type II on “a limited trial at Asschaffenberg,” but the results were “so unsatisfactory that it was never put to general use.”<sup>35</sup> Rather than redouble their efforts in-house, the Engineer Division took an alternative approach: they sought outside experts for assistance.

In fall 1950, the Engineer Division contacted two architect-engineers for assistance, Ellery Husted and Hugo van Kuyck. Both individuals were familiar with US military operations from their separate experiences during the Second World War. Before the war the New York born and Yale-trained Husted (1901-1967) worked under James Gamble in designing the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in New York. During the war he rose to Lieutenant Commander in the US Navy and was a member of their Joint Target Group, which conducted intelligence research on air target attacks and their potential structural damage effects. He maintained an interest in these issues after the war, writing on the challenges of sheltering a civilian population in the event of potential nuclear

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<sup>34</sup> Although the general rule was to choose the lowest bid, the urgency of accommodating the troop increases sometimes prioritized speed over cost. For example, in April 1951 the construction of a new 200-bed hospital building was approved for Augsburg at Flak casern, which was to accommodate a 10,000 troop increase to the area, scheduled to arrive 1 November 1951. Three bids were received, from which Clifford V. Morgan recommended the highest bid, that also promised the soonest completion date of 31 October, “in order to provide medical service for this increased population” as soon as possible. See Internal Route Slip “Construction of US Army Hospital, Augsburg, 5 September 1951, European Command, NARA 549, Box X.

<sup>35</sup> Command Report, The Engineer Division 1950, Headquarters European Command and Headquarters US Army, Europe, 39, NARA RG 549, Box 987; *The US Army Construction Program*, 78.

attacks,<sup>36</sup> and serving as a consultant to various US government agencies, including the Air Force, Army Corps of Engineers, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Civil Defense Administration, and National Security Resources Board.<sup>37</sup> He also resumed his professional activities as an architect and partner in the New York architectural firm, Gugler, Kimball, and Husted. Here, his most significant role was as a member of the Eero Saarinen led team to design and build Washington Dulles International Airport.

Hugo van Kuyck (1902-1975) followed after his father Walter van Kuyck, studying architecture at the Institut supérieur des Beaux-Arts in Antwerp, and then civil engineering at the Université de Ghent. After completing his studies in 1931 and working with his father, he moved to Brussels to work under Victor Horta for four years.<sup>38</sup> Around the same time he was invited to lecture at Yale University on an ongoing basis, which led to contacts that became crucial to his settling in the United States after the May 1940 German invasion of Belgium. Following the Pearl Harbor attack he joined the US Army Corps of Engineers and contributed engineering expertise to the 1944 landing on Omaha beach, which earned him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He later saw action in Walcheren, Burma, and Okinawa, and was awarded the Bronze Star and Legion of Merit by the United States government.<sup>39</sup> After the war he served as a technical advisor to the Belgian Economic Mission to the United States and was an active member of the National Town Planning Board of Belgium.<sup>40</sup> His most significant works included the Luchtbal social housing project for

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<sup>36</sup> Ellery Husted, "Shelter in the Atomic Age," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 9, no. 7 (1953): 2273–76.

<sup>37</sup> "Ellery Husted, 66, Retired Architect," *New York Times*, July 19, 1967. For an example of such work with the FCDA, see David Monteyne, *Fallout Shelter: Designing for Civil Defense in the Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 115-116.

<sup>38</sup> Special thanks to Denis Pohl for sharing various documents relating to Hugo van Kuyck's professional career.

<sup>39</sup> Michel Bailly, "Découvrir Hugo van Kuyck, Pic de la Mirandole belge," *Bulletin Mensuel* No 4, (April 1988), 23.

<sup>40</sup> Hugo van Kuyck, *Modern Belgian Architecture: A Short Survey of Architectural Developments in Belgium in the Last Half Century* (New York, N.Y.: Belgian Government Information Center, 1946).



1,800 inhabitants in Antwerp and the Palais de la Coopération Mondiale et Pavillon des Nations-Unies à l'Exposition universelle et internationale de Bruxelles of 1958.

Both Husted and van Kuyck were thus well known to military personnel who were confident in both individuals' expertise and their willingness to consult in tackling the military housing challenge. The second point is significant. American military officials had contacted other professionals in the United States, but they were reluctant to offer their services because all work was paid with German deutsche marks, rather than American dollars, which, due to an unfavorable exchange rate, reduced their fees.<sup>41</sup> Husted and van Kuyck accepted the lower fees and offered their services during the second half of 1950.<sup>42</sup> Their contributions, rather than offering a complete redesign of housing, were economical revisions of the existing Type I, which resulted in two, more efficient updates: the Standard Type IIIA and Standard Type IVA introduced in February 1951.<sup>43</sup>

Both schemes took similar approaches in resolving overall inefficiencies. To offer more apartments within the same overall dimensions, the maids' and children's spaces in the Type I attic were converted to additional apartments. The maids' quarters were relocated to the basement and the children's playrooms were eliminated. The Type I basement was unified with a single corridor that connected to both stairwells, thereby eliminating the redundancy of the furnace and boiler rooms and laundry and garbage services. This reconfiguration further opened up basement space for additional storage for each apartment. The apartment sizes were reduced from 1,450 square feet to 1,378 square-feet for three bedrooms, and from 1,147 square-feet to 1,080 square feet for two

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<sup>41</sup> Recall from the previous chapter that new housing construction was paid through German federal mandatory funds. Command Report, The Engineer Division 1950, Headquarters European Command and Headquarters US Army, Europe, 33, NARA RG 549, Box 987; *The US Army Construction Program*, 23.

<sup>42</sup> Husted travelled to West Germany on 7 September 1950 "for a short stay," and van Kuyck consulted "for a short-term period." Ibid., 39.

<sup>43</sup> Although authorship between the two is unclear, it appears likely that Hugo van Kuyck was responsible for the Type IVA, which was used far more than the Type IIIA.

bedrooms.<sup>44</sup> Finally, the Type I pitched roof was replaced with a flat roof on the Type IVA, while maintained in the Type IIIA (figures 3.9-3.10).<sup>45</sup>

The new interiors were also similar in logic, while differing in detail. The Type IVA, mostly likely designed by Kuyck, consolidated the social functions to the front of the apartment and the private functions to the back (figures 3.11a-b). For a three bedroom apartment, one entered immediately into an open living room space along the front elevation, and after a coat closet behind the front door, a slightly smaller dining room along the back elevation. Behind the closet and connected to the dining room was a kitchen also along the back elevation. Beyond these social spaces were two bedrooms (a small bedroom and the master bedroom) continuing along the back elevation, and a bathroom and middle-sized bedroom along the front elevation; all accessed through a short hallway and separated from the living/dining spaces with a door. In addition to the entrance closet, the bedrooms all had built-in closets rising almost to the ceiling. Additionally, all the rooms had windows and, except for the kitchen, all spaces had wall-mounted heating. The bathroom had a sink, toilet, and bathtub. The two-bedroom followed a similar overall configuration, except it switched the bathroom to the back wall and the hallway on the dining room side.

The Type IIIA divided the social and private functions along either side of a central corridor that ran from the entrance to the master bedroom located at the end. In a three bedroom, end apartment, all the bedrooms were placed along the front wall, from smallest to largest. Opposite these spaces was an enclosed bathroom immediately after the entrance, followed by entry into a combined pantry, eat-in kitchen space that wrapped around the bathroom, and finally, an open and

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<sup>44</sup> This was an initial space reduction from the Type I between 1950 and 1951. Space reductions continued in 1952 within the Type III/IV series, particularly with the three bedroom unit, “from 1,346 net square feet to 1,259 net square feet of floor area.” See “Command Report, Engineer Division 1952,” Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1954, NARA RG 549, Box 994.



<sup>45</sup> *The US Army Construction Program*, 78, 80.



Figure 3.9 Joint German-American Musical Program by the Frankfurt Police band during the Opening of the new housing project “Von Steuben Siedlung”, Frankfurt, Germany. 20 Sept 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-510643.



Figure 3.10 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014).



Figures 3.11ab "Proposed Alternate Housing," Grundrisstypen und Baubeschreibung für Austausch - Wohnungseinheiten in der Französischen Zone des Bundesgebietes, Der Bundesminister der Finanzen, 3 March 1953, RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.

combined dining and living space, that also connected to the kitchen. Like the Type IVA, the same features appeared in the Type IIIA, such as built-in closets and heating units below windows in the bedrooms. However, the bathroom in the Type IIIA had no window and was placed at a distance from the master and middle bedrooms. Conversely, the kitchen in the Type IIIA included a separate eating area, in addition to the dining room, and more storage space than the Type IVA. Finally, the Type IIIA living-dining space was larger than the Type IVA configuration, at approximately 320 square-feet.<sup>46</sup>

Overall, the Type IIIA changes were more incremental from the Type I, maintaining the more open and larger combined living and dining spaces, and using the central corridor to separate social and private functions. By locating the bathroom and kitchen along the interior wall separating apartments, it also prioritized more efficient mechanical and heating placement over everyday convenience. By comparison, the Type IVA deviated more in its revisions, producing more compact spaces and a more conventional front-back character of functions. Although apartment kitchens were also back-to-back from each other, the bathrooms were located in the middle zone of each apartment and on both the front (3-bedroom) and back (2-bedroom) walls, thereby requiring additional piping in the basements. Compared to the Type IIIA corridor, that stretched from the entrance to the master bedroom, the much tighter Type IVA corridor connecting the bedrooms and bathroom translated to each door opening almost immediately to another door directly across.

In both cases, the new Types offered an updated, standardized housing format that could be easily adjusted (pre-construction). What followed in later years were subsequent sub-types, designated with additional letters and Roman numeral-letter combinations. For example, the Type IVAC was exactly like the Type IVA, except it had a flat roof, instead of a gabled roof.<sup>47</sup> Likewise, whereas the Type IVAa was a sixteen-unit building with a pitched roof, the Type IVAac was exactly

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 80; Command Report, The Engineer Division 1950, Headquarters European Command and Headquarters US Army, Europe, 39-40, NARA RG 549, Box 987

<sup>47</sup> *The US Army Construction Program*, 80.

similar, except for its flat roof. Two additional designations included the Type IVBa, which was a three-entrance, twenty-four unit building with a gabled roof, and the Type IVBac, which was also a three-entrance, twenty-four unit building with a flat roof. The three-entrance Type III variations were 65 feet longer than their two-entrance counterparts, which were, in turn, about twelve feet longer than the Type IV options. Revisions to the interiors also occurred within the 'Types' already existing framework. For example, on 8 April 1952, the Engineer Division issued a two-page memo to the Heidelberg Military Post (HMP) commanding officer approving "immediate construction" for 432 housing units within the HMP zone, of which 104 units were approved for Heidelberg. The memo went on to note that the Engineer Division was modifying the interiors of both the Type IVA and IVB, for which new drawings would be available very soon.<sup>48</sup> The adjustments were said to be minor and identical in both building types: one and a half meter reduction to the overall length of the building and "slight shifting" of interior walls and door openings in order to accommodate built-in closets in bedrooms. The new designations were labeled as Type IVAac and Type IVBbc.<sup>49</sup>

## **Extension**

In early spring 1952, Heidelberg Military Post was ready to build new housing in Heidelberg. With the updated housing Types already developed, they simply needed a new tract of land on which to build. They chose a site across from 130th Station medical complex on Karlsruherstraße, again reinforcing the commitment to connect new living settlements to existing military facilities. The Post officials submitted a request on 18 March 1952 to the Land Commissioner for 22 hectares

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<sup>48</sup> The Engineer Division actually released the new changes the same day, to another military post. In a memo to the Air Installation Officer at Twelfth Air Force (Wiesbaden), the detailed changes included: the overall length of the buildings shortened 1.5m, in order to reduce square footage to 1,250; the roof changed from a parapet wall to a projecting slab and gutter; hardwood floors reduced from 24mm to 10mm; some minor adjustments to fixtures in the kitchen and bathroom; and two downspouts relocated to the front of the buildings. See Memo from Headquarters, European Command to Air Installations Officer, Twelfth Air Force, Subject: Stand[ard] Apartment Buildings, 8 April 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1066-1070.

<sup>49</sup> Memo from Headquarters, European Command to Commanding Officer, Heidelberg Military Post, Subject: Construction of Phase XI Family Apartments, 8 April 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1066-1070.

of land on which they intended to build twelve apartment buildings with 288 apartments. From the Land Commissioner the request was then submitted to the Land Government of Württemberg-Baden on 2 April. Two days later, military officials received a reply. “The Land Government objected to the proposed requisition” arguing “that the area was larger than needed for the number of dwellings to be constructed,” and was therefore withholding approval for the request.<sup>50</sup> On 10 April, city officials met with military officials in an effort to reach an agreement. However, during this meeting it was further revealed that military officials had already begun preliminary field work on the site, and “building contractors [had] already been invited to send in bids [despite] no attempts having been made ... to reach an agreement with the Heidelberg city authorities on the contemplated type of construction and the location.” German officials requested the suspension of building activity on the site and also counter-proposed to save “20 hectares of [the] most valuable garden land by building tall buildings.”<sup>51</sup> Military officials quickly disregarded the suggestion and instead searched for yet another site that would allow them to build according to plans already developed. On 17 April an agreement was reached, in which 8 hectares of land was requisitioned for the construction of 288 apartments. Having failed to secure a new site for new housing across from Patton Barracks initially, and now across from 130th Station Hospital, military officials secured new sites for housing across from Campbell Barracks.

The first site, located immediately east of Campbell Barracks on Römerstraße, consisted of two rectangular plots and extending directly south of the existing family housing (figures 3.12-3.13). On the northern border with the family housing, a chapel was just completed on the site the previous fall (figures 3.14-3.15). Around the same time that fall, construction began on three 88-man BOQ on the most southern plot, before a fourth BOQ was authorized in March 1952, with funds

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<sup>50</sup> Letter from Zinn Garrett, Special Assistant for Laender Operations, to Mr. Theodor Blank, Representation of the Federal Chancellor for Matters Connected with the Increase of Allied Troops Bundeskanzleramt, April 17, 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 62.

<sup>51</sup> Letter from Mr. Blank to Mr. Garrett, Subj: Construction of Housing at Heidelberg, April 10, 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 62.





Figures 3.12 Aerial View of EUCOM Headquarters, Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg. 15 August 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-350695.



Figures 3.13 Aerial view of Campbell Barracks, showing the exits and approaches on the east side. 15 July 1958. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-365556.



Figures 3.14 The Heidelberg Military Post chapel located across the street from the U.S. Army in Europe Headquarters, at Heidelberg. 17 November 1952. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-425054.



Figures 3.15 The Post Chapel, Heidelberg Military Post. 1 February 1952. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-396166.

allotted for minor site work.<sup>52</sup> Later that summer in July, 48 family housing units were authorized by the Logistics Division and the following month, approved in principle, and allocated 14,000 DM for site work by the Engineer Division.<sup>53</sup> By the end of the month, on 27 August, 1,617,000 DM was allocated for the construction of the two Type IVBa buildings, with additional funding for exploratory work in October, and further funding in December 1952, for a total of 1,691,900 DM.<sup>54</sup> Finally, 36 senior officers quarters were authorized in November 1952, and funded 40,000 DM for planning.<sup>55</sup> These senior accommodations extended south from the chapel, seven of them placed in a row along the site's eastern edge, with five on the northern site and two located on the southern site. Two additional senior officers quarters were placed perpendicularly on the northern site; the first near the chapel, and the second, three buildings further down. The configuration created an open green space with a five building perimeter along three sides, and the fourth side open to Römerstraße and Campbell Barracks. The buildings were two levels with an attic and basement and consisted of two apartments per floor (figure 3.16). Extending further south on the site's western edge were the four BOQ, in a single row, and on its eastern edge, two Type IV apartments, forming a second row.

The second and third sites were developed in parallel for family housing. On 20 March, 92,000 DM was initially allocated for the site planning of 248 family units.<sup>56</sup> This was adjusted the

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<sup>52</sup> Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 19 March 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1066-1070; Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 12 August 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1070.

<sup>53</sup> Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 7 August 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1070.

<sup>54</sup> Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 27 August 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1066-1070.; Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 30 October 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1066-1070.; Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 4 December 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1070.

<sup>55</sup> Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 10 November 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1070.

<sup>56</sup> Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 20 March 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1070.



Figures 3.16 Dependent Housing Area. 15 Sept 1964. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-612585.

following day with the Logistics Division authorizing 184 units, which was approved in principle ten days later by the Engineer Division.<sup>57</sup> The following week an additional 104 family units were authorized and approved, and later, in May 1952, 10,052,789 DM was allocated for the combined construction of 288 family housing units on two sites.<sup>58</sup> With an additional 1,650,058 DM in funds in early summer and 247,954 DM in September, the 288 family units were allocated 12,042,801 DM in 1952.<sup>59</sup>

Both housing sites were south of Campbell Barracks. The larger site, with 184 units, occupied two rectangular corner plots and was diagonally across from the four BOQ under construction. It consisted of eight Type IIIBac apartment buildings, in which six formed a rectangular perimeter around an open green space, with an additional two buildings on its longer north side, forming a second, outer row. The smaller site, with 104 units, bordered Campbell Barracks to the south and was diagonally across from the 184-unit site, to the north-west (figure 3.17). It consisted of four Type IIIBac apartment buildings that followed the same pattern of the 184-unit site (as well as the earlier 1949-50 development), with all four buildings forming a perimeter around a green open space on three sides, and a fourth, southern side open to the street. By facing the open space and street to the south, rather than opening up to the barracks, the orientation separated military housing from military activities proper (later reinforced with fencing), in which the former remained open to German civilian encounters, while the latter remained restricted. Additionally, despite the authorization and approval identifying the program as 184- and 104-unit developments, the actual construction adjusted this division while maintaining the overall number of

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<sup>57</sup> Memo from Headquarters, European Command to Commanding Officer, Heidelberg Military Post, Subject: Construction of Phase X Family Apartments, 31 March 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1070.

<sup>58</sup> Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 15 May 1952, NARA RG 549, Box 1066-1070; Memo from Headquarters, European Command to Commanding Officer, Heidelberg Military Post, Subject: Construction of Phase XI Family Apartments, 8 April 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1070.

<sup>59</sup> Memo from Engineer Division, Headquarters to Heidelberg Military Post, 9 September 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1070.



units. On the larger site, twelve buildings accommodated 192 units, while on the smaller site, four buildings offered 96 units.

In total and across the three sites, 336 family units were planned and constructed from spring 1952 to spring 1953. All fourteen buildings were four-story, 24-unit horizontal apartment blocks, meaning each building had three front entrances with a vertical core that accessed two apartments per floor, as well as a basement, which traversed the entire length of the building. The main exterior difference between the two Type IVBa apartments and the twelve Type IIIBac apartments was the roof; a pitched roof for the former and a flat roof for the latter. This was most likely to have the Type IVBa buildings follow the pattern of the BOQ already under construction on the site, whereas the Type IIIBac buildings had no similar existing context.

In addition to the original 336 units built from 1949-50, Heidelberg now had 708 newly constructed family units. Just as the Type I apartment buildings operated as an extension to the existing administrative center, the newer buildings also extended outward, now east and south, from Campbell Barracks, further consolidating the American military presence in Heidelberg around the former Wehrmacht casern. While the 1950 proposal attempted to concentrate military personnel around Patton Barracks, thereby producing two more or less equal military cores, the newer development shifted military personnel firmly around Campbell Barracks..<sup>60</sup>

A further consolidation occurred with the shift from the Type I to the newer Type III/IV series. Whereas the first housing development offered 336 units across twenty-eight buildings, the newer development matched the number of units in half the number of buildings, benefitting from the recommendations offered by Husted and van Kuyck, i.e., converting the fourth floor attic spaces into apartments, and expanding the length of a building with the optional third stairwell. These

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<sup>60</sup> On 31 January 1958, all three sites around Campbell Barracks - the twenty-eight Type I apartments to its north, the nine senior officers' quarters, four bachelor officers quarters, and two Type IV apartments to the east, and the twelve Type III apartment buildings to the south - were consolidated under the new designation, Mark Twain Village (MTV). It now contained 708 family apartments, in addition to a school for dependents' children, and a chapel.



combined features allowed the Type III/IV series to double capacity while reducing costs, time, and space of construction.

In terms of costs, we can gauge military planners' priorities. In the first Type I apartments built in 1949-50, the US Army allocated 16.5 million for 28 buildings with 336 units, which resulted in just under 590,000 DM per building and 49,100 per unit. In the November 1950 bulletin, they projected 600,000 per building, or 50,000 per unit. With the combined 1952 construction, they allocated 981,000 per building, or 40,900 per unit. The priority was thus unit costs over building costs, in which military engineers privileged the cost benefits of consolidating more units into fewer buildings. Despite rising labor and material costs, the more dense Type III/IV series offered almost 17% savings from the Type I buildings constructed in 1949-50. In financial terms, the stalling of building Type I housing in 1951 actually paid off with the updated Type III/IV housing available in 1952.

Nevertheless, the construction and consolidation of 336 units still fell far short of the 1,176 family units proposed in the November 1950 *Engineer Bulletin*. That proposal offered Heidelberg a coordinated attempt to address troop augmentation within a single, unified master plan. With the actually built schemes, expansion was replaced by extension, achieved through an incremental enlargement that consolidated and strengthened the American presence on the city's edge and immediately near existing military facilities. Although this limited approach maintained a link between living and working conditions and concentrated military personnel within a manageable zone, the incremental extension failed to address augmentation satisfactorily. We can gain a better understanding of the pressures at work by venturing further out, and surveying what was built elsewhere in the American zone in response to troop augmentation. In doing so, we can also examine the degree to which the Heidelberg housing proposal and other military guidelines acted as precedents for new housing construction.

## Augmentation Housing

Recall from the previous chapter that by September 1950, Heidelberg Military Post allocated just under 16.5 million DM for new family housing in Heidelberg. By January 1951, the military post command had allocated a total of 21,715,867 DM for all family housing within HMP (Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, and Mannheim). This early commitment to housing construction put HMP ahead of all other military post commands, except the larger Nürnberg Military Post, which allocated over 30 million deutsche marks to family housing during the same period.<sup>61</sup> By the end of the fiscal year, 31 March 1951, HMP allocated just over 24 million deutsche marks for new housing, which registered at just over 19% of all new family housing construction for the period in the American zone.<sup>62</sup>

Beginning in April 1951, other area commands rapidly expanded their housing commitments. Nürnberg Military Post continued building with almost 1.5 million DM directed toward new housing, while Stuttgart Military Post committed over 2.5 million, and Würzburg Military Post almost 3 million. Additionally, a new military post was established west of the Rhine - Rhine Military Post - and during its first month in operation, it allocated 1.29 million to new housing construction.<sup>63</sup> More moderate funding occurred in Augsburg, Frankfurt, and Munich, with each

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<sup>61</sup> Monthly Report of Engineer Operations, Control Branch, Engineer Division United States Army, Europe, 1 February 1951, 2. NARA RG 549, Box X. Nürnberg Military Post included two large training areas (Grafenwohr and Hohenfels), as well as large military posts (Fürth and Nürnberg), along with several middle- and small-sized posts, including Ansbach, Bamberg, Bayreuth, Erlangen, Schwabach, and Vilseck.

<sup>62</sup> Total new housing funding was 126,262, 628 DM for the period 1 April 1950 to 31 March 1951. Monthly Report of Engineer Operations, Control Branch, Engineer Division United States Army, Europe, 1 April 1951, 2. NARA RG 549, Box X.

<sup>63</sup> Originally introduced as "Rhine Military Post" and later designated as the "Western Area Command," the Rhine Area Command consisted of three large posts: Vogelweh, Landstuhl, and Baumholder; three medium-sized posts: Bad Kreuznach, Mainz, and Pirmasens; and several smaller posts: Idar-Oberstein, Kirchheim-Boland, Worms, Oppenheim, and Zweibrücken. The new command was a calculated attempt to address two potential weaknesses in American defense. The first was the north-south line of communications that was viewed as vulnerable to a potential Soviet attack. The Rhine command was the final destination in the new line of communications through France (west-east) initiated by Clay in 1949; (See note 26 in Chapter 1). The second calculation was locating that terminus (and escape route if ever needed) west of the Rhine river, which military strategists viewed as a natural barrier against enemy ground forces. However, the region was highly rural and required much more extensive construction and infrastructure. From 1 April 1951 to 31 December 1951, military officials allocated 198 million DM to building the region for military purposes, of which 121 million was directed toward troop training and housing.

area command funding between 350,000 and 400,000 DM in housing. By comparison, Heidelberg only committed 10,620 DM across its area command in April. The lowest amount of all the twelve area commands.<sup>64</sup>

This trend continued throughout the year. In May, Stuttgart and Würzburg appeared to separate their areas from the rest of the pact, spending almost 4.25 million and 3 million, respectively, on housing. Nürnberg and Rhine also continued building, spending 1.36 million and 1.10, respectively. The other area commands, including Heidelberg, continued to spend more moderate amounts on housing.<sup>65</sup> In June Heidelberg's funding jumped, with the command spending almost 1.9 million on new housing in Karlsruhe and Mannheim. This monthly allocation surpassed both Würzburg's (1.67 million) and Nürnberg's (1.2 million), while trailing behind Rhine's (4.67 million) and Stuttgart's (8.25 million).<sup>66</sup> Similar funding patterns occurred the following months, with Stuttgart outpacing the other commands, spending over 51 million in new housing construction for the year, followed by Rhine, overtaking Würzburg in July and ending the year with over 40 million directed toward new housing. After Würzburg, Nürnberg, and Augsburg, Heidelberg ended the year spending approximately 12.75 million DM almost exclusively in Karlsruhe and Mannheim. Thus the entire military post had spent less in 1951 than it had in 1950 despite the new urgency to accommodate new military personnel and family members.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Monthly Report of Engineer Operations, Control Branch, Engineer Division United States Army, Europe, 1 May 1951, 2. NARA RG 549, Box X.

<sup>65</sup> Monthly Report of Engineer Operations, Control Branch, Engineer Division United States Army, Europe, 1 June 1951, 2. NARA RG 549, Box X. Heidelberg funded 320,033 DM toward family housing.

<sup>66</sup> Monthly Report of Engineer Operations, Control Branch, Engineer Division United States Army, Europe, 1 July 1951, 2. NARA RG 549, Box X.

<sup>67</sup> Heidelberg Military Post was not the only command area that funded fewer housing projects in 1951 than in 1950, Nürnberg and Frankfurt also spent less, as did the much smaller Bremerhaven enclave and Garmisch recreational area. Nor was a certain decrease in housing allocations unexpected. According to the November Bulletin, engineers projected 11,400,000 DM for new housing construction in Heidelberg, which would have still been less than the 1950 allocation for Heidelberg, and relatively equal to the prior year for HMP. Monthly Report of Engineer Operations, Control Branch, Engineer Division United States Army, Europe, 1 January 1952, 2. NARA RG 549, Box XX.

All of these expenditures reveal a rapid and expanded construction program. Even with the stalled progress in Heidelberg, military officials ramped up their building efforts in response to troop augmentation, spending on average, over 20.5 million deutsche marks a month on new family housing across the zone.<sup>68</sup> In this first year response, major troop concentrations took form around Nürnberg in the southeast, and in proximity to the military training area Grafenwöhr, as well as the East-West Germany border; in the Stuttgart area, which was home to the Seventh Army in the south; and the new Rhine region, which included another major training ground at Baumholder, a new medical center at Landstuhl, and a major troop concentration at Kaiserslautern.

Despite all this new construction, military officials still could not keep pace with new troop arrivals. In late October 1951, a backlog estimated approximately 3,500-4,000 families waiting for military housing.<sup>69</sup> By January 1952, the disparity only increased, with 7,548 units required for troops and their families (figure 3.18). The situation only marginally improved in February and March, before falling to 4,500 in April and 3,700 in May. This was due to a decrease in military personnel, rather than increased building. Ultimately, the drop in personnel did little to ameliorate the situation. For the remainder of the year, the backlog in housing continued to inch up each month, and by the end of 1952, military officials were over 6,300 units short of their requirements.<sup>70</sup>


But even with what was built, to what extent did post commanders actually follow military guidelines? We can register a range of results through a series of aerial photographs of new military housing projects. One example that appeared to confirm the *Bulletin* influence was Heilbronn. Located approximately 60 kilometers southeast of Heidelberg in Stuttgart Military Post, US Army

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> "Housing Scarce for GI Families in Germany," *The Washington Post*, Oct 30, 1951, 4. In most cases, soldiers waiting for family housing lived in assigned BOQ, while family members remained stateside.

<sup>70</sup> The shortage almost doubled in 1953. See Table 4 in *The US Army Construction Program*, 14, for an annual breakdown from 1 Jan 1950 to 30 June 1953.




Figures 3.18 Status of Family Housing - Calendar Year 1952. RG 549: Records of United States Army, Europe, 1942-1991. Box X.

officials confiscated Wehrmacht military facilities in the city in 1945, initially utilizing them as displaced persons camps. In addition to later expanding these facilities for their own use, two residential areas were planned for troop augmentation (figures 3.19-3.20). We can see from an aerial photo and map that the housing areas were planned primarily as extensions to the existing military facilities, which were located on the southern edge of the city. The first housing area of twelve buildings was placed between the existing facilities and a residential area of single-family, detached homes, and two roads, one of which was the main road connecting to Stuttgart. The second housing area, consisting of fifteen family apartments and three BOQ, was placed diagonally across from the military casern in an otherwise undeveloped area.<sup>71</sup> The effort to consolidate and strengthen the American military presence linking the new housing to the existing facilities is clear. In the first housing area, the further effort to utilize existing infrastructures is also apparent, with the use and connection to the existing roads. In the second area, an entirely new road was required, for which Heilbronn officials chose a single, straight road that looped around and connected to itself. Thus the two areas differed, with the first more open to both German and American residential circulation as it followed the already existing grid structure, while the second was more closed and contained. Between the two residential areas, a shopping area and school were also built, thus pulling American personnel closer in still, in which work, living, shopping, and education all occurred within a compact, though open space.

A second example, about 200 kilometers east of Heidelberg, also appeared to follow military guidelines very closely. On the western outskirts of Nürnberg in Fürth, yet another German casern, now operated by American forces, set the base for new housing (figures 3.21-3.22). The new residential area was immediately across from a large military casern complex, occupying a long strip of land, for which thirteen buildings were placed in a row facing each other in a single line. Along a second strip, another row of buildings formed, now side-by-side, before expanding on a third plot

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<sup>71</sup> See n.17 on the controversies surrounding this development.




Figures 3.19 Heilbronn Stadtplan. 1963. Historische Stadtpläne, Stadtarchiv Heilbronn.



Figures 3.20 Aerial view of housing area. August 25, 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-468927.





Figures 3.21 Stadt-Plan Fuerth, in Beilage zum Adressbuch der Stadt Fürth 1905, (Fürth: Schmittner, [1905 ca.]; Köln: A.-G. für Mechanische Kartographie).



Figures 3.22 Aerial view of Nurnberg Post's Newly Completed Housing Project Near Post HQ. 5 April 1951. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-368866.



of land, in which four buildings encircled a center green space. The location again prioritized the work-living connection for military personnel, in which housing extended immediately out from a military center. Like the first housing area in Heilbronn (and those around Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg) the American military community was also open to the surrounding, though less developed, area (on which they would further expand).

But even proximity to existing military structures could produce different results. Approximately 100 kilometers southeast of Heidelberg was Stuttgart, in and around which several US military facilities and residential areas were located. The main housing community was (and remains) located at Robinson Barracks (figure 3.23). An aerial photo reveals a more expansive and more isolated development. The housing area includes two smaller residential areas along slightly winding, cul-de-sac streets, in which the buildings are somewhat off-set from each other. In addition, there is a larger residential area that loosely follows grid-like patterns and includes both throughway streets and more cul-de-sacs. Finally, there is a series of five apartment buildings in a slightly winding road. Accompanying these 46 buildings is a school, library, shopping center, and recreational fields. Although the development also maintains a closeness to an existing military casern (bottom right) as well as a newer facility (located in the top middle of the development), there are clear differences to both Heidelberg, Heilbronn, and the *Engineer Bulletin*. The development utilizes a much larger plot of land with a lower level of density, as a sizable amount of land remains undeveloped. The more isolated location also required extensive new infrastructure. The combination brought to reality the concerns addressed in the various policy updates that tried to address the need for more land for augmentation and economizing existing utilities. With the Stuttgart example, these issues appear more compromised, while the proximity to work was satisfied.

But in some cases, the extension from existing military facilities was not followed. Immediately north of Stuttgart in Ludwigsburg, there were five German caserns controlled by American forces in the early 1950s. Two were on the cities western and eastern edges, while another



Figures 3.23 An aerial view of the housing area at Robinson Barracks. 23 August 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-468924.

two were close to each other in the city center, and a final one was in the southeast of the city. An initial housing area of six buildings was constructed five blocks south of the two center caserns, followed by a larger project of sixteen buildings further west, near the southeast casern (figure 3.24). In neither case was an immediate connection to military facilities developed, as both required a short vehicle commute between work and living. In the second larger case, the housing was also considerably isolated from other functions, such as medical, educational, shopping and recreation, as well as the local population (figure 3.25). Access to these activities required vehicle transport via a main road that immediately passed the development. The development also required its own new infrastructure in the absence of existing connections. A third housing area, responding to troop augmentation, furthered the insular condition, while addressing some of the issues of proximity to other functions. On a large plot further south from the sixteen building settlement, 52 apartment buildings were constructed, along with an elementary and high school, athletic fields, and a chapel. Although it did not appear in the photograph, the development was built near a military airfield, although most of the military functions occurred further away in one of the five caserns. The housing area thus detached living and working, in which commuting to and from work was now required. It also separated Americans from Germans, as there was little reason or opportunity for either to interact with the other. Instead, the new housing area, which also required its own infrastructure, further contained and consolidated an American military presence. To a certain degree, the planning even restricted American interactions with a cul-de-sac street system that reduced driving to an efficient secondary-primary connection within the community.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> For a rather unique case, see military officials' efforts in Bad Tölz, where new housing was built immediately near an existing casern and airfield on the city's eastern edge in 1954, while an existing school in the city center was planned for expansion. German city authorities questioned this "extremely undesirable" solution and countered that a new school should be built near the new housing area, thus eliminating a 30 minute walk each way or busing students through "streets with heavy traffic." Military rejected this proposal for over a year, until accepting a new school building near existing American military facilities in fall 1955. See folder, "Bad Toelz Construction of a School for the U.S. Forces, 1953-55," in NARA RG 466, Box 65, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn, General Records, 1953-55.



Figures 3.24 An aerial view of the housing area at Ludwigsburg, August 25, 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-468921.



Figures 3.25 Aerial view of housing, August 25, 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-468928.

Despite their differences, all of these (and other) housing developments responded to troop augmentation according to the general guidelines outlined by military officials. In particular, they all attempted to consolidate the American military presence within specific boundaries, either explicitly, as in the case of Stuttgart, or more loosely, as in Heilbronn and Nürnberg. Most also aimed to link new housing areas to existing military facilities, as with Heilbronn, Nürnberg, and Stuttgart, which all expanded outward from an initial military point. In terms of planning, the approaches were more mixed, with Heilbronn and Nürnberg constructing more compact housing areas near existing structures, while Stuttgart and Ludwigsburg built more spacious settlements in less dense areas. In general, the larger the military force, the more land was required, which pushed housing areas further from military centers. This in turn required more comprehensive planning of ancillary functions, such as educational, recreational, religious, and commercial facilities, as well as greater initial investment in supporting infrastructures. The buildings tended to favor the Type IV with a gable roof. Military officials also continued to build three-story, 18-unit apartment blocks, along with four-story, 16-unit offerings. The guidelines then, were not so rigid as to produce a total standardization of military communities, but rather allowed for slight variation and difference according to specific, local conditions and preferences. Nevertheless, whatever their differences, the scale and speed of new housing construction created stark differences with their immediate environments.

A second factor also emerged. New housing communities were beginning to be established further from city and military centers. This was partly a practical matter, as city centers or even areas along city peripheries could not accommodate the size requirements for new military communities. Acquiring new land slightly more remote from city and military concentrations satisfied the American desire for greater space. But the new cooperative relations also produced new tensions and disagreements, as occurred in Heidelberg. During the previous occupation environment,

Heidelberg Military Post would have simply built a new housing community near Patton Barracks, as the November Bulletin had modeled it. By the early 1950s, new working conditions now demanded that American plans come with German support and approval (in addition to German funds). For their part, German authorities were not resistant to military expansion, but in their efforts to accommodate the more expansive programs, they simply had to offer more remote (and cheaper) land, as they increasingly negotiated their own economic interests. In Heidelberg this new partnership had mixed results, with local authorities stalling two housing schemes and questioning the size and manner of building. In Nürnberg and Heilbronn they appeared more accommodating, although Heilbronn authorities also took issue with the land selected for new building. In Stuttgart and Ludwigsburg, local authorities were fairly successful in locating military expansion within a specific zone further away from the city centers. Increasingly, the military model of expanding from initial military points was confronted with a new German preference, which was to give American officials the space requirements they desired, at further removed locations.

Regardless of where it occurred, all of this new building was bound to generate reactions. Somewhat surprisingly, the quickest and sharpest responses were leveled by American government officials. In December 1951, they accused military officials of “Living like Prince[s],” where “wasteful practices” highlighted their “spending like wild people.”<sup>73</sup> In January 1952 it was reported that shopping options available to military personnel included “winter fashion for women and stocking Egyptian leather goods, Indian bric-a-brac and Spanish ceramics for Christmas.” All the ancillary facilities, from clubs and cinemas, to schools and apartment buildings, were evidence of a “construction of luxurious accommodation[s].”<sup>74</sup> Later that month, accusations against military “extravagances” ramped up, driven primarily by US senators who had recently toured various

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<sup>73</sup> Jack Raymond, “Living Like ‘Prince’ Denied by M’Cloy,” *New York Times*, Dec 22, 1951, 3.

<sup>74</sup> “U.S. Troops Know No Austerity,” *South China Morning Post*, Jan 1, 1952, 7.

military establishments.<sup>75</sup> Leading the charge was Senator Allen J. Ellender, a Democrat from Louisiana, who vowed to expose the scandal of waste.<sup>76</sup> For Ellender, West Germany and the US Army were emblematic of a larger waste observed throughout Europe, in which “luxurious” working and living conditions had gone unchecked, while foreign governments also “milked” American funds for their own advantages.<sup>77</sup> After his return to the United States, he delivered several senate speeches in early 1952 on the topic that appeared to generate enough support among colleagues.<sup>78</sup>

By April, “irate senators” were applying the pressure on “luxury living” in West Germany. In view of the “plush living quarters” enjoyed by military officials, senators prepared an amendment that would bring an “end to free servants and special trains” if the US military did not act.<sup>79</sup> Although their authority was questionable and military officials had initially resisted, countering that the services offered were not paid by American taxpayers nor as extravagant as senators suggested, later that month the State Department forwarded a request to cut certain privileges, estimated to cost 45 million dollars annually.<sup>80</sup> On 3 May, the US Army announced the end of free servant services, stating that the elimination would save the 45 million paid through the German

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<sup>75</sup> At the very moment of Ellender’s European trip, an article appeared that linked the level of “special treatment” VIP guests (senators, entertainers, Washington officials, business and labor representatives) received (and expected) from military officials, to the level of support visitors expressed back home. “The Army has learned the hard way that a snub or lack of the attention a dignitary consider due him invites a retaliatory blast when that dignitary returns home.” “U.S. Brass in Germany Shines Up - for VIPs,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec 24, 1951, 6.

<sup>76</sup> “Senator Finds Waste by U.S. Aides Abroad,” *New York Times*, Jan 18, 1952, 48.

<sup>77</sup> William S. White, “Ellender Charges Aid Waste Abroad,” *New York Times*, Dec 21, 1951, 5.

<sup>78</sup> Similar accusations were leveled on State Department officials’ overseas living standards. See for example, Jane C. Loeffler, *Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America’s Embassies* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), 96.

<sup>79</sup> “Senators to Axe Lush Army Living,” *The Austin Statesman*, Apr 10, 1952, A10.

<sup>80</sup> “Plans to Cut Off Army Luxuries in Germany Delayed,” *The Washington Post*, Apr 26, 1952, 4.

government's occupation costs, while adding that the termination of these services would begin immediately, and take over a year to complete.<sup>81</sup>

The elimination of free maid services directly connected to housing. From the Type I to both Types III and IV, maids' quarters were built into the general housing program, first occupying the attic space of the Type I, and moved to the basement in the later Types. But without their costs guaranteed by German taxpayers, the incentive had disappeared, leaving a significant portion of the basement space potentially unoccupied. Nevertheless, military engineers responded by continuing to offer these spaces in revised housing plans, and new buildings continued to be constructed as before, with one maids' room per apartment.

## Conclusion

The expanded American military presence in the Federal Republic did not just happen unhindered. Rather, it materialized through a sequence of actions and negotiations between different actors in various locations. In this chapter I examined these interactions at the initial moment of expansion. Military planners appeared overwhelmingly determined to rely on already - though limitedly employed - tried and tested policies and procedures, despite changed circumstances. Policies and conditions from 1949-50 were taken as a base from which standardization and expansion could proceed with minimal adjustment. But conditions on the ground had changed. Germans were no longer a completely subservient group without power. They were now partners who worked to accommodate American expansion goals within certain limits. As we have seen, each case had its own specific factors, but the total effect was one in which military priorities were

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<sup>81</sup> "U.S. Army Reduces Frills in Germany," *The Sun*, May 4, 1952, 17. Although no numbers were provided, the article also noted that the US Army had budgeted for 29,000 servants. This was not the first instance of protest against US Army living standards in FRG by American senators. They had complained earlier in 1950 as well, to which military personnel changed their "general thinking ... namely the apartments under construction were too large and extravagant for junior officers and cost too much money." Command Report, The Engineer Division 1950, Headquarters European Command and Headquarters US Army, Europe, 39, NARA RG 549, 39. Germans also expressed anger at how their occupation expenses were allocated, preferring "to see their money buying a little more defense and fewer comforts for the occupying armies." "Army Luxuries Upset Germans," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Jan 19, 1951, 1.



arranged in cooperation with German authorities, rather than through the brute force of earlier seizures. This new working model created a more complex reality, in which military concentrations still materialized, though in different forms. The ideal case remained an immediate continuity, expanding from confiscated military centers. In this scenario, a concentration and consolidation of American and military persons and activities could proceed within a compact space of oversight, reducing external influences and interruptions. But new, alternate conditions also occurred, in which military functions and civilian activities were separated, with living conditions taking on a more enclave form, now isolated from both working conditions and local German populations. Both forms developed simultaneously, bringing to the foreground the reality that previously tested models could not (always) be easily duplicated, and that German authorities had a vested interest and role in shaping American expansion.

As the military expanded, so too, did German agency, taking a more proactive stance around crucial issues, such as derequisitions and new agreements to direct military building. As in the case of housing, these new initiatives exposed new tensions and conflicting interests. Increasingly, differences between local authorities found their way to federal and civilian government officials who had to negotiate and settle disputes, an issue we briefly encountered already with the potential housing site near the 130th Station hospital complex. In Heidelberg, the 1952 breakthrough in housing represented only one area of difference between American and German officials, as military officials embarked on new construction projects to further enlarge and consolidate their activities in the city. Several projects in the city resulted in prolonged discussions and disagreements as German officials pressed to resolve local frustrations and military officials attempted to resolve their failures to address troop increases for the area. Collaboration had consequences.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### AGENCY AND EXPANSION, 1951-1961

*Sorry, Mrs. Jackson.* At some point SFC Richard Willis must have uttered these words to Sgt. Donald A. Jackson's wife, as Willis announced that the Jackson family was being temporarily relocated from their military housing at Patrick Henry Village in Heidelberg. But they were not alone. Willis' remarks applied to over three hundred families that suffered the same fate after a German architectural firm inspected the housing complex, and found the same conditions over and over again. Plaster was falling off interior walls and brickwork was crumbling on load-bearing walls. The firm noted that deteriorating conditions were already noticeable in 1957, and were the result of "brick containing excessive lime [that] disintegrated as it absorbed additional moisture."<sup>1</sup> It was 13 July 1961, a mere six years after it was completed, and Patrick Henry Village was "condemned."<sup>2</sup>

It certainly did not begin like this. In summer and fall 1955, when members of Congress visited the Federal Republic, they almost always stopped in Heidelberg. And in their touring of US military facilities in Heidelberg, they inevitably ended up in Patrick Henry Village. This newly built housing community was lauded and celebrated by senior staff who escorted various government representatives around models of Patrick Henry Village in a mess hall, the actual site in either sun or rain, and squeezed them together for group photographs (figures 4.1-4.8). Although other military areas were larger, Patrick Henry Village was a new and modern community, offering the latest amenities and conveniences to personnel and their families. In terms of the US military presence in Europe, it was the plan achieved. In a June 1955 speech Colonel Charles F. McNair, Commander of Headquarter Area Command, was unequivocal in his admiration: "The brightest spot in the future picture is Patrick Henry Village ... when completed, we feel [it] will be the one of the most desirable

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<sup>1</sup> Herb Scott, "110 Army Families to Reoccupy Six Heidelberg Buildings," *Stars and Stripes*, November 19, 1962, 8.

<sup>2</sup> "First family moved from condemned quarters, Patrick Henry Village, Heidelberg, Germany, 7/13/1961," NARA RG 111, Element Number: 111-LC-44660 & 44661.



Figure 4.1 Arriving at the Heidelberg Air Field is Congressman Gerald R. Ford. 12 Aug 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-509583.



Figure 4.2 Col. E.J. Drinkert, Deputy Commanding Officer HACOM, with Congressmen after their tour of the Patrick Henry Dependent Housing Area near Heidelberg. 13 Aug 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-509590.



Figure 4.3 Mike and Nancy Holbrook, son & daughter of SGT & Mrs Frank W. Holbrook, takes distinguished visitor by the hand and go for a walk in Patrick Henry Village. 8 Sep 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-509603.



Figure 4.4 Col Charles F. McNair, Commanding Officer HACOM, and Rear Admiral John Will, Director of Personnel, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. 19 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466375.



Figure 4.5 Col Leckie is briefing the party prior to their tour of D.A. [Dependents Area] civilians quarters in Patrick Henry Village. 6 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466325.



Figure 4.6 Col McNair is orientating the gentlemen on Patrick Henry Village in Schwetzingen. 17 Nov 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-469150.



Figure 4.7 Shown here are the House Civil Service Subcommittee. They are visiting D.A. civilians quarters in Patrick Henry Village. 6 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466326.



Figure 4.8 Congressman George A. Shuford, a member of the House Committee of Veteran Affairs, and his family talk with a fellow family from North Carolina. 13 Aug 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-509591.

American living areas in Europe, with all EES [European Exchange Services] services, schools, officers, and NCO clubs, and possibly a golf course.”<sup>3</sup> In 1955, Patrick Henry Village was a gem.

How can we understand these contrasting realities beyond the immediacy of shoddy construction work? One way, I want to suggest, is through the tracing of entanglement and collaboration between American and German authorities in fulfilling several construction projects in Heidelberg beginning in 1951. In doing so, I call attention to both the heightened - though limited - level of German agency in determining the parameters of certain kinds of projects, as well as the complex bureaucratic workings now involved in initiating new projects. I contend this combination had a significant impact, working counter to high-level military directives and plans addressing troop expansion, and instead producing prolonged, multi-level administrative exchanges.

To interrogate these new developments, I rely on internal records between several agencies, principally the German Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen) and the US High Commission for Occupied Germany (HICOG). Although both agencies were established in 1949 with the formation of the Federal Republic, their interaction and coordination dramatically increased in early 1951 around the financing necessary to support the expanded American military presence. In relation to occupation activities, both agencies were similar. Based in Bonn, the new political capital, both were civilian government agencies that served as high-level liaisons for either state and city administrations (in the Federal Ministry case), or military post and EUCOM-USAREUR officials (in the HICOG case). But there was one key difference: the Federal Ministry could make and implement decisions, HICOG officials did not have any equivalent determining powers but rather, simply acted as a go-between, relaying issues and responses between the Federal Ministry and various military agencies. In this sense, the Federal Ministry’s authority was more inline with EUCOM-USAREUR. But the larger point is that with new American military expansion came new organizational structures deemed necessary to implement and account for activities, resolve and

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<sup>3</sup> “McNair Cites Housing Plans For HACom,” *Stars and Stripes*, June 17, 1955, 10.



communicate differences. In most cases, the very correspondence between Federal Ministry and HICOG officials implied a dispute or problem at a local level around a specific project.

In Heidelberg, several projects required the elevation and participation of both agencies. But even with their input, there was no guarantee that projects would move forward at all, or in the manner one party intended or preferred. Regardless of final outcomes, what occurred in all cases were extended exchanges between agencies, correspondences with local authorities on issues and positions, and compromises and propositions to resolve stalemates. This chapter centers on four episodes that reveal these dynamics in an effort to understand how certain projects were initiated, progressed, stalled, and were either pushed through or terminated.

The first episode examines a Heidelberg airstrip and military officials' decision to extend it for expanded use. What would have been a relatively straightforward project only a few years earlier, was now a site of contestation between local German officials and EUCOM-USAREUR officials that stretched on for almost two years before being resolved. The second episode connects derequisition pressures around hotels in the city center with a new hotel/club proposal for military personnel. Whereas the airstrip pitted Germans against Americans, the hotel/club proposal found both sides willing to work toward a solution. Nevertheless, at various moments the proposal hit roadblocks that required adjustments that again extended for a few years. The third episode centers on housing and residential requisitions and German attempts to jumpstart an alternative housing program that would resolve the increasing pressures and frustrations of local German citizens. Like the hotel/club proposal, the alternate program was initiated by German authorities rather than Americans, and extended beyond Heidelberg and even the American zone of occupation. It shows the increased level and limits of German agency in dealings with American officials and conversely, the degree to which military officials were willing to compromise around certain issues. The final episode brings us back to Patrick Henry Village and its development as a new military community. By the time this project started, over three years had already passed from Truman's troop

augmentation announcement. Over the course of that time, the continuing pressure to build only increased as Heidelberg failed to secure sites to accommodate planned expansion, while new concerns also entered the frame: the moment was fast approaching when the Federal Republic would attain full sovereignty, at which point, it was understood that German funds for US military projects would expire. These dual pressures created the need to act quickly. Ultimately, once construction on Patrick Henry Village - a large military housing area with an array of community services - finally started, it rose from the ground quicker than much smaller, single program projects - such as the airstrip, though as we already saw, not without consequences.

Recent scholarship on US military bases has largely ignored or dismissed local governments' agency.<sup>4</sup> Instead, it has favored research, for instance, on the roles of prominent architects in collaborating with military institutions, in efforts to complicate canonical architectural histories.<sup>5</sup> Some authors have examined more recent US military developments - rejecting the notion of architects' involvement - suggesting that the relations between the US military and the "host nation" - governed by legal agreements and contracts - allows "everything from military conduct to the layout of space [to] generally default to the U.S. position regardless of the concerns, customs, or cultures of the 'host nation'." Additionally, local elites have been read as accepting these conditions for the potential financial rewards that American consumerism brings with American soldiers.<sup>6</sup> Despite evidence supporting these realities, the main objective in this chapter is to detail a counter-example of the actual working conditions by which the US military community in Heidelberg expanded. With this example, I argue German representatives were crucially integral in shaping the

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<sup>4</sup> An exception is Theodor Scharnholtz, "German–American Relations at the Local Level, Heidelberg, 1948–1955," in Thomas W. Maulucci and Detlef Junker, *GIs in Germany: The Social, Economic, Cultural and Political History of the American Military Presence* (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2013), 142–160.

<sup>5</sup> Brett Tippey, "Richard Neutra in Spain: Consumerism, Competition, and U.S. Air Force Housing," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 1 March 2021; 80 (1): 48–67.

<sup>6</sup> Mark L. Gillem, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 16, 23, *passim*.

physical presence of the US military in Heidelberg (and elsewhere), taking an active hand in where large-scale communities were established, cooperating and challenging American-led projects according to local and state interests, and initiating their own projects to force US military action. As such, this chapter brings into focus a hitherto unknown set of complex coordinations between German and American authorities that allowed for US military expansion.

### **Episode One: Heidelberg Airstrip**

On 19 September 1951, Mr. W. Pierce MacCoy, Special Assistant, HICOG contacted his Bonn counterpart, Mr. Theodor Blank of the Federal Chancellery, seeking his assistance. In a letter, MacCoy relayed that he had been contacted by EUCOM personnel and that “a request through regular channels to the Land Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden” was being delayed, and therefore, “appreciated if [the Chancellor’s] office [could] take whatever action [to] secure the immediate approval of the request.” The issue was a military airstrip in Heidelberg, which EUCOM officials sought approval to extend an extra 1000 feet in length, and 26 feet in width. This was an “urgent military necessity,” MacCoy relayed, that would “accommodate ... larger type aircraft” according to EUCOM officials, and was thus a matter of great importance.<sup>7</sup>

Parallel to sending the issue up the chain of command, EUCOM officials also continued to negotiate with German authorities in Heidelberg toward a solution. A month later, on 19 October, Major General George P. Hays directed his Chief of Staff, Major General Daniel Noce, to ascertain the hold up. In his response, Noce noted that the issue was “not due to land acquisition problems,” but rather “technical objections raised by the Germans.” Extending the airstrip an extra 1,000 feet in length would cross a secondary road, Diebsweg. Working with the German Highway Ministry,

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<sup>7</sup> Theodor Blank’s full title in this respect was, “The Representative of the Federal Chancellor for Matters Connected with the Increase of Allied Troops,” inside the Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery). More generally, he was West Germany’s first Defense Minister, and avid promoter of German rearmament, despite his civilian background. For more on Blank, see “Theodor Blank, Bonn Defense Minister,” *New York Times*, May 15, 1972, 38. Both Blank and MacCoy were located in the Bonn area. Letter from W. Pierce MacCoy to Mr. Theodor Blank, Subj: Extension Military Airstrip, Heidelberg, September 19, 1951, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

EUCOM engineers quickly devised a solution the following week. The US military would build “a by-pass road around the airstrip” at a cost of 100,000 DM. Agreement was reached; Heidelberg city officials would withdraw their objections and relay their approval to Bundesland officials. The issue appeared settled.<sup>8</sup> A few days later, having not heard back from his Bonn counterpart, MacCoy contacted Blank again on 19 November to inform him of the agreeable settlement, almost repeating word-for-word Noce’s letter from earlier.<sup>9</sup>

As it turned out, the Federal Chancellery had also investigated the issue separately with Government Württemberg-Baden authorities and Blank responded to MacCoy two days prior to MacCoy’s second letter, on 17 November. The response highlighted “the loss of best arable and garden land, as well as ... the destruction of many valuable fruit-trees,” as well as interference “with farming work on the adjoining fields.” Nevertheless, the Chancellery understood the urgency of the request and was “prepared to accept agricultural losses if EUCOM [would workout] a solution to the resultant traffic security problem,” i.e., the Diebsweg secondary road. As Blank explained, this issue was not a minor one, as the road was the main connection between two districts (Kirchheim and Pfaffengrund) between which, traffic was “steadily increasing.” Furthermore, the EUCOM proposal “to erect, as a safeguard for vehicles and pedestrians, safety-barriers ... did not appear sufficient,” and Heidelberg city officials, speaking through Blank, voiced concern with the build-up of vehicular traffic along the Diebsweg. These concerns notwithstanding, the letter ended by confirming the jointly agreed solution of a new by-pass, to be funded by EUCOM officials.<sup>10</sup>

Despite their overlapping communications, both sides appeared in agreement on the issue and at the end of the year, Government Württemberg-Baden officials requested, through the

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<sup>8</sup> Letter from Daniel Noce, Major General, GS Chief of Staff, to Major General George P. Hays, Deputy United States High Commissioner for Germany, 5 November 1951, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

<sup>9</sup> Letter from W. Pierce MacCoy to Mr. Theodor Blank, Subj: Extension Military Airstrip, Heidelberg, November 19, 1951, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

<sup>10</sup> Letter from Herr Blank to Mr. W. Pierce MacCoy, November 17, 1951, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

Federal Chancellery, confirmation of the agreed upon terms from EUCOM officials, via the High Commissioner for Germany. In a 28 December letter, they requested confirmation on six points, including: the limitation of the extended strip crossing Diebsweg only to be used “by the plane of the Supreme Commander of the U.S. Army, General Thomas T. Handy”; this plane would only land and depart once a day, during the day, and “in good weather conditions”; two barriers, “similar to those used at railroad crossings,” were to be erected, along with light signals operated by American airfield personnel, who were to ensure that local traffic on the Diebsweg would not be halted over 15 minutes; US military personnel would take additional precautions to ensure security and safety; prior to construction, military officials would complete the necessary forms and provide city officials with a 100,000 DM check, to be used for road construction of their choosing; and finally, all maintenance concerning the barriers and light signals would be provided by US military officials for the duration of the airfield’s use.<sup>11</sup> On 2 January 1952, MacCoy forwarded the letter to Colonel L.F. Gordon of Logistics Division in Heidelberg, asking him to confirm the points, along with a written confirmation by Colonel David H. Tulley, commanding officer of the Engineer Division. Two weeks later, MacCoy received a confirmation letter on all six points, signed by a D.C. Turner, Lieutenant Colonel, and two weeks after that, on 30 January, MacCoy forwarded a confirmation by EUCOM officials to Blank.<sup>12</sup>

Two months passed before Blank responded in agreement. W. Pierce MacCoy had left his post and was replaced by Zinn B. Garrett, Special Assistant for Länder Operations. In a short reply, Blank confirmed that city and Land officials approved the project and had received the 100,000 DM

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<sup>11</sup> Letter from Herr Blank to Mr. W. Pierce MacCoy, Subj: Extension of the Airstrip on Airfield Heidelberg, December 28, 1951, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

<sup>12</sup> Letter from D.C. Turner to W. Pierce MacCoy, Subj: Extension of the Airstrip on Airfield Heidelberg, European Command, Headquarters, 16 January 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 70. Letter to Mr. Theodor Blank from W. Pierce MacCoy, Subj: Extension of the Airstrip on the Airfield Heidelberg, January 30, 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

payment from EUCOM officials. Construction work could now begin. At the end he noted: “I consider this case as cleared as far as my office is concerned.”<sup>13</sup>

In the meantime, EUCOM officials were already moving forward. Initially, the Logistics Division had approved 250,000 DM for the extension, after which the extra 100,000 DM was approved “for a by-pass road.” On 28 February 1952, an additional 380,000 DM was authorized by the Logistics Division, bringing total expenditure to 730,000 DM.<sup>14</sup> As construction progressed in spring and summer 1952, minor additional funds were allocated to update airfield facilities, including “the construction of administrative and barracks buildings” (figure 4.9).<sup>15</sup>

But in early fall 1952, HMP officials hit a road block. In a letter to city and Land officials, Heidelberg Military Post had requested an additional “eight hectares of land adjacent to the Army air strip.” They explained that the extra land was necessary as a safety precaution “to eliminate hazards to C-47 aircraft utilizing the field.” In order to stabilize “the shoulders of the runway,” an extra 50 feet on both sides of it, as well as an extra 200 feet on both ends, were necessary. On all four sides, the removal of trees was also required. The Germans opposed the request, countering that the new request was for good agricultural land. Stuck at an impasse, in late October USAREUR officials again elevated the issue to HICOG for assistance.<sup>16</sup> In a letter to Garrett, now Civil-Military Relations Officer, USAREUR pleaded its case, regretting the further acquisition of land, but pointing out the impossibility “to carry out adequate defense planning without acquiring vitally needed real estate,” without which, “landing and take-off operations at the air strip [could] be

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<sup>13</sup> Letter from Herr Blank to Mr. Z.B. Garrett, Subj: Extension of the Airstrip on the Airfield Heidelberg, April 8, 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

<sup>14</sup> Memo from Engineer Division to Heidelberg Military Post, 28 Feb 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1071.

<sup>15</sup> Memo from Engineer Division to Heidelberg Military Post, 20 Aug 1952, NARA RG 549, Boxes 1066-1071.

<sup>16</sup> On 1 August 1952, Headquarters, European Command (EUCOM) was redesigned Headquarters, United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), which remained in Heidelberg. At the same time, an effort to unify and consolidate naval, air force, and army operations was also established under the umbrella United States European Command (USEUCOM), based in Frankfurt. Later that fall, USEUCOM moved to the outskirts of Paris, and in 1967, after France withdrew from NATO, it relocated to Stuttgart. See Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953* (Darmstadt, Germany: Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), 156.



Figure 4.9 The U.S. Army in Europe Headquarters airfield in Heidelberg.  
17 Nov 1952. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal  
Officer. SC-425053.

performed only under hazardous conditions.” The urgency in the matter now required “negotiations at the highest possible level.”<sup>17</sup>

In response, Garrett relayed the USAREUR position to Blank, who was brought back into mix in early November. Despite their previous deadlock, Blank convinced both parties to a suitable compromise. In an early December response to Garrett, he spelled out the terms of the agreement: the air strip would be widened 30.5 meters on both sides, extended 61 meters on its western end, and 91 meters on its eastern end, for a total size of 7.58 hectares. Additionally, 3.44 hectares (379 meters by 91 meters to the west), would be cleared but not requisitioned.<sup>18</sup> Garrett immediately relayed the terms for confirmation four days later and on 2 March 1953, the file was closed (figures 4.10-4.11).<sup>19</sup>

What can we glean from this nineteen month episode? First, a more extensive level of collaboration had developed between various American and German agencies and officials. At a local level, Military Post officials were in dialogue and negotiation with German city officials around various planning and building aspects, such as securing and clearing land for construction. Agreements and setbacks were either hashed out between these officials, or raised to a higher level for confirmation or resolution. In the case above, that meant EUCOM-USAREUR officials and Government Württemberg-Baden authorities, both of whom appeared to support their lower level counterparts. Simultaneously, conflicts could also be raised with higher level officials in Bonn, such as representatives in the Federal Chancellery and HICOG. At this level, representatives appeared to work as conduits for local concerns, while also working cooperatively toward immediate resolutions.

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<sup>17</sup> Letter from Brigadier General L.V. Warner to Mr. Zinn Garrett, 30 Oct 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

<sup>18</sup> Letter from Zinn Garrett to Mr. Theodor Blank, November 6, 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 70; Letter from Herr Blank to Mr. Z.B. Garrett, Subj: Enlargement of the Army Landing Field in Heidelberg, December 4, 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 70.

<sup>19</sup> Letter from Zinn Garrett to Lt. Col. C.M. Duke, Logistics Division, December 8, 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 70.





Figure 4.10 Aerial view of Heidelberg airstrip. 2 Mar 1955. RG 111-SC:  
Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466123.



Figure 4.11 Luftbild: Film 100 Bildnr. 32. Landesvermessungsamt Baden-Württemberg: Landesbefliegung Baden-Württemberg 1968 - Luftbilder und digitales Orthophoto 1968. 2017-2021. 2-5939708.

There was also a new bureaucratic framework. On each side, various internal communications occurred between agencies in parallel to external communications between American and German constituents. Procedures were set in place to initiate new building activities for military post commanders, which channeled their way through several EUCOM-USAREUR departments. Even with a relatively simple project as an airstrip extension, several departments were involved. Similar activities occurred on the German side as well. The Federal Chancellery corresponded with city and state officials to confirm issues and interests, in order to determine the next course of action. In both cases, multiple levels of bureaucratic procedures took place internally, overlapping with external communications.

This new bureaucracy also created a temporal dimension. In the case above, a rather simple airstrip extension request had stretched to several months before actually being realized. This was not due to financial constraints, lack of expertise, or difficulty in acquiring the land, but rather the “technical objections” raised by German authorities of the airstrip crossing a main road (although they also, later, objected to losing agricultural land as well.) The bureaucratic procedures - confirming one side’s position while replying to another - meant that even a simple project like an extension could now drag on for any number of reasons. Any hold-up that could not be immediately resolved between the two local parties, could set a sequence of communications that extended the length of a project far beyond its initial timetable.

## **Episode Two: Heidelberg Officers’ Club**

But the new agency and cooperation could not only slow things down, they could also speed things up. Especially around pressures to derequisition properties in the city center, German agencies and officials were eager and proactive to expedite agreeable solutions with military officials. Conversely, releasing properties were a lower priority for American officials. With a new Heidelberg

hotel project for senior US military staff, occurring at the tail end of the airstrip negotiations, this reversal of positions and priorities became evident.

In March 1952, German and American officials coordinated efforts for a new hotel in Heidelberg for US military personnel. The construction of a new hotel was initiated for the explicit “purpose of the release of requisitioned hotels in Heidelberg.”<sup>20</sup> In particular, after it was built, four hotels in the city - the Viktoria, Wagner, Perkeo, and Schroeder - were to be released by American officials.<sup>21</sup> By September, general agreement was reached. The construction of the new hotel would not be charged against any occupation costs or mandatory budgets, but rather, 3.5 million DM in funds would be made available through the German federal budget. Military officials would have decision-making in site selection and “USAREUR [would] reserve the right to make a final decision on the plans and specifications.”<sup>22</sup> In addition, they would also have the right to inspect the site and construction activity at any time.

After several months of negotiations, the site and general design criteria were also agreed by city and military officials in September. The selected site was a small piece of municipal land in the Neuenheim residential suburb north of the Neckar. Among the single-family residences, an eight-story hotel was to be built, consisting of 200 rooms, a restaurant, dining room, ballroom, bar, and a cafe and terrace on the top floor.<sup>23</sup>

But the Federal Ministry of Finance took issue with the site and design and recommended changes. First, Dr. Heinz Oeftering of the Federal Ministry asked the city administration to make available a better site, a municipal plot along the Neckar and near the Ernst-Walz Bridge. The

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<sup>20</sup> Letter from Ministerialdirektor Professor Dr. Oeftering, Federal Ministry of Finance, to Mr. Zinn Garrett, Civil-Military Relations Officers, US-HICOG, 5 November 1954, NARA RG 466, Box 62.

<sup>21</sup> Letter from Dr. Oeftering to Lieutenant General Eddy, Commander-in-Chief, Headquarters, US Army, Europe, Heidelberg, 23 December 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 61,

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

motivation behind this alternate site was to maximize the hotel's financial potential, with the view that "this large hotel [was] sure to be a profitable enterprise" if it was relocated on a more ideal site near the river, rather than in the middle of the suburb. In its new location, the hotel would enjoy a "lovely view of the castle and the surrounding hills." Implicit in this alternate suggestion was the aim to build a hotel that, once transferred back to German ownership, would also serve future, local tourism interests. However, when it came to the interior design, Oeftering and Federal officials were less future orientated. Although they agreed in principle to the interior program, they did not agree to "Equipping all hotel rooms with an individual shower room, wash basin, toilet, and built-in wardrobe." Nor did they agree to the rooftop cafe and terrace, claiming that "the strained financial situation of the Federal Republic," required that "the Federal Ministry [keep] the total building expenses for the substitute hotel ... as low as possible." They also provided "a political point of view," arguing that German citizens "would not understand the necessity of luxurious furnishings."<sup>24</sup>

In January 1953, military officials agreed in principle to the changes suggested by the Federal Ministry. They approved the new site, removed the rooftop cafe and terrace, and agreed to reduce the number of private showers, toilets, and wash basins in the rooms. They also agreed to release the four hotels in their possession once the new hotel was constructed.<sup>25</sup> Despite these concessions, after an architectural competition commenced later that spring, the results revealed a new problem: "the total expenses would have been 5,5 million DM in order to build [according] to American requirements." As this price tag exceeded the available German federal funds, the project was immediately terminated.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>25</sup> Letter from Harry L. McFarland to Zinn Garrett, January 23, 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 62.

<sup>26</sup> Letter from Ministerialdirektor Professor Dr. Oeftering, Federal Ministry of Finance, to Mr. Zinn Garrett, Civil-Military Relations Officers, US-HICOG, 5 November 1954, NARA RG 466, Box 62.

Although the hotel did not move forward, Federal and city officials continued to explore the issue. As an alternative to the hotel, in early 1954 the Federal Ministry of Finance proposed the construction of four, 50-person bachelor officers' quarters (BOQ), for which 2.25 million DM would be made available from German Federal General Funds. In addition to securing the funding, this new direction would also accelerate construction by utilizing an already existent building type that did not require new designs. It was also a proven method, according to Federal officials, in releasing commercial properties, having been successfully employed in several other German cities.<sup>27</sup>

American officials countered with a new plan. In an early June 1954 meeting between USAREUR officials and the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe Heidelberg, American representatives informed their counterparts that new funding was being made available for the construction of BOQ on a new site. But rather than connect this new development to the release of city hotels, a thermal bath in Heidelberg, and a swimming pool in Mannheim, they requested that German officials also utilize new General German Federal Funds for the construction of a clubhouse, two swimming pools, three youth homes, and 22 tennis courts. The total estimated cost for these new structures was calculated at 3.43 million DM.<sup>28</sup>

The Federal Ministry balked at the new proposal, instead searching for a new middle ground. Two weeks after the USAREUR proposal was announced, the Federal Ministry noted that “no means from the General German Federal Funds could be provided for the construction of youth’ homes nor for the construction of tennis courts,” however, these funds would be made available for “community buildings” that would “enable the release of all requisitioned hotels in Heidelberg.” American officials agreed after four youth homes were added. Tentative plans were drawn up for one clubhouse with annex accommodations for officials and four youth homes, for which 6 million

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<sup>27</sup> For example, Bad Mergentheim, Mannheim, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt. Ibid., 1.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 2.

DM was allocated (1.5 million from German General Federal funds and 4.5 million from Mandatory Expenditure Funds).<sup>29</sup>

But there was one final barrier. In November 1954, the Federal Ministry again balked at providing funds for the four youth homes. But they also increased their contribution by one million for the clubhouse, to a total of 2.5 million DM. With this increase they expected the immediate services for the clubhouse could be satisfied. More importantly for them, with the added one million deutsche marks, they expected “all requisitioned hotels will be released in the course of 1955.”<sup>30</sup>

Throughout the negotiations the German position and priority centered around derequisitioning. Federal authorities highlighted the loss of revenue due to requisitioned properties, noting in Heidelberg’s case that tourist revenue had “decreased by approximately 80%” with the continued requisition of the city’s hotels. They also accepted the military policy that these properties would only be released after alternative options were made available on a one-to-one correspondence. Working within that context, they attempted to initiate several options, first the hotel, then the four BOQ, in order to initiate the releases. Their aim remained solely focused on the hotels, for which they continuously expressed “a strong interest.” For their part, American officials appeared to register German derequisitioning objectives as a potential opportunity to extract a few more services. From the initial hotel, first offered in 1952 in order to accommodate senior officials, the list of services continued to grow beyond a one-to-one correspondence between release and new offering. By June 1954, they had expanded their request to include recreational facilities that surely exceeded their requisitioned holdings, for instance, 22 tennis courts. The necessity of their request also appeared somewhat unclear; for example, they first asked for three youth homes along with swimming pools and tennis courts, and after having all those services rejected by German officials, then asked for four youth homes. Finally, unlike the high priority airstrip example, in this

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 3.

example they exhibited greater patience in negotiations, allowing time to pass and content not to elevate negotiations to HICOG officials. It was rather German officials who attempted to expedite the process, and who, in November 1954, reached out to their American Bonn counterparts for assistance. A week after receiving a request for assistance from the Federal Ministry in early November, Zinn Garrett of HICOG communicated with USAREUR officials in Heidelberg to confirm their position.<sup>31</sup>

USAREUR officials accepted the Federal Ministry's offer in late January 1955. The agreement set for a new Officers' Club with a Senior Officers' annex to be constructed for 2.5 million DM (figure 4.12). Both facilities were to be constructed at Hegenichhof, a new site southwest of Heidelberg and west of Campbell Barracks, and totaling 65,000 square-feet (40,000 for the club, 15,000 for the annex). Any costs exceeding the 2.5 million were to be paid by American officials. Both structures would conform to Engineer Division guides, be supervised by Engineer personnel, and built by German construction firms. Once complete, along with BOQ already under construction at the site, American officials would release eleven hotels and clubs in the city. Finally, the American response noted that "Expeditious action toward completion ... will result in early release of the above properties."<sup>32</sup>

Specifications for the new club were explicit in connecting the building to larger German contexts. As a club for senior personnel at Headquarters Area Command, the expectation was that the venue would entertain "high ranking US government dignitaries and guests," and therefore, the building's "architectural treatment and degree of finish [should] be of high quality." For the exterior,

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.; Letter from Zinn Garrett to Colonel J. H. Kerkerling, Logistics Division, USAREUR, 12 November 1954, NARA RG 466, Box 62.

<sup>32</sup> The properties to be returned were as follows: the hotels were the Europa, Victoria, Perkeo, Schrieder, Wagner, Hansa Haus, Darmstaedter Hof, and Bayrischer Hof, and the clubs were the Stadtgarten, Macogen, and Molkenkur. Letter from R.L. Burch, Captain AGC to Mr. Archer Blood, US High Commissioner for Germany, 27 Jan 1955, NARA RG 466, Box 62.





Figure 4.12 Officers Club, Patrick Henry Village. Sept 1964. RG 111-SC:  
Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-612584.

this meant a design that would “blend with surrounding architecture and maintain a definite German influence.” The material options for walls included “stone, brick, timber and stucco,” while “concrete, asphalt plates or paving bricks” were suggested for terraces and sidewalks. Roof recommendations included sloped roof tiles or mosaic tiles. For the interior, “typical” German themes were recommended. Examples, such as “Bavarian, Jaeger, [or] University rooms” were suggested for specific spaces, such as the main dining room area, the ballroom, cocktail lounge, bar, cafeteria, and the party rooms.<sup>33</sup>

Between the airstrip and officers’ club projects, a deliberate effort to collaborate was evident, as well as the intentions of each side to pursue specific interests. For American officials, priority projects such as the airstrip required immediate attention and, if delayed, escalation. Neither did raising the issue up the chain of command prevent parallel, local efforts to resolve disagreements and find working solutions. We saw a somewhat similar approach with the 1952 housing projects in the previous chapter. While officials there worked to resolve land acquisition issues, they also prepared new policy procedures and initiated bids for construction. More haphazardly, they even started fieldwork on a site which they had not yet secured. Ultimately, with the airstrip extension military officials were willing to pay a premium in order to break the deadlock with German authorities. By comparison, extending the airstrip did not aid German interests, which at the time were centered around derequisitioning. In fact, the extension had two negative consequences, first in losing agricultural land, and second in bisecting a major road between two areas. If American officials were willing to pay to push their project forward, German authorities showed they were willing to disregard these inconveniences for a price. Despite their opposing interests, both sides accepted collaboration as preferable to resistance or more forceful tactics.

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<sup>33</sup> “Outline Specifications for Proposed Officers Club, Hegenichhof,” Engineer Division, Headquarters, USAREUR, 27 Jan 1955, NARA RG 466, Box 62.

The roles were reversed with the Officers' Club. For Americans, a new hotel was an acceptable convenience, but not a priority. The current state of hotel and club requisitions in the city center, which had not changed since 1945, continued to sustain American requirements, even if the facilities were being utilized less frequently than earlier. For Germans, the issue was more dire. The lost of revenue was no longer due to military occupation per se, but rather the military's insistence to retain properties in their service until they were absolutely sure these properties were no longer needed. Thus the properties remained unavailable or partially available as well as under utilized. And they did so at a moment when business opportunities were beginning to expand.<sup>34</sup> Another factor with the hotel proposal was the location. For German authorities, a working assumption was that the new hotel would initially be built for senior military staff, but at some future date, would transfer to German control. As such, an ideal location along the river and an architectural competition were acceptable conditions for the project. But by June 1954, American officials appeared less invested in supporting a new project in the city, and instead more focused on further consolidating a military presence on an alternative site. Before moving on to the development of that site, it is useful to examine one more episode of American-German entanglements and the complex negotiations and interests around housing for both parties. In the immediate, the example relates specifically to new housing in Heidelberg, as well as the larger American zone; later we will see how it also relates to housing programs in the British and French occupations zones.

### **Episode Three: Heidelberg Alternate Housing - Size Matters**

Recall from the previous chapter that Heidelberg Military Post encountered a series of difficulties in getting its housing program off the ground in 1951 and early 1952. On two occasions

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<sup>34</sup> In general, by the early 1950s, the recovery and "miracle" of the West German social market economy under Ludwig Erhard was in full gear. "[D]uring the 1950s the West German economy grew by an astounding 8.2 percent per year." The causes for this growth have generated vast scholarship; for an overview see Konrad Hugo Jarausch, *After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 72-90 (quote from 89). For a detailed study, see Anthony James Nicholls, *Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918-1963* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.)

Heidelberg Military Post encountered push back from city authorities around site selection. Meanwhile Heidelberger citizens grew frustrated with the slow release of their properties. Nevertheless, German authorities remained committed to working with their American counterparts toward developing solutions. Thus, at the very moment HMP officials attempted (and failed) to secure land for new housing across from the 130th Station hospital complex, German authorities also suggested a new, alternate housing program for American military personnel.

On 10 March 1952, both American and German officials met in Heidelberg to discuss the new housing initiative. The objective was to accelerate the release of requisitioned properties by beginning a complementary housing program. The critical component to the initiative was that for each new apartment built, a corresponding requisitioned apartment would be released and returned. For German officials the project was “deemed most appropriate in view of the fact that 242 one-family houses with 331 apartments and 207 apartment houses with 778 apartments [were] under requisition.” American officials also viewed the idea approvingly in view of their failures to initiate their own housing construction, as well as the agreement by German authorities to a series of conditions, including: the “financing of this construction [would] not be charged to occupation costs and mandatory expenditures or future defense funds,” Heidelberg Military Post would still control and have final authority on the planning, have equal say in site selection, and be mutually involved in determining which properties to release once new alternative housing was complete. There appeared few drawbacks and both sides were in agreement.<sup>35</sup>

In September, the Federal Ministry was ready to provide funding for a first phase test. It contacted the Commander in Chief of USAREUR, Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, informing him of a plan, agreed in principle, to construct forty-eight apartments for American personnel in Heidelberg, consisting of two types: the first option was a three-bedroom apartment at 950 square-

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<sup>35</sup> Letter from Dr. Oeftering, Federal Ministry of Finance to Lieutenant General Eddy, Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR, 15 September 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

feet and a two-bedroom apartment at 840 square-feet; and the second option was a three-bedroom apartment of 1,245 square-feet, and a two-bedroom option of 1,060 square-feet. The average construction cost for the first type was 30,600 DM, and for the second type, 35,250 DM. But according to preliminary Federal Ministry calculations, this amounted to construction costs of 2,500 DM per cubic foot, which they objected to for being too high. In their efforts “to effect a reduction in the construction expenses,” they demanded that building costs “must be reduced” to 2,300 DM per cubic foot. To justify this reduction, they noted that “the apartments for foreign diplomats [were] built on a basis of DM 63.00 per cubic meter [2,225 DM per cubic foot] ... and apartments for civil servants on a basis of DM 54.00 per cubic meter [1,907 DM per cubic foot].” To achieve the 200 DM reduction per unit, they recommended reducing the second options’ total square footage from 1,245 square-feet to 1,087 square-feet in the three-bedroom, and 1,060 to 960 square-feet in the two-bedroom.<sup>36</sup>

The Federal Ministry also expressed a desire to expand the alternate housing program. Once the changes were made and agreed upon for Heidelberg, they would also be offered in other area commands. The Bundestag “requested the execution of a similar construction project” in several other locations, for which the Federal Ministry was prepared “to make funds available.” These included Mannheim, Nürnberg, Bamberg, Erlangen, Munich, and Wetzlar. In each case, the Heidelberg plans would “be used as a basis for the construction of apartments in [these areas] by adapting them according to the respective local situations.”<sup>37</sup>

At the end of the correspondence to General Eddy, the Federal Ministry made reference to a potential problem. After the March meeting and general agreement on the alternate housing program, a EUCOM letter in late April clarified the US military position concerning minimum “living space” standards. EUCOM would “not approve the construction of apartments” that did not

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 3.

meet specific minimum specifications: 800 square-feet for one-bedroom apartments, 1,050 square-feet for two-bedroom apartments, and 1,250 square-feet for three-bedroom apartments.

Additionally, it requested that certain amenities be included in units, such as kitchen cabinets and built-in shelving in bedrooms. Rather than address these differences in their September correspondence, the Federal Ministry requested a meeting with Eddy in order to discuss moving the program forward. Nevertheless, an evident issue between the minimum standards of American military personnel and the maximum standards of German authorities had emerged.<sup>38</sup>

In a November response, military officials confirmed the issue and their position. After acknowledging the “considerable trouble and expense ... German authorities [were] prepared to go to” in their desire to construct the 48 apartments, the letter expressed dismay with the Federal Ministry’s suggestion to “scale down the size of the apartments.” Although local agencies in Heidelberg had reached an agreement, in which “the planned apartments appeared to represent adequate accommodations,” the Federal Ministry’s suggested changes of reducing the sizes of the apartments were considered undesirable. The reductions “of such small size [were] not within the standards ... for military and civilian personnel through the command and thus [were] unacceptable in exchange for presently held facilities.” In order to facilitate an exchange, military officials reiterated several demands. Inspections at various stages of construction and prior to “final acceptance” must be allowed; various amenities, including central heating, refrigerators, ranges, built-in kitchen cabinets, built-in closets in bedrooms, sideboards, china closets, and furniture must be included in each unit; German authorities would bear all expenses for these utilities and amenities; none of the costs would be charged against current or future US budgets; and minimum space requirements would be followed. In addition, military authorities recommended German authorities disregard an absolute ceiling on unit costs, “since construction costs will vary with location and site.” Finally, there was a statement expressed in the beginning of the response and reiterated at the end.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 4.

“New units must be commensurate with those the Federal Government desires to have derequisitioned.” And later, “Units released will be generally commensurate with the size and quality of apartments furnished in exchange.”<sup>39</sup>

The commensurability between new apartments and existing accommodations represented a new requirement by military officials. Part of this simply reflected that German authorities were now in a willing position to build apartment buildings for American military personnel, for which Americans felt the need to define their standards. But it also highlighted and complicated a previous position accepted by both sides, in which new military housing was assumed to be transferrable to a German middle class after American use. The initial seizure of residential properties in 1945 consisted of a range of properties, for instance the accommodations seized across the river along Philisophenweg were not middle class residences, but rather villas owned and previously occupied by a local elite. The apartment buildings seized in the city center represented a more modest and, for German authorities, acceptable middle class standard, from which to build new alternate housing schemes for American personnel. But for military officials, these apartments represented only the lower limit of military standards, that would require several upgrades to be deemed acceptable in potentially newer offerings. German authorities were thus stuck in a complex triangle, looking at the past and requisitioned properties, at the present and American requirements, and to an abstract future of what German residential needs might be.

Nevertheless, military officials continued to demand that commensurability be met for alternate housing proposals. In a supplemental letter to their November response, officials noted that the military housing program was initiated “to overcome existent or impending [housing] shortages,” rather than address requisitioned properties. There was thus a certain satisfaction if housing needs were fulfilled through the combination of requisitioning and new construction. However, they did not object to German authorities building alternative housing in order to expedite

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<sup>39</sup> Letter from L.D. Lott, Colonel AGS, to Mr. Zinn Garrett, 12 Nov 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

the release of properties, but only if these alternate offerings were considered acceptable. It was “strongly urged,” the letter continued, “that the German authorities develop standard plans for apartments complying with the established criteria,” detailed in the November response. If this route was taken, “an agreement” would soon follow. To assist their German counterparts further, military officials offered design guidance. They included in the supplemental letter the typical two- and three-bedroom plans being used by the US military as a “point of departure,” and assured the Federal Ministry that with “aggressive control procedures” in place, the apartments could be constructed “for little more [than] the optimum cost figures quoted by the chancellory.” The plans were the Type IVA variant, already in use throughout West Germany, and seemed to suggest that the quickest route to the release of residential properties was for German authorities to simply take these designs, already approved by USAREUR, as their building model (figures 4.13a-b).<sup>40</sup>



In mid-January 1953, the Federal Ministry of Finance responded with a lengthy fourteen page letter, bringing to the fore their own significant condition. After reiterating its financial commitment of 75 million DM, for which 90% was allocated for new military housing, and the “lively public controversy” at the Federal and Land level of prolonged requisitions, it highlighted the legal basis of the American policy and the time limits of that position.<sup>41</sup> Although initially within international law, the Occupation Statute that allowed for confiscations and requisitions would expire one year after the Federal Republic was granted full sovereignty. After a one year transition period had passed, “the continued availability of those private dwellings ... [would] be subject to ... the ‘Bundesleistungsgesetz’,” for which the German Bundestag had “made it quite clear that they would not approve” a continuation of requisition policy except one “limited to the essential

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<sup>40</sup> Supplemental letter, L.D. Lott, Colonel AGS, to Mr. Garrett, 1 Dec 1952, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

<sup>41</sup> The letter noted that the entire 75 million DM was approved by the Federal Ministry of Finance and the German Bundestag and that none of the funds were connected to the Allied Occupation costs or Mandatory Expenditure costs, but rather through the Einzelplan XXVII of the German Federal Budget. The letter also provided several examples of private residences under requisition that had not been occupied for between one year and 32 months. Federal Ministry of Finance to Mr. Garrett, Civil Military Relations Officer, HICOG, 15 January 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.





Figures 4.13ab "Proposed Alternate Housing, 2 Bed Room Unit," Guide Specifications for Construction of Alternate Accommodations for U.S. Forces, 26 February 1953, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Engineer Division Construction Branch, RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.

minimum [that would] not prejudice the owners' own requirements." In addition, the new scope of requisitioning would be complemented by an equally "limited" and "clearly specified and relatively short period," and German owners would have the right "to appeal to the appropriate German court." The letter immediately warned that in such cases, there was "no doubt" that German courts "[would] in numerous cases disallow any extension of the requisition beyond the said period of one year." The repercussions for American personnel would be moving from one property to another for short periods, the charges of which would come from support funds or even "the domestic funds of the Forces."<sup>42</sup>

The letter also addressed the "satisfactory" of German alternate offerings. Rather than taking "the extraordinarily lavish standards established" during the occupation period as a reference point, the Federal Ministry recommended following the already established rules under the Occupation Statute. In this case, consideration of German interests and "the capacity of the German economy" would be factored in making decisions guided by "objective principles." If agreement were out of reach, then recourse to an Arbitration Tribunal should be utilized. The response ended by noting that existing policy agreements made no mention of allowing military forces to refuse alternative housing, nor any references to financial requirements for alternate accommodations. It rather only referenced "space requirements, which [were] to be kept to a minimum."<sup>43</sup>

To break the impasse, a conference was scheduled for 4 February 1953 between several members of the Federal Ministry and German Building Advisory Group, Heidelberg, and General Eddy and his staff. In a short note on 29 January, Zinn Garrett instructed Dr. Oeftering and the German representatives attending to "proceed directly to [General Eddy's] office ... in the

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 6-7.

Command Building” for their 9:30am meeting.<sup>44</sup> In another office memo on the same day, Garrett provided some context to a Bonn colleague, noting that “approximately 23,000 homes are still under requisition” and had been “since 1945.” Although they were making progress, agreement was difficult since “the Army insists upon something like the present Army apartments and the Germans offer smaller, less expensive [alternatives].” Garrett then compared this deadlock to negotiations between the Air Force and German authorities, and noted that “unofficial” agreement had been reached for the Air Force to “accept the apartments offered by the Germans.” “This should blackjack USAREUR into accepting them also,” Garrett concluded, “since the Army could hardly face criticism that the apartments were good enough for the Air Force, but not good enough for the Army.”<sup>45</sup>

Before the meeting could start, it was rescheduled at the last minute by General Eddy’s office. On 9 February, Garrett confirmed to his Bonn colleague the rescheduled meeting set for the following day. He urged his colleague to contact General Eddy “and impress upon him the political importance of reaching an agreement.” One possible line of argument “could suggest to General Eddy that it will be difficult to explain to the American as well as to the German public how the apartments Oeftering offers to build are good enough for the Air Force, but not good enough for the Army.”<sup>46</sup>

When the meeting occurred the following day, USAREUR officials were less concerned. General Eddy did not attend, and no agreement was reached. According to Garrett’s assessment two days later, the issue remained the Federal Ministry’s budget ceiling of 31,000 DM per unit and the military’s floor of 38,000 DM per unit. This difference impacted the size of accommodations, which

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<sup>44</sup> Letter from Zinn Garrett to Dr. Oeftering, January 29, 1953, NARA 466, Box 61.

<sup>45</sup> Garrett ended his memo noting that the chances for agreement were good, which was “very important ... since German home owners are not in a mood to wait much longer for their homes.” Office Memorandum from Zinn Garrett to Mr. S. Reber, January 29, 1953, NARA 466, Box 61.

<sup>46</sup> Garrett also reiterated “the protests of home owners ... [was] becoming more and more bitter.” Letter from Zinn Garrett to Mr. S. Reber, February 9, 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

neither side was willing to compromise. Garrett summed up the issue: “The difficulty has to do with size: the Army insists upon 1,080 square-feet per unit, the Germans propose 1,030 square-feet.”<sup>47</sup> As such, the alternate housing program in Heidelberg broke down.

In their approach, American military officials appeared to shift their attention on housing costs now that those costs had shifted out of their hands. While they remained cost conscious with their own housing program, they attempted to convince their German counterparts to be less concerned with the issue. We saw in the previous chapter and the previous housing projects in Heidelberg, that engineer personnel continuously worked to consolidate more apartments into fewer buildings and reduce the overall cost per apartment unit. Throughout this time, even American government officials pressured the US Army to develop more moderate living standards. On the other hand, despite rising construction costs, by the time negotiations on alternate housing were taking place, military engineers had reduced the construction costs per unit by approximately 10,000 DM in two years. But as German federal officials pointed out, this was still more than other government officials. Even more alarming was Garrett’s observation comparing the US Air Force’s acceptance of German alternate housing, while the US Army refused it.

One way to account for the US Army’s position is to consider what may have occurred if they accepted the German ceiling of 31,000 DM per unit construction. In this case, two types of housing would have been available to enlisted personnel; an American, larger apartment, and a German, smaller one. At this point, American-built housing already had three main types - the Type I, Type III, and Type IV - of varying, though large, size. If the smaller alternate housing were added to this list, the difference between the largest offering - a three bedroom Type I at 1,450 square feet - and the largest of the smallest - a three bedroom alternate apartment at 1,030 square feet - would have represented an almost 28% difference. From a military perspective that prioritized standardization and chain of command, this difference would have been too great. The

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<sup>47</sup> Letter from Zinn Garrett to Mr. S. Reber, February 12, 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

standardization of housing had a clear financial advantage, but it also operated to reinforce a military uniformity important for maintaining order and control.<sup>48</sup> For the US Air Force, the German housing option was more feasible because the branch's presence in West Germany was smaller, newer, and had not embarked on a housing program at all comparable to the US Army's. For diplomats and civil servants, overseas accommodations had always been provided by foreign governments, and therefore did not have an issue of different housing standards within a specific country. In the US Army's case, alternate housing was being offered after military officials had already begun their own housing program and therefore a comparison and linking between the two was viewed as crucial. Nevertheless, refusing to compromise on a large-scale initiative fully funded by German authorities at a time when political tensions around housing were high and the US Army's housing program was behind, was a risky move. Would military officials regret their stance?

In the immediate term, the failure to initiate an alternate housing program in Heidelberg did not mean the German initiative was over. Derequisitioning residential properties was far too important to rely on the success and time of a single case. Rather than renegotiations around developing a test model that could be rolled out elsewhere, Federal Ministry authorities (and military officials) simply bypassed the specific failure at Heidelberg, and developed a more general plan.

### **Alternate Housing Program**

The Federal Ministry of Finance's initiative to expedite the release and return of residential properties was not isolated to one case study, but rather a larger effort throughout the Federal Republic, that aimed to address the frustrations of German citizens separated from their residences. In the American zone, since the EUCOM-USAREUR housing programs only aimed to provide housing for troop increases, the Federal Ministry stepped in to supplement those efforts with an

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<sup>48</sup> For an alternative interpretation of later US military design and construction policies prioritizing the "familiarity" of American suburbia, see Mark L. Gillem, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 73.

alternate housing program that would link - one by one - already existing requisitioned properties with new military housing, i.e., for each new, alternate apartment built, one requisitioned property would be released.<sup>49</sup>

On 6 October 1952, the Federal Ministry of Finance introduced the “First Program for the Construction of Alternate Buildings for the Forces for the purpose of releasing Requisitioned Buildings.” The program called for 893 apartments to be built across four Lander - Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and Bremen - and 34 US military sites. The two largest sites were Frankfurt (124 apartments) and Munich (100 apartments). In all cases, the financing followed the Heidelberg example, with funding fully provided by the German federal government.<sup>50</sup> By mid February 1953, a consolidated and expanded list was developed, with 1,008 US Army units approved across 13 military sites, as well as an additional 500 US Air Force units approved.<sup>51</sup> Later that month, USAREUR issued a specifications guide for alternate housing, in which they detailed the approved construction procedures, from site work, masonry, plastering, floor slabs, waterproofing, sound absorption, insulation, terrazzo flooring and tile work, roofing, joinery for doors, windows, and screens, wood flooring, locksmith’s work, glazing, painting, central heating and hot water, cold and hot water supply, drainage, plumbing, electrical work, and finally, built-in furniture.<sup>52</sup> As an annex to these specifications, they also included approved plans. A week later, the Federal Ministry of Finance

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<sup>49</sup> David A. Lane, James J. Borrer, and George W. Tays, “The U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953-1957,” Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, Headquarters, 1958, 36.

<sup>50</sup> Letter from Prof. Dr. Oeftering to Mr. Zinn Garrett, Civil-Military Relations Officer, Subj: “Construction of Housing in exchange for the Release of Requisitioned Private Dwellings which are under USAREUR Control,” January 15, 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

<sup>51</sup> Letter from Harry L. McFarland to Mr. Zinn Garrett, 16 Feb 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

<sup>52</sup> “Guide Specifications for Construction of Alternate Accommodations for U.S. Forces, [Richtlinien zum Leistungsverzeichnis der Abgeänderten Wohnblockbauten fuer U.S. Forces],” Headquarters United States Army, Europe, Engineer Division, Construction Branch, 26 February 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

issued its own guide specifications for 1,506 alternate apartments, and included the same floor plans for both the two-bedroom and three-bedroom apartments.<sup>53</sup>

The apartments were the USAREUR-approved Type IVA, with slight overall adjustments. Rather than the four-story options recommended by Husted and van Kyuck, the alternate options came either as a three-story apartment building with two staircases and twelve total units, split evenly between six two-bedroom offerings and six three-bedroom offerings; or a two-story building with two staircases and eight total units, again evenly split between two- and three-bedroom options. In both cases, the overall length and width of the buildings remained the same - 49.98m x 9.34m - while the height on the three story option was 10.65 meters, versus 7.90 meters for the two-story building.<sup>54</sup> The interior layouts were identical to the Type IVA series, including the overall size, which was 1,180 square-feet for the three bedroom, and 980 square-feet for the two bedroom.

So the Federal Ministry gave in to USAREUR's space requirements? In short, yes. The US Army's refusal to compromise on minimum space requirements ultimately paid off, with German authorities agreeing to their terms. To do so, Federal Ministry officials adjusted their approach in two fundamental ways. First, they reduced the options available from two options with two variants, to one option with two variants. With the new options - 1,180 square-feet for three bedrooms and 980 square-feet for two bedrooms - the alternate housing sat between their previous offerings - 1245 and 950 for three bedrooms, and 1,060 and 840 for two bedrooms. In this way, they simplified and reduced their costs per unit. Second, they reduced overall construction costs by proposing smaller overall buildings. The smaller buildings, offering either twelve or eight units per building, also counter balanced the larger unit sizes, making the alternate program more feasible for German authorities.

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<sup>53</sup> "Grundrisstypen und Baubeschreibung für Austausch-Wohnunseinheiten in der Amerikanischen Zone des Bundesgebietes, Erstes Program," Federal Ministry of Finance, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 2.

So the Heidelberg alternate housing program was back on? Not quite. Although the Federal Ministry and USAREUR reached agreement in April 1953 for the general alternate housing program, and Heidelberg remained on the list of places for which alternate housing was to be built, agreement on specifics was still not reached between Heidelberg Military Post and Federal Ministry officials.<sup>55</sup> This was not necessarily a unique circumstance. As the program got underway, a number of adjustments occurred to the overall number of dwellings and their locations, responding to the shifting of US military's troops.<sup>56</sup> And as the October 1952 Federal Ministry press release had noted in the main title, this was only the initiation of the first program. In a draft of a later April 1953 press release, the Germans ended their statement noting that negotiations on a "second program" would begin soon.<sup>57</sup> There was thus greater emphasis on initiating a general program, or series of programs, than pursuing individuals cases.

The general program proved a success, with 1,506 alternate units being constructed - beginning in fall 1953 - by German building agencies for US military personnel. In Bavaria, 558 units were built, the bulk of which were located in Munich.<sup>58</sup> In Hesse, another 558 units were built, with Frankfurt gaining the most. In Baden-Württemberg, 342 units were approved with Mannheim being allocated 96 units. Heidelberg was still included on the list, now for 90 alternate units. And finally, Bremen and Bremerhaven were approved for 48 units. With each new unit built, a corresponding

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<sup>55</sup> Letter from Dr. Scaeffler, Federal Ministry of Finance, to Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe, Subj: "First Program for Construction of Alternate Dwellings in the US Zone in Germany," 14 April 1953; and Letter from Edward T. Williams, Major General, Chief of Staff, to Mr. Zinn Garrett, 16 April 1953, NARA RG 466, 61.

<sup>56</sup> There were also numerous cases in which no combination of 8- and 12- unit apartments would add up the desired goal, e.g., there were ten cases of constructing and releasing six units, six proposals to build and release eighteen units, and three proposals to construct and release thirty apartment units. All of these were adjusted in order to consolidate building locations and reduce construction costs. See letter from Ministerialrat Weise to Mr. Zinn Garrett, July 13, 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

<sup>57</sup> "Entwurf, Presseverlautbarung," Der Bundesminister der Finanzen, April 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

<sup>58</sup> Munich was initially allocated 102 units for US Army personnel, but after consolidation efforts, this number increased to 132. The extra thirty units were transferred from Bad Tölz. Similarly, 30 units originally planned for Sonthofen were reallocated to Kaufbeuren (18 units) and Fuessen (12 units). Numerous changes of this sort took place in early summer 1953. See letter from R. L. Burch to Mr. Zinn Garrett, 1 June 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.



dwelling was returned to the previous German owner, thus fulfilling the main objective of the program. Even before these results started to bear fruit, the Federal Ministry initiated a second alternate housing program. By the time the second program was completed, in August 1957, an additional 1,662 units were built under the joint venture (figures 4.14-4.15).<sup>59</sup>


Whereas the previous encounters between German and American officials addressed specific developments, e.g., the airstrip and club, the alternate housing program raised the collaboration to a general housing program. The German federal government was under intense and continued pressure to act on the seizures of private property that had now stretched over eight years. The impetus to develop a new housing program signaled a coordinated action to respond to these domestic pressures, relieving pressure on German elected officials by coercing military officials' hands to act more quickly around their control of properties. For their part, military officials were more reluctant to give in to external pressures. Although their own housing construction program continued to lag behind the troop increases, they remained committed to already established policy specifications. The collaborative entanglement between the respective agencies ultimately worked out after German officials adjusted their position around American size requirements. But how unique were these events? Did German officials initiate similar programs in other zones to address property seizures? Did they have to adjust their proposals to fit similar requests from other military organizations? To examine these circumstances, let us briefly step out of the American zone, and into the British and French zones of occupation.

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<sup>59</sup> The initial press release for the second program indicated another 1,740 alternate units to be constructed: 768 in Land Bavaria, 342 in Land Baden-Württemberg, 582 in Land Hesse, and 48 in Bremen. Federal Ministry of Finance, Press Release, NARA RG 466, Box 61. In total, 4,284 units were built under the two German alternate housing programs - 3,168 units for the US Army, and 1,116 for the US Air Force. See Tays, "The U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 1953-1957," 39.



Figures 4.14 Dependent housing area, Landstuhl, Germany. 3 Sept 1964.  
RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-612554.



Figures 4.15 “Austauschwohnungen für die Amerikanischen Streitkräfte, Wohnungen mit 2 und 3 Schlafzimmern,” in Supplementary Program, Obörregierungsrat Rocke, Federal Ministry of Finance to Mr. Zinn Garrett, Civil-Military Relations Officer US-HICOG, 20 March 1954, RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.

## **Alternate Housing in the British and French Zones**

Parallel and simultaneous to American and German negotiations on new supplemental housing in exchange for private requisitioned properties, the German Federal Ministry of Finance also entered into talks with British and French military authorities to develop similar housing programs that would alleviate the tensions around seized properties in both respective zones of occupation. By early spring 1953, the Federal Ministry and both occupying powers had each come to agreements.

In the British zone of occupation the Federal Ministry agreed to build 1,000 substitute housing units across 41 British military sites. Of the total offerings, 920 units were to be constructed in the British zone of occupation and an additional 80 units in the British sector of Berlin. Half of the total units were to be built in Land North Rhine-Westphalia at twenty-two locations. The largest concentration was in Düsseldorf with 57 dwellings, followed by Minden and Wuppertal, each with 40 dwellings. In Land Niedersachsen, 319 units were to be constructed and exchanged across 14 locations with the most in Hannover, followed by Celle and Oldenburg. In Schleswig-Holstein, 70 apartments were agreed in the plan, with 40 at Neumünster. Finally, Hamburg had 31 apartments included, along with Berlin's 80, for construction and exchange.<sup>60</sup>

For the most part, the British plan was the same as the American case. As with the Americans, the building sites were to be agreed on by both German and British agencies, ideally on public lands and on or near military sites already in use by British forces. Revisions to specific sites would also be negotiated between British and German officials. German building agencies would carry out the actual building activities, while British officials would have the right to visit and inspect sites as they desired. Crucially, as the substitute housing units were completed, requisitioned properties would be released on a one-to-one basis. Finally, the funding for the substitute units

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



<sup>60</sup> Federal Ministry of Finance to UK High Commissioner, Subj: First Programme for the construction of substitute dwellings in the British Zone of Occupation and in the British Sector of Berlin, 31 March 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.

would not be charged against either Allied Occupation Costs, Mandatory Expenditure Budgets, or other funds to support British forces. Instead, they would come from Federal Ministry funds in line with the American program. However, substitute units would not be supplied additional “furniture and fittings.” If the British forces required these additions, they would “be debited” to either of these funds.<sup>61</sup>

Despite these similarities, there was one significant difference: the size and offering of actual dwellings. Unlike the American insistence on minimum size requirements, the British accepted the German offerings, which came in four options (figures 4.16a-d). The Type I was a two-bedroom unit designed to accommodate a four-person family. In addition to a bathroom and kitchen, it had a combined dining and living room space that connected to a balcony. The unit measured at 792 square-feet; almost 200 square-feet less than the American two-bedroom offering. The Type II followed a similar pattern to the Type I but larger, adding a third bedroom and separating the toilet from the rest of the bathroom. At 906 square-feet, this four- or five family unit still measured some 74 square-feet less than the smallest American alternate option. In the case of a four person family, the added bedroom could be used for maid quarters; another difference from American living standards that located maids’ quarters outside of the dwelling. Both the Type I and II were contained in either a two- or three story apartment building with a central staircase connected to two apartments per floor, similar to the general building layout of the American options. The overall length was not to exceed 50 meters, which meant the largest apartment building could accommodate twelve units in total. The Type III/RH was a duplex with two bedrooms, for a four person family. It measured 847 square-feet in addition to a basement and backyard space. Finally, the Germans offered the British a Type IV/RH, another duplex with three bedrooms that accommodated up to

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.



Figures 4.16a-d Basic Types and Description of Buildings for Substitute Dwelling Units in the British Zone of the Federal Territory and in the British Sector of Berlin, The Federal Minister of Finance, Bonn, 31 March 1953, RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.







five people. Excluding the basement, even this largest option was still smaller than the smallest American option, measuring at 956 square-feet.<sup>62</sup>

One month after British and German authorities reached agreement on their housing program, French and German authorities reached a deal. Again, the terms and conditions of the French substitute housing program were exactly the same as the British - financing, one-to-one exchange, collaboration in site selection, German construction, and French oversight - except in one area: unit offerings (figures 4.17a-f). Whereas American military forces were offered two types of dwellings and British forces were offered four types, French military forces were offered ten housing options. All four British options were also offered to the French, albeit under different designations, for instance, the British Type I was relabeled as the French Type 3, the British Type II was configured exactly like the French Type 4, the British Type III/RH duplex was also the French Type 3/RH duplex, and the British Type IV/RH duplex was the same as the French Type 4/RH duplex. The other options included one and two bedroom apartments, designated as Type 2 (3) LgH, accessed from a central, enclosed staircase, and then a semi open corridor almost the full length of the building. The Type 2a was a 500 square-foot one bedroom with basement for the ground level apartment. The Type 2b was a slightly larger one bedroom with a balcony. Unlike other duplex offerings, the French Type 5/RH offered an open living and dining room space in its three bedroom offering, which was expanded on for the Type 6/RH, four bedroom. Finally, the Type 6 was a large four bedroom option that included a balcony off the kitchen, as well as second balcony connected to the living and dining room space.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Federal Ministry of Finance to UK High Commissioner, Annex B, "Basic Type and Description of Buildings for Substitute Dwelling Units in the British Zone of the Federal Territory and in the British Sector of Berlin, First Programme," 31 March 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61. According to Federal Ministry calculations, these differences were sufficient to match building costs targets. The Type I unit was calculated at 26,300 DM in a three story configuration, and 29,600 DM in a two story set up. The Type II was 30,200 DM or 34,000 DM. The Type III/RH was calculated at 28,7000 DM, and the Type IV/RH at 32,200 DM.

<sup>63</sup> Federal Ministry of Finance to High Commission of the French Republic in Germany, Anlage B, "Grundrisstypen und Baubeschreibung für Austausch - Wohnungseinheiten in der Französischen Zone des Bundesgebietes - Erstes Programm," 20 April 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 61.



Figures 4.17a-f Grundrisstypen und Baubeschreibung für Austausch - Wohnungseinheiten in der Französischen Zone des Bundesgebietes, Der Bundesminister der Finanzen, Bonn, 20 April 1953, RG 466: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1944-1955, Box 61.

Both British and French housing programs suggest that the American presence in West Germany was perhaps exceptional but not unique. Since the war, all three occupying powers had seized private properties for their own use, and had continued to retain these properties well into the 1950s. Thus German officials faced the same challenges throughout West Germany around requisitioned housing and foreign militaries. In all three cases, they entered into collaborations in order to resolve these issues and assuage citizens' frustrations with the slow pace of property returns. In the American case, USAREUR officials held fast to the standards and policies they had already developed with their own construction program and refused to reduce their size requirements. Ultimately, the pressure to act resulted in German authorities adjusting their proposals to fit American demands. On the other side, German authorities were successful in implementing their own housing standards for British and French militaries. Especially with the French program, Federal Ministry officials developed and offered a wide range of suitable housing options. We can only speculate if the larger options were also offered to the Americans; and further wonder: were these options really "unacceptable" to USAREUR officials? In any case, despite the differences and variations in housing options, all programs were remarkably similar in intent and structure. Federal authorities were willing to financially subsidize and supplement foreign military housing in order to expedite the transfer of seized properties back to German owners. In all three cases they aimed to consolidate the respective military forces around or near already developed military areas and construct the new housing using German firms. And they brokered all three agreements at the same time, indicating not only a coordinated effort, but also a time-sensitivity to act quickly.

And once a solution was reached between German officials and each of the occupying powers, the Germans did proceed rapidly. As the Federal Ministry made explicit in its correspondence with British officials, "The 1,000 substitute dwelling units are to be built as quickly as possible and are to be completed if at all possible by the 30th November, 1953," that is, in a mere



eight months.<sup>64</sup> Whether or not they achieved these ambitious construction goals - they did not - is less significant than their intention to initiate construction immediately, proceed rapidly, and at scale. In effect, Federal officials intended to building approximately 3,600 units - 1,506 for Americans, 1,000 for the British, and 1,000 for the French - in under a year and across approximately 150 sites.

As with German federal officials, American military officials also were keen to act quickly with their own construction plans. Whereas Germans were responding to the distinct issue of requisitioned properties, military officials in Heidelberg had a different set of issues to tackle. Since the troop augmentation announcement in fall 1950, a major housing response in Heidelberg had stalled, which in turn delayed the stationing of US troops in the area, as well as the arrival of family members. Meanwhile, numerous other US military communities had sprung up across the American zone in response to troop increases, creating at least a concerning perception of Headquarters officials' abilities to fulfill military directives. Finally, it was understood that the availability of deutsche mark funds would come to end once West Germany was granted full sovereignty.<sup>65</sup> If Heidelberg did not act while German source funds were available, they would have to build for expansion with the more expensive, congressionally approved, American tax dollar. The pressure was on.

#### **Episode Four: Patrick Henry Village**

After three years of delays, a new housing site was finally secured. In a November 1953 express letter from the Federal Ministry of Finance to several state and city agencies, Oeftring authorized the Chief Finance Administration in Karlsruhe to purchase 61 hectares of land at 2.90

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<sup>64</sup> Federal Ministry of Finance to UK High Commissioner, Subj: First Programme.

<sup>65</sup> The Federal Republic of Germany was granted full sovereignty on 5 May 1955, according to the Nine-Power, Four-Power, and North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings in Paris from 20-23 October 1954. In accordance with this change was the formal termination of the Occupation Regime. See "Nine-Power, Four-Power, and North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings at Paris, October 20-23, 1954," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2*.

DM per square meter, or 1.77 million DM for the entire site. The land consisted of two large lots on the northwest edge of a major autobahn and secondary road intersection in Hegenichhof, southwest of Heidelberg and west of Campbell Barracks. Unlike the previous (proposed and built) housing developments in Heidelberg, there was no other major build-up in the vicinity. Therefore the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Working Party of Building Technicians) of Heidelberg was requested to “immediately start” preparatory work in connecting the site for waste water disposal (from the Kurpfalzring industry area north), water supply (connecting to existing pipes from Mannheim), and electricity supply (from one transformer station in the north and another switching station in the south). The total cost for these connections was estimated at another 2.7 million DM, for which the Federal Ministry was willing to finance 1.55 million DM, with an additional one million deutsche mark loan to the city.<sup>66</sup> Thus the processes of locating and acquiring the site and preparing it with infrastructure updates was directed by German federal agencies, which determined where American expansion would occur.<sup>67</sup> Whereas previously the existing German build-up of military facilities had determined where US military forces established their occupational settings, now the Federal Ministry took an active role in locating the place for expansion.

Aiming to consolidate various living requirements, the program for Patrick Henry Village started out large, and only continued to expand. At two conferences held in Heidelberg in October and November 1953, military officials revealed their intentions to construct 414 apartments (23 buildings) for personnel and their family members over five phases, for which they had already secured funding for 198 units (phases one and two). Additionally, they planned on building a church, high school, gas station, and bachelor officer quarters. Later that November, the Federal Ministry

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<sup>66</sup> Express letter from Dr. Oeftering, Acting Federal Minister of Finance, to the Ministry of Finance of the Land Baden-Wuerttemberg (Stuttgart), the Chief Finance Administration (Karlsruhe), the Regierungspraesidium Nordbaden Department II - Finance (Karlsruhe), the Municipal Administration (Heidelberg), the Working Party of Building Technicians (Heidelberg), Subj: Construction of Apartments for Occupation Personnel and Exchange Apartments at Heidelberg, November 23, 1953, NARA RG 466, Box 62.

<sup>67</sup> Scharnholtz, “German–American Relations at the Local Level, Heidelberg, 1948–1955,” 159.

also confirmed that an additional 150 alternate apartments were to be built on the site - the 90 apartments from the first alternate program and 60 from the second program.<sup>68</sup> By January 1954, the alternate housing rose to 174 units, as work on 324 USAREUR apartments was beginning construction, scheduled to be completed by the fall (figure 4.18).<sup>69</sup> In June the program expanded further. Military officials confirmed that they now intended to construct 900 USAREUR family apartments, in addition to the 174 alternate units, 714 bachelor officer quarters, a bowling alley, cinema, dispensary, emergency storage facility, library, and - as we already saw - a club and annex, in addition to the church and school.<sup>70</sup> With the increase to 1,074 total family units, Heidelberg Military Post had finally approached the objectives set fourth in the November 1950 *Engineer Bulletin*, where they had proposed 1,176 family units. They had also expanded their supplemental programming beyond the 1950 proposal's modest inclusion of a church and school, to include more entertainment services. All of this new and expanded programming also required an expanded site, which had now expanded from the initial 61 hectares to 97.2 hectares.

An aerial image from the 1960s shows how the master planning configured all these programs on the new site (figure 4.19). The housing was divided into two halves, with the southern portion dominated by family apartment buildings and the northern section dedicated to single-family homes and bachelor officer quarters (figures 4.20-4.21). The main entrance road from the east separated the two halves, while also connecting to the community functions in the center of the site. The road network was hierarchically structured with two main streets along the periphery of the main housing area, three shorter streets that connected to them and to cul-de-sac parking spaces for

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<sup>68</sup> Express letter from Dr. Oeftering, Subj: Construction of Apartments for Occupation Personnel and Exchange Apartments at Heidelberg.

<sup>69</sup> "HACom to Construct 2,172 Family Units," *Stars and Stripes*, January 22, 1954, 9.

<sup>70</sup> Letter from Robert V. Roberts, Major AGC to Mr. Zinn Garrett, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner of Germany, 14 June 1954, NARA RG 466, Box 62. With the introduction of the alternate housing program, military officials began identifying their own housing construction program as "USAREUR apartments" in order to distinguish between the two.



Figure 4.18 Patrick Henry Village dependents housing under construction. 1955. Stadtarchiv Heidelberg.



Figure 4.19 Luftbild: Film 100 Bildnr. 32. Landesvermessungsamt Baden-Württemberg: Landesbefliegung Baden-Württemberg 1968 - Luftbilder und digitales Orthophoto 1968. 2017-2021. 2-5939708.



Figure 4.20 Aerial view of Patrick Henry Village looking west. 1955. Stadtarchiv Heidelberg.



Figure 4.21 Aerial view of Patrick Henry Village looking south. 1955. Stadtarchiv Heidelberg.

each two apartment buildings. A similar configuration developed in the northern section, with an enclosed loop road. Similar to other military housing areas we encountered earlier, the buildings were more or less arranged in a north-south grid and then shifted either left or right, or north and south from one another. The main and first section of USAREUR apartments were built along four rows with five to eight apartments in each row. During a later phase, additional housing was developed on the site's western edge, with a single column of apartment buildings facing each other before expanding toward the southwest of the site. Ten alternate apartment buildings, located at the center of the site near the main entrance, followed the pattern set by the USAREUR buildings. Parking for each unit was provided along the front of each building, while open green spaces were provided in the rear and between the rows of buildings.

All the apartment housing was from the Type IVA series. The initial 324 USAREUR apartments were contained in eighteen buildings, all of them three-stories with an attic and basement, divided into three sections by staircases, each of which accessed six apartments. During the later building phases, the same housing type and configuration was continued. The alternate housing, which began construction in spring 1955, was exactly the same, except smaller in length, with each building containing twelve units, evenly divided between two staircases. At the northern end, there were 77 single-family homes, reserved for generals, and bachelor officers' quarters for single personnel.<sup>71</sup>

By March 1955, the initial phases of USAREUR apartments were complete. But since other programs were still unfinished, or not yet begun, military personnel and their families living in the new apartments were offered various services and furnishings provided for their convenience, including delivery services that provided bread, milk, and cream and various interior furnishings

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<sup>71</sup> Due to the large number of senior staff stationed in Heidelberg, single-family homes were reserved only for the military rank of General, whereas in other locations, it was usually available for Lieutenant Colonels and Majors. See Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 82.

(figures 4.22-4.23). The delivery services in particular highlighted the immediate reality of living conditions, in which vast goods were readily available at commissaries in Heidelberg as elsewhere, but disconnected from housing areas without an automobile (figures 4.24-4.26). The new housing site was too isolated for small, quick, and more frequent purchases of perishable goods - as had been the case, or at least an option, earlier - and now required delivery for certain goods. On the other hand, the quantity and range of goods fitted perfectly for the larger size kitchens. The result of the larger, but isolated kitchen was a permanent shift to behaviors more similar to American suburban developments, in which grocery shopping occurred less frequently, with larger purchases, and required the conveniences of an automobile in order to transport items from the store to the home.

In general, the differences in consumption did not go unnoticed. When Germans caught a glimpse into new American mass consumerism, they were shocked. Recalling a childhood encounter with two American girls in early 1950s Baumholder, historian Hanna Schissler was acutely aware of the “visual gap” between herself and the girls in terms of dress and appearance. An unknown consumerism was later introduced when she accompanied them to their home and watched “these girls ... step on a chair in their kitchen and take handfuls of candy out of a glass that their mother had put up on the cupboard. It seemed the most natural thing on earth to eat candy by the handful, and I was invited to do the same.”<sup>72</sup> A similar exposure - without the invitation to participate - appears in the photograph of the quartermasters delivery service, in which two German children paused their playing, in order to observe the food deliveries for the American women. In Schissler’s case, indoctrination was immediately halted by her mother, who forbade further contact, highlighting the caution some adult Germans took in exposing their families to “the extraordinarily lavish standards” enjoyed by Americans.<sup>73</sup> The isolation of a military community, such as Patrick Henry

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<sup>72</sup> Hanna Schissler, *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 10.

<sup>73</sup> The two children were most likely accompanying their mother(s) who in maid services for military family(ies).





Figure 4.22 Capt Robert Avon's children Robert and Debby, look out the living room window from their new quarters at Patrick Henry Village, the US Army's housing development on the outskirts of Heidelberg. 29 March 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer.



Figure 4.23 The delivery truck of the Heidelberg commissary delivers bread, milk, and cream to the dependents quarters of Patrick Henry Village. 29 March 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-4666133.



Figure 4.24 All over interior of QMC commissary at Kelley Barracks, Moehringen, Germany. 5 Aug 1953. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-461492.



Figure 4.25 View of meat counter of Heidelberg commissary store No 1. 4 Sept 1953. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-461562.



Figure 4.26 Self-service vegetable counter, HAC [Headquarters Area Command] Army Commissary Store No 1, Heidelberg, Germany. 11 Aug 1953. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-461510.

Village, thus aided both sides in their desires and cautions. Americans could enjoy their new luxuries without protests from the local population, while Germans could either shield and normalize their more modest living conditions without the annoyances of comparison with higher American living standards, or participate vicariously.<sup>74</sup> As such, the American military kitchen in particular followed the more general American postwar kitchen, in symbolizing “American modernity and prosperity” beyond its immediate domestic settings.<sup>75</sup>

Nevertheless, more housing and additional amenities at Patrick Henry Village were still required. Although the first families had moved in by March 1955, construction rapidly continued with additional USAREUR housing units, as well as the other programs (figure 4.27). In early April, USAREUR engineers reported that “nearly 1,000 apartment units [were scheduled] to be finished in Patrick Henry Village” by summer. Approximately 600 USAREUR bachelor officer quarters and 100 German bachelor officer quarters were also slated for completion. And by the end of summer, the school, civilian and officers’ mess halls, the dispensary, chapel, and NCO club would be finished.<sup>76</sup> By November, the inconvenience of getting to the site even with an automobile was acknowledged, as Heidelberg officials agreed to fund a new road, and later a bridge, to the new housing area. The new road was estimated at 900,000 DM, of which the US Army would pay 420,000 DM and

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<sup>74</sup> Even if immediate participation was not possible, there was nevertheless, a framework in place for Germans to “learn their role[s] as consumers,” which Michael Wildt has noted more generally as taking place in the 1950s. See for instance Michael Wildt, “Plurality of Taste: Food and Consumption in West Germany during the 1950s,” *History Workshop Journal*, No. 39 (Spring, 1995), 22-41; idem, “Continuities and Discontinuities of Consumer Mentality in West Germany in the 1950s,” in *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s*, ed. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 211-229. See also Scharnholtz, “German–American Relations at the Local Level, Heidelberg, 1948–1955,” 159-160.

<sup>75</sup> Mary Nolan, *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 257-259. At an even larger scale, the kitchen as an ideological weapon during the early cold war period has received considerable attention; in addition to Nolan, see for example Greg Castillo, “Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption As Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 2 (2005): 261–88; and Elaine Tyler May, “The Commodity Gap: Consumerism and the Modern Home,” in *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008), 153-173.

<sup>76</sup> “Bulk of HACom Family Housing to be Finished by Summer,” *Stars and Stripes*, April 7, 1955, 9.



Figure 4.27 Construction work in progress at Patrick Henry Village. 29 March 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466130.

German local and state authorities the remaining. The Army would allocate an additional 335,000 DM for the bridge connecting to the main entrance.<sup>77</sup>

As most of these projects were still under construction, members of Congress were given tours of Patrick Henry Village. On 13 August, several senators toured the new site and met military families. A photograph of a democratic senator from North Carolina conversing with family members shows the living room set up of a new unit (figure 4.8). More interestingly, it also shows apartments in the background, both of which appear to be empty, allowing the viewer to even see a building in the further background. Two weeks later, a republican senator from Indiana “inspected” the housing area and its furniture (figure 4.28). The following week, a democratic senator from Georgia walked around the site with another family (figure 4.3). A month later, a group of House Civil Service committee members toured the new military community (figure 4.7). And the following month, a democratic senator from Vermont received an overview of the site with a model before visiting it in person (figure 4.6).

All of these visits (and their photographic documentation) hinted at the pressure, and perhaps also confidence, Heidelberg military officials attached to constructing Patrick Henry Village. The previous delays in establishing an expanded military presence at European headquarters had put a scrutixzing eye on Heidelberg and its ability to complete a fundamental and significant task. Their response, once a new site was secured, was rapid.<sup>78</sup> For instance, although German officials only finalized the purchase of the land in late November 1953, military engineers had already initiated preliminary work on the first eighteen apartment buildings by January 1954. By March 1955, over 400 units were completed and later that summer, an additional 600 family units were ready, along with several hundred BOQ units and several other programs. The rush to open the site suggested that Heidelberg Military officials viewed their efforts approvingly. Not unlike the renderings of the

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<sup>77</sup> “HACom Gives 420,000 DMs for New Road,” *Stars and Stripes*, November 13, 1955, 2.

<sup>78</sup> As the Express Letter from the Federal Ministry indicated, the German effort also moved with urgency.



Figure 4.28 Inspecting dependent housing units in Patrick Henry Village. 29 Aug 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-510639.

two hospital buildings on the covers of the *Medical Bulletin* in the first chapter, Heidelberg officials seemed intent to show their progress at Patrick Henry Village before it was even complete and prove that they had (already) accomplished the task of providing accommodations for expansion. In the midst of the summer construction, Colonel Charles F. McNair, Headquarters Area Commander, “predicted that nearby Patrick Henry Village will soon become one of the most desirable housing areas in Europe.”<sup>79</sup>

A significant part of the desirability was the supporting services. The chapel, located at the center of the site immediately past the main entrance, offered a 250-seat place of worship for residents. Like housing, chapel design followed local precedent through several revisions (figure 4.29). The chapel at Patrick Henry Village was the fourth addition to the greater Heidelberg military community (figures 4.30-4.31). It included a mezzanine level, similar to the one built near Campbell Barracks, as well as a similar steeple and apse. The NCO club, named the “Old Dominion,” opened in late October with an active daily program for members. The club offered “dancing on Monday, bingo Tuesday, ‘Hillbilly Night’ Thursday, floor shows Friday, prize and dance night Saturday, and Bingo Sundays.” In addition, it hosted NCO wives’ meetings every week.<sup>80</sup>

By spring 1956, a new European Exchange Services building was being constructed to house several functions, including a barber shop and beauty salon, delicatessen, and laundry and dry cleaning services. Later that summer, library construction began, along with a community-youth building.<sup>81</sup> In 1960, the elementary school, which initially accommodated the first three grades, was expanded. A new building provided an additional twenty classrooms as well as “an arts and crafts room, a library, a music room, and a large combination auditorium and gymnasium.” The new

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<sup>79</sup> “McNair Cites Housing Plans For HACom,” *Stars and Stripes*, June 17, 1955, 10.

<sup>80</sup> “Noncoms Open New Club at Patrick Henry,” *Stars and Stripes*, November 5, 1955, 10.

<sup>81</sup> “HACom ‘Cities’ Mushroom at 3 Housing Areas,” *Stars and Stripes*, March 16, 1956, 9





Figure 4.29 Inside view of St. Ann's Chapel, Heidelberg, Germany. 19 Sept 1952. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-413485.



Figure 4.30 Exterior view of the new Patrick Henry Village chapel, Heidelberg, 13 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466356.



Figure 4.31 Interior view of the new Patrick Henry Village chapel, Heidelberg, 13 Oct 1955. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-466357.

building transferred all elementary services to Patrick Henry Village, while middle and high school students remained at Mark Twain Village.<sup>82</sup>

The scale and speed of building ultimately resulted in construction errors. On 9 July 1961, the *Stars and Stripes* ran on its front page the news that 1,330 people needed to be evacuated from sixteen apartment buildings at Patrick Henry Village. The paper noted that a preliminary report, conducted the previous month by a German architectural firm, found noticeable “deterioration in the bricks” first reported as early as 1957, only “two years after the buildings were constructed.” Four years later, the situation had deteriorated further, to the point that USARUER ordered an evacuation, in which 303 families - of a total of 1,900 - would be required to relocate in order to correct the issue.<sup>83</sup> According to USAREUR engineers, the problem was that the brick used in construction “contain[ed] excessive lime [that] disintegrated as it absorbed additional moisture.” “‘The *only* danger’,” they continued, “‘was in load-bearing walls’.”<sup>84</sup> A few days later, a USAREUR inspection also noted plaster falling off interior walls and crumbling bricks on the exteriors.<sup>85</sup> Finally, the preliminary report noted a piece of non-negative news that the defective brick was only used in one area, the southwest section of Patrick Henry Village, thereby containing the issue.

Two weeks later, USAREUR warned that seven additional buildings might have the same issues. Two months later it was confirmed: an additional eight buildings had faulty brickwork. In total, 398 apartments across twenty-four buildings required immediate fixing. The families were to be relocated to various other locations, depending on where housing was available. In a rather cruel twist of irony, twenty apartments were offered by French authorities in nearby Speyer. These were

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<sup>82</sup> “New Heidelberg Building Doubles Student Space,” *Stars and Stripes*, September 21, 1960, 8.

<sup>83</sup> “Army Will Move 1,330 from Faulty Housing,” *Stars and Stripes*, July 9, 1961, 1.

<sup>84</sup> “110 Army Families to Reoccupy Six Heidelberg Buildings,” *Stars and Stripes*, November 19, 1962, 8. [Emphasis mine]

<sup>85</sup> “First family moved from condemned quarters.”

almost certainly German alternate apartments, which several years earlier were deemed below Heidelberg standards.<sup>86</sup>

At least publicly, military officials did not dwell too much on the issue. Rather, they approached the problem as they would other military issues. The lime imbalance that produced defective bricks made visible the weakest point in a larger structure - literally and figuratively. Once this weak point was located and analyzed, it could be corrected, after which, the entire structure would be made stronger. This was a core principle of a modern military, in which understanding positions of strength and points of vulnerability were deemed crucial in carrying out military actions and to continuously renewing the institution.<sup>87</sup> Now the same approach was being applied to domestic conditions. Engineers simply isolated the issue and made the necessary structural corrections, taking eighteen months to renovate the twenty-four buildings. By January 1963, 110 families reoccupied the renovated dwellings, with additional reoccupations set to take place in June, October, December, and finally April 1964.<sup>88</sup>

It is all too tempting to label this new military community as an embarrassing, colossal failure, perhaps similar to other twentieth century “large-scale social engineering” episodes.<sup>89</sup> With almost a quarter of the apartment units being condemned only six years after being constructed, any other interpretation would be questionable. Nevertheless, perhaps a more fruitful reading is to not only acknowledge the failure, but also register how failure and various kinds of setbacks were integrated into - and perhaps integral to - the larger project of establishing an expanded American

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<sup>86</sup> “30-40 Housing Units Offered to USAREUR,” *Stars and Stripes*, July 26, 1961, 8.

<sup>87</sup> A similar point was made by Cornelia Vismann with respect to the media shift from documents to files that allowed for political power to be “permanently updated.” See Cornelia Vismann, *Files: Law and Media Technology* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008), 79.

<sup>88</sup> Scott, “110 Army Families to Reoccupy Six Heidelberg Buildings,” 8.

<sup>89</sup> James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020.)

military presence in Heidelberg and the Federal Republic in the 1950s. In this view, the various episodes examined in this chapter alert us to how military officials appeared to work in and benefit from an operational setting that provided time and space for errors, the resources necessary to investigate those short-comings or counter-propose alternatives, and the additional resources to implement changes and continue fine-tuning those results. We saw this most explicitly with housing, as military engineers transitioned from one housing type to the next, (unsuccessfully) adjusted their original designs, sought external assistance, and continued to trim and shift specific aspects of their updated apartment dwellings. It was also evident with housing sites, as they moved from one location to another, to yet another. Whatever the difficulties they encountered, a framework (and control) existed that allowed military officials to work through them toward satisfactory resolutions. In other words and to cite a specific example, what mattered was not so much the existence of defective bricks in apartment buildings, but the structural organization and technical knowledge (either internally or contracted) that could correct the problem.

New cooperative relations with German authorities ultimately did little to change the general contours of these military actions. That was never the aim. West German interests were generally aligned with and supportive of American military pursuits in the early 1950s. What mattered were the details. Inasmuch as military actions stalled Heidelberg economic growth through the continuing requisition of commercial properties, there was bound to be frustration and tension between the two parties. But it was a conflict that could be actively managed for mutual benefit. An appropriately large site could be located and developed to address troop augmentation, but it could also resolve the continued military control of hotels in the city center. An airstrip could be extended, but there needed to be compensation for the local inconveniences incurred. As such, German agency nudged projects by degrees according to local interests. Part of that influence was also temporal, slowing down projects that did not benefit local interests, and accelerating (and even initiating) projects that did. In both cases, the primary aim was to ultimately move projects forward through collaboration.

And move forward they did. Through the course of these cooperations and events, Heidelberg was radically transformed. By the end of the decade, approximately 10,000 Americans - either working for or affiliated with the US military - lived in the area, with the majority in either Mark Twain Village or Patrick Henry Village, and worked in either Patton Barracks, Campbell Barracks, or the Nachrichten medical complex. For all this, a physical infrastructure was developed to sustain and support personnel and dependents beyond purely military functions. Almost two hundred new apartment buildings rose south of the city. Education and youth services were available for service members' children, various shopping and entertainment amenities were offered, medical facilities provided modern treatments, and recreational and religious functions offered physical and spiritual development. Meanwhile, existing military facilities supported a broad range of high-level administrative divisions and activities.<sup>90</sup> In all cases, new and existing clusters of Americans emerged within equally new and existing structures either design-built or reconfigured for myriad purposes. The actions set into motion at various moments during the decade (and prior) had finally reached their apogee. During the Cold War and after, only a few additional functions were introduced; a commissary and more educational facilities at Patrick Henry Village; a second bathroom add-on to some of the apartment buildings at Patrick Henry Village; additional educational space at Mark Twain Village; more administrative space at Campbell Barracks; a motor pool and gymnasium at Patton Barracks.

In the 1960s and later, Heidelberg itself also grew. Especially in the once open area between Heidelberg and Rohrbach, new German housing developed, encircling Nachrichten casern and Mark Twain Village-Campbell Barracks. Not a new entanglement, but rather a new proximity was

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<sup>90</sup> By the mid 1950s, Campbell Barracks was the administrative home for the following divisions: Comptroller and Finance and Accounting; Adjutant General; Chaplain; Signal; Public Information; Armed Forces Information and Education; Political Advisor; Engineer Division and Transportation; Engineer Division; Civil Affairs; Medical; Quartermaster; Ordnance; Judge Advocate; Chemical; Labor Service; and Provost Marshal. In addition, it home for the Commander in Chief, Chief of Staff, Secretary General Staff, and US Naval Forces, Germany. Finally, it housed General Staffs, including G-1 (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), and G-4 (Logistics). See "Installations: Administration of Campbell and Patton Barracks," Staff Circular No. 210-30, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 5 April 1956, 2. NARA RG 549, Box 447.

reestablished. Although there was a physical closeness, both sides - American and German -tended to keep to themselves, as each now had their own services and daily activities that no longer required interaction.<sup>91</sup> No such condition occurred with Patrick Henry Village, as the area around the community remained undeveloped. The result was precisely what military officials had envisaged for Heidelberg, a military headquarters comfortably set in the quaint city from which military operations could be carried out; the United States military had designed a home to command.

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<sup>91</sup> Scharnholz, "German–American Relations at the Local Level, Heidelberg," 159-160.

## EPILOGUE

### TRAIN, DISPLAY, ENGAGE

In front of a crowd of approximately 300 people, the American and German national anthems each play before their respective national flags are lowered for the last time. It is early Friday afternoon, 6 September 2013 on the parade ground at Campbell Barracks, and the American military presence in Heidelberg has officially come to an end after 68 years.<sup>1</sup>

According to most accounts, the end of the US military's stationing in Heidelberg was marked not by the dissolution of the Cold War conflict, but rather the US military's shift to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after September 11th, yet again signaling events in the east impacting actions in Europe-Germany.<sup>2</sup> One consequence of this shift was that military life in the city in the early twentieth-first century took a more insular turn with new fencing planned around Mark Twain Village. Another was that high-level administrative functions were relocated to new strategic positions, with the US Army headquarters moving to Wiesbaden, and a NATO command base moving to Izmir, Turkey. The insularity and strategic conditions were not unrelated. Unlike Heidelberg, the military presence in Wiesbaden "sits atop a hill, isolated and thus secure, in this post-9/11 world, from the kind of local interactions that long made the Americans welcome." Additionally, the US military in Wiesbaden is more consolidated than Heidelberg, which included

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<sup>1</sup> Alison Smale, "Storied U.S. Barracks Closes with Little Fanfare," *New York Times*, Sep 8, 2013, 14.

<sup>2</sup> Beginning in September 1990, the US military presence in West Germany was dramatically reduced and restructured in continuous efforts to save, or rather redirect, defense spending. See Robert Jackson, "150 U.S. Bases Will be Shut or Pared Overseas," *Los Angeles Times*, Sep. 19, 1990, A4; Ian Johnson, "Germany Summon Allies for Talks on Troops, Bases," *The Sun*, Sep 7, 1991, 2A; "Pentagon Adds 83 Bases to Europe Cutbacks," *The Washington Post*, Jan 31, 1992, A6; and "Clinton Moves Toward Military Base Closing," *The Globe and Mail*, Jul 2, 1993, A8. A significant objective in the restructuring was the move and expansion "to Russia's border" under the NATO umbrella. See Frank Bruni, "President Urging Expansion of NATO to Russia's Border," *New York Times*, Jun 16, 2001, A1; William Drozdiak, "Putin Eases Stance on NATO Expansion," *The Washington Post*, Oct 4, 2001, A1; Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Looks Eastward in New NATO," *The Washington Post*, May 28, 2002, A10; and Ian Fisher, "U.S. Eyes a Willing Romania as a New Comrade in Arms," *New York Times*, Jul 16, 2003, A1.



several separate areas that required their own (costly) security measures by the time it closed (figure 5.1).<sup>3</sup>

Although Heidelberg's American military era has come to an end with a relentless push further east, it is worth looking back at its activities during its 68 years in operation.

The reader will surely have noted at this point that I have continuously and casually invoked military activities - variously referred to as procedures, operations, protocols, and duties - throughout this study. I have further claimed throughout that Heidelberg's built environment played a crucial role in these activities, not simply as a reflection of institutional-military power, but rather constituting a critical instrument in actually forming and sustaining that power and those activities. It is therefore worth asking what these activities the built environment allowed for and supported over the course of seven decades. In this final section, I want to briefly suggest and examine three kinds of activities: troop training through command-wide exercises, missile presentation as a display of technological prowess, and unsanctioned war. What I want to suggest is a military power increasingly unhinged.

## **Troop Training**

Between 11-18 September 1950, a joint Army, Air Force, and Navy field exercise - Exercise Rainbow - was conducted in the American zone of occupation. The exercise took place "with the utmost seriousness under the shadow of hostiles which had broken out in Korea." The main objective was to test all aspects of coordination between air, ground, and naval forces, with special attention paid to communications and tactical movements, against an "aggressor force" from the east. In addition to the joint American forces, both French and British ground and air units

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<sup>3</sup> According to Pentagon estimates, the \$112 million a year that would be saved by closing Heidelberg would largely come from these security expenses. See Smale, "Storied U.S. Barracks Closes." Initially announced in June 2010, the Department of Defense originally intended to close both Heidelberg and near-by Mannheim facilities (22 in total) by 2015; and John Vandiver, "USAREUR announced base closures for Mannheim, Heidelberg," *Stars and Stripes*, June 23, 2010.




Figure 5.1 Walter F. Elkins, Christian Führer, Michael J. Montgomery, and Peter Blum, *Amerikaner in Heidelberg 1945-2013* (Heidelberg: Verlag Regionalkultur, 2014), 12.

participated, as well as American troops based in Trieste and the US zone of occupation in Austria. Commanding the entire exercise from Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg, was Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, European Command, who could see the coordinated actions simulated by personnel physically moving pieces on a large situation map in the war room (figure 5.2). The accuracy of this information relied on several relays from various points in the field to a Mobile Radio Relay Station on Campbell Barracks (figure 5.3).<sup>4</sup>

An additional simulation occurred in the medical services, where “each post determine[d] the numbers of medical officers, dental officers, and nurses that could be made available for maneuvers.” This included medical personnel at 130th Station hospital, as well as personnel from Frankfurt and Munich.<sup>5</sup>

Exercise Rainbow was neither the first nor the last training exercise commanded from Heidelberg. The 1949-50 training season was initiated one year prior, with Exercise Harvest in September 1949. Harvest was the first joint exercise between the Army, Air Force, and Navy forces and included 112,000 troops across the entire American zone of occupation, as well as military and government officials from thirteen other countries.<sup>6</sup> As combat operations were simulated across the American zone of occupation, commanders and staff reported on various skills and level of readiness, including movement and mobility, tactical operations, and coordination between units. The following spring, Exercise Shamrock took place in the greater Heidelberg area. This exercise was more focused on administrative organization and training and testing communications across

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<sup>4</sup> Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953* (Darmstadt, Germany, Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), 176.

<sup>5</sup> Major James R. Francis, MSC, “Medical Service’s Part in ‘Exercise Rainbow,’” *Medical Bulletin*, Vol 7, No 11 (November 1950), 659-660.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.




Figure 5.2 The joint U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy field exercise, designated as "Exercise Rainbow," held in the U.S. zone of Germany September 11-18, 13 September 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-349719.



Figure 5.3 "Exercise Rainbow" - 11-18 September 1950. 12 September 1950. RG 111-SC: Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. SC-349741.

the entire command.<sup>7</sup> Throughout, Heidelberg operated as the commanding center for directing, coordinating, and reviewing these maneuvers.

## Display

If the joint exercises in the early 1950s were primarily focused on training and coordinating activities and communications through simulated war conditions, then by the mid-1950s an additional confidence in new military power was introduced. On June 1956, the new Nike Ajax missile was displayed on the parade grounds of Campbell Barracks for a select group of American and German officials (figure 5.4). This was only one in “a series of exhibitions throughout [West] Germany, [that aimed at] showing off a prototype of the missile and its associated equipment.”<sup>8</sup> The goal was to convince German officials of its deterrent power and necessity, which military officials hoped would further ease new negotiations for additional land acquisition. In order to operate, the system required thirty acres of unobstructed land for its four parts, which included the launch zone, command and control center, radar tracking of foreign aircraft, and an operating space for personnel.<sup>9</sup> A new entanglement condition ensued, as German citizens protested the additional loss of agricultural for military purposes, the threat that deterrence could also provoke an attack, and the concern around rearmament.<sup>10</sup>

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
<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2015), 281.

<sup>9</sup> Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M Moorhus, *Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945-1991* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005), 130.

<sup>10</sup> Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 281.





Paul W. Simmon, consultant to the Heidelberg City Government, and Herman Hagen, Heidelberg Burgermeister, view the Nike missile display at Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg, June 1956.

Figure 5.4 Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2015), 256.

Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, a toned down Nike air defense program was planned for West Germany. From the initial twenty-four sites planned, four sites were actually acquired, and only two were completed in the Kaiserslautern region.<sup>11</sup>

The Nike Ajax only had a short 25-mile (40 kilometer) range and almost immediately had reliability issues due to the combination of liquid fuel propulsion and vacuum tube electronics.<sup>12</sup> The first of the Nike antiaircraft, surface-to-air missiles developed by the Army, the missile system was later updated with improved Hercules and Zeus models, the former introducing nuclear capabilities and the latter being the first antiballistic missile, or ABM. Other advanced weapons also expanded USAREUR's short-range missiles arsenal, including the Lacrosse and Hawk systems, which were introduced in the early 1960s.

After the display of these weapons, their use fused with training. As joint coordination and tactical movement training continued to refine troop readiness, new exercises - such as "Sabre Knot" and "War Hawk" - added atomic weapons to training programs. A main objective became the proper, functioning use of atomic weapons under simulated conditions. Troops were simultaneously trained in "offensive and defensive" conditions, including "the evacuation of mass casualties caused by enemy attacks."<sup>13</sup> In both cases, the exercises emphasized coordination and security of weapons, as well as camouflage techniques to evade enemy detection. The experiences and results eventually led to Exercise Sabre Hawk in February 1958, "the largest maneuver yet in the history of the force," involving 125,000 troops. The exercise took place across the entire American zone and included "a series of attack, defend, delay, and withdraw scenarios" with real-time commander adjustments to identify weaknesses and errors. The exercise also "tested atomic weapons employment, target

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<sup>11</sup> American officials ultimately bypassed negotiations with German officials by locating all the sites on US or French-controlled property. Ibid., 329.

<sup>12</sup> Mary K. Lavin, *Thematic Study and Guidelines: Identification and Evaluation of U.S. Army Cold War Era Military-Industrial Historic Properties* (U.S. Army Environmental Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 1998), 27, 75.

<sup>13</sup> Carter, *Forging the Shield*, 266.



acquisition, resupply, and aerial troop movement” under intentional “cold-weather conditions” (figure 5.5).<sup>14</sup> Although Heidelberg never housed any of these advanced weapons, throughout their simulated testing and coordinating, it remained a critical node in the new European pentomic era.<sup>15</sup>

## Engage

Entanglement resurfaced in the early 2000s. But whereas in the 1950s it revolved around the seizure of property, in spring 2003 the issue was actual war. “Each Saturday, large crowds march through the housing area on Römerstrasse.” The local German population organized weekly anti-war protests over several months and against the unsanctioned US invasion of Iraq. As they had generations earlier, protesters began in Heidelberg and ended in front of Campbell Barracks, passing through the first new housing construction project completed in 1950. “While the protests are mostly peaceful, acts of vandalism have increased since the start of the war in Iraq. Protesters blocked traffic along the main thoroughfare and painted peace signs on the street. Rowdy teens hurled eggs and insults at soldiers behind the fence of nearby Campbell Barracks. Some demonstrators camp out along the sidewalks.” The open configuration of the housing area, along with its proximity to Campbell Barracks, ensured that the anti-war demonstrations would reach and interrupt both military authorities, as well as family members.<sup>16</sup>

And indeed they did, though perhaps not as much as they intended. US officials immediately responded with a town hall, for which about twenty of the 700 residents of Mark Twain Village attended to discuss the demonstrations and force protection. And then they responded with a fence.

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 301-302.

<sup>15</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986).

<sup>16</sup> Rick Scavetta, “Officials reassure Mark Twain Village residents on safety,” *Stars and Stripes*, April 4, 2003.



An M59 armored personnel carrier of the 55th Engineer Battalion in Miltenberg during Exercise SABRE HAWK, February 1958

Figure 5.5 Donald A. Carter, *Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951-1962* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2015), 302.

By the end of July 2003, a new fence wrapped around most of the Mark Twain Village housing area, establishing a physical barrier between the American residential community and the world around it. Thus a more aggressive set of political and military actions resulted in a more isolated and protected physical setting. Although Mark Twain Village had remained physically open to the surrounding area throughout the Cold War period and after (as had many other military communities in the Federal Republic), the military power it sustained had finally expanded to dangerous, if not reckless, levels, requiring a redefinition of the very physical conditions the military provided for its personnel. The one had effectively destroyed the other.

The American war in Iraq, but also wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, mark an end result of the training exercises and weapons development that had been in continuous production at least since the early postwar period. From first utilizing existing German structures to transition military operations from war to occupation to defense, American military officials progressively shifted from simulated war actions involving troops, various forms of equipment, and increasingly devastating weapons, to an offense of real, largely unsanctioned wars in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and south Asia. In each case, personnel and equipment based in Europe in general, and Germany in particular, performed crucial roles, with Heidelberg operating as one administrative center for decision making. But the various forms of built environment that had made each successive military development possible, had themselves become unsustainable and too problematic. To state it differently, to a certain degree, the built environment not only sustained, but also offered a check on how far destructive military power could, or was willing, to go, until the equilibrium pushed too far in the other direction, for which the built environment was willingly abandoned. This newer military power, greatly expanded, has effectively shifted and normalized a different physical infrastructure operating in more remote locations and with local elites who offer fewer oversight restrictions. What remains to be seen, is to what degree this newer power, seemingly unchecked, actually constitutes a more stable world.

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