Assessing the Impact of Issue Ownership Voting in the Rest of Canada (ROC) during the 2015 Canadian Federal Election

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Abstract

With the effects of issue ownership voting being assessed within previous Canadian elections, this thesis analyzes how issue ownership theory serves as a predictor of individual vote choice in the 2015 Canadian federal election. A binary logistic regression is used to examine how issue ownership theory emerges across each psychological dimension (associative or competency) and on a variety of issues – including the economy, health care, education, environment, crime and defense – to ultimately predict vote choice for each major political party (Liberal, Conservative, and NDP). Our results show a relationship between both the associative and competency dimensions of issue ownership and individual vote choice for each major party within the 2015 election. This thesis finds mixed results when assessing which dimension serves as a better predictor compared to the other. The competency dimension performs as a better predictor for the issues of health care and crime. However, the associative dimension emerges as a better predictor for the environment and education issues. This illustrates how the 2015 case adds further variation to the comparative issue ownership literature when pondering which dimension emerges as a better predictor. These findings illustrate a Canadian case where associative issue ownership voting emerges, and that during the 2015 election the Liberal Party emerges as having issue ownership over the most issues compared to the Conservatives and NDP when considering both the associative and competency dimensions.

Les effets de l'appropriation d'enjeux sur le vote ayant été évalués sur les élections canadiennes précédentes, cette thèse analyse en quoi la théorie de l'appropriation d'enjeux fut un prédicteur du choix du vote individuel lors de l'élection fédérale canadienne de 2015. Une régression logistique binaire est employée pour examiner la présence de la théorie de l'appropriation d'enjeux dans chaque dimension psychologique (associative ou compétence) considérant une variété d'enjeux, notamment l'économie, les soins de santé, l'éducation, l'environnement, la criminalité et la défense, afin de prédire le choix de vote pour chaque grand parti politique (libéral, conservateur et néo-démocrate). Nos résultats montrent une relation entre les dimensions associative et de compétence de l'appropriation d'enjeux, et le choix de vote individuel pour chaque grand parti au cours de l'élection de 2015. Cette thèse trouve des résultats mitigés concernant la supériorité prédictive d'une dimension par rapport à l'autre. La dimension de compétence est un meilleur prédicteur des enjeux de santé et de criminalité. Cependant, la dimension associative semble être un meilleur prédicteur des enjeux d'environnement et d'éducation. Cette thèse illustre à quel point l'élection canadienne de 2015 ajoute une variation supplémentaire à la littérature comparée sur l'appropriation d'enjeux lorsque l'on s'interroge sur la prédictibilité de chaque dimension. Ces résultats démontrent que l'appropriation d'enjeux associative est en émergence au Canada et que, le Parti libéral possédait plus d'enjeux que le Parti conservateur et le NPD à l'élection de 2015 lorsque l'on considère les deux dimensions.

Keywords: Canada; issue ownership; voting; party competency; associative

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> "true friendships are extremely hard to come by" because "where on earth are you going to find anybody who will be keener to advance his friends career than his own? … As Ennius rightly said, a friend in need is a friend indeed. There are two opposite charges on which most [people] stand convicted of fickleness and unreliability. When they are doing well, they forgo their friends; and when a friend is in difficulties they desert him. Anyone who proves himself a serious, reliable, and steadfast friend in both these sets of circumstances clearly belong to an extremely rare and indeed almost superhuman class of person".[1]

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[1] Cicero and Michael Grant. 1982. *Cicero: On the Good Life.* Markham, ON: Penguin Books Ltd. 209.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The 2015 Canadian federal election campaign can be characterized by two overarching themes: first, a campaign period dominated by certain issues such as the economy, and second, a Liberal Party victory at the ballot box (see Dornan 2016; Delacourt 2015; McNeney 2015; Clarke et al. 2016; 2017). These trends were on full display during *The Globe and Mail*'s party leader debate on the economy, when Liberal Party leader, Justin Trudeau gave the following as part of his opening response:

> "we have a plan, a strong and clear plan to invest in the middle class, to grow the economy, give it a kick-start it needs, and put more money in Canadians' pockets. It starts with actually raising taxes on the wealthiest one percent so we can lower them for the middle class. It starts with investing in Canada once again: in roads; in clean water; in transit; in jobs. And when we talk about that investment, we're very clear. We're going to run three modest deficits in order to pay for it. Now, those are the kinds of investments that Mr. Harper hasn't made for ten years. […] And if you think this economy's doing great, then Mr. Harper is your guy" (Maclean's 2015).

His remarks illustrate an attempt to create a positive association with his party's approach to addressing the Canadian economy for certain sections of the Canadian electorate (such as the middle class), while simultaneously trying to ascribe a negative one to the Conservatives. A potential explanation to illuminate the motivations underlying his behaviour during this debate can be found in the theory of issue ownership. Issue ownership theory is often defined as "a campaign effect when a candidate successfully frames the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing the country that [one] is better able to "handle" than his opponent (1996: 826)."

Issue ownership theory has gained considerable attention from scholars in the past decade as an explanation for both party and voter behaviour (Lefevere et al. 2015; Lefevere et al. 2017; Walgrave et al. 2016; van der Brug 2017; Stubager 2018). With this thesis, I aim to contribute

knowledge by delving solely into the voting behaviour stream of the literature by engaging with the 2015 Canadian federal election as a case study.

In the Canadian context, issue ownership as an explanation for voting behaviour has been studied in past federal elections (see Nadeau and Blais 1990; Nadeau et al. 2001; Bélanger 2003; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Bélanger and Nadeau 2015), but the 2015 election remains unexamined. This gap is driving my research, which asks: "what role did issue ownership have in shaping vote choice in the 2015 federal election?" In other words, the relationship to be examined is whether parties having issue ownership, on a given issue, predicts whether an individual will vote for that party. This will further add to the body of Canadian voting and electoral behaviour literature by assessing what issues are owned by political parties through whether (or not) it contributes to how individuals prescribe their vote choice, and ultimately to each party's electoral success.

Further, through this case selection, this thesis seeks to offer additional clarification on the effects of issue ownership voting in Canadian elections, whilst also contributing to the theory of issue ownership more broadly, and its importance and relevance within electoral studies. This is done to leverage both literatures to each's mutual gain. First, this thesis applies some of the debates from the larger literature to the Canadian context. This is done in order to allow for new questions and perspectives to emerge (Turgeon 2014: 8-9). Afterwards, I assess whether the 2015 election, and the Canadian case more generally can potentially further inform these debates. Thus, as Bélanger and Stephenson's (2014: 117) note, "it is truly a win-win situation: the generalizability of comparative theories can be tested and potentially supported, while the specific features of the Canadian system can be made more readily apparent" (see also Farney and Levine 2008).

Thus, two subsequent questions emerge from scholarly debates derived from the larger issue ownership literature which will be the focus of this study: first, how does individual perceptions of issue ownership predict their vote choice, and, second, how useful is issue ownership voting at explaining the 2015 election when compared to other predictors of vote choice? The current state of the issue ownership literature has found that two dimensions – associative and competency – exist to explain how voters form the psychological association between an issue and a political party (see Walgrave et al. 2012). Therefore, it is important to assess, within the 2015 case, how voters came to conceptualize issue ownership and which dimension serves as a stronger predictor. Additionally, with issue ownership theory being but one potential explanation of how Canadians decided to vote in the 2015 election, it will be important to assess the meaningfulness of issue ownership itself as an explanatory factor relative to other potential determinants of voting behaviour.

In order to unpack these questions and better understand the 2015 case, the remainder of this thesis will be organized into four chapters: the following chapter will include a review of the relevant literature; chapter three will include the hypotheses and methodology; chapter four is the empirical results, and chapter five offers the concluding remarks. Ultimately, this thesis will show issue ownership voting occurs from both psychological dimensions in the 2015 Canadian election, while exhibiting an independent effect.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This overview of the literature begins by providing a working definition of issue ownership theory. Petrocik's seminal article outlines the theory as "a campaign effect when a candidate successfully frames the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing the country that [one] is better able to "handle" than his opponent" (1996: 826). This theoretical explanation would not be complete without extrapolating further about what it means to handle an issue, as Petrocik attempts to do. Petrocik characterizes handling as:

> "the ability to resolve a problem of concern to voters. It is a reputation for policy and program interests, produced by a history of attention, initiative, and innovation towards these problems, which leads voters to believe that one of the parties (and its candidates) is more sincere and committed to doing something about them" (ibid.)

This is not the only definition and conceptualization of issue ownership theory, however, with other scholars having since offered their own conceptual definitions of it (see Egan 2013; Stubager 2018; Walgrave et al. 2015).[2] Similarly, Petrocik (1996) is not the first scholar to raise this connection; how parties have an electoral advantage on some issues and use it to their benefit can be found within Budge and Farlie's (1983) work.[3] The decision to use this definition, however, is not without acknowledging the scholarly debate surrounding the definition of issue ownership theory or challenging Petrocik's definition (see van der Burg 2017; Stubager 2018; Therriault 2015; Vliengenthart and Lefevere 2017). The use of this current conceptualization is to focus on instead the objective of this thesis, rather than to engage in this debate within the literature. The decision to use this definition is due to its widespread use within this literature. Within the Canadian case specifically, this definition is used as a conceptual foundation exclusively within

[2] Walgrave et al. (2015) provides a clear and concise summary of the different conceptualizations of issue ownership used by previous scholars.

[3] Petrocik (1996: 826) does directly acknowledge the impact of Budge and Farlie's (1983) work in shaping his conceptualization of issue ownership theory for the American context.

recent studies of issue ownership voting (Bélanger 2003; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Bélanger and Nadeau 2015). Furthermore, this definition has been used to inform distinct theoretical frameworks and research designs with the development of the literature.

Issue ownership theory can serve as an explanation for either party or voting behaviour (van der Brug 2004; 2017; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Walgrave et al. 2014; Lanz and Sciarini 2016). Most early literature, namely Budge and Farlie (1983) and Petrocik (1996) explored issue ownership's application to party behaviour to explain how parties sought an electoral advantage by emphasising their owned issues compared to non-owned issues during a campaign period (Bélanger and Meguid 2008: 478; Lanz and Sciarini 2016: 213; Walgrave et al. 2014: 1-2; van der Brug 2004: 211; 2017: 522).[4] Additionally, these early studies used aggregate level results to explain the effects of issue ownership on vote share (van der Brug 2004: 211).[5] However, some early works examined the effects of issue ownership on individual-level vote choice (van der Brug 2004; Nadeau et al. 2001; Bellucci 2006; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Green and Hobolt 2008). It is in the tradition of these latter works that I intend to contribute and engage with. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify the theoretical foundations in which issue ownership anchors itself within the larger literature of issue voting and electoral studies.

2.1 Issue Ownership's Theoretical Underpinnings within Voting Behaviour

The types of issues and the way in which voters distinguish between parties along these issues is critical for understanding issue ownership theory. Downs (1957) outlines the first tradition of issue voting based on positional issues where voters differentiate between party positions and ultimately

[4] For another example see Petrocik et al. (2003), additionally issue ownership is not fixed with parties sometimes trying to obtain ownership of issues that are already owned by other parties (see Holian 2004). For an example within the Canadian context see Nadeau et al.'s (2010) account of the Liberal Party's strategy to own and frame the health care issue in the 2000 election.

[5] For an example within the Canadian context see Bélanger (2003).

choose the party closest to their intentions. Stokes (1966: 373) argues that contrary to Downs (1957), some issues are not positional and instead considered valence issues because the public and the parties, as well as candidates, are not divided on issue position but instead share an ideal outcome (ex. such as a strong, healthy economy). Thus, the public and parties' consensus on valence issues has voters instead decide which party is better able to achieve this goal once in office. From the American context, the Democratic Party's ownership of the unemployment issue has allowed them to be rewarded at the ballot box when the issue is raised (Wright 2012). This aligns with Petrocik's (1996: 827) preliminary "sources of issue ownership", at least in the short term, through performance issues (for another classification see Egan 2013).[6] Similarly, positional issues do not necessarily align with issue ownership voting because, if a voter's position on the issue does not match the party's position, there is no utility for the voter to acknowledge (or inform their vote choice) for the issue owning party (Bélanger and Meguid 2008: 483). Furthermore, Green and Hobolt's (2008) account reinforces the view that a party's competency (i.e. issue ownership), when compared to party position, is a better predictor of vote choice.

The other major concept that has come to inform issue ownership theory is salience. The importance of saliency for a party's owned issues arises within the election period, when parties fight to improve the saliency of their owned issues to improve their electoral outcome (Budge and Farlie 1983; see further Egan 2013; Budge 2015). Budge and Farlie's (1983) original work outlining the importance of saliency examines party behaviour rather than voting behaviour, however. This focus does *not* mean that saliency is not important when examining voting behaviour. Bélanger and Meguid (2008) illustrate the separate conditional need for issue saliency

[6] Egan (2013: 5-6) classifies these types of issues as "consensus issues" but acknowledges their similarity to valence issues.

in the minds of voters for issue ownership to affect their vote choice (see also Green and Hobolt 2008; Walgrave et al. 2012; Egan 2013; Bélanger et al. 2018).[7] However, the effects of issue salience can be impacted more by political knowledge compared to issue ownership (Dejaeghere and Erkel 2018). To sum up, the roots of issue ownership theory primarily rely on a party's (perceived) reputation for performing and willingness to focus on valence issues and these subsequent issues' importance during the election. In short, issue ownership theory is a more appropriate issue voting framework in the case of valence (or consensual) issues than proximity voting theory.

2.2 Assessing Stability and Fluctuations in Issue Ownership

With the major concepts and conceptualization of issue ownership defined, it is important to understand the duration and stability that political parties have in maintaining ownership of an issue. Initially, Budge and Farlie (1983) and Petrocik (1996: 826) highlight how issue ownership's stability exists within a long-term association with the party and is hard to change. Petrocik (1996: 829) argues the social identities found within political parties formed an alliance between the party and certain issues that ultimately can serve as a basis for issue ownership to form, and thus makes it easier for parties to maintain it over time (see Wright 2012). Egan (2013) follows in this tradition using his own "revised" theoretical definition (see Chapter 2) of issue ownership; indicating "long-term associations" and later confirming the appropriateness of this definition.[8] Further, while Petrocik (1996) and Egan (2013) studied the American context, Green and Jennings (2012a; 2012b) found support for the stability of issue ownership over time in Great Britain. However, Egan (2013: Chapter 5) does acknowledge that in the short term it is possible for parties to 'lose'

[7] Other scholarly works however illustrate that issue ownership can directly influence vote choice potentially without a need for saliency (see Bellucci 2006; Green and Jennings 2012a; 2012b).
[8] See especially Egan (2013: Chapter 5).

or have their ownership of an issue taken by another party, *but* the new issue owning party may not maintain ownership permanently.[9] In sum, Kleinnijenhuis and Walter (2014: 226) illustrate this problem, where issue ownership appears to be "stable over time at the macro level" with "instability at the micro level". In contrast to these findings, Christensen et al. (2015: 153) find in their study of Swedish elections that perceptions of issue ownership during their period of study (1979-2010) regularly fluctuated and changed between parties.

While these accounts outline both sides of the debate on the durability and stability of issue ownership perceptions, they cumulatively illustrate the potential for fluctuating issue ownership perceptions either during or in-between elections. This is paramount given the scope of this research project with its focus on a single election, as it cannot comment on how parties maintain (or lose) long-term ownership of an issue (for Canadian examples of this long-term association, see Nadeau and Blais 1990; Bélanger 2003). Instead, it offers a potential explanation for how individuals perceive parties to own issues within the 2015 case and offers an analysis on whether parties continue to maintain or lose ownership of an issue compared with previous elections.

It is possible for parties to obtain ownership of issues held by other parties under certain conditions (see Holian 2004).[10] The party behaviour branch of this literature can also be helpful in explaining the potential sources that could inform an individual's perceptions of a party's ownership on an issue. Walgrave and de Swert (2007) find that both the party and the media can be the cause of issue ownership to emerge (for the effects of media coverage, see Tresch and

[9] For another example see Petrocik's (2003) analysis of issue ownership with shifts in particular years.
[10] Tresch et al. (2015) would argue that a party's capability to take ownership of an issue from another party is not likely to occur from an associative dimension compared to previous literature that has focused on the competency dimension. Additionally, Budge (2015: 771-774) develops a typology on the conditions and constraints parties in an election face for whether they can emphasis or de-emphasis an issue.

Feddersen 2018). Similarly, Walgrave et al. (2009) assert that the party leader can also influence the formulation of issue ownership (see also Brasher 2009).[11] Turning towards the individual level, Stubager and Slothuus (2013: 584) find support for four sources (partisanship, attitudes, performance evaluations, and party constituencies) which can inform one's perceptions on issue ownership.[12] Finally, Lanz and Sciarini (2016) find that these individual short term influencers on perceptions towards a party's issue ownership will have an effect on their vote choice. In other words, the volatility of issue ownership voting can occur within a single election, and given this paper's focus, a potential contribution of this paper will be to reflect and situate the 2015 case within the larger Canadian literature.

2.3 Issue Ownership within the Canadian Context

Two of the first major studies of issue ownership in Canadian elections were Nadeau and Blais (1990) and Bélanger (2003), and in the case of Nadeau and Blais (1990), issue ownership had not yet been coined by Petrocik.[13] It is also important to highlight that these initial studies of issue ownership voting in Canada were similar to other studies during this period because the source of issue ownership is 'unidimensional', in that a party's perceived competency on an issue lead them towards obtaining issue ownership. (Walgrave et al. 2012: 773; see also Walgrave et al. 2015; van der Brug 2017). Their study found that Canadians were able to distinguish between parties based

[11] Interestingly, Walgrave and Lefevere (2017) find results for both individual and party factors that can alter perceptions of issue ownership among the electorate.

[12] See further examples of the effects of partisanship on issue ownership (Walgrave et al. 2016; Wagner and Zegolvits 2014; Therriault 2015; Walgrave et al. 2014; van der Burg 2017) for performance evaluations (Bellucci 2006), and Petrocik (1996) for "constituency associations".

[13] Nadeau and Blais (1990) were examining perceptions of party competence on different issues. This study remains appropriate when discussing the state of literature of issue ownership for two reasons. First, from a theoretical standpoint, the examination of perceptions of party competence does fall within our conceptualization of issue ownership because Nadeau and Blais (1990) are concerned with the government's performance. Second, from a methodological standpoint, their analysis is conducted using the 'standard' measure for (competency) issue ownership (see Petrocik 1996; van der Brug 2017; Stubager 2018; Therriault 2015; Walgrave et al., 2012; 2015; 2016; Lefevere 2015;2016; Vliengenthart and Lefevere 2017).

on their degree of competency on four issues – national unity, inflation, unemployment, international affairs – where a clear electoral advantage exists across their period of analysis, 1953-1988 (ibid.). As a result, the Liberals had been perceived as competent on two issues (international affairs and national unity) and the NDP on another (unemployment) (Nadeau and Blais 1990). Furthermore, both Nadeau and Blais (1990: 323) and Bélanger (2003: 540) illustrated that this expected competency of a party on an issue was distinct from their general popularity, thus paving the way for the potential viability of issue ownership within the Canadian context. While this is done at the macro level, it provides the first indication that competency issue ownership was seen as distinct among parties compared to their overall popularity with the public. Similarly, Bélanger (2003: 549) found that the Liberal party was ultimately, from 1953-2001, able to obtain issue ownership of all five issues (national unity, international affairs, unemployment, economy, deficit/debt) for an electoral advantage. While Canadian parties were seen to have long standing ownership of some issues, there is also a chance for ownership to shift away, or to re-align, in the short term (Bélanger 2003). This ultimately shows that issue ownership can be seen at the macro level to benefit political parties.

These two initial studies of issue ownership in Canada can be characterized by three prevailing features. First, like the rest of the literature at the time (van der Brug 2017: 522), these Canadian electoral behaviour studies were conducted at the macro level. Second, these studies also surveyed which parties held ownership of multiple issues at a time. Third, the Liberal party appeared to obtain issue ownership over most issues in both studies (Nadeau and Blais 1990; Bélanger 2003) with congruent accounts on the international affairs and national unity issues. Bélanger (2003: 554) offers a potential explanation for how the Liberals managed to gain ownership over a disproportionate amount of issues, in part due to them being able to benefit from

perception changes on their competency based on "government performance and party system change" due to their long periods in office. In addition to the cross-validation of these results, this also confirms the Liberal party's ownership of these issues over a long period of time, which further supports the trend in the literature laid out by Petrocik (1996) and Egan (2013). These accounts contradict each other on the unemployment issue, however, Bélanger (2003: 546) explains that the NDP's trouble in being able to use the issue to their electoral advantage allowed the Liberals to capitalize on it. However, the literature on issue ownership in Canada has also looked at this phenomenon at the micro level.

Another early study of issue ownership in Canada was conducted by Nadeau et al. (2001) which provides some unique insights, similar to other initial studies (Nadeau and Blais 1990) and more recent studies (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Bélanger and Nadeau 2015; Bélanger et al. 2018). Nadeau et al. (2001)'s focus is similar to other studies from this period insofar as it studies multiple issues (national unity, unemployment, taxes, social programs, crime) albeit only in the 1997 federal election. This study also foreshadows the current state of the literature on issue ownership when exploring its effect on vote choice, which is measured at the individual level. Nadeau et al. (2001: 423-424) conclude that the Liberal party was able to benefit electorally from owning the national unity issue because it was the most salient issue in the 1997 campaign.[14] Unlike past studies, Nadeau et al. (2001) was able to control and account for party preferences within their model, thus illustrating the effects of issue ownership voting occurring separate of partisan identification.

More recent studies on issue ownership literature share other similarities. First, similar to Nadeau et al. (2001), both Bélanger and Meguid's (2008) and Bélanger and Stephenson (2014)

[14] A study by Nadeau et al. (2010) offers a similar account examining the Liberal party's behaviour and strategy surrounding the health care issue in the 2000 election.

find an effect of issue ownership voting. Bélanger and Meguid (2008: 489) found in their later analysis of the 1997 and 2000 elections that the reputation of the party did matter but needed to consider the voter's perceived issue salience on a specific issue to discern its effect. They found that on issues such as taxes, social programs, and jobs, issue ownership voting did occur but was significantly conditioned by issue saliency (ibid.).[15] Additionally, Bélanger and Stephenson's (2014: 114-116) issue ownership voting findings in the 2008 election, while *not* the primary focus of the study, present two important findings relevant to this study. First, it shows that the effect of party competency or issue ownership on both Liberal and Conservative vote choice, although it is significantly influenced by partisan identification. Second, it also again explores the perceptions of issue ownership and its effect on vote choice on multiple issues, in this case crime, jobs, welfare, and for the first time the environment (ibid.). This trend of exploring the effects of issue ownership voting through party competency appears to end federally with the 2008 election.

At the provincial level, issue ownership voting literature appears to be restricted exclusively to the Quebec context. Whether at the provincial or federal level, previous literature in Quebec has found support for issue ownership voting on the economy issue (Bélanger and Gelineau 2011) and on the national question (Bélanger et al. 2018) from a singular competency dimension. For the 2011 federal election, Bélanger et al. (2018: 135-36) find that the Bloc Québécois had issue ownership of the national question, but also indicate that compared to the provincial context, issue ownership voting on this issue is less effective for predicting vote choice. Bélanger et al.'s (2018: 102-103) work provides support within the Canadian context for Stubager and Slothuus' (2013) driving perceptions of issue ownership, through examining how electoral

[15] Further support for the effects of saliency on conditioning the effects of issue ownership voting is seen within Bélanger et al.'s (2018: Chapter 4) account examining the national question in which the effect federally (support for the BQ) and provincially can be seen to benefit two parties depending on an individual's constitutional preferences.

support for the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) and Parti Québécois (PQ) is derived from "(a) the importance voters themselves give to the national question, (b) their feelings of attachment and identification towards Canada and Quebec, (c) their evaluations of the costs and benefits of various constitutional options, and (d) their own constitutional preferences." From Bélanger et al.'s (2018) contribution to the literature, in affirming the national question issue, shows that the Canadian context continues to be a viable case for the assessment of issue ownership voting because perceptions of issue ownership appear to be derived from similar sources as other countries (see further Walgrave and Lefevere 2017). Additionally, it shows that having issue ownership of a provincial election's most salient issues compared to others can in part explain that party's electoral success (see Bélanger et al. 2018).

Similar to Bélanger et al. (2018) and Bélanger and Gelineau (2011), recent studies on issue ownership voting in Canada focus on a single issue and, at the federal level, this is the economy. Furthermore, these recent studies have followed certain trends. Aside from Bélanger and Meguid (2008), the most recent accounts in Canada have become concerned exclusively with the effect of owning the economy issue on vote choice. This trend begins to become distinct in studies focused on issue ownership voting from the 2008 election onwards. Bélanger and Nadeau (2014) found that compared to the United States, the Conservative party's economic performance allowed them to retain ownership of the economy issue and aided in their re-election in 2008 and 2011. In other words, they found that the Conservative party was able to retain ownership of the economy despite the economic downturn because they were able to successfully foster positive perceptions of their

'ability to manage' the economy through cultivating positive performance evaluations through a comparative lens (ibid.).[16]

Bélanger and Nadeau (2015) also examined issue ownership voting on the economy in which their study offers unique implications for issue ownership voting in Canada. Unlike previous micro-level studies at the federal level (see namely Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Bélanger and Nadeau 2014) that examined issue ownership over two elections, they examined the effect across multiple elections. Through analyzing economic issue ownership voting across five elections, they show that issue ownership voting on a single issue regularly has a role in shaping an individual's choices at the ballot box (Bélanger and Nadeau 2015: 923). Additionally, they show that the party seen to own the economy issue has in fact shifted over time from the Liberal party to the Conservatives (ibid.). This illustrates the possibility for the Canadian case to contain both short and long-term effects of issue ownership, at least for the economy issue. This study has built the necessary theoretical underpinnings to feasibly explore the volatility of single case election because unlike previous works, it shows the potential for issue ownership to shift whether in a single election or over time. However, both of these accounts illustrate two points: first the Conservative party has issue ownership of the economy at the end of the 2011 election and likely had it going into 2015 election, and second when voters engage in issue ownership voting on the economy it produces an electoral advantage for the (in this case Conservative) party (Bélanger and Nadeau 2014; 2015).[17]

[16] Bélanger and Nadeau's (2015: 481-82) findings additionally provide further support for the importance of studying the effects of issue ownership through a party behaviour lens. See also Nadeau et al. (2010).

[17] Additionally, both Bélanger and Nadeau (2014; 2015) illustrate that specifically competency issue ownership of the economy can be seen as another explanation or dimension of economic voting. They make this distinction in part because the use of perceptions towards party competency are distinct from prospective or retrospective performance evaluations (ibid.). Therefore, this provides an example of where the issue ownership literature can be used to inform other subfields of voting behaviour (for another example see Sanders et al. 2011).

Even on the economy issue, the effects of issue ownership voting has yet to be conducted in the 2015 case. Nadeau and Bastien (2017: 382) offer a concluding speculation surrounding which party gained (or retained) issue ownership in the 2015 election, which was centered around the economy issue. They hypothesized from examining public opinion polls commissioned during the election that the Conservatives were unable to capitalize on their ownership of the issue going into the election and instead a "stalemate" occurred with the Liberals on the issue, ultimately allowing the Liberals to 'win' ownership (ibid.). However, they did not examine the effects that having issue ownership of the economy had on individual vote choice.

2.4 Purpose of this Thesis

This literature points towards a small but potential contribution this work can make by exploring issue ownership of the economy within the 2015 election. Therefore, I intend to examine whether the Conservative party, which had issue ownership of the economy after the 2011 election (see Bélanger and Nadeau 2014; 2015) would continue to own and use it to their electoral benefit in the 2015 case. The examination of which party owned the economy issue during the 2015 election is also important because it was seen by the electorate, as a whole, as the most salient issue (McNeney 2015; Coletto 2016; Nadeau and Bastien 2017; Clarke et al. 2016; 2017). Thus, this thesis offers an account from the 2015 election on whether having issue ownership of the most salient issue will land that party in government like the Liberals on national unity in 1997 (Nadeau et al. 2001) or health care in 2000 (Nadeau et al. 2010).

Again, this contribution alone shows a potential trend towards single issue analysis reminiscent within the issue ownership literature in Canadian elections. Other potential gaps in the literature surrounding issue ownership in Canada despite the current substantial contributions include: (1) a lack of analysis of which parties have ownership of different issues aside from the

economy (and the national question) in recent elections, and, (2) the impact of issue ownership voting on *any* issue during the 2015 election. This thesis fills these two gaps in the literature by exploring the 2015 federal election as a case study. I can illustrate which parties either gained or maintained ownership of different issues during the 2015 election and the subsequent effect it had on that party's vote choice. In addition to addressing these gaps within the Canadian context, I contribute to two large and one smaller scholarly debates within the larger issue ownership literature.

A small but potential contribution this thesis makes to this literature is in examining which competency issue ownership survey questions better measures the larger concept. Therriault (2015: 937) found when conducting a survey experiment in American congressional elections, the "best qualified" questions compared to the traditional "best job" question was seen to more "precisely" measure competency issue ownership.[18] The inclusion of multiple competency survey questions asking *separate* respondents, during the 2015 election, about their perceptions of a party's competency on an issue presents an opportunity to contribute to the existing literature on the best methodological approach for measuring (competency) issue ownership.

The 2015 federal election serves as an excellent case study to examine the two subdimensions of issue ownership which have recently been emphasized in the European literature: *associative* and *competence*. A debate has emerged on how exactly "the connection between issues and parties in the minds of voters" comes to be formed (Walgrave et al. 2015: 780). Initially, issue ownership was thought to be primarily achieved by a party based on their ability to adequately resolve an issue while in office (Walgrave et al. 2015; Bellucci 2006; Egan 2013).

[18] For another different competency measure see Stubager (2018).

Whereas, Walgrave et al. (2012) found that an associative dimension of issue ownership exists and informs vote choice distinct from the competency dimension. This associative dimension sees the connection between the issue and party through a "spontaneous association" by the voter (Walgrave et al. 2012). Walgrave et al. (2012: 773) theorizes that associative issue ownership "triggers 'accessibility,' a basic mechanism of information-processing and decision-making that refers to easily retrievable information coming to the top of a voter's mind."[19] It has now become commonplace to consider both dimensions as viable for voters to make the connection between the party and the issue (see Walgrave et al. 2012; 2015; Lefevere et al. 2015; 2016; Lachat 2014; Van der Burg 2017; for a contrary account, see Stubager 2018). The evidence on the effectiveness of one dimension over the other for better predicting the effects of issue ownership voting is more mixed. Some studies have found that when comparing the effects of each dimension alongside each other: both were effective (Lachat 2014), primarily competency was (Lutz and Sciarini 2016), or predominantly associative was (Walgrave et al. 2012; 2016; Lefevere 2016; see also van der Brug 2017).

However, this debate within the literature has yet to take place within the Canadian context. Issue ownership studies in Canadian federal elections have *exclusively* looked at only the competency dimension because of a lack of measures for the associative dimension (see Nadeau and Blais 1990; Nadeau et al. 2001; Bélanger 2003; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Bélanger and Nadeau 2014; 2015). The same can be said for studies of provincial Quebec elections (Bélanger and Gelineau 2011; Bélanger et al. 2018). Additionally, previous studies have been concerned with the incumbent party in office in which competency issue ownership was argued to be the most

[19] Walgrave et al.'s (2012) theoretical underpinnings of associative issue ownership are underscored by Scheufele and Tewskbury (2007) and Aalberg and Jenseen's (2007: 118) past work.

applicable dimension to examine given that perceptions of government performance on the issue could be taken into account (see Bélanger and Nadeau 2015; see also 2014; in Quebec's provincial context, see Bélanger et al. 2018: Chapter 4). Fatefully, the 2015 general election provides both measures, and thus presents an opportunity to consider this debate within the Canadian context, but also to better explore the conditions by which issue ownership occurs in the minds of voters.

This thesis contributes to another debate surrounding the potential for endogeneity in the relationship between issue ownership and vote choice. Recently, the literature has questioned the utility of issue ownership because of two other determinants of vote choice: partisan identification and policy positions. First for some scholars, the effect of partisan identification when included in models creates a strong biasing of the results particularly in the competency dimension (Walgrave et al., 2016; Wagner and Zegolvits 2014; Therriault 2015; Stubager and Slothuus 2013; Walgrave et al. 2014). In other words, a voter's perception of whether a party is able to perform on or resolve an issue is not based on previous performance, but on their party preference (Walgrave et al. 2014). Second, some scholars have made the case that instead of being separate entities, policy positions are used to determine issue ownership in the minds of voters (Therriault 2015: 937; see further Stubager and Slothuus 2013; Lefevere et al. 2016; Walgrave et al. 2016; Vliengenthart and Lefevere 2017). This potential inclusion of policy positions has been raised as a critique because issue ownership's effectiveness relies on parties owning valence issues. The challenge presented appears to be an issue of endogeneity where an individual's position may potentially shape and distort their perceptions about which party is best able to perform on an issue.

The other side of this debate on the effect and relationship between other determinants and issue ownership is more nuanced. The effect of either partisan identification or policy positions appears across both dimensions, but some scholars have found that the associative dimension is

less affected (Walgrave et al. 2016; Lefevere et al. 2016; see also van der Brug 2017). In some cases, these valence issues, on which issue ownership relies, can potentially be influenced by policy positions when conceptualized by voters (see Sanders et al. 2011; Green and Hobolt 2008).[20] However, Dejaeghere and Erkel (2018: 23-24) find associative issue ownership is sometimes used by individuals as a heuristic to spatially situate a political party's policy position. Similarly, some authors have found that competency perceptions inform partisan identification instead (Vliengenthart and Lefevere 2017; Green and Jennings 2012b; see also Bélanger and Gelineau 2010). This thesis contributes to this debate when examining the 2015 Canadian election by including these other determinants in an effort to better clarify their effect on the relationship between issue ownership and vote choice. With the state of the literature and major debates surrounding issue ownership theory presented, this next chapter will outline this study's methodology.

[20] Alt (1979: 10) explains that any issue lacks mutual exclusivity in that it can include "both valence and positional aspects". Their work does not comment on the directionality of the causal arrow between these two concepts but provides a potential theoretical explanation for how these aspects could come to affect one another.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Hypotheses

Given the state of literature, Canadians have been found to engage in issue ownership voting, on certain issues, as recent as the 2011 federal election (for the economy issue in 2011, see Bélanger and Nadeau 2014; 2015). This thesis will test whether this relationship between issue ownership and vote choice occurs in the 2015 case. However, in taking this a step further, I intend to examine how voters came to conceptualize an association between a party and an issue, on multiple issues, and subsequently the impact this has on their vote choice. The literature identifies issue ownership as being obtained by a party in the minds of voters either through a competency or associative dimension (Walgrave et al. 2012; 2015; Lefevere et al. 2015). The directionality of the relationship is likely to be positive because an individual that views a party as best able to deliver on an important issue will cast their vote accordingly (Petrocik 1996).[21] These dimension-specific hypotheses are summarized as:

> **H_1** The more an individual perceives a party to be competent on an issue, the more likely he/she will cast his/her vote for that party.
>
> **H_2** The more an individual uses an associative-based formulation to establish a party as an issue owner, the more likely that he/she will vote for that party.

There is merit to exploring the separate effect of each dimension of issue ownership even if they both have a positive effect on vote choice. In studying the effect of issue ownership voting, the competency dimension has been used by voters (at the individual level) in recent Canadian elections for the economy, and it has shown to benefit electorally the party that owns the issue (Bélanger and Nadeau 2014; 2015). Through testing whether voters prescribe issue ownership as a result of a party's perceived competency on *other* issues, it will better explain the effect of issue

[21] Alternatively, negative issue ownership can also occur in which a party is seen to be the worst or unable to deliver on an issue (see Wagner and Meyer 2015). The focus of this thesis however is on how issue ownership voting is seen to be an interest of the party because it presents an opportunity to increase their total vote share.

ownership voting. If associative-based issue ownership voting occurs in the 2015 election, then this shows that some Canadian voters conceive a party's ownership of an issue as a result of this "spontaneous association" (Walgrave et al. 2012: 772). Thus, testing the relationship between issue ownership and individual vote choice across both psychological dimensions (and across multiple issues) allows for a more in-depth analysis and application of issue ownership theory in order to understand which owned issues were greater contributors in explaining the 2015 electoral results. Through the examination of both of these dimensions concurrently, this also raises the question of which dimension is a better predictor of an individual's vote choice.

In order to address this subsequent question, one must examine the existing debate in outlining a criterion to determine which dimension (of issue ownership) is a better predictor than the other. Recently, scholars (Walgrave et al. 2016; van der Brug 2017; Vliegenthart and Lefevere 2017) have argued that the associative dimension is a better predictor predominantly because it is less affected by other potential predictors: namely, party identification and policy positions. The Canadian case does however present a potential testing ground to compare the effects of each issue ownership dimension on vote choice with partisan identification remaining relatively stable over time (Bélanger and Stephenson 2010) and with positional issue voting having been seen to inform individual voter preferences in previous Canadian elections.[22] In following with past literature, I will work deductively from the current direction of the literature in hypothesizing that the Canadian context, namely in the 2015 Canadian election, will follow a similar comparative pattern to other cases of issue ownership voting especially given the presence of these other predictors

[22] However, positional issue voting has been found to occur in Canadian elections but is often seen to have a minimal effect (for a contrary account see Johnston et al. 1992) ultimately on the party's success at the ballot box such as the 1997 (Blais et al. 2002b), 2000 (Blais et al. 2002a), 2008 (Gidengil et al. 2012: 98), or 2011 (Fournier et al. 2013) elections. That said, in the 2011 election, Fournier et al. (2013: 888-889) find that the NDP's success in Quebec was informed by positional issues more compared to the Rest of Canada (ROC) where the effects were relatively minimal compared to other predictors.

within Canadian elections. Within the 2015 case specifically, a theoretical explanation that expects the associative compared to the competency dimension is a better predictor because Canadian partisan identification appears to have remained stable over time (see Bélanger and Stephenson 2010), thus the competency dimension is more susceptible to partisan identification and will be a weaker predictor. This hypothesis is represented formally below as:

> **H_3** Associative-based issue ownership is a greater predictor of an individual's vote choice than competency-based issue ownership.

3.2 Methods

The 2015 Canadian Election Study (CES) contains the necessary data to research the questions posed within this thesis. This secondary survey data is advantageous because it contains individual responses to questions during the 2015 election period that can be operationalized to measure both the main predictor (IV) and outcome (DV) variables. The 2015 CES is a mixed-mode survey containing both a telephone and online component (Fournier et al. 2015a). The telephone component saw 4,202 respondents while the online component saw 7,412 respondents (ibid.) The online component contains a unique set of questions, specifically a survey experiment in which different types of question wordings were used to measure issue ownership on a variety of issues.

The two main predictor variables for different issues need to be operationalized. This thesis will explore which party is seen to have issue ownership over different issues (such as health care, environment, education, crime and justice, defense). All these issues were chosen for analysis because they were identified by Clarke et al. (2016: 328-333) with the exception of immigration

as salient issues identified by voters in the campaign during the 2015 election.[23] [24] The decision to omit immigration from the issues to be analyzed is because it is "certainly a positional issue" (van der Brug 2017: 528) and thus *not* a valence issue. First, for each issue the competency dimension of issue ownership will be measured by combining the responses from two survey questions: "which party would do a better job handling each of the following issues" and "which party is best qualified to handle the following issues?" (Fournier et al. 2015b). This is appropriate given that previous studies have used these question wordings (see Walgrave et al. 2015; 2016; Therriault 2015). Since two different survey questions were used to measure the competency dimension, it presents an opportunity to analyze whether one question wording better captures competency-based issue ownership when other factors are present (for an analysis of which question wording 'performs' better in the United States, see Therriault 2015). Second, the associative dimension is measured by the question "when you think about the following issues, please indicate which party you naturally think about first?" (Fournier et al. 2015b). The associative dimension question wording is slightly different than previous work. However, it still captures the essence of our conceptual definition and therefore Walgrave et al.'s (2012) original conception of the associative dimension, which sees "a spontaneous association" form between the party and issue (see also Kleinnijenhuis and Walter's (2014: 227) definition). A potential limitation weakens the aim of assessing which dimension of issue ownership better predicts vote choice (**H_3**). This limitation is that respondents were *not* surveyed for responses to both the associative and competency

[23] Clarke et al. (2016) use separate survey data to present their analysis. They also do not find that immigration was stated as an important issue; the niqab issue was represented as being part of "cultural issues" (ibid. 330). Additionally, while all these issues were salient, Clarke et al. (2016: 328-333) found that the economy was the most salient by a substantial margin.

[24] For additional discussion surrounding which issues that were considered by political elites to define the 2015 electoral discourse, see McNeney (2015) and Coletto (2016).

dimensions, therefore, the comparison that occurs between the associative and competency variables is the result of a split sample.

Issue ownership of the economy is also operationalized in order to test **H_1** but it was not part of the battery of issues included in the issue ownership experiment in the CES. Thus, the survey question used to measure the economy issue is, "which party do you think would be best at managing Canada's economy?" A similar question wording (or identical in the case of the 2011 election) has been used in past Canadian accounts which have assessed issue ownership voting on the economy issue (see Bélanger and Nadeau 2014; 2015; see also Blais and Nadeau 1990; Bélanger 2003). In these previous accounts, this type of survey measure captures the competency dimension of issue ownership. There is *no* measure within the 2015 CES to capture the associative dimension of the economy issue. Thus, the economy issue cannot be used to test **H_2** or **H_3**. In the case of *all* issue ownership variables, they were coded as dichotomous with '1' for the party of interest (Liberal, Conservative, or NDP) and all other values as '0'.

Vote choice as the outcome variable will be measured using the post-election vote choice question and remain coded as dichotomous variables to include only the three major Canadian parties as categories: Conservative, NDP, and Liberal.[25] The Bloc Québécois is excluded because of its presence solely in Quebec. This paper will *not* explore whether issue ownership voting patterns occur in the 2015 election in Quebec because of its longstanding unique electoral dynamics (compared to the rest of Canada) in federal elections since 1993 (see Gidengil et al. 2012: 147; Bélanger at al. 2018).

[25] The decision to omit respondents from the Green Party despite their status as a fixture within the Canadian party system was primarily because of the small number of Green Party voters found in the survey sample. Indeed, their inclusion within a preliminary draft of this thesis created important estimation problems.

The remaining variables to test each hypothesis can also be outlined here. Both party identification (party of interest = 1) and issue positions were coded as dummy variables to be included in the models to analyze to what degree they affect the impact of issue ownership voting (for each positional issues' question wording and coding, see Appendix 1.3). Finally, in both models, control variables will be included for other potential socio-demographic determinants found to affect vote choice in federal elections (Blais et al. 2002a; Gidengil et al. 2012). They include age (age = the respondent's age in years), sex (female = 1), education (graduate/professional = 1), religious affiliation (Catholic = 1; Protestant = 1), marital status (married or couple = 1), union membership (living with or union member = 1), and income (high income = 1), province of residency (Atlantic = 1; West = 1).[26]

To test our hypotheses, univariate, bivariate, and multivariate statistical tools will be employed, specifically for the latter through using a binary logistic regression technique.[27] Bélanger and Nadeau (2014: 2015) use this technique when assessing the effect of issue ownership voting in past Canadian elections. Our decision to use the same technique is also justified by meeting these considerations: methodologically, given the binary nature of the outcome variable, and theoretically because it is important to analyze the size of the effect of the issue owning party on vote choice for each major political party. Lastly, the calculation of marginal effects in the post-estimation of each multivariate model was applied to assess the relative magnitude of each variables' effect on the outcome variable.

[26] For full question wordings and coding, see Appendix 1.4.

[27] Alternatively, the multinomial logit regression technique could have been employed. It has been used in previous issue ownership voting work in Canada (see Bélanger and Nadeau 2014) because of the multiple categories of the vote choice variable. This thesis alternatively tried estimating its model using this regression technique, however the results were effected by the small sample size for each party.

Chapter 4: Results

4.1 Perceptions of Competency and Associative Issue Ownership in the 2015 election

Figure 1: Competency Issue Ownership - 'best at' wording



The first step to understanding the effects of issue ownership (IO) in the 2015 case is to identify which party holds ownership of a given issue. This can be done through examining which parties were seen by voters to hold ownership in the post-election period. First, through examining the traditional IO measure (see Petrocik 1996) on which party is "best at" handling an issue – a competency-based dimension – a few trends emerge which can be seen in Figure 1.[28] In this instance, the Liberal Party appears to have been successful in being perceived as owning the most issues with three: health care, education, and crime. By a substantial margin, the Liberals appear to own the health care (15.5%) and education (26.4%) issue when compared to the second highest party. However, on the crime issue, the Liberals exhibit a smaller gap (6.7 percentage points) between themselves and the second party perceived as competent. On the defense issue, given the relatively small difference (0.8 percentage points) between the numbers of individuals that saw the

[28] This thesis adheres to the recommendations made by Kastellec and Leoni (2007), thus attempting to visualize empirical results whenever possible to improve the ease of interpretation. However, the initial corresponding frequency tables for the IO question can also be found in Appendix 2.1.

Conservatives as better qualified on the issue compared to the Liberals, a tie between these parties for ownership is likely because the difference can be attributed to sampling error. The NDP, the other major political party, does not appear to have ownership over any of these issues. They only emerge as the second party most qualified in a single case (health care). Similar to the NDP, the Green Party does not appear to be perceived by many individuals as being competent on most issues (< 5 % in each case), with the exception of environment issues, where they are seen as being the most competent on the issue by a substantial margin (14.7 percentage points).

When using a different measure of competency issue ownership (CIO), a similar trend emerges, although variation does occur. Therriault (2015) found that another distinct, and better, according to his findings, measure for CIO is driven by a party's perceived qualifications in performing an issue compared to their ability to best handle an issue. In light of these findings, this measure of CIO is assessed here on another subset of individuals to determine who they found to hold issue ownership – which can be found in Figure 2.[29] Similar to Petrocik's (1996) wording used above, 2015 Canadian respondents identified the Liberal Party as being the most qualified to handle the health care, education, and crime issues (see Figure 2). However, the marginal difference between the two measures is minimal (< 3.0 percentage points) in the case of the health care and education issues. In the case of the health care issue, the second-place finisher does switch from the Conservatives to the NDP to handle the issue, although the variation in respondents' choices remains minimal (< 3.0 percentage points). On the crime issue, the most qualified CIO measure decreases the gap between the Liberal and second place Conservatives (6.7% to 1.9%). This brings the degree of competition for attaining (competency) issue ownership of the crime issue in line with defense between the two parties. Additionally, on the environmental issue, the

[29] For corresponding frequency tables for these CIO issues see Appendix 2.2.

Green Party is still seen as the most qualified to handle the issue, however, the degree of competition for ownership is much closer with the second-place Liberals, with a diminished gap from 14.7 percentage points in the 'best at' measure to 2.3 percentage points using the 'qualified' measure. Most strikingly, the difference between the results of the two CIO measures is on the defense issue: where the main competitors, the Liberal and Conservative parties, appear to slightly trade issue ownership with the Liberals being seen as more qualified compared to the Conservatives by a minimal margin (1.0 percentage points). This again shows that neither party can have issue ownership of the defense issue given the minimal difference, instead a tie occurs.

Figure 2: Competency Issue Ownership - 'qualified' wording



Ultimately, this comparison between two different CIO measures offers some potential insights. First, it shows that different types of CIO measures will have at least some variation in how individuals perceive which party is seen as having issue ownership. This is especially notable in an instance where two parties are in close competition with one another for issue ownership. In sum, the Canadian case contributes to the larger scholarly debate within the literature on the importance of considering the methodological implications of using different survey question

wordings to operationalize competency-based issue ownership.[30] However, this thesis is unable to go further in highlighting which measure is a more effective indicator (for an analysis on this, see Therriault 2015) in conceptualizing issue ownership, as these questions were asked to separate subsamples of respondents. Thus, I cannot make a direct comparison of the attitudinal preferences of the same individuals. Additionally, the degree of congruency between the descriptive results on each measure allows them to be combined into a single CIO variable for each issue, which we do in Figure 3.[31]

Figure 3: Perceived Issue Ownership - Competency Dimension



Examining the combined CIO measure, it provides a more robust picture of which parties were issue owners in the 2015 election. With the results being similar, Figure 3 shows the Liberals

[30] For different analyses on these methodological considerations see Therriault (2015), Walgrave et al. (2016), and Stubager (2018). Each of these three studies finds that compared to the 'traditional' issue ownership measure, the qualified measure is a better performer. That said, Stubager (2018: 365) highlights that the traditional measure does capture the *short term* considerations of the electorate, which fits with the primary focus of this thesis which is concerned with a single election.

[31] This claim could be further confirmed through using Pearson's r correlation calculation to ensure the greater reliability of the combined CIO measure. However, this is not possible given the constraints of the data because respondents were not asked each of the two CIO measures.

maintain issue ownership over health care (45% of respondents), education, (49.2%) and crime (43.8%).[32] As seen in Figure 3, the voters are relatively split on who is the most competent on the defense issue, with the difference between the Liberals and Conservatives being 0.1 percentage points in favour of the Liberals. Thus, it is difficult to clearly identify which party is seen as the most competent on the issue in this election, instead it shows *neither* party is able to attain issue ownership resulting in a tie. The Conservatives appear to own the economy issue (35.8% of respondents), with the Greens owning the environment issue (39.3%) by a substantive margin.

Additionally, we can assess whether parties that have historically been known to hold ownership of an issue in past elections maintained it in the 2015 election. Like Blais and Nadeau's (1990) and Bélanger's (2003) findings, the Liberal Party appears to be perceived as competent on the most issues (see Figure 3). However, the issues analyzed here differ from issues analyzed in these past works. This thesis can further show the long-term association on the economy issue. Bélanger and Nadeau (2014; 2015) identifies that the Conservatives were seen to have issue ownership of the economy issue, at the end of the 2011 election, and the 2015 electorate continues to view them as the most competent in handling the economy. This finding also runs contrary to Nadeau and Bastien's (2017: 382) concluding speculations that the Liberals were able to retake ownership for this election. With the competency dimension of issue ownership examined, this thesis now turns towards interpreting how individuals ascribed issue ownership based on the associative dimension.

Perceptions of which party seen to hold issue ownership through the associative dimension (AIO) offers different results in comparison to the competency dimension. As seen in Figure 4,

[32] For the corresponding frequency tables see Appendix 2.3.

both the Liberal and Conservative parties are seen to hold ownership of two issues each.[33] Similar to the CIO dimension, the Liberals hold issue ownership over health care (38.3% of respondents) and education (50.3%), while the Greens hold ownership of the environment issue (55.6%). On the other hand, the Conservatives are seen to hold AIO over crime (56.6% of respondents) and defense (62.1%). What is striking from the results of the associative dimension measure is that, with the exception of health care where the Liberals and the NDP are in close competition to gain issue ownership, the party that has issue ownership is perceived so by a majority of individuals. This shows that the competency and associative dimensions lead to distinct results in how individuals perceive a party to have issue ownership. However, while distinct from one another, these two dimensions of issue ownership need to be tested to see if they can serve as a predictor of individual vote choice.

Figure 4: Perceived Issue Ownership - Associative Dimension



[33] For the corresponding frequency tables see Appendix 2.4.

4.2 Bivariate Analysis of Issue Ownership on Vote Choice

While this initial univariate analysis identified which parties were seen to hold issue ownership across different issues, the next stage of analysis must examine whether a relationship can be observed between issue ownership and individual vote choice. Starting with competency-based issue ownership, a bivariate logistic regression model was estimated for each issue (see Appendix 4 for every bivariate regression model). This model regressed each issue ownership variable on voting for each of the three major parties. In Table 1, it shows how holding competency issue ownership of the education issue effects vote choice. For the education issue, two things become clear for each major political party. First, the CIO education coefficient indicates a positive relationship, and this relationship between CIO and vote choice is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). These findings for the education issue are similar compared to other CIO issues, which serves to highlight (like every other IO model) that when an individual identifies a party as the most competent, it can potentially impact their vote calculus. Therefore, these bivariate analyses provide preliminary support for $\mathbf{H_1}$.

Table 2: Education CIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
Intercept	-1.55***	-2.34***	-2.34***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
IO	2.87***	3.12***	4.55***
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.21)
N	1105	1105	1105

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

A similarly modelled bivariate regression analysis was used to assess whether a relationship is found between AIO of this same issue and vote choice. Table 2 shows the logistic regression coefficients which indicate whether an individual identifying the major political party

as having AIO of the education issue, predicts their decision to vote for the same party. From these results, it shows a positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) relationship for each major party – like other AIO issues (see Appendix 4). These cross-issue findings indicate that holding AIO over any issue (under analysis) will positively affect a party's vote share. Thus, this shows preliminary support for **H_2**.

Table 3: Education AIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
Intercept	-1.46***	-2.03***	-2.10***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
IO	2.48***	2.56***	4.00***
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.29)
N	517	517	517

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

In sum, holding either AIO or CIO on any issue appears to positively influence an individual's voting preferences, regardless of which major party the individual identifies as issue owner. Ultimately, this illustrates that issue ownership voting did occur within the 2015 election to the benefit of, at least, every major political party. From these bivariate models, another trend does emerge; the regression coefficients (regardless of AIO or CIO) are always largest for the incumbent party at the onset of the election – which at that time was the Conservative party. This finding may be able to illustrate which parties are more partial to the effects of issue ownership voting. However, given the biased nature of these logistic regression coefficients, I will unpack whether these larger incumbent coefficients are the result of a larger effect size that is in fact substantive through post-estimation later in this chapter. Prior to this, the next subsection examines

whether a threat to the internal validity of this relationship exists through addressing a prevalent confounder variable in voting behaviour: partisan identification.

4.3 Disentangling Issue Ownership from Partisan Identification

From these univariate and bivariate statistics, it is unclear how much an individual's perception of issue ownership is the result of another confounding variable. It is important to assess to what degree an individual's partisan identification potentially colours their willingness to bestow a party with issue ownership. This decision to focus on analyzing the relationship between partisan identification and issue ownership is driven by three theoretical justifications. First, partisan identification exists near the beginning of Campbell et al.'s (1960) "funnel of causality" and thus can influence other factors before an individual arrives at their vote choice, thus it may bias future results (see also Miller and Shanks 1996). Second, Stubager and Slothuus (2013: 584) clearly show that an individual's perceptions of dispensing issue ownership can be derived from partisanship, thus illustrating that partisan identification may have an indirect effect. Third, the literature has long identified the potential for endogeneity for issue ownership voting from partisan identification (Walgrave et al. 2014; see also Walgrave et al., 2016; Wagner and Zeglovitz 2014; Therriault 2015; Stubager and Slothuus 2013). Within the Canadian context, partisan identification continues to remain relatively stable among the electorate in the long term (Bélanger and Stephenson 2010). However, the objective of assessing this relationship between partisan identification and issue ownership within the 2015 case is to show that issue ownership is sufficiently independent of partisan identification.

Table 3: Crosstabulation of Party ID by CIO Health Care

CIO - Health Care	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	317	5	19	7	348
	71.40%	7.40%	4.40%	2.40%	
Green	2	17	6	4	29
	0.50%	25.00%	1.40%	1.40%	
Liberal	81	29	347	77	534
	18.20%	42.60%	79.60%	26.60%	
NDP	44	17	64	202	327
	9.90%	25.00%	14.70%	69.70%	
Total	444	68	436	290	1238
	35.90%	5.50%	35.20%	23.40%	

$\chi^2 = 1111.14$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

One way to assess whether issue ownership is independent of partisan identification in this instance is through conducting crosstabulations. This is first reflected through producing a crosstabulation of CIO health care and party identification in Table 3. It shows that across each row of the CIO variable, the largest column percentage is when the individual's partisan identification and the party for issue ownership match. Thus, this further supports Stubager and Slothuus' (2013) findings that partisanship can serve as a source of issue ownership. However, another trend emerges in which partisans that do not believe their party can handle the issue effectively often appear to select the same second place party. On CIO health care, this is best represented by observing the Liberal row across partisan identifiers, where the second largest column percentage total for each partisan identifier is seen. Furthermore, this can be represented by the total number of row cases (n = 534) that identified the Liberals as having issue ownership compared to the NDP (n = 327) and the CPC (n = 348). Thus, while partisan identification can be seen to have an effect on CIO, it does not completely explain its variance. Similarly, the trends seen in CIO health care are reflected in each of the other CIO issues (see Appendix 3.2).

Additionally, as seen in Table 4, the same trend emerges when assessing AIO health care and partisan identification, as well as for each specific AIO issue (see Appendix 3.1).

Table 4: Crosstabulation of Party ID by AIO Health Care

AIO - Health Care	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	119	0	16	7	142
	58.30%	0.00%	7.60%	4.40%	
Green	3	9	2	3	17
	1.50%	29.00%	1.00%	1.90%	
Liberal	28	7	146	41	222
	13.70%	22.60%	69.50%	25.90%	
NDP	54	15	46	107	222
	26.50%	48.40%	21.90%	67.70%	
Total	204	31	210	158	603
	33.80%	5.10%	34.80%	26.20%	

$\chi^2 = 397.28$ $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Whilst these previous bivariate analyses have shown issue ownership voting occurred in the 2015 election and that while issue ownership produces an independent effect from partisan identification, it still has an effect. Thus, in order to understand the effect size of partisan identification on the relationship between issue ownership and vote choice, the next subsection assesses this relationship within a multivariate analysis.

4.4 Issue Ownership Voting within a Multivariate Analysis

4.4.1 Competency Issue Ownership Voting

Table 3: Multivariate Competency Issue Ownership – Liberal Vote Choice

	Health Care	**Education**	**Environment**	**Crime**	**Defense**	**Economy**
(Intercept)	-1.82***	-2.61***	-1.95***	-0.98	-0.72	-0.58
	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.60)	(0.51)
CIO	**2.57*** **	**2.55*** **	**1.85*** **	**2.25*** **	**2.25*** **	**1.80*** **
	(0.24)	**(0.23)**	**(0.26)**	**(0.24)**	**(0.28)**	**(0.29)**

Policy Positional	-0.01	0.90*	0.66*	-0.36	-0.29	-0.57*
	(0.24)	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.23)
Party ID	2.53***	2.46***	2.71***	2.63***	2.50***	2.48***
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.25)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.03**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.56	0.99**	0.80*	0.41	0.43	0.46
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.45)	(0.34)
Income	-0.21	-0.04	-0.21	-0.15	-0.19	0.06
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.31)
Gender	-0.05	-0.07	0.31	-0.11	0.09	0.27
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.20)
West	-0.36	-0.74**	-0.75**	-0.63**	-0.67*	-0.14
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.21)
Atlantic	0.48	0.42	0.58	0.05	0.31	0.05
	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.52)	(0.57)	(0.34)
Union	0.39*	0.28	0.13	0.09	0.40	0.19
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.22)
Catholic	-0.53	-0.57	-0.34	-0.14	-0.28	-0.03
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.28)
Protestant	-0.02	-0.17	-0.10	0.22	0.26	-0.20
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.23)
Married	0.22	0.38	0.36	0.31	0.26	0.15
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.22)
N	769	772	708	750	579	895

Note: calculated with robust standard errors (in parentheses)

Moving into a multivariate context, it becomes clear that competency issue ownership continues to have an effect in predicting individual vote choice. Table 3 presents logistic regression estimates for competency issue ownership for the Liberal party, with each column reflecting a different issue. Despite the inclusion of traditional sociodemographic determinants of vote choice (see Gidengil et al. 2012; Blais et al. 2002a) and known confounders, namely partisan identification and policy positional variables (see Walgrave et al. 2016; Lefevere et al. 2016), when the Liberal party is identified by an individual as having issue ownership – of in this case health care, education, environment, crime, defense, or the economy – through a competency dimension (Liberal = 1)

then it has a positive effect on their decision to cast a vote for the Liberal party.[34] For each issue, this relationship remains statistically significant ($p \leq 0.001$). Finally, while it is not possible to interpret the effect size from Table 3's coefficients, a trend does emerge within each model, where the effect size of the CIO variable is smaller in comparison to that of partisan identification – except for health care (β = 2.57 compared to 2.53). This trend adds further support to the representativity of these findings because it shows that the effects of issue ownership voting in the 2015 Canadian case exhibit a trend comparative to other electoral contexts (Walgrave et al. 2016) or previous Canadian elections (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Bélanger and Stephenson 2014).

Table 4: Multivariate Competency Issue Ownership – NDP Vote Choice

	Health Care	**Education**	**Environment**	**Crime**	**Defense**	**Economy**
(Intercept)	-3.04***	-3.18***	-3.06***	-3.29***	-3.48***	-2.72***
	(0.69)	(0.77)	(0.72)	(0.70)	(0.88)	(0.64)
CIO	**2.26***	**2.26***	**1.30***	**2.17***	**1.51***	**1.54***
	(0.29)	**(0.31)**	**(0.39)**	**(0.40)**	**(0.40)**	**(0.34)**
Policy Positional	-0.40	0.12	0.18	-0.31	-0.22	-0.62*
	(0.32)	(0.48)	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.26)
Party ID	2.90***	2.97***	3.53***	3.18***	3.61***	2.85***
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.32)
Age	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.46	-0.73	-0.31	-0.14	-0.02	-0.16
	(0.51)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.59)	(0.41)
Income	-0.57	-0.59	-0.80	-0.36	-0.84	-0.55
	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.64)	(0.42)
Gender	0.11	0.08	-0.03	-0.04	-0.23	-0.26
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.25)
West	0.16	0.37	0.23	0.50	0.28	0.10
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.26)
Atlantic	-0.27	-0.18	0.02	0.26	0.51	0.37
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.54)	(0.57)	(0.39)
Union	-0.11	-0.05	0.31	0.33	0.28	0.12
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.29)
Catholic	0.40	0.37	0.17	0.18	0.11	0.10
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.44)	(0.33)
Protestant	-0.57	-0.40	-0.41	-0.57	-0.45	-0.17
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.30)

[34] For each CIO issue, a bloc recursive approach was used to better understand how the inclusion of each different variable effected the relationship between CIO and vote choice. These results can be found in Appendix 4.1.

Married	-0.41	-0.47	-0.42	-0.51	-0.52	-0.54*
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.26)
N	769	772	708	750	579	895

Note: calculated with robust standard errors (in parentheses)

To better understand the relationship between competency-based issue ownership and vote choice, each model was estimated using Canada's two other major parties. Table 4 presents the logistic regression coefficients for when individuals identified the NDP as having CIO for each issue and cast their vote accordingly. Table 5 displays the results of identifying the Conservative Party (CPC) as the value of interest (= 1) for each CIO and vote choice variable. Both Table 4 and 5 demonstrate similar findings (as Table 3): when an individual identifies any of Canada's three major parties as having CIO of an issue, it yields a positive (and statistically significant) effect on their decision to cast their vote for the same party. Thus, this congruency across different parties and issues within a multivariate context provides clear support for **H_1**.

Table 5: Multivariate Competency Issue Ownership – CPC Vote Choice

	Health Care	**Education**	**Environment**	**Crime**	**Defense**	**Economy**
(Intercept)	-4.59***	-3.49***	-3.64***	-5.72***	-5.80***	-5.54***
	(0.84)	(0.79)	(0.75)	(0.84)	(0.99)	(0.82)
CIO	**3.14*** **	**2.92*** **	**2.28*** **	**2.83*** **	**3.07*** **	**3.05*** **
	(0.38)	**(0.41)**	**(0.43)**	**(0.35)**	**(0.45)**	**(0.32)**
Policy Positional	-0.33	-1.24*	-1.15**	0.87*	0.76	1.22***
	(0.39)	(0.51)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.37)
Party ID	3.80***	3.79***	4.30***	4.10***	3.75***	3.04***
	(0.38)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.36)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.24	-0.63	-0.58	-0.80	-0.91	-0.35
	(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.64)	(0.53)
Income	0.64	0.47	0.99*	0.64	1.36*	0.72
	(0.58)	(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.52)
Gender	0.01	0.11	-0.27	0.21	0.25	-0.05
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.31)
West	0.68	0.78*	0.78*	0.30	0.60	-0.07
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.30)
Atlantic	-1.09	-1.21	-1.55*	-0.60	-1.47	-1.06
	(0.94)	(0.69)	(0.71)	(1.06)	(0.90)	(0.65)
Union	-0.51	-0.78	-0.73*	-0.71	-1.08*	-0.25

	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.39)
Catholic	0.32	0.38	0.22	0.29	0.29	-0.35
	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.52)	(0.48)	(0.55)	(0.41)
Protestant	0.34	0.41	0.21	0.07	-0.21	0.32
	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.45)	(0.33)
Married	0.08	-0.25	-0.05	-0.06	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.33)
N	769	765	708	750	579	895

Note: calculated with robust standard errors (in parentheses)

4.4.2 Associative Issue Ownership Voting

Table 6: Multivariate Associative Issue Ownership – Liberal Vote Choice

	Health Care	**Education**	**Environment**	**Crime**	**Defense**
(Intercept)	-1.66*	-1.65	-1.51*	-1.65*	-1.29
	(0.74)	(0.87)	(0.73)	(0.69)	(0.80)
AIO	**1.93*** **	**2.45*** **	**1.35*** **	**2.09*** **	**2.27*** **
	(0.32)	**(0.33)**	**(0.39)**	**(0.40)**	**(0.48)**
Policy Positional	-0.01	0.07	0.29	-0.35	-0.55
	(0.33)	(0.51)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Party ID	2.36***	2.60***	2.83***	2.86***	2.48***
	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.41)
Age	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	1.00	0.89	0.68	1.19*	1.14
	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.59)
Income	0.09	0.10	0.16	0.52	0.49
	(0.51)	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.60)
Gender	0.05	-0.05	-0.03	0.18	0.08
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.40)
West	-0.16	-0.28	-0.27	-0.25	-0.47
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.39)
Atlantic	0.53	0.23	0.76	0.17	0.05
	(0.61)	(0.57)	(0.64)	(0.62)	(0.70)
Union	-0.14	0.04	-0.33	-0.20	0.13
	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.41)
Catholic	-0.04	-0.30	-0.25	-0.34	-0.11
	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.48)
Protestant	-0.28	-0.23	-0.48	-0.30	-0.58
	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.49)
Married	0.59	0.53	0.58	0.47	0.46
	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.41)
N	366	356	332	341	276

Note: calculated with robust standard errors (in parentheses)

The next stage is to assess whether the relationship between the associative dimension of issue ownership (AIO) and vote choice also exists within a multivariate context. First, the relationship

between AIO and vote choice can be understood through support for the Liberal party (see Table 6). When an individual naturally identifies the Liberals with *any* issue (health care, education, environment, crime, or defense), it has a positive effect on their decision to ultimately cast their vote for the Liberal party (Table 6). This relationship remains positive and statistically significant ($p \leq 0.001$) for each issue. Thus, a political party seen to have AIO of any issue can improve their vote share. Similar to CIO, every AIO logistic regression coefficient remains substantively smaller than that for partisan identification. This further illuminates the short-term context in which the relationship between AIO and vote choice exists when holding a relatively stable and strong predictor of vote choice constant.[35] The dynamics surrounding AIO must be understood in its ability to predict vote choice for other major political parties to ensure this relationship is unique to the Liberals.

Table 7: Multivariate Associative Issue Ownership – NDP Vote Choice

	Health Care	**Education**	**Environment**	**Crime**	**Defense**
(Intercept)	-2.17*	-4.28***	-2.43*	-1.84	-1.12
	(0.89)	(1.18)	(1.00)	(0.95)	(1.09)
AIO	**1.84*****	**1.87*****	**0.83**	**1.99***	**1.28**
	(0.37)	**(0.42)**	**(0.51)**	**(0.77)**	**(0.84)**
Policy Positional	-0.49	0.89	0.57	-0.45	-0.55
	(0.46)	(0.70)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Party ID	2.79***	2.81***	3.58***	3.17***	2.85***
	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.44)
Age	-0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.70	-0.53	-0.63	-0.32	-0.59
	(0.66)	(0.68)	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.73)
Income	-0.43	-0.06	-0.18	-0.70	-1.02
	(0.63)	(0.71)	(0.79)	(0.72)	(0.76)
Gender	-0.04	-0.13	-0.12	-0.31	-0.15
	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.42)
West	0.27	0.31	0.05	0.16	0.31
	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Atlantic	0.38	0.87	0.41	0.65	0.64
	(0.65)	(0.59)	(0.66)	(0.65)	(0.74)
Union	0.43	0.29	0.36	0.09	0.00

[35] For a discussion on the enduring stability of partisan identification, see Bartels 2002.

	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.55)
Catholic	-0.12	0.19	-0.06	-0.29	-0.76
	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.65)
Protestant	-0.06	0.03	0.05	-0.00	-0.18
	(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.49)
Married	-1.09**	-0.95*	-1.28*	-0.69	-0.76
	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.52)	(0.43)	(0.45)
N	366	356	332	341	276

Note: calculated with robust standard errors (in parentheses)

When examining the relationship between AIO and NDP as well as CPC vote choice, similar but distinct findings emerge. When individuals identify the NDP as having AIO and voting for the NDP, a similar trend emerges. Table 7 shows that a positive and statistically significant relationship exists when an individual identifies the NDP as having AIO of the health care (β = 1.84, $p \leq 0.001$), education (β = 1.87, $p \leq 0.001$), and crime (β = 1.99, $p \leq 0.001$) issues. However, this (positive) relationship is *not* statistically significant when an individual identifies the NDP as having AIO of the environment or defense issues. This shows having AIO on certain issues will ultimately lead individuals to vote accordingly. When examining the relationship when individuals identify the Conservatives as having AIO, the findings seen in Table 8 are similar to both the Liberal and NDP cases because the relationship is always positive. This relationship remains statistically significant for each AIO issue: when an individual identifies the Conservatives as having AIO for any issue, it serves as a predictor of their vote choice. Additionally, the trend remains consistent, as the effect size for the AIO variable, for each issue, remains substantively smaller for every major political party compared to partisan identification. These findings provide further support for **H_2**, since the relationship between AIO and vote choice remains consistently positive as well as statistically significant across multiple issues and different party's vote choice. With issue ownership voting being seen to occur as a result of both psychological dimensions (associative and competency) in the 2015 election, the next section seeks to understand the degree of substantive significance.

Table 8: Multivariate Associative Issue Ownership – CPC Vote Choice

	Health Care	**Education**	**Environment**	**Crime**	**Defense**
(Intercept)	-4.69***	-3.65**	-3.49***	-6.03***	-6.95***
	(0.96)	(1.22)	(0.90)	(1.21)	(1.36)
AIO	**2.45***	**3.28***	**2.55***	**2.93***	**3.10***
	(0.46)	**(0.57)**	**(0.69)**	**(0.72)**	**(0.67)**
Policy Positional	0.56	-0.37	-0.72	0.87*	1.16*
	(0.43)	(0.66)	(0.54)	(0.43)	(0.53)
Party ID	3.04***	3.28***	3.56***	3.74***	3.35***
	(0.44)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.47)	(0.51)
Age	0.03*	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Education	-0.77	-0.80	-0.06	-1.08	-0.54
	(0.72)	(0.75)	(0.66)	(0.76)	(0.80)
Income	0.04	-0.09	-0.22	-0.44	0.13
	(0.73)	(0.79)	(0.69)	(0.71)	(0.83)
Gender	-0.20	0.17	0.06	0.04	0.08
	(0.42)	(0.48)	(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.51)
West	0.15	0.18	0.26	0.23	0.40
	(0.43)	(0.50)	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.50)
Atlantic	-1.19	-1.17	-1.69	-0.34	-0.43
	(0.68)	(0.80)	(0.97)	(0.79)	(0.91)
Union	-0.31	-0.40	0.05	0.18	-0.06
	(0.60)	(0.64)	(0.53)	(0.62)	(0.67)
Catholic	-0.13	-0.05	0.11	0.85	0.92
	(0.70)	(0.66)	(0.58)	(0.65)	(0.68)
Protestant	0.43	0.29	0.47	0.32	1.24
	(0.43)	(0.51)	(0.45)	(0.56)	(0.64)
Married	0.24	0.17	0.22	0.28	0.55
	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.54)
N	366	356	332	341	276

Note: calculated with robust standard errors (in parentheses)

4.4.3 Assessing AIO and CIO as predictors

With the directionality of competency issue ownership's effect conforming to our theoretical expectations, it is now important to further understand the substantive effect it has on predicting vote choice. Appendix 6 displays the calculated average marginal effects for each CIO issue and voting for each major party, in which four major findings emerge.[36] First, when a party is seen to

[36] Additionally, in order to ensure the robustness of these findings, the marginal effects using the observed-values approach (see Hanmer and Kalkan 2013) were calculated with robust standard errors for each model. In each case, the use of robust standard errors was found to yield substantively similar results. Thus, this shows the current models are less likely to be subject to misspecification (see King and Roberts 2015).

have CIO of any issue, it is a substantive predictor of an individual's vote choice in favour of that party. This is best illustrated when the NDP is seen to have issue ownership because, compared to the other two parties, the effect size is the smallest for each issue, predicting at least a 14 percentage points increase in voting for the NDP (such as on the defense issue, see Appendix 6.5). Second, when Conservatives are perceived to have CIO of the health care (43%) and economy (36%) issues, this remains the most substantive predictor of (Conservative) vote choice in comparison to other party models of vote choice. In contrast, identifying the Liberals as having CIO of education (41%), crime (37%), environment (30%) and defense (37%) issues is the most substantive predictor of vote choice when compared to other parties (namely the Conservatives). Finally, while substantive significance exists when examining the effects of competency issue ownership voting for each major party, the individual strength of holding ownership of specific issues does not appear to differ significantly. When comparing the predictive effects across each Liberal and Conservative vote choice model, the difference between each one on every issue is equal to or less than 10 percentage points.

Associative issue ownership on a variety of issues also emerges as a substantive predictor of individual vote choice for each major political party. Appendix 6 illustrates the calculated average marginal effects of an individual's perceived AIO's , on each issue, ability to predict vote choice for each major party.[37] This shows that when a party is perceived as obtaining AIO of the health care, education, crime, or defense issue, it will serve as a substantive predictor of vote choice for that party (see Appendix 6). However, an exception exists when examining the environment and defense issues, since the relationship between individuals identifying the NDP as having AIO and vote choice is statistically insignificant. Similar to the effects of CIO voting, when the

[37] These marginal effects were also estimated using the observational approach outlined in Hanmer and Kalkan (2013).

Conservatives are identified as having AIO of education (43%) and the environment (31%), it remains the most substantive predictor compared to other parties on the issue. Additionally, when the Liberals are identified as having AIO of health care (34%), crime (33%) and defense (37%), it emerges as the strongest predictor. For the environment and defense issues, the degree of variation in the effect size between the Liberals and Conservatives is smaller (< 3 percentage points) compared to other AIO issues and their CIO counterparts.

Through highlighting the strongest predictor for each issue from both competency and associative dimensions, it presents an avenue to compare which dimension serves as a better predictor relative to the other. On the health care issue, CIO (43%) serves as a stronger predictor of Liberal vote choice compared to AIO (34%) (Appendix 6.1). For the education and environment issues, the associative dimension serves as a better predictor compared to its competency counterpart but the strongest predictor of party support shifts from being for Liberal (CIO) to CPC (AIO) (see Appendix 6.2-3). On the crime issue, the competency dimension (37%) serves as a slightly stronger predictor of Liberal vote choice compared to its associative dimension (34%) counterpart (Appendix 6.4). For the defense issue, the effect of AIO (37%) and CIO (37%) are substantively similar (Appendix 6.5). In sum, in comparing the direct effects of the associative and competency dimensions of issue ownership on vote choice of five issues, both dimensions have two issues where it serves as a better predictor compared to the other, as well as one neutral (or tied) issue. Thus, these findings only find partial support for **H_3** because for certain issues (health care and crime), a competency dimension serves as stronger predictor, despite the inclusion of potential sources of endogeneity, and under some conditions, no substantive difference exists between the two dimensions (defense).

The partial support for **H_3** can be further unpacked to situate these findings within the larger literature. These mixed findings on which dimension of issue ownership voting serves as a better predictor further confirm the variability found in other electoral contexts such as Switzerland (Lachat 2014; for an alternative account, see Lutz and Sciarini 2016), but the degree of potential country variation is broader given the issue ownership measures employed (see Lefevere et al. 2016). It is important to further clarify the short-term effects of issue ownership voting in the 2015 case because the potential for either associative and competency issue ownership voting to occur for both the same issues and to the electoral advantage of multiple parties presents a potential theoretical challenge: which issues did parties in the 2015 Canadian federal election electorally benefit from having issue ownership?

4.4.4 Situating Issue Ownership Voting within the 2015 election

This final subsection looks to add further clarification to the 2015 case by unpacking under which issue conditions does having ownership improve a party's vote choice. Until this point, it has been shown that associative and competency issue ownership voting occurs for the same (but multiple) issues to the benefit of multiple parties. However, the foundation of issue ownership theory emphasises that political parties *cannot* have ownership of every issue, but instead highlight these owned issues during the campaign period (see Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Egan 2013; see also Wright 2012). Therefore, it is important to identify exactly what issues are in the interest of political parties to activate issue ownership voting at the individual level.

Table 9: Average Marginal Effects for all CIO Issues on each Party

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
CIO Health Care	**0.14***	**0.21****	**0.05**
	(0.07)	**(0.07)**	**(0.04)**
CIO Education	**0.18****	**0.07**	**0.04**

	(0.07)	**(0.04)**	**(0.04)**
CIO Environment	**0.07**	**0.02**	**0.03**
	(0.05)	**(0.03)**	**(0.03)**
CIO Crime	**0.01**	**-0.00**	**-0.00**
	(0.05)	**(0.03)**	**(0.03)**
CIO Defense	**0.13***	**0.01**	**0.14****
	(0.07)	**(0.04)**	**(0.05)**
CIO Economy	**0.13***	**0.10***	**0.07**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Health Positional	0.03	-0.04	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Education Positional	0.03	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Environmental Positional	0.05	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Crime Positional	-0.05	0.01	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Defense Positional	-0.02	-0.03	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Economic Positional	-0.03	-0.02	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party ID	0.07	0.11*	0.14
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.06	-0.00	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Income	0.02	-0.08	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Gender	-0.02	-0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
West	-0.11**	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Atlantic	0.01	-0.00	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Union	0.06	-0.01	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Catholic	-0.07	0.03	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Protestant	0.03	0.01	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)

Married	0.02	-0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
N	289	289	289

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

Starting with the successful 2015 Liberals, it becomes clear when controlling for the effects of having issue ownership of different issues that certain issues shaped Liberal vote choice compared to others. Table 9 shows the calculated average marginal effects of holding each issue ownership variable constant, separately across the competency dimension,[38] when assessing their individual effect.[39] For CIO to predict Liberal vote choice, only defense (13%), economy (13%), education (18%), and health care (14%) remain statistically significant. However, Table 10 shows that when the associative dimension is used by individuals to perceive issue ownership, the Liberals may receive votes based only on the education issue (32%), which emerges as the strongest predictor within the model. It appears that Liberal issue ownership voting occurs over a variety of issues when individuals form the party-issue association, but more so through a competency lens compared to an associative lens. Across both dimensions of issue ownership, however, the Liberals were able to benefit substantively from owning the education issue.

Table 10: Average Marginal Effects for all AIO Issues on each Major Party

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
AIO Health Care	**0.02**	**0.09**	**0.08**
	(0.05)	**(0.05)**	**(0.07)**
AIO Education	**0.32*****	**0.18****	**0.15***
	(0.06)	**(0.07)**	**(0.07)**
AIO Environment	**0.12**	**0.04**	**0.06**
	(0.07)	**(0.04)**	**(0.07)**
AIO	**0.09**	**0.22***	**0.07**

[38] Another potential way to estimate this effect would be to control the effects of associative and competency dimensions of the same issues within a single model. However, this current analysis is limited by the split sample nature of the data.

[39] The initial tables reporting these logistic regression coefficients can be found in Appendix 7.1.

Crime			
	(0.07)	**(0.11)**	**(0.07)**
AIO Defense	**0.13**	**-0.05**	**0.18***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Health Care Positional	-0.03	-0.02	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Education Positional	-0.04	0.14	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Environment Positional	-0.07	0.04	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Crime Positional	-0.05	-0.05	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Defense Positional	-0.03	0.03	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Party ID	0.23***	0.20***	0.22***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.11	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Income	0.06	-0.09	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Gender	0.01	-0.01	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
West	-0.15***	0.07	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Atlantic	-0.12	0.23*	-0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)
Union	0.02	0.03	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Catholic	-0.05	-0.08	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Protestant	-0.09	0.01	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Married	0.02	-0.05	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	194	194	194

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

The limited number of issues that lead to issue ownership voting for the Conservatives when holding each other issue constant further illuminates the importance of certain issues to

parties in the 2015 context. CIO voting for the Conservatives is only significant for the defense (14%) issue, but the effect is only moderately substantive (Table 9). However, for AIO voting, the defense (18%) and education (15%) issues remain both statistically significant and substantive predictors of Conservative vote choice. This shows that within the 2015 case, the dimension in which individuals form issue ownership for a party on an issue can have a significant effect on that party's potential vote choice such as the defense issue, where an associative compared to a competency formation is a slightly better predictor of Conservative vote choice (Table 8- 9).

When assessing the impact of issue ownership voting for the NDP, a greater degree of variation occurs across both dimensions. For the NDP, CIO emerges as a predictor of vote choice, once holding other CIO measures constant, when individuals identify the NDP as having ownership of the economy (10%) and health care (21%) issues (Table 9). However, when examining the effects of AIO voting, the crime (22%) and education (18%) issues emerge as statistically significant predictors of NDP vote choice, with crime being a substantive predictor.

Some overarching findings arise through estimating when having issue ownership of which issues ultimately effects voting for each of the major parties within the 2015 case. First, political parties can obtain a perceived issue ownership of different issues, which can vary depending on how the individual makes this psychological association. This is best exemplified through how individuals identify the Liberals or NDP as being able to perform on health care (see Table 9); and, how it can serve as a substantial predictor of vote choice, whereas the same does not occur from an associative dimension (Table 10). Additionally, in reverse, the same occurs for the NDP with the crime issue. Ultimately, this shows that not only are both dimensions of issue ownership distinct in their ability to influence vote choice in the Canadian context, but it is subject to inter-party variation.

Second, being perceived as competent managers of the economy seems to benefit two of the major party's vote choice, from a competency dimension (Table 9). The importance of subsequently having issue ownership of the economy issue within the 2015 case must be clarified. Within the Canadian context, having issue ownership of the economy has always been in the interest and benefit of the incumbent party (Bélanger and Nadeau 2014; 2015) because of its ability to increase the party's vote share. However, the importance of the economy to the 2015 case specifically cannot be undersold because both individuals surveyed during the election period (see Clarke et al. 2016; 2017) and subsequent post-election analysis (McNeney 2105; Coletto 2016; Nadeau and Bastien 2017) identify that the economy issue was a major thematic underpinning of the 2015 election. Thus, this shows that (competency) issue ownership voting on the economy issue can serve as a potential explanation to better understand the outcome of the 2015 case. Furthermore, going into the 2015 election, the Conservatives had recently benefited from issue ownership voting on the economy issue (see Bélanger and Nadeau 2014; 2015), but were *not* able to repeat this feat seeing as the marginal effect in the 2015 case is statistically insignificant.

From the associative dimension, the education issue emerges as the only substantive predictor of vote choice for every major party (Table 10). The effects for the CIO voting on the education issue are more mixed and only significant for the Liberals (18%). While issue ownership voting only measures individual perceptions on a party's past competencies or willingness to focus on an issue,[40] education falls under provincial, rather than federal, jurisdiction. It has been well researched that Canadian voters face challenges in discerning political accountability across federal-provincial lines (see Cutler 2004; 2010; 2017). This shows that associative issue voting

[40] For an analysis of how political parties 'handle' the issues they own once elected see Egan (2013: Chapter 6).

can emerge on a variety of valence issues at the federal level but is not restricted to the jurisdictional constraints of Canadian federalism.

Finally, issue ownership voting emerged as a significant predictor of Liberal vote choice in the 2015 election. The number of CIO (health care, defense, education, economy) and AIO (education) issues that were both statistically and substantively significant predictors of Liberal vote choice is important, even after controlling for both other issues and other sources of endogeneity (Table 9, Table 10). This is in sharp contrast to the weak to moderate effects of having AIO or CIO of the statistically significant issues for other parties. Therefore, this shows the potential role issue ownership voting had for explaining parties' electoral support at the individual level and as a result the viability of issue ownership voting as a potential explanation for making sense of the 2015 Canadian election outcome. This perceived affect between issue ownership and individual vote choice must be interpreted with caution because these findings use cross-sectional and post-election survey data. This serves as a potential limitation because this data is unable to rule out the potential for reverse causality.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This thesis' objective has been to understand the role issue ownership voting had within the 2015 federal election in Canada, with the exception of Quebec, and will now offers some key insights. Using Canadian Election Study (CES) survey data, it was able to identify which parties were perceived by individuals to have obtained issue ownership of different issues – such as, health care, education, environment, crime, defense, and (for the competency dimension) the economy as well as for both psychological dimensions, associative and competency. Furthermore, within a bivariate and multivariate context, this thesis was able to show associative and competency-based issue ownership voting occurs within the 2015 case. This relationship between issue ownership and vote choice, regardless of dimension, remains statistically and substantively even when controlling for known confounders of issue ownership (see Walgrave et al. 2015; Lefevere et al. 2016) and traditional socio-demographic determinants (see Gidengil et al. 2012; Blais et al. 2002) for all three major parties and on most issues examined. Ultimately, this thesis' findings illustrate that among the three major parties, when controlling for issue ownership of other issues in the model, issue ownership voting benefited the Liberal party on the most issues, across both dimensions, although this result comes predominantly from a competency psychological formation. However, under these same model specifications, some issues were still identified as significant predictors of vote choice, across both dimensions, for both the NDP and Conservative parties. Therefore, this confirms that issue ownership voting occurred in the 2015 Canadian election as a distinct predictor of individual vote choice.

This thesis' findings offer some potential explanations to the existing scholarly debates within the Canadian and larger issue ownership literatures. On the economy issue, the Conservatives were the issue owners coming into the election and were again identified as the

'best managers of the economy' and initially when compared to the other parties had the most substantive effect. However, this was *not* the case when we introduced other issue ownership variables into the model because it then became the only party where the effect was both insignificant and non-substantive, with instead the Liberals having won issue ownership in the 2015 election. In addition, this thesis illustrates that the associative dimension of issue ownership, like the competency dimension, can emerge as a predictor of individual vote choice in the Canadian context – at least within the 2015 election. Turning towards the larger literature, the variation in results between the two competency-based survey measures illustrates the importance of methodologically considering how to operationalize the concept – thus adding further support to Walgrave et al. (2016) and Therriault (2015). Finally, the mixed support regarding the question of which dimension is a better predictor of vote choice further adds to the varying results seen within the comparative literature.

Despite the contributions made by this thesis, it is not without being subject to some limitations. First, as these findings come from a single case, this thesis is only able to comment on the short-term effects of issue ownership voting specifically within the parameters of the 2015 election. This presents a potential limitation because we see that issue ownership theory was concerned primarily with long-term (Petrocik 1996), as well as short-term party-issue associations (for further discussion of this, see Stubager 2018).[41] Second, the low number of respondents that ultimately answered each issue ownership survey measure presented challenges because: first, it led to the omission of the Green party from multivariate analyses despite it being the modal category for both associative and competency measures on the environment issue. Second, it

[41] For Canadian studies that examine the long-term issue ownership by parties see Nadeau and Blais (1990), Bélanger (2003), or Bélanger and Nadeau (2015).

prevented us from being able to assess whether the relationship between issue ownership and vote choice is conditioned by issue salience in the 2015 case. Both challenges serve as limitations given that their resolution would add further robustness to the existing results. Third, this study finds that associative compared to competency issue ownership voting must be tempered given the comparison is between respondents from a split sample instead of the same respondents. Finally, the omission of Quebec from this analysis prevents this work from obtaining a complete understanding of the role of issue ownership voting during the 2015 election, especially given the province's role in shaping "the identity of" government (Johnston 2015: 37). However, these limitations present avenues for future research.

This thesis' contribution to the development of the issue ownership literature presents potential pathways for future research. In the Canadian case, it offers a description of which parties have come to obtain issue ownership on issues in the 2015 case which serves as a starting point to assess whether these parties are able to maintain this association to their electoral advantage in future elections on some newly identified (i.e. education, defense) or longstanding issues (economy). Additionally, researchers may assess whether associative issue ownership voting continues to persist in future Canadian elections to determine whether it is a durable predictor of vote choice or an outlier to this specific election. Another consideration may be to further our epistemological understanding of how issue salience affects the relationship between associative-based issue ownership and individual vote choice in Canada. With this further expansion of the study of issue ownership voting at the federal level, it may help to better understand the impact of issue ownership voting at the provincial level in the Rest of Canada (ROC) considering previous studies have focused on Quebec (see Bélanger and Gélineau 2011; Bélanger et al. 2018). Finally, this study illustrates that certain parties are perceived as owning specific issues to their benefit at

the ballot box but this limits the application of issue ownership theory to the representation dimension, when future projects could explore how individuals perceive the issue owning party's ability to address these issues compared to non-owned issues once in office (for an example, see Egan 2013).

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Survey Question and Indicators

1.1. **Independent Variables: Issue Ownership**[42]

In all cases in 1.1., (*except 1.1.4.*) the original values were ordered from 1-5, in the following order: "Conservative, Liberal, NDP, Bloc Quebecois, and Green". For each of these variables only response for the "Conservative", "Liberal", "NDP", "Green", and "Other" party were kept as valid responses and made into separate dummy variables. However, in 1.1.4. it was a similar ordering but instead starting with Liberal then Conservative etc. and the responses "None", and "About the Same" were kept with the latter two being collapsed into a single category.

1.1.1. Competency Issue Ownership Questions - most qualified:

"Which party is best qualified to handle the following issues?"

1.1.2. Competency Issue Ownership Questions - best job:

"Which party would do a better job handling each of the following issues?"

1.1.3. Associative Issue Ownership Questions:

"When you think about the following issues, please indicate which party you naturally think about first?

These above questions were asked for each issue separately: health care, education, environment, crime and justice, and defense.

1.1.4. Competency Issue Ownership Questions – economy alone:

"Which party do you think would be best at managing Canada's economy?"

1.2. **Dependent Variable: Vote Choice**

1.2.1. "Which party do you vote for?"

The original values were ordered from 0-5, in the following order: "Other, Conservative, Liberal, NDP, Bloc Quebecois, and Green" with other values being non-responses. These were recoded with only responses kept for the "Conservative", "Liberal", and "NDP" values.

Main Confounders of Interest:

Party Identification

1.2.2. "In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Conservative, Liberal, NDP, Bloc Québécois, Green, or none of these?"

[42] These issue ownership questions were part of the web portion of the CES and part of a survey experiment, where respondents were randomly asked either one of these three questions or none of them.

In each model, the partisan identification variable was coded as a dummy variable with the value '1' corresponding with the dependent variable in that model.

Policy Positions:

1.2.3. Healthcare: "People who are willing to pay should be allowed to get medical treatment sooner"
1.2.4. Education: "Should the federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now on... [education]"
1.2.5. Environment: "To help stop climate change, should governments increase the taxes on gas and heating oil by 10%?"
1.2.6. Crime and Justice issue: "The government should be able to crack down on suspected terrorists, even if that means interfering with the rights of ordinary people"
1.2.7. Defense: "Canada has sent the military to help fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Is this a good decision, a bad decision, or are you not sure?"[43]
1.2.8. Economy: "What should the federal government do to help the Canadian economy: balance the budget or run a deficit?"

For health care, crime and justice, and education, they were all ordinal variables although education only had three values (more, less, stay the same), while the other two used a Likert scale. The other remaining policy questions were nominal. All policy positions were coded as dummy variables.

1.3. **Other Control Variables:**

1.3.1. Age (in years):

"In what year were you born?"

This was calculated into years through subtracting the respondent's birth year by the year the survey was conducted (2015).

1.3.2. Education

"What is the highest level of education that you have completed"

Initially, there were 11 levels of education for respondents to select from "no schooling" to "professional degree or doctorate". It was collapsed into a 0-1 scale.

1.3.3. Income

"Combination of income_num, income, and income_grp"

This variable was already combined responses of respondent's household income in income bracket ranges ("0 – $29 000 to "More than $110,000".

[43] This question was asked as part of a survey experiment with web respondents receiving 1 of the 4 questions assigned to them. The question wording reflected in this proposal is the shortest version (see Fournier et al. 2015b for all question wordings). For this project however, all of the responses to each question were combined into a single variable.

It was recoded for this analysis onto a 0-1 scale.

1.3.4. Gender

"Are you [Male or Female]?

This variable was recoded with 'Female' being recoded wit the value '1' and 'Men' as '0'.

1.3.5. Region Variables

"Which province or territory are you currently living in?"

Two separate variables were created from this survey question: a West and Atlantic regional dummy variables with Ontario and the Territories serving as the reference categories. Additionally, respondents from Quebec were omitted from the analysis.

1.3.6. Union Index

"Do you belong to a union?" and "Does anyone else in your household belong to a union?"

This variable was created from combining responses from these two survey questions to indicate whenever an individual said 'Yes' to either question was coded as '1' and 'No' to be coded as '0' while removing non-responses.

1.3.7. Religion

"What is your religion, if you have one?"

From this survey question, two religion variables were created: Catholic and Protestant. In order to create a Catholic variable all responses to Catholic were set as '1' and all others '0'. For Protestant, all respondents that identified 'Protestant' or any 'Protestant' denomination[44] were set as '1' and all other values '0'. In both cases, non-Catholic and Protestant religions served as the reference category.

1.3.8. Married

"Are you presently married, living with a partner, divorced, separated, widowed, or have you never been married?

This variable was coded with either "married", "living with a partner", as '1' and all other responses as '0'.

1.4. **Weight Variable:**

"Main Weighting Variables. Combined ProvWgt (Web) and NatWgt(Phone)."

This weight variable was taken and used directly from the dataset.

[44] The responses of "Anglican", "Baptist", "Lutheran", "Presbyterian" were considered protestant denominations.

Appendix 2: Frequency Tables for IO Measures

2.1 CIO frequencies for "best job" measure

Frequency Distribution - Best CIO Health Care		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	148.0	23.2
Liberal	288.0	45.1
NDP	189.0	29.6
Green	13.0	2.0
Total	638.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - Best CIO Education		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	148.0	23.7
Liberal	313.0	50.1
NDP	134.0	21.4
Green	30.0	4.8
Total	625.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - Best CIO Environment		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	101.0	14.8
Liberal	196.0	28.8
NDP	88.0	12.9
Green	296.0	43.5
Total	681.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - Best CIO Crime		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	248.0	38.5
Liberal	291.0	45.2
NDP	90.0	14.0
Green	15.0	2.3
Total	644.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - Best CIO Defense		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	278.0	44.2
Liberal	273.0	43.4
NDP	63.0	10.0
Green	15.0	2.4
Total	629.0	100.0

2.2 CIO frequencies for 'most qualified measures'

Frequency Distribution - Qualified CIO Health Care		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	175.0	27.1
Liberal	290.0	44.9
NDP	161.0	24.9
Green	20.0	3.1
Total	646.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - Qualified CIO Education		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	167.0	26.2
Liberal	308.0	48.3
NDP	136.0	21.3
Green	27.0	4.2
Total	638.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - Qualified CIO Environment		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	123.0	18.1
Liberal	224.0	33.0
NDP	93.0	13.7
Green	239.0	35.2
Total	679.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - Qualified CIO Crime		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	256.0	40.4
Liberal	268.0	42.3
NDP	90.0	14.2
Green	19.0	3.0
Total	633.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - Qualified CIO Defense		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	266.0	42.6
Liberal	272.0	43.6
NDP	73.0	11.7
Green	13.0	2.1
Total	624.0	100.0

2.3 **CIO combined measures frequencies**

Frequency Distribution - CIO Health Care		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	323.0	25.2
Liberal	578.0	45.0
NDP	350.0	27.3
Green	33.0	2.6
Total	1284.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - CIO Education		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	315.0	24.9
Liberal	621.0	49.2
NDP	270.0	21.4
Green	57.0	4.5
Total	1263.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - CIO Environment		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	224.0	16.5
Liberal	420.0	30.9
NDP	181.0	13.3
Green	535.0	39.3
Total	1360.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - CIO Crime		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	504.0	39.5
Liberal	559.0	43.8
NDP	180.0	14.1
Green	34.0	2.7
Total	1277.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - CIO Defense		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	544.0	43.4
Liberal	545.0	43.5
NDP	136.0	10.9
Green	28.0	2.2
Total	1253.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - CIO Economy		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	2198.0	35.8
Liberal	1753.0	28.6
NDP	1119.0	18.2
Green	189.0	3.1
Other	49.0	0.8
None or Same	832.0	13.6
Total	6140.0	100.0

2.4 **AIO measures frequencies**

Frequency Distribution - AIO Health Care		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	150.0	23.7
Liberal	243.0	38.3
NDP	221.0	34.9
Green	20.0	3.2
Total	634.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - AIO Education		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	140.0	23.0
Liberal	306.0	50.3
NDP	143.0	23.5
Green	19.0	3.1
Total	608.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - AIO Environment		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	77.0	11.4
Liberal	143.0	21.2
NDP	80.0	11.8
Green	376.0	55.6
Total	676.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - AIO Crime		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	345.0	56.6
Liberal	187.0	30.7
NDP	60.0	9.8
Green	18.0	3.0
Total	610.0	100.0

Frequency Distribution - AIO Defense		
	Frequency	**Percent**
Conservative	387.0	62.1
Liberal	178.0	28.6
NDP	47.0	7.5
Green	11.0	1.8
Total	623.0	100.0

Appendix 3: Crosstabulations Issue Ownership by Party Identification

3.1 AIO Crosstabulations

Crosstabulation of Party ID by AIO Health Care

AIO - Health Care	Party ID: CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	119	0	16	7	142
	58.30%	0.00%	7.60%	4.40%	
Green	3	9	2	3	17
	1.50%	29.00%	1.00%	1.90%	
Liberal	28	7	146	41	222
	13.70%	22.60%	69.50%	25.90%	
NDP	54	15	46	107	222
	26.50%	48.40%	21.90%	67.70%	
Total	204	31	210	158	603
	33.80%	5.10%	34.80%	26.20%	

$\chi^2 = 397.28$ $p < 0.001$

Note: Column percentages reported

Crosstabulation of Party ID by AIO Education

AIO - Education	Party ID: CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	107	0	18	2	127
	55.20%	0.00%	8.70%	1.30%	
Green	0	10	3	3	16
	0.00%	34.50%	1.50%	2.00%	
Liberal	62	11	164	57	294
	32.00%	37.90%	79.60%	37.50%	
NDP	25	8	21	90	144
	12.90%	27.60%	10.20%	59.20%	
Total	194	29	206	152	581
	33.40%	5.00%	35.50%	26.20%	

$\chi^2 = 418.46$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Column percentages reported

Crosstabulation of Party ID by AIO Environment

AIO - Environment	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	64	0	7	4	75
	29.80%	0.00%	3.30%	2.40%	
Green	107	33	106	93	339
	49.80%	86.80%	49.50%	56.70%	
Liberal	30	3	81	25	139
	14.00%	7.90%	37.90%	15.20%	
NDP	14	2	20	42	78
	6.50%	5.30%	9.30%	25.60%	
Total	215	38	214	164	631
	34.10%	6.00%	33.90%	26.00%	

$\chi^2 = 167.30$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Crosstabulation Party ID by AIO Crime

AIO - Crime	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	180	5	90	57	332
	84.50%	17.20%	44.80%	40.40%	
Green	1	11	4	2	18
	0.50%	37.90%	2.00%	1.40%	
Liberal	23	5	95	50	173
	10.80%	17.20%	47.30%	35.50%	
NDP	9	8	12	32	61
	4.20%	27.60%	6.00%	22.70%	
Total	213	29	201	141	584
	36.50%	5.00%	34.40%	24.10%	

$\chi^2 = 259.41$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Crosstabulation of Party ID by AIO Defense

AIO - Defense	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	180	5	90	57	332
	84.50%	17.20%	44.80%	40.40%	
Green	1	11	4	2	18
	0.50%	37.90%	2.00%	1.40%	
Liberal	23	5	95	50	173
	10.80%	17.20%	47.30%	35.50%	
NDP	9	8	12	32	61
	4.20%	27.60%	6.00%	22.70%	
Total	213	29	201	141	584
	36.50%	5.00%	34.40%	24.10%	

$\chi^2 = 266.42$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

3.2 CIO Crosstabulations

Crosstabulation of Party ID by CIO Health Care

CIO - Health Care	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	317	5	19	7	348
	71.40%	7.40%	4.40%	2.40%	
Green	2	17	6	4	29
	0.50%	25.00%	1.40%	1.40%	
Liberal	81	29	347	77	534
	18.20%	42.60%	79.60%	26.60%	
NDP	44	17	64	202	327
	9.90%	25.00%	14.70%	69.70%	
Total	444	68	436	290	1238
	35.90%	5.50%	35.20%	23.40%	

$\chi^2 = 1111.14$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Crosstabulation of Party ID by CIO Education

CIO - Education	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	306	4	22	5	337
	69.50%	6.20%	5.20%	1.70%	
Green	5	26	10	8	49
	1.10%	40.00%	2.40%	2.80%	
Liberal	97	25	348	99	569
	22.00%	38.50%	82.10%	34.60%	
NDP	32	10	44	174	260
	7.30%	15.40%	10.40%	60.80%	
Total	440	65	424	286	1215
	36.20%	5.30%	34.90%	23.50%	

$\chi^2 = 1111.61$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Crosstabulation of Party ID by CIO Environment

CIO - Environment	Party ID CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	64	0	7	4	75
	29.80%	0.00%	3.30%	2.40%	
Green	107	33	106	93	339
	49.80%	86.80%	49.50%	56.70%	
Liberal	30	3	81	25	139
	14.00%	7.90%	37.90%	15.20%	
NDP	14	2	20	42	78
	6.50%	5.30%	9.30%	25.60%	
Total	215	38	214	164	631
	34.10%	6.00%	33.90%	26.00%	

$\chi^2 = 683.15$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Crosstabulation of Party ID by CIO Crime

CIO - Crime	Party ID CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	395	7	67	38	507
	82.50%	11.10%	16.10%	13.80%	
Green	7	15	5	2	29
	1.50%	23.80%	1.20%	0.70%	
Liberal	66	29	314	108	517
	13.80%	46.00%	75.50%	39.30%	
NDP	11	12	30	127	180
	2.30%	19.00%	7.20%	46.20%	
Total	479	63	416	275	1233
	38.80%	5.10%	33.70%	22.30%	

$\chi^2 = 913.33$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Crosstabulation of Party ID by CIO Defense

CIO - Defense	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	422	11	65	52	550
	87.40%	18.30%	15.90%	20.00%	
Green	4	13	5	4	26
	0.80%	21.70%	1.20%	1.50%	
Liberal	48	35	315	109	507
	9.90%	58.30%	76.80%	41.90%	
NDP	9	1	25	95	130
	1.90%	1.70%	6.10%	36.50%	
Total	483	60	410	260	1213
	39.80%	4.90%	33.80%	21.40%	

$\chi^2 = 877.37$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Crosstabulation of Party ID by CIO Economy

CIO - Economy	Party ID				
	CPC	Green	Liberal	NDP	Total
CPC	1740	28	180	45	1993
	83.50%	9.50%	10.20%	4.00%	
Green	12	114	18	19	163
	0.60%	38.60%	1.00%	1.70%	
Liberal	103	56	1226	148	1533
	4.90%	19.00%	69.40%	13.30%	
NDP	76	61	150	773	1060
	3.60%	20.70%	8.50%	69.30%	
Other	154	36	193	131	514
	7.40%	12.20%	10.90%	11.70%	
Total	2085	295	1767	1116	5263
	39.60%	5.60%	33.60%	21.20%	

$\chi^2 = 6337.32$, $p < 0.001$

Note: Cell counts and column percentages reported

Appendix 4: Bivariate relationship between issue ownership and vote choice

Health Care AIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	NDP	CPC
Intercept	-1.14***	-2.04***	-2.06***
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.13)
IO	2.46***	2.17***	3.31***
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.24)
N	541	541	541

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Health Care CIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	NDP	CPC
Intercept	-1.50***	-2.66***	-2.39***
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.11)
IO	3.15***	3.23***	4.67***
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.21)
N	1130	1130	1130

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Environment AIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	NDP	CPC
Intercept	-0.54***	-1.33***	-1.34***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
IO	1.83***	1.36***	3.57***
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.38)
N	571	571	571

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Environment CIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	NDP	CPC
Intercept	-0.73***	-1.57***	-1.63***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
IO	2.14***	1.86***	3.89***
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.23)
N	1172	1172	1172

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Crime CIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	NDP	CPC
Intercept	-1.34***	-1.99***	-2.79***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)
IO	2.68***	2.92***	3.83***
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.18)
N	1120	1120	1120

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Crime AIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	NDP	CPC
Intercept	-0.67***	-1.53***	-2.80***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.27)
IO	1.76***	1.99***	2.79***
	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.29)
N	520	520	520

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Defense AIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
Intercept	-0.71***	-1.33***	-3.04***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.31)
IO	1.92***	1.64***	2.86***
	(0.20)	(0.33)	(0.33)
N	535	535	535

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Defense CIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
Intercept	-1.29***	-1.90***	-3.11***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.18)
IO	2.62***	2.71***	4.08***
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.20)
N	1107	1107	1107

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Economy CIO - Bivariate

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
Intercept	-1.09***	-2.13***	-2.65***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)
IO	3.12***	2.82***	4.12***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
N	3560	3560	3560

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
Standard errors in parentheses

Appendix 5: Bloc recursive approach for assessing effects of AIO and CIO

5.1 Health Care

Health Care CIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	Socio-Dem.	Only PP	Both PP and PID	No PID or PP	Full
(Intercept)	-1.50***	0.05	0.08	-1.02***	-1.06**	-1.79***
	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.46)
CIO – Health Care	3.15***				3.24***	2.56***
	(0.15)				(0.16)	(0.21)
Age		-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01*	-0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		0.51***	0.49***	0.57**	0.59*	0.55
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.33)
Income		-0.02	0.04	-0.29	-0.08	-0.18
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.34)
Gender		0.25***	0.26***	0.14	0.05	-0.01
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.21)
West		-0.60***	-0.66***	-0.46***	-0.34*	-0.36
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.22)
Atlantic		0.62***	0.64***	0.71***	0.41	0.46
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.39)
Union		0.16	0.17	0.27*	0.27	0.67**
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.26)
Catholic		-0.03	-0.05	-0.16	-0.66**	-0.51
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.28)
Protestant		-0.22*	-0.23*	-0.00	-0.32	-0.01
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Married		0.10	0.09	0.29*	0.08	0.20
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Health Care Positional			-0.05	0.15		-0.03
			(0.08)	(0.11)		(0.21)
Party ID				3.09***		2.54***
				(0.12)		(0.23)
n	1130	2848	2730	2135	985	774

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Health Care CIO - NDP

	Bivariate.	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Both PP and PID**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.66***	-0.62***	-0.29	-2.38***	-2.28***	-3.06***
	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.57)
CIO – Health Care	3.23***				3.25***	2.26***
	(0.17)				(0.19)	(0.26)
Age		-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.00	0.01	-0.27	-0.27	-0.45
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.42)
Income		-0.95***	-0.90***	-0.35	-1.03**	-0.61
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.44)
Gender		0.10	0.05	0.05	0.30	0.08
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.26)
West		0.40***	0.54***	0.27	-0.06	0.17
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.27)
Atlantic		0.05	0.09	-0.14	-0.14	-0.21
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.49)
Union		0.37***	0.35**	0.21	0.26	-0.32
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.34)
Catholic		-0.21	-0.24*	0.16	0.35	0.41
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Protestant		-0.62***	-0.63***	-0.52**	-0.66**	-0.58
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.33)
Married		-0.39***	-0.36***	-0.50***	-0.18	-0.38
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.27)
Health Care Positional			-0.86***	-0.61***		-0.39
			(0.10)	(0.15)		(0.28)
Party ID				3.40***		2.92***
				(0.14)		(0.26)
n	1130	2848	2730	2135	985	774

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Health Care CIO - CPC

	Bivariate.	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Both PP and PID**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.39***	-1.65***	-2.00***	-3.44***	-3.38***	-4.64***
	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.32)	(0.48)	(0.72)
CIO – Health Care	4.67***				4.70***	3.15***
	(0.21)				(0.25)	(0.33)
Age		0.01***	0.01***	0.01*	0.01	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.60***	-0.62***	-0.43	-0.45	-0.15
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.36)	(0.48)
Income		0.77***	0.66***	0.56*	0.87*	0.69
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.36)	(0.49)
Gender		-0.37***	-0.36***	-0.18	-0.42	0.02
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.30)
West		0.36***	0.34***	0.41**	0.68**	0.62*
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.31)
Atlantic		-0.93***	-0.99***	-1.07***	-0.81	-1.11
		(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.48)	(0.68)
Union		-0.51***	-0.51***	-0.54**	-0.63*	-0.88*
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.39)
Catholic		0.22*	0.26*	0.02	0.39	0.27
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.30)	(0.42)
Protestant		0.68***	0.70***	0.29	0.89***	0.33
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Married		0.22*	0.21*	0.05	0.04	0.06
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.32)
Health Care Positional			0.69***	0.06		-0.32
			(0.08)	(0.14)		(0.32)
Party ID				4.11***		3.81***
				(0.14)		(0.33)
n	1130	2848	2730	2135	985	774

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Health Care AIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.06***	-1.56***	-1.51*
	(0.11)	(0.47)	(0.61)
AIO - Health Care	2.46***	2.27***	1.73***
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.28)
Age		-0.00	-0.02*
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		0.80*	1.05*
		(0.36)	(0.47)
Income		-0.06	-0.09
		(0.37)	(0.46)
Gender		0.22	0.13
		(0.21)	(0.27)
West		-0.35	-0.32
		(0.22)	(0.28)
Atlantic		0.61	0.47
		(0.35)	(0.48)
Union		0.22	-0.20
		(0.27)	(0.36)
Catholic		0.33	-0.07
		(0.27)	(0.36)
Protestant		0.03	-0.29
		(0.26)	(0.34)
Married		0.30	0.62*
		(0.22)	(0.29)
Health Care Positional			0.13
			(0.28)
Party ID			2.52***
			(0.31)
n	541	456	367

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Health Care AIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.18***	-1.03*	-2.25**
	(0.16)	(0.50)	(0.73)
AIO - Health Care	2.17***	2.09***	1.65***
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.33)
Age		-0.01	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.50	-0.88
		(0.40)	(0.57)
Income		-0.34	-0.28
		(0.42)	(0.58)
Gender		0.10	-0.07
		(0.23)	(0.33)
West		0.43	0.43
		(0.24)	(0.34)
Atlantic		0.55	0.49
		(0.40)	(0.58)
Union		0.20	0.62
		(0.30)	(0.42)
Catholic		-0.61	-0.16
		(0.32)	(0.43)
Protestant		-0.44	-0.08
		(0.28)	(0.41)
Married		-0.51*	-1.12**
		(0.25)	(0.36)
Health Care Positional			-0.53
			(0.36)
Party ID			2.95***
			(0.35)
n	541	456	367

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Health Care AIO – CPC

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.96***	-2.62***	-4.58***
	(0.14)	(0.60)	(0.84)
AIO - Health Care	3.31***	3.51***	2.51***
	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.41)
Age		0.02*	0.03*
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.50	-0.70
		(0.45)	(0.57)
Income		0.41	0.07
		(0.46)	(0.60)
Gender		-0.47	-0.30
		(0.26)	(0.35)
West		0.16	0.20
		(0.27)	(0.36)
Atlantic		-2.01***	-1.19
		(0.53)	(0.70)
Union		-0.60	-0.59
		(0.37)	(0.53)
Catholic		-0.04	-0.15
		(0.35)	(0.50)
Protestant		0.34	0.46
		(0.31)	(0.40)
Married		0.06	0.23
		(0.28)	(0.38)
Health Care Positional			0.44
			(0.36)
Party ID			3.04***
			(0.36)
n	541	456	367

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

5.2 Education

Education CIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	Socio-Dem.	Only PP	Both PID and PP	No PP or ID	Full Model
(Intercept)	-1.55***	0.05	-0.26	-1.38***	-0.77*	-2.55***
	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.50)
CIO – Education	2.87***				2.97***	2.51***
	(0.14)				(0.16)	(0.21)
Age		-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02**	-0.02*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		0.51***	0.47***	0.58**	0.59*	0.92**
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.33)
Income		-0.02	0.03	-0.24	0.02	0.00
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.34)
Gender		0.25***	0.23**	0.10	0.14	-0.03
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.20)
West		-0.60***	-0.63***	-0.43***	-0.70***	-0.74***
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.22)
Atlantic		0.62***	0.63***	0.74***	0.30	0.40
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.39)
Union		0.16	0.15	0.25	0.21	0.63*
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.26)
Catholic		-0.03	-0.06	-0.16	-0.54*	-0.58*
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.28)
Protestant		-0.22*	-0.23*	0.03	-0.51**	-0.16
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.24)
Married		0.10	0.06	0.27*	0.18	0.33
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Education Positional			0.45***	0.50**		0.94**
			(0.13)	(0.18)		(0.32)
Party ID				3.06***		2.53***
				(0.11)		(0.22)
n	1105	2848	2762	2164	961	775

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Education CIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Both PP and PID**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.34***	-0.62***	-1.48***	-3.17***	-2.29***	-3.17***
	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.63)
CIO – Education	3.12***				3.13***	2.25***
	(0.17)				(0.19)	(0.26)
Age		-0.00	0.00	0.01*	0.01	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.00	-0.02	-0.25	-0.05	-0.72
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.42)
Income		-0.95***	-0.88***	-0.36	-1.16***	-0.63
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.43)
Gender		0.10	0.02	0.02	0.14	0.05
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.25)
West		0.40***	0.36***	0.12	0.28	0.39
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.26)
Atlantic		0.05	-0.07	-0.31	-0.02	-0.10
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.50)
Union		0.37***	0.34**	0.23	0.06	-0.29
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.34)
Catholic		-0.21	-0.22	0.14	0.26	0.37
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Protestant		-0.62***	-0.63***	-0.52**	-0.41	-0.40
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.33)
Married		-0.39***	-0.37***	-0.50***	-0.22	-0.41
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.28)
Education Positional			0.97***	0.68**		0.09
			(0.17)	(0.25)		(0.43)
Party ID				3.38***		3.01***
				(0.14)		(0.26)
n	1105	2848	2762	2164	961	775

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Education CIO - CPC

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Both PP and PID**	**no PID and PP**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.34***	-1.65***	-0.76***	-2.66***	-3.01***	-3.57***
	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.71)
CIO – Education	4.55***				4.45***	2.94***
	(0.21)				(0.24)	(0.33)
Age		0.01***	0.01***	0.01*	0.01	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.60***	-0.55***	-0.48*	-0.73*	-0.58
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.48)
Income		0.77***	0.69***	0.53*	0.81*	0.43
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.48)
Gender		-0.37***	-0.29***	-0.11	-0.36	0.12
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.30)
West		0.36***	0.44***	0.45**	0.82***	0.79**
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.31)
Atlantic		-0.93***	-0.89***	-1.03***	-0.75	-1.22
		(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.45)	(0.64)
Union		-0.51***	-0.48***	-0.51**	-0.31	-0.82*
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.38)
Catholic		0.22*	0.25*	0.06	0.30	0.39
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.29)	(0.40)
Protestant		0.68***	0.70***	0.25	0.94***	0.43
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.33)
Married		0.22*	0.25**	0.06	-0.14	-0.21
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.32)
Education Positional			-1.16***	-0.91***		-1.25**
			(0.13)	(0.22)		(0.44)
Party ID				4.09***		3.80***
				(0.14)		(0.32)
n	1105	2848	2762	2164	961	775

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Education AIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.46***	-2.02***	-1.76*
	(0.15)	(0.50)	(0.78)
AIO – Education	2.48***	2.52***	2.50***
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.30)
Age		-0.01	-0.03**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		0.80*	0.81
		(0.39)	(0.50)
Income		0.43	0.05
		(0.39)	(0.50)
Gender		0.34	0.02
		(0.22)	(0.30)
West		-0.44	-0.38
		(0.23)	(0.31)
Atlantic		0.18	0.20
		(0.38)	(0.52)
Union		0.03	-0.35
		(0.29)	(0.37)
Catholic		0.26	-0.21
		(0.28)	(0.37)
Protestant		0.20	-0.27
		(0.28)	(0.38)
Married		0.38	0.64*
		(0.24)	(0.31)
Education Positional			0.10
			(0.48)
Party ID			2.68***
			(0.35)
n	517	435	359

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Education AIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.03***	-1.51**	-4.15***
	(0.14)	(0.54)	(0.98)
AIO – Education	2.56***	2.60***	1.89***
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.34)
Age		0.00	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.56	-0.66
		(0.44)	(0.59)
Income		-0.70	-0.15
		(0.46)	(0.60)
Gender		0.03	-0.16
		(0.25)	(0.34)
West		0.40	0.34
		(0.26)	(0.34)
Atlantic		0.91*	0.90
		(0.42)	(0.61)
Union		0.42	0.85*
		(0.32)	(0.40)
Catholic		-0.49	0.12
		(0.33)	(0.43)
Protestant		-0.64*	-0.02
		(0.32)	(0.45)
Married		-0.54*	-1.02**
		(0.26)	(0.36)
Education Positional			0.88
			(0.64)
Party ID			2.89***
			(0.38)
n	517	435	359

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Education AIO - CPC

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.10***	-2.05**	-3.89***
	(0.15)	(0.64)	(1.07)
AIO – Education	4.00***	4.10***	3.59***
	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.50)
Age		0.00	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.42	-0.53
		(0.51)	(0.62)
Income		0.15	0.03
		(0.52)	(0.66)
Gender		-0.31	0.07
		(0.29)	(0.39)
West		0.31	0.40
		(0.30)	(0.40)
Atlantic		-1.58**	-1.20
		(0.61)	(0.75)
Union		-0.58	-0.58
		(0.41)	(0.55)
Catholic		-0.18	-0.11
		(0.39)	(0.52)
Protestant		0.29	0.33
		(0.35)	(0.46)
Married		0.02	0.12
		(0.32)	(0.41)
Education Positional			-0.33
			(0.59)
Party ID			3.31***
			(0.39)
n	517	435	359

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

5.3 Environment

Environment CIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	Socio-Dem.	Only PP	Both PID and PP	No PP or ID	Full Model
(Intercept)	-0.73***	0.05	-0.21	-1.25***	-0.22	-1.95***
	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.46)
CIO - Environment	2.14***				2.29***	1.85***
	(0.14)				(0.16)	(0.23)
Age		-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education		0.51***	0.39**	0.44*	0.56*	0.81*
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.33)
Income		-0.02	0.01	-0.31	0.03	-0.16
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.33)
Gender		0.25***	0.30***	0.15	0.25	0.33
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.20)
West		-0.60***	-0.67***	-0.44***	-0.71***	-0.76***
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Atlantic		0.62***	0.68***	0.81***	0.24	0.53
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.35)
Union		0.16	0.10	0.16	0.15	0.38
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.25)
Catholic		-0.03	-0.02	-0.00	-0.60**	-0.35
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.27)
Protestant		-0.22*	-0.23*	0.03	-0.38*	-0.08
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.23)
Married		0.10	0.14	0.34*	0.10	0.31
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.22)
Environment Positional			0.63***	0.53***		0.64**
			(0.09)	(0.13)		(0.22)
Party ID				3.04***		2.73***
				(0.12)		(0.22)
n	1172	2848	2469	1952	1023	712

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Environment CIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Both PP and PID**	**No PP and PID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.57***	-0.62***	-0.85***	-2.71***	-1.42***	-2.97***
	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.56)
CIO - Environment	1.86***				2.03***	1.24***
	(0.17)				(0.19)	(0.30)
Age		-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education		-0.00	-0.06	-0.16	-0.00	-0.29
		(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.41)
Income		-0.95***	-0.97***	-0.35	-1.10***	-0.87*
		(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.43)
Gender		0.10	0.02	0.05	0.24	-0.07
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.25)
West		0.40***	0.41***	0.09	0.42**	0.28
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.26)
Atlantic		0.05	0.15	-0.23	0.12	0.17
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.43)
Union		0.37***	0.40***	0.24	0.34	0.06
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.32)
Catholic		-0.21	-0.14	0.11	-0.07	0.17
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.32)
Protestant		-0.62***	-0.57***	-0.55**	-0.60**	-0.44
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.30)
Married		-0.39***	-0.32**	-0.52**	-0.31	-0.33
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.27)
Environment Positional			0.40***	0.27		0.18
			(0.11)	(0.16)		(0.27)
Party ID				3.56***		3.55***
				(0.15)		(0.25)
n	1172	2848	2469	1952	1023	712

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Environment CIO - CPC

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Both PID and PP**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.63***	-1.65***	-1.22***	-3.04***	-2.43***	-3.88***
	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.70)
CIO - Environment	3.89***				3.88***	2.32***
	(0.23)				(0.26)	(0.37)
Age		0.01***	0.01**	0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.60***	-0.40**	-0.41	-0.51	-0.52
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.46)
Income		0.77***	0.79***	0.62**	1.01***	0.97*
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.45)
Gender		-0.37***	-0.35***	-0.18	-0.50**	-0.23
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.28)
West		0.36***	0.41***	0.48**	0.65***	0.74*
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.30)
Atlantic		-0.93***	-1.16***	-1.25***	-0.92*	-1.51**
		(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.58)
Union		-0.51***	-0.47***	-0.37*	-0.78**	-0.97*
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.38)
Catholic		0.22*	0.14	-0.08	0.35	0.21
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.39)
Protestant		0.68***	0.65***	0.30	0.68***	0.18
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.32)
Married		0.22*	0.12	-0.01	-0.06	-0.10
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Environment Positional			-1.22***	-0.95***		-1.02**
			(0.11)	(0.17)		(0.35)
Party ID				4.07***		4.30***
				(0.15)		(0.30)
n	1172	2848	2469	1952	1023	712

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Environment AIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-0.54***	-0.74	-1.48*
	(0.09)	(0.40)	(0.58)
AIO - Environment	1.83***	1.77***	1.31***
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.33)
Age		-0.00	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		0.84*	0.74
		(0.33)	(0.48)
Income		-0.07	0.07
		(0.34)	(0.47)
Gender		0.29	-0.02
		(0.19)	(0.28)
West		-0.63**	-0.42
		(0.20)	(0.29)
Atlantic		0.39	0.74
		(0.32)	(0.50)
Union		-0.05	-0.36
		(0.25)	(0.35)
Catholic		-0.07	-0.20
		(0.24)	(0.36)
Protestant		-0.08	-0.41
		(0.23)	(0.34)
Married		0.20	0.58
		(0.20)	(0.30)
Environment Positional			0.39
			(0.30)
Party ID			2.86***
			(0.32)
n	571	478	333

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Environment AIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.33***	-0.49	-2.39**
	(0.10)	(0.45)	(0.77)
AIO - Environment	1.36***	1.15***	0.72
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.44)
Age		-0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.68	-0.70
		(0.37)	(0.63)
Income		-0.25	-0.16
		(0.38)	(0.64)
Gender		0.09	-0.07
		(0.21)	(0.36)
West		0.56**	0.19
		(0.22)	(0.36)
Atlantic		0.33	0.42
		(0.36)	(0.65)
Union		0.25	0.54
		(0.28)	(0.43)
Catholic		-0.52	-0.13
		(0.27)	(0.46)
Protestant		-0.63*	-0.06
		(0.27)	(0.45)
Married		-0.71**	-1.35**
		(0.22)	(0.41)
Environment Positional			0.49
			(0.37)
Party ID			3.72***
			(0.40)
n	571	478	333

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Environment AIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.34***	-1.87***	-3.57***
	(0.10)	(0.50)	(0.81)
AIO - Environment	3.57***	3.70***	2.94***
	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.68)
Age		0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.03	-0.13
		(0.39)	(0.57)
Income		0.37	-0.13
		(0.39)	(0.59)
Gender		-0.42	0.00
		(0.23)	(0.34)
West		0.35	0.40
		(0.23)	(0.36)
Atlantic		-0.82	-1.71*
		(0.44)	(0.77)
Union		-0.56	-0.22
		(0.33)	(0.49)
Catholic		0.25	0.09
		(0.29)	(0.45)
Protestant		0.46	0.41
		(0.27)	(0.42)
Married		0.29	0.29
		(0.24)	(0.38)
Environment Positional			-0.78
			(0.42)
Party ID			3.49***
			(0.36)
n	571	478	333

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

5.4 Crime

Crime CIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Both PID and PP**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.34***	0.05	0.21	-0.84***	-0.40	-1.02*
	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.44)
CIO – Crime	2.68***				2.72***	2.23***
	(0.14)				(0.15)	(0.21)
Age		-0.01***	-0.01*	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education		0.51***	0.44***	0.50**	0.30	0.43
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Income		-0.02	0.03	-0.17	0.18	-0.10
		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.34)
Gender		0.25***	0.23**	0.10	-0.01	-0.10
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.20)
West		-0.60***	-0.67***	-0.45***	-0.68***	-0.66**
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.22)
Atlantic		0.62***	0.60***	0.72***	-0.17	-0.04
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.39)
Union		0.16	0.18	0.28*	0.05	0.45
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.26)
Catholic		-0.03	0.05	-0.06	-0.26	-0.14
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.27)
Protestant		-0.22*	-0.18	0.02	-0.08	0.25
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Married		0.10	0.10	0.21	0.03	0.25
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.23)
Crime Positional			-0.51***	-0.42***		-0.38
			(0.08)	(0.11)		(0.21)
Party ID				3.04***		2.67***
				(0.12)		(0.22)
n	1120	2848	2636	2073	973	755

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Crime CIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem**	**Only PP**	**PP and PID Only**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.99***	-0.62***	-0.22	-2.20***	-1.83***	-3.21***
	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.58)
CIO – Crime	2.92***				2.90***	2.15***
	(0.19)				(0.21)	(0.31)
Age		-0.00	0.00	0.01*	0.00	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.00	-0.21	-0.37	0.15	-0.17
		(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.43)
Income		-0.95***	-0.97***	-0.46	-0.95**	-0.32
		(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.44)
Gender		0.10	0.08	0.03	0.08	-0.07
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.26)
West		0.40***	0.41***	0.16	0.32	0.56*
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.27)
Atlantic		0.05	0.02	-0.26	0.20	0.39
		(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.47)
Union		0.37***	0.32**	0.15	0.23	-0.10
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.34)
Catholic		-0.21	-0.17	0.11	0.07	0.25
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.34)
Protestant		-0.62***	-0.52***	-0.38*	-0.71**	-0.57
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.33)
Married		-0.39***	-0.35***	-0.41**	-0.22	-0.44
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.28)
Crime Positional			-0.90***	-0.83***		-0.30
			(0.09)	(0.14)		(0.26)
Party ID				3.40***		3.23***
				(0.14)		(0.26)
n	1120	2848	2636	2073	973	755

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Crime CIO - CPC

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Only PP and PID**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.79***	-1.65***	-2.41***	-3.96***	-4.15***	-5.93***
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.34)	(0.44)	(0.72)
CIO – Crime	3.83***				3.73***	2.76***
	(0.18)				(0.20)	(0.30)
Age		0.01***	1.44***	1.23***		0.93**
		(0.00)	(0.09)	(0.15)		(0.33)
Education		-0.60***	0.01*	0.01	0.02**	0.02
		(0.13)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income		0.77***	-0.37**	-0.43	-0.50	-0.77
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.48)
Gender		-0.37***	0.75***	0.53*	0.45	0.65
		(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.52)
West		0.36***	-0.35***	-0.13	-0.04	0.23
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Atlantic		-0.93***	0.46***	0.49***	0.54**	0.32
		(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.31)
Union		-0.51***	-0.94***	-0.92***	-0.06	-0.58
		(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.38)	(0.63)
Catholic		0.22*	-0.51***	-0.48**	-0.18	-0.84*
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.39)
Protestant		0.68***	0.08	-0.04	0.20	0.24
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.40)
Married		0.22*	0.58***	0.22	0.66**	0.02
		(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.33)
Crime Positional			0.21*	0.07	0.26	-0.12
			(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.33)
Party ID				3.97***		4.11***
				(0.14)		(0.33)
n	1120	2848	2636	2073	973	755

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Crime AIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-0.67***	-1.14**	-1.57**
	(0.10)	(0.44)	(0.61)
AIO – Crime	1.76***	1.77***	1.95***
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.33)
Age		-0.00	-0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		1.01**	1.33**
		(0.35)	(0.51)
Income		0.22	0.28
		(0.35)	(0.49)
Gender		0.36	0.21
		(0.20)	(0.29)
West		-0.59**	-0.44
		(0.21)	(0.30)
Atlantic		0.45	0.10
		(0.36)	(0.54)
Union		0.09	-0.12
		(0.26)	(0.37)
Catholic		-0.05	-0.31
		(0.26)	(0.38)
Protestant		0.00	-0.27
		(0.25)	(0.38)
Married		0.17	0.51
		(0.22)	(0.31)
Crime Positional			-0.46
			(0.28)
Party ID			2.95***
			(0.32)
n	520	438	343

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Crime AIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.53***	-0.49	-2.07**
	(0.11)	(0.49)	(0.76)
AIO – Crime	1.99***	2.02***	2.00***
	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.55)
Age		-0.01	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.59	-0.52
		(0.40)	(0.60)
Income		-0.36	-0.48
		(0.41)	(0.63)
Gender		-0.14	-0.31
		(0.23)	(0.36)
West		0.67**	0.33
		(0.24)	(0.36)
Atlantic		0.55	0.73
		(0.40)	(0.63)
Union		0.30	0.11
		(0.30)	(0.46)
Catholic		-0.62*	-0.35
		(0.31)	(0.46)
Protestant		-0.79*	-0.05
		(0.31)	(0.47)
Married		-0.49*	-0.74*
		(0.25)	(0.36)
Crime Positional			-0.33
			(0.35)
Party ID			3.35***
			(0.36)
n	520	438	343

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Crime AIO - CPC

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.80***	-3.37***	-6.01***
	(0.27)	(0.60)	(0.96)
AIO – Crime	2.79***	2.95***	2.92***
	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.53)
Age		0.01	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.67	-1.05
		(0.39)	(0.63)
Income		-0.11	-0.38
		(0.40)	(0.64)
Gender		-0.32	0.02
		(0.23)	(0.39)
West		0.13	0.27
		(0.24)	(0.38)
Atlantic		-1.04*	-0.32
		(0.46)	(0.73)
Union		-0.31	0.11
		(0.31)	(0.53)
Catholic		0.68*	0.86
		(0.30)	(0.50)
Protestant		0.65*	0.33
		(0.28)	(0.46)
Married		0.27	0.27
		(0.25)	(0.41)
Crime Positional			0.91*
			(0.38)
Party ID			3.74***
			(0.39)
n	520	438	343

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

5.5 Defense

Defense CIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	Socio-Dem.	Only PP	No PP or ID	Both PID and PP	Full Model
(Intercept)	-1.29***	0.05	0.39	-0.50	-0.10	-0.67
	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.50)
CIO – Defense	2.62***				2.75***	2.23***
	(0.14)				(0.16)	(0.25)
Age		-0.01***	-0.01*	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education		0.51***	0.47**	0.53*	0.37	0.39
		(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.38)
Income		-0.02	0.04	-0.32	-0.09	-0.23
		(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.39)
Gender		0.25***	0.16	0.12	-0.03	0.10
		(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.23)
West		-0.60***	-0.68***	-0.40**	-0.67***	-0.68**
		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.26)
Atlantic		0.62***	0.50**	0.43	-0.02	0.27
		(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.45)
Union		0.16	0.30**	0.29	0.20	0.75**
		(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.29)
Catholic		-0.03	0.01	-0.09	-0.21	-0.28
		(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.31)
Protestant		-0.22*	-0.15	0.06	-0.03	0.27
		(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.29)
Married		0.10	0.01	0.17	0.26	0.28
		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.26)
Defense Positional			-0.81***	-0.62***		-0.28
			(0.09)	(0.13)		(0.24)
Party ID				3.06***		2.57***
				(0.14)		(0.27)
n	1107	2848	1872	1521	962	583

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Defense CIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**No PP or ID**	**Both PID and PP**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.90***	-0.62***	-0.07	-2.16***	-1.98***	-3.39***
	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.69)
CIO – Defense	2.71***				2.75***	1.50***
	(0.20)				(0.23)	(0.38)
Age		-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.00	0.02	-0.28	0.09	-0.02
		(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.50)
Income		-0.95***	-1.13***	-0.39	-1.09***	-0.70
		(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.52)
Gender		0.10	-0.12	-0.19	0.19	-0.27
		(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.30)
West		0.40***	0.35**	0.25	0.28	0.35
		(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.32)
Atlantic		0.05	0.21	0.09	0.37	0.58
		(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.53)
Union		0.37***	0.40**	0.16	0.24	-0.26
		(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.37)
Catholic		-0.21	-0.32*	-0.19	0.10	0.15
		(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.39)
Protestant		-0.62***	-0.40**	-0.16	-0.93***	-0.45
		(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.38)
Married		-0.39***	-0.23	-0.45*	-0.18	-0.47
		(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.32)
Defense Positional			-1.01***	-0.60***		-0.19
			(0.12)	(0.17)		(0.32)
Party ID				3.53***		3.67***
				(0.17)		(0.32)
n	1107	2848	1872	1521	962	583

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Defense CIO - CPC

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem**	**Only PP**	**Both PID and PP**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-3.11***	-1.65***	-2.88***	-4.86***	-4.62***	-6.05***
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.43)	(0.47)	(0.81)
CIO – Defense	4.08***				4.01***	3.03***
	(0.20)				(0.23)	(0.38)
Age		0.01***	0.01***	0.02**	0.02***	0.02
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.60***	-0.60***	-0.45	-0.54	-0.81
		(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.54)
Income		0.77***	0.86***	0.70**	1.02**	1.30*
		(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.55)
Gender		-0.37***	-0.11	-0.02	-0.10	0.23
		(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.34)
West		0.36***	0.50***	0.30	0.58**	0.58
		(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.35)
Atlantic		-0.93***	-0.97***	-0.84*	-0.54	-1.37*
		(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.63)
Union		-0.51***	-0.75***	-0.48*	-0.45	-1.09*
		(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.44)
Catholic		0.22*	0.23	0.28	0.09	0.27
		(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.45)
Protestant		0.68***	0.47***	-0.03	0.66**	-0.20
		(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.38)
Married		0.22*	0.22	0.21	-0.13	-0.05
		(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.36)
Defense Positional			1.90***	1.28***		0.69
			(0.12)	(0.18)		(0.38)
Party ID				4.11***		3.75***
				(0.18)		(0.37)
n	1107	2848	1872	1521	962	583

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Defense AIO - Liberal

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-0.71***	-1.24**	-1.19
	(0.10)	(0.44)	(0.67)
AIO – Defense	1.92***	2.05***	2.29***
	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.38)
Age		-0.00	-0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		0.88*	1.17*
		(0.35)	(0.54)
Income		-0.03	0.24
		(0.36)	(0.57)
Gender		0.42*	0.14
		(0.20)	(0.33)
West		-0.67**	-0.71*
		(0.21)	(0.33)
Atlantic		0.36	-0.06
		(0.34)	(0.59)
Union		0.45	0.33
		(0.26)	(0.41)
Catholic		-0.02	-0.07
		(0.25)	(0.42)
Protestant		-0.18	-0.54
		(0.25)	(0.41)
Married		0.15	0.56
		(0.22)	(0.35)
Defense Positional			-0.69*
			(0.32)
Party ID			2.62***
			(0.36)
n	535	451	278

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Defense AIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-1.33***	-0.43	-1.53
	(0.10)	(0.47)	(0.85)
AIO – Defense	1.64***	1.25***	1.28
	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.69)
Age		-0.00	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.64	-0.77
		(0.38)	(0.63)
Income		-0.37	-0.77
		(0.39)	(0.71)
Gender		0.05	-0.15
		(0.22)	(0.38)
West		0.66**	0.47
		(0.23)	(0.37)
Atlantic		0.34	0.78
		(0.38)	(0.69)
Union		0.12	0.09
		(0.28)	(0.47)
Catholic		-0.50	-0.84
		(0.28)	(0.52)
Protestant		-0.73*	-0.23
		(0.29)	(0.45)
Married		-0.55*	-0.83*
		(0.23)	(0.40)
Defense Positional			-0.43
			(0.35)
Party ID			3.07***
			(0.38)
n	535	451	278

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Defense AIO - CPC

	Bivariate	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-3.04***	-3.67***	-7.00***
	(0.31)	(0.63)	(1.16)
AIO – Defense	2.86***	3.23***	3.36***
	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.65)
Age		0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.47	-0.32
		(0.39)	(0.66)
Income		0.28	0.24
		(0.40)	(0.72)
Gender		-0.62**	-0.03
		(0.23)	(0.41)
West		0.17	0.58
		(0.23)	(0.41)
Atlantic		-0.89*	-0.40
		(0.43)	(0.86)
Union		-0.62*	-0.44
		(0.30)	(0.57)
Catholic		0.57	0.93
		(0.29)	(0.54)
Protestant		0.83**	1.14*
		(0.27)	(0.49)
Married		0.44	0.43
		(0.25)	(0.43)
Defense Positional			1.21**
			(0.41)
Party ID			3.37***
			(0.41)
n	535	451	278

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

5.6 Economy

Economy CIO - Liberal

	Bivariate.	Socio-Dem	Only PP	Both PP and ID	No PP or ID	Full Model
(Intercept)	-1.09***	0.05	1.35***	0.11	-0.85***	-0.56
	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.28)	(0.39)	(0.21)	(0.43)
CIO - Economy	3.12***				3.08***	1.82***
	(0.10)				(0.12)	(0.25)
Age		-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.02***
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education		0.51***	0.41*	0.29	0.51**	0.46
		(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.16)	(0.30)
Income		-0.02	-0.05	-0.06	0.04	0.04
		(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.16)	(0.30)
Gender		0.25***	0.15	0.17	0.31**	0.27
		(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.18)
West		-0.60***	-0.55***	-0.31	-0.54***	-0.22
		(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.19)
Atlantic		0.62***	0.33	0.12	0.45**	-0.02
		(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.16)	(0.32)
Union		0.16	0.39*	0.43*	0.14	0.37
		(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.24)
Catholic		-0.03	0.07	-0.08	-0.17	-0.02
		(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.24)
Protestant		-0.22*	-0.32*	-0.29	-0.11	-0.19
		(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.22)
Married		0.10	0.03	0.13	0.09	0.15
		(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.20)
Economy Positional			-1.34***	-0.91***		-0.53**
			(0.13)	(0.18)		(0.20)
Party ID				3.09***		2.50***
				(0.18)		(0.22)
n	3560	2848	1181	955	2450	896

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Economy CIO - NDP

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem**	**Only PP**	**Both PID and PP**	**No PP or ID**	**Full Model**
(Intercept)	-2.13***	-0.62***	-0.44	-2.75***	-1.70***	-2.77***
	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.30)	(0.49)	(0.24)	(0.53)
CIO - Economy	2.82***				2.76***	1.53***
	(0.10)				(0.12)	(0.27)
Age		-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education		-0.00	-0.16	0.12	-0.17	-0.23
		(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.34)	(0.19)	(0.38)
Income		-0.95***	-1.15***	-0.57	-1.01***	-0.52
		(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.19)	(0.40)
Gender		0.10	0.33*	0.03	-0.02	-0.22
		(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.22)
West		0.40***	0.23	0.23	0.35**	0.17
		(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.23)
Atlantic		0.05	0.18	0.27	0.03	0.46
		(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.34)	(0.20)	(0.37)
Union		0.37***	0.15	-0.02	0.28*	-0.10
		(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.29)
Catholic		-0.21	-0.26	0.31	-0.15	0.08
		(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.15)	(0.30)
Protestant		-0.62***	-0.39*	0.07	-0.81***	-0.18
		(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.15)	(0.28)
Married		-0.39***	-0.32*	-0.54*	-0.31*	-0.47*
		(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.24)
Economy Positional			-0.35*	-0.25		-0.61**
			(0.14)	(0.21)		(0.23)
Party ID				3.61***		2.89***
				(0.21)		(0.27)
n	3560	2848	1181	955	2450	896

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Economy CIO - CPC

	Bivariate	**Socio-Dem.**	**Only PP**	**Both PID and PP**	**No PP or PID**	**Full model**
(Intercept)	-2.65***	-1.65***	-4.13***	-5.27***	-3.11***	-5.52***
	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.57)	(0.29)	(0.70)
CIO - Economy	4.12***				4.04***	3.11***
	(0.11)				(0.13)	(0.28)
Age		0.01***	0.02***	0.02*	0.01*	0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Education		-0.60***	-0.36	-0.44	-0.72***	-0.25
		(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.44)
Income		0.77***	1.06***	0.57	0.37	0.75
		(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.45)
Gender		-0.37***	-0.47***	-0.25	-0.25*	-0.07
		(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.27)
West		0.36***	0.44**	0.16	0.38**	0.00
		(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.28)
Atlantic		-0.93***	-0.78**	-0.57	-0.87***	-1.04
		(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.44)	(0.25)	(0.54)
Union		-0.51***	-0.66***	-0.56	-0.43**	-0.15
		(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.30)	(0.16)	(0.37)
Catholic		0.22*	0.23	-0.23	0.09	-0.36
		(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.16)	(0.35)
Protestant		0.68***	0.74***	0.26	0.63***	0.33
		(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.15)	(0.31)
Married		0.22*	0.30*	0.38	0.17	-0.10
		(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.30)
Economy Positional			2.44***	1.73***		1.14**
			(0.20)	(0.29)		(0.36)
Party ID				4.23***		3.03***
				(0.23)		(0.30)
n	3560	2848	1181	955	2450	896

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Appendix 6: Calculated Average Marginal Effects

6.1 Health Care

Average Marginal Effects - CIO Health Care

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
CIO	**0.43*****	**0.24*****	**0.36*****
	(0.04)	**(0.04)**	**(0.06)**
Health Care Positional	-0.00	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party ID	0.41***	0.36***	0.49***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Age	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.06	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income	-0.02	-0.04	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Gender	-0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
West	-0.04	0.01	0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Atlantic	0.05	-0.02	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Union	0.04	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Catholic	-0.06	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Protestant	-0.00	-0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Married	0.02	-0.03	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
n	769	769	769

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

Average Marginal Effects - AIO Health Care

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
AIO	**0.34*****	**0.22*****	**0.31*****
	(0.06)	**(0.05)**	**(0.07)**
Health Care Positional	-0.00	-0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Party ID	0.43***	0.41***	0.43***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.14	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Income	0.01	-0.04	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Gender	0.01	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
West	-0.02	0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Atlantic	0.07	0.04	-0.09*
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Union	-0.02	0.04	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Catholic	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Protestant	-0.04	-0.01	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Married	0.08	-0.10**	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
n	366	366	366

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

6.2 Education

Average Marginal Effects - CIO Education

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
CIO	**0.41*****	**0.26*****	**0.31*****
	(0.04)	**(0.05)**	**(0.06)**
Educational Positional	0.10*	0.01	-0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party ID	0.39***	0.39***	0.47***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.11*	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income	-0.00	-0.04	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
West	-0.08**	0.03	0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Atlantic	0.05	-0.01	-0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Union	0.03	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Catholic	-0.06*	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Protestant	-0.02	-0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Married	0.04	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	772	772	772

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

Average Marginal Effects - AIO Education

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
AIO	**0.40*****	**0.25*****	**0.43*****
	(0.05)	**(0.06)**	**(0.09)**
Education Positional	0.01	0.08	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Party ID	0.42***	0.42***	0.42***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	-0.00**	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.11	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Income	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Gender	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
West	-0.03	0.03	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Atlantic	0.03	0.09	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Union	0.00	0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Catholic	-0.04	0.02	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Protestant	-0.03	0.00	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Married	0.06	-0.09*	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
N	356	356	356

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

6.3 Environment

Average Marginal Effects - CIO Environment

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
CIO	**0.30*****	**0.13****	**0.20*****
	(0.04)	**(0.04)**	**(0.05)**
Environmental Positional	0.09*	0.01	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party ID	0.49***	0.55***	0.60***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.10*	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Income	-0.03	-0.06	0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Gender	0.04	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
West	-0.09**	0.02	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Atlantic	0.08	0.00	-0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Union	0.02	0.03	-0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Catholic	-0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Protestant	-0.01	-0.03	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Married	0.04	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	708	708	708

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

Average Marginal Effects - AIO Environment

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
AIO	**0.23*****	**0.09**	**0.31*****
	(0.06)	**(0.05)**	**(0.09)**
Environmental Positional	0.04	0.06	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Party ID	0.55***	0.57***	0.56***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.10	-0.06	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Income	0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Gender	-0.00	-0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
West	-0.04	0.00	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Atlantic	0.12	0.04	-0.15*
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Union	-0.05	0.03	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Catholic	-0.04	-0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Protestant	-0.07	0.00	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Married	0.08	-0.12**	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	332	332	332

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

6.4 Crime

Average Marginal Effects - CIO Crime

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
CIO	**0.37*****	**0.24*****	**0.27*****
	(0.04)	**(0.06)**	**(0.04)**
Crime Positional	-0.04	-0.02	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Party ID	0.45***	0.43***	0.49***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.05	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income	-0.02	-0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender	-0.01	-0.00	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
West	-0.07**	0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Atlantic	0.01	0.02	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Union	0.01	0.02	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Catholic	-0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Protestant	0.02	-0.04	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Married	0.04	-0.04	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	750	750	750

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

Average Marginal Effects - AIO Crime

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
AIO	**0.33*****	**0.25***	**0.28*****
	(0.06)	**(0.11)**	**(0.05)**
Crime Positional	-0.05	-0.04	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Party ID	0.51***	0.50***	0.52***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.16*	-0.03	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Income	0.07	-0.07	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Gender	0.02	-0.03	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
West	-0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Atlantic	0.02	0.07	-0.03
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Union	-0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Catholic	-0.04	-0.03	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Protestant	-0.04	-0.00	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Married	0.06	-0.07	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
N	341	341	341

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

6.5 Defense

Average Marginal Effects - CIO Defense

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
CIO	**0.37*****	**0.14****	**0.31*****
	(0.05)	**(0.04)**	**(0.05)**
Defense Positional	-0.03	-0.02	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party ID	0.42***	0.50***	0.43***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00**	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.05	-0.00	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Income	-0.02	-0.06	0.08*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Gender	0.01	-0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
West	-0.08*	0.02	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Atlantic	0.04	0.04	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Union	0.05	0.02	-0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Catholic	-0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Protestant	0.03	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Married	0.03	-0.04	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	579	579	579

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

Average Marginal Effects - AIO Defense

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
AIO	**0.37*****	**0.17**	**0.30*****
	(0.06)	**(0.11)**	**(0.05)**
Defense Positional	-0.08	-0.06	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Party ID	0.43***	0.47***	0.46***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Age	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.16*	-0.06	-0.05
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Income	0.07	-0.11	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Gender	0.01	-0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
West	-0.06	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Atlantic	0.01	0.07	-0.04
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Union	0.02	0.00	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Catholic	-0.02	-0.08	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Protestant	-0.08	-0.02	0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Married	0.06	-0.08	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	276	276	276

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

6.6 Economy

Average Marginal Effects - CIO Economy

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
CIO	**0.30*****	**0.18*****	**0.36*****
	(0.05)	**(0.05)**	**(0.05)**
Economy Positional	-0.07*	-0.05*	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Party ID	0.46***	0.42***	0.35***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00**	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.06	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income	0.01	-0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender	0.03	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
West	-0.02	0.01	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Atlantic	0.01	0.03	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Union	0.02	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Catholic	-0.00	0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Protestant	-0.02	-0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Married	0.02	-0.04*	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	895	895	895

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

Appendix 7: Logistic Regression Models including all IO Variables

7.1 CIO

Assessing all CIO Issues for each Party

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
(Intercept)	-3.73	-2.36	-9.50
	(1.90)	(2.56)	(7.05)
CIO Health Care	**1.53**	**2.72****	**1.80**
	(0.80)	**(1.02)**	**(2.70)**
CIO Education	**1.92***	**1.18**	**1.51**
	(0.79)	**(0.94)**	**(2.99)**
CIO Environment	**0.96**	**0.32**	**1.40**
	(0.70)	**(0.99)**	**(2.65)**
CIO Crime	**0.19**	**-0.11**	**-0.03**
	(0.82)	**(1.19)**	**(2.91)**
CIO Defense	**1.54**	**0.24**	**4.01**
	(0.82)	**(1.13)**	**(2.90)**
CIO Economy	**1.51**	**1.67**	**2.08**
	(0.82)	(0.98)	(2.20)
Health Positional	0.47	-0.89	0.51
	(0.64)	(0.73)	(2.14)
Education Positional	0.43	-0.30	-1.62
	(0.96)	(1.16)	(3.31)
Environmental Positional	0.67	-0.76	-1.09
	(0.76)	(0.94)	(3.43)
Crime Positional	-0.66	0.31	1.16
	(0.70)	(0.85)	(1.99)
Defense Positional	-0.23	-0.65	1.83
	(0.74)	(0.95)	(3.43)
Economic Positional	-0.36	-0.46	2.37
	(0.72)	(0.93)	(2.38)
Party ID	0.86	1.71	3.89
	(0.74)	(0.90)	(3.13)
Age	-0.00	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Education	0.83	-0.06	-1.83
	(0.93)	(1.16)	(3.83)
Income	0.23	-1.72	2.37

	(1.01)	(1.45)	(3.24)
Gender	-0.27	-0.14	0.73
	(0.62)	(0.83)	(2.57)
West	-1.60	0.94	1.61
	(0.86)	(1.02)	(2.93)
Atlantic	0.14	-0.04	-2.30
	(1.01)	(1.29)	(3.55)
Union	0.82	-0.23	-2.30
	(0.64)	(0.85)	(1.85)
Catholic	-1.07	0.64	0.28
	(0.99)	(1.01)	(2.48)
Protestant	0.49	0.16	-1.78
	(0.72)	(0.95)	(3.17)
Married	0.27	-0.72	0.29
	(0.64)	(0.84)	(1.84)
N	289	289	289

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, robust standard errors in parentheses

7.2 AIO

Assessing all AIO Issues for each Party

	Liberal	**NDP**	**CPC**
(Intercept)	-1.82	-4.10	-6.81*
	(2.14)	(2.41)	(2.87)
AIO Health Care	**0.25**	**1.21**	**1.28**
	(0.72)	**(0.99)**	**(1.35)**
AIO Education	**2.72*****	**2.04***	**2.08**
	(0.71)	**(0.92)**	**(1.21)**
AIO Environment	**1.25**	**0.52**	**0.94**
	(0.77)	**(0.99)**	**(1.90)**
AIO Crime	**0.95**	**2.67**	**1.20**
	(0.94)	**(1.41)**	**(1.60)**
AIO Defense	**1.35**	**-0.79**	**3.11**
	(0.98)	**(2.32)**	**(1.88)**
Health Care Positional	-0.34	-0.33	0.74
	(0.77)	(1.07)	(1.09)
Education Positional	-0.44	2.11	-0.71
	(1.03)	(1.73)	(1.68)
Environment Positional	-0.79	0.58	0.35
	(0.77)	(1.00)	(1.14)
Crime Positional	-0.58	-0.78	1.18

	(0.73)	(0.84)	(1.05)
Defense Positional	-0.37	0.44	0.11
	(0.72)	(0.87)	(1.13)
Party ID	2.14**	2.24**	3.01**
	(0.80)	(0.85)	(1.03)
Age	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Education	1.31	-1.08	-1.11
	(1.21)	(1.40)	(1.93)
Income	0.75	-1.41	-1.38
	(1.02)	(1.81)	(1.85)
Gender	0.11	-0.20	0.05
	(0.74)	(0.91)	(1.05)
West	-1.72*	1.04	1.11
	(0.76)	(0.92)	(1.11)
Atlantic	-1.51	2.89	-0.39
	(2.04)	(1.90)	(2.54)
Union	0.26	0.41	-0.08
	(0.84)	(1.39)	(1.31)
Catholic	-0.61	-1.30	1.33
	(0.90)	(1.17)	(1.47)
Protestant	-1.07	0.20	0.72
	(0.92)	(0.99)	(1.22)
Married	0.28	-0.77	0.06
	(0.74)	(0.84)	(1.01)
N	194	194	194

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, robust standard errors in parentheses