

Strange Allies:
Canada-Quebec-France Triangular Relations, 1944-1970

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the Canada-Quebec-France triangle from the period after the Second World War to the 1970s. It argues that the France-Quebec rapprochement of the 1960s and accompanying tensions in Ottawa's relations with Quebec City and Paris were the result of the clashing of nationalist reactions (Gaullist, Quebecois and Canadian) that arose from domestic circumstances in the triangle's components intersecting with the acceleration of transnational cultural and economic flows and preponderant US power.

The first half of the work discusses the 1944-1960 period. These years were a high point in Canada-France relations, as a common Atlanticist response to Cold War realities meant greater official contact; moreover, economic exchanges grew in absolute terms and cultural links multiplied, consistent with the proliferation of transnational relations and Quebec's socio-cultural transformation. The period, however, was also marked by growing differences; the conditions contributing to expanded links also fuelled nationalist reactions and set the stage for subsequent tensions. The official Canada-France relationship was undermined by Ottawa and Paris' increasingly divergent foreign policies. Additionally, Quebec neo-nationalism's rise exacerbated Canada's internal tensions and stimulated Quebec interest in cooperation with France to maintain Quebec's majority francophone identity. Paris responded enthusiastically, encouraged by its concern to counter US cultural power.

Triangular relations in the 1960s are explored in the second half of the dissertation. Notions of ethno-cultural solidarity, geo-political considerations, and a

belief that Quebec was destined to accede to a new political status combined to encourage the France-Quebec special relationship. Ottawa struggled to respond to the evolving Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist challenges. Ultimately, the passing of the acute crisis phase of triangular tensions was attributable less to the federal response than to political events in Quebec City and Paris, the reality that Quebec and Gaullist nationalism increasingly were talking past each other, and the fact that the international trends to which they were a response proved stronger. By 1970, the triangle had settled into a period of *attentiste* truce.

Employing elements of the “new diplomatic history,” notably attention to the cultural dimension, the dissertation brings together archival sources from all three points of the triangle, furthering our understanding of the development of each of its components, and of the history of globalization.

Résumé Analytique

Cette thèse est une étude des relations triangulaires entre le Canada, le Québec et la France de la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale jusqu'aux années 1970. L'idée développée est que le rapprochement entre la France et le Québec durant les années 1960 ainsi que les tensions en résultant entre Ottawa, d'une part, Paris et Québec d'autre part, sont le fruit d'un affrontement opposant des courants nationalistes (gaulliste, québécois et canadien) survenant de conditions domestiques s'entrecroisant avec des courants transnationaux culturels et économiques. Sur ces derniers, se greffe le poids toujours croissant des Etats-Unis, dont le rôle devient prépondérant.

La première partie de la thèse traite de la période allant de 1944 à 1960. Ces années constituent une nouvelle étape dans l'histoire des relations franco-canadiennes. En effet, grâce à une politique atlantiste commune élaborée durant la Guerre Froide, les contacts officiels franco-canadiens sont nombreux. En outre, en harmonie avec la multiplication des échanges transnationaux et la transformation culturelle du Québec, les relations économiques mais aussi culturelles se multiplient également. Pourtant, l'époque n'est pas exempte de difficultés, appelées à se développer ultérieurement. Les conditions contribuant au développement des liens alimentent également les réactions nationalistes. Ottawa et Paris divergent sur bien des aspects de politique étrangère et les relations franco-canadiennes en sont sapées; l'ascension du néo-nationalisme québécois entraîne des tensions internes au Canada tandis qu'au contraire, la France est sollicitée pour maintenir l'identité majoritairement francophone du Québec. La réponse de Paris fût enthousiaste, et motivée par une préoccupation de contrer le pouvoir culturel étasunien.

La deuxième partie de la thèse met en valeur ces relations durant les années soixante. À l'idée d'une solidarité ethnoculturelle, se rattache une nouvelle donne géopolitique et une conviction que le Québec est au seuil d'accéder à un statut politique neuf, favorisant ainsi des relations privilégiées entre le Québec et la France. Ottawa se bat pour répondre aux défis provenant à la fois du gaullisme et du néo-nationalisme québécois. La crise est aiguë, et sa résolution tient moins à la politique fédérale alors menée qu'aux événements politiques à Québec et à Paris, aux différences entre le nationalisme québécois et le nationalisme gaulliste, et au poids, toujours plus fort, des tendances internationales auxquelles ceux-ci répondaient. Le début des années soixante-dix est marqué par une trêve attentiste entre les différents partis concernés.

Utilisant des éléments de la « new diplomatic history, » qui accorde une attention plus grande à la dimension culturelle, la thèse analyse des sources archivistiques de l'ensemble des partis concernés, permettant une compréhension approfondie de l'évolution de leurs relations, mais aussi de la mondialisation.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: In de Gaulle's Shadow

The world had come to Montreal. Expo 67 was an overwhelming success, drawing visitors from around the globe. Against the backdrop of the festivities marking Confederation's centennial, the universal exposition was equally a celebration of the Quiet Revolution – the emergence of a modern, urbanized, industrialized Quebec, as well as the cultural, economic, and political empowerment of North America's *fait français*. Situated on islands in the St. Lawrence River, the geographic feature so prominent in the history of Montreal, Quebec, and Canada, Expo's very location was rich in symbolism.

The riverain setting was also a fitting image of the era of globalization; what had been constructed in the middle of the St. Lawrence was quite literally a “global village,” to employ Marshall McLuhan's phrase describing the international phenomenon.¹ With its theme *Terre des Hommes/Man's World*, inspired by the title of a work by French author Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Expo was intended as a tangible representation of the “merging of efforts coming from thousands of sources and uniting in the creation of a single vision: Earth, the creation of Man.”² Indeed, the post-war transportation and communications advances on display in Montreal underscored how in the latter half of the twentieth century, the world's population was in closer contact than at any previous time in history, holding out the prospect of the globe's various national tributaries flowing into one great river of humanity.

¹ Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, *The Medium is the Massage* (Bantam, 1967), 63.

² Gabrielle Roy, Introduction, *Terre des hommes/Man and his World* (Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World Exhibition), 28-30.

Yet paralleling the enthusiasm over this dizzying proposition, there were also questions, misgivings, and even hostility. McLuhan himself predicted that globalization would be accompanied, paradoxically, by the assertion of regional, ethnic, and religious “particularism.” It was thus appropriate that in addition to the title of *Terre des Hommes* providing Expo’s theme, Saint-Exupéry should have written in this work of the need for individuals to feel that “en posant sa pierre, que l’on contribue à bâtir le monde.”³ It was not enough for the world’s various populations simply to contribute to the human adventure; rather, there remained an abiding need to have the uniqueness of that contribution recognized, and for assurances it would not be drowned under globalization’s homogenizing aspects.

Among the visitors to Montreal that summer was General Charles de Gaulle, determined to use his visit to send a message about the importance and relevance of national existence in the face of globalization, and linked to this, the necessity of cooperation between the world’s French-speaking peoples. Accompanied by Quebec’s Premier, Daniel Johnson, the French President spent July 24 travelling down the *Chemin du roy* along Quebec’s north shore, stopping in the communities en route where large crowds accorded him a rapturous welcome. In Montreal, the climactic destination of a journey designed to underscore the ties of history, culture, and sentiment binding the francophone populations on either side of the Atlantic, crowds in the hundreds of thousands lined the streets to catch a glimpse of this towering historic figure. As the motorcade turned off Sherbrooke Street onto rue St. Denis toward the old part of the city, the bells of Montreal’s churches began to peal.

³ “By placing one’s own stone, one contributes to building the world.” Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, *Terre des hommes* (Gallimard, 1966), 59.

An immense throng greeted France's President at the City Hall overlooking Place Jacques-Cartier. De Gaulle was escorted into the building, and very quickly cries of "le Général, au balcon" and "Le Québec aux Québécois" went up, joining the placards proclaiming the slogans of Quebec's *indépendantiste* movement being waved alongside the French tricolour and the Quebec *fleur-de-lys*. Answering the calls, the General emerged onto the balcony over the City Hall's entrance. From his vantage point, de Gaulle was greeted by a panorama that included the teeming, excited crowd gathered in the heat and humidity of a Montreal summer night. Emblematic of the historic Anglo-French struggle of which the city, Quebec, and Canada were so much a product, the General's view also took in the monument to British admiral Lord Horatio Nelson in honour of his victory over French forces at the Battle of the Nile. Below the square lay the St. Lawrence and Expo. Acknowledging the crowd's acclamations and surveying the dramatic scene before him, de Gaulle began to speak:

C'est une immense émotion qui remplit mon coeur en voyant devant moi la ville de Montréal française. Au nom du vieux pays, au nom de la France, je vous salue de tout mon coeur.

Je vais vous confier un secret que vous ne répérez pas. Ce soir ici, et tout le long de ma route, je me trouvais dans une atmosphère du même genre que celle de la Libération.

Et tout le long de ma route, outre cela, j'ai constaté quel immense effort de progrès, de développement, et par conséquent d'affranchissement vous accomplissez ici, et c'est à Montréal qu'il faut que je le dise, parce que, s'il y a au monde une ville exemplaire par ses réussites modernes, c'est la vôtre. Je dis c'est la vôtre et je me permets d'ajouter c'est la nôtre. Si vous saviez quelle confiance la France, réveillée après d'immenses épreuves, porte maintenant vers vous, si vous saviez quelle affection elle recommence à ressentir pour les Français du Canada, et si vous saviez à quel point elle se sent obligée de concourir à votre marche en avant, à votre progrès!

C'est pourquoi elle a conclu avec le gouvernement du Québec, avec celui de mon ami Johnson, des accords pour que les Français de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique travaillent ensemble à une même œuvre française. Et d'ailleurs le concours que la France va, tous les jours un peu plus, prêter ici, elle sait bien que vous le lui rendrez parce que vous êtes en train de vous constituer des élites, des usines, des entreprises, des laboratoires, qui feront l'étonnement de tous et qui, un jour, j'en suis sûr, vous permettront d'aider la France.

Voilà ce que je suis venu vous dire ce soir en ajoutant que j'emporte de cette réunion inouïe de Montréal un souvenir inoubliable. La France entière sait, voit, entend, ce qui se passe ici et je puis vous dire qu'elle en vaudra mieux.
 Vive Montréal! Vive le Québec! ... Vive le Québec LIBRE!
 Vive le Canada français et vive la France!⁴

De Gaulle had just placed *his* stone. As if thrown into a pond, a favoured metaphor of the French leader, the shockwaves caused by this act expanded outward in concentric circles from Place Jacques-Cartier. With the French and Quebec notables behind the French leader still absorbing his words, a thunderous, delirious roar of approval arose from the crowd surrounding City Hall. Further west at Montreal's Windsor train station, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, responded in panicked disbelief at what he had just seen on his television, while up the river in Ottawa, the Prime Minister, Lester Pearson, reacted angrily to the broadcasted speech. The shockwaves reached into homes throughout Quebec, where the reaction of the population was as varied as their opinions regarding their province's political destiny; they reached a Canadian populace itself wondering about the country's future even while celebrating its past; they reached across the Atlantic to France, where they provoked reactions from derision to joy; they circled the globe. De Gaulle's words had dramatically drawn the world's attention to the debate raging over Quebec's political future and laid bare Canada's unity crisis.

Although the French leader's remarks provoked astonishment on both sides of the Atlantic, ample signs preceded the *cri du balcon*. This was only the most dramatic manifestation of a complex triangular dynamic that had emerged between Paris, Quebec City, and Ottawa; a byproduct of Canada, Quebec, and France's

⁴ Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981), 165-166.

interconnected post-war development intersecting with a set of profound changes in international affairs. Indeed, the sentiments to which de Gaulle gave voice were symptomatic of a larger global phenomenon; populations around the world and the West especially were coming to terms with the preponderance of American influence – political, economic, and cultural – and more broadly, the proliferation of transnational exchanges and interdependence heralding globalization. By calling into question the fundamental unit of the international system – the state – and raising fundamental questions about the bases of ethnic, religious, and national identity, globalization constituted a challenge in terms of mediating between the local and the global, the particular and the common, the parochial and the cosmopolitan, that today is more present than ever.⁵

This work explores the Canada-Quebec-France triangular dynamic as a case study of this international phenomenon with the aim of gaining a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the motivations, manifestations and tensions of the 1960s, explaining the relatively sudden emergence of official triangular relations after nearly two centuries of minimal official contact, and its consequences. In so doing, it explores the domestic circumstances in the triangle's three components, and how these interacted with post-1945 global realities thus situating triangular relations in the broader history of twentieth century international relations.

The dramatic nature of de Gaulle's visit and persisting debate over Quebec's political future, and by implication Canadian unity, has generated a significant

⁵ Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (Ballantine Books, 2001); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (Touchstone, 1997).

literature on Canada-Quebec-France relations in the 1960s. Accounts chronicling the dramatic events of July 1967 appeared shortly after, but lacked rigorous historical analysis by virtue of their proximity to the events in question and the politically-charged atmosphere in which they appeared.⁶ A similar weakness characterizes the numerous accounts of participants; although a crucial addition to the historiography, the advantage of greater distance in time is tempered by the actors' emotional proximity to events. Foremost among these works are French journalist Pierre-Louis Mallen's *Vivre le Québec libre* and *Êtes-vous dépendantiste?*, and Pierre de Menthon's *Je témoigne: Québec 1967, Chile 1973*, written by France's consul general in Quebec City. Alain Peyrefitte, a former French minister, provided a fascinating insider account in *De Gaulle et le Québec*, which supplements a relatively brief reminiscence by the French foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville.⁷ The principal accounts of Quebec actors include Claude Morin's *L'Art de l'impossible: la diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960* and André Patry's *Le Québec dans le monde*, both of which explore triangular relations as part of a larger discussion of Quebec's international activities. Equally significant are the memoirs of Jean-Marc Léger, a foremost advocate of France-Quebec cooperation and Quebec's links with the

⁶ Jean Tainturier, *De Gaulle au Québec: le dossier des quatre journées* (Éditions du Jour, 1967); Pierre-Louis Guertin, *Et De Gaulle vint...* (Langevin, 1970); François-Albert Angers, "L'épilogue de la visite du Général de Gaulle," *L'Action nationale* 1967, 57(2): 175-180.

⁷ Pierre de Menthon, *Je témoigne: Québec 1967, Chile 1973* (Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979); Pierre-Louis Mallen, *Vivre le Québec libre: Les secrets de De Gaulle* (Plon, 1978) and *Êtes-vous dépendantiste?* (La Presse, 1979); Maurice Couve de Murville, *Une politique étrangère, 1958-1969* (Plon, 1971); Alain Peyrefitte, *De Gaulle et le Québec* (Stanké, 2000). Also, Maurice Couve de Murville, "Pearson et la France," *International Journal* 1973-1974, 29(1): 24-32, which offers additional insight into French views of Lester Pearson and his diplomacy. References to the triangular relations are also found in the memoirs of de Gaulle's aide-de-camp, François Flohic, *Souvenirs d'Outre-Gaulle* (Librairie Plon, 1979) and the Elysée Secretary-General, Bernard Tricot, *Mémoires* (Quai Voltaire, 1994).

international francophone community.⁸ Not to be outdone, the federal actors have provided their version of events; the most comprehensive is Eldon Black's *Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1994*. Lester Pearson and Paul Martin also provided accounts in their memoirs.⁹

The first academic analyses of the triangular tensions of the 1960s appeared in the 1970s, anticipated by the work of graduate students.¹⁰ The monographs included political scientist Renée Lescop's *Le Pari québécois du général*, and Sylvie Guillaume and Pierre Guillaume's broader analysis in their mischievously titled *Paris-Québec-Ottawa: un ménage à trois*. Included in this first generation of academic works was arguably the definitive anglophone account to date, Dale Thomson's *Vive le Québec libre!* Although not an academic work, French journalists Anne Rouanet and Pierre Rouanet's examination of de Gaulle's Quebec policy and

⁸ Claude Morin, *L'Art de l'impossible: la diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960* (Boréal, 1987); André Patry, *Le Québec dans le monde* (Leméac, 1980); Jean-Marc Léger, *Le Temps dissipé: souvenirs* (Éditions Hurtubise HMH Ltée, 1999). Neither Jean Lesage nor Daniel Johnson produced memoirs of their time as Quebec Premier. Similarly, there is only a disappointingly brief account of the triangular relations by the individual considered the father of Quebec diplomacy, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, in his *Combats d'une révolutionnaire tranquille* (Centre Éducatif et Culturel, 1989). There is more detail in the memoirs of former Minister of Cultural Affairs and Deputy Premier, Georges-Émile Lapalme, *Le paradis du pouvoir, Mémoires vol. III* (Leméac, 1973), and those of his deputy Guy Frégault, *Chronique des années perdues* (Leméac, 1976), notably regarding the early stage of France-Quebec cultural cooperation. Also, Paul Gros d'Aillon, *Daniel Johnson, L'égalité avant l'indépendance* (Stanké, 1979) and Jean Loiselle, *Daniel Johnson, Le Québec d'abord* (VLB éditeur, 1999), provide accounts by Johnson's close advisors.

⁹ Eldon (Pat) Black, *Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1974* (Carleton University Press, 1997); Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, vol. 3*, John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1972); Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life, v. II, So Many Worlds* (Deneau, 1985). Also, see the memoirs of Martin's successor, Mitchell Sharp, *Which Reminds Me: A Memoir* (University of Toronto Press, 1994). Black's work is notable for its use of archival documents. The third volume of Pearson's memoirs was completed by the editors after his death, undermining its value as a primary source.

¹⁰ Bernard Mélard, *La politique de la France vis-à-vis du Québec*, M.A. thesis (Université Laval, Department of Political Science, 1971); Louise Beaudoin, *Les relations France-Québec, deux époques, 1855-1910, 1960-1972*, M.A. thesis (Université Laval, Department of History, 1974); Christopher Malone, *La Politique québécoise en matière de relations internationales, changement et continuité, 1960-1972*, M.A. thesis (University of Ottawa, 1974); Jacques Fillion, *De Gaulle: son image du système international et des relations France-Canada-Québec*, M.A. thesis (University of Ottawa, Department of Political Science, 1974); Luc Roussel, *Les Relations culturelles du Québec avec la France, 1920-1965*, unpublished dissertation (Université Laval, Department of History, 1983).

the events of July 1967 in *Les trois derniers chagrins du général de Gaulle* is frequently cited in the literature.¹¹

These works have served as part of the foundation of larger biographical works of the persons involved which have furthered our understanding of the triangular relations, including Jean Lacouture's biography of de Gaulle and John English's study of Pearson. Of similar interest are the discussions in surveys of the period in which triangular tensions were most pronounced, including John Hilliker and Donald Barry's work on Canada's Department of External Affairs after the Second World War to the close of the 1960s, and J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell's examination of foreign policy under Pierre Trudeau. Maurice Vaïsse has also devoted a chapter to the triangular relations in his account of de Gaulle's foreign policy.¹² There has, moreover, been valuable exchange between historians and international relations scholars, with triangular relations explored in *Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale*, edited by Paul Painchaud, and in the examination of the international activities of sub-national entities co-edited by Ivo. D. Duchacek, Daniel Latouche and Garth Stevenson. Triangular tensions are the subject of John P.

¹¹ Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981); Sylvie Guillaume and Pierre Guillaume, *Paris-Québec-Ottawa: Un ménage à trois* (Éditions Entente, 1987); Anne Rouanet and Pierre Rouanet, *Les trois derniers chagrins du Général de Gaulle* (Grasset, 1980); Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988).

¹² Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970*, (Harper Collins, 1991); John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992); John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, vol. II, Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995); J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (University of Toronto Press, 1990); Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Fayard, 1998), 648-670.

Schlegel's discussion of Ottawa's response to the 1968 "Gabon Affair," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*.¹³

The renewed constitutional crisis triggered by the ill-fated Meech Lake Accord, which culminated in the Quebec referendum on sovereignty in 1995, led to a second generation of works on the Canada-Quebec-France triangle. These included J.F. Boshier's provocative and polemical *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997*, and Frédéric Bastien's work on France-Quebec links in *Relations particulières: la France face au Québec après de Gaulle*. A colloquium marking the fortieth anniversary of the official France-Quebec rapprochement was the occasion for Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier's study of the group of French parliamentarians, diplomats and civil servants who made up the "Quebec lobby." Robin Gendron has widened the geographic scope, examining triangular relations in the context of the emergence and institutionalization of the Francophonie.¹⁴

Inevitably, the historiography has been shaped by the authors' beliefs and the political climate in which their works were produced. The literature has thus been

¹³ *Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale*, Paul Painchaud ed. (Presses de l'Université de Québec, 1977); Ivo D. Duchacek, Daniel Latouche, and Garth Stevenson, *Perforated Sovereignities and International Relations, Trans-sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments* (Greenwood Press, 1988); John P. Schlegel, "Containing Quebec Abroad: The Gabon Incident, 1968," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, John Kirton and Don Munton, eds. (Prentice-Hall, 1992). Other works include Anne-marie Jacomy-Millette, "Les activités internationales des provinces canadiennes," in *De Mackenzie King à Pierre Trudeau: Quarante ans de diplomatie canadienne/From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau: Forty Years of Canadian Diplomacy*, Paul Painchaud, ed. (Les Presses de l'université Laval, 1989); Louis Balthazar's "Quebec's International Relations: A Response to Needs and Necessities," in *Foreign Relations and Federal States*, Brian Hocking, ed. (Leicester University Press, 1993), and most recently, the *Histoire des relations internationales du Québec*, Stéphane Paquin ed., in cooperation with Louise Beaudoin (VLB éditeur, 2006).

¹⁴ J.F. Boshier, *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999); Frédéric Bastien, *Relations particulières: La France face au Québec après De Gaulle* (Boréal, 1999), and by the same author, *Le poids de la coopération: le rapport France-Québec* (Québec-Amérique, 2006); Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier, *Le Lobby du Québec à Paris: Les Précurseurs du Général de Gaulle* (Québec-Amérique, 2002); Robin Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community, Canada's Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).

marked profoundly by the Gaullist legacy, Quebec's *question nationale* and its implications for Canada's future. There exists a cleavage between francophone and anglophone accounts, and the spectrum of interpretation ranges from a resolute Gaullist or Quebec nationalism, to that of an avowedly anti-Gaullist, federalist, and Canadian nationalist position. A consequence of these linguistic and political cleavages has been parochial, even Manichean analyses, with francophone works tending to focus on the Paris-Quebec City axis and the question of Quebec's political future, and the anglophone literature providing greater emphasis on the Ottawa-Paris dimension and federal efforts to contend with the apparent threat to Canadian unity that Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalism posed.¹⁵

These cleavages, beyond being reflected in the subject matter emphasized, have been apparent in the sources (or lack thereof) employed. Thomson's *Vive le Québec Libre!* cites few archival records beyond the Second World War period, and these are limited to federal ones. Boshier's *The Gaullist Attack on Canada* relies almost entirely on one archival source: the papers of Marcel Cadieux, Under-

¹⁵ Not surprisingly, Gaullist and Quebec nationalist accounts are predominant in the francophone historiography. The works of de Menthon (1979), Mallen (1978; 1979), Rouanet and Rouanet (1980), and Peyrefitte (2000) are written from an avowedly pro-Gaullist perspective sympathetic to the cause of Quebec independence. In terms of Quebec works, the nationalist perspective is especially pronounced in Morin (1987) and Bastien's accounts (1999; 2006). Conversely, the federalist perspective permeates anglophone accounts. Thomson (1988), written in the years after the 1980 sovereignty-association referendum, the battles over the patriation of the Canadian constitution, and the relatively harmonious triangular relations that accompanied the holding of the first *Francophonie* summit in 1986, approaches the subject matter from a less polemical, moderate federalist perspective. The most avowedly federalist and anti-Gaullist analysis is contained in Boshier (1999). Written after the 1995 referendum when a third referendum, this one leading to Quebec sovereignty, appeared imminent, Boshier's work takes a decidedly hostile view of France-Quebec relations and, notwithstanding the title, devotes considerable attention to pre-1967 events in arguing Canada has been the target of a sustained and concerted Gaullist offensive since the early 1960s. Anti-Gaullist and anti-separatist, Boshier often descends into polemic, expressing frustration that the Canadian government has been unwilling and unable to respond effectively (i.e. strongly) to the linked Gaullist and Quebec nationalist threats. Frédéric Zoogones has provided a rarity in the francophone literature: an exploration, albeit limited in scope, of the federal perspective in the triangular tensions. Frédéric Zoogones, "Les relations France-Canada-Québec: Ottawa face à l'émergence internationale du Québec (1963-1968)," *Bulletin d'histoire politique* 2003, 11(3): 152-166.

secretary of State of Canada's Department of External Affairs (DEA) in the 1960s. Boshier's account provides some insight into the decision-making process in Ottawa, but the overall result is a distorted analysis that often verges on a hagiography of Cadieux, as Boshier adopts the DEA official's perspective. Similarly, Bastien's accounts are based almost exclusively on French and Quebec archival sources, with the federal archives all but ignored. This is also the weakness of Sylvain Larose's account of the establishment and early years of Quebec's Delegation-General in Paris.¹⁶ The selective use of archival sources and a heavy reliance on the memoirs of the personalities involved has tended to reproduce the mythology surrounding the triangular tensions of the 1960s, with the author's political agenda too often interfering with the analysis.

To the extent there exists a theme running through this disparate historiography, it is the figure of de Gaulle, who casts a figurative shadow over the literature as lengthy as the one he did in real life. Heavily focused on the French leader's actions and personality, a surfeit of attention is given to the minutiae surrounding his 1967 visit, what he intended by his Montreal remarks, and the extent to which these were premeditated. A preoccupation with the events of July 1967 tends to reduce actors other than the French leader to the role of passive observers, and obscures the broader national and international trends at play, precluding a broader and arguably more significant analysis. The fifteen years after the Second World War for example, which included the lifespan of the French Fourth Republic, have generally been ignored or given only cursory attention since de Gaulle did not

¹⁶ Sylvain Larose, *La création de la délégation générale du Québec à Paris (1958-1964)*, M.A. thesis (Université du Québec à Montréal, Department of History, 2000).

hold office during most of the period; instead, a focus on the dramatic events of the war years and the 1960s has limited discussion to a superficial chronicling of official visits between the two countries. Consequently, the triangular tensions appear to erupt almost spontaneously, with scant reference to their domestic and international context. Ironically, this “de Gaulle-centric analysis,” taken to its logical conclusion relegates the French leader’s *cri du balcon* to a dramatic but historic footnote.¹⁷

The de Gaulle-centric analysis has also contributed to another weakness of the historiography: a disproportionate emphasis on the political aspects of the triangular relationship. Encouraged by the dramatic nature of events and the Gaullist political phenomenon, there has been a preoccupation with the intergovernmental relations and diplomacy of the period, notably in attempts to assess the reasons for de Gaulle’s actions and Canada’s responses. This has led to a neglect of factors at the sub-state level and pre-1960 relations, a result compounded by a partisan concentration on post-1960 events.¹⁸ As a number of Quebec historians have suggested, however, pre-

¹⁷ Perhaps the best examples of this are Thomson (1988), which after exploring the war years, jumps immediately to the 1960s, with only passing references to the 1946-1958 period. Lescop (1981) is not much better in this regard given its similar preoccupation with de Gaulle’s visit. At times, the results verge on the outlandish: Rouanet and Rouanet (1980) devote ten pages in explaining how de Gaulle found his way to the balcony of Montreal’s City Hall, and how the microphone he used for his remarks was waiting (and plugged in!) for him. Similarly problematic is Boshier (1999), which despite its preoccupation with post-1967 events, fixates on de Gaulle and his loyal followers. Also, Frédéric Dupuis, “De Gaulle et l’Amérique des Deux Nations,” *Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique* 1997, 111(2): 165-180; Charles Halary, Charles de Gaulle et le Québec, 1967-1997, un éloignement littéraire instructif,” *Bulletin d’histoire politique* 1997, 5(3): 42-61. For discussions of wartime relations, see Éric Amyot, *Le Québec entre Pétain et de Gaulle: Vichy, la France libre et les Canadiens français, 1940-1945* (Fides 1999); Paul M. Couture, *The Politics of Diplomacy: The Crisis in Canada-France Relations, 1940-1942*, unpublished dissertation (York University, Department of History, 1981); J.F. Hilliker, “The Canadian Government and the Free French: Perceptions and Constraints 1940-44,” *International History Review* January 1980 2(1): 87-108. There are of course exceptions to this de Gaulle-centric analysis, including Gendron (2006), and Roussel (1983).

¹⁸ For example, Bastien (1999); Black (1999); Thomson (1988); Fontaine (1977); Robert H. Keyserlingk, “France and Quebec: The Psychological Basis for their Cooperation,” *Queen’s Quarterly* 1968, 75(1): 21-32. In this regard, see Robert Dean, “Commentary: Tradition, Cause and Effect, and the Cultural History of International Relations,” *Diplomatic History* Fall 2000, 24(4): 621-622. Dean describes the traditional approach as tending to be written from inside the cultural assumptions that

1960 Quebec was far more complex than it often is portrayed in the historiography of the triangular tensions, not least in terms of its attitudes toward France. External influences (including those of France) presaged the Quiet Revolution and were instrumental in Quebec's development, and are critical to understanding the triangular dynamic.¹⁹

These deficiencies suggest the advantage of the “new diplomatic history” that has emerged over the past quarter-century, originally focused on US foreign relations history. The new diplomatic history has its origins in globalization, and situates American history in a larger transnational or international context, a trend similarly encouraged by the rise of social and cultural history and postmodernism. The new diplomatic history engages with the question of “strategic” or “national” interests of states that are the stuff of “high politics” and the preoccupation of the traditional diplomatic historian. It also acknowledges the importance of the state and of intergovernmental relations; however, consistent with its greater openness to developments in other historical sub-disciplines, new diplomatic history takes a broader perspective. It recognizes and explores the role of sub-state actors, including sub-national governments, non-governmental organizations, and questions of ethnicity, culture, class, gender, and religion. It also pays greater heed to

structured the systems of power under analysis (i.e. in defence of a status quo), whereas cultural inquiries have generally emerged from outside, or in opposition to, governing assumptions.

¹⁹ Yvan Lamonde, *Allégeances et dépendances, L'histoire d'une ambivalence identitaire* (Éditions Nota bene, 2001); Gérard Bouchard, *Entre l'Ancien et le Nouveau Monde, Le Québec comme population neuve et culture fondatrice* (University of Ottawa Press, 1996); Philippe Prévost, *La France et le Canada: D'une Après-guerre à l'autre, 1918-1944* (Les Éditions du Blé, 1994); Michael Oliver, *The Passionate Debate: The Social and Political Ideas of Quebec Nationalism, 1920-1945* (Véhicule Press, 1991); Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985); Pierre Savard, “Les Canadiens français et la France de la ‘cession’ à la ‘révolution tranquille’,” in *Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale*, Paul Painchaud, ed. (Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1977).

transnational factors such as capital movements, technology transfers, cultural exchanges, and the flow of ideas.²⁰ Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman has argued that the new diplomatic history, in supplementing rather than supplanting traditional diplomatic history, encourages a multiarchival, multinational approach, one which listens to the voices of the actors on all sides, recognizes that governments are not monolithic entities, and draws on sources from outside or on the margins of government, acknowledging the fact that much “diplomacy” is not carried out by diplomats.²¹

The cultural turn has figured prominently in the new diplomatic history. Akira Iriye has been at the forefront of those arguing the value of cultural analyses in the history of international relations, paying attention to how communication within and among nations, notably the “sharing and transmission of memory, ideology, emotions, life-styles, scholarly and artistic works and other symbols.” Iriye has referred to a “cultural foundations” approach to the history of international relations built on the fundamental proposition that a nation is a cultural definition as much as a power and economic system. Acknowledging this permits broader inquiries of governmental behaviour and attitudes. Iriye has also noted the value in this regard of the “cultural exchange” approach that has as its object of inquiry the linkages between individuals – their associations, the material goods they produce, and the ideas they generate, in the private, semi-public, and public spheres.²²

²⁰ Michael J. Hogan, “The ‘Next Big Thing’: The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age,” *Diplomatic History* 2004, 28(1): 5-16; Dean (2000), 615-616.

²¹ Elizabeth Cobbs-Hoffman, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a Global American History,” *Diplomatic History* 1997 21(4): 499-518.

²² Akira Iriye, “Culture,” in “A Round Table: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations,” *The Journal of American History* June 1990, 77(1): 99-104. An excellent example of the “cultural

This cultural aspect makes the new diplomatic history an especially promising analytical framework for examining the triangular tensions, given the importance of the cultural dimension in their emergence and manifestation. This is all the more important since, with the exception of Luc Roussel's *Les Relations culturelles du Québec avec la France, 1920-1965* and Nathalie François-Richard's *La France et le Québec, 1945-1967 dans les archives du MAE*, culture has generally been neglected in the historiography. Part of the reason for this lacuna has been the emphasis on the political dimension of events, which has led to cultural aspects being taken for granted or ignored. It has also arisen from a preoccupation with the period of the Quiet Revolution; a number of works have accorded little attention to the cultural dimension of pre-1960 triangular relations owing to the presumed predominance in Quebec of traditional nationalism with its ambivalence toward France. Yet it is arguably in the cultural domain that triangular relations underwent their most substantive change during the fifteen years following the Second World War.²³ Equally significant, the cultural dimension draws attention to what arguably is the

exchanges" approach is Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998).

²³ Roussel (1983); Nathalie François-Richard, *La France et le Québec, 1945-1967 dans les archives du MAE*, unpublished dissertation (Université de Paris-VII, 1998). Even at this, Roussel's work was written when the MAE records were still unavailable; conversely, Richard's work is based principally on these French sources. Lescop (1981) offers a brief discussion of the post-war growth of cultural exchanges, but the focus remains on the formal cultural relations of the 1960s. Guillaume and Guillaume (1987) argue Quebec and France grew further estranged during the Duplessis era. While perhaps true at the public level, the argument does not hold at the private and semi-private level, especially in terms of cultural relations. Thomson (1988) refers to an increasing interest among French Canadians for France in the post-war period due to advances in communications and economic prosperity, but offers neither details nor evidence to support this claim. Boshier (1999) acknowledges the proliferation of cultural exchanges; however, the analysis is refracted through the prism of his argument regarding a Gaullist imperialist conspiracy instead of seeing the phenomenon as a manifestation of the post-1945 growth of transnational exchanges, with his work too often intimating that all cultural links were politically-motivated (i.e. malevolent). Donald N. Baker's "Quebec on French Minds" *Queen's Quarterly* 1978, 85(2): 249-265 is an exception in the historiography, with its references to notions of cultural solidarity between France and Quebec as part of Baker's explanation of the France-Quebec rapprochement. Also in this regard, see Keyserlingk (1968).

elephant in the corner of triangular relations – the preponderance of US power, especially in terms of cultural influence – with which all three points of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle had to contend.²⁴

The cultural lacuna of the triangular tensions and the preponderant US influence is linked closely to a similar weakness in the historiography regarding economic relations. This weakness has been encouraged by the consistently limited nature of the Canada-France economic relationship, which has encouraged historians to focus their energies elsewhere. Discussion of economic relations is confined chiefly to the 1960s. Accounts of Canada-France economic links in the post-1945 period are found mainly in the francophone literature, and little effort has been made to examine the links between these relations and the ensuing triangular tensions.²⁵

Once again drawing upon Saint-Exupéry's words, what follows is my modest effort "to place one's stone ... to building the world" of historical literature of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle, its components' interwoven evolutions, and the broader development of international relations. After the passing of more than four

²⁴ José Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-1971* (UBC Press, 2006); Yvan Lamonde and Gérard Bouchard, *Québécois et Américains, La culture québécoise aux XIXe et XXe siècles* (Fides, 1995); Lamonde (2001); Philippe Roger, *The American Enemy: A Story of French Anti-Americanism*, translated by Sharon Bowman (University of Chicago Press, 2005).

²⁵ There is only minimal reference to pre-1960 economic relations in Thomson (1988), Boshier (1999), Lescop (1981), and Guillaume and Guillaume (1988). Prévost (1994) contains a significant economic component, but the work only discusses events up to the immediate post-1945 period. Jean Vinant, *De Jacques Cartier à Péchiney: Histoire de la coopération économique franco-canadienne* (Chotard et associés, 1985) provides a survey of economic exchanges but little analysis. France-Quebec economic cooperation is discussed in Gaston Cholette, *La coopération économique franco-québécoise, De 1961 à 1997* (Les presses de l'Université Laval 1998), but the author was one of the principal Quebec actors involved, which distorts the analysis. Unilingual anglophone readers are obliged to glean what they can from works on the larger history of Canadian foreign economic policy, such as B.W. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European Option*, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), and by the same author, *Dancing Around the Elephant: Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973* (University of Toronto Press, 2007). Of interest as well is Michael Hart, *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization* (UBC Press, 2002).

decades since the *cri du balcon*, it is opportune to return to – or in many cases examine for the first time – the primary sources available in the French, Quebec and Canadian archives to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the interacting motivations and actions of all three components of the triangle. What is required is an account that acknowledges not only what divided Canada, Quebec, and France, but what they shared in common, and that demonstrates that the tensions were not idiosyncratic, but rather, were situated in a larger international and transnational narrative regarding the rise of globalization.

With these ambitions in mind, this dissertation draws on the new diplomatic history, and works from the linked presumptions that “national” histories as such can only be written effectively if one pays heed to the impact of global forces upon them, and that exploring the history of globalization compels an examining of developments at the state and sub-state levels, to understand their broader impact and implications.²⁶ This approach acknowledges the significant role de Gaulle played in the events in question, but situates his actions in a broader analytical framework. It moves beyond personality to pay closer attention to the structural context of which de Gaulle and other actors were so much a product, and in which they operated. The approach transcends the national arena, arguing that the dramatic events of the 1960s did not simply arise from endogenous factors in one or more points of the triangle, but were the result of these factors intersecting with more profound international trends. The proposed analytic framework thus addresses the lacunas in the literature, shifting the

²⁶ Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye, “Introduction,” *The Global History Reader*, Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye, eds. (Routledge, 2005), 3; Hogan (2004); Bruce Mazlish, “Comparing Global History to World History,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Winter 1998, 28(3): 385-391; Cobbs-Hoffman (1997); Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” *International Organization* Autumn 1978, 32(4): 881-912.

emphasis away from de Gaulle and the national arena, to focus on the cultural and economic dimensions of triangular relations, and explore how these dimensions interacted with the broader political context.²⁷

To accomplish this task, the thesis brings the extensive archival records that exist in all three points of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle into conversation to an unprecedented degree. These include the French presidential papers, notably those of de Gaulle and his successor, Georges Pompidou. The rich holdings of France's *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, which include the records generated by the Foreign Minister's office, provide important insight into French bureaucratic politics. In Canada, the research has been informed by the considerable files of the Department of External Affairs, many obtained through the *Access to Information Act*. The Quebec archives also yielded a bountiful array of records. In addition to the numerous governmental sources, notably those of the *Ministère des affaires intergouvernementales*, this work benefits from the information gleaned from the private papers of numerous senior Quebec participants involved in the events of the 1960s. The research in Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec City permits a more nuanced understanding of the intergovernmental rivalry in Canada that accompanied the triangular tensions.

This "return to the sources" permits us to view de Gaulle's *cri du balcon* in a new light, unpacking the mythology surrounding this admittedly significant event – arguably the most dramatic and enduring symbol of the triangular relationship – to reveal what insights it and the tensions of the 1960s provides into the history of international relations and the histories of Canada, Quebec, and France. The

²⁷ Mazlish and Iriye (2005), 11.

evolution of triangular relations entailed far more than questions of personality; as important as these may have been, the evolution was shaped by structural international realities and the efforts at the state and sub-state level to come to terms with them. This dissertation argues that the evolution of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle after the Second World War and the tensions of the 1960s are best understood as arising from clashing nationalist responses that were conditioned by domestic circumstances intersecting with post-war international realities, notably the acceleration of transnational exchanges and economic interdependence that accompanied preponderant US power in the West. This was in keeping with a broader paradox at the heart of twentieth century international relations: that the proliferation of exchanges transcending the state and nations occurred parallel to the belief that “nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value of our time.”²⁸

These nationalist responses were central to the development of Canada-France relations in the fifteen years after the Second World War that are examined in the first half of the dissertation. Although the two countries each emerged from the war confronting a unique set of domestic and international challenges, Ottawa and Paris shared a need to respond to preponderant American influence. For a time, there appeared the potential for a more substantive relationship following the two capitals’ embracing an Atlanticist foreign policy as a response to Cold War geo-political realities. Atlanticism soon became a source of divergence between Ottawa and Paris, however, as nationalist reactions to the Cold War international system, notably US predominance, pushed them in different directions. The divergence between Canada

²⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (Verso, 1991), 3.

and France was even more apparent in the economic sphere, as Canadian liberal internationalism was frustrated by French protectionism. The regionalization of international trade after 1945 resulted in the relative stagnation of the two countries' economic relationship.

The record was by no means wholly negative. Paradoxically, the international realities fuelling the nationalist responses that undermined the official bilateral relationship also encouraged a rapprochement, especially between France and French Canada. Historically, traditional French-Canadian nationalists had displayed a marked hostility toward *France moderne* by virtue of its post-1789 secular liberalism; instead, they preferred the pre-revolutionary *France éternelle*. The increasing strength of Quebec neo-nationalism after the Second World War, combined with the acceleration of transnational exchanges and economic interdependence, led to greater Quebec appreciation of *France moderne* as an indispensable ally, as an increasingly urbanized and industrialized Quebec strove to preserve its majority francophone identity. The shift in Quebec attitudes regarding France was welcomed in Paris, which sought expanded relations to ensure French Canada's cultural survival. More fundamentally, Quebec neo-nationalist preoccupations corresponded to French nationalist apprehensions about the ramifications of American economic and cultural 'imperialism.'

These French and Quebec nationalist reactions were in increasing contact after 1945. This was apparent in the economic sphere, where the *relative* stagnation of Canada-France economic relations was accompanied by an *absolute* growth of exchanges, especially between France and Quebec. While liberal economic policies

in Canada and a bounded liberal approach in France meant the two countries were oriented toward their continental markets, the growth of transnational exchanges fed nationalist interest in France-Quebec cooperation to address US economic influence and reconcile modernization with the preservation of cultural specificity.

Cultural exchanges also grew and evolved, consistent with the larger global phenomenon. Quebec's socio-cultural transformation led to a proliferation of contacts with *France moderne*, eclipsing those that the traditional nationalists had maintained with *France éternelle*. The increased Quebec openness toward *France moderne* did not mean that contacts were free of controversy. Indeed, consistent with the ascendance of Quebec neo-nationalism, there were growing Quebec demands for French recognition of French Canada as an equal partner and producer of francophone culture, with a unique contribution shaped by its North American identity.

Notwithstanding the admitted complexities of France-Quebec relations, the unmistakable trend was toward increased cultural contacts between France and Canada and growing interest in cooperation, encouraged to a significant extent by apprehensions on both sides of the Atlantic about US cultural power. In addition to the nationalist concerns in France and Quebec about "Americanization," English-Canadian nationalists were preoccupied with American influences on the Canadian identity. The result was a growing politicization of culture as governments in all points of the triangle moved to support and protect the national culture in the face of transnational (i.e. American) influences. Defining borders bred conflict. The dynamic set off an increasingly rancorous intergovernmental dispute in Canada as the

francophone and anglophone reactions collided, exacerbating latent tensions about Canada's constitution and the relationship between its two principal linguistic communities. France was increasingly drawn into the fray and the stage was set for triangular relations and tensions.

The second half of the dissertation explores the evolution of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle in the 1960s. The concern to protect and promote Canada's *fait français* and ensure the international *rayonnement* of French culture encouraged notions of France-Quebec solidarity and efforts to give this tangible substance and form. As a consequence, Ottawa found itself increasingly marginalized, despite growing English-Canadian appreciation of French Canada as a shield against Americanization, and federal efforts to breathe new life into relations with France to respond to Quebec's Quiet Revolution and to serve as a counterweight to US influence.

The question of Quebec's political future played a crucial role in the evolving triangular dynamic. The acceleration of Quebec's political life attracted France's attention, conditioned by its post-war experience of decolonization and the priority Gaullism accorded national independence. Consequently, the French interpretation of events in Canada was that Quebec was determined to achieve a new political status, ranging from a special status within a reformed federal Canada to outright independence. Paris thus adopted an increasingly supportive position in expectation of this inevitable development, encouraging Quebec's cultural, economic, and political *épanouissement*, and eventually pushing Quebec toward independence.

Up to a point, Quebec City welcomed French actions. After all, they provided useful leverage in its negotiations with Ottawa over the federal system. The focus of this struggle was the constitutional responsibility for Canada's foreign affairs. The dispute was fuelled by the absence in the Canadian constitution of a formal assignment of competence for the conduct of foreign affairs, except for a defunct provision that had permitted Ottawa to implement British Empire-signed treaties. Quebec neo-nationalist ambitions, the latent Quebec concern to protect against federal encroachment on provincial jurisdiction, and the increasingly vocal neo-nationalist condemnation of the "Anglo-centric" nature of Canadian foreign policy, provoked the avowed assertion of Quebec City's capacity to act internationally as French Canada's spokesperson.

After the *cri du balcon*, however, Quebec City began to display a certain reticence, indicative of the fact that if there was a complementarity between Gaullism and Quebec neo-nationalism, these were by no means synonymous, and that each reaction was to an extent using the other to advance its own political agenda. Indeed, if Quebec City was pleased to have French support, particularly that of de Gaulle, as it strove to achieve greater autonomy within Canada, it was also increasingly concerned that events were escaping its control and that Quebec was becoming a political object as the Gaullist and Quebec nationalist reactions appeared more and more to be talking past one another.

The federal reaction during this period was one of mounting concern over the implications for Canada's unity of the strengthening ties between Quebec and Gaullist nationalism. Ottawa's frustrating task was to confront Paris without

reinforcing Paris' cooperation with Quebec City in a way inimical to the federal position and national unity. Ottawa's response to events was thus confused, exacerbated by its having to contend with a moving target as the internal challenge of Quebec neo-nationalism and the external challenge of Gaullist nationalism progressively moved the bar. This response was further weakened by a federal tendency to focus on Quebec, and to fixate on de Gaulle. The widening divergence between Ottawa and Paris over Atlanticism was another complicating factor. Ottawa, motivated by an array of not necessarily consistent domestic and external considerations, strove to act as a linchpin between France and its North Atlantic allies. The effort had the perverse effect of confirming the Gaullist perception of Canada's satellization, providing the geo-political rationale for Paris' "Quebec policy."

These mutually-reinforcing motivations – ethno-cultural, political, and geo-political, in combination with Canadian constitutional ambiguities, produced the triangular relations. The convergence of Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalism led to the France-Quebec *retrouvailles* and the gradual emergence of a special (and increasingly direct) relationship. Ottawa's initial accommodation to the Quiet Revolution's international imperatives was followed quickly by federal attempts to give greater substance to Canada-France relations. These efforts fanned the flames of the rivalry between Ottawa and Quebec City, and spurred Paris and Quebec City's efforts to strengthen links. Tensions mounted throughout the 1960s as federal sensitivity grew over Quebec's international activity and Paris' increasingly over support of Quebec's position.

The triangular dynamic was manifest in the economic sphere as all three nationalist reactions (with different goals in mind) sought to overcome the structure of the economic relationship between France and Canada, and challenge the regionalization of international trade accompanying the efforts to establish a liberalized international trading regime. Although economic aspirations were a driving force behind the France-Quebec rapprochement, the pursuit of cooperation exposed a fault line in the triangular dynamic: Canada's economic "satellization" was also Quebec's problem, tied as it was to the North American economy.

It was in the cultural sphere that triangular relations were most evident, a logical result given that the question of French Canada's survival as a viable cultural entity went to the heart of the Quiet Revolution. The Ottawa-Quebec rivalry over control of foreign affairs, the latent constitutional dispute over cultural affairs in Canada's federal system, and the broader issue of responsibility for the protection and promotion of Canada's *fait français* combined to spark a race for cultural agreements with Paris. Quebec sought to protect its cultural autonomy – especially in education – from federal encroachments, and Ottawa strove to maintain its primacy in foreign affairs. The *de facto* direct, privileged France-Quebec relations that resulted from these agreements expanded over the latter half of the 1960s and were a primacy source of confrontation.

Triangular tensions were at a fever pitch and the stage set for confrontation by the time of de Gaulle's 1967 visit, which ushered in the acute phase of triangular relations. Following the dramatic events of that summer, Paris and Quebec City moved to strengthen their relationship and cooperated to achieve a distinct Quebec

participation in the *Francophonie*, consistent with de Gaulle's deliberate policy of encouraging the establishment of a separate Quebec international personality as a means to hasten its independence. Ottawa struggled to respond to what it considered a fundamental challenge from within and without to its constitutional prerogatives and Canadian unity, meeting only mixed success. Ultimately, it was less the efficacy of Ottawa's response than changes in Paris and Quebec City that were crucial to the passing of the acute crisis phase of triangular relations. Even at this, examination of triangular relations after de Gaulle had left the political stage and in the context of the emergence of the *Francophonie* demonstrates that special France-Quebec relations and the broader triangular dynamic were set to continue, a situation owing not least to the interacting domestic and international conditions from which these had arisen were enduring, suggesting that the normalization of relations in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle promised to be long and arduous. All of this suggests the value in bringing new light to bear on the subject matter by moving it out of the shadow cast by the General.

Chapter 2

Atlanticism in Common: France-Canada Relations, 1944-1954

The Normandy village of Courseulles-sur-Mer lies at the centre of what on June 6, 1944 was Juno Beach, the Canadian sector of Operation *Overlord*. If there is a place embodying Franco-Canadian friendship, it is this locale where days after the Allied landings, General Charles de Gaulle returned to the France he had escaped from four years earlier. Emblematic of the change that the war had wrought on Canada-France relations, the Free French leader was greeted by Canadian soldiers upon arriving.¹ Both countries now figured more prominently in each other's foreign policy calculations. As the war ended, their bilateral relationship appeared poised to enter a new phase.

This chapter examines the political dimension of this relationship in the period from France's Liberation to the 1954 failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty. During the decade following the Second World War, Canada-France relations were shaped by the French and Canadian foreign policy responses to the Cold War and the preponderance of American power. Bilateral contact and cooperation were greater than ever in the decade following the Second World War, due (somewhat contradictorily) to Paris and Ottawa's collaboration in multilateral forums, and a common adherence to Atlanticism. Each capital regarded the other as a

¹ DEA, G-2, v. 5692, 1-A(s), p. 4 – Letter from Office of the Representative of Canada to the French Committee of National Liberation, Algiers, to DEA, 27 June 1944. For discussion of the two countries' wartime relations, see Éric Amyot's *Le Québec entre Pétain et De Gaulle* (Fides 1999), Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec Libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 30-80, Paul M. Couture, *The Politics of Diplomacy: The Crisis in Canada-France Relations*, unpublished dissertation (York University, Department of History, 1982); J.F. Hilliker, "The Canadian Government and the Free French: Perceptions and Constraints 1940-44," *International History Review* January 1980 2(1): 87-108.

useful and necessary ally in their pursuit of foreign policy goals and the maintenance of their international position. While Atlanticism appeared initially an opportunity to develop bilateral relations, however, Paris and Ottawa viewed the post-war challenge through separate prisms, and thus embraced Atlanticism with different expectations. By the end of 1954 and the controversy of the EDC Treaty, the discrepancy between the Canadian and French understandings of Atlanticism had led to it becoming a source of discord. Paris, contending with the challenges of a reduced international stature and decolonization, chafed under Atlanticism's constraints; Ottawa, mindful of its need for a counterweight to US influence, strove to act as a linchpin and reconcile France and NATO.

New Beginnings

Facing the post-war era, Ottawa and Paris both believed their strengthened wartime links could be expanded and employed to mutual benefit. De Gaulle visited Canada for the first time in July 1944, prior to Ottawa's official recognition of the *Gouvernement provisoire de la République Française* (GPRF). The General's briefing notes described Canada as an interpreter between Europe and North America by virtue of geography, and between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin worlds owing to its ethnic origins.² De Gaulle was enthusiastic about the reception he received, particularly in Ottawa where he was accorded the honours due a head of state.³ Ottawa and Paris' symbolic elevation of their diplomatic missions to full embassies shortly after Canada recognized the GPRF in October 1944 reflected the growing importance both capitals assigned to the bilateral relationship. The DEA's concern

² ANF, 3AG1/259/1 – Aide Mémoire pour le Voyage du Général de Gaulle.

³ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-E(s), Report from Vanier to SSEA, 18 July 1944.

that Canada's ambassador, Georges Vanier, should present his credentials as quickly as possible to ensure Canada's precedence on the diplomatic list was clear proof of Canada's desire for closer cooperation.⁴

De Gaulle made a second trip to Canada in 1945. France's ambassador to Ottawa, Jean de Hauteclocque, recommended the visit arguing it would strengthen relations and offer political assistance to the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, described as a friend of France.⁵ The General's remarks at an Ottawa press conference reflected the potential for more substantive links:

Je suis persuadé que la place que vous occupez maintenant dans le monde et qui se développe tous les jours, justifie de la façon la plus large un resserrement et un développement des relations franco-canadiennes. ... Il n'y a entre nous aucune espèce d'intérêts qui nous oppose, il y a au contraire des intérêts rapprochés. Je ne parle pas seulement de l'intérêt historique et des raisons de sentiments qui nous unissent d'amitié, mais je parle du fait de votre propre développement et de l'intérêt qu'il y a ce que deux pays comme le Canada et la France agissent ensemble dans toute la mesure où ils le pourront. ... je crois pouvoir dire que nous sommes aujourd'hui au commencement d'un vaste développement des relations franco-canadiennes pour le bien de tout le monde.⁶

Ottawa's new appreciation of France stemmed from a recognition of France's centrality to the post-1945 settlement,⁷ notably the French role in a restored European counterweight to US influence. This included Paris' support of Canada's "middle power" status, accompanied by a belief that what was viewed as Ottawa's traditional "linchpin" function between the UK and US could be expanded into an intermediary role between France and the Anglo-Americans. Prior to de Gaulle's 1944 visit, DEA

⁴ DEA, A-3-b, v. 2704, 31-T-40, Memorandum from Wrong to the Undersecretary, 24 October 1944.

⁵ DDF, 1945, v. I – Document 441, Télégramme de M. de Hauteclocque, Ambassadeur de France à Ottawa, à M. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 18 juin 1945.

⁶ MAE, v. 43 – Service d'Information Français, Conférence de Presse du Général de Gaulle, 29 August 1945. There was potential for de Gaulle to have had a more extended stay in Canada. Amid a French ministerial crisis in November 1945, he enquired whether Ottawa would object to his going to Canada as a private citizen in the event he failed to form a government. Ottawa agreed without hesitation, although nothing came of it. DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-E-1(s) – Telegram from Vanier to SSEA, 20 November 1945; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-E-1(s) – Telegram from SSEA to Vanier, 20 November 1945.

⁷ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5724, 7-CS(s) – Supplementary Note on Yalta Commentary, 11 May 1945.

officials advised King to invite him to Canada given that Washington's invitation to the French leader had not been particularly gracious, and that such a gesture would help smooth relations between France and its allies.⁸

French diplomats noted their country's enhanced stature in Ottawa, citing remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, in his 1947 Grey Lecture at the University of Toronto, considered the most comprehensive declaration of Canada's post-war foreign policy:

Nos relations avec la France découlent de principes qui se dégagent nettement de notre histoire. Nous n'avons jamais oublié que la France demeure une source de notre culture. Nous nous rendons compte qu'elle constitue un élément indispensable de notre vie internationale. [...] Le Canada a toujours cru à la grandeur de la France, même aux jours les plus sombres. Pendant la guerre, nous n'avons jamais douté que la France pût jouer un rôle important dans sa propre libération. Nous avons appuyé les chefs que le peuple français était prêt à suivre. Nous comprenons les lourdes difficultés que lui ont imposées deux invasions au cours d'une génération. Nous lui aiderons à se remettre sur bien non seulement par sympathie, mais parce que sa restauration nous est nécessaire. ...⁹

This was the first time a Canadian external affairs minister expressed the notion of a Canada-France special relationship.¹⁰ St. Laurent repeated the point when he unveiled a plaque commemorating the allies' wartime meetings in Quebec City, affirming that France, in addition to the UK and US, was inseparably bound to Canada's past, present, and future.¹¹

⁸ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-E(s) – Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Robertson, 9 June 1944; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-E(s) – Telegram from Vanier to SSEA, 15 June 1944; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-E(s) – Telegram from SSEA to Vanier, 24 June 1944; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-E(s) – Telegram from Vanier to SSEA, 30 June 1944; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-E(s) – Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Norman Robertson, 1 July 1944. For discussion of US attitudes regarding de Gaulle and this visit, see Raoul Aglion, *Roosevelt and De Gaulle, Allies in Conflict: A Personal Memoir* (The Free Press, 1988), 173-183.

⁹ MAE, v. 34 – Letter from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 17 January 1947, Conférence de M. Saint-Laurent sur les principes de la politique extérieure du Canada.

¹⁰ André Donneur, "Les relations Franco-Canadiennes: Bilan et Perspectives," *Politique Étrangère* 1973, 38(2): 181. Donneur cautions correctly that despite this, France still placed a distant third to the US and UK in Canadian foreign policy priorities.

¹¹ MAE, v. 34 – Letter from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1947, Allocution de M. Saint-Laurent à Québec, le 18 janvier.

Paris recognized Canada's enhanced international stature and capabilities. De Hauteclouque affirmed that Canada could justly claim recognition as a world power by virtue of its war effort, industrial development, agricultural capacity, and the strength of its national sentiment.¹² In perhaps the most comprehensive account of Paris' post-war attitudes regarding Canada, an MAE report prepared in 1949 stressed the country's new importance, arguing this could only increase with immigration and technological advances that would facilitate the exploitation of Canada's natural resources. The report even speculated that Canada could displace the UK as the centre of gravity of the Commonwealth, predicting that

ce vaste territoire, un fois peuplé de façon plus dense, verra se constituer, à une époque qui n'est sans doute pas très éloignée, *une des plus puissantes nations du monde* [emphasis added].¹³

Paris was also impressed by Ottawa's growing international assertiveness and determination to secure its autonomy from the UK and US, including Ottawa's claim it would not be beholden to any Great Powers during negotiations to establish the UN organization at the 1945 San Francisco Conference. French attention was drawn to King's assertions that in pursuing its national interests Canada would increasingly act independently of the Commonwealth, and that although Ottawa had subordinated its wartime interests to London and Washington in deference to the greater allied effort, this was intolerable in peacetime, and Canada's war effort entitled it to participate in

¹² MAE, v. 43 – Revue de l'année 1945, from de Hauteclouque to Bidault.

¹³ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949. France's Ambassador, Francisque Gay, apparently prepared this report at the end of his mission in Canada. His time in and enthusiasm for Canada is discussed in Pierre Savard, "L'Ambassade de Francisque Gay au Canada en 1948-49," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 1974, 44(1): 5-31.

all aspects of the post-war settlement.¹⁴ An MAE report explained Ottawa's positive disposition toward France as stemming partly from a Canadian concern to counter-balance US influence.¹⁵

Such claims to independence and the pursuit of national interests resonated in Gaullist ears. De Gaulle recalled being convinced that French colonizing efforts in Canada were vindicated by King's analysis during their 1945 talks:

This is our situation: Canada adjoins the United States for over 5,000 km ... It is, besides, a member of the Commonwealth – an occasionally onerous responsibility. But we intend to act in complete independence. We are a nation of unlimited space, endowed with great natural resources. Our ambitions ... are oriented internally. We have no interest in opposing France in any of her fields of action. On the contrary, we have every reason to lend her our good offices to whatever degree that we can.¹⁶

Paris recognized that this increasingly powerful, independent Canada was a useful ally. Claiming British wartime support for the Free French would not have been as constant without Canadian pressure, the French Ambassador, Francisque Gay, described Canada as representing “une certaine influence française” in the Commonwealth that London had to acknowledge, so that Paris could observe and influence Commonwealth policies through Ottawa.¹⁷ De Gaulle's 1945 visit

¹⁴ MAE, v. 37 – Note, MAE, Amérique, 10 March 1945; MAE, v. 34 – Letter from de Hauteclouque, to MAE, Amérique, 6 July 1945, la situation internationale du Canada; MAE, v. 43 – Entretien du Général de Gaulle avec M. Mackenzie King, 29 August 1945; MAE, v. 34 – Telegram from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 18 December 1945; MAE, v. 34 – Letter from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 18 December 1945, visite de M. Mackenzie King en Grande Bretagne et en Europe, 17 décembre 1945.

¹⁵ MAE, v. 43 – Note: L'intérêt que présente le développement des relations franco-canadiens, undated [circa 1946].

¹⁶ Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs, volume III, Salvation, 1944-1946*, translated by Richard Howard (Simon and Schuster, 1960), 245. Also, Philippe de Gaulle, *De Gaulle, mon père, Entretiens avec Michel Tauriac* (Plon 2003), 363. De Gaulle's son describes the French leader and King as enjoying “rapports excellents.”

¹⁷ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949.

stemmed in part from a belief that visiting Canada would send London a reassuring signal amid Anglo-French tensions in the Middle East.¹⁸

French interest in Canada also arose from its perceptions of Ottawa's influence with the US, fuelled by claims such as King's that Canada was able to serve as an intermediary between Paris and Washington.¹⁹ Gay described France's Ottawa Embassy as possessing a unique window on the evolution of American policy, and that by virtue of the closeness of Canada-France relations, Ottawa could, when appropriate, be asked to lobby Washington on Paris' behalf.²⁰

Linked to Ottawa's perceived influence with the Anglo-Americans, Paris considered Canada well-placed to advance French interests in international forums, most notably the UN.²¹ On the eve of King's March 1945 visits to Washington and London, Paris sought to use his influence with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to advance the French position on the new international organization. The MAE instructed de Hauteclocque to emphasize to King the similarity of the French and Canadian positions, and the fact Paris' positions would enhance the influence of middle powers, Ottawa's major concern.²²

At the subsequent San Francisco conference, the French were instrumental in ensuring the success of Ottawa's proposal that the Security Council could not call on a country to contribute to a coercive action if it had not participated in the decision-

¹⁸ DDF, 1945, v. I – Document 441, Télégramme de M. de Hauteclocque, Ambassadeur de France à Ottawa, à M. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 18 juin 1945.

¹⁹ MAE, v. 43 – Note pour le Secrétaire Général, 20 September 1944.

²⁰ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² MAE, v. 37 – Telegram from Dejean, MAE, Amérique, to French Embassy, Ottawa, 6 March 1945. Also, Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations* (UBC Press, 2005), 109-110. A similar message was conveyed to Ambassador Vanier.

making process.²³ Conversely, French officials appreciated Canadian efforts to ensure French membership on the Council, Ottawa's understanding of Paris' concern at being excluded from the Reparations Commission established during the Yalta Conference, and its support of Paris' effort to ensure French was an official language of the new organization.²⁴ This cooperation continued at the UN, with Gay asserting "c'est qu'avec aucune autre nation nous nous sommes trouvés plus habituellement, plus complètement, plus amicalement d'accord", and noting Canada's support could be counted on in the majority of major debates, with its delegation acting increasingly as an intermediary between the French and Anglo-Americans.²⁵

Atlanticism in Common?

The emerging Cold War provided impetus for further cooperation as Ottawa and Paris embraced Atlanticism as a response to the deteriorating international situation, the foremost example of this being their participation in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Reflecting on the negotiations, Ambassador Gay argued that Ottawa had played a major role and been a useful ally in virtually all discussions affecting French interests.²⁶ Gay's appraisal was somewhat overstated; it also failed to acknowledge the differing motivations and expectations underpinning each country's Atlanticism, consistent with John English's observation

²³ MAE, v. 37 – Telegram from Fouques-Duparc, San Francisco, to MAE, Amérique, 19 May 1945.

²⁴ MAE, v. 43 – Note: L'intérêt que présente le développement des relations franco-canadiens, undated [circa 1946].

²⁵ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949; DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from European Division, for the Under-Secretary, 3 November 1949.

²⁶ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949.

that “as with all faiths, the tenets [of Atlanticism] were understood differently by its adherents.”²⁷

French Atlanticism, and thus Paris’ approach to NATO, had a more realist, geo-political base. France’s foremost security concern in the immediate post-war period was German revival, and Paris hoped to regain its international influence by serving as an intermediary between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviet Union. The Moscow-backed coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, together with its growing concern over communist strength in France pushed Paris to shift from quasi-neutralism to a more West-oriented foreign policy. Evidence of France’s shift into the Western camp was its adherence, with the UK and Benelux countries, to the March 1948 Brussels Treaty, a mutual defence pact and, more broadly, an overture to North America for assistance as the Cold War deepened.²⁸

As the negotiations leading to NATO began in mid-1948, Paris’ foremost concern, beyond securing US economic and military aid, and responding to the Soviet threat and related Anglo-American pressures for West German rearmament, was to use the alliance to retain Great Power status. This meant ensuring a French voice in the West’s defence and strategic planning equal to that of the Anglo-Americans’. Paris was equally determined to ensure that any pact contributed to France maintaining control of its overseas possessions, especially in North Africa. This

²⁷ John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 112.

²⁸ For the evolution of French policy toward Atlanticism, see: Charles G. Cogan, *Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO: Then and Now* (Praeger, 1997), 3-90; Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l’OTAN: De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen* (Masson, 1991), 26-38; John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe* (Leicester University Press, 1990); Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1946-1958* (Cambridge University, 1987), 81-94, 112-132; Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945*, translated by Michael Shaw (Continuum, 1980), 179-197.

realist dimension of French Atlanticism was evident in Paris' annoyance at being excluded from the March 1948 preliminary talks between American, British, and Canadian officials owing to US security concerns, and the MAE's preoccupation that the proposed Alliance should adopt a line of defence as far east as possible, thereby increasing French geo-political significance and influence while simultaneously strengthening its security.²⁹

There was, however, a fundamental conflict between Atlanticism and French nationalism. Atlanticism was a weak reed since France could never be pre-eminent, a condition reinforced by the transatlantic affinities founded upon the historic and cultural links between the US, UK and Canada.³⁰ It is not surprising, therefore, that although France boasted staunch Atlanticists such as Robert Monnet and Raymond Aron, there was a sense in Paris shortly after signing the North Atlantic Treaty that France had become "the tail to a kite flown in Washington," and questions as to whether the benefits of NATO membership were outweighed by the liabilities.³¹

²⁹ Cogan (1997), 3-90; John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe* (Leicester University Press 1990), 198-221; Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford University Press, 2003), 27-62; Michael M. Harrison, "French Anti-Americanism under the 4th Republic and the Gaullist Solution," in *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism, a Century of French Perception*, Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie France Toinet, eds., translated by Gerry Turner (St. Martin's Press, 1990), 171.

³⁰ Cogan (1997), 41; Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949* (McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 26-30, 67. Reid, a Canadian diplomat involved in NATO's founding, notes the Anglo-American background of the fifteen core personalities involved in establishing NATO. With the exception of Louis St. Laurent, who had French-Canadian and Irish Catholic origins, these individuals were "members of the group of Protestant British and Protestant Irish origin which at that time dominated national political activities in the United States, Britain and Canada, making it natural for them to become advocates of a North Atlantic alliance of which these countries would be the core." Also, by the same author, "The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance," *International Journal*, 1967 22(3): 433. Reid regretted the alliance was "to so great an extent an Anglo-American concept, an Anglo-American creation," and that Ottawa did not do more to correct this dynamic from the start.

³¹ DEA, G-2, v. 3775, 7839-40, p. 1 – Letter from Paris Embassy, Vanier, to SSEA, 19 May 1950. For a discussion of French Atlanticists, see Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis: Des origines à nos jours* (Éditions de Seuil, 1976), 207.

Canadian Atlanticism, on the other hand, was influenced more heavily by liberal internationalist ideas, arguing strongly for the inclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty's non-military provisions. The debate over Article 2 of the treaty, meant to facilitate economic, cultural, and political cooperation between the signatories, reflected Canadian desires that NATO be more than a military alliance, and that it should promote broader economic and political integration leading to the emergence of a truly 'Atlantic Community'.³² Ottawa's position was expressed by the declaration of its Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, who insisted that beyond a traditional alliance, "[o]ur Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots" to make a positive contribution to the maintenance of peace.³³

Beyond the liberal internationalist motivation, however, a realist, geo-political consideration also figured into Ottawa's lobbying for Article 2, and more generally, Canadian Atlanticism. The war had upset the delicate balance Ottawa sought to maintain between Washington and London; the exponential growth of US power and Britain's accompanying decline pushed Canada into the American orbit.³⁴ Canadian

³² Stéphane Roussel, "'L'instant kantien': La contribution canadienne à la création de la 'Communauté nord-atlantique,' 1947-1949," in *Canada and the Early Cold War/Le Canada au début de la guerre froide, 1943-1957*, Greg Donaghy, ed. (Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1998), 119-156; Reid (1977), 133-142. Reid acknowledges that more realist elements in DEA circles were rather dismissive of the ideas underpinning Article 2, notably Canada's Ambassador in Washington, Hume Wrong, and his second-in-command T.A. Stone. These dissenters were outnumbered, however, by advocates of Article 2 in Ottawa, among these Reid himself, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and the Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent.

³³ Lester B. Pearson, "Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* April 1949, 27(3): 374-378; Lester B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, volume II*, John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1972), 63.

³⁴ This of course had been occurring for some time, and the war accelerated existing trends. For a discussion of the increasingly close ties between Canada and the US, see Jack Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945*, second edition, (University of Toronto Press, 1990), 114-158; B.J.C. McKercher, "World Power and Isolationism: The North Atlantic Triangle and the Crises of the 1930s," in *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956*, B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1996), 110-146; James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, volume 2: Appeasement and Rearmament* (University of Toronto Press, 1965), 176-183.

concerns about the Soviet threat and what this portended for Canada-US relations, and Ottawa's inability to secure a tangible "middle power" status in the UN that it considered the best guarantor of autonomous Canadian international action, encouraged Ottawa to embrace Atlanticism. This response to post-1945 realities appeared the most effective tool available to influence Washington and safeguard Canada's autonomy: NATO would expand Canada's traditional European counterweight from a weakened UK, to include France and the rest of Western Europe, so that Canadian nationalism "marched hand in hand with internationalism."³⁵

Although France and Canada adopted Atlanticist responses to Cold War realities based on their respective national interests, liberal internationalism featured more prominently in Ottawa's decisions. Canada's historical experience as the junior member of the "North Atlantic Triangle" conditioned Ottawa to view Atlanticism as a reasonable compromise of sovereignty to provide Canada with an autonomous, nominally equal international voice to promote the building of a transatlantic community.³⁶ Realist considerations were more apparent in Paris' calculation, as Atlanticism appeared the best means to ensure France's security while re-establishing

³⁵ J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968* (Deneau Publishers, 1981), 137; Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth," *International Journal* Spring 2000, 55(2): 188-206; Reid (1977), 131, 139; Erica Simpson, "The Principles of Liberal Internationalism according to Lester Pearson," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Spring 1999, 34(1): 75-92; English (1992), 58.

³⁶ Reid (1977), 108-109, 132. After the completion of the preliminary tripartite talks in Washington, the DEA's Under-secretary, Norman Robertson, observed that "[a] situation in which our special relationship with the United Kingdom can be identified with our special relationships with other countries in Western Europe and in which the United States will be providing a firm basis, both economically and probably militarily, for this link across the North Atlantic, seems to be such a providential solution for so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great lengths and even incur considerable risks in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership." For discussion of Canada's historic interplay with the British and Americans, see John Bartlet Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*, (McClelland and Stewart, 1945).

it as a Great Power; moreover, France's historical experience ill-prepared it to accept a secondary status in the new alliance.

The fundamental differences between Canadian and French Atlanticism were present at the outset. In addition to France's ambivalence regarding Article 2,³⁷ the St. Laurent Government found Paris' insistence that the treaty should cover its North African dependencies problematic, fearing it would transform the new alliance into a vehicle for perpetuating colonialism. Faced with Paris' *sine qua non* that Algeria be included under the terms of the treaty, however, Ottawa conceded the point in the greater interest of establishing the alliance.³⁸ Reporting on the negotiations, one Canadian diplomat complained that the French delegation had produced "no positive or constructive ideas whatsoever." Lester Pearson questioned the logic of French concerns that the new alliance could provoke a Soviet attack, arguing only a united Western effort could deter an attack, so that France's preoccupation with increasing its own national military strength was wrong-headed. As Paris appeared to hesitate, Pearson suggested Georges Vanier "talk some sense into his French friends, who, of all people, should be the most enthusiastic" about an Atlantic alliance.³⁹ Although NATO provided a new arena for developing Canada-France relations, it was clear this was not without complications. As the differences between the French and Canadian versions of Atlanticism became more pronounced in the following decade, there

³⁷ Reid (1977), 60, 167, 174. Paris initially supported the early British effort to delete Article 2, likely in exchange for British support of its demand that the treaty cover its Algerian territories. As negotiations proceeded and it was increasingly likely Article 2 would remain in the treaty, France supported the provision in exchange for Canadian support of its stance regarding the inclusion of Algeria and Italy in the new alliance. Another consideration that caused the shift was the value Paris came to see in downplaying NATO's military aspect to avoid provoking Moscow.

³⁸ Robin Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community, Canada's Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 16-17; Reid (1977), 213-218.

³⁹ Reid (1977), 116-119; Pearson (1972), 50.

remained opportunities for cooperation between Ottawa and Paris, but ultimately Atlanticism would become a source of divergence.

The peak in Canada-France cooperation during these years occurred amid the Korean War, when both countries pursued a “diplomacy of constraint.”⁴⁰ Although Paris and Ottawa backed the UN resolution condemning the North Korea’s June 1950 invasion of South Korea, both capitals were concerned about the US-dominated action on the peninsula, and feared a wider conflict, particularly given the bellicosity of US Commander General Douglas MacArthur. Paris also worried about the increased pressures for German rearmament that accompanied US involvement in Southeast Asia. By the end of 1950, Ottawa and Paris recognized their common preoccupations regarding Korea, and used their influence to counter “the more impetuous aspects” of US policy.⁴¹

The strength of the Canada-France relationship was evident throughout 1951. France’s Prime Minister, René Pleven, visited Ottawa, commenting to Canadian officials during his stay “upon the remarkable extent to which French and Canadian views coincided on the most important world problems.”⁴² Pleven’s time in Ottawa was preceded by Louis St. Laurent’s first visit to France as Prime Minister. French officials noted the Canadian leader’s concern that it should not appear an after-

⁴⁰ Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (University of Toronto Press, 1974); William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton University Press, 1995); Martin Kitchen, “From the Korean War to Suez: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1950-1956,” in *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American Canadian Relations, 1902-1956*, B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1996), 220-255. Also, Marilyn B. Young, “‘The Same Struggle for Liberty’: Korea and Vietnam,” in *The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis*, Mark Atwood Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall, eds. (Harvard University Press, 2007), 196-214. Paris’ diplomacy was itself constrained by a concern to retain US support for French military action in Indochina.

⁴¹ MAE, v. 39 – Note from MAE, Amérique to Director, Affaires Politiques, 7 December 1950; DEA, A-3-b, v. 2492, 10463-P-40 – Annual Review for 1950, 16 January 1951.

⁴²DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – Memorandum, 6 February 1951, Conversations with Monsieur Pleven, 3 February 1951.

thought to his attending the Commonwealth meeting in London. To the contrary, Paris interpreted the visit as a signal that Ottawa viewed relations with France as being of equivalent importance and was using the occasion to emphasize its autonomy from London and Washington.⁴³ The MAE considered St. Laurent's time in Paris an opportunity to demonstrate French desire for strong collaboration with Ottawa, especially in its relations with the US, seeing Canada as better placed than any country to present views not easily accepted in Washington.⁴⁴ Indeed, during their talks, Pleven expressed concern to St. Laurent about the US and UK's preponderant role in NATO, suggesting they were establishing an "Anglo-Saxon direction" of the Alliance.⁴⁵

In April 1951, France's President, Vincent Auriol, became the first French head of state to visit Canada. The event took place amid heightened anxiety over Korea and the prospect for a wider conflict following US General Douglas MacArthur's threats to destroy Chinese ports, cities, and airfields if Peking did not negotiate with the UN.⁴⁶ During the visit, Lester Pearson reiterated to his French counterpart, Robert Schuman, that Ottawa and Paris held similar concerns about the direction of US policy. Referring more than once to Ottawa's "courageous policy," Schuman and Auriol argued Ottawa could criticize the US much more emphatically than Paris dared given its reliance on Washington for military and economic aid.⁴⁷

⁴³ MAE, v. 44 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, 25 December 1950.

⁴⁴ MAE, v. 44 – Note pour le ministre, 11 January 1951, *Rapports franco-canadiennes*.

⁴⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 3775, 7839-40, p. 1 – Note to File, 14 February 1951, Views Expressed by M. Pleven in conversation with Mr. St. Laurent at the Hôtel Matignon.

⁴⁶ Kitchen (1996), 232.

⁴⁷ DEA, G-2, 8300, 9908-AD-2-40, p. 3.2 – Memorandum from Pearson to the Under-Secretary, 7 April 1951, Visit of President Auriol. Also, Thomson (1988), 69. General Henri Giraud, co-chair with de Gaulle of the CFLN, visited in 1943, but was received as a "distinguished French general." De Gaulle was not head of state during his 1944 and 1945 visits.

Shortly after Auriol's visit, Pearson's speech to the Canadian Club in Toronto claiming the era of "easy and automatic relations" between Canada and the US was over was welcomed in Paris as an effort to signal Washington about Canadian concerns over the hawkish political climate in the US and fears that the American-led UN action on the Korean peninsula risked escalating into a larger war. The French Embassy characterized Pearson's remarks as an effort to maintain Atlantic solidarity, describing Ottawa as using its special relationship with the US to send messages that Washington might ignore if they came from other allies. France's Ambassador, Hubert Guérin, even suggested Pearson deserved a share of the credit for US President Harry Truman's subsequent firing of MacArthur.⁴⁸

In the wake of Pearson's speech, Guérin concluded that the evolution of the Canada-France relations since 1945 revealed a "communauté d'intérêts et d'intentions" that Paris should cultivate.⁴⁹ The ambassador cited Canadian public opinion's support for France's "peace offensive" at the 1951 UN General Assembly, and the fact Auriol's opening remarks were better received in Ottawa than in Washington, as proof of Canada's greater understanding and willingness to defend Western European positions on the Cold War.⁵⁰ The Ottawa-Paris rapport and its potential for the promotion of French interests was recognized in the MAE: the *Amérique* division cited Pearson's questioning of France's embassy more frequently

⁴⁸ English (1992), 58-62; MAE, v. 44 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, 19 April 1951; MAE, v. 45 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 11 April 1951; MAE, v. 41 – Letter from Francis de Laboulaye, Charge d'Affaire A.I., to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 27 April 1951, du rôle du Canada dans les relations entre les Etats-Unis et les puissances occidentales.

⁴⁹ MAE, v. 44 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, 19 April 1951. President Auriol noted in his diary that Ottawa was "tout à fait d'accord" with Paris in its reading of the international situation. Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-1954, volume 5*, Laurent Theis, ed. (Librairie Armand Colin, 1975), 177.

⁵⁰ MAE, v. 39 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, 12 December 1951, Le Canada et l'offensive de paix à l'Assemblée des Nations Unies.

than any other mission on problems about which he felt under-informed justified it being provided additional information in order to strengthen links with Ottawa.⁵¹

Atlanticism in Question

Although a shared Atlanticist response to Cold War realities offered new opportunities for Canada-France relations, this dynamic also masked, and even exacerbated policy differences between the two countries. One of the earliest examples of this arose over the issue of recognition of the Associated States of Indochina (ASI). As Paris tried to reassert its control of Indochina after 1945, the nationalist challenge to French colonial authority quickly escalated into armed conflict. The Cold War gave the struggle an ideological dimension that made it a test of Atlantic solidarity, especially after France enlisted US support.⁵² France's difficulties in countering the Viet Minh led to a March 1949 agreement that provided the ASI of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam a degree of independence within the French Union and established the former emperor, Bao Dai, as head of state in Vietnam.⁵³

Canada's Paris Embassy counselled early recognition of the new regime as a means to counter communist expansion in the region and aid Paris in maintaining domestic support for its participation in western defence, thereby maintaining Atlantic solidarity. The DEA greeted the recommendation with scepticism about the viability and legitimacy of the Bao Dai regime, doubts that the antipathy of neutral

⁵¹ MAE, v. 95 – Memorandum from MAE, Amérique, to Directeur Général, Politique, 8 May 1952.

⁵² Raymond F. Betts, *France and Decolonization, 1900-1960* (Macmillan Press, 1991), 92; Rioux (1987), 149.

⁵³ R.E.M. Irving, *The First Indochina War: French and American Policy, 1945-1954* (Croom Helm, 1975), 56-58.

countries such as India for French actions reinforced.⁵⁴ French expectations that Canadian recognition of the ASI would occur in concert with the Anglo-Americans were thus dashed in early February 1950, when Ottawa did not follow the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand when they recognized the Bao Dai regime.⁵⁵ Meeting with Pearson to express French preoccupations and press for Canadian recognition, Guérin was mollified somewhat by the Canadian minister's intimation that a more formal gesture could soon follow remarks he had made recently in Parliament acknowledging Indochina's progress toward self-government.⁵⁶

The Canadian Cabinet's subsequent decision to delay recognition of the ASI provoked concern in Paris. The DEA Under-secretary, A.D.P. Heeney, returned from a meeting in the French capital with his MAE counterpart, Alexandre Parodi, impressed by Paris' disappointment, "considerable importance [having been attached] to [Canadian] recognition of Bao Dai because of what [Parodi] called [Canada's] 'autorité morale.'" Paris urged Ottawa to move immediately on recognition to help counter the communist threat in Southeast Asia.⁵⁷

French Embassy officials were told at the DEA that Ottawa's main concerns were that the Bao Dai regime did not exercise adequate control over Vietnamese territory, and that there were questions as to the degree of independence Paris had granted to the ASI, prompting Guérin to believe the decision was due mainly to the

⁵⁴ DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 3 – Letter from Canadian Ambassador, Paris, to SSEA, 18 March 1949; DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 3 – Memorandum from Reid to American and Far Eastern Division, 31 August 1949. Also, Douglas A. Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* (University of Toronto Press, 1984), 38-49.

⁵⁵ MAE, v. 36 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, Amérique, 29 January 1950; DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 4 – 25 February 1950, Cabinet Document, Indo-Chinese States: Recognition.

⁵⁶ MAE, v. 44 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, 24 February 1950.

⁵⁷ DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 4 – Cabinet Document, Indo-Chinese States: Recognition, 25 February 1950; DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 5 – Telegram from the Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 3 March 1950.

DEA's Far East division treating the matter too legalistically.⁵⁸ The analysis was only partially correct; the delay was also tied closely to the Canada-India "special relationship" that Pearson was trying to cultivate. In addition to wanting to prevent a racial split in the Commonwealth, Pearson wished to avoid alienating New Delhi given that its moderate nationalist government had delayed recognition.⁵⁹ Such considerations trumped arguments favouring Canadian recognition, including Soviet and PRC recognition of Ho Chi Minh's government, and the concern that Ottawa's delay might be interpreted as a signal of non-confidence in French policy and a lack of empathy for France's centrist government and its domestic challenges.⁶⁰

The Korean War led to a renewed French push for Canadian recognition of the ASI, including an appeal to Canadian liberal internationalism by casting the Indochina conflict as part of the larger struggle against communism. DEA officials such as A.R. Menzies, the head of the Far East Division, were more understanding and conceded the need to reconsider Ottawa's position, leading France's Embassy to

⁵⁸ DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 5 – Memorandum to File by Menzies, 3 March 1950, Indochina; MAE, v. 36 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, Amérique, 10 March 1950; MAE, v. 44 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, 6 May 1950.

⁵⁹ DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 4 – Memorandum to the Cabinet, Draft, 17 February 1950, re: Recognition of the Indo-Chinese States of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos; DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 4 – Memorandum to the Cabinet – Draft, Recognition of the Indo-Chinese States of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos [undated]. For a discussion of the Canada-India relationship, see Ryan Touhey, *Dealing with the Peacock: India in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1941-1976*, unpublished dissertation (Department of History, University of Waterloo, 2006). This factor in Ottawa's decision-making is neglected in Magali Deleuze, "Le Canada, les Canadiens et la guerre d'Indochine: quelques intérêts communs?" *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* July 2000, 54(223): 17-29, which provides a useful overview of Franco-Canadian relations during the Indochinese conflict.

⁶⁰ DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 4 – Memorandum to the Cabinet, Draft, 17 February 1950, Recognition of the Indo-Chinese States of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos; DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 4 – Memorandum to the Cabinet, Draft, Recognition of the Indo-Chinese States of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos [undated]; DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 4 – Memorandum from C. Ritchie to the Under-secretary, 21 February 1950.

predict a favourable shift of Canadian policy.⁶¹ The Canadian Cabinet again deferred its decision on recognition, however, and it was only at the end of 1952 that Ottawa officially recognized the ASI. Cold War realities dictated the belated action. Although the Viet Minh were largely in control of Vietnam and the ASI still did not fulfill the customary legal requirements to be recognized as independent states, the Cabinet's view was that any encouragement to Franco-Vietnamese forces was desirable in the context of the continuing conflict, and to support France in the interest of Atlantic solidarity.⁶²

The episode demonstrated that while Atlanticism was significant, it was not an absolute guarantee of harmony between France and Canada, and could be trumped by other factors; moreover, differences between the Canadian and French versions of Atlanticism had exacerbated the disagreement between Ottawa and Paris. The French observation that Canada was acting more independently on the world stage after 1945 was confirmed, but this time to Paris' chagrin. France's preoccupation with re-establishing itself as a Great Power and retaining its sphere of influence, and its expectations of Canadian support, clashed with Ottawa's promotion of its middle power status so dependent upon relations with the Commonwealth, particularly India, and its adherence to liberal internationalist principles. It was only when the situation deteriorated – in France, Indochina, and internationally – that the dictates of Atlanticism had prompted Ottawa to act.

⁶¹ DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 7 – Memorandum from C. Ritchie for the Under-secretary, 4 July 1950; MAE, v. 44 – Letter from Basdevant, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, Ambassade de France au Canada to Schuman, MAE, Asie-Océanie, 8 July 1950.

⁶² DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 7 – Cabinet Document, External Affairs: Recognition of Indo-Chinese States, 12 July 1950; DCER, v. 18 – Document 1008, PCO, Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Cabinet, 1 November 1952, Recognition of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; PCO, A-5-a, v. 2651, Cabinet Conclusion, 5 November 1952, Recognition of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The ASI issue was a harbinger of a growing divergence between Paris and Ottawa in foreign policy objectives and approaches. The peak of French Atlanticism existed between 1948 and 1952, corresponding with the most acute phase of French vulnerability to the Soviet threat. Thereafter, Paris assumed an increasingly nationalist position, chafing at the preponderant US influence in NATO.⁶³ The French embrace of Atlanticism was a response to the Soviet threat and an attempt to secure parity with the UK, but this was predicated on Paris having an equal voice in Western strategic decision-making, something that appeared increasingly unrealistic given the “growing hegemonic impulse” in Washington that pessimistic appraisals of West European military capabilities encouraged.⁶⁴ The centralization of authority under US auspices that accompanied General Dwight Eisenhower’s appointment in 1950 as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and French exclusion from the leadership in the Atlantic and Mediterranean maritime commands created a “certain malaise” in France, leading to growing French frustration over relations with Washington and the apparent US-UK “special relationship.”⁶⁵

A French nationalist reaction to the bi-polar international order was evident by the autumn of 1952, manifested most often by a neutralist “third way” position.⁶⁶ Auriol described the growth of “a violent anti-American sentiment” in France to Vanier, who subsequently claimed that thinly veiled criticisms of the US in a speech by the French President were proof of a “a growing impatience in foreign policy

⁶³ Lundestad (2003), 73; Rioux (1987), 138.

⁶⁴ Cogan (1997), 106.

⁶⁵ Cogan (1997), 91-116.

⁶⁶ Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Post-War France, 1945-1954* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 190; Michel Winock, “The Cold War,” in *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: a Century of French Perception*, Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie France Toinet, eds., translated by Gerry Turner (St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 69.

matters.”⁶⁷ A 1953 poll by the *Institut Français d’Opinion publique* revealed that many French viewed Europe as a possible “third force” between the superpowers, an “Europeanist” alternative to Atlanticism.⁶⁸

French nationalist disenchantment with Atlanticism contrasted with Ottawa’s adherence to Atlanticist principles and its self-appointed role as NATO’s “helpful fixer.” Accordingly, Vanier urged Ottawa to act as a linchpin between Paris and Washington, arguing that an active Canadian role in NATO would strengthen French faith in the alliance and assist French Atlanticist politicians.⁶⁹

Canadian preoccupation with maintaining Atlantic solidarity was evident during the acrimonious debate over the European Defence Community (EDC). The deepening Cold War and fighting in Korea had increased the sense of urgency regarding Western European defence. In response to European calls for an integrated NATO force in Europe comprising a North American troop commitment and a US commander, Washington began exerting pressure for the re-arming of West Germany within NATO under a single, unified command.⁷⁰ For France, German rearmament not only represented a security risk, but a threat to Paris’ entire recovery strategy in that it promised to upset the European balance of economic, political, and military power. Paris responded in 1950 with the Pleven Plan, the progenitor of the EDC,

⁶⁷ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5872, 50163-40, p. 1.1 – Despatch from Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 28 October 1952.

⁶⁸ Grosser (1980), 119; Harrison (1990), 172.

⁶⁹ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5872, 50163-40, p. 1.2 – Telex from Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 25 April 1953; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5872, 50163-40, p. 1.2 – Despatch from Canadian Ambassador, Paris, to SSEA, 12 January 1953. Also, Deleuze (2006), 20-21. She describes a “clan français” in the Canadian foreign policy establishment that included Vanier, his counsellor in Paris, Charles Ritchie, Jules Léger (appointed Under-secretary in 1954), and to a lesser degree the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and the Minister of Defence, Brooke Claxton. This group, for reasons ranging from francophilism to anti-communism, favoured Canadian support of France during the often tumultuous life of the Fourth Republic.

⁷⁰ Cogan (1997), 91-116; Lundestad (1998), 53.

wherein German rearmament was to be carried out under the supranationalist cloak of European integration, although in practice the EDC would come under NATO control. The scheme was crucially weakened, however, by its ambitiousness and Britain's decision not to participate.⁷¹

Paris' objectives were consistent throughout the ensuing lengthy debate: limit West Germany's influence and sovereignty while integrating it into the West on terms favourable to France. Despite the French origins of the proposal, Paris increasingly feared the EDC failed to safeguard French national interests. Opponents such as de Gaulle and his *Rassemblement du peuple français*, emboldened by success in the 1951 parliamentary elections, condemned the EDC as an excessive concession of sovereignty, relegating France to a second-tier status relative to the British and Americans. The EDC's opponents characterized it as a plot to ensure the Anglo-Americans became the sole possessors of independent armed forces with the continental European powers under their control. Conversely, EDC supporters such as the Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, countered that French influence derived from its commitment to European integration, and warned rejecting the treaty could prompt the US to turn toward Germany or even withdraw from Europe.⁷²

The Atlanticist ideal guided Ottawa's response throughout the EDC debate, notably in its efforts to reconcile Paris and Washington and see the project realized.

The MAE was certainly aware of Ottawa's concern over French delays in ratifying

⁷¹ Claire Sanderson, *L'impossible alliance? France, Grande-Bretagne, et défense de l'Europe, 1945-1958* (Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003), 265-360; William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (UNC Press, 1998), 135-144; Cogan (1997), 91-116; Charles Cogan, *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France Since 1940* (Praeger, 1994), 75-95; Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe*, (Macmillan 1993), 28; Grosser (1980), 121-123.

⁷² Hitchcock (1998), 160, 169, 185; Cogan (1994), 94. For a contemporary work, see Herbert Leuthy, *France against Herself*, translated by Eric Mosbacher (Meridian Books, 1955).

the treaty and the potential for a US overreaction; St. Laurent privately reiterated the need for prompt action to France's Prime Minister, René Mayer, during his 1953 visit to Canada.⁷³ Paris appreciated Ottawa's efforts and viewed them as proof of Canadian understanding and moderation.⁷⁴ Pearson's sympathetic remarks regarding French concerns about German rearmament at the December 1953 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, during which the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, warned of an "agonizing reappraisal" of US policy in Western Europe if the EDC failed, earned an amount of gratitude from Bidault that took Pearson by surprise.⁷⁵ The Foreign Minister was perhaps drawn more to the sympathetic elements of Pearson's remarks rather than his deeper Atlanticist message, which Pearson repeated in acknowledging Bidault's gratitude, claiming:

I am not ... conscious of having said anything ... which merited any special recognition, because the sentiments to which I gave utterance were those which come naturally to Canadians. Because of our history, our traditions and our origins we are ... able to understand somewhat more clearly than our American neighbours the feelings of our friends in France, especially when questions of Franco-German relationships are under consideration. It would be surprising if it were not so.

At the same time, because we are North Americans, we also appreciate and share the anxiety of the government in Washington that European arrangements should soon be completed which will make it easier for us on this continent to cooperate to the full within the North Atlantic coalition by associating Germany in some form ...⁷⁶

⁷³ MAE, v. 95 – Letter from de Laboulaye to MAE, Amérique, 28 October 1952, Les hésitations à l'égard de l'Armée européenne; DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – Memorandum for the Undersecretary, 10 April 1953.

⁷⁴ MAE, v. 99 – Note: Visite de M. Saint Laurent, 7-10 février 1954, Chef du Gouvernement Canadien. Also, English (1992), 92. English recounts Pearson being receptive to the entreaties of his son, Geoffrey, at this time a diplomat in Paris, to be understanding of the French position.

⁷⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – Letter from Bidault to Pearson, 22 December 1953.

⁷⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – Letter from Pearson to Guérin, 30 December 1953; DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – Message from Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 12 January 1954. Bidault reiterated his appreciation to Canada's ambassador, Jean Désy, who reported that with "great sincerity ... Mr. Bidault thought it particularly significant and even moving that a Canadian of British origin should express the French position with such clarity, understanding, and good-will. [...] no other eminent statesmen of another country had so fairly and so courageously commented upon current international problems from the French point of view."

Under intense pressure from Washington and its NATO allies, Paris tried alternately to revise, improve, and ultimately avoid ratifying the EDC treaty. The new Prime Minister, Pierre Mendès-France, tried to eliminate its supranational character, but ultimately failed in the face of US opposition. He consequently refused to engage his government's future over the treaty, leading the National Assembly to block ratification, thereby effectively killing it.⁷⁷

Although Ottawa welcomed the subsequent alternative to the failed EDC of the Western European Union (WEU) that emerged from the October 1954 Paris Agreements,⁷⁸ it was anxious the compromise which abandoned the EDC's supranational dimension should not undermine the future of the Atlantic Community by encouraging an "Europeanist" solution.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, there was a degree of official optimism in Ottawa about Mendès-France, seen as more capable than his predecessors of responding to France's domestic and international challenges. For his part, the French leader considered Pearson a useful ally who could explain Paris' action on the EDC to the US. Pearson did so, lobbying Dulles in advance of Mendès-France's November 1954 talks in Washington.⁸⁰ When the French leader visited

⁷⁷ Winand (1993), 59; Wall (1991), 264, 304; Grosser (1980), 125.

⁷⁸ Hitchcock (1998), 197-201. The WEU was established through an amending of the 1948 Brussels Treaty as an international organization that abandoned the EDC's supranational aspects and maintained national armed forces. Invited to become a member of the WEU, West Germany regained full sovereignty and entered NATO in return for allied control over German air and naval production and a ban on German bacteriological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

⁷⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 11562-39-40, p. 1.3 – Memorandum from Léger to Mr. Holmes and Mr. Chapdelaine, 16 November 1954, Visit to Ottawa of Prime Minister Mendes-France.

⁸⁰ Jacques Portes, "Pierre Mendès-France au Canada (15-17 Novembre 1954)," *Études Internationales* 1983, 14(4): 785; DDF, 1954, v. II – Document 110, M. Hubert Guérin, Ambassadeur de France à Ottawa, à M. Mendès France, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Tels. nos. 529-537, Ottawa, 30 août 1954; DDF, 1954, v. II – Document 116, M. Mendès-France, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à M. Hubert Guérin, Ambassadeur de France à Ottawa, Tels. nos. 1201-1204, Paris, 1^e septembre 1954. Paris was especially appreciative of what it considered to be Pearson's sympathetic reaction to the treaty's failure, and his assertion of a direct Canadian role in responding to the crisis. Ambassador

Canada during this same trip, the issue of US leadership in the West was raised during his talks with St. Laurent. Mendès-France expressed acceptance of this reality, but emphasized that Western Europe needed to lessen its dependency on Washington as a prerequisite to a more flexible foreign policy. St. Laurent sympathized, explaining that Canada, possibly more than any other country, was aware of and had to take into account American public opinion.⁸¹

Given the resolution of the EDC debate and Canada and France's ongoing cooperation in NATO and the UN, it is not surprising that Canada's Ambassador in Paris, Jean Désy, claimed at the outset of 1955 that the bilateral relationship had "never been more active or more useful than in the last few years."⁸² Indeed, the EDC controversy did not produce a confrontation between Ottawa and Paris; instead it offered the opportunity for cooperation and strengthened bilateral links.

There were shadows on the horizon, however. The warm feelings between Paris and Ottawa during the EDC episode were more the by-product of the latter's broader concern with preserving the Atlantic framework than sympathy for the French position *per se*. If the controversy had offered an occasion for cooperation, it also highlighted a widening divergence over Atlanticism between Canada and France as a result of the two countries' differing domestic and international challenges. Consistent with its Atlanticist foreign policy, Ottawa had sought to reconcile Washington and Paris throughout the EDC debate; for France however, the

Guérin was instructed to ask the Canadian Minister to use his influence in Washington to help resolve the difficult situation.

⁸¹ DEA, G-2, v. 3775, 7839-40, p. 1 – Departmental Memorandum by L.V.J. Roy and R.A.D. Ford, 26 November 1954, Mr. Mendes-France's Visit to Canada.

⁸² DEA, G-2, v. 6829, 2727-AD-40, p. 7.1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, Institut France-Canada, 22 June 1955.

controversy constituted a national reawakening that included a growing ambivalence for Atlanticism.⁸³ Four years after proposing the Pleven Plan, and amid a humiliating withdrawal from Indochina blamed partly on insufficient US support, Paris now viewed excessive dependence on Washington as a greater threat than a re-armed Germany. Intense American pressure for ratification increasingly made the EDC treaty, notwithstanding its French origins, appear a US *diktat*.⁸⁴ In rejecting it, Paris asserted its independence from Washington by refusing to accept what it considered an excessive concession of sovereignty in pursuit of the Atlanticist ideal, and challenged a two-tiered NATO that would have seen France treated differently from the US, UK and Canada.⁸⁵ Canada's Paris Embassy sent Ottawa an article in *Le Monde* it felt represented official views; it suggested that the French and Americans were not divided over the necessity of NATO but rather its terms and conditions, observing that while Paris viewed the Alliance as a pact between equal and free nations, Washington appeared to consider the alliance a disguised US protectorate.⁸⁶

While continuing to work together within the Atlantic framework, Ottawa and Paris were increasingly working at cross purposes. As France, preoccupied with re-establishing its Great Power status, grew more assertive in pursuing its national interests within NATO and faced the challenges of decolonization, it shifted further from the Atlanticism understood by its Canadian ally. Ottawa, anxious to maintain an effective Western deterrent, give substance to its middle power claims, and mindful

⁸³ Wall (1991), 263-295; Rioux (1987), 204-209.

⁸⁴ Cogan (1994), 85, 93; Winand (1993), 50.

⁸⁵ Wall (1991), 264, 304, characterizes the Mendès-France government as "something of a revolution in Franco-American affairs," arguing it was the first government since 1946 to place French interests before relations with Washington and conceiving of them as independent of Franco-American interests; as such, he considers it a "harbinger of the 5th republic."

⁸⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 3775, 7839-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 23 October 1954, Anti-American Feeling in France.

of the need for a European counterweight to the US, continued to adhere to the Atlanticist ideal and tried to reconcile Paris to it. The result over the course of the latter half of the 1950s would be growing divergence, and ultimately, a deterioration of the official bilateral relationship.

Chapter 3

Atlanticism in Question: Canada-France Relations, 1954-1960

Given the growing divergence over Atlanticism between Ottawa and Paris in the late 1950s, it is fitting that what is remembered as a triumph of Canadian diplomacy – Lester Pearson’s contribution to the defusing of the Suez Crisis – should have occurred in conjunction with what arguably was the nadir of the foreign policy of the French Fourth Republic. The events of the autumn of 1956 highlighted the growing nationalist reactions to the Cold War international order that were affecting both countries’ foreign policies and their bilateral relationship. At the time, Pearson’s efforts were greeted in Canada with criticism by those who viewed them as a betrayal of Canada’s “mother countries,” and a disturbing indication of overweening US influence; in France, the ill-fated Anglo-French raid was supported enthusiastically as a forceful assertion of the national interest and an act of defiance against Washington.

This chapter examines the evolution of Canada-France relations from the aftermath of the EDC controversy to the eve of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, and discusses the deterioration of the bilateral relationship caused by the increasing manifestation of Canadian and French nationalist reactions to post-1945 realities. Although the war years and early Cold War facilitated greater bilateral contact and cooperation, this momentum could not be sustained owing to Paris and Ottawa’s increasing foreign policy differences. By the mid-1950s, the Atlanticist orientation of French foreign policy was diminishing as Paris resented the realities of an alliance perceived increasingly as impeding French national interests. France’s weakening position in North Africa, its frustration with its reduced international stature,

compounded by the preponderance of US influence, led to an increasingly nationalist foreign policy that culminated in the Fourth Republic's collapse and de Gaulle's return to power. During this period, Canada's relations with the UK and Commonwealth continued to decline in significance, fuelling nationalist concern about the implications of the growing weight of Canada's links with the US. Contrary to the French example, however, Ottawa adhered to Atlanticism as a response to its relative loss of international influence and the challenges of its asymmetrical relations with the US, so that Canadian nationalist preoccupations continued to be expressed through Ottawa's efforts to maintain and strengthen the transatlantic framework.

The result was that Atlanticism evolved into a source of divergence in Canada-France relations. Examination of Canadian and French differences over the interrelated issues of North African decolonization, the Suez Crisis, nuclear proliferation, and NATO's organization reveals that bilateral relations prior to the emergence of Canada-Quebec-France triangular tensions were not just superficial and anaemic (or even irrelevant to subsequent events) as is often implied¹; rather, relations in the 1950s were deteriorating, making geo-political considerations crucial to understanding the triangular relationship of the following decade.

Atlanticism and North Africa

Events in North Africa arising from decolonization spilled into the affairs of the North Atlantic, highlighting the Ottawa-Paris divergence over Atlanticism. The

¹ A good example is Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec Libre!* (Deneau, 1988). Similarly, there is scant reference to the geo-political dimension of the 1945-1960 period in Renée Lescop, *Le pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981).

war years enhanced the importance of Empire in French minds as a guarantor of Great Power status and a pre-eminent position in Europe. North Africa figured most prominently in this regard, but the war undermined French influence in the region: the collapse of 1940 and arrival of Anglo-American forces in 1942 disrupted French authority and increased international interest in the region's post-war future. While the Fourth Republic attempted reforms to permit it to retain its Empire, nationalist movements in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria only gained strength after 1945.²

Nationalist calls in Morocco and Tunisia for "internal independence" evolved by the 1950s into demands for full independence. Paris' reluctance to concede this led to a downward spiral of popular unrest, French repression, and nationalist appeals to international public opinion. French control over both countries deteriorated sharply as the Arab-Asian bloc in the UN General Assembly promoted the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist cause.³

Ottawa's support for North African decolonization was conditioned by the priority it attached to NATO solidarity. Ottawa was initially indulgent toward Paris and its actions in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, but, consistent with the Atlanticist orientation of its foreign policy, attempted to reconcile France to the broader

² Martin Thomas, *The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945-1962* (St. Martin's Press, 2000), 14-37; Raymond F. Betts, *France and Decolonisation, 1900-1960* (Macmillan Press, 1991); Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1984); Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1946-1958*, translated by Godfrey Rogers (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 87-88; D. Bruce Marshall, *The French colonial myth and constitution-making in the Fourth Republic* (Yale University Press, 1973).

³ Thomas (2000), 38-69.

priorities of its allies, particularly Washington, as French difficulties in North Africa began to have a deleterious effect on Western interests and Atlantic solidarity.⁴

This dynamic was evident in the transatlantic controversy known as the “Pinay Affair” that erupted in 1952 when the US delegation to the UN abstained on a vote regarding the inscription on the General Assembly’s agenda of a discussion of the Tunisian situation. Paris viewed the abstention as a betrayal that, combined with a reduction of US off-shore procurement aid to France, fuelled a suspicion that US support for decolonization concealed ambitions to supplant French influence in North Africa, and provoked France’s Prime Minister, Antoine Pinay, to publicly accuse Washington of interfering in France’s domestic affairs. The Canadian delegation’s votes at the UN against the Arab-Asian bloc’s resolutions urging France to recognize Tunisian and Moroccan independence, and which sought to create a good offices committee to facilitate negotiations to this end, earned Ottawa Pinay’s gratitude. French diplomats ascribed the sympathetic Canadian reaction to the Pinay Affair as arising from the country’s own difficulties in managing its relationship with the US.⁵

In fact, Ottawa’s actions were motivated primarily by a fear that criticizing French actions in North Africa could lead France to reject the EDC, withdraw from Indochina, or even bring an anti-NATO government to power in Paris. Evidence of Canadian Atlanticist preoccupation was the fact that Ottawa subsequently reversed its position and supported inscription of the Tunisian and Moroccan issues on the UN

⁴ Robin S. Gendron, “Tempered Sympathy: Canada’s Reaction to the Independence Movement in Algeria, 1954-1962,” *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 1998, (9): 226.

⁵ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5872, 50163-40, p. 1.1 – Despatch from Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 28 October 1952; MAE, v. 95 – Letter from de Laboulaye to MAE, Amérique, 27 October 1952; Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Post-War France, 1945-1954* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 218-232; Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945*, translated by Michael Shaw (Continuum, 1980), 137-140.

agenda, hoping the chance to discuss the North African situation would mollify the Arab and Asian states and thereby safeguard Western interests.⁶ Although concern for Atlantic solidarity prompted Canadian support for the French in North Africa, this had its limits; to Paris' disappointment, Ottawa's preoccupation with NATO's broader security interests in the region, and its anti-colonial sympathies, led it to advocate a gradual assumption of Moroccan and Tunisian self-government.⁷

The July 1954 "Carthage Declaration" signalled Pierre Mendès-France's government's adoption of a liberal policy regarding Tunisia that led to conventions on internal self-government in 1956, and full sovereignty in 1958. Similarly, the government of Edgar Faure adopted a liberal policy in 1955 that resulted in the end of the French protectorate in Morocco.⁸ France's most vexing colonial problem remained unresolved however; Algeria, considered by law an integral part of France, came to dominate French politics and contributed to the Fourth Republic's collapse. The idea of a French *mission civilisatrice* in Algeria was long in dying. The 1945 Sétif uprising and the violent French reaction, combined with the events in Morocco and Tunisia, fuelled Algerian nationalism and led to the eruption of a full-blown insurgency in November 1954. Accommodation was a non-starter for Paris given that the conflict followed France's humiliation in Indochina, the withdrawal from Tunisia and Morocco, and the heightened French nationalism surrounding the EDC's

⁶ Robin Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community, Canada's Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 23. After voting in favour of the inscription, the delegation received instructions from the Cabinet "to prevent any severe or malicious criticism of France."

⁷ DEA, A-4, v. 3495, 19-1-B-1954(1), p. 1 – Relations between Canada and France, 18 January 1954.

⁸ Rioux (1987), 228, 245; Betts (1991), 100.

collapse. The French military and a large segment of the political class were determined that Algeria would not be another defeat.⁹

Canadian sympathy for Algerian nationalism was evident in Ottawa's grudging acceptance of French demands that NATO's collective security guarantee be extended to the Algerian coast as a condition of Paris' participation in the alliance. Nevertheless, a preoccupation with Atlantic unity and a belief that NATO's strategic interests were best served by French control of the Mediterranean littoral led Ottawa initially to support France's efforts to break the insurgency. Mounting evidence throughout 1955 of French difficulties in this regard, and the *Bandung Declaration* on self-determination, which stoked Canadian fears of a rift between the West and the Afro-Asian states, provoked a shift of Ottawa's position. Paris' transfer of an army division from West Germany to Algeria, thereby weakening NATO, also helped convince Lester Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, that French actions in Algeria were undermining the Atlanticist cause.¹⁰

Jules Léger, the DEA's Under-secretary, was convinced that Algerian independence was a foregone conclusion within a generation and recommended Ottawa encourage Paris to adopt a liberal policy, arguing this would serve NATO's long-term interests more than a protracted, bloody nationalist conflict. Ottawa's hope to satisfy Algerian aspirations without harming French, and by extension NATO interests, were stymied by the fact Paris considered Algeria a domestic issue and thus keenly resented any interference from the international community, including its

⁹ Thomas (2000), 14-37, 70-99; Betts (1991), 94, 103; Alfred Grosser, *Affaires étrangères, la politique de la France, 1944-1984* (Flammarion, 1984), 139. For an account of the place of empire in French thought, see Paul Clay Sorum, *Intellectuals and Decolonization in France* (UNC Press, 1977).

¹⁰ Gendron (2006), 14-16, 27-30. Also, Irwin M. Wall, *France, the United States and the Algerian War* (University of California Press, 2001), 9-32.

allies. France's UN delegation walked out of the 1955 General Assembly over an Arab-Asian resolution requesting discussion of Algeria, and returned only after a compromise, brokered partly by Canadian diplomats, that resulted in no discussion taking place. Ottawa hoped to use the 1956 North Atlantic Council meeting to encourage Paris to pursue a solution similar to that adopted in Morocco and Tunisia, but was forestalled by Paris' request that its NATO allies forswear any interference and declare unqualified support for French efforts in Algeria.¹¹

As the French Government of Guy Mollet adopted an all-out war effort in 1956, Canada's embassy warned that a French defeat in Algeria would provoke a political extremism and bitterness that transcended anything witnessed since 1945.¹² France's ambassador in Ottawa, Francis Lacoste, observed after talks with Pearson and DEA officials that Canadian circumspection over Algeria masked a growing anxiety over the situation and its implications for NATO solidarity. Paris' response to these concerns recalled its earlier portrayal of Indochina; Algeria was cast as part of the global struggle against communism, except that in this case, the implications to French security were that much more immediate. Lacoste insisted repeatedly to his Canadian interlocutors that France was engaged in Algeria by necessity and in the service of Western geo-strategic interests.¹³

France's deteriorating position in Algeria led to the Suez Crisis, the most dramatic example of the growing Canada-France divergence over Atlanticism.

¹¹ Gendron (2006), 29-33; DEA, v. 7722, 12177-40, p. 2 – Message from SSEA to Canadian Delegation, North Atlantic Council, Paris, 20 March 1956.

¹² DEA, G-2, v.7043, 6938-40, p. 10 – Despatch from the Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 7 March 1956.

¹³ MAE, v. 98 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 15 June 1956, L'opinion canadienne et la question algérienne.

French actions in the crisis were motivated partly by a concern to safeguard French investments given Egypt's July 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal. Additionally, there was a general aversion to Egypt's President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, particularly his anti-Israeli position and championing of pan-Arabism, fuelled by the conviction that democratic Europe's failure in the 1930s to confront the totalitarian challenge should not be repeated with what was viewed as Egypt's quasi-fascist regime. Paris' foremost concern, however, was to halt Cairo's material support of the Algerian insurgency.¹⁴

Paris desired close collaboration with London and Washington in responding to the crisis, but became increasingly exasperated with what it considered to be a temporizing US approach. Determined to remove Nasser and halt Egyptian arms shipments to Algerian insurgents, Paris acted as an intermediary between the British and Israelis in crafting plans for a military response.¹⁵ France's Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, warned Lester Pearson that "his government was determined to see the matter through by force if necessary."¹⁶

Ottawa's response recalled that of the EDC debate, the objective being to defuse the crisis and maintain Atlantic solidarity. Canadian concern regarding the impact on NATO was especially acute; amid growing internal tensions in the alliance, Pearson had reiterated Canada's desire to strengthen NATO's non-military component, and its belief in the necessity of inter-allied consultation as the Atlantic

¹⁴ Thomas (2000), 100-129; Rioux (1987), 271-273; Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, "Comment on conduit une coalition: La France et la Grande Bretagne dans l'affaire de Suez," *Histoire, Économie et Société* 1994 13(1): 101-104; Wall (2001), 33-66; Maurice Vaisse, "France and the Suez Crisis," in *Suez 1956, The Crisis and its Consequences*, Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds. (Clarendon Press, 1989), 134-138.

¹⁵ Vaisse (1989), 138-140; Coutau-Bégarie (1994), 104-105; Grosser (1984), 135.

¹⁶ DEA, A-3-b, v. 6115, 50378-40, p. 1.1 – Letter from Henry Davis, Canadian Embassy, Paris to Ford, European Division, 7 September 1956.

coalition traversed a period of “severe tests.”¹⁷ He carried this message to NATO capitals as a member of the alliance’s “Three Wise Men” committee, established in May 1956 with a mandate to find ways to strengthen NATO’s non-military cooperation and re-energize the Atlanticist cause.¹⁸

Aware that the French blamed Egypt for the Algerian insurgency, Ottawa viewed Paris and London’s actions as a dangerously flawed effort to destroy Nasser.¹⁹ The British and French veto of the US resolution in the Security Council condemning Israel for its pre-arranged attack on Egypt at the end of October, followed by the Anglo-French military intervention, realized Ottawa’s worst fears and went to the core of Canada’s foreign policy: an open split in NATO between its foremost allies.

Ottawa’s response was to use the General Assembly to contain the crisis and facilitate a solution that would extricate the British and French, and minimize damage to Atlantic solidarity and the Commonwealth. Initially, therefore, there was no Canadian public condemnation of Paris or London for violating the UN Charter; rather, Pearson worked the corridors of the UN to build support for a peacekeeping force to defuse the situation.²⁰ Although Pearson’s efforts bore fruit when the Security Council mandated the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to assemble an emergency military force to act as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli

¹⁷ Lester Pearson, “After Geneva: A Greater Task for NATO,” *Foreign Affairs* October 1955, 34(1): 14-23.

¹⁸ John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 116-118.

¹⁹ Marc J. O’Reilly, “Following Ike? Explaining Canadian-United States Cooperation during the 1956 Suez Crisis,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* November 1997, 35(3): 75-107; Michael Fry, “Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the United Nations,” in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*, Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds. (Clarendon Press, 1989), 288-290; Robert W. Reford, “Peacekeeping at Suez, 1956,” *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, John Kirton and Don Munton, eds. (Prentice-Hall, 1992), 60-63.

²⁰ Fry (1989), 300-312; O’Reilly (1997), 83-86.

forces, the situation deteriorated with the Anglo-French paratroop landings in Egypt on November 5, an action that provoked Moscow to threaten to launch atomic weapons against Paris and London. Before Anglo-French military objectives were realized, intense US financial pressure against London led Britain's Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, to inform Mollet that he was forced to accept a ceasefire and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force without Anglo-French participation.²¹

Notwithstanding the calls of France's Minister of Defence, Maurice Bourgès-Manoury, and other officials for France to carry on, Guy Mollet accepted the stark reality of the raid's failure. The debacle meant Paris sank further into the Algerian quagmire, having enhanced Nasser's prestige in the Arab world at a corresponding cost to French influence. Mollet believed himself abandoned by Eden and felt the US had betrayed France as it had done in Indochina. The economic pressure Washington imposed and its refusal to respond to Soviet sabre-rattling confirmed a growing French belief that NATO had become a fig leaf hiding US hegemony.²²

Atlantic solidarity was shaken to its core. During the crisis, Mollet asserted that Atlanticism could not be reduced to a mere military alliance; rather, it required substantive allied political co-ordination within *and* without of the NATO area.²³ The events of autumn 1956 defined future relations between France and "les Anglo-Saxons," fuelling French resentment over preponderant US influence, concerns over

²¹ Diane B. Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis* (UNC Press, 1991); Martin Kitchen, "From the Korean War to Suez: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1950-1956," in *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956*, B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1996), 250.

²² Vaïsse (1989), 336; Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford University Press, 2003), 84; Coutau-Bégarie (1994), 107-108.

²³ DEA, G-2, v. 7043, 6938-40, p. 10 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 24 October 1956.

decolonization, and a sense that French interests were ill-served by the West's strategic decision-making structures. Paris thus became increasingly preoccupied with articulating an autonomous policy from Washington.²⁴

Referring to an “undercurrent of satisfaction that Nasser has been shown up [...] and that France had reacted vigorously, [and] independently of the US,” Canada's Paris embassy warned against underestimating the depth of French nationalist sentiment, claiming that although NATO was still considered to be indispensable to French security, this was paralleled by a growing sense of the necessity to safeguard France's independence in the alliance.²⁵ Canada's High Commission in London cited a British Foreign Office source in reporting that senior French cabinet members had seriously considered the “emasculat[i]on, if not the actual break-up, of NATO” to free France from the US embrace.²⁶

These reports heightened Canadian anxiety over French intentions regarding NATO. DEA officials feared the increased assertiveness of the Mollet government on European integration in the wake of Suez could have serious ramifications for Canada, reflected in a departmental brief to the Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent:

It is precisely because M. Mollet's heart is in the European idea that those on this side of the Atlantic must temper their praise for his accomplishments by some sober stock-taking of where “Europeanization” of the Mollet brand may take us. ... [I]t could conceivably provide the Europeans with what might seem to them a plausible alternative to NATO ... *it is surely axiomatic for us that Western Europe should*

²⁴ Wall (2001), 33, 57-62; Coutau-Bégarie (1994), 107-108; Vaïsse (1989), 143.

²⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 7068, 7839-40, p. 2 – Despatch from Davis, Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, 16 January 1957; Coutau-Bégarie (1994), 106. French public opinion was remarkably united, with forty-three percent expressing support for the raid even two years after its failure.

²⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 6461, 5475-FA-17-40, p. 1 – Telegram from Canadian High Commission, London to DEA, 13 December 1956, After Suez. Also, Gendron (2006), 40. This report came on the heels of NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe warning the Canadian Cabinet that a UN condemnation of French policy in Algeria could precipitate France's withdrawal from the alliance.

*develop and integrate as part of the Atlantic community, not only militarily but in every major field of policy [emphasis added].*²⁷

Although Ottawa was not subject to as intense a level of French resentment as was reserved for Washington and London, Francis Lacoste did relay St. Laurent's reproach of France and the UK for their unilateralism and disregard for the UN, including his assertion that the era when the "supermen of Europe" ruled the world was over. The ambassador ascribed the remarks to a combination of Irish blood, vehement anti-colonialism, and French-Canadian insecurity, egocentrism and isolationism.²⁸

Suez and its aftermath can be seen as a more dramatic example of the dynamic evident in the EDC debate, arising from the Canada-France divergence over Atlanticism. In both situations, Canada sought to minimize the damage to Atlantic solidarity in response to France's increasingly nationalist foreign policy. The crucial difference was that whereas Canadian efforts had been a source of French appreciation and gratitude regarding the EDC, two years later Ottawa's actions were less appreciated, given that their aim was to maintain the solidarity of a transatlantic alliance that a growing portion of French decision-makers criticized as unresponsive, even hostile, to French interests.²⁹

France's deteriorating position in Algeria exacerbated the Canada-France divergence over Atlanticism. Although it continued to respond to Paris' growing alienation from its allies, Ottawa was frustrated with what it considered French intransigence and the consequences of this for NATO interests and solidarity. Jules

²⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 7791, 12515-40 – Visit of Premier Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau, Ottawa, March 2-4, 1957, Introduction to the Prime Minister's Brief.

²⁸ MAE, v. 104 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 3 December 1956.

²⁹ Wall (2001), 73-74; O'Reilly (1997), 92-94; Vaïsse (1989), 335-338.

Léger warned that it was “becoming very difficult” for Ottawa to continue to support French action in Algeria,³⁰ and the DEA did not disguise its annoyance at Paris’ “stubbornness ...not [... to] face certain basic facts,” nor appreciate the challenge this presented Canada and the other allies.³¹

It was in this context of growing transatlantic exasperation over Algeria that the Fourth Republic collapsed. The Eisenhower administration’s policy regarding the French position in North Africa was considerably less indulgent after Suez, and Washington deployed economic pressure to bring about a resolution of the conflict.³² French anger over an Anglo-American arms shipment to Tunisia, fearing it would fall into Algerian hands, was followed in early 1958 by French forces bombing the Tunisian village of Sakiet to flush Algerian insurgents out of the border community. Washington expressed deep anger to the French Ambassador over the action that resulted in considerable civilian deaths, and increased the pressure for a settlement by establishing an Anglo-American “Good Offices” mission to resolve Franco-Tunisian tensions.³³

In Ottawa, Jules Léger met with Lacoste; while disavowing interference in French affairs, the DEA Under-secretary suggested that Washington’s Good Offices offer was the best Paris could hope for, and should take advantage of it to resolve not only the immediate crisis, but the broader Algerian issue. The French diplomat reluctantly agreed to relay the message after Léger emphasized Ottawa’s concern that

³⁰ Gendron (2006), 42.

³¹ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5872, 50163-40, p. 1.2 – Telex from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 12 April 1958.

³² Thomas (2000), 130-157; Matthew Connelly, “The French-American Conflict over North Africa and the Fall of the Fourth Republic,” *Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer* 1997, 84(2): 15-19.

³³ Wall (2001), 92-95, 99-133; Connelly (1997), 18-22.

Tunisia could use the Sakiet Affair to bring the entire Algerian question before the UN Security Council, which would force Ottawa to consider its response jointly with the other allies.³⁴ The exchange revealed the extent of official Canadian exasperation: with events in North Africa increasingly threatening the West's strategic and political interests, Ottawa was siding with London and Washington and bringing its own pressure to bear on Paris, moved by a desire to avoid another open rupture in the Atlantic alliance less than two years after the Suez Crisis that would result from a Security Council debate.

French opinion interpreted an April 1958 letter from US President Dwight Eisenhower to France's Prime Minister, Félix Gaillard, in the aftermath of Sakiet as supporting Algerian independence; this, combined with the intense US economic pressure that raised the spectre of a balance of payments crisis meant the Gaillard Government's acceptance of the Good Offices mission was viewed as a selling out of French interests to Washington, and provoked the protracted ministerial crisis that culminated in de Gaulle's return to power and the *de facto* end of the Fourth Republic. Matthew Connelly has described the events of that spring as an "anti-American revolt," a rejection of the US-dominated Atlanticist framework perceived to be undermining French interests.³⁵

Canada's embassy in Paris reported on the prevalence of anti-American and anti-NATO sentiment, reminding Ottawa that the nationalist reaction was not "just

³⁴ MAE, v. 103 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 19 February 1958, Affaire de Sakiet.

³⁵ Michael M. Harrison, "French Anti-Americanism under the 4th Republic and the Gaullist Solution," in *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism, a Century of French Perception*, Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie France Toinet, eds., translated by Gerry Turner (St. Martin's Press, 1990), 174; Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford University Press, 2002), 160-170.

the isolated rantings of right-wing extremists,” but present “in a wide segment of French public opinion.”³⁶ Henry Davis, the Embassy’s Minister, observed that

[amid] the realization that its friends are relegating it, in fact if not in word, to the status of a second-class power, there are many in France and many more in Algeria who want to show that France still has courage and determination, the ability to act forcefully and not to fear the consequences ... that France is still vigorous and master of its own destinies.³⁷

Despite misgivings about de Gaulle’s attitude regarding Atlanticism, Ottawa considered him the best hope for French political stability and a solution in Algeria, and therefore continued to support France in the UN and refrained from applying any private pressure³⁸; however, Canadian concerns about the French leader’s ability (and willingness) to settle the Algerian issue continued until his September 1959 announcement that the Algerian Muslim population would be called upon to exercise their right to self-determination in a referendum.³⁹

From Ottawa, Lacoste reported on the satisfaction to de Gaulle’s announcement, and the DEA’s readiness to assist France at the UN as much as it could.⁴⁰ Paris had generally recognized in the months preceding the announcement that Ottawa was torn between its established position on decolonization and a desire not to add to French difficulties⁴¹; however, tensions had not been avoided. The news in late summer 1958 that Jules Léger was to meet with representatives of the

³⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 7044, 6938-40, p. 11.2 – Despatch from Davis, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to SSEA, 18 April 1958.

³⁷ DEA, G-2, 7044, 6938-40, p. 12 – Despatch from Davis, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to SSEA, 4 June 1958, *The Background to the Crisis in France*.

³⁸ Gendron (2006), 47

³⁹ Gendron (1998), 236; Gendron (2006), 52.

⁴⁰ MAE, v. 98 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 24 September 1959; Gendron (2006), 49. For example, on the basis that it prejudged the outcome of negotiations, Canada’s delegation at the 1958 General Assembly voted against the Arab-Asian bloc’s resolution recognizing Algeria’s right to independence and urging France to negotiate with the Algerian provisional government and other nationalist leaders to achieve this.

⁴¹ MAE, v. 100 – Note sur la Politique Étrangère du Canada, Direction Générale Politique, Amérique, 30 October 1958.

Conference of Independent African States lobbying on behalf of Algerian nationalists provoked a strong reaction from the French Embassy. Lacoste similarly protested when the CBC aired interviews with the FLN's unofficial representative in New York and two Algerian students in Montreal. These incidents were followed by France's Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, complaining privately that Ottawa believed it knew more about foreign affairs than any other country, suggesting Canadian actions regarding Algeria were testing the new French regime's patience.⁴²

Although de Gaulle's announcement was by no means the end of the Algerian issue, it ended the period during which North African decolonization most affected Canada-France relations. After years of grudging support in order to maintain Atlantic solidarity, Ottawa could now back France enthusiastically and openly endorse Algerian self-determination, but not before North African decolonization had exacerbated the Canada-France divergence over Atlanticism.⁴³ Paris increasingly questioned the efficacy of Atlanticism, while Ottawa continued to rely on it as the most effective available response to Cold War realities, especially in ensuring a counterweight to US influence. With de Gaulle's return, Ottawa would soon have to contend with a determined French effort to provoke change in the post-1945 transatlantic framework. Canada's efforts to preserve the Atlanticist ideal in the face

⁴² Gendron (2006), 47-51; DEA, G-2, v. 4881, 50115-1-40, p. 1 – Telex from Reid, Canadian Embassy, Bonn to Ottawa, 4 May 1959. “[American journalist] Marquis Childs, who is staying with us, has told me of a conversation which he had [...] with the French foreign minister, Couve de Murville, in which Couve showed marked impatience with Canada ... Couve referred to De Gaulle's recent warning that France would break off diplomatic relations with any country which recognized the [Algerian] FLN. He said that this warning was especially directed at Yugoslavia. He then made some such remark as that the Yugoslavians believed they knew more than anybody else about foreign affairs, “just like the Canadians.” Another remark about Canada was that the longer Canadians were without a foreign minister [Diefenbaker having assumed the portfolio following the death of Sidney Smith] the more active their foreign policy became.”

⁴³ Gendron (1998), 237.

of the Gaullist challenge would widen the gap between Ottawa and Paris, and lead to further erosion of their bilateral relationship.

Atlanticism and Atoms

Early in the life of the Fifth Republic, the nuclear proliferation issue provided an example of the negative impact of the Canada-France divergence over Atlanticism. Canada was a member of the nuclear club along with the US and UK – due in part to the contribution of Free French scientists in the Anglo-Canadian laboratory at the Université de Montréal during the war, but the price had been acceding to American demands for a halt to French involvement in Canadian atomic activities.⁴⁴ Washington was determined to maintain a US monopoly of atomic weapons for as long as possible.⁴⁵ Although Eisenhower arrived in office believing Soviet advances meant a US nuclear monopoly was no longer viable, the increased allied nuclear sharing he proposed was to occur within the established Atlanticist (i.e. US-controlled) framework; moreover, congressional opposition and inter-agency disputes made any agreement difficult.⁴⁶

The potential for atomic issues to provoke Franco-Canadian estrangement was realized in 1955 when Paris expressed interest in purchasing Canadian uranium for its

⁴⁴ Donald H. Avery, “Atomic Scientific Cooperation and Rivalry among Allies: The Anglo-Canadian Montreal Laboratory and the Manhattan Project, 1943-1946,” *War in History* 1995 2(3): 274-305. A French insider account is Bertrand Goldschmidt, *Atomic Rivals*, translated by Georges M. Tenner (Rutgers University Press, 1990).

⁴⁵ John Baylis, “Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship,” *Diplomatic History* Winter 2001, 25(1): 33-61; S.J. Ball, “Military Nuclear Relations between the United States and Great Britain under the Terms of the McMahon Act, 1946-1958,” *The Historical Journal* 1995, 38(2): 439-454.

⁴⁶ Baylis (2001), 36-37.

atomic energy research program.⁴⁷ The most contentious obstacle to the proposed sale was the controls and safeguards issue. Guided by its liberal internationalism and proliferation concerns, Ottawa favoured international controls as a condition of the sale, reflected in its support for the new International Atomic Energy Agency that was established in 1957. This approach also responded to Canada's Atlanticist-inspired concerns to avoid the disruption to NATO that it feared would accompany French atomic military capability.⁴⁸

The Canadian position ran counter to French nationalist preoccupations. Reflecting France's growing alienation from Atlanticism and resentment over its second-tier status in NATO in atomic matters, Paris refused to countenance any external control, so that no deal was realized. Word came from Canada's Paris Embassy regarding the "strong nationalistic tone" of a National Assembly debate on atomic energy, with the explanation that French objections to Ottawa's conditions for the sale of uranium were predicated on a belief that to accept any external supervision implied acceptance of a subordinate position on atomic matters.⁴⁹

Differences between Ottawa and Paris over nuclear proliferation were exacerbated by France's decision after the Suez Crisis to proceed with an atomic weapons program. First proposed during the Mendès-France Government, Suez convinced the Mollet Government that possession of atomic weapons was necessary to ensure French prestige and a voice in NATO equal to the UK. Canada's diplomats

⁴⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 4125, 14003-F-5-3-40 – Aide-Mémoire from French Prime Minister's Office, 9 September 1955.

⁴⁸ Brian Buckley, *Canada's Early Nuclear Policy: Fate, Chance, and Character* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 104-105; Robert Bothwell, *Eldorado: Canada's National Uranium Company* (University of Toronto Press, 1984), 404-407.

⁴⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 4125, 14003-F-5-1-40, p. 1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 13 July 1957; Bothwell (1984), 407-410.

in Paris were told at the MAE of the necessity for countries like France and the UK to counterbalance US influence in NATO and beyond, it being implied that Britain's atomic capability was the major reason why the Anglo-Americans exercised a "virtual con-dominium" over NATO. Washington's lacklustre response to Soviet threats during Suez also confirmed a belief that a US atomic monopoly was not in France's security interests.⁵⁰

Returned to power, de Gaulle ordered the atomic weapons programme accelerated, and made clear that France would have its own (and independent) nuclear capability.⁵¹ The Gaullist position clashed, however, with an increasingly avowed Canadian disarmament stance, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, and his deputy, Norman Robertson, were both preoccupied with the cause. Moreover, Robertson dismissed an independent French *force de frappe* as offering no discernible advantage to NATO.⁵²

A confrontation came in 1959 when the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN protested France's first atomic explosion in the Algerian desert. Ottawa's sympathy with Paris' critics was tempered by a concern to avoid a gratuitously critical, counter-productive position; instead, Canada strove to achieve the unlikely goal of a formalized protest that did not offend France. Francis Lacoste invoked Atlantic solidarity and urged

⁵⁰ Wall (2001), 74; Goldschmidt (1990), 357; Grosser (1980), 167-172; DEA, G-2, v. 4125, 14003-F-5-1-40, p. 1 – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 8 March 1958. Also, Baylis (2001), 33-34; 39-49. In terms of the Anglo-American dimension, Paris' determination was reinforced in this regard by the July 1958 US-UK atomic cooperation agreement, which provided for an unprecedented exchange of vital nuclear secrets and established a framework for a nuclear partnership. The agreement stemmed in part from Washington's desire to employ closer defence cooperation as a means to heal the wounds left by Suez.

⁵¹ Wall (2001), 165; Grosser (1984), 195.

⁵² Jack Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968*, (Deneau Publishers, 1981), 333; Richter (2002), 80-104; H. Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (University of Toronto Press, 1989), 106-113; DEA, G-2, v. 6009, 50271-L-40, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson for the Minister, 10 September 1959.

Ottawa to vote against any resolution linked to French nuclear testing, but his appeal was ineffective; the response from the DEA was that Ottawa was anxious to see the earliest possible end to atomic testing, so that the Canadian delegation would therefore likely vote for the most moderately worded anti-testing resolution.⁵³

Paris regarded it as a sort of defection when Canada's delegation voted for a resolution calling on France to refrain from nuclear tests in the Sahara. Charles Lucet, the MAE's second-ranking official, raised the issue with Canada's ambassador, Pierre Dupuy, asking rhetorically why after years of large US, UK, and even Soviet tests, Canada had chosen the occasion of a "little French explosion" to censure France. Dupuy warned Ottawa the dispute could have consequences in other fields, after being told by the head of the MAE's European division that although the incident should not be overblown, de Gaulle would see Canada's action as further proof of NATO's diminished value.⁵⁴ The disarmament issue re-surfaced during de Gaulle's April 1960 visit to Canada, when the Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, reasserted Ottawa's opposition to atomic testing; de Gaulle remained unrepentant, affirming France could only stop testing if all nations destroyed their warheads.⁵⁵

⁵³ DEA, G-2, v. 6009, 50271-L-40, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson for the Minister, 10 September 1959; DEA, G-2, v. 7044, 6956-40 – Memorandum from Holmes to the Minister, 3 November 1959, French Nuclear Tests: Moroccan Items at the General Assembly; DEA, G-2, v. 7044, 6956-40 – Memorandum for the Minister, 6 November 1959.

⁵⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 6009, 50271-L-40, p. 1.2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 26 November 1959, Sahara Tests; DEA, G-2, v. 7666, 11562-126-40, p. 1.2 – Briefing Book, France-Canada Relations, 7 April 1960.

⁵⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 7045, 6956-A-40 – Memorandum for the Under-secretary, 19 April 1960, De Gaulle-Diefenbaker private conversation, by Henry Davis, based on accounts of Fournier and Robinson; DEA, G-2, v. 7045, 6956-A-40 – Draft Memo for Under Secretary, 21 April 1960, Prime Minister's Comments on De Gaulle Visit, prepared by Basil Robinson.

Divergence Manifest: The Nationalist Challenge and Atlanticism

The advent of a French nuclear military capability was indicative of Paris' larger antipathy for the Cold War international order and accompanying shift to a more nationalist foreign policy. Despite French efforts since NATO's inception, the alliance was not a partnership of equals entailing global solidarity. Paris' effective exclusion from the inner circle of Anglo-American strategic cooperation fuelled French ambivalence toward Atlanticism, a sense France's "association with NATO ha[d] required her to make concessions, even sacrifices, without being compensated by comparable advantages."⁵⁶ There was a "general chorus of applause" from all corners of French political opinion when Christian Pineau used his March 1956 speech to the Anglo-American Press Association in Paris to bemoan publicly the lack of genuine tripartite co-ordination between Paris, London, and Washington, and to appeal for Anglo-American understanding of France's difficulties in North Africa. Canada's ambassador to France, Jean Désy, was struck by the depth of feeling among his French contacts, describing the general reaction as "satisfaction that France now has a foreign minister ... not afraid to speak frankly and firmly to France's two most powerful allies."⁵⁷

French dissatisfaction with NATO and the preponderant American influence in the alliance was strikingly evident in the dying days of the Fourth Republic, and only increased with de Gaulle's return to power. In 1944, the French leader had

⁵⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 7068, 7839-40, p. 2 – Despatch from Davis, Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, 12 April 1955; Charles G. Cogan, *Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO – Then and Now* (Praeger, 1997), 42, 70.

⁵⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 7068, 7839-40, p. 2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 5 March 1956.

ruefully observed that the US was ““already trying to rule the world.””⁵⁸ The ‘Yalta Myth’, which posited French exclusion from a divvying up of the post-1945 world between the superpowers (with a compliant UK as a junior partner of the Americans), figured prominently in Gaullist thought, and the rapidity with which the US and UK apparently healed the rift Suez left only reinforced this belief.⁵⁹ De Gaulle scorned the Fourth Republic’s foreign policy, notably its Atlanticism, claiming it

was to all intents and purposes concerned with pleasing others. Naturally enough, it found the required ideologies to camouflage this self-effacement ... [O]n the pretext of Atlantic solidarity [it subjected] France to the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxons.⁶⁰

De Gaulle strove to end what he considered France’s second-tier status, and to challenge the Cold War’s bipolar international system. Gaullist thought held that France’s independence required it to prevent a *de facto* collusion between the superpowers enabling them to maintain hegemony in their spheres of influence. In practical terms, this meant ending what de Gaulle viewed as France’s unhealthy dependence on (i.e. subservience to) Washington and achieving French leadership of a Western Europe that was an equal partner with the US.⁶¹

De Gaulle’s return to power did not so much change the substance of French foreign policy as its nature and the worldview underpinning it: the Rankean notion of foreign policy, whereby the nation-state was accorded highest political value,

⁵⁸ Raoul Aglion, *Roosevelt and De Gaulle, Allies in Conflict: A Personal Memoir* (The Free Press, 1988), 180-181.

⁵⁹ Grosser (1980), 40, 148; Anthony Hartley, *Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement* (Dienstoffrey, 1971), 211.

⁶⁰ Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, translated by Terence Kilmartin (George Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd, 1971), 9-10.

⁶¹ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Fayard, 1998), 113, 117-123; Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l’OTAN: De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen* (Masson, 1991), 65-68; Cogan (1997), 138; Edward L. Morse, *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France* (Princeton University Press, 1973), 117; Maurice Couve de Murville, *Une politique étrangère, 1958-1969* (Plon, 1971); P.G. Cerny, “De Gaulle, the Nation-State and Foreign Policy,” *The Review of Politics* 1971, 33(2): 258; De Gaulle (1971), 19, 164-166.

supplanted the liberal internationalism of Atlanticism. Although France would continue to confront the Soviet threat alongside the US and its NATO allies, the Gaullist aim was to ensure that in so doing, France recovered its rightful geo-political rank in the West and increased its autonomy from and influence with Washington.⁶²

The growing assertiveness of French foreign policy and Ottawa's continued commitment to Atlanticism reinforced Canadian inclinations to act as a transatlantic linchpin. The DEA believed that when de Gaulle turned his attention to NATO, Ottawa would be "faced with the need for careful diplomacy and delicacy," and that it should help establish better relations between France and its allies, particularly Washington. The Canadian Embassy warned that a failure to consult Paris on important issues could only encourage "fissiparous tendencies"; Ottawa was advised that to maintain Alliance solidarity, it should "take every opportunity to consult the French" and strongly encourage London and Washington to do likewise.⁶³

Canadian concerns were borne out by de Gaulle's annoyance at not being consulted prior to the July 1958 Anglo-American military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan following a coup d'état in Iraq, or Washington's handling of the Second Formosa Straits crisis that erupted the following month. Both interventions had the potential to escalate into a larger conflict implicating the NATO allies, and in the case of Lebanon it had involved US forces based in France.⁶⁴ Consistent with Paris' preoccupation that it possess an equal voice in allied strategic planning, de Gaulle

⁶² Grosser (1980), 183-185.

⁶³ DEA, G-2, v. 4881, 50115-1-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Defence Liaison (1) Division to the Under-secretary, 29 May 1958, De Gaulle and NATO; DEA, G-2, v. 7068, 7839-40, p. 2.2 –Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 30 July 1958, Mid-East-Summit Conference. There were even discussions in the DEA about re-appointing Ambassador Vanier to Paris given his wartime friendship with de Gaulle.

⁶⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 7068, 7839-40, p. 2.2 –Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 1 September 1958, Psychology of General De Gaulle's Circle with Regard to US and UK; Vaïsse (1998), 116-117.

proposed a US-UK-France “Directorate” through which France would achieve the political equality with the Anglo-Americans it had been seeking since the 1940s.⁶⁵

The response in Ottawa to de Gaulle’s proposed Directorate was cool. Diefenbaker reacted “very strongly,” dismissing it as betraying “a totally unrealistic assessment of France’s power and influence in NATO affairs.” Jules Léger suggested that if the French leader had identified correctly the challenge of preponderant US influence in NATO, his “remedy could well kill the patient.” Ottawa was hostile to the French proposal, fearing it would lead to a formalized, two-tiered NATO that would undermine the very rationale for Ottawa’s long-standing commitment to Atlanticism: a US-UK-France strategic partnership would reduce Ottawa’s ability to influence the Great Powers through NATO; the decline of Canada’s international stature since 1945 would be institutionalized; and Ottawa would effectively be denied the European counterweight, leaving Canada more vulnerable in its relations with the US.⁶⁶ The scope of the Canada-France divergence over Atlanticism was laid bare: what to Gaullist eyes was a means to ensure French autonomy and international influence was, refracted through Ottawa’s Atlanticist prism, a threat to Canada’s autonomy and ability to act internationally.

During their first meeting in Paris in November 1958, Diefenbaker expressed with some force Canada’s opposition to the Directorate.⁶⁷ The French leader

⁶⁵ Vaïsse (1998), 117-123; Grosser (1980), 185-186; Wall (1991), 191. Wall notes Georges Bidault’s October 1949 proposal of an “Atlantic High Council for Peace” was effectively de Gaulle’s directorate by another name.

⁶⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 4881, 50115-1-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Léger for the Minister, 16 October 1958, General De Gaulle’s Letter, re: NATO; DEA, G-2, v. 7068, 7839-40, p. 2.2 – Prime Minister’s Brief, November 1958, General De Gaulle and NATO.

⁶⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 4881, 50115-1-40, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 30 October 1958, General De Gaulle’s Memorandum to President Eisenhower and Mr. MacMillan; DEA, G-2, v. 4881, 50115-1-40, p. 1 – Telex from Dupuy, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 30 October 1958.

responded that it was unacceptable that decisions affecting NATO allies be taken by Washington alone and that the organization's strategic planning was carried out by the US and UK high commands. When Diefenbaker argued that Ottawa wanted greater consultation in NATO too, but not at the price of a two-tiered alliance, de Gaulle rejoined that Canada had already accepted this in practical terms, citing Ottawa's acquiescence to the Great Powers' decisions regarding the Middle East, Asia, and disarmament. Diefenbaker did not respond to this point, but intimated that if the Directorate were established and NATO's geographic scope extended to reflect French extra-European interests, Ottawa would reconsider its NATO commitments.⁶⁸

Although described by Diefenbaker's foreign policy advisor as "successful and enlightening," the exchange between the two leaders was emblematic of the evolution of Canada-France relations since 1945 and how this had been affected by increasingly divergent responses to Cold War realities.⁶⁹ The cooperation stemming from the two countries' Atlanticist responses had faded by the late 1950s; Paris believed its interests were better served by challenging the Atlantic framework, while Ottawa continued to believe maintaining this framework was the best means to safeguard Canadian interests.

The Directorate proposal and the broader Gaullist challenge to Atlanticism were of heightened concern to Ottawa since Canada was itself experiencing a nationalist reaction to Cold War realities, specifically, the asymmetrical and

⁶⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 7045, 6956-A-40 – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 6 November 1958, Diefenbaker-De Gaulle talks; DDF, 1958, v. II – Document 314, Compte Rendu de l'entretien du Général De Gaulle et de M. Diefenbaker, Premier Ministre du Canada, le 5 novembre 1958, à l'Hôtel Matignon.

⁶⁹ H.B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (University of Toronto Press, 1989), 64

deepening relationship with the US. Although anti-American sentiment in Canada was less virulent after the Second World War than in earlier periods, by the mid-1950s nationalist rumblings began to emerge. Ottawa's failure to support London during the Suez Crisis provoked a considerable section of anglophone Canadian opinion, which condemned the St. Laurent government's action as indicative of its continentalist predilections. Many suggested Canada had become the "chore boy" of the US, and a better friend to Nasser than London and Paris.⁷⁰ Nationalist belief that Liberal governments since the 1930s had caused Canada to fall into the US embrace was reinforced by the release of the preliminary report of the Gordon Commission that outlined the scope of the American economic presence in Canada.⁷¹

It was in this atmosphere of heightened nationalist sensitivity that the "Norman Affair" erupted. Commentators blamed the suicide of Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman on US communist witch-hunts. The controversy, described by Pearson as the most severe instance of anti-Americanism he had ever experienced, galvanized nationalist concern about the trend of Canada-US relations. Historian J.L.

⁷⁰ O'Reilly (1997), 87. Also, see George Grant, *Lament for a Nation* (McClelland and Stewart, 1965), 11. Grant described Ottawa's actions during the Suez Crisis as "an open attack on the British." For a survey of English-Canadian press opinion of the crisis, see José Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-1971* (UBC Press, 2006), 115-129. The *Toronto Telegram*, *Globe and Mail*, *Montreal Star*, and *Montreal Herald* endorsed the British position. Finally, see Reford (1992), 74. Reford cites John Meisel's claim in a study of the 1957 election that Suez was not a major factor in the Liberal defeat. While perhaps true, there appears little doubt that, among English Canadians at least, the crisis contributed to a general nationalist concern that the Progressive Conservatives exploited.

⁷¹ Lawrence Aronsen, "An Open Door to the North: The Liberal Government and the Expansion of American Foreign Investment, 1945-1953," *American Review of Canadian Studies* Summer 1992, 22(2): 186; J.M. Bumsted, "Canada and American Culture in the 1950s," *Interpreting Canada's Past, v. II, After Confederation*, J.M. Bumsted, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1986), 400. Also, *Canada and the End of Empire*, Phillip Buckner, ed. (UBC Press, 2005), which provides a discussion of the political, economic, and cultural manifestations and reactions to the slackening of the tie with the UK in the late 1950s and 1960s.

Granatstein has characterized the controversy as the moment when modern Canadian anti-Americanism emerged as a potent political force.⁷²

John Diefenbaker and his Progressive Conservatives reaped the electoral benefit, winning the 1957 federal election after fanning nationalist concerns that the Liberal Government had undermined Canada's independence by embracing Washington too closely at the expense of the UK and Commonwealth tie. Despite severe Tory criticism of the Liberals' continentalist inclinations, however, there was continuity between the Diefenbaker Government's foreign policy and that of its predecessor. The core preoccupation remained finding a counterweight to US influence, as demonstrated by the new ministry's concern to revive the Commonwealth link. Ottawa continued to adhere to the Atlanticist ideal represented by NATO, which was of even greater importance after the Diefenbaker Government approved the Canada-US North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD) in 1958, which provided for a joint military command between the two countries concerning air defence. As Diefenbaker's opposition to de Gaulle's Directorate proposal revealed, each leader and the governments over which they presided shared a concern to ensure autonomy from Washington, but differed over the best means to achieving this end.⁷³

The result was that by the autumn of 1958, there was concern in Ottawa at the state of Canada-France relations. Although "regularly described as close and sympathetic due to ... ties of culture and history," the relationship was subject to

⁷² English (1992), 180; J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Harper Collins, 1996), 110-120.

⁷³ English (1992), 190; Robinson (1989), 4, 17-23; Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Defence, 1945-1958* (UBC Press, 1987).

“recurring difficulties and frictions.”⁷⁴ A DEA report to Diefenbaker warned that Ottawa and Paris tended to take their bilateral links for granted, which “disguised the need to keep ourselves and each other informed ... about our policies and ... changes in our national position[s].” The report expressed the fear that Canada’s complex relations with the US and UK were poorly understood in France and that Ottawa had failed “to convince [Paris] of our independent involvement in international affairs.” It also sounded the alarm that relations would suffer if these misconceptions were not corrected, and that only a “consistent and determined development of [high level] political consultation” would facilitate true cooperation.⁷⁵

The DEA analysis, however, skirted the core issue: there was a fundamental (and growing) difference between Ottawa and Paris over what constituted the best means to achieve “independent involvement in international affairs,” a point Pierre Dupuy emphasized in arguing:

[i]t might not be an exaggeration to state that many Frenchmen, even in government circles, tend to think that Canada, in the Washington-Ottawa-London triangle, is more often than not the recipient of advice, which we usually act on. [...] Only by emphasizing Canada’s independent course in international political and economic affairs, and her initiatives, could one hope to gain that measure of influence likely to enable us to “sell” our policies [to Paris] ...⁷⁶

Paris was aware of the growing nationalist sentiment in Canada and the concern among Canadians not to appear “un satellite des Etats-Unis” as North American interdependence increased.⁷⁷ French circles considered the increasingly

⁷⁴ DEA, A-4, v. 3496, 19-1-D-1958/1 – Prime Minister’s Tour, October-December 1958.

⁷⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 7068, 7839-40, p. 2.2 – Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 22 October 1958, Shortcomings in Franco-Canadian Relations.

⁷⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 4003, 10117-AD-40, p. 1.1 – Letter from Dupuy, Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, March 15 1960.

⁷⁷ MAE, v. 104 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Politique, 2 November 1954, Quelques données de la politique canadienne; MAE, v. 114 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 4 May 1956, Discours de M. Pearson sur « quelques aspects des relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis ».

rancorous debate over Canada-US relations, reflected in the Diefenbaker Government's election, as consistent with a nationalist reaction, a view reinforced by the growing public discourse on Canadian political, economic, and cultural "émancipation."⁷⁸

As the Diefenbaker Government continued in office, however, French officials were struck by the disparity between its nationalist rhetoric and its accomplishments. Lacoste argued that after eighteen months, "Conservative" Canada had scarcely reduced, and certainly not eliminated, the US influence it reproached the Liberals for having tolerated. To the contrary, France's ambassador considered the new government to have markedly increased Canadian dependence on Washington by virtue of having hastily accepted the NORAD agreement and a Canada-US ministerial defence committee.⁷⁹ Paris was aware of Canadian concerns about Canada's relations with the US and the need to safeguard autonomy; however, the continued growth of American influence in Canada, notwithstanding the Diefenbaker government's stated intentions and limited efforts to reduce this, fuelled a French belief that Canada was drifting inexorably into the US orbit.

Indicative of the decline of Canada-France relationship since 1945 were the doubts in both capitals surrounding de Gaulle's 1960 visit to Canada. In addition to concern that the trip would be cancelled as a consequence of Canada's vote at the UN regarding French atomic testing, the DEA feared that Ottawa was being sent a signal when, despite prior French knowledge, the visit was scheduled for days conflicting

⁷⁸ MAE, v. 114 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 4 February 1959, Relations canado-américaines.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

with Diefenbaker's planned trip to Mexico.⁸⁰ Similarly, the apparent lack of warmth and enthusiasm in Ottawa during the subsequent visit was such that it drew comments from the French delegation, perplexed at the apparent public indifference and lack of pomp that contrasted sharply with the extraordinary receptions that greeted de Gaulle in the UK and US during the same tour. Ambassador Lacoste gamely attributed the difference to a Canadian temperament shaped by its ethnic origins, history, and even the northern climate, and claimed France's President was in good company: even the most popular Royal visitors did not attract significant crowds.⁸¹

Lacoste's efforts to assuage the presidential ego aside, the reality was that although Atlanticism had been a source for bilateral contact and cooperation in the immediate post-war years, the challenges of the Cold War and the differing Canadian and French experiences of these meant it had evolved into a source of divergence between Ottawa and Paris that was undermining the bilateral relationship. With nationalist reactions increasingly manifest on both sides of the Atlantic, the opposition between the Canadian and French positions on Atlanticism would lead to new disputes and contribute to the triangular tensions.

⁸⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 7666, 11562-126-40, p. 1 – Message from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 4 January 1960; DEA, G-2, v. 7044, 6956-40 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 27 November 1959; MAE, v. 96 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, 28 November 1959; DEA, G-2, v. 7666, 11562-126-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Davis, European Division to USSEA, 28 November 1959.

⁸¹ DEA, G-2, v. 7666, 11562-126-40, p. 1.2 – Memorandum from Keith, European Division to Acting USSEA, 5 May 1960; MAE, v. 100 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 30 April 1960, Visite officielle du Président de la République au Canada.

Chapter 4

Diverging Integration: Canada-France Economic Relations, 1944-1960

In 1855, the French corvette *La Capricieuse* visited British North America to re-establish official contact between France and its former colony. The visit occurred in a context of increasingly liberalized international trade. Paris' motivation was primarily economic; it viewed the colonies as a source of cheap commodities and a vast market for manufactures. A parallel French priority was to protect the colonies against excessive US economic influence, a concern they shared following the demise of the British Empire's mercantile system in 1846, and the achievement of a new reciprocity agreement with the US. However, despite a triumphal visit that fuelled hopes for increased exchanges, a glowing report of the colonies' development, and the subsequent establishment of a French consulate, economic relations remained marginal due to international conditions, private sector indifference, and the failure of either side to treat them as a priority.¹

Ninety years later, there were renewed hopes of expanding Canada-France economic relations within a liberalizing international economic order. This chapter examines the economic dimension of Canada-France relations, contrasting the two countries' foreign economic policies after the Second World War and situating these in the broader discussion of Atlanticism. French interest in securing assistance in its post-1945 recovery corresponded to a Canadian desire to expand exchanges as part of the broader multilateralist, liberalized trade policy Ottawa had adopted to ensure

* Unless otherwise indicated, all economic statistics presented in Canadian dollars.

¹ Jacques Portes, "'La Capricieuse' au Canada," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* December 1977, 31(3): 351-370; Pierre Savard, *Le Consulat Général de France à Québec et à Montréal, de 1859 à 1914* (Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1970).

overseas markets for Canadian products, not least those of the country's industrial sector that had grown significantly during the war. A parallel aim, as in the 19th century, was to restore a European economic counterweight to US influence, in this case removed by Britain's economic decline.

As occurred following the *La Capricieuse's* visit, however, ambitions for a more substantive economic relationship were frustrated by diverging responses to domestic and international economic conditions, notably greatly enhanced US economic power and Ottawa and Paris' efforts to come to terms with this, so that Canada-France economic relations stagnated in relative terms in the fifteen years after the war. France's preoccupations with its post-war recovery, not least a nationalist concern to reduce its dependence on the US and secure a leadership position on the continent, led Paris to employ a trade policy oriented increasingly toward Europe, culminating in its contribution to the founding of the European Common Market (ECM). Ottawa's liberal internationalist trade policy, intended to provide counterweights to the American profile in the Canadian economy, was frustrated as the Canada-France divergence over Atlanticism was manifested in the economic sphere. Amid Europe's growing economic integration, that of North America increased significantly too as the US offered Canada the surest markets and sources of capital, a development that by the late 1950s had spawned nationalist concerns, not least about the implications for Canada's independence.

Great Expectations

The foremost characteristic of the post-1945 international economic order was American predominance.² Convinced that a sustainable peace depended on a prosperity realizable only through multilateral, liberalized trade, Washington worked to establish a framework beneficial to Western capitalist states. Interested more “in ‘the exigencies of economic interdependence’, than ‘the claims of national independence’,” this was to be achieved through the institutions that emerged from the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the ill-fated International Trade Organization (ITO), which were to assist in reconstituting independent centres of power in Europe and Asia and integrate them into an international liberal capitalist order under the influence of its new American hegemonic manager.³

Canada emerged from the war in a strengthened economic position both relatively and absolutely as a result of extensive wartime diversification and expansion described as “Canada’s second industrial revolution”; the value of its industrial production had more than doubled and now accounted for more than a third

² Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (Unwin Hyman, 1988), 357; Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (McGraw-Hill, 1968), 41. US GNP in constant 1939 dollars rose from US\$88.6 billion to US\$135 billion by 1945. American productive capacity grew by fifty percent and physical output of goods by more than this. The war made the US dollar an international reserve currency; foreign official holdings rocketed from negligible amounts before the war to US\$3 billion by 1946. By 1947, Washington held seventy percent of global gold reserves.

³ David Ellwood, “The American Challenge and the Origins of the Politics of Growth,” in *Making the New Europe: European Unity and the Second World War*, M.L. Smith and Peter M.R. Stirk, eds. (Pinter Publishers, 1990), 186-188; Anthony D. Smith, “Towards a Global Culture?” in *Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, Mike Featherstone, ed. (Sage Publications, 1990), 172; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Clarendon Press, 1997), 36-39; Donald Cameron Watt, “US Globalism: The End of the Concert of Europe,” *American Unbound: World War II and the Making of a Superpower*, Warren F. Kimball, ed. (St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 46-48; Randall Bennett Woods, *A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946* (UNC Press, 1990).

of the Canadian economy.⁴ Ottawa endorsed and participated in the establishment of the post-war international economic order as a convinced disciple of multilateral, liberalized trade as the prerequisite for peace.⁵

As in the political sphere, Canadian liberal internationalism was inspired partly by nationalist concerns. Beyond a belief informed by the experience of the 1930s that protectionism had potentially disastrous results, Ottawa was motivated to find secure export markets to ensure Canada's post-war reconstruction and prosperity.⁶ Canadian liberal multilateralism was also inspired by the new economic conjuncture: measures such as the 1941 *Hyde Park Declaration*, which continentalized defence production, had accelerated North American economic interdependence. Similarly, the UK's dire situation meant Ottawa had effectively lost its traditional European counterweight to US economic influence, and hence had an interest in an international regime that facilitated the diversification of Canada's foreign economic relations and thereby diluted American influence.⁷

⁴ Lawrence Aronsen, "From World War to Cold War: Cooperation and Competition in the North Atlantic Triangle, 1945-1949," *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956*, B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1996), 194. The war resulted in five thousand new manufacturing plants, and the total value of industrial production increased from \$3.4 to \$8.25 billion. Also, Michael Hart, *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization* (UBC Press, 2002), 128. From 1939 to 1945, the value of Canadian exports more than tripled, from \$922 million to \$3.17 billion. This outpaced the growth of imports, which more than doubled from \$736 million to \$1.5 billion.

⁵ Aronsen (1996), 189, 192.

⁶ Government of Canada, Minister of Reconstruction, *Employment and Income, with special reference to the initial period of reconstruction* (King's Printer, 1945); Hart (2002), 133.

⁷ For discussion of the *Hyde Park Declaration*, see J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945*, second edition (University of Toronto Press, 1990), 132-145; R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, *Ties that Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime from the Great War to the Cold War* (Hakkert, 1977), 69-92. For an account of the decline of Anglo-Canadian trade and its implications for post-war Canadian foreign economic policy, see: B.W. Muirhead, *The Development of Postwar Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European Option*, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 16-46; Hart (2002), 145-170; Aronsen (1996), 189-192; R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, *American Dollars – Canadian Prosperity: Canadian-American Economic Relations 1945-1950* (Samuel-Stevens, 1978), 21-140.

Indicative of North America's growing interdependence was Canada's 1947-1948 balance of payments crisis, caused by the massive amount of US imports purchased by Canadians and the UK's decision to end the convertibility of the Pound. The situation was resolved when Washington agreed that European countries could use US aid funds to purchase Canadian goods, assuring Ottawa a source of US currency. There were also efforts to expand the US market for Canadian products, including increased American purchases of Canadian strategic commodities such as iron ore and uranium. Free trade negotiations, however, were quashed by the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, who feared this would reinforce the continentalist trend.⁸

Ottawa also began to pay attention to the advantage of American investment in Canada to remedy its US dollar shortage; efforts to increase such investment in the primary and secondary industrial sectors were undertaken on the assumption that beyond the initial investment, the resulting economic development would lead to a corresponding reduction in imports that would save additional US dollars. American demand for Canadian natural resources, new import restrictions that encouraged the growth of branch-plants, and a ten per cent devaluation of the Canadian dollar in 1949 provided further stimulus to US investment, so that Ottawa's balance of payments situation improved dramatically by the early 1950s. The Liberal Government was reluctant to hamper the flow of US capital; mindful of the domestic political benefits of prosperity, Ottawa was aware that the size of Canada's debt

⁸ Aronsen (1992), 182-183.

limited its ability to spend on economic development, and that Western European sources of capital were diminished.⁹

Canada's challenge in responding to preponderant US economic power after the war was dwarfed by that of France, which faced "a fragmented market, a shattered industry, [and] exhausted work force."¹⁰ By the end of 1945 Paris was forced to seek a US\$550 million loan from the US Export-Import Bank to finance essential purchases of machines and raw materials. France's weakness and accompanying dependence was underscored by the 1946 Blum-Byrnes Agreement, which effectively extinguished France's wartime debt and provided a second Export-Import Bank loan of US\$650 million, but unlike the December 1945 loan, came at the price of agreeing to American proposals on international trade in advance of the talks to establish the ITO, and undertaking a number of measures to liberalize French commercial policy.¹¹

Deteriorating economic condition in France in 1947 accompanied labour unrest and growing communist strength in French politics, and led to Washington's Marshall Plan. The ensuing European Recovery Program (ERP) meant French security and prosperity depended more than ever on US aid; between 1948 and 1952 France received \$US2.63 billion, or twenty per cent of Marshall Plan aid. The

⁹ Aronsen (1992), 173-185. Between 1948 and 1950, forty-two American companies worth more than \$1 million established Canadian operations; Muirhead (1992), 128-129.

¹⁰ Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 18-21. In the seventy-four *départements* touched by the war, a quarter of all buildings had been destroyed and a million families were homeless; less than half the railways were serviceable, 7500 bridges were destroyed, and coal production had collapsed. Most telling was the index of industrial production: from a base of 100 in 1938, this had fallen to 38 in 1944 – even more catastrophic when one considers the Depression-era economy of the late 1930s.

¹¹ Frances M.B. Lynch, *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome* (Routledge, 1997), 40-47. The trade liberalization measures included the enacting of new *ad valorem* tariffs that would not increase protection above pre-1939 levels, the abandonment of import quotas except when France's balance of payments was under threat, and the abandonment of the subsidization of exports and taxation of imports to compensate for the over-valued franc. Also, Rioux (1987), 83-85.

provisions of the 1948 Franco-American agreement regarding the ERP, however, were perceived by French deputies as the expression of a “colonizing” intent.¹²

During this period, French foreign economic policy was driven by a preoccupation with recovery. Free French elements in London and Algiers during the war developed a *dirigiste* strategy integrating free enterprise with state planning. The 1947 Monnet Plan, which sought to enlist US support in French reconstruction efforts, outlined a recovery programme comprising newly nationalized and non-nationalized sectors of the economy that envisaged France as the dominant continental economic power, in partnership with the Anglo-Americans.¹³

Reconstruction issues thus dominated Canada-France economic relations immediately after the war. The conflict had disrupted the limited Canada-France relations that had existed before 1939. Exchanges came to a virtual halt, and those that endured were almost entirely unidirectional, in the form of Canadian aid to the Free French.¹⁴ French appreciation of Canadian economic power was reflected in an MAE report noting that Canada had emerged from the war as one of the world’s great

¹² Lynch (1997), 52-58; Rioux (1987), 114, 133-134; Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945*, translated by Michael Shaw (Continuum, 1980), 75-81; Brian A. McKenzie, *Remaking France: Americanization, public diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan* (Berghahn Books, 2005); William Burr, “Marshall Planners and the Politics of Empire: The United States and French Financial Policy, 1948,” *Diplomatic History* 1991, 15(4): 495-522.

¹³ William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (UNC Press, 1998), 15, 22-24; 39. Lynch (1997), 72-102; Andrew Williams, “France and the New World Order, 1940-1947,” *Modern and Contemporary France* 2000, 8(2): 191-202.

¹⁴ Jean Vinant, *De Jacques Cartier à Péchiney, Histoire de la coopération économique franco-canadienne* (Chotard & Associés Éditeurs, 1985); Philippe Prévost, *La France et le Canada: D’une après-guerre à l’autre, 1918-1944* (Les Éditions du Blé, 1994), 414-420. In 1943, Canada exported \$74.5 million of goods to French North Africa. The following year, an agreement extended Canadian “Mutual Aid” to the Free French. By the end of the programme in September 1945, France had received almost \$24 million in assistance in the form of ship armaments, army uniforms and equipment, and the shipment of wheat and agricultural material to North Africa.

industrial powers.¹⁵ Canadian shipyards assisted in replacing France's merchant marine, and de Gaulle's visits in 1944 and 1945 were dominated by efforts to secure Canadian assistance for reconstruction.¹⁶

Following French official overtures in March 1945, discussions in Ottawa led to Canada extending France a thirty-year loan of \$242.5 million under the *Export Credit Act* to facilitate the purchase of Canadian goods.¹⁷ Consistent with Canada's wartime mutual aid policy, this loan, which accounted for forty-five percent of the monies paid out under the legislation, was a case of enlightened self-interest, reflecting Ottawa's preoccupation to secure export markets and restore the European counterweight to Canada's economic relations with the US.¹⁸

Canadian motivations were underscored when the French inquired about the prospects for a second loan almost simultaneous to the concluding of the April 1946 formal agreement for the first.¹⁹ Ottawa's response was a sympathetic no. The first loan had caused some hesitation from Canadian officials sceptical of the potential trade benefits, and a second loan was considered even less commercially justified. The Minister of Trade and Commerce, C.D. Howe, recommended against the proposal, arguing that Ottawa had already extended substantial aid and a second loan

¹⁵ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949; MAE, v. 51 – Telegram from Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 23 March 1945.

¹⁶ Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général De Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981), 14; Vinant (1985), 94.

¹⁷ MAE, v. 53 – Telegram from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 14 March 1945; MAE, v. 53 – Telegram from Monnet, French Embassy, Washington to MAE, Amérique, 29 July 1945; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Draft Memorandum on Canada-France Bilateral Relations since World War II, 28 November 1963. The April 1946 agreement was preceded by a "gentleman's agreement" in October 1945 enabling Paris to benefit immediately from the aid. Prévost (1994), 424.

¹⁸ Vinant (1985), 97; Prévost (1994), 419-420; Lescop (1981), 19; Granatstein (1990), 313. Canadian mutual aid to France, valued at \$24 million, was dwarfed by the \$723 million in aid that the UK received from Canada under the programme in 1943-44.

¹⁹ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-C(s) – Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 29 April 1946.

could risk Canada's economic health and be poorly received by the public.²⁰ The negative response was apparently well-received by French officials. Paris withdrew the request, and Canadian and French officials agreed that there would be no public reference to the episode to avoid any awkwardness.²¹

Although Ottawa expressed willingness to give "sympathetic consideration" to a future loan, this was predicated on Paris removing certain trade restrictions.²² However, when the French Ambassador, Jean de Hauteclocque, met with the Minister of Finance, J.L. Ilsey, and the DEA's Under-secretary, Lester Pearson, to discuss the matter the following year, the response remained negative. A majority of the Canadian Cabinet and senior officials understood Paris' situation but believed there were other ways to assist.²³ The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, told de Hauteclocque that beyond financial and economic concerns, notably Canada's balance of payments worries, there were political considerations, including the fact that Ottawa was being asked to provide military aid to Greece and Turkey.²⁴

Frustrated Ambitions

If Canadian post-war aid to France was motivated partly by its desire for French markets, this was part of a broader strategy to establish a multilateral, liberalized international economic order. The failure of the ITO as a result of US

²⁰ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-C(s) – Letter from Howe to Robertson, 3 May 1946; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-C(s) – Letter from Mackenzie, Deputy Minister, Trade and Commerce to Robertson, 3 May 1946. Mackenzie noted that on a per capita basis, Canadian aid to France to that point was much greater than that of the US. Also, Lescop (1981), 19.

²¹ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-C(s) – Memorandum from Robertson for King, 8 May 1946

²² DEA, A-3-b, v. 5693, 1-C(s) – Memorandum from Heeney, Secretary to the Cabinet to Robertson, 7 May 1946.

²³ MAE, v. 54 – Telegram from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, 28 February 1947.

²⁴ MAE, v. 54 – Telegram from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, 4 March 1947; MAE, v. 54 – Telegram from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, 12 April 1947.

congressional opposition threatened this goal, as did European reluctance to reduce non-tariff trade barriers as part of the subsequent provisional solution of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Combined with Canada's balance of payments troubles with the US, this forced Ottawa into a more pragmatic approach that increased North American economic integration, thereby heightening concerns about Canadian reliance on the US.²⁵

These concerns reinforced Canadian Atlanticism's economic dimension. Believing that Western cooperation in the military sphere would be strengthened by that in the economic, and mindful of Ottawa's need to obtain US aid dollars the Europeans were spending, Ottawa insisted on the inclusion of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The provision envisaged an economically-interdependent North Atlantic community that would help realize the goal of multilateral liberalized trade and restore the European counterweight in Canadian economic relations.²⁶

Despite high Canadian hopes, the bid for greater transatlantic economic integration that Article 2 represented went unrealized, a failure consistent with the stagnation of Canada's economic relations with Western Europe that resulted from the Europeans' preoccupation with encouraging intra-European trade, and their tendency to use Marshall Plan aid to purchase US goods.²⁷ In July 1950, the European Payments Union (EPU), a multilateral monetary exchange clearing system facilitating compensatory payments between the central banks of member states, was

²⁵ Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, *Canada since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism* (University of Toronto Press, 1981), 89; Aronsen (1996), 193. For a discussion of Canada's role in the stillborn ITO and the emergence of the GATT, see Hart (2002), 131-141.

²⁶ Muirhead (1992), 47-75; Erika Simpson, "The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson," *Journal of Canadian Studies* Spring 1999, 34(1): 82.

²⁷ Muirhead (1992), 109. Exports to the Benelux group, France, Germany and Italy accounted for eight percent of total Canadian merchandise exports in 1947, the last pre-ERP year, declined to under four percent in 1950, and were only six percent by 1955.

established to encourage trade within Western Europe. Something of “a club for systemic discrimination against payments to the dollar area,” the organization fostered a sense of European financial solidarity in response to IMF and US influence, all of which ran counter to Ottawa’s liberal multilateralism.²⁸

This dynamic was present in Canada-France relations, as Ottawa and Paris’ diverging commercial policies and priorities frustrated ambitions for a more substantive relationship. The immediate concern following the normalization of economic relations after the war was a trade imbalance that overwhelmingly favoured Canada: in 1944, Canadian exports to France approached \$15.9 million, while only \$9,000 of French exports entered Canada. The imbalance was even greater the following year, when Canadian exports to France approached \$77 million, compared to approximately \$273,000 of imports from France (see Appendix A, Table 1).²⁹ Canadian officials agreed in August 1945 to Paris temporarily subsidizing its exports to enhance their competitiveness; however, by the end of 1946 DEA officials were telling French officials that although Ottawa understood the need to address the trade imbalance, its room for manoeuvre was limited since any measures extended were applicable to US goods due to their Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) status.³⁰

Paris’ concern about the Canada-France trade imbalance led France’s Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, to propose a bilateral committee of officials that would meet regularly to discuss developing economic relations. While C.D. Howe agreed in

²⁸ Cooper (1968), 40; Rioux (1987), 135.

²⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 3310, 9245-40, p. 1 – Memorandum for the File by T.W.L. McDermot, 6 July 1949. By 1947, with French recovery underway, the gap narrowed but remained heavily in Canada’s favour: Canadian exports to France amounted to \$81.1 million, compared to \$8.75 million in French imports.

³⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 3310, 9245-A-40 – Memorandum, 10 August 1945; MAE, v. 54 – Telegram from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, 26 December 1946.

principle at the time, there was significant bureaucratic opposition; the view in the DEA was that there was little need for a permanent committee, a point the Finance Department echoed, worrying that the proposal would lead to French requests for bilateral payments agreements and further loans.³¹ The DEA's Under-secretary, A.D.P. Heeney, told France's ambassador, Hubert Guérin, that Ottawa was open to informal consultations, but felt a permanent committee unnecessary and even potentially inconvenient in that it would compete with other consultative mechanisms; moreover, concern was expressed that too formal a structure would reduce the chance of success, citing the recently created Canada-UK Economic Committee's lack of tangible results.³²

The French proposal and the Canadian reaction were symptomatic of their diverging commercial policies. Whereas Paris viewed a bilateral approach as the most effective way to advance its interests and develop relations, Ottawa, reflecting its multilateral and Atlanticist inclinations, proposed the two countries co-operate to realize the potential of the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 2. Canadian predilections were apparent in Pearson's public calls in April 1950 for the use of the North Atlantic Treaty to assist Canada to resolve the problems in its economic relations with the US and Western Europe.³³

³¹ DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.1 – Letter from Heeney, USSEA to Mackenzie, Deputy Minister, Department of Trade and Commerce, 3 February 1950, Proposed continuing Economic Committee between Canada and France; DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Plumtre to Heeney, 21 February 1950, Proposal for Continuing Canada-France Economic Committee.

³² MAE, v. 54 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, Amérique, 30 January 1950.

³³ MAE, v. 54 – Letter from Heeney to Guérin, 28 December 1949; MAE, v. 52 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, Amérique, 6 May 1950.

Paris was anxious to see the committee established, however, and the Embassy lobbied Canadian officials persistently.³⁴ These efforts, Ottawa's interest in expanding trade, and concern that Paris could misinterpret the existence of a Canada-UK committee, combined to overcome official reticence and led to a belief in Ottawa that at least one "exploratory" meeting was required.³⁵ This was arranged, but Pearson warned Canada's ambassador, Georges Vanier, that the meeting should *not* be considered the first of a formal, permanent economic committee: although Ottawa wished to promote economic relations with France and hold meetings when appropriate, it wanted to avoid "unprofitable meetings and unnecessary trans-Atlantic journeys"; moreover, there was concern the French proposal not serve as a precedent, since Belgium was making similar overtures.³⁶

Vanier's account of the subsequent meeting suggests French officials believed the project of a permanent, formal committee was further advanced than did Ottawa. Canadian misgivings were verified when it became clear that Paris had not thought through the proposal in terms of its practical contribution to expanding exchanges. The outcome of the talks was that the French obtained a bilateral committee, but it was agreed there would not be regularly scheduled meetings.³⁷ The establishment of the Canada-France Economic Committee drew further attention to the divergence

³⁴ MAE, v. 54 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, projet de constitution d'un comité mixte économique franco-canadien, 15 December 1949; MAE, v. 54 – Note for Guérin, Compte-rendu d'un entretien avec M. Mackenzie, Sous-ministre du Trade & Commerce; DEA, A-3-b, v. 4620, 50052-40, p. 4 – Memorandum from Heeney to Campbell, 28 January 1950.

³⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.1 – Letter from Heeney to Mackenzie, 3 February 1950, Proposed continuing Economic Committee between Canada and France; DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.1 – Message from SSEA to Chairman, Canadian Delegation to GATT, Geneva, 8 March, 1950; DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.2 – Memorandum from A.E. Ritchie, Economic Division to European Division, 20 December 1952, Franco-Canadian Trade Talks.

³⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.1 – Message from SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 8 March 1950.

³⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.1 – Telegram from Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 6 April 1950.

between the two countries' post-war economic policies: Paris' push for regular meetings of a formal committee mandated to examine and direct the expansion of trade was consistent with its *dirigiste* approach to reconstruction and development. Ottawa's scepticism about the committee highlighted its preference for a multilateral, liberal policy, a point underscored during the meeting by the Canadian delegation's advocacy of a more *ad hoc* approach that emphasized the private sector's role.

The Committee's ability to fulfill its mandate and realize more robust Canada-France economic relations was thus heavily circumscribed by Ottawa and Paris' differing responses to post-war economic realities. Although there was support in some French quarters for a liberal multilateralist commercial policy, the general thrust of French economic policy was intended to boost domestic productivity and reduce the proportion of international trade as part of French GNP in order to solve the country's chronic current accounts deficit; moreover, support for liberalized trade was tempered by a determination to maintain protectionist measures until reconstruction was complete.³⁸

France's recovery was made even more difficult by the economic impact of the conflicts in Indochina and North Africa and the deepening of the Cold War, especially the eruption of the Korean War. In the early 1950s, France experienced a spike in inflation that provoked a downturn in manufacturing and exports that exacerbated its trade and current accounts deficits and depleted its dollar and gold reserves. The government of Edgar Faure also faced a ballooning budget deficit. The deteriorating situation put a brake on the tentative steps toward France's economic liberalization within the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

³⁸ Lynch (1997), 36, 111, 130.

Any move toward the convertibility of the franc was delayed, import controls removed since the end of the war were re-imposed, export subsidies for the North American market were extended to all markets, and customs duties on a number of raw materials, suspended after the war to facilitate reconstruction, were re-imposed in March 1953. Between 1952 and 1957, France was one of the most protected OEEC members.³⁹

Another effect of the difficult French economic situation was its turn – albeit not without reluctance – toward Europe. During its 1947 balance of payments crisis, the French offered to form a customs union with any CEEC member. Subsequent French reluctance regarding the US-backed EPU had been overcome by the realization of Paris' proposed European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which in addition to establishing France's leadership of the European integration movement, offered the prospect of economic liberalization in a larger protected environment.⁴⁰

A consequence of French economic nationalism and the growing orientation of its commercial policy toward Europe was the relative stagnation of Canada-France economic relations. Canada's commodity exports were affected by Paris' re-imposition of customs duties; Canadian exports to France declined from approximately \$48 million in 1952 to \$32 million in 1953 (see Appendix A, Table 2).⁴¹ The trend toward integration reinforced the intra-European orientation of Western European commercial policy. In 1953, only eleven per cent of total imports

³⁹ DEA, A-3-b, v. 2492, 10463-P-40 – Annual Review of Events in France for 1951, April 1952; DEA, A-3-b, v. 2492, 10463-P-40 – Annual Review of Events in France for 1952, March 2, 1953; Lynch (1997), 128, 133-136; Hitchcock (1998), 148.

⁴⁰ Lynch (1997), 104, 124.

⁴¹ DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-40, p. 2.1 – Report by R.G.C. Smith, Commercial Counsellor, Canadian Embassy, Paris, 27 April 1953; DEA, A-4, v. 3495, 19-1-B-1954(1) – Economic and International Trade Position of France, 18 January 1954.

from dollar countries (e.g. Canada) into OEEC countries were free from quantitative restrictions, compared with seventy-one percent of intra-European trade. As an EPU member, France had little incentive to proceed on currency convertibility and liberalizing trade; beyond a feared inability to compete with the US, the excuse proffered was that French dollar shortages and the imperatives of reconstruction made such discrimination necessary. French exports to EPU members increased by forty-two percent between 1952 and 1954, a rate far exceeding that of exports to dollar countries. Similarly, French manufactured exports to West Germany doubled over the same period, notwithstanding a general decline of France's exports owing to its economic difficulties.⁴²

By the mid-1950s, with Western Europe reviving as an economic power, Paris considered continued discrimination against the dollar zone as necessary protection for France's higher-cost economy and the encouragement of intra-European trade.⁴³ French officials played for time regarding the convertibility of the franc to give Paris the chance to bring its external and internal finances into line and develop policies to cope with the larger commercial implications of convertibility, not least being the anticipated loss of much of the protection that France's industry enjoyed in its overseas territories, which still absorbed more than a third of French exports.⁴⁴

Ottawa was annoyed at Paris' reluctance, compared to the majority of the other West European states, to move on currency convertibility. The deleterious impact of French economic policies on Canada's exports prompted Pearson to express concern to Guérin about Ottawa and Paris' "noticeable divergence" over

⁴² Lynch (1997), 125, 144; Cooper (1968), 39; Muirhead (1992), 109-114.

⁴³ Muirhead (1992), 127-129.

⁴⁴ Lynch (1997), 141.

commercial policy, and urge “the speediest possible development of multilateral trade on the broadest possible basis.”⁴⁵ Although Paris liberalized eleven per cent of its import trade in January 1956, which favoured Canadian exports, Ottawa considered the measure only a first step; moreover, the deepening of the Algerian War, the near cessation of US aid and the disastrous 1956 harvest ended the relative stability that the French economy had achieved in the mid-1950s, reinforcing the protectionist impulse.⁴⁶

An example of French economic nationalism and the frustration this caused in Ottawa was Paris’ decision to accord favourable treatment to synthetic rubber imports from two US firms in exchange for their aiding in the establishment of a French plant; effectively banning Canadian imports, the move was considered to risk a twenty per cent reduction of total Canadian exports to France. When Ottawa protested, French officials expressed regret but noted that the Canadian supplier, the Crown corporation *Polymer*, had declined an invitation to participate.⁴⁷

Ottawa lobbied against the measure and threatened retaliatory measures, arguing the French move contravened the GATT.⁴⁸ With Ottawa and Paris at an impasse, Canada’s ambassador, Pierre Dupuy, regretted Ottawa’s failure to proceed with a formal challenge, arguing it would encourage French protectionism, and that Paris and *Polymer*’s moves toward a bilateral settlement constituted an abandonment

⁴⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 7157, 9245-40, p. 3.1 – Letter from Pearson to Guérin, 8 September 1955.

⁴⁶ MAE, v. 103 – Affaires Économiques et Financières, Note: Relations Économiques entre l’Union Française et le Canada, 20 February 1957; DEA, G-2, v. 7157, 9245-40, p. 3.1 – Letter from Bull, Deputy Minister, Trade and Commerce, to Treuil, Commercial Counsellor, French Embassy, Ottawa, 27 January 1956; Lynch (1997), 128.

⁴⁷ MAE, v. 143 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 25 March 1958.

⁴⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 7158, 9245-40, p. 5 – Message from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 13 June 1958, France Synthetic Rubber; MAE, v. 143 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 25 June 1958, Caoutchouc Synthétique.

of the multilateral principle, and a “most serious precedent” that could be employed in other sectors.⁴⁹ Although France’s ambassador, Francis Lacoste, was called in for an extraordinary joint meeting with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sidney Smith, and the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Gordon Churchill, to be told of Ottawa’s concern, the impasse endured, with Lacoste justifying the measure by referring to French post-war recovery efforts and its trade imbalance with Canada. Ultimately, the matter was resolved when *Polymer* reached an agreement with Paris.⁵⁰

The trade imbalance that continued to favour Canada increased Paris’ temptation to discriminate. An MAE memorandum ascribed the persistent relative weakness of France’s exports to Canada to the high level and instability of French prices, insufficient commercial methods, and French industry’s fear of competing in the Canadian market.⁵¹ Ongoing discussions, notably the meetings of the Canada-France Economic Committee, and greater French awareness of opportunities in the Canadian market, produced some results: Canada’s Embassy in Paris estimated that France’s exports to Canada in 1951 would reach \$25 million, more than double the previous year; however, the apparent progress was belied by their continued relative stagnation: Canadian exports to France remained greater (see Appendix A, Table 3).⁵²

⁴⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 7158, 9245-40, p. 5 – Letter, Personal & Confidential from Dupuy to Robertson, 24 November 1958; DEA, G-2, v. 7158, 9245-40, p. 5 – Dispatch from Charge d’Affaires A.I., Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, 7 August 1958, Synthetic Rubber – France; MAE, v. 143 – Telegram (2) from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 31 January 1959. Indeed, Lacoste, noted to his superiors that French trade specialists felt France’s position was weak and would not withstand a Canadian GATT challenge.

⁵⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 7158, 9245-40, p. 5, Memorandum from Robertson for the Minister, 22 January 1959, Protest to the French Government Regarding Restrictions on Canadian Exports of Synthetic Rubber to France; MAE, v. 143 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 31 January 1959; DEA, G-2, v. 7158, 9245-40, p. 5.2 – Dispatch from Dupuy, Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, 23 June 1959, Synthetic Rubber.

⁵¹ MAE, v. 142 – Note: Relations Économiques Franco-Canadiennes, 28 February 1957.

⁵² DEA, G-2, v. 3310, 9245-40, p. 1 – Letter from Manion, Commercial Secretary, Canadian Embassy, Paris to Heasman, Director, Trade Commissioner Service, 18 October 1951. Manion’s forecast slightly over-estimated French exports.

A part of Paris' response was to seek indirect aid through off-shore procurement programs from dollar zone countries, hoping to improve its balance of payments through American and Canadian purchases of French military equipment. Ottawa was unenthusiastic about the French requests. While it made a *pro forma* effort, Pearson believed the French proposal should be discouraged given its bilateral attributes and the growing integration of North America's defence sector.⁵³ Instead, Ottawa reaffirmed its liberal internationalism during the March 1953 visit of France's Prime Minister, René Mayer, arguing that the dilemmas of Canada-France economic relations could not be solved within a narrow bilateral framework, and that Paris should adopt a multilateral approach. Nonetheless, it was agreed during talks between C.D. Howe and France's Finance Minister, Maurice Bourgès-Manoury, that the Canada-France Economic Committee would examine the trade balance issue.⁵⁴

Although Guérin reported enthusiastically on the committee's October 1953 meeting, the results were meagre: Ottawa undertook to examine but refused ultimately to grant the French requests for tariff concessions, given the Department of Finance's position that the requests were unreasonable and would have to be extended to other countries. Guérin claimed that the meeting highlighted the obstacles to a rapid development of French exports and redressment of the trade imbalance: French

⁵³ DEA, G-2, v. 4502, 50030-L-40, p. 7 – Memorandum for File, by A.E. Ritchie, Economic Division, 15 November 1952; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5872, 50163-40, p. 1.2 – Telex from Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 30 March 1953; DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Wilgress to Pearson, 11 March 1953; DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – Memorandum for the European Division, 23 March 1953; DEA, A-4, v. 3493, 18-1-D-FRA 1953/1 – Briefing for French Ministerial Visit, March 1953. For discussion of the integration of the North American defence sector, see Cuff and Granatstein (1978), 140-178.

⁵⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.2 – Memorandum from Meagher, Economic Division, to C. Ritchie and MacDonnell, 27 March 1953, Franco-Canadian Trade Balance; DEA, A-3-b, v. 5872, 50163-40, p. 1.2 – Letter from Beaupre, Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Defence Production, to Bull, Deputy Minister, Trade and Commerce, 31 March 1953; DEA, G-2, v. 3284, 6956-40, p. 1 – French Ministerial Visit, Talks on Economic and Financial Questions, 2 April 1953.

prices were too high and its products squeezed out by British, American, and West German competitors, and that the limited amount of French capital invested in Canada meant that the Canadian market for France was “riche de possibilités, mais secondaire,” and France’s economy remained of marginal interest to Canadians.⁵⁵

Ongoing worry over the volume of French exports to Canada prompted Ottawa to grant Paris’ request that French goods not be subjected to dumping duties in response to the rebate French industry received for social security charges. Conceived as a temporary exemption, the issue became another irritant between Ottawa and Paris.⁵⁶ During discussion of an extension of the exemption, Pearson was informed by his Under-secretary, Jules Léger, of the consensus among Canadian officials that Paris was not displaying “sufficient awareness of the importance of more liberal commercial policies being pursued by the leading trading nations” and was “less conscious than [it] should be of the Canadian point of view.”⁵⁷ A senior Department of Finance official stated it was “difficult to see why we should deliberately discriminate in favour of a country which so resolutely maintains its rights to discriminate against us.”⁵⁸

Despite Ottawa’s belief that the exemption ran contrary to liberal principles, and a fear that Canada could be compelled to extend similar treatment to US imports, the extension was granted, stemming largely from apprehension over the potential

⁵⁵ MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Guérin to Bidault, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 27 October 1953, de la commission mixte franco-canadienne; DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-G-40 – Despatch from SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 3 December 1953, Canada-France Trade Talks; DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-40, p. 2.1 – Letter from Plumptre, Director, International Economic Relations Division, Department of Finance, to A.E. Ritchie, Economic Division, DEA, 10 June 1954.

⁵⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-40, p. 2.2 – Message from SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 11 September 1954; MAE, v. 142 – Note: Relations économiques franco-canadiennes, 28 February 1957.

⁵⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 7157, 9245-40, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Léger to the Minister, 8 September 1955, French Social Security Tax.

⁵⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-40, p. 2.2 – Memorandum from Plumptre to Harris, 23 August 1955.

impact on French exports that would result from their increased price.⁵⁹ The dispute endured, and even became bound up in French purchases of Canadian wheat when Lacoste successfully lobbied Paris to place a significant wheat order to encourage Ottawa to grant a long-term exemption.⁶⁰ The irritant was only resolved after Paris ceased reimbursing French exporters for social security charges.⁶¹

The relative stagnation of Canada-France economic relations was apparent by the late 1950s, a result of Canada's liberal economic policies and Paris' bounded liberal approach. In 1958, France ranked eleventh as the destination for Canadian exports, taking only \$45.2 million worth of goods, in stark contrast to the \$2.83 billion shipped to the US. Historian Bruce Muirhead argues that the poor showing of French exports to Canada, albeit inferior to those of the UK and West Germany, was consistent with a broader lack of West European interest (relative to that reserved for European markets) in the rapidly expanding Canadian market's demand for manufactured and semi-manufactured products.⁶² The relative stagnation of Canada-France trade was matched by the paucity of direct investments between the two countries. Between 1953 and 1963, French investment in Canada was a modest \$40

⁵⁹ MAE, v. 142 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 11 February 1956; MAE, v. 142 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 5 October 1956. MAE, v. 142 – Note: Relations Économiques Franco-Canadiennes, 28 February 1957. Paris estimated imposition of the duties would result in the volume of French exports to Canada falling by one-third to a half.

⁶⁰ MAE, v. 142 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 27 November 1956; MAE, v. 142 – Telegram from Wormser, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, Service de Coopération Économique, to French Embassy, Ottawa, 26 February 1957, Achats de blé au Canada; MAE, v. 142 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 2 May 1957; DEA, G-2, v. 7158, 9245-40, p. 4.1 – Department of Trade and Commerce, Interoffice Correspondence from Wm. Frederick Bull to C.M. Isibster, 3 May 1957; DEA, G-2, v. 7158, 9245-40, p. 4.1 – Record of Cabinet Decision, Meeting of May 9th, 1957, French Social Security Taxes and Canadian Dumping Duty.

⁶¹ MAE, v. 142 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 12 November 1957; MAE, v. 142 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 13 November 1957.

⁶² Muirhead (1992), 132; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book 1960* (Queen's Printer 1960), 1003-1004. The value (in millions of dollars) of these countries' exports to Canada in 1958 was as follows: United Kingdom \$526.6; West Germany \$105.9. The value of France's exports to Canada was \$41 million. By comparison, the value of US exports to Canada exceeded \$3.57 billion.

million, accounting for only three per cent of foreign direct investment in Canada by 1957. This compared to an equally modest FF130 million of Canadian investments in France, most of which were linked to large US interests.⁶³

Diverging Integration

The Canada-France divergence over foreign economic policy was underscored by the establishment of the European Common Market (ECM). Emerging out of the post-war European unity movement heralded by the 1950 Schuman Plan and that led to the EPU and the establishment the following year of the ECSC, it was a measure of French economic nationalism that Paris was initially reluctant to establish a common market among the six ECSC partners, fearing West Germany would dominate. Facing increasing pressure from its OEEC partners to liberalize, however, and fearing that having already provoked the failure of the European Defence Community, a French rejection of the common market would isolate it within Europe, Paris engaged in the common market negotiations. During the course of the talks, it became clear that West German concessions held out the prospect of an economic sphere and continental bloc in which France could hold preponderant influence. French interest received a further negative boost from the US economic pressure during and after the Suez Crisis, which demonstrated the need to reduce Paris' economic dependence on Washington, and served as an additional spur to the negotiations that culminated in

⁶³ MAE, v. 103 – Affaires Économiques et Financières, Note: Relations Économiques entre l'Union Française et le Canada, 20 February 1957; Pierre-Yves Pépin, "Les relations économiques franco-canadiennes: données récentes et perspectives," *L'Actualité Économique* 1964, 40(3): 485-486. A contemporary article remarked upon the dilemma that although there was room for an increase in French exports to Canada, these would remain relatively limited until there was greater French investment in the country. Jean Mehling, "Remarques sur le commerce franco-canadien et les importations canadiennes," *L'Actualité économique* 1958-1959, 34(4): 614-617.

the *Treaty of Rome* (1957), which provided for the establishment of a common market consisting of France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries.⁶⁴

Although Canadian decision-makers favoured Europe's economic integration in the abstract, their support was predicated on it occurring within an Atlanticist framework, so that a recovered, united Europe would counter-balance the US in Canada's economic relations. The record of intra-European organizations such as the EPU prompted anxiety over the potential for increased barriers against Canadian exports to Europe, and the prospects for liberalized multilateral trade.⁶⁵ Mindful of the Canadian economy's need for overseas markets, Ottawa was concerned transatlantic trade was being "sacrificed on the altar of European reconstruction and integration."⁶⁶

Consequently, Ottawa's relative neutrality in the early stage was replaced by growing disquiet as the ECM emerged, with the new entity's protectionist elements ascribed to French influence. St. Laurent voiced support for the ECM during the 1957 visit of France's Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, but expressed concern that it might become a source of agricultural protectionism. Paris was aware of Canadian preoccupations, with the MAE noting that Ottawa suspected French activities even while claiming to follow the integration project "with interest and sympathy."⁶⁷

The Treaty of Rome institutionalized the dynamic of post-war Canada-France economic relations: Canadian liberal multilateralism was trumped by a French

⁶⁴ Jeffrey Glen Giauque, *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Europe, 1955-1963* (UNC Press, 2002), 19-33; Grosser (1980), 119-128; 144; Lynch (1997), 137, 169-183.

⁶⁵ Muirhead (1992), 112.

⁶⁶ Hart (2002), 155.

⁶⁷ Muirhead (1992), 164, 174; DEA, G-2, v. 7791, 12515-40 – Memorandum from Léger to European Division, 4 March 1957; MAE, v. 143 – Affaires Économiques et Financières, Note: Problèmes de l'économie canadienne en 1958, Rapports avec la France, 29 October 1958.

protectionism within a supranational European framework, as the ECM members moved toward internal free trade and a common external tariff structure. Canadian efforts on behalf of multilateral, liberalized trade had ended in disappointment and the implementation of a *de facto* regional trade bloc. Paradoxically, West European protectionism was fuelling North America's economic integration: faced with nationalist economic policies such as those France employed, and the need for export markets considered crucial for Canadian prosperity, the web of Canada-US economic links only expanded.⁶⁸

This dynamic contributed to a growing nationalist reaction in Canada against US influence. Ambassador Guérin cited the extensive press coverage of the October 1953 meeting of the France-Canada Economic Commission as proof of growing Canadian worries over North American integration, especially a *La Presse* editorial expressing misgivings that Canada's economic relations were so weighted toward the US.⁶⁹ St. Laurent expressed his personal concern to Guérin about Canada's dependence on the US, and his desire to increase trade with France.⁷⁰ His remarks to the diplomat came amid Ottawa's decision to establish the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects that Walter Gordon chaired. Although at the beginning of 1956 a Gallup poll indicated that nearly seven-tenths of Canadians believed US investment was good for Canadian economic development, this changed following the rancorous parliamentary debate over American involvement in the construction of the trans-Canadian natural gas pipeline, and the release of the Gordon

⁶⁸ Muirhead (1992), 109, 164, 176. Canadian exports to the US boomed, from thirty-eight percent of total exports in 1947 to sixty-five percent in 1960.

⁶⁹ MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Guérin to Bidault, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 27 October 1953, de la commission mixte franco-canadienne.

⁷⁰ MAE, v. 141 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, Amérique, 27 September 1955.

Commission's preliminary report at the end of the year, which warned of the US dominance of the post-1945 growth of foreign direct investment. The Progressive Conservative opposition seized upon nationalist worries about the potential implications for Canada's economic development, living standard, and independence arising from North America's accelerating economic integration, accusing the Liberals of allowing Canada to "inexorably drift into economic continentalism."⁷¹

The economic dimension of the Canadian nationalist response to post-1945 realities was a crucial factor in the 1957 election of the Diefenbaker Government, which promised to stem the growing continentalism and revitalize economic relations with Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth. Diefenbaker conveyed these intentions to other Commonwealth leaders during their June 1957 meeting in London; carried away perhaps by events, the Prime Minister announced spontaneously that Canada would divert fifteen percent of its import trade from the US to the UK.⁷²

Diefenbaker's proposed trade diversion was interpreted in French circles as confirming the new government's desire for greater economic independence from the US.⁷³ Ottawa's preoccupation with stemming the continentalist tide was also reflected in Diefenbaker's using his 1958 encounter with de Gaulle to voice support for European economic and political integration but also express concern over the "Fortress Europe" that could result from the ECM's common external tariff. When de Gaulle responded by citing Ottawa's maintenance of the imperial preference,

⁷¹ Stephen Azzi, *Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism* (McGill-Queen's Press, 1999), 34-65; Aronsen (1992), 185-187; English (1992), 190.

⁷² Tim Rooth, "Britain, Europe, and Diefenbaker's Trade Diversion Proposals, 1957-1958," in *Canada and the End of Empire*, Phillip Buckner, ed. (UBC Press, 2005), 117-132; H. Basil Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (University of Toronto Press, 1989), 10-14.

⁷³ MAE, v. 128 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 9 July 1957.

Diefenbaker replied that the system was minor and largely sentimental, and that France had a history of far more restrictive practices.⁷⁴

Notwithstanding Canadian frustration over French protectionism or the Diefenbaker Government's emphasis of the Commonwealth link, Ottawa remained interested in France as part of the effort to diversify Canadian trade. The 1958 European Monetary Agreement that replaced the EPU facilitated full currency convertibility; in addition to heralding the recovery of Western European economies and currencies, it also held out the prospect of greater opportunities for expanded transatlantic trade.⁷⁵

France's improving economic situation fuelled Canadian hopes for expanded relations.⁷⁶ The Rueff-Pinay economic stabilization programme enacted after de Gaulle's return to power helped control inflation, stabilized the franc at a lower level, and liberalized trade. Among the measures enacted were the convertibility of the franc for non-resident accounts and the removal of import restrictions, which virtually eliminated this aspect of French discrimination against the dollar area. Canadian exports to France nearly doubled, from \$43 million in 1959 to \$73 million in 1960.⁷⁷ The more equitable trade balance with Canada that Paris had sought since the war's

⁷⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 7045, 6956-A-40 – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 6 November 1958, Diefenbaker-De Gaulle Talks; DDF, 1958, v. 2 – Document 314, Compte Rendu de l'entretien du Général de Gaulle et de M. Diefenbaker, Premier Ministre du Canada, le 5 novembre 1958, à l'Hôtel Matignon.

⁷⁵ Cooper (1968), 39-40.

⁷⁶ Rioux (1987), 321-323. By 1958, industrial production was more than double its 1938 level; from 1950 to 1959, industrial output grew by more than fifty percent, an annual rate of around six percent. French industry had never experienced such rapid growth.

⁷⁷ MAE, v. 144 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 21 March 1961, Exportations canadiennes en France. Also, Hart (2002), 219. By comparison, the value of Canadian exports to the US for the same period decreased slightly, and there was only a slight increase in the value of goods shipped to the UK.

end was finally achieved in 1959, when French exports outpaced those from Canada to France (see Appendix A, Table 2).⁷⁸

Bill Crean of the Canadian Embassy praised the French economic performance; while conceding that protectionist impulses remained, he suggested that the new Gaullist regime meant Ottawa could look forward to dealing with a France that was “at least as liberal” as other ECM members, and opined that France’s success would ensure that the new entity would not be protectionist.⁷⁹ De Gaulle’s 1960 visit to Canada was viewed in the DEA as a good opportunity to breathe new life into Canada-France economic relations, and Paris was aware that the Diefenbaker Government’s declared objective was to free the Canadian economy, at least partially, from “la tutelle américaine.”⁸⁰

Despite such hopes, however, the reality was that the growing regionalization of international trade oriented Canada and France increasingly toward their respective continents. In 1957, nearly sixty percent of Canadian exports went to the US, from which Canada purchased more than seventy percent of its imports. By comparison, between 1958 and 1963, the EEC never absorbed more than approximately eight percent of Canadian exports, and was the source of only five per cent of Canada’s imports. The Diefenbaker Government’s economic nationalism was more apparent than real and North America’s interdependence deepened. Paris noted the evident

⁷⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 7666, 11562-126-40, p. 1.2 – Briefing Book on France-Canada Relations, 7 April 1960; Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Fayard, 1998), 170.

⁷⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 7158, 9245-40, p. 5.2 – Personal and Confidential Letter from Crean to A.E. Ritchie, Economic Division, 22 September 1959. “[...] After eighteen months here I am beginning to find a France that I did not know before the war, or immediately after it ... The economic planning started in 1947 really has begun to pay the maximum dividend.”

⁸⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 7045, 6956-A-40 – Memorandum from Beaulne, European Division, to Davis, 23 November 1959; ANF, 5AG1/404 – Documentation destinée au Général de Gaulle, à l’occasion de son voyage officiel au Canada, 18-22 avril 1960.

ineffectiveness of Ottawa's nationalist response, remarking on the fact that although the new government was exploring new markets in the communist bloc and Asia, Canada's trade with Europe was decreasing while exchanges with the US continued to grow.⁸¹

The intensification of Canada-US economic relations was of course partly the consequence of Ottawa's difficulty gaining access to West European markets, a result of the protectionist measures these countries employed, with France at the forefront.⁸² By the end of the 1950s, French commercial policy was axed increasingly on Europe, and its principal export market was shifting from its overseas territories to Europe. To Ottawa's chagrin, the trade liberalization Paris embraced would be realized within the relative protection of the emerging ECM. Returned to power, de Gaulle accepted the common market, sharing his predecessors' view that this would permit France to modernize and develop its economic power within a broader protected environment. Even more significantly for subsequent events, France's new leader was determined to take advantage of the political opportunities that Europe offered, intending to employ it as the foundation for France's global influence and the Gaullist challenge of the Atlanticist status quo.⁸³

⁸¹ MAE, v. 143 – Affaires Économiques et Financières, Note: Problèmes de l'économie canadienne en 1958, Rapports avec la France, 29 October 1958; MAE, v. 114 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 4 February 1959, Relations canado-américaines. Also, Hart (2002), 148, 219.

⁸² Muirhead (1992), 106-107.

⁸³ Giauque (2002), 34; Vaisse (1998), 170; Lynch (1997), 129. Also, Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (W.W. Norton and Company, 2006), 296. In 1952, forty-two percent of French exports went to its overseas territories and former colonies, compared to the less than sixteen percent to the five other Western European countries that established the ECM. By the beginning of the 1970s, however, more than half of French exports went to its ECM partners.

Having emerged from the war years in radically different economic situations, Canada and France responded in diverging ways to the challenges of the post-war international economic order. A common preoccupation regarding preponderant US economic power had not translated into a more substantive relationship; instead, economic relations stagnated in relative terms as both countries pursued their differing foreign economic policies and priorities. Neither country had realized the primary objective of its commercial policy; rather, both had been forced by events beyond their control into a continental partnership that was a second choice. There was one crucial difference, however; whereas Paris remained able to employ the emerging European Economic Community to pursue an economic nationalist agenda, this option was not available to Ottawa in its continental context. Canadian officials continued to hope for a larger Atlantic economic community that would dilute the American profile in Canada's economy, but the growing regionalization of international trade, and Ottawa's continued adherence to a liberal commercial policy, rendered this ambition increasingly futile. These structural realities would have a significant impact on both Canada and France in the 1960s, not least in shaping the evolution of the Canada-Quebec-France triangular tensions.

Chapter 5

Growth amid Stagnation: Triangular Economic Relations, 1944-1960

The economic motivation underpinning *La Capricieuse*'s 1855 visit to British North America was paralleled by a cultural dimension: a French belief that the local francophone population provided a natural gateway to North American markets. Cultural concerns were also evident in Captain Paul-Henri de Belvèze's conviction that greater economic contacts would prevent French Canada from being assimilated into American civilization, and preserve it as a future French economic partner as US economic power increased.¹ Similar ideas surrounded France-Quebec economic links in the 1960s, suggesting that beyond the relative stagnation of relations that a cursory reading of the statistics reveals, Canada-France economic relations in the fifteen years after 1945 were more complex, with significant implications for the emergence of the triangular tensions.

This chapter moves beyond the formal bilateral relationship between Ottawa and Paris to explore economic contacts at the sub-state level in the fifteen years after the Second World War. This examination is crucial to understanding the emergence of the triangular tensions of the 1960s. Notwithstanding the divergence of Canadian and French foreign economic policies, the international trends of increased economic interdependence and transnationalism meant an *absolute* growth of exchanges, fuelling hope for a more substantive relationship. Additionally, there were increased contacts as a result of private and public efforts to address the relative stagnation of the economic relationship. Although such efforts ultimately proved wanting, they did

¹ Jacques Portes, "'La Capricieuse' au Canada," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* December 1977, 31(3): 355-358.

encourage those who saw more robust France-Canada economic relations as part of the answer to nationalist concerns about the implications of accelerating transnational economic exchanges, notably US economic power and its consequences.

Nationalist preoccupations in Canada were especially acute given that Ottawa and Quebec City's proclivity for a liberal approach to economic development, combined with the shortcomings of Canadian commercial policy discussed in the preceding chapter, meant that the US presence in the economy was that much more pronounced. Interest in cultivating economic links with France was particularly pronounced in Quebec, linked to the rise of French-Canadian neo-nationalism. To neo-nationalists, an increasingly modernized France was an essential partner to assist Quebec in responding to the twin challenges of economic transformation and cultural survival, an alternative to "Anglo-Saxon" capital for industrialization, and a means to francophone economic empowerment. Paris reciprocated this neo-nationalist desire for economic collaboration. Quebec's rapid industrial expansion drew French attention and piqued a nationalist interest in ensuring that Quebec's cultural specificity was maintained. French motivations in this regard were informed by the broader nationalist preoccupations in France about American economic and cultural influence in terms of its own post-war development.

The result was the emergence in the fifteen years after the Second World War of a growing sense of solidarity as two francophone populations on both sides of the Atlantic sought to preserve their cultural uniqueness in the face of globalization's antecedents and preponderant American economic power. This was reflected in the decision at the end of the 1950s to re-open a Quebec office in Paris to foster

economic links. The decision was also consistent with the trend of triangular economic relations, which favoured increasingly the France-Quebec axis, notwithstanding Ottawa's own interest in France as part of the European counterweight to US economic influence, and despite French awareness of the economic opportunities in Canada beyond Quebec.

The Growth of Economic Contacts

Communications and transportation advances accompanying the US economic predominance and efforts to forge a multilateral, liberal international economic order after 1945 facilitated an interdependence that was quantifiably and qualitatively unprecedented.² In the two decades following 1945, world trade grew by over US\$120 billion to a total of US\$165 billion.³ Foreign direct investment accelerated sharply; US direct investment in Europe rose more than ten-fold in the 1950s, and there was an increase in the number and significance of non-state actors, notably transnational corporations, contributing to the increasing interpermeability of domestic and foreign policy, and calling into question notions of state sovereignty.⁴ The international relations scholar, Samuel Huntington, has identified a "transnational organization revolution" arising from the diffusion of largely US-developed

² Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (McGraw-Hill, 1968), 151-152; Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics* April 1973, 25(3): 333-340.

³ Cooper (1968), 3, 59-67. From 1953 to 1964, world exports of manufactures rose by 228 percent, and from 1950 onward, the international commodity trade grew at an annual average of more than seven per cent.

⁴ Marion Camps, *The Management of Interdependence: A Preliminary View* (Council of Foreign Relations, 1970), 8-13; Cooper (1968), 67, 82.

technologies and Cold War realities, leading to an American “empire” marked by the *penetration*, rather than the *acquisition* of new territories.⁵

The absolute growth of France-Canada trade (see Appendix A, *Table 2*) and economic contacts was consistent with post-war international trends, and at least in terms of contacts, was especially pronounced between France and Quebec. This was evident at a governmental level. French officials considered Quebec’s Minister of Trade and Commerce, Paul Beaulieu, the foremost champion of increased France-Quebec economic exchanges. Beaulieu visited Paris in 1949 to forge links with France’s business community, and in subsequent encounters with France’s diplomats in Canada, he consistently affirmed Quebec’s need for French capital and managerial and technical expertise to fuel its industrial development. On one occasion, when France’s Consul General in Quebec City responded to his entreaties by referring to the constraints imposed by his country’s economic situation, Beaulieu acknowledged these, but maintained that France’s economic profile was insufficient and ineffective, and urged that Paris increase awareness of the opportunities available in Quebec.⁶

Efforts such as Beaulieu’s, however, were hampered by Maurice Duplessis’ ambivalence toward France, as a March 1945 meeting that Beaulieu convinced the Quebec Premier to hold with France’s new Consul General in Quebec City demonstrated. Duplessis raised the question of developing commercial relations and

⁵ Huntington (1973), 342-347.

⁶ MAE, v. 43 – Letter from Moeneclaey, Consul Général de France à Montréal et à Québec to de Hauteclouque, 20 March 1945; MAE, v. 54 – Letter from de Perugia, Chiffreur, Gérant le Consul Général de France à Québec, to MAE, Amérique, 14 May 1949, Ouverture d’une agence commerciale de la Province de Québec à Paris; MAE, v. 54 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec et à Halifax to Schuman, MAE, Affaires Économiques, 16 November 1951, Entretien avec M. Paul Beaulieu. Also, Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 26-27. Beaulieu was the latest in a long line of senior Quebec personalities who visited France. Premier Honoré Mercier arrived in 1891 trying to raise a \$10 million loan. Mercier was followed by Premiers Lomer Gouin and Alexandre Taschereau. The practical results of such visits were rather limited.

securing French capital investment, but generally demonstrated a hostile attitude, and was not especially forthcoming regarding a French request for Quebec newsprint, pleading an inability to act since the matter was under federal jurisdiction.⁷

Following this inauspicious start, Duplessis subsequently paid greater lip service at least to the value of French investment. The Premier urged French industrialists to invest in “New France,” since nowhere else offered so secure an investment and Quebec would benefit from French contributions and expertise.⁸ These appeals were often made in the context of a concern to dilute anglophone, and especially British and English-Canadian influence; in private conversation with French representatives, Duplessis professed a desire to see an influx of French capital to help loosen British capital’s grip on Quebec and counter “idées avancées.” The Premier deplored the growth of UK investment and, professing a desire to see a larger French presence, even alluded to the possibility of favourable treatment for French firms. He remained unmoved by suggestions that France’s situation prevented it from exporting the required capital, citing Britain’s growing profile despite its own challenges in order to shame French officials into acting.⁹

Duplessis’ entreaties notwithstanding, Paris had to contend with the Premier’s enduring antipathy for France and his government’s liberal economic policy.

⁷ MAE, v. 43 – Letter from Moeneclaeey to de Hauteclocque, 20 March 1945. Ottawa rationed newsprint as a wartime measure, taking its lead from the Anglo-American Combined Raw Materials Board established in January 1942.

⁸ MAE, v. 26 – Letter from Lorion, Conseiller d’Ambassade, Chargé du Consulat Général de France à Québec, to Bidault, MAE, Amérique, 13 May 1947; ANF/4AG.552 AP/96 – Voyage au Canada, avril 1951 – Rapport récit de l’Ambassadeur M. Guérin.

⁹ MAE, v. 54 – Letter from Lorion, Conseiller d’Ambassade, Charge du Consulat Général de France à Québec to Bidault, MAE, Amérique, 22 October 1947, Déclarations de M. Duplessis; MAE, v. 54 – Letter from Duranthon, Consul Général de France à Québec et Halifax to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 4 January 1950, Situation de la France au Québec; MAE, v. 5 – Chronique mensuelle from Triat, Consul Général de France à Montréal to the Ambassador, April 1950.

Consistent with the broader trend of Canada-US economic relations, Duplessis preferred American capital, as he was determined to prevent his government from becoming beholden to Quebec's anglophone financial and industrial elite to finance capital projects.¹⁰ Even Beaulieu recognized the primacy of US markets by concentrating his effort on attracting American investors.¹¹ The major French firms in Quebec complained that even when they contributed to the Union Nationale, they often received less favourable treatment than other foreign firms.¹² When Duplessis expressed annoyance over Paris' awarding honours to those he deemed "rouge," and alluded to a boycott of the French business community since it "ne savait pas récompenser ses véritables amis," members of this community suggested it politic to award the Premier the French Legion of Honour, particularly given French interest in participating in the anticipated St. Lawrence Seaway project.¹³

In spite of such challenges at the governmental level, Canada-France economic exchanges did increase. French involvement in a Montreal subway system was discussed in 1949 during a visit by a senior French Finance Ministry official. That same year saw the French *Centre international d'Échanges culturels et sociaux* organize a visit by industrialists to study Canadian capabilities in agricultural

¹⁰ Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 100.

¹¹ Jean Vinant, *De Jacques Cartier à Péchiney, Histoire de la coopération économique franco-canadienne* (Chotard & Associés Éditeurs, 1985), 120.

¹² MAE, v. 176 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 29 January 1952, célébration du Centenaire de l'Université Laval à Québec.

¹³ MAE, v. 44 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 13 February 1951, relations avec le Gouvernement provincial de Québec; MAE, v. 45 – Affaires Économiques, directeur-général, Note, 24 February 1951; DEA, G-2, 8300, 9908-AD-2-40, p. 2.1 – Message from SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Washington, 6 February 1951. There were plans for Duplessis to be awarded a *cravatte* naming him Commander in the Legion of Honour, during President Vincent Auriol's subsequent visit, in addition to French plans to awarding St. Laurent and Pearson the *Grand Croix*; however, these plans apparently did not come to fruition due to Ottawa's objections on the basis of the *Nickel Resolution* (1919) that opposed Canadians being awarded honours by foreign governments.

machinery, electronics, engineering, mining, and aluminium production. The head of France's passenger rail service and the commercial director of the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* also visited, accompanied by agents of France's rail and shipping industries. Conversely, more than a hundred members of Montreal's Chamber of Commerce travelled through France as part of a European tour.¹⁴

Tourism grew as well. French officials considered Canada, particularly its francophone population, an exceptional source of tourists that would provide France the Canadian dollars needed to pay back Ottawa's 1946 loan.¹⁵ A French mission toured Canada in 1947 to examine how to tap into this potential; Ottawa's subsequent decision to remove the limit on the amount of currency that Canadians were permitted to bring to Europe boosted the number of visits to France.¹⁶

Another development favouring tourism and economic contacts in general was the establishment of direct, regular air service between France and Canada. The initiative came from Paris as part of its effort to increase its intake of Canadian tourist dollars. A bilateral air agreement was announced in August 1950, and two months

¹⁴ MAE, v. 5 – Chronique mensuelle from Triat, Consul Général de France à Montréal to the Ambassador, October 1949; DEA, G-2, v. 3310, 9245-40, p. 1 – Telegram from Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 1 June 1949; MAE, v. 5 – Chronique mensuelle from Triat, Consul Général de France à Montréal to the Ambassador, April 1949; MAE, v. 5 – Chronique mensuelle from Triat, Consul Général de France à Montréal to the Ambassador, August 1949; Vinant (1985), 111-112.

¹⁵ MAE, v. 60 – Letter from Le Président du Gouvernement, MAE, to Monsieur le Commissaire Général au Tourisme, 25 October 1946; Letter from de Hauteclouque to MAE, 9 October 1946, *Tourisme Canadien en France*; MAE, v. 60 – Letter from Basdevant, Charge d'Affaires a.i. de l'Ambassade de France au Canada to MAE, *Accords Techniques, tourisme canadien en France*.

¹⁶ MAE, v. 60 – Letter from M.P. Négrier, Consul Général de France à Montréal, to MAE, 2 January 1947, M. Depret-Bixio, Inspecteur Général des Bureaux à l'Étranger; MAE, v. 60 – Letter from de Hauteclouque to MAE, *Amérique*, 4 January 1947, *tourisme Canadien en France*; MAE, v. 60 – Letter from Pearson to Gay, 11 March 1949.

later, *Air France* inaugurated a regular, weekly Montreal-Paris air service.¹⁷ *Trans-Canada Airlines* established a twice-weekly service the following year.¹⁸

Regular air service facilitated increased trade visits and missions. In May 1951, a French economic mission, led by the *Chef de Service* of France's *Ministère du commerce et de l'industrie*, toured Montreal's principal commercial and industrial centres.¹⁹ Quebec's Solicitor-General, Antoine Rivard, visited France that year to interest its business community in Quebec.²⁰ A significant French business delegation accompanied the academics who attended Université Laval's centennial celebrations in 1952.²¹ This was followed by the visit to Paris of Quebec City's mayor, Lucien Borne. French officials considered Borne an important personality well-disposed to France, and the ambassador, Hubert Guérin, hoped the visit would result in improved relations.²² In 1953, an assistant to Montreal's mayor, Camillien Houde, visited Paris to investigate the Metro system, encouraging French hopes for involvement in a Montreal subway.²³

The increasing number of trade fairs facilitated additional economic contacts. French products were displayed at the first Canadian National Exhibition after the

¹⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 6173, 72-ALB-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Stoner to Plumpre and Moran, 14 February 1950; DEA, G-2, v. 6173, 72-ALB-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from McDermot to Economic Division, 22 March 1950; DEA, G-2, v. 6173, 72-ALB-40, p. 1.3 – Message from SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 2 October 1950.

¹⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 6173, 72-ALB-40, p. 1.3, Letter from H.A. Young, Deputy Minister to Heeney, USSEA, 28 March 1951; DEA, G-2, v. 6173, 72-ALB-40, p. 1.3 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, 9 April 1951.

¹⁹ MAE, v. 5 – Revue mensuelle, May 1951.

²⁰ MAE, v. 44 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec et à Halifax, to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, undated.

²¹ MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Queuille, Conseiller Commercial, French Embassy, Ottawa to M. le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Économiques, Relations Économiques Extérieures, Service de l'Expansion Économique, 10 April 1952.

²² MAE, v. 95 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 11 August 1952.

²³ MAE, v. 95 – Lettre from Guérin to Bidault, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 28 April 1953, projet de séjour à Paris d'un représentant de la Municipalité de Montréal.

war, and the collection was subsequently transported to Montreal and inaugurated jointly by ambassadors Georges Vanier and Jean de Hauteclocque.²⁴ France became a regular participant in the annual Canadian International Trade Fair in Toronto that began in 1948. Notwithstanding doubts about its “international” character, the embassy promoted French participation as tangible proof of a determination to expand France’s economic presence throughout Canada.²⁵

The most significant fair of the period for Canada-France economic relations was a French exposition in Montreal in 1954. Originally proposed by the French embassy’s commercial counsellor, Montreal authorities responded enthusiastically: the city offered use of its new Palais du Commerce free of charge and spent \$50,000 on advertising.²⁶ Guérin urged Paris to avoid half-measures, describing the exposition as an opportunity to strengthen France’s profile in Quebec and reduce French-Canadian ambivalence toward France.²⁷

The ambassador was not disappointed. The MAE seized the occasion to generate considerable publicity for France. The Montreal press was full of praise. Fourteen thousand visitors flocked to the Palais du Commerce on the first full day, including the Prime Minister, Louis Saint-Laurent, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, C.D. Howe, Quebec’s Provincial Secretary, Omer Côté, and Cardinal

²⁴ Vinant (1985), 103-104.

²⁵ MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Treuil, Conseiller Commercial, French Embassy, Ottawa to Monsieur le Secrétaire d’État aux Affaires Économiques, Service de l’Expansion Économique, 12 August 1952, Exposition internationale de Toronto.

²⁶ MAE, v. 95 – Letter from Guérin to MAE, Affaires Économiques, 4 December 1952, Projet d’exposition française à Montréal en 1953; MAE, v. 141 – Letter from MAE to Ministre des Affaires Économiques, Relations Économiques Extérieures, Service de l’Expansion Économique et des Foires, 12 March 1953, Exposition française industrielle et commerciale à Montréal, September 1954.

²⁷ MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Guérin to Bidault, MAE, Amérique, 13 February 1954, Exposition française à Montréal; Vinant (1985), 106.

Paul-Émile Leger.²⁸ The French Embassy considered the event a major success, and noted the free publicity that the extensive francophone media coverage provided. According to Guérin, French Canadians had never seen so many French products gathered together nor had they had such occasion to appreciate the vitality of modern French industry, and predicted the exposition would boost French exports, at least to Quebec. Regretting there had not been a greater emphasis of commerce over spectacle, Guérin remarked on the difficulty that had been encountered in recruiting French participants.²⁹ Such difficulty reflected the underlying structure of Canada-France economic relations; notwithstanding government efforts such as the exposition, France's private sector interest in Canada remained lacklustre, oriented toward its domestic and continental markets.

A reciprocal opportunity to raise Canada's economic profile in France arose in conjunction with the centenary of the visit of *La Capricieuse*. Paris organized festivities, including an exhibit at France's *Archives nationales* recounting Canada's evolution with an emphasis of its economic development. The MAE sent invitations to Ottawa, Quebec City, and Toronto to send representatives to festivities in La Rochelle. Canada's ambassador, Jean Désy, argued for a strong presence since these were "an excellent occasion" to build economic contacts.³⁰ Much to the regret of France's embassy, however, the invitations yielded little official interest. Only the federal Minister of Labour accompanied Désy to the ceremonies.³¹

²⁸ MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Amérique, 13 September 1954, Exposition de Montréal.

²⁹ MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Affaires économiques et financières, 2 November 1954, Exposition française de Montréal.

³⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 8059, 2727-AD-40, p. 6.1 – Letter from Désy to DEA, 25 May 1955.

³¹ DEA, G-2, v. 6829, 2727-AD-40, p. 7.1 – Memorandum for the Acting Minister, 23 June 1955.

Greater governmental interest greeted an exposition on Canada's provinces held in Paris' *Grands Magasins du Louvre*. Désy approached the provincial governments to urge their participation, and Quebec and Ontario answered the call. More than three thousand attended the opening, and over a hundred thousand visitors passed through the exposition during its first week.³² Quebec had pride of place, with Quebec City determined to show off the province's development and increase French awareness of the economic opportunities available. Quebec interest in the exhibition was paralleled by the establishment in 1957 of the *Foire de Montréal*, the first fair organized entirely by private interests. By the time of its third edition in 1959, the fair counted exhibits from fifteen countries, with French participation the most significant and remarked upon.³³

The proliferation of organizations promoting Canada-France economic links was another example of growing contacts. During the October 1950 meeting of the Canada-France Economic Committee, the French delegation proposed that France's *Comité franc-dollar*, established to promote Franco-American economic links, should be expanded to operate between the two countries. Ottawa agreed, but consistent with its more liberal policy, this was on the understanding that the organization would be primarily a private sector operation.³⁴ The *Chambre de Commerce française de Montréal*, in existence since the 1880s, in 1953 established a *Comité France-*

³² ANQ, E5, 1960-01-027, v. 196, 18 January 1958, *L'Espoir* (Nice), "3000 Personnes ont inauguré hier l'exposition 'Visages du Canada'"; ANQ, E5, 1960-01-027, v. 196, *Présence du Québec à Paris par Armour Landry* – Paris, 24 January 1958.

³³ *Informations canadiennes*, February 1957, 2(13); *Informations canadiennes* June-July 1959, 4(35).

³⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 6243, 9245-G-40, p. 1.1 – Report from Canadian Embassy, Paris, France-Canada Trade Talks, October 23, 1950; MAE, v. 54 – Note from MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières to the Minister, undated, conversations commerciales franco-canadiennes; MAE, v. 141 – Échanges commerciaux entre la France et le Canada, 1 February 1954.

technique in Montreal, headed by the French embassy's commercial counsellor, to promote French technical and scientific methods.³⁵

In 1955, Désy, citing growing French private sector interest and the absence of a service independent of the Canadian Embassy to promote economic exchanges, helped French business personalities establish the *Institut France-Canada*, mandated to increase personal contacts in the economic and cultural spheres. A number of intellectual figures interested in Canada were enlisted, with Désy as honorary president. The new organization quickly attracted more than sixty French Chambers of Commerce as members, and began publishing *Informations canadiennes*, a newsletter regarding Canadian political, cultural, and especially economic issues. A technical exchanges committee worked with the *Comité France-technique* to promote awareness of French engineering methods and encourage the use of French technical terminology.³⁶ Two years later, the *Institut's* economic committee was re-named the *Chambre de Commerce France-Canada*. Headed by Emmanuel Monick, President of the *Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas*, and co-operating with the Canadian Embassy and local Chambers of Commerce, it hosted meetings to bring together France's business community with Canadian economic figures, and organized expositions throughout France to promote Canadian economic potential, including that held at the *Grands Magasins du Louvre*.³⁷

³⁵ MAE, v. 99 – Visite de M. Saint Laurent, 7-10 février 1954 – Chef du Gouvernement Canadien, undated; Vinant (1985), 113-114.

³⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 6829, 2727-AD-40, p. 7.1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, Institut France-Canada, 22 June 1955; DEA, G-2, v. 6829, 2727-AD-40, p. 7.1 – Letter from SSEA (Léger) to Désy, 22 July 1955; DEA, G-2, v. 6829, 2727-AD-40, p. 7.1 – Institut France-Canada, Statuts; DEA, G-2, v. 6829, 2727-AD-40, p. 7.1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 26 July 1955; Vinant (1985), 123-142; *Informations canadiennes* January 1957, 2(12).

³⁷ *Informations canadiennes* January 1957, 2(12); Vinant (1985), 128-134.

The foregoing discussion makes clear that notwithstanding the *relative* stagnation of economic relations between Canada and France, contacts and exchanges were increasing, and there were efforts – both public and private – to expand links. The success of such efforts ultimately remained limited, however, as the private sector of both countries proved generally unresponsive, oriented more toward their respective continental markets. This dynamic was reinforced by the liberal economic policies to which Ottawa and Quebec adhered, thereby encouraging North America's economic integration, notwithstanding the professions of interest from both levels of government in seeing more substantive economic links with France. Conversely, France's *dirigiste* approach, and its shift toward liberalization within a protected European framework meant that its private sector concentrated on the French domestic and colonial, and European markets.

The Nationalist Impulse

Yet the growth of contacts between Canada and France was not without effect, and the efforts to expand the relationship portended a deeper concern. Paradoxically, the absolute growth of the two countries' economic exchanges, consistent with the acceleration of transnational exchanges in the post-1945 period, was seized upon by nationalist elements on both sides of the Atlantic as proof of the potential for greater collaboration in contending with this international phenomenon, and the accompanying challenge of American economic power.

Parallel to the broader Canadian nationalist response to US economic influence was Quebec's ascendant neo-nationalist reaction. The Great Depression drew attention to French Canada's economic marginalization and gave rise to a

growing belief that traditional nationalism was no longer an effective response to the challenge of preserving French Canada's cultural specificity. Quebec's renewed industrialization during and after the war contributed to massive socio-economic change that undermined the foundations of traditional French-Canadian society.³⁸ The demise of the *Bloc populaire canadien*, a fragile wartime coalition of French-Canadian nationalists, and the corresponding resurgence of Duplessisme that the traditional nationalist community abetted, fuelled neo-nationalist frustration about what was condemned as a lackadaisical response to a set of socio-economic challenges that were considered a danger to French Canada's survival that surpassed that of the Conquest.³⁹

The increased foreign economic presence accompanying Quebec's development, notably in the resource sector, contributed to a growing resentment at anglophone domination of Quebec's economic life.⁴⁰ The 1949 Asbestos strike became a symbol of French Canadians' secondary status, the scope of non-francophone (and particularly American) influence in the Quebec economy, and the

³⁸ Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, Jean-Claude Robert, François Ricard, *Quebec since 1930*, translated by Robert Chados and Ellen Garmaise (James Lorimer and Company, 1991), 128; Behiels, (1985), 8-10, 20-21; Richard A. Jones, "French Canada and the American Peril in the Twentieth Century," *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, Fall 1984, 14(3): 333-350. Concerns about the socio-cultural implications of the industrial age of course existed before the 1930s, as is discussed in Susan Mann-Trofimenkoff, *The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec* (Gage Publishing Ltd., 1983), 184-200, 218-232.

³⁹ Paul-André Comeau, *Le Bloc populaire, 1942-1948* (Éditions Québec-Amérique, 1982); Behiels (1985), 21, 38-40. Behiels describes the *Bloc populaire* as a re-affirmation of traditional French-Canadian nationalism and a harbinger of post-war neo-nationalism, drawing upon Catholic social doctrine to mitigate the worst features of capitalism, envisaging a regulatory, and if need be interventionist Quebec state, to realize French-Canadian economic liberation.

⁴⁰ Behiels (1985), 102-103. By 1957, a quarter of Quebec manufacturing production came from US branch plants, with most destined for the US market. Only a handful of French-Canadian-owned firms had managed to build up markets outside the province. Two French-Canadian banks retained only seven per cent of the total active assets held by Canadian banks. One per cent of active stocks on the Montreal Stock Exchange belonged to French-Canadian firms, and only five per cent of company directors in 1954's Directory of Directors were French-Canadian.

Duplessis Government's relative indifference to the situation. The growing number of francophone Quebecers graduating from studies in the physical, social, and administrative sciences, and from the province's business schools, who faced limited opportunities for advancement only exacerbated neo-nationalist frustration.⁴¹

The Tremblay Commission, Quebec's rejoinder to the federal Rowell-Sirois report on Canada's federal system, warned of the dangers of "centres of influence ... clearly foreign to the population's cultural tradition." Similarly, neo-nationalist historians Michel Brunet, Maurice Séguin, and Guy Frégault blamed Quebec's economic inferiority on the Conquest and its political consequences, including traditional nationalism's preoccupation with non-economic priorities, which facilitated anglophone economic predominance. Neo-nationalist figures such as André Laurendeau and Gérard Filion, *Le Devoir's* publisher, denounced US and Anglo-Canadian economic dominance of Quebec, bemoaned French Canada's economic marginalization, and contended that the Duplessis government was selling off Quebec's natural resources to foreign interests and placing the interests of the UN ahead of the population. They condemned a 1946 deal granting US corporate interests access to the province's iron ore deposits in Ungava at bargain prices as the most egregious example of this dynamic. Another neo-nationalist personality, journalist Jean-Marc Léger, argued that the French-Canadian nation's economic liberation could not take place without political liberation. His analysis was inspired by an encounter during his studies in Paris with the French economist François

⁴¹ Behiels (1985), 12-18, 129; Jones (1984), 343. Also, *The Asbestos Strike*, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, ed., translated by James Boake (James Lewis & Samuel, 1974).

Peyroux, who was preoccupied with how to safeguard the independence of nations amid the growth of interdependence.⁴²

Léger's claims typified how neo-nationalist resentment over foreign (i.e. non-francophone) dominance of the Quebec economy, and the socio-political conditions that perpetuated this, prompted demands for a more activist, francophone-oriented state to realize French-Canadian economic empowerment. This remedy challenged traditional nationalists' hostility to anything approaching *dirigisme* or socialism. Neo-nationalists feared that without such action, however, the homogenizing effects of industrialization and urbanization would end in assimilation.⁴³

The neo-nationalists' concern for Quebec's industrial development and the need to gain control of the economic levers of power motivated their demand for greater economic cooperation with France. In their view, French Canada's survival depended upon its securing a firm industrial economic base. If Canada as a whole was worried by continentalist trends, anxiety was even more pronounced among Quebec neo-nationalists, who discarded the traditional nationalist ambivalence for *France moderne*, and came to regard economic collaboration as essential.

Growing Quebec interest in France was reflected in the francophone press' coverage of the controversy over Coca-Cola in France at the end of the 1940s. A potent symbol of US economic power and consumer society, the company's efforts to establish itself in France became a lightning rod for anti-American sentiment. The communist daily, *L'Humanité*, warned that France's "coca-colonisation" would be the logical result of US economic and cultural dominance. For French winegrowers,

⁴² Jones (1984), 343; Behiels (1985), 51, 97-114; Jean-Marc Léger, *Le Temps dissipé: souvenirs* (Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 1999), 141-142.

⁴³ Behiels (1985), 18, 43-44, 47.

the soft drink was a threat to their livelihood. An intense legal battle erupted when Paris denied Coca-Cola the right to import the ingredients necessary to produce its drink.⁴⁴ France's Ottawa Embassy noted the sympathy Quebec's francophone media expressed for France's position; *Le Canada* expressed doubt over whether it would ultimately succeed, but saluted France's struggle against "américanisation."⁴⁵

The 1957 Quebec-Ontario exposition in Paris foreshadowed the triangular tensions of the following decade. At the time, DEA officials believed that given Quebec's interest in participating in the exposition, Ottawa's profile should be "something more than ... perfunctory."⁴⁶ Montreal's *La Patrie* referred to the fact that "for the first time" Quebec was taking part "alone" in an exposition in Paris. Although not a source of serious concern, the DEA noted there was no reference in the *La Patrie* article to the involvement of Canada's Embassy or Désy in organizing the event.⁴⁷

La Presse subsequently welcomed the Quebec Provincial Chamber of Commerce's announcement of an economic mission to France in 1959 to encourage foreign investment in Quebec, arguing the importance for Canada of developing links with Europe – and France in particular – in order to reduce US economic influence in Canada.⁴⁸ As the 1950s drew to a close, the separate *École des Hautes Études*

⁴⁴ Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French* (University of California Press, 1993), 53-69; Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954* (Cambridge University Press 1991), 121-126.

⁴⁵ MAE, v. 12 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 4 April 1950, La presse canadienne et l'affaire « Coca-Cola » en France.

⁴⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 6830, 2727-AD-40, p. 8.1 – Memorandum from Information Division to USSEA, 15 May 1957.

⁴⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 6830, 2727-AD-40, p. 8.1 – DEA Routing Slip from M.O. to European Division, "Pour la Première Fois Seul: Exposition du Québec en France," *La Patrie*, 27 June 1957.

⁴⁸ MAE, v. 143 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 15 October 1958, Mission commerciale du Québec en France.

Commerciales (HEC) in Montreal and Paris instituted a student exchange programme. Two years later François-Albert Angers, director of the *Institut d'Économie Appliquée* of Montreal's HEC, announced a cooperation agreement with the *Institut de Science Économique Appliquée de Paris* to facilitate the publication in France of works by Canadian economists.⁴⁹

The growth of nationalist anxiety in Canada was mirrored across the Atlantic. The Coca-Cola controversy was symptomatic of a more profound French worry about US economic power and its impact on France. Beyond misgivings about the political ramifications of France's economic dependence on Washington, France perceived the US as at once a model and menace, obliging the population to ask how American prosperity and power could be achieved while retaining France's cultural specificity. Doubts existed even among the US' greatest French proponents about the socio-cultural costs of the American way of life and its impact on the "traditional sense of Frenchness."⁵⁰

French worries were inseparable from a broader preoccupation with modernization. This was evident immediately after the war in the Monnet Plan, which French technocrat Jean Monnet sold to de Gaulle as a massive modernization effort essential to realizing France's *grandeur*.⁵¹ Paris sent at least forty economic missions to the US to facilitate the modernization of French industry, and

⁴⁹ *Informations canadiennes*, September-October 1958, 3(27). Participants undertook a six week internship in major commercial enterprises in each country; *Informations canadiennes* May 1960, 5(43). For a discussion of the emergence of economics as a discipline in Quebec in the interwar period, and foreign influences, notably French, in this regard, see Jonathan Fournier, "Les économistes canadiens-français pendant l'entre-deux-guerres: entre la science et l'engagement," *Revue de l'histoire de l'Amérique française* 2005, 58(3), 389-413. Angers and a number of other personalities involved in the institutionalization of economics in Quebec studied at Paris' *École libre des sciences politiques*.

⁵⁰ Kuisel (1993), 3, 101-102.

⁵¹ Hitchcock (1998), 32.

approximately five hundred French missions under the auspices of the Marshall Plan toured American factories, farms, stores and offices.⁵² On the eve of becoming France's Prime Minister in 1954, Pierre Mendès-France launched his "Appel à la jeunesse," calling on France to place its traditional divisions behind it, and strive for a strong, dynamic and modern country.⁵³

The emergence of *Poujadisme* and its surprise success in the 1956 French elections was symptomatic of this preoccupation with modernization. This right-wing movement, which began as a tax revolt born of a sense of powerlessness and nostalgia, engaged in Vichy-style rhetoric against the Fourth Republic's *dirigisme* and the rapid socio-economic change of the post-war years.⁵⁴ In a similar vein, the writer and intellectual François Mauriac, commenting at the close of the 1950s on the impact of American economic and cultural influence on France, bemoaned its accompanying cult of technology and the mania for speed that he felt fundamentally at odds with French *genie* and civilization.⁵⁵

France's nationalist apprehensions informed official views of its economic relations with Canada. Shortly after the war, a MAE report argued that Paris should seize the opportunity for stronger economic cooperation with Canada given the complementarity of France's reconstruction requirements with Canada's conversion to a peacetime economy, coupled with Ottawa's desire to escape the Anglo-American

⁵² Peter J. Taylor, "Izations of the World: Americanization, Modernization and Globalization," in *Demystifying Globalization*, Colin Hay and David Marsh, eds. (St. Martin's Press, 2000), 57; Kuisel (2000), 70.

⁵³ Rioux (1987), 226.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 247-249.

⁵⁵ Cited in Michel Winock, "The Cold War," in *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: a Century of French Perception*, Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie France Toinet, eds., translated by Gerry Turner (St. Martin's Press, 1990), 73.

embrace.⁵⁶ France's Ambassador, Jean de Hauteclocque, urged that until France's industrial capacity revived, Canada's should be used to safeguard French markets, as the precursor to a potential longer term industrial cooperation that would see joint Canada-France conquests of other markets.⁵⁷

Paris' concern that France be perceived as a modern, dynamic economy was evident in French representatives' calls for a more effective promotion of France's scientific and technical achievements as the prerequisite to increasing its economic presence in Canada.⁵⁸ France's Ambassador, Francis Lacoste, strove in public appearances to correct what he viewed as a strongly rooted opinion among both francophone and anglophone Canadians that France was unproductive, economically stagnant, and not scientifically advanced, with a population resisting the sacrifices necessary for modernization.⁵⁹

Cultural considerations were especially prominent in France's economic interest in Canada. Paris continued to see Quebec as a gateway to the larger Canadian and North American markets; a MAE report recommended Paris take advantage of cultural affinities with French Canada to increase France's economic presence in

⁵⁶ MAE, v. 53 – Renseignement, Ministère de la Guerre, État-Major de l'armée, 5^{ème} bureau, 29 May 1945, des relations économiques futures entre la France et le Canada; MAE, v. 43 – Note: L' intérêt que présente le développement des relations franco-canadiens, undated.

⁵⁷ MAE, v. 53 – Letter from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, 6 October 1945, Collaboration industrielle et culturelle entre la France et le Canada; MAE, v. 53 – Note from de Hauteclocque, Ambassade de France au Canada, 28 August 1945; MAE, v. 53 – MAE, Compte Rendu de la réunion tenue le 6 novembre 1945 sous la présidence de M. Alphand au sujet des relations économiques de la France et du Canada. The Ambassador's proposal met a lukewarm response in the MAE: Hervé Alphand, director of the MAE's Economic Division, suggested it was too early to talk specifics, and that the best short term option was to dispatch technical and industrial missions to Canada and encourage French investment in Canadian industry

⁵⁸ MAE, v. 86 – Note from Queuille to Mouton, Conseiller Culturel, French Embassy, Ottawa, 3 March 1952.

⁵⁹ MAE, v. 142 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 13 March 1956, Réunion de la Chambre de Commerce Française de Montréal; MAE, v. 142 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 22 March 1956, Réunion de la Chambre de commerce du district de Montréal.

Canada. De Hauteclouque affirmed that the strong Quebec representation in the King Government meant that Ottawa would be naturally inclined to support economic cooperation with France. He cited Quebec's wartime development and the fact that its new industries would have to convert to peacetime operations in suggesting that these would be predisposed for commercial and sentimental reasons to work with French industry. The ambassador also referred to Sorel's naval yards that were partly owned by the Simard family as an example, arguing that if Paris facilitated their buying out of the federal stake in the facilities, it would have strong influence over a firm that would receive numerous French industrial orders.⁶⁰

Beyond French economic interest, the Sorel example draws attention to French post-war views of French Canada as a collectivity requiring economic assistance to ensure its survival, and demonstrates a converging of interests between French and Quebec nationalism as two francophone populations worked to realize their economic development while retaining their cultural specificity. The French embassy's commercial counsellor observed that socio-economic changes were prompting Quebec's Government to turn to France as a source of investment and technical expertise, and that the response should be positive since beyond any financial benefits, French investment would strengthen the *rayonnement* of French culture in North America.⁶¹ To avoid French-Canadian-owned industry becoming absorbed by larger North American interests, de Hauteclouque argued Paris should

⁶⁰ MAE, v. 43 – Note: L'intérêt que présente le développement des relations franco-canadiens, undated, [circa 1946]; MAE, v. 53 – Letter from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 6 October 1945, Collaboration industrielle et culturelle entre la France et le Canada.

⁶¹ MAE, v. 53 – Letter from Boncour, Conseiller commercial, French Embassy, Ottawa to Monsieur le Ministre de l'Économie Nationale, Direction des Relations Économiques Extérieures, 7 May 1943 [sic, 1945] Industries françaises à St. Jean (Province de Québec).

ensure that French-Canadian involvement in French reconstruction efforts was favoured over that of any other foreign industrial interest.⁶² Similarly, France's Consul General in Quebec City argued for a small, quality immigration of French engineers, managers, and entrepreneurs to help ensure French Canada's continued economic viability.⁶³ Perhaps most significantly for the triangular tensions that subsequently emerged, MAE reports early in the post-war period argued that France was well-positioned to assist French Canada to realize its technical and economic potential, particularly by encouraging francophone banking and industrial operations and the development of professional and technical education, so that its population growth would be accompanied by the achievement of socio-economic equality with English Canada.⁶⁴

Quebec's socio-economic transformation amplified the ethno-cultural dimension of France's interest in economic relations. Hubert Guérin affirmed in the mid-1950s that earlier French depictions of Quebec as a francophone, Catholic, artisan enclave were no longer appropriate.⁶⁵ France's Consulate General in Montreal was also struck by the increased francophone economic assertiveness. It acknowledged the continued preponderance of anglophones in Quebec's economy, but observed that the francophone population was taking an increasingly active role.⁶⁶

⁶² MAE, v. 53 – Note from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 28 August 1945; MAE, v. 53 – Telegram from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique, 12 July 1945.

⁶³ MAE, v. 179 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec et Halifax, to MAE, Amérique, 20 March 1952, de l'immigration française.

⁶⁴ MAE, v. 43 – Note: L'intérêt que présente le développement des relations franco-canadiens, undated, [circa 1946]; MAE, v. 48 – Les Canadiens Français dans l'économie canadienne, April 1946, projet de note.

⁶⁵ MAE, v. 127 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Amérique, 16 October 1954, La Province de Québec et le pouvoir fédéral.

⁶⁶ MAE, v. 148 – Letter from Triat, Ministre Plenipotentiaire, Charge du Consulat Général de France à Montréal, to Guérin, 11 May 1955, Formation scientifique et technique des Canadiens français; MAE,

Symptomatic of French worries about Americanization, Paris' awareness of Quebec's socio-economic changes fuelled misgivings over the impact on French Canada of growing American economic influence. In the late 1940s, France's Quebec City Consulate General linked the rapid changes in French-Canadian life to this expanding US presence, observing that after two centuries of resisting Anglo-Saxon influence represented by the UK, Quebec appeared to be rapidly accepting that of the Americans, as evidenced by the wartime increase of the US economic interests in Quebec, and Duplessis' industrialization policy that promoted American investment. The Consulate General's report warned of a new and growing dependence on the US that was prompting socio-economic changes threatening French Canada's survival. The MAE noted the report's conclusion, which in affirming that the Catholic Church was increasingly hard-pressed to hold back the tide of American cultural influences, anticipated the subsequent neo-nationalist triumph and the Quiet Revolution.⁶⁷ In March 1960, the *Comité France-Technique*, prompted by concern among professors, engineers, and students about the lack of French scientific and technical textbooks available in Quebec, hosted an *Exposition du Livre Scientifique et Technique Français* in Montreal, which a visiting French professor at Laval organized.⁶⁸

The broader structure of France-Canada economic relations intensified French concerns, especially given the paucity of French investments in Quebec and the Duplessis government's marked preference for US capital. French representatives

v. 142 – Letter from Ribere, Consul Général de France à Montréal, to Lacoste, 13 May 1957, Place occupée par les Canadiens-Français dans l'économie de la Province.

⁶⁷ MAE, v. 41 – Note from del Perugia, Gérant le Consulat Général de France à Québec, to MAE, Amérique, 21 May 1949, Influence des Etats-Unis dans la Province de Québec.

⁶⁸ *Informations canadiennes* April 1960, 5(42).

sounded the alarm over the threat to francophone culture represented by the importation of American technical terminology that deformed the language spoken in industrial centres.⁶⁹ Following Duplessis' refusal in early 1958 to open a Quebec commercial office in Paris, dismissing it as a waste of money and explaining that "l'Europe est le passé; les Etats-Unis, le présent; le Canada est l'avenir," Francis Lacoste found it ironic that in condemning Duplessis' remarks and viewing Europe as a counterweight – economic and otherwise – to US power, English Canada demonstrated that it understood Europe's significance, and France's role in resisting preponderant US influence, to a far greater extent than Quebec's Premier.⁷⁰

Despite Lacoste's frustration over Duplessiste ambivalence, the interaction of French and Quebec nationalist anxiety contributed to a trend in Canada-Quebec-France triangular economic relations favouring the France-Quebec axis. Part of the explanation for this, of course, was a question of history. In addition to the longstanding links between France and Quebec, the economic capital of Canada was Montreal well into the twentieth century. Paris only appointed a commercial officer to Toronto in 1949.⁷¹ Another significant factor was the question of cultural affinity. Guérin, for example, remarked upon English Canada's discouraging under-representation in participation, media coverage, and attendance at the time of the 1954 French Exposition in Montreal, suggesting this demonstrated that Quebec

⁶⁹ MAE, v. 170 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 16 July 1952, Rapport annuel du Services Culturel.

⁷⁰ MAE, v. 96 – Letter from Lacoste, to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 29 January 1958, Le Canada, les États-Unis et l'Europe, Déclarations de M. Duplessis, Premier Ministre de la Province de Québec. Réaction de Toronto.

⁷¹ Vinant (1985), 142

should be the primary target of French efforts.⁷² The cultural dimension was also linked to French awareness of the expanding US economic presence in Canada; whereas in the case of Quebec this encouraged an official interest in increased cooperation, such a consideration did not carry the same weight outside of Quebec, notwithstanding the francophone minority populations.

Beyond questions of history and cultural affinities, however, French assessments of Quebec's economic potential led to a strengthening of the France-Quebec axis. An internal MAE report in 1957 judged Quebec to be the province destined to have the most brilliant economic future by virtue of its size, mineral resources, hydro-electric potential, and geographic position.⁷³ France's Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, and its Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, were highly impressed with Quebec's economic development during their March 1957 visit.⁷⁴ Duplessis' death in 1959 only increased French interest; Lacoste reported that in spite of the long history of French-Canadian ambivalence for France, there was a growing Quebec desire to expand economic contacts, and that Paris should seize the occasion as Quebec offered the greatest economic opportunities available in Canada.⁷⁵

French officials certainly acknowledged that more should be done to develop France's economic presence outside Quebec; Guérin recognized that it was necessary not to neglect the other provinces, and Paris appointed a Consul General to Edmonton to monitor the development of Alberta's petroleum industry. Lacoste deplored the

⁷² MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Affaires économiques et financières, 2 November 1954, Exposition française de Montréal; Vinant (1985), 101.

⁷³ MAE, v. 142 – Relations économiques franco-canadiennes, 28 février 1957.

⁷⁴ Conrad Black, *Duplessis* (McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 493-494; Vinant (1985), 140.

⁷⁵ MAE, v. 129 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 12 December 1959, Problèmes actuels de la Province de Québec: le legs de M. Duplessis et la recherche d'un nouvel équilibre politique.

lack of a substantial French economic profile in Ontario, reporting that the province's officials were contacted by more German industrialists in a month than they were by representatives of French firms in more than a year.⁷⁶

The reality, however, was that French attention was increasingly focused on Quebec, as demonstrated during de Gaulle's 1960 visit. The French leader's briefing notes remarked that the Quebec Government was displaying a marked preference for French industry over that of the British or Americans.⁷⁷ During the subsequent trip, de Gaulle noted the "Anglo-Saxon" economic domination of Montreal and the lament of its mayor, Sarto Fournier, that so little French investment came to the Quebec metropolis.⁷⁸ De Gaulle publicly alluded to French interest in Quebec's economic evolution, praising it as "une grande réussite française" that, had it not been realized, would have meant the diminution of the international "choses françaises."⁷⁹ The French leader's remarks suggested that as Quebec grappled with the challenge of reconciling economic development with preserving its cultural specificity, it was becoming to Gaullist eyes a proxy for a France confronting a similar set of challenges.

The growing convergence of Gaullist and Quebec nationalist preoccupations in the economic sphere assumed tangible form following the Quebec Government's

⁷⁶ MAE, v. 142 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 6 March 1956, Expansion commerciale française dans l'Ontario; MAE, v. 142 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Affaires économiques et financières, 15 March 1956, Voyage de M. Nickle; MAE, v. 142 – Note: Relations Économiques Franco-Canadiennes, 28 February 1957.

⁷⁷ ANF, 5AG1/404 – Documentation sur le Canada, Documentation destinée au Général de Gaulle, à l'occasion de son voyage officiel au Canada, 18-22 avril 1960.

⁷⁸ Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, translated by Terence Kilmartin (George Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd, 1971), 242.

⁷⁹ ANF, 5AG1/284 – Discours du Président de la République Française à l'issue du dîner d'État, au Château Frontenac; ANF, 5AG1/284 – Allocution prononcée par le Général de Gaulle à la fin du Banquet offert par la Ville de Montréal à l'Hôtel Queen Elisabeth, 21 avril 1960.

decision to re-open a commercial office in Paris that had been closed in 1912. Adélar Godbout's Liberal government had had similar plans after the 1939 election, but the fortunes of war shelved the idea; instead, reflecting the growing US economic influence in Quebec, an Agency-General was opened in New York.

The idea of a Quebec office in Paris, however, did not disappear. In September 1945, Paul Beaulieu told the French commercial counsellor of his desire for a Quebec commercial representative in France independent of the Canadian Embassy, arguing that neither it nor its francophone personnel were staunch enough defenders of Quebec interests. The French official responded to Beaulieu without making a commitment, but subsequently told de Hauteclouque that even if Ottawa opposed the idea there was little it could do to prevent such action since Canada's constitution permitted the provinces to operate overseas offices for the promotion of trade and immigration. The counsellor cautioned, however, that Paris should be wary given the potential for Quebec City to use such an office to enlist French support in opposing Ottawa, and that it was not in the interests of either France or French Canada to support the Duplessis Government. The recommendation was therefore that Paris' approval of any office be linked to Ottawa's consent and a carefully delineated mandate.⁸⁰

Little ultimately came of the discussion, or Paul Beaulieu's visit to Paris four years later to explore the possibility of opening a Quebec office.⁸¹ The main reason

⁸⁰ MAE, v. 63 – Letter from Lechartier, Commercial Counsellor, to de Hauteclouque, 15 September 1945, Exposition provinciale de Québec. The question of provincial competence regarding international activities is discussed at greater length in chapter eleven.

⁸¹ MAE, v. 54 – Letter from del Perugia, Gérant le Consul Général de France à Québec, to MAE, Amérique, 14 May 1949, Ouverture d'une agence commerciale de la Province de Québec à Paris.

for the inaction on a Quebec office appears to have been Duplessis.⁸² In early 1958, amid the success of the exposition at *Les Grands Magasins du Louvre*, Quebec Liberal leader Georges-Émile Lapalme again raised the idea. The Premier's response, however, was a categoric refusal, arguing that earlier initiatives had proven not worth the expense, and that expositions and trade missions would suffice.⁸³

Duplessis' refusal occurred amid the lobbying of the soon-to-retire Désy to be appointed, even unofficially, Quebec's representative in Paris. The Premier apparently toyed with the idea, reasoning it would raise the stature of Quebec, have some economic utility, and be a relatively inexpensive sop to neo-nationalist elements, but his answer remained no. Undaunted, the nationalistic Désy continued to push for the appointment, claiming it would permit him to end his career "devoting ourselves to the cause of our people, without having to fight against the contrary and often hostile influences of our so-called anglophone brothers."⁸⁴

La Tribune de Sherbrooke took up the idea of a Quebec office following France's Consul General in Quebec City suggestion to a *Comité France-Amérique* luncheon.⁸⁵ It was not until after Duplessis' death, however, that the proposal for a Quebec office in France was examined seriously. In the 1959-1960 budget estimates, Quebec's Ministry of Industry and Commerce received a supplementary budget for the expressed purpose of opening a new Agency, and in March 1960 the Premier,

⁸² Charles Halary, "Charles de Gaulle et le Québec, 1967-1997, un éloignement littéraire instructif," *Bulletin d'histoire politique* 1997, 5(3), 49.

⁸³ MAE, v. 96 – Letter from Ambassade de France au Canada, Lacoste, to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 29 January 1958, Le Canada, les Etats-Unis et l'Europe – Déclarations de M. Duplessis, Premier Ministre de la Province de Québec. Réaction de Toronto.

⁸⁴ Black (1977), 493-494. Indicative of his nationalist sympathies, Désy wrote: "What a joy and what a satisfaction we will have in showing to the world, without having to mask them, our true colours. We will try to carry on, abroad, the combat that you are leading within our own borders with such fruitful firmness."

⁸⁵ Thomson (1988), 29.

Antonio Barrette, indicated Quebec would open offices in Paris and London; Barrette confided to Ambassador Lacoste that he expected some difficulties from Ottawa, and that this had led him to announce the London office to establish “balance” and ensure the opening of the Paris office, to which he attached a much higher priority.⁸⁶ Despite these intentions, the subsequent defeat of the Union Nationale meant that the task of opening a new office fell to the new Liberal government of Jean Lesage.

Economic relations between Canada and France in the fifteen years following the Second World War therefore present a mixed record. Although at a governmental level and in relative terms they were anaemic and a source of divergence, contacts of an economic nature between the two countries grew in absolute terms. This growth was certainly evident in a monetary sense, but even more significantly, it had occurred in terms of a thickening web of interpersonal contacts that contributed to the emerging sense on both sides of the Atlantic that a more substantive economic relationship would be beneficial to both sides. This sentiment stemmed in large measure from fears of US economic influence and the cultural consequences that flowed from this. International conditions had intersected with and exacerbated Quebec neo-nationalist, French, and Canadian nationalist apprehensions, a crucial precursor to the triangular relations and tensions of the 1960s. As these interacting nationalist responses led to increased cooperation and conflict in the economic sphere, however, an important question remained unanswered: how effective would the combined efforts of the nationalist reactions be in overcoming the structural

⁸⁶ MAE, v. 129 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 2 March 1960, Agences de la Province de Québec à Paris et à Londres; Sylvain Larose, *La création de la délégation générale du Québec à Paris (1958-1964)*, M.A. thesis (Université du Québec à Montréal, Department of History, 2000), 31; Black (1977), 495.

realities of the Canada-France economic relationship and the broader international trends to which they were a response?

Chapter 6

Prelude to a Rapprochement: Canada-France Cultural Contacts, 1944-1960

In 1942, Charles de Koninck, Dean of Université Laval's Faculty of Philosophy, invited French writer-in-exile Antoine de Saint-Exupéry to deliver a talk in Quebec City. During the visit, Saint-Exupéry met de Koninck's eight-year-old son Thomas, who became part of his inspiration for the title character of *Le Petit Prince*, the international best-seller the French author published the following year. A quarter-century later, Expo 67's theme of *Terre des hommes/Man's World* was taken from the title of Saint-Exupéry's novel of the same name.¹ These examples of transnational cultural exchanges were emblematic of the growth and evolution of cultural contact between France and Canada, especially French Canada during the Second World War and after. Although the political and economic aspects of the official bilateral relationship were anaemic and even deteriorated in the fifteen years after 1945, cultural relations multiplied between the two countries, consistent with the larger phenomenon of increasing transnational exchanges.

This chapter explores the proliferation and nature of Canada-France cultural contacts after the Second World War, and provides a foundation for the discussion of the politicization of cultural links that takes place in chapter 7. The growth of France's cultural contacts with francophone Quebec was especially pronounced, as the importance of traditional, conservative cultural links declined relative to those of a modern, secular nature. This rapprochement was not without its own tensions, as

¹ Frédérique Doyon, "Le mystère de l'édition et de la genèse québécoises du *Petit Prince*," *Le Devoir*, 22 April 2006, F1; Gabrielle Roy, Introduction, *Terres des Hommes/Man and His World* (Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World Exhibition, 1967), 24.

Quebec's socio-cultural transformation meant that French Canada saw itself increasingly as a cultural producer whose unique contribution to francophone culture merited respect, rather than merely a dependent consumer of and agent for French cultural products.

The Fortunes of War

Cultural contacts between France and French Canada were never completely severed after the Conquest and reflected a spectrum of political and ideological positions.² Quebec's traditional nationalist elite distinguished between *France éternelle* and *France moderne*, favouring the former pre-1789 incarnation as an ally in maintaining French Canada's linguistic and religious specificity. *France moderne* was condemned as a Trojan horse for liberal, secular influences that would undermine the foundations of French-Canadian civilization and lead to its ruin.³

² An example of this at the official level was the work of Hector Fabre, who served simultaneously as Quebec's agent-general and Canada's commissioner in Paris, and was most active in promoting cultural contacts between France and French Canada. John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume I: The Early Years, 1909-1946* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 17; Daniel Chartier, "Hector Fabre et le Paris-Canada au coeur de la rencontre culturelle France-Québec de la fin du XIXe siècle," *Études Françaises* 1996, 32(3): 51-60. Also, Jean-Louis Roy, *Édouard-Raymond Fabre, libraire et patriote canadien, 1799-1854: contre l'isolement et la sujétion* (Hurtubise HMH, 1974). Roy's work chronicles the life of Hector Fabre's father, who spent time in Paris before returning to Montreal to become Lower Canada's first bookseller.

³ For discussions of the nature of the links between France and Quebec prior to 1945, see Monique Bégin, *Les échanges culturels entre la France et le Canada depuis 1763: essai d'interprétation symbolique*, M.A. Thesis (University of Montréal, Department of Sociology, 1965); Centre culturel canadien, *Les Relations entre la France et le Canada aux XIXe siècle*, Colloque, 26 April 1974, organisé par le Centre culturel canadien (Centre culturel canadien, Paris, 1974); Louise Beaudoin, *Les relations France-Québec, deux époques, 1855-1910, 1960-1972*, M.A. thesis (Université Laval, Department of History, 1974); Pierre Savard, "Les Canadiens français et la France de la 'cession' à la 'révolution tranquille'," in *Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale*, Paul Painchaud, ed. (Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1977), 471-495; Luc Roussel, *Les relations culturelles du Québec avec la France, 1920-1965*, unpublished dissertation (Université Laval, Department of History, 1983); Sylvain Simard, *Mythe et reflet de la France: l'image du Canada en France, 1850-1914* (Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1987); *L'image de la Révolution française au Québec 1789-1989*, Michel Grenon, ed. (Éditions Hurtubise, 1989); Michael Oliver, *The Passionate Debate: The Social and Political Ideas of Quebec Nationalism, 1920-1945* (Véhicule Press, 1991); Philippe Prévost, *La France et le Canada: D'une Après-guerre à l'Autre, 1918-1944*, (Les Éditions du Blé,

French Canada's bifurcated view of France was evident in the traditional nationalist elite's approval of Vichy's 'Révolution nationale.' Despite a wartime evolution of public opinion in favour of de Gaulle and the Free French,⁴ an enduring support for *France éternelle* after 1945 was evident in the polarization of views over the fate of disgraced Vichy leader Marshall Philippe Pétain.⁵ Quebec's Premier, Maurice Duplessis, was reluctant to meet with the new French Consul General in Quebec City, refusing to see any "maquisard," and relenting only when the diplomat accompanied a delegation of visiting French journalists. During the meeting, Duplessis accused French officials of favouring the Liberals, and, consistent with his view of French Canadians as "improved Frenchmen" affirmed that French Canada's centuries of cultural "resistance" were greater than France's wartime experience.

1994); *La Capricieuse (1855): poupe et proue, Les relations France-Québec (1760-1914)* Yvan Lamonde et Didier Poton, ed. (Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2006); Yvan Lamonde, *Allégeances et dépendances, L'histoire d'une ambivalence identitaire* (Éditions Nota bene, 2001) : 137-166; Gérard Bouchard, *Entre l'Ancien et le Nouveau Monde, Le Québec comme population neuve et culture fondatrice* (University of Ottawa Press, 1996), 9-11, 42-43; Stéphanie Angers et Gérard Fabre, *Échanges intellectuels entre la France et le Québec (1930-2000), Les réseaux de la revue Esprit avec La Relève, Cité libre, Parti pris et Possibles* (Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2004), 17-46.

⁴ Éric Amyot, *Le Québec entre Pétain et de Gaulle: Vichy, la France libre et les Canadiens français, 1940-1945* (Fides, 1999); Robert Arcand, "Pétain et de Gaulle dans la presse québécoise entre juin 1940 et novembre 1942," *Revue historique de l'Amérique française* Winter 1991, 44(3): 363-387. MAE, v. 63 – Letter from Moeneclaey, Consul Général à Québec et Montréal, to Bonneau, Délégué du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française à Ottawa, 9 September 1944, Exposition Provinciale de Québec; MAE, v. 210, Réactions – Telegram from Bonneau, French Ambassador, Berne, to MAE, Amérique, 28 July 1967. Indicative of the evolution of Québec opinion was the enthusiastic welcome de Gaulle received in Montreal in July 1944, which moved him to remark to Gabriel Bonneau, Free France's representative in Canada, that "Cela a été comme à Bayeux," referring to the rapturous welcome he received in Normandy a few weeks earlier. The equating of Montreal and Bayeux hints at an intriguing insight into de Gaulle's view of French Canada.

⁵ MAE, v. 43 – Letter from de Hautesclouque to Bidault, MAE, 5 April 1945; MAE, v. 13 – Revue de la Presse Canadienne du 15 au 31 juillet, 1945 – questions extérieures – Analyse; MAE, v. 43 – Letter from Moeneclaey to Bidault, MAE, 19 November 1945. Moeneclaey reported the spontaneous applause by an audience in Montreal's Théâtre St-Denis when Pétain appeared on screen during a newsreel. For a discussion of *France éternelle* sentiment in Quebec after 1945, see the discussion of newspaper attitudes in Pierre Savard, "L'ambassade de Francisque Gay au Canada en 1948-1949," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 1974, 44(1): 25-27; John Hellman, "Monasteries, Miliciens, War Criminals: Vichy France/Quebec, 1940-1950," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1997, 32(4): 539-554; Yves Lavertu, *L'affaire Bernonville: Le Québec face à Pétain et à la collaboration, 1948-1951* (VLB éditeur, 1994).

When the Premier referred disparagingly to divisions in France, a French official present responded that France was united behind de Gaulle, prompting the Premier to intimate that this was not the true France.⁶

Paris was thus aware of French-Canadian ambivalence toward France.⁷ Acknowledging the significance of the question of religion, the MAE described relations with the Quebec clergy as one of the most important and delicate questions for France's representatives; indeed, although he ultimately did not earn the Quebec clergy's approval, Francisque Gay was appointed ambassador to Canada by virtue of his Catholic activism and close ties to France's Christian Democratic movement.⁸ A heated debate in Quebec's francophone press in the early 1950s over French Catholicism prompted France's Embassy to claim that the one attitude not to expect from French Canadians regarding France was indifference, given their tendency to invoke France in their internal quarrels, as either a target or an ally.⁹

The references to France in French Canada's internal debates were consistent with what Michael Behiels has described as the "prelude" to the Quiet Revolution, and reflected the evolution of Canada-France cultural exchanges.¹⁰ France's collapse in 1940 facilitated francophone Quebec's exposure to progressive French intellectual currents that the traditional nationalist elites had previously filtered out. Above all,

⁶ MAE, v. 43 – Letter from Moeneclay to de Hauteclocque, 20 March 1945. The French report states Duplessis claimed Gaullist France was "pour lui une nation absolument nouvelle."

⁷ MAE, v. 171 – Annual Report, Service culturel, French Embassy, Ottawa, 31 July 1957.

⁸ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949; Savard (1974), 5-7.

⁹ MAE, v. 170 – Letter from Guérin to Bidault, MAE, Amérique, 16 March 1953, opinions émises sur la vie intellectuelle et spirituelle en France.

¹⁰ Michael Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985).

there were numerous contacts with New York's French exile community, uniform in its opposition to Vichy.¹¹

The war also contributed to a shift in how francophone Quebec perceived its cultural relationship to France and the broader international francophone community. France's wartime effacement facilitated French Canada's cultural *épanouissement*. After 1940 the task of helping to maintain and propagate French culture fell to francophone Quebec.¹² Ottawa's decision to grant publishers special permission to breach copyright and re-print French works that the war had rendered inaccessible led Quebec's publishing industry to grow exponentially.¹³ Before 1940 Canadian publishing houses had produced fifty French-language works annually; during the war, seven hundred re-editions of French works alone were published, enabling Quebec publishers to support local talent.¹⁴

Quebec's literary community received an "infusion intellectuelle" that arose not only from the re-printing of existing French works and the related growth of the

¹¹ Élisabeth Nardout, *Le Champ littéraire québécois et la France 1940-50*, unpublished dissertation (McGill University, Department of French Language and Literature, 1987), 85-92. Members of this community included Julien Green, Étienne Gilson, who taught at the University of Toronto, Jacques et Raissa Maritain, André Maurois, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Saint-John Perse, and Pierre Brodin. André Breton spent the summer of 1944 in Gaspé, where Yvan Goll also went and wrote *Le Mythe de la Roche percée*. Painters included André Masson, Marc Chagall, Max Ernst, Yves Tanguy, and Fernand Léger. Among the works more easily available in Quebec were the poetry of Arthur Rimbaud, the novels of André Gide and Georges Bernanos, René Descartes' *Discourse on Method*, and the writings of existentialists such as Jean-Paul Sartre.

¹² Roussel (1983), 165-171; Nardout (1987), 5-6, Prévost (1994), 386. For discussion of this *épanouissement*, see Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, Jean-Claude Robert, François Ricard, *Quebec since 1930*, translated by Robert Chodos and Ellen Garmaise (James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1991), 118-144, 284-306.

¹³ Nardout (1987), 93-97; Prévost (1994), 400-402. *Éditions Bernard Valiquette* began such operations and by 1942 was selling ten thousand French-language works per month throughout North America. Competing publishing houses included *Éditions de l'Arbre*, *Granger et Frères*, *Beauchemin*, *Les Éditions Variétés*, *Fides*, *Société des Éditions Pascal*, and *Éditions Parizeau*. By 1944, approximately twenty Quebec companies were re-publishing French works.

¹⁴ MAE, v. 64 – Bulletin de Renseignements, Études Sociales et Culturelles, Canada, L'Édition de Langue Française au Canada, 20 August 1946. The pre-1940 statistic did not include religious works or educational texts.

local publishing industry, but new works by exiled French writers who wrote for, or contributed to Quebec journals such as *La Nouvelle Relève*, which helped spread the ideas of the French Catholic left.¹⁵ Moreover, the unusual wartime conditions fostered greater awareness in Quebec of the universality of “French” culture and an understanding that France was not its sole agent, and that Quebec could be a major contributor to the international francophone community. The result was French Canada’s growing demands for French acknowledgement of its unique cultural contribution so that exchanges could shift from a metropolitan-colony dynamic to one of partnership. Adrien Pouliot, Dean of Laval’s Faculty of Mathematics, a Sorbonne graduate, and representative of the Quebec-based *Comité de la survivance française*, described his group’s purpose to a French audience in 1948 as being

faire comprendre à nos cousins de France que nous ne sommes plus un petit peuple bien inférieur mais plutôt deux nations sœurs qui désirent travailler, *sur un pied d’égalité* [emphasis added], à l’expansion de la culture française dans le monde.¹⁶

The Proliferation of Cultural Contact

Traditional, conservative links were increasingly eclipsed after 1945 by more progressive, liberal contacts between *France moderne* and French Canada. Claude Galarneau has argued that post-war cultural exchanges between France and French Canada contributed to the emergence of a more pluralistic Quebec.¹⁷ French Catholic personalist thought, with its concern to establish social and political institutions to permit individuals to realize their spiritual and material potential, inspired both the

¹⁵ Nardout (1987), 57-60. Examples of the pre-war influence included *La Nouvelle Relève*’s predecessor, *La Relève*. Also, Michael Oliver, *The Passionate Debate: The Social and Political Ideas of Quebec Nationalism, 1920-1945* (Véhicule Press, 1991), 105-147.

¹⁶ Roussel (1983), 170-171, 252-253.

¹⁷ Claude Galarneau, “Une France en partie double au frontières du mythe et de la réalité,” *Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa* April-June 1985, 55(2): 61.

neo-nationalist and rival *citélibriste* challenges to the Duplessis Government and Quebec's traditional nationalist order.¹⁸

The openness in Quebec to more progressive Catholic thought was demonstrated by the favourable and extensive coverage accorded French personalist writer Henri Daniel-Rops during a 1952 speaking tour.¹⁹ Similarly, Abbé Pierre, a champion of social justice and former member of the French Resistance, received an enthusiastic reception during his visit to Canada in 1955, when more than ten thousand attended a speech he delivered, and the following year, when he toured Quebec City, Montreal and Ottawa.²⁰

A barometer of the growing influence of progressive French Catholic thought was the hostility it provoked from traditional nationalists. The publication of an edition of the French personalist review *Esprit* in 1952 devoted to French Canada produced a strong response by virtue of its criticism of Quebec cultural life, notably what it identified as the Catholic Church's domineering influence.²¹ Expatriate French historian Robert Rumilly condemned the neo-nationalists and *citélibristes* for entering into an unholy alliance with French communists, accusing them of having

¹⁸ Behiels (1985), 20-36, 61-83; Michael Gauvreau, *The Catholic Origins of Quebec's Quiet Revolution, 1931-1970* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 42-58; Alain-G. Gagnon, "André Laurendeau: The Search for Political Equality and Social Justice," *Quebec Studies* 1999, (27): 80-83; Christian Roy, "Le personnalisme de l'ordre nouveau et le Québec (1930-1947): Son rôle dans la formation de Guy Frégault," *Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique française* 1993, 46(3): 463-484.

¹⁹ MAE, v. 89 – Message from Triat, Consul Général de France à Montréal, to French Ambassador, Ottawa, *Chronique Mensuelle*, April 1952.

²⁰ MAE, v. 95 – Letter from de Villelume, Charge d'Affaires, to Pinay, MAE, Amérique, 31 May 1955, Visite de l'Abbé Pierre à Montréal; MAE, v. 96 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, 29 June 1956, Séjour au Canada de l'Abbé Pierre.

²¹ "Le Canada Français," *Esprit*, August-September 1952, 20(193-194), 169-280. The authors appearing in the special edition were Frank Scott, Gérard Pelletier, Maurice Blain, Jean-C. Falardeau, Ernest Gagnon, Jean-Guy Blain, D'Iberville Fortier, and Jean-Marc Léger; MAE, v. 170 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec to Schuman, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 24 October 1952, le numéro d'*Esprit* sur le Canada. Also, Angers and Fabre (2004), 59-104 for a discussion of the links between *Cité libre* and *Esprit* in the post-war period.

been seduced by left-wing and anti-clerical ideas, and of hastening French-Canadian assimilation by their efforts to “de-nationalize Quebec youth at the service of English Canada.”²²

Traditional voices of concern such as Rumilly’s were increasingly marginalized, however. The war’s end meant a normalization and increase in educational and academic contacts between France and French Canada consistent with an increasingly positive attitude in Quebec toward *France moderne*. The changing disposition in academic circles led to Laval awarding an honorary doctorate in 1946 to Jean de Hauteclocque, the first French ambassador to receive such an honour.²³ During the ceremony, the university’s new rector, Monsignor Ferdinand Vandry, affirmed his attachment to France and French culture, and publicly declared the need for increased cultural exchanges, especially of an intellectual nature, between France and French Canada.²⁴

The Monsignor’s wish was realized: the MAE estimated that more than a thousand Canadian students visited France on some form of government scholarship in the decade after 1945, and many others, far surpassing the number awarded funding, spent time in France at their own expense.²⁵ After its wartime closure, the student residence *Maison des étudiants canadiens* (MEC) at Paris’ *Cité universitaire*

²² Behiels (1985), 55-57.

²³ MAE, v. 62 – Telegram from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, 7 January 1946.

²⁴ MAE, v. 62 – Letter from Lorion, Conseiller d’Ambassade, Charge du Consulat Général de France à Québec, to Bidault, MAE, Amérique, 24 January 1946, Remise d’un diplôme d’honneur de Docteur ès-Sciences à l’Ambassadeur de France.

²⁵ MAE, v. 171 – Annual Report, Cultural Service, French Embassy, Ottawa, 31 July 1957. Indeed, a number of personalities prominent in the triangular relations of the 1960s spent time studying in France after the war; among these were Gaston Cholette, Jean-Marc Léger, and Pierre Trudeau. Also, see Gérard Pelletier, *Souvenirs: Les années d’impatience, 1950-1960* (Stanké, 1983), 37-38. He emphasizes the importance of going to Paris for members of his generation, describing the city as their intellectual point of reference

re-opened. Initially under the supervision of the Canadian Legion's educational service, at least 2400 demobilized Canadian soldiers and officers stayed at the MEC while taking university courses in Paris. The establishment returned to civilian life in 1946, and a majority of the residents in the years that followed were from Quebec.²⁶

Numerous French professors visited Canada to renew links that the war had interrupted. The *Institut Scientifique Franco-Canadien* (ISFC), established in the 1920s, had a much easier task in facilitating exchanges of French and Canadian academic personalities. The Université de Montréal welcomed up to four visiting French professors annually, while Laval received up to three, resulting in the visits of almost a hundred professors by 1960.²⁷ By the late 1940s, Paris' representatives in Canada were remarking on the large number of French professors the francophone universities were requesting, the numerous applicants for scholarships to study in France, and the fact that it was in Canada, and Quebec especially, that French speakers touring North America drew the largest audiences.²⁸

France's embassy boasted in 1953 that the French contribution to Canadian university life had never been so significant. In addition to academic exchanges, French professors occupied permanent posts at Laval, Université de Montréal, McGill, Dalhousie, Queen's, and the University of Toronto.²⁹ At the Université de

²⁶ Linda Lapointe, *Maison des étudiants canadiens, Cité internationale universitaire de Paris, 75 ans d'histoire, 1926-2001* (Éditions Stromboli, 2001), 76; Roussel (1983), 229. In 1959-60, two-thirds of the sixty-six occupants were from Quebec.

²⁷ MAE, v. 43 – Revue de l'Année 1945, from de Hauteclouque to Bidault, MAE; Roussel (1983), 214-215, 393-395; *Informations canadiennes*, September 1956, (8-9).

²⁸ MAE, v. 66 – Letter from Gay to MAE, Relations Culturelles, 1 March 1949, ci-joint Note du Conseiller Culturel sur l'enseignement français au Canada.

²⁹ MAE, v. 170 – Letter from de Laboulaye, Charge d'Affaires, A.I., to Bidault, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 29 July 1953, Rapport annuel du Service Culturel; MAE, v. 99 – Visite de M. Saint Laurent, 7-10 février 1954 – Chef du Gouvernement Canadien; MAE, v. 171 – Action Culturelle de la

Montréal alone, one hundred and seventy French professors taught under various auspices between 1958 and 1962.³⁰

Members of Quebec's academic community and *Cité libre* personalities helped establish the *Institut canadien des affaires publiques* in 1954. *Radio-Canada* broadcast its annual meetings in the Laurentians, further exposing Quebec audiences to prominent French-Canadian and foreign intellectuals on public policy issues.³¹ Among the French personalities who attended was *Le Monde* editor Hubert Beuve-Méry, who gave the 1954 keynote address on social democracy. Sorbonne professor René Marrou, and journalist and sociologist Raymond Aron were keynote speakers at subsequent meetings.³²

The number of Quebec academics visiting France also increased, due in part to ISFC efforts, which sent a professor from Laval and Université de Montréal annually. Reflective of increasing Quebec assertiveness, the ISFC's president expressed a desire that there should be a greater reciprocity given the growing awareness in France of Quebec's academic personalities, so that instead of simply being sent to France, these individuals should be invited.³³

A further example of the growth of intellectual contacts, the evolution of Quebec attitudes regarding *France moderne*, and the wish to be acknowledged as an

France au Canada, 28 February 1957. Three years later, it was estimated twenty-five French nationals held permanent posts in Canadian universities.

³⁰ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 212, Institut Scientifique Franco-Canadien – Letter from André Bachand, L'adjoint au recteur et directeur des relations extérieures, Université de Montréal, to Guy Frégault, 13 November 1962. Twenty-eight were part of the regular faculty, thirty-five taught for a semester or a full year, eighteen came as speakers under the ISFC auspices, eight taught summer courses at the university, and eighty-one came for brief visits such as for a conference, or as part of a lecture tour.

³¹ Behiels (1985), 80.

³² MAE, v. 95 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, Amérique, 2 November 1954; MAE, v. 172 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Culturelles, 8 August 1958, Rapport du Service Culturel, 1957-1958.

³³ Roussel (1983), 184-186.

equal partner in cultural development, was the Université de Montréal's effort in the late 1950s to establish an international association of French-language universities. The founding meeting of the *Association des Universités Partiellement ou Entièrement de Langue Française* (AUPELF) was held in Montreal in 1961. Considered a cornerstone of the subsequent *Francophonie*, the new organization was headquartered in Montreal, and mandated to foster cooperation and communication, and intellectual exchanges.³⁴

The growth of intellectual contacts and the more positive attitude toward *France moderne* did not, of course, mean the disappearance of French-Canadian ambivalence toward France. In fact, the French Ambassador, Francis Lacoste, accused the Université de Montréal's *Institut d'histoire* of hostility toward France and ignoring all French historians. He recounted how neo-nationalist historian Michel Brunet made remarks regarding France that were considered so hostile that the university's rector, Monsignor Irinée Lussier, felt obliged to invite Lacoste to deliver a speech at the university as compensation.³⁵

The expansion and evolution of Canada-France cultural contacts was even more apparent in the artistic sphere. A year after the war ended, France's Embassy informed Paris of Quebec's younger generation's growing interest in new French literary works, contemporary art shows, and the visits of French theatre companies.³⁶

The successful tours of *Théâtre Groupe*, *Compagnie Jean-Louis Barrault et*

³⁴ MAE, v. 173 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Affaires culturelles et techniques, 3 January 1961; MAE, v. 173 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1966 [sic, 1961]; DEA, G-2, v. 5057, 2727-14-40, p. 1, AUPELF, Projet de Statuts, Préambule.

³⁵ MAE, v. 172 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Culturelles, 8 August 1958, Rapport du Service Culturel, 1957-1958.

³⁶ MAE, v. 64 – Note pour Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles, 18 June 1946, Extraits d'une lettre M. Négrier, Consul Général à Montréal.

Madeleine Renaud, and the warm reception that greeted *Théâtre national populaire* during the 1954 French trade exposition in Montreal presaged the visit of the *Comédie française*, which performed to acclaim in Montreal, Quebec City, Ottawa, and Toronto during its first North American tour in 1955.³⁷

The expanding French-Canadian theatre also enjoyed success in France, as evidenced by the warm critical welcome that the *Théâtre du Nouveau Monde* (TNM) received at the *Festival dramatique internationale de Paris* in 1955.³⁸ Paris was interested in the growth of the French-language theatre in Canada, particularly when TNM director Jean Gascon claimed a significant theatre audience had been created in Canada as a result of touring French theatre troupes and French-language productions shown on television.³⁹ Lacoste described the founding of the *Comédie canadienne* in 1958, which established a permanent venue in Montreal to perform French-Canadian productions, as the most significant event in Quebec theatre since 1945.⁴⁰

French Canada's continued ambivalence toward France and the evolution of its cultural self-awareness meant that the proliferation of cultural contacts was not without complications. The wartime growth of Quebec's publishing industry that resulted from its re-printing French works set the stage for conflict. Quebec publishers hoped to continue their lucrative activity after 1945. This ambition clashed with Paris' determination, as part of its reconstruction efforts, to re-establish

³⁷ MAE, v. 5 – Chronique mensuelle from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, December 1948; MAE, v. 5 – Chronique mensuelle from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, October 1949; MAE, v. 141 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Amérique, 13 September 1954, Exposition de Montréal; MAE, v. 89 – Message from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, Chronique Mensuelle, October 1952; MAE, v. 171 – Letter from de Villelume to Pinay, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 10 November 1955, visite officielle du Canada de la Comédie Française.

³⁸ *Informations canadiennes* February 1956, 1(2).

³⁹ *Informations canadiennes* May 1957, 2(16).

⁴⁰ MAE, v. 172 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Culturelles, 8 August 1958, Rapport du Service Culturel, 1957-1958.

the monopoly France's publishers enjoyed in printing French works. The result was the failure of many of the Quebec publishing houses that had emerged during the war.⁴¹ Tensions were exacerbated by French publishers' growing interest in the Canadian market which helped maintain the dominance of French interests in Quebec's publishing sector. Shortly after the war, a *Centre du Livre Français* was established with the mandate to promote the sale of French publications in Canada. In 1950, Jean Malye, head of *Les Belles-Lettres* visited Montreal to contact book stores and local publishers, and French publishers *Flammarion* and *Librairie Hachette* opened branches in Montreal later that year.⁴² Robert Toussaint, head of *Arthème Fayard*, visited in 1959 to establish *Fayard-Canada* to distribute French publications and seek out new literary talent. The reassertion of French publication rights, by plunging the Quebec publishing industry into crisis and impeding the emergence of a wholly autonomous literature in the short term, fuelled the will for French-Canadian literary *épanouissement*.⁴³ The dispute underscored the changing dynamic of cultural relations between France and French Canada, as the crux of the controversy was French Canada's role as a cultural producer.

The "Charbonneau Affair" also exposed the differences that the evolution of attitudes in Quebec about French Canada's cultural relationship to France generated. Controversy arose when France's *Comité National d'Écrivains* condemned Quebec publishers *Variétés* and *Éditions de l'Arbre* for publishing authors it deemed collaborators and who were blacklisted in France. Robert Charbonneau, co-founder

⁴¹ Nardout (1987), 5-6; 170-172.

⁴² MAE, v. 5 – Chronique mensuelle, March 1950, M. Triat, Consul Général de France à Montréal, à l'Ambassadeur.

⁴³ Nardout (1987), 175.

of *Éditions de l'Arbre*, editor of *La Nouvelle Relève*, and President of the *Association des Éditeurs* defended the decision to publish these authors. An avowed anti-fascist, he argued the importance of the free diffusion of ideas; a noted Francophile, he nonetheless resisted what he viewed as French interference in Quebec's literary life, denouncing French cultural colonialism and urging French Canadians to abandon the idea that they were North America's interpreters of French thought.

Élisabeth Nardout has described the dispute as a major step in the self-definition of Quebec literature, a clash between Quebec intellectuals and France's intellectual Left that exemplified Quebec's growing interaction with the outside world.⁴⁴ Yvan Lamonde and Gérard Bouchard refer to the conflict as evidence of a growing acceptance of Quebec's *americanité* – that is, a New World society that has undergone a rupture with its original metropole.⁴⁵

In spite of the occasionally strained relations, literary contacts grew; Paul Péladeau, head of *Editions Variétés* and the *Syndicat Éditeurs Canadiens* visited France in 1949 with the goal of expanding trade in the publishing industry, and that same year Montreal's *Les Éditions Fides* opened a branch in Paris.⁴⁶ Between 1955 and 1966, the amount of French books sold in Quebec rocketed from 480 to 2700 metric tonnes.⁴⁷ Nardout has suggested that disputes such as the Charbonneau Affair attracted the attention of the French intelligentsia to the existence of Quebec

⁴⁴ Nardout (1987), 169; 190-206; Roussel (1983), 164-167.

⁴⁵ Bouchard (1996), 33-34; Lamonde (2001), 89-90, 95. Charbonneau's words are telling: "Il faut sortir 'de la zone d'influence' de la France comme les États-Unis l'ont fait de l'Angleterre et les pays de l'Amérique du Sud de l'Espagne ou du Portugal. L'Amérique est l'avenir."

⁴⁶ MAE, v. 66 – Telegram from Gay to MAE, 8 March 1949; MAE, v. 5 – Message from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, *Chronique mensuelle*, May 1949.

⁴⁷ Nathalie Richard, "La politique culturelle de la France vis à vis du Québec, 1945-1967," in *Français et Québécois: le Regard de l'autre*, Paris, 7-9 October 1999, Jean-Pierre Bardet and René Durocher, eds. (Centre de coopération interuniversitaire franco-québécoise, 1999), 155.

literature, and the publicity (albeit negative) generated contributed to the legitimizing of Quebec literature as a distinct, autonomous form.⁴⁸

Increasing French interest was accompanied by increased recognition: Gabrielle Roy won the prestigious *Prix Fémina* in 1947 for *Bonheur de l'occasion*, and the *Académie française* awarded Roger Lemelin its *Prix de la langue française* in recognition of his first novel, *Au pied de la pente douce*. His subsequent novel, *Pierre le magnifique*, brought him the *Prix de Paris* in 1952. Lemelin's success was paralleled by that of Jean Simard, whose *Félix* earned the *Prix Kormann* in 1947.⁴⁹ Two years later, the newly-established Quebec book club *Cercle du Livre de France* instituted what became the most prestigious annual literary prize of the period in the province, awarded to a novel written by a French-Canadian author and that offered the possibility of publishing contracts in France. Similarly, an agreement at the start of the 1950s resulted in French publisher Robert Laffont publishing two French-Canadian works annually.⁵⁰ In 1956, the French *Société des Gens de Lettres* hosted an exhibition of the works of poet Alain Grandbois and the novelist Philippe Panneton.⁵¹ At the end of the decade Yves Thériault's *Agaguk* was shortlisted for the famed *Prix Goncourt* and took the *Prix France-Canada* in 1960. Although Marie-Claire Blais' *La Belle Bête* was not a commercial success when it was released in

⁴⁸ Nardout (1987), 244-245; 378-380. The controversy attracted the attention of publications prominent in France's literary community, including *Les Lettres Françaises*, *Les Nouvelles Littéraires*, *Le Figaro Littéraire*, *Le Monde* and *Combat*.

⁴⁹ Jacqueline Gérols, *Le Roman québécois en France* (Hurtubise HMH, 1984), 64; Nardout (1987), 242; *Informations canadiennes* February 1959, 4(31).

⁵⁰ Nardout (1987), 380-383; Gérols (1984), 8, 89, 132. The agreement was the product of agreements between Pierre Tisseyre and Robert Laffont. Tisseyre was a French national in Quebec who worked to re-open the French market to French-Canadian products. By the end of the decade, however, Laffont sought to put an end to the arrangement owing to the lack of interest for Pierre Gélinas' *Les Vivants, les morts et les autres*. Laffont did however publish Claire Martin's *Doux-amer*, and collaborated with Tisseyre in the 1960s, publishing the works of Hubert Aquin, Marcel Godin, and Claude Jasmin.

⁵¹ DEA, G-2, v. 6830, 2727-AD-40, p. 7.2 –Letter from Garneau, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to SSEA, 8 March 1956.

Paris in 1961, the *Académie Française* bestowed its recognition of her “services rendus au dehors à la langue française.”⁵²

Once again, however, cultural contacts were not without difficulties. French publishers and booksellers tended to marginalize French-Canadian authors by denying them adequate marketing support, a situation that was especially frustrating given the reality that Paris remained for French-Canadian literature the platform for international success. There was also a tendency to favour only those writers who had already met with success in Quebec. It was only at the end of the 1950s that French publishers evinced a greater willingness to take a chance on the first editions of new Quebec authors, such as Anne Hébert’s *Les Chambres de bois*.⁵³ Quebec publishers also complained that they were at a serious disadvantage in France’s book market due to the quasi-monopoly the major French organizations enjoyed, notwithstanding a 1959 agreement between the *Association des éditeurs canadiens* and France’s *Librairie Hachette* for the latter to display twenty Canadian titles in its two hundred outlets.⁵⁴

Beyond the growing intellectual and artistic contacts, the expansion of transnational exchanges was reflected in the proliferation of groups promoting cultural links between France and Canada proliferated. Shortly after the war, French intellectual personalities such as André Siegfried and Georges Duhamel visited to help revive the activities of *Alliance française*, the private French organization

⁵² Gérols (1984), 111, 149-150.

⁵³ Nardout (1987), 384-385; Gérols (1984), 4-7.

⁵⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 4003, 10117-AD-40, p. 1.1 – Letter from Delisle, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to USSEA, DEA, 11 August 1960, Information and Cultural Activities of the Embassy, April-June 1960; ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 25, Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris, Dépôt du livre canadien à Paris – Letter from Gaston Miron, président de la Commission d’Exportation de l’Association des Éditeurs Canadiens, to Georges-Émile Lapalme, 3 July 1962.

mandated to promote the *rayonnement* of French culture.⁵⁵ New *Alliance* branches were established in Rimouski, Rivière-du-Loup, Sherbrooke, and Saint-Hyacinthe, adding to the network of clubs across Canada that included Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Halifax. Coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Montreal organization was the announcement of the formation of a federation of the various branches throughout the country.⁵⁶ Among the French personalities who visited Canada under *Alliance* auspices were Vercors, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean-Albert Sorel, François de la Noë, and Maurice Bedel. The organization was also a vehicle to promote Canada in France, as the audience of five hundred that attended a talk the Canadian embassy's cultural attaché gave to the *Alliance* branch in Poitiers attested.⁵⁷

Among the new organizations in France were a number of friendship groups, including the *Fédération Normandie-Canada*, founded clandestinely in 1942. In addition to commemorating Canadian sacrifices in Normandy, its aim was to develop artistic, historic and spiritual links, with French Canada especially.⁵⁸ *Jeunes France-*

⁵⁵ MAE, v. 43 – Revue de l'Année 1945 from de Hauteclouque to Bidault, MAE.

⁵⁶ MAE, v. 170 – Letter from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, 17 December 1953, Création d'une section de l'Alliance française à Saint-Hyacinthe; MAE, v. 5 – Revue mensuelle, January 1952; MAE, v. 89 – Message from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, Chronique Mensuelle, March 1952. Also, Jean-Yves Pelletier, *L'Alliance française d'Ottawa, 1905-2005: un siècle d'histoire* (Alliance française d'Ottawa, 2005), 9, 41; Roussel (1983), 233-235.

⁵⁷ MAE, v. 43 – Bilan des activités française au Canada en 1946 from de Hauteclouque to MAE, Amérique; MAE, v. 89 – Message from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, Chronique Mensuelle, November 1952; MAE, v. 89 – Message from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, Chronique Mensuelle, March 1953; MAE, v. 89 – Message from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, Chronique Mensuelle, November 1953; DEA, G-2, v. 8059, 2727-AD-40, p. 5.2 – Letter from F. Charpentier, Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 15 March 1951.

⁵⁸ MAE, v. 70 – Letter from Jacques Henry, President, founder of Fédération Normandie-Canada, Société d'Amitié Franco-Canadienne, Lisieux, France, 9 March 1948. By December 1946, there were 2500 members, and in October 1947, a branch established in Rouen with 500 members. Roussel (1983), 241.

Canada was established in 1947 parallel to the arrival of Canadian students in France on bursaries provided by Paris.⁵⁹

More significant was the *Accueil Franco-Canadien* (AFC), established to welcome Canadians visiting France and to coordinate the growing number of friendship groups. Included in its membership were figures long active in Canada-France cultural exchanges, including Étienne Gilson, the AFC's provisional president, and chair André Siegfried, a prominent French historian who had written extensively on Canada.⁶⁰ The AFC ceased operating as a distinct entity in 1951, subsumed into a new umbrella organization, the *Association Générale France-Canada* (AGFC), established to achieve greater coordination of the proliferating friendship groups' efforts. The AGFC was a federation that included the *Association Normandie-Canada*, the National Assembly's France-Canada Parliamentary Association that had been established in 1947, and the France-Canada Group of the French Senate. The association was presided over by Jean Raymond-Laurent, a former French cabinet minister, National Assembly deputy, and head of the France-Canada Parliamentary Association. It operated a library in Paris and hosted an annual general meeting in French cities linked historically to Canada.⁶¹ During its first six years of existence, the AGFC assisted close to three thousand Canadians at its welcome centre in Paris and organized 455 events such as lectures, films, colloquia, lunches, and dinner-

⁵⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 3592, 2727-AD-40, p. 4 – Accueil Franco-Canadien, Statuts.

⁶⁰ MAE, v. 70 – MAE, Amérique, Note: Association de l'Accueil Franco-Canadien, Réunion du 27 janvier 1947; MAE, v. 70 – Letter from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, Création d'un Comité d'accueil France-Canada, 3 April 1947; DEA, G-2, v. 3271, 6420-40, p. 1 – Letter from Vanier to Pearson, 8 February 1947; DEA, G-2, v. 3592, 2727-AD-40, p. 4 – Accueil Franco-Canadien, Statuts – undated; MAE, v. 70 – Note sur l'Accueil Franco-Canadien, from Accueil Franco-canadien to MAE, Amérique, December 1948.

⁶¹ MAE, v. 70 – Form Letter from Accueil Franco-Canadien, 15 April 1951; MAE, v. 175 – Note for Secrétaire d'État, MAE, Amérique, 28 March 1957, 7^e Congrès national de France-Canada.

speeches. In 1958, the group established its *Prix France-Canada* to honour a French-Canadian literary work, and by the end of the decade boasted a membership of eight thousand.⁶²

Canada's Ambassador, Jean Désy, generally dismissed the AGFC however, describing its annual meeting as little more than an opportunity for participants to flaunt their oratorical abilities.⁶³ His strained relations with the AGFC prompted him to assist in organizing the *Institut France-Canada*, hoping to correct what he characterized as the inefficiency of existing groups that remained relevant only to the intellectual community.⁶⁴ While designed to serve primarily as a vehicle for the development of economic ties, the *Institut* was nevertheless active in the cultural sector, organizing a "Canada Week" in Paris shortly after its establishment that included lectures on France-Canada relations and a concert at the Sorbonne.⁶⁵

Across the Atlantic, the *Union scientifique et technique France-Canada* was founded in 1944 by Canadians and French nationals in Montreal, to provide assistance in France's post-war recovery. In 1952, the group *Amitiés françaises-canadiennes* recruited its membership, estimated to number at least a hundred, among the French Protestant community in Canada. To cultivate contacts with France that were not uniquely Catholic and conservative, the group affiliated with the *Institut démocratique canadien*, an organization founded by Liberal Senator T.-D. Bouchard and dedicated to the promotion of a more modern, pluralist Quebec.⁶⁶

⁶² Roussel (1983), 243-244.

⁶³ DEA, G-2, v. 8059, 2727-AD-40, p. 6.1 – Letter from Désy to USSEA, 30 March 1954.

⁶⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 6829, 2727-AD-40, p. 7.1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, Institut France-Canada, 22 June 1955; MAE, v. 175 – Note for the Secrétaire d'État, MAE, Amérique, 28 March 1957, 7^e Congrès national France-Canada.

⁶⁵ *Informations Canadiennes*, December 1955 1(0).

⁶⁶ Roussel (1983), 241-242; 254-255.

Accueil Franco-Canadien (which bore no relation to its French predecessor) was established in 1951. Inspired by the motto “même sang oblige,” the organization worked to foster friendly relations between French and French Canadians. Boasting a membership of three to four hundred by the end of its first year of existence, the group held numerous cultural and social events, including films and lectures by visiting French personalities. It also organized an office to provide recent French immigrants free legal and medical services, facilitated loans, and provided an employment service. Earning the praise of France’s President, Vincent Auriol, and Canada’s Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent, *Accueil* opened branches in Quebec City and Ottawa, cultivated links with France-based organizations such as the AGFC, and changed its name to *Association France-Canada* in 1954.⁶⁷

Another group was the *Union Culturelle Française* (UCF), founded in 1954 to promote the international defence of the French language and culture, and that sought to involve all groups and territories in which French was the principal or secondary language. The Canadian section, founded the same year as the larger organization, was headed by the Under-Secretary of the Province of Quebec, Jean Bruchési, who also sat on the UCF’s international council. By the end of 1954, thirty Canadian associations adhered to the section. Although built upon the traditional cultural links between France and French Canada, the UCF differed in ways revelatory of the post-1945 evolution of cultural relations: the organization was born out of growing

⁶⁷ MAE, v. 70 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, Amérique, 26 November 1951; MAE, v. 175 – Brochure, *L’Accueil franco-canadien fait appel à votre Collaboration, Association d’amitié franco-canadienne, œuvre d’assistance à l’immigrant français*, undated [circa 1952-1953]; MAE, v. 175 – Letter from Kosciusko-Morizet, Directeur du Cabinet, Présidence de la République to de Boisanger, MAE, Amérique, 4 September 1953; Jean-Marc Léger, *Le Temps dissipé: souvenirs* (Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 1999), 200; Roussel (1983), 242.

concern about the international status of French language and culture, coupled with a belief that these could be used to connect populations. At the UCF's first congress in Versailles in 1955, Léopold Sedar Senghor, who went on to serve as Senegal's first president and a driving force in *la Francophonie*, invoked the "nouvel universalisme de la langue française."⁶⁸

While the majority of Canada's and France's general populations were unaffected and unaware of the activities of groups such as the UCF, *Accueil Franco-Canadien*, or the AGFC, there were other avenues through which cultural contacts increased. Notable among these was the growth of tourism, aided by post-war prosperity, transportation advances, and even the post-war movement to twin cities.⁶⁹ The number of tourist visas issued by French offices in Canada nearly doubled between 1948 and 1949, leading France's Embassy to anticipate an annual rate of twenty thousand Canadian visits to France.⁷⁰ The effective waiving of visa requirements and the establishment of transatlantic air travel contributed to the growth of tourism over the following decade.⁷¹ In 1963 alone, a hundred thousand

⁶⁸ MAE, v. 175 – Letter from Guérin to Pinay, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 3 May 1955, Union culturelle française (section Canada); Léger (1999), 368-371; Roussel (1983), 264-265. Among the groups participating in the Canadian section of UCF were the *Conseil de la vie française*, the *Confédération des travailleurs catholiques*, the *Chambre de commerce du Québec*, *le Barreau du Québec*, *la Fédération des Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste*, and the Université de Montréal.

⁶⁹ Brian Angus Mackenzie, *Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy and the Marshall Plan* (Berghahn Books, 2005), 111-146; Christopher Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (UNC Press, 2004), 13-149; Madeleine Provost, "Le jumelage des villes," *L'Action nationale* 1985, 75(4): 371-384.

⁷⁰ MAE, v. 60 – Letter from Basdevant, Charge d'Affaires a.i. de l'Ambassade de France au Canada, to MAE, Accords Techniques, tourisme canadien en France. During the first six months of 1949, 3849 tourist visas were issued by French offices in Canada, up from 1825 the previous year; moreover, these figures did not include business trips with a tourist component, nor Canadian tourists seeking visas at France's embassy in London.

⁷¹ DEA, G-2, v. 6331, 232-C-40, p. 2 – Memorandum from Heeney for the Minister, 17 April 1950 – Visa Modification Agreement, France. While Canadians were permitted to visit Canada for up to three months without a visa, French nationals still required a "multi-entry visa," provided for free, to enter Canada; MAE, v. 5 – Message from Triat to French Ambassador, Ottawa, *Revue mensuelle*, June 1951.

Canadians visited France, representing an annual growth rate since 1950 of twelve percent, with half this number from Quebec, often French Canadians tracing their ancestral roots.⁷²

Transatlantic tourism, however, remained the privilege of the economic elite, so that it was the growing mass media that offered the greatest scope for expanded cultural contact. As Benedict Anderson has written in his exploration of nationalism, the mass media are essential channels for inculcating the sense of a shared culture, interests, vocabularies, and identity.⁷³ Indeed, *indépendantiste* André d'Allemagne claimed that for all of its "refrancisation" campaigns, the efforts of the *Société Saint-Jean Baptiste's* efforts paled in comparison to the impact of the post-war influx of French-language detective novels, the Belgian comic *Tintin*, and French-language films and magazines.⁷⁴

Agence France-Presse opened a Montreal bureau in 1946, the same year as *Le Monde Français* and *Carrefour* began publishing Canadian editions.⁷⁵ A 1956 agreement between the France-based *Société Gens de Lettres* and Quebec's *Association des hebdomadaires canadiens de langue française* gave the latter the right to produce French works without prior authorization.⁷⁶ In 1947, the CBC and

⁷² MAE, v. 171 – Annual Report, Cultural Service, French Embassy, Ottawa, 31 July 1957; Pierre-Yves Pépin, "Les relations économiques franco-canadiennes: données récentes et perspectives," in *L'Actualité Économique* 1964, 40(3): 487. While the average visit was eight days, when a distinction is made between French and English Canada, the average stay was seventeen days for the former, 3.5 for the latter.

⁷³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, second edition (Verso 1991), 35.

⁷⁴ André d'Allemagne, *Le colonialisme au Québec* (Les éditions R-B, 1966), 116.

⁷⁵ MAE, v. 43 – Bilan des activités française au Canada en 1946 from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique.

⁷⁶ MAE, v. 171 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, Relations Culturelles, 14 March 1956, Accord sur la reproduction d'œuvres d'écrivains français passé entre la Société des Gens de Lettres et l'Association des hebdomadaires de langue française du Canada. Novels and news articles were exempted from the agreement. Also, Jean-Marc Léger, "Le Devoir et l'actualité internationale," in *Le Devoir: un journal*

French national radio concluded an agreement to facilitate programme exchanges. This was the precursor of *Radio-Canada* becoming a member of the *Communauté radiophonique des programmes de langue française*, founded in 1955 to facilitate radio exchanges, and followed two years later by Radio-Canada's posting permanent correspondents in Paris.⁷⁷ Another instance of growing French-Canadian participation in the international francophone community was the successful lobbying by French-Canadian journalists that led to the establishment in 1953 of the *Association internationale des journalistes de langue française* (AIJLF), which held its congress in Montreal in 1955.⁷⁸

The flow of French films to Canada also resumed after the war. Paris' representatives considered the cinema a valuable cultural agent, particularly in Quebec. The Consul General in Montreal characterized the cinema as a tool to combat anglicization, and a window onto French culture that could influence French Canada.⁷⁹ That this latter aspect could lead to controversy was demonstrated in 1947 when the Quebec censor banned the French film *Les Enfants du paradis*, a decision that drew a protest from France's ambassador, Francisque Gay. Consistent with the enduring traditional French-Canadian hostility toward *France moderne*, Gay's comments provoked a furor in the Quebec press leading French writer François

indépendant (1910-1995), Robert Comeau et Luc Desrochers, eds. (Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1996), 299-304.

⁷⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 3592, 2727-AD-40, p. 3 – Letter from E.R. Bellemare to A. Anderson, Information Division, 19 April 1947; André Donneur, "Les relations Franco-Canadiennes: Bilan et Perspectives", *Politique Étrangère* 1973, 38(2): 182.

⁷⁸ Léger (1999), 253-256; *Informations canadiennes* December 1955, 1(0).

⁷⁹ MAE, v. 64 – Letter from Négrier, Consul Général de France à Montréal to Bidault, MAE, 5 July 1946, Films Français.

Mauriac to criticize publicly the state of French-Canadian culture.⁸⁰ When France's embassy took advantage of its extra-territorial rights to avoid the Quebec and Ontario censors and hosted a screening of the film, *Le Devoir* criticized it as an attempt to cultivate French Canadians against their will.⁸¹

Notwithstanding the *Les Enfants* controversy, the flow of French film continued; indeed, in 1950, *Son Copain*, a France-Canada co-production was screened at the Théâtre Saint-Denis. New French film distribution companies were established, including *Francital* in Montreal in 1949, and *Paris-Canada Films* the following year.⁸² By 1954, more than a fifth of new feature films screened in Canada were from France.⁸³ Lacoste cited the considerable success of the first *Semaine de Film Français* in 1958 as proof of the potential Canadian market for French film; however, recognizing the persistence of traditional nationalist ambivalence, the ambassador recommended that any future edition be held partly in Ontario given its more liberal censor, and to avoid ignoring English-Canadian audiences that could result from over-estimating the size of the Quebec market.⁸⁴

Quebec films were also screened in France. The first feature-length films were produced during the war, and in 1953, actor Gratien Gélinas visited Paris for the

⁸⁰ Nardout (1987), 239-240. Nardout argues Mauriac's rebuke was particularly significant given the high esteem in which he was held in Quebec.

⁸¹ Roussel (1983), 194-195; Savard (1974), 19.

⁸² MAE, v. 5 – Message from Triat for French Ambassador, Ottawa, Rapport mensuelle, November 1950; MAE, v. 5 – Message from Triat for French Ambassador, Ottawa, Chronique mensuelle, May 1949; MAE, v. 5 – Message from Triat for French Ambassador, Ottawa, Chronique mensuelle, March 1950; Prévost (1994), 406. Also, Yvan Lamonde and Pierre-François Hébert, *Le Cinéma au Québec, Essai de statistique historique (1896 à nos jours)* (Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1981), tables 112-113 for a listing of film distribution companies in Québec between 1951-1978. Other companies distributing French films included *J.A. Lapointe*, *Rex Film*, and *Art Film*.

⁸³ Linteau et al. (1991), 285-286. They argue the proportion shown in Quebec would have been higher.

⁸⁴ MAE, v. 172 – Telegram from Levasseur to MAE, Amérique, 5 November 1958; MAE, v. 172 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, 19 November 1958, *Semaine du film français au Canada*.

premiere of *'Tit-coq'*.⁸⁵ Lacoste emphasized that any progress of French films in the Quebec market would be dependent on the openness to French-Canadian cinema, arguing that the desire for reciprocity was as strong as it was in the literary industry.⁸⁶ The following year, Claude Jutra arrived in France, immersing himself in the New Wave cinema of the period, establishing friendships with French director François Truffaut, who assisted the subsequently famous Quebec filmmaker to produce *Anna la bonne* (1959). Jean Rouch encouraged him to produce the documentary *Le Niger, jeune république* (1961). Jutra also drew inspiration from Jean Godard to produce his critically-acclaimed *À tout prendre* (1963).⁸⁷

Links were also forged between French and Canadian television. Television spread rapidly across Quebec in the 1950s, with nearly nine-tenths of households owning a set by the end of the decade. By the late 1950s, Montreal was the world's largest French-language production centre and the third-largest in the English-speaking world after New York and Hollywood. The spread of the medium created an unparalleled stage for Quebec artistic talent, which according to Susan Mann-Trofimenkoff, seized upon television to make it into "a purifier of language [and] a provider for education." The new medium provided a crucial contribution to Quebec's socio-cultural and political transformation, to which the nationalist fervour surrounding the *Radio-Canada* strike of 1959 attested.⁸⁸ The French Embassy

⁸⁵ MAE, v. 89 – Dépêche de E. Triat, Consul Général de France à Montréal, à S.E. Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, *Chronique Mensuelle*, May 1953; Linteau et al. (1991), 126; Lamond and Hébert (1981), 134.

⁸⁶ MAE, v. 172 – Letter from Lacoste to MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, 19 November 1958, *Semaine du film français au Canada*.

⁸⁷ Steve Vineberg, "Filming in Poetry," *The Walrus* November 2006, 3(9): 87-89; Jim Leach, *Claude Jutra, Filmmaker* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 53-58, 83-84.

⁸⁸ Gilles Lalonde, "La Francophonie et la politique étrangère du Canada," in *De Mackenzie King à Pierre Trudeau: Quarante ans de diplomatie canadienne, 1945-1985/From Mackenzie King to Pierre*

emphasized the value of television to its cultural activities, noting that all French visitors to Canada were invited regularly to appear on *Radio-Canada*'s shows.⁸⁹

A result of these increased cultural contacts after 1945 was the emergence of a growing Quebec community interested in facilitating stronger contacts between France and French Canada. The individual most emblematic of Quebec's post-war openness toward France and the larger international francophone community was perhaps Jean-Marc Léger. Very much a product of the post-war growth of cultural exchanges between France and Canada, Léger was influenced significantly by an encounter with Georges Duhamel during the French writer's 1945 visit to Montreal, as well as his attending the talks that other visiting French personalities gave at Montreal's *Alliance française*. He was also exposed to French intellectual and artistic personalities while attending the Université de Montréal. Léger studied at Paris' *Institut des sciences politiques* from 1949 to 1951, and it was during this sojourn that his efforts and those of his classmate d'Iberville Fortier, a future federal Official Languages Commissioner, to promote greater knowledge of French Canada in Paris' intellectual circles, led to the publication of the special edition of *Esprit* on French Canada.⁹⁰

An avowed Francophile and tireless advocate of cultural exchanges between French Canada and the francophone world, Léger returned to Montreal after his studies preoccupied by the question of Quebec's political future, the condition of the

Trudeau : forty years of Canadian diplomacy, 1945-1985 (Les presses de l'Université Laval 1989), 221; Susan Mann-Trofimenkoff, *The Dream of Nation, A Social and Intellectual History of Québec* (Gage Publishing, 1983), 282-285; Gérard Laurence, "Le début des affaires publiques à la télévision québécoise, 1952-1957," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* 1982, 36(2): 213-239; *Informations canadiennes*, February 1956, 1(2).

⁸⁹ MAE, v. 171 – Annual Report 1955-1956, Cultural Service, French Embassy, 19 September 1956.

⁹⁰ Léger (1999), 94-99, 112-144.

French language in Canada, and the need for an international organization for francophone peoples that would allow French Canada, and Quebec especially, to act internationally. It was Léger who founded the Montreal-based *Accueil Franco-Canadien*, and who was a driving force behind the UCF, the AIJLF, and the establishment of AUPELF, of which he was appointed Secretary-General in 1961.⁹¹

Another of the neo-nationalist personalities interested in cultivating cultural relations with France was André Patry, who from a very early age displayed an abiding interest in international affairs. During the war, at the age of twenty-one he organized a lunch in Quebec City to bring into contact members of the academic and diplomatic community, including René Ristelhueber, the former Minister of France to Canada. After the war, Patry served in turn as Université Laval's newly-established positions of external relations secretary and director of cultural relations, charged with promoting the university's international contacts. It was in the latter capacity that he travelled to France in 1954, making diverse private and public contacts, meeting with cultural relations officials at the MAE and members of the various groups involved in promoting links between France and Canada. While working for Laval, Patry encountered prominent academic René Grousset, who stoked his interest in the Arab world, and famed French intellectual and politician André Malraux, of

⁹¹ Léger (1999), 178, 197, 362-376. Léger's recollection of his motivations for establishing the UCF provides insight into his thinking regarding the France-Quebec relationship; in referring to his time as a student in Paris, he claims: "Je me sentais exclu du débats où se retrouvaient étudiants français et étudiants de l'empire français. Je constatais que ces derniers étaient juridiquement français alors que moi, issue de Français et de langue maternelle française, j'étais en France, juridiquement, un étranger. J'en retirais le sentiment moins d'une sorte d'injustice que d'une forme d'absurdité."

whom he wrote *Visages d'André Malraux* in 1956. Increasingly dissatisfied in his post at Laval, Patry left to work for NATO in Paris, promoting cultural exchanges.⁹²

Even Montreal's mayor, Jean Drapeau, reflected the growing interest in cultivating cultural links between France and Quebec. He jumped at the suggestion by his Paris counterpart that he make an official visit to France. In recommending the visit to the MAE, the French Embassy affirmed that Drapeau, who in 1956 became the first mayor of Montreal to visit Paris in an official capacity, never hesitated to demonstrate his Francophilia.⁹³

The cultural sphere thus provides a more positive record of Canada-France relations after 1945. Consistent with the post-war growth of transnational exchanges, contacts had proliferated across the cultural spectrum, prompting Ambassador Désy to note a growing French interest in cultural relations with Canada motivated by a greater understanding that Canada had a unique contribution to make.⁹⁴ This understanding was also increasing on the Canadian side of the Atlantic; the proliferation of cultural contacts was consistent with international trends, but it also reflected domestic conditions, most significantly Quebec's socio-cultural transformation. The war years and after had witnessed the gradual eclipse of traditional French-Canadian nationalism, and with it the hostility toward *France moderne*. Relations were increasingly of a secular, progressive nature, and reflected in the community interested in developing cultural relations between France and

⁹² Roussel (1983), 204-205; Robert Aird, *André Patry et la présence du Québec dans le monde*, (VLB éditeur 2005), 12-38.

⁹³ MAE, v. 96 – Letter from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 17 May 1956, Projet de visite officielle en France, de M. Jean Drapeau, Maire de Montréal; MAE, v. 96 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, 7 August 1956.

⁹⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 6829, 2727-AD-40, p 7.1 –Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, Institut France-Canada, 22 June 1955.

French Canada. To be sure, the decline of hostility toward *France moderne* did not mean that cultural relations between France and French Canada were free of conflict or any less complex. Indeed, equally symptomatic of Quebec's evolution was the fact it was not merely a matter of the consumption of French cultural products; there was a growing chorus for French Canada's unique contribution to francophone culture to be acknowledged, and for Quebec to be recognized as an equal and independent cultural producer in its own right, in partnership with France and the international francophone community. This bid for partnership would be a crucial element in the triangular relations of the 1960s.

Chapter 7

“*Plus que jamais nécessaires*”: The Politicization of Canada-France Cultural Relations

In 1946, a furor arose over what traditional French-Canadian nationalists viewed as the negative influence on Quebec’s education system of two French-sponsored colleges in Montreal. Nationalist daily *Le Devoir* opined that:

Ce qui s’est passé dans le cas de [Collège] Marie de France et ce qui se passe dans celui de [Collège] Stanislas prouve de façon très nette que nous devons nous défendre nous-mêmes et juguler cette ... colonne de la laïcité étrangère et maçonnique.

Stanislas constitue un danger prochain. Marie de France est un danger imminent, que dis-je, présent.

Que les catholiques, ceux de l’Action catholique et ceux de la Hiérarchie, agissent avant qu’il ne soit trop tard.¹

Two decades later, the newspaper’s reaction to French influence in Quebec’s education system had shifted; *Le Devoir* reported approvingly of the visit to Paris of Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Quebec’s Minister of Education, to sign an agreement with his French counterpart, Christian Fouchet, establishing a vast system of cooperation touching on every aspect of Quebec’s educational system.²

In addition to demonstrating Quebec’s broader socio-cultural transformation and the accompanying evolution of attitudes regarding cultural contacts with France, the contrast between these articles draws attention to the growing politicization of cultural affairs after 1945 that is examined in this chapter. Quebec’s *épanouissement*

¹ Luc Roussel, *Les Relations culturelles du Québec avec la France, 1920-1965*, unpublished dissertation (Université Laval, Department of History, 1983), 193-194. The controversy erupted following the accidental release of a Free French report that in addition to suggesting the quality of education offered by the French-sponsored colleges was superior to their Quebec counterparts, intimated that the Catholic character of Collège Marie de France was temporary, its ultimate aim being “libérer les esprits.” The ensuing uproar among nationalists occurred parallel to the *Affaire Stavelot* that arose from the condemnation of French-inspired education in Quebec by Father Romeo Trudel, Dean of University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Philosophy, writing under the pseudonym Jean de Stavelot.

² “Le Québec signe sa 1ère entente internationale,” *Le Devoir*, 27 February 1965, 1.

and the expansion of transnational exchanges which boosted cultural relations between Canada and France after the Second World War carried with them a more defensive impetus to forging links. As traditional French-Canadian nationalism was eclipsed, the “Anglo-Saxon,” notably American cultural influence accompanying Quebec’s socio-economic transformation was considered a threat to French Canada’s cultural survival. A growing Quebec nationalist interest in cultural relations with France coincided with French efforts to cultivate relations to ensure the *rayonnement* of French culture in the face of American cultural power, including in Canada, and Quebec especially. The increased openness toward *France moderne* in post-1945 Quebec was symptomatic of a broader ideological, generational and class conflict within French-Canadian nationalist ranks over the nature of Quebec society and the question of preserving its francophone majority in the face of Americanization. As chapter five discussed, interest in forging links with France was especially pronounced among neo-nationalists who, in espousing an increasingly Quebec-centric, “Quebecois” approach centred on the province’s francophone majority, saw an activist Quebec state and the cultivation of links with *France moderne* as the most effective inoculation against increasing American cultural influence.

A consequence of these nationalist preoccupations was pressure for greater state involvement in culture. This politicization of cultural affairs sowed the seeds for future conflict. Ottawa and Quebec City lagged behind Paris in terms of state support of culture, but neo-nationalist calls for a greater Quebec government response to Americanization were matched by English-Canadian nationalist pressures on Ottawa to act to counter American cultural power. The ensuing growth of federal cultural

activity provoked jurisdictional conflict between Ottawa and Quebec City in the 1950s, as what Quebec viewed as an encroachment on provincial jurisdiction was interpreted as a threat to French Canada's survival. Neo-nationalist calls multiplied for Quebec City to take a more active approach to counter the federal initiatives. The jurisdictional dispute foreshadowed the tensions of the 1960s, as three nationalist reactions – Canadian, Quebecois, and French – strove to respond to preponderant American cultural power.

A Growing State Role

To a large extent, governments fuelled the proliferation of cultural contacts. At the heart of nineteenth century liberalism was the assumption that “cultural internationalism” would create a solid base for peace and prosperity, reflected initially in the efforts of private philanthropic organizations such as the Carnegie Foundation. The enhanced importance of cultural diplomacy after the First World War was evident in the establishment in 1922 of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation as part of the League of Nations. The crises of the 1930s and the Second World War accelerated state appropriation of cultural activities and further enhanced the importance of cultural diplomacy, as the founding in 1945 of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) demonstrated.³

³ Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 51-130; For further discussion of the cultural dimension of international relations, see *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, Mike Featherstone, ed., (Sage Publications, 1990); Peter J. Taylor, “Izations of the World: Americanization, Modernization and Globalization,” in *Demystifying Globalization*, Colin Hay and David Marsh, eds. (St. Martin's Press, 2000); James A. Field Jr., “Transnationalism and the New Tribe,” in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane (Harvard University Press, 1970).

A pioneer of cultural diplomacy, France employed culture to maximize its international influence. Quasi-private efforts in the years following the Franco-Prussian War such as *Alliance Française* and the *Comité Amérique-France* presaged the incorporation of culture into French foreign policy in the interwar period.⁴ Paris attached even greater importance to cultural relations after 1945. A distinct cultural relations division was established in the MAE, and whereas France signed eleven “intellectual cooperation” agreements in the interwar period, it concluded sixty-five in the fifteen years after the Second World War, second only to the US.⁵

The enhanced stature of culture within French foreign policy was reflected in Paris’ appointment of a cultural counsellor to its Ottawa embassy. As the ambassador, Francisque Gay, explained to the visiting French actor Fernandel with only slight exaggeration, “[l]e véritable ambassadeur de France au Canada, c’est vous monsieur Fernandel.”⁶ Not surprisingly, French Canada was accorded a high priority, with Gay’s predecessor, Jean de Hauteclocque, asserting that given

l’importance que les puissances du Nouveau Continent prennent dans le monde international, le survivance en Amérique d’un élément français vivace, prolifique, fidèle, et dont l’influence déjà grande dans les problèmes politiques canadiens ira

⁴ François Roche and Bernard Pigniau, *Histoire de diplomatie culturelle des origines à 1995* (adpf, 1995); Maurice Bruézière, *L’Alliance française: histoire d’une institution* (Hachette 1983); François Chaubet, *La politique culturelle française et la diplomatie de la langue: l’Alliance française, 1883-1940* (L’Harmattan, 2006); Iriye (1997), 91. Also, DEA, D1, v. 778, 375, – Memorandum for the Prime Minister, undated [circa 1942]. During the Second World War, the DEA Under-secretary, Norman Robertson, expressed concern about the panoply of organizations promoting France-Canada cultural links, worrying Vichy could employ these to stoke Quebec isolationism and thereby undermine the Canadian war effort.

⁵ William R. Pendergast, “UNESCO and French Cultural Relations, 1945-1970,” *International Organization* Summer 1976, 30(3): 454-483; Roussel (1983), 152-153. The Cultural Relations division consisted of four branches: the first was mandated to promote the French language, overseeing the works of French institutes, secondary schools, cultural centres, and *Alliance française* schools abroad, and providing professors for foreign universities and schools; the second encouraged cultural exchanges of persons and objects not related to education; the third facilitated exchanges in the theatre, music and visual arts; the fourth branch oversaw France’s technical assistance to the developing world.

⁶ MAE, v. 171 –Action Culturelle de la France au Canada, 28 February 1957; Pierre Savard, “L’ambassade de Francisque Gay au Canada en 1948-1949,” *Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa* 1974, 44(1): 9.

certainement en augmentant, représente pour notre pays un atout extrêmement fort ... faut-il que nous ne le négligions pas [...] que nous resserrions nos relations avec lui par tous les moyens ...⁷

One internal MAE report even recommended that France's activities in Quebec be primarily cultural, given the necessity of maintaining strong contacts with "ce foyer de civilisation et de langue française."⁸ Similarly, the MAE argued that Quebec and France should co-operate for the *rayonnement* of French culture in North America by virtue of their common language, as well as shared religious and intellectual traditions.⁹

French efforts were not limited to Quebec. The MAE acknowledged the value of targeting francophone communities outside Quebec and English Canada, particularly the latter since unlike Quebec francophones it did not harbour ambivalent feelings for France.¹⁰ Similarly, as Canada's Acadian population marked the bicentenary of the *grand dérangement*, France's representative recommended that Paris take a reserved approach regarding cultural exchanges that left the initiative to the Acadians.¹¹ France's Ambassador, Hubert Guérin, welcomed the 1951 *Massey Report* on Canadian cultural life as an opportunity for Paris to adapt its efforts to Canadian objectives, enhancing links that could be drawn on when "Canada sera devenu économiquement et politiquement l'une des très grandes puissances de

⁷ MAE, v. 2 – Telegram from de Hauteclocque to MAE, 28 February 1945; MAE, v. 53 – Letter from de Hauteclocque to MAE, Amérique, 6 October 1945, Collaboration industrielle et culturelle entre la France et le Canada – Relations Industrielles Franco-Canadiennes.

⁸ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949.

⁹ MAE, v. 63 – Relations Culturelles Franco-Canadiennes, 5 Octobre 1945.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ MAE, v. 95 – Letter from Lapierre, Consul Général à Halifax to MAE, Amérique, 17 August 1955, Bicentenaire des Acadiens.

l'Occident.”¹² Guérin's remarks reflected Paris' desire for a Canadian interlocutor with which expanded cultural exchanges could be realized, and a readiness to engage with Ottawa in this regard.

Since the highest priority of Paris' cultural diplomacy was the international defence of the French language, the MAE employed the linguistic ties between France and French Canada as a primary vehicle for its cultural activities.¹³ Paris noted the growth of French-language summer schools at Canadian universities during the war,¹⁴ and the MAE facilitated Canadian French-language professors' visits to France for courses.¹⁵ After the wartime interruption, Paris resumed providing a modest subsidy to the *Comité permanent de la survivance française* (CPSF), which was at the forefront of French-language advocacy in Canada.¹⁶ The CPSF organized the third *Congrès de la langue française* in Quebec City and Montreal in 1952. Attracting more than four thousand delegates from North America, the discussions on the condition of North America's francophone communities were attended by a high-level French delegation that included the director of the *Académie française*, the

¹² MAE, v. 62 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 15 August 1951, du rapport de la Commission Massey.

¹³ Roche and Pigniau (1995), 80-82; Pendergast (1976), 459. There was of course French interest prior to 1945: representatives of the *Académie française* attended the 1912 and 1937 *Congrès de la langue française* organized by the *Société du parler français au Canada*, whose successor, the *Comité de la survivance française*, received a FF 36,000 subsidy from the MAE in 1939. Roussel (1983), 119-126, 152-153.

¹⁴ Élisabeth Nardout, *Le Champ littéraire québécois et la France 1940-50*, unpublished dissertation, (McGill University, Department of French Language and Literature, 1987), 38, 73; MAE, v. 63 – Relations Culturelles Franco-Canadiennes, 5 October 1945.

¹⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Letter from Vanier to SSEA, 30 March 1946. These were distributed equally between Quebec and the other provinces.

¹⁶ Roussel (1983), 247-250.

Archbishop of Aix-en-Provence, Jean Raymond-Laurent, the head of the Association Générale France-Canada, Guérin, and several academic personalities.¹⁷

It was not just Paris preoccupied with defending the French language. The organization of the *Congrès de la Refrancisation* in 1957 and the scathing denunciations of Quebec's education system that appeared three years later in Jean-Paul Desbiens' *Les insolences du Frère Untel* testified to a growing preoccupation in Quebec over the status and quality of French in the province.¹⁸ France's ambassador, Francis Lacoste, suggested that the Congrès was a barometer of the broader evolution of Quebec attitudes toward France, given that at the height of the traditional nationalist order, French Canadians frequently affirmed that the quality of French spoken in Quebec was purer than its Parisian equivalent. Lacoste suggested that for Quebec's intelligentsia at least, a concern to preserve the French language was inspiring demands for a greater cultural rapprochement with France.¹⁹

French government efforts contributed significantly to post-war intellectual contacts, notably through scholarships and academic exchanges.²⁰ For example, the MAE considered the French-sponsored Collège Stanislas as one of the most useful tools for French intellectual penetration of Quebec, a means to improve the quality of education in the province and make French Canadians more amenable to *France moderne*.²¹ Luc Roussel has noted the effectiveness of the college and its female

¹⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 8274, 9456-LN-40 – Letter from Canadian Consulate General, Boston to USSEA, 24 July 1952.

¹⁸ Congrès de la Refrancisation, *Le congrès de la refrancisation, Québec, 21-24 juin, 1957* (Éditions Ferland 1959); Jean-Paul Desbiens, *Les insolences du Frère Untel* (Éditions de l'Homme, 1960).

¹⁹ MAE, v. 171 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 17 July 1957, « Sa Majesté la Langue Anglaise ».

²⁰ MAE, v. 43 – Note: L'intérêt que présente le développements des relations franco-canadiens, undated, [circa 1946].

²¹ MAE, v. 63 – Note: Relations Culturelles Franco-Canadiennes, 5 October 1945.

counterpart Collège Marie de France as cultural agents; beyond the significant growth of the two schools' populations, the students tended to be members of Montreal's privileged class, magnifying the cultural impact.²² Paris also strove to increase the number of Canadians studying in France. Even before the Second World War ended, the MAE announced an annual programme of forty scholarships for Canadian students (the same number awarded to the US and UK). Divided approximately equally between students from Quebec and the rest of Canada, eight hundred Canadians had benefited by 1956.²³ The MAE, mindful of Canada's linguistic and cultural cleavages and aware of an English-Canadian desire to see French influence inculcate a more progressive, liberal spirit in Quebec, argued that Paris could be pleased if its cultural efforts produced the integration and "fusion morale" of the "deux Canadas." This was tempered, however, by an awareness that the success of French cultural activities in Quebec depended on these never appearing to be in service to English-Canadian interests.²⁴

The French government also funded friendship groups. Roussel ascribes the establishment of new branches of *Alliance française* in Canada after 1945 to the

²² DEA, G-2, v. 5056, 2727-AD-40, p. 9 – France-Canada Cultural Relations, 25 November 1963; Roussel (1983), 74, 201-202, 354. In 1940, there were 200 students at Collège Stanislas, a number that grew to 750 by the early 1960s. There was similar growth at Collège Marie de France, where the student population rose from 200 in 1946 to 800 by the 1960s. Among the alumni of Collège Stanislas were personalities prominent in the triangular tensions, including André d'Allemagne, constitutional scholar Jacques-Yvan Morin, and Jacques Parizeau. L'Association des anciens du Collège Stanislas, Liste des anciens, <http://www.ancienstan.com/liste.php>, 20 July 2007.

²³ DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Letter from H. Laugier, MAE, Relations Culturelles to Vanier, 2 June 1945; DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Letter from Vanier to Pearson, 22 March 1948; DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Despatch from Canadian Embassy, Paris, 22 March 1948; DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Provisional List from French Embassy, Ottawa to DEA, Scholars of the French Government for 1946-47; MAE, v. 171 – Communiqué, DEA, Ottawa, 16 November 1956. Among the first group of recipients was Pierre Trudeau, who along with fellow bursars Roger Rolland and Marcel Rioux, were active in the *Cité libre* movement.

²⁴ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949.

interest and efforts of the French government, rather than a demand from the Quebec population.²⁵ Similarly, the plans for the Paris-based *Accueil Franco-Canadien* were drawn up at the Quai d'Orsay in cooperation with Canada's diplomats in 1947, and the organization received a monthly subsidy from the MAE.

French cultural diplomacy, however, faced a number of official obstacles across the Atlantic where the state's involvement in culture was far less pronounced. If Paris was at the forefront of cultural diplomacy, Ottawa was much slower to act. Part of the explanation for the lag was constitutional: many aspects of cultural relations fell under exclusively provincial or shared jurisdiction, making Ottawa's pursuit of cultural diplomacy problematic, especially after a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruling in 1937 effectively restricted Ottawa's treaty-implementing power to those matters under exclusive federal competence.²⁶

The challenge that constitutional realities posed for Ottawa's cultural diplomacy with France was underscored when Canada's Ambassador, Georges Vanier, proposed that Ottawa should approach Canadian universities to obtain tuition exemptions for French students. He was motivated by the multiplying inquiries from French students, and out of a concern to reciprocate Paris' scholarship programme. Mindful that the provinces' exclusive jurisdiction in education made it difficult for Ottawa to distribute scholarships, Vanier felt that constitutional considerations should

²⁵ Roussel (1983), 233-235. The interest displayed in Saint-Hyacinthe, where the new branch's first event was attended by more than 300 people, appears to contradict Roussel's claim; moreover, the origin of the new branches' creation does not negate that they increased the opportunity for contacts.

²⁶ The federal treaty-making power, however, appeared left intact. This issue is examined more closely in chapter 11. Greg Craven, "Federal Constitutions and External Relations," in *Foreign Relations and Federal States*, Brian Hocking, ed. (Leicester University Press 1993), 14; Renaud Dehousse, "Fédéralisme, asymétrie et interdépendance: aux origines de l'action internationale des composantes de l'État fédéral," *Études internationales* June 1989, 20(2): 283-309; Howard A. Leeson and Wilfrid V. Vanderelst, *External Affairs and Canadian Federalism: The History of a Dilemma* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1973), 88.

not inhibit the cultivation of Canada-France cultural relations. To resolve the issue, he proposed the establishment of a permanent committee of representatives of the provincial departments of education, universities, and the DEA.²⁷ Nothing came of Vanier's proposal, however, so that a subsequent DEA report conceded that there were far fewer opportunities for French students to study in Canada than vice versa.²⁸

The fate of Vanier's proposal draws attention to an institutional bias that inhibited Canadian cultural diplomacy. Although partly explained in the case of Canada-France cultural relations by federal awareness of French-Canadian ambivalence for *France moderne*, the more immediate reason was that cultural diplomacy was generally under-appreciated in Ottawa, reflected in the marked lack of enthusiasm in the DEA in 1944 when Jean Désy, then Ottawa's ambassador to Brazil, negotiated Canada's first-ever cultural relations agreement without prior authorization. The treaty was ratified due only to the advanced state of the talks and a fear that backing out would offend Rio de Janeiro.²⁹

The institutional bias was also evident in the federal response to claims Paul Gouin, Quebec's Minister of Trade and Commerce, made in 1943 about the province's duty to promote cultural and commercial relations with Latin America. Lester Pearson, Minister-Counsellor at Canada's legation in Washington, conceded that Gouin's remarks suggested Canadian foreign policy did not reflect French

²⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Letter from Vanier to Pearson, 22 March 1948; DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Despatch from Canadian Embassy, Paris, 22 March 1948. DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Letter from Vanier to SSEA, 8 March 1946; DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Letter from J.C. Laframboise, Rector, University of Ottawa, to USSEA, 1 June 1946. Also, Roussel (1983), 231-232. Vanier's effort in this instance contradicts Roussel's assertion that he did not attach much importance to cultural relations.

²⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Information Division to USSEA, 20 August 1954.

²⁹ John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume I: The Early Years, 1909-1946*, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 318.

Canada's cultural affinities with Latin America, but maintained that it was premature to set up a cultural relations division in the DEA. The Under-secretary, Norman Robertson, was even doubtful about Pearson's suggestion that an official be tasked to co-ordinate cultural activities with the US, UK and Latin America, arguing it would be difficult to convince Parliament of the value of cultural diplomacy.³⁰

Although Ottawa appointed a cultural and press attaché to Paris after the war, this had more to do with questions of reciprocity given the equivalent French appointment than it did with any significant policy shift.³¹ Indeed, in 1946 Paul Beaulieu, second secretary at the Canadian Embassy, voiced frustration that he had neither the time nor resources to develop cultural links with France, in spite of the DEA having told him that cultural relations would be his main task in Paris. Beaulieu decried the paucity of Ottawa's cultural effort and urged that additional personnel be posted to the Embassy to develop cultural links, warning that Canada's unprecedented popularity in France was fleeting and would be difficult to regain.³²

Matters improved somewhat during the 1950s. Ottawa employed monies that France owed it for Canadian wartime material assistance to establish in 1952 the *Canadian Government Overseas Awards* that facilitated year-long sojourns in France for approximately thirty Canadian students and artists annually. To avoid constitutional complications, the programme was administered by the *Royal Society of Canada*.³³ Out of these funds a \$150,000 grant was made to the *Maison des*

³⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Letter from Pearson to Robertson, 2 June 1943; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Letter from Robertson to Pearson, 25 June 1943.

³¹ Roussel (1983), 229.

³² DEA, G-2, v. 3592, 2727-AD-40, p. 2 – Memorandum from Beaulieu to the Ambassador, 27 May 1946.

³³ DEA, G-2, v. 8343, 10441-AD-40, p. 1 – Letter from Reid, SSEA to Vanier, 27 March 1950; DEA, A-4, v. 3495, 19-1-B-1954(1), p. 1 – Note: Relations between Canada and France, 18 January 1954.

étudiants canadiens in Paris, on the belief that the building's deplorable state of repair reflected poorly on Canada.³⁴ René Garneau, the embassy's First Secretary in charge of cultural and press affairs, was active in and enjoyed considerable prestige among Paris intellectual circles. A Quebec journalist and literary figure, Garneau had before the war called for strengthened links between French Canada and France and went on to work for the Massey Commission.³⁵ The embassy organized an exposition in 1958 of Canadian English and French-language works that attracted considerable French interest.³⁶ This was followed by the embassy's involvement in negotiations culminating in the 1959 agreement between the *Société des Éditeurs Canadiens* and *Librairie Hachette* to distribute French-Canadian literature in France that was accompanied by a display in Paris of these works.³⁷

The overall reality remained, however, that Ottawa continued to accord little official priority to cultivating cultural relations with France and the international francophone community. Jean Désy, building on his wartime efforts to forge cultural links with Brazil, appears to have acted largely on his own initiative as ambassador in Paris in expanding cultural links between France and French Canada, and did so with limited budgetary resources.³⁸ The embassy complained to the DEA about the resources it was allocated for its Information and Cultural Section, emphasizing the

³⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 3272, 6471-40 – Memorandum for File by Peter Dobell, 20 November 1952.

³⁵ Roussel (1983), 230; Yvan Lamonde and Gérard Bouchard, *Québécois et Américains, La culture québécoise aux XIXe et XXe siècles* (Fides, 1995), 76.

³⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 5056, 2727-AD-40, p. 9 – France-Canada Cultural Relations, 25 November 1963; *Informations canadiennes*, June-July 1959, 4(35).

³⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 4003, 10117-AD-40, p. 1.1 – Letter from Delisle, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to USSEA, DEA, 11 August 1960, Information and Cultural Activities of the Embassy, April-June 1960.

³⁸ Roussel (1983), 231-232.

political significance of culture in “this country which was once very rightly described as ‘La République des Professeurs.’”³⁹

It was only with the establishment of the Canada Council for the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences (CCA) in 1957, in keeping with the recommendation of the Massey Report six years prior, that Ottawa had at its disposal a vehicle to pursue indirectly a cultural diplomacy. Beyond the new organization’s domestic mandate, it was also responsible for promoting Canadian culture abroad. In addition to funding Canadian students in France, the CCA awarded fellowships for French students and academics to study in Canada, and established a programme for Canadian universities to invite foreign professors.⁴⁰

Even with this evolution, the difference in the official priority that Ottawa and Paris accorded cultural diplomacy was glaringly apparent. The time that elapsed between the Massey Report and the establishment of the CCA underscored the institutional bias in Ottawa against state involvement in cultural affairs, as did the fact the organization’s endowment came from private sources. By the early 1960s, thirty-nine percent or \$71 million of France’s foreign affairs budget was directed to cultural and technical cooperation, whereas the cultural exchange element of the DEA was \$8000, the majority in the form of book presentations.⁴¹ Even taking into account monies granted by the CCA or Ottawa’s indirect involvement in culture through the

³⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 4003, 10117-AD-40, p. 1 - Notes on the Information and Cultural Section, Paris Embassy, 13 September 1957. As proof of this political significance, see Pascal Ory, *L’aventure culturelle française, 1945-1989* (Flammarion, 1989).

⁴⁰ Roussel (1983), 186-189; DEA, G-2, v. 5261, 8260-AD-40, p. 2 – Letter from USSEA, N.F.H. Berlis, to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 18 February 1960. Under this program during the 1958-1959 year, Université Laval received four French professors. As of February 1960, a total of sixty-three Canadians were studying in France under CCA auspices.

⁴¹ Laurent Mailhot and Benoît Melançon, *Le Conseil des Arts du Canada, 1957-1982* (Éditions Leméac 1982), 34; DEA, G-2, v. 5056, 2727-AD-40, p. 9 – France-Canada Cultural Relations, 25 November 1963.

CBC and *Radio-Canada*, the 1963 *Glassco Report* on the federal civil service was correct in describing Ottawa's cultural diplomatic effort as pitiful.⁴²

In its efforts to cultivate cultural relations with Canada, Paris also had to contend with official ambivalence in Quebec City toward state involvement in cultural affairs, especially the promotion of links with France. Examples of the Quebec Government's efforts in facilitating cultural links with France were conspicuous by their rarity. These included a contribution to the post-war reconstruction of the university in Caen, for which the Duplessis Government was awarded an honorary doctorate.⁴³ Although Quebec City resumed its annual \$5000 subsidy to the *Maison des étudiants canadiens* after a wartime suspension, this occurred more out of a sense of tradition than interest in forging educational links.⁴⁴

More typical was the failure of the *Association Canadienne-Française pour l'avancement des sciences* in trying to convince Quebec City to establish bursaries to enable French students to pursue their doctoral studies in Quebec. Similarly, the *Institut Scientifique Franco-Canadien's* lobbying for an increased subsidy from the Duplessis Government fell on deaf ears, so that this remained at pre-war levels. The *Tremblay Report's* call for a more activist role for Quebec City in cultural affairs to

⁴² DEA, A-3-C, v. 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum for the Minister from Marcel Cadieux, Programme of Cultural Cooperation with French-Speaking Countries, 19 August 1963; Paul Rutherford, "The Persistence of Britain: The Culture Project in Postwar Canada," in *Canada and the End of Empire*, Phillip Buckner, ed. (UBC Press 2005), 201; Mailhot and Melançon (1982), 62. During the CCA's first five years of operation, the subsidies it granted never exceeded \$10 million (and often did not exceed \$6 million), and this figure included monies spent in Canada.

⁴³ MAE, v. 96 – Letter from Lacoste to Pineau, MAE, Amérique, 27 September 1956.

⁴⁴ Roussel (1983), 229. The subsidy was only raised to \$10,000 starting in 1958-1959.

protect against federal incursions in the wake of the *Massey Report* also was ignored.⁴⁵

Although Quebec resumed granting bursaries to students interested in studying in Europe, minimal sums were allocated and the programme stagnated.⁴⁶ Complicating matters further was the intense politicization of the system by which bursaries were allocated, the principal criteria being friendliness to the Duplessis Government and ideological suitability. The Premier's ambivalence toward France, for example, did not prevent his awarding bursaries to the daughters of two of his ministers. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, who helped forge the official cultural rapprochement between France and Quebec in the 1960s, has recalled his brother being awarded a bursary, only to be informed that a portion would be withheld for the political organization of cabinet minister Paul Sauvé.⁴⁷ As a consequence of this bias, a decreasing proportion of the bursaries awarded were for studies in France.⁴⁸

Responding to the American Challenge

Notwithstanding these official obstacles, Canada-France cultural relations grew in the fifteen years following the Second World War. As chapter six argued, part of the explanation was the general post-war growth of transnational exchanges, and more specifically, Quebec's cultural *épanouissement*. This positive dimension, however, was paralleled by more defensive considerations. Growing transnational

⁴⁵ Roussel (1983), 153-155, 180-183, 225-227. ISFC requests were refused in 1947 and 1952. Although the subsidy was increased from \$5000 to \$7000 in 1953-1954, this was considerably less than requested, and the subsidy remained at this level until the 1960s.

⁴⁶ Roussel (1983), 173-176. The scholarship program established in the interwar period that permitted Quebec students to undertake post-graduate work abroad remained unchanged, so that the amount awarded remained \$1200 until 1959, when it was raised to \$2000.

⁴⁷ Paul Gérin-Lajoie, *Combats d'un révolutionnaire tranquille* (Centre Éducatif et Culturel, 1989), 162.

⁴⁸ Conrad Black, *Duplessis* (McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 320; Roussel (1983), 34-37; 173-179. Roussel estimates that less than two-thirds of Quebec government bursars went to France after 1945.

exchanges provoked nationalist worries that these threatened national cultures, and fed a determination to preserve cultural specificity in a period of profound change. Since the US constituted the foremost cultural power by virtue of its enhanced geopolitical and economic strength, its role as the centre of the mass media-driven popular culture, and Washington's own cultural diplomacy, it became the object of particular anxiety. Consequently, reactions against "Americanization" apparent in the interwar period intensified after 1945.⁴⁹

Americanization may be understood as the advent of a consumer society in the image of the United States, entailing the influx of American cultural products from jazz, to rock music, to Hollywood films. The phenomenon was especially pronounced among the younger generations and the popular classes, making the corollary of Americanization – anti-Americanism – the purview predominantly of socio-economic and cultural elites. The nationalist reactions that emerged on both sides of the Atlantic were partly in response to what has come to be known today as globalization, what international relations scholar Peter J. Taylor has described as the "final expression" of the 'American century,' and as a barometer of the United States' hegemonic cycle, the cultural attributes of which were inseparable from its political and economic components.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Iriye (1997), 81-82, 157-158. For a discussion of the rise of American cultural diplomacy, see Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (Cambridge University Press, 1981); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American dream: American economic and cultural expansion, 1890-1945* (Hill and Wang, 1982). For a discussion of French anti-Americanism prior to 1945, see Philippe Roger, *The American Enemy: A Story of French anti-Americanism*, translated by Sharon Bowman (University of Chicago Press, 2005); Robert O. Paxton, "Anti-Americanism in the Years of Collaboration and Resistance," in *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: a Century of French Perception*, Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie France Toinet, eds., translated by Gerry Turner (St. Martin's Press, 1990), 55-63.

⁵⁰ Taylor (2000), 50-54.

The dynamic meant that any Canadian interest in cultivating cultural relations with France to counter Americanization found a sympathetic response in Paris, which was itself concerned about the extent of US cultural power, as part of a larger cultural anti-Americanism among the intelligentsia, political class, and public opinion.⁵¹ French antipathy for American cultural influence evident before the war grew after 1945 as preponderant US power raised fundamental questions about French identity and culture. The Franco-American cultural rivalry was evident in the resentment in France surrounding the May 1946 Blum-Byrnes loan agreement, blamed for the US film industry gaining a strong position in France.⁵² As the 1950s progressed and the reality of France's Americanization was increasingly apparent, a debate about the socio-cultural impact suffused its intellectual and political life. Across the French political spectrum, the question was whether France's national identity could survive Americanization intact. Works such as Cyrille Arnavon's *Américanisme et nous* warned against the colonizing aspects of American culture, and even an avowed Atlanticist and champion of modernization such as Raymond Aron expressed strong misgivings about France's ability to maintain its cultural specificity.⁵³ As Philippe Roger has suggested, those aspects of American culture embraced enthusiastically in France – such as jazz, rock n' roll, westerns, and even Jerry Lewis – were themselves

⁵¹ Roger (2005), 324.

⁵² Victoria De Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: the American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960", *The Journal of Modern History* March 1989, 61(1): 53-87; Michael M. Harrison, "French Anti-Americanism under the 4th Republic and the Gaullist Solution," in *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: a Century of French Perception*, Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik and Marie France Toinet, eds., translated by Gerry Turner (St. Martin's Press, 1990), 169-178. Also, Roger (2005), 326-330, 339-371. Pre-war cultural anti-Americanism was notably evident among members of the Catholic left involved in cultural links with French Canada, such as Emmanuel Mounier and Étienne Gilson.

⁵³ Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (University of California Press, 1993), 108-113, 124-130; Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954* (Cambridge University Press 1991), 113-136; Cyrille Arnavon, *L'Américanisme et nous* (Del Duca, 1958).

symptomatic of a concern about Americanization as they appeared at the time dissident or subversive within American culture – that is, un-American.⁵⁴

French anxiety regarding Americanization was especially acute given Paris' belief that France's cultural *rayonnement* was a means to compensate for its weaker economic and geo-political position compared to the US.⁵⁵ Paris' disquiet about American cultural influence in Canada and its interest in the opportunities this presented for Canada-France relations were evident shortly after the war, and by no means were restricted to French Canada. The embassy reported on growing English-Canadian interest in Western Europe as a response to the challenge of Americanization.⁵⁶ France's diplomats similarly remarked that those voices in Canada who expressed suspicion of *France moderne* were a reduced minority, and that to the contrary, there was a common preoccupation among the elites of both of Canada's linguistic communities for stronger cooperation with France, reinforced by a mutual concern to defend against US cultural influence.⁵⁷ The embassy informed Paris, however, of a growing disconnect between Canada's intellectual elite, francophone and anglophone, and a general population profoundly affected by American culture.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Roger (2005), 441-442.

⁵⁵ Kuisel (1993), 37-69; Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1946-1958* (Cambridge University, 1987), 435-445; Alfred Grosser, *Affaires étrangères, la politique de la France, 1944-1984* (Flammarion, 1984), 221-222.

⁵⁶ MAE, v. 66 – Letter from Gay to MAE, Relations Culturelles, 1 March 1949, ci-joint Note du Conseiller Culturel sur l'enseignement français au Canada.

⁵⁷ MAE, v. 62 – Letter from Basdevant, Charge d'Affaires *ad interim* de l'Ambassade de France to Schuman, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 28 June 1950, Commission d'enquête sur l'avancement des Arts, Sciences et Lettres au Canada.

⁵⁸ MAE, v. 171 – Rapport annuel 1955-1956, Cultural Service, French Embassy, Ottawa, 19 September 1956.

French officials expressed specific concern about Quebec's Americanization shortly after the war. The MAE, which had deemed it essential for cultural and economic reasons that French films regain and develop the market position they had lost to the US film industry during the war, was concerned at the end of the 1940s as Quebec audiences continued to prefer American films. Similarly troubling for French representatives in Canada was the influence of US intellectual life in the Quebec university community and the prolific flow of American books into the province.⁵⁹ France's Embassy feared that in many respects, the general French-Canadian population was even more susceptible to US influences than English Canada given that the former did not possess the British and Irish connections through which US cultural influence was refracted in English Canada.⁶⁰

French preoccupation with American influence in Quebec helps explain the reaction of France's Consul General in Quebec City, François de Vial, to a speech Abbé Lionel Groulx made to the 1953 annual meeting of the Quebec-based *Conseil de la Vie française*. De Vial was struck by Groulx's violence of tone, his "démonstration fanatique" of Ottawa, and the complete absence of any openness to cooperation with English Canadians; the diplomat expressed bewilderment over Groulx's failure to display greater concern regarding French Canada's rapid Americanization, which de Vial considered a far greater threat. The diplomat's comments are especially noteworthy as they reflected a belief that regardless of cultural differences, English and French Canada had an interest in a united effort to

⁵⁹ MAE, v. 63 – Letter from MAE to Minister of Information, Direction Générale de la Cinématographie, 4 July 1945, Diffusion des films français au Canada; Linteau et al. (1991), 126; MAE, v. 41 – Note from del Perugia, Gérant le Consulat Général de France à Québec, MAE, Amérique, 21 May 1949, Influence des Etats-Unis dans la Province de Québec.

⁶⁰ MAE, v. 171 – Rapport annuel, Cultural Service, French Embassy, Ottawa, 31 July 1957.

stem the American tide. In a similar vein, de Vial could not comprehend Groulx's unwillingness to turn to France to help French-Canadian culture.⁶¹

Notwithstanding the traditional nationalist's disposition, other elements in Quebec demonstrated a greater willingness to turn toward France. Consistent with the longstanding ties between traditional nationalists and *France éternelle*, Armand Maltais, head of the *Société Saint-Jean Baptiste de Québec* told sailors of the French ship *Aventure* visiting as part of the ceremonies marking the centenary of the visit of *La Capricieuse* of French Canada's determination to maintain its French culture, and referred to the inestimable value of French support in this task. Quebec's Solicitor-General, Antoine Rivard, also made comments revealing an interest in cultural links with France as a bulwark against Americanization. After comparing Quebec's cultural survival to that of the French Resistance during the war, Rivard affirmed:

Cet esprit, cette culture subissent de rudes assauts ... C'est la conséquence de notre promiscuité avec une grande République voisine qui relève d'une autre culture et possède une autre mentalité. Les contacts avec la Ville Lumière sont plus que jamais nécessaires. ... Il importe de continuer les relations avec la mère patrie pour que vive ce peuple d'Amérique qui maintient les traditions de la culture française.⁶²

De Vial found Rivard's remarks particularly significant as they were a rare public affirmation by a senior member of the Duplessis Government of the need to maintain relations with France as a means to counter US influence.⁶³

The French Embassy's cultural service referred to French Canada's "rapide évolution de la mentalité" as earlier debates in Quebec over the desirability of intellectual ties with France that marked traditional nationalist ambivalence for

⁶¹ MAE, v. 175 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec, to MAE, Amérique, 24 September 1953, Réunion du Conseil de la Vie Français.

⁶² MAE, v. 95 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec, to MAE, Amérique, 23 July 1955, Commémoration de l'Arrivée de la Capricieuse.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

France moderne had been replaced by an almost total acceptance of French intellectual life and of cultural contacts as an invaluable source of support for French Canada. The more open attitude toward France was ascribed to Quebec's rapid socio-economic transformation; the foremost debate in Quebec cultural life arose from the concern among French Canada's elites to reconcile traditional and modern Quebec, with the intellectual elite displaying a marked preference for French culture over Americanization. France's representatives also emphasized, however, that this growing avant-garde wishing to purify French-Canadian culture through more intense contact with French civilization was increasingly alienated from a wider population that accepted its Americanization.⁶⁴

The Embassy's assessment of Quebec's post-war evolution is consistent with the analyses of Gérard Bouchard and Yvan Lamonde in their explorations of the concept of *americanité** in Quebec's historical development. Surveying the growth of nationalist apprehensions about Quebec's Americanization which paralleled that of American cultural and economic influence in Quebec, Bouchard and Lamonde have noted how the war years and the post-1945 period reinforced American cultural influence, widening a cleavage in existence since the late 18th century between a bourgeois nationalist elite more culturally-oriented toward France, and the popular classes oriented toward the US.⁶⁵ The preoccupation with the threat that

⁶⁴ MAE, v. 170 – Copie du Rapport annuel du Service Culturel de l'Ambassade, from Ambassador of France to Canada, to MAE, Amérique, 26 July 1954.

* The concept of *americanité* describes a New World phenomenon involving a rupture with the ideologies, references, and cultural models of the colonial metropole, paralleled by utopian visions of new beginnings and the construction of a distinct, new superior society. This includes the appearance of distinct linguistic terms, legends, symbols, identity and culture, culminating most often in a political emancipation involving the creation of a sovereign state.

⁶⁵ Yvan Lamonde, *Allégeances et dépendances, L'histoire d'une ambivalence identitaire* (Éditions Nota bene, 2001); Gérard Bouchard, *Entre l'Ancien et le Nouveau Monde, Le Québec comme*

Americanization was perceived to pose to French Canada's survival transcended divisions within the nationalist ranks, so that Abbé Groulx's claim in 1941 that one day history would recognize the accomplishment of French Canada's recognition of "le continentalisme américaine," found its echo a decade later in André Laurendeau's warning of the "danger mortel" of the United States' "influence uniformisante," and the leftist radicalism of *Parti pris* in the 1960s.⁶⁶

Where differences arose among Quebec nationalists was on the question of which incarnation of France might assist the preservation of French Canada's cultural specificity in the face of Americanization. Traditional nationalists such as Groulx evinced a deep suspicion of *France moderne*, seeing in its secular liberalism a threat to French Canada's survival as great as that of English Canada and the US. Neo-nationalists however, encouraged by the post-war proliferation of cultural links, were far more open to expanded cultural relations with *France moderne*, seeing in it a useful and necessary ally as Quebec adapted to its urbanized, industrialized reality and contended with transnational influences. The francophone urban proletariat was to be protected from Americanization – and assimilation – by a greater communion between *Québec moderne* and its French counterpart. In this sense, the neo-

population neuve et culture fondatrice (University of Ottawa Press, 1996); Yvan Lamonde and Gérard Bouchard, *Québécois et Américains, La culture québécoise aux XIXe et XXe siècles* (Fides, 1995), 70-86; Yvan Lamonde, "Le Regard sur les Etats-Unis: Le Révélateur d'un clivage social dans la culture nationale québécoise," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 1995, 30(1): 69-73; Alain-G. Gagnon, "Andre Laurendeau: The Search for Political Equality and Social Justice," *Quebec Studies* 1999 (27): 80-92. Also, Richard A. Jones, "French Canada and the American Peril in the Twentieth Century," *The American Review of Canadian Studies* Fall 1984, 14(3): 339.

⁶⁶ Lamonde (2001), 91; Bouchard and Lamonde (1995), 76; Roger (2005), 411-412. Quebec was by no means exceptional in this regard; there was a similar convergence of opinion in English Canada as left-nationalists took much inspiration from the conservative nationalism espoused by George Grant. In this regard, see Philip Massolin, *Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge of Modernity, 1939-1970* (University of Toronto Press, 2001). Similarly, Philippe Roger has described how the French Left was the heir to an anti-American tradition that prior to the 1940s was espoused predominantly by France's conservative elements.

nationalist embrace of *France moderne* recalled that of the traditional nationalist turn to *France éternelle*: both entailed a nationalist elite pursuing its self-appointed mission of preserving the integrity of Quebec's francophone culture.⁶⁷

Neo-nationalist calls for expanded France-Quebec cultural links dovetailed with their broader advocacy of a more activist Quebec state to ensure French Canada's cultural survival.⁶⁸ Neo-nationalist preoccupations were reflected, for example, in the growing calls for Quebec City to increase francophone immigration to Canada to balance that from non-francophone countries. By the end of the 1940s, the annual number of new arrivals from francophone countries was under a thousand.⁶⁹ Ottawa established an immigration mission in Paris in 1950 that nearly doubled the annual number of new arrivals, but French immigrants constituted only three percent of the total number of immigrants Canada received between 1951 and 1954, a situation exacerbated by Paris' opposing any recruitment campaigns.⁷⁰

Another impediment to French immigration was the Duplessis Government. It reflected the traditional nationalist preoccupation that French immigration should be "healthy" and not undermine French Canada with subversive liberal thought, and refused stubbornly to act, despite the fact that Ottawa and the provinces shared responsibility for immigration. Indeed, Ambassador Guérin complained that far from being given any special priority by provincial authorities, new arrivals from France

⁶⁷ Yvan Lamonde, *Ni avec eux ni sans eux: Le Québec et les États-Unis* (Nuit Blanche, 1996), 89-90.

⁶⁸ Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 40-41.

⁶⁹ DEA, G-2, 8300, 9908-AD-2-40, p. 2.1 – Immigration from France, 4 April 1951.

⁷⁰ DEA, A-4, v. 3495, 19-1-B-1954(1), p. 1 – Relations between Canada and France, 18 January 1954.

were often discriminated against as a result of the subversive opinions that they were assumed to hold by virtue of their origins.⁷¹

There were growing calls for increased francophone immigration from Quebec's francophone press, led by Jean-Marc Léger, that were echoed by organizations such as the Montreal-based *Accueil franco-canadien* that he had founded. They criticized the Duplessis Government for its outmoded, *laissez-faire* position on immigration.⁷² Prompted by the representations of the *Société d'assistance aux immigrants* and the *Chambre de commerce du district de Montréal*, the Tremblay Commission examining Quebec's constitutional situation recommended that Quebec City take a more assertive approach regarding immigration to preserve Quebec's francophone majority. At the same time, however, the report also dismissed the province's need for immigration and even expressed worry about its destabilizing influence. Ultimately, no action would be taken until the 1960s.⁷³

Similarly indicative of the pressure on Quebec City to take a more activist role in developing cultural links with France were the growing calls for a Quebec office in Paris. In the context of the discussion over francophone immigration, *Le Devoir* urged the establishment of an office that could *inter alia* encourage immigration. The

⁷¹ MAE, v. 44 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 13 February 1951, relations avec le Gouvernement provincial de Québec; MAE, v. 176 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 29 January 1952, célébration du Centenaire de l'université Laval à Québec.

⁷² MAE, v. 179 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec et Halifax, to MAE, Amérique, 20 March 1952, de l'immigration française; MAE, v. 179 – Letter from Guérin to Bidault, MAE, Conventions Administratives et Sociales, de l'immigration au Canada, 12 May 1952; MAE, v. 179 – Letter from de Laboulaye, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., au Canada, to Schuman, MAE, Conventions Administratives et Sociales, 30 September 1952, L'opinion canadienne et l'immigration française; MAE, v. 175 – Brochure, *L'Accueil franco-canadien fait appel à votre Collaboration, Association d'amitié franco-canadienne, œuvre d'assistance à l'immigrant français*, undated.

⁷³ Martin Paquet, "Des lettres mortes ... La Commission Tremblay et l'immigration (1953-1956)," *Journal of Canadian Studies* Winter 1996, 30(4): 52-74

Fédération des Sociétés de Saint-Jean Baptiste de Québec also took up the cause in a memorandum to Duplessis and Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent.⁷⁴

Paul Gouin, the former Cabinet minister, prevailed on Québec City in 1952 to take responsibility for promoting French-Canadian culture abroad by appointing an agent to Paris. Gouin, recalling his remarks of a decade earlier when as a member of the Godbout Government he had announced Québec's plans to appoint trade commissioners to Latin America, argued that although Ottawa had appointed a French-Canadian cultural attaché in Paris and planned to do the same in Brussels, these individuals, by virtue of their appointment, were "fédéralistes" who constituted an attack on Québec's autonomy.⁷⁵ There were repeated calls in the Québec legislature for a representative in Paris, not least from the Francophile Liberal leader, Georges-Émile Lapalme, who argued the need for Québec to open an office in Paris to promote cultural links and thereby safeguard and strengthen Québec's majority francophone culture.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ MAE, v. 179 – Letter from de Laboulaye, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., au Canada, to Schuman, MAE, Conventions Administratives et Sociales, 30 September 1952, L'opinion canadienne et l'immigration française; MAE, v. 179 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général de France à Québec, to MAE, Amérique, 26 October 1953, Immigration des Français dans la Province de Québec. Also, Michael Behiels, *Québec and the Question of Immigration: From Ethnocentrism to Ethnic Pluralism, 1900-1985* (Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 11-13.

⁷⁵ ANQ, E4, 1960-01-483, v. 436, Conseil Culturel du Québec, Le Conseil Culturel du Québec (projet), Paul Gouin, 25 October 1952. Gouin envisaged this attaché as taking responsibility for Québec students and scholarship students, promoting French-Canadian culture, gathering information for the *Office d'Urbanisme* and *Office de Linguistique et de Refrancisation* he also proposed, acquiring works of art and archival documents for Québec's collections, and seeking out French professors for Québec's post-secondary institutions. Gouin anticipated the cultural activities of the Québec Delegation-General that opened a decade later.

⁷⁶ Georges Émile Lapalme, *Le vent de l'oubli, Mémoires, volume II* (Leméac 1970), 238-239; Roussel (1983), 227.

A Growing Jurisdictional Conflict

The growing pressure neo-nationalists exerted for a more activist Quebec state that would cultivate cultural links with France helped to set the stage for a conflict between Ottawa and Quebec City. This arose from the fact that English-Canadian nationalist worries over Americanization were pushing Ottawa into the cultural sphere. Although “high culture” flowered in Canada after 1945, American popular culture gained a “veritable stranglehold,” as new technologies, a weakening British cultural presence, and the English-Canadian cultural elite’s dismissal of popular culture meant Canadians were exposed to American cultural influences as never before.⁷⁷ This fuelled English-Canadian nationalist apprehension about the survival of a Canadian identity distinct from the US.

These nationalist concerns, evident in the first half of the 20th century in response to the influx of American radio and film, had prompted the creation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.⁷⁸ The 1951 *Massey Report* reflected this cultural anti-Americanism, railing against “the onset of a purely ‘materialistic society,’ the rise of ‘mass’ man, and the decline of the West into a debased state of passivity and conformity.”⁷⁹ Paul Rutherford has described the idealized vision among the English-Canadian intelligentsia of the British cultural metropole, held up as the means to combat US popular culture, as evidenced by the British ties to the

⁷⁷ Allan Smith, “From Guthrie to Greenberg: Canadian High Culture and the End of Empire,” in *Canada and the End of Empire*, Phillip Buckner, ed. (UBC Press, 2005), 212; Rutherford (2005), 195; J.M. Bumsted, “Canada and American Culture in the 1950s,” *Interpreting Canada’s Past*, v. II, *After Confederation*, J.M. Bumsted, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1986), 399-401.

⁷⁸ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, third edition (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 115-126.

⁷⁹ Rutherford (2005), 198-199. Also, see Paul Litt, *The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission* (University of Toronto Press, 1992).

Royal Winnipeg Ballet and the Stratford Festival established after the war, and the fact the Massey Commission (with its eponymous Anglophile co-chair) was inspired by the example of the British Arts Council in its urging the establishment of the CCA.

The federal government's greater involvement in culture in response to the Massey Report and the broader English-Canadian cultural nationalism, such as its decision to provide funding to Canadian universities, provoked resistance in Quebec, where it was viewed in nationalist circles as an encroachment on provincial jurisdiction.⁸⁰ The conflict arose from the nebulous treatment accorded culture under the *British North America Act*. The responsibility for "culture" as such was not assigned to any one level of government, although the provinces were given jurisdiction over education. The outcome of the *Radio Reference* (1932) established a federal competence in communications, and after the war Ottawa acted on the Massey Report's recommendation that it use the residual powers clause, which the constitution assigned to the federal government, to justify further cultural activities, including funding post-secondary educational institutions. The establishment of the CCA reflected a growing federal interest in developing a foreign cultural relations policy.⁸¹ Ottawa also established the Canadian Commission for UNESCO in 1957, mandated as the only interlocutor between the international organization and Canada's various cultural institutions; the commission was made up entirely of officials linked to federal organs.⁸²

Nationalists in Quebec considered federal cultural activities – domestic or abroad – and the justification offered for them, as illegitimate, given their belief that

⁸⁰ Behiels (1985), 206-207.

⁸¹ Roussel (1983), 186-187.

⁸² Patry (1980), 56.

the spirit, if not the very text of the constitution made culture an exclusive provincial jurisdiction.⁸³ As Michael Behiels has observed, the crux of the issue was a debate over which level of government could best ensure the survival and well-being of French and English Canada in the face of the American challenge. The English-Canadian nationalist response was that an activist federal government was necessary to promote Canada's two founding cultures. Some in Quebec, such as Father Georges-Henri Lévesque, co-chair of the Massey Commission and Dean of Laval's Faculty of Social Sciences advocated this position, arguing Quebec and French Canada were not synonymous, and that Ottawa thus had an obligation to foster Canada's bi-cultural reality.⁸⁴

The neo-nationalist community rejected Lévesque's position as naïve, and argued that as serious as the challenge of Americanization was, this by no means justified any ceding of Quebec autonomy. To the contrary, notwithstanding a growing English-Canadian sympathy and appreciation for Canada's *fait français*, it was unthinkable for neo-nationalists that Quebec should turn over even the smallest measure of its cultural development to federal institutions controlled by the anglophone majority; French Canadians had no choice but to confide the maintenance, defence, and expansion of their culture to their national government, which was located in Quebec City, not Ottawa.⁸⁵ Canada's two nationalist reactions to Americanization, and the two levels of government that were being pressured to take a more activist role, were on a collision course.

⁸³ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 2 – Mémoire à l'intention de Monsieur Guy Frégault, sous-ministre des Affaires culturelles, from Jacques-Yvan Morin, undated [circa 1965].

⁸⁴ Behiels (1985), 207-208.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

This increasingly rancorous intergovernmental conflict possessed serious implications as it intersected increasingly with the French nationalist response to Americanization. In 1959, Ottawa's ambassador to Lima encountered France's new Minister of Culture, André Malraux, at a dinner in his honour in Peru's capital. Malraux expressed France's deep interest in Canada and its desire to expand cultural relations; the Canadian diplomat subsequently cited the conversation in informing the DEA that France was undertaking a "vast cultural offensive" of which Canada would be a significant part.⁸⁶ The following year, during his visit to Canada, Charles de Gaulle praised French-Canadian survival and success as a cultural entity, describing French Canada as "un fleuron que vous avez ajouté à la couronne de ce qui est notre chose à tous, la chose française."⁸⁷ The French leader, reflecting French cultural nationalist preoccupations about American cultural power, emphasized in Montreal the significance he attached to French Canada's will to survive:

ce que vous êtes est très important, pour le Canada bien entendu, pour la France aussi ... et j'ajoute, pour le Monde, car il est essentiel, vous le sentez tous, qu'il y eût, sur cet immense continent Américain, une entité Française vivante. Une pensée Française, qui dure, *qui est indispensable pour que tout ne se confonde pas dans une sorte d'uniformité* [emphasis added]. ... [La France] a besoin de sentir et de savoir que son rayonnement s'étend, qu'elle trouve des échos, des appuis partout et qu'elle en trouve principalement chez ceux qui viennent d'elle-même. Je vous remercie de cela également pour elle.⁸⁸

These senior French personalities' remarks were consistent with Paris' abiding and growing interest in Canada, especially French Canada, and its survival as a cultural entity. This interest was symptomatic of a broader French concern about US cultural strength; if increased transnational exchanges had led to increased

⁸⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 7069, 7839-40, p. 3 – Despatch No. 225 (1959) from Canadian Ambassador, Lima, Peru, to SSEA.

⁸⁷ Lescop (1981), 126.

⁸⁸ MAE, v. 100 – Allocution Prononcée par le Général de Gaulle à la fin du Banquet offert par la Ville de Montréal à l'Hôtel Queen Elisabeth, le vendredi, 21 avril 1960.

cultural contacts, they had also fuelled nationalist concern about the implications for the *rayonnement* of French culture at home and abroad. Concern about Americanization was a transatlantic phenomenon as nationalist preoccupations among Canada's francophone and anglophone populations about American cultural influences encouraged interest in cultivating links with France, especially among Quebec's neo-nationalist community, which saw these as essential to Quebec maintaining its francophone identity amid its socio-cultural transformation.

A consequence of these growing – and interacting – nationalist preoccupations was an ongoing politicization of cultural affairs. Malraux's appointment as France's first Minister of Culture reflected the trend, as did the centrality of culture in France's diplomacy after the Second World War. Even in Canada, where constitutional and institutional obstacles meant the trend was delayed, there was growing pressure on governments to act in the cultural sphere. Indeed, Ottawa's increasing cultural activity had proved a source of conflict with the Duplessis Government in the post-war period, fuelling neo-nationalist calls for Quebec City to take a more activist cultural role to safeguard Quebec's autonomy in cultural affairs and French Canada's survival. In stark contrast to the situation in which it found itself in the immediate post-1945 period, Paris found itself faced with two interested interlocutors, one in Ottawa and the other in Quebec City. While this held out the prospect of expanded cultural relations, French diplomacy had to resolve how it was to conduct its cultural activity in Canada. The heightened nationalist sentiment surrounding cultural affairs and encouraging more substantive intergovernmental relations meant that such

exchanges, and the manner by which they were to be conducted, were poised to become a source of dispute, and ultimately, of triangular tensions.

Chapter 8

Le 'fait français': The Cultural Impetus for Triangular Relations

In the months of delay preceding Allied recognition of the *Gouvernement provisoire de la république française* in 1944, one of Ottawa's diplomats warned that

our Canadian future is bound up in this thing. As our French population is educated and liberalized ... I am convinced that the sentimental bonds between them and the French people of France will turn into something more practical and real. This change will be expedited by the fact of France getting a dirty deal out of the war. French nationalism itself will become French racialism and it is bound to make a big play for the sympathy and moral support of its American outpost. I would be fearful that Canadian unity might be too fragile a thing to stand up should this country and France become seriously estranged and should French racialism win its possible bid for the sympathy of French North America. Is there nothing we can do to divert the Flood?¹

A quarter century later, on the eve of Charles de Gaulle's 1967 visit to Canada, aspects of Tommy Stone's analysis appeared remarkably prescient. As this chapter discusses, the rise of Quebec neo-nationalism, and efforts to equip the Quebec government, as French Canada's 'national' state, to protect and promote North America's *fait français* in an increasingly interdependent world, had found an enthusiastic partner in Paris. Gaullist France was preoccupied with countering US cultural power, and concerned that Quebec's modernization should not undermine French Canada's cultural identity. The primacy of the nation in the Gaullist worldview encouraged Paris to accept the 'two nations' constitutional thesis that posits Canada's duality as fundamentally a compact between an anglophone nation with its capital in Ottawa, and a francophone nation with its capital in Quebec City.

The result was that Paris increasingly favoured Quebec City, viewing it as the capital of the only viable national entity capable of resisting American power. The

¹ DEA, G-2, v. 5692, 1-A(s), p. 4 – Letter from Stone to Robertson, 13 June 1944.

official France-Quebec rapprochement was paralleled by Ottawa's increasing marginalization. The dynamic fuelled a federal unease that had arisen from growing concerns about Canada's unity, and the reality that similar to the Quebec neo-nationalist and Gaullist responses to Americanization, English Canada was experiencing a nationalist reaction to what was considered preponderant American influence. Ottawa was preoccupied, especially after the Pearson Government's 1963 election, to employ Canada's *fait français* as a source of differentiation from the US, and as a means to cultivate relations with France to realize its larger foreign policy goal of a viable European counterweight to the US. The interaction in the 1960s of these three nationalist reactions, all of which were preoccupied with French Canada's future and responding to American power, resulted in the emergence of triangular tensions.

As Stone's wartime analysis foreshadowed, a degree of cultural essentialism characterized the triangular relations of the period. It was presumed (and feared) that the affinities between France and Quebec made them natural allies. There was certainly a great deal of complementarity between Gaullism and Quebec neo-nationalism; however, complementarity did not dictate a perfect harmony or an identity of interests, especially given the complex relationship between France and French Canada. Even as references to France-Quebec cultural solidarity multiplied, there existed a certain disconnect between the two nationalist reactions as each used the other to advance its political agenda.

The Interaction of Reactions

A year into office, Quebec's Premier, Jean Lesage, told a Université de Montréal audience that French Canada could not escape international realities, and that with the end of Quebec's relative insularity, there were no more protective barriers between French Canada and the outside world.² The remarks touched on an issue that Quebec had grappled with for decades, and that the traditional nationalist order's passing heightened in relevance: how to ensure French Canada's cultural survival as Quebec modernized?

Consistent with the more positive neo-nationalist disposition toward *France moderne*, part of the answer was for Quebec City to establish greater contact with France and the larger international francophone community. Quebec's new Minister of Youth, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, told the founding meeting of the *Association des universités partiellement ou entièrement de langue française* (AUPELF) of Quebec's need to multiply contacts with organizations, institutions, and countries that like Quebec boasted a French cultural heritage.³

Growing Quebec interest in links with France and other French-speaking populations was consistent with the post-war trend toward increased transnational cultural contacts. The notion of *francophonie* – or cooperation between the world's

² ANQ, P688, S1, SS1, 1986-03-007, v. 17, 150 – Discours, Université de Montréal, 3 May 1961, *Le Canada français dans le monde moderne*. For discussion of this aspect of the motivation for Quebec's international activity, see Louis Balthazar, "Quebec's International Relations: A Response to Needs and Necessities," in *Foreign Relations and Federal States*, Brian Hocking, ed. (Leicester University Press, 1993), 145-150; Renaud Dehousse, "Fédéralisme, asymétrie et interdépendance: Aux origines de l'action internationale des composantes de l'État fédéral," *Études Internationales* 1989, 20(2): 283-310; Frédéric Dupuis, "De Gaulle et l'Amérique des Deux Nations," *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, 1997, 111(2): 165-180; Claude Morin, *l'Art de l'impossible: la Diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960* (Boréal, 1987), 36-40.

³ DEA, G-2, v. 5057, 2727-14-40, p. 1 – Allocution de l'Honorable Paul Gérin-Lajoie lors de la séance inaugurale du Congrès constitutif d'une association mondiale des universités de langue française, à l'Université de Montréal, le 8 septembre 1961.

French-speaking populations – had been debated since the late nineteenth century; in the decades that followed, a number of private initiatives sought to cultivate francophone cultural cooperation. With many of France’s former colonies achieving independence, the notion of francophonie took on greater salience, so that even the anti-colonial-minded *Esprit* devoted a special edition exploring the French language’s transnational dimension.⁴ Notwithstanding ambivalence in Paris over measures that could lead to charges of neo-imperialism, or conversely, an undermining of its bilateral ties with its former colonies, France considered cultural affinities a means to ensure its *rayonnement* in the face of anglophone, notably US cultural influence.⁵

The increased priority Quebec assigned to forging cultural links with the international francophone community underscores the tremendous symbolic importance of Lesage’s visit to Paris in 1961. Beyond opening the new *Maison du Québec* in the French capital, the visit was designed to signal at an official level that Quebec was orienting itself toward closer links with France. The significance appeared during the preparations when Quebec’s Deputy Premier and Minister of Cultural Affairs, Georges-Émile Lapalme, told France’s ambassador, Francis Lacoste, that the trip should be organized to be as impressive as possible, to reflect the extraordinary importance Quebec attached to developing links with France.⁶ Paris’

⁴ Anne Voisin, “Solidarité française et francophonie,” *Études Gaulliennes* December 1979, 7(27-28): 53-54; Stéphanie Angers et Gérard Fabre, *Échanges intellectuels entre la France et le Québec (1930-2000), Les réseaux de la revue Esprit avec La Relève, Cité libre, Parti pris et Possibles* (Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2004), 85.

⁵ S.K. Panter-Brick “La Francophonie with special reference to educational links and language problems,” in *Decolonisation and After: The British and French Experience*, Georges Fischer and W.H. Morris-Jones, eds. (Frank Cass & Co., 1980), 330-335; Alain Peyrefitte, *De Gaulle et le Québec* (Stanké, 2000), 52.

⁶ MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 18 May 1961; Roussel (1983), 278; Gérard Bergeron, *Le Canada-Français après deux siècles de patience* (Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 13.

consul general in Montreal urged that the reception granted the Quebec Premier be appropriate to his stature as French Canada's representative, signalling French leanings toward the two nations approach.⁷

The visit was spectacular. De Gaulle had taken a personal interest in the arrangements and delegated France's Minister of Culture, André Malraux, to be his personal representative at the opening of the *Maison*. A delegation of some three hundred Quebecers – including half the Lesage Cabinet – descended on Paris, in an atmosphere “reminiscent ... of relatives returning home after a long absence.”⁸ A motorcade of twenty-six limousines whisked the delegation to their lodgings at the Hôtel Crillon.⁹ During his time in the French capital, Lesage affirmed that modern realities made it incumbent for Quebec to affirm its presence abroad and multiply contacts with other countries, with France at the forefront, to ensure French-Canadian civilization survived.¹⁰ Overwhelmed by the reception he was accorded, Lesage paraphrased Louis XIV's celebrated quip regarding the Pyrenees in declaring “il n'y a plus d'Atlantique!”¹¹

Beyond viewing these contacts as a guarantor of Quebec's cultural specificity, the visit reflected the province's *épanouissement* and determination to

Bergeron characterized the visit as being equal in significance to the rupture represented by the 1763 *Treaty of Paris*, and the renewal of official contact that the 1855 visit of *La Capricieuse* represented.

⁷ MAE, v. 146 – Personal Letter from Boyer Ste-Suzanne, Consul Général de France à Montréal, to Roux, Directeur Général adjoint des Affaires Politiques, 23 August 1961.

⁸ Thomson (1988), 95-96.

⁹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation, Inauguration, 1961-1967 – Notes sur l'ouverture de la Délégation générale du Québec à Paris en 1961, from Lussier to Chapdelaine, 27 July 1981.

¹⁰ MAE, v. 146 – Agence Générale de la province du Québec à Paris, Inauguration par M. Lesage – *Europe-Canada, Bulletin d'Information*, 14 October 1961, Inauguration de la Maison de Québec – Discours de l'Honorable M. Jean Lesage, Premier Ministre du Gouvernement de Québec; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 29, Discours de Jean Lesage par Claude Morin – Réponse à Dupuy, Réception à l'Ambassade du Canada en France, 4 October 1961.

¹¹ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 29, Discours du Jean Lesage par Claude Morin – Alliance Française de Montréal, Hon Jean Lesage, Premier Ministre, 11 March 1962.

participate as a distinct and equal partner in the production and propagation of francophone culture. Historian and sociologist Gérard Bouchard has explained how the rise of neo-nationalism and the Quiet Revolution constituted an effort to come to terms with Quebec's *americanité*, and its self-recognition as a cultural entity distinct from France.¹² Although Lesage invoked frequently the idea of cultural solidarity between France and French Canada,¹³ he also reminded his hosts in Paris that French Canada's duty was to be itself, not merely an "appendice nordique de la France," and that the strength of the international francophone community was found in its diversity.¹⁴ When André Malraux, France's Minister of Cultural Affairs, visited Canada two years later, Lesage reiterated this message, affirming that French Canada's French heritage did not render it any less Canadian.¹⁵ Lesage's successor also emphasized French Canada's distinctiveness. During his first visit to Paris in 1967, Daniel Johnson declared that Quebec was determined to retain its French heritage, but made sure to emphasize that it had a different destiny from France.¹⁶ Even amid the heightened tone of cultural solidarity during de Gaulle's 1967 visit, Johnson was careful to refer to French Canada's distinct North American identity.¹⁷

¹² Gérard Bouchard, *Entre l'Ancien et le Nouveau Monde, Le Québec comme population neuve et culture fondatrice* (University of Ottawa Press, 1996), 37-38.

¹³ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 29, Discours de Jean Lesage par Claude Morin – Discours no. VIII, Dîner Chez le Président de Gaulle; MAE, v. 146 – Letter from Denizeau, Consul Général de France à Québec to Levasseur, Chargé d'Affaires de France A.I., au Canada, 16 October 1961, Retour du Premier Ministre.

¹⁴ MAE, v. 146, Agence Générale de la province du Québec à Paris, Inauguration par M. Lesage – *Europe-Canada, Bulletin d'Information*, 14 octobre 1961, Inauguration de la Maison de Québec, Discours de l'Honorable M. Jean Lesage, Premier Ministre du Gouvernement de Québec.

¹⁵ ANQ, P688, S1, SS1, v. 17, 18 – Dîner pour Ministre des Affaires culturelles de la France, André Malraux, 11 October 1963.

¹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-6-QUE, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 19 May 1967, Visite de M. Daniel Johnson.

¹⁷ MAE, v. 209, Dossiers constitués pour le voyage du Général de Gaulle au Canada, 1967, Discours prononcés – Allocution de M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, Dîner Offert par le

Those advocating more radical action than Lesage and Johnson were similarly careful to highlight Quebec's distinctiveness, even when appealing for French support. The vice-president of the *Rassemblement de l'indépendance nationale* (RIN), André d'Allemagne, declared during a 1963 visit to Paris that it was only natural that the Quebec independence movement's first appeals for support should be to "un peuple frère," and asserted that there existed a nation in Quebec – the oldest in North America, and by virtue of its population, the largest French-speaking nation in the world after France.¹⁸ The RIN candidate in Gaspé wrote de Gaulle to express his dream to see established a "France-Québec" republic to serve as a francophone Israel where the francophone diaspora in North America could find "leur Pernod au petit café du coin, même sous la forme de cidre de pomme."¹⁹ For his part, Quebec writer Hubert Aquin was sarcastic and scathing in his dismissing the idea that the *Québécois* were part of a transatlantic French nation.²⁰

The remarks of the premiers and other Quebec personalities reflected the complexity of Quebec identity. There was an acknowledgement of francophone Quebec's French heritage and a sense of belonging to an international francophone community; indeed, this reality was embraced as the means to facilitate Quebec *épanouissement*, protect its majority francophone culture, and realize Quebec as the political expression of the French-Canadian nation. For the overwhelming majority of those in Quebec championing the France-Quebec rapprochement, however, the

Général De Gaulle, Président de la République Française, Pavillon de la France, 25 July 1967; Morin (1987), 81.

¹⁸ "Conférence de Presse donnée a Paris le 11 octobre 1963 par André d'Allemagne, vice-président du Rassemblement pour l'indépendance Nationale," *Québec Libre* 1963, 1(1): 1-12.

¹⁹ MAE, v. 277 – Letter from Normand Charleboix, Candidat RIN, Gaspé Nord to De Gaulle, 18 March 1966.

²⁰ Hubert Aquin, "Nos cousins de France," in *Point de Fuite* (Cercle du Livre de France, 1971), 67-70

sense of “imagined community” did not entail the idea of a transatlantic French nation.²¹

Thus, even while praising de Gaulle for his actions during his 1967 visit to Quebec, the president of the *Société Saint-Jean Baptiste*, François-Albert Angers, warned his fellow “Quebecois” of their need to remain themselves: a national entity distinct from France.²² It was Montreal’s Mayor, Jean Drapeau, who perhaps best expressed the multifaceted nature of Quebec identity in remarks at a luncheon he hosted during de Gaulle’s visit; employing the term “French Canadian,” Drapeau acknowledged the affinities between France and Quebec, but asserted the roots of French Canadians “plongent plus profondément dans le sol canadien,” so that if there was gratitude for the France’s leader’s interest in French Canadians, there existed a degree of ambivalence for France itself arising from their having learned to “survivre seuls pendant deux siècles.” Drapeau expressed hope that French assistance would help French Canada contribute to the betterment of Canada as a whole, emphasizing that “nous sommes attaché à cet immense pays.”²³

Drapeau’s remarks about Quebec’s complex and Canadian character touched on the fact that the effort to cultivate relations with France and the Francophonie were inspired partly by the idea of an historic cultural vocation for Quebec. One notion posited Quebec, and more generally, French Canada, as a bulwark protecting Canada

²¹ *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, second edition (Verso 1991), 46, 134. Anderson notes that a diverse number of nations can share the same national print-language, and that despite the tendency of nationalist ideologues to do so, language should not be equated with nation; however, his invoking the “Anglo-Saxon family” as an example does suggest that an “imagined community” is capable of transcending the boundaries of nation-states.

²² François-Albert Angers, “L’épilogue de la visite du Général de Gaulle,” *L’Action nationale* 1967, 57(2): 175-180; Bergeron (1967), 9.

²³ DEA, A-4, v. 9568, *Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada* (undated): 93-95. Also, Thomson (1988), 236.

from Americanization. During his 1961 visit to Paris, Lesage described it as a “delicious paradox” that the most enlightened elements of English Canada, the beneficiary of the Conquest, wished the survival of French culture in Canada as ardently as French Canadians, in order to protect against the US cultural invasion.²⁴ The Premier argued that the best means for French Canada to be faithful to its French origins was to remain in Confederation and inoculate Canada’s two founding cultures against Americanization.²⁵ Daniel Johnson also referred to this idea in his espousing a new binational regime as a response to US cultural hegemony that would ensure English Canada’s independence and protect French Canada from assimilation.²⁶

The scope of Quebec’s cultural vocation expanded with neo-nationalism’s growing assertiveness. Johnson argued that Quebec was destined to serve as the link between Europe and North America, given that it was the product of French civilization, but was also a full and integral participant in North American civilization.²⁷ Jean-Marc Léger and Gaston Cholette, Commissioner-General for cooperation in Quebec’s Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs went even further, claiming that by virtue of its being simultaneously a first world country and

²⁴ ANQ, P688, S1, SS1, 1986-03-007, v. 17, 174 – Réception à l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris, 6 October 1961, Hon. Jean Lesage, Premier Ministre; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 29, Discours de Jean Lesage par Claude Morin, 23 août 1960-3 décembre 1960 – Notes d’un discours prononcé à l’Assemblée Législative par l’honorable Jean Lesage, Premier ministre, en présentant le projet de Loi relatif à la création du ministère des Affaires culturelles.

²⁵ ANQ, P688, S1, SS1, v. 17, 18 – Dîner pour Ministre des Affaires culturelles de la France, André Malraux, 11 October 1963.

²⁶ Daniel Johnson, *Égalité ou indépendance* (Éditions Renaissance, 1965), 113.

²⁷ MAE, v. 209, Dossiers constitués pour le voyage du Général de Gaulle au Canada, 1967, Discours prononcés – Allocution de M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, Dîner Offert par le Général de Gaulle, Président de la République Française, Pavillon de la France, 25 July 1967.

“colonisé,” that Quebec had the potential to serve as a bridge between the West and the Third World.²⁸

As remarks such as those of Johnson, Léger, and Cholette indicate, the Union Nationale’s return to power in 1966 did not signal a return to the traditional nationalist hostility toward *France moderne*; to the contrary, references to cultural solidarity between the French and French-Canadian nations increased. Quebec’s junior Education Minister, Marcel Masse, called on English Canada to recognize that Quebec’s cultural isolation in North America meant that its survival depended on the strength it could gain from a “retour aux sources” and links with the French-speaking world.²⁹ Daniel Johnson told France’s ambassador, François Leduc, that the aim of his 1967 visit to Paris was to confirm at the French administration’s highest level that Quebec City could count on support in ensuring the French-Canadian nation’s survival, confessing the profound need for a friendly country to assist Quebec in responding to modern cultural and economic realities.³⁰ During the subsequent visit he emphasized French Canada’s need for France, in both its historic and modern incarnations, to assist Quebec to remain faithful to its cultural heritage and itself as a “nation de culture française.”³¹

²⁸ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 1 – Document de Travail de Gaston Cholette, directeur général des relations avec l’étranger, 14 June 1968, la politique « africaine » du Québec; ANQ, P599, 2001-01-001, v. 4, Causeries et conférences de J.M. Léger sur le Québec et le Canada français, 1952-1996 – *Le Devoir*, Octobre 1969, “Jean-Marc Léger énumère six domaines de coopération entre les pays de la francophonie”; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 183, Coopération, Les grandes orientations de la coopération franco-québécoise – Document de travail en vue de la VIIIe session de la Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise, par Gaston Cholette.

²⁹ MAE, v. 278 – Allocution de l’Honorable Marcel Masse, Ministre d’État à l’Éducation, au Club Renaissance de Québec, 15 March 1967.

³⁰ MAE, v. 206, Visite de Daniel Johnson – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 9 May 1967.

³¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-6-QUE, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 19 May 1967, Visite de M. Daniel Johnson.

Parallel to and encouraged by neo-nationalist calls for France-Quebec rapprochement, there was increased appreciation in Ottawa of the opportunity Canada's *fait français* offered to cultivate relations with France and the international francophone community. Part of the federal interest in the French-speaking world was related to its broader foreign policy concerns. The DEA believed that Ottawa could employ its cultural links with France to cultivate a bilateral relationship that could be used to mitigate the deteriorating relations between Paris and the NATO allies.³² There was also, however, a more immediate domestic concern. By the time of the 1963 federal election, concerns were growing about the constitutional implications of Quebec's Quiet Revolution. The new Pearson Government's response was to increase French-Canadian influence in Confederation, and the federal government especially, reflected in its Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, urged that cultural affinities between France and French Canada be "exploited in the best sense of the word" to strengthen the bilateral relationship and national unity.³³ The federal capital hoped that rather than a source of disunity, a cultivation of Canada-France relations that included links between Paris and Quebec City would mitigate neo-nationalist pressures.

Linked to these external and internal motivations, notably the strength of neo-nationalism and the accompanying concern for national unity, was an appreciation of

³² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Washington to DEA, 9 September 1963; DEA, A-3-C, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 21 October 1963.

³³ DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Paul Martin, 12 September 1963; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Enclosure to Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 21 October 1963, Franco-Canadian Relations.

French Canada as a point of differentiation for Canada's identity and a shield against Americanization, which was of growing preoccupation among English Canadians, especially among the liberal intellectual elite. For example, in 1951, the *Toronto Daily Star* referred to an emerging distinct Canadian way of life that drew on characteristics of "our two great races, the English and French."³⁴ Similarly, Vincent Massey considered Canada's bicultural dimension a source of strength distinguishing the country from the US.³⁵ Likewise, in *Lament for a Nation*, George Grant described French Canada as the keystone of the Canadian nation, bemoaning John Diefenbaker's "One Canada" concept for ignoring the historic basis of Canadian nationalism in its failure to acknowledge French-Canadian communal rights.³⁶

A conservative nationalism, best represented by Diefenbaker's dogged opposition to the adoption of Canada's new flag, opposed anything perceived to dilute the country's British heritage or pose a threat to national unity by encouraging Quebec's distinctiveness. This conservative nationalism was increasingly overshadowed, however, by a liberal English-Canadian variant that considered questions regarding Canada's national identity and unity could best be answered by a shift toward distinctive Canadian symbols, and a greater recognition of the country's 'two nations.'³⁷

³⁴ José Igartua, *The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-1971* (UBC Press, 2006), 98.

³⁵ Karen Anne Phibbs-Finlay, *The Force of Culture: Vincent Massey and Canadian Sovereignty*, unpublished dissertation (University of Victoria, Department of History, 1999), 309-310.

³⁶ George Grant, *Lament for a Nation* (McClelland and Stewart, 1965). This argument culminated in the call in Marcel Rioux and Susan Crean, *Deux pays pour vivre, un plaidoyer* (Éditions coopératives Albert Saint-Martin, 1980) for some form of sovereignty-association as the best defence for the Quebecois and English-Canadian nations to protect themselves from American influence.

³⁷ Igartua (2006), 104-107, 177-195, 222.

Lester Pearson invoked the importance of Canada's biculturalism when he warned the *Association des Hebdomadaires de Langue Française de Québec* that neither an independent Quebec nor a truncated Canada would be long able to resist the US embrace, and appealed for English and French-Canadian cooperation in resisting an “américanisme envahissant, d'une véritable invasion culturelle et financière.”³⁸ The increased appreciation of Canada's “fait français” was also reflected in a DEA review of Canada-France relations in 1963 that argued that increased links and a greater francophone orientation of Canadian foreign policy would benefit Canada as a whole by strengthening its identity in the face of US influence.³⁹ This message was delivered by Pearson and Martin during their 1964 visit to Paris, with the Prime Minister telling Georges Pompidou that Canada's bilingual and bicultural nature was the best guarantor of its identity in the face of the American challenge.⁴⁰

Increased Canadian interest in official relations with France as a bulwark against American cultural influences found a receptive audience across the Atlantic. The heightened preoccupation in France with Americanization was reflected in the release of Sorbonne professor René Étiemble's polemic pamphlet *Parlez-vous franglais?* that railed against American cultural power and the corruption of the French language by anglicisms stemming from the English language's international

³⁸ MAE, v. 134 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 19 August 1963; MAE, v. 137 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 23 December 1963, M. Pearson, no. 1391 bis/AM.

³⁹ DEA, A-4, v. 3087, 6 – Le Canada (Québec) et l'Europe Francophone, 1960-1966, Cahier II, Étude préparée par l'équipe chargée du projet sur la francophonie, 1974, 8.

⁴⁰ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 29, Compte-Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada à Paris, le 15 janvier 1964; DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 31, Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre M. Georges Pompidou et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada, à l'Hôtel Matignon, le 16 janvier 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 December 1964.

dominance. This cultural anti-Americanism would culminate in the student riots of May 1968, which may be understood as partly inspired by a rebellion against the conformism, consumerism, and alienation identified with Americanization.⁴¹

As chapter 7 discussed, Canada's Americanization was a French concern throughout the post-1945 period. Members of the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs committee who visited Canada in 1962 described a country that although marked profoundly by European civilization, appeared unavoidably drawn into the US orbit. They declared it France's national interest and duty as a "nation-sœur" to intensify economic and cultural links with Canada, especially Quebec.⁴²

The French deputies' focus on Quebec was consistent with Paris' enhanced preoccupation with French Canada's survival as a viable cultural entity. French officials acknowledged the American dimension of Quebec society; an internal MAE report explained that even as France-Quebec ties increased, Paris had to remain mindful of Quebec's Canadian and North American character, and recognize France and Quebec's histories had diverged for two centuries.⁴³ France's consul general in Montreal noted how French Canadians shared Canada's fascination for things American,⁴⁴ and following his 1963 visit, André Malraux claimed that neither Quebec *indépendantistes* nor the general population were anti-American; rather, they were

⁴¹ René Étiemble, *Parlez-vous franglais?* (Édition Gallimard, 1964); Philippe Roger, *The American Enemy: a Story of French Anti-Americanism*, translated by Sharon Bowman (University of Chicago Press, 2005), 405; Richard J. Golsan, "From French Anti-Americanism and Americanization to the "American Enemy"?" in *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy and Anti-Americanism after 1945*, Alexander Stephan, ed. (Berghahn Books, 2006): 42-63.

⁴² MAE, v. 101 – Rapport d'Information, MM. Bosson et Thorailleur, Députés, Assemblée Nationale, 18 March 1963.

⁴³ MAE, v. 135 – Note sur la Province de Québec, MAE, Amérique, 9 October 1961.

⁴⁴ MAE, v. 136 – Le Consul Général de France à Montréal à Son Excellence Monsieur L'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, à Ottawa, 6 September 1962, Fin de mission.

anti-English Canadian, wanting French Canadians to own Montreal's skyscrapers.⁴⁵ Even France's Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, perhaps in an effort at reassurance following de Gaulle's July 1967 visit, remarked on Quebec's American character to Paul Martin, describing French Canadians as more American than European French.⁴⁶

French awareness of Quebec's American dimension fed French fears, however, that the growth of US cultural influence threatened Quebec's cultural survival. In lobbying for the lavish reception reserved for Lesage in 1961, France's consul general in Montreal explained that as the base of North America's *fait français*, Quebec was threatened by the Anglo-Saxon culture surrounding it and would therefore benefit from the strengthened self-confidence Paris could help cultivate.⁴⁷ He also affirmed that despite Quebec and France's historic divergence and the complex sentiments this entailed, there was an organic attachment between "un groupe irremplaçable et qui est issue de nous" that French-Canadian disquiet over the advance of English in Montreal was strengthening.⁴⁸ Pompidou expressed to Quebec's representative in Paris, Jean Chapdelaine, his concern about Quebec's ability to maintain its identity in the face of "the American colossus."⁴⁹

The *Académie française*'s hosting of Lesage for one of its sessions during his 1961 visit made clear the French concern to maintain Quebec's *francité*, as did its

⁴⁵ Peyrefitte (2000), 30.

⁴⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Telex from Paul Martin, Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, to DEA, 26 September 1967. Martin, desperate to end the Gaullist interventions, seized the occasion to emphasize French Canada's North American reality and identity.

⁴⁷ MAE, v. 146 – Personal Letter from Boyer Ste-Suzanne, Consul Général de France à Montréal, to Jacques Roux, Directeur Général adjoint des Affaires Politiques au Département, 23 August 1961.

⁴⁸ MAE, v. 136 – Le Consul Général de France à Montréal à Son Excellence Monsieur L'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, à Ottawa, 6 September 1962, Fin de mission.

⁴⁹ Thomson (1988), 158.

subsequent awarding the Premier a medal in recognition of his government's efforts on behalf of the French language.⁵⁰ The considerable increase in references to Quebec in the French press soon became a concern of Canada's Embassy, which noted the growing media interest and expressed concern over the coverage's apparent lack of balance and tendency to ignore the Canada outside of Quebec.⁵¹ This dynamic may have arisen partly as a result of France's ambassador, Raymond Bousquet, having urged Paris the previous year to facilitate greater coverage of events in Quebec and to inform the French population of the evolution of "ce peuple auquel nous rattachent tout de liens."⁵² Bousquet's appeal was matched by a similar request Jean Lesage made to de Gaulle during his 1963 visit to Paris, following which a permanent correspondent of the *Office Radio-Television Française* was sent to Montreal.⁵³

French intellectual circles regarded Quebec's efforts to modernize without losing its cultural specificity as directly relevant to France.⁵⁴ Hubert Beuve-Méry, editor of *Le Monde*, in a private conversation with Canada's ambassador to France,

⁵⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Letter from Halstead, Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 31 May 1963.

⁵¹ By 1964, a monthly average of three hundred articles referred to Quebec, whereas in 1961, the number was only twenty-four. ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964; ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel – Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 11 December 1962. Lussier cautioned figures were only an approximation given the clipping service selected articles only containing the word "Quebec," not "French Canada" or other variations. Also, DEA, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 12 October 1964, Présence du Canada dans la presse française: images québécoise et images canadiennes.

⁵² MAE, v. 174 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Service d'Information et de Presse, 1 March, 1963, Télévision France-Canada français; MAE, v. 145 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 27 April 1963; MAE, v. 174 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 18 April 1963.

⁵³ Thomson (1988), 104; Pierre-Louis Mallen, *Vivre le Québec libre: Les secrets de De Gaulle* (Plon, 1978), 25.

⁵⁴ Robert H. Keyserlingk, "France and Quebec: The Psychological Basis for their Cooperation," *Queen's Quarterly* 1968, 75(1): 21-32.

Jules Léger, expressed sympathy for the aims of the Quiet Revolution, but voiced scepticism as to Quebec's ability to resist American pressures given the scope of the challenge that this presented for France, a larger, more geographically and culturally distinct entity.⁵⁵ Jean-Marie Domenach, editor of *Esprit*, argued Quebec's relevance to France and Europe amid the spread of the "modèle américain," describing Quebec as a testament to the challenge posed to reconciling American civilization's shocking assimilatory capacity, and the tremendous challenge of maintaining a distinct political and socio-economic system while embracing the 'American way of life.'⁵⁶ French sociologist Joffre Damazedier, who had taught at the Université de Montréal, declared that the very future of France's culture, society, and economy was at play in Quebec's "fièvre révolte" against the Anglo-Americans, which was provoking France's population to think about the renewal of their own country and the future of their civilization. Damazedier wondered whether Quebec could invent "une seconde Amérique, une Amérique de culture française où les valeurs de justice, de liberté, de vérité, et de beauté seraient mieux incarnés dans la vie quotidienne des collectivités et personnes."⁵⁷

Most significant in terms of the emergence of the triangular tensions were the efforts of the "Quebec Lobby." This was a group of French politicians, civil servants, and other personalities promoting France-Quebec links. In the late 1950s, many persons who would have a prominence in the triangular tensions of the following decade began to take an interest in the potential that this increasingly assertive

⁵⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 20 October 1964.

⁵⁶ Jean-Marie Domenach, "Le Canada Français, Controverse sur un nationalisme," *Esprit* February 1965, 33(335): 321-322.

⁵⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Pierre Godin, *La Presse*, 5 September 1967, "L'indépendance économique de la France se joue dans la lutte du Québec pour la libération."

Quebec represented. These included the diplomat Bernard Dorin, who while posted to France's Ottawa Embassy established contact with prominent neo-nationalists Jean-Marc Léger, journalist Yves Michaud, historian Denis Vaugeois, and international law professor Jacques-Yvan Morin.⁵⁸

Dorin was a colleague of his fellow French national Philippe Rossillon, who had founded the organization *Patrie et progrès* to inculcate nationalist sentiment on the French Left and was similarly interested in Quebec and French Canadians arising from his travels to Canada. Dorin and Rossillon were soon joined by other Quebec sympathizers in France. Although members of this informal lobby differed in terms of ideological and political affiliations, and even to an extent disagreed over the ideal political status for Quebec, they shared a nationalist concern for the international *rayonnement* of French culture. They were predisposed to sympathize with the Quebec neo-nationalist position and promote North America's *fait français* as a means to serving France's broader national interests.⁵⁹ Indeed, Quebec lobbyists, the majority of who had never visited Canada or only in passing, often displayed a predilection encouraged by a "francolâtre" (an excessive love of France) to more readily imagine Quebec as part of a transatlantic French community, than to acknowledge its Canadian and North American identities. Quebec lobbyist Étienne

⁵⁸ Gérin-Lajoie, 320; Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier, *Le Lobby du Québec à Paris: Les Précurseurs du Général de Gaulle* (Éditions Québec-Amérique, 2002), 19-30.

⁵⁹ Lists of the Quebec lobby exist elsewhere and there is little need to repeat them here. Instead, these personalities will be identified as such throughout the rest of this work. Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion is Comeau and Fournier (2002). Also, J.F. Boshier, *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 63-83, details what he terms the "Quebec mafia." The choice of terminology reflects the analysis; Boshier argues members were "engaged in an imperial enterprise that was revived and promoted by de Gaulle," and that any notion of cultural solidarity was in fact an ill-disguised anglophobia.

Burin des Roziers, Secretary-General of the Elysée during the 1960s, described Quebec as:

l'illustration saisissante de la pérennité du peuple français, de la permanence de la Nation française à travers les âges et les vicissitudes de l'histoire. Quel exemple, quel témoignage, quel manifeste de la vitalité tenace et vigoureuse de notre race, de la force de notre sève commune que la croissance magnifique du rameau détaché du vieil arbre il y a plus de deux siècles.⁶⁰

Toward 'Two Nations' and Triangular Tensions

Growing French interest in Quebec led Paris and its representatives to view Quebec as constituting the only viable national entity in Canada capable of withstanding American cultural power. France's consul general in Montreal argued French Canada's cultural vitality surpassed that of English Canada.⁶¹ A MAE official echoed this sentiment in describing Quebec as the cornerstone of the only truly Canadian political community.⁶² These French assessments of Quebec were consistent with the Quebec neo-nationalist two nations thesis of Canada suggested by the Tremblay Report regarding Quebec's constitutional relationship with Canada. The argument was that Confederation was a compact between two nations – anglophone and francophone – the latter being the responsibility of the Quebec Government, which accordingly should possess the powers and resources required to promote the *fait français* in Quebec and throughout Canada.⁶³ This resulted in demands for a special constitutional status and greater autonomy for Quebec within Canada, and presaged the calls for independence of the 1960s.

⁶⁰ Etienne Burin des Roziers, "Trois Voyages du Général de Gaulle au Québec," *Études Gaulliennes* December 1979, 7(27-28): 66; Comeau and Fournier (2002), 28-29; Anderson (1991), 7.

⁶¹ MAE, v. 136 – Le Consul Général de France à Montréal à Son Excellence Monsieur L'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, à Ottawa, 6 September 1962, Fin de mission.

⁶² MAE, v. 328 – Note pour le Ministre, 4 June 1965, Canada (Observations sur la conjoncture).

⁶³ The most prominent statement of the "two nations" thesis, contemporaneous to the events in question, is Daniel Johnson, *Égalité ou indépendance* (Éditions Renaissance, 1965).

Paris' evolution toward a two nations approach in its relations with Quebec and Canada was a logical consequence of the Gaullist worldview, notably its Rankean regard for the primacy of the concept of 'nation' and its relationship with the state.⁶⁴ De Gaulle possessed a strong predisposition toward the two nations thesis. During his 1960 visit to Canada, he equated explicitly Quebec and French Canada.⁶⁵ Meeting a group of Canadians studying at Paris' *École nationale d'administration* five years later, de Gaulle raised his arms and exclaimed "Ah, le vrai Canada!" when told the majority were from Quebec.⁶⁶ A DEA analysis prepared after de Gaulle's 1967 visit argued it was clear that the French leader believed English Canada possessed neither the will nor ability to resist American influence, a sentiment confirmed by a post-visit briefing that the Elysée staff provided journalists of the magazine *L'Express* in which Canada was described as not being a "true national entity."⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Anderson (1991), 81; P.G. Cerny, "De Gaulle, the Nation-State and Foreign Policy," *The Review of Politics* 1971, 33(2): 254-278; Comeau and Fournier (2002), 44; De Gaulle (1971), 239-241; André Fontaine, "La France et le Québec," *Études Internationales* 1977, 8(2): 393-402; Peter Fysh, "Gaullism and Liberalism," in *Political Ideologies in Contemporary France*, Christopher Flood and Laurence Bell, eds. (Pinter, 1997); Anthony Hartley, *Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement* (Dienstfrey, 1971), 6-7; Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Cornell University Press, 1974), 22-28; Leopold von Ranke, *The Theory and Practice of History*, Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, eds. (Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1973).

⁶⁵ MAE, v. 100 – Allocution Prononcée par le Général de Gaulle à la fin du Banquet offert par la Ville de Montréal à l'Hôtel Queen Elisabeth, 1^{er} vendredi, 21 avril 1960; ANF, 5 AG1/199, 1 – Entretien du Général de Gaulle et M. Diefenbaker en Présence des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères, le 19 avril 1960; DEA, G-2, v. 7045, 6956-A-40 – Memorandum for the Under-secretary, 19 April 1960. Also, de Gaulle (1971): 239. In his memoirs, de Gaulle asserts that during the visit Diefenbaker told him privately that he intended to re-organize Confederation along bilingual and bicultural lines. In addition to such a claim being incongruent with the Prime Minister's avowed preference for "One Canada," there is nothing in either the French or Canadian accounts of the two leaders' conversations to buttress de Gaulle's claim. It appears the French leader may have confused Diefenbaker with Pearson.

⁶⁶ Jean-François Lisée, *Dans l'œil de l'aigle: Washington face au Québec* (Boréal, 1990), 75.

⁶⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 14 August 1967 – General de Gaulle's Visit to Canada: An Analysis; Thomson (1988): 224.

Notwithstanding the assertions from Quebec figures regarding French Canada's distinctiveness as a cultural entity, de Gaulle tended to view French Canada as a branch of the French nation, and was inclined to project onto Quebec France's efforts to seek autonomy from, and serve as a counterweight to the Anglo-Saxon powers.⁶⁸ Moreover, amid the accession to independence of France's colonies, it was natural for the ethno-cultural dimension to gain greater primacy in Paris' thinking, especially given the calls, not least from the former colonies, for an international association of francophone states.⁶⁹ In discussing the emerging Francophonie, Jean de Broglie, one of France's Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs even predicted that the era when the struggle for political and economic supremacy was coming to an end and it was necessary to prepare for the time when future struggles were axed on questions of cultural independence.⁷⁰

Paris' attention was thus drawn to Lesage's declaration that the only tool French Canada possessed in responding to the twin challenges of modernization and Americanization was the Quebec state. Paris paid heed to the Premier's description of Quebec as the "mère patrie" of North America's francophones, his appeals for France-Quebec cooperation to facilitate Quebec's cultural mission, and consistent with the earlier recommendations of the Tremblay Report, his government's

⁶⁸ Jacques Filion, "De Gaulle, la France et le Québec," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 1975, 45(3): 317. Also, Peyrefitte (2000), 37. It is telling that during a French cabinet meeting in 1964 in which Quebec was discussed, de Gaulle insisted on use of the terms 'Français' and 'Anglais' rather than "francophone" and "anglophone."

⁶⁹ J.F.V. Keiger, *France and the World Since 1870* (Arnold, 2001), 21; Donald N. Baker, "Quebec on French Minds," *Queen's Quarterly* 1978, 85(2): 255; Kolodziej (1974), 525. Also, Comeau and Fournier (2002), 22. Quebec lobbyist Bernard Dorin explained why he and his colleagues considered Quebec vital to France: "Autrement, c'était l'Hexagone français replié sur l'Europe, d'autant que la décolonisation avait liquidé l'empire colonial. L'ambition était d'ouvrir une fenêtre sur le nouveau monde et qu'il n'y ait plus, comme auparavant avec la colonisation ... mais des rapports d'égalité et d'échange."

⁷⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10684, 26-2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 November 1966, Position française sur la francophonie.

establishment of a Ministry of Cultural Affairs and the *Office de la langue française*, as proof of Quebec's determination to serve as French Canada's political expression and to be at the forefront in promoting the *rayonnement* of francophone culture in North America.⁷¹

The trend of French thinking could be seen in the weight accorded in French circles to the notion of French Canada as a bulwark against Americanization. As early as de Gaulle's 1960 visit to Canada, Paris was cognizant of a Canadian desire to give greater official prominence to Canada's cultural duality and its links to French civilization to help differentiate and defend Canada's "personnalité" from American influences.⁷² Aware of the growing appreciation among the English-Canadian elite of the value of Canada's *fait français* as a point of differentiation from the US, the MAE affirmed that French Canada's growing influence in Ottawa and Quebec's international activities could only help Canada as a whole resist the American cultural embrace.⁷³ Members of the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee echoed this assessment in arguing that English Canada's future would be best assured by a renewed Quebec that would give Canada as a whole a distinct and original personality.⁷⁴ Similarly, French journalist Claude Julien's *Le Canada: dernière*

⁷¹ MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Levasseur, Charge d'Affaires de France, a.i., au Canada, to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 14 June 1961, Discours du Premier Ministre de la Province de Québec, Ottawa, 3 juin 1961; MAE, v. 146, Agence Générale de la province du Québec à Paris, Inauguration par M. Lesage – *Europe-Canada, Bulletin d'Information*, 14 October 1961, Inauguration de la Maison de Québec – Discours de l'Honorable M. Jean Lesage, Premier Ministre du Gouvernement de Québec; MAE, v. 87 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 15 April 1962, Fin de mission au Canada, Novembre 1955-avril 1962, Annexe V – relations culturelles franco-canadiennes.

⁷² ANF 5AG1/404 – Documentation destinée au Général de Gaulle, à l'occasion de son voyage officiel au Canada, 18-22 avril 1960.

⁷³ MAE, v. 135 – Note sur la Province de Québec, MAE, Amérique, 9 October 1961; MAE, v. 87 – Letter from Couve de Murville, MAE, to Bousquet, 22 May 1962, Instructions générales concernant votre mission.

⁷⁴ MAE, v. 101 – Rapport d'Information, MM. Bosson et Thorailleur, Députés, Assemblée Nationale, 18 March 1963

chance de l'Europe, urged English Canada to make common cause with a French Canada reacting against American cultural and economic influences, and embrace bilingualism and biculturalism as the surest protection against Americanization.⁷⁵

During Lesage's 1961 visit to Paris, de Gaulle publicly affirmed France's interest in multiplying links with Quebec, arguing a strengthened French fact in North America would benefit French Canada, Canada as a whole, and the larger international community.⁷⁶ When Pearson visited three years later, de Gaulle invoked the idea of French Canada as guarantor against Americanization, explaining to him that France's interest in French Canada's new-found dynamism derived partly from the fact that it could only assist Canada as a whole in differentiating itself from the US.⁷⁷ Two years later, the French leader told Canada's ambassador, Jules Léger, that it was in the interests both of France and Canada's linguistic communities that "vous résistiez à l'américanisation."⁷⁸

The significance Paris attached to relations with Quebec was reflected in the 1963 visit of André Malraux.⁷⁹ Ambassador Bousquet described the enthusiasm of Canada's francophone elite, who considered the visit of the famed French intellectual and "missionnaire du rayonnement français" as a spectacular recognition of Quebec's *épanouissement* and a promise of fraternal support from a revitalized France. In improvised remarks in Montreal, the French minister lauded the cultural affinities

⁷⁵ Claude Julien, *Le Canada, dernière chance de l'Europe* (Grasset, 1965), 264-265.

⁷⁶ Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981), 30.

⁷⁷ DDF, 1964, v. 1, Document 29 – Compte-Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général De Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada à Paris, 15 January 1964.

⁷⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.1 – Letter from Léger, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Cadieux, 12 July 1966, Rapport des relations franco-canadiennes multilatérales et bilatérales.

⁷⁹ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 22, Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris (1961-1962), Général – Letter from Lussier to Lapalme, 27 October 1961.

between France and French Canada, and, inviting French Canadians to face the future in cooperation with France, exclaimed:

Il n'y a pas un lieu au monde où l'énergie française se montre comme elle se montre ici ... La prochaine civilisation, nous la ferons ensemble!⁸⁰

Malraux's comments were an example of the growing references to France-Quebec cultural solidarity prompted by French interest in North America's *fait français* and concerns about American cultural power. During Pearson's 1964 visit to Paris, de Gaulle voiced France's interest in "notre peuple installé au Canada,"⁸¹ and a few months later asserted to Léger that France was present in Canada by virtue of the fact that numerous Canadians were of French blood, language, culture, and thought, and were essentially French in all areas except the question of sovereignty.⁸²

Raymond Bousquet was particularly enthusiastic about an article in *Le Devoir* by French-Canadian writer Jean-Éthier Blais that called on French Canadians to put aside their past ambivalence and forge links with France, which he described as "notre ouverture sur le monde de demain." The ambassador described the article as a dramatic public affirmation of the fact that "le Canada français participe comme tel à la grandeur et aux faiblesses de la France," noting Blais' assertion that Quebecers would not dare to have asserted themselves since 1960 had France not regained its international prestige and authority.⁸³ Similarly, the MAE's view was that French

⁸⁰ MAE, v. 101 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 21 October 1963, voyage de M. Malraux au Canada. Also, Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Fayard, 1998), 286, citing Jean-Louis Crémieux Brillhac, "André Malraux ministre délégué à la Présidence du conseil," in *Institut Charles-de-Gaulle, Actes du colloque, De Gaulle et Malraux* (Plon 1987).

⁸¹ Bergeron (1967), 20.

⁸² MAE, v. 195 – Telegram from Cl. Lebel, MAE, Services de Presse et d'Information to French Embassy, Ottawa, 2 June 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Telex from French Embassy, Ottawa, to DEA, 4 June 1964, Présentation des Lettres de Créance.

⁸³ MAE, v. 198 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 18 November 1964, Incidences canadiennes du relèvement français.

Canada's renaissance was of considerable importance to Paris, in that it could give impetus to the emergence of an association of French-speaking peoples.⁸⁴

The French believed that the 1966 election of the Johnson Government was marked by a desire to continue Quebec's official rapprochement with France. Ambassador Leduc affirmed that never had the will for France-Quebec cooperation been expressed so strongly and clearly as in Marcel Masse's public remarks on the necessity of linguistic collaboration with Paris. Conceding any effort would be a long-term one, Leduc argued Paris could nonetheless be certain that the French language and culture in Quebec could only bloom and become "plus authentiquement françaises."⁸⁵

Amid the triangular tensions in the months leading to De Gaulle's 1967 visit, René de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, the Elysée diplomatic counsellor and Quebec lobby member, told John Halstead, head of the DEA's European Division, that

[f]or the General the French Canadians are a very special case. For him they are of course Canadians in the first place but they are also former Frenchmen and for this reason the normal rules do not apply.⁸⁶

Similarly, during Johnson's 1967 trip to Paris, de Gaulle characterized France-Quebec links as proof that despite the time elapsed since the Conquest, the distance, and political obstacles, "tous les Français, d'où qu'ils viennent et où qu'ils soient, sont profondément convaincus maintenant du grand destin qui leur est commun."⁸⁷

⁸⁴ MAE, v. 328 – Note pour le Ministre, 4 June 1965, Canada (Observations sur la conjoncture).

⁸⁵ MAE, v. 278 – Letter from Picard, Consul Général de France à Québec à Son Excellence Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, 14 October 1966, Allocution de M. Marcel Masse à Joliette.

⁸⁶ DEA, A-4, v. 9568, Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), p. 12; Comeau and Fournier (2002), 27-28.

⁸⁷ MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Alphand to French Embassy, Ottawa, 29 May 1967, Visite de Johnson à Paris.

The corollary of France according higher priority to Quebec City was Ottawa's marginalization. The Gaullist worldview, with its origins in an early nineteenth century conceptualization of nation, considered Canada, with its francophone population's secondary position, a holdover from a dynastic era that had ended with the rise of national self-determination.⁸⁸ Canada's anglophone-dominated federal system was believed incapable of ensuring French-Canadian survival and *épanouissement*; what was required was a new political order founded on a true bi-national partnership, with Quebec responsible for North America's *fait français*.⁸⁹

Initially, the French sought a France-Quebec official rapprochement that did not offend Ottawa.⁹⁰ There were early signs, however, of French scepticism of Ottawa's willingness and ability to promote the *fait français*. As early as 1963, de Gaulle made clear his preference for direct France-Quebec cooperation, since Paris could not allow this "laisser noyer ... dans une affaire concernant l'ensemble des deux Canadas."⁹¹ The following year, he told Léger that while Paris would do nothing to hamper the Pearson government's bilingualism policy, that he felt it "probablement impossible à réaliser."⁹² The ambassador subsequently described French Canada as being more than a sentimental consideration for the French leader; rather, it was an integral part of the Gaullist belief in France's international cultural

⁸⁸ Anderson (1991), 83.

⁸⁹ Lescop (1981), 26-28, 48-49.

⁹⁰ MAE, v. 146 – Personal Letter from Boyer Ste-Suzanne, Consul Général de France à Montréal, to Roux, Directeur Général adjoint des Affaires Politiques au Département, 23 August 1961; MAE, v. 135 – Note sur la Province de Québec, MAE, Amérique, 9 October 1961.

⁹¹ Charles de Gaulle, "Note pour Étienne Burin des Rozières, Secrétaire Général de la Présidence de la République, 4 September 1963," in *Lettres, Notes et Carnets, volume 9, Janvier 1961-Décembre 1963* (Plon, 1986). De Gaulle wrote: "Nous pouvons développer rapports avec le Canada tel qu'il est encore. Mais nous devons, avant tout, établir une coopération particulière avec le Canada français et ne pas laisser noyer ce que nous faisons pour lui et avec lui dans une affaire concernant l'ensemble des deux Canadas."

⁹² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 4 June 1964, Présentation des Lettres de Créance.

vocation. He added that de Gaulle viewed French Canada's *épanouissement* as crucial to Canada's future and necessitating a transformation of English-Canadian attitudes, but warned of Gaullist scepticism over the validity and viability of a bi-ethnic nation.⁹³

French doubts about Ottawa's ability to protect and promote the *fait français* were reinforced by the growing France-Quebec axis. Jean-Marie Domenach, for example, expressed agreement with Quebec poet Fernand Ouellete's condemnation of bilingualism as leading not to coexistence, but to a continuous aggression of the majority language over the minority.⁹⁴ Paris took note of the Quebec Minister of Cultural Affairs, Jean-Noël Tremblay, dismissing Ottawa's bilingualism efforts given that the West, totally "Américanisée," would never accept such a policy.⁹⁵

To the Quebec lobby, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was thus mistaken in his analysis that his government's bilingualization efforts would help improve France-Canada relations.⁹⁶ For example, leading member Philippe Rossillon, rapporteur-general of the *Haut comité pour la Défense de la langue française* established in 1966 and attached to the French Prime Minister's office with a mandate to protect and promote the use of the French language, dismissed Ottawa's bilingualization efforts as a trap and attempted assimilation by stealth, arguing Canada's constitutional and

⁹³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Léger to DEA, 8 September 1965, de Gaulle et les relations franco-canadiennes.

⁹⁴ Jean-Marie Domenach, "Le Canada Français, Controverse sur un nationalisme," *Esprit* February 1965, 33(335): 296-302.

⁹⁵ MAE, v. 214, Jean-Noël Tremblay, Ministre des Affaires Culturelles du Québec, le 9-20 janvier 1968 – Note from Jurgensen for the Secrétaire-Général, 18 January 1968.

⁹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16.2 – Telex from DEA to Canadian Mission, United Nations (for SSEA and USSEA only), 4 October 1968.

demographic realities would limit the federal effort's practical impact.⁹⁷ Rossillon's criticisms were reiterated in an MAE report characterizing Ottawa's bilingualism policy as an ephemeral concession, arguing that the prospects of saving North American francophones outside Quebec were slim, so that French Canada's best hope was in a powerful Quebec that could serve as a base of support.⁹⁸ De Gaulle believed that Canada's francophone minority communities, at least those located on Quebec's borders would not suffer as a result of a sovereign Quebec, and indeed would benefit from its enhanced capacity to realize its cultural vocation. His successor, Georges Pompidou, similarly was doubtful of Ottawa's bilingualism policy.⁹⁹

French scepticism about bilingualism was linked to concerns about non-francophone immigration to Quebec, notably the tendency of new immigrants to assimilate into anglophone culture, which it was argued would strengthen the federalist political position in the debate over Quebec's *question nationale*, and in the longer term, lead to French Canada's eventual disappearance.¹⁰⁰ Raising the spectre of "étouffement démographique," de Gaulle's diplomatic counsellor Saint-Légier de la Saussaye observed ruefully to Quebec's representative in Paris, Jean Chapdelaine, that it was symptomatic of Montreal's anglophone minority's state of mind that it had imposed English as the *lingua franca* of Montreal.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ MAE, v. 331 – Note sur le Bilinguisme au Canada, 22 October 1968, Philippe Rossillon, Premier Ministre, Haut Comité pour la Défense de la Langue Française.

⁹⁸ MAE, v. 232 – Note, 25 January 1969, Questions de politique générale et linguistique.

⁹⁹ Peyrefitte (2000), 43. De Gaulle held out no long-term hope for the francophone communities that were not contiguous to Quebec. Also, Frédéric Bastien, *Relations particulières: La France face au Québec après De Gaulle* (Boréal, 1999): 33; Pierre de Menthon, *Je témoigne: Québec 1967, Chile 1973* (Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979), 16-18.

¹⁰⁰ MAE, v. 200 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 23 August 1967.

¹⁰¹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974, Letter from Chapdelaine to Morin, 5 December 1967, conférence de Presse du Général de Gaulle.

Ottawa's marginalization extended to Paris' dismissal of those French Canadians working at the federal level. Acknowledging that French Canadians had served as Prime Minister, de Gaulle described Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Louis St. Laurent as "marionette[s]" with English Canadians pulling the strings.¹⁰² The federal Minister of Manpower and Immigration (and Pearson's heir apparent), Jean Marchand, was denied an audience with de Gaulle during a 1966 visit, with Paris explaining that it did not want to create a precedent by welcoming a minister not responsible for Foreign Affairs.¹⁰³ The rebuff, however, followed the Elysée having hosted Quebec's Premier, Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs, and Montreal's Mayor, prompting Léger to express his frustration to Ottawa that the welcome reserved for Canadian ministers in Paris depended on the level of government they represented.¹⁰⁴

The Gaullist preference for Quebec was even more pronounced after July 1967. De Gaulle described Trudeau as "l'adversaire de la chose française au Canada." When Gérard Pelletier, the federal Secretary of State, visited Paris in 1969 to open an art exhibition, the Elysée chastised France's Foreign Minister, Michel Debré, for approving the visit without prior authorization, and reminding him of de Gaulle's attitude toward Ottawa, particularly federal personalities who were

¹⁰² Peyrefitte (2000), 83.

¹⁰³ DEA, A-4, v. 9568, *Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada* (undated), 12. Also, Thomson (1988), 150; Morin (1987), 46. The French position echoed that of Quebec neo-nationalists. Claude Morin recalled francophone officials in the DEA as handmaidens to the anglophone establishment, and André Patry spoke of "self-loathing French Canadians." The references were in large measure to Marcel Cadieux, the DEA's Under-secretary in the 1960s, and an avowed opponent of Quebec's efforts to establish a distinct international personality.

¹⁰⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.2 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 2 December 1966; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.2 – Memorandum from Martin for the Prime Minister, 8 December 1966, Canada and President de Gaulle.

“d’origine français et dont il pense qu’ils ne sont pas sincèrement fidèles à leurs origines.”¹⁰⁵

The most dramatic manifestation of the notion of France-Quebec ethno-cultural solidarity, and of French support for Quebec national self-determination was of course de Gaulle’s 1967 visit to Quebec. Johnson had predicted that the French leader’s visit would signal to the world that “nous existons,” making Quebecers more conscious of their unique existence and demonstrating their participation in a universal francophone culture. De Gaulle was determined to use the occasion to highlight the transatlantic cultural links between France and Quebec; English Canada, and by extension, Ottawa, was at best a distant secondary consideration.¹⁰⁶

During France’s Liberation de Gaulle felt himself “an instrument of fate”; so too now did he see himself as history’s agent.¹⁰⁷ To re-pay the historic debt of Louis XV, that is, the idea that France had abandoned the colonists of New France after the Conquest, loomed large on de Gaulle’s agenda.¹⁰⁸ Upon embarking at Brest in July 1967, de Gaulle confided to his son-in-law that it was the “last chance to rectify the

¹⁰⁵ DEA, A-4, v. 9809, 21-F-11-1979/1, MF-4153 – Canadian National Unity: Current French Attitudes and Policies, Intelligence Advisory Committee Assessment 4/79; MAE, v. 202 – Présidence de la République, Secrétaire Général, 28 March 1969, to Michel Debré; MAE, v. 202 – Letter from de Gaulle to Debré, 27 March 1969. De Gaulle’s comments were: “Je pense qu’il n’était pas opportun de recevoir M. Pelletier, Ministre du Gouvernement d’Ottawa, Gouvernement avec lequel le Gouvernement français a toutes raisons de garder de grandes distances.”

¹⁰⁶ English (1992), 340; Thomson (1988), 199; Lescop (1981), 51-54. ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9, Letter from Deniau to Patry, 23 September 1966; MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Jurgensen to Saint-Légier, Présidence de la République, Palais de l’Élysée, 13 July 1966; MAE, v. 208, Dossier Général, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Note to File, 4 March 1967, SECRET; DEA, A-4, v. 9568, Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), 109-115.

¹⁰⁷ Thomson (1988), 101.

¹⁰⁸ Bergeron (1967), 85; Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970* (Harper Collins, 1991), 450-451; Comeau and Fournier (2002), 42-43; Anne Rouanet and Pierre Rouanet, *Les trois derniers chagrins du Général de Gaulle* (Bernard Grasset, 1980), 24-31. One can not help speculating whether, given the parallels de Gaulle saw between Algeria and Quebec (see chapter 9), he was not more sensitive to Louis XV’s abandonment of the *colons* of New France.

cowardice of France.” Numerous French cabinet ministers told Léger after the visit that de Gaulle was pursuing a “politique de remords” to “redress centuries of injustice on the part of France regarding New France,” an historic duty to aid Quebec.¹⁰⁹ The French leader also appeared mindful of his personal place in history, telling Jean-Daniel Jurgensen during the return flight to Paris that had he not acted as he had “Je n’aurais plus été de Gaulle.”¹¹⁰

De Gaulle’s triumphal visit was bathed in historical and cultural symbolism. The French President played a significant personal role in planning his voyage. His arrival recalled the route taken by the French explorers and colonists of past centuries and the visit of *La Capricieuse* in the 1850s, arriving in Quebec City on the naval cruiser *Colbert*, named for the French minister who had played a pivotal role in the development of New France. Triumphal arches and flags abounded along the *Chemin du roy*, as did the blue *fleur de lys* painted at two meter intervals on the pavement. A public holiday was declared, and buses were arranged to transport the population to the spectacle, all designed to bring them into communion with the French leader at the villages along the route that were designated to represent the various regions of France.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter to Cadieux from Léger, 28 September 1967; Lescop (1981), 16.

¹¹⁰ Rouanet and Rouanet (1980), 27.

¹¹¹ Thomson (1988), 197; Comeau and Fournier (2002), 51; Rouanet and Rouanet (1980), 103-133; Lyse Roy and Michel Hébert, “La triomphale entrée de Charles de Gaulle dans la bonne province du Québec, tenue en juillet 1967,” *Cahier du Groupe de recherches sur les entrées solennelles*, Concordia University, http://gres.concordia.ca/publications2/articles_pdf/roy.pdf, 20 July 2007. The account compares the ceremonial aspects of de Gaulle’s visit to those of receptions granted *ancien régime* monarchs. Also, ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996, Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996. In planning the trip, it was originally proposed instead of de Gaulle travelling down the *Chemin du roy*, the *Colbert* would sail up the St. Lawrence at night with bonfires of greeting along the shore. Upon reading the proposal that would prevent him the direct contact with the population he intended, de Gaulle became enraged, crumpling the document and exclaiming “torche-cul des services!” After this episode, the Elysée invited Quebec lobby member

The French leader's remarks during his stay, not least the famous speech from the City Hall of "la ville Montréal française" were replete with references to France-Quebec cultural solidarity, going so far as to intimate that French Canadians were members of a transatlantic French nation co-operating to counter American cultural power and promote the *fait français* in North America and the rest of the world.¹¹² A DEA post-mortem observed that de Gaulle had been addressing not only French Canada but the population of France throughout the visit, advocating repeatedly the defence of the French language and civilization against the pressures of Americanization, and promoting the idea that France and Quebec, both in a period of renewal, should join in a common effort to this end.¹¹³ On the last day of the visit, while acknowledging the differing circumstances of the French of France and those of Canada, de Gaulle publicly affirmed:

Votre œuvre et celle des Français de France ce sont deux œuvres qui conjuguées. Ce sont deux œuvres liées, ce sont des œuvres qui procèdent de la même inspiration, ce sont des œuvres françaises.¹¹⁴

Edgar Faure, the French Minister of Agriculture, confirmed to Léger that de Gaulle's actions had been motivated by a belief that France's population had to be made aware of the Quebec example. Similarly, Georges Gorse, the Minister of Information, emphasized that a primary motivation of de Gaulle's behaviour was a preoccupation with challenging American hegemony, believing it essential to

Bernard Dorin, by virtue of his having served in the Ottawa Embassy, to collaborate closely in the preparations.

¹¹² Lescop (1981), 154-173.

¹¹³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 14 August 1967 – General de Gaulle's Visit to Canada: An Analysis.

¹¹⁴ Lescop (1981), 170-173.

strengthen and facilitate the development of Quebec and its francophone personality in order to help it resist Americanization.¹¹⁵

De Gaulle wrote Johnson in the wake of the visit, urging a re-doubling of cooperation efforts “[p]our notre communauté française.”¹¹⁶ The letter followed the account of the French leader’s visit sent to all of Paris’ diplomatic posts that cited the rapturous welcome the French leader had received, including the crowds singing *La Marseillaise*.¹¹⁷ Ottawa’s negative public reaction was ascribed to federal authorities being under pressure from “canadiens britanniques,” and the account concluded by emphasizing the importance of assisting the Johnson Government in its efforts to ensure progress for “la nation française d’Amérique du Nord,” arguing such efforts would benefit “un peuple de même origine et de même langue.”¹¹⁸ In a November 1967 press conference in which he prophesied Quebec’s independence, de Gaulle quoted words French literary figure Paul Valéry wrote days before his death:

Il ne faut pas que périsse ce qui s’est fait en tant de siècles de recherches, de malheurs et de grandeurs et qui court de si grands risques, dans une époque où domine la loi du plus grand nombre. Le fait qu’il existe un Canada français nous est un réconfort, un élément d’espoir inappréciable. Ce Canada français affirme notre présence sur le continent américain et démontre ce que peuvent être notre vitalité, notre endurance, notre valeur de travail. C’est à lui que nous devons transmettre ce que nous avons de plus précieux, notre richesse spirituelle.¹¹⁹

Yet, in his enthusiastic support of Quebec nationalism, his tendency to see French Canada as a branch of the French nation, and his preoccupation with

¹¹⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 20 September 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 22 September 1967.

¹¹⁶ ANF, 5 AG 1/199 – Letter from De Gaulle to Johnson, 8 September 1967.

¹¹⁷ Anderson (1991), 145. Anderson cites the singing of national anthems as an example of “unisonance” that contributes to a sense of nation. The singing of *La Marseillaise* during de Gaulle’s visit may thus be considered the manifestation of and appeal to an “imagined community.”

¹¹⁸ MAE, v. 210, Réactions – Telegram from de Leusse, MAE, Affaires Politiques, Telegram Circulaire à Tous Postes Diplomatiques, 28 July 1967.

¹¹⁹ Lescop (1981), 189; Black (1997), 18. In fact, de Gaulle apparently misquoted Valéry, a point the deceased writer’s son, who happened to be France’s permanent representative at UNESCO, was quick to point out with indignation to his Canadian counterpart the following day.

countering American power, de Gaulle in his analysis of Quebec tended to ignore those aspects of the Quebec identity – not least its Canadian component – that distinguished it from France. Indeed, although Daniel Johnson responded to de Gaulle’s letter confessing he had feared for the future of the French-Canadian nation in the absence of strong links between France and the rest of the francophone world,¹²⁰ the French President’s multiplying references to the “Français du Canada” caused discomfort in Quebec. After de Gaulle’s press conference, Jean Chapdelaine gently conveyed the message to André Bettencourt, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs responsible for cooperation with Quebec, and René de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye that Quebec City preferred the term “Canadien français” to “Français du Canada.” This yielded a smile from Chapdelaine’s interlocutors, who warned there was little hope of changing the language the General used.¹²¹

If Quebec nationalism had found a useful ally in its Gaullist counterpart, it was increasingly apparent that this was not without complications. Quebec’s nationalist reaction had become intertwined with that of France, making it at times difficult to distinguish between the two. De Gaulle’s 1968 New Year’s message, for example, referred to “la nation française au Canada” as part of the larger French nation that included France and its overseas territories.¹²² The French leader also intended for Johnson to attend the July 1968 Bastille Day celebrations alongside him on the reviewing stand, part of a lavish reception for the Premier’s unrealized second

¹²⁰ ANF, 5AG1/199 – Letter from Johnson to de Gaulle, 16 September 1967.

¹²¹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Morin, 5 December 1967, sujet: conférence de Presse du Général de Gaulle.

¹²² Charles de Gaulle, “Allocution radiodiffusée et télévisée prononcée au Palais de l’Elysée, 31 décembre 1967,” in *Discours et Messages, Vers le terme, janvier 1966-avril 1969* (Plon, 1970), 251.

visit.¹²³ When Johnson died in September 1968, de Gaulle expressed a desire to attend his funeral and was only dissuaded following Quebec City's expression of concern about the complications that could arise from his presence. Instead, Couve de Murville and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Jean de Lipkowski, were dispatched, and de Gaulle sent a message of condolence in which he described the event "pour tous les français, ceux de France et ceux du Canada, une perte très grande et profondément ressentie."¹²⁴ Similarly telling was that prefects throughout France were instructed to lower the French flag to half-staff on all public buildings the day of the deceased Premier's funeral.¹²⁵

De Gaulle may have been the personality who took publicly the most advanced position and actions regarding France-Quebec relations, but he was certainly not alone in advocating the idea of an ethno-cultural solidarity between "les Français vivant de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique."¹²⁶ Indeed, he may be viewed as the personification of the broader French nationalist concern about Americanization and the future of the *fait français* in France and abroad, and a desire to ensure that modernization did not come at the price of cultural distinctiveness. These factors were prominent in the Quebec lobby's efforts and in the interest of the members of the French intelligentsia in French Canada's future. This nationalist preoccupation and the Gaullist worldview combined to encourage Paris to favour the two-nation

¹²³ Thomson (1988), 277.

¹²⁴ Patry (1980), 107; MAE, v. 268 – Telegram from du Boisberranger, MAE, to French Embassy, Ottawa, 28 September 1968.

¹²⁵ ANQ, E42, 1960-01-054, v. 81, Correspondance « E » (à compter du 1^{er} juillet 68) – *Courrier de l'Ouest*, Angers, Anjou Ouest, 30 September 1968, "Drapeaux en berne aujourd'hui."

¹²⁶ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Ministres du Québec en France, 1969-1972 – *Le Devoir*, 23 January 1969, "Le toast du général."

thesis of Confederation and treat with Quebec to aid it in its efforts to maintain its “French” identity.

De Gaulle was thus a compelling figure for Quebec nationalists of all political stripes, not just because of his avowed support of Quebec, but because he represented a *France moderne* that to a Quebec experiencing its Quiet Revolution, was potentially a partner, another francophone society determined to maintain its cultural specificity as it modernized. Although disputing ideas of a transatlantic French nation, Quebec nationalists invoked ideas of ethno-cultural solidarity, not just out of a sense of euphoria over the official *retrouvailles* of the 1960s, but out of a recognition that Gaullist interests corresponded with Quebec neo-nationalist ambitions to preserve Quebec’s majority francophone culture and assert Quebec City’s responsibility for the *fait français* in North America. Jean-Guy Cardinal summed up the neo-nationalist motivations for cultivating relations with France when he claimed during his 1969 visit to Paris that in a world in which distances were shortening and cultures interpenetrating, that “Québécois, pour rester eux-mêmes” required “oxygène francophone.”¹²⁷

The community of interest between the Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist reactions increasingly clashed with a third nationalist response – that of English Canada. Quebec was not alone in its attempting to come to terms with its *americanité* – there was anxiety in English Canada about the waning of the British connection and corresponding American influence, and the challenge to national unity that an increasingly assertive Quebec represented. The result was that even as new national

¹²⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Ministres du Québec en France, 1969-1972 – Discours de Jean-Guy Cardinal au dîner du Président de la République, 22 January 1969.

symbols such as the Maple Leaf flag were adopted and there was increased appreciation of Canada's francophone population as a source of differentiation – not least from the US – there was growing federal sensitivity over the proclivity of Paris and Quebec City to treat directly with each other, and Ottawa's consequent marginalization. The internal logic of the Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist reactions in this sense dictated the frustration of the Canadian nationalist response, giving rise to triangular relations and tensions.

Chapter 9

Vive le Québec libre? Triangular Relations and the will for Independence

As triangular tensions grew in the mid-1960s, federal officials cast about for ways to give substance to Canada-France relations and assert Ottawa's primacy in foreign affairs. One proposal was to have the Governor-General, Georges Vanier, and his wife, Pauline Vanier, undertake a state visit to France. The Vaniers were in all likelihood the first Canadians that Charles de Gaulle had ever met, encountering them in London in the dark days of 1940. The Vaniers had been his stalwart supporters ever since, and saw a visit reciprocating that of the General in 1960 as the natural climax to their public career. The proposal, however, became bound up in the deteriorating Canada-France relationship and de Gaulle's opposition to Canada's constitutional status quo. Consequently, he offered to receive the Governor-General only as a close personal friend, not as Canada's head of state, since this was Elizabeth II. Despite federal protests that the Queen could not fulfill this role internationally since when traveling outside the Commonwealth she did so as Britain's head of state, the visit was not realized, angering and disappointing Ottawa and the Vaniers. Months later, during Daniel Johnson's visit to Paris, in which he was greeted with the honours owed a head of state, de Gaulle confessed to the Quebec Premier that if grateful for Vanier's dogged support of France, he had always held against him his avowed federalist and imperialist inclinations.¹

¹ DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FRA-1964/3 – Possible Visit of the Governor-General to France in 1965, 10 December 1964; MAE, v. 190 – Letter from Leduc to Durand, Chef du Service du Protocole au Département, 29 March 1966; Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 30, 70-80, 170-175; Paul Gros d'Aillon, *Daniel Johnson, L'égalité avant l'indépendance* (Stanké, 1979), 151.

The episode was symptomatic of a broader dynamic, examined in this chapter, of how the debate over Quebec's political future had contributed to the emergence of triangular relations and tensions. Aware of the changes in Quebec after 1945, Paris maintained a discreet attitude supportive of Canada's federal reality. In the early 1960s, however, French attitudes began shifting toward a more overtly 'two nations' approach, predicated on a belief that Quebec's *épanouissement* necessitated fundamental change of the Canadian constitutional order, ranging from a renewed federalism to Quebec's independence. The neo-nationalist push for increased autonomy met an enthusiastic response in French circles, arising from the Gaullist preoccupation with national independence that France's experience with decolonization reinforced. Consistent with the belief that a new political status for Quebec was an historic inevitability, de Gaulle's 1967 visit was meant as a *coup de pouce* – a boost – to the Quebec neo-nationalist cause.

There was anxiety in Ottawa over the constitutional and political consequences of the growing solidarity between the Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalism. Both clashed with a Canadian nationalism fanned by a preoccupation with maintaining Canada's independence from the US, and sensitive to anything interpreted as undermining unity and increasing Canada's vulnerability. The federal margin of manoeuvre in responding to the situation was limited, however, having to respond to French involvement in Canadian affairs in a manner that avoided fuelling Quebec separatist sentiment. In Quebec too, following the dramatic events of 1967, there were misgivings about the trend of events; while advocates of independence

For a discussion of the Vaniers' relationship with de Gaulle, see Robert Speight, *Vanier: Soldier, Diplomat and Governor General: a Biography* (Collins, 1970).

took succour from the *cri du balcon*, the Union Nationale government was anxious that French assistance be limited to increasing Quebec's stature within Canada and not precipitate independence. De Gaulle's expectations of Quebec's rapid accession to independence were dashed as a result of the differences between Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalism. The result was disappointment and confusion in Paris, which ironically found itself asking the same question as English Canada: "What does Quebec want?"

The Quiet Evolution of French Perceptions and Attitudes

Intergovernmental relations within Canada after 1945 were marked by a clash between the centralizing "new federalism" Ottawa preached, and the autonomist position of Quebec's Union Nationale government. As the scope of federal influence increased in Canadian life, the Duplessis government resisted, supported by traditional nationalists and the private sector – francophone and anglophone – and espoused an anti-statist, *laissez-faire* approach to government.² As Quebec's socio-economic transformation proceeded, however, the neo-nationalist critique of both approaches grew in strength. Neo-nationalists bemoaned Quebec's ineffectual, passive approach to autonomy and French Canada's political and economic marginalization, and called for an expanded, interventionist Quebec state to effect the fundamental reforms of Quebec society and the economy. Amid clashes between Ottawa and Quebec City over issues of taxation and the funding of post-secondary education, neo-nationalists worried that an anglophone-dominated welfare state could not be trusted with French-Canadian survival, and that the logical outcome of the new

² Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 98-99.

federalism would be a *de facto* unitary state that ignored Canada's regional and ethnic diversity. Quebec's neo-nationalists clamoured for fundamental constitutional reform to alter the federation's balance of power, preserve provincial autonomy, and make Quebec French Canada's 'foyer.' They took exception to the Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent, describing Quebec as "a province like the others" with no claim to special status.³

Neo-nationalist lobbying prompted the Duplessis Government to act on long-standing calls for a separate Quebec income tax in 1954, which led eventually to a federal-provincial agreement on taxation. Two years later, after the longstanding conflict arising from Ottawa's decision to subsidize Canada's universities, Quebec City increased funding of the province's post-secondary institutions substantially in order to assert its constitutional prerogative over education. Similarly, the jurisdictional conflict with Ottawa, the hostility of *Le Devoir* as it came under neo-nationalist editorial control, and pressure from the various Chambers of Commerce, prompted the Duplessis Government in 1953 to appoint the Tremblay Commission to investigate the province's constitutional and political relationship with the rest of Canada.⁴

Ultimately, however, the Union Nationale resisted the neo-nationalist pressures, and ignored the recommendations of the Tremblay Report. The commissioners, mindful of the threat to French Canada's survival posed by urbanization, industrialization and a domineering federal government, and sensing the implications of the growth of transnational exchanges, endorsed neo-nationalist calls

³ Behiels (1985), 22, 30, 186.

⁴ Behiels (1985), 187-199, 203-211; Kenneth McRoberts, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*, third edition (McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 79-128.

for a Quebec welfare state and constitutional reform involving a decentralization to realize the thesis that Canada was a partnership between two nations, with Quebec City, as the only majority francophone government, responsible for French Canada.⁵

Conversely, Quebec's Liberal Party seized upon the Tremblay Report and transformed its essentially conservative contents into a plan for reform that called for a renegotiation of the fiscal basis of federalism and an expanded, activist Quebec state. The Liberals thereby attracted neo-nationalist support that carried them and their new leader Jean Lesage to victory in the 1960 election. As Michael Behiels has pointed out, neo-nationalist support meant that from the outset, Lesage was under pressure to distance his party from its federal cousin, attract progressive elements, and embrace the neo-nationalist vision of reform that fused a desire for linguistic and cultural equality with the belief in the need for modernization of every aspect of Quebec society, including its relationship with the rest of Canada.⁶

France's representatives were conscious of Quebec's quiet evolution. The ambassador, Hubert Guérin, cited the relative indifference in Quebec to the death of conservative French nationalist, Charles Maurras, as indicative of the traditional nationalist order's fragility. Guérin explained that a "profonde évolution" was occurring; certain Quebec political and intellectual circles were espousing ideas radically opposed to the traditional nationalist position, and although Quebec political life had not experienced a similar evolution, the province was aligning itself socially and economically with the rest of Canada and proceeding toward greater integration with North America. Guérin expressed hope that while retaining a "certain

⁵ Behiels (1985), 199, 212-214; Jean-Marc Léger, "Conditions d'un État français dans la Confédération Canadienne," *L'Action Nationale* March-April 1954, 43(3-4): 328-350.

⁶ Behiels (1985), 257-263.

nationalisme” to maintain its language, French Canada would become more aware of its membership in the larger Canadian entity and discover a sense of solidarity with English Canada. He ascribed the elusiveness of harmonious relations between Ottawa and Quebec City largely to the fact Quebec had not redefined itself politically and psychologically to reflect its socio-economic transformation.⁷

French awareness of Quebec’s post-war transformation meant that Duplessis’ antipathy for *France moderne* was reciprocated.⁸ At the time of Université Laval’s centennial in 1952, Guérin expressed concern about France’s Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, attending the celebrations, fearing the Premier would exploit the visit to the benefit of a government Paris had “nulle raison” to support.⁹ Duplessis’ departure was welcomed as ushering in a long overdue political evolution; in the months following the Premier’s death, Guérin’s successor, Francis Lacoste, claimed that behind the apparent stability represented by the new Premier, Paul Sauvé, change was afoot and Duplessiste policies were being abandoned.¹⁰

During his 1960 visit to Canada, de Gaulle met with Sauvé’s successor, Antonio Barrette, a moderate nationalist more open to France than Duplessis, and opposition leader Jean Lesage, who was girding for the upcoming provincial election

⁷ MAE, v. 95 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, Mort de Charles Maurras, 17 December 1952; MAE, v. 127 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Amérique, 16 October 1954, La Province de Québec et le pouvoir fédéral. Guérin acknowledged there was never a nationalist movement à la France’s *Action française*; rather, there was a purely French-Canadian nationalism that drew on Maurrasian doctrine.

⁸ Characterized as embodying the beliefs of the traditional nationalist core, the Premier was described as “autocratique ... rusé, ombrageux et égocentrique.” Guérin was struck by the Premier’s assertion to him that Québec politics could be summed up as “à savoir si l’on est pour ou contre Maurice.” MAE, v. 44 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 13 February 1951, relations avec le Gouvernement provincial de Québec.

⁹ MAE, v. 176 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 29 January 1952, célébration du Centenaire de l’Université Laval à Québec.

¹⁰ MAE, v. 129 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 12 December 1959, Problèmes actuels de la Province de Québec: le legs de M. Duplessis et la recherche d’un nouvel équilibre politique.

by advocating fundamental change. Like many informed English- Canadian observers of the time, French circles hailed the Lesage Government's subsequent election as signalling the end of Duplessisist conservatism and a public appetite for Quebec to take a more assertive role in Canada and beyond.¹¹

The unfolding Quiet Revolution provoked an evolution of French attitudes regarding Quebec and its political development. French diplomats were impressed by the growing strength of Quebec nationalism, remarking that after a year in office the Lesage Government was under pressure to accelerate the pace of reform. In their view, the trend of public opinion could only encourage the Premier to adopt a tougher approach with Ottawa. They noted as well the multiplying references to "État du Québec," "principes de souveraineté," and "la nation canadienne française."¹² France's consul general in Montreal believed that Quebec's metamorphosis was becoming adventurous, and recommended Paris adopt an "état de disponibilité" that responded to Quebec's requests.¹³ The advice echoed de Gaulle's council to Raymond Bousquet, France's new ambassador. The French President emphasized the "absolue nécessité" to respond generously to the Lesage Government's requests.¹⁴ After a few months in Canada, Bousquet, cognizant of the hardening of nationalist attitudes among Quebec's political class, wondered how far Lesage was prepared to

¹¹ MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 15 March 1961, Le Gouvernement de M. Lesage et les problèmes d'éducation et de culture dans la Province de Québec; MAE, v. 87 – Letter from Couve de Murville, MAE to Bousquet, 22 May 1962, Instructions générales concernant votre mission.

¹² MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Levasseur, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 14 June 1961, Discours du Premier Ministre de la Province de Québec, Ottawa, 3 June 1961.

¹³ MAE, v. 136 – Le Consul Général de France à Montréal à Son Excellence Monsieur L'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, à Ottawa, 6 September 1962, Fin de mission.

¹⁴ MAE, v. 97 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 22 June 1962, Conversations à Québec les 14 et 15 juin, avec MM. Lapalme, Gérin-Lajoie, Frégault et Jean-Charles Felardeau.

go, citing the Premier's claim that Confederation was facing its "last chance" in responding to opposition leader Daniel Johnson's calls for a new constitution.¹⁵

French interpretations of the Quebec situation were influenced by the emergence of the modern separatist movement heralded by the stir accompanying the publication of Marcel Chaput's *Pourquoi je suis séparatiste*. Ambassador Lacoste was impressed by the speed with which the separatist idea gained so much interest and support, notably among the younger generation.¹⁶ By the autumn of 1962, the initial scepticism of France's consul general in Montreal regarding separatist strength was dispelled, averring it could not be dismissed as the expression of agitators.¹⁷ Similarly, Ambassador Bousquet was struck by the growth of *indépendantiste* sentiment, reporting at the beginning of 1963 on what he viewed as the growing strength of a "courant, désormais irréversible" leading to either total equality between Canada's linguistic groups or Quebec independence.¹⁸

The pace of change in Quebec similarly shaped French attitudes regarding Canada and its constitutional regime. During the Duplessis era, Quebec City and Paris' mutual antipathy contributed to a very correct French approach; if an internal MAE report in 1949 observed that French and English Canadians only collaborated at the minimal level required, and regarded one another jealously, it also emphasized the

¹⁵ MAE, v. 136 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 5 February 1963; MAE, v. 136 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 8 February 1963, M. Lesage et le nationalisme au Québec; MAE, v. 136 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 25 January 1963, Ouverture de la vingt-septième Législature du Québec.

¹⁶ Marcel Chaput, *Pourquoi je suis séparatiste* (Éditions du Jour, 1961); MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 10 May 1961, La province de Québec devant la Confédération canadienne: mouvements "séparatistes", progression économique et politique, considérations du point de vue français; MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 27 June 1961, Les mouvements séparatistes de la Province de Québec.

¹⁷ MAE, v. 136 – Le Consul Général de France à Montréal à Son Excellence Monsieur L'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, à Ottawa, 6 September 1962, Fin de mission.

¹⁸ MAE, v. 132 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1963, Le Canada au début de 1963, Essai du synthèse.

importance of not interfering in federal-provincial relations, especially between Ottawa and Quebec.¹⁹

Guérin nonetheless characterized Canada as a typical federation in that regardless of legal guarantees, the central government tended to dominate the sub-national governments. Paris also noted the political and economic power imbalance between French and English Canadians. The MAE reacted with concern over Vanier's claim to one of its officials that to amount to anything in Canada, French Canadians had to become entirely bilingual, permitting them to meet their anglophone citizens on the same level.²⁰ Guérin bemoaned the fact that while an increasing number of French Canadians held senior positions in Ottawa, the price of success was the repudiation of their French traditions, so that English dominated the Canadian federation more than ever. The French diplomat attributed Canada's difficulties to the *British North America Act* that set the stage for conflict between the francophone minority preoccupied with autonomy, and the anglophone majority's centralizing tendency. He also emphasized the necessity of a French Canadian like St. Laurent championing the federalist cause to ensure that Ottawa's actions did not provoke a true French-Canadian resistance, the implication being that French-Canadian leaders were hostages to English Canada, their main role in Ottawa being to ensure federal (and anglophone) ascendancy.²¹

¹⁹ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105 – Note: L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949.

²⁰ MAE, v. 43 – L'intérêt que présente le développement des relations franco-canadiens, undated [circa 1946].

²¹ MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, v. 105, Note – L'importance internationale du Canada, 10 September 1949; MAE, v. 126 – Letter from Guérin to Bidault, MAE, Amérique, 27 January 1954, du fédéralisme canadien; MAE, v. 127 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Amérique, 16 October 1954, La Province de Québec et le pouvoir fédéral.

French perceptions of Quebec and its relationship with the rest of Canada were also to an extent refracted through the prism of France's decolonization experience. The international decolonization phenomenon influenced Quebec intellectual life profoundly. Quebec intellectuals drew on the anti-colonial *tiers-mondiste* literature and examples of decolonization to re-imagine Quebec as a colony, situating it and French Canadians within a global movement of resistance and revolution.²²

The ideas and implications of decolonization quickly spilled into Quebec political discourse. The right-wing separatist organization *Alliance Laurentienne* advocated Quebec decolonization, as did the left-wing *Rassemblement pour l'indépendance Nationale* (RIN). During a 1963 press conference in Paris, the RIN's vice-president, André d'Allemagne, linked Quebec independence explicitly to the decolonization movements.²³ The very terms that became linked to the reforms initiated by the Lesage Government – 'Quiet Revolution', 'Maîtres chez nous' – evoked decolonization, and Quebec government officials referred to the international

²² Beyond leading to some of the most famous examples of anti-colonial resistance, the French Empire's disintegration gave rise to a number of foundational intellectual works on the subject, such as Pierre Stibbe's *Justice pour les Malgaches* (Éditions du Seuil, 1954); Aimé Césaire's *Discours sur le colonialisme* (Présence Africaine, 1955); Albert Memmi's *Portrait du colonisé: précédé du portrait du colonisateur* (Buchet/Chastel, 1957), and perhaps most significantly, Frantz Fanon's *Les damnés de la terre* (F. Maspero, 1961). The work of neo-nationalist historians Guy Frégault, Michel Brunet, and Maurice Séguin, positing the "decapitation thesis" of Quebec's post-1763 development were crucial to providing fertile ground upon which the ideas of decolonization fell, positing the idea of French Canadians as the victims of a transfer from one colonial authority (i.e. France) to another (i.e. Anglo-Canadian and American). For a fascinating discussion of how the idea of 'Quebec as colony' gained prominence in Quebec's intellectual and political life, see Sean Mills, *The Empire Within: Montreal, the Sixties, and the Forging of a Radical Imagination*, unpublished dissertation (Department of History, Queen's University, 2007); Magali Deleuze, *L'une et l'indépendance, 1954-1964: Les médias au Québec et la guerre d'Algérie* (Éditions Point de fuite, 2001). Works more contemporary to the events discussed include André d'Allemagne, *Le colonialisme au Québec* (Éditions R-B, 1966), and Pierre Vallières, *Nègres blancs d'Amérique: autobiographie précoce d'un "terroriste" québécois* (Parti pris, 1968).

²³ "Conférence de Presse donnée à Paris le 11 octobre 1963 par André d'Allemagne, vice-président du Rassemblement pour l'indépendance Nationale," *Québec Libre* 1963, 1(1), 1-12. For insight into d'Allemagne's thinking, see his *Le colonialisme au Québec* (Les éditions R-B, 1966).

phenomenon in explaining their actions. René Lévesque, then Quebec's Minister of Natural Resources, responded to doubts about the nationalization of *Hydro-Québec* by invoking the Egyptian example in pointing out that despite doubts to the contrary, the Egyptians had proven that they could operate the Suez Canal that Cairo nationalized.²⁴ Similarly, Lévesque declared that to be a success, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism would have to recognize that Quebec was not “une simple colonie occupée,” but one of Canada's two pillars.²⁵

France's decolonization experience meant there was a receptiveness to the decolonization discourse emanating from Quebec and a tendency to refract developments there through the prism of third world independence.²⁶ Todd Shepard has described the “invention of decolonization,” that accompanied the end of French rule in Algeria, whereby after years of fighting, there emerged across the French political spectrum a certainty that “decolonization” was a stage in the forward march of history, part of a narrative of progress that began with the revolution of 1789.²⁷ Just as nineteenth century France embraced an imperialism justified by a *mission civilisatrice* to compensate for reduced international power, so too did Gaullist France

²⁴ *The Champions*, p.1, “Unlikely Warriors” (National Film Board of Canada, 1978).

²⁵ MAE, v. 134 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 15 July 1963.

²⁶ J.F. Boshier, *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 76. He notes many Quebec lobby members had in common the fact they had some exposure with France's former colonies in Africa during the period in which nationalist pressures that culminated in independence were growing.

²⁷ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*, (Cornell University Press, 2006), 2-7, 75, 271-272. Also, Philippe Roger, *The American Enemy: A Story of French Anti-Americanism*, translated by Sharon Bowman (University of Chicago Press, 2005): 321-322, 332. There may also have been a projecting of France's relationship with the US onto Quebec; Roger describes the popularity of the ‘France as colony’ metaphor in the post-1945 period in writings from the communist Left, employed for example in George Soria's *La France deviendra-t-elle une colonie américaine?* (1948), to more centre-right elements, such as the warning against American neo-colonialism in Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's, *Le Défi américain* (1967).

embrace a *mission libératrice*, positioning itself as a champion of self-determination, decolonization, and the developing world.²⁸

While *Le Monde* and Jean-Marie Domenach cautioned in the pages of *Esprit* against making too direct a comparison between Algeria and Quebec, Jacques Berque, a Collège de France professor and decolonization scholar who taught at the Université de Montréal in 1962, did not hesitate to, affirming in *France-Observateur* in 1963 that Canada's French-speaking population was colonized. Nor did the Tunisian-born Albert Memmi, whose *Portrait du colonisé* was so influential in inculcating the idea of Quebec as colony in *indépendantiste* circles.²⁹

Amid the dénouement of the Algerian Revolution, France's representatives in Canada issued steady reports on what appeared to be a similar *Québécois prise de conscience*. The numerous references to Quebec's "émancipation" and "libération" in Bousquet's reports were no accident: he cited the international decolonization movement as the most significant factor contributing to Quebec's evolution, and argued that Quebec and French Canada's subordinate status in Confederation was increasingly untenable at a time when the colonies in Africa and Asia were achieving independence. The ambassador claimed that French Canadians' reactions were

²⁸ Robert J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 29-30; Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Fayard, 1998), 452-460, 502-503. Also, MAE, v. 136, 8.7.1 – Letter from Benoist, Consul Général de France à Montréal to Bousquet, 23 April 1963, Front de Libération de Québec. That the decolonization analogy could potentially cut both ways was revealed after the first FLQ bombings, when France's Consul General in Montreal suggested the need for a rapid and effective police action to prevent a repeat the "psychose désastreuse" that took hold in Algeria.

²⁹ Elizabeth II au Canada," *Le Monde*, 14 October 1964, 1; Jean-Marie Domenach, "Le Canada Français, Controverse sur un nationalisme," *Esprit*, February 1965, 33(335): 310; Jacques Berque, "Les révoltés du Québec," *France-Observateur* 10 October 1963, 1(2): 10-11. This work was subsequently published in the Quebec radical left journal *Parti pris* in December 1963. Also see, "Préface de Jacques Berque," in Marcel Rioux, *Les québécois* (Parti pris-Maspero, 1967), 7-16; Albert Memmi, *Portrait du colonisé, précédé du Portrait d'un colonisateur et d'une préface de Jean-Paul Sartre, suivi de Les Canadiens français sont-ils des colonisés?* (L'Étincelle, 1972), 137-146.

analogous to that of colonized peoples, even arguing they were prepared to accept a reduced standard of living if their will for independence provoked Confederation's collapse.³⁰ André Malraux, France's Minister of Culture, was struck during his 1963 visit to Quebec by the references to decolonization, and in reporting to the French Cabinet, described French Canadians' anger as having grown so large that there was now a will for them to be something other than "hommes en colère."³¹ By mid-1965, France's consul general in Quebec City concluded that while the form it would take remained unclear, Quebec's march toward its destiny was "irreversible" and it would not be stopped on its path of "progrès et de l'émancipation."³²

If to French eyes Quebec was another Algeria, Canada was another Fourth Republic: an inherently flawed political regime best discarded in favour of a new entity capable of responding to political realities. De Gaulle remarked in April 1963 to Alain Peyrefitte, his minister responsible for re-settling French Algerians, that just as France had granted self-determination to the Algerians, Canada should have to do the same for the French of Canada.³³

³⁰ MAE, v. 132 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1963, *Le Canada au début de 1963, Essai du synthèse*; MAE, v. 136 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 25 January 1963, *Ouverture de la vingt-septième Législature du Québec*; MAE, v. 174 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Service d'Information et de Presse, 1 March, 1963, *Télévision France-Canada français*; MAE, v. 132 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 28 March 1963, *Portée des élections fédérales en cours*. There was some doubt in the MAE over Bousquet's claim the Quebec population was prepared to make a material sacrifice to achieve independence. Also, *Who's Who in France*, sixth edition, 1969-1970 (Éditions Jacques Lafitte, 1969), 532. The French diplomat most supportive of the 'Quebec as colony' idea had not spent any lengthy period of time in France's colonies after the war, instead working at the MAE and as Ambassador to Belgium. His distance from the actual decolonization phenomenon while still exposed to its impact offers perhaps an insight into his readiness to accept the argument.

³¹ Alain Peyrefitte, *De Gaulle et le Québec* (Stanké, 2000), 17, 28-29.

³² MAE, v. 276 – Letter from Picard, Consul Général de France à Québec à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, 8 July 1965, *Bilan de cinq années d'expérience au Québec*.

³³ Peyrefitte (2000), 17.

There was initially a clear preoccupation in Paris with ensuring that expanding France-Quebec links not come at the price of Franco-Canadian relations³⁴; however, this was accompanied by a growing consensus that developments in Quebec necessitated change to Canada's constitutional order.³⁵ The results of the 1962 federal election confirmed a French sense of Canadian *immobilisme*. Bousquet described the Progressive Conservatives' minority win as leaving Canada politically weaker, with a government in Ottawa that had lost the confidence of Canadians at a moment demanding dynamic, imaginative leadership, and warned that Confederation's future was at risk if the Conservatives remained in power.³⁶ He reported the sense of witnessing a "fin d'un règne," welcoming the prospect as in the interest of Canadians, who faced a choice between either the independence of the "colonie anglo-saxon" that was Quebec, or achieving a productive co-existence. The ambassador acknowledged that French Canadians did not wish Confederation to end, but warned this could change if their appetite for reform went unsated.³⁷

³⁴ MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 10 May 1961, La province de Québec devant la Confédération canadienne: mouvements "séparatistes", progression, économique et politique, considérations du point de vue français; MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 27 June 1961 – Les mouvements séparatistes de la Province de Québec; MAE, v. 135 – Note sur la Province de Québec, MAE, Amérique, 9 October 1961; MAE, v. 87 – Letter from Couve de Murville, MAE, to Bousquet, 22 May 1962, Instructions générales concernant votre mission; MAE, v. 87 – Personal Letter from Bousquet to Roché, MAE, Directeur des Affaires d'Amérique, MAE, 30 August 1962.

³⁵ MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 12 December 1960, La Province de Québec sous le Gouvernement de M. Lesage; Perspectives nouvelles au Canada; Chances nouvelles pour l'action économique et culturelle de la France; MAE, v. 97 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 1 June 1962, Voyage à Toronto.

³⁶ MAE, v. 87 – Personal Letter from Bousquet to Roché, MAE, Amérique, MAE, 30 August 1962; MAE, v. 132 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 19 January 1963; MAE, v. 136 – Letter from Bousquet, to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 25 January 1963, Indépendance du Québec au sein d'une Confédération canadienne.

³⁷ MAE, v. 132 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1963, Le Canada au début de 1963, Essai du synthèse; MAE, v. 136 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 5 February 1963; MAE, v. 136 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 18 June 1963, Québec et Confédération, 1963, année de la croisée des chemins!; MAE, v.

French hope shifted to Lester Pearson and the Liberals to accomplish the fundamental change to accommodate the new Quebec reality. The Liberal leader's December 1962 calls in parliament for a "co-souveraineté politique, économique et culturelle nationale des francophones," and his claim that Canada's future would be determined by English Canada's response to its francophone counterpart's desire for equality, fuelled Bousquet's expectation that Pearson, who had indicated in the days before he became prime minister that he considered national unity the most crucial issue of the day, would deliver wholesale reform.³⁸ The French diplomat characterized the 1963 election as the most important in Canadian history and as the country's last chance, warning that whoever was elected would have to co-operate closely with the Lesage Liberals and enact a truly bi-national confederation, or risk Canada's collapse.³⁹ The subsequent Liberal victory was welcomed in French circles, with the MAE considering that the strong Quebec contingent on the government benches – including a record number of francophones in the cabinet, offered the best case scenario for francophone equality.⁴⁰

The high French hopes notwithstanding, the Pearson Government had to contend with the increasing assertiveness of Quebec neo-nationalism, which

132 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 28 March 1963, *Portée des élections fédérales en cours*.

³⁸ MAE, v. 137 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 23 December 1963, M. Pearson; MAE, v. 132 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 3 January 1963, *Discours au parlement de M. Pearson: Bilinguisme et biculturalisme au Canada*; MAE, v. 134 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 22 August 1963, *Bilinguisme dans l'Administration canadienne*. Also, John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 259, 278.

³⁹ MAE, v. 132 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 28 March 1963, *Portée des élections fédérales en cours*. This assessment was greeted with scepticism by an unknown official in the MAE, who observed that such dire predictions had been made for decades.

⁴⁰ MAE, v. 133 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 24 April 1963, *Programme intérieur du nouveau Gouvernement libéral*; MAE, v. 136 – Note: *La Province de Québec*, 7 May 1963. Also, English (1992), 267.

reinforced the belief in French circles that Quebec was accelerating toward a new (if as yet unclear) political status. André Malraux claimed that the enthusiasm with which he was received in 1963 was not “tout à fait naturel,” and that the idea of “autonomisme” was much stronger than Paris had previously thought, suffusing Quebec’s political life and widespread among the general French-Canadian population.⁴¹ René Lévesque’s condemnation of the constitutional status quo in which he referred to the possibility of separation attracted French attention, as did a conversation Bousquet had with Montreal’s mayor, Jean Drapeau, who dismissed Pearson’s “co-operative federalism,” claiming that the real choice was between independence or, as Drapeau preferred, a bi-national confederation.⁴²

Although Pearson offered reassurances during his January 1964 visit to Paris that Canada would remain united in a manner reflecting the country’s bicultural reality, he left France’s leadership with the impression that he was not truly conscious of the implications of the Quiet Revolution, contributing to an erosion of French optimism about the Pearson Government.⁴³ French doubts about the Pearson Government’s prospects for success grew as the tensions between Ottawa and Quebec City increased over the federal spending power, Quebec participation in national social programs, and as the federal Liberal Quebec caucus’ series of scandals undermined the government’s standing in Quebec. The French impression that

⁴¹ Peyrefitte (2000), 27.

⁴² MAE, v. 259 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 5 May 1964; MAE, v. 275 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 27 April 1964, Confidences de M. Jean Drapeau, L’avenir du Québec et des Canadiens-français.

⁴³ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 31, Compte Rendu de l’Entretien entre M. Georges Pompidou et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada, à l’Hôtel Matignon, le 16 janvier 1964; MAE, v. 259 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, Une politique généreuse qui ne porte pas de fruits; MAE, v. 192 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 28 April 1964, Réunion consulaire des 9 et 10 avril 1964, Exposé de M. Bousquet sur les questions politiques. Also, Maurice Couve de Murville, “Pearson et la France,” *International Journal* 1973-1974, 29(1): 31.

Ottawa was hard-pressed to respond effectively to the acceleration of Quebec's political life was reinforced by the *Samedi de la matraque* at the time of the Queen's 1964 visit, and the bitter debate over Canada's new flag. The French believed that Pearson had reached the limits of the concessions he could offer at the very moment when Quebec political realities made it impossible for Lesage to curtail his demands.⁴⁴

The February 1965 release of the first volume of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism that claimed Canada was going through “the worst crisis in its history” confirmed the French belief that a fundamental change to the Canadian political order was on the horizon.⁴⁵ Pearson subsequently told France's new ambassador to Ottawa, François Leduc, that he wanted an “Austro-Hungarian solution” for Canada, although qualifying this short of two independent states.⁴⁶ Leduc reported on the widespread opposition in Quebec to the proposed Fulton-Favreau constitutional amending formula designed to facilitate the “patriation” of Canada's constitution as evidence of the increasingly nationalistic hue of Quebec politics.⁴⁷ The Quebec official André Patry confirmed this analysis, telling Alexis de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, de Gaulle's diplomatic counsellor, and Jean Basdevant,

⁴⁴ MAE, v. 134 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 21 November 1963, Conférence fédérale-provinciale du 25 novembre 1963; MAE, v. 275 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 6 April 1964; MAE, v. 262 – Letter from de Pampelonne, Chargé d'Affaires de France a.i. au Canada, to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 4 August 1965, Bilan de la conférence fédérale provinciale. Also, English (1992), 280-283, 350-354.

⁴⁵ MAE, v. 318 – Letter from Charles de Pampelonne, Charge d'Affaires de France a.i. au Canada, to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 3 March 1965, Le bilinguisme et la crise canadienne (le Rapport Laurendeau-Dunton). De Pampelonne expressed little shock at the report, arguing that if it had rattled Canadian opinion, the report's warning was obvious to any objective observer.

⁴⁶ MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 1 April 1965.

⁴⁷ MAE, v. 276 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 9 June 1965, Surechère nationaliste de l'opposition de Québec.

head of the MAE's Cultural Relations division, to expect significant constitutional developments in the near future given that the Fulton-Favreau formula was doomed.⁴⁸

The Liberal failure to win a majority in the 1965 federal election was interpreted in French circles as a repudiation of the Pearson government's attempts at conciliation. The lacklustre reception granted Lesage (a possible heir to Pearson) during his tour of western Canada promoting constitutional reform did little to dissuade Paris from its impression that Canada's political order was outdated and unresponsive, prompting de Gaulle to observe to Canada's ambassador to Paris, Jules Léger, in the spring of 1966 that "[v]ous êtes à un moment difficile ... Vous êtes deux entités, peut-être deux états, l'un de langue française et l'autre de langue anglaise."⁴⁹

The French leader's comment reveals that the French belief in the logic and necessity of a new political status for Quebec was endorsed at the highest levels of the French Government. De Gaulle claimed in his memoirs that his 1960 visit had revealed to him Canada's centrifugal tensions, leading him to favour a new political entity that would unite two equal anglophone and francophone states that would help them to preserve their distinctiveness and permit Canada "to obliterate the historic injustice on which it was based."⁵⁰ Following the first wave of FLQ bombings, de

⁴⁸ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9 – Letter from Patry to St. Léger de la Saussaye, Conseiller diplomatique, Palais de l'Elysée, 15 July 1965; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9 – Letter from Patry to Basdevant, 13 July 1965. Quebec rejected the Fulton-Favreau formula six months later.

⁴⁹ Peyrefitte (2000), 47; MAE, v. 262 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Politique, Deux années de Gouvernement Pearson, 5 May 1965; MAE, v. 276 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 14 October 1965, Voyage dans l'Ouest du Premier Ministre du Québec; MAE, v. 262 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 10 November 1965; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 1 April 1966, Rencontre avec Gen de Gaulle: Relations bilatérales.

⁵⁰ De Gaulle (1971), 238-242; Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier, *Le Lobby du Québec à Paris: Les Précurseurs du Général de Gaulle* (Éditions Québec-Amérique, 2002), 50-51. There is the likelihood of some post hoc rationalization in de Gaulle's memoirs. Evidence from the time does suggest that he was aware of the changes afoot in Quebec, but he returned from this visit very disappointed in the Quebec portion, annoyed at the criticism he had received for the purges that

Gaulle asked Quebec's Delegate-General in Paris, Charles Lussier, if he was "tempted by separatism."⁵¹ Later that year, during preparations for Pearson's visit to France, the French leader predicted "le Canada française, deviendra nécessairement un État, et c'est dans cette perspective que nous devons agir."⁵² Similarly, he observed to Léger during his 1964 accreditation ceremony that Canada "soit un, soit deux" was promised a brilliant future.⁵³ De Gaulle suggested to Lesage during his 1964 visit to Paris that he saw Quebec as ultimately achieving some form of independence, and reiterated this opinion to Quebec ministers Paul Gérin-Lajoie and Pierre Laporte during their visit the following year, comparing Quebec's situation in North America to that of France in Europe. De Gaulle's son Philippe has recalled his father being greatly affected by Daniel Johnson's *Égalité ou indépendance*, asking himself what assistance he could provide.⁵⁴

Jean Lesage became a casualty of evolving French attitudes, viewed increasingly as dépassé, especially after he assured de Gaulle during his 1964 visit to Paris that there was "no question" of Quebec independence, explaining that separation would harm the population's standard of living and result in servitude to foreign economic power. Lesage argued that the province's best option was to

occurred after France's liberation, and disappointed by Quebecers' ignorance of France's evolution, and their defeatist mentality.

⁵¹ Thomson (1988), 107.

⁵² DEA, A-4, v. 9809, 21-F-11-1979/1 – Canadian National Unity: Current French Attitudes and Policies, Intelligence Advisory Committee Assessment 4/79. This contrasts with the assurance de Gaulle gave Pearson during his subsequent visit that "Nous n'avons aucune intention de gêner votre existence nationale et nous considérons votre Gouvernement fédéral comme un fait. Nous ne nous mêlons pas de vos affaires." DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 30, Compte rendu de l'entretien entre le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre du Canada à l'Élysée, 16 janvier 1964.

⁵³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 4 June 1964, Présentation des Lettres de Créance.

⁵⁴ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Lesage, 3 December 1965; Philippe de Gaulle, *De Gaulle, mon père*, Entretiens avec Michel Tauriac, (Plon 2003), 362.

develop itself within a diverse Canada.⁵⁵ Leduc came away from his first visit to Quebec City as ambassador commenting that a number of the Premier's collaborators appeared freer of the past and better able to envisage the future through the prism of Quebec than of Canada.⁵⁶

Notwithstanding the evolution in French perceptions of Lesage, the surprise defeat of his government in 1966 raised questions in French minds about Quebec's political future.⁵⁷ Leduc quickly reassured Paris, however, that the Union Nationale's return did not mean that of Duplessisme, relaying Daniel Johnson's remarks to the *Société Richelieu* asserting Quebec's need to exercise its right to self-determination to ensure French-Canadian freedom. Leduc declared the task of modernizing and affirming Quebec would continue, even if the new government would be less dynamic and its efforts less spectacular. Indeed, the ambassador predicted that the Johnson Government's profound mistrust of federal authorities made a deterioration of Ottawa-Quebec City relations inevitable.⁵⁸

The growth of Paris' interest in Quebec matched the Johnson Government's increasing assertiveness. De Gaulle told the new Premier that the growing France-Quebec cooperation was only a beginning given the "brillant avenir s'ouvre au

⁵⁵ MAE, v. 205, Deuxième séjour à Paris de Monsieur Lesage, Premier Ministre du Québec, 7-11 novembre 1964 – Partial Transcript, untitled, to the Ministre de l'Information, 12 November 1964, Voyage Lesage. Also, Thomson (1988), 137.

⁵⁶ MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 8 April 1965.

⁵⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.1 – Telex from Ford, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to DEA, 23 June 1966, De Gaulle Visit.

⁵⁸ MAE, v. 277 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 3 June 1966, M. Daniel Johnson et l'indépendance québécoise; MAE, v. 277 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 6 June 1966; MAE, v. 277 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 9 June 1966, La révolution tranquilisée ou les intentions de M. Daniel Johnson; MAE, v. 199 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 25 July 1966.

Québec.”⁵⁹ He told Jean Chapdelaine, Quebec’s representative in Paris, that France could be counted on to do everything it could to assist Quebec, but that this would be much easier to accomplish once Quebec achieved new constitutional arrangements with Canada.⁶⁰ Johnson visited Paris a few months after the exchange, and in explaining the importance of de Gaulle’s planned visit to Quebec in terms of efforts to secure a new constitutional relationship with Canada, the Premier is alleged to have implored: “Mon Général, le Québec a besoin de vous. C’est maintenant ou jamais.”⁶¹

Johnson’s appeal coincided with the plea for French assistance in Gérard Bergeron’s *Le Canada-Français après deux siècles de patience*. The work described the growing discussion of independence in Quebec, and predicted that if trends continued this could be expected within fifteen years.⁶² This message was repeated by Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, head of the MAE’s *Amérique* division and a leading Quebec lobby member, who claimed that French Canada was at a turning point in its history, a view Leduc echoed in declaring at the end of June 1967 that a “certain moment de vérité” was at hand, that the only option left was Johnson’s demand for a comprehensive negotiation of the new constitution, and predicting that to be successful, the negotiations would have to be conducted bilaterally between Quebec City and Ottawa.⁶³ Emphasizing that the debate over Quebec’s political future and

⁵⁹ ANF, 5AG1/199 – Letter from De Gaulle to Johnson, 24 September 1966.

⁶⁰ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter (3) from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 14 February 1967.

⁶¹ Rouanet and Rouanet (1980), 61.

⁶² Gérard Bergeron, *Le Canada-Français après deux siècles de patience* (Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 263-266; André Fontaine, “La France et le Québec,” *Études Internationales* 1977, 8(2): 395. De Gaulle is alleged to have read this book en route to Quebec in 1967.

⁶³ MAE, v. 199 – Note from Jurgensen for Couve de Murville, 2 May 1967, *Conversations avec la Premier Ministre du Québec*; MAE, v. 279 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, *Amérique*, 30 June 1967, *Vocation internationale du Québec*. Thomson (1988), 155. Jurgensen served as the deputy director of the MAE’s *Afrique-Levant* division in the first half of the tumultuous 1950s.

the best means to preserve its francophone personality was a source of conflict as much within Quebec as it was between the province and the rest of Canada, Leduc characterized the increasingly rancorous debate as symptomatic of broader international trends, arguing that the shrinking of the globe and acceleration of ideas had provoked concern to ensure French-Canadian survival, leading its elite to strive for recognition of the French-Canadian nation's right to organize itself and be treated as an equal, and calls from the general population for equality of opportunity and an improved standard of living.⁶⁴

By 1967, the Quiet Revolution had provoked a shift of Paris' attitudes regarding Canada and Quebec from the pro-federalist position of the immediate post-war period. There was a complementarity between Quebec neo-nationalism, with its goal of greater autonomy, and Gaullist nationalism, with its preoccupation to ensure national independence, and shaped by France's decolonization experience. These nationalist responses increasingly were at odds with Canadian nationalism, determined (albeit struggling) to respond to the questions Quebec neo-nationalism was raising about Canadian unity, and sensitive to external influences perceived as complicating the situation.

De Gaulle's *coup de pousse*

It is against this background that de Gaulle's 1967 visit to Canada, or more accurately, to Quebec, should be understood. The visit was conceived in French

His sympathy for Quebec was also shaped apparently by a visit to Quebec City in 1950 when he had only been able to obtain service in English at the Château Frontenac.

⁶⁴ MAE, v. 265 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 4 January 1967; MAE, v. 278 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 11 May 1967, *Le Québec et la Confédération Canadienne*.

circles as providing a *coup de pousse* to Quebec neo-nationalism. More than a year before it took place, Jean-Daniel Jurgensen characterized the visit as “tout à fait crucial” for French Canada’s future.⁶⁵ Far from an improvisation, de Gaulle’s visit was prepared meticulously. Bernard Dorin, a Quebec lobby member involved in the preparations, has recalled the awareness and understanding in Paris that the visit was intended to assist the Quebec nationalist cause.⁶⁶ His claim is substantiated by the warning Canada’s ambassador to Washington, Edgar Ritchie, received from the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, on the eve of the French leader’s arrival. Rusk’s sources in Paris claimed “nothing de Gaulle is likely to do or say in Canada will bother Washington, but it may worry Ottawa.”⁶⁷

The Quebec-centric nature of de Gaulle’s visit was reflected in Paris’ preoccupation that it be limited to Quebec. French parliamentarian Xavier Deniau told André Patry that during a September 1966 cabinet meeting in which de Gaulle explained his policy regarding French Canada, the French leader was adamant in his desire to limit his visit to Quebec.⁶⁸ Although Ottawa was subsequently included on the itinerary, an Elysée document confirms that de Gaulle conceived of the visit as

⁶⁵ MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Jurgensen to Monsieur de Saint-Légier, Présidence de la République, Palais de l’Elysée, 13 July 1966; Charles de Gaulle, *Lettres, Notes et Carnets*, volume 11, Juillet 1966-Avril 1969, Note pour MM. Pompidou, Messmer et Couve de Murville, 12 janvier 1967; Pierre-Louis Mallen, *Vivre le Québec libre: Les secrets de De Gaulle* (Plon, 1978), 93-99; Thomson (1988), 178-182. Jurgensen’s note contradicts previous accounts such as Dale Thomson’s that suggest de Gaulle was uncertain about visiting Quebec and that the decision was taken on an ad hoc basis over the winter of 1966-1967 and after a series of “reconnaissance” missions by his ministers. In fact, it appears that as early as a year before it took place, the decision (in the MAE at least) was well-advanced, albeit with uncertainty as to whether the visit could be realized according to de Gaulle’s desire that it be axed on Quebec. The proposal that the French leader should arrive by boat resolved any lingering doubts about the trip by the beginning of 1967.

⁶⁶ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Bernard Dorin to Marcel Masse, 25 March 1966.

⁶⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v 8910, 20-FR-1-3-USA, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Washington to DEA, 21 July 1967.

⁶⁸ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9 – Letter from Deniau to Patry, 23 September 1966.

being to “French Canada” in response to the invitation of its leader, Daniel Johnson; while the French president would visit Ottawa, this was to have only a “caractère symbolique, le voyage étant centré sur le Québec.”⁶⁹

The corollary of French emphasis on Quebec was an implicit (and increasingly explicit) rejection of the Canadian status quo. The contretemps over the Vaniers’ proposed state visit to France was symptomatic of this antipathy. Similarly, when Ottawa requested a congratulatory message from de Gaulle that could be broadcast at the outset of Canada’s Centennial year, the MAE’s *Amérique* division recommended that the content be carefully weighted to ensure it marked French interest in Canada while avoiding any judgment of the *British North America Act*.⁷⁰ De Gaulle opposed any message, however, arguing France had no reason to celebrate the incorporation of “une partie du peuple français” into a British political entity that sprang from a French defeat and that had become very “précaire.”⁷¹

In responding to Vanier’s invitation to visit Canada in conjunction with Canada’s centennial and Expo 67, de Gaulle made no reference to the Centennial celebrations. It was only after Jules Léger’s concerted effort that the MAE agreed to a reference to the anniversary of Confederation in the communiqué announcing de Gaulle’s visit; moreover, the reference was only made in connection with the organization of Expo 67, rather than being cited as a reason for the visit. More telling

⁶⁹ MAE, v. 208, Dossier Général, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Note, 4 March 1967 – SECRET.

⁷⁰ MAE, v. 199 – Note from Jurgensen for the Secrétaire-Général, MAE, 9 December 1966.

⁷¹ Peyrefitte (2000), 53-54.

was the speech that the French leader was to have delivered in Ottawa deliberately avoided any reference to Confederation's centennial.⁷²

By the mid-1960s, the federal government was concerned about French interest in Quebec's political status, especially de Gaulle's, and what this portended for Canadian unity. Xavier Deniau's remarks supportive of Quebec independence during an October 1964 visit to Quebec gave pause, especially given his position as rapporteur of the National Assembly's foreign affairs commission.⁷³ Léger asserted that in both the short and long term, de Gaulle had accepted as a fact a modification of the balance of power within Canada.⁷⁴ The DEA's Under-secretary, Marcel Cadieux, was very disturbed by the account of a conversation Vanier had with the French Minister of Finance, Michel Debré, during his visit to Canada at the beginning of 1967. The Governor-General spoke "frankly" to Debré about French attitudes toward Quebec; however, the French Minister offered absolutely no response, except when Pauline Vanier urged the necessity of Paris not to forget that there existed a Canada outside of Quebec, to which Debré replied cryptically that Paris was "aware of many things."⁷⁵

Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, described de Gaulle's interest in Quebec as "intensely personal and supremely important" and a significant

⁷² DEA, A-4, v. 9568 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), 54; MAE, v. 208, Dossier Général, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Telegram from de Bartillat, MAE, Amérique, 23 June 1967; MAE, v. 209, Discours – Allocution du Président de la République à son arrivée à Ottawa, le 26 juillet; MAE, v. 209, Discours – Speech to have been delivered in Ottawa on Parliament Hill.

⁷³ Boshier (1998), 28; DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-40, p. 6 – Canada-France Relations, Comments by Pierre Joncas, Economic Division for O.G. Stoner, on a Report by Mr. Gilbert, undated [circa October 1964].

⁷⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Léger to DEA, 8 September 1965, De Gaulle et les relations franco-canadiennes.

⁷⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 2.2 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division, to the Under-secretary, 13 January 1967, Visit of Mr. Debré, Call on the Governor-General.

determinant of French policy. In early 1967, Martin opined that while France's leader was not satisfied with the "pre-1960 vintage" of the Canadian federation, he probably did not consciously intend to weaken Canada. Martin expressed concern, however, that de Gaulle's attitude could be "misunderstood" in Quebec and consciously exploited in France. He advised Pearson that Ottawa needed to be watchful regarding the "clandestine activities" of certain French nationals supportive of separatism, prompting the Prime Minister to agree to regular information exchanges with Brussels and Bern, which were similarly concerned about French actions regarding their francophone communities.⁷⁶

At the outset at least, the Embassy and Ottawa were generally agreed that a non-confrontational, quiet diplomatic response was preferable given the concern to avoid public confrontations with France that would have negative repercussions in Quebec. This approach was informed by a federal fixation on de Gaulle. Léger argued that rather than "grasping the nettle," Ottawa should wait out France's ageing leader, and in the interim maintain a bland, positive approach at the senior governmental level while defending federal interests at lower official levels.⁷⁷ Ottawa maintained a wishful belief that de Gaulle's attitude was best explained by ignorance, with Martin suggesting Pearson write him personally as he did not "fully comprehend the Canadian situation."⁷⁸ Similarly, Marcel Cadieux expressed frustration over Ottawa's apparent inability to make de Gaulle understand the

⁷⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 January 1967.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 February 1967.

potential results of his actions, and asked Léger if he could think of any French personality with sufficient influence to intercede with him.⁷⁹

Another factor contributing to Ottawa's preference for quiet diplomacy was the confidence placed in Paul Martin's working relationship with his French counterpart, Maurice Couve de Murville, for whom Martin had a great deal of admiration.⁸⁰ According to Jean Chapdelaine, however, the extent of the Martin-Couve de Murville dialogue was greatly exaggerated, his MAE contacts having told him that it consisted mainly of Martin "garde la bouche ouverte, quasi à gober des mouches, d'admiration béate, et c'est monsieur Couve de Murville qui fait le topo."⁸¹ Although France's Foreign Minister was by virtue of his cautious nature and diplomatic background not inclined to endorse the most provocative aspects of Paris' Quebec Policy, the reality was that his ability to influence events was limited arising from the primacy of the Elysée in foreign affairs and de Gaulle's personal interest.

Ottawa's last best chance to affirm its position was Martin's June 1967 visit to Paris. The External Affairs Minister opted for a cautious approach during his audience with de Gaulle, however, explaining subsequently that he could have raised Ottawa's concern that the French leader's visit not be permitted to undermine Canadian unity, but decided not to given the cordiality of the meeting and the fact the discussion focussed mainly on international questions. The dynamic, according to

⁷⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Telex from Cadieux to Léger, 23 March 1967. Also, Boshier (1998), 89-91. This qualifies the amount of credit that Boshier tends to bestow on Cadieux for his foresight regarding the "Gaullist attack."

⁸⁰ MAE, v. 204 – Letter from Bousquet to Lucet, Directeur politique, MAE, 22 November 1963.

⁸¹ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 29, Maison des Étudiants Canadiens à Paris – Letter from Chapdelaine to Morin, 27 June 1967, Maison des étudiants canadiens. Also, Boshier (1999), 122. Cadieux remained sceptical of the value of Couve de Murville's friendship.

Martin, was the same during his talks with Couve de Murville.⁸² This missed opportunity contributed to the general sense of resignation in the DEA that although de Gaulle would possibly make inopportune remarks during his visit, there was “nothing we can effectively do at this point to avoid it.”⁸³

Echoes of the *cri du balcon*

De Gaulle’s visit began propitiously enough, with the French leader declaring upon arriving in Quebec City that there could never be anything but high esteem between France and Canada “dans son ensemble.”⁸⁴ During the state dinner Daniel Johnson hosted, however, de Gaulle referred to Quebec’s right to self-determination, claiming it only natural that its population should “devenus maîtres d’eux-mêmes,” and with other Canadians embark on efforts to arrive at a new political arrangement.⁸⁵

The twin themes of self-determination and the need for a fundamental change of the Canadian political order dominated the French leader’s remarks the following day as he travelled down Quebec’s North shore. Influenced by the political history of France to which he himself had contributed, de Gaulle told Daniel Johnson during their tour that Quebec’s plan to participate in an upcoming constitutional reform conference was a waste of time since a deficient political regime could never be reformed from within. Throughout the day, Canada was not included in the list of vivats that punctuated the end of the French leader’s speeches, and the calls for

⁸² DEA, A-4, v. 9568 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), p. 65-77; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Conversations du SEAE avec le Général de Gaulle, 9 June 1967.

⁸³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 4 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division to Cadieux, 7 July 1967, General de Gaulle’s Visit.

⁸⁴ MAE, v. 209, Textes et Notes, Voyage au Général de Gaulle au Québec, Président de la République, 23-26 juillet 1967, À son arrivée à l’anse au Foulon, le 23 juillet 1967, 3.

⁸⁵ MAE, v. 209, Textes et Notes, Voyage au Général de Gaulle au Québec, Président de la République, 23-26 juillet 1967, Au dîner offert par M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, à Québec, le 23 juillet 1967, 4-5.

Quebec self-determination grew increasingly explicit, culminating in the *cri du balcon* in Montreal.⁸⁶

During the ensuing controversy, de Gaulle reaffirmed his belief in the justness of his intervention. At the luncheon Mayor Drapeau hosted, de Gaulle claimed he had been able to get to the “fond des choses” regarding French Canada’s realities, and expressed the hope that his visit had contributed to Quebec’s *élan*.⁸⁷ During the return to Paris, de Gaulle declared to Bernard Dorin that “Je leur ai gagné dix ans!”⁸⁸

Notwithstanding the roar of approval from the crowd in response to his “Vive le Québec libre!” the reaction in Quebec to the French leader’s actions was complicated, revealing that if there existed a complementarity between Gaullist and Quebec nationalism, differences also existed. *Indépendantistes* Pierre Bourgault and Gilles Grégoire were ecstatic at the boost de Gaulle had given their cause. Conversely, Jean Lesage, speaking on behalf of his divided Liberal caucus, rejected de Gaulle’s encouragement of separatism and held the Johnson Government responsible for the controversy.⁸⁹ Johnson privately expressed misgivings even before the events in Montreal, and after de Gaulle’s departure confided privately to his advisors that what had occurred in Montreal was regrettable.⁹⁰ If the Premier echoed de Gaulle’s call for French Canada’s national *épanouissement*, he intended that this

⁸⁶ Thomson (1988), 203; Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981), 154-166.

⁸⁷ Lescop (1981), 171.

⁸⁸ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Bernard Dorin to Marcel Masse, 25 March 1996.

⁸⁹ Thomson (1988), 212, 232-233.

⁹⁰ Pierre Godin, *Daniel Johnson 1964-1968, la difficile recherche de l'égalité* (Les Éditions de l'Homme, 1980), 241.

should occur within a united, reformed and confederal Canada.⁹¹ Having to manage a government divided between its moderate and more nationalist wings, Johnson sought to minimize the crisis while profiting from the opportunity. In the official government statement of 28 July regarding the visit, the Premier condemned the press attacks against de Gaulle, characterizing the French leader's remarks as courageous and lucid, and affirming that in calling for Quebec emancipation and self-determination he had endorsed the Johnson Government's positions. The Premier reiterated this interpretation in Quebec's legislature when it met days later, emphasizing his government's determination to achieve a new constitution that recognized the French-Canadian nation legally and politically and assured it the powers it required for its development.⁹²

The complexity of Quebecers' reactions to de Gaulle's proposed answer to their *question nationale* was reflected in the strong public support accorded Drapeau's luncheon speech in which he praised France's leader for his interest in and assistance to French Canadians, but reminded the General of French Canadians' attachment to a reformed Canada.⁹³ In a similar vein, René Lévesque, subsequent to his founding the *Parti Québécois*, summed up the complex Quebec reaction by

⁹¹ MAE, v. 209, Dossiers constitués pour le voyage du Général de Gaulle au Canada, 1967, Discours prononcés – Allocution de M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, Dîner Offert par le Général De Gaulle, Président de la République Française, Pavillon de la France, le mardi, 25 juillet 1967; Thomson (1988), 203; Morin (1987), 79. Johnson allegedly claimed after one of de Gaulle's speeches along the *Chemin du roy* that "If he continues like that, by the time we get to Montreal, we will have separated." After the Montreal speech, Johnson confided to his advisors: "Il va falloir penser à tout cela: on va avoir des problèmes."

⁹² Lescop (1981), 60; Thomson (1988), 234-235.

⁹³ DEA, A-4, v. 9568 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated); Thomson (1988): 212-214, 234-236. A poll taken shortly after the *cri du balcon* revealed sixty percent of respondents opposed the intervention. By 12 August, a CROP poll revealed a majority of the population now approved both the General's visit and his Montreal remarks, interpreting "Vive le Québec libre" not as an invitation to separate but rather to "enhance the measure of freedom that Quebec already possesse[d] within Canada." Drapeau's remarks were supported most strongly and Ottawa's official response considered too harsh.

suggesting that if de Gaulle had drawn unparalleled attention to Quebec and the question of its political future, he had gone a bit too far in his Montreal remarks.⁹⁴

News of the Montreal events provoked a mixture of incredulity, bemusement, and opposition in Paris. Generally, the public and press disapproved of de Gaulle's action.⁹⁵ De Gaulle was able to count on support from the Gaullist Left; a group of French politicians, the "Groupe de 29" lauded de Gaulle's actions and claimed it only right that Quebec should obtain what Algeria and the other African states had obtained from the Fifth Republic.⁹⁶ The non-Gaullist Left, however, expressed disapproval. Leading socialists Gaston Defferre, François Mitterrand, and Guy Mollet each in his turn took issue with what was characterized as interference in Canadian affairs.⁹⁷

Doubts existed even among de Gaulle's colleagues, not least members of the French Cabinet.⁹⁸ Ministers summoned to Orly airport in the pre-dawn darkness to greet the President upon his return complained openly as they waited.⁹⁹ The Minister of Transport, Louis Joxe, told Ambassador Léger he regretted the *cri du balcon*. The

⁹⁴ MAE, v. 201 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 26 April 1968, Déclarations de M. René Lévesque à New York.

⁹⁵ Fontaine (1977), 393. A poll conducted by the *Institut Français de l'opinion publique* revealed the *cri du balcon* met with the least initial public support of all of his foreign policy actions, with only eighteen per cent of respondents expressing approval, compared to forty-five percent opposed. As for press reaction, see Maurice Vaïsse, "Les réactions françaises à la visite de De Gaulle au Québec," in *Histoire des relations internationales du Québec*, Stéphane Paquin and Louise Beaudoin, eds. (VLB éditeur, 2006), 56-61; Thomson (1988), 220. The government-friendly *Le Figaro* chastised the government but gave de Gaulle the benefit of the doubt in assessing his actions. *Le Combat*, *L'Aurore* and *Le Monde* were all categorical in their criticism. Ironically, other than the Gaullist organ *Le Nation*, only the communist *L'Humanité* endorsed the French leader's actions.

⁹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – *France Soir*, 8 August 1967, "Le gauche gaulliste: De Gaulle a eu raison au Québec."

⁹⁷ Thomson (1988), 231; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 10 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 27 November 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 6 December 1967.

⁹⁸ Comeau and Fournier (2002), 60-61; Thomson (1988), 227. Thomson quotes Jean-Daniel Jurgensen's claim that "not one politician out of eight," even among Gaullists, supported de Gaulle's actions.

⁹⁹ Hervé Alphand, *L'étonnement d'être, Journal 1939-1973* (Fayard, 1977), 493.

Minister of Agriculture, Edgar Faure, who had refused to go to Orly in order to mark his disapproval, echoed a widespread view that France's leader had begun to lose his faculties.¹⁰⁰ There were certainly misgivings in the MAE about de Gaulle's actions. Maurice Couve de Murville assured Paul Martin that he and the rest of the presidential entourage were shocked by de Gaulle remarks and anxious to minimize its negative effects. Couve de Murville confided privately to Alain Peyrefitte that de Gaulle's actions in Montreal were wrong and that he needed to realize that the Quebec independence he was trying to provoke would end up in "désastre."¹⁰¹

A notable dissenter was Ambassador Leduc, who was in the impossible position of trying to keep Ottawa content while carrying out Paris' instructions. Although he agreed on the necessity of a fundamental re-ordering of the Canadian state to enhance Quebec's political status, he disagreed with de Gaulle's intervention to provoke this.¹⁰² As a result of his questioning the logic of supporting Quebec independence, Leduc fell into disfavour with the Elysée after July 1967. His *fin de mission* report praised the attention de Gaulle had drawn to the Quebec problem and the official France-Quebec rapprochement, but bemoaned the damage done to France-Canada relations.¹⁰³ The ambassador's assessment reflected a general view among

¹⁰⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 22 September 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 17 October 1967.

¹⁰¹ Thomson (1988), 210-212; Peyrefitte (2000), 65. Also, Lacouture (1991), 461. Couve de Murville's misgivings were by no means absolute; he apparently excused the General claiming: "If you had been swept up as I was in that wave of enthusiasm, you would understand better. It was unimaginable, that Chemin du roy, unimaginable."

¹⁰² MAE, v. 278 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 11 May 1967, Le Québec et la Confédération Canadienne.

¹⁰³ In discussions with Delegate-General Chapdelaine, de Gaulle revealed an annoyance with the Ambassador. ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 12 October 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Memorandum from D'Iberville Fortier, Press and Liaison Section, to USSEA, 27 March 1968; MAE, v. 189 – Letter from Leduc to Debré, MAE, Amérique, 26 June 1968, Rapport de fin de mission au Canada, 1965-1968. Also, Peyrefitte (2000), 74. On one of Leduc's despatches regarding the sense of hurt in Ottawa, de

the French political class outside the core of de Gaulle's supporters and the Quebec lobby: even if the Gaullist intervention in Montreal was opposed as an unwarranted, ill-advised provocation, there was general agreement over the need and the inevitability of change to Canada's political reality in order to accommodate Quebec aspirations for greater autonomy.

As for the federal reaction, de Gaulle's remarks provoked concern even before his arrival in Montreal. Although he rose and applauded, Paul Martin was alarmed over the French leader's comments at the Quebec City dinner that effectively endorsed the Johnson Government's constitutional position. In keeping with the federal approach to the triangular tensions, Martin nevertheless recommended Ottawa avoid creating a public issue and thereby make de Gaulle a martyr to the Quebec nationalist cause; instead, the French leader's remarks could be discussed when he reached Ottawa. Martin's rationalization was that de Gaulle had not specifically pronounced on what the result of Quebec self-determination should be, and had even referred to Quebecers finding a solution with other Canadians.¹⁰⁴

The loud roar of approval that rose from Montreal's Place Jacques-Cartier following the *cri du balcon* announced the failure of Ottawa's quiet diplomacy. Silence was no longer a viable option, especially given the backlash that could be expected from anglophone Canada. Although initially in a "hope-induced state of denial" about what had just transpired, Paul Martin quickly contacted Pearson, who was particularly offended by the French leader's comparing the atmosphere in

Gaulle commented: "[l]a question n'est pas que la blessure de M. Lester Pearson soit cicatrisée; la question est que le peuple français du Canada ait la pleine disposition de lui-même."

¹⁰⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 24 July 1967, General De Gaulle's Visit; Martin (1985), 594.

Quebec to Paris' Liberation. Both agreed that a federal protest had to be conveyed to the French even prior to an emergency cabinet meeting.¹⁰⁵ Consistent with the federal fixation on de Gaulle, and mindful of his diplomatic mission in Paris, Jules Léger counselled a prudent response that took into account the broader context of France-Canada relations. While Martin continued to favour as conciliatory approach as possible, other ministers, notably Pierre Trudeau and Jean Chrétien prevailed on Pearson to make clear that the French leader's behaviour was "unacceptable." After lengthy discussion it was agreed to include this in the official government response, along with an acknowledgement of the welcome de Gaulle had received and a rejection of the Liberation metaphor.¹⁰⁶

The French response to Pearson's public statement was swift: de Gaulle cut short his trip and returned to Paris, despite Leduc's lobbying and a last-ditch federal effort to have the Ottawa portion of the visit realized. De Gaulle gave the Cabinet an account of his actions and an official communiqué was released on July 31 claiming that the "Français canadiens" held the unanimous conviction that Canada's constitution had not assured them liberty, equality and fraternity in their own country, and that de Gaulle had sensed their will for self-determination, prompting him to give assurances that French Canada could rely on France's support.¹⁰⁷ He elucidated further on his actions in a televised address three weeks later, claiming it was

¹⁰⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Memorandum from Christoff, Press and Liaison, to D'Iberville Fortier, 28 July 1967; DEA, A-4, v. 9568 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), 79; Thomson (1988), 209-211; Lisée (1990), 73. Indicative of Martin's state of mind and continued preference for a conciliatory approach was that after hearing de Gaulle's remarks, he told his assistants that there was nothing necessarily sinister about the French leader's vivat.

¹⁰⁶ PCO, A-5-a, v. 6323, Cabinet Conclusion, 25 July 1967a – General de Gaulle; PCO, A-5-a, v. 6323, Cabinet Conclusion, 25 July 1967b – General de Gaulle.

¹⁰⁷ Lescop (1981), 174-175.

France's vocation to support the right to self-determination of all peoples as the *sine qua non* of international harmony.¹⁰⁸

Subsequent French actions were guided by a conviction Quebec was on the threshold of some form of independence, reflected in de Gaulle's claim to Johnson that

[i]l semble bien que la grande opération nationale de l'avènement du Québec, telle que vous la poursuivez, soit maintenant en bonne voie. L'apparition en pleine lumière du fait français au Canada est maintenant accomplie et dans des conditions telles que, - tout le monde le sent, - il y faut des solutions. On ne peut plus guère douter que l'évolution va conduire à un Québec disposant de lui-même à tous égards.¹⁰⁹

The French considered that the *Confederation for Tomorrow* Conference marked a significant step in the acceleration of constitutional change in Canada, with Leduc claiming that any lengthy delay on reform would give Quebec *indépendantistes* their chance.¹¹⁰ De Gaulle used his November 1967 press conference to pronounce more clearly on his vision of Quebec. Condemning Canada's federal system as a threat to French Canada's survival, he argued it essential that the question of Quebec's political future be resolved, and predicted this would entail its independence and partnering with what remained of Canada in a new association.¹¹¹ De Gaulle closed an eventful 1967 reminding French officials that "[i]l faut soutenir le Québec."¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 11 August 1967.

¹⁰⁹ ANF, 5AG1/199 – Letter from de Gaulle to Johnson, 8 September 1967.

¹¹⁰ MAE, v. 266 – Letter from Carraud, Charge d'Affaires a.i. au Canada, to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 7 December 1967, Conférence sur la Confédération de Demain; MAE, v. 266 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 2 January 1968.

¹¹¹ Lescop (1981): 185-189; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Memorandum from E.P. Black for the Ambassador; MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 1 April 1965. This message was also conveyed to American and West German diplomats, who were told Paris foresaw an "Austro-Hungarian solution" for Canada, recalling Pearson's remarks to Ambassador Leduc two years prior. The original report from Leduc on the exchange is underlined and circled in different inks,

The Gaullist analysis of Quebec's political situation appeared initially confirmed by Paris' Quebec interlocutors. Jean Chapdelaine emphasized to de Gaulle the significant impact of his visit, claiming public opinion now generally accepted that as a minimum, Quebec should be accorded special constitutional status.¹¹³ Quebec's Minister of Cultural Affairs, Jean-Noël Tremblay, told MAE official Jean-Daniel Jurgensen that he and other Quebec personalities such as Claude Morin, René Lévesque, and Marcel Masse believed that complete independence, followed by the establishment of a common market with Canada, was inevitable in a few years.¹¹⁴

The broader reality, however, was a growing disconnect between Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalism. De Gaulle's increasingly explicit prescriptions for Quebec's political future was not entirely welcomed in Quebec City, where there was growing reticence about the pace of events and the impact of French interventions. In discussions with Alain Peyrefitte during the French Minister of National Education's September 1967 visit to Quebec, Johnson revealed a sense of being overwhelmed by events and French actions, warning Peyrefitte that things were going "trop vite" and that for Quebec to move as quickly and forcefully as France's leader desired would produce a disaster. Johnson emphasized that what he desired was a strong Quebec in

suggesting the phrase was visited more than once by French officials and that Pearson's words were turned against him.

¹¹² MAE, v. 212 – Note à l'attention de M. Raimond, Directeur-Adjoint du Cabinet du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, from F. Bujon de l'Estang, Secrétariat Général, Présidence de la République, 28 December 1967, Sur le télégramme d'Ottawa No. 2040-44 du 22 décembre 1967.

¹¹³ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 12 October 1967.

¹¹⁴ MAE, v. 214, Jean-Noël Tremblay, Ministre des Affaires Culturelles du Québec, le 9-20 janvier 1968 – Note from Jurgensen for the Secrétaire Général, 18 January 1968.

a united Canada, with increased autonomy as a means to *avoid* independence, not realize it.¹¹⁵

Worried that the pace of events was escaping his control and threatening his larger goal of fundamental constitutional reform, Johnson temporized, encouraged by the concern of Quebec's business community. The dynamic was evident as early as October 1967, with the MAE noting that the Premier was moderating his public remarks.¹¹⁶ When news arrived of de Gaulle's news conference amid the constitutional talks in Toronto, Marcel Faribault, Johnson's constitutional and economic advisor, considered it a deliberate attempt to undermine the negotiations. He recommended Johnson disavow the French leader; however, faced with threats from the more nationalist Marcel Masse and Jean-Noel Tremblay that they would resign if he did so, Johnson kept his counsel.¹¹⁷

Jean Chapdelaine expressed discomfort that it was increasingly impossible to talk with French officials without it leading to a discussion of Quebec independence. He claimed that although the MAE was making an effort to avoid further confrontations, de Gaulle considered Quebec sovereignty inevitable, within or without a new confederal framework, and thus unconcerned by adverse federal reactions. The strength of Gaullist convictions were reflected in Chapdelaine's discussions in the wake of de Gaulle's news conference with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Andre Bettencourt, responsible for overseeing France-Quebec

¹¹⁵ Peyrefitte (2000), 99-101.

¹¹⁶ MAE, v. 279 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 5 October 1967.

¹¹⁷ Thomson (1988), 257-258; Paul Gros d'Aillon, *Daniel Johnson, L'égalité avant l'indépendance* (Stanké, 1979), 194-195; Stéphane Paquin, "Les relations internationales du Québec sous Johnson et Bertrand, 1966-1970," in *Histoire des relations internationales du Québec*, Stéphane Paquin and Louise Beaudoin, eds. (VLB éditeur, 2006), 53. Johnson was more forthcoming in private, claiming "[I]e vieux bonhomme est en train de me fourrer."

cooperation, and Alexis de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, when neither acknowledged Chapdelaine's discreet suggestion of Quebec reservations about the French leader's increasingly avowed support of independence. Chapdelaine suggested to Claude Morin that Johnson would have to raise the issue personally, since notwithstanding de Gaulle's stature, it was of questionable advantage to have an external authority repeatedly pronouncing on Quebec's future.¹¹⁸ Morin echoed this concern, telling Chapdelaine that while certain that French assistance would be extremely useful over the longer term, he worried about the potential short term consequences.¹¹⁹

Quebec City's reticence over French actions in the months following de Gaulle's visit was paralleled by consternation and frustration in Ottawa over its apparent impotence in responding to the Gaullist and Quebec nationalist challenges to Canada's unity. Federal options in the months after de Gaulle's visit remained circumscribed by those factors that had informed its reaction prior to July 1967: Ottawa had to strike a careful balance between responding to French interventions, but in a way that did not threaten national unity and thereby bring de Gaulle's prophecy to fruition. Allan Gotlieb, head of the DEA's Legal Division, believed Ottawa was extremely vulnerable and would have little recourse if Paris recognized Quebec as an independent state.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 30 November 1967; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Morin, 5 December 1967, conférence de Presse du Général de Gaulle; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Morin, 12 June 1968.

¹¹⁹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Letter from Morin to Chapdelaine, 15 December 1967.

¹²⁰ DEA, A-3-C, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11, ANNEX – Federal action to deal with possible French support for separatism, by A.E. Gotlieb, September 6, 1967, attached to Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Paul Martin, SSEA, November 29, 1967, Ottawa, Quebec and De Gaulle – Where do we go from here? The report weighed options that included a reference to the International Court of Justice, the breaking of diplomatic relations, the imposition of economic sanctions, and attempts to

Unsurprisingly given events, Ottawa remained fixated on the figure of de Gaulle. Initially, the DEA characterized his actions as an error, claiming that while he had reaffirmed his intention to give Quebec direct support, there were indications he was trying to return to a more ambiguous position. The subsequent French government account of the visit and de Gaulle's public explanation disabused Ottawa of this notion. A DEA analysis concluded that the French leader was "solely responsible" for the tenor of his visit, and that his initiatives revealed a conviction that Quebec independence was inevitable. Ambassador Léger echoed this analysis in suggesting that French ministers and officials were only carrying out Elysée orders.¹²¹

As a result of this analysis, the DEA continued its pragmatic, quiet diplomatic approach, believing a "business as usual" policy to be the only reasonable short-term response in the circumstance. Paul Martin succeeded in securing from Cabinet a minimal reaction to the French government communiqué; however, reflecting the faith Ottawa, and Martin especially, continued to place in Couve de Murville, the DEA conceded that the policy was practical only so long as Ottawa could count on the discreet good will of French officials, including the Foreign Minister.¹²² At the end of September, Martin had his first chance to discuss the events of the summer with his French counterpart. During a lengthy "good, frank talk," the Canadian

discredit de Gaulle (to which Pearson suggested a journalist might travel to St. Pierre and Miquelon to report on conditions there). There was even discussion regarding the need to discreetly sound out Washington regarding the possible applicability of the Monroe Doctrine.

¹²¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 6 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division, to USSEA, 1 August 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 14 August 1967 – General de Gaulle's Visit to Canada: An Analysis; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 20 September 1967.

¹²² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 6 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division, to USSEA, 1 August 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Memorandum from Gotlieb to Acting Under-secretary, 3 August 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 14 August 1967 – General de Gaulle's Visit to Canada: An Analysis; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Yalden to Léger, Personnel et confidentiel, 25 October 1967. Also, Thomson (1988), 231.

minister conveyed Ottawa's dissatisfaction and concern. Much to Martin's relief, Couve de Murville "emphasized his desire to remain friends" and offered assurances that Ottawa had nothing to worry about, characterizing "Québec libre" as a call for cultural autonomy rather than political separation. Martin challenged this interpretation given subsequent French declarations, including the Foreign Minister's own recent declaration that "le problème du Canada est une question nationale française." Martin claimed never to have seen his counterpart more defensive.¹²³

De Gaulle's news conference two months later underscored Ottawa's difficult situation. Lester Pearson interpreted de Gaulle's comments as dispelling any lingering doubts about the French President's attitude regarding Quebec and Canada.¹²⁴ The Canadian Embassy argued that any response had to be based on an understanding that maintaining Franco-Canadian relations was in Canada's interest, and that it was important to distinguish between the Elysée and France.¹²⁵ Similarly, the DEA's view was that Ottawa had to consider the impact of the federal reaction on Quebec City. Marcel Cadieux argued that de Gaulle was "not content to prophesy," but was trying to "speed up the process of Canada's disintegration"; nevertheless, the DEA official claimed that the critical front was in Quebec, not France, and that a violent federal reaction would force Johnson to indulge more radical elements.¹²⁶

¹²³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 1 September 1967. It had caused Martin "great pain" when presented with news of his counterpart's remark, made before the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs commission. Also, DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Telex from Martin, Canadian Mission, United Nations, to DEA, 26 September 1967.

¹²⁴ Black (1997), 19.

¹²⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 10 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 28 November 1967; Black (1997), 20.

¹²⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 10 – Memorandum for the Minister, 27 November 1967, Notes on General de Gaulle's Press Conference; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 10 – Memorandum from Stoner for the Acting Prime Minister, 27 November 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046,

A Cabinet debate resulted in an official position that de Gaulle was acting on his own with little domestic support, and Pearson making a firm statement in Parliament in which he disputed de Gaulle's analysis of Canada's history and political situation, describing the latest intervention as an "intolerable" attempt to undermine Canada's unity, emphasizing that Canadians would decide their country's future, and asking them to be restrained in their reactions so as to avoid playing into the hands of those who would divide them.¹²⁷

After this most recent controversy, Martin acknowledged the temptation to react, but still counselled maintaining the "business as usual" approach, arguing that the most effective way for Ottawa to contain de Gaulle was to "go to the source of the problem which is in Quebec." In a recommendation that ironically was consistent with the logic behind de Gaulle's intervention, the Minister urged that Ottawa take every step to engage moderate Quebec opinion regarding constitutional reform, including reaching an understanding, even on an interim basis, that would involve a federal shift toward Daniel Johnson's position, to buy the constitutional reform process valuable time. Martin's sense was that even if Johnson did not co-operate, Ottawa would at least have a better understanding of his intentions, and could plan more serious measures. Pearson generally agreed with Martin's assessment, but insisted on the need to take diplomatic notice, and expressed doubt as to the viability of the business as usual approach. Voicing frustration over the federal dilemma,

20-1-2-FR, p. 10 – Memorandum for the Minister, 27 November 1967, Notes on General de Gaulle's Press Conference; DEA, A-3-c, v. 11632, 30-10-FR, p. 2 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 28 November 1967, Discours du Général de Gaulle.

¹²⁷ MAE, v. 212 – Telegram from Carraud to MAE, Amérique, 28 November 1967; House of Commons, *Debates*, 2nd session, 27th parliament, 28 November 1967 (Hansard, 1967), 4774.

Pearson complained that Johnson would “try to ignore and avoid the necessity for *any* choice” between Ottawa and Paris.¹²⁸

Waiting for Quebec

Growing Canadian fears over national unity and the impact of French actions fanned Canadian nationalist flames and contributed to Pierre Trudeau’s rise to power. France’s representatives described the new Liberal leader as a partisan of the constitutional status quo in his hostility to special status for Quebec.¹²⁹ Nor did they believe that the Liberals’ subsequent majority electoral victory meant that the Johnson Government had lost popular support for its political agenda. They acknowledged, however, that the political equation had shifted in favour of those advocating the federalist option.¹³⁰

Days after his electoral victory, Trudeau told the departing Leduc of his hope that Paris would not thwart his efforts to assure French Canadians an equal place in Canada.¹³¹ He reiterated his concerns to Leduc’s successor, Pierre Siraud, expressing himself at a loss to reconcile Siraud’s assurances of French neutrality with recent events.¹³² Trudeau also had occasion to question France’s policy toward Quebec and Canada when Couve de Murville, by this time France’s Prime Minister, visited

¹²⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, pt. 11 – Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Paul Martin, SSEA, November 29, 1967, Ottawa, Quebec and De Gaulle, Where do we go from here?

¹²⁹ MAE, v. 280 – Letter from de Menthon to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 21 February 1968, L’opinion québécoise et la candidature de M. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, à la direction du parti libéral fédéral; MAE, v. 280 – Note pour Monsieur Joxe, 3 May 1968; MAE, v. 280 – Letter from Leduc to Debré, MAE, Amérique, Vues constitutionnelles de M. Trudeau, 7 June 1968.

¹³⁰ MAE, v. 280 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 26 June 1968; MAE, v. 189 – Letter from Leduc to Debré, MAE, Amérique, 26 June 1968, Rapport de fin de mission au Canada, 1965-1968.

¹³¹ MAE, v. 201 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 27 June 1968.

¹³² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16.2 – Telex from DEA to Paris, undated, France-Canada Relations: French Ambassador’s Call on PM; MAE, v. 201 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 26 September 1968.

Quebec City to attend Daniel Johnson's funeral in September 1968. Trudeau challenged the logic of Paris' actions, characterizing them as interference in Canada's affairs that taken to their logical conclusion, entailed support for Quebec separation. Couve de Murville denied France support for separatism, arguing this would lead ultimately to the assimilation of Quebec francophones. Reflecting afterward on the exchange, Trudeau expressed doubt as to his French counterpart's truthfulness, ruminating that Paris seemed unable (or unwilling) to acknowledge the contradictions and consequences of its policy.¹³³

Indeed, notwithstanding Couve de Murville's reassurances regarding Quebec separatism, and the growing reticence in certain Quebec circles over de Gaulle's calls for independence, Paris continued to believe that the province was destined to achieve some form of sovereignty. Consequently, French officials tailored their behaviour to serve this end, including favouring those Quebec elements that could bring this to fruition. As the expectations of the Gaullist worldview collided with Quebec realities, de Gaulle had grown increasingly disillusioned with Johnson. In the weeks following the *cri du balcon*, the French leader expressed his disappointment over the Premier's failure to seize the opportunity to make history that his intervention had created.¹³⁴ According to Alain Peyrefitte, de Gaulle's November 1967 press conference was designed partly to push Johnson to follow the course of action he believed inevitable.¹³⁵ Considering Lesage and Drapeau dépassé, de Gaulle perceived Johnson as at risk of suffering the same fate, describing him as a politician lacking the

¹³³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16.2 – Telex from DEA to Canadian Mission, United Nations (for SSEA and USSEA only), 4 October 1968.

¹³⁴ Peyrefitte (2000), 106-109.

¹³⁵ Thomson (1988), 277

necessary courage rather than a true statesman. The French leader railed against vested interests in Quebec who had much more of a stake in the status quo and were blocking the path to the independence he considered the logical solution to Quebec political realities.¹³⁶

The French doubted the nationalist credentials of Johnson's successor, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, who they saw as more conciliatory to Ottawa, and consequently a weaker defender of Quebec. Siraud predicted that Bertrand's timidity would ultimately result in a victory for more nationalist elements in the Union Nationale or the opposition, and Quebec's return to the path leading to sovereignty.¹³⁷ Indeed, the MAE welcomed Bertrand's decision to cancel his scheduled visit to France in late 1968, since Paris had no interest in increasing his stature. To French officials, Bertrand's decision to send the Deputy Premier and Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal, an avowed nationalist, was a serendipitous opportunity to cultivate relations with a stronger advocate for Quebec.¹³⁸

Paris' faith in the inevitability of Quebec sovereignty was reinforced when unnamed Union Nationale and Liberal sources told its diplomats that Quebec's

¹³⁶ De Menton (1979), 16-18. Indicative of Paris' view was de Menton's subsequent attributing to federal pressure the repeated delay of Johnson's ultimately unrealized second visit to France. Also, Comeau and Fournier (2002), 62-63. Bernard Dorin confirms de Gaulle's disillusionment regarding Johnson.

¹³⁷ MAE, v. 215, Voyage en France du M. Bertrand, Premier Ministre du Québec, non-réalisé – Telegram from de Menton, MAE, Amérique, 13 December 1968; MAE, v. 212, Confidential Letter from Ambassade de France au Canada, anonymous [likely Siraud] to Jurgensen, MAE, Amérique, 30 December 1968; MAE, v. 213 – Note from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 22 February 1969, Entretiens avec diverses personnalités gouvernementales du Québec.

¹³⁸ MAE, v. 215, Voyage en France du M. Bertrand, Premier Ministre du Québec, non-réalisé – Note from Jurgensen for the Minister, 23 December 1968. Also, de Menton (1979), 19; Black (1997), 77. During the Cardinal visit, de Menton gained the impression that de Gaulle no longer believed in a rapid accession of Quebec to independence, but remained persuaded that this would occur eventually.

political situation would evolve ultimately toward independence.¹³⁹ The founding of the Parti Québécois (PQ) further strengthened French convictions that Quebec was destined to realize a new political status. The resignation of François Aquin from the Quebec Liberal caucus to sit as an *indépendantiste* in the wake of de Gaulle's visit heralded a realignment of Quebec party politics and a polarization of political life over the question of Quebec's future that Paris observed with great interest.¹⁴⁰ French diplomats considered the PQ proof of an acceleration of Quebec's political life to which de Gaulle's visit had contributed. Voters now possessed a choice between federalism and independence, with the latter cause only growing in popularity.¹⁴¹ France's new Consul General in Quebec City, Pierre de Menthon, speculated that the PQ could hold the balance of power after the upcoming Quebec election, and predicted a moment of choice for Quebec. He considered the growing will for Quebec autonomy irreversible and suggestive of the choice that Quebecers would make.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ MAE, v. 202 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, 1 November 1968; MAE, v. 202 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, 1 November 1968; MAE, v. 212 – Confidential Letter from Ambassade de France au Canada, anonymous [likely Siraud] to Jurgensen, MAE, Amérique, 30 December 1968; MAE, v. 213 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 18 February 1969; MAE, v. 283 – Letter from de Menthon to Debré, MAE, Amérique, 30 April 1969, M. Mario Beaulieu; MAE, v. 213 – Exposés faits par le Consul général de France à Québec sur « l'évolution politique au Québec (mai 1968-mai 1969) » et sur « la coopération franco-québécoise » lors de la réunion consulaire qui s'est tenue à Ottawa les 9 et 10 mai 1969.

¹⁴⁰ MAE, v. 210, Réactions – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 2 August 1967; MAE, v. 279 – Letter from Picard, Consul Général de France à Québec to Leduc, Congrès de la Fédération libérale du Québec; MAE, v. 212 – Letter from Carraud, Charge d'Affaires, a.i. au Canada to Debré, MAE, Amérique, 1 August 1968.

¹⁴¹ MAE, v. 281 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 16 October 1968; MAE, v. 283 – Letter from de Menthon to Debré, 15 May 1969, Entretien avec M. Gilles Grégoire, Vice-président du Parti Québécois.

¹⁴² MAE, v. 213 – Exposés faits par le Consul général de France à Québec sur « l'évolution politique au Québec (mai 1968-mai 1969) » et sur « la coopération franco-québécoise » lors de la réunion consulaire qui s'est tenue à Ottawa les 9 et 10 mai 1969; De Menthon (1979), 32.

De Menthon's appraisal of the PQ's electoral chances proved overly optimistic to the extent the new party only took seven seats in the 1970 election; however, the PQ had attracted nearly a quarter of the popular vote. This prompted Ambassador Siraud to opine that in spite of the Bourassa Liberals' victory, Quebec still faced the ultimate question of whether its future was to be found in Confederation or some form of independence, and the need to resolve the question was increasingly apparent to a growing number of Quebecois. Similarly, the PQ's strong showing prompted Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, promoted assistant director of political affairs at the MAE, to tell a Canadian Embassy official that the federalist election win did not mean Canada's difficulties were solved.¹⁴³

Indeed, Jurgensen appeared determined to ensure that this was not the case. After the Quebec election, the MAE official made an unsolicited offer to the PQ's treasurer, Fernard Paré, telling him that France was prepared to provide the PQ with substantial financial assistance. Jurgensen's offer once again drew attention to the disconnect between Gaullism and Quebec neo-nationalism, as the suggestion of French financial assistance provoked a strongly negative reaction from René Lévesque when he was informed. The PQ leader, mindful of how it would appear if the French offer of assistance became public knowledge, and the reaction that it would provoke among federalist and francophobe elements in Quebec, resented the

¹⁴³ MAE, v. 193 – Letter and Report from Siraud, to Schumann, MAE, Amérique, 9 June 1970, de la réunion consulaire, Note, La signification des élections du 29 avril au Québec; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 27 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 16 May 1970, Relations France-Canada.

compromising position in which the offer had placed the PQ. It was made clear to Jurgensen that the French offer of assistance could not be accepted.¹⁴⁴

Jurgensen's offer notwithstanding, Paris was evolving toward a more *attentiste* position. The preceding December, France's Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, had argued that Paris was correct in its adopting a lower profile as Canada's unity crisis deepened. He argued that it meant that no one could place blame on France about the difficulties arising from the constitutional reform negotiations that were underway in Canada, notably the provincial complaints that Trudeau's intransigence was serving to encourage Quebec separatist sentiment. The new occupant of the Elysée, Georges Pompidou, agreed with Schumann's analysis, and characterized the French Embassy's report on the negotiations as evidence of the need for Paris to stand firm in maintaining its Quebec policy.¹⁴⁵

Paris was informed in the early autumn of 1970 by unnamed officials in Quebec's Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs that the Trudeau Government was exhausting the good will of the Bourassa Government, and with this, the last best chance for federalism. An MAE report to Schumann, reflecting a certain French bewilderment over political developments in Quebec, cited the fact that at least a third of Quebec francophones were *indépendantiste* and fervent PQ supporters, but that the recent Quebec *attentisme* made it difficult to predict the course of events. It therefore recommended Paris take a circumspect attitude. The report's analysis reflected an

¹⁴⁴ Pierre Duchesne, *Jacques Parizeau, Biographie, tome I, 1930-1970* (Québec-Amérique, 2001), 599-605. Duchesne cites Parizeau's confirmation of this episode. The proposed amount remains unclear, ranging from one hundred to three hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Indicative of the significance of the amounts under discussion, Lévesque had estimated the PQ would need three hundred sixty thousand to wage its 1970 campaign.

¹⁴⁵ ANF 5AG 2/1021 –Telegram from Siraud to MAE, 13 December 1969, Réactions à l'issue de la Conférence Constitutionnelle; MAE, v. 274 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 13 December 1969, réactions à l'issue de la Conférence Constitutionnelle.

underlying French expectation that Quebec would eventually achieve a new political status, but that this would not occur as rapidly as had been expected, not least by de Gaulle. In counselling circumspection, the report also reflected the misgivings in the MAE over the more provocative aspects of Paris' Quebec policy.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, the evolution of events after July 1967 revealed that de Gaulle had erred in his reading of Quebec. Although he remained convinced that Quebec would attain independence, the French leader had been forced to concede that he had misread its ripeness for this. What Gaullist nationalism prescribed, Quebec neo-nationalism was not (at least not yet) prepared to accept.

Yet, de Gaulle's actions had had an impact on French policy, and reflected the broader shift of French views of Quebec and Canada, and their linked political future. The result was a dualistic, two nation approach in the anticipation that it was not a question of if but when Quebec would achieve a new political status. The most provocative aspects of Paris' Quebec policy faded as it became apparent the *cri du balcon* had not produced the desired result. These were replaced by a more *attentiste* approach, reflective of the MAE's preference for caution, and intended to ensure that Quebec could count on Paris' support as it grappled with its *question nationale*.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ MAE, v. 218 – Note pour Monsieur le Ministre, 3 October 1970, Impressions canadiennes.

¹⁴⁷ This policy would be apparent during the October Crisis, when Paris interpreted Ottawa's hard-line response as consistent with a federalist resistance to Quebec's *épanouissement*, and the invocation of the *War Measures Act* viewed as an effort to subjugate Quebec. The result was a rather ambiguous French response that condemned FLQ actions out of a general opposition to political violence, but that also was conditioned by a concern that the reaction of Canadian and Quebec authorities, notably the former, not be permitted to interfere with Paris' interpretation of the *Québécois* interest, or to threaten the core of the Gaullist legacy of the France-Quebec special relationship. David Meren, "Les sanglots longs de la violence de l'automne: French Diplomacy Reacts to the October Crisis," *Canadian Historical Review* December 2007, 88(4): 613-644.

According to the MAE, France had provided Quebec with a number of unanticipated political trumps, and it was now up to Quebecers to play them.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ MAE, v. 218 – Note pour Monsieur le Ministre, 3 October 1970, Impressions canadiennes.

Chapter 10

Atlanticism in Conflict: The Geo-political Impetus for Triangular Relations, 1960-1967

As Canada's centennial year opened, Lester Pearson was finding his celebrated diplomatic skills taxed severely. At home, the effort to conciliate Quebec and keep it in Confederation was proving inadequate, as evidenced by the growth of *indépendantiste* strength. Abroad, Ottawa's efforts to conciliate France and keep it in NATO had proved similarly wanting, with Paris having announced its withdrawal from the alliance's integrated military command, provoking a crisis in the Atlantic framework. In this latter regard, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, recommended to Pearson that Ottawa continue its self-appointed linchpin role and strive to reconcile Paris with NATO and Washington in support of what remained of Atlantic solidarity, and to preserve the rapidly deteriorating Canada-France relationship. Pearson's rueful response that Paris was not inclined to "make it easy" to act on Martin's advice reflected Ottawa's difficult situation, caught as it was in the transatlantic acrimony between Paris and Washington.¹ The divergence between Canada and France over Atlanticism evident by the late 1950s had grown in the decade that followed, placing a further strain upon the bilateral relationship. The triangular tensions are therefore impossible to understand without situating them in their broader geo-political context, as notions of ethno-cultural solidarity and the debate over Quebec's future intersected with global events.²

¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin for Pearson, 24 January 1967.

² Edward L. Morse, *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France* (Princeton University Press, 1973), 135. Morse declares it "difficult to overestimate the bearing of geopolitical factors on French foreign policy." Donald N. Baker, "Quebec on French Minds," *Queen's Quarterly* 1978, 85(2):

As nationalist reactions to Cold War realities were increasingly manifest on both sides of the Atlantic, differences between Ottawa and Paris encouraged the France-Quebec rapprochement. The Gaullist challenge to Atlanticism was predicated on a belief that NATO had evolved from a necessary deterrent against Moscow into a vehicle for US hegemony in the West. Ottawa's view, however, was that while flawed, NATO offered the most effective means to counterbalance US power and influence Washington; consequently, Paris' efforts to achieve a strategic partnership between the US and a French-led Western Europe were feared in Ottawa as potentially forcing Canada even more into the American geo-political orbit. Ottawa thus continued its efforts to reconcile Paris to NATO and Washington, and thereby preserve the Atlanticist framework. It also hoped that closer Canada-France contacts would respond to Quebec neo-nationalist charges that Canadian foreign policy inadequately reflected Quebec's needs for closer relations with France.

Although past Canadian efforts on behalf of Atlantic solidarity had contributed positively to Canada-France relations, by the 1960s, the inherent contradictions in Ottawa's response to the Gaullist challenge fatally undermined such action. Ottawa's general aim of strengthening relations with Paris was predicated on an erroneous presumption that bilateral links could be employed to avoid disruption of the Atlantic framework. Moreover, a tension existed between the international and

250. In evaluating de Gaulle's Quebec policy, Baker suggests that it is not possible to determine whether his calculations were geo-political or ethno-cultural. Baker's is an artificial dichotomy; rather than two mutually exclusive concepts, the geo-political and ethno-cultural dimensions were mutually reinforcing. Thomson commits the same error in *Vive le Québec Libre!* in arguing anti-Americanism was not a primary motivation in explaining de Gaulle's intervention. An alternate interpretation of geo-political factors is proposed in André Fontaine, "La France et le Québec," *Études Internationales* 1977, 8(2): 393-402; however, Fontaine accords greater weight to ethno-cultural factors in his analysis, based on his questionable claim that Paris should have been *pleased* with Ottawa's opposition to UK entry into the ECM, its understanding position regarding French policy regarding NATO, and its support of détente and criticism of US actions in Vietnam.

domestic motivations underpinning Canadian efforts to cultivate relations with Paris, which created additional problems. At the same time as Ottawa was preoccupied with mitigating the Gaullist challenge to Atlanticism, it also was motivated to breathe new life into the bilateral relationship to address Quebec neo-nationalist pressures and ensure French neutrality in Canada's affairs.

The Pearson Government's efforts to develop relations with Paris – whether out of an external or domestic consideration – were suspect in Gaullist eyes. The more Paris challenged the Atlanticist framework and the more Canada-France relations deteriorated, the more Ottawa sought to forge links with Paris. Canadian efforts only fed the French conviction that Ottawa had become the servant of US interests, confirmation of Canada's drift into the American orbit. This belief encouraged Paris to pursue direct relations with Quebec, intervening in Canadian affairs partly out of a desire to provoke fundamental change in Canada's political order to bring about a sovereign Quebec, partnered with the rest of Canada in a new entity Paris believed would be better able to resist US pressures and remain a useful ally to France. While one could argue (and it was) that this approach failed to recognize that collapse of the Canadian federation could only enhance US geopolitical strength, in Gaullist eyes, the status quo was already producing this result, thereby justifying intervention.

Diverging Nationalist Responses: Gaullism versus Atlanticism

By the early 1960s, following Anglo-American rejection of de Gaulle's Directorate proposal, Washington and Paris were at loggerheads over the organization of the strategic leadership of the West. The informal tripartite talks between French,

British, and American officials that began in 1959 as the Eisenhower administration's alternative to a Directorate proved inadequate. The French leader was dissatisfied by US handling of the Berlin Crisis, believing that the new president, John F. Kennedy, had been insufficiently forceful in assuring Western Europe's defence. The question of command and control of American nuclear weapons in France further poisoned relations. NATO's adoption of the US-backed "flexible response" strategy raised the spectre to Gaullist eyes that nuclear weapons might not be used in the event of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, and confirmed de Gaulle's belief that the Atlanticist status quo, specifically military integration under NATO auspices, was prejudicial to the French national interest. Consequently, France withdrew its Mediterranean and North Atlantic fleets from NATO's integrated command, and Paris refused to integrate its domestic air defence squadrons with those of the alliance.³

Franco-American differences were best exemplified by the rival "Grand Designs" for relations between North America and Western Europe. The Kennedy White House took up the Eisenhower administration's idea of 'Atlantic Community,' hoping to end the disarray in the Western camp since the Suez Crisis and promote European integration within a framework that safeguarded preponderant US influence and avoided the emergence of an autonomous (and potentially rival) West European bloc. The clearest expression of US aims was Kennedy's July 1962 "Declaration of Interdependence" speech in which the American President endorsed the efforts

³ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Fayard, 1998), 45, 121-125. Also, MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Couve de Murville, v. 12 – Entretien des Trois Ministres des Affaires Étrangères, chez M. Herter, à Washington, 1 June 1960. Consistent with its antipathy regarding the original directorate proposal, Ottawa expressed opposition to the informal tripartite meetings when it learned of them.

toward European unity, and called for a “a concrete ... mutually beneficial partnership” between Europe and the US.⁴

What Kennedy proposed ran counter to the Gaullist position. Two months prior to Kennedy’s speech, de Gaulle publicly opposed the Atlantic Community concept as an unacceptable subordination to Washington. Viewed from Paris, the “Declaration of Interdependence” was another assertion of the benefits of US hegemony.⁵ Gaullist concerns in this regard were subsequently reinforced by the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which, combined with the Sino-Soviet split, convinced de Gaulle of the US’ strategic superiority and the end of any genuine Soviet threat. France was encouraged and able, therefore, to take a more assertive, autonomist position in transatlantic relations.⁶

The debate in NATO over the command and control over nuclear arms further encouraged this Gaullist challenge. Despite France’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, Washington’s concerns about the disruption in NATO that would result from further proliferation in the alliance, combined with an American appreciation of the British atomic contribution, ensured that US-UK nuclear cooperation remained an exceptional relationship, thereby reinforcing Paris’ perception of NATO as a vehicle for Anglo-American hegemony.⁷ French suspicions were confirmed by the December 1962 Nassau Agreement that gave the UK access to American Polaris

⁴ Jeffrey G Giauque, “Offers of Partnership or Bids for Hegemony? The Atlantic Community, 1961-1963,” *International History Review*, March 2000, 22(1): 86-94; and by the same author, *Grand Designs & Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1995-1963* (UNC Press, 2002), 98-125; Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe* (Macmillan, 1993), 248-264.

⁵ Giauque (2000), 86-94.

⁶ Alfred Grosser, *Affaires étrangères, la politique de la France, 1944-1984* (Flaammarion, 1984), 200.

⁷ John Baylis “Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship,” *Diplomatic History* Winter 2001, 25(1): 34-35.

missiles to modernize its nuclear force. The agreement also contained Washington's rejoinder to France's *force de frappe*: the Multilateral Force (MLF), an integrated European nuclear force under the NATO umbrella, making it effectively US-controlled. Paris rejected this nuclearized version of the ill-starred European Defence Community, considering it yet another attempt to re-affirm Anglo-Saxon unity and maintain US nuclear supremacy, further underscoring the necessity of the Gaullist challenge to the Atlantic status quo.⁸

De Gaulle responded with his "Europeanist" Grand Design. Freed from the distraction of decolonization following Algeria's accession to independence, the Gaullist view was that the only rational response to the new geo-political conjuncture was for an independent, French-led Western Europe to counter-balance US power. To facilitate French predominance in Western Europe, de Gaulle sought reconciliation with Bonn, culminating in the Franco-German friendship treaty of 1963 that was the French leader's riposte to Kennedy's Declaration of Interdependence speech. Additionally, de Gaulle used a January 1963 press conference to denounce London for betraying Europe by signing the Nassau Agreement, and citing this as one of his reasons for vetoing British membership in the European Common Market, claiming that to approve this would be akin to admitting a Trojan horse that would perpetuate European dependence on the US.⁹

⁸ Giaque, (2002), 115-118; Giaque (2000), 99-100; Vaïsse (1998), 154-157; Charles G. Cogan, *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France Since 1940* (Praeger, 1994), 95; Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN. De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen* (Masson, 1991), 76-77.

⁹ Vaïsse (1998), 248-262; Geir Lundestad, "*Empire*" by *Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1957* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 66.

Washington moved quickly to counter the Gaullist challenge. It pressured Bonn to include a preamble to the Franco-German Friendship Treaty which reaffirmed US-West German friendship, thereby stripping the treaty of its Europeanist *raison d'être*. Thwarted in the realization of his Grand Design, but determined to challenge preponderant US power, de Gaulle turned elsewhere: Paris recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) over American objections, and, making a virtue out of necessity, cultivated an image for France as a champion of decolonization and self-determination, developing links with the Third World to counter US influence.¹⁰

Gaullist eyes also turned to Canada where nationalist reactions were increasingly manifest. France's Ambassador in Ottawa, Francis Lacoste, saw Canada as being situated at a geo-political convergence point in terms of Cold War political, economic, and military issues.¹¹ His successor, Raymond Bousquet, equally mindful of Canada's geo-political dilemma, reported the concern expressed in the Canadian media and political circles that the Gaullist and American Grand Designs be realized in an Atlanticist framework, and that Canadians, torn between their European history and American geography were posing questions about their identity and Canada's place in the transatlantic order.¹²

The appearance of works such as James Minifie's *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey*, an excoriation of the Canada-US defence relationship and a call for

¹⁰ Lundestad (1998), 68; Vaïsse (1998), 452-460, 502-503.

¹¹ MAE, v. 87 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 15 April 1962, Fin de mission au Canada, novembre 1955-avril 1962.

¹² MAE, v. 105 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 13 July 1962, Union politique européenne et interdépendance atlantique, Réactions canadiennes.

neutrality, was indicative of the heightened nationalist sentiment of the period.¹³ John Diefenbaker, conscious of the nationalist wave that had propelled him and his government into power, and conditioned by a series of cross-border disputes, was especially sensitive to the public mood regarding the country's relationship with the US, so that Canadian foreign policy took on an increasingly nationalist hue. The election of the Kennedy administration, and the difficult personal relationship that developed between the Prime Minister and the White House's new occupant exacerbated the situation. The UK's application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) added to Diefenbaker's frustration over the increasingly lopsided "North Atlantic triangle." The Macmillan Government's decision threatened the Commonwealth tie that Diefenbaker and his party considered vital to countering US influence, and placed a strain upon Ottawa's relations with London.¹⁴

Common ground, therefore, existed between de Gaulle and Diefenbaker. Although differing over Atlanticism, both sought greater autonomy from the US and opposed British membership in the EEC. There was also a certain Gaullist aspect to Diefenbaker's dismissal of Pearsonian "quiet diplomacy" with Washington, and his assertion Canada-US defence cooperation could never entail subservience.¹⁵ French

¹³ James M. Minifie, *Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Canada's role in a revolutionary world* (McClelland and Stewart, 1960). Other nationalist works appeared throughout the decade, the most famous and influential perhaps George Grant, *Lament for a Nation* (McClelland and Stewart, 1965). Also, H.B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (University of Toronto Press, 1989), 265-266.

¹⁴ Robinson (1989), 35, 47-51, 92, 144. Among the cross-border irritants were the question of the extra-territorial application of US law related to the embargoes against the PRC and Cuba on American subsidiaries based in Canada, US import restrictions on oil, the issue of Chicago's diversion of water from Lake Michigan, and the proposed passage of a Soviet ship through the St. Lawrence Seaway.

¹⁵ André Donneur, "Les relations Franco-Canadiennes: Bilan et Perspectives," *Politique Étrangère* 1973, 38(2): 182; John G. Diefenbaker, *One Canada: Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, volume 2, Years of Achievement, 1957-1962* (Macmillan, 1976), 151; *volume 3, The Tumultuous Years* (Macmillan, 1977), 16; Grant (1965), 51, 61. The parallels were not lost on George Grant, who praised de Gaulle for recognizing NATO as an "Ogdensburg Agreement writ large" (referring to the

officials noted the deteriorating Canada-US relations in the early 1960s, especially the temporizing Canadian response during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Diefenbaker Government's procrastination in accepting the stationing of US nuclear warheads in Canadian territory.¹⁶

Paris was most impressed however, by what it considered the inefficacy of the Canadian nationalist response as represented by the Diefenbaker Government. A 1961 MAE study affirmed that Canada and the US were linked more than ever; two years later, French parliamentarians returned from a study mission warning that Canada risked being integrated into the US by virtue of geography and international events.¹⁷

The tempestuous debate in Canada over the acceptance of US nuclear warheads was emblematic of the Canada-France divergence over Atlanticism, and confirmed Gaullist beliefs that Canada was increasingly in the US geo-political orbit. The origins of the controversial episode lay in the Soviet acquisition of the hydrogen bomb and the launch of Sputnik two years later, which forced a re-assessment of NATO strategic doctrine, the stockpiling of tactical nuclear warheads for alliance forces, and the installation of medium-range missiles in Western Europe. As in

1940 Canada-US agreement that effectively continentalized North American defence) that had become a tool for US hegemony. Grant predicted, however, that Gaullism would ultimately meet the same fate as Canadian nationalism, arguing it could not withstand liberalism. De Gaulle himself may have seen the parallels; he sent Diefenbaker an autographed copy of his memoirs. DEA, A-3-c, v. 8648, 20-1-2-FR, p. 29 – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 27 October 1970.

¹⁶ MAE, v. 129 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 11 January 1961, Nationalisme canadien; MAE, v. 132 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1963, Le Canada au début de 1963, Essai du synthèse. In emphasizing Ottawa's strong neutralist sentiment, Ambassador Bousquet argued that apart from its NATO and NORAD membership, Canadian foreign policy differed little from that of the non-aligned states.

¹⁷ MAE, v. 115 – Note to File, Les États-Unis et le Canada, Fin de Mai 1961; MAE, v. 101 – Voyage de la Commission des Affaires Étrangères de l'Assemblée Nationale au Canada, septembre-octobre 1962, Rapport d'Information, MM. Bosson et Thorailleur, Députés, Assemblée Nationale, 18 March 1963.

France, the initial concern in Ottawa was over the command and control issue, namely, how to reconcile the stationing of US warheads on allied territory while respecting national sovereignty. In the late 1950s the Diefenbaker Government sent signals suggesting it would accept US warheads under some form of joint control system, including the 1958 announcement that Ottawa would acquire the American, nuclear-capable *Bomarc* missiles.¹⁸

Diefenbaker and de Gaulle discussed the warhead issue during the French leader's 1960 visit. De Gaulle was unequivocal in stating that the command and control question precluded the presence of foreign warheads in France. Consistent with Gaullist doctrine, any warheads and the circumstances of their use had to be under Paris' authority, even if there was a willingness to associate the US in some manner with this control. France's Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, repeated this position to Howard Green, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, rejecting Washington's proposed "double-key" system.¹⁹ Green's response that Ottawa could accept such an arrangement highlighted the differing Canada-France approaches to Atlanticism, and more broadly, both capitals' perception of their geo-political position in the Cold War.²⁰ Canadian acceptance of the double-key system was founded on a belief that (in theory) it prevented a US launch of Canada-based weapons without Ottawa's agreement, and in the circumstances, seemed a

¹⁸ Robinson (1989), 27-29, 86, 106. For a discussion of this controversial episode, see Knowlton Nash, *Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing across the Undefended Border* (McClelland & Stewart, 1990); Patricia I. McMahon, *The Politics of Canada's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963*, unpublished dissertation (University of Toronto, Department of History, 1999). A discussion of the French position regarding US warheads and the installation of medium-range ballistic missiles may be found in Vaïsse (1998), 126-139, 143-152.

¹⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 7045, 6956-A-40 – Report on Meeting held in Ottawa, 19 April 1960, between President De Gaulle and Members of the Canadian Cabinet.

²⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 7045, 6956-A-40 – Pierre Dupuy, Account of Conversation at Government House between Green and de Murville, 19 April 1960.

reasonable compromise of sovereignty consistent with Canadian Atlanticism and aspirations for middle power status. For Paris, however, the arrangement was an unacceptable compromise of sovereignty, as it could lead to a situation where Washington could effectively veto the use of American warheads based in France.

The warhead issue became bound up in the heightened nationalist sentiment in Canada, and the increasingly vocal disarmament movement. After more than four years of vacillation and even prevarication, not least owing to Howard Green's avowed anti-nuclear position, and following the Cuban Missile Crisis that underscored dramatically the need to resolve the issue, Diefenbaker's failure to move on what appeared a Canadian commitment to acquire warheads for the Bomarc provoked a crisis in Canada-US relations that in January 1963 culminated in the fall of his government.²¹

The ensuing election was tumultuous, a bitter contest fought largely over the twin issues of continentalism and Americanization. Tellingly for French perceptions of the strength of Canadian nationalism, it was the first election in Canadian history in which the side championing the anti-American position did not carry the day.²² Instead, the Pearson Liberals emerged victorious with a minority government. Although equally troubled over the question of acquiring US warheads, Pearson had effectively reversed his party's stated position on the warheads issue in the lead-up to the campaign, arguing the Diefenbaker Government had undertaken a commitment to

²¹ Grant (1965), 12. Grant characterized the Bomarc Crisis as "the strongest stand against satellite status that any Canadian government ever attempted." Also, John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 244; Robinson (1989), 283-311. For discussion of Canada-US relations during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Jocelyn Maynard Ghent "Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Pacific Historical Review* 1979, 48: 159-184.

²² English (1992), 191; J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Harper Collins, 1996), 127,143.

acquire nuclear warheads, and that a Liberal Government would honour the commitment as a precursor to its re-negotiating with NATO and the US a “more effective and realistic [i.e. non-nuclearized] role for Canada.”²³ Pearson’s years as External Affairs Minister had convinced him that managing relations with the US was the foremost task of Canadian foreign policy, so that although frustrated with Washington and not immune to the growing nationalist and anti-nuclear sentiment, the alliance with Washington – and more broadly NATO – remained the cornerstone of Pearsonian foreign policy.

The Pearson Government arrived in office with an Atlanticist-inspired concern to improve relations with Washington, London, and Paris. Pearson believed the Atlantic framework to which he had devoted so much of his career was the best vehicle for Canada to reconcile its national and international priorities. His disagreement with the Gaullist position was evident in his response to the Gaullist assertion that each country had a right to its national defence. In contrast, Pearson argued that NATO should be strengthened, and that the transatlantic alliance would be weakened if its members insisted on unique national defences.²⁴

The outcome of the Bomarc crisis, the Liberal reversal of policy and the ensuing electoral victory that heralded the return to power of the personality most identified with Canadian Atlanticism, reinforced French views of Canada as a US satellite. Couve de Murville subsequently ascribed the Diefenbaker Government’s election loss to the fact that its position on the warheads issue was viewed as anti-

²³ English (1992): 191, 249-250; Lester Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson*, volume 3, John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1972c), 71.

²⁴ MAE, v. 97 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, 13 April 1961.

American.²⁵ In the wake of the Liberal victory, Bousquet reported that Pearson's foremost concern in his first meeting with Kennedy was to re-establish a fruitful dialogue and cooperation as part of a larger effort to create a "new climate" with the US and UK after the strains of the Diefenbaker years.²⁶

Paris was keenly aware of the new government's Atlanticist preoccupations. According to Couve de Murville, Paris considered Pearson the incarnation of a Canadian post-war foreign policy that was idealistic and the normal reaction of a nation that did not have much experience of failures, and as a consequence held hopes that others no longer nourished. The former French foreign minister recalled that Pearson's Atlanticism and liberal internationalism were perfectly logical given the Canadian leader's preoccupations with Canada-US relations, and the fact NATO and the UN were the means by which Washington exercised its hegemony.²⁷

From Linchpin to Vise-Grip

The Pearson Government's foreign policy priorities compelled it to respond to the Gaullist challenge to Atlanticism. Ottawa was well-informed of the difficulties between Paris and Washington: de Gaulle had told Canada's ambassador, Pierre Dupuy, in 1961 that the international order was undergoing a significant evolution so that the US could no longer claim exclusive leadership of the West.²⁸ A Canadian Embassy assessment noted de Gaulle's preoccupation with establishing a balance

²⁵ Maurice Couve de Murville, *Une politique étrangère, 1958-1969* (Plon, 1971), 66.

²⁶ MAE, v. 115 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 13 May 1963.

²⁷ Maurice Couve de Murville, "Pearson et la France," *International Journal* 1973-1974, 29(1): 25-27.

²⁸ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5873, 50163-40, p. 2 – Telex from Dupuy, 17 June 1961, Audience with General De Gaulle.

between Western Europe and the US, and his opposition to “what he [saw] as a bid for United States hegemony.”²⁹

France’s alienation from NATO was viewed in the DEA as a threat to Canadian interests. Admittedly, the grand post-war dream of an Atlantic community had not been realized, and as the 1960s progressed doubts grew within the Pearson Government about the alliance, symptomatic of a broader concern about Canada-US relations and a growing interest in United Nations peacekeeping.³⁰ Ottawa feared, however, that the Gaullist challenge risked undermining not only the Western deterrent, but what remained of the European counterweight deemed essential to maintaining Canadian autonomy from Washington, and a voice in international councils. Beyond the domestic motivation to expand links with France, therefore, Ottawa was moved to cultivate bilateral relations with Paris so that it could reconcile France and NATO and preserve the Atlanticist framework.

Preoccupation with Canada’s alleged linchpin role was evident in the establishment of a DEA task force and an interdepartmental committee, both mandated to examine and recommend measures to develop Canada-France relations. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, argued it essential to develop the bilateral relationship following his conversation about Franco-American relations with the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who told him of the absence of

²⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Review of French Policy, Enclosure to Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris, December 19, 1963.

³⁰ For a discussion of the debate within the Pearson Government and the DEA regarding Canada’s policy regarding NATO and NORAD, see Greg Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies, Canada and the United States, 1963-1968* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 92-122. For an overview of Ottawa’s reactions to Gaullist foreign policy in the 1960s, Samir Saul, “Regards officiels canadiens sur la politique étrangère de la France gaullienne, 1963-1969,” *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporaines* July 2006, 54(223): 69-91.

substantive dialogue between Washington and Paris.³¹ Martin suggested to Rusk that Ottawa could assist in responding to the Gaullist challenge given “the special relationship which derived from Canada’s bilingual character and historical association with France.” Following this encounter, Martin told Bousquet that Ottawa was considering how it could help “re-activate” the Paris-Washington dialogue.³² In several conversations with his international counterparts, Martin referred repeatedly to his estimation that Canada, by virtue of its bi-cultural heritage and historic ties to France, was well-positioned to improve relations between France and NATO and Washington.³³ Martin told Britain’s Foreign Secretary that sufficient regard was not being given to de Gaulle’s “Latin sensitivity,” and that Canada was re-examining its relations with France to foster a closer cooperation and communication with Paris. Martin subsequently used the December 1964 NATO ministerial meeting to back French opposition to the MLF, provoking Washington’s ire.³⁴ For the Canadian minister, France’s strained relations with its allies presented a unique opportunity that

may well be part of [Canada’s] historical or national vocation, to serve occasionally as an interpreter or bridge between the English-speaking and the French-speaking communities of the world. This role would be added to the part which we have for many years been playing, or have tried to play for the benefit of world peace.³⁵

³¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson for Martin, 30 August 1963, Relations between France and Canada; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Washington to DEA, 9 September 1963.

³² DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-40, p. 6.1 – Memorandum from European Division to the Under-Secretary, 10 September 1963, French Ambassador’s Call on the Minister, September 9.

³³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Telex from Canadian Mission, United Nations to DEA, 3 October 1963; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Washington to DEA, 25 September 1963.

³⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Telex from Canadian Mission, United Nations to DEA, 3 October 1963; Donaghy (2002), 106.

³⁵ DEA, A-3-c, 10064, 20-1-2-1, p. 1 – Memorandum from Dumas to George, European Division, Minister’s Speech on Foreign Policy, 27 October 1965.

Ottawa's concern to develop relations with France so that it could act as a transatlantic linchpin was evident during Pearson's 1964 visit to Paris. In advance of his arrival, Bousquet informed the MAE of the Canadian leader's awe of de Gaulle, and his apprehensions for the trip regarding NATO-related issues, given their differing positions.³⁶ During the visit, de Gaulle told Pearson that Washington had become used to a leadership role that was no longer appropriate given Europe's recovery, and would have to cede its preponderant influence to a true trans-Atlantic partnership better reflecting the balance of power between Europe and the US. For his part, Pearson stressed the importance of the Atlanticist framework, and urged French understanding of US global responsibilities. He acknowledged the closeness of Canada-US relations, citing this as the reason for the high priority Ottawa assigned to maintain strong transatlantic links. Pearson explained that tensions between Europe and the US forced Ottawa into the impossible position of having to choose between the two, and that a concern to prevent this was the source of Canada's support for an Atlantic community.³⁷

Despite a positive assessment of Pearson's visit in Ottawa that prompted hopes it would lead to a healthier, more substantive bilateral relationship that would enable Canada to act as a linchpin between Paris and the rest of the NATO allies, Ottawa's efforts would ultimately fail to prevent a major disruption of the Atlanticist framework. The circle could not be squared between the Canadian aim to mitigate the differences in NATO, and Paris' determination to provoke fundamental change.

³⁶ MAE, v. 204 – Personal letter from Bousquet to Rocher [sic, Roché], 16 October 1963.

³⁷ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 29, *Compte-Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada à Paris, le 15 janvier 1964.*

What one nationalist reaction demanded, the other could not concede without renouncing itself.

Even those points on which Ottawa and Paris agreed demonstrated their divergence over Atlanticism, as was the case regarding their common opposition to the US-sponsored MLF. Whereas Paris opposed the concept because of its integrationist dimension, Ottawa had no difficulties with this aspect *per se*, so long as it had a say in the nuclear decision-making; rather, the Canadian opposition arose from the view that the proposal was ultimately unworkable and thus disruptive to NATO at a difficult moment for the Alliance. Additionally, the MLF ran counter to Ottawa's stance on nuclear proliferation.³⁸

Senior DEA officials and Bousquet had a “free-wheeling exchange” about NATO in November 1964. The French ambassador insisted that US policy was wrecking the alliance, and contended that the Germans and British, by supporting the proposed MLF, were “placing themselves in the position of American satellites,” something that Paris was unwilling to do. This drew a strong response from the DEA officers, who argued Ottawa “did not want to be in bed alone with the Americans, and ... that in a large bed occupied by countries on both sides of the Atlantic no one country need dominate the others.” Bousquet conceded that Paris preferred “an old fashioned ‘19th century’ military alliance with North America, ready in case of war, but not involving any integration of foreign ... or defence policy ... still less an

³⁸ DDF, 1963, v. 1 – Document 174, Compte Rendu, Entretien de M. Couve de Murville, avec M. Paul Martin, 21 mai 1963; MAE, v. 105 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 8 June 1963, MLF; MAE, v. 105 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 4 June 1963; DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Mémoire pour le sous-ministre, 22 May 1963, Entretien entre le Ministres des Affaires Étrangères de France et le Ministre des Affaires Extérieures du Canada, 21 May 1963. Also, Vaisse (1998), 374-377.

Atlantic Community.” The DEA officials expressed alarm at his claim and its conflict with Canadian Atlanticism, asserting Ottawa was:

inherently pro-French ... and certainly wanted to see the isolation of France ended, but at present that isolation was somewhat self-imposed and threatened to impose on [Canada] a similar isolation in North America, which would be contrary to the basic lines of Canadian policy for the past two centuries.³⁹

With Paul Martin reiterating this position in the House of Commons, the MAE understood clearly Canadian desires to maintain and strengthen NATO’s transatlantic ties, and its opposition to “North American” and “European” blocs in the Alliance.⁴⁰

The divergence was fundamental, and one understood by Canada’s Ambassador, Jules Léger, who questioned the efficacy of Ottawa’s efforts to reconcile Paris to the Atlanticist position. Léger believed that there was scant prospect of Canada (or any NATO ally) persuading Paris to adopt a less nationalist position, and suggested that it was more realistic for Canada to place less priority on Atlantic integration and seek a pragmatic solution addressing French concerns and thereby preserve NATO. The ambassador even proposed that Ottawa facilitate a modified version of de Gaulle’s 1958 Directorate proposal, noting that while it meant conceding on a point of principle, it would serve the larger Canadian interest of maintaining the transatlantic alliance.⁴¹

In addition to diverging aims, Canada-France relations were undermined by differing diplomatic styles. Léger characterized Gaullist foreign policy as concerned more with the long-term than the present, compared to that of Canada, which he described as pragmatist, incrementalist, and preoccupied with immediate challenges.

³⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 10 November 1964, Conversation with M. Bousquet, French Ambassador.

⁴⁰ MAE, v. 241 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 21 November 1964.

⁴¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10295, 27-4-NATO-3-1-FR, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 8 October 1965, France and NATO.

Pearsonian “quiet diplomacy” was clearly in stark contrast to its provocative Gaullist counterpart; Pearson sought to operate within the existing Cold War framework (especially in its corridors of power) to effect changes pragmatically and address problems as they arose, whereas de Gaulle worked very publicly to provoke fundamental change.⁴²

Beyond the incompatibility of Gaullist and Canadian nationalist aims and methods, Ottawa’s efforts to cultivate links with Paris were undermined by the fundamental tensions between their multilateral and bilateral objectives. In addition to the Pearson Government’s wish to cultivate the bilateral relationship so that this could be employed to lessen tensions in NATO, Ottawa desired stronger Canada-France links to prove its commitment to a bicultural foreign policy in response to Quebec neo-nationalism.

Norman Robertson alluded to the tensions inherent in the Canadian approach at the outset of the 1963 review of Canada-France relations. The DEA Under-secretary expressed concern about the negative effect that could result from the perception widespread amongst the diplomatic corps in Ottawa that Canada’s chief aim in strengthening links with France was to reconcile Paris and Washington. In his view, Ottawa would be better positioned for the task the less it was discussed. Accordingly, Paul Martin, reflecting the growing importance Ottawa attached to relations with Paris for their own sake, emphasized the bilateral rather than multilateral dimension of France-Canada relations during his October 1963 meeting

⁴² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Léger to DEA, 8 September 1965, De Gaulle et les relations franco-canadiennes; Erika Simpson, “The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* Spring 1999, 34(1): 80-86; Denis Stairs, “Present in moderation: Lester Pearson and the craft of diplomacy,” *International Journal* 1973-1974, 29(1): 143-153.

with Couve de Murville. During their talks, Martin abjured a “helpful fixer” role for Canada, claiming it was “not [Ottawa’s] intention at all” to “play ... intermediary between France and the United States.”⁴³ Nonetheless, within six months of the Pearson government’s time in office, French officials were interpreting Ottawa’s overtures for strong bilateral contacts as motivated chiefly by Atlanticist considerations. Bousquet cited the history of Canadian efforts to act as a linchpin between the US and Europe in claiming that Martin appeared convinced this was Canada’s vocation, notably in terms of reconciling Paris and Washington.⁴⁴

Unavoidable in the conflict between Ottawa and Paris was the question of Canada-US relations. The perception among French officials that Ottawa’s interest in developing its links with Paris was motivated primarily by a concern to maintain the Atlantic framework was informed by Paris’ sense of Canada’s satellization, which Ottawa’s efforts on NATO’s behalf only reinforced. The success of Ottawa’s attempts to strengthen the bilateral relationship was dependent on its ability to convince Paris of its independence from the US and UK, and of its will to alter fundamentally the Atlantic status quo. Yet Ottawa’s concern to preserve the transatlantic framework, believing it to be the most realistic guarantor of Canadian independence, ruled this out. Indeed, a DEA memorandum argued:

⁴³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson to the Minister, 9 September 1963; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum for the Minister, October 9, 1963; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from European Division to File, 10 October 1963, Meeting between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the French Foreign Minister at Idlewild Airport, New York, 9 October 1963.

⁴⁴ MAE, v. 137 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 31 December 1963, M. Paul Martin; Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life, volume II, So Many Worlds* (Deneau, 1985), 575. Martin accuses Bousquet in his memoirs of heavily leaking and deliberately distorting their 9 September meeting to suggest Ottawa’s main priority in improving France-Canada relations was to facilitate Franco-American détente. Given Martin’s repeated allusions to this in conversations with other foreign ministers, however, it is not surprising that such a view existed.

we must not weaken our ties with London and Washington in the process of trying to improve our relations with France. Our assumption ... is that a balance can be kept which will enable us to take cooperation with the French more seriously without eroding our position in London and Washington.⁴⁵

French preoccupation with Canada's geo-political situation surfaced once again during Pearson's 1964 visit to Paris. The Canadian Embassy sensed a French "assumption" during the visit that Ottawa's policies were shaped primarily by its relations with Washington. France's Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, in acknowledging Quebec's Quiet Revolution, told Pearson that rather than any question of unity, the main risk Canada faced was in maintaining its independence and distinctiveness from the US, so that it was incumbent on French and English Canadians to unite their efforts in meeting the challenge. Similarly, de Gaulle told Pearson he understood Canada's domestic and international situation, arguing that beyond the importance to maintaining an international equilibrium, a strong France and Europe was essential to Canada's independence.⁴⁶ Gaullist geo-political preoccupations were also evident during Léger's accreditation ceremony as ambassador. De Gaulle warned the diplomat that although in theory Canada's development could occur without France, this would be at the price of the country's independence, as it was only with France that Canada was able to "maintenir un certain équilibre qui lui est essential."⁴⁷

⁴⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.2 – Memorandum from George, European Division, to the Under-secretary, 31 March 1964, Canada-France Relations.

⁴⁶ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 31, Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre M. Georges Pompidou et M. Lester Pearson, Première Ministre du Canada, à l'Hôtel Matignon, le 16 janvier 1964; DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 29, Compte-Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada a Paris, le 15 janvier 1964; DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FR-1964/3 – Telegram from Halstead, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 21 February 1964. Halstead reported that when the official communiqué was discussed, Couve de Murville remarked "he knew we wanted a ref[erence] to NATO ... to satisfy our American friends."

⁴⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 4 June 1964, Présentation des Lettres de Créance.

Pearsonian diplomacy confirmed Gaullist views of Canada's satellization. Dale Thomson has argued that in the toast de Gaulle made at the state dinner during Pearson's visit, the French leader made clear that Canada's credibility in French eyes depended on its ability to resist the US geo-political embrace. Thomson also cites the claim of Pierre Trottier, the Canadian Embassy's cultural counsellor, that de Gaulle tested Pearson in Paris, dangling the prospect of French cooperation in exchange for undertaking to move Canada out of the US geo-political orbit and to ensure French Canada's future. Pearson failed the test, however, confirming French perceptions of Canada's satellization.⁴⁸

Canada's Embassy reported that Canada-France differences were linked intimately to tensions between the Elysée Palace and the White House, citing the observation of French diplomats that Ottawa tended "à éternuer lorsque Washington tousse."⁴⁹ Léger claimed Paris took for granted that Ottawa's actions were influenced foremost by Washington. He worried about the consequences for Canada-France relations arising from Ottawa and Paris' divergence in the multilateral sphere:

Aussi longtemps que la politique de De Gaulle sera anti-américaine ou considérer comme telle à Washington, et aussi longtemps que le Canada continuera d'être aussi profondément marqué par la politique de Washington, il y a danger non pas de malentendu car le jeu est ouvert mais de réticence de part et d'autre à procéder à un rapprochement plus intime et dans le cadre bilatéral et dans le cadre multilatéral. En un mot le Canada, selon De Gaulle, est trop fortement influencé par Washington.⁵⁰

Léger emphasized that de Gaulle did not perceive Ottawa as possessing a special role or being strategically positioned to act as a linchpin as it had in the early

⁴⁸ By contrast, Pearson believed de Gaulle had been pleased by Canada's "sympathetic understanding" of French recognition of the PRC (albeit with his observing to the French leader that Washington would not be pleased with Paris' decision). Thomson (1988), 120, 124-125.

⁴⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v 8910, 20-FR-1-3-USA, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA – 31 May 1965.

⁵⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Léger to DEA, 8 September 1965, De Gaulle et les relations franco-canadiennes.

1950s. The ambassador ascribed the French leader's position to continued Canadian support of Atlanticism and his belief that Canada was too rooted in the Anglo-Saxon world to fulfill this task. De Gaulle was attracted to Canada only to the extent its foreign policy asserted independence from Washington and reflected the country's bi-cultural nature.⁵¹

Léger's misgivings about Canada's awkward position between Washington and Paris went to the core of the manner in which the Franco-Canadian divergence over Atlanticism was undermining the bilateral relationship. Ottawa's approach was fundamentally flawed as it presumed Canada was a viable interlocutor within NATO. Similarly, Gaullist geo-political preoccupations conditioned Paris to view anything short of a challenge to the Atlanticist framework as evidence of satellization, and to dismiss Ottawa's analysis that Atlanticist offered the most realistic response to Canada's geo-political situation.

Meanwhile, relations between France and its allies deteriorated. Paris called for a Franco-American military treaty to replace NATO and de Gaulle mused increasingly about a French withdrawal from the alliance. The DEA Under-secretary, Marcel Cadieux, warned Pearson that de Gaulle intended to propose substantial changes to NATO after the French presidential election at the end of 1965. Cadieux recommended that Ottawa should resist any attempt to dismantle the integrated command under which North American forces were stationed in Europe, and strive to minimize any disruption to the political, economic, social and cultural links

⁵¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Léger to DEA, 8 September 1965, De Gaulle et les relations franco-canadiennes. Also, DEA, A-3-c, v. 20-1-2-FR, p. 1 – Memorandum from Robertson for the Minister, 18 September 1963, Canada-France Relations. It was not only Paris that felt this way; the American Ambassador to Ottawa, Walt Butterworth, informed the DEA that Canadian efforts to improve Franco-American relations were “not welcome” in Washington.

underpinning the Atlantic community.⁵² Paul Martin, reflecting the gravity of the situation and Ottawa's desire to salvage what it could of the Atlanticist framework, wondered if although Ottawa "should not gratuitously give up integration, [it should] not rule out the possibility that it might prove preferable to have a loose NATO Alliance, without military integration but including France."⁵³ This suggestion followed a speech Pearson delivered to the Canadian Club in Ottawa a year prior (and from which he had had to backtrack given the reactions it provoked) in which he suggested reforms to NATO that came close to endorsing the "two-pillar" approach to the alliance that Ottawa had always opposed.⁵⁴

Ottawa's exertions in reconciling France to NATO came to naught when during his February 1966 news conference, de Gaulle announced France would withdraw from NATO's integrated military command and that allied forces would be asked to depart France. The decision was the logical conclusion of the divergence that had existed between the Canadian and French versions of Atlanticism since NATO's founding, and more immediately, the differences between Gaullist and Pearsonian diplomacy. Canada, as a middle power, and given its geo-political realities, continued to see NATO, even with its admitted imperfections, as something to be preserved and reformed from within. Ottawa's prescription to cure the alliance's ills, however, was a deepening of integration, something intolerable to Gaullist France. A belief that national defence was the state's foremost *raison d'être*,

⁵² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10295, 27-4-NATO-3-1-FR, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Pearson, 22 October 1965, *The State of the Atlantic Alliance*.

⁵³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10295, 27-4-NATO-3-1-FR, p. 2 – Memorandum for File, Proposed Reply to the United States Aide Mémoire Concerning Anticipated French Action on NATO, 8 March 1966; Vaisse (1998), 383-385.

⁵⁴ English (1992), 320.

and Paris' dogged pursuit of *grandeur* and national independence, coupled with its determination to challenge the Cold War international order, informed the Gaullist position that the Atlanticist status quo and any form of military integration was an unacceptable concession of sovereignty that had to be challenged.⁵⁵

De Gaulle's announcement, which Maurice Vaïsse characterizes as a "revers majeur" for Canadian diplomacy, left Pearson with a feeling of "despair and angry frustration." He considered Paris' decision a stubborn refusal to acknowledge the lesson of the twentieth century that national sovereignty was no guarantee of security. Allowing frustration to overcome his usual diplomatic demeanour, Pearson asked a senior French Embassy official whether Canada should take its hundred thousand war dead with its forces to Germany.⁵⁶

For want of any viable alternative, Ottawa's impulse for conciliation endured, as demonstrated by Pearson's writing de Gaulle that Ottawa was determined to pursue the expansion of bilateral Canada-France relations "sans égard aux divergences du moment qui pourraient nous séparer sur des problèmes internationaux."⁵⁷ The French leader expressed gratitude over the attitude that Canada's delegation displayed toward

⁵⁵ Vaïsse (1998), 44-45, 114-115, 381-382.

⁵⁶ Vaïsse (1998), 387; Pearson (1972c), 264-265; English (1992), 323. Expressing disgust over the French decision in his diary, Pearson railed that de Gaulle was making appeals "to a past that has not validity, least of all to the French." If Pearson's cemetery tale is true (he did recount the alleged exchange to US President Lyndon B. Johnson during an August 1966 meeting, see FRUS, 1964-1968, v. XIII – Document 196, Memorandum of Conversation, Chamcock, New Brunswick, 21 August 1966), the exchange may have confirmed French views of Canada's satellization, as Dean Rusk apparently put the same rhetorical question to de Gaulle. Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: the Cold Alliance since World War II* (Twayne Publishers, 1992), 146. Some caution is warranted, however; Costigliola quotes Thomas J. Schoenbaum, *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Simon and Schuster, 1988), 421, which offers no documentary evidence or attribution for the exchange.

⁵⁷ ANF, 5AG1/199/1 – Letter from Pearson to de Gaulle, 31 March 1966. Also, Thomson (1988), 172. Thomson overstates matters in suggesting Ottawa's reaction to the French withdrawal from NATO was determined primarily by the perceived need for good relations with France for domestic political reasons. His analysis underscores the importance of situating the Canada-Quebec-France triangle in a broader international context.

France during the subsequent NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, where Paul Martin succeeded in having a reference to the alliance's determination to address détente included in the final communiqué to respond to French concerns. Paris' attention was also drawn to Pearson's remarks in the US in June 1966 in which, although reaffirming the need to preserve the Atlanticist framework, acknowledged Gaullist concerns and the need to recognize Europe's post-war recovery.⁵⁸ Similarly, Martin told Belgium's ambassador to Canada that Washington was being "unduly harsh" with the French over NATO, and that his recent speech at the National Newspaper Awards Dinner was intended to "redress the balance" by emphasizing a theme complimentary to France. Martin also subsequently visited Washington to try to soften Dean Rusk's attitude.⁵⁹

When Britain's High Commissioner, Sir Henry Lintott, voiced mystification at how Ottawa could conciliate de Gaulle given the unilateralist, nationalist aspects of French foreign policy, Martin conceded that the Gaullist position was unsound in the long-term, but affirmed that Canadian efforts to conciliate him were essentially realistic, arguing the need to differentiate between France and its President and to accept what he referred to enigmatically as the "international French fact."⁶⁰ Even in 1967, Martin continued to argue that Ottawa might act as a "helpful fixer" for France

⁵⁸ MAE, v. 244 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 15 June 1966. This speech, delivered at the Atlantic Award dinner, is found in Lester Pearson, *Words and Occasions: an anthology of speeches and articles selected from his papers* (University of Toronto Press, 1970), 254-259; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.1 – Telex from Ford, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to DEA, 23 June 1966, De Gaulle Visit; Donaghy (2002), 107.

⁵⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10296, 27-4-NATO-3-1-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Robinson to Defence Liaison (1) Division, 18 April 1966, Minister's Conversation with the Belgian Ambassador, April 18, 1966, re: NATO; Martin (1985), 441; Department of External Affairs, "The New NATO Situation: Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, at the National Newspaper Awards Dinner, Toronto, April 16, 1966," in *Statements and Speeches, 1965-1966* (Government of Canada, 1966).

⁶⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8910, 20-FR-1-3-USA, p. 1 – Memorandum from the SSEA to USSEA, 22 June 1966.

in multilateral forums and strengthen Paris' perception of the benefit of strong Canada-France relations.⁶¹ Martin had matters upside-down however; rather than strengthening the Canadian position, Ottawa's efforts to reconcile France and the NATO allies reinforced the Gaullist belief of Canada's satellization.

Notwithstanding Martin's assessment, there were doubts in DEA circles about the wisdom of Canada's approach, not least those of Jules Léger, who questioned Ottawa's ability to forge links with France given their foreign policy divergence:

La détérioration du climat multilatéral nuit sans doute aux relations bilatérales; inversement, une concordance des politiques étrangères peut produire de bons effets sur ces même relations ... En voulant se soustraire à l'hégémonie américaine la France en un sens s'éloigne de nous. De toute façon ... nos intérêts vitaux étant plus près de ceux de Washington que de ceux de Paris nous avons tendance à suivre plutôt qu'à comparer avant de choisir notre propre voie.⁶²

Léger described Canada's Atlanticism as consistent with the DEA's tendency to situate Canada's development in the framework of the anglophone world, something at odds with Gaullist priorities. The Ambassador also emphasized Ottawa's limited margin of manoeuvre in seeking counterweights to US influence: Canada's engagements toward international organizations or the interpretation Ottawa gave to them weighed heavily on relations with France; moreover, the scope of Canada-US links made bilateral cooperation with any third party difficult without US consent.⁶³

⁶¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 January 1967. Also, Martin (1985), 462, 575; Jean-François Lisée, *Dans l'œil de l'aigle: Washington face au Québec* (Boréal, 1990), 76. According to Lisée, the US State Department considered Ottawa's actions to be the result of a French policy to use links with Quebec to obtain leverage over Canada in both the bilateral and multilateral spheres. Paul Martin echoes this analysis in his memoirs, claiming de Gaulle “sensed Canada's emerging domestic problems placed him in a favourable bargaining position to exact maximum concessions for a minimum return. He tried to hold us hostage, always driving a hard bargain and seeking to use our desire for closer relations with France to offset the adverse reactions of other states to his self-interested policies in NATO and the European Community.” Martin nonetheless re-asserts that Ottawa's efforts to reconcile France and NATO were sound, even if they earned other allies' displeasure.

⁶² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.1 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 12 July 1966, Rapport des relations franco-canadiennes multilatérales et bilatérales.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

The reality was that Ottawa's position was increasingly untenable: the contradictions between its bilateral and multilateral priorities were apparent, and its ability to serve as a transatlantic linchpin was clearly exhausted. This situation had been emerging since the mid-1950s, but conditioned by its Atlanticist policy Ottawa had failed to recognize fully the ramifications of the fundamental divergence between Canadian and French foreign policy. The price of this failure was that Canada had shifted from a self-appointed linchpin of the North Atlantic to being in a vise-grip, caught in the geo-political struggle between Paris and Washington.

The Geo-Political Impetus for Triangular Relations

Manifest not only in the multilateral sphere, Ottawa and Paris' divergence over Atlanticism contributed to their deteriorating bilateral relationship and the emergence of Canada-Quebec-France triangular tensions. Confronted with a Canada it viewed as firmly ensconced in the "Anglo-Saxon" sphere of influence and as a US satellite by virtue of its persistent Atlanticist efforts, Paris was encouraged to establish direct, privileged relations with Quebec. Attributing the Canadian geo-political situation to an anglophone-dominated federal state, de Gaulle embarked on his policy of aiding Quebec resist the American embrace and to provoke a fundamental change of Canada's political order involving a sovereign Quebec partnered with the rest of Canada, to ensure the independence of the "Canadas" from the US that would allow them to continue their vocation as a counterweight to US power.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Jacques Fillion, "De Gaulle, la France et le Québec," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 1975, 45(3): 298-306, 317.

The evolution of French policy toward this position could be seen in the years preceding de Gaulle's *cri du balcon*.⁶⁵ In the mid-1950s, the French Embassy relayed Pearson's assertions of Canadian independence from the US, and his citing the co-existence of the country's anglophone and francophone populations as its *raison d'être*. French officials also considered French Canada to be at the vanguard of issues related to Canada's independence from both the UK and the US.⁶⁶ In his memoirs, de Gaulle claimed he took a particular interest in French Canada during his 1960 visit, seeing in it a countervailing influence over US hegemony in the Western hemisphere. While conceivably a *post hoc* justification of subsequent events, his comment to Pearson in Paris that a renewed French Canada was the best guarantor of Canadian independence is not as easily dismissed.⁶⁷

De Gaulle's analysis was not idiosyncratic: his remarks echoed a 1963 report by members of the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission that concluded that a renewed French Canada was the surest safeguard of Canadian independence, allowing Canada to fulfil its mission as a linchpin between North

⁶⁵ An excellent example of French appreciation of Canada's geo-political significance was Claude Julien, *Canada: Dernière Chance de l'Europe* (Grasset, 1965). Written by *Le Monde*'s foreign news editor, Julien expressed support for a renewed, united Canada. Decrying European ignorance of Canada's significance, Julien argued Europe's independence was at stake over Canada's ability to resist the US embrace. He also applied to the European context the Canadian linchpin thesis, claiming that the key issue was whether Canada could be strengthened to act as a counterweight to the US, thereby allowing Europe to engage in a true dialogue with Washington.

⁶⁶ MAE, v. 29 – Letter from Duranthon, Consul Général de France à Québec, to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 12 October 1949; MAE, v. 42 – Letter from Duranthon, Consul Général de France à Québec et Halifax, to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 4 July 1950, Fête de la Confédération, Évolution du Canada vers l'indépendance; MAE, v. 41 – Letter from Basdevant, Charge d'Affaires a.i., to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 22 June 1950; MAE, v. 114 – Message from Triat, Ministre Plenipotentiaire, Charge du Consulat Général de France à Montréal, to Guérin, 17 March 1955.

⁶⁷ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 29, Compte-Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada à Paris, le 15 janvier 1964; Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, translated by Terence Kilmartin (George Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd, 1971), 239.

America and Europe within the Atlantic community.⁶⁸ France's Ambassador, François Leduc, believed it would be only in the long-term that Canada, after taking its place among the great industrial powers, could hope to speak on more equal terms with the US, but in the interim it was far from certain that Canada could maintain its identity and independence. To Leduc, the answer depended on the way in which Canada's francophone and anglophone populations were able to take advantage of the chances that a unique biculturalism offered and the foreign links this entailed, seeing Quebec's role in this dynamic as decisive.⁶⁹

As Canada-France relations deteriorated, Ottawa was cognizant of Quebec's geo-political significance, and its importance to the bilateral relationship, but the assessment was refracted through the Atlanticist prism. Notwithstanding Ottawa and Paris' differences over NATO, laid bare by the French withdrawal from the Alliance's integrated command, Quebec's geo-political role was referred to as conditioning Canada's past linchpin efforts. As a senior advisor to Pearson observed, France's main interest in Canada was "surely in our relation to our influence internationally and our influence with the United States specifically," so that Paris had to be made to understand that the influence of a Canada shorn of Quebec could not "be counted on as being understanding of, or sympathetic to the French position." What could be expected would be a strong revulsion, as "unreasonably 'Anglo-Saxon' as the attitude of a bitter Northern Ireland."⁷⁰

⁶⁸ MAE, v. 101 – Rapport d'Information, MM. Bosson et Thorailleur, Députés, Assemblée Nationale, 18 mars 1963.

⁶⁹ MAE, v. 293 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, Amérique, 2 December 1965, problèmes financiers canadiens.

⁷⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10077, 20-FR-9, p. 2.1 – Memorandum from European Division to Mr. Wylie, Office of the Prime Minister, 14 October 1966, Visit to Ottawa of M. Joxe, October 15-17.

Georges Gorse, France's Minister of Information, shared this assessment. In a private conversation with Léger, he expressed fear that de Gaulle ignored the danger that too great an independence for Quebec would push the rest of Canada into the US embrace, ultimately enhancing US geo-political influence.⁷¹ This view was shared by many French figures who questioned the logic of Paris' Quebec policy, among these Leduc, who alerted Paris that all observers estimated Quebec's separation would be followed by the US absorbing what remained of Canada, considerably increasing American power and material advantages over Europe. Leduc also emphasized that the American dimension of French Canada's identity and its preoccupation to maintain a high standard of living meant that if Quebec did achieve independence, it would orient itself toward the US.⁷² These critiques of Gaullist policy, however, failed to take into account pro-Quebec elements in Paris, de Gaulle foremost among them, who believed that the Canadian status quo was already producing the feared enhancement of American power, a view reinforced by the Pearson government's Atlanticist efforts that, ironically, had as their aim the safeguarding of Canadian autonomy. De Gaulle simply dismissed Ottawa's approach as wrong-headed and a symptom of the inability of Canada in its current incarnation to extricate itself from the US grip.

Geo-political considerations figured prominently in de Gaulle's July 1967 visit. De Gaulle's biographer, Jean Lacouture, argues that in a sense, the French leader's speech at the state dinner in Quebec City was more provocative than his

⁷¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 20 September 1967; Donald N. Baker, "Quebec on French Minds," *Queen's Quarterly* 1978, 85(2): 249.

⁷² MAE, v. 278 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 11 May 1967, *Le Québec et la Confédération Canadienne*; MAE, v. 189 – Letter from Leduc to Debré, MAE, Amérique, 26 June 1968, *Rapport de fin de mission au Canada, 1965-1968*.

Montreal remarks in that he not only called for Quebec self-determination, but incited Canada as a whole to free itself from US tutelage. Not only was Quebec to be sovereign, but in saving itself, it would save the rest of Canada.⁷³ The official MAE account of the visit sent to all of France's diplomatic posts explained that de Gaulle's actions during his visit were intended to underline that the ferment in Quebec would produce a new political order ensuring a better "équilibre général" of the North American continent. De Gaulle told one of his closest advisors, Jacques Foccart, that French Canada would some day become a "grande puissance," making it crucial that France have "un pied là-bas," and that France's contemporary aid would yield future benefits.⁷⁴ The Elysée's press secretary, Gilbert Pérol, claimed that had the Ottawa portion of the visit proceeded, de Gaulle would have delivered an address on the "personnalité canadienne" that discussed the challenges that Canada as a whole faced in terms of the "problème d'un voisinage extrêmement puissant."⁷⁵ France's Finance Minister, Michel Debré, echoed this idea in characterizing de Gaulle's Montreal remarks as "a warning against U.S. hegemony over Quebec, the rest of Canada, and indeed much of the rest of the globe," affirming France's will to "resist any policy ... which would tend to facilitate any hegemony whatsoever."⁷⁶

By 1967, Canada-France relations had deteriorated dramatically from the heights achieved in the early post-war period. Yet, there was a thematic consistency

⁷³ Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970* (Harper Collins, 1991), 452-453; Frédéric Dupuis, "De Gaulle et l'Amérique des Deux Nations," *Revue d'Histoire diplomatique* 1997, 111(2): 168-172.

⁷⁴ MAE, v. 210, Réactions – Telegram from de Leusse, Affaires Politiques, Telegram Circulaire à Tous Postes Diplomatiques, 28 July 1967; Jacques Foccart, *Tous les soirs avec De Gaulle, Journal de l'Élysée, volume I* (Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1997), 684-686.

⁷⁵ DEA, A-4, v. 9568, Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), 109-115.

⁷⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – FBIS, French Minister's Article, Paris, AFP, 4 August 1967.

between these two historical moments. In the immediate post-war period, Paris' interest in Canada derived from a view that the country was a useful ally in pursuing French goals, and an effective counterweight to the US and UK. Similarly, Canada emerged from the war viewing relations with France as a means to restore the traditional European counterweight to American influence, considered all the more essential given the exponential increase in US power. By the 1960s, with the return to power of de Gaulle and Pearson, the respective champions of Gaullism and Atlanticism, the stage was set for conflict. As the Gaullist challenge proceeded, Ottawa continued and even reinforced its efforts to minimize any disruption to NATO. Rather than being viewed as a useful ally and counterweight to the US and UK, however, Paris now considered Canada a US satellite. This was especially problematic for Ottawa as it increasingly was motivated to cultivate relations with France out of a concern to respond to Quebec neo-nationalism. Ottawa's Atlanticist leanings, however, exacerbated the difficulty in cultivating the bilateral relationship to this end, since such efforts were viewed as being on behalf of a transatlantic framework and a Canadian status quo at odds with the French national interest. Atlanticism had thus evolved from a source of strength in France-Canada relations, to become part of the justification for the French intervention to bring about a fundamental re-ordering of the northern half of North America to enable it to better resist the US embrace.

Chapter 11

Les retrouvailles: Triangular Political Relations, 1960-1967

When the Quebec government opened an office in New York in 1943, Marcel Cadieux, then a junior DEA officer, warned that although it was perfectly constitutional for a province to operate offices abroad, these could become vehicles for a nationalist agenda if Quebec City decided it could promote the province's interests internationally more effectively. Cadieux worried that if the DEA confined its activities to areas strictly under federal jurisdiction, the provinces eventually would seek to project their personalities beyond Canada's shores, presenting Ottawa with a fundamental challenge regarding the conduct of foreign affairs, and the very essence of Canada's federal system.¹ Two decades later Cadieux, as Under-secretary of the DEA, had to contend with the accuracy of his prediction. Quebec's Quiet Revolution was marked by neo-nationalist efforts to have Quebec act internationally as French Canada's interlocutor. Although initially the neo-nationalist objective was to forestall federal attempts to encroach on provincial jurisdiction, many nationalists envisaged achieving a separate international personality for Quebec as a step on the path to independence, drawing inspiration from the example of Canada's constitutional evolution and the achievement of its independence from Britain.

The most tangible example of the Quiet Revolution's international dimension was the opening of Quebec's Delegation-General in Paris. Initially welcomed in federal circles, the growth of France-Quebec relations soon became a source of tension and rivalry with Quebec City over the constitutional competence for foreign

¹ DEA, A-3-b, v. 5753, 54-C(s) – Memorandum from Cadieux to Wrong, 19 May 1943.

relations. The dispute increasingly implicated Paris in Canada's domestic affairs, which led to tensions with Ottawa as the French Government increasingly favoured the Quebec position. It also caused discord in the French capital between the Elysée, determined to achieve direct relations with Quebec City, and more cautious elements in the MAE, which strove to act on the Elysée orders and respond to Quebec requests, but also desired to avoid confrontations with Ottawa. In responding to the situation, officials in Ottawa had to balance defence of the federal prerogative in foreign affairs against the need to maintain cordial relations with Paris and to avoid fuelling Quebec separatist sentiment. The result was that by the time the preparations for de Gaulle's 1967 visit were underway, the stage was set for confrontation.

Constitutional Conundrum

The triangular tensions of the 1960s arose in part from the ambiguous nature of the constitutional competence for Canadian foreign policy. Conceived as a measure to facilitate internal self-government, the *British North America Act* (1867) did not contain an explicit assignment of responsibility for foreign affairs except for section 132, which provided for the Dominion Government to implement international treaties entered into by the British Empire. Ottawa argued that the residual powers clause in the constitution meant that exclusive responsibility for foreign affairs fell to the federal government. Following Canada's accession to international sovereignty with the *Statute of Westminster* (1931), the provinces used the courts to challenge exclusive federal responsibility for foreign affairs, notably the treaty power, fearing that this would lead to Ottawa's encroaching on provincial jurisdiction. The *Labour Conventions Case* (1937) resulted in the Judicial Committee

of the Privy Council effectively ending a federal monopoly over foreign affairs by limiting Ottawa's power to implement treaties to only those subjects under federal jurisdiction. The decision did not address, however, the question of the treaty-making power.² The most powerful expression of the federal prerogative in foreign affairs was contained in the 1947 *Letters Patent* constituting the office of Governor-General of Canada, which contained a full delegation of those powers exercised by the Crown, leading Ottawa to assert it had the right to conclude any type of international treaty.³

The DEA's Legal Division characterized the constitutional ambiguity as "the most important single obstacle limiting and confining the scope of Canadian foreign policy."⁴ Although Ottawa acknowledged the right of provinces to operate overseas offices in their areas of jurisdiction, it refused to recognize any provincial *jus tractatum*: only Ottawa had the right to treat with foreign powers, even in matters of provincial jurisdiction.⁵ Prior to Confederation, the British North American colonies, including what became Quebec, had operated offices abroad to promote trade and immigration, and Canada's provinces continued to project their interests overseas after 1867. After opening an agency in London in the early 1870s, Quebec appointed

² Howard A. Leeson and Wilfrid V. Vanderelst, *External Affairs and Canadian Federalism: The History of a Dilemma* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Ltd., 1973), 2, 62, 88; Anne-marie Jacomy-Millette, "Aspects juridiques des activités internationales du Québec," in *Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale*, Paul Painchaud ed. (Presses de l'Université de Québec, 1977), 515-544. The *Labour Conventions Case* overturned the *Radio Reference* (1932) that distinguished between the treaty-making and treaty-implementing power, placing the former under the residual powers clause of the BNA Act, suggesting Ottawa could acquire authority over matters of provincial jurisdiction if legislation were required to carry out an international obligation pertaining to the subject.

³ Greg Craven, "Federal Constitutions and External Relations," in *Foreign Relations and Federal States*, ed. (Leicester University Press, 1993), 14; André Patry, *Le Québec dans le monde* (Leméac, 1980), 55.

⁴ DEA, A-3-b, v. 4305, 11333-40 – Memorandum from Burbridge, Legal Division to the Acting Under-Secretary, 13 July 1951.

⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from European Division to the USSEA, 31 May 1960; DEA, G-2, v. 4286, 10605-A-40 – Memorandum by T.H.W. Read, 11 May 1955, Provincial Representation Abroad.

an agent-general to Paris, Senator Hector Fabre, in 1882. Fabre was subsequently named Canada's Commissioner-General, mandated to promote emigration and trade and follow any directions from Canada's High Commissioner in London.⁶ In 1914, the Quebec government closed its agency in Paris, an office in Belgium was closed in 1925, and the one in London a decade later. The Duplessis Government passed legislation in 1936 abolishing all Quebec offices abroad. The Godbout Liberals rescinded the measure upon their election, but the war meant only the New York office was opened.⁷

After 1945, provincial offices took on greater importance and significance. Federal sensitivity about control of foreign affairs was exacerbated as, consistent with the rise of transnational relations and economic interdependence the content of international relations shifted increasingly from its more formal "sacred" aspects to technical matters previously considered "domestic" concerns. These subjects in federal systems were less likely to be under the purview of central governments, encouraging sub-national governments to increase their international activity.⁸ The proliferation of provincial overseas offices after the war testified to the evolution of

⁶ Patry (1980), 47; Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 24-26. Lower Canada opened an agency in London as early as 1816. Also, Bernard Penisson, "Le Commissariat canadien à Paris (1882-1928)," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, December 1980, 34(3): 357-376; John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume I: The Early Years, 1909-1946* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 17, 22-23, 72-73. Indicative of events a half-century later, by the time of his death in Paris in 1910, Fabre's connection with Ottawa had become decidedly tenuous, his status described as "more or less undefined and unsatisfactory."

⁷ Hilliker (1990), 62; Thomson (1988), 26-27. The decision to close the Quebec office in Paris arose from concerns about Roy being in a conflict of interest given his concurrent representation of Quebec and private business interests. A Dominion-Quebec agreement resulted in Roy giving up the directorship and the official representation of the Quebec Government.

⁸ Renaud Dehousse, "Fédéralisme, asymétrie et interdépendance: Aux origines de l'action internationale des composantes de l'État fédéral," *Études Internationales* 1989, 20(2): 284-288.

international relations; first in London, and then increasingly in Western Europe and the US, these offices were designed primarily to promote trade.⁹

The potential for foreign affairs to serve as a source of intergovernmental dispute was evident in the diplomatic illness of Maurice Duplessis during the 1948 visit of France's Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. The Premier was annoyed Ottawa had not consulted him in advance.¹⁰ Conversely, federal preoccupations were reflected in the DEA considering essential the sizeable staff of Canada's embassy in Paris, as it conducted "a lot of work for the Province of Quebec." A.D.P. Heeney, the department's Under-secretary, argued that the alternative was a Quebec office that could become a "source of embarrassment in our relations with France."¹¹ During preparations for the 1951 state visit of France's President, Vincent Auriol, Canada's ambassador to France, Georges Vanier, urged that he be protected from visits to locales that did not bear a national character. Vanier saw no reason for the French leader to spend more than five or six hours in any city outside Ottawa.¹² Similarly, federal officials were pleased with the 1954 visit of Pierre Mendès-France, who observed a careful balance between English and French Canada. Paris had requested Ottawa make clear in any publicity that his decision to visit Quebec and Montreal before Ottawa was owing to scheduling arrangements arising from the Queen

⁹ John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume II, Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 26, 217-218. Indicative of the potential for conflict over the foreign policy power, the DEA rejected the request of the four agents-general in London for an extension of privileges that would have made them equal to other foreign representatives; however, four years later they were granted the same privileges as consular officials.

¹⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 3981, 9908-AD-2-40 – Memorandum from Léger, European Division to the Under-secretary, September 28, 1950.

¹¹ DEA, G-2, 11336-14-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Heeney for the Minister, 6 February 1951, the Canadian Embassy, Paris.

¹² DEA, G-2, v. 3981, 9908-AD-2-40 – Telex from Vanier, Canadian Embassy, Paris to SSEA, 13 October 1950, Visit to Canada of M. Vincent Auriol, President of the French Republic.

Mother's visit, and that his decision followed consultation with and the blessing of federal officials.¹³

As Cadieux had warned, the constitutional debate over responsibility for foreign affairs was linked to a broader issue of the place of francophones in Canada's foreign policy establishment. When the DEA was established in 1909, few senior officials were concerned that its operations should reflect Canada's dual cultural and linguistic heritage.¹⁴ In the ensuing decades, despite efforts to increase the francophone presence in the DEA, this remained problematic. The few French Canadian officers tended to encounter discrimination in a work environment that, like the rest of the civil service, was English-speaking. It was only in 1934 that the senior direction boasted a French Canadian, and the war years, marked by the closing of Canada's legations in Paris and Brussels, reinforced the DEA's anglophone character.¹⁵

A post-war report that Cadieux, a strong advocate of a greater francophone presence in the DEA, prepared on Canada's Paris Embassy while he headed the DEA's personnel division, complained that certain anglophone officers had made no

¹³ DEA, G-2, v. 6647, 11562-39-40, p. 1 – Message from Davis, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to the SSEA, 9 November 1954, Mendès-France's visit to Canada. This claim conflicts with the account in Jacques Portes, "Pierre Mendès France au Canada (15-17 Novembre 1954)," *Études Internationales* 1983 14(4): 781-787. Portes cites (not without expressing some doubt) Mendès-France's claim to him that the decision to visit Quebec City and Montreal first was meant to show a mark of sensitivity to a province where France had not always been sufficiently visible. The exchanges between the MAE and DEA of the period do not bear out this claim.

¹⁴ Hilliker (1990), 47, 62. Nor were any French Canadians on the original staff: a francophone clerk was hired in 1910, but this was in a technical capacity. The DEA's Anglo-centrism could be seen in the poor quality of its translations, so much so that Paris requested all diplomatic messages be written in English.

¹⁵ Hilliker (1990), 120-122, 151-152, 259. Hilliker notes that French-Canadian officers, such as Jean Désy and Pierre Dupuy, tended to favour postings abroad since these offered greater opportunity to work in their mother tongue; the consequence was that they had less opportunity to be noticed by superiors and promoted to senior positions. Of the twenty-six temporary wartime appointments between 1941 and 1944, all but two were anglophone.

effort to learn French or expose themselves to French culture and politics, relied on francophone staffers to translate despatches, and preferred entertaining their anglophone diplomatic counterparts. Although the DEA undertook to make French lessons available to its employees, this was on a voluntary basis. The Treasury Board refused to cover the costs of tuition for French-language instruction on the grounds it was not a foreign language. The record was not wholly negative: in 1948, Pearson asked Jean Désy and Pierre Dupuy, the senior francophones of the DEA, to be Under-secretary, but neither took up the offer.¹⁶ Six years later, Jules Léger was appointed over more senior officers to the position, partly because of his being French-Canadian, and as a result of the lobbying of Lester Pearson and A.D.P. Heeney, with the Prime Minister, Louis St Laurent, supporting the measure.¹⁷ Of the 368 officials who joined the DEA between 1946 and 1964, eighty were francophone, and nearly twenty-two per cent of Canada's Foreign Service officers were francophone on the eve of the Quiet Revolution. However, only one hundred officers were fluently bilingual, and of these, seventy-five were francophone.¹⁸

The relative marginalization of francophones in the DEA, both reflective of and reinforcing the Anglo-centric nature of Canadian foreign policy, was increasingly

¹⁶ John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 20. Dupuy cited health problems, and the conditions Désy attached to his accepting the post – a pay hike and official residence – were denied by a frugal Louis St. Laurent.

¹⁷ DEA, G-2, 11336-14-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Moran, 23 October 1950, The Embassy in Paris; Hilliker and Barry (1995), 18, 90, 99; English (1992), 84, 149. English notes that although they collaborated effectively and respected one another, Léger and Pearson did not develop a close relationship. Léger would later say that Pearson and other senior departmental personalities such as Norman Robertson and Hume Wrong “had a blind spot” regarding French Canada.

¹⁸ J.L. Granatstein, *A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian Statecraft, 1929-1968* (Deneau Publishers, 1981), 359; Gilles Lalande, *The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism: Diplomatic Personnel (1945-1965) and Language Use (1964-1965)* (Government of Canada, Queen's Printer, 1969). Also, see Hilliker and Barry (1990), 187. They discuss the publication of Marcel Cadieux, *Le diplomate canadien, Éléments d'une définition* (Fides, 1962) as an effort of the DEA to stimulate francophone interest in Canada's Foreign Service.

a source of resentment given Quebec's evolving attitudes toward France and the growing neo-nationalist interest in cultivating relations with the francophone world. As early as 1951, the MAE described Louis St. Laurent's visit to France as motivated partly by concern to respond to French-Canadian nationalist complaints that Ottawa's foreign policy was tied too closely to the Anglo-Saxon powers.¹⁹ Auriol was received warmly during his 1951 visit: Montreal's mayor, Camillien Houde, about whose pro-Vichy sympathies the French President had been warned, assured him that although French Canada had at one time feared *France moderne*, this was no longer the case. Both France's President and its Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, were moved to comment on the enthusiastic welcome, and the French leader apparently left his audience at Université Laval in tears after his remarks lauding the ties of history and culture between France and French Canada.²⁰ The reception was even warmer three years later for Pierre Mendès-France. While the meeting between the Prime Minister and Duplessis remained rather formal and superficial, Mendès-France was received enthusiastically in Montreal and Quebec City by crowds demonstrating a spontaneity that drew French reporters' attention.²¹

There was discernible sympathy and concern in Quebec's francophone press as France grappled with its international challenges, even if some doubts remained

¹⁹ MAE, v. 44 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, 25 December 1950, St. Laurent visit.

²⁰ Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-1954, volume 5, 1951*, Laurent Theis, ed. (Armand Colin, 1975): 175; Pierre Guillaume, "Montaigne et Shakespeare, Réflexion sur le voyage du Président Vincent Auriol au Canada, en avril 1951," *Études canadiennes* 1978, (4): 107.

²¹ Portes (1983), 783-784. Portes argues that the warmer reception for Mendès-France was consistent with the fact Auriol was more suspect by virtue of his atheism and socialism. The fact Mendès-France was Jewish, however, suggests a growing Quebec interest in France that transcended questions of religion and was consistent with the eclipse of elements favouring *France éternelle*.

about French domestic politics.²² In the aftermath of France's withdrawal from Indochina and amid the climax of the EDC Treaty debate, *Montréal-Matin* used Bastille Day to exhort France to overcome its difficulties because "le monde a besoin du sourire radieux d'une France toujours jeune, assurée de ses lendemains." Even *L'Action Catholique*, a paper often hostile to *France moderne*, affirmed France worthy of admiration since despite its post-war difficulties, it appeared prepared to meet any future challenges.²³ France's ambassador, Hubert Guérin, ascribed French-Canadian interest in France's international position to the fact that Quebec wished to see France maintain its status and influence as a Great Power, a situation analogous to Canada's anglophone provinces' attachment to the UK. The press reaction to the fall of Mendès-France's government reinforced this view. The Embassy reported public opinion considered it a national misfortune for France.²⁴

The constitutional and cultural complexities of Canada's relations with France were evident at the time of Vanier's retirement as ambassador. The French Embassy described choosing his replacement as a delicate task, given the necessity for Ottawa to find someone who could reconcile federal and Quebec views as much as possible.²⁵ The Quebec City consulate reported on the impatient anticipation of Vanier's departure among a large segment of French Canadians, notably Duplessis' entourage and the cultural and intellectual communities, who considered him "Ottawa's man." The consulate described Vanier's successor, Jean Désy, as enjoying a much better

²² MAE, v. 102 – Letter from Guérin to Schuman, MAE, Amérique, 29 April 1952, du Canada et de la question de Tunisie.

²³ MAE, v. 95 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, MAE, Amérique, 22 July 1954, le 14 juillet et la presse canadienne.

²⁴ MAE, v. 95 – Letter from Guérin to Mendès-France, Cabinet du Ministre, 2 November 1954; MAE, v. 95 – Letter from de Vial, Consul Général à Québec, to MAE, Amérique, Chute du gouvernement Mendès-France, 10 February 1955.

²⁵ MAE, v. 95 – Telegram from Guérin to MAE, 19 November 1953.

reputation, since French Canadians considered him “réellement de leur langue et leur sang,” and believed he would remember it.²⁶

Further examples of Quebec nationalist resentment of the DEA’s anglo-centrism included the *Conseil de la Vie Française* decrying the inadequate level of bilingualism in the DEA and among Canada’s representatives abroad.²⁷ Similarly, *Le Devoir* complained that English was almost exclusively the language of communication among those responsible for arranging de Gaulle’s 1960 visit.²⁸ Another preview of the triangular tensions to come was the campaign Montreal’s Junior Chamber of Commerce and *Le Devoir* led that year decrying the discrepancy between Canadian aid to the African members of the Commonwealth and francophone Africa, arguing the Diefenbaker Government was ignoring the French African states.²⁹

A pied-à-terre in Paris...

The clearest example of the evolution of Quebec attitudes regarding France, and more broadly, the need for Quebec to act internationally, was the province’s decision to open the *Maison du Québec* in Paris. It fell to the Lesage Liberals to bring the plan to fruition, notwithstanding the irony that their electoral platform made

²⁶ MAE, v. 91 – Telegram from Bidault, via Parodi, Secrétariat Général, MAE, to French Embassy, Ottawa, 14 November 1953; MAE, v. 91 – Letter from Derival, Consul Général de France à Québec, to MAE, Amérique, 12 March 1954, de la nomination de M. Jean Désy comme Ambassadeur en France. Also, Black (1977), 490-494. This was not apparently lost on Ottawa: lobbying for a Quebec office in Paris, Roger Maillat told Duplessis “Johnny [Désy] is still largely capable of earning his salt. And if Diefenbaker has shown himself unjust and brutal towards him, that is because that “yellow mafia” which is still powerful in Ottawa, found “that fellow Désy was a bit too much on the French side!”

²⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 7666, 11562-126-40, p. 1 – Translation of *Le Devoir* article of March 24 1960.

²⁸ “Ottawa et ‘the president of the French Republic’,” *Le Devoir*, 6 April 1960, 1; DEA, G-2, v. 7666, 11562-126-40, p. 1 – Memorandum for the Minister, 7 April 1960.

²⁹ Robin Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community, Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 73-74.

no mention of international relations. The deputy Premier and former Liberal leader, Georges-Émile Lapalme, who had promoted the idea of an office in Paris since the 1950s, was the driving force, profiting from a visit to Europe a few months after the Liberals' victory to meet with France's Minister of Culture, André Malraux, who told him of de Gaulle's interest in developing links with French Canada ever since his 1960 visit, and encouraged Lapalme to proceed with opening an office.³⁰ Underlining the initiative's neo-nationalist underpinnings, and a harbinger of triangular tensions, the title "Delegate-General" was selected for Quebec's representative, to signal a qualitative departure from the province's prior overseas offices.³¹

Federal reactions to the proposed Maison du Québec were mixed. Duplessis was told during the early discussions that Canada's Ambassador in Paris, Pierre Dupuy, favoured Quebec representation in the capital. The DEA rejected the charge, however, that Canada's embassy was an ineffective spokesperson for Quebec, arguing that the embassy always emphasized France-Quebec affinities outside official political circles, and Quebec enjoyed a higher prominence in Paris than any other province. Although the DEA was convinced that the proposed office would "raise

³⁰ Thomson (1988), 90-93; Georges-Émile Lapalme, *Le paradis du pouvoir, mémoires, volume III* (Leméac, 1973), 42-48. Although there is no disputing that Lapalme played a key role in the official France-Québec rapprochement, he overstates this in his memoirs: "Les relations France-Québec, c'est moi! Personne d'autre!" Also, DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to USSEA, 28 November 1960. Indicative of the ad hoc nature of events was the fact the MAE's *Chef du protocole* asserted that the first the MAE heard of the proposed office was in the press reports regarding the Lapalme-Malraux meeting.

³¹ MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1961; MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Roché, MAE, Amérique to French Embassy, Ottawa, 24 January 1961; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 26 January 1961; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Letter from Lapalme to Robertson, 18 April 1961; Thomson (1988), 28. The title was apparently first employed in a conversation about a Quebec "delegate general for Europe" between Désy and Gérald Martineau, a member of Quebec's Legislative Council and friend of Duplessis. Quebec City rejected the traditional appellation for provincial representatives, "Agent-General," as an awkward translation from the English; after discussion and Paris and Ottawa signalled approval, it was agreed the title Delegate-General would be employed. Quebec continued initially to use the term "Agent-General" for its other representatives.

certain problems” requiring attention, there was a willingness to adapt, with the proviso that any new arrangements respect federal authority over foreign affairs. Dupuy did not foresee any difficulties, and the DEA suggested that the embassy should facilitate the project in an effort to preserve good relations with Quebec City and maintain the pre-eminent position of the embassy in Paris.³²

Ottawa was reassured in this early phase of France-Quebec *retrouvailles* by the clear desire within the MAE that these should not lead to problems in relations with Ottawa. The *Amérique* division shared the view of the ambassador, Francis Lacoste, that Paris should take no action regarding the proposed Quebec office without Ottawa’s prior approval, and that the responsibilities of the Canadian embassy and the Quebec office should be carefully delineated.³³ Similarly, the DEA believed that the new Delegate-General, Charles Lussier, who had been in Paris since the mid-1950s as director of the *Maison des étudiants canadiens*, would not cause any difficulties; indeed, Lussier publicly disavowed in Paris the idea of a separate Quebec diplomatic power.³⁴

The desire for harmony in the emerging official triangular dynamic continued amid Lesage’s visit to Paris to inaugurate the Maison du Québec. Louis Roché, head of the MAE’s *Amérique* division, facing pressure from Quebec City, notably

³² DEA, G-2, v. 7044, 6956-40 – Memorandum from Beaulne to File, 2 May 1960, Conversation with Canadian Ambassador to France; DEA, G-2, v. 7044, 6956-40 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 31 May 1960, Projected Opening of Agencies of the Province of Quebec in London and Paris; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from European Division to the USSEA, 31 May 1960. Also, Thomson (1988), 29, 94.

³³ MAE, v. 144 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, *Amérique*, 2 December 1960; MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Roché, MAE, *Amérique* to French Embassy, Ottawa, 19 January 1961; MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, *Amérique*, 25 January 1961.

³⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 26 January 1961; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Telex from Dupuy to DEA, 11 October 1961; *Informations canadiennes*, June-July 1961, 6(53). The Quebec delegate-general’s brother was Monsignor Irénée Lussier, the Université de Montréal rector at the forefront of efforts to establish AUPELF

Lapalme, for Lesage to be accorded a spectacular welcome, advised the Elysée that while it was not possible to receive the Premier as the head of government of an independent state, he could be treated as a special guest. Roché warned that Ottawa could take umbrage at too ostentatious a welcome, so that preparations should be made in concert with the Canadian embassy. De Gaulle himself possessed the final word on the level of pomp and ceremony.³⁵

Amid the spectacle of the visit, Lesage remained circumspect and emphasized repeatedly that Quebec's enhanced profile in Paris was consistent with Canadian constitutional realities. The Premier claimed that rather than an attempt to usurp Ottawa's role, Quebec's presence in Paris ought to be viewed as part of a collaborative Canadian effort.³⁶ In spite of Canadian press chatter about the lavishness of the reception, the DEA's assessment was supportive, arguing that if Lesage had been received "almost like a head of state," Paris had stressed the provincial character of the Quebec office, and de Gaulle had emphasized the compatibility of France-Quebec with Canada-France relations.³⁷ Dupuy believed Lesage had generally been "very cautious" in his statements and that the visit clarified in French minds the mandate of the Maison du Québec. The ambassador's

³⁵ MAE, v. 146 – Letter from Roché to Brouillet, Directeur du Cabinet du Président de la République, Palais de l'Elysée, 7 May 1961; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 93, p. 2, 1961 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, séance du 15 mai 1961; MAE, v. 146 – Letter from Roché to Couve de Murville, 12 June 1961, Délégation générale de la Province de Québec, Inauguration des bâtiments; MAE, v. 146 – Note from unknown [likely Roché] to Levasseur, French Embassy, Ottawa, 13 July 1961.

³⁶ MAE, v. 146, Agence Générale de la province du Québec à Paris, Inauguration par M. Lesage – *Europe-Canada, Bulletin d'Information*, 14 October 1961, Inauguration de la Maison de Québec – Discours de l'Honorable M. Jean Lesage, Premier Ministre du Gouvernement de Québec.

³⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from Robertson to the Minister, 8 November 1961; Thomson (1988), 100.

only concern was whether those appointed to Quebec's office would follow the Premier's discretion.³⁸

Dupuy's worry about staff attitudes underscored the potential pitfalls of the emerging triangular dynamic. In the short term, the most vexing issue was the status of Quebec's new representation in Paris. Appointed Delegate-General, Lussier was given no written instructions or mandate regarding his dealings with French authorities. He was told simply that it was up to him to establish the office.³⁹ Reflecting the initiative's nationalist dimension, Quebec City subsequently expressed a desire for Lussier and his staff to have a status as close as possible to that enjoyed by diplomats, Lesage confiding to Lacoste that he did not wish to appear too submissive to Ottawa, so that the less Quebec had to pass through Canada's Embassy in Paris the better.⁴⁰

Mindful to ensure the new arrangements respected the federal prerogative in foreign affairs, Canada's diplomats inquired at the MAE as to what privileges the Quebec office would enjoy. Ottawa proposed that Lussier be accorded the privileges of a consul or vice-consul, a status analogous to provincial representatives in the UK. No provision, however, for sub-state actors existed under French law.⁴¹ Louis Roché told Lacoste that while Quebec City could expect a friendly attitude from Paris, the

³⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Telex from Dupuy, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 11 October 1961, Premier Lesage's Visit to Paris.

³⁹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation – Inauguration, 1961-1967, Notes sur l'ouverture de la Délégation générale du Québec à Paris en 1961 from Lussier to Chapdelaine, 27 July 1981. Indicative of the improvised nature of events was that during preparations for Lesage's trip, Lussier was forced to recruit Quebec students in France to present themselves as Quebec officials for meetings at the MAE.

⁴⁰ MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1961.

⁴¹ DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Letter from USSEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 1 September 1960; MAE, v. 144 – Note from Protocole to Amérique, 25 November 1960; MAE, v. 144 – Telegram from Roché, MAE, Amérique to French Embassy, Ottawa, 29 November 1960; MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Louis Roché, MAE, Amérique to French Embassy, Ottawa, 19 January 1961; MAE, v. 146 – Note from le Jurisconsulte to MAE, Secrétaire Général, 3 February 1961, représentation de la Province de Québec; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from Cadieux to USSEA, 2 February 1961.

question of its status would have to be resolved by Canadians.⁴² The MAE believed that the easiest solution was for Ottawa to inscribe Lussier on the Canadian Embassy's diplomatic list. The DEA opposed this, however, as contravening the constitution, in that it amounted to a province appointing members of Canada's overseas representation.⁴³

Faced with Lapalme's request for Ottawa to intercede with Paris to secure some form of diplomatic status for the Maison du Quebec and its three senior officials, the DEA believed Ottawa should respond to it quickly and effectively to reduce "the danger of disputes and rivalries."⁴⁴ Accordingly, Ottawa prevailed on Paris to consider an *ad hoc* arrangement or even a change to French statutes to facilitate Quebec's request for an official status and privileges. The lack of progress on the issue persuaded Lussier that the DEA was unhappy with Quebec's presence in Paris.⁴⁵ Lesage expressed concern to Ottawa about the situation and asked for assistance in resolving the matter.⁴⁶ Although Ambassador Dupuy continued to press for the "British solution," the issue remained unsettled by the time of Lesage's 1963 visit to Paris. Increasingly impatient with the French bureaucracy, the Premier briefly toyed with enacting unspecified reprisal measures to provoke Paris into acting, before deciding to prevail upon the newly elected Pearson Government.⁴⁷

⁴² MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Roché, MAE, Amérique to French Embassy, Ottawa, 24 January 1961.

⁴³ MAE, v. 146 – Telegram from Roché, MAE, Amérique to French Embassy, Ottawa, 9 February 1961; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from Cadieux to USSEA, 16 February 1961.

⁴⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Letter from Lapalme to Robertson, 18 April 1961; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from Robertson to the Minister, 24 April 1961.

⁴⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Telex from Fournier/ Cadieux to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 24 April 1961; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation, Inauguration, 1961-1967 – Letter from Adam, Secrétaire des Agences, Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce to Lussier, 4 July 1962.

⁴⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Robertson, 26 March 1962.

⁴⁷ Thomson (1988), 104.

The federal Liberals, returned to power in 1963 and committed to a more open approach to Quebec, were equally anxious to safeguard federal primacy in foreign affairs in the face of Quebec's growing international activity. To reconcile these two goals, a greater priority was assigned to the bilingualization of the foreign policy establishment and efforts to ensure Canada's foreign policy reflected its bicultural reality. France's ambassador, Raymond Bousquet, characterized a speech on Canada-France relations that Paul Martin, the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, gave in Quebec City as an appeal to French Canada and an attempt to demonstrate the importance Ottawa attached to relations with France to ensure events evolved in a manner consistent with federal interests.⁴⁸

There had been mounting criticism in Quebec nationalist circles over the paucity of Canadian representation in francophone Africa, and in July 1963 Jean-Marc Léger wrote a series of extensive articles in *Le Devoir* arguing the necessity of Quebec having stronger relations with France and the newly independent francophone states. He acknowledged that French-Canadian indifference had contributed to this federal neglect, and so applauded Lesage for opening the Maison du Québec, since in Léger's opinion, only Quebec could ensure contacts between French Canada and the francophone world. He also argued that such contacts were a crucial precondition to French Canada's emancipation.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Hilliker and Barry (1995), 348-349. Foreign Service officers were sent to Université Laval for study and officials were given freedom to choose between French and English for official communications. The DEA also began distinguishing between "career" and "post" languages (French and English designated as the most important for the former), and the Treasury Board began funding French language training; MAE, v. 133 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 11 June 1963.

⁴⁹ MAE, v. 136 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 29 July 1963, *Le Québec dans le monde francophone*; Éditoriaux de M. Jean-Marc Léger, "Le Québec dans le monde francophone," *Le Devoir*, 22-25 July 1963, 1-2; Gendron (2006), 91-92.

Léger's articles prompted Norman Robertson to warn Martin that what was proposed would have "very grave" national and international repercussions. To "reduce the pressure for separate Quebec external policies and representation," the DEA Under-secretary recommended that the DEA take steps to promote bilingualism in the department, expand Canada's diplomatic presence in francophone Africa, increase cultural relations with the francophone world, and above all, strengthen all aspects of its relations with France.⁵⁰

Martin acted on Robertson's recommendation that a DEA task force be established to examine Canada-France relations, along with an interdepartmental committee which was to develop a government-wide response. Chaired by Robertson, members of the latter committee were instructed that the "primary objective" of their work was of a domestic nature, part of the Pearson Government's efforts to promote greater French-Canadian participation in federal activities.⁵¹ The instructions reflected Ottawa's predisposition to view the situation primarily through a domestic lens, and its preoccupation to respond to the Quebec nationalist challenge. The interdepartmental committee did not function well, however, as DEA efforts were stymied by bureaucratic inertia.⁵²

⁵⁰ DEA, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson to Martin, 27 July 1963, Provincial Autonomy and External Relations.

⁵¹ The committee brought together senior officials from the Privy Council Office, Finance, Industry, Trade and Commerce, the Bank of Canada, the DEA, Transport, and Fisheries. DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson to Martin, 30 August 1963, Relations between France and Canada; DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-G-40, Interdepartmental Committee on Canada-France Relations, 1 October 1963 (First Meeting); DEA, E-4, v. 3087, 6 – Le Canada (Québec) et l'Europe Francophone, 1960-1966, Cahier II, Étude préparée par l'équipe chargée du projet sur la francophonie, 1974, 8.

⁵² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.2 – Letter from George to Léger, 21 April 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Memorandum from George, European Division, to the Under-secretary, 21 April 1964. George was annoyed by Paul Martin's failure "grasp the nettle," preferring to only write his fellow ministers rather than making an intervention in Cabinet.

It was in this context of growing federal concern over the Quiet Revolution's implications in foreign affairs, and more broadly, Canadian unity, that Pearson visited France in January 1964. To assert Ottawa's primacy in foreign affairs, the DEA insisted that Pearson be greeted with at least the same level of pomp Lesage had been accorded three years earlier.⁵³ Similarly, Pearson told Ambassador Bousquet that he wanted the visit to focus largely on bilateral relations, so that he could return home claiming Canada-France relations had entered a new, more substantive phase.⁵⁴

Pearson and Martin used their time in Paris to boost bilateral relations and increase Ottawa's credibility at home and abroad. The Canadians sought in their discussions with de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, and Maurice Couve de Murville, to establish regular interministerial meetings to develop economic and cultural links and that would complement similar arrangements with London and Washington. An agreement-in-principle was also reached regarding the coordination of Canadian and French foreign aid policies in francophone Africa.⁵⁵

Canada's Embassy characterized the trip an "undoubted success."⁵⁶ Comfort was derived from de Gaulle's private assurance that France had no intention of interfering in Canada's affairs, and his toast in which he declared the growth of France-Quebec cooperation would in no way interfere with Canada's political life. Pearson returned from Paris reassured that Canada-France relations rested on a firmer

⁵³ MAE, v. 204 – Letter from Bousquet to Lucet, MAE, Directeur Politique, 22 November 1963.

⁵⁴ MAE, v. 204 – Personal Letter from Bousquet to Rocher [sic, Roché], 16 October 1963.

⁵⁵ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 28, Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre M. Couve de Murville et M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Canada à Paris, 15 janvier 1964; Document 29 – Compte-rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada à Paris, le 15 janvier 1964; Document 30, Compte rendu de l'entretien entre le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre du Canada à l'Elysée, 16 janvier 1964. Also, Gendron (2006), 87.

⁵⁶ DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FR-1964/3 – Telegram from Halstead, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 21 February 1964.

foundation and that growing France-Quebec links would be conducted in a manner respecting the constitution, describing the visit to Maurice Lamontagne, the Secretary of State, as the most significant of his entire career.⁵⁷

The new Canadian Ambassador to Paris, Jules Léger, confirmed Ottawa's cautious optimism. Three months into his posting, Léger reported his belief that de Gaulle had given word that he was to be assisted in his efforts to cultivate Canada-France relations. The ambassador compared the situation to his boyhood village's church organ, which periodically needed a good cleaning given the organist's penchant for throwing her chewing gum into the pipes; Léger was optimistic that the combined efforts of Ottawa and its Embassy would "clean out the pipes" of the bilateral relationship. Confirmed as the DEA's Under-secretary a few months prior, Marcel Cadieux agreed, claiming that Léger's posting was off to a "bon départ."⁵⁸

The issue of the status of Quebec's office in Paris, however, remained outstanding. Expectations in Quebec that the Pearson Government's election would lead to a rapid solution were soon dashed, provoking frustration and suspicions of federal intransigence, and reflecting the intensifying intergovernmental rivalry over foreign affairs.⁵⁹ In fact, Ottawa continued to hope for an informal agreement with Paris over the question of privileges. When Dupuy's demarches failed to yield

⁵⁷ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 30, *Compte rendu de l'entretien entre le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre du Canada à l'Élysée*, 16 janvier 1964; MAE, v. 204 – Telegram from Pampelonne to MAE, Amérique, 18 January 1964.

⁵⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.2 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 8 July 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 6 October 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.2 – Letter from Cadieux to Léger, 28 September 1964; Granatstein (1981), 362. Cadieux was appointed under-secretary despite Paul Martin's initial hesitation, due to the lobbying of his predecessor, Norman Robertson, who was convinced that a francophone should succeed him.

⁵⁹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, *Délégation, Inauguration, 1961-1967* – Letter from Lussier to Arthur, *Chef adjoint au Cabinet du Premier Ministre*, 31 May 1963; ANQ, E42, 1990-09-002, v. 405, *Délégation du Québec à Paris, 1964-1966, « A »* – Letter from Blais to Lussier, 2 March 1964.

results, Pearson had raised the irritant during his visit to Paris, appealing to Pompidou to intervene in the matter to bring about a solution. The DEA was thus annoyed with Jean-Marc Léger's claim that Ottawa was to blame for the impasse, and his accusation that federal officials were working to prevent Quebec's office from obtaining the facilities and privileges it required. The view in Ottawa was that it was French law that was the primary obstacle.⁶⁰

Georges-Émile Lapalme, frustrated over the situation and revealing the strengthening links between Paris and Quebec City, met André Malraux during a May 1964 visit to Paris, and discussed the difficulties regarding the status of the Maison du Québec, explaining that these were impairing the development of France-Quebec relations. Malraux reportedly raised the issue with de Gaulle, who instructed the MAE to resolve the impasse. In Ottawa meanwhile, the federal cabinet, facing an increasingly impatient Quebec and another request from Lesage for assistance, agreed that in addition to a demarche by Léger, Martin would intercede with Couve de Murville and Lesage would lobby de Gaulle for a solution.⁶¹ On the eve of the Premier's 1964 visit to Paris and partly in gratitude for his contribution to the success of recent federal-provincial negotiations, Pearson agreed to Paris extending the rank

⁶⁰ Thomson (1988), 109-110, 122; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 8 June 1964, The Delegation of Québec in Paris; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Mémoire pour le Dossier by Cadieux, Nos Relations avec la France, 25 June 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.2 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 8 July 1964. Léger noted that part of the blame rested with the Embassy, which he argued had been slow in carrying out certain instructions, giving rise to an erroneous belief in Quebec and Paris that Ottawa was not pleased with the Quebec office's existence.

⁶¹ Georges-Émile Lapalme, *Le paradis du pouvoir, mémoires, volume III* (Leméac, 1973), 251; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966 – Memorandum for Cabinet, from Paul Martin, 2 October 1964, Status of Quebec Delegation in Paris; ANQ, E42, 1990-09-002, v. 405, Délégation du Québec à Paris, 1964-1966, « A » – Message from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, October 1964 – Pour l'ambassadeur du Premier Ministre.

and privileges of Consul General to Quebec's representative in Paris, although his name would not appear on the diplomatic list.⁶²

While federal officials considered the arrangement analogous to the situation of provincial representatives in the UK, in fact Quebec's Delegate-General and the Maison du Quebec (henceforth called the Delegation-General) enjoyed a greater status in the diplomatic hierarchy in France, being analogous to an embassy.⁶³ Although finally resolved, the difficulties in determining the status of the Delegation-General demonstrated the potential complications of the triangular relationship. As Quebec City was encouraged to act internationally by the logic of neo-nationalism, it was increasingly at odds with Ottawa, which was determined to preserve the federal prerogative in foreign affairs. Indeed, Jean Chapdelaine, Lussier's successor as Delegate-General, asserted to Georges Pompidou that regardless of the longstanding links between France and Canada, Ottawa's embassy was simply unable to care for France-Quebec relations as effectively as the Delegation-General. His remarks reflected the former DEA officer's disillusionment with Ottawa, fuelled by his strained relations with Marcel Cadieux, a division among francophone members of the DEA that reflected the larger divisions in Quebec society over the *question nationale*. Chapdelaine considered Cadieux insufficiently understanding of Quebec's need for international activity.⁶⁴ Moreover, the clash between Quebec City and Ottawa was drawing Paris into Canadian affairs. The MAE initially demonstrated a

⁶² MAE, v. 205, Deuxième séjour à Paris de Monsieur Lesage, Premier Ministre du Québec, 7-11 novembre 1964 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 19 October 1964; Thomson (1988), 135; Claude Morin, *L'Art de l'impossible: la Diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960* (Boréal, 1987), 23; Patry (1980), 60-61.

⁶³ Thomson (1988), 135-136.

⁶⁴ Thomson (1988), 131; Morin (1987), 45-46. There was also a personal consideration: Chapdelaine apparently saw Cadieux as stifling his career progress, reflected in his being posted to Canada's embassy in Cairo.

concern that the rise of Quebec neo-nationalism should not interfere with France-Canada relations. Neo-nationalism's growing assertiveness and France-Quebec *retrouvailles*, however, compelled Paris to reassess the manner in which its relations with Canada (and Quebec) were to be conducted.

Growing Triangular Relations and Triangular Tensions

Occasions for further complications grew as the neo-nationalist challenge to federal control of foreign affairs intensified. If the Quebec state was French Canada's political expression, it was only logical in an increasingly globalized environment that this principle should be extended to the international sphere.⁶⁵ Nationalists such as Jacques Brossard, a former Canadian diplomat, Jacques-Yvan Morin, an international law professor at the Université de Montréal, and Louis Bernard, a senior legal officer in Quebec's Department of Federal-Provincial Affairs, argued that French officials should be persuaded to sign an intergovernmental agreement with Quebec to establish a precedent supporting a Quebec treaty-making power and the externalization of Quebec's constitutional jurisdiction. The deputy minister of the department, Claude Morin, was similarly determined that Quebec negotiate international agreements in its areas of jurisdiction independent of Ottawa, and interpreted federal efforts to expand relations with France as a counter-offensive aimed at Quebec.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Balthazar (1993), 143-145.

⁶⁶ Thomson (1988), 116, 127, 145; Jacques-Yvan Morin, *L'État fédéral en droit international* (Université de Paris, Institut des Hautes Études Internationales, 1961-1962); Jacques Brossard, André Patry, Élisabeth Weiser, *Les pouvoirs extérieurs du Québec* (Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1967); Paul Painchaud, "The Epicenter of Quebec's International Relations," in *Perforated Sovereignities and International Relations, Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments*, Ivo D. Duchacek, Daniel Latouche and Garth Stevenson, eds. (Greenwood Press, 1988), 93-94.

The neo-nationalist challenge regarding foreign affairs was manifest most dramatically in the April 1965 speech Paul Gérin-Lajoie made to the consular corps in Montreal. The Minister of Education and deputy Premier declared that Quebec possessed an international personality by virtue of its sovereignty in areas of provincial jurisdiction. A constitutional expert who in the 1950s had played a lead role in developing the Montreal Chamber of Commerce's position for the Tremblay Commission, Gérin-Lajoie contended that in light of the *Labour Conventions Case's* circumscribing Ottawa's treaty-implementing power to matters under exclusive federal jurisdiction, it was reasonable to posit that provincial authority in areas of provincial jurisdiction was not limited to treaty implementation, but included a competence to negotiate and sign international agreements. The Quebec minister considered this all the more important since the evolution of international relations meant matters under provincial jurisdiction were increasingly in play. In addition to this limited *jus tractatum*, Gérin-Lajoie called for distinct Quebec participation in international organizations dealing with matters under provincial jurisdiction, such as UNESCO, and affirmed that Quebec City expected reciprocal treatment for its representatives from those countries with representatives posted in Quebec. While subsequently denying that he was calling into question the federal foreign policy prerogative, Gérin-Lajoie reflected neo-nationalist thinking when he argued that Ottawa represented an entity more anglophone than francophone, thus making it essential that Quebec, which boasted the continent's only majority francophone government, have the responsibility for contacts between the francophone world and French Canada.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 5 – Allocution du ministre de l'Éducation, Monsieur Paul Gérin-

The initiative for Gérin-Lajoie's remarks appears to have come from the man himself, though with the encouragement of Claude Morin and other officials advocating a distinct international personality for Quebec. Morin confessed to Lesage he was unsure whether what was dubbed the "Gérin-Lajoie doctrine" could be proven juridically, but believed this was beside the point: a political solution was required given that the status quo was unacceptable. Characterizing the issue as a matter of "fierté nationale," Morin claimed that without provoking Canada's dissolution, and regardless of any legal obstacles or federal opposition, Quebec had to obtain the ability to negotiate, sign, and implement international agreements in its areas of jurisdiction.⁶⁸

Although Gérin-Lajoie spoke without the authority of the Cabinet or the Premier, the fact that he was able to repeat and expand upon his remarks ten days later revealed he had at least Lesage's tacit support.⁶⁹ Concerned to avoid provoking

Lajoie, aux membres du Corps consulaire de Montréal, 12 April 1965; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 3 – Allocution du Vice-Président du Conseil et Ministre de l'Éducation Monsieur Paul Gérin-Lajoie, prononcée devant une délégation d'universitaires belges, français et suisses, au Parlement de Québec, le 22 avril 1965; Paul Gérin-Lajoie, *Combats d'un révolutionnaire tranquille* (Centre Éducatif et Culturel, 1989), 20, 133, 325.

⁶⁸ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from Morin to Lesage, 30 April 1965, Voyage à Ottawa; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 94, p. 1, 1965 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, Séance du 7 mai 1965.

⁶⁹ Thomson (1988), 144-148; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 94, 1965, p. 1 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, Séance du 7 mai 1965; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, Box 94, Volume 1, 1965 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, Séance du 11 mai 1965. According to Gérin-Lajoie, Lesage's response when given a copy of the original speech after the fact was "C'est bon, Paul, c'est bon." The Quebec cabinet discussions of this period reveal the fluidity of Lesage's thought; on May 7 Lesage affirmed that the most acceptable solution would be that when Ottawa was called on to sign an agreement touching on provincial jurisdiction, that it should have to inform the provinces so that they could discuss it with federal authorities, with the provinces remaining free to act. A week later, Lesage emphasized to his colleagues the importance of avoiding provoking federal authorities through public remarks or gestures regarding Quebec international activities. The instructions suggest the Quebec leader, if agreeing in principle with the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, did not welcome the dispute it had provoked with Ottawa, and was concerned to keep the more assertive government members under control. This was linked to the rivalry between Ottawa and Quebec City regarding cultural agreements with France that is discussed in chapter 12.

Ottawa, Lesage nonetheless endorsed publicly the idea of Quebec concluding agreements (as opposed to treaties) in its fields of jurisdiction. Lesage's acceptance of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, combined with his more practical concern to manage the nationalist elements in his cabinet, prompted the creation of an interministerial committee on foreign relations that Claude Morin chaired, with André Patry as technical advisor. The committee was mandated to co-ordinate departmental activities and facilitate a coherent Quebec foreign policy and international activities.⁷⁰

The Gérin-Lajoie doctrine confirmed growing federal anxiety over the implications of Quebec's international activities. The previous autumn, Canada's Paris embassy reported on the need for French Canada to be convinced its interests in relations with France could be as well-served by Ottawa as Quebec City, warning that if the idea of exclusive relations between France and the province of Quebec were encouraged, it would drive French and English Canada further apart and eventually involve France "willy-nilly" in Canadian affairs.⁷¹ Early in his posting, Léger warned that Ottawa and Quebec City's differing priorities regarding relations with France meant special attention was required to avoid conflicts in areas of mixed jurisdiction.⁷² Under criticism from the *Globe and Mail* and opposition leader John Diefenbaker following Gérin-Lajoie's April 1965 remarks, Martin publicly affirmed Ottawa's exclusive control over foreign affairs, declaring unconstitutional an

⁷⁰ ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 94, p. 1, 1965 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil exécutif, Séance du 25 août 1965; Patry (1980), 77; Thomson (1988), 149; Comeau and Fournier (2002), 66. This is consistent with Morin's assessment that Lesage was conservative by temperament, tending initially to oppose proposals of his ministers and senior officials; however, once rallied to a project, he would champion it as if it were his own. Morin cites France-Quebec relations as an example of this dynamic.

⁷¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, pt. 1.1 – Enclosure to Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 21 October 1963, Franco-Canadian Relations.

⁷² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.2 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 8 July 1964.

independent provincial treaty-making power, and emphasizing federal efforts to ensure Canada's foreign policy reflected its bicultural reality.⁷³

Claude Morin visited Ottawa for meetings with federal officials after Gérin-Lajoie's speech and encountered a Marcel Cadieux "quasi hors de lui" accusing Quebec City of bad faith and offering sarcastic congratulations for what he referred to as Quebec's declaration of independence. Told Ottawa could not consider even a limited international capacity for any province, Morin rejoined that Ottawa should get used to the idea since Quebec would be presenting such a demand. Cadieux warned that Ottawa could alert all countries that it would consider any contact with Quebec as interference in Canadian affairs, a warning that Morin dismissed as an empty threat since in so doing, Ottawa would sign its death warrant by provoking Quebec and revealing to the world Canada's profound divisions.⁷⁴

Days after the tempestuous exchange between the two officials, Pearson met with Lesage and Gérin-Lajoie to discuss the question of constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs and of Quebec's international activities. Although the conciliatory Pearson was willing to concede more powers Quebec in terms of international activities, an agreement-in-principle that emerged from this meeting went unfulfilled. Cadieux, determined to stare down the neo-nationalist challenge to the federal prerogative in foreign affairs, warned the Prime Minister that what was proposed went against existing policy, was unconstitutional, and would diminish Canada's

⁷³ MAE, v. 276 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 22 April 1965; Thomson (1988), 150.

⁷⁴ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from Morin to Lesage, 30 April 1965, Voyage to Ottawa.

international personality.⁷⁵ Although Cadieux championed the idea of channelling Quebec's international activity into a broader Canadian foreign policy that better reflected the country's bicultural reality, he opposed adamantly anything suggesting Quebec City had a "national" role to play internationally, or that Quebec was to be responsible for Canada's relations with the francophone world.⁷⁶

The jurisdictional conflict was prominent in Quebec's bid for greater control over Canada's foreign aid programme. Quebec City sought an agreement between its *Service de la coopération avec l'extérieur* attached to the new Ministry of Education, and Ottawa's External Aid Office (EAO) to facilitate Quebec participation in the administration of Canada's foreign aid as a precursor to its assuming quasi-total responsibility for Canadian development assistance to the francophone world.⁷⁷ Lesage wrote Pearson in February 1965 requesting a greater Quebec role in Canadian aid to francophone countries. Ottawa's refusal was based on its view that the concession would threaten federal prerogatives. Moreover, Quebec's push for de facto responsibility for administering foreign aid with the francophone world was at odds with the Pearson Government's determination to expand Canadian aid to francophone Africa as proof of the federal commitment to biculturalism.⁷⁸ Although the DEA took measures to increase Quebec's role in the programme, negotiations to

⁷⁵ Thomson (1988), 156-157; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 94, p. 1, 1965 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, Séance du 11 mai 1965.

⁷⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10141, 30-12-QUE, p. 3 – Memorandum from Cadieux to the SSEA, 4 February 1966, The Provinces and International Relations, refers to a memo from SSEA, 17 December 1965.

⁷⁷ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 7, France-Actim, Ententes & Accords Coopération Technique – Note to Robert Morin, Directeur de la coopération technique, 13 February 1964, Attitude à prendre au sujet de coopération culturelle entre Ottawa et Paris; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 1 – Document de Travail de Gaston Cholette, directeur général des relations avec l'étranger, 14 June 1968, la politique « africaine » du Québec.

⁷⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-12-QUE, p. 1 – Letter from Lesage to Pearson, 19 February 1965; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-12-QUE, p. 1 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 1 April 1965; Thomson (1988), 152; Gendron (2006), 86. Canadian aid to francophone Africa rocketed from \$300,000 to \$4 million in 1964 and up to \$7.5 million in 1965.

facilitate cooperation between the EAO and Quebec's Ministry of Education ended in failure owing to federal concern that the resulting agreement could be interpreted as a step toward a separate Quebec international personality, and Quebec City's balking at the concessions Ottawa requested as a safeguard against federal marginalization. These intergovernmental tensions were aggravated by repeated Quebec attempts to reach an aid agreement with Tunisia and Ottawa's efforts to prevent this.⁷⁹

Another barometer of the Ottawa-Quebec rivalry over foreign affairs was the extent to which Quebec's representatives in Paris were criticized in Quebec circles. Although Charles Lussier was Lapalme's personal choice as Delegate-General, he failed to live up to the Quebec minister's expectations. Lapalme even questioned his commitment to Quebec and its population.⁸⁰ The criticism of Lussier's successor was even harsher. Jean Chapdelaine and Jules Léger were good friends, and agreed to work together and keep one another informed while respecting their individual prerogatives.⁸¹ The deputy minister of Quebec's Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Guy Frégault, was especially concerned at the dynamic, fearing Chapdelaine was passing too much information to Ottawa. Robert Elie and André Giroux, senior officials at the Delegation-General, echoed these worries, criticizing Chapdelaine as arrogant and subservient to the Canadian Embassy.⁸² The complaints of Quebec lobby members such as Xavier Deniau, who claimed that Chapdelaine was destroying everything achieved between France and Quebec in recent years, reinforced such doubts. Jean-

⁷⁹ Gendron (2006), 106-111.

⁸⁰ Larose (2000), 90.

⁸¹ Thomson (1988), 139-140.

⁸² ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 4 – Note from Frégault to M. le Ministre des Affaires Culturelles, confidentiel, 14 July 1965; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 6 – Letter from Patry to Johnson, 12 July 1966.

Daniel Jurgensen, head of the MAE's *Amérique* division, expressed disappointment over the Delegation-General's reduced activity since Chapdelaine's arrival. Sent to assess the situation, Jean-Marc Léger confirmed the Quebec office was being eclipsed by the embassy and blamed Chapdelaine.⁸³

Efforts to assert Quebec's international personality increased following the Union Nationale's arrival in power. While in opposition, the new Premier, Daniel Johnson, had declared it essential for Quebec to gain "complete control" of its international fields of competence, as much a case of his trying to upstage the Lesage Government as reflecting his awareness that Quebec's international action could yield domestic benefits on the constitutional front. He told Morin he was favourable to Quebec's international activity, describing himself a pragmatist who wished to avoid "éclats," firm on core principles but flexible on the details.⁸⁴

After the 1966 Quebec election, Johnson followed Chapdelaine's advice and wrote de Gaulle to assure him of Quebec's continued interest in relations with France. He also sent to Paris two of his closest aides, Paul Gros d'Aillon and Jean Loiselle, to convey the message that not only did his government support recent France-Quebec agreements but that he wanted to improve, enlarge and surpass these.⁸⁵ Cabinet Ministers Jean-Noel Tremblay and Marcel Masse, both avowed nationalists, explained to France's ambassador, François Leduc, their determination not to leave it to Ottawa to assert Quebec's place in the francophone world, convincing the diplomat

⁸³ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9 – Extrait d'une lettre de monsieur Clément Saint-Germain, 29 September 1966; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9 – Note sur la D.G. du Québec à Paris by J-M. Léger, undated.

⁸⁴ Thomson (1988), 150, 177; Morin (1987), 70.

⁸⁵ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 25 July 1966; ANF, 5AG1/199 – Letter from Johnson to De Gaulle, 13 September 1966; Jean Loiselle, Daniel Johnson: *Le Québec d'abord* (VLB Éditeur, 1999), 86-87; Paul Gros d'Aillon, *Daniel Johnson, L'égalité avant l'indépendance* (Stanké, 1979), 125-130.

that Paris could expect France-Quebec cooperation to grow, describing Johnson as feeling closer to Paris than Ottawa.⁸⁶

Leduc's analysis appeared borne out by the adamantness of Quebec officials that Johnson should meet privately with Couve de Murville during his 1966 visit to Canada.⁸⁷ Beyond a concern to emphasize Quebec's special relationship with France and contest a federal *droit de regard*, Quebec officials contemplated a general cooperation agreement to facilitate future links in areas not covered by existing France-Quebec ententes, and more significantly, to institutionalize the relationship irrespective of future political and constitutional developments.⁸⁸ The proposed agreement was discussed during the subsequent meeting between the Premier and Foreign Minister, following which Gaston Cholette, the head of Quebec's *Service de la coopération*, prepared a draft permitting the widest possible scope of exchanges.⁸⁹

Paris' response to Quebec's growing international assertiveness was consistent with its evolving assessment of Quebec's political destiny, leading it to favour increasingly the Quebec constitutional position regarding foreign affairs. A few months after the Pearson government's election, Bousquet considered it absolutely normal that Ottawa wished to have its say regarding the conduct of France-Quebec affairs. The ambassador's remarks echoed Couve de Murville's acknowledgement during a 1963 visit to Ottawa that federal involvement was

⁸⁶ MAE, v. 199 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 25 July 1966; MAE, v. 278 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 27 July 1966, Nouveau gouvernement québécois.

⁸⁷ MAE, v. 199 – Telegram from Jurgensen to the Minister, 26 September 1966.

⁸⁸ ANQ, E42, 2004-01-002, v. 70, Projet d'accord général Franco-Québécois – Note from Cholette for Morin, 19 September 1966, accord général de coopération franco-québécois.

⁸⁹ Peyrefitte (2000), 89; ANQ, E42, 2004-01-002, v. 70, Projet d'accord général Franco-Québécois – Memorandum from Cholette to Morin, 12 October 1966, Projet d'entente générale sur la coopération entre le Gouvernement du Québec et le Gouvernement de la République Française.

indispensable.⁹⁰ Two years later, Leduc cautioned that in cultivating links with Quebec, Paris should move methodically and orderly to “équilibrer l’impétuosité de nos amis du Québec.”⁹¹ He welcomed the subsequent establishment of Quebec’s *Ministère des affaires intergouvernementales* (MAIQ) as permitting the expansion of cooperation with France across all government departments and potentially leading to reduced triangular tensions.⁹² These examples reflected a more cautious, nuanced approach regarding Paris’ Quebec policy among some MAE elements, including Couve de Murville, which had been evident since the outset of the *retrouvailles*. There was certainly strong support at the Quai d’Orsay for increasingly direct relations with Quebec, but this was tempered by a concern among France’s professional diplomats to avoid conflicts with Ottawa, in contrast to the relative indifference at the Elysée. The MAE found it progressively more difficult, however, to keep happy the increasingly emboldened Elysée, assertive Quebec City, and sensitive Ottawa.⁹³

French diplomats came away from a June 1965 meeting with Quebec officials on education cooperation convinced Quebec City would soon have “‘mains libres’”

⁹⁰ MAE, v. 204 – Personal letter from Bousquet to Rocher [sic Roché], 16 October 1963.

⁹¹ MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 8 April 1965.

⁹² MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, Amérique, 3 March 1967, visite à Québec; MAE, v. 323 – Telegram from Leduc, MAE, 29 March 1967. As in the case of the original interministerial committee established under Lesage, Johnson was encouraged to establish the MAIQ in order to manage his Cabinet, as evidenced by Jean-Noël Tremblay’s unauthorized public criticism of the France-Quebec cultural agreement, which he alleged was working poorly.

⁹³ Vaïsse (1998), 306, 309; Comeau and Fournier (2002), 72-73. Bernard Dorin confirms that the Elysée diplomatic counsellor, René Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, gave instructions that were decisive in encouraging Couve de Murville, slightly “en arrière de la main” but perfectly loyal regarding the Quebec policy, to follow the policy set by de Gaulle. Also, Anne Rouanet and Pierre Rouanet, *Les trois derniers chagrins du général de Gaulle* (Grasset, 1980), 79. Jean-Daniel Jurgensen claims that less than half of the MAE’s officials supported the Elysée’s Québec policy, and that several senior officials opposed it.

regarding its international activities.⁹⁴ The Lesage Government's creation of the interministerial committee on foreign relations was interpreted in French circles as an official sanction of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine and evidence of Quebec's determination to project itself abroad.⁹⁵ André Patry was even more explicit, telling André Malraux that the establishment of the committee marked another step on Quebec's path toward "émancipation politique."⁹⁶ Couve de Murville publicly extolled the burgeoning France-Quebec special relationship during his 1966 visit, and a few months later, in an audience he granted Chapdelaine, de Gaulle looked forward to the time when Quebec's international personality would be established clearly so that France would be more easily able to render assistance.⁹⁷

Daniel Johnson's May 1967 visit to France reflected the evolving French attitude regarding Quebec City as a viable interlocutor. De Gaulle had invited the Quebec Premier to Paris after Johnson first wrote him, and repeated the invitation months later emphasizing the importance of Johnson and him becoming acquainted prior to visiting Quebec.⁹⁸ The lavishness of the reception, including de Gaulle's personal intervention to ensure that only Quebec flags would fly at Orly airport and the fact Johnson was received twice at the Elysée, surpassed that accorded Lesage six years prior and was intended to signal that Paris considered Quebec City a viable

⁹⁴ MAE, v. 328 – Note pour le Ministre, 4 June 1965, Canada (Observations sur la conjoncture). Also, Vaïsse (1998), 111. "Mains libres" should not be interpreted as meaning independence; the report noted that the Lesage Government was determined to prevent a rupture with Ottawa. This said, the expression's appearance in quotations suggests its Gaullist usage, i.e. the leitmotif of Gaullist foreign policy that France should obtain freedom of action on the international stage.

⁹⁵ MAE, v. 276 – Message from Picard, Consul Général de France à Québec, to Leduc, 31 August 1965, Création à Québec d'un Comité interministériel chargé des relations extérieures. Also, Morin (1987), 43.

⁹⁶ Robert Aird, *André Patry et la présence du Québec dans le monde* (éditeurs VLB, 2005), 72.

⁹⁷ Thomson (1988), 180; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter (3) from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 14 February 1967.

⁹⁸ ANF, 5AG 1/199 – Letter from de Gaulle to Johnson, 24 September 1966; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter (2) from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 14 February 1967.

interlocutor.⁹⁹ It also reflected the fact that increased presidential attention to the Quebec file was trumping the MAE preference for a more nuanced approach.

Paris' shift toward a special relationship with Quebec was evident in Ottawa's progressive marginalization. At the time the *Maison du Québec* was under discussion, de Gaulle acknowledged the realities of Canada's federal system regarding jurisdiction over foreign affairs, but argued Paris should not be dissuaded from establishing special links with Quebec just because they could be "désagréables" to Ottawa.¹⁰⁰ Jules Léger voiced his concern to the DEA early after taking up his post in Paris that if there was an easy rapprochement between France and Quebec given their common interest in cultural cooperation, the same could not be said of France and Canada as a whole since there was less French interest in areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Léger warned that a greater imbalance in triangular relations could encourage Quebec nationalist elements.¹⁰¹ The ambassador surveyed subsequently what had been accomplished in Canada-France relations in the eighteen months since Pearson's 1964 visit to Paris, bemoaning the fact that an unprecedented peacetime expansion of contacts and the fragile foundation of a more enduring rapprochement was almost entirely the result of Ottawa's initiative. Léger claimed Paris was not reciprocating federal efforts to develop a "France policy" so that Ottawa would have to rely on itself to establish stronger bilateral links.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Peyrefitte (2000), 55; Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle, The Ruler, 1945-1970*, translated by Alan Sheridan (W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 450.

¹⁰⁰ Charles de Gaulle, "Lettre à Geoffroy de Courcel, Secrétaire Général de la Présidence de la République, 21 janvier 1961," in *Lettres, Notes et Carnets, volume 9, Janvier 1961-Décembre 1963* (Plon, 1986).

¹⁰¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.2 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 8 July 1964.

¹⁰² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.2 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 2 November 1965.

Léger's ostracization in Paris was a further gauge of evolving French attitudes. Shortly after Léger and Cadieux had expressed optimism in the early autumn of 1964 regarding the former's mission in Paris, the ambassador told another departmental colleague that "this devil of a man in this devil of a country is creating a devil of a situation."¹⁰³ The Canadian diplomat's standing in Paris had suffered as a result apparently of de Gaulle's taking exception to his remarks during his letters of credence ceremony intimating that Canada's development could proceed without France. Reporting on the ceremony, Léger described the General's response notable as for its terseness and certain provocative remarks.¹⁰⁴ The embassy, however, remained relatively sanguine, describing the audience as having passed in "an atmosphere of perfect cordiality," with the emphasis in both Léger and de Gaulle's remarks on a common desire to develop relations.¹⁰⁵ Months later, Léger was not invited to attend an Elysée luncheon for Lesage. Only then did federal officials realize that Léger had given offence, and Paul Martin was advised to use a December 1964 meeting with Couve de Murville to reaffirm federal confidence in its ambassador. Notwithstanding this intervention, Léger was on the outs in Paris for the rest of his ill-starred posting.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Thomson (1988), 139.

¹⁰⁴ De Gaulle had referred to French Canadians as French in every respect except their sovereignty.

¹⁰⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Telex from Léger to DEA, 4 June 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 4 June 1964, *Présentation des Lettres de Créance*; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Letter from John Halstead, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to USSEA, 5 June 1964, *Ambassador's presentation of credentials: Public & Press Reaction*.

¹⁰⁶ DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FRA-1964/3, Letter from Martin to Léger, 25 November 1964; DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FRA-1964/3 – Minister's Meeting with French Foreign Minister, December 1964 – Memorandum from Cadieux for the Minister, 10 December 1964; Thomson (1988), 128-130. A great deal of attention is paid to this episode in the historiography; while the apparent incident between Léger and de Gaulle was significant, it should not be accorded undue explanatory weight regarding subsequent events. Léger's subsequent ostracization had more to do with his representing

As Ottawa struggled to respond to the emerging France-Quebec special relationship, it had to contend with the rapid evolution of events in Quebec. For example, the DEA interpreted the Lesage Government's establishing the interministerial committee on Quebec external relations as indicative of the Premier's desire to maintain control of the situation, and that notwithstanding Gérin-Lajoie's pronouncements, a majority of the Quebec Cabinet still favoured co-ordination and consultation with Ottawa.¹⁰⁷ Marcel Cadieux favoured a collaborative approach, recommending a federal effort to work with those elements who envisaged Quebec's international activity within a federal framework (among whom he still counted Claude Morin) to discourage independent initiatives from more radical elements.¹⁰⁸

Ottawa's approach to Couve de Murville's September 1966 visit underscored the difficult federal position. Paul Martin was initially quite firm that he should be present during any meeting between the Foreign Minister and Johnson, even threatening to cancel the Quebec City portion of the visit if this condition were refused.¹⁰⁹ In the face of Quebec's determination, however, Martin agreed to absent himself from the Quebec City portion of the visit on the pretext of an "emergency" cabinet meeting, with the *quid pro quo* that Quebec officials would generate a minimum of publicity regarding the meeting and that there would not be any spectacular declarations. Instead, the federal government was represented by John

federal authorities (i.e. the Canadian status quo) and de Gaulle's preference to treat directly with Quebec.

¹⁰⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11568, 30-1-1-QUE, p. 1 – Memorandum from Gotlieb, Legal Division to Cadieux, 28 February 1966, Coordination des activités québécoises dans le domaine international.

¹⁰⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11568, 30-1-1-QUE, p. 1 – Letter from Cadieux to R.G. Robertson, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, 9 March 1966, Coordination of the Activities of Quebec in the International Field.

¹⁰⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10077, 20-FR-9, p 1.2 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Collins, 22 September 1966, M. Couve de Murville's Visit to Quebec City.

Halstead, head of the DEA's European division who while Johnson and Couve de Murville met privately, escorted their wives to a museum.¹¹⁰

The DEA considered the visit a success. John Halstead claimed nothing was said or done that could embarrass Ottawa or complicate Ottawa-Quebec City relations, relaying the assurances from Leduc and Chapdelaine that Johnson had been "absolutely correct" in respecting provincial jurisdiction. Despite these assurances and the claim of Couve de Murville's chief of staff, Bruno de Leusse, that the discussion had been of "no real importance," the wisdom of Ottawa's approach was questionable given the discussion that had occurred regarding the France-Quebec cooperation agreement and Quebec's participation in the emerging *Francophonie*, both of which entailed the assertion of a Quebec international personality and threatened the federal interpretation of the Canadian foreign policy power.¹¹¹

The Couve de Murville episode underscored the escalating tensions between Ottawa and Quebec City regarding jurisdiction over foreign affairs in the months after the Johnson Government's election. Cadieux made clear to Leduc his irritation over the direct invitations Quebec's Delegation-General sent to French ministers, arguing Chapdelaine did not possess the right to treat with a foreign government.¹¹² Federal anxiety was more strongly reflected in the stern reaction to the announcement at the end of February 1967 of the establishment of the MAIQ, exacerbated by federal awareness of the historic parallels with the establishment of the DEA and its

¹¹⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10077, 20-FR-9, p 1.2 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Halstead, 26 September 1966, Visite de M. Couve de Murville à Québec. Also, Boshier (1998), 93. The concession apparently came from Pearson who feared the public reaction. Cadieux was opposed, arguing it would serve as a precedent permitting Johnson to meet with other French personalities independently of Ottawa.

¹¹¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10077, 20-FR-9, p. 2.1 – Memorandum from Halstead to Martin, 3 October 1966.

¹¹² MAE, v. 199 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 13 February 1967.

contribution to the achievement of Canada's international personality and independence. Pearson declared publicly that Ottawa would resolutely oppose any Quebec effort to use the MAIQ as the basis for signing international agreements independently.¹¹³ A hardening of federal attitudes was also evident in the establishment of a DEA task force, chaired by Allan Gotlieb, head of the DEA's Legal Division, to work closely with the Prime Minister's Office and Privy Council Office to monitor Quebec's international activity and expand Canada's links with the international francophone community.¹¹⁴

A consequence of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, foreign aid squabbles, and the actions of the Johnson Government was Ottawa's tendency to assign Quebec the larger share of blame for the triangular tensions. The consensus in Ottawa was that if Quebec nationalist determination met a ready French response, Paris was simply responding to the initiative coming from Quebec City. Paul Martin maintained that the road to improved triangular relations went through Quebec City, urging "close cooperation and mutual confidence" between the two levels of government.¹¹⁵

The federal preoccupation to contain Quebec neo-nationalist ambitions, however, led Ottawa to underestimate the scope of the French challenge. There were certainly concerns by mid-1964 that the growing France-Quebec axis was causing complications: Cadieux expressed concern to Bousquet about the difficulties arising from the tendency of French authorities to contact Quebec City prior to raising

¹¹³ MAE, v. 278 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 2 March 1967.

¹¹⁴ Hilliker and Barry (1995), 397.

¹¹⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 January 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 14 April 1967.

matters with Ottawa.¹¹⁶ With the DEA questioning the “somewhat unusual courtesies” Paris was extending to visiting Quebec personalities after Gérin-Lajoie’s visit in 1965 to sign an education cooperation agreement, Pearson “very discreetly” raised federal concerns with Bousquet, explaining that nationalist elements were exploiting French gestures and provoking reactions in the rest of Canada that made it more difficult for Ottawa to develop relations with France.¹¹⁷

The controversy that arose two months later during a visit Martin made to France, when no representative was sent to greet him upon his arrival, reflected increased sensitivities, and by the end of the year, Cadieux was complaining to Léger that Quebec “one-upmanship” was leading Paris to behave inappropriately.¹¹⁸ Federal apprehension about the implications of France-Quebec links only grew with Léger’s report that prior to Lesage’s electoral defeat, the Premier had maintained a monthly correspondence with de Gaulle. The suggestion that many of the Lesage Government’s initiatives might have been discussed by the two leaders made recent French actions more understandable, and implied a “very worrying” degree of French involvement in Canada’s affairs.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Mémoire pour le Dossier by Cadieux, 25 June 1964, Nos Relations avec la France.

¹¹⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p 2.2 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 22 March 1965.

¹¹⁸ MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Jurgensen, MAE, Amérique to French Embassy, Ottawa, 10 May 1965; MAE, v. 198 – Note pour la Direction des Affaires Économiques et Financières, à l’attention de Mlle Claude-Lafontaine, Incident à Orly à l’arrivée de M. Paul Martin, 19 mai 1965; Boshier (1998), 34. In fact, the incident was due to bureaucratic error and the fact Martin’s visit was of a private character. This contradicts Boshier’s assertion that Couve de Murville snubbed Martin. Also, DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.2 – Letter from Cadieux to Léger, 6 December 1965.

¹¹⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.2 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Halstead, 19 December 1966, Relations with France. While there is evidence of a Lesage-de Gaulle correspondence in the Quebec and French archives, there is nothing to suggest the volume to which Léger refers. This does not rule out the possibility that such correspondence has not survived.

The federal tendency to blame Quebec for the deteriorating situation, however, meant concerns in Ottawa about French actions were marked by a desire to extend Paris the benefit of the doubt. This was not entirely unwarranted, given the MAE efforts, especially early in the 1960s, to reconcile the France-Quebec special relationship with France-Canada relations. At the end of 1965, Cadieux warned that federal efforts to meet the Quebec nationalist challenge over foreign affairs would fail if Paris did not maintain a correct diplomatic posture, but opined that the French “sûrement” would hesitate to encourage Quebec City so long as they were better informed of the consequences of their actions and viewed Ottawa as a useful and profitable partner.¹²⁰ A year later, Léger urged Ottawa to not focus unduly on the negative and thereby lose sight of the real progress being made in expanding relations with France.¹²¹ Paul Martin continued to blame “misunderstanding” and an ignorance of Canadian constitutional complexities in certain French circles that were being exploited by elements in Quebec. The Minister described Ottawa-Paris tensions as a manifestation less of ill will than an ongoing adjustment of the bilateral relationship to accommodate political developments; there had been “honest misunderstandings” with Paris, but these were declining thanks to Ottawa’s policy of “alertness, firmness, and friendliness.”¹²²

To the extent Ottawa assigned blame to France, this focused on de Gaulle, a proclivity influenced by the faith placed in the Martin-Couve de Murville relationship

¹²⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.2 – Letter from Cadieux to Léger, 6 December 1965.

¹²¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 16 January 1967, Relations France-Canada et France-Quebec.

¹²² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 January 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 February 1967.

and an inaccurate belief that the MAE was simply carrying out the Elysée's wishes.¹²³ Léger claimed that the relative importance the French leader attached to relations with Quebec City and Ottawa was dependent on his estimation of Quebec's political future and that he would accept whichever interlocutor came to him. The ambassador argued that a good deal of Ottawa's difficulties would soon be resolved since de Gaulle's policy was a passing phenomenon that, like the General, was nearing its natural end, since no successor would be able to revive the policy.¹²⁴

While waiting for nature to take its inevitable course, Ottawa was increasingly concerned by what it considered to be de Gaulle-inspired actions. Federal officials believed their suspicions confirmed when Chapdelaine was received by the French leader in February 1967. The meeting was characterized as the latest example of Paris bypassing Ottawa to treat directly with Quebec, and symptomatic of a systematic interference in Canada's affairs.¹²⁵ In the weeks prior to Daniel Johnson's visit to Paris, Paul Martin expressed annoyance and blamed de Gaulle for the fact arrangements were being handled directly between the Delegation-General and the Elysée, bypassing Canada's embassy. Pearson was reduced to approaching the Premier to ask that he intercede with Paris to ensure Léger was "included, where

¹²³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 2.2 – Memorandum from SSEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 1 November 1966, Visite à Ottawa de M. Couve de Murville du 28 au 30 septembre, Analyse et conclusions; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 January 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Telex from Léger to Cadieux, 29 March 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Cadieux, 20 April 1967.

¹²⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Léger to DEA, 8 September 1965, de Gaulle et les relations franco-canadiennes; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 16 January 1967, Relations France-Canada et France-Québec; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Letter from George to Halstead, 17 January 1967.

¹²⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, USSEA only, 15 February 1967.

possible” during the visit; indeed, it was only Johnson’s intervention that ensured the hapless ambassador was invited to attend the luncheon de Gaulle hosted.¹²⁶

The result was that tensions were rife on the eve of de Gaulle’s 1967 visit to Canada, in large measure owing to the increasingly pronounced triangular diplomatic relationship that had emerged. International conditions, notably the acceleration of economic interdependence and transnational exchanges had intersected with Quebec neo-nationalism, which was determined to safeguard provincial jurisdiction from any federal encroachments and to assert Quebec City as the French-Canadian nation’s international spokesperson.

Quebec neo-nationalist efforts were also the logical result of Canadian constitutional and institutional realities, including the ambiguity of the foreign policy power that the *Labour Conventions Case* had underscored, and a foreign policy establishment that in both form and content had tended to neglect Canada’s *fait français*. While understandable to the extent of traditional French-Canadian ambivalence for France *moderne*, Ottawa failed to keep pace with the changing attitude in Quebec that accompanied its socio-cultural transformation, and throughout the 1960s attempted with diminishing success to respond to the emerging France-Quebec special relationship. Cadieux’s wartime prophecy about the difficulties that could arise from the nebulous treatment of foreign affairs in Canada’s constitution had come true: Quebec believed it could more effectively promote its interests internationally than Ottawa.

¹²⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum for the Prime Minister from Paul Martin, 14 April 1967; Jean Loiselle, *Daniel Johnson, Le Québec d’abord* (VLB éditeur, 1999).

Motivated by a sense that Quebec was evolving toward a new political status, notions of ethno-cultural solidarity, and its broader geo-political concerns, Paris was compelled to favour Quebec's bid for a distinct international personality. Encouraged by members of the Quebec lobby, the lead in this regard was taken by the Elysée. Even within the MAE, where there existed scepticism about the "Quebec policy" Paris was pursuing, and whose professional diplomats favoured a more orthodox, nuanced, and non-confrontational approach, Quebec's advocates ensured that the trend was toward direct France-Quebec relations. The strengthening Paris-Quebec City axis and weakening Paris-Ottawa axis were thus symptomatic of the broader interaction of the nationalist reactions in play, and presaged the dramatic events of July 1967.

Chapter 12

Épanouissement: Triangular Cultural Relations, 1960-1965

Marcel Cadieux was furious. A year of increasing triangular tensions was ending with France-Quebec relations reaching new heights, and Ottawa finding itself increasingly at a disadvantage. The DEA Under-secretary had just learned from newspaper reports of the lavish welcome Quebec's Minister of Education, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, and its Minister of Cultural Affairs, Pierre Laporte, had received in Paris, where they were attending meetings of the *Commission permanente de la coopération franco-québécoise*, established earlier in 1965. In addition to meeting with more French ministers in one week than federal ministers had encountered in a year, the two Quebec personalities had met with de Gaulle, who hosted a luncheon in their honour from which Canada's ambassador, Jules Léger, was pointedly excluded. Determined to avoid seeing Ottawa the "rejected suitor during a Franco-Quebec romance,"¹ Cadieux confided to Léger that his initial reaction was to find a means to make clear to Paris that there were consequences to its actions, to demonstrate that Ottawa was not naïve and had its limits. Despite his anger, however, Cadieux acknowledged the need to proceed cautiously since any reprisals risked the French forging stronger links with Quebec. Beyond his anger, he believed that Ottawa's interests lay in cooperating with Paris.²

This episode reflected the dynamic of triangular cultural relations. Quebec City was increasingly assertive in seeking cultural cooperation with Paris. The

¹ John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 318.

² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.2 – Letter from Cadieux to Léger, 6 December 1965.

centrality of education in the Quiet Revolution combined with the neo-nationalist determination to see Quebec City realize its vocation as French Canada's "national" government, extend its jurisdiction abroad in cultural affairs, and challenge federal actions in the domain. Quebec cultural diplomacy received an enthusiastic welcome in Paris. The intensity of cultural relations during the decade offered a stark contrast with the official indifference from the Duplessis Government and a federal approach that was only marginally better. By the early 1960s, the MAE had established a clear priority in promoting cultural agreements, notably those of a scientific and technical nature that encouraged French as the language of the workplace.³ Paris had to contend, however, with the intergovernmental rivalry in Canada as Ottawa and Quebec City competed to be its primary interlocutor in cultural relations. Paris' interest in challenging US power, the belief that Quebec was evolving toward a new political status, and a preoccupation to safeguard North America's *fait français*, made for a potent nationalist cocktail. The result was a series of agreements between Paris and Quebec City of expanding scope and an increasingly official nature.

The France-Quebec cultural rapprochement led inevitably to tensions, becoming bound up in the jurisdictional rivalry between Ottawa and Quebec City. Although federal officials welcomed greater cultural links between Canada and France in the abstract, they were increasingly fearful that Quebec could exploit Paris' actions in a manner prejudicial to the federal constitutional position and national unity, leading Ottawa to strive to ensure France-Quebec cultural cooperation was carried out in a manner respecting federal authority. Ottawa was determined to

³ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Fayard, 1998), 316-317.

protect its prerogative in foreign affairs, and assert its role in cultural diplomacy. This clashed with Quebec City's resolution in protecting its education jurisdiction and asserting its responsibility for culture. The result was that the rivalry between Ottawa and Quebec City in cultural affairs evident in the 1950s was internationalized, and became a driving force of triangular tensions.

Rapprochement: The Cultural Dimension

France-Quebec cultural relations were not at the forefront of Jean Lesage's thoughts when the *Maison du Québec* was established. Preoccupied with forging economic links, Lesage confessed to not having considered the new office's cultural activities when France's ambassador, Francis Lacoste, inquired about its mandate.⁴ The cultural dimension of the Delegation-General was a much higher priority for other members of the Quebec Cabinet, notably the Deputy Premier and Minister of Cultural Affairs, Georges-Émile Lapalme, and the Minister of Youth, Paul Gérin-Lajoie. The Francophile Lapalme was in Paris in 1958 when André Malraux was named Minister of State responsible for France's newly-created Ministry of Culture. This inspired him to recommend that Quebec create a similar ministry. He viewed Quebec's new office primarily in cultural terms, as reflected in his choice for Delegate-General, Charles Lussier, who was director of the *Maison des étudiants canadiens* and thus involved in education links between France and Quebec.⁵

⁴ MAE, v. 144 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 8 October 1960.

⁵ Sylvain Larose, *La création de la délégation générale du Québec à Paris (1958-1964)*, M.A. thesis (Université du Québec à Montréal, Department of History, 2000), 43; Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 94-95, 105. Lapalme and Lussier were increasingly at odds as a result of a jurisdictional struggle in Quebec City over responsibility for the *Maison du Québec*. Lapalme increasingly bypassed Lussier regarding cultural affairs after making the cultural counsellor, Robert Elie, responsible to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs that Lapalme headed.

Despite its initially vague mandate, the Maison du Quebec set about strengthening the French-Canadian cultural presence in France, including participating in a number of art exhibitions, hosting colloquia, sponsoring book launches, and promoting Quebec literature in the Hexagon. By the end of 1962, Lussier affirmed that the mere presence of the new office was contributing to a heightened cultural profile.⁶ At the beginning of 1962, a cultural counsellor was appointed, and two years later the Delegation's cultural section was further strengthened by the appointing of an assistant cultural counsellor and librarian.⁷

Quebec City's interest in expanding cultural relations with France corresponded to that of Paris. After his 1960 visit to Canada, de Gaulle was determined to expand cultural relations with French Canada.⁸ Indicative of the presidential interest and anticipating the subsequent triangular dynamic, the MAE reorganized France's cultural representation in Canada. Notwithstanding initial budgetary concerns at the Quai d'Orsay, the French cultural attaché in Ottawa was transferred to a new cultural office in Montreal, and a second attaché appointed to Quebec City; both attachés were to work under the authority of the Embassy's cultural counsellor, who remained in Ottawa.⁹

⁶ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel. Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris, Letter from Lussier to Rousseau, 15 June 1962; ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel. Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris, Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 11 December 1962; ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 27 May 1963.

⁷ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 8, Délégation à Paris – Section Culturelle de la Délégation à Paris, Robert Elie, 15 September 1964; ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 21, Coopération à l'extérieur, 1966-1971 – Note from Hamelin to Giroux, Assistant Deputy Minister, 5 January 1970, Rapport d'activité comme attaché culturel du Québec, de janvier 1964 à décembre 1969.

⁸ MAE, v. 87 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1961, cf. Letter de M. Roger Seydoux à Lacoste, 17 May 1960; DEA, G-2, v. 3197, 5175-40 – Telex from Dupuy to Cadieux, 3 June 1961.

⁹ MAE, v. 87 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 23 January 1961; MAE, v. 87 – Note from Basdevant to Couve de Murville, 27 January 1961, Création d'un poste d'attaché culturel à Montréal;

Lacoste expressed annoyance and concern over the re-organization, warning Paris that the measure suggested France's cultural activity in Canada was becoming Quebec-centric, to the neglect of English Canada and francophone minorities elsewhere. Lacoste feared that Ottawa would view France's behaviour as encouraging French-Canadian particularism, and even as a threat to the federal prerogative in foreign affairs. The re-organization of French cultural representation, he argued, might well be interpreted as a response to the opening of the Maison du Québec and thus an effort to establish direct France-Quebec relations. The MAE's *Amérique* division echoed Lacoste's concern, and endorsed his call for the second attaché to be appointed to Toronto instead of Quebec City to demonstrate French neutrality and desire to conduct pan-Canadian activities. Paris, however, ignored their remonstrations, and the attaché appointments to Quebec went ahead.¹⁰

Lacoste's warning about Ottawa's reaction proved correct. The DEA Under-secretary, Norman Robertson, interpreted Paris' action as forcing the pace of France-Quebec relations to the extent that "political significance might be given to this move." Robertson went on to identify the primary dilemma that Ottawa would face throughout the decade, namely, how Ottawa could contest French actions without Quebec nationalists seizing upon its objection to accuse Ottawa of interfering in the France-Quebec rapprochement.¹¹

MAE, v. 87 – Letter from Basdevant, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, to Lacoste, 6 February 1961, Organisation de notre représentation culturelle au Canada.

¹⁰ MAE, v. 87 – Telegram from Lacoste, to MAE, Amérique, 20 March 1961; MAE, v. 87 – Note from Amérique to Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, 23 March 1961, Représentation culturelle au Canada; MAE, v. 87 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, 9 June 1961, Annexe III à la lettre du 8 juin 1961 à M. Éric de Carbonnel, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

¹¹ DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Memorandum from Robertson to Green, 4 May 1961.

Marcel Cadieux, then Assistant Under-secretary in the DEA, called in Lacoste to explain the federal concern that extremists in Quebec “anxious to involve French representation in their schemes” could exploit the announcement of the new cultural attachés. Lacoste agreed to relay Cadieux’s proposal that Paris not proceed with, or at least delay, the appointing of the second attaché to Quebec City. Paris denied the request, however, leading Canada’s ambassador, Pierre Dupuy, to raise the matter with Jean Basdevant, head of the MAE’s Cultural Relations division.¹² Basdevant assured Dupuy that Paris wished to avoid any misunderstanding, explaining that the appointments would be made with “maximum discretion,” and intimating that a cultural attaché would be appointed to Toronto in the future. The MAE official also referred to Paris’ ready acceptance of the appointments being made at a consular instead of diplomatic level to lessen their apparent significance. On the basis of this exchange, Cadieux concluded that realistically Ottawa could take no further action, save to urge Paris to proceed as quickly as possible on the Toronto appointment.¹³

The attaché episode, combined with the proposed Quebec office in Paris, and efforts to establish the *Association des universités partiellement ou entièrement de la langue française* (AUPELF) fuelled DEA interest in expanding Canadian cultural diplomacy, especially with France. Cadieux, an exception in the DEA given his recognition of the cultural aspects of foreign policy, expressed hope that once

¹² DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Robertson, 9 May 1961; DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Robertson, 16 May 1961, Appointment of French Cultural Officers in Montreal and Quebec.

¹³ DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 3 June 1961; MAE, v. 173 – Telegram from Rebeyrol, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, Enseignement et Oeuvres, to French Embassy, Ottawa, 12 July 1961, MM. Bernard et Formery. The distinction between diplomatic and consular appointments was artificial and designed to placate Ottawa: although given the title of “délégué culturel et consul,” Paris considered the diplomats to enjoy the status accompanying a diplomatic appointment as “cultural attaché.”

established AUPELF would provide a vehicle for federal participation in scholarship exchanges with francophone countries, of which he was a strong proponent. He also wanted a special inter-agency committee established to examine Canada's cultural relations with France, believing it essential given the opening of the Maison du Québec that the Embassy have the support of all federal agencies involved in cultural affairs.¹⁴

Despite Cadieux's strong lobbying efforts, the Diefenbaker Government's response to cultural relations with the francophone world was lacklustre, limited initially to small, one-time gifts of scholarships to the newly independent francophone states in Africa. A \$600,000 annual educational aid fund that Cadieux had secured to send Canadian teachers to francophone Africa was halved by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Howard Green, and it was only with Cadieux and Norman Robertson's sustained lobbying that the funds remained dedicated exclusively to francophone Africa.¹⁵

The Pearson Government's arrival in office was accompanied by a greater sense of urgency to develop cultural relations with France. Amid growing Quebec questioning of Ottawa's will and ability to cultivate links with the francophone world, underscored by Jean-Marc Léger's series of articles in *Le Devoir*, the DEA

¹⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 5057, 2727-14-40, p.1 – Abstract from the Report on the Seignory Club Conference on Canadian Information Abroad, November 17-18, 1960, French Language Scholarships; DEA, G-2, v. 5057, 2727-14-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Robertson, 2 February 1961, Establishment of International Union of French Language Universities; DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Information Division, 6 June 1961. The sub-committee was to bring together representatives of the CBC, NFB, National Gallery and NRC. Also, Thomson (1988), 151.

¹⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 5057, 2727-14-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Robertson, February 2, 1961, Establishment of International Union of French Language Universities; Robin Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community, Canada's Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 73-75. By comparison, Ottawa had allocated \$3.5 million annually since 1959 for African Commonwealth members.

accelerated study of a proposal that Ottawa help establish a multilateral cultural cooperation programme among francophone countries that would build on the educational aid programme for francophone Africa established two years prior.¹⁶ Supported enthusiastically by the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, Ottawa hoped that a multilateral educational and cultural exchanges programme would facilitate greater cooperation between Ottawa and Quebec, and strengthen national unity by virtue of Canada's expanded contacts with France and the francophone world.¹⁷

The Canadian proposal, however, was still-born owing largely to French opposition. To maintain its influence with its former colonies, Paris preferred to keep cultural relations on a bilateral basis. Notwithstanding this setback, Martin agreed to Cadieux's suggestion that Ottawa establish bilateral cultural programmes with francophone Europe, and France especially.¹⁸ Accordingly, the DEA created a \$250,000 budget for cultural exchanges with francophone Europe. Four-fifths of the monies were allocated to fifty scholarships to bring French, Belgian and Swiss students to Canada, and the balance was earmarked for artistic exchanges and the purchase of a studio at the new *Cité Internationale des Arts* in Paris. The budgetary commitment, however, simply consolidated funds that Ottawa had distributed on an

¹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Information Division to Robertson, 15 March 1963, Educational Aid Programme between French-Speaking Countries; DEA, A-3-c, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 19 August 1963, Programme of Cultural Cooperation with French-Speaking Countries.

¹⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Robertson, 23 April 1963, Biculturalism; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson to Martin, 27 July 1963, Provincial Autonomy and External Relations; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson to Martin, 30 August 1963, Relations between France and Canada.

¹⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 19 August 1963, Programme of Cultural Cooperation with French-Speaking Countries. The Canadian proposal was also rejected by the Belgian and Swiss Governments.

ad hoc basis, formalizing and focusing their dispersal in order to more clearly assert federal authority.¹⁹ The growing importance the DEA attached to cultural diplomacy was articulated in an internal report on Canada's cultural relations with France. In addition to asserting the need to harmonize its cultural exchanges programs with Canadian foreign policy, the report characterized the expanding France-Quebec cultural links as "a classic example" of Quebec City taking Ottawa's place as a result of federal difficulties in operating effectively in the cultural sphere.²⁰

The DEA report's reference to Quebec's cultural activities with Paris underscored the latent jurisdictional dispute between Ottawa and Quebec City over culture. Whereas education was an exclusive provincial jurisdiction, responsibility for culture remained hotly contested. Quebec neo-nationalists refused to distinguish between the two, asserting that the spirit of Canada's constitution meant culture was a provincial responsibility. Jacques-Yvan Morin, professor of international and constitutional law at the Université de Montréal, described how the growth of English-Canadian nationalism and the Massey Report's eloquent arguments had resulted in greater federal activism in cultural affairs. Morin feared that having engaged on this path, Ottawa would be tempted to assume responsibility for the protection and promotion of Canadian francophone culture. This of course ran counter to the neo-nationalist objective of ensuring Quebec City possessed the responsibility for North America's *fait français*. In Morin's estimation, Quebec had to assert its claim to cultural leadership through accumulating precedents and

¹⁹ DEA, A-3-C, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 19 November 1963; ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 4 – Letter from Martin to Lesage, 30 December 1963; DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 30, Compte rendu de l'entretien entre le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre du Canada à l'Élysée, 16 janvier 1964; Thomson (1988), 117.

²⁰ DEA, G-2, v. 5056, 2727-AD-40, p. 9 – France-Canada Cultural Relations, 25 November 1963.

establishing the administrative capacity to counter federal encroachments. Morin's recommendations were reflected in a Quebec government report calling on Quebec City to become the linchpin between France and French-language groups throughout North America.²¹

Quebec, therefore, challenged Ottawa's proposed cultural relations programme. In proposing the federal cultural strategy to Paul Martin, Marcel Cadieux had suggested that constitutional disputes might be avoided and the challenge overcome of the DEA's lack of qualified personnel, by asking the Canada Council to administer the programme under DEA supervision. He also recommended consultations with Quebec City prior to any announcement, even raising the possibility of Quebec making a financial contribution to the programme, and serving on an advisory committee; his answer to "co-operative federalism."²² Informed of Ottawa's proposed cultural programme, however, Guy Frégault, Quebec's deputy minister of Cultural Affairs, dismissed it as a public relations measure in anticipation of Pearson's 1964 visit to Paris, an attempt to steal the rug from under Quebec's cultural activities. In addition to expressing a concern that Quebec cooperation would encourage federal incursions into the education sector (given the programme's large educational component), Frégault cited the parsimonious budget as proof that Ottawa's priority was publicity, not cultural exchanges. Frégault and Claude Morin, deputy minister for Federal-Provincial Relations, recommended Ottawa be told

²¹ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 2 – Memorandum from J-Y. Morin to Frégault, Deputy Minister, Affaires culturelles, undated; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 7, France-Actim, Ententes & Accords Coopération Technique – Note to R. Morin, Directeur de la coopération technique, 13 février 1964, attitude à prendre au sujet de coopération culturelle entre Ottawa et Paris; Claude Morin, *l'Art de l'impossible: la Diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960* (Boréal, 1987), 39.

²² DEA, A-3-c, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, Programme of Cultural Cooperation with French-Speaking Countries, 19 August 1963.

Quebec City was best-positioned constitutionally and practically to implement the programme and that the funds envisaged were insufficient. Gaston Cholette, head of the *Service de la coopération avec l'extérieur*, claimed that as French Canada's national state, Quebec should seek the extension abroad of what he affirmed was its exclusive jurisdiction over culture within Quebec's borders, and challenge any federal activity in the domain.²³

In the Quebec Cabinet's discussion of the issue, Lesage observed that since Ottawa appeared uninterested in reaching a compromise, it would have to be informed of Quebec's constitutional concerns and the need for discussions.²⁴ The Premier's decision was the precursor to a difficult meeting between Marcel Cadieux and Claude Morin, who in addition to setting out Quebec's constitutional preoccupations, emphasized that Quebec City could only entertain a token role for Ottawa in terms of cultural relations, fearing that too high a federal profile would encourage Paris to take a pan-Canadian approach to cultural exchanges and divert resources better concentrated in Quebec.²⁵

Ottawa and Quebec City's dispute over the cultural programme was but one example of the emerging triangular dynamic, emphasized by André Malraux's 1963 visit to Canada. Meeting with Paul Martin in Ottawa, the French Minister of Culture assured him that Paris had no hidden objectives in its relations with Canada. He simply hoped that expanding cultural and technical exchange programmes would

²³ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 4 – Memorandum from Frégault to C. Morin, 7 January 1964; ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 4 – Letter from C. Morin to Frégault, 8 January 1964; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 7, Coopération Technique, Note from Cholette to R. Morin, Directeur de la coopération technique, 13 February 1964, Attitude à prendre au sujet de coopération culturelle entre Ottawa et Paris.

²⁴ ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 93, p. 5, 1964 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, Séance du 30 janvier 1964.

²⁵ Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life, volume 2, So Many Worlds* (Deneau, 1983), 577.

contribute to “le pays actuellement en devenir qu’est le Canada.”²⁶ During the Quebec portion of the visit, Malraux expressed hope that increased France-Quebec links would contribute to French Canada’s cultural *épanouissement*. The French Minister and Lesage agreed in their talks that after some initial projects of smaller scope, a more formal programme of France-Quebec cultural cooperation would be developed.²⁷ France’s Ambassador, Raymond Bousquet, encouraged Quebec City to “battre le fer pendant qu’il est chaud” to develop France-Quebec exchanges.²⁸ Lesage supported the projects, but his priority remained economic cooperation, whereas the much more enthusiastic Lapalme has recalled the discussions as the “grand départ” of France-Quebec cultural cooperation.²⁹

From Paris’ perspective, Malraux’s trip was a great success, although the MAE was taken aback by the French minister’s improvised remarks regarding France and French Canada building “la prochaine civilisation” together. Bousquet dismissed the concern that two English-Canadian newspaper columnists expressed over Malraux’s remarks as a misrepresentation arising from their insufficient knowledge of French, and noted that other English-language publications had provided a more objective account. The ambassador also discounted rumours that Pearson wished in

²⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 5056, 2727-AD-40, p. 9 – Memorandum to File by Fournier, 21 October 1963, Entretien entre M. Malraux et le Ministre d’état chargé des Affaires Extérieures du Canada, 8 October 1963; DEA, A-3-c, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Garneau to Robertson and Cadieux, 21 October 1963, essai de bilan de la visite Malraux.

²⁷ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 4 – Compte-Rendu de la réunion du 15 octobre 1963 à Montréal, prepared by French Embassy, Ottawa, 25 October 1963.

²⁸ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 4 – Letter from Bousquet to Lapalme, 29 October 1963.

²⁹ Thomson (1988), 108; Georges-Émile Lapalme, *Le paradis du pouvoir, mémoires, volume III* (Leméac, 1973), 241-244. When Malraux outlined the projects to him, Lesage reportedly asked: “All that will cost us how much?” “Not a cent” was the reply.

any way to hamper France-Quebec cultural cooperation, arguing that to the contrary, Ottawa wished to encourage this, but in a manner allowing for federal input.³⁰

Ottawa was generally pleased with Malraux's visit, since it served as the occasion to sign a France-Canada cinematography agreement to facilitate co-productions between Canada's National Film Board and the *Centre nationale de la cinématographie française*. Although the tenor of some of Malraux's remarks prompted some worry that taken out of context they could lend themselves to a nationalist interpretation, a DEA analysis ascribed them to Malraux's literary background, and claimed they were consistent with his visit's broader aim of strengthening French-Canadian confidence. The report explained that calls for French Canadians to "prend la main" of France were an attempt to emphasize that French Canadians (and through them all of Canada) were participants in the cultural values of France and Western Europe, and thus able to contribute to the building of a civilization responsive to modern challenges and was "ni américaine, ni communiste." Ottawa was also reassured by the fact that in his more formal remarks, Malraux remained within the parameters of his assurance to Martin that France could not treat separately with a Canadian province. Moreover, prior to his departure he had emphasized that his improvised remarks were to be understood within a strictly cultural context and that there was no question of encouraging Quebec to become a French satellite.³¹

³⁰ MAE, v. 101 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 21 October 1963, voyage de M. Malraux au Canada; MAE, v. 204 – Personal letter from Bousquet to Louis Rocher [sic, Roché], 16 October 1963.

³¹ MAE, v. 173 – Accord sur les Relations Cinématographiques Franco-Canadiennes, 11 October 1963; DEA, G-2, v. 5056, 2727-AD-40, p. 9 – France-Canada Cultural Relations, 25 November 1963; DEA, A-3-c, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Garneau to Robertson and Cadieux, 21 October 1963, essai de bilan de la visite Malraux; DEA, G-2, v. 5056, 2727-AD-40, p. 9 –

Ottawa's chief concern was Quebec City, reflective of the growing convergence of the intergovernmental rivalries over culture and foreign affairs. Although Ottawa felt Lesage had kept a proper measure in expressing Quebec sympathy for France, there was federal annoyance over Georges-Émile Lapalme's remarks and actions. The Quebec minister's failure to associate federal representatives with Quebec-sponsored events during the visit was interpreted as an attempt to marginalize Ottawa in France-Quebec relations. René Garneau, the Canadian embassy's cultural counsellor, derived comfort from the surprise expressed by the visiting French delegation at Lapalme's attitude, citing this as proof the French had not lost "le juste sens de choses." Garneau reassured Ottawa that although Quebec would likely continue to make minimal efforts to keep Ottawa informed of its cultural activities with France, the embassy's contacts in Paris would ensure Ottawa remained informed.³² The diplomat made no reference, however, to the impact on the federal position in the event of a shift of French attitudes.

The Race for Agreements

Triangular cultural relations continued to expand after Malraux's visit and became a primary source of tension. Federal sensitivity increased over Quebec City's attempts, consistent with the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, to establish a direct cultural collaboration with Paris. Ottawa was progressively more concerned over the French

Memorandum from European Division to Cadieux, 21 October 1963, Visite de M. André Malraux, Allocution et Déclarations publiques. Also, DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 –Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to Ottawa, 2 August 1962, Malraux Visit to Canada.

³² DEA, A-3-c, v. 5057, 2727-15-40, p. 1 – Memorandum from Garneau to Robertson and Cadieux, 21 October 1963, essai de bilan de la visite Malraux. Also, Lapalme (1973), 237. Lapalme was consistent; reflecting his antipathy for Ambassador Dupuy and René Garneau, he invited Malraux to visit Quebec during a spring 1962 visit to Paris and informed Canada's Embassy only after the fact.

response to Quebec overtures, notwithstanding the MAE's attempts to give satisfaction to the Quebec requests that had the Elysée's backing, while avoiding a direct confrontation with Ottawa.

The first example was the agreement facilitating Canadian bureaucrats' studies at France's *École nationale de l'administration* (ENA). A result of contacts between ENA and Canadian universities, notably Monsignor Irénée Lussier, Rector of the Université de Montréal, the plan called for a dozen candidates, the only stipulation being a fluency in French. After enthusiastic responses from Quebec City and Ottawa, an exchange of letters during Pearson's 1964 visit to Paris established the programme. The project, allegedly proposed by Quebec lobby members Philippe Rossillon and Bernard Dorin, reflected Paris' growing interest in Quebec, especially as the Elysée intervened to ensure there were funds for the exchanges. It also provided another occasion for differences between Ottawa and Quebec City. The latter considered the ENA Agreement a federal incursion into Quebec's education jurisdiction, made more bitter by two of the posts going to federal bureaucrats, whereas Quebec believed that Quebec civil servants had priority.³³ In addition to the latent constitutional dispute, the Ottawa-Quebec differences over the ENA Agreement stemmed from the fact that in proposing it to Ottawa, Bousquet failed to mention the

³³ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 7, France-Actim, Ententes & Accords Coopération Technique – Note to R. Morin, Directeur de la coopération technique, 13 February 1964, attitude à prendre au sujet de coopération culturelle entre Ottawa et Paris; Gaston Cholette, *Au Service du Québec: Souvenirs* (Septentrion, 1994): 108; Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier, *Le Lobby du Québec à Paris: Les Précurseurs du Général de Gaulle* (Éditions Québec-Amérique, 2002), 69. Dorin claims that he and Rossillon enlisted the Elysée's support for the programme owing to the MAE's initial opposition.

existing agreement-in-principle between ENA's director and Gaston Cholette, so that the subsequent federal participation appeared an effort to outflank Quebec.³⁴

Marcel Cadieux, by this time the DEA's Under-secretary, raised the matter with Bousquet at the end of June 1964. Cadieux urged that to avoid future problems, Ottawa be kept better informed of contacts between Quebec and French official bodies. Preoccupied with safeguarding the federal prerogative in foreign affairs, Cadieux also warned against *post hoc* transformations into Canada-France agreements those arrangements generated through contacts between Quebec City and French organizations, including those of a quasi-public nature.³⁵

The dispute over the ENA agreement was an early indication of the extent to which the growth of France-Quebec education cooperation contributed to triangular tensions. In an immediate sense, education was the epicentre of the triangular relationship, the point of convergence of Canadian intergovernmental rivalries. Education was the centrepiece of the Quiet Revolution, and as the Quebec state took over the education system, it assumed the responsibility for the preservation and promotion of Quebec's francophone majority identity. It was determined to act on this responsibility at home and abroad, and committed to safeguarding against any federal encroachments.³⁶ Neo-nationalist aims, however, conflicted with Ottawa's equally strong determination to maintain its prerogative in foreign affairs, and the federal commitment to fund post-secondary education and research that was considered essential to Canada's national development. The rivalry was consistent

³⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Memorandum to File by Cadieux, 25 June 1964, Nos Relations avec la France.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Michael D. Behiels, *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution, Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 149-184.

with the broader international emphasis of education as the vehicle for modernization and prosperity and as a vehicle for cross-cultural exchanges. Paris attached a high priority to education in this regard, reflected in the number of grants for foreign students to study in France increasing from just under three thousand in 1959 to more than five times that by 1967.³⁷

The increasingly official nature of the cultural rapprochement was reflected in the Maison du Québec's multiplying activities in the education sector, to the point that Charles Lussier recommended organizing a *Service de l'enseignement* in the Quebec office to co-ordinate these. Similarly, the new French cultural attachés were instructed that education cooperation was their foremost task.³⁸ The establishment of the Quebec Ministry of Education in 1964 further politicized cultural affairs. To frame Quebec-France cooperation in the domain, Gaston Cholette approached Ambassador Bousquet to propose an education cooperation agreement, one that emphasized university-level exchanges.³⁹

During his May 1964 visit to Quebec, Xavier Deniau, a member of France's National Assembly, head of its *Groupe parlementaire d'étude sur le Québec*, and a Quebec lobby member, discussed the education cooperation agreement with Bousquet, Lesage, and Gérin-Lajoie. When the French Embassy informed Ottawa of the proposed agreement at the end of June 1964, Paul Martin wrote Bousquet

³⁷ William R. Pendergast, "UNESCO and French Cultural Relations, 1945-1970," *International Organization* Summer 1976, 30(3): 470.

³⁸ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel – Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris, Letter from Lussier to Rousseau, 15 June 1962; MAE, v. 173 – Note to File, 3 October 1961, Relations culturelles franco-canadiennes.

³⁹ Paul Gérin-Lajoie, *Combats d'un révolutionnaire tranquille* (Centre Éducatif et Culturel, 1989), 322; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Memorandum from Dench, Information Division, to Cadieux, 25 June 1964; MAE, v. 327 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, 18 July 1964, Conclusion d'un accord de coopération et échanges universitaires entre le Canada et la France – Échange de lettres franco-québécois.

emphasizing that Ottawa welcomed expanded education contacts between Paris and Quebec City, but that any official agreement would require federal consent in order to respect its prerogative in foreign affairs. Given the time constraints involved and a concern not to be perceived as interfering in Quebec's jurisdiction, the DEA agreed to a triangular arrangement similar to that employed in a recent France-Quebec agreement on engineering exchanges: negotiations would be mainly between Paris and Quebec City, with Ottawa joining at the final stage to signal its consent and safeguard the federal prerogative through an exchange of letters with Paris. Ottawa also made clear to French officials its expectation that any France-Quebec agreement would be provisional, to be superseded by a larger France-Canada cultural agreement to be negotiated.⁴⁰

Ottawa having given its approval, discussions on the agreement intensified. Bousquet emphasized to Paris the exceptional significance of the proposal, explaining that Quebec expected France to play an inspirational and educational role that would provide an unparalleled opportunity to influence the formation of Quebec youth. He also predicted that the agreement would encourage similar cooperation with Ottawa and the other provinces. Similarly, Lesage referred to notions of cultural solidarity in lauding the project to de Gaulle. The Premier characterized the agreement as a crucial tool for Quebec to build the structures indispensable to its future, realize the potential of the Quiet Revolution, and as a means to solidify Quebec's links with

⁴⁰ Thomson (1988), 127; Roussel (1983), 300; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Memorandum to File by Cadieux, 25 June 1964, Nos Relations avec la France; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Letter from Bousquet to Cadieux, 26 June 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 30 June 1964; MAE, v. 327 – Programme de Coopération et d'Échanges Universitaires entre la France et la Province du Québec, 2 November 1964, Annexe, Lettre de Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Extérieures Canada, à Son Excellence Monsieur Raymond Bousquet, Ambassadeur de France, 9 July 1964. The engineering exchanges agreement is discussed in chapter 14.

France and the larger international francophone community.⁴¹ During his February 1965 visit to Paris to sign the agreement, Gérin-Lajoie confided to Alain Peyrefitte, France's Minister of Information, that he considered it essential to combat *joualistes* like playwright Michel Tremblay and singer Robert Charlebois and purify the French spoken in Quebec.⁴² The Quebec minister's remarks were consistent with the nationalist elite's orientation toward France as part of its self-appointed mission to protect the general population from Americanization and preserve the integrity of Quebec's French heritage. The remarks also underscored that notwithstanding the eclipse of traditional nationalist hostility for *France moderne*, divisions endured between Quebec nationalists, notably between the bourgeois elite and the popular classes, over Quebec's *americanité* and its appropriate relationship to France.

The evolution of the negotiations of the education agreement provided a barometer of the growing Quebec assertiveness. An initial round of talks between Paris and Quebec City resulted in the proposal that Gérin-Lajoie would sign a series of agreements with a quasi-public organization to be established in Paris, and that would be capped by a France-Quebec committee to administer the programmes.⁴³ Gérin-Lajoie and Lesage subsequently pronounced this insufficient, however, and counter-proposed a more ambitious scheme providing for direct government financing for professorial exchanges instead of leaving this to universities. Gérin-Lajoie believed this arrangement, consistent with the neo-nationalists' education

⁴¹ MAE, v. 205, Deuxième séjour à Paris de Monsieur Lesage, Premier Ministre du Québec, 7-11 novembre 1964 – Note au Président de Gaulle du Premier Ministre, Monsieur Jean Lesage, 9 November 1964.

⁴² MAE, v. 327 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, 18 July 1964, Conclusion d'un accord de coopération et échanges universitaires entre le Canada et la France – Échange de lettres franco-québécois; Alain Peyrefitte, *De Gaulle et le Québec* (Stanké, 2000), 40-41.

⁴³ MAE, v. 320 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 18 July 1964.

agenda, would assist Quebec's Ministry of Education to gain greater control over the province's post-secondary institutions and ensure they served the general interest.⁴⁴

Federal nervousness over the trend of negotiations grew during the autumn of 1964. A letter about the agreement from Lesage to de Gaulle that Ambassador Léger was to deliver contained passages indicating the project appeared to be taking on a more formal tone, with implications for the federal prerogative in foreign affairs. Among these were references to Quebec as a "pays," and the use of the term "accord," significant in international law, to refer to the agreement. Moreover, although Lesage proposed originally that the agreement be signed by the Quebec and French Ministers of Education, he now suggested to de Gaulle that the agreement should also be signed by Jean Basdevant, head of the MAE's Cultural Relations division. Federal officials feared that this procedure would diminish the agreement's provisional aspect and give it a more formal, permanent authority.⁴⁵ Indeed, Gérin-Lajoie, anticipating his speech to Montreal's consular community a few months later, asserted to Basdevant that Quebec had a right to sign international agreements in its fields of jurisdiction. The MAE official, however, convinced him to accept a less formal authentication method to avoid angering Ottawa, reflecting the MAE's

⁴⁴ MAE, v. 327 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, 18 July 1964, Conclusion d'un accord de coopération et échanges universitaires entre le Canada et la France; MAE, v. 327 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, Accords de coopération éducationnelle franco-qubécois, Projet « large ».

⁴⁵ MAE, v. 327 – Note au Président de Gaulle du Premier Ministre, Monsieur Jean Lesage, 9 November 1964; DEA, A-3-C, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 13 November 1964, Canada-France Relations in the light of Mr. Lesage's Recent visit to Paris; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Notes for Conversation with M. Basdevant, 18 November 1964.

preference to give satisfaction to Quebec's increasingly ambitious demands while avoiding as much as possible conflict with federal authorities.⁴⁶

The federal government, anxious about the emerging triangular dynamic and its impact on national unity, instructed Jules Léger, in presenting Lesage's letter at the Elysée to convey Ottawa's "reservation," and that it considered the proposed agreement only of a technical and provisional nature that would eventually be superseded.⁴⁷ Léger carried out the demarche reluctantly, fearing it would signal federal misgivings about France-Quebec links and annoy the Elysée, dragging it into the Canadian jurisdictional quarrel. The ambassador believed his warning that federal oversensitivity would alienate the Elysée and harm Canadian interests was vindicated by de Gaulle's deliberate refusal to invite him to attend the luncheon de Gaulle hosted when Lesage subsequently visited. Paul Martin disputed the suggestion of a direct link between the demarche and snub, but expressed concern over what the episode portended.⁴⁸

Marcel Cadieux reiterated Ottawa's concern about the evolving negotiations to Jean Basdevant when the MAE official visited Canada in November 1964 to finalize the agreement with Quebec officials. The DEA Under-secretary also emphasized federal desire for expanded cultural France-Quebec relations that avoided any constitutional complications. Exemplifying the MAE's delicate balancing act, Basdevant reminded Cadieux that Paris had only entered into the negotiations after

⁴⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Message from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 25 November 1964. Also, Guy Frégault, *Chronique des années perdues* (Leméac, 1976), 98-99. Frégault confirms this MAE proclivity, citing as an example that it took some time to convert Jean Basdevant to the Quebec cause, not least because he had been posted to the Canadian Embassy during the controversy over *Les Enfants du paradis* in the immediate post-war period.

⁴⁷ Thomson (1988), 136; Patry (1980), 62.

⁴⁸ DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FRA-1964/3 – Letter from Martin to Léger, 25 November 1964; DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FRA-1964/3 – Personal Letter from Léger to Martin, 13 November 1964.

Ottawa expressed its approval, and gave him assurances that there was no question of a formal diplomatic agreement between Paris and Quebec City. Cadieux, however, was unable to secure the inclusion in the Ottawa-Paris exchange of letters that were to cover the France-Quebec agreement a reference to it being an interim measure that would be capped by an eventual Canada-France cultural accord. Basdevant argued Quebec authorities would object to the term “interim”; instead, Cadieux agreed that the exchange of letters would simply take note of the arrangements between France and Quebec and refer to a Canada-France accord to be negotiated.⁴⁹

Despite this meeting, and the assurances Maurice Couve de Murville gave Paul Martin, developments in Quebec remained a concern for Ottawa.⁵⁰ Cadieux opposed Claude Morin’s suggestion that the agreement be termed a “joint declaration,” arguing that this gave the agreement a more formal tone and that press and public opinion would interpret it as evidence that Quebec sought a separate international personality. The issue was resolved when the two officials agreed on use of the term “entente” for the agreement that provided for exchanges of university professors, researchers and students, teacher training, the improvement of technical instruction, increased harmonization of France and Quebec’s educational systems, and the establishing of the *Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise* to facilitate the collaboration. It was also arranged that rather than a simple initialling of the entente, Gérin-Lajoie and the French Minister of National

⁴⁹ DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FRA-1964/3 – Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le 18 novembre 1964 à 9:30 à l’occasion de la visite de Monsieur Basdevant à Ottawa.

⁵⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 December 1964.

Education, Christian Fouchet, would sign it, a more formal procedure under international law.⁵¹

Cadieux's preoccupations with Quebec intentions were justified. As Gaston Cholette has recalled, Quebec officials were determined to give the entente as formal a character as possible; they achieved this by including a preamble that referred to the November 1964 Lesage-de Gaulle conversations.⁵² Although the federal prerogative in foreign affairs was safeguarded ostensibly by the exchange of letters between Martin and the French Embassy's charge d'affaires the same day that the *France-Quebec Education Entente* was signed in Paris, Cadieux expressed annoyance that Quebec nationalists were exploiting a strictly cultural agreement to advance their political agenda.⁵³ Indeed, members of the Quebec delegation Gérin-Lajoie led to Paris did not hide from French officials their belief that Quebec was signing its first international agreement. The Quebec minister characterized publicly Ottawa's role in the negotiations as an "observant consentant" in asserting Quebec had acted in complete independence. He subsequently cited the agreement in his April 1965 remarks that became the basis for the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine.⁵⁴ Federal concerns were exacerbated further by the welcome French authorities accorded the Quebec minister, including several ministerial meetings and a hastily arranged private audience with de

⁵¹ DEA, A-3-c, v.10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 21 January 1965; MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 12 February 1965; Thomson (1988), 140; Gérin-Lajoie (1989), 323. The appellation of the commission was apparently proposed by Bousquet, intended to signal the indefinite nature of the agreement.

⁵² Gaston Cholette, *Au Service du Québec: Souvenirs* (Septentrion, 1994), 115.

⁵³ MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Pampelonne to MAE, Amérique, 27 February 1965; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2 – Memorandum for the Minister, 23 February 1965; Thomson (1988), 142. In spite of the federal position that the entente carried no weight in international law, Jean-Marc Léger described it as an important step in Quebec's achieving a separate international personality, and Jacques-Yvan Morin claimed Ambassador Léger had "done everything to block the entente" that had been realized only as a result of de Gaulle's personal intervention.

⁵⁴ MAE, v. 327 – Note to File, 1 March 1965, Visite à Paris de M. Gérin-Lajoie (26 février-2 mars).

Gaulle. Ottawa was similarly unimpressed by the fact France's Minister of Education, Christian Fouchet, referred to the entente as an "accord" and "treaty" during its signing.⁵⁵

Even as Quebec City congratulated itself on having strengthened its claims to the internationalization of its education jurisdiction, the entente and its reverberations fuelled Ottawa's determination to reach a cultural agreement with Paris, an *accord cadre* to provide a clearly defined framework for future France-Quebec cultural agreements and thereby safeguard the federal prerogative in foreign affairs. Mindful of the fact that Canada's own evolution to international sovereignty was a result of the gradual accumulation of precedents that culminated in the *Statute of Westminster*, the DEA insisted when the education entente was first discussed that it could not serve as a precedent for future agreements. To avoid a constitutional challenge based on precedent, Ottawa was compelled to develop a long-term policy to facilitate cultural links between the provinces and foreign states in a manner that respected provincial jurisdiction and federal authority in foreign affairs.⁵⁶ The DEA hoped that the accord cadre would achieve this by acting as *a priori* ratification and providing a co-ordinating mechanism between Ottawa, Paris and the provinces.⁵⁷

In December 1964, Couve de Murville informed Martin of Paris' agreement to the Canadian proposal.⁵⁸ Basdevant received Ottawa's proposed draft of the accord

⁵⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2 – Letter from Halstead, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Cadieux, 5 March 1965; Gérin-Lajoie (1989), 324.

⁵⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Memorandum from European Division to the USSEA, 30 June 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Telex from Léger to DEA, 8 July 1964.

⁵⁷ DEA, A-4, v. 3497, 19-1-BA-FRA-1964/3 – Procès-verbal de la réunion tenue le 18 novembre 1964 à 9:30 à l'occasion de la visite de Monsieur Basdevant à Ottawa.

⁵⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 December 1964.

cadre six months later.⁵⁹ The federal aim was to ensure any arrangement did not entail an unconditional and unfettered provincial competence to negotiate independently with France. What Ottawa sought was a *droit de regard* to safeguard its foreign affairs prerogative. To federal officials, this meant Paris was obliged to consult and inform Ottawa of its intentions to negotiate with any provincial government, and communicate any proposed agreements sufficiently in advance to permit Ottawa to determine if it fell within the purview of the accord cadre and was consistent with Canadian foreign policy. It also provided that federal “explicit consent” would be required for any agreements.⁶⁰ More broadly, Ottawa considered the agreement the means to ensure balanced French cultural activities in Canada, a guarantee that francophone minorities outside Quebec and anglophone Canadians would not be neglected as France-Quebec links expanded.⁶¹

Quebec City was suspicious of the federal initiative. Provided detail of the project at the beginning of 1965, Quebec officials expressed concerns about the reference to educational exchanges in the agreement and lobbied for the inclusion of a provision about the constitutional limits on Ottawa’s international action in areas of provincial jurisdiction.⁶² Claude Morin was briefed on the accord cadre during his visit to Ottawa following the pronouncement of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. The Quebec official was told by his federal counterparts that Ottawa, aware of Quebec reticence about any measure perceived to reduce the education entente’s significance, was willing to include in the agreement a provision permitting provinces to follow the

⁵⁹ MAE, v. 327 – Note pour le Ministre, 31 May 1965, Relations culturelles.

⁶⁰ MAE, v. 328 – Canadian Counter-Proposal, Canadian Embassy, Paris, 10 September 1965.

⁶¹ MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 1 April 1965; MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 13 April 1965.

⁶² Patry (1980), 64.

procedure followed for the France-Quebec entente. The federal concession was made notwithstanding the original motivation for the accord cadre. Morin questioned Ottawa's good faith, however, when the federal Minister of Forestry and Rural Development, Maurice Sauvé, confided to him that the proposal he had been provided was at that moment before the federal Cabinet, which hoped to arrive at a policy in advance of Paul Martin's imminent visit to Paris. Morin was successful in getting Sauvé to delay any definitive decision until after Lesage and Gérin-Lajoie had the chance to discuss the matter with Pearson a week later.⁶³

Paris was thus confronted with – and implicated in – this intergovernmental rivalry. France's ambassador, François Leduc, informed Paris of Quebec's reserved reaction to the federal initiative, including Gerin-Lajoie's assurance that Quebec would not take advantage of the envisaged framework, but would continue using the procedure followed for the education entente.⁶⁴ Leduc characterized Ottawa's accord cadre as a rejoinder to the stir the education entente caused. Nevertheless, he recommended that Paris seize the occasion to expand cultural relations at the federal level, and profit from the Ottawa-Quebec City rivalry to increase its cultural activities in Canada, while still concentrating its effort on Quebec.⁶⁵

Quebec officials also informed the Quebec lobby in Paris of the situation. André Patry, who had been appointed advisor to the new interministerial committee responsible for Quebec's international activities, wrote Jean Basdevant to alert him to

⁶³ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from Morin to Lesage, 30 April 1965, Voyage à Ottawa.

⁶⁴ MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 31 May 1965.

⁶⁵ MAE, v. 327 – Note for the Minister, 31 May 1965, Relations culturelles; MAE, v. 328 – Note: problèmes d'information au Canada, 2 June 1965.

the fact that Quebec City disapproved of the accord cadre. Patry also contacted René de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, the Elysée diplomatic counsellor, requesting that in light of Quebec's reservations, that Paris limit the France-Canada cultural accord's visible dramatic impact by finalizing it through an exchange of letters instead of a formal agreement.⁶⁶

During the accord cadre negotiations, French attitudes were guided by a concern to respond to Ottawa's initiative in a manner that respected Quebec objections. Despite federal expectations and earlier French assurances, when Marcel Cadieux proposed placing the France-Quebec Education Entente formally in the accord cadre, Leduc expressed concern this would raise difficulties with Quebec City.⁶⁷ Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, the new head of the MAE's *Amérique* division and a Quebec lobby member, argued that rather than being obliged to keep Ottawa informed of any new France-Quebec agreements, the French responsibility should be limited to an exchange of letters with federal authorities, and that it should be up to Quebec City to work out administrative arrangements with Ottawa. This would ensure that Paris was not compelled to serve as a *de facto* agent of federal authority in Canadian jurisdictional quarrels.⁶⁸ Jurgensen's professed neutrality, however, was effectively an endorsement of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, in that it did not fully acknowledge Ottawa's primacy in foreign affairs. To the French official, arguably Quebec's foremost advocate at the Quai d'Orsay, Quebec's wishes were of a higher priority than avoiding offending Ottawa.

⁶⁶ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9 – Letter from Patry to Basdevant, 13 July 1965; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9 – Letter from Patry to de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, 11 September 1965.

⁶⁷ MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 13 April 1965.

⁶⁸ MAE, v. 328 – Note from Jurgensen for MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques, 11 June 1965.

The triangular dynamic was evident in the back-channel contacts between French representatives and Quebec City as Ottawa and Paris negotiated the accord cadre. Lesage complained to Leduc that Ottawa had not kept Quebec City informed of the accord cadre discussions, and told him that Quebec, consistent with the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, could not accept without public protest the idea of diplomatic consultations between Ottawa and Paris on the nature and subject matter of France-Quebec agreements.⁶⁹

The impact of these parallel France-Quebec negotiations was quickly apparent. Lesage expressed a desire for the replacement in the text of the expression “consentement explicite” with regard to Ottawa’s consent to future agreements, characterizing the provision as insulting. Accordingly, Basdevant obtained changes to the proposed agreement consistent with the Premier’s request. Similarly, although Quebec’s Delegate-General, Jean Chapdelaine, described Basdevant as willing to go along with Ottawa’s “train d’enfer” to conclude the cultural agreement, the MAE official’s cooperation had its limits. He had ensured that the accord cadre would not contravene the core principles of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, thereby defusing the “bombe” Ottawa intended by it. Indeed, the MAE official’s efforts revealed a growing pro-Quebec sympathy in the MAE, as, consistent with Jurgensen’s recommendations, they limited Paris’ responsibility to keeping Ottawa informed of any negotiations with Quebec to a basic notification, with the onus on federal authorities to seek information from the provincial government. There was no reference in the accord, for example, to the federal interpretation of the constitutional basis for the conduct of Canada’s foreign affairs. Instead, this would be contained in

⁶⁹ MAE, v. 328 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 13 September 1965.

an accompanying exchange of letters consisting of a federal declaration of which Paris would simply take note.⁷⁰

Chapdelaine's account of Basdevant's efforts demonstrates the strength of the France-Quebec axis and its ability to undermine federal aims. The resulting *France-Canada Cultural Agreement* provided for the development of education, cultural, scientific, technical and artistic exchanges between France and Canada's provinces. Ottawa obtained its framework agreement, but this fell short of the goals contributing to the original federal motivation; Paris had only to "inform" Ottawa, the reference to education exchanges was watered down to respect Quebec jurisdictional concerns, and there was no acknowledgement in the text that France recognized federal claims to exclusive control over foreign affairs. Consistent with Patry's earlier lobbying, the agreement was signed not by Couve de Murville, but Leduc, reducing its symbolic importance. The accord cadre's *raison d'être* had also been undermined by the federal concession that ententes between France and Canadian provinces could refer either to the accord cadre, or follow the exchange of letters procedure employed for the France-Quebec education entente. In Chapdelaine's opinion, this meant Quebec's capacity for international activity remained secure.⁷¹ Increasingly, Quebec City with Paris' assistance was gaining the upper hand in its disputes with Ottawa not only over culture, but the conduct of foreign affairs.

Ottawa's decision to proceed with an agreement that fell short of its original motivations is explained partly by the fact that parallel to the accord cadre

⁷⁰ MAE, v. 328 – Letter from Basdevant to Léger, 14 September 1965; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 5 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Morin, 20 September 1965, Accord culturel – Vos lettres du 7 et du 9 septembre 1965.

⁷¹ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 5 – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 20 September 1965, Accord culturel – Vos lettres du 7 et du 9 septembre 1965; Thomson (1988), 164-165.

negotiations, Paris and Quebec City reached another, broader cultural cooperation agreement. During preparations for the first meeting of the *Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise*, in a suggestion reflective of the strengthening France-Quebec axis and growing federal marginalization, Basdevant told Leduc that the committee should not limit itself to educational issues contained in the education entente, but should examine cultural relations as a whole. The senior MAE official even opined that the entente could be used to facilitate France-Quebec cultural cooperation in areas under Ottawa's jurisdiction, such as telecommunications.⁷²

Basdevant's ambitions, however, were surpassed by those in Quebec City. The new Minister of Cultural Affairs, Pierre Laporte, suggested to Basdevant that a new France-Quebec cultural agreement be negotiated. The suggestion revealed the centrifugal forces within the Lesage Cabinet and the growing assertiveness of neo-nationalism, as Laporte's initiative was designed partly to match Gerin-Lajoie's success regarding the education entente and avoid the growing France-Quebec cultural rapprochement falling under the exclusive authority of the Ministry of Education. Laporte's deputy minister, Guy Frégault, a staunch supporter of the Gerin-Lajoie doctrine, saw a second agreement as a means to advance Quebec's claims to international action. Ottawa's proposed accord cadre provided a further impetus to this aspect of the second agreement.⁷³

⁷² MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Basdevant to French Embassy, Ottawa, 30 April 1965. Also, Comeau and Fournier (2002), 72-73. Quebec lobby and former diplomat Bernard Dorin recalled that the involvement of Basdevant and another senior official, Édouard Tysset, in these negotiations was indicative of the fact that those favouring Quebec were in the ascendancy in Paris and at the MAE.

⁷³ MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 18 May 1965; MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Basdevant, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques to French Embassy, Ottawa, 21 May 1965; MAE, v. 327 – Note for the Minister, 31 May 1965, Relations culturelles; MAE, v. 328 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 13 September 1965; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 94, p. 1 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, Séance du 11 mai 1965; Morin (1987), 41-42; Patry (1980), 64;

Basdevant agreed to Laporte's proposal. Mindful of federal sensitivities, he suggested initially that the new agreement could be finalized after the accord cadre was concluded. Leduc disagreed however, arguing that Quebec concerns over the proposed France-Canada agreement or any federal effort to challenge its international activities, argued in favour of Paris and Quebec City moving rapidly to draft, negotiate, and sign the second cultural entente before the accord cadre negotiations were too advanced.⁷⁴ For his part, de Gaulle expressed personal interest in what Jean Chapdelaine described to him as the first cultural agreement between two French communities engaged to promote the respect, purity, and propagation of the French language.⁷⁵

Although the possibility of a second agreement was referred to vaguely during Lesage's talks with Pearson in early May 1965, news of the proposed second France-Quebec cultural agreement provoked concerns in Ottawa, a reaction exacerbated by Quebec City's officially notifying the DEA regarding the initiative only after Laporte left for Paris to discuss it. Upon Laporte's declaration after his meeting with André Malraux that there was an agreement in principle on a second entente, Canada's embassy told the MAE that Ottawa desired to facilitate Quebec's international activities, but expected to be consulted in advance of any formal talks. In the interim,

Roussel (1983), 306-307; Thomson (1988), 156. Evidence of the internal political dimension was the fact Laporte made the announcement he would be going to Paris to negotiate the second agreement despite explicit instructions from Lesage that there were to be no public declarations regarding Quebec's international activities. Similar evidence of the rivalry in the Lesage Government was the Premier's lobbying to have Laporte sign the proposed agreement in Paris with André Malraux, so that a balance of prestige was maintained with Gérin-Lajoie.

⁷⁴ MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Basdevant, MAE, Affaires Culturelles et Techniques to French Embassy, Ottawa, 21 May 1965; MAE, v. 327 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 31 May 1965.

⁷⁵ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Lesage, 27 July 1965.

Ottawa took solace from the efforts underway to achieve the accord cadre, and the assurances Cadieux had received a few days prior in Paris from the Secretary-General of the MAE, Éric de Carbonnel, and Jean-Daniel Jurgensen that there were no plans for further France-Quebec agreements.⁷⁶

Consequently, the DEA was alarmed when it learned at the end of August from the Paris embassy that negotiations of the France-Quebec cultural agreement were well-advanced, a report Claude Morin confirmed. Cadieux was annoyed and frustrated, considering the *fait accompli* a betrayal by French officials given the earlier assurances he had received in Paris. The DEA Under-secretary was also concerned that the draft that Morin provided of the French government's proposed text appeared to release Paris from any obligation to inform Ottawa when it entered into any future agreements with Quebec, which, by facilitating direct France-Quebec relations, challenged the federal prerogative in foreign affairs. Cadieux was determined to make French officials understand that international law and diplomatic courtesy dictated no country could treat with a part of another without keeping the central government informed. Far from exporting Canada's constitutional debate, the Under-secretary believed it had become necessary to protect against foreign involvement in it.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2.2 – Message from SSEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 19 May 1965; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2.2 – Message from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 23 August 1965; Thomson (1988), 156, 160.

⁷⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2.2 – Message from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 23 August 1965; DEA, A-3-c, v. 11642, 30-14-7-1, p. 1 – Letter from Morin to Cadieux, 26 August 1965; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2.2 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 1 September 1965. The chronology of events suggests Jurgensen and de Carbonnel did not deliberately mislead Cadieux during their May 1965 talks; however, the subsequent lack of consultation once negotiations were underway reveals a marked preference for Quebec City.

Consternation in Ottawa was paralleled by quiet satisfaction in Quebec City. Morin considered that Quebec had been correct in expressing its international ambitions a few months prior and thereby demonstrating its firm intentions. He believed, however, that as negotiations reached a conclusion, and in anticipation of similar agreements with other countries, that Quebec should adopt a more discreet attitude. Morin worried that public declarations from Quebec government figures regarding the foreign affairs rivalry would provoke Ottawa, lead to delays and possibly impede Quebec City's future international activity. Morin contended that too much was at stake and that notwithstanding Ottawa's realization of the accord cadre, the France-Quebec cultural agreement would strengthen Quebec's bid for an international personality, as would the success he anticipated of efforts to gain the right to name members of Canadian delegations to international meetings. Lesage acted on Morin's recommendation to instruct the Cabinet to avoid any public or private comments that Ottawa could seize upon to interfere with the realization of the second France-Quebec entente.⁷⁸

Despite the mounting tensions, Morin and Cadieux remained in contact. Cadieux even obtained a number of revisions to make the proposed agreement more acceptable to Ottawa. These revisions, however, came at the price of federal acceptance that there would be no reference in this second France-Quebec entente to the accord cadre, in keeping with neo-nationalist preoccupations to assert the Gérin-

⁷⁸ ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 94, 1965 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil exécutif, Séance du 15 septembre 1965; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from Morin to Lesage, 15 September 1965, les relations internationales du Québec.

Lajoie doctrine and Quebec autonomy in cultural affairs.⁷⁹ There were additional examples of the triangular dynamic in the latter stages of the negotiations. French officials were concerned over the federal insistence on a reference in the accompanying Paris-Ottawa exchange of letters to federal involvement in the negotiations, something Paris and Quebec City's actions had ensured had not been the case. Leduc visited Morin secretly to urge him to inquire of the DEA about the proposed letters to ensure Quebec had no objections.⁸⁰ When Morin did so, federal officials informed him that the passage referring to Ottawa's involvement was designed to avoid any repeat of the claims of an independent Quebec action that accompanied the education entente.⁸¹ Despite Paris' efforts to eliminate any reference to trilateral negotiations, Quebec officials informed Leduc that they had conceded on the point, given the gains Morin had secured in his talks with Cadieux, not the least being references in the entente to its being between the "Government of Quebec" and "Government of the French Republic."⁸²

Although news of the Laporte and Gérin-Lajoie visit to Paris quickly changed Cadieux's opinion, he expressed relative satisfaction with the outcome of this latest negotiation, affirming that even if the proposed agreement was more detailed than its February 1965 predecessor, there were no doubts left about Ottawa being kept

⁷⁹ Roussel (1983), 308; Thomson (1988), 163-164. Morin told Chapdelaine that this "goodwill" gesture was motivated partly by his awareness that "la France tiendra le ministère des Affaires extérieures informé et j'ai mieux poser un geste de courtoisie qui, au lieu de nous nuire, peut être utile." The changes Cadieux was able to secure included deletion of references to "pays," "peuple," "état," and "citoyens." References to the French and Quebec "gouvernements" were retained.

⁸⁰ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 61/1 – Chronological Notes by Morin, undated.

⁸¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2.2 – Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 20 November 1965.

⁸² MAE, v. 328 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 23 November 1965.

informed of the negotiations and federal prerogatives.⁸³ This second entente was more formal in tone, however, which according to Dale Thomson, marked a further step toward recognition of the province's right to enter into agreements with other countries. Much broader in scope than the education entente, it was intended to facilitate the panoply of cultural links, and expand the mandate of the *Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise*.⁸⁴

A final example of the triangular dynamic in the race for agreements was the question of timing. Initially adamant that Quebec City sign its entente with Paris before the completion of the accord cadre, Claude Morin feared that failure to do so would invite federal claims that it fell within the new federally-sanctioned framework, and make it appear that the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine was a dead letter.⁸⁵ Ottawa was equally determined to see the accord cadre concluded first. Aware of Ottawa's desire in this regard, Paris conceded the point during negotiations Marcel Cadieux conducted in the French capital. The concession, however, was ephemeral. It occurred after French officials had been informed that Lesage and Morin were satisfied that the accord cadre would not restrict Quebec's international activities as much as had been feared, and were thus willing to see the France-Quebec cultural entente concluded after the accord cadre. Ottawa had won the race for agreements, but the federal concessions extracted during the triangular negotiations suggested the victory was pyrrhic.⁸⁶

⁸³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 2.2 – Memorandum for the Minister, 17 November 1965, Signature of France-Quebec Cultural Entente.

⁸⁴ Thomson (1988), 163; Roussel (1983), 310.

⁸⁵ Thomson (1988), 163.

⁸⁶ MAE, v. 328 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 13 September 1965; MAE, v. 328 – Note for the Secrétaire-Général, 3 November 1965, Accord culturel franco-canadien; Roussel (1983), 309; Patry (1980), 65.

Paris, Quebec City and Ottawa's frenetic efforts to reach the various cultural agreements of 1965 testified to the intensifying triangular relations and tensions. The agreements also drew attention to the clashing nationalist reactions – and the intergovernmental rivalries – in the cultural domain. The post-war proliferation and politicization of cultural links, coupled with Quebec neo-nationalist preoccupations to safeguard Quebec's majority francophone identity, had encouraged Quebec City to establish the bases of an enduring cooperation with Paris. The Quebec overtures received an enthusiastic response in France, guided by its own nationalist concern about the *rayonnement* of French culture and its openness to the precepts of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. Ottawa also moved to cultivate cultural links with France, not least to respond to Quebec neo-nationalism and assert its exclusive control over foreign affairs. Consistent with the broader trend of triangular relations, however, Ottawa found itself increasingly marginalized. The strengthening France-Quebec axis meant that the cultural agreements, including the accord cadre that Ottawa hoped would provide a stable framework for cultural relations and contribute to national unity, would be used by Paris and Quebec City to challenge and undermine the federal position, and thus become a source of further confrontation.

Chapter 13

Mission Impossible? France-Quebec Economic Relations, 1960-1970

France's representatives in Canada in 1867 considered Confederation to be the first step toward the fledgling Dominion's annexation by the US, and therefore potentially inimical to French interests. One diplomat subsequently recommended convincing Quebec's Premier of the need to seek French economic assistance to reinforce Canada's independence in the face of growing American strength.¹ Similar considerations were present a century later as Quebec neo-nationalists sought francophone economic empowerment as a means to achieve greater autonomy and ensure cultural survival. The Quiet Revolution's economic dimension coincided with the Gaullist challenge to US economic power and efforts to resist Americanization while ensuring French success in an increasingly globalized economy.

The economic dimension of the France-Quebec rapprochement demonstrates, however, that these relations were not without contradiction. Quebec was perceived as requiring French economic assistance to ensure its "émancipation" from "Anglo-Saxon" economic influence, a strategy consistent with the Gaullist challenge to preponderant US power. Interest in economic rapprochement was also fired by the need for ethno-cultural solidarity and a discourse of decolonization. At the same time, however, Quebec was viewed as a francophone society boasting a modern, industrial economy that could work with France to challenge Anglo-American economic predominance, with each serving as the gateway to the other's respective continental markets.

¹ Pierre Savard, *Le Consulat Général de France à Québec et à Montréal de 1859 à 1914* (Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1970), 40.

The complementarity of the Quebecois and the Gaullist nationalist agendas fostered increased economic links, particularly at an official level. These objectives, however, ultimately could not overcome interrelated domestic and international economic realities, notably the growing regionalization of international trade, which meant that the French and Quebec private sectors remained oriented toward their respective regional markets rather than toward each other. A growing private sector perception that France-Quebec economic contacts were being used to promote a political agenda that could lead to instability further dampened interest. France's economic difficulties in 1968 signalled the effective end to the Gaullist challenge to US economic predominance, and undermined France-Quebec cooperation. Ultimately, those trends that facilitated post-war contacts and spawned nationalist calls for France-Quebec economic cooperation – increasing interdependence and transnationalism under the auspices of preponderant US power – curtailed the scope of cooperation.

Le Défi américain

Over the quarter-century after 1945, the volume of world trade doubled every ten years. By 1950 US multinational corporate investment was twice as large as portfolio investment in foreign loans and stocks. By the end of the 1960s, corporate investment was four times as large, and located predominantly in Western Europe, Canada, and Japan.² It was within this context of emerging economic globalization

² Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century* (W.W. Norton and Company, 2006), 293-295; Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford University Press 2003), 77; Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), 85. US investment in Western Europe stood at \$1.7 billion in 1950, but by 1962 had increased to \$8.9 billion, accounting for a quarter

that Quebec opened its Delegation-General in Paris. For Jean Lesage, economic motivations were a foremost consideration, telling France's Ambassador, Francis Lacoste, the office's principal task was to cultivate France-Quebec economic links.³ Speaking at its inauguration, Lesage cited Quebec's need to increase its profile in Europe and urged cooperation, claiming:

[n]ous vous offrons, à vous Français d'abord, de collaborer avec nous à la mise en valeur de toutes les richesses dont [Québec] est si abondamment pourvue. Nous voulons, en quelque sorte, que vos capitaux et que votre énergie créatrice s'ajoutent aux nôtres dans les tâches d'ordre économique auxquelles nous avons entrepris de nous attaquer.⁴

Lesage underscored his economic conception of the Delegation-General in declaring to the Quebec Cabinet that industrial expansion was the priority, and should be the focus of the representatives' principal efforts.⁵

The Premier's position was consistent with the neo-nationalist concern to cultivate economic links with France to dilute "Anglo-Saxon" influence in the Quebec economy, promote francophone economic empowerment, and ensure greater autonomy. It was believed that only through partnering with France could Quebec realize the economic development it desired while preserving its francophone identity. Quebec's Delegate-General, Charles Lussier, hoped Quebec would match

of US investment abroad. European investment in the US started higher, but increased more slowly, from \$2.2 billion in 1950 to \$5.2 billion in 1962. There were more than 2800 "new operations" (i.e. acquisitions, expansions, or new establishments) of US firms in ECM countries from 1958 to 1965.

³ MAE, v. 144 – Telegram from Lacoste to MAE, Amérique, 8 October 1960; Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 93. Quebec's Minister of Trade and Commerce, André Rousseau, agreed to the Maison du Québec, but grumbled that economic and financial considerations dictated the priority should be to establish an office in London. Also, Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier, *Le Lobby du Québec à Paris: Les Précurseurs du Général de Gaulle* (Éditions Québec-Amérique, 2002), 113-114. Claude Morin confirms that Lesage's priority was foremost economic, but notes the competing cultural impetus.

⁴ MAE, v. 146, Agence Générale de la province du Québec à Paris, Inauguration par M. Lesage – *Europe-Canada, Bulletin d'Information*, 14 octobre 1961, Inauguration de la Maison de Québec, Discours de M. Jean Lesage, Premier Ministre du Gouvernement de Québec.

⁵ ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 94, p. 1, 1965 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, Séance du 20 janvier 1965.

Ontario's post-war success in attracting the overwhelming share of European investments in Canada.⁶ Senior officials of Université Laval described the emerging France-Quebec rapprochement as arising from desires to offset two centuries of virtually exclusive Anglo-Saxon investment that had dispossessed French Canada of its industry and finance, and made Montreal an anglophone business centre.⁷

Neo-nationalist economic preoccupations were evident in the shift toward a *dirigiste* economic development policy inspired partly by the French example, and a determination that the Quebec state should take a more activist role in the economy to correct French-Canadian economic marginalization that the previous *laissez-faire* approach was alleged to have produced. The *Conseil d'orientation économique* established by the Godbout Government was revived after having been abolished by Duplessis, and the *Bureau d'Expansion industrielle* and a *Bureau de Recherches économiques et scientifiques* were created. In addition to the nationalization in the hydro-electricity sector that made Hydro-Quebec the flagship of francophone economic empowerment, the *Société général de financement* (SGF) was established in 1962 as a public-private venture to modernize and expand the francophone small and medium-sized small business sector, and the *Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec*, mandated to invest Quebec's pension funds, was to an extent modelled on France's *Caisse des dépôts et consignations*. Other ventures in the steel, energy, mining and forestry sectors followed.⁸ Quebec's Minister of Industry and Commerce,

⁶ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel – Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris, Letter from Lussier to Rousseau, 15 June 1962.

⁷ MAE, v. 276 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 21 July 1965.

⁸ Gaston Cholette, *La coopération économique franco-québécoise, de 1961 à 1997* (Les presses de l'Université Laval 1998), 216; Pierre Arbour, *Québec Inc., and the Temptation of State Capitalism*, translated by Madeleine Hébert (Robert Davies Publishing, 1993), 20-23; Kenneth McRoberts, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*, third edition (McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 132-135.

Gérard-D. Lévesque, described French economic planning as the example best responding to Quebec's priorities, comparing Quebec to France's position in the ECM, planning its economic development without full control over tariffs or other economic levers.⁹

After his 1961 trip to Paris, Jean Lesage expressed the hope that French capital and engineers would be involved in establishing what became known as SIDBEC. The planned Quebec steelworks stemmed from neo-nationalist resentment over the Duplessis-era Ungava deal, a belief that what was considered a disastrous blow to Quebec economic interests could be offset only by establishing a government-owned corporation that would provide Quebec with a crucial prerequisite to the promotion of tertiary industry and national economic development by breaking the province's dependence on Hamilton's steel mills.¹⁰ Quebec's Minister of Natural Resources, René Lévesque, led a mission to Paris to encourage French involvement in Quebec's steel industry, and Gérard-D. Lévesque outlined Quebec's efforts to the *Chambre de Commerce France-Canada* as part of his broader appeal for French aid in helping Quebec modernize, including the training of professors, engineers, civil servants, and entrepreneurs.¹¹ Lesage lobbied for French involvement in SIDBEC during his 1964 visit to Paris and his conversations with de Gaulle. Equally, Gérard

⁹ ANQ, E16, 1960-01-035, v. 56 – Chambre de Commerce France-Canada, Speech by Minister of Industry and Commerce G-D. Lévesque, 30 May 1963.

¹⁰ MAE, v. 146 – Letter from Denizeau, Consul Général de France à Québec to Levasseur, Chargé d'Affaires de France A.I., au Canada, 16 October 1961, Retour du Premier Ministre; MAE, v. 144 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques, Conversations de Québec les 14 et 15 juin [1962], avec MM. Lesage, Rousseau, René Tremblay et Gauvin; MAE, v. 143 – Note to File, 29 October 1958, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, Problèmes de l'économie canadienne en 1958, Rapports avec la France. The idea of French involvement in a steel plant in Quebec had been discussed since the late 1950s. Also, Behiels (1985), 114; McRoberts (1983), 134.

¹¹ MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 16 February 1963, voyage à Paris d'une mission canadienne, dirigée par M. René Leveque [sic], Ministre des Richesses Naturelles; ANQ, E16, 1960-01-035, v. 56, Chambre de Commerce France-Canada – Speech by Minister of Industry and Commerce Gérard-D. Lévesque, 30 May 1963.

Filion, head of the SGF, expressed his preoccupation to facilitate greater Quebec economic independence “dans un orbite français” when he travelled to France the following year to solicit technical and financial aid for the project.¹²

Neo-nationalist interest in economic relations with France was linked to a concern with French-Canadian cultural survival. In calling for greater French economic assistance, Quebec’s leaders invoked the notion of ethno-cultural solidarity. In the words of Gérard-D. Lévesque, French investment would help francophone culture thrive in North America.¹³ René Lévesque and Jean Deschamps, the Deputy Minister of Industry and Commerce expressed a desire that SIDBEC should employ French rather than US methods, and cultural considerations were also invoked in discussions of the French firm *Péchiney*’s possible construction of an aluminium plant on Quebec’s North Shore. A senior Quebec official explained that a French economic presence would provide a significant cultural benefit to the local community.¹⁴ Meeting with de Gaulle in July 1965, Quebec’s Delegate-General, Jean Chapdelaine, argued that French participation in Quebec’s economy was crucial to ensuring French became the language of the workplace and that francophone economic empowerment was a condition of expanding France-Quebec cultural

¹² MAE, v. 205, Deuxième séjour à Paris de Monsieur Lesage, Premier Ministre du Québec, 7-11 novembre 1964 – Partial Transcript for the Ministre de l’Information, 12 November 1964, Voyage Lesage; MAE, v. 293 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 26 November 1965.

¹³ ANQ, E16, 1960-01-035, v. 56, Chambre de Commerce France-Canada – Speech by Minister of Industry and Commerce Gérard-D. Lévesque, 30 May 1963.

¹⁴ MAE, v. 293 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 14 May 1964; ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 212, Investissements Français – Letter from Bélanger, Sous-Ministre, Ministère de l’Industrie et du Commerce, to Claude Morin, 14 September 1967, Compagnie Pechiney.

links.¹⁵ Similarly, Daniel Johnson stressed to de Gaulle the symbolic aspect of France-Quebec economic collaboration:

Il y a des dures réalités quotidiennes auxquelles est soumis notre monde du travail, pour qui il n'existe, trop souvent, de sécurité et de lendemain qu'à l'ombre de la puissance économique des Anglo-Saxons. Aux yeux de l'ouvrier canadien-français, il semble parfois évident que les jeux sont faits. Pouvons nous espérer qu'une collaboration déterminante s'établira entre nous dans tous les domaines de la vie collective?¹⁶

In addition to being employed defensively, ethno-cultural solidarity was cited as an inducement for French investment. According to Gérard-D Lévesque, the common language would ease the task of French managers operating in Quebec. A Quebec government report predicted that international economic trends would dictate that as French firms cast their eyes toward North America, cultural factors would draw them to Quebec.¹⁷

Lesage invoked ethno-cultural considerations to convince de Gaulle to intercede to ensure French automobile manufacturers *Renault* and *Peugeot* established their Canadian assembly plant in Quebec, claiming:

Introduire dans une étude de rentabilité commerciale la question d'affinités entre deux peuples ne me paraît pas déplacé lorsque je m'adresse à un homme d'État dont la carrière est toute marquée du souci de la hiérarchie des valeurs. Je ne veux pas parler seulement de notre désir constant de voir se resserrer davantage avec votre pays nos liens culturels et économiques, mais d'une logique du destin qui doit toujours faire du Québec un collaborateur instinctif de la France.¹⁸

In addition to suggesting that start-up problems would be more easily resolved between partners sharing the same language, and “chez qui une commune souche ethnique favorise une compréhension mutuelle,” Lesage concluded by warning that if

¹⁵ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Lesage, 27 July 1965.

¹⁶ ANF, 5AG1/199 – Letter from Johnson to de Gaulle, 16 September 1967.

¹⁷ ANQ, E16, 1960-01-035, v. 56, Chambre de Commerce France-Canada – Speech by Minister of Industry and Commerce Gérard-D. Lévesque, 30 May 1963; ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 212, Investissements Français – Notes sur les investissements français au Québec, 11 May 1967.

¹⁸ ANF, 5AG1/199 – Letter from Lesage to de Gaulle, 8 October 1963.

the plant were located in another province, “notre fierté française en serait vraiment attristée.” De Gaulle responded by assuring Lesage of his personal interest in French Canada’s development, and while noting that the question of profitability would play a role in terms of the decision, promised that Paris would make every effort to ensure that the decision would correspond to Quebec wishes.¹⁹

Cultural affinities underpinned another of Quebec’s arguments for French investment: the portrayal of Quebec as the “[t]ête de pont des entreprises française en Amérique du Nord,” a “strategic observation post” for French industry to monitor US innovation and engineering, and an open gateway to the American consumer market. Turning nationalist concerns about Quebec’s Americanization on their head, advocates of France-Quebec solidarity argued that together they might conquer North American markets.²⁰ Chapdelaine informed de Gaulle that beyond any political motivations, France should increase its economic presence in Quebec because it was:

un tremplin pour la conquête de marchés, pour la conquête des hommes en Amérique du Nord, pour faire que ce continent ne soit pas, ne puisse jamais redevenir anglo-saxon. Le Québec y aurait son avantage, mais la France aussi.²¹

The idea of Quebec as bridgehead to the American market played a central role in the ultimately successful efforts to attract the French automotive assembly

¹⁹ ANF, 5AG1/199 – Letter from de Gaulle to Lesage, 7 November 1963; Thomson (1988), 108. This letter followed the Premier receiving a non-committal response to a letter he had sent Pompidou, and amid rumours the French auto manufacturers were considering opening the assembly plant in Ontario. Also, Comeau and Fournier (2001), 86. Jean Deschamps, Quebec’s Deputy Minister of Industry and Commerce at the time, confirms that the decision to open what was named the *Société de Montage d’automobiles* (SOMA) was strictly political, possessed no economic logic, and was the result of Lesage and de Gaulle’s interventions. The head of *Renault* recognized this, asking Deschamps how Quebec’s government expected to establish a North American market for French automobiles when it would not even buy these for its own use.

²⁰ ANQ, E16, 1960-01-035, v. 56 – Chambre de Commerce France-Canada, Speech by Minister of Industry and Commerce Gérard-D. Lévesque, 30 May 1963; *Informations canadiennes* March 1965, 10(87), advertisement; ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 212, Investissements Français – Notes sur les investissements français au Québec, 11 May 1967.

²¹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Lesage, 27 July 1965.

plant named the *Société de Montage d'automobiles* (SOMA). Quebec's Minister of Industry and Commerce, André Rousseau, emphasized that vehicles assembled in Quebec could be sold in the US, as did Lesage when he met with members of the 1963 Renault mission to Canada and urged that the plant be located in Sorel, given its proximity to the border and the St. Lawrence Seaway.²²

Cultural affinities led to French involvement in the construction of Montreal's Metro, owing to Mayor Jean Drapeau's efforts that were paramount in overcoming pressures for US involvement. The significance of the cultural dimension was underscored by efforts to ensure that the system's 1966 inauguration was attended by a senior French figure, as it turned out the Minister for Public Works, Louis Joxe, to underscore its being a tangible link between Montreal and Paris.²³

The Gaullist Response

How were Quebec's economic overtures received by Gaullist France? The post-war growth of economic interdependence and transnational exchanges, and the resulting blurring of the foreign and domestic spheres, challenged the Rankean notion at the core of Gaullist thought that the state's primary task was to achieve the utmost level of independence by organizing all internal resources to this end.²⁴ Alfred Grosser has explained the apparent contradiction between Gaullist preoccupations

²² MAE, v. 144 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques, Conversations de Québec les 14 et 15 juin [1962], avec MM. Lesage, Rousseau, René Tremblay et Gauvin; MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 5 March 1963, Voyage au Québec. Entrevue avec M. Lesage et les Ministres provinciaux. Mission Renault et Mission Sud-Aviation.

²³ MAE, v. 97 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 26 May 1962, Visite à Montréal; MAE, v. 199 – Telegram from Carraud, French Embassy, Ottawa, to MAE, Amérique, 18 August 1966; MAE, v. 190 – Letter from Jurgensen to Leduc, 18 March 1966; MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Jurgensen to Saint-Légier, Présidence de la République, Palais de l'Élysée, 13 July 1966.

²⁴ Edward L. Morse, *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France*, (Princeton University Press, 1973), 13-16.

with independence and French economic success in the 1960s that accrued from its integration into the increasingly globalized economy. In his analysis, economic development was central to and symptomatic of Gaullist efforts to harness international realities for national benefit.²⁵ Beyond the financial stabilization of the late 1950s, the Fifth Republic was preoccupied with the creation through industrial mergers of “national champions,” notably in the high-technology sector, as part of a general effort to modernize and project French economic might.²⁶

Gaullist determination to safeguard French sovereignty converged with an array of French opinion, from the Left’s hostility to alleged American imperialism to traditional protectionist elements, to make common cause against US economic power. The best-selling book published in France in the 1960s was Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s *Le défi américain*, which advocated a supranational approach to European integration to prevent Europe’s economic satellization by US multinationals. His work captured the national *zeitgeist* of anxiety over the US economic influence in France and its implications for French sovereignty and identity.²⁷ This was also reflected in *Le Monde* editor Hubert Beuve-Méry’s expression of pessimism to Canada’s ambassador, Jules Léger, about France’s Americanization and its ability to resist the invasion of US capital.²⁸ The simultaneity of “Americanization” and anti-Americanism was not at all paradoxical. The former was a scapegoat for everything perceived as a negative social consequence of economic development and gave rise to the latter, as the spread of

²⁵ Alfred Grosser, *Affaires étrangères, la politique de la France, 1944-1984* (Flammarion, 1984), 219.

²⁶ Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*, (University of California Press, 1993), 149.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 154-184; Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, *Le défi américain* (Denoël, 1967).

²⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 20 October 1964.

ideas associated with economic modernization were denounced as symptomatic of foreign (i.e. US) rule.²⁹

From the outset then, French officials characterized the Quiet Revolution as a tremendous opportunity. Ambassador Lacoste enthused that France was well placed to reap the benefits if it made a significant contribution to Quebec's development. Conceding that the initiative would come mainly from France's private sector, Lacoste recommended that Paris encourage it to be active in Quebec, given the unprecedented desire in the province for technical and industrial cooperation with France.³⁰

Growing French interest in Quebec led members of the French National Assembly's foreign affairs commission to tour the province's industrial establishments and meet with senior Quebec officials and Cabinet Ministers as part of a larger Canadian visit.³¹ This was followed in October 1962 by a significant economic mission to Canada led by former Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of France, Wilfrid Baumgartner. Quebec's Delegation-General judged the mission a success, citing Baumgartner's subsequent public assessment of Quebec as "une terre d'élection pour les investissements européens à l'étranger."³²

²⁹ Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945*, translated by Michael Shaw (Continuum, 1980), 217.

³⁰ MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 12 December 1960, La Province de Québec sous le Gouvernement de M. Lesage; Perspectives nouvelles au Canada; Chances nouvelles pour l'action économique et culturelle de la France; MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 10 May 1961, La province de Québec devant la Confédération canadienne: mouvements "séparatistes," progression économique et politique, considérations du point de vue français.

³¹ MAE, v. 101 – Voyage de la Commission des Affaires Étrangères de l'Assemblée Nationale au Canada, septembre-octobre 1962.

³² ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel – Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 11 December 1962.

The 1963 French trade exposition in Montreal was also indicative of French economic interest in Quebec. Opened by France's Minister of Culture, André Malraux, there were significant delegations from the *Chambre de Commerce France-Canada* and *Conseil nationale du Patronat français*, in addition to numerous peripheral demonstrations and events promoting modern France. Almost three hundred thousand visitors toured the *Palais du Commerce*, and the event attracted extensive media coverage, especially in the francophone press.³³

French awareness of the Quiet Revolution's economic opportunities was also reflected in Ambassador Bousquet's urging that Paris should invest at least \$1 million in the SGF, claiming that this would give France a voice in the organization's activities in promoting Quebec's economic development, and be strongly welcomed by Lesage.³⁴ Although a consortium of French banks, mostly private, only purchased \$400,000 of the \$10.7 million of shares of SGF's initial offering, five years later when the organization's initial funds were exhausted, another French consortium purchased nearly half of the shares of the SGF's second offering, and an administrative post was reserved for a French representative.³⁵ The creation in 1965 of a Quebec City section of the *Chambre de commerce française de Montréal* was designed to cement closer France-Quebec economic links. More than five hundred

³³ MAE, v. 146 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 4 November 1963, Exposition française de Montréal, 1963; Centre national du Commerce extérieur, "Exposition Française de Montréal, 11 au 27 octobre 1963", *Moniteur Officiel du Commerce Internationale* (MOCI), 5 October 1963, (81); Cholette (1998), 27.

³⁴ MAE, v. 145 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 27 April 1963.

³⁵ MAE, v. 226 – Note to File, March 1968, Coopération économique franco-québécoise; Robert Taton, "Investissements, participations et réalisations françaises au Québec," *Le Monde Francophone: Le Québec, Un An Après, Europe-France-Outremer* September 1968, (464): 42; Cholette (1998), 237. The consortium included the *Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations*, *Crédit National*, *Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur*, and nationalized French banks.

attended its inauguration, including Lesage, senior Quebec ministers, and a large contingent of French business personalities.³⁶

Efforts to portray Quebec as a North American bridgehead did not fall on deaf ears. Lacoste described Quebec as an economic link between Europe and Canada, particularly given the completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway, and suggested French economic activity in Quebec could lead to opportunities throughout the Western hemisphere, notably in Latin America.³⁷ Reporting on the outcome of the 1963 French trade exposition, Quebec's Delegation-General noted the interest among French firms when informed that defence products produced in Canada could be sold to the US.³⁸ Georges Pompidou referred to Quebec as a "base d'études du marché américain et tremplin vers sa conquête" in observing that it lived at the rhythm and level of the US. Although he conceded that France's private sector continued to be intimidated by the North American market, he cited its interest in the ECM as a good omen of what might be achieved in Quebec and beyond.³⁹

Consistent with their broader view of developments in Quebec, French officials interpreted Quebec interest in expanded economic links as a bid for economic liberation. Daniel Johnson had insisted to de Gaulle that Quebec was not a "pays sous-développé qui attendrait de lui des cadeaux," but "péturie de culture

³⁶ MAE, v. 293 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 22 June 1965, Intérêts français au Québec. The initiative was spearheaded by Bernard Leclerc of the *Crédit foncier franco-canadien*.

³⁷ MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 12 December 1960, La Province de Québec sous le Gouvernement de M. Lesage; Perspectives nouvelles au Canada; Chances nouvelles pour l'action économique et culturelle de la France; MAE, v. 144 – Province de Québec, situation économique, Relations commerciales et financières avec la France, Caractéristiques économiques de la Province, 3 October 1961; Claude Julien, *Le Canada: dernière chance de l'Europe* (Grasset, 1965), 277. He describes Quebec as the door to Canadian and North American markets.

³⁸ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964.

³⁹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Lesage, 14 May 1965.

française et modelée au dynamisme nord-américain.”⁴⁰ These descriptions notwithstanding, France perceived Quebec as an industrializing – even developing – society that required French assistance and cooperation to escape Anglo-Saxon tutelage and realize its economic potential. For example, in his memoirs, Maurice Couve de Murville groups Quebec into a discussion of development and cooperation in Algeria and francophone Africa.⁴¹ Ambassador Lacoste relayed the *indépendantiste* movement’s preoccupation with economic decolonization, citing as an example Raoul Roy’s arguments in *La Revue Socialiste*.⁴² In the spring of 1963, de Gaulle told the French Cabinet of how he was struck by French Canada’s colonized economic position.⁴³ Authors such as Gérard Bergeron reinforced such views, referring to Quebec’s “colonisation économique” and the steadily growing US economic influence that he blamed on a paucity of France-Quebec links.⁴⁴

The MAE paid careful attention to Quebec’s younger generation’s desire to “émanciper la Province de la tutelle économique et financière des anglo-saxons,” as well as to Lesage’s publicly stated intention to exploit Quebec’s immense resources to profit French Canada and dilute the influence of US capital. Nor did the MAE fail

⁴⁰ Alain Peyrefitte, *De Gaulle et le Québec* (Stanké, 2000), 95; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Général de Gaulle, 1967, Allocution de bienvenue de M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, au Général Charles de Gaulle, Président de la République Française, Anse au Foulon, le dimanche, 23 juillet 1967

⁴¹ Maurice Couve de Murville, *Une politique étrangère, 1958-1969* (Plon, 1971), 451-453. The former foreign minister also depicts Lesage as a developmental nationalist by drawing a parallel between Quebec’s economic development, including the preponderant anglophone presence in the economy, and that of the developing world.

⁴² MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 10 May 1961, La province de Québec devant la Confédération canadienne: mouvements “séparatistes,” progression économique et politique, considérations du point de vue français.

⁴³ Peyrefitte (2000), 21.

⁴⁴ Gérard Bergeron, *Le Canada-Français après deux siècles de patience*, (Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 13-18. Perhaps the most famous condemnation of Quebec’s economic situation was Pierre Vallières, *Nègres blancs d’Amérique, autobiographie précoce d’un terroriste québécois* (Parti pris, 1968). Also, André d’Allemagne, *Le colonialisme au Québec* (Les éditions R-B, 1966), 44-58.

to note the Premier's desire to secure greater economic weight within Canada.⁴⁵ Bousquet subsequently described the French trade exposition as coinciding with a key phase of Quebec's evolution, namely the wish to replace anglophone economic predominance with a francophone one.⁴⁶ Indeed, he subsequently attributed Canada's unity problems to French Canadians' will to assume the economic and financial direction of their "État," and noted their interest in finding an alternative to Anglo-Saxon *tutelle* and economic methods.⁴⁷ In a similar vein, François Leduc argued that it was in the economic sphere that France could make the greatest contribution to Quebec's self-determination efforts.⁴⁸

A preoccupation with France's importance for francophone economic empowerment was at the head of discussions regarding the establishment of SOMA. Bousquet shared Lesage's desire that the automotive assembly plant be established in Quebec, arguing this would benefit Paris' relations with Quebec City, and benefit the Lesage Government politically and economically.⁴⁹ The ambassador subsequently reported on the announcement of a *General Motors* (GM) automotive plant to be built north of Montreal, recounting that although Quebec officials were pleased, they regretted France's automotive industry had been scooped. The development

⁴⁵ MAE, v. 135 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 12 December 1960, La Province de Québec sous le Gouvernement de M. Lesage; Perspectives nouvelles au Canada; Chances nouvelles pour l'action économique et culturelle de la France; MAE, v. 136 – Note to File, La Province de Québec, 7 May 1963.

⁴⁶ MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 26 February 1963, Mission de M. René Lévesque à Paris; MAE, v. 146 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 4 November 1963, Exposition française de Montréal, 1963.

⁴⁷ MAE, v. 192 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 28 April 1964, Réunion consulaire des 9 et 10 avril 1964, Exposé de M. Bousquet sur les questions politiques.

⁴⁸ MAE, v. 278 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 17 March 1967, réflexions sur le problème québécois; MAE, v. 278 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 11 May 1967, Le Québec et la Confédération Canadienne.

⁴⁹ MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 5 March 1963, Voyage au Québec. Entrevue avec M. Lesage et les Ministres provinciaux. Mission Renault et Mission Sud-Aviation.

underscored the challenge Paris and Quebec City's growing cooperation was designed to overcome, a reminder of Quebec's integration in the North American economy with which French and Quebec state capitalism had to contend. Notwithstanding the GM announcement, Bousquet asserted that the French effort remained important since beyond appealing to a different consumer, the GM plant was to be a strictly US firm in terms of its capital and management, and to Quebec eyes another example of economic "colonisation," offering little for the development of Quebec secondary industry, and bereft of any cultural benefit. The SGF, however, would control the French assembly plant, ensuring a truly Quebec-owned factory that would be more satisfying in terms of prestige and Quebec's interests. Bousquet argued Paris had an opportunity to counterbalance (albeit modestly) the US technical presence in Quebec, claiming that the Lesage Cabinet and a majority of Quebecers strongly preferred to adopt French rather than American engineering methods, an analysis confirmed by his subsequent conversation with René Lévesque, who insisted on Quebec City's strong interest in French technical assistance for the functioning of the new assembly plant.⁵⁰

A similar dynamic drove the founding of SIDBEC. Perceived as a major test of Paris' will to aid Quebec's achieving greater economic independence, Leduc argued strongly for French participation, notwithstanding the French steel industry's financial difficulties, seeing it as complementary to the initiatives of the *Compagnie Générale d'Électricité*, *Peugeot*, and *Renault* that Quebec City had helped finance.

⁵⁰ MAE, v. 293 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 8 May 1964; MAE, v. 293 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 12 May 1964. Lévesque's interest in French investment is confirmed in the account in Pierre-Louis Mallen, *Vivre le Québec libre: Les secrets de De Gaulle* (Plon, 1978), 29-30, according to which Lévesque prevailed on Mallen, an ORTF reporter in Montreal, to emphasize to French authorities the importance Quebec attached to French investment.

In his view, Quebec was asking Paris for a tangible and reciprocal sign of confidence in its economic development efforts.⁵¹ Couve de Murville echoed this view in describing SIDBEC as part of a broader effort to diminish the relative strength of US capital in Quebec's economy, and recommended an investment in the steelworks as tangible proof of French interest in Quebec's development, not to mention its political advantages.⁵² Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, head of the MAE's *Amérique* division and a Quebec lobby member, also emphasized the political dimension as a reason for French involvement, beyond his conviction that SIDBEC was economically sound.⁵³

The idea of economic liberation was all too evident during de Gaulle's 1967 visit; in remarks at the dinner Daniel Johnson hosted in Quebec City, the French leader claimed Quebec was not

seulement une entité populaire et politique [...] c'est aussi une réalité économique particulière et qui va grandissant. N'acceptant plus de subir, dans l'ordre de la pensée, de la culture et de la science, la prépondérance d'influences qui vous sont étrangères, il vous faut des élites, des universités, des laboratoires à vous. Bien loin de n'assumer, comme autrefois, que des rôles auxiliaires dans votre propre progrès, vous voulez en être les créateurs et les dirigeants ...⁵⁴

In the months after the visit, Leduc perceptively warned Paris that Quebecers, faced with an independence that threatened to deprive them of even a portion of their material well-being, would opt for compromise, and therein lay the economic leverage that "les Anglo-saxons ... utilisent sans vergogne."⁵⁵ Leduc's successor, Pierre Siraud, echoed this view in reporting a consensus among Quebec politicians

⁵¹ MAE, v. 293 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, *Amérique*, 26 November 1965.

⁵² MAE, v. 294 – Letter from Couve de Murville to Monsieur le Ministre de l'Économie et des Finances, 18 February 1966, de la SIDBEC.

⁵³ MAE, v. 190 – Letter from Jurgensen to Leduc, 18 March 1966.

⁵⁴ MAE, v. 209, Textes et Notes, Voyage au Général de Gaulle au Québec, Président de la République, 23-26 juillet 1967 – Au dîner offert par M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, à Québec, le 23 juillet 1967.

⁵⁵ MAE, v. 189 – Letter from Leduc to Debré, MAE, *Amérique*, 26 June 1968, Rapport de fin de mission au Canada, 1965-1968.

that the population would not opt for independence until the economic timing was right, highlighting the necessity of France-Quebec economic cooperation.⁵⁶

French preoccupation with Quebec's economic liberation was also conditioned by an ethno-cultural consideration. Ambassador Bousquet urged Paris to use investment to strengthen North America's "fait français," affirming the importance of economic assistance to Quebec's cultural health and as a means to dilute US economic power.⁵⁷ In proposing increased engineering exchanges with French Canada, Raymond Treuil, the French embassy's commercial counsellor, noted francophone students in Canada used US texts, joined English-speaking US and Canadian associations upon graduating, and that it was easier for them to continue their education in the US than in France.⁵⁸ Bousquet shared Treuil's desire that a France-Quebec agreement on engineering exchanges create a valuable infrastructure for future French investment in Canada and Quebec that would eventually permit Quebecers to take charge of the hydroelectric sector, using French methods they had learned in France.⁵⁹ Important to Bousquet as well were the provisions for a France-Quebec engineering association and a bilateral technical cooperation centre –

⁵⁶ MAE, v. 202 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, 1 November 1968.

⁵⁷ MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 13 July 1963, Bilan de l'économie canadienne en 1962; MAE, v. 136 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 27 June 1962; Jean Vinant, *De Jacques Cartier à Péchiney: Histoire de la coopération économique franco-canadienne* (Chotard et associés, 1985), 18.

⁵⁸ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 7, France-Actim, Ententes & Accords – Note from Treuil, Comité Franc-Dollar, Montréal, to Bousquet, 8 January 1963.

⁵⁹ MAE, v. 144 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 17 January 1963; MAE, v. 173 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 2 April 1963. See chapter 14 for discussion of the "ASTEF agreement" on engineering and technical cooperation.

Informatel France-Québec, established in Montreal at the end of 1965 – to increase the diffusion of French technical reviews and textbooks and organize expositions.⁶⁰

Ethno-cultural concerns loomed large in French portrayals of Quebec as a sister francophone society striving to realize economic modernization while maintaining its cultural specificity in the face of preponderant American power.⁶¹ Gaullist economic policy placed a high priority on redressing the technological imbalance between France and the US, and in portraying France as a modern, dynamic high-technology economy.⁶² The 1963 trade exposition, for example, was intended to show off France's post-war industrial achievements.⁶³ Parallels were drawn between France and Quebec's economic dilemmas. Members of the 1962 French parliamentary mission remarked upon the inspiration the Lesage government drew from France's *dirigiste* model of economic development.⁶⁴ In April 1966, Yves Plattard, a commercial counsellor at the French Embassy proposed an "alliance franco-québécoise" to help Quebec diversify its trade, suggesting joint scientific research programmes between the "deux nations françaises." Plattard believed that France would be a rich, technically-developed and capable partner that could assist Quebec, adding that Paris wished to avoid France and Europe becoming an

⁶⁰ MAE, v. 173 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 2 April 1963; Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981), 41.

⁶¹ J.F. Bosher, *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 8, 17-18; Michel Brunet, *Québec-Canada Anglais: Deux itinéraires, un affrontement* (Éditions HMH Ltée, 1968), 278.

⁶² Grosser (1980), 218.

⁶³ MAE, v. 146 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 4 November 1963, Exposition française de Montréal, 1963.

⁶⁴ MAE, v. 101 – Rapport d'Information, MM. Bosson et Thorailleur, Députés, Assemblée Nationale, 18 March 1963.

exclusively consumer society for the benefit of US companies.⁶⁵ Quebec lobbyist Bernard Dorin has recalled his sense in the 1960s that France almost had more to learn from Quebec than it could provide, given the province's North American location and robust growth.⁶⁶

De Gaulle was especially attached to the view of Quebec as an example of francophone economic achievement. The French leader made clear to Quebec's Minister of Education, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, his interest in seeing the France-Quebec Education Entente used to promote scientific and economic exchanges.⁶⁷ After France's Minister of National Education, Christian Fouchet, visited Quebec the following year, de Gaulle told the Cabinet that he viewed French Canada as a sort of "regeneration" for the French themselves.⁶⁸

In anticipation of Expo 67, de Gaulle told the French Cabinet of the necessity of France demonstrating its achievements and capabilities to French Canada.⁶⁹ In his remarks at Montreal's City Hall, the French leader praised Quebec for its development, and, describing Montreal as the "ville exemplaire" of modernization, emphasized France-Quebec economic solidarity, confident that the assistance Paris provided to francophone economic empowerment and Quebec's development would one day be reciprocated by Quebec.⁷⁰ At the Université de Montréal the following day, the French leader referred more explicitly to France-Quebec economic

⁶⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11642, 30-14-7-1, *Le Devoir*, 7 April 1966, "Plaidoyer d'un diplomate français en faveur d'une alliance plus étroite entre son pays et le Québec," 1.

⁶⁶ Comeau and Fournier (2002), 22-23.

⁶⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Lesage, 3 March 1965. Attached note by Jean Chapdelaine, undated.

⁶⁸ Lescop (1981), 146, 165-166.

⁶⁹ Vaisse (1998), 652.

⁷⁰ Thomson (1988), 202. The scope of the challenge that confronted France-Quebec economic cooperation was reflected in the fact that the vehicle that carried de Gaulle and Johnson down the *Chemin du roy* was a Lincoln Continental.

cooperation in resisting Americanization, reminding his audience that Quebec lived in the shadow of an “État colossal” that threatened its very existence. Together Quebec and France would live and modernize on their own terms, a goal as essential to the “Français du Canada” as for the “Français de France”.⁷¹ The French leader returned to this theme in his remarks at the luncheon Mayor Drapeau hosted. De Gaulle rejoiced that far from having lost its “âme française” since the Conquest, Montreal had become an economic metropolis that for France stood as an example of what could be accomplished as its population “prend le chemin de ce qui est moderne sans perdre ce qui est humain.”⁷²

The notion of France-Quebec economic solidarity only increased after de Gaulle’s visit. Ambassador Leduc insisted that France-Quebec cooperation should be on equitable terms, dictated not just by considerations of Quebecois psychology, but because France had much to learn from Quebec in terms of economic development.⁷³ De Gaulle returned repeatedly to the theme of economic cooperation, declaring during a Cabinet discussion of French assistance to Quebec that his foremost concern was that francophone Quebec students be trained as engineers, resulting in a significant increase in the amount and number of French technical cooperation bursaries.⁷⁴ When Quebec’s Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal, visited in 1969, de Gaulle observed that on two continents, Quebec and France were engaged in the same fight:

⁷¹ Lescop (1981), 169.

⁷² MAE, v. 209, Textes et Notes, Voyage au Général de Gaulle au Québec, Président de la République, 23-26 juillet 1967, au déjeuner offert par le maire de Montréal à Montréal, le 26 juillet 1967.

⁷³ MAE, v. 200 – Telegram(2) from Leduc to MAE, 23 August 1967.

⁷⁴ MAE, v. 200 – Conseil Restreint sur l’aide économique et culturelle au Québec, 5 September 1967; Cholette (1998), 40-41.

celui de la vie qui, désormais, se confond avec celui du progrès. C'est à la condition de nous affirmer, d'avancer, de rayonner, que nous pouvons sauvegarder et faire valoir notre substance française et, à partir de là, coopérer avec d'autres et fournir au bien de tous les hommes notre contribution à nous.⁷⁵

De Gaulle emphasized that France and Quebec had a common interest in investing not only in North America's francophone communities to ensure that Quebec was surrounded by "un rayonnement francophone," but abroad, especially in francophone Africa, to combat Anglo-Saxon economic power.⁷⁶

Early Results and Assessments

Despite the rhetoric, the establishment of the *Maison du Québec* and Jean Lesage's second Paris visit as part of a larger European tour to secure capital, the immediate result of efforts to increase France-Quebec economic ties remained disappointingly limited.⁷⁷ No industrial agreements were signed nor did any French firms establish operations in Quebec during the first two years following the Quebec office's spectacular inauguration.⁷⁸ Notwithstanding this, Lesage responded effusively when de Gaulle asked him about the results of his economic discussions during his third trip to France in 1964. The Premier claimed representatives of France's financial sector had reacted very positively to Quebec's plans for industrial

⁷⁵ Charles de Gaulle, "Toast adressé à M. J.G. Cardinal, Vice-Président du Conseil des ministres du Québec, 22 janvier 1969," in *Discours et Messages, Vers le terme, janvier 1966-avril 1969* (Plon, 1970).

⁷⁶ ANF 5AG1/199 – Compte rendu avec le Général de Gaulle, 24 January 1969, Visite officielle en France de M. Jean-Guy Cardinal, Vice-président du Conseil des Ministres du Québec, 22-26 janvier 1969.

⁷⁷ Thomson (1988), 103.

⁷⁸ Cholette (1998), 260.

development, consistent with what he considered growing French interest in Quebec.⁷⁹

Lesage's response belied the fact that although Gaullist and Quebec nationalist objectives were complementary, tangible success remained limited, due largely to private sector reluctance. Part of this reluctance stemmed from international economic realities, notably the ongoing regionalization of international trade. France's private sector preferred the ECM, which offered greater profit opportunities. Charles Lussier was told numerous times that while there was interest in Canada, limited means meant French firms preferred to establish operations in the larger ECM markets.⁸⁰ The evolution of the ECM and the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations dissuaded French industry from establishing new overseas enterprises; instead, they fuelled efforts to reinforce, consolidate and regain industrial interests in France.⁸¹ This trend was reinforced by Washington's July 1963 decision to tax outgoing capital flows in response to its growing balance of payments deficit, a consequence of which was the immediate reduction of European interest in Quebec as a North American bridgehead.⁸²

The French private sector's hesitation was also linked to economic concerns specific to the Canadian, and more especially, Quebec market. In his first report as

⁷⁹ MAE, v. 205, Deuxième séjour à Paris de Monsieur Lesage, Premier Ministre du Québec, 7-11 novembre 1964 – Partial Transcript to the Ministre de l'Information, Untitled, 12 November 1964, Voyage Lesage.

⁸⁰ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel – Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris – Letter from Lussier to Lapalme, 5 May 1961; ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel – Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris – Letter from Lussier to Rousseau, 15 June 1962.

⁸¹ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 12, Investissements Français – Notes sur les investissements français au Québec, 11 May 1967.

⁸² ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961– Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964. For a discussion of US efforts to address its balance of payments difficulties and its impact on Canada, see Greg Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 26-91.

Delegate-General, Lussier remarked on numerous French business figures' belief that Quebec opposed economic planning and preferred a *laissez-faire* approach, which they considered a disincentive to investment. An even greater concern, however, was the French perception of business in Canada as being an Anglo-American domain so that Quebec was not worth the effort.⁸³ Lussier returned to this theme in explaining French private sector reluctance to participate in the 1963 French Trade Exposition in Montreal, arguing that it felt US economic strength rendered French success impossible, reflected in “un état de panique” any time he raised the idea of French firms competing in the Quebec market.⁸⁴

Even amid SOMA's establishment, the SGF's President, Gérard Filion, deplored publicly an insufficient French economic presence, arguing Quebec's economic development required French business leaders to stop viewing Canada – Quebec especially – as US territory. Filion added that to succeed in Quebec, French firms would have to renounce certain paralyzing administrative practices and adopt North American methods. His remarks highlighted the tensions between Quebec and Gaullist nationalist efforts to cultivate economic relations and Quebec's North American reality. Gaston Cholette recalled that in this early phase of France-Quebec economic cooperation, Quebec businesspersons often felt more at ease with their Anglo-Saxon partners, accustomed as they were to North American business methods, to the extent they subscribed to the North American stereotype of French

⁸³ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Annuel – Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris – Letter from Lussier to Lapalme, 5 May 1961; Peyrefitte (2000), 22. Underscoring the Anglo-centric nature of Canada's foreign policy establishment, Lussier ascribed this French perception of Quebec to the fact that other than the ambassador, Canada's representatives in francophone countries were almost exclusively anglophone.

⁸⁴ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964.

business as inefficient and excessively cautious. Months after his triumphal visit to Paris, Jean Lesage courted New York's financial community, and the commercial section of Quebec's office in the city was expanded. Montreal business weekly *Les Affaires* opined that if "les Français hésitent toujours à contribuer à l'essor industriel du Québec, les Américains n'attendent pas, quant à eux, qu'on aille les solliciter."⁸⁵ Similarly, Jean Chapdelaine argued it was necessary to be realistic, that although he and the Delegation-General had conducted tireless efforts that would likely yield major French investments in the long-term, the reality was Quebec's industrial development depended foremost on its own effort, and secondly, on US investment.⁸⁶

Beyond immediate economic considerations, another factor contributing to the French private sector hesitation was Quebec's political situation, notably the growth of the *indépendantiste* movement. In this sense, there were contradictions in the logic of those motivated to expand France-Quebec economic relations as a means to greater Quebec autonomy. The private sector's concern over where political events could lead discouraged its willingness to act in accordance with Paris and Quebec City's objectives.

As early as 1963, French private sector concern was evident when Lussier reported the financial representatives he encountered never failed to remark that they did not understand the various independence movements in Quebec. Acknowledgement of the justness of many of the movements' motivations did not extend to a comprehension of what was to be gained by independence. Lussier

⁸⁵ MAE, v. 293 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 27 November 1964, *Les investissements français et l'opinion québécoise*; Cholette (1998), 36-37; Thomson (1988), 102.

⁸⁶ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Lesage, 28 December 1965.

worried about the impact on efforts to attract French capital, citing his contacts' reluctance to establish operations "dans une partie du Canada qui deviendrait pour eux un nouveau Katanga." Lussier welcomed the report of members of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee that visited Canada, and their urging French investment in Quebec as a means to offset US economic influence. The Delegation-General hoped the report would counter the harmful influence of reports on Quebec's *indépendantistes*.⁸⁷

The next year, however, Lussier noted that *Front de Libération de Québec* (FLQ) actions were dampening the French industrial community's enthusiasm, and argued that the Delegation-General had to multiply efforts to make clear that increasing calls for Quebec independence did not constitute a danger to foreign capital.⁸⁸ Canada's embassy was initially dismissive of the suggestion that talk of separatism or acts of terrorism were driving away French investors, but by the beginning of 1965 Ambassador Léger confessed to having misread the situation, citing conversations with senior economic figures, including Wilfrid Baumgartner and the President of *Compagnie de Suez*, who each confirmed a growing French private sector concern and corresponding declining interest in Quebec.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 27 May 1963.

⁸⁸ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964.

⁸⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 22 June 1964, French Investment in Cda; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 6 January 1965.

A Political Push

Private sector hesitation reinforced a consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that a significant political effort was essential to expanded France-Quebec economic relations. Lussier believed if major (particularly state-owned) French firms could be persuaded to locate in Quebec, others would follow their example.⁹⁰ In February 1967, Jean Chapdelaine met with René de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, the Élysée's diplomatic counsellor, to discuss the lack of progress, suggesting French economic interest in Quebec appeared to be declining, citing SOMA's start-up problems and the difficulties encountered negotiating a proposed French loan to Quebec. The remarks clearly made an impression, as Chapdelaine was invited to meet with de Gaulle to discuss how to improve the situation.⁹¹

The expansion of France-Quebec economic links was a prominent aspect of Daniel Johnson's 1967 visit to Paris, during which he sought assistance in addressing Quebec's financial and technical needs, including French participation in the *Institut de Recherches de l'Hydro-Québec*, and the establishment of a Quebec research institute. The Premier also lobbied successfully for the creation of a joint France-Quebec committee of high-level public and private sector representatives to inventory and suggest possibilities for expanding economic relations.⁹²

⁹⁰ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964.

⁹¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, USSEA only, 15 February 1967. The loan issue is discussed in chapter 14.

⁹² MAE, v. 206, Visite de Daniel Johnson – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 1 May 1967; MAE, v. 199 – Note from Jurgensen for the Minister, 2 May 1967, Conversations avec la Premier Ministre du Québec; MAE, v. 199 – Compte-Rendu de la séance de travail franco-québécoise présidée par M. Herve Alphan, Secrétaire Général du Département, 18 May 1967. Also, Jean Loiselle, *Daniel Johnson: Le Québec d'abord* (VLB éditeur, 1999), 127-136.

De Gaulle used his own subsequent visit to highlight the significance of the economic dimension of France-Quebec relations. French governmental efforts to establish substantive cooperation only increased after July 1967. Following a special meeting of the French Cabinet to examine French economic and cultural assistance to Quebec, monies allocated for technical cooperation jumped from the FF1.1 million originally budgeted for 1968 to FF10 million.⁹³ When Chapdelaine was invited to the Elysée the following month to discuss plans for Johnson to make a second visit to Paris, de Gaulle emphasized the importance he attached to the fact that the Premier be accompanied by Quebec's Minister of Finance, Paul Dozois, for economic discussions. The French leader added he had thought too of sending France's Finance Minister, Michel Debré, to Quebec that autumn but that his schedule and health prevented this.⁹⁴

Although Johnson's second trip to Paris was never realized, during his last press conference the Premier insisted that increasing French investment in Quebec and developing the economic relationship was to be the focus of his visit.⁹⁵ In anticipation of it, his government had paid for a lengthy supplement in Paris' financial journal *Les Echos* appealing for French investment.⁹⁶ Similarly, France's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs responsible for the Quebec file, Jean de Lipkowsi, affirmed it essential that Johnson return from his visit with something tangible in terms of economic cooperation given his government's difficult situation

⁹³ MAE, v. 228 – Note pour le Cabinet du Secrétaire d'État, à l'attention de M. Malaud, du projet d'emploi des crédits supplémentaires accordés pour le Québec en 1968 au titre de la coopération technique. The funds were dedicated to hosting scholarship students, Quebec personalities, and the sending of French experts to Quebec.

⁹⁴ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 12 October 1967.

⁹⁵ MAE, v. 281 – Conférence de Presse de M. Daniel Johnson, 25 septembre 1968.

⁹⁶ Boshier (1998), 46.

in the face of opposition attacks and the Trudeau Government's recent election. Similarly telling was the French government reaction when the head of French petroleum giant *Société Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine* (SNPA) expressed reluctance over participating in a proposed Quebec oil refinery project to be carried out by France's state-owned *Entreprise de recherches et d'activités pétrolières* (ERAP), of which SNPA was a subsidiary. Michel Debré, by this time Foreign Minister, gave word that the head of SNPA was to be told in no uncertain terms that the refinery project had a political dimension, and thus was a foregone conclusion.⁹⁷

Following Daniel Johnson's death and worries about the health of his successor, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, Quebec's avowed nationalist Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal, and Jean-Paul Beaudry, Minister of Industry and Commerce, visited Paris in January 1969. The Quebec ministers' time in the French capital followed the release of the report by the *Comité franco-québécois sur les investissements* (CFQI), the committee that had been struck following Johnson's 1967 visit and made up of senior Quebec and French finance officials and businesspersons.⁹⁸ The CFQI report called for a more systematic organization of economic missions as a precursor to more direct action. It also recommended the creation of a permanent joint committee of public sector officials, which would be mandated to implement the report's recommendations and to monitor and facilitate cooperation, especially French investment in Quebec.⁹⁹ Debré expressed interest in

⁹⁷ MAE, v. 214, Voyage en France de M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, mai 1967-septembre 1968 – Substance de la conversation chez le Ministre le 25 septembre 1968, concernant la visite de M. Daniel Johnson, 26 September 1968.

⁹⁸ MAE, v. 226 – Letter from Hervé Alphand to Chapdelaine, 14 February 1968.

⁹⁹ MAE, v. 227 – Rapport de la Commission Franco-Québécoise pour l'Étude des Investissements, January 1969.

the CFQI report, particularly the recommendation of the permanent joint committee. Cardinal conveyed Quebec's agreement, and an exchange of letters between the two ministers provided for the establishment of the new *Comité franco-québécois pour les opérations de coopération industrielle*.¹⁰⁰

The Limits of Political Efforts

The Quebec delegation was satisfied with the results of the economic mission. Jean-Guy Cardinal enthused about the establishment of the permanent joint economic committee, as well as the studies underway of new projects in his meetings with senior French personalities. Shortly after the Cardinal-Beaudry visit arrived word that French steel giant *Schneider* would participate in SIDBEC.¹⁰¹ As his posting to Paris came to an end the following year, Patrick Hyndman, the Delegation-General's economic counsellor, praised the growth of French investment in Canada over the preceding years, noting this had grown from \$10 million in 1962 to \$148 million in 1968, with Quebec attracting the majority of secondary industry investment.¹⁰²

Hyndman conceded, however, that the level of French industrial investment remained far below what Quebec needed. The official's assessment was consistent with the fact that despite the political efforts of the preceding decades, the expansion of France-Quebec economic relations had had to contend with a number of obstacles. Most dramatic among these was the economic aftermath of the *événements* of May

¹⁰⁰ MAE, v. 215 – Voyage en France du M. Bertrand, Premier Ministre du Québec (non-réalisé) Compte Rendu des Entretiens Officiels entre la Délégation Française et la Délégation Québécoise au Département, 22 January 1969.

¹⁰¹ ANF 5AG1/199 – Compte rendu avec le Général de Gaulle, le 24 janvier 1969, Visite officielle en France de M. Jean-Guy Cardinal, Vice-Président du Conseil des Ministres du Québec, 22-26 janvier 1969; MAE, v. 213 – Note from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 22 February 1969, Entretiens avec diverses personnalités gouvernementales du Québec.

¹⁰² ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation Organisation, 1967-1973 – Discours d'adieu de Monsieur Patrick Hyndman devant la Chambre de Commerce France-Canada, le 14 janvier 1970.

1968. The severe pressure on the franc, exacerbated by France's weakened commercial position as a result of the disruption in the Spring and the ensuing settlement, undermined Paris' capacity to encourage France's private sector to invest in Quebec. Instead, the priority was domestic economic recovery, to Quebec City's chagrin.¹⁰³

The challenge posed by Paris' reduced capacity to cultivate economic relations draws attention to the broader problem – the fact that notwithstanding the political push of the 1960s, the private sectors in France and Quebec remained relatively unenthusiastic, and oriented toward their respective continental markets. This orientation was equally evident at the political level as Quebec's Minister of Finance, Paul Dozois, expressed his reluctance to seek a loan on French markets for fear of upsetting New York's banking community; even the Francophile Jean Drapeau was unimpressed at the offerings of the Paris market when he sought a loan for Montreal, claiming he could do better in Canada or on Wall Street.¹⁰⁴

Even those transatlantic links that were forged did not necessarily follow Paris and Quebec City's political lead. French tire manufacturer *Michelin* announced that its new North American plant would be in Nova Scotia, a decision motivated by its ice-free port and by what François Michelin described to Jean-Paul Beaudry as his company's need for a "bain anglophone."¹⁰⁵ A similar scenario played out when

¹⁰³ Vaïsse (1998), 406; Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Cornell University Press, 1974), 206; MAE, v. 226 – Telegram from Chauvet, French Embassy, Ottawa, to MAE, Amérique, 9 July 1968; Black (1997), 44.

¹⁰⁴ MAE, v. 226 – Letter from de Menthon, to MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 7 February 1968, Possibilités d'un emprunt québécois en France; Jean-François Lisée, *Dans l'œil de l'aigle: Washington face au Québec* (Boréal, 1990), 91.

¹⁰⁵ MAE, v. 226 – Telegram from d'Aumale, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières to French Consulate General, Québec, 19 October 1968; MAE, v. 233, Comité Franco-Québécois sur les

French aluminium giant *Péchiney* decided against locating its North American aluminium plant in Quebec. Discussed during Daniel Johnson's 1967 visit, high-level political interventions in Paris and Quebec City could not overcome the fact that *Péchiney* found Hydro-Quebec's power rates too expensive and the value of Quebec as a bridgehead trumped by the savings on customs duties and transportation that would result from a US location.¹⁰⁶

These decisions had negative repercussions in Quebec, given the public demand for French investment as proof of the tangible benefit of France-Quebec relations. The Michelin decision provoked an especially strong reaction, sparking fears in the Bertrand Government that the decision would be exploited by the opposition to denounce the hollowness of France-Quebec economic cooperation.¹⁰⁷ Robert Bourassa was elected leader of the Quebec Liberals having criticized the Union Nationale for its "Parisian splendours" and accusing France of not matching its rhetoric with concrete action.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, notwithstanding Pompidou's strong support in the abstract for French investment in Quebec, and some personal interventions to spur cooperation, economic relations continued to stagnate in relative terms.¹⁰⁹

Investissements – Telegram from Chauvet, French Embassy, Ottawa to MAE, 30 July 1969, Investissements français au Québec.

¹⁰⁶ MAE, v. 226 – Note sur un projet d'implantation de Pechiney dans l'Est de l'Amérique du Nord, 22 August 1967; MAE, v. 226 – Telegram from de Courson, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières to French Embassy, Ottawa, 22 September 1967; MAE, v. 226 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 18 April 1968.

¹⁰⁷ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 183, Coopération, Les grandes orientations de la coopération franco-québécoise – Document de travail en vue de la VIII^e session de la Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise, par Gaston Cholette; MAE, v. 202 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, 1 November 1968; MAE, v. 233, Comité Franco-Québécois sur les Investissements – Telegram from Chauvet, French Embassy, Ottawa, 30 July 1969, Investissements français au Québec.

¹⁰⁸ MAE, v. 284 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 20 October 1969; Bastien (1999), 75.

¹⁰⁹ ANF, 5AG2/1021 – Note from Raimond for Bernard, 9 December 1969; ANF, 5AG 2/1049 – Annotations du Président – Relations Franco-Québécoises, 11/12 mars 1970, tel no. 269/72 de Québec, cl. Québec – coopération – Affaire Michelin; Bastien (1999), 85.

Another impediment to realizing more robust France-Quebec economic relations was the private sector reticence that accompanied the growth of Quebec separatism. Daniel Johnson's more moderate public remarks following de Gaulle's visit, for example, was a result of pressures from Quebec's business community.¹¹⁰ There was a surprisingly limited amount of French concern about the ramifications of the independence debate on France-Quebec economic relations and Quebec's economic health. De Gaulle expressed scepticism about the debate scaring off US investors, and André Bettencourt, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, told Jean Chapdelaine that the negative reaction of financial markets to de Gaulle's vocal support for independence in his November 1967 news conference was "plus que de chantage que réelle." When Bettencourt asserted that Quebec was destined for sovereignty given its popularity among the younger generations, Chapdelaine had to refrain from retorting that the province's economic development depended upon the more senior generations in control of the economic levers of power and less inclined toward political adventures. In an analysis fundamentally at odds with the economic liberation motivation underpinning France-Quebec economic cooperation, and indeed the logical thrust of the Quiet Revolution, Bettencourt and Elysée diplomatic counsellor René de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye both acknowledged without hesitation to Chapdelaine that the US remained Quebec's main source of foreign direct investment, but opined that regardless of political developments there would be no risk of this ending so long as Quebec had natural resources to develop.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ MAE, v. 200 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 27 October 1967; Thomson (1988), 257.

¹¹¹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 5 December 1967, conférence de Presse du Général de Gaulle; de Menthon (1980), 16-18; Thomson (1988), 271.

Perhaps most emblematic of the record of political efforts to expand France-Quebec economic relations was the tale of SOMA. The autonomic assembly plant was bedevilled by difficulties as soon as it began operating in October 1965. Despite the cautious optimism expressed during the Cardinal-Beaudry mission that a doubling of sales figures over the preceding year reflected what political will could accomplish in the economic sector, the reality was that the operation was not profitable. Despite interventions from Pompidou and Bourassa, who had been elected Premier, the problem-plagued plant ceased operations at the end of 1972.¹¹²

The reality was that for all of the political efforts on both sides of the Atlantic, and despite the progress that had been made in increasing economic exchanges, Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalism ultimately had not been able to overcome the international economic realities that had prompted their collaboration and the broader official rapprochement: the growth of transnational exchanges, interdependence and the regionalization of international trade. The private sector was simply not an enthusiastic participant in the France-Quebec special relationship. In 1968, France was ranked ninth among those countries purchasing Quebec products, well behind the US, UK, West Germany and Japan. Similarly, France was placed only sixth in terms of products that Quebec purchased.¹¹³ The pessimistic prediction that the French

¹¹² MAE, v. 294 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 21 November 1966; MAE, v. 226 – Note to File, 13 February 1967, Entretien du Délégué Général du Québec avec le Directeur d'Amérique; ANF 5AG1/199 – Compte rendu avec le Général de Gaulle, le 24 janvier 1969, Visite officielle en France de M. Jean-Guy Cardinal, Vice-Président du Conseil des Ministres du Québec, 22-26 janvier 1969; ANF 5AG2/1021 – Telegram from de Menthon, to MAE, 17 December 1969, négociations entre la Régie Renault et la Soma; Bastien (1999), 83-84; Cholette (1998), 240.

¹¹³ Cholette (1998), 254; Robert Talon, "Investissements, participations et réalisations françaises au Québec," in *Le Monde Francophone: Le Québec, Un An Après* (Europe-France-Outremer, September 1968), 42-44. Also, see Appendix, *Table 4*. In 1960, exports to France accounted for 1.38 percent of Canada's export trade; by 1970, this had lightly regressed to 0.93 percent. The trend was reversed

intellectual Jean-Marie Domenach had made in 1965 was being borne out: the margins of manoeuvre and the potential for the success of *dirigisme* – in France no less than in Quebec – remained limited in a liberal capitalist international economic system.¹¹⁴

In this sense, the France-Quebec effort may be viewed as the counterpart to the ultimately unsuccessful nationalist-inspired effort that the Diefenbaker Government had undertaken to restore and strengthen the British economic counterweight to US economic influence. In both instances, the attraction of the putative transatlantic partners' respective continental economic poles proved stronger and precluded the realization of the more substantive economic relationship that was desired. It would not be until the 1980s that any significant relative progress would be made in France-Quebec economic relations, and even then, reflecting the realities that had marked the relationship since 1945, the results would remain limited.

regarding French goods purchased by Canada. In 1960, these accounted for 0.91 percent of imported goods, and by 1970, had risen slightly to 1.13%.

¹¹⁴ Jean-Marie Domenach, "Le Canada Français, Controverse sur un nationalisme," *Esprit* February 1965, 33(335): 322.

Chapter 14

Much Ado about (almost) Nothing: Triangular Economic Relations, 1960-1970

As the French Trade Exposition in Montreal opened in October 1963, *Le Figaro* described France-Canada economic relations as at a turning point, arguing that in addition to Quebec looking to France for support in strengthening its economic autonomy from Ottawa, English Canada was just as inclined to search out French assistance as a guarantor of its economic independence from Washington.¹ The article was accurate on both points: efforts to cultivate France-Quebec links in the economic sphere contributed to the emergence of triangular relations and increasing tensions, as Ottawa also sought to cultivate economic links with France. The federal effort was inspired primarily by a concern to cultivate bilateral relations in response to the evolving situation in Quebec. A parallel concern, however, one predating the Quiet Revolution, was to build relations with France to strengthen the European counterweight to the US.

This chapter examines the triangular economic relations, revealing how Ottawa's ambitions were frustrated as the Canada-France divergence in foreign economic policies widened in response to the Gaullist challenge of the post-1945 international system. A series of economic-related disputes confirmed Paris' view of Canada's satellization, which to Ottawa's chagrin reinforced the impetus for France-Quebec economic cooperation. The result was triangular tensions. Ottawa's reaction to efforts to strengthen France-Quebec economic links was accompanied by a

¹ MAE, v. 145 – *Le Figaro*, 14 October 1963, “Amorce d’un important tournant dans les relations économiques franco-canadiennes.”

marginalization of the federal position. The economic consequences of France's May 1968 *événements*, however, announced the failure of the Gaullist challenge to US economic power, undermining France's margin of manoeuvre and contributing significantly to ending the acute crisis phase in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle. For all of the nationalist efforts to alter the structure of France-Canada economic relations, by the end of the 1960s these had grown only in absolute terms; their relative stagnation continued amid the regionalization of international trade.

Canadian Economic Interest in France

Stephen Azzi has described the final report of the Gordon Commission as “a watershed in Canadian economic, political, and intellectual life,” legitimizing and encouraging nationalist concern about the US economic presence's impact on Canada. The report warned of the behaviour of American subsidiaries in terms of the concentration of research and decision-making with US parent companies, and of the logic of political union that flowed from an ever-deepening economic integration. Canadian nationalist anxiety about North America's economic integration grew throughout the 1960s. Even the Governor of the Bank of Canada, James Coyne, issued veiled warnings about the extent of US ownership of the economy. Unemployment had risen due to an export sector hit by a Canadian dollar driven artificially high by the flood of US capital. The 1962 financial crisis that accompanied a withdrawal of US capital reminded Canadians of the extent of their country's economic links with its southern neighbour. It fed fears of an “unemployment crisis,” and the longstanding concern that Canadians were fated to be “hewers of wood, and drawers of water” for the US, the worry being that Canada

would be effectively de-industrialized and have to depend on its resource-based economy. The cancellation of the *Avro Arrow* became a touchstone for those bemoaning continentalization and its perceived threat to Canadian independence, reflected in works such as Walter Gordon's *Troubled Canada*.²

Nationalist concerns were exacerbated by the British bid for membership in the ECM. Coming after Diefenbaker's unrealized import diversion schemes, the British bid meant that Canada faced the further reduction of its transatlantic economic counterweight to the US.³ Over the preceding decade, Canada had stood by virtually helpless as Washington, mindful only five percent of the US economy relied on exports, sacrificed the prospect of liberalized transatlantic trade "on the altar of European reconstruction and integration."⁴ In the 1960s, conservative nationalists such as George Grant were joined and gradually overshadowed by a more left-wing critique arguing that a liberal, multilateral commercial policy was placing Canada in a neo-colonial relationship vis-à-vis the US.⁵

² Stephen Azzi, *Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism* (McGill-Queen's Press, 1999), 64; J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 152-153; Greg Donaghy, *Tolerant Allies, Canada and the United States, 1963-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 8-9; Walter Gordon, *Troubled Canada: The Need for New Domestic Policies* (McClelland and Stewart, 1961). Other works sounding the economic nationalist alarm included: University League for Social Reform, *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* Stephen Clarkson, ed. (McGraw-Hill, 1968); Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: the Multi-National Corporation in Canada* (Macmillan, 1970).

³ Andrea Benvenuti and Stuart Ward, "Britain, Europe, and the 'Other Quiet Revolution' in Canada," in *Canada and the End of Empire*, Phillip Buckner, ed. (UBC Press, 2005), 165-182; H.B. Robinson, *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (University of Toronto Press, 1989), 210-212, 278-279; Bruce Muirhead, "The Development of Canada's Foreign Economic Policy in the 1960s: The Case of the European Union," *Canadian Historical Review* December 2001, 2(4): 693; and by the same author, *Dancing Around the Elephant: Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973* (University of Toronto Press, 2007) for a larger discussion of the Canada-US economic relations and their implications for Canadian foreign economic policy.

⁴ Michael Hart, *A Trading Nation, Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization* (UBC Press, 2002), 155.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 197-198.

During the early days of the Fifth Republic, Paris' decision to make the franc convertible and relax import controls on goods from dollar countries such as Canada drew the immediate attention of Canadian officials in search of alternate markets. The ECM's cut to its common external tariff that was extended to all GATT members offered Ottawa additional reassurance that there might be a European solution to its American fears, as did measures Paris adopted in 1959 to encourage foreign direct investment.⁶ With France's economy performing strongly, Canada's embassy predicted at the end of 1960 that France promised a strong and diversified market for Canadian exports.⁷ Between 1960 and 1961, the number of embassy-organized visits of the Canadian business community increased by fifty percent.⁸ Federal optimism was fuelled further by the 1962 Baumgartner economic mission, the members of which met with John Diefenbaker and were guests of honour at a luncheon hosted by Canada's Minister of Finance and attended by several other Ministers and senior officials.⁹ Subsequent missions carried out by *Renault*, *Peugeot*, and *Compagnie Générale d'Électricité*, and the decision of *Mines Domaniales des Potasses d'Alsace* to participate in a Saskatchewan potash mine also fed hope that the relative stagnation

⁶ Maurice Vaïsse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Fayard, 1998), 168; Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (University of California Press, 1993), 159-162.

⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – International Trade Relations Branch, Department of Trade and Commerce, 15 January 1960, France Extends Dollar Import Liberalization; DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 5 April 1960, Import Liberalisation-France; DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 27 June 1960, France-Import Liberalization; DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – Canadian Embassy, Paris, Annual Statement of Trade Prospects, 18 November 1960; DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – Kniewasser, Commercial Counsellor, Canadian Embassy, Paris, 22 December 1961 – Annual Statement on Trade Prospects, December 1961.

⁸ George Hees, "Les relations commerciales entre le Canada et la France," in *Edhec 61, Canada – Numéro spécial d'Edhec Informations*, École de Hautes Études de Commerciales du Nord, Lille.

⁹ DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Programme de la visite de la mission économique et financière française au Canada, 9-16 octobre 1962.

of the two countries' post-war economic relationship was over and that a more substantive collaboration could be realized.¹⁰

Federal preoccupation with diversifying Canada's economic relations was all too evident in Ottawa's review of Canada-France relations in 1963. The primary mandate of the interministerial committee was to examine the economic and financial aspects of Canada-France relations, with an accompanying hope that stronger ties with France would promote closer Canadian links with the ECM that in the longer term could be employed to influence European economic and trade policy, crucial to Ottawa's diversifying Canadian economic relations.¹¹

The federal desire to expand economic links with France to balance US influence was evident during Lester Pearson's 1964 visit to Paris. In the wake of Washington's curtailment of US capital exports, a decision that threatened the basis of Canadian prosperity, Pearson told France's ambassador, Raymond Bousquet, that he hoped to return from Paris with an agreement that increased France's economic presence in Canada.¹² In Paris, he conceded that Canadian growth could not occur without American capital and markets, but expressed Ottawa's hope to dilute the American influence.¹³ Upon his return to Canada, Pearson told Bousquet that the federal budget would provide incentives to French manufacturers, and reiterated his

¹⁰ MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 13 July 1963, Bilan de l'économie canadienne en 1962.

¹¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson to Martin, 30 August 1963, Relations between France and Canada; DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-G-40 – Interdepartmental Committee on Canada-France Relations, 1 October 1963 (First Meeting).

¹² MAE, v. 204 – Personal Letter from Bousquet to de Carbonnel, Secrétaire-Général du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 15 July 1963.

¹³ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 31, Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre M. Georges Pompidou et M. Lester Pearson, Première Ministre du Canada, à l'Hôtel Matignon, le 16 janvier 1964; DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 30, Compte rendu de l'entretien entre le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre du Canada à l'Élysée, 16 janvier 1964.

desire for French industrial investment to serve as a counterweight to that of the US, the constant increase of which was of significant concern.¹⁴

Although Ottawa's concern to strengthen Canada-France economic relations responded to longstanding nationalist preoccupations regarding US economic influence, the Quiet Revolution provided an additional motivation. Ottawa also considered expanded Canada-France relations a response to Quebec nationalist pressures. During his Paris visit, Pearson told de Gaulle that Canada's interest in developing economic relations with France was spurred in part by the increased role and influence of Quebec and French Canadians in Canada's domestic affairs.¹⁵

Consequently, economics occupied the highest priority on the DEA's agenda for its task force and the interministerial committee reviewing Canada-France relations. In keeping with the liberal, multilateralist orientation of post-war Canadian commercial policy, however, some committee members had reservations about the wisdom of encouraging special bilateral trade relations with France. Norman Robertson acknowledged that bilateral cooperation ought not usurp Canadian multilateral policy, but argued that domestic considerations made supplementary bilateral contacts necessary and logical.¹⁶

The domestic and international motivations underpinning federal efforts to cultivate economic relations with France led Ottawa to try to revive the Canada-France Economic Committee, moribund since 1953. It was Robertson who proposed the idea, which was then taken up both by the DEA task force and the interministerial

¹⁴ MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 27 February 1964.

¹⁵ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 29, Compte rendu de l'entretien entre le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre du Canada à l'Élysée, 15 janvier 1964.

¹⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-G-40 – Interdepartmental Committee on Canada-France Relations, 1 October 1963 (First Meeting).

committee. Although the committee's limited effectiveness in the 1950s was recalled, such doubts were assuaged somewhat by an optimism that Paris appeared to be making an effort to develop its investments in Canada.¹⁷ The circumstances under which the committee had originally been established had long since changed, however, and Ottawa was now the *demandeur*. When Pearson proposed reviving the committee and raising it to a ministerial level equivalent to Canada's arrangements with the US and UK, the MAE reaction was non-committal, suggesting the matter be discussed during his upcoming visit to Paris.¹⁸ The Prime Minister reiterated the proposal when de Gaulle inquired of practical measures to boost Canada-France trade. Pearson suggested that arrangements should exist with France similar to Canadian meetings with the Americans and British, proposing a ministerial committee meeting at least once a year. In his talks with Maurice Couve de Murville, Paul Martin emphasized the importance Ottawa attached to the idea.¹⁹

Fifteen years earlier the two capitals' roles were reversed. Now, Paris' response to the proposed committee was lukewarm. De Gaulle insisted that a France-Canada committee possess sufficiently important subject matter to justify such high-level meetings, and noted Paris' serious difficulty in encouraging the French private sector to establish operations in Canada. France and Canada, he felt, did not share enough in common to make such an approach worthwhile. Couve de Murville

¹⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Robertson to Martin, 30 August 1963, Relations between France and Canada; DEA, G-2, v. 6830, 2727-AD-40, p. 8.2 – Memorandum from European Division to the USSEA, 11 September 1963; DEA, G-2, v. 6519, 9245-G-40 – Interdepartmental Committee on Canada-France Relations, 1 October 1963 (First Meeting).

¹⁸ MAE, v. 204 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 24 September 1963; MAE, v. 204 – Telegram from Lucet to French Embassy, Ottawa, 27 September 1963.

¹⁹ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 28, Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre M. Couve de Murville et M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Canada à Paris, 15 janvier 1964; Document 29 – Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada à Paris, le 15 janvier 1964.

echoed this view, arguing that while there was a great desire to develop relations and hold talks as the need arose, a formal committee with regularized meetings presented challenges in terms of workload, timing, and competition with other ministerial meetings.²⁰

Divergence Enduring: Canada-France Economic Differences

Ottawa's difficulty in reviving the Canada-France Economic Committee underlined the two countries' differing trading patterns and their divergence over commercial policy and their broader political agendas that rendered problematic the expansion of economic relations. The Canadian Embassy's cautious optimism about the prospects for increased economic links present at the start of the decade was proving misplaced. Irrespective of the motivations driving Ottawa's efforts to develop economic relations, the reality was that Canadian aims had to contend with the economic dimension of the Gaullist nationalist challenge to preponderant US power in the West.

A clash had been brewing since before the advent of the Fifth Republic. After the announcement of the ECM, Washington had worked to strengthen the economic component of the Atlantic framework by initiating the Dillon Round of GATT talks with the aim of lowering the ECM's common external tariff. It also spearheaded the establishment of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which succeeded the OEEC and included Canada and the US in its

²⁰ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 28, *Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre M. Couve de Murville et M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Canada à Paris, 15 janvier 1964*; Document 29 – *Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada à Paris, le 15 janvier 1964*. Also, DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – *Memorandum from European Division to File, 10 October 1963, Meeting between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the French Foreign Minister at Idlewild Airport, New York, 9 October 1963*.

membership, to help ensure that European integration evolved in a manner consistent with US economic interests. The Kennedy administration supported Britain's membership in the ECM and enacted the *Trade Expansion Act* (1962) that initiated the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations. All of these efforts were meant to establish a liberal, multilateral international trade regime, and constituted the economic component of Kennedy's transatlantic Grand Design, one that challenged the Gaullist position.²¹

Europe's post-war recovery made its economic inequality with the US even more unacceptable to Gaullist eyes and provided Paris with the incentive and opportunity to achieve a more symmetrical relationship. Determined to block any semblance of transatlantic free trade, De Gaulle strove to build up Franco-German relations while simultaneously limiting the ECM's supranational tendencies. Rather than one voice in a European chorus, France was determined to maintain its autonomy and lead the rest of Europe. The corollary was Paris' effort to ensure that the UK and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) be kept at a distance. This was accomplished through France's championing the enactment of the ECM's new common external tariff in 1960, two years earlier than originally envisaged, in order to consolidate European integration on Paris' terms.²²

Paris' 'empty chair' policy in 1965 on the debate over Europe's Common Agricultural Policy demonstrated Gaullist efforts to ensure that the ECM served

²¹ Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1957*, (Oxford University Press, 1998), 52-54; Vaïsse (1998), 552.

²² Jeffrey Glen Giaque, *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Europe, 1955-1963* (UNC Press, 2002), 33-40; Vaïsse (1998), 163.

French national interests.²³ De Gaulle vetoed UK membership in the ECM in January 1963, and the trade liberalization measures of the late 1950s were replaced by an increasingly selective policy.²⁴ After a number of high-profile corporate takeovers in 1964, notably that of auto manufacturer *Simca* at the hands of *Chrysler*, and the French computer company *Bull* by *General Electric* (which had implications for developing France's *force de frappe*), Paris adopted a series of protectionist measures to discourage foreign (i.e. US) investment in France, and urged its ECM partners to adopt similar measures.²⁵ Starting in 1963, Paris also mounted a "gold offensive" against the American dollar and its preponderant role in the international monetary system. France converted its dollar reserves into gold and then withdrew from the international gold pool to raise the price of the metal to provoke a devaluation of the US dollar.²⁶

Although there was thus "no lack of trade and economic questions" for Ottawa and Paris to discuss, a DEA report in 1963 made clear the department's uncertainty over which lent themselves to mutually beneficial discussions, given France's "more rigid national patterns and conceptions of national interest," and Ottawa's and Paris' differing approaches to international trade. The DEA report warned that talks would be counter-productive if they produced only "sterile

²³ Muirhead (2001), 707.

²⁴ Jeffrey G. Giauque, "Offers of Partnership or Bids for Hegemony? The Atlantic Community, 1961-1963," *International History Review* March 2000, 22(1): 98; Lundestad (1998), 74-75; Edward A. Kolodziej, *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Cornell University Press, 1974), 189-191.

²⁵ Frieden (2006), 349; Vaïsse (1998), 398-399; Kuisel (1993), 159-162.

²⁶ Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945*, translated by Michael Shaw (Continuum, 1980), 218-224, 235-237; Alfred Grosser *Affaires étrangères, la politique de la France, 1944-1984* (Flammarion, 1984), 220; Vaïsse (1998), 397, 400-407; Frieden (2006), 344-345; Kolodziej (1974), 184.

confrontation,” and that France’s ECM membership made “purely ‘bilateral’” agreements unattainable.²⁷

Ottawa’s foremost concern was to prevent the emergence of a “Fortress Europe” that would force Canada further into the US economic orbit. If the Canadian embassy initially considered the ECM a generally liberalizing force in France, the economic divergence between Canadian Atlanticism and Gaullism made the ECM a source of friction, as Paris placed its protectionist imprimatur on the ECM, making it a vehicle for Gallic economic nationalism.²⁸

Although the Diefenbaker Government looked askance on British membership in Europe, the Pearson Government held another position.²⁹ While concerned about the implications of too heavy a reliance on US markets and capital, Pearson was not an economic nationalist, but an Atlanticist. Still in opposition, Pearson described protectionism as “out of step with history,” and urged Diefenbaker to seize upon British offers for free trade, arguing these could be the first step toward a truly “Atlantic Economic Community.”³⁰ He told Ambassador Bousquet that in the event of British membership in the ECM, Canada should take up the challenge contained in Kennedy’s Grand Design and promote stronger transatlantic economic links,

²⁷ DEA, G-2, v. 6830, 2927-AD-40, p. 8.2 – Notes on Some Trade and Economic Aspects of Canada-France Relations, undated [circa 1963].

²⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – Canadian Embassy, Paris, France – Annual Statement of Trade Prospects, 18 November 1960; Muirhead (2001), 698, 705. Olivier Wormser, head of the MAE’s Economic Affairs division, told Canadian officials that “France was a protectionist country, had always been a protectionist country, and probably would always be a protectionist country.”

²⁹ MAE, v. 97 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, 13 July 1962.

³⁰ Donaghy (2002), 10; English (1992), 231.

explaining later that any economic inconvenience to Canada arising from British membership would be trumped by its larger contribution to the Atlanticist cause.³¹

Pearson raised the issue of British membership in the ECM during his 1964 Paris visit, emphasizing the importance Canada attached to British membership as part of a broader Canadian desire to expand trade with Europe, a position not designed to attract Gaullist support given Paris' opposition to the British "Trojan Horse." Indeed, de Gaulle responded by asserting Europe intended to stay united economically, to protect itself from being drowned under US products. Pearson's counterpart, Georges Pompidou, reiterated the Gaullist position in explaining Paris' concern to prevent France from falling into the US economic orbit. Pearson reminded his hosts of Canada's own anxiety regarding American economic power as the reason Ottawa wished to increase exchanges with Europe, and France especially.³²

Federal efforts to develop Canada-France economic relations were also hampered by non-economic factors, as demonstrated by the renewed discussions about a French purchase of Canadian uranium for its nuclear energy programme. In late 1962, Paris expressed interest in signing a ten-year contract to purchase five hundred tons of uranium per year from *Dennison Mines*.³³ Paris considered Pearson to have undertaken, during his 1964 visit, to see the project realized. This fact, combined with the depressed state of the uranium market, Canada's surplus product, and Ottawa's awareness that France could obtain South African uranium without

³¹ MAE, v. 97 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, 23 August 1962; MAE, v. 199 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 18 October 1966.

³² DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 29, Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada a Paris, le 15 janvier 1964; DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 31, Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre M. Georges Pompidou et M. Lester Pearson, Première Ministre du Canada, à l'Hôtel Matignon, le 16 janvier 1964.

³³ DEA, G-2, v. 4125, 14003-F-5-3-40 – Memorandum from Stoner, Economic Division to A.E. Ritchie, 12 December 1962.

controls, led French officials to believe the purchase could proceed without Ottawa attaching any supervisory conditions.³⁴

French estimations were incorrect. In February 1965 Ottawa informed Paris that any purchase would be subject to conditions set by Canadian authorities. Although discussions continued throughout the year, the proposed purchase languished as differences between Canada and France continued over the control issue. Ottawa's announcement in June that the sale of Canadian uranium would be reserved for peaceful uses so that henceforth all sales (including those to the US and UK) would be subject to verification, was dismissed by the MAE as Ottawa believing France was in a *demandeur* position and sought a rapid agreement, whereas this was not the case.³⁵ Exploration of a possible sale continued throughout 1966 and the matter was raised again when the DEA Under-secretary, Marcel Cadieux, visited Paris. Cadieux's MAE counterpart, Hervé Alphand, reiterated France's unwillingness to accept any external controls, offering only the promise that any uranium purchased would be used for pacific ends. Cadieux reaffirmed Ottawa's dilemma given its non-proliferation position and its adherence to AIEA regulations. Although the two officials left the door open for a possible future deal on Canadian enriched uranium,

³⁴ MAE, v. 258 – MAE, Service des Affaires Atomiques, Note: Approvisionnement en uranium au Canada, 1 December 1964; John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 322.

³⁵ MAE, v. 258 – MAE, Service des Affaires Atomiques, Note: Uranium canadien, 17 February 1965; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10077, 20-FR-9, p. 1.1 – Message from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 13 April 1965, Jurgensen Visit – Accord Cadre; MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 4 May 1965; MAE, v. 258 – Note from MAE, Service des Affaires Atomiques to Couve de Murville, 19 May 1965, Uranium canadien; MAE, v. 258 – Telegram from Martin, MAE, Service des Affaires Atomiques to French Embassy, Ottawa, 24 May 1965.

the French purchase of natural uranium fell through, and with it an opportunity to boost economic relations.³⁶

The unrealized uranium deal had political repercussions. De Gaulle monitored the affair closely, and several senior French figures, including Pompidou, emphasized to Canada's ambassador, Jules Léger, the significance the French leader attached to reaching an agreement. The dispute became entangled in French concern over US efforts to deny Paris access to uranium sources owing to Washington's opposition to the *force de frappe*. The French interpreted Ottawa's stance throughout the negotiations as conditioned by its relations with the US.³⁷

The failure of the uranium deal fed France's growing conviction of Canada's economic satellization. The members of the National Assembly's foreign affairs commission who visited Canada in autumn 1962 returned to France convinced that an insufficient population and financial resources, and internal divisions had led to Canadian economic dependence on the US.³⁸ Paris' representatives confirmed this assessment. In a discussion on the prospects for a Canada-US customs union, France's Ambassador, Francis Lacoste, observed that US firms in Canada behaved as colonizers, and predicted that the regionalization of international trade meant Canada would be a junior partner of the US and sooner or later would be compelled to adopt

³⁶ MAE, v. 199 – Audience accordée par le Secrétaire Général à M. Cadieux, Secrétaire-Général du Ministère Canadien des Affaires Extérieures, 19 November 1966.

³⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from Léger to DEA, 8 September 1965, De Gaulle et les relations franco-canadiennes; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9, Letter from Yalden to Léger, Personnel et confidentiel, 25 October 1967; Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier, *Le Lobby du Québec à Paris: Les Précurseurs du Général de Gaulle* (Éditions Québec-Amérique, 2002), 53; Jacques Foccart, *Tous les soirs avec De Gaulle, Journal de l'Élysée, volume I* (Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1997), 425; Claude Julien, *Le Canada: dernière chance de l'Europe* (Grasset, 1965), 42. Even Julien, who Ottawa counted as an ally against Gaullist interference, attributed the outcome of the failed uranium sale to Canada's ceding to US pressure and symptomatic of its satellization.

³⁸ MAE, v. 101 – Rapport d'Information, MM. Bosson et Thorailleur, Députés, Assemblée Nationale, 18 March 1963.

an associated, if not identical economic policy with Washington. France's consul general in Montreal echoed this assessment in recounting that many of his business contacts in both linguistic communities were mentioning *sotto voce* that Canada's future was a customs union with the US.³⁹

Soon after the 1963 Canadian election, Bousquet observed that the victorious Liberals had drawn their support from the regions where economic integration with the US was most advanced and profitable, and had done poorly where American investments were failing, an electoral outcome obliging the Pearson Government to adopt a more favourable attitude to the US.⁴⁰ Bousquet's analysis appeared borne out by the debacle of the 1963 Gordon budget that proposed a number of nationalist-minded *dirigiste* measures subsequently withdrawn following the "violent and bitterly hostile" protests from the business community on both sides of the border.⁴¹ Further proof of the French belief of Canada's satellization came during Pearson's 1964 visit to Paris when de Gaulle expressed a willingness to increase France's economic presence in Canada, but told Pearson it would be difficult for Canada to "sortir de son cercle anglo-saxon."⁴²

Confirmation of North America's deepening interdependence soon followed. Greg Donaghy has observed that despite a professed intention to reduce Canada's

³⁹ MAE, v. 115 – Letter from Lacoste to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 7 March 1962, *Le Canada et les Etats-Unis: perspectives « d'union économique »*; MAE, v. 136 – Le Consul Général de France à Montréal à Son Excellence to Bousquet, 6 September 1962, Fin de mission.

⁴⁰ MAE, v. 133 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 17 April 1963.

⁴¹ Azzi (1999), 95-110; English (1992), 276; Donaghy (2002), 22-23; Lester Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, volume 3*, John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1972c), 107, 128-131.

⁴² Consistent with his Atlanticism, Pearson responded that this was not Canada's aim, but rather a more effective balance between Europe and the US. DDF, 1964 – Document 30, *Compte rendu de l'entretien entre le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre du Canada à l'Elysée*, 16 janvier 1964.

economic dependence on the US, the Pearson Government oversaw “a dramatic and significant increase in North American economic integration.”⁴³ Evidence included the 1965 Canada-US Auto Pact, the origins of which lay ironically in Ottawa’s nationalist effort to develop Canada’s secondary industry and reduce its dependence on US capital. Similarly telling was the cooperation between Canada and the US during the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations, which followed Ottawa’s strong support of the American moves to establish the OECD and, notwithstanding the nationalist uproar it provoked, the release of the Merchant-Heeney Report in 1965 that endorsed deepening Canada-US economic ties and a quiet diplomatic approach to their management.⁴⁴ French views of Canada’s economic satellization may also have been confirmed by denigrating comments Jean Marchand, the federal Minister of Manpower and Immigration (and Pearson’s Quebec lieutenant), made in February 1967 about the apparent lack of progress in France-Quebec economic cooperation. Marchand claimed that nothing could be practically done to escape US technological and financial power, so that it was better to adapt to and profit from it rather than search in vain for an unattainable economic independence. The MAE noted Marchand’s reference to de Gaulle’s inability to prevent *General Electric*’s takeover of *Bull*, and his argument that even the most nationalist French Canadian could not be convinced to prefer a Peugeot or Renault to a US automobile.⁴⁵

⁴³ Donaghy (2002), 25-66; Muirhead (2001), 700-701.

⁴⁴ Livingston T. Merchant and A.D.P. Heeney, *Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership* (Government of Canada, June 28, 1965); MAE, v. 243 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 15 July 1965.

⁴⁵ MAE, v. 278 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 10 February 1967, Déclarations de M. Marchand.

France's ambassador, François Leduc, argued North American integration had been less the product of a deliberate policy where the risks of interdependence had been properly assessed, than the result of two equally liberal governments ceding the initiative to the private sector. Leduc remarked as well on Canada's perpetual "valse-hésitation," in which the desire for US capital alternated with a worry over the country's independence, an ambiguity reflected in the inconsistent positions taken by Canada's two principal political parties. The MAE noted Leduc's conclusion that Canada and the US were condemned to live together, and that regardless of its political evolution, Canada was destined to be a northern projection of the US economy.⁴⁶ As if to confirm this analysis, Canada opened its Centennial year with two-thirds of its trade being with the US and more than half its industry in American hands, prompting Leduc to remark that having chosen a high standard of living and a civilization of comfort for fear of losing an already insufficient population to the US, Canada had mortgaged its resources and now was trying to square the circle of retaking control without displeasing the US or suffering a loss of the prosperity believed crucial for unity. Leduc was pessimistic at the prospect for success, however, arguing that Canadians were incapable of the material sacrifice required to recover their independence.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ MAE, v. 293 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, *Amérique*, 2 December 1965, *problèmes financiers canadiens*.

⁴⁷ MAE, v. 265 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, *Amérique*, 4 January 1967. Also, Julien (1965). Julien decried Canada's economic satellization, suggesting the loss of Canada's economic potential to the US represented a defeat for Europe far more serious than that France had experienced on the Plains of Abraham; however, Julien opposed Quebec independence and Gaullist policy in this regard, arguing it would merely accelerate the process of satellization. Instead, he appealed for Quebec and the rest of Canada to unite in resisting the US economic embrace with European help.

Much Ado about Something

The French assessment of Canada's satellization encouraged Paris to focus on cultivating economic relations with Quebec. The pitfalls of this dynamic were seen during the "Caravelle Affair." In March 1963, France's state-owned *Sud-Aviation* sent a mission to Canada to lobby *Trans-Canada Airlines* (TCA) to purchase its *Caravelle* airliner. The proposed French contract had an advantage over its UK and US competitors' given that the entire assembly of the airliner would be carried out by Montreal's *Canadair*, leading Jean Lesage to promise his total support in lobbying Ottawa. Bousquet himself met with the federal Minister of Transport, Léon Balcer, who was strongly supportive of the Caravelle and indicated that *Sud-Aviation* was best-placed to win the contract given the Diefenbaker Government's insistence that the winning bid should boast the maximum direct benefit to Canada's economy.⁴⁸

Bousquet cautioned Paris that the match was far from won, but that the outcome would be more assured with the election of a Liberal government in Ottawa, given the federal party's reliance on Lesage's electoral machine in Quebec.⁴⁹ Indeed, in the wake of the Liberals' minority victory, Lesage undertook to intervene immediately with Pearson and the new government on behalf of the Caravelle. Paris noted that a third of the government caucus came from Quebec; this and the new government's preoccupation with French Canada created an ideal situation for France-Quebec cooperation. Accordingly, Bousquet followed the advice of Léon Balcer, now on the opposition benches, to provide all of the information regarding the

⁴⁸ MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 5 March 1963, Voyage au Québec. Entrevue avec M. Lesage et les Ministres provinciaux. Mission Renault et Mission Sud-Aviation.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Caravelle to Quebec's Members of Parliament, especially those on the transport committee, as well as to cultivate public opinion in support of Sud-Aviation's bid.⁵⁰

Although Bousquet used a June 1963 meeting with Paul Martin to lobby on behalf of a TCA purchase of fifty-five Caravelles, difficulties soon surfaced. The Chair of the Air Transport Board argued there was "simply no North American market for the Caravelle" since it had reached the limits of its technical development. He also argued that the British and American alternatives were more appropriate to TCA needs. Ottawa considered it of greater benefit to Canada's economy to have the Toronto-based *De Havilland* produce components for the US Douglas DC-9, given its greater sales potential.⁵¹

The interministerial committee mandated to examine France-Canada relations arose directly out of the Caravelle issue. At the time, Norman Robertson recognized the matter's delicacy and pushed for a committee to be established to consider the gamut of economic relations with France. Similarly, the DEA task force on Canada-France relations examined potential responses to French lobbying regarding the airliner.⁵²

Bousquet expressed concern to Martin about "strong opposition" to the Caravelle in some influential Canadian quarters, notably the Presidents of Canadair and TCA. The ambassador reminded Martin the sale was also a question of prestige,

⁵⁰ MAE, v. 136 – Note: La Province de Québec, 7 May 1963; MAE, v. 145 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 27 April 1963; MAE, v. 164 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 11 June 1963.

⁵¹ DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Memorandum to File by Fournier, European Division, 17 June 1963; DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-40, p. 6.1 – Memorandum from Stone, Economic Division to Acting Under-Secretary, 21 August 1963, commercial relations between Canada and France.

⁵² DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-40, p. 6.1 – Memorandum from Stone, Economic Division, to Acting Under-secretary, 21 August 1963, commercial relations between Canada and France; DEA, G-2, v. 6830, 2727-AD-40, p. 8.2 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 11 September 1963.

even implying de Gaulle could intervene to ensure that Sud-Aviation met competitive prices.⁵³ Bousquet also suggested the benefit of Pearson being able to refer to a Caravelle purchase during his upcoming visit to Paris, given recent French investment in Canada that included the potash plant in Saskatchewan and the proposed automotive assembly plant. The diplomat made clear that economic issues had political implications for improved France-Canada relations. Martin encouraged Bousquet to continue lobbying, and promised to tell Pearson of his own personal support for the French bid.⁵⁴

Martin subsequently characterized the Caravelle purchase as an opportunity to establish “a community of interest” with Paris and linked the issue to Canada’s Atlanticist linchpin efforts. He told Pearson that there were important domestic and international reasons to give serious consideration to TCA opting for the Caravelle, so that all else being equal, the potential impact on employment in Montreal and the ability to help improve Franco-American relations meant the Sud-Aviation bid merited close attention.⁵⁵ Pearson responded to Martin that he was assured by the Minister of Transport, George McIlwraith, and TCA’s President, Gordon MacGregor, that the Caravelle was being given every consideration and no final decision would be taken without Cabinet being consulted, but that the French airliner was at a considerable disadvantage compared to its British and American competitors.⁵⁶ The Prime Minister took a more optimistic tone a few days later, however, telling

⁵³ DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1, Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 12 September 1963.

⁵⁴ DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-40, p. 6.1 – Memorandum from European Division to the Under-secretary, 10 September 1963, French Ambassador’s Call on the Minister, September 9.

⁵⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – Memorandum from Martin for Pearson, 12 September 1963.

⁵⁶ DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-40, p. 6.1 – Memorandum from Dier to the Under-secretary, 16 September 1963.

Bousquet that while TCA's independent recommendation would be essential to the final decision, the Cabinet could take into account political contingencies if it were judged that technical considerations between the competitors were roughly equal.⁵⁷

Bousquet continued his lobbying efforts, particularly among members of the Quebec Liberal caucus; in fact it became a source of some annoyance. During a French Embassy dinner in honour of Sud-Aviation, Marcel Cadieux questioned the company's president about North American sales beyond the TCA contract. The company president admitted that there was no prospect of sales in the US at present, but undertook to give Canadair all future sales in the North American market. Subsequently, a DEA official noted that during the dinner, Bousquet had talked solely of Quebec rather than Canada in proposing a *quid pro quo* purchase.⁵⁸

Bousquet's efforts yielded some fruit when many French-Canadian MPs asked the Minister of Transport to confirm press reports that TCA had selected the Douglas DC-9. The federal Liberal Quebec caucus issued a press release affirming support for the Caravelle.⁵⁹ A Quebec Cabinet discussion resulted in the release of a public statement emphasizing Quebec support for Sud-Aviation's bid. Similarly, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Gérard-D. Lévesque, contacted Pearson and his federal counterparts to urge the Caravelle purchase.⁶⁰

After the official announcement that the Douglas bid had won the TCA contract, Jean Lesage confided to Bousquet that the decision had gone against Sud-

⁵⁷ MAE, v. 204 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 24 September 1963.

⁵⁸ DEA, G-2, v. 5289, 9245-30, p. 6.1 – Memorandum from Hooten, European Division to Economic Division, 25 October 1963, Caravelle Tactics; Thomson (1988), 116.

⁵⁹ MAE, v. 145 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 6 November 1963; MAE, v. 164 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 16 November 1963.

⁶⁰ ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 93, p. 4, 1963 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, le 6 novembre 1963.

Aviation because of the greater item cost of the Caravelle, the fact the French airliner was slightly slower, and TCA's interest in orienting itself toward a lighter, faster fleet to reduce operating expenses.⁶¹ Matters degenerated quickly, however, when Gordon MacGregor made disparaging comments about the Caravelle before the House of Commons Transport Committee. Bousquet compared the controversy to the preceding year's *Canadian National* "Gordon Affair," reporting that the TCA president was subjected to intense questioning from the committee's francophone members, and that there was a protest march on TCA's Montreal office.⁶² The Caravelle decision, after so many interventions from Quebec politicians, provoked French-Canadian frustration and exasperation, and MacGregor's comments were interpreted in Quebec nationalist circles not as a strike against *Sud-Aviation*, but against French Canada, reflected in the far greater attention Quebec's francophone press devoted to the controversy. The affair went to the heart of Quebec nationalist sensitivities over French-Canadian economic marginalization, and the efforts of the Quiet Revolution to ensure a francophone managerial and technical capacity and industrial base.⁶³

In his subsequent meeting with de Gaulle, Pearson expressed his disappointment over the TCA decision. Paul Martin regretted publicly MacGregor's

⁶¹ MAE, v. 164 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 22 November 1963.

⁶² MAE, v. 165 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 12 December 1963. The "Gordon Affair" erupted when the head of *Canadian National Railways* (CN), Donald Gordon, claimed that the lack of French Canadians on CN's board arose from a lack of competent candidates, which sparked a large demonstration in front of the company's Montreal office.

⁶³ MAE, v. 165 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 13 December 1963, Déclarations du Président de TCA sur la Caravelle; MAE, v. 165 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 13 December 1963; MAE, v. 165 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 10 December 1963; Thomson (1988), 116. Also, Pierre-Yves Pépin, "Les relations économiques franco-canadiennes: données récentes et perspectives," *L'Actualité Économique* 1964, 40(3): 502-504, as an example of the manner in which the decision was received.

comments, affirming bravely that the Caravelle Affair would not affect Canada-France relations.⁶⁴ Yet relations had been affected: Marcel Cadieux told Ambassador Bousquet that rightly or wrongly, there was a sense that France's embassy had stoked Quebec opinion to bring pressure to bear on Ottawa. Cadieux suggested that if Sud-Aviation had treated directly with Ottawa, the controversy could have been avoided.⁶⁵

The subsequent ill-fated discussions of a French purchase of Canadian uranium provoked a similar triangular dynamic. Bousquet was aware that Pearson was under pressure from his French-Canadian ministers, notably Maurice Sauvé, who opposed strongly any treatment of France that differed from that accorded the US or UK.⁶⁶ At one point during the languishing talks, Alain Peyrefitte, the French Cabinet Minister responsible for France's nuclear programme, approached Jean Chapdelaine, expressing Paris' deep disappointment over Canadian discrimination against France as compared to the Anglo-Americans, and suggesting Quebec should not remain indifferent to such a situation. Chapdelaine's impression was that Paris was trying to employ its growing links with Quebec City to have it intercede with Ottawa to facilitate a deal.⁶⁷

Another example of the triangular dynamic was the quasi-official France-Quebec agreement on engineering exchanges and technical cooperation, part of their

⁶⁴ DDF, 1964, v. 1, Document 29 – Compte-Rendu de l'Entretien entre le Général de Gaulle et M. Lester Pearson, Premier Ministre du Canada à Paris, le 15 janvier 1964; MAE, v. 165 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 19 December 1963.

⁶⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Memorandum to File by Cadieux, 25 June 1964, Nos Relations avec la France.

⁶⁶ MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 4 May 1965.

⁶⁷ ANQ, E42, 1990-09-002, v. 405, Délégation du Québec à Paris, 1964-1966, « A » – Letter from Chapdelaine to Morin, 17 February 1966.

joint efforts to promote francophone economic empowerment.⁶⁸ The origins of the “ASTEF Agreement” date to the early post-war period. Paris and Ottawa had reached an internship agreement in 1956, but the results were disappointing.⁶⁹ In mid-1962, Bousquet received enthusiastic responses from Quebec governmental and academic circles to Paris’ proposal that Quebec facilitate internships for recent French engineering graduates.⁷⁰ Six months later, building on the Baumgartner Mission’s success, Bousquet proposed establishing an intergovernmental technical cooperation programme to facilitate the training of French-Canadian engineers, even suggesting that if Paris and Quebec City concurred, a bilateral agreement could be signed.⁷¹

During Jean Lesage’s May 1963 visit to Paris, he discussed France-Quebec technical cooperation with de Gaulle as part of their larger discussions about ways and means to increase France’s economic presence in the province. By the end of the month, officials had drafted an agreement between Quebec City and France’s quasi-official *Association pour l’Organisation des stages en France* (ASTEF), providing for diverse internships, mixed professional training centres, technical documentation in French, a France-Quebec engineering association intended to maintain the links

⁶⁸ *Entente entre le ministère de l’Éducation du Québec et l’Association pour l’organisation des stages en France (ASTEF) relative à la formation du Centre de diffusion de la documentation scientifique et technique française au Québec* (1964).

⁶⁹ MAE, v. 63 – Letter from Lorion, Conseiller d’Ambassade, Charge du Consulat Général de France à Québec to Bidault, MAE, Relations Culturelles, 29 May 1946, Venue à Québec d’élèves de l’École Polytechnique; DEA, G-2, v. 3796, 8260-AD-40, p. 1 – Letter from Charpentier, Press and Cultural Attaché, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Allan Anderson, Information Division, DEA, 11 January 1950; *Informations canadiennes* October-November 1956, 1(10-11); DEA, G-2, v. 5056, 2727-AD-40, p. 9 – France-Canada Cultural Relations, 25 November 1963. By 1963, there had been only twenty applications by Canadians, and fifty from French nationals, that had resulted in only about a dozen internships over the life of the 1956 agreement.

⁷⁰ MAE, v. 144 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques, Conversations de Québec les 14 et 15 juin [1962], avec MM. Lesage, Rousseau, René Tremblay et Gauvin; MAE, v. 144 – Letter from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 5 July 1962, Échange bilatérale franco-québécois [sic] d’ingénieurs techniques.

⁷¹ MAE, v. 144 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 17 January 1963; MAE, v. 173 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 2 April 1963.

forged by the exchanges, and a bilateral committee to co-ordinate the various programmes.⁷² To affirm the Quebec government's bid for international activity, Paul Gérin-Lajoie's letter during the negotiations to the head of ASTEF, Marcel Demonque, made no reference to Canada or Canadians, and revealed a presumption of exchanges beyond the scope of engineers, to include professors, scientists, researchers, managers and union figures.⁷³

The DEA expressed little concern when Ottawa learned of the France-Quebec discussions. Nonetheless, since the agreement was to be signed by Gérin-Lajoie and the ASTEF, legally a private association but supported by the French government and subject to its policy direction, Norman Robertson recommended that Martin publicly expressing in writing his approval of the France-Quebec exchange of letters in order to safeguard the federal prerogative in foreign affairs. Federal officials were put at ease by the parallel agreement between ASTEF and the University of Toronto.⁷⁴

A more worrisome manifestation of triangular relations for Ottawa were the discussions regarding a French loan to Quebec. Bousquet believed that regardless of Quebec's political future, its economic reality was that only the US banking system was able to assure Quebec the means for its investment and nationalization policy, so

⁷² MAE, v. 145 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 31 May 1963.

⁷³ Cholette (1998), 34. Cholette explains that the uncertainty as to whether there would be any other France-Quebec cooperation agreements beyond this first one led Quebec to seek as broad a scope as possible.

⁷⁴ MAE, v. 145 – Note from MAE, Conseiller Juridique, to MAE, Amérique, 8 May 1963, de la conclusion d'un accord de coopération technique avec la Province de Québec; MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 1 June 1963, Accords privés de coopération technique franco-québécois et franco-ontarien; DEA, G-2, v. 5232, 6956-40, p. 5 – Memorandum from Robertson to Martin, 15 August 1963; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p.6 – Procès-Verbal d'une Réunion Inter-Ministérielle sur les Échanges de Jeunes avec la France, 27 April 1967. In response to concerns that the MAE's Legal Division expressed about the complications arising from Canadian constitutional realities, Bousquet suggested the France-Quebec agreement be supplemented by one with a private, Ontario organization, to safeguard against any anglophone recrimination. The subsequent agreement with the University of Toronto remained a dead letter, owing to a lack of initiative from the institution.

that unless European market conditions changed, any new francophone state would face the same reliance on US markets for capital that Canada did.⁷⁵ Shortly after this report, Quebec's Delegate-General, Charles Lussier, quoted an unnamed French Minister who confided to him that Paris was studying a possible financial agreement with Quebec equal to that it recently initiated with Mexico, suggesting Quebec could expect to obtain approximately \$150 million.⁷⁶

Progress was slow and difficult. In 1966, Daniel Johnson learned that the issue was splitting the French administration into two groups: one favoured a loan to aid Quebec to establish SIDBEC, while the other preferred a direct loan to the Quebec government. More alarming was the news that no one within the French administration was truly seized with the issue. Paris' early reimbursement of its post-war debt to the US that autumn led Quebec officials to anticipate a similar repayment of the remaining \$67 million of Ottawa's 1946 loan to Paris. The prospect prompted a Quebec-inspired proposal that France should pay back the debt early, with the stipulation that these monies should go to Quebec City. Jacques Parizeau, economic advisor to Johnson, and Marcel Cazavan, the deputy minister of Finance, suggested that a consortium of banks in Quebec could hold the funds temporarily and lend these out to Quebec. In turn, Quebec would pay back Ottawa according to the original repayment schedule.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ MAE, v. 275 – Letter from Bousquet to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 27 April 1964, Confidences de M. Jean Drapeau – L'avenir du Québec et des Canadiens-français – Suite à mes dépêches Nos. 603, 604, 605/AM, 606/AM5.

⁷⁶ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210 – Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964.

⁷⁷ ANQ, E42, 2004-01-002, v. 70, Projet d'accord général Franco-Québécois – Aide-mémoire pour l'honorable Premier Ministre du Québec en vue de son entretien avec le ministre français des affaires étrangères, 30 September 1966.

The initial reaction of Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, head of the MAE's Amérique division, was that the Quebec proposal would appear unacceptable to Ottawa, since it would not profit from any early repayment. Jurgensen, however, had no objection to the arrangement, if Ottawa consented, given that Paris had a political interest in putting such a large sum at Quebec's disposal. The MAE's Secretary-General, Hervé Alphan, subsequently told Chapdelaine of the MAE preoccupations, especially its belief that Ottawa would not accept a situation in which its position as debt holder was effectively usurped. While Alphan claimed to be favourable in theory to the idea, he suggested that France should not "choquer" federal officials, but suggest an alternate way for Paris to loan Quebec the money, one more likely to meet with Ottawa's approval.⁷⁸

In addition to his talks at the MAE, Chapdelaine discussed Quebec's proposal with senior Elysée officials. René de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, de Gaulle's diplomatic counsellor, promised to raise the matter with the French leader.⁷⁹ The Elysée subsequently recommended in favour of the Quebec proposal, but conditioned this on Couve de Murville's agreement. Apprised of this qualification, Chapdelaine met with the Foreign Minister's chief of staff and Alphan. Although sympathetic, the MAE was reluctant, owing to "le nihil obstat outaouais." Chapdelaine learned that Couve de Murville's opposition to the Quebec proposal stemmed from concern over Ottawa's reaction, prompting the Delegate-General to recommend Jacques Parizeau intervene with federal officials to reach an accommodation. Chapdelaine

⁷⁸ MAE, v. 294 – Note by Jurgensen, 28 October 1966, Remboursement de notre dette au Canada; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 6, Dossier constitutionnels, C-1.6.0 – Referendum 1966, Memorandum from C. Morin to Parizeau, 28 November 1966.

⁷⁹ ANQ, E42, 1990-09-002, v. 405, Délégation du Québec à Paris, 1966-1967 « B » – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 4 November 1966.

also met with Étienne Burin des Roziers, the Elysée's Secretary-General, who assured him that the main obstacle was a concern not to anger Ottawa, quipping that Couve de Murville was a financier and thus conservative by nature. The Elysée official promised to pursue the matter as soon as there was word about the results of Quebec's efforts in Ottawa.⁸⁰

News of the Quebec proposal had reached Ottawa by this point, with the federal Cabinet pronouncing itself strongly against the idea, fearing it would be perceived as interference in Canadian affairs and as French aid to Quebec that Ottawa was unable (or unwilling) to extend. Marcel Cadieux suggested an alternative: Ottawa could express agreement on the condition that the monies were made available to all provinces. Another option was for Paris to make the funds available to a private consortium in France for re-lending to Quebec to obviate any suggestion of a government-to-government arrangement.⁸¹ Ambassador Léger took a more indulgent view, observing:

[s]i nous voulons que nos relations avec la France s'intensifient je crois bien que nous devons en accepter parfois la rançon qui est un certain dérangement dans nos habitudes soit nord-américaines soit anglo-saxonnes.⁸²

When France's Finance Minister, Michel Debré, received Chapdelaine in early 1967, Paris' categorical answer was that no action could be taken given the federal disapproval. Debré added, however, that having discussed the matter with de Gaulle, he was prepared to facilitate Quebec borrowing on France's financial

⁸⁰ ANQ, E42, 1990-09-002, v. 405, Délégation du Québec à Paris, 1966-1967 « B » – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 6 December 1966.

⁸¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10141, 30-12-QUE, p. 4 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 1 December 1966, Pre-Payment of Post-War French Loan; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10141, 30-12-QUE, p. 4 – Memorandum from Langley, OUSSEA to USSEA, 7 December 1966, French Loan to Quebec.

⁸² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.2 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 5 January 1967.

market.⁸³ Debré reiterated this position during his subsequent visit to Canada to a visibly disappointed Paul Dozois, Quebec's Minister of Finance.⁸⁴ Dozois subsequently told Ambassador Leduc that following conversations with a representative of the *Banque de Paris des Pays-Bas*, he did not believe the interest rates and commissions involved would permit Quebec to secure a loan in Paris competitive with New York markets.⁸⁵

Undaunted, Chapdelaine continued to lobby in support of the Quebec loan, meeting with Jurgensen and discussing the matter with de Gaulle.⁸⁶ Responding to the French leader's queries, Chapdelaine argued it was possible that Ottawa could be persuaded to support the measure, but that this was beside the point since what was proposed would not affect Ottawa being reimbursed for its 1946 loan to France according to the original 1946 schedule. De Gaulle promised to re-examine the matter when Chapdelaine emphasized the loan's symbolic benefit, citing the fact that Montreal's Mayor, Jean Drapeau, had wished to see Montreal's metro built with French capital, but that the system had had to be funded with US funds since an arrangement could not be reached.⁸⁷ When Ottawa learned of this exchange, the

⁸³ ANQ, E42, 1990-09-002, v. 405, Délégation du Québec à Paris, 1966-1967 « B » – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 11 January 1967.

⁸⁴ MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, Cabinet du Ministre, 18 January 1967, *Séjour de M. Debré au Canada*.

⁸⁵ MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 3 March 1967, *visite à Québec*.

⁸⁶ MAE, v. 226 – Note: Entretien du Délégué Général du Québec avec le Directeur d'Amérique, 13 February 1967.

⁸⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter (3) from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 14 February 1967.

DEA called in Leduc to underscore its expectation to be kept informed of any developments.⁸⁸

The Quebec loan issue, along with the Caravelle Affair and the ASTEF agreement, demonstrated the France-Quebec axis' growing significance and reinforced Ottawa's desire to cultivate economic relations with France. Federal concern about the triangular dynamic was reflected in Ottawa's determination to resolve tariff issues and secure an exemption from Canadian content regulations to facilitate the establishment of the SOMA plant.⁸⁹ Pearson urged Bousquet to approach him directly if there were any difficulties regarding the negotiations, and, when SOMA subsequently experienced financial difficulties, Ottawa extended it a federal sales tax break to encourage *Renault* and *Peugeot* not to abandon the operation.⁹⁰ Ottawa even hoped to see another French auto assembly plant located outside Quebec (the preference being Paul Martin's Windsor constituency), and the DEA suggested that during talks with Lesage about French participation in SOMA and SIDBEC, that Ambassador Léger should enquire how Ottawa might participate in the projects in order to give them a "more solid Canadian character."⁹¹

⁸⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, USSEA only, 15 February 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Halstead to Cadieux, 17 February 1967.

⁸⁹ MAE, v. 293 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 15 September 1964, pour la Direction Économique avec prière de communiquer à DIRELATEX et M. Rousselier.

⁹⁰ MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, Amérique, 27 February 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Letter from Smith, Canadian Embassy, Paris to Warren, Deputy Minister, Department of Trade and Commerce, 28 February 1967.

⁹¹ MAE, v. 145 – Letter from Bousquet, to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 11 July 1963, Visite au Canada des représentants de la Société Peugeot en vue de la création d'une usine de montage; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Memorandum from George, European Division, to Léger, 19 May 1964, French Investments in Canada; MAE, v. 205, Deuxième séjour à Paris de M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Extérieures du Canada, 13 décembre 1964 – Entrevue de M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Canada avec M. Couve de Murville, 13 December 1964.

Canadian efforts to revive the Canada-France Economic Committee continued, in spite of Paris' tepid response, leading Couve de Murville to agree finally to Ottawa's proposal at the end of 1964.⁹² The divergence between the two countries' commercial policies remained an obstacle, however, so that months later, the DEA's European division expressed frustration at the delays in arranging the committee's first meeting, and French reluctance to discuss multilateral issues such as the ECM or GATT.⁹³ When the committee finally met in November 1965, Leduc ascribed Ottawa's interest in it largely to a concern to have a federal, institutional counterweight to France-Quebec economic links. Leduc acknowledged that beyond this political consideration, Ottawa desired greater economic links to dilute US economic influence in Canada, but claimed that notwithstanding this, the results of the committee's discussions were rather thin.⁹⁴

Ottawa organized a trade mission to France to reciprocate the Baumgartner Mission of 1962, a further indication of federal concern to cultivate economic relations. The trade mission had been discussed since the autumn of 1963, but it was not until June 1966 that Canada's Minister of Industry, Charles Drury, led the federally-sponsored economic mission to France, accompanied by the Deputy Minister of Commerce, a deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, the Director of Quebec's *Société Générale de Financement*, and members of Canada's business

⁹² MAE, v. 205, Deuxième séjour à Paris de M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Extérieures du Canada, 13 décembre 1964 – Entrevue de M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Canada avec M. Couve de Murville, 13 December 1964.

⁹³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 3.1 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 26 September 1965, The French Ambassador's Call.

⁹⁴ MAE, v. 293 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières, 3 December 1965, Réunion de la Commission mixte économique franco-canadienne.

community, including senior Quebec figures.⁹⁵ Beyond the Drury Mission, the Department of Trade and Commerce's trade promotion included an active programme of participation in Trade Fairs and Trade Missions (the rate of Canadian participation was doubled) and an increase of the number of economic officers in the Paris Embassy.⁹⁶ Ottawa was even able to take comfort from a September 1968 agreement with Paris for the export of \$1.5 million of Canadian plutonium for Paris to use in its nuclear reactors.⁹⁷

Two years after visiting Paris, however, Pearson expressed disappointment to de Gaulle over the limited progress of France-Canada economic relations and urged a greater effort. Although the value of trade between the two countries had grown, Canadian exports to France had actually diminished as a percentage of Canada's larger export trade (see Appendix A, *Table 4*).⁹⁸ De Gaulle agreed on the advantages of developing Canada-France trade, but claimed that the private sector had to be relied upon to ensure increased economic exchanges, and that French protectionist habits meant it would take time for France to adjust to international competition. De Gaulle's response contrasted markedly with the more active political will

⁹⁵ DEA, G-2, v. 6830, 2727-AD-40, p. 8.2 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 11 September 1963; MAE, v. 205, Deuxième séjour à Paris de M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Extérieures du Canada, 13 décembre 1964 – Entrevue de M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Canada avec M. Couve de Murville, 13 December 1964; MAE, v. 293 – Telegram from Lavery, MAE, Affaires Économiques et Financières to French Embassy, Ottawa, 24 September 1965; MAE, v. 294 – Telegram MAE, Amérique, 25 May 1966; ANQ, E42, 1995-08-010, v. 27, Mission Économique du Canada en France, 6-15 juin 1966 – Mission Économique du Canada en France, Mission book.

⁹⁶ Vinant (1985), 203; DEA, A-4, v. 3163, 32-A-1967(1) – Canada-France Economic Committee, Canadian Brief, October 1967. The number of officers involved in trade promotion efforts was increased from five to eight in 1965.

⁹⁷ MAE, v. 258 – Note from MAE, Service des Affaires Atomiques to Service de Presse, 10 October 1968; ANF, 5AG1/199 – Compte Rendu of Entretien entre M. Debré et M. Sharp, du 4 octobre 1968.

⁹⁸ ANF 5AG1/199 – Letter from Léger to de Gaulle, 31 March 1966.

characterizing France-Quebec economic links.⁹⁹ Moreover, the French leader's attitude toward Canada's economic presence in France was influenced by the broader Gaullist concern about US economic influence and its views of Canada's satellization.¹⁰⁰

Leduc was more willing to acknowledge the lopsided nature of French efforts. Preparing for Michel Debré's 1967 visit to Canada, he suggested the Finance Minister visit Toronto and deliver a speech in English, claiming that in addition to pleasing Ottawa, it would give a boost to Leduc's bid to mount a trade exposition in Toronto in 1968 similar to that held in Montreal in 1963. Leduc argued that beyond responding to repeated federal overtures, Ontario's evolution regarding the "fait français" justified the project even more than commercial considerations. The MAE remained sceptical, however, one official limiting his comments to an exclamation point in the margins of Leduc's report. Debré did not visit Toronto.¹⁰¹

De Gaulle's 1967 visit only heightened federal concern about the relative weakness of Canada-France economic links compared to the France-Quebec axis, especially to the extent France-Quebec economic cooperation threatened the federal position regarding the constitutional competence for Canada's foreign affairs. The priority accorded Quebec at the highest levels of the French government was evident during the 1968 visit to Canada of the French National Assembly's finance

⁹⁹ ANF 5AG1/199 – Letter from de Gaulle to Pearson, 5 April 1966; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 1 April 1966, Rencontre avec Gen de Gaulle: Relations bilatérales.

¹⁰⁰ Foccart (1997), 353. De Gaulle, to take one example, reacted violently to news in February 1966 that the Canadian nickel giant *INCO* was planning to establish itself in the French overseas territory of New Caledonia, considering this an American Trojan horse.

¹⁰¹ MAE, v. 199 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 17 November 1966. Leduc's awkward position was clear by this point; his request was plaintive, wondering whether what he proposed was possible "pour une fois"; MAE, v. 294 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Affaires économiques et financières, 18 November 1966, Projet d'exposition française à Toronto.

commission led by the former Finance Minister (and future President) Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Under pressure from the Elysée, the committee was scheduled originally to limit the Canadian portion of its North American tour to Montreal and Quebec City.¹⁰²

The mid-September 1967 announcement of regular economic meetings between French and Quebec ministers prompted the DEA to call in Leduc to warn of the potential encroachment on federal jurisdiction, arguing that while Ottawa did not oppose economic discussions *per se*, these could not be carried out under the aegis of a France-Quebec intergovernmental organization.¹⁰³ Federal concerns were particularly pronounced over the exchange of letters that took place in 1969 between Quebec's Education Minister, Jean-Guy Cardinal, and Michel Debré, which established the *Comité franco-québécois pour le développement des investissements et des échanges industriels*, especially since Ottawa was only informed of the exchange at the last moment.¹⁰⁴

Anxiety also greeted the news in Ottawa that, notwithstanding the earlier failure of Quebec's proposed repayment of France's outstanding post-war debt to Ottawa, talks between French and Quebec officials meant that there was a "good possibility" of a French loan to Quebec of up to US\$40 million, which Allan Gotlieb, head of the DEA's Legal Division warned would "strengthen the hands of extremists"

¹⁰² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10079, 20-FR-9, p. 10 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Pearson, April 3, 1968, Visit to Ottawa by a delegation of the French Finance commission; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Note from Cadieux to Halstead, 27 March 1968. This effort was thwarted by the commission's non-Gaullist members, who also threatened to publicly dissociate themselves from any inflammatory language or incidents during the Quebec portion of the visit.

¹⁰³ MAE, v. 200 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 23 September 1967; MAE, v. 200 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 14 October 1967.

¹⁰⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 19 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 27 January 1969.

in Quebec by allowing them to argue independence would not be costly.¹⁰⁵ Quebec's Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Claude Morin, had inquired once again after de Gaulle's visit about Quebec's proposal for repayment of France's outstanding 1946 debt, but was informed by the MAE that Paris continued to prefer a loan on private French markets.¹⁰⁶

Ultimately, economic realities arising from the *événements* of May 1968 in France dictated that there would be no loan – private or otherwise, and more generally, the economic consequences of that spring contributed to the passing of the acute phase of triangular tensions.¹⁰⁷ Even before the economic crisis of 1968, Paris had had to come to terms with the fact it had been outflanked in its efforts to discourage US foreign direct investment. Although the annual rate of US investment in France had declined, American capital had simply opted for other ECM members, notably West Germany. Fears of falling behind its partners, especially in the high-technology sector, compelled Paris to return to a more liberal policy in 1966. The offensive that Paris had led against the US dollar was also in tatters. France simply found itself isolated among its European partners in the face of the crisis that struck the US dollar over the winter of 1967-1968. The other ECM members chose to

¹⁰⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-12-QUE, p. 1 – Memorandum from Gotlieb to Cadieux, 15 September 1967, French Loan.

¹⁰⁶ ANQ, E42, 2002-10-005, v. 44, Voyages Europe, Claude Morin – Letter from C. Morin to Jurgensen, 14 August 1967; ANQ, E42, 2002-10-005, v. 44, Voyages Europe, Claude Morin – Letter from Jurgensen to Jacques Parizeau, 25 August 1967.

¹⁰⁷ The Delegation-General's economic counsellor asserted that if the events of 1968 had not occurred, it was likely Quebec would have borrowed a substantial sum on French financial markets. ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Délégation Organisation, 1967-1973 – Discours d'adieu de Monsieur Patrick Hyndman devant la Chambre de Commerce France-Canada, le 14 janvier 1970.

support the American currency and existing monetary system, regardless of the uncertainty surrounding it and the US economy.¹⁰⁸

The events of May 1968 set off a cycle of disruptions to French production, pressure on the franc, and a decreasing commercial position that resulted in a significant currency crisis and France's largest balance of payments deficit since the Second World War. The economic success of the Fifth Republic and French grandeur were threatened. The crisis obliged a revision of French foreign policy, a rejoining of the international gold pool and massive cuts to government spending that affected Gaullist priorities – including the *force de frappe*. More humiliating still, Paris was forced to seek US support to avoid devaluing the franc, thereby pushing France toward a greater dependence on Washington than it had experienced in recent years, and signalling the effective end of the Gaullist challenge to US economic leadership. It would fall to de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, to carry out the devaluation of the franc that the General had resisted tenaciously.¹⁰⁹ If Gaullist economic nationalism had identified correctly the challenges arising from preponderant US economic influence, it ultimately could not overcome the economic interdependence and transnational exchanges against which it was reacting. It is therefore no surprise that coming amid the pressure on the franc, Pierre Trudeau's parliamentary quip of "Vive le franc libre," should have sparked fury at the Elysée.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Vaïsse (1998), 400, 403-407; Kolodziej (1974), 205-206.

¹⁰⁹ Vaïsse (1998), 406-407; Kolodziej (1974), 206-212; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La France et les États-Unis: Des origines à nos jours* (Éditions de Seuil, 1976), 249-251.

¹¹⁰ Edward L. Morse, *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France* (Princeton University Press, 1973), 250-251; Grosser (1980), 256; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 18 – Personal Letter from E.P. Black to John Halstead, 28 November 1968.

After the events of May 1968, Canada's embassy predicted that although the Elysée's Quebec policy was not likely to change, the economic ramifications had hit Franco-Quebecois cooperation significantly, and that French economic challenges meant Paris would have greater difficulty in giving substance to its policy.¹¹¹ There were two profound ironies in this outcome and the broader history of the economic triangular relationship. Amid the regionalization of international trade after 1945 and the accompanying acceleration of North America's economic integration, Canadian nationalist concerns had grown about the implications of preponderant US economic power for Canada's independence. These concerns had fuelled efforts to cultivate economic relations with France and contributed to triangular tensions. The Gaullist nationalist response to these same international economic realities prompted Paris to view Canada as a satellite of the US, resulting in French efforts to strengthen economic relations with Quebec. Ironically, however, French economic nationalism, during France's recovery, the emergence of the ECM, and the GATT negotiations, had contributed to and reinforced Canada's predicament. By the end of the 1960s, the post-war economic trend in the triangle remained; the efforts of the three capitals had resulted in absolute growth of trade between Canada and France, but in relative terms the relationship remained stagnant.

The second irony was that US economic influence, over which there was so much Canadian nationalist concern in the 1960s, ultimately proved to be a crucial if inadvertent ally for Canadian national interests. The inability of the Gaullist nationalism to overcome US economic power and the accompanying realities of

¹¹¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 15 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 July 1968.

increasing economic globalization meant France experienced a period of profound political and economic turmoil. One of the consequences of these developments was the weakening of Paris' ability to act on its Quebec policy, so that the more immediate threat to Canada's sovereignty – Gaullist interventions – was mitigated.

Chapter 15

Crisis: Political Triangular Relations, 1967-1968

Two months before the dramatic events of July 1967, amid Ottawa and Quebec City's jurisdictional rivalry and mounting triangular tensions, an exasperated François Leduc confessed to Quebec's deputy minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Claude Morin, that he had never experienced so many difficulties in his life as he was encountering in organizing the French presidential visit to Canada. The ambassador complained that whatever de Gaulle ended up doing, someone in Canada would be upset, and predicted Ottawa would ultimately be the loser.¹

Leduc's complaint underscores how de Gaulle's visit was the occasion for the most dramatic manifestation of the triangular dynamic, ushering in a period of crisis in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle. This chapter examines the events leading up to the French leader's voyage to Quebec and its aftermath, with the emphasis on the jurisdictional dispute over responsibility for Canadian foreign affairs, and France's moves toward recognizing Quebec as a viable interlocutor. As Quebec City intensified efforts to assert a distinct international personality, Paris demonstrated a proclivity to treat directly with Quebec. This dynamic was evident in the preparations for de Gaulle's visit, the measures to consolidate and institutionalize direct France-Quebec relations following the controversial visit, and the effort to achieve separate Quebec participation in the *Francophonie*.

¹ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 10 – Note from C. Morin to Johnson, 11 May 1967, L'itinéraire canadien de De Gaulle.

Ottawa faced the same dilemma it had throughout the 1960s: how to counter Gaullist interference and Quebec nationalists' bid for a separate international personality in a manner that did not exacerbate the unbalanced triangular dynamic. In the months after de Gaulle's visit, federal officials were increasingly divided over the appropriate response, debating the continuation of a pragmatic, quiet diplomatic response, or the alternative of a harder line.

Waiting for De Gaulle

In May 1966, amid the Quebec election that brought the Johnson Government to power and after Montreal's Mayor, Jean Drapeau's public suggestions, Canada's ambassador in Paris, Jules Léger, sounded out French officials about de Gaulle visiting Canada during Expo 67. Fearing complications if Quebec officials learned during the campaign of Léger's informal inquiries, the French officials were asked to keep the matter strictly confidential.² Following the Union Nationale victory and Daniel Johnson's informing Ottawa he would personally invite de Gaulle to the international exposition, the French leader received two formal invitations. The first was from the Governor-General, Georges Vanier, who invited the French President to celebrate Canada's Centennial and attend Expo. A week later, as the Embassy and Delegation-General had arranged and Ottawa had agreed, Quebec's representative in Paris, Jean Chapdelaine, delivered the second personal invitation from Johnson.³

² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10077, 20-FR-9, p. 1.1 – Message from George to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 2 May 1966, De Gaulle Visit.

³ MAE, v. 208, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Letter from Léger to de Gaulle, 6 September 1966; MAE, v. 208, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Letter from Johnson to de Gaulle, 13 September 1966; DEA, A-4, v. 9568, 18-1-D-FRA-1967/1 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), 3; John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 327.

Consistent with Paris' evolving 'two Canadas' policy, de Gaulle responded separately to the invitations. The French leader's sympathies were reflected in his answers. In a warmer tone and at greater length, he welcomed Johnson's invitation, having been assured by the Premier in a second letter accompanying the formal invitation of his government's commitment to the France-Quebec rapprochement. Lauding the cooperation that had already developed and claiming this would only grow, de Gaulle confessed he was unable for the moment to give an answer, but offered assurances France recognized Expo's significance, and in the interim, invited Johnson to Paris so that that they could become acquainted. De Gaulle responded to Vanier's invitation more simply with the explanation that unspecified current conditions raised equally unspecified questions about the visit that it was necessary to examine "à loisir."⁴

The invitation episode was a harbinger of the triangular dynamic that suffused every aspect of the visit. Relations were strained between Ottawa and André Patry, who in July 1966 was named the Quebec Government's *Chef du protocole*. Ottawa considered Patry's sending letters to the diplomatic corps outlining protocol matters for foreign diplomats in Quebec an encroachment on federal jurisdiction, notably the provisions he set out for visitors during Expo. As a consequence the DEA sent its own letter to the diplomatic corps to affirm that Ottawa was their interlocutor,

⁴ MAE, v. 208, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Telegram from G. Curien, Cabinet du Ministre, to MAE; ANF 5AG1/199 – Letter from de Gaulle to Johnson, 24 September 1966; DEA, A-4, v. 9568, 18-1-D-FRA-1967/1 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), 4.

responsible for foreign visits and an intermediary for discussions with provincial governments.⁵

By the first weeks of 1967, Ottawa had lost effective control over the itinerary as Paris, especially the Elysée, selected Quebec City as its primary interlocutor.⁶ When de Gaulle confirmed to Chapdelaine his intention to visit barring any surprise in the March 1967 French legislative elections, the French leader requested the matter be kept secret, explaining he would inform Ottawa later. De Gaulle outlined an itinerary to the Delegate-General, subject to Johnson's approval, which would see him arrive in Quebec City by boat before heading to Montreal to visit Expo, and then a brief visit to Ottawa. He also indicated his openness to travelling through Quebec's countryside.⁷

The France-Quebec talks spelled trouble for Ottawa. Federal officials were especially anxious that the programme be balanced so that the Quebec City portion did not dominate, to prevent giving new ammunition to those advocating a separate Quebec international personality.⁸ When an official in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) noted that the proposed federal itinerary meant de Gaulle would stay twice as long in Ottawa as other heads of state, Marcel Cadieux rejoined that "the longer we

⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11622, 30-7-QUE, p. 1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 21 October 1966, Circular Letters from Quebec Government to Diplomatic and Consular Missions; DEA, A-3-c, v. 11622, 30-7-QUE, p. 1 – Memorandum for the Minister, November 2, 1966, Circular Letters of Quebec Government to Diplomatic Missions; André Patry, *Le Québec dans le monde* (Leméac, 1980), 89.

⁶ DEA, A-4, v. 9568, 18-1-D-FRA-1967/1 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), 18.

⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter (2) from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 14 February 1967.

⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 2.2 – Letter from Cadieux to Hodgson, Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, PMO, 4 January 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 3 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 3 April 1967, Visit of General de Gaulle.

keep the General in Ottawa, the better.”⁹ The federal hope was that regardless of existing Ottawa-Quebec City differences, the Johnson Government would recognize the value in maintaining a common front to forestall Gaullist interference.¹⁰

Consternation seized the DEA when an article appeared in the *Ottawa Journal* on March 17 detailing de Gaulle’s plans to arrive in Quebec City by boat. Such an arrangement precluded the federal desire that the visit begin in Ottawa to emphasize that de Gaulle was visiting “Canada” and avoid the appearance of the federal government being relegated to a second-tier status.¹¹ The PMO moved quickly to take over complete responsibility for the visit from Lionel Chevrier, the federal commissioner in charge of official visits to Expo. Since Ottawa had still not received any confirmation of the visit, Ambassador Léger asked the MAE if de Gaulle had in fact decided to come to Canada.¹²

The *Ottawa Journal* article added to an increasingly tense atmosphere between Paris and Ottawa. This was evident at the time of Georges Vanier’s death. The deceased Governor-General’s widow, Pauline Vanier, still resented keenly de Gaulle’s failure to sanction Vanier’s state visit to France, and considered it an insult that Claude Hettier de la Boislambert, chancellor of France’s *Ordre de la Libération* was sent to represent the French Government at the funeral. De Boislambert believed

⁹ DEA, A-4, v. 9568, 18-1-D-FRA-1967/1 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), p. 15.

¹⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 3 – Memorandum from Walls to Halstead, 11 April, 1967.

¹¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 3 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 3 April 1967, Visit of General de Gaulle.

¹² DEA, A-4, v. 9568, Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), p. 22; MAE, v. 208 – Dossier Général, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Note pour M. le Secrétaire Général, le 22 March 1967, conversation avec l’Ambassadeur du Canada; MAE, v. 208, Dossier Général, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Telegram from MAE, Amérique to French Embassy, Ottawa, 18 April 1967; ANF, 5AG1/199 – Letter from de Gaulle to Johnson, 18 April 1967; English (1992): 333. Ambassador Léger’s inquiry at the MAE came more than a month after the de Gaulle-Chapdelaine discussion. It was only April 18 that Ottawa was informed the visit would proceed. Paris notified Quebec the same day.

he was treated shabbily and resented disparaging remarks Pauline Vanier made to him about de Gaulle.¹³ As her last official act before leaving Rideau Hall, Vanier called in Ambassador Leduc and asked him to convey to the Elysée the terse message of “1940,” recalling the Vaniers’ longstanding support for France and its President.¹⁴

Another incident, surrounding the fiftieth anniversary ceremonies of the Battle of Vimy Ridge, stoked further resentment. De Gaulle took exception to Ottawa organizing the event without consulting Paris, notably that he was invited to attend the commemoration after Prince Phillip, who was to represent the Canadian monarch. The MAE made it explicit to Léger that de Gaulle wanted the affair to be a strictly Franco-Canadian event, meaning that the British Prince’s presence was unwelcome and that French representation would be affected if he attended. Both capitals rested on their positions, with Ottawa fearing that to cede on the point would be a sign of weakness and invite further French interventions over Canadian constitutional realities. Consequently, the ceremony went ahead with the Prince in attendance, but no high-level French presence or guard of honour. Tensions only increased when the dispute became public at the beginning of April 1967.¹⁵

In Paris for discussions about de Gaulle’s visit, Leduc confided to Léger that “things were not going well in Ottawa” and that various incidents were affecting

¹³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Eberts, Chief of Protocol, to USSEA, 14 March 1967.

¹⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Eberts, Chief of Protocol, to USSEA, 13 April 1967; Deborah Cowley and George Cowley, *One Woman’s Journey: A Portrait of Pauline Vanier* (Novalis, 1992), 155-156. Vanier wrote Yvonne de Gaulle, reviewing the tensions between Ottawa and Paris over Quebec’s future. Vanier was subsequently invited to the Elysée for a private luncheon, but was upset when during it de Gaulle expressed his sympathy for Quebec independence.

¹⁵ DEA, A-4, v. 9568, 18-1-D-FRA-1967/1 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), p. 32-47; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division to the Under-secretary, 5 April 1967; Charles de Gaulle, Lettre à Étienne Burin des Rozières, Secrétaire Général de la Présidence de la République, 13 janvier 1967, *Lettres, Notes et Carnets, volume 11, Juillet 1966-Avril 1969* (Plon, 1986).

French attitudes negatively. In addition to the recent irritants, conversations that John Halstead, head of the DEA's European division, had in Paris in late 1966 with the Elysée's diplomatic counsellor, René de Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, and senior MAE officials about the constitutional implications of France appearing to favour Quebec City over Ottawa as interlocutor had found their way to "high places" where the implicit criticism had been ill-received. Léger too had noticed an increasing chill in Paris.¹⁶

Canadian attitudes were no less adamant. Pearson himself had made clear that if the rumours that de Gaulle might not visit Ottawa proved true, there would be no visit.¹⁷ When Leduc confirmed the accuracy of the *Ottawa Journal* article detailing de Gaulle's arrival, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, voiced alarm and suggested he would have to discuss the matter personally with the French leader.¹⁸ Later that month, Martin told Maurice Couve de Murville that while Ottawa was "not... setting any condition," the federal desire was for de Gaulle to begin his visit in Ottawa, "the heart of the nation," to ensure the visit had a maximal impact. Martin emphasized that the France-Quebec special relationship made this even more important, arguing if de Gaulle had Canada's unity at heart, he would land in the federal capital.¹⁹

¹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Letter from George to Halstead, 22 March 1967 – Secret and Personal; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, 4.2 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division to Cadieux, 16 December 1966, France-Canada and France-Quebec Relations.

¹⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 3 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 3 April 1967, Visit of General de Gaulle.

¹⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division, to the Undersecretary, 5 April 1967.

¹⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Telex from Martin (via Paris Embassy) to DEA, 23 April 1967; Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 191.

Despite Martin's entreaties to Couve de Murville, Ottawa in fact had already effectively conceded the point. Despite arrangements reached with André Patry in December 1966 that all official visits to Canada for Expo would begin in Ottawa, the federal decision to permit the Austrian, Ethiopian, and West German heads of state to begin their visits in other provincial capitals was seized upon in Quebec City to push for de Gaulle to begin his visit there.²⁰ During a reportedly very friendly meeting in April 1967, Daniel Johnson made clear to Pearson his expectation that the visit would begin in Quebec City, and the PMO subsequently decided that Ottawa would not contest the issue if de Gaulle insisted on beginning his visit in the Quebec capital.²¹ Amid discussion of a compromise that would see the French leader's visit begin in Montreal before proceeding to Quebec City and Ottawa, Marcel Cadieux reluctantly approved, rationalizing that the visit's termination in Ottawa would permit the federal government to "have the last word and... correct any undesirable impressions the General's visit to Quebec City might create." Notwithstanding this, Cadieux recommended that French officials again be told the federal preference for the visit to begin in Ottawa, to facilitate French concessions on other points, and counter Quebec pressure on Paris for de Gaulle to begin his visit in Quebec City.²²

Cadieux was justified in his concern about Quebec pressures. The federal government's concern to safeguard its constitutional position was paralleled by Quebec City's efforts to promote a distinct international personality. Upon learning

²⁰ Patry (1980), 98.

²¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 3 – Memorandum for File by Robinson, 18 April 1967, President de Gaulle's Visit; Lester Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, volume 3*, John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1972c), 245-246; Thomson (1988), 191.

²² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 4 – Letter from Hodgson, Principal Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister to Cadieux, 11 May 1967, Visit of General de Gaulle; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 4 – Letter from Cadieux to Hodgson, 15 May 1967.

of a proposed itinerary change that would see de Gaulle arrive in Montreal, Claude Morin conveyed the Johnson Government's disappointment to Leduc, accusing Paris of giving in to Ottawa. Morin pressed for even a brief stop in Quebec City before Montreal, but the ambassador responded that the proposed arrangement was the only possible compromise given de Gaulle's determination to begin his visit in Quebec and the federal wish for him to arrive in Ottawa. Leduc argued that Morin's request would force Paris to choose openly between Canada and Quebec, whereas de Gaulle could indicate his choice implicitly by arriving in Montreal (i.e. on Quebec territory) and visiting Quebec City immediately after.²³ Patry reiterated Quebec's disappointment over the proposed Montreal arrival to Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, head of the MAE's *Amérique* division, emphasizing the geographic, political, and psychological factors commending Quebec City as the visit's starting point.²⁴ During his visit to Paris in May, Johnson raised the itinerary question with de Gaulle. Johnson cited his meeting with Pearson a month earlier in claiming that the Prime Minister was "indifférent" about the question, accepting the idea of de Gaulle arriving in Quebec City since the Governor-General, Roland Michener, would greet him wherever he arrived. A convinced de Gaulle informed Léger of the change of itinerary.²⁵

If Johnson overstated Pearson's indifference over the circumstances of de Gaulle's arrival, he was correct on the core issue: Pearson had instructed the DEA

²³ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 10 – Note from C. Morin to Johnson, 11 May 1967, L'itinéraire canadien de De Gaulle.

²⁴ MAE, v. 209, Notes de la Direction – Note by JF, MAE, Amérique, 17 May 1967, Visite du Général de Gaulle au Canada.

²⁵ MAE, v. 208, Dossier Général, Antérieur au Voyage, au 23 juillet 1967 – Telegram from de Leusse, Cabinet du Ministre, MAE, to French Embassy, Ottawa, 26 May 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 4 – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 18 May 1967, Visite du Général de Gaulle.

accept the change from Montreal to Quebec City.²⁶ Pearson's concession, however, was predicated partly on Ottawa being responsible for the official greeting, which led to another dispute over the size of the federal profile in the Quebec capital.²⁷ The squabble was over whether de Gaulle was to be escorted to the Citadelle by the Governor-General, or the Quebec Premier, or both, and was only resolved when Johnson proposed a compromise. It was agreed that the Governor-General would receive de Gaulle officially and then proceed alone to the Citadelle, where he would greet the French leader again after Johnson escorted him there through the streets of Quebec City.²⁸

The protocol disputes, while arcane and at times even farcical, were symptomatic of the larger struggle between Ottawa and Quebec City over the constitutional competence for foreign affairs. The extent of Ottawa's marginalization was evident in the exclusion of federal officials from the planning sessions conducted by Quebec officials and France's *Chef du protocol*. Much of the logistical details were worked out in Paris between Quebec officials and senior members of the Quebec lobby.²⁹ Consistent with his conciliatory approach, Pearson turned down Martin's suggestion that there be federal representation accompanying de Gaulle and the Quebec personalities along the *Chemin du roy*.³⁰ He also conceded that de Gaulle might host a reception on board the *Colbert* instead of a planned federal reception at

²⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 4 – Memorandum from Lalonde to Cadieux, 30 May 1967, Visite du Général de Gaulle.

²⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Memorandum from Williamson, External Affairs Liaison Officer, State Visits to the USSEA, 22 June 1967.

²⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Memorandum from Moncel, 14 June 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Note for File by Moncel, 16 July 1967.

²⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Memorandum from Williamson, External Affairs Liaison Officer, State Visits to the USSEA, 22 June 1967; Thomson (1988), 197.

³⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Memorandum from Martin for Pearson, 10 June 1967.

the Citadelle. The extent of the intergovernmental rivalry was evident on the eve of the visit when federal and Quebec officials held separate, concurrent press briefings.³¹

Ottawa's last chance to assert its position with Paris was during Paul Martin's June 1967 visit to the French capital. The DEA had recommended an intermediate approach, rejecting the alternatives of doing nothing or a more rigid stance as ineffective and liable to provoke further interventions. Martin was advised to explain that although Ottawa did not object to the development of France-Quebec links within a federally-sanctioned framework, and would be rather flexible regarding demonstrations of France-Quebec friendship, it could not agree to direct France-Quebec relations without a federal pressure. Although the DEA felt Couve de Murville would likely be more receptive to the federal position, hope remained in the DEA that de Gaulle's realism would sensitize him to the argument that Paris and Ottawa would both suffer from any estrangement between the federal and Quebec governments. Martin's decision not to convey the message meant Ottawa's quiet diplomacy was rendered completely silent on the eve of the dramatic events.³²

Shortly after de Gaulle's arrival in Quebec City, Martin claimed the French leader was:

adopting explicitly and in public the attitude which has been implicit for some time in his treatment of relations between France and Canada on one hand and France and

³¹ Thomson (1988), 197-198.

³² DEA, A-4, v. 9568, 18-1-D-FRA-1967/1 – Le Général de Gaulle en Visite au Canada (undated), 41, 65-68; DEA, A-3-c, v. 11622, 30-7-QUE, p. 1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 21 October 1966, Circular Letters from Québec Government to Diplomatic and Consular Missions. Martin's decision not to raise the issue was consistent with his preference for a pragmatic, conciliatory approach to the triangular tensions. At the time of Patry's letter to the diplomatic corps, he had been anxious to avoid a public controversy, advising Pearson to simply express federal concerns to Johnson informally. Similarly, during the controversy over the Vimy anniversary, Martin urged Pearson not to provoke a public controversy over French attitudes regarding the ceremonies.

Quebec on the other ... [stressing] ... the priority he gives to France-Quebec relations.³³

Throughout the following day along the Chemin du roy, de Gaulle's remarks emphasized his view of Quebec as a viable interlocutor and the significance he attached to special, direct relations. At every stop, he highlighted the growth of the official France-Quebec rapprochement, referring to the 1965 agreements his government and that of Quebec's had signed, and praised Franco-Quebecois solidarity.³⁴ A further indication of French thinking came after the visit, in the MAE account sent to French diplomatic posts around the world. According to the missive, so far as Paris was concerned, relations with Ottawa could continue in all sectors, but that direct France-Quebec cooperation was to continue and expand.³⁵

Crisis Enduring

In the wake of de Gaulle's visit, Paris and Quebec City both moved to consolidate direct, privileged relations. Daniel Johnson asserted publicly that "nous avons dépassé le stade des paroles et ... nous sommes entrés dans celui de l'action," and sent Claude Morin to Paris to discuss a more systematic organization and expansion of France-Quebec links.³⁶ A report on France-Quebec relations prepared at the request of the Elysée and Couve de Murville reflected the high-level interest in Paris, as did de Gaulle's convening the French Cabinet (extraordinary during the French summer) to discuss France-Quebec cooperation, and a second more restrained

³³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Memorandum to Pearson, 24 July 1967, General de Gaulle's Visit.

³⁴ Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981), 154-172.

³⁵ MAE, v. 210, Réactions – Telegram from de Leusse, MAE, Affaires Politiques, Telegram Circulaire à Tous Postes Diplomatiques, 28 July 1967.

³⁶ MAE, v. 212 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 24 August 1967.

meeting that decided upon the measures to be taken. There was also a meeting at Quebec's Delegation-General that discussed the next phase of France-Quebec cooperation which senior French governmental figures attended.³⁷

The most significant example of the effort to institutionalize France-Quebec relations was the September 1967 visit to Quebec by France's Minister of National Education, Alain Peyrefitte, converted to the Quebec cause by his diplomatic counsellor and Quebec lobby member Bernard Dorin.³⁸ De Gaulle sent Peyrefitte to meet with Johnson and his ministers to establish a programme of political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Even more significant, however, was the French leader's urging Peyrefitte to convince Johnson to establish an intergovernmental organization akin to that which existed between France and West Germany, to oversee the cooperation and facilitate France-Quebec relations. The organization, the French leader explained, was meant to serve as a "fait accompli" to hasten Quebec independence by contributing to the recognition of its international personality.³⁹

During subsequent talks, Johnson expressed a strong desire for strengthened interministerial structures as a means to increasing the scope and efficiency of

³⁷ ANQ, E42, 2002-10-005, v. 44, Voyages Europe, Claude Morin – Letter from C. Morin to Jurgensen, 14 August 1967; ANQ, E42, 2002-10-005, v. 44, Voyages Europe, Claude Morin – Letter from Jurgensen to C. Morin, 18 August 1967; MAE, v. 200 – Conseil Restreint sur l'aide économique et culturelle au Québec, 5 septembre 1967, 15h.30; MAE, v. 200 – Letter from Chapdelaine, 14 September 1967. Eldon Black, *Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1974* (Carleton University Press, 1997), 10. Present at the restrained Council of Ministers meeting were de Gaulle, Couve de Murville, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, the Minister of National Education, Alain Peyrefitte, the Minister of Finance, Michel Debré, and the Minister of State for Scientific Cooperation, and Atomic and Space Issues, Maurice Schumann. Among those at the Delegation-General meeting were Schumann, Saint-Légier de la Saussaye, and Jurgensen.

³⁸ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996.

³⁹ Alain Peyrefitte, *De Gaulle et le Québec* (Stanké, 2000), 88-90. Peyrefitte quotes de Gaulle as saying: "nous allons proposer au Québec une coopération bilatérale de plus en plus étroite, qui aboutira de facto à ce que la France traite le Québec comme un État souverain."

France-Quebec links.⁴⁰ Quebec's preoccupation with the political and administrative structures for realizing cooperation struck Leduc during the discussions as arising from a mix of electoral considerations, a desire for prestige and efficacy, and a concern to avoid anything suggesting Quebec was submitting to a French imperium. Johnson himself had demanded the inclusion in the subsequent communiqué of the passage "de part et l'autre de l'Atlantique d'égal à égal."⁴¹ The communiqué also referred to the creation of a permanent secretariat to promote cooperation, a joint commission to facilitate youth exchanges, periodic consultations between the French and Quebec ministers of education and economic affairs, and provisions for regular meetings at the "highest level" of the French and Quebec governments.⁴²

When Chapdelaine was summoned to the Elysée a few weeks later, de Gaulle told him of his desire that Johnson visit France again that autumn, accompanied by his principal ministers for meetings with their French counterparts to push "les développements déjà engagés et même les accélérer," alluding to this second visit being followed by another round of ministerial meetings in Quebec in the spring. De Gaulle also briefed Chapdelaine on plans to assign to each French ministry a senior official who would be responsible to promote France-Quebec links.⁴³

⁴⁰ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 21, Coopération à l'extérieur, 1966-1971 – Procès-verbal des décisions arrêtées entre MM. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, Vice-président du Conseil, Ministre de l'Éducation et de la Justice, Jean-Noël Tremblay, Ministre des Affaires Culturelles, Marcel Masse, Ministre d'État à l'Éducation, d'une part, et M. Alain Peyrefitte, Ministre de l'Éducation Nationale, représentant le Gouvernement français, d'autre part.

⁴¹ MAE, v. 212 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 18 September 1967; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996, Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996.

⁴² Thomson (1988), 251-252; Morin (1987), 84.

⁴³ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 12 October 1967.

The extent of French support for direct relations with Quebec was evident in the reaction to Leduc's suggestion that Paul Martin would grant Paris greater freedom of action in Quebec if Paris undertook to keep Ottawa informed of its activities and provided assurances it would not encourage Quebec to sign international agreements without federal authorization. Leduc also warned that chilly Ottawa-Paris relations would continue if an arrangement were not reached. The MAE response was that this was of "peu importe" to the Elysée, and as 1967 drew to a close, Leduc told Morin that France was prepared to do anything Quebec wished in terms of formal relations, including further agreements, regardless of federal objections.⁴⁴

Another indication of French intentions was the reorganization of France's diplomatic presence in Canada. The new consul general in Quebec City, Pierre de Menthon, was told that given Quebec's growing autonomy in foreign relations, his mission would differ qualitatively from that of his predecessors. The consulate general was to be expanded considerably and given responsibility for France-Quebec relations, while the embassy occupied itself with relations with the rest of Canada. De Menthon was instructed that barring exceptional circumstances, he should communicate directly with Paris rather than through the embassy. Consistent with France's two-nation approach and sympathy for Quebec's constitutional position, Paris now effectively operated two embassies in Canada. Moreover, personnel

⁴⁴ MAE, v. 200 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 14 October 1967; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, Statut du Québec, Général – Memorandum from C. Morin to Johnson, 22 December 1967; Peyrefitte (2000), 38.

increases meant France's combined representation in Quebec soon exceeded that in Ottawa.⁴⁵

By the spring of 1968, Ambassador Léger was bemoaning the obvious second-tier status of Canada-France relations relative to the rapidly expanding France-Quebec links, noting that scarcely a week passed without Quebec ministers, senior officials or experts visiting France.⁴⁶ Ottawa's response to the growing formalization of France-Quebec relations continued to be hampered by the necessity of avoiding acts that would reinforce the unbalanced triangular dynamic and thereby undermine further the federal position and Canadian unity. Consistent with its pre-July 1967 approach, and mindful that a France-Quebec alliance would eviscerate any retaliatory measures, the DEA's first instinct was to prefer a pragmatic, quiet diplomatic response, a reaction conditioned by the continued federal fixation on de Gaulle. Upon learning at the end of August 1967 of Alain Peyrefitte's planned visit, Marcel Cadieux recommended that the French minister should receive the best possible reception in Ottawa. Arguing that the best course of action was to avoid further confrontations with the Elysée's occupant, Paul Martin even mused about adopting the position that de Gaulle created a *sui generis* situation, with the hope

⁴⁵ MAE, v. 190 – Note for MAE, Personnel et de l'Administration Générale, 9 December 1967, Effectif de l'Ambassade de France à Ottawa; MAE, v. 191 – Letter from Couve de Murville, MAE, to Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, 14 March 1968; MAE, v. 212 – Instructions à M. Pierre de Menthon, Consul Général de France à Québec (Projet); DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Memorandum from European Division to USSEA, 26 February 1968; Pierre de Menthon, *Je témoigne: Québec 1967, Chile 1973* (Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979), 24; Peyrefitte (2000), 38. There was a foreshadowing of this development. In December 1964, at the time of Leduc's posting, de Gaulle described him as “par la force des choses” Paris' ambassador to Quebec, in anticipation of the day when France and Quebec exchanged ambassadors, emphasizing that Leduc would have to adapt to this new reality being dictated by Quebec's evolution and that of France-Quebec cooperation. After 1967, the consulate general's personnel grew from three to fourteen, and the staff increased from a dozen to approximately sixty.

⁴⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 13 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 3 April 1968, Franco-Canadian Relations.

Ottawa's constitutional position was not damaged beyond repair before he left the stage.⁴⁷

The “business as usual” approach that Ottawa pursued was predicated on a concern to avoid further deterioration of Canada-France relations and the belief that although de Gaulle attached greater importance to relations with Quebec City, federal efforts since 1964 and the cooperation of French officials believed not to share the Elysée's bias had produced substantive results. There was also hope in Ottawa that given the negative public reaction in France to de Gaulle's actions during his visit, that Gaullist leaders would restrain him from attempting to establish a formal state-to-state relationship with Quebec.⁴⁸

The flaws in the federal response, however, were laid bare when Peyrefitte limited his stay to Quebec, and Ottawa was neither consulted formally nor even informed of the visit in advance. Ottawa interpreted the French communiqué announcing the Peyrefitte-Johnson agreement as an escalation, notably the references to the new intergovernmental organizations and regular ministerial meetings. Martin advised Pearson that the communiqué amounted to French recognition of “a measure of [international] sovereignty” for Quebec, given the lack of prior notification of, consultation with, and authorization from Ottawa, the absence of any reference to the

⁴⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Memorandum from Gotlieb to Acting Under-secretary, 3 August 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 7 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 25 August 1967, Visite du Ministre français de l'Éducation; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 8.1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 15 September 1967, Visits by French Ministers to Canada.

⁴⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 14 August 1967, General de Gaulle's Visit to Canada: An Analysis.

federal government in the announcement, and the suggestion that the intergovernmental organization would be organized on an “égal à égal” basis.⁴⁹

Ottawa’s response to the Peyrefitte-Johnson agreement was limited to asking Paris for more information and inquiring how it could be reconciled with international law and the 1965 cultural agreements. Similarly, when the French Minister of Agriculture, Edgar Faure, visited Canada, the “business as usual” approach led Pearson to accept that Faure would meet with his federal counterpart in Montreal since the Elysée had forbidden French ministerial visits to Ottawa. The measured federal reactions were meant as a positive message to moderates in Paris in the hope of reducing tensions.⁵⁰ Martin’s subsequent discussions with Couve de Murville, Leduc, and the Embassy’s contacts with the MAE, however, led him to admit to Pearson that direct France-Quebec relations would continue, and that the federal claim to an exclusive prerogative over foreign affairs was increasingly being undermined.⁵¹

The result of the ongoing incidents was a growing rift in federal circles between those advocating adherence to the pragmatic “business as usual” approach

⁴⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 8.1 – Message from Martin to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 6 September 1967, Peyrefitte Visit; DEA, A-3-c, v. 11642, 30-14-7-1, p. 1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 22 September 1967, Quebec-France Relations and the Federal Government. Also, ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996. There was the potential for a much more serious incident: Peyrefitte forgot on the sidewalk in front of his hotel in Montreal his briefcase containing a number of highly sensitive documents, including a duplicate of the letter from de Gaulle the French minister had just delivered to Johnson. No one noticed the briefcase was missing until the delegation reached Dorval airport. Dorin raced back downtown to see if he could find it, fearing what would occur if it fell into RCMP hands, but to his astonishment the briefcase was waiting on the sidewalk when he arrived.

⁵⁰ Black (1997): 12; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 8.1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 15 September 1967, Visits by French Ministers to Canada; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 8.1 – Telegram from DEA to Léger, Canadian Embassy, Paris, September 21, 1967, Visit of Mr. Faure; de Menthon (1979), 28.

⁵¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11642, 30-14-7-1, p. 1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 31 October 1967, Quebec-France Relations and the Federal Government.

and those favouring a more assertive, legalistic response to affirm the federal position regarding the constitutional competence for foreign affairs. Even Paul Martin, one of the most prominent advocates of a pragmatic response to triangular tensions, agreed with a memorandum prepared for then Minister of Justice, Pierre Trudeau, which argued that the Peyrefitte-Johnson agreement constituted a grave threat to Canada's unity, and that a failure to challenge it ran the risk of being seen to accept a *de facto* independent Quebec international personality.⁵² De Gaulle's November 1967 news conference in which he lauded the direct France-Quebec relationship added to the sense of urgency in Ottawa to respond to the Gaullist challenge.⁵³

The federal rift over the appropriate course of action was most apparent between Jules Léger and Marcel Cadieux. As much rivals as friends, the two senior francophone officers of the DEA were almost destined by virtue of their differing experiences, positions, and geographic locations to be at odds over the best course of action regarding the triangular tensions. Evidence of a latent dispute arose in early 1967 when Léger, who favoured a pragmatic approach to the triangular tensions, expressed concern over what he saw as a hardening federal attitude. The dispute followed Léger's writing an article (that ultimately went unpublished owing to objections in the DEA) that appeared to endorse aspects of the Gérin-Lajoie

⁵² DEA, A-3-c, v. 11642, 30-14-7-1, p. 1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 31 October 1967, Quebec-France Relations and the Federal Government; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Memorandum to the Minister of Justice from Ivan L. Head, International Legal Consequences of Recent France-Quebec Accord, 2 October 1967; Ivan L. Head and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *The Canadian Way: Shaping Canadian Foreign Policy, 1968-1984* (McClelland and Stewart, 1995), 287. Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau recall that the Pearson Government did not regard the Peyrefitte-Johnson agreement with the seriousness they felt it deserved until Trudeau sounded out his colleagues Jean Marchand and Gérard Pelletier, and Head prepared the memorandum that was presented to the Cabinet.

⁵³ Lescop (1981), 186-188.

doctrine.⁵⁴ Cadieux, arguably the voice in the DEA advocating the toughest response, conceded the need to maintain good relations with Paris, but argued the impact of French actions on federal prerogatives and Canadian unity trumped this consideration.⁵⁵

In the wake of the Peyrefitte visit controversy and mindful of his diplomatic mission in Paris, Léger urged Ottawa to maintain its “business as usual” approach, arguing that the game was not up. To avoid further incidents until the situation stabilized, Léger believed that Ottawa should avoid the Elysée as much as possible, support efforts in Paris where federal and Quebec interests coincided, and avoid activities in areas where there were differences. Léger expressed concern over his instructions to convey to the MAE Ottawa’s disquiet about the Peyrefitte visit, claiming the demarche would make its way to the Elysée, annoy de Gaulle, and cause the Embassy further difficulties while accomplishing nothing. As an alternative, he suggested the embassy should intercede with French cabinet members to urge they visit Ottawa during any visits to Quebec, and that the DEA could pursue the Peyrefitte visit issue with Leduc on the grounds it was his responsibility to keep Ottawa informed. Léger concluded by advising Ottawa to be more flexible regarding

⁵⁴ Robin Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community, Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 126.

⁵⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Telex from Cadieux to Léger, 28 February 1967, Léger’s telegram to Cadieux, 27 February 1967; Black (1997), 15. Cadieux was suspicious of French intentions, having seen the patronizing way Paris treated the Walloons in Belgium after the Second World War, and having served as a member of the Indo-China International Commission in the 1950s. Conversely, Léger had completed his studies in France on a French government scholarship, and been posted to Paris since the late 1950s.

ministerial visits and accept that certain French ministers would go to Quebec without going to Ottawa.⁵⁶

Léger's advice did not sit well with Cadieux. The Peyrefitte visit had weakened severely his tacit support for the "business as usual" approach, provoking him to urge a more assertive defence of the unity of Canada's international personality. He argued that Paris had to be made aware of federal opposition and that it would consider sanctions if French interference continued. Cadieux complained that what Léger proposed was unacceptable given the constitutional and legal issues at stake, and expressed his frustration that the ambassador appeared to rule out a protest even for the record. He also considered Léger's logic faulty in suggesting the Elysée would not find out or be any less annoyed if Ottawa made its protest through Leduc.⁵⁷

Further evidence of the differences between the two DEA officials came when Léger retorted that despite recent events, it was a mistake to claim Canada-France relations had deteriorated, by citing the growth of France-Quebec links. Léger believed that although progress was confined chiefly to Quebec, this was only natural

⁵⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 8.1 – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 12 September 1967, Visite de M. Peyrefitte; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 September 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 20 September 1967.

⁵⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Pearson, 18 September 1967, Cultural Relations with France; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10078, 20-FR-9, p. 8.1 – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 12 September 1967, Visite de M. Peyrefitte. Also, Boshier (1998), 87-104. Consistent with the polemical tone of his work, Boshier paints Cadieux in almost hagiographical terms, depicting him as a tragic solitary figure frustrated in his efforts to mount an assertive response. Aside from the historiographical issues arising from the fact Boshier bases his analysis almost exclusively on Cadieux's private journals, his assertion that Pearson, Martin and the rest of the cabinet and senior civil service did not share his apprehensions regarding de Gaulle is overstated given the documentary evidence. While there were significant federal errors, Boshier, symptomatic of his broader argument, presents an assessment of Cadieux and his actions that fails to acknowledge sufficiently the Pearson Government's narrow room for manoeuvre in light of its preoccupation with the unfolding unity crisis.

given the circumstances. If there had been tensions and problems in terms of form, France-Quebec cooperation was developing well, and offered the prospect of an expansion to other provinces. Acknowledging the deviations from international norms, Léger warned against an overly legalistic approach that would only end up benefiting Quebec City. An exasperated Cadieux dismissed Léger's analysis as proof that he would "never see the constitutional and political implications of this new [France-Quebec] relationship." The DEA Under-secretary did not believe that Ottawa's concerns could be discounted as mere "legalisms." In his view, the France-Quebec rapprochement was positive only if Paris accepted Ottawa's position for the conduct of these relations. He disputed Léger's optimistic claim that the substance of France-Quebec cooperation was benign, arguing that it treated Quebec as a distinct international entity and undermined Ottawa's biculturalism efforts.⁵⁸

Subsequently, Cadieux and Léger had a "difficult" and "heated" discussion in Paris. While he conceded the need to be careful and avoid exacerbating the Canada-France crisis, Cadieux was determined to make Léger understand Ottawa could not remain indifferent to the fact Paris was treating Quebec as a *de facto* independent state with flagrant disregard for Canada's sovereignty. Cadieux left the French capital believing he had persuaded Léger that Ottawa's approach was not entirely negative and that rather than preventing the development of France-Quebec relations, Ottawa sought to place these in a framework respecting Canada's sovereignty.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 13 October 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Telex from Cadieux to Léger, 17 October 1967.

⁵⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 10 – Memorandum for the Minister, 11 November 1967.

Ottawa's awkward position did not escape the notice of Quebec's Delegate-General. Jean Chapdelaine informed Daniel Johnson that the federal response to the institutionalization of France-Quebec relations was being guided by a legalistic approach, whereas Quebec was approaching the matter from a purely political perspective, inspired by a belief that there was an infinite possibility for negotiation with Ottawa. Moreover, with Paris' support, Quebec was able to present Ottawa with *faits accomplis* and leave it to the jurists to work out the details.⁶⁰ Chapdelaine's assessment underscored the fact that in responding to French actions, Ottawa had to be mindful of the Canadian domestic repercussions of Quebec's constitutional challenge. The DEA advised Pearson that the only way to gain leverage with Paris was to talk to Quebec. Allan Gotlieb, head of the DEA's Legal Division, even suggested Ottawa consider a constitutional *quid pro quo* with Quebec City to ensure its support for Canadian international unity.⁶¹

Paul Martin's preference for a pragmatic, conciliatory response to French actions, more akin to the position Léger espoused, stemmed largely from his holding Quebec City chiefly responsible for the triangular tensions, arguing that Quebec officials were "play[ing] into" de Gaulle's hands, so that the matter could only be dealt with effectively as an Ottawa-Quebec City problem.⁶² Throughout the autumn of 1967, Martin contended that the challenge of the triangular relations was ultimately internal, as it was unrealistic to expect Paris to accept the federal position without

⁶⁰ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 30 November 1967.

⁶¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Draft Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 14 August 1967, General de Gaulle's Visit to Canada: An Analysis; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 7 – Memorandum from Gotlieb to Acting Under-secretary, 3 August 1967.

⁶² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 29 September 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 22 September 1967.

Quebec's agreement. Convinced that it was time for Ottawa to take "imaginative action," Martin recommended a variety of possible actions to reduce tensions, including measures to demonstrate Ottawa's willingness to facilitate provincial international activities within a co-operative, federal framework. Struck by the need for greater consultation between Ottawa and the provinces on foreign affairs, Martin told Pearson that Ottawa should "not be in a position of letting France have better and more extensive contacts with Quebec than Quebec has with us."⁶³

Cadieux favoured a much more assertive approach than his minister, whom he characterized as "the perpetrator of an unending series of blunders and misjudgements," arising from his political ambition and pragmatism.⁶⁴ He did agree, however, that improving the relationship with Paris depended on greater cooperation between Ottawa and Quebec City. At the beginning of December 1967, Cadieux conceded that although Quebec was unprepared to renounce its international activities, it was not deliberately trying to achieve its complete independence through precedents in the international sphere, so that the more satisfaction Quebec City received in foreign affairs within the existing constitutional framework, the less it would be tempted to use Paris to force Ottawa's hand. Cadieux considered it essential to avoid placing Johnson in a position where he was forced to treat with de Gaulle and cater to *indépendantiste* elements, given his plans to visit Paris again and the outstanding question of Quebec's participation in the *Francophonie*. The DEA

⁶³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11642, 30-14-7-1, p. 1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 31 October 1967, Quebec-France Relations and the Federal Government.

⁶⁴ Boshier (1998), 94-95.

Under-Secretary was optimistic, however, that Johnson desired a compromise with Ottawa, citing his “constructive attitude” during a recent meeting with Pearson.⁶⁵

Triangular Tensions and the emerging Francophonie

Events in Africa quickly put paid to Cadieux’s cautious optimism. Ottawa considered the prospect of a *Francophonie* organization initially as a potential advantage as it would reinforce the federal role as the co-ordinating authority for expanded cultural relations. It would also provide evidence of Ottawa’s commitment to a bicultural foreign policy. Conversely, a failure to take the initiative would encourage those domestic and foreign elements pushing for a distinct international personality for Quebec. The DEA’s European Division warned that Ottawa would at some point have to envisage intergovernmental cooperation. The department’s legal experts believed that although it was constitutionally possible for the provinces to participate in an association of francophone states under federal auspices, independent Quebec membership in an intergovernmental organization would constitute endorsement of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine and recognition of Quebec as a “state” under international law.⁶⁶

Growing federal interest in the Francophonie paralleled that of Quebec City. Paul Gérin-Lajoie had called for an association of francophone countries in a speech in Montpellier in 1961, and subsequently discussed the matter with de Gaulle and

⁶⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 8 December 1967, France-Canada-Québec, *Échéances prochaines*; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Pearson, 26 December 1967.

⁶⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11632, 30-10-FRAN, p. 1 – Visit of President Senghor, September 19-21, “La Francophonie,” 13 September 1966; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10685, 26-2-CDA-QUE, p. 1 – Memorandum from Gotlieb, Legal Division to European Division, 27 September 1966, Constitutional Implications of Quebec’s Participation in the Proposed French Community; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10684, 20-6-CDA, p. 1 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division to USSEA, 24 October 1966, *Le Canada et la Francophonie*.

Couve de Murville.⁶⁷ The Johnson Government built on this interest, concerned to avoid Ottawa's involvement in the emerging organization.⁶⁸ The Francophonie was discussed during the April 1966 meeting of the *Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise*. When France's Minister of National Education, Christian Fouchet, visited Quebec later that year, the junior education minister, Marcel Masse, expressed Quebec City's interest in hosting an international meeting of francophone education ministers. Acknowledging that what was proposed would lead to a confrontation with Ottawa, Masse nonetheless affirmed Quebec's will to prevail over any federal objections in reiterating this desire to Jean Basdevant, head of the MAE's Cultural Relations division, who was supportive and promised to take up the matter with the highest authorities.⁶⁹

The Quebec Cabinet mandated AUPELF and its Secretary-General, Jean-Marc Léger, to organize the proposed meeting. Léger was given his mandate informally so that it could be claimed that the proposed meeting was a non-governmental affair, thereby outflanking Ottawa.⁷⁰ Léger enlisted the support of Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, who notwithstanding his doubts about the likely hostile federal reaction, promised to assist to the extent of his abilities given his conviction

⁶⁷ MAE, v. 243 – Letter from MAE à Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France à Tunis, 20 July 1965, *Coopération culturelle entre la Tunisie et le Québec*; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, *Délégation du Québec en France, 1964-1966*, Letter from Chapdelaine to Lesage, 3 March 1965, Attached note by Jean Chapdelaine (undated). Also, Gérin-Lajoie (1989), 319.

⁶⁸ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 5 – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 11 July 1966, *francophonie*; ANQ, E42, 1990-09-002, v. 405, *Délégation du Québec à Paris, 1966-1967 « B »*, Letter from Morin to Chapdelaine, 26 July 1966.

⁶⁹ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, *Statut du Québec, Général – Mémoire du Ministre d'État à l'Éducation au Conseil des Ministres*, 7 December 1966, *Première conférence au Québec des ministres de l'éducation des pays francophones*; MAE, v. 322 – Note from Basdevant to the Secrétaire Général, MAE, 21 September 1966, *Relations culturelles franco-québécoises*.

⁷⁰ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, *Statut du Québec, Général – Memorandum from Gaston Cholette, Directeur général de la coopération internationale to C. Morin*, 12 December 1966; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, *Statut du Québec, Général – Letter from Jean-Marc Léger, Sec-Gen, AUPELF to C. Morin*, 13 January 1967.

that Quebec should be a participant in the Francophonie.⁷¹ Léger's efforts were paralleled by those of Chapdelaine, who lobbied de Gaulle, emphasizing the profound need Quebec City felt to participate fully in international meetings of francophone education ministers.⁷²

Worried by Johnson's public remarks about the Francophonie and word de Gaulle was preoccupied with the question of Quebec's participation in it, Paul Martin used the occasion of Maurice Couve de Murville's September 1966 visit to express federal concern regarding the modalities of Quebec participation in international meetings of francophone education ministers, given the tendency for political and cultural questions to overlap.⁷³ Aware of Quebec efforts to host a francophone education ministers conference, Martin affirmed publicly that it was the federal government that would sponsor any intergovernmental conference held in Canada.⁷⁴ When Elysée efforts resulted in Quebec's Minister of Justice being invited to a meeting of the private *Institut International de Droit des Pays francophones*, Ottawa took steps to secure an invitation for itself. Pearson's parliamentary secretary, Pierre Trudeau, was dispatched to the meeting in Lomé, and then toured francophone African capitals to promote the federal interpretation of the Canadian constitution. Back in Canada, Cadieux reminded Leduc "there was only one address ... for correspondence relating to Francophonie and that was Ottawa."⁷⁵

⁷¹ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 5 – Letter from Jurgensen to J-M. Léger, AUPELF, 2 February 1967.

⁷² MAE, v. 226 – Note: Entretien du Délégué Général du Québec avec le Directeur d'Amérique, 13 February 1967; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969 – Letter (4) from Chapdelaine to Johnson, 14 February 1967.

⁷³ MAE, v. 199 – Entretien entre M. Couve de Murville et M. Paul Martin, 29 September 1966 à Ottawa; Gendron (2006), 120.

⁷⁴ Thomson (1988), 266-267.

⁷⁵ Gendron (2006), 122-123.

To avoid an evolution of the Francophonie inimical to the federal position and pre-empt any potential disputes with France, Martin used a speech to the Montreal Junior Chamber of Commerce to present Ottawa's proposal for a private umbrella organization, approved by national governments, which would coordinate the activities of non-governmental organizations dedicated to promoting French language and culture.⁷⁶ Taken by surprise, the MAE was annoyed, a reaction which Canada's embassy interpreted as pique at being caught out "at [its] own game." Indeed, the Canadian proposal followed the founding in Paris of the *Association de solidarité francophone* (ASF) that, though a private organization, boasted significant official involvement. This included France's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Jean de Broglie, several Quebec lobby members, and accorded a prominent position to Quebec's Delegate-General. France's former ambassador to Canada, Raymond Bousquet, had spearheaded the effort.⁷⁷

The issue of Quebec's participation in the Francophonie took on greater urgency following de Gaulle's *cri du balcon*. Symptomatic of the sense of crisis reigning in the DEA, it was argued that the Francophonie had become "a barely-disguised mechanism for serving the political goals of France through intrusion in our internal affairs."⁷⁸ Federal concern increased when Father Georges-Henri Lévesque,

⁷⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 February 1967; Department of External Affairs, "Canada and 'la Francophonie': Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, Montreal, March 11, 1967," in *Statements and Speeches 1967-1968* (Government of Canada, 1968).

⁷⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Letter from George to Halstead, 22 March 1967 – Secret and Personal; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Telex from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 1 March 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 February 1967; MAE, v. 199 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 13 February 1967.

⁷⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10684, 20-6-CDA, p. 1 – Memorandum from Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 17 August 1967, Conséquences de la visite du Général de Gaulle pour la participation du Canada à la francophonie; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – ANNEX – Federal action to deal with

by this time the Rector of Rwanda's National University, returned from the founding meeting of the *Association des universités africaines* in Morocco sounding the alarm about Jean-Marc Léger, who he said used the meeting to lobby for direct Quebec participation in the *francophonie*. Lévesque urged Ottawa to appoint a prominent diplomat to neutralize the efforts of the head of AUPELF, concerned that Léger would eventually achieve his "Austerlitz si on ne lui prépare pas un Trafalgar."⁷⁹

As it turned out, the battle came in the Gabonese capital of Libreville, in the context of a meeting of francophone ministers of education under the auspices of the *Organisation commune africaine et malgache* (OCAM). The Quebec Lobby was instrumental in the "Gabon Affair." Bernard Dorin has recalled that ensuring separate Quebec participation at the conference was "le plus beau 'coup'" he and fellow Quebec lobbyist Philippe Rossillon achieved. There was no difficulty in their getting de Gaulle's approval, the French leader being "enchanté" by the "bonne farce" sprung on Ottawa.⁸⁰ De Gaulle's insistence on full Quebec participation in the meeting was consistent with his larger aim of establishing a separate Quebec international personality as a means to hasten independence.⁸¹

possible French support for separatism, by A.E. Gotlieb, September 6, 1967, attached to Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 29 November 1967, Ottawa, Quebec and De Gaulle – Where do we go from here?; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 September 1967.

⁷⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11632, 30-10-FRAN, p. 1 – Memorandum from Beesley, Legal Division to Cadieux, 14 December 1967, Fondation au Maroc de l'Association des Universités africaines : rôle du Père G.H. Lévesque et de Jean-Marc Léger.

⁸⁰ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Divers – Letter from Peyrefitte to Chapdelaine, 6 July 1998. Dorin recounts how, concerned about the inexperience of the Gabonese in the matter, Rossillon and he took the greatest care to brief the Gabonese authorities to ensure Quebec received an invitation.

⁸¹ Peyrefitte (2000), 85; Jacques Foccart, *Le Général en Mai, Journal de l'Élysée, volume II, 1968-1969* (Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1998), 343-345. Indeed, de Gaulle subsequently refused to attend a reception during the September 1968 meeting of the *Association internationale des parlementaires de langue française* (AIPLF) as it appeared Quebec would not attend owing to its opposition to not

When the question of Quebec's participation in the Francophonie was raised during Peyrefitte's September 1967 visit to Quebec, Marcel Masse expressed a belief that he already was invited to attend the upcoming conference.⁸² Delegates to the AUPELF meeting held in Montreal earlier that year had endorsed the notion of Quebec participation at Libreville, and Masse had spent the summer of Expo lobbying visiting French African leaders for an invitation.⁸³ Daniel Johnson was convinced Quebec should be invited directly to participate at Libreville, and would not countenance any federal involvement in the matter given that the conference dealt with education.⁸⁴ Morin informed Leduc of the Premier's firm stance at the end of December 1967, assuring him Quebec City would handle any difficulties with Ottawa. The ambassador responded that Paris was "inspiring" Gabon in the matter, would do exactly as Quebec City desired, and that it could count on a direct invitation.⁸⁵

Chapdelaine pressed the matter in Paris. The MAE was concerned to obtain Quebec's participation at Libreville without provoking another bilateral crisis with Ottawa.⁸⁶ Reflective of the MAE's more nuanced approach to triangular relations, Jean-Daniel Jurgensen referred to the federal proposal that Ottawa could simply appoint Quebec's Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal, head of the Canadian

holding separate membership in the organization. De Gaulle declared "Je n'irai pas s'il n'y a pas le Québec, ce serait ridicule! C'est complètement grotesque!" It was only the determined persuasion of his close advisor, Jacques Foccart, that led the French leader to attend the reception.

⁸² MAE, v. 234 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 18 September 1967.

⁸³ Gendron (2006), 127, 130.

⁸⁴ Claude Morin, *L'Art de l'impossible: la Diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960* (Boréal, 1987), 116.

⁸⁵ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, Statut du Québec, Général – Memorandum from C. Morin to Johnson, 22 December 1967.

⁸⁶ Frédéric Bastien, *Relations particulières: La France face au Québec après De Gaulle* (Boréal, 1999), 51; Peyrefitte (2000), 110. Bastien cites Leduc as one of the opponents of Quebec receiving an invitation, and Peyrefitte claims Couve de Murville and other senior MAE officials were opposed to Quebec participation in the Libreville meeting.

delegation. Chapdelaine responded unequivocally that Quebec had little interest in attending the conference if it were not invited directly, rejecting any arrangements designed to placate Ottawa. Chapdelaine later told Morin that Jurgensen's reaction was as good as could be desired given that the MAE wished to "contenter tout le monde et puis son père."⁸⁷

While discussions took place between Quebec City and Paris, anxiety grew in Ottawa. In November 1967, Ottawa learned from its ambassador in Niger that Quebec was to be invited to Libreville.⁸⁸ The DEA's European division urged Ottawa to reach a *modus vivendi* with Quebec City regarding international francophone meetings, even one falling short of federal principles, warning that not doing so risked Quebec, with French assistance or other francophone states, achieving arrangements inimical to Canada's international personality. Pearson wrote Johnson at the beginning of December to emphasize federal willingness to include Quebec representatives in Canadian delegations to international conferences and co-operate in Quebec's regarding participation in the Francophonie. Federal hope continued for a compromise that provided for significant Quebec participation in Libreville as part of a Canadian delegation.⁸⁹ Ottawa's efforts and the hope Paris would not frustrate them, however, appeared increasingly unrealistic. Pearson's letter to Johnson went

⁸⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 11 January 1968; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, Statut du Québec, Général – Memorandum from C. Morin to Johnson, 22 December 1967; Gendron (2006), 132.

⁸⁸ Gendron (2006), 130.

⁸⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Memorandum from European Division to Francophonie Division, 8 December 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 8 December 1967, France-Canada-Québec – Échéances prochaines; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 11 January 1968.

ominously unanswered, and Paris' unresponsiveness to a Canadian request for assistance in sending a group of observers to Gabon did little to ease concerns.⁹⁰

On January 17, the Quebec Government announced it had been invited to attend the Libreville Conference and would be sending a delegation led by Jean-Guy Cardinal.⁹¹ Consistent with the de Gaulle-centric analysis in Ottawa, Martin reminded Pearson of the MAE's efforts to avoid another confrontation. Federal officials resented Daniel Johnson, who Martin alleged was "much less helpful" in his public remarks than he had led Pearson to believe when the two men discussed the matter the previous day. The Premier had made no attempt to minimize the legal and constitutional implications of Quebec receiving an invitation to an international conference.⁹²

After last-ditch federal efforts to secure an invitation failed, Ottawa responded by suspending its relations with Gabon, and lodged an oral protest with the MAE. Emblematic of the more profound differences in federal circles over the most effective way to respond to the triangular tensions, this response was far milder than what Cadieux recommended in order to "let the French and the world know that there is still some life left in us." The DEA Under-secretary, however, had been overruled by Martin who argued Ottawa did not have the "luxury of 'gestures of annoyance',"

⁹⁰ Black (1997), 30-31.

⁹¹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Divers – Letter from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 14 August 1998; Peyrefitte (2000), 112. There exists a (likely) apocryphal story that the invitation was mistakenly sent by the Gabonese Embassy in Washington to the DEA, and then forwarded erroneously by a DEA official to Quebec City. Claude Morin dismisses the idea, arguing the time frame involved did not permit this. What appears closer to the truth – and explains the possible origin of the tale – is Peyrefitte's account that the invitation was almost sent by the Gabonese Embassy to Ottawa, but that a quick-thinking official prevented this and ensured it was sent directly to Quebec City.

⁹² DEA, A-3-c, v. 11652, 30-16-QBC, p. 1 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 18 January 1968, Quebec Participation in Francophone Education Ministers Conference.

convinced that no protest would prompt de Gaulle to modify his policy, and could in fact give him the grounds to ignore the Canadian government entirely.⁹³

In Libreville, Jean-Guy Cardinal, sent with Johnson's instructions to take a "strong line," headed up a delegation that was treated as if it represented an independent, sovereign state. Quebec flags flew throughout the Gabonese capital and Cardinal was lodged at the presidential mansion, the only attendee other than Alain Peyrefitte. The French Minister used his public remarks to draw attention to Quebec's participation in the conference not as an observer but as a member of the Francophonie. All such measures were meant to emphasize Quebec's arrival on the international stage.⁹⁴ Federal consternation was mirrored in the satisfaction of Quebec's promoters. In his remarks to the conference, Cardinal emphasized Quebec's separate invitation, asserting the legitimacy of Quebec City's efforts to establish and strengthen its relations with the international francophone community since Quebec boasted eighty-five per cent of Canadian francophones, and invoking the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine.⁹⁵

The close of the Libreville Conference only meant the end of the first phase of the confrontation, as Ottawa suspected Paris intended to invite Quebec to participate in the follow-up conference in the French capital in April.⁹⁶ In one of his last acts as Prime Minister, Pearson wrote Johnson on the eve of the Paris meeting with the offer that Quebec's Minister of Education should chair Canadian delegations to

⁹³ Gendron (2006), 134; Peyrefitte (2000), 120; Lescop (1981), 75. While Martin's arguments won the day, de Gaulle was already all but ignoring Ottawa, as evidenced by his lack of concern about the federal reaction.

⁹⁴ Gendron (2006), 133; Morin (1987), 125-133; Thomson (1988), 270.

⁹⁵ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, Participation du Québec, Libreville, février 1968 – Déclaration de M. Cardinal, Ministre de l'Éducation du Québec, Conférence de Libreville, 5 au 10 février 1968.

⁹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Note from Cadieux to Halstead, 27 March 1968, Conversation avec M. Carraud.

international meetings of francophone ministers of education, and more broadly, urged a solution of the rivalry between Quebec City and Ottawa over foreign affairs that would respect the internal competences of the provinces while permitting Canada to retain a united international personality.⁹⁷

Contrary to Pearson's hopes, and consistent with the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, the view in the Premier's office was that Quebec should agree to participate in a "Canadian" delegation only subsequent to a full-blown crisis erupting over Quebec's participation in the Paris meeting. Moreover, to safeguard the principle of provincial sovereignty, André Patry would only countenance a delegation comprised of provincial representatives that received instructions from their respective capitals and spoke in their name only, arguing that such a position was necessary to check persistent federal efforts to decide unilaterally which aspects of foreign affairs it controlled. Faced with the Ottawa-Quebec City impasse, Patry argued negotiation was the only solution, making it incumbent on Quebec to multiply the precedents that favoured the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine.⁹⁸ Johnson only responded to Pearson's letters, therefore, on the eve of the Paris meeting, and in doing so reaffirmed Quebec's right to attend by virtue of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. A federal attempt to lessen the impact of Quebec's participation in the Paris meeting by pressing Quebec City and Paris to have New Brunswick attend also ended in failure.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, Statut du Québec, Général – Letter from Pearson to Johnson, 5 April 1968; Morin (1987), 134-136. This followed a second letter about the Francophonie education ministers meetings that the Prime Minister sent but that also had gone unanswered.

⁹⁸ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, Statut du Québec, Général, Note à l'honorable Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, de André Patry, Conseiller, 9 April 1968; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v.147, CME, Statut du Québec, Général – Note from Patry to Johnson, 10 April 1968, *Fédéralisme et conférences internationales sur l'éducation*.

⁹⁹ Morin (1987), 136-137.

Ottawa made clear to French officials its objections to Quebec attending the Paris meeting. The federal position regarding Quebec's international activities was affirmed in a white paper on *Federalism and International Relations* released after the Libreville Conference. Leduc was summoned to the DEA and told of the "serious repercussions" that would accompany Paris not respecting the federal position, and the new Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, used a speech to the Montreal Chamber of Commerce to take issue with French actions. Ottawa subsequently released a second white paper, *Federalism and International Conferences on Education*, which Cadieux had largely drafted, arguing that Canada's external sovereignty was indivisible, and outlined the federal government's commitment to a bicultural foreign policy and willingness to work closely with the provinces to ensure arrangements at international conferences that respected both provincial and federal jurisdictions.¹⁰⁰

Consistent with its more pragmatic, conciliatory approach, the Canadian embassy advised Ottawa against taking action beyond a warning, fearing any more drastic measure could provoke stronger reprisal measures from de Gaulle, including a suspension of relations that elements in Paris and Quebec City would exploit to further undermine the federal position.¹⁰¹ Indeed, the prospect of a new triangular crisis loomed when the French press learned that Jules Léger had been called back to Ottawa for consultations. While this had more to do with the Trudeau Government's arrival in power, the DEA feared it could be misconstrued as a provocative gesture if

¹⁰⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Telex from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 3 April 1968, CDA-FRA Relations: Conversation with French Ambassador; Paul Martin, *Federalism and International Relations* (Government of Canada, 1968); Mitchell Sharp, *Federalism and international conferences on education* (Government of Canada, 1968); Mitchell Sharp, *Which Reminds Me...: A Memoir* (University of Toronto Press, 1994), 188; Black (1997), 35.

¹⁰¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 13 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 3 April 1968, Franco-Canadian Relations.

the reason for the ambassador's absence was not clarified quickly, leading to a deterioration of relations beyond the "point of no return." Léger therefore returned to Paris earlier than intended, but carrying a note protesting French actions as detrimental to Canada's constitution and violating Canadian sovereignty, and which argued that Paris had neglected francophone minorities outside of Quebec by hosting only a Quebec delegation.¹⁰²

A second invitation was not issued. Instead, the MAE argued that the Paris meeting was simply a continuation of the Libreville Conference.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, Jean-Guy Cardinal and Quebec's delegation was accorded the same level of recognition and participation as the other sovereign delegations, without Ottawa ever being informed officially of the status of Quebec's participants.¹⁰⁴

Canadian protests proved of limited apparent utility. De Gaulle gave specific instructions that in the event a Canadian delegation showed up at the meeting, it was to not be permitted to attend.¹⁰⁵ Meeting with Léger on behalf of Couve de Murville, Louis Joxe, France's Minister of Justice, abjured any French desire to interfere in Canadian affairs. He then immediately contradicted this claim, however, by explaining that Paris would accept any agreement that Ottawa reached with Quebec City. This implied that French actions were governed foremost by Quebec desires. Joxe also questioned the federal position that Canada's constitution did not permit

¹⁰² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, Return of Ambassador and Notification to MFA, 16 April 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Memorandum from Sharp to Trudeau, 25 April 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16.2 – Telex from Léger to DEA, 4 May 1968; MAE, v. 201 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to MAE, 3 May 1968; Black (1997), 36.

¹⁰³ MAE, Canada 1964-1970, v. 280 – Note for Monsieur Joxe, 3 May 1968.

¹⁰⁴ John P. Schlegel, "Containing Quebec Abroad: The Gabon Incident, 1968," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, John Kirton and Don Munton, eds. (Prentice-Hall, 1992), 159.

¹⁰⁵ Peyrefitte (2000), 121.

Paris to host a Quebec delegation for an international conference.¹⁰⁶ The new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, reiterated to Leduc Ottawa's opposition to the question of Quebec's participation in the Paris meeting, characterizing it as the latest example of France's failure to respect the federal interpretation of Canada's constitution. Leduc denied Paris was interfering in Canadian affairs or that it was interpreting for itself the constitution, before ultimately pronouncing Sharp's concern a trivial legalism. Sharp responded that to the contrary, the matter was of supreme importance to Canadian unity.¹⁰⁷ The exchange encapsulated the triangular dynamic that had emerged over the preceding years. Ottawa's efforts to safeguard the federal prerogative in foreign affairs, and more broadly, Canadian unity, fell on deaf ears given Paris' sympathy for the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine and its encouragement of a distinct international personality for Quebec.

The meeting between Leduc and Sharp was the last before the French ambassador departed Ottawa after what could only be described as a tumultuous posting. Similarly, Jules Léger was soon to leave Paris having weathered the decade's intense triangular tensions. Even more significant, however, were the political changes afoot. Already in Ottawa, Pierre Trudeau had taken over from Pearson as Prime Minister. Dramatic events in Paris and Quebec City were also to lead to political changes in the other two points of the triangle. What remained to be seen after the months of crisis was what the implications of these changes would be for Canada-Quebec-France triangular relations.

¹⁰⁶ Black (1997), 38.

¹⁰⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 14 – Memorandum from Cadieux to European Division, 28 May 1968.

Chapter 16

Rivalry, Recrimination, Renewal: Triangular Cultural Relations, 1965-1970

The *Association France-Québec* (AFQ) was established in Paris in the autumn of 1968. Among the leading figures in this organization dedicated to strengthening transatlantic links were prominent members of the Quebec lobby such as the French parliamentarian Xavier Deniau, diplomat Bernard Dorin, and bureaucrat Philippe Rossillon. In addition to providing a significant subsidy to the AFQ, Quebec's Delegation-General opposed any links between it and the *Association General France-Canada* (AGFC) that had existed since the 1940s. Consistent with the Quebec government's growing involvement in promoting cultural links with France, there were poor relations between the Delegation-General and the AGFC, an organization that Quebec officials considered superfluous given the cultural agreements Paris and Quebec City had signed in 1965, and suspect by virtue of its enduring pan-Canadian sympathies.¹

Commenting on an AGFC request for Ottawa to provide financial support to ensure the organization's survival in the new conjuncture, Eldon Black, the second-ranking official at Canada's embassy, highlighted unwittingly how the matter reflected the broader triangular relationship. He expressed uncertainty over the long-

¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 17.2 – Memorandum from Black, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to USSEA, 6 November 1968, Association France-Canada; ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris – Trimestriels, Rapport de la Section Culturelle pour les mois d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1965; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 6 – Letter from Elie, Conseiller culturel, to Frégault, 2 March 1966; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 13 – Memorandum from Black, Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 18 April 1968, Association France-Canada et Délégation du Québec. Also, Luc Roussel, *Les Relations culturelles du Québec avec la France, 1920-1965*, unpublished dissertation (Université Laval, 1983), 358-381.

term prospects of two parallel associations in France, one for Canada that “more or less” included Quebec, and the other for Quebec only. Black speculated that the AFQ, supported by the Delegation-General and the French Government, would quickly rise in significance and possibly eclipse the much more Canada-friendly AGFC, particularly if the latter group’s activities were limited to francophone minorities outside of Quebec and English-speaking Canada.² This AGFC-AFQ rivalry was the triangular cultural relations of the preceding years in microcosm and consistent with the politicization of cultural relations. The race for agreements set the stage for increased tension in the Canada-Quebec-France cultural relationship with a strengthening France-Quebec axis and Ottawa’s marginalization. Paris and Quebec City employed the 1965 agreements to cultivate cultural exchanges, justify privileged direct relations, and by extension, assert Quebec’s international capacity.

Ottawa was ill-placed to respond to the triangular dynamic effectively, and the success of the *accord cadre* quickly proved hollow. Rather than safeguarding the federal prerogative in foreign affairs, the France-Canada cultural agreement tended to undermine it. In addition to the second-tier status of the Ottawa-Paris axis relative to France-Quebec links, the federal government’s eclipse appeared confirmed by Paris’ growing proclivity to bypass it and treat directly with francophone minority groups outside Quebec. In response, Ottawa sought to protect its position by increasing its cultural activities in France, asserting its role as a viable interlocutor to facilitate contacts between France and French Canada, including Quebec, and protesting what it considered misuse of the cultural agreements. When the *accord cadre* came up for

² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 17.2 – Memorandum from Black, Canadian Embassy, Paris to USSEA, 6 November 1968, Association France-Canada; Eldon Black, *Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1974* (Carleton University Press, 1997), 139.

renewal in 1970, Ottawa was forced to choose between the difficult experience of the preceding five years, and not renewing the agreement, thereby losing what little control it enjoyed over cultural relations. The Trudeau Government opted for a qualified renewal, a choice made more palatable by what federal officials considered to be an emerging triangular normalization as a result of the changes of government in Paris and Quebec City, but that also indicated a tacit acceptance of the France-Quebec special relationship that had emerged over the preceding decade.

Rivalry

Amid the negotiations of the accord cadre and the second France-Quebec entente, Canada's Paris embassy warned Ottawa that Quebec was supplanting Canada's image in France, and called for a long-term effort to cultivate the French media and facilitate visits to France of Canadian cultural and intellectual figures to redress the situation.³ The embassy's recommendations were consistent with Ottawa's broader preoccupation to safeguard its interpretation of the Canadian constitution and assert its role as a viable interlocutor for France regarding cultural relations, especially after the pronouncement of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine.

In mid-1965, the DEA Under-secretary, Marcel Cadieux, recommended an increase in Canada's activities at UNESCO, reflecting the increased importance Ottawa was assigning to cultural diplomacy as a means to reinforce federal primacy in foreign affairs. Indeed, when DEA officials provided a proposed draft of the accord cadre to Jean Basdevant, head of the MAE's Cultural Relations division, they also told him that Ottawa was expanding the scope of its cultural relations programme

³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10935, 56-1-2-FR, p 1.1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 7 July 1965.

that it had established in 1964, quadrupling the budget from \$250,000 to \$1 million, and more than doubling the number of student and professorial exchanges. Intergovernmental rivalry over cultural affairs also fuelled Ottawa's efforts to cooperate with the provinces, including provincial participation in Canadian delegations abroad, to counter any Quebec bid for direct representation. In January 1966, the cultural affairs section of the DEA's Information Division became a division in its own right.⁴ More ambitious still were the discussions in the DEA about establishing a Canadian cultural centre in Paris. The ambassador, Jules Léger, and the embassy's cultural counsellor, Pierre Trottier, lobbied heavily for a cultural centre to increase Canada's profile in the French capital, demonstrate Ottawa's determination to cultivate special links with France, and supplement the embassy by co-ordinating and regularizing Ottawa's cultural diplomacy. After years of effort, the approval to purchase a building to house the centre was granted in June 1967.⁵

Quebec City noted the increased federal cultural activity. Although the 1965 agreements fuelled French interest in Quebec and led to an increase of the Delegation-General's cultural activities,⁶ Jean-Marc Léger complained that Ambassador Léger and Trottier had become very "présent," multiplying the

⁴ Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 151; MAE, v. 327 – Note pour le Ministre, 31 May 1965, Relations culturelles.

⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Letter from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 21 October 1963 – Franco-Canadian Relations; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10935, 56-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Letter from Martin to Messrs. Favreau, Sauvé, Pépin, Côté, Cardin, L. Cadieux, Marchand, 12 January 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10935, 56-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from European Division to Information Division, 7 July 1965, programme d'info et de manifestations culturelles en France; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10935, 56-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 22 December 1966, Centre Culturel Canadien à Paris; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10935, 56-1-2-FR, p. 1.1 – Memorandum from Bellemare to Head of Information Division, 17 January 1967, Proposed Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris; Ambassade du Canada, (Paris), *Centre Culturel Canadien, 25 ans d'activité, 1970-1995* (Government of Canada, 1995), 22-23.

⁶ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 26, Délégation culturelle du Québec à Paris – Trimestriels, Rapport de la Section Culturelle pour les mois d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1965.

embassy's cultural activities and acting as "apôtres fiévres" for France-Canada cultural relations. Jean-Marc Léger decried what he termed a lacklustre effort by Quebec's Delegation-General and Jean Chapdelaine, complaining that the embassy was increasingly being contacted about France-Quebec affairs.⁷

Claude Morin, aware of the link between the increase in Ottawa's cultural activities in France and the France-Quebec rapprochement, expressed some ambivalence at the situation. Although frustrated that Ottawa had the advantage of greater financial resources to pursue the intergovernmental rivalry, he was also convinced that the federal effort would not damage French-Canadian culture, and he was even prepared to venture that once Quebec's international personality was achieved there would be room enough for both Ottawa and Quebec City in France.⁸ More directly affected, Chapdelaine described Quebec's position as continuously under threat given the vigorous federal effort to present a very francophone face in Paris. The Quebec representative warned that the growing federal cultural presence in the French capital meant that regardless of having less financial means at its disposal than Ottawa, Quebec had to act quickly to avoid any threat to its jurisdiction over education and culture.⁹

Even the *Maison des étudiants canadiens* (MEC) did not escape the Ottawa-Quebec rivalry. Up to the 1960s, only Quebec had provided regular funding to the student residence at the *Cité universitaire*. Quebec City therefore looked with

⁷ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 3, 9 – Note sur la D.G. du Québec à Paris, J-M. Léger, undated [circa autumn 1966].

⁸ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Personnel, Missions de France au Québec, 1966-1971 – Letter from Morin to Chapdelaine, 2 June 1966.

⁹ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, CME, Statut du Québec, Général – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 1 December 1966.

askance on Ottawa's decision to award the MEC a \$500,000 grant.¹⁰ Quebec's Minister of Cultural Affairs, Jean-Noël Tremblay, cancelled Quebec's subsidy when he learned a new wing built with federal funds would bear a cornerstone with no reference to Quebec's long-standing support.¹¹

Tensions between Ottawa and Quebec City were further exacerbated by the federal attempt to reach an accord cadre with Belgium and present Quebec with a *fait accompli*. Quebec officials, who had been in contact with their Belgian counterparts since the mid-1960s regarding increased cultural links, were furious when informed of the agreement five days before it was to be signed by Prince Albert of Liège in Montreal, considering it a federal incursion into its jurisdiction that prompted them to dissociate the Quebec Government from the accord.¹²

France-Quebec cultural cooperation issues thus figured prominently during Daniel Johnson's May 1967 visit to Paris. In meetings with France's Minister of Culture, André Malraux, and Hervé Alphand, Secretary-General of the MAE, the Premier proposed the establishment of a Quebec cultural centre in Paris, a touring French-Canadian cultural exhibition, and increased exchanges. The aim was to

¹⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Bilan des échanges entre la France et le Canada depuis la signature de l'Accord culturel [undated, unauthored, circa May 1967].

¹¹ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 183, Maison des étudiants canadiens – Letter from Frégault to C. Morin, 19 June 1967. The subsidy was only reinstated two years later, when it was increased from \$18,000 to \$25,000. ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 183, Maison des étudiants canadiens – Telegram from Cholette to Chapdelaine, 29 September 1969.

¹² Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier, *Le Lobby du Québec à Paris: Les Précurseurs du Général de Gaulle* (Québec-Amérique, 2002), 54; Thomson (1988), 193-194; Claude Morin, *L'Art de l'impossible: la Diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960* (Boréal, 1987), 95-96; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 94, 1965, p.1 – Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif, Séance du 7 mai 1965.

heighten Quebec's cultural profile in France and reinforce its claim as the primary interlocutor for cultural relations with French Canada.¹³

As occurred during the negotiating of the 1965 agreements, Paris attempted to respond to federal overtures in a manner that did not impinge on the development of France-Quebec cultural links. The question of youth exchanges reflected the French approach. Federal officials contacted the French embassy to express Ottawa's interest in funding a programme of youth exchanges, and during a December 1966 visit to Paris the federal Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Jean Marchand, reiterated Canadian desires to France's Minister of Youth, François Missoffe.¹⁴

Paris' response to the federal initiative was shaped by Quebec City's reaction: worried at being outflanked by Ottawa after Marchand's visit, Quebec officials lobbied for an exclusively France-Quebec programme. The ambassador, François Leduc, expressed bemusement over the latest manifestation of the Ottawa-Quebec rivalry, but argued that regardless of the origins of Quebec's interest in exchanges, Paris would have to act on the issue.¹⁵ Accordingly, Marchand's suggestions went without a response while a France-Quebec youth exchange programme was discussed during the April 1967 meeting of the *Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise*. Annoyance in the DEA only grew amid word that youth exchanges were

¹³ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 2, Daniel Johnson, 1966-1969, Visite à Paris du Premier Ministre M. Daniel Johnson, 17-22 mai, 1967 – Visite à Monsieur Malraux, Questions Culturelles, Jean Chapdelaine; MAE, v. 206, Johnson Visit – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 9 May 1967; MAE, v. 199 – Compte-Rendu de la séance de travail franco-québécoise présidée par M. Hervé Alphand, Secrétaire Général du Département, 18 May 1967.

¹⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Bilan des échanges entre la France et le Canada depuis la signature de l'Accord culturel [undated, unauthored]; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Procès-verbal d'une Réunion Inter-Ministérielle sur les Échanges de Jeunes avec la France, 27 April 1967.

¹⁵ MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Conventions Administratives et des Affaires Consulaires, Conventions, 27 October 1966; MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, Amérique, 3 March 1967, visite à Québec.

to be discussed during Johnson's 1967 visit to France.¹⁶ The head of the MAE's *Amérique* division, Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, subsequently advised Ottawa it could raise the question of youth exchanges with de Gaulle during his visit to Canada, but the limited monies available in Paris meant federal officials should "not set their sights too high."¹⁷

Paris' favouring Quebec City over Ottawa was also evident in the field of immigration, another contested joint jurisdiction. The Pearson Government was interested in increasing francophone immigration as part of its biculturalism policy; indeed, this was the primary motivation for new consulates general in Bordeaux and Marseilles.¹⁸ While there was discussion of re-settling French Algerian farmers in Canada in the early 1960s, little ultimately came of the discussions, and only seven families emigrated under a pilot project.¹⁹ The immigration issue was of particular concern to Jules Léger, who considered it the most important long-term issue in Canada-France relations, arguing that Ottawa had to act for Canada to maintain and develop its bilingual character. The federal preoccupation regarding French

¹⁶ MAE, v. 199 – Note from Jurgensen to Couve de Murville, 2 May 1967, *Conversations avec la Premier Ministre du Québec*; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-6-QUE, p. 1 – Telex from DEA to Léger, Canadian Embassy, Paris, 13 May 1967, *Visite de Ministres du Québec en France*.

¹⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 26 June 1967.

¹⁸ DDF, 1964, v. 1 – Document 28, *Compte Rendu de l'Entretien entre M. Couve de Murville et M. Paul Martin, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Canada à Paris*, 15 janvier 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.2 – Memorandum from Consular Division to Personnel Division, 10 April 1964, *Proposal to Open Two Consulates in France*; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 1.2 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division to Cadieux, 19 February 1964, *Établissement de postes de l'Immigration en France*; MAE, v. 198 – Telegram from Bousquet to MAE, *Amérique*, 10 May 1964.

¹⁹ MAE, v. 180 – Letter from French Embassy, London, to Couve de Murville, MAE, *Amérique*, 21 October 1961, *Fixation de colons Algériens au Canada*; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 93, p. 2, 1961 – *Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil exécutif*, 22 November 1961; ANQ, E5, 1986-03-007, v. 93, p. 5, 1964 – *Mémoire des délibérations du Conseil Exécutif*, 5 February 1964; ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, *Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961* – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 2.1 – Memorandum from European Division to Cadieux, 21 May 1964, *List of Suggestions for Closer Canada-France Cooperation*.

immigration was the immediate motivation underpinning Marchand's 1966 visit to Paris.²⁰

Once again, interest was not limited to Ottawa. The *Maison du Québec* received a growing number of immigration inquiries, prompting the Delegate-General, Charles Lussier, to call for the establishment of a Quebec immigration service in Paris.²¹ Under pressure from nationalist groups and the Union Nationale, in 1965 the Lesage Government established an immigration service attached to the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Renamed the *Direction générale de l'immigration* by the Johnson Government, a January 1967 report called for Quebec City to take an active role in immigration as a means to maintaining Quebec's francophone majority, a recommendation that resulted in a new Ministry of Immigration in late 1968.²²

Paris again favoured the Quebec initiative over that of Ottawa. In advance of Marchand's Paris visit, Leduc advised the MAE that any talks be non-committal and should play for time, given expectations of a comparable overture from Quebec City, and the fact that Quebec officials considered Marchand a potential obstacle to the establishment of a Quebec immigration service.²³ The MAE viewed the federal minister's visit as part of Ottawa's efforts to outflank Quebec. Jurgensen argued that Paris' interest was in immigration cooperation with Quebec City, since French

²⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.1 – Memorandum from George, European Division to USSEA, 27 June 1966, Immigration française au Canada – Réunion interdépartementale du 28 juin; MAE, v. 199 – Entretien entre M. Couve de Murville et M. Paul Martin, le 29 septembre 1966 à Ottawa.

²¹ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Agent Général de la P.Q. à Paris, Rapports activités 1961 – Letter from Lussier to G-D. Lévesque, 14 May 1964.

²² ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 4 – Note from Frégault to Laporte, confidentiel, 14 July 1965; Michael D. Behiels, *Quebec and the Question of Immigration: From Ethnocentrism to Ethnic Pluralism, 1900-1985* (Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 17-19.

²³ MAE, v. 199 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Conventions Administratives et des Affaires Consulaires, Conventions, 27 October 1966.

immigrants would have the most beneficial impact in Quebec and be at risk of assimilation in the rest of Canada.²⁴ The lukewarm French response to the federal initiative disappointed Léger deeply. He considered it a lost opportunity to cultivate France-Canada relations in an area crucial to federal biculturalism efforts, and another indication of Ottawa's marginalization.²⁵

Federal concern about the trend of triangular cultural relations was fuelled by reports of the April 1967 meeting of the *Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise* suggesting that discussions had exceeded the framework provided by the 1965 cultural agreements. Of similar worry was the reference to the opening of a Quebec cultural centre in Paris in the official communiqué preceding Johnson's visit to France, interpreted in the DEA as suggesting Quebec City, not Ottawa, was French Canada's international spokesperson.²⁶

There was also disappointment in Ottawa over the functioning of the accord cadre in which so much hope had been placed, and more generally, French attitudes regarding cultural relations with Canada as a whole. Although the France-Canada agreement led to increased exchanges, Ottawa was preoccupied with Paris' apparent lack of interest in the Canada-France mixed committee that had been established, relative to its France-Quebec counterpart.²⁷ Marcel Cadieux warned of the "invidious comparisons" that the discrepancy between the French approaches to the two committees could produce. When the matter was raised with Leduc, the French

²⁴ MAE, v. 199 – Note from Jurgensen to Couve de Murville, 2 May 1967, *Conversations avec le Premier Ministre du Québec*.

²⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10098, 20-1-2-FR, p. 4.2 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 2 December 1966.

²⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-6-QUE, p. 1 – Telex from DEA to Léger, Canadian Embassy, Paris, 13 May 1967, *Visite de Ministres du Québec en France*.

²⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 11 – Bilan des échanges entre la France et le Canada depuis la signature de l'Accord culturel [undated, unauthored, circa May 1967]; André Donneur, "Les relations Franco-Canadiennes: Bilan et Perspectives," *Politique Étrangère* 1973, 38(2): 194.

diplomat responded by describing the Canada-France committee in more limited terms, viewing it as only a meeting of representatives of both countries' foreign ministries.²⁸ Typical of the French position was the assessment that the results of the committee's June 1967 meeting were limited and far less significant than that achieved during the equivalent France-Quebec discussions.²⁹

Not surprisingly, Ottawa's effort to participate in the founding meeting of the *Comité international pour la langue française* (CILF) was rebuffed. Although billed as a private international association, CILF operated under the aegis of French law, members of the Quebec lobby were prominent in the organization, and there was provision only for a Quebec branch of the organization.³⁰ The MAE was concerned that federal participation in the CILF would frustrate Quebec's efforts to assert a separate position in the organization. Quebec City was determined that if there was one field in which it was absolutely crucial for Quebec to act independently, it was the defence of the French language. Consequently, Ottawa's participation in CILF had to be resisted.³¹

De Gaulle's 1967 visit and the subsequent efforts to expand and institutionalize France-Quebec cooperation reinforced the triangular cultural dynamic.

²⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division to USSEA, 31 May 1967.

²⁹ MAE, v. 329 – Note pour le Secrétaire-Général, 29 June 1967, Réunion à Ottawa de la Commission culturelle franco-canadienne.

³⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11632, 30-10-FRAN, p. 1 – Memorandum from H.B.R[obinson] to Martin, 18 August 1967, Deuxième Biennale de la langue française. When approached by Ottawa, the CILF's founder, Sorbonne linguist Alain Guillerrou, claimed it impossible to accept federal financial involvement without seeing Paris' and Quebec City's support disappear. DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 17 – Memorandum to the Minister, 17 September 1968.

³¹ MAE, v. 331 – Note from Fesquet to MAE, Cabinet du Secrétaire d'État, 16 November 1969, Adhésion du Canada au Conseil International de la Langue Française; ANQ, E42, 2004-01-002, v. 64, 5 – Note from Frégault to Morin, 15 May 1967, Conseil International de la langue française. Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981), 47. That same month, Ottawa announced it would be providing a \$50,000 subsidy to AUPELF.

France increased cultural assistance to Quebec across the board. Provisions were made to increase the number of French teachers sent to Quebec from three hundred to a thousand, and to augment by nearly seven times the number of Quebec bursary students. Consistent with French concerns to counter US cultural power, Paris increased the values of the scholarships to make them competitive with those of American universities. The MAE's *Amérique* division also requested the Delegation-General to supply a list of prominent individuals who could speak at universities throughout France in order to cultivate interest in Quebec.³² These and other proposals to expand France-Quebec cultural cooperation were discussed during the September 1967 meetings of France's Minister of National Education, Alain Peyrefitte, with Daniel Johnson and his ministers responsible for cultural affairs.³³ By the fiscal year 1969-1970, the Quebec and French governments were spending a total of \$8.8 million on exchanges stemming from the 1965 cultural ententes.³⁴

Diplomatic personnel on both sides of the Atlantic were reorganized to facilitate France-Quebec cultural links. The Quebec portion of the French embassy's cultural section was transferred to the consulate general in Quebec City. The cultural attaché that had been appointed to the post in 1961 was joined by a more senior-ranked cultural counsellor; both officers now worked under the authority of the new consul general, Pierre de Menthon, rather than the ambassador. De Menthon was

³² MAE, v. 200 – Conseil Restreint sur l'aide économique et culturelle au Québec, 5 septembre 1967, 15h.30; MAE, v. 200 – Note pour la Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles, 7 septembre 1967, Conférenciers québécois en France.

³³ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 21, Coopération à l'extérieur, 1966-1971, Procès-verbal des décisions arrêtées entre MM. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, Vice-Président du Conseil, Ministre de l'Éducation et de la Justice, Jean-Noël Tremblay, Ministre des Affaires Culturelles, Marcel Masse, Ministre d'État à l'Éducation, d'une part, et M. Alain Peyrefitte, Ministre de l'Éducation Nationale, représentant le Gouvernement français, d'autre part.

³⁴ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 203 – Parlementaires français, Note sur la coopération franco-québécois, 1 September 1970. Quebec provided \$3.2 million and Paris contributed the balance.

chosen partly on the basis of his extensive experience in the MAE's cultural relations division. De Gaulle himself instructed de Menthon to increase cultural contacts.³⁵ The French measures were paralleled by Quebec's decision to appoint two new cultural attachés to its Delegation-General in Paris.³⁶ Yet another initiative was the inauguration of the *Centre de diffusion du livre québécois*, responsible for the distribution of Quebec publications in France. The Centre's opening constituted a culmination of Quebec preoccupations since the end of the war to see French-Canadian literature recognized and promoted in France.³⁷

Facing a strengthening France-Quebec axis and its own marginalization, Ottawa did its best to become a viable interlocutor. After de Gaulle's visit, Léger sounded the alarm: Canada's embassy was in a permanent state of inferiority thanks largely to France's information services and Quebec's Delegation-General's own robust information service, which included a full-time press liaison, something the embassy itself did not possess.³⁸ The Paris embassy deemed it "vital" that France's population be made aware that de Gaulle's caricature of Canada and his predictions

³⁵ MAE, v. 190 – Note pour la Direction du Personnel et de l'Administration Générale, 9 December 1967, Effectif de l'Ambassade de France à Ottawa; MAE, v. 189 – Note pour le Secrétaire Général from Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, 6 September 1967, Consulat Général de Québec; MAE, v. 191 – Letter from Couve de Murville, MAE, to Monsieur l'Ambassadeur de France au Canada, 14 March 1968; Pierre de Menthon, *Je témoigne: Québec 1967, Chile 1973* (Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979), 14-18. It appears that the MAE, in expanding the Quebec City consulate general's cultural staff, employed the same distinction it had in 1961 when the cultural attachés were posted to Montreal and Quebec City (see chapter 12 for this episode). Although MAE documents from the period employ the diplomatic titles "conseiller culturel" and "attaché culturel," these same officers are referred to in Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Diplomatic Corps and Consular and other Representatives in Canada 1969-1970* (Queen's Printer, June 1969), 168-169, as possessing the more innocuous consular title "délégué culturel et consul". Such a manoeuvre was consistent with MAE efforts to achieve direct relations with Quebec City in a manner that avoided provoking Ottawa.

³⁶ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 8 – Letter from L'Allier, Directeur de la Coopération avec l'Extérieur to Héroux, Directeur des délégations, MAIQ, 4 January 1968.

³⁷ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 8 – Inauguration du Centre de Diffusion du Livre Québécois en France, 18 October 1967.

³⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 13 October 1967.

were incorrect, arguing that Ottawa might actually profit from the interest in Canada de Gaulle had generated to correct false impressions and project the federal perspective.³⁹ It also urged Ottawa to introduce more co-ordination in its cultural diplomacy to counter Paris' 'two nations' approach. The embassy itself established a committee that included members of all federal agencies involved in cultural affairs in France. This was part of a general (and overdue) strengthening of the embassy's cultural and information resources that included the addition of a full-time press officer to promote a pan-Canadian image in response to Léger's earlier entreaties.⁴⁰ Two years later, in April 1970, ceremonies to inaugurate the new Canadian Cultural Centre were attended by nearly eight hundred guests, including leading French and Canadian cultural personalities.⁴¹

The increased federal effort reinforced the Ottawa-Quebec City rivalry in Paris. Quebec's Delegation-General characterized the embassy's frenetic activities as a "paternalisme grandissant," necessitating a rapid reaction to the "véritable offensive concertée" intended to demonstrate to French opinion that the Delegation-General's activities were of an ancillary nature.⁴² Symptomatic of the rivalry was the 1968 visit to Paris of Jean-Noël Tremblay, a visit that took on a much more political hue, including hastily-arranged meetings with French cabinet ministers and de Gaulle,

³⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8840, 20-1-2-STAFEUR-FR – Telegram from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 17 September 1968, Franco-Cdn Relations: The Next Five Years.

⁴⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16.2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 17 September 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 17 – Letter from Black to Stephens, Head, Information Division, DEA, Personal, 7 November 1968; Black (1997), 67-69.

⁴¹ Black (1997), 70, 146.

⁴² ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 7 – Action Culturelle à Paris du Gouvernement Central du Canada et du Gouvernement du Québec, Jean Vallerand, Conseiller Culturel, 24 October 1967.

when Tremblay learned Jean-Luc Pépin, the federal Minister of Communications, was to be in Paris at the same time to inaugurate a Canadian art exhibition.⁴³

Recrimination

As tensions grew, it soon became apparent that Ottawa had been mistaken in its expectation that the 1965 agreements had safeguarded its prerogative in foreign affairs. In fact, Paris and Quebec City employed the cultural agreements to pursue direct links in a manner marginalizing Ottawa and challenging the federal interpretation of the Canadian constitution.

Ambassador Léger had warned of potential problems during the accord cadre negotiations, suggesting that Ottawa's logic was flawed. In his view, Ottawa's attempts to safeguard its prerogative amounted to an *a priori* approval of agreements between France and Quebec, and thus had the potential to foster future disputes since it would be difficult in practice to refuse such agreements. Léger preferred an *ad hoc* approach given Paris' increasingly difficult attitude.⁴⁴ The prescience of his analysis is confirmed in Claude Morin's recollection that even before the France-Canada cultural agreement was concluded, Jean Lesage was interpreting it far more "libéralement" than Ottawa intended, and disputing the notion that it was to cap any future France-Quebec exchange programmes.⁴⁵

⁴³ MAE, v. 214, Jean-Noël Tremblay, Ministre des Affaires Culturelles du Québec, le 9-20 janvier 1968 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 9 January 1968.

⁴⁴ DEA, v. 10492, 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC, p. 1 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 30 October 1964, Accord Culturel avec la France; Gerald F. Fitzgerald, "Educational and Cultural Agreements and Ententes: France, Canada and Quebec – Birth of a New Treaty-Making Technique for Federal States?", *American Journal of International Law*, July 1966, 60(3): 534-535.

⁴⁵ Morin (1987), 24.

It was not just the accord cadre that became a source of dispute. The federal government was annoyed as well over Quebec's Minister of Education, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, inviting his French counterpart, Christian Fouchet, to visit Quebec for meetings of the *Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise* without informing Ottawa.⁴⁶ Months later, press reports on the scope of the commission's April 1967 discussions led the DEA to ask Léger to obtain details on the meeting from the MAE. More generally, Léger was instructed to obtain a report whenever an official Quebec delegation visited Paris for such talks, to underscore Ottawa's determination to assert its *droit de regard* regarding the 1965 ententes, and its opposition to any new projects that did not have prior federal knowledge and consent.⁴⁷ Unbeknownst to Ottawa, however, a few months prior the MAE's Legal division had recommended that, given federal sensitivity regarding the foreign affairs prerogative presented a serious obstacle to France-Quebec relations, Paris should act only where it could be argued that Ottawa had given its implicit agreement to direct Paris-Quebec City contacts, citing the France-Quebec cultural entente as an example.⁴⁸

Federal concern about the application of the 1965 agreements grew parallel to the expansion of France-Quebec cultural cooperation. Ottawa resented what it viewed as an abuse of the accord cadre to facilitate direct France-Quebec relations in a manner marginalizing and undermining Ottawa. After Peyrefitte's September 1967

⁴⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-6-QUE, p. 1 – Message from Martin to Léger, 28 February 1966; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-6-QUE, p. 1 – Personal Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 22 February 1966; Thomson (1988), 180.

⁴⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-6-QUE, p. 1 – Telex from DEA to Léger, 1 May 1967, Visits of Québec Ministers and Officials to Paris.

⁴⁸ MAE, v. 194 – Note from MAE, Service Juridique, to MAE, Amérique, 17 February 1967, Relations avec les autorités provinciales du Canada.

visit, Cadieux and Pearson each in turn told Leduc that while applauding the expansion of France-Quebec cultural relations, the DEA wished France to expand exchanges with Canada as a whole, making it regrettable that Peyrefitte had not gone to Ottawa. Cadieux conceded that it appeared that the matters the French minister discussed in Quebec followed the letter of the 1965 agreements, but he warned Leduc that Ottawa expected to be informed of such visits other than through press reports, and that matters such as films, educational television, and satellite communications raised in the talks were of mixed or exclusively federal jurisdiction, requiring Paris to treat with Ottawa.⁴⁹

The ministerial visit to Quebec of François Missoffe shortly afterward led to a more heated exchange between Cadieux and Leduc. When the ambassador asked what Ottawa expected Paris to do when it received invitations from Quebec, Cadieux retorted: “what international law prescribes and all other countries do, you come to us.” Leduc responded by warning Ottawa against being “too formalistic” and sensitive. He offered assurances that Paris did not intend to sign any agreement with Quebec outside the scope of the accord cadre without prior federal knowledge and consent.⁵⁰

Leduc’s qualified reassurance came amid word of a new France-Quebec intergovernmental organization to facilitate youth exchanges. The matter had been raised during Peyrefitte’s talks, and the subsequent Missoffe visit resulted in plans for the *Office franco-québécois de la jeunesse* (OFQJ), which Paris and Quebec City

⁴⁹ MAE, v. 200 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 23 September 1967; MAE, v. 219 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 28 September 1967.

⁵⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Martin, 13 October 1967; MAE, v. 200 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 14 October 1967.

were to fund equally.⁵¹ Cadieux cited the youth initiative in his discussions with Leduc as evidence of Paris and Quebec City failing to respect the letter and spirit of the 1965 agreements.⁵² Ambassador Léger conveyed the federal concern to the MAE as well, naming the OFQJ as the perfect example of Paris and Quebec City's proclivity to conduct negotiations in areas beyond which they had federal consent, an action constituting interference in Canadian internal affairs that amounted to acceptance of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine.⁵³ Paul Martin provided Maurice Couve de Murville with an aide-mémoire calling on Paris to consult Ottawa with sufficient advance notice regarding the details of any proposed France-Quebec projects, including the OFQJ.⁵⁴

Despite Ottawa's numerous demarches, Paris and Quebec City proceeded on the OFQJ in a manner virtually bypassing Ottawa, justifying their action by arguing that they had federal sanction by virtue of the 1965 agreements.⁵⁵ Despite Ottawa's expectation to be consulted in advance, Leduc recommended that Paris take Quebec City's cue in establishing the OFQJ.⁵⁶ Concerned to avoid undermining the Quebec position during the February 1968 federal-provincial conference on constitutional reform, Quebec City preferred that the protocol establishing the OFQJ be announced

⁵¹ ANQ, E6, 1976-00-066, v. 21, *Coopération à l'extérieur, 1966-1971 – Procès-verbal des décisions arrêtées*; MAE, v. 212 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 18 September 1967; MAE, v. 219 - Note: *Relations culturelles franco-québécoises*, 10 November 1967.

⁵² MAE, v. 200 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 14 October 1967.

⁵³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 10 – Telex from Léger to DEA, 23 November 1967, *Relations France-Cda*. The French response came four days later in the form of de Gaulle's news conference. Black (1997): 16.

⁵⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12.2 – Telex from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 7 February 1968.

⁵⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12.2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 8 February 1968. Bettencourt claimed that “nous ne voulons pas agir derrière le dos de l'un de nos partenaires” regarding the need for Quebec permission to communicate the protocol to Ottawa; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Telex from Léger to DEA, 4 March 1968.

⁵⁶ MAE, v. 237 – Letter from Leduc to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 1 November 1967.

after the conference. Accordingly, the MAE telephoned the Canadian embassy the day the conference ended and twenty-four hours before the protocol was signed, sending it a text of the protocol that Paris claimed the education entente authorized.⁵⁷

Coming as it did on the heels of the constitutional conference in Ottawa and against the backdrop of the unfolding Gabon Affair, the *fait accompli* provoked anger in Ottawa. In their view, even if the subject matter appeared to fall within the scope of the education entente, the short notice effectively stripped Ottawa of its right to prior consultation and consent, and was tantamount to Paris reserving for itself and Quebec City the right to decide if the protocol conformed to the 1965 agreements and Canada's constitution. The DEA considered "absurd" Jean-Daniel Jurgensen's assertion to Léger that Paris had no formal obligation to submit the OFQJ protocol for prior approval, and that it had contacted the embassy only as a courtesy and because Quebec officials had given their permission.⁵⁸

Federal annoyance over Paris' actions and the outcome of what originally had been Ottawa's initiative regarding youth exchanges was exacerbated by a sense that even though the DEA had not properly been consulted, it was obliged to go through the farce of approving the France-Quebec protocol in order to safeguard the (increasingly illusory) federal prerogative in foreign affairs. Altogether, the DEA

⁵⁷ MAE, v. 237 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 6 February 1968; MAE, v. 237 – Letter from de Bresson, MAE to Leduc, 8 February 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12.2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 8 February 1968.

⁵⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11642, 30-14-7-1, p. 1 – Message from Cadieux to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 8 February 1968, Office Franco-Québécois de la Jeunesse; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12.2 – Note from Roquet to Halstead, 8 February 1968, Échanges de jeunes; MAE, v. 237 – Note to File, 9 February 1968.

considered the episode a dangerous precedent that could be repeated in other areas, making preventive measures essential.⁵⁹

Despite Ottawa's determination, however, the dynamic of the OFQJ was repeated in terms of satellite cooperation. Quebec expressed significant interest in establishing links with France in satellite technology. Daniel Johnson considered such cooperation especially essential, anticipating the impact of US satellite programming and the need for a French-language equivalent to ensure French Canada's survival in an age of ever-growing mass communications. The question was discussed during his 1967 visit to Paris, with the Quebec delegation expressing its eagerness to see Quebec participate in financing a satellite with a broadcast range that would cover Quebec.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, Léger viewed satellite technology as an equally promising arena for cultivating Canada-France relations, owing to Ottawa's jurisdiction in the area and what appeared to be French openness to such cooperation.⁶¹ Jurgensen had told Léger of being impressed by a French physicist's claim that no language would survive in the space age without its own satellites, and referred to a possible joint effort to maintain "linguistic equilibrium" in satellite communications, noting Canada

⁵⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12.2 – Draft Statement, 9 February 1968, Office Franco-Québécois de la Jeunesse; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12.2 – Memorandum for the Under-secretary, 15 February 1968, France-Quebec Agreements.

⁶⁰ MAE, v. 206 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 9 May 1967; MAE, v. 199 – Compte-Rendu de la séance de travail franco-québécoise présidée par M. Hervé Alphand, Secrétaire Général du Département, 18 mai 1967; MAE, v. 257 – Note from Jurgensen for the Secrétaire Général, MAE, 18 May 1967; ANQ, 1983-05-000, v. 157, Relations Fédérales-Provinciales, Satellites (1) – Rapport préliminaire sur les communications par satellites pour le Québec, by Gaston Cholette, Gatién Dandois, Jacques Gouvernement, Claude Lapointe, 12 July 1967. Also, Gaston Cholette, *Au Service du Québec: Souvenirs* (Septentrion, 1994), 207-208. Johnson was initially pragmatic, claiming that which level of government Paris dealt with regarding satellite communication was of secondary importance to Quebec being covered by the French-language satellite. The Premier's position evolved over the following months under the influence of officials like Cholette.

⁶¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to Cadieux, 28 April 1967.

would be bombarded by US programming in the 1970s. Canada's embassy urged Ottawa to act rapidly to ensure any progress in satellite cooperation was not overtaken by France-Quebec initiatives.⁶²

The embassy's warning was justified given that Quebec officials considered that a June 1967 mission to Paris had secured French assistance to start and make rapid progress for independent Quebec action in satellite communications. Johnson's advisors urged him to lobby during de Gaulle's 1967 visit for the launch of a France-Quebec satellite and a satellite cooperation agreement with Paris.⁶³ In Paris, Jurgensen instructed the Director-General of France's *Centre nationale d'études spatiales* (CNES) to avoid any commitments with Ottawa since Paris attached greater importance to working with Quebec. Conceding that telecommunications were of Ottawa's exclusive jurisdiction, Jurgensen reminded his MAE colleagues of the Johnson Government's preoccupation with gaining greater autonomy in the field, and advised that Paris should prudently engage in discussions with Quebec at the official level.⁶⁴

Ottawa's suspicions were therefore aroused by word that Claude Morin had discussed satellite cooperation during his September 1967 visit to Paris.⁶⁵ Federal concerns grew when the CNES' head of foreign relations visited Quebec on a fact-

⁶² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 26 June 1967; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 September 1967.

⁶³ ANQ, 1983-05-000, v. 157, Relations Fédérales-Provinciales – Satellites (1), Rapport préliminaire sur les communications par satellites pour le Québec, by Gaston Cholette, Gatien Dandois, Jacques Gouvernement, Claude Lapointe, 12 July 1967.

⁶⁴ ANQ, E42, 2002-10-005, v. 44, Voyages Europe, Claude Morin – Letter from Jurgensen to C. Morin, 18 August 1967; MAE, v. 225, Voyage de M. Peyrefitte, Ministre de l'Éducation Nationale au Québec, 10-14 septembre 1967 – Note from Jurgensen to MAE, Relations Culturelles, 8 September 1967.

⁶⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Letter from Léger to Cadieux, 13 October 1967.

finding mission, but pleaded a busy schedule prevented him from visiting Ottawa. Moreover, federal authorities were informed of the visit only three days in advance.⁶⁶ Cadieux referred angrily to French actions as shameful and disgusting in their suggestion that Quebec possessed competence in satellite communications while marginalizing Ottawa.⁶⁷ Léger conveyed Ottawa's concerns to the MAE, and urged Paris to halt negotiating separately with Quebec City.⁶⁸

In addition to Léger's demarche, the new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, presented his French counterpart, Michel Debré, an aide-mémoire reiterating Ottawa's interest in satellite cooperation. Paris maintained its dualistic approach, however, amid the Johnson Government announcing the establishment of *Radio-Quebec* and calling for Quebec City to have control of telecommunications.⁶⁹ Although France believed that France-Canada cooperation could parallel France-Quebec cooperation, it decided that a joint declaration with Quebec on satellite cooperation should occur prior to any links with Ottawa in order to forestall any federal interference.⁷⁰

Informed of the possibility of a France-Quebec agreement-in-principle on satellite cooperation during the upcoming 1969 visit to Paris of Quebec's Minister of Cultural Affairs, Jean-Guy Cardinal, Ottawa viewed the situation as akin to the OFQJ episode, and made clear to Paris its expectation to be consulted in advance, reiterating

⁶⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Périard, Memorandum to File, 13 October 1967.

⁶⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Memorandum from Halstead, European Division to Cadieux, 17 October 1967, Relations France-Canada.

⁶⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 10 – Telex from Léger to DEA, 23 November 1967, Relations France-Cda.

⁶⁹ ANF, 5AG1/199/1 – Compte Rendu, Meeting between Debré and Sharp, 4 October 1968; Cholette (1994), 211.

⁷⁰ MAE, v. 257 – Note from Jurgensen to Debré, 14 October 1968, Coopération spatiale franco-canadienne.

the federal jurisdiction over telecommunications. Léger, however, warned the DEA to be realistic. If Quebec City wished Ottawa excluded, Paris would do so.⁷¹ On the eve of Cardinal's visit, Hervé Alphan, the MAE's senior official begged ignorance of any potential agreement, feeding the DEA's fears that Ottawa could anticipate being presented another *fait accompli*.⁷²

Ottawa's misgivings were borne out when, in addition to agreements on French assistance in establishing the Université du Québec and the forming of the permanent committee on France-Quebec economic cooperation, Cardinal and Debré exchanged letters on satellite cooperation that provided for Quebec participation in the larger Franco-German *Symphonie* project and plans for a France-Quebec satellite to be called *Memini* (Latin for "I remember," an unsubtle reference to Quebec's provincial motto "Je me souviens"). During their talks, Cardinal stressed Quebec's need for greater autonomy in telecommunications to respond to its educational and cultural requirements. Debré responded that Paris had made its decision, and henceforth would give Quebec greater priority over Ottawa in satellite cooperation.⁷³

Once again, the Canadian embassy was informed of the exchange of letters only at only the last moment. The DEA considered the announcement unconstitutional as it exceeded the scope of the 1965 agreements, and could thus be

⁷¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 11604, 30-6-QUE, p. 5 – Telex from Black, Canadian Embassy, Paris to Halstead, 25 November 1968, Franco-Canadian Relations, visit of PM Bertrand; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 18 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 20 December 1968; Black (1997): 78. Canadian Embassy officials subsequently learned the text had existed for four months.

⁷² DEA, A-3-c, v. 11604, 30-6-QUE, p. 6 – Message from DEA to Léger, 14 January 1969, Voyage en France d'une délégation ministérielle québécoise; DEA, A-3-c, v. 11604, 30-6-QUE, p. 6 – Note from Sharp to Trudeau, 17 January 1969, Voyage en France de la délégation Cardinal; DEA, A-3-c, v. 11604, 30-6-QUE, p. 6 – Telegram from Beaulieu, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 17 January 1969, Voyage en France de Dél Ministérielle Québécoise.

⁷³ MAE, v. 215, Voyage en France du M. Bertrand, Premier Ministre du Québec, non réalisé – Compte Rendu des Entretiens Officiels entre la Délégation Française et la Délégation Québécoise au Département, 22 January 1969.

construed as a treaty under international law. Ottawa refused to recognize the letters as treaties and reaffirmed its position regarding the exclusivity of the federal treaty-making power.⁷⁴ French authorities abjured any intervention in Canadian domestic affairs, with the Elysée rationalizing its actions by arguing that there was no conflict with Ottawa's jurisdiction (i.e. no need for prior consultation) since the exchange of letters referred only to a joint study, not to any practical consequences.⁷⁵ Ultimately, it was Quebec hesitation that prevented any further deterioration. By the time the Bourassa Government arrived in power in 1970, budgetary constraints and technical setbacks had convinced Quebec officials that the collaboration should be dropped quietly.⁷⁶

Ottawa also was sensitive to Paris' treating directly with francophone minority groups outside Quebec, bypassing the accord cadre and reinforcing Ottawa's marginalization as an interlocutor within and outside Canada. The first instance involved the Acadian community, an episode that arose during Peyrefitte's September 1967 visit, when Quebec lobby members Bernard Dorin and Philippe Rossillon introduced the French Minister to four representatives of the *Société nationale des Acadiens*. Peyrefitte and Rossillon were instrumental in putting the Acadians in touch with the Elysée, encouraged them to request cultural assistance, and arranged

⁷⁴ ANQ, E5, 1985-05-002, v. 1, De Gaulle 1967 – Letter from Debré to Cardinal, 24 January 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 19 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 27 January 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 19 – Memorandum from Legal Affairs Division to Legal Adviser, 29 January 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 20 – Memorandum from Legal Affairs Division to European Division, 10 February 1969.

⁷⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 20 – Telex from Beaulieu, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 21 February 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8646, 20-1-2-FR, p. 20 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 6 February 1969.

⁷⁶ ANQ, 1983-05-000, v. 157, Relations Fédérales-Provinciales, Satellites (1) – Memorandum from Simon to Jean-Paul L'Allier, Ministre des Communications, 22 June 1970.

their January 1968 visit to Paris where they held discussions with de Gaulle and French officials about a cultural exchange programme.⁷⁷

Paul Martin refused to dismiss the Acadians' visit as merely a private affair. Rather, he argued that their reception constituted a political operation with serious implications for Canada's domestic policy, notably the federal bilingualism programme. He expressed frustration that

French support for the French fact in this country is increasingly designed to take place through direct and privileged contact with Quebec as the 'Government of French Canadians', and with francophone groups elsewhere, without reference to Ottawa or the other provincial governments concerned.⁷⁸

Convinced that Paris was carrying out similar activities with the Franco-Manitoban community, Marcel Cadieux complained that if trends continued Ottawa, notwithstanding its biculturalism policy, would find itself completely outflanked by French activities.⁷⁹

After senior MAE officials Jean Basdevant and Jean-Daniel Jurgensen visited New Brunswick in March 1968 as part of a large delegation to discuss cultural cooperation with the Acadian community, Cadieux and Leduc had a stormy meeting that ultimately resolved nothing. The Under-secretary asserted that France's cultural cooperation with the Acadians fell under the terms of the accord cadre and should

⁷⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996; ANF, 5 AG1/199, Québec, Entretiens, Correspondance avec le Général de Gaulle, 1963-1969 – Letter from de Gaulle to Léon Richard, Président de la Société Nationale des Acadiens, 28 October 1967; Robert Pichette, *L'Acadie par bonheur retrouvée: De Gaulle et l'Acadie* (Éditions d'Acadie, 1994): 105-195; Alain Peyrefitte, *De Gaulle et le Québec* (Stanké 2000): 95-97, 105, 112-116.

⁷⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 17 January 1968. Also, Thomson (1988), 265. Such reactions contradict Thomson's claim that Ottawa reacted "almost complacently," and even with relief that French activity was extending beyond Quebec.

⁷⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 17 January 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Pearson, 19 January 1968, Activities of the French Embassy and Consulates; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 12.2 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Pearson, 11 February 1968.

therefore have involved both Ottawa and the New Brunswick authorities, to which Leduc responded that cultural affairs were not a federal jurisdiction. When Cadieux challenged this, Leduc countered it was standard practice for French cultural attachés to pursue activities with private groups in Canada and abroad and characterized Ottawa's expectation to be informed of all cultural activities as "unreasonable and suspicious." An agitated Cadieux protested that his response was perfectly reasonable given the lengthening list of Gaullist interventions.⁸⁰

The stage was set for a much more public confrontation a few months later, soon after the Trudeau Government's arrival in power. In September 1968, Philippe Rossillon undertook a "private" visit to Manitoba at the behest of the President of the *Association culturelle de la Vallée de la Rivière Rouge*. In discussions with numerous Franco-Manitoban representatives, Rossillon raised the prospect of Paris appointing a cultural attaché to Winnipeg, and recommended the francophone community follow the Acadian example and prepare a list of requests for assistance from France as a precursor to sending a delegation to Paris.⁸¹

Informed of the discussions by Rossillon's hosts, a federal official was dispatched to Manitoba and the provincial authorities informed Rossillon of their expectation that any agreements be carried out under the auspices of the accord cadre. Cadieux claimed that even if the French Embassy had no prior knowledge of

⁸⁰ Black (1997), 49. When New Brunswick Premier, Louis Robichaud, learned of the visit, he issued an official invitation, and in meeting with the delegation, made clear that New Brunswick welcomed French assistance to the Acadian community, but only if this respected the accord cadre, and involved provincial authorities. Arrangements between Paris and a private group were deemed unacceptable. Also, DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-FR-1-2, p. 13 – Telex from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 3 April 1968, CDA-FRA Relations: Conversation with French Ambassador.

⁸¹ MAE, v. 211, Voyage de M. Rossillon au Manitoba et incident entre la France et le Canada, septembre 1968 – Letter from Bourdon, Consul Général de France à Winnipeg, to Siraud, "Association Culturelle de la Vallée de la Rivière Rouge," passage de M. Rossillon; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16 – Memorandum from Cultural Affairs Division to Gotlieb, 6 September 1968.

Rossillon's private visit, the Acadian episode had demonstrated the political character of the French civil servant's travels.⁸² Cadieux's concerns were reiterated more forcefully, and publicly, by Pierre Trudeau, who in Eldon Black's memory, appeared intent on embarrassing Paris and preventing any recurrence. Trudeau reprimanded Rossillon and Paris severely. *The Globe and Mail* quoted the Prime Minister as saying that "if French Canadians are more or less going to plot with secret agents of France in Canada, this can harm ... French-Canadian interests. He went on to argue that "nothing could be more harmful to the acceptance of the bilingual character of Canada in the [majority anglophone] provinces [...] than having the agents of a foreign state coming into the country and agitating as it were to get the citizens of that particular province to act in a given way."⁸³ French authorities rejected the accusation, and the unofficial government spokesman *Broussine* accused Trudeau of conducting an anti-French, anti-de Gaulle campaign. De Gaulle told his advisors Trudeau's attitude was "seriously jeopardizing the whole relationship between Ottawa and Paris."⁸⁴

Jean-Daniel Jurgensen considered it curious that Trudeau should fault Rossillon for trying to encourage Franco-Manitobans to defend their language, since the community could scarcely do otherwise, and that the absence of any question of

⁸² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Sharp, Conversation with the French Ambassador, 11 September 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16 – French Embassy Statement, 12 September 1968.

⁸³ *The Globe and Mail*, 12 September 1968, "PM assails 'secret agents' of Paris", A1; *The Globe and Mail*, 15 September 1968, "Was no secret over Rossillon, Trudeau says," A8. Trudeau's remarks remain disputed. Trudeau himself denied referring to Rossillon as a "secret agent." Black argues that the press misquoted the Prime Minister, combining his use of the word "agent" and reference to "surreptitious." Black (1997), 47, 50-52. Rossillon was apparently under RCMP surveillance; however, France's intelligence services were also tracking him, suspecting him of gold and arms trafficking. Frédéric Bastien, *Relations particulières: La France face au Québec après De Gaulle* (Boréal, 1999), 104; Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, *La Piscine: The French Secret Service since 1944*, translated by W.D. Halls (Basil Blackwell, 1989), 233-241.

⁸⁴ Thomson (1988), 282.

separatism meant that his act posed no political problem.⁸⁵ What Jurgensen was unable (or unwilling) to recognize was that Ottawa viewed Rossillon's actions as symptomatic of the broader trend of Paris' cultural activities in Canada. Since the beginning of the 1960s, Paris had increasingly treated Quebec as French Canada's spokesperson and marginalized Ottawa and federal claims to represent French Canadians in and outside of Quebec, and in so doing, challenged federal jurisdiction. Called in to the MAE to hear Hervé Alphand's half-hearted defence of Rossillon and the suggestion that Ottawa should drop the matter, Ambassador Léger reminded the Secretary-General that such incidents could be avoided if Paris availed itself of the accord cadre.⁸⁶

Renewal

The tensions arising from the expansion of France-Quebec cultural cooperation and Ottawa's apparent marginalization provided the unhappy context for the 1970 discussion of the renewal of the accord cadre. In his first meeting with the new French ambassador, Pierre Siraud, Trudeau made clear that while he saw great advantages in stronger cultural links between Quebec and France, Paris' behaviour under the accord cadre, and more generally, its two nations approach rendered hollow any assurances that France bore no ill-will against Canada and its unity.⁸⁷

The DEA believed that simply renewing the accord cadre would mean Ottawa would continue to face Paris' dualistic policy, something to be avoided. The DEA,

⁸⁵ MAE, v. 211, Voyage de M. Rossillon au Manitoba et incident entre la France et le Canada, septembre 1968 – Note from Jurgensen to Debré, 11 September 1968.

⁸⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 20-1-2-FR, p. 16 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 17 September 1968, Rendez-vous avec M. Alphand.

⁸⁷ MAE, v. 201 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 26 September 1968.

therefore, favoured a qualified renewal of the 1965 agreement, but with a revised exchange of letters accompanying it to state more clearly federal expectations regarding prior consultation and consent. Clearly, the DEA still hoped for a gradual normalization of relations with Paris and Quebec City following de Gaulle's departure from office earlier in the year, and what they interpreted as appeasing signals from France's new Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann.⁸⁸

The DEA, therefore, rejected a wholesale re-negotiation. Its officials feared provoking Gaullist ire and an aggressive Quebec reaction that would scuttle any hope for a rapprochement.⁸⁹ This assessment was shared by Canada's diplomats in Paris. Eldon Black, the embassy's minister, argued that aside from some measures to address Ottawa's concerns about the modalities of the accord cadre, maintenance of the (admittedly imperfect to federal eyes) structure for cultural triangular relations better served the federal interest than the uncertainty and continuation of Paris' two Canadas approach that would accompany a major confrontation over a re-negotiation.⁹⁰ Black's position was also informed by the fact that in the Rossillon Affair's aftermath, the MAE had agreed that the France-Canada Mixed Commission should discuss French assistance to francophone minorities outside Quebec. The positive results of this February 1969 meeting encouraged the DEA to believe in the

⁸⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Memorandum from Blanchette, Direction des Relations entre pays francophones to GEU, 17 December 1969, Révision de l'accord-cadre avec la France; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Memorandum from Mathieu to Halstead, 19 February 1970, Accord Cadre; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 27 – Memorandum from Sharp to Trudeau, 28 April 1970.

⁸⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Memorandum from Blanchette, Direction des Relations entre pays francophones to GEU, 17 December 1969, Révision de l'accord-cadre avec la France.

⁹⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Letter from Black to Halstead, 16 January 1970.

potential for change, especially after Paris moved to implement a broader programme of pan-Canadian cultural exchanges under the accord cadre.⁹¹

The view in the Prime Minister's Office was more ambivalent. During a January 1970 conversation with Black, Trudeau appeared unworried when the diplomat referred to the potential risks of the accord cadre and the consequences of its failure if Ottawa insisted on a re-negotiation of the main agreement. Responding to Black's appeal for a more cautious, pragmatic approach, the Prime Minister simply observed that given Paris' behaviour, there did not seem much point in "going out of our way to co-operate."⁹²

Four months later, however, Trudeau agreed that given the impossibility of a successful re-negotiation of the accord cadre, qualified renewal was the best alternative. The DEA arranged that Paris would be informed that Ottawa considered its stipulations equally applicable to the 1965 France-Quebec education and cultural ententes.⁹³ The shift in the Prime Minister's attitude was attributable to Mitchell Sharp's relatively successful visit to Paris to open the new Canadian Cultural Centre. The reception reserved for Sharp in April suggested that the new Pompidou Government was making tentative steps toward more normalized relations. Discussions regarding the accord cadre and France-Quebec cultural ententes, however, were marked by disagreement as Maurice Schumann, on instructions from France's new President, Georges Pompidou, made clear Paris believed the 1965

⁹¹ Black (1997): 52, 95-97; Donneur (1973), 194.

⁹² DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Letter from Black to Gilles Mathieu, 15 January 1970; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Letter from Black to Halstead, 16 January 1970; Black (1997), 128-129.

⁹³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 27 – Memorandum from Sharp to Trudeau, 28 April 1970.

agreements did not provide Ottawa with a *droit de regard* on cooperation between Paris and Quebec City.⁹⁴

Ottawa's decision to renew was made more palatable by the Bourassa Liberals' electoral victory, bringing to power what was considered a more pro-federalist government. Trudeau and Sharp agreed that, although there would be no change in the substance of the planned federal demarche, it should be made more conciliatory in form. Moreover, the federal authorities agreed that the new Quebec Premier should be provided a copy of Ottawa's letter in advance, especially since it eventually would find its way to him.⁹⁵ Presented with the planned federal demarche, Bourassa expressed appreciation of the prior notice. A convinced Francophile, Quebec's new Premier ventured (cautioning he was not completely informed of the details) that there would be no great difficulties, as he intended to take a "low key" approach with Ottawa in terms of cultural triangular relations, and that so long as the core of France-Quebec cooperation was assured, he had no desire to waste time over problems of form.⁹⁶

There was not a great deal of worry in Paris about the accord cadre in any event. Albert Féquant, the new head of the MAE's *Amérique* division, told a Canadian embassy official confidently that France would not abandon Quebec and that France-Quebec links remained a priority for Paris, so that even if the accord cadre expired, Paris and Quebec City had, by virtue of the indefinite nature of the

⁹⁴ ANF 5AG2/1021 – Note, 5/6 février 1970, tél, no. 113/115 d'Ottawa, cl. Canada « Visites » rappel à Québec – « Notes du Président »; Black (1997), 144-146.

⁹⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 27 – Memorandum from Sharp to Trudeau, 6 May 1970, The Accord-Cadre with France.

⁹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 27 – Memorandum from Tremblay, AUSSEA, to Sharp, 11 May 1970, Accord-cadre franco-canadien: réactions de M. Bourassa à la lettre du PM; Bastien (1999), 16.

education entente, the core agreement with which to continue cultural cooperation. When the embassy official asked why Paris insisted on regarding cooperation with Quebec City and Ottawa as mutually excluding, and making a choice Quebecers themselves had not made, Féquant explained this arose from Paris' assessment of Canadian realities, notably what it considered to be a hard-line Trudeau Government and a belief Ottawa's bilingualization efforts were destined to fail.⁹⁷ Paris' confidence also derived from the knowledge that Ottawa was unlikely to move against the accord cadre or insist on the inclusion of a formalized procedure for French ministerial visits to Quebec. Informed of the pending Canadian demarche, the MAE considered as unacceptable anything that questioned the 1965 ententes or gave Ottawa a right of control on their application.⁹⁸

When Ottawa finally announced its intention to proceed with a qualified renewal, Mitchell Sharp emphasized to Siraud that Ottawa believed that the 1965 agreements should not be used to permit Quebec to assert a separate international personality. Sharp provided the ambassador with a note explaining the conditions under which Ottawa was proceeding with the renewal. He also encouraged Paris to join with Ottawa in examining how the accord cadre and the exchange of letters accompanying this had functioned, to avoid future misunderstandings. The federal missive made clear Ottawa's expectation to be informed in advance of any cooperation it authorized, including notification from Paris of any intentions to

⁹⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 27 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 16 March 1970, Rappports Franco-Cdns.

⁹⁸ MAE, v. 216 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 17 October 1969, Visite de M. de Lipkowski au Québec; MAE, v. 202 – Telegram from MAE to French Embassy, Ottawa, 22 November 1969, Relations Franco-Canadiennes; MAE, v. 207 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 14 April 1970, Visite de M. Sharp et Accord Culturel Franco-Canadien de 1965.

engage with any province in negotiations, providing information on request regarding any discussions in progress, and communicating well in advance the contents of any agreements emerging from such contacts. The explanation also called for joint discussions in the event of any future difficulties regarding the accord cadre, and Ottawa's expectation to be informed in advance of French ministerial or official visits under the terms of the 1965 agreements.⁹⁹

Ambassador Siraud responded that Paris desired good relations with Ottawa, but was equally determined that the 1965 France-Quebec ententes be implemented without federal interference. Siraud warned Ottawa against seeking a *droit de regard* or control over the application of the agreements. Sharp made clear that Ottawa was not calling into question the substance of the 1965 agreements, but wished to resolve any future divergences through mutual consultation. Ottawa's proposals were, he claimed, more likely be made easier since Bourassa had been consulted and supported the federal demarche.¹⁰⁰

Maurice Schumann's first instinct was to protect the French position. He instructed, therefore, that there be no written response to Ottawa's demarche. Anticipating a discussion of the issue with Sharp during an upcoming meeting in Rome, Schumann also advised Pierre de Menthon to sound out Bourassa over France-Quebec relations to ascertain his response to Ottawa's actions and ensure a coordinated approach.¹⁰¹ Despite Bourassa's conciliatory initial reaction, Quebec

⁹⁹ MAE, v. 203 – Letter from Sharp to Siraud, 11 May 1970; Black (1997), 151-152.

¹⁰⁰ MAE, v. 203 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 12 May 1970, Accord culturel franco-canadien et ententes franco-québécoises de 1965.

¹⁰¹ MAE, v. 203 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 12 May 1970, Accord culturel franco-canadien et ententes franco-québécoises de 1965; MAE, v. 203 – Telegram from Alphand, MAE, Amérique, to French Consulate General, Quebec City, 14 May 1970.

officials, including Claude Morin, were determined to safeguard the privileged, direct France-Quebec relationship. After talks between Morin, Bourassa, and the new Quebec Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs, Gérard-D. Lévesque, Quebec City's official position was that the accord cadre should be renewed as a whole and without alteration, and that anything approaching systematic federal control of the content of France-Quebec cooperation would be considered as a contravention of what was considered its *raison d'être* of facilitating direct relations. Although prepared to accommodate Ottawa's concern that Paris should provide prior notification of any French ministerial and official visits to Quebec, any change that could lead to indirect federal control was to be rejected.¹⁰²

Quebec City's position confirmed the approach Schumann took in his May 1970 meeting in Rome with Sharp. In advance of the meeting and in response to Ottawa's stated position, Pompidou claimed it necessary to "faire la bête," arguing "nous avons les accords, nous les appliquerons."¹⁰³ Although Schumann claimed Paris had no desire to weaken the Canadian federation and was explicit in assuring Sharp that Paris would make greater efforts to harmonize France-Quebec relations with France-Canada relations, he went on to assert that the 1965 France-Quebec ententes would be applied in a manner Quebec believed conformed to Canada's constitution. Consequently, Paris opposed any systematic consultations with Ottawa regarding their implementation. Sharp responded to this intimation of continued cultural triangular tensions by taking issue with Schumann's phrasing. He reiterated

¹⁰² MAE, v. 203 – Telex from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 19 May 1970, Relations franco-québécoises.

¹⁰³ MAE, v. 203 – Letter from Jurgensen to Schumann, 20 May 1970; ANF, 5AG2/1021 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, 12 May 1970, Accord culturel franco-canadien et ententes franco-québécoises de 1965.

Ottawa's position: it was not up to Quebec City to interpret Canada's constitution to France, or for Paris to do this on Quebec's behalf; Paris had to deal with the federal government, as only this jurisdiction possessed an international personality.¹⁰⁴

The exchange between the two foreign ministers was symptomatic of what was to be a very gradual normalization of relations in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle. Even the Bourassa Government, perceived as more pro-federalist than its predecessors, recognized the importance of cultural cooperation with France, a position reinforced by Quebec officials determined to maintain the gains of the preceding decade. Consistent with the triangular dynamic that accompanied the 1965 race for agreements and their subsequent implementation, French policy remained guided foremost by its contacts with Quebec City, designed to maintain the core of the France-Quebec special relationship. Faced with the enduring harmony between the Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist positions, Ottawa opted for a pragmatic approach to the renewal of the 1965 cultural agreements, mindful that for all of the difficulties that had been encountered, the negative consequences of provoking a collapse of the framework were of greater concern than its qualified renewal. In opting for this course of action, however, and despite its stated conditions for renewal, designed to safeguard the federal interpretation of the foreign policy power, it may reasonably be argued that Ottawa had signalled a tacit acceptance of the reality that France-Quebec direct relations would endure, with a guarantee that federal prerogatives would be respected effectively no greater than that Ottawa had obtained in the original cultural agreements.

¹⁰⁴ MAE, v. 203 – Telegram from French Embassy, Rome to MAE, Amérique, 27 May 1970; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 27 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Rome, to DEA, 27 May 1970, SSEA Mtg. with French Foreign Minister: Bilateral Relations. Also, Black (1997), 152-153.

Chapter 17

Is Paris Turning? Triangular Political Relations Enduring, 1968-1970

Champagne and relief flowed in equal measure at Canada's embassy on April 28, 1969 following Charles de Gaulle's resignation as President of France after the defeat in a referendum of his proposals for reform of France's Senate and regional administration.¹ Beyond relief at seeing the departure of an individual who had caused such difficulties for Ottawa, the bursting of corks and euphoria was consistent with de Gaulle's prominence in federal analyses, and expectations his retirement could only lead to a normalization of relations in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle. The dramatic French developments followed those on the other side of the Atlantic: Daniel Johnson's death the previous autumn had brought to power the less assertive Jean-Jacques Bertrand; changes in Quebec were preceded by those in Ottawa: Trudeaumania had produced the first majority government since 1958-1962, one determined to confront Quebec nationalism and respond assertively to French involvement in Canada's affairs.

Although changes at the top contributed to the passing of the acute crisis phase of triangular tensions, it was quickly revealed that in fixating on de Gaulle Ottawa had erred in its analysis. Tensions continued as Paris maintained its 'two Canadas' approach and the question of Quebec's participation in the *Francophonie* came to a head. Moreover, the ethno-cultural, geo-political, and political bases of the nationalist responses underpinning the triangular relations remained present, so that

¹ Eldon Black, *Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1974* (Carleton University Press, 1997), 98.

although the outlines of a fragile *modus vivendi* began to appear after the election of the Bourassa Government in Quebec, triangular tensions were poised to continue.

Change at the Top?

Pierre Trudeau arrived in office having collaborated closely with the DEA task force responding to the French and Quebec nationalist challenges to the federal interpretation of the Canadian foreign policy power.² He had personally offended France's ambassador, François Leduc, and mused publicly in the days following de Gaulle's visit what the reaction would be if a visitor to France shouted "Bretagne aux Bretons!"³ During the cabinet deliberations about de Gaulle's November 1967 news conference, Trudeau had excoriated the Pearson government's temporizing approach as "pragmatic and incoherent," bereft of an overall strategy, denying Canada the strong leadership it required.⁴ The foreign policy review announced shortly after Trudeau's coming to power was premised on the priority of ensuring Canada's survival as a federal and bilingual state, and intended partly to respond to the "extraordinary external threat" Gaullist France posed. During the 1968 federal election campaign, Trudeau made clear he would consider a victory a mandate to challenge Quebec's extraterritorial ambitions.⁵

² John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, volume II, Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 397.

³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10097, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Letter from George, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to John Halstead, DEA, European Division, 17 January 1967. Leduc told George that Trudeau "was rude" to him. Also, Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre!* (Deneau, 1988), 232.

⁴ PCO, A-5-a, v. 6323, Cabinet Conclusion, 28 November 1967 – Reply of the Canadian Government to General de Gaulle.

⁵ Thomas S. Axworthy, "'To Stand Not So High Perhaps but Always Alone': The Foreign Policy of Pierre Elliott Trudeau," in *Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years*, Thomas S. Axworthy and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, eds. (Viking, 1990), 23; John P. Schlegel, "Containing Quebec Abroad: The Gabon Incident, 1968," in *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, John Kirton and Don Munton, eds. (Prentice-Hall, 1992), 160.

Trudeau nonetheless used his first press conference after winning the Liberal leadership to extend an olive branch, arguing that triangular tensions aside, as a French Canadian he welcomed expanded France-Canada relations. Asserting Canada's capacity to act as an agent for the *rayonnement* of francophone culture, Trudeau even suggested he was open to meeting with de Gaulle. Sworn in as Prime Minister in the wake of the Gabon controversy, Trudeau expressed to his Cabinet a desire to de-escalate tensions with Paris and Libreville. Leduc remained unconvinced by the new leader's overture, however, arguing Trudeau-style federalism did not countenance any concessions regarding Quebec's international personality.⁶

The Trudeau Government's determination to take a more assertive approach than its predecessor on triangular relations was underscored by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) taking over responsibility for the France and Francophonie files from the DEA.⁷ An early indication of the new approach was Ottawa's handling of the Rossillon Affair. Although a response to what Ottawa considered a fundamental violation of Canadian sovereignty,⁸ France's new ambassador, Pierre Siraud, suggested Trudeau's aggressive reaction was inspired by a desire to respond to comments that de Gaulle had just made that drew parallels between Canada's political difficulties and Nigeria's civil war, and criticizing its federal system as an example of neo-colonialism, comparing Canada to Rhodesia, Malaysia, and Cyprus. Siraud subsequently characterized Trudeau's reaction a manoeuvre and argued that in

⁶ MAE, v. 201 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 8 April 1968; MAE, v. 267 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 9 May 1968; MAE, v. 189 – Letter from Leduc to Debré, MAE, Amérique, 26 June 1968, Rapport de fin de mission au Canada, 1965-1968. Also, Black (1997), 37.

⁷ Black (1997), 36.

⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16 – Memorandum to Sharp, 13 September 1968, Nature of Activities by Philippe Rossillon, 13 September 1968.

describing Philippe Rossillon as a secret agent, Trudeau had shown a willingness to manipulate the facts to cast France in a negative light.⁹

Perhaps chastened by the media controversy and the ensuing French reaction, Trudeau made a conciliatory statement on Canada-France relations in the House of Commons in which he welcomed French assistance to Canada's francophone population as a means to strengthen national unity. Subsequently he informed Mitchell Sharp, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, that Ottawa, having made its point publicly in the Rossillon Affair, should return to a quiet diplomatic approach to avoid future incidents.¹⁰ Siraud came away from his first meeting with Trudeau days later with a sense the Prime Minister was trying to create a more serene climate.¹¹ Similarly, Trudeau used a private meeting with France's Prime Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, who was in Canada to attend Daniel Johnson's funeral, to explore the logic of France's Quebec policy.¹² The return to the Pearson era's approach to triangular relations demonstrated that Ottawa continued to face the dilemma of having to navigate between the Scylla of Quebec nationalism and the Charybdis of Gaullist interference. Ultimately, it was not the effectiveness of

⁹ MAE, v. 211 – Note from Jurgensen to Debré, 11 September 1968; MAE, v. 211 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 16 September 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 9 September 1968; Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages, volume 5, Vers le terme* (Plon, 1970). This interpretation of the affair has been posited most recently in Frédéric Zoogones, “Les relations France-Canada-Québec: Ottawa face à l'émergence internationale du Québec (1963-1968),” in *Bulletin d'histoire politique* 2003, 11(3): 164. Zoogones cites the fact Trudeau waited two weeks before reacting, that the reaction was preceded by his meeting with Manitoba's Premier and Secretary to the Cabinet, and a former journalist employed by the civil service, and that Trudeau's remarks followed de Gaulle's provocative comments.

¹⁰ House of Commons, *Debates*, 1st session, 28th parliament, volume 1, 16 September 1968 (Hansard, 1968), 66-67; Black (1997), 51.

¹¹ MAE, v. 201 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 26 September 1968.

¹² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 6.2 – Telex from DEA to Canadian Mission, New York (for SSEA and USSEA only), 4 October 1968.

Ottawa's response that led to the passing of the acute crisis phase of triangular relations; rather, this was more a result of events in Quebec City and Paris.

One of these factors was Quebec City's hesitation. Daniel Johnson had been determined that Quebec should have an international capacity, and saw the benefits that the leverage of French-assisted international activity could provide in constitutional discussions with Ottawa. In the wake of de Gaulle's visit, however, the Quebec Premier was increasingly concerned by the pace of events, fearful that French actions were pushing Quebec down a path further and more quickly than desirable. During the September 1967 visit of France's Minister of National Education, Alain Peyrefitte, the Quebec Premier expressed profound misgivings about the formal intergovernmental organization de Gaulle proposed with provisions for reciprocal head of government visits every six months. It was only with Peyrefitte's gentle and persistent persuasion that reference was made to this provision in the resulting communiqué, and then with Johnson's condition that the reciprocal visits be at the prime ministerial level. Similarly, there was no formal signature of the Johnson-Peyrefitte cooperation agreement so as to limit its formal nature.¹³ France's consul general in Quebec City, Pierre de Menthon, noted the ambiguity inherent in Johnson's constant public allusions to Quebec's "vocation internationale."¹⁴

Johnson's deteriorating heart condition added to the mixed signals emanating from Quebec City regarding its international activities. Scheduled to visit Paris in

¹³ Alain Peyrefitte, *De Gaulle et le Québec* (Stanké, 2002), 99-101; Dale C. Thomson, "Les relations internationales de Daniel Johnson," in *Daniel Johnson, Rêve d'égalité et projet d'indépendance*, Robert Comeau, Michel Lévesque and Yves Bélanger, eds. (Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1991), 273; Renée Lescop, *Le Pari québécois du général de Gaulle* (Boréal Express, 1981), 69; MAE, v. 212 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, Amérique, 18 September 1967.

¹⁴ MAE, v. 280 – Letter from de Menthon to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 10 May 1968, M. Daniel Johnson et la « vocation internationale du Québec ».

April 1968, the Premier's health, together with the excuse that his government could fall during his absence, led to a postponement until after the parliamentary session. Another delay owing to the French legislative elections prompted further rescheduling to coincide with Bastille Day, before the visit was deferred a third time on account of Johnson's worsening health, prompting Quebec City to assure French officials that there was no question of diplomatic illness.¹⁵ Johnson never saw the French capital again, succumbing to a heart attack just days before visiting in October 1968.

Initially it appeared Jean-Jacques Bertrand's accession to power would change little in the triangular relationship. Claude Morin, deputy minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, told Pierre de Menthon that the new Premier wished to take up Johnson's visit to Paris as soon as possible.¹⁶ In reality, however, Bertrand, while not prepared to countenance a return to the *status quo antebellum*, did not attach as high a priority to relations with France or the affirmation of Quebec's international personality. Siraud informed Paris that Quebec City, assured of the primacy of France-Quebec links, was amenable to normalized relations between Paris and Ottawa, and that Bertrand intended to use his December 1968 visit to Paris to demonstrate the compatibility of France-Quebec and France-Canada relations.¹⁷

French scepticism about Bertrand grew when he cancelled his visit to Paris following a heart attack. An embarrassed Morin explained to Consul General de

¹⁵ MAE, v. 214 – Voyage en France de M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, mai 1967-septembre 1968 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 4 March 1968; MAE, v. 212 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 23 July 1968; MAE, v. 214, Voyage en France de M. Daniel Johnson, Premier Ministre du Québec, mai 1967-septembre 1968 – Letter from de Menthon, to MAE, Amérique, 25 July 1968.

¹⁶ MAE, v. 215 – Voyage en France du M. Bertrand, Premier Ministre du Québec, non-réalisé – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 3 October 1968.

¹⁷ MAE, v. 281 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, Amérique, 1 November 1968; Morin (1987), 89.

Mention that the new Premier was obsessed with the idea that he too would die of a heart attack before or during the visit. Although Bertrand expressed enthusiasm about the outcome of the January 1969 visit to Paris of his deputy, Jean-Guy Cardinal, and Jean-Paul Beaudry, and affirmed his commitment to direct France-Quebec relations, French officials were doubtful, especially when told more nationalist elements in Quebec City had favoured cancelling Bertrand's visit out of fear he would present a dépassé image of Quebec that could give rise to false impressions about France-Quebec relations.¹⁸

Divisions existed within the Union Nationale government over Quebec's international activity. An indication of this was the dispute that arose at the time of the Cardinal-Beaudry visit. The acting Premier, Paul Dozois, apparently forgetting a Cabinet decree had been issued authorizing the ministers to enter into new agreements with Paris, was furious when he learned from press reports about the exchanges of letters that had taken place in the French capital, insisting publicly that the ministers had not possessed prior authorization. The incident set off a public dispute within the Union Nationale government and Premier Bertrand was forced to issue a clarification and an endorsement of the agreements.¹⁹

French reservations about Quebec City's willingness to assert a separate international personality and the priority it accorded direct France-Quebec relations

¹⁸ MAE, v. 215 – Voyage en France du M. Bertrand, Premier Ministre du Québec, non-réalisé – Telegram from MAE, Amérique, 23 December 1968; MAE, v. 212 – Confidential Letter from French Embassy, Ottawa [likely Siraud] to Jurgensen, MAE, Amérique, 30 December 1968; MAE, v. 213 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 18 February 1969; MAE, v. 215 – Voyage en France du M. Bertrand, Premier Ministre du Québec, non-réalisé – Telegram from MAE, Amérique, 23 December 1968.

¹⁹ Paul-André Comeau and Jean-Pierre Fournier, *Le Lobby du Québec à Paris: Les Précurseurs du Général de Gaulle* (Québec-Amérique, 2002), 64; Thomson (1988), 274, 289-290; Claude Morin, *L'Art de l'impossible: la Diplomatie québécoise depuis 1960* (Boréal, 1987), 85, 91.

were matched by questions on the other side of the Atlantic about the direction of French policy. The political earthquake of May 1968 shook the foundations of the Fifth Republic. Jean Marchand, federal Minister of Manpower and Immigration and Trudeau's close friend, celebrated publicly the collapse of de Gaulle's "politique de grandeur," reflecting Ottawa's hope that the *événements* would force Paris to re-order its priorities and lead to a relaxing of tensions.²⁰ Federal optimism was quickly tempered, however, by the recognition that the Elysée was unlikely to change its attitude substantially, especially given the strong Gaullist victory in the subsequent legislative elections, and the fact France's new Foreign Minister, Michel Debré, was an avowed Gaullist.²¹

Debré had assured Quebec's Delegate-General, Jean Chapdelaine, of his interest in the Quebec file, which he promised to monitor personally and directly, a position he reiterated publicly.²² Debré's words confirmed a quiet confidence in Quebec City that it could continue to count on French support. Although Johnson asked to be informed of developments on an hourly basis at the climax of the *événements*, the view in Quebec City shortly afterward was that little had changed: de Gaulle remained in power, and if the new Prime Minister, Couve de Murville, was more pragmatic, he was very familiar with the Quebec file. Debré was described as

²⁰ MAE, v. 201 – Letter from de Menthon to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 7 June 1968, *Le Québec face à la crise française*; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 15 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 15 July 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16.2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 17 September 1968.

²¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 15 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 15 July 1968.

²² ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, *Reportage Politique, 1967-1974* – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 2 August 1968, *Politiques française et québécoise*; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 17 September 1968.

the most pro-Quebec and “ultra” of the anti-Ottawa senior ministers, and the Quebec lobby could always be counted upon to ensure Quebec had friends in high places.²³

A Seat at the Table (I): Triangular Relations and the Francophonie

If the events of May 1968 and ensuing economic difficulties made it impossible for Paris to take as advanced a position as it had followed since the previous summer, Paris remained able to assist Quebec in promoting a separate international personality, notably in terms of its participation in the *Francophonie*. The policy was consistent with the ‘two nations’ approach characterizing Gaullist policy regarding Canada and Quebec. Ottawa, capital of an anglophone political entity, had no place in the Francophonie. Instead, it was Quebec City, as the French-Canadian nation’s capital, that had the rightful claim to membership.

Notwithstanding Bertrand’s more conciliatory attitude toward Ottawa, he appointed as minister of intergovernmental affairs Marcel Masse, an avowed advocate of Quebec’s separate international personality. The Quebec officials responsible for the France-Quebec rapprochement also remained in place, determined that Quebec should retain what it achieved in the Gabon Affair. Jean Chapdelaine warned that there was no guarantee the Libreville precedent would be followed with regard to the January 1969 francophone education ministers conference in Kinshasa.²⁴ Morin insisted that a separate Quebec delegation to Zaire’s capital was essential,

²³ MAE, v. 201 – Letter from de Menthon to Couve de Murville, MAE, Amérique, 7 June 1968, Le Québec face à la crise française; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 29 May 1968; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 2 August 1968, Politiques française et québécoise.

²⁴ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, Statut du Québec: CME Conférence générale, 1968 – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 19 September 1968.

since participation in a federal delegation would contravene the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, implying a renunciation of Quebec's international personality and an acceptance of a *de facto* federal international responsibility for education that Ottawa would use eventually to interfere in Quebec's domestic jurisdiction.²⁵ Quebec preoccupations regarding the Kinshasa meeting were equally applicable to the scheduled meeting in Niger's capital, Niamey, to discuss the establishment of a permanent intergovernmental organization to facilitate francophone cooperation.

Ottawa's foremost concern, reinforced by the Gabon Affair, was to assert and safeguard the federal prerogative in foreign affairs. Canada's Embassy in Paris despaired that Ottawa could do little more than defend its claims to participate in the Francophonie, and held out the "somewhat wishful" hope for a compromise between Ottawa and Quebec City to avoid another crisis as Canada's new ambassador, Paul Beaulieu, arrived in Paris.²⁶ Attempting to outflank Paris and Quebec City, however, Ottawa pressed its case with the francophone African states. Paul Martin, after being appointed to the Senate, was sent on a tour of francophone Africa in November 1968, and there were renewed federal efforts – including the posting of a roving ambassador – to increase links with francophone Africa, notably in terms of development assistance, through which Ottawa hoped to gain leverage to defend the federal position.²⁷

²⁵ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, Statut du Québec: CME Conférence générale, 1968 – Claude Morin, Quelques Brèves Réflexions sur Kinshasa, 20 December 1968.

²⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 16.2 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 17 September 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 18 – Personal Letter from Black to Halstead, 28 November 1968.

²⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10045, 20-1-2-FR, p. 5 – Memorandum from Martin to Pearson, 24 January 1967; DEA, A-4, v. 3074, 9 – Visit of Paul Martin in Africa, 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-GABON – Memorandum from Yalden to the Under-secretary, 14 May 1968, Renewal of Normal Relations with

Ottawa's approach to foreign aid to francophone Africa underlined how it had become bound up in the triangular tensions. The question of Quebec's influence in Canada's development assistance programme had only increased in salience with the election of the Johnson Government, and federal hopes to see foreign aid as a means to expand relations with France had gone unrealized. French officials were not enthusiastic about the prospect of Canadian aid to francophone Africa, seeing this as an intrusion into its sphere of influence.²⁸

The Gabon Affair coincided with a Canadian aid mission to francophone Africa led by the former federal minister Lionel Chevrier, which was designed to increase Canada's profile by resolving longstanding difficulties arising from the External Aid Office's anglo-centrism prior to the mid-1960s, and the logistical problems on the ground, to ensure the monies Ottawa was allocating were spent.²⁹ Caught up in the Gabon Affair, the mission's planned stop in Libreville was cancelled, this in addition to Ottawa cutting its minimal aid to Libreville served as a warning to other African capitals.³⁰

Hopes in Quebec City that the Gabon Affair would give Quebec the leverage needed to gain control of Canadian development assistance to francophone states were paralleled by concern that Ottawa's greater resources would ultimately win francophone Africa over to the federal position on Quebec participation in the Francophonie. Quebec officials therefore prevailed on Paris for assistance,

Gabon; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Memorandum from Sharp to Trudeau, 20 October 1969, *Dimension africaine de notre politique envers la France et le Québec*; Black (1997), 85.

²⁸ Robin Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community, Canada's Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 87-88, 108; Thomson (1988), 155.

²⁹ DEA, A-4, v. 3163, 32-1968-1 – Chevrier Mission Report. Although the Chevrier Mission had been arranged for some time, it nonetheless became bound up in the Gabon Affair.

³⁰ Schlegel (1992), 162; Gendron (2006), 134-135.

emphasizing they had not been consulted in advance of the Chevrier Mission.³¹ The result was that while the Chevrier Mission reported positively on its reception in Paris, meeting with Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, head of the MAE's *Amérique* division, the Elysée subsequently expressed its annoyance at not being consulted about the Canadian visitors being received.³² Reflecting the widening geographic scope of the triangular tensions, France's diplomatic missions in Africa were instructed to give no advice or support to the Chevrier Mission beyond general information.³³

The rivalry continued in advance of the Kinshasa and Niamey Conferences. As Ottawa multiplied its goodwill gestures toward Zaire,³⁴ Paris suggested Quebec could assure itself a separate invitation to Kinshasa with an aid offer to Zaire. Jean Chapdelaine felt that the suggested \$500,000 for construction of a school or another project a rather exorbitant price for a separate invitation; however, he realized that the

³¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10140, 30-12-QUE, p. 4 – Memorandum from Yalden to Economic Division, 28 August 1967, Quebec Initiatives in the Aid Field; MAE, v. 249 – Telegram from Leduc to MAE, *Amérique*, 27 January 1968; MAE, v. 249 – Message from de Menthon to MAE, *Amérique*, 31 January 1968, Aide apportée par le Québec aux pays sous-développés; ANQ, E42, 1988-08-021, v. 16, Agence canadienne de développement international, partie A - Memorandum from Arthur Tremblay to the Minister of Education, undated [circa April 1968]; ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 1 – Document de Travail de Gaston Cholette, directeur général des relations avec l'étranger, 14 June 1968, la politique « africaine » du Québec.

³² MAE, v. 249 – Note to File, 13 February 1968, Visite de M. Chevrier; ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Délégation du Québec à Paris (novembre 1967 à) – Confidential Report from [illegible], Conseiller de Press et d'Information and Gilles Loiselle, to C, Morin, 21 February 1968; Black (1997), 33-34. Black recounts the Canadian Embassy's surprise that the Chevrier Mission was received in Paris and repeats the assumption that this had received Elysée approval. In attempting to explain de Gaulle's reasoning, he suggests – erroneously – that Quebec considered it in its interest that the mission be received, and informed Paris accordingly. Black's account highlights the danger, heightened in a de Gaulle-centric analysis, which accompanies presumptions of intentionality in a complex bureaucratic setting.

³³ MAE, v. 249 – Telegram from MAE, Affaires Politiques, 14 February 1968, to French Embassy, Algiers, Tunis, Rabat, Dakar, Yaoundé, Abidjan, Niamey, Ottawa, Québec; Robin Gendron, "L'aide au développement et les relations entre le Canada et la France dans les années 1960 et 1970," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* July 2006, 54(223): 49-67.

³⁴ ANQ, P422, S2, 1995-01-008, v. 2, 8 – Note de Service, 22 October 1968, Notes sur la participation éventuelle du Québec à la conférence de janvier à Kinshasa. Ottawa's gestures included sending teachers to Zaire, in addition to supplementary scholarships, plans for a faculty of dental surgery in cooperation with the Université de Montréal, and talks on a possible agreement between *Air Canada* and *Air Congo*.

foreign aid rivalry presented Quebec City with a dilemma over its participation in Kinshasa, and by extension the Francophonie.³⁵ The Delegate-General took comfort, however, from the fact that federal leverage in Africa was somewhat ephemeral since Ottawa could not withdraw its development assistance from one country without risking the collapse of its support in other African capitals. Additionally, when Niger's President, Hamani Diori, expressed reticence about issuing Quebec a separate invitation for fear Ottawa would withdraw its promised support for the Niamey Conference, Paris promised to compensate Niger for any losses, reflecting the French position that it was in the "intérêt commun" that Quebec be present in all international francophonie meetings.³⁶

Triangular tensions surrounded the Kinshasa and Niamey Conferences. Claude Morin and other Quebec representatives were in touch with the French Consulate General to convey Quebec City's insistence upon its participation at Kinshasa, and Bertrand wrote Zaire's President, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, to request an invitation. Ottawa was able, however, to achieve a measure of success in advance of the meeting. Unlike Niger, which was a former French colony, Zaire's colonial tie had been with Belgium, with which Canada enjoyed good relations by virtue of a shared concerns over French actions. Added to the influence of Canadian aid money,

³⁵ ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, Statut du Québec: CME Conférence générale, 1968 – Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 19 September 1968.

³⁶ MAE, v. 212 – Note pour le Secrétaire d'État, 13 septembre 1968, Projet de Communication pour des Ministres, Relations franco-québécoises; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 61, Relations internationales du Québec, Conférence de Niamey au Niger, 1969-1970 – Telex from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 22 November 1968, Niamey; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 61, Relations internationales du Québec, Conférence de Niamey au Niger, 1969-1970 – Telex from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 28 November 1968, Niamey.

initially the result appeared to be a federal victory: Mobutu resisted French pressure to send an invitation to Quebec and invited Ottawa instead.³⁷

Morin and Chapdelaine contemplated a boycott to protest and undermine Ottawa's ability to form a credible delegation, but Paris' intervention made this unnecessary. France's ambassador in Kinshasa made it known that while Paris would accept a federal Canadian delegation attending the conference, France would not attend if Quebec were not sent a separate invitation, prompting Zairian officials to comply to avoid a collapse of the conference.³⁸ From Quebec City, Pierre de Menthon gloated that the "bataille de Kinshasa" appeared won. Although the Libreville precedent had not been strictly followed, Quebec had obtained a separate invitation, with French assistance, thwarting an outright federal victory and preventing any substantive loss of what Quebec had achieved in Libreville.³⁹ The apparent France-Quebec victory was subsequently undone by Mobutu's effectively 'disinviting' Quebec by making clear his expectation that its delegation would be part of the Canadian contingent; however, this was somewhat less of a setback than historians Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein have suggested. Just as the disinvasion arrived, Ottawa and Quebec reached a compromise that permitted Quebec's delegation to Kinshasa to be identified as such and to express itself in its areas of jurisdiction. Although Quebec was forced to accept a federal presence in

³⁷ Black (1997), 85; Morin (1987), 146.

³⁸ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 8 January 1969, Conférence des ministres de l'éducation Kinshasa; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, Statut du Québec, CME Conférence générale, 1968 – Claude Morin, Quelques Brèves Réflexions sur Kinshasa, 20 December 1968; ANQ, E42, 1995-02-001, v. 147, Statut du Québec, CME Conférence générale, 1968 – Telex from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 21 December 1968.

³⁹ MAE, v. 213 – Personal Letter from de Menthon to unknown, MAE, 8 January 1969; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 8 January 1969, Conférence des ministres de l'éducation Kinshasa.

Kinshasa in respect of Canada's federal system, the compromise represented a significant achievement vis-à-vis the federal power and Quebec's ability to speak with its own voice on the international stage. Quebec's junior education minister, Jean-Marie Morin, co-chaired the Canadian contingent with New Brunswick Premier, Louis Robichaud, chosen to demonstrate that Canada's *fait français* was not confined to Quebec.⁴⁰

If Ottawa and Quebec had come to an arrangement for Kinshasa, and federal officials could be pleased with the significant precedent of a Canadian delegation to a Francophonie conference, triangular tensions were no less evident during the meeting. Federal officials, including Trudeau's close advisor Marc Lalonde, attended to ensure that there was no "backsliding." Quebec lobby member Bernard Dorin personally ensured that provincial flags, notably that of Quebec, were flown outside the conference site, consistent with the Ottawa-Quebec agreement. Moreover, instead of the united, co-chaired Canadian delegation envisaged, what arose in Kinshasa were two quasi-independent delegations. Canadian Embassy officials complained to the Elysée after the conference about the French delegation members who "had felt unable to indulge in the most elementary courtesy" toward Robichaud.⁴¹

⁴⁰ J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (University of Toronto Press, 1990), 139; MAE, v. 331 – Letter from Siraud to Debré, MAE, Amérique, 13 January 1969, Conférence de Kinshasa; Black (1997), 86; Morin (1987), 148-153. Rather than following up his participation in Libreville, Jean-Guy Cardinal refused to head a delegation under the terms of the federal-provincial compromise.

⁴¹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Telegram from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 15 January 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10687, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 2 – Report of a Meeting February 5, 1969 in Quebec City concerning the Niamey Conference, 6 February 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8646, 20-1-2-FR, p. 20 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 6 February 1969; Frédéric Bastien, *Relations particulières: La France face au Québec après De Gaulle* (Boréal, 1999), 56. Ottawa's mood was apparently not improved by Robichaud's sleeping through much of the proceedings.

A similar dynamic characterized the February 1969 Niamey Conference, all the more significant since the meeting was to discuss the institutionalization of the Francophonie, thereby raising the thorny question of Quebec's membership, which went to the core of the triangular conflict. For Claude Morin, everything that Quebec City had gained throughout the preceding decade was at stake, and would be reduced to an "accident de parcours" if Ottawa succeeded in blocking a separate Quebec membership in the proposed intergovernmental francophonie organization under discussion.⁴² This added to worries he expressed after the Kinshasa conference about Quebec's vulnerability arising from its reliance on French assistance in engaging with Ottawa in the constitutional gamesmanship:

[n]ous sommes fortement débiteurs, un objet de politique plutôt qu'un sujet. Ce n'est pas une situation confortable, ni qui puisse continuer longtemps, ni qui le doive, sans que nous y perdions la direction de nos affaires.⁴³

It was Ottawa, however, that was at an immediate disadvantage. Quebec lobby members Philippe Rossillon and Bernard Dorin were responsible for most of the ideas and documentation regarding the conference, which they prepared on the presumption that Quebec would attend the conference and join the subsequent organization in its own right. The lobby's strong influence was clearly evident in the proposed statutes for the new francophone cooperation agency, which were drafted in a way marginalizing federal involvement and providing a prominent position for Quebec, referred to throughout the draft text as an "état" or "pays."⁴⁴

⁴² Morin (1987), 198-199.

⁴³ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 8 January 1969, Conférence des ministres de l'éducation Kinshasa. Also, Gendron (2006), 138. Morin's expression of anxiety contradicts Gendron's assertion that Ottawa was "forced to try to find a compromise with a government in Quebec that had less of a need to do so."

⁴⁴ Black (1997), 89; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10687, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 1 – Memorandum from SSEA to Trudeau, 25 November 1968, Niamey Conference. The Canadian Government was mentioned only

Following discussions between Paris and Quebec City over a separate invitation for Quebec, President Diori, who had accepted Ottawa's position regarding the nature of Quebec participation in the meeting, faced French pressure to invite Quebec separately in respect of the Libreville precedent. Claude Morin's misgivings about managing the Paris and Ottawa sides of the equation were vindicated, as unbeknownst to him French authorities initially told Diori that only Quebec City should be invited to the conference.⁴⁵

Facing conflicting pressure from Paris and Ottawa, Diori sent federal authorities an invitation to the conference that contained the suggestion that Quebec's Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal, could be part of the Canadian delegation. Diori sent Premier Bertrand a similar letter, and Jean-Guy Cardinal was sent a personal invitation by Niger's Education Minister. Diori's "unpleasant surprise" was ascribed in DEA circles to French pressure, as the invitation was sent only after France's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Yvon Bourges, arrived in Niamey.⁴⁶

A combination of the French interventions with Diori, the Kinshasa compromise, and the fact that the subject matter of the Niamey Conference

once in the thirty page document, while the words "Québec" or "Québécois" appeared on virtually every page.

⁴⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10687, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 1 – Telegram from Malone, Canadian High Commission, Lagos to DEA, 1 November 1968, Francophonie – Audience with Pres Diori; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10687, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 1 – Telex from Malone, Canadian High Commission, Lagos to DEA, 20 November 1968, Francophonie Conference in Niamey; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10687, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 2 – Memorandum from African and Middle Eastern Division to Under-Secretary, 5 December 1968, Niamey Conference; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 21 February 1969, Niamey; Bastien (1999), 56; Black (1997), 90.

⁴⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10687, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 1 – Letter from Diori to Trudeau, 18 November 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10687, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 1 – Telex from Malone, Canadian High Commission, Lagos to DEA, 20 November 1968, Francophonie Conference in Niamey; Black (1997), 89; André Patry, *Le Québec dans le monde* (Leméac, 1980), 128. Indicative of the legal wrangling, Patry's account refers to Diori's letter to Bertrand as an invitation, whereas Black's account argues Diori was able to limit his compromise to non-essentials, claiming his letter supported the federal thesis that there could only be one Canadian representation in international affairs, and left it to Canadian authorities to work out the details.

strengthened federal claims to participate, led Ottawa and Quebec City to make another compromise regarding the Niger meeting. For the first time, a federal minister, Gérard Pelletier, would lead a Canadian delegation to an international Francophonie conference, strengthening Ottawa's claims to be a viable interlocutor for the Francophonie, and the federal competence for foreign affairs. As at the Kinshasa meeting, Quebec's delegation, led by Marcel Masse, was a distinct part of the Canadian contingent, and Ottawa agreed reluctantly that in the event of any internal disagreement during the conference, Canada would abstain from voting.⁴⁷

Although not marred by scandal, the Niamey Conference was rife with tension. In addition to disputes over the flags flying over the conference site, the Quebec lobby was active in the corridors promoting separate Quebec participation in the proposed *Agence de coopération culturelle et technique* (ACCT). Even before leaving for the conference, Masse declared that Quebec's delegation was completely autonomous and subject to no instructions from any authority other than Quebec City. In Niger, Masse rejected the existence of a Canadian delegation *per se*; rather, for Quebec City there was only a "représentation canadienne" to emphasize that since much of the proposed activity of the ACCT fell under provincial jurisdiction, Ottawa was not able to "delegate" anyone to speak in its name and that only Quebec had this capacity.⁴⁸ Moreover, Masse reneged on the Ottawa-Quebec City agreement by refusing to co-chair the Canadian delegation and insisted on re-negotiating duplicate

⁴⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 21 February 1969, Niamey; Black (1997), 90. Decisions at the conference were reached by consensus, so that this condition, significant as it was, remained without effect.

⁴⁸ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 21 February 1969, Niamey; Morin (1987), 154-155.

seating arrangements to conform to the previous month in Kinshasa.⁴⁹ According to Claude Morin, matters were not helped by Quebec *chanteuse* Pauline Julien's cry of "Vive le Québec libre!" during the proceedings.⁵⁰ Trudeau subsequently told Bertrand that although he was pleased Ottawa and Quebec City had reached an understanding prior to the meeting, he was concerned about the threats to Canada's international unity represented by Quebec again having received a direct invitation and Masse's behaviour.⁵¹

The conference resulted in a provisional secretariat to draft the proposed ACCT's statutes, and agreement upon a second meeting in Niamey that would approve these and formally establish the organization. The provisional secretary-general appointed by the conference was none other than Jean-Marc Léger, the avowed supporter of the Francophonie and Quebec's international activities. Federal officials were not enthusiastic at the prospect, but after Léger provided assurances to his long-time colleague Gérard Pelletier that he would not take advantage of his post to promote Quebec independence, he received federal backing.⁵²

Reflecting on what Quebec had achieved in Libreville, Kinshasa, and Niamey, and with increasing federal involvement in the Francophonie, Claude Morin and Jean Chapdelaine agreed that a moment of truth had arrived: Quebec should use the advantages of precedent and French assistance to negotiate with Ottawa to secure as a

⁴⁹ Black (1997), 90-91.

⁵⁰ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 21 February 1969, Niamey.

⁵¹ MAE, v. 215, Séjour Paris, M. Marcel Masse, Ministre Québécois de la Fonction Publique et du Plan, 24-27 février 1969 – Note from Jurgensen to Cabinet du Ministre, undated, Délégation du Québec à la Conférence de Niamey; MAE, v. 331 – Telegram from de Menthon, to MAE, Amérique, 13 March 1969; Thomson (1988), 291.

⁵² Black (1997), 61; Jean-Marc Léger, *Le Temps dissipé: souvenirs* (Éditions Hurtubise HMH Ltée, 1999), 400-404.

minimum, distinct and autonomous participation for Quebec delegations under Canadian auspices at all international conferences touching on provincial jurisdiction. The Quebec officials agreed Ottawa had to understand that if it failed to accept and adapt to the new reality, it would force Quebec down a path worse for all concerned.⁵³

La plus ça change...

The fluid nature of the situation in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle was underscored dramatically a few weeks after the Niamey Conference, when de Gaulle announced his resignation. The events of May 1968 had reinforced a preoccupation in Ottawa and Quebec City with preparations for the post-de Gaulle era, best revealed by the efforts of both capitals to cultivate links with members of the non-Gaullist right and left-wing figures such as François Mitterrand.⁵⁴

The immediate reaction in Quebec circles to de Gaulle's departure was a confidence that the France-Quebec privileged relations would continue. Morin and Chapdelaine both believed that France's Quebec policy would survive the loss of its greatest sponsor, since de Gaulle would continue to retain influence out of office, senior French bureaucrats generally favoured the Quebec position, and the forming of the new government meant certain Quebec lobby members were even better placed to render assistance. Chapdelaine considered it unlikely that the new French

⁵³ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 8 January 1969, Conférence des ministres de l'éducation Kinshasa; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Telegram from Chapdelaine to Héroux, pour Claude Morin, 21 November 1969.

⁵⁴ ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Délégation du Québec à Paris (novembre 1967 à) – Confidential Report from [illegible], Conseiller de Press et d'Information and Gilles Loiselle, to C. Morin, 21 February 1968; ANQ, E42, 2002-04-003, v. 210, Délégation du Québec à Paris (novembre 1967 à) – Letter from C. Morin to Loiselle, 12 February 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 9 – Note from Cadieux to Yalden, 25 October 1967.

government could turn its back on Quebec without being accused of abandoning Gaullism's core principles. Allowing that French actions would likely be less provocative and that Quebec would have to take more of the initiative, the two Quebec officials reflected the ambivalence in Quebec City over recent events in their suggesting that the new conjuncture would be healthier since Quebec would formulate and propose action rather than react to French initiatives.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, Quebec moved to safeguard its position. Morin visited Paris following the presidential election that brought Georges Pompidou to power, to emphasize Quebec City's determination to maintain direct relations. Morin was pleased that he arrived while the new government was determining its priorities and before federal representatives had made their contacts. The visit occurred prior to Pompidou making any public comment on the triangular relations. This enabled Morin to consult with the new President's foreign affairs advisors, Martial de la Fournière and Jean-Bernard Raimond, the former a Quebec lobby member, as policy directions were being articulated. Morin also derived comfort from what he characterized as a rather weak Canadian diplomatic presence in Paris, arguing that the embassy was neither organized nor psychologically-oriented to counter France's pro-Quebec position. Morin believed that Jules Léger's departure had left a hole and that Paul Beaulieu's effectiveness as Canada's ambassador was undermined by health problems and his being overwhelmed by the political situation in France.

⁵⁵ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974, Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 7 May 1969; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from C. Morin to Bertrand, 15 July 1969, L'attitude du nouveau gouvernement français par rapport au Québec – Résumé de mes conclusions.

Consequently, the embassy seemed less effective than Quebec's Delegation-General.⁵⁶

Morin returned from Paris with a view that the Pompidou administration was just as sympathetic to Quebec as its predecessor, and that despite some difference in nuance and form, direct France-Quebec relations would endure. Morin described the new Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, as "entièrement acquis" by Quebec. According to Morin, if the Gaullist baron wished to avoid useless troubles with Ottawa, he definitely was not a federal supporter, and was surrounded by Quebec lobby members, notably Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, with whom he was friends.⁵⁷

Confidence also reigned in federal circles. The embassy's immediate reaction to de Gaulle's resignation was that regardless of the outcome of the ensuing presidential election, and with the proviso that any dialogue would have to be initiated in a careful and constructive manner, Ottawa would be able to engage in a dialogue with the new French leader and his government. The embassy also expressed optimism that the MAE would now be able to establish a position more independent of the Elysée, and that ministers and officials involved in de Gaulle's Quebec policy would depart or moderate their behaviour.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974, Letter from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 7 May 1969; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from C. Morin to Bertrand, 15 July 1969, L'attitude du nouveau gouvernement français par rapport au Québec – Résumé de mes conclusions; Black (1997), 75-76. Black recalls Beaulieu as a cultured, gentle man out of his depth, with little of the stamina his position required and apparently "incapable of breaking out of his passivity."

⁵⁷ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from C. Morin to Bertrand, 15 July 1969, L'attitude du nouveau gouvernement français par rapport au Québec – Résumé de mes conclusions. Morin's French interlocutors told him to not publicize Schumann's pro-Quebec sentiment, so that federal officials would remain under the impression he was favourable to them.

⁵⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 21 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 30 April 1969, Franco-Cdn Relations, Post-De Gaulle.

Although the embassy recommended Ottawa adopt a prudent attitude during the ensuing presidential elections to avoid squandering any opportunity for rapprochement, it was not surprising, given de Gaulle's centrality in federal analyses, that his resignation led to Ottawa's misreading the situation and overextending itself.⁵⁹ Emboldened by events in Paris, officials in the DEA were not prepared to heed the embassy's advice when they learned that Pierre Laurent, an avowed Gaullist and new head of the MAE's Cultural Relations division, was scheduled to visit Quebec City for a meeting of the *Commission permanente de coopération franco-québécoise* but had declined an invitation to visit Ottawa. Confident that it was the "moment le plus idéal" to deal once and for all with Paris' two-state approach to visits, the DEA pressed the issue.⁶⁰ The Canadian embassy considered Ottawa's decision ill-advised, suggesting the result would be a pyrrhic victory. Instead, embassy officials counselled a conciliatory approach with a hope the Laurent visit would be the last such incident. Ambassador Beaulieu warned that by giving an impression Canada was seeking to exert pressure during the presidential campaign when Pompidou's opponent Alain Poher appeared to be mounting a credible threat, Ottawa would be "très mal placés" to seek a rapprochement if Pompidou were elected.⁶¹

⁵⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 22 – Les élections présidentielles en France: L'avenir des relations France-Canada, undated.

⁶⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 22 – Message from DEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 31 May 1969, Laurent Visit; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 22 – Memorandum from Périard to Halstead, 5 June 1969, INFO – à votre demande, Visite de M. Laurent, Directeur général de la Direction culturelle au Quai; Black (1997), 101.

⁶¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10079, 20-FR-9, p.11 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 29 May 1969, Visite de Laurent pour Commission Mixte France-Québec; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 22 – Telex from Beaulieu, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 2 June 1969, Visite de Laurent.

Beaulieu's warnings proved prophetic. Laurent's visit was cancelled after the embassy conveyed the DEA message that the French official should visit Ottawa. After Pompidou's win, Ambassador Beaulieu was called in to the MAE and told of the bad impression that the demarche had caused. In Paris some weeks later, Morin was told of the incident numerous times, with French officials characterizing Ottawa's action as "un procédé grossier." A furious Michel Debré, the outgoing Foreign Minister, allegedly commented that "[n]ous aurons notre revanche plus tard."⁶²

Notwithstanding the "Laurent Affair," Ottawa remained cautiously optimistic. The DEA considered Pompidou committed to preserving the essence of France-Quebec cooperation, but felt he did not share de Gaulle's objectives or style; with Canada and Quebec lower on the new President's agenda, the DEA predicted centrists in the new government would be less inclined to accept recurring crises. Ottawa interpreted an apparently warmer attitude in Paris – including a Dominion Day message from Schumann – as signs of a thawing of the chill of the previous era.⁶³

The contretemps over the Laurent visit was in fact a harbinger of continuing triangular tensions. The Elysée's new occupant had limited exposure to Canada and Quebec, having visited only once before, and this being a one-hour layover in

⁶² DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 23 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 30 June 1969, Entretien avec Lipkowski; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from Morin to Bertrand, 15 July 1969, L'attitude du nouveau gouvernement français par rapport au Québec – Résumé de mes conclusions; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Letter from Black to Halstead, 24 October 1969; Black (1997), 101-103. Black claims that the episode "destroyed any chance of starting a dialogue" with the new French administration.

⁶³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 22 – Les élections présidentielles en France: L'avenir des relations France-Canada, undated; Bastien (1999), 71; Black (1997), 103-105.

Montreal returning from the South Pacific in 1964.⁶⁴ Pompidou had been largely informed in advance of de Gaulle's intentions regarding his 1967 visit, although he claimed not to have received prior warning of the *cri du balcon*. Initially, Pompidou characterized de Gaulle's actions in Montreal a "folie," reflecting a far less personal engagement with Quebec than his predecessor that prompted concerns among the Quebec lobby that Pompidou's arrival in the Elysée would mean an abandonment of Paris' Quebec policy.⁶⁵

The Quebec lobby's concerns, however, were not borne out. Although desirous of improved relations with Ottawa, Pompidou was unwilling to countenance any fundamental change to Paris' Quebec policy. Part of his rationale arose from domestic political considerations: attempting to maintain and consolidate a presidential coalition, Pompidou could not risk alienating de Gaulle loyalists. More broadly, however, conditions giving rise to the triangular relations in the first place remained largely in place. Geo-politically, Franco-American relations were improving, but this paradoxically reinforced the value of France-Quebec relations as political cover. Questions of ethno-cultural solidarity remained as salient as ever, especially amid the institutionalization of the Francophonie and Pompidou's preoccupation with the *rayonnement* of the French language. Finally, the consensus in Paris remained that Quebec was evolving (slowly, to be sure) toward a new political status, and Paris had an interest in assisting in this.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10077, 20-FR-9, p. 1.1 – Letter from USSEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 1 September 1964, *Escale à Montréal du Premier Ministre Georges Pompidou*.

⁶⁵ Comeau and Fournier (2002), 89; Bastien (1999), 29; Black (1997), 99.

⁶⁶ Black (1997), 108; Bastien (1999), 31, 33-34.

Pompidou thus desired good relations with Ottawa, but excellent relations with Quebec. In practice, this meant the continuation of Paris' two Canadas policy in its relations with Canada and Quebec, and consequently a perpetuation of triangular tensions.⁶⁷ The contradictions inherent in his approach were apparent in French officials telling Morin during his July 1969 visit that Paris did not wish to intervene directly in Canadian affairs, but was also ready to assist Quebec in its efforts to achieve greater autonomy. In their view, Ottawa would have to get used to Quebec enjoying privileged relations with France designed to permit Quebec to affirm itself in North America and the Francophonie. Morin nonetheless encountered a desire to “donner le change à Ottawa” and correct the excesses of the de Gaulle-era, if only to minimize federal complaints. When asked if Quebec City would object to Paris respecting protocol norms a bit more, Morin gave his tentative approval on the basis that there was nothing to lose by giving Ottawa the impression Paris was observing protocol, while making clear to federal officials that any apparent improvement of Ottawa-Paris relations was the result not of federal efforts, but because Quebec City condescended to allow it.⁶⁸

The new government's attitude was soon revealed in Pompidou's response to a question from a reporter about French designs on Quebec:

Jacques Cartier est mort et Montcalm aussi, n'est-ce pas? Par conséquent nous n'avons pas l'intention d'annexer le Québec. Il n'en est pas moins vrai que nous ne pouvons pas ne pas voir des relations très étroites et amicales avec les Français du

⁶⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Telegram from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 27 May 1970, Réception diplomatique; Bastien (1999), 39.

⁶⁸ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from C. Morin to Bertrand, 15 July 1969, L'attitude du nouveau gouvernement français par rapport au Québec – Résumé de mes conclusions; Bastien (1999), 39, 71. An example of the qualified goodwill gestures was Pompidou's end to de Gaulle's ban on ministerial visits to Ottawa; however, this was on the condition set by Quebec City that France-Quebec direct relations were not called into question.

Québec pour des raisons qui tiennent à l'histoire, à la race et à la culture et ces relations déjà sont étroite et excellentes.⁶⁹

Ottawa and Quebec City interpreted the statement similarly: the onus was on federal officials to ensure enduring France-Quebec links did not prejudice France-Canada relations, an analysis Beaulieu felt confirmed by his first meeting with Maurice Schumann. Similarly, Jean-Bernard Raimond made clear to Canada's embassy that "il n'y aura pas de changement dans la politique française mais il faut éviter les drames."⁷⁰ By the end of July 1969, the initial burst of federal optimism for a triangular rapprochement had begun to dissipate. The DEA recommended Ottawa continue its longstanding policy of endeavouring to develop relations and cooperation with Paris, while defending vigorously its constitutional position and doing everything to avoid unnecessary confrontations with Quebec or France to permit the normalization process to take hold.⁷¹

The flaws in Ottawa's de Gaulle-centric analysis and its accompanying unrealistic hopes for a rapid rapprochement were revealed during the ensuing months as the Pompidolienne approach to triangular relations became more evident. The most significant incident occurred in October 1969 during the visit to Quebec of France's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Jean de Lipkowski, an ardent Gaullist and Quebec supporter whom Marcel Masse had invited. Federal officials considered

⁶⁹ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Telex from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 10 July 1969.

⁷⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 24 – Memorandum from Robinson to Sharp, 17 July 1969, Conférence de presse du Président Pompidou, Les relations France-Canada; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 1, Reportage Politique, 1967-1974 – Telex from Chapdelaine to C. Morin, 10 July 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 24 – Telex from Beaulieu to DEA, 21 July 1969, Rencontre avec Schumann; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 24 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 16 September 1969, Franco-Cdn relations.

⁷¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 24 – Les relations France-Canada, Perspectives à moyen terme, 13 August 1969.

the visit – his first to Canada – a litmus test of the Pompidou Government’s intentions, and thus deemed it essential he visit Ottawa.⁷²

Although Consul General de Menthon, Ambassador Siraud and Claude Morin endorsed de Lipkowski’s visiting Ottawa to placate federal concerns, Maurice Schumann opposed this concession, arguing that given the recent visit to Ottawa of France’s Minister of Justice, René Pleven, for a conference of the *Institut international de droit d’expression française* and billed as a goodwill gesture, federal officials might conclude erroneously that Paris had retreated from its policy of direct relations with Quebec.⁷³ Furthermore, Pompidou instructed his advisors not to give Ottawa the impression that Paris was changing its Quebec policy by having several French ministers visit Ottawa. De Lipkowski declined Ottawa’s invitation with the unconvincing explanation that his visit to Quebec was “touristic,” not “political.”⁷⁴

⁷² DEA, A-3-c, v. 10046, 20-1-2-FR, p. 15 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 15 July 1968; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10047, 20-1-2-FR, p. 19 – Telex from Beaulieu, Paris Embassy to DEA, 3 January 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10079, 20-FR-9, p. 11 – Telegram from Black, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 22 August 1969.

⁷³ ANF, 5AG2/1049 – Voyage de M. René Pleven au Québec (à partir du 7 septembre), 8 August 1969, tel no. 579/80, d’Ottawa, cl. Québec; ANF, 5AG2/1049, Annotations du Président – Canada 18/19 septembre 1969, tél no. 659/61 d’Ottawa (cl. Canada) – Préparatifs des entretiens de M. Maurice Schumann et de M. Sharp, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères canadien (24 septembre); MAE, v. 213 – Telegram from Chauvet to MAE, Amérique, 2 September 1969, Entretien avec M. Claude Morin; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 24 – Memorandum for the Minister, Relations with France, 11 September 1969, Mr. Pleven’s Visit; MAE, v. 213 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE Amérique, 12 September 1969; Bastien (1999), 39. The Pleven visit illustrates the Pompidou Government’s approach to the triangular relationship. Aware that Pleven would likely encounter Trudeau during his visit, Pompidou and MAE officials both met with him before his departure, encouraged by Claude Morin’s expressing concern that the visit of a French minister to Ottawa could be misconstrued by the press as signalling a change of French policy. During the subsequent visit, Pleven did encounter Trudeau, promising him that France would not provoke Canada’s disintegration and expressing Paris’ desire for good relations. In his discussions with Premier Bertrand the previous day, however, Pleven had insisted to the Premier on the continuity of France’s Quebec policy. The difference between the exchanges was symptomatic of the new French government’s desire to maintain a dualistic policy, but in a manner avoiding further confrontations. This appears especially the case when one takes into consideration the subsequent “de Lipkowski Affair” discussed below.

⁷⁴ ANF 5AG2/1021 – Note, tél no 610/18 de Québec du 20/21 août 1969. Pompidou wrote: “Il faut maintenir nos relations avec le Québec et c’est à Ottawa à les accepter comme telles. Nous ne jetterons pas d’huile sur le feu entre Québec et Ottawa mais il ne faut à aucun prix donner à Ottawa l’impression que nous changeons de politique.” Also, Black (1997), 109.

Mitchell Sharp accordingly conveyed Ottawa's concerns to Schumann during their tempestuous first encounter, arguing the necessity of reducing tensions and insisting that France-Quebec links be carried out in a manner consistent with Ottawa's interpretation of the constitution. The French Foreign Minister downplayed federal objections to Paris' apparent continued support for a separate Quebec international personality, resisting Sharp's claim that only de Lipkowski's visiting Ottawa could Paris avoid another incident and prove its desire not to interfere in Canadian affairs.⁷⁵

Informed of Ottawa's objections, Pompidou complained to a Canadian reporter that "ils sont absurdes à Ottawa," which Canada's embassy interpreted as a deliberate sign of his extreme annoyance over the firm federal stance. Pompidou felt it necessary to remain firm, not "admettre le chantage," and to maintain the position that French officials could visit Quebec without having to go to Ottawa. Consequently, he refused to permit de Lipkowski to visit the federal capital, and was all the more determined not to cede on the point given a leadership challenge from orthodox Gaullists during this period that made maintaining his predecessor's Quebec policy a test of his credibility.⁷⁶ The most Paris would concede was Maurice Schumann's suggestion, rejected by federal officials, that de Lipkowski would visit

⁷⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 24 – Telex from Canadian Mission, United Nations to DEA and PMO (Lalonde), 24 September 1969, Conversation with Mr. Schumann; Bastien (1999), 45.

⁷⁶ ANF, 5AG2/1021 – Note, 30 Septembre/1^{er} Octobre 1969 – tél no. 723/30 d'Ottawa (cl. Québec, visite Lipkowski et Canada); DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Letter from Black to Halstead, 10 October 1969. Bastien (1999), 42-43.

Ottawa the following month when he visited New York, to maintain the notion of a separate visit to Quebec.⁷⁷

With Trudeau furious and Ottawa demanding that the French Secretary of State stop in the capital or risk the visit being interpreted as a deliberate challenge to Ottawa and Canadian unity, the stage was set for another confrontation. De Lipkowski visited Quebec, and federal anger was further exacerbated when the French Secretary of State commented publicly on the constitution, including an apparent endorsement of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine and references to Quebec independence. The federal reaction was strong, with Ottawa placing the blame squarely on Paris. Trudeau entered the fray, denouncing de Lipkowski's "insolence" and referring to him as not being a very important minister. For the first time since de Gaulle's November 1967 news conference, the Cabinet discussed the triangular tensions, during which Mitchell Sharp raised the prospect of Ottawa breaking off diplomatic relations. Although Ottawa decided to play down the incident publicly in the domestic context, Cabinet agreed to seize the occasion to press its demands with Paris regarding the circumstances of future visits of French personalities. A DEA task force was also established to study possible punitive measures should negotiations with Paris flounder.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ ANF, 5AG2/1021 – Note from G. Gaucher to Monsieur le Président de la République, 6 October 1969, Visite de M. de Lipkowski au Québec. Even this limited compromise was effectively withdrawn on Pompidou's approval amid the deepening tensions prior to the visit.

⁷⁸ PCO, A-5-a, v. 6340, Cabinet Conclusion, 15 October 1969, Question of the relations between France and Canada; ANF 5AG2/1021 – Note, le 14/15 octobre 1969, tél no. 815/19 d'Ottawa cl. Québec – voyage Comiti et rappel à Notes du Président; Bastien (1999), 41-42; Black (1997), 113-115. Indicative of the tension – and of the dangers of matters spiralling out of control – was that federal officials interpreted as further provocation the news that Joseph Comiti, the French Secretary of State for Youth, also would be visiting Quebec. It was only later that Ottawa learned the apparent insult was in fact the result of a lack of bureaucratic co-ordination. Pompidou himself appeared cognizant of the

Ottawa considered the visit a setback and evidence that the new Pompidou Government was unwilling (or unable) to dissociate itself from Gaullist policy. Eldon Black argued that the visit demonstrated that if Paris wanted improved relations with Ottawa, it was not prepared to give up its separate and preferential policy regarding Quebec, and would not do so until it realized that this was a source of ongoing embarrassment.⁷⁹ In the midst of the controversy, Marcel Cadieux, the DEA Under-Secretary, recommended Ottawa avoid a direct confrontation given indications of progress on Canada-France relations as a whole. After de Lipkowski's contentious remarks, however, Cadieux made clear to Ambassador Siraud that the strong federal reaction was indicative of the Trudeau Government's refusal to tolerate efforts to achieve a separate international personality for Quebec, and its increased ability and determination to respond to provocations.⁸⁰

The reaction in Paris was one of resolve. Given Maurice Schumann's absence from Paris, Ambassador Beaulieu had the unpleasant task of discussing the de Lipkowski Affair with the man at the centre of the controversy. De Lipkowski dutifully conveyed Schumann's annoyance over Trudeau's personal attacks on him after a number of goodwill gestures from Paris, including the Pleven visit and the Schumann-Sharp meeting. After this exchange, Beaulieu concluded that Paris was unwilling to modify its core position regarding triangular relations, an assessment the

risks involved in the tense atmosphere, acknowledging Paris had "un peu trop" of its ministers visiting Quebec at the same time, for which he blamed the MAE.

⁷⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Letter from Black to Halstead, 10 October 1969; Black (1997), 123.

⁸⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10079, 20-FR-9, p. 11 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Sharp, 10 October 1969, French Ministerial Visits – Suggested Action; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Memorandum from Cadieux to European Division, 18 October 1969, Conversations with the French Ambassador.

official French statement on de Lipkowksi's visit confirmed.⁸¹ Pompidou considered Trudeau's remarks about the French Secretary of State "inadmissibles," and instructed that Canadian protests were to go unanswered. Indeed, they met with absolute silence at the Quai d'Orsay, to the chagrin of Eldon Black, sent to enquire about the French reaction from a tellingly unresponsive Jacques de Beaumarchais, the MAE's Political Director.⁸² There was "absolutely no meeting of minds" during Beaulieu's subsequent discussions with Schumann, with the Foreign Minister observing Ottawa-Paris relations were "pire que jamais."⁸³

The DEA was irritated and disappointed over the trend of events, exacerbated perhaps by the overly optimistic expectation of a different attitude from the Pompidou Government that was heightened by the stronger government in Ottawa and weaker Quebec position.⁸⁴ There were still, however, voices of federal optimism; Beaulieu and Eldon Black were of the view that despite the suspicion and hostility engendered, the de Lipkowski Affair had demonstrated the limits of Canadian patience, so that even if Paris was not changing the core of its Quebec policy, an important bridge had been crossed and Ottawa was favourably placed to pursue more positive action and dialogue. Cadieux shared this qualified optimism, suggesting friendly French gestures since Pompidou's takeover appeared to indicate that better relations between Ottawa and Quebec City would lead to better relations with Paris, and that Quebec

⁸¹ ANF, 5AG2/115 – Entretien entre M. de Lipkowski et l'Ambassadeur du Canada à Paris, 28 October 1969, Note to Schumann, 21 October 1969, Entretien avec l'Ambassadeur du Canada; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10079, 20-FR-9, p. 11 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 21 October 1969; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 22 October 1969, Réunion du Conseil des Ministres.

⁸² ANF, 5AG2/1021 – Note, 23 Octobre 1969, tél no. 927/30 d'Ottawa cl. Canada (et Notes du Président) rappel à Québec; ANF, 5AG2/1021 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, 24 October 1969, Relations Franco-Canadiennes – Annotation du Président; Black (1997), 119.

⁸³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Letter from Black to Halstead, 7 November 1969.

⁸⁴ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Letter from Mathieu to Black, 18 November 1969.

was no longer able to count on France to the same degree as during the de Gaulle era. Cadieux characterized the de Lipkowski Affair as an “accident de parcours,” arguing the question was not *whether*, but rather *when* French policy would change. The DEA Under-secretary was confident that the activism of the de Gaulle era had ended, and that Ottawa could expect a certain French neutrality, even an inactivity and disengagement toward Quebec.⁸⁵

A Seat at the Table (II): The Road Back to Niamey

Developments in the Francophonie revealed Cadieux’s assessment to be premature. Ottawa had hoped de Gaulle’s departure would lead to the international francophone community shifting from an arena of conflict with Paris to one of cooperation. The Canadian embassy even predicted that the Francophonie would be less politicized under Pompidou, and that the compromises Ottawa and Quebec City reached for the Kinshasa and Niamey Conferences would limit Paris’ room for manoeuvre.

Morin returned from his July 1969 visit to France, however, convinced that the Pompidou Government was prepared to facilitate Quebec’s participation in Francophonie meetings. Michel Jobert, the new Secretary-General of the Elysée, was a convinced partisan of the Francophonie and Quebec.⁸⁶ Paris was determined to maintain its influence with francophone Africa through its bilateral links, and

⁸⁵ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Telex from Beaulieu, Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 12 December 1969, Relations France-Cda; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Message from Cadieux to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 29 December 1969, Relations France-Cda; Black (1997), 125.

⁸⁶ ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 60, Mémoires aux Premiers Ministres/Memos de M. Morin aux Premiers Ministres, 1962-1976 – Memorandum from C. Morin to Bertrand, 15 July 1969, L’attitude du nouveau gouvernement français par rapport au Québec, Résumé de mes conclusions; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales, 1969-1996 – Letter from Dorin to Masse, 25 March 1996.

therefore resented and opposed Ottawa's efforts to establish a multilateral dynamic that promised to bring Canada and other countries such as Belgium and Switzerland into its dealings with its former colonies. Pompidou himself was a staunch advocate of the Francophonie, claiming to support the idea even more strongly than de Gaulle.

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The first indication of enduring triangular tensions linked to the Francophonie came in connection with the Paris' follow-up meeting to the Kinshasa Conference. Federal officials, fearing Ottawa would be bypassed and only Quebec asked to attend, tried to turn the previous year's Gabon Affair to their advantage, arguing that Ottawa was automatically invited to attend the follow-up meeting by virtue of its having sent a delegation to Kinshasa.⁸⁸ The question of invitations and the Canadian representation at the meeting, delayed partly because of French political developments, became entangled in the deteriorating relations between Ottawa and the Bertrand Government and the heightened tensions of the de Lipkowski Affair. At the end of April 1969, Trudeau wrote Bertrand requesting he intercede to remind French officials of the Ottawa-Quebec compromise regarding the Kinshasa conference, and his expectation that the federal government should be invited to the Paris meeting. Morin initially made clear to France's representatives Quebec City's desire that Paris send it a direct invitation, arguing this would strengthen Quebec's

⁸⁷ ANF, 5AG2/1049 – Annotations du Président, 28 juillet 1970, tél no. 758/63 d'Ottawa cl. Canada « coopération franco-canadienne »; Comeau and Fournier (2002), 105; Bastien (1999), 63-64; Philippe Gaillard, *Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard* (Grand livre du mois, 1995), 266-267. The Elysée's African "proconsul," Jacques Foccart, characterized Canadian actions at Niamey I as extremely prejudicial to the French position, and ascribed de Gaulle's initial ambivalence about the institutionalization of the Francophonie to his concern that Ottawa would use it to establish itself in Africa. Also, Peyrefitte (2000), 79. Pompidou apparently was concerned de Gaulle's actions in Montreal could harm the Francophonie by stoking fears of French neo-imperialist designs.

⁸⁸ Black (1997), 88.

constitutional position and send a message that Paris' was maintaining its Quebec policy in the post-de Gaulle era.⁸⁹ Morin subsequently interceded with French authorities, however, to ensure that Ottawa was formally notified of the meeting and that there would be a federal presence at it, seeing it as being in Quebec's greater interest to avoid a full-blown crisis that could provoke the loss of what it had achieved regarding participation in the Francophonie.⁹⁰

During the September 1969 Sharp-Schumann encounter, things quickly became acrimonious when the Paris meeting was raised, with both foreign ministers blaming the other's capital of undermining the compromise Ottawa and Quebec City had reached regarding the Kinshasa conference.⁹¹ Angered over the de Lipkowski Affair, Pompidou instructed the MAE not to cede to Ottawa on the issue, and another confrontation was only avoided when Ottawa and Quebec City reached a last-minute agreement that saw Quebec's junior Minister of Education, Jean-Marie Morin, lead a Canadian delegation that included representatives of other provinces and federal advisors.⁹²

The de Lipkowski Affair fuelled federal anxiety in Ottawa over French actions on Quebec's behalf in advance of Niamey II, but the general view in Ottawa

⁸⁹ MAE, v. 331 – Telegram from de Menthon to MAE, Amérique, 13 March 1969; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3, Dossier Personnel – Letter from Héroux, MAIQ, Directeur des Délégations, to Chapdelaine, 21 April 1969; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 3 – Letter from Trudeau to Bertrand, 25 April 1969; Bastien (1999), 53.

⁹⁰ Morin (1987), 159-161. Morin acknowledges the role that Bertrand's more conciliatory attitude played in the decision.

⁹¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 24 – Telex from Canadian Mission, New York, to DEA and PMO (Lalonde), 24 September 1969, Conversation with Mr. Schumann; Black (1997): 111.

⁹² ANF, 5AG2/1021 – 24/25 September 1969, Entretien entre M. Sharp, Secrétaire aux Affaires Extérieures du Canada, et M. Maurice Schumann – tél, no 2889/99 de New-York – cl. Conférence des Ministres de l'Éducation – Annotation du Président de la République; Bastien (1999), 54; Black (1997), 124. Black describes this arrangement in positive terms, claiming it set the precedent followed thereafter whereby a Quebec minister led the Canadian delegations to conferences of francophone ministers of education, and Paris' acceptance of the arrangement.

in early autumn 1969 was that efforts to cultivate relations with the various African capitals meant that the federal cause was in a rather favourable position, a belief reinforced by the fact the draft statutes for the ACCT favoured Ottawa's position by providing only for the membership of "pays" (i.e. sovereign states), which meant only federal participation in the organization. Ottawa was determined, in anticipation of the conference, to secure both Quebec City's and Paris' recognition of the primacy, if not exclusivity, of the federal prerogative in foreign affairs.⁹³

Ottawa's guarded optimism and the federal position eroded steadily under a concerted France-Quebec effort in the months preceding Niamey II. Acting on a request from Quebec City, where there was consternation at the draft charter, and encouraged by Philippe Rossillon, Jean de Lipkowski interceded with President Diiori to make clear that it was Quebec, not Canada, that should be the participant in the ACCT.⁹⁴ Pompidou considered it "indispensable" that Diiori send Quebec an invitation, and Jacques Foccart, the highly influential Elysée Secretary-General for African Affairs, brought his personal pressure to bear on Niger's leader.⁹⁵ Quebec City and Paris also undertook to have the draft statutes revised, concerned that what was proposed would not only marginalize Quebec and impede its effort to achieve a

⁹³ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 25 – Memorandum from Sharp to Trudeau, 20 October 1969, *Dimension africaine de notre politique envers la France et le Québec*; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10688, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 8 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 23 October 1969, *Francophonie – Agence*; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10688, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 9 – Memorandum from Cadieux to Sharp, 16 January 1970; Bastien (1999), 59; Granatstein and Bothwell (1990), 148.

⁹⁴ MAE, v. 232 – Note for the Secrétaire d'État, 16 September 1969, *Entretien de M. de Lipkowski avec M. Hamani Diiori*; Bastien (1999), 58-59.

⁹⁵ Jacques Foccart, *Dans les bottes du général, Journal de l'Elysée, volume III, 1969-1971* (Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1999), 208; Bastien (1999), 61.

distinct international personality, but threatened French influence in Africa by virtue of the rather ambitious multilateral organization envisaged.⁹⁶

By early February 1970, Ottawa was forced to recognize that its position was under attack, given Quebec's claims to have French support in undertaking a revision of the proposed statutes to provide for separate Quebec participation, and mounting evidence that Paris was once again seeking an invitation for Quebec.⁹⁷ Federal worries were heightened when it learned that de Lipkowski had contacted the various African capitals to emphasize Quebec would not participate in Niamey II without a direct invitation, arguing that it would be a shame if an anglophone country [sic] succeeded in imposing its will on the Francophonie. Any solace Ottawa had from its (mistaken) belief that de Lipkowski had acted on his own initiative was tempered by worries that he was backed by Gaullist protectors, which made Pompidou a prisoner of his pro-Quebec advisors.⁹⁸

Ottawa brought its own pressure to bear. Trudeau contacted Pompidou to make him aware Ottawa would oppose any initiative during Niamey II liable to undermine the principle of state sovereignty regarding the proposed ACCT. Federal efforts also resulted in Diori writing to Premier Bertrand only to *inform* him of the

⁹⁶ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10688, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 10 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 21 January 1970.

⁹⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10688, 26-4-1969-NIAMEY, p. 10 – Memorandum from Stansfield, Coordination Division to SSEA (PDM), 6 February 1970.

⁹⁸ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 20 February 1970, Niamey II; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 2 – Telex from de Goumois, Canadian Delegation, Niamey to Bissonnette, DEA, 12 March 1970, Francophonie – Niamey II; Foccart (1999), 234-235. In fact, Pompidou had sent de Lipkowski to the African capitals, fearing that the failure of a direct Elysée initiative to secure Quebec an invitation would harm his international credibility.

conference, and doing so in a manner that underscored the federal interpretation of the foreign policy power.⁹⁹

When the Canadian embassy sought the Elysée reaction to Trudeau's message, Jean-Bernard Raimond would only say that there would be no difficulties so long as Ottawa and Quebec City came to a prior agreement regarding Quebec's participating in the meeting.¹⁰⁰ Raimond was much more forthcoming with Michel Jobert, the Elysée Secretary-General, to whom he expressed doubts as to whether the ACCT's creation was worth the risks involved to French interests. Raimond recommended Paris seek a postponement since beyond specific French interests in Africa, it appeared Quebec was not going to be able to attend in its own right, and that Paris faced arriving in Niamey having to deal with a Canadian delegation "à vocation anglophone" backed by African leaders influenced significantly by Ottawa.¹⁰¹ Raimond's advice followed assurances that Jean Chapdelaine received from senior MAE official and Quebec lobby member Jean-Daniel Jurgensen, that Paris would propose a delay of Niamey II if Quebec felt it had to boycott the meeting.¹⁰²

The discussion in Paris of a boycott, however, was shaped by France's specific interests in Africa, and influenced by what was viewed as Quebec City's *attentisme*. At the end of January, reflecting French bewilderment over political developments in Quebec, Pompidou described Quebec as "un partenaire très

⁹⁹ Morin (1987), 205-210; DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Conférence de Niamey, Compte rendu d'un entretien de M. Tremblay avec l'Ambassadeur de France, 27 February 1970; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 1 – Discuté avec l'Ambassadeur de France, 27 February 1970, P. Tremblay, PDS.

¹⁰⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 26 – Telex from Canadian Embassy, Paris, to DEA, 6 March 1970, Niamey Conference.

¹⁰¹ ANF, 5AG2/1039 – Note to Jobert, 6 March 1970, Conférence de Niamey.

¹⁰² ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Note: Niamey, Chapdelaine, 5 March 1970.

mollasson” beset by internal division. Jacques Foccart agreed with the French leader’s analysis that in the face of federal strength, Quebec City appeared disinclined to follow France, so that it was necessary for Paris to avoid finding itself in an exposed position within the Francophonie. As a consequence, despite Pompidou’s initial inclination to back a Quebec boycott, Foccart was able to persuade him that the conference should proceed, to avoid a diplomatic setback and a loss of influence among its former colonies that would be disappointed with the collapse of the ACCT.¹⁰³

The divisions in Paris over the best course of action reveal that the tensions between Ottawa and Paris over Niamey II were linked to the parallel differences between Ottawa and Quebec City. De Lipkowski’s reaction to Trudeau’s message to Pompidou was that it was indicative of federal attempts to block Quebec from acting internationally, and Pompidou’s was that the Canadian leader’s approach was “un peu fort.”¹⁰⁴ Federal anxiety about Paris’ actions prompted Trudeau to reiterate to Bertrand that Ottawa opposed Quebec’s bid for separate membership in the ACCT as a threat to Canada’s international unity. Reiterating Ottawa’s preference for an organization of sovereign states, Trudeau alluded to a withdrawal of federal support from the proposed agency if France or any other country acting on Quebec’s behalf

¹⁰³ Foccart (1999), 237-241, 253-254. Pompidou’s initial reaction was that “nous faisons la francophonie pour le Québec, et ce serait complètement ridicule de la faire avec le Canada sans le Québec”; however, the French leader was also concerned that Paris’ decision to back the Québec boycott be discreet, fearing Quebec would use the support to strike at Ottawa and that it would be Paris that would suffer as a result.

¹⁰⁴ Bastien (1999), 56-57.

undermined Ottawa, suggesting that Quebec would be blamed for the collapse of the multilateral initiative by virtue of its obstinacy.¹⁰⁵

Facing a firm federal stance and what he described as a “retournement française” as Paris strove for a solution that could rally the various African delegations but not prevent Quebec participation in the francophonie, Claude Morin was pessimistic in the days preceding Niamey II about Quebec’s ability to influence events. In his view, the only trump that Quebec City retained was the threat of boycott. In responding to Trudeau’s threat to withdraw its support, Bertrand referred obliquely to this when he declared that there was a point beyond which Quebec City could not make any concessions, and asserting it crucial that Quebec’s presence and activities in the Francophonie be adequately identified, and that in ACCT activities it be able to speak in its own name and make engagements in areas of its jurisdiction.¹⁰⁶

Ill-prepared for the threat of a boycott and confident that Quebec’s interest in attending Niamey II would ultimately overcome any objections regarding the federal conditions for its participation, Ottawa now agreed to most of Quebec’s requirements for distinctive identification of its delegates, and conceded that the head of Quebec’s delegation could speak in Quebec’s name in terms of provincial subjects and viewpoints.¹⁰⁷ The question of Quebec’s attending Niamey II was thus resolved. There was no guarantee, however, that Ottawa would not use the ACCT’s charter to

¹⁰⁵ DEA, A-4, v. 3166, 32-C-1970(2) – Memorandum to Cabinet, 2 March 1970, Participation du Canada à la conférence de Niamey et l’Agence de coopération culturelle et technique, Annexe; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 1 – Letter from Trudeau to Bertrand, 7 March 1970.

¹⁰⁶ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Telegram from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 9 March 1970, Niamey; ANQ, P762, 1999-10-011, v. 62, Relations Internationales du Québec, Documents portant sur la participation du Québec à l’ACCT, 1970-1971 – Telegram from Bertrand to Trudeau, 10 March 1970; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Letter from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 13 April 1970.

¹⁰⁷ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Letter from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 13 April 1970; Granatstein and Bothwell (1990), 149.

reverse Quebec gains in terms of its international activities and block its distinct participation in the Francophonie.¹⁰⁸

Any federal hope that the agreement with Quebec City would encourage French cooperation was quickly dashed. Pompidou responded to Trudeau's earlier message with the claim that Paris respected the principle of state sovereignty, but was equally of the view that ACCT membership should be open to the membership of various universities, private associations, and non-sovereign governments, thereby facilitating Quebec's distinct participation in the proposed Agence and effectively endorsing the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine's core claim that Quebec's sovereignty in its domestic jurisdiction bestowed on it the capacity to act internationally.¹⁰⁹ Further proof of French intentions came when Gérard Pelletier, federal Secretary of State and head of Canada's delegation, arrived in Paris en route to Niamey. Pelletier was given France's proposed revisions to the ACCT statutes that provided for a distinct Quebec membership, with Maurice Schumann warning that Paris would not abandon Quebec, and would move unilaterally to establish an organization excluding Canada if Niamey II ended in failure.¹¹⁰

The erosion of the federal position was apparent as discussions in Niamey began. Prominent Quebec lobby members Jean-Daniel Jurgensen and Philippe Rossillon were in attendance as advisors to France's contingent. With Premier Bertrand having just called an election, Quebec's delegation was led by Julien

¹⁰⁸ Morin (1987), 218.

¹⁰⁹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 2 – Memorandum to Trudeau, 17 March 1970, Niamey II – Attitude de la France; Foccart (1999), 253-254.

¹¹⁰ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 2 – Telegram from Pelletier to DEA, 16 March 1970, Francophonie – Niamey II – Propositions Françaises; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 2 – Telegram from Black, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 16 March 1970, Francophonie – Interview Schumann-Pelletier.

Chouinard, secretary to the Quebec Cabinet, who also served as the Canadian delegation's vice-chair. During the negotiations, France's representatives proposed that in addition to the sovereign states signing the ACCT charter, that "participating governments" that had constitutional competence in matters under the organization's purview be permitted to sign. Reticence from the African delegations prompted the French to add the qualification that such governments should have the approval of the sovereign state of which they were a part. Pelletier informed Ottawa that there was little sympathy among the delegations present for federal opposition to the French proposal.¹¹¹ Paris had completely outflanked Ottawa in its efforts to block a distinct Quebec participation in the ACCT. Trudeau initially refused to countenance the French proposal, but an awkward Canadian effort to block it proved fruitless. The dearth of support among the other delegations for the Canadian rearguard action, and the prospect of being blamed for the collapse of the conference and the failure of the ACCT, effectively forced Ottawa to accept Paris' proposal and a distinct Quebec participation in the Francophonie.¹¹²

Quebec City was understandably pleased with the results of Niamey II. Claude Morin had worried that Quebec was facing a major political defeat, the establishment of the ACCT without provision for a separate Quebec participation. Jean Chapdelaine had even mused that, faced with this prospect, it might not be a

¹¹¹ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 2 –Telex from Pelletier, Canadian Delegation, Niamey to DEA, 18 March 1970, Conf-Niamey II; Bastien (1999), 66.

¹¹² DEA, A-3-c, v. 8647, 20-1-2-FR, p. 27 – Mémoire au Cabinet, 19 March 1970, Niamey II – Attitude envers la France; Bastien (1999)m 67-68; Bothwell and Granatstein (1990), 149-152. The federal counter-proposal was that the French provision would not apply to federal states that were themselves signatories to the ACCT charter, thereby ruling it a dead letter in terms of Canada and Quebec.

catastrophe if the ACCT were stillborn.¹¹³ With Julien Chouinard signing the ACCT charter on its behalf, Quebec became effectively a member of an international organization and the core of the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine – that Quebec was entitled to act internationally in its areas of constitutional jurisdiction – was confirmed and institutionalized. Although the victory was qualified in that it had been dependent on Ottawa's consent, the reality remained that Ottawa's attempts to assert exclusive federal control of foreign affairs had fallen short; Ottawa was forced to accept Quebec as a participating government in the Francophonie. The view among Quebec's officials was that they and their French counterparts had used the question of Quebec participation to mutual benefit. Chapdelaine opined that Ottawa had failed to understand it had overreached in trying to put Quebec in its place, which resulted in Canada being put in its place and presented with a failure at Niamey. The Delegate-General expressed the hope the outcome would lead to increased Quebec influence in CIDA and a similarly autonomous position in other international bodies, including UNESCO and the OECD.¹¹⁴ Echoing Chapdelaine's optimistic appraisal and using a poker analogy, Morin claimed that Quebec had beat a flush with a pair of twos, owing to French assistance that he described as essential to ensuring Quebec's victory in the face of a stronger federal position.¹¹⁵

Paris was also satisfied with the outcome of its efforts, both in terms of its relations with francophone Africa, and its approach to triangular relations. The co-

¹¹³ Morin (1987), 210; ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Note: Niamey, Chapdelaine, 5 March 1970.

¹¹⁴ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Conférence de Niamey II, 16-20 mars 1970, Report by Chapdelaine, 31 March 1970.

¹¹⁵ ANQ, P776, 2001-01-006, v. 4, Niamey, 1969-1970 – Letter from C. Morin to Chapdelaine, 13 April 1970.

chair of the French delegation, Pierre Billecocq, the Secretary of State for National Education, was proud of what had been accomplished, reporting to an equally satisfied Pompidou that a large number of African states had signed on to the charter, the new organization's headquarters would be in Paris thereby permitting maximal French influence, and there were provisions for a distinct Quebec membership, with Ottawa's – reluctant – blessing.¹¹⁶

There was much more ambivalence in federal circles. Although Trudeau declared publicly the Francophonie to be the only winner, the view in the DEA was that any satisfaction over the ACCT's creation and Canadian membership in it had to be balanced against the circumstances of its birth and the fact that, contrary to prior federal expectations, the MAE appeared to be maintaining the Gaullist Quebec policy. From Paris, Eldon Black complained that Ottawa appeared weaker for having been forced to compromise at Niamey II, and feared Quebec's Gaullist sympathizers would be emboldened, making it even more difficult to convince Paris to discontinue its dualistic policy and not intervene in Canadian affairs.¹¹⁷

Confronting the reality that its de Gaulle-centric analysis had proved flawed and the Pompidou Government was maintaining privileged relations with Quebec City, Ottawa had to content itself with incremental steps toward a more normalized relationship with Paris. This included the welcome Mitchell Sharp received during his April 1970 visit to Paris that was warm relative to the tensions of the preceding years, including Maurice Schumann's assurances that Pompidou desired normalized

¹¹⁶ Bastien (1999), 68.

¹¹⁷ DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 2 – Memorandum from Bissonnette to GRF, 26 March 1970, Les suites de la Conférence de Niamey, Questions politiques; DEA, A-3-c, v. 10691, 26-4-1970-NIAMEY, p. 2 – Telex from Black, Canadian Embassy, Paris to DEA, 23 March 1970, Relations France-Canada au lendemain de Niamey II.

relations more than ever. The Foreign Minister responded with obvious discomfort to Sharp's criticism of French actions during Niamey II, claiming that Paris did not want to interfere in Canadian affairs. Further encouragement came during this trip when the French Government's spokesman, Léo Hamon, told a DEA official that Ottawa could expect an "inflexion" of French policy regarding Canada.¹¹⁸

Sharp interpreted the rather positive visit as a signal of French will for a rapprochement, but the veterans of Canada's embassy were more sceptical. Indeed, Pompidou in advance of Sharp's arrival had instructed French officials to be careful to maintain Paris' policy regarding Quebec's distinct participation in the Francophonie. In terms of a planned French ministerial visit to Canada, Pompidou decreed that this should be a minister whose responsibilities did not fall under provincial jurisdiction, so that there would be no reason for him to visit Quebec. In arranging for a strictly federal visit, this would enable Paris to maintain its policy that French governmental officials could visit Quebec City without going to Ottawa.¹¹⁹

Paris could in any event afford to make more friendly overtures toward Ottawa. Quebec's apparent *attentisme* regarding its political future made it difficult for Paris to pursue a more aggressive policy. In the interim, the renewal of the 1965 cultural agreements meant that the basis of the France-Quebec special relationship

¹¹⁸ Black (1997), 144-148.

¹¹⁹ ANF, 5AG2/1021 – Telegram from Siraud to MAE, 12 December 1969, Relations franco-canadiennes; ANF 5AG2/1049 – Annotations du Président, 8/9 janvier 1970, tél 8/15 d'Ottawa cl. Canada; ANF 5AG2/1021 – Note, 5/6 février 1970, tél 113/115 d'Ottawa, cl. Canada « Visites » rappel à Québec – « Notes du Président »; ANF 5AG2/1021 – Note, 21 janvier 1970, tél 42/45 d'Ottawa, cl. Canada – « Visite » rappel à « Canada – Notes du Président » - Échanges de visites ministérielles. Similarly indicative of the Pompidolienne approach was the French leader's instruction that Quebec City be asked to not extend an invitation to the French minister to visit during his time in Canada, and his declaring that given the April 1970 Sharp visit and planned French ministerial visit to Ottawa, it would be necessary to have a French minister visit Quebec to avoid any suggestion that Paris was retreating from its Quebec policy.

was secure. Combined with the outcome of Niamey II, the neo-nationalist objectives for Quebec's international activity had largely been achieved: if Ottawa continued to claim it possessed a *droit de regard*, Quebec was able to pursue what amounted to direct, privileged relations with France and the Francophonie.

The road to normalization thus promised to be slow and not without detours. Despite the establishment of the ACCT, the constitutional debate over the competence for Canada's foreign affairs remained unresolved, as would be demonstrated by a renewed conflict between Ottawa and Quebec City in the months preceding the ACCT conference held in the two capitals in 1971, over the modalities of Quebec's participation in the Agence.¹²⁰ This continued rivalry could only increase amid the efforts to reform the Canadian constitution and the broader debate over Quebec's political future. Moreover, Quebec's new Premier, Robert Bourassa, was determined that the core of Quebec's cooperation with France should endure, and was surrounded by officials determined to maintain what Quebec had achieved regarding its international activities. Most broadly, despite the changes that had taken place in all three capitals, the triangular relationship was poised to continue by virtue of the fact the nationalist responses on both sides of the Atlantic that had emerged and intersected after the Second World War were still playing out. Quebec City still had to contend with its *question nationale*, for which Ottawa had its own answer, and France had to come to terms with the Gaullist legacy. The acceleration of globalization was to ensure that the nationalist responses to which the advent of this international phenomenon had helped give rise would continue to interact and clash in the years to come.

¹²⁰ Bastien (1999), 68-69.

Chapter 18

Conclusion

Charles de Gaulle's *cri du balcon* was an electric moment of high political theatre, a cathartic occasion as he gave succour to Quebec nationalist aspirations, vaunted the ties of culture, history, and sentiment between France and Quebec, and urged solidarity between their two populations. Far from marking the beginning of tensions in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle, much less giving rise to Quebec's debate on the *question nationale* and Canada's accompanying unity crisis, the significance of the French leader's remarks derived from their being a dramatic climax to the triangle's components' interwoven evolutions after 1945, and their interaction with profound developments in international relations. De Gaulle's actions may have been in the avant-garde, but he was by no means alone in the sentiments he expressed. Indeed, he may be viewed as the personification of the nationalist reactions that had arisen on both sides of the Atlantic in response to the intersection of international trends and realities with local circumstances, some of which the triangle's components held in common, others that were unique to each. Montreal's Place Jacques-Cartier was the location on July 24, 1967 for the dramatic convergence and clash of these nationalist reactions, of efforts to come to terms with preponderant US influence and what was being referred to as globalization, and the implications of both for questions of national identity, development, and independence.

This exploration of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle after the Second World War has focused on the paradox at its core – the notion that the conditions that

encouraged the rapprochement were also those that spawned the tensions of the 1960s. I have argued that the emergence of Quebec neo-nationalism and the Gaullist variant of French nationalism, a result of the interplay of domestic and international conditions, spurred a France-Quebec rapprochement, initially in the private sphere but increasingly in the public sphere as the Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist reactions achieved power. The rise of these first two nationalist responses and the growing allegiance between them presented a dilemma for the third nationalist reaction, a Canadian one principally English-Canadian in origin but that included francophone and other elements, fuelled by the same international trends as its French and Quebec counterparts. Quebec neo-nationalism called into question the conceptualization and even unity of “Canada” as a political entity; the Gaullist response posed fundamental questions about the basis of Canada’s international life; in combination, the Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist responses challenged fundamental assumptions and objectives of Canadian nationalism. The dynamic was equally true in reverse, and the result was an increasingly complex triangular dynamic in which proliferating links existed alongside the growth of suspicion, tension, and confrontation.

This understanding of the triangular tensions of the 1960s was achieved through the use of a multilevel analysis drawing on the new diplomatic history in examining the interacting behaviour of decision-makers in Ottawa, Quebec City, and Paris, and acknowledging the importance of the interplay between the domestic and international spheres. Broadening the scope of analysis, including paying greater attention to the pre-1960 period has revealed the importance of factors beyond the governmental level, not least the crucial cultural dimension of triangular relations. As

such, the triangular tensions were significant as an historic episode not just in and of themselves, but for the insight they provide into the respective (albeit interconnected) development of Canada, Quebec, and France, and for the greater understanding they facilitate of the history of international relations. This includes the questions of identity and the place of “nation” in the globalization era, and related to this, the efficacy of nationalist responses to “Americanization,” or, understood more broadly, the deepening of economic interdependence and the proliferation of transnational exchanges that comprised globalization.

The conditions for this convergence and clash of nationalisms in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle ripened throughout the post-1945 period. Bilateral contact and cooperation between Canada and France was greater than ever in the decade after the Second World War. In contending with US geo-political strength and the Cold War, Ottawa and Paris viewed each other as useful and necessary allies, reflected in their cooperation in multilateral forums and a shared Atlanticism. The two capitals, however, embraced this foreign policy response out of differing motivations. By 1954, amid NATO’s growing internal tensions, Atlanticism had evolved into a source of discord in Canada-France relations. French foreign policy took on an increasingly nationalist hue, chafing at an Atlanticism that to a growing segment of French opinion appeared an ill-disguised vehicle for American hegemony. Canadian nationalist concern about US geo-political strength also grew during the period, but Ottawa continued to view Atlanticism as the most effective guarantor of Canada’s autonomy and international action. The result was a persistent Canadian effort to mitigate discord in the North Atlantic, manifested most dramatically during the Suez Crisis.

This divergence over Atlanticism led to a deterioration of the Canada-France relationship during the latter half of the 1950s.

Nationalist-inspired differences were even more pronounced in the economic sphere. Canada and France emerged from the war in different economic situations, but both had to contend with preponderant American economic power and their dependence on this for their prosperity. Ambitions for a more substantial economic relationship went unrealized as the two countries diverged over foreign economic policy. Paris' preoccupation with recovery, maintaining a leadership position on the continent, and reducing US economic influence led Paris to employ a protectionist – or more accurately, a bounded liberal – policy oriented increasingly toward Europe, reflected in its contribution to the emergence of the European Common Market. The growing regionalization of international trade that this entity represented ran counter to Ottawa's liberal internationalist trade policy, designed to diminish the relative strength of the US in Canada's economy through a multilateral trading regime that would diversify Canada's economic relations. The differences between Canadian and French foreign economic policy meant the economic relationship stagnated in relative terms, symptomatic of and reinforcing the two countries' orientation toward their respective continental markets, and fuelling nationalist anxiety in Canada.

Such nationalist anxiety draws attention to the other dimension of the Canada-France economic relationship. Consistent with the international trend toward increased economic interdependence and transnationalism, exchanges between the two countries grew in absolute terms – not just monetarily but in terms of interpersonal contacts. This aspect of economic relations fuelled interest in a more

robust relationship as an end in itself, but also spurred a more defensive motivation arising from concern about the implications of American economic influence, including the question of Americanization. In addition to a Canadian concern to see the restoration of the country's European economic counterweight to the US, the rise of French-Canadian neo-nationalism was accompanied by a growing interest in cooperation with France as Quebec adapted to new socio-economic realities and neo-nationalists sought to preserve its francophone identity. These nationalist preoccupations found a receptive audience in France, which was itself contending with Americanization. Nationalist considerations thus figured prominently in questions of Paris' approach to economic relations with Canada, especially Quebec.

The preoccupation with Americanization evident in all three components of the triangle also played a determining role in shaping the cultural dimension of relations, which consistent with the global proliferation of transnational cultural exchanges, underwent the most substantial growth and evolution. The trend was especially pronounced between France and French Canada, highlighting Quebec's socio-cultural transformation as the traditional nationalist order with its preference for *France éternelle* was eclipsed by elements favouring *France moderne* and exchanges of a more secular, liberal, and progressive nature. These exchanges not only reflected but contributed to Quebec's development in the years preceding the Quiet Revolution. The period was also characterized by a shift in the way francophone Quebec's nationalist elite viewed French Canada's cultural relationship with France; the idea of French Canada as a dependent consumer or agent on behalf of French culture faded

relative to the notion of it being a producer and contributor to international francophone culture, shaped by its North American reality, that merited recognition.

As in the economic sphere, Quebec's coming to terms with its *americanité* also produced a more negative, defensive impetus for the growth of cultural relations with France. Consistent with the longstanding nationalist mission to preserve Quebec's francophone identity, neo-nationalist elements turned to *France moderne* for protection from Americanization, considered all the more a threat by virtue of Quebec's socio-economic evolution and the growing strength of American cultural influence among the general population.

Neo-nationalist interest in cultivating cultural links with France was part of the broader push for an activist Quebec state – not least in cultural affairs – to ensure the survival and development of North America's *fait français*. The concern to see a greater governmental involvement was also spurred by the latent constitutional rivalry between Ottawa and Quebec City over culture and the broader question of French Canada's place in Confederation. For it was not just Canada's francophone population that was coming to terms with the "American" dimension of its identity; in English Canada too, American cultural influence was a going concern. Already apparent in the interwar period, an English-Canadian nationalist reaction arose that after the war pushed Ottawa to increase its cultural action. These federal efforts clashed with Quebec nationalist sensibilities that, shaped by Canada's history, held that French Canada could not afford to see Quebec cede any of its autonomy in cultural affairs.

The increasing politicization of cultural affairs in Canada was part of a more profound international trend. Indeed, constitutional, institutional, and ideological biases meant Ottawa and Quebec City lagged behind as cultural exchanges – increasingly of a public nature – grew in significance as part of international relations. Paris was much further advanced in this regard, deploying its cultural strength to compensate for its diminished geopolitical and economic power. The challenge of American cultural influence that accompanied the growth and evolution of transnational cultural exchanges after 1945 provided further impetus to greater involvement of the French state in cultural affairs. Despite its geographic location, France, like Canada and Quebec, had to come to terms with its own “American reality,” and was preoccupied with the *rayonnement* of French culture at home and abroad.

By the end of the 1950s, amid the announcement that Quebec would open an office in Paris to promote economic and cultural cooperation, and following the combination of estrangement and rapprochement that the post-war years had witnessed, the stage was set for official triangular tensions. The interacting nationalist reactions on both sides of the Atlantic produced a dynamic of cooperation and confrontation that culminated in the *cri du balcon* and the crisis in the Canada-Quebec-France triangle.

The Quebec neo-nationalist achievement of power in 1960 with the election of the Lesage Government was preceded two years prior by the establishment of the Fifth Republic and the return to power of the Gaullist variant of French nationalism. Gaullism, with its emphasis on the independence of the nation, a Rankean

conceptualization of the appropriate relationship between nation and state, and preoccupation with the realization of French *grandeur*, was attracted to Quebec neo-nationalism's bid to equip Quebec as French Canada's national state. Interest in Quebec was especially pronounced among the group of Gaullist parliamentarians, diplomats, and senior civil servants known as the "Quebec lobby," but also went beyond Gaullist circles. The community of interest that the preceding years' proliferation of cultural contacts had encouraged combined with French concerns about US cultural strength to whet French interest in Quebec, an interest founded upon notions of ethno-cultural solidarity.

The France-Quebec rapprochement was further strengthened by the acceleration of political life in Quebec and accompanying questions about Canada's future. Up to 1960, Paris maintained a discreet attitude respecting Canada's federal reality. The advent of the Quiet Revolution, in combination with the French experience of decolonization, however, led to a growing consensus among the French political class that Quebec's *épanouissement* necessitated a fundamental change to Canada's constitutional and political order. Paris shifted toward an approach in its relations with Canada (or perhaps more accurately the 'Canadas') consistent with the 'two nations' thesis of Confederation that Quebec neo-nationalists propounded. In its most advanced form, Paris' 'Quebec policy' entailed not only support for but the active encouragement of Quebec independence.

Initially supportive of the France-Quebec *retrouvailles*, Ottawa's ensuing relative marginalization provoked a growing federal unease that Canadian nationalist preoccupations about Canada's identity and independence exacerbated. The

conservative variant of this nationalist reaction held that anything encouraging French-Canadian particularism or that endorsed the two nations thesis threatened Canada's unity. The liberal variant, more open to Quebec neo-nationalism, exhibited greater appreciation for French Canada as a point of differentiation from the US, and hoped to achieve a compromise that would preserve Canada's unity and a national co-existence that would ensure the survival of French and English Canada as cultural entities distinct from the US.

Consistent with this liberal variant was a preoccupation with cultivating relations with France and the international francophone community to respond to neo-nationalist pressures. Herein lay a fundamental source of the triangular tensions, as the Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist position held that Ottawa was incapable of conducting relations with France in a manner consistent with French-Canadian interests. In any case, it was unwelcome; rather, Quebec City believed that given the constitutional ambiguities regarding responsibility for Canada's foreign affairs, logic dictated that Quebec's sovereignty in its areas of domestic jurisdiction extended abroad. The longstanding debate over Canadian federalism was thus internationalized, as the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine argued that a failure to recognize Quebec's international capacity would result eventually in Ottawa encroaching on provincial areas of jurisdiction by way of its alleged primacy in foreign affairs, undermining the federal principle and constituting a threat to French Canada. Paris increasingly favoured this Quebec position. Although the Elysée was at the forefront of encouraging direct France-Quebec relations, the influence of Quebec's supporters at the Quai d'Orsay meant that the MAE also undertook to cultivate direct

cooperation, even while displaying a greater preoccupation to minimize federal objections and diplomatic incidents.

The strengthening France-Quebec axis represented a challenge for Ottawa, which resolutely opposed the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine, arguing that the unity of Canada's international personality and by implication the country itself, demanded federal primacy in foreign affairs irrespective of the subject matter. Ottawa found itself further marginalized as a result of its widening divergence with Paris over Atlanticism. In keeping with post-1945 Canadian foreign policy, Ottawa strove to reconcile Gaullist France to NATO and Washington to preserve the Atlanticist framework still deemed essential to Canada's autonomy from the US and the basis of its international action. Beyond this goal, there were federal hopes that the closer links with France would respond to neo-nationalist criticism that Canadian foreign policy responded inadequately to French Canada's needs, and in demonstrating to Gaullist nationalism the value of its Canadian ally, prevent against French interventions in Canada's unity debate. Motivated by this array of competing external and domestic aims, the Pearson Government's efforts were suspect in Gaullist eyes, and resulted in a vicious cycle of estrangement whereby the more Paris challenged the Atlanticist framework and the more Canada-France relations deteriorated, the more Ottawa strove to forge links with Paris, confirming the Gaullist view of Canada's drift into the US orbit and encouraging French interventions to bring about a new political entity in North America better placed to resist the pull of the US and serve as a useful ally for France.

It was out of this combination of nationalist-inspired ethno-cultural, political, and geo-political considerations that the triangular tensions of the 1960s emerged. The dynamic was apparent in the economic sphere as Quebec neo-nationalist efforts to achieve francophone economic empowerment as a means to greater autonomy and cultural survival meshed with the Gaullist challenge to US economic strength and broader French concerns to reconcile modernization with the preservation of France's national identity. A corollary of the growth of France-Quebec cooperation was the frustration of federal efforts to cultivate economic links, a condition exacerbated by the economic disputes arising from the ongoing divergence of French and Canadian foreign economic policy that confirmed the Gaullist view of Canada's satellization and reinforced the impetus for France-Quebec cooperation.

It was in the cultural domain that triangular relations and tensions were most apparent. Consistent with the conflicts between Ottawa and Paris over cultural affairs and responsibility for foreign affairs, Quebec City was increasingly assertive in pursuing cooperation with Paris as a means to realizing Quebec's neo-nationalist-inspired cultural vocation as French Canada's national government. Paris responded with enthusiasm, anxious to safeguard North America's *fait français* as part of the larger Gaullist challenge of US power – cultural and otherwise. The result was a series of cultural agreements that were progressively more official and wide-ranging, sparking federal concern about the apparent threat to Ottawa's interpretation of the constitutional basis for the conduct of foreign affairs, and the growing trend of French cultural activity in Canada to centre on Quebec, a policy that marginalized Ottawa

and the rest of Canada, and was accompanied by Paris' proclivity to treat directly with francophone minority groups outside Quebec.

The increasingly direct France-Quebec relations in the economic and cultural spheres were symptomatic of Paris' general favouring of the province's claims to a capacity for international activity, and became enmeshed in the efforts of Quebec's advocates in France to help it achieve a new political status. De Gaulle's visit was the apotheosis of this policy, ushering in the acute crisis phase of the triangular tensions, reflected in the French leader's subsequent explicit pronouncements in favour of Quebec independence and Paris' efforts to ensure a distinct Quebec participation in the Francophonie as a means to hasten this.

With Canadian nationalist interests being challenged from within and without, Ottawa faced the dilemma of responding to Gaullist and Quebec nationalist initiatives in a manner that did not reinforce the lopsided triangular dynamic and further erode Canada's constitutional position. This gave rise to divisions in federal circles, especially after July 1967, as the effectiveness of Ottawa's quiet diplomatic response was questioned and pressures grew for a more assertive, legalistic approach. Although the Trudeau Government's arrival in power was accompanied by Ottawa adopting more assertive positions, this was more a question of degree than of fundamental change, as Ottawa's principal dilemma in responding to the triangular dynamic remained in place.

In an immediate sense, changes of political leadership in the triangle's three capitals were accompanied by the passing of the acute crisis phase of triangular tensions. The change, however, had much to do with more profound domestic and

international conditions. Examining the economic dimension of triangular relations, for example, we see that the nationalist reactions to the advent of globalization proved unable to overcome the international phenomena to which they were responding. The complementarity of the Quebec neo-nationalist and Gaullist reactions led to increased contacts and exchanges. Despite a concerted effort in Quebec City and Paris, however, these exchanges never attained the scope desired by the advocates of France-Quebec economic cooperation. Even including Ottawa's efforts (admittedly motivated by a different set of considerations) to cultivate economic relations, the three components of the triangle were unable to overcome interrelated domestic and international realities. For all of the references to and actions to promote France-Quebec economic solidarity, the reality was that the French and Quebec (and, for that matter Canadian) private sectors were oriented toward their respective continental markets, so that the relative stagnation of the post-war economic relationship continued. Moreover, the inescapable irony was that for Quebec to realize the francophone economic empowerment it sought, the capital required was available only in the US, not in France.

The shortcomings of France-Quebec economic cooperation were all the more evident in the aftermath of the *événements* of May 1968, which undermined Paris' ability to assist Quebec. Conservative nationalist George Grant had predicted three years prior that Gaullism was destined to fail in the face of liberalism, and as Paris found itself increasingly isolated in its attempts to challenge US economic leadership, and compelled by the dictates of economic interdependence to moderate its foreign policy positions, Grant's lament for the French nation appeared prescient. The

dynamic was underscored by the mounting private sector reticence to follow Paris and Quebec City's political lead, arising from the concern that this was inspired by an agenda that could lead to instability. An examination of the outcome of the economic dimension of relations demonstrates the broader significance of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle to the history of international relations, as it illustrated the limits to the efficacy of nationalist responses to globalization.

The outcome of cultural triangular relations was more nuanced. As France-Quebec cultural cooperation grew in the second half of the 1960s, Ottawa sought to protect its position by increasing its cultural activities in France to avoid leaving the field to Quebec, and asserted its role as a viable interlocutor to facilitate contacts between France and French Canada, including Quebec. Ottawa opted for a qualified renewal of the accord cadre, rationalizing that the unsatisfactory situation that had arisen over the preceding years was still preferable to the crisis that could arise if the framework for cultural triangular relations collapsed. This decision was encouraged by Ottawa's expectation that the worst of the triangular tensions were over, and that changes of political leadership in Paris and Quebec City, along with that in Ottawa, held out the prospect of a triangular rapprochement. Despite its expressed reservations, however, in agreeing to renew the accord cadre, Ottawa had in a certain sense tacitly accepted privileged, direct France-Quebec relations in cultural affairs.

The cultural triangular relations of the 1960s were consistent with Marshall McLuhan's prediction that globalization would provoke a reaffirmation of particularism. These exchanges were founded upon a belief that only Quebec City was able and willing to ensure French Canada's survival in an era of proliferating

transnational exchanges, carried out with a Paris preoccupied with promoting the *rayonnement* of French culture in the face of Americanization. They clashed with an Ottawa fearing the France-Quebec rapprochement's implications not just in terms of what it asserted was an encroachment on its prerogative in foreign affairs, but as a threat to Canada's identity and even independence by effectively denying it the advantage of its *fait français*.

In this sense, the record of cultural triangular relations has implications for our understanding of the history of Canadian federalism. With the cooperation agreements it reached with France, Quebec demonstrated a willingness and ability to employ and bend the federal system in service to its needs. For all of the disputes of the 1960s over the circumstances under which cultural exchanges were to be carried out, and the fact that neither Ottawa nor Quebec City achieved complete satisfaction in this regard, the fact remains that Canadian federalism proved ultimately to be an adaptable beast, with Ottawa's *de facto* acceptance that the core of direct, privileged cultural cooperation between France and Quebec would endure.

The nature of the Canadian system and Quebec's place within (or without of) it, was of course at the core of the political triangular relationship. Quebec was able, with increasingly overt French assistance, to exploit the constitutional ambiguities over the competence for Canadian foreign affairs, and able to project itself abroad and achieve a distinct (if circumscribed) international personality, notably regarding its participation in the Francophonie. This was a significant achievement for Quebec neo-nationalism, and something it deemed essential to safeguard and promote. More broadly, the achievement was exemplary of the larger international phenomena of

increasing interdependence and transnational exchanges. The enhanced importance of “low politics” after 1945 was accompanied by growing efforts by sub-state entities to act internationally, reflecting globalization’s transformative impact on notions of state sovereignty upon which the Westphalian international order was based. The heightened sense of particularism accompanying globalization was reflected in the bids for increased Quebec autonomy, up to and including independence, which encouraged cooperation between the Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist reactions, and in Canadian nationalist sensitivity to anything perceived to threaten Canada’s unity or ability to resist the American embrace. The Canada-Quebec-France triangle was thus at the centre of the debate in international affairs of the period, a debate that has endured and intensified, over how to reconcile questions of sovereignty and national existence with a globalization that renders such concepts ephemeral.

This debate accompanying globalization was especially relevant to Canada by virtue of the dispute over the responsibility for foreign affairs, and more broadly its cultural cleavage and enduring discussion over the appropriate constitutional and political relationship among its population. For the *indépendantistes* and de Gaulle of course, the answer lay in Quebec’s independence. The complementarity between the Gaullist and neo-nationalist positions was reflected in the Lesage and Johnson Governments’ employing French interest in and support for Quebec as leverage to increase its autonomy within Confederation. There were limits, however, to this complementarity; even as Ottawa awoke to the scope of the challenge that the allied Gaullist and Quebec neo-nationalist responses constituted, there was a growing disconnect between these. Quebec’s political class and population in the main

appreciated French support – and even to a significant extent the *cri du balcon* – as a welcome validation of Quebec’s national existence and an invaluable boost to achieving greater autonomy. To the confusion of Paris and the disappointed expectations of de Gaulle, however, Quebec was not prepared to act as rapidly or as definitively on the answer that France’s leader proposed to the *question nationale*. Instead, consistent with a pragmatism conditioned by Quebec, Canadian, and North American realities, the advocates of the Quebec neo-nationalist and Canadian nationalist responses continued to engage each other within the existing federal framework as they sought to realize their linked political destinies.

This dissertation has demonstrated the value of the “new diplomatic history” to the study of Canada’s international activities, and more broadly, in demonstrating the interpermeability of the domestic and international spheres, the analytical potential of “internationalizing” Canadian history. The historian’s work is never done of course, and alongside the answers this study of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle has provided exist questions to which the further application of the new diplomatic history may provide greater understanding. There existed, for example, a gendered discourse accompanying the discussion of the triangular relations, and this aspect may shed further light onto how decision-makers approached the events of the 1960s and the broader question of Quebec’s political future. This study has also added to the examination, but more exploration is required, of the interacting efforts of Quebec and Canada to come to terms with their *americanité*. Conversely, the triangular dynamic offers intriguing avenues for the exploration of anti-Americanism’s transnational dimension, the flow of ideas and discourses that arose as populations

came to terms with preponderant US power and Americanization. This also draws attention to the cultural underpinnings of the linchpin thesis so prominent in Canadian foreign policy history and Atlanticism. Ottawa's adherence to Atlanticism and its linchpin efforts throughout the period studied in this work resulted in a foreign policy failure begging for a broader examination of the basis of Canada's international action and its coming to terms with post-1945 geopolitical realities. Readers will no doubt also have noted that although this work has sought to go beyond the enduring criticism of diplomatic history – that it is the story of what one clerk said to another – the voices in this work have come predominantly from political, cultural, and intellectual elites; although understandable given the events surveyed, there is surely analytical benefit to widening the frame of investigation further to include the voices of those individuals who participated in the increased exchanges that arose from the triangular relations of the 1960s and their interpretation of events, especially in terms of what insight this may provide regarding the construction and evolution of identity.

Finally, this approach should be applied to the history of the Canada-Quebec-France triangle beyond the period discussed in this work, since triangular tensions continued into the 1970s. This was because the nationalist reactions that had arisen on both sides of the Atlantic were continuing to play out and interact, and the domestic and international conditions that had fuelled these responses remained salient. Amid the deepening of globalization, France had to come to terms with the Gaullist legacy, and the new Pompidou Government, pushed by Quebec lobby members, was determined to pursue privileged relations with Quebec to ensure the development of the *fait français*. Although the trend was toward a less interventionist

policy, the expectation remained that Quebec was destined to accede to a new political status. In Canada, beyond concern about the scope of American influence, the debate over responsibility for Canada's international activity remained unresolved, part of the much larger constitutional debate, and there was a determination to recover the federal position in foreign affairs as part of the larger effort to stare down the Quebec neo-nationalist challenge and preserve Canadian unity. Even with the 1970 election of the Bourassa Government in Quebec that held out the possibilities for the emergence of a fragile *modus vivendi*, the question of Quebec's political future remained to be answered, as demonstrated by the *Parti Québécois* winning nearly a quarter of the popular vote, presaging its future electoral success. For all of these reasons then, it is more accurate to describe the Canada-Quebec-France triangle at the close of the 1960s as having entered a period of *attentiste* truce, rather than a period of rapprochement, as the echoes of de Gaulle's *cri du balcon* and the clash of nationalist responses to globalization to which this gave voice continued to reverberate on both sides of the Atlantic.

Appendix

Table 1 - Canadian Trade with France, 1944-1949 (in '000s of CDN dollars)¹

Year	Canadian Exports to France	% of Total Exports	Imports from France	% of Total Imports	Canadian Trade Balance with France
1944	15,865	0.47	9	0.00	15,856
1945	76,917	2.39	273	0.02	76,644
1946	69,748	3.03	4,551	0.25	65,197
1947	80,443	2.88	8,467	0.33	71,976
1948	92,216	2.99	12,443	0.48	79,773
1949	35,464	1.18	13,061	0.48	22,403

Table 2 - Canadian Trade with France, 1950-1960 (in '000s of CDN dollars)²

Year	Canadian Exports to France	% of Total Exports	Imports from France	% of Total Imports	Canadian Trade Balance with France
1950	18,110	0.58	14,423	0.46	3,687
1951	46,264	1.17	23,085	0.58	23,179
1952	47,999	1.11	18,388	0.47	29,611
1953	31,908	0.77	21,407	0.50	10,501
1954	33,440	0.85	21,331	0.54	12,109
1955	42,134	0.97	24,364	0.53	17,770
1956	52,710	1.09	31,719	0.57	20,991
1957	57,030	1.17	34,987	0.64	22,043
1958	44,688	0.91	40,007	0.79	4,681
1959	43,157	0.84	56,940	1.03	-13,783
1960	72,907	1.35	50,121	0.91	22,786

¹ Canada, Minister of Trade and Commerce, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Division, *Trade of Canada 1959-1960, v. 1, Summary and Analytical Tables* (Ottawa, August 1965). Note that the table takes into account only trade with metropolitan France.

² Canada, Minister of Trade and Commerce, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Division, *Trade of Canada 1959-1960, v. 1, Summary and Analytical Tables* (Ottawa, August 1965). Note that the table takes into account only trade with metropolitan France.

Table 3 – Canada Trade with France, 1950-1953 (in billions of francs)³

Year	Canadian Exports to France	French exports to Canada	French Trade Balance with Canada	Percentage of Cdn. imports covered by French exports
1950	7.8	4.7	-3.1	60
1951	18	7.7	-10.3	42
1952	26.8	6.6	-22.2	24
1953 (11 months)	12.7	8.5	-4.2	66

Table 4 – Canadian Trade with France, 1960-1970 (in '000s of CDN dollars)⁴

Year	Canadian Exports to France	Percentage of Total Canadian Export Trade	Canadian Imports from France	Percentage of Total Canadian Import Trade
1960	72,907	1.38	50,121	0.91
1961	71,923	1.24	54,280	0.94
1962	57,561	0.93	56,160	0.89
1963	63,428	0.93	58,170	0.88
1964	79,433	0.98	68,687	0.87
1965	87,273	1.02	96,103	1.11
1966	84,541	0.83	106,651	1.08
1967	80,608	0.72	130,080	1.17
1968	81,516	0.61	121,647	0.98
1969	128,583	0.88	151,841	1.07
1970	154,201	0.93	158,846	1.13

³ MAE, v. 141 – Note to File, 1 February 1954, Échanges commerciaux entre la France et le Canada.

⁴ Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book 1965* (Government of Canada, 1965), 917-922; Canada, Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book 1972* (Government of Canada, 1972), 1074-1081.

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