Polarization of Political Culture: Islam and Pakistan, 1958-1988

by

Jena Karim

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 0-494-12732-5
Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 0-494-12732-5

Abstract

Author: Jena Karim

Title of Thesis: Polarization of Political Culture: Islam and Pakistan, 1958-1988

Department: Institute of Islamic Studies

Degree: Master of Arts

This study examines the relationship between Islam and political culture in Pakistan in the four decades following its naissance. It assesses the validity of the argument that a polarity has emerged in the Pakistani political culture, consisting of Islamism and Islamic modernism. In the case of Pakistan, Islamism refers to the use of the primary sources of Islam law, the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth,* and *sunnah*, in crafting both policy and political institutions. Islamic modernism refers to the systematized use of these primary sources as well as other (external) sources, adjusted for contemporary circumstances. These ideologies, as defined here, are gleaned from the discourse of a Pakistani ideologues, Sayyid Abu'l A 'lā Mawdūdī and Fazlur Rahman. It examines the thought of Mawdūdī and Rahman as the discursive backdrop to the polarity of political culture. It then provides analysis of three regimes which exacerbate this polarity.

They include the Islamic modernist regime of Ayub Khan, from 1958 to 1969, the quasi-Islamist regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, from 1971 to 1977, and finally the Islamist regime of General Zia ul-Haq, from 1977 to 1988.

Rèsumè

Auteur: Jena Karim

Titre de la thèse: Polaritè de la culture politique: Islam et Pakistan, 1958-1988

Dèpartement: Institut d'Etudes Islamiques

Diplôme: Maîtrise en Arts

Cette étude examine le rapport entre l'Islam et la culture politique au Pakistan pendant les quatre décennies depuis sa naissance. Elle évalue la justesse de la position qui dit qu'une polarité ait surgit dans la culture politique pakistanaise, consistant de l'islamisme et du modernisme islamique. Dans le cas du Pakistan, par islamisme, on entend l'emploi des textes de base de le lois Islamiques, le Qur'ān, le ḥadith et la Sunnah, pour élaborer la politique générale, ainsi que les institutions politiques. Par modernisme islamique, on entend l'emploi systématique de ces textes de base ainsi que d'autres textes (externes), adaptés pour satisfaire aux circonstances contemporaines. Ces idéologies, ainsi définies, ont été retirées du discours de deux spécialistes pakistanais, Sayyid Abu'l A 'lā Mawdūdi et Fazlur Rahman. Cette étude examine la pensée de Mawdūdi et Rahman comme étant l'antécédent discursif de la polarité de la

culture politique. Ensuite, elle fournit une analyse des trois régimes politiques qui ont exacerbé cette polarité. Ceux-ci englobent le régime islamique moderniste de Ayub Khan, de 1958 à 1969, le régime quasi-islamiste de Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, de 1971 à 1977, et finalement le régime islamiste du général Zia ul-Haq, de 1977 à 1988.

To my parents, Sikandar and Zarifa Karim, whose unconditional support and wisdom have made everything possible.

Acknowledgements

The completion of thesis would not have been possible without the guidance of so many individuals. I would like to offer my gratitude to the faculty and staff at the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University. Dr. Sajida Alvi was an especially invaluable resource, with her guidance through the large volume of sources, and her tireless efforts in facilitating my understanding the case of Pakistan. I am truly grateful for her encouragement throughout the writing process and her generosity with time. I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to two faculty members at Oberlin College. Dr. Eve Sandberg has supported me throughout my academic endeavors over the past six years and taught me the delicate business of understanding political phenomena. Dr. Anna Gade introduced me to the study of Islam. Her intelligence and thoughtful approach to this discipline have been inspirational.

I would like to thank the staff of the Islamic Studies Library. Salwa Ferahian has been a wonderful resource due to her in-depth knowledge and willingness to guide researchers through their tenure at the IIS. Wayne St. Thomas was also incredibly helpful and patient, fielding innumerable questions and making the process of research more efficient. Finally, I would like to thank Heather Empey for her English translations of French sources, and other French-English translations contained within this thesis.

A Note on Transliteration

The Arabic and Urdu names and terms used in this thesis have been transliterated as per the guidelines set forth by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. The Arabic and Urdu long vowels have been transliterated with a line above the Romanized letter, as in "Mawdūdī." The emphatic consonants, ح, ص, and ط with no exact English equivalent have been transliterated with a dot under the Romanized letter, as in "ḥadīth." The consonant ع has been transliterated with an inverted apostrophe, as in "sharī 'a." The consonant ء has been transliterated with a conventional apostrophe, as in "Qur'ān."

Pluralized forms of the Arabic and Urdu words are presented in anglicized forms, as in "ḥadīths." Broken plurals are juxtaposed to the anglicized forms within parenthesis, as in (aḥādīth); those not provided follow the normal patterns of Arabic and Urdu morphology.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Introduction

A Brief Historical Overview and Definitions of Key Terms

The political culture of Pakistan represents a distinctive legacy of political tumultuousness, a lack of systemic regime change based upon a cohesive ideological premise rooted in consensus. This phenomenon is particularly problematic because the raison d'etre of Pakistan is a nation for Muslims, with the ability to practice Islam within the ethical principles prescribed in the tier of Islamic sources, the Qur'ān, ḥadīth, and sunnah. Thus, there would seem to be an implied ideological consensus.

Of course, any faith-based system contains elements of heterodoxy; however, there is no gray area of discourse in Pakistan, nor is the emphasis of dissent on the modes of religious practice. Rather, political discourse is polarized, caught between "Islamization" and "Islamic modernism," depending on which faction voices ideology with compromises made with other parties to gain political capital.

The political parties are diluted as a consequence of a multi-party system, where coalitions are established for shared interests in the treatment of specific policy, but these coalitions are not sustained on a shared ideological plane. What emerges is a boom and bust political cycle, where the regimes alternate between these two poles in the two forms of martial law and democracy, neither of which follows the rules of its

own definition. Specifically, martial law is not always oppressively authoritarian, nor is democracy entirely participatory, where the masses are *de facto* political patrons.

The rise and fall of regimes by opposition parties are fueled by reactionary rhetoric to the regime in power. Because of the lack of cohesive ideology to the extent of implementation of Islamic principles in governance, each regime is critiqued as not being committed to either Islam or democracy. These reactionary premises for discourse further polarize Islamism and Islamic modernism into mutually exclusive political ideology, with political leaders who widen this divide to gain political capital.

Essentially, this ideological chasm has developed into a dialectical relationship between Islamism and Islamic modernism that is a significant determinant of these inconsistent political preferences of the population. This polemic has been in effect since the inception of the state, although exacerbated in particular by three regimes of Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Zulfiqar Bhutto (1972-1977), and Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988).

The Necessity of Pakistan

The naissance of Pakistan was virtually a product of necessity. The two-state solution to the growing hostilities between the Hindus and Muslims of colonial India was perhaps the only way to diffuse a civil war. Even during the British Raj (1858-1947), the Indian National Congress (INC) was perceived by the Muslims as threatening their interests.[1] In 1928, at the time of the Nehru Report, the Indian National Congress leaders rejected separate electorates and special safeguards for Muslims on political and

[1] The Indian National Congress, which began in 1885, was the political organ of the Hindu populace in India. For more information on this body, please see: Kochanek, Stanley. "The Indian National Congress: The Distribution of Power between Party and Government." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, (4). August, 1966. 681-697

intellectual grounds.[2] Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan was, at the time, in negotiations with the Congress to safeguard Muslim interests. He offered an amendment to the Nehru Report which combined a strong federal government, infused with specific safeguards for Muslims.[3] In the decade following, Jinnah's role and interactions with the Muslim League intensified, whence he began to unify the Muslim population in their majority provinces of Bengal, Sind, Punjab, and the Frontier Province after the elections of 1937 retained the power of the Indian National Congress.[4]

After these elections, Jinnah began to negotiate India's political and military institutions with the INC and the Muslim League. British interests were also integrated into these negotiations out of necessity, and because of the turmoil of World War II, the British did not want the Indian military diluted to undermine the Asian military powerhouse.[5] However, the reality of the growing unrest was soon undeniable, and the British conceded that the breakdown of civil administration required some attention, and they considered partition. [6] Thereafter, Jinnah managed to negotiate the two-nation solution.

With economic institutions in place prior to the actual partition, the political institutions were largely based on the Indian and British models. Most Muslims united

---

[2] Sayeed, Khalid. *Politics in Pakistan, the Nature and Direction of Change.* New York: Praeger, 1980. 24-25

[3] *ibid.*

[4] *ibid,* and Ziring, Lawrence. *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century.* Lahore: Al-Abbas International, 1997. 21-22.

[5] Ziring, Lawrence. *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century,* 29-52.

[6] Ziring, Lawrence. *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century,* 29.

for this purpose of a state for Muslims, and as for heterodoxy within the Muslim population, Jinnah "probably felt after the establishment of the state that he could calm the religious passions."[7]

The creation of Pakistan thus arose from a desire to enfranchise the Muslim population of India, and safeguard those interests. However, there is an ideological gap between enfranchising a segment of the population and creating an Islamic state. This gap became more pronounced as the fervor of necessity wore off after the creation of Pakistan, and the more difficult task of state-building ensued.

Ideological Upheaval in State-Building

Lawrence Ziring notes that there was little or no conceptualization in defining the structure of the new state.[8] Moving beyond the argument for necessity and feasibility, it did not render actual political ideology on which the state would function. This was quite problematic in the decade that followed partition. Jinnah did not survive long after the creation of the state, when he died in 1948, he left a power and ideological vacuum. In the period from the creation of the state until Ayub Khan's martial law regime in 1958, there was ideological and political chaos. Liaquat Ali Khan, who immediately followed Jinnah as Governor-General, and later as Prime Minister, led a Constituent Assembly to develop political institutions for a nation which still lacked an

---

[7] Sayeed, Mahmood. *Politics in Pakistan,* 27.

[8] Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century,* 98.

identity or, more specifically, a body of political values to guide the process of creating a viable constitution.[9] Several more leaders and assemblies followed.

Still other issues arose. There were issues of local and tribal authority, to which certain areas had become accustomed. Thus, issues of representation plagued the assembly and the Constituent Convention charged with the development of a constitution. This is relevant to the ideological underpinnings of that state in that a plurality of tribes and ethnicities would yield a plurality of ideology. How could a state encompass pluralism? This plagued the nation into further partition later in 1971 and is treated more specifically in Chapter 3.

Also, and most salient to this analysis, what was the extent to which religion permeated the political infrastructure? Ziring notes that, "Pakistan has been the outcome of a religious movement made political; it could not therefore be true to itself if it did not sustain the religious circumstances of its origin."[10] He also notes that the Objectives Resolution of 1949 was the response to this desire to integrate religion into the governing infrastructures. The initial desire was to administer a state with a transcendental consciousness of sorts, whereby the legitimacy of the institutions was gleaned from God, who was the ultimate Sovereign. Thus, it became convention that anything repugnant to Islam would not stand, be it an act of law or a regime itself. However, it would turn out to be increasingly difficult to integrate normative religion into secular political institutions, where the actors themselves, the 'ulamā and the

---

[9] Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century,* 147-175.

[10] Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century,* 183.

political actors were not in ideological concert within their own ranks, as well as with one another.

Thus, in the desire to synthesize normative religion and political institutions, a polarity emerged, where differing interpretations and political realities continued to plague Pakistan and the development of a political culture not only lacking a consistent ideological framework, but consequently, a polarization of existing ideology.

As aforementioned, this analysis will focus on the regimes which exacerbated this polarity through their policies and rhetoric. However, such an analysis would be incomplete without an explication of the seemingly incompatible religious ideologies and their methodologies to assess what principles are behind the policies and rhetoric of these regimes. This follows in Chapter 1, where the discursive background of polarity is examined. The chapters thereafter focus on the three regimes themselves, and the conclusions about this polarity.

Definitions for Purposes of Clarity

In the case of Pakistan, *Islamism* (the ideology) and *Islamization* (the cache of policy) extend beyond *de jure* implementation of the shari'a; rather they refer to a political infrastructure ***solely*** premised on and administered by the ethical principles and institutions provided by the primary sources in Islamic law.

Islamic modernism refers to the *integration* of governing principles that are derived from these sources, with a political infrastructure progressively adjusted for socio-material and political conditions, through *ijtihād* and other means.[11]

Finally, at the level of elites, *political culture* refers to political behavior, policy, and the processes by which these policies are implemented. At the grassroots level, it refers to political behavior based upon inclinations towards rhetoric presented by the elites.

[11] These definitions are loosely based on those provided by William Sheppard in "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," In *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* vol 19, 1987. pgs 307-336. They are adjusted for the Pakistani case.

Scope and Format

This study seeks to bridge ideology/rhetoric and policy to evaluate political culture, and the polarization contained therein. The ideology and rhetoric of Islam in the case of Pakistan, coupled with the circumstances of its statehood make for a complex religio-political nexus. The scope of this thesis treats the thirty years following the first decade of statehood to indirectly assess the impact of a lack of an ideological blueprint, as well as to trace the trajectory and evolution of the ensuing polarity exacerbated in the regimes from 1958 to 1988.

This brand of religio-political analysis would be impossible without an assessment of the discourse fueling the ideology of the political actors in question. Thus, the first chapter details and compares the competing ideologies and rhetoric of Syed Abul A'la Mawdūdī, an Islamist and that of Fazlur Rahman, an Islamic modernist. This chapter examines their interpretations of the primary sources, especially the Qur'ān, and their methodologies in so doing. This then serves as the discursive backdrop to understand how Islamic ideology and methodology is expressed in Pakistan's public sphere. The use of these two actors was not random. Both were deeply involved in the political sphere, and this is reflected in their ideologies.

The next chapter begins the analysis of the intersection between Islamic modernist ideology and the policymaking it influenced. Ayub Khan did more than tout the Islamic modernist ideology and methodology in political rhetoric; he attempted its practice in policymaking. This chapter details this process, and its contribution in shaping political culture.

The regime of Zulfiqar Bhutto adds another layer of complexity to the mix. This chapter follows the same format as the previous chapter with analysis of ideology and policy. However, it does so through the lens of how Islam was used to gain political capital, as well as its subsequent effects on the continuum of polarity.

The last regime of this analysis examines the ideology and political manifestation of Islamism, the diametric opposite of Islamic modernism. The Zia ul-Haq regime is treated as the final point of exacerbation of polarity within the political culture of Pakistan, and the implications therein are discussed in this chapter.

While there are comparative elements woven throughout this study, the Conclusion attempts to undertake this more definitively to complete the assessment of the polarity. This is significant because this polarity within the political culture extends to current times, causing perennial instability in the region. With modern global conditions increasing the geopolitical significance of Pakistan, it is crucial to understand the roots of instability, so as not incise further instability with ineffective policy.

Sources

The sources employed in this study range from speeches and memoirs to political histories. Because the subject of this thesis falls within the latter half of the twentieth century, many of the primary sources were available in English translation. However, due to circumstance, political sensitivity, and a subsequent lack of availability, some chapters in this thesis contain more primary sources than others. This will become more apparent shortly in this discussion of the individual chapters of this inquiry. Also, the often incendiary nature of the policymaking of these regimes yielded many sources that run the gamut of bias and offer sometimes disparate data. Finally, it should be noted that the sources serve as data for the argument that a polarity exists in Pakistan's political culture. However, they do not address the argument specifically. The following discussions review the employed sources chapter by chapter.

Chapter 1: The Discursive Background of Polarity

Perhaps because Syed Abul A'la Mawdūdī was a noted ideologue and Fazlur Rahman was a thinker, many of their original writings were published, and thus consulted in the analysis of their discourse. For Mawdūdī, this included a variety of sources. His exegesis of the Qur'ān, *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān*, provides an Urdu translation as well as ideological and historical commentary of the Qur'ān. This work was treated as the premise of his political/ideological pieces. These pamphlets, including *Let Us Be Muslims* and *The Ethical Viewpoint of Islam* provide the ethical behavioral

prescriptions which are the hallmarks of the Islamist ideology, and are analyzed in some detail in this study.

The writings of Fazlur Rahman advocate a systematized approach to understanding and infusing Islamic principles into the public sphere. In his analysis of Qur'ānic injunctions, *The Major Themes of the Qur'ān*, Rahman addresses the various roles of man, as prescribed by the Qur'ān. Within these roles, Rahman offers detailed analyses and gleans the Islamic modernist Qur'ānic perspective. His writings thereafter espouse an Islamic methodology to adopt a systematized approach in treating modernity. The piece consulted in this research includes *Islam and Modernity*, which details this methodology. The two sets of sources are contrasted in this work.

Chapter 2: The Failure of Islamic Modernism: the Ayub Khan regime, 1958-1969

The content of this chapter attempts to bridge the ideological position and the policymaking of the Islamic modernist camp of Ayub Khan and Fazlur Rahman. In doing so, the sources employed treat both ideology and policy, with some overlap. In the ideological section, the *Speeches and Statements of Ayub Khan* volumes were useful in crafting both the Islamic modernist ideology of Ayub, as well as the trajectory of policy to realize this ideology. His autobiography, *Friends Not Masters*, was also especially useful for this purpose. Lawrence Ziring's *The Ayub Khan Era* provided a political historical backdrop to this analysis. In terms of the intricacies of Ayub's policymaking, Louis Hayes' *The Struggle for Legitimacy* and Hamid Khan's *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* provided detailed stipulations of policy and constitutional processes. The same format of analysis and subsequently, the types sources consulted are used in the following chapters.

Chapter 3: The Uses of Islamic Ideology: The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regime, 1971-1977

As in the previous chapter, the assessment of policy through the lens of ideology was undertaken in this chapter. The volumes of published speeches of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, *Politics of the People,* were useful on the ideological front. In tracing the policy of Bhutto, several sources were employed. From Lawrence Ziring's *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century*, Hamid Khan's *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan,* and Anwar Syed's *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*, the policies of Bhutto were gleaned and evidentiary support was corroborated against each source. Because of the controversy attached to this regime numerous later sources showed partisanship and were less useful.

Chapter 4: Total Islamziation: the Regime of Zia ul-Haq, 1979-1988

This chapter was the most challenging in finding objective and trusted sources. Zia did not live to write an autobiography, and his speeches were largely embedded in secondary source material. The piece *Les Lois Islamiques* contained speeches and legal text and was thus employed for both the policy and ideological sections of the chapter. Once again, Hamid Khan's *Constitutional and Political History* and Lawrence Ziring's *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century* provided an historical backdrop to the policy analysis. William Richter's chapter "Domestic Policy in 1980s" provides insight into Zia's infrastructural changes and far-reaching domestic reforms. Syed Shah's *Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1972-1988)* contains more specific legal data, especially as it pertained to the various Ordinances during this era. Muhammad Qasim Zaman's work, *The 'Ulamā in Contemporary Islam,* provides a novel dimension to the policy analysis,

detailing Zia's relations with the religious elite. Anthony Hyman, Muhammad Ghayur, and Naresh Kaushik's work *Pakistan: Zia and After,* includes data on the Council for Islamic Ideology (CII), an interesting body operating during Zia's time. Finally, while Rubya Mehdi's *Islamization of Laws in Pakistan* was not specifically cited in the text, it was an essential resource from which to corroborate legal data gleaned from the cited sources.

Chapter 1

The Discursive Backdrop of Polarity

Political culture refers to processes of governance and political behavior. These range from the behavior of the élites, to the religious and political ideology as well as the affective inclinations of the grassroots electorate. Political reality is often different from ideological reality, but the latter sets the most extreme boundaries. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the gamut of methodology in systematizing Islam and its sources into a way of life, especially in the political culture.

In the case of Pakistan, with its raison d'etre as a Muslim space, and its status as a Muslim state, the analysis of the religio-political nexus begins at the discursive level, where seemingly polar ideologies are shaped, and are subsequently configured into policymaking norms and political behavior, which will be specifically treated in the forthcoming chapters.

In the gamut of discourse on this systemization of Islamic principles, there is a progression of thought from Qur'ānic exegesis and the analyses of ḥadīths *(aḥadīth)*, to the derivation of ethical norms in the public and private spheres from the Qur'ān; how these ethical norms are expressed in "modern" circumstances; and finally how to govern the Muslim population with these norms adjusted (or not) for modern socio-material conditions. For the Islamist, the points of divergence within this progression seem to lie in the exegesis and the centrality of the primary sources on Qur'ān, *ḥadīth,* and sunnah,

and consequently, on ethical norms, and the need for the integration of normative Islam into governance, through implementation of the sharī 'a and the social and/or political infrastructures themselves in order to preserve the sanctity of the faith and its function as an all-encompassing way of life.

To the Islamic modernist, the systemization of normative Islam does not end with a blanket application of normative Islam without regard to contemporary external conditions, or even conditions within the Muslim community. Rather they account for these conditions and contend that modernity is latent in Islam and its sources, if they are not restricted to the interpretations during the medieval period of Islam.

Two Pakistani thinkers who represent these and other ideological distinctions are Sayyid Abu'l A 'lā Mawdūdī (Islamist), founder of the Jamā 'at-i Islami political party and Fazlur Rahman (Islamic modernist), an intellectual who favored a more holistic methodology in systematizing Islam and its sources. Mawdūdī, although a political figure, was most notably the ideological and discursive conscience of the Jamā 'at-i Islami, and is useful in assessing the Islamist positions for this analysis.[1] Their

[1] The Jamā'at-i Islami is a political party advocating an Islamist position. Briefly, it was founded in 1941 as an organization to protect Muslim interests in the Subcontinent, as it opposed the "secularist" approaches of the Muslim League. Its membership is varied, and it continues to exist today as a large and vibrant religio-political party. After the regime of Zia ul-Haq, its popularity declined, as it did not gain seats in Parliament, nor gain any Ministry positions. However, as of 2002, it gained seats and is enjoying a slight resurgence in Pakistan. The party will be mentioned when it is relevant to the discussion. For more data on the Jamā'at-i Islami, please see the following sources, (full citations are included in the bibliography): Ali Rahnema. *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, London: Zed Books, 1994,111-124; Safdar Mahmood. *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development 1947-1999,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.153-156 and Mumtaz Ahmed, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamā'at-i Islami and the Tablighi Jama'at in South Asia," In *Fundamentalisms Observed.* Eds: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. vol 1, 1991,457-530.

ideologies and implications for Pakistan contained therein will be analyzed and compared in this chapter.

The Islamist Discourse of Sayyid Abu'l A 'lā Mawdūdī

Sayyid Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī (1903-1979) began his career as journalist in the 1920s where he edited and wrote in various publications such as *Hamdard,* a nationalist magazine and *Muslim*, the official newspaper of the Jamī 'at 'Ulamā-i Hind (Society of Indian 'Ulamā). He then progressed to writing treatises, as the political conditions around him changed, and pre-partition Muslim-Hindu tensions were on the rise.[2] It was at this time that he abandoned his nationalist tendencies, rescinding his faith in the Indian National Congress because of his perception of its lack of protection of Muslims.[3] His new position of an "Islamic way" to safeguard Muslim interests was heavily laden with Islamic language, and the centrality of this message was intertwined into his writings. This new approach was to begin the process of strengthening the *ummah* in India, and this underpinning of communalism and solidarity is apparent in his later writings, which will be treated with thematic analysis shortly.

The Primary Sources and Mawdūdī's Islamism

To Mawdūdi, implicit in this communalist ideology was the ethical fortification of the ummah as prescribed in the primary sources of Qur'ān and ḥādīths *(aḥādīth).*This

---

[2] Rahnema, *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, 101-105.

[3] *Ibid.*

approach was not unlike that of Sayyid Quṭb of Egypt, by whom he was influenced.[4] He initially undertook this means of achieving socio-political change through ethical refurbishment by writing exegetical works with commentary for "the common Muslim".

In his exegetical *magnum corpus, Tafhīm al-Qur'ān (Towards Understanding the Qur'ān),* he presented an Urdu interpretation of the Qur'ān, complete with historical and ideological commentary. In the introduction to this work, he noted that literal translations do not "[arouse] the reader to ecstasy, stirring his being, making his eyes flow with tears, or raising a storm of emotion within his soul."[5] This is an intriguing statement because of the large role of affect in Mawdūdī's interpretation from the outset, which may not be expected given his disparaging views of Sufism. Of course, to any Muslim at any point on this ideological plane, the notion of weeping during Qur'ānic recitation is conventionally accepted, however, the slightly more intense nature of Mawdūdī's remarks are interesting to note. What is more novel in his preface is the discarding of literal translation, which is also surprising considering his placement in the ideological realm of Islamism, which tends to be literal in its approach. His assessment of literal translations as "lifeless" in its (lack of) literary conventions undermining the richness of the Qur'ānic tradition seem to lend certain legitimacy for an

---

[4] Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966) was a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, and wrote on the formation of the ideal Muslim ummah as a means of achieving social change. One of his major works, *Ma'ālim fī- al Ṭāriq (Milestones),* contained faith-based ethical guidelines for living and coping with the ignorant "others" as well as the ignorant from within the ummah, collectively known as the *jāhilīyya.* Please see the following translation: Quṭb, Sayyid. *Ma 'ālim fī-al Ṭāriq (Milestones).* Cedar Rapids: Mother Mosque Foundation, 1995.

[5] Mawdūdī, *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān.* Lahore : Maktabah-i Ta'mīr-i Insāniyyat : Idārah-i Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, 1975, vol. 1, 2

interpretive approach, with his historical commentaries integrated into his interpretation. [6]

Thus, the crux of Mawdūdī's ideology lies in the notes to the translated *sūrahs (suwar).* He explains potentially nebulous and crucial concepts in the translation. One concept that is important for the purposes of this analysis is man's relationship to God, and subsequently his role on earth, and society.[7] In his introductory commentary on *sūrah al-Baqarah* (the Cow), referring to the role of man, Mawdūdī says:

> Thus far man has been summoned to serve and obey God on the grounds that God is his creator and sustainer...the only attitude which can be deemed appropriate for man is one of service and subjection to God.[8]

The initial premise of Mawdūdī's ideology, like that of most Muslim thinkers, is the supremacy of God over creation. The next set of questions in this progression is: if God is the superior entity, what is the role of man relative to this entity, as well as ontologically and, socially in the temporal realm? Therein lay the gamut of assessments of man's role on earth. The question of authority is also central to this discussion. Who or what (human institutions) will serve as the keeper of this role prescribed by God in the Qur'ān? The notion of vicegerency also treated in *sūrah al-Baqarah, ayah 30.*

---

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] In Islamist discourse, the role of man on earth, relative to God, has both theological and subsequently political implications. For example, the analysis of the role of man gave rise to the premise of man's vicegerency in the Shi'i context, as in the Iranian model of governance. In the Sunni context, the role of man on earth and as operating in the social sphere implies ethical upliftment of the ummah, per the thought of al-Fārabī. Please see: Al-Fārābī. *Fusūl al-Madanī; Aphorisms of the Statesman.* Edited with an English translation, introd. and notes by D. M. Dunlop. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Publications, 1961.

[8] Mawdūdī, *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān,* 59. Here Mawdūdī is referring to Sūrah al-Nisā', ayah 30 [4:30].

> Just think when you Lord said to the angels: 'Lo! I am about to place a vicegerent on earth,' they said: 'Will you place it on one who will spread mischief and shed blood while we celebrate Your glory and extol Your holiness? He said: Surely I know what you do not know.[9]

Mawdūdī offers the following commentary on this notion of vicegerency:

> God created man as His vicegerent. In this capacity, man is obliged not merely to serve and worship Him, but also to act in accordance with His instructions and guidance...in this connection the Qur'ān defines precisely the true nature of man and his correct position in the universe.[10]

In this statement, Mawdūdī reinforces the Qur'ānic notion of vicegerency. What is interesting here is the mention of acting "in accordance with His instructions and guidance." The foci of Mawdūdī's writings are ethical codes for the community and in political ideology that derive legitimacy from such a passage that asserts the ethical responsibility of humanity, especially because it is requisite for the position of vicegerent.

The implication in this *ayah* is that despite what the angels believe are the bounds of human nature (i.e. the tendency toward violence and chaos), God is asserting that those bounds may or may not exist. Thus, if there is that possibility that human beings can overcome their own destructive inclinations, Mawdūdī believes that it is through an ethical overhaul of the community that humanity can live up to the role of vicegerent.

---

[9] *Ibid.* This *ayah* is taken from the English translation of Mawdūdī's Urdu translation, which is comparatively similar to other English translations. This same *ayah* is taken from a translation by Ahmed Ali:

> Remember when your Lord said to the angels: 'I have to place a trustee on the earth,' they said: 'will You place one there who would create disorder and shed blood, while we intone Your litanies and sanctify Your name? " And God said: 'I know what you do not know.' [2:30]

Aside from minor lexical distinctions, this translation mirrors Mawdūdī's translation. Again, the crux of Mawdūdī's ideology is in his commentary, not his actual translation. Also, please see bibliography for full citations of the translations.

[10] Mawdūdī, *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān,* 59

Once the premise of this role was set, Mawdūdī's next step was to assess how this role could be adequately fulfilled, namely, through the communal ethical refurbishment. The centrality of communalism in Mawdūdī's ideology is a product of several religio-cultural phenomena. It is a possible result of living with the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India in the 1930s and the 1940s, whereby in his view, the interests of the Muslims could only be safeguarded if the *ummah* was united, and there were no conflicting interests within the community. This unity and consensus of interests could only be achieved if the community was treading on the same path toward the same goals.

It is at this ideological juncture where the role of man and Islamic ethics converge. Thus, in Mawdūdī's view, socio-political change where Muslims can fulfill their roles in vicegerency, as prescribed by the Qur'ān, can only occur if the community is ethically matured. He then takes on the responsibility of educating the masses to realize this maturity and understanding of Islam.

Mawdūdī and Ethics

In his works on ethics, Mawdūdī again tailors his approach and diction to the common Muslim, as he did in *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān.* In the *Ethical Viewpoint of Islam,* a published lecture delivered to the Islamiyya College, Peshawar in 1944, he focuses on the necessity of ethical refurbishment and the means to achieve it. Early in the lecture, he notes:

> The nations of the world are in mortal conflict with each other and every country is anxious to strike at the well-being and prosperity of another. The struggle has gone so deep as to draw into its vortex not only national groups but also individuals within these groups. Thus, the moral vices...now stand fully exposed to us.[11]

[11] Mawdūdī, *The Ethical Viewpoint of Islam,* Lahore: Markazi Maktaba Jamā'at-i Islami, 1953.

Here, Mawdūdī is connecting ethics to the global situation. This was delivered during World War II, among the most violent and uncertain times in modern human history, and thus, his concern seems so be that this destructive face of human nature not permeate the Muslim ummah. Further in the lecture, along the same vein, he notes:

> Therefore, if the peoples of the world are exhibiting on a large scale the seamy side of human nature through their collective institutions, that can only lead us to conclude that, in spite of all its intellectual and cultural progress, mankind is passing through a period of intense moral decadence which grips by far the greatest majority of human beings.[12]

What is especially interesting in this excerpt is the reference to "progress". Here, he does not directly state that modernity and ethical behavior are mutually exclusive, but his grievances with modernity lie in how man perceives his own role on earth. Specifically, whom does he obey, if any supervening authority, that would dictate his behavior, and thus facilitate progress within the ethical bounds prescribed by this authority?[13] With a lack of these ethical bounds, and the subsequent inability to *truly* discern good from evil, he argues that:

> in their practical consequences, such belief have wrought havoc in the fabric of human civilization, and yet because outwardly they are made to appear as an antidote to social evils, they are being continually absorbed in our collective life and thought.[14]

He is building the case for adherence to Islam as the antithesis of this bleak picture of the world. Pursuant to this, he says:

---

[12] Mawdūdī, *The Ethical Viewpoint of Islam,* 8, 39

[13] Mawdūdī, *The Ethical Viewpoint of Islam,* 9-19.

[14] Mawdūdī, *The Ethical Viewpoint of Islam,* 20

> In this way [adherence to moral law] Islam puts an end to that anarchy of thought and conduct which results from the assumption that there is no power above man and from trying to build a whole ethical system on the basis of this assumption.[15]

To Mawdūdī, the Islamic notion of the supremacy of God over man, and the obedience of man to God would prevent moral decadence and more importantly, a code of ethics with the shaky premise of man's sole accountability to man is the cause of the corruption of human nature.

With the necessity for communal ethics as an ideological foundation, the specific ethical norms become important in outlining Mawdūdī's ideology. What is this Islamic ethical code that will lead to the salvation of human nature, in his view? In his work, *Let Us Be Muslims (Khuṭubāt)* he integrates the Islamic principles of faith *(imān)*, the nature of Islam, prayer *(ṣalāt)*, fasting *(sawm)*, pilgrimage *(ḥajj)*, and holy war *(jihād)* with commentary on their ethical behavioral manifestations.

His language in this work is interesting. He is speaking to his audience, and true to form, is attempting to educate them about Islam.[16] He begins this work by asserting that Islam is the greatest gift from God, and in order to be grateful for such a gift, it is incumbent upon Muslims to follow the prophetic model of Muḥammad. He notes,

> To be truly grateful for this greatest favor, you must therefore render to Allah His due...How can we, you may ask, render these dues? The best way of showing gratitude-and there is no other way-is to become totally committed followers of the Prophet. [17]

---

[15] Mawdūdī, *The Ethical Viewpoint of Islam,* 39.

[16] He asserts this desire to educate the lay Muslim in *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān*, and this approach is seen in most of his writings. Also, many of his writings are taken from pamphlets that were published in book form by the Jamā'at-i Islami.

[17] Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslims,* Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1985,47.

In this statement, Mawdūdī sets the tone for the ethical norms and modes of religious practice which follow. He then continues the progression of his ideology of adhering to *true Islam* with the notion that knowledge and faith are inextricably intertwined. He then prescribes one hour a day in the search for Dīn (religion). Explicit in this prescription is understanding the primary sources, which he has provided in his other writings.[18] Therein lies one example of his trademark way of explaining a theological concept (the acquisition of knowledge from the primary sources) and then giving a practical means to its accomplishment. More examples of this follow in the specific categories of faith, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, alms-giving, and holy war.

One element of Mawdūdī's style, not to be underestimated, is the power of his rhetoric. Because he is speaking to the masses in virtually all of his writings, his influence is of importance. He is, admittedly, not writing for scholars or intellectuals; rather, for the uneducated masses. The language he uses is poignant, calling on his "brothers in Islam" to listen to his message, which undoubtedly they did and continue to do. An example of such rhetoric follows:

> Does such negligence (of religion) not entail the danger of losing an even more precious gift- your *Imān* (faith)? Most of your time and labor is spent on things which sustain your physical existence in this life. Why can you not spend even a tenth part of your time and energy on things which are necessary to protect your *Imān*, which can sustain your being in the present life and in the life to come?[19]

It is doubtful that any Muslim, whether or not in ideological concert with Mawdūdi, will refute such questions, which is to say that the masses who lack access to more sources, will be quite affected by such statements.

---

[18] Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslims,* 52.

[19] *ibid.*

The treatment of various Islamic concepts and their ethical behavioral counterparts is specific and detailed. The following chart encapsulates some of his conceptual and prescriptive advice:

Table 1.1: Mawdūdī's Conceptual and Behavioral Paradigm

Exposition of Concepts	Cited Sources	Behavioral Prescriptions
Prayer *(ṣalāt)*- as an act of worship. Worship means revering, serving and obeying God.	The Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and *sunnah*. (Sūrah al-'Ankabūt 29:45)[20]	Asceticism and chanting are not sufficient, and the daily prayers are crucial.[21]
Fasting *(sawm)*- abstaining from dawn to sunset from eating, drinking, and sex as a means of remembering God. It strengthens faith, and replaces hunger for food with hunger for God.	The Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and *sunnah*. (Sūrah al-Baqarah, 2:183)[22] *Ḥadīth* report cited: "Whoever observes the Fast, believing and counting, has all his past sins forgiven." (Bukhārī, Muslim)[23]	Fasting during the month of Ramaḍān, the ninth month of the Islamic calendar is essential. It entails abstention from food, drink, and sex, as well as abstention from falsehood and quarrelling. Also, it increases the scope of kindness and goodness.[24]

[20] The *ayah* is translated as:

> Recite what has been revealed to you in this Book, and be in constant devotion. Surely prayer keeps you away from the obscene and detestable, but the remembrance of God is greater far; and God knows what you do. (Sūrah al-'Ankabūt, ayah 45[29:45])

All of the translations, unless otherwise mentioned, are taken from Ahmed 'Ali.

[21] Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslims,* 153-164.

[22] This ayah is translated as:

> O believers, fasting is enjoined on you as it was on those before you, so that you become righteous. (Sūrah al-Nisā', ayah 183 [4:183])

[23] Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslims,* 181-194.

[24] *Ibid.*

Alms-giving *(zakāt)*- setting aside a portion of wealth for the needy and the poor. By giving to others, individual wealth is purified.	The Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and *sunnah*. (Sūrah al-Anbiyā' 21:73)[25] (Sūrah al-Māi'dah 5:12) (Sūrah al-Nisā' 4:36)	In modern terms, 2 ½ percent of wealth is obligatory in Ḥanāfī law. For agricultural products, there are more specifications.[26]
Pilgrimage *(Hajj)*- the resolution to visit the Ka'bā in Mecca.	The Qur'ān and the prophetic model of Ibrāhīm. (Sūrah al-'Imrān 3: 96-7)[27]	While performing the pilgrimage, it is prohibited to: be indecent or lewd, brag, be ostentatious, or to postpone the ritual as to make fighting possible.[28]

[25] These ayāt are translated as follows:

> And We made them leaders to guide (the people) by Our command; and We inspired them to perform good deeds and observe their moral obligations and pay the zakat; and they obeyed Us. (Sūrah al-Anbiyā', ayah 73 [21:73])

> God convenated the people of Israel and raised twelve leaders among them, and said: "If you fulfill your devotional obligations, pay the zakat and believe in My apostles and support tem, and give a goodly loan to God, I shall certainly absolve you of your evil, and admit you to gardens with streams of running water. But whosoever among you denies after this, will have wandered away from the right path. (Sūrah al- Mā'idah ayah 12 [5:12])

> Pay homage to God, and make none His compeer, and be good to your parents and relatives, the orphans and the needy and the neighbors who are your relatives, and the neighbors who are strangers, and the friend by your side, the traveller and your servants and subordinates. God surely does not love those who are boastful and arrogant. (Sūrah al-Nisā', ayah 36[2:36])

[26] Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslims,* 207-227.

[27] These ayāt are translated as follows:

> The first House of God to be set up for men was at Bakkah the blessed, a guidance for the people of the world. It contains the clear signs, and the spot where Abraham had stood. And anyone who enters it will find security. And whosoever can afford should visit the House on a pilgrimage as duty to God. Whosoever denies, should remember that God is independent of the peoples of the world. (Surāh al-'Imrān, ayāt 96-97[3:96-97])

[28] Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslims,* 243-271.

Holy war *(jihād)*-to abolish the lordship of man over man and bring him under the rule of the One God.	Islamic notion to enjoin the good and forbid the evil. (Sūrah al-'Imrān 3:110)[29]	The creation of governments run by God-conscious people, where government policies are formulated with Divine guidance is the cause of this battle.[30]

What is salient about these ethical behavioral prescriptions is Mawdūdī's reliance upon the primary sources in deriving them. While he continues to take an admittedly interpretive approach, rather than a strictly literal approach, he is specific in what is considered acceptable within the practice of Islam. This specificity seems characteristic of the Islamist position, whereby, the primary sources are used to extract, in concert with the rulings of a particular legal school *(maḍhab)*, ethical norms, with little influence of external sources.

The first four entries of the chart serve to elucidate on this specificity of Mawdūdī's ideology. It is also a point on the progression of his ideology. He begins with Qur'ānic exegesis, the necessity of living an "Islamic" lifestyle, and the components of this lifestyle. It is the last entry in the table, *jihād,* that links ethics to the development of his political ideology.

His characterization of jihād as ending man's lordship over man and unity under one God is an extension of the centrality of religious/communal identity in his ideology

---

[29] This ayah is translated as follows:

> Of all the communities raised among men you are the best, enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong, and believing in God. If the people of the Book had come to believe that it was the best for them, but only some believe, and transgressors are many. (Sūrah al-'Imrān, ayah 110[3:110])

[30] Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslims,* 285-293.

and his notion of the role of man as vicegerent accountable to God. In his view, the effectiveness of social change hinges on the cohesiveness of the Muslim community, and he provides an interpretation of practice which enables this change. The exposition of Islamic concepts and their behavioral counterparts function as the path to achieve the elevated ethical position required of the community.

Mawdūdī's Political Framework

The next point on this ideological progression is Mawdūdī's political ideology, or a system of governance that is premised on the role of man as vicegerent with ethics, and subsequently law, strictly derived from the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and *sunnah*. The two major elements to this ideology, mostly extracted from his work, the *Political Ideology of Islam* are.: the purpose of the Islamic state and the nature and structure of the Islamic state. He reiterates the fundamentals of Islam, which mirror those already stated.

In his discussion of the objectives of the Islamic state, Mawdūdī views the role of man as the vicegerent of God on earth as part and parcel of an Islamic state. More specifically, he notes,

> The object of the state is not merely to prevent people from exploiting each other, to safeguard their liberty, and to protect its subjects from foreign invasion; it also aims at evolving and developing that well-balanced system of social justice which has been set forth by God in His Holy Book. Its object is to eradicate all forms of evil and to encourage all types of virtue and excellence expressly mentioned by God in the Holy Book.[31]

[31] Mawdūdī, *The Political Theory of Islam,* In John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 252–271.

This passage indicates that the intentions of the Islamic state are to uphold the general principles, as well as the specific codes of behavior outlined in the Qur'ān. While Mawdūdī does not take a strictly literal approach to identifying these principles and their behavioral counterparts, his interpretation of them remains close to the text. Insofar as the ends justifying the means, he asserts,

> For this purpose, political power will be made use of as and when the occasion demands, all means of propaganda and peaceful persuasion will be employed; the moral education of the people will also be undertaken and social influence as well as the force of public opinion will be harnessed to the task.[32]

This passage indicates that certain measures are needed to realize the goals of the Islamic state. What is interesting here is that social influence and public opinion are not mutually exclusive. This implies that the state is not above criticism, despite its premise on the primary sources. However, it seems that it is Mawdūdī's wish that public opinion will change once the persuasive power of the primary sources is realized by the masses, hence his goal of their education.

The next element of his ideology is the nature and structure of the Islamic state. The first issue for Mawdūdī is Islam's compatibility with democracy. He summarily dismisses this notion as Islamically invalid because the nature of democracy is that "sovereignty rests with the people," and the whole notion of vicegerency rests on the notion that God is ultimately and singularly sovereign.[33] However, Mawdūdī reconciles this notion with his populist underpinnings (he rejects a theocracy because it is exclusive) to fashion a "theo-democracy." He defines it as follows:

---

[32] *ibid.*

[33]Mawdūdī, *The Political Theory of Islam,* 28.

> [A theo-democracy is] a divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God.[34]

In terms of the structure of the state, he says,

> The executive, under this system of government, is constituted by the general will of the Muslims, who have the right to depose it. All administrative matters and all questions about which no explicit injunction is to be found in God's *shari'at* (law) are settled by the consensus of opinion among the Muslims.[35]

Here, Mawdūdī integrates the Divine premise with the populist premises of his ideology. In his view, they are mutually inclusive in governance. Briefly, the specific structure of the state is broken into seven stipulations.[36] Analysis follows each.

1) The head of state, *Amīr*, will be elected from among the most virtuous. He will be fully obeyed so long as he follows the laws of God and His Prophet.

Mawdūdī's notion of ethics and the role of man as vicegerent converge here. The *Amīr* is elected, although, as is the practice, a few actors emerge as the "virtuous" and one is elected therein.

2) Those in the rank and file of governance are not above criticism and may be tried in the courts.

This ensures that autonomous, and potentially tyrannical, actions are not undertaken, as the political actors are subject to the law.

3) The head of state must take counsel from an Advisory Council of Muslims.

This stipulation allows for educated determination of policy. This Council would most likely be comprised of those familiar with the primary sources of Islam.

4) The advice of this Council may or may not be legally binding, depending on the view of the *Amīr*.

---

[34] Mawdūdī, *The Political Theory of Islam,* 29

[35] *ibid.*

[36] Specific stipulations are taken from: Mawdūdī, *The Political Theory of Islam,* 51-56.

The stipulation allows for the discretion of the vicegerent to prevail.

5) Any electioneering strategies be rendered illegal as they are repugnant to Islam.

This prevents ostentation in the electoral process, as well the focus on the individual instead of the community at large.

6) There is to be no partisanship in this Advisory Council. Only individual notions of truth and justice should prevail.

Partisanship is divisive and would make the individual privy to the interests of some, and not the interests of the entire community.

7) The judiciary shall be independent of the executive, and thus not be compelled to make legal decisions based upon anything other than justice prescribed by the Qur'ān and Sunnah.

This is a feature of most systems of checks and balances. It ensures that no actor be above the law and that no judge be compelled to act in a manner that satisfies the interests of a few, rather than the community as a whole.

The specificity with which Mawdūdī treats governance and political ideology is perhaps a result of his political behavior. He became involved in the political arena and founded a political party, the Jamā 'at-i Islami in order to facilitate his ideological progression. In summary, this progression began with Qur'ānic exegesis, which included the salient role of man as vicegerent, then continued with the ethical behavioral prescriptions to fulfill this role, and the notion of vicegerency and governance converged into his political ideology, which treated the nature and specific structure of an Islamic state.

There are several elements that are characteristically Islamist in Mawdūdī's ideology. The first is the centrality of the adherence to the primary sources. While Mawdūdī does not subscribe to a literalist view, his interpretations are adjusted for seemingly stylistic reasons, with few substantive components, as in *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān.*

Thus, his ethical prescriptions come directly from these primary sources, and subsequently his political ideology as well.

The second is this isolationist view of *jihād*, where Muslims, as a community, are united against a morally decadent "other," so as to preserve the Qur'ānic values detailed in this exegesis and behavioral prescriptions. The political ideology, which is premised and bounded by this system of ethics, is not malleable in terms of the state's reliance on the organic primary sources.

Finally, there is the perception of modernity and progress. It is conventional wisdom that in the post-colonial era that progress is a Western phenomenon; to Mawdūdī the Western body of values represents "man's lordship over man," and is not therefore not compatible with the Islamic way of life. What emerges is a rejection of Western configurations of modernity, and progress that is bounded by the stipulations in the primary sources.

The common denominator is thus the moral nature of man and how he fulfills the role of vicegerent. Specifically, the nature of man as he relates to God, through the principles derived from the primary sources. It is at this ideological juncture that Islamist discourse and Islamic modernist discourse part ways. The next section will evaluate this divergence through the ideology of Fazlur Rahman.

The Islamic Modernist Discourse of Fazlur Rahman

Fazlur Rahman, (1919-1988), unlike Mawdūdī, was not a political actor with a discursive focus; rather, he was an academic and modernist thinker from Pakistan, educated in Punjab and Oxford, with degrees in Arabic and philosophy, who came to

North America in the 1950s. Rahman's discursive foci were different in content from those of Mawdūdī, and their institutional placements were also radically distinct.[37] Thus, their audiences were also distinct. Rahman's writings were tailored for an academic audience, whereas Mawdūdī, admittedly, wrote for the semi-educated masses. Because the purpose of this analysis is to treat their ideology as a discursive framework for the forthcoming political analysis, it is beyond the scope of this work to address the implications of their audiences further.

Primary Sources and Rahman's Islamic Modernism

Rahman's treatment of the primary sources is conceptual and thematic, in stark contrast to Mawdūdī treatment of specific behavioral prescriptions. In his exegetical work, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* instead of treating the "pillars of Islam," he analyzes eight concepts, almost philosophical in nature, and evaluates the Qur'ānic passages and principles which apply to these broad concepts. The result of this exegesis is philosophical. Whereas Mawdūdī developed a political order premised upon the notion of vicegerency, Rahman's methodology is the final product. Reform using this methodology is Rahman's response to revivalists such as Mawdūdī. To this end, Rahman begins with man as an individual and progresses to man in society in terms of how the Qur'ān treats these two temporal roles of man. With an integration of historical, philosophical, and psychological perspectives, his methodology differs from Mawdūdī in that Rahman asserts the necessity and centrality of certain concepts within the Qur'ān because of certain circumstances (historical, psychological and otherwise).

---

[37] Kurzman, Charles, ed. *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 304.

Rahman's View of the Role of Man, as Prescribed by the Qur'ān

In treating the role of man, Rahman cites the same *ayah* as Mawdūdī, *Sūrah al-Baqarah, ayah 30* (2:30), which speaks of man's role as vicegerent. Along this vein, he comments on the nature of man. Man's primordial nature (*fiṭra*) as the crown of creation, "outstripping even the angels when they (humans) excel in both knowledge and virtue."[38] Rahman then deeply delves into the nuances of the nature of man, as stated in the Qur'ān. This includes the human psychology of evil-doing and the theological consequences therein. However, he begins this with a statement of the heaviness of vicegerency:

> It is these men who fully realize that man "has not been created in sport," but has a serious task (23:115) and is answerable for his success or failure, for both God and man have taken a grave risk in this vital affair, the vicegerency of man.[39]

Thus, this notion of vicegerency is not treated lightly, and has theological and ethical implications. This heaviness was the centerpiece of Mawdūdī's ideology, as well. Rahman continues,

> The bane of humanity so far is that most men refuse to "look beyond [al-'āquiba]," "do not lay any store by for the morrow," i.e., do not contribute to--and do not even understand, or attempt to understand--the long-range moral goals of the human endeavor.[40]

---

[38] Rahman, Fazlur. *Major Themes of the Qur'ān.* Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980. 17-19.

[39] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 19. The *ayah* cited here is translated as:

> Do you think We created you for nothing, and that you will not return to Us?
> (Sūrah al-Mu'minūn, ayah 115 [23:115])

[40] *ibid.*

Man's role as vicegerent carries with it moral responsibility, as Rahman is suggesting here. However, this role is not to be taken for granted, or in Rahman's language, God's partnership in carrying out this responsibility. Rahman invokes the verses that refer to God "sealing up the hearts of men, putting blinds on their eyes, casting chains up to their chins, so that they cannot look down and ponder." He posits that God does this because of man's own actions, thus creating accountability to God.[41]

Why, then, does man repeatedly engage in wrong behavior? After all, if man is placed on an intellectual pedestal, relative to other species of creation, then ignorance is not necessarily the only explanation, as Rahman's progression would suggest. He puts forth the following psychological supposition,

> If a person once does good or an evil deed, his chances of repeating that kind of action increase, and of doing its opposite proportionately decrease. With constant repetition of an evil or of a good action, it becomes almost impossible for a person to do the opposite, or even to think of it...actions create a psychological habit.[42]

What is implicit, and later becomes explicit, is the role of God in man's pattern of behavior. Rahman seems to be a proponent of a level of free will, which guides man in one direction or the other, and man is ultimately accountable (to God) for the path that is chosen. This is not to imply that an individual will stringently adhere to either good

---

[41] *ibid.* Here, Rahman is referring to two *ayāt*:

> And they say: 'Our hearts are enfolded in covers.' In fact, God has cursed them for their unbelief; and only a little do they believe. (Sūrah al-Baqarah, ayah 88[2:88])

> We shall turn their hearts and their eyes, for they did not believe them at the very first, and leave them to wander perplexed in bewilderment. (Sūrah al-An 'ām, ayah 110 [6:110])

[42] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān*, 20.

or evil; rather that human behavior functions on a slippery slope. Once there is an inclination toward evil or good, there is an increased likelihood to continue to magnify that inclination.

What then emerges for Rahman is a dialectical tension between the good, ethical behavior, and deviant behavioral manifestations, brought on by ignorance or the "smallness of the mind."[43]

Rahman briefly discusses this permeation of the primordial nature. He notes that the Qur'ān treats evil-doing and the causes of deviance as reflexive, thereby causing this dialectical tension. Essentially, his reconciliation is that within this primordial nature are the two dialectical poles which are rooted in the same notion of identification with the "Higher Law," but marred by this "smallness of the mind."[44]

The question then arises, how is this tension to be treated by man? In Rahman's view,

> These contradictory extremes are, therefore, not so much a 'problem' to be resolved by theological thought as tensions to be 'lived with' if man is to be truly religious,' i.e., a servant of God. Thus, utter powerlessness and 'being the measure of all things,' hopelessness and pride, determinism and 'freedom,' absolute knowledge and pure ignorance...are extremes that constitute natural tensions for proper human conduct.[45]

This balance of morality for the individual is thus part and parcel of being human. However, what contrasts Mawdūdī's ideology is that this balance should *not* be upset. Mawdūdī would perhaps argue that this tension should be resolved through specific

---

[43] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān*, 20, 22, 23, 25,27.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*

ethical behavioral prescriptions as stated in the Qur'ān and ḥadīth. However, Rahman addresses this by asserting,

> Since its primary aim is to maximize moral energy, the Qur'ān-which claims to be 'guidance for mankind'- regards it as absolutely essential that man does not violate the balance of opposing tensions. The most...important fact of moral life is that violating this balance in any direction produces a 'Satanic condition' which in its moral effects is exactly the same: moral nihilism.[46]

According to Rahman, this "moral nihilism" refers to self-righteousness. To justify this connection, he looks to the Satanic model, whereby it was this self-righteousness that caused Satan to not bow to Adam and the end result was that "[Satan] became a professional evilmonger because he thought his personality could not be recovered."[47]

Thus, it seems as though upsetting this balance is problematic and can have the disastrous consequences of self-righteousness, which is nihilistic because it is a hallmark of pride, which itself is a component of unbelief *(kufr)* because it introduces the potential to take God for granted, as Satan did in refusing to bow to Adam. This potential violates the most central Islamic, or monotheistic concept of the supremacy of God, which would ultimately create an amoral slippery slope.[48]

---

[46] *ibid.*

[47] *ibid.*

[48] Here, Rahman cites the following verses from the Qur'ān to substantiate this argument.

> Do not exceed the limits of God, for those who exceed the bounds set by God are transgressors (Sūrah al-Baqara, ayah 229 [2:229])

> These are the limits set by God, and those who follow the commandments of God and the Prophet, will indeed be admitted to gardens with streams of water running by, where they will forever abide; and this will be success supreme.
> Those who disobey God and the Prophet and exceed the bounds of law, will be taken to Hell and abide there for ever and shall suffer despicable punishment. (Sūrah al-Nisā' ayāt 13-14 [4:13-14])

Given the necessity of this balance is Rahman's view, how is man to conduct himself as an individual? If ethical prescriptions to supersede the evil within man's nature are not the way to exist, what feature of human nature will prevent rampant evil-doing, as psychologically derived by Rahman? His response lies in the concept of *taqwā,* which he defines as "to guard of protect against something."[49] More specifically, he defines it as a safety net of sorts, embedded within this moral tension, or the limits set forth by God, presumably on the primordial nature, whereby there is a fear of the consequences of one's actions brought on by the judgment of God, albeit a merciful God.[50] Again, he reiterates the importance of not transgressing the bounds of this limit. This centrality of *taqwā* is premised on the notion that human beings will experience lapses of judgment but are subject to the forgiveness of a God who is merciful. In Qur'ānic terms, according to Rahman, "that which is good remains for the benefit of humanity, but that which is false has a transient existence only, even though it looks present." [51]

Thus, Rahman essentially argues that upsetting the moral balance and its subsequent "moral frenzy" is more consequential than the occasional moral lapse for which God forgives. Furthermore, these lapses can be ameliorated perhaps because they

---

Rahman asserts that "exceeding the bounds of God" is analogous to upsetting the moral balance.

[49] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 29.

[50] *ibid.* See also: Rahman, *Islam and Modernity,* 155.

[51] *ibid.* For this premise, he cites the following *ayah*:

> He who does a good deed will receive ten times its worth; he who does evil will be requited to an evil degree; and no one will be wronged. (Sūrah al-Baqara, ayah 160[2:160])

are isolated behavioral incidents and not an amoral slope that is perceived as the correct behavioral path. His reconciliation of the aforementioned psychological disposition of man is thus that the slippery slope of behavior exists; however, man must be conscious of this balance of the dialectical tension within his own nature.

Therein lies Rahman's critique of Mawdūdī's behavioral prescriptions. It seems to upset this balance and does not include the safety net of *taqwā* that Rahman contends protects humanity from itself. Instead, Mawdūdī's scheme is more dangerous because it could create self-righteousness, whereby the ends justify the means. In Mawdūdī's view, humans are left to externally protect these ethical norms.

Rahman's Configuration of the Social Role of Man

How then is man to translate this internal tension into social interaction? Mawdūdī's ethical prescriptions was a strongly recommended scheme for human interaction in Muslim terms. However, Rahman adopts a less rhetorical style in assessing the same concepts of the *zakāt* tax and *jihād.* Mawdūdī "calls on" his fellow Muslims to adhere to these derived prescriptive behaviors, true to his role as an ideologue. Rahman's function as an academic/modernist thinker would yield a more explanatory style in treating these concepts. Their assessments of *zakāt* and *jihād* with their Qur'ānic premises are similar, because they are generally accepted by all Muslims and the clarity with which they are dealt with in the Qur'ān is not necessarily disputed. However, it is important to note that the method and extent of their implementation is subject to a variety of opinion. This level of specificity is beyond the scope of this analysis because although Mawdūdī was active in the political arena, he was not a

policymaker nor was Fazlur Rahman. Again, what is salient here is the distinction in their rhetorical styles which will be more specifically later in this chapter. Also, the analysis of Rahman's views on two components of the Qur'ān functions to distinguish his exegetical (and ideological) methodology from that of Mawdūdī.

In Rahman's ideological progression, the connection between man's role as an individual, with his dialectical nature and his role as vicegerent, to his role in society, as Qur'ānically assessed is how this tension is manifested in social interaction given the Qur'ānic mandates of justice and equity. While Mawdūdī is focused on the community's aspirations of ethical behavior, magnified externally by ritual practice, to the end of fulfilling the role of vicegerent, Rahman deals with society as a microcosm of civilization and as an extension of the individual self. This is seemingly more inclusive and general, rather than specifically creating a community as a reaction to external socio-political circumstances, as in Mawdūdī's case.[52] Again, this is perhaps a function of their two distinct roles as a political ideologue and an academic/modernist thinker, whereby the former is more inclined to pander to public opinion in the rhetoric.

Rahman begins the assessment of the social role of man with the Qur'ānic denunciation of economic disequilibrium and the subsequent social inequalities present in pre-Islamic commercial Meccan society, where he progresses to the stipulation of the *zakāt* tax and the ban on usury in the Qur'ān. It is important to note that Rahman views the centrality of these concepts of equity and justice through the historical lens of the status quo of the Meccans, and as a means of reconciling socio-economic change with acquisition of wealth. His primary framework, however, remains the nature of man and

[52] Zaman, *The 'Ulamā in Contemporary Islam,* 103.

the dialectical tension within his nature. In other words, Rahman uses history to evaluate the specific stipulations of *zakāt* and the ban on usury as they occur in the Qur'ān and his framework on the nature of man to assess their perceived necessity.

In terms of pre-Islamic Meccan society, he notes,

> Mecca was a prosperous commercial town, but it had a subterranean world of exploitation of the weak (the tribeless, slaves, and hirelings), and a variety of fraudulent commercial and monetary practices.[53]

The historical assessment of Meccan society is then connected to the implications of the commercial society. To this effect he says,

> The Qur'ān bears eloquent testimony to a situation characterized by selfish and callous un-charitableness and boastful conspicuous consumption on the one hand and grinding poverty on the other.[54]

Although Rahman notes that the acquisition of wealth is not repugnant to Islam, and is termed by the Qur'ān as "the bounty of God *[faḍl Allāh].*" Prosperity is among the highest blessings of God, however it is the abuse of wealth and the subsequent preoccupation with it at the expense of "higher values" that is problematic.[55] Presumably, the "higher values" include the morality with which wealth is acquired and the consideration for the needy. Thus, within Rahman's framework of the nature of

---

[53] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 38.

[54] *Ibid.* The ayāt cited here are as follows:

> Competition in accumulating wealth keeps you preoccupied until you visit your graves. Nay, you shall find out soon; nay, nay, you shall find out soon. (Sūrah al-Takāthur, ayāt 1-4 [102:1-4])

> Woe beside every slanderer, back-biter, who amasses wealth and hordes it. Does he think his wealth will abide for ever with him? By no means. He will be thrown into ḥuṭuma. How will you comprehend what ḥuṭuma is? It is the fire kindled by God, which penetrates the hearts. (Sūrah al Humazah, ayāt 1-7 [104:1-7])

[55] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 39.

man, "this lack of consideration for the economically needy is the ultimate expression of the pettiness and narrowness of mind- the basic weakness of man."[56] The Qur'ān is then responding to this problem by giving specific guidelines for the acquisition and use of wealth. Here, Rahman notes that "after the Qur'ān denounced the Meccans for hoarding wealth and exploiting the poor classes, in Madina the *zakāt* tax was imposed."[57] It is at this juncture where Rahman alludes to how the Qur'ān should be systematized for socio-material conditions. In absence of this, there is a narrow and strictly historical application of such a principle, which is problematic when current conditions do not match those of this historical application. He notes,

> [The] categories of expenditure, including social welfare in a wide sense and comprising relief from chronic indebtedness...defense, education, health....are so broad that they comprise...the activities of a state. Yet, the Muslims came to understand these functions characteristically narrowly under a hidebound tradition and zakāt became, in the course of time, necessarily defunct.[58]

This notion of systemization will be treated in more detail shortly. He alludes to this again in dealing with the prohibition of usury.

The next stage of the Qur'ānic protection against the ills of wealth is the ban on usury, or *riba.* According to Rahman, the "Qur'ān exhorted Muslims to 'spend in the cause of Allāh' and thus 'establish credit with God, so that God may repay you

---

[56] *ibid.*

[57] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 41-42. Specifically, he cites *Sūrah al-Tawbah*, ayah 60 [9-60], which says:

> Charities are meant for the indigent and needy, and those who collect and distribute them, and those whom you wish to win over, and for redeeming slaves (and captives) and those who are burdened with debt, and in the cause of God, and the wayfarers: so does God ordain. God is all-knowing and all-wise.

[58] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān*, 43.

manifold,' rather than invest money in usury in order to suck the blood of poor people."[59] This social (and economic) conscience of the Qur'ān as a reaction to the status quo is central for Rahman, especially later in his ideological progression to his views of modernity. In his view, how this reaction to the status quo was later adjusted is important, and has implications in how the primary sources are used in the political arena. On the prohibition of *riba*, he notes,

> The prohibition of usury was essential for the public welfare; the medieval lawyers of Islam, however, drew the conclusion from this that all forms of interest are banned, a stand to which even today the vast majority of Muslims still cling, despite the fundamental change in the role of modern banking in the context of a "development economy." It is some measure of the current confusion in thought that numerous educated Muslims use Keynesian or Marxist arguments to support their position. [60]

Again, he is concerned about the application of this Qur'ānic "policy" in modern conditions, whereby it is perhaps not possible to completely circumvent interest, in an economy which is interdependent on resources from non-Muslim entities. However, in later works, he puts forth the notion of systemization of the Qur'ān, as aforementioned, which would perhaps account for such socio-economic realities.

---

[59] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 40,41. Some of Rahman's Qur'ānic references here include:

> Who will give a goodly loan to God, which He might double many times? For God withholds and enlarges and to Him you will return. (Sūrah al-Baqara, ayah 245 [2:245)

> Those who live on usury will not rise (on Doomsday) but like a man possessed of the devil and demented. This is because they say that trading is like usury. But trade has been sanctioned and usury forbidden by God. Those who are warned by their Lord and desist will keep (what they have taken of interest) already, and the matter will rest with God. But those who revert to it again are the residents of Hell where they will abide for ever. (Sūrah al-Baqara, ayah, 275[2:275])

[60] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān*, 41.

Another stipulation of some importance in Rahman's ideology is that of total endeavor in the name of God, or *jihād.* He begins the explication of this concept with the functions of the Muslim Community. The central premise for the communal interaction is the Qur'ānic premise of "enjoining the good, and forbidding the evil." In Rahman's progression, *jihād* was introduced as follows,

> There is no doubt that the Qur'ān wanted the Muslims to establish a political order *for the sake of creating an egalitarian and just moral-social order.* Such an order should, by definition, eliminate 'corruption on the earth [fasād fi'l-ard]' and 'reform the earth.' To fulfill this task....the Qur'ān created the instrument of jihād- indeed, 22:41, describing this function of the Muslim Community follows directly upon the verse laying down the principle of jihād for the first time. [61]

The verse to which Rahman is referring is as follows:

> Those who would be firm in devotion, give zakāt, and enjoin what is good and forbid what is wrong, if We gave them authority in the land. But the resultance of things rests with God. (Sūrah al-Ḥajj, ayah 41). [62]

Thus, in Rahman's view, the concept of *jihād* emerged from this call to "enjoin the good, and forbid what is wrong." The product and function of the Muslim Community is thus to create a social order premised on this ethos, as well as to facilitate such an ethos within the community. In his progression, *jihād,* unique to the Muslim community, is necessary because there is theological disparity with other communities in how to create this social-ethical order, and the nature of authority therein.[63] It is important to note here that Rahman is not focused on the authority, which he briefly mentions; rather the function of the Community, which he addresses again, along with the conditions for *jihād.*

---

[61] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 62-63.

[62] Ali, *Al-Qur'ān, a Contemporary Translation,* 287.

[63] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 63.

However, his view of *jihād* is again part and parcel of the nature of man framework. If the nature of man is a dialectic, and the Qur'ān (and *taqwā*) provide a safety net, what is the nature of this struggle, or *jihād*? From the general communal function, Rahman switches back to his framework of the nature of man. He begins with a refined definition of the term: "*jihād*, indeed, is a total endeavor, and all out effort- 'with your wealth and lives...to make God's cause succeed.'"[64] Although he does not delve too far into the notion of "God's cause," it is presumably in his focus on enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. However, he contextualizes this in the Qur'ānic notion of economic justice. He further notes on *jihād* and the individual,

> Economic justice itself is for a higher end, for man does not live from hour to hour and from day to day...but his vision must see through the consequences of his actions and aim at the end which constitutes the meaning of positive human effort; otherwise those who endeavor and those who do not would become indistinguishable.[65]

Thus, there are consequences to not engaging in such an endeavor. Within his framework of the nature of man, along with Qur'ānic stipulations, Rahman reinforces his view that while this dialectical human nature exists, there are responsibilities of both

---

[64] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān.* 64. Here, Rahman is quoting *Sūrah al-Tawbah, ayah* 41[9:41].

[65] *Ibid.* Some Qur'ānic citations used by Rahman on *jihād* are as follows:

> The faithful who sit idle, other than those who are disabled, are not equal to those who fight in the way of God with their wealth and lives. God has exalted those in rank who fight for the faith with their wealth and souls over those who sit idle. Though God's promise of good for all, He has granted His favour of the highest reward to those who struggle in preference to those who sit at home. (Sūrah al-Nisā', ayah 95 [4:95])
>
> Come to believe in God and His Apostle, and struggle in the cause of God, wealth and soul. This will be good for you, if you can understand. (Sūrah al-Ṣaf, ayah 11[61:11])

the individual and the community which warrant attention. The Qur'ān provides for ways to fulfill these responsibilities, and advance warning of consequences of inactivity.

However, it is in the ways and means of fulfilling those responsibilities, where there are distinctions in interpretation between Rahman and Mawdūdī. In the *jihād* portion of his behavioral prescription paradigm, Mawdūdī employs the same Qur'ānic notion of "enjoining the good and forbidding the evil" to arrive at the conclusion that fighting in the cause of God implies fighting "man's lordship over man." Rahman, on the other hand, uses the notion in the specific concepts of socio-economic justice, whereby God's cause is adjusted for contemporary circumstances and socio-political realities, such as an interdependent economy. It can be argued that Mawdūdī is also reacting to contemporary circumstances, with notions of Muslim nationalism in an environment he perceived as hostile to Muslim interests. However Rahman's critique of this type of application was that viewing *jihād* without the appropriate historical context, to assess why this stipulation was central and to glean from the context how it can be adjusted can lead to its misuse, or use for other ends other than the creation of an ethical order.[66]

For the concept of *jihād*, Rahman presents an historical case in its usage. He presents it as a Qur'ānically vetted reaction for *fitna*, defined by Rahman as, "pressures to defect from affiliations or retreat from [sic] views."[67] This term was employed in the early Madinan days to describe:

---

[66] For more on the critiques of Mawdūdī by Rahman, and vice-versa, please see:
Berry, Donald Lee. "The Thought of Fazlur Rahman as an Islamic Response to Modernity." Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services. 1996. pgs 120-160.

[67] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān*, 160.

> active pressure, including physical violence and even fighting of Meccans to bring back those new Muslim converts who had left Mecca and joined the Prophet in Madina, its standard use refers to the persecution of Muslims by Meccan pagans in Mecca itself.[68]

However, the Muslims at the time were not strong enough to warrant retaliation, so *jihād* and the usage of this term in the Qur'ān would not have referred to this point in history. In verses revealed later, when the community was stronger, and retaliation was both a possibility and a necessity, then its use was an appropriate response to this pressure. To this Rahman notes,

> But Islam gained very considerable strength during the last phase of the Prophet's Meccan career. Indeed, Muslims were permitted by the Qur'ān in 16:126 even to retaliate against attacks upon them with physical violence, although bearing persecution with patience rather than violence.[69]

Rahman makes a distinction between these two types of response. *Jihād* in the Meccan sense refers to a "strong-willed resistance to the pressures of *fitna*, and retaliation in the case of violence."[70] In the Madinan case, *jihād* refers to "an organized and total effort of the community- if necessary through war- to overcome the hurdles in the way of the spread of Islam."[71] This distinction is important in view of the centrality of historical contextualization in Rahman's methodology. Both cases vet jihād to ward off what threatens the community, and Rahman notes the historical background with some specificity with regard to the emergence of the Muslim community. Although he does

---

[68] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 159.

[69] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 159-160. The verse cited here is as follows:

> If you have to retaliate, do so to the extent you have been injured; but if you forbear it is best for those who bear with fortitude. Endure with patience, for your endurance is not without the help of God. Do not grieve for them, and do not be distressed by their plots. (Sūrah al-Naḥl, ayāt 126-127 [16:126-127])

[70] Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'ān,* 159-160.

[71] *Ibid.*

not address the uses of history vis-a-vis its placement in the Qur'ān in his exegetical work, he later advises against blanket uses of concepts without historical context, a major feature of his overall methodology in treating Islam.

Fazlur Rahman's Islamic Methodology

To assess this practical result of an Islamic methodology, the following section will deal with Rahman's methodology, especially as it relates to modernity. In his work, *Islam and Modernity*, Rahman uses the development of Islamic education as the unit of analysis to assess modernity (within Islam) in classical, medieval, and contemporary contexts. For the purpose of this analysis, his last chapter, "Prospects and Some Suggestions," is especially salient. In this chapter he notes the primary and secondary sources of Islamic thought and their uses in Islamic intellectual history (leading to the curricula of Islamic education), whereby the historicity of such uses is essential. The content of this chapter lies beyond the scope of this paper, however the role of history in Rahman's view is particularly telling of how Islam and Islamic education can be adjusted for contemporary circumstances. Essentially, Rahman seeks to bridge the gap between normative and historical Islam through a careful assessment of intellectual history and its sources.[72]

To this effect he notes,

> If the spark for modernization of old Islamic learning and for the Islamization of the new is to arise, then the original thrust of Islam- the Qur'ān and Muḥammad-must be clearly resurrected so that the conformities and deformities of historical Islam may be clearly judged by it.[73]

[72] Rahman, *Islam and Modernity,* 141.

[73] *Ibid.*

The clarity of which Rahman speaks is the placement of certain concepts within the accurate historical contexts so that their uses are as intended by the primary sources, especially the Qur'ān. Rahman presents the following methodology to achieve this resurrection,

> I also indicated how this resurrection may be accomplished-namely, by studying the Qur'ān's social pronouncements and legal enactments in the light of its general moral teaching and particularly under the impact of its stated objectives (or principles, if one prefers this expression) on the one hand and against the background of their historical-social milieu on the other.[74]

Rahman also critiques other efforts to return to "pure" Islam, which he perceives as ironically un-Islamic because they are inherently Western or reactions to the West.[75] He blames a lack of a clear method for both "modernists" and "fundamentalists." The irony does not end there. Rahman notes that "the Muslim modernists say exactly the same thing as the so-called Muslim fundamentalists say: that Muslims must go back to the original and definitive sources of Islam and perform ijtihād on that basis."[76] Presumably to relieve some of the polemic, a clear method of interpretation of the Qur'ān and Sunnah would be the most effective solution. To Rahman, this clear method integrates historical context and the systemization of the Qur'ān to adjust to socio-material circumstances.

To this effect, he notes,

> [The social body] of thought should be organized next to the pure moral thought of the Qur'ān and the lessons from history upon which the Qur'ān is so insistent. Unless the material of the Qur'ān is well systematized, it can be dangerously

---

[74] *ibid.*

[75] *ibid.*

[76] Rahman, *Islam and Modernity,* 142.

> misleading to apply individual and isolated verses to situations, as most Muslim preachers and even many intellectuals tend to do.[77]

Here, Rahman is perhaps responding to his own circumstances and grievances with ideologues like Mawdūdī whom he perceived as using this faulty methodology. In any case, to Rahman, an historical perspective was not merely enough; in the final lines of this chapter, he notes, "it is of the greatest importance to determine exactly where a society is *at present* before deciding where it can go," [emphasis added].[78] Thus, to Rahman, an integration of the past and the present is central to the proper application of Qur'ānic principles and the most effective methodology in staying true to Islam.

This methodology is Rahman's ideological product. It emerged from his own Qur'ānic exegesis, where the nature of man framework gave a philosophical and psychological reasoning and the substantive historical cases presented the evidence of the centrality and necessity of these concepts in the Qur'ān. This methodology and his commentary on it, discredits Mawdūdī's *perceived* blanket application of Qur'ānic principles, with only a moral framework and the role of the vicegerent to account for their necessity, and a lack of objective historical analysis. The following table summarizes Rahman's ideology and provides some specific comparison with Mawdūdī's ethical behavioral paradigm.

---

[77] Rahman, *Islam and Modernity,* 161.

[78] *ibid.*

Table 1.2: The Islamic Ideology of Fazlur Rahman and its Comparison to Mawdūdī's Ideology[79]

Exposition of Concepts	Cited Sources	Practical Result	Distinction from Mawdūdī
The nature of man and man as an individual Because man has is most elevated of creation, there is a responsibility to act as vicegerent of God in the temporal realm. However, man is also predisposed to the dialectical tension between good and evil *(fiṭra)* creating the potential for moral nihilism	The Qur'ān: Sūrah al-Mūminūn, ayah 115 [23:115] Sūrah al-An'ām, ayah 110 [6:110]	To avoid upsetting the tension between good and evil through essentialized behavioral prescriptions.	This was Rahman's response to revivalist configurations of vicegerency. Mawdūdī believed that the prescriptions facilitated adherence to the Qur'ān; Rahman believed they were dogmatic, and could instead facilitate righteousness and moral nihilism.
The social role of man Given that the Qur'ān provides specific stipulations for the social role of man, they can be systematized to account for historical context. This will facilitate accuracy in creating an ethical order.	<u>Zakāt:</u> The Qur'ān: Sūrah al-Tawbah, ayah 60 [9:60] and the historical basis of its usage. <u>Riba:</u> The Qur'ān: Sūrah al-Baqara, ayah 245 [2:245] and the historical context of its prohibition. <u>Jihād:</u> The Qur'ān Sūrah al-Nisā, ayah 95 [4:95]. Sūrah al-Naḥl, ayāt 126-127 [16:126-127], and the variety of historical context of its usage.	A methodology to systematize these principles in their accurate historical configuration. Also, a re-configuration of Islamic education to emphasize historical context and accuracy.	Mawdūdī advocated a more literal interpretation of these principles, whereby they should be implemented in a political order in a manner that stays close to the text of the Qur'ān. Rahman sought to use systemization as a means of adapting the principles to modernity.

[79] Please see the text of this chapter for appropriate citations.

Conclusion

In summary, Rahman's commentary on the Qur'ān yields a complex methodology, quite distinct from that of Mawdūdī. Through his framework on the dialectical nature of man, the historical contextualization of Qur'ānic concepts, and their presence in the Qur'ān, the necessity and placement of such concepts are clear. Mawdūdī, however, was responding to a different set of circumstances, whereby the presentation of such concepts functioned to bring the community together in a time where Muslims were threatened by other groups in colonial and post-colonial South Asia. Perhaps these circumstances necessitated a different approach, and also the fact that Mawdūdī's audience consisted primarily of the uneducated masses called for a simpler exegesis and solution to imminent threat. This more accessible method would yield more immediate social change from the bottom up, whereas Rahman, an intellectual, had seemingly completely different aspirations for reform, where social change could occur from within the *intelligensia* and extend outward. He was responding to modernity, and how Islamic intellectual thought could be the catalyst for reform.[80] In fact, he was admittedly responding to thinkers like Mawdūdī and their populist methodologies, which were problematic in that they had potential to be misused by the masses, and these revivalist thinkers themselves.

The practical results embodying the methodological (i.e uses of the Qur'ān) and substantive principles (i.e. the zakāt tax) gleaned from these commentaries are also somewhat different. Whereas Mawdūdī had an ideological progression that led him to create a political order, with an *amīr* as a vicegerent who embodies the ethical elements

[80] Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*, 1-12.

found in the Qur'ān, Rahman's result focused less on political order, and more on education and systemization of the Qur'ān to redirect the course of Islamic thought and perhaps Islamic civilization.

What is relevant in the comparison of these two thinkers and actors is that Rahman's view that Mawdūdī's methodology is flawed, and that it gave rise to a political infrastructure is the "misuse" to which Rahman refers. Therein lays the polemic between Islamization and Islamic modernity. In Mawdūdī's configuration of the former, the application of the Qur'ān is a set of behavioral prescriptions to fulfill the call to vicegerency. This configuration has practical value because of Mawdūdī's connection to the Jama 'āt-i Islami. As noted earlier, this party is in favor of Islamization of the political and policy infrastructure in Pakistan, based upon frameworks similar to that of Mawdūdī, adjusted for political necessity. This party notwithstanding, such frameworks are instrumental in changing public opinion, whereby the rhetoric of Islamization, based on these ethical prescriptions, is a reaction to a failed regime subscribing to Islamic modernism. This is will become clear in the forthcoming analysis of the Ayub regime of 1958-1969 and the reactionary rhetoric of Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto, as well, from 1972-1977. The rhetoric and platform of Zia ul-Haq from 1977-1988 is especially interesting because it was almost purely in favor of Islamization.

Of course, Islamization took many forms in its political reality. However, the purpose of the analysis of Mawdūdī's thought was to assess his methodology and the product of his exegetical endeavor, which was his ideology on ethical behavior. Based on this standard of behavior, a polity emerged, whereby a figure of the highest ethical

standing would lead the community to be a self-contained system of Islamic life.[81] Mawdūdī's role, and subsequently the role of his party in the political culture of Pakistan extends beyond imbued rhetoric at certain points in time. This rhetoric has become one pole of a dialectical political culture, and while it reacts to Islamic modernism, Islamic modernism reacts to this rhetoric and its political configuration.

---

[81] For more on Mawdūdī's configuration of an Islamic polity, please see Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam.* 102-103.

Chapter 2

The Failure of Islamic Modernism:

The Ayub Khan Regime, 1958-1969

In the case of Pakistan, discourse and political behavior are inextricably intertwined. This is particularly true in the three decades following its naissance, where discourse shaped modes of statecraft directly. For older states, discourse may affect isolated policy, but in states where there is no infrastructure, the effect is greater in breadth and depth. This effect of discourse thus permeated all aspects of the political arena, and is seen in the ideology and policy of the regimes of this time. As seen in the previous chapter, the discursive backdrop itself was polarized. This polarity of discourse, coupled with its closeness to political behavior, bred polemic.

Specifically, with the lack of an ideological blueprint upon which to build a state, and opposing ideological discourse to consider, the stage was set for polarity within the Pakistani political culture. The need to create practical social governing institutions immediately after partition was thus an ad hoc process, whereby the necessity of this endeavor overtook the necessity to solidify a national character, giving rise to a cohesive set of political values and a political culture consistent with those values.

In the case of Pakistan, this process would be further complicated by its premise, a state for Muslims. The distinction between an Islamic state and a state for Muslims is important in the context of Pakistan. Because its nationhood was a direct

reaction to Indian (Hindu) nationalism, the question of whether there was an implication of a state solely based upon Islamic principles (an Islamic state) becomes a consequence of a lack of *initial* ideological cohesion. Therein is a facet of the ideological polarity between Islamism and Islamic modernism, where the lack of a blueprint creates an ideological vacuum filled in alternation by both poles of discourse, and subsequently regimes who subscribe to one or the other, or both.

This chapter will address the beginning of the exacerbation of this polarity, where a decade after statehood, it became the central goal of the nation to create a feasible constitution. This constitutional process was thus a high priority of the Ayub regime. It was perhaps one of the earliest points after the birth of Pakistan where political ideology was expressed within the political process, and the regimes to follow would react to Ayub's framework. The discussion will include this initial framework through the analysis of the following: antecedent conditions and Ayub's rise to power; his ideology; his policies of the Basic Democracies and the subsequent Constitutional changes; critique of these policies; and finally, his legacy in developing the Pakistani political infrastructure. This analysis is not meant to be an exhaustive political history; however some overview of influential events is provided.

Antecedent Conditions and Ayub's Rise to Power

Ayub held several posts both within the military and in defense prior to his rise as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) in 1958. On January 7, 1948, he became General Officer Commanding in East Pakistan, replacing the British Officer. East Pakistan was a difficult region to govern. It was vastly distinct from West

Pakistan, on ethnic, cultural, and economic fronts. It was not viewed as a major focus of the distribution of resources from West Pakistan, nor a bastion of political importance. This becomes important later during Bhutto's regime, whence the country was plagued by civil war, leading to the creation of the new state of Bangladesh. During this post, Lawrence Ziring notes, he faced issues arising from the aforementioned status of East Pakistan. His performance therein led Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to recommend him to command the Pakistani Army, when the British General Sir Douglas Gracey retired in 1950.[1] In fact, historian M.H. Bhatti, as noted by Lawrence Ziring, asserts that,

> The decision was a highly unexpected one. General Ayub was neither seniormost nor most distinct so far as his actual achievements were concerned.[2]

This in large part because Ayub was only involved in East Pakistan and did not participate in the Kashmir War of 1947-1948.

While Ayub was commander, he focused his efforts on rebuilding the Pakistani Army, with also paying close attention to the political infrastructure. The 1950s were an especially tumultuous time in Pakistan, and Ayub inherited a great deal of its social, political and economic consequences.

Briefly, there were riots in East Pakistan in 1952, 1954, 1956, and 1958, presumably the precursors to the civil war to follow; the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951; disturbances in Punjab in 1953; and tribal clashes in the Northwest

---

[1] Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971. 5-7.

[2] *ibid.*

Frontier Province.[3] Without the presence of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan to stabilize political forces, and create a sense of national unity, the nation was in political uproar.[4] Another consequence of this lack of stability, and perhaps a reinforcing cause, was the on-going struggle to create a Constitution.

Without an ideological premise, and a supporting infrastructure, these consequences only worsened. With the partition of the country and the creation of Pakistan, problems plagued both sides of the borders. Economic disparity, poverty, and illiteracy intensified; and ethnic conflicts became more prevalent.[5] These yielded a further consequence which would plague Ayub's regime. As the people became further entrenched in poverty and conflict, there was a lack of understanding of the political process to change their condition. Without a cohesive ideological base and institutions within the grasp of the grassroots, there was little scope for working through these problems.

At this time following partition, Ayub briefly served as Defense Minister in Prime Minister Iskander Mirza's cabinet, where he kept an even closer eye on the constitutional process and the political infrastructure, while also focusing on the expansion and modernization of the Pakistani army. Prior to assuming this duty as Defense Minister, he drafted a memorandum in which he articulated his initial position on the trajectory of Pakistan, and the means to which it would achieve it. In it he states,

> The ultimate aim of Pakistan must be to become a sound, solid, and cohesive nation to be able to play its destined role in world history. This can be achieved only if as a start a constitution is evolved that will suit the genius of the people

[3] *ibid.*

[4] *ibid.*

[5] *ibid.*

> and be based on the circumstances confronting them, so that they set on the path of unity, team work and creative progress.[6]

This statement is a precursor to Ayub's ideological and political framework, especially his Basic Democracies infrastructure, in which he desired the representation of all segments of the country having a stake in the political process, and its institutions. However, this memorandum was also a precursor to his views on the modernization of the state, where it could viably interact on the world stage. Here, "modernization" implies the adjustment, or at this time, the developments of an infrastructure to cope with the contemporary issues of representation to thus unify the country to *progress.* This notion evolved over time and will be addressed in more detail in the forthcoming section on Ayub's ideology and rhetoric.

This continuing instability gave Ayub more momentum to affect change. In 1954, the Muslim League lost elections in East Pakistan, and new coalitions formed in its place, along with many individual political actors.[7] To this Ayub noted that the masses did not understand the parliamentary system and further refined his view that such a system, modeled after the British system, was not viable in the Pakistani case. It did not take into account the disenfranchised, who may not have been represented in parliamentary alliances, and lacked a strong central authority to facilitate equal representation. While this is a cornerstone of his ideology, antecedent events influenced the development of this view, which would later be configured into a political infrastructure.

---

[6] Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969*, 8.

[7] *ibid.*

Ayub's fascination with the constitutional process was magnified in 1956, when the Second Constituent Assembly drafted a constitution amidst continuing civil unrest in East Pakistan and political breakdown in West Pakistan. Briefly, the stipulations of this Constitution are summarized below:[8]

Table 2.1: The Constitution of 1956

Stipulation	Ideological Rationale	Analysis
Presidential Powers: Voted in by an electoral college Appoints Prime Minister Dissolves National Assembly Has veto power Authority over currency Power to suspend fundamental rights In emergency cases, can issue proclamations overriding the National Assembly.	Strong central powers to govern the country. To "check" the National and Provincial Assemblies. To maintain control during periods of dissent and unrest.	The Constitution was developed in the height of political instability. In order to cope with unrest, the central government wielded considerable authority.
Powers of the National Assembly: 300 member assembly, with even representation from East and West Pakistan Make and pass laws Override Presidential veto with two-thirds majority	To provide equal representation of East and West Pakistan To "check" the President.	This equal representation was intended to ease tensions between East and West Pakistan, however, the central authority and the powers therein was problematic for the East Pakistanis, as stated by the Awami League, a political party in East Pakistan. This party opposed this Constitution on the grounds that the central

[8] The stipulations and portions of the ideological rationale are taken from:

Hayes, Louis. *Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. 65-67.

Judges could be removed by the National Assembly		authority was too powerful. Because the capital was located in West Pakistan, the East Pakistanis felt that it would be relegated to the whims of a West Pakistani government. Given that they had a larger population, they also demanded proportional representation in the National Assembly.
Judiciary Powers: Supreme Court judges appointed by the President Provincial High Courts also appointed by the President Dealt with disputes, appellate matters from lower courts, and matter of constitutionality.	With original jurisdiction on constitutionality, especially in dealing with the actions of the central government, it "checked" the federal powers.	In order to maintain the centrality of the Constitution in governance, the most significant responsibility of the judiciary was to uphold constitutionality in governance.
Role of Islam: No law was to be repugnant to the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*. The country was to be the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" The ultimate sovereignty lay with God. Establishment of a commission to bring laws into concert with Islam.	To retain the Islamic character of the state.	These stipulations vaguely alluded to Islam, with only one specific measure to integrate Islam into law making. There were no interpretive guidelines given. Presumably, this was left to the stipulated commission. Also, this model of governance is inherently Western, with an *integration* of Islam, and not an Islamic *premise* per se.

It was two years later, in 1958, when the crumbling political infrastructure gave way to virtual anarchy. Specifically, there were crises within Provincial Assemblies and continuing ethnic conflict. Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the legislative assemblies, and the political parties were abolished. He then enacted martial

law.[9] At this time, the army, under Ayub's command, staged a coup and ousted Mirza. On October 27, 1958, General Ayub Khan assumed the office of the Presidency.

The Ideology of Ayub Khan

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لاَ يُغَيِّرُ مَا بِقَوْمٍ حَتَّى يُغَيِّرُوا مَا بِأَنْفُسِهِمْ

Surely Allah changes not the condition of a people, until they change their own condition.[10]

As noted earlier, Ayub had his attentions on the constitutional process. It was at that juncture, when unrest was more prevalent than order, where Ayub saw the need for an infrastructure to ameliorate the condition of the people, who were not benefiting from the parliamentary system. Even in the army, he advocated modernization and progress, whereby Pakistan would become a viable and productive state. Upon assuming power, this component of modernity, coupled with inclusivity would crystallize into a new Constitution and democratic framework. Certain elements of Islam would then be added to the mix to create a character of Islamic modernism for this regime. This section will examine how Ayub connected Islam and a democratic infrastructure in his ideology in appealing to the masses. Ultimately, he sought to "change the condition of the people" through these changes.

In sum, his integration of Islam and an infrastructure to facilitate modernity was the key feature of his ideology, and his policies. On the need for infrastructure, he notes,

---

[9] Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era,* 9.

[10] Khan, Ayub. *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967. Preface; It is a Qur'ānic reference: *Sūrah al-R 'ad, ayah 11* [13:11].

> Internally, the major problem for us has been to establish political institutions and stable instruments of government. These institutions and instruments had to be fashioned according to our thinking, temperament, and needs. [The lack of a broad perspective]...has retarded progress. The political system which we inherited had no relevance to our conditions.[11]

Here, Ayub has the premise that the previous political infrastructure was fraught with instability, and did not address the needs nor the character of the people. He believed a new infrastructure based upon these components would undermine the causes of instability, such as tribal conflict, and poverty. Thus, the nation could move beyond its internal strife.

Later in this passage he mentions Islam. While he is not specific about how to integrate Islam into this infrastructure, the following provides some insight into the premise of its integration. He notes,

> As a Muslim, my sole anxiety has been to unite the people of Pakistan in light of their faith and ideology. Our society is torn by a number of schisms; the most fundamental is the one which separates the educated classes from the traditional groups. It is vital that understanding and communication between these two sections should be restored. This can come about through a proper interpretation of Islamic principles and their application to the present-day problems.[12]

Essentially, Ayub sees the utility of Islamic ideology in dealing with societal problems, within an infrastructure which undermines instability and facilitates progress through inclusiveness of all social and ethnic groups in governance. The systemization of Islam to ensure accuracy in its application is reminiscent of Fazlur Rahman's ideology. This was not coincidental, as Rahman worked closely with Ayub in a consultative capacity, as well as in a more specific role as head of the Institute of Islamic Studies.

---

[11] Ayub, *Friends Not Masters,* ix.

[12] *ibid.*

The following table depicts the ideological similarities between the contemporaries:

Table 2.2: The Ideology of Fazlur Rahman and Ayub Khan

Concept	Rahman's "Pure" Ideology	Ayub's Configuration	Analysis
The theo-political role of man	Vicegerency is a responsibility for man, but given his dialectical nature, this role must be undertaken cautiously without essentialized prescriptions. Rather, it should be carefully approached through a systematizing methodology of historical Islam and its sources to adapt to modern conditions.	Ayub viewed Islam as an adaptable system, and touted this view in his rhetoric. Also, the notion of systematization led to treating general Islamic principles, such as equity and inclusiveness in his policies, namely the Basic Democracies.	Ayub created a socio-political infrastructure to facilitate this inclusiveness. However, it was problematic because the indirect nature of this type of democracy undermined the very inclusiveness it sought. Also, Ayub circumvented the more specific ethical prescriptions of prayer and alms-giving by presumably relegating that to the individual, not the government.
Developing and using an interdisciplinary methodology in systematizing the primary sources	Again, through the accurate assessment of the Qur'ānic injunctions, their historicity, and their appropriate usage, Islamic ideology would be adaptable to modern conditions.	Ayub sought to reform the process of the study of Islam, and infuse it with this methodology through calling on Fazlur Rahman himself to develop Islamic education in this manner.	Developing such a methodology was an endeavor for the intelligentsia, and not a political actor *per se*. However, the tutelage given to systemization in Ayub's rhetoric was significant.

On the eve of his second inauguration, Ayub released a *President's Manifesto*, in which he articulated more specific goals of his administration. Those relevant to this discussion are presented below and analysis, as needed, follows the stipulation:[13]

Table 2.3: The *President's Manifesto*, 1965

Stipulation	Analysis
I. I Believe	
• that Allah, in His infinite Mercy, created Pakistan to give the Muslims of these regions a homeland in which to mould their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and the spirit of Islam.	Here, Ayub articulates the Islamic premise of the state.
• that the will of the people is supreme in all matters of the State.	He reinforces the notion that the interests of the people are central in governance. This was a direct critique of the previous Constitution, where the matters of the state could supersede the rights of the people.
• that democracy provides the surest means of securing the fullest participation of the people in the affairs of their country	
• [democracy] must be based on pragmatism rather than dogmatism and must safeguard the basic right of the people to freedom of speech, association, and assembly under the rule of law.	This stipulation is the ideological basis for his Basic Democracies infrastructure. The "dogmatism" noted here could be a reference to the previous regimes, where fundamental rights were often at the discretion of the central authority.
• that the people...must move, as fast as possible, into the age of science and technology, while...preserving the basic tenets of their faith, in order to attain a higher standard of living.	He is articulating the modernist position.
• that all class distinctions should disappear...and [Pakistanis] should live...as a model community symbolizing Islamic brotherhood and equality of man.	He invokes an Islamic principle for the sake of unity.
• Pakistan should develop into a Welfare State where basic necessities are available to all.	This would attempt to bridge the gaps in the quality of life for all.
II. I Maintain	
• that further progress....would be possible only if we develop sufficient self-reliance to study our own problems and	He advocates customizing an infrastructure to facilitate progress.

[13] Specific stipulations of the Manifesto are taken from: Ayub, *Friends Not Masters*, 250-253.

to solve them in our own way. • only an enlightened approach based on practical realism rather than dominated by theorization, will help us to shed retrograde and antiquated traditionalism. • that in all material and economic matters our attitude should not be doctrinaire, but dictated...by the situation. • that Pakistan's sovereignty and unity as a nation can be guaranteed only by a strong Centre capable of providing full provincial autonomy.	This is a critique of Islamism. "Practical realism" and the rejection of "theorization" imply that policy must be adjusted as needed, and not subject to application based upon theoretical and antiquated methods. He asserts the need for a strong federal center, to manage the provincial entities and ensure autonomy.
III. I Undertake • to provide for the widest possible and most equitable distribution of wealth. • to adopt all practical means to raise the income of the common man so as to reduce the disparity between the rich and the poor. • to ensure that the burden of taxation is distributed in a fair and equitable manner • to expand further the scope of the rural works programme. • to build up a strong rural community, capable of looking after its own needs.	This emphasis on equality would undermine instability arising from economic disparity. By investing in the rural areas, he is again trying to limit economic disparity between the urban and rural classes.
IV. I Urge • for Faith. We must have faith in ourselves and our destiny, and whatever the community might embark upon should be a source of pride and satisfaction to all of us. • for National Outlook. We cannot afford to think in terms of provinces or regions. The economic advancement which we have already achieved has taken us to a stage where further progress will depend on our ability to evolve a national outlook, a national vision, and to secure national unity. • for Hard Work. Empty slogans and fond hopes will get us nowhere.	This is motivational rhetoric to mobilize the masses. He expresses the need for unity to realize progress, and also as a direct reaction to tribal and provincial clashes contributing to political instability and the hindrance of socio-economic progress. Again, this is motivational rhetoric. It could also be a reaction to the rhetoric of other political actors.

Thus, this *Manifesto* is a specific policy outline of Ayub's Islamic modernist framework, where Islam is influential in principle and the careful assessment of needs and conditions

create an adjustable infrastructure from which to govern to create unity and facilitate progress, thereby undermining the causes of political instability.

However, how does Ayub more specifically reconcile Islam with his ideology of modernity, and which principles of Islam are central to this reconciliation? He advocates the use of *ijtihād*, or independent, interpretive judgment of legal (and theological) questions, which he then believes gives way to the latency of progress in Islam. In a speech delivered at the opening ceremony of Jāmi 'a Islamia at Bahawalpur in 1963, he makes several key statements to this effect:

> Pakistan was established on the basis of religion. We demanded Pakistan for the preservation of out religion and culture, and Allah, in His bounty, granted us the boon of Pakistan...But modern education and enlightenment are spreading day by day. In the last century, our so-called religious scholars thought that safety for Islam lay in depriving the Muslims of the knowledge of English and the new sciences. If, however, Islam is the true religion of Allah and its principles are correct and everlasting, then Islam does not stand in danger from modern education or new ideas.[14]

Here, Ayub is establishing the connections between Islam and his configuration of modernity, namely through "modern" education and the sciences. In Ayub's Islamic modernist ideology, there is not an inverse relationship between (perceived) extra-Islamic disciplines and Islam. This becomes clearer in his next set of remarks in the same speech:

> It is not the correct way to combat new science and new ideas by confining ourselves within the limitations of our knowledge and keeping away from all outside influences. The correct way is that we should study the new sciences and new ideas. Our religion ordains that we accept a good thing, wherever it may be found, and whatever is wrong, we must counter it and prove it is wrong. There is nothing in the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* which stands in danger from the new sciences or the new ideas...The Qur'ān repeatedly appeals

[14] *Speeches and Statements of Ayub Khan,* Vol VI, June 1963-July 1964, 42-43.

> that we should make use of our own reason and intellect. The Holy Prophet himself opened the gateway of *ijtihād*.[15]

This passage offers key insight into Ayub's placement of Islam relative to modernity. He notes that receptiveness to external influences does not inhibit the ability to "enjoin the good and forbid the evil." By invoking the Qur'ān and the prophetic model he adds legitimacy to this notion. His advocacy of *ijtihād* is also interesting, in that it reinforces his position as an Islamic modernist, as defined in the Introduction.

In the next passage, he warns of the consequences of not using the intellect and reason to carve out thought adjusted for contemporary circumstances.

> If we act narrow-mindedly and follow the beaten track, then future generations will stray away from Islam in the same manner as the Western nations have gone astray from their religions.[16]

This comparison to the West is interesting. Earlier in the passage, he advocated receptiveness to external sources of education, presumably from the West. However, he makes the distinction between receptiveness to external sciences and total secularity inspired by the West.

Finally, from the "new sciences," Ayub ventures to the notion of progress. This term is often problematic, especially because it often implies the eradication of tradition, which is typically unacceptable to the Islamists, in fear that the loss of tradition leads to the loss of the prominence of religion. However, this is disputed by Islamic modernists, and especially by Ayub. He notes,

> Islam is a religion of progress. We all know what phenomenal progress the companions of the Prophet made simply by acting on the principles of Islam. Coming of a violent and uncivilized society, they not only became the most

---

[15] *ibid.*

[16] *ibid.*

> civilized people of the time, but also came to be known as experts in arts, literature, and science, and as leaders of thought. Why is it, then, that the followers of the same Islam are backward and unprogressive today? Obviously, we are not following in the footsteps of the Companions of the Prophet.[17]

Here, Ayub likens progress with the formative period of Islam. The invocation of the Prophet and the Companions of the Prophet as "modernists" of sorts is a powerful reference. Again, this disputation of the connection between tradition and the retention of the faith is a feature of the ideology of many Islamic modernists, as was also seen in Fazlur Rahman's ideology. Although Rahman takes it a bit further in that not only will religion *not* be lost in the attention to socio-material circumstances; rather it will be enhanced. The blanket adherence to tradition, in this view, will undermine the continued effectiveness of certain principles in the Qur'ān.[18] This adherence was the primary argument in favor of Islamic modernism. It is also the differential between Islamic modernism and other schools of modernism, where religion was not necessarily the central feature of preservation.

With Ayub's reiteration of the premise of Islamic modernism, the task of placing this ideology in terms of a cohesive set of political values becomes important. This will lead to the evolution of these political values into a political infrastructure and actual policy.

The traditionalist camp in Pakistan was troubling to Ayub for a few reasons. Aside from the ideological distinctions themselves, the consequences of such an ideology in Pakistan were also problematic. Because of its relatively recent naissance, and lack of an ideological blueprint, any ideology could filter into the political

---

[17] *ibid.*

[18] Please see chapter 1, pages 30-48 for an exposition of Fazlur Rahman's ideology.

infrastructure, and leave its impression. In particular, Ayub felt that the traditionalist camp was compromising unity because the actors therein were not open to his ideological positions and subsequently, his policies.

This ideology of unity and "progress" through the *appropriate* retention of Islamic principles, as adjusted for modernity, is seen in Ayub's policymaking, as examined below in the Basic Democracies plan and its connections to this ideology.

The Basic Democracies: Islamic Modernism in Practice

The Basic Democracies Framework was introduced in October 1959 to overhaul the political infrastructures in Pakistan. Ayub intended for it to be an inclusive political system of representation without the interference of political party machines. In his view, it would integrate tradition with modernity by retaining the infrastructures of authority in the villages and connecting them to the federal government.

Islam was not a large part of crafting this framework, nor was it critiqued for its lack of attention to religion. Rather, the issue of a representative or indirect democracy was problematic. The issue of more specific attention (or lack thereof) to Islam is present in the constitutional process of this regime. This will be addressed in the forthcoming section.

Specifically, "Basic Democracies was a pyramidal plan enabling people to elect directly to local councils the men they knew, who would in turn elect the upper tiers of the administration. There were altogether 80,000 Basic Democrats elected on the basis

of adult franchise."[19] There were councils which operated within this pyramid. These councils and their function are stated below:

Table 2.4: Administrative Councils of the Basic Democracies[20]

Council and Their Specifications	Function
Union Councils- one council for a number of contiguous villages and a Town Committee for each town. This council then elected one representative for the next tier.	Included industrial promotion, food production, public works projects, education and other social projects.
Thana (East Pakistan) and *Tehsil* (West Pakistan) Councils	Coordinated activities of the Union Councils and Town Committees.
District Councils- district councils excluding urban areas Municipal Councils- councils for urban areas	Included mostly public works and economic projects. Sometimes undertook health and education initiatives.
Divisional Councils	Coordinated the work of local councils, municipal bodies, and cantonment boards. Also monitored and evaluated these bodies.
Two Provincial Advisory Councils for East and West Pakistan	These Councils were advisory in nature, and ceased to function after the 1962 Constitution. They were replaced by provincial legislatures.

This multi-tiered framework sought to ensure representation from the bottom up. However, in a nation that was accustomed to direct involvement in the political arena, it was viewed as means of alienation. By increasing the bureaucracy, and pushing the people further away from the center of governance, this framework was not successful in promulgating a sense of inclusiveness. While the framework may have increased efficiency in terms of public works and economic endeavors, because the beneficiaries had a stake in those processes, the alienation that resulted plagued the regime, and ultimately led to its downfall.

Thus, this framework, an antecedent to the Constitution of 1962, did not fare well in the public sphere, especially among the Islamists. Furthermore, the notion of

[19] Khan, Hamid. *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001. 219.
[20] Data taken from: Khan, *Constitutional and Political History,* 220.

indirect democracy for the sake of efficiency was largely a Western norm. In other words, it did not have Islamic roots that were discernable to the people. The critique of the Western nature of this framework gave rise to doubts of the regime's commitment to retaining the Islamic character of the state, particularly by members of the opposition parties and actors akin to Mawdūdī. It was this type of critique which fueled the polemic between Islamic modernism and Islamization.

Ayub attempted to address the Islamic question in his crafting of the Constitution of 1962 in addition to reinforcing his Basic Democracies. The next section will examine the stipulations of this Constitution in view of infrastructure and Islamic ideology.

The Constitution of 1962: Legal Codification of Islamic Modernism

The Constitution of 1962 essentially codified the Basic Democracies into law and detailed the separation of powers at the federal level. The following table offers analysis of relevant stipulations.

Table 2.5: The Constitution of 1962 [21]

Stipulation	Ideological Rationale	Analysis
Presidential Powers:		
Establishment of a presidential system, with central authority in federal hands, especially the President.	A centralized system of governance, where the President enjoys indirect power could provide for sound implementation of the regime's objective of the Basic Democracies.	This regime's Constitution was largely perceived as secularist, **minus** a system of checks and balances.
The President is responsible		The centrality of authority was problematic for the

[21] Stipulations taken from: Hayes, Louis. *Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy*,74-78; Mahmood, Safdar. *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, 1947-1999.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 68-91; and Raza, Rafi. *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967-1977.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997. 179-185

for all government appointments, except judiciary. The appointees are accountable to the President. Presidential has the power to dissolve the National Assembly President had the ability to unilaterally enforce ordinances in a state of emergency, which was declared by the President	In terms of the specific stipulations, Presidential authority over appointees, the National Assembly, and enforcement of ordinances ensures that the objectives of the regime are not subject to too much intrusion.	masses, and the secularist spin of the regime led to the failure of the regime and opened the ideological window for "Islam" to be perceived as a more viable solution to the problems of modernist governance.
Powers of the National Assembly: This included legislative authority and veto power The Council of Ministers was established as an advisory body with no voting or binding power over policy.	These stipulations were modeled to some extent after the Western models of governance. The National Assembly was formed to enact federal legislation. The Ministers' body was a group of advisors of sorts, with no binding power, however to make policy recommendations to the President.	Again, these stipulations reinforce the centralization of power in federal hands.. Ayub admittedly wanted to keep power centralized so that his Basic Democracies framework could be efficiently implemented.
The Constitution initially substituted "Islam" for Qur'ān and *sunnah*" as sources of law.	There was some concern expressed from within the regime about the validity of *ḥadīth* reports in their current state of analysis, especially by Fazlur Rahman.[22]	De-Islamizing the Constitution was vital in using sources other than the Islamic sources of the Qur'ān and *sunnah*.

This Constitution had several modernist features. First, it had a combination of a strong federal center and an infrastructure of representation. Perhaps this combination was to allow for provincial representation while keeping the provinces at bay with a strong federal center. Previous to this regime, the provinces often governed themselves, contributing to a lack of national unity. The primary critique of this administrative infrastructure was that it was not tailored to the pre-existing socio-political culture.

[22] Rahman, Fazlur. *Islam and Modernity,* 103.

Ideally, this socio-political culture was largely based on localized governance, with a national administrative infrastructure and a national identity that did not undermine the provincial identity. Thus, there was a level of provincial autonomy to account for a heterogeneous population which extended beyond public works projects. Therefore, the unity that Ayub sought in crafting the Basic Democracies and the Constitution did not account for this heterogeneity.

The last stipulation is of particular importance because it fueled debate in the public sphere. This was the removal of "Qur'ān" and "*sunnah*" from the document.[23] In his ideology, Ayub advocated a modernist approach to integrating Islam into governance. Influenced largely by Fazlur Rahman's thought, this integration meant the adjustment of normative Islam to modernity. In legal terms, this also implied a critical analysis of the Qur'ān to be applied when appropriate, as opposed to the Islamic norm of the Qur'ān as the premise of law. The *sunnah*'s place in governance and law was tentative because of Rahman's (and subsequently) views of the validity of ḥadīth reports. This stipulation was later repealed in 1964, much to the pleasure of the religious elite.

It should be noted that Ayub's Basic Democracies and constitutional changes disenfranchised the religious elite. Other than non-binding councils, they were relegated to an advisory role in the political arena.[24] They remained a constituency to be reckoned with because of their appeal to the masses. Thus, Ayub had to pander to the religious elite when political necessity so warranted. However, because the Basic Democracies

---

[23] Hayes, Louis. *Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy,* 69

[24] *ibid,* 68

and the subsequent constitutional changes were so removed from wholly Islamic governance as perceived by the religious elite, compromise was difficult.

Conclusion: The Legacy of the Ayub Khan Regime

Essentially, the Ayub Khan inherited a virtual ideological vacuum, filled with little more than a skeletal infrastructure. His modernist views on the integration of Islam in governance, with the need for representation with a strong federal government sought to make Pakistan a viable and productive state. However, his policies failed to account for the pervasiveness of Islam and identity in the evolving Pakistani political culture. This is an example of the gap between rhetoric and political reality. While the Basic Democracies attempted to represent the disenfranchised, it ultimately alienated them because they became further removed from the center of governance. The Constitution of 1962, and its implications for Islam's place in Pakistani politics, further affected Ayub's relations with the masses. Other religio-political actors emerged with promises of wholly Islamic governance as a mode of enfranchisement, which widened the gap between the Islamic modernist camp and the masses.

Thus, the polemic between Islamism and Islamic modernism gained momentum as Ayub's regime continued to weaken. Efficiency through Ayub's infrastructures had was not well received, despite his commitment to systematizing Islam in the governing sphere. This left an impression on Pakistan's political culture, where the role of Islam in governance would become more important in crafting both rhetoric and policy. It became a litmus test of sorts to gauge the actor's relationship with the masses as well as his or her commitment to staying true to the intent of Pakistan as a state for Muslims.

After the fall of the Ayub regime in 1969, the question of how to craft a state with Islamic political values and policies became open once again. The next section will analyze the Zulfiqar Bhutto regime and how his approach to this question further polarized Pakistan's political culture.

Chapter 3

The Rhetoric of Islamic Ideology:

The Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime, 1971-1977

The failure of the Ayub Khan regime to sustain itself against the pressure of the opposition, once again led to regime change. However, it led to an ideological shift as well. Another key feature of a nation with a developing political culture is the propensity for extreme ideological shifts. Of course, with any regime change, there is a shift in modes of governance. In Pakistan, when there is an ideological shift, major changes in political organs also seem to occur. This inconsistency has led to instability in governance and continued ideological polarity.

The Ayub regime began this process of polarity. The regimes to follow then adhered to a pattern of shifts, where Islam and the extent of its integration became a major focal point of rhetoric and political behavior. The regime immediately following the Ayub regime was of some consequence in the political history of Pakistan, particularly in the secession of East Pakistan. The regime of Yahya Khan, from 1969-1971, will be briefly treated in the following section. However, it was after this stint of martial law and during the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from 1971 to 1977 which had a lasting impact on political culture.

This chapter assess this impact through analysis of Bhutto's regime with the following: antecedent conditions and the Yahya Khan regime; Bhutto's ideology and the uses of Islam therein; his policy towards East Pakistan; the stipulations of the

Constitution of 1973; and conclusions about the effects of Bhutto's ideology and policy on political culture.

Antecedent Conditions and the Yahya Khan Regime

When Ayub relinquished power, the Deputy-General of Pakistan's army, Yahya Khan assumed power under martial law. This regime was ideologically transient. Initially, Yahya's objective was to stabilize the country under martial law using the existing political mechanisms. In 1970, with Bhutto influencing the ruling elite, Yahya was forced to restore civilian rule and political party machines.[1] He held elections on October 5, 1970 under pressure from the political parties. These elections would be direct, and thus the country moved away from Ayub's Basic Democracies.

There are several components of this regime which make it notable. The first is that Yahya favored a parliamentary system and the presence of political parties despite martial law. With such drastic changes to the political system, in spite of emphasis on stability during regime change, many actors emerged. Public debate about statecraft and administration also flourished at this time.[2]

Yahya attempted to build consensus among his military government and civilian actors in crafting a new political framework. The product of this effort was the Legal Framework Order (LFO) which sought to redistribute seats in the National Assembly so that a new constitutional process could begin. This new distribution favored East Pakistan, as its population outnumbered the other provinces. However, the political

---

[1] Ziring, Lawrence. *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 324-325.
[2] *ibid.*

parties, and the different actors had a variety of interests in the implementation of the LFO. Some members of the military government balked at the idea of extending so much power to the Bengalis for fear of secession. Others believed that the LFO would remedy East Pakistan's emerging discontent with West Pakistan's governance.[3] However, with few assurances of political capital couched in a stable infrastructure, there was little trust between the East and West Pakistanis.

Yahya's second component of note was negotiating with the East Pakistanis. The nature of these negotiations will be addressed shortly in the third section. However, Yahya's inability to reconcile Bengali nationalism with West Pakistani interests cost him the election of 1970.

During Yahya's regime, Bhutto was intimately involved in developing the LFO. Towards the end of Ayub's regime he had secured political capital through founding a political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). This gave him the political credibility and presence he needed at both the grassroots and elite strata. He started the party in 1967, after breaking ties with the Ayub Khan regime, where he served as foreign minister. The breakdown of that relationship is complex and most likely a result of political alienation. However, the split is salient because the development of the PPP and Bhutto's ideology largely began as a mode of separating himself ideologically from Ayub Khan. In particular, Bhutto sought to distinguish himself from Ayub's modernist ideology and Western-influenced political institutions.

Thus, Bhutto was politically well-positioned in Yahya's regime to deal with East Pakistan crisis. However, Yahya failed miserably, and Bhutto had the support of the

---

[3] *ibid.*

West Pakistanis. The PPP was rallying the masses in most of the provinces while Bhutto was involved in the LFO and East Pakistan. Yahya's inability to counter Bengali nationalism, coupled with Bhutto's adept political maneuvering led to the latter's rise to power in 1971.

This political maneuvering was dependent on Bhutto's political capital. Bhutto's PPP had billed itself as a populist party, and the platform was laced with compelling rhetoric, which garnered the support of the masses. The forthcoming discussion assesses Bhutto's ideology and rhetoric, especially as it differs from Ayub, and the subsequent impact on political culture.

The Ideology of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Bhutto's ideology was couched in the platform of the PPP. The following chart depicts some salient features of the PPP's ideology and offers the rationale for its platform. It draws from a variety of sources, from Islam to Lenin's discourse to create a system of Islamic socialism.

Table 3.1: The Platform of the Pakistan People's Party[4]

Stipulation	Rationale
Socialist Economy:	
Nationalization of the industrial economy	To prevent the exploitation of workers
Land redistribution to the peasant classes	To facilitate the eradication of landlordism
Establishment of cooperatives	To encourage collective production and safeguard rural workers
Democratic Governance:	
Democratic governing institutions	To allow for broad and direct involvement in political practice.

[4] Data taken from: Syed, Anwar. *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.* New York: St Martin's Press, 1992. 64-67.

Freedom of belief and expression No censorship of the truth	To promote thought and discourse among the people and the elites
Islamic Principles: Economic equity Social justice Retention of Islam in the political sphere	To maintain the Islamic character of the nation and adhere to the values therein.

Bhutto compensated for his own elite socio-economic position in the landed class through the development of this Islamic Socialist platform. It represents a nexus of Islamic socio-economic values, democratic modes of governance, and socialist economic infrastructures. It was in stark contrast to Ayub's ideological premise in that it kept Islam as a guiding principle and attempted to make the connection between Islam and socialism. Ayub sought a systemization of Islam, through Fazlur Rahman, and its integration into the political sphere.[5] Bhutto operated from normative Islam for rhetorical purposes, which did not ruffle the beliefs of the masses.

Bhutto's assertion that socialism is Islamic was not novel in the Muslim world, and initially it was well-received by the people. In a speech at a public meeting in Gujarat, on March 1, 1970 he painted a dismal picture of the Pakistani masses under the Ayub Khan regime, citing heart-wrenching examples of workers who were denied medical care, while the rich and "capitalist" classes enjoyed a lopsided lifestyle. He also

[5] This is specifically stated in Ayub's rhetoric. Please see the previous chapter, pages 60-68 for specific examples.

noted that several Muslim countries are able to retain their Islamic roots while still providing the masses with education and health care.[6] He said,

> [Regarding the forthcoming elections], our foremost principle is that unless capitalism and exploitation are ended, the problems of the people cannot be solved....we want a change in the economic system. Our opponents are those who have sucked the blood of the common man. Our objective is to bring their hegemony to an end.[7]

He then made an appeal to the audience using Islam directly. He said,

> We want to raise the prestige of Muslims. Pakistan came into being as their homeland. Pakistani Muslims are staunch Muslims. Islam will live forever. Islam was given to us by Allah and His Messenger, and the people of Pakistan have full faith in it. I have served the cause of Islam more than my opponents.[8]

This juxtaposition of socialist ideology with the Islamic idiom gives it legitimacy in that it implicitly merges the two ideologies. Bhutto can then easily make the ideological transition that socialism is Islamic. He does this later in the speech where he attacks the religious factions in their support for the 1956 Constitution which was not Islamic because it was framed in British terms. Rather "the Qur'ān is our Constitution."[9] Most likely for the sake of the elections, he championed upholding the correct Islamic principles of equality, which is inherent in socialism. In the PPP's *Manifesto*, this merger of Islam and socialism is made explicit. It says,

> [Socialism] means true equality of our citizens, fraternity under the rule of democracy in an order based on economic and social justice. These aims follow from the political and

---

[6] Bhutto, Zulfiqar. *Politics of the People: Awakening the People.* Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications. 27-28

[7] *ibid, 29*

[8] *ibid.*

[9] *ibid,* 31

> social ethics of Islam. The Party thus strives to put in practice the noble ideals of the Muslim faith.[10]

This ideological merger began as a reaction to the Ayub regime. Bhutto wanted to remain politically distinct, and this rhetoric was ideal in doing so because it integrated the Islamization ideology with socialism, which usually carries great ideological appeal among the poor masses. While Ayub also invoked Islamic principles in his rhetoric, Bhutto did not use the more radical Islamic modernist ideology such as suggesting an *amir* to lead the community to an Islamic way of life. This ideology had lost its popularity, and Bhutto wanted to remove himself from its milieu. Rather, his uses of Islam were general. This is not to imply that his socialist agenda was well-received by the religious elite, especially Mawdūdī. However, unlike his predecessor, he did not alienate them or their policy preferences. He used political maneuvering as a means of compromise. Examples of this will be discussed in the forthcoming section on the Constitution of 1973.

In his inaugural address, the previously secular Bhutto makes some interesting Islamic overtures. He does not explicitly claim to be a prophetic exemplar. However, his allusions to the prophetic model of Muḥammad and the platform of the PPP suggest that the latter is *virtually* derived from the former, hence adding the legitimacy and gaining the trust of the masses ideologically committed to Islam. In the address he said,

> The *Seerat* [conduct] of the Holy Prophet has interested me not only because I am a Muslim, but also because he is the perfect ideal for the modern man...He taught equality of man...he stood for the rights of the oppressed...He condemned the tyranny and exploitation of the downtrodden in agricultural, commercial and other relationships in

---

[10] Syed, Anwar. *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.* New York: St. Martin's Press,1992. 67

> various modes of production...He brought the light of reason to show the way out from the darkness of ignorance...[11]

The prophetic model is an incredibly high ideological standard to attain in crafting policy. It thus becomes dangerous ground on which to tread politically because the line between personal behavior and political rhetoric is blurred. For example, Afzal Iqbal noted that the religious masses were *quite* offended when Bhutto later admitted he drank wine.[12] This discredited the extent to which he was committed to an Islamic society. The religious parties, such as Mawdūdī's Jam 'āt-i Islami, used such sentiments to attack Bhutto both personally and ideologically. Eventually, they were able to rally the masses against him.[13]

In its effect on political culture, it is important to note that the disenfranchised masses that Bhutto was targeting also tend to be more religious than the educated or wealthy elites. It was this group that Bhutto was most concerned with in presenting his ideology. As aforementioned, this was the audience who were alienated by Ayub, which ultimately led to his downfall. Bhutto sought to bridge the gap between the elites and the masses, to avoid a similar fate.

From ideological rhetoric comes policy rhetoric as means of legitimizing both ideology and policy. During his regime, Bhutto sought to implement his socialist agenda through land reforms and the nationalization of most industries in order to "stop the concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of a few ruling tycoons.[14] It is at

---

[11] Iqbal, Afzal. *Islamisation of Pakistan.* .Delhi: Vishal Printers, 1984. 101

[12] *ibid*, 103

[13] Sayeed, Khalid. *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change.* New York: Praeger, 1980. 86-87.

[14] Syed,Anwar. *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,* 120

this juncture of policy and rhetoric where socialist ideology, as was the lesson in Eastern Europe for forty years, can easily merge with political autocracy. Given Bhutto's attachment to power, this was a certain reality. His goals of nationalizing all things private was later perceived as a mode of controlling the discourse and behavior of the ruled.

In terms of land reforms, in 1972, Bhutto announced that he would lower the ceilings on land ownership to 150 acres and shift the water tax and the cost of seeds to the landowners.[15] This was to enable the landless peasants to "lift their heads from the dust and regain their pride and manhood, their self-respect, and honor."[16] However, while this rhetoric was retained in the party platform, the reality of politics made Bhutto make distinctions between the oppressive landowners and enlightened landowners. He altered the ideology to accommodate the entrepreneurial classes. The results of the reforms were modest and Bhutto did not push the issue of further reform.[17]

In politics, it is an obvious reality to modify ideology for practical purposes of broadening appeal. However, the ideological thrust for equality in Islamic socialism is expressed in radical land reform. It was not a political promise made in passing, but rather, a major feature of electioneering strategy.

It seems that strong ideological claims are necessary to gain the support of the masses. However, there was an expectation of practice, and when the reforms failed to reach those expectations, it added to the mistrust of the efficacy and character of Pakistani politicians. Essentially, Bhutto attempted to secure his political capital

---

[15] *ibid*, 127

[16] *ibid.*

[17] *ibid*, 131

through Islamic ideological and policy rhetoric. However, securing political capital often came at the expense of the grassroots electorate, because of compromises to policy. Thus, this led to this mistrust.

The next section follows the analysis from ideology to policymaking of the Bhutto regime that details these compromises. The first is the secession of East Pakistan and the second is the Constitution of 1973.

The Secession of East Pakistan

The purpose of the analysis of the policies and process of implementation of this regime is to elucidate on the lack of cohesive ideology. The consequence of this is ideology is tailored to fit the event, and thus provide a justification for certain policies that may require ethical legitimacy. When there is a body of unchanging ideology, or at least political values, the political actor operates within the boundaries set by the ideological cohesion. In Pakistani politics, the lack of a body of such ideology makes *any* ideology, framed within one of the two poles, justify policy and its implementation.

Furthermore, the justification of policy through lofty ideology allows for questionable political behavior by the actor, where there is no infrastructure of checks and balances to stay within a value system. This is a shaky foundation for institution-building. The subsequent lack of transparency and accountability allows for corruption without consequences so long as the actor's political capital encompassing alliances, the power of the ruling party, financial assets and the like, is sustained. The first case is of the civil war between East and West Pakistan in 1971 and Bhutto's promulgation of the war for his own ends of gaining political capital.

The first policy to be treated carries a significant political weight in its effect. Bhutto's place in history was often defined by the civil war between East and West Pakistan. It was a complex crisis in Pakistani history, with a variety of actors vying for the fulfillment of different interests. The purpose of the analysis of this crisis is to show the consequences of a lack of infrastructure of checks and balances, and prove the crystallization of the layer of mistrust that exists in the Pakistani political culture, as a result of Bhutto's treatment of East Pakistan.

A brief assessment of the political backdrop of the secession is necessary here. The relations between East and West Pakistan were lukewarm since the inception of the state. As the political infrastructure developed, the East Pakistan was given less and less autonomy by the political center in West Pakistan. Discontent increased as Ayub's Basic Democracies essentially alienated the East Pakistanis in governance. The relations went from bad to worse in 1968 during the Agartala conspiracy case when several key actors in the Bengali nationalist movement were accused of anti-national activities.[18] Among them was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was also accused of conspiring with India for the secession of East Pakistan. Due to the constitutional issues surrounding the lack of evidentiary support and Ayub's weakening government, Ayub's government withdrew the case.[19]

The National Assembly elections of December 7, 1970 laid the foundation for the weak political negotiations that eventually broke up Pakistan. The Awami League, a Bengali nationalist party, had won 151 out of 153 contested seats, with 75% of the vote

---

[18] Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan.* 339-341.

[19] *ibid.*

in East Pakistan.[20] In West Pakistan, the PPP had won a little over 40% of the vote in both in Punjab and Sindh, which was a significant victory for the left-leaning party of Bhutto.[21] With the political capital gained for Bhutto in the West, and overwhelmingly solidified for the Awami League in the East, the stage was set for a power struggle.

As a campaign platform, the Awami League, and its leader, Mujibur Rahman, developed the Six-Point Plan that was to amend policy in East Pakistan through extension of provincial autonomy. The plan included the following stipulations:

Table 3.2: The Six Point Plan[22]

Stipulation	Analysis
1. Establishing a federal parliamentary system based on direct adult franchise.	This system would ensure the presence of the Awami League at the federal level.
2. Restriction of federal government to foreign affairs, defense, and currency, with some provincialization of foreign relations.	This stipulation would create more autonomy for the provinces, with federal funds. Also, foreign aid would be more independent of the federal center.
3. Non-Bengali industrialists in East Pakistan should be subjected to the same rules as foreign investors.	This would discourage economic involvement of the West Pakistanis in East Pakistan and subsequently, political involvement.
4. Entrusting all taxation powers to the provinces, with exceptions for foreign affairs and defense.	This would necessitate a separate fiscal infrastructure in East Pakistan, and thus undermine federal involvement in East Pakistan.
5. Independent foreign exchange accounts for each province.	It would provide independent provincial funds.
6. Establishing an independent militia in East Pakistan.	This would allow for supplementary provincial defense.

These stipulations were part and parcel of the Bengali nationalist agenda. Thus, there was a power-play between East and West Pakistan, to which neither side was able to relent. The Six-Point plan was not amenable to West Pakistan because it relinquished

[20]Raza, Rafi. *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967-1977.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997. 38

[21] *ibid.*

[22] Data taken from: Khan, Hamid. *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan,*401.

too much autonomy to the provinces. Aside from Point 1, which had garnered some consensus in West Pakistan, the other points were not viable within a federal infrastructure. However, even to Mujib, these points were merely a starting point for negotiations for autonomy.[23]

Yahya was afraid that this plan, coupled with the overwhelming electoral support of the Awami League might cause a crisis in the country. He was concerned with dominance of the West wing over East Pakistan. The result of this fear was a reluctance to transfer power to Bhutto's PPP, which was not ideally strong enough politically to deal with this feasible threat to unity.

However, Yahya, Bhutto, and Mujib negotiated the platform, which had fueled the nationalist movement in East Pakistan. Given that there was a history of neglect on the part of West Pakistan, and in particular Ayub's regime, this was neither a surprise nor random phenomenon. Rather, it was a delicate situation with the legitimacy of the federal center at stake.

Bhutto's role in these negotiations is contested. The key to understanding his objectives was that he was not taken seriously by the media because of his narrow victory in the elections. This insecurity with power, coupled with Yahya's ineptitude and indifference to the regional concerns in East Pakistan, only made the Bengali nationalism movement stronger. Bhutto was willing to go with some level of provincial autonomy, with the exception of foreign aid. However, had he accepted Mujib Rahman's platform, and relinquished power to the Awami League given by the voters in

---

[23] *ibid.*

the election, the war would have been averted altogether, and Pakistan would have been a confederation of provinces with autonomy, and not a dismembered state.

Each position became intensified and opposed, and negotiations broke down. The intense bloodshed of 1971 eventually criminalized Yahya and Bhutto took power. He had disassociated himself from the conflict, and did not seek to retain the unity of the country because it was politically ineffective. Instead, in a speech to the United Nations Security Council shortly afterward, he claimed that the situation in Pakistan allowed for a new opportunity to build a state.[24] Thus, East Pakistan seceded.

The manipulation of the ineptitude of Yahya Khan and the overwhelming power garnered by Mujibur Rahman, was threatening to the power of West Pakistan and Bhutto himself. Because these events came during Ayub and Yahya's regime, where public opinion had little stake in the process, and because the only source of representation was the National Assembly which was suspended by Yahya, there was scope for Bhutto to influence the process of negotiation tailored to securing and maintaining his political capital.[25]

This lack of consensus in dealing with East Pakistan came as a result of the lack of a solid infrastructure of institutions. This gave Bhutto political space to act without personal or short-term political consequences in the protection of his position. If there was a solid system of checks and balances to ensure that one actor could not retain sole influence over a policy, perhaps the civil war could have been averted through the

---

[24] Syed, *Discourse and Politics,* 109-110

[25] Hayes,Louis. *The Struggle for Legitimacy,* 114

negotiation of national interests. Instead, the dissatisfaction of the East Pakistanis turned into a scramble for political capital.

This need for political capital extended to the Constitution of 1973. It reinstated the focus of Islam in the document, as well as revamping Ayub's governing infrastructure. While these objectives seem like a function of ideological change, the manner in which they were codified into law was divisive. While it sought to return back to the ideological premise of Islam, it did so for political reasons, and this was especially problematic. The secession of East Pakistan had weakened the federal center, although not Bhutto himself. However, Bhutto's Islamic ideology had lost credibility after his failed land reforms, and he was facing delicate relations with the 'ulamā. The next section will assess the consequences of this combination of factors through analysis of the Constitution of 1973.

The Compromise of the Constitution of 1973

The next policy case is the Constitution of 1973. The secular-minded Bhutto developed a Constitution that integrated Islamic principles.[26] The prior Constitution of Ayub Khan's regime in 1962 was perceived as placing a secular, virtually Western face on state-administration. Also, Ayub's Basic Democracy mode of governance was constitutionally expressed as centralizing power to the federal sphere, so that democracy as his regime envisioned it could be implemented without the barriers of provincial intrusion.

---

[26] Hayes, Louis. *Struggle for Legitimacy,* 73.

The purpose of this analysis is to depict the need to "Islamisize" the Constitution as a two-tiered reaction, on a conceptual/ideological plane and on as a mode of dealing with a crisis. At a conceptual level, Bhutto's changes are a reaction to Ayub's "West struck" Constitution, particularly to distinguish himself from this previous failed regime by re-integrating normative Islam into the political consciousness, and subsequently the political discourse in Pakistan. Bhutto drew on similar sources, yet his approach or appeals to the public were not at all flagrantly Western, as Ayub had done. On the crisis-coping plane, Bhutto's Constitution was also a reaction the events in East Pakistan, in order to gain political capital and legitimacy, at a time when there was divisiveness in the country.

Specifically, the two major features of the new Constitution were the integration of the religious language and the new federal infrastructure. What is especially interesting about these two components is their illusory nature. Bhutto was a secularist in ideology, and did not favor provincial autonomy, particularly after the East Pakistan war. However, there were some caveats that altered the intentions of a truly democratic system. The alterations to the Constitution made in 1973 are represented in the following chart.

Table 3.3: The Constitution of 1973[27]

Stipulation	Ideological Rationale	Analysis
More active representation of East Pakistan in Federation.	Given the events of 1971, and that Bangladesh was not yet recognized by Pakistan, it gave legitimacy to how the West wing interacted with East Pakistan.	This stipulation provided an escape from the formal recognition of the state of Bangladesh, and also gave the appearance of provincial participation and autonomy because the prime minister

[27] Hayes,Louis. *Struggle for Legitimacy,* 73.

		still retained ultimate authority. (Refer to the next two stipulations.)
Lessening the power of the President, and giving federal powers to the prime minister	The change to a parliamentary system requires this shift of power, where the president's role more understated than the prime minister, whose party is in power.	Without opposition of an empowered president, the prime minister and the party have the political authority to act.
The National Assembly may vote "no confidence" for a PM, but must suggest a replacement in the same motion. A PM may stay in power for five years, but a replacement must be suggested immediately thereafter.	Regime shifts are not as volatile and frequent.	It is unrealistic within a multi-party system, with changing alliances and constant ideological polarization to unite to engage in consensus for smooth regime changes. Thus, the PM will retain central authority.
The establishment of a bicameral legislature, where the Senate, the house of equal provincial representation had no authority in money matters.	One assembly can represent the population based upon numbers, and the other equal representation.	Because the federal legislature was operating on a parliamentary system, the majority in power has control over fiscal policymaking in the National Assembly, represented by population, not equal representation.
Establishing Islam as the state religion No policy should be repugnant to the Qur'an or Sunnah The PM must be a Muslim The declaration of the faith of the PM and President while taking the oath of office.	Uniting the country under the guise of Islam	These stipulations suggest unity under Islam and Bhutto's commitment to the *raison d'etre* of Pakistan. It gave him legitimacy within the religious parties and kept them from opposing the establishment of a parliamentary system.
Declaring the Aḥmadiyya non-Muslims	Retaining the purity of Islam	This was a way of engaging the 'ulamā and their ideology into governance.

These stipulations, admittedly taken from Western governments such as Australia and Germany are justified within these Western systems because most of these

systems contain an internal infrastructure of checks and balances that is feasible.[28] Most democratic systems are centralized, where the party in power enjoys a leadership role in policymaking. However, these nations are not subject to the ideological tensions between Islamization and Islamic modernism. They are accountable to solidified political values and a legacy of historical affinity to those values. There is a marked lack of checks and balances. Particularly, the lack of a juridical structure to check the legislative branches is problematic, because in a parliamentary system the party in majority can triumph over small and weak opposition parties. This system in the Pakistani context is not egalitarian because of the polarization of ideology. The constant need to make and break alliances reinforces the mutual distrust because the alliances are not solid and potentially reinforce the polarized ideological infrastructure.

It was no accident that Bhutto moved away from a presidential system in favor of a parliamentary system[29]. It allowed political capital to remain unchallenged because of the inefficiency and shakiness of a state without ideological consensus.

Bhutto was careful in crafting the stipulations of Islamic ideology. In order to gain the support of the religious elite, he infused the Constitution with religious language, and more importantly, contradicted Ayub's changes from 1956. The stipulations themselves ranged from cosmetic to consequential. The declaration of the Aḥmadiyya as non-Muslims was an example of the latter. Prior to the constitutional process, this issue divided the nation. The rank and file of the 'ulamā were troubled by

---

[28] Raza,Rafi. *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967-1977.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997, 180.

[29] Hayes, Louis. *Politics in Pakistan: the Struggle for Legitimacy,* 74

this offshoot sect of Islam, and Bhutto sought to retain fidelity to his Islamic rhetoric in the face of harsh critique.

Essentially, Bhutto attempted to secure political capital in the constitutional process through pandering to the religious elite, as well as altering the governing infrastructure to facilitate a parliamentary system. As aforementioned, Bhutto was concerned with a secure power base, and the Constitution exacerbated this tendency. The final section will assess the effects of this tendency in Bhutto's political behavior on political culture.

Conclusion: The Legacy of the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime

The ideologically divided political culture, lacking a cohesive body of values allows for a political infrastructure that does not emphasize accountability. Additionally, the unbounded rhetoric is intoxicating to the masses. However, because of the boom and bust nature of the regime change and Bhutto's concern with political capital, there is now an added layer of mistrust of political actors and institutions. This mistrust increased the chasm of ideology further because a general Islamic premise in rhetoric no longer appealed to the masses, or the religious elite. Ali Nawaz Memon encapsulated the mistrust in the Pakistani political consciousness. He noted, "rarely do [political leaders] posses honesty and integrity and follow up on promised actions... [nor do they] enjoin the good and forbid the evil."[30] The last statement is particularly

[30] Memon, Ali Nawaz. *Pakistan: Islamic Nation in Crisis.* Lahore, Vanguard Books, 1997. 79

salient, because it is Qur'ānically derived, and the ideal of human behavior.[31] Thus, the ideological camps had to become more extreme in order to circumvent this mistrust.

This came about for several reasons, as stated in the preceding sections. First, the socialist rhetoric of Pakistan People's Party used the polarized nature of political discourse to present a lofty integrated approach of political economy and Islamic principles of egalitarianism as an electioneering tactic. However, in policymaking these reforms were half- hearted, as was the case with land reforms. Two policies of consequence, the East Pakistan crisis and the Constitution of 1973, painted a different picture than the ideological utopia presented by Bhutto's rhetoric. If his premise of rule was equality, then he would have negotiated with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and accepted the Six Point Plan, or at the very least, turned the tide of neglect of the region. Political reality interceded for Bhutto, and the need for political capital could not be reconciled with it.

The Constitution of 1973, extending federal powers and the appearance of provincial autonomy, was also a representation of a lack of accountability. There was no feasible system of checks and balances to foster long-range institutional sustainability. Thus, this lack of internal and external accountability and the ability to draft a constitution based on the political climate of the time is problematic. It places modes of governance solely at the will of the person or party in power.

Thus, Bhutto's regime added another layer of complexity to the polarized political culture. The behavior of the successive regime was a consequence of this effect,

---

[31] This exact statement was also used by the Mu'tazaliah, a rationalist sect within the Islamic tradition during the 9th century, AD. See Goldzher, Ignaz. Andras and Ruth Hamori, tr. *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

as aforementioned. The next chapter will examine the ideology and policy of Islamization in the Zia ul-Haq regime, from 1977 to 1988. As the category suggests, this regime sought to realize total Islamization of the Pakistan, a process which started with the Objectives Resolution of 1949, leaving lasting impression on political culture, and continued the process of polarity.

Chapter 4

Total Islamization:

The Zia ul-Haq Regime, 1977-1988

The mistrust cultivated by the Bhutto regime laid the foundations for the rise, and perceived necessity of the Islamist movement in Pakistan. The rationale of this necessity was that a leader with the strictest adherence to Islam and its tenets of morality should emerge as an antithesis to the Bhutto regime. The failing Bhutto regime was creating momentum for this Islamist ideology, and so the pattern of ideological polarity continued. In fact, the concessions made by Bhutto to the Islamist camps, namely the declaration of the Aḥmadiyya as non-Muslims, as well as the others detailed in the previous chapter, fueled the popularity of these parties to the masses.[1] They gained political capital and influence at this time, as they began to unify to oust the PPP from power. This process will be detailed in the forthcoming section.

Essentially, the impact of Bhutto's regime on Pakistan's political culture was to yield his political leverage to the various political parties and their sympathizers within the Islamist camp. This leverage eventually led to Bhutto's ouster and the rise of Zia ul-Haq, the commander of the Pakistan Army and an advocate of an Islamized system of governance. This shift of ideology toward Islamization is significant for the evolution of political culture in Pakistan. It represents the system outlined by Mawdūdī, and the

[1] Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century,* 411-422.

diametrically opposite system detailed by Ayub Khan and Fazlur Rahman. However, this move toward Islamization does not imply that the evolution of political culture stopped at this juncture. Rather, it began to alternate between these poles, as aforementioned.

This chapter will examine the regime of Zia ul-Haq and the implications of Islamization in governance through the analysis of the following: the antecedent conditions and Zia's rise to power; Zia's ideology of Islamization; his program of Islamization in terms of infrastructure, law, and education reform; and finally, his legacy in the scheme of Pakistan's political culture.

Antecedent Conditions and Bhutto's Ouster

The waning days of the Bhutto regime were riddled with problems of legitimacy, albeit unbeknownst to Bhutto himself. Opposition parties unified themselves into the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). These parties included the United Democratic Front, Mawdūdī's Jamā 'at-i Islami, the Jamā 'at-ul 'Ulamā-i Islam, the Jam 'iāt-ul 'Ulamā-i Pakistan, and Tehrik-i Istiqlāl (Independence Movement).[2] When Bhutto called for elections in 1977, the PNA struggled to develop a slate of candidates to counter Bhutto and the PPP. Bhutto seemingly had a paradoxical rationale for calling for elections. Although he had assured himself of his own victory, the need to gain more political capital was pressing for Bhutto.[3] The PNA launched a smear campaign against Bhutto, attacking everything from his personal disposition to his policymaking.

---

[2] *ibid*

[3] *ibid.*

Thus, the elections of March 7, 1977 were not smooth. In the days leading up to the elections, ethnic conflict, spurred by the PPP and PNA campaigns, became intense and election districts became war zones.[4] The day of the elections bought no reprieve as opposition insurgents blocked polling places. In response Bhutto had allowed the PPP administrators to "take aggressive action in getting the PPP voters to the polling places."[5] Not surprisingly, the results favored Bhutto and the PPP. They received 60% of the vote, with 75% of the National Assembly seats. The PNA managed to get 35% of the vote and 17% of the National Assembly seats. The PNA contested the results with cries of foul play.

Bhutto did not relinquish authority, nor did he dissolve the National Assembly. Rather, he attempted to dispute claims of corruption. His efforts failed, however, and he was ousted in a bloodless coup staged by the military. The commander of the Pakistan Army was Zia ul-Haq who then assumed power and declared martial law in the country on July 5, 1977.[6]

Although the coup was a "white-glove affair," it is important to note the details of Bhutto's ouster because of how it shaped public opinion and thus, how it contributed to the legitimacy of Zia's agenda of Islamization. The reaction of the public to the ouster was initially mixed. Despite this, Bhutto's lack of legitimacy, the political capital of the Islamist parties and the brevity of the coup itself, did not allow for too much *influential* opposition. While the PPP retained a good amount of popular support, it did

---

[4] *ibid.*

[5] *ibid.*

[6] *ibid.*

not translate into sustained opposition to Zia's ascendancy.[7] Also, Zia was careful to handle the ouster as a suspension of power, and not as an actual transfer of power.[8]

While Bhutto was sent into exile to Muree and placed under house arrest, Zia did not immediately abrogate the Constitution of 1973, nor did he engage in any serious policymaking right away. He did, however, suspend the Constitution until order was established, as implied by the imposition of marital law. Also, he appointed the Chief Justices of the provincial High Courts as governors in their respective provinces. Interestingly enough, Zia also claimed to not to desire a political position when order was established. He promised new elections within 90 days of the coup.

However, Zia postponed the elections scheduled for October 1977 citing corruption by Bhutto's regime. A series of White Papers were issued by Zia's government alleging Bhutto's involvement in a 1974 murder, as well as rigging of elections, control of the media, misuses of government funds and other acts of wrong-doing while in office.[9] Bhutto was tried and convicted in 1979, and the decision was upheld by the Supreme Court. There was some controversy regarding the trial. Several of the judges were Bhutto's political foes, and some scholars contend that the trial may not have been fair.[10]

---

[7] Richter, William. "Domestic Politics in the 1980s." In *Pakistan Authoritarianism in the 1980s.* eds. Craig Baxter and Syed Razi Wasti. Lahore: Vanguard, 1991. 73.

[8] Ziring, *Political History of Pakistan,* 425.

[9] Richter, William. "Domestic Politics in the 1980s," 73-74.

[10] Khan, Hamid. *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan,* 616.

However, he was sentenced to death by the courts. [11] His execution took place on April 4, 1979 despite pleas of clemency from United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, American President Jimmy Carter, and heads of state from Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and the Arab world.[12]

Zia was now positioned to lead the country according to the Islamist agenda, promising that the new order would be strictly Islamic and not subject to the whims of political actors. Rather, political infrastructures and policy would be based upon the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The next section will examine the specific ideologies which shape this Islamic order, and provide comparisons to the previous regimes of Ayub and Bhutto. It will also draw parallels between this ideology and that of Mawdūdī, which represent the ideological paradigm shift from Islamic modernism to total Islamization.

The Ideology of Zia ul-Haq

As discussed in Chapter 1, the Islamist ideology is premised on the infusion of religiously-derived ethical principles into socio-political infrastructures. Within this ideology, Islam provides the principles needed in the temporal realm, through the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth,* and *sunnah.* Thus, there is no need for reliance on other (external) sources for political values.

These principles, as aforementioned, are ethical in nature. Mawdūdī's consolidation of these principles into an ethical order appealed to Zia in both policy and rhetoric. However, Zia was not an ideologue. His concerns were, presumably, the

---

[11] Richter, William. "Domestic Politics in the 1980s," 73-74.

[12] Khan, Hamid. *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan.* 616.

integration of the Islamist ideology into a political rhetoric and policy that was palatable to the people. The socialist underpinnings of the PPP still lingered in the political favor of the electorate, and Zia needed to change the tide of public opinion before he called for elections to end martial law.[13]

Like many political actors before him, he relied on rhetoric for this purpose. The fact that the people were somewhat confused by Bhutto's trial and execution had its pros and cons. Zia had the opportunity to introduce conservative Islamic ideology to the masses, and expect some receptiveness. However, he could not do so overtly at the expense of the socialist PPP ideology. Rather, the Islamist ideology had to be pitched on its own merit, with the underpinnings of ethical behavioral prescriptions. This ethical dimension was effective because of the perception that Bhutto was corrupt, and perhaps a *genuinely* Islamic government would prevent the further infiltration of corruption into Pakistani politics.

Mawdūdī attempted to do this at an ideological level, however without the political capital to support a *Niẓam-i Islam,* the ideology and rhetoric was not politically realized. As aforementioned in Chapter 1, Mawdūdī sought political capital through the founding of his political party, the Jama'āt-i Islami. Thus, his ideology was infused with political theory. For the purposes of this analysis, Mawdūdī's "pure" ideology is relevant. With Zia in power, there was scope for the Islamist agenda to be politically manifested. The table below will compare the ideologies of Mawdūdī and Zia with the pure ideology represented in the former, and the political rhetoric in the latter.

---

[13] Richter, William. "Domestic Politics in the 1980s," 73-74.

Table 4.1: The Islamic Ideologies of Abul A'la Mawdūdī and Zia ul-Haq

Concept	Mawdūdī's "Pure" Ideology	Zia's Configuration	Analysis
Theo-political role of man as vicegerent	Man as vicegerent of God to act in accordance with His instructions and guidance.[14] This role would be given to an *amir* (leader).	An *amir* must guide the people of Pakistan to an Islamic way of life through the implementation of an Islamic system of governance.[15]	Zia translates Mawdūdī's theological position of the *amir* into a political position within an Islamic political infrastructure.
The realization of the communal ethical underpinnings of Islam	Offers specific ethical behavioral prescriptions for the various tenets of Islam. These include: prayer, fasting, alms-giving, pilgrimage, and holy war/effort.[16]	The Islamic system of governance entails a systemized and codified infusion of these fundamental tenets in governance.[17]	Again, Mawdūdī provides the theoretical premise for Zia's policies of Islamization.
Interactions with extra-Islamic entities	The sources for law and political infrastructure are contained within Islam, and its sources.[18] Resistance to dealing with entities within which there is "man's lordship over man," or encourage such a system.[19]	In the process of codification of Islamist ideology, there is (theoretically) sole reliance on Islamic sources of the Qur'ān, Sunnah, and Islamic legal precedent.[20]	Zia's Islamization policies are the political analog to Mawdūdī's Islamist view of Western and extra-Islamic entities.

Zia's ideology and rhetoric follow a pattern, much like Mawdūdī's ideology. Of course, this pattern was configured in terms of political values and institutions. For

[14] Mawdūdī, *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān*, 59.

[15] *Les Lois Islamiques,* 21-22.

[16] Please see Chapter 1, page 10 of this analysis for further explanation of the ethical prescriptive advice.

[17] *Les Lois Islamiques,* 21-22. The forthcoming section on Zia's policies of Islamization will lend more specificity to this infusion of ethics.

[18] Mawdūdī, *Let Us Be Muslims.* 243-271.

[19] *ibid.*

[20] *Les Lois Islamiques,* 6-22.

example, the notion of man's role as vicegerent of God is already well-established within the Islamist ideology, as are the other issues of concern to Mawdūdī as an ideologue.[21] However, what is stated in similar terms between Zia and Mawdūdī is the attention to ethics and the comprehensive nature of the Islam and the sources contained therein. The first point of the pattern is the general adherence to the Islamic system. The ethical dimension contains the specific stipulations within this system.

In an address to the nation in 1981 during the celebration of the birth of the Prophet, Zia promoted the adherence to an Islamic system. He noted,

> We are introducing a system, which Insh'Allah, will completely transform us. Naturally, this depends upon our conduct and our personal effort, for a system [which] can be but a guide for man and cannot curb him. It is time that we put our conduct to the test. I have great hopes for the nation. I am fully aware of the fact that a people who achieved their goal in the Pakistan movement and in that for Niẓām-i Islam [order of Islam] will also succeed in establishing an Islamic way of life.[22]

Thus, Zia contends that the infusion of an Islamic system in governance will lead the people to an Islamic way of life. His connections to the Pakistan movement tie in Pakistani nationalism, which was still part of the political culture at this time. Essentially, Zia uses several connections in this excerpt to provide legitimacy to his *Niẓam-i Islam.*

In more specific terms, he asserts that Islam is,

> a religion which is fundamentally oriented towards security, a progressive and enlightened religion which establishes justice. It is capable of satisfying needs, and rising to the challenges of any given era. Instead of the rich and the strong, it protects the poor and the weak, and whether with regards to the relationship between man and woman, employer and employee, or Muslim and non-Muslim, it ensures the

[21] Please see Chapter 1 of this analysis for more explanation of the ideology.

[22] *Les Lois Islamiques,* 21-22.

> safeguarding of their rights. It establishes equilibrium in the temporal domain and in the spiritual domain.[23]

This type of rhetoric is appealing to the downtrodden, to whom the notion of equity in Islam would be viewed as a saving grace. Additionally, Zia provides for the safeguarding of rights which was effective on two levels. It gave legitimacy to the Islamist agenda as well as to Zia's regime itself, because this would obviously resonate with the masses. While Bhutto made similar references to Islam, Zia's policymaking brings Islamization to the next level of adherence.

The ethical dimension to the Islamist agenda is part and parcel of an Islamic system. In Zia's case, this dimension gains clarity in his policymaking. The next section will address the policy implications of the Islamist agenda with its connections to the spiritual realm of the faith.

The Policies Contained Within the Islamic System of Zia ul-Haq

The policies of Islamization are comprehensive, given the nature of Islam. According to the primary sources, Islam is a way of life, and thus an Islamic system of governance would extend to all facets of life.[24] Also, because Zia perhaps saw himself as leading the community toward an Islamic way of life, the nature of his policies had to reflect the comprehensive nature of the faith. The policies of Islamization permeated most facets of life, and were not limited to minor cosmetic changes to political infrastructure. This section will examine the magnitude of these changes, as well as

---

[23] *Les Lois Islamiques,* 6

[24] This is noted in several *ayāt* in the Qur'ān. Some examples include: 3:138, 5:15-16, 6:155, and 7:170.

assess the implications for the polarizing trajectory of ideology in Pakistani political culture.

As aforementioned, Zia's major changes were not immediate. It was a staggered process where the Constitution of 1973 was not abrogated, but rather it was initially amended. The following table details the various amendments made to the Constitution of 1973 by Zia on February 10, 1979. These amendments, known as the *Hudūd* Ordinances were presented as legal ordinances, as the name suggests. Upon issuing them, Zia's push toward Islamization gained momentum. To this effect he noted,

> It is Allah's beneficence that the present government has been able to fulfill these aspirations [introduction of the Islamic system in Pakistan] of the people. In the short period of one and a half years so much work has been done that I today formally announcing the introduction of an Islamic system in the country..."[25]

To this day, these amendments are still the subject of debate among policy wonks in Pakistan. Also, these ordinances were the first real indication of the extent to which Zia was truly an Islamist because they were present in all *shari'ah*-enforcing countries. Thus, they are the emblematic laws within Islamic systems, and the starting point of realizing Islamization. The ordinances follow:

---

[25] Shah, Syed. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1972-1988).* Islamabad: Qaid-i Azam Chair. National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Qaid-i Azam University, 1996, 249-250.

Table 4.2: The *Hudūd* Ordinances of 1979 [26]

Stipulations[27]	Ideological Rationale	Analysis
Prohibition of intoxicants, including: its (non-medicinal) consumption, sale, transfer, or receipt. Medicinal consumption is controlled by law. The function of these ordinances was to "bring [them] in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'ān and Sunnah. **Punishments for engaging in such acts:** up to five years imprisonment and a whipping not to exceed thirty lashes.	As stated in the text of the ordinance, this prohibition would essentially codify Islam in Pakistan.	This codification would fulfill the norms of Islamic governance and thus, rid the country of the behaviors which were "repugnant to Islam." It made the rhetoric a reality. Also, it was not a function of pressure; rather it was Zia's adherence to Islam.
Offenses of Property, including: surreptitious theft of property. **Punishments for engaging in such acts:** for a first offense, the amputation of the right hand from the joint of the wrist; for a second offense, the amputation of the left foot up to the ankle; for subsequent offenses, lifetime imprisonment.	As per (literal) Qur'ānic injunctions, the punishment was appropriate to the crime, thus retaining fidelity to the primary sources.	This prohibition, and its punitive measures in particular, are salient. The punishments are gleaned from the Qur'ān, to the letter. This magnitude of adherence is characteristic of the Islamist ideology.
Offense of *Zina,* including: adultery and rape (*zina bil-jabr),*. **Punishment for engaging in such acts:** varying amounts of lashes; in some cases imprisonment and death	As per normative Islam, this ordinance would retain the family infrastructure.	There were some problems with this ordinance. Namely, there were issues of evidence as it is difficult to prove rape, Even in the case of a resulting pregnancy, often the woman was punished. Current debate centers on this issue.

[26] *Les Lois Islamiques,* A2-A30.

[27] A distinction should be noted between *hudūd* and *tazir.* The distinction between the two lies in the discretionary nature of evidentiary support. *Tazir* refers to discretionary evidentiary support, whereas *hudūd* refers to more concrete evidence. *Tazir* usually carries less of a penalty.

Offense of *Qazf* (false accusation), including: such falsity in the cases of *zina* **Punishment**: a whipping of eighty lashes	To reduce the likelihood of false witness in such cases.	This was a safeguard to prevent wrongful accusation and conviction in *zina* cases. However, it did not address the primary issue of evidence in such cases.

These ordinances essentially Islamized the existing laws. The penal codes prior to the introduction of *Hudūd* ordinances were modeled after British penal codes, and were thus not Qur'ānically derived. The derivation of these laws from the primary sources is another example of Zia's intention of leading the country toward total Islamization.

The next set of legal reforms and amendments are socio-economic in nature. They add another layer of adherence to normative and scriptural Islam to Zia's Islamist governance. These reforms centered on finance and the infusion of Islamicity therein. Once the *Hudūd* Ordinances were enacted, this next step was perhaps easier to introduce, as Zia's role as an Islamic leader was crystallized, and Islamization gained legitimacy.

The following table details these socio-economic reforms. In the Islamic context, social values intersect with economic values, especially as it pertains to the equitable distribution of wealth. The policies which emerge are a function of the Qur'ānic injunction of equity.

Table 4.3: Socio-Economic Reforms [28]

Stipulation	Ideological Rationale	Analysis
The institutionalization of *zakāt*. Mode of Implementation: The government would deduct 2.5% from bank savings, company capital, and government capital of individuals. All other assets were subject to voluntary taxation, per *sharī 'a* guidelines. It was to be administered by the Central *Zakāt* Commission, under the Ministry of Finance. Beneficiaries: the subsistence, rehabilitation, health, and education of indigents. It also provided for *dinī madrasas* (religious schools).	This would contribute to the equitable distribution of wealth. However, Syed Shah argues that the monies were used by the government to facilitate the policies of Islamization.	*Zakāt* is another emblem of the Islamist agenda. With the equitable distribution of wealth, which appealed to the masses, there was yet another layer of legitimacy for Zia's regime. It also provided fiduciary support to the actors within Islamization, such as the *'ulamā*, to continue their own efforts in solidifying Islamization.[29]
The institutionalization of *'ushr* (land tax). Mode of Implementation: A 5% tax was imposed on the value of harvests on irrigated land and a 10% tax on rain-fed lands. The landowner, grantee, allottee, lessee, leaseholder, or landholder was responsible for this tax. Those who were eligible to receive *zakāt* were exempted from this tax. Beneficiaries: The monies were distributed to the *mustaheqīn* (deserving) as	See above. *'Ushr*, although a separate tax, was leveraged under the legal umbrella of the *zakāt system.*	This tax, like the *zakāt* tax added legitimacy to Zia's Islamization policies because the notion of equity and charity theoretically had broad-based appeal.

[28] The stipulations are taken from:

Shah, Syed. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1972-1988).* 260-263.

[29] *ibid.*

determined by the Central *Zakāt* Committee.		
The prohibition of *riba* (usury) Mode of Implementation: the standardization of interest-free banking; the distribution of loans based upon the sharing of income accruing from rent. Beneficiaries: those who could not afford to pay off loans leading to destitution.	To fulfill the Qur'ānic injunction prohibiting *riba.* Zia noted that the prohibition of *riba* was a social insurance system of sorts, whereby wealth would not be concentrated in the hands of a few through money-lending, institutionalized or otherwise. Also, it would prevent further destitution of those who rely on loans.	See above. It showed Zia's adherence to the Qur'ān and thus continued the process of Islamization.

To summarize, Zia built his "Islamic" credibility through socio-economic reform that was palatable to the masses, after the introduction of the *Hudūd* Ordinances. Although the latter was derived from the primary sources, it was the more punitive facet of Islamic jurisprudence. The socio-economic reforms gave the regime a truly Islamic spin through the emphasis on the Qur'ānic notion of equity.

The next stage of Islamization was the re-configuration of political infrastructure. This is the foundation for policymaking in any political system. Thus, in his quest of "de-Bhuttoization," Zia began to alter the structures that facilitated the ("un-Islamic") policies of the previous regimes in order to institutionalize Islamization.[30] There was a necessity to redistribute power and roles within the political and legal structures to correlate with norms of Islamic governance. This was accomplished through the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) of 1981, whereby all fundamental rights were in the Constitution of 1973 were taken out, and the provisions

[30] The term, "de-Bhuttoization" is employed by William Richter in his piece, "Domestic Politics in the 1980s."

of their enforceability were rendered null and void.[31] The fundamental rights had already been replaced with the aforementioned *Hudūd* Ordinances and the socio-economic reform. However, it was not explicitly stated in legal terms until 1981. So, what becomes salient about this PCO is the enforceability clause, whereby the legislative and judicial actors who are charged with the task of making the laws and reviewing them have new roles within the Islamic system.

The following table assesses the infrastructural re-configurations:

Table 4.4: Zia's Infrastructural Changes Per the Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981[32]

Zia's Changes	Analysis and Implications
The appointment of the Vice-President to serve at the pleasure of the Chief Martial Law Administrator and perform the functions prescribed by the CMLA.	With the Vice-President at the mercy of the CMLA, the regime was fortified with internal allies in making and enforcing policies. **Distinction from the Bhutto regime (Constitution of 1973)[33]:** The Vice-President was chosen by the party in power, not necessarily *explicitly* by the individual in power.
A Federal Council *(Majlis-i Shūra)* was created, and comprised of those members chosen by the President.	The power of legislation became centralized as per an authoritarian system. Presumably, if Zia was to lead the country towards an Islamic system, then it would have to be at the expense of democracy in order to ensure the Islamicity of policy. **Distinction from the Bhutto regime (Constitution of 1973):** While Bhutto's political infrastructure was centralized, the legislative body was at

[31] *Les Lois Islamiques,* A4

[32] The stipulations are taken from: Khan, Hamid. *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan,* 647.

[33] Please see the previous chapter, Table 3.3, page 90 for the data on the Constitution of 1973.

	the discretion of the political party in power, adhering to the norms of a parliamentary system in the Western configuration. Thus, its membership was not unilaterally determined.
Provisions related to the judiciary: 1. the Supreme Court could transfer cases from one High Court to another; 2. Principal seats and permanent Benches of the High Courts were determined, and permanent Benches were established by the President. 3. The President had the authority to appoint judges in both the High Court and the Supreme Court. 4. While the writ of jurisdiction was retained by the High Courts, however, martial authorities could issue supervening acts and orders.	These changes took away the powers of the judiciary, and presumably affected their biases and their jurisdiction. Essentially, it made them beholden to the central authority. **Distinction from the Bhutto regime (Constitution of 1973):** The judiciary had original jurisdiction over all cases. The federal "branch" had no authority in these cases.
Political parties could only function when political activity was restored, if they had registered with the Election Commission (EC) in 1979. All other political parties stood to be dissolved and their funds forfeited to the federal government.	Because martial law was in full force in 1979, and rule was arbitrary, there was little likelihood that dissenting political parties would have been able to register with the EC. **Distinction from the Bhutto regime (Constitution of 1973):** In Bhutto's parliamentary system, the amalgam of political parties was essential in the political process. However, Bhutto was accused of, and eventually convicted of the manipulation of other parties in favor of the PPP. It was this multiplicity that necessitated the perpetual scramble for political capital.
Any laws made prior to July 5, 1977 were declared null and void.	De-Bhuttoization in the institutional sphere was thus completed.
The President and the CMLA had the power to amend the Constitution.	Again, this placed sole political authority in the hands of the head(s) of state. **Distinction from the Bhutto regime (Constitution of 1973):** The legislature had a stake in the constitutional process, whereby the members of parliament had veto powers.

All judges were required to take an oath. The President had the authority not to give an oath to a judge, who would then cease to hold office.	This was another stipulation to make the judiciary beholden to the central authority. **Distinction from the Bhutto regime (Constitution 1973):** Again, the judiciary had more *de facto* authority and more accurately, less subservience to the central authority.
Any judges taking an oath under the PCO could not question the validity of the stipulations therein.	This severely limited the ability of the judiciary to review constitutional cases. **Distinction from the Bhutto regime (Constitution of 1973):** please see previous entry.

The overall product of these changes was the increased tendency toward authoritarian governance. Zia took this (perceived) role of *amir* quite seriously, whereby the autonomy of the "branches" was shed in favor of ensuring Islamicity in legislation and jurisprudence. Also, the PCO essentially abrogated Bhutto's political infrastructure and consequently, the crucial hallmarks of the previous regime. However, the Constitution of 1973 was never formally abrogated.

Zia did not seek to take on such reforms overtly unilaterally; rather he desired another authority to vet them. Prior to the introduction of the PCO, Zia called on the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) to prepare a draft for an Islamic system of governance.[34] The CII was constituted in 1962, and re-convened in 1981 for the purpose for the catalysis and overseeing of the Islamization process.[35] Its membership included Islamic scholars, as well as Zia's Islamist cohorts. The responsibilities of this organ

[34] Shah, Syed. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1972-1988)*, 274-276.

[35] Hyman, Anthony, Muhammed Ghayur and Naresh Kaushik. *Pakistan: Zia and After.* Islamabad: Abhinav Publications, 1989. 64-66.

were to make recommendations to the legislative bodies "as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives, individually and collectively, in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam, as enunciated in the Qur'ān and Sunnah.[36] In more specific terms, the CII was to make recommendations to bring existing laws into conformity with Islamic injunctions.

Zia also called upon other Islamist bodies to assess existing laws and reform in their accord and repugnancy to Islam. The emerging recommendations were an overhaul of the status quo, especially to family law and the like. These changes lie outside of the scope of this analysis, however suffice it to note that they entailed a relegation of authority to a few actors.[37] They also favored public knowledge of government activities so that they may appreciate the work done by the government in its Islamization efforts.[38] Zia was not amenable to the recommendations that curtailed government authority, especially the authority of the head of state. The other recommendations were integrated by Zia into the PCO, and included the abolition of *riba*, and the like. [39]

These recommendations, and others provided by the Ansari Commission fueled public debate as to the correct Islamic order to be implemented in Pakistan. This commission was given the same charge as its predecessors. The recommendations presented by the Commission primarily dealt with women's roles in the public sphere. The members noted that if a woman should enter politics: she be 50 years of age; have prior written consent from her husband; and that a blood relative accompany her to

---

[36] *ibid.*

[37] Hyman, Anthony, et al. *Pakistan: Zia and After.* 128-130.

[38] *ibid.*

[39] *ibid.*

meetings and trips abroad.[40] However, the recommendations were filtered through Zia's own personal convictions, and thus rejected.[41] Presumably, they were integrated as Zia saw fit.

The purposes of these commissions were to ensure the broad support of reform. However, because of the diversity of ideology within the Islamist camp, it was not easy to attain total consensus. Also, Zia's desire for centralized power also contributed to the lack of convergence. Zia's relations with the 'ulamā were tepid at best because of the latter circumstance. While he desired to retain this institution of religious authority, there is "little doubt about the regime's efforts to co-opt [them]."[42]

Finally, the next stage of reform was in the education sector. The objectives of these reforms were to Islamize knowledge and to develop institutions to facilitate this knowledge and learning. More specifically, Zia asserted that they would:

> foster in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan in general and the students in particular, a deep and abiding loyalty to Islam and Pakistan and a living consciousness of their spiritual and ideological identity. [The reforms also functioned to] inculcate, in accordance with the Qur'ān and Sunnah, the character, conduct and motivation expected of a true Muslim.[43]

The notion of identity presented by Zia is interesting in that it presumes ideological consensus. It reinforces the role of the *amir* in Islamist ideology as the leader who will guide the community to an Islamic way of life through the exposure to and implementation of Islamic principles in quotidian life. Aside from jurisprudence,

---

[40] *ibid.*

[41] Shah, Syed. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1972-1988).* 274-276.

[42] Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam,* 77. Zaman notes this phenomenon occurred in Zia's efforts to reform the madrasas (*madaris*). Discussion regarding educational reform is forthcoming.

[43] Shah, Syed. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1972-1988).* 267-269.

education was another seemingly lucrative medium to facilitate this process. Zia undertook serious educational reform during his tenure. The following table explicates this process and the trajectories of the stated reforms.

Table 4.5: Educational Reforms [44]

Reform	Trajectory	Analysis
Curricular changes: the revision of textbooks and other media to conform to Islamic values, which included: 1. establishing separate educational facilities for men and women; 2. making religious education compulsory for Muslims, and 3. establishing Urdu as the language of instruction in schools.	These reforms led to debate in the public sphere about the ramifications of segregated institutions for women. The National Educational Council was established to merge Islamic ideology and "modern" education.	These curricular changes were vetted by the CII. What is interesting here is while "modern" education was not completely discarded these reforms oriented the course of the curriculum toward more indigenous education, and thus encouraged a "mixed" curriculum. The linguistic component is also salient because it was a mode of unifying the masses under a nationalist umbrella, as well as providing accessibility of education.
Institutional changes/addenda: 1. the founding of the *Shari'a* faculty at Qaid-i Azam University to impart *shari'a* and modern law at a postgraduate level.	This faculty evolved into the Islamic University, later the International Islamic University.	This institution provided a learning space for Islam, and presumably to train scholars to further the Islamization process.

These reforms dealt primarily with secular educational institutions. Zia's education policy extended further to the *madrasas (madāris).* Despite the fact that these institutions fell under the jurisdiction of the *'ulamā*, Zia sought to bring them under government control. In order to entice this concession, Zia's regime offered the prerequisites of financial aid, scholarships, and government recognition of degrees,

[44] Reforms taken from: Shah, Syed. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1972-1988).* 267-269.

which increased the probability of government employment. [45] Briefly, the reforms entailed bringing the madrasa education into the mainstream through infusing modern education into the curriculum.[46] Because of a perceived ideological connection to the 'ulamā, Zia sought to converge the spheres of religious authority and political governance.

This is distinct from the approaches taken by Ayub and Bhutto. Ayub sought to alter the methodology of the process of the infusion of Islam into political infrastructure and (thus) adapt it to modern circumstances. Bhutto sought to retain political capital by superficial inclusion of the 'ulamā's demands. On a macro level these distinctions reflect the trend of ideological polarity and its subsequent effect on political culture. This comparison will be addressed more specifically in the conclusion.

Conclusion: The Legacy of the Zia ul-Haq Regime

Zia's regime of Islamization was cut short by his death in a plane crash in 1988. However, his legacy of Islamization is still tangible in the public sphere, especially as it pertains to current world affairs. This legacy is the final point of discussion in the continuum of polarization in the Pakistani political culture. Specifically, it represents an extreme use of Islam, whereby Islam was not simply a set of values to be infused at will; rather it represented a comprehensive system to act as the premise for governance. Thus, the lack of an initial ideological blueprint in the naissance of Pakistan, the failure of Zia's predecessors to rectify this, and Zia's own Islamist ideology in facilitating an

---

[45] Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam,*74-78.

[46] Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam,* 79.

Islamic state rendered a nation-state with a legacy of polarity, with nothing save ideological dissent as a de-stabilizing force.

In summary, Zia took a superficial adherence to Islam in governance, and re-configured it to retain fidelity to the primary sources through his reforms. The *Hudūd* Ordinances sought to eradicate social vices and codified Qur'ānic injunctions, per normative legal Islam. The socio-economic reforms adhered to the injunctions of equity, also per legal Islam. The infrastructural reforms provided a political means to realizing the sustainability of these reforms. However, these changes were not necessarily normative; they fueled debate within the sphere of Islamic authority as they were largely perceived, by religious authorities and "secular" authorities alike, to place power in the hands of (too) few. Finally, the educational reforms sought to merge two previously distinct spheres, the 'ulamā and (political) governance through infusing religious education and "modern" education into the mainstream.

Zia gave Islamization in the Pakistani context an authoritarian dimension. Much like Mawdūdī, his ideological analog, he sought to bring and oversee his configuration of normative Islam to a nation of Muslims. Ultimately, this was not entirely palatable to the masses, or to rising political actors waiting in the wings. Thus, it added to the cache of failed ideology whose impression is undeniably stained in Pakistan's polarized political culture.

Conclusion

Summary and Implications of Polarity

The complexity of Pakistan's political culture is premised upon a lack of an ideological blueprint, which enabled the emergence of competing ideologies and the policymaking therein. Thus, the cycle of political preferences and its varying degree of adherence to Islamic principles and methodology has evolved into a polarized political culture, alternating between Islamic modernism and Islamism. The regimes which laid the foundation for this polarity ascended to power after the first decade of statehood. They are compared with one another, as well as against the discursive backdrop provided in the first chapter, in the chart below:

Summary of Ideology, Policy and Discourse

	Ayub	Bhutto	Zia
Ideology relative to discursive backdrop	Ayub's ideology is akin to that of Fazlur Rahman. Both touted a systematized approach to evaluating the primary sources, and then adapt the principles gleaned to modern conditions. Through this methodology, the	In response to the failure of the Ayub regime because of a perceived lack of adherence to Islamic political norms, Bhutto desired to re-infuse the political sphere with more normative Islamic values, especially notions of equity in the economic	Bhutto's failure to appear genuinely committed to Islam opened the door to a wholly Islamizing ideology. Zia's ideology was akin to that of Mawdūdī. His goal was to lead the *ummah* of Pakistan to a (truly) Islamic way of life, as prescribed by the primary sources

	Ayub	Bhutto	Zia
	Islamic principles could be realized in the spheres of governance.	spheres through populist rhetoric. This is accepted by both Islamist and Islamic modernist ideologies. However, Bhutto took a step beyond normative Islam with the rhetoric of "Islamic socialism," which is rejected by Islamists.	without too much adjustment in methodology for modernity. Some exception is made in his educational reforms.
Policy relative to ideology	The Basic Democracies and Constitution of 1962 sought to create an infrastructure that facilitated this ideology. Ayub favored the "modern" elements of democracy which ensured full representation from the bottom, while keeping the federal center strong. Its Islamicity comes from the presumed inclusiveness and consensus-building in the representative legislative bodies.	The War of 1971 so weakened the federal center of Pakistan, and thus Islam became a means for retaining political capital. The Constitution of 1973 was the vehicle for gaining political capital through its Islamic language. It dismantled the Basic Democracies while cosmetically infusing it with Islamic language. Another point of interest is the declaration of the Aḥmaddiya as non-Muslims, another consequential policy to depict Bhutto's commitment to Islam.	The Islamization policies were several-fold; they included reforms in governing and public spheres. These reforms dissipated fundamental rights in favor of an Islamic society, with regard to a federally strong infrastructure to ensure enforcement, socio-economic responsibility, and bringing religious and secular education into the mainstream.

	Ayub	Bhutto	Zia
Contribution to polarity	Islamic modernism was the first point on the polarity. In a nation of Muslims, this regime attempted to absorb radically different ideology and its methodology into governance. However, while it had some following among the upper social echelons, it did not appeal to the masses because it was perceived to infiltrate secularity in normative Islam.	Using Islam in the scramble for political capital added a layer of mistrust to the political culture. It affected polarity because it would take a truly compelling and acceptable ideology to convince the masses of Islamicity after this regime.	Zia's ideology is the opposing pole to Ayub's ideology, thus cementing the polarity. Zia's rise to power left an impression in Pakistan's political culture, whereby it was possible to infuse Islam into the sphere of governance using the methodology prescribed by normative Islam.

Essentially, these regimes and their discursive counterparts have hindered cohesion in the sphere of governance because of their polarizing ideologies and policies. The implications of this phenomenon are the continued lack of identity and subsequent political instability as Pakistan enters into the next half-century of statehood. It has been further complicated by external forces, including anti-terrorism policies of Western nations, whereby its geopolitical position necessitates internal stability to prevent incisive activity within Islamist elements and the opposing Western nations towards Pakistan. However, this necessity often creates opportunity. Perhaps current conditions will be the impetus to craft a national identity palatable to all segments of Pakistanis, and the ensuing ideology and policy will create a sanctuary for Muslims envisioned by its founders almost six decades ago. Only then will the malaise and disillusionment that persists in the hearts of the people be abandoned.

Bibliography

I. Mawdūdī and Fazlur Rahman: the Religio-Political Nexus (Islamization and Islamic Modernism)

A. Primary Sources

Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul A'lā, *The Ethical Viewpoint of Islam.* Lahore: Markazi Maktaba Jamā'at-i Islami, 1953.

----------, *Let Us Be Muslims.* Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1985.

----------. "Political Theory of Islam." In John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

----------. *The Islamic Movement: Dynamics of Value, Power, and Change.* Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1984

----------, *Towards Understanding the* Qur'ān. *(Tafhīm al-*Qur'ān*).* tr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1988. volumes 1-7.

Rahman, Fazlur. *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

----------. *Major Themes of the Qur'ān.* Minneaopolis: Biblioteca Islamica, 1980.

----------. *Islam.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

----------. "Revival and Reform in Islam." In P.M. Holt, Ann Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds. *The Cambridge History of Islam,* 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

----------. "Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method, and Alternative." In *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* vol 1(4), October, 1970.

B. Secondary Sources

Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din. *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah.* Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1968.

Ahmad, Khurshid and Z.I. Ansari. *Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Sayyid Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī.* Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1979.

Abu Rabi', Ibrahim M, ed. Islamic *Resurgence: Challenges, Directions, and Future Perspectives: A Round Table with Khurshid Ahmad.* Tampa: The World and Islam Studies Enterprise, 1994.

Ahmad, Mumtaz. "Islamic Fundamentalims in South Asia: the Jama'at-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jama'at," In *Fundamentalisms Observed.* Eds: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. vol 1, 1991.

Alī, Aḥmed. *Al-Qur'ān: A Contemporary Translation.* Karachi: Akrash Publishing, 1984.

Esposito, John., ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam.* New York: Oxford University, 1983.

Haddad, Yvonne, *Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History.* Albany: State University of New York, 1982.

----------, et al. *The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography.* New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.

Habermas, Jungen. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.

Kurzman, Charles., ed. *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

McDonough, Sheila. *The Authority of the Past: A Study of Three Muslim Modernists.* Chambersburg: American Academy of Religion, 1970.

Rahnema, Ali., ed. *Pioneers of Islamic Revival.* London: Zed Books, 1994.

Sharī'atī, 'Alī. *On the Sociology of Islam.* Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979. Denny, F. "Fazlur Rahman: Muslim Intellectual." In *The Muslim World.* vol 79 (2), April 1989, 91-101.

Shepard, William. *The Faith of a Modern Muslim Intellectual.* New Delhi: Indian Institute of Islamic Studies, 1982.

----------. "Islam and Ideology: Towards Typology." In *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* vol 19, 1987.

Sonn, Tamara. "Fazlur Rahman's Islamic Methodology." In *Muslim World.* vol 81, 1991.

Waugh, Earle H. and Frederick M. Denny, eds. *The Shaping of Islamic Discourse: A Memorial to Fazlur Rahman.* Georgia: Scholar's Press, 1998.

Zaman, Qasim. *The 'Ulamā in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

II. The Regimes

A. Primary Sources

Bhutto, Zulfiqar. *Politics of the People: Awakening the People.* Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications.

----------. *Politics of the People: Marching Towards Democracy.* Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications.

----------. *Politics of the People: Reshaping Foreign Policy.* Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications.

----------. *New Directions.* London: Namara Publications, 1977.

----------. *If I Am Assassinated.* New Delhi: Vikas, 1979.

Haque, Zia ul. *Revelation and Revolution in Islam.* Lahore: Vanguard, 1987.

Khan, Ayub. *Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography.* London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Speeches and Statements of Ayub Khan, Vol VI, June 1963-July 1964, 42-43.

B. Secondary Sources

Ahmed, Feroz. "Has the People's Rule Arrived?" *Pakistan Forum.* Volume 2, Issue 5. February, 1972.

Ahmed, Ishtiaq. *The Concept of an Islamic State : An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan.* London: Pinter, 1987.

Ahmad, Mujeeb. *Jamiyyat 'Ulamā-i Pakistan, 1948-1979.* Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993.

Ahmed, Mushtaq. *Politics of Crisis.* Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1987.

Bailey, Sydney Dawson. *Parliamentary Government in Southern Asia, an Introductory*

Essay on Developments in Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan, 1947-1952. Issued in co-operation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. London: Hansard Society, 1953.

Callard, Keith. *Pakistan: a Political Study.* London: Allen and Unwin, 1957.

Chishti, Faiz Ali. *Betrayals of Another Kind : Islam, Democracy, and the Army in Pakistan.* Delhi: Tricolour Books, 1989.

Feldman, Herbert. *A Constitution for Pakistan.* London: Oxford University Press, 1956.

----------*Revolution in Pakistan: a Study of the Martial Law Administration.* London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Gardezi, Hassan and Jamil Rashid, eds. *Pakistan, the Roots Of Dictatorship : the Political Economy of a Praetorian State.* London: Zed Press, 1983.

Gualtieri, Antonio. *Conscience and Coercion : Ahmadi Muslims and Orthodoxy in Pakistan.* Montreal: Guernica, 1989.

Haider, S.M. *Social Change and Development in Pakistan.* Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1981.

Hayes, Louis. *Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

Humayun, Syed. *Sheikh Mujib's 6-point Formula : an Analytical Study of the Breakup of Pakistan.* Karachi, Pakistan : Royal Book Co., 1995.

Iqbal, Afzal. *Islamisation of Pakistan.* Delhi: Vishal Printers, 1984

Jalal, Ayeesha. *The State Of Martial Rule : The Origins Of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Jawed, Nasim. Islam's Political Culture : Religion and Politics in Predivided Pakistan. Austin : University of Texas Press, 1999.

Khan, Hamid. *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Khan, Mazar Ali. *Pakistan: The Barren Years.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Khan, Muhammad Asghar, ed. *The Pakistan Experience : State & Religion.* Lahore: Vanguard, 1985.

----------. *Generals In Politics : Pakistan 1958-1982.* London: Croon Helm, 1983.

Les Lois Islamiques: Discours Adresse a La Nation Par Le Général Zia ul-Haq. Islamabad, 1979.

Mahmood, Safdar. *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, 1947-1999.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

----------. *Pakistan: Tarikh o Siyasat, 1947-1988.* Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1989.

Malik, Jamal. *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan.* New Delhi: Manohar, 1996.

Malik, Hafeez, ed. *Pakistan: Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

McGrath, Allen. *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Mehdi, Rubya. *The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan.* Surrey: Curzon Press, 1994.

Memon, Ali Nawaz. *Pakistan: Islamic Nation in Crisis.* Lahore:Vanguard Books, 1997.

Mody, Piloo. *Zulfi, My Friend.* Delhi: Thomson Press, 1973.

Munir, Muhammad. *From Jinnah to Zia.* Lahore: Vanguard, 1980.

Nasr, Sayyid Vali Reza. *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: the Jama'āt-i Islami in Pakistan.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

----------. *Mawdūdī and the Making of Islamic Revivalism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

----------. *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Naz, Huma. *Bureaucratic Elites & Political Developments in Pakistan, 1947-58.* Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1990.

Noman, Omar. *Pakistan : A Political and Economic History Since 1947.* New York : Kegan Paul International, 1990.

Pirzada, Syed Sharifudin. *Evolution of Pakistan.* New Delhi: Uppal and Advent. 1988.

Raza, Rafi. *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967-1977.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Richter, William. "Domestic Politics in the 1980s." In *Pakistan Authoritarianism in the 1980s.* eds. Craig Baxter and Syed Razi Wasti. Lahore: Vanguard, 1991. 73

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86.* Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986.

Saeed, Javaid. *Islam and Modernization: a Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey.* Westport: Praeger, 1994.

Sayeed, Khalid. *Politics in Pakistan, the Nature and Direction of Change.* New York: Praeger, 1980.

Schofield, Victoria. *Bhutto: Trial and Execution.* London: Cassell, 1979.

Shah, Syed. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan (1972-1988).* Islamabad: Qaid-i Azam Chair. National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Qaid-i Azam University, 1996. 249-250.

Syed, Anwar. *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Syed, Muhammad Aslam, ed. *Islam and Democracy in Pakistan.* Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1995.

Syed, Mujawar Hussain Shah. *Federalism in Pakistan: Theory and Practice.* Islamabad : National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1994

Suleri, Ziauddin Ahmed. *Politicians and Ayub: a Survey of Pakistani Politics, 1948-1964.* Lahore: Lion Art Press, 1964.

Tayyeb, Ali. *Pakistan: a Political Geography.* London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Von Vorys, Karl. *Political Development in Pakistan.* Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965.

Waseem, Mohammed. *Politics and the State in Pakistan.* Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989.

Yusuf, Hamid. *Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments, 1947-1997.* Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1999.

Zaheer, Hassan. *The Separation of East Pakistan : The Rise and Realization of Bengali*

Muslim Nationalism. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Zingel, Wolfgang Peter, Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallemant, eds. *Pakistan in the 80s : Ideology, Regionalism, Economy, Foreign Policy.* Lahore: Vanguard, 1985.

Ziring, Lawrence. *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971.

----------. *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

----------, *Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History.* Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003.

Periodicals and Newspapers Consulted

The Pakistan Almanac. Karachi: East and West Publishing Group.

The Pakistan Horizon. Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs.

Dawn. Karachi: The Dawn Group of Newspapers.

Jang. Karachi: Jang Group of Newspapers.