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MAASAI PASTORAL POTENTIAL: A STUDY OF RANCHING IN
NAROK DISTRICT, KENYA

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A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy



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**Maasai Pastoral Potential:
A Study of Ranching in Marok District, Kenya**

ABSTRACT

Maasai Pastoral Potential: A Study of Group Ranching in Narok District, Kenya

The socio-economic conditions which affect development in general, and group ranching in particular, among the Maasai of Narok District, Kenya are analyzed. Systems of relationships between Maasai social units are examined to demonstrate how different individuals and groups within Maasai society, each with a diversity of vested interests, react to the opportunities and disadvantages offered them by imposed development programs and altered ecological conditions.

A single group ranch, Rotian OlMakongo, is the focus of intensive study. Maasai on this ranch, which is located in a semi-high potential wheat-growing area of Narok District, have largely been resistant to planned change.

The reaction of group ranch members to development are analyzed showing how lineage and clan affiliation, age set relations, stock friendships and other systems of relations affect individual and group decision-making.

On the one hand the analysis demonstrates how the structure of the group ranch itself is not conducive to the consensual decision-making which ranch planning officials anticipated would occur regarding such important issues as stock limitation. On the other hand traditional Maasai social units are seen at different times both to promote and inhibit new organizational forms to deal with a changing set of economic, ecological and political conditions.

A general trend toward impoverishment, disenfranchisement and supplementary economic pursuits is outlined. However, traditional pastoralism is not seen as being totally subsumed by a more dominant, essentially capitalistic mode of production. Rather, traditional pastoralism is seen to define the transformation of internal forms through a structure which incorporates the modern sector. The tension between the traditional and modern sectors is not their disassociation, but rather, their integration into the dynamic process of change within the structure.

RÉSUMÉ

Le potentiel pastoral des Maasai: Une étude de l'élevage extensif dans le district Narok, au Kenya

Les conditions socio-économiques qui influent sur le développement en général, et l'élevage extensif collectif en particulier, dans le district Narok du territoire des Maasai au Kenya sont analysés. Les différents systèmes de rapports qui existent entre les unités sociales Maasai sont examinés afin de montrer comment les divers groupes et individus au sein de la société Maasai, chacun se caractérisant par un choix d'intérêts variés, réagissent aux possibilités et aux inconvénients reliés aux programmes de développement qui leur sont imposés ainsi qu'aux conditions écologiques nouvelles.

Un groupe d'élevage unique, Rotian OlMakongo, a été sélectionné pour une recherche intensive. Les Maasai habitant sur ce ranch situé dans un secteur de culture du blé de potentiel moyen dans le district Narok, ont été particulièrement hostiles au changement planifié.

Les actions au développement des membres d'un groupe d'élevage extensif sont analysées en montrant comment l'affiliation au clan ou à la famille, les rapports selon les classes d'âge, les amitiés en raison du bétail et d'autres systèmes de rapports influent sur la prise de décisions des groupes et des individus.

D'une part, l'analyse montre comment l'organisation du groupe d'élevage elle-même ne contribue pas du consensus d'opinion en ce qui a trait aux objectifs établis par l'équipe de planification, notamment en ce qui a trait à la limitation des troupeaux. D'autre part, les unités sociales Maasai traditionnelles ont, à différentes occasions, soit favorisé soit entravé les nouvelles formes organisationnelles prévues pour leur permettre de s'ajuster à l'état changeant des conditions économiques, écologiques et politiques.

Une tendance générale vers l'appauvrissement, la privation des droits de représentation et la recherche d'activités économiques complémentaires est remarquée. Toutefois, le pastoralisme traditionnel ne semble pas se fondre totalement dans un mode de production de nature plus dominante et essentiellement capitaliste. Il semble plutôt faire l'objet d'une transformation de valeurs internes sous la forme d'une organisation incorporant l'approche moderne. La tension entre les valeurs traditionnelles et modernes ne provient pas de leur dissociation, mais plutôt de leur intégration en un processus dynamique de changement au sein de l'organisation.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THE AIM OF THE STUDY

Because of early colonial land alienation and present-day agricultural encroachment, together with a broad range of other pressures, the contemporary Maasai, who formerly enjoyed the highest standard of living in East Africa, now find themselves in situations of increasing impoverishment. Their rapidly growing human and animal populations are forced to compete for virtually static natural resources, while their traditional mechanisms for coping with such shortages have become practically inoperative. The response of the Kenyan Government to this pastoral dilemma has been the introduction of commercial ranching programs based on group and individual ownership of land and property. It is their hope that group ranching "will provide Maasai with an incentive to conserve rangeland, promote economic development, and provide the pastoralists with an adequate standard of living without disenfranchising large numbers of people."

To facilitate this transformation in Maasai pastoral society, the Kenyan Government, with financial and technical aid from several donor countries, has over the past fifteen years been implementing a program of ranching development involving large expenditures of capital. The aim of the present study is to investigate the impact of such ranching schemes on one group of Maasai, in Narok District, Kenya. Since the Kenyan model for ranching has generated much interest in other countries with pastoral

populations, the present intensive study should have a relevance beyond the Narok District, especially in the rest of Kenya and elsewhere where governments are concerned with pastoral responses to commercial ranching incentives, with the impact commercial ranching has on pastoral populations, and with the benefits and social costs which such ranching programs produce.

THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Once the decision is made to investigate the impact of an economic development program such as group ranching, it is then necessary to decide whether attention will be focused on the national or macro level of implementation, or on the comparatively smaller community or micro level, because each requires a different theoretical approach and raises different questions for the investigation to answer. For example, most macro level analyses assume that traditional societies are static and homogeneous entities, and that development is initiated by exogenous factors such as an infusion of capital or technology which subsequently pushes the traditional societies into economic growth (Rostow 1962).

On the other hand, and in keeping with the focus of this study, traditional societies can also be said to have an internal dynamism of their own which includes distinctions based on material wealth and prestige (cf. Hill 1970). In fact, it can be demonstrated that such endogenous distinctions or factors play an important role in economic development for traditional societies (cf. Salisbury 1970).

Very often macro theories and macro analyses ignore intracultural differences and proceed to generalize across a diversity of societies, thus

threatening to raise many of the issues concerning comparability which already surround the formalist-substantivist debate in the field of economic anthropology. Alternatively, and as suggested by Salisbury (1970:6), focusing on the internal properties of a society in order to investigate its response to development

... complements studies dealing with only exogenous development. But at the same time it should be noted that to the extent that the presence of developmental forces within traditional societies facilitate or reinforce the working of exogenous forces, to that extent, the amount of variation apparently explained by theories of the latter type must be reduced by the amount due to interaction between endogenous and exogenous forces.

THE THEORETICAL THRUST OF THE STUDY

The theoretical thrust of this study is based on the premise that a social analysis is not primarily concerned with what can be termed the morphological social form of the total Maasai social system, but rather, should be interested in analysing relationships between determinants and processes which generate that form. Here, emphasis will be placed on the system of relationships which come about as a result of Maasai pastoral management units adapting to each other within a natural, economic, political and administrative framework.

Stated differently, it is not sufficient simply to view Maasai society as a monolithic unit faced with development. Attention must also be given to the different individuals and groups within Maasai society which have a diversity of vested interests and which react differently to the opportunities and disadvantages presented to them by imposed development programs. For example, the way Maasai react to innovations can often readily be linked to losses or gains in status and wealth within their

traditional social system. This observation is consistent with Salisbury's (1970) opinion that the major impetus behind development often comes from within the developing society itself and that simply striving for increased status can lead to economizing with respect to the production of goods. In light of these comments, this study will attempt to understand the incidence and benefits of ranching schemes among the Maasai by taking into account the conflictual nature of individual and group interests, such as those which materialize within their age grade organization.

Because this study intends to examine the systems of relationships between Maasai social units, it will place major emphasis on conducting an analysis of a single group ranch, rather than attempt to extrapolate from data selected according to random sampling techniques from a great number of ranches. It is the contention here that focussing on a single group ranch is a more fruitful approach to understanding the impact of the group ranching program on the Maasai than is trying to generalize about this impact by examining data collected throughout the Narok District. The reason for saying this is that random sampling, by definition, assumes there are no relationships between the units selected for analysis. Furthermore, random sampling also tends to imply that such units are uniform and this contention would be seriously doubted by anybody familiar with the Maasai.

By selecting a single group ranch for intensive analysis, the study begins with a population which shares a common environment in which people are striving to make a living. This common environment partly comprises natural factors, such as ecological conditions, and partly comprises social factors, such as interactions among the Maasai and between the Maasai and

relevant non-Maasai. This population is organised into a variety of social units each of which evaluates different courses of action, reaches decisions and acts on those decisions. Although the social boundaries separating these social units are part of the investigation, they can generally be said to be decision-making units confronted with similar adaptive problems within the broad group ranching format (cf. Barth 1967).

In keeping with the approach outlined above, this study will develop models of Maasai adaptations which incorporate various factors to explain how decision-making strategies are both rational and appropriate to various situations. This is important because very often it is the pastoralists, not the development program, who are blamed for any failures. Here, too, it must be understood that many of the difficulties encountered by pastoralists in trying to adapt to new methods of exploiting their environment, or envisaging man-animal relationships, cannot be thought of as being primarily ecological or economic.¹ In a social system such as that of the Maasai, where cattle are used as symbols of social relationships, it is extremely difficult to conduct a predominantly formal economic analysis of development.

It should also be understood that models illustrating systemic interdependencies are heuristic devices to explain how systems work. Given the principle of rationality as it applies to specific conditions and

¹ This does not deny that the economy itself implies social interaction and that kinship, friendship, marriage, etc., have a real economic sense about them. Nevertheless, it is possible to recognize the interaction and still keep the various relations conceptually distinct. As Godelier (1977:123) points out, "Unity of function does imply a confusion of functions."

situations. the models developed in this study should be useful for building hypotheses concerning Maasai decision-making strategies that emerge whenever such conditions and situations change. In addition, this particular approach will permit testing of the basic assumptions surrounding group ranching. All development programs like this are founded on some logic or theory of social change and contain a series of predictions about the outcome of project interventions. Of course, such predictions are not always explicitly spelled out in a nation's development plans, but they are certainly implied in such statements as, "If we do away with the system of communal land tenure, we will provide pastoralists with the incentive to conserve rangeland" (Range Management Officer, Narok, personal communication). In fact, statements like this are often closer to being a proscriptive warning to pastoralists than they are to being a planner's prediction!

SELECTING A GROUP RANCH FOR A CASE STUDY

Having offered some justification for studying a single group ranch, it is worthwhile discussing briefly how that particular group ranch was chosen. After travelling for a month or more throughout Narok District visiting numerous ranches, it became obvious that Maasai were expressing serious and widespread concerns about the feasibility of group ranching. These concerns ranged from intra-and inter-group ranch rivalries, through conflicts between members of different Maasai generational age sets, to the inability of many ranches to provide suitable graze for stock. The two concerns which were consistently the topics of much heated discussion among the Maasai were encroaching agricultural expansion into their grazing

areas, especially where this involved barley and wheat cropping, and instances of government sanctioned subdivision of group ranches into individual holdings.

In order to measure fully the extent to which these concerns are affecting group ranching, a ranch was selected from among those situated in a semi-high potential area where wheat and barley cropping is presently an important aspect of group ranch development. This ranch, Rotian OlMakongo, may not be representative of group ranches located in the semi-arid regions of Narok District. However, a number of features made this ranch particularly interesting for research. Unlike many other ranches in the semi-arid areas, it was incorporated very early, while most ranches were only undergoing land adjudication at the time of this research. Why then, given the length of time it has been in existence, has there been no development of a pastoral infrastructure on the ranch? The ranch has been growing wheat and barley for several years. How is such agricultural development affecting pastoral potential? Also, a large number of non-Maasai acceptees are living within its boundaries. How do these non-pastoralists affect pastoral development strategies for the ranch? Finally, many of its residents have begun to shift away from intensive involvement in the pastoral economy. Does this represent a transformation of a pastoral production system and how and why is it occurring?

The selection of Rotian OlMakongo may raise questions as to its representativeness. In particular, it poses the question: Does this ranch present a model of group ranching which is unique to those ranches located in semi-high potential areas with the potential for agricultural diversification, or is it also valid for those other group ranches located

in the semi-arid areas of the district? It is my belief that the strategies and decision-making frameworks which I will analyse will be applicable to these other ranches. The response to imposed change can only be understood when we realize what it is that is changing.

I hope to show that the system of relationships in Maasai society is becoming strained at both the upper and the lower limits of structural and functional compatibility, and that as this occurs it is possible for social relations to be so severely affected as to prevent social reproduction.

It is my belief that the intensive study of Rotian OlMakongo is valuable precisely because so many variables are impinging on the social system. The challenge is to determine the points at which systemic relationships break down and thus to suggest an explanation for transformations and changes that occur.

Rotian OlMakongo and the surrounding area is one where mixed pastoralism and agriculture is being tried. It is very similar to Ngong, Loitokitok, and Upper Mau where earlier land adjudication practices have led not only to a considerable loss of land for pastoral production, but also, "to the Maasai tribe, probably forever" (Lawrence Report 1966:25). This loss of land is directly related to Kenya's national development objective of increasing agricultural production in pastoral areas which have the potential for this. Like Ngong, Loitokito and Upper Mau, the entire Trans Mara region in Narok District is slated for an extensive program of mixed agriculture. Given this trend, an investigation of Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch should provide an excellent opportunity to study and analyse many of the socio-economic features of this transition from pure pastoralism to a mixed or dual economy.

The future direction of ranches such as Rotian OlMakongo is important since the feasibility of subsistence pastoralism is under such close scrutiny. It has been suggested that, "whatever is done the pastoral resource base in many cases will be insufficient to support the subsistence needs of the population by 2000 A.D. even if all land is available" (Campbell 1979a: Appendix: my emphasis). This picture becomes even more gloomy when recognition is given to the fact that agricultural expansion into areas like Rotian OlMakongo significantly reduces what is still considered to be prime dry season grazeland by many Maasai living in the semi-arid areas. As a result, whatever decisions are made about land use on ranches like Rotian OlMakongo, they will eventually affect the viability of group ranching in semi-arid areas. Thus, the strategies for coping with decreased productivity in the arid areas may increasingly approach those found in the high potential areas although the conditions there may be reflected in different outcomes. Presently, pastoralists living near subsistence level in arid areas, where herd quality suffers from lost dry season grazing areas, are often attempting to increase the size of their herds simply to try and maintain their level of production (cf. Hoben 1976). This problem is exacerbated by the frequent influx of numerous illegal graziers into ranches in the semi-arid regions - graziers whose own ranchland is often given over to wheat and barley cropping.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the future of Maasai living in the semi-arid areas of Narok District will be increasingly determined by the fate of those other Maasai presently occupying the semi-high potential areas in that district. Whether the Narok District Maasai generally become a disenfranchised and impoverished group, or whether they will be able to

capitalize on the various political and economic factors available to them will to a large extent be influenced by the actions and decisions of the Maasai living on group ranches such as Rotian OlMakongo. For this reason, it is hoped that an investigation into Rotian OlMakongo's responses to group ranching will provide an understanding of pastoral potential and group ranch development throughout Narok District and offer some special insights into the future of all Maasai living there.

RESEARCH METHODS

As this research was carried out by an anthropologist, the most basic research method used was participant observation. This method involved spending considerable time at Rotian OlMakongo observing and participating in all aspects of ranch operation, as well as pursuing a variety of questions with the Maasai living there during their daily activities. Throughout my entire research period, I employed a young Maasai man who functioned as an interpreter/research assistant. This young man is educated to the secondary school level, is fluent in both English and Maa, and is related to many of the families living at Rotian OlMakongo. For a few months, I was able to employ a female interpreter who provided me with access to Maasai women and an opportunity to discuss their reactions to group ranching.

In addition to participant observation and informal questioning, other methodological techniques were used. These included:

1. In-depth Interviews. This research technique was pursued with both individuals and groups. For example interviews were held with most group ranch committee members on an individual basis. Later, a group interview

was held with the same people to promote discussion on ranch matters and to help verify answers given during individual interviews. All interviews were recorded and transcribed in Maa and later translated into English.

2. Questionnaires. A lengthy questionnaire in the Maa language was drawn up, but this could only be used sparingly since it very often elicited what respondents thought might be the 'hoped for' answers. For example, when asking the question on one particular ranch, if members thought there were too many people living there to make the ranch economically viable, most people replied in the affirmative. Later, during an in-depth interview, I learned that most of those who said 'yes' to this question were not concerned with the carrying capacity of the ranchland and its relationship to population growth and resource use. Instead, because they belonged to the dominant clan living on the ranch, they simply said 'yes' in reference to the non-clan members and non-Maasai living there. Problems like this aside, it was possible to cover, and get answers to, many questions without appearing to run quickly through a list.

3. Ranch Economic Data and Household Budgets. Considerable research time was spent collecting quantitative data from a cross-section of households on the ranch. This included systematically recording herd numbers, herd composition and herd offtake rates whenever this was possible. Household budgets were based on a dry season monitoring of incomes and monthly expenditures. It proved difficult to monitor regularly milk production at Rotian OlMakongo. However, the milk production records of nearly forty Zebu cattle belonging to the Maasai ranching project at Ilferin-Loita were thoroughly analysed and this compared closely with the limited data collected at Rotian OlMakongo. Finally, a detailed survey was made of

income earned by ranch members involved with non-traditional economic pursuits like charcoal burning, timber cutting, and livestock trading, usually referred to as cattle trekking.

4. Off-Ranch Interviews and Data Collection. Because the concept of group ranching was initiated and imposed on the Maasai by the Kenyan government, time was spent investigating the strategies, objectives, and organization of the various government agencies involved with economic development. Here, interviews were conducted with employees of the Ranch Planning Office, the Range Management Office, and the District Development Office, Livestock Marketing Division, all of whom provided a good deal of information on such topics as the organization of the group ranching program, the financing of the program, the procedures for acquiring and repaying group ranch loans, and the financial status of group ranches throughout the district. Further information was obtained by accompanying the District Range Management Officer to several of the Annual General Meetings (AGM) held at group ranches throughout the district. Inquiries and lengthy interviews were also conducted with employees from the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), an agency which provides development funds in the form of loans to group ranches and individual Maasai. As well, interviews were conducted with employees of the Kenya Wheat Board which is one of the organizations which finances wheat cropping in the district. Data were also collected from various sources, both Maasai and non-Maasai, concerning political alignments, affinities and coalitions within and between group ranches and how these were connected to the various political factions within both Narok District and Kenya as a whole. I was especially fortunate that my research coincided with national

and district county council elections which enabled me to observe the election campaign process, particularly where this involved the activation of various political alliances which affected intra- and inter-ranch relationships. While these various off-ranch topics and institutions are not the major focus of this study, they do provide an indispensable and relevant context within which decision-making on group ranches can be understood.

MAASAI PASTORALISM: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Early Period

The origin of the Maasai² has been traced to the northwestern shores of Lake Rudolf, Kenya, from where they migrated southwards, dispersing and absorbing other tribes along the way. As early as the seventeenth century, the Maasai were occupying the Ngorongoro Crater region in Kenya and the Serengeti Plains in Tanzania (Jacobs 1975:411).

During this Maasai migration to the south, other Maa-speaking pastoral groups occupied the eastern and western fringes along their route. Today, the most northern Maa-speaking pastoralists are the Samburu. There are other Maa-speaking peoples living in Kenya and Tanzania today, such as the Arusha, who practice some combination of pastoralism-agriculture and the Njemps who also supplement their diet with fishing. Maa-speakers who deviated from the strictly pastoral diet were looked upon as inferior by the Maasai. Today, there are more than 438,000 Maa-speaking people living

² A full ethnographic account of the Maasai and their moves does not fall within the scope of this study. However, readers who wish such information can refer to Berntsen 1979; Fosbrooke 1948; Hollis 1905; Huntingford 1953; Jacobs 1965, 1975; and Merker 1911.

in Kenya and Tanzania. Of these, approximately 52% are pastoral Maasai with some 164,000 of them living in Kenya (Jacobs 1975:406).

Prior to the arrival of the British in East Africa, the Maasai, the Samburu and other pastoral tribes were engaged in a long series of conflicts with each other. In fact, due to the protracted warfare, many of the historical pastoral groups, such as the IlLaikipiak Maasai, who were soundly defeated by the IlPurko Maasai, no longer exist as discrete entities. In addition, during the early days of the British occupation many of the Maa-speaking pastoral groups in Kenya were attempting to recover from the effects of war, a most disastrous smallpox epidemic, a serious outbreak of rinderpest which killed many of their animals, and a severe drought. Consequently, when Kenya became a protectorate in 1895, and steps were taken to build roads and railways into the interior through lands held by the Maasai, the British met with little resistance from the decimated pastoralists.

It was during this early colonial period that the Maasai first lost important water sources and dry season grazeland to European settlers and agricultural encroachment. Apparently, an inflated account of Maasai aggression and territorial expansion encouraged the British to negotiate a settlement with the Maasai (Mungeam 1970). In 1904 the Maasai agreed to a treaty which resulted in their giving up large portions of land in the Rift Valley region of Kenya and moving onto the Laikipia Plateau where the British guaranteed them a permanent and final settlement "so long as the Maasai as a race shall exist" (Sanford 1919:24). By 1911 this agreement

was broken by the British and the Maasai were forced to move to a smaller and less fertile southern reserve.³

Despite the fact that Maasailand enjoyed the status of a reserve with some additions or confiscations, until land adjudication began in the late 1960's a steady migration of non-Maasai into the area beginning as early as the 1920's resulted in a continuing loss of valuable grazeland for the Maasai. As will be discussed, this loss of land, together with a host of other factors, had and continues to have, many effects on Maasai pastoral practices.

TRADITIONAL MAASAI HERDING PRACTICES AND ENVIRONMENT

The pastoral Maasai have never been a unified tribe with a single political system. Rather, they are divided into several autonomous and named iloshon (trans. sections) based primarily on localized age grade organization. At the same time, these sections also incorporate clan organization, which crosscuts age grade ascription and provides another basis for identification and mutual cooperation. In this way, members of the same clan or age set are represented in all the sections. Each section is associated with recognized boundaries and families would "generally

³ Although Maasai pastoralists occupy a variety of ecological niches, some of which are suitable for agriculture, many Maasai are living in parts of Kenya where agriculture is precarious and in some cases impossible. What is commonly referred to as Kenya Maasailand today comprises a 40,000 square mile area in the southwestern portion of the country which is divided into two ecological zones by the Rift Valley. The lower eastern plateau zone is composed mainly of semi-arid, savannah land, while the higher rainy western zone is made up of grassland and an extensive cover of cedar and wild olive trees (Pratt and Gwynn 1977). Much of the rift valley floor is arid to semi-arid desert dotted with acacia trees. Rainfall is seasonal, sometimes torrential, and often variable. Narok District lies in the higher potential, western zone.

graze solely within their own tribal (section) territory, and were prepared to defend these boundaries by force, if necessary against intrusions" (Jacobs 1975:414). Movement across such boundaries does take place on an individual and contractual level while "the gradual pushing into a region by several homesteads without such agreement is interpreted as a form of annexation. In the context of the 1960's and 1970's, such incursion involves the added threat of loss of the land through adjudication if the 'facts' were allowed to stand" (Galaty 1979:15).

The warrior age set, active within the age grade organization at any particular point in time was utilized as a mobile force to protect pastures from incursions by neighbouring groups and, some researchers (Jacobs) have suggested, to assist in the forcible entry into new grazing areas whenever this was necessary. The Dyson-Hudsons (1969) assert that the ability of pastoralists to migrate over large areas and leave behind exhausted pastures enabled them to ignore large-scale conservation efforts. Others suggest that the structure of Maasai society itself, for example, the necessity to accumulate stock for bridewealth whenever the age grades turned over, further promoted territorial expansion.

Each Maasai section was further subdivided into named inkutot (trans. localities) which do not own land but, "manage as if they did" (Jacobs 1973:3). Individual families "secured rights to communal resources only by common residence within the same locality over long periods of time and by regular participation, involving specific obligations, in local age set activities. Families would thus hesitate to move frequently from one locality to another because of the rights and obligations that attached to local loyalties and the need to transfer them" (ibid:415).

The traditional Maasai herding system, as well as the activities associated with each age set, generally took place within the confines of the locality. To a certain extent, this level of organization functioned as a corporate group, each locality having its own age set spokesmen and council of elders which mediated disputes and enforced customary law. Within these ecologically self-contained localities, the Maasai traditionally exploited their rangeland by moving their herds and perhaps their families between semi-permanent high potential dry season pastures and temporary low potential wet season pasture. Local organization ensured that Maasai stock had access to both types of pasture for conservation and grazing purposes and helped guarantee that various traditional rangeland management techniques were employed, such as the regular burning of portions of the grazeland to help generate new grass growth, the hauling of water by donkey in dry season grazing areas and the judicious grazing of sheep to prevent destruction of grass roots.

Each locality is further subdivided into a number of progressively smaller units. It is at the most basic level, the individual household, that control over production factors in the pastoral economy, namely livestock and labour, is founded. A man first establishes his household at marriage though he may eventually have several wives, each one building her own house for herself and her children. Maasai boys receive animals from their parents and agnatic relatives during special events in their life cycle. When a bride enters the settlement she is entitled to gifts from affines and her husband. The cattle given to a wife form the basis of her allotted herd, while those retained by the husband can be thought of as his residual herd (c.f., Spencer 1978). Thus the herd component of a new

household is built up. While different individuals have a variety of rights in the livestock, the male head of the household manages them as one unit. Therefore, formal rights of ownership relating to herding strategies are vested in the head of the household; decisions concerning disposal of animals are complex and place certain constraints on a man's use of such animals. Women have the rights to the milk and certain parts of slaughtered animals that have been allocated to them, and their sons expect to eventually inherit these cattle. Furthermore, stockfriends, close relatives and age mates may make demands upon the herd so that decision-making within the management unit must take into account a vast number of variables over and above the condition of the range, etc.

Household viability (Stenning 1965) is conditioned by a number of social variables as well, so that during the early phase of establishment even a fairly wealthy man is dependent upon others until he produces sons who can take on the herding duties. A balance between labour available, herd requirements and household needs is likely more possible by the time a man reaches senior elderhood. This balance eventually declines with the dissolution of his family when his own sons marry. In order to maintain viability a certain amount of mutual help and cooperation is needed.

In response to the factors which influence the autonomy of individual households a number of institutionalized forms of cooperation are evident. In terms of the everyday management of livestock, the most relevant cooperative form is the grouping of a number of individual households into a common residential site in which membership is optional. This residential unit is referred to as enkang (trans. village or settlement). A number of inkang'itie (pl.) are usually clustered in one area and are

referred to as emurua (trans. settlement area) which is also the "cold" grass which grows up at the location of an abandoned settlement and each settlement area is dotted with these old sites. Cooperation within an enjang is often extended to other inkang'itie in the settlement area.

A number of settlement areas within the same locality are referred to as elatia (trans. neighbourhood). Cooperation between different neighbourhoods takes the form of granting grazing access to herders who are temporarily passing through the area. Movements of individuals and households is most often from one settlement village to another, but settlement villages rarely move as entire units, most settlements lasting an average of seven years (Western 1979) before disease, decay, etc. induce a search for a new location.

The settlement represents a convenient locus for combining labour and providing security, but it has no overall authority structure which can determine individual decision-making strategies of herd management, such as where to graze or when to buy, sell or slaughter an animal. In fact, the aim of each household is to become as autonomous as possible. "Thus each family and kraal camp regulates its affairs as it pleases and acts independently as it chooses. Differences of opinion over herd management often cause families to break away and join up with other camps" (Jacobs 1963:31).

Notwithstanding this individuality, reciprocal arrangements among settlement partners often occur. The sharing of milk between families with large herds and those who are experiencing a temporary milk shortage is common. The manipulation of the labour force is an ongoing process. Many impoverished herders join the enjang of a wealthy man, having nothing to

offer except their labour. Tasks are shared between households, and herdboys are often exchanged as well as information about animals, pastures, disease, etc. The slaughter of animals for a variety of reasons inevitably leads to a sharing of meat. Thus, common residence is one influence on how wealth is redistributed in the form of productive capital, labour and food.

A number of other institutionalized reciprocal relations are evident in Maasai society. Similar to the arrangements occurring among settlement members are arrangements between patrilineal clansmen, especially the loaning of milch cows and herdboys. Furthermore, clansmen, close agnates and certain affines have the right to 'beg' for animals and it is often difficult to refuse them. Also, the exchange of animals between stockfriends is seen as a means of spreading the risk of loss of animals due to localized drought or disease. The demands of age mates at times entails the exchange of stock (van Zwanenberg and King 1975:49).

It is this redistribution of the means of production which has led many researchers to conclude that the Maasai system is essentially egalitarian. "These factors, related to the productive activity itself tend to redistribute wealth in the long run" (Dahl 1979:274). At the same time generosity in terms of the sharing of stock, milk and meat, etc. is highly regarded and redistribution leads to prestige and power.

Schneider (1978, 1979, 1980) concludes that pastoralists manage their herds for capital growth and that diffuse stock relationships create conditions "in which the amount of wealth that can be accumulated is practically endless" (1978:24). Thus, while household labour limits the size of a herd that a stockowner can manage, exchange of livestock

generates the means for capital accumulation in the face of alternative investment or consumption options. Furthermore, Dahl and Hjort (1976) have shown that optimal strategies of subsistence pastoralism (i.e. milk production) require keeping a large number of milch cows as well as breeding bulls, immatures and male animals for exchange or slaughter. In fact, pastoralists need to keep herds of a size that is often wrongly seen by government sources to reflect "surplus" or "irrational" accumulation.

Traditionally, pastoral Maasai were more or less completely dependent on their livestock for their livelihood, subsisting mainly on the milk, blood and meat of their animals. The exponential natural growth of human and animal populations eventually may have led to the depletion of grazeland. Under traditional herd management practices and other self-regulatory mechanisms exhaustion of pasture land was temporary and probably not serious since the pastoralists had more opportunity to move their herds elsewhere. Pressure on pasture due to these growth rates was relieved in the past by various natural calamities. A combination of drought and animal disease, often resulting in famine, has been an almost regular feature in Kenya's pastoral areas. During the nineteenth century, this combination occurred once almost every ten years and the twentieth century has brought disaster in 1903, 1908, 1919, 1928, 1935, 1945, 1950, 1960, 1973 (van Zwanenberg and King 1975:85). Thus, pastoral range management systems were kept in relative states of balance and imbalance and "aggressive expansion phases alternated with periods of quiescence" (Allan 1965:317).

THE ALTERED ECOLOGICAL BALANCE

The traditional forms of Maasai pastoral organization were practised in an environment quite different from today. The loss of grazeland to colonial settlement and agricultural expansion, the establishment and frequent closure of neighbouring international borders, as well as the demarcation of wildlife reserves within Kenya, have made traditional herding strategies increasingly difficult (Jacobs 1975:419). In addition, the earlier high mortality rate for humans and livestock in Kenya caused by drought and epidemics has been significantly reduced by relief programs and modern medicine.

Jacobs (1975) describes Maasai herding practices carried on in these radically altered ecological areas as 'vitiating' pastoral systems because Maasai families must remain in low potential grazing areas, never giving the grasses and soil there an opportunity to recuperate from one season to the next. Increased human population growth in those areas has resulted in an increased demand for livestock in order to meet local subsistence needs. Here, Hoben (1976) notes that, once the available pasture per livestock unit decreases and herd quality follows suit, pastoral families living at the subsistence level are forced to increase the size of their herds in order to simply maintain the same level of production.

Generally speaking, Maasai livestock numbers tend to increase fairly rapidly whenever conditions are favourable, particularly after a drought (Allen 1965:316). Estimates of growth rates range from between 4 and 20 per cent per annum. Estimates (Meadows and White 1979) of restocking rates in Kajiado after the 1960 drought indicate an initial 7 per cent rate which

declined to 5 per cent as pressure on the rangelands increases after a few years.

RANGE MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

As early as the 1930's the colonial government began to report apparent signs of degradation of grazeland within the pastoral reserves. As Galaty (1980) notes, development of the pastoral areas has been, and is now, predicated upon the assumption of an immanent ecological crisis. The herding practices of the Maasai were seen as irrational, destructive and non-productive forms of land use. The Maasai were thought to be "destroying their own lands through willful neglect" (Van Zwanenberg and King 1975:99).

The relationship between land-use practices and productivity is a thorny and, as yet, unresolved issue (cf. Boserup 1965; Geertz 1963). The ecological consequences of traditional pastoralism have been hotly debated in Kenya by a number of ecologists. Some experts maintain that pastoralism is destroying the natural environment and wildlife while others posit that traditional pastoralism has in fact helped create the particular short grassland regime which supports the large herds of ungulates in those pastoral areas (e.g. Bell 1971). Meadows and White (1979) point out that 20 years after the 1960-61 drought in Kajiado District, no irreversible ecological decline of grasslands appears to have taken place.

This is not to deny the seriousness of overgrazing, but simply to note that the scientific basis for deducing an ecological crisis is flimsy. The Maasai do recognize deterioration of the range, especially in areas of circumscribed grazing. After the rains, I commented on an expanse of green

rangeland. An elder pointed out that many years earlier the area was covered with olperesi olrasha, a grass that cattle thrived on, but now, the area was covered with olopikikonqoi, a grass that is difficult for cattle to digest so that they do not grow fat or give much milk. On the other hand, areas which have been considered an "irreclaimable wasteland" are later seen to provide excellent graze (Doherty 1977).

The devastation of the range which the colonial government observed was thought to be caused by the pastoralists' desire to keep large surpluses of old, diseased and sterile animals. Thus, the major problem was thought to be one of overstocking. This particular understanding of the problem points to a very real contradiction between the economic interest of government and pastoralist. From the pastoralist perspective, the problem of land degeneration has little to do with overstocking, but rather, it stems from the fact that pastoralists are often denied access to resources because of a serious land shortage. For the government, overstocking was the result of irrational herding practices and systems of communal land tenure. It was not recognized as the result of an increasing maladjustment of the traditional herding system struggling for survival.

On the other hand, the 'rationality' of Maasai pastoral activities, such as mobility, growth and dispersion, has been well documented and defended in anthropological literature (e.g. Dyson-Hudson 1970; Jacobs 1965; Schneider 1974). Dahl and Hjort (1976) have shown that the large herds of these pastoralists are not excessive for a subsistence milk economy and that the number of 'surplus' stock is actually very small.

In any event, to cope with overgrazing and erosion, the colonial administration imposed destocking programs on the Maasai and other Kenyan

pastoralists. These programs involved cull branding, quota systems and grazing controls. During World War II, the forced sale of livestock was implemented. Maasai informants explained that government officials and askaris (police) would go to each settlement and mark the cattle from each family that were to be brought to official auction locations on a certain date. Several Maasai told the story of a warrior who was away in the bush and when he returned he discovered that his favourite bull, which had been given to him at circumcision, had been marked for sale. He journeyed to Narok and begged the District Commissioner to take two of his other animals instead of the bull, but the D.C. refused. On the day of the sale, the warrior appeared with his bull, raised his spear and hurled it into the D.C.'s chest, killing him. Educated Maasai explained that he was taken away, tried and hung, although some older Maasai insisted that "the government would never dare to hang a Maasai, and to this day he is in a prison on an island off the coast".

This story emphasizes the hostility which Kenyan pastoralists felt towards colonial destocking programs and calls attention to the so-called problem of maintaining law and order among pastoral people. In fact, pastoral hostility had surfaced earlier when various Christian missions attempted to abolish female circumcision and coerce Maasai children into attending school. To deal with hostility, several superficial acts were implemented, such as impounding spears, imposing a police levy force throughout pastoral areas, hastening of ceremonies to end warriorhood and so on. Needless to say, these regulatory acts only served to increase conflict. Tignor (1976:87) claims that the warriors were particularly antagonistic toward the British and in the 1930's they had instigated

several uncoordinated uprisings. Particularly, the prohibition on cattle raiding drastically lessened a warrior's opportunities for obtaining cattle for bridewealth purposes and thus warrior resistance, in part, could be linked to their inability to gain new status and wealth.

Mungeam (1970) has speculated that pastoral wealth, measured in large herd sizes, actually protected herders from the demands imposed on them by colonial administrators. That is, taxes could always be paid by selling stock and this removed the threat of having to resort to the highly unattractive prospect of wage labour. This argument can only be seen to have limited validity since it is important to realize that stock were not always easily converted into cash during colonial times, especially not during the early days when herds were frequently quarantined and stockowners were restricted from buying and selling animals at official auctions held around the country (Ross 1924:95). This type of policy prevented the Maasai from obtaining boran breeding bulls from the northern Samburu areas which in turn affected the productivity of their own herds.

Most of the colonial pastoral development programs eventually failed because of various social, economic, technical and even logistical reasons. But insofar as they were effective, these programs are reported to have exacerbated the injurious effects which pastoralists were perceived to have on their environment (cf. Dyson-Hudson 1975; Jacobs 1975). The introduction of water dams and bore holes to provide additional water facilities allowed many cattle to survive which otherwise would have died during the dry seasons. This, combined with a lack of grazing improvements and totally inadequate markets where pastoralists could sell stock, often culminated in grazeland being depleted more rapidly than ever. In fact,

whenever the colonial range management programs concentrated on limited areas of rangeland and strictly enforced these, it placed an increased burden on those areas not covered by the scheme which had to absorb stock excluded from the program areas.

As I shall examine in the next chapter, the 1950's and 1960's brought an entirely new approach to dealing with range management issues. Instead of attempting to control the resources themselves, government policy was directed towards radically altering traditional land tenure systems in the belief that this would provide the organizational framework in which the Maasai would have the incentive to control access to graze.

CHAPTER TWO

GROUP RANCHING IN NAROK DISTRICT OF MAASAILAND

LAND DEVELOPMENT AND THE NAROK MAASAI

Land adjudication and group ranching in the 1960's and 1970's in Maasailand cannot be understood as an isolated phenomenon but rather must be seen in perspective to land tenure reform elsewhere in the country. The Colonial Government outlined the direction of agricultural growth in the Swynnerton Plan (1955). Intrinsic to this plan was the notion that land consolidation and title deed were necessary elements in giving farmers the incentive to develop their land and invest in cash crops. In other words, private property and development were seen to go hand in hand.

The land issues were complex and varied greatly from tribe to tribe but enclosure and adjudication became a key factor for the British in responding to the 1950's Mau Mau rebellion. The earlier expropriation of large areas of the best agricultural land for white settlement had caused a severe shortage of land in the African reserves, especially in the Kikuyu areas. The government believed that the Mau Mau movement was fuelled by the overcrowding on the Kikuyu Reserves forcing the landless and disenfranchised into the urban areas. Land reform was seen as a way to counter this political agitation. Therefore, since land reform was primarily a political solution, it was directed primarily at the Kikuyu districts of the Central Province (de Wilde 1967:9). Colonial sources pointed to "spontaneous" enclosure and the apparent move away from communalistic land use in Kikuyuland and Luoland, along with increased

fragmentation of existing holdings as a justification for the transformation of African tenure institutions into European forms of land ownership. At any rate, those Kikuyu leaders who might have voiced objections were in detention during this period and by 1957 the land reform campaign in Kikuyu districts was well under way.

The initial increased productivity of some high potential farms was more than off-set by the stagnation of the great majority of the farms and certainly there would continue to be landless, many who could not be absorbed into the farm labour force. However, "individualization seems to have been accepted not for its alleged potential for revolutionizing agriculture or range management, but for its credit generating potentialities particularly for uses outside of these activities" (Okoth-Ogendo 1979:5). In other areas of the country the government did not have such strong political pressures to promote land reform.

These colonial land reform efforts were taken over after independence by the Kenyan government and embodied in the Land Adjudication Act of 1963. Kenya's own political leaders attempted to accelerate land reform and the establishment of freehold title to land. It was felt that long term investment in the former reserve lands was essential to restore and increase productivity. In order to accomplish this the security of tenure was considered paramount, especially since it was believed that the main capital asset of Africans in Kenya was land. Registration of land in Kikuyu country had been completed by 1960 and this was extended to Meru, Embu, Nandi and Baringo.

This governmental emphasis on freehold title to land gave rise to a scramble by various Maasai sections to re-establish boundaries and

locations and by various individual Maasai to lay claim to tracts of land. However, this is not totally unrelated to the land shortages elsewhere in Kenya. For many years the Maasai reserve was being encroached upon by individuals from other tribes. Thus, in order to facilitate an understanding of Maasai reaction to land reform, I would like to review the history of land alienation and agricultural encroachment in Narok District. As early as the 1930's the Maasai Reserve began to feel the effects of the penetration of other ethnic groups. Infiltration of Kikuyu has been heavy among the Purko Maasai, especially in Mau Narok and the areas contiguous to Narok township - a situation similar to the Ngong area of Kajiado. The Maasai in Western Narok District (i.e. the Uasin Gishu and Moitanik) have experienced an influx of Luyia, Nandi and Kipsigis. However, to say that non-Maasai migrants have encroached on the Maasai Reserve sheds little light on the nature of their arrival and their interaction with the Maasai. Let us examine several cases in order to demonstrate the relationship between land, politics and non-Maasai.

Infiltration of Kikuyu into Maasailand has been an ongoing process. During the 'big famine' at the turn of the century many stockless Maasai sought refuge with the Kikuyu and often took wives. Later, when these Maasai returned to their homelands many of their Kikuyu dependents came along. There are many descendants of this type of inter-tribal marriage living at Nairagiengare and the Mau in Narok and also at Ngong and Loitokitok in Kajiado. Other very prosperous Maasai were known to bring Kikuyu or Kipsigis herders into the family to supplement a labour shortage. These herders were given a yearly remuneration of stock and many chose to stay on in Maasailand, often being adopted into a Maasai family. Other

non-Maasai entered the district and established symbiotic relationships with Maasai hosts. For example, they were given permission to plant a shamba (trans:garden) for their own subsistence in return for working 'free' a small plot for their Maasai host.

At the time, the Maasai believed that they were getting the better deal. As one elder explained, "We were getting something free...for nothing". These long time resident non-Maasai, either related through affinal ties, adopted into a family or invited into the area by a Maasai host, are known as acceptees. At the time of adjudication, these acceptees were recognized by the Kenyan government as having legitimate land rights to obtain an individual piece of land or become members of a group ranch. Indeed, the Maasai were informed that development of their district could not proceed unless acceptees were able to participate. It was at this point, in the 1960's, that the Maasai fully realized that they were not getting something (ie. foodstuffs, labour, etc.) for nothing because in the end they paid dearly. The land that they thought these acceptees were temporarily using became land that the acceptees owned.

Furthermore, not all movement into Maasailand was of a contractual nature. For example, during the 1930's, "Kikuyu squatters evicted in the Nakuru-Naivasha area spilled over into some of the underdeveloped areas of the vast Masai Reserves where they joined other Kikuyu, some of whom had been living there since the time of the Carrier Corps press gang raids in 1917 ..." (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:251). In 1949, the government disbanded some 11,000 Kikuyu squatters who had been living at Olenguruone since 1942 when the area was first excluded from the Maasai reserve. Many of these squatters spread into Narok District. Infiltration of the

district by such uninvited, or illegal aliens was frequent and took place on the Kipsigis frontier as well.

Maasai also experienced the loss of large areas of land as well as encroachment by individuals. In 1926, a section of the Trans Mara Division, known as Areas A and B, was added to the Maasai Reserve. At about the same time a small number of Luo moved into the area to take up agriculture. In 1933, the District Commissioner had a trench constructed along the border of Area A and B to prevent elephants from crossing and destroying shambas on the Nyanza side. Many Luo assumed the trench to be the boundary and further movement of Luo into the area followed. However, the Carter Commission of 1935 recognized and confirmed the Areas A and B as part of Maasailand. In 1947, an agreement was reached between the Narok and South Nyanza African District Councils. The Maasai would issue a short term, ten year lease to Nyanza, based on an annual rent of 2,920 Shs., calculated by multiplying the number of Luo residents by 13 Shs. per year.

In 1960, the Maasai were asked by the Luo to renew the lease. The Maasai refused to do this since they wanted to take over the land themselves. However, the Luo refused to move and between 1960 and 1964, the Maasai claim that the number of Luo in the area tripled, and that they refused to pay any rent. The friction between the Maasai and Luo was heightened by two other factors. First, the Maasai firmly believed that the government was encouraging the Luo to occupy their land as a method of relieving severe Luo land shortages. Second, unlike some other acceptee arrangements which often entailed intermarriage, the Luo do not circumcise (males or females) and were considered out of the bounds of intertribal marriage.

The land issue was heightened in 1964 when the Regional Land Commission ruled that the entire area should be part of the Nyanza side. A group of educated Maasai and prominent chiefs, etc. immediately rejected the commission's recommendation and at that point the Kenyan government fixed a compensation award for the Maasai at 18,560 Shs. based on agricultural records and valuation of the land at 2 Shs. per acre. The Maasai objected, saying they wanted independent surveyors appointed and claimed the land was worth much more. The government offered to pay lost rent from 1961-66 at a value of 22,800 Shs. with interest of 6 1/2% on the annual capital. The Maasai rejected this offer since they felt the number of Luo had increased so rapidly that a much higher rent was in order.

In 1966, a final offer of 30,030 Shs. was confirmed and the Maasai were told to spend it on projects which would promote the interests of all Maasai, such as development of the Masai-Mara Game Reserve¹ or government livestock programs. However, a full year later, when a Narok County Council clerk queried a visiting government official as to what had become of the money, he was told that compensation had been renegotiated to 18,560 Shs. The Narok County Council Chairman responded, "The Maasai are compelled to surrender their beloved land to the Luo and to accept this token money despite the fact that the County Council has on many occasions rejected it. The Council is ridiculed by the attitude which the government has taken in respect of land compensation for these two areas in question"

¹ Ironically, development of the Maasai-Mara Game Reserve may benefit the Maasai in general by generating some revenue for the district; it actually deprives individual Maasai of important dry season grazing areas, reducing their ability to practice pastoralism (cf. Galaty 1980).

(A Speech Delivered By Chairman Narok County Council, Ole Nampaso, Jan.11 1967).

Another example of non-Maasai infiltration into Narok district involves the Kipiose and Trans Mara areas. In Kipiose there are many Mandi acceptees and in Trans Mara there are numerous Kipsigis migrants. Indeed, many of these migrants have lived in the area since 1949 when they filed application with the Maasai Border Committee and can be thought of as legitimate acceptees. At the same time, a great number of Kipsigis have entered the area without invitation and relationships between Maasai and Kipsigis in the area are hostile. This is true despite the fact that a good deal of intermarriage has taken place between the two peoples.

For the most part, these illegal acceptees were 'using' Maasai land for agricultural purposes and are located in high potential areas of the district. In the 1960's, the Moitanik section wanted to evict the heavy concentration of Kipsigis from the fertile land around the Njipishipi area of the Kilgoris-Kericho boundary and form a Maasai Agricultural Society to cultivate maize and potatoes. This proved difficult as the Maasai soon learned that it was almost to evict acceptees. The Narok District Commissioner (1966) who was himself a Kipsigis told the Maasai that they must find a solution for the acceptees before development would commence in their district. He maintained that the Maasai were treating the Kipsigis poorly and unfairly, with the local council "dishing out holdings to Masai but disregarding the interests of the acceptees Should the Kilgoris people show the acceptees a place to live as their own I would support such a move. I have reasons for my backing" (Letter D.C. F.K. Cherogony Dec. 17, 1966).

The educated Maasai and chiefs responded to the District Commissioner's claim by maintaining that "The Maasai have been more generous than any other tribe in Kenya with their land and this of course is due to the ignorance of the land by the Maasai" (Jan. 11, 1967: Chairman Narok County Council Ole Nampaso a speech delivered to the Minister of Lands and Settlements). The Kipsigis were accused of fighting, killing and attacking Maasai and stealing their cattle in an attempt to drive them from the land and claim it for themselves. It was felt that acceptees should identify with the aspirations of the Maasai people and clearly the Kipsigis were not doing this but were in fact building up strongholds of their own within the district.

At a 1966 meeting of Maasai leaders held in Nakuru, the Provincial Commissioner spoke to the Maasai and warned them that they should not let the acceptee problem become a political issue. He referred to certain prominent Maasai who were making "inflammatory speeches" and who in this way were the main cause of tension between the Kipsigis and the Maasai in the Kilgoris area (Minutes of a Conference of Maasai Leaders Nakuru 1966). The Provincial Commissioner went on to say that he had information that one such prominent man was land grabbing and was unable to extend his holdings because an acceptee had refused to relinquish his rights to a piece of land. He further speculated that Maasai politicians in the area were afraid because they knew that there were many clever, educated Kipsigis with political aspirations of their own.

The meeting concluded by agreeing that all non-legitimate acceptees in the district should be removed. However, they should not be removed by force, but through the proper government channels. Also, the acceptees

should be warned that the government would not help in the cost of repatriating them to their home provinces. This in effect placed the Maasai and the illegal acceptees in a political dilemma. Several chiefs had warned that they would soon not be able to control the moran in their area who wanted to forcibly evict the Kipsigis. The official response was that eviction of acceptees must be through non-violent channels. However, the mere fact that an acceptee is given notice to leave the district does not always encourage compliance when the acceptee has nowhere to go and no money to get there. Also, the fact that many more acceptees than Maasai are educated made them more adept at manipulating political factors to ensure their permanency in the area.

Notwithstanding the call to avoid making the acceptee issue a political problem, the prominent Maasai of both districts drafted a letter to the late President Kenyatta stating that the "alien infiltrators" in their land should be evicted and that all schemes for development in their districts should be for Maasai and not acceptees. The Maasai were said to feel like second class citizens because it seems that "an alien is more recognised on this land which we inherited from our forefathers and it should be condemned forever, as we believe it is against the Kenya Constitution which honours tribal lands and the existing rights of land occupied by bona-fide residents of such tribal lands" (Memorandum to His Excellency The President by both Narok/Kajiado County Councils and Members of Parliament and other Prominent Masai Leaders, 1968). Thus, the acceptee issue is very difficult to divorce from the total problem of the politics of land and power. At independence the Kenyan government had promised to take responsibility for the great numbers of landless people but by the mid 1960's programs such as

the Million-Acre Settlement Scheme were seen not to provide a comprehensive solution and the government began to extricate itself from the settlement issue. Although the Kenyan government probably did not have an explicit policy of encouraging encroachment into Maasailand, as the Maasai believed, it was certainly to its advantage for the acceptees and illegal squatters already in the district to come to some solution, rather than to return to their homelands and aggravate overcrowding in those Kikuyu, Kipsigis and Luo areas which are considered politically more sensitive and volatile locations.

EDUCATION, POLITICS AND THE LAND ISSUE

It should be noted that within Maasailand, many of the Maasai to receive education were in fact offspring of inter-tribal marriages particularly between Maasai and Kikuyu. Most of the educated Maasai tended to take non-Maasai wives themselves since it was difficult to find educated Maasai girls or ones who would keep shambas or live in town, etc. It is not surprising then that as early as 1927, educated Maasai joined the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) and even raised money to send Kenyatta to London. Also, the ex-army corps of Maasai were strong supporters of the KCA. In the 1930's these educated Maasai formed the Maasai Association to promote political consciousness in Maasailand, although they remained active members of KCA, boycotting Mission schools and protesting the circumcision issue, etc.

Other Maasai movements, such as the Group of Educated Maasai of 1946, were founded on self-help goals which aimed to encourage agriculture and trade among the Maasai. Of course, many of the leaders of the movement

were from families of mixed origin who already were involved in agriculture and trade. This Maasai leadership supported the newly formed Kenya African Union (KAU) under Kenyatta but clearly wished to express their own goals under a separate organization. In 1950, the Maasai Association was again formed with the protection of land in the Maasai Reserves being its prime focus. The major issue which sparked this concern was the government plan to gazette the Mau Forest. The Maasai decided to hire a European lawyer to represent their rights. As one Maasai explained, "It was very costly, about 15,000 Shs. to get a lawyer at that time for every section to be represented. Every section paid the money. It was very easy to get the money because of the land". Some Maasai suggest that a certain educated Maasai, in collusion with the District Commissioner, was exploiting the forest for their own profit and that the two wanted the forest to become Crown Land so that they could exploit it and only give the Maasai a small rent. On advice of their lawyer, the Maasai, led by Mootian, formed the Purko Timber Company to show that the Maasai were making use of the forest. Maasai involved with the company claim that they were successful for about ten years when they were forced into liquidation because of debts that the government "tricked" them into.

During the 1950's, educated Maasai and ex-army officers encouraged the Maasai to support the KAU. Although the Maasai claim that they knew very little about what sparked the Kikuyu rebellion, at first the Narok Maasai "strongly supported them". However, shortly after the Emergency was declared in 1952, the Narok Maasai claim that some very prominent Maasai "olkitok" (trans:important men) were killed by freedom fighters who took their cattle to feed themselves. Because of this early incident the Maasai

turned against the Kikuyu struggle and, with much government encouragement, formed homeguards centered around manyattas manned by the Nyangusi warriors of the day (See Appendix A, Composition of the Maasai Age Grade Organization).

Many of the Kikuyu in Narok were believed to have joined the freedom fighters and the government began to round them up and put them in detention camps unless they could establish a connection with a Maasai family who allowed them to take up residence. However, Kikuyu could no longer herd cattle in the bush for they were harassed by the moran as cattle thieves for Mau Mau. Thus, the role that the Kikuyu played in the Maasai economy as a source of supplementary labour was negated. The Maasai claim that freedom fighters began to force Maasai families to take the oath and pledge to hide fleeing fighters in their settlements. One of the educated Maasai leaders at the time, the late Oimeru ole Masikonde who had been a supporter of KCA and then KAU, was among those prominent and popular men coerced into taking the oath. Masikonde reported the incident to the government and became a strong opponent of Mau Mau, encouraging Maasai to report infiltrators in their area. He became the de facto leader of the homeguard. In fact, the Maasai petitioned the government to arrest all the Kikuyu in Narok district. An il-tareto elder explained to me:

The Maasai were happy to be able to get the Kikuyu out of their district. Even we say, we are very lucky because of that oath. The whole of this area was taken by Kikuyus at that time, even up to this place where we are living now. The other side of Narok was full of Kikuyu and they were taking everything.

Thus, it seems that the Maasai in Narok withdrew their support for the forest fighters not out of any misplaced loyalties to the British colonial government but out of the suspicion that Maasai land interests would be

ignored and Kikuyu squatters would be allowed to overrun their district. Although some recent scholars claim, "Basically, it is not true as B.E. Kipkorir wants us to believe that the Movement did not spread beyond Central Kenya. Mau Mau had a considerable number of supporters in Narok District. Ole Kisio, a Mau Mau general, was a Maasai. Most of the squatters of the Rift Valley fully supported the Movement" (Kinyatti 1977:306). Indeed, it does appear that the Rift Valley squatters supported Mau Mau but more than often the Maasai did not support the Rift Valley squatters. Many of those Maasai who supported the movement throughout the fifties were of mixed Kikuyu-Maasai origin and identified strongly with the Kikuyu orientation of the movement.

In 1956, the educated Maasai of the Nyangusi age set, who were often secondary school students at the time, formed the IlKalekal and Ilkamaneke Association² for both the Narok and Kajiado Maasai. The Association was intended to be a political organization but was denied political status by the government. Although genuinely concerned with promoting education and establishing a district Education Board, the education function also served to cloak its fundamentally political nature. These Maasai were particularly concerned that the Maasai agreement should be reviewed and they wished to be given access to a place called Enkutoktok on the Laikipia Plateau since the Liabon had designated it for the site of the E-unoto ceremony. The land issue was central.

² IlKalekal was the right hand circumcision group and IlKamaneke was the left-hand circumcision group of the age set which came to be named IlNyangusi. Philip Lemein was secretary of the Narok branch.

In 1960 the Maasai reformed an association called the Maasai United Front which was to include all Maasai sections. It too was politically oriented. The educated Maasai could see that all of the various tribal groups "were struggling towards independence and the Maasai wanted their own representation" (personal communication: Philip Lemein). Indeed, there was even talk of joining the Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai for the purpose of constituting a separate country! The Maasai feared that their position in an independent Kenya might be precarious given the land hunger that had sparked the unrest of the previous decade. A former member of the Maasai United Front elaborated:

Their first aim was about their land agreement because after independence we knew first we have to stop the Maasai land from being taken away and to stay as a reserve country. The land must stay for the Maasai because other people are entering with a pass. We wanted strongly to persuade the government that this land should not be taken away from the Maasai people. So it will be a closed district. Also, they wanted to have their own members of parliament with the new government and to get their own people from each district, including Kilgoris, Narok, Kajiado and Ngong and also the Samburu. This would protect and enlarge the whole area. We wanted the lands which had been taken by Europeans like Mau Narok by Mr. Powys Cobb. This portion of land should be given back. If the Europeans are leaving Kenya all the land that belonged to Maasai and was taken away should come back to the Maasai again.

POST COLONIAL LAND CONCERNS: THE EDUCATED MAASAI AND THEIR REACTION

After independence in 1963, land adjudication and enclosure was escalated and although Maasailand initially retained its reserve status, it too was slated to undergo radical land tenure reform. With independence came an increased desire to promote conservation and protect wildlife which was viewed as a means of generating foreign capital through the tourist industry. This was in keeping with the announced government policy of

maximizing the nation's growth. In this way, the Maasai lost access to several valuable dry season pastures, specifically the Maasai-Mara Game Reserve in Narok. Indeed, certain ecologists, foreseeing the doom of pastoral peoples, suggested that game ranching would be ecologically and economically sounder a pursuit than pastoralism (Owen 1973:113). Gazetting of areas of the Maasai forest also generated considerable hostility. Perhaps this background serves to highlight some of the concerns over land that have motivated Maasai response to political and developmental issues concerning land tenure in recent years.

It is not surprising then that a great number of educated Maasai, government appointed chiefs, and politicians, etc., began to stake land claims for themselves early in the 1960's. This was especially true in Kilgoris, Osupuko and Mau where local area councils received an overwhelming number of applications for individual ranches and farms from both non-Maasai acceptees and the so-called 'enlightened' Maasai.³ This became increasingly desirable as government sponsored wheat schemes were introduced into the high potential areas of Narok and Kajiado. The Narok County Council proceeded to accept applications for land holdings and demarcation.

In 1964, a regional government agent attended a local Narok County Council meeting and informed those present that their land holdings would best be secured if the entire region was officially a demarcation area. In a unanimous vote it was agreed, "That the County Council of Narok be declared an adjudication area with effect for the 5th of December, 1964"

³ Government correspondence at this time tended to refer to the educated Maasai as the 'enlightened' Maasai.

(Narok County Council Min.117/64, Res. No.49/64). In fact, these educated Maasai, long before the government made a concerted effort to change land tenure systems here, had a vision of the entire district being subdivided into individual plots.

In light of this, the District Commissioner of Narok wrote a letter to the Minister of Lands and Settlement stating that he felt that the majority of the 'shuka clad' (i.e., traditionally dressed) Maasai were opposed to land consolidation and that before individual registration be condoned for the few 'progressive' Maasai in the district who were land grabbing, attention should be turned to registration of group holdings. The D.C. further stated that a new political group called the Maasai Working Party had approached him with these views.

The Narok County Council requested to meet members of this so-called 'Working Party.' No one came forward. The educated Maasai maintained that they had the right to own land and reap the fruits of "uhuru" (trans:freedom) just as other Kenyans outside of Maasailand had these rights. A year passed and still the district had not been declared an adjudication area. The County Council clerk, Ole Siparo, wrote to the Commissioner of Lands, "Further delay may cause frustration" (Letter 5th Nov. 1965). The Narok North member of parliament, Ole Tipis, wrote the Hennings Commission on Land Consolidation, "What guarantee is there if we follow his [the D.C.'s] doctrine to its conclusions that sooner or later his daydreams of group holdings will not end in disputes, resulting in the long run fragmentation of these holdings" (Letter 1965).

The Lawrence Report of 1965-66 outlined grounds for the establishment of group ranches in both Maasai districts as a method for accelerating

agricultural and pastoral development. The adjudication procedure was to be placed in the hands of Cabinet and land grabbing by prominent Maasai was to be halted. Although the Lawrence Report did not deny the existence of individual holdings in Maasailand, it did point out that many people did not understand the implications and responsibilities of individual tenure and far from making positions more secure, it made former clan land disposable and more likely to pass to people outside the clan or tribe through defaulting on a loan or private sale. Indeed, the report refers to "the Ngong area of Maasailand where registration of land to individuals has resulted in immediate sale to Kikuyu farmers and consequent loss of the land to the Maasai tribe, probably forever" (Lawrence Report 1966:25). The report further suggested that government study any problems of fragmentation and resolve them along with settling the acceptee issue in pastoral areas before development could take place. Commercial banks and other donor agencies would not provide credit except on the security of land title. The World Bank made it quite clear that "registration is a prerequisite of the range development program" since "without the certainty of ownership and the clear right of the group to exclude outsiders, which is provided by registration, no agency would be prepared to lend money for range development" (Lawrence Report 1966:131,31).

The educated Maasai of both Narok and Kajiado felt that an endorsement of group ranching would be a condemnation of their own individual holdings and, furthermore, would strip them of a powerful tool - control over land adjudication. It is not hard to imagine that the 'official' Maasai response to the Lawrence Report was negative and hostile. Prominent Maasai of both districts combined to petition the late President Kenyatta. They

wrote, "Maasai feel their fundamental rights have been violated by the Ministry of Lands and Settlement. The Maasai have decided to settle permanently on their land, either individually or in groupings. But the Ministry of Lands (Ref Min Lett No. 23/14/68) completely deny County Council and ordinary Maasai the natural heritage of their soils ... A close study of the Lawrence Report in regard to land tenure in Masailand is equally perillous and any sensible man may only term it two fold destructive innuendo" (Petition submitted to The President by Masai Leaders, 1967).

The Maasai rejected the notion that "Masailand be in the hands of Cabinet" but rather suggested that County Councils "be the final authorities in approving individual or group ranching and the Central government should only come in for registration of approved ranches and that the composition of the Adjudication Committee should be of local membership under the County Councils."

The next few years brought about a battle for control over adjudication. The Narok County Council proceeded to receive applications for land holdings and approve plots. Repeatedly, the Maasai were informed that "No local or County Council has the right to distribute crown land ... and these illegal allocations of land will eventually be cancelled" (Letter from A. Davies, Permanent Secretary, Minister of Local Government, Jan., 1967). Several months later the Permanent Secretary for Lands and Settlements, Shiyukah, echoed the same theme, "County Council approval will not be accepted." The Maasai were just as adamant in their demands that the County Council be given the right to distribute land. They further argued that the process of application that they followed was indeed fair.

It was the responsibility of the government to honour these allocations. Of course these 'progressive' Maasai failed to point out that the ordinary shuka clad Maasai herders were not aware that they could file application for an individual plot of land. Thus, while applications may have been treated fairly the majority of Maasai were never even in the position to consider filing an application in the first place.

In October of 1966, J.H. Angaine, the Minister of Lands and Settlement, addressed a baraza in Kajiado and tried to explain the benefits of group ranching. He pointed out that if individual ownership of land was introduced throughout Maasailand and the land divided equally among each family now living there that each family would receive only about 200 acres, which would barely be enough to "scrape a very poor living" (Speech by J.H. Angaine, Kajiado 1966). All this went for naught as the educated Maasai leadership still wanted the entire district to be sub-divided and were indeed proficient propaganda agents for their cause.

In 1967, the Minister of Lands and Settlements met with County Council and other prominent Maasai. Ole Nampaso, the Narok County Council Chairman, told the Minister, "Although group ranching and family ownership of land sounds a good idea, the Maasai are of the opinion that sooner or later there will be a lot of land disputes and in view of the unforeseeable problems, it is found that individual ownership of land should be introduced right from the beginning. Land policy should be unified throughout the country and as such there is no justifiable reasons for differentiating individual ownership of land in Maasai from other districts in Kenya which are determined to comply with national policy to utilize the

land and by doing so, all the resources will be exploited to a maximum" (Meeting of Maasai and Minister of Lands and Settlement 1967).

As the Maasai became more vocal about their desire to obtain title deed and become eligible for loans, which they were being denied, the government began to make some concessions. The Provincial Commissioner, S. Nyachae, informed a Maasai leaders conference in 1967 that "those people who have already been allocated land either by County or Local area councils could be allowed by land adjudication Committees to retain the land unless there is a dispute to review." By 1968, the Land (Group Representatives) Act provided the legal framework for the formation of group ranches with funding provided by the Livestock Development Project, Phase I (1969-1974) for the division of all of the Kaputiei section's land in Kajiado. Land adjudication was later accelerated in Narok within the framework of the Livestock Development Project, Phase II which began in 1974. Prominent Maasai were assigned to the adjudication committees which then filed application with the Narok Office of Lands and Settlements which had opened in the district in the late 1960's.

At this point the educated Maasai and many acceptees were anxious to have their holdings legalized so that they could receive loans for development of wheat shambas, upgraded cattle and a myriad of other economic pursuits and entrepreneurial activities. As adjudication and registration proceeded in Narok a certain amount of collusion emerged between applicants and government officials. Individual Maasai worked the system to their advantage and registered not just one but sometimes several plots of land, and even managed to declare themselves members of group ranches. Many ordinary herders were astute enough to register on two or

more ranches to ensure their cattle ample pasturage and movement in case of drought. Still others split up family members in order to have access to various ranch grazelands. And finally, many non-Maasai government officials involved in registration secured individual small plots for themselves, particularly in the wheat growing areas of Upper Mau and Trans Mara. Maasai were fully aware of land holdings in their district going to senior civil servants and politicians from Nairobi.

Although the following contention is difficult to prove, informants suggest that educated Maasai did not make an issue of land holdings going to outsiders for two important reasons. One, they could ill afford an investigation of adjudication procedures which would uncover their own acquisition of multiple holdings, and two, those outsiders obtaining plots were very often in powerful positions in the national political hierarchy so that they could quiet any grievances expressed against them.

Another chapter will more closely focus on individual ranches, the men who own them and their relationship to group ranches. I should mention here that this study does not attempt to infer that the alienation of land by individual Maasai should be condemned outright as land grabbing. Certainly an educated Maasai cannot be made to live in a traditional Maasai settlement. However, the abuse and illicit manipulation of the system is evident when some men acquire several plots of the best land for themselves and perhaps even keep Zebu cattle on a group ranch which is overgrazed precisely because its members no longer have access to those 'best' areas of land. Furthermore, the credit system operates to widen existing differences of wealth and opportunity, since loans were given to these progressive small-risk herders who were already better off than others (cf.

Leys 1975:99; Leo 1977). This practice is questionable, since it is not certain that such progressive individuals are indeed the most favourable loan recipients. As I mentioned earlier, and as occurs elsewhere in the country, the credit generating potential of private land is often channelled into activities other than the development of the individual ranch. For example, in Narok district several of the educated and prominent Maasai have invested in tented safari or photographic camps and tourist lodges - often located on a group ranch which receives only a small rent.

The contention of the Narok District Commissioner of 1966 was that the 'shuka clad' Maasai were totally against demarcation while educated Maasai claimed that individual demarcation was preferred. Both responses, however, reflect the various social, political, economic and ecological variables which impact to varying degrees on different Maasai groups. For the most part, my own research among the so-called 'shuka clad' Maasai indicates that a great many herders had little knowledge about the entire demarcation issue until it was announced de facto that a certain area was now a group ranch and that stockowners must come to register as members and secure a place for themselves. As one elderly Maasai explained, "When this land was being demarcated, we were just laughing. No one informed us about demarcation so we did not know what they were doing. Now we know that it was bad. It is the worse thing that ever happened to the Maasai". On the other hand, many Maasai living on group ranches insisted that they preserved Maasai brotherhood and cultural identity.

In the chapters to come, emphasis will be placed on analysing the diverse responses to ranching development, not as random and unrelated but

as dialectical decision-making strategies or options generated from a common conceptual framework. A number of variables such as wealth, age set, herd and family size, clan, education, etc., influence the range and diversity of production strategies and responses to development initiatives. Such an approach suggests that responses to development initiatives in one area of Narok can eventually be correlated with responses in another area so that an overall picture can be sketched. For instance, individuals who do obtain land in the Mau and develop wheat shambas, impact on the decision-making strategies of Maasai herding cattle in the arid areas who once used the Mau as reserve grazelands in times of drought. Conflictive responses to development need not be attributed merely to idiosyncrasies, but to the dialectics of power in the social, economic and political realms.

GROUP RANCHING AND DEVELOPMENT

Since the majority of development programs are carried out through government and aid agencies, it is important to recognize that the administrative organization of bureaucracies are just as much a part of the process of directed change as the recipient or target group. Unfortunately, many researchers studying planned change fail to make this methodological and conceptual distinction. Aid agencies operate on the basis of various ethnocentric principles and often it is assumed that "techniques, programs and solutions that have worked well in the most developed countries will work equally well in developing countries" (Foster 1973:605). Furthermore, the desirability of intervention programs, such as group ranching, itself is a value-judgement. Social values in general

define what will be called a social problem, what the acceptable and appropriate means will be to meet this problem and who will be given the power and resources to do so.

The assumptions, goals, and theories held by aid agencies or governments does have an enormous effect on the planning, administrative and professional operations of any development program. In order to study the responses of Maasai to development and to evaluate the prospects for reaching the desired goals of the ranching program, it is necessary to determine what these assumptions are. All planned change is based upon some theory of social change. Indeed, Galaty (1980:2) notes that, "in particular, the conceptual frameworks and organizational guidelines of planning should represent yet another object of research and explanation, rather than the point of departure of inquiry". Misunderstanding of the relationship between desired objectives and organizational structure has frequently led to the belief that any problems with respect to implementation or diffusion of technology rest with the "developing" society.

As Foster (1973:180) points out, the notion of assumptions underlying technical assistance organizations is a simplification of the problem since in fact there are sometimes several levels of operational assumptions. This seems to be the case with the group ranching program in Maasailand. The tacit aims of ranch planning officials in the field are often different from the stated objectives of the program. Field personnel are concerned with the delivery of services such as undertaking ranch surveys and are judged on the immediate criteria of the effort expended to put these services into practice. However, at the supervisory and administrative

level where field activities are outlined, there are sometimes different assumptions underlying program direction. The assumptions held by these personnel are not always the same as those developed at the central planning and policy level. The ultimate goals and perhaps even success of a program are usually evaluated and determined at this level according to whether the objectives of the program are reached. Often feedback between upper and lower levels is minimal so that minor adjustments suggested by a fieldworker may have to be reviewed at the policy level over a period of months.

Evaluation of a development program including analysis of the goals of the national government and aid agencies is essential in order to assess the impact of directed change. Such an evaluation is not intended to be threatening but rather constructive. Information gathered by anthropologists can and should be considered when evaluation and replanning take place. With these comments in mind, the next section will analyse the objectives underlying the group ranching program as offered by Kenyan government officials and aid agencies.

GROUP RANCHES

Before analyzing the underlying assumptions, motives and theories of social change that laid the foundation for the establishment of group ranching in Maasailand, I shall first detail the nature of the group ranch itself.

The process for establishing a group ranch commences when the Land Adjudication Department declares an adjudication area open for registration. This area is usually based on "location" which is the

smallest administrative unit of the Kenyan government. An adjudication committee is elected and usually is made up of prominent local leaders and this committee then has the right to validate all further land claims. Individual land claims are also brought to the committee which must decide whether to accept the claims. Boundaries are eventually established, often in view to establishing secure title rather than to securing specific size of plots or composition of groups. People living in the area are then invited to register as members of the newly demarcated group ranch and it is the committee's decision to accept applications. After 60 days, during which time a committee decision may be appealed, the adjudication documents are given to the Registrar of Group Representatives who through the Ministry of Lands and Settlement in Nairobi grants title deed to the group and individual ranches so registered.

The objectives of the group ranch program are as follows:

- 1) Increased productivity of rangelands and the prevention of overgrazing through a ranch rotational grazing scheme.
- 2) To guarantee a regular offtake of beef cattle and thus insure a more productive commercial livestock sector.
- 3) To increase milk production through the introduction of upgraded stock.
- 4) Establish herds that are in direct proportion to the carrying capacity of the rangelands and market.
- 5) Conserve natural resources by controlling exploitation of resources.
- 6) Prevent the spread of contagious disease through the systematic use of dips, vaccinations and quarantine.
- 7) To deliver and administer development loans.
- 8) To provide the human population with an adequate or improved standard of living without disenfranchising large numbers of people.

The objectives of the group ranching program were to be achieved through the following mechanisms:

- a) Securing of title deed through the above described process of adjudication and incorporation.
- b) The introduction of technical mechanisms such as upgraded stock, bore holes, dips and so on.
- c) The creation of two responsible managerial bodies, namely an elected slate of Group Representatives who function as the legal trustees for the corporation and are authorized to receive loans, acquire debts, etc., on behalf of the ranch corporation. A second level of authority is invested in the elected Group Ranch Committee, composed of a chairman, secretary, treasurer and seven members-at-large which represent the ranch managerial body.

At this point it becomes profitable to more fully examine the assumptions underlying the formation of group ranching and to determine whether the theory of social change on which they are based are indeed valid. I shall systematically examine the objectives of the group ranching program which were derived from the assumptions that determined policy planning at the administrative level.

- 1) The objective to increase productivity of the rangelands in Maasailand is predicated on the assumption that traditional herding practices were a destructive form of land use. Individual stockowners were seen to maximize their cattle holdings and ignore conservation of the communal reserve grasslands, essentially because they would have no guarantee that others would do likewise (Davis 1971; Livingstone 1977). The assumption that traditional herding practices were destructive of the rangelands is a basic derivative of the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1969) argument. The theory of social change accompanying such assumptions is that, if communal use of the resource leads to destruction of grazelands, then privatization of the resource will lead

to its development. After all this was seen to be the solution to the tragedy of the commons in Europe. The conversion of Maasai land use practices into European ownership and tenure relationships was seen to be the crucial element of development. The group ranch organization was seen as conferring on the pastoralists a notion of exclusivity of rangeland and thus providing them with the incentives to conserve rangeland and promote economic development.

As was suggested earlier, the assumption that Maasai herding practices are destructive of the rangelands is really a question of research and not a foregone conclusion. Dunne (1977) finds that measurable soil erosion takes place even in the absence of livestock. Wildlife ecologists have discovered that herbivores may actually improve the quality and quantity of the rangelands through their own activity (e.g. Vesey-Fitzgerald 1969; MacNaughton 1976), and Campbell (1979:19) suggests that "overgrazing was more a recurrent problem consequent upon drought than a continuous constraint upon development." And as far as cost-benefit outputs go, Stanley-Price (1979) states that the returns on extensive use of the range rather than selective use of a ranch is by far the most economical path for individual herders.

- 2) The objective of developers, to guarantee a regular offtake of beef cattle and promote a more productive commercial livestock sector is based on the assumption that Maasai pastoralists are overstocked and reluctant to sell their livestock. This assumption is a corollary of the theory that traditional pastoralism is a destructive form of land use. The theory of change underlying this view was based on the notion that commercial beef ranching is a more productive economic activity

than subsistence pastoralism. One must remember that the motives for such a policy direction were in keeping with the Kenyan government's desire to "maximize the nation's economic growth" (Davis 1971:22). Meat production in Kenya has been steadily declining and the population growing rapidly so that predictions for 1990 point to a deficit meat supply under current conditions of production. Stanley-Price (1979) predicts that Kenya could become a net importer of beef and pork. Von Kaufmann (1976) maintains that if the pastoral areas of Kenya could raise their offtake rates to even half of those expected on a commercial ranch (i.e. an offtake for pastoralists of about 14% for the market) the contribution of the rangelands to the national economy would increase by 70%. Thus, the aim of the national government is to provide more beef to the local, national, and international market, thereby generating an exportable surplus of cattle products which would earn valuable foreign exchange for Kenya from the livestock sector. Here we can clearly recognize that "national, not local perceptions of the utility of development dominate planning, both concretely, because the prime movers of development serve their own class needs above all others and ideologically, because current ideas of the development state require each segment to contribute to the whole, not stand apart from it" (Aronson 1980:43).

Evaluating the underlying assumptions that stimulate the desire for increased offtake of Maasai cattle leads us to ask certain questions. Are the Maasai overstocked? Do herders refuse to sell their animals? Is commercial beef ranching in the context of arid areas more productive than subsistence herding?

Dahl and Hjort (1976) and others have shown that in order to meet subsistence demands based primarily on milk production, the Maasai must keep fairly large herds which conform to a certain herd composition and structure (i.e. preponderance of females) in order to meet nutritional requirements, ensure the reproduction of the herd and meet social obligations. Thus, in order to ensure herd regeneration annual offtake rates are approximately 8% (Dahl and Hjort 1976; Ruthenberg 1971). Meadows and White (1979:11) discovered that offtake rates including subsistence and market slaughter as well as mortality in Kajiado varied "according to whether the herd is increasing, decreasing or in a relatively stable position. At the beginning of the period when the herd is recovering rapidly from a two year drought the offtake rate is low, only 9%, but rises to 13%, and finally to 15%."

Thus it seems that Maasai are not unwilling to sell stock, and their endeavours to do so are conditioned by the requirements of regeneration of their herds and marketing opportunities. Market sale, limited at one time by the availability of adult steers, are now including more cull females and nonproductive heifers (Meadows and White 1979:23). Furthermore, the realization of the value of cash and variations in market price are evident on the part of the Maasai since they much prefer to sell to private slaughterhouses where they get a higher price than by selling to the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) (Doherty 1979:13). Also, one has to question whether growth of pastoral production above population growth will necessarily contribute to overall economic growth. The effective demand for dairy and beef products (ie. what people can afford to pay), may be inadequate to purchase the increase.

Thus, increased output and sale may lead to lower prices and incomes. It has been noted that, "too often percentage of take-off increases while productivity and standard of living go down" (McLaughlin 1970:35).

Stanley-Price (1979:17) has indicated that if one applies the same criterion of efficiency to commercial ranching and subsistence pastoralism in the semi-arid areas, subsistence pastoralism, which supports seven times more people on the same land, is more productive than "the management system of the rancher which is alien to this environment and is expensive to maintain as a result." The difference between commercial beef production and subsistence herding will be discussed later from an anthropological perspective.

- 3) The objective of increasing milk production in pastoral areas is not predicated upon the assumption that improved dairy stock will provide Maasai pastoralists with their traditional dietary staple, while enabling them to keep fewer animals because of the increased production. Planners suggest that increased milk production would help bring the Maasai into the market economy through the sale of milk. The suitability of upgraded or exotic stock will be discussed at another time.
- 4) and 5) The objectives of maintaining herd sizes related to market demands and carrying capacity of ranchland, while promoting conservation, are again direct corollaries of the above assumptions. The regulation of stock numbers was to be based on calculations by range planners who would establish stock quotas for each ranch. The assumption here was that with security of tenure and the incentive to

improve bounded rangelands would come the realization of the fixed relationship between the finite natural resource and the livestock. Stockowners were then expected to sell animals to conserve graze. Since the Maasai subsist off of their herds it has always been more important for them to preserve the herd than the land.

Land management was not the major consideration of traditional Maasai pastoralists since it was probably easier to leave behind exhausted pastures. The introduction of new land management practices was seen to be necessary since Maasai living on ranches theoretically would have access to a limited and circumscribed grazing area which could become misused quite easily. Nevertheless, it is important that developers understand the relationships which produce the structure of the society that they wish to change. Thus, livestock populations grow mainly as a result of the nature of the herd capital and labour inputs. Capital accumulation is expanded through a number of diffuse stock relationships which not only spread risk but spread capital beyond an individual's labour abilities. If living on a group ranch means that one's own cattle should not leave and nonmembers should not enter, then one has to wonder whether this destruction of the basis of capital formation (Schneider 1978) will be reflected in deflationary trends in the traditional economy.

The technological innovations which are to accompany and induce range improvement such as rotational grazing, stock quotas and limitations, include such things as dips, bore holes, fire breaks, upgraded stock and so on. Another important component of making group ranches a viable alternative is of course an adequate marketing system.

Therefore, it was thought that infrastructural development should be introduced quickly to offset any dry season limitations or periodic drought so that the long term ecological viability of the ranch is demonstrated. The social relations of Maasai pastoral production are unlikely to respond to changes in material conditions until it can be shown that these conditions have in fact altered.

On the other hand, it should be realized that Maasai have often shown a good initial response to technical innovation which benefited the herds through increased productivity or limiting disease. However, if they do not accept the values implicit in the transformation from nomadic herding to commercial ranching, the existence of pastoralism becomes even more precarious. That is, if group ranch boundaries are enforced and technical innovations contribute to the build-up of herds which is funneled into subsistence practices, then the demographic growth of animal and human populations will eventually make these practices increasingly inappropriate, no matter what type of management is practised.

- 7) This leads us to the objective of providing development funds for group ranches. The provisions of development loans, which will be outlined later, were considered to be an important aspect of ranch development for technical improvements such as water and cattle dips and upgraded stock, etc. The underlying assumption of the aid agencies was that privatization of land holdings would promote the use of land as collateral for credit. However, it is quite evident that the political feasibility of declaring a group ranch bankrupt and selling the land is questionable. Thus, creditors would have to seek out each

individual member and try to obtain his share of the loan. The basis for the group ranch as collateral is therefore not strong.

Furthermore, if the ecological viability of the ranch is questionable then the maintenance of the herds within ranch boundaries becomes precarious. Thus, the exclusivity of group ranchlands, which is seen to be the incentive to induce members to request development loans is put in doubt. On the other hand, if pastoralists employ development capital and become more and more dependent on refined techniques and infrastructures then it should be recognized that cost reducing innovations along with expanding pastoral production will create unemployment and possibly disenfranchisement in the pastoral sector.

- 8) The objective to improve the standard of living of the pastoralists without disenfranchising large numbers of people is the 'humanistic' element of the development project and is based on the assumption that Maasai society should be transformed into an economy based on meat production in order for economic development to occur. However, this assumption sees development as dependent on western social pattern variables and this is not necessarily true.

The implementation of the objectives of the group ranching scheme are embodied in the creation of novel organizational bodies which have the power to enact and supervise these plans. The technical information concerning such things as stocking rates are apparently provided by the field officers of the Range Management Division. Each ranch has a detailed development plan drawn up, based on field surveys and censuses, etc. The

I accuracy of these reports, given the small number of field personnel, are questionable, and whether the personnel exist to make these plans known and understandable to the ranch members is doubtful.

Nevertheless, the newly elected body of the group ranch committee is considered responsible for management activities and is therefore expected to enforce culling rates and grazing schemes if these are detailed in the ranch development plans. Committee members are suppose to supervise the construction and maintenance of any infrastructural improvements undertaken when loans have been granted and manage the use of upgraded or fattening stock.

Even if ranch development plans are understood by committee members it is still problematic whether these new organizational structures have the capacity to operate and regulate activity for which they were created. Galaty (1980:6) suggests, "A general issue is raised when organizers or planners conceive of novel organizational forms as ones which will replace or supersede former organizational affiliations, and begin to stimulate behavior appropriate to itself rather than past forms ... In each case, the link between organization and output is a tenuous one, though assumed by the organizational theory."

The group ranch committees were to be responsible for destocking and grazing restrictions yet the very men who sat on these committees were often wealthy herders who had the most to lose if destocking was introduced. Thus, committee members were reluctant to make decisions that were not in their own best interests. Furthermore, from the earlier account of Maasai herding practices it is evident that authority over other herders' stock and sometimes even one's own stock was not tolerated. The

Land (Group Representatives) Act does not provide the group ranch committee with any clear-cut sanctions to enforce compliance with development goals, although it does enable individual members to delay or obstruct the decisions reached by a committee, by applying "to a subordinate court having jurisdiction in the area to determine the question." Thus, the legal provisions of the Act do not give group ranch committees the authority to carry out decisions concerning management and supervision on the ranch.

The group ranch committee was to be the progressive spirit of development on the ranch while the Group Representatives were seen to be the trustees, guarding the traditional ways. However, the inability of these men to function as a corporate group is evident in a number of ways. It is difficult to call a meeting and arrange for the Registrar of Group Representatives to attend and general meetings are even more difficult since a legal quorum of 60% must be met before decisions can be reached. In the proceeding chapters I shall examine how the perceptions of group ranch members and their assessment of the costs and benefits of ranch development influence individual and group decision-making strategies and the formation of novel organization forms.

SOME ANTHROPOLOGICAL ISSUES

The ultimate goal of the group ranching schemes is to increase the offtake rate of cattle and in effect convert the Maasai from subsistence pastoralists into commercial beef producers. Many scholars have shown that a shift from subsistence milk to commercial beef production is not merely an extension of traditional practices (Dyson-Hudson 1970; Schneider 1979;

Bourgeot 1981). It is in fact a transformation to a completely new mode of production since commercial ranching is similar to an agricultural production strategy.

Schneider (1978) examined offtake rates in relation to herd management practices and suggests that the Maasai manage cattle as investments. That is, because livestock numbers increase rapidly, Maasai manage their cattle for profit. This being the case, a minimal offtake of cattle may be the best strategy within a subsistence economy, while it clearly would not be if one were involved in commercial beef or milk production. He claims that pastoralists manage their herds for capital growth and that diffuse stock relationships create the conditions "in which the amount of wealth that can be accumulated is practically endless" (Schneider 1978:24). This enables pastoralists to invest in livestock beyond their subsistence function. Thus, constraints on development must be recognized in that process of herd growth whereby each stockowner is involved in numerous sets of cattle relations corresponding to a wide variety of social ties and in the circulation of cattle among and within production units that in many ways parallels the process of social reproduction (cf. Spencer 1978).

Beef production is based on a different economic rationale than pastoralism. Large, well-fed animals are maintained only until they reach the desirable weight for market when they are sold and the profits reinvested. The pastoralists maintain large numbers of small sized, drought resistant livestock. "The major portion of the herd will be kept in adult female animals whereas with beef herds the largest number would be young animals and bulls" (Schneider 1980:217).

The anthropological issue which is raised by this discussion relates to the relationships between social forms and production strategies. It may well be that these relationships are not necessarily causal. Nevertheless, it is still important to determine how significant correlations and statistical variations based on this kind of data actually reflect transformations of specific structural properties of the Maasai social system. If the relations of production in Maasai society generate the conditions for non-monetary capital accumulation and social reproduction then breaking the cycle of livestock exchange on ranches in order to promote increased offtake may involve organizational change with drastic effects on the entire Maasai social system.

Related to the implementation of beef ranching is the notion that consumption patterns will continue to change from a reliance on milk, meat and blood to a diet of purchased grains. Pastoralists compete with calves for milk therefore livestock do not achieve optimum weight gains for marketing. The subsistence herd must be reduced and the relation of the herder to the herd altered. For example, one pastoral development project among the Fulani of Senegal suggested a separation of the marketing and subsistence herds with total consumption of milk for the calves in the former (Teitelbaum 1977).

Consumption patterns must continue to change if beef production is to be successful, otherwise, as the population of a group ranch grows there will be a reduction of the marketable herd until the subsistence herd eventually utilizes the entire ranch. However, since the pastoral diet has a strong cultural connotation which defines group interaction, distinctions

from neighbouring groups, etc., changing the diet further could disrupt other aspects of Maasai society.

If as some authors claim (Dahl and Hjort 1976) investment in livestock was practical since other forms of investment were lacking, then one has to determine whether alternative investment opportunities are available for the pastoralist which will provide returns as high as the traditional economy. If ranches are able to stop cattle movement across boundaries then opportunities for investment in the traditional economy will be hampered and a 'deflationary process' (Schneider 1979) may set in.

The whole notion of increased offtake is of course dependent on the availability of reliable markets and the ability of effective demand to absorb the livestock offered at market. If urban purchasing power is not adequate to purchase the livestock then the market will be flooded and prices will be driven downwards greatly reducing the pastoralists' supposed substantial profits from beef production. Furthermore, the notion that the productivity of commercial beef production in arid areas is greater than the traditional subsistence economies is one that is highly questionable (Stanley-Price 1979; Western 1981).

Another issue which will be examined is the notion that sedentarization benefits nomadic pastoralists by providing them with access to schooling, services of various natures, etc. The group ranch program is a form of forced, albeit limited, sedentarization. Putting aside the question of whether or not a group ranch is an ecologically viable unit once the cessation of movement is accomplished, one can still ask whether it is a socially viable unit. "Many health problems have surfaced among settled nomads ... The health of the livestock has been affected as well and an

increase in deficiency diseases and parasitic infection has been reported from the areas of settlement" (Konczacki 1978:63).

Throughout this dissertation, attention will be focused on numerous questions of anthropological and general relevance.

- 1) Will privatization of land make it secure as collateral?
- 2) Will land as collateral generate credit?
- 3) Will exclusivity of range encourage Maasai to develop a range infrastructure?
- 4) Will offtake rates increase and commercial beef production practices be implemented?
- 5) Will dietary practices change?
- 6) Will productivity increase with a shift to beef production?
- 7) Will alternative investment opportunities and market conditions support a beef ranching operation?
- 8) Will the costs and benefits of the ranching schemes be compatible with the social, economic and political interests of Maasai pastoralists?
- 9) Will the benefit incidence of the project take into account the conflictual nature of individual and group interests such as the age grade organization?
- 10) What is the relationship between production strategies and social form?

There exists an urgent need for this type of information. It is my hope that the methodological approach taken will not only assist in understanding pastoral responses, but also to make a contribution to anthropological literature in general and applied and development anthropology in particular by addressing these questions.

RANCHING IN KAJIADO DISTRICT: A BRIEF REVIEW

A devastating drought in 1960-61 led to the death of approximately 65-80% of the total Kajiado herds (Hedlund 1971; Jacobs 1973; Meadows and

White 1979). The Kaputei Development Committee was soon after formed and a number of influential Maasai herders divided up 56,000 acres into 28 individual ranches. Maasai in other sections were soon demanding demarcation of land for themselves and the concept of group ranching emerged in the Lawrence Report of 1966. This demand for land adjudication was less a result of the devastation of the drought than the insecurities regarding the integrity of Maasailand due to agricultural encroachment, and loss of valuable dry season graze to wildlife preserves and immigration of non-Maasai into the area, etc. (Galaty 1979).

Research in Kajiado in the early 1970's indicated that the group Kaputei ranches were artificial boundaries which did not bear any relation to traditional sociological units. Jacobs (1973) notes: "The so-called sociological units of the FAO Kaputei Report do not in fact correspond to the basic sociological units which the Maasai recognize as territorially or socially important." In some cases ranches were seen to correspond to the elatia (Hedlund 1971:7) but for the most part they did not represent any consistent traditional unit of Maasai society.

The ecological viability of these ranches was questionable, except perhaps the Poka Ranch, which might be considered atypical due to its highly favourable ecological conditions. During the drought of the early 1970's herders moved their livestock to areas of known grazing and the new group ranch boundaries presented no obstacle to these movements (Halderman 1972). In effect, semi-nomadism continued to be practiced on the Kaputei ranches and infrastructural development did not proceed quickly enough to offset the conditions of the dry season which promote movement.

Maintaining stock within ranch boundaries was possible only during exceptionally wet years.

It has been noted that individual ranchers stand apart as a class of educated political and economic leaders and that the support that they muster among group ranch members leads to hostilities and the polarization of groups (Hedlund 1971). Individual ranches do close off their boundaries to group ranchers and stock relationships have been declining in Kajiado. Individual ranchers are able to attract support not on the basis of livestock transfers but on their ability to function as effective political patrons. Traditional age set leaders are losing their positions of leadership and group ranch representatives are often chosen from among the ranks of young educated men. Davis (1971:28) notes the rise of a young, entrepreneurial class which is in competition with older, more traditional stockowners.

Destocking and enforcing stock quotas has proved impossible essentially because those wealthiest men who would have to sell off the most cattle are often the very ones sitting on the group ranch committees. Profits that have been generated by ranch activities are generally channelled back into increasing production of the traditional economy. For the most part, "the lack of short-term benefits resulted in the creation of factions and difficulties in cooperation" (Hedlund 1971:9). Schneider (1979:250) reviews the Kajiado data and concludes that, "In short, the seeds of polarization of wealth were laid, a seemingly common outcome of development schemes all over the world."

Since little if any research has been carried out in Narok district of Maasailand this dissertation will focus on the impact of group ranching

there. Certainly there are bound to be many similarities in the way that group ranching has impacted on the two districts, although one might expect differences to appear since Narok district enjoys a much higher rainfall and was less affected by the previous two droughts. Furthermore, the development of agriculture, particularly in the Mau and Trans Mara are an acknowledged part of the development of Narok district. To what extent agricultural development can proceed without further jeopardizing pastoral production will be discussed. More detailed information concerning Kajiado data, such as offtake rates, etc., will be brought forward when it becomes more relevant for comparative purposes with Narok data.

NAROK DISTRICT: THE ECOLOGICAL FEATURES

Narok District covers an area of 18,500 square kilometers. In the east, the district is bounded by the Nkuruman Escarpment, which is the western wall of the Rift Valley; to the west of the escarpment run the Loita Hills, rising to a height of 2,670 meters and gradually merging with the Siana Plains. Continuing to the west is Mara country and the Loita Plains which lie between 1,500 and 2,100 meters in elevation. To the north, the Mau Escarpment rises to 3,030 meters and west of the Siria Escarpment, the Trans Mara lies at between 1,500 and 1,800 meters, gradually merging into the foothills of the Kisii Highlands.

The average rainfall in Narok District is bi-modal, varying from some 380 millimeters per year in the southeastern area to more than 1,780 millimeters in the northwestern Mau region. The contrast between wet and dry season is less obvious in the western corner of the district. In general Narok Maasai expect a long wet season (April-May) followed by a

long dry season (July-October) then a short wet season (November-December) and a short dry season (January-March).


According to Pratt et al (1966), the vegetation types found in Narok District are: (1) Bushland; (2) Woodland; (3) Grassland; (4) Dwarfshrub Grassland; (5) Forest. These types of vegetation are distributed in three major ecological zones with distinct climates, viz., (a) humid-dry humid; (b) dry humid-semi-arid; and (c) semi-arid.

Due to this ecological variation, planners have designated three areas for development in Narok District. These are as follows:

- (1) High potential areas such as Mau and Trans Mara;
- (2) Semi-marginal areas such as Lower Mau where mixed agriculture/pastoralism is seen as possible; and
- (3) Marginal areas which are only suitable for pastoralism.

These basic land use zones based on ecological criteria can be seen in Figure 1 below (Narok District Development Plan 1972).

Figure 1 Land Use Zones Of Narok



A Kipsigis Settlements
 B Rangeland and Wildlife
 C Transmara Forest
 D Kisii Settlements
 E Mara Ranches
 F Lower Mau Mixed Farming
 G Mau Forest

H Upper Mau Agriculture
 I Rangeland and Wildlife
 K Loita Highlands, Rangeland
 L Loita Forest
 M Nkuruman Escarpement
 N Maasai Mara Game Reserve
 Forest Land

RANCH BOUNDARIES

The adjudication of ranch boundaries in Narok district was not based on any consistently meaningful Maasai social or territorial unit. Group ranches in the medium to high potential area were often small in size and the Upper Mau is divided into group farms. In the semi-arid area, ranches are very large and membership high. Maasai have variously informed me that their group ranch was comparable to elatia, emurua, enkutoto and olkeri. Often ranchers on the same group ranch describe their territory by a different name.

In the area north of the Narok-Nairobi road certain families have long been associated with certain areas. Demarcation here often followed the apparently well-known boundaries of neighbouring settlement areas. Even here I was told cases of one area bribing a surveyor to allot 300 hectares of land to their group ranch when it was known to belong to another neighbourhood. Originally, these ranches were referred to by the name of the dominant Maasai family that was associated with the area, for example OleNchoi Group Ranch or Masikonde Group Ranch. However, since acceptees and other Maasai living in the area were registered as members it was felt that naming the ranch after prominent elders or lineages gave the impression that these particular men 'owned' the ranch so the names were changed to reflect other features of the area such as a type of grass or river, etc.

Maasai families associated with certain tracts of land in these areas nevertheless trekked their cattle on well defined roncho as well as exploited the graze and water in their immediate neighbourhood. For example, a family might have a particular roncho which lasted about two

months and involved the trekking of cattle for salt. Salt was and still is considered to be an essential element in maintaining the health of the herds, preventing sleeping sickness, etc. A number of factors would influence the duration of any particular roncho. If there were many calves the herd would travel slowly and not stay long at the salt since calves are known to glutton themselves. If the cattle were healthy then they would move quickly to the salt and slowly graze on the way home. Another roncho would be associated with the search for dry season graze. Likewise, the movement of cattle through traditionally established trekking patterns was common in the arid areas. During the dry season many Maasai from the arid plains would move northward into the lower Mau area since all of IlPurko Maasai considered this a drought reserve.

While boundaries occasionally recognized the association of a number of families with fairly permanent homesteads (enkang), they failed to recognize the rights of cattle to pass through a much wider area in search of graze, water, salt, etc. As one elder commented, "We have Ole X to blame. He accepted group ranching for our area. Before group ranching our cattle were free. They could graze anywhere. But during the drought (1973) even Ole X took his cattle somewhere else off this group ranch. People then wonder, why did he accept group ranching". Thus, the ecological viability of the ranches, without infrastructural improvements, is seen as doubtful.

Furthermore, certain prominent Maasai who had been requesting individual demarcation of Maasailand, insisted that if group ranching was going to proceed, then, "there was no question of marking sectional boundaries in Maasai. The whole district belongs to the Maasai as a whole.

Therefore, there is no need for sectional boundaries to be formed. The land is still spacious and Maasai will be allotted plots as is considered fit, not going into minor details, such as saying this is Purko or Ildamat Maasai" (Hon. Konchellah, Minutes of a Meeting at D.C.'s Office, Narok 1965).

Given this directive, it is not surprising then that little attention was paid to sectional boundaries and one particular group ranch, Olomisimis, has members from three different Maasai sections, viz., Moitanik, Siria, and Uasingishu. Sectional rivalries are a traditional aspect of a group's association with territorial access to pastures (cf. Galaty 1979), and these tensions have been heightened since herders from all sections are now expected to work together to develop the ranch. Yet, where do you put a dip? The one dip already on the ranch is located next to the chief's homestead. Which section should have a dip next? Development is viewed largely as a competitive process and the basis of cooperation is certainly lacking. Interestingly enough if one reads the 1976 development plans for Olomisimis drawn up by the Range Management Division the report includes a review of the social-political situation on the ranch and concludes that there are no known disputes among members and they all share the same facilities!

Notwithstanding these reports, the Agricultural Finance Committee Officer in Narok at the time of this research recognized that the ranch was beset by interpersonal antagonisms and the ranch committee had requested that the ranch be subdivided according to sections. The ranch unity problems of Olomisimis are further aggravated by a large number of Kipsigis and Kisii acceptees who are members of the ranch and whose interests are

not in keeping with pastoral development but rather in the growing of maize shambas. The ranch planning office decided to let the member of parliament for Narok SouthWest make the final decision about whether and how the ranch should be subdivided. Since that particular year, 1979, was an election year, the politician decided not to make his decision until 'later.'

One begins to wonder whether putting together rival factions on the same group ranch was more a strategy than an accident or oversight. Many of the educated Maasai who wanted the entire district subdivided into individual holdings had at first argued that factionalism, disagreements, rivalries, etc. would hinder development and destroy group ranching. However, when the group ranch was seen to be the order of the day, these same leaders suggested that adjudicators not pay any attention to sectional boundaries since everyone was Maasai. Thus, as far as ranch boundaries are concerned, it almost appears that certain areas were demarcated in a way that their self-destruction was inevitable. It is very easy for many of these educated Maasai leaders to point a finger now and say 'We told you so.'

Hostilities of a sectional nature also exist between the IlPurko and the IlDamat sections in Narok. The smallest and weakest section in Narok, the IlDamat, have been having boundary disputes with the Narok IlKeekonyokie for several decades in the Ntulele area. The IlDamat claim that IlPurko Maasai were allowed into the area during the 1973-4 drought and afterwards refused to move out. Instead they aligned themselves with the IlKeekonyokie in an attempt to push the IlDamat out of the area. It is reported that at least seven IlDamat members have been killed in the ensuing intersectional hostilities (Weekly Review, September 12, 1980).

The dispute has evolved into a political issue with various politicians backing one group or the other. Even Kajiado politicians are taking positions on this issue. I shall speak more of this political involvement later. Suffice it to say that the whole area under question is now an adjudication area and one group of politicians has avowed that the area must be adjudicated as one large group ranch while another group believes that the area should be subdivided into three distinct group ranches. The decision was left in the hands of the Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley and he decided that a recommendation for subdivision by a 1978 committee should stand, however, he later reversed this decision and declared that the entire region should be one group ranch.

Thus, demarcation of group ranch boundaries has not often corresponded to any traditional unit of social or territorial relevance for the Maasai, and it has at times become the battlegrounds for politicians attempting to gain leadership and support.

THE INTEGRITY OF GROUP RANCH BOUNDARIES

One of the most important elements pertaining to development on group ranches is the integrity of ranch boundaries. The group ranch is supposed to provide the organizational framework for controlling access to grazelands within the ranch boundaries. Indeed, this feeling of exclusivity that was supposed to emerge with the privatization of land was seen as the incentive for conservation and development of the range. However, as in Kajiado, movements of people and livestock between ranches is commonplace. A large number of group ranches are attempting to stop illegal graziers from violating their ranch grazelands and have indeed

greatly hindered traditional trekking routes (i.e. roncho) of many Maasai. The ability to keep non-members off of group land seems to be greatly increased when a large portion of the land is given over to agricultural activities. Thus, upper Mau has become so heavily involved in the growing of wheat and barley that encroachment of herders looking for graze is virtually being eliminated. The Maasai have lost one of their best dry season reserves, an area that all of Purko Maasai once considered accessible during drought. This same pattern is emerging in parts of the Trans Mara where wheat, maize and other cash crops are under cultivation.

While reading ranch plans one is struck by the fact that many ranches complain of numerous illegal graziers occupying their territory. Nkairamiram reported 30 illegal graziers who were considered to be particularly unfavourable intruders because it was believed that the Maasai involved all had wheat shamba up in the Mau. OlKeri reported over 300 livestock grazing illegally but said that unless the government took steps to remove them that they would not physically force them off the land. Naibor Ajijik, a group ranch high up in the northwestern corner of the Mau which is heavily involved in wheat growing, had an influx of illegal graziers during the last drought. The ranch committee chairman forcibly removed these herders but the evicted and outraged drought victims are suing the ranch. The outcome of such a case will have widespread ramifications since if the ranch should be successfully sued on this issue, the integrity of ranch boundaries becomes a farce.

In the semi-high potential and semi-arid areas, movement of livestock between ranches increases the more arid conditions become. This movement is sometimes facilitated by an agreement between ranches. In other cases

individuals exploit their relationships with affines, agnates, stockfriends, age mates and others in order to gain access to grazeland. One ranch member asserted, "we can move in direction x to get to salt because group ranch A allows us to pass through, but we can no longer go in direction y since we are not on good terms with members of group ranch B." Some of the movement between ranches is temporary and of a seasonal nature since many of these ranches apparently are not ecologically viable.

Maasai prefer to exploit graze by moving into an area where a relative happens to be a group ranch member. It is very difficult for such illegal graziers to be turned away and often when a ranch reports illegal graziers they are referring only to those Maasai who have no particular close tie to a ranch member. Wealthy stockowners may use other means to receive permission to move onto another group ranch. For example, they will hire several herdboys from the other ranch to supplement their labour force. In this way, a number of families who are ranch members are deriving support from a non-member and will insist that no eviction takes place. Another way that illegal graziers may gain access is through prestations to a host who then gives them permission to graze on the group ranch. Ranch planning officials refer to this as bribery especially where illegal graziers gain access by providing beer for particular elders.

The integrity of ranch boundaries is therefore extremely questionable. My own research data corresponds to census reports of the group ranches with development plans which indicate that often 20-30% of the ranch membership are nonresident. Since only a small fraction of these nonresident members would be absorbed into the work force, we can assume that many of the nonresident members are living on another group ranch,

usually with their livestock. In some cases movement is legitimized since many Maasai registered for membership on more than one group ranch at the time of demarcation.

Ranch members who are interested in maintaining the integrity of the ranch boundaries do attempt to pressure other members not to accept cattle from stockfriends and to deny their relatives access to graze. A great number of Maasai on group ranches in the semi-high potential areas reported that stock exchanges had been largely curtailed. Thus, while movement between group ranches has not ceased, demarcation has disrupted traditional movements of cattle and members are more dependent upon calling up some individual relationship to secure rights to resources. As I will detail later, this has given rise to intensified conflicts between lineages, clans, etc.

So far as I was able to ascertain there is absolutely no movement of livestock from group ranchlands onto individual ranches. Individual ranches are of course too small to support large influxes of stock and furthermore individual ranches have often invested in a fence, dip and upgraded stock which they do not want coming into contact with disease carrying local cattle. However, individual ranchers often do keep a herd of Zebu cattle which is grazed and maintained by another person on a group ranch.

In the final analysis, it would seem that demarcation and group ranching have affected and altered traditional movements but for the most part the integrity of group ranch boundaries is definitely not secure. Traditional methods of levying a fine or the use of force do not seem to be effective and ranch members are reluctant to remove trespassers, especially

during dry season or drought conditions. Furthermore, certain illegal graziers are tolerated because of their relationship to ranch members, while some are considered welcome guests when they play host to a number of impoverished families. Thus, the basic incentive that planners felt would stimulate the desire for range improvement and development has not been forthcoming. Even government sanctions are inadequate to enforce boundary sovereignty since there are just not enough police in the district to evict widely scattered illegal herders.

RANCHES WITHIN RANCHES: THE ISSUE OF SUBDIVISION

As I have noted earlier there is considerable pressure on the part of the educated Maasai leadership to have the entire district of Narok demarcated on an individual basis. Many such leaders obtained individual ranches, often located in the best areas of the district. Some prominent Maasai have been attempting to privatize group ranchland. This is seen as a foresighted strategy on their part since the Ranch Planning Office repeatedly tells group ranch members that if all members agree then a group ranch may be subdivided. I attended a meeting at which Kanuga Group Ranch was presented with its certificate of incorporation with a mandate for cattle herding. This particular group ranch has a membership of 22 and although many members are called Ole Kashew they are considered to be Kikuyu. In fact, there was not a shuka clad member among the 22 members. The first thing that this newly incorporated group ranch did was have a spokesman stand and ask whether they might subdivide the land between all the families and use what was left for group land. The ranch members were said to be more interested in developing shambas because if they herd

cattle in the bush the moran come and steal them. The ranch planning officer told the Kanuga group ranch that they must first form a ranch committee of the various elected officials. Then, if all members decided to subdivide the ranch they would be allowed to do so, however, they would be required to pay for a costly survey of the land. Despite such costs many group ranches are destined for subdivision in the years ahead and this is seen as a foregone conclusion by most local government officials.

Another occurrence which is quite commonplace is the acquisition of individual plots of land on group ranchlands. On the Lemek Group Ranch, several of the prominent committee members have carved out pieces of land for themselves along a ridge by the river and it is more than likely that eventually this will lead to conflict over access to water for the rest of the membership. Five of these prominent men not only obtained individual ranches but have all received loans to construct five dips on their individual ranches within the group ranch. Although these men do not seem to have title deed they are definitely seen as shining examples by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (A.F.C.). Furthermore, one individual requested and the committee, of which he is a member, unanimously consented to give him a piece of land on the group ranch to develop a photographic camp. Most of the membership are also indicating an interest in subdivision of the group ranch into private holdings. After all, it is felt that if the ordinary herder does not get a piece of land now, there may be nothing left in the near future.

After occupying their individual ranches for a period of time and investing in an infrastructure, most of the individual ranches have or probably will obtain title deed. The first auction of an individual ranch

on February 19, 1979 was a Maasai who had bought a tractor for harvesting wheat in the Mau with a loan that he obtained by putting up his individual ranch at Lemek. When he defaulted on the loan the ranch was sold and naturally to an outsider.

Another prominent Maasai county council member was a member of Olngenjemi group ranch when he requested an individual ranch within the group ranch. He promised that he would put in wheat and share the profits with the group and also build a dip and allow the membership access. He was given the individual land and built a large stone house, a dip and planted wheat. After a few years he fenced off his land, stopped sharing the wheat profits and refused to allow the group ranch members to come on the 'ranch within the ranch' to use the dip. The group ranch members tried to sue him but were told that they could only get the land back if they paid reimbursement for the house and all the infrastructural developments. The group ranch said that they were not in the position to do that and he has now obtained title deed to the land.

Widespread illegal subdivision is apparent throughout the Mau Narok. Even in 1965 the Narok County Council could report to the Hennings Commissions on Land Consolidation that over sixty farms had been allocated in the Mau and were awaiting title deed. Since that time dozens of group farms have been subdivided and sold or leased to outsiders for the production of wheat or barley. In fact, the wheat board officials estimate that 90% of the wheat growers in the Mau are Kikuyu. Group ranches in the Mau such as Olomoro and Naibor Ajijik have subdivided their land and even without benefit of title deed seem to be able to lease or in some cases sell the land. As a result, most pastoral Maasai who were interested in

carrying on herding activities were very early on squeezed out of the Mau. Mau Narok has been an area of heavy Kikuyu penetration and intermarriage for a lengthy period and many of the area residents were interested in agricultural rather than pastoral development. Whenever land was group allocated a number of individual members would press for a piece of land to "experiment" on as is the euphemism, wholeheartedly embracing the government plea to encourage wheat growing in the area. In other words, group demarcation in the Upper Mau region has been routinely ignored.

Subdivision of group ranchland is a much debated subject with politicians adding fuel to the fire by encouraging their supporters to support one or the other position (i.e. group ranching or individual ranching). I attended several Group Ranch Annual General Meetings and almost inevitably the question would be asked, "Will we be allowed to subdivide?" Usually a vote is taken and a unanimous agreement for subdivision does not occur. Later, I shall present a detailed analysis of the motives and vested interests which influence particular ranch members to request subdivision. I shall now simply outline some of the most common reasons presented for or against subdivision. Many proponents of subdivision repeatedly noted that group ranch members were not able to cooperate and therefore there could be no decisions about development. It was argued that since group consensus was needed and groups could not come to a consensus, then each individual should have a piece of land that he could make decisions about without the consent of others. In other words, land as a valuable commodity is becoming explicitly recognized among many Maasai. Not only is it recognized as a valuable commodity but also as a scarce one. For example, when a ranch member's sons reach the age of 18

they are theoretically able to be registered as ranch members themselves. However, I noted several cases where the elders on the ranch refused to allow these young men to register. Several reasons were offered. The elders did not consider these "warriors" to be responsible adults who could make a contribution to group discussions. It was also argued, "If one man has twenty children and another man only has a few and they are all registered, then if the ranch is subdivided one day the man with many children will dominate the land". Other Maasai justified their fear that there will not be enough land to go around as follows: "Some men are clever and some men are stupid and perhaps the clever man will benefit at the expense of others." Land was seen as a commodity that was already spread thin. Ownership of land was seen as a necessary requirement for security in a way that access to pastures in the traditional system never was.

Competition for land, should subdivision occur, will certainly lead to a scramble. I asked elders many times: where, if they kept their sons from registering would their sons' generation find land for herding? I was told, "That is not our problem. Let them worry about that in the future." Since subdivision is seen as such a very real possibility any Maasai who builds a modern house, dip, etc., on group land is looked upon with suspicion. The Maasai can point to too many examples of other Maasai who were able to alienate group land after making individual improvements. Despite Maasai elders' objections the Ranch Planning Office has been granting membership to the young eligible sons since this is felt to be guaranteed in the group ranch constitution.

It is definitely recognized by many Maasai that should individualization of land occur many Maasai will be disenfranchised. I have often been told, "This land will not support our sons." It is seen that prominent Maasai, politicians, etc. all have individual pieces of land, and more and more Maasai entrepreneurs are attempting to invest some of their profits in land acquisition. The emergence of such a rural elite who have used land to create a very real division of class relations⁴ is evident and the limitations of traditional pastoralism make capital accumulation in the form of livestock an increasingly inappropriate strategy and one which for the bulk of Maasai is directed towards peasantization and impoverishment (cf. Asad 1981; Bourgeot 1981; Galaty 1981).

Thus, for every group ranch member who sees individual interests best being served through the subdivision of land, there are always some who are committed to pastoralism, which they could not practice if their range was limited. Others recognize that they would lose through subdivision because their ability to secure a favourable piece of individual land was negligible. Many young Maasai pointed out that if the land was subdivided then pastoralism would be restricted to the point where each Maasai would have to produce a subsistence shamba. Since at present Maasai women generally will not plant shambas, younger men feared that more and more Maasai would be looking for Kikuyu or Kipsigis wives and the cultural identity of the Maasai would be threatened.

⁴ Galaty (1981:14) suggests that class distinctions predicated upon ownership of land can be related to the divisions "created by government salaries and political posts in the state-market context."

Maasai who are already impoverished or herdless often view subdivision favourably especially in areas where wheat growing, charcoal burning or other economic pursuits are carried out on group land. They receive a small share of the income derived from wheat but often believe that if they owned even a small tract of land they could make a bigger profit by renting or selling the land. This is a generalization since many impoverished Maasai are dependent upon wealthy Maasai herders for their subsistence and for the most part express the views which support the position of their patron.

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT

The group ranches in Narok District are thought to be able to finance the development of a ranching infrastructure (i.e. dips, crushes, boreholes, firebreaks, etc.) or development enterprises (i.e. fattening steers, upgraded stock, breeding bulls, etc.) in four ways:

- (1) request an Agricultural Finance Corporation (A.F.C.) loan;
- (2) through monies obtained from wheat/barley growing either through requesting a loan or leasing the land;
- (3) through monies gained from leasing land for tented tourist camps or wildlife revenue from the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife;
- (4) through monies gained from livestock offtake.

Taking out an A.F.C. Loan

Under this option, group ranchers are given financial support through a ten year loan which is repayable at 11% per annum. The A.F.C. loans are to be repaid according to the number of cattle each ranch member owns, i.e. wealthy stockowners pay on a linear scale a higher amount than poorer

owners. Stock wealth is determined when a detailed ranch development plan is drawn up before the loan is disbursed. It is hoped that the obligation to repay such loans will lead to an increased offtake of livestock on each ranch.

On the Kajiado group ranches the issuing of stock quotas to determine offtake distribution on the ranch has not been successful and members of Narok group ranches claim that they were not given quotas per se but rather told that each person would be asked to contribute based on their ability to pay (cf. Helland n.d.:22). I will later discuss the interpretation of this method of repayment by Maasai group ranchers.

At the time that this research was carried out more than sixty group ranches, plus numerous individual ranches, had been registered in Narok District, but, fewer than fifteen had been fully incorporated. Even fewer ranches requested or took out development loans.

The ranch planning officer and other government officials who attend various group ranch Annual General Meetings are constantly encouraging the Maasai to take out a development loan and start building up an improved ranching infrastructure or become involved in a progressive enterprise. Maasai reluctance to take out a development loan is extremely complex and related to a number of different vested interests which are seen to be jeopardized by development. Here, I will present a general outline of some of the concerns which motivate acceptance or rejection of a loan.

First of all, there is generally a high level of interest shown by Maasai stockowners in technical innovations which are seen to improve the health and condition of their livestock. For the vast majority of Maasai dips, crushes, and bore holes are seen as a way to enhance the health of

I their herds and stimulate growth in their indigenous economy. However, ranch planning officials make it quite clear that these infrastructural improvements will improve herd quality so that livestock can be sold to finance the debt. Because individual herds vary greatly and those with the most cattle would be expected to sell greater numbers of animals, many Maasai are reluctant to take out a loan even though they do want to see water development, dips, etc.

It is quite evident that on many group ranches the Maasai have not accepted the values and principles of commercial ranching. Consequently, in the short run, the technological determinism which is so often the basis of development models (and macro theory in general) is not borne out. Furthermore, investment in infrastructural development is considered risky. For example, Maasai informants often noted that they were being exploited and many group ranch members reported that they were being charged much higher prices than usual when they purchased building materials, medicine for cattle, and so on. Because of this they worry that any development funds would soon be spent without very much to show for it. This might leave a group ranch with a half finished dip and much pressure to sell off livestock to repay their loan. In fact, many Maasai who were against loans said they feared that they would be forced to sell off too much livestock and be left destitute. Consequently, rather than regarding infrastructural development as a means of increasing ranch security, many Maasai describe it as a "plot" by government officials to place them heavily in debt with the result that their land will be sold to "outsiders."

Another aspect of infrastructural development is that most of the improvements are not properly managed and maintained so that as a business

proposition they appear risky. OlKeri group ranch in lower Mau was the first ranch to receive a loan for a dip and the Ministry of Water Development helped them build it while Veterinarian Department vehicles transported the building materials. The ranch was small with a membership of only eighteen. The dip attendant who was chosen had no other qualifications than being the son of one of the members who had some schooling. It is expected that this attendant will be elected the treasurer of the ranch committee. One group ranch which I investigated had financed its dip both with private funds and a grant of 6,000 Shs. from the Office of Lands and Group Ranches. The dip attendant was given complete control of finances. Ranch members were not charged a dipping fee but each person contributed 50 Shs. per month for the dipping solution. Non-members from neighbouring group ranches were charged 30 cents per adult animal and 20 cents per calf. Sometimes the dipping solution was diluted when the attendant ran short. No records were kept, no bank account was opened and the general membership was confident that all the money that was collected by the dip attendant was spent on the medicine.

It is not surprising then that the acquisition of A.F.C. loans for such things as dips is considered a risky proposition. Ranch membership is often divided in relation to who they think will benefit most from the loan and who will suffer most in repaying the loan. In the medium high potential areas where agricultural encroachment and wheat growing are widespread many Maasai committed to pastoralism firmly believe that if they accept a loan all those ranch members who are in favour of subdivision will not help to repay it and the burden will fall on a few members who will eventually default and lose their ranch. Elder after elder echoed this

view - "taking out a loan will bring subdivision". The Maasai pointed out that in high potential areas the people that want a loan are men not committed to pastoralism and they are very often non-Maasai. While loans officers may view these members as progressive, the Maasai membership see them as exploitative.

Some Maasai assert that they are not interested in voting for a loan because they are poor and the wealthy are going to benefit. Others assert that because they are wealthy they do not want a loan because they will be financing development for the poor. The herder of average wealth sees the poor and wealthy as beneficiaries since the poor have nothing to lose and the wealthy can afford to lose some capital without undue hardship. Let us look at some examples of these positions.

For example, Nkairamiram Group Ranch voted 13 to 5 in favour of accepting a loan to provide water development, dip construction and breeding bulls. The loan was approved with the condition that the five opposing members would be exempt from repayment. These five members are in effect treated like non-members. The reason given by the five members who rejected the loan was that as average herders they would benefit least from development since Nkairamiran has a great many stockless and poor members who would not be able to contribute very much to the repayment of the loan and the wealthy herders were going to benefit from the purchase of breeding bulls. This belief was based, not just on a perceived notion of how the benefits would be distributed, but on the very real conditions explained to them by ranch planning officials. They were told that breeding bulls would be allocated by the group ranch committees and these committees should give the bulls to those members who had the most livestock (i.e. the wealthiest)

since if the bulls die, the wealthy owner will be more assured of at least producing a few offspring.

It was pointed out to me that all five of the opposing members were known to have either private holdings in the Mau or to be members on other group ranches. While this may have influenced their decision to vote against the loan since they had alternative locations where they could move, it was their position in the power structure that was most influential. One cannot simply extrapolate an immediate and causal correlation between men opposed to development and those with land interests elsewhere. This becomes readily apparent when looking at Ilmashariani Group Ranch where the men elected to the group ranch committee also keep wheat shambas in the Mau. However, unlike the opposing five members at Nkairamiram, these individuals are considered to be the driving force behind obtaining a loan for their group ranch. Like the opposing five members at Nkairamiram, these Ilmashariani committee members are certainly not the wealthiest stockowners on their ranch, since they had been selling livestock to develop their interests in Mau.

One explanation that Maasai herders gave me for the acceptance of the loan at Ilmashariani was that "Ilmashariani is a Kikuyu ranch." In other words, there is a heavy penetration of Kikuyu here and a great deal of intermarriage. The ranch leadership, though not as wealthy as some of the more traditional livestock owners, are educated men of mixed ancestry. The five men at Nkairamiram see their holdings in Mau or membership on other group ranches as ways of bolstering their subsistence economy while those men at Ilmashariani see their livestock on the group ranch as a means of bolstering their agricultural pursuits. Even though the two sets of men

represent a category of men of average wealth and they both have outside land interests, their goals, values, and commitments are not the same.

Since loans are also encouraged for the purchase of upgraded stock it is important to understand what the Maasai believe is the advantage or disadvantage in possessing such animals. In Narok district, the Sahiwal is the most common of the upgraded stock which is offered for purchase either as heifers or breeding bulls. Briefly, as far as a scientific explanation of the difference between Sahiwal stock and local Zebu, it is known that indigenous cattle are genetically conditioned to produce less milk in the dry season which in effect conserves the animal. Sahiwal cows produce milk in much larger volumes and this drops off less in the dry season. However, the continuation of milk production under adverse conditions proceeds at the expense of their own body growth since they have been bred primarily for milk production.

What is of most importance here are the perceptions that Maasai have of purchasing Sahiwal stock. Maasai stockowners consistently informed me that "we have a fear of those animals." The most common explanations given were as follows:

- (1) Sahiwal cattle have to be watered every day. Maasai cattle are usually not watered daily and in fact should not be watered daily. Therefore, if Maasai kept local cattle and grade cattle they could not be herded together but would have to be separated. The Sahiwal would have to be kept in an area that was close to water.
- (2) During the dry season Sahiwal cattle tend to die. Maasai cattle are much better at adapting to semi-arid conditions, losing weight rather than dying unless conditions are extreme.
- (3) Sahiwal cattle are more susceptible to disease. Local cattle have a greater natural immunity to indigenous diseases. Sahiwal cattle should be dipped weekly, which means that they should be kept in close proximity to a county dip or else a dip must also be constructed on the ranch.

- (4) Sahiwal cattle are lazy. It is thought that Sahiwal cattle are not as capable as Maasai cattle in long distance forages for graze and furthermore Sahiwals are seen to lose condition when they walk long distances. "Sahiwals cannot walk as far as Maasai cattle."
- (5) Although the Sahiwals are seen to produce much more milk than Zebu cattle, Maasai insist that they are not as easy for women to milk and girls in particular would not be able to milk them. Men would have to help in the milking.

Although all of these points were derived from Maasai stockowners, they relate fairly closely to scientific knowledge about the differences between Zebu and Sahiwal (cf. Barret and Larkin 1974). When an A.F.C. loan is encouraged for purchasing breeding bulls or grade cows the Maasai must weigh the costs and benefits of such a purchase in terms of their own ability to spend the extra time and energy with grade animals, given that they are not easily herded by children or milked by girls and women, and that grazing, watering and practical care of such animals is different from that of their other livestock. In other words, determining who would benefit from grade stock is related to labour force, herd size, herding strategies, etc., and not all men are in the position to alter their practices.

A.F.C. loans are encouraged for water development, firebreaks, dips, etc., but many Maasai explained that they did not want a loan for those things because that would encourage the closure of ranch boundaries and this would prevent relatives and stockfriends from coming onto the ranch. If a ranch possesses its own dip, and ranch cattle are healthy, then many members would not want to let potentially unhealthy, disease carrying stock onto their ranch. In fact, Maasai can articulate quite well their fear that if they eliminate the circulation of cattle to stockfriends and

relatives they may well have destroyed their ability to survive if drought or epidemic should hit. Faith that infrastructural improvements will offset the limitations of the dry season is very weak. Although pastoralists are all too often asked to believe in the benefits of range development programs, Konczacki (1978:55) suggests that even for the planner the estimation of value output of a scheme is an "act of faith rather than action based on reliable cost-benefit analysis." Perhaps Morgan (1972) should be heeded when he suggested that pastoralists should be given insurance policies to safeguard them against the disasters which inevitably occur.

Ranch planners explain that A.F.C. loans for water development are seen as a method of making the Maasai more sedentary. However, in the most arid areas of the district, where the Maasai are certainly the most nomadic, water development is not always feasible. Ewaso Nyiro Group Ranch applied for a loan for bore hole development but an initial survey indicated that such development would take millions of shillings and, given the human and livestock population of the ranch, it would take 100 years to repay the loan. Although damming was considered as an alternative it was determined that even here three quarters of the use of the reservoir would be by wild animals. Ewaso Nyiro was refused the loan.

The fact that some group ranches are refused loans and others are encouraged to take out loans for things that they do not want leads Maasai to believe that loan-taking is a fickle if not political game. This notion is further reinforced by the fact that individuals from group ranches who apply for a loan are often denied them. They say, "the loans are controlled by politician X and our ranch does not support him." They also

see many individual ranchers obtaining loans and wonder why they cannot acquire one since they are applying as individuals and not ranchers. The fact that most individual ranchers have private collateral and are either educated or wealthy enough to have someone keep records for them is usually not considered. Whether or not it is always true, for there are obvious cases when it is, political patronage is seen to be an important variable in obtaining a loan, especially an individual loan. In regards to individuals applying for a loan, Maasai believe that acceptees or ranchers of mixed ancestry stand a better chance getting a loan because loan officers would favour ranchers who can speak their language or establish kin ties with them. These officers tend not to be Maasai. In fact, several of the group ranches that have development loans have many non-Maasai registered members which Maasai are quick to point out.

Although there are many more examples of Maasai attitudes towards taking out an A.F.C. loan, I will limit these since I have made the point that it is not easy to generalize about Maasai reasons for rejecting or accepting a loan. It is often difficult, unless the group is small, for a ranch to make a single decision, and individuals must weigh a number of variables which influence their perceptions of the costs and benefits of accepting a loan for development.

The Financing of Wheat Growing in Narok

Approximately 15% of the land in Narok District at the time of this research was given over to wheat and barley, in a 30% to 70% proportion. Much of this cropping is carried on in the high potential areas above the Narok-Nairobi highway. Barley growing is financed and controlled by the

Kenya Breweries, since barley production is destined solely for use in beer production. In 1979 there were three possibilities for financing wheat growing in Narok District, as follows: (A) a Guaranteed Minimum Return Loan issued by the A.F.C.; (B) a Wheat Board of Kenya loan and (C) funding from the Integrated Agricultural Development Project issued by the Wheat Board Narok Project.

(A) Guaranteed Minimum Return Loans:

The Narok County Council issues release forms which a Maasai or leasee obtains and submits to A.F.C. which is then approved through the D.A.C.⁵ In 1977, 350 people applied for this loan. This is considered the most favourable loan and everyone admits that it is most often a political loan going to civil servants, etc. This loan provided financing at a 75% rate. The leasee or Maasai farmer must pay 5 Shs. per acre premium and is then guaranteed 500 Shs. per acre even if the wheat fails due to natural catastrophies. When a contractor is hired for plowing, harrowing, planting and harvesting, the job is inspected and then the approval form is sent to Nairobi before any payment is made.

Even with these stringent controls much abuse of these loans has taken place. A leasee will plant 200 acres and get the contractor to put 500 acres on the invoice and if the crop fails he then claims for 500 acres. In 1977 the A.F.C. spent 19 million shillings on wheat loans and 90% of the crop failed due to heavy rains at harvest time which left the wheat rotting in the fields. The money for these loans comes from Treasury which

⁵ District Advisory Council.

incurred huge losses. In 1979, during my research tenure, the Kenyan government announced that it was halting the issue of Guaranteed Minimum Return Loans.

(B) Wheat Board of Kenya Loans:

At the time of research the Wheat Board of Kenya issued loans at a rate of 100%. Controls over spending were extremely lax and contractors would often travel to Nakuru with an invoice that had not even been signed by the farmer and collect their payment. It was quite easy for a contractor to say that he was to be reimbursed for all costs on 1,000 acres when he cleared only 200. When the farmer sells the crop from only 200 acres he finds himself in debt since he cannot repay the loan. This practice is so widespread that contractors are becoming extremely wealthy and refusing to work for the A.F.C. since there are more stringent controls. Since A.F.C. and the Wheat Board do not exchange lists of those men with loans, officials feel sure that some clients obtain money from both sources and then purposefully default on one of their loans.

Wheat Board loans are repayable even if weather or animals destroy the entire crop. The majority of loans were given to leasees and if the crop failed the leasee was able to run away and often could not be traced. However, if a Maasai took out a loan he could not run away since the land was his home and suspicion arose that "Maasai were easily harassed if they defaulted on a loan but a leasee could get away with anything". For this reason, Wheat Board loans which had been growing began to steadily decline.

In 1975 the Wheat Board had 30% defaulting on their loans. In 1976 they had 40% defaulting and in 1977 they had 65%. The high percentage of defaulters in 1977 was attributed to disastrously wet conditions which

caused almost the entire crop to be lost. Ironically the only way that farmers could recoup their loss was to put even more acreage under wheat to try and make a greater profit.⁶ However, because of such heavy defaulting the Wheat Board had to cut down on their loans, although in 1978, which was a good year with dry weather at harvesting time, there were only 20% defaulters. Despite this good year, losses for the Wheat Board were so high and production of wheat so unstable that in 1979 they were forced to declare themselves bankrupt.

Let us now ask the question: Who benefits from wheat growing? First of all, 90% of the land given over to wheat growing and barley production is leased to outsiders, mainly Kikuyu. The Maasai rent their land on three to five year contracts. The leasee pays the owner 130 to 160 Shs. per acre per year for the use of the land depending on whether he is renting new or old land. It costs the leasee 325 Shs. per acre to hire a contractor to plow, plant, spray and harvest old land and 345 for new land. The leasee farmer is not actually paid the money which goes directly to the contractor who performs the work. After delivering the wheat to K.F.A. and subtracting the Wheat Board costs, the farmer gets the remainder.

For example, if a leasee rents 100 acres from a Maasai, the Wheat Board would subtract the cost of the contractor at, let us say, 325 Shs. for a total of 3,250 Shs. Old land in the upper areas usually yields eight bushel bags per acre and the farmer is paid a controlled price of 100 Shs. per bag. From 100 acres the farmer would get 800 bags of wheat and at 100

⁶ It is rather ironic that unusual rains during the dry season which are a boon to Maasai pastoralists are such a disaster to the agriculturalists.

Shs. a bag he would receive 80,000. From this would be deducted the 3,250 Shs. Wheat Board expenses and the 1,300 rental fee. The leasee stands to make a profit of 46,200 Shs. and the Maasai leasing the land receive only 1,300. Since the leasees and contractors are non-Maasai it can be seen that the circulation of wheat money benefits people almost entirely outside the district. The Maasai only realize a fraction of what the wheat is worth.

The next profit making step is the milling. The Wheat Board buys the wheat in bulk for a controlled price of 100 Shs. and sells it to the miller in grades 1 (124 Shs. per bag) through to grade 6 (106 Shs. per bag). The miller sells a bag of flour for 280 Shs. per bag. The Maasai however rarely buy wheat flour and almost never purchase such items as bread. Thus, the nutritive benefit of wheat growing, which it was argued by planners would help raise the standard of living of Maasai, also circulates outside the district. The nutritive value of barley growing is channelled into beer and Maasai do not often buy bottled beer, having access to their own traditional sugar and honey beer.

Unscrupulous contractors can and do take advantage of leasees, and unscrupulous leasees can and do take advantage of the Maasai. Clearly, however, Maasai group ranchers and landholders are the low men on the ladder and if swindling of any nature takes place the Maasai lose out. This is not to say that there are not some instances of Maasai taking advantage of leasees, etc. I heard stories about Maasai in the Mau selling land to eager Kikuyu farmers who then discovered that there was no title deed. The Maasai who made the transaction changed into a shuka and disappeared. As a Kikuyu said to me: "Once they are dressed in a shuka

there is no way that you can tell them apart." In the Melili area a certain rich Maasai is known to exploit other Maasai living on the group farm by growing wheat without paying them a lease fee. For the most part though, it is Maasai group ranchers and landowners who tell the stories of their leasees running away without paying them a penny of rent money.

If wheat growing is so lucrative, why then do the Maasai not cut out the middleman and grow the wheat for themselves? The reasons are numerous but there are a number of general themes. First of all the Maasai stress that they have a great fear of defaulting on their loans and losing either their cattle or their land at auction. In 1975 Olopito Group Ranch went in debt to the Wheat Board and only with great reluctance were they persuaded into putting more wheat acreage under the following years. In 1978 they cleared their loan. In a bad year the leasee can flee but the Maasai are left to pay the consequences which may consume profits from future years.

The growing of wheat in the high potential areas of Mau has certainly led to the widespread subdivision of group holdings and although title deeds are not always forthcoming this land is still being sold to outsiders, many of whom are government officials and civil servants. These individuals who run their wheat shambas from Nairobi are referred to as the "telephone farmers." Wheat Board officials estimate that about 1% of the wheat farmers in Mau are actually Maasai. Many of these Maasai (i.e. local chiefs, sub-chiefs, county councillors, etc.) with large wheat shambas in the Mau have clearly made huge profits and are commonly called the Maasai "wheat elite." The Maasai wheat elite are usually members of one or more group ranches in the district, some also have individual ranches where they

raise graded stock bought with their wheat profits, and many invest in a variety of businesses.

If the Maasai on group ranches in general make such little profit then why do they engage in wheat growing? First of all, the late President Kenyatta pleaded with the Maasai to show their progressiveness and allow wheat growing to be introduced into their district. The political pressure to allow high potential land to be put to a 'more productive use' for the national good was immense. Also, those Maasai squeezed out of the Mau believed that during a drought they would be able to return, which did not occur during the 1973-74 drought. As well, many Maasai felt that they were being paid money for doing nothing. Maasai see wheat money in the form of land rental payments as free money. Cattle trekkers and wealthy stockowners are increasingly seeing wheat shambas as a means of making a short term profit in order to buy more cattle and increase their prestige in the traditional economy. Others say that wheat money "is like finding money on the roadside and it can be spent on anything." This is the case, it was argued, because a man did not sell any animals to get the money, so he was free to spend it as he pleased. Often the profits of wheat that group ranchers received were spent on food and other consumables rather than being channelled into any form of ranch development.

Attend a meeting at a ranch where wheat growing is possible and one hears constant argument over whether to grow more wheat, less wheat or stop growing wheat. This is a common scenario that I witnessed many times. A wealthy stockowner stands and says, "We do not want wheat. Let us build a dip." A non-Maasai member or perhaps a stockless Maasai says, "Let us subdivide the land and each person can make his own profit from wheat if

that is what he wants to do." A young man says, "Let us grow more wheat for a few years and buy more cattle. Then we can stop growing wheat." Wheat growing, whatever its long term future in Narok, has had a tremendous effect on the Maasai. It has increased conflict between those committed to pastoralism and those committed to agriculture, between group and individual interests, between young and old, and so on.

However, some group ranches have been able to use wheat money to finance development of their group ranch. For example, Rotian Kotikash planted a wheat shamba and were able to generate 7,000 Shs. towards the construction of their dip. However, many ranches are not able to convert wheat money into development mainly because there are too many conflicting views on what development should be. For example, a neighbouring ranch tried to get members to donate wheat money for dip construction. Many members refused and those who did donate later claimed that the committee chairman spent the money himself. Murua group ranch, which also grows wheat, voted out its committee which had been in favour of taking out a loan and building a dip. Wheat growing, unity of purpose and ranch development certainly do not always go hand in hand.

However, because wheat money seems so easily obtainable, merely by allowing someone else to grow a crop, even group ranches in the semi-arid areas have requested or attempted to grow wheat. Nkairamiram Group Ranch leased wheat shambas to the Provincial Commissioner one year and to a Senior Chief another year. The ranch is much too arid and the wheat failed both years. Ilmashariani Group Ranch has also tried and been unable to grow wheat.

Maasai who want to grow more wheat on their ranches point out that after harvest the cattle can come and graze on the stubble. Those pastoralists committed to livestock respond that the wheat is planted on prime grazing land that should be utilized by their cattle and furthermore wheat stubble is rough and coarse and yields adequate fodder only provided that cattle are watered on the same day. If cattle are not watered on the same day that they eat stubble, they become thirsty and their milk production falls. Typically, Maasai do not water their cattle every day since they believe that this makes their cattle's joints weak. Therefore, although cattle can graze on stubble they must have access to water and other graze so that they can alternate. While grazing on wheat stubble on group ranches may be possible, the Maasai point out that their cattle can no longer graze in the Upper Mau because they are denied access to it and there are no dips there so their cattle would die. One further point that is mentioned by Maasai is that wheat shambas on group ranches have attracted buffaloes close to their homes. Finally, many traditional pastoralists comment that leasees can and have fined Maasai when their cattle stray into wheat fields. Thus, regardless of the monetary value in wheat, those Maasai who traditionally used the Mau as a grazing reserve during drought are now remarking that agriculture is quickly reducing the long-term prospects for herding in the lower areas while most of the profits are seen to accrue to 'outsiders.'

Even those Maasai or non-Maasai ranch members most committed to the continuation of wheat growing are finding that factors beyond their control continue to make the profitability of wheat growing highly erratic and unstable. Due to the bankruptcy of the Wheat Board and the cessation of

G.M.R. loans, in 1979 many group ranches could not find leasees to put in wheat shambas. Many of the difficulties in wheat growing that lead to such unstable production are problems which will have to be solved at the national level. Fragmentation of holdings, corrupt or inefficient contractors, bankruptcy of financial backers and a terribly inadequate transportation system all contribute to low production. Silos of 5,000 ton capacity were built at great expense at Narok town but if it rains during the harvesting season the roads are unnegotiable and the wheat cannot be brought in. Interestingly enough, even with all the failings of wheat growing in Narok, government officials remarked that in the future they believe that all the land above the Narok-Nairobi highway will be subdivided because their agricultural potential is far too great for group ranching.

(C) Integrated Agricultural Development Program

This project, which was sponsored and funded by the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), was seen as a way of enabling Maasai farmers to benefit and profit from the development of wheat shambas in the Mau. In 1978, the World Bank undertook a two week study tour of the Mau and found that there were many registered landowners awaiting the issue of title deed. The Ministry of Agriculture was told to select forty-four (44) participants who would be given loans when they presented their title deeds.

During the time of my tenure, the forty-four Maasai were chosen, mainly civil servants. Many of these men had submitted applications for title

deeds to the Ministry of Lands and Settlement over three years earlier.⁷ A baraza was held in the Mau and these people were told by the Permanent Secretary, the Minister of Agriculture, the Provincial Commissioner and others that the money was ready for them to collect through the A.F.C. office in Narok. When the men arrived to get their loans they were turned away because they did not have title deeds. Although the politicians knew full well that the participants needed title deeds they sent them anyway and the blame was placed on the A.F.C. Because 1979 was an election year, the strategy of providing funds and then placing the blame elsewhere when they could not be handed out appeared to be calculated.

Tourist Camps and Wildlife Revenue

Another source of funds for group ranches comes from tented camps. Those ranches with a substantial wildlife population can lease sections of their ranches to businessmen who, on the basis of a 12 month lease agreement, establish tourist camps. Additional revenue is made from the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife as compensation for wild animals coming onto their ranches from the Maasai Mara game reserve. Occasionally, individual members will develop a tourist camp on group land for their own profit. However, Koiyaki Group Ranch, which was receiving 150,000

⁷ The Ministry of Lands and Settlements and the Ministry of Agriculture officially deny that illegal subdivision of land is the norm in the Upper Mau. Local officials are certainly fully aware that this is going on, especially since many of them have been able to obtain pieces of land themselves. However, for the Ministry of Lands and Settlements to issue title deeds for many of these individual holdings would be a tacit approval of what is considered at central planning levels to be a deplorable chain of events.

shillings a year in six month installments, had banked 200,000 Shs. in 1979 and said that they wanted to buy 150 grade steers for their ranch.

The ranch planning office at first refused, saying that since Koiyaki did not have a dip or any ranch development they should not be bringing in grade steer. The members of Koiyaki retorted that if they were not allowed to get the steers then they would divide the money between each member and it could be spent as each decided. Given this, the ranch planning office decided to arrange for 150 grade steers at 82,000 Shs. and also for Kerichi Tick Control office to contract for a dip for the ranch at 30,000 Shs. The ranch members agreed to this.

Whereas ranch planning officials have some control of development through loans, they have very little control over development through such lucrative and private funding. Control over wheat money is also minimal, although encouragement of wheat growing is considered important. The goal of increasing agricultural production in high potential areas takes primacy over controlling pastoral development which is seen as precarious in these areas.

Increased Livestock Sales

Planners believe that another way that the Maasai can fund ranch development is through increased livestock sales. Since it is difficult enough to issue quotas for repayment of loans and force the group to collectively make payments, it is problematic whether the Maasai would decide on their own to collectively pool money obtained from increased livestock sales to promote development. Again, decisions about who would sell what animals and what contribution each person should make, if not

left voluntary, are not easily enforced by group ranch committees. Certain ranches in the district, such as Suswa Kitet Group Ranch, have applied for a development loan and were rejected on the grounds that their ranch is overstocked and that ranch members have more than enough personal cattle wealth to self finance some development. However, these ranchers are certainly not about to destock in order to become eligible for a development loan. Thus, while individuals have often channelled cash gained through livestock sales into medicine for their cattle and dip fees, I was not aware of a single incidence where money from livestock sales was used collectively for ranch development.

In summary, it can be seen that financing development is a complex issue. Although planners point to a number of different sources, such as loans, wheat growing, wildlife revenue and offtake, the conflictual interests of different individuals on group ranches often makes the use of such monies for pastoral development difficult.

CHAPTER THREE

ROTIAN OLMAKONGO GROUP RANCH

The majority of investigations dealing with the development of group ranches in Kenya's Maasailand stress the role played by ecological factors in enhancing or inhibiting ranch development (e.g. Pratt and Gwynne 1977), while in some cases efforts are made to illustrate how ecological conditions combine with socio-economic circumstances to effectively influence group ranch development (e.g. Campbell and Migot-Adholla 1979; Davis 1971; Halderman 1972; Hedlund 1971; Jacobs 1973). Nevertheless, in spite of the importance that socio-economic conditions have for the success or failure of development schemes in general and group ranching in particular, little systematic research has been carried out on this subject. The following chapter attempts to overcome this deficiency by presenting an in-depth socio-economic analysis of a specific group ranch located in Narok District.


This particular group ranch has been demarcated for over ten years but despite the fact, or as we shall later see perhaps because of the fact, that it is located in a wheat growing area its members have shown little development initiative and the ranch has not taken out a loan, constructed a dip, developed bore holes or purchased grade stock. The following analysis attempts to explain this lack of development by concentrating on how ranch members perceive the costs and benefits of ranch development, how access to group ranch resources is structured, and how individual and group strategies are used to pursue various ends and diverse interests. I hope

to demonstrate that Maasai social structure can act as a major constraint on certain types of development and, at the same time, suggest ways in which this can be avoided.

ROTIAN OLMAKONGO GROUP RANCH


The group ranch chosen as a study area is officially known as Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch and is located approximately 16 kilometers north of the town of Narok. Rotian OlMakongo is bounded on the west by Rotian Kotikash Group Ranch, both of which share frontage on the Narok-Nakuru road. To the south, Rotian OlMakongo shares a common boundary with Olopito Group Ranch and a fenced individual ranch. The eastern boundary of Rotian OlMakongo is the Seyabei Rivers which provides a natural division between Rotian OlMakongo and Olkeri and Kurua Group Ranches. Directly to the north Rotian OlMakongo shares a common boundary with Oloorageek Group Ranch (see map in Figure 2 below which has been abstracted from the Rotian OlMakongo Development Plan, 1974, Ministry of Agriculture).

Figure 2 Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch



Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch covers an area of 1,661 hectares. An ecological survey of this ranch carried out in 1974 shows that the vegetational cover includes 141 hectares of open forest (8.5%) of which 57 hectares (40%) are usable; 182 hectares of bushed grassland (11%) of which 127 hectares (70%) is usable; 498 hectares of grassland (29.5%) with 100% of this reportedly usable; and 847 hectares of forest (51%) of which 127 hectares (15%) are usable. The total accessible area for herding activities on this ranch is 809 hectares or 49% of the ranch area. The ranch is considered to be located on semi-high potential land (see map in Figure 3 below).

Figure 3 Vegetational Cover At Rotian OlMakongo



A HISTORY OF THE ROTIAN AREA

Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch was officially demarcated in 1966 although a development plan for the ranch was not drawn up until 1974. The process of demarcation in this area was considered to be uncomplicated compared to other parts of Maasailand, mainly because of the recognized, permanent and lengthy association of certain families in the area with definite land rights. Rotian OlMakongo was demarcated on the basis of the Ole Masikonde family's long standing residency in the area. I have been able to reconstruct some of the history concerning the movement of families into this area through interviews with Maasai elders.

Nkapilil Ole Maskonde was a prominent Maasai elder of the IlPurko section (iloshon) living on the Laikipiak Plateau at the turn of the century. Many of the Nyangusi elders presently living on Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch claim that Nkapilil is their grandfather which legitimizes their land rights in the area over many newcomers who are registered members on the group ranch. How then did Nkapilil come to be associated with an area many thousands of kilometers to the south of the Laikipiak Plateau?

Nkapilil Ole Masikonde was one of the Maasai elders who signed the 1904 Maasai Agreement with the British. He then became the senior elder of the Northern Maasai Reserve and was commonly regarded as a chief by the colonial officials at Rumuruti where he resided and worked as an interpreter for the British administrators. However, Nkapilil opposed the subsequent 1911 Treaty and he and Legalishu, the senior warrior who was regarded as another important Northern reserve chief, refused to sign. Eventually, the British were able to exert considerable pressure on the two men and they agreed to sign. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that because they signed this treaty, Legalishu was promised all rights to the Lemek Valley and Nkapilil was promised the Likia area in Upper Mau (cf. Leys 1973:129). The retired elders presently living in the Rotian area who remember the 1911 move to Likia assert that the British 'paid' Nkapilil to move and take up residence at Likia. However they claim that when Nkapilil arrived at Likia he was 'cheated by the Europeans,' mainly because Mr. Powys Cobb and another European had already been given the same land. As a result, the Masikonde family was soon forced to move on further southward where they took up residence in the Rotian area. Since Nkapilil Ole

Masikonde was a chief and olkitok or respected and wealthy elder, many Maasai families followed him.


The Maasai living at Rotian claim that when Nkapilil arrived in the Rotian area he found it unsettled, although they admit that the area was commonly recognized by the IlPurko Maasai as belonging to the IlDamat section. Since the IlPurko are the largest section and were numerically strong and powerful at that time, they met with little resistance and effectively gained control of the area. The Masikondes and their followers did well in the Rotian area and informants claim that Nkapilil had several wives and over a thousand cattle.

Nkapilil was so wealthy that he had several Kikuyu and Kipsigis herders attached to his family and working as herders. There were no Kikuyu or Kipsigis in the Rotian area until that time and it is said that Nkapilil brought his herders along with him from the north. Many of these herders who lived with Nkapilil were eventually adopted by him and have taken the Masikonde name and live in the area as registered ranch members today. These long time resident acceptees were pointed out as being il-nusui or not pure Maasai. However, they are considered to have legitimate land rights in the area as opposed to the many recent acceptees who do not or can not integrate with Maasai society to the same degree.

After the Masikonde lineage moved to Rotian, its members quickly set up procedures for grazing and trekking cattle. Throughout the dry season herds were kept within the confines of what is presently the group ranch, although they did graze their cattle as far away as the Keseyeria Forest and Likia in Upper Mau. In fact, all of Upper Mau was regarded by the IlPurko Maasai as a reserve in case of drought.

During the wet season herds were dispersed south towards ilchangi-pusi and iloisisui. However, at demarcation, only that area associated with Masikonde permanent settlements was included in the group ranch. In relation to their traditional herding patterns then, the ranch has lost a major portion of what was formerly high-potential dry season grazeland in the Mau and virtually all of their former wet season grazeland to the south (see map in Figure 4 below).

Figure 4 Traditional Herding Pattern



Since the 1920's the Masikonde family have lived permanently in various settlement areas in the Rotian area and, while there has been transhumant movement into and out of this area, anybody who wanted to settle permanently at Rotian had to obtain permission from the Masikonde lineage.

In fact, the Masikondes claim that in those days it was easy to drive away any unwanted herders who came into the area but since demarcation it is impossible to drive away those people not acceptable to the Masikondes. By the end of World War I Nkapilil was given the Medal of the First Honour by the British for persuading the Maasai to supply the British army with sheep and goats.

Nkapilil strongly supported education for the Maasai and sent his two eldest sons, Matanda and Oimeru, to school, first at Kijabe and later to the Church of Scotland Mission school at Thogoto. Matanda and Oimeru were both active in politics, speaking before the 1932 Carter Commission on land grievances. Oimeru was the first president of the Maasai Association formed in 1930 and was at various times a senior chief.

It was in 1930 that the well-known 'Famine of the Hides' struck and in 1936 East Coast Fever struck the area and devastated the Maasai herds. However, since Nkapilil employed numerous Kikuyu and Kipsigis herders, he retained them to plant shambas and provide the Maasai with free food until the cattle herds could be built up again.

ADJUDICATION AND MOVEMENT OF CATTLE

While I have indicated that the boundaries of Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch do not encompass the seasonal grazing patterns of the residents of the area, it is necessary to examine the relationships presently existing between Rotian OlMakongo and other neighbouring ranches to fully illustrate the extent to which adjudication has affected cattle movements.

To the west Rotian OlMakongo shares a boundary with Rotian Kotikash Group Ranch. Relations between the OlMakongo and Kotikash Group Ranches

are strained with neither ranch allowing the other's cattle to come onto their land. There are several reasons given for these restrictions. Members of the Masikonde lineage claim that in 1922 the Kotikash family arrived from the Mau and requested that they be accepted in the area. Nkapilil and Oimeru Ole Masikonde gave them permission to settle on the land to the east of the Masikondes. The same year OleNchoi arrived from Mulot and was accepted into the area and given land to the south. These families all began to exchange women in marriage and develop numerous affinal relationships. For some reason, it is said that elders from Kotikash and OlMakongo (Masikonde) began to quarrel and relations grew cold. Informants insisted that they did not remember what the quarrel was about since the elders involved were dead. However, when the ranches were being demarcated, members of the Masikonde lineage claim that elders from Rotian Kotikash paid bribes to the land surveyors in return for about 300 acres of land which should have been part of Rotian OlMakongo according to tradition. This led to considerable conflict between the two ranches and the cessation of livestock movement across the Narok-Nakuru road which is their common boundary.

Rotian Kotikash constructed a dip on their ranch and refused to allow Rotian OlMakongo cattle to make use of it. Members of Rotian OlMakongo say that the people of Kotikash are jealous of them because they are the rightful owners of the land and they want to see their cattle suffer since they have to be trekked 16 kilometers to the Narok County Council dip. Members of Kotikash say that they want to keep their ranch disease free and that the people of OlMakongo are jealous of them because of their unity.

I should emphasize here that this is a generalized view of cattle movement since herders can, and do, exploit relationships with agnates, affines, stockfriends and others in order to gain individual access to grazeland. Thus, while the majority of residents of OlMakongo cannot enter Kotikash Group Ranch it is quite ironic that the chairman of the group ranch committee of Rotian OlMakongo is a non-resident member who has been able to exploit affinal relationships to obtain membership on Rotian Kotikash Group Ranch where he resides and keeps most of his cattle.¹

The OleNchoi family, which settled the land to the south of Rotian OlMakongo, now occupy the Olopito Group Ranch. Relationships between Olopito and OlMakongo are for the most part good and permission is readily granted for members of these ranches to trek cattle across one another's land. Most of Upper Mau has been turned over to agricultural development and it is difficult for Rotian residents to gain permission to trek their cattle there. However, ranch members still trek their cattle to Eorr-Enkitok near the Enabelbel trading centre during the dry season. Also, at that time of year they are given permission to pass through Murua Group Ranch and Olchoro Group Farm on the way to Sonkoro in Upper Melili.

Throughout the wet season ranch members are forced to keep their cattle on the ranch because their traditional grazelands near ilchangi-pusi have been demarcated and now comprise parts of other group ranches. The membership of these group ranches discourage herders from outside the area from entering their grazelands. It should be pointed out that there is

¹ After leaving Kenya I learned through correspondence that the Rotian Kotikash had decided to open their dip facilities to members of Rotian Ol Makongo for the standard dipping fees.

absolutely no exchange of grazing rights between group ranches and neighbouring individual ranches. Indeed, most individual ranches are fenced to prevent this from occurring.

ILLEGAL GRAZERS AT ROTIAN OLMAKONGO

As can well be seen when examining livestock movement at Rotian, the people of this area do move their cattle off the group ranch and thus become at times, in the eyes of ranch planning officers, illegal graziers on other group ranchlands. Depending on the individual or group relationships involved, they may also be considered illegal graziers by other Maasai in the area. Traditional movements have been greatly affected by demarcation and as I will later show this in turn intensifies conflicts between lineages, clans, etc. Residency patterns on the ranch, which will be detailed shortly, will indicate the nature of movement off the ranch. Here, let me briefly examine another problem and that is movement of illegal graziers onto the Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch.

Because of Rotian OlMakongo's favourable location in part of a dry-season grazing area, the ranch is frequently plagued with illegal graziers. There are numerous ways that these illegal graziers come to enter OlMakongo Group Ranchlands and while some are considered legitimate temporary interlopers others are considered unwanted or threatening. Several examples can be given to illustrate this.

During times of drought stockowners from the more arid southern group ranches begin to move northward and at this time Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch has a great many illegal graziers who do not even come and ask for permission. During the 1976 drought residents of OlMakongo claim that they

did not take their cattle off the ranch and that water was plentiful. However, the numerous herds of cattle that moved onto their ranch at this time resulted in overgrazing, especially in those areas near the Seyabei River. It is difficult to turn away drought victims since they are often desperate and as one elder informed me, "We have no otherwise in times of drought." Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, another group ranch which forcibly evicted drought victims is being sued by those evicted! For the most part, while these illegal graziers are unwanted it is expected that their stay in the area will be temporary.

The problem of illegal graziers at OlMakongo is further exacerbated by the movement of Maasai from Upper Mau into the Rotian area because of expanded agricultural development in the locations where they have legitimate land rights. These Maasai are particularly resented since everyone is quick to point out that they are trespassing on other group ranchland because their own is under wheat.

At the time of research the land from Eorr-Enkitok to Enabelbel or the Ole Tipis Trading Centre was not fully demarcated. It is thickly forested and is not originally associated with Maasai families of long standing. It was and is part of the Rotian OlMakongo as well as many other Maasai's dry season grazing area. In the past ten years there has been a large influx of Kikuyu into the area and while there has been some intermarriage and many of these people call themselves Masikonde they continue to bring in their relatives from Nyeri and other Kikuyu locations. In 1979 a demarcation committee was formed to formally begin adjudication of the area. The land is being 'given' to those so-called Maasai. The Maasai at Rotian point out that the local Maasai politician speaks to these people in

fluent Kikuyu and is anxious to maintain their vote. Most of these individuals can speak Maa, although even government officials have said, "As soon as the land is demarcated they will all be speaking Kikuyu again." Many of those on the demarcation committee, i.e., county councillors, D.O.'s, etc., secured pieces of land for themselves. Several cattle trekkers from the Rotian area approached committee members and were hopeful of 'buying' a piece of land. When queried why they would want a plot of thickly forested land they astutely replied: "Some day that land will be cleared and they will be growing wheat there."

I make this point here because already the entire Upper Mau has been lost to the Maasai as a dry season grazing reserve and in the years to come it is apparent that this agricultural encroachment will move further southward. Once the entire area around Enabelbel is demarcated, the people of Rotian will no longer be able to make use of this land for pastoralism and this will certainly intensify the conflict with other pastoralists from the south who move onto their ranchlands during the dry season or at times of drought.

A neighbouring ranch, Murua Group Ranch, is considered very densely bushed and difficult to graze cattle on. Many of the members from that ranch spread out onto other neighbouring ranches, including Rotian OlMakongo. There is a political undercurrent that affects relationships between these and other group ranches, however, this will be discussed later.

Members of Murua Group Ranch routinely receive permission to trek their cattle across Rotian OlMakongo and similarly the reverse is true. However, one family of Masikonde, which includes five brothers and their wives and

children, have actually settled on Rotian OlMakongo and constructed an enkang. All five of these brothers are cattle trekkers and are considered wealthy, possessing over 400 head of stock between them which they keep on the OlMakongo Ranch. They have filed application to become registered members of Rotian OlMakongo. The current membership is divided as to whether or not to allow these guests to become legitimate members. Because they have so many cattle they have a surplus of milk which they sell in town and share with other families. They also provide employment for a couple of herdboys on the ranch. Thus, some member families wish to see them join because they are viewed as beneficial patrons. Others, however, say that there are already too many people and cattle on the ranch and that this family should be forced to leave.

On neighbouring Olopito Group Ranch, another family called Ole Partiop from Murua has also settled and the dominant family on the ranch, OleNchoi, has taken the case to court to have the Partiop family from Murua removed. How the case will be decided has more to do with the political backing the different sides have been able to muster than with legitimate land rights.

There are two members of Rotian OlMakongo, Ntiati and Lesinko Ole Ratia who have been accused of having their names forged on the register and several other members regard them as illegal trespassers and wish to see them evicted. Both of these brothers are members of a family ranch at Melili. These men, along with another brother and his two adult sons and a non-member from Olkeri Group Ranch live together in one enkang. One elder is a Nyangusi elder and owns about 120 cattle. However, he has no adult sons and the son of the treasurer of Rotian OlMakongo's Group Ranch committee herds his cattle for him. The treasurer is a strong advocate for

allowing the brothers to remain at Rotian OlMakongo. Furthermore, OlMakongo's chairman is an age mate and a close personal friend of the Ratia families.

Movement onto the ranch also takes the form of temporary permission for stockfriends and relatives to join an enkang. The Maasai say that it is particularly difficult to turn away your mother's brother and family or your sister's husband. However, increasingly other members will pressure a man not to allow his stockfriends and relatives to take up residence on the ranch. Passing through the ranch is one thing; taking up residence is another.

To illustrate the tensions that arise, let me present a case. The brother of a second wife of a deceased member of Rotian OlMakongo arrived at the ranch to take up residence and was given permission by the deceased man's brothers. This non-member was a member of Maji Moto Group Ranch. The man began to burn charcoal and was told that since he was not a ranch member he would have to pay a fee to the ranch. He refused to do this and with his profits he bought several goats which were herded communally with various other Maasai families. Since many of the young children in the area attend the nearby school and were not available for herding, the man was told that he must take a turn herding the goats. He refused to go out herding. Finally, he obtained a ram which the other Maasai said was thin, a poor performer with the ewes, a bad colour and overall an unacceptable breeder. The other Maasai have repeatedly requested that this man castrate his ram, put a leather apron on it or separate it from the rest of the flock. Despite very angry appeals the man has not complied. Eventually, the entire ranch, including the brothers of this man's deceased brother-in-

law decided to go to the police and file a complaint to have the man evicted. Since they could hardly complain that they did not like his ram, they filed complaint against him for the illegal burning of charcoal on group ranchland.

The issue of membership on the ranch is very sensitive. At one group ranch meeting attended by various government officials and local chiefs, all the young men over 18 who had come of age and not been previously registered were told to come forward and upon showing their new I.D. cards they would be registered. One young man stepped forward to register saying that his father was a member. A number of the young Maasai stood and said that the man's father was not a member. An elderly Kipsigis ranch member stood and announced that the boy in question was indeed his son. However, the senior warriors present still insisted that the boy was not the son of this man and should not be registered. The chief gave the boy three days to prove whether or not he was the son of a member.

After the meeting I questioned the senior warriors and they admitted that the boy was in fact the son of the old man who was a member. However, they pointed out that they were Kipsigis and that they both kept shambas at Mulot. The boy was a non-resident and had been called home by his father for the very purpose of registering. Although the boy's father was a legitimate acceptee, the senior warriors felt that since they maintained land elsewhere the boy really had no right to membership. Needless to say the boy was eventually registered. At this same meeting a Maasai living on the ranch who claimed that he had no other place to go and was not a member of another group ranch filed permission to become a member. A vote was taken and the man was not allowed to stay. I should

point out here that the Maasai elders even attempted to deny their own adult sons the right to register until the young men appealed to the District Commissioner and according to the ranch constitution were eventually admitted. I will speak more of this issue at a later point when I discuss the issue of subdivision.

Illegal graziers flood into the Rotian area at other times because the area is often chosen by the Laibon and elders as a ritual site. In early 1979, a ceremony for the senior warriors was held at Rotian and large numbers of warriors and cattle stayed in the area for a couple of weeks. Later, the E-unoto manyatta was constructed on neighbouring Olkeri Group Ranch and the cattle of the junior warriors at this manyatta grazed at OlMakongo. In 1974, the Iseuri age grade held a ceremony called the manyatta of the stools at Rotian and it is considered that the area will be designated for ritual activities in the future. Since the Laibon has instructed that rituals be celebrated here it is quite impossible for the people of Rotian OlMakongo to turn away the participants and their cattle. Fortunately, these ritual incursions are temporary and irregular.

In general, Rotian OlMakongo ranch members can deal with illegal graziers in three ways: (1) by levying traditional fines; (2) by using physical force; and (3) by reporting the problem to the government or police. None of these methods have proven very effective since illegal graziers are often on the ranch by request, being given permission or in some cases after paying a small 'gift' to a host member. Others are chased away but when this cannot be accomplished it is difficult to get any action from government sources. Even evicting non-members who have taken up residence involved long court suits. To conclude, I should mention that

although I undertook a survey of livestock numbers on the ranch owned by ranch members, it is pointless to attempt to estimate the grazeland available per livestock unit since this would be a gross misrepresentation of conditions on the ranch given the large volume of cattle grazing there illegally.

Demarcation of group ranches in the Rotian area has not led to the cessation of livestock movements although these have been greatly affected by loss of important dry season grazing and relationships between neighbouring group ranches. Giving relatives and stockfriends access to ranch resources creates conflicts between ranch members concerning land ownership and rights in ways that traditionally allowing access to graze never did.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIOLOGY OF ROTIAN OLMAKONGO GROUP RANCH

THE MEMBERSHIP

At the time of this research, Rotian OlMakongo had a registered membership of 80 persons, including the spouse of a senior warrior who had been killed loading bags of wheat. Of this membership, 14 persons are considered to be non-Maasai or acceptees. While Rotian OlMakongo was demarcated on the basis of the Masikonde lineage's long-standing association with the area, representatives of other Maasai lineages and clans also have membership on the ranch. Originally, this ranch was named and it is still popularly known as the Rotian Masikonde Group Ranch. However, because this gave the impression that the ranch 'belonged' to the Masikonde lineage, the name was changed to OlMakongo. The same is true of Olopito Group Ranch which is popularly known as Olenchoi Group Ranch after its dominant lineage. Other ranches in the area are often known by such names.


Of the total ranch membership, 56 men and their families are resident members on the ranch while 24 live somewhere else off the ranch.¹ These numbers fluctuate as some members return to take up residence and others leave to live or herd elsewhere or take up employment, etc. In general though it is quite accurate to say that it is usual for approximately 30%

¹ Of the non-resident members 12% are non-Maasai members. In relation to the total non-Maasai population, 21% of the members are non-resident and of the Maasai membership alone 31% are non-resident.

of the ranch membership to be non-resident. Even given this fluctuation of members who leave and then later return I found that of this 30% non-resident membership, 50% of them had never lived at Rotian OlMakongo or at least had not done so for a good many years.


Maasai and non-Maasai members, for the most part, live separate and apart on the ranch. The Maasai live in several inkang'itie' or homesteads and the non-Maasai in individual homes. Maasai enkang, each a fenced enclosure with several houses, can be illustrated in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5 Residential Locations At Rotian OlMakongo



The composition of enjang locations at Rotian OlMakongo will be briefly described.


Enjang #1 Head Of Enjang: Parningori Ole Masikonde



The entire enjang is home to sons and grandsons of Oimeru ole Masikonde, il-ukumai clan. Parningori is eldest son of Oimeru's first wife Titi. Sironka and Ketta are his full brothers, both unmarried and cattleless. Nkurruna and Taato are sons of Oimeru's second wife Tito. Mandile, Lasiti and Letoun are sons of Oimeru's 3rd wife. Kirropan and Kuya are sons of


Parningori and Samaine is the son of Parsiap, the deceased full brother of Parningori.

Enkang #2 Head Of Enkang: Sereria Ole Masikonde




Sereria ole Masikonde, the only Nyangusi elder in the enkang, is the half Iseuri brother of Oimeru and son of a Kikuyu mother. Ntiati ole Ratia is one of the members accused of forging his name on the register. He is Eiseuri. Karioro is a Rampau whose father died before adjudication. He is away trekking cattle and Sereria tends his cattle. Koileken, Darapei and Letina are full brothers whose father died.

Enkang #3 Head Of Enkang: Sayialele Ole Nereshet




Sayialele is an elderly ilterito elder, the father of Kikyaninge, Tipapa and Lentoi. Lemaria is the Rampau son of Lentoi and works off the ranch with Barbarunye at times. Aramat, Wauntaro, Tiaringot and Barbarunye are full brothers whose great-grandfather was Kipsigis.

Enkang #4 Head Of Enkang: Lesinka Ole Ratia



Enkang #5 Naresha Ole Naeku And Nenkorodo Ole Siolombe



Ntiati works as nightwatchman in Mau Narok at K.F.A. His first wife is Parsiap ole Masikonde's daughter.

Enkang #6 Enkang Not Typical

SHAMBA

☐ Lesire ole Kuya
- 2 Kikuyu wives

SHAMBA

The Ruria family
(Kikuyu acceptees
go by name
Masikonde)

☐ ? ole Masikonde
- his wife (no
relation of other
Masikondes)


Mzee Saitoto
ole Masikonde

☐ Tirma ole Kuya
- his Kikuyu wife
- Kotikash ole Kuya

☐ ? ole Masikonde
- Is the Nyangusi
brother of cattle trekkers
living in boma #7

Tirma Masikonde is a Nyangusi elder who took 60 cattle of a Twati elder who died. He has only 8 left as he sold others for drinking. He has been cursed to death by the other elders. His son Kotikash works away at Mara Serena Lodge and Lesira, a Nyangusi, has two Kikuyu wives who keep a large shamba and sell produce in town and on ranch. He has about five cattle. Note the Kikuyu do not have gates of their own.

Enkang #7 Head Of Enkang: Kirringai, Kantet And Metemie Ole Masikonde



All non-members from Murua Group Ranch who want to become members at Rotian OlMakongo. Kirringai and his brothers Metemie and Kantet are all Eseuri and along with Lesinko have become very wealthy through cattle trekking.

COMPOSITION OF RANCH MEMBERSHIP

The dominant lineage on Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch is the Masikonde Lineage.² This particular lineage is a member of the il-ukumai clan (See

² The dominant clan on Olopito Group Ranch is il-aizer and on Rotian Kotikash Group Ranch it is il-makesen.

Appendix B). Although the il-ukumai clan is made up of several other lineages, at Rotian OlMakongo the Masikonde lineage comprises 80% of the il-ukumai clan membership. The remainder of the ranch membership belongs to, in order of strength, il-makesen, il-aiser, il-taarosero and il-molelian clans, along with a number of Kikuyu and Kipsigis acceptees.

Unlike other parts of Maasailand where Jacobs (1971) reports that membership in an enkang is not likely to reflect agnatic lineage or clanship, the IlPurko Maasai of both Upper and Lower Mau have come more and more to associate 'elatia' (trans. neighbourhoods), with lineage and/or clan groupings. Enkang often reflect the grouping together of brothers, paternal uncles and agnatic cousins. For this reason, the Masikonde lineage in particular, and the il-ukumai clan in general, believe that they are the only legitimate claimants to the group ranchlands. Many of the ranch members not belonging to the il-ukumai clan came into the Rotian area during the late 1950's and early 1960's once they began to lose grazeland elsewhere, particularly in Upper Mau. Some of the Kikuyu and Kipsigis acceptees on the group ranch, many of whom were adopted and use the Masikonde name, are also considered to have less than 'proper' rights to the land, mainly because they encourage too many non-Maasai relatives to come and join them.

In determining who were the Kikuyu and Kipsigis on the group ranch I followed the Maasai categorization of these people. For the most part, it was fairly easy to recognize most of the acceptees since they usually do not live in enkang, they do not usually keep cattle and they are not included in any of the age set activities. There are a few cases where the distinctions become less clearly defined. Sasine ole Masikonde, a very

elderly il-tareto elder, is said to be the paternal grandson of a Kipsigis man whom Nkapilil ole Masikonde adopted. However, he has a number of cattle and two Maasai wives, lives in an enkang and his own children have participated in age grade ceremonies. This man and all his offspring were considered Maasai although it is significant that even after four generations people would point out the ethnic origin of this family.

Another ranch member, Koiyone ole Pasiany, was adopted by Parsiap ole Masikonde in the 1930's and although he is considered a Nyangusi elder and owns about forty cattle he is still considered a Kikuyu and people will tell you that he resides 'with' the ole Naeku family on the ranch. He has two wives both of whom are Kikuyu and so in keeping with the Maasai categorization I classed him as a Kikuyu.

Other ranch members, such as Sereria ole Masikonde who is a son of Nkapilil, are considered to be Maasai even though it is pointed out that they had a Kikuyu mother. The Maasai in this area say that if you marry a Kikuyu or Kipsigis wife your sons will grow up to love cattle so long as they grow up among the Maasai. Thus, the group ranch members who had a Maasai father and a non-Maasai mother are all considered to be part of the Maasai ranch membership. Thus, we are left with fourteen non-Maasai ranch members, ten Kikuyu and four Kipsigis. These non-Maasai ranch members make up 17% of the group ranch membership. Interestingly enough, of the resident, married Maasai at Rotian OlMakongo, 18% of them have Kikuyu or Kipsigis wives. It is more than likely not coincidental that the incidence of intermarriage at Rotian reflects the incidence of acceptees in the area. The Maasai men married to non-Maasai women are represented by two Nyangusi elders, 3 Iseuri elders and 1 Rampau senior warrior. Three of these men

belong to the il-ukumai clan and 3 are il-makesen. None of these particular Maasai owns more than ten (10) cattle so they have little vested interest in the pastoral economy.

In general, at a personal level, relationships between the Maasai and non-Maasai members are cordial. The non-Maasai all keep subsistence shambas (trans. gardens) and tension does occasionally develop when Maasai cattle enter the shambas and are subject to fines. A great many Kikuyu labourers live in the Rotian area as charcoal burners and timber cutters. Although they are not group ranch members and do not attend ranch meetings, they have been invited into the area by a Maasai host to whom they pay a fee to carry out these pursuits. The Maasai do not want any more acceptees settling on their land and they make sure the labourers do not build themselves houses, etc.

When I initially carried out questionnaire surveys at Rotian one of the questions which was asked was: Are there too many people living here? The response was usually positive. It was only later, after long conversations with ranch members, that I discovered that the majority of il-ukumai members who feel this way do so not because of any awareness of the carrying capacity of the ranchland and its relationship to population growth and resource usage, but rather, simply because there are too many of the 'wrong kind' of people living there. There are too many people at Rotian OlMakongo, according to the il-ukumai, because there are too many non-il-ukumai, recent arrivals, Kikuyu and Kipsigis, and so on.

Nevertheless, since the il-ukumai are the dominant clan at Rotian OlMakongo (see Figure 6 below) one would think that they could easily dominate ranch politics, particularly since they could form an effective

voting bloc if they were determined to wield their influence during ranch meetings.

Figure 6 Clan Membership Of Rotian OlMakongo

<u>CLAN</u>	<u>NO. OF MEMBERS</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
il-ukumai	41	51
il-makesen	15	18
il-aiser	5	6
il-taarohero	4	5
il-molelian	1	1
Non-Maasai	<u>14</u>	<u>17</u>
TOTAL	<u>80</u>	

There is additional support for suspecting that il-ukumia clansmen might dominate the ranch when consideration is given to the composition of the group ranch committee according to clan affiliations (see Figure 7 below). Age set affiliation will also be given for future reference.

Figure 7 Committee Composition At Rotian OlMakongo

<u>COMMITTEE POSITION</u>	<u>CLAN AFFILIATION</u>	<u>AGE SET</u>
Chairman	il-ukumai	Nyangusi
Vice-Chairman	il-taarohero	Nyangusi
Treasurer	il-ukumai	Iseuri
Secretary	il-ukumai	Rampau
Organizer	il-makesen	Iseuri
Member	il-ukumai	Nyangusi
Member	il-ukumai	Nyangusi
Member	il-ukumai	Nyangusi
Member	il-ukumai	Nyangusi

Nevertheless, in spite of this apparent statistical majority, il-ukumai clansmen do not exert comparable influence on ranch decision making. There are several reasons for this. First, a survey of residential status of ranch members indicates that at least 24 members or 30% do not live on the ranch. Of the 24 non-resident members, 17 are il-ukumai, 3 are il-makesen, 1 is il-aizer and 3 are non-Maasai. In effect then, the il-ukumai resident on the ranch number only 24 members which reduces their presence from 51% to 42%.

A second reason why the il-ukumai clansmen lack influence has to do with the fact that Maasai loyalties and interests are also reflected in the age grade system which distributes and often fragments clan loyalties and interests. For example, to a large extent, the ruling elder age set on the ranch, the Nyangusi, are the traditional and real power brokers on the ranch committee. Decisions concerning generational relationships, education, etc., are often made at this level. All Nyangusi elders may contribute their opinions until a consensus of opinion is reached. However, because the il-ukumai clan does not monopolize this age set (nor does any other clan), it happens that decision-making is very often not based on clanship. Figure 8 below shows the Maasai ranch membership according to age set affiliation.

Figure 8 Age-Set Affiliation At Rotian OlMakongo

<u>AGE-SET</u>	<u>NO. OF MEMBERS</u>
Tareto	3
Terito	5
Nyangusi	21
Iseuri	19
Rampau And	17
Tobola	1

A third factor which undermines decision-making on the group ranch is that ranch loyalties are often ignored or overlooked because of a member's economic interests elsewhere. For example, some of the members, including the non-resident ranch committee chairman, are seen to be more interested in developing their land holdings elsewhere. Other members have membership on other group ranches and this is most definitely thought to contribute to their lack of interest in seeing development of Rotian OlMakongo. Figures 9 and 10 below show the land interests of ranch members other than Rotian OlMakongo, in relation to their clan and age set affiliations.

Figure 9 Individual Land Holdings Off The Ranch

<u>IN RELATION TO AGE-SET</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>IN RELATION TO CLAN</u>	<u>NO.</u>
Terito	1	il-ukumai	4
Nyangusi	3	il-aiser	2
Iseuri	2	il-taarosero	1
Rampau	1		
Kikuyu	1		
Kipsigis	2		
TOTAL	<u>10</u>		

Figure 10 Group Ranch Membership Elsewhere

<u>IN RELATION TO AGE-SET</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>IN RELATION TO CLAN</u>	<u>NO.</u>
Terito	1	il-ukumai	3
Nyangusi	3	il-makesen	1
Iseuri	1	il-molelian	1
TOTAL	<u>5</u>		

The fact that some members have land holdings elsewhere or are members of other group ranches does not necessarily mean that they have no interest in Rotian OlMakongo. There are at least six men resident at Rotian who have land interests elsewhere. One man keeps part of his herd at OlMakongo and another part at Ilmashariani Group Ranch of which he is a member. Another man keeps most of his cattle at Rotian, although he divides his time between OlMakongo and Oloirito Group Ranch. Nevertheless, the issue of land holdings other than at Rotian OlMakongo is seen to influence decision-making. At one meeting I attended where the elders were trying to decide whether the ranch should accept a loan everyone kept complaining about the lack of unity on the ranch. Finally, one elder stood and said: "The reason that there is no development at Rotian is because people with land elsewhere have another fortune so they do not care if this land is subdivided."

The Maasai at Rotian OlMakongo will also assert that pastoral development has been thwarted on their ranch because the non-Maasai members have no interest in sharing the costs of cattle dips, bore holes, firebreaks, etc. With the exception of the one Kikuyu living with the Naeku family, none of the non-Maasai own cattle and are instead solely concerned with agriculture. The fact that these non-Maasai members do not own cattle is not entirely of their own choosing. Most of the Kikuyu and Kipsigis acceptees were originally brought into the area by the Masikonde lineage to act as herdsmen. Not only did their importance as herders shrink as Maasai livestock numbers in this area diminished, but during the Emergency any Kikuyu found herding cattle in the bush was regarded as a

potential thief for the forest fighters. It became at this time impossible for the acceptees to continue in this role and to this day most Kikuyu and Kipsigis acceptees refuse to herd cattle since they believe that the Maasai warriors would only come and steal the livestock. The acceptees who have integrated most fully seem to have accomplished this before their roles as herders were lost, although this may also be a function of time. Today, many of the acceptees do keep flocks of sheep and goats, however, even these animals are cared for by a Maasai herder and are housed in a Maasai enkang at night. As a result, acceptees keep comparatively few animals and, in fact, there is little real opportunity for such people to fully participate in the pastoral economy even if they did desire to do so.

THE CATTLE ECONOMY OF ROTIAN OLMAKONGO

Above, I examined the involvement of non-Maasai ranch members in the cattle economy and how this affects their decisions on what direction development should take. Let us turn now and scrutinize Maasai involvement in the pastoral sector. Figure 11 below reveals some significant statistics regarding residence status of ranch members in relation to their stock wealth and also their age set affiliation.

Figure 11 Resident Status At Rotian Olmankongo

<u>AGE-SET</u>	<u>RESIDENT</u>	<u>NON-RESIDENT</u>	<u>30+ CATTLE</u>	<u>NO CATTLE</u>
Tareto	33	-	1	2
Terito	3	2	2	-
Nyangusi	16	5	6	2
Iseuri	10	9	4	8
Rampau And Tobola	13	5	4	7
Kikuyu	7	3	1	9
Kipsigis	4	-	-	4
TOTAL	56	24	18	32

On the basis of the data presented above, it can be seen that 57% of the ranch membership have no cattle and this figure could be even higher since there are three or four non-resident members that no one knows anything about. If one considers the resident ranch membership only, it should be noted that 18 members or 32% do not own any cattle. Since this number includes ten non-Maasai, one could say that approximately 20% of the resident Maasai members at Rotian OlMakongo are stockless. On the other hand, there are 18 resident members or 32% who own more than 30 cattle. I calculated herds over 30 for resident ranch members only since it was difficult to confirm herd size of non-resident members. On the other hand, since several non-resident members were known to be completely destitute and stockless I included them in the number of members with no cattle. Overall the percentage of members with more than 30 cattle will probably approximate 40% since I was told that two of the Nyangusi and one of the Terito elders not living on the ranch were "very wealthy." A herd size of 30+ cattle was chosen as a benchmark because Maasai informants in this area regarded this as significant in deciding if a herder is 'committed' to the pastoral economy. Most of the families with more than 30 cattle were able to sell some milk in town during the wet season while those with less consumed everything.

I should point out that most Maasai living at Rotian OlMakongo are ideologically committed to pastoralism and that they regard this as the most prestigious economic endeavour possible. If one temporarily omits the 10 non-Maasai resident members from the picture we find that 39% of the resident Maasai have over 30 cattle and 20% of the Maasai here are stockless, with the remainder of the Maasai members falling somewhere in

between these two extremes. Sheep and goats are also kept on the ranch although I did not attempt a survey to calculate their numbers. Some stockless members do have sheep and goats and one particularly wealthy young Rampau is said to have over 500 sheep and goats. Sheep are never milked and goats are only milked if the kid dies and then the milk is used solely for making tea. Sheep and goats are utilized mainly for ritual purposes, as a medium of social exchange, as slaughter stock during food shortages, and as market stock when cash is scarce. Blood is rarely consumed by ranch members or their families except on ceremonial occasions.

If one looks only at the non-resident Maasai members, it was found that 52% of them have no cattle. It is interesting to note that 23% of the non-resident Maasai are Nyangusi elders and 42% are Iseuri. The Rampau account for a further 23%. Informants at the ranch believe that none of the non-resident Nyangusi are stockless, while 8 of the 9 non-resident Iseuri are said to be without any cattle. This last comparison seems to support the contention made by Nyangusi elders that "the Iseuri have drunk their herds." At least three Iseuri ranch members are said to be vagrants in Nairobi. The Nyangusi elders explained that the Iseuri were prohibited by the government from carrying out many of their warrior activities or their ceremonies were greatly speeded up. On the other hand, opportunities for the Eseuri to attend school were limited so that now many of them are like a 'lost generation.' The Rampau have had greater pressure to attend schools so that they are seen as having alternative occupations open to them if they do not have many cattle, and many of the poor Rampau are ardent cattle trekkers who are seen to be amassing wealth to build up future herds.

On the basis of the preceding comments concerning the distribution of livestock wealth among group ranch members, it should not be surprising that there is considerable conflict regarding what direction ranch development should take. Aside from doing nothing, most ranch members recognize two divergent development alternatives. One is to increase agricultural production in the area, i.e., wheat cropping, and the other is to develop a pastoral infrastructure. One faction of the ranch membership, viz., wealthy stockowners, argues that agriculture has not benefited the ranch and should be completely discontinued. Others, who have little vested interest in pastoralism and nothing to gain from infrastructural improvements in this sector, want more land given over to wheat cropping in order to increase the revenue for individual members.

Even among the Maasai and given the generally small herd sizes, ranch development is inhibited to some extent by the disparities in stock wealth that do exist. Since repayment of a development loan is based on the proportion of stock wealth that each member possesses, those few men with very large herds feel that they will have to bear the greatest burden for development. Indeed, there are several families that are too poor in stock wealth to contribute financially. Moreover, there are no traditional social units on which to base solidarity in terms of livestock development.

With regard to these two development possibilities, we might ask: Are there any organizational frameworks which enable ranch members to muster behind one alternative or the other? One might immediately note that 9 of the 18 resident members with over 30 cattle are from the il-ukumai clan. Consequently, it is in the interest of these men to economically align themselves with men from other clans who also have large herds. However,

as figure 11 shows, men with more than 30 cattle belong to five different age sets, along with one Kikuyu who is more or less considered a Nyangusi. Because of this, these wealthier stockowners have difficulty forming a united coalition with respect to ranch development. In fact, those Maasai committed to pastoral development raise their objections to wheat cropping in terms of individual appeals relating to their individual interests. Furthermore, this individualism appears to account for the failure of ranch members to take any initiative in securing loans for pastoral development. The following example should serve to illustrate this point.

During an informal meeting of the elders at Rotian OlMakongo, the possibility of taking out a development loan was discussed at great length. Finally, it was unanimously agreed that the ranch should not take out a loan. Reasons cited by the elders were "loans will make us quarrel" and "loans will lead to subdivision" or "the chief has not taken a loan so why should we?" Thus, even though some members are united in their desire for further pastoral development, there does not appear to be any traditional sociological unit present in which their solidarity in one sphere of activities, i.e., ranch development, may be channelled without being overshadowed by solidarity deriving from other spheres of activity such as age set, clan, lineage and so on. In order to avoid conflict or strain in these other activities, the majority of the membership at Rotian OlMakongo give the impression that they would prefer to do nothing.

When one talks to these elders individually and away from their peers, many of them will complain vehemently about the lack of development on the ranch and the difficulty of reaching a consensus of opinion. Ironically, consensus constitutes itself in the form of anti-development posturing

since by doing nothing at least the status quo is protected. In any event, it is safe to say that the major constraint on ranch development at Rotian OlMakongo does not derive from a lack of incentive, or acute laziness as members have often been accused by government agents. Instead, it derives from the inability of ranch members to realize new organizational forms which would be able to handle the interests of people and not just age mates, clansmen or stockfriends, etc. Each individual feels that he is taking a separate risk and after considering all the variables most members decide that the "opportunity costs" (cf. Schneider 1974) or social risks involved are simply too high.

In March of 1979, Rotian OlMakongo held its Annual General Meeting. At this meeting, local government officials suggested that the ranch should take out a 30,000 shilling loan to contract for a bulldozer to clear more ranchland for wheat production. It was said that the profits from expanded wheat could be used for future ranch development such as dip construction. Finally, the membership voted to take out the loan.³ This might seem to contradict what has already been said above concerning members' negative attitudes to development loans. However, it should be recognized here that the members of Rotian OlMakongo are under considerable psychological pressure to demonstrate signs of 'progress' since nothing visible has been done at the ranch for more than ten years. Furthermore, members are aware that they are considered one of the least cooperative group ranches in the

³ Here one should note that since 30% of the membership is non-resident and a 60% turnout of membership is needed for a quorum, at Rotian Ol Makongo 90% of the resident members must turn out. This, rather than pure indifference, probably explains why meetings are often cancelled due to poor attendance.

district, with an apathetic membership. Voting for the development loan at this time was something that members felt that they had to do to please ranch planning officials. Officials from the Ranch Planning Office are only too aware of this contradiction. In fact, after a public vote like this many of the ranch members go to their office in Narok individually to complain that they really did not intend to vote the way that they did.

Group ranch members further decided to request the loan because government officials explained to them that they would only have to repay the loan at the rate of 3,000 shillings per year. However, after talking to ranch members after the meeting it seems clear that they do not understand the principles behind borrowing and repaying money. They were not aware of interest charges and consequently they do not understand that they will have to repay much more than the original 30,000 shilling loan. It is interesting that ranch planning officials attempted to persuade the ranch to take out a loan for wheat development under the guise that it could finance pastoral development. For one thing, 30,000 shillings was the usual cost for construction of a dip so that if pastoral development were the prime concern for the area it would make more sense to take out the loan initially for a dip rather than wheat expansion. It seems quite evident that ranch planning officials in the area foresee the destiny of the Lower Mau in agricultural development. Since these officials are ostensibly in office to promote pastoral ranch development, at present they endorse agricultural development as a means to promote pastoral development. Privately, many officials admit that in twenty years they expect the entire area above Narok township to be subdivided and given over to agriculture or a form of agro-pastoralism.

Elders at Rotian OlMakongo continually maintained that there had been no ranch development because of the ranch committee's lack of organizational abilities. In the past, it was argued, members were reluctant to contribute money that they got from wheat to the committee and even the charcoal money which had been allotted to the committee was spent by the members with nothing to show for it. The committee chairman offered to resign and ranch planning officials suggested that there should be an election to choose new committee members. A vote was taken and the membership voted unanimously to retain the existing committee. In a very real sense then, it would seem that the lack of initiative on the part of the committee contributes to maintaining the delicate balance between conflicting interests of ranch members.

The inability of ranch members to generate cooperation and unity on the ranch points to the potential for subdivision of ranchland into individual or family holdings. This has become a major concern for many ranch members, particularly those Maasai who fear the loss not only of pastoralism but of their cultural identity. Already, members with land holdings elsewhere and those without cattle, together with the acceptees, regard subdivision favourably. In fact, if these three groups were to join forces and vote in favour of subdivision, they would undoubtedly form a powerful coalition since together they constitute 76% of the total ranch membership. Ranch planning officials have told the members that if everybody is in favour of subdivision, then the ranch can be demarcated into individual holdings.

The membership at Rotian OlMakongo has not yet moved in this direction for the same reasons that decisions concerning ranch development have not

been taken. Namely, the economic interests of various members are often overshadowed by obligations to clansmen, age mates, relatives and stockfriends, etc.⁴ Furthermore, non-resident members often fail to appear at ranch meetings to exercise their vote while others in favour of subdivision are compromised by their allegiance to committed pastoralists. Finally, some members refuse to consider subdivision because they intend to participate in the pastoral economy in the future. Maasai ranch members who are committed to a pastoral economy maintain that the amount of land an individual or family would have after sub-division would not be sufficient to support a large cattle herd. Even the late chief Zakayo, himself the owner of an individual ranch, pleaded with the members of Rotian OlMakongo not to subdivide because most people would face a life of poverty or would immediately sell their land leaving their entire family landless. However, taking out loans for dips and grade stock, etc. is also considered a risk since these people of Rotian firmly believe that should they default their ranch would be confiscated, subdivided and sold to repay the debt. Thus, it appears that this group ranch is in somewhat of a stalemate position and members are reluctant to make decisions for fear that this could upset the delicately balanced status quo.

HERD SIZES, STRUCTURE, NUTRITION AND FAMILY BUDGETS AT ROTIAN

Herd sizes at Rotian OlMakongo ranged from less than ten cattle to over a hundred. A survey of herd structure and offtake rates indicated a range

⁴ Ironically, one of the most vocal proponents of subdivision is the non-resident group ranch committee chairman.

of female cattle in the total herd of 60 to over 80%. The poorer the stockowner and the smaller his herd, the higher the preponderance of female cattle. The average offtake rate of cattle for consumption was approximately 4%, while the total offtake including sales and exchange was in the neighbourhood of 29%. There is a slightly higher offtake of sheep (37%) and goats (42%). Again, the higher the offtake rates, the poorer were the families involved. Of the 25% sale or exchange of livestock, about half of it would be in the form of exchange. As can be seen, this does not represent an absolute offtake since one type of animal is exchanged or replaced with another.

Overall, offtake at Rotian seems too high to permit natural herd growth. This claim is further substantiated by the Maasai's contention that calf mortality in the Rotian area is approximately 60% due to cold wet mornings during the wet season. Although I was unable to fully verify this, Maasai stockowners claimed that mortality rates in the arid areas are only about 20% which is certainly in keeping with research in this regard (Meadows and White 1979:5).

Offtake rates of livestock are offset by the fact that about 12% of these are in the form of exchange. Steers are regularly exchanged for heifers. Many other forms of exchange take place, usually between residents of Rotian and stocktraders or cattle trekkers. Some of the exchanges that took place at Rotian while I was conducting research were as follows:

1 bull	exchanged for 2 steers
1 young castrated bull	exchanged for 1 ram and 1 fat he-goat
3 oxen	exchanged for 5 heifers and 1 steer
1 sterile cow	exchanged for 1 heifer and 1 calf
1 steer	exchanged for 1 heifer and 1 calf
1 old bull	exchanged for 2 heifers
2 heifers	exchanged for 24 sheep

Furthermore, since most of the Maasai at Rotian OlMakongo are involved in other economic activities which bring in cash at various times of the year, they will attempt to replace this high offtake with the purchase of heifers from Mulot or from cattle trekkers. Consequently, it is difficult to monitor herd structure, and even size for that matter. One cattle trekker, a resident member of Rotian OlMakongo, returned one day with eleven heifers and one steer to add to his herd. For the most part, one can say that herd structure in this area is directly related to the high offtake rate and the subsequent purchase of heifers or exchange of animals. In other words, herd composition and growth is not dependent on natural fertility alone.

NUTRITIONAL STATUS

I attempted to examine the seven enjang sites at Rotian OlMakongo to determine whether or not the Maasai herders on the ranch were able to fulfill their subsistence needs from their cattle alone, i.e., through milk consumption. I knew before the survey was even conducted that milk production seemed insufficient and that their diet was supplemented almost daily by maize meal, home-grown vegetables, fat, sugar and tea. Of course, use of these products did decline during the wet season.

Although I knew approximately how many cattle were in each enjang, I was not able to enumerate how many cattle were actually lactating in either the wet or dry season. Thus, in order to estimate how many lactating cows were in each herd, I assumed that approximately 60% of the total herd would be heifers or adult cows and that 50% of these would be lactating at any one time (cf. Jacobs 1965). This estimate may, in fact, be too high or too low depending on calving rates and length of lactation (Dahl and Hjort 1978:148). Maasai in this area do claim that their cows have a short period of lactation, about 5 months, which means that a larger herd would be necessary to provide nutritional requirements. The high calf mortality rate does not completely undermine lactation since the Maasai can keep their cows lactating by substituting a calf or stuffing the hide of the deceased calf and presenting it to the mother. For the most part, the percentage of cows and heifers in the herds at Rotian are higher than the 60% assumed so that for the purpose of average outputs I decided to use the 50% lactating figure (see Figure 12 below).

Figure 12 Daily Milk Production At Rotian OlMakongo

<u>ENKANG SITE</u>	<u>NO. OF CATTLE</u>	<u>NO. COWS LACTATING</u>	<u>MILK PROD. WET SEASON (litres)</u>	<u>CALORIC CONTENT</u>	<u>MILK PROD. DRY SEASON (litres)</u>	<u>CALORIC CONTENT</u>
1	180	54	81	54270	27	18090
2	120	36	54	36180	18	12060
3	220	66	99	66330	33	22110
4	164	49	74	49448	25	16482
5	67	20	30	20200	10	6733
6	98	29	44	29547	15	9849
7	395	118	179	119092	59	39697

Given that a certain number of cows were lactating, the output of milk was determined from the estimates of my own informants and a number of other researchers who have investigated this area (Epstein; Dahl and Hjort 1976; McKay; Spencer 1973). I assumed that Maasai cows on average will produce 1.5 litres of milk daily for human consumption during the wet season and .5 litres of milk during the dry season. A great many variables affect the output or volume of milk such as: availability of graze, range conditions, etc. Maasai at Rotian pointed out that younger herders who were not able to take the cattle as far for good graze or because they were not as competent herders, contributed to a decline of milk production in the cows in their herds. The number of calories in a litre of Maasai milk was considered to be 670 calories (Brown 1973).

Thus, given an estimate of milk production at the inkang'itie at Rotian OlMakongo during the wet and dry seasons one can relate this information to the number of residents in each enkan. In order to estimate the daily caloric needs of these residents based on "Dietary Allowances" calculations it was estimated that adult males (over 18 years of age) require 2,800 calories per day; adult females (over 18 years of age) require 2,400 calories per day and a child needs 2,000 calories per day. These are based on standards for North American consumption and Brown (1973:69) and others suggest that an average adult pastoral male probably needs only 2,300. Thus, estimates in Figure 13 below may well be too high, however, even given allowance for a decreased caloric requirement we shall see that caloric requirements and caloric output of milk do not coincide.

Figure 13 Daily Caloric Requirements Of Enkang Sites At Rotian OlMakongo

ENKANG SITE	MEN	WOMEN (RESIDENT)	CHILDREN	CALORIC REQUIREMENTS			TOTAL
				MEN	WOMEN	CHILDREN	
1	10	7	22	28000	16800	40000	84800
2	6	7	17	16800	16800	34000	67600
3	10	10	16	28000	24000	32000	84000
4	4	3	11	11200	7200	22000	40400
5	8	7	16	22400	16800	32000	71200
6	5	4	12	14000	9600	24000	47600
7	4	4	8	11200	9600	16000	36800

Given the daily caloric output of milk in relation to the required daily caloric needs of the residents, one can calculate to what degree milk consumption contributes to subsistence needs of resident members at Rotian OlMakongo. Figure 14 below shows that only two in'kangi'tie, sites 4 and 7, produce enough milk to contribute substantially to their diets even in the wet season. Interestingly, enkang 4 is the residence of one of the members that others are trying to evict and the other residents of the enkang are non-members of the ranch. However, residents of enkang 3 herd the cattle for 5 because of a shortage of adult sons. Enkang 7, which is the only site to also have a dry season surplus, are also not group ranch members at OlMakongo. Their generosity with their surplus milk is one reason why many resident members do not want to see them expelled from the ranch. Also, during ceremonies held at the Rotian area, enkang 7 provides food for visiting dignitaries. In general, however, if one examines each enkang, it becomes apparent that these people cannot subsist largely on a milk diet and that they must in fact seek alternative food sources.

Figure 14 Contribution Of Milk To Subsistence Needs

<u>ENKANG SITE</u>	<u>WET SEASON</u>	<u>DRY SEASON</u>	<u>AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION</u>
1	82%	21%	51%
2	53%	18%	35%
3	78%	26%	54%
4	122%	40%	81%
5	20%	13%	20%
6	62%	20%	41%
7	323%	107%	215%

If one were to consider that among the seven inkang'itie at Rotian OlMakongo there was a total redistribution of milk between those with a surplus and those with a deficit, then during the wet season the total amount of milk available in the area would fully meet subsistence needs, i.e., 106%. Even with redistribution, during the dry season only 35% of subsistence needs would be met. However, this scenario does not occur since there is not total redistribution of milk. I cannot accurately determine how much of the surplus from one enkang is channelled to another, although I do know that a Maasai woman from enkang 2 sells her surplus milk during the rainy season to the Kikuyu on the ranch. Two women from enkang 3 also sell milk in Narok town during the wet season. One woman from enkang 4 regularly sells milk in town when the settlement has a seasonal surplus. Enkang 7 sell surplus milk although during the time of this research, a great deal of its wet season surplus went to Tobola warriors from the nearby E-unoto manyatta and to visitors at a Rampau ceremony held at Rotian.

Thus, while some redistribution certainly does occur, if one considers the inkang'itie other than sites 4 and 7, it can be seen that subsistence

needs are not entirely met even during the rainy season, not to mention the dry season. If one takes the average contribution of milk to the total yearly diet then most enjang at Rotian OlMakongo obtain about 54% of their diet or less from their herd's milk production. Having spent considerable time at enjang sites 1, 2, and 3 during the dry season, I witnessed days when only the children received any milk and powdered milk was bought in town to make the children some uji (porridge). When considering contribution of family herds to subsistence, I have not accounted for meat, blood, etc. since I was attempting to determine how much milk consumption contributed to the diet.

In general then, one might say that during the wet season Maasai herds contribute approximately 75% to their diet while during the dry season they contribute only about 20% of subsistence needs. On average, milk consumption provides only about 50% of the total diet. Morgan (1972:164) and Brown (1973:69) speculate that meat consumption accounts for about 20% of the pastoral diet. I was not able to confirm this number, but even were it the case the Maasai diet in this area would still have to be supplemented by 30% or more from other food sources. This is in marked contrast to Jacob's (1965:155) findings for Kisongo Maasai in Tanzania in the 1960's. He found that agricultural products formed less than 20% of the Maasai yearly diet. The Maasai at Rotian OlMakongo supplement their diet with homegrown vegetables (an activity which has become more widespread among Maasai women in the last five years), eggs (from keeping chicken) and the purchase of unga (maize meal), sugar, tea, vegetables, etc.

Now, given this reduction in dependence on a milk diet, in many cases to almost 50% of the total caloric intake, it is interesting to note that Pratt and Gwynne (1977:39) speculate that "if half the milk ration is replaced by grain, then half the number of breeding females are required and the land requirement per family is halved." Indeed, this very process is occurring at Rotian OlMakongo encouraged by expanding human populations, agricultural encroachment, declining cattle numbers and so on. However, the ecologists' predictions (ibid:39): "Reduce the dependence on the milk diet and the battle is at least part won," does not appear to be materializing. Again, I would stress that declining milk dependency is the result of scarcity and poverty and that the 'battle' that many stockowners are fighting is a losing one. Repeatedly, Maasai women commented that if they had enough milk they would not be buying maize meal and vegetables.

The sale of milk in this area, where so many residents cannot meet their wet season subsistence needs, is again a sign of poverty and not modernity and abundance. The Maasai are becoming more and more enmeshed in the cash economy, and they must constantly be seeking opportunities to obtain cash to pay for clothing, school uniforms, medicine, dipping fees, tobacco and of course food. Although I do not have concrete evidence, I would also suggest that meat consumption among Maasai in this area is less than the 20% predicted by Brown (1973) as many dying, old and barren animals are sold to obtain cash to supplement the diet and the income.⁵ Thus, increased cattle sales and dietary changes are the result of

⁵ Dead calves, kids and lambs are fed to the children. The Maasai here claim that they lose very few shoats, but given the very high number of calves that are said to die, children obtain some meat in this manner.

increasing scarcity. A traditionally high protein diet is increasingly being supplemented with a less nutritious cereal grain diet. Thus, the contention that increasing Maasai involvement in the market economy and decreasing their dependence on milk will raise their standard of living is not apparent at this stage of events.⁶ To a large extent, alternative economic activities subsidize the pastoral economy at Rotian OlMakongo.

Participation of Maasai in the cash economy may be demonstrated by examining the family budgets of one of the enkang sites on the Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch. The yearly budget was derived from estimates taken from male and female residents during the dry season. These estimates may be slightly high since consumption of posho and vegetables does seem to decline in the wet season if there is plenty of milk. Since Rotian is home to several cattle traders, many people claim that they never have to buy fat as the trekkers bring it home to them. This particular settlement did not have to purchase fat. The yearly budget was calculated based on the purchase of the following items.

Item

Maize meal	Also known as unga, a family of six or more would consume about 2 debes of unga a week. A debe costs 15 Shs.
Sugar	The above family would use about 2 kilograms of sugar a week or purchase a sack of sugar for 415 Shs.
Tea	Most families claimed to spend about 20 Shs. a week or 70 Shs. a month on tea.

⁶ It is difficult to say to what extent this is true for the arid areas of Narok. However, during the dry season, many inkangi'tie that I visited did not have enough milk to go around or even to serve guests a cup of tea. Furthermore, at the Tobola E-unoto manyatta, which represented warriors from the entire district, everyone was said to be going hungry and the warriors were resorting to drinking a mixture of water and sugar.

Figure 16 Income Per Year⁷

<u>HOUSEHOLD</u>	<u>HUT A</u>	<u>HUT B</u>	<u>HUT C</u>	<u>HUT D</u>	<u>HUT E</u>	<u>HUT F</u>
Charcoal	9,000	5,000	3,000	2,000	2,000	-
Timber	900	-	-	-	-	-
Wages	900	200	500	-	1,200	-
Milk/Breads	100	100	40	-	100	-
Wheat	1,500	1,000	1,500	500	500	-
TOTALS	12,400	6,300	5,040	2,500	3,800	-

Figure 17 Livestock Sales And Purchases

<u>Animals Sold</u>		
Hut A	Sterile cow (600 Shs.)	600 Shs.
Hut B	Bullock (600 Shs.); old cow (700 Shs.); 5 he-goats and rams (370 Shs.)	1,670 Shs.
Hut C	4 steers (2,400 Shs.); 3 cows (1,800 Shs.); 6 he-goats and rams (450 Shs.)	4,650 Shs.
Hut D	No sales	
Hut E	Bullock (2,000 Shs.); sterile cow (1,000 Shs.)	3,000 Shs.
Hut F	No sales. 3 oxen were exchanged for 5 heifers and one steer	
TOTAL		9,920 Shs.

⁷ The incomes reflected here are those that are available to the household for everyday use. Huts A, C and E all have cattle trekkers each reportedly making a yearly income of about 15,000 Shs. However, this is used in their business since about 10,000 in cash is needed to start out on each trek. These men all send home small monthly allowances to their wives. The actual amount of money that men turn over to their wives from charcoal and wheat is very difficult to estimate. Some of it is saved and some disappears without ever being accounted for.

Figure 17 Continued

<u>Animals Purchased</u>		
Hut A	12 heifers (4,200 Shs.)	4,200 Shs.
Hut B	3 she-goats (150 Shs.)	150 Shs.
Hut C	6 heifers (2,100 Shs.); 4 steers (1,200 Shs.); 6 he-goats (440 Shs.); 3 she-goats (210 Shs.)	3,950 Shs.
Hut D	5 ewes (500 Shs.); 3 he-goats (180 Shs.)	680 Shs.
Hut E	11 heifers (3,850 Shs.); 1 steer (300 Shs.)	4,150 Shs.
TOTAL		<hr/> 13,130 Shs.

Given the above expenditures and incomes one would think that balancing the budget would be a matter of adding total household incomes and monies from animals sold and compare this to the total household expense and the number of animals purchased. Such a comparison would produce 33,444 Shs. in gross expenses and 39,920 Shs. in income calculated. In this way, it would appear that enkang site X effectively covers the cost of their expenses and makes a profit in doing so. This is not the case and needs further elaboration.⁸

First of all, I did not include the income of the cattle trekkers in the total household incomes since these monies are not regularly available for women for the purchase of foodstuffs, etc. Rather, I included only

⁸ The money available to the pastoral household is difficult to estimate since it does not come in the form of a steady and predictable income. At certain times many households appeared to have virtually no cash available.

that amount sent home to the enjang as monthly allowances.⁹ As we shall see later, cattle trekking is not a lifetime occupation so monies available to a household for expenses may only exist for a matter of months and sometimes a few years. After a trekker ceases his activities, it is hoped that he will have brought many more milch cows into the herd and the additional milk will offset the need for the cash that he once provided.

The sale and purchase of animals should perhaps be considered separately from the household budget since several of the animals sold were marketed expressly for the purpose of helping two of the cattle trekkers set themselves up in business. Similarly, a great many of the animals purchased were bought by the cattle trekkers with the profits of their business. For this reason, it is most accurate to examine the household expenses and incomes alone. It would appear that other income generating sources provided approximately 10,000 Shs. in extra monies. However, not appearing on the budget was the information that one member of the enjang used 3,000 Shs. to pool with friends to lease a wheat shamba in Mau. The entire crop was lost and their entire investment was gone. Another member has put aside several thousand shillings towards the purchase of an individual piece of land in an area that was being demarcated.

The members of this enjang were one of the families on the group ranch with shares in one of the six wheat shambas. However, the following year they could not find a leasee to put in wheat and immediately this reduced

⁹ Furthermore, I did not attempt to calculate the extent to which my presence 'supplemented' the pastoral income and diet. My contribution took the form of a constant, though small supply of sugar, tea and maize meal. This may have affected some household budgets.

their income to 25,000 Shs. Charcoal revenues also fluctuate and although members could earn even more money from this source, most ranch members believe that in five to ten years the forest on their ranch will be depleted and incomes from this source will eventually be lost.

Thus, there is a keen desire on the part of those Maasai committed to pastoralism to build up their herds since alternative economic pursuits seem to be dwindling for them rather than expanding. Those ranch members favouring subdivision see the exploitation of ranch resources, such as wheat, charcoal and timber, as a move towards individualization and feel it would be foolhardy for them to become involved in ranch loans for pastoral development. In sum then, the prospects for development on Rotian OlMakongo must be seen in relation to the benefits that individual members perceive accruing to them. Wheat growing, charcoal burning, subdivision, etc., are all strategies which involve certain social and economic costs for ranch members. It is important to remember that economic development will sometimes have different ramifications for the individual than for the group.

Perhaps, for this reason, group endeavours are most often compromise solutions which are acceptable to the majority of ranch members. However, at Rotian OlMakongo, the compromise solution most often accepted is to do nothing. To the government, this appears to be an anti-development stance. This is not the case. It is simply the most feasible solution at present given that some members want pastoral development and others want subdivision and agriculture. Given that pastorally orientated Maasai are still in a majority on the ranch, then if pastoral development of the group ranch is to have any chance at all, other compromise solutions will have to

be made available and acceptable if the ranch is to survive. At present, because of economic necessity and herd management practices, many men on the group ranch represent a labour force involved in other economic activities which largely support the livestock economy. I would suggest that developers, i.e., the Ranch Planning Office for example, might be able to exploit some of the economic alternatives already in operation, to provide the incentive and capital for ranch development. Let us turn now to an in-depth examination of these pursuits.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUPPLEMENTING THE PASTORAL ECONOMY:
ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC STRATEGIES

Since very little has been documented concerning Maasai participation in alternative economic pursuits, it is perhaps worthwhile to present a detailed account of these activities. It is important to look closely at these pursuits because of their increasing contribution to subsistence, the impact that they have on markets, wage labour and stratification as an index of economic change. These pursuits are also part of the increasingly complex land use patterns which are emerging in the district.

CHARCOAL BURNING

During the early 1960's, many non-Maasai acceptees began burning charcoal for commercial sale in the Rotian area. However, after land adjudication commenced, most ranch members at Rotian OlMakongo began to complain that many individuals, especially these non-members, were making a profit from exploiting a resource belonging to the group. Certain members even pointed to this as a reason for subdivision of the land. They argued that since group members were not benefiting from a group resource, then the land should be subdivided and each individual landowner could charge others to make use of their resources. Other ranch members argued that since the forests were a group resource anyone was free, as a ranch member, to go and burn his own charcoal.

The compromise solution to this debate was that more Maasai were encouraged to burn charcoal and any member who did not wish to burn his own

charcoal could hire a Kikuyu labourer to work for him. By 1974, the practice of hiring labourers to burn charcoal for a Maasai employee became widespread.

Rotian OlMakongo is covered with 988 hectares of open or dense forest and this constitutes 59% of their total land. A large portion of these forests on the group ranch are given over to charcoal making. The charcoal industry utilizes a limited variety of trees and shrubs. The following are the trees used for charcoal at Rotian.

- (1) Ol-leleshwa (Maasai name): (tarchonanthus camphoratus). Identified from Dale and Greenway (1961:160). This is a bush shrub, the leaves smelling of camphor when crushed.
- (2) Ol-kinyei (Maasai name): (euclea schimperi) (ibid:177). This is a small tree, abundant in the Rotian area.
- (3) Ol-orien (Maasai name): (olea africana) (ibid:348). This is a heavily branched and spreading tree which is commonly known as the brown or wild olive tree. It grows to a height of 20 to 30 feet. Ol-orien is also used by the Maasai for firewood since they do not use charcoal.
- (4) Ol-paligilagi (Maasai name): (tricholadus ellipticus) (ibid:233). This is a shrub or thicket forming tree which attains a height of 35 feet. Traditionally, since it is a hard, tough wood which bends easily, it was used for poles in hut construction, although ranch members no longer build traditional huts.
- (5) Ol-tepesi (Maasai name): (acacia seyal) (Mol 1978:161). An acacia tree.

Although the Maasai at Rotian OlMakongo do not use charcoal, cooking instead on wood fires, a survey of the resident ranch membership indicates that 74% of those living on the ranch either produce charcoal themselves or hire one or more Kikuyu labourers to do so for them. Charcoal burning in this area has provided not just a few entrepreneurs but the vast majority of Maasai ranch members with the opportunity to make a cash return from their land. Without a doubt, ranch members would say that the sale of charcoal is the largest source of revenue on the ranch, providing a steady though small flow of cash for most families. The only individuals not

involved in this business are a few very old men, a few of the very wealthy herders and some of the cattle trekkers.

Of the forty or more Maasai who receive revenue from charcoal, at least fourteen of them hire Kikuyu labourers. One rather wealthy young man has ten labourers working for him, although most people employ only one or two. Most of these labourers board at the dukas (stores) on the ranch for 60 Shs. per month. Informants state that a hard-working labourer, with capital to employ helpers, can produce 140 bags of charcoal in one week, although this would be rare. Most labourers average approximately 15 to 20 bags of charcoal a week. Since Maasai do not work full-time at charcoal burning, it is estimated that a Maasai usually averages 4 to 8 bags a week at the most.

The process of charcoal burning begins with the felling of trees. A number of labourers in the area have power saws which they use for this purpose. It takes about four tanks of petrol (gas) or 160 Shs. worth of petrol to fell enough trees for a lorry (truck) to take a full load. The labourers pay the sawer and also hire helpers the next day to arrange the wood into several kilns which burn for 5 days. A 7 ton lorry arrives on the ranch every three days, sometimes every day, and takes a load of 140 bags of charcoal. The trucker pays the labourers 12 Shs. per bag and the labourer must give his Maasai employer 4 Shs. on every bag. The charcoal is then trucked to urban areas where it is sold for 28 Shs. or more a bag. On average, a good labourer can bring in about 240 Shs. a week, which generates about 80 Shs. a week for an individual Maasai employer.

In this way, the ranch has effectively individualized a group resource, i.e., the forest. All profits from this industry are highly distributed.

I There is very little opportunity to pool this charcoal money for ranch development. At one time members agreed to donate some of their charcoal money for construction of a dip, however, when the committee chairman tried to collect it, members were unwilling to give him any. Residents explained that they feared only a few individuals would benefit if charcoal money was pooled and since everyone had need of the cash it was better for each person to make his own money. Indeed, charcoal burning represents the only source of income for many of the Maasai on the ranch. Since much of the money is used to supplement the diet, and also for clothing and when possible for cattle, it is one of the few alternatives open to many Maasai which enables them to plug into the cash economy.

I should mention here that the amount of cash available for a woman to put towards her household expenses from charcoal burning is difficult to estimate. Men give their wives 20 Shs. here and 40 Shs. another time, and do not actually tell their wives how much money they earn. Some women claim that their husbands go to town and 'drink' most of the charcoal money. Also, very few Maasai women are willing to go and burn charcoal themselves, the activity being a very arduous occupation. However, many of the non-Maasai women on the ranch do go out and burn some charcoal and it has been suggested that non-Maasai women are becoming popular as wives, especially second wives, since they are willing to work at charcoal and keep shambas.

Although charcoal burning is not completely unselective in the wood that it uses, it nevertheless constitutes a major source of ecological degradation. Cutting proceeds with no plans for reforestation for conservational purposes, even though indiscriminate cutting can be seen to

denude the area of trees that provide shade and soil protection. The Maasai at Rotian agree that the forest on their ranch will be completely 'finished' within five to ten years at the present rate of charcoal production. To exacerbate the destruction of forest resources, the Maasai here claim that the wooded areas exhausted by charcoal burning also make the area unsuitable for cattle grazing. A 1979 newspaper article suggested that all the forests in Narok District should be gazetted in order to protect them from the devastation of charcoal burning. This type of action would generate great hostility among the Maasai as witnessed by their reaction in 1948 to the gazettement of part of the Mau forest which apparently was not being used.

Even though the Maasai realize that their forests are being devastated, they are not willing to cease charcoal burning because there is such an urgent need for cash. The complete cessation of charcoal burning on Rotian Olmakongo would have drastic social and economic consequences since so many Maasai are dependent on this industry to subsidize their subsistence as well as the livestock economy of the region. Not only would it be difficult to put a stop to charcoal burning, given the overwhelming policing this would involve, but one must also consider that 75% or more (Western and Semakula 1979:9) of the energy used in Kenya is derived from wood. Any policy which affected the production of charcoal would send prices soaring.

Given the importance of charcoal for the Rotian economy in particular and the Kenyan economy in general, there is no reason why it should not be included in management plans. The charcoal industry on the ranch could be accompanied by a plan for reforestation and organized so that control and

management of resources is possible. Such managed charcoal burning, rather than denuding an area, could provide a valuable means for clearing the bush to a desired density and species. Finally, the organization of charcoal burning should allow for capital to be generated for future investment in the ranch. This of course implies the cooperation of the Ranch Planning Office and perhaps other agencies such as the International Council for Research in Agro-forestry.

The control of charcoal burning might be facilitated if ranch members had some added incentive for such control over and above the conservation aspect. I would suggest that one means of promoting this incentive would be for the ranch to take out an A.F.C. loan to purchase a lorry for the ranch. Rather than selling their charcoal for 12 Shs. a bag, it could be transported to market centres to obtain 28 Shs. or more per bag. Individual ranch members could continue to burn charcoal or hire labourers, who would still receive 12 Shs. per bag. All profits gained on the sale of the charcoal to external markets could be invested in a group ranch savings account at the bank and this could initially be used to repay the loan and maintain the vehicle.

A lorry could serve as a multipurpose vehicle, carrying logs from the ranch's timber business, transporting cattle and picking up supplies for local dukas on return trips. It is estimated that a lorry could probably earn 4,000 Shs. per week. The cost of petrol and salaries for a driver and turnboy, who could be hired from the ranch, would be deducted from this return. In this way, the already existing revenue which accrues to individuals would not be upset, while at the same time, the lorry would generate profits for the group ranch. Repayment of the loan need not come

out of individual contributions, rather the lorry would pay for itself. When the lorry was paid off after a few years, then the profits could be used for ranch development. Should the venture fail, the lorry could be sold to repay the debt and this would not affect individuals in the same way as repayment of a loan to contract for a bulldozer to put more acreage under wheat.

If the Maasai were willing to take a loan for a lorry, it could be accompanied by instruction on the management and organization of controlled bush clearance and/or reforestation. It is hoped that the additional group revenue will help provide this incentive although this is certainly not a foregone conclusion. Management of such a business endeavour is not impossible for Rotian OlMakongo members. The group ranch committee could act as custodians of the group savings account with numerous checks and balances, such as an A.F.C. Loans Officer countersigning cheques after receiving invoices, etc. A lorry operation of this nature could provide immediate short-term benefits for the ranch members which are consistent with their already existing economic patterns.

TIMBER CUTTING

Another example of Maasai participation in informal sector activities, though far less pervasive than charcoal burning, is the timber cutting industry. The group committee on the ranch tightly controls participation in this industry. Only those ranch members with extraordinary needs for cash are given permission to cut timber. Permission is granted only on a short-term basis and the decision is taken to the Ranch Planning Office and formally recorded. The right to cut timber is given for only a few years

or even for a few lorry loads. Several members have been given temporary permission to cut timber to obtain cash for emergency medical needs for their family. One man was given permission to cut timber to cover the costs of his son's post secondary education. One non-member, married to the daughter of a ranch member was given permission to cut timber solely for the purpose of constructing a duka on the ranch. He was allowed to sell the trimmings but was only allowed to enter the business until the duka was completed. At the time of my research, three members were actively making money from the timber industry.

There is only one tree used for the timber industry and that is ol-tarakwai or (junipercus procera) (Dale and Greenway 1969:3), also called 'pencil cedar'. It is the largest juniper in the world and it is of major economic importance for the timber industry in East Africa. The wood is of a light to medium weight and straight grained with an excellent natural durability. It is sometimes exported to Europe where it is used for lead pencils, wardrobe linings, etc. In Kenya, it is used for building construction, flooring, roof shingles, fence posts, telegraph poles, etc. The Maasai at Rotian OlMakongo no longer build traditional dung huts but, instead use ol-tarakwai for the construction of so-called 'improved' houses with thatched roofs. It is for this reason that committee members say there are such stringent controls on the timber business. If everyone was allowed to cut timber there would soon be none left for hut construction for the local people. In effect, the timber industry can be understood as a form of insurance that provides cash when a member has a legitimate and urgent need of cash.

The ranch members who participate in this industry all hire several Kikuyu labourers who live in the area expressly for this purpose. These Kikuyu own their own power saws and charge 40 Shs. per litre of petrol and one shilling per log. Six workers are then employed to load the logs onto the lorry and they are paid 10 Shs. each. After the timber has been felled, the Maasai employer has two options open to him. He can sell the timber locally, in which case he is paid about 300 Shs. for a lorry load of 40 logs and the contractor pays for the labourers and loaders. On the other hand, he can hire a lorry and driver and haul the timber to Nairobi where it sells for 2,300 to 2,800 Shs., depending on the quality of the wood. However, since lorry rental is at least 1,400 Shs. and the employer must pay his labourers and then travel to Nairobi with the timber to be paid, as well as make his own way back home, the first option is most often chosen at a substantial reduction in potential profits for the Maasai employer.

Here, it can be seen that the ownership of a lorry by the ranch would make the timber business a much more profitable enterprise. Shipments could be taken directly to Nairobi and the rental fee reduced or eliminated. A few lorry loads per month or a certain percentage of the increased profits could be channelled into a group ranch bank account for repayment of the lorry loan and eventually for development on the ranch. Moreover, ol-erien trees are also an excellent wood for furniture and panelling according to Dale and Greenway (1961:348) and these are abundant on the ranch. These trees might also be exploited in the timber business depending on their marketability.

CATTLE TREKKING

Cattle trekking is another Maasai entrepreneurial activity which involves the buying and selling of livestock for profit. It is a highly speculative enterprise with great potential for capital accumulation. Several full or part-time cattle trekkers are members of Rotian OlMakongo, and several resident non-members are trekkers. The importance of this economic pursuit in enabling many Maasai to opt into the pastoral economy is so great that a detailed look at the cattle trekking industry in Narok is warranted.

Although there are historical precedents for cattle trekking in Maasai culture, this activity gained popularity during the 1950's when Maasai began to exploit new economic conditions, viz., the increase of stock auctions and stock markets in Kenya. The majority of cattle trekkers in Maasailand today belong to the warrior age grade, although a number of junior elders are involved. Generally speaking, cattle trekkers have two things in common. One, they tend to belong to impoverished Maasai families and, two, they did not actively participate in traditional warrior life by moving away from their families to live in manyattas (i.e., warrior settlements) in the bush. These two conditions are closely connected. One of the main reasons for not joining age mates is that family herds are too small to allow stock to be taken away to the manyatta to support a warrior. Also, warriors often visit their home settlements with their age mates and a small herd simply could not provide enough milk to entertain such visitors. In addition, some Maasai families have an insufficient number of skilled cattle herders and cannot afford to be without their young men for prolonged periods of time.

Although the age grade system is based on principles of equality among age mates, the ability of individuals to participate in the reciprocal obligations of warriorhood is directly related to the level of their family pastoral production. At one time raiding, especially for poorer herders, was a means for warriors to acquire stock and eventually finance a first marriage. Today, stock raiding is extremely difficult due to the Kenyan police and anti-stock theft units operating in the countryside.¹ Present-day cattle trekkers are able to utilize their period of warriorhood to pursue an economic strategy which enables them to convert cash into cattle to build up family herds in anticipation of marriage.

Cattle trekking is a short-term business since it requires considerable endurance and stamina. Most men do not trek for more than six years. Still, cattle trekking can be lucrative and the best way for many young men to accumulate capital and build up a herd. Many of the wealthy young men in Narok gained their fortunes through cattle trekking and most full-time trekkers reported that it was easy to gross 15,000 Shs. in one year. Most of these young men must obtain financial support to begin cattle trekking. This is accomplished through a political patron, less-impooverished family connections, the sale of their existing livestock in anticipation of much higher gains, affiliation with already-established trekkers, or loans from the Agriculture Finance Corporation.

¹ It is interesting that Narok Maasai interviewed believed that the cattle obtained in stock raiding and theft was not used for the purpose of bridewealth since it was too easily recognized due to branding and earmarks. Instead, they claim such cattle was eaten in the bush by the warriors. This is perhaps more true of any theft which occurs nowadays where anti-stock theft units pursue the thieves.

Cattle trekking for the Narok Maasai involves the purchase of stock at official auction sites such as Mulot or Emarti and then selling the animals to butchers in Ngong or Nairobi. Trekkers maintain that they must travel with at least ten animals to Ngong to make the trip profitable and worthwhile. The following is an example of a stocktraders profit margin.

<u>ANIMAL</u>	<u>PAID AT MULOT</u>	<u>SOLD AT NGONG</u>
Ox	2,000 Shs.	2,500 Shs.
Steer	1,400 Shs.	1,800 Shs.
Sterile Cow	1,400 Shs.	1,700 Shs.
Old Bull	1,300 Shs.	1,600 Shs.
Heifer	700 Shs.	1,800 Shs.

Along the way, trekkers trade or purchase animals with local Maasai settlements. Heifers bought at Mulot are usually not taken to market but exchanged at an enkang for a steer which will bring a much higher price from the butcher. Trekkers like to pay cash for animals at Maasai homesteads since many stockowners are desperate for cash and will greatly undersell their animals. Thus, the profit margin for the trekker is substantially higher. Since the cattle trekkers interviewed were all Purko Maasai, it is not surprising that they claimed that the Purko were the best stock traders since they were formidable bargainers and were able to accurately estimate their profit margins. The Loita and Kisongo Maasai were considered to be the worse trekkers since they were not as aware of going prices and would sell animals very cheaply. The trekkers also admitted that they occasionally will steal animals if they come across a

very young boy herding alone in the bush. Cattle trekkers have also been known to steal from one another.

The rank order of preferential animals for sale to butchers at markets in and around Nairobi is: steer, bull, ox, sterile cow, pregnant cow, heifer (not pregnant). On the other hand, the rank order of stock for sale to Maasai along the way or for purchase for their family herds is: heifer, young bull and male calves.

After purchasing animals at Mulot, trekkers easily bypass quarantine, mainly by claiming that the animals were purchased for their own family herds. A number of Kikuyu cattle trekkers buy stock around the quarantine areas at Kibiko and then transport them by truck for sale around Dogoretti. However, most trekkers prefer to move their animals on to Ngong and Nairobi. Cattle trekkers will buy diseased animals but say that they prefer travelling with healthy animals since they can be trekked much faster. If they are caught with sick animals they are turned back. However, sick animals pose no problem for the most part since local Ngong butchers are quite willing to purchase animals, such as those with hoof and mouth, simply discarding the tongue.

The claim that quarantine facilities are easily bypassed and that cattle trekkers have their own illegal stock routes is one that the district Livestock Marketing Officer readily admitted. Livestock marketing figures were based on the assessment fee paid to the County Council on the livestock held in quarantine facilities for two weeks before sale. The County Council receives 10 Shs. per head of stock and according to this calculation, in 1978, 5,250 official sales were recorded by the County Council. The Livestock Marketing Officer claimed that it is estimated that

another 45,000 animals leave the district illegally (personal communication).

Meadows and White (1979:9) calculated commercial sales in Kajiado by subtracting the estimate of the Narok cattle marketed there from the total animals sold. They assumed that "the great majority of Narok cattle enter Ngong Division through Livestock Marketing Division's (L.M.D.) holding ground at Kibiko ... Over the last five years it appears that an average yearly number of 9,500 cattle have been sold from Narok District through Kibiko." It is my opinion, according to all the cattle trekkers interviewed, that large numbers of livestock enter Ngong Division illegally to be sold to local butchers. Thus, calculations of Maasai offtake rates and herd structure based on commercial sales by Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) may not accurately reflect conditions in Narok District. There is a great deal of illegal movement and sale of livestock, however, much of the cattle redistributed in this way originates from outside the district to begin with, from such areas as Kisii and Kipsigis.

After purchasing animals at Mulot and elsewhere the trekker attempts to travel to Ngong as quickly as possible. This can usually be accomplished in about six days. Trekkers are notoriously cruel to their animals, beating them about the horns to make them hurry. Stock is allowed only about two hours of grazing per day. As one trekker stated, "even a Sahiwal will move fast when beaten." If a man was moving his family herds from Mulot to Ngong he would take about eighteen days. However, trekkers say that they would rather take the chance of losing an animal to fatigue along the way and quickly reinvest the profits than to trek at a slower pace. Trekkers often travel at night for the purpose of bypassing quarantine.

During the day they often join up with trekkers they meet along the way, however, they always separate at night because of a lack of trust.

Cattle trekkers will point out that they are taking considerable economic risks since they must have the ability to herd animals long distances, negotiate prices and estimate the quality of their stock to make a worthwhile profit margin. Also, trekkers can be away from their homesteads for as long as a year at a time and they face the risk that their personal affairs and family herds will be mismanaged by others. Equally risky is the chance that cattle being trekked will contract some disease and die, or be injured or killed by lions or buffalo. The Kipsigis are accused of attempting to steal animals after they are purchased at Mulot and the Arusha try to steal stock around the Tanzanian border area. Many trekkers said that the hardest thing that they had to face while trekking was hunger. Occasionally, a number of trekkers will share the loss of one animal to be slaughtered for food if the stocktraders have gone a few days without any food.

Once at Ngong, trekkers from Narok say that local butchers are most definitely the preferred market. There are several reasons for this. Butchers pay higher prices than KMC, partly because the level of inspection in such small abattoirs is less stringent. Because the costs of processing and converting carcass to meat are lower the butchers can afford to pay more. Trekkers realize that parts and sometimes whole carcasses would be condemned if sold to KMC. Local butchers are most interested in weight and not grade, so local cattle fetch higher prices at a butcher. Furthermore, local butchers often sell directly to restaurants, which bypasses the

regulations surrounding retail prices and are thus able to offer higher prices themselves.

The sale of cattle to local butchers is based on speculation. The animals are not weighed but sold by sight, and trekkers and butchers must be skilled at estimating their profits. The Narok trekkers are able to make substantial profits from their business. Local butchers in Narok District cannot afford to be competitive with the prices offered in Ngong Division, and cattle trekkers would never sell a healthy animal here. The only animals slaughtered at the local Narok butchers are jokingly called 2-D meat - dying or diseased. The final reason that Ngong butchers are preferred over the KMC is that these butchers return the hide and the stomach contents to the trekker. Hides are then sold to local dealers who pay 2 Shs. per kilo on the hides. The fat from the stomach is either sold to other Maasai or sent home for the cattle trekker's family.

Once a cattle trekker has accumulated a profit, he usually invests in heifers and bull-calves for breeding purposes to build up his family herd. Generally, when trekkers are adding stock to their own herds they prefer to obtain Maasai cattle, especially since they are able to purchase these at very low prices. However, occasionally Kipsigis or Kisi stock will be added to their herds.

The trek to Ngong is the most common route for cattle movement although there is also some trade through the Mau to Nakuru and also to South Nyanza, Kisii and Kericho. Trade with the Tanzanian Maasai was popular until the border closed in the mid-1970's. Trekkers in the Rotian area say that they have not crossed the border for a few years mainly since this was not necessary because Tanzanian Maasai come into Kenya to either exchange

steers for heifers or obtain cash for their animals. Trekkers say that they could purchase such animals cheaply and the Tanzanian Maasai were satisfied since they would convert their Kenyan shillings on the black market for greater amounts of their own money and increase their purchasing power.

Most cattle trekkers are involved in this business because they cannot become capital accumulators (i.e., realize substantial herd growth) in the traditional economy through strategies of livestock production. These young men cannot activate traditional inheritance rights to family herds, simply because those herds are not large enough or no longer exist. Many young men with families subsidize their household budget through cash sales of animals to the extent that natural herd growth is rendered impossible. For young men in this position, one of the most expedient ways to avoid complete alienation from the pastoral economy is to become cattle trekkers. Thus, they become capital accumulators through redistribution within the pastoral economy, buying, selling and exchanging livestock.² When queried as to when a cattle trekker 'retires' from this business, young men replied, "When we get old or rich."

For the most part, the cattle trekking business is a very lucrative enterprise and one that is also considered by most Maasai to be a high prestige activity. Cattle trekkers are all thought to carry several thousand shillings on their person. Cattle trekkers take their arduous

² It would be interesting to determine to what extent these trekkers affect local ecological conditions buying cattle from Maasai in temporary dry range conditions and perhaps distributing them to areas of higher potential graze.

task seriously and it is said by all that very few trekkers drink. There is a certain amount of conspicuous consumption since a watch, an umbrella and a flashlight have almost become symbolic of cattle trekkers. Because trekkers carry such large sums of money they are a particular target for thieves. I was told stories of young men starting out in the business, making their first profit and then being robbed of everything at Ngong. At Rotian, a cattle trekker from Kotikash Group Ranch became friendly with the Kikuyu who ran one of the dukas. For safety, he left large sums with this storekeeper who eventually spent the whole amount. The Kikuyu hired men to kill the trekker since he knew he could not pay him back. This happened early in 1978 and I was told the storekeeper was arrested and awaiting trial. Trekkers are also under constant pressure from their relatives, family and friends to loan them money. It is not surprising then that many of the trekkers are beginning to open bank accounts in order to deter numerous borrowers.

Although cattle trekkers do carry on a specialized activity, more and more it is evident that these young men are seeking to diversify their economic strategies, using some of their profits to invest in the purchase of a parcel of land, a small retail business, wheat and barley cropping, etc.³

At this point, I would suggest that cattle trekkers on the ranch could also benefit from the group ownership of a lorry. The cattle trekkers

³ One young senior warrior (Rampau), a member at Rotian Ol Makongo, was such a successful cattle trekker, he already has three wives, a large cattle herd, 500 shoats and is now building a duka on the ranch to set up a small trading business.

interviewed stated that a lorry would certainly facilitate their business and that they resented the Kikuyu with lorries who did business in Maasailand. Only a couple of very wealthy herders had ever purchased a lorry, most men saying that since they were only in the business for a short period (i.e., a few years) they did not want to take the added risk of investing in a lorry. However, if the group ranch owned a lorry, it could at times be rented to the trekkers to transport stock from Mulot to Ngong. The time advantage that this would give the trekkers, who would be able to make several trips in a shorter period of time and purchase larger numbers of stock, would generate greater profits and more than pay for lorry rental. The rental fee would of course go into the group account for payment of the loan or development costs on the ranch.

The Livestock Marketing Officer in Narok explained that he felt there were ways to make the government livestock routes and quarantine facilities more feasible. He said that the KMC should have a complete monopoly on the meat coming out of Narok and this would probably close down local auctions. KMC would raise their prices and the Maasai would no longer see an advantage in illegal stock routes since KMC would accept only quality meat. I would suggest that the use of transport vehicles by Maasai cattle trekkers, especially if this became more widespread than just at Rotian, might encourage trekkers not to bypass quarantine because of the added time advantage. In any event, transporting stock in a lorry may aid in disease control in a small way, since sick animals would not be trekking throughout the district and could be isolated upon their arrival at Ngong.

Furthermore, ownership of a lorry gives the stockowners and trekkers some control over the timing of livestock sales. The suggestion that KMC

become the sole purchaser of stock in Narok is untenable for many reasons. For example, the Narosora Group Ranch area of Narok is considered to be a location where the Maasai are very reluctant to sell their stock. However, Maasai in the Narosora area informed me that KMC twice arranged an auction for the area and that stockowners trekked cattle from as far away as Loita and both times the KMC failed to arrive for the auction. After that, stockowners vowed that they would not take a chance and travel to KMC auctions but would instead sell their cattle to passing cattle trekkers.

Two of the cattle trekkers at Rotian have applied for an A.F.C. loan in order to buy cattle in larger quantities. They believe that they were not successful because they support the wrong political candidate, however, they were told that they would not be able to keep adequate records since they were not educated.⁴ It certainly would be logical to finance such men, especially if they had access to a lorry to facilitate the transport of slaughter stock to market centres. Furthermore, it is not unfeasible that trekkers at Rotian OlMakongo could also be encouraged to start a steer fattening operation with the group ranch getting a certain percentage of the profit as a grazing fee or managing the entire operation. Since the organizational structure of the group ranches has not promoted the conditions necessary to generate strategies consistent with beef ranching, it would perhaps be wiser to encourage the marketing of livestock through

⁴ During interviews with Maasai in Mosero, a very traditional, arid area where many people are not interested in group ranching, some people commented that development for them would be sending a few children to school so that they could become better cattle trekkers!

supporting an organizational framework (i.e., cattle trekking) which already functions to increase livestock sales.

It is recognized that the profits from this business are channelled back into the traditional pastoral economy -- the very economy which planners were hoping to change. However, if cattle trekking can be supported as the livestock marketing mechanism in the district, rather than the group ranches per se, and some of the profits are channelled into infrastructural development of the ranches, then ranches may in the long run be able to provide the security for the Maasai to direct innovation and transformation in a manner which is consistent with their needs and their own institutions.

WHEAT GROWING

Rotian OlMakongo has been leasing land for wheat and barley cropping for several years. However, due to the inability of the members to decide how to divide the profits, it was agreed in 1977 that the wheat and barley land on the ranch would be divided into six 'wheat shambas' of approximately 100 acres each. Eleven to fourteen members would share the profits in each group. Members formed into groups on the basis of family ties, friendship or merely the ability to cooperate with one another. Each group was to decide separately who they would lease their land to.

As mentioned earlier, a leasee pays 150 Shs. per acre, one third of the payment before harvest and two thirds after. This system is less than perfect and some of the groups have claimed that their leasee fled after harvest without paying any money. This tends to happen especially during bad years such as 1977 when the wheat rotted in the fields due to excessive

rains. Most groups claim that they receive only about 300 Shs. per person annually. One of the wheat groups on the ranch rented their land to a former Magistrate of Narok whom they claim never made any payments to them. The group decided to expell the leasee during the second year of his three year contract. They informed him that he was being expelled shortly after he had contracted for the land to be plowed. Now this former leasee is suing these ranch members for the 7,000 Shs. which he paid out for plowing and he also wants to return to finish out his lease.

Because of these uncertainties some ranch members argue that the ranch should stop growing wheat completely, while others argue that if they put more land under wheat, then individual profits would be greater. However, despite the wishes of ranch members, during the 1979 planting season only three of the groups were able to find leasees for their land and then reduced amounts were put under, perhaps 300 acres in total. This is blamed on the fact that the Wheat Board was forced to cut back on their loans because of bankruptcy, and GMR loans were abolished. Given this background of unstable production, inadequate transportation should it rain, and monetary difficulties, it is quite ironic that the ranch planning office suggested to the Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch that they take out a loan to clear more land for wheat cropping in the 1980's!

Once again it is quite clear that ranch members have effectively individualized and privatized the benefits of wheat growing. The group ranch concept was supposed to promote cooperative relations between members, but instead it has actually promoted competitive relationships between members based on their relative wealth and level of participation in the pastoral economy. The ranch members at Rotian OlMakongo have

refused to make contributions towards ranch development out of their wheat money since it is quickly spent. This is not to say that wheat growing is necessarily in opposition to ranch development, provided that the carrying capacity of the remainder of the ranch is sufficient to support the livestock population. Rotian Kotikash, which has a membership of only thirty-three, planted a wheat shamba to be used for dip construction, and other ranches with a small membership are better able to come to a consensus than those ranches with larger memberships such as OlMakongo.

Experts have argued over the desirability of long-term wheat growing in the Narok area, speculating on the possibility of dust bowl conditions emerging. However, the Kenyan government, backed by the World Bank and other agencies, has a firm commitment to agricultural development in the high potential pastoral areas. For this reason, regardless of whether the strategy is sound, if wheat cropping is to continue then the government should make it easier for group ranches and not individuals, especially those from outside the district, to make large profits. If GMR loans are ever to be reinstated, they should be made available to group ranches rather than go to political favourites. Ranches have generally been reluctant to take out Wheat Board loans for fear of defaulting since the leasee might run away, but the owner of the land cannot run. Indeed, this should make the group ranch a more attractive loan recipient, and the Maasai would finally realize the full value of wheat growing. The loan should even be made conditional on the caveat that a certain proportion of acreage should be allocated to generating revenue for ranch development purposes.

OTHER MEANS OF SUPPLEMENTING THE PASTORAL ECONOMY

Commodity Production and Trade

Maasai women at Rotian attempt whenever possible to sell their excess milk and ghee. Only a few women are able to do this regularly, while others participate occasionally when there is a short-term surplus. Most Maasai women here will occasionally travel to Narok to sell beaded handicrafts to merchants who then sell them to tourists passing through. The productive activity of these women is sporadic and certainly does not generate enough revenue to help increase herds. Rather it generates small sums which are used to purchase food and clothing.

Shambas

Keeping a shamba not only supplements the pastoral diet for many Maasai at Rotian, but in some cases, especially for Kikuyu families, it also provides a small cash income. Close to half the resident families at Rotian maintain an individual shamba. These shambas, which are never more than a couple of acres, are planted close to the owner's home. A member does not have to ask permission from the ranch committee to make use of the land in this way. However, it is agreed that shambas should not be "too large." It is difficult to determine what the Maasai mean by "too large," although I was told that this would be a shamba that was planted for commercial purposes. Most shambas are attended by women and geared towards domestic consumption of maize, beans and potatoes. Some families do sell their surplus produce in Narok or to other ranch members. Maasai women at Rotian claim that it is only in the past five years that shamba keeping among Maasai in this area has become so widespread.

Employment

Employment off the ranch is becoming an increasingly important alternative economic strategy for many young or impoverished men. At Rotian OlMakongo, five ranch members are employed as night watchmen, three work at tourist lodges in the area, two are hired herders, one builds houses, one is a gateboy and another a turnboy. Because of the low standard of education--only one ranch member has gone to secondary school--the jobs available to most ranch members are extremely low paying. Most men earn under 300 Shs. per month. The ideal is to send money home each month and to save some for buying cattle. However, savings are generally too small for a young working man to build up his herds. Even so, many young men on the ranch have been searching unsuccessfully for jobs. Off-ranch employment at least reduces the number of people to be fed in households facing increasing impoverishment. This potential labour force will certainly continue to grow as more and more Maasai are forced to diversify their production strategies in an attempt to supplement the pastoral economy with cash.

Campbell and Migot-Adholla (1979:2) have suggested that there is an urgent need to develop secondary and tertiary activities in order to generate employment and capital in Kajiado District of Maasailand. This is equally true for Narok District as well. Increasing impoverishment and a growing number of underemployed men in the pastoral economy would underscore the readiness of many Maasai to participate in alternative forms of employment. The closer these occupations are to the pastoral economy, such as leather tanning, ghee production, etc., the greater are the opportunities for stimulating growth in both the cash and subsistence economies.

CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSING THE TRENDS: WHAT IS CHANGING?

To this point my thesis has demonstrated using both quantitative and qualitative data some of the empirical signs that shifts have occurred in the traditional Maasai social system. This was seen in increased poverty, alienation from pastoral production and diversification of economic strategies, along with a growing disparity between the rich and the poor, and between Maasai relegated to group ranches and those associated with individual ranches. Nevertheless, it is my contention that in order to determine to what extent these apparent upsets actually represent transformations of the traditional Maasai social system, it is first necessary to determine what it is that is changing. To this end, I intend to construct models of several systems or subsystems in Maasai society which will enable me to represent the social structure.

This analysis will be based on my own data of IlPurko Maasai society and also on that of several other anthropologists who have done research on the traditional social system. In this way, I hope to delineate the internal properties of IlPurko Maasai society and demonstrate that certain of its parts may be strained beyond functional compatibility due to excessive influence of certain variables which may be internal or external to the system. However, whether the cause of strain is endogamous or exogamous, it is to the same end that the Maasai attempt to organize the elements offered or abandoned to it.

I should also emphasize that the following interpretation of the data is not necessarily the Maasai interpretation, so I shall attempt to be

clear in regards to what constitutes data and what amounts to my interpretation of those data. This is consistent with the notion that model building should help to give a new or different intelligibility to empirical reality. Furthermore, models can act as heuristic devices to predict outcomes whenever certain features are added or omitted. In fact, some theorists suggest that such models should be able to "account for both the actuality and the potentiality" (Scholte 1973:670) of such additions or deletions. Since this statement refers to the predictive powers of models, it should be emphasized that they do not predict the course of action for individuals in a society, nor do models in any way generate action. They are predictive in the general sense that relations between given parts of a social system constrain or limit the possibility for making choices elsewhere in that system.

It would be virtually impossible to examine and analyse all of Maasai society. Therefore, I have chosen a number of social systems or subsystems to concentrate this analysis on. The particular systems chosen were selected for a number of reasons. Because I am largely interested in systems of production, consumption and distribution in Maasai society, I have tended to choose those domains which play a role in these activities. My interest in these domains is obviously a reflection of my interest in the introduction of ranching in Maasailand. The concept of group ranching is based on goals which attempt to alter Maasai production strategies (i.e., access to graze, etc.), disrupt distribution systems (i.e., the circulation and exchange of cattle) and inhibit certain consumption patterns (i.e., decrease the dependency on a milk diet).

Since production strategies are related to the necessary labour to perform herding duties, this thesis attempts to examine the ways in which labour is provided. However, for the Maasai, labour does not only exist as an economic function. A man must have a wife, children and friends, since for the most part, he cannot provide himself with labour in any other way. In this way, it can be said that the labour necessary for production cannot be separated or distinguished in time and space because labour is provided only following the intervention of social factors such as marriage. For this reason, I will analyse the marriage system to show how women are circulated, in exchange for cattle, between production units.

Next, I will examine the exchange of cattle among stockfriends since many writers have indicated that it is in fact the diffuse network of stock exchanges which creates the conditions for capital accumulation in Maasai society (cf. Schneider 1980). I will look at this exchange of livestock as it relates to the overall production strategies and the consumption needs of individual households. The involvement of a man in either household consumption or diffuse exchange relationships is largely determined by when he is eligible to inherit and alienate cattle for exchange. This timing is related to progression through the age grade system which will be examined in order to determine its relationship to production and distribution functions in Maasai society.

The following models of Maasai society are presented without providing an abundance of empirical data which can be found in a variety of sources (Galaty, Jacobs, Schneider and others). The reader is referred back to chapter one and to these other sources for more detailed empirical data to

support my claims. Let us now examine the marriage system in Maasai society.

The Maasai practice patrilineal clan exogamy. Each Maasai oloshon or section, the IlPurko section for the purpose of this analysis, are divided into two moieties which are composed of a number of clans (il-gilat) and these clans are further subdivided into a number of subclans or what the Maasai call houses (ink-ajijik) (See Appendix B). The subclans are in turn made up of numerous lineages (il-marei). The rule of clan exogamy is often ignored within some of the very large clans which possess several subclans. Maasai point out that when clans such as Ilmakesen and Ilaiser become exceedingly large and intermarriage is evident, then it is possible that such a clan will break up (i.e. segment) and form two separate clans. The IlPurko Maasai claim that the ideal partner for marriage would be a girl from a different clan but the same moiety although there is no rule which governs marriage at the moiety level.

A Maasai man must seek a wife from outsiders, i.e., from non-clansmen. To do this, he exchanges cattle (approximately six) for a woman thereby establishing an asymmetrical relationship with his affines since he is a debtor and in a decidedly subordinate position. The relationship between this man (ego) and his wife's father and brother is denoted by the kinship terminology which directs them to call each other olaputani.¹ This relationship cannot be immediately reversed because of the prohibition

¹ A man's female affines, i.e. his wife's sister or mother, are also called enkaputani. A mother's sister is enkapu, although the relationship from ego's point continues in the male line only and when a man's female affines marry into yet another clan, their husbands and children will have no specific kin ties.

against marriage between such affinal relatives. From Ego's perspective, even the children of his wife's brother remain olaputani to him, despite the fact that his own children will stand in a relationship to his wife's clan characterized by the kinship terminology olenkapu.


Ego's relationship to his mother's clan is based on the relationship of olenkapu and his mother's brother in particular is said to have a powerful curse, so when he comes asking for cattle it would be difficult to refuse him. The IlPurko in this study area also emphasized that a wife's father or brother have similar rights to "get into my herd without fear and take whatever they need and I will have nothing to say. If I refuse him, he will have the ability to take away his daughter". Thus, Ego from clan A stands in an inferior position as olenkapu to his mother's clan B since they are wife-givers to his clan and can come begging for livestock. Ego also stands in an inferior position as olaputani to his wife's clan C who are also wife-givers to his clan and can come begging for gifts as well.

Not only does ego stand in an inferior position as olenkapu or olaputani because his clan received a woman, but he also stands elsewhere in a superior position as olenkapu or olaputani since his own sisters, daughters and paternal aunts marry into other clans. Here then, when ego's sister (or daughter) marries into clan D, her husband becomes olaputani to ego and her children become olenkapu to him. Similarly, his father's sister's husband from clan E is olaputani to him and her children are olenkapu.

Figure 18 below shows that at any given time, one clan is at once wife givers and superior to another clan and wife receivers and inferior to some other clan. As a result of this generalized exchange structure, any one

group's status is relative to that of another group and not absolute. Each clan is engaged with others in a number of interdependent cycles of generalized exchange. This, of course, is an idealization since the prohibition of marriage between cousins actually reflects behaviour at the lineage level (i.e., closely associated agnatic males) so that each clan is engaged in numerous interdependent links.

Figure 18 Wife Givers And Wife Receivers



The number of clans (lineages within clans to be exact) having women forbidden to clan A increases with the number of women marrying into other clans. However, the daughters of these women will be potential wives for

ego's wife-giving apu and aputani relatives. Since females who marry out do not maintain any specific kin ties when they have families and furthermore, since grandchildren refer to their grandparents' relatives as olosotwa, a term which implies no specific kinship tie, it seems likely that rules of exogamy will be discontinued, forgotten or reversed after three or more generations. The overall balancing of groups is structured within this larger system of dualism (i.e. direct reciprocity) which is able to operate without contradicting any unilateral rules of exchange. This interpretation should not be seen to contradict the empirical fact concerning continual segmentation in Maasai society. In other words, the balanced structure of status which I have outlined may seem incompatible with segmentation since the balancing of groups would soon cease to correspond to empirical patterns of segmentation.

However, it has been demonstrated that the composition of groups and continually developing patterns of segmentation are irregular and quite unpredictable (Jacobs 1965; Spencer 1965). I maintain that it is the exchange of cattle and the continually unfolding situations involving opposition between domains which structure the overall unpredictable balance between lineage groupings. This permits a very flexible system of marriage because "the exchange, instead of being present and immediate, is potential and deferred" (Levi-Strauss 1969:470). More precisely, the Maasai system of generalized exchange which gives no guarantee in the long run that a group who receives a woman will eventually reciprocate, indeed, encourages men to speculate. The very nature of the generalized exchange structure encourages men to accumulate securities, that is women and cattle.

On the one hand, men who give away women exchange them for cattle which are merely a token and not a severance payment. These men may come begging for gifts of cattle from their affines and thus accumulate securities in the form of an unending supply of cattle since they have no assurance that their group will ever receive a woman in return. Men further speculate by trying to corner the marriage market. In other words, it is important to realize that polygyny is a corollary of generalized exchange. This type of speculation and the accumulation of credit leads to the possibility of very real status differences between groups which is antithetical to the theoretically overall balanced nature of these exchanges. As a result, it can be said that the system of generalized exchange gives rise to both a structure of status equality and status inequality. That one or the other of these dialectically balanced structures may become dominant or over-emphasized, is always a possibility and as we shall observe later, it is becoming increasingly frequent.

Respect and power in Maasai society are closely connected to a man's ability to be able to give rather than to receive. In order to give, a man must have a surplus of either cattle, women or children. Yet the primary means for a man to build a herd, obtain a wife and produce children, is by receiving and indebting himself to others. Thus, striving for power by maximizing status and prestige represents the pivotal dialectical process in Maasai society. In other words, the very act of striving for power is, in fact, its own negation. Let us look more closely at some other ways that a man is able to accumulate and circulate cattle.

We have conceptualized the creation and maintenance of alliances, namely olaputani or olenkapu, by building a model of exchange where men

establish relationships with other outside groups by receiving or giving a woman. However, a man is also able to create an exchange relationship with numerous individual men within his descent group, viz., men perceived to have an agnatic relationship. Women are exchanged for cattle which represent a debit or credit relationship between affines, and cattle are exchanged between agnates (i.e. stockfriends) as tokens of mutual respect and reciprocal exploitation. Thus, cattle exchanged with outsiders for women represent a relationship which is always one of superior/inferior. When cattle are exchanged within the clan and among stockfriends, the relationships which ensue are based on equality. For this reason IlPurko Maasai claim that the ideal stockfriend is a clansman. See Figure 19 below.

Figure 19 Exploitation And Reciprocity

Affines	Exploitation	Ego	Reciprocity	Stockfriends
	Inequality Through Women		Equality Through Cattle	

Through the goodwill of a man's father, or through the help of stockfriends after a man's father has retired or died, a man may be able to gather enough cattle to make his first bridewealth payment and present his new wife with a herd of subsistence livestock. However, once he has allocated a substantial number of cattle to his wife, a man must then be able to exploit her herd for his own advantage if he is going to continue to develop his exchange relationships with stockfriends. Women cannot

circulate cattle outside of the household and are charged with distributing cattle to their sons by prestations to them throughout their life and the inheritance of any undesignated cattle by the youngest son upon her death. Sons, even circumcised ones, are also limited to household circulation of cattle, unless they obtain permission from their father to distribute cattle externally. Elders, as heads of households, are not concerned with distributing their cattle among their sons, but with circulating cattle outside of the household and upon an elder's death his eldest son will inherit his herd. Here we can see that it is a wife, an outsider, who perpetuates a man's agnatic lineage by having sons and circulating cattle among them. Ironically, it is this very tie that binds a woman directly to her husband's lineage, which creates a source of opposition within a larger circle of men, viz., the husband's agnatic clan.

Even though the Maasai are patrilineal, it can be seen that the interests of a father and his sons are not always the same, while the interests of a mother and her sons are essentially identical. Here then, the formal logic of the agnatic group is at variance with its internal realities. Thus, logically, males are seen to perpetuate the agnatic lineage, while in actual practice, it is women whose interests are linked directly to the development of their husband's agnatic lineage. Of course, women perpetuate the entire system by also having daughters who are exchanged with outside groups thus ensuring the long-term balancing of groups.

If we visualize the cattle circulated by men as belonging to a horizontal domain of exchange, and those circulated by women and sons as belonging to a vertical domain of exchange, we can see that the two

structures represent contradictory or conflicting tendencies. Thus when a man circulates cattle externally, he will try to select an animal from the herd of his wife or sons. The more a man is able to alienate his wives' and sons' cattle, the better is he able to develop and strengthen relationships of reciprocity among his agnates and stockfriends in particular. However, if a man exploits cattle from his wives' herds to an extreme, he will eventually reach a point where the alienation of additional cattle might seriously interfere with a woman's ability to feed her family. At this point, a man must employ different strategies and options.

In other words, the development of the horizontal domain is limited by a variable from the vertical domain. A variable from the production system, i.e., milk production, operates within the vertical domain to set some lower limits for this domain, and once this lower limit has been reached the vertical domain then limits any further expansion of the horizontal domain. Conversely, if a woman's herd grows too large and her husband has not been circulating or alienating cattle, then her labour force may become too small to manage her herds. Her husband, faced with declining productivity and increased livestock mortality must choose a new strategy such as circulating cattle, remarrying or obtaining client herders. Seen in this way, stress occurs when the relationship between the vertical and horizontal domains cannot be maintained due to some shift in the relative importance of certain production variables, such as labour and surplus, or productivity and consumption, and so on.

If a man chooses to remarry, he enters into yet another external alliance and after presenting his new wife with a subsistence herd he must

once again build up his own herd or opt for strategies which will concentrate on his wives' and sons' vertical domain. These decisions may be influenced by such factors as a man's age, the number of sons he has and their ages, etc. This process creates a continual feedback mechanism which is operating at the intraclan level between the horizontal and vertical domain as well as at the interclan level. Consequently, the creation of asymmetrical interclan alliances through the unilateral exchange of women and cattle leads to a number of fluctuating cycles of status equality and status inequality. Nevertheless, the creation of these superior/inferior alliances enables a man to develop his vertical domain, and the growth of his wife's autonomous household enables a man to form strong symmetrical alliances based on the reciprocal intraclan exchange of stock between horizontal domains. The very act of creating outside alliances strengthens internal power relationships. Indeed, it has been noted that such a mode of alliance "is the next thing to lineage endogamy ... Rather than maximize alliance, it approaches maximum exclusiveness" (Sahlins 1968:62).

The dialectical process which emerges when cattle are exchanged leads a man through a continual series of alternating strategies which encourage the development of either the horizontal or vertical systems. These systems are themselves encapsulated within the wider system of generalized exchange. While these systems are developed in opposition to each other, it can be said that they reveal a complementarity by imposing limits on one another. Thus, if a Maasai man attempts to strive for power and prestige in this system, he will necessarily accumulate cattle and women. There are any number of variables which act as limiting factors. Since I am presenting the ideal, which can be realized within the limits of structural

and functional compatibility between systems, I should reiterate that not all men are equally good managers, and localized drought may devastate a herd, so that even following the same strategies, men will end up with different outcomes, statuses, careers, etc., as the continually unfolding situations of opposition define the possibility for a diversity of alternative and sometimes competitive options. The important point to realize is that it is the nature of the exchange systems which generates surplus, and variables such as the reproductive capacity of cattle or the ecological setting, etc., while setting limits on this exchange, in no way determine the form it takes.²

Earlier, I spoke of Godelier's warning not to confuse unity of function, which has led some writers to cast economic systems as identical to kinship systems for example. In heeding this warning, I will now attempt to analyse the economic system, not as identical to the marriage and kinship system, but in relation to its own functional priorities. Here then, it is possible to conceptualize the network of stockfriend relationships as a production community, where elders, acting as heads of households following the death of their own fathers, are ideally concerned with developing strong and reciprocal relationships within their so-called production community by means of extended cooperation. The use of this term, extended cooperation, is quite different from Terray (1972) who uses it in reference to cooperation for the purpose of extreme physical

² This explains why researchers are able to observe instances where two groups of people such as "...the Somali and the Boran Galla live side by side in a similar environment, with similar animals, in Northern Kenya; yet their pastoral organizations are different and their social organizations markedly so" (Monod 1975:122).

exertion, such as hut construction. For the purpose of this analysis, a production community is a group of men who according to IlPurko Maasai are ideally agnates and who circulate and distribute cattle among themselves for a variety of reciprocal obligations.

The production community should not be regarded as a static group, but rather, as a number of changing and overlapping stockfriend networks. A man's stockfriends may themselves be involved in many other networks including stockfriendships with non-agnates. Each clan can be thought of as comprising a number of production communities, operating intermittently, often linked to other clans, and being poorly defined. Thus, following Sahlin (1968:53) this production community is best viewed as a widely uncoordinated category of people. Nevertheless, and as uncoordinated as it may be, the production community still plays an important part in the production strategies of a stockowner. In fact, it is not unreasonable to regard this extended cooperation as a form of collusion, since in order to develop relationships to their fullest, elders alienate cattle from their wives' and sons' herds and place them in each other's herds. In fact, women can never be certain exactly how many cattle their husbands actually possess. Here it is difficult to speak of ownership in the purest sense of the word, since a man has managerial control of all the cattle being herded by his households, while his rights to dispose of stock are greatly influenced by the rights which other individuals are seen to have vested in the same animals.

In contrast to the larger production community, individual household production units are managed by women, with the aid of their children and young adult sons. It is the aim of these production units to circulate

cattle within the bounds of the domestic household sphere. Rather than being concerned with distribution, these units are concerned with accumulation since they are in fact primarily consumption units. Although there is a certain amount of sharing between household production units, it can be said that each unit must cope with its own separate needs and therefore, these units organize their work force through restricted cooperation.³

Within each production community, elders act as organizers and are not actually involved in the labour requirements of pastoral production, especially as they grow older. Cattle husbandry is learned at an early age and is carried on almost exclusively by the household production unit by children and young adult sons, ie., warriors. Women milk the cattle twice daily, care for calves and generally maintain the household. Elders gather together each day to organize the logistics of herding, deciding when the cattle should be moved into or out of certain areas, who should move the cattle, and so on. In other words, elders do not control the resources but they can manage access to them. In this system, cattle and land are both the object and the means of production. The elders do not base their control on a complete appropriation of the means of production since cattle are in fact distributed among the production units. Nevertheless, this distribution of cattle enables elders to become capital accumulators, to remarry and also to expand their labour force. Here then, elders can be

³ Terray (1972:115) points out that restricted and extended cooperation are both subforms of simple cooperation. Restricted cooperation refers to maintenance of the domestic unit while extended cooperation refers to the wider distribution of cattle by elders.

seen to, in actuality, control the social reproduction of their society and following strategies of distribution, accumulation and marriage leads to considerable prestige.

A woman's household production unit concentrates on the accumulation of cattle for the eventual purpose of redistribution. Capital accumulation for this unit leads to an abundant redistribution of consumption goods in the enkang, and to the redistribution or circulation of cattle to sons, in the form of inheritance and prestations which leads to the perpetuation of the agnatic lineage. While it is elders who control social reproduction, it is women who maintain the structural reproduction of the social system.

It is necessary to point out that these two spheres of production are difficult to keep conceptually distinct and there are a number of reasons for this. First of all, cattle belonging to the elders' production communities are kept within their individual households and sent out to graze with the cattle of their wives. In other words, there is no spacial distinction between these two units since cattle associated with an elder's production unit are dispersed and never herded or managed collectively by elders. Secondly, the analytical distinction between roles (i.e., the elder as a father vs. the elder as a stockfriend) is not easily disentangled from empirical observation since such a distinction is not always recognized by the individuals involved. However, as far as this analysis is concerned, social system is a conceptual and not an empirical reality since the whole purpose of model building is to say something new and different about the data. Finally, as I demonstrated earlier, the dialectical relationship between the two spheres of production is

constantly transforming one into the other, which also adds to the difficulty in keeping them conceptually distinct.

The relationship between these two production units not only provides and distributes calories and nutrition among household production/consumption units, but just as importantly, it is also a means of creating use and exchange value through the appropriation and transformation of cattle (cf. Cook 1973:850). Every married woman is concerned with maintaining her own herd from the demands of kinsmen and the frequent requests of her husband. Each unit operates more or less autonomously and the Maasai say that every stockowner is striving to become independent and autonomous. Despite this ideal, autonomy is a female strategy and elders who attempt to accumulate cattle and build up a number of independent households do so by becoming enmeshed in the interdependent and collective or reciprocal obligations of the elder's production community (ie. stockfriends). This, in fact, is the male oriented and high status strategy. Eventually, cattle circulating in the elder's production community are exchanged with outsiders for a woman and some cattle are used in establishing a new wife's autonomous household. However, another autonomous household can then be exploited to develop the elder's production community. As a result, an elder must, to a certain extent, separate his own interests as a member of a larger production unit from those of the smaller household production unit.

The nature of the elder's production community, its interdependence and function can perhaps best be conceptualized as a diachronic reality. That is, it is really a statistical entity which can be isolated in time but which is constantly shifting both its membership and its form over time.

The autonomy of the individual households can be thought of as a synchronic reality, since households are easily isolated as permanent and everpresent units, albeit, developing with the maturation of its members. Schneider (1978) suggests that the circulation of cattle among stockfriends creates the conditions necessary for almost unlimited accumulation of capital by overcoming the limits of household labour. However, it is a constant struggle for an elder to maintain a balance between these two production units. The circulation of cattle through time and between stockfriends generates varying degrees of conflict between the collective interests of the production community and the individuality of the household units.⁴

In order to understand the nature of capital accumulation in Maasai society, it is important to realize that the synchronic identification of the economic system alone would reveal very little since the dynamics are recognizable over time through a limited series of variations. The over- or under-development of either of these production systems may lead to the transformation of the system. That is, concentration on developing one extreme or the other (i.e., extreme interdependence vs. extreme autonomy) would have consequences for the entire social system as it moves through time. Generally, the dialectical relationship between the two spheres creates a logical combination of the two extremes.

⁴ To a certain extent, the contrast between the two production strategies and the units themselves may be associated with the wet season which is seen as conducive to exchange, and the dry season which concentrates on individual household production. However, an elder can only exploit his family's herds in the wet season to the point that they are able to maintain subsistence in the dry season to follow.

These two strategies, autonomy or interdependence, are both symbolically and ideologically represented in Maasai society by their concepts of olkitok (trans. an important man) and a-paik (trans. to be mean, selfish, stingy). A man who is olkitok, or who attempts to follow strategies directed towards olkitok status, is a man involved in multiple exchange relationships, often having several wives and many cattle and highly respected and esteemed. Men considered to be a-paik, while not necessarily poor, are usually concerned primarily with their own family herds, do not exchange livestock readily and often have only one wife. The status of a man considered to be selfish is very low and disdained. Although a man's economic status plays a role in conferring olkitok or a-paik status, these two terms refer more to commitment to or withdrawal from the exchange system per se. Men following a strategy of, or considered to be olkitok, are seen to be concentrating on the development of the horizontal domain and all that entails. Men following an a-paik strategy are faulted not so much for concern with and development of their family herd, but with their neglect and underdevelopment of the horizontal domain.

Whereas olkitok and a-paik are directly linked to wealth and status as they relate to the social exchange system, Maasai also recognize the status opposition of the wealthy or the poor in relation to other economic considerations. Here, the Maasai speak of olkarsis (trans. a wealthy man) as opposed to olaiterani (trans. poor, without cattle). A man who is olkarsis, or begins to follow such a strategy, is someone who is extremely wealthy but who like a selfish man does not exchange livestock. However, a very wealthy man more than likely followed a strategy of olkitok at one time and although such a man may not be esteemed, his great wealth is

certainly respected. Thus, rather than emphasize olkarsis's neglect of the horizontal domain, he is seen to place overemphasis on the vertical domain. A man who is olaiterani is poor and destitute, whether through bad luck or bad management, etc. Such a man, while not disdained, is pitied, and emphasis is placed not on his non-participation in the horizontal domain, but on his underdeveloped vertical domain.

Although a man considered to be olkitok is much respected and involved in numerous reciprocal and distributive relationships, the development of such a strategy in its extreme puts strain on the entire system. That is, such a man may be so generous to his stockfriends and affines that occasionally his own family herds may be jeopardized. Men following such a strategy to the extreme risk losing their labour force since wives and adult sons may protest their exploitation by withdrawing their labour. It is possible that someone who is olkitok may lose their cattle due to the extreme development of the horizontal domain or even a natural disaster and he could be transformed into a olaiterani or a-paik status. On the other hand, a man who is olkitok may reach a point where he begins to curtail and limit his involvement in such reciprocal arrangements, transforming his emphasis from a concentration of the horizontal exchange domain to a concentration on the vertical domain.


A man who is a-paik and concentrates on his vertical domain from the outset jeopardizes the possibilities of capital accumulation since his herds may grow too large for his domestic labour force. Since labour is provided through the intervention of social factors, this man would have to begin to circulate cattle - a strategy which augments labour through the loaning of herdboys and marriage. If this type of strategy did not emerge,

then it is quite possible that his stock could suffer and dwindle, which is precisely one of the ways that the Maasai maintain that Enkai (trans. God) punishes the selfish. To give another example, the destitute herder, olaiterani, will usually attempt to transform the extreme underdevelopment of his vertical domain by entering the horizontal domain, not by exchanging cattle, but by exchanging his own labour power to a wealthy patron (i.e., olkitok or olkarsis) in return for subsistence and a small remuneration.

The possibility exists for each one of these status types to transform itself into another. A selfish man may become wealthy and possibly transform his status into that of olkarsis. A poor herder, olaiterani, is always hopeful that he might accumulate cattle and opt for a new status and career. An olkitok may meet with misfortune, disease, drought or disaster and lose his means of developing and maintaining his horizontal domain. Similarly, a man who is olkarsis may meet with misfortune and his over-developed vertical domain will then be seen as an under-developed horizontal domain and the status transformation to a-paik would emerge. Within this social system, individuals have a wide range of strategies to select from and status orientation may be directed primarily towards high social status (i.e., olkitok) or high economic status (i.e., olkarsis). The social system can be thought of as containing contradictions and discontinuities and this analysis of the system seeks to uncover the nature of the constraints within which a wide range of possibilities evolves through time and space. The strategies which various men opt for lead to diverse careers with different status implications such as have been outlined. The domination of any one of these status types or extremes (i.e., olkitok, olkarsis, a-paik or olaiterani) disrupts and strains other

parts of the social system. A number of mechanisms exist, such as the curse, ostracism, fining, and so on, which attempt to keep these statuses within socially acceptable upper or lower limits. Figure 20 below indicates how these opposite and contradictory terms are self-limiting and always on the verge of transforming themselves.

Figure 20 Status And Herding Strategies



I have outlined the emergence of influential men in terms of a highly developed exchange structure (i.e., olkitok) and those associated with a highly developed production or economic system (i.e., olkarsis). However, the Maasai recognize relationships of superiority, seniority and authority, not only in relation to these two systems, but in practically every social system in Maasai society. Since this thesis shall eventually analyse the emergence of new positions of authority and superiority in the form of individual ranchers, politicians, etc., I shall briefly look at some of the other forms of ranking and differentiating individuals in Maasai society.

As elsewhere in Maasai society, the rank ordering of brothers must be understood as a dialectical process which confers both status equality and status inequality. When brothers reckon their relationship through their father, they are considered to be generational equals, and all the men of their fathers' generation and above (i.e., father's brothers) are superior while the generation which will come after them (i.e., sons) will be inferior. However, the Maasai also determine the status of brothers by ranking through the mother. This is done spacially and symbolically by associating senior female status and rank with huts built to the right of a man's gateway, and junior female status and rank with huts built to the left side of the gatepost. Sons from a senior wife are shown considerable deference by their junior halfbrothers. Thus, brothers can be said to have status equality with seniority reckoned through the father and status inequality with seniority reckoned through the mother.⁵


Given that the Maasai are polygamous and an elderly man may take a very young junior wife, it often happens that skewing of these rules occurs. I noted many instances where an age mate was actually the younger brother of a father of another age mate. However, since they were circumcised together and therefore age set equals, they dropped the formal terminology of uncle and nephew, though the warrior from the junior generational strata continued to show a considerable amount of respect to his age mate.

For the most part, the importance of this seniority system is its relevance for the purpose of inheritance. Through women (i.e., mothers)

⁵ Within each family sons are also ranked according to their birth order so that younger brothers are expected to show deference to their elder brothers.

the Maasai recognize the hierarchical principle of segmental seniority or inequality of brothers. Ironically, though status inequality of brothers is reckoned through their mother, it is the mother who creates the material conditions of equality by distributing cattle fairly evenly to all her sons during her lifetime. On the other hand, though status equality or generational equality of brothers emerges through the relationship with their father, it is their father who exploits their herds creating the material conditions of inequality. At death, the most profound reverser of time and space, a woman is expected to bequest her cattle, which have not been distributed, to her youngest son. Similarly, when a father dies, his elder sons should inherit, a practice which does not recognize the status equality of brothers as generational equals. See Figure 21 below.

Figure 21 Status Equality/Inequality Between Brothers



Given the nature of the inheritance system, and the fact that young adult men cannot alienate cattle outside the household while their father is alive or without his permission, it becomes quite clear that while the optimal strategy of capital accumulation for an elder is based on distribution of livestock among stockfriends, the only strategy for a young man who is interested in capital accumulation is through concentration on his mother's household production unit and the ongoing process of prestation and vertical distribution of cattle among brothers.

Although the descent system determines who may inherit, the age grade system plays an important role in determining when. An uncircumcised boy may not inherit and if his father or mother die, his cattle must be held in trust by a relative, who may or may not manage it competently. As we have noted earlier, all boys circumcised during a particular period of time are considered age mates and pass through the age grade system together. The age grade system in Maasai society is a mechanism which at once creates a vertical ranking of different age sets based on inequality between junior and senior age sets, and a tendency towards status equality within age sets, i.e., along a horizontal axis. However, even within age sets there is a differentiation of members since a senior group is initiated first, being the right-hand of the circumcision group and a junior group is initiated later, being the left-hand of the age set.⁶ Even within these

⁶ This is a very brief and incomplete look at the age-grade system. However, there is further ceremonial segmentation on every level. Each oloshon is ranked and it is the ilkeekonyokie Maasai who begin initiating a new age-set, with the other sections following their lead. The order of hut locations at such ceremonial manyattas reflects the segmental and

senior and junior groups the initiates are divided into right and left hand groups, and a number of boys are chosen for leadership roles, such as the olaiguenani, the olotuno, etc., and are expected to be given considerable respect and deference. After the E-unoto ceremony of the junior group, the entire age set will move on together as one group eventually obtaining an age set name. Here then, even though the most dominant principle within the age set is equality and reciprocity of all members, it is structured on the basis of a number of contrasting sets of symbolic identifiers, the elements of which are complementary in nature (e.g. right and left, senior and junior, black and red, and so on).

The vertical ranking of age sets is based on the superiority of the senior age sets and the inferiority of the junior age sets. The relationship between a warrior age set (morán) and the senior elders in the alternate age set (i.e., two age sets above) is based on a special firestick relationship since these are the elders who kindled the new warrior age set. These elders have a potent curse over the warriors, are arbitrators, ritual specialists, advisors, teachers, punishers, etc., for the warriors. Warriors are expected to have considerable respect for their firestick elders as well as a certain amount of fear. The age set adjacent to the warriors (i.e., one age set above) stand in a superior relationship, although they have no special curse over the warriors and do not demand the same amount of respect and certainly not the fear. These junior elders

hierarchical ordering of not only the moieties, i.e. Orok Kiteng' and Odo Mongi, but also the clans and subclans as well. The circumcision of right and left hand groups emerges within this pervasive ceremonial ordering.

themselves stand in a firestick relationship to their alternate age set, the retired elders, and so on.

There is a constant and complementary balancing of relationships between and within various Maasai age sets and this carries over into other domains of social life. Indeed, the age grade system is both opposed and complementary to many other systems of societal relationships. The relationship of the age grade system to these other systems of relationships creates limiting conditions for the development of any of these sets of relationships.⁷ In other words, the age grade system is autonomous with respect to its own internal properties but these must be kept within the bounds of compatibility with the properties of other systems. For example, a young man is not only a warrior, but he is a member of his mother's household production unit. Participation in this unit was seen as his primary means of capital accumulation. For this reason, he must balance his own interests as a primary producer and his propensity for capital accumulation against those interests associated with warriorhood and particularly the possibility of additional capital accumulation through raiding. A young man who comes from a wealthy family would expect capital accumulation to accrue most rapidly through the natural increase of his family herd and inheritance, while a man from a destitute family would have to weigh the prospects of accumulation through

⁷ At the empirical level, an indication that various systems set limits on the development of one another is demonstrated by the fact that membership in an age set crosscuts other identifications, such as descent, residence, clan, etc. Because of this, a man who is very wealthy (olkarsis) and has considerable economic power may, in fact, find himself subordinate to men of a more senior age set who are much poorer than himself.


herding for a patron against the raiding abilities of his warrior company. And of course all of the warriors would have to weigh the benefits of the high status and prestige which comes with raiding against other strategies which might provide high returns, such as cattle trekking.

To elaborate, let me suggest that participation in the age set is not a strategy which is equally open to all initiates, even though all initiates are theoretically equals. In general, a man who is olkitok and involved in multiple exchange relationships will have sons who participate in the age set ceremonies. Since this man is quite rich his sons will be able to take cattle to the manyatta and their prestige will be heightened by their level of participation. A selfish man, a-paik, will generally not have large herds and when his sons participate in warrior activities their level of participation will be affected by the meager number of cattle they are able to contribute. A man who is wealthy, olkarsis, but isolated from the reciprocal obligations of exchange relationships will often have sons who do not participate in age set ceremonies because of their obligations to supply labour power at home because of the large size of their family herds.

The destitute herder, olaiterani, will not be able to send his sons to participate in such ceremonies out of sheer poverty since these young men must concern themselves first and foremost with family subsistence. Occasionally, a young stockless man may find warriorhood the only vehicle for accumulation of livestock through raiding, although for most this represents one of a possibility of strategies. Participation in age set ceremonies and activities is considered prestigious. The sons of a man who is a-paik who participate in age set ceremonies may be relatively low in

status when compared to those boys who participate more fully, yet they are all equal and enjoy a certain amount of moral superiority over the sons of wealthy herders who do not participate. The sons of wealthy men who do not join the manyatta nevertheless enjoy a higher status than the destitute non-participants because of their high level of participation in pastoralism. The relationship between participation in warriorhood and the exchange/production strategies of fathers is diagrammed in Figure 22 below.

Figure 22 Warriorhood And Participation Status



When a warrior takes his family cattle to graze in the rugged and marginal areas during the dry season, he does so as a function of his identification with the household production unit and not with the age grade per se. Participation in the warrior age set merely confers eligibility for arduous herding tasks, while connection to a household unit creates responsibility. Variables from one system limit the possible

development of another. Warriors often do withdraw their labour to participate in various activities and this affects the herding capabilities of their household.⁸ It is not surprising then, that elders are prone to point out the lazy and irresponsible behaviour of warriors. However, if a warrior refused to supply any labour whatsoever, he could cause severe losses in his family herds which would not be to his advantage since some of the family cattle belong to him. Similarly, although an elder has the right to alienate cattle from the herds of his sons and wives, it is not to his advantage to cause them hardship since their withdrawal of labour would reduce his overall ability to participate in the horizontal exchange of livestock.⁹

Thus either sets of relationships, in the extreme, constitute a threat to both social systems since a number of factors emerge which indicate that the upper or lower limits of compatibility have been reached and that a shift in strategies is imperative. This entails a shift, not for the entire social system, but for certain individuals. For example, if a warrior participates fully at manyatta he reduces his family labour force, which may or may not jeopardize the herding abilities of his family unit.

⁸ This is especially true since warriors often take their mothers and younger, uncircumcised sisters to manyatta, as well as subsistence cattle. In this respect, the polygamy rate might be seen as one variable which limits the age set system since a monogamous elder limits the level of participation of his sons because they are competing for the economic and domestic services of the wife/mother. An elder with only one wife would find it hard to function without a wife to manage a household unit.

⁹ Women withdraw their labour most commonly by running away to their own kin, although women do run away for other reasons. This strategy seems to be used most often by young, new wives.

If his father participates in livestock exchanges among stockfriends, he may or may not jeopardize consumption levels for his family. Both these strategies of high participation in warriorhood or exchange, while never fully possible for all warriors or all elders at all times, remain the high status and high risk strategies.

In contrast, a warrior who spends most of his time at home augments or increases his family labour force, but diminishes the potential of his warrior age set. Similarly, an elder who focuses primarily on his own family herds increases consumption for his family while decreasing the solidarity of his agnatic group. Both these strategies in the traditional social system are considered low status and low risk. In the physical sense of risk, it is the individualized, low status strategy which produces the greatest ecological risk, since localized disaster could ruin a man and without stockfriends his herd regrowth would be more difficult. See Figure 23 below.

Figure 23 Status And Risk

[Warrior at manyatta	--- labour	reduced	High status
			-----	High risk
[Elder with stockfriends	--- consumption	reduced	High status
			-----	High risk
[Warrior at home	--- labour	increased	Low status
			-----	Low risk
[Elder at home	--- consumption	increased	Low status
			-----	Low risk

A number of permutations of the above strategies may be operative at different times and to varying degrees depending on a number of variables which set limits on consumption and labour. For example, a warrior may attempt to follow a high status strategy while his father follows a low status strategy and both their activities will affect the abilities of the other. For the most part, when a warrior withdraws his labour from his father's herds, he does so not to change the exchange structure, but rather to restore it to a more tolerable state. There are many variables for instance which affect the amount of labour a warrior might be willing to provide. These include such factors as the size of the family herds, the number of wives his father has, whether his father plans to remarry, how many years until the next change-over of the age sets, when he himself will be an elder, along with a host of ecological factors which impact on range conditions, herding techniques and strategies, etc.

An understanding of the age grade system in relationship to the production and exchange systems emphasizes the need for recognizing their reciprocal correspondence, while not confusing their functions. Such a confusion often leads to a simple form of functionalism. For example, some writers have noted that "the age grade system shields the family from some of the strains entailed by polygamy" (Spencer 1965:307).¹⁰ In such an analysis, the age grade system is seen to delay the age of marriage and

¹⁰ Reducing tension caused by polygamy may in fact be a non-issue since the assertion that polygamy engenders friction and intense competition for women may be more an ethnocentric notion than the result of polygamy itself. When I speak of the strains of polygamy I refer not necessarily to the empirical manifestations of such things as hostility among co-wives, etc., but of structural strains entailed by a system of both status equality and status inequality.

thus allow elders to accumulate several wives. However, I have indicated that the accumulation of several wives is a function of the exchange structure which encourages men to speculate.

It is not surprising that many researchers have noted the control of marriage by senior elders and attribute this to the authority and respect which accompanies the role of elder. I maintain that the authority which is seen to be vested in the mantels of elderhood is a consequence of the exchange structure which places elders in the structural position of controllers by enabling them to follow strategies which permit their residual herds to grow at a relatively faster rate than those of their wives and sons. This argues against the circular notion that the elders' authority or "moment of tribute" enables them to control privileged goods, viz. cattle and women, and that they control privileged goods because they have authority (Terray 1972:176).

We can see that elders are in a structural position to control bridewealth and therefore social reproduction of the entire social system. It is my contention that these elders are not able to turn this functional power and authority into a real power to exploit. Although many researchers have noted such a limitation on power relations, their explanations rest at the empirical level, pointing to the redistribution of herds to overcome labour shortages, the overlapping of reciprocal obligations, and so on. On the other hand, I am trying to demonstrate that while all elders theoretically may follow strategies of accumulation and distribution which enable them to control women and cattle, the relationship of these systems to the age grade system ensures that there will be a dialectical relationship between the control of women and the

control of cattle. From the perspective of a warrior ego, one group of elders controls the cattle he desires, and another group of elders controls the women he desires. A number of strategies exist which enable a warrior to undermine the control of elders and re-establish the balance in his own favour.¹¹ Finally, the fact that all warriors, through the process of physical and social maturation, will become elders, makes the entrenchment of power relationships a tenuous one. Consequently, one might say that "polygamy does not run counter to the demand for an equitable distribution of women. It merely superimposes one rule of distribution onto another" (Levi-Strauss 1963:44).

I am certainly not arguing against the conclusion of researchers such as Southall (1970:42) who argue that the decentralized and acephalous Eastern Nilotic societies, which includes the Maasai, tend not to express power relations in terms of rank and status differentiation. Indeed, the dialectical relationship between variables both within and between subsystems in Maasai society was seen to militate against an absolute power structure, to the extent that it would be extremely difficult to find any axis along which a major cleavage could occur. I noted that the generalized exchange structure which characterized Maasai marriage made it unlikely that one group could gain absolute superordination over another, since a series of balanced cycles emerged. Several writers have recently

¹¹ Once again we can see how the curse acts as a mechanism to keep the system within socially acceptable limits. The firestick elders have a potent curse over the warriors, however, the elders from the same clan are said to be reluctant to curse their own sons which is tantamount to cursing their own herds, and the elders from outside are in the position of becoming affines to the warriors from other clans and their curse is limited by the ability of the warrior's curse as mother's brother.

noted that the egalitarianism of the Maasai cannot be thought of as ideological or altruistic (cf. Dahl 1979:274). I am in complete agreement, although I believe that this argument should be refined further so that care is taken to avoid inferring a covert rationality of social relations from a technique of adaptation to the natural environment.

On the one hand, researchers such as Dahl contend that capital accumulation is expanded through redistribution and exchange which makes it possible to transcend the limits of the household labour force. Others have viewed this distribution and circulation of cattle as being functionally related to certain ecological and demographic conditions (Spencer 1973). In other words, large herds, dispersed among a number of households, were seen as an assurance against drought and epidemic. Since dispersal was considered an economic and ecological necessity, it was offered that the management needs of large herds are such that large polygamous households are needed to maintain them. Thus, the circulation of women was seen primarily as a means to distribute the labour force. However, my analysis clearly does not regard the circulation of women simply as a means of distributing labour because this is only secondary to the exchange relationships which are "themselves simply the form taken by this distribution in the sphere of circulation" (Turray 1972:314).

Once again, I will emphasize that accumulating wives is a function of the generalized exchange system which becomes a pragmatic strategy which encourages men to speculate. There is, of course, ample evidence from pastoral societies which indicates that there is a correlation between the size of cattle herds and the size of families. However, a correlation does not necessarily imply causality. The validity of this type of reasoning

can be questioned by reversing the logic of this argument and saying that polygamy entails the expansion of surplus, because it is impossible to determine that the need for herding labour exists before the surplus required to feed them does. Thus, social forms are not mechanically related to production strategies. We cannot assume that the Maasai are polygamous because they must maintain large herds of cattle nor can we assume that capital accumulation is primarily the result of optimizing surplus and labour.

I have tried to show that it is social relations which generate the nature of herding personnel and that it is labour which regulates the ability of a stockowner to accumulate a surplus and not the converse. In other words, social structure determines the nature and limits of labour input. Ecological and demographic conditions do not determine the relationship between surplus and labour, nor do they dictate the manner of exploitation, although I have pointed out that they do act as limiting variables and one cannot argue with the tautological statement that social forms exist within the bounds of environmental adaptability. I have suggested that the relationship between elements within and between subsystems, such as interdependence vs. autonomy, distribution vs. accumulation, and so on, be understood as a dialectical process, where two different tendencies realize their limits through each other. Thus, I cannot accept those analyses which account for relationships, such as those seen to be connected with exchange, distribution, circulation, etc., as adaptive mechanisms which serve to decentralize herds during drought, or expand the labour force and so on. I do not deny that these things do

occur. However I do deny that their occurrence is the *raison d'être* of the social system.

The culture-environment interaction approach does not explain the value of cattle in Maasai society, except to infer that, since large cattle herds are an ecological necessity, they become *ipso facto*, the focal point of economic activity. Such a focus presents the pastoralist as Ecological or Economic Man, operating with a keen sense of individual rationality. I have attempted to demonstrate and explain the exchange of cattle and the circulation of women in Maasai society in terms of the logic of the wider social system of which it is a part.

To reiterate, only too often cultural ecology or what some critics have called vulgar materialism (cf. Godelier 1974) equates kinship or political and ideological systems with the adaptive advantage of resources which are channelled through these systems. I have attempted to show that stockfriend networks cannot be reduced to a complicated and covert mechanism which ensures against the risks of ecological crisis in subsistence which might come about as a result of exceptional fluctuations in rainfall, pasture conditions, etc.¹² The explanation which I have offered demands that the reader take account of the economic function of stockfriendships and political and ideological relations which enable elders to become eligible for participation in exchange strategies and glorifies the dominance of their behaviour. In fact, the exchange of livestock among such men can be thought of as a public expression of an

¹² The same can be said of the Potlatch and other social forms which have been simplified in this manner.

economy which at certain times is capable of producing a surplus which the ideology of exchange and reciprocity in Maasai society emphasizes as the legitimacy and right of individual elder's autonomy. In other words, the economic aspect of stockfriend exchange and the accompanying political and ideological relations must be seen in relation to the production and control of surplus. Such an interpretation does not see social relations reduced to the technical requirements of adaptation to the natural and biological environment, nor does it recognize the hidden rationality of exchange networks as merely the assurance of selective advantage for the herding groups practicing it.

Indeed, the level of production techniques sets limits which determine not the fixed outcome, but the possibility of alternatives, choices and options. However, Godelier (1974:36) suggests that we must do more than merely indicate the functional interdependence of social relations, even if we have stressed the plurality of different complementary functions. Here then, I agree that it is now our task to analyse the specific function of each system of relations, on the form and content of social organization. For Godelier, the dominance of a certain social factor comes about because it is seen to function as the relations of production, not necessarily as an organizational framework, but as a mechanism which controls access to the means of production and as a result, the social authority to maintain that control, i.e. political relations. To accept the premise that the relations of production "have a general determining effect on the organization of society ..." (Godelier 1974:36) is not particularly meaningful unless we are able to shed some light on the conditions under which a certain set of relations takes on the function of relations of

production and how the emergence of functional changes may lead to transformations of the forms and mechanisms of this dominance.

To this point, my analysis has attempted to elaborate not only a structural analysis of kinship and age set systems which isolates these structures from their function, but also to explain the plurality of their functions, especially in relation to the economic system. Rather than look for determinants, I have demonstrated fluid interdependencies which act on each other in self-limiting, though complementary, fashions. Finally, I must suggest that the analysis would be further heightened if the structures so far elaborated could be formulated more precisely in terms of the material and social conditions of production. While I do not intend this to be a Marxist analysis per se, it is useful to provide some definitions of a few of those Marxist concepts which are here applicable, as heuristic devices, for separating the economic function from the judicial-political, and from the ideological function. Since one of the important theoretical questions which I set out in the introduction was the nature of the relationship between production techniques/strategies and social form I find it necessary to say more than the fact that the kinship system and age grade system play a dominant and political role because they integrate other social relations.

Following Terray, Godelier, Mellaisoux and others, the mode of production is seen as a three part system which includes the following:

- (1) An economic base(a) a system of productive forces which includes the raw materials, tools, and material conditions, and can be thought of as the technical relations which Terray (1972:41) calls "man's appropriation of nature."

- (b) a system of relations of production which are the relationships between producers which structure the process of production and distribution.
- (2) A judicial-political level....relations of authority, control and power.
- (3) Ideological level....values, belief systems, norms, etc. which support the specific social relations of production.

Unlike Terray, this analysis will not interpret the production process as a labour process and thus attribute a different mode of production to every labour process. However, it is interesting that Terray has suggested (1972:150) that when the economic base is dominant then it is also autonomous and that when the political or ideological levels are dominant, then the three phases of the mode of production are highly integrated. This integration leads to the convergence of their determinations so that rather than appearing as distinct sectors they have a common realization. For this reason, Terray suggests that concrete social forms are not directly linked to a particular mode of production. Nevertheless, it is still possible to analyse the reasons for the dominance of certain socio-economic formations--in the case of the Maasai, kinship and age grade--in terms of structural causality of specific interconnections of social structures.

Briefly, I shall review my analysis in light of the above outlined conceptual frameworks. The economic base is composed of a system of productive forces, characterized by short-term production techniques for cattle, goat and sheep herding, virtually no tools, and operating in an

area of semi-arid and arid (and some semi-high-potential) grazelands with a bimodal rainfall, frequent drought and the prevalence of certain areas of restricted use due to tsetse fly or tick borne cattle diseases. The relations of production, as I have pointed out, revolve around the exchange relations of elders and their control over resources, the herding duties and responsibilities of children and young adults, as well as the milking and care of young stock by women. Such duties are carried out largely within the family and communally only in the sense of temporary arrangements of enkang partners. Labour shortages may be supplemented by loaning of herdboys among clansmen and hiring of client labour. The warrior age grade was responsible for protection or expansion of boundaries. However, in general, the reproduction of the system of relations of production in Maasai society must be seen in light of matrimonial exchanges, stockfriend networks and the growth of the independent household units.

The production process is based on two labour processes which are on the one hand, the elder's community of stockfriends which is a collectivity much wider than the immediate family or neighbourhood and which excludes women. Although this unit functions as a distribution unit we must not overlook the fact that the strategies attached to such circulation are overtly connected to production strategies. The maintenance of this process and its social reproduction are closely connected to the perpetuation of agnatic clanship as a determination of who may participate. The age grade system and rules of inheritance determine when a man is eligible to participate. One might then say that the reproduction of this

production process as an economic function in society is generated through the reproduction of agnatic kinship and the age grade system.

On the other hand, the production process is based on the domestic activities of the household production units which are associated with an individual elder's managerial control, though made operational by the activities of women and children. The social reproduction of this unit is directly connected to the process of matrimonial exchange which was seen to be exogamous and widespread, based on the principles of generalized exchange.

Earlier I have suggested that the relationship between these two systems of relations of production is a dialectical interaction where emphasis on one process affected the co-existence of the other. However, this does not preclude us from asking whether one of these processes is dominant. Maasai men are able to belong to both of these production units while women and children are identified with only the household unit.¹³ However, the exchange of livestock is the principal activity of the elder's stockfriend network or production community, while the domestic work and care of animals is charged to the household unit. Thus, we can see that the responsibilities of the household unit necessitate by far the greater expenditure of labour. Furthermore, the household unit, outside of *olpul* (trans. meat-eating locale), is the major consumption unit, so that the household production process can be seen as the dominant process since it

¹³ In fact, it has been noted (Terray 1972:156) that this type of separation occurs when the productive force of labour is quite poorly developed.

imposes its ever present consumption needs and limits on the elders' production community.

Both of these systems of relations of production operate to structure the same community and it is hoped that the limits and connection between the two have been demonstrated. Thus, on one level I have suggested that the household production process is dominant while at the level of judicial-political relations, authority, control and monopoly are vested in the hands of elders through the age grade system, and through the mechanisms of accumulation and distribution they impose relations of authority on the overall socio-economic formation. Nevertheless, I have indicated that the power of the elders is limited and their relationship to the household units constrains the scope still further. Control of the economy and the goods derived from it is not based on the appropriation of the means of production.

The elders' authority was intricately connected to the reproduction of the social system. However, as I noted, social reproduction is also the means of reproduction of the material conditions of the relations of production, and the point of conjunction for the two. Thus, stock exchanges enable elders to acquire wealth and perpetuate the system through marriage which is the instrument of household production and its continuance is related to the physical reproduction of the group. In this way, the natural reproduction of Maasai social structures, and of the continuation of the economic conditions, are closely connected as part of the entire system.

I should also point out that in the ideological domain it is the elders' production community which is dominant. The cooperation and

exchange between stockfriends and age mates is extolled, while the selfishness and individual interest of women are belittled. This ideological emphasis, which is, of course, backed by physical dominance and authority relations, is recognized by Maasai women.¹⁴ As many women told me, "We have no voice. If our husbands want to give away our cow they can just take it. It is the same with our daughters. They have the right to give them away without consulting us. Men do not like a woman who tries to tell them what to do".

To summarize, the dominant trait of the mode of production in traditional Maasai society is self-subsistence, and the relations of production are realized through marriage, agnatic descent and the age grade system. Thus, the socio-economic formation of Maasai pastoral production is the aggregate of descent groups linked by relations of various economic order (i.e. accumulation, distribution, circulation of labour, and so on) and the political order which imposes relations of authority on the overall economic process (i.e. the age grade system which at one time also involved the protection of territory, raiding and expansionary tactics). Finally, the ideological order which includes rituals, sanctions, taboos, symbols and so on which at once support the dominance of the male oriented production community while at the same time elaborating the dialectical relationship between social sub-systems.

I should defend my choice of defining only two labour processes since it might be suggested that the strategies of men who are either olkarsis or

¹⁴ I will discuss this more fully in another chapter dealing with women.

olkitok, which enable them to hire labour on the one hand, or borrow labour on the other, might be thought of as two more labour processes. However, I have chosen to regard these two processes as the logical outcome of the extreme over-development of either the production community or the household unit. These points are indeed examples of incipient endogenous change which I will discuss at greater length when I introduce the disruptions and empirical changes which have been associated with group ranching and other encroachments. However, before I turn to examine the effect of group ranching on the traditional Maasai socio-economic formation I will conclude this section of the analysis by following Godelier's (1974:51) lead and extricate the internal constraints on the mode of production which express not only the conditions which foster the mode of production but which set limits on alternative possibilities for this production.

This approach represents the constraints expressed through the social systems which channel the process of production and which emerge within a generalised ecosystem which contribute to the biological requirements of animal and plant reproduction, etc. Far from being reductionist, such an approach elaborates a system of constraints which intervenes on inter and intra-system relationships within Maasai society, along with other systems which set limits on the development of certain variables. In Maasai society it is possible to delineate the following constraints:

Constraint No. 1

The Dispersion Constraint: Household units recognize minimal and maximal herd sizes which meet consumption needs, are compatible with

the labour force, etc. Herds above the maximal size may be dispersed to other units.

Constraint No. 2

The Cooperation Constraint: Cooperation in the process of production, accumulation and exchange relates to sex, age set, clanship, affinal ties.

Constraint No. 3

The Fluidity Constraint: Enkang partners, neighbourhoods and so on are constantly changing composition as people and livestock come and go in search of grazing opportunities.

It is now possible to examine these constraints as a system which in turn affect the limiting nature of each individual constraint. Let us first examine the effects of constraint no. 1 and 3 on constraint no 2. Cooperation in the production process by age, sex, etc., assumes a form conditioned by the action of constraint no. 1 since herd growth may exceed labour and dispersion of stock can overcome local labour restrictions or temporary ecological crisis. The action of constraint no. 3 on the cooperation constraint is made manifest through the constant modification of group size and social composition as transhuman movement throws people of different lineages, clans, affinital networks and age sets into and out of face-to-face contact. Cooperation in the daily process of production and distribution of cattle and dairy products must be able to take place in light of frequent shifting social contexts.

It is possible to examine the effects of constraint no. 1 and 2 on the fluidity constraint (no. 3). The fluidity constraint is compatible with a number of environmental and social purposes. Drought, epidemic, localized rainfall, depletion of graze, and so on, can be strategically avoided or minimized through movement in an ecosystem which is acted upon by a certain

level of productivity of technology. This constraint is acted upon by the dispersion constraint (no. 1) to the degree that the dispersal of stock among stockfriends may reduce the necessity of herd mobility. On the other hand when fluidity is chosen and herds move to new areas to seek water or graze, the direction, distance and type of movement will be affected by constraint no. 2 since the need for cooperation according to different herd structures and composition, family sizes, and so on, may affect the amount of fluidity possible.

Finally, let us take a brief look at the effects of constraint no. 2 and 3 on constraint no. 1. Constraint no. 1, dispersion, is conditioned by the necessity to maintain herds which are adequate for the subsistence of the household members and to a certain extent to the advantage of enkang partners (i.e., the effects of constraint no. 2). Similarly, constraint no. 3, whereby people and livestock move in an ecologically advantageous manner, reduces the necessity to disperse herds among other herders since a stockowner physically disperses his own herd. The ability of a man's labour force to trek cattle and sometimes even split in different directions must be weighed against the dispersal constraint which moves animals and not necessarily people.

Having presented the system of interacting constraints which set the limits on the social and material conditions of reproduction, it is now possible to examine some of the major social systems of Maasai society regarding the necessity of their social action on other systems given the operation of the above constraints. One of the major social units of the Maasai is the oloshon or section which are traditionally considered to be ecologically, politically and economically autonomous, each section being

associated with its own distinct herding territory. The emergence of distinct communal herding territories associated with a single oloshon, for example the IlPurko vs. the IlDamat, can be explained by constraints no. 1 and 3. The dispersion of livestock takes place within a territorial secure unit, i.e. within the same territory, so that all livestock so dispersed have access to the territorial grazelands. Here then we can begin to explain the reason for the form and content of the social relations which are the basis of property, ownership and the use of the resource. Clan exogamy can be related to the existence of widespread, dispersed or what is commonly known as 'communal' rights of access to graze because of the action of constraint no. 3, the fluidity constraint, which is made manifest through constantly shifting social contexts. Thus, what is invariable for the Maasai is not the internal composition of settlements since members of the same clan, age set, etc., are represented in each settlement and each neighbourhood, but of the relationship of settlements and neighbourhoods to each other, a relationship which permits the reproduction of the society.

To take this analysis further, it is possible now to analyse the effect of the mode of production, including the system of constraints, on the nature of Maasai kinship relations and age grade organization. The form of Maasai kinship, the generalized exchange structure, makes operative the mode of production within the limits imposed by the system of constraints, which is associated with the non-closure of clans or the rule of exogamy, which maintains a relationship of exchange between clans. The kinship terminology itself stresses not only the differences of age and sex, but also the difference between insiders (clansmen) and outsiders (affinal relatives). Marriage rules are negative and prohibitive, in that not only

can you not marry within your own clan, but you cannot marry anyone who stands in the relationship of olaputani or enkapu (i.e. affinal relatives), such as into your mother's lineage, your sister's or father's sister's husband's lineage, and so on. These rules prevent the closure of groups into units which exchange women on a regular and direct basis which would generate a system of restricted exchange. Further, they do not encourage the simple replication of a man's father's or grandfather's marriage, which duplicate former relations and thus make relations between clans permanent rather than fluid.

Here then, constraints no. 3 and 1 are consistent with the forms of affinity in Maasai society and at the same time, they explain the fact that marriage is primarily an exchange between families since overall fluidity would be difficult to maintain between demographically larger segments, such as the entire clan. Furthermore, it can be seen that the structural effects of the mode of production on the descent system are complementary with those on affinity. Because there is no restricted exchange, and no basis for continuity, the genealogical depth of lineages is shallow and poorly developed. In order for Maasai society to reproduce itself under the constraint of fluidity, there should be at least four different clans exchanging women in order that the ties created remain widespread and diffuse.

In the judicial-political realm it is quite possible to show that rules and norms, as well as the authority structures which maintain them, are parallel to the process of production and the constraints imposed by the mode of production which puts nature to its own specific uses rather than the other way around. I shall demonstrate this by analysing the effects of

the constraints on the political relations within and between Maasai oloshon. By political relations, I refer to the rules and norms of actions which regulate individual and group access to pasture and productive resources within and between territorial boundaries. These rules include such things as the norms for raiding, stock movement, murder and homicide payments, the use of different weaponry, etc.

The effects of the constraints imposed by the mode of production on political relations are not the same as the effects which they impose on other systems of relations. This I believe is so because the constraints are acting upon an aspect of the Maasai social system which is not as integrally connected to the process of production as kinship relations. Nevertheless, the effect on political relations must be considered isomorphic to the effects which such constraints create on other major social relations (cf. Godelier 1974:55). The major characteristics of Maasai political rule or authority are as follows:

- (1) Inequality in political authority between individuals or age sets.
- (2) Collective sanction in the regulation of conflicts between individuals or groups.

Inequality in political authority can be observed between men and women, senior generation and junior generation, senior elders and junior elders, etc. While the inequality, especially within the age grade structure, is highly defined between groups, it is relatively weak, and is dispersed vertically. In fact, elders wield a communal authority and within any particular age set the ability of any one individual to become dominant is limited by the voluntary (i.e. constraint no. 2) and provisional (i.e. constraint no. 3) relations between individuals in the

production process. In other words, if a man attempted to impose his authority over other individuals who are considered to be structural coevils, these individuals could refuse to cooperate or move away. Economic wealth, as generated within the traditional system, cannot easily be turned into horizontal control or power over other herders.

As mentioned earlier, each elder is able to establish authority relations through the kinship system, especially over his own family, and economic wealth may also give him the ability to function as a patron with authority over a number of client herdersmen. However, unless such a man acts within the communal setting of the council of elders, he is not assured of influencing or demanding action from other individuals. Thus, an influential man is one who does not impose his wishes on others, but through the mechanism of cooperation within the council of elders is able to eventually become a major factor in determining the consensus arrived at.

Here then, I should point out that the existence of 'olkitok' or a big man, takes place, as I have demonstrated, within the framework of reciprocity through the mechanisms of dispersion and cooperation (i.e. constraints no. 1 and 2) which generate respect in the neighbourhood and strengthen solidary relations of clansmen. However, the personal authority that such important men seem to muster can be directly linked to the way in which their surplus, actually and ideally, perpetuates the reproduction of society. On the other hand, the existence of wealthy men known as olkarsis suggests an accumulation of wealth, which though it may have been made possible via the conditions of social reproduction, is eventually extricated from the conditions of reproduction of the mode of production,

through the ability and desire of such men to ignore or overcome constraints no. 1 and 2. Since their wealth is not associated with the influence of 'giver' or 'sharer', nor with the power relationships which build up with stockfriend networks, made manifest at various times through the actions of the local council of elders, their ability to influence is limited to the personal assessment of other herders who may decide to attach themselves to the enkang of such a wealthy man. However, the possibility that such herders may leave at any time and move to another area undermines the degree of personal authority which a wealthy man can generate. Not only is it difficult for one individual to maintain prolonged authority over other individuals, but lack of continuity over time through marriage alliances (constraint no. 3) makes it difficult not only for an individual to maintain authority, but for such an individual to pass on his authority to his descendants, which could of course result in the formation of a hierarchy of political power which would be connected to a new form and content (i.e. strong lineage based kin groups, and so on).

The second characteristic of Maasai political relations which I pointed to was the collective sanction of conflicts. In some societies individual mechanisms such as witchcraft play a major role in repression of conflict. However, in Maasai society the constraints of dispersion, cooperation and fluidity mitigate against such a mechanism since dispersal of herds to distant stockfriends implies trust and reciprocity and the movement of stock and homesteads takes place within the continually unfolding situations of cooperation between clansmen, enkang partners, affines, age mates, and so on. The ever present possibilities of mutual aid are not

consistent with witchcraft which is associated with social relations and conditions of hostility, suspicion and distrust.

In Maasai society, sanctioning of many wrongdoers, whether it be for such breaches as adultery, murder, breaking of food or sex taboos,¹⁵ unannounced entry into a grazing area, and so on, usually takes place through the mechanism of group enforcement (i.e. the council of the elders, fining delegations, etc.). Within the council of elders, certain men, whether because they are clansmen or for other reasons, may side with the aggrieved or the accused party, and the final solution and decision of the council is a compromise which brings unity and emphasizes the 'proper' order of things.

There are instances in Maasai society where certain types of behaviour or interaction of certain groups elicit repressive violence or even violence. For example, if an uncircumcised girl becomes pregnant, she changes from a sweet to a bitter person, and it is said that her bitter blood would cause the circumcisor to become sterile and her child will be born bitter, etc. Such a girl, traditionally, if she is not circumcised before the pregnancy shows or aborts, is set upon by the other women, her house is torn down, her nose slashed, and she may be driven out of the community. Such punishments must be seen in light of the potential or actual disruption of the behaviour to the conditions of social reproduction of the entire social system. The analysis of the relationship between the mode of production and symbolic practice deserves much more elaborate

¹⁵ Sanctioning of men who have broken food taboos, or have been too lax with their daughters, etc., is taken up periodically when women join forces to form a fining delegation.

attention than falls within the scope of this thesis. However it is safe to say that an understanding of the various levels (economic, political and ideological) enables one to determine the function of symbolic practices as they serve to perpetuate social relations in their entirety.

The second type of example of violence as a means of political or social control can be seen in the traditional function of the warrior age set to physically defend or enter new territories to expand or protect pastoral resources. Although movement of individuals or families can take place between oloshon on a contractual basis, I have referred to Galaty (1979) who indicates that movement of entire settlements into another oloshon's grazing area is considered a form of annexation which meets with hostility. Thus, at the periphery of such territorial boundaries, either between Maasai sections or other neighbouring pastoral or agricultural non-Maasai peoples, there was and still remains a great deal of tension which traditionally was associated with armed defense of territories. Within sectional territories movement is facilitated by the nature of the constraints of dispersion, cooperation and fluidity, which have been associated with stockfriend networks, sharing mechanisms and affinal ties. The pursuit of pastoral production within the limits of these constraints created large ecologically viable territories within which individuals and their stock could pass from one locality to another by receiving rights of access to pass through the grazing areas of adjoining localities. Violent confrontation at the intrasection level, i.e. intra-oloshon, is further channelled by restrictions on the type of weapons which warriors can use against each other, homicide payments, the ability of area councils to arbitrate by fining and mediating, and so on.

Thus, violence takes place progressively on the periphery of territorial associations, and the nature of conflict and the degree of aggression is conditioned by the segmentary nature of Maasai society so that groups more distantly connected are subject to more hostile reactions. In general, I wish to suggest that aggression and violence are not compatible with constraints no. 1 and 3, when seen in light of the social reproduction of the relations of production. Constraint no. 2 may be compatible with aggression to the extent that it promotes cooperation of one group to the exclusion of others. Therefore, although it can be said that in relationship to the internal properties of a single Maasai oloshon, constraints nos. 1, 2 and 3 of the mode of production are incompatible with armed aggression or warfare, the historical significance of Maasai interaction with other oloshon and other herding and agricultural peoples¹⁶ is well documented and consistent with the emergence of a warrior age set, an effective military force with the ability to protect the social system and the mode of production from interference from outside forces.

Since communal access to graze, dispersion of herds and so on were an integral part of the functioning of each section, it was extremely important that these territories be protected from incursions which would disrupt mobility and fluid interaction within the oloshon. Thus, the very constraints that inhibited intra-oloshon warfare and competition were associated with the protection of the social system and territory from

¹⁶ This interaction was based both on the transhumant movements of the Maasai and the encroachment of other peoples into Maasailand. Also, not all interaction between the Maasai and neighbouring groups was hostile as evidenced by the trade and intermarriage between Maasai and Kikuyu and several other peoples.

outsiders. In other words, an armed military force in Maasai society was incompatible with the internal properties of the social system and its functioning was turned outwards against the penetration of other groups into the oloshon. It would certainly be tempting at this point to analyse the symbolic practices associated with warriorhood to show how these relate to the reproduction of social relations as a whole. However, such an endeavour demands a dissertation of its own so some cursory remarks will have to suffice.

The association of the warrior age set with the periphery of oloshon life and the negative aspects of its functioning with the internal operation of the mode of production is balanced by its integration into society through the mechanism of the age grade system and the control of elders. The authority of firestick elders over warriors, which has so often been linked very simply and functionally to the demands of a polygamous strata for a monopoly on women, must be seen in light of control over a social unit in society which is peripheral to the internal operation of the socio-economic formation and the mode of production. Elders are in the structural position of controllers of surplus and therefore marriage and it is quite evident that within the age set system, elders must decide how much of their surplus production will be channelled for the functioning of the age grade structure. Thus, the authority of the elders can be related to their control of the surplus necessary for the operation of other social structures. In light of this, the reader must remember the manner in which production strategies of poor men or rich men, and so on, affected the participation of their sons in the warrior manyatta.

Here then, it is important to recognize that traditionally a great deal of the surplus in the subsistence pastoral economy was channelled into the maintenance of the age grade structure, and the warrior age set in particular, since cattle, women and children were extricated from the family production field and sent off to manyatta with the warrior. Thus, it can be seen that production surplus in traditional Maasai society was not always channelled directly into an enlargement of the level of productive forces, although it was the basis for enlargement and augmentation of pastures and the community's productive resources. The warrior age set was largely separated from the internal relations of production, though they acted as a supplementary labour force on behalf of the community in terms of the labour involved in waging wars, defending or conquering pastures and protecting society's productive resources. Such a military force no doubt enabled the Maasai to cope with population increases and changing resources thereby ensuring the ability of the entire society to reproduce itself on the same basis.

The separation of the warrior age set from the internal constraints of the mode of production is physically and ideologically reinforced by their association with the bush and the manyatta, and the numerous food taboos enjoining them to always drink with an age mate present, never eat meat in front of circumcised women (i.e. in the settlement), never eat grains, etc. These taboos reinforce the separation of the warrior age set and the economic aspect of the age grade system from the on-going economic process of livestock production, accumulation and exchange (See Appendix D). Every effort is made by the elders to channel the activities of the warriors outside of society. Raiding activities of warriors were expected to be

directed at outside groups. Each section was divided into a number of warrior companies (isirit) and although there was some aggression between companies, it was still expected that cattle stealing not take place within the section.

Many writers have suggested that raiding activity was a means for a warrior to build up herd capital in anticipation of his own marriage. However, the IlPurko Maasai insist that if a warrior was caught stealing cattle from within his own section his age set would be fined seven cattle. When one warrior company steals cattle from settlements associated with another warrior company of the same section then the warriors take these cattle to olupul and eat them because they are too easily identifiable by brand and ear marks and cannot be used for marriage negotiations. Thus, every effort is made to channel the military power of the warriors outward rather than inward. Finally, I should point out that the reintegration of warriors into mainstream life involves a number of rituals which signify an intensification of the process of production such as the milk drinking ceremony or the meat eating ceremony, which should symbolically increase the quantity of milk or meat to be distributed and shared by the community, and the integration and unity of economic and social spheres which are largely separated in the age grade system. In light of this, I would suggest that the change of the age grades every fifteen or so years is a form of political action which overcomes a number of social oppositions which are continually fostered by the mode of production, such as opposition between a warrior's household production unit and his father's production community, and which are threatened by the over or under-development of household herds or community distribution.

The elaboration and analyses of the various social systems which have been presented should help to illustrate the traditional mode of production in Maasai society. We may now ask what it is that is changing with the onslaught of modern day Kenyan development plans.

In combination with a host of factors--ecological, economic, political, etc.--the structure of Maasai society creates a limited range of options for members. In attempting to analyse the selection of strategies by various herders, we must seek the rationality of the entire system and not just of one element, such as cattle. This is consistent with Friedman's (1974:458) warning that, "It is the system which defines the necessary function of its elements, and to treat the element independently is to avoid the real problem." In this analysis, the rationality of the system was embodied in the dialectical relationship between interdependence vs. autonomy; production community vs. household production; wealth vs. poverty; and so on. The development of either the horizontal or the vertical domain was seen to be limited in the traditional Maasai system since both production systems are interdependent (i.e. complementary) and in themselves, structurally inadequate (i.e. contradictory). If one particular domain is over- or under-developed, then features emerge which result in the opposite.¹⁷

¹⁷ This approach is similar to Leach (1964) in his analysis of political change in Highland Burma where he identifies two incompatible but simultaneously available systems, i.e. gumsa and gumlao. Although historically these two systems have dominated different communities at different times, Leach maintains that in their practical application they are always interrelated.

By identifying the constraints and options surrounding relationships of different kinds, we demonstrate two important things. First, we show that endogenous economic transition is an ongoing process in an exceedingly fluid economy. The nature of this transition is uncovered by showing that the rational pursuit of economic, political and social advantage takes place within a context of specific shifting alternatives, and that various individuals are provided with the incentives for exploiting them while others are unable to do so. Secondly, such an analysis exposes the paradoxes of intention and consequences that so often defeat the goals of development planners who have based their policies on an overall transformation of the society in question.

When I speak of identifying constraints on the social system, I refer to variables which may cause strain on the functional and structural compatibility of subsystems in Maasai society, and not to underlying determinants. Indeed, this analysis does not seek to expose any absolute determining variables, since I have tried to indicate that factors which impinge on one herder may do so to quite a different extent on another. Having said this, I must hope that such an approach does not communicate an oppressive sense of burden on circumstance. What is important to recognize is that at certain times, and for various reasons, herders come close to exceeding the upper or lower limits of a system when they adopt or are forced into strategies which favour the development of some variables and the neglect of others. In other words, rather than infer causality from one element or determinant factor, this analysis seeks to outline fluid interdependencies that have coherence over time but are much too complex to

be handled in an analysis which focuses on what can be called methodological causation.

Let us turn now to the next chapter and attempt to 'plug' these data and statistics relating to increased poverty and smaller herds into the models which I have been building to determine whether or not transformations of the traditional system are in fact occurring. In attempting to analyse Maasai reactions and altering personal relationships to the traditional social structure, I hope to be able to distinguish structural change, which will involve a transformation of processes and operational conditions, from those processes which involve a mere change of extent or content, although it is obvious that both transformation and alteration may appear at the same time. In light of this, I suggest that change is not an integral process. Initially, it may take part in only a certain aspect of social activity which in the long term may alter opportunities and constraints of action for individuals in other directions.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE IMPACT OF RANCHING SCHEMES ON MAASAI SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The models which have been elaborated in the previous chapter represent relations which still exist throughout Maasailand. However, their existence, as representative of the entire social system and the mode of production, are increasingly being impinged upon by the action of the Kenyan government, swiftly spreading agricultural encroachment, diversified occupational and employment opportunities, a highly circumscribed resource base and a growing population, and so on. The extent to which these, and other exogenous factors, are affecting the Maasai social system, either through alteration or partial or complete transformation, shall be investigated by inserting the empirical data which I collected into the models, and thereby determining the compatibility between them.

The nature of such models enables them to benefit the analysis of the impact of social changes in two ways. First, it is possible to examine many of the particular incidences of evident social crisis which have been discussed previously, and to then analyse them for confirmation of the modalities of change consistent with the models. Second, it is possible to suggest or predict some of the outcomes which have not yet occurred, given the nature of the strain on certain systems of relations. However, such inferences will be based on the grounds established by the evidence presented. In order to explain and understand Maasai reactions to the numerous social, economic and political factors now impacting on their lives it is important not only to account for the forces of change (i.e.

government, ranching, agriculture, marketing, etc.) in terms of their empirical manifestations (i.e., poverty, polarization, divisiveness, etc.), but to place them within the framework of the social system which is being acted upon. In the final analysis, whatever the outcome for the Maasai society and economy, it can only truly be explained when we demonstrate that the traditional system itself determines the form that any structural changes may take.

In order to demonstrate the effect of certain events or developments as they impact on Maasai society and the traditional socio-economic formation, it will be necessary initially to isolate each of the factors to be considered. However, I hope to eventually show that several different factors may be impacting on the social system at the same time, or in an accumulative manner, and that it is this overall effect which must be determined. Therefore, as I introduce my data and the impact of each on the models, I ask the reader to remember that this systematic approach will lead eventually to the integration of the various levels. Let us first examine the effect of demarcation and the imposition of relatively small, circumscribed resource bases (i.e., group ranches) on the Maasai social structure.

ALTERING STOCK MOVEMENTS: THE MODEL CONTRACTED

The loss of grazing land and the interruption of traditional movements of livestock among the Maasai has been an ongoing process which was most dramatically evident with the Maasai Moves into a much reduced southern reserve, the continual encroachment of agricultural groups into Maasai rangelands and the more recent post-colonial introduction of land

adjudication and the division of Maasailand into individual or group owned land. For the most part, except for a few ill-fated development schemes, the confinement of the Maasai to the present day reserves was such that the traditional pastoral mode of production was left intact as the basis for organizing subsistence. Nevertheless, the loss of important dry season grazing areas disrupted seasonal migration of herds, management strategies, etc., and forced many pastoralists to live in former low potential wet season grazing areas which Jacobs (1975) refers to as vitiated pastoral systems.

However, constraint no. 3, fluidity, of the mode of production was predicated upon the possibilities of widespread relationships and subsequently of the option of movement throughout a widespread territory. However, the limits which such a constraint set on the development of certain systems of relationships within the framework of Maasai social structure were undermined by the restrictions placed on Maasai movements. Many pastoralists in such areas found themselves in the position of pursuing strategies which were leading to production outcomes of olaiterani (i.e., the destitute) or a-paik (i.e., the selfish).

Given this decrease in production output, it is interesting that certain writers, such as Boserup (1965), have suggested that a decline in available per capita resources is often the basis for the intensification of food production and the receptivity of individuals to new techniques of production. In other words, production scarcity rather than surplus is seen to generate the incentive to adopt new production methods. On the other hand, some researchers (Meadows and White 1979) have indicated that Maasai receptivity to group ranching and technological development was

facilitated in Kajiado District by the devastating drought of 1962 which decimated 85% of Maasai herds. Although in this instance failure of traditional methods of subsistence can certainly be thought of as one of the contributing factors, it was not the only factor.

In fact, I am not trying to make a single case for one side of the argument or the other. I certainly do not rule out the possibility of subsistence abundance or oversupply of resources or even extreme wealth as providing a basis for strain in the traditional system - a strain which may lead to the adoption of new production techniques. Structurally, I have attempted to show that variables which strain the socio-economic system at either the upper or lower levels (i.e., surplus or scarcity) may disrupt those conditions which are necessary for the reproduction of the entire social system. Such strains have probably existed for certain individuals within Maasai society, however, I suggest that given the disruption of many traditional conditions through demarcation, massive government intervention, etc., it is possible that over time, the entire Maasai society may be faced with strain in both social and economic systems, to the extent that the Maasai socio-economic structure may become transformed.

In light of such a statement, I should emphasize that I am not suggesting any sort of linear progression, or inevitable outcome for all societies faced with growing populations and declining resource bases. In fact, intensification of food production in the face of such challenges is not necessarily the only response to be expected. Spooner (1972:265) describes the situation of demographic pressures on an Iranian oasis community which experienced intense agricultural competition. The pressure on the resource base was resolved by the de-intensification of food

production when a number of agriculturalists opted to move into pastoralism.¹

THE EFFECT OF DEMARCATION ON THE AGE GRADE SYSTEM

In Maasailand, early attempts to limit movement of livestock were also accompanied by 'pax britannea' and the control of warfare, raiding and aggressive territorial expansion. To a large extent, the state took over the role of protector, which had been in the hands of the warrior age set. The state did not, however, take on the role of enlarger or expander of the community production resources, a task which had been associated with the raiding and aggressive activities of the warriors. The constraint of dispersion was seriously disrupted and the potential of the entire pastoral production system was limited. This, I believe, has generated a great deal of tension at the periphery of oloshon territorial boundaries, since greatly reduced and circumscribed herding ranges heightens the need for preventing neighbouring oloshon and non-Maasai peoples from entering such boundaries.

Although warfare such as existed in the past, when certain oloshon such as the ilaikipiak were driven to extinction, has been eliminated, border skirmishes between warriors from different sections still exist and serves a recognizably important role for the mainstream of Maasai society (i.e., preventing further erosion of territorial integrity). Nevertheless, such skirmishes are frowned upon by the government and raiding has been largely

¹ Such an argument, of course, is based on the premise that agriculture is more productive than pastoralism, which is certainly not acceptable to all researchers (cf. Schneider 1979).

curtailed with the existence of anti-stock theft units within the army which attempt to track down and capture culprits. Given the great reduction in their military service to the community, it is not surprising that much of the raiding activity which goes on today is directed inwards, i.e., within a warrior's own oloshon. I shall present other explanations for this later, however, the fact that elders have so often cooperated with the government in attempting to eradicate stock theft and limit warrior activities must be understood in light of the increase in intra-sectional raiding.

The participation of young men in their warrior manyatta at the present time is steadily declining. Let us examine the models which I have built to suggest some more detailed explanations for this decline. The imposition of circumscribed grazing territories, agricultural encroachment, and finally demarcation and group ranching, has led to a decrease in herd quality, movement and so on, and therefore, to an increased number of men following strategies based on an underdeveloped household production unit. I have suggested that, even traditionally, not all young men had equal access to participate in warrior activities and an increase in impoverished herders means an increase in the number of boys who do not participate full time in manyatta life.

The decrease in participation at manyatta is difficult to compare, past and present, since any data concerning level of participation in the past are non-existent. However, from all accounts, it seems safe to speculate that participation in warrior life was rather widespread and included the vast majority of young men. This level of participation has been drastically reduced, although again, this varies from region to region. In

the lower Mau region, where considerable research was conducted, I feel quite secure in suggesting that fewer than 50 per cent of the eligible warriors, both junior and senior, attended their warrior manyatta. At Rotian Ol Makongo Group Ranch there were twenty or more warriors and only four of them had lived at the manyatta. Of these four, two had lived there for over a year and the other two had spent a few months. Thus, a full 80 per cent of the young men there had either stayed home with their families, one attended school, others sought employment or left for other reasons. In other areas, such as Loita and Mosero, participation in warriorhood appears much higher.

Young men who had attended manyatta differentiated themselves from those who did not by referring to them by a different name than the one adopted by the age set. The right-hand of the warrior age set, the senior warriors at the time of research, was referred to by several names, most commonly as irampau, a name which was chosen at the boy's manyatta. Later at the warriors' manyatta, the firestock elders called them ilkiyeku and at E-unoto, the warriors changed their name to ilkiseyia and the elders later decided to call them ilkiruti. Similarly, the left hand of the age set, the junior warriors, were generally called iltobola, a name they had chosen themselves, although they were renamed ilkirupi by the elders at manyatta and at the time of this research, ilkirupi was reaffirmed by the elders at the E-unoto manyatta. In several years' time, when both the left and right hands of the age set hold their village of the stools (Enkang'Olorikan), they will be given a common name for the entire age set which may take some time before it 'catches' on and is widely used. In the Rotian area, the

junior elder age set, iseuri, are still commonly referred to as ilterekeyia, which was the popular name of the right-hand of that age set.

Those young men who had not attended warrior manyatta or actively participated in their activities were referred to by the other warriors as irandai, which refers to weakness, and is also the name of a slow, rhythmic singing style. If the men who did not go to manyatta were cattle trekkers, they were often referred to as ilkeshekop, indicating that they had travelled far and wide. However, the young men who did not participate nearly always referred to themselves as irampau or ilkiseyia, not wishing to acknowledge the more disparaging association with irandai, especially since many of the uncircumcised boys, waiting for the next age set of warriors to be formed, were calling themselves irandai as well. Perhaps this excerpt from a song, sung by a young irandai man, might serve to illustrate the position of those men who do not go to manyatta villages:

Let us sing the irandai song.
The song of the real irandai.
We do not like their behaviour.
The irandai are floating.
They are not irampau, nor are they iltobola.
That is why they are always so thin.
Their thoughts are disturbing them.
Yesterday, I wished that I had gone with
the people who know the true battle.

The non-participation of many of these warriors must be directly related to the ability of their fathers to permit a certain amount of subsistence surplus to be channelled into the maintenance of a social structure (i.e., the warrior age set) outside of the production system. Although some boys actively chose not to go to manyatta, others who do not go would very much like to attend, but have no choice because of economic circumstances. Similarly, I interviewed warriors at the iltobola E-unoto

manyatta who said that their fathers and peers forced them to go and that they wished they could have stayed away and done other things - such as cattle trek or go to school.

We should recall earlier statistical data which showed that 20% of the resident Maasai members at Rotian Ol Makongo Group Ranch were stockless, and another 41% had herds of less than thirty animals, which entails great difficulties in meeting subsistence needs. Thus, over 60% of the Maasai on this ranch, which is quite typical of this particular area, can be considered as either olaiterani or a-paik, based on their relative poverty and economic pursuits. Although this number represents a cross-section of the age sets and not necessarily just the fathers of the warriors, it nevertheless suggests a strong correlation between poverty and participation level at warrior villages. The warriors who remained at Rotian, who included several sets of brothers, all came from families who were either too poor to support them or who required them at home to help with herding. Eight of the young men who did not participate were considered heads of households because their own fathers had died. These young men were left with the responsibilities of managing their herds and involving themselves in related economic activities, rather than in warrior activities which would have estranged them from their settlements and not have been conducive to stock (capital) accumulation.

The rate of polygamy also has an effect on participation in warrior manyatta. I shall later discuss a number of variables which are affecting the polygamy rate, but, at present I shall simply refer to my data, which clearly indicate that polygamy at Rotian Ol Makongo and most likely the Mau area in general, is quite low. At Rotian Ol Makongo, fewer than 25% of the

married Maasai were polygamous and a number of these had taken non-Maasai women as second wives. In the past, researchers working among the Maasai and Samburu have suggested that polygamy rates for these societies approaches 1.6 (Jacobs 1968; Spencer 1975).² Although polygamy rates still vary with age set, so that in general senior elders have more wives than juniors, there seems to be a definite decline in plural marriages. This reduced rate of polygamy in the Mau regions means that stockowners are not in the position to send their wives and children off to the manyatta with a warrior son since they would have no other wife to rely on. Such monogamous stockowners must base all herding strategies on the manipulation of factors associated with a single household production unit.

In fact, interviews with many warriors who did not attend manyatta emphasized that their fathers had not permitted them to go or had actively opposed such a move. One young man explained that his father's reasoning was based on his assertion that "it is useless to go and live out in the bush. The warriors of today do nothing, except make trouble for the elders". While I have suggested that in some cases the labour requirements and management needs of a man's household may demand that he devote his time to herding pursuits, this is often not the case. Since many of the young men who do not go to manyatta are from stockless or poor families, their labour skills are not always essential at home. I shall later discuss the involvement of these boys in different kinds of economic alternatives.

² The married Maasai membership at Rotian Ol Makongo, which I had data for, included 40 men with a total of 51 wives, producing a polygamy rate of 1.20.

For young men from destitute families, only two options are widely available. Such men can enter paid employment off the ranch, as night watchmen, herders for individual ranchers, in tourist lodges, etc., or work as client herdboys. In fact, there are several young men in the area who had not even been circumcised and were working as client herdboys within the traditional economy. These 'boys' all expressed humiliation of their uncircumcised adult state but explained that they had been lent out by their fathers who desperately needed the livestock received in payment or the food provided by the patron. After circumcision, their fathers would no longer be able to lend them out in such a way. Thus, some boys from impoverished families not only abstained from warrior life, but were unable to enter the age set dictated by their sociological maturation. Non-entry into the age set was not simply for the purpose of apparent father-son exploitation, but also because, most informants agreed, a circumcision cost at least 1,000 KSH which was beyond the means of a destitute family.³ Here then, we are talking about the sons of olaiterani, young men with little opportunity to plug into the cattle economy, except as client herdsman, and an equally poor opportunity to make an adequate salary off the ranch in order to buy back into the pastoral economy. Such youth, both the wage-earners and the client herdboys, although technically members of the group ranch, are more realistically part of a disenfranchised group. Most of the boys who did not go to manyatta came from families with marginal attachment

³ These grown boys shunned contact with groups of people and always lingered around the periphery since they were ashamed to have to bow their heads to be touched in greeting. Instead, they avoided being in a position where they would have to be greeted at close hand by others.

to mainstream pastoralism, families with so few cattle that their fathers could not afford to be involved in widespread stock exchanges. To a large extent, given the small herd sizes associated with their families, these young men were not compelled to provide labour at home, especially if they had younger brothers and sisters. However, labour constraints are not simply linear in relation to herd size and a certain amount of qualitative division of labour is associated with herd structure and type of stock, i.e., cattle as opposed to shoats. Children and young uncircumcised boys, and occasionally women, herd small stock and young animals, while herds with a preponderance of adult stock need more expert herding management. At Rotian Ol Makongo, older boys did much of the herding of livestock, although the young irampau and iltobola were needed to take the cattle to the Narok dip every two weeks and to carry out some of the more arduous herding tasks such as grazing in the forest. If the warriors were too busy with other pursuits, then the cattle were not taken to the dip.

Ironically, given the fact that the elders on the ranch had persuaded the warriors not to go to manyatta, several elders complained that "in the past the warriors loved their cattle but nowadays they are too busy with other things." The dilemma centres on the fact that poorer herders do not want their sons to become active warriors but to help out when needed with their family herds. The warriors feel that if they do not go away to manyatta, then they do not want to be treated like children, being told when and where to herd, but would rather attempt to build up their herds for the future. In fact, one of the major restrictions on labour comes in the form of care of young stock and shoats. Each enkang on the ranch has two or three children who are attending the nearby primary school at

Rotian, approximately a dozen children, as compared to only two men from the warrior age set who had gone to school. Therefore, there are not always enough children around to perform such herding duties. The warriors are particularly loath to be seen taking small stock out to graze. For this reason, many of the elders at Rotian take turns herding several flocks communally and often recruit their wives for this task. This of course places an increased burden on a woman's workload, since she may not be able to gather firewood or fetch water until the children arrive back from school to relieve her.

Many of the warriors who come from impoverished families, though with some livestock, are very keen to become cattle trekkers if they do not go to warrior manyatta. Although some labour requirements from these men are needed by their family households, it is often felt that to sell some livestock in order to start out in the livestock trading business or to find a sponsor will result in higher pay-offs in the long-term, pay-offs which it is hoped will compensate for any short-term losses associated with their lack of labour input. Warriors from totally destitute families are not usually able to finance themselves in the cattle trekking business, largely because the needs of their family for subsistence demand an immediate and short-term crutch, such as employment, which will stave off immanent disaster.

To reiterate, I have suggested that the channelling of surplus production into the maintenance of a warrior age set (i.e. by underwriting manyatta life) is becoming increasingly difficult for elders because of increasing poverty. Thus, many of the young men who do go to manyatta take very few cattle with them and often they are not accompanied by their

mothers or sisters. I would suggest, and interviews with dozens of warriors have supported this, that warrior manyattas today are not always able to remain self-sufficient, and that hunger is often an element of manyatta life. It is not surprising then that the warriors often travel about to visit inkangitie in their localities in the hopes of being given milk at the home of one of their age set mothers. This brings them into the settlement areas and into contact with married women which creates tension among both the senior and junior elders who believe that the warriors are trying to seduce their young wives. One has no way of reckoning whether warriors of today who attend manyattas are loitering around the inkangitie to a greater extent than in the past, although this is what the elders insist. Certainly tensions over seductions are very real, nevertheless, I am suggesting that the conflict is being exacerbated by the lack of surplus which traditionally played a major role in keeping the warriors in the bush.

If there is not enough milk available for the warriors at manyatta, another option open to them is the consumption of meat at olupul. Since cattle raiding or theft between sections is difficult given the likelihood that police and anti-stock theft units will be called in, much of the raiding that occurs nowadays is from within a warrior's own section, though probably from the locality of another warrior company (i.e., sirit), an activity which was traditionally sanctioned. This interpretation is consistent with the comments of the warriors who stated that they ate any cattle which they stole before they could be recognized although they might put cattle into their herd if they were able to steal from a Kikuyu. One can better understand the tension between warriors and elders when one

understands the disruptions which demarcation, etc., have had on pastoral potential and production surplus. Therefore, the inward focus of warrior activity related to raiding within one's own section should be associated with the lack of surplus from the centre (i.e. mainstream Maasai society) to support the activities at the periphery (i.e. manyatta life).

There are certainly other factors which impinge on the age grade system, and these will be discussed later. However, it is important to understand how the relationship between limited Maasai movement, especially outward at the periphery and circumscribed pastoral resources has contributed to the tensions generated in the age grade system between warriors and elders. The traditional relationship between centre and periphery appears to be stained. The activities of warriors were traditionally directed outward at the periphery of oloshon boundaries or at other oloshon. This protection and expansion provided the conditions of security within each oloshon which facilitated the operation of the cooperation constraint (no. 2) on the mode of production, thus permitting the process of capital accumulation within the oloshon. The present day impossibility of expanding resources, stock raiding, or armed aggression at the periphery, has seriously increased competition for resources within each sectional territory. Such resources were formerly not part of the competitive framework, except at the periphery, and cooperative relationships determined access to resources. Overall, the inability of the traditional subsistence mode of production to continue operating on the basis of the three constraints detailed earlier, has drastically reduced or rechannelled surplus production - a surplus which I have suggested supported manyatta life. The inability of warrior manyatta to reach self-

subsistence, or enhance their resources by outward expansion, has contributed to the tension between warriors and elders, as the warriors turn inwards to expropriate the resources for subsistence which are needed for the continuation of the institution itself, in its present form.

STOCKFRIENDS AND EXCHANGE: CHANGING STRATEGIES

Traditional Marxists have tended to suggest that in non-capitalistic societies, such as the Maasai, the mode of production is characterized by a low level of capital and technological production and that it is labour rather than land which is the scarce commodity (cf. Sahlins). This view is not substantiated by the level of capital production and accumulation in traditional Maasai society, based on a rapidly expanding resource (i.e. cattle herds). However, one might say that the traditional operation of the Maasai mode of production was based on abundant land or the potential to expand or enlarge production resources at the periphery, very few material necessities for production and the availability of labour as a concomitant of social relations. Nevertheless, given the historical factors involved from colonial times to present day group ranching schemes, the value of land and labour in Maasai society must be seen in light of their transformation into limiting factors and scarce commodities. Furthermore, I am suggesting that the land issue must be understood in this historical sense, since any transformations which occur do so in a logical progression of the particular Maasai situation, rather than in correspondence to some general determining law or evolutionary sequence.

The imposition of demarcation, and the adjudication of both group and individual ranches in both Maasai districts, has heightened the strain on

the Maasai socio-economic system. It has interfered with movement and expansion at the periphery and also impinged on exchange and capital accumulation within the centre of each oloshon. In effect, the government sponsored ranching program has tried to suggest that if the Maasai only settle on group ranches, then the constraints on the traditional mode of production will simply go away. They have offered the Maasai certain political and economic resources, such as legal title deeds, financial assistance and so on, which they feel will foster conditions conducive to accumulation outside the bounds of social exchanges. They have not, of course, been able to create the ecological conditions which would further dissolve the limitations placed on the production system by the various constraints. This is especially true in the arid areas.

In certain areas of Narok District, such as the Upper and Lower Mau, Trans Mara Division, etc., encroaching agricultural expansion, especially wheat, barley and maize cropping, has also greatly restricted seasonal movements of livestock, and group ranches contiguous to these areas must increasingly become the sole resource base for Maasai stockowners living there. As their movements become more and more restricted, the membership of group ranches in these areas is becoming more concerned with prohibiting people and their stock from other ranches from entering, and especially from taking up residence on their group ranch. The effect of enclosure in these high and semi-high potential areas is that the constraints on the mode of production have been drastically disrupted. Mobility of herds is greatly reduced and restricted by the inability of stock to trespass on neighbouring group ranches and surrounding wheat fields. Dispersion of stock in these areas has greatly contracted since ranch members pressure

other members not to accept stock from non-members, fearing that such men will later attempt to take up residence. Cooperation is undermined by the decrease in surplus production aggravated by the inability of herders to follow strategies based on mobility and dispersion, and the growing competition for bounded resources.

Again, as with the declining participation in manyatta life, it is difficult to give precise estimates of the decline of stockfriend relationships. However, that such a decline is taking place is quite evident. Interviews with ranch members in these semi-high potential areas consistently produced the following types of comments:

Long ago, we had many stockfriends. Now it is very rare. The old people were the ones who exchanged stock.

And the following:

Nowadays, if you give two heifer it is very expensive, but before people had more cattle and you could give five heifers and it would not hurt you.

When asked to explain why the Maasai were no longer exchanging stock to the extent they had in the past, the reply of one junior elder may serve to summarize the majority of replies.

It is because of the land. The land is becoming very bad. Long ago, friendship was a good act, but nowadays, development forces us to neglect these acts and put them backwards. Even a long time ago, there were many cattle on this land but nowadays there are many people who do not have many cattle.

Here then, I suggest, on the basis of qualitative data, that in some areas of Narok District there has been a substantial decline in the exchange of stock among stockfriends.

The exchange of livestock among stockfriends was the primary activity of many elders, and the models which I developed earlier showed that the

constraint of dispersion on the mode of production was facilitated by relationships of agnatic clanship. However, livestock exchange among elders did not occur in isolation, but as I demonstrated, in conjunction with the activities of household production units. Indeed, one must recognize that although stock exchange brought high social value, both production systems were of equal vitality, the stock networks fostering distribution and exchange of cattle outside of the family, while the household units operated to consolidate and distribute cattle within the family. In those areas where stock networks have been curtailed, the relationship of the elder's production community and the household production units to one another is affected and this in turn affects the operation of other systems of relationships. This is an important point, since it was earlier suggested that the interplay or dialectical relationship between these two systems created the conditions for the social reproduction of the entire social system and also for the material conditions which are the basis of the mode of production.

The exchange of stock among clansmen was seen as directly connected to the form of descent, kinship and marriage. However, undermining the stockfriend system does not mean that the descent system ceases to function, although its relationship to household units is altered. At one time, the circulation of production resources from the household units to the larger stockfriend networks (production communities) was a source of opposition among women and their husbands' agnatic clansmen. Increasingly, one finds that the interests of many stockowners are much closer to those of their wives, i.e., consolidation. Thus, clanship and household production each become narrowly focused and cease to function outside of

their own spheres. Clanship still has its own internal and segmental properties which serve to identify members and each household still provides the basis for identification of property and inheritance rights of those within it. However, family and lineage no longer have a common area of realization outside of their own internal properties, an area of realization which was reflected in production strategies of exchange and accumulation.

Furthermore, removing the economic aspect of exchange and accumulation from clanship (i.e. stockfriend networks) does not mean that exchange and accumulation in Maasai society has ceased. It does mean, however, that there are new social relations, some of which already existed, others which have been created, which are attempting to fulfil the economic aspect once associated with stockfriendship. This does not infer that new relationships, such as between Maasai herders and the market or the informal sector, can be thought of as clanship relations transformed into market relations. Rather, it suggests that the exchange function of intra-clan relationships are being developed on a new basis to solve new problems.

Of course, the inter-relationship between stockfriend networks and household production units, as two systems which were once equally vital in the realm of the the relations of production, varies considerably, depending on whether the stockfriend networks are still intact, weakened or in the process of being eliminated. In the Rotian area, where stock exchanges are greatly reduced and inhibited by group ranching, as well as by small herd sizes, many of the Maasai stockowners still attempting to subsist off of their herds have made use of a number of other social

relations to try to continue operating on the basis of constraint no. 1. Thus, the following strategies, based on new and old relationships, are being activated to transfer the function of capital accumulation away from clan relationships as well as many of the social obligations which were attached to this relationship.

- (1) Shifting the function of exchange associated with the dispersion constraint into those relationships associated with the fluidity constraint.

Not only have stockfriend exchanges declined in the Rotian area, especially since demarcation, but ranch members at Rotian Ol Makongo and neighbouring ranches further explained that it was becoming quite difficult to let a stockfriend move into the ranch. If a stockfriend wanted to take up residence or graze his cattle on the ranch, then the elder who wished to sponsor him must speak on his behalf before the council of elders to receive group permission. A number of herders stated that such requests were very often being turned down. On the other hand, ranch members emphasized that certain people could come begging for graze and that it was quite difficult to turn them away since the council of elders recognized the legitimate rights of these people to seek assistance. These people are mother's brother and his family, and sister's husband and his family.

Since dispersion of herds is becoming difficult through the traditional stockfriend networks among clansmen, I would maintain that some Maasai stockowners are attempting to continue dispersion strategies through exchange relationships, not with clansmen, but with affines or potential affines. My own research did not permit the time to carry on a detailed statistical study of this shift. However, interviews with most of the stockowners at Rotian OlMakongo strongly suggest that, rather than exchange

livestock with men perceived to be agnatically related, stock is exchanged with men perceived to be future fathers-in-law. Repeatedly, I was informed:

When you exchange stock, that person becomes like somebody who has given you his daughter to marry.

and again,

You have to know the person you will give or exchange stock with because there are many people with a lot of cattle who do not help their friends. So this is how it is, if you give a cow to someone, that cow will no longer be in your boo (trans. kraal) so you must know that your stockfriends will help you out with your problems. After you have given him a cow, he might thank you by giving you his daughter to marry.

Since the reciprocal obligations and relative status equality among clansmen are quite unlike the relationship which a man has with the person who has 'given you his daughter to marry,' it would seem that stockfriendship is no longer primarily associated with clansmen. This, of course, is reinforced by the fact that Maasai clans are theoretically exogamous, and that the Maasai of the Rotian area were quite insistent that stockfriends were men who might become your olaputani (father or brother-in-law). The association of stock exchanges with affinal relationships is further reinforced by the following statements:

Commonly, men of different age sets will exchange stock and then marry each other's daughters. People of the same age set will not marry each other's daughters, although they may exchange their little sisters. When people stay together, a younger man may please an older man from a different age set so the older man might go to him and say, "I want us to be friends" and the friendship will begin there and it will start by the elder giving him one heifer. They will continue to give animals until, at long last, that elder will give you his daughter.

One might think that the above account was given in response to questions about how a man finds a wife. However, it was, and several others of a similar nature, a description of how a man finds stockfriends.

Therefore, the exchange relationship in this area of Rotian is associated with potential affinal or marriage ties, and since age mates and clansmen cannot be fathers-in-law, it follows that the ideal stockfriends are now considered by many to be non-related men of a different age set. In fact, this can be thought of as a form of economizing, since the two exchange relationships (i.e. marriage and stockfriend) are now combined into one. In other words, with the breakdown of stockfriend networks in the Rotian area, stockowners are increasingly attempting to incorporate the elements associated with constraint no. 1, dispersion, formerly connected to clanship, onto the elements connected with constraint no. 3, fluidity, which is associated with marriage. There seems to be a tendency, especially for young men, to make their stockfriends into their affines, and thus, rather than disperse stock to men who are only able to give stock in return, it makes sense to disperse stock to men who will give daughters in return. Ranch members may try to discourage stockfriends from bringing each other's cattle onto the ranch but they have never objected to anyone bringing a new wife onto the ranch. Thus, the affinal relations are being invested with the economic significance of dispersion and distribution which was ideally associated with the relations of clanship.

I shall discuss the effect of this shift away from exchange with agnatically related clansmen/stockfriends on the marriage and kinship systems generally in another section. However, let us first turn to another set of relations that the Maasai, especially in Upper and Lower Mau, Trans Mara, etc., are employing to take over the economic function which was associated with stockfriends networks (i.e. the distribution and accumulation of livestock).

- (2) Greater reliance on the market to supplement family subsistence in times of scarcity or to slough off surplus in times of abundance.

In contrast to the restriction of colonial times, livestock marketing opportunities are becoming widespread throughout Narok District, although they are certainly not as obvious in the remoter areas. Thus, the sale of animals, either to stock trekkers or at market centres, represents another option which is open to a Maasai stockowner, over and above the varied social exchanges which he might have generated with the same animal. In the Rotian area, I estimated that offtake rates of livestock for sale and/or exchange to trekkers, on average, represent approximately 26% of the herd annually, and when mortality and consumption or subsistence slaughter are considered the figure approaches 30%. About 13% of this offtake is destined for the market. In terms of the estimates for traditional Maasai livestock offtake rates, which were thought to be about 8% in total, the volume of offtake in the Rotian area is extremely high (cf. vonKaufman 1976). Meadows and White (1979) have suggested that offtake rates in Kajiado District, when times are favourable, approach 15%. Probably, a review of the entire district of Narok would be closer to this figure, since offtake rates in areas such as Narosura, Suswa Kitet, Loita, etc., are considered to be very low according to the assessment of the Livestock Marketing Officers. Nevertheless, when we focus attention on a sub-area such as Lower Mau, we can observe drastic alterations of traditional offtake rates.

It is now possible for development planners to look at these areas of high offtake and suggest that one of the goals of the group ranching program, i.e. a high and sustained offtake of livestock, is being realized.

This is true although a good deal of the offtake is in the form of exchange of one kind of animal for another, and there is a strong tendency to attempt to replace the animals sold by the purchase of other animals whenever possible. Thus, it would be wrong to infer that this high offtake is for the benefit of the group ranch, and especially to think that the private property aspect of group ranching has created the incentive to conserve grazeland by increasing sales of surplus or non-productive animals. Increased sales in these areas have more to do with poverty than with the state of the ecology per se, although there are of course seasonal fluctuations in terms of an individual's readiness to sell.

A number of factors are affecting livestock sales in these areas. The decline in stockfriend networks among the Maasai living here often means that ownership and rights to dispose of an animal are becoming highly individualized. Thus, the multi-stranded rights which several individuals might have had in animals in a man's herd are beginning to dissolve. Here too, many of the reciprocal obligations of mutual aid which accompanied stockfriendships are dissolving as well. The market is becoming not only the place to sell animals, but also the place where a herder finds supplementary food during times of scarcity, a function which at one time had been associated almost solely with the aid and redistribution of pastoral products within Maasai society, especially among clansmen. The decrease in stock exchanges has drastically weakened the mechanisms for mutual aid, which enabled pastoralists living below subsistence level to attach themselves to other households which could support them.

Nowadays, stockowners with herds which are too small to meet the nutritional requirements of their families are frequently turning to the

market to generate cash for the purchase of grains to overcome a temporary, or in some cases a permanent, deficiency in the milk diet. Although richer herders do not have to resort to as much conversion through the market in order to meet consumption needs, they may choose to sell animals which are in excess of the capabilities of their labour force, since the opportunities for exchanging such animals are diminishing. The net effect of this increased involvement in market relations is that the pastoral economy of the Rotian area is becoming increasingly monetized, to the extent that, in many instances, it is becoming acceptable to replace the social value of cattle with cash.

Let me present just a few examples in order to demonstrate the extent to which monetization of the economy is taking place. I attended one circumcision where the initiate's father, rather than giving an animal, presented 100 KSH. Cash was also substituted for part of a bridewealth payment, and I saw new brides who received gifts of cash from their co-wives and brothers-in-law, instead of livestock. Fining delegations frequently assessed partial cash fines on wrongdoers, and the circumcisor was paid in cash and honey beer. A very common practice in the Rotian area, especially among irampau and iltobola, is that young men who are too poor to exchange livestock with one another exchange a shilling or fifty cent piece, and instead of calling themselves after an animal, refer to each other by their monetary exchange. There are many such examples, which suggest that the monetization of the pastoral economy is beginning to turn cattle into a commodity, a process which Schneider (1979:223) suggests will lead to a deflationary trend in the economy.

In brief, growing poverty in the Rotian area, exacerbated by limitations on movement and exchange of livestock and the rapid spread of agriculture, has led to a decrease in stockfriend networks among clansmen and also a decline in the support mechanisms of mutual aid. As an alternative, many herders are turning to the market as a means of providing cash through livestock and shoat sales.

- (3) High offtake rates (from above) lead to a vicious cycle syndrome, where diversification into the informal sector becomes necessary to restock the herds which provide the cash which supplements the inadequate pastoral diet.

Traditionally, stockfriend networks, or as they have also been conceptualized, elders' production communities, enabled elders to follow strategies of exchange which were associated with striving for olkitok status. Men who attempted to follow strategies of olkitok were able to create their own stores of wealth through the establishment of a supra-local form of organization which reached beyond the local community. Distribution of livestock was not alienation of livestock from pastoral production, but rather accumulation of capital in one part of the production system. On the other hand, when the distribution or dispersion of livestock in the form of exchange is halted or curtailed, and livestock are instead marketed, they are removed totally from the pastoral production system. The link between distribution and accumulation is irrevocably severed.

Research indicates that the poorer the herder, the higher was his offtake rate and the less likely was he to be able to participate in stock exchanges. For such men, the greater their involvement in livestock sales, the greater was their need to find some mechanism of accumulation outside

of the stock exchanges which they were not participating in. For the majority of these impoverished herders, diversification of pastoral production, through increased involvement in the informal sector, such as charcoal burning, trading, cattle trekking and so on, provided a very shaky alternative to accumulation in the traditional economy. Very few of these men, with the exception of cattle trekkers, are ever able to break this vicious cycle and build up herds which are able to grow largely through the process of natural reproduction.

Group ranching programs were imposed in order to stimulate increased livestock sales to promote a beef production industry in Maasailand and supposedly lead to a higher standard of living for the Maasai. However, increased offtake in the Rotian area has not come about for the reasons which the planners thought it would and is therefore not leading to beef marketing strategies or to an increased standard of living. The process which is clearly evident in the Rotian area is the systematic transfer of economic resources outside the reach of local control (i.e. to the market), to provide the services and necessities which were once served from within. When livestock are used as commodities to provide services they are no longer "self-reproducing currencies" (cf. Schneider 1979:225) which augment themselves and thus provide "the conditions for economic growth and also the condition for political decentralization." Livestock as commodities must constantly be replenished and the impoverished herder cannot always replenish quickly enough, while a few wealthy herders come to monopolize the commodity, which traditionally had not been so easily controlled. Furthermore, even authority relations, which at one time were developed through the relations of production described earlier, and which were

associated with elderhood and production strategies as status relationships, are increasingly being seen to be generated from outside of the Maasai economy. I shall explain this transference of authority and leadership relations in the next section.

LAND AND SOCIO-POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

I have attempted to demonstrate that the Maasai of Narok are increasingly confronted with threats to their subsistence and it is quite safe to say that they are experiencing growing feelings of frustration, which more and more are beginning to generate disputes over productive resources. These disputes have been highlighted through intra-ranch conflicts over the use of resources and inter-ranch hostilities concerning access to rangelands, and so on. The dialectic between exchange and accumulation of livestock is becoming strained to the point where local and regional exchanges of goods have been disrupted and this has created needs which are being satisfied in other ways. For example, some of these needs are being met by increased involvement in the market economy, by the transformation of stockfriend relations, and by diversification into an informal sector.

I would further suggest, given the historical significance of the land question in Kenya, that another manner in which the Maasai have met these threats is through the progressive enlargement of leadership. Here then, I am referring to the emergence of the modern political elite and, for the most part, the individual ranchers throughout the district who serve as their supporters and brokers for the rest of Maasai society. In Maasailand, as throughout Kenya, land values have been continually

escalating, and friction and litigation are increasingly becoming the means for solving these disputes, a situation which never arose traditionally within a section since access to land within each oloshon did not enter into the system of competition. In fact, the entire Maasai socio-economic system is being turned inside-out as relations which were associated with the periphery turn inward and spread throughout the centre of mainstream society.

I should point out that this analysis has not proceeded from the a priori assumption that strain in the traditional social system will be made manifest through increasing class conflicts. In other words, I have not been searching for an emerging class category as a creative possibility in the strict Marxist sense, rejecting as I do the notion that as societies move towards capitalism there is only one principal contradiction, which is that between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Maasai society has presented us with a number of contradictions which are not class based and are interconnected with each other in various complex ways. Certain writers (Balandier 1969) have suggested that to understand change or transformation in a society, we must seek it in the innovative responses of those social units most consistently victimized by the transformation. I have attempted to analyse all levels of the socio-economic formation and to suggest that certain events and occurrences, such as demarcation, agricultural encroachments and so on, have in fact increased the number of disaffiliated pastoralists who are turning to the national, political and market system in order to remain a part of the pastoral system.

Here then, the new leadership and elite are seen to be part of the problem and part of the solution. The politicians (i.e. including county

councillors, M.P.'s and chiefs) and to some extent Maasai civil servants, are increasingly being called upon to adjudicate and settle disputes over land, and/or provide access to resources (financial, etc.) originating outside of the local economy. Traditionally, the council of elders mediated disputes on the basis of consensus and not on the basis of someone winning at the expense of another person. The action of the council integrated the loser back into the social unit by the nature of fines imposed, etc. In Maasai society the overlap of social roles has made it difficult to mobilize new forms of organization to cope with impersonal constraint on the economic system.

The traditional economic system was one of control by elders of surplus livestock created by the labour of the direct producers. Isolated at a single moment of circulation, exploitation may seem apparent, but the production process as a whole is not based on absolute exploitation. Power, authority and control were dispersed vertically over the producers, so that elders controlled women and children and not each other. However, as control shifts away from control of the producers to control of the means of production itself, i.e. land, the new elite are becoming involved in a very different pluralistic competition which represents more diffuse interests. Thus, the potential basis of influence is dispersed horizontally, rather than vertically.

If the role of individual ranchers (who are also the businessmen and politicians) in the Narok socio-economic scene was simply one of isolated commercialized ranching, then one would expect that the prestige and social status, as well as the authority of these individuals in the traditional society, would be very low. However, these men have been able to create

widespread reciprocal, though non-pastoral, relationships within the wider pastoral population. Economic reciprocity between individual and group ranchers has been largely eliminated, but in their capacity as politicians or political brokers, these ranchers control and dispense political and social services. The ordinary, uneducated pastoralists feel that these men are essential in helping them to interface with government and to cope with entirely unfamiliar sets of political conditions over which they have little control. Individual ranchers, in this capacity, represent traditional Maasai in courts over issues ranging from land disputes and stock theft, through arranging loans and employment, to securing schooling for children, etc.

These brokers are expected to muster large segments of the voting population in their regions during election, either for national politicians or local government officials. Loyalty at the polls can be aided by winning support through services offered, activating lineage and clan ties, investing in large-scale gift-giving at election time, and so on. In return for the support that these brokers generate, they are rewarded with substantial economic benefits, often being given the opportunity to establish themselves in retail businesses, transportation enterprises, wheat cropping, the tourist industry, and other economic pursuits.

The extent to which these individual ranchers/politicians/entrepreneurs affect the life of their community is not limited to merely interfacing occasionally between traditional and national institutions. The kind of action, and occasionally excessive loyalty, that these men are able to garner is frequently translated into inter- and intra-group ranch

antagonisms and factionalisms. A few examples might serve to demonstrate the manner in which political affiliation impinges on decision-making on group ranches and ultimately, on the direction of the development of a group ranch, and perhaps the entire district.

Let us consider the case of Olipito Group Ranch. The dominant lineage, which was originally associated with that area, and which also has a senior chief from its ranch, filed a law suit against another family who were registered ranch members but who also had membership on Murua Group Ranch further to the north. One of the national politicians, who received political backing from the chief, decided to support the dominant lineage, while his opposition candidate backed the other family's claim. At the same time that this land dispute was raging, the Salvation Army had been given permission to build a church and school on Olipito Group Ranch. Both families requested that the buildings be constructed next to their inkangitie which were on opposite sides of the ranch. Eventually, political factors favoured the dominant family and the buildings were completed close to their homestead. An opening ceremony was held and Maasai from neighbouring ranches who had supported the politician backing the other family said that the politician in the other camp arrived and asked everyone to vote for him; they felt uncomfortable and left saying they would not use the school just constructed because of this.

Throughout Narok District, group ranch membership aligned itself with various local or national politicians. Sometimes, this split ranch membership into two opposing factions according to the support that they gave different politicians. Even disputes among ranch members over non-land questions often became highly political once politicians chose to

promote the cause of one side or the other. In such cases, the ability of a group ranch structure to promote a cooperative framework for development is completely overshadowed by the competitive rivalries of various factions.

During the political campaigning, which took place at both the national and local level during my research tenure, politicians would employ a few prominent men on various group ranches to distribute gifts and promote their causes. Loyalty to a candidate is often based on ties of kinship and marriage, as well as a widespread network of obligatory support based on the jobs, schooling, loans, or other services which the candidate has made available to individuals. The Maasai, men and women alike, composed campaign songs to refer to the virtues of their candidate. The following examples, referring to some candidates, indicate the concern of these Maasai with linking the political sphere to the issue of land security, development and litigation.

Singer: We are very proud of Ole B, the ol-nyangusi who borders the school ...
 That same day, we will favour Ole B and he may have the saying of the morning (prayers).
 Help you will get, our ol-nyangusi with heavy thoughts that you may continue helping all of our people.
 I should have good praise when I refer to Ole B.
 The song should really praise him that he may lead us better.
 X (a woman on the ranch) is your sister and you both love cattle.
 When you go away and come back to Kenya, bring the knowledge that you will benefit all IlPurko.
 May you bring the knowledge and may the children kiss your knee.

Singer: When I went watching, I saw the people of Olokurto talking nonsense.
 When I heard them talking nonsense I decided to tell them to vote for Ole B.
 Councillor Y lives at Olokurto and his great friend lives next to him.

They are all pleased by Ole B because he has great support to get our land.

Singer: Ole B, keep trying, for Kikuyu are almost taking away the cattle.

Ole B, keep trying, for with you, the land will not disappear.

Singer: Ole B, do not worry we are at your face and you will have joy
Ole C, what did you do? You poured your money and you will not get a single card ...

Let us all wake up and support Ole B and Ole C will be chased away.

Singer: Development is coming to take Ole B to parliament.
Our elder will really go to where we want him to be.
We must be proud of our man who is going to parliament.

Singer: Are you all on the side of the great one, who will not watch your land disappear?
Ole B lives at Motonyi and the handsome Ole D is his neighbour.
His cattle have beautiful skins and they walk home alone for milking.
Ole B of big stomach, take care of your people.

At the time of the research, a number of political factions were aligning themselves in such a manner as to greatly increase the power of Ole B and defeat Ole A. Ole B's son married the daughter of the Member of Parliament for Narok South, creating a large united bloc of anti-A opponents. The M.P. for Narok West was also a long time foe of Ole A. This political manoeuvring was nipped in the bud when the Kenyan president, Daniel arap Moi, came to Narok and announced at a baraza (trans. open air meeting) that candidate B was withdrawing from the political arena for the sake of unity, enabling Ole A to win by acclamation. Ole B was given a lucrative post elsewhere for his compliance. However, this does not end the rivalry between these two politicians or the Maasai who support them and everyone is sure that they will meet again in the future.

It is interesting that while both politicians A and B claim to represent the Maasai, both speak fluent Kikuyu, were educated among the Kikuyu, and are married to Kikuyu wives. However, many of the group ranchers discuss their support for either of the candidates in terms of which one is more Maasai. Ole A gathers much of his support in Upper Mau where there is heavy infiltration of Kikuyu and it is said that he talks to them in Kikuyu and is sympathetic to their desire for subdivision of the land. Thus, even though politician B also speaks fluent Kikuyu, those Maasai not interested in subdivision say that he is a 'real' Maasai and that he loves the land and cattle. Both these politicians have many individual land holdings throughout the district, however, Ole A is seen to be on the side of subdivision while Ole B is seen to favour the continuation of group ranching.

In this way, development in Narok District is closely related to the political process. The ability of various prominent men and their supporters to become effective power brokers in the district greatly influences the potential for development. Sectional rivalries on some group ranches is destined to be 'solved' at the political level. Many of the various chiefs and county councillors with individual land also have membership on a group ranch. Although they are often non-resident members, they have considerable influence in determining that a dip or school, etc., will be built and where it will be located. Several such Maasai have expropriated individual land on a group ranch. In one such case at Lemek Group Ranch, some of the members complained to the Ranch Planning Office and were told to resolve the matter through their group committee. As is

so often the case, the chief involved was also a member of the committee and the grievance was dropped.

Due to the enviable success of many individual ranchers, there is now slowly emerging an effort on the part of some traditional Maasai to emulate these elite by investing in land - a pursuit which remains closely tied to one's ability to cultivate political brokers. For the majority of Maasai, faced with shrinking resources, growing populations, individualization and increased conflict over land use, the new elite (i.e. the individual rancher/politicians) with their connections to important national resources, are seen as the agents capable of mitigating disputes. Ironically, Maasai become divided in their loyalties to different politicians and sometimes this reflects their alignment with different courses of development such as subdivision vs. group ranching, wheat expansion vs. pastoral development, and so on. However, it also happens that these factions are often striving towards the same end and that the rivalry is over distribution of those ends, i.e. competition over scarce resources. Thus, the ordinary Maasai lend their support to the politician whom they believe will generate the most opportune mobilization of resources, and he is pitted against another politician whose backers also see him as representing an equitable redistribution of resources for their area. Sadly, the rationality that the ordinary Maasai is seeking in the socio-political system, the extensive redistribution of resources, is becoming linked to horizontal political bases, which compete for localized resources rather than cooperate for Narok Maasai in general. Therefore, the 'rationality' which so many group ranchers desire may never be realized for those groups now suffering the most.

Here then, we can see that even among the elite, who for the most part are now *il-nyangusi* elders, there is no strong unifying element and that in attempting to build up horizontal power bases, the elite themselves are divided into a number of coalitions. Politicians, aspiring candidates, and their political brokers, are often attached to political patrons in Nairobi who attempt to channel services and rewards (i.e. economic and political) for their supporters.⁴ The power of certain individuals may be greatly affected if their patron in the national elite falls from favour, so that politicians may come and go while at the local level, chiefs, county councillors, etc., are usually ready to reactivate this support for another person. At the grassroots level there is a growing realization that the national government, by the nature of its interventions, will continue to impact on Maasai life and that the ordinary Maasai herder needs to interact with government, courts, loans officers, police, etc., with the aid of their new leadership.

Thus, the politicians and elite who constitute this new leadership are slowly achieving a higher and higher social status, which at present the majority of Maasai feel is commensurate with the perceived functional necessities of the activities and services performed by these men and is thus an appropriate reward for their services. Competition for scarce resources is starting to permeate Maasai society and, increasingly, access

⁴ The interconnection of local level councillors, chiefs, etc., and national political figures, as well as the relation of these associations to the formation of a one-party state in Kenya and the alignment of Maasai interests with different power blocs is very complex and would demand treatment in a much more detailed and documented manner than is possible at this time.

and control of these resources, particularly land, is linked to the increased differentiation of roles as made manifest through the elite. This differentiation of roles, and the political authority which is attached to it, is, however, becoming a specialized function instead of a comprehensive kind of social eminence, which in the traditional Maasai system was more an ideological and functional authority than a real source of power. The new elite are creating elaborate channels of social mobility (i.e. education, housing, languages, etc.), specialized ambition structures (ties with government, courts, military, etc.), and so on, all of which have very limited possibilities of transfer at different levels.

Thus, in the traditional society, someone who was olkitok, a wealthy and respected man, may have been influential, but everyone realized that given a disaster or "the will of god," such a man might lose everything and, furthermore, that with hard work and good luck a poor man could always hope to build up such a large herd. The former principles of reciprocity and redistribution which had been associated with olkitok status, and were seen to be the basis of reproduction of the entire social formation, are not the basis of the relationship of this new elite to the rest of Maasai society. Their economic connection with mainstream society is much closer to olkarsis, where wealth is extricated from the conditions of reproduction of the traditional mode of production. However, traditionally, this was merely a strategy which certain individuals could opt for to maximize their economic advantage but which did not bring about any particular political advantage, since by extricating themselves from the social network of reciprocal exchange they also isolated themselves from the authority structure.

The new elite, the modern day *olkarsis*, following strategies very similar to the traditional wealthy men, not only isolate themselves from the symmetrical and reciprocal obligations of the subsistence mode of production, but are able to respond to the incentives offered by government agencies which aim to promote ranch development and a shift to beef ranching, by taking advantage of the new options and, by so doing, having the government underwrite their essential capital and organization resources. Therefore, with the ability to insulate themselves through construction of dips, veterinary medicine, fencing, water development and so on, they are able to overcome the constraints which, despite demarcation, still affect the ability of the traditional mode of production to function and reproduce itself.

Economic and political differentiation of individuals in the traditional society was not connected to the control of the factors of production and thus access to land and labour; even the wealthy still continued to be integrated into society through kinship and age grade systems. Through their positions on area adjudication committees and their ties to government departments, the new elite are now actually seen to be controllers of the factors of production.⁵ Furthermore, an increasing number of impoverished herders, *olaiterani*, are finding it ever more difficult to attach themselves to other pastoral households, since fewer and fewer households are following strategies which permit them to become patrons. The impoverished are finding themselves in the position of

⁵ Sometimes they are characterized as accomplices of the national government.

becoming marginalized, not only from the land, but from the traditional subsistence mode of production. The modern olkarsis, rather than attaching these poor herders to their households, are transforming the social requirements of labour away from the generalized system of marriage exchange and away from obligations of kinship and descent, by hiring individuals from this displaced labour force and paying them salaries which are small compared with the returns on their labour which are realized by the employer.

Land, labour and cattle are all becoming commodities and the individual rancher/politician is in the position to turn the strategy of over developing the individualized and nucleated family herd into a permanent production process which provides employment for some of the disenfranchised and impoverished, who may become the herdsmen for the wealthy in this new system. Furthermore, the elite's very ability to alienate some of the best grazing lands for their own individual use perpetuates the strain throughout the traditional system. At the same time, they have become the arbitrators and mediators for those very individuals whose pastoral potential is being decreased - the Maasai group ranch members.

Thus, the continuation of subsistence-oriented pastoralism and the emergence of a new political elite represent two systems evolved at different levels and locked in contradiction. The relation of this new elite to the rest of Maasai society must be understood across the continuum defined by the transformation of land, labour and cattle, which has enabled them to hold their positions. However, their very existence affects the nature and quality of relationships within Maasai society and the selection

of strategies open to the disadvantaged on the one hand, and the active pastoralists on the other. In other words, the relation of this new elite to the rest of Maasai society has consequences for the entire social system. Ironically, the direction of expansion of productive forces which the individual rancher is able to adopt is in fact the very direction which the government planners have tried to direct the mainstream of Maasai society. Although lauded as exemplary models of development, we can also observe that their production expansion takes place at the cost of increased differentiation and economic and social stratification which is starting to characterize the development process throughout Maasailand. In fact, this is quite consistent with the findings of many researchers, who have discovered that competition and inequality are often the basis for expansion of productive forces.

Attempts to stimulate economic development through group ranching and development of the productive forces, in general, has not created the sought after results - widespread pastoral development. It has, however, increased conflicts and competition over land and led to the progressive enlargement of a new political elite who mitigate disputes and through their ability to alienate land, exacerbate the basis for disputes. As has occurred elsewhere, it is quite possible that this initial transformation of socio-political relations, which may be thought of as the expansion of non-economic activities, will eventually prove the catalyst in expanding or transforming the overall productive forces throughout Maasailand. However, given another goal of the group ranching program, which is to provide an equitable distribution of resources without disenfranchising any Maasai from the land, then it does not appear that a political transformation will

provide the grounds for the 'rational' or equitable use of the economic resources of Narok District.

Despite the direction which this new and enlarged leadership is taking Maasai society, i.e. increased social and economic differentiation, it appears that as government impinges and intervenes in the pastoral sector ever more often, the function of these men will be needed even more to channel the resources available only from the national sector into a pastoral economy which may increasingly become dependent on costly capital investments to operate. Not only will the new leadership be in the position to direct these goods and services into Maasai society, but in order to do so there will be a corresponding outward transfer of economic resources internal to the system, to satisfy the purposes which lie outside the reach of local control. More and more, the operation of the pastoral system will depend on the services which can be provided by the national sector, just as pricing and marketing policies are controlled by the government and not the pastoralist. As land and labour are extricated from solidary forms of social organization associated with descent and marriage, and as the values and accessibility of both land and labour are dictated by outside market and government interventions, then the various spheres--economic, political and ideological--lose their common area of realization, and their growing autonomy enables the growth of a labour process based on the contractual buying and selling of manpower.

The important point to recognize about the transformation of land and labour from production resources into commodities themselves is that many researchers have identified this point as the very essence or basis of the emergence of exploitative and, indeed, class relations (Godelier 1974;

Mellaissoux 1981; Terray 1972). Of course, subsistence pastoralism has not and will not merely cease because of this exploitation. Indeed, at present, the formal aspect of many traditional structures is still intact, although they now involve growing polarization between groups and individuals, a decline of reciprocal obligations between strata, and the emergence of altered strategies to cope with a transformed system of incentives. In other words, although there has not been a radical transformation of the Maasai socio-economic formation based on the economic conditions of beef ranching, the underlying social fabric has been profoundly altered.

This disruption of the traditional system is most evident in areas of greater agricultural penetration and competition for resources, such as in the area of the Rotian Ol Makongo Group Ranch. Although less obvious in the arid areas, even here signs of strain on production systems and social organization are apparent. In the medium and high potential areas of Maasailand, exploitation can be seen in the growing dissociation of production units from consumption units, of the labour force from the productive resources, and so on. And with this process has come growing poverty and the immanent need of conversion through the market for securing subsistence. In other words, an underlying feature of the economy in the Rotian area is the insidious undermining of self-subsistence as a major aspect of the economy.

PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION: MONETIZATION OF THE MAASAI ECONOMY

In traditional Maasai society, production and consumption units, although not entirely homologous, since women and children did not belong

to the elders' production community, nonetheless overlapped, and distribution of cattle and their products were not assessed monetarily. My own data from the Rotian area have documented the inability of a great many stockowners to activate former relations of exchange and reciprocity which had been the basis of capital accumulation largely because of agricultural encroachment and limitations on stock movement, with the result of declining potential for stock accumulation and in many cases the complete inability of a household to provide for its consumption needs. In order to subsidize consumption needs a variety of strategies have been adopted by various households in accordance with shifting needs, family size and structure and certain internal and external demands.

Of the resident Maasai members at Rotian, 20% are destitute and of the non-resident Maasai members approximately 52% are stockless, which means that such families are in the position that they must find alternative economic endeavours or pursuits in order to subsist. It was virtually impossible to locate most of the non-resident stockless Maasai, however, according to other ranch informants, many of the younger men had taken up employment at tourist lodges or in Nairobi and several of the older men were thought to be vagrants and drunks. The resident members who were stockless supplemented or made their living by participation in the informal sector, largely in charcoal burning and by the aid of money sent home from a son working as a nightwatchman in an urban centre or similar employment.

Ironically, for many of the Maasai ranch members, who see their ranchland as being overcrowded and resources being depleted, this out-migration of the disadvantaged and disaffiliated membership creates the

internal conditions which enable certain traditional mechanisms to be maintained. In other words, given the circumscribed nature of the ranch grazeland, which greatly limits the operation of constraints no. 1 and 3 (dispersion and fluidity), which operated to move livestock out of areas of resource depletion, etc., livestock must now stay put and it is people (and the potential for increased stock that they represent) who are siphoned out of the system. Here then, we can see that the alienated non-producers, non-pastoralists are being effectively separated from the means of production (i.e. from land and from cattle).

Thus, the disenfranchised and impoverished must enter the cash economy in order to become consumers. For the most part, these men take on the jobs of herdsmen on the individual ranches throughout the area and of paid employment at tourist centres and urban areas. Although patron/client relationships do still exist, I believe that there are not enough men in the position of patrons to absorb all of the men who would increasingly fill the ranks of clients. Thus, there is a growing number of these so-called 'free-labourers' looking for employment throughout Norok District. The salaries and wages which these workers are able to make in the employment of individual ranchers or others, given the fact that most are uneducated and with limited skills, are very low. Thus, a great many of them still look to their ties with their home community and are able to benefit from pastoral production when they do return home. Furthermore, many of the men in these circumstances must leave their families behind and the pastoral community becomes charged, to a certain extent, with aiding their destitute families. In other words, the absence of these men from the consumption unit in fact often raises the production requirements of

other domestic units which have given refuge to the families of these men. In turn, most workers send home a portion of their income, usually 100 KSH per month, most not making more than 300 KSH, and almost all of the money that is sent home is used to subsidize subsistence. Here then is the classic marginalized worker, neither integrated into the national economy or capitalist sector and unable to integrate into the local pastoral economy (cf. Meillaissoux 1981:129).

Production and consumption units have also become disassociated among the rather large proportion of ranchers who might be classified as a-paik. Most of these families own small herds of stock and goats which do not meet subsistence needs and these families find themselves entering the informal sector in order to subsidize their needs. They burn charcoal, they cut timber, they sell garden produce, crafts and milk. They are increasingly drawn into the cash economy which lessens, if not the commitment, certainly the production efforts of pastoralism. Although the informal sector has been described in so many instances in terms of its diversity and vitality (ILO 1979:118) and potential for generating small-scale, dynamic enterprises, it should be noted that the Maasai entry into the informal sector is not so much as innovative entrepreneur, but as passive partner.

For example, the 1979 ILO Report on Kenya suggests that the owner of a small-scale business in the informal sector may earn more than the wages of a person employed in the formal sector. However, the Maasai men and women employed as workers in the rural informal sector earn far less than the wages of workers in the formal sector. With the exception of cattle trekking, most of the impoverished Maasai enter the informal sector, not as heads of an enterprise, but as employees. The involvement of Maasai in

charcoal burning is a case in point. Although the Maasai 'own' the land and the forest resources which are being exploited, it is the Kikuyu entrepreneurs from outside, with their trucking businesses and power saws, etc., who in effect control the industry and make the greatest profit. The majority of Maasai, since they are not in a position to enter the industry 'full-time' are content to realize a fraction of the value of charcoal in a rental or use tax. The same is true about the timber business on the ranches in the Rotian area.

The sale of garden produce and milk by Maasai women is rather sporadic and its income-generating potential for most families is unpredictable and short-term. Many Maasai women at Rotian Ol Makongo made beaded handicrafts for sale in town. Again, these handicrafts were taken to tourist dukas in Narok and sold to the Kikuyu, Kamba and Somali vendors for extremely low prices. The vendors would then sell the Maasai jewellery and other artifacts to passing tourists for higher prices which enabled them to make substantial profits. The Maasai women were well aware of the prices that tourists paid for their handicrafts, but since they were not in a position to enter into the handicraft business 'full-time' they grudgingly sold their crafts to these middlemen for whatever price they could get. Whereas many Maasai in the category of olaiterani or destitute were alienated from the pastoral economy and many entered the work force as marginalized workers, the pastoralists who I have categorized as a-paik usually attempt to subsidize their subsistence and their income by entering the informal sector. They are exploited as 'part-time' workers in the informal sector and their involvement in these activities, along with their small herds, makes them 'part-time' pastoralists. Thus, from the statistics and trends

at Rotian OlMakongo, one can see that there is a growing number of part-time or what may aptly be called marginalized pastoralists, many with the hope that they will be tomorrow's olkitok, but most with prospect of finding themselves tomorrow's olaiterani.

One successful entrepreneurial activity, cattle trekking, represents a very real possibility for making substantial profits in the informal sector. Given the operation of this business, on foot across rugged terrain and the short-term involvement associated with youth and stamina, the income-generating possibilities of this pursuit are limited to a few years. Nevertheless, many trekkers have made their 'fortunes' and by and large it is men such as these, who have come from impoverished households, who buy back into the pastoral economy by building up large herds of livestock. Thus, the possibility of accumulating livestock has enabled these young men to reenter the pastoral economy and the manner in which they do so will determine whether their career paths are directed towards olkitok status or olkarsis status.

However, it is quite obvious from the data presented that in many areas, the possibility of following strategies that would lead to an olkitok status are being reduced since the networks of exchange and reciprocity which characterized such a status are largely curtailed in the highland areas. As I hope to explain shortly, this means that men with livestock are in some cases attempting to maintain the olkitok status by infusing it with a whole new nexus of orientations, while in other cases it becomes clear that olkarsis status and all the individualization that entails, of both production and consumption, represents another strategy which is closely connected to opting out of the pastoral economy.

CHAPTER EIGHT

INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES AND THE MYTH OF KINSHIP

INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES

The position of wealthy Maasai nowadays has been strengthened by the existence of several investment alternatives which underwrite their separation from mainstream traditional pastoralism. This does not mean that all men who were wealthy in the traditional system have transformed their status into individual ranchers and entrepreneurs. Indeed, as Galaty (1981:86) points out, "the paths between systems traced by social and spatial migrations of individuals and families are complex and varied." However, the terms and the relational representations which they depict certainly have been transformed.

Moreover, as all the social relations which surrounded traditional pastoral productive strategies become less operative, it seems likely that more and more traditional pastoralists will opt into individualistic strategies thereby making the competition for land and resources that much more pronounced. As the ability of these individuals to obtain individual title deed to favourable pieces of land diminishes, as it already is doing, one can predict a stronger movement in the direction of subdivision of group ranches.

Figure 24 below outlines the movement of Maasai from one sector to another on the basis of the terms and categories previously outlined.

Figure 24 Status Transformation

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL SECTOR</u>	<u>NATIONAL SECTOR</u>	<u>RANCHING SECTOR</u>
Olaiterani	client herdsmen	marginal workers	disenfranchised pastoralist/group ranch
A-piak	poor pastoralist	informal sector	marginal pastoralist/group ranch
Olkarsis	rich pastoralist	politicians, businessmen	individual rancher
Olkitok	important pastoralist	cattle trekkers	group rancher

The relationship between categories in the traditional herding system was not only dialectical, but because almost all investment opportunities were realized within the Maasai socio-economic system, they were also cyclical in nature (i.e. self-generating). Individuals in the pastoral economy were maintained within the social system and livestock was circulated throughout society in such a way that surplus production supplemented the consumption needs of the poor and, indeed, supported other social institutions, such as the age grade system.

The transformation of social categories within the national and ranching sectors does not mean that all pastoralists are being transformed into some new or altered status. It does indicate that the terms themselves are being used to provide an operational framework for understanding the relationships of certain types of people in the ranching and national sector. When one presents such a categorization schematically

it does appear that the categories are discrete and rigid, a fact which would seem to contradict the placement of a certain man by different informants into more than one category. This need present no problem if one keeps in mind that the elements within categories can and are manipulated according to many situational variables, but the relationship between categories conveys a consistent message.

The transformation of these categories into the ranching and national sector is still based on a dialectical interaction between categories, but the relationship is no longer cyclical, rather, it has become hierarchical.

Traditionally, since the economic interests of wealthy men were stimulated and enhanced through investment in the pastoral economy, especially through redistribution, one might say that furthering the economic interests of wealthy pastoralists promoted overall growth of the entire pastoral economy. However, alternative investment opportunities for very rich stockowners now enables them to break the relationship between the inflationary spiral of livestock (i.e. capital) growth and the inability to control or maintain surplus production except through exchange and redistribution...a process which worked to the benefit of poorer herders. Alternative investment opportunities, such as in land, have given the wealthy Maasai a way to control his surplus, not through its redistribution, but through its accumulation outside of the traditional pastoral economy.

Increasingly in certain areas of Narok very poor and destitute pastoralists must enter the labour force as employees working for wages. Notwithstanding the position of these men, it is important to realize that an understanding of social change does not depend only on the responses of

the poor and the destitute, who have been most consistently victimized. The entire Maasai socio-economic system has been effected by development programs, and this has presented different opportunities within Maasai society for the advantaged and the disadvantaged, for the active and the inactive, and so on.

The continuation of the subsistence pastoral economy enables workers to 'fall back' and be supported in Maasai society when they are underpaid or unemployed. Individuals often straddle economies. The Kenyan government has always recognized the importance of developing Narok district without disenfranchising large numbers of people. This is consistent with the direction of a great many recent analyses of social change in pre-capitalist societies (Galaty 1981; Godelier 1977; Meillassoux 1981). No longer are subsistence economies seen as being totally subsumed under the dominant mode of capitalist production. Instead, it has been recognized that a paradox exists, since most attempts at social change or rural development of non-capitalistic modes of production are based on both the conservation and the dissolution of non-capitalist modes of production.

To a certain extent, even though government planners wanted to convert the Maasai into beef ranchers, the group ranch concept was thought of as a mechanism which would also preserve 'traditional' life. If one recognizes the intent to conserve traditional Maasai social structures through the same mechanism which is designed to change their economic structures, i.e. the group ranch, then it becomes quite clear that an underlying premise of the ranching program is based on a thesis that there is no relation between production strategies and social forms. Of course, the mode of production in Maasai society is embedded in the social structures, not necessarily in

a relationship of determinacy, but certainly in an intricate relationship of mutual influence. One cannot think of the group ranch as preserving anything since, more to the point, the group ranching program has profoundly affected Maasai social systems and it is the Maasai who, not because of but in spite of group ranches, have attempted to preserve their social systems through manipulations and alterations which are starting to become extensive enough that the underlying social structures are becoming profoundly altered.

One might ask: should not disenchantment and resentment at these disruptions be more sharply focused, especially within the ranks of those Maasai most obviously victimized: the disenfranchised, the destitute and the poor herders? Although one can recognize certain signs of resentment surfacing among these people, it is, as yet, quite undeveloped.¹ For a number of reasons, the majority of Maasai, especially from the arid areas, will indicate that they are proud of the accomplishments of the Maasai elite. Individual ranchers are seen as models of what all hard-working pastoralists could become if they so desire and 'God is willing.' However, in the arid areas most wealthy pastoralists are not interested in such a settled existence since they are still able to practice traditional movements to a greater extent than in the north. The pastoral economy has not been disturbed as much as in the highland areas, so that the siphoning off of the impoverished is not as evident since they are better able to be

¹ I do not feel it is necessary to explore the moral issues concerning exploitation, nor to comment on the question of whether exploitation really occurs if workers do not feel exploited (cf. Boulding:1973). I use exploitation in the dictionary sense and not solely as a Marxist dialect.

absorbed and maintained within the pastoral system. However, even in the arid areas, it is not uncommon to find a number of the wealthy herders who are interested in obtaining an individual ranch or who have carved out individual plots on group ranches. Those in a position to compete for scarce resources are often the most resentful.

THE MYTH OF KINSHIP

Most of the wealthy individual ranchers and businessmen offer jobs to other Maasai through a network of traditional relationships, so that their employees are often impoverished kinsmen, affines, clansmen or age mates. These workers still tend to think of themselves as attached to their employer's household just as they would have been attached to the household of a wealthy pastoralist in the traditional system. In fact, several of the young men at Rotian OlMakongo worked on the individual ranch or in businesses owned by a man who they called olenkapu (in this case, mother's brother). This employer was shown considerable respect and deference, not only because he was an employer, but because of the kinship relationship. Furthermore, the fact that he supplied jobs for so many destitute herders was considered a sign of his benevolence and generosity. Since this same employer was also a politician, he gave livestock to some of the young men from the area to campaign for him. These men actually felt that because of the exchange, this individual rancher was their stockfriend.

Notwithstanding the kinship terminology and the ties of marriage and clanship between employer and employees, it is very important to realize that kinship relations are in no way the basis of the relationship between the individual rancher and his workers. However, kinship relationships are

preserved in such a way that they are quite capable of supporting an ideology of power and, furthermore, they cloak what otherwise would be very obvious relations of exploitation. In other words, what these workers fail to recognize is that the relationship of 'olenkapu,' or other such relationships which these men believed linked them to their employer, is no longer a relationship between individuals, but between categories, or constituted groups or classes. Thus, the relationship is between two distinct groups--the wealthy and the destitute--and kinship relations or age grade relations in no way express the growth and organization of the relations of production in the economic realm of the individual rancher (cf. Meillassoux 1981:86).²

Still, confusion arises out of the fact that individual ranchers continue to be members of the local community and are apparently integrated into Maasai society because of the traditional continuity of economic, political and social relationships. However, when the individual rancher becomes involved in new relations of production, it becomes difficult for many Maasai, and indeed for many researchers, to understand that relationships of kinship may still operate to identify individuals within both groups, but it does not define the relationship between the two groups, which in their incipient form are as Godelier (1975:155) suggests, "the structure of the mode of production." This separation of function is important since it enables us to analyse the process whereby social

² According to a recent International Labour Organization report on Kenya (1978) wages paid to workers in the pastoral sector are below the level at which malnutrition is inevitable. The opportunity for such men to buy back into the pastoral economy is certainly less than for men involved in patron-client relationships (cf. Schneider 1979:220).

competition, which revolved around the strategic distribution of cattle. transforms itself into competition for control and distribution of the factors of production themselves (i.e. land).

I should stress that this process is quite different from the process of accumulation of wealth among the Maasai laibons (trans. diviners) described by Galaty (1981). The position of the laibon is linked to a form of ranking as a means of social differentiation, rather than a transformation of the forces of production. In other words, the relationship of the laibon to the supernatural enabled him as part of a social minority to obtain exceptional social position through the non-reciprocal prestation of cattle and women. However, the laibon did not control access to pasture. The individual rancher, on the other hand, has transformed his wealth into ownership of land and investment in a number of alternative outlets other than pastoralism.

Thus, in observing the relationship of individual ranchers to the rest of society we must realize that new relations are emerging to take over the economic roles and functions which the kinship system once held. Labour was a concomitant of the social system and could be obtained primarily through the intervention of social factors. It is no longer necessary for an individual rancher to provide himself with labour by increasing his social exchange network or obtaining more wives. In fact, his very control and alienation of land at one end of the production system has helped create the shortage at the other end of the system which leads to a growing number of disenfranchised workers. Although most of these workers feel connected to their employer through a relationship of kinship or affinity, it is becoming increasingly apparent that kinship relations do not

correspond to the new social conditions. However, it is certainly to the advantage of individual ranchers to foster the illusion that their relationship to the rest of Maasai society, and to the workers in particular, is like a kinship relation such as mother's brother and that the job that he provides is like the patronizing enterprises of the traditional olkitok.

Furthermore, I should emphasize that the relationship of these men (employers vs. employees) is not connected to age grade relations. Although, for the most part, the vast majority of the men who are individual ranchers in Narok District are elders, particularly from the il-nyangusi age set of senior elders, it would be entirely wrong to think of the division between the individual rancher and his workers, or other Maasai in general, as a division between elders and juniors. I have demonstrated that the traditional social structure placed elders in the position of controllers, with a vertical authority over the producers under them, i.e. women and children, a situation which enabled them to control livestock flows. Thus, it is quite natural that in the initial stages of gaining access to resources, the men in position of controlling them are linked to the age set of senior elders who are in the structural position to control. The position of the present day individual rancher must be seen in light of their structural position, and a number of complex factors, family histories which often involved forced attendance at school, forced entry into the civil service or teaching profession and the opportunity, as an educated elite, or an appointed or elected elite, to grasp the incentives provided within the framework of the national system which articulated with the pastoral economy. However, the nature of their

authority is no longer based on a vertical control of producers, but a horizontal control which enables them to dominate not just their family members, but also their peers. In other words, their exploitation is much more pluralistic and horizontal than the so-called exploitation of elders over juniors in the traditional system.

The elite, are now fortifying their own positions, erecting a number of barriers to prevent the entry of new members and narrowing the criteria or channels through which participation can be achieved. Furthermore, the elements associated with the elite are becoming difficult to transfer, such as language, dress, education, housing, etc., so the belief that, with good luck and God's will all men can obtain this position, is not the case. Certainly the basis of the individual rancher's wealth cannot be easily dispersed, except perhaps to his own children who are also more likely to acquire the attributes associated with the elite because of their privileged position in schools, etc. Therefore, while individual ranchers appear to be senior elders, they represent not a class of senior elders per se, but a class of land owners and entrepreneurs who have been able to take advantage of a new set of economic conditions, and their own actions in turn impact on the entire social system.

In respect to this process, it is interesting to note that although most of the elite have rather widespread kinship ties and age set relations throughout the district, coming as they did out of the traditional system and thereby having brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, cousins and affines, etc., who still function within the traditional subsistence mode of production, the children of the elite are not so closely tied to the traditional social system and are finding that their connections with the

rest of Maasai society are narrowing. Many of the young sons and daughters of the Maasai elite are now looking for spouses and the most common place for them to find one is among other elite, rich families. This is especially true since the elite have often stopped circumcising their daughters, because of having adopted Christianity or modernity in general. A traditional pastoralist suggested that no one except another individual ranch family would want to marry such an uncircumcised girl. Thus, intermarriage between the wealthy, landowning Maasai (especially among the educated children of these men) is certainly the most desirable practice, especially to create political alliances. A good number of these educated elite, i.e. the children of the individual ranchers, as opposed to an ordinary Maasai child who receives an education, wish to marry educated women, and since there are so few educated Maasai girls many are taking non-Maasai wives. Thus, although at present kinship and, to a certain extent age set ideology, unites both pastoralist and the new elite or individual rancher, increasingly it is being denied in practice by the intermarriage of elite, or marriage to non-Maasai.

Education, Christianity, modernity, economic interests and many other factors have contributed to the trend among individual ranchers/elite to remain monogamous. Although there are still a number of chiefs and subchiefs throughout the district who have several wives and who seem more closely connected to the traditional system of status and prestige, their landowning and informal sector pursuits set them quite apart from traditional men of olkitok or olkarsis status. Furthermore, many of these chiefs send their children to school and it is likely that this second generation will come to embrace monogamy since strategies of extensive

marriage alliance are not as conducive to control and consolidation of assets such as land and infrastructural developments.

The traditional Maasai marriage system, which was associated with extensive ties and alliances and the movement of mobile wealth, is certainly affected by increased poverty and the decreasing emphasis on mobile wealth. In what ways does the monetization of the Maasai economy affect the operation of the marriage system? Let us examine some of the apparent deviations in the Maasai system of marriage which were beginning to occur in the Rotian area.

MANIPULATING THE SYSTEM: MARRIAGE, DESCENT AND KINSHIP

In areas such as Rotian, where stockfriend networks are being eliminated, the movement of people and livestock is being curtailed and herd sizes are dwindling, one might ask: is there a traditional pastoral system in operation at all here, and furthermore, how does such a pastoral system operate if the traditional system of relationships have been stifled?

I have earlier suggested that the constraints of dispersion, cooperation and fluidity on the traditional subsistence mode of production were conducive to the extensive marriage alliances of the Maasai, to the form of patrilineal descent and so on. To a certain extent, group ranching has removed these constraints although not necessarily the ecological conditions which they also represented. In light of this, I detected a number of strategies which attempted to manipulate the traditional marriage system in order to operate within the limits and conditions now impacting on many parts of Narok District. These strategies, while not always

widespread nor characteristic of the entire social system, represent individual attempts to transform a new set of economic incentives through variations on the traditional social formations. While there has not been a radical transformation of the Maasai socio-economic formation per se, this continuing process of individual deviation is greatly disturbing the basis of social forms.

I shall examine some strategies, most of which pertain specifically to marriage, which are being used by some Maasai men who are trying to continue their involvement in the pastoral or, in some cases, the agro-pastoral economy. Each one of these strategies was recorded at least once at Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch.

- (1) Endogamy
- (2) Marriage of Affines
- (3) Sister Exchange
- (4) Intra-ranch Marriage
- (5) Inter-ethnic Marriage
- (6) Opting Out

(1) Endogamy

It is becoming more difficult for a herder to take up residence on another group ranch on the basis of a stock association. However, the right of a man's affinal relatives to take up residence is strongly recognized and usually accepted by ranch committees. Thus, for some pastoralists, especially those who have been attempting to follow olkitok production strategies (i.e. extensive exchange) in areas where dispersion of livestock is becoming difficult, clan endogamy has been practiced.³

³ It seems likely that the IlPurko Maasai actually condone clan endogamy since they often suggested that it was permissible as long as it took place between clansmen who came from different houses within the clan. Members of smaller clans emphasized that clan exogamy was a definite norm.

Although I have insufficient statistical data to suggest that this is a trend, it is a fact that several individuals in the Rotian area have married clanswomen. Furthermore, informants believed that such endogamous marriages are becoming more frequent. On the other hand, clan endogamy is not an entirely new phenomena and informants speculated that even traditionally clans might have become so large that intra-clan marriage occurred until the clan split in two at which time exogamy resumed. The fact that Ilaiser and Il-makasen are exceptionally large clans and this is where most intra-clan marriage occurs perhaps suggests that these clans are in the process of segmentation and that readjustment will eventually occur.

In general, one might speculate that a group ranch member who marries a clanswoman is in a sense economizing since he is turning people that he already has a reciprocal relationship with into affines. Thus, clan endogamy may be thought of as a production strategy for individuals who are attempting to economize on production for exchange. Indeed, the preponderance of clan-based residential units in the Lower Mau area as opposed to formerly non-related men forming residential partnerships, perhaps suggests that intra-clan marriage has been an ongoing and frequent occurrence in this area. This may be associated with the relatively early decrease in mobility for herders in the highland areas, related to agricultural encroachment, higher rainfalls than the arid areas and the accessibility of non-Maasai herdsmen to supplement the labour force, and so on. Extensive marriage ties, related to the fluidity constraint on the mode of production, were not as desirable, while production for surplus

through dispersion and accumulation among stockfriends became adequate to meet the needs of both dispersion and fluidity when mobility was not as important. With demarcation, it is possible that for the pastoralist with a good size herd it became even more opportune to economize on the production of surplus for exchange.

(2) Marriage of Affines

Cousin marriage in Maasai society is expressly forbidden, not only among parallel cousins who are considered siblings, but among cross-cousins (i.e. mother's brother's daughter or father's sister's daughter). Both sets of female cross cousins are considered to be enenkapu in relation to a male ego. Nevertheless, I did record one such marriage where a young man married his mother's brother's daughter (classificatory). The young husband in question was a cattle trekker and had formed a business and stock exchange relationship with his bride's brothers who were his age mates as well as olenkapu relatives who had the right to beg stock from his herd. By marrying their sister, he altered his relationship to these men very little since they were still olenkapu and they already had the right to beg his cattle. If he had taken a wife from a non-related clan, then he would have had two different sets of people with the right to beg for livestock from him.

In fact, marrying affinal relatives is almost the mirror opposite of endogamy since they both seek to accomplish the same thing, i.e. economize on production of surplus for exchange, but from different starting points. If such matrilinear cross cousin marriage continued in preceding generations then it would facilitate a strong relationship between

affinally related groups especially if they came to be associated with land. Although observing the occurrence of such a marriage in no way indicates that the frequency of affinal inter-marriage is increasing, it does suggest that for some individuals it may become an option or strategy which they might choose to exploit.

On the other hand, from the perspective of the entire Maasai social system, matrilateral cross cousin marriage is a major upset to the traditional marriage system since by replicating his father's marriage, a man intensifies relationships between two clans and irrevocably severs the long-term, open-ended system of prestation and counter-prestation. In other words, if such a strategy became the basis of the marriage system it would transform the present system into one of intensive, direct (non-reciprocal) exchange. Given the potential disruption to the traditional marriage system, it is perhaps not surprising that a few weeks after the above marriage took place and the girl had joined her husband at Rotian, a delegation of elders from the girl's clan arrived at Rotian and stood shouting at the gateway of the young husband's enkang. They cursed the marriage, spat and asked to have the girl returned to them. Many of the elders removed their clothing and spoke their curses naked. It was wrong, they claimed, for the young man to marry into the same lineage as his mother and the marriage would be cursed and the cattle that were given in bridewealth would die and the couple's children would die and their cattle would not prosper. The young man's mother went out and spoke to these elders from her natal clan and eventually everyone agreed on a fine in order to erase the 'shame' of the union and enable the elders to bless the couple.

(3) Sister Exchange

Again, sister exchange seems antithetical to the traditional system of marriage, since if two men exchange their sisters, the exchange is direct and immediate, rather than indirect and deferred. Traditionally, a man could expect to receive help and beg cattle from his father's sister's children and he could expect to give help and cattle to his mother's brother's children, both of these sets of relatives (i.e. cross cousins) being referred to as olenkapu. From the perspective of the children in a marriage based on sister exchange, mother's brother's children and father's sister's children become one and the same, which of course is consistent with the fact that they are already called by the same kin term. Schneider suggests that marriage systems based on sister exchange are quite rare in Africa (Schneider 1981:127) and of course, what I am describing is not a marriage system, but a deviation or strategy used by some individuals.

Furthermore, I should point out that isolated cases of sister exchange among the Maasai are not as disruptive to the social system as affinal marriages potentially are. As long as the two men who exchange sisters are initially un-related and the practice is not carried over into the next generations, then the marriage itself does not violate any rules in Maasai society. Still, such sister exchanges are not considered ideal although many Maasai believed that they are increasing at an alarming rate. Sister exchange is commonly known to be a form of marriage alliance adopted by the poor or destitute in order to obtain wives without having to transfer any livestock. When two men give each other their sisters in marriage, there is no need to transfer livestock since such a transfer would only be

negated by the reciprocal and symmetrical transfer of equally valuable goods, i.e. women. This symmetrical relationship would also exist for the children of such a union since they would not stand in a superior or inferior position as a wife-giving or a wife-receiving group, unless they took a wife according to the rules and prohibitions of the traditional marriage system.

I was aware of several recent marriages in the Rotian area which were based on sister exchange and many of the warriors on the group ranch at Ol Makongo were in the process of trying to arrange similar sister exchanges because they did not have access to enough bridewealth for a more conventional marriage. Unlike the previous deviations, which sought to economize on the production of surplus for exchange, sister exchange occurs because of the absence of surplus for exchange.

Direct exchange of women and production for subsistence are strategies directly connected to poverty. Furthermore, it was pointed out that sister exchange produced marriages which were highly unstable and prone to divorce. If a girl ran away from such a marriage her brother would be very likely to lose his wife since his brother-in-law would ask to have his sister returned. When a woman ran away traditionally and divorce seemed inevitable, the most a man's brother-in-law could do was demand to have the bridewealth cattle returned. This did not, however, affect his own marriage and the stability of his household production unit.

(4) Intra-Ranch Marriage

Intra-ranch marriage is becoming a desirable form of alliance in those areas where movement has been restricted and the emphasis on production

centres around consolidation of land and cattle as valuable commodities. Intra-ranch marriage does not try to necessarily economize on or eliminate exchange relations, rather it attempts to minimize production of surplus for exchange. In other words, intra-ranch marriage seems to be a strategy associated with men who wish to channel their production surplus⁴ outside of the traditional economy and social relationships which could be built up on that surplus decline. For the most part, such men choose to channel some portion of their production into the wider economy, not because they are entrepreneurs seeking lucrative investment alternatives, but because they are poor and are attempting to supplement their inadequate subsistence.

In areas where land values are escalating and friction over land use is evident, many Maasai believe that their future security lies in consolidating their rights to the land. This is especially true for those Maasai whose production strategies are increasingly becoming based on subsistence, rather than exchange. Ironically, the greater the emphasis on subsistence needs, the greater the separation between production and consumption units, as cattle, land, forest resources, etc., all become commodities which must be converted through the market before consumption can take place in the household units. Thus, traditionally, although the mode of production has been described as subsistence, it was the production of surplus for exchange (indeed, the essence of which has actually encouraged writers to characterize the Maasai as capitalists - cf. Spencer

⁴ Indeed, such men often are forced to channel domestic production outside of the traditional economy as well, selling off the subsistence herd, etc.

1978) which made the Maasai society such an efficient subsistence economy in terms of redistribution, circulation, etc.

Production solely for subsistence means that men following such a strategy must minimize production of surplus for exchange. Intra-ranch marriages need not violate any marriage rules in Maasai society. However, in the desire to marry a daughter of another ranch member, individuals have resorted to strategies predicated upon those deviant marriage alliances just mentioned, such as endogamy, affinal marriage, sister exchange and so on. Selecting a bride on the basis of her father's residence was not particularly important traditionally since mobility of people and herds (i.e. mobile capital) meant that such a location was only temporary. However, when production is associated with relatively immobile resources such as land and where cattle are used primarily as subsistence commodities, then it becomes more desirable to establish alliances which will consolidate these production resources.

Most of the marriage alliances of senior and retired elders at Rotian were from outside the immediate area, and they had considerable affinal ties with neighbouring group ranches such as Olopito (Olnchoi) and Kotikash. However, a number of the younger men hoped to make alliance with girls whose fathers were members of the group ranch. Such marriages were definitely seen as a way of keeping ranch membership from expanding and protecting production resources. Since affinal relatives often sought to gain access to graze on each other's pastures, turning ranch members into affines eliminated this pressure. Furthermore, the security of group ownership is not considerable and many ranch members fear or hope, as the

case may be, that the ranchland will be subdivided and that those members who are most united will strengthen their claims to the land.

However, intra-ranch marriage, even when it does conform to all the marriage rules in Maasai society, does not necessarily guarantee the unity and consolidation which is sought after. At Rotian, a senior warrior married the daughter of another ranch member from a nearby enkang. This girl's brother then used the cattle he had received at his sister's marriage to obtain a wife for himself from off the ranch. For a number of rather serious reasons the first marriage did not work out and the girl ran away to her home and everyone agreed that the marriage was over. The angry husband demanded that his bridewealth be returned which it could not since it had already been used by the girl's brother. Since the two men in the case were age mates, the strain on ranch life became very evident as other age mates aligned themselves, on the basis of clanship, with one or the other of the young men and interaction between the two enkang was purposefully kept to a minimum. Instead of promoting unity, a failed intra-ranch marriage produced serious ramifications for future cooperation of ranch members and judging from the comments of the Maasai involved, it cast doubts on the suitability of affinal relationships to provide solidary relations such as those which were seen to be associated with clanship.

(5) Inter-ethnic Marriage

Inter-ethnic marriage in the Rotian area has a rather long history which was briefly described in chapter one. The frequency of non-Maasai marriage, which is almost always a Maasai male taking a non-Maasai woman, is closely associated with the strategies of both the wealthy and the

impoverished. In fact, many stockowners asserted that under the present conditions in the Rotian area, it would be quite desirable for most herders to have a Kikuyu or Kipsigis wife, especially for a second wife. On a group ranch, it was suggested that a Maasai wife would look after pastoral chores and a Kikuyu wife would build a shamba and burn charcoal.

Presently, 18% of the ranch membership at Rotian Ol Makongo are non-Maasai and this can be compared with the fact that 18% of the married Maasai members have non-Maasai wives. Furthermore, the potential for this inter-marriage to increase is great since in the last few years dozens of Kikuyu labourers have been employed in the area, burning charcoal, cutting trees, loading and driving trucks, and so on. Many of these Kikuyu workers would be delighted to have a sister or daughter from their own overcrowded home areas marry a Maasai man. Such a marriage would make it possible for these men and other of their family members to obtain legitimate acceptee status in Maasailand and perhaps eventually own a piece of land or at the very least, to take up residence and build a shamba.

Most of the Maasai who have taken non-Maasai wives come from impoverished families and are involved in informal sector pursuits, agriculture and employment in order to subsist. Although these poor Maasai realize that inter-ethnic marriage marks the influx of more non-Maasai 'relatives' into Maasailand, which is one argument given by pastoralists for reducing such marriages, it also provides an alternative to bachelorhood and a partner for increasing productivity from informal sector pursuits. Indeed, many of the young Maasai men at Rotian have speculated that if their ranch is subdivided and the plots allotted to each family are too small for pastoralism, then those men who wish to continue herding will

sell their land to non-Maasai and move, while those Maasai who have nowhere else to go or are too poor will have to secure their land rights through residency and land use. Inter-ethnic marriage is seen as one way to secure these rights since a non-Maasai wife would be better able to move in the direction of intensive agriculture. It is not surprising then, that many young Maasai predict that if the Rotian area is subdivided, it will mean the end of the Maasai culture and language in the region.

(6) Opting Out

Although opting out of the ranch economy can take the form of the destitute leaving for employment or the wealthy leaving for an individual ranch, it also encompasses those herders who wish to exchange livestock, remain mobile and marry in a 'traditional' manner. A few of these herders have already opted out of the Rotian ranch economy by moving to the arid area since stock limitations and movement are not as restrictive because there is still some non-demarcated land adjacent to arid area ranches. If subdivision in the Lower Mau occurs a number of Maasai committed to pastoralism would certainly move to the arid areas - a move which will only exacerbate conditions on the rangelands there.

At the time of research, some Rotian herders did have stockfriends in the arid area. However, since the herders from the arid areas were increasingly being prohibited from entering the highlands because of increased wheat growing, etc., the advantage or desirability of stockfriends from Lower Mau was, I expect, diminishing. In other words, the attempt to remain a pastoralist, following traditional production strategies, etc., by moving to the arid areas will only accelerate the

destruction of those conditions which enabled a certain amount of traditional pastoralism. This will be discussed at greater length later.

PRODUCTION STRATEGIES AND SOCIAL FORMS

The question now becomes: How are we able to interpret and analyse these deviations from the traditional marriage alliances in Maasai society? Earlier, I suggested that Maasai social forms were consistent with their particular mode of production given the nature of constraints which were operating on the system. For example, the fluidity constraint was seen as particularly suited to the manner in which Maasai exchanged rights in women, and thus with the patrilineal form of descent, and system of marriage exchange which fostered fluidity and so on. In other words, it was hypothesized that the traditional structure of kinship, marriage and descent systems, as well as the age grade system which was particularly consistent with the cooperation constraint, provided a framework which enabled the majority of Maasai pastoralists to continue within the subsistence mode of production associated with their level of technology and herd management.

At present, a number of factors have begun to impact on the traditional Maasai herding system and these factors make it increasingly difficult for kinship, marriage and descent systems to operate as appropriate frameworks for exchange relationships or for gaining access to the means of production. I would contend that the growing number of so-called 'deviant' marriages reflect a changed set of economic conditions and opportunities which have altered production strategies to the extent that many individuals find themselves in the position where they must change either

their marriage strategies or their production techniques. This view does suggest that there is indeed a relationship between production strategies and social forms since we can see that individuals often must manipulate and adjust social relations when traditional production strategies can no longer be followed. Nevertheless, I am not asserting a relationship of causality between the two, but rather, in pre-capitalist societies, a relationship of interdependency and integration which cannot be known beforehand, but must be part of the analysis.

I should point out that I was unable to determine from the previous data on the Maasai, the extent to which these deviations are a relatively recent phenomena, or the extent to which they have always occurred. I would suggest that within the traditional Maasai marriage system which was associated with exogamy and prohibitions on cross cousin marriage, the possibility to arrange atypical marriages has always existed.⁵ However, in the past, it is probably safe to speculate that such deviations represented only a statistical minority of the marriages contracted and that they are presently increasing. Furthermore, I maintain that this type of deviation is quite different from demonstrating that a society which is polygamous, for example, has a great percentage of marriages which are monogamous. Monogamy simply means that some households are not able to achieve plural

⁵ The entrepreneurial skill of the Maasai stock owner to accumulate cattle by manipulating the exchange, distribution and circulation of cattle has often been recognized. This same skill is also demonstrated by the ability of some individuals to manipulate their social system to their own advantage. Although this is not a new skill, I suggest that the need to employ it is becoming more widespread.

marriage for a variety of reasons and this in no way contradicts the marriage rules in that society.

Although I am interested in the relationship between production strategies, or economic systems, and social forms (i.e. the structure of social relations), it is certainly not the intent of this thesis to develop a typology of pastoral social systems in relation to production systems. Nevertheless, I shall take this opportunity to discuss some of the literature which surrounds this debate and perhaps to better anchor my own theoretical position. The range of opinion concerning the interconnection between social forms and production strategies or economic systems, covers the entire spectrum of possibilities. Many early functionalists stressed the dominance of kinship or social relations in subsistence economies and this gave way, for the most part, to a disregard for economic systems which were not considered to exist separately from these other 'generalized institutions' (Evans-Pritchard 1940).⁶ On the other hand, a number of anthropologists have even rejected the notion that there is any connection between economic and social structure, especially as a rejection of evolutionary theories of societal development (cf. Murdock 1949:200).

Specifically, in regards to pastoralism, Spooner (1971:208) writes, "Nomadism is an extreme form of adaptation which generates extreme degrees of instability of minimal social groupings and requires a high degree of fluidity of social organization. There are, however, no forms of social organization or other cultural features which are either found in all

⁶ Later Firth (1964:14) turned this portion around suggesting that social structure be related to the economic relations upon which they are dependent.

nomadic societies or found exclusively in them." Although most researchers who have lived among the pastoral peoples of Africa and Asia would tend to agree with this interpretation, there have been several attempts to correlate pastoral social organizations or forms with particular aspects of their herding economy such as types of large animals managed, dependence on cultigens, and so on.

Anthropologists such as Barth (1966) have encouraged the use of generative models in the attempt to uncover correlations between marriage and kinship systems in relation to the category of livestock which is being herded (cf. Rubel 1969). However, others, such as Lewis (1975) and Pastner (1971) find the correlations suggested in such research as highly questionable. Baxter (1975) has also spoken out against correlating pastoral social forms with their relative dependence on different types of livestock. He asserts that many pastoral peoples living in similar arid environments, and exploiting the same type of animals, such as the Somali and the Boran Galla of southern Ethiopia, manage their animals in quite different ways with corresponding differences in their social organizations.

Other attempts have been made, for example, to correlate the amount of bridewealth paid at marriage with the ratio of livestock and to suggest that "the richer the society, the more they paid and the greater the rights they obtained" (Schneider 1979:82). However, Goldschmidt (1974,1981) in a treatment of the same subject was not able to find any apparent

correlation.⁷ Some researchers have tried to correlate the degree of mobility or transhumance with the forms of social organization. Mobility has been linked with a people's dependence on agricultural products in their diet. The more nomadic the people, the smaller the reliance, while the more sedentary the people, the higher the reliance. Further, the degree to which these people are reliant on agriculture is then seen to relate to their settlement patterns, which in turn affect community structure and political organization (cf. Martin and Voorhies 1975:338). However, such a model does not explain why some of the highly pastoral peoples, such as the Maasai, were indeed quite immobile (Jacobs 1965) and why some pastoral people who are heavily dependent on the consumption of cultigens are extremely nomadic, such as the Bedouin.

Martin and Voorhies (1975:338) have suggested that nomadic pastoral societies which depend largely on their herds for subsistence, societies which they call obligative pastoralism, will possess social organizations of a tribal nature as defined by Service (1962). On the other hand, pastoralists who rely on grain, especially with a dependence of 30 to 40%, are considered facultative pastoralists, and it is expected that their socio-political organizations should be more advanced, although they too were discovered to have tribal organizations. The lack of difference was ascribed to the scanty data available for obligative pastoralists. However, in general nomadic and transhumant groups were thought to be associated with "less complex socio-political units ... Exceptions

⁷ Indeed, Jacobs (1965a:149) posits that bridewealth payments are larger and livestock as wealth are more important in economies where they are "secondary sources of subsistence" which is quite the opposite to Schneider's thesis.

sometimes occur among those societies, on the periphery of prosperous agricultural communities, which have exerted their military prowess and political influence through the exaction of tribute" (Ibid 1975:337).

Another examination of the relationship between economic processes and social structures can be found in Schneider's (1979) ambitious attempt to correlate the two and in so doing, to develop a theory of the origin of states based on the differences between "hierarchy and equality as they related to economy." In brief, Schneider (Ibid:9) asserts that in East African societies, where the volume of large livestock production generates man/animal rations of 1:1 or better, equality emerges due to the fluidity of mobile wealth, the volume of exchange and the inability of any individual to monopolize its production. Societies which fall below this ratio, and therefore do not have mobile wealth, base their social systems on material resources such as land, which can be monopolized and this produces hierarchical systems.

Schneider further hypothesizes that livestock production in East Africa is not limited by the suitability of land for agriculture, but only by the presence of tsetse fly. Although this covers the case of pastoralists who practice herding in fertile lands, it does not explain why it is that one can also find agriculture flourishing within the bounds of fly-free areas. Indeed Galaty (1981:45) suggests that Schneider's approach "avoids the question of how the two forms of production are combined in many societies, recently described as agro-pastoral." This is an important point since agricultural encroachment into the arid areas is an ongoing process in the post-colonial development, i.e. maximizing land use.

The existence of egalitarian social systems which possess mobile wealth (i.e. livestock) has also been correlated with the type of kinship terminologies prevalent in these societies. East African pastoral societies are most often associated with Omaha terminology, or in some cases, where there is extreme individualism and entrepreneurship, with Descriptive terminology. Omaha kinship terminology is seen to generate conflicts between various categories of people over the control of wealth in the form of livestock. In contrast, when the major form of wealth is land and access to it is uneven, Iriquois kinship terminology is prevalent because it reflects a form of political alliance which makes marriages intensive and thus forms the basis of providing access to production resources by maintaining wealth and effecting closure.

In fact, the connection between portable wealth and its exchange among men, which was generally associated with patrilineal descent, is not a new thesis. Schneider (1979:217) credits Sir Henry Maine "with having uniquely ascertained that there are two basically different types of social systems, one in which position is relatively fixed and the other in which social mobility is more possible." One should not forget that Morgan (1877) made a similar contribution since he believed that the portable wealth associated with pastoralism enabled accumulation and that this led to a change in descent systems from formerly matrilineal horticultural societies to patrilineal. Indeed, Engels connected the emergence of portable wealth with the control of exchange by men and the submission and exploitation of women.

Thus, if one ignores the evolutionary perspective of these early theories, they do in fact support Schneider's notion that societies with

high man/animal ratios tend to be patrilineal although he further claims that they can be correlated with Omaha and Descriptive kinship terminology which relate to extensive marriage systems in what are characterized as egalitarian societies. However, Schneider (1979:152) does remark that his correlations of portable wealth and kinship terminology are not always on a one to one basis. He admits that "some occurrences of Omaha and Iroquois are still inexplicable. The Iroquois Gogo are an example of a society that apparently does not fit the theory. The Gogo are wealthy cattle people whose mode of life resembles the Turkana in many ways. Why, under these circumstances, they practice cousin marriage and utilize Iroquois terminology is not clear." Martin and Voorhies (1975:366) suggest that the answer to such questions lies in the historical "origins of herding in settled communities, and to the persistence of institutional configurations born in these traditions long after their adaptive advantage may have disappeared" (cf. Galaty 1981:45). Indeed, many anthropologists perceive pastoralists as being spin-offs from agricultural societies and seek to explain the "historical origins of modern pastoralists, and the gradual fluctuation of many of these groups between nomadic and settled life" (Martin and Voorhies 1975:334).

Although I do not totally disagree with Schneider's findings I do remain rather skeptical concerning the causal relations between the statistical correlations which he demonstrates. Certainly Schneider does not go so far as to posit a binary relationship between kinship nomenclature and marriage systems since he recognizes that Omaha terminology is associated with a number of variants. Indeed, Levi-Strauss (1969:xi) points out that the range of marriage types and the combinative

possibilities in Omaha systems "are so large in number that, for all useful purposes and on the human scale, they might as well be infinite." Nevertheless, because of demographic factors, i.e. small populations, Omaha systems in most societies produce marriage types "which represent only an absurdly low proportion of the possible types" (Ibid). Still, the fact that Omaha terminology may be associated with a variety of different kinship relationships suggests that the formal similarities of these terminologies are not as revealing as the differences which result from diverse functions and internal structures. These internal structures and functions are most important in determining the operation of economic, political and even ideological systems - in effect, the reproduction of the society. However, one may assume that, given the limited possibilities of types that Omaha produces, the structural effects of these different kinship types will be inter-related.⁸

The basis of Schneider's theory for the origin of the state lies in demonstrating how kinship relations, as made manifest through terminology, were egalitarian when associated with mobile wealth, while in the development of class societies, or hierarchical societies, kinship relations consolidated and monopolized wealth. In this theory, the "kinship system is not just a function of the production system...the indications are that kinship and economy correlate, moving together somewhat independently of production systems" (Schneider 1981:24). Here then, Schneider (Ibid:152) suggests that the association of economics and

⁸ This particular statement is meant as a speculation since it is not within the scope of this thesis to analyse Maasai society in a cross-cultural perspective.

kinship in East African societies is "some process such as the velocity of movement of repositories of value or the rate of capital formation..."

Such an approach misrepresents the correspondence between economy and kinship by making it appear as an external rather than an internal relationship. Having done so, Schneider (1979:143) then uses it to explain apparent anomalies to this theory. The fact that some of the Interlacustrine Bantu possess extensive Omaha marriage systems in association with fertile land and agriculture, is seen as a reflection of the inclusion of cattle in the Bantu economy. This is seen as an indication that "even low levels of production of cattle can generate Omaha organizations." Thus, even in societies where livestock ratios of 1:1 are found but are not the basis of a pastoral society, for Schneider they must still provide the basis of extensive property relations because the people have an Omaha kinship terminology.

This type of theory covers such a range of societies and production types that I do not find it particularly useful as a theory for the development of the state or inequality. If one recognizes the relation between economy and kinship as an internal one, then one relates the functioning of kinship in pre-capitalist societies to the overall structure of the productive forces. When new forms of production emerge, for whatever reasons, such as petty commodity production, wheat growing, etc., as among the Maasai, a number of changes take place which alter residence patterns, labour processes, authority relations, and so on. As the new social conditions become pervasive, they exceed the limits beyond which kinship relations are able to function as relations of production. This does not mean that kinship relations or terminologies disappear, but rather

that they may no longer be dominant and that other social relations are established to function as the relations of production. Thus, I would agree with Godelier (1977:123) who asserts, "If we wish to explain the evolution of primitive societies, we have to explain the appearance of new incompatible functions alongside the maintenance of former social structures. The question of passing from class societies to the state may, therefore, be partially reduced to a knowledge of the circumstances wherein kinship relations cease to play the dominant role unifying all the functions of social life."

Schneider is fairly safe when he is dealing only with pre-capitalist societies, but, with the impingement of national governments and mercantile forces upon so many pre-capitalist societies, the theory appears to falter.

We should recall Terray's (1972:50) point that in capitalist economies it is quite easy to observe socio-economic formations and assign them to either the economic, the political or the ideological realm. On the other hand, in pre-capitalist societies, the association of socio-economic formations with production strategies is so integrated that such associations can only be made "in the course of the investigation" (emphasis mine). This is precisely where the contribution of the present analysis rests. I have repeatedly attempted to demonstrate, in the course of the analysis, the dominance of certain socio-economic formations, such as stock networks (elder's production communities), household production units, and so on, in terms of the structural dependency of specific interconnections between social structures, or what Godelier (1977:124) might call "reciprocal correspondence." This type of analysis is particularly useful for understanding and determining the impact of

development programs. Rather than simply suggesting that Maasai society is being subsumed or subordinated to a dominant capitalistic or market system, I have tried to show that the internal mechanisms of Maasai society themselves determine the organizational variations which appear and which then may be acted upon or perhaps will themselves act on the market system. This approach allows one to investigate how specific variations of factors lead to the emergence of differentiated social forms within the broad range of a similar structural framework.

Thus, although former relations, such as between clansmen, or affines or age mates, appear to represent the new relations between employer and employee, landowner and destitute, and so on, in reality, the correspondence between kinship and economy has gone beyond the level of structural and functional compatibility and it is at this point (where the limit of correspondence has been reached) that the new mode of production operates. The relationship between individual ranchers and their employees is just such a relationship which reveals that the limits of the kinship/economy correspondence have been reached and "it is these limits which reveal the historical and objective content of each structure" (Godelier 1977:124). Individuals actively manipulate social relationships in order to capitalize on a new set of economic and political conditions and this makes the economic relations appear to be structured by these social relations. Indeed, one might suggest that such manipulations which project the relationships between categories of production from the traditional sector onto the national/ranching sector represent a cultural account of social change among the Maasai (cf. Galaty 1981:86).

It should now be clear why I am not interested in developing a typology of pastoral societies, which has been attempted in relation to a number of different sets of variables and always with a number of exceptions to the rule, since the relationship between the variables is neither binary (i.e. causal) nor is it verifiable. Moreover, most typologies either appear too categorical since societies are one thing or the other, or they recognize such a broad range of diversity within each category that the correlations which they seek to demonstrate become highly suspect. My own analysis particularly argues against any sort of unilinear evolutionary perspective which sees a society totally transforming its social forms to meet changed or so-called 'advanced' economic conditions. It has been the aim of this thesis to determine a system of relationships in traditional Maasai society and through this analysis to demonstrate in what manner social relations act as relations of production and thus to demonstrate the connection between production strategies and social forms within the limits or constraints which foster the reproduction of the entire social system. Such an understanding enables one to better explain and demonstrate the impact of national development schemes and agricultural encroachment which have attempted to alter traditional production strategies. I have sought to understand the extent to which these new strategies and relations are compatible with the former relations and the extent to which functional changes bring about changes in form and internal structure.

SUMMARY

To summarize, atypical or deviant marriage alliances can be thought of as strategies connected to productive activities, though not, as I

explained, as a way of explaining the relationship between those production activities. Even traditionally, the relationship between a wealthy patron and a poor client could not be considered a kinship relationship.


Nevertheless, the relationship was generated by a concomitant of social factors which produced the labour force and was related to production, accumulation and distribution. In other words, although the relationship was not a kinship relation, the reproduction of the social and material means of production had a common area of realization within the kinship system and the production system. I would suggest that the deviant marriage alliances presented differ from the traditional marriage system, not in kind but in degree. They attempt to readjust to a new set of conditions in Maasailand that have led to the realization of production alternatives outside of Maasai society (i.e. the Maasai socio-economic formation) or to the non-realization of social and material productive forces within Maasai society. That is to say, that while the Maasai still have to biologically reproduce themselves, the kinship system and the production system(s) are increasingly coming to have quite separate areas of realization.

In relation to this changing set of conditions (i.e. demarcation, agricultural encroachment, lack of mobility and exchange, and so on) associated primarily with group ranching, it is possible to present a model which suggests some relationship between production strategies and marriage alliances. Figure 25 indicates that deviant marriage alliances such as clan endogamy and cross-cousin marriage (affinal marriage) are particularly appealing to those pastoralists most interested in following strategies of production in areas where movement and exchange of livestock has been

curtailed. They are strategies of fairly rich herders, men considered to be olkitok, who are no longer able to continue developing multiple exchange relationships.⁹ Instead, they begin to consolidate pastoral production by economizing on the social relationships built up around stock exchanges - a move which begins to strengthen or maximize household production. Such marriages are, in effect, the first step towards a move in the direction of olkarsis status and individualized production strategy. They are tantamount to intensifying and individualizing pastoral production. Nevertheless, they initially represent the attempt by many rich herders to remain within the pastoral production system without investing surplus production outside of the pastoral economy. At the other end of the group ranching pastoral continuum are those men who also wish to remain within the pastoral economy but are too poor to pay bridewealth. For such men, who might be considered as tending towards a-paik strategies, sister exchange and to some extent, intra-ranch marriage minimizes or eliminates the necessity for stock exchanges and concentrates on maximizing household production by supplementing it with production assistance from the informal sector.

⁹ Inter-ethnic marriage in the group ranch situation virtually eliminates any chance of expanded pastoral production ever entering into the marriage exchange relationship since if non-Maasai in-laws take up residence in Maasailand they would be prevented from ever herding livestock.

Figure 25 Status And Marriage



Other Maasai are not able (i.e. the destitute - olaiterani) or become unwilling (i.e. the wealthy - olkarsis) to participate in the pastoral economy. The destitute have no choice but to attempt to eliminate production for exchange since they do not own any production resources. Inter-ethnic marriage provides the opportunity to obtain a wife in the face of virtual elimination from the pastoral economy and the need to diversify production through agriculture or employment.¹⁰ Sister exchange could also be an option for the destitute, although it is associated more with the 'hopes' of getting back into the pastoral economy, whereas inter-ethnic marriage is more closely associated with extricating oneself from the pastoral economy.

The wealthy pastoralist, olkarsis, who has opted out of the ranch economy in favour of individual ranching and business pursuits is best characterized as following marriage strategies which will enable a form of class endogamy and consolidation of land and production resources. Initially, these may not contradict any marriage rules in Maasai society, although eventually they will, if only because of demographic considerations. The elite attempt to arrange marriages which will protect, preserve and reproduce their privileged and superordinate position. This means that they often seek to intensify marriage relations between wealthy families and not become involved in asymmetrical relations with families who have nothing to give. Since the elite represent only a small fraction

¹⁰ The reader must remember that the model represents a static picture or an ideal representation and that between olkitok and a-paik is a continuum so that herders other than those who have actually arrived at olkitok status may, in fact, arrange marriage alliances of a similar nature.

of the Maasai population one must consider that they are not always able to supply themselves with women. Thus, one detects two other marriage strategies which can be correlated with the elite. Inter-ethnic marriage is quite common among the elite as well as a certain element of hypergamy. Maasai girls from wealthy families in the pastoral economy (i.e. olkitok) seem to be able to move 'upwards' by marrying olkarsis but the daughter of an elite is not likely to marry 'down.' Indeed, one sees an element of this emerging throughout the marriage system as political and production relations become more stratified and hierarchical. Men who are olkitok do not want their daughters to marry men who are a-paik and men who are a-paik do not want their daughters to marry men who are olaiterani, although marriage of daughters 'upwards' is more acceptable.¹¹

The apparently increasing number of atypical marriage alliances in the Rotian area has been related to the production strategies of certain categories of Maasai (i.e. olkitok, olaiterani, etc.), all affected by government development and land adjudication programs, growing market and informal sector activities, and so on. It has been emphasized that these categories, based on stock wealth, status, production and exchange strategies, etc., do not reflect the transformation of individuals from the traditional pastoral society into the national and ranching sector. The

¹¹ This interpretation is based on interviews and qualitative data since it is a process which is only now evolving and taking shape. Statistically, such deviant alliances may still represent only a small portion of Maasai marriages. Nevertheless, I would strongly suggest that such marriages are part of a dynamic system and that they represent a trend. I have isolated the elements of that system in an idealized and schematic manner although they represent a system in considerable flux.

use of such categories in the ranching and national sector, rather than suggesting the movement of individuals, points to the transformation of cultural terms. The division between these categories may not always seem clear cut since individuals move between categories being classified and reclassified as circumstances dictate. Thus, individuals who are classed in these categories actually represent a continuum even though the categories themselves retain a certain fixity of relationship. However, even this movement of elements (i.e. individuals) between categories has become, and will continue to become, less evident as entrenchment and stratification associated with hierarchical relationships between categories starts to replace the former egalitarian and cyclical relationships which characterized the dialectical relationship between terms.

Traditionally, although the Maasai pastoral economy was never isolated, it was the predominant vehicle for almost all accumulation and investment opportunities (cf. Godelier 1977:172). Thus, both social and material reproduction assumed an interdependency, such that the promotion of clanship, extensive marriage alliances, stock exchange, and so on, fostered the conditions which generated the particular Maasai mode of production. This does not mean, of course, that a production strategy such as mobility, can be linked causally with a social form such as clanship, or vice versa. Indeed, one recognizes the futility of this since clan and lineage relationships are often localized and connected to non-mobile property relations in other societies. The important point, as far as this analysis is concerned, is that in traditional Maasai society, the relationship between social formations, production strategies and even authority

relations, was such that they were all reproduced simultaneously, a situation which need not confuse kinship and age grade relationships with economic relationships.

Nowadays, it is much more difficult to simply relate production strategies to Maasai social formations since with the imposition of colonial/capitalist economic structures, accumulation and investment opportunities are available outside of Maasai society and social forms no longer have a common area of realization with production strategies. Although there is still a core of subsistence pastoralism in Narok District, there is also a whole category of people who no longer realize their production opportunities within Maasai society but are able to sell their manpower in the labour market. Another category no longer accumulates wealth or reinvests within the pastoral economy but rather profits on the immense surplus value generated by the extremely low wages paid to the employees who work for them. Strictly speaking, this relationship between members of the one category, the landowning employer and the other category, the disenfranchised worker, constitutes the emergence of a new mode of production which is no longer organized on the basis of kinship and age grade relations.

As I have suggested earlier, the emergence of another mode of production does not necessarily mean the destruction of the former subsistence mode of production since I have tried to show that there is an interaction between the two, such that activities in one system affect the choices in the other. As Terray (1972:157) points out, "if two systems of relations of production serve to structure the same community, it is necessary first to find their limits and understand their connection, then

to enumerate the internal modifications of each, and, finally, to discover which of them is the system and hence the dominant mode of production." It is the emergence of this new mode of production which is of interest, not because it is a demonstration of a capitalist production system subsuming the subsistence system, but because the new relations of production have been structured from within Maasai society and that they appear to have been encapsulated, albeit in an underdeveloped form, in the old relations of production.

Since this is such an important point, it is perhaps wise to reiterate and elaborate on this. The implementation of group ranching and other development programs were not devised, at least consciously, to separate pastoralists from their means of production. However, lack of mobility, decreases in exchange opportunities, and so on, can be thought of as instrumental in creating the conditions which detached the factors of production (i.e. land, labour and cattle) from their former positioning in the social structure. This made land, cattle and labour available, at least for some individuals, as production resources or commodities. The rearrangement of these elements into new combinations is precisely the point where a new mode of production is emerging. Although precipitated by the impact of exogenous factors, it is the structure of the Maasai society which determines the relationship between the elements offered or abandoned.

I have attempted to demonstrate that the new economic base in Maasai society, as represented by the individual rancher vs. the worker, is actually dependent upon the maintenance of former kinship and communal relationships, since they are in effect used to support the new mode of

production, while at the same time they destroy the old economic base since the reproduction of the relationship between employer and employee depends on siphoning off of destitute workers and indeed, the creation of those very destitute workers. In other words, the old subsistence mode of production, which was related to the dominant role of kinship relations is not completely destroyed but it assumes a secondary role in the organization of subsistence and production relations at the level of each neighbourhood, or group ranch. The new social organization is, in actuality, the relationship between these modes of production which have been associated with the enlargement of leadership and the emergence of a new social stratum. This dominance of the political function in the new mode of production is essential in the organization of relations of control and domination and in the reproduction of the very mode of production itself.

Although the traditional mode of production has theoretically been left intact on the group ranches, the fact that it no longer operates under the same constraints, i.e. mobility, cooperation and fluidity, means that social systems must constantly be manipulated and adjusted in order to appear to conform to the traditional herding economy. In other words, in areas such as Rotian, Maasai who wish to remain pastoralists and accumulate livestock must be willing or able to mediate relationships which are becoming functionally, if not structurally, incompatible. That is, when it is no longer possible to accumulate stock through exchange among clansmen, then another relationship must be able to take on the function of accumulation. For some wealthy herders this might mean practicing clan endogamy or cross cousin marriage, etc., while for poorer herders this

might mean accumulation through production strategies in the informal sector.

Furthermore, the relationship between individual ranchers and their employees, while quite different from the traditional relations of production, where a wealthy man who individualized his production strategies was still dependent on the labour of client herders who received subsistence and payment in cattle, nonetheless uses the old relations of production to give form to the new relations of production. Thus, the individual rancher tends to hire his 'clansmen' or his destitute nephews or affines who received aid traditionally because of the mutual and reciprocal obligations of clansmen and even affines to assist one another. Although I have discussed this earlier in this chapter, I must emphasize that the old relations of production are not the basis of the new relations although by appearing to give form to the new, they cloak the economic element by making this element seem to be something else. Indeed, many Maasai would describe the relationship between individual rancher and his worker and also the relationship between individual and group ranchers, as quite analagous to relationships in the former mode of production and therefore simply an extension of it.

However, this is not the case but certainly explains why so many Maasai do not see exploitation in the relationship between the elite and the destitute. The same structural relationships have been maintained (i.e. a-paik/olkitok and olaiterani/olkarsis) but the content and function have been changed and this is why I earlier suggested that kinship ideology now serves to mask power relations by representing the new relations. The individual rancher, olkarsis, does not appear to be an employer who offers

low wages to his workers. Rather, he is most often seen as a benevolent and respected patron, or clansman. The traditional ideology associated with kinship relations and age set system, an ideology which represented relations of production which were fairly egalitarian, is now used to represent relations of production which are much more stratified and hierarchical.

As Godelier (1977:192) reminds us, such an interpretation of ideology is of theoretical concern since it suggests that it is no longer possible to think of ideology as "a direct and simple reflection of economic infrastructures." The consequence of such a transference of ideological representations is that the new relations of production, whose content is actually based on stratification, appears in a form which makes it difficult to see the real content. The victimized and destitute, accepting this ideology, do not 'blame' the wealthy and the landowners for their predicament, but rather the will of God. Indeed, Godelier (Ibid) argues that at the representational level the transference of ideologies of equality onto modes of production which are not egalitarian may conceal the exploitation within the new mode of production and also serves to justify this exploitation and oppression to both the dominant and the dominated.

Ironically, the new mode of production emerging in Maasailand (basically a capitalist mode of production) alongside the traditional subsistence mode of production, embraces the representational aspect of kinship and age grade ideology, while in practice denying and negating, perhaps even destroying it. The dominant role that kinship once held in organizing production and labour processes is undermined by the enlargement of political relations and leadership which sets itself up as new social

stratum which manipulates the factors of production by interfacing with the national/modern sector and in so doing is no longer solely dependent on the traditional system for its survival or reproduction.

CHAPTER NINE

SOME OTHER DISRUPTIONS: THE IMPACT ON WOMEN

To this point, my analysis has examined the impact of social, economic and political upheavals in Maasailand in terms of their effect on inter- and intra-systemic relationships. For the most part, the relationships examined have been related to the interests, strategies, status and concerns of men, particularly elders who have reached the position of heads of households. Yet such an analysis would be incomplete without also demonstrating the impact of development initiatives on the other 50% of the adult population.

The traditional Maasai social system has been characterized as an acephalous, egalitarian system (Schneider 1979), albeit not by design, but through the necessities of redistribution (Dahl 1980). Now, despite this egalitarian categorization, anthropologists have been quick to point out that this equality did not include women who were considered as inferiors, subordinates and of minor legal status lacking the right to inherit livestock. It is necessary to take a closer look at the status, role, autonomy and labour attributes of women in the traditional society in order to determine to what extent there has been a shift in their contribution to production and their status and position under the new set of conditions apparent in many areas of Narok District.

In order to understand the position of Maasai women, particularly wives, it is necessary to elaborate on the dialectical relationship between the household production unit and the elders' production community. To

reiterate, although each woman marrying into a lineage was given her own nucleus of a milk herd, she did not in a strict sense own capital. She could circulate the cattle within the family unit, by prestations to her children, largely her sons and to her co-wives but she could not exchange livestock with people outside of the family to create alliances nor could she sell or slaughter one of these animals without obtaining permission from her husband.

The elders' production community was conceptualized as a supra-local organization which exceeded the bounds of the localized community. Being dispersed and certainly non-corporate, the cattle exchanged among stockfriends was maintained within the family herds with milking rights being given out amongst a man's wives. I have described the delicate balance which elders must keep between the two units and the fact that some elders adopt strategies which are decidedly directed towards accumulation rather than milk production - strategies which sometimes operate to the detriment of their families.

As earlier suggested, the elder's production community is not a corporate group or a physical entity but can only take its identity through the composition of individual households. Therefore, the elders do not need a separate labour force to herd the cattle which are associated with the stock exchange networks. They become part of the production and labour concerns of the household units. In other words, there is no need to establish a strict division of labour which would complement this division of women's herds and men's herds. Women are the dairymaids, although men may milk if they are herding away from home overnight, and although the major herding labour comes from children and adolescents, women can and do

herd livestock if they are needed. Thus, women provide not only an important labour contribution to the family or domestic economy but they are also integral to the larger pastoral economy or the horizontal (public) domain.

Although women do not 'own' their own herd, they do maintain rights of usufruct in their allotted herd and in the milk cattle in their husbands' herd which have been assigned to them. Despite the fact that an elder decides where the livestock should graze each day, when it will be watered, or when a major move will occur, a certain amount of management expertise remains in the hands of his wife. Women are responsible for "eramatare" (trans. caring) for the young calves, kids and lambs. It is the woman's choice how much milk she will take for her family's consumption and how much to leave for the calf, though if conditions are favourable the calf is given the two left teats. It is the wife who decides when to wean the calf and who cares for young animals which are sick or orphaned. Thus, if men are largely dependent upon the natural reproduction of their herds, as was the case traditionally, in order to realize growth, it was women who played the major role in the survival of young offspring. It has often been mentioned that Maasai goats have a high frequency of twinning and indeed an elder may be quite proud that he has several she-goats which regularly produce twins. On the other hand, Maasai women consistently informed me that they did not like to see twins as inevitably one of them had to be bottle-fed which meant sharing cow's milk with one more mouth. If milk was scarce a woman would rather see a kid go hungry than her own child. Thus, women do make extremely important decisions relating to the family food supply and to this extent it is possible to relate the status of women to

the wealth of their husbands. The more milk cows that a woman has, the greater is her decision-making power. the better are the chances that she will be able to make decisions which will benefit both her family and the young animals, and the higher is the status and prestige accorded to her.

Shortly, I shall discuss the effects of poverty and altered production strategies on Maasai women. but, first I should mention that the decision-making strategies of women regarding consumption, care of young animals, etc., must be related to the types of production strategies which I have suggested were traditionally available for elders to follow. Thus, if a man is olkitok, and involved in widespread stock exchanges, he risks losing this status if he is so generous in his exchanges that his wives and children are not able to properly feed themselves. Here we can see the contradiction between household and community production at its maximum or upper level. Women can affect the volume of an elder's exchange by withdrawing labour (running away) or taking more milk for consumption to the detriment of the calves, and so on until the elder decides or is persuaded by other elders to stop taking stock from the household units. The poor (a-paik) herder may follow strategies which are essentially female in their orientation since without surplus stock, the primary goal of such a herder is to maintain some balance between production and consumption. The wives of such men may find themselves 'borrowing' milk from other women in their enjang and their status would certainly be lower than that of the 'lenders.' The wife of a destitute herder would, like her husband, have the inferior status of a client, dependent upon a wealthy pastoral family. She would not have any cattle and so would not control the family consumption standards. She would provide labour for her patron, gather

firewood and water, tend small stock, etc., and in return, she and her husband would be given subsistence. Such a woman and her husband would hold very low status positions in the pastoral economy.

It is important then to remember that just as the status and prestige of Maasai men was highly differentiated according to wealth, production strategies, generosity, relative position in the age grade system and so on, similarly the status and position of women can be highly differentiated according to wealth, number of children, generosity, age and association with an age set of their husbands. In fact, in regards to generosity, a Maasai man may ask his wife to feed his age mates but he cannot go into her milk gourds if she says she cannot, nor can he prepare anything if she is away. Thus, to a large extent the generosity of men (age mates) depends largely on the generosity of their wives. In relation to everyday consumption patterns, it is women who control the distribution of milk and other products such as maize, tea, posho, etc. Twice daily, in the morning and the evening, there is a formal breakdown of consumers within each consumer (household) unit. (See Appendix C for breakdown of the labour input and consumption).

Children and young herders are fed first, usually milk and sometimes uji. After the cattle have left to graze for the day the elders will enter their huts and they too will be fed. Women wait until the men have left and then they eat. However, one should remember that last is not always least since a woman decides how to distribute the available food and it is she who determines how much to save for herself. Men often accuse women of being stingy and selfish and of hoarding milk which is completely opposite to the reciprocity and sharing which was inculcated into age mates within

an age set. On the other hand, women are also known to take care of the needs of their family to the extent that they do not eat anything themselves. Partly, a woman's generosity and the manner in which she distributes milk and offers it to visitors will reflect the number of milk cows that she has at her disposal, the size of her family and the seasonal conditions.

If one recalls that the Maasai possess a very strong ideological commitment to milk as the most important component of the diet, then it is interesting that, relatively speaking, those with the lowest status and the least productivity are the ones most likely to receive milk. If children have the lowest status, they are nonetheless associated with the high status of milk drinking, while men who have the highest status, i.e., elders, may not always receive milk, especially if it is very scarce during the dry season. It is interesting to note that if the category of men is broken down into warriors, junior elders and senior elders, and if all three are present, then the warrior would eat first to indicate his inferior status to the junior elder. The Nyangusi (senior elder) would eat next, going before the junior elder to indicate his senior status viz-a-viz the junior elder. Compare this consumption pattern in Figure 26 below.

Figure 26 Consumption Patterns And Status

<u>HOUSEHOLD MILK CONSUMPTION</u> (Order) *	<u>STATUS</u>
1) Children	Lowest Status
2) Men	Highest Status
3) Women	Lower Status

(Order Among Men)

1) Warriors	Lowest Status
2) Senior Elders	Highest Status
3) Junior Elders	Lower Status

* Vosher notes that the order of consumption is men, children, and women, which is certainly true for meat. However, among the IlPurko, dairy consumption in the settlement followed the pattern outlined above.

When we speak of the warriors as having the lowest status we refer to their ranking within the age grade system since the age set associated with warriorhood is admired by all and full participation brings high status and generates a great deal of prestige for warriors, especially among girls and even married women. The presentation of milk to warriors before senior and junior elders is symbolically reinforced by a number of food taboos, one of which prohibits warriors from eating grains of any kind and from partaking of meat within a settlement. As men move progressively further into elderhood the restrictions are removed through a series of rituals until a senior elder, it is said, can eat anything he wants, at any time and in

front of anybody.¹ From outward appearances, it seems that senior elders are like children given that both have the same restrictions on food. However, symbolically it is children and warriors who are associated. Within the household unit, children have the lowest status, especially the very young children who are the least productive members of the unit. Within the age grade system, warriors have the lowest status and in terms of their contribution to domestic production, they too are the least productive. Thus, the system of milk production, distribution and consumption ensures that the non-producers (children and warriors) will have the highest dependence on milk and the lowest status within their respective systems. Those with the lowest dependence on milk, senior elders, despite the ideological importance of milk, have the highest status. (See Appendix D for food eating rules.)

A man/woman with a large herd during the wet season may be able to feed everyone a substantial milk diet and share a surplus as well. Nevertheless, those with smaller herds, especially during the dry season, do not somehow undermine the senior elders' privileged position in society by channelling milk supplies first and foremost for children and warriors. The extreme emphasis on the high status of a milk diet has never been linked to the symbolic ranking of males, or to senior elders in particular. Indeed, the opposite is the case, so that those who are of lowest status are symbolically associated with milk. Indeed, Maasai women will speak of the warriors "needing" milk just like little children and of having

¹ Subject to certain food prohibitions which affect everyone in society, such as not eating milk and meat at the same time.

especially saved milk to make sure that warriors would be given a whole gourd to drink by themselves. The slaughter and distribution of meat is controlled by men and does not conform to the pattern described above. However, given the relative infrequency of slaughter for consumption and the sporadic nature of slaughter for ritual, I will only present the daily consumption pattern associated with milk and grains which are produced, processed and distributed by women.²

This important role of women in the production process has been emphasized by other anthropologists (Jacobs 1965b; Llewelyn-Davies 1978) and indeed, Rigby (1980:32) suggests "that the division of labour on the basis of sex is fundamental in the relations of production and the process of production...and that...women play a critical role as a category at all levels of the mode of production, in the transfer of rights of control and access to the means of production...." Despite this knowledge, pastoral societies such as the Maasai have been essentially described as male dominated and the subjugation of women is never explored. The ideology of male supremacy and the relatively low status of women, viz-a-viz men, in Maasai society in fact has led anthropologists to contradict those statements which indicate that women do play important decision-making roles in the family economy. Llewelyn-Davies (1978:9) even after noting the role of women in production and consumption concludes that "women,

² Men are associated with the production and distribution of meat and blood. I have collected considerable data on the distribution of meat at olpuls and for various ritual and ceremonial occasions, however, the presentation of such data is not warranted within the scope of this study.

then, are excluded from all important decisions relating to the welfare of the herds."

Such confusion arises from the comparison of decision-making abilities of men (elders) and women (wives) as if they were at the same level of control and operating within the same system of productive processes. The association of women with the household production unit (earlier described as the vertical domain) in fact involves the production of livestock for the creation of use-value. It is not that women do not make important decisions relating to the welfare of the herd, but rather, that the important decisions which women make are largely related to livestock as objects of subsistence to be circulated internally and consumed. Control over these two important aspects of the productive process must be understood as a basic component of the relations of production.

In other words, the association of smaller units in localized, and often temporary communities, indeed, can be conceptualized as one aspect of the relations of production and operated upon by the economic constraints of subsistence pastoralism. The grouping together of a number of households, referred to as an enjang, is given a feminine gender prefix. Enjang partners are concerned with the daily tasks of pastoral production and the provision of those domestic services, housing, childcare, food production, etc., which are encompassed within the domestic realm of women. It is at this level that Godelier (1978) referred to the smaller organizational units in pastoral societies. Despite the fact that each enjang is referred to as the settlement of so-and-so, usually the most senior resident elder, it is at this level that the role of women in production is centred.

Nevertheless, there exists another level of organization at the supralocal level. This involves the numerous overlapping and interdependent stock networks. Women do not have a comparable role in the relations of production which emerge from this social formation. Although stock networks are not corporate groups, they constitute a productive process which enables some men to accumulate livestock while those who cannot reciprocate must be prepared to offer labour, loyalty and so on, to a richer patron. This is the male domain, the horizontal circulation of livestock, not solely for the purpose of subsistence, but also for the purpose of accumulation and exchange.

This balance, which in fact is not always kept in a state of balance, between the subsistence concerns of the female, which includes children and warriors, and the accumulation and exchange concerns of the male (elder), is tilted in favour of the elders who control the exchange of livestock outside of the household unit. However, the antagonistic tendencies which might exist between household interests of women and the wider interests of men, is mediated by the exchange of women between descent groups. The clan represents, in its structural form, an association of men, not as users of livestock, but as investors of livestock. It is not surprising then that the Maasai word for clan, olgilat, is given a masculine gender prefix.

This network of supra-local relationships was earlier described as a system of relationships which reduced inequality of stock wealth through a mechanism of accumulation of surplus, not by its consolidation within family or lineage groups, but through its dispersal among stockfriends, especially clansmen. Thus, we can see how the same economic constraints give rise to both the smaller and the larger units and how, despite the

complementary, or dialectic relation between the two, structurally, the interests of women within the household unit are often opposed to the interests of that larger circle of men agnatically connected to their husbands. Moreover, there is no word in Maasai society to describe the relationship between clans, except on the basis of individual relationships of marriage. Indeed, none was needed since it was the marriage itself which finally mediated the two opposing tendencies (i.e. production for use and production for exchange), and by the nature of the extensive marriage system, provided the conditions for both the material and the social reproduction of the mode of production.

In other words, the Maasai social system provides the structural framework which mitigates against monopoly and the resultant hierarchical social relations which could emerge. This egalitarianism is manifest, not necessarily between all individuals, but within the social structure and as part of the ideology of kinship and age grade. At the local level, where inequality is quite evident, it is the differential access to subsistence resources associated with the amount of milk available for each wife which is of paramount importance. Men never compare herd sizes or ask each other how many cattle they possess and are often quite secretive about where they have exchanged livestock. On the other hand, women will admit that they have run out of milk and will try to find someone with a surplus to lend them some. It is not the size of a man's herd per se which differentiates households, but rather the ability of some women to control a subsistence surplus in relation to others who cannot. Therefore, although elders control production for exchange which may lead to situations where some men accumulate much more than others and we have seen how this might lead to

the four basic production strategies, it still remains that differential access to subsistence food supplies is in the hands of women and therefore inequality between households is essentially kept at the domestic level, between women. Since men do not have access to, nor do they allot food, it is women who are accused of hoarding, refusing to share, of being stingy and mean, and so on.

Thus, it is quite ironic and understandable that discrepancies in wealth do not interfere with the solidarity of clansmen, the reciprocity of stockfriends or the brotherhood of age mates. Everyone admires a man with a large herd and hopes to someday build one for himself. If inequality of stockwealth leads to resentment it is most often at the household level and associated with a lack of generosity in terms of herd produce controlled by women. We might now ask: How does this situation fit with Engel's (1975) hypothesis which asserts that male ownership of private property, which in pastoral societies is thought of as livestock, along with production for exchange, are the basis for women's subordinate position in such societies? Although we can see that Maasai women do have a subordinate position, it is quite obvious that we should not place undue importance on a notion of ownership of property. Women, within their own production units, have been characterized as having quite extensive rights in livestock and control over the distribution and consumption of the products of those livestock (i.e. milk, fat, hides, skins, etc.). However, men control production for exchange as a public or social process of production, while women control livestock simply as productive property, and within the domestic setting.

This is not to suggest that men do not accumulate surplus out of personal motivations. I have indicated that part of this production

surplus was necessary in order to support other social institutions, in particular the age grade system. The age grade organization played an important role in the reproduction of the mode of production, by deferring and in many cases expanding or enlarging community production resources. However, I cannot agree with Rigby (1980:36) when he claims, "that the division of labour within each sex category, extending beyond the production units, is based largely upon age set organization, and not upon kinship or affinal ties; although, of course, these latter play a subsidiary role." Galaty (1981:87) after noting the reciprocal dialectic between the age set system and the clan-lineage system, sides with Rigby and asserts that, "the age set system decisively supercedes and encompasses the descent system by providing the basis for the constitution of the political order."

It is quite true, as Galaty (Ibid) points out, that descent groups among the Maasai are (or were) dispersed and as such could not provide the basis for asserting territorially aligned political actions. However, it is the very fact that these lineages are so widely spread that they functioned so perfectly in fulfilling the constraint of mobility through dispersion of livestock. In other words, in recognizing the political significance of the age grade system we must remember that age sets do not own cattle nor do they control essential production resources. A man brings cattle to a warrior manyatta from his father's family herd and he obtains cattle when he is ready to marry not from age mates, but from relatives, and so on. I am certainly not attempting to downplay the importance of the age set system in Maasai society, however, I do not

recognize primarily that "age set and age grade relations function as relations of production" (Rigby 1980:32).

Here then, I must agree with Baxter and Almagor (1978:170) that indeed, "men do stock work appropriate to their age and status and hence work which is appropriate to their set...But a careful reading of the literature shows that these associations hold only in so far as age-suitability for the task, age-grading and set rules fit in with the labour requirements of the family herd and the need to fill essential familial roles." Although age mates have unavowed reciprocal obligations of mutual aid among themselves as one informant noted, these do not extend into rights "to get into each other's herds. But if an olenkapu wants to take an animal from your herd you will have nothing to say".

Galaty (1981:86) has noted that "the domain of kinship and clanship offers an elaborate symbolic system by which the domain of age sets is defined and organized," and furthermore, "the age set system feeds back upon the kinship and lineage system by serving as the mechanism by which generational relations within the family and lineage are defined." I certainly acknowledge this dialectic while I do not concede that the age set system "supercedes" the kinship system because it provides the basis for the political order, but rather, the clan-lineage system, despite its non-corporate appearance "supercedes" the age set system because it provides the basis for the economic order.

Where the kinship system plays a role in determining property relations and production systems, the age set system plays a crucial role in determining timing. The descent system determines who may inherit livestock. Since the bulk of the inheritance must come from the

subistence or household herds we have noted that indeed, women are instrumental in the process of inheritance since it is they who are most responsible for presenting gifts of livestock to their sons. On the other hand, a son's rights in those livestock remain essentially identical to those of his mother's until he is circumcised and socially recognized as entering the public domain (horizontal). The descent system determines who may inherit, and the age set system determines when he may become the controller of that inheritance for the production of exchange. Thus, for a male, circumcision and the progression through a number of age set rituals transform a youth, not just from a boy to a man but from a member of a domestic production unit into a potential member of the elders' production community with legal adult status in terms of inheriting. Women, on the other hand, never obtain full adult status, since female circumcision never confers upon the woman the right to become members of the larger community of production for exchange.³ Thus, the circumcision of women is not mediated in its timing by a social institution, such as the age set system, but is determined by the biological onset of physical maturation which reinforces the symbolic association of women with Nature and men with Culture, or women with the domestic and men with the public. This symbolic elaboration is pervasive in Maasai society.

³ After circumcision, a young man no longer greets his father by bowing his head and a circumcised youth cannot be 'loaned' out for herding duties and in this way the age set does influence the labour force. Circumcised adult women must greet their father and all his age mates with the bowed head of a child for their entire life. On the other hand, the Maasai have a proverb which states, "A boy is never really circumcised while his father is alive," demonstrating the very gradual acquisition of "real" property rights.

Although the reciprocal obligations of sharing remain a lifelong aspect of the relationship between age mates, once a man becomes the head of a household, it is important to recognize that age mates do not share any property rights in livestock. On the other hand, a man's kinsmen and affines do recognize multistranded rights or shared property relations in various livestock. Similarly, once a man takes a wife, his kinsmen and affines do not share any sexual rights in that woman while his age mates are not only allowed, but are expected to be given ungrudging sexual and domestic (i.e. food and shelter) access.⁴ It is not surprising then, that all cattle belonging to men of the same clan are entitled to be branded or earmarked with the same clan brand, and such cattle may be referred to figuratively as the cattle of a certain clan. Conversely, when women marry, they are not referred to as the wives of their husbands' clan, but, both figuratively and literally, as the wives of their husbands' age set.

Within the age set system, not only are age mates permitted to have sexual access to each other's wives, but members of alternate or adjacent age sets, like kinsmen and affines, are completely denied such access on penalty of fines. Again then, it is not surprising that rules of kinship, marriage and incest combine to make senior elders stand as a category of fathers to all warriors who therefore become their sons, while the age set

⁴ Despite this ideal, married men did indicate signs of jealousy and one young husband actually attacked one of his age mates who was spending considerable time with his wife. The elders fined the husband for his selfishness in "allowing a woman to come between age mates." Also, sexual access still remained in the hands of women since wives were not obligated to have sex when age mates of their husbands slept over and could simply "make an appropriate excuse".

which is most likely to provide wives, the adjacent age set, is seen as in-laws.

Age mates and clansmen are both groups of men sharing relationships of solidarity. Among age mates, one expression of solidarity, among others, is the sharing of sexual and domestic rights in each other's wives. The expression of solidarity among clansmen is the sharing, in an ideological sense, of cattle. The relationship between age mates confers on members the rights to be associated with their age mates' wives' domestic units which are related to food production and distribution and sexual favours. Indeed, when a man's age mates are visiting it is one of the few times that he may tell his wife to prepare food, although, if she does and what she prepares is her decision. It is quite impossible for men to entertain other men without a wife and until they are married they must depend on their mothers for food if they are living in a settlement.

The relationship between clansmen confers on each other the rights to associate in relation to the public or social production of livestock for exchange. Within the traditional Maasai mode of production, social or public production, while being the major concern of men, was dependent upon a relationship to the domestic production of the woman's household unit established and maintained on the basis of marriage. When a kinship or affinal relationship exists between men, whether reciprocal (clansmen) or non-reciprocal (affines), such a relationship in the domain of public production takes precedence over the relationship which exists if such men are circumcised together and become age mates. Thus, although age mates are allowed sexual access to one another's wives, if those age mates are already affines, brothers or close lineage members they do not have access,

although of course such a system is open to much manipulation.

Furthermore, very strong ties between age mates will be transformed from the domestic to the public domain by the reciprocal exchange of livestock and the establishment of a stockfriend (i.e. property) relationship between the two men.⁵

Descent groups are highly dispersed and provide a particularistic model for fluidity and mobility, and are thus closely associated with production of livestock for exchange. On the other hand, the age set system provides a universalistic framework of identification which cross-cuts lineage and clan groupings ensuring that there is always a localized group of men on which to base association (cf. Eisenstadt 1956). The local cluster of households is associated with the daily herding of household herds or a woman's domestic production for use. Men who are involved in both particularistic relations which promote production for exchange as well as making management decisions about household herds.

However, it is a man and his wives who make complementary management decisions about the herd, where to graze, when to water, whether or not to wean a calf, and so on. The age set system impinges on this domestic unit of production not by constituting it, but by being constituted by it. Although elderhood confers on an individual the 'right' to become involved in public production for exchange by conferring legal adult status upon male members, the age set system does not provide a political mechanism

⁵ Note the exchange of money between impoverished age mates in the Rotian area who use it to symbolize the possibility of establishing a business partnership of some kind which might lead them to 'share' profits rather than livestock.

through which age mates or others in the system may force a man to exchange stock with specific individuals. In other words, the age set system cannot function to direct individuals (within an oloshon) where or when or in what direction to herd, which stock to exchange, sell, buy or slaughter and so on. Indeed, the council of elders, as localized political decision-making bodies, are able to function as mediators between production for exchange and production for use, or one might even suggest, at times between men and women!

For example, the council of elders cannot tell a man where to graze his livestock, but if there is a dispute between men the council can arbitrate and mediate and issue a fine. This position of mediation enables the council of elders to mediate most disputes which might have arisen traditionally, especially in relation to marriage, fertility, inheritance and the maintenance of "appropriate" social relations and decorum. Thus, the Maasai age set system was of political importance not because it provided a framework for political decision-making, but because it provided the framework by which to mediate the political consequences of individual conflicts and interactions.

I am not trying to deny the political aspect of the age set system and I am certainly not suggesting that it does not play a role in the relations of production. Indeed, the reciprocal dialectic between the age set system and other institutions is a vital element in the timing of the sexual division of labour by affecting when a man can inherit livestock, when a man can marry and beget children, and so on. On the other hand, I hope that I have demonstrated why it is that the productive activities of elders and women are largely associated with the pastoral mode of production.

Unlike Gellner (Msh 1978:24), I cannot agree that "The preoccupation with mode of production is opposed to mode of coercion. Modes of coercion are much more important than, at least as important as mode of production." The structure of the Maasai age set system, despite the militaristic function of the warrior age set, is not a mode of coercion, since as Baxter and Almagor (1978:174) have noted, warriors are "agents of force, not the controllers of forces..." Force was directed outwards, as I indicated earlier, at the periphery, so that it involved company against company, oloshon against oloshon.

Thus, the age grade organization in Maasai society has a complementary function to the relations of production, since the division of labour by age and sex as well as access to the differential levels of control of the means of production is linked to both the developmental cycle of the family and the developmental cycle of the age set. In other words, I am not suggesting that since the militaristic function of the age set system has been largely eliminated, that the age grade organization, and the warriors in particular, have become anachronistic. However, I do think that because the age grade organization was so highly visible and provided such a readily observable administrative framework, it was too often thought that the age set primarily structured relations of production by determining herding duties, labour input, management and control, and so on, when most of these relations are more closely connected to the developmental cycle of the domestic unit in relation to the emergence of public units.

The ability of men to accumulate a surplus within their wider production community meant that it was possible to channel a certain amount of that surplus into supporting an age set system, particularly a warrior

class which would protect and defend this surplus by ensuring that the conditions of reproduction of the entire social system could continue. Livestock within the woman's domestic unit produced only surplus product, while livestock in the elder's production community could be considered a true investment (though of course still contributing to subsistence). Thus, it is surplus production associated with relations of production outside of the age set which support the age grade organization and those men in the position of control over production resources (elders) are able to constrain the behaviour of the warrior class in a very extensive though not always decisive manner and not vice versa. However, these men are controllers, not because they are elders, but they have become elders because they are controllers (cf. Terray 1972:129).

The asymmetrical relationship of males and females in the relations of production is based not only on a division of the technical, but also on the social relations of production. The interests of women within their household units are essentially in opposition to the interests of the agnatic clan, while it is the development of the interests of women which perpetuate the agnatic clan. Thus, the association of women with their husband's age set rather than his clan masks the true basis of intersexual opposition which is the different levels of control of production resources. In fact, the Maasai emphasized that sexual rivalries among males should never make men "fight over cattle" and this means that sexual rivalry should not disrupt the unity and solidarity of agnatically related men. Women's sexuality is seen to cross-cut clan membership so that competition over women is centred on the relationship between age grades and not the relationship between lineage/clansmen. In other words,

theoretically, conflict between men over access to women will not become a conflict in the public domain where production for exchange takes place but will be kept within the domestic domain.

I shall present a case study concerning inter-age set adultery because it escalated into a conflict which eventually suggested strain in the public domain and the traditional fining of the offenders did not take place in relation to junior vs. senior age set but in terms of clan vs. clan.

CASE STUDY: INTER-AGE SET ADULTERY

Generally, the sharing of wives' sexual favours is considered to be a vital aspect of the relationship between age mates, while fines and prohibitions surround inter-age set adultery. Even within age sets this potential for sexual access follows certain rules of decorum and men and women alike are able to define behaviour which would constitute intra-age set promiscuity and which is frowned upon. For example, age mates should never sleep with one another's wives without telling the age set that they plan to do this. There is no need to be secretive and thus secretive behaviour can lead to punishment, usually a fine of one heifer. If an age mate warns his age set then there is no fine for sleeping with another age mate's wife in the settlement, although again, age mates should not indulge in sex with another age mate's wife out in the bush. Similarly, a new wife who arrives at a settlement should act quite shy or "women will say she is still young and free with sex and this would make everyone wonder and would be a bad start to the marriage and for her reputation". Although warriors joke openly among themselves about seeking sexual favours among the wives

of married age mates or the young wives of senior age sets, and develop their own elaborate language so that they can even talk about their exploits in front of others, women should never go seeking sex and one who does is called "kesid" (trans. prostitute).

The most serious inter-age set adultery is thought to be between a woman married to a sponsoring firestick elder and a man from the warrior age set who are age set sons to these elders. The fine in the case of these individuals being caught together in the settlement is considered very heavy and is most often a heifer, while if they are caught in the bush the fine would probably be a blanket and honey beer. Adultery between a woman married to a junior elder age set and a man from the adjacent warrior age set is not as serious and the fine is lighter, usually only a blanket and some honey beer. Women who become involved in adulterous unions are careful to hide the affair from their husbands since getting caught usually entails serious beatings for a wife. Furthermore, women, especially those married into the same age set, contend that they will "hide one another's love affairs and protect each other. A woman who does not will lose many friends and will be called a gossip monger. If a woman tells a man that his wife is seeing another man, that woman who has been betrayed will tell her husband, "Have you married me in somebody else's ear?" In fact, Llewlyn-Davies (1978) claims that among the Loita Maasai she never heard of a case where a woman betrayed the affair of another woman. The case I am about to present involves just such an occurrence.

THE CONFLICT


Two senior warriors who lived in the same enkang at Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch created the conflict after spending the night with two young Il Nyangusi wives. Warrior A was married and had three children. He was the eldest son in his family and his father had died when he was a boy so he had taken on the responsibilities of family life (elderhood) very early. Warrior A was from the il-aiser clan. His friend, Warrior B, was also married but without any children and he was from il-ukumai clan (see Figure 27).

Warrior B told his wife to go and spend the night at the hut of Warrior A's wife. The warriors were joined in the hut by the two young wives. One girl was from il-ukumai and her Nyangusi husband was from ilTaarrosero clan. They were ranch members and lived at a neighbouring enkang. The other girl was from il-makesen clan and her Nyangusi husband, from another neighbouring enkang, was an il-ukumai clansman and a prominent member of the Ranch Committee. Warrior A slept with the il-ukumai girl and Warrior B slept with the il-makesen girl. The wife of Warrior B was so infuriated at having been sent out of her hut that she went to both the Nyangusi husbands and told them what was happening. The il-ukumai Nyangusi said he was not going to become involved but the ilTaarroser elder went and spent the night outside the hut of Warrior B and in the morning he saw his wife leaving.

When Warrior A went back to his own hut the elder followed and began to curse the warrior, his wife, three children and cattle to death. The entire group ranch was in a turmoil and all of the women and the warriors were extremely angry with Warrior B's wife. The women married to warriors kept emphasizing, "She has hurt her own husband and she has hurt herself.

She will be the one to lose cattle. We will all lose cattle because she has hurt the age set".

Figure 27 Inter-Age Set Adultery



- Warrior A - Asked all Il-aizer Nyangusi elders to defend him against the curse
- Il-aizer elders asked Il-ukumai elders to join together to form a united moiety
- Ilnyangusi - Iltaarrosero elder called on olMakesen and il-molelian elders to support him as members of the same moiety
- Odo Mongi told Orok Kiteng' to take back their ilukaumai girl
- Compromise - Odo Mongi would keep the girl
- iRampau and Ilnyangusi from Orok Kiteng' would pay a fine of 4 heifers, 4 blankets and honey beer
- After the fine was paid elders of Odo Mongi would bless Warrior A and his family and cattle

Normally such a breach of sexual rules, which has violated the relationship between the age sets, is solved as an age set problem with the council of elders meeting, discussing the evidence and hearing all parties

explain their position and then deciding on a fine. The man that has been found in violation will be expected to receive help in paying the fine from all of the age mates and thus the feeling that the entire age set has been fined. The woman who has committed the adultery will be beaten by her husband. Indeed, after such an incident when tensions are high, some of the families involved may even choose to move to a new location which helps to diffuse the hostility.

In this particular case, all the men involved were members of the same group ranch and therefore the opportunity to move away from the situation was not a viable alternative. The conflict was further heightened by a number of other factors as well. In everyone's minds was the fear that the group ranch would one day be subdivided, if not into individual holdings, then into two or three smaller group ranches. Thus, there was a great concern that individuals who could show cooperation and solidarity would be able to present a strong front and would be in a better position to obtain a 'good' piece of land. Although there were discrepancies of wealth and different age set affiliation among clansmen, it was still generally asserted that kinship alliances would provide a stronger basis for unity in terms of land claims than age set unity. This is not just an interpretation of data, it is what the majority of Maasai men at Rotian claimed to be happening.

The next day, a meeting of the council of elders was called and because the ilTaarrozero elder had cursed him to death, Warrior A begged the Nyangusi elders of his clan (il-aiser) to defend him at the meeting since, as a warrior, he would have no rights to speak out unless called upon to do so. The il-aiser elders decided that because of the gravity of the il-

taarosero elder's curse which in effect concerned their entire clan, they would defend Warrior A. At the meeting tensions were still high and the il-taarosero elder would not remove the curse. Because of this, the il-aiser elders went to the il-ukumai elders and asked them to stand together with them as members of the same moiety, Orok Kiteng' (Black Cattle Moiety). The il-ukumai agreed to this and this in turn led the il-makesen and il-molelian elders to join together with il-taarosero since they were all members of Odo Mongo (Red Ox Moiety). Thus, what had started out as an age set tension evolved into clan tensions and finally into a moiety dispute.

At the next meeting, the elders from the Red Ox Moiety, to which the wronged Nyangusi husband belonged, told the Black Cattle Moiety elders to take back 'their' girl who had come from il-ukumai clan and with her would go many curses. The elders of the Black Cattle Moiety begged the elders to keep the girl and bless the senior warrior and his age set and decide on a fine. After long heated debates this solution was agreed upon by all. It then took several more days of meetings to decide on the fine. Initially, the Red Ox Moiety demanded nine (9) heifers, six (6) blankets and honey beer. Eventually the fine was lowered to four (4) heifers, four (4) blankets and honey beer. Warrior A is technically responsible for the fine and will not be blessed until the entire fine has been paid. However, it is not to his age mates in general that he must turn to help pay the fine, but to all the senior warriors and the senior elders of the Black Cattle Moiety (i.e. il-aiser and il-ukumai clansmen) are expected to lend him support. In other words, Nyangusi elders from this moiety will be helping to pay a fine for adultery against the ilnyangusi age set.

It has been noted elsewhere that the Kaputiei Maasai were one of the groups in which moiety played an important role (Vosher 1980:53). Vosher has attributed this to the fact that Kaputiei Maasai seem to have formed only recently, many of them being Maasai from other oloshon, who for various reasons were unable to find wives. These particular Maasai form two separate manyattas at the enkipaata ceremony based on moiety, something which is not as common elsewhere in Maasailand. Moreover, Vosher (ibid:53) suggests that because of their recent formation the Kaputiei Maasai must establish strong clanship solidarities in order to be absorbed into the group and to enter into the marriage system.

Although I am not familiar with the Kaputiei Maasai, it does seem that among the IlPurko Maasai of Narok, the growing importance and emphasis on moiety affiliations is a fairly new phenomena which can be associated with decreased mobility, demarcation and group ranching and the need to consolidate land interests rather than to disperse livestock interests. Although my own data gave no statistical evidence to support this, the Maasai in the Rotian area claimed that when possible, it is preferable to marry a girl from the same moiety. This preference might be another recent phenomena associated with the growing preeminence of kinship relations as a means of consolidating land interests, especially for those Maasai in areas of high or medium potential agricultural land where the fear of subdivision and disenfranchisement are immediate and very real concerns.

To end this particular case study, I should report that the two young wives of the Nyangusi elders were punished (beaten) by their husbands. The wife of Warrior B decided to divorce him and went to live with her parents (il-makesen) in a neighbouring enkang on the group ranch. She later

returned to her hut and tried to take out a small cupboard which her husband had given her when he had been trekking cattle. The husband, as well as his mother, claimed that the cupboard belonged to the husband and was now the property of the mother. The wife grabbed a panga (sword) and slashed her husband on the leg. He picked up his orinka (club) and beat his wife on the shoulders until she fell unconscious. At that point, I was called to take the wife to the hospital. After going to the hospital, the wife went to the police and lodged a formal complaint against her husband and decided to stay in the town of Narok with some relatives who were working there. It was felt by all that Warrior B's wife would not be able to look forward to a happy life and many felt she would end up a prostitute in town. Warriors belonging to the two moieties clearly avoided each other for several weeks.

THE IMPACT OF GROUP RANCHING ON WOMEN

It now remains to demonstrate just how the major upheavals associated with demarcation, group ranching, agricultural expansion and increasing poverty affect the role, contribution and status of women. Here then, I will examine the shifting access to productive resources, the emergence of alternative economic pursuits and wage labour and how the effects of both internal and external forces alter the internal dynamics of the social system. This disruption of the social system has been shown to have a differential impact on individual stockowners, as well as to have different ramifications for the individual than the group. Similarly, such disruptions have differential impacts within the family or household unit,

although the impact of such schemes (i.e. group ranching) on women and children are very rare, given any attention.

Many anthropologists (Dyson-Hudson 1975; Goldschmidt 1981; Horowitz 1979; etc.) have suggested or noted that the role of women in pastoral societies where women control milk production is seriously threatened when development programs are introduced which emphasize commercial meat or milk operations. As the economy becomes commercialized, males are seen to take control not only of the productive resource but of the product as well so that women lose their status by losing control over the family food supply and any income which had been derived from the sale of surplus milk (Horowitz 1979:70). Indeed, an AID report on the attempt to emphasize meat production among the Tanzanian Maasai concluded that, "Maasai women saw themselves threatened by economic disenfranchisement, for they attributed their economic power and personal autonomy to their control over the allocation of milk and dairy produce (AID 1980:29).

However, the group ranching program in Narok District has not replaced the traditional economy with a livestock economy based upon the commercial production of meat and milk. Indeed, at a presentation at the University of Nairobi a representative from the World Bank asked me, "Those Group Ranches out in Maasailand have not become beef or dairy ranches. Nothing has changed so what is there for you to study out there?" Although the group ranching program has not turned the Maasai into commercial beef producers, the impact of these schemes, in combination with land insecurities, the fear of subdivision, agricultural expansion and so on, have profoundly affected basic social fabric of the Maasai socio-economic system. In the attempt to provide subsistence in the face of a new set of

economic and political conditions, the Maasai are entering into new relationships, or charging old relationships with new functions, and all of this affects not only the relationship between men, which as we noted is becoming more stratified, but also the relationship between men and women, and this in turn alters the status and position of women.

In the Rotian area, a variety of production strategies are being adopted by men including participation in the national or ranching sector and, for the most part, these production strategies are adversely affecting the status and economic contribution of women. Although women have always occupied an inferior position to males, especially ideologically, everyone recognized the autonomy of a woman's household and her role as provider and controller of the family food supply. No herder could hope to function in the traditional economy without the complementary efforts of his wife and children and bachelorhood was almost unheard of. Women played a vital role not only in the reproduction of the labour force, (i.e. biological reproduction) but in the reproduction of the mode of production.

The degree of poverty in the Rotian area has not only lowered the impoverished woman's status, viz-a-viz those Maasai women from whom she is continually begging milk, but it has also altered her entire role. Although to a certain extent the traditional economy still operates in various degrees, I have noted that it is not possible for wealthier pastoral families to absorb or employ all of those members from destitute families. Let us now examine the position of Maasai women as their own production strategies, status and contributions shift as they attempt to accommodate to the production strategies of their husbands. The implementation of group ranching has not entailed a sudden change from

traditional pastoralism to commercial beef or milk production. Similarly, the availability of alternative investment outlets, involvement in other economic pursuits, growing market opportunities, etc., has not meant a wholesale (i.e. society wide) shift in the relations between the sexes, but involves a process whereby the relationships between the domestic production/consumption unit and the public production sphere of men become slowly separated until a point is reached where women and children become non-producers supported by a production unit which has no correspondence with the domestic unit. As this process begins to emerge in Maasailand, it is important to have an analytical framework based on the crucial variables which I have outlined, such as contribution to the labour force, control of food supply, relationship of consumption and production units, and so on, in order to understand exactly what is happening to the role of women under conditions of socio-economic change, and just how this will affect their future potential and status.

THE RANCHING AND NATIONAL SECTOR

The Impoverished Woman

Impoverished Maasai women are those women who are married to elders following production strategies described as a-piak. These women do not have enough milk cattle to provide a subsistence base for their families and thus, their role as providers of family consumption are seriously undermined. Traditionally, when an elder followed such a strategy he did everything possible to foster the growth of his subsistence herds and did not become involved in the public sphere of exchange since he did not have a surplus. Nowadays, men and women alike are turning to alternative

economic outlets which supplement subsistence. Thus, the involvement of men in activities such as charcoal burning, timber cutting and so on, is not based on the public/domestic dichotomy, but rather disrupts the autonomy of the woman's domestic domain by the fact that it is the man who is most active in production aimed at household subsistence. However, many of the activities in which they are involved can only be converted into consumption through the market. Although women are not barred from becoming involved in income-generating activities, there are fewer opportunities for them to do so. The sale of milk and handicrafts is often seasonal and sporadic and the physical demands of charcoal burning and many other pursuits limit female participation.⁶ These women become more and more dependent on the income of their husbands to provide subsistence and supplement their meager milk supplies.

On the other hand, men will attempt to control money in much the same manner as they did cattle. In other words, men attempt to accumulate a surplus to be used for exchange, in most cases to be used for the purchase of additional livestock. Women no longer have autonomy since they must depend on the cash that their husband gives them and in many cases attempt to cajole him into giving more. Women had controlled the total production and distribution of milk but in this new economic setting they do not control the production of money and their husbands can withhold as much as they want. They become processors of food and the important function of

⁶ Another pursuit which Maasai women sometimes undertake is the illegal brewing of a potent alcoholic drink called changaa. Mill Hill Fathers told me that often women left at school bomas "are not given enough cattle to support themselves and in order to make some money to buy food for the children they resort to brewing changaa".

controlling the family food supply becomes an aspect of male involvement in the domestic sphere. In fact, in certain areas of Narok such as Loita where small dairies have been set up, payment is made on account each month. Although the women bring the milk to the dairy, the account is in their husband's name and it is the man who goes to pick up the monthly payment.

The monetization of the economy affects the position of women in another way. The accumulation of cash by men, even when it is reinvested in the pastoral economy, is often in the form of heifers and cows or steers. One of the important contributions of a woman was her role in caring for newborn and young animals. This role is undermined when the reproduction of the herd is no longer dependent upon natural herd growth but relies heavily upon the introduction of adult stock. This affects the labour force also since children and young herdboys are assigned to young stock and/or shoats, whereas adult stock requires adolescents or men. Indeed, one might speculate that part of the reason that there has been a dramatic increase in children attending school in the past five years has been the growing importance of buying adult stock to stimulate herd growth, and thus lower demand for child labour.

Traditionally, men following an a-piak strategy experienced lower status because of their lack of participation in the public (horizontal) domain of stock exchange outside of the family. Because of their desire now to consolidate their holdings, such men are often considered to be selfish, largely because their interests are too closely aligned to their wives' domestic interests. Consolidation of family herds formerly meant that a woman could rest assured that the subsistence base of the herd would

not be exploited (exchanged) by her husband and that her subsistence activities and the internal circulation of cattle would be the most important aim of herd management. The availability of other economic pursuits now means that consolidation no longer unifies the interests of husbands and wives. Husbands are no longer forced to consolidate within the domestic domain, i.e., within the household. The appearance of income generating informal sector undertakings has made it possible for men to bypass the dependence on promoting natural herd growth within their wives' herds. Income is handed over very selectively to wives, usually just enough to meet the immediate consumption needs of the family. Surplus money can be used to buy stock which naturally contribute to the milk supply if they are cows, but which enter into the husband's herd and enables it to grow. If such a strategy is successful then eventually some families will build up herds which are more capable of providing subsistence.

However, despite the ideal of most impoverished herders to buy back into full-time participation in the pastoral economy, most of these herders have become enmeshed in what I referred to earlier as the vicious cycle syndrome. They sell stock in order to supplement consumption and they work in order to support family needs and replace the livestock, but incomes are low and sporadic and often the stock coming in cannot replace the stock being used and eventually the downward spiral leads to destitution.

Many wives of impoverished herders in the Rotian area have begun to keep shambas and raise chickens in order to sell eggs. For the most part these shambas, which have become commonplace only in the past five to ten years, are small subsistence plots which generate only partial

supplementary needs to the diet as indicated by the household expenditures on food items. A few non-Maasai wives have larger plots and do sell some surplus in town. However, none of the women are supposed to put in shambas for the purpose of commercial sale only. It is feared that if subdivision does occur those people who have invested in their shambas will have stronger claims to the land than those interested in livestock and that subdivision would then follow agricultural interests rather than pastoral. Therefore, for the present, it is quite unlikely that the income from shamba produce will provide an avenue for increasing the revenue of Maasai women faced with having to supplement their income. At most, shambas are expected to be subsistence plots. As we have seen, the vast majority of the land in this area which is turned over to agriculture, is in the form of wheat and barley cropping which is outside the realm of female participation and provides only a small rental fee for male group ranch members.

The status, role and position of the impoverished woman on a group ranch today seems much lower than that of impoverished women in the traditional pastoral system. In the traditional system, it was actually the man who was impoverished in many ways, since all cattle had to be protected for the subsistence needs of his wife leaving him without any livestock to exchange. In fact, this underscored the important position of his wife since herd growth was dependent upon her good care of young stock. Now that herd growth is not dependent upon natural growth - not that this is a conscious male decision - and women are becoming more dependent upon cash contributions from the earnings of their husbands, the labour input and the productive role of the domestic unit is diminishing. Slowly, the household unit is becoming simply a consumption unit with less role in the

production process and very little basis for managerial control of the family food supply.

Women in this situation have lost considerable status as their economic contribution drops. With only a handful of cattle and little opportunity to earn a steady cash income the principal activity of these women has become tending children and performing household chores. True, their husbands still depend on them to provide a house and shelter and food but the household unit no longer has that dialectical relationship to the production activities of the husband - an integral part of the relations of production and the essential component in the reproduction of the mode of production. The husband's activities are more dependent upon the market economy and those pricing and marketing factors which affect informal sector activities throughout Kenya, and over which he has no control.

Even the contribution of women to such activities as hut building is diminishing in this area as settlements move less often and 'improved' housing becomes predominant. The vast majority of the houses in this area have high, thatched conical roofs and there are a number of men in the area who are hired to build these new style houses - or at least to put the roof on. That is not to say that the work load of these women is substantially reduced. The amount of time which is devoted to the care of young animals may be diminished but they must now spend time in their shambas or selling handicrafts in town, and so on, activities which are time consuming, yield small rewards and are not seen to contribute to a woman's status. In fact, even those households which have increased their numbers of shoats as their livestock numbers dwindled have not substantially increased the status of women. Although Rubel (1969) suggests that women in pastoral societies

will have a more prominent position in the social structure when there are large percentages of shoats in the total herd. Maasai women rarely milk sheep or goats. Thus, the control of milk for the family food supply is absent. Although shoats may be milked occasionally if the lamb/kid dies such milk is considered inferior to cow's milk and would only be drunk in tea or fed to twin offsprings. Furthermore, the larger the shoat flock the more work there is in caring for kids and lambs and the more herding input is required of young children and sometimes of women themselves. At Rotian, even elders were seen to take turns herding shoats because of the shortage of young children to perform this task.

Although a woman will have been given gifts of shoats at various times she will not have the same level of property rights in large numbers of shoats as she might hope to have in a cattle herd. The sale of small livestock as a form of quick change or petty cash (cf. Dahl and Hjort 1976, and others), is in the hands of men. Although men may sell a goat because of the subsistence requirements of his family, the decision to sell and the distribution of the income is in his hands. Similarly, the slaughter of shoats is a male prerogative and although men will often slaughter small stock for consumption, to satisfy a pregnant wife in her first months of pregnancy,⁷ etc., again the slaughter of small stock and the distribution of meat is largely in the hands of men. Llewlyn-Davies (1979) noted that Maasai women in Loita were particularly pleased to see their sons become adults (circumcised) and take over control of their herds because a son

⁷ In the latter months of pregnancy women watch their diets strictly to reduce weight gain for themselves and the fetus in order to ease birth.

would generally give his mother 'permission' to slaughter a sheep for visitors and friends, whereas a husband would not.

Certain researchers have suggested that the position and status of women in pastoral development programs might be strengthened if more attention were paid to promoting the development of small stock. Although women and children provide the major labour input in the care of small stock, this does not provide the status and position for women which the control of a subsistence herd does and the rights to all products associated with animals allotted to their herds. Unless such a project actually was designed so that women were placed in the position to market such stock and control the income from such sales, I would suggest that promoting small stock development may not increase the economic status of women, while it would surely increase their work load.

A great many of the women at Rotian fall into this category of impoverishment, still possessing a very small herd and unable to meet subsistence needs and becoming more dependent upon the cash contribution of their husbands to provide the family food supply. The future for these women depends on many things, not the least of which is the direction in which government steers development in Maasailand. A great number of these women were convinced that they would never be able to fully enter the pastoral economy again, so it is not surprising that several women told me that they would like to see subdivision so that they "could have their own shamba. This group ranch thing delays us from doing good work on that land".

Another woman at Rotian explained, "Most women would prefer individual land. In Mau, subdivision of the land started and we said, 'The Mau people

are doing something contrary to the Maasai culture.' When they started ploughing wheat, we all said, 'They have thrown their cattle aside,' but nowadays, even in this area they are starting to plough wheat and subdivision of the land is occurring just like in the Mau. Those people of the Mau are richer than any person in this area." A young man listening to this conversation said, "Then it is this land that you like and not cattle? You like it when a man is given a small piece of land." The woman replied, "Yes, because that is life."

Will subdivision of the entire lower Mau area occur? Officially, the government promotes group ranching and pastoral development, while unofficially, most local officials believe that in the next ten years subdivision is inevitable because of the agricultural potential of the land. The effect on women, should subdivision occur, will then relate to numerous other variables. The land will be 'owned' by her husband and although she may want to put in a large shamba to sell produce in town her husband may lease all the land for wheat development leaving her only a subsistence plot. Not only will this leave a woman with little autonomy it will also isolate her within the nuclear family away from the support mechanism of other women. It is conceivable that women's economic contribution and role could increase if agricultural development takes the form of garden produce. However, despite warnings from the Wheat Board that subdivision will fragment holdings, making contracting, ploughing, harvesting and yields much more difficult and more costly because of the reduced scale, subdivision seems inevitable and the promotion of agricultural development will most likely be in the form of wheat and barley growing. As I mentioned, this will continue to adversely affect

women's status and it will certainly have an effect on inheritance practices.

Although some men in Lower Mau are in the position to buy a piece of land, and others are powerful enough to expropriate a piece of group land, most impoverished men cannot afford to buy land. Their only hope for obtaining land is through the subdivision of group ranches. Some men, unable to obtain land having no livestock whatsoever, cannot 'wait' for subdivision to occur. They are the economically disenfranchised and our next category of women are females associated with such units.

The Destitute Woman

A great many of the men who are destitute have been forced to remain bachelors so there are actually many more destitute men than there are women. Nevertheless, a great number of families are slowly sinking into destitution and the number of wealthy families who might act as patrons to these families has declined. Patron/client relationships do still exist and a number of families loan out several of their children to 'help' out other families which reduces their subsistence responsibilities. For most of the destitute, the most viable way to survive nowadays is to enter the work force as labourers for an individual rancher or in the employment of an informal sector business for wage labour. Women married to such men, especially young women, may be taken into the home of a rancher as a houseservant though often such men are forced to leave their families behind, there being fewer employment opportunities for women. Such women depend on relatives and begging from other families in order to survive. Much of the husband's wages are sent home for subsistence but this is never

enough and certainly not enough to enable the worker to save and hope to eventually buy cattle.

Many of the wives of destitute herders must seek refuge with their own kin or with close family members of their husband's lineage and must eke out a living on the charity of others and the small amounts of money that are sent home each month. They must often manage for months on end without even seeing their husband and have little opportunity to earn money since they can hardly afford to buy beads for handicrafts. Some of these women have attempted to become more involved in charcoal burning so that other Maasai women will liken them to Kikuyu women who seem to have more stamina for the vigorous work involved.

As I mentioned in an early chapter, many impoverished men have been unable to find wives at all and have remained bachelors. The Iseuri elders at Rotian, who should have all been settled into married life, had an extraordinarily high rate of stocklessness and bachelorhood. Although women with one foot still in the pastoral camp and the other in the national sector view subdivision favourably, it is not unfair to predict that those women associated with destitute families will suffer a very adverse fate should subdivision occur. Women are not usually legitimate ranch members, except insofar as they are married to a ranch member.⁹ Thus, if the land is subdivided and their husband should sell the land, they would have few options open to them. Although this dependence is true

⁹ At Rotian OlMakongo one woman was made a member, the widow of a senior warrior killed in an accident and whose male children were too young to be registered. In fact, she was seen to be holding their membership in trust.

of all Maasai females it is especially a problem for the destitute wife since it is her husband that is most likely to want to or have to immediately sell his land.

Moreover, daughters of destitute families may find it increasingly difficult to find husbands. Wealthier families may not want to take a girl whose kin would be so in need of begging favours. Other destitute families may not be in the position to take wives at all. If unmarried Maasai girls find themselves in families that have been disenfranchised both economically and spacially from the pastoral economy, then it is quite conceivable that they could begin to drift into towns and urban centres attempting to make some money as prostitutes. Although this is not very common presently, I would suggest that the growing numbers of destitute may make this scenario much more likely.

For the destitute, men and women alike, entry into wage labour, especially working for wealthy Maasai individual ranchers, who may feel that they are doing their impoverished 'relatives' a favour by providing a job, establishes a very real organic link between the national market economy and the subsistence pastoral economy. Subsistence pastoralism does not simply disappear, nor is it subsumed by 'capitalism.' However, in order to continue functioning under new sets of economic conditions, conditions which are affected by national marketing and pricing structures it is necessary to channel the destitute out of the pastoral system. This enables the pastoral system to continue operation while being increasingly monetized since exchange is no longer an internal but an external investment which enables individuals to transform their capital savings into privatized and individualized investments. This tends more and more

to reproduce individual households in relation to the national sector, rather than the pastoral community. Increasingly, it is essential to recognize that subsistence pastoralism in Maasailand is dependent for its social reproduction, not on traditional constraints, but on decisions and structures in the national sector.

The Rich Woman

As far as the national sector is concerned, let us consider rich pastoral women as those women who are married to group ranch members who have been able to achieve olkitok status. For a number of younger married men who came from impoverished families, the ability to follow production strategies of olkitok was founded upon their success in cattle trekking. Although such men are building up traditional herds or using their earnings for "sociological investment" (cf. Balandier 1969), their very activities, viz-a-viz the national sector have contributed to the monetization and degeneration of the traditional economy so that when such men are 'ready' to engage in full-scale exchange relationships with stockfriends, they are often unable to do so. In other words, cattle trekkers accumulated their own surplus in cash which was not immediately channelled into the maintenance of other social institutions (such as the age grade). Traditionally, capital saving occurred in the internal livestock economy. However, the privatization and monetization of capital, along with other factors, restricted and reduced the relationships on which such investment was based, so that when cattle trekkers attempted to 'reinvest' in internal relationships which had functioned to stimulate capital accumulation, through exchange, these relationships were largely curtailed.

To a large extent, the wives of such men are in a respected position, having control of surplus milk supplies. Again, we must remember that large numbers of adult stock have been brought into the herds and this affects a woman's role in caring for offspring although this should only be temporary since we are not involved in a vicious cycle of diminished production. Nevertheless, among cattle trekkers one notes a good deal of manipulation in order to provide care for the sudden increases in adult stock, with herds sometimes increasing suddenly by fifteen or twenty adult animals. Relationships with brothers, paternal uncles and nephews play a very prominent role in the 'management' of these livestock if the husband leaves for another round of cattle trekking. Wives may not have any of these cattle put into their subsistence herds and although they will be given milking rights to animals it is also possible that a new wife will be sought who may be given more cattle as a new bride than the first wife because of her husband's thriving business.

A number of young herders who were attempting to follow olkitok strategies and were frustrated with the decreasing possibilities to realize stock growth through traditional exchange relationships, began to express very deep interests in investing in land and perhaps a business venture of some sort. The effect that this would have on their wives again would be influenced by whether or not the wife was sent to live on the individual plot of land and, if so, how the production and development of that land would proceed. Some herders are most interested in developing a wheat shamba, others in becoming an individual rancher and keeping upgraded cattle. Still, many herders would keep their wives on group ranches and develop their land interests elsewhere. The traditional opposition between

production for use in the female domestic unit and production for exchange which involved elders in their stockfriend community networks, would to a certain extent transform itself into the opposition between group land and individual land, subsistence sector and national sector, and so on.

However, just as I described how kinship relations can seem or appear to structure the relationships within the new mode of production or between the subsistence mode of production and the national (capitalistic) mode of production, in fact, the relationship between employers and employees, etc., is not a kinship or age set relationship although it appears much less exploitative when masked as such. Similarly, the use of individual land vs. the use of group land, the cash economy vs. the subsistence economy may conceivably evolve into a relationship which appears to be predicated upon the old opposition between the sexes, by making the ownership of land and investment a male prerogative and the maintenance of subsistence needs a female prerogative. When a woman is well off it appears that she is not eager to see cattle being converted into cash for individual land which her husband wishes to purchase and when women are associated with poor families they are often eager for subdivision in order to exploit their land more fully while their husbands may still cling to the hopes of increasing involvement in the pastoral economy.

That men's and women's interests evolve in different spheres of control and activity - men in the public and women in the domestic - may in fact lead in the future to those interests most aligned with subdivision (i.e. the poor women or the rich men) being regarded as progressive and those interests most aligned with pastoralism as being thought regressive. However, it is important to realize that the interests associated with

individual land or group land, with investment or with consumption, etc., is not in reality, the relationship between men and women, but is indeed the emergence of a contradictory organization of economic relations between a continuing though diminishing subsistence pastoralism, and a national, market (capitalistic) economy.

The Wealthy Woman

Although within the core of subsistence pastoralism as it is still practiced, there are still some wealthy individuals, olkarsis, we shall consider here the women who are married to individual ranchers as the wealthy. Some men who have developed individual shambas and several land holdings, many of whom are government-appointed chiefs, continue to raise their children and keep their wives in traditional settings. A great many of the individual ranchers do set their families up on an individual piece of land and in most cases the wife is not responsible for the management or the control of the ranching activities. Such men have hired ranch managers, herdboys, milkers and so on. Quite often the domestic activities of the woman are greatly reduced by the use of houseservants to look after children, prepare and serve food and so on.

To a large extent though, we are no longer talking about the pastoral Maasai woman. I indicated earlier that many of the educated Maasai politicians and entrepreneurs were unable to find a Maasai wife and quite often took a non-Maasai wife or someone of mixed ancestry. Thus, when we talk of the confinement of women in a domestic sphere which lacks any autonomy and control, we are not actually pointing to specific women whose households were transformed in this sense. Again we must realize that we

are talking about the transformation of cultural terms, as reflecting the process whereby women lose their autonomy and their control of the family food supply and this is not simply a direct transformation from one day being a domestic power broker in a Maasai enkang to the next day being a dependent on an individual ranch. However, I do hope that I have demonstrated that as production strategies strain in different directions, a number of variables combine to affect, not only relationships, statuses and power between men, but also between men and women.

In assessing the position of women in wealthy families associated with individual land holdings, some of which may pursue pastoral pursuits, we must recognize that although these women do not have a great deal of control over the family food supply in terms of production, since they are dependent upon their husband's income and they may not contribute much to the labour supply, which seems to devalue the position of women, there are other factors working to their advantage. Being free of the responsibility of domestic chores to a great degree, it is not uncommon to find that individual ranchers are sending not only their male children, but their female children to school as well. In other words, the opportunity for girls from wealthy Maasai families to get an education and perhaps even to go on to university or some other occupational training is increasing. This of course is true of the sons of such families but the paucity of Maasai girls in the educational system previously makes this growing trend much more remarkable.

On the other hand, we must recall that education is starting to become one of those traits which is associated with the entrenchment of the elite. As happens everywhere, the fathers of these children have the political and

financial power to make sure that their children find a place in secondary and post-secondary institutions, even when their grades have been too low to warrant promotion on merit. Often times, the children of the Maasai elite do not attend school in their home districts because the standard of education is considered lower than in a more prestigious Nairobi school and these students may benefit from the sophistication of urban schooling. Others will be put into private schools when they are unable to continue in the public system, and so on.⁹ Upon graduation these students also have an advantage in searching for employment because of their father's contacts or even the opportunity to become involved in the management of one of their father's business ventures or land (ranching) investments.

For the most part, Maasai women associated with the wealthy or elite enjoy a highly privileged position, quite different from most other Maasai women, although in relation to men who occupy the same strata we must realize that their position is nonetheless subordinate. Earlier I mentioned that the contacts of the present elite with the traditional society are often extensive, however, these contacts diminish for their children. Although many of these elite are ilNyangusi elders and relate to other Maasai in this capacity, almost without question, they have withdrawn their wives from the reciprocal obligations of domestic and sexual sharing which should characterize their interaction with age mates. Thus, in much the same way that their land and productive resources have been privatized

⁹ Ironically, the Narok elementary and secondary boarding schools are heavily populated by non-Maasai students, many of whom were sent because they could not find spots in schools with higher standards in their own areas or because it was believed that it would be easier for them to 'pass' in a rural school, etc. (cf. King 1976).

and individualized, their wives and daughters have essentially been privitized and isolated as well. The adoption of Christianity by many of the elite has also contributed to this situation.

Sexual asymmetry among this category of Maasai referred to as the elite, i.e. *olkarsis*, is no longer a reflection of the same sexual asymmetry which characterized the relations of production in the traditional economy. Traditionally, sexual asymmetry involved the opposition of elders in reciprocal relations of exchange of livestock and women (as well as warriors and children) in relations of production for consumption and internal circulation (inheritance). Elders' power rested in their control of labour and their accumulation of surplus cattle. Thus, the circulation of women and cattle played important mediating roles in maintaining the delicate balance between production and consumption units. The solidarity of clansmen in networks of exchange was reinforced by the association of all cattle 'of the same earmarkings' and the solidarity of age sets was reinforced by the association of all women married to age mates as 'wives of the age set.' Therefore, the conflicts in the age grade over women represent, metaphorically, in their sexual expression, the conflict between those confined to the domestic unit of production for consumption (i.e. women, children and age mates, in particular warriors), and those eligible to participate in exchange of livestock for accumulation (i.e. elders). Similarly, the conflicts within a clan, subclan, lineage or family, over livestock, that is, between men who can exchange cattle and their wives and warrior sons, represents, metaphorically, in the circulation of livestock, those who control bridewealth and those who do

not. Here then women provide both solidarity and opposition within age sets and cattle provide both solidarity and opposition within families.

The relations of production which characterize the elite generally do not conform to the traditional form. No longer is control of the producers, that is, of women and adult sons, of prime importance because the domestic unit is no longer a production unit. No longer is control of bridewealth an essential aspect of the reproduction of the mode of production because the labour force is no longer a concomitant of social relationships. Individual ranchers and entrepreneurs are able to hire their labourers. In most of these families there is almost complete separation of the consumption unit from any involvement in, or relationship to, production units or to the reproduction of the mode of production, except in so far as biological reproduction replaces each individual unit and the domestic services of a wife support an individual rancher who could afford to buy such services if he was unmarried. Thus, the strategic control has shifted away from control of the producers to control of the means of production themselves.

Furthermore, wealthy Maasai women are not landowners, and the pattern of inheritance, which is yet to be played out in the second generation, seems to suggest that only males will inherit land. Women will be associated with land and productive resources only through fathers or husbands. It is possible, because many of these women are being educated, that some will enter the labour force in urban centres most likely in traditional occupations such as secretary, clerk, etc. For the most part, these women function as a consumption unit only after the conversion of production output from their husband's ranch, business, etc., through the

market. Thus, their position is similar to a Western housewife who is given an allowance to run the household and is dependent on that money. Such a wealthy woman differs from the destitute women largely in her very privileged position as a member of the elite.

Not only has the intersexual relationships between elite changed, but the relationship between these elite and other Maasai, despite the appearance of relationships couched in the idioms of kinship or age set, has also changed. Livestock belonging to an individual rancher is not considered the livestock of his clan and the wife of an individual rancher is not considered the wife of his age set. Nevertheless, for much of Maasai society the relationship between individual and group ranchers is often thought of, in a metaphorical sense, as articulating oppositions which previously were seen to lie in sex or age differentiations. The individual rancher is likened to an elder accumulating a surplus in the domestic or horizontal exchange sphere. Indeed, many group ranchers feel that if they are lucky, have God on their side, and are only able to accumulate enough surplus, they too could easily transform their production unit into an individual ranch.

Few such men realize that production of surplus for investment in land, businesses, conspicuous consumption, etc., does not leave much surplus for investment in stock networks, age set institutions, and so on. Since these social forms were integral parts of the very process of accumulation, alternative investment opportunities which do not promote these relationships must have been found. Traditionally, all men had the opportunity to accumulate through exchange and all men had the opportunity to invest surplus in additional marriages, in sending sons to manyatta and

so on. Not that all men were able to participate fully, but access to the structures of livestock accumulation and social investment were available for all men. Nowadays, access to the structures of accumulation (loans, advice, title deeds, etc.) and also to structure of investment (land, business, infrastructure, etc.) is not open to all and is often directly related to fostering specific political relations. Thus, it is quite ironic that age, sex or kinship relations are employed to express relationships of emerging socio-economic hierarchy and in doing so, they make this hierarchy appear much more egalitarian and much less harmful than it actually is.

It is quite possible that in the future, as I have suggested, the sexual opposition which traditionally articulated certain strains in the relations of production, will emerge as metaphor for group versus individual land interests. This might take the form of the impoverished Maasai woman attempting to raise her subsistence level by turning to increased subsistence/cash agriculture and pushing for individual land in contrast to her husband who will be unable to pursue pastoral interests on a small piece of land and still hopes to turn in this direction. Or, it may take the form of rich pastoralists being unable to find investment opportunities in the traditional economy and attempting instead to invest in land while their wives, who enjoy considerable prestige and status in the pastoral economy may not wish to be isolated from the traditional setting where her very acts of sharing are the basis of her status. If the push for subdivision and individualization of land is ever seen to take on this theme of intersexual opposition, it too will merely serve as another means of emphasizing a metaphor which does not express the real basis of

socio-economic inequality but which will diffuse the growing issue of opposition between the politically and economically advantaged elite and the disadvantaged Maasai group rancher, worker or herder.

DEVELOPMENT: PROMOTING PUBLIC OR DOMESTIC SPHERES

In understanding the impact of development programs and planned interventions such as group ranching, we must analyse the effect that such programs will have on numerous relationships and furthermore, given the various disruptions which have already affected different households, we must be able to discuss the differential impact of such interventions across households and even between different household members. I have attempted to demonstrate that traditional relations are disturbed through the separation of household production (consumption) units from their former dialectical relationship to the elders' exchange community. In some cases, this separation is nearly complete, such as for olaiterani households and olkarsis households where women do not contribute to production, on the one hand because their husbands have nothing, and on the other hand because their husbands have everything including hired labour who have taken on all the tasks once associated with the domestic domain.

Let us consider, for example, the differential impact of some development objectives as they might affect men and women who are largely associated with olkitok or a-paik households on a group ranch. For the most part, development initiatives have been directed solely at elders. Since most development interventions concerned interests associated with the public domain, though not always consistent with the level of control invested in elders, it is not entirely surprising that the government

planners turned to those elders who dominate the public domain.

Nevertheless, there has been no advancement of development initiatives associated with the domestic production and consumption of household units, especially in relation to the level of control invested in women in terms of livestock product.

To cite just one example, the Rotian area is fairly well watered in comparison with the semi-arid lowlands to the south so that there has been little need for the people living there to dig wells or pay particular attention to the watering needs of livestock since these are quite easily met. Thus, very early on when Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch was first incorporated, it was suggested by the Ranch Planning Office, after completing a development plan for the ranch, that they take out a loan for water development in the vicinity of the inkangitie. The elders voted against water development and this is understandable, since in the public domain, which was associated with the management and decision-making aspect of herding, grazing, watering and health care of livestock, the watering of livestock was accomplished at the Seyabei River (one of the ranch boundaries) during the course of herding activities while the cattle were out with the herdboy.

For the most part, it was difficult to get women to discuss development because they often felt that they did not know anything about the development of the ranch since it was discussed with government officials at a distant baraza location where women were excluded. However, some of the women at Rotian did admit that they felt it was unfair that their husbands had not taken out a loan for water development. As one woman explained, "We women suffer by carrying water from a far place like the

Seyabei River". In other words, we must recognize that water development on the Rotian OlMakongo Group Ranch would have benefited women in the domestic sphere by reducing the amount of time and effort involved in collecting water for human consumption and use. However, it was men who were in the position to make the decision concerning water development and they chose not to take out a loan which would have benefited the domestic household unit. Perhaps, had water development been connected to the public domain in relationship to the watering needs of livestock, the elders would have voted differently. Indeed, water development is often a first priority of the group ranches from arid and semi-arid areas which take out loans. At Rotian, water development for pastoral production in the public sphere would have entered the debate over what direction public production should take - pastoral vs. agricultural, group vs. individual land, and so on. One wonders if women were the ones voting for a loan whether they would be interested in promoting domestic development and would have perhaps rejected a water development loan associated with stock development in the public domain.

The development of a dip has created much debate among the elders at Rotian and I have related this to different levels of participation in the pastoral economy and commitment to a future of pastoralism. Although livestock health, especially adult stock, is the concern of men, the increased use of dipping and other innoculatory procedures also affects women and the domestic sphere. In other words, elders do not want to see their livestock die during epidemics and are particularly receptive to certain dawa (trans. medicine) which have reduced livestock deaths. Dipping and inoculations such as against hoof and mouth are often

perceived, not to keep cattle alive but to make them healthier and more productive. To a certain extent, the accumulation of herd capital for the creation of exchange value is related to the volume of exchange and not the quality of the livestock exchanged. Quality and productive output are aspects of concern for the domestic unit and therefore have a greater impact on women's household concerns.

Thus, the elders at Rotian had to weigh the advantages of dipping livestock to their own production strategies to determine whether the increased health and productivity of the animals outweighed the benefits that might accrue by channelling money into other purposes or by pursuing other options rather than animal health. Most of the elders at Rotian do try to have their cattle taken to the Narok dip every two weeks, but if adult herders did not make themselves available to do so then it was put aside. On the other hand, women maintained that the ranch should have a dip and when questioned most women seemed to suggest that they would have favoured a loan for dip development. This is not to say that elders do not want to see healthy, productive animals. However, if the maintenance of healthy, productive animals is linked primarily to the domestic domain, it is often difficult for an elder to justify an expenditure which would promote the interests of his wife rather than the interests of exchange which he might be trying to establish. When these interests can be balanced, or when health is linked to livestock numbers in the public domain, then dip construction is often sought after.

Here then, we must remember that it is quite difficult to categorically state that the Maasai reject or favour certain development initiatives. Water development may be rejected in some areas and accepted in others,

while a dip may be built in some locations but not in others. Often this relates to whether the development of the water or the dip is related to development of forces associated with production or consumption, or with stock networks, household units, and so on. In every case, it is men making the decisions and a number of variables impact on their decisions which relate to wealth, unity or separation of production/consumption units, and many others.

We have noted that men are often able to usurp control over production for use which had been associated with women when conditions are such that products which mainly had use value in the domestic realm, take on a commodity and exchange value which exceeds the consumption or productive output in the household. Traditionally, women controlled the dairy product: skins, hides, surplus milk, ghee, etc., of the animals designated for their herds and some of this could be sold and the money obtained kept by women. However, most of this money was destined solely for the domestic domain for subsistence goods. We have seen that when the opportunity arises for these activities to generate considerable income and to become the basis for widespread investment alternatives, then it often happens men transfer the control over product from the domestic to public domain and are aided in this by development forces which enable them to dominate and exploit intersexual relations.

Since women's status was traditionally connected to their control of surplus product and since the exchange activities among elders did not actually remove surplus product from the overall production system, it can be seen that despite the structural contradictions between household unit and stock exchange networks, the activities of both men and women and their

related status implications were essentially complementary. However, the ability of men to market animals and to invest outside of the Maasai economy severs the complementary relationship between household and production since the overall production system is not fostered by the external investment and thus the production sphere of the elder becomes overdeveloped or dominant. Production for exchange among elders had been redistributive in nature, while production for exchange outside of the pastoral economy isolates the production unit, not only from the household unit, but from the other production units which had been reciprocally connected.

One must recognize that the loss of status among women who have lost control of the family food supply is not simply correlated with poverty and the attendant lack of adequate subsistence. Poverty correlates with the loss of status for women (and men for that matter) because it acts as a catalyst which forces pastoralists to enter into new production strategies, and sometimes into entirely new economic relations. In following these new strategies, a poor man who is trying to minimize his exchange relationships for example, may enter into a marriage based on sister exchange and such marriages reduce a woman's status and role since she enters into marriage without the ability to establish control in the domestic domain. However, there is no mechanical relationship between social forms and production strategies. Thus, while poverty is certainly one of the variables which induces men to exchange sisters, the reduced status of women in these circumstances is not simply 'caused' because of the sister exchange but in this particular case must be related to the separation of consumption and

production units and thus the isolation of women in non-producing units which are provided with, but do not control consumption.

On the other hand, women married to wealthy pastoralists (i.e. individual ranchers) are similarly isolated in units of domestic service with little relationship to the productive activities of their husbands. However, these women enjoy considerable prestige and this superior status is implicitly recognized in prestigious marriages. In other words, the isolation of women in the domestic domain has different ramifications for the poor than for the rich. Here then, explanation need not be only on the basis of correlations, but as Goody (1976:26) suggests, it must take into account "the relative influence of a variety of factors on a particular situation; or, alternatively, we need to examine a variety of consequences of a particular factor."

In the traditional mode of production, intersexual opposition was made manifest in division of labour, interests in livestock, levels of control, property and inheritance rules, and so on. Despite the empirical manifestations of male dominance, productive activities of women played an equally vital role in constituting the relations of production and finally for reproducing the social and material conditions of production itself. Therefore, as I have tried to demonstrate, the authority of elders over the producers, i.e. wives and children, was not essentially exploitative, but rather reflected a complementary relationship which I have detailed extensively. With the growing separation of production and consumption units, whereby the consumption units are no longer part of the relations of production and kinship and age set relations are losing their common area of realization in the productive processes, it is possible for the

relations of production to become based on relations of exploitation. This exploitation, to a certain extent, takes the form of exploitation of men, who have expropriated the factors of production and turned product into a commodity, over women who have lost control of product which must be converted through the market before consumption. However, it also takes the form of Maasai, some Maasai come to control factors of production which increasingly enables them to exert hierarchical control over those who do not. Thus, as the national capitalist system impacts more and more on Maasailand, there are contradictory pulls which both preserve and destroy the traditional pastoralism. Response to group ranching and development initiatives must be understood in relation to the active and the inactive, the advantaged and the disaffiliated, and so on.

It is only in relation to this wider framework of social upheaval that we can begin to understand the meaning of inter-societal difference in responding to development. It is in relation to this wider framework that we can understand the basis of increased inter-generational and age set conflicts. It is in relation to this wider framework that we can interpret the shift in intersexual relationships. It is in relation to this wider framework that we can observe how shifting alternatives for some herders in turn affect the choices of all other herders and so on. Indeed, by understanding the wider framework (the interaction of a subsistence mode of production as it is affected by, and in turn affects the imposition of a capitalist mode of production), we are able to shed some light on the emergence of different social forms in Maasailand, despite the existence of a broadly similar social structure.

Advantaged and disadvantaged are both members of the Maasai community and kinship relations do not disappear. However, for those Maasai who I have characterized as disadvantaged, there is still an element of the traditional relations of production operating and to a certain extent these Maasai attempt to follow strategies which enable kinship relations to have a common area of realization with economic relations. On the other hand, despite the appearance of economic relationships based on kinship and age set relations, the relationship between those who might be called the advantaged elite and other Maasai is no longer one of kinship, and relationships of exploitation and stratification are emerging. This is an extremely complex process since the subsistence economy does not simply disappear or suddenly transform itself with the onset of exploitation.

CHAPTER TEN

A RETROSPECTIVE: SOME CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The intent of this thesis has been to present data collected in Narok District of Maasailand in order to demonstrate Maasai reaction to group and individual ranching schemes, wheat growing and agricultural encroachment, financial assistance programs, and so on. In order to focus this analysis, Rotian Ol Makongo Group Ranch was investigated as an in-depth case study, presenting a ranch which had been incorporated for several years, showed little sign of development and, being located in the semi-high potential area of Lower Mau, was involved in wheat and barley cropping. Such a group ranch, with its lack of unity, with its growing poverty, with its diverse interest groups including a number of Kikuyu and Kipsigis acceptees, etc., was the opportune locale to study the differential impact of ranching programs. Here then, I was able to observe the decision-making arena at Rotian as various Maasai and non-Maasai made their positions known on such issues as loan taking, pastoral versus agricultural development, movement of livestock between ranches, stockfriendship, etc.

Despite the association of certain lineages with different localities in this area and the overwhelming majority of clansmen who theoretically dominate the membership of these group ranches, I was able to demonstrate that poverty often aligned men of different clans in terms of other interests and that age set affiliation also crosscut economic status and clan identity. In the face of impersonal constraint on the economic system, it became extraordinarily difficult to muster a common and

acceptable organizational framework to deal with a changed set of economic and political conditions. The framework established by the group ranch program, itself based on a group ranch committee and a slate of group representatives, did not and could not become the basis for a decision-making forum which promoted beef ranching interests, telling ranchers when to sell or buy, where to herd, etc. Instead, the group ranch committee was simply a rubber stamp for the decision-making process of local councils of elders who, more often than not, especially when the ranch was large and factionalism was evident, arrived at a consensus opinion which essentially amounted to doing nothing.

Ranches such as Rotian OlMakongo which did very little to promote ranch development, refused to take out a loan and did not wish to invest in a dip, water development, etc., were considered by the government (Ranch Planning Office, etc.) to be anti-development, lazy, conservative, and so on. I attempted to show that the Maasai were not anti-development per se, but were attempting to maintain a very precarious status quo. A loan, a dip, upgraded stock, and so on, were capital expenditures which were seen to be for the benefit of some at the expense of others, or at the expense of some for those who did not contribute, and so on. A loan for a dip or graded stock was thought to benefit the wealthy, while subdivision or increased agricultural activity was thought to benefit the non-Maasai and the destitute. The compromise solution which was acceptable to the majority of the resident membership was not to act at all.

In order to investigate the impact of group ranching a number of studies were undertaken to gather statistical data to determine the make-up of the ranch population, herd sizes (and where possible structures), land

interests elsewhere, employment, nutritional output of herds and caloric needs of people, household budgets (incomes and expenditures), and so on. In this way, I was able to determine that, just as the Maasai suggested in interviews, the area was plagued by growing poverty and that more and more families were unable to subsist on their herds and were forced to supplement their diets with purchased grains. These were obtained by selling off what cattle were available, by participating in informal sector activities, by planting small shambas of maize, beans, potatoes, etc., and by seeking employment.

In light of the desperate need for many Maasai to participate in the informal sector, burning charcoal, trekking cattle, selling milk and crafts, etc., a detailed description of these activities was provided as well as the prediction readily foreseen by many Maasai that many of these activities, especially charcoal burning, were short-term, stop-gap measures and that indeed, the forest resource would be dissipated within ten years. Unless pastoral development or even agro-pastoralism were promoted, then those impoverished herders who so desperately relied on supplementary economic activities would be doomed for destitution and probably disenfranchisement.

Having established the basis of Maasai reaction to the group ranching program in terms of empirical evidence which indicated growing poverty, increased reliance on a grain diet, growing factionalism, decreasing stockfriend networks, etc., the stage was set to proceed to the next level of analysis. Although many development planners analyse data which come from this empirical level and so are aware of or 'understand' that there are problems emerging, such as factionalism or poverty, it is my contention

that they do not fully understand the impact of these schemes on the Maasai social system. In other words, it is essential to realize that change is not an integral process. Extensive disruptions of subsystems or even the processes by which these disruptions occur may initially entail mere changes in content. When such changes do take place in one part of a social system they create opportunities and constraints which impact on particular Maasai and their decision-making options in other directions and on other subsystems. At times, such changes in content may lead to modification or transformation of the social structure. Although many development planners are most interested in the apparent changes in content, it is my contention that whatever changes do occur, it is the Maasai social structure which will determine the structure of elements which are offered or abandoned. In light of this, the next stage of my analysis was concerned with determining the nature of Maasai social structure in relation to the particular mode of production in Maasai society. In this way, it was hoped to shed more light on the impact of ranching schemes on the Maasai social structure and to avoid some of the errors of cause and effect which plague so many development programs.


Since I have taken many opportunities throughout this dissertation to reiterate the analysis of the traditional Maasai social structure, it should be adequate at this point to briefly present the scope of that analysis. I attempted to construct a number of models of particular traditional Maasai social structures with the theoretical stance that while relations of production in Maasai society appeared to be realized through kinship and age grade relations, nonetheless, each system was autonomous in terms of its own internal properties and it was possible to recognize the

unity of function without confusing economic relations with kinship relations, and so on. In light of this, I examined various subsystems on the basis of either social, political or economic variables and at times attempted to shed some light on the ideological system.

I have speculated that within the traditional Maasai socio-economic formation, economic relations were highly integrated with kinship, clanship, family, age set and marriage relations because all of these various subsystems have a common area of realization in the production process and in reproducing the material and social conditions of reproduction of the mode of production. Thus, despite the notion of contradiction, all of the various subsystems are interconnected in a reciprocally dialectical system which defines the limits of structural and functional compatibility both between and within systems. Without elaborating again, I have suggested that such a system, despite great disparities in individual stock wealth, operated within an essentially egalitarian framework. Furthermore, despite the fact that authority and power relations appear at a number of different levels, they are made manifest through the various dialectical relations of various subsystems which serve to integrate the whole system.

The age grade system, though not directly involved in the production process nevertheless, in its dialectical relationship to other systems of relations, sets limits on these relationships and these in turn set limits on the age set system.

Figure 29 Integration Of Production Processes and Social Relations.*



* I have not included the ideological system which could be represented as spacial and symbolic categorizations which present an analogous system of dialectical interrelationships and which serve to justify the dominance of certain subsystems over other subsystems, and so on.

Given this understanding of the operation of the traditional Maasai socio-economic system, which was bestowed with a dynamic element with the inclusion of a fluid system of production strategies, which accounted for different career outcomes, statuses, etc., I next attempted to show how demarcation, agricultural encroachment, group and individual ranching, and so on, impacted on this traditional Maasai social system, both in terms of processes which merely changed content and also on the basis of emerging transformations of the social structures themselves. Focusing on the medium-high potential area of Rotian, I have incorporated the empirical evidence of various immanent social crisis and data into the models in order to analyse them for confirmation of the modalities of any changes consistent with the models.

The loss of important dry season grazing pastures through colonial treaties, agricultural encroachment, gazetting of forests, establishment of wildlife parks, international borders and finally the rise of individual ranches, along with demarcation of Maasailand into group ranches with restrictions on livestock movement and so on, have all contributed to diminishing pastoral potential, reducing the quality of grazelands and livestock (and possibly human) health. In the face of declining herd productivity, I suggested that a greater number of herders were forced into following production strategies which de-emphasized the exchange value of livestock and concentrated on promoting use value strategies. The vast number of such pastoralists, characterized as a-paik, begin to extricate themselves from the reciprocal exchange of cattle among stockfriends. This process of declining stockfriend networks was quite evident in the Rotian area.

Since the accumulation of surplus for exchange was the basis of control of bridewealth and, thus, eventually became the basis of interclan relationships which encouraged men to speculate in multiple marriages, the reduction of this surplus for exchange was related to a decrease in polygamy and to the manipulation of the marriage system to contract alliances which were not as speculative, such as sister exchange, and which were reflective of the poverty which inhibited participation in the public exchange of cattle. Introduced into the production system of such herders were opportunities to participate in informal sector activities such as charcoal burning, cattle trekking, employment and to earn income by turning over pasture for wheat growing. Although it is possible to point to the entrepreneurial aspect of Maasai participation in such pursuits, it is also obvious that many pastoralists were left little choice as they became involved in a vicious circle of production to supplement their inadequate pastoral production.

On-ranch data indicated that most households, on average for wet and dry season, could only produce 50% of their caloric needs from milk consumption. The sale of cattle and shoats augmented subsistence and participation in other economic activities was a means to earn cash to replace the animals removed from the pastoral system. The opportunity to become involved in non-pastoral pursuits was open mainly to males and the decreasing herd sizes affected the status and position of women who no longer occupied the role of controller of the family food supply. The separation of production and consumption units, though not always absolute, was growing and many such households could only consume after conversion

through the market, which made women dependent on cash contributions from their husbands and resulted in considerable loss of autonomy.

The future for many of these marginal pastoralists seems to be destitution which forces those without stock presently to seek outside employment on individual ranches or in the informal sector. This places an increased burden on the pastoral economy which attempts to support the families which are left behind. The growth of this category of destitute Maasai will certainly lead to massive under- and unemployment since the job market is already inundated. Wealthy pastoral families which once provided patronage for the impoverished are not as numerous and since production strategies of accumulation through exchange are diminishing many of these families are attempting to transform their production strategies through investment in alternative outlets such as land, businesses, etc. In this way, they attempt to establish new relations of production on the basis of disruptions (e.g. land adjudication) which have freed various factors of production from their former positioning in the social structure.

The rich, individual rancher who has already accomplished this has been able to transform land, labour and cattle into commodities and in so doing, the government underwrites his essential capital and organizational needs. The relationship of these individual ranchers to other Maasai living on group ranches, despite the appearance of kinship and age set relations which tend to cloak the economic relationship, is actually based on a new organization of relations of production based on exploitation of workers which was seen to have been present, though underdeveloped or latent within the traditional social structure.

For the most part, these rich individual ranchers were also part of the new political leadership in Maasailand and were indeed characterized as being part of the problem and part of the solution. The alienation of land for individual use contributed to the diminishing pastoral potential for other Maasai, while the increased conflict over land use bolstered the role of these very men as mediators and arbitrators, as access to land and external resources became linked to increased economic and political differentiation. The activities of these elite then, was linked to both the destruction of the traditional social system and to the maintenance of traditional pastoralism or group ranching since accumulation was heightened for the individual rancher by the use of cheap labour in the form of disenfranchised workers.

For many group ranch members in the Rotian area I discovered a process of production which undermined self-subsistence and which involved the Maasai increasingly in market relations. However, rather than increase the standard of living of pastoralists as they entered the national economy and raised their livestock offtake rates, for the majority it appeared to lower the standard of living, replace a high protein diet with a less nutritious grain diet, diminish relations of reciprocal aid and undermine clan solidarity which had been predicated upon, in part, shared property rights in cattle. Thus, clan solidarity was ultimately a public expression of an economy capable of producing a surplus and the relationship between men who controlled that surplus. The inability of large numbers of Maasai to produce and exchange a surplus of livestock leads to competitive relations among clans as domestic households attempt to gain access to increasingly scarce resources.

Despite disintegrating relations of solidarity among clansmen, clanship has not completely ceased to be an important institution among the Maasai. In many areas where land use and subdivision are concerns, we find that in order to consolidate rights to land some group ranch members will tend to practice clan endogamy and/or intensify marriage relations by marrying an affine and attempting to strengthen lineage as a corporate group with vested land rights. Although these manipulations and the resultant deviations they represent are apparent for the individuals involved they do not initially represent a society wide transformation of the marriage and kinship system. Nevertheless, they do result in constraints for other individuals in other directions. Depending on how pervasive, how enduring and how embedded they become, they could eventually strain the entire system to the point that relationships which had maintained it are destroyed and modifications or transformations of the social structure occur.

Although one chapter was devoted specifically to the impact of group ranching programs on women, the analytical framework for understanding how development schemes will affect the status, role and position of women has ramifications for the understanding of the entire development process. Here then, most researchers on women's studies have generally linked the historical exploitation of women, which is seen to increase in complex societies, to the undervaluation of women's contribution to production and "this aggravates the unevenness of capital investment in development" (D'onofrio-Flores 1982:24). I felt that it was necessary to devote a chapter to women precisely because in the past many researchers almost totally ignored the impact of development on women since most programs were

designed primarily to promote, alter or introduce interests which were controlled by men. However, in reality, one cannot understand the nature of development unless one understands, not just the rationality of one element (i.e. women) but the rationality of the entire social system as it responds to both endogenous and exogenous disruptions. We have noted that with demarcation emerged a process which shifted the strategic centre of competition over cattle to competition over the factors of production themselves. This process affects different categories of Maasai in different ways so that the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated, the man and the woman, the elder and the warrior, all act and react as advantaged or disadvantaged, active or passive, accomplice or victim, etc. This dissertation has attempted to show the impact of development on many of these various groups and how the interrelationships between them will affect the options which are available to certain individuals when constraints are imposed by the very choices made by other individuals in other areas.

Having investigated the impact of group ranching and other disruptions on the Maasai social structure, particularly in the highland areas, where agricultural encroachment is greatest and alternative economic pursuits are possible, a number of conclusions have been made. Demarcation of land, restrictions on movement, loss of pasture land to wheat and barley cropping and so on, have resulted in a decline in stock exchange and the inability of elders here to accumulate surplus stock through these traditional networks of capital accumulation. A large number of herders are following strategies which were characterized as a-paik, selfish, and it is difficult to determine precisely whether these strategies themselves have led to the

marked poverty of the area, or whether loss of herd quality and quantity because of degenerated pastures lead to the pursuit to the so-called strategies of the selfish man.

Despite this chicken-or-egg question, the fact that so many herders have opted or been forced into strategies which lead to an underdeveloped exchange system, has affected the choices and constraints for those pastoralists who do possess considerable livestock. Demarcation has made it physically more difficult to exchange livestock across ranch boundaries, while proliferation of impoverished herders have made it culturally more difficult to find stockpartners. The decline in stockfriend networks is also followed by a decline in the reciprocal obligations which had attached to these partnerships. Thus, the impoverished herder unable to provide his own subsistence must sell livestock in order to supplement an inadequate diet and such men often become involved in numerous alternative economic endeavours in order to earn cash with which to replace the livestock that have been sold. For the most part, these impoverished herders appear destined to become trapped in a downward spiral until finally they become stockless and destitute. Such destitute Maasai have been characterized as a burgeoning proletariat, a new category of Maasai who are, in effect, free labourers. This trend is particularly strong since those families which traditionally acted as patrons who integrated the disaffiliated back into the pastoral economy as client herdsmen with the chance (albeit often a slim chance) of building up another herd, have also been forced or have chosen to make choices which extricate themselves from the more reciprocal economic relationships of a patron.

Here then, many of the wealthy pastoralists increasingly opt to take advantage of new investment alternatives and new production strategies which are becoming possible as various development programs and government actions begin to dislocate the traditional factors of pastoral production from their former positioning in the social structure. These new conditions have made it possible to transform land, labour and cattle into commodities and the rearrangement of these elements into new combinations has been described as the emergence of a new mode of production. The traditional pastoral mode of production still continues to operate, though often in a modified form so that while kinship, clanship and age set relations still continue to exist, rather than playing the dominant role in organizing the relations of production, they assume a secondary role, organizing subsistence and production relations for small-scale neighbourhoods. The relationship between these modes of production was analysed, not simply as a dominant capitalist mode of production subsuming a subsistence mode of production, but as an interaction whereby the structuring of various elements by the Maasai social structure indeed, set limits and constraints on the development of the capitalist mode of production itself. This interrelationship was defined as the new social organization and was closely connected to the enlargement of leadership and the alienation of individual land holdings by a new social stratum.

I have attempted to highlight some of the major analytical findings which were elaborated throughout this thesis. I shall not at this stage reiterate all of the empirical data, however, one should always keep in mind that this theoretical level translates itself into the individual hardships associated with declining stock numbers and inadequate diets; the

suffering and insecurity associated with decreasing reciprocal obligations and pastoral support mechanisms; in sum, with all the human action and interaction which can be observed throughout Narok District. In fact, it has been my intent, through the methodological approach employed, to elaborate a framework which would make this vast array of empirical evidence understandable and explainable. In doing so, I have shed light on the differential impact of development programs, explained a wide range of conflictual responses, and demonstrated that it is quite possible for an intervention to have greatly different ramifications for the individual than for the group. Having said this, I shall now turn briefly to discuss the applicability of these analytical frameworks and models for the arid areas of Maasailand.

THE IMPACT OF GROUP RANCHING ON THE ARID AREAS

It is the firm belief of this researcher that the models and analytical frameworks which were developed to interpret the responses and explain the impact of group ranching in the highland areas of Lower Mau, are equally suitable for understanding the impact of group ranch development in the arid areas of the district as well. Presently, the arid areas, which have not yet been entirely demarcated, tend to appear closer to the traditional pastoral mode of production. However, it has been demonstrated (Jacobs 1975) that many pastoralists occupying arid areas must pursue their production strategies in vitiated environments which were formerly wet season grazing reserves. The drastic effect that this has on herd quality and degeneration of the range is no doubt leading to a process of impoverishment, not unlike that at Rotian, where herders opt for a-paik

strategies and stock exchange networks begin to decline along with the networks of mutual aid. This process may not be as advanced, nor occurring as rapidly as in the highlands, however, based on interviews with arid area ranchers rather than an in-depth study of one particular arid area ranch, it certainly appears to be entrenching itself here as well. As we have seen, the choices of such individuals affect other individuals, such as the wealthy, and in other directions such as age set conflicts.

In much of the arid area of Narok, agricultural encroachment has been minimal and wheat and barley cropping are often not possible. Without forest area resources, charcoal burning and timber cutting are non-existent economic options and in the more remote areas there are fewer opportunities to market surplus milk, etc., or to sell livestock when the time is most appropriate for the herdsman. Employment, education and health opportunities also decline in the arid areas. Therefore, as pastoral potential declines in the arid areas we should find strategies emerging which are similar to those which characterized the reaction to contracted pastoral potential in the highland areas, although the conditions in the arid areas, with the lack of investment alternatives and supplementary economic pursuits, may be reflected in different outcomes. For example, since there will be less opportunity for poor herders to supplement their families' diets through cash contributions gained from informal sector activities, there may be an even greater need to manipulate certain aspects of the social structure, such as marriage alliances, age set relations, etc. When impoverished herders are unable to establish relations through which to accumulate capital, their slide into the ranks of the destitute

and unemployed labourer may occur even more rapidly than has been the case in the north.

It is quite evident that all those decisions concerning land use which are taken in the highland areas will affect the pastoral potential and the choices to be made by pastoralists living in the lowland, arid areas. Subdivision and intensified agricultural use of all that land above the Narok-Nairobi road would most certainly lead to a decline in pastoral productivity given the level of technology currently in place. This decline would be exacerbated no doubt by an influx of Maasai from the highland areas, who either sell or lease their land in order to carry on with so-called traditional pastoral pursuits.

It is not unreasonable to suggest that the wealthiest herders from the arid areas may in the future look to investment opportunities outside the pastoral economy, perhaps in land in the highland areas or individual ranches for tented camps or in retail businesses, etc. Therefore, while the poorer herders attempt to move into the arid area production system, the wealthier herders already there will be attempting to move out, if not in the physical sense, then in the economic sense. Despite a core of Maasai pastoralists or group ranchers in both the arid and highland areas who attempt to follow strategies conducive to some form of subsistence herding, in the future one might speculate that the relationship of the highlands to the lowlands could very easily approach a relation analogous to the olkarsis-olaiterani relationship in the modern sector. That is, those individuals in the highlands where the majority of high potential individual ranches are located may come to control and monopolize the

factors of production and the lowlands will provide a continuing source of labourers to work on these ranches and farms.

Data for the Rotian area indicated that approximately 30% of the ranch membership was non-resident and that the majority of these Maasai were destitute and not simply herding livestock elsewhere. After examining census data for arid area ranches it appears that there is a high level of absenteeism there also, however, I did not carry out my own detailed census in order to determine whether the majority of these non-resident herders were destitute or living on other group ranches. It is likely that there is more mobility and movement across ranch boundaries in the arid areas. It is also likely that the number of non-resident members who are destitute and leaving the ranch for employment is increasing in the arid areas.

The great differentials in herd wealth that were found at Rotian seem to be a general trend throughout Narok District since Campbell (1979a:59) revealed that survey data for Narok showed that 20% of the largest herds accounted for over 50% of the animals and 60% of the herds accounted for less than 25% of the animals. This finding is quite different from herd distribution among the Maasai of Loitokitok Division in Kajiado District where Campbell (1979b) found a more egalitarian distribution and was able to state that herd wealth was distributed much more equally among these pastoralists than was the distribution of income in Kenya generally. Certainly, this disparity between Kajiado and Narok cannot be attributed solely to the fact that the survey was conducted during a drought year since pre and post drought data indicated little change in this distribution in Loitokitok. Without carrying on more detailed analysis of the Kajiado data to account for this difference, it might be said that the

disruptions to the pastoral production system in the past few decades, despite the fact that Narok is better watered and suffers less from drought conditions, have led in Narok to a greater detachment of cattle, labour and land from their former interrelationships within the various social and economic systems which had generated the particular mode of production in Maasai society. In other words, if the relatively egalitarian redistribution of livestock among production units characterized the traditional subsistence economy, then perhaps the Maasai of Narok have moved further away from the traditional economic strategies of production than have the Kajiado Maasai.

This is not to say that the same models which have been developed in this analysis cannot be used to explain the impact of group ranching in Kajiado District, but simply, that without knowing the social, economic and political variables which are affecting decision-making strategies there, it is difficult to say precisely what the 'causes' are for this difference in herd wealth distribution. This difference is further emphasized by Camapbell's (1979a:53) finding that while the majority of Kajiado Maasai do not favour individual ranching, 57.9% of Narok respondents wished to see individual ranches for their district. In Narok District, the decline in stock exchange relationships can be related to the consolidation of herd capital by the wealthy because of restrictions on movement, decline of potential stockpartners and growing alternative investment outlets. A great many of those poor herders operate to a large degree outside the cooperation constraint. This was one of the constraints on the traditional mode of production which had promoted the sharing of herd produce and the redistribution of stock through shared property rights. However,

alternative economic pursuits and individualized cash incomes mitigate against these mechanisms of reciprocal aid.

It is not surprising then that Campbell (1979a:53) found that group ranches were considered more favourably in Kajiado district because of their perceived ability to promote and support the continued mechanisms of cooperation. The Narok Maasai did not report that cooperation was an important aspect of group ranching. My own ranch surveys in Narok District supported this lack of enthusiasm for group ranching by the majority of respondents and a rather widespread interest in individual ranching, even in the arid areas. While drought conditions and overwhelming herd losses may have been a factor in precipitating acceptance of group ranching in Kajiado, the importance of land security was also instrumental since group ranches were considered a mechanism to preserve former cooperative relations and reciprocal interactions, rather than as a mechanism to expand or change production techniques in the face of production scarcity. Nevertheless, Hedlund (1971:9) reported that many of the group ranches in Kajiado were experiencing increased fractionalism and "difficulties in cooperation."

One might even suggest that traditionally, the constraints on the pastoral mode of production have created much more rigid upper and lower limitations between variables which maintained relationships within and between various systems, in Kajiado than in Narok because of the different ecological environment. The association of certain families with particular areas of permanent residence is certainly not a new phenomena in Narok so that social relations may have always been more conducive to less extensive ties relating to mobility, fluidity and cooperation. In other

words, mechanisms of redistribution may traditionally have been weaker in Narok and thus, greater disparities in stock wealth may have always characterized the difference between Kajiado and Narok Maasai.

The expansion of agriculture, demarcation, and the monetization of the Maasai economy in so many areas seems to have heightened this difference by providing both the wealthy and the very poor with alternative economic pursuits and investment opportunities, which at either end of this continuum are associated with individualization and privatization of resources. This process has been most marked in the highland areas. In the arid areas, where herd distribution may still be more egalitarian, it should be easier to find ranch memberships which can reach consensus about pastoral development because the spread effect, or benefit of a dip or water development, etc., would be more uniform. However, there are a myriad of variables which often mitigate against this as well. For example, there are ranches such as Olomisimis or the proposed group ranch for Entulele, which incorporate three different oloshon into the same membership. There are group ranches, such as Narosura, whose membership is so large that it is almost impossible to gather together a quorum to make decisions.

THE RANCHING PROGRAM: A SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

The group ranch program was undertaken in Kenya's Maasailand with the hope of achieving a number of objectives. Very early on, these objectives were examined in light of the premises of change upon which they were predicated in order to determine whether or not underlying variables or elements which the program sought to alter were indeed correlated in the

manner suggested and if not, to offer another understanding of those interrelationships. It is hoped that this thesis avoids many of these pitfalls of action and consequence which are the basis of so many development programs. Let us once more examine these objectives in order to discuss how the impact and reaction of Maasai to demarcation has, and will continue to have, an effect on the expected outcomes of program objectives.

It is quite true that to a large extent demarcation has taken place without any apparent signs to the casual observer that group ranch objectives have really been implemented at all, or that the Maasai are experiencing profound disruptions of the basic social fabric of their society. Given this lack of understanding about what is actually happening out in Maasailand, it is not surprising that a good number of development planners, especially from aid agencies, expressed skepticism that there was anything in Maasailand to study since many of the planned interventions were never implemented due to lack of staff, planning, etc. For example, most ranches did not follow any on-ranch rotational grazing scheme as outlined in a ranch development document. Livestock sales seemed to be increasing, but certainly not through the mechanism of beef-marketing orientation through ranch membership.

It is true that Maasai seemed more receptive to those innovations concerned with the health of livestock, such as dips, vaccinations and so on. Although even here, there was not unanimous agreement concerning the acceptability of these things and the willingness to take out a loan for dip construction varied greatly from ranch to ranch. Moreover, Maasai remained quite cautious in regards to promoting upgraded stock despite

their clear admiration of the tremendous volumes of milk produced, size, etc. I have attempted to show that the social relations of production, which were highly integrated with the reproduction of the production process as an economic function, operated together as part of the entire system. The Maasai generally associate dipping cattle with the necessity to keep cattle in the vicinity of the dip since treated livestock are thought to lose much of their natural immunity and so cannot be moved to an area without a dip.

Since development planners want dips and other infrastructural improvements to do precisely this, i.e., attach groups of Maasai herders to a permanent ranch location, rejection of a dip is thought to be anti-development, a sign of conservatism or just plain ignorance on the part of the Maasai which might be remedied with sufficient propaganda (i.e. education). However, mobility and fluidity are not simply or merely techniques of adaptation to the natural environment, but are also inherent aspects of the natural reproduction of the Maasai social structure, and these social structures represented the dominant means of accumulating surplus and investing herd capital. Thus, those models based on ecological determinism, where the dispersion of livestock is an adaptive mechanism which serves to decentralize herds to overcome drought and epidemics, fail to explain why it is that infrastructural development cannot be the only factor in inducing Maasai to restrict movement and exchange of livestock.

If alternative widespread and massive investment and accumulation opportunities are not available, almost simultaneously, with such infrastructure development, then the reproduction of the production process will remain integrated with the reproduction of agnatic kinship, marriage

system and age grade system for at least a portion of the Maasai population. Similarly, the reverse is true to a certain extent, since new investment and accumulation opportunities will not be widely acted upon if the ecological constraints on the production process set very rigid limitations on the relationships between variables within various social systems. Here then, we must realize that it is not simply the fact, as many planners have thought, that infrastructural development has not proceeded quickly enough or on a massive enough scale to counteract the ecological restrictions of dry season herding requirements. I would maintain that there has not been a systematic introduction of infrastructural development, accumulation structures (i.e. very stable marketing and pricing institutions, etc.) and investment alternatives (i.e. within or without the pastoral economy).

This is not to say that such a process is not emerging in Narok District, since I have described the rise of a Maasai elite, as well as a category of destitute Maasai who have been able to choose, or have been forced into a new system which organizes relations of production on a very capitalistic basis rather than through kinship or age set mechanisms. However, I am saying that the group ranching format itself has certainly not provided the organizational framework and conditions which are conducive to the goals which have been outlined in the development policies. I would hypothesize that the proliferation of dips should, to a certain extent, correlate with the volume of livestock exchange. In general, greater receptivity to dips should be found in those areas where there has been greatest restrictions on movement and decline of stockpartnerships. Again, this is not to say that group ranching in these

areas has been successful in generating receptivity to dipping, but that growing poverty, the availability of alternative economic pursuits, and the need to invest heavily in subsidizing the pastoral diet has meant that restrictions on livestock movement is becoming a de facto way of life.

On the other hand, numerous other factors influence this process. Although several of the ranches in Lower Mau invested in a dip, we have seen that Rotian OlMakongo remained reluctant and this was related to the fact that a large number of members were destitute or non-pastoral acceptees and they had little, if any, interest in promoting the pastoral economy. Thus, the reasons that ranches such as Rotian refuse a loan for dip development may be quite different from the reasons which underlie the rejection of a loan in many of the arid areas. Of course there are arid area ranches which have invested in a dip such as Lemek, Koiyaki and Olkinyei. Interestingly, these ranches all receive revenue from the Department of Wildlife and by leasing tented tourist camps. Furthermore, there has been a number of individual ranches developed on prime locations on these ranches and much of the general membership is considering subdivision. Although high potential area ranches do receive wheat money and are actively involved in charcoal burning, etc., we have seen that, except for a small elite, much of this money is caught up in the 'vicious cycle syndrome' and that it does not promote production expansion, but supplements production deficiencies. I do not have enough data on arid area ranches to suggest with certainty, however, the income generated from wildlife and tented camps may be more available for investment in livestock in these areas because it is not as necessary to supplement the pastoral diet and economy.

The point that is essential to recognize is that group ranching and development initiatives do not have a single impact, nor is there a single Maasai response. Thus, dip construction, water development, upgraded stock, livestock marketing, etc., have a differential impact, according not only to different areas, but to different interest groups whose reciprocal interaction in reproducing the social structure must be seen to vary according to the ecological, social, political and economic variables which are acted upon.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

It is quite apparent that there has been very little group ranch development throughout Narok District, although there have been many 'developments' not directly attributable to the group ranch format. In the Rotian area, charcoal burning, timber cutting, cattle trekking and so on, are all activities which have become essential to the economy, despite the fact that they were not initially considered in the ranch development outline. Nevertheless, they all represent potential points for development of many of the existing relations of production, whether between or within production units. One of the objectives of the ranch program was to promote a sustained offtake of beef cattle. However, ranch members have been unable to make joint or cooperative decisions on offtake, and the issue generated considerable conflictual response.

However, a number of young men, whose structural position in the production process has been detailed, have taken advantage of the entrepreneurial outlet provided by the lucrative business of cattle trekking or stock trading. The very nature of this business is to produce

a sustained and high offtake of marketable livestock, albeit not from their own family herds. This category of entrepreneur is seen as a highly uncoordinated body of individuals and most trekkers have found it extremely difficult to obtain any 'official' support of their businesses in terms of underwriting of capital expenses by way of loans, etc. Thus, despite the unity of interest which stimulates these cattle trekkers to buy and sell cattle for a profit, planners have chosen to believe that group ranch membership creates a corporate and coordinated body of individuals who should be encouraged to market livestock, despite the fact that there is no unity of interest in terms of livestock offtake between these members.

Therefore, as I have suggested earlier, it should be possible to promote livestock marketing through the development of existing livestock marketing mechanisms. This could be done through the development of stock trekking businesses associated with trekkers who have membership on the same group ranch, though this need not necessarily be the basis. Such promotion could take the form of loans for transport vehicles and the introduction of steer fattening operations which lease land and provide herding employment for other group ranchers, etc. This would greatly reduce the requirements of physical stamina as well as enable this activity to become a sustained business endeavour rather than a short-term outlet.

I do not feel that it is the task of this present thesis to detail all of the development possibilities of such an undertaking, although planners would certainly have to take into account the potential of such a development to lead to monopolization of the industry and thus safeguard against such a happening through a number of regulations which would ensure a fairly egalitarian spread effect of the benefits. Furthermore, since

acquisition of loans, licences, etc. is so closely connected to the political process and the dispensing of largess by the elite, controls would have to be instituted to prevent only trekkers who support one politician from benefitting while those who do not are cut off from development opportunities.

Another goal of the ranch program, which was thought to be essential for promoting increased offtake rates, was to decrease Maasai dependence on a milk diet, drawing them into the national economy through the purchase of foodstuffs and greatly reducing the amount of land required by each family to obtain subsistence. However, in the Rotian area, where diets have been heavily dependent upon purchased grains, we should remember that charcoal burning is the most widespread pursuit for obtaining the cash necessary to supplement the diet and that this activity, unregulated as it is and without any conservation efforts, is denuding the forests and destroying the ecology at a much faster rate than is degradation of rangelands due to overgrazing. Thus, rather than applauding the decline of milk dependency in this area, which is directly associated with poverty and declining standard of living, there is an urgent necessity to control and, through replanting, etc., to promote these on-ranch informal sector businesses.

Promoting informal sector development may not appear compatible to promoting pastoral development. However, many impoverished herders are involved in supplementary activities which are often inadequate to sustain subsistence and which lead to the total decline of herds and the disenfranchisement of many individuals. The activity of these individuals affects the pastoral potential of the entire group ranch. Every effort must be taken to halt this process of povertization since any hope for so-

called group ranch development is inhibited overall. If pastoral development is the desired goal, then many of those activities which are presently the last step into poverty must be organized in order to facilitate a step into the pastoral economy. It is not out of the question to recognize that on many group ranches there is a category of impoverished herders whose special needs can be met in such a way that they are not alienated totally from the pastoral economy. In fact, in attempting to promote 'pastoral' development without understanding the extent of those non-pastoral pursuits which are part of the production process and decision-making framework of so many herders, developers often encounter what appears to be an anti-development stance. It is ironic, that having interviewed nearly all of the impoverished families at Rotian, practically everyone expressed a desire to 'reenter' the pastoral economy. However, collectively, dip construction was not a means to get back into the economy if one had no cattle to dip, although individually most herders thought that dipping cattle was a good idea.

Similarly, the collective attitude of the Rotian Maasai suggested that charcoal burning was destroying their forests and wheat growing was reducing their best pastures, while individually, each herder was opting for these very strategies, not because they want to see their pastures reduced or their woodlands destroyed, but because of their very desire to remain pastoralists and the urgent needs of meeting subsistence requirements. With this understanding, we must recognize that pastoral development in such an area cannot take the form of simply introducing upgraded stock or building a dip, nor can or should it concentrate only on promotion of non-pastoral pursuits. In other words, I suggest that it is

possible to promote individual interests in such a way as to eventually derive collective benefits throughout the pastoral economy, rather than trying to promote collective interests in the pastoral economy which are seen to relate to competitive and differential individual benefits.

In a study of resources, land use and population growth in Kajiado District, Campbell (1979b:13) predicts that "By 2000 AD ... there will be a shortage of culturable land and over 30,000 adult equivalent pastoralists will be unable to gain a subsistence livelihood from the rangelands." The trend in Narok similarly suggests widespread disaffiliation of many Maasai from the pastoral economy and, as I have predicted, this will certainly spread to the arid areas of the district. Thus, I am in agreement with Campbell when he emphasizes the urgent need to develop secondary and tertiary industries in the pastoral districts, institute land use policies which will make agriculture more compatible with pastoralism, and generally develop a more "integrated development policy for the area" (Ibid:15). He suggests the development of such livestock related industries as tanning and leathercraft, along with an expansion of marketing and export possibilities for these products, as well as livestock raising industries which would provide "economic returns to the ranches ... from the subsistence production of the herds, from the sale of milk products, from the sale of livestock, and from the incomes earned by those engaged in the various aspects of the industry" (Ibid:20).

Promoting this aspect of rural development is a necessity and stands the possibility of being more successful than group ranching alone, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, if nothing is done in Maasailand, then it has been demonstrated that subsistence needs will outstrip both the

pastoral and agricultural resources of the district within the next twenty years. In other words, no matter what type of herd management practices are adopted on group ranches, if subsistence production remains the primary focus, then human and animal population growth will eventually exceed the carrying capacity of the rangelands. If alternative production, investment, employment and marketing opportunities are not a vital part of the development of Maasailand, then it is clear that massive disenfranchisement will create problems of rural-urban migration which already plague many of the other districts in Kenya.

Secondly, the introduction of many pastoral improvement programs through the framework of the group ranch, require that collective and cooperative decisions and action be taken on matters which are traditionally part of a competitive framework for herders. For example, all pastoral ranch members may agree that improvement of range conditions is desirable and that rotational grazing should be enforced. Such a policy impacts on an individual's decision-making strategy dictating when and where and with whom he will graze his livestock. Despite the desire for pastoral development, the social and economic constraints, which vary enormously for different categories of herders, mean that if everyone follows the same strategy, the outcome will be more advantageous to some than to others. This does not mean that the Maasai are never able to make collective decisions, but simply that many of those things which developers wish to see developed cooperatively were never the basis of collective action. Moreover, consensus opinion is often not the optimum development strategy for a group ranch in its collective sense.

It is my opinion that the development and promotion of such things as livestock trading, transport industries, charcoal and timber businesses, steer fattening operations, etc., as well as improved rural marketing centres and secondary and tertiary industries, could provide the conditions whereby individuals, especially those now floundering in the pastoral economy, might be able to find some security which could turn these outlets into prospering and viable businesses rather than as temporary stepping stones into poverty which many of the informal sector outlets now are. This security would have a ripple effect, directly on the pastoral economy. Stock trekker associations, especially with transport businesses and developed market centres throughout the district would come to rely more and more on the willingness of practicing pastoralists to sell livestock and a reliable and fairly priced marketing network could certainly lead to a higher offtake on group ranches.

Steer fattening and livestock raising operations which could be run on leased group ranchlands would provide an incentive for those disaffiliated pastoralists associated with the 'business' end to feel that their well-being is tied to pastoral development. Therefore, such pastoralists who formerly represented impoverished membership with little interest in pastoral development, could actually become instrumental in the decision-making process on group ranches by bringing consensus opinion away from the so-called anti-development posturing, and into full-scale development of dips, water, firebreaks, upgraded stock and so on. In other words, just as the decisions which are being made by pastoralists in the highlands affects pastoral potential in the lowlands, so too the decisions which are being made by the impoverished on a group ranch are affecting pastoral potential

for the committed pastoralists. To promote development options for these impoverished herders, especially those that are related to the pastoral economy, can only help to improve pastoral potential for everyone.

Here then, I am certainly not suggesting that group ranches should be dismantled or that they are failures. It is too late now to take a step backward. However, development in Narok District must become more diversified and seek to identify and promote a more comprehensive and integrated course of action. The Kenyan government has always expressed a very keen desire to promote rural development and this thesis has not been intended to devalue the efforts of the group ranching program as a rural development approach but simply to demonstrate the constraints which the Maasai social structure set on the implementation of these programs. Having outlined the process whereby more and more Maasai are becoming disaffiliated from pastoralism, I have suggested some development directions which may serve to integrate them back into the economy of the district and, in the end, to promote the development of the pastoral sector which was sought after in the first place.

Given the above statements, I will make some brief comments on the issue of subdivision. Unfortunately, the outcome of this land issue may have more to do with political manoeuvring and the extent to which government promotes agricultural development, than with promoting a policy which is most beneficial to the Maasai and the pastoral economy. If the type of development which I have just outlined is not promoted immediately then the process of povertization in the Lower Mau will very likely lead to subdivision and, in fact, many government officials suggested unofficially that they considered this to be the optimum course. However, if this

occurs, which could happen as the result of consensus votes where the very wealthiest following olkarsis strategies opt for individualization, and the destitute have no use of the land for pastoralism, then without hesitation. I would predict that there will be massive sales of land to non-Maasai agriculturalists and that only the very wealthy would stay and the destitute who would work for them. This would mean great influxes of middle-range herders into the arid areas with a subsequent additional strain on the resources there.

Although I have spoken very little about agricultural development and the needs of farmers, the type of integrated approach which Campbell (1979b:20; 1979a:58) suggests, which would protect Maasai land rights and institute land use practices which make agro-pastoralism a more viable and compatible form of land use, would become impossible to implement. Agricultural growth would proceed at the expense and to the detriment of pastoralism. This is certainly not the optimum course of development for agriculture either since "the growth in the industrial population that would occur if livestock-related industries were created would provide commercial outlets for farm products in the area" (Campbell 1979b:20). Furthermore, the subdivision of the land and the growth of food cropping would have a profound effect on the wheat and barley industry of the area, making it much less cost efficient and destabilizing the industry further.

I have earlier criticized wheat and barley growing in Narok District, however, not solely because it impinged on Maasai dry-season rangelands, but more importantly, because the benefits of the wheat growing were accruing to outsiders and to a small portion of Maasai 'wheat-elite'. This is a difficult problem to remedy since many of those people profiting most

are government officials, however, if wheat and barley growing are to continue in the district, then the Masai in general must be made the recipients of the greatest share of the profits to be made and this should not be done against the security of their land title since all of those leasors who have profited have not been asked to put up such high stakes. With the aid of donor agencies who have pushed the wheat growing schemes, the Maasai group ranch members should be offered some form of a guaranteed minimum return loan, which formerly was available only to individuals through political connections.¹ While I am certainly not against all agricultural development in Narok District, I am against any policies or trends which promote this development to the exclusion of the pastoral sector.

To backtrack somewhat, I should mention that I do realize that my stance against subdivision will not be met favourably by those Maasai who are now actively endorsing subdivision and attempting to acquire individual ranches and land holdings. However, the importance of land as an investment opportunity in Maasailand and the competition which centres around gaining access and control of land is exacerbated by the lack of other potentially profitable and stable investment alternatives. Thus, the young educated, the wealthy, the disenfranchised, and so on, see land ownership as the solution to their problems, which are essentially

¹ For example, the selection of forty-four Maasai farmers to receive CIDA funding for wheat growing was in no way a policy aimed at promoting a so-called higher standard of living for the Maasai. The Maasai chosen were nearly all civil servants, landowners and considered low risk recipients. Thus, the loans were offered not to those Maasai who had benefited least, but to those 'progressive' Maasai who were already better off and were benefiting most. Such a policy is self-serving, promoting wheat growing without any real concern for the Maasai population.

dissociation from the traditional pastoral economy. While I can sympathize with their desire for land, it should also be realized that this scramble for individual land is also part of the problem and that if there were other investment outlets for these men in industry, business and marketing opportunities in their district, the conflictual grabbing for land may be alleviated.

Presently, it is very difficult for an educated or wealthy Maasai to build a modern house or other infrastructural improvements if he is a member of a group ranch. Group ranchers have too often seen a portion of the group land turned into an individual ranch after improvements were made. However, if the wealthy and the educated were able to invest in many other endeavours without having to resort to individual land holdings, then it might become more feasible that individuals would be able to make these improvements on a group ranch without the fear that the land will be 'stolen.' In other words, the development of these alternatives is essential since otherwise, collectively, the group ranch will continue to stifle the development potential of entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs will attempt to develop their potential through land ownership and privatization of resources. It is my belief that entrepreneurship and individual development can take place within the collective framework of group ranch ownership, however, this is something which would have to be actively promoted since those Maasai now aspiring to obtain individual holdings will certainly feel hostility at being barred. However, a decision has to be made whether to promote the interests of a few or to promote the overall development and well-being of the entire district.

What does this mean for the present elite and their land holdings? These must stand, however, I would hope that if the value of land as the only investment alternative declines, the role of these men who arbitrated land disputes, etc., will also decline. However, it is extremely difficult to prevent these very men from playing a large role in the implementation of all of the new development alternatives in the district, and thus retaining their position through their ability to set individuals up in these new employment outlets, businesses and industries. If this happens, then they would continue to foster hierarchical, horizontal alliances and power bases which competed for development input. That this should happen is unfortunately quite likely given the overall operation of the political system in Kenya. However, it is not impossible to institute such a program of rural development with checks and constraints and regulations to limit this. On the other hand, if all participants choose to ignore these rules, if bribery is widespread and if politicians stand to make substantial financial gains then there is little more that a development program can do.

I would further suggest that the development of the type of integrated approach outlined may greatly increase Maasai attendance in educational institutions. The majority of the Maasai whom I discussed the education issue with, felt that education was a good thing that did not have to conflict with cultural values (cf. Campbell 1979a:63), however, since there were so few employment opportunities for the educated in Narok and so little opportunity to make use of education for business purposes, etc., many of them felt that it was futile to send many of their children to school. On the other hand, if there are increased opportunities for the

educated to participate in an expanded and pastoral-related economy where keeping records, bookkeeping, auditing, etc., were definite assets, then I certainly feel that the advantages of sending children to school will seem greater and this could be reflected in rising Maasai school enrollment which presently, according to government surveys (Republic of Kenya 1975:8) is considered extremely low compared to other districts in Kenya.

Many educated Maasai from the non-elite told me that their own families and the majority of the group ranch membership where they were registered regarded them with considerable suspicion and often prevented them from obtaining positions on group ranch committees. It was felt that they were not proficient pastoralists because they had spent so much of their lives away at boarding schools while on the other hand, their education was not bringing forth the jobs and opportunities which had been expected. Many of these jobless, educated youth felt that they were mistrusted because other Maasai felt that they might be able to use their education to gain an individual ranch on the group ranch. If these educated Maasai were able to enter rural occupations which not only brought in salaries but stimulated and benefited the pastoral economy, then much of this suspicion would evaporate. Of course, this prediction is highly speculative since the quest for individual land has become so deeply ingrained in the competition for declining resources throughout the district. The kind of trust of which I speak would not happen overnight, however, if rural development was implemented to stimulate opportunities for entrepreneurship and employment for those who desperately need it, and individual land was withdrawn from

the competitive arena, then conditions would certainly be fostered to reduce many of the tensions which now exist.

I have suggested that rural development promote the interests of the disadvantaged and in so doing, it will provide a climate for overall pastoral development by linking and integrating the interests of the disadvantaged with productivity and expansion of the pastoral economy. Here then, I must point to another category of Maasai who deserve special interest. This category is, of course, Maasai women, particularly those women who belong to impoverished households. If development leads to the promotion of the pastoral economy, even with some emphasis on the development of commodity relations in relation to that portion of the herd destined for production for exchange by elders, then women will be able to retain their status and position in relation to that part of the herd still destined for subsistence by maintaining control over the family food supply. Here too, if overall herd productivity is increased and if this results in surplus milk supplies, every effort should be made to encourage the marketing of dairy products by women with the control of the financial rewards remaining in their hands. This might be achieved through the introduction of local dairy cooperatives, run and managed by women. That this might mean training pastoral women and overcoming the objections of male pastoralists and planners does not mean that it cannot be accomplished if developers put their minds to it. Increased milk sales should come about because of production surplus and not as a result of production scarcity.

Unfortunately, it is quite obvious that before this ideal stage of integrated pastoral development is ever reached, a large number of pastoral

families will have been disenfranchised from the pastoral economy. Thus, in developing employment and entrepreneurial alternatives, there must also be an effort to develop opportunities for women to participate. In Kajiado, the Maasai Rural Training Centre at Isinya employs over 200 Maasai women who produce craftwork on a piecework basis (Campbell 1979b:19) and the IlKerin Project in Loita also employs Maasai women. Impoverished Maasai women who have begun to keep shambas are inexperienced and have been reduced to small subsistence plots because of the fear that the development of commercial plots on group ranchlands may become the basis for obtaining individual land rights and lead to subdivision. If security of group ownership could be made firm, which it is not now, due to government officials constantly telling people that, indeed, the land could be subdivided if the majority wanted it, then the fear of women increasing their involvement in agriculture would not be as great, as long as this agricultural use of the land did not interfere with pastoral usage. It might, indeed, be useful for agricultural extension and training officers to introduce training programs for these Maasai women in those areas where spontaneous cultivation is taking place. An increase in rural centres due to the expansion of secondary and tertiary industries, etc., could provide marketing opportunities for surplus food crops.

At this point, I should emphasize that exclusivity of range through group ownership has not provided the security which planners, using their models of western development, suggested would lead to the Maasai's desire to develop ranch infrastructure. In fact, under the current conditions and in light of the historical significance of the land issue in Maasailand, it has actually hampered range development and infrastructural growth.

Because the differential in the benefit incidence of such development is great, it is felt that such developments could become the basis on which certain individuals appropriated control and privatized ownership. It is not surprising that many researchers (Baxter 1975; Lewis 1975; Spencer 1978) have noted that pastoralists readily appreciate and understand the value of innovations yet reject them all the same.

Ironically, the privatization of land has not turned it into a secure form of collateral for the Maasai and at the same time, those very developers who felt that such group ownership would enable land to generate credit have come to find that the sort of insecurities which exist make it virtually impossible to enforce unity of membership for repayment of loans. Of course, it is hardly feasible to confiscate group land, despite the fears of pastoralists that this will happen to them. Therefore, it is my belief that the Kenyan government and the World Bank and other donor agencies who developed this orientation, should develop new policy directions for promoting and financing development in Maasailand. Rather than attempt to promote collective development, I would encourage promoting numerous and widespread, small-scale operations for individuals and groups of individuals who wish to form an association for business purposes. Thus, a steer fattening operation need not be something that an entire group ranch undertakes, but could be managed by an association of cattle trekkers whose interests revolve around the buying and selling of livestock. They could lease group ranchlands, employ herders and generate income for the group ranch and thus stimulate the possibility for wider pastoral development. This would necessitate the introduction of loans which initially might have to be free of collateral. However, since group

ownership of land has not proved a sound basis for collateral anyway, the risk of default may be less than on a group ranch per se where individuals have competitive interests in the outcome.

I have attempted to make some brief and preliminary suggestions and recommendations for an approach to integrated rural development in Narok District of Kenya Maasailand, and, by extension, for other pastoral areas. I have not attempted to detail a 'development program' but to suggest directions which will be more compatible with existing relations of production by building on them and promoting them rather than threatening them. However, it is my very deep desire that this thesis has provided a theoretical framework and some practical directions for reorienting the development process in a more successful and beneficial manner for the Maasai people in general. This, ultimately, is the most important goal of the thesis, over and above any contribution which I might hope to make to anthropological studies. Thus, despite the fact that the Kenyan government and development planners have no obligation to respond to these recommendations, if this thesis in any way generates more research and a re-evaluation of present policies, then it will have been most successful.

CAN WE MAKE PREDICTIONS?

I have attempted to build up models of Maasai society which have a certain force of predictive power in that they should be able to account for the addition or deletion of elements in the model. However, there is such a continual flux of new variables into the system that in reality, the models can account for social change ipso facto, by confirming the modalities of that change. This is not to say that the models fail, but

simply that we are not predicting what is going to happen, but rather, after having explained how Maasai decision-making strategies are both rational and appropriate to various situations, it is possible to develop hypothesis concerning Maasai decision-making strategies when such conditions and situations change. The inferences made are based on the grounds established by the evidence presented and account for Maasai reaction to development initiatives, not only in terms of apparent isolated empirical manifestations, such as poverty, factionalism, etc., but incorporates them within the framework of the entire social system. Many researchers and planners recognize the impact of some aspects of group ranching in terms of these empirical signs, however, this analysis has gone one step further by explaining and demonstrating how the traditional pastoral system itself determines the form that any structural changes may take.

Given current trends in Narok District, some vague predictions about the future can be suggested. Growing poverty means that there is not enough surplus production to be channelled into supporting the age set system and the lack of surplus product to be controlled and distributed by women, reduces the network of age mate solidarity. Thus, if poverty becomes even more widespread, then the age set system will be undermined greatly. This would affect inheritance practices and the marriage system and even inter-familial and community relations and dietary restrictions and so on. There are so many unknown variables which could feed into the system, and these variables could have multiple effects by disrupting relations in one system which could lead to economizing and the expansion of surplus in another system. However, whatever factors do impact on

decision-making, can be plugged into the models and this will suggest outcomes based on the elements offered or abandoned.

Much of the direction of future development remains uncertain in that it is unclear what factors that government will promote or discourage. The government has not taken a firm position on whether it is actually intent on promoting pastoral development, or whether its policy of promoting the most productive form of land use for the national interest will lead them to invest in agricultural development which is often incompatible with pastoral production. The interests of donor agencies also place constraints on government policy and the role of aid agencies might be vital in determining future directions of input. U.S. AID, for one, has begun to stress the importance of developing the subsistence economy of pastoralists rather than promoting a commercial beef economy (AID Program Evaluation Report 1980).

The issue of subdivision is emotionally charged and the intrusion of political factors in determining the outcome of this issue will greatly affect the future of Maasai everywhere. If agricultural development and subdivision is promoted, there will most surely follow widespread sales of land and an influx of pastoral families to the arid areas creating more overcrowding there and reducing productivity further. I have outlined the sort of deep disturbances that this will have on the Maasai social structure.

Thus, despite the fact that there is a continual flux of new variables impacting on the Narok Maasai and future inputs are indeterminant, given what we do know now and the general trends which are suggested, I maintain that this knowledge could become the basis of some very positive action

which could overcome the consequences of cause and effect which were the basis of the group ranch development program, and which led to failures when the desired effect did not occur.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS

It is my belief that this dissertation has made an original and valuable contribution on a number of levels. First, it has contributed substantially to the paucity of research on the effects and impacts of group ranching in Narok District of Kenya Maasailand. The majority of studies which previously dealt with the development of group ranches stressed the role played by ecological factors in enhancing or inhibiting ranch development (e.g. Pratt and Gwynne 1977). Some efforts were made to illustrate how ecological conditions combine with socio-economic circumstances to effectively influence group ranching development (e.g. Campbell and Migot-Adholla 1979a; Davis 1971; Halderman 1972; Hedlund 1971; and Jacobs 1973). Nevertheless, in spite of the importance that socio-economic conditions have for the success or failure of development schemes in general, and group ranching in particular, little systematic research had been carried out to determine how the structure of the Maasai socio-economic formation set constraints on both individual and group reaction to these programs.

The present thesis attempted to contribute to this deficiency by providing a base of valuable data which suggested correlations and arenas of social crisis. However, it was the methodological and theoretical approach taken, which enabled the development of a framework within which to evaluate the effect and impact of these empirical signs of social

crisis, such as poverty, declining stockfriend networks, and so on. It is my hope that the use of such an orientation has indeed contributed to development anthropology in general, and perhaps even applied anthropology, by demonstrating the heuristic power of building models which can explain both the actuality and the potentiality of social systems when various elements are introduced or removed. Many other African countries are observing the Kenyan experience with group ranching because of their own pastoral populations. and are keenly interested in the nature of pastoral responses to commercial ranching incentives, the impact of these schemes on the pastoral population and the benefits and social costs which are emerging from such programs. For this reason, it is hoped that the insights provided by the type of analysis used will have a much broader relevance.

Goldschmidt (1981) has been a keen advocate of developing an anthropological approach to pastoral development and this is precisely what I have attempted to do. Moreover, I have tried to build on the valuable theoretical contributions which have been made by such researchers as Hjort, Galaty and Rigby, as well as to incorporate certain aspects of theory from such Marxist anthropologists as Godelier, Mellaisoux and Terray. It has been my intent to show that development is not an integral process inducing monolithic changes which 'separate' everything that is traditional from everything that is modern. Instead, and as Galaty (1981:22) suggests, both the forces of tradition and change operate simultaneously and this interaction provides the synthesis for "a single dynamic yet coherent social space"

Here then, I would suggest that the present thesis further contributes to the field of anthropological literature by contribution to the following theoretical issues:

- (1) The Understanding of Social Change
- (2) The Relationship Between Production Strategies and Social Form
- (3) The Relationship Between Kinship and Economy

(1) Understanding Social Change: In identifying social change, I have maintained that there is a difference between structural change and mere content change. In other words, it is necessary to differentiate those processes which actually generate transformation of the Maasai social structure, and those which are related to an alteration of content or function. Of course, both of these processes often occur simultaneously. It is quite impossible to understand the empirical manifestations of social change unless we know what it is that is changing. In analysing Maasai society, I attempted to demonstrate the conditions under which certain sets of relations functioned as the relations of production, and to explain the dominance of certain socio-economic formations, such as stockfriend networks, household production units, and so on, in terms of the structural dependency of specific interconnections between social structures. As various government interventions are imposed on the Maasai a number of changes become apparent, such as differences in residence patterns, labour processes, etc. As the new social conditions become pervasive, they may exceed the limits beyond which the relations of production can be generated through kinship relations. As other social relations are established to

function as relations of production, kinship does not become irrelevant but is no longer dominant in unifying the economic functions of social life.

In other words, I attempted to demonstrate how the introduction of functional changes (e.g. demarcation, etc.) are becoming the basis for the transformation of the forms and mechanisms which had enabled kinship relations to hold their dominant role as relations of production. Moreover, I tried to show how the internal mechanisms of Maasai society themselves determine the organizational variations which emerge and the extent to which new strategies and relations are compatible with the former relations, thus demonstrating the extent to which such functional changes bring about changes in form and internal structures.

The analysis indicated that despite profound disruptions to the social fabric of Maasai society, there remains a core of subsistence pastoralism and the traditional social relations of production continue to operate for them at the community level to organize subsistence. However, here we do find processes which are related to changes in content and function as individuals become involved in a great deal of manipulation in order to restore various systems to more tolerable limits. On the other hand, the impact of certain government interventions, which altered the factors of production from their former positioning in the social structure, made it possible for some individuals to become involved in new relations of production based on the commoditization of land, cattle and labour.

Traditional pastoralism was not seen as being totally subsumed by a more dominant, essentially capitalist mode of production. Rather, the traditional mode was seen to set limits on the expansion of the latter since it was necessary for the new mode of production to promote and

maintain the traditional sector to a certain extent, since the traditional sector was the basis of creating surplus value in the new mode of production. At the same time, the activity of those in the modern sector was seen to limit and perhaps even destroy pastoral potential in the traditional sector. The conjuncture of these two models of production was considered to be that point at which a new social organization could be identified. Thus, the transformation of internal forms was made meaningful through a structure, a new social organization, which incorporates the modern sector, while the tension between the old and the new is not their dissociation, but rather their integration into the dynamic process of change within the structure.

Furthermore, I was able to demonstrate that the new mode of production gave the appearance of being structured on the basis of the old mode of production, through kinship, marriage and age set relations. However, while embracing the representational aspect of kinship and age set ideology, which traditionally were associated with relations of production which were fairly egalitarian, those operating in the new mode of production are much more stratified and hierarchical. This seems to suggest that there is certainly not a one to one correspondence between ideological systems and economic 'infrastructures.' Moreover, the transformation of cultural categories from the traditional to the modern sector, which appear to retain the same content but in a system of relations which have been transformed from cyclical and egalitarian to rigid and hierarchical, can be thought of as a cultural account of social change among the Maasai.

(2) The Relationship Between Production Strategies and Social Form; and

(3) The Relationship Between Kinship and Economy. I shall discuss these two issues together because, as I have interpreted them, they represent opposite sides of the same coin. Indeed, my understanding of these issues was extremely important for my approach to understanding social change. Essentially, the stance which was taken in this thesis is that although there is not considered to be any causal connection between production strategies and social forms, in preindustrial societies social formations, production strategies and even authority relations are all produced simultaneously because they have a common area of realization in the reproduction of the mode of production. Thus, economic and social relations are both internal relations and are integrated in such a way that is difficult to determine beforehand which social relations are associated with particular production strategies and forms. These must be determined in the course of the investigation. Although production strategies and social forms are not mechanically related, which suggests that correlations which seem significant in one society may prove unjustified in another society, does not mean that there is no relationship at all between the two.

Schneider (1981:152) has suggested that the association of economics and kinship in pastoral societies is most probably related to such things as the rate of capital formation. I have suggested that in preindustrial or subsistence modes of production, we must emphasize that it is not just the connection between kinship and capital formation per se which is important, but the fact that they have a common area of realization through the process of social and material reproduction. Production strategies for

many Maasai nowadays have become linked to capital accumulation through such channels as wage labour, investment in land, petty commodity relations and entrepreneurial operations and so on. These new relations revealed a point at which the structural and functional integration and correspondence of economy and kinship had reached the limits of correspondence and at this point we must look at the specific historical evolution of the factors which have come into play for a particular society. There is no general determining law or evolutionary sequence associated with the so-called development process, however, as Godelier (1977:123) suggests such an analysis allows us to understand how "kinship relations cease to play the dominant role unifying all the functions of social life."

However, because kinship no longer plays a dominant role in the relations of production does not necessarily mean that kinship relations disappear, and in fact, they may serve to structure the overall domestic community of both the modern and the traditional sector. Because of this, Terray (1972) suggests that there really is no correspondence between production strategies (economy) and socio-economic formations. Rigby (1980) echoes this sentiment when he suggests that "at certain levels of the development of productive forces, the cultural-historical factor is crucial in defining the actual form of the relations of production and the productive process in societies in fundamentally the same ecological and economic circumstances, at the same level of productive forces." Godelier (1977:124) asserts that when the reciprocal correspondence between economy and kinship can no longer be maintained, the limits of this compatibility reveals "the historical and objective content of each structure."

To generalize, I might suggest that in preindustrial societies a number of factors serve to maintain a reciprocal correspondence between economy and kinship (or another social formation). These factors include: (1) the integration of all levels of society so that social and material reproduction represents aspects of the same process; (2) investment of production surplus takes the form of developing social institutions which are internal to the society, and (3) production and consumption units are integrally connected making both production for exchange and production for use, complementary and vital aspects of the production process. The innumerable processes by which the association of these factors gradually is altered, represents to this author the development process, which is neither unilineal or unidirectional.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to provide insights into the impact of the demarcation process in Narok District of Kenya Maasailand. Many of my statistics and much of my qualitative data was based on an in-depth study of Rotian Ol Makongo Group Ranch, which is located in the wheat growing area of Lower Mau. After undertaking a thorough and detailed analysis of Purko Maasai society, I then employed the models constructed to explain situations of evident (i.e. empirical) social crisis. Such models were able to explain the modalities of social change, both in terms of alterations of content and function and also in terms of transformations of basic forms. By suggesting those situations where the structure of the Maasai socio-economic formation placed constraints on individual's ability to respond to the incentives of the development program, I was also able to make

suggestions for overcoming this inertia and realizing that any failures of the program could not be placed on Maasai 'backwardness' or resistance to change, or to their lack of understanding of what technical improvements would mean.

Furthermore, I attempted to provide information on the impact of development and group ranching on Maasai women, not simply because women have been ignored by both planners and researchers, but because an understanding of how the strategic centre of competition in Maasai society was shifting from competition over cattle to competition over the factors of production themselves, had profound effects on the position and status of women. Furthermore, the loss of control over domestic production and the family food supply was essential in understanding the disruptions which are becoming evident in the age set system.

All of those interventions which enabled the factors of production to become detached from their position in the social structure enabled certain individuals to reorganize these factors in such a way that they became the basis of expansion of leadership associated with hierarchical power bases rather than with the more egalitarian authority relations of traditional society. This new leadership, the individual ranchers, represents to planners the 'progressive' element in Maasai society and they have received a great deal of financial assistance which has enabled them to exemplify for the government, what the expansion of pastoral production should be.

However, the activities of these men have been linked to the problems of contracted pastoral potential on group ranches and to part of the solution through mitigation of land disputes. Their relation to the rest of Maasai society has been examined as the emergence of a new mode of

production based on a new organization of the productive relations. However, it was suggested that such a political transformation would not provide the grounds for an equitable or rational use of the economic resources of Narok District. For this reason, I have suggested that subdivision and escalation of individual ranching be halted and that other investment and accumulation alternatives be introduced which are in fact intended to benefit those groups which are the most disadvantaged.

I should point out that this analysis has not been intended to stand as a condemnation of individual ranchers. Certainly there are a few such men who stand out as exploiters, but the majority of these individuals are men deeply concerned with the future of the Maasai people and who work in the contemporary setting to promote better educational facilities, better health care, better livestock care and so on. Many of these men are profoundly saddened by the declining pastoral potential of the traditional pastoralist. They do not recognize that their alienation of land exacerbates this contracted potential. Here then, it should be remembered that my analysis of the political and economic activities of the elite often suggests a relationship between these activities and negative effects on the pastoral Maasai, however, it has not been my intent to condemn these men and indeed, I am indebted to several individual ranchers for their willingness to answer questions and discuss the issues of group ranching.

To the casual observer or the envoy from an aid agency who conducts a whirlwind one week tour of Maasailand, there appears to be very little change. The land has been nearly all demarcated into group ranches, but life seems to go on much as it has always gone on. The Maasai appear to be one of those peoples who have clung to a tenacious resistance to social

change and modernization. Many developers would argue that demarcation has had very little impact on the Maasai and point to the apparent lack of enthusiasm, the blatant disregard for ranch boundaries, and the reluctance of Maasai ranchers to invest in infrastructural improvements. Yet, nothing could be further from the truth. The Maasai people are experiencing profound social, economic and political disturbances, which generate different effects for various segments of the population, and correspondingly, differential reactions. It is precisely these various effects and reactions which this thesis has attempted to analyse by demonstrating their reciprocal correspondences through a system of fluid interdependencies.

The analysis suggests trends of impoverishment, destitution, and disenfranchisement which will surely lead to the types of unrest and urban-rural migration characteristic of many other Kenyan regions if left unchecked. The methodological approach and analytical tools used in the study provided an understanding of Maasai society which suggested a number of areas where government or development agencies might intervene to stimulate and promote 'development' through the existing relations of production. These emerging trends can be acted upon now before they appear as gross statistical data. Given the bleak forecast which seems inevitable for the Maasai if these types of positive action are not undertaken, a rethinking of development policy in Maasailand is not only timely, but urgently necessary. Colin Leys (1975:275) has lamented the probability that academic studies will be unable to contribute to "the effort to achieve new strategies of development grounded in the interests of the mass of those who are currently the victims of underdevelopment. Perhaps the

most such studies can do is to try not to obscure the structures of exploitation and oppression which underdevelopment produces, and which in turn sustain it." It is hoped that the present study has more than fulfilled this role and, in the final analysis, has also demonstrated that Maasai social structure plays a role in determining the outcome of any changes or transformations.

APPENDIX A

Composition Of The Maasai Age Grade Organization (1980)

<u>AGE GRADE</u>	<u>AGE SET</u>	<u>RIGHT-HAND CIRCUMCISION GROUP</u>	<u>LEFT-HAND CIRCUMCISION GROUP</u>
Retired Elders	ilTuati ilTareto ilTerito	ilMirisho ilKetuli ilTiyieki	ilMeitaruni ilKitoip ilKitotu
Senior Elders	ilNyangusi	ilKalekal	ilKamaniki
Junior Elders	iSeuri	ilTerekeiyia	ilTiyiogo
<hr/>			
Warriors	Senior	ilKiruti	ilTobola
	Junior	ilRampau	ilKirupi

APPENDIX B

The IlPurko Maasai Division Into Moieties, Clans And Houses Of The Mau Narok Area

Black Cattle Moiety (Orok Kiteng')

Clans (ilgiat)	Houses (inkajijik)	Lineages (ilmarei)
(1) Ilaiser (aiserr-sounds made by warriors to scare wild animals or tell women to start milking. Associated with Rhino)	a. ilpasimaro b. lemusere c. looingerr d. lekitiy	eg. Kishampili. Taki. Ratia. Kuyo. Kipila. Ketere. Nchoe. Sanoi. Nkurruna. Ntaysia. etc.
(2) Ilukumai (Associated with lion)	a. ilukumai	eg. Masikonde. Sangok. Maleto. Mamyio. Musuni. Murero. Nampaso. Tomboi. Kidiis. Wotuni. Sairowna. Kuya. Saaya. Teeka. etc.

Red Ox Moiety (Odo Mongi)

(3) Ilmakesen (akesen - to get clothing ready - associated with)	a. lerakita b. lekaiki c. losekelai d. leseko e. lesire	eg. Sopia. Kiriama. Lanke. Naeku. Nerisnet. Nkurumu. Ololdapash. Matulel. Kosen. Maembe. Kerempe. Dikirr. Partoip. Mereru. Latoluo. Karkar
(4) Iltaarrosero beaters of the bush - associated with hyena)	a. ilimeponi b. iltidirr or lenap owuaru	eg. Olkumimoru. (the Kuyioni. Esho. Mwanik. Oiyie. Montoi. etc.
(5) Ilmoleilian (amoleshe - the red ones that are not upright)		eg. Langas. Oloirasa. Pere. Sialala. etc.

APPENDIX C

Maasai System Of Dividing The Day And Associated Activities

<u>TIME</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>PRINCIPLE ACTIVITIES</u>
1. amana esirua (dawn) 6 a.m.	The eland is going around	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- elders praying- women preparing for milking, getting fire
2. ailepu enkolong	The sun is rising	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- women milking- boys and men return to wives'/mothers' huts- children, warriors still sleeping- elders in kraal (boo) exchanging nights news viewing cattle and giving orders
3. abulu inkishu	Releasing cattle from the boo	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- children awake and eating milk, porridge- warriors awake
4. abulu ntarre	Releasing shoats from the boo	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- she-goats, ewes given their kids/lambs for feeding- sick animals cared for (women-young stock men adult stock)
5. ang'elu lasho	Separating calves	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- herdsboys take the calves away from the cattle
6. aosh inkishu	Beating the cattle	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- cattle are taken to graze by herdsboys

<u>TIME</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>PRINCIPLE ACTIVITIES</u>
7. aramat ntarre	Helping the shoats	- shoats are grouped together by women and herders outside the boo
8. anya endaa	Eating food	- circumcised men now eat
9. aibung' ilkuoo	Holding the lambs and kids	- women and children take the lambs/kids back to huts - circumcised men still eating or talking
10. aosh ntarre (11 a.m.)	Beating the shoats	- herdsboys - girls take the shoats to graze - accompanied for short distance by elders - women eat
11. dama (11 a.m. - 5 p.m.)	During the day	- commonly translated as 'free time' - men play board games, talk travel, visit, sleep, hold meetings - women gather firewood, get water, care for children, visit, drink tea, go to stores, etc.
12. enkiriata e nkolong (mid-day)	Direct sun	- a time for being outdoors (a subdivision of 11 above)
13. ashuko e nkolong	Sun going back down	- children eat during the early period - herdsboys rush to do this

APPENDIX D

Food Eating Regulations

<u>CATEGORY OF PEOPLE</u>	<u>CATEGORY OF FOOD</u>			
	<u>MILK</u>	<u>MEAT</u>	<u>BLOOD</u>	<u>CEREAL</u>
Senior Elder	Anywhere	Anywhere	Anywhere	Anywhere
Junior Elder	Anywhere	In the bush or hut but with no more than 3 women present	In the bush with few women	In the hut with wife or in the bush with no women
Senior Warriors	Anywhere	In the bush without women	The same	In the hut with no children or uncircumcised girls
Junior Warriors	Anywhere	Same as senior warriors	Same	Should never eat
Uncircumcised Boys and Girls	Anywhere	Anywhere	Anywhere	Anywhere
Circumcised Girls	Anywhere	Hut	Hut	Hut but not with circumcised males

(Women cannot eat in the presence of their fathers or their father's age mates and a woman will drink but not eat in the presence of her lover. Warriors should always drink milk with an age mate).

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