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COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND BENEFITS PROCESSES AT THE SHIPYARD PROJECT, SAN FRANCISCO

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ABSTRACT

On a 700 acre brownfield site in south-eastern San Francisco, an immense multi-use redevelopment project called The Shipyard is being built. Touted as one of America's transformative investments, this project has the potential to bring unrivalled levels of investment into a neighbourhood that currently suffers from poverty, high unemployment, environmental contamination, and stigma. This project will see the reuse of a disused naval shipyard site and signifies a substantial change from the industrial uses that have until now characterized the area. The developer, Lennar Corporation, has made significant efforts to improve services in the area in order to strengthen market values and shift popular perceptions. One of the most pressing questions surrounding the project is how development will move forward in a manner that respects and benefits the local community. A coalition of community groups has pushed for benefits for the community and has negotiated a "core community benefits agreement" (CCBA) with the developer. This report examines the community engagement and benefits processes associated with The Shipyard and analyses their appropriateness and effectiveness.

RÉSUMÉ

Sur une friche industrielle de 700 hectares dans le sud-est de San Francisco, un projet de reconstruction immense appelé The Shipyard est en développement. Annoncé comme un investissement transformateur aux États-Unis, ce projet apportera un niveau inégalé d'investissements dans un quartier qui souffre de pauvreté, chômage élevé, contamination environnementale, et de stigmatisation. Ce projet permettra également la réutilisation d'un site de chantier naval désaffecté ce qui signifie un changement substantiel des usages industriels qui ont jusqu'à présent caractérisé l'endroit. Le promoteur, Lennar Corporation, a déployé des efforts considérables pour améliorer les services dans la région, renforcer la valeur du marché immobilier et modifier la perception générale. Une des questions les plus importantes du projet porte sur la manière dont le développement progressera tout en respectant et bénéficiant la population locale. Une coalition de groupes communautaires a poussé pour de telles prestations et a négocié un accord de bénéfices à la communauté. Ce rapport examine l'engagement et avantages communautaire associés avec The Shipyard et analyse leur pertinence et leur efficacité.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACCE	Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment
ACORN	Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
AD10	Alliance for District 10
AMI	Average median income
BVHP	Bayview Hunters Point
CAC	Citizen's Advisory Committee
CBA	Community Benefits Agreement
CCBA	Core Community Benefits Agreement
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CIP	Community involvement plan
DDA	Disposition and Development Agreement
EIR	Environmental Impact Report
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
NADM	New Accountable Development Movement
PAC	Project Area Committee
RAB	Restoration Advisory Board
SAJE	Strategic Actions for a Just Economy
SFHA	San Francisco Housing Authority
SFLC	San Francisco Labour Council
SFOP	San Francisco Organizing Project
SFRA	San Francisco Redevelopment Agency

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

Located in the south-eastern portion of San Francisco, California, the Bayview Hunters Point Shipyard and Candlestick Point project is touted as one of the most "transformational" development projects currently underway in the United States (Brookings Institute, 2012). On a site over 700 acres in size, the Miami-based development company Lennar Corporation envisions a grand scale redevelopment project named The Shipyard. This large, waterfront, brownfield redevelopment project will bring in a mix of land uses to a site that currently houses a decommissioned naval port site, a state park, and the soon to be disused Candlestick Park stadium, home of the San Francisco 49ers football team. The project is planned to include 12,000 new homes, 326 acres of parks and open space, 3,150,000 square feet of office space, 885,000 square feet of retail space, and 100,000 square feet of community facilities. The site is incredibly complex, and the project is fiercely political.

The Shipyard also has the potential to bring to the area's residents long needed services, local jobs, green space, and stronger connections (economically and physically) to the rest of San Francisco. Bayview Hunters Point (BVHP) is a marginalized community characterized by lower income worker households and large African-American and Asian populations. It is one of the poorest neighbourhoods in San Francisco and suffers from problems such high unemployment rates, violence, and drug use. Historically there has been a lack of basic services in the area, such as access to well stocked grocery stores; this is compounded by BVHP's relative isolation. The community continues to be faced with a landscape shaped by an industrial past, including the presence of significant toxic contamination at the old naval site. As the Shipyard/ Candlestick Point project has moved forward, the question of how this project might affect or benefit that surrounding community has become an issue of utmost importance, inciting the efforts and passions of numerous groups. The resulting community benefits package and core community benefits agreement are seen as a significant success by some and as an inadequate offering by others.

Throughout the report, terminology is used as follows: the neighbourhood surrounding the project is referred to as Bayview Hunters Point (BVHP), or simply the Bayview; the project is comprised of two main parcels of land, the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard and Candlestick Point, and collectively the project is referred to as The Shipyard; The Shipyard is used in reference to the project, while the use of the word shipyard, without capitalization, is meant to refer to the naval site.

Figure 1 - A rendering of the future Shipyard project, downtown San Francisco in the background
Source: www.transparenthouse.com

The Shipyard project has been the result of many unique circumstances coalescing at a particular point in time. The building boom experienced in many American cities in the late 1990's and early 2000's coincides with Lennar's interest in the shipyard naval site and Candlestick Point. A site of such size and amenities in close proximity to central San Francisco offers adequate incentives such that a developer would be willing to navigate the lengthy remediation process, extensive permit requirements, and zoning changes necessary to move forward. When Lennar became the master developer for the site in 1999 the project was estimated to run over the course of 20-25 years. Now, in 2013, they are fourteen years into the project and vertical construction started in June of this year. There remains significant environmental remediation to be accomplished by the U.S. Navy before all of the land is turned over to the developer, and hurdles in terms of financing may produce additional slow-downs. However, this large scale project, estimated to take a quarter of a century to realize, is to transform completely both an underutilized plot of land and a larger community as well. This type of city-building strategy is typical of mega-projects and is associated, unfortunately, with residential displacement, increased congestion, and economic development in forms unlikely to employ current residents.

The Shipyard has experienced substantial delays thus far. Financing has been problematic and a lawsuit regarding environmental remediation and the early transfer of land slowed down the development process (detailed in Chapter 5). In addition, a significant change in California legislature, the disbanding of the state's redevelopment agencies, resulted in upheaval within the main governmental body responsible for the project. On February 1, 2011 all of California's redevelopment agencies were dissolved in hopes of redistributing funds in a manner which would improve the state's financial situation. Redevelopment agencies have historically concentrated on development in marginalized areas with programs such as economic development and affordable housing construction (Dolan, Garrison, and York, 2011). Since 2011 the Successor to the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency has continued to work on a few ongoing projects, Hunters Point Shipyard and Bayview Hunters Point continue to fall under their mandate (www.sfredevelopment.org).

The main research theme of this work is the problem of how a project of such large scale, which is part of a greater city-building strategy, can move forward while also benefitting the existing community in a way that is sensitive to local context. This problem is addressed by examining the appropriateness and effectiveness of the community engagement and benefits tactics employed in the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project. Appropriateness refers to how well the engagement and benefits processes account for the specific concerns and needs of the BVHP population, while effectiveness denotes the quality of these processes, as measured in outcomes. These two concepts are employed in order to assess how (and how well) the community has been involved in The Shipyard development process and if these processes might actually help address some of the social and economic justice issues of the past.

Supplementary research concerns include:

- What political or historical forces help empower communities to push for a role in the development of these projects?

- How can benefits be achieved that do not diminish over the lifespan of a project, and that secure sustainable aid for those who need it the most?

- How are various stakeholder groups benefitting from The Shipyard project? (If certain groups have been prioritized in the engagement process, the resulting development and associated benefits may not be ideal for the population as a whole.)

This topic is both critical and timely to study. A new concept of appropriate development practices has emerged, and there is an opportunity to strive for shaping the most successful and relevant standards for community engagement today. The current planning atmosphere in North America recognises that community engagement needs to be accomplished in a meaningful way in order to avoid the mistakes of the past, such as the redevelopment projects of the 1960's. Public participation and benefits have also been acknowledged as potential avenues of addressing social and economic injustice issues. It is in this environment that critical studies of development projects and engagement techniques must be completed in order to determine if these processes are actually accomplishing what they claim, how the incorporation of engagement is affecting urban development strategies, and the potential negative externalities of such an approach. Tools, such as CBAs, must be constantly examined so that disadvantages can be mitigated and that stakeholders do not fall into the trap of assuming that a tactic that works well for one development will be a success for all. This work supports the vision that community engagement and benefits need to stop being considered an optional or separate aspect of development projects, but must instead become an integral and innate part of them. Tactics need to be improved so that engagement can shift from passive information sharing to offering community members a true stake in the future of their neighbourhood through participation in the decision-making process.

Focusing on the case study of the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project allows for an examination of successes and failures of various techniques as they occurred on the ground. This research is complementary to the literature, which speaks to engagement tools more generally. It is often the very real political situation or historical legacy of a site that allows for certain engagement tools to be successful, and examining a current case study allows for an exploration of these details that may otherwise not be made obvious. The choice of the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project is also significant as the large scale of the development increases the stakes involved; an immense amount of money (an estimated 7.7 billion US$), a large piece of land, and increased political and public scrutiny means that the successes or failures of this project will occur in the spotlight and stand as examples to future developments. This project has the real opportunity to transform a neighbourhood, as well as that neighbourhood's relationship to the larger city of San Francisco. For The Shipyard to fail in this respect would be an enormous blow to the community.

It is important to address claims that the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project is pushing for a new level of community benefits, or that conversely the achieved benefits and engagement simply pays lip service to an unavoidable process, public participation, created by a particular political environment. In a project with so many controversial aspects, sensational reports and media attention can often highlight only one side

of a story. It is possible that while some groups benefit enormously from the project, others are passed over or must even suffer from some negative externalities. To allow certain groups to suffer, especially those who have been historically marginalized, is to allow trends of social and economic injustice to continue. A balance needs to be reached in which both current and future populations are benefitting from The Shipyard project.

This report contributes to the field of community engagement and public participation by examining the real life challenges associated with involving the community in the decision making process and studying the conditions that need to be in place in order for a developer to be amenable to an extended benefits and participation program. By looking at how appropriate and effective the various community engagement programs associated with the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project have been, this report questions how different stakeholder groups have been involved, as opposed to simply measuring final dollar amounts granted in benefits. The true value of benefits – in my view – lay in how effective they are in reaching all segments of the community, and how sustainable they are in regards to producing long-term changes. This report aims to add to the understanding of how to successfully incorporate the community in the development process and the advantages of doing so, while also providing a basis upon which future studies of this project can be based. A detailed examination of The Shipyard at its halfway point, just as actual construction commences, may help allow for those comparisons.

Construction of Phase I of the project broke ground on June 27, 2013. Although it will take many years for construction to be completed, the project now stands on the cusp of realizing, or not, all of the promises that have been made to the BVHP community. As the project evolves over time, further research should be conducted on how changes have affected outcomes and how expectations have been met or challenged. The hope is that the project, poised to be transformational in land uses, is one that empowers local residents and benefits all stakeholder groups.

Methodology

This work stems from the research being conducted by the Making Megaprojects Work for Communities group based in the McGill University Urban Planning Department (www.mcgill.ca/urbanplanning/mpc). This analysis is an extension of the work being done by Professor Lisa Bornstein on the execution of community benefit agreements in various cities. Initial research on The Shipyard and associated benefits agreements was conducted for a jointly written comparative paper (Bornstein and Leetmaa, 2012) that motivated me to take a more in-depth look at the project in order to better understand the dynamics at play and the extent and limitations of the agreed upon benefits. The BVHP project was originally brought to the group's attention by Julian Gross, the lawyer of the Lennar/AD10 CCBA and an expert in the field of CBAs more generally.

This research project was completed using qualitative methods. Data were collected from a variety of sources including official government documentation, promotional material, news and popular media sources, and interviews. Data collection was supplemented with a trip to San Francisco in order to complete interviews and a site-visit (from March 4 – 8, 2013). I collected quantitative data and concrete details while also seeking to capture more intangible information, such as the mood and feelings of different stakeholders regarding the project and the political process surrounding it.

Bodies that provided official documentation on the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project included: the Navy, the Successor to the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA), and the San Francisco Planning Department. The City of San Francisco provides open access to a large amount of documentation and is an excellent resource for details regarding regulatory requirements, development details, and historical information. The Successor to the SFRA provided documentation such as Disposition and Development Agreements (and amendments), Redevelopment Plans, Environmental Impact Reports, city-led Community Benefits Packages, and an inventory of community meetings held (the SFRA was dissolved on February 1, 2012 and a Successor Agency has been in place for certain projects since that time). Documentation from the Navy has been extremely detailed; the most important document for the purposes of this paper was their 185 page Final Community Involvement Plan. The majority of these documents were available online, although some had to be obtained through special requests or were passed on during interviews.

Because of how current the project is, news articles were critical sources of new information. Regular searches of local papers were completed using a list of relevant search terms. This was particularly helpful for keeping track of recent developments. Opinion pieces also provided a sense of how various groups have felt about the project, although care had to be taken in order to separate the information that was being reported and the views of the author. Many smaller local papers have an overt political position. Information from news sources provided leads for important issues to explore further, but not much substantive detail or information.

Promotional material for the development offered a look at what type of lifestyle Lennar is striving to provide at The Shipyard. The use of language and imagery was very telling in regards to how they want the rest of San Francisco to start imagining the Bayview area. The promotional website for The Shipyard highlighted positive community activities and developments in BVHP. This provides a contrast to media reports that tended to focus on crimes and other social problems in the area.

Interviews were semi-structured; guide questions were prepared beforehand but participants were encouraged to add information that they felt to be important or relevant. Interviews were conducted either using Skype VoIP or in-person during the research trip to San Francisco. Varying between 45 minutes and an hour and a half in length, interviews were scheduled at the participants' convenience. In-person interviews were conducted at a previously agreed upon location, usually the office space of the person or organization being interviewed. Interviews were recorded for transcription purposes if the interviewee agreed to it beforehand. Participants were initially contacted via email with a prepared script; this was later followed up by a phone call if no response was received. Interviewed participants represented a variety of stakeholder groups.

The trip to San Francisco permitted interviews with people face-to-face as well as a site visit. The ability to conduct interviews in person offered many advantages: interviewees tended to speak more informally, and more openly, in person than over the phone, and it was easier to gain perspective of how and where various groups operated. The site visit was unguided and as such could not include portions of the site blocked off to the public. This visit was critical in gaining perspective in regards to the scale of the site as well as the feel of the existing neighbourhood.

The main limitation of the research was that The Shipyard project was ongoing throughout the research period, and thus was constantly evolving. Information about the development could change week to week.

One pertinent example is with respect to the funding of The Shipyard. A deal that would have seen an immense amount of funding for the project coming from a Chinese bank collapsed, although many actors, including the mayor of San Francisco who had just made a trip to China to finalize the deal, assumed that the funding was secure. As of June, 2013, funding had been obtained from TPG Credit Management (Levy, 2013). This state of instability meant that throughout the research period much attention had to be paid to current events and news articles. However, this also made the project extremely dynamic and exciting.

Another limitation was the inability to contact representatives from all stakeholder groups. Despite efforts, some people were not interested or willing to be interviewed, and many were not reachable through the contact information provided on websites or otherwise. The tense political atmosphere and controversy surrounding The Shipyard project has made some people wary of granting interviews. An increased number of representatives would have been beneficial to this work, however the number of stakeholder groups involved in the project is large and to speak with all of them would have been outside the timeframe for preparing this report.

Writing about a development in San Francisco while based in Montreal also presented some unique considerations. Phone calls and scheduling had to take the time change into account and I was not as familiar with the planning atmosphere and development requirements of the city and the state. The majority of my interviews and my only site visit had to be scheduled into a one week period. Ideally I would have been able to re-visit the site and the larger neighbourhood several times. However, my role as an outsider also proved to be beneficial from a research point of view. I had few assumptions about the relationships between various people and groups and was able to enter the situation without preconceived beliefs about politics and tensions. These tensions revealed themselves to me through meetings and interviews and had less impact on my observations than if I had been aware of them initially. Furthermore, I was given the impression that some people felt more comfortable speaking to me because I was not associated with any local groups or organizations. Many were flattered that someone from so far away had taken an interest in their work.

Structure of the report

This report examines the appropriateness and effectiveness of the community engagement and benefits process surrounding The Shipyard project. The literature review (Chapter 2) examines characteristics typical of brownfield redevelopment and mega-projects, and the importance of involving the community in the planning and decision-making processes of each. A number of features must be in place for a developer to be willing to move forward on these types of projects, and these characteristics tend to support a situation in which public participation and empowerment is easier to achieve. The literature on community benefits agreements as tools for economic and social justice is also explored.

Chapter 3 gives an overview of the project site and the Bayview community, both what exists currently and from a historical perspective. The Shipyard project is then introduced and its features are described in detail in order to give the reader a sense of what will be on the ground once the project is completed, as well as an idea of what the implications of such a large project might be.

Chapter 4 outlines the main processes of community engagement and benefits: the Navy's public involvement plan, the official community engagement program run by Lennar and the City, the official community benefits program, and the core community benefits agreement negotiated between Lennar and the coalition of community groups called Alliance for District 10 (AD10). This section outlines the different approaches and tactics employed by various groups and what stakeholders were involved in the process.

Chapter 5 provides an assessment of those processes in regards to their effectiveness and appropriateness in engaging the Bayview community.

Finally, the report concludes with some lessons learned from the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project that may be helpful to similar developments in the future.

> *"San Francisco's shipyard project is both physically and economically transformative for the Bay Area, and globally significant..."*
>
> *-Bruce Katz, vice-presidents, Brookings Institution (San Francisco Chronicle, 2011).*

CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW

The Shipyard/Candlestick Point project is partially located on a heavily contaminated brownfield site (approximately 500 acres of a disused naval port site) and is large enough to share many characteristics associated with mega-projects. This literature review will explore the relationship between these types of redevelopment projects with the cities in which they are located, as well as with their neighbouring communities. First, the redevelopment and environmental remediation of brownfield sites will be explored. Next, the literature on mega-projects and their roles in city building and urban redevelopment will be presented. This literature review examines how it might be possible to reconcile city building strategies and local community needs using the three tools of: government investments, community participation, and community benefits agreements. Finally, the chapter examines the assessment of projects, specifically in terms of appropriateness and effectiveness.

Brownfields: redevelopment and environmental remediation

Brownfield redevelopment sites are argued to have a particular relationship with their communities and the larger city. They are characterized by significant environmental issues and tend to be located in areas of low-income households and high unemployment. Despite these attributes (or, arguably, because of them) the redevelopment of these brownfield sites has enormous potential to be transformative for both their immediate neighbourhood and the larger city or area in which they are located. Large scale brownfield sites may attract the development of mega-projects; these immense undertakings are favoured by cities looking to attract foreign capital and international attention. Arguably, for this potential to be realized, the site must be located in a growing and economically stable city. Developers require adequate incentives, such as high return on investment, in order to be willing to overcome unique challenges of brownfield redevelopment such as the lengthy remediation process and increased regulatory requirements. These conditions create an agreeable (even optimal) environment in which to push for extensive community engagement and benefits so that the development can address local issues while also acting as a larger city-building strategy. One such way that communities are finding to ensure that local needs are met is through the use of community benefit agreements (CBAs).

As defined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a brownfield site is a property that, due to the presence of toxic or polluting substances, requires decontamination before its reuse or redevelopment can move forward (www.epa.gov/brownfields). These sites tend to be contaminated due to past industrial uses. Environmental contaminants can be present in brownfield sites in the ground, water, or air at varying levels (Dixon, 2000). Often the pollutants can remain fairly harmless if they are not disturbed, but redevelopment can easily introduce dangerous matter into the environment. Ellerbusch argues that brownfield sites with residential neighbourhoods in close proximity may pose a health risk for that surrounding community (2006). Residents may feel confident that their health problems are connected to environmental contamination of the land and water, but this requires extensive and costly testing in order to verify (Metzger and Lendvay, 2006). In addition to these health concerns, undeveloped brownfield sites can have a significant impact on the surrounding neighbourhood by negatively affecting land values and perceptions of the area. These sites may be visually unappealing, which sends a negative signal to existing residents that their neighbourhood is not worthy of investment and upkeep, and of course sends a negative image to potential investors who may perceive this blight as a clear indication that they should not be investing in the area (Laurian, 2004).

Typically, brownfield sites are located in economically depressed areas with a high proportion of low-income and minority residents (Gallagher and Jackson, 2008). This trend is a result of the fact that industrial and manufacturing facilities have historically been built alongside workforce housing (Paull, 2008). The very process that results in brownfield site creation, the closing down of industrial activity, also results in a loss of jobs locally (Dixon, 2000). A circle of disinvestment is then at work; the presence of abandoned plots of land results in decay that leads to depressed property values and more abandonment (Ellerbusch, 2006). In the United States, these communities are often mostly non-white and characterized by low-income households. Since the 1990's, the redevelopment of brownfield sites has become a city-building strategy meant to achieve the revival of urban areas and to improve the state of the ecological environment (Dillon, 2013). Investment in these old industrial wastelands is creating a new type of value in the urban environment and signifying that the city, and investors, are willing to reconsider these spaces.

Brownfield sites can vary in their levels of contamination, with higher levels of pollutants obviously requiring more extensive, costly, and time-consuming clean-up processes (Dixon, 2000). At an extremely high level of contamination, the shipyard naval site has been placed on the National Priorities List by the EPA and labelled a Superfund site. Superfund (also known as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, CERCLA) is an environmental program run by the EPA designed to address abandoned hazardous waste sites (www.epa.gov/superfund). CERCLA was established in 1979 in order to leverage resources for the clean-up of these sites (Gallagher and Jackson, 2008). There are approximately 1500 Superfund sites currently in the United States (Gute, 2006). The EPA requires all brownfield site remediation projects that receive funding or other help from them to conduct a community engagement and education program (Dixon, 2000). Community engagement requirements include actions such as the preparation of a Community Involvement Plan, the appointment of an agency spokesperson for information dissemination, and community interviews (EPA, 2005). The Superfund Community Involvement Handbook (2005) prefaces the engagement requirements by stating "This table lists and describes the **minimum** community involvement requirements that EPA must conduct at a Superfund site. Simply fulfilling these requirements will not necessarily result in effective community involvement at a site" (p. 77). In addition to these requirements the EPA also provides an extensive Community Involvement Toolkit and policy directives that are meant to help developers and other groups achieve more meaningful and successful engagement (www.epa.gov/superfund/community/toolkit.htm).

Because of these characteristics, there is significant impetus to move forward with brownfield redevelopment. Investment in these projects can help achieve environmental aims as well as improve the situation for socio-economically marginalized populations. Gute (2006) sees brownfield redevelopment as an essential aspect in the management of environmental risk in high-income countries. The required decontamination process reduces levels of polluting elements and improves the environmental situation overall. The use of these brownfield sites also helps slow down processes of urban/suburban sprawl at the regional level because they allow for the re-use of land opposed to the development of greenfields (Dixon, 2000; www.epa.gov/brownfields). Brownfield sites are also often located advantageously in relation to the central city or to transportation corridors such as railways and waterways. This is an additional characteristic that makes them attractive as sites of potential development.

Development of these sites has the potential to bring in much needed jobs, economic development, and an expanded tax base (Meyer and Van Landingham, 2000; Solitare, 2005). However, unless a commitment has been made regarding local hiring, jobs entering the area may not be available to the local community

(Dixon, 2000). Local hire policies are often the result of public engagement and local benefits programs. In addition to this change in economic realities, the elimination of visual blight has an important impact on improving perceptions of a neighbourhood for both outsiders and residents. Changing how people perceive the area and working against the stigma of a neighbourhood can help reverse trends of disinvestment, working to shift an underutilized, contaminated, and unsightly property into a community asset (Paull, 2008).

The transformation of brownfield sites also has the potential to address issues of environmental injustice in depressed neighbourhoods, as identified by Gallagher and Jackson (2008). These low-income communities often suffer from significant health problems associated with their proximity to brownfield sites (especially those with high levels of contamination, such as Superfund sites). Property values also suffer as visual blight and stigmatization of the area keep new residents and investors away (DePass, 2006). Often communities feel that they have been overlooked and ignored by governments as contaminated sites are left unaddressed. In order to tackle this problem, public funds for brownfield clean-up should be targeted at communities that have suffered the most (Knapp and Hollander, 2012). The EPA's National Priorities List includes the location and state of contamination of Superfund sites and has helped increase the transparency and awareness of hazardous sites. Acknowledging the existence of contamination and the prioritization of its clean-up is a first step in addressing these issues of environmental injustice. Other steps towards addressing environmental injustice include educating the public about the state of these sites, listening to their concerns, and involving them in the decision-making process (DePass, 2006).

In the case of BVHP, many in the community feel that they are victims of environmental injustice as they have been subjected to environmental hazards and routinely neglected by the City (Metzger and Lendvay, 2006). A myriad of health problems, such as asthma and cancer, plague BVHP residents at an above average level. Many directly relate their illnesses to the multitude of toxic sites located within their neighbourhood (in addition to the shipyard Superfund site, there are an estimated 100 brownfield sites, numerous leaking underground fuel tanks, and a sewage treatment center located in the immediate area (Bayview Hunters Point Mothers Environmental Health & Justice Committee, 2004)). BVHP residents have a sense of powerlessness as they are subjected to these disproportionately high environmental burdens, yet feel that they lack capacity to engage the city in order to enact change (Metzger and Lendvay, 2006). Pursuing remediation of these contaminated sites will help signal to the community that their health concerns are being addressed. In addition to benefitting the immediate community, environmental remediation is necessary in order for new investors and residents to feel safe moving into the area.

Mega-projects and urban redevelopment/city-building

Large brownfield sites often attract a type of development called a mega-project. Typically mega-projects take one of two different forms: the first is a single large building with significant symbolic power, such as a concert hall or sports arena, and the second is a larger but more complex development that incorporates many land uses and forms (Orueta and Fainstein, 2009). Regardless of final form, mega-projects are characterized by a long timeline, which means that they must inevitably weather political changes. Because of this, completed projects rarely match their initial proposals (Orueta and Fainstein, 2009) and special care must be taken to ensure that changes do not erode the intended effects or community benefits associated with the project.

It is not atypical for new mega-projects to be located on brownfield sites; in developed countries, mega-projects now tend towards the use of disused industrial lands (as opposed to residential areas as done in the past) (Orueta and Fainstein, 2009). This is a significant change in practice compared to the large scale redevelopment projects of the 1960's that resulted in significant residential displacement, often through the razing of entire neighbourhoods. Ellerbusch (2006) argues that the redevelopment of the 1960's shares similar goals with contemporary brownfield redevelopment goals: improving the state of housing and encouraging economic growth. He states that the main difference separating developers from the mistakes of fifty years ago is listening to the needs of the community. The legacy of the redevelopment projects of the 1960's continues to color popular perceptions of large city-led projects, and is in part responsible for the community benefits movement. However, contemporary mega-projects are now being used as tools for competition and growth by cities, not as opportunities for slum removal (Orueta and Fainstein, 2009).

Both brownfield redevelopment and the building of mega-projects have become popular strategies for North American cities with strong economies. A strong real estate market and high land values are critical in order for them to be attractive to developers. Brownfield developments in particular require a high potential return on investment for developers to be willing to navigate the lengthy and expensive decontamination process. Paull (2008) outlines additional development obstacles: remediation costs are high and therefore can be a source of uncertainty in estimating project costs, the pre-development process tends to be longer because of the expanded regulatory process, and when these sites are located in marginal communities then developers face additional market barriers such as lower land values.

During the late 1990's and early 2000's, centrally located urban land became more attractive to potential developers and investors (Bornstein, 2007; Eisinger, 2000). A building boom resulted from this increase in the popularity of cities, and lands adjacent to central business districts, such as old industrial sites or transportation hubs, were consumed at an increasing rate (Parks and Warren, 2009; Wolf-Powers, 2010). These newly desirable locations were often situated within or in close proximity to poorer residential neighbourhoods, populated by people who had moved in when no one else was willing to. These groups came to fear the potential negative externalities of large-scale redevelopment in their neighbourhoods, such as displacement, congestion, and increases in the costs of living. These neighbourhoods became prime sites for urban mega-project development. However, the potential and much needed opportunities associated with redevelopment, such as economic growth and the creation of employment, were attractive to the existing community as well (Wolf-Powers, 2010).

Mega-projects tend to be located in cities that have reached a significant level of growth and now desire the development of a project that may help them become more recognized on the world stage (Bornstein, 2010). Large scale sporting events and their associated infrastructure, such as the upcoming 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar or the 2012 London Olympics, are good examples of this strategy. The Shipyard/Candlestick Point project was originally planned with the potential siting of a new stadium as part of the development, although this would have been a regional draw, not an international one. The stadium has since been dropped from the project (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3).

Reconciling city building strategies and local community needs

One of the main concerns in both brownfield and mega-project developments (or in projects characterized as both, such as the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project) is how to pursue a city-building strategy while at the same time taking local concerns into consideration (Bornstein, 2010). Mega-projects represent a model of urban development that is attractive to municipal governments. These high profile projects can help attract external capital and redefine a neighbourhood that suffers from a negative public image. Because of the characteristics of these projects, detailed above, these redevelopment projects actually create an optimal situation for communities to push for high levels of engagement and benefits. Increasingly, cities are looking for projects to establish themselves as desired additions to the community, and are hoping for developers who are willing to engage the community and seriously undertake improvements for the community through a benefits program (Laing, 2009). Cities often need leverage in order to push developers to pursue engagement and benefits programs; this leverage is most easily found in urban areas with strong economies and high land values, two characteristics that often encourage the development of brownfield sites and mega-projects.

Government investment

Typically brownfield redevelopment is highly subsidized or funded by the federal government, therefore the public has a greater stake in how that site will be used (Bartsch, 2003). The use of tax funds for clean-up means that there is a greater imperative to include the public in the decision making process. The Shipyard/Candlestick Point project is unique in this sense because the clean-up is being completed by the Navy and funded by the Department of Defense. Although this is still a use of federal funds, as the Navy is a federal organization, it does not reflect the typical process of private developers or cities receiving subsidies and grants from the federal government so that they can move forward with remediation. The proportion of public money to private money tends to increase as the site is located in less desirable locations. A study from the Northeast-Midwest Institute found that on average in the United States a brownfield redevelopment project will receive one dollar of public money in every eight spent, while a project located in an area of low real estate values may see subsidies as high as one dollar in every three (Paull, 2008).

Community participation

One of the most critical components in moving forward with brownfield redevelopment is the development and execution of an appropriate and extensive community participation process. As Bartsch (2003) argues, this process is critical (even more so than with new or greenfield development), because of the significant public funds involved and the histories that these sites have had in their communities. Often these sites are strongly associated with the loss of jobs and economic power, and this loss is symbolized in strong visual blight. They come to represent both the past and the potential future for existing residents. Public participation is crucial in order to navigate competing visions for this future. Participation can occur at varying levels, from simple and somewhat passive public notification to extensive management of the redevelopment process and a symbolic ownership of the remediation process (Dixon, 2000). In between, different degrees of input on clean-up process decisions can be granted to the public.

Gallagher and Jackson (2008) argue that passive methods of informing the public, such as public information meetings, are not sufficient in assuring that remediation will be completed properly, that land uses

will be satisfactory, or that community redevelopment objectives will be addressed. Ideally, the community should be actively involved through processes that include a regular back and forth dialogue between stakeholders, such as the development of an advisory committee. An advisory committee is typically composed of members who represent different stakeholder groups, such as residents, business owners, and community leaders, and is responsible for representing, and passing information onto, the larger population. In addition to educating residents about the remediation, this process can help build trust between stakeholder groups and should produce results that are satisfactory to the impacted community.

In 2003, the EPA released its Public Involvement Policy which outlines a recommended set of procedures for public participation. These guidelines are not legally enforceable, but offer a starting point for EPA administered programs (Solitare, 2005). Public participation regarding environmental clean-up is desirable because it can help address issues of environmental injustice (Gallagher and Jackson, 2008). There are additional advantages to pursuing extensive public participation: it adds to the democratic process and as such remediation outcomes gain greater validity in the eyes of the public (Solitare, 2005). This means that the public will be less likely to contest the remediation outcomes; this will speed up and facilitate moving forward with development. Local collective knowledge can also produce superior decisions, improving the final results of the remediation. Other benefits include empowering and educating the community while dispelling misinformation. Despite these advantages there are potential negative externalities related to involving the public, such as suffering from a slowdown in the remediation process, subjecting the clean-up and redevelopment to ideas put forward by non-experts, increasing costs, causing conflict between community groups or members, and alienating the opinion of those who are not adequately vocal or who do not feel comfortable within the participation process (EPA, 2005; Cogan, 2000).

Public participation does not necessarily occur naturally even if the appropriate processes are in place. Certain factors come into play regarding whether the public will be willing or eager to participate in an engagement process. Citizens must feel that they are part of the decision making procedure and that they are able to shape the forthcoming development in a way that might enhance the future of their community (Solitare, 2005). Greenberg and Lewis (2000) conducted a study of two hundred residents in a low-income, primarily Hispanic, New Jersey neighbourhood in order to identify how and to what degree residents wanted to be involved in the redevelopment process. They found that those individuals who wanted to participate tended to be positive thinkers, with a distrust of authority, bothered by the presence of brownfields, and eager to improve the situation for future generations.

As outlined by Solitare (2005), there are five main conditions that encourage public participation: all stakeholders involved in the process must be committed to the involvement of the public, residents need to be aware of all participation opportunities, residents need to have the available time and resources to commit to participating, there must be a sense of trust regarding the stakeholders' fairness and honesty, and the issue at stake must be one that is considered to be problematic by the community. Laurian (2004) underlines the necessity of residents having time and money in order to be able to participate fully; it is usually residents of high or medium high incomes that are able to participate in local politics or interest groups. This is problematic in typical brownfield sites as surrounding neighbourhoods tend to be characterized by lower income households. In order to capture that group, Laurian (2004) recommends that organizers provide resources for participation, such as free child care services during meetings, and take the needs of these populations into consideration when planning the time and location of meetings.

One of the most basic barriers to public participation is the public's lack of knowledge regarding meetings and other opportunities for involvement. Increasing awareness of these opportunities is a critical first step. Improving the public's view of local government and the developer can also help foster a culture of participation if it gives the perception that the engagement process is legitimate (Solitare, 2005). When residents feel that their input is being taken seriously they are more willing to commit time and other resources to participating in the redevelopment process. When the developer is considered part of the community, and is perceived as an insider by the local population, then levels of trust will be much higher than if they are perceived to be outsiders (Solitare, 2005). This is an integral aspect of Lennar's strategy, as discussed further in Chapter 4. Developers that need to establish their position and that trust must work even harder to involve the public.

If parties are not viewed as legitimate by the public, an organized and concerned community can advocate for a public process at a different level of government. This is appropriate in the face of potential collusion between the government and the private sector, so that a community can work to expose either party. Finally, communities that have a history of activism or political rallying tend to be more capable of pushing for community participation in these situations. A strong base of active community organizations can help galvanize residents and create a sense of ownership regarding brownfield land (Dixon, 2000).

Public participation in the development of mega-projects is equally as important, yet presents a different set of problems and considerations (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003): local fears of gentrification and displacement are often justified when these large scale projects come into established neighbourhoods, and low-income households are often the ones with the least political power to fight them, yet are disproportionately impacted. There is a range of tools and tactics that communities can engage in order to secure benefits and a development process that moves forward while respecting their needs.

Developers have tended to pay lip-service to community engagement requirements by holding informational meetings at which point community members can voice their concern regarding decisions that have already been made. This passive form of public engagement rarely helps to address the needs of the existing community and does not encourage community organizing or empowerment. The past decades of planning practice have witnessed a shift towards more effective and active forms of participation. Most recently, community benefits are emerging as a more widely recognized aspect of the development process and a right of the community (Parks and Warren, 2009), although they continue to be a hotly contested subject. Tools and tactics that have been developed to embrace this new perspective on engagement include (Islands Trust, 2010):

- community member advisory boards,
- community workshops that involve members of the public in the decision making process,
- informal meetings for community members to discuss issues in casual venues such as coffee shops,
- outreach where the developer actively searches out groups (such as church congregations) to provide with information (as opposed to meetings with a set time and place that members must decide whether or not to attend),
- design charrettes, and
- the dissemination of information in highly accessible ways such as online list-serves.

Community Benefits Agreements

In the early 2000's, a new tool emerged in urban redevelopment practice in the United States: the community benefits agreement (CBA). This development deal is a legally binding contract between the developer of a project and a coalition of community groups (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, 2005). A CBA typically commits a developer to a certain community benefits package in exchange for support of their project by a partnership of community groups. The public sector is not party to a private CBA. This tool has been used in numerous redevelopment projects across the United States, a large portion of which have been located in California. A CBA has been negotiated in regards to the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project.

Mega-project and brownfield development have prompted numerous communities to come together to challenge this new growth regime with campaigns that push for growth to be coupled with equity (Parks and Warren, 2009). CBAs came forward as a solution to this tension; a way of moving forward with redevelopment while benefitting the existing community. The environment described above, one of a strong real estate market and renewed interest in centrally located sites, is one of three pre-requites outlined by Wolf-Powers (2010) for a CBA to work. In addition to this strong incentive for real estate investment, a project must have significant public subsidy associated with it, and the potential for community opposition to disrupt the project must be strong enough that it makes logical sense for a developer to negotiate with community groups in return for their support. The greater the amount of public money associated with a project, the greater the moral imperative to involve the public and to develop a substantial benefits package. As mentioned earlier, these characteristics are often associated with brownfield redevelopment and mega-projects.

A CBA outlines a community benefits package that the developer is committed to providing over the life of the project or within a set time frame (such as fifteen or twenty five years). These benefits may act as a complement to those achieved by the City in their Disposition and Development Agreement (DDA), but are outside the public domain. The legal recourse available to both parties if the other does not follow through on their commitments is one of the most significant and innovative aspects of a CBA. A DDA, including the benefits outlined within it, can be amended multiple times over the lifespan of a project. Benefits may erode as complications occur and cost estimates change. This is a particularly substantial threat for mega-projects as their timelines are so long term. Legal enforceability also helps protect the benefits in face of the fact that the political leverage and influence that community groups have diminishes significantly once a project has been approved (Gross, 2008). In return for this benefits package, the coalition of community groups commits to publicly support the project.

Gross (2008) emphasizes that the two main components in the definition of a CBA are inclusiveness and accountability. Inclusiveness refers to the process of negotiating the CBA; it should be a tool through which a spectrum of community concerns can be heard and addressed before a project obtains approval. Although it should expand the ability of a community to express their concerns, a CBA should not substitute an extensive engagement or participation process run by the city or the developer regarding the project. Greater inclusiveness grants the CBA improved political leverage and negotiating power. Only an inclusive coalition of groups with adequate political sway will be able to convince a developer to participate in a CBA. Accountability refers to the outcome of a CBA rather than the process. A CBA holds each party legally accountable to their commitments over the entire lifespan of the project.

Although the specifics of the benefits package vary from project to project, the main issues tend to include: the development of affordable housing, the creation of a fund for use by the community, benefits regarding employment (job training, local/first source hiring, and living wage ordinances), improvements to local transportation infrastructure, the construction of public amenities or facilities (such as parks and meeting space), and improvements to the ecological environment (Knapp and Hollander, 2012). According to proponents, each CBA should be shaped by the particular needs of the community, as determined through public consultation. This can be a challenging process, especially when there are numerous groups with competing needs involved. Often groups exist that are against a particular project regardless of any potential achieved benefits; these groups can argue that the coalition claiming to speak for the community as whole are not in fact representative (Wolf-Powers, 2010).

The coalition of community groups needs to be well organized, should have a significantly large constituency, must have adequate political leverage, and need to be able to reach common priorities and goals (Baxamusa, 2008; Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, 2005; Parks and Warren, 2009). In American cities, unions and other labour groups often have significant political power and their involvement in CBA coalitions has proven successful several times (Laing, 2009). According to Wolf-Powers (2010), the inclusion of organized labour can involve the greater labour movement politics of the larger city or region in which the project is situated. She also points out that there is a potential conflict between the interests of union members and the interests of community members trying to get access to union jobs. This tension would be most relevant in the construction industry. Bornstein argues that as unions have become active in the urban planning arena, they have brought new organising and negotiating tactics that have worked to redefine the relationships between developers, government, and the community (2007). However, unions have not made a presence in community development in all cities; the Canadian experience has much less union involvement than the American one (Bornstein, 2007). CBAs have been identified as potential avenues to bring labour and community groups together for the greater goals of promoting social justice (Laing, 2009). Other groups commonly involved include faith-based organizations, affordable housing supporters, environmental advocates, and community groups working on social and economic justice or development issues.

Since the early 2000's, a significant body of literature has emerged regarding CBAs. Many authors have written about the legal structure, the potential that such a tool has in the development field, and its associated advantages and disadvantages. Julian Gross, the director of the Community Benefits Law Center and the lawyer who negotiated the Lennar/AD10 agreement, has written extensively on the topic. His work would provide a solid base for those wishing to learn more about CBAs or explore concepts mentioned here in greater detail.

There are certain prerequisites necessary for a CBA to work. The preconditions for being able to effectively negotiate a CBA are outlined in Table 1, and the elements of a successful CBA are outlined in Table 2 (below). Logically, both parties involved require certain incentives for them to participate in a CBA. Often the community coalition wants a project to move forward as long as certain benefits are associated with it. However, groups often do not have a clear stance at the outset of negotiations and sometimes they can be quite rigid in their belief that the project should only move forward if certain conditions are met. The motivation on part of the developer is a bit more complex. Baxamusa (2008) argues that the reason for a developer to participate in a CBA is purely political. He states that the main impetus for the developer to participate is the fear of uncertainty which throws off the typical balance of power. This political leverage

is the main power source for the community coalition, and because of this there is an impetus to involve as many community members as possible in the coalition in order to develop this leverage (Gross, 2008). The developer will commit to a CBA only if there is a threat that their project might not be able to move forward without substantial public support. All large projects must go through a discretionary public vote, in which politics and the level of popular support play a critical role. Zoning changes, land sales, subsidies, and infrastructure support are some examples of issues which would require a public vote.

In addition to the agreed upon community benefits package, CBAs also help achieve community empowerment as they actively involve community members in defining their own goals and stipulations as to how a project can move forward. Knapp and Hollander (2012) state that CBAs have the potential to be transformative to the brownfield redevelopment practice. Both pursue common goals of public participation, community empowerment, local economic growth and environmentally sustainable development.

Parks and Warren see CBAs as a critical component of the new accountable development movement (NADM) (2009). The authors define the NADM as an effort at the local level, especially through organized labour groups, to push for justice in situations of economic inequality. With the aim of economic and power redistribution, the CBA is one potential tool that can be used within a larger economic justice movement to help fairly allocate the benefits of new urban growth (other tools include: living wage ordinances, labour-peace agreements, and minimum-wage campaigns). The authors argue that in order for a CBA to be effective it must be grounded in a larger organized political movement that works at the local level for economic justice and the redistribution of benefits.

Despite a fairly successful track record thus far, CBAs continue to draw significant criticism from various groups. These criticisms tend to be associated with specific projects rather than the concept as a whole, and are often the result of misinformation or misunderstandings regarding the agreement. One regularly stated criticism is that the groups in the community coalition are self-interested and are pushing for benefits most useful to their own constituents (Wolf-Powers, 2010). In addition to favouring the needs of their own members, these groups are often criticized for not being representative enough of the entire affected community. This criticism speaks to the difficulty of appeasing all community groups, something that a CBA does not actually have to achieve. These groups who are fundamentally against the project have also made claims that a CBA is simply a tool with which a developer can purchase public support through the promise of delivering certain benefits that will not reach the whole community (Wolf-Powers, 2010). However, groups from the coalition are often restricted by terms of the CBA itself from receiving direct financial benefits from the agreement.

Criticisms of CBAs have also been distilled from projects that claim to have a CBA, but in fact have agreements that differ significantly from the true definition of a CBA and undermine the concepts of inclusiveness and accountability put forward by Gross (2008). In particular, several examples from New York City have been heavily condemned (Fainstein, 2009; Salkin, 2007). The 2006 Bronx Terminal Market CBA has been criticized for being weak and for not representing the wider community in its demands; the community groups that were involved were given short notice to draft their concerns, and most did not have the time or resources to get professional help. This resulted in the community groups having very little actual power during the negotiation process (Salkin, 2007). Furthermore, the commitments found within the agreement are not easily enforceable, especially once the responsibility for their implementation falls to tenants and contractors (third parties to the CBA) (Gross, 2008). Stronger language and tighter agree-

ments can usually be achieved when legal help is available while drafting the agreement, especially if the lawyer has had previous experience with CBAs. These shortcomings may have been minimized if the CBA had respected the importance of inclusiveness and accountability.

Although many of these criticisms seem to be based in misinformation or misunderstandings of the concept, CBAs need to be evaluated further before issuing strong statements about their success as a tool for securing community engagement and benefits. Knapp and Hollander (2012) point out that there has been a lack of evaluative literature on the subject and therefore discussions on its success are currently speculative. It seems that immediate benefits, such as community empowerment in the redevelopment process, have been achieved but the execution of projects is recent and on-going, and it is thus too early to properly assess longer-term benefits.

According to Parks and Warren (2009), a successful CBA should have a high level of transparency in its negotiation and implementation, in addition to a well-defined and vigorous method of tracking and enforcing implementation. Implementation is strengthened when the larger community continues to scrutinize the developer and track the realization of the committed benefits. The community coalition must continue to be a unified and strong body in order to ensure that benefits are achieved (Parks and Warren, 2009). The implementation of CBAs can be burdensome and time consuming for the groups involved. Often an implementation committee is organized; this group sets forth the rules that will guide the use of funds. Different stakeholders, such as community representatives and local government, can be included in the implementation role (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, 2005).

It may be difficult to emphasize the need for stringent monitoring during the initial negotiation process because it suggests a lack of trust, however it is critical that enforcement of the agreement is detailed and legally sound (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, 2005). In order for effective enforcement and monitoring to be possible, each benefit within a CBA must have a time frame associated with it so it is clear when the benefit must be delivered (and conversely, make it clear when it has not been supplied on time). Monitoring can be achieved through the use of reports from the developer, required at regular intervals and by certain dates. In addition to these reports, community groups should investigate the developer's claims in order to assure that they are being truthful. Tenants in the new development should be able to prove that they are adhering to wage and hiring policies as outlined in the CBA, however they may be reluctant to do so (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, 2005).

Table 1 – Preconditions for successful CBA negotiations

ELEMENT	SOURCE
• a strong real estate market • significant public subsidy associated with the project • high potential for community opposition to disrupt the project	Wolf-Powers, 2010
• a coalition of community groups that is well organized, has a significantly large constituency, has adequate political leverage, and is able to reach common priorities and goals	Baxamusa, 2008 Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, 2005 Parks and Warren, 2009
• a fear of uncertainty which throws off the typical balance of power between the developer and the community	Baxamusa, 2008

Table 2 - Key elements for a successful CBA

ELEMENT	SOURCE
• inclusiveness • accountability	Gross, 2008
• grounding in a larger organized political movement that works at the local level for economic justice and the redistribution of benefits • a high level of transparency in negotiation and implementation • a well-defined and vigorous method of tracking and enforcing implementation	Parks and Warren, 2009
• a time frame associated with the outlined benefits	Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio, 2005

Assessing projects

The literature suggests that a series of different elements contribute to the success of a CBA (see Table 1). More generally, this report examines the BVHP development initiatives and engagement processes in terms of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the project vis-à-vis its context. Some of the criteria for each come from official regulations and guidelines (legislation, planning guidelines and the like); others arise from the literature discussed above; and still others derive from the specific historical context of the area (see Chapter 3). The operational criteria for assessment are listed briefly below, and discussed further in Chapter 5. Only a few indicative sources are listed, though the literature on each criterion is extensive.

Palerm (2000) argues that public participation processes must be evaluated within their own country-specific context and that criteria should not be applied across situations of different circumstances. Participant aims can vary widely depending on historical, cultural, and environmental backgrounds, making the evaluation of public participation by goals especially sensitive to local context (Chess and Purcell, 1999). In this report, two primary criteria are used to explore the success of the engagement between the 'developers' and 'local residents'. The first is to look broadly at how well the engagement and benefits processes have taken **local context and local concerns** into account by addressing issues of key importance to the BVHP community in the development project. I term this broad criteria 'appropriateness' to signify that the resulting development - if responding well to a range of local conditions and incorporating many local concerns – would be one that was seen as an 'appropriate' development for the site by a wide range of stakeholders. Some criteria of appropriateness in this sense include:

- *Voice/inclusiveness*: have steps been taken to ensure input from all sectors of the community is considered in a meaningful way in the formulation of the development project? (Gross, 2008).

- *Equity*: do these development processes balance benefits for both current and future populations of BVHP? Are these processes helping to address economic inequality? (Parks and Warren, 2009).

- *Environmental justice*: have all segments of the affected population had the opportunity to be informed, to discuss, or to bring forward concerns regarding environmental issues, a key issue in past neighbourhood struggles over development? (DePass, 2006; Metzger and Lendvay, 2006; www.epa.gov/superfund). To what extent does the resulting development – as approved – respond to such concerns?

- *Aesthetic fit*: have intangibles, such as the design and aesthetics preferences of neighbourhood residents, been taken into consideration? Is the design of the project one which residents find 'fits' with the existing site and neighbourhood? (Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989).

Effectiveness, in this study, is assessed based on the outcomes of these processes, and as such criteria can be difficult to develop as definitions of successful outcomes may vary from group to group (Chess and Purcell, 1999). When the goals of participation vary between groups, developing evaluation criteria can be problematic:

> "Participation can thus be seen by different parties as a threat or an opportunity, a legal obligation or a bundle of democratic rights. These different expectations and experiences condition the criteria stakeholders may adopt to evaluate participation." (Laurian and Shaw, 2008, p. 296)

Despite these evaluative difficulties, the following criteria can help indicate if outcomes will be successful and therefore effective:

- *Participation*: has the public been willing to be part of the participation process? If so, have they had the capacity to participate? (Palerm, 2000; Solitaire, 2005)

- *Legitimacy*: do participants perceive the project and the developer to be legitimate? (Solitare, 2005)

- *Timing*: at what point in the decision making process was the public involved? (Chess and Purcell, 1999)

- *Quality*: have the processes allowed for meaningful deliberations across all stakeholder groups? (Cogan, 2000)

The above criteria will allow this report to consider some of the most important issues for the BVHP community and provide an assessment of the community engagement and benefits process that is sensitive to local context.

Summary

In this age of new city building strategies, brownfield redevelopment has the capacity to address issues of environmental injustice, clean-up unattractive and unhealthy sites, stimulate economic growth, and help transform blighted urban areas. Often brownfield sites offer great potential for the construction of mega-projects. These two types of development must be located in economically strong cities for developers to be willing to take on the added hurdles of remediation and increased timelines and costs. Large amounts of public funding tend to be involved and public approval is required for necessary regulatory changes, which creates an optimal environment for affected communities to push for an extensive engagement process and benefits package. As a new accountable development movement pushes for active engagement opportunities, a new range of tools has emerged above and beyond the traditional and passive public informational meetings: the community benefits agreement. The following chapters will look at the history of the Bayview Hunters Point community and details of the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project. Furthermore the Lennar/AD10 CCBA, the core community benefits agreement for the project, will be explored through some of the primary concepts that have been introduced in this literature review.

CHAPTER THREE - THE SITE, COMMUNITY, & PROJECT

The Shipyard project is illustrative of challenges faced by many old port sites around the world; large scale sites, often adjacent to economically strong cities, are ripe for redevelopment but must first clear the hurdle of significant environmental contamination, and then proceed with development in a manner that respects and involves the surrounding communities. The Bayview Hunters Point neighbourhood has historically been considered distinct and separate from the rest of the city of San Francisco, a perception perpetuated by a legacy of industrial development and sensationalistic portrayals of the community in popular media. This relative isolation from the rest of the city has created a community and site with a host of unique and complex characteristics that demand careful consideration by Lennar and the City when moving forward with The Shipyard project. This section will describe some of the main characteristics of the project site, the history of the BVHP community, and the details of the Lennar project. The site's history and characteristics show how desirable it is to develop the Shipyard and Candlestick Point lots, while also making clear the challenges that need to be surmounted before that is possible. The community of Bayview Hunters Point is diverse and has a strong history of community activism, yet suffers from high rates of unemployment, criminal activity, and health problems. The essential challenge, faced by Lennar, the City, and the community is how to make the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project work within the neighbourhood and for the neighbourhood. The details of the project, as outlined in the Disposition and Development Agreements for each phase, are outlined to convey its scale and character, and to underline how this development will represent a significant change from past land uses.

Figure 2 - View onto BVHP from Candlestick Point
Source: personal photograph

The Site

The city of San Francisco defines Bayview Hunters Point, also referred to as the Bayview, by the boundaries of Cesar Chavez Boulevard to the north, Bayview Hill to the south, and Highway 101 to the west (with San Francisco Bay to the east). This larger area contains the neighbourhoods of Hunters Point, India Basin, Bayview, Silver Terrace, Bret Harte, Islais Creek Estuary and South Basin as well as the Candlestick Point state park and stadium and the decommissioned naval shipyard site (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). This southeasterly section of San Francisco has historically been referred to as South Bayshore and shares the same geographical boundaries as the 94124 zip code (see figure 3). These boundaries define all data listed within this report. There are eleven districts in San Francisco, each represented by one member of the Board of Supervisors, a body which is similar in purpose and structure to a city council. The Bayview is located in District 10, a larger area that also encompasses the neighbourhoods of Potrero Hill, Central Waterfront, Dogpatch, Visitacion Valley, Little Hollywood, Sunnydale, and McLaren Park (see figure 4). This distinction is of importance due to how the coalition of community groups party to the project community benefits agreement chose to define itself (the three groups came together to form the Alliance for District 10, AD10).



Figure 3 - San Francisco ZIP codes, code 94124 highlighted in yellow
Source: maps.com, Santa Barbara, emphasis on 94124 added by author



Figure 4 - District 10 highlighted in red
Source: www.sfgov2.org

The project site is situated on the disused Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, the Candlestick Point State Recreation Area, and Candlestick Park Stadium and covers over 700 acres of land. The site has few built up portions and contains no residential buildings. The only significant use currently on the shipyard site is an artist colony called The Point, which houses studios for over 300 visual artists, writers, and musicians. These artists started to move into disused buildings on the old naval site in the early 1980's and now represent the largest artist colony in the United States (www.thepointart.com).

The Bayview is distanced from the rest of San Francisco in part by geography (some hilly topography) and large infrastructure (U.S. Highway 101, Interstate 280), as well as through particular processes of historical development (and arguably underdevelopment). Originally, efforts to keep the Bayview separate from the rest of the city were explicit; zoning was employed to keep industrial uses, especially those associated with unpleasant smells or other emissions, away from downtown and grouped together in BVHP. Proximity to shipping services also encouraged the development of industry in this area. The Bayview's industrial history started with the concentration of slaughterhouses in the area, this earned it the nickname "Butchertown" in the 1850's. The slaughterhouses were joined by tanneries, meat-packing factories, and fertilizer producers. The area that they occupied, on the Islais Creek mudflats, is the same area that the India Basin Industrial Park occupies to this day.

Perhaps the most critical development in the Bayview was the building of a dry dock in 1866 and the greater maritime development of the area in general (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). In 1903 a new dry dock was completed, the largest on the West Coast. Naturally deep waters off of the coast made this area ideal for the docking of large vessels. Bethlehem Steel eventually took over the site from the California Dry Dock

company (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). In the 1930's, the site was further developed and became a nucleus of jobs and economic activity. This resulted in residences and other services for workers starting to appear, helping to stabilize the area. In 1940, the U.S. Navy acquired the dry dock and it became the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. This significantly catalyzed further development of the area and laid way for one of the most transformative periods for this community: World War II.

The Hunters Point Naval Shipyard was a site of critical importance for the United States during WWII, and became a significant employment hub. The availability of jobs attracted unprecedented levels of migrant workers to the area, and the Bayview saw its population explode from 14,000 in 1940 to 43,000 in 1945 (SFRA, 1996). This increase was similar to that experienced by the rest of San Francisco, although in 1950 BVHP's population reached over 51,000 at a point when the overall population of San Francisco was decreasing (Kelly and VerPlanck, 2010). In particular, traditionally marginalized groups such as African-Americans and women were able to profit from the increase in jobs as many able bodied men who would normally have access to these jobs were overseas. The quality of the jobs, many were in skilled occupations, was higher than what would have been available to these groups traditionally (SFRA, 2002). An already established community of African-Americans made it a natural location for black wartime workers to settle (SFRA, 1996). During this time the Bayview became an industrial center of regional importance as activities

Figure 5 - Aircraft carriers being repaired at the shipyard, 1963



Figure 6 - Dry docks at the shipyard, circa 1920



Figure 7 - Dry docks at the shipyard, circa 1867

Source (all 3 figures): Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010

such as steel production, warship construction, and national defense increased (SFRA, 2002). During the war the shipyard was enormously important economically for the whole of San Francisco and a strategically important point for the Allies.

During its time on the site, the U.S. Navy handled many toxic substances, including nuclear material. The Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, a radioactive research lab, was located at the shipyard and "Fat Man", the first atomic bomb to be used in warfare, was transported through the shipyard en route to its final destination (SFRA, 1996). Other activities, such as the cleaning of ships and the use of toxic paints, contributed to a legacy of environmental contamination that characterizes the site to this day.

The naval site was a critical part of San Francisco's industrial base as a whole, and the Bayview has been extremely important in the overall economic development of the city. As operations on the naval site slowed down, the Bayview's population declined to about 20,000 (SFRA, 2002). Employment at the shipyard decreased from its peak of 18,235 to 6,000 by 1949. When the Navy ceased operations on the site in 1974 the majority of those workers lost their jobs. The Navy officially closed the base in 1988, although they leased the land to the company Triple A between 1975 and 1985 (SFRA, 1996). Due to the high levels of environmental contamination, the site has been generally empty and unused for the past forty years while the Navy has been working on the decontamination process. As such, the Lennar project will result in no residential displacement on the site itself.

This legacy of separation from the rest of San Francisco has been further entrenched by a lack of public transportation connecting the Bayview and the rest of the city. The inadequate transit is indicative of limited institutional investment in the area. It was only in 2007 that the 3rd Street MUNI (San Francisco Municipal Railway) light rail was constructed offering a direct connection between BVHP and downtown San Francisco. The construction of the light rail disrupted businesses along 3rd Street, the commercial center of BHVP, and some shops were forced to close. This, in addition to the perception that few workers for the project were hired from the community, has prompted some critics to state that the project was obviously for the benefit of developing the area for future populations, and not for current residents (Dillon, 2011). This transit connection represents a significant investment in the area by the city (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). Transit connections to other parts of the Bayview, especially east of 3rd Street, remain patchy (see figure 8 for current MUNI routes and other existing transit).

The housing stock in the Bayview is currently a mix of buildings, which reflect the different periods of economic growth the area has experienced. More than 20% of the current housing stock was built before 1940, and 28% was built during WWII and the decade following it (SFRA, 2002). There are some existing Victorian-era houses, which are often 1-2 story wooden frame buildings on larger lots, mixed with rowhouses from the 1920's and 1930's, built in a period during when the entire country was experiencing a housing boom (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). A significant amount of housing, often meant to be temporary, was constructed for wartime workers during WWII. Some of this wartime worker housing was transferred to the San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA) in 1946 to be used for social housing. The result is a mix of housing stock that combines old single family homes of historic value as well as housing that was never meant to be used as permanent residences.

Figure 8 - Current public transportation available in BVHP
Source: The Shipyard transportation plan, www.sfredevelopment.org

Located on a hill overlooking the shipyard, the Hunters View social housing project is now slated for demolition and redevelopment, almost sixty years after it was originally built on the foundations of wartime worker housing (Nafici, 2006). Despite being rebuilt, construction quality was similar to that of the original temporary housing. Deferred maintenance has also been a significant problem and has resulted in a situation where only 150 households are living in a project that technically has 267 units due to the abysmal condition of the buildings (www.huntersview.info). This redevelopment is being funded by HOPE SF, a public housing revitalization organization that was brought together by the Mayor's office and a citizen task force in the recognition that many of the housing projects in San Francisco are in dire need of funding and repair (hope-sf.org). This rehabilitation is separate from the Lennar project. The Alice Griffith housing project, also referred to as Double Rock, is located in BVHP as well. Built in the early 1960's to replace war workers dwellings of the 1940's, Alice Griffith was one of the few housing projects at the time that actually accepted African-American tenants due to a SFHA policy that limited tenants to those who were of the dominant ethnicity in the surrounding neighbourhood (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). Alice Griffith is in dire need of redevelopment as well, and is a rallying point for many BVHP residents, especially the poorest and most disenfranchised. Alice Griffith regularly scores very low on the HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Planning) Public Housing Inspection Rating, which looks at social housing living conditions; this report recently pointed out significant problems, such as boarded up units, broken windows, and mold. The rebuilding of Alice Griffith is included as part of The Shipyard project.

In a city that currently has some of the highest real estate prices in North America, a site such as The Shipyard and Candlestick Point has incredible potential to supply much needed housing, as well as be transformative to the city as a whole. The site is situated on the waterfront of San Francisco Bay (with over fourteen miles of coastline), and is located in one of the city's sunnier microclimates. Looking northwards, much of The Shipyard has views onto downtown San Francisco, with skyscrapers that seem removed from the peaceful site, yet tantalizingly close. This site offers an incredible opportunity for a developer, has the potential to help ease some of the housing pressures in San Francisco, and may also help bring economic activity and employment to a neighbourhood that is in dire need of it.

Figure 9 - Hunters Point housing projects, 1961
Source: Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010

Figure 10 - Housing projects in BVHP, 1961
Source: Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010

"The consensus of opinion is that the Hunter's Point area has been described as an undesirable slum to disguise the fact that it has some of the most magnificent views, best weather, and generally excellent exclusive residential potential in the city."

Hippler, 1974, p. 173

Candlestick Park, which makes up about 200 acres of Phase 2, includes a state park that will be improved and remain in place after the construction of the project. Currently this waterfront park curves around the perimeter of Candlestick stadium and the sea of parking that engulfs it (see figure 11). Construction on the stadium started in 1958 and the era of sporting events and concerts that followed, in particular football games of the San Francisco 49ers, is now coming to an end as a new stadium in Santa Clara will be finished and ready for use for the 2014 season. With the opening of the Santa Clara stadium, Candlestick stadium is slated for demolition. Currently the state park mostly draws people from the directly surrounding area unless the stadium is in use. Activities that take place there include picnicking and fishing. This natural resource will continue to be managed at the state level, although it will be significantly renovated.

Figure 11 - The current Candlestick Park stadium and surrounding parking
Source: Google Earth



Figure 12 - Candlestick Park stadium parking
Source: personal photograph

Figure 13 - Candlestick Park stadium
Source: personal photograph

Figure 14 - Views from Candlestick Park
Source: personal photograph

Despite the strength of the San Francisco real estate market, the Bayview suffers from negative representations in the media. Popular conceptions of the area by many San Franciscans are not favorable (detailed below). This has affected the local real estate market. In addition, the state of environmental contamination at the shipyard site has slowed down development of the area. The Navy is legally responsible for the clean-up, which has been on-going for over twenty years and will cost close to one billion US$ once it is completed (Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, www.epa.gov). The Navy has divided the site into seven parcels (A through G) that suffer from varying levels of contamination and will be remediated on different timelines. Currently the clean-up process is approximately 70% complete (www.epa.gov). The clean-up has been extremely political, and has included a community engagement process of its own (this process is detailed in the next chapter).

The site has been designated as a Superfund site and placed on the National Priorities List by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This means that it has been defined as "an uncontrolled or abandoned place where hazardous waste is located, possibly affecting local ecosystems or people" (www.epa.gov). This high level of contamination has caused many to speak about issues of environmental injustice. The Bayview community has not only the Superfund site to contend with, but several other polluting industrial sites in the area as well.



Figures 15-17 - Renderings of the future Shipyard project
Source: www.transparenthouse.com, www.theshipyardsf.com

The Community

The Bayview is, and has historically been, considered distinct and outside of the rest of San Francisco. Popular conceptions of the area see it as a ghetto with high crime rates, an area that is marginalized and should be avoided. For many San Franciscans, the only reason to visit this part of the city will be gone when the 49ers football team relocates to their new stadium in Santa Clara. While these views are often exaggerated, the Bayview does have some distinct features in comparison to the rest of San Francisco. These have partially been the result of its industrial past. A variety of planning decisions that have seen it continually underserved by public transportation and generally cut off from the rest of San Francisco have also added to these characteristics. In part as a reaction to these development patterns, the people of BVHP have a history of community activism and political rallying around matters that directly concern or affect them. Some residents argue that it is not only industry that has been isolated to BVHP, but a particular population as well. Steeped in issues of economic and social injustices, some residents believe that "undesirable" populations have been systematically relegated to BVHP (Hippler, 1970).

Images of difference, of BVHP as a socio-economically and racially distinct part of San Francisco, have been entrenched by media representations that reinforce and perpetuate realities of difference. Arthur Hippler, who wrote from a socio-anthropological point of view in the early 1970's, uses very illustrative language that seems to capture the essence of how the Bayview was perceived by the white majority in the rest of San Francisco: "Hunters Point is a depressed and isolated district... clearly an outcast community" (1970, p.1).



Figure 18 - Bayview neighbourhood community center
Source: SFRA, 2002.



Figure 19 - Artist's redndering of current shipyard
Source: www.thepointart.com

While many accounts of the Bayview community are sensationalistic, the area does in fact suffer from high unemployment rates, severe poverty, violence related to gangs and drugs, and other social problems. As determined by the 2005-2009 American Community Survey and the 2010 U.S. Census, the Bayview (as defined by the 94124 zip code) has an unemployment rate of 14% (double the rate of San Francisco as a whole, at 7%) and an average household income of 43,155$ (compared to 70,117$ for the larger city) (SF Planning Department, 2011). Violent crime in the Bayview is a tragic reality that has terrible effects on the community and continues to dominate perceptions and media coverage of the area. Although reliable statistics are difficult to find, a quick search of San Francisco media sources paints a picture of a neighbourhood suffering from the fear and stigma associated with high rates of shootings.

The Bayview's 2010 population was 33 996 (compared to 805 235 for the entirety of San Francisco) (U.S. Census Bureau). The Bayview's industrial histories, and the jobs associated with these land uses, have historically attracted a migrant population to the area: initially European immigrants, then African-Americans from the South, and now largely Asian, especially Chinese, groups. Although Asians currently make up the largest portion of the population (33% compared to 32% African-American or 12% white (SF Planning Department, 2011)) there continues to be a prevailing perception that BVHP is a largely African-American community.

The largest upsurge in the African-American population occurred during WWII when the Navy base was working at its fullest capacity. Not only was there a large number of jobs available, but it was also a time when discriminatory hiring practices were trumped by the war time effort (Nafici, 2006). This period, in which the economic well-being of the community was so closely tied to a concentration of work on one site and within one industry, laid a path that would eventually lead to unemployment and its associated problems once the war was over, and even more so once the Navy ceased operation in 1974. The African American population has declined in BVHP, and in San Francisco as a whole. In 1980, African Americans comprised nearly three quarters of the Bayview's population, a percentage that dropped to under half by 2000 (Jacobs, 2012). Despite this decline, they continue to be the most vocal sector of the community. Combatting this trend of African American decline in the city is one of the leading motivations for some of the AD10 groups, as discussed in further detail in following chapters.

The Depression era leading up to WWII saw Bayview residents working together in a spirit of self-help in response to the challenges faced by the country as a whole. People lobbied the City for much needed improvements to public infrastructure such as sewage systems, parks, schools, and public transportation (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). When it became obvious that help would not be coming from the City, residents worked together to make infrastructure improvements and establish services such as a cooperative grocery store (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). In 1939 the Hunters Point Improvement Association was formed and worked on many of these issues, as well as trying to connect the area to greater San Francisco. This is illustrative of how hard BVHP residents have had to work in an effort to receive simple improvements that often came easily to other parts of the city. This lack of investment by the city has had long-lasting effects in the area.

The 1960's represented a new political landscape for Bayview residents; it was during this time that residents found that they could engage in city politics in a different way and start pushing for much needed improvements. The community started to organize itself in the face of issues such as deteriorating housing conditions and high unemployment rates, especially among the African-American population. Not only

were groups vocalizing concerns and bringing attention to major problems in the area, but they were well organized and worked towards producing change in their neighbourhood. In addition to demonstrations, such as Black Monday which supported African-American employment in construction unions, the community "took matters into their own hands" when they saw that the City was not going to instigate change on their behalf. During this time activism was especially strong in the African-American community and some programs were particularly effective, such as Youth for Service, a youth job training program (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010). Before this time the community largely organized through church groups and community leaders tended to be associated with the church. The importance of faith-based organizing continues to be relevant in the community today.

Part of the impetus for community engagement in the 1960's came from the War on Poverty Act legislated by President Johnston in an effort to curb the national poverty rate of 19% (Dillon, 2011). With some federal money available, an Economic Opportunities Council was established and worked on projects such as youth programs, day care, and legal assistance (SFRA, 1996).

Unfortunately this activism was dealt a large blow when in September 1966 a riot took place in Bayview Hunters Point that put the area into the spotlight and intensified racial tensions. The riot was sparked when police shot and killed a 17 year old African-American boy who was fleeing from a car that had been stolen. Angry groups of residents started to form and demands were made for the offending police officer, who was white, to be charged with murder. After a night of some minimal criminal activity community leaders were unable to settle the problem and the police warned they would return with increased force. The next evening police opened fire on the community center in response to alleged gun shots. Afterwards, they entered the building only to find a group of unarmed adolescents. This pushed the initial incident into a full blown race riot that lasted three days and was characterized by violence and property damage. At this point, many BVHP residents became convinced that the police were no longer distinguishing between people who were criminals or not, but simply between people who were black and white. This event is illustrative of the fears of the African American community in BVHP at this time; that they were being isolated into one area so that they could effectively be controlled or destroyed. Arthur Hippler provides a compelling account of the event in his detailed 1970 article "The Game of Black & White at Hunter's Point".

Figure 20 - Riot in BVHP, September 28, 1966

Source: www.foundsf.org

Unfortunately, the riot resulted in community disintegration as fear and hatred towards the police, and white San Franciscans in general, increased. Following the riots a group of business leaders promised to create 2000 jobs for Bayview youth, yet only a small percentage of these promised jobs ever materialized. A sense of distrust due to unfulfilled promises was further entrenched by this event, and continues to act as an undertone to promises made to the Bayview community. This in part explains why the community has been suspicious of all promises made by the City and Lennar, and why they have gone to such lengths to ensure that the benefits promised to them are fulfilled.

Following the stop in activity at the naval site in 1974, the Navy tried to play a role in community development and job creation in an effort to mitigate the effects of the site's closure. They attempted to find jobs for workers at other government facilities through a replacement program, offered job training opportunities, and gave early retirement to those who wished to take it (Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010; SFRA, 2002). Despite these efforts, the closure had a devastating effect on the area. High unemployment and poverty rates came soon after.

Another blow to community strength and activism was a crack-cocaine epidemic that hit the area in the 1980's. This problem further entrenched issues of poverty and community disintegration, while also introducing additional issues such as gang and drug related violence (Dillon, personal communication). Stigmatization of the area became even more ingrained during this time, perpetuating many of the social problems that were present.

More recently, in 1994, the community successfully fought the potential siting of a power plant in their neighbourhood which would have joined two others, resulting in an area with the highest density of power plants anywhere in the U.S.. The value of this cooperative community action is well-described by Rechtschaffen (1995):

> "Collectively, the strategies of the Bayview-Hunters Point community have resulted in more than just an energetic campaign in opposition to the power plant. They have also led to a better informed and more assertive community, highly focused on tackling a range of existing community health and environmental problems." p. 572

The industrial history of the BVHP neighbourhood, especially the presence of naval activity, has resulted in significant environmental contamination on the old port site. In addition to this contamination, there are several other offending sites located within the Bayview that include a sewage treatment plant and numerous brownfield sites. The surrounding community has suffered from increased exposure to harmful contaminants and the population suffers from elevated rates of many diseases: hypertension, heart failure, diabetes, etc. Some illnesses are at rates double that of the rest of San Francisco (such as cervical and breast cancers) (Bayview Hunters Point Mothers Environmental Health & Justice Committee, 2004). Many have claimed this to be a blatant example of environmental injustice, or environmental racism, as a marginalized population of lower income and minority groups have been forced to suffer the most. A report put together in 2004 by the Bayview Hunters Point Mothers Environmental Health & Justice Committee, the Hunters View Tenants Association, and Greenaction for Health & Environmental Justice provides a toxic inventory for BVHP and outlines the main issues of concern for the community; this report shows that in areas most affected by environmental contamination, African-Americans comprise over 70% of the population. However, Kelley and VerPlanck (2010) point out that the majority of the polluting sources that have

contributed to this problem were in place before the arrival of most of the area's African American population. Regardless of what was there first, efforts to combat these problems have proceeded slowly. Arguably, these issues might have been dealt with more quickly if affecting other parts of the city. Rechtschaffen argues that polluting sites do more than just physical harm, but that they have negative emotional and psychological effects as well as financial externalities (1995).

The Project

In early 1999 Lennar became the master developer for the site. A plan was put together for the site over a ten year period, culminating in two disposition and development agreements (DDAs) that were reached in 2003 (for Phase I) and 2010 (for Phase II). The DDAs constitute an agreement between Lennar and the Redevelopment Agency regarding the final form of the development. However, these agreements are subject to amendments and therefore can change over the life of the project. These amendments, along with the original DDAs and accompanying material, are available on the Successor to the SFRA website (www.sfredevelopment.org) and represent the most up to date plans for the project.

> *"...the Project is designed to reconnect the Shipyard and Candlestick Point with the Bayview Hunters Point community and the rest of San Francisco and transform these long-abandoned waterfront lands into productive areas for jobs, parks and housing, including affordable housing."*
>
> *(SFRA phase II executive summary, 2010, p.1)*

Figure 21 - Rendering of the future Shipyard project with Candlestick Point in the foreground
Source: www.transparenthouse.com

Figure 22 - Current state of Candlestick Point Stadium
Source: personal photograph

Figure 23 - Land use plan for Phase I and Phase II of the Shipyard
Source: Lennar Urban, www.theshipyardsf.com

The site has been divided into two phases: Phase I and II. Phase I is located on the shipyard portion of the site (see figure 23) and will include 1,600 units of housing, 26 acres of open space, and 10,000 square feet of commercial space. Land will also be set aside for the development of community facilities (SFRA phase II executive summary, 2010). Horizontal construction of roads, lighting, and other infrastructure has been completed on the Phase I site and vertical construction started in June of this year.

Phase II is significantly larger, and will encompass the rest of the shipyard site as well as the Candlestick parcel. There will be 10,500 housing units, more than 300 acres of open space (including a complete renovation of the current Candlestick state park), and 800,000 square feet of retail space (the majority of which will be on the Candlestick parcel). Other features of Phase II include three million square feet of space dedicated to clean technology research and development as well as business incubator space, a new building for the artists' colony, and a rebuilding of the Alice Griffith housing project (SFRA Hunters Point Shipyard Project Summary).

Plans for Phase II originally included the potential siting of a new stadium to replace the Candlestick Park facility. However, the 49ers football team decided to relocate to Santa Clara for a variety of reasons, including transportation constraints and costs associated with supplying adequate parking. Many fans were upset by the move as they felt that such an iconic San Francisco team should be located in the city, and

many fans are nostalgic about the Candlestick stadium that has hosted the 49ers since 1971 (and the baseball team, the San Francisco Giants, from 1960 to 2000). However, interviews revealed that those involved with the planning of the project feel that without the stadium they are free to pursue alternatives that will result in better transportation options, more integrated land uses, and intensification in job potential for the people who will live in the area.

Figure 24 - Rendering of the future Shipyard project, Candlestick Point section
Source: www.transparenthouse.com

These land uses, and the associated vision for the BVHP area, represent a significant shift from what has existed in the area historically. In particular, they represent a step towards integrating BVHP with the rest of San Francisco, and indicate that the City is willing to reimagine the neighbourhood and its role in the larger city. One interviewee made the comparison of the successful Embarcadero waterfront revitalization that took place in downtown San Francisco. While now a thriving and busy urban space, it was once underused and bleak, cut off from the city by the elevated Embarcadero freeway. The vision that the City and Lennar has for The Shipyard mirrors the success of the Embarcadero.

The project includes a number of 'baked in' benefits; these are externalities that the community will benefit from, but that are not explicitly part of the community benefits package. The most obvious one is the improvement of empty and dilapidated space that currently characterizes much of the site. The 326 acres of land set aside for parks and open space will create new public green spaces as well as renovate and improve existing ones, such as Candlestick Park. Another critical development will be the improvement of transportation connections both within BVHP and to downtown. There are plans to develop a bus rapid transit system, an express downtown bus, and a transit center located in the north-east sector of The Shipyard (see figure 25). Connections will be further improved as the street grid is extended down to the waterfront.

Figure 25 - Proposed transit improvements to BVHP
Source: The Shipyard transportation plan, www.sfredevelopment.org

Conclusion

The specific community and site histories of BVHP expose the unique circumstances and legacies that continue to have a very real effect on day-to-day life in the Bayview. Reviewing these histories is of critical importance in determining how to assess the community engagement and benefits processes that have been undertaken in regards to The Shipyard project (processes which are detailed in Chapter 4). As discussed in the literature review, consideration of local context is integral in being able to evaluate public participation. This history therefore supplies the base on which the remainder of the report is built and an assessment of appropriateness and effectiveness can be developed.

The site history shows how the area continues to be strongly influenced by two main forces: isolation from the rest of San Francisco and the legacy of the dry dock and the Navy's presence. Furthermore, the community history makes clear how important it is that issues of economic, social, and environmental injustice are addressed. This history reinforces the criteria outlined in the literature review for assessing appropriateness. For a project and its associated public participation process to be appropriate in the BVHP context, it must address problems of *environmental justice* by giving all residents an opportunity to learn about, discuss, and challenge the remediation of the shipyard site. The process must be *inclusive* and grant *voice* to all segments of the population. Issues of *equity* need to be addressed by ensuring that incoming economic opportunities are available to all and that potential negative externalities, such as displacement, are mitigated. Finally, Bayview residents must have the chance to shape design aspects of the project, such as the *aesthetic fit*, so that The Shipyard respects the existing feel of the neighbourhood, one which is unique in San Francisco, and takes advantage of the many amenities that the site offers.

The criteria for assessing effectiveness (*participation*, *legitimacy*, *timing*, and *quality*) underscore the importance of harnessing a legacy of community activism in the area. The public participation processes surrounding The Shipyard should take advantage of this history while also acting as a channel for addressing injustices of the past. Following a description of the community engagement and benefits processes in the next chapter, these criteria of appropriateness and effectiveness will be employed in Chapter 5.



Figure 26 - Hunters Point dry dock, 1942
Source: Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010

Figure 27 - Candlestick Park stadium, 1963
Source: Kelley and VerPlanck, 2010

CHAPTER FOUR - COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & BENEFITS PROCESSES

Vacant and largely unused since the closure of the Navy forty years ago, the shipyard site has taken on different meanings for various groups. Many, such as developers and the City, see it as a site of enormous potential that could help supply much needed housing and give an economic boost to an area suffering from unemployment and a lack of opportunities for its residents. Others see it as blight and a source of health risks, and some even feel that it embodies the neighbourhood's abandonment by the larger city of San Francisco. All of these ideas and images have imbued the site with significant emotional value, making its future highly contentious and political. The re-use of this site will signify a change in how the City is willing to interact with the Bayview in the future; San Francisco no longer wants to use the area to isolate its industrial activity. Because of these strong associations with the site, its development and future uses have spurred an immense amount of interest from a wide variety of stakeholders and groups.

Many see this project as an opportunity to re-connect BVHP to the rest of San Francisco and to develop much needed jobs and housing. However, if this development moves forward without consideration for the existing residents, the effect will likely be to transform what is on the ground while merely pushing out current residents and the households that are most in need of the incoming opportunities. Concerns of gentrification are not unfounded. One way of trying to mitigate potential negative externalities for the existing community is to involve them directly through a community engagement and participation process. As explored in the literature review, this can be achieved through a variety of means; however it is critical that these efforts are locally-situated so that the process and the resulting benefits packages are appropriate and effective.

This chapter explores two main facets of the project: the community consultation and engagement processes, and the achieved community benefits packages. The community has been involved by the Navy in the shipyard site clean-up and remediation process, largely through educational and informative meetings. Lennar and the city of San Francisco have pursued an extensive and resource heavy community engagement/participation process regarding the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project. The resulting community benefits packages are significant: the City and Lennar have developed packages for both Phase I and Phase II of the project, and this is complemented by the benefits negotiated in the Lennar/AD10 core community benefits agreement (CCBA). This chapter describes the engagement that has occurred and the benefits that have been achieved thus far, while Chapter 5 assesses the tools used and provides an analysis of their outcomes.

Community engagement process

The community consultation and engagement process surrounding the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project has occurred on many levels and in a variety of forms; this report examines the Navy-led clean-up/remediation and examines the roles of the CAC and PAC in the context of the larger official engagement process for The Shipyard project. Details concerning the scale and scope of community meetings and public participation are also summarized.

The Navy has used a Community Involvement Plan (CIP) to inform and involve members of the surrounding community on the state of the site's clean-up. Between 1994 and 2009 the majority of community engagement occurred through the Restoration Advisory Board (RAB). The RAB consists of people from

a variety of groups, such as local residents, public interest groups, and environmental organizations. The primary mandate of the RAB was to act as a venue for the discussion of clean-up strategies and priorities. Following the dissolution of this body in 2009 the Navy conducted a survey in order to determine the main concerns of the community regarding the consultation process in an effort to better address key issues. The conclusions of the survey found that residents felt that information about the Navy clean-up had not been communicated effectively and that the difference between Lennar's Shipyard project and the Navy clean-up of the shipyard has not been made clear (U.S. Navy, 2011). The latter confusion has fuelled criticism of the engagement process pursued by Lennar and the City (discussed further below). Public participation since the dissolution of the RAB has mostly taken the form of informational meetings with brief question and answer periods (Dillon, 2013).

The majority of the Navy's efforts regarding community involvement have been to educate and inform residents. They have used community groups (such as churches or tenant associations), community leaders, presentations, pamphlets, and social media in order to distribute information about the remediation process. The Navy has gone beyond the engagement requirements set out by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, and they have reported that involving the public in the clean-up process has resulted in achieving higher levels of remediation and an improved final outcome. The involvement of the community in the remediation process is a critical first step in addressing issues of environmental justice. In the 2011 executive summary of the Navy's CIP, environmental justice is defined as "the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people in the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies" (p. 5). In particular, race or socio-economic status should not be a determining factor in how a person can be involved in the clean-up process. Interviews have indicated that there is still significant confusion and misinformation regarding the decontamination.

Community members have mobilized in a reaction to community health problems, many of which are perceived to be direct results of the contamination of the shipyard site (along with the siting of other heavy industrial uses in the area). Since 1984, the grassroots organization Arc Ecology has offered technical support to concerned community groups regarding the health effects on the neighbourhood due to the presence of the shipyard site. Through ArcEcology, the Community Window on the Hunters Point Shipyard Cleanup was established as an environmental justice project offering open information regarding the clean-up (www.communitywindowontheshipyard.org). This group ensures that information provided by the Navy is accessible, and also provides additional material from third party groups. Although the Navy has been making significant efforts to inform the local community, their strategy has not been adequately locally-situated, therefore community members have reacted to what they perceive as a lack of information through self-organization (explored in greater detail in Chapter 5). The contamination of the shipyard and its associated health issues is a particularly emotional topic for residents. Many in the neighbourhood suffer from health problems and many perceive this as a direct threat to the sustainability of the community and their children's futures. Although these illnesses may or may not be directly related to the shipyard site, the Navy and this uninhabited, toxic piece of land are natural scapegoats for these issues. This legacy of poor health is a rallying point for residents. In some ways, the clean-up process has become a symbol of atonement for past injustices to the neighbourhood, and as such residents are committed to making sure that it is executed properly and land is returned to safe levels of cleanliness.

The Navy CIP and engagement efforts are important to consider because the industrial history and contamination issue of the shipyard site has played a large role in shaping how people feel about the Lennar

project. Health issues are a day-to-day reality for many residents, and the fight for a healthy living environment for themselves and their children continues to act as a reminder of past injustices to the community. This concern over the clean-up has been a continued issue of importance even in community discussions with the City and Lennar.

The official community engagement and participation process for the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project has been organized by Lennar and the City (the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, SFRA, until 2012 and the Successor to the Redevelopment Agency since then). Engagement has largely taken the form of information distribution, open meetings, and public workshops. A critical part of the official community engagement process has been the Hunter's Point Citizen's Advisory Committee (CAC). Established in 1993 by the SFRA, this committee is composed of community residents and business owners with the official mandate of increasing public participation and overseeing the redevelopment process of The Shipyard site. Similar to the Navy's RAB, the CAC is an advisory board with no decision making power. Through a series of open workshops and meetings, the CAC developed a set of development guidelines that it claims represent the primary concerns of the community and how they would like to see development occur in BVHP (see box below). The CAC continues to hold open and public general meetings on a monthly basis. Subcommittees often meet more regularly and the CAC can meet with the SFRA up to 4-5 times per week. According to the SFRA, members of the CAC are incredibly well informed and know the documentation regarding the project better than some officials (Kaslofsky, personal communication). Some of the CAC members have been on the committee for 18-19 years and have extensive knowledge of the site and project.

CAC Guidelines

1. Create jobs for economic vitality
2. Support existing businesses and an artist's community
3. Create an appropriate mix of new businesses
4. Balance development and environmental conservation
5. Facilitate appropriate immediate access
6. Integrate land use
7. Acknowledge history

Source: www.hpscac.com

The BVHP Project Area Committee (PAC) was elected in 1997 and was a community-based organization with the role of providing advice and information to the SFRA based on meetings with the community and guiding future redevelopment efforts. This advisory body, the formation of which was required by California Community Redevelopment law, helped make decisions regarding the broader Bayview Hunters Point Project Area. The PAC ceased the majority of its activities and stopped receiving funding when the Redevelopment Agency was dissolved (SFRA, 2002).

Meetings with the public have varied in size, scope, and purpose. They have also differed in form and audience depending on what stage of the development process was/is underway. During the three and a half years that it took to complete the entitlement process, the City participated in approximately 375 public meetings. Meetings would sometimes have 150-200 people in attendance, and involved a variety

of stakeholder groups. All meetings have been open and public. Themes at these meetings have varied, some examples include considering bicycle travel throughout the site with bicycle advocacy groups and discussing the re-building of Alice Griffiths with current tenants.

Both the City and Lennar have been cautious and had more meetings than might be necessary in order to offer the opportunity for all residents to voice their concerns. Repeating information several times was deemed a better strategy than potentially being blamed for not being open with important information. In addition, it was critical for key players in the development process to be present at these meetings so that no question would have to go un-answered. In fact, interviewees spoke of the problem of meeting fatigue; it would be difficult for concerned community members to attend even a small proportion of meetings.

When asked about the scale of this engagement process compared to those of other similarly sized projects, representatives from the SFRA indicated that this is atypical of what is usually achieved and exceeds other projects of similar size by about three or four times (Kaslofsky, personal communication). Over 400 000 U.S. $ is being spent annually on engagement. Information is regularly sent out to over 200 000 people through mailing lists in addition to the information provided through their website. Comparable projects might have an advisory committee, but with seven or so members, not thirty as in this case. In their experience, this is an immense amount of funding and resources for engagement.

One obvious question is why Lennar would invest so much time and resources into the engagement process. One interviewee was quick to point out that "they're humans, they enjoy it!". While this may certainly play a role in it, the fact is that BVHP suffers from low real estate values and continues to suffer from negative associations with crime, unemployment, and other problems. As Lennar works to engage the community and better the image of the area, they are also working towards improving perceptions of the neighbourhood with the hope that it will result in strengthening the local real estate market. Lennar is concerned with the double bottom line and realizes that in order to increase the real estate values in the neighbourhood they have to work outside of the borders of their site and be a positive influence in the community (Kaslofsky, personal communication). Since 1999, when Lennar became the master developers for the site, they have been working towards becoming a community institution in the BVHP area. There has been an effort to integrate into the community through participating in community events and projects outside of their own development. This highlighting of positive action in the Bayview is displayed on The Shipyard's official website (theshipyardsf.com).

It is in part because of the reputation and popular media images of BVHP that Lennar has had to work hard to improve the neighbourhood situation through benefits and engagement. Bayview residents have also demanded to be involved in the process. Therefore, the engagement and benefits processes have been expanded due to the history of the area as well as the day-to-day realities of the site. They are locally-situated but have also been developed in part by outside perceptions of the area. It is a monumental task for Lennar to work towards changing this perception, especially when stories of crime and violence continue to dominate the news of BVHP; on May 15, 2013, a 20 year old man was stabbed to death in Hunter's Point and this story has been widely distributed across North American news sources.

Lennar has a director of community affairs, Cheryl Smith, working full time on the benefits program and community outreach for The Shipyard project. This position serves as a liaison between community groups and the developer, as well as organizes the community benefits program. Hired in 2007, Smith is a former Bayview resident and has experience working with the community in her role as executive director of the Bayview YMCA (Business Wire, 2007). Press coverage of Smith's hire has highlighted her personal connection to the area and the appropriateness of a long-time Bayview resident working towards transforming the area into "a neighbourhood the community has long deserved" (Business Wire, 2007). Smith's connection to the area has helped Lennar develop an engagement process and benefits package that responds to the diverse needs of the community. Undoubtedly, this move was also an effort to gain approval for the project in the BVHP area and in San Francisco as a whole. Smith worked with public relations in order to campaign for community support of the ballot initiatives that were going to public vote in 2008 (described further below).

Official benefits packages

Phase I of the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project is relatively small compared to Phase II. It has a six million dollar community benefits package associated with it. Examples of these benefits include:

- A community builder program in which at least 30% of the lots designated for private housing development must be developed in partnership with a construction firm that is based in BVHP.

- An area set aside for the development of business incubator space and a small business assistance program to encourage the development of local businesses in The Shipyard.

- A home buyer's assistance program that includes down payment assistance, first-time buyer financing programs, and homeownership counselling services.

- A 225,000$ job training fund for programs such as local summer employment and internships for youth.

Some of the benefits for Phase I are packaged as assistance for the community, but are also based in "improving" the cultural landscape of BVHP to be more attractive to outsiders. For example, the Phase I benefits agreement stipulates that an interim African Marketplace must be established as a an "African-themed temporary festive outdoor setting" (2005, p.21) that will display and sell African themed crafts and gifts, house a farmers' market style space for selling fruits and vegetables, and provide a venue for traditional African-American music. The benefits agreement specifies that the space it meant to act as a cultural destination for residents and tourists. The argument that this space will act as a cultural hub representative of BVHP residents is a strange one as the history of most of the African-American residents in the area is one of escaping slavery in the South, and most recent immigrants to the area are in fact of Asian origin. This benefit does not seem to represent the local community or to address their needs.

Vertical construction of Phase I started on June 27, 2013. Only once construction is completed will it be clear if Lennar has followed through on the entirety of its benefit commitments for this phase.

Main sections of the Phase II DDA Community Benefits Plan:

1. Education
2. Community health and wellness
3. Community facilities
4. Core community benefits agreement
5. Business development/community asset building
6. Community benefits fund

Phase II of The Shipyard project is significantly larger and has an appropriately expanded benefits package that consists of six main sections (see box above). The achieved core community benefits agreement (CCBA) has been amended as part of the benefits plan and is detailed later in this chapter as it was not initially part of the benefits package negotiated between the City and Lennar.

The education benefits include a 3.5 million dollar scholarship program and a 10 million dollar education improvement fund to assist residents up to thirty years of age in educational attainment and to support education enhancements in the Bayview area (such as facility upgrades and wellness programs) respectively. Health and wellness is addressed through a 2 million dollar "Wellness Contribution" and a contribution to the expansion of the Southeast Health Center. In regards to community facilities, 7.5% of retail space must be dedicated for such uses and must be spread out throughout the site. Uses of this land will include the International African Market Place (the permanent fixture of the interim marketplace set out in Phase I), space for the San Francisco Public Library to establish reading rooms, and space for the Candlestick state park to use for a welcome/information center. This section of the benefits plan includes the rebuilding of The Point artist studios and 326 acres of public open space and parks. Business development and community asset building includes a community builder program, such as seen in Phase I, that will be applied to 500 units in a variety of affordability levels throughout the project site. Further construction support will be provided through technical assistance, insurance and credit support, and contractor workshops. Finally, the community benefits fund will be financed by 0.5% of proceeds from the sale of market rate units. This money must be reinvested in the project site or BVHP in ways that benefit low to moderate income households or eliminates blight. The SFRA determines how this reinvestment will be made in consultation with the CAC. Appropriate uses of these funds include but are not limited to public safety, assistance for senior citizens, and support of the arts.

These benefits represent a significant investment in the BVHP community by Lennar. They will undoubtedly provide much needed help and economic stimulus to the neighbourhood. What remains to be seen is how sustainably the benefits are implemented, or if they will be used in a manner that offers nothing more than temporary boosts in social programs. Will these benefits reach current BVHP residents, or will they favour incoming households that will eventually cause the displacement of BVHP residents and the gentrification of the neighbourhood? Hopefully the participation of the CAC will help shape the benefits to be as appropriate and effective as possible.

The community benefits packages negotiated between the City and Lennar are laid out in the Phase I and II Disposition and Development Agreements (DDAs). A DDA is legally binding document and can only be amended if both parties consent to it. However, these amendments do often occur, resulting in changes to the original benefit commitments. Aspects of large projects are subject to change, especially in the case of long-term projects such as The Shipyard; these changes may become easy scapegoats for eroded benefits as delays and other problems start to affect the projected bottom line. It is partially in reaction to the potential threat of the City not refraining from amendments which might affect community benefits that a coalition of community groups came together to press for a community benefits agreements: a document with which they will be able to hold Lennar accountable to their promises.

Core Community Benefits Agreement - CCBA

In response to this large scale development with potentially dramatic and unavoidable effects on the surrounding community, a myriad of groups became interested and invested in following the project's development. Many groups were, and continue to be, against the project as a whole. However, some were in support of the project as long as it went forward in a manner that benefitted the wider community. Many stakeholder groups spoke to the moral imperative of moving forward with development of the shipyard site that has been unused since the Navy left in 1974. If Lennar's project had been rejected or stopped in another manner, this site may easily have remained vacant for at least another twenty years. This could have resulted in the continued underdevelopment of the BVHP area as well as an enormous opportunity cost associated with not expanding San Francisco's housing base (in a very strong market situation), or bringing much needed commercial and construction activity into the area. In an area that was, and is, in dire need to affordable housing and economic activity, especially in the form of jobs, Lennar's development has significant potential to improve the current situation.

In the fall of 2007 the San Francisco chapter of Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) began to investigate ways of supporting the project while also receiving a guarantee from Lennar that certain community benefits would be achieved (Ford, personal communication). ACORN wanted an alternative to the DDA that contained the city's benefits program, which although legally-binding can be amended by the City. They came across the Staples Center community benefits agreement and the work of SAJE (Strategic Actions for a Just Economy) and other community groups in Los Angeles and subsequently contacted Julian Gross, the lawyer for the community groups that negotiated the Staples Center agreement. It was through this process that ACORN became determined to pursue their own CBA and worked to get two other groups involved: the San Francisco Organizing Project (SFOP) and the San Francisco Labour Council (SFLC). In late 2007, these three groups, each described below, came together to form the group Alliance for District 10 (AD10) (the geographic boundaries of District 10 are defined in Chapter 3) (see figure 4). AD10 then approached Lennar in order to negotiate a core community benefits agreement (CCBA). The descriptor of "core" was added in order to signal to other groups that the agreement did not cover all issues of importance to the community. AD10 wanted to ensure that Lennar did not present the CBA as a comprehensive and complete benefits package when certain issues, such as environmental remediation, had not been touched on at all. AD10 was also making an effort to mitigate potential criticisms that the agreement did not cover all of the community's concerns.

ACORN was an assemblage of community groups across the United States that worked to support the needs of low and moderate income families regarding issues such as voter registration, access to health

care, neighbourhood safety, and affordable housing. ACORN disbanded in 2010. The San Francisco chapter had to shut down activities very rapidly; on-going projects needed to be passed on to other community groups or abandoned. ACORN's role in the CCBA was transferred to a new organization, ACCE, the Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment. ACCE describes itself as "a multi-racial, democratic, non-profit community organization building power in low to moderate income neighbourhoods to stand and fight for social, economic, and racial justice" (www.calorganize.org). It has members across California and advocates on issues such as public education, access to health care, and fighting to save homes.

SFOP is a member of the national group PICO (People Improving Communities through Organizing) and is a faith-based organization that works with over thirty congregations and schools, and has a membership of about 40 000 San Franciscans. Some of SFOP's priorities include accessible health care and education, affordable housing, and the creation of safe streets. The SF Labor Council is a local body of AFL-CIO (the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization). Membership includes approximately 100 000 workers and their families from over 150 affiliated unions. It is important to understand the principal goals and mandates of these organizations, as well as the size and distribution of their membership because the final CCBA reflects the primary concerns of their constituents. This is part of the reason why the CCBA focuses so heavily on housing and jobs.

With the CCBA, Lennar stands to benefit from increased credibility, public support, and acceptance of the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project by the AD10 groups. Arguably, this support was timely and of the utmost importance in the face of two propositions on the ballot that had the potential to be deal breakers for the project. Prop G was the ballot initiative which would allow for the zoning changes that Lennar required in order to move forward. Prop F, put forward by a liberal member of the board of supervisors, Chris Daly, would have required the project to have 50% affordable housing. In order to move forward with the development, Lennar first needed a "yes" vote on Proposition G and a "no" on Proposition F. Lennar claimed that a "yes" vote on Prop F would have seriously undermined the financial feasibility of the project, and was therefore seen as a deal breaker by Lennar.

Once negotiations started, there was an urgency to complete the agreement before the two initiatives critical to the project's success went to vote in June, 2008. This strict timeline helped focus the groups and the entire agreement was negotiated, drafted, and finalized within three months. Three months is an extremely short amount of time to finalize a complex legal document such as the CCBA; some interviewees confessed that this time crunch may be reflected in certain aspects of the agreement that may have been more clearly written had there been more time available. A less rushed timeline may have also helped establish the role and scope of the CCBA to the public, potentially allowing for greater understanding and limiting negative reactions to the agreement.

Julian Gross, mentioned earlier in the literature review, was the lawyer for the Lennar/AD10 CCBA. He has a history in representing non-profit organizations and has drafted over a dozen CBAs in his career. Gross' involvement provided greater credibility to the Lennar/AD10 CCBA and helped ensure that the agreement was well written.

The CCBA is primarily focused on providing benefits regarding housing and jobs. The agreement holds Lennar to construct more than 31% of its new housing as below-market rate units (see box on next page). These units must be priced within predefined bands of affordability based on Average Median Income

(AMI) of San Francisco households. This will help supply San Francisco with much needed housing units for households that fall into the gap between qualifying for fully subsidized units and being able to afford adequate housing at a market rate (this gap represents a significant issue in the current San Francisco housing market). This will help supply housing for middle class workers in professions such as nursing. In addition, the agreement has secured $27.3 million for the Community First Housing Fund that will help residents purchase market-rate housing units with services such as down-payment assistance and housing counselling. This financial aid is expected to bring the total amount of below-market rate units to above 35%, a level that is significantly higher than what is required; legally the project is held to a minimum of 15% affordable housing by the city of San Francisco (applied across the city) and a minimum of 25% set out by the Bayview-Hunters Point Redevelopment Plan (Jacobs, 2010). The affordable housing must be built simultaneously with Lennar's market-rate housing. At the halfway point of Phase II there is a check-off point at which time Lennar is not allowed to start construction on the second half of its market rate housing until the first half of the affordable units are completed and move-in ready (the affordable units will be built by a mix of Lennar, other private developers, and the City). This puts considerable pressure on all parties to ensure that affordable units are completed in a timely manner and in particular holds the City to a strict timeline.

One of the points in the CCBA that has been most important for the community has been the commitment to rebuild the Alice Griffiths social housing project as part of the first period of construction in Phase II. The CCBA requires that construction timing occur such that current residents of the project will have the opportunity to move straight from their existing home into the newly built units so to avoid displacement.

Priority for the affordable housing units is given to families who had been displaced by the redevelopment actions in areas such as the Fillmore District that resulted in significant dislocation of African-Americans. As mentioned earlier, decline in San Francisco's African-American population is a continuous trend. Bayview residents, families with unaffordable rents, and residents, prior residents and family members of residents of District 10 are then given priority in that order. This part of the agreement underlines one of AD10's main concerns in drafting the CCBA: helping African-American residents remain in the area and allowing those who had been previously displaced from San Francisco to return to the city (Jacobs, 2010). Although this is a guiding principle, strict limits are in place from affordable housing funding sources and there is not much flexibility to target households.

Additionally, the CCBA does much to address the issue of jobs. The CCBA commits Lennar to providing $8.5 million to workforce development in BVHP. This amount is being matched by the Mayor's Office of Economic and Workforce Development. In addition to this funding Lennar has agreed to union recognition and a first source hiring policy. One of the most significant achievements of the CCBA is its requirement

As per the CCBA, of the project housing units:

- 15.66% must be affordable rentals for families with incomes below 60% AMI
- 16.2% must be for-sale units for households between 80% and 160% AMI
- For a total of 31.86% below-market rate units

for living wage salaries. A living wage refers to a salary which represents the minimum amount required to meet basic needs such as food and shelter if working a full time job. Often, especially in the United States, the minimum wage falls below a living wage. The SFRA requires a higher wage rate in its project areas and the CCBA enforces that wage within The Shipyard project. This ensures that all contractors, as well as future purchasers and lessees, will have to pay their employees a living wage. In 2010 the San Francisco minimum wage was $9.79 USD per hour and the living wage that the SFRA demanded was $11.54 USD (Jacobs, 2010). A summary of all achieved benefits packages is outline in Table 3.

Table 3 – Concrete community benefits funding requirements associated with The Shipyard

BENEFITS PROGRAM	RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS	$ AMOUNT ASSOCIATED WITH PACKAGE
Phase I	Lennar and the SFRA	$ 6 million
Phase II	Lennar and the SFRA	$ 82 million (includes benefits negotiated in the CCBA)
CCBA	Lennar and AD10 (distribution by the San Francisco Foundation)	controls $ 38 million of the total Phase II $ 82 million

Following the negotiation of the CCBA, criticisms and attacks against the agreement emerged. Many of these accusations were based in misinformation or a lack of understanding as to what the role of a community benefits agreement should be. Of these attacks, one stands out in particular as it came from a group of academics with some previous experience in CBAs. This group included: Gilda Haas, urban planner and founder of SAJE; Peter Marcuse, Professor Emeritus of Planning in the School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation at Columbia University; and Chester Hartman, an academic whom has taught at Columbia, Yale, Berkeley, Harvard and George Washington Universities. These academics wrote a letter to San Francisco elected officials detailing their analysis of the CCBA's shortcomings. Points of contention included the fact that the agreement does not address critical environmental issues, that the agreement does not adequately attend to housing, and that the document is not implementable because it relies too heavily on actions taken by governmental bodies (Marcuse *et al*., 2010). Furthermore, they found the CCBA negotiation and execution processes to be lacking in transparency and democratic participation. Many of these assertions were made by comparing the CCBA to the Staples Center CBA in Los Angeles. This letter is illustrative of the confusion that many had regarding the CCBA and its role. Considering that these criticisms were written by professionals with previous experience with CBAs, it is easy to imagine that most area residents would have much less understanding of CBAs. This might fuel backlash against the agreement.

Julian Gross responded to the letter in his role as the lawyer of the Lennar/AD10 CCBA, as well as the lawyer of the Staples Center CBA. Gross details the several factual inaccuracies found in the original letter, as well as points out that many of the key points simply represent the authors' views on city policy rather than an academic analysis of the actual CCBA (Gross, 2009). In response to the accusation that the CCBA does not address the issue of environmental contamination, a subject that appeared in some newspaper articles and other criticisms of the CCBA as well, Gross clarifies that the CCBA was never meant to touch on all matters of importance regarding the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project. This is one of the reasons that it is a *core* community benefits agreement. By not addressing the environmental issue, the CCBA is not signifying that it has not identified the clean-up as a subject of key importance to the community as a whole or even to the AD10 groups. Rather, AD10 felt that it was best addressed through other means (especially since the Navy is in charge of the clean-up, not Lennar), and that their efforts would be most effective addressing

the core needs of housing and jobs. In addition, AD10 at no time claimed to represent the entire spectrum of opinions from the community. Rather, the three groups that comprise the coalition defined their goals and opinions based on the most pertinent needs of their constituents. The presence of the CCBA was also never meant to be a hindrance to other community groups that wish to state or support alternative views (Gross, personal communication).

One critical misinterpretation made by some regarding the CCBA is that it is part of the community benefits package organized between the City and Lennar. This misunderstanding has resulted in criticisms that the CCBA has not asked for enough and diminishes what might have otherwise been achieved. The Lennar/AD10 CCBA is a private agreement between a developer and a coalition of community groups, and as such is separate from the benefits package agreed upon between Lennar and the City. At times, the CCBA has pushed for a greater amount of benefits than originally agreed upon with the City, such as improved levels of affordable housing units. At no point does any part of the CCBA restrict or change the commitment made to the City by Lennar or diminish the public planning process. Likewise, the actions of the City or other governmental bodies can have no impact on the benefits that Lennar is required to deliver by the CCBA. The critical letter states that benefits may be diminished by late government approvals for housing or other factors, however this is untrue. Regardless of issues that may cut away at the developer's profit margins, such as delays in permits or subsidies, or a drop in housing unit market value, there can be no resulting reduction in the benefits required by the CCBA.

It is difficult to understand why such hasty criticisms of the CCBA emerged. A lack of information for the general public may have resulted in misunderstandings of the role and purpose of the CCBA. Additionally, BVHP community members, especially those who have been extensively involved in the official engagement process, may view the CCBA as operating outside of the community. The CCBA may, in that regard, be seen as a challenge to a process that has been largely public and locally-situated. The three community organizations that comprise AD10 have a significant share of constituents in BVHP, but do not have the same long standing history in the area as many other groups do. AD10's large and widely distributed membership base gives them the political leverage that was required to get Lennar to negotiate with them. The support of their large constituency in days leading up to the vote on Props G and F is one of the main motivators for Lennar to have entered into the CCBA at all. Many groups do exist solely within the BVHP area and some feel that it would have been more appropriate for them to be more involved in the CCBA negotiations. However, this does not address the question of what might have prompted such an attack from a group of recognized academics.

False accusations were also made that the AD10 groups were able to receive funding through the CCBA. In reality, the agreement is written in such a way that these community groups are strictly forbidden from receiving any of the funds allocated through the CCBA due to conflict of interest. All funds from Lennar are being held by a third party organization, the San Francisco Foundation, while final decisions are made regarding their use.

The CCBA has achieved a significant benefits package for the BVHP community and yet its validity, and the legitimacy of the AD10 groups, has been questioned by some. Table 4 outlines some of the preconditions for the successful negotiation of a CBA and how the Lennar/AD10 CCBA compares to them, and Table 5 evaluates the CCBA with the elements required for a successful community benefits agreement that were

introduced in the literature review. Most of these elements are met, suggesting that the Lennar/AD10 CCBA will prove to be a success.

Table 4 – The Lennar/AD10 CCBA in relation to frequent preconditions for successful CBA negotiations

ELEMENT	ACHIEVED?
a strong real estate market	Yes, although less so in BVHP than in the larger city of San Francisco
significant public subsidy associated with the project	Yes
high potential for community opposition to disrupt the project	Yes, especially regarding Props G and F
a coalition of community groups that is well organized, has a significantly large constituency, has adequate political leverage, and is able to reach common priorities and goals	Yes
a fear of uncertainty which throws off the typical balance of power between the developer and the community	Yes

Table 5 – The Lennar/AD10 CCBA compared with elements of a successful CBA

ELEMENT	ACHIEVED?
inclusiveness	Disputed
accountability	Yes
grounding in a larger organized political movement that works at the local level for economic justice and the redistribution of benefits	Yes
a high level of transparency in negotiation and implementation	Not for negotiation, but improved for implementation
a well-defined and vigorous method of tracking and enforcing implementation	Yes
a time frame associated with the outlined benefits	Yes

Following the signing of the CCBA, Prop G was accepted and Prop F failed, allowing for Lennar to move forward with the project. Out of a final benefits package of approximately 82 million dollars, the CCBA Implementation Committee and San Francisco Foundation controls approximately 38 million (see Table 2). The distribution of funds associated with the CCBA will be handled through the Implementation Committee. Established in January 2009, the committee consists of seven members: representatives from AD10, the PAC, the CAC, Lennar, and a mutually agreed upon seventh member from the community (necessary for voting reasons). Currently the SF Foundation is holding 7.4 million dollars to be distributed. As one representative from the SFLC pointed out, it is difficult to achieve a balance between immediate needs and the creation of something more sustainable for the community (Ford, personal communication). In order to determine the community's priorities, the committee organized "listening sessions" in which non-profit organizations, members of AD10 groups, church congregations, and other groups were questioned on their key concerns and priorities for the funds. The results of these sessions will help ensure that the money is used and distributed in the most appropriate and effective way. Approximately five hundred people from the neighbourhood were involved. The information has been compiled in a listening report summary that will guide the Implementation Committee's decision making process (the report should be available by the end of 2013).

The Implementation Committee must meet regularly to "develop strategies and procedures for the implementation of the policies and programs set forth in the CCBA" (Lennar/AD10 CCBA, p. 14). Lennar has committed $75,000 annually for the operation of the committee. It took about one year for the initial guidelines to be established that govern the committee. This is an example of how the process outlined by the CCBA can be cumbersome, and how decision making may be hindered by the guidelines that govern it (Ford, personal communication). The concerted effort made to ensure that the community's input is considered at all points in the decision making process has partially limited the CCBA's ability to instigate change. The CCBA acknowledges that the CAC and PAC are representative of the community's interests and states the intention to involve these two bodies when moving forward with implementation (although the PAC really only exists in name at this point as activities and funding have ceased).

> *"The Implementation Committee will work closely with the CAC, the PAC and all residents of District 10 to ensure that the implementation of the CCBA meets the needs of the Bayview Hunters Point community and reflects the substantial work of the CAC and the PAC in identifying the needs of Bayview Hunters Point and District 10."*
>
> *Lennar/AD10 CCBA, p. 14*

Summary

The engagement and benefits processes surrounding The Shipyard project have been executed by a number of different groups (see Table 6 for a summary). Engagement has been largely based on the distribution of information however there has been enough organizing capability on the part of the community that they have been able to achieve a fairly extensive benefits program and push for satisfactory outcomes. BVHP's history makes it clear how critical it is that issues of social, economic, and environmental justice are addressed through these engagement processes. The Shipyard is making an effort to reimagine the built form of this part of San Francisco, and as such interactions with the BVHP community need to be reimagined by the City and Lennar as well. This chapter has outlined the base and structure of these engagement and benefits processes, and the next will examine their effectiveness and appropriateness.

Table 6 – Key engagement processes

ENGAGEMENT THEME	ORGANIZING ACTORS	KEY ACTIVITIES & BODIES
Shipyard site clean-up and remediation	The U.S. Navy	information distribution open meetings Community Involvement Plan (CIP) Restoration Advisory Board (RAB)
Project development and entitlement process	Lennar and the SFRA (and the Successor to SFRA since 2012)	information distribution open meetings public workshops Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) Project Area Committee (PAC)
CCBA implementation	Lennar and AD10	listening sessions

CHAPTER FIVE - ASSESSMENT OF ENGAGEMENT & BENEFITS

The public engagement and community benefits processes that have been pursued concerning the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project have been significant in both time and resources committed. However, the effectiveness and appropriateness of these processes has yet to be studied. A true evaluation of this project will only be achievable in the decades after construction is completed and households and businesses have moved in. Nevertheless, conflicting claims are being made regarding the benefits and engagement achieved in these projects; some state that the CCBA has helped achieve unprecedented levels of benefits for the community (Jacobs, 2010; 2012), and some regard the entire process as a further entrenchment of social and economic injustice for current residents (Dillon, 2011;2013). This chapter assesses the community engagement and benefits process surrounding the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project thus far, using the two main concepts of effectiveness and appropriateness.

Effectiveness, as used in this report, refers to the quality of the overall engagement process. Four criteria have been developed to help indicate how effectively the public have been involved in the engagement and benefits processes: *participation*, *legitimacy*, *timing*, and *quality*. Participation refers to two key considerations: have efforts been made to grant the public the capacity to participate in these processes, and how willing has the public been to participate? Legitimacy is the public's perception of how valid the participation process has been and if the City and Lennar will seriously consider their input. The public's perception of legitimacy affects how they are willing to participate and therefore the quality of the final outcomes. Timing evaluates when the public was involved in the decision making process (as this effects how their opinions and ideas have been considered in the project development). Quality refers to how easily public input could be 'heard' and incorporated meaningfully.

As described in Chapter 2, and as employed in this report, 'appropriateness' refers to how the unique needs and concerns of the BVHP community have been taken into consideration during the development and execution of the engagement process. Has the engagement process been customized to local needs? Were adequate forums created for local residents to voice concerns, preferences, and demands? Does the resulting project reflect those concerns and respond to them? The four criteria that will be used to assess appropriateness are:

- *voice/inclusiveness*: the opportunity to participate in discussions regarding the project must be afforded to all members of the community; furthermore, community input must be considered in a meaningful way. The history of BVHP makes clear that appropriate development in the community must address the legacy of disenfranchisement and underdevelopment that has occurred. Voice, representation, and empowerment should be considered in assessing the project and its development.

- *environmental justice*: this criterion examines how the public has been involved in discussions regarding environmental issues and if all segments of the population have been able to be involved in those discussions. This criterion is particularly important in consideration of the significant contamination of the shipyard site and the perceived health associated with it. Have concerns been addressed in resulting programs and development propositions?

- *equity*: The Shipyard represents an immense amount of money, resources, and opportunities entering BVHP. This criterion examines if those benefits will reach the local population and if these resources will help address issues of economic inequality. A critical question regarding equity is: have the risks of incoming development, such as residential displacement, been mitigated for current residents?

- *aesthetic fit*: this criteria looks at how the public has been engaged in determining issues such as aesthetics of the site. Achieving a balance between taking advantage of the site's natural amenities and creating a project which respects the existing feel of the neighbourhood is a challenge which should involve the community in order to ensure success.

These two main concepts, of effectiveness and appropriateness, are affected by historical processes that have shaped the community and the site; BVHP's industrial legacy is the reason that such a large-scale empty site is available adjacent to downtown San Francisco, and this same history has been integral in creating an environment in which the community has been able to push for a certain level of benefits (as well as why they might require these benefits more than other segments of the population).

In addition to the broad assessment of the effectiveness of the engagement processes and the appropriateness of resulting propositions, an assessment should consider the outcomes of the overall process for the area and the residents. This is difficult to measure at this point in the project's lifespan as many of these outcomes have not been realized and groups have not had a chance to react to them. As such, discussion is confined to examining what has been achieved thus far and using arguments put forth in the literature.

There are three main processes that the BVHP community has had the opportunity to be involved in: the Navy led site clean-up, the engagement program executed by Lennar and the city of San Francisco, and the negotiation of the Lennar/AD10 CCBA. This assessment will cover environmental remediation and public processes, site redevelopment negotiations, and the CCBA. At the end of each section, tables will outline how these processes have respected the criteria of effectiveness and appropriateness outlined earlier. These processes will be framed in the concept of justice: social, economic, and environmental. The following chapter will distil some lessons learned from the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project experience that may be of value to future development projects.

Environmental remediation and public processes

The remediation of the shipyard naval site is of enormous symbolic significance due to the strong perceptions of environmental injustice held by much of the community. The Navy's historic presence in the area is associated with the heyday of ample employment and a strong economic base, as well as the decline of the area as jobs disappeared with the closure of the site. This large scale abandoned site has acted as both a reminder of the decline of the neighbourhood, as well as a threat to the current community. This threat includes a compromised environment, potential health risks, and lack of investment brought on by stigma and blight. The site is also a poignant visual reminder of being overlooked by the larger city. For these reasons, involving the community in the remediation process can be a significant step in addressing environmental injustice issues.

Arguably the Navy has involved the community, but in a rather superficial manner focused on information dissemination. Significant efforts were made to inform the community of the remediation process and to

move forward with transparency. However, the Navy's own survey of community residents found that many felt that they were not receiving adequate information (U.S. Navy, 2011). One interviewee detailed how many criticisms of the clean-up (directed at the City and Lennar as well as the Navy) have been based in misinformation, suggesting that education efforts have not been entirely successful.

It seems the Navy has been effective in disseminating information to a large portion of the BVHP population, but not necessarily in ensuring that residents interact with and understand that material. This may be in part due to the nature of the remediation process which involves complex ecological considerations and technical clean-up techniques, much of which may be difficult for a lay-person to understand. A lack of professional understanding may also result in residents pushing for outcomes that they believe to be necessary, but may in fact be simply increasing costs or lengthening timelines with little or no additional benefit.

The community has nevertheless pushed for improved levels of decontamination which highlights how this topic is one of significant importance to many of the neighbourhood residents. One example is the debate over early transfer of a particular parcel of land from the Navy to Lennar; this would have seen responsibility for the remediation of that site shifted to the developer. Residents were concerned that clean-up would not be completed to a satisfactory level if early transfer was achieved (Earthjustice, 2011). The issue was eventually brought to a California Superior Court which ruled that early transfer could not be completed because such a transfer had not been examined in the environmental impact report (Superior Court of the State of California, 2011). This incident shows how the community was able to shape remediation outcomes to fit their expectations. However, residents (mostly those associated with environmental organizations such as Greenaction for Health and Earthjustice) were forced to work outside of the engagement process and against the Navy and Lennar in order for their concerns to be addressed. This is an indication that the agreement reached between Lennar and the Navy may not have occurred within an appropriate engagement process, otherwise residents would have been able to have their concerns addressed without going to court. However, this is an imperfect indicator as it only requires a small number of dissatisfied people to bring such an issue to court, which may occur even if the vast majority of the population is satisfied with the outcomes. Additionally, those who do go to court tend to be organized groups which may or may not have an alternative agenda or reason for affecting a project's outcome.

Without the ability to participate meaningfully, environmental justice remains somewhat elusive for BVHP residents. The community must be able to push against what they perceive to be an unfair environmental burden both currently and for future populations. Although the Navy's site remediation and Lennar's project are often confused, they are in fact separate events and as such have separate community engagement processes.

In regards to the criteria developed earlier, environmental justice is obviously the most pertinent measure of appropriateness in the Navy-led decontamination process. The adequate clean-up of the shipyard site, as determined by the public, is a very significant step towards remedying past injustices. Although information sharing has been widespread and it appears that all segments of the population have had access to relevant material, the community has not been granted much opportunity to be part of the decision making forum. Additional criteria are referred to in the tables below.

Table 7 – Effectiveness of the Navy engagement process

CRITERION	LEVEL OF ADHERENCE	OTHER COMMENTS
Participation	medium	The public has been willing to participate but have not been given much capacity to do so outside of the RAB.
Legitimacy	medium	This is difficult to assess as many believe that the responsibility for clean-up to falls to Lennar; however, perception of the Navy seems to be generally good.
Timing	medium - high	Information has so far been disseminated throughout the entirety of the clean-up; however the dissolution of the RAB may have been premature.
Quality	low	Participatory exercises did not adequately capture local input and therefore did not produce pertinent information for use by the Navy in moving forward.

Table 8 – Appropriateness of the Navy's programmes and propositions for development of the site

CRITERION	LEVEL OF ADHERENCE	OTHER COMMENTS
Voice/ inclusiveness	low	Input from the community has only been considered minimally.
Environmental justice	medium	Information has been available to all segments of the affected population, although there has not been much opportunity to be an active part of discussions or decision making processes.
Equity	high	Remediation is desirable and appropriate for all current and future populations.
Aesthetic fit	high	The clean-up of the shipyard site is an important visual signal to the surrounding community that their neighbourhood is worthy of investment and represents a critical step in working against the stigma of the area.

Site redevelopment negotiations

Since becoming master developers of the site in 1999, Lennar has made an effort to establish themselves as an insider of the BVHP community. They have approached certain issues with a sensitivity which is not typical of developers in order to promote a certain image of themselves in the area. This effort has been critical in creating an environment in which residents feel that participation in the engagement process is worth their effort. Lennar has signalled to the community that they want this development to fit into the current neighbourhood, that they are committed to improving services in the area, and that they want to listen to the public. It is probable that this effort is largely self-interested; by improving services and other amenities in the community, Lennar is working towards increasing the market value of the area (median home values in BVHP are 586,201$ compared to 781,490$ for the whole of San Francisco (SF Planning Department, 2011)) as well as hoping for continued community and political support for their efforts. However, sending the message out that the interests of residents will be taken into consideration is a critical step in building trust with the community and showing that they are willing to listen. This may help encourage the public to get involved as they feel that their concerns will be listened to and addressed in some form.

The use of the Citizens' Advisory Committee (CAC) has encouraged transparency and has made Lennar

and the City accountable for all decisions and changes made to the development as any alteration to the project must first go through this body. Furthermore, it represents an effort to engage various stakeholder groups such as business owners and residents. Having a core group of community members work together over a long time period means that they are able to accumulate extensive knowledge about the project and its intricacies. According to one interviewee from the City, the CAC has an excellent understanding of the documentation related to the project despite it often being lengthy and quite complex; for example some members on the committee are familiar with the entire Environmental Impact Report (EIR) which totals 8500 pages. This has made it more difficult for changes to the project to be made without the community being informed. As the CAC is a product of the City it runs the risk of not being completely unpartisan.

Interviews have given the impression that the public participation process was completed on such a large scale that it could in fact be overwhelming. The hundreds of meetings coordinated and run by Lennar and the City would sometimes attract hundreds of participants (other times, as meeting fatigue set in, only a handful). During the three to four years it took to complete the entitlement process, approximately 375 meetings were held. These would regularly attract 150-200 people and all key stakeholders, such as the Navy, Lennar, the City, the PAC and CAC, would be in attendance (Kaslofsky, personal communication). This scale of engagement proved to be very challenging for all parties involved. It is difficult to measure the quality of engagement and determine how much of what was brought forward by the community was actually taken into consideration. Some described the process as a "free for all" and a "roadshow". The official community engagement process has been extensive, but has largely placed residents in reactive and passive roles.

The act of organizing and holding such a large number of meetings sends a signal to the community that the City and the developer are willing to listen. This effort on the part of Lennar is a good first step in building trust in the community. Unfortunately, hosting a slew of public meetings and workshops can, and did, result in meeting fatigue for BVHP residents. Participating in public meetings is time consuming and can be demanding on other resources as well (such as the money required for child care). As one interviewee mentioned, participating in the entirety of the open engagement process could easily be a full time job. Despite the number of meetings, it is difficult to assess if they were effective in capturing a large spectrum of BVHP residents. Often numerous meetings around a particular issue attracted repeat attendees instead of capturing a wider range of participants. Furthermore, it tends to be the loudest participants that are able to dominate conversations. One interviewee noted that the most vocal and active sector of the BVHP community continues to be the African-American population; this indicates that participants may not be representative of the community as Asian residents are now the largest portion of the population.

It appears that many of these meetings took the form of passive information sessions and that issues tended to be discussed in a reactive manner; a decision had been made regarding an aspect of the development (such as land uses) and the public was informed and given the opportunity to react to this information. A more effective approach would have been to allow the public to come forward with their own ideas so that new information and visions could be transmitted to Lennar and the City. Workshops were organized for certain aspects of the project, but these tended to be much more limited in terms of scope and people involved, and still brought the public into the process after decisions had been made. For example, four workshops were held in 2008 "to solicit community opinion on the proposed land use plan for the Candlestick Point/ Hunters Point Shipyard integrated project area" (M.I.G., 2008, p. 1). These were organized in order to encourage as much participation as possible; daycare and food was made available, over 5000

people were informed of the event, and community groups were involved in the outreach process (M.I.G., 2008). However, these workshops were also largely reactive. Information was passed onto participants (a total of 112 over the four days) by several speakers, and then focus group style discussions were led by a professional facilitator. The use of the term "workshop" here refers more to the small group format (8 to 10 people per group) rather than the actual process of brainstorming and coming up with new information. Discussion questions included "Which of the proposed parks would you be most likely to use?" and "Do you think the plan provides for a pedestrian-friendly street experience?" (M.I.G., 2008). These questions are clearly asking participants what they think about a proposed plan, as opposed to involving them in the design or decision making process. This is problematic because it does not allow for the introduction of new ideas, only the assessment of predefined plans which may or may not be the best solution for certain issues. Making sure that the public is only allowed to participate in a reactive role does not help give voice or representation to the community; in fact it continues the trend of disenfranchisement that the community has been suffering from. Without empowerment the engagement process is not being adequately sensitive to the true needs of the BVHP population.

The official engagement and benefits process has been situated to potentially help address historical injustices. The BVHP community has suffered from being the designated industrial dumping ground for the larger city and routinely considered as distinct and separate from the rest of San Francisco. An important consideration is if this project will be built for the benefit of the existing community, or solely for a future unknown population. The reality will probably fall somewhere in-between. The CCBA has helped shape the intent and language of the benefits package to ensure that current residents are explicitly considered. Many of the criteria for the affordable housing and hiring policies outlined in the CCBA stipulate that BVHP residents, especially those who have suffered from displacement in the past, are to be prioritized. The CCBA makes a clear effort to help the community currently living in BVHP benefit from incoming economic activity. One of the strongest symbols of local sensitivity is the rebuilding of the Alice Griffiths housing project unit-for-unit. Currently Alice Griffith embodies the decay of the neighbourhood and the fact that people in need have been overlooked; the reconstruction of the project will keep many of BVHP's poorest residents in the area. It is this type of vulnerable population that is usually the first to be displaced in the course of redevelopment projects.

One potential measure of appropriateness is to examine how different stakeholder groups have fared in the engagement process. Lay citizens have had opportunities to be informed about the project, but little ability to participate in decision-making. It seems that the community has not been empowered by the engagement process, but certain groups with adequate political power have been able to rally around points of concern. BVHP's history of community activism has helped encourage residents to vocalize their opinions on the project. Most groups seem to be pleased with the outcomes thus far. Lennar has shown sensitivity to locally important issues such as the re-building of the artists' colony and consultation with Alice Griffith tenants. However, some groups remain strictly against the project.

As a stakeholder, Lennar has dedicated an immense amount of effort and resources into trying to improve the image and economic reality of BVHP, however this is ultimately to their advantage if it is accompanied by a rise in real estate values. Do the ultimate motivating factors matter if this investment is accompanied by positive externalities which benefit the community? Unfortunately, the process risks being tailored towards future growth and therefore more appropriate for incoming investors and residents. Further considerations of appropriateness and effectiveness are detailed in the tables below.

Table 9 – Effectiveness of the Lennar/City engagement and benefits process

CRITERION	LEVEL OF ADHERENCE	OTHER COMMENTS
Participation	medium - high	A large part of the public has been willing to participate; however certain obstacles (such as time and resources required) have precluded some residents from being able to do so.
Legitimacy	medium	Lennar has done a lot of work in the BVHP community to become an "insider". However, they are still widely seen as large developer with few ties to the area. Perceptions of legitimacy vary from group to group.
Timing	low - medium	The public was often asked for feedback once decisions had already been made, as seen in the design workshops held in 2008. However, the use of the CAC throughout the project has granted continuity and provided some local input during all of the project development.
Quality	medium	Despite the large amount of meetings, public input does not tend to be considered during the decision making process when it would be most meaningful.

Table 10 – Appropriateness of Lennar and the City's programmes and propositions for development of the site

CRITERION	LEVEL OF ADHERENCE	OTHER COMMENTS
Voice/ inclusiveness	medium	The inclusiveness of the engagement process has been extremely high: a large number of open meetings have been held concerning all aspects of the project. However, these have been largely information sharing meetings and little opportunity has been granted for participants to voice their concerns.
Environmental justice	N/A	Lennar's most relevant avenue for addressing environmental justice has been through the Environmental Impact Statement and assessment, a process which has not been explored in this report.
Equity	medium	Lennar has been working to benefit the current community as well as improve perceptions of BVHP and services for potential incoming residents. It is in Lennar's interest to improve market values in the area and it is difficult to determine if this bottom line is prioritized over current residents.
Aesthetic fit	medium	Although the public has mostly been given opportunities to react to plans, some groups have been able to actively participate in design (such as the new buildings for the artists' colony). The renovation of Candlestick Park should prove to be a benefit for all.

The CCBA

As a stakeholder, AD10 provided their organizational and political power in order to negotiate a CCBA for the community and in particular for their constituents. As individual groups they are not able to benefit financially or otherwise from the CCBA. This allows us to examine the outcome of the CCBA as an intended benefit for a wider community as opposed to potentially being a side effect of an alternative motive, such as created by Lennar.

The benefits package negotiated between the City and Lennar addresses many concerns of the community and shows a surprising sensitivity to local issues. For example, the commitment to rebuild the artist colony space recognizes the importance of their presence in the community (and of course the presence of a large artists' network is an advantage to the image and value of the area). Redesign of the space was completed with significant consultation with representatives from the colony. However, the effectiveness of these benefits cannot be confirmed until they have been put in place because there is a chance that the City will allow the DDA to be amended, unlike the benefits secured in the Lennar/AD10 CCBA.

Despite its potential shortcomings, the CCBA has achieved a package of benefits greater than that which was originally negotiated between the City and Lennar. The CCBA has in that case been effective in achieving benefits for the community. Although the outcomes have yet to be achieved, the legal structure of a CBA means that it can be assumed with a fairly high level of confidence that these benefits will be executed. Where the CCBA appears to fall short is in its role of empowering the BVHP community. The AD10 groups are perceived as outsiders by many, and the negotiation process of the CCBA did not involve much engagement with the wider public (only with the constituents of the three groups). Some interviewees lamented the rushed timeline of the negotiations (three months) and recognize that engagement with the wider community was sacrificed as a result (Ford, personal communication). Therefore, the appropriateness of the benefits achieved may be contested. Regardless of if these benefits are the most appropriate for the community, they are without a doubt positive achievements which would benefit a residential neighbourhood regardless of history or particular socio-demographic characteristics. One of the reasons that the CCBA stands to be so effective, in fact why it was able to be achieved at all, is because an ideal environment had been set-up beforehand through the unique history of the site. The incentives for Lennar to develop and the public approval requirements meant that AD10 had significant leverage with which to work. The characteristics of the site as a brownfield redevelopment and a mega-project contributed to this possibility.

Critics of the CCBA have argued that it does not effectively address certain important issues, such as the environmental remediation of the old naval site. This brings up the question of if effectiveness should be measured by how many issues the agreement addresses, or by the extent to which certain issues are dealt with. Would it be more effective for the CCBA to address all issues of importance to the community, or is it better to focus on certain subjects of greatest importance (to the coalition's constituency and the wider community)? This report concludes that the CCBA's focus has been both appropriate and effective. Through the official engagement process, housing and employment were revealed to be the topics of primary concern for the majority of the community and these are the two main areas of focus in the CCBA.

In addition, the CCBA works extremely well as a complement to the official benefits package and engagement process. It has strengthened the benefits identified as main concerns for the wider community

without negatively affecting other outcomes. It has secured some of the most critical benefits by making Lennar legally accountable to their commitments, removing the possibility that these promises might erode over time and in the face of project set-backs. The Lennar/AD10 CCBA has shown how an organized group can take advantage of the need for public approval (in this case public approval was critical in order to get the necessary votes on Props G and F) to push for a certain level of benefits. However, the CCBA has not acted as an organizing or empowering tool in itself for the wider community. The political power of the AD10 groups, especially SFOP, has been critical in ensuring that Lennar would be willing to participate and therefore in securing these benefits as well as their effectiveness.

The CCBA has helped address social and economic injustices by demanding a high level of benefits from Lennar. The AD10 groups are in favour of the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project because of the potential it holds to help bring economic development and other benefits to an area in dire need of them. They have harnessed an important tool from the New Accountable Development movement to ensure that this "transformational" project is aligned with social and economic justice aims and not simply an event which will push San Francisco's marginalized population further away.

The current implementation process of most CBAs, including the Lennar/AD10 CCBA, is effective in the sense that it ensures that outcomes that have been committed to are achieved. However, the process tends to be time consuming and burdensome, therefore slow-downs can affect when benefits are actually delivered to the community. This slowdown is partially a reaction to the fear that funds will not be administered in a sustainable manner, and benefits will end up acting as band-aid money opposed to addressing problems at the root. The Lennar/AD10 Implementation Committee has in fact already received and distributed their first pot of money. The funds went to a program that gave 120 youths summer employment and to a program which offered stipends so that 9th grade students who were struggling with math and sciences could get tutoring (Ford, personal communication). Both programs have been successful, but unfortunately not very sustainable. Local schools have been inspired to continue providing tutoring services despite the funding running out, however the job program has had no continuation at all. The feedback from the group involved was "thanks, but no thanks" as the 8 week program produced no sustainable results (Ford personal communication). The Implementation Committee did take this as a learning experience in order to improve their process and work towards finding programs with more sustainable outcomes, therefore working towards more effective outcomes.

It is difficult to achieve balance between immediate need and more sustainable programs when considering the use of funds. The listening sessions organized by the Implementation Committee tried to address this is by engaging the community to determine how they want to prioritize the use of funds. The engagement of the community at this stage of the CCBA is not simply paying lip service to the concept of public participation; in fact, engaging the community at this stage is more meaningful than it might have been during the initial negotiation process. During negotiations, AD10 had to be extremely organized and politically strong in order to achieve a certain level of benefits. Now that those resources have been committed to, the community is able to participate in the decision-making process with confidence that funds are secured and available. The fact that the funds are already tenable means that citizens are more positive and willing to participate as they can have greater confidence that their participation will have tangible results. This process will help empower residents to have a say in how these funds are distributed and what they feel is a sustainable use of this money, therefore adding to the appropriateness of this process. The following tables summarize the effectiveness and appropriateness of the CCBA process and package.

Table 11 – Effectiveness of the CCBA process

CRITERION	LEVEL OF ADHERENCE	OTHER COMMENTS
Participation	low - medium	Some of the public wanted to participate in the negotiation by did not feel included in the process.
Legitimacy	medium	Although their political leverage and organizational strength was necessary to negotiate the CCBA, many perceive the AD/10 groups to be illegitimate and outsiders to the community.
Timing	medium - high	The tight timeframe that Lennar and AD/10 had to work in for the negotiation of the agreement mean that the wider public could not be involved during negotiation, however the public has now been involved in the implementation process.
Quality	medium	Having a fewer number of groups with decision making power allowed for a strong negotiating stance, and that power has now been spread out to include a wider group.

Table 12 – Appropriateness of the CCBA

CRITERION	LEVEL OF ADHERENCE	OTHER COMMENTS
Voice/ inclusiveness	medium	AD/10 did not involve the wider community when negotiating the CCBA, however use of the Listening Sessions has brought community input into the implementation process.
Environmental justice	low	The CCBA does not address environmental issues.
Equity	high	The CCBA is very strong in addressing housing and jobs for current BVHP residents in order to ensure that they benefit from The Shipyard. Sensitivity to issues such as the rebuilding of Alice Griffith illustrates this consideration of the current population.
Aesthetic fit	medium	Although the CCBA does not include design specifications, the affordable housing stipulations ensure that the built environment will include a variety of housing options. Ensuring that the project is being built for a wide spectrum of the population means that it has a greater chance of fitting into the existing built environment.

Conclusion

Despite the scale of these processes, much of the engagement completed by the Navy, Lennar, and the City has been focused on information distribution and has subsequently fallen short of being truly effective or appropriate. It seems that much of the engagement that occurred was in reaction to the fear of being accused of not informing the community adequately, or in order to reach public meeting requirements. A greater focus on involving community members in the decision-making process and encouraging empowerment would help address problems of disenfranchisement that the community has historically dealt with. The negotiation of the CCBA was not brought to the wider community, however now that the political strength of AD10 is less critical as a means of leverage the community is being asked to help determine the most appropriate and effective use of funds possible.

The criteria used in this chapter are based in the literature and the local history of BVHP. Evaluation of public participation and community benefits can be difficult, especially when different groups have varying ideas of what constitutes a successful outcome. Furthermore, the fact that The Shipyard has only recently started construction means that only a portion of these processes has been completed and outcomes are not finalized. These criteria provide a set of characteristics with which to critically consider what has been achieved thus far and how well these processes may serve the BVHP community today and in the future. They allow for a comparison of three of the main engagement processes and are meant as a complimentary tool to the discussion which precedes them. The next, and final, chapter will elaborate on some of the key lessons to be learned from The Shipyard project and its associated engagement and benefits thus far.

CHAPTER SIX - LESSONS & CONCLUSIONS

The Shipyard/Candlestick Point project is one of many North American developments in the past couple of decades that has pursued a large scale public participation process. It has also joined the ranks of several developments that have negotiated their community benefits package in conjunction with a community benefits agreement. Because of its characteristics as a brownfield redevelopment and a mega-project, The Shipyard has been positioned so that the City and the Bayview Hunters Point community have been able to leverage what seems to be an impressive level of benefits for the existing neighbourhood. The critical questions to be answered in this report are: how effective and appropriate has the community engagement and benefits processes been?; and will the benefits that have been committed to be realized for the current marginalized community of BVHP? As vertical construction of Phase I gets underway in the summer of 2013, these questions are on the verge of being answered. This includes the question being asked by all of San Francisco: will this project be the transformational success it has the potential to be?

A strong historical legacy of being San Francisco's industrial dumping ground has left the Bayview with a contaminated landscape and a stagnant economy that is capable of providing few jobs to its population. As the larger City works towards re-imagining this neighbourhood, issues of economic, social, and environmental injustice need to be addressed. Lennar has made a committed effort to become an "insider" of the community; however its motives for benefitting the community are based largely in a push to increase market values through improving the image and popular perceptions of the area.

Figure 28 - Groundbreaking on Phase I, June 2013
Source: www.shipyardsf.com

Figure 29 - Phase I horizontal infrastrucutre in place
Source: SF Gate



Although it will be many years before the Shipyard/Candlestick Point project may be deemed a success or a failure, or that its engagement and benefits may be thoroughly critiqued for their effectiveness, several lessons stand to be learned from the project's development thus far. First, The Shipyard project has shown that, despite the fact that public engagement is becoming a critical component of urban development projects, a variety of pre-requisite characteristics still need to be in place before a developer might be pushed to allow a community improved benefits and participation opportunities. The presence of public subsidies and the need for a public vote on Props G and F partially provided the impetus for Lennar to participate in public engagement and enter into the CCBA. A developer will commit to a benefits program once it makes political and financial sense as a strategy, especially if it exceeds the minimum requirements set forth by a city and carries legal obligations concerning its execution. As described by Baxamusa (2008), a power imbalance created through a fear of uncertainty is a major impetus for a developer to negotiate a CBA.

These characteristics are often associated with brownfield redevelopment projects that receive significant federal funding and require re-zoning or other regulatory changes that need public support in order to move forward. Brownfield sites are well positioned for their surrounding community to demand high levels of engagement and benefits; this is particularly pertinent as these sites are often located in neighbourhoods with low-income populations that have suffered from a loss of employment and economic activity. However, in order for a developer to be willing to commit the time and resources necessary to navigate this process, one that can be much more difficult and time-consuming than pursuing a greenfield development project, the brownfield site must be located in a strong real estate market, usually within a desirable urban area. The financial incentive of a strong return on their investment is one of the necessary characteristics for a developer to be willing to participate in extended engagement and benefits processes.

A second lesson from The Shipyard project is that increasing the number of open public meetings does not necessarily increase the quality or effectiveness of the engagement process. The significant number of community meetings pursued by the City and Lennar seem to have been more of a political manoeuvre rather than a true effort at improving the quality of public feedback and participation. The number of meetings seems to have been a type of defense against being accused of not properly informing the community on important issues. Public consultation needs to be improved so that the process moves away from a multitude of passive information sessions towards true citizen engagement; the community needs to be involved in the actual decision-making process instead of only being allowed to react to decisions once they have been made. Even the workshops hosted by Lennar and the City were simply small group discussion sessions regarding choices that had already been made opposed to obtaining input during the actual development process.

The reaction of citizens to the potential early transfer of a parcel from the Navy to Lennar shows that if a community feels strongly about a decision made regarding their community, they can find ways of addressing the issue outside of the defined engagement process. This is more easily achieved when a community feels adequately empowered. In this case, the community was galvanized through a history of community organizing and as a reaction to perceived environmental injustice in the Bayview. This example shows how the community organized around issues of importance; to avoid slow-downs in the development process and to avoid the construction of projects that are bad for the area, the community should be involved. In this case the community pushed for the outcome that they believed would result in the highest level of environmental remediation.

Thirdly, this development project has shown how the community benefits agreement is a critical tool in the New Accountable Development Movement arsenal. The CBA is a stronger method of delivering benefits than a DDA, as it cannot erode over time as a project faces complications or slowdowns that affect its bottom line.

A CBA is more effective in empowering a community if it is not negotiated solely as a political tool. When Lennar needed to take advantage of the political leverage held by the community coalition groups the negotiation process was rushed and did not leave room for wider community engagement. Unfortunately, this is an innate part of the characteristics in which the community requires political leverage to obtain an extended benefits package. If the negotiation of the CCBA had not occurred in time for the ballot vote, then AD10 would have lost the political leverage that was necessary to get Lennar to the table.

Despite this conflict between the innate political nature of a CBA negotiation and that political nature being damaging to the wider engagement effort, there are other opportunities to empower the community. The Implementation Committee of the Lennar/AD10 CCBA has made an explicit effort to find out from the community the most important and sustainable ways that funds from the CCBA might be used through their Listening Sessions. Although money was committed to particular uses in the negotiation process, such as housing or job training, the details of these programs are still flexible enough that the community can now be part of the decision making process. Arguably, being involved at this point in the process is even more meaningful than being part of the initial negotiation process. As the AD10 groups have succeeded in using their political strength in securing the benefits fund, the public may be more willing to commit their time to a cause that already has funding secured to it and will have very real results.

A final lesson illustrated by The Shipyard is that mega-projects attract the attention of a huge number of interest groups, all with varying agendas, visions for the future, and priorities. Some will be against the project in any shape or form, some will distrust the developer or the City regardless of the process, and many will support the project for the accomplishment of personal aims. It is not possible to develop a project that will leave all groups happy or satisfied and often it will be the opinion of the loudest group which gets picked up by the media. Unfortunately many groups have knee-jerk reactions to aspects of a project without being properly informed. These types of reactions are even more common when the project is one that takes place within a community or area with a contentious or political atmosphere, or one that represents significant investment. Groups that have an attachment to a neighbourhood naturally have significant emotional investment in the area and are passionate about particular issues, especially if they feel affected by those issues in their day-to-day life. Large amounts of money often attract the attention of groups that feel that they should be receiving a part of that funding in one way or another. The Shipyard project's experience was that once Phase II was announced, representing significantly more land and investment than Phase I, a multitude of groups came out of the woodwork to champion their causes.

As seen with the critical reaction to the Lennar/AD10 CCBA by a number of academics, reactions can be seriously misinformed. If a group of professionals with background experience in CBAs can react with such mislead accusations, it is easy to understand how groups with no previous training in such issues may react similarly. Because the CCBA was not part of the official engagement process between Lennar and the City its negotiation was not subject to the same type of educational outreach. This may in part be where much of the misinformation and criticisms stemmed from. Most current information about CBAs exists in

the form of academic literature; this might not be easily accessible or appropriate for informing the wider community.

This lesson is undoubtedly already obvious to cities and developers with experience in large-scale project planning. The greater question is how to minimize these reactions, or at least ensure that statements that do get voiced are well-informed and bring a relevant and helpful point of view to the discussion table. The city of San Francisco and Lennar tried to address this through hosting a multitude of meetings to inform the community on all aspects of the project. However, more attention should have been paid to ensuring that many different segments of the community were reached through this process and that people felt that attending would be worth the necessary time and resources. If meetings had involved the community in the actual decision-making process, than groups would have less material to criticize these decisions, as they would have had the opportunity to participate in determining their outcomes. Improving the quality of the public participation process may help mitigate criticisms of a large project, although these are inevitable to a degree.

These lessons, and this report as a whole, represent a starting point from which to continue studying and analyzing the Shipyard/Candlestick Point development project. Halfway through its lifespan, the reverberations of this project will be felt throughout San Francisco, and will inevitably change the face of the Bayview over the next decades. While we can examine the appropriateness of the community engagement and benefits processes as they have been executed so far, the effectiveness of their outcomes remain to be seen. The Lennar/AD10 CCBA has shown how community groups can organize to push for greater and more secure benefits than what might be accomplished by the city. Hopefully this agreement can help set a standard for other community groups wanting to see developments move forward in their neighbourhoods in a way that benefits and respects local residents. These groups must first realize the necessity of political strength in getting developers to sit down at the table and hopefully use that strength to leverage the imbalance of power in their favour.

The Shipyard/Candlestick Point project cannot be simplified to a list of housing units, acres of park space, or number of dollars committed to the community. It is a project that has had life breathed into it by the myriad of stakeholder groups who have faith in its ability to change the future of the Bayview community. These groups have proven their commitment through significant time and resources. What true benefits will be realized can be debated endlessly, yet the bottom line is that an abandoned and toxic piece of land is being re-imagined and remade with the intent of making it a healthier part of San Francisco. The hope is that a mutually beneficial relationship can be reached between the current Bayview community and the project, one that sees market value of the area rise, popular perceptions of the neighbourhood improve, and a decline in problems such as unemployment, housing inaccessibility, and economic decline. Certain structures have been put in place that should help ensure that this is achieved, however all groups involved need to keep pushing for the realization of a strong and healthy project throughout its lifespan. Although the first stake has barely been dug, now is the time to examine and study The Shipyard project and the lessons it might hold for the future.

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INTERVIEWS

Brekke, Therese. CEQA Manager, Lennar Urban. Interviewed on March 20, 2013.

Dillon, Lindsey. Academic at the University of California. Interviewed on March 6, 2013.

Ford, Conny. Vice President for Political Activities, San Francisco Labor Council. Interviewed on March 7, 2013.

Gross, Julian. Director, Community Benefits Law Center. Lawyer of the Lennar/AD10 CCBA. Interviewed on February 27, 2013.

Jacobs, Ken. Chair, Center for Labor Research and Education, University of California. Interviewed on March 6, 2013.

Jones, Stuart. Associate Director, IBI Group. Interviewed on February 21, 2013.

Kaslofsky, Thor. Project Manager, Hunters Point Shipyard. Successor to the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. Interviewed on March 6, 2013.

Lawson, Wells. Successor to the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency. Interviewed on March 6, 2013.

A number of interviewees preferred to remain anonymous.