Space, Practices, Discourse:

The *Praxis* of the Created Environment

Alison Tett

Graduate Programme in Communications

McGill University, Montréal

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ABSTRACT

SPACE, PRACTICES, DISCOURSE:

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This thesis attempts to develop a theory of praxis for the created environment. The three bodies of theoretical work it brings together are the political and philosophical traditions of praxis, theories of discursive practice, and recent understandings of social space which define space in terms of practices. Summaries of these three traditions are followed by suggestions for how they mutually extend and amplify one another to create a theory of spatial and discursive praxis. As an application of this theory I look at professional "practice" as it concerns the created environment, by exploring the implications of praxis for architecture and urban planning. I argue that realizing change in the created environment will require the urban design professions to base their own spatial and discursive practices on multiple meanings that have coalesced around the term praxis.

RÉSUMÉ

ESPACE, PRATIQUES, DISCOURS:
LA *PRAXIS* DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT CRÉÉ

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Cette thèse a pour but de développer une théorie de la *praxis* pour l'environnement créé. Elle synthétise trois courants théoriques: les traditions politiques et philosophiques de la *praxis*, les théories de la pratique discursive, et de récentes interprétations de l'espace social décrivant l'espace en termes de pratiques. Nous résumons d'abord ces trois traditions pour ensuite suggérer de quelle façon elles se complètent et s'amplifient réciproquement afin d'arriver à une théorie de la *praxis* spatiale et discursive. Nous procédons ensuite à une application de cette théorie en examinant la relation de la "pratique" professionelle à l'environnement créé et en explorant les implications de la *praxis* pour l'architecture et la planification urbaine. Finalement, en ce qui concerne la transformation de l'environnement créé, nous suggérons que les professions de design urbain devraient baser leur propres pratiques spatiales et discursives sur les sens multiples que le terme *praxis* a accumulés au cours de son histoire.

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I would also like to express my gra' ide to Jeanne Wolfe of the School of Urban Planning for her :ouragement, and to Alberto Perez-Gomez and his inaugural ⌣lass in the graduate History and Theory of Architecture programme for introducing me to architecture created according to very different knowledge practices. Although I have drawn on different theoretical traditions from those suggested by Professor Perez-Gomez, I hope that the work I have put together here contributes to identifying the level at which change in the created environment needs to occur.

I also thank my parents for their unconditional support, and my father for instilling in me from a very early age a critical awareness of space, cities, and the possibilities they hold for intensifying human activity.

Of my friends, I would especially like to thank Blane Little for his comments on Einstein's theory of active space, Susan Palmer for her lived created space of phantasy, Jonathan T. Wheatley for his building in practice some of what this thesis describes in theory, and Ariane Dind and Jennifer Fisher, who in related ways have helped me develop a voice.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is centered around three terms: space, practice, and discourse. In a very real sense, the middle term - practice - is the central concept around which the thesis turns. In the histories of philosophy and political theory the idea of practice, or praxis, has accrued several meanings having to do with public life, critical activity, and ultimately the epistemology and ontology of human subjects. While this history has its origins in early Greek thought, the notion of practice has more recently become central to two other areas of study: discourse theory and the socio-political analysis of space.[1] In each of these cases the understandings of practice put forward by literary theorists, geographers and sociologists have tacitly drawn on aspects of the praxis concept without making them fully explicit. It will be the task of this thesis to make these implied references explicit, and at the same time to broaden the applicability of the term by proposing an integrated theory of discursive and spatial praxis.

The larger purpose behind this project is to develop a dynamic framework for understanding social space and the materiality of the "created environment."[2] By understanding space in terms of practices I hope to identify fundamental processes which need to change if the created environment is itself to be changed. Of the many levels at which this change could be enacted, I have chosen to look at

architectural and urban planning practices because of the way these activities are "purposive" as regards the created environment (King 1988), and have produced legitimating discourses. Despite numerous shifts in these discourses over the past fifty years, much of the created environment in the Western developed world remains urban wasteland, inadequately meeting human needs and compromising the expression of human desires. While the urban design professions are not unilaterally responsible for this malaise, acting as they do within financial, institutional and even global political-economic constraints, what I hope to show is how understanding both created space and the architecture and urban planning professions in terms of practices radicalizes the perception of how change enters the system. As a disclaimer and also to limit the scope of this project, the larger political-economic processes which shape the created environment will not be addressed in this thesis, except insofar as the practice theories of space and discourse show how individuals' and groups' micropractices are imbricated with political and economic macropractices.

The reason why practice is key to this thesis warrants further elaboration. The explanation for its centrality is threefold. In the first place, practice when applied to understanding social space captures the immediacy of the created environment in its enactment. This accounts for why it has been adopted by geographers and sociologists seeking

to regenerate the analysis of social space. An analogy for the model of space it provides can be drawn from modern physics, where since Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity, the notion of space has become "active" through the idea of absolute space being replaced by the spacetime of spatially and temporally extended "processes."[3] The second reason why practice is central to this thesis is heuristic: It provides a common ground between theories of discursive practices and practice theories of space. The fact that this common ground exists supports the viewpoint that discourses and spaces are intricately connected to one another. The final reason practice is pivotal to this thesis stems from the critically relevant meanings that have aggregated around the term praxis which can be brought to bear on understanding social space. As mentioned above, these meanings have to do with constitutive self-activity and public life. One specific understanding of praxis which defines it as the unity of theory and practice will be seen to have particular relevance to this thesis because of the way it points to discrepancies between architectural and planning theories and practices. What I will attempt to show in this regard is not just that changes in theory are ineffectual unless they become practice, but also that the practices which produce a theory are integral to its ability to cause change. By understanding theory in terms of practices an explanation can perhaps be provided for why architectural and planning "products" haven't

changed significantly, even when the theory ostensibly has.

The reason why discourse is important to this project also requires explanation. Discourses, understood as practices which determine and are determined by a culture's structures of representations,[4] are akin to created environments in the sense that both realms materially embody rules for thinking and acting. Without conflating ontological categories or positing a theory of "pan-discursivism," the close association between discourses and social space needs to be recognized: Created environments are not just material objects; they are also the procedures which produce these objects, including their discursive procedures.[5] This becomes especially evident when how social spaces are subject to discourses is recognized. Building codes, architectural and planning theories, civic health regulations, popular design magazines, and social discourses such as those dealing with technology and liberalist ideas of property, are all part of the discursive cartel of the created environment which define and legitimate the production of acceptable social space. Discourses, which can be considered consistently to formulate subjects and objects in the same way, also formulate the created environment. Particularly when understood as practices, discourses are not just discrete theories but are integral with the objects they speak for.

By bringing together the traditions of <u>praxis</u>, spatial practices, and discursive practices as a framework for

assessing architectural and urban planning practices, I propose that this thesis contributes to three areas of study. In the first place, it contextualizes contemporary theories of discourse and space in terms of the history of praxis. It also contextualizes the term praxis itself, which in recent years has become popular in many discourses, including those of architecture and urban planning, without being clearly defined.[6] Secondly, the ideas brought together in this thesis make it relevant to planning and architecture education programmes which are concerned with how change occurs in the urban environment. In the case of architecture, it causes the "architecture as space" theme to be eclipsed which originated in Germany in the 19th century and became popular in this century with publications by Sigfried Giedion (1946) and Bruno Zevi (1957).[7] By understanding architecture and cities in terms of practices, change becomes perceivable in the instantiation of both designers' and urban inhabitants' daily procedures. For this reason the ideas presented in this thesis could also be of interest to groups and social movements which are working to invest environments with greater meaning and congeniality. Its usefulness in this regard would be to help evaluate when "change" is really change. Thirdly, this thesis contributes to the already formulated practice theory of space by making it a true theory of practice, rather than one which remains confined to description, which has been the case so far.[8]

The division of this thesis into two parts derives from the way it integrates several theoretical traditions together. In Part One I examine the traditions of praxis, discursive practices, and space as practices, independently from their being brought together as a theory of spatial and discursive praxis in Part Two. Chapter One therefore begins with meanings that have been attributed to praxis in philosophy and political theory from the early Greeks through to the 20th century. This history traces how the concept of praxis begins as a notion of self-sufficient activity, and develops with Aristotle into a theory of public life. Kant makes criticism central to the term's meaning, while Hegel initiates its ontological dimension by understanding subjects in terms of constitutive self-activity. Marx in turn extends Hegel's understanding by also suggesting that subjects' products are constituted by their activities. The definition of praxis as the unity of theory and practice will subsequently be traced through the Young Hegelians and Marx to the Frankfurt School theorists. A final section will look at more recent configurations of praxis which have attempted to integrate Aristotelian and Marxist elements of the concept. The particular theorists reviewed here will include Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas.

The understanding of praxis as the unity of theory and practice will be looked at more specifically in Chapter Two, where practice theories of discourse will be summarised. The

work reviewed here will be that of Julia Kristeva and Michel Foucault, set in the context of pragmatic approaches to language analysis and Charles S. Peirce's philosophy of Pragmaticism. Peirce's theory of signs will provide the epistemological background for practice-based understandings of language such as those developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Austin and John Searle. The summary of Kristeva's work will emphasize the productive process of signification and the formation of subjects within this process. Foucault's theory of discourse will complement Kristeva's viewpoint by identifying the way discourses regularize positions of subjectivity. The concepts of praxis underlying these theories of discursive practices will be seen to be those definitions which unify theory and practice, and consider practices to be constitutive of self.

In Chapter Three the review shifts to how space has been understood as practices. This overview begins with political interpretations of space, but then moves on to look at how this political nature can be radicalized by understanding space in terms of practices. Henri Lefebvre's contribution to the theory of space will be looked at first for the way it extends Marx's comments on space by developing a spatial theory of social reproduction. It is Lefebvre's interest in micropractices and le quotidien which first makes practices central to the analysis of space. Manual Castell's adaptation of Louis Althusser's theory of practice to space will be

discussed next, followed by a brief review of how the geographer David Harvey has attempted to incorporate Marx's theory of praxis into a political understanding of space. Michel Foucault's contribution to the theory of space will subsequently be looked at, both for how it substantiates the political, micropractice-based understandings of space as developed by the previous theorists, as well as for how it introduces discourses and the constitution of subjects to the analysis of space. This will be followed by a discussion of Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, which begins to address how subjects and spaces mutually engender one another through practices. Bourdieu's recognition of the role of the body in this process will be further elaborated upon through Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of the body-subject. Michel de Certeau's development of Merleau-Ponty's understandings of the body and space will also be summarised, particularly as it redresses aspects of Bourdieu's and Foucault's analyses by emphasizing how resistance and phantasy are integral to the production of space. Anthony Giddens' structuration theory of space will conclude the chapter by bringing together many of the above-mentioned themes and integrating them into a socio-spatial theory of society based on practices.

These first three chapters provide independent, parallel bodies of theory which only "intersect" in the fourth chapter, "The Praxeis of Architecture and Urban Planning." This fourth chapter thus forms the crux of the thesis. In it the theories

of praxis latent in the views of space and discourses as practices will be brought to the forefront and amplified into a theory of discursive and spatial praxis. Architectural and urban planning practices will be examined in the light of this theory in order to assess whether recent changes in the professions constitute change at the level of praxis. I will argue that architects and planners can best realize change by coming to understand both space and their "professional practices" in terms of the political and philosophical traditions of praxis. To conclude the chapter I will take a more general look at the way subjects, society and the material world become "converged" in the production of the created environment, and the potential role of planners and architects in bringing about this convergence according to an inclusive understanding of praxis.

In the Conclusion I will summarize what a praxis-based ontology of the created environment entails, and the praxis-based theory of change that proceeds from it. From my discussion of professional practices in the created environment, I will move on to consider more fundamentally the interdependency of practices in the constitution of subjects and spaces, selves and ultimately cities.

NOTES

1.In his 1971 book, Praxis and Action, Richard Bernstein has looked at how the concept of praxis underlies four currents of philosophical thought in the modern era: the tradition stemming from Hegel and Marx, Existentialism, Pragmatism, and Analytic Philosophy. In line with this tradition, discourse theory and post-Kantian theories of space can be considered two further areas of study that have been enriched by the concept of praxis.

2.This term is used by Anthony Giddens following David Harvey's use of "created space" to denote urban space as produced by capitalism (Giddens 1981, 149; 1984, xxvi; Harvey 1973, 309-10). The terms "created space" and "spatiality" have similarly been used by Soja to distinguish socially produced space from "contextual space" (or space per se), the physical space of material nature, and the mental space of cognition (Soja 1980, 209-10; 1985, 92). I choose to use "created environment" and "created space" in part for the positive connotations they convey: The adjective "created" emphasizes how the built environment is a product of human making, involving human creativity and therefore holding out the possibility for change.

3.Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity displaced the view that spatial and temporal locations are absolute. Instead it posited the world of space and time as the single four-dimensional manifold of spacetime. The Special Theory of Relativity recognizes that observers will partition spacetime into a "space" and a "time," but it correctly predicts that they will make this partitioning in different ways depending on their motion. According to the Special Theory of Relativity, "space" is therefore a three-dimensional cross-section of a four-dimensional manifold, where the relevant cross-section depends upon the motion of the observer in question. For this reason it is no longer meaningful to posit absolute temporal or spatial location or the separation of events. Since the Special Theory of Relativity, spatially and temporally extended "process" has become the more fundamental reality, and space has become "active."

4.This definition is a slight variation of one provided by Richard Terdiman, which reads: "a culture's determined and determining structures of representations and practice" (Terdiman 1985, 12).

5.The way discourse constitutes seemingly nondiscursive phenomena is a major theme in Foucault's work. He explicitly refers to it in relation to his study of madness in the The

Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1972, 32).

6.An example from architectural discourse which illustrates the vague use of praxis is a 1984 essay by J. A. Knesl on "The Powers of Architecture." Knesl uses praxis in a loose way to connote positive attributes of human activity. He makes reference to "human-life praxis," "economic praxis," "architectural praxis," "societal-life praxis," "design praxis," "interventive human praxis," and "aesthetic praxis," without specifying what he means by praxis. At one point he makes a distinction between "human practices and praxis" (Knesl 1984, 14) without clarifying the basis for his distinction. Since the term praxis has acquired so many meanings, defining it would prevent it from becoming mere jargon.

7.Peter Collins traces the geneology for the "architecture as space" concept to Hegel's Philosophy of Art (based on lectures delivered in the 1820s), and subsequently to Heinrich Wölfflin's development of Hegel's comments on space into a technique for art criticism (Collins 1965, 286). Given this similarity, he notes that the theme did not become popular until the 19th century. In the 18th century, complex architectural spatial relations were discussed in terms of structure and proportion, rather than in terms of space (Collins 1965, 285). Not discussed by Collins but also pivotal to the development of the theme, were Alois Riegl's distinction of architecture which delimits space from architecture which encloses it, and August Schmarsow's view that all architecture, even to the primitive hut, is a spatial structure. Schmarsow (1853-1936) was the first to consider architecture a creator of space. His work connecting architecture to embodied experience was similar to that of Husserl and the early phenomenologists who were beginning to formulate their critique of positivism at the time (Ikonomou 1985, 126-44, 189). With regards to 20th century architectural theorists' use of the "architecture as space" theme, Bruno Zevi, who popularised the notion for English audiences, considers space to be the "protagonist" of architecture which defines its reality. He does not credit Schmarsow with having originated this idea. Sigfried Geidion's somewhat earlier use of the space concept is central to his evolutionary typology of architectural forms. Giedion suggests that there has been a progression from two-dimensional to three-dimensional architectural forms, and most recently with modernism, to four-dimensional forms which require the active dimension of time to be properly understood. Giedion implies that certain modernist projects exhibit the "space-time" of Einstein's special theory of relativity, but as Collins argues, he doesn't substantiate this over-simplified scheme (Collins 1965, 287-93).

8.What I am calling the "practice theory of space" has been extensively developed through Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration. Geographers exploring the applicability of Giddens' theory have suggested how it might be relevant to empirical research (Dear and Moos 1986a, 1986b; Gregson 1987 [these authors also cite earlier examples]), but to the best of my knowledge no one has investigated its implications for guiding and evaluating social and environmental change efforts.

PART ONE

SPACE, PRACTICES, DISCOURSE

CHAPTER ONE

THEORIES OF PRAXIS:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL TRADITIONS

I begin the theoretical review section of this thesis with concepts of praxis. While the history of this term has been documented elsewhere,[1] its main configurations will be outlined here because of the way it forms the substratum for the entire thesis. What will become apparent in this review is that the history of the praxis concept is not linear. Rather several philosophical and political traditions have coalesced around the term which remain distinct even while overlapping in various ways. Different definitions of praxis will later be seen to have relevance for different aspects of the theories of discourse and space. The common ground between discourses, practices and space will be those definitions of praxis having to do with the ontology and epistemology of human subjects, public life, and the relationship of theory to practice.

The history of the term praxis begins with the Greeks. Nicholas Lobkowitz cites its earliest Greek meaning to have been acting or performing. Its related meanings were to accomplish, for example a journey; to manage, as in a state of affairs; and to do or to fare (Lobkowitz 1967, 9). This understanding of praxis as doing was contrasted with poiësis, or making. The distinction here concerned the relationship

between action and its end. Praxis was considered to be that mode of action whose meaning resided in itself: the completion of the act was its own accomplishment. The meaning of poiësis, on the other hand, resided in the work produced. According to this broad definition poiësis could include the varied activities of slaves, artisans, physicians, and writers of drama and poetry (Lobkowitz 1977, 26).

The contrast between poiësis as productive activity and praxis as "non-instrumental"[2] activity also lay in the political connotations of the latter term. This dimension of praxis derived from philosophical speculations on what kind of person was the happiest, wisest, and best. According to Cicero, Pythagorus in framing his viewpoint on this issue defined the ideal life of the philosophos by dividing men into the types which attend festive games: those who sell wares for profit and ultimately are motivated by sensual gratification; those who seek honour by participating in the games; and those who observe and contemplate the beauty of the speeches and athletic feats. For Pythagorus the last option - that of the philosopher's contemplative way of life - was the most honourable. Aristotle, however, using this story as the framework for his own discussion of acceptable vocations, also recognized the participatory lifestyle of the bios praktikos - or life of politically engaged praxis - as an honourable alternative for wealthy, enfranchised citizens of the Greek polis (Lobkowitz 1977, 13-15). As further formulated by

Aristotle, the lifestyles of the bios politikos and the philosopher's bios theoretikos each had a corresponding type of knowledge attached to it. In the case of the bios theoretikos, a sacred aspect of its associated knowledge type was suggested by the root word theoros, or spectator, which originally referred to the emissary sent to consult oracles and observe the sacred rituals of neighbouring city-states. The divine aspect of this function was reinforced by a suggested etymological connection between theoros and theos, or god (Lobkowitz 1977, 14). The type of knowledge attributed to the bios theoretikos therefore concerned the eternal and unchanging divine world, or theoria. The type of knowledge corresponding to the politician's bios praktikos was conversely that dealing with the changing, unstable world of people. In the Nicomachean Ethics what Aristotle called "practical knowledge" concerned contingent relations and how political and ethical tasks could be performed well. Politics for Aristotle was thus a branch of practical knowledge. The term praxis by this way of thinking came to signify those activities characteristic of free people's political and ethical lives.

These varied understandings of practice and the practical in early Greek and Aristotelian thought form a cluster of associations which reinforce and "thicken" the central notion of praxis. The idea that praxis is action which is its own end, for example, relates to Aristotle's understanding of

praxis as political life. This is because the "end" of political life in the polis was self-justified: its telos was itself - a vital and politically engaged public life for all citizens. However, what Aristotle called "practical knowledge" did not correspond to praxis understood as self-justified action, since practical knowledge didn't concern the Absolute, which could be contemplated as an end in itself, but instead how to proceed ethically given the changing conditions of interactive life. Practical knowledge was always provisional, like a set of "game rules" (Lobokowitz 1977, 18). Given this distinction, both practical and theoretical knowledge were nonetheless forms of praxis understood as activity (Lobkowitz 1977, 16).

The political understanding of praxis as engaged public life receded in importance with the decline of the polis even within Aristotle's own lifetime. With the greater mobility of classes in the Hellenistic period, virtue and perfection were no longer identified with a specific social status and philosophers developed an understanding of virtue less related to public life (Lobkowitz 1967, 57). While the Stoics sought to integrate the bios theoretikos with the bios praktikos - evident in the lives of Seneca, Cicero and Marcus Aurelius - this ideal was superceded by that of the Neo-Platonists between the 2nd and 4th centuries A.D. In part a reaction against Stoicism, the Neo-Platonists valorized contemplative life which had as its goal union with a transcendent Absolute.

The Aristotelian sense of praxis lost its currency during this period and only surfaced in the later Christian context as the question over whether the life of practice (charity) or contemplation would assure one of salvation.

It was in the 12th century that the term "practical" acquired its modern sense of expedient. This meaning of the term has been traced to a small treatise by Hugh St. Victor called Practica geometriae, which concerned the geometrical measurement of distances, surfaces and volumes. The irony that this should be the source for the vernacular meaning of "practical" is that in his much larger work, the Didascalion, St. Victor defined practica in the Aristotelian sense as knowledge relating to ethics, economics and politics. For reasons not entirely clear, it was his use of practica as applied knowledge which became accepted as the received tradition. It was this understanding of the term which Francis Bacon popularised in his precept that true knowledge is that which bears fruit in practice.

Given this new, vernacular understanding of "practical," the Aristotelian concept of praxis did not entirely disappear from philosophical discourse. Its ethical component was retained by Locke, for whom praktikè was the "skill of rightly applying our own powers and actions...." Locke can be considered to have straddled the two definitions of the term because the goal towards which these skills were to be applied was practical in the Baconian sense of being "the attainment

of things good and useful" (Locke cited in Petrovic 1983, 385).

It is moreover to Kant that the reemergence of a political understanding of praxis has been credited. The notion of the practical was central to Kant's project of granting authority to science while at the same time holding on to overriding principles of morality. The term practice is not used consistently in his writings. In his essay, "On the saying: 'This may be right in theory but does not hold good for praxis'", praxis is the application of theory to cases encountered in experience. But in The Critique of Pure Reason practice forms the basis of his distinction between ethics and the natural sciences. Practical reason for Kant is the type of cognition concerned with what ought to be, while pure reason is the basis for theoretical cognition, enabling people to know what is. The standard criticism of Kant's understanding is that it posits a value-free world of existence - the "is" of positivistic, inexorable laws - separate from precepts for action, which are the "ought" of individuals' internal moral freedom. In the Marxist critique he thus divorces theory from practice. Other commentators, however, point to Kant's statements on the ultimate unity of reason, and to his concession, in the final analysis, of granting primacy to practical reason (Petrović 1983, 385).[3] However Kant's system is evaluated, his understanding of praxis remains Aristotelian in so far as it concerns the

ethics of autonomous agency, and not the repetition of an immutable order of things.

Kant's distinction between the "is" of theory and the "ought" of ethical practice served as the point of departure for subsequent philosophies of the relationship of theory and practice. Fichte, for example, accepted Kant's basic system while modifying it and contending even more forcefully that practice is primary. Schelling similarly worked within the Kantian tradition but attempted to find a third term which would simultaneously incorporate and transcend the essential aspects of theory and practice. Following Schelling, Hegel also sought the unity of theory and practice in a dialectically higher moment (Petrović 1983, 385). Hegel's understanding of the two terms is particularly important because it catalyzed the development of the praxis concept by the Young Hegelians and Marx. As Shlomo Avineri has remarked, the philosophy of praxis "cut deep into the Hegelian system...though Hegel himself could hardly have foreseen all its implications" (Avineri 1969, 131).

The notion of praxis can be discussed at two levels in Hegel's philosophy. The first level has to do with how theory and practice are specifically reworked in Hegel's system. This aspect concerns how Hegel sought to bypass the Kantian theory/practice dualism by dividing philosophy into the spheres of pure thought (logic), nature, and human reality (Finite Spirit), where theory and practice emerge but are

transcended by a higher synthesis in each of the three divisions. The ultimate "truth" of theory and practice is Hegelian "freedom," achieved through social life in the sphere of "Objective Spirit," and only known in the sphere of "Absolute Spirit" experienced as art, religion and philosophy (Petrović 1983 385).

The second level at which Hegel's understanding of praxis can be looked at is the way it underlies his concept of Geist. The strands of this argument have been succinctly brought together by Richard Bernstein (1971) in his interpretation of how Hegel's philosophy influenced Marx. Bernstein, following Avineri and others,[4] suggests that Marx developed his concept of praxis as a result of his dialectical, immanent critique of Hegel's Geist. Geist, or Spirit, was Hegel's theoretical conflation of the classical Greek notion of Reason, or Noûs - which from Anaxagorus through to Spinoza was periodically considered the ultimate teleological Subject - and the Judaeo-Christian tradition of divine Providence guiding history. Praxis underlies Hegel's concept of Geist in the sense that the internal dynamic which causes Geist to be simultaneously negated, affirmed and transcended (Aufhebung), is for Hegel a process of self-activity. Hegel makes this view explicit in his statement that "The very essence of Spirit is action. It makes itself what it essentially is; it is its own product, its own work" (Hegel cited in Bernstein 1971, 21). Since Geist is chiefly expressed through the

agency of individuals, Hegel extends this critical viewpoint by contending that "Man is his own action, the sequence of his actions, that into which he has been making himself" (Hegel cited in Bernstein 1971, 22). Praxis as incipiently formulated by Hegel is thus the activity through which subjects form themselves.

This foundation of Hegel's philosophy profoundly inspired Marx and the Young Hegelians. But rather than accepting Hegel's opinion that his philosophical worldview could only describe manifestations of Reason in the past, the Young Hegelians sought to project Hegelian theory into the future by making it effective in practice. For them theory in the form of criticism could propel history. The understanding of praxis as the union of theory and practice largely derives from their movement in the 1840s.

Working at the fringe of the Young Hegelian movement was the Polish count August von Cieszkowski. His Prolegomena zur Historiosophie [1838] initiated the viewpoint that Hegelian theory should be united with practice. Cieszkowski suggests in his Prolegomena that philosophy be reassessed as having a "practical" - in the sense of "applied" - role in actualising Idealism. This popular sense of practical in Cieszkowski's thought is tempered by an equally present Aristotelian aspect. Both understandings of the term are evident in his advocation that philosophy "descend from the heights of theory into praxis", since praxis as he uses it here means "concrete,"

"social activity" (Cieszkowski cited in Avineri 1968, 129). Activity of this sort is primary for Cieszkowski because in reworking Hegel's philosophy he suggests that praxis replace religion in Hegel's division of Absolute Spirit into art, religion and philosophy. Praxis in this sense refers to the activity of humanity on reaching Hegelian Absolute Knowledge, and is what follows reaching salvation in theory (Lobkowitz 1967, 199, 218). The "concreteness" of Cieszkowski's understanding of praxis contributed to his building a better bridge between subjectivity and objectivity than that provided by Hegel's theory of matter. Whereas for Hegel matter was spirit in self-alienation, for Cieszkowski matter was rehabilitated through the Self becoming concrete only through action related to external objects (Avineri 1968, 128-9). Cieszkowski's contributions to the theory of praxis were not widely recognized during his lifetime. Even Marx, writing five years after the publication of Cieszkowski's Prolegomena, did not match Cieszkowski in his understanding of praxis as concrete social activity (Lobkowitz 1967, 274). Today Cieszkowski's early development of Hegelianism as an action-oriented system to bridge theory/practice and objectivity/subjectivity is more widely recognized as a precursor to contemporary understandings of action and subject/object relations.

The theorists more properly considered Young Hegelians - Arnold Ruge, Bruno Bauer and Moses Hess - developed the praxis

concept as the principle that reality is actively shaped by theory. Ruge in 1843, for example, noted how the German working class had "digested" theory sufficiently to allow "its breakthrough into existence...." Praxis as he defined it was "the movement of the mass in the spirit of theory" (Ruge cited in Avineri 1968, 133). Bauer similarly suggested that theory becomes translated into practice in his letters to Marx where he discouraged Marx from engaging directly in political affairs. Instead he advised Marx to pursue an academic career because theory, in his view, was always the strongest praxis (Bauer cited in Avineri 1969, 132). But while Ruge and Bauer recognized the need for theory to become translated into practice, they didn't translate their own theories into social action. This fact was recognized by Hess, for whom Ruge's and Bauer's conceptions of praxis were still insufficiently emancipated from theory. Of the three, Hess placed greater emphasis on the need for social action because for him alienation could only be overcome through social practice (Avineri 1968, 133).

Marx's initial interest in praxis was in accordance with the Young Hegelian sentiment of the times. Like his friend Hess, he wanted to realize philosophical ideals in practice. From the outset, therefore, Marx's concern was "'practical-critical' activity" rather than pure theory; he considered the whole notion of "thinking isolated from practice...[to be] a purely scholastic question" (Marx 1967a, 401). This was the

reason for Hegel's initial appeal for Marx: Hegelianism provided a means for conceptually surpassing the Kantian "is" versus "ought" dichotomy by showing how the theory of Idealism manifests in the practice of history (Marx 1967b, 42).

The theorist who further catalyzed Marx's ideas on how philosophy could be realized in practice was Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach's critique of religion on the grounds that God is an alienated projection of unrealized human qualities, served to refocus attention on humanity itself. Feuerbach concretized Hegel's philosophy by showing how "being," or humanity, is the "subject," while "thought," or Hegelian Absolute Spirit, can only be the "predicate" which proceeds from being (Feuerbach 1972, 168). This "transformative method" devised by Feuerbach for inverting Hegelianism was used by Marx in his own critique of Hegel. While Feuerbach did not advance the praxis concept in its own right, continuing as he did to understand the term in its Kantian sense of moral activity, he did contribute to Marx's materialization of philosophy by relocating the active subject in people. This in turn directly inspired Marx's understanding of praxis: In recognizing the advancements of Feuerbach's theory of the active human subject, Marx also recognized the limitations of Feuerbach confining his understanding of activity to consciousness. Marx's development of the praxis concept as "sensuous human activity," outlined so forcefully in his "Theses on Feuerbach," was intended to overturn these last remnants of

Idealist philosophy and complete Feuerbach's inversion of Hegelian Geist.

The praxis concept in Marx has been credited with providing the foundation for his entire philosophy. This has been the outlook defended by "humanist" interpreters of Marx against "scientistic" interpreters who claim that there is an "epistemological break" between Marx's early writings and his later, "mature" work of Capital, where the praxis concept is superceded by economic determinism.[5] On the basis of Marx's actual use of the term praxis, Lobkowitz notes that Marx nowhere in his writings defines it, and that considering the centrality of the concept to his work, he uses it seldomly. In The German Ideology, for example, Lobkowitz points out that praxis is used in both its vernacular and philosophical senses, but that in its "strong sense" it always refers to activities which contribute to the humanization of society (Lobkowitz 1967, 419-20). The interpretation given to Marxist praxis in this summary will follow this "strong sense." The different facets of the term which will be touched upon are how it underlies Marx's understandings of production, epistemology, and consequently revolutionary change.

The relationship between praxis and production in Marx's thought has caused some Marxian interpreters to define Marxist praxis more according to Aristotle's understanding of poiësis than praxis.[6] Production for Marx does concern the material creation of objects (poiësis), but it also takes into account

the procedures by which objects are produced. What will be suggested here, therefore, is that Marx's conflation of objects with the activities that produce them sublates the traditional Aristotelian distinctions and provides a deeper understanding of what both objects and activities are. This will later be seen to have direct implications for how space can be understood in terms of activities.

The link between human practices, or praxis in German, and material objects is forged in Marx's view that manufactured goods are human activity in congealed form. In his analysis of capitalist society Marx looks not only at what is produced, but how it is produced. He contends that in alienated society people are alienated from the activity that produces goods as well as from the goods themselves (Marx 1964, 122-31). The procedures which go into making objects are fundamentally important for Marx because human subjects in his view are their activities; a person's character is constituted of what they do - their praxis. By merging material objects with the subject's activities which produced them, Marx dissolves the traditional ontological distinction between subjects and objects (Bernstein 1971, 44).
He also shows how material production is simultaneously social production and social reproduction. His understanding of production thus exceeds the instrumental view of it as poiesis. Production for Marx is instead the anthropological characteristic that distinguishes humanity; it is what

constitutes humanity's "species-life." It is through the praxis of their productive activities that people transform nature, and in this process, themselves.

There are epistemological consequences of Marx's recognition that practices are integral to production. Where Idealism had postulated the active role of the subject in the subject/object relation, Marx realigns this insight by contending that subjects know the world only as it is a product of their real, objective practices. While materialistically retaining belief in a "real world" which interacts with consciousness, Marx recognizes that people don't passively contemplate the world, but actively shape it both materially and cognitively. It is through this understanding of praxis that Marx is able to propose the unity of subjects and objects. Praxis according to this use of the term is transformative activity which affects understanding and cognition (Vasquez 1977, 116).

The identity which Marx posits between subjects and objects/ people and their humanly constructed world, extends also to the relationship he suggests exists between individuals and society. Through praxis - activity which constitutes subjects at the same time it constitutes their productions - Marx transcends traditional dualisms by contending that both individuals and society are "the ensemble of social relations" (Marx 1967a, 402). For Marx the social is sustained in the daily activities or praxis of individuals.

Changing individual and societal practices thus has emancipatory potential because it involves changing the conditions and productions which in turn condition people. Marx's third thesis on Feuerbach indicates that he considers this aspect of praxis to be revolutionary:

> The coincidence of the change of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be comprehended and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice (Marx 1967a, 401).

The emancipatory dimension of Marx's concept of praxis emerges on other fronts as well. His view that people create their existence both epistemologically and materially through praxis implies that this existence is historical and therefore can be changed. An emancipatory thrust is therefore inherent to the concept. It is for this reason that Marx sometimes uses praxis to denote non-alienated, "free [and] conscious activity" (Marx 1964, 127).[7] Praxis according to this understanding of the term is what offers the way out of alienation. It describes the experience of people in the future emancipated society who are able to recognize themselves in both their activities and resulting products. Praxis is thus the goal of the emancipated society, and, as "practical-critical activity," it is also the means by which a truer identity can be achieved between people and the objective world they create.

Marx's theory of praxis underwent both revision and extension by subsequent Marxist thinkers. This history will

be briefly summarised to show its continuity and discontinuity from the 19th century through to the 20th century. In recounting this phase of the concept's history, emphasis will be placed on its reemergence from the 1950s to the 1970s as a combined Aristotelian and Marxist theory. The theorists whose work will be chiefly looked at are Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas.

The "revisionist" aspect of this history begins with Engels, who popularised the idea that Marxian praxis was synonymous with experiment and industry. This interpretation was later criticized by Georg Lukács. Engels also emphasized that aspect of praxis having to do with the relation of theory to practice: Since action precedes argumentation, Engels argued that practice is the ultimate criterion of truth. This definition was picked up by Lenin, and later by Mao Tse-Tung, who in addition to this understanding of the term, defined praxis as the unity of knowing and doing (Petrović 1983, 387).

In Petrović's summary of the praxis concept, Antonio Labriola is cited as the first Marxist theorist to develop Marxism as a philosophy of praxis on the basis of the "Theses on Feuerbach" (Petrović 1983, 387). Giovanni Gentile also pursued this project, interpreting praxis as "sensuous human activity." In this century Antonio Gramsci likewise considered Marxism to be the "philosophy of praxis," but didn't always distinguish praxis in its "strong sense" from Engel's understanding of it as industry and experiment

(Petrovic 1983, 387). Lukács, whose criticism of Engels has already been mentioned, considered praxis to be the central concept of his History and Class Consciousness (Lukács 1971, xviii). His humanist reading of Marx served as an impetus for later developments of the praxis concept, including those by the Frankfurt School theorists and the Yugoslav praxis philosophers.

As is well-recognized, the relationship of theory to practice was a primary concern of the Frankfurt School group of social theorists (Horkheimer 1972, 215-42). Although critics generally agree that practice was insufficiently united with theory in their development of "critical theory," one of the key insights of the Frankfurt School was its recognition that when practice becomes distorted and fails to fulfill theory (which was the case in Stalinist Russia), the theory itself needs to be revised. The two definitions of praxis which the Frankfurt School recognized were its Marxist interpretations as revolutionary activity and the ontological fulfillment of human potentiality (Horkheimer 1972, 244-5; Akard 1983, 207). This latter sense of the term was developed in particular by Marcuse. Marcuse reworked the praxis concept by returning to the early Greek understanding of the term as "doing." He then used Hegel's distinctions of the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of freedom" to suggest that praxis in the realm of freedom constitutes the full realization of human existence. An Aristotelian side of this conception is

evident in Marcuse's claim that this form of praxis is its own goal and telos (Petrović 1983, 388).

An emancipatory understanding of praxis was also developed by Mihailo Marcović, Gajo Petrović, and other Yugoslav social philosophers who contributed to the international journal Praxis during the 1960s and 1970s. The Yugoslav Praxis group originated out of the desire to recover the humanist Marx from the scientistic interpretation that had become orthodox under Stalin. Identifying "free, human creative activity" as the central category of Marx's philosophy (Marcović 1979 xxi), praxis became the pivotal concept of the group in their attempt to develop a critique of contemporary Yugoslav institutions.

The final group of theorists to be looked at in this review are Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas. Grouping these three thinkers together this way does not imply that their views on action and praxis form a neat synthesis. If anything, they have defined their positions polemically against one another. Habermas, for example, credits Arendt and Gadamer with drawing his attention to the importance of Aristotle's distinction between praxis and techné (Habermas 1973, 286 note 4), but disagrees with Arendt over what he considers to be her anachronistic championing of Aristotle (Habermas 1977, 15), and has been engaged in an enduring debate with Gadamer over the role of criticism in social theory. Their views on praxis will be presented here

as complementary, but only in the sense that they together point to some of the key aspects of a theory of praxis for contemporary social theory.

Gadamer's interest in praxis can be situated in terms of his larger interests in ontology, "understanding understanding," and the critique of scientism. His use of the concept emerges in his criticism of the domination of technology based on science, where, like Habermas, he attempts to restore the meaning of "practical" to its Aristotelian sense from its vernacular sense as the application of science to technical tasks. His discussion of the practical in this context is integrated with his analysis of understanding, because understanding in his view is always an active "happening" or "event," which is constitutive of a person's praxis. Understanding is thus a form of Aristotelian practical reason which ultimately relies on a person's phronēsis, or the practical wisdom that enables an individual to mediate ethics in a given situation. This latter aspect of Gadamer's analysis has been criticized by Habermas because it neglects to emphasize the need for argumentation to challenge the ethical claims which are inherited from tradition. Gadamer instead emphasizes how cultures are embedded in hermeneutical situations whose traditions shape individuals in their processes of "becoming". This basic difference in orientation has been the starting point for the "Gadamer-Habermas debate" on the role of criticism and the possibility

of transcending the hermeneutic point of view. For the purposes of this review, what will be noted about their different orientations is that they arise from different understandings of praxis.

In the case of Gadamer, the lineage for his understanding of praxis can be traced through Aristotle (with its related concept of phronēsis), and subsequently through Kant, whose ethical, "practical reason" offered regulative ideas for moral action (Habermas 1971, 248). Habermas' concept of praxis shares this Aristotelian lineage, but rejects the associated emphasis on phronēsis. The common ground between Gadamer's and Habermas' conceptions of praxis is therefore ethics and politics, which in the modern context they suggest need to be revitalized as necessary counterbalances to technocracy and the hegemony of scientism.

Their shared understanding of praxis diverges with Habermas' second formative influence, which is Marx rather than Kant. The particular aspect of Marxist praxis which serves as a precedent for Habermas is its understanding as "practical-critical activity" aimed at the conscious shaping of historical conditions. It is this tradition of praxis that accounts for why Habermas defines "practical questions" as those concerned with the acceptance and rejection of norms (Habermas 1971, 35). For Habermas, the possibility of making history with will and consciousness is the emancipatory legacy of the Enlightenment. While aware of the Enlightenment's

dialectic, he remains committed to the modernist project, and for this reason seeks to reconcile Marx's positive vision of modernity with the distopian visions proffered by Max Weber, Lukács, and Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in their respective theories of rationalization, reification and instrumental reason. In an attempt to give the emancipatory thrust of modernity a "quasi-transcendental" status, Habermas integrates his theory of praxis with ordinary language philosophy. He argues that within all speech acts there are implicit claims to reason[8] which when redeemed by interlocutors in "communicative action" geared to mutual understanding and consensus, cause tradition, authority and force to be replaced by consensually agreed upon norms and goals. How Habermas' theory of praxis has been developed by planning theorists seeking to ground urban planning in the "practical-critical" understanding of praxis will be looked at in Chapter 4. At this point what is noteworthy about Habermas' theory of praxis is its fusion with a theory of language which also is geared to the emancipatory shaping of reality.

In closing this review with Arendt's theory of praxis, the intent is not to suggest that Arendt either chronologically or conceptually provides the "last word" on how praxis has been rethought in this century. As already mentioned, her work on praxis precedes that of Habermas, and in terms of overall conception can be readily criticized for

the way it reduces the realm of politics by developing a theory of freedom at the expense of a theory of justice.[9] This last aspect of Arendt's philosophy points to basic differences between her political orientation and that of Habermas. But given these differerces, there are considerable points of contact between their understandings of praxis: Like Habermas, Arendt recognizes the interdependency of speech and praxis in the functioning of the polis; they both, therefore, can be said to renew Aristotelian aspects of the concept in conjunction with theories of language. How Arendt makes the link between speech and praxis will be briefly summarised and then followed by a few remarks on her specific contributions to the theory of praxis.

The connection Arendt makes between praxis and speech arises with her conception of "action," which for her is the highest form of human activity, to be contrasted with work and labour as various forms of Aristotelian poiésis. Together these three types of activity constitute what Arendt calls the vita activa, which was the Medieval translation of Aristotle's bios politikos. It is Arendt's concept of action, however, which most closely corresponds to the Aristotelian bios politikos, because action as she defines it is the sphere of activity involving political participation in the polis. It is because action as a form of praxis leaves no product other than itself - a more fully human, politicized life for citizens - that Arendt considers speech in the form of stories

to give "materiality" to human actions exerted in concert. Speech and action together form a "web" of interrelationships which give substance to human activities. They are the means by which subjects disclose themselves in public and are mutually interdependent. In Arendt's view, "the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words" (Arendt 1958, 158). Arendt further connects speech with action by contending that both capacities are necessary for a fully human life. She compares the life of politically engaged praxis to a "second birth" which occurs when actors insert themselves into the human world through their words and deeds. This second birth follows physical birth, which is what confers subjects as initium, or newcomers who take initiative and are prompted into action by the very virtue of their birth (Arendt 1958, 176-7). By these means Arendt makes speech and action integral to her understanding of human subjects.

The particular contribution Arendt can be said to make to the theory of praxis lies in her evocation of the immediacy and intensity experienced by people realizing themselves in spontaneous, communal action. Arendt identifies periods of Western history when citizens became caught up in self-organized political action to create social structures vivified by action. What Arendt's theory of praxis can be said to offer, therefore, is a politicized understanding of action which presupposes the public space of the polis

(Bernstein 1977, 148). Arendt successfully describes the tangibility of human praxis in such a way that ontological materiality is ascribed to human activity. This notion of the possible "materiality" of action has several implications for how social space can be understood in terms of practices. Some of these implications are latent in Arendt's own writings. Her observation, for example, that speech and action become reified in art (1958, 187), can be extended to understanding all built forms in the created environment. Similarly, her contention that in the founding of Greek cities the legislator and the architect belonged to the "same category" (1958, 194-5), has implications for how discourses and interactive practices come to define space.

The theories of praxis which have been summarised in this review can be categorized under four interrelated headings. The first category has to do with public life, and includes both the self-sufficient aspect of public life as an alternative to alienation, and the practical-critical activity carried out in public life which seeks to shape social conditions. This tradition originates with Aristotle and is developed in various ways by Kant, Marx, the Frankfurt School, Arendt, Gadamer and Habermas. According to this set of associations, the praxis of public life is an end in itself which also serves to counterbalance scientism. Arendt's and Habermas' developments of speech theories in conjunction with praxis contribute to this definition of the term. The

emancipatory thrust of this understanding of praxis connects it with the second meaning of the term, which is the unity of theory and practice. The philosophers who developed this understanding of praxis - Cieszkowski, the Young Hegelians, Marx and members of the Frankfurt School - aimed to realize emancipatory theories in practice. The third set of meanings which have coalesced around praxis concern ontology. This understanding of the term has precedents in Hegel's view of constitutive self-activity, but was most formatively developed by Marx. Marx's emphasis on "sensuous human activity" gave new meaning to praxis by conceiving practices not only materially, but as constitutive of both subjects and their productions. The unity he proposed between producer, productive activity, and product, sublated the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis and provided an understanding of praxis that continues to challenge social theory today.[10] The ontological aspect of praxis is reinforced by the term's epistemological aspect, which is the fourth set of associations to have coalesced around it. Praxis as developed by Cieszkowski and Marx emphasized how subjects know the world only as it is a product of their concrete, material actions. Gadamer also contributed to this conception of the term through his development of an action-based theory of understanding.

As an addendum to this history of praxis I will now look at theories of discourse which have centered on the notion of

practice. Discourse, which normally is aligned with theory in the theory/practice dualism, will here be presented as an illustration of that definition of <u>praxis</u> having to do with the synthesis of theory and practice.

NOTES

1.Much of the work written on praxis is in German. Among the key sources available in English are by Nicholas Lobkowitz (1967, 1977). His 1977 essay is in a collection edited by Terence Ball, and is a condensation of the Greek portion of this history. I have used it as the basis for my summary of this phase of the term's history. A succinct but comprehensive overview of praxis by Gajo Petrović can be found in Tom Bottomore, editor, Dictionary of Marxist Thought (1983). The first section of Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez's The Philosophy of Praxis (1977) provides a materialist interpretation of the Greeks' understanding of praxis and a Marxian explication of praxis as poiesis. Richard Bernstein's 1971 work, Praxis and Action, has already been referred to. In his more recent book (1983), Bernstein extends his approach of tracing the concept of praxis in diverse philosophical traditions by looking at the work of Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty and Arendt in terms of praxis. As social philosophers consciously working to revitalize the political understanding of praxis, Arendt (1958), Gadamer (1981) and Habermas (1973) also provide histories of the term in the course of positioning themselves within its tradition.

2."Instrumental" is used here according to its tradition in Critical Theory. At the origin of this tradition is Max Weber's category of "purposive-rational action" to denote action "oriented to ends, means and secondary results" (Weber 1978, 26). The Frankfurt School philosophers Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno took up the negative consequences of purposive-rational action in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972 [1944]), renaming it "instrumental reason." The intermediary between their concept and Weber's purposive-rational action was George Lukács' notion of "reification," outlined in his History and Class Consciousness (1971 [1968]). Habermas in his continuation of the Frankfurt School tradition retained the concept of "instrumental action," tieing it in with the "technical interest" of his early, tripartite scheme of cognitive interests (Habermas, 1971 [1968]). In his more recent work, instrumental action is included in his division of "system," which he opposes to the emancipatory, communicative realm of the "lifeworld" (1984 [1981]). Praxis as understood by the early Greeks is "non-instrumental" because it doesn't have an "interest" beyond itself.

3.Karl Rashke (1977) also defends Kant against Marxist interpretations that Kant divorces theory from practice.

4.Avineri 1969; Rotenstreich 1965, 41.

5.John Hoffman in his critique of the "Marxist praxis writers" cites the following theorists as members of this group: Lukàcs, Korsch, Gramsci, Marcuse, A. Schmidt, Sartre, Lefebvre, Avineri, Kolakowski and Petrović (1975). Althusser and his followers are among those comprising the second group of "scientistic" interpreters. It was Althusser who posited an epistemological break between Marx's early and later writings (Althusser 1970). Richard Bernstein in arguing against this latter view, suggests that Marx in Capital retains the praxis notion by describing capitalism as an alienated form of human activity (Bernstein 1971, 55-66).

6.An example is Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez's The Philosophy of Praxis (1977).

7.Petrović notes that Marx's terminology is not always consistent. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, "labour" as alienated activity is contrasted with praxis, or non-alienated activity. But in some cases Marx uses "labour" and praxis interchangeably. In The German Ideology, praxis as non-alienated activity is replaced by the term "self-activity" (Petrović 1983, 386).

8.These are the validity claims for truth, normative legitimacy, and truthfulness, which correspond respectively to the domains of "the" world of external nature, "our" world of interactive society, and "my," or a personal world, of internal nature. Habermas contends that when a speaker makes a statement, listeners normally evaluate the statement according to its comprehensibility, whether or not the statement is true, whether the speaker has the right to make the statement given the normative context, and whether the speaker is expressing his or her beliefs and intentions sincerely. If any of these criteria are unclear, listeners have the right to challenge the speaker's comprehensibility, knowledge base, normative rightness, or sincerity (Habermas 1979).

9.Arendt defines freedom in terms of communal self-government but excludes from self-government issues relating to such things as economics and defense (Walker 1988, 66-7).

10.A case can be made, for example, that it underlies contemporary formulations of "structuration theory," which will be reviewed in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER TWO

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

The concept of practice became central to discourse theory at the point when objectified, discrete understandings of texts as advanced by New Criticism and Structuralism proved inadequate in providing a materialist, contextualized account of how language is implicated in the formation of subjects and their social practices. Within Continental philosophy the development of the practice theory of discourse can be chiefly credited to Michel Foucault and to Philippe Sollers, Julia Kristeva and other contributors to the journal Tel Quel during the 1960s and 1970s. In the case of the Tel Quel group, the intellectual groundwork for their views can be traced principally to Marx's process-centered theory of dialectical materialism. Indirectly, their work was also informed by philosophical developments in the English speaking world, namely the semiotic theory of the 19th century American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, and ordinary language philosophy as founded by Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Austin but introduced to French circles through Émile Benveniste's concept of énonciation. Precedents for Foucault's theory of discourse cannot easily be traced to such specific sources, but as Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow suggest, Foucault presupposed the type of language study developed by pragmatics and speech act theory

without engaging in either their methods or specific concerns (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 46-9). Although Foucault's concept of "episteme" was short-lived,[1] it is possible to situate both his and the Tel Quel group's developments of theories of discursive practice in terms of a pragmatic episteme which was gradually gaining ground.[2] Peirce and the speech act theorists' understandings of signs and meaning can be considered part of the epistemic ground that made theories of discursive practice possible, and it is for this reason that I begin this review with outlines of their contributions to Post-Structuralist theories of discourse. How Foucault and Julia Kristeva rethink discourse and signification in terms of practices will follow.

Charles Peirce's triadic theory of semiotics provides a starting point for this review because of the epistemological perspective it affords on how subjects socially construct meaning through their relations with signs and the material world of existence. Peirce's emphasis on practice emerges with his concept of semiosis, which for him is the continuous action of signs generating further signs in the consciousness of individuals. These derivatory, "more developed sign[s]," are tantamount to subjects in the process of meaning production, and are what Peirce calls "interpretants" (Peirce 1931-58, 2.228).[3] It is his recognition of interpretants that enables Peirce's semiotic theory to address the formation of subjects in their interaction with signifying

practices and the world. By considering meaning to be produced from the ongoing interaction of "representamens" (what "stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity") (Peirce 1931-58, 2.228), interpretants, and the material world, Peirce bypasses the Cartesian framework inherited by Western philosophy with its two doctrines that subjective individualism forms the basis of verification, and limits imposed by language can be overrided to provide direct knowledge of reality (Bernstein 1971, 5-6). Instead, Peirce suggests that meaning is interactively produced, with "reality" being dependent on community. Further, language doesn't allow spectator-subjects a transparent view of reality, but is one of the material factors subjects mediate in their comprehension of the world. Peirce's semiotic theory thus recognizes that understanding language and its reification in texts means taking language's materiality into account as well as its uses in historically situated occurrences.

Peirce's philosophy, which he named Pragmaticism, provided the basis for Charles Morris' identification of pragmatics as one of the three ways signs can be studied. As categorized by Morris, pragmatics concerns the interrelationship of signs and their users, in contradistinction to syntactics which looks at the relationship of signs to each other, and semantics, which analyses the connection between signs and their referents (Morris 1938). The pragmatic dimension of

language analysis was catalysed by Ludwig Wittgenstein's development of ordinary language philosophy. In his Philosophical Investigations (1958) Wittgenstein relocated the central linguistic function in the context of human life by looking at how meaning derives from use in language games. This practice-oriented approach to language analysis was subsequently expanded upon by John Austin's and John Searle's formulations of speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Austin and Searle recognized the performative function of language and emphasized how semantic content is determined by contextual use. Within French theoretical circles Émile Benveniste's concept of énonciation incapsulated many of these pragmatic approaches to language by dealing with the marks of speakers in speech. Basing his analysis on the presence of deictics in language, Benveniste reintroduced the subject to French semiological thought by distinguishing Saussure's langue and parole from énonciation, which he defined as acts of linguistic appropriation which situate speakers in their relations with the world. Like the other pragmatists, Benveniste differentiated language as a system of signs and rules from language as activity manifested as discourse (Benveniste 1966, 258).

Peirce and Benveniste are among those theorists whom Julia Kristeva acknowledges as contributing to her critiques of both Saussurean semiology and Derridean deconstruction. In addition to these theorists, Kristeva's critical framework

builds on several other philosophical and linguistic traditions, namely Marx's understanding of production, Husserl's theory of object-constituting subjectivity (which she interprets materially), the notion of dialogism as put forward by Mikhail Bakhtin, and Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theories. Kristeva draws on all these sources to advance a theory of the generation of signification which is integrated with a theory of the subject. She decries structuralist language philosophies which examine linguistic products as though they were fetishes, rather than focussing on the processes which produce the products (Kristeva 1984, 13). She similarly criticizes language theories which presume the subject to be fully formed independent of their positioning within language. Following Lacan, she instead considers a subject's use of language to be a continuation of his or her process of ego construction. Through extrapolating on Freud's theory of drives, Kristeva posits a materialist understanding of language, the body, and the world, which challenges the idealist conception of the unified subject as source of meaning. For Kristeva, signification is the process of the subject. It is a "productivity" where texts, and particularly avant-garde texts, act as signifying practices which displace readers' positionalities and require them continually to reformulate their symbolic relations with the world. The unity and presumed self-presence of subjects become dissolved in the

activity of their meaning production. "Practice," for Kristeva, involves subjects being placed en procès (understood as both "on trial" and "in process") through their struggle with systems of representation. By following Freud in recognizing the activity of the unconscious in meaning production, Kristeva's theory of the subject provides an additional ontological level to the praxis-based understandings of the subject outlined in the previous chapter. Her theory of the subject can be said to complement that developed by praxis theorists by recognizing that constitutive self-activity also occurs at the level of interiority.

Like Kristeva, Foucault recognizes that understanding history and ideology requires taking into account how subjects are positioned within signifying practices. But while Kristeva concentrates her study of signifying practices on poetic language and that of subjects undergoing psychoanalysis, Foucault studies speech acts which claim some institutional legitimacy and demonstrate what he calls, after Nietzsche, the "will to truth." His emphasis on practice has a number of sources and justifications. In the forward to the English translation of Les Mots et les choses, he states that his theory of discursive practice is intended to counter phenomenological theories of the knowing subject (Foucault 1973, xiv). In place of this subject, Foucault attempts to show how discourses regularize positions of subjectivity.

His emphasis on practice also has a materialist basis. He speaks of the "awesome materiality" of discourses where statements are not, "like the air we breathe, an infinite transparency; but things that are transmitted and preserved, that have value, and which one tries to appropriate..." (Foucault 1972, 120, 216). This materiality is peculiar, however, because discourses are also practices in the sense of being "events," and are therefore neither substance nor immaterial action, but a form of "incorporeal materialism" (Foucault 1973, 231). This materialism is grounded in Marxist praxis because through treating discourses and knowledges as practices he seeks to avoid separating ideas and actions according to the usual theory/practice split.

While Foucault's concern with practices remains constant throughout his work, the focus he gives to the concept shifts with his change in methodology from his earliest studies on the carceral institutions to his final volumes on the history of sexuality. In his earlier, "archaeological" studies, practice is investigated as the a priori rules which govern discourses. For any particular discourse, Foucault examines not its contents or representations as a set of signs, but "the practices that form the objects of which [it] speak[s]" (Foucault 1972, 49). In accordance with this research protocol, he looks at who is accorded the right to speak, how their legitimate perspectives are defined, how norms for the elaboration of theories are fixed, and how fields of objects

become delimited into bodies of knowledge (Foucault 1977, 199). In his later, "genealogical" studies, however, Foucault emphasizes the aspect of discursive practices having to do with how subjects use discourses in their formations of self. His focus of attention turns away from how discourses constitute empirical reality, to the way we constitute ourselves through practices of the self (Foucault 1987, 113). These practices are both physical and discursive and it is their interaction which defines a subject's self-understanding. In a way which intersects very well with the implications of the practice theory of space to be reviewed in the next chapter, Foucault helps to show how historically variable practices lead to subjects' historically variable self-understandings (Hoy 1984, 9).

This overview of practice theories of discourse can be further summarised by returning to Peirce's model of the triadic relationship between subjects, signs, and the material world. In Foucault's early works, the relationship between signs and the world is emphasized through Foucault showing how signs organized as discourses determine subjects' apprehensions of the world. In his later work the focus is switched to the subject in the subject/sign relation. Like Kristeva, Foucault becomes concerned with how subjects constitute themselves through interaction with signifying practices. Benveniste, conversely, emphasizes the aspect of the subject/sign relation having to do with the inscription

of subjects on signs. The dynamic principle underlying all of their explorations of the confluence of subjects, signs and the world, however, is practice. Peirce instigates this viewpoint by proposing an epistemological model based on subjects actively expanding their sign fields through the interactive process of semiosis. Wittgenstein and the speech act theorists in turn show how speaking is a form of doing, where meaning derives from the context of language use. Kristeva and the Tel Quel group draw upon Marx's theory of practice to highlight the production of signifying systems, and Foucault, whether examining rules of discursive formations or the formation of discursive subjects, bases his analyses on the activities which produce both subjects and discourses.

Two traditions of the praxis concept can be seen to underly these theories of discursive practice. Kristeva's and Foucault's understandings of discourse exemplify praxis defined as the unity of theory and practice through their proposing the inseparability of the content of texts from the discursive practices which produce them. Practice theories of discourse as formulated by Peirce, Foucault and Kristeva also exemplify the definition of praxis having to do with the self-constitutive activity of subjects, because they recognize that subjects also become constituted in their discursive activities. The convergence of these theories of language and discourse around the theory of praxis points to

a much larger convergence in social, political and scientific thought. How this convergence has manifested in recent retheorizations of social space will be looked at next.

NOTES

1.In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault defines "episteme" as "the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems" (Foucault 1972, 191). Foucault later retracts the notion of episteme because he realizes that there is seldom just one "total set of relations" that exists at any one time. Rather than completely discarding the concept, Timothy Reiss (1982) has suggested that there is generally a dominant episteme (which he renames "discursive class"), and other epistemes contemporary with it which may be occulted formally, but which become emergent in practices. Reiss by this means replaces Foucault's model of epistemic "rupture" (which Foucault also came to consider problematic) with a model based on one episteme developing out of a predecessor.

2.Foucault's disclaimer in refuting his classification as a structuralist could equally apply to his indebtedness to pragmatic theories of discourse: "It would hardly behove me, of all people, to claim that my discourse is independent of conditions and rules...which determine other work that is being done..." (Foucault 1973, xiv).

3.The format for references to Peirce's Collected Papers is volume number followed by the section number from the 1931-58 edition.

CHAPTER THREE

SPACE AS PRACTICES

The notion that space is constituted of practices has developed from cross-disciplinary attempts to surpass Kant's schema which holds that space is an a priori of knowledge. In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant argued that space is not a thing in itself (noumenon), but is one category of the mind making knowledge possible. As Edward Soja has pointed out, this concept of space is still current in the common understanding which distinguishes adjectives such as "social," "political," "economic," and "historical," from "spatial." Whereas the former adjectives are taken to suggest human action and motivation, the term "spatial" typically connotes something external to social practice; space is still widely considered to be a context for society, rather than a construct created by society (Soja 1980, 210).

Theorists critical of this viewpoint have countered that space is materialist, political and ultimately produced by physical and communicational practices. This chapter will provide an overview of how these notions developed in relation to one another by first tracing how Marx's views on space have been pursued by more recent Marxist theorists such as Henri Lefebvre, Manual Castells, and David Harvey. The starting point here will simply be Marx's recognition of the political nature of space, but in summarizing the work of

these later Marxist theorists emphasis will be placed on how each relates space to social and political practices. Following this, Foucault's understanding of space will be reviewed because it more radically connects space with discursive and physical practices. Pierre Bourdieu's work on habitus will subsequently be looked at for how it dovetails with Foucault's views and builds on Marx's theory of praxis to suggest the beginnings of a practice theory of space. From a less socially determinist point of view, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's contributions to the theory of social space will then be summarized and used to provide a context for Michel de Certeau's work on 'practices of space." De Certeau's contribution to understanding social space will be seen to have particular importance because he emphasizes the role of phantasy in producing and understanding spatial practices. Finally, how many of these theorists' insights can be integrated into a social-spatial theory will be addressed through Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration.

Theorists recognizing the political nature of space have often sought a foundation for their views in Marx. This is because a materialist approach to analysing space is evident in the writings of Marx and Engels despite their own priorization of time, exemplified by their theory of historical materialism.[1] The substrata of Marx's spatial interests surface in a number of places. These can be

briefly summarised as Marx's concerns with the geographical uneveness of capitalist production, the role of rent and private ownership of land, the geographical transfer of surplus value, the territorial division of labour, and the antithetical relationship between town and countryside (Soja 1980, 209).

One explanation for why this political role of space has only recently been pursued by Marxist theorists has been put forward by Henri Lefebvre. In La Pensée marxiste et la ville (1972), Lefebvre suggests that in the 19th and early 20th centuries the overt exploitation of labour didn't necessitate theorists looking any further afield to explain how capitalism functioned. However in his own attempt to account for capitalism's survival from competitive industrialism to its current advanced monopoly form, Lefebvre returned to Marx's observations on space to develop a theory of spatial structural forces. In Lefebvre's view, capitalism attenuated its internal contradictions and expanded "by occupying space, by producing a space" (Lefebvre 1976a, 21). For Lefebvre the production of space in advanced capitalism is linked directly to the reproduction of social relations of production. By this means he situates class relations in the structures and contradictions of socially organized space. Although he doesn't present spatial struggle as a substitute for class struggle, he does maintain that a social revolution could only succeed if it were also a spatial revolution (Soja 1980,

215). Lefebvre's fundamental thesis thus acknowledges that space is social (Lefebvre 1974, 35), but goes beyond this by recognizing that space is also political; it is strategic and "a product literally filled with ideologies" (Lefebvre 1976b, 31).

The connection which Lefebvre makes between space and practices is most directly expressed in his La Production de l'espace (1974). Here he proposes that social/spatial practices are inherent to spatial forms, and that social space incorporates social acts (Lefebvre 1974, 26, 46). It is significant that Lefebvre's interest in urban space was preceded by a more general concern with le quotidien and the role of micropractices in causing change (Lefebvre 1968). This interest carried through his earlier works on developing Marxist thought in the area of urbanism (1970, 1972), to his later work where he more fundamentally looked at space in terms of its production through practices (1974). One of Lefebvre's key concepts in this later work is "la pratique spatiale," which he defines as a projection of "la pratique sociale" which englobes both production and reproduction (Lefebvre 1974, 15, 42).

The challenge which Lefebvre poses to traditional Marxian analyses stems from his rejection of the standard economic base and superstructure model. To the question, "Can the realities of urbanism be defined as something superstructural?", Lefebvre answers, "No. The reality of

urbanism modifies the relations of production..." (Lefebvre, 1976b, 31). Lefebvre goes on to specify that although he ascribes an active role to spatial processes - in this case to that of urbanism - he doesn't consider it sufficient to transform the relations of production. Instead he suggests that urban forms and practices are a "force of production," in a manner similar to science (Lefebvre, 1976a, 210).

It is Lefebvre's apparent raising of the spatial problematic to a position above the role of economic production that Manuel Castells takes issue with in his major work, La Question urbaine, which was purposely titled to contrast with Lefebvre's La Révolution urbaine (Soja 1980, 212). Castells contributes to the post-Kantian retheorization of space by conceding that space is a material product and that there is no theory of space that is not also a general social theory (Castells 1979, 115). The issue of space he makes secondary, however, to the role of the state in social reproduction, particularly as it is involved in the reproduction of the labour force and in influencing collective consumption. In this and in his use of the concept of "practice," Castells works within the neo-Marxist, structuralist framework provided by Louis Althusser. In the 1975 "Afterword" to The Urban Question, Castells qualifies his indebtedness to Althusser by stating that he had been influenced by "a certain interpretation" of Althusser's work (Castells 1977, 438). A brief outline of Althusser's concept

of practice will be made at this point to clarify Castell's own application of the term to space.

The context for Althusser's comments on practice is the debate on the relationship of theory to practice as initially inherited from the Young Hegelians. In Reading Capital, Althusser expresses cynicism towards 20th century humanist Marxists' reliance on "practice" to bypass the Gordian knot of epistemological uncertainties (Althusser and Balibar 1970, 56). He nevertheless asserts "the primacy of practice" over theory on the basis that all "levels of social existence are the sites of distinct practices" (Althusser and Balibar 1970, 58). While conceding that economic practice is "determinant in the last instance" (Althusser and Balibar 1970, 58), Althusser's theory of practice is aimed at overcoming the reductionist view of an economic base structure as well as the opposing view which holds that the superstructure is relatively autonomous. By conceptualising both base and superstructure as distinct practices, Althusser is able to define social formations in terms of how homologous practices interact. The four types of practice he identifies are the economic, political, ideological and theoretical. Each type of practice is distinguished by the type of "raw material" it transforms, its set of procedures or means of production, and its product (Althusser 1969, 166-7; Althusser and Balibar 1970, 58-9).

A spatial dimension of Althusser's theory is evident in his acknowledgement that practices have sites. He accounts for social reproduction, for example, by noting that practices become articulated as "regional structures" which in turn occupy key places in larger global structures. In accordance with his structural-Marxist leanings, Althusser ascribes agency to "the structure of the relations of production (Althusser and Balibar 1970, 180). In terms of this viewpoint the spatial aspect of structure becomes manifest as "the definition and distribution of...places" (Althusser and Balibar 1970, 180).

It is these intimations of a theory of space that Castells elaborates upon in The Urban Question. Castells can be said, in fact, to translate Althusser's political theory into spatial terms by providing a spatial corollory for three of Althusser's levels of production (Gregory 1978, 118). Althusser's economic level becomes for Castells the spatial realizations of production, consumption and exchange; Althusser's political level of production accounts for what Castells identifies as the institutional organization of space; and the Althusserian ideological level is analysed by Castells in terms of "network[s] of signs, whose signifiers are...spatial forms and whose signifieds are ideological contents..." (Castells 1979, 127). An example he gives of a spatial phenomenon involving all three levels, is housing (Castells 1979, 126).

Castells more generally contends that each type of space has a corresponding mode of production. By following Althusser in conceptualising production modes as matrices of set practices, Castells is able to fuse the concepts space and practices together. He can go beyond his own formulation that space "supports" social relations, and suggest that space is "practised" by social relations (Castells 1977, 442). While he is critical of Lefebvre's tendency to "fetishize" space[2] and is careful to assert that spatial forms don't determine social relationships, he remains adamant about the interrelationship between matter and consciousness as it pertains to space. For Castells, spatial forms are society, and not just reflections of it (Castells 1983, 4).

Like Lefebvre and Castells, Marxist geographer David Harvey begins by recognizing the political nature of space, and proceeds by examining the relationship of space to practices. Harvey's work can be situated within the movement of anglophonic geographers which in the 1970s began to question the assumptions of quantitative geography. Mainstream quantitative geography seeks to map economic costs onto geographic space through location theory and other mathematical models. Its underlying assumption is that human motivation can be reduced to the desire to minimize the friction of distance (Hall 1984, 35). Harvey and others challenged this view by contending that the spatial form of

cities does not result naturally according to a functionalist human ecology. Instead, they argued that cities develop in conjunction with which people get which amenities or non-amenities, where. Harvey's Social Justice and the City (1973) served as a landmark critique of traditional geographical methods by proposing that cities result from the production and distribution of surplus value. His most recent work (1985) continues this theme by exploring how capitalism produces its own geography. His self-stated intent is to "upgrade" historical materialism by providing a theory of historical-geographical materialism.

The connection between space and practices is already well-formulated in his earlier Social Justice and the City. Harvey in this work expresses dissatisfaction with studies which separate the totality of cities into things and activities (Harvey 1973, 303-4). In his own work he attempts to bring together spatial forms and activities by arguing that "social processes are spatial" (Harvey 1973, 10-11). Claiming unawareness of Lefebvre's work at the time of writing Social Justice, Harvey states in his conclusion to the book agreement with Lefebvre on "the social-process-spatial-form theme" (Harvey 1973, 307). His own development of this theme benefits from Marx's notion of praxis, which he makes the basis of his theoretical/practical framework. He also draws on aspects of Althusser's discussion of the relation of theory to practice, without aligning himself with

Althusser's political position. By these means Harvey is able to turn the question "What is space?", into the question, "[How] is it that different human practices create and make use of distinctive conceptualizations of space?" (Harvey 1973, 13-14). He is similarly able to suggest that "there are no philosophical answers to philosophical questions that arise over the nature of space - the answers lie in human practice" (Harvey 1973, 13). Harvey's recognition of the importance of practices is what leads him to propose that changing cities will require reconciling policies dealing with social processes, with policies geared to changing spatial forms (Harvey 1973, 50).

As outlined in the review of pragmatic theories of discourse, Michel Foucault also subsumes "theory" in the form of discourses to the practices which produce it. In this section his understanding of how space is connected to discursive and other practices will be summarized. Discussing Foucault's work on space at this juncture is additionally appropriate because like Lefebvre, Castells, and Harvey, he bases his analysis on the relationship of space to power.

Foucault's interest in space stems partly from his attempt to redress the imbalance which originated at the end of the 18th century when the impact of scientific discourse on philosophy resulted in time becoming the legitimate concern of philosophers. As evidence for this Foucault points to the

importance attributed to time in the philosophies of Hegel, Bergson and Heidegger (Foucault 1980b, 149). Whereas time became associated with "fecundity, life, dialectic", space during this period conversely became treated as "the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile" (Foucault 1980b, 70).

The importance of space to Foucault's analyses emerges in his spatial metaphors. These include his use of such terms as "position," "displacement," "site," "field," "domain" and "region." Foucault justifies his spatial metaphors on the grounds that they enable the points at which discourses are transformed in and through power relations to be deciphered (Foucault 1980b, 70). Viewed retrospectively, this is a structuralist leaning in Foucault's earlier work, designed to provide an alternative to phenomenological approaches to discourse analysis based on temporal metaphors. An emphasis on time in analysing discourse only leads, Foucault contends, to a model of internal transformations of consciousness, whether at an individual or collective level. Spatial metaphors, on the other hand, both circumvent this tendency and make the relationship of knowledge to power more explicit:

> Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power. There is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, ...which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region and territory (Foucault 1980b, 70).

The conception of power which Foucault brings to his analysis of social space differs significantly from traditional understandings which hold that power exists in a fixed amount. Rather than subscribing to the Weberian view that power is demonstrated whenever an individual imposes his or her will despite resistance (Weber 1947, 152), Foucault considers power to be generative. He likens it to a "machine in which everyone is caught up, those who excercise power just as much as those over whom it is excercised" (Foucault 1980b, 156). Power for Foucault also differs from standard conceptions by being directly related to spatial and temporal distributions. The relationship of space to power is clearly expressed in his parameters for an alternative social history:

> A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the same time be the history of powers.. - from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat, institutional architecture from the classroom to the design of hospitals, passing via economic and political installations (Foucault 1980b, 149).

He more specifically explains the spatial expression of power this way:

> Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up (Foucault 1979, 202).

In his studies of the carceral institutions one of the ways he analyses power is by looking at how particular gazes

become institutionalized; how they are "effectively inscribed in space" (Foucault 1980b, 146). Within architecture he notes that prior to the 18th century, the large-scale building projects of strongholds, palaces and cathedrals served to make secular and religious power explicitly manifest. After the 18th century the display of power became more internalised; "it [became] a question of using the disposition of space for economico- political ends" (Foucault 1980b, 148). Examples of this less explicit display of power which functioned by prescribing social practices are factories, housing designed for workers, prisons and schools.

Foucault's works on the carceral institutions deal not only with the practices which spatial forms concretize, but also with how discourses in the form of knowledge practices give rise to spaces. In the case of his study of madness, he shows how psychiatric knowledge presupposed the closed space of the asylum. The discursive practices of clinical medicine similarly gave rise to the hospital, and "disciplinary knowledge contained within itself the model of the prison" (Editors of Hérodote, in Foucault 1980b, 73). As mentioned in the previous chapter, in his later volumes on the history of sexuality Foucault extends his notion of practice to consider the practices of the self by which individuals of different epochs constitute themselves as subjects (Foucault 1984, 6). The connection he makes between knowledge practices, behaviors and spaces remains intact in this later

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work. In the introductory volume of The History of Sexuality he makes reference to the confessional, the brothel, the mental hospital, the master bedroom and the analyst's couch as legitimized sites in the modern era which arose coterminously with sex as a certain set of subject-constituting practices. The construction of social space in Foucault's view thus remains integral to practices of knowledge, power relations and subjectivity, even in this later work.

For the purposes of this thesis, what is particularly noteworthy about Foucault's perspective is the interplay he suggests exists between physical and discursive practices. In describing what an archaeological analysis of a painting would entail, for example, he proposes that the discourse of painting with its concepts of colour, proportion, depth and contour, be correlated with the physical practices which were current at the time. He suggests that the discourses on painting were embodied in "forms of teaching and codes of practice,...and also in processes, techniques, and even in the very gesture of the painter" (Foucault, 1972, 194). This kind of concordance between objects, discourses and practices will be seen to provide a critical perspective on planning and architecture practices in the final chapter.

Despite major differences in orientation, there are several points of contact between Foucault's project and that of anthropologist turned sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. In

the first place, Bourdieu's endorsement of Erwin Panofsky's thesis on the relation of space to discourse suggests an affiliation with Foucault's own project in this area. In terms of their overall intents, both writers are concerned with revealing hidden sources of domination and repression, but whereas Foucault considers power relations to be diffuse, Bourdieu focusses his analysis on how symbolic power is used to reproduce class divisions. Within their chosen frames of reference both theorists identify power at work in the practices of everyday life. Bourdieu's understanding of daily practices is informed by Marx's notion of praxis, and it is within this frame of reference that he develops an analysis of space. These aspects of Bourdieu's social theory will be discussed in the course of outlining his own contribution to the theory of spatial praxis.

Bourdieu's self-named "théorie de la pratique" (1972) is important because it begins to conflate physical phenomena with the practices which constitute them. Bourdieu deals less specifically with space than the theorists described above, but he does provide a model for how practices can be considered intrinsic to space. The way Bourdieu achieves this is through his concept of habitus. The term "habitus" is one which Bourdieu adopts from Erwin Panofsky, whose book, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism (1951), Bourdieu translated into French. Panofsky in turn appropriated "habitus" from the medieval Scholastics, for whom the term

meant "the principle that regulates the act" (Panofsky 1957, 21). Other predecessors who developed complementary notions of "habit" but who Bourdieu appears to have been unaware of are Charles Peirce, John Dewey, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. For the purposes of this summary only Bourdieu's acknowledged debt to Panofsky will be elaborated upon.[3]

Panofsky's book on medieval architecture anticipates Foucault's work relating space to discourse because he demonstrates a connection between the design of Gothic cathedrals and the Scholastic philosophy which was contemporary with their construction. Unlike other scholars who had noted such a correpondence, Panofsky brackets out the content of medieval scholastic thought to show how its procedures, or modus operandi, became incorporated into Gothic design (Bourdieu 1967, 137). Foucault's concept of "episteme" is likewise foreshadowed in Panofsky's view that the correspondences between Gothic cathedrals and Scholasticism exceed "mere parallelism" by being methodologically specific yet more diffuse than individual influences which theological advisers could have exerted on the architects and builders (Panofsky 1957, 20). Panofsky attempts to support his thesis by showing how the discursive procedures of Scholasticism, especially its three part argumentive structure of the Summa, became translated into built form. It is in this context that he uses the

Scholastics' term "habit" to describe how certain pervasive principles have an impact on a wide range of activities. Through the concept of habitus Panofsky seeks to account for how creators participate in the collectivity of their age. For Panofsky, habitus is what guides and directs even the most unique of creative acts. In Bourdieu's opinion the concept is able to explain what other theorists merely describe through notions of "une vision unitaire du monde" or "un esprit du temps' (Bourdieu 1967, 142, 147).

As developed by Bourdieu, the concept of habitus assumes political dimensions. Bourdieu uses the term to explain social reproduction and more specifically how individuals come to internalize externalities and externalize internalities in such a way that class relations are constantly reaffirmed (Bourdieu 1977, 72). Habitus for Bourdieu accounts for how individuals' independent "strategies" cohere along class lines without being externally orchestrated. Habitus exists only as dispositions, yet is the generative principle of both perceptions and practices, working to integrate different aspects of people's lives. In developing his notion of habitus Bourdieu resists making the concept totally deterministic. An attempted balance between fixed and alterable elements is evident in his definition of it as "a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified

practices" (Bourdieu 1979, vii).[4] Marx's theory of praxis is central to Bourdieu's understanding of habitus because like the early Marx, Bourdieu disbands with divisions between society and the individual. Instead, he presents social reality as making individuals at the same time that individuals produce social reality. Thus habitus for Bourdieu pivots between being the product of practices and the "force formatrice d'habitudes" (Bourdieu 1968, 287) which in producing practices reproduces the regularities of habitus. Bourdieu's acknowledged debt to Marx is evident in his calling this theoretical approach "praxeological knowledge." Through this type of knowledge practice Bourdieu seeks dialectically to sublate subjectivist, phenomenological approaches to the human sciences, and objectivist, deterministic approaches (Bourdieu 1973). Within praxeological knowledge, habitus more specifically bridges subjectivist and objectivist approaches because it attempts to grasp how personal agency and culturally determined, collective aspects of an individual's practices are mediated.

The implications of Bourdieu's notions of habitus and practice for post-Kantian retheorizations of space have not yet been fully recognized. The applicability of his theory to space is suggested in his ethnographic study of Kabylia, where he provides a perceptive analysis of how the Kabyle house is a projection of daily living practices which reifies both cosmology and gender relations (Bourdieu 1979).[5] He

directly addresses the relationship of space to practices in his Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique. Here Bourdieu suggests that social space is the objectification of habitus. He considers inhabited space, particularly for preliterate societies, to be "the principal locus for the objectification of the generative schemes" of habitus (Bourdieu 1977, 89). Inhabited space thus inculcates habitus, which in turn reproduces space as sets of practices. This is in accordance with Bourdieu's general view that cultural systems operate within fields of action. Habitus is formed in daily practices and results in social and spatial formations which also become manifest at the level of everyday actions.

Bourdieu's emphasis on practice leads him to consider the role of the body in social reproduction. In accounting for how children come to assimilate a habitus, he suggests that 'schemes are able to pass from practice to practice without going through discourse or consciousness..." (Bourdieu 1977, 87). Children imitate actions, which become "em-bodied" through what Bourdieu calls "the dialectic of objectification and embodiment" (Bourdieu 1977, 87). Social space is dialectically implicated in this nexus of relations between body, actions, and world. Bourdieu expresses this relationship in praxeological fashion, as follows: "the 'book' from which...children learn their vision of the world is read with the body, in and through the movements and

displacements which make the space within which they are enacted as much as they are made by it (Bourdieu 1977, 90, my emphasis).

Bourdieu's interests in the body and movement are indebted to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the "body-subject." For this reason and also because Merleau-Ponty's philosophy underlies that of Michel de Certeau - a more recent theorist of space and practices - his views on the body, action and space will be summarised here. In their own right Merleau-Ponty's ideas are historically important for showing how space can only be understood from an embodied perspective.

For Merleau-Ponty, recognizing the integrated nature of the body has epistemological importance because it "runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object..." (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 198). The notion of the body-subject is developed by Merleau-Ponty for this purpose of surpassing the traditional philosophical dichotomy between subjects and objects. Through the body-subject concept Merleau-Ponty seeks to provide an alternative to dualist philosophers who from Descartes, with his idea of the cogito, through to Husserl, with his notion of the "transcendental ego", had priorized mind, making the world an object of constituting consciousness. Drawing on the interactive model of human perception proposed by Gestalt psychology, Merleau-Ponty attempts to supercede causal explanations of the relationship between consciousness and the world by

developing a model based on interdependence. His idea of the body-subject contributes to this end by refusing to make the body an object of a perceiving subject's consciousness. Instead, he emphatically contends that the body is not an object, just as awareness of the body is not a thought. Bodily knowledge is rather always "implicit and vague", and derives from "taking up the drama being played out in it..." (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 198).

Understanding how movement affects perception proceeds from this recognition of the central role of the body. Perception, which for Merleau-Ponty is the fundamental way of "knowing," is a product of both intentions and bodily actions. This is because it is only in crossing a space, or making an object, that we perceive the space or object as we do. The sense of the spatiality of one's body is similarly only "brought into being in action" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 102). Merleau-Ponty points out that it is in considering the body in movement that one becomes aware of how the body "inhabits space," as opposed to simply being "in" it (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 139).

Taking as his unstated starting point key aspects of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of action, the body and space, Michel de Certeau examines how subjects use "spatial practices" to circumvent power relations (de Certeau 1984, 126). De Certeau succinctly brings together several of Merleau-Ponty's themes in his statement that "being acts only

in spatial practices" (de Certeau 1984, 144). De Certeau specifically draws parallels between his work and that of Merleau-Ponty when he cross-references two of his key terms with those of Merleau-Ponty. What de Certeau calls "place" (lieu), which for him is the static order in which coexisting elements are distributed, corresponds in Merleau-Ponty's terminology to "geometrical space," or "homogeneous, isotropic spatiality." De Certeau's "space" (espace), on the other hand, which takes direction and velocities into account and is "actuated by the ensemble of movements deployed within it" (de Certeau 1984, 117), corresponds to what Merleau-Ponty calls "another spatiality," or "anthropological space." De Certeau connects the two kinds of space in his statement that "space is practised place" (de Certeau 1984, 117). While Merleau-Ponty uses his distinction between "geometrical" and "anthropological space" to develop a social ontology, de Certeau's distinction between "place" and "space" is used for politico-theoretical ends. This is because the making of "space" for de Certeau, implies social actors engaged in resisting domination through their daily spatial practices. The two theorists who form the context of de Certeau's work, therefore, are Foucault and Bourdieu: Foucault because in his earlier work he doesn't consider how subjects resist the forms of domination he meticulously identifies,[6] and Bourdieu because despite his commitment to surpassing voluntarist and determinist perspectives, still makes his "agents" "subject"

to a determining habitus.[7] An example de Certeau provides of how "place" and "space" imply these opposing theories of the subject comes from city planning. "Place" for de Certeau would be a site as dreamed and designed by urban planners, while "space" would be the same site as appropriated by people in their daily living practices. Like the Central Americans who assimilated but ultimately subverted Catholicism, urban practitioners live within the parameters set out by urban design professionals but transform "place" to their own "space" through their daily actions.

The theoretical framework de Certeau employs is that of speech act theory. "Space" according to this analogy is comparable to language as it is spoken, while "place" is comparable to studies of a language's formal structure. De Certeau chooses to analyse "space" over "place" because he "privileges the act of speaking" (de Certeau 1984, xiii), pragmatically considering meaning to be constructed in performance. In his analysis of space he extends his analogy with speech acts by considering walking to be for urban systems, what speaking is for language systems. He more specifically looks at what he calls "pedestrians' utterances," or how acts of walking spatially realize sites. Since history, for de Certeau, begins as footsteps, individuals' acts of walking are a form of poiesis which become real, historical "spatial creations" (de Certeau 1984, 129).

The political significance of these creations emerges in de Certeau's statement that "spatial usage creates the determining conditions of social life" (de Certeau 1984, 129). At the same time he recognizes that spatial creations are imbued with the phantasies of individuals' singular subjectivities. As he describes it, "pedestrians fill the streets with the forests of their desires and goals" (de Certeau 1984, xxi). De Certeau's simultaneous recognition of both the political and the subjective makes his approach particularly important for a retheorization of space which seeks to incorporate a conception of the desiring subject into an overall political framework.

Many of the preceding approaches to understanding space have been integrated by Cambridge social theorist Anthony Giddens in his structuration theory of society. What Giddens has called "structuration theory" is ultimately indebted to Marx's theory of <u>praxis</u> with its view that producer and product cannot be separated. This is because a central principle of structuration theory - what Giddens calls "the duality of structure" - considers social structure to be both medium and outcome of the conduct it organizes, existing in action at the moment of its instantiation, and therefore reproducing itself only as it is being produced.[8] Structuration theory is thus also related to Bourdieu's theory of practice. It is in fact part of a larger convergence in social theory which has attempted to surpass

the division between determinist, structural explanations of social phenomena, and voluntarist theories based on human agency and action.[9] Giddens' own resolution to this divide has been to consider subjects "knowledgeable human agents" whose daily actions cohere to form "systems" of reproduced practices. Giddens' theory of structuration is therefore syncretic, but nonetheless constitutes a rethinking of what practices and structures are in social reproduction.

Space plays a central role in Giddens' theory of structuration. His interest in space is only one side of his larger interest in time-space and the way time-space functions in the reproduction of society. Beginning with Central Problems in Social Theory (1979) and continuing through A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (1981) and The Constitution of Society (1984a), Giddens has argued that time-space intersections are essentially involved in social existence. He considers them to be constitutive features of social systems which have to be "brought to the very core of social theory" (Giddens 1981, 3).

Given this emphasis on time-space, space nevertheless receives special attention in Giddens' theory. This is not only because it is where the reproduction of society occurs, but because in a manner similar to Foucault, Giddens regards space as having for too long been considered transparent. He rejects those attempts at retheorizing space which are based on the "banal assertions" that everything takes place in

space and that space is therefore the "embracing container" or reflective mirror of social life (Giddens 1979, 202). Instead, he extends Marx's precept in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that "Men make their own history but they do not make it just as they please..." (Marx 1963, 15), by proposing a spatial corollory:

> ...human beings "make their own geography" as much as they "make their own history". That is to say, spatial configurations of social life are just as much a matter of basic importance to social theory as are the dimensions of temporality...(Giddens 1984a, 363).

Giddens' emphasis on people making spaces derives from his thesis that space can only be understood in terms of the processes that constitute it. For Giddens, space is always a product of human action. His understanding of space as practices provides an additional layer of meaning to Althusser's precept that institutions are "sites of practices," because in Giddens' view, it is the practices which also create the sites. The inspiration for this theory was derived in part from "time-geography" as originally developed at the University of Lund by Torsten Hägerstrand. Giddens draws freely from time-geography's approach and postulates, but then radicalizes them to extend their relevance to social theory. A brief outline of Hagerstrand's theory is necessary at this point to provide a framework for understanding Giddens' elaboration of the time-geographic model.

The initial intent behind Hagerstrand's development of time-geography was to suggest a form of geography in which constraints on activity could be formulated in terms of "location in space, areal extension, and duration in time" (Hagerstrand 1970, 11). His starting premises were that time and space are integrated, people are indivisible and hence always occupy a specific time-space, and that any given space has a limited "packing" capacity to accomodate events (Hagerstrand 1974, 271). Time-geography makes use of the notion of "stations" to designate fixed time-space locations. When individuals' separate projects result in their meeting together at a station for a period of time, Hagerstrand refers to this phenomenon as a "space-time bundle." Through its graph system which plots changes in temporal and spatial locations on perpindicular axes,[10] time-geography is able to record how individuals and populations co-exist in time and space, and how their "paths" intersect to form webs of interacting trajectories. The ultimate aim of time-geography is to provide a geographical biography of a population within a constrained environment. It provides a dynamic model, which is also contextual through its examining the interactions between people and their environment at specific times and places.

Giddens takes from Hagerstrand's model the notions of stations" and interaction "bundles" but doesn't separate them, since this would suggest a division between structure

and action. Starting instead from the notion that "structure" only exists in its enactment, he coalesces the places of interaction with the "bundles" of action which converge in them. Whereas time-geographers emphasize the movement between stations, Giddens extends their model by "entering" the places of convergence to analyse how sites also consist of actions. His theory of the subject is implicated in this spatial process because individuals, which he regards as purposive agents, are considered to be constituted in and through their interactions at the stations or social settings where they interact, just as the stations are constituted by the agents' actions. This recalls Bourdieu's statement that space consists of peoples' movements and displacements enacted within it, just as people are constituted in the spaces of these same movements and displacements (Bourdieu 1977, 90).

As an example of the kind of social analysis his theory of space makes possible, Giddens describes the types of interactions which constitute the "locale" of the elementary school (Giddens 1984a, 134-9). Following Hägerstrand, Giddens first points out that the school is a station along the converging paths of several distinct groups of individuals. He then moves inside the locale to analyse how its interactions are constitutive of it as an institution. The first observation he makes about the time-space paths that make up the school is that they occur in an enclosure.

The notion of enclosure is central to Giddens' understanding of power as it relates to space. This understanding is indebted to Foucault's concern with carceral confinement but is intended to broaden the applicability of Foucault's insights so that all places of bounded interaction can be analysed as discipline-instituting "power-containers". Giddens displays his indebtedness to Foucault when he states that discipline ordinarily can only proceed where there is a "sphere of operations closed off and closed in on itself" (Giddens 1984a, 145). The school as an enclosure regularizes the distribution of encounters that occur within it in several ways. Temporally, the time-table is the most obvious mechanism which coordinates the school's time-space paths. In terms of space, Giddens makes use of his concept of regionalisation to analyse the management of body movements and activities within the enclosure. By the term "regionalisation" he draws attention to the internal partitioning, or zoning, of time-spaces that are demarcated according to characterising social practices or routines. The concept of regionalisation provides Giddens with an additional analytical tool for specifying mechanisms of power. This is because regions correspond to the "proper places" individuals are expected to be at any given time of the day (Giddens 1984a, 146). Within elementary schools, regionalisation is evident in the divisions that exist between the main body of the classroom and the cloakroom, the

teacher's desk and the pupils' desks, as well as between the staffroom and the classrooms. Each of these regions is associated with a set of practices. There are some times and some spaces in a school where heterogenous, "unfocussed" forms of interaction are allowed to occur, but if these take place outside of specified areas and periods, the teacher is considered to have lost control of the class.

Giddens' next level of analysis is to look at the contextual interrelations that exist between the regions he has identified and the power relationships generated by the enclosure. In the case of the elementary school, he notes that there is a "double line" of authority in operation in that the principal's relationship with the teachers in the office and staffroom parallels the teachers' relationship with the children in the various regions of the classroom and schoolyard. The enclosure of the school is also contextualized in terms of other locales and external power relationships. Thus inspectors, school board members, and parents may from time to time enter the school to influence policies or otherwise shape the school's activities. In all cases these contextual interrelationships are expressed as time-space paths and practices.

As an institution the elementary school is comprised of the daily actions which occur within it. But these have what Giddens calls "time-space distanciation," or the propensity to become "stretched" over space and time. To account for

how individuals' practices result in institutional regularity, Giddens identifies three levels at which practices cohere in space and time. The first level derives from Hagerstrand's notion of "daily path" and describes how the immediate nexus of localized time-space actions and interactions are constituted. The second level corresponds to Hagerstrand's identification of the "life path" and accounts for how the cumulative actions of peoples' life-cycles cohere as biographies. The third level is based on Fernand Braudel's notion of the longue durée and describes how actions attain temporal duration and spatial breadth by becoming institutions which exceed individuals' biographies. In the case of the elementary school, its constitutive practices undergo change and variation at the daily level, but still maintain sufficient continuity to make it an institution serving long-term social reproduction. For Giddens it is the dialectic between all three time-space levels which produces the regularities of institutions within the variable daily actions of individuals.

Giddens' analysis of what constitutes space by occurring in it extends to the types of communication which take place in an enclosure. In his example of the elementary school, Giddens notes how teacher-student dialogue serves to bracket times and spaces. Patterns of dialogue, such as those of students who exercise their "dialectic of control" by verbally pushing against what they know to be the teacher's

threshold of intolerance, also become "stretched" in space and time to form institutional practices which instantiate "structure" at the moment of their enactment. The time-space solidity, or "fixity," of the school is therefore related to its social and communicative fixity, and both are expressed in the physical milieux of day-to-day activities (Giddens 1984a, xxv). Thus dialogue and other discursive practices are ultimately spatial because they "bind" times and spaces. They exceed being action by being forms of interaction which extend individuals' social relationships spatially in the form of institutions. To use Harold Innis' terminology (Innis 1951), dialogue may be "time-binding" in the sense of procuring continuity over time rather than over large spatial distances, but it is also "space-binding" in Giddens' sense of constituting space through the interaction structures it consolidates. Like Foucault's theory of discourse and Panofsky's notion of habitus, Giddens' theory of structuration suggests how physical and communicational phenomena materially interact.[11] In a way which exceeds aspatial communication theories such as those developed in the 1960s and 1970s by Richard Meier, Melvin Webber, and Seymour Mandelbaum,[12] Giddens shows how discursive practices remain integral to the material production of space.

Giddens' understanding of space holds several implications for research methods. Perhaps the first implication is that disciplinary boundaries which normally circumscribe social

analyses need to be dissolved. He rejects, for example, the false antinomy of space and time when relegated to the separate disciplines of history and geography. In his view social analysis requires a more stereoscopic approach if it is contextually to identify how time and space are configured in social interactions. In particular, the relevance of geography to critical social theory needs to be recognized. This work has in fact been begun by "geographers" such as Edward Soja, Nigel Thrift, Derek Gregory, and Allan Pred, in part as a response to Giddens' theory of structuration.[13]

Giddens similarly rejects the traditional dichotomy between "macro" and "micro" research approaches. Like Foucault, Bourdieu and de Certeau, he emphasizes the role of micropractices in the constitution, reproduction, and transformation of "macro" social systems. An application of Giddens' theory to the historical study of cities would mean that cities would no longer be analysed as either unique historical places or as points in larger social processes,[14] but as unique places historically functioning in the constitution of larger social processes. This would be more along the lines of Braudel's research which connects daily practices with global trends (Braudel 1982; Giddens 1984, 362).

Like all of the theorists who have been reviewed in this chapter, Giddens views space as a construct of practices rather than as a context for practices. Marx's notion of

praxis underlies his theory of structuration just as it forms the subtext to several other theorists' works looked at in this chapter who have explored how the spatial aspects of Marx's political analyses can be merged with his theory of praxis. Elements of the praxis concept can be seen to form the basis of Lefebvre's notion of "la pratique spatiale," Castell's inference that space is practised, Harvey's disinclination to separate things and activities, and Bourdieu's categories of habitus and praxeological knowledge.

The relationship of discourses to space is in turn anticipated by Panofsky but is most fully worked out by Foucault in his examinations of how discourses in the form of knowledge practices contribute to the formation of created spaces. Lefebvre also acknowledges the relationship of discourses to spaces, without applying the metaphor of the text to environments as was common in semiotic analyses of architecture and cities in the 1960s and 1970s.[15] A theory of discourse and space also underlies de Certeau's suggestion that the pragmatic theory of language - specifically, speech act theory - provides a model for understanding how space is comprised of practices. The "materiality" which de Certeau ascribes to speech and movement recalls Hannah Arendt's thoughts on this subject, and both of their approaches can be said to prefigure Giddens' work on how speech concretizes institutional space.

A third theme which subtends the recent retheorizations of space as outlined in this chapter is the constitution of subjects within socio-spatial practices. Bourdieu, de Certeau, Foucault and Giddens all address this issue, taking into account the role of the body in the subject-constituting process.[16] What is noteworthy here is that just as the formation of subjects became crucial to theories of discourse, it also has become critical to understanding how space is constituted of subjects' practices. The role of phantasy in this process was only briefly eluded to through de Certeau's suggestions in this area, and a fuller understanding of socio-spatial practices would need to take greater account of the role of desire in the constitution of subjects and spaces.

The concept of practice which lies at the basis of these retheorizations of space and the subject draws on the ontological and epistemological dimensions of the praxis tradition without incorporating other key dimensions which also have specific relevance to space. In Part Two which follows, the understandings of praxis as public life and critical activity will also be brought to bear on the practice-based retheorization of space, thus extending it into a theory of spatial and discursive praxis which substantiates the definition of praxis as the unity of theory and practice.

NOTES

1.Marx's emphasis on time has been credited to his reaction against Hegel's reification of space in the form of the state. Rather than following Hegel in his view that history is directed by the territorial Geist of the state, Henri Lefebvre suggests that Marx preferred to restore time to revolutionary primacy (Lefebvre, cited by Soja and Hadjimichalis 1985, 62).

2.Spatial fetishism is a criticism which has frequently been leveled at Lefebvre's work. Castells doesn't use this term himself in reference to Lefebvre's project, but does make Lefebvre the unnamed target of his criticism when he attacks theorists who consider space "qua space" to be determinative of social relationships (Castells 1979, 442). Edward Soja has summarised the differences between Lefebvre and Castells on this issue. The conclusion he reaches is that Lefebvre's position has been too easily dismissed by Castells and others who have disregarded some of Lefebvre's key insights for the sake of greater Marxian orthodoxy (see Soja 1984; Soja and Hadjimichalis 1985).

3.The contributions that the pragmatists Peirce and Dewey, and the phenomenologists Husserl and Merleau-Ponty make to understanding habit can be briefly summarized here. Peirce considers habit, chance and law to be the three elements "active in the world" which organize existence (Peirce 1931-57, 1.409). Within this triad habit spans the gap between chaotic chance and "the cosmos of order and law" (Peirce 1931-57, 6.262). Habit is central to Peirce's epistemology because he believes that meaning is produced by the habits of interpretants' previous sign-relationships. Habit provides regularity of interpretation without causing meanings to become fixed, since habits themselves are formed through chance occurrences. The link Peirce makes between habit and action corresponds to Bourdieu's and the Scholastics' understanding of habitus as principles regulating acts. For Peirce, habit can only be described by the kind of action it gives rise to (Peirce 1931-57, 5.491). Bourdieu in turn notes that habits of actions have class regularities and interests. Peirce's understanding of habit augments Bourdieu's concept of habitus by providing an epistemological basis for it. Where Bourdieu describes habitual practices and points out their political implications, Peirce accounts for their origins and role epistemologically.

As recognized by James Ostrow (1981), John Dewey's understanding of habit also intersects with Bourdieu's concept of habitus at several points. What Ostrow doesn't

mention is Dewey's indebtedness to Peirce on this count. Following Peirce, Dewey considers habits to be activities influenced by prior activities which affect perception and give rise to acquired, or accepted meanings. Dewey's understanding of habit has political implications because like Bourdieu, he considers habits to be projective sources of behavior which provide people with their working capacities as well as their "effective desires". He ultimately equates habits with "will" (Dewey 1925, 25).

Victor Kestenbaum (1977) draws parallels between Dewey's more phenomenological understanding of habit as pre-objective, lived meaning, and Edmund Husserl's definition of habitus as "meaning constituted in lived experience" and retained by the individual (Husserl cited by Kestenbaum 1973, 122). Maurice Merleau-Ponty in turn contributes to the theory of habit by likening habits to the "intentional threads" which establish links between individuals' bodies and the world (Kestenbaum 1977, 26).

4.The reason Bourdieu emphasizes the transposability of dispositions is that he wants to explain how class relations are maintained even when practices and values change. The way he does this is through adopting Saussure's non-referential theory of meaning based on difference. By this way of thinking social class can be understood as the constant reinvention of difference. Bourdieu's use of the term "la distinction" (1979a) captures how this process works by playing on the two meanings of the word: something is distinctive if it is different and/or if it is superior. In Bourdieu's view classes and subclasses define themselves by engaging in practices and material cultures of "distinction" which continually shift in relation to one another.

5.Bourdieu's study of the Kabyle house is structuralist in so far as he suggests that the house's meaning derives from the oppositional relations it objectifies between male/female, fire/water, cooked/raw, light/dark etc. He bases this aspect of his analysis on the fact that in Kabylia the houses are divided into a dark, nocturnal, lower part where things that are damp, green, raw and associated with nature are kept (jars of water, wood, green fodder, the stable), and a light-filled upper part where the loom and objects associated with fire are stored (cooking implements, the lamp, and the rifle). Bourdieu's study exceeds being a static identification of oppositions, however, by interconnecting the house as a material manifestation of culture with the practices which produce it. The house and the actions of its inhabitants are presented as conjoined in the daily living rituals which determine places for sleep and sexual relations, the seating of guests and the positioning of girls and women depending on their age and marital status. The house is also a microcosm of the universe with its internal

divisions corresponding to the divisions of the seasons. Here too, Bourdieu identifies these homologies on the basis of body movements and actions.

6. In The History of Sexuality Foucault addresses how discourses subvert domination: "We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (Foucault 1980, 101).

6. Despite Bourdieu's attempt to mediate voluntarist and determinist perspectives, sociologists widely agree that his social theory favours determinism. Critics point out that his social "agents" are ultimately functions of a "träger" that determines even their "regulated improvisations" (Bourdieu 1977, 78-9; Wacquant 1987, 79).

8. In Central Problems in Social Theory Giddens intimates his indebtedness to Marx's theory of praxis by noting that "Marx's writings still represent the most significant single fund of ideas that can be drawn upon in seeking to illuminate problems of agency and structure" (Giddens 1979, 53). In a 1984 interview he goes on to admit that structuration theory appropriates a generalised notion of praxis from Marx (Giddens 1984, 127).

9. N. J. Thrift (1983, 28) has attempted to summarize the development of this convergence. According to him, the formative origins of the structuration approach can be traced to the publication of Berger's and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality in 1966. The theory was subsequently made more recursive and transformational by Bourdieu (1977), Roy Bhaskar (1979) and Giddens. Other theorists who have pursued a dialectical mediation between agent and structure are Cornelius Castoriadis (1975), Karl Kosik (1976), and Alain Touraine (1977). Allan Pred (1982) also provides a summary of some of the theorists who have contributed to the development of structuration theory.

10. The following are some examples of time-geographic maps.



a) (below) The paths of two individuals (Parkes and Thrift 1980, 245)



c) (above) A comparison of four daily paths (Parkes and Thrift 1980, 260).

11. Giddens can be criticized, however, for not having a fully worked out theory of discourse to account for how discourses act as arenas for the production of social life (Storper 1985, 421). Given this criticism, Giddens does use the term "discourse" and even recognizes its institutional character. His reference to the term arises with his attempt to provide a classification scheme for institutions. Following Althusser's identification of three "levels" or "instances" of social formation, Giddens chooses to ground his own

classification scheme on the characteristics he considers to be universally implicated in human interaction: "the communication of meaning, the operation of power, and modes of normative sanctioning" (Giddens 1981, 46). The respective "structural property" for each of these characteristics is signification, domination and legitimation. He derives four major types of institutions from these three structural properties, according to which property is dominant in the institution (domination has two forms, as authority and as allocative power). Where signification is the dominant property, Giddens suggests that the institution concerned can be analysed according to its symbolic orders and its modes of discourse. Like Foucault, he recognizes how discourses are interconnected with forms of domination and legitimation, but unlike Foucault, he doesn't develop a method for analysing them.

12.Meier, Webber and Mandelbaum all anticipated that new communication technologies would have the effect of making traditional understandings of spatiality obsolete. As in time-geography, Meier proposed in his A Communications Theory of Urban Growth (1962) that data be collected on the origins, intersections, and destinations of the daily interaction paths of individuals within the geographical limits of cities. But unlike the data collected in time-geography, Meier suggests that the data be limited to individuals' communicative "transactions," which Meier considers to be the basic unit of interpersonal relations, comparable to the "bit" in information theory. Meier views the city as channels of communication and equates the city's residents with their messages. Like Giddens, he understands institutions in terms of the accumulation and interlocking of individuals' messages and communication paths which form temporally sustainable, complex webs (Meier 1962, 22). But unlike Giddens, Meier provides no analysis of physical space to ground his model of institutional communication networks.

Webber's essay, "The Urban Place and the Nonplace Urban Realm" (1964), extended Meier's argument by analysing the spatial consequences of telecommunication systems on communities. Webber was the first to propose the "community without propinquity" thesis which holds that "communities comprise people with common interests who communicate" (Webber 1964, 110). This aspatial definition of community was intended by Webber to replace the more common, spatial definition which understands community as heterogeneous groups of people who achieve unity through their interdependently pursuing different interests at common places (Webber 1964, 110).

Almost a decade later, Mandelbaum reconfirmed the view that understanding space in terms of communication networks causes the significance of physical space to be eclipsed. His thesis in Community and Communication (1972) is that

because the city is a communication network, the spatial model of the city should be abandoned, along with the association of the word "community" with a pattern of settlement (Mandelbaum 1972, 23-7).

In responding to aspatial theories of communication, Giddens acknowledges that telecommunication systems have resulted in greater "time-space convergences." But he argues that the use of electronic media still occurs in settings of interaction, and that their associated discursive practices continue to solidify spatial relations.

13.Although these geographers recognize the contribution of structuration theory to reformulating the relationship between social and spatial theories, they also base their geographical approaches on Giddens' precursors, who only receive passing reference in Giddens' own work (Giddens 1981, 10, 140; Soja 1983, 1270). A key text containing papers by many of these geographers is Social Relations and Spatial Structures, edited by Derek Gregory and John Urry (1985). Environment and Planning D: Society and Space is the principal journal exploring the current intersection between geography and social theory.

14.As an example of this traditional schism urban historian Charles Tilly points to the mutually exclusive subject matters of two of Jane Jacobs' major works. In The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jacobs deals with the daily interactive practices of urban living, extensively chronicling the type of mixed-use street life which makes neighbourhoods vibrant and safe places to live and work. In her The Economy of Cities, on the other hand, she examines the overall role of cities in producing healthy economies (Tilly 1984, 121-2). Her "micro" and "macro" perspectives do not intersect.

15.Rather than contributing to the structuralist analysis of created environments, Lefebvre suggests that a more subtle analysis is required to disclose the relationship of language to space (Lefebvre 1974, 24-5). Given this attitude, his understanding of the materiality of language and discourse in relation to space is equivocal. On the one hand he suggests that discourse is abstract and nonmaterial when compared to spatial reality: "Les rapports sociaux de production ont une existence sociale en tant qu'ils ont une existence spatiale; Sinon, ils restent dans l'abstraction 'pure,' c'est-à-dire dans les représentations et par conséquent dans l'idéologies, autrement dit le verbalisme, le verbiage, les mots (Lefebvre 1974, 152-3). On the other hand, his reply to the question of how society is held together, is "Par le langage et le metalangage, par la parole qui se maintient vivante sous le discours au premier et second degré, sous les avalanches scripturaires" (Lefebvre 1968, 360).

16.In the case of Giddens, the interdependency of space and action in his theory ties both concepts to an understanding of the body as the locus of the acting self which mediates the surrounding world. Giddens' general concern with "positioning" also presumes an embodied social perspective.

PART TWO

SPATIAL AND DISCURSIVE *PRAXIS*

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PRAXEIS OF ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN PLANNING

In reviewing the traditions of praxis, discursive practices and spatial practices independently from one another, certain continuities have become apparent which suggest how these theories mutually extend and support one another. What is more, in several instances the three central terms of this thesis - space, practices, and discourse - have been seen combined within individual theorists' works. Foucault is the primary example here, although Lefebvre, too, considers the interrelationship of spatial practices and language, and Giddens likewise recognizes the role of discourses in the social production of space.[1]

Given this groundwork towards a combined theory, what this chapter will explore is how the traditions outlined in Part One can be brought together as a theory of spatial and discursive praxis to radicalize the understanding of how practices shape the created environment. My particular focus of attention will be architectural and urban planning practices. Rather than concentrating on a single aspect of the practices of planners and architects, my intent in this chapter will be to provide an overview of the multiple ways practices are constitutive of the two urban design professions. By looking at these professions in terms of

their discursive practices, spatial practices, and praxeis, an overlay of perspectives will be built up that together point to the level of change that needs to occur for planners and architects to reestablish their relations with each other and the people they design for.

I will begin by looking at the relationships of urban planning and architecture to their discourses. In a separate section for each profession I will examine the recent histories of planning and architecture to see how discourses have been used to legitimate style choices and professional practices. In line with a theory of discursive praxis, I will also examine the way these discourses are constitutive of the two professions and retain traces of the professions' procedures. An understanding of discourse will be seen to explain why designers at twenty year intervals produce very different kinds of designs from each other. A theory of discourse accounts for this fact by suggesting that in any given period dominant discourses define good design, and that it is in relation to these discourses that architects and planners express their own design intentions. If the relationship between designers and the dominant discourse is oppositional, another discourse is forged, based on a different "selective tradition"[2] of associated practices and discourses. The reason why discourses and not styles are considered formative in this process is that styles can generally be traced to larger cultural and discursive patterns

which are contemporary with them.[3] My reviews of planning and architectural discourses will include examinations of the discourses of planning and architecture, i.e. those discourses produced by planners and architects in the everyday operation of their professions; as well as the discourses on planning and architecture, i.e. those discourses produced by critics assessing the practices of planners and architects. In the case of postmodern architecture, the gap between these two types of discourse will be seen to be minimal as practising architects engage in critical discourse on their own profession. By determining which definitions of the praxis concept most legitimize the planning and architecture professions today, I will evaluate how their respective discourses either promote or impede the realization of their praxeis. In the case of planning, I will propose that it can currently be legitimated as a profession concerned with extending the praxis of public life, but that its own discursive practices limit its ability to realize this potential. The contemporary architecture profession will in turn be seen to be aligned with the praxis of self-constitutive activity, at least insofar as postmodern architectural theorists seem to be aware of the constitution of themselves in their discourses and professional practices. But here, as with the planning profession, I will argue that the role of practices in realizing change has been insufficiently recognized: The shift from architectural

modernism to postmodernism will provide an example of the way design movements can be forged out of critiques of their predecessors, but prove ineffectual if the change does not extend to their spatial and discursive practices.

In a third section to this chapter I will attempt to denaturalise current architectural and planning practices by taking a brief look at design procedures carried out in other cultures and at other times, which have correspondingly produced different kinds of created spaces. The underlying theme connecting these examples will be that planning and architecture are sites of practices which bring together the three ontological realms of interiority, society, and the natural or material world. A theory of change will necessarily be seen to affect all three realms. I will argue that concepts of praxis as outlined in the first chapter of this thesis radicalize the understanding of the interconnections between the three realms, and therefore provide a compelling analysis of how change is effected in the created environment.

Planning and the Public Sphere

The production of discourses is central to the functioning of urban planning as a profession. The origins of the modern profession were hinged on its formation of a discourse, and the profession's subsequent history has been closely tied to the changing discourses which have been used

to legitimate its practices. The discursive origins of the modern planning profession have been traced by Christine Boyer in her 1983 work, Dreaming the Rational City. Taking Foucault's notions of space, discourse and power as her starting points, Boyer reconstructs the formation of the American planning profession on the basis of its own gradual formation of a professionalized discourse on the city. By studying how everyday planners and not just the profession's key theorists and autonomous actors spoke and were spoken by prevailing disourses, she shows how the American planning profession became formalised at the confluence of several 19th century discourses, including those of tenement house surveyors, industrial efficiency experts, sanitation reformers, municipal art societies, and the moralistic city park movement. In Boyer's view the planning profession became conglomerated at the intersection of these discourses, and in its subsequent history assimilated numerous other discourses in an ongoing attempt to establish a legitimate role for itself.

The reason why discourse is so central to the functioning of the urban planning profession derives from the equivocal position of planners in Western society. This position is due to the fact that urban planning is a social activity requiring deliberate collective action, which at the same time operates within a liberalist laissez-faire economic system (Roweis 1981). To justify collective actions that affect private

property, planners have had to create a discourse to mediate public and private interests and at the same time establish their own claims to knowledge. Before looking at the way the procedures of urban planning are inscribed in the profession's discourse, I will examine two of the discourses which have been used to legitimate its practices: those of scientific rationality and, more recently, participatory democracy. The discourse on participatory democracy will be the connecting link to my analysis of planners' discursive procedures because of the way these procedures interfere with instantiating planning's praxis of realizing the public sphere.

The alliance between planning, science and rationalism occurred quite recently in the profession's history. Previous to the early-20th century planners drew their precedents from the "craft activities" of architecture and surveying, and so treated planning issues as design problems subject primarily to questions of efficiency and aesthetics. It was only with evidence of growing complexity in society and the need to justify plans to an increasingly articulate public, that planners began to make the process of planmaking explicit and to demonstrate how societal complexity could be scientifically understood and managed (Batty 1985, 104-5). It was therefore the need for accountability that initially led planners to invoke science and rationality as norms. Like other social reform movements established after the 19th century, planning came to require for its political

legitimacy, evidence of a scientifically rational knowledge (Weaver, Jessop and Das 1985, 145). The adoption of a rationalist credo by planners meant that substantive goals had to be replaced by a Popperian concern for the procedures which would produce the right decisions. The scientific approach to planning accordingly became known as procedural planning theory. One of its major precepts is that it can be considered independent from the phenomena planned. In terms of Max Weber's identification of four types of rationality, procedural theory is based on "purposive-rationality" because it "[weighs] the relations of means to ends, the relations of ends to secondary consequences, and...the relative importance of different possible ends" (Weber 1978, 26). As Habermas notes, however, planning actually exemplifies purposive-rational action of the second order because it "aims at the establishment, improvement, or expansion of systems of purposive-rational action themselves" (Habermas 1970, 81).

The extent to which rationality became integral to planners' self-image is evident in planning discourse. In his studies of rationality in planning literature, Eric Reade has pointed out how the words "planner" and "rational" are frequently coupled together. Reade notes that planning, defined as rationality, is often portrayed as an end in itself rather than as a means for realizing identifiable outcomes. He further observes that planners tend to consider their role to be "more rational" than that of politicians,

interest groups, the public or other experts. This appears to be the case even when planners are unable to define what it is they mean by the term "rational" (Reade 1982, 51; 1985, 81-2).

The rational model of planning was most overtly espoused from approximately the 1940s to the 1960s. It is still the predominant model used by municipal offices throughout the Western world and is the one critics take issue with when proposing alternative planning approaches. But since the 1960s an alternative planning model has emerged which emphasizes the potential of planners to facilitate collective decision-making processes. The discourse on participatory democracy is increasingly being used to justify the urban planning profession. It coexists with the discourse on scientific rationalism but at least theoretically, is beginning to replace it. Its gathering momentum is a response to disenchantment with the results of "rational" planning procedures, and also follows the greater politicization of planners in recent years. Its use may also be attributed to a desire to deflect responsibility for planning decisions away from planners and onto the collective body as a whole. Planning procedures that have been legitimized by the discourse on democratic decision-making range from advocacy planning as first promoted by Paul Davidoff (Davidoff 1965), to most city plans' formal recognitions of the desirability of "citizen participation" in the planning process. As compared to architectural practice where it is generally only the

immediate client or property owner who is able to influence the design of a particular portion of urban space, urban planning increasingly holds out the possibility for all interested citizens to contribute to the design of the collective environment. I would like to suggest that this is the basis on which the urban planning profession currently legitimizes itself. In terms of the definitions of praxis outlined in Chapter 1, planning is now being justified on the grounds that it contributes to realizing the praxis of the public sphere.

To illustrate this turn in the discourse of planning theory I will look briefly at the work of two theorists who have contributed to its emergence: John Friedmann and John Forester. In both cases their planning approaches are sympathetic with the praxeis of public life and critical activity as espoused by Jürgen Habermas. In the case of Friedmann, his theory of "transactive planning" is not consciously positioned in relation to Habermas' Aristotelian and Marxist understandings of praxis,[4] yet corroborates Habermas' understanding through promoting a "dialogue society" where decision-making proceeds from communicative interaction. In Friedmann's view, the "good society" "lives entirely in dialogue" and "cannot exceed the limits of its dialogue..." (Friedmann 1979, xiii). He succinctly articulates Arendt's praxis of speech and political action when he notes that "In dialogue, the object, man, disappears

and is transformed into an active subject, the protagonist of history" (Friedmann 1973, xvi). The understanding of praxis as public life arises in Friedmann's concern for extending the public sphere and his belief that fundamental change can only occur through the involvement of people who currently lack substantial power in society (Friedmann 1973, xvi). He contends that planning can facilitate this involvement by promoting interaction between individuals as the basis for political action and decision-making. The stated purpose of both his and Habermas' dialogue society is to create a social order based on communicatively informed choices rather than on unquestioned traditions. The planning practice that Friedmann proposes complements what Habermas identifies as the "lifeworld" realm of social experience, where subjects determine courses for action on the basis of communicatively agreed consensus.[5] For Habermas, the lifeworld is the sphere of political praxis. Friedmann's model of planning promotes this type of praxis through calling for citizens' direct engagement in shaping their collective environments.

Whereas Friedmann anticipates Habermas' development of the praxis concept in his suggestions for the restructuring of planning practices, John Forester consciously places himself in the Habermasian tradition by exploring the relevance of Habermas' social theory to existing planning institutions. Like Friedmann, Forester develops the praxis theory of planning by looking at how planning can promote critical

activity and extend the realm of public life. His most explicit exposition of praxis defines it as the emancipatory potential of social action to eliminate illegitimate power relations (Forester 1985a, x, xix, xv). But Forester also appears to subscribe to the understanding of praxis as self-constitutive activity. This is suggested by his continual emphasis on the practices of planners, and accounts for why his vernacular uses of "practical" and "pragmatic" (Forester 1981, 163; 1982a 63) actually point to the importance of everyday activities in reproducing society. The role of discourses in social reproduction is also recognized by Forester. He can be considered, in fact, to prefigure a theory of discursive praxis by proposing that planners' actions are primarily communicative rather than instrumentalist. Planners, he suggests, don't just gather information and make plans, but shape communication networks. The key source of planners' power, he contends, is their control over information. Given this "gatekeeper" aspect of planners' role, Forester suggests that planners can work to alleviate what Habermas calls "systematically distorted communication:"

> Once analysts recognize the organizations within which they work as humanly distorted communication structures, and then understand action within these organizations as fundamentally communicative, they may recognize both their possibilities and responsibilities to correct unnecessary yet disabling distortions of communications... (Forester 1980-1, 602).

Forester specifies numerous ways an institution's discourse may be systematically distorted. Some of these are if the discourse presents only a single social and political reality, obscures issues or responsibility, manipulates trust and consent, encourages passivity, justifies inequality, or "twists fact with possibility" (Forester 1985b, 206, 216). In analysing how planners' discourses are distorted, Forester makes use of Habermas' identification of the "ideal speech situation" by considering it a "critical reference point" to answer the question, "distorted from what?" (Forester 1985b, 204, 206). He specifically uses the notion of the ideal speech situation to suggest how planners can correct their own communication distortions by analysing their discourse's comprehensibility, truth, sincerity and legitimacy (Forester 1985b, 214). Forester's concern for the discourse of planning contributes to a theory of discursive praxis because he analyses discourses at the level of the procedures which produce them. By emphasizing how planners' role is largely communicative, he also points to the way both individual planners and the profession as a whole become constituted through their discursive procedures.[6]

Forester's and Friedmann's planning theories are discourses on planning. I would like now to take an extended look at city plans as an example of a discourse of planning. This analysis will extend Forester's viewpoint that discourses consist of procedures, by looking at how city plans retain

traces of the planning procedures that produce them. Rather than drawing on Habermas' critical theory to analyse the discourse of city plans, I will explore the relevance of Foucault's and Kristeva's view that subjects are positioned within signifying practices, by looking at how planning procedures regularize the positions of both planners and "the public"[7] within its discourse. This positioning will be seen to be significant when the provisions for citizen participation in city plans are considered. If as Friedmann and Forester suggest, the extension of the public sphere is to be a primary role for current planning practices, then it is important that the discourse of planning not reify subject positions which limit involvement in the public sphere from the outset. Contrary to municipal authorities' professed commitment to citizen participation, I will argue that planners' subject position has been shaped by the doctrine of "public interests" and that this position sets up a system of practices which undermines planning discourse's potential to embody participatory procedures. As the textual basis for this study I have looked at four Canadian planning documents from Montréal, Toronto and Halifax, which share similar conditions of production but which were written over approximately twenty years, from 1963 to 1985.[8] At the expense of downplaying some of these documents' differences from each other, their regularities will be emphasized in order to identify continuities across the discourse. How

planners are constructed as the "speaking voice" of city plans will be looked at first, followed by an analysis of the way this speaking voice prevents others from being empowered discursively. By this means the procedures which produce planning discourses will be seen to be integral to them, and the production of planning discourse will be presented as constitutive of political reality and not just as representative of it.

Identifying how planners become positioned within their discourse is obfuscated by the fact that as a profession, planners are "ex-nominated." Like Barthes' bourgeoisie, they are a "class" that refuses to be named (Barthes 1972, 138-42). This is because legitimation procedures require the credited author of a city plan to be either an elected government body, a government appointed committee, or simply the community as a corporate entity which has undergone a "planning process." Where mention of city planners is made, it generally takes the form of a reference to "staff work" or occurs in the context of their being advised by a committee (Toronto 1977, 45; Halifax 1984, I-3, III-16). A specific way in which planners' voices are occulted in plans is through the use of passive, non-transactive grammatical constructions (Kress and Hodge 1979). For example, a 1977 Toronto Planning Board publication states that, "As part of the background work done...a survey of the industrial firms in the King-Parliament area was undertaken" (Toronto 1977, 191),[9] without saying by whom or at

whose initiation. Agentless constructions in planning discourse appear to denote planners' action because where community groups are involved, their participation is credited since it adds legitimation to the final document. Thus in the same publication the following statement occurs: "The request for such a study had been made by a local community group, the South Cabbagetown Community Improvement Association" (Toronto 1977, 49). Non-transactive grammatical constructions have the effect of making the discourse "speak for itself" by shifting attention away from planners and onto the status of the discourse itself. The fusing of legality with political planning statements also causes attention to be focussed on the status of the discourse rather than on the voices speaking through it. The legality of a planning document is frequently established through an official title and authority section, the inclusion of the city crest, a legal endorsement by the minister of municipal affairs, and the use of legal language.

Given the fact that speaking voices in planning documents seldom identify themselves, there are several ways the voices' underlying perspectives can be used to identify planners' subject position within plans. In the following example a skyline as opposed to a street-level perspective is evident: "The financial district with its bustling canyons is the dominant concentration and the one whose clustered towers identify the heart of the city from a distance" (Toronto 1963,

3). Another subject position which often appears in plans is one which eulogizes growth and inadvertently presents the plan as a self-fulfilling prophecy:

> By becoming familiar with our proposals, you will gain a better understanding of the phenomenal growth which lies in store for our territory in the near future. At the dawn of the year 2000, this development represents a challenge I invite you to take up..." (Montréal 1985, 1).

Subject positions can also be discerned behind classifications and adjectives used in planning texts. This is because the meanings attributed to words vary according to how the positions of those who use them are perceived. Within any "discursive formation" readers construct an image of the speaker in order to make the reading of a text consistent (Pêcheux 1982). In planning discourse some of the key words and phrases which point to an implied speaker are "appropriate," "nuisance," "good development," "suitable," and "better use." The by-laws and other regulations of planning discourses also point to an implied speaker because rules always presuppose a "knower" who has formulated the proper way to act in order to bring about a desired state (Fowler and Kress 1979, 26).

The question arises as to why planning discourse requires an anonymous and legally authoritative subject to express community aspirations and programmes for their realization. On the basis of the plans looked at, two answers can be proposed to account for this discursive trait. The first

answer has to do with the fact that both the plans and the processes which result in urban morphology are presented as "agentless." The following excerpts from the plans illustrate this discursive trait:

> The uptown business centres will continue to grow and the suburban shopping centres will proliferate as population spreads outwards (Toronto 1963, 7).
>
> The location of industry has followed the evolution of modes of transportation and communication and has moved towards outlying sectors (Montréal 1985, 1).

The gaps in these statements might suggest that impersonal collective will or technology are causal agents, but actually point to the independent role of business in determining urban form. An exception to the suggestion of agentless urban change is provided in the 1963 Toronto publication where the role of the private developer in initiating development is emphasized:

> It is recognized that the great majority of buildings will be erected by private developers, and that the process of private development has its own typical characteristics: the assembly of sites where wanted, the design of buildings to meet the developer's needs....All require reasonable flexibility...to allow the developer to exercise his initiative in carrying out his development (Toronto 1963, 13).

The context of this statement is an apology for planners' intervention in laissez-faire development. The Planning Board by this means acknowledges planners' role in changing

development procedures, but omits crediting planners for their impact on the urban environment. In the same publication the Chairman of the Planning Board states that the plan's proposals "have been influenced by many factors - [the] street patterns, [the] business groupings, [the] subway" (Toronto 1963, 4), without acknowledging that these urban features were once planned developments. This kind of omission becomes critical when the planning results have been adverse. Halifax's plan refers to strip commercial development without acknowledging the planning legislation that allowed it to originate in the first place, and Montréal's plan similarly laments an agentless urban sprawl (Halifax 1984, II-13; Montréal 1985, 3). The 1977 Toronto Planning Board publication provides a further example of how adverse social effects may be attributed to a form of development but not to the planners who designed or approved that form:

> ...the construction of the Richmond and Adelaide ramps to the Don Valley Parkway in the 1960's resulted in the demolition of about 170 residential buildings, the displacement of nearly 2,000 people, and a physical split in the remaining residential neighbourhood (Toronto 1977, 18).

No contextualising statements are provided with this description which implicate planners for their role in bringing about these changes. The hidden author function within plans appears to be related to the planning profession's lack of accountability when it comes to previous

planning decisions. A contradiction by this means is set up between the denial of agency credited to previous planning documents, and the supposed efficacy of the current document.

The second reason why planners' voices are screened within planning discourse has to do with the mediative function planners have assumed in capitalist society. Here the textual analysis of city plans substantiates what planning critics have maintained about the profession, but locates in the discourse itself a key site where conflicting interests are arbitrated through "administrative rationality" (Burten and Carlen 1979, 36). The mediative function of planning discourse is evident in its overriding concern for "balance:"

> The plan must be receptive to the new, the big, the monumental design but it must also be geared to human needs... (Toronto 1963, 4).
>
> [The Neighbourhood Development Plan] attempts to strike a balance between conflicting demands for land that will most benefit the local residents, businessmen and workers... (Toronto 1977, ii).
>
> ...the next step was to focus in greater detail on the specific issues which require decisions to meet our needs for, on the one hand, protecting and preserving our residential environments, and on the other, providing for new growth and development (Halifax 1984, I-3).

Balance is perhaps the characterising claim of urban planning discourse because it is through proposing a "balanced perspective" that competing urban interests are arbitrated and a "collective voice" is constructed. Planners' concern with balance extends to their own professional legitimacy.

Sometimes this concern surfaces as self-reflexive justifications for policy decisions:

> Some proposals may seem timid, others may encroach on the normal right to make private decisions; few, if any, will seem wild or extravagant when considered in their context and timing (Toronto 1963, 4).

Generally planners mediate their contradictory position by justifying the profession on the grounds that it "channels growth" and assists in making private development more efficient and cost-effective.

The mediative role of planners is further consolidated by the profession assuming the voice of the "public interest' in planning documents. The identification of a public interest separate from the interests of business and private property can be justified in Western society on the grounds that frequently private interests do not create spaces amenable to interests beyond their own. Given this concession to public interests, the discursive position which it has led planners to assume often thwarts members of the public from speaking their own interests in planning documents. Patrick McAuslan's study of the history of public interest law is useful here in identifying how planners' discursive position has become established through aligning itself with a public interest. According to McAuslan, the idea that there is a public interest separate from the interests of private property was not recognized in Common Law until important cases resulted in

the concept being formalised in 1911 and 1915. The original catalyst for public interest legislation was Jeremy Bentham's 18th century utilitarian philosophy. In the form that it became legally legitimate, the public interest was considered a concern of planners and public administrators who could be trusted to act in good faith on the public's behalf, and who ultimately were accountable to the government, and not "the public," for their policies and actions (McAuslan 1980, 2, 4-5). The association of public interest planners with government becomes evident in the plans' provisions for citizen participation. This identification of the position of the speaking voice in city plans also provides an example of the way the procedures which produce a discourse become inscribed in it.

In the planning documents looked at, citizen participation was considered an adjunct to the planning process and not integral to it. Contradictions between the planning discourse's stated commitment to public participation and its actual discursive procedures frequently surfaced at the level of language. For example, in the summary of Montréal's plan which was distributed to all households in the region, no discrepancy seems to have been detected in the development commission's invitation to "the population"[10] to participate by presenting its views on "the final version of the development plan" (Montréal 1985, 8). Similarly, in Halifax's plan, citizen participation appears to

have been an exercise carried out separately from plan formulation itself. The two activities are presented as being distinct:

> In addition to its responsibility for putting forward a municipal development plan, the Municipal Development Plan Committee had the task of seeking the views of the public (Halifax 1984, I-2).

The accepted role of participation in this plan is subsequently revealed to be legitimation. In the following extract the "dialogue" referred to becomes one-way explanation in the final analysis:

> Citizen participation is a process which should result in a continual dialogue between City Council and the public, and, to some extent, with their public servants in the municipal administration. It seeks to maximize the flow of information between all parties involved in municipal decision-making and to explain the basis on which policies are adopted (Halifax 1984, III-43).

The simulacrous nature of participation in the planning process is well expressed by the Halifax plan itself, through the choice of the word "represents" in the following extract, rather than "requires:"

> It is hoped that the dialogue which [the participation strategy] facilitates will be consistent with the general principles which participatory democracy represents (Halifax 1984, III-44).

These examples point to how the participation provisions are a veneer added to the still dominant framework of public interest procedures. The discourse accurately retains traces of the procedures which produced it. The positioning of planners in relation to government results in a set of discursive practices which prevent planners' discourses from embodying the participatory philosophy they espouse. The possibility of planning discourse changing is dependent on the procedures which produce it changing.[11] And the possibility of cities changing is also dependent on discursive procedures changing. This is because the procedures which produce plans are the same procedures which produce urban designs. City plans are not only practices which result in a discourse, for plans become translated into real objects, constraints and opportunities; their physical manifestation is artifacts which consolidate community experience, separate public from private, and reify social relations. It is for this reason that city plans are not just a routine example of municipal government discourse: They are practices which result in enduring processes and relationships; they are a form of knowledge which physically constructs a social reality. A theory of discursive <u>praxis</u> helps to focalize these interrelationships by showing the level at which planners' practices will need to change if their profession is to further the <u>praxis</u> of public life.

Architecture and the Construction of Self

Like planners, architects also rely on discourses to legitimate their practices and style choices. Although their position is less overtly mediative than that of planners, architects have continually justified their design prerogative to the public, the related design professions, and themselves, by producing and reproducing legitimating discourses. The basis of these discourses have changed frequently in the three hundred years since the founding of the first modern architectural academy, yet the procedures underlying these discourses have consistently been founded on exclusivity: In the 18th century trained architects defended their professional status on the grounds that their classical education enabled them to reproduce appropriate classical designs; in the 19th century architects distinguished themselves from the building "trades" by emphasizing the gentleman origins of their profession;[12] and in the modern period when architects' designs were not visibly different from those produced by engineers, architects maintained the position of their profession by asserting the superiority of their artistic and socially conscious sensibilities.[13] The discursive practices which produced these claims were intricately tied up with architects' professional practices as a whole. In what follows I will look at one turning point in architectural history - the most recent one from modernism to

postmodernism - to see how architects' exclusive procedures have remained constant beneath the surface of stylistic changes. While postmodern architects have to some extent embodied the praxis of self-constitutive activity through the self-conscious construction of themselves in their discourse and other practices, I will argue that the praxis of architectural change lies at a yet more fundamental level -- one which instantiates a more inclusive understanding of praxis as activity which realizes community in the act of producing individuals.

As a distinct style, the emergence of architectural modernism was bound up with several turn of the century discourses and design procedures. Parallel to its assumption by urban planners, the discourse on rationalism was also appropriated by architects, but in the guise of functionalism understood as the aesthetic of mechanical utility. The discourse on functionalism pre-existed its use in this century,[14] but was taken up by modern architects to validate their abstract, ahistorical designs, suggestive of technology and industrial processes. The "rationality" of this aesthetic was particularly evident in modern architects' proposals for urban regeneration schemes such as those produced by Frank Lloyd Wright in his plan for Broadacre City, and Le Corbusier in his design for the remaking of Paris as La Ville Radieuse. The rationality of these designs consisted in their separation of functions and their unitary design aesthetic: Descartes'

emblem of the modernist project as the city "a professional architect has freely planned on an open plain" (Descartes 1957, 10) was realized by these modern architects in their models for the rational rebuilding of urban life.

The modernists' rational style of design followed from their positivist, utopian belief in universal solutions to problems of urban living ("Beyond" 1980, 5). As a design movement concerned with achieving social reform through built form, modern architects considered themselves to be the purveyors of an urban aesthetic which would enlighten the lives of the working classes. This attitude is concisely summed up in a retrospective statement by Philip Johnson:

> We really believed, in a quasi-religious sense, in the perfectability of human nature, in the role of architecture as a weapon of social reform...the coming Utopia when everyone would live in cheap prefabricated flat-roofed multiple dwellings - heaven on earth (Johnson cited in Coleman 1985, 3).

But the egalitarian principles of modern architects were contradicted by their professional practices and attitudes. Working people's own aesthetics and critical capacities were poorly regarded by modern architects. Walter Gropius, for example, considered the working classes to be intellectually undeveloped and for this reason considered it useless to consult them about the utopian housing designs he produced for them. Mies van der Rohe similarly didn't provide clients with alternative design schemes because he didn't believe they had the capacity to choose between them. Likewise, Le

Corbusier is on record for having stated that the working classes would have to be reeducated in order to appreciate his urban vision (Knox 1987, 369).

These attitudes were expressed in the design practices of modern architects, and traces of these practices were retained in their discourses. While aiming to produce both designs and a discourse to further social equality, the practices of modern architects precluded this from happening. This becomes evident in the use modern architects made of the discourse on futurism. To some extent the elitist procedures of modern architects were occulted by their ascribing a futuristic telos to architecture. By aligning their modernist design preference with that of a futuristic "spirit of the age," modern architects were able to deflect attention away from their own design intentions and onto futurism as an external force for change. Futurism enhanced modern architects' social innovator role and also justified their designs by allowing them to claim that it was not them but the age that willed design changes. Thus Mies van der Rohe could succinctly state in 1923 that "Architecture is the will of the age conceived in spatial terms" (Mies van der Rohe in Conrads 1964, 74). The procedures of modern architects nevertheless broke through to leave their marks on their discourse. Mies van der Rohe inadvertently undoes his above statement, for example, when he later concedes that "the meaning and right of every age consists solely in providing the spirit [of the

age] with the necessary prerequisites for its existence" (Mies van der Rohe in Conrads 1964, 123). Similarly, Le Corbusier both reveals the legitimating function of futurism and the exclusive design procedures of modern architects in the following extract taken from Towards a New Architecture, where he first futuristically asserts that the "new spirit" exists, and then outlines the steps architects need to take in order to propagate it to the general public:

> A great epoch has begun.
> There exists a new spirit.
> . . . . . .
> We must create the mass-production spirit.
> The spirit of constructing mass-production houses.
> The spirit of living in mass-production houses.
> The spirit of conceiving mass-production houses
> (Le Corbusier 1946, 12).

The new buildings of modern architecture did not change the world in the ways modern architects had expected them to. Instead of providing an egalitarian living aesthetic for all segments of society, modern architecture was readily coopted by multinational and other large corporations for the design of office buildings. While many factors contributed to this consequence, the fact that modern architects' egalitarian principles did not penetrate to the level of their practices can be considered one reason why the outcome of modern architecture fell short of its practitioners' intents. Modern architects' procedures of exclusivity infused their modernist designs. In accordance with Marx's understanding of praxis, the buildings modern architects produced were expressions of

the architectural practices which produced them.

The shift from architectural modernism to postmodernism corresponded to the waning of architecture's social purpose in the 1960s. With the utopian and technological aspirations of the modern movement both unrealizable and no longer desirable by the middle of the century, architects sought to reestablish their position within the expanding cartel of created environment professions by aligning themselves with a different selective tradition of discourses. Although there are currently several architectural "postmodernisms,"[15] all of these design movements legitimate their profession by positing a distinct break between their design intentions and those of modern architects. To some extent the claim of such a break is well-founded: Postmodern architects no longer share the Cartesian dream of a city "conceived at one go by a single architect", but instead rally around Jean-François Lyotard's call for "an infant-housing and an infant-city" (Lyotard 1985, 52), where designs take their place within the urban palimpsest without cancelling out previous design approaches. But despite this apparent rupture between modern and postmodern design methods, postmodern architects' practices and legitimating discourses have not significantly changed from those of their modernist predecessors. I will outline the continuities between the two design movements in the course of describing postmodern architects' revised system of legitimation.

The first continuity between modern and postmodern architects resides in their mutual legitimation as artists. Under modernism the architect-as-artist image was most cultivated by Le Corbusier. If there has been an intensification of this image with postmodernism, it is evident in the way postmodern architectural drawings and models now enter museums and private collections as "auratic"[16] works of art. This recent trend has been reinforced by the second basis on which postmodern architects legitimate themselves, that of being theorists. The "theoretical turn" in postmodern architecture is a new departure for the profession and replaces the social innovator role architects had assumed with modernism. The theoretical basis of current postmodern architecture complements the profession's artistic legitimation by providing it with a conceptual edge which makes architects' representations comparable to work being produced by other contemporary artists. The legitimation of postmodern architects as artists-theorists is not something all practising architects have contributed to, since most architects remain concerned with the daily exigencies of the building industry. But all architects have benefited vicariously from the legitimating image of the architect-artist-theorist as promulgated by universities and the architectural and popular presses.[17]

I would like to suggest that the current legitimation of postmodern architects as artists and theorists rests ultimately on their praxis, understood in two senses stemming from the tradition of Hegel and Marx. The first sense is Marx's understanding of praxis as non-alienated activity which occurs when people are identified with both their actions and resulting products. Along with other creative and artistic professions, the profession of architecture provides its practitioners with the opportunity to realize themselves in the material world they design. The second definition of praxis which architects instantiate is its understanding as activity which constitutes subjects at the same time it constitutes their productions. Although this concept of praxis is descriptive of all people in their productive relations, there has been an immanent understanding of self-constitutive praxis by architects which has served to instil an aura around the architecture profession which other urban design professions do not share. This is because the architect-as-artist image is not based only on the artistic products of architects, but also on their artistic life as lived. This praxis extends to how postmodern architects discursively "construct" themselves, since as evident in architectural periodicals such as Daidalos, L'Arca, Perspecta, AA Files, and Lotus, architects have created a theoretically rich and visually beautiful discourse which is as constitutive of the profession as their other professional practices.

Before implying that continuing these practices is all postmodern architects have to do to realize the praxis of their profession, I would like to take a closer look at their discourse - in both its structuralist and post-structuralist phases - to see how at the procedural level the profession still shares discursive continuities with modernism.

One of the arguments I am attempting to substantiate in this thesis is that discourses "traverse" a period and become expressed in a multitude of disciplines and objectified forms. This has positive critical effect when a given discourse can be used hermeneutically as one of many "filters" through which to interpret a body of knowledge and practices. Postmodern architects' appropriation of structuralist and post-structuralist theories to some extent has had this positive benefit, but it has also served to confine architectural debate to the theoretically initiated. Semiotics, for example, which became popular across many disciplines during the 1960s, facilitated architecture's "inward" turn after the demise of the profession's social purpose under modernism. Semiotics legitimized postmodern architecture's formalistic trend by providing it with a theory for self-referentiality. On the one hand it catalyzed the overlaying of architectural forms and ideas to expand and play with the realm of architectural meaning; but on the other hand the appropriation of semiotics by architectural theorists served as a discursive procedure of exclusivity to maintain architects' position in

the hierarchy of the urban design cartel. This is the view Tom Wolfe popularises in From Bauhaus to Our House. Wolfe parodies the structuralist rhetoric of what he calls "academic architecture" on the grounds that its intent was to "baffle the bourgeoisie" through a bewildering system of internal propaganda (Wolfe 1981, 97-121). Manfredo Tafuri also expresses this view, but in terms of architecture's crisis of legitimation:

> Through semiology architecture seeks its own meaning, while tormented by the sense of having lost its meaning altogether....No longer able to present itself as a utopia, architecture indulges in nostalgic contemplation of its own outmoded roles, or disputes with itself as a means of survival (Tafuri 1976, 161, 163).

The subsequent embracing of post-structuralist theories by architects has also occurred as a procedure of exclusivity to legitimize the profession. Viewed positively, deconstructivist architects have sought to open up architectural expression by building what in the past were unbuildable ideas. As expressed by Peter Eisenman, the intent of deconstructivist architecture has been not to repress former architectural styles, but "surgically" to see what it is they have repressed. For this reason Eisenman considers deconstruction in architecture to be not a style but a process which can lead to many different styles (Eisenman 1988, 53, 57, 60). The ideal which Eisenman defends is somewhat compromised, however, by the exclusivity

with which he expels other postmodern architects from his circle (Eisenmann 1988), as well as by the way his and other deconstructivists' designs have become clearly identifiable as a style.[18] The deconstructivists therefore claim to be pluralists, subverting totality and defending otherness, while in fact both their procedures and designs are frequently monist and elitist. The traditional hierarchies they attempt to dispel are recreated in their own intellectual hierarchy, with the deconstructivist architect positioned at the apex. Their building the unbuildable has not yet extended to the practices which produce their buildings, and for this reason the change which they have espoused has not yet transformed their praxis.

The nominal change from architectural modernism to postmodernism is emblemized in the post-structuralist discourse postmodern architects have appropriated. Post-structural theorists' emphases on the deferral of closure and the syntactic play of signifiers is descriptive of postmodernism as an architectural style. Just as the modernists' egalitarian ideals did not penetrate to the level of their practices, postmodern architects' essentially unchanged practices have meant that stylistic change has stayed at the surface of their buildings: beneath their new postmodern claddings office buildings are frequently still the same modernist boxes. But postmodern architects' preoccupation with surface is also descriptive of their

appropriation of critical discourse itself. For the most part even their explorations of deconstruction have occurred at a superficial level, possibly due to a presumption of the term's meaning given its implied connection to architecture.[19] The impovrishment of architectural criticism is something Bernard Tschumi makes reference to when he notes that the potential of recent critical discourse has been divested of its impact by being used to "inject" meaning artificially into buildings rather than to question the mediated nature of architectural practice itself (Tschumi 1983, 7). In some cases the discourse of architectural representation has changed, but once again at a level that does not impinge on architectural praxis. The Neo-Rationalist architect Rob Krier, for example, has replaced the specialized representational modes of section and axonometric with "the most popular form: the perspective, replete with drama, narrative" (Tschumi 1983, 11). But Krier can foreground people engaged in dramas of urban life in his drawings, yet still design buildings which reproduce the political relations of 18th century spaces.[20] Peter Eisenman, who conversely has questioned the political relations of traditional urban forms, can also change the discourse of architectural representation but in a fashion so abstruse that it reconstructs the kind of hierarchy he attempts to dispel. For these reasons postmodern architects' stylistic concern with surface also characterises their architectural practices and the way their conception of

change has not extended to their *praxis*. In this sense the theories which have legitimated the architecture profession from modernism to postmodernism have changed, but not the practices which have produced those theories. And although the social role assumed by postmodern architects has been different from that established by modern architects, in both cases the profession has legitimized itself through procedures of exclusivity. Architectural styles and philosophies changed in the latter part of this century, but not the functioning of the profession at the procedural level. Postmodern architects have defined their profession counterfactually on the basis of their critique of modernism, but have retained the modern movement's underlying assumptions of legitimacy.

It remains to make some suggestions for what a *praxis* of architectural change would entail. Beyond postmodern architects' constructions of self in their professional practices, I will argue that greater recognition is required of the way their practices also construct communities.

The *Praxis* of Change

I would like to initiate this discussion of planning and architectural change by recontextualising current practices. As a brief historical excursus I will look at three examples of design practices which have produced very different kinds

of created spaces. All three examples illustrate "nonrational" design methods; this choice of example is not based on nostalgia but on the desire to denaturalise current practices, which only became established in their present form during the last three centuries (Perez-Gomez 1983). Following the theories of spatial practice outlined in Chapter Three of this thesis, what I would like to emphasize through these examples is how the planning and architecture professions are constituted of practices, and how these practices produce built forms at the same time they produce relations between subjects and both material and social worlds.

The first example comes from the Batammaliba people of Togo and Ghana. Suzanne Blier in her recent book on the architecture of the Batammaliba describes the ritual practices which are integral to both the Batammaliba's architect-builder's profession and the sculptured two-storey mud houses they create. The ceremonies and practices which produce Batammaliba houses are constitutive of the houses themselves: The rites carried out during construction encapsulate the houses' roles as cosmological model, paradise, temple, fortress, theatre and social diagram (Blier 1987, 24). These rites include the making of offerings (embedded in the foundations of specific rooms to ensure the fertility of the household), and markings which are made on the houses' exteriors to denote the cosmological relation of the houses to the Batammaliba universe. The practices which

produce the houses become reified in the designs themselves, which in turn become enacted in the daily patterns of inhabitation carried out in the completed houses. The houses also become incorporated into the rites and ceremonies observed throughout the Batammaliba year, being circumambulated in processions which recreate in footsteps a social "body" connecting all of the village's houses together. The houses are likewise anthropomorphically made to bear the marks of marriages, births and deaths through the addition of "soul mounds" and decorative horns and drapings. For this reason Batammaliba architecture provides a particularly striking example of the way practices become reified in built form: the procedures which produce Batammaliba houses cannot be separated from their designs and ongoing transformations.

A second example of the way practices become part of designed form can be drawn from the history of Western architecture and town building. In his The Idea of a Town, Joseph Rykwert describes the rites and auguries which went into the founding of Rome and other ancient cities. These rites and practices included divination to determine the site of the new town, the ploughing of the city's boundaries to establish its limitations, the burial of relics to create a mundus, the lighting of the civic hearth, and surveying procedures to establish the town's orientation. Plutarch describes the city founding ritual as follows:

> That is to say, a circular pit was dug on what is now the comitium and in it were placed firstlings of all the things whose use was allowed by the law or required by nature. And finally everyone threw in a handful of dirt which he had brought from the country whence he had come, and stirred everything around. Such a pit is called by the Romans 'mundus', a name that also applied to the whole cosmic system. Thereupon it was encircled, like the center of a compass, to mark the circumference of the city. The founder affixed an iron ploughshare to a plough, hitches up an ox and a cow, and personally draws a deep furrow around this boundary line. He is followed by some others whose task it is to sweep all the clods of earth into the inside, taking care that none remain outside. With this line the circumference of the wall is determined, which is then, after the expulsion of two letters from the word, given the name pomerium, meaning the area behind or beyond the wall. At those places where a gate is to be, the ploughshare is removed and the plough lifted over in order to leave a gap. For this reason, the whole wall is considered sacred with the exception of the gates...(Plutarch quoted in Kern 1983, 14).

The rites and practices that created new towns were not just carried out at the moment of the cities' foundations, but were reenacted at regular commemorative festivals and were "permanently enshrined in monuments whose physical presence anchored the ritual to the soil and to the physical shape of the roads and buildings" (Rykwert 1988, 27). It was therefore not just the practices which determined the sites and layouts of early cities which were different from modern planning practices, but concomitantly, the resulting built forms as well.

The naturalisation of current architectural and town planning practices can also be historicized by looking at how architecture was practised by the European cathedral builders

beginning in the 12th century. This third example is admittedly weighted because like in the previous two examples, the medieval cathedral had a different investiture of meaning than that which is ascribed to architectural developments today. I will go into more detail describing the practices of medieval cathedral design because of the very different conceptions of theory, practice, and their interrelation as praxis which were current in the Middle Ages at the time of the cathedrals' constructions. My emphasis in describing these design practices will be on their "anagogical" aspects, since this is how builders of the period would have themselves understood their work. The political and economic dimensions of the cathedrals will therefore be bracketed: The contemporary recognition, for example, that the cathedrals physically displayed the Church's power will be considered secondary to the builders' own belief that they were creating heavenly order on earth.[21]

Architectural theory in the Middle Ages was in one sense an ars fabricandi, passed on from master masons to their apprentices, and concerned with the "how" of stereotomy and masonry construction. But within the cosmological worldview, building theory was also connected to the perceived geometrical order of the universe as intimated in the Bible and expanded upon by St. Augustine in terms of musical proportion and harmony. The principal design concern of the medieval master builders was the "true measure" by which the

elevation of buildings - and especially sacred buildings - could be determined from the geometry of their ground plans. The knowledge of how to design and build according to geometric principles was the professional secret of the medieval masonry lodges (Frankl 1945). The importance attributed to these principles was not shared by builders everywhere in Europe, but where architectural theory was not regarded cosmologically, the actual practice of building was attributed special status. This was the case in the building of the cathedral at Milan in the 14th century. Minutes kept of the meetings between builders and patrons indicate that the Milanese patrons found the master builders imported from France and Germany for their technical expertise impossible to work with because they did not share the same attitude about the relationship of geometry to science and art. For the northern master builders, architecture without geometry was not art, and buildings not based on a geometrical figure were technically unsound (Ackerman 1949). Theory, beyond being an ars fabricandi, was what the northern architect-builders believed established church architecture as a reconciliatory force between the human and divine worlds.[22] The Milanese builders were less concerned with theory than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe because for them "good practice" was what ultimately determined the integrity of a building. As renowned masons they understood good practice as technical skill (they believed that if their cathedral's walls

were built perfectly straight they would not fall), but also as having a devotional attitude while building. This latter aspect of architectural practice was a peculiarly medieval trait which Otto von Simson, citing work done in this area by Dom Jean Leclercq, suggests was related to the etymological connection between "edification" and "edifice," and the associated belief that building the soul as a temple could be realized in the act of devotionally constructing sacred architecture (von Simson 1974, 127-8). That a building was not just the finished product but all the processes that went into producing it, is the predominant message of the booklet Abbot Suger wrote to commemorate the consecration of his church at St.-Denis. In accordance with the understanding of his age, Suger was aware of the connection between the building of subjects and the building of edifices, and further recognized the implications for building community in this process.

Architectural practice in the Middle Ages also differed from current conventions because of the different role of the architect in the building process. While the word "architector" was briefly revived in the mid-13th century through the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the term "master builder" more adequately conveys the function of the architect in the early Middle Ages. Unlike in current architectural practice, the medieval master builder actively worked on the site. Records of the building of Canterbury

Cathedral, for example, show how in 1178 William of Sens had to resign as the cathedral's chief mason because a fall from the scaffolding kept him too long away from the site. As far as the design process went, records suggest that the patron and master builder worked together in developing the architectural form of their buildings. In some cases working drawings do remain extant: They served as contracts and also indicate that builders sometimes supervised several projects simultaneously, leaving daily direction in the charge of journeymen. But as Franklin Toker notes, these drawings are relatively primitive. There was as yet no separation between architect and builder, since this only occurred in the mid-16th century when working drawings became more technical (Toker 1985, 88). The simplicity of the drawings compared to the executed works also points to the fact that medieval building plans were allowed to evolve; designs could be formalised in the process of building itself. The design of the church at St.-Denis, considered to be the first formulation of Gothic architecture, was guided by Abbot Suger's singular desire to embody the Neoplatonic theology of light in built form.[23] But given Suger's influence in shaping the style of his church, what is notable about the medieval cathedrals is the layering of workmanship and the multitude of hands and "voices" which became inscribed within them. It was the practice of Gothic architecture, with the relationships this entailed between architect-builders, townspeople,

patrons, artisans, and even cosmology, which became materialized in built form. In later years, the designs of the medieval cathedrals could be copied, but it was only the practices of the age which could originally give them form.

These historical and cross-cultural examples highlight not only how town planning and architectural practices become materialized in built forms, but also the inherently social natures of architecture and city building. In the act of producing created environments, architects, planners and entire communities become engaged in constructing spaces at the same time they construct personal identities and social and cosmological relations. Today, planners and architects may narrowly view the operation of their professions in the circumscribed tasks of their daily activities without realizing how these activities are part of a much larger instantiation of social practices and relations. As the practice theories of space outlined in Chapter Three would indicate, however, planners' and architects' professional practices are intricately tied up with large scale processes of social reproduction. In particular, Bourdieu's notion of praxeological knowledge and Giddens' structuration theory of space are useful in identifying how architects' and planners' practices cohere to set up more far-reaching relationships in the production and reproduction of social space. What a praxeological understanding of social space would entail, therefore, and what the examples from Togo, ancient Rome, and

medieval Europe are particularly illustrative of, is the way both individuals and social groups are constituted in the collective process of producing the created environment.

The three "factors" of this process - subjects, society, and space - correspond to what Habermas identifies as the three ontological spheres of the personal world of interiority, the social world of intersubjective relations, and the material world of nature or physical existence (Habermas 1979). Architecture and town planning can be seen to deal with all three spheres in the daily instantiation of their practices. A theory of change necessarily takes these three ontological realms into account. On the basis of the theories of praxis outlined in Chapter One, what I would like to suggest is that the various traditions of praxis also address these ontological spheres, showing how they are interconnected in the everyday practices which produce space.

The intersection of individuals with the material world is addressed in Marx's theory of praxis which holds that subjects' activities become constitutive of both themselves and their material products. The intersection of subjects with the social world is in turn addressed by the theory of praxis developed by Marx, Bourdieu and others, which recognizes the dialectical interplay between the formations of subjects and societies. These theories of praxis all concern ontology, bringing together the realms of the individual, the social and the material in a matrix held

together by human activity. But the production of the created environment also concerns the Aristotelian definition of praxis as public life. In the act of creating spaces, people become engaged in the production of their communities. The public life aspect of producing space extends Hannah Arendt's concept of the vita activa by showing how it is not just speech, but also space that gives materiality to action and thereby to the fully human, active life. When people have the opportunity of consciously shaping their created environment, then the "practical-critical" tradition of praxis stemming from Aristotle, Kant and Marx also becomes a factor in the social production of space. And when people are able to realize themselves in their activities and the created spaces which result from those activities, then Marx's understanding of praxis as non-alienated, "free [and] conscious activity" (Marx 1964, 127) also becomes realized in the act of producing space.

For the urban design professions to contribute to the realization of this praxis-based understanding of the created environment, it will mean overturning the standard notion of professional "practice" as the conduct of professionals in their business relations (or the "practical," "pragmatic" side of a profession according to the vernacular definitions of these terms),[24] by coming to perceive architectural and planning practices as praxeis. As suggested in the analyses of the architecture and planning professions in the first two

this chapter, this will involve greater recognition by architects and planners of the way their own practices become inscribed in discourses and built forms. In their daily interactions with some groups and individuals and not others, and in their carrying out of technical tasks or administrative agendas, architects and planners create webs of trajectories which materialize their professions at the same time they materialize their immediate environments, essential aspects of the environments they design for others, and social and material relations. As the examples from Togo, ancient Rome and medieval Europe also illustrate, design methods inflect the kinds of designs produced: The position of the designer in relation to clients, builders, and the material world become expressed as practices which result in certain kinds of designs being produced and not others. The relationship of discourses to these practices was examined in the discussions of contemporary planning and architectural practices. At the procedural level, it was suggested that there are concordances between the discourses of the architecture and planning professions and their designs. An architectural and planning praxis would recognize these concordances and professionals attempting to change the created environment would be aware of how this change has to extend to their discursive practices as well. Such a change would in turn realize the definition of praxis as the unity of theory and practice.

A praxis of planning and architecture would also require greater recognition by planners and architects of the way identities are forged in producing the created environment. This would include their own personal and professional identities, and as well as those of all people whose actions become constitutive of space. Such a praxis would require greater understanding, too, of the way meaning proceeds from practices and not just from the final forms of buildings and urban environments. As professionals specifically concerned with the created environment, it would mean that architects and planners consciously enact practices which extend the meaning-giving realm of practices to others. In the case of postmodern architects, this would involve extending their self-constitutive praxis as artist-theorists by recognizing the penetration of community in their own identities (Sandel 1982, 149-50). Likewise in the case of urban planners, the praxis-based conceptions of space, change and professional practice would radicalize the current understanding of "citizen participation." Rather than making participation a legitimation procedure for public interest policy-making, actions of citizens would become identified with the production of urban space. This would overturn current "participation in participation" (Reissman and Gartner 1970, 54) procedures with a planning process based on the "ontological right" of people to realize their individual praxeis in the co-production of space. This in turn would

lead to the renewal of a public sphere empowered by citizens themselves (Habermas 1974),[25] rather than the maintainance of a "public interest sphere" aimed at "participative management" (Frederickson 1973, 266).

The adoption of an inclusive understanding of _praxis_ by architects and planners would change not only their relations with the people they design for, but their relation with each other. Currently the relationship between architects and planners is based on a series of antinomies. Whereas architects legitimate themselves by upholding the intuitive, individualist side of human self-expression, planners justify their practices on the grounds of defending the public sphere. The polarisation of the two professions becomes extreme when architects become elitist artist-theorists and planners base their collective decision-making processes on economics and "rationalizing" the built environment. The different rationalities on which the two urban design professions base their identities need not conflict if both professions are committed to realizing the _praxeis_ of self and society in the act of producing created environments. Following John Forester's suggestions for a programme for planning practitioners, planners could still assume a maieutic role in urban affairs, clarifying issues, making sure that over-simplified answers are not proposed for complex problems, and ensuring that as many voices as possible become "materialized" in their environment; architects, too, could continue to

explore the artistic "construction of self" in built form, both of themselves and others. The intuitive/rational division between architects and planners would however be sublated when both professions came to perceive the praxeological connection between individuals, the social sphere, and space.

In proposing a *praxis* theory of change for architects and planners, the position which I have been taking issue with is that stylistic change by urban designers constitutes a fundamental change in the created environment. Too often a change in architectural or town planning fashion is considered a change in the functioning of the profession itself. A change in the content of a profession's discourse is likewise frequently considered to be a formative change in a profession's practice. A *praxis* theory of change would recognize the importance of stylistic and content changes in the functioning of the urban design professions, since as micropractices they are imbricated with much larger patterns of change. But it would also identify how change has to proceed from practices. The theory of change that this thesis has been building towards is one which connects the individual with the social, and micropractices with macro-processes. It posits overlapping at the level of practices in the formations of subjects, discourses and spaces. The theory of *praxis* which encapsulates this process considers activities to be partially constitutive of subjects and their products,

including their products of spaces and discourses. Subjects, spaces and discourses become understood as an interconnected matrix where change is initiated by subjects, but only becomes social change at the point where it is instantiated in practices - discursive and/or spatial. This understanding of change provides an explanation for why much postmodern architectural design as well as many urban plans' nominal provisions for citizen participation, have remained at the level of surface: The institutional changes which such designs and participation provisions portend have not proceeded from changes in the professions' spatial and discursive practices. Praxis understandings of change, subjects, and the created environment could conversely lead to design and planning procedures that engage people's identities in the act of producing spaces.

NOTES

1.R. J. King in a 1988 article in Society and Space also brings together the key elements of this thesis by looking at "practices, space and meaning in the context of social change" (King 1988, 450). The aim of King's article is to identify urban design procedures which are counteractive to dominant interests. As opposed to the tradition of discourse discussed in this thesis, however, King appears to draw on Habermas' understanding of discourse as communicative action to examine validity claims and norms (Habermas 1979, 209). I was unfamiliar with King's article at the time of beginning this thesis.

2.The concept of "selective tradition" was formulated by Raymond Williams. Williams uses this phrase to account for the way traditions are not absolute, but are composed and recomposed according to the changing interests and values of a culture. Selective traditions always correspond to contemporary values and are used to legitimate them. The creation of a selective tradition is an ongoing process which begins in the period itself, since the known and remembered aspects of a culture are always a reduction from everything that is produced in that culture (Williams 1961, 50-52).

3.Panofsky's study of the relationship of Scholasticism to the design of medieval cathedrals (referred to in Chapter 3) provides one example of the way styles can be connected to larger discursive patterns concurrent with them. Foucault's dual concerns with discourses and the politics of space also led him to note cases where dominant discourses became materialized spatially. His identification of order and classification as the basis for the classical episteme, for example, became expressed in both 18th century discourses on biology, grammar and economics, and in space. He suggests that the classificatory "table" was the underlying model for the 17th and 18th century segregation of the sane from the mad, the healthy from the sick, and the virtuous from the wicked. Architecturally, this episteme became expressed in the insane asylum, the hospital and the panopticon prison. Foucault also suggests that the establishment of botanical gardens and menageries in the classical age represented not a new curiosity, but a new space in which to see animals and exotic plants. As opposed to the medieval and Renaissance display of animals in bestiaries or as spectacles, he contends that in the classical period they became physically arranged in tables (Foucault 1973, 131). The parallel development in housing has been researched by Philippe Ariès. In his social history of the family, Ariès notes how prior to

the 18th century all household activities took place in central salles through the use of collapsable tables and beds. After the 18th century the typical middle class house became compartmentalised through the introduction of use-specific chambres (Ariès 1962, 390-98).

4.The main precedents which Friedmann adopts for his planning approach are Eastern philosophy and "substantive rationality" as defined by Karl Mannheim. Mannheim's understanding of substantive rationality was based on Max Weber's conception of it as rationality which takes values and morals into account (Weber 1978, 85). In Reade's view, however, Mannheim used the concept to veil his prescriptions for the kind of society he wished to see in a language of social scientific objectivity (Reade 1985, 87-93). Friedmann's intent in using the notion of substantive rationality has been to redirect procedural planning theory away from the search for efficient means to achieve unquestioned ends, towards a reappraisal of the ends themselves.

5.Habermas distinguishes "lifeworld" and "systems" realms of experience to account for the way communication rights and procedures have been institutionalized with the shift from traditional to modern culture, along with institutions based on purposive-rationality. He makes each sphere explanatory of a concurrent dynamic operating in modern society and then contends that for modernity to fulfill its progressive impetus, the lifeworld sphere of social action will have to become the encompassing framework for purposive-rational subsystems. The reason Habermas identifies lifeworld and systems spheres of social activities is to reconcile Weber's, Lukàcs' and the Frankfurt School's negative assessments of the Enlightenment with Marx's positive assessment of modernity. Although Habermas in his more recent work has been less critical of the systems sphere than in his earlier publications (evident in his more reconciled assessments of Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann in The Theory of Communicative Action), he remains wary of systemic processes assuming dominance within institutions because this results in what he calls the "colonization of the lifeworld," or the driving out of mechanisms for social integration from domains in which they cannot be replaced. Nevertheless, he views the lifeworld and its related systemic processes as being interdependent. Communicative action as it is carried out in the lifeworld is "too fragile a mechanism of action coordination" to carry the whole load of social integration without some "systemic anchoring", while systemic, instrumental action needs to be legitimated through communicative action and anchored institutionally in the lifeworld (Wellmer 1985, 55).

6.The term Forester uses for "discursive procedure" is "communicative action." This term has a specialised meaning in Habermas' social theory, but although Forester applies Habermas' theory to planning practices, he doesn't use "communicative action" in its strict Habermasian sense. For Habermas, the term denotes interlocutors' use of dialogue to reach mutual understanding and consensus. Communicative action is contrasted by Habermas to "strategic action," which is where interlocutors manipulate impressions to gain personal benefits. Forester uses "communicative action" in a much more general sense to denote all the different kinds of speech acts planners engage in (Forester 1982, 63). These speech acts may be strategic, but ultimately are geared to achieving communicative action in Habermas' sense of the term, through enabling all sectors of society to participate in authentic political discourse.

7.The notion of "the public" as used in administrative discourse generally presumes a unitary body. In city plans the implied homogeneity of the public is contradicted by the discourse's identification of different residential densities, which frequently is its only acknowledgment that there might be multiple "publics."

8.The plans are the City of Toronto Planning Board's Plan for Downtown Toronto (1963), which is cited in the text as Toronto 1963; its Preliminary Neighbourhhod Plan: King-Parliament (1977), cited as Toronto 1977; the City of Halifax's Municipal Development Plan for the City of Halifax (1984), cited as Halifax 1984; and the Communauté Urbaine de Montréal's Résumé de la version définitive du schéma d'aménagement/Summary of the Final Version of the Development Plan (1985), cited as Montréal 1985.

9.Emphases in quotations from planning documents will be my own.

10.Foucault suggests that the origin of the term "population" in administrative discourse coincided with the objectification of community members and their subjection to analysis, intervention and surveillance (Foucault 1980b, 171). Its use in this planning document to address community members being invited to express their opinions on the plan, appears to be a carryover from the planners' quantitative planning methods, and therefore aptly illustrates Foucault's contention about the term's origin.

11.As an example of planning discourse produced according to more authentic participatory procedures, consider this goals section from the Borough of York's plan (particularly items 5 and 7):

1. to secure the health, safety, convenience and welfare of the Borough of York's citizens;
2. to provide a guide for the public and private actions affecting the future development of the municipality;
3. to provide the citizens and businessmen of the borough with a sense of security and confidence in the future of their community;

. . . . . .

5. to limit the number of public garages, automobile service stations and/or gasoline bars where gasoline may be stored or kept for sale to 95;
6. to provide adequate educational facilities to meet the needs of citizens;
7. to permit no more pool rooms or billiard halls;
8. to attain maximum citizen participation in the planning and decision-making process (Borough of York, in Lang and Page 1973, 52-3).

This plan was drawn up after an extensive participation programme, and is notable for the way multiple voices have been retained within it.

12. In the United States architects only began charging fees on a regular basis from the mid-19th century. Prior to this architects were "gentlemen" with independent sources of income who could be commissioned on a private basis (Saint 1983, 6, 76). The way the gentleman origins of the American profession could be used to justify designs is evident in turn of the century architectural journals. For example a critic in one 1894 article praises an architect for having "a sense of beauty fostered by leisure to enjoy beauty" (Architectural Record 1894, 191). The gentleman origins of architecture could also be more explicit, as in the following 1904 example: "It is an architecture for gentlemen, it breathes good breeding and marks good blood....[The architects] treated their art with respect...[and] never forgot that an architect must be first of all a gentleman" (Architectural Record 1904, 410, 421).

13. A 1932 statement by Hugh Häring, one of the founders of the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture, provides an example of the way architects differentiated their design work from that of engineers: "The work of the engineer has as its goal merely the performance of the material work within the limits or in the domain of economic effects....The architect, on the other hand, creates a Gestalt, a total form, a work of spiritual vitality and fulfillment, an object that belongs to and serves an idea, a higher culture" (Häring in Conrads 1964, 126).

14.According to Edward de Zurko, the discourse on aesthetic functionalism has existed since antiquity and was taken up by physicists, politicians and economists before being hailed by architects (Zurko 1957, 3-15). The associated use of the discourse on technology to justify modernist design likewise was not original to the 20th century. Whether proposing classical, Gothic, or modern architecture, French and English critics since the 18th century have argued that these designs were the outcomes of a rational intellectual discipline applied to technological problems (Watkin 1977, 8, 33).

15.Critics have uniformly divided postmodern architecture into two camps: Hal Foster, who applies his categories to disciplines other than architecture, distinguishes between the postmodernisms of reaction and resistance (Foster 1983); Diane Ghirardo's corresponding classifications are stylistic versus theoretical postmodernism (Ghirardo 1984-5); and Howard Harris and Alan Lipman refer to the same basic distinction in their differentiation between the populist and the patrician in postmodern architecture (Howard and Lipman 1986). To use Ghirardo's terms, Peter Eisenman and other deconstructivists would be considered representative of the theoretical branch, while Robert Venturi and others pursuing his "learning from Las Vegas" aesthetic would be considered examples of the stylistic school. Leon and Robert Krier, Aldo Rossi, and other"Neo-Rationalists" would also be part of this latter group, insofar as they have replaced the functional aesthetic of modernism with one drawn from traditional 18th century urban forms.

16.Walter Benjamin (1969) differentiated art which has been mechanically reproduced from original art works which retain the "aura" of their unique existence in space and time. The current aura of architectural drawings derives not only from their being the originals from which magazine reproductions are made, but from the new cult-status of their architect-artist makers.

17.The relationship between "ordinary" architects and internationally hailed, trend-setting architects has been explored by Neils Prak (1984) in terms of Bourdieu's theory of <u>la distinction</u>.

18.Although in Diane Ghirardo's division of postmodern architecture as either stylistic or theoretical (1984-5) Eisenmann and other deconstructivists would be considered theoretical, their work has also assumed stylistic uniformity. That this fact is now recognized is suggested by a Museum of Modern Art exhibit that specifically looks at the movement as a style which can be situated in relation to the Russian constructivists.

19.Derrida has stated that despite the presumed connection between deconstruction and architecture, deconstruction is not itself an architectural metaphor (Benjamin 1988, 10).

20.The following is an example of Krier's narrative style of perspective:



(Krier 1982, 6).

The Neo-Rationalists have made the traditional city the source for their architectural typology (Vidler 1978). This has led to a historicist vocabulary based on the archetypes of the street, avenue, square, arcade and colonnade, which is "classic" both architecturally and frequently in a politically totalitarian sort of way. The ambiguity of Rob Krier's contribution to a changed architectural practice is reinforced by his brother Leon Krier's equivocal political position: On the one hand Leon Krier states that the Neo-Rationalists' primary concern is to recreate the public realm (Krier 1978), but on the other hand he defends the architecture of Albert Speer (Jencks 1988, 27).

21.The interrelationship of spiritual and political-economic factors in the construction of the cathedrals was likely recognized during the period itself. Otto von Simson, whose study of the Gothic cathedrals emphasizes the theological determinants of their design, also notes the political and economic contexts of the cathedrals' constructions. For example, Abbot Suger's religious campaign to build a new church at St.-Denis, was not inseparable from his political desire of consolidating the power of the Capetian monarchy in the Ile de France. Similarly, the citizens and builders who rebuilt the cathedral at Chartres after the fire of 1194, were motivated principally to create a palace for the relics of the

Virgin Mary which had survived the fire, but were also aware of the economic importance of the cathedral in attracting pilgrims and fairs to their town (von Simson 1974).

22.This reconciliatory function is evident in Abbot Suger's prayer at the consecration of the church at St.-Denis, where he presents church architecture in the light of the Christian doctrine of the spiritualisation of matter: "...Thou uniformly conjoinest the material with the immaterial, the corporeal with the spiritual, the human with the Divine....Thou visibly restorest and miraculously transformed the present (state) into the Heavenly Kingdom..." (Suger 1946, 121).

23.The way the medieval metaphysics of light became translated into Gothic architecture provides a good example of the way discourses influence design. In Europe during the 12th and 13th centuries, light was a measure of beauty. In theology, philosophy and courtly epics, the adjectives most used to denote beauty were "lucid," "luminous," and "clear." The theological significance of light was compounded in France, due to the country's patron saint, Denis, being conflated with the Eastern mystic Denis, who as the Pseudo-Areopagite had blended the Neoplatonic philosophy of light with that found in the Gospel of St. John (von Simson 1974, 52-55). Together these popular, religious and patriotic currents of thought formed a discourse on light in 12th century France which Abbot Suger incapsulated in his specifications for the rebuilding of the abbey of St.-Denis as a light-filled structure with the amount of wall space devoted to windows its chief architectural innovation.

24.That this is still the accepted meaning of professional "practice" is confirmed by a recent book by Robert Gutman, titled Architectural Practice: A Critical View (1988). The critical nature of the book does not extend to the notion of practice itself, since it remains entirely concerned with matching architectural training with the demands of the building industry. Its overall aim is to make recommendations to secure both the profitability of individual firms and the profession's hold on the design market.

25.In his history of the rise of the "bourgeois public sphere," Habermas shows how its political importance derived from its independence from government. The state and the public sphere didn't overlap; the public sphere invested itself with legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

"Tu loges dans ton acte même,
ton acte, c'est toi."
(Antoine de Saint-Exupéry 1942,
168)

My aim in this thesis has been to explore the ontology of the created environment, and on this basis to propose a theory for what constitutes change in the production of urban space. As my theoretical framework I have overlaid the philosophical and political traditions of _praxis_ with more recent theories of discursive practice and space as practices. This framework has served to situate the theories of spatial and discursive practices in terms of the history of _praxis_, and at the same time to provide a "fused," multi-layered understanding of the constitution of the created environment.

The particular understanding of space which this framework affords is "praxeological" in several senses. It draws on ontological definitions of _praxis_ when it suggests that the created environment be viewed as materialized human actions which constitute space at the same time they contribute to constituting individuals and social relations. Through this understanding of _praxis_, created spaces become understood as "congealed" human activity which continue to be "enacted" in the actions and interactions which take place in them. As in the above epigrammatic statement by Saint-Exupéry, the

material world by this way of thinking becomes conjoined with human actions and identities. This praxis-based understanding of space assumes a political dimension when the Aristotelian tradition of praxis is brought to bear on it: The production of space then becomes an activity central to the realization of individuals' public lives. It is this overlay of political and ontological theories of praxis and space which make it especially pertinent to analysing architectural and planning practices. As I have tried to suggest in the final chapter of this thesis, planners' and architects' professional practices can become professional praxeis if they begin to recognize how their own and others' spatial and discursive practices become constitutive of space, and at the same time they work towards empowering others to produce spaces.

My own "subtext" in bringing together this framework has been to gain a perspective from which to view contemporary approaches to urban design. These approaches include architectural practices based on "syntactics," such as those of deconstructivists who attempt to recreate architectural meaning - or intentional non-meaning[1] - out of the syntactic play of architectural "phonemes;" as well as "semantic" architectural approaches, which following Husserl's identification of the transcendental, semantic dimension of meaning, seek to recreate architecture as a reconciliatory force between the finite human world and cosmology. As my examples of "non-rational" design practices in Chapter Four

suggest, this is a position I am sympathetic with. Yet I remain cautious about it since it means reproducing professional design prerogatives which limit others from expressing themselves in a "spatial sphere." Since urban planning does hold out the possibility for people to contribute to shaping the collective environment, my emphasis in suggesting that planning and architectural "rationalities" are complementary, was geared to showing how the intents of both "individualist architects" and "collectivist planners" could converge at the level of praxis. My reason for taking an especially close look at planners' discourse, however, was to show how planning procedures will have to change if planners are in fact to help bring about an extended public sphere. Thus beyond syntactic, semantic, and "public interest" approaches to creating meaning in the environment, what I have tried to show is how they might all be sublated in a praxeological, pragmatic mode of understanding and enacting space.

I would like to suggest that the key insights of this thesis derive from its integrative nature. The theoretical reviews set out in Part One could potentially provide an incisive framework for many other studies of the role of practices in producing spaces. While I have chosen to look at professional design practices as they impinge on creating environments, this type of analysis could also be carried out from individuals' or social groups' points of view. The

theories of praxis in these cases would once again provide a radical ground for individuals' claims for greater expression in realizing themselves and community in the active production of social space.

NOTES

1.In describing his post-structuralist architectural intentions in designing Parc de la Villette in Paris, Bernard Tschumi states how he attempted to create "an architecture that means nothing, an architecture of the signifier rather than the signified - one that is pure trace or play of language" (Tschumi 1988, 39).

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