

SHORT TITLE:

COHESION AND FACTIONALISM IN FEDERAL
POLITICAL PARTIES

ABSTRACT

The major Canadian federal parties are not usually considered highly ideological. Nonetheless, the degree of ideological consensus among members within each party has important consequences for party unity. The object of this paper is to determine whether important intra-party ideological cleavages exist among M.P.'s and whether these cleavages are related to ethnic and regional divisions.

The first chapter reviews relevant studies of recent Canadian federal legislatures. The following chapters analyse the results of a mailed questionnaire sent by the author to the M.P.'s of the 28th Parliament. The data show a relatively high degree of ideological cohesion among members of the minor parties, but revealed important cleavages along ethnic and regional lines within the major parties. In the conclusion, an attempt is made to determine the consequences of these divisions for party unity and for the party system.

ADDENDUM

The chi-square test of statistical significance was used throughout this paper in the interpretation of data. However, it was pointed out that several tables to which the chi-square test was applied did not fulfill the assumptions of the test. The chi-square may yield false results if the sample size is under fifty, or if there are several cells in the matrix that have less than five in a cell. Thus the chi-square test was inappropriate to a number of tables in this study; more specifically, those tables dealing with regional and ethnic comparisons among the Conservative Members of Parliament. Consequently, another test of statistical significance was applied to all those tables to which the chi-square test was not applicable. The new test used was the 'lambda',¹ which is not subject to the limitations of the chi-square. The 'lambda' test has the further advantage of measuring strength of relationship as well as statistical significance.

The 'lambda' test confirmed the chi-square findings except for three tables: Tables 5.15 and 5.17, which dealt with inter-party differences on religious issues, and Table 6.1, dealing with inter-party differences on the issue of 'French-Canadian rights'. The inter-

¹For a description of the 'lambda' test, see: Palumbo, Dennis, Statistics in Political and Behavioural Science, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York 1969; pp. 160-163.

party differences in the two tables dealing with religious issues were found, upon application of the 'lambda' test, to be of very low statistical significance (Table 5.15 yielded the result $\lambda = .098$, and Table 5.17, $\lambda = .195$). The explanations and conclusions regarding these tables should thus be treated with caution, if not disregarded.

The application of the 'lambda' test to Table 6.1 showed a significant, although not very strong, relationship between party membership and attitudes towards French rights ($\lambda = 0.212$). This inter-party difference is explainable by the divergence of opinion between the English-speaking Conservatives and all other parties and groups, hence the explanation and conclusions concerning this question may be allowed to stand.

The use of a second statistical test, then, confirmed our original findings, with the exceptions noted above. These exceptions did not bring any substantial alteration in our general conclusion.

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by

Normand E. Duern

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Dept. of Political Science
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction -----	1
CHAPTER ONE: PREVIOUS STUDIES -----	16
A. Kornberg Study -----	16
B. Hoffman and Ward Study -----	24
C. Schwartz Study -----	31
CHAPTER TWO: INTRODUCTION TO THE DATA -----	33
A. The Twenty-Eighth Parliament -----	33
B. The Data -----	34
CHAPTER THREE: GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SYSTEM -----	42
A. Future Expectations -----	42
B. Evaluation of Present Situation -----	44
C. Canada's Greatest Problem -----	47
D. Group Influence -----	52
E. Summary -----	53
CHAPTER FOUR: ATTITUDES TOWARDS SYMBOLS AND INSTITUTIONS -----	57
A. The Monarchy -----	57
B. The Parliamentary System -----	62
C. Summary-----	67
CHAPTER FIVE: CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM-----	69
A. Causes of Poverty -----	69
B. Welfare Measures -----	72
C. Regulation of Private Enterprise -----	73

	<u>Page</u>
D. Authoritarianism -----	79
E. Attitudes Towards Organized Labour -----	81
F. Role of Religion-----	82
G. Summary and Conclusion-----	86
A. Economic Issues -----	86
B. Non-Economic Issues -----	89
CHAPTER SIX: FRENCH RIGHTS AND SEPARATISM -----	92
Summary -----	95
GENERAL CONCLUSION -----	97
A. Patterns of Cleavages-----	97
a). Perceptions of the System -----	98
b). Traditional Symbols and Institutions -----	101
c). Liberalism-Conservatism-----	103
1. Economic Questions -----	103
2. Non-Economic Questions -----	107
d). French Rights and Separatism -----	108
e). Conclusions on Patterns of Factionalism -	109
B. Conclusions on the Party System -----	114
APPENDIX-----	118
BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	128

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Page</u>
2.1 Occupations and Level of Education of M.P.'s of the Twenty-Eighth Parliament-----	33
2.2 Distribution of Sample by Party-----	37
2.3 Distribution of Sample by Language Group-----	38
2.4 Distribution of Sample by Region -----	38
2.5 Distribution of Sample in Major Parties by Ethnic Groups -----	39
2.6 Distribution of Sample: Conservative Party by Regions -----	40
3.1 "Do You Think Life in General Will Get Better or Worse For Canadians Over The Next Few Years" (%)--	42
3.2 Future Expectations: By Ethnic Groups in Major Parties (%)-----	43
3.3 "Do You Think That Canada's Development As A Nation Is As Sound As It Might Be, Or Is It Basically Unsound?" (%) -----	44
3.4 Sound Development: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	45
3.5 Sound Development: Liberal Party by Regions (%) ----	46
3.6 Sound Development: Conservative Party by Regions --- (%)	46
3.7 "Which <u>ONE</u> of The Factors Named Below Is The Greatest Single Problem Facing Canada Today"? -----	48
3.8 Greatest Problem: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	50
3.9 Greatest Problem: Conservative Party By Regions ----	51
3.10 "At Present, Which Of These Groups Seems to You to Have The Most Influence On Government?" (%) ---	52

	<u>Page</u>
4.1 "Do You Believe That the Monarchy Makes A Substantial Contribution to Canadian Unity?" (%)-----	58
4.2 Monarchy and Unity: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%)-----	58
4.3 Monarchy and Unity: Liberal Party By Regions (%) -----	59
4.4 "In Your Opinion, Could Canadians Come to Have As Much Regard For an Elected President As They Do For the Traditional Monarch?" (%)-----	60
4.5 Monarchy vs. Presidency: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	61
4.6 Monarchy vs. Presidency: Liberal Party By Regions (%) -----	62
4.7 "In General, Do You Think That A Parliamentary System Is Preferable To a Presidential System Of The American Type?" (%) -----	63
4.8 Parliamentary vs. Presidential System: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	64
4.9 "In General, Do You Think That a Parliamentary System Is More <u>Efficient</u> Than A Presidential System, Less Efficient, or Just The Same?" (%) -----	65
5.1 "In General, Considering the Opportunities Available In Canada, Which Do You Think Is Most Often to Blame If A Person is Poor: Lack of Personal Effort, Or Circumstances Beyond His Control?" (%) -----	69
5.2 Reasons for Poverty: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	70
5.3 Reasons for Poverty: Conservative Party By Regions (%) -----	71
5.4 "Some Say That The Government, In Future, Should Devote More Effort To See To It That All People Rich or Poor, Should Have Adequate Education, Medical Care, Protection Against Unemployment, and Income. Do You Agree?" (%) -----	72
5.5 Welfare Measures: Conservative Party By Regions ----	73

	<u>Page</u>
5.6 "Some People Say That Business Enterprise Can Continue To Give Us Our High Standard of Living Only If It Remains Free of Government Regulation. Do You Agree?" (%) -----	74
5.7 Comparison of "Welfare" and "Freedom From Government Regulation" Questions - Liberal and Conservative Parties (%) -----	75
5.8 Freedom From Government Regulation: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (5) -----	75
5.9 Comparison of Responses to "Regulation" and "Welfare" Questions: Liberal Party By Ethnic Groups (%) -----	76
5.10 Freedom From Government Regulation: Conservative Party By REgions (%) -----	77
5.11 Comparison of "Welfare" and "Government Regulation" Questions: Conservative Party By Regions (%) ----	78
5.12 "Do You Think That It Would Be A Good Thing For Canadian Society If More Authority Were Given To The Forces Of Law and Order, Or Do They Have Sufficient Means Now?" (%) -----	79
5.13 Police Authority: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	80
5.14 "Do You Think That Organized Labour Is Being Generally Well-Led Or Badly-Led By Its Leaders?"----	81
5.15 "Do You Believe That Society Would Be Improved If There Were More Religious Instruction In Schools?"--	82
5.16 Religious Instruction: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	83
5.17 "Do You Think That It Would Be a Good Thing If The Churches Took Public Stands On Important Political Issues?" (%) -----	84
5.18 Churches And Politics: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	85
6.1 "There Is Considerable Feeling That French Canadians Have Not Received Their Full Rights Under Confederation. Do You Agree?" (%) -----	92

	<u>Page</u>
6.2 French Rights: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	93
6.3 "If a Province Were To Decide, Through Its Legally Constituted Authorities, To Separate From The Rest of Canada, Should The Federal Government Prevent It From Doing So?" (%) -----	94
6.4 Preventing Secession: By Ethnic Groups In Major Parties (%) -----	95

INTRODUCTION

According to Robert Alford, the Canadian party system is rather unique among Anglo-American democracies, in that it constitutes what he calls "pure non-class politics".¹

Class voting is low in Canada because the political parties are identified as representatives of regional, religious, and ethnic groupings rather than as representatives of national class interests.²

This situation prevails, says Alford, because the disparate elements of Canadian society have not yet been sufficiently integrated into a Canadian 'nation'.³ They are still more inclined to think of themselves as members of a particular ethnic, regional, or religious group within Canada rather than as members of a Canada-wide social class. Consequently, our major federal parties have eschewed the 'left-right' ideological stands usually associated with class-based politics. While the interests of a particular social class can usually be expressed in a coherent and fairly comprehensive theory of society, it is obviously more difficult to develop a single ideology corresponding to all the varied and disparate elements on which the major Canadian federal parties are based.

¹Alford, R., Party and Society (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963), p. 250.

²Ibid., p. 257.

³Ibid., p. 254.

This is not to say that the two major parties are indistinguishable at any given moment in terms of 'conservatism-liberalism', but rather that the 'left-right' ideological position of the parties plays a relatively minor role in their voter appeal and policy decisions, and remains for the most part vague and inarticulate. The major parties compete with one another mainly in promising greater benefits to each of the various ethnic and regional elements composing their electoral support. Less value is attached to maintaining ideological consistency from one region to the next, than to electoral success.

It is generally accepted, then, that the major Canadian federal parties are not highly ideological, in the sense that little emphasis is placed on the articulation of, and adherence to, a comprehensive, cogent, and more or less 'official' body of values, norms, and social theories proper to each party. At this point, it seems pertinent to ask to what degree the members of a given party share the same general attitudes towards, and evaluation of, the nature of Canada, the role of the state, and other fundamental concepts of society and politics. Although a well-defined party ideology is absent in both major parties, it would seem reasonable to assume that members of a given party bear a closer ideological affinity with the other members of their own party than with those of the opponent's. That this has not been the case at all times has been demonstrated notably in instances where party discipline has been relaxed (e.g., the free vote on the abolition of capital punishment ranged most French-speaking Liberals and Conservative back-

benchers against the majority of English-speaking Liberals and a few Conservative front-benchers). It is important to know if, in fact, there is a consensus on most ideological questions within each major party, for several reasons. The first and most immediate is to determine the likelihood of intra-party cleavages in the event that certain ideological issues should come to the fore. Parties in which internal cohesion is based primarily on the need to maintain discipline for reasons of electoral and political success (i.e., to maintain a Parliamentary majority) or on historical reasons (i.e., the French Canadians supporting the Liberals out of antipathy for the Conservatives) are susceptible not only to open cleavages under unusual circumstances, but also to internal paralysis in certain stages of policy formulation due to lack of shared attitudes and values among the members.

The problem goes further than questions of party discipline, however. If it were demonstrated that differences of attitudes, values and ideology are greater, for instance, between M.P.'s of the two major ethnic groups than those between existing parties, then the relevance of our party system could be questioned.

There appear to be at least three major schools of thought on the subject of the appropriateness of our existing party system. One of these is that of the apologists of the present system; the other two belongs to its critics. Those who seek to justify the 'brokerage' system do so on the grounds that regional and ethnic differences in Canada are so great, and the possibility of national integration so

remote, that the best that any party system can do to prevent the country from fragmentation is to make day-to-day compromises and agreement on concrete issues. Only in this way, say the advocates of 'brokerage' politics,⁴ can explosive, perhaps irreconcilable differences of ethnicity and region be attenuated. The apologists of the brokerage system do not necessarily maintain that the present party system is the most desirable, but only that it is the best one possible in the present Canadian context. The argument assumes, obviously, that extreme ethnic and regional cleavages exist and are strong enough to threaten Confederation unless tempered by 'brokerage' parties. The present study will therefore seek to discover how these cleavages are expressed in ideological divergences among Members of Parliament, and how persistent and intense these differences are. The results of the study could help to justify or refute the assumption upon which the 'brokerage' apologists rest their case.

A second major trend of thought on the Canadian party system is that of critics, such as John Porter,⁵ who view ethnic and regional differences as less fundamental than class differences. For these critics, most regional and ethnic differences can be explained in terms of class differences and economic disparities. Consequently, the emphasis should be put on creating a party system that voices the con-

⁴Dawson, Robert MacGregor, The Government of Canada (Toronto 1948), p. 501ff; and Corry, Democratic Government and Politics (Toronto 1946, Chapter 6.

⁵Porter, John, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto 1965), Chapter 12.

clashing interests of 'haves' and 'have-nots', rather than of language groups or of narrow regional interests. The present major parties are thought to be avoiding ideological stands and comprehensive long-term national policies, necessary to the economic progress of underprivileged classes and areas. The difficulty with this 'class-oriented' line of argument is that it cannot tell us the means of achieving class-based politics; nor can it even say whether a re-alignment in terms of classes is possible in the present context of misunderstanding and suspicion between regional and particularly ethnic groups. This study may help to clarify the problem. It is extremely important for the advocates of 'class-based' politics to know whether there are perceptions and beliefs common to all the poorer regions of the country. If such common ideological currents exist, then there is at least some basis for the hope that these regions may recognize their common economic interest, the chances for a 'class'-type politics appear slight. This study cannot provide any definite answer to this question because it deals with a limited group: Members of Parliament, who may not necessarily provide an accurate reflection of the electorate. Nevertheless, the results could be highly indicative in that they may show the ideological orientations of elites of different regions and ethnic groups, and may indicate the likelihood or possibility of new alignments.

Finally, a third interpretation of the party system may be described as 'sectionalist'.⁶ This school would criticize the party system

⁶e.g., see Morin, Jacques-Ivan, Le Federalisme, Universite de Montreal, Montreal, 1963.

for not representing adequately ethnic and regional differences. This criticism is based on the assumption that the fundamental divergences in Canadian society are cultural and regional and that these differences should be promoted; it thus differs from the advocates of 'class-based' politics in relegating economic issues to a subordinate position (or at least in perceiving greater local autonomy as the best solution to economic problems). This school also differs from the 'brokerage' trend of thought by stressing the importance of the preservation or promotion of regional and ethnic-cultural diversity rather than the need for greater national integration. The results of this study would be useful to the 'sectionalists' in showing whether ideological orientations of M.P.'s are more closely related with ethnicity and region than with party membership.

It is clear from the above that whether one stresses the need for greater national integration through brokerage politics, the need for better representation of different economic interests through class politics, or the desirability of expressing sectional interests through the party system, the question still remains - to what degree are attitudes shared by the various groups within each party, and to what extent do cleavages persist?

What cleavages may we expect to find? Alford, typically, mentions ethnic, regional and religious cleavages⁷ as the decisive factors in Canadian voting behaviour. To what extent religion remains

⁷Alford, op.cit., p. 251.

a key factor in voting behaviour is a moot point, but Kornberg considers religion far less important than ethnicity or regionalism on the bi-culturalism question.⁸ Kornberg's view seems justified, as regional and ethnic clashes seem to be far more pervasive today in Canada than religious divisions.

Ethnicity, in terms of the French and English language groups, is often put forward as the primary factor in the determining of political attitudes and behaviour in Canadian federal politics, and the foremost source of cleavages. One aspect of the ethnic difference is categorized by Kornberg as the 'culturalist' theory of Canadian legislative behaviour.⁹ This theory maintains that French Canadians have never fully accepted democracy or democratic institutions, and that their particular socialization inclines them to think in terms of narrow, concrete, immediate goals and in terms of their respective regions and riding, with little interest in broad policies on a national scale. In short, the theory assumes a relatively parochial outlook on the part of French Canadians, with a mistrust of democratic and Parliamentary institutions. This outlook would be represented in particular goals, motives, and representational role perceptions.

⁸Kornberg, "The Religious Factor in Attitudes Towards Biculturalism", Western Political Quarterly XVIII, 1965, pp. 285-91.

⁹Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1967, pp. 34-36.

French Canadians are expected to think of themselves first as delegates of their particular constituency and to be more concerned with promoting constituents' interests than those of Canada as a whole. The motives and goals of French Canadian M.P.'s are thought to be more limited to personal gain and advancement rather than to public service. The main concern of the French Canadian M.P., according to the 'culturalist' theory, would be to dispense favours while in office to ensure re-election. Finally, French M.P.'s would consider their highest duty that of protecting French language and religious rights.

Kornberg's study did not confirm this theory. The later Hoffman and Ward study,¹⁰ however, which was more oriented towards investigating ethnic differences, did discover some persistent ethnic cleavages, mainly in the manner in which M.P.'s perform their roles and in their attitudes towards Parliament.

There is another aspect to the question of bi-ethnic differences, which neither the Kornberg nor the Hoffman and Ward studies treat. Both studies concentrate on M.P.'s perceptions of their roles, their motives and goals in political life, and so on. Neither study undertakes to investigate fully differences in fundamental political attitudes and beliefs, in conceptions of society, in policy preferences,

¹⁰Hoffman and Ward, Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the House of Commons. Report No. 2 to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, March 1966. Unpublished Manuscript.

and so forth. Kornberg does present a series of questions on 'ideological positions on policy issues',¹¹ but relates the answers mainly to party differences and makes no attempt at correlating them with ethnic and regional differences.

Certain assumptions are commonly made concerning the ideological position of French-speaking M.P.'s, of which the following by Alford is typical:

Having a region (Quebec) which supports the major Left party but which represents conservative forces has consequences for Canada that are different from those produced by the South in the United States. Quebec probably exerts far more pull to the Right upon the Liberal party than the South does upon the Democratic party because Quebec is much larger than the South relative to the rest of the nation.¹²

The assumption is that French Canadian M.P.'s are considerably more conservative than their English-speaking counterparts. The present study will undertake to investigate this assumption, and further, to determine in what issue-areas important ethnic cleavages exist. This last point is particularly important, as it may serve to clarify an especially vague aspect of the assumption. Indeed, the assumption of French Canadian conservatism does not specify whether French Canadians are expected to be conservative on all issues or only in certain areas. If we relate this 'conservatism' hypothesis to the one

¹¹Kornberg, A., Canadian Legislative Behaviour, op.cit., p. 260.

¹²Alford, op.cit., p. 260.

which says that French Canadians mistrust and misunderstand democracy, one might expect that French conservatism might be expressed mainly through authoritarianism. This does not necessarily mean, however, that this 'conservatism' will carry over into such matters as welfare legislation and economic matters in general. The French Canadian's lesser commitment to democratic institutions may also mean a lesser commitment to traditional Anglo-Saxon principles of the sanctity of private enterprise, and a greater acceptance of state intervention, particularly in view of Quebec's depressed economic position. In one respect at least, that concerning the monarchy and British traditions and symbols, one may expect the French Canadians to be less conservative and more open to change. Hence the theory of French Canadian conservatism has to be qualified and requires further investigation and clarification.

After ethnicity, a most important expected source of real and potential intra-party cleavages is regionalism within the English language group. The different social and economic backgrounds and political histories of the various regions outside Quebec may well give rise to differing attitudes towards, and perceptions and evaluations of, Canadian politics. The Hoffman and Ward study noted the very different role perceptions of the "strikingly dissimilar Maritime member and the British Columbia member".¹³ This suggests that regional differences may extend to ideological and policy issues; however, some

¹³Hoffman and Ward, op.cit., p. 385.

attempt must be made to distinguish between cleavages resulting from differing economic situations, and those resulting from particular cultures associated with a region. To make a more accurate evaluation of the importance of ethnic and regional differences, there should be a control for local economic conditions. It may be that many apparently ethnic cleavages, for instance, are actually related to Quebec's economic position.

To summarize, the present study will seek to probe the general ideological orientation of M.P.'s, to discover what cleavages exist among them, and how such cleavages relate to party membership, membership in one of the two main ethnic groups, and regional background. The method chosen was that of a mailed questionnaire sent to Members of Parliament and covering main issue-areas:

1. General perceptions and evaluation of Canadian society;
2. Evaluation of and attachment to traditional institutions and symbols;
3. Conservatism-liberalism and authoritarianism; and
4. French rights and provincial autonomy.

These issue-areas are intended to reveal the main cleavages among M.P.'s. A first group of questions will probe M.P.'s perceptions of Canadian society as a whole, in order to reveal several divergent views of the state of the country and the nature of the problems facing it.

The perceptions of traditional institutions and symbols are thought to be a source of cleavage between ethnic groups as well as between parties; hence the importance of the issue-area. Although differing perceptions of traditions only rarely cause open intra-party cleavages (e.g., the flag debate) nonetheless differing views of symbols and traditions may be a substantial source of friction. In some cases such divergence may be enough to prevent any 'rapprochement' among M.P.'s who are in general agreement on other matters.

The conservatism-liberalism and authoritarianism issue-area is of greatest importance. It is commonly assumed that our 'brokerage' parties are both inclined to a 'centre' stand on economic issues, because both are composed of and elected by a wide range of individuals from all parts of the political spectrum. More specifically, it is commonly held that French-speaking Liberals exercise a conservative influence on the Liberal party,¹⁴ in economic as well as other matters; but little proof of this supposition is ever offered. This study will attempt to confirm or to refute this assumption. Further, we might expect to find intra-party cleavages along regional lines, due to widely divergent economic conditions. The conservatism-liberalism question involves bread-and-butter issues which are crucial to party policy formulation; therefore, general agreement among party members is far more vital on this issue than on most others.

¹⁴See Alford, quoted above, p. 8.

Finally, the issue-area of French rights and of regional autonomy is of great importance currently. This issue has particular importance for the Liberal party cohesion. Although the party leadership is committed to bilingualism and the extension of French rights, the degree of consensus on these policies among the English-speaking Liberals remains a moot point. The leadership is also strongly opposed to separatism; and again, the opinions of back-bench Liberals on this issue are doubtful.¹⁵ The Conservative party will bear scrutiny as well, for its leadership also appears rather more sympathetic to French aspirations than do the Conservative back-benchers. Thus we may expect substantial cleavages within both parties.

These four issue-areas should then reveal the most important current sources of cleavages, and whether these cleavages appear to follow ethnic or regional lines.

The ethnic variable will be studied mainly in relation to the Liberal party, which is the only one containing a large number both of English and French-speaking M.P.'s. The attitudes of French Liberals will be compared with those of the Creditistes and the French-speaking M.P.'s, as the 'culturalist' theory implies. Similarly, the attitudes of English-speaking M.P.'s of all parties will be compared. The regional variable will be of interest in comparing regional influences

¹⁵Beck, J.M., The Pendulum of Power (Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1968), pp. 408-409.

on English-speaking M.P.'s. (The sample of French-speaking M.P.'s outside Quebec is very small [$N = 2$] and therefore regional differences among members of this language group could not be explored).

The resulting data should be highly indicative of the degree of ideological cohesion in the federal parties. In highly cohesive parties one would expect to find general (although not universal) consensus on at least major ideological issues. The existence of substantial factions on major issues already indicates a certain failure in the integrative function of party, and the existence of such factions must necessarily make the formulation of party policy more difficult, consensus difficult to obtain, and cases of dissatisfaction, if not open rebellion, more likely. Such dissatisfaction would make necessary the frequent imposition of party discipline, and a consequent further alienation of dissenting elements. Factionalism becomes even more serious when the dissenting faction or factions tend to be the same on all issues. Where there is a different group of 'dissenters' on every issue, there is less likelihood of fragmentation than would be the case where, for instance, a particular cultural or regional group finds itself consistently at odds with the other party members. Hence the importance of revealing whether the main factions in our federal parties do or do not correspond to well-defined territorial or cultural groups. If they do, then we may question not only the existing party alignments, but the very appropriateness of the Parliamentary system itself, and its rigidly disciplined parties, to a federal society. Where the fundamental divergences in a society correspond to territorial divisions (rather than to class divisions,

for example) the system of disciplined parties may be inappropriate at the federal level. The fact that our federal parties have generally managed to maintain discipline thus far does not necessarily prove that there exists general consensus within parties; rather, it may be that the parties have avoided potentially contentious issues as much as possible and have tried to achieve agreement on relatively innocuous and acceptable policies which do not pose a threat to party discipline. There is, of course, a price to pay for this cautious method of proceeding; it is that comprehensive, long-term, and ideologically consistent policies must be sacrificed to day-by-day piecemeal solutions to all problems. An alternative to factionalism is extreme caution bordering on immobility. This study will attempt to clarify the effect of culturally and regionally-based ideological factions upon cohesion in federal parties.

CHAPTER ONE

The two recent studies dealing with Canadian legislative behaviour and discussing at length French-English differences in attitudes and perceptions are Kornberg's¹ study of the 25th Parliament and the Hoffman and Ward² study of the 26th Parliament. In this chapter we shall examine briefly the results of these studies and determine what they reveal concerning cultural differences among M.P.'s. The study by Mildred Schwartz³ of attitude differences among party supporters will also be examined; we may expect to find that certain of these attitudes are common to both party supporters and their M.P.'s.

A. The Kornberg Study

The aim of the Kornberg study was to discover the motives, goals, and representative roles of M.P.'s, and the correlation between these variables and the social background and political experience of the members. Of particular interest to Kornberg was the testing of the 'culturalist' theory, mentioned above, of Canadian legislative behaviour.⁴

¹Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour, op.cit.

²Hoffman and Ward, op.cit.

³Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Prentice-Hall, 1967), Chapter 10.

⁴Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour, op.cit., pp. 34-36.

The study remained for the most part at a very general level. A first series of questions asked what were the motives of M.P.'s for entering politics. The motives were classified into two main groups: ideological or 'policy' motives, and 'personal predispositions' to political life. According to the culturalist theory, French Canadians were expected to be less concerned with ideological and policy questions, and more strongly motivated by a desire for personal advancement. Kornberg's results showed that in fact French Canadians were more disposed to cite ideological reasons for entering politics than were English Canadians. The overall difference was very slight, however, when Social Crediters, who were exceptionally ideological in outlook, were excluded. Since French-speaking Social Crediters differed considerably in this respect even from French-speaking Conservatives and Liberals with similar backgrounds, Kornberg concluded⁵ that the main variable affecting results was party membership. Kornberg's findings must be treated with caution, however. In this part of the study M.P.'s were simply asked outright to state their motives for entering politics. It is conceivable that some M.P.'s preferred to give ideological motives in order not to appear parochial or opportunistic.

A second series of questions were intended to find the general orientations of legislative goals.⁶ Goals were classified as 'area-

⁵Ibid., pp. 63-83.

⁶Ibid., pp. 87-100.

oriented', that is, oriented mainly towards the legislator's own riding or region; or 'policy-oriented', aiming towards nation-wide policies. According to the culturalist theory, French Canadians, relatively indifferent to questions of national policy, should be more concerned with protecting the interests of their own riding and locality. The cultural variable was found to be one of the best predictors of response, along with education and party membership, but the result was, according to Kornberg, inconclusive.⁷

Representational roles were studied in a third section. Legislators were classified according to 'representational styles' into three types: "trustee", or one who believes that his electors have given him a mandate to use his own judgement in deciding issues; "delegate-servant", or one who invariably follows his constituents' wishes; and "politico", or one who tries to strike a balance between his own opinion and his constituents'. Legislators were also classified according to their 'representational focus', as being either national, national-local, or local. The cultural variable had a certain correlation with representational styles, but little with representational focus.⁸

The most interesting part of the Kornberg study for our purposes was that concerning the significance of party membership for ideology.⁹

⁷Ibid., p. 100.

⁸Kornberg, op.cit., p. 114.

⁹Ibid., pp. 119-136.

Questions were asked on points of ideology; however, they were generally not related to cultural differences. The focus remained on party differences. In a series of questions dealing with the extension of cultural dualism, Kornberg found that the Liberal and the Social Credit parties were most favourable to the extension of bilingualism; the N.D.P. was divided, and the Conservatives were largely opposed. However, Kornberg does not compare the responses of the two groups within parties having members of both groups (at that time, Liberals, Conservatives, and Social Credit all contained English and French Canadians). It is difficult to say, therefore, to what extent the Liberals' favourable attitude towards cultural dualism is due to the large proportion of French Canadian members.

A second issue dealt with civil rights, specifically, the Quebec Padlock Law. In this question the ethnic variable was closely scrutinized because, as the Act was passed in Quebec, it was "assumed that the respondents' positions on the French Canadian Cultural Index would have influenced their attitudes so strongly that it could not be overlooked".¹⁰ (One might wonder, incidentally, why the same assumption was apparently not made for the 'cultural dualism' question). It was found that party differences predominated, with right-wing parties being relatively favourable to the Law. Ethnicity did appear to influence the response, but the correlation "was less strong than

¹⁰Ibid., p. 124.

assumed".¹¹ On questions concerning 'welfare statism' and 'political participation and tolerance' Kornberg also found that party divisions were correlated to left-right attitudes, with the N.D.P. and Liberals well left of the Social Credit Party and the Conservatives. Kornberg concludes that "these attitudes are generally shared by a substantial proportion of each party group, and thus may facilitate cohesive action by party members".¹² The phrase "substantial proportion" is rather ambiguous, and seems almost gratuitous when Kornberg's results are examined closely. Kornberg gives the following tables:¹³

Position on the Welfare State Index, by Party Affiliation

(%)

<u>Position on Index</u>	<u>Party Affiliation</u>	
	<u>Left-Wing Parties</u>	<u>Right-Wing Parties</u>
strongly favour	59	8
moderately favour	35	45
strongly oppose	6	47
	(N = 76)	(N = 89)

The table may be interpreted as showing 'substantial' agreement among left-wing parties, but the same can hardly be said for the right-wing parties. The dichotomy between those who "moderately favour" welfare policies and those who are "strongly opposed" would seem to imply considerable disagreement. Similarly, the 'liberalism-conservatism' table does

¹¹Ibid., p. 124. Kornberg does not say how strong it was.

¹²Ibid., p. 126.

¹³Ibid., pp. 124-25. Tables 7.3 and 7.4.

not appear to warrant Kornberg's conclusion.

Relationship Between Position on a Liberal-Conservative
Scale and Party Affiliation (%)

<u>Position on Scale</u>	<u>Party Affiliation</u>	
	<u>Left-Wing Parties</u>	<u>Right-Wing Parties</u>
Liberal	43	17
Moderate	30	22
Conservative	27	61
	(N = 73)	(N = 85)

In this table, the left-wing parties contain an important right-wing bloc, while the right-wing parties are more consistent. Hence, the tables indicate considerable dissident groups within both the left and right wing parties. These divergent groups may be normal in a congressional-style system with little party discipline, but may be a serious obstacle to cohesive action by parties in a parliamentary system, where party unanimity in the House is a necessity. Furthermore, before drawing any conclusions on the degree of cohesion of the parties, it would be essential to know who are the dissenting elements, and whether the dissenting opinions coincide with other cleavages (e.g., ethnic or regional) within the parties. Kornberg did not discuss this question, perhaps because his main interest in the study was focused on representational roles, goals, and perceptions of the M.P.'s. The 'cultural variable' was studied only in relation to such roles and perceptions; the effect of culture or ethnicity was not a focal point of

Kornberg's study. In his general conclusion, Kornberg states that the data obtained in his study did not permit any definite judgement on the 'culturalist' theory; the results neither prove nor disprove it.¹⁴

Kornberg speculates, however, that the 'culturalist' theory holds true to the extent that French Canadians probably experience considerable role conflict while in office, due to their having "internalized the norms of two or more groups",¹⁵ that is, cultural norms and party norms. However, the system is maintained:

Generally, French-Canadian M.P.'s accept or resign themselves to the demands of party because they share prevalent party ideological positions. Party discipline is not perceived as excessive (the party at times recognizes their claims for independent action) and, whether inspired by self-interest, a pride in party membership, the desire to achieve party-relevant goals, or out of a concern for the continued maintenance of the viability of their party and the system itself, they willingly accept a cohesion norm.¹⁶

Kornberg here appears to group together several motives for maintaining cohesion which are not necessarily interrelated. One could question whether French-Canadian M.P.'s accept party discipline because they "share prevalent party ideological positions", or for the more pragmatic reasons immediately following. A later statement of

¹⁴Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 143.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 144.

Kornberg's is indicative:

... French cultural characteristics, when all other variables are controlled, are rather strongly correlated with variations in goals and representative role orientations but are not so correlated when other factors are permitted to impinge upon them. At such times, cultural considerations give way to other needs, principally, the needs of the party.¹⁷

The exigencies of the party system, then, require a certain sublimation of French-Canadians' goals and attitudes in favour of prevalent party needs. It seems pertinent to ask whether French-Canadians might not also bear ideologies substantially different from those of English-speaking members of the same party, but maintain cohesion for practical reasons of political expediency. Indeed, such an ideological cleavage seems implicit in the hypothesis put forward by Alford, that Quebec acts as a conservative influence on the Liberal party in a manner analogous to that of the American South upon the Democratic party. To sum up, if the importance to M.P.'s of party cohesion is sufficient to override differing views of representational role orientations and goals, it might also suffice to override ideological differences, particularly if compromises are made on the level of concrete policies. Hence, party cohesion might be possible even if members of bi-ethnic parties do not share a "prevalent party ideology"; and Kornberg's assumption that they do share such an ideology has yet to be proven.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 144.

B. The Hoffman and Ward Study

This study was carried on under the auspices of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and was aimed primarily at investigating the consequences of bi-ethnicity on the federal legislature. Further, comparisons between regions were made, where pertinent. The focus of the study, however, was similar to Kornberg's in that it concentrated on the M.P.'s general attitudes and views on the role of an M.P. and of the House; his perceptions of his constituents, of other M.P.'s and of the practice of bilingualism in the House and other government services. The appendix¹⁸ gives the five main purposes of the study:

1. To discover the role perceptions of M.P.'s and to ascertain significant ethnic, regional, party, or urban-rural variations;
2. To ascertain the degree to which M.P.'s regard politics as a full-time occupation;
3. To examine the relationship between certain structural features - the caucus, committees, bilingual speaker;
4. To ascertain how the bilingual/bicultural phenomenon affects the operations of Parliament;
5. To examine the channels of communication of ideas and influence between and within parties, and especially between English and French M.P.'s.

The Hoffman and Ward questionnaire does not probe ideological tendencies (although certain questions may have ideological implications

¹⁸Hoffman and Ward, op.cit., Appendix A.

i.e., those dealing with the usefulness and reform of Parliament). Its findings are nonetheless suggestive.

The study indicated that recruitment and socialization of M.P.'s had relatively little correlation with ethnicity; there were some slight differences, however, between the two major and two minor parties, and between regions.¹⁹ Similarly, the ethnic variable had no obvious correlation with pre-Parliamentary political experience; the greatest difference was between the two major and two minor parties.²⁰

The question of 'representational roles' brought out some ethnic differences, although these were not necessarily predominant. The representational-role types used by Hoffman and Ward were 'trustee', 'constituency-delegate' and 'party-delegate', with an added category of 'mixed types'. To classify M.P.'s the researchers asked them how they would vote in case of a conflict between constituency and party opinion, between constituency opinion and the M.P.'s personal views, and between the M.P.'s personal views and party opinion. Thus a hierarchy of determining factors in M.P.'s voting decisions was established.²¹ The results showed that in case of a conflict between constituency and personal opinions, M.P.'s from urban areas tended to stick to their own opinions more than M.P.'s from rural or partly-urban, partly-rural constituencies. The ethnic variable did not appear as an important

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 103-105.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 108-109.

²¹Ibid., pp. 112-117.

factor; nor did party or region. In a conflict between party views and personal views, Liberals were more inclined to go with their party than other M.P.'s; Maritime M.P.'s also were more inclined to follow party opinion than M.P.'s of other regions.²² Finally, in a situation of conflict between party and constituents' views, French M.P.'s appeared far more inclined to vote according to their constituents' wishes than English-speaking M.P.'s.²³ In general, French M.P.'s tended to fall into the 'mixed types' category, since in cases of conflict no one orientation predominated: French M.P.'s tended to be 'party-delegates' at the expense of the 'trustee' role, but also tended to be 'constituency-delegates' at the expense of the 'party-delegate' role. Likewise, a regional variation showed up in the global results; Maritime M.P.'s were also more inclined to fall into the 'mixed types' category. This came about because Maritime M.P.'s were less inclined to stick to their personal opinions where these conflicted with either party or constituents' views, but were more inclined to use their own judgement in the event of a clash between party and constituents' views. Hence, the greatest overall difference in role perceptions among M.P.'s appeared to be the greater tendency of the French M.P.'s to turn to their constituencies in the event of a clash of opinions.²⁴

Another aspect of role perceptions was the question of 'areal' roles. M.P.'s were asked whether they considered themselves as representing, primarily, their constituency, their province, or the entire

²²Ibid., pp. 122-124.

²³Ibid., pp. 127-129.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 130-131.

country. Again, an attempt was made at establishing a hierarchy of choice. When only the dominant or first choices were considered, little difference appeared between French and English; but when the distribution of respondents listing 'province' as one determining factor was analysed, it was found that French M.P.'s were far more likely to mention their province.²⁵ Hence it could be surmised that this greater importance of the home province for French-Canadians could indicate a correspondingly different ideological concept of Canada. The study further indicated that French Canadians tended more to assimilate constituency and province in their role perceptions.²⁶ This takes on considerably more importance when compared with results of another part of the study, which asked M.P.'s if they felt that they had a specific role to perform as members of their respective ethnic groups. French-Canadians were twice as likely as English-Canadians to assign a specific ethnic representational role to themselves. Taken together, all these findings could indicate an ethnic division in perceptions of Parliament, and of Canadian political and social structures, a difference which may have important implications at policy-making levels.

The study showed also that ethnic differences were even clearer in M.P.'s performance of their roles than in perceptions of their roles. French-speaking M.P.'s were more 'deeply rooted' in their constituencies, and depended far more on personal contacts and social gatherings as means

²⁵Ibid., p. 137.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 139-140.

of communication with constituents than did the English M.P.'s who made use of devices such as newspapers, radio and television and mailed newsletters⁽²⁷⁾. One aspect of this difference in style which might merit investigation is the significance for the English M.P. of depending on means of communication which are unidirectional, i.e. consist of the M.P.'s 'educating' his constituents, while the French M.P. prefers more personal contacts which allow him to feel the pulse of his community. This behaviour might well be the surest indication that English M.P.'s do perceive themselves as having an educational and guiding role to play with regard to their constituents, while French M.P.'s are less concerned with enlightening their constituents than in learning their feelings and opinions. One might expect from this that French-Canadian M.P.'s might remain, to a far greater degree than their English-speaking counterparts, representatives of the attitudes and perceptions of their respective regions and of their ethnic group as a whole.

Ethnic differences again appeared to be fundamental in attitudes of M.P.'s towards Parliament and political life in general. French-speaking M.P.'s complained far more than English M.P.'s about the inefficiency of Parliament, and were far more responsive to proposals for procedural reforms and the restructuring of the House and Senate. French-Canadians seemed generally less satisfied with political life in Ottawa⁽²⁸⁾.

On the ideological level, the evidence would lead us to expect

27. Ibid, pp 199-200

28. Ibid, pp 282-285.

then to find French-Canadians less attached to existing structures and more open to drastic constitutional reforms.

Communication between the ethnic groups was found to be difficult, even within the same party, such as the Liberal party. The study concludes that even under the best circumstances the M.P.'s of one language group rarely seem to appreciate the perceptions of the other.²⁹ Again, this absence of communication could well reinforce existing inter-ethnic ideological differences and be reinforced by them. Party integration obviously may suffer considerably from such lack of communication.

In general, then, the Hoffman and Ward study appears to confirm that of Kornberg with regard to the 'culturalist' theory. French M.P.'s are somewhat more constituency-minded, but only under certain circumstances (i.e. intense conflicts of constituency and party opinion) does this trait appear decisive. The role perceptions of French and English-speaking M.P.'s do not differ fundamentally; however, the Hoffman and Ward study showed that the manner of fulfilling these roles did differ from one ethnic group to the other. Furthermore, there were considerable inter-ethnic differences in the attitudes of M.P.'s towards various aspects of the Parliamentary system, and French-Canadians generally seemed less satisfied with all aspects of federal politics.³⁰

²⁹Ibid., pp. 340-341.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 385-386.

The fact that role perceptions differed relatively little may indicate that the 'culturalist' theory, if it ever held true, may be at least partly obsolete, to the extent that French-Canadian legislators have internalized some of the norms of Parliamentary democracy held by their English-speaking counterparts. The role-perceptions, at least, of French-speaking M.P.'s coincides fairly well with those of English-speaking M.P.'s. Beyond this point there seems to be some role conflict among French-Canadian M.P.'s, as their fulfillment of the M.P.'s role differs somewhat from their avowed aims - perhaps because the parliamentary-democratic norms have not yet been fully internalized, perhaps because these norms conflict with the expectations of the French-speaking M.P.'s constituents.³¹

The Hoffman and Ward study did not ask questions of a specifically ideological nature. Undoubtedly such questions would have been felt to be beyond the scope of the study, which was primarily concerned with the attitudes of M.P.'s of different ethnic backgrounds towards Parliament, towards their constituencies, towards bilingualism in general, and towards each other. Questions of policy not related to bilingualism were probably not considered relevant, and might have been resented by M.P.'s.

Nonetheless, some of the study's findings do have ideological implications. The study showed substantial differences in perceptions,

³¹Ibid., pp. 156-161.

attitudes, and performance on a number of points. If the prevailing parliamentary-democratic norms have only partly taken hold among French-Canadian M.P.'s, and inter-ethnic communication remains fitful even within parties, then party cohesion may be weak on ideological questions wherever both ethnic groups are present. Moreover, the Hoffman and Ward study also showed occasional regional differences, particularly between Maritime M.P.'s and those from other English-speaking regions.³² This suggests regionalism, independently of ethnicity, as another important factor adversely affecting party cohesion.

C. The Schwartz Study

The Schwartz study³³ deals with the larger question of party consensus among supporters. It was found that "consensus within parties varied according to the party, the characteristics of the voters, and the issues considered".³⁴ The study showed a relatively high degree of consistency among N.D.P. supporters, but a far lesser degree among P.C. and Liberal supporters.³⁵ The conclusion is that the Conservative and Liberal parties are "relatively unsuccessful in imposing a consistent point of view on their varied supporters".³⁶ There is thus

³²Ibid., pp. 155, 163-164, 199.

³³Engelmann and Schwartz, op.cit., Chapter 10.

³⁴Ibid., p. 207.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

some basis to the views that the major parties rest upon "... a body of opposed supporters, held together by traditional loyalties, mis-perceptions, and favours".³⁷ In general, "... compared to support for parties, opinions of voters are much more strongly affected by ties of region and origin. This is true for all parties, except for the minor ones or at least the C.C.F./N.D.P.". ³⁸

The question, then, is whether such regional and ethnic cleavages persist to a significant degree among M.P.'s. The intra-party ideological cleavages found among party supporters may find some expression among the party elites, although to a lesser degree, owing to greater party socialization. The present study will, in the following section, attempt to determine the extent to which parties have been successful in creating agreement upon general ideological principles among their respective members of Parliament. Particular interest will be paid to bi-ethnic parties and parties containing members from various regions.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 221.

CHAPTER TWO

INTRODUCTION TO THE DATA

A. The Twenty-Eighth Parliament

The 264 members of the 28th Parliament were divided among four political parties: Liberal, 155; Progressive Conservative, 72; New Democratic, 22; Ralliement des Creditistes, 14; and one independent.

TABLE 2.1

Occupations and Level of Education of M.P.'s¹
of the 28th Parliament (%)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Professional	64.4	43.2	57.1	7.1	54.5
Proprietor- Manager	23.5	33.7	9.5	50.0	27.2
Farmer	3.4	10.8	9.5	7.1	6.1
Low Status (blue collar, etc.)	2.7	5.4	14.3	21.4	5.3
Other	6.0	6.8	9.5	14.3	6.8
TOTAL	100.0	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.9
<u>Education</u>					
College or University	85.2	83.8	81.0	50.0	82.9
Less	8.7	8.1	14.2	42.9	10.6
No Data	6.0	8.1	4.8	7.1	6.4
TOTAL	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9

¹Normandin, Pierre, Canadian Parliamentary Guide, Ottawa, 1969.

An examination of the social backgrounds of M.P.'s showed that the three larger parties resembled each other with regard to the occupational and educational backgrounds of their respective members; only the Creditistes differed appreciably in these respects from the norm.

A series of chi-square tests showed that the only statistically significant difference among parties' social background was that between the Creditistes and all other parties. Therefore one may expect that any difference we may discover between the Creditistes and other parties will be at least partly explained by differences in social and educational background. Further tests of statistical significance were applied to the two major parties in order to detect any significant relationship between social background and ethnic or regional origin. No such relationships were found. Therefore, we may conclude that occupational and educational levels of M.P.'s of the two major parties are readily comparable; and any ideological differences between the two parties, and between regional and ethnic groups within these parties, cannot be explained in terms of educational and occupational background.

B. The Data

The present study of the ideological orientations of federal M.P.'s is based on the answers to a mailed questionnaire sent to all (264) members of the 28th Parliament in January, 1970. Because of limitations of time, only a single mailing was possible. Some 124

answers were received, of which 117 were useable. This constitutes a response of 44.3%, which is relatively high for mailed questionnaires. Kish note that responses to such questionnaires have been observed from 10% to 100%,² and that results have been published based on as little as 12% response to a single mailing to doctors. If one considers that Canadian M.P.'s currently receive an average of two or three questionnaires a month (according to one very helpful M.P.), a response rate of 44.3% may be considered highly successful. We may add that Kornberg based his study on a sample of 165 M.P.'s (62.1%), and Hoffman and Ward, with considerable resources at their disposal, based their study on a sample of 145 M.P.'s (54.4%).

Certain limitations were imposed by the need for preserving complete anonymity and the necessity of keeping the length of the questionnaire within reasonable bounds. The need for anonymity precluded detailed questions on the respondent's background, such as years of Parliamentary experience, position in the party, and so on, which in many cases would have sufficed to identify him. On the advice of an M.P., questions of background had to be kept to the strictest minimum, in order to ensure a maximum number of responses. The results appear to justify this decision; of the 124 responses received, 7 were unusable because respondents answered all questions save those asking regional background and party membership, despite an

²Kish, Leslie, Survey Sampling, Wiley and Sons, 1965; pp. 538-539.

introductory letter stating that this information was necessary. Presumably, many other M.P.'s declined to answer any part of the questionnaire because they objected to these questions.

The form of the questionnaire, which consisted of closed-end questions, also had its drawbacks. Certainly such questions may lose certain shades and distinctions discernable in an open-ended questionnaire. A closed-end questionnaire was chosen so that it could be answered quickly and easily. Another helpful M.P. advised us that in many cases the determining factor in his decision to answer a mailed questionnaire was that it be of the closed-end type, rather than one requiring more or less lengthy essay-type answers.

Hence, only regional origin and party membership were asked of M.P.'s. Ethnic background, which for purposes of the study was limited to the major groups, French and English Canadians, was determined beforehand with the help of the Canadian Parliamentary Guide for 1970. Questionnaires with introductory letters were sent in the appropriate language, eliminating the need for a question asking ethnic background.

The distribution of the sample by party, region, and ethnic background showed the sample to be representative of the totality of M.P.'s, with a few qualifications.

TABLE 2.2
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE BY PARTY

	<u>Total in Parl.</u> %		<u>No. of Responses</u>	<u>% of Total in Parl.</u>	<u>% of Total Responses</u>
Liberals	155	58.7	62	40.0	53.0
P.C.	72	27.3	32	44.4	27.4
N.D.P.	22	8.3	14	63.6	12.0
R. Cred.	14	5.3	9	64.3	7.7
Independent	1	0.3	0	0.0	0.0
<u>Totals</u>	264	99.9	117	44.3	100.1

We expected a lower return from the government party members, as these normally have the most work to do, may be bound by secrecy, and so on. The government party did have the lowest proportion of responses, but the difference between the proportion of responses of Liberals and Conservatives was not statistically significant (chi-square = 0.1635, insignificant at .90 level). The minor parties had higher rates of response than the major parties; this too was to be expected, as these smaller parties are more ideological, "mass" parties committed to 'educating' the public. The difference of rate of response between the two major parties and the two minor parties was not statistically significant (chi-square = 2.2002, insignificant at .10 level). We may conclude that there is no significant bias in our data as far as party membership is concerned.

The two major ethnic groups with which we are concerned also had similar rates of response.

TABLE 2.3

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE BY LANGUAGE GROUP

	<u>Total in Parl.</u>	<u>No. of Responses</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
French	75	37	49.3
English	189	80	42.3
<u>Totals</u>	264	117	44.3

Some regional variations in rates of response appeared.

TABLE 2.4

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE BY REGION

	<u>Total in Parl.</u>	<u>No. of Responses</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Maritimes*	25*	12	48.0
Quebec	74	37	50.0
Ontario	88	38	43.2
West and N.W.T.	70	29	41.4
<u>Totals</u>	257	116	45.1

Chi-square = 0.49197 (insignificant at .50 level)

The most important discrepancy was the lack of any response whatsoever from Newfoundland M.P.'s. There is no apparent explanation for this lack of response, unless it is connected to the fact that six

*excludes Newfoundland

of Newfoundland's seven M.P.'s are newly-elected Conservatives (the Conservative party was excluded from Newfoundland from 1962 to 1968, and had little success before 1962), who may be unsure of their standing in the party and reticent about their ideological opinions.

A breakdown by ethnic groups and regions of the major parties' responses reveals some further strengths and weaknesses of the sample. The minor parties will not be included in the breakdown; the Creditistes are ethnically French-Canadian and the N.D.P. are English-Canadian; regionally, all Creditistes are from Quebec, and the N.D.P. sample is spread over four provinces, which is too small for a regional breakdown to be meaningful.

TABLE 2.5
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE IN MAJOR PARTIES BY
ETHNIC GROUPS

	<u>Total in Parl.</u>	<u>No. of Responses</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
English P.C.	66	29	43.9
French P.C.	6	3	50.0
<u>Totals</u>	72	32	44.4
Chi-square = 0.0304 (insignificant at .80 level)			
Eng. Lib.	101	37	36.6
Fr. Lib.	54	25	42.6
Totals	155	62	40.0

Chi-square = 0.5754 (insignificant at .80 level)

TABLE 2.6
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE CONSERVATIVE PARTY
BY REGIONS

	<u>Total in Parl.</u>	<u>No. of Responses</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Maritimes*	19*	11	57.9
Quebec	4	3	75.0
Ontario	17	9	52.9
West and N.W.T.	26	9	34.6
<u>Totals</u>	66	32	48.5

*excludes Newfoundland

The tables show that French and English-speaking Liberals, and English-speaking Conservatives, are about equally well represented. A special problem presents itself when dealing with French-speaking Conservatives, because the universe is so small (only six French-speaking Conservatives were elected). Of the six French Conservatives, only four are from Quebec; and since all three French Conservative respondents were from Quebec, we may be able to draw some valid conclusions concerning at least the Quebec wing of the Conservative party in the analysis.

The regional distribution also presents some problems. As was previously noted, no responses were received from Newfoundland M.P.'s; hence Newfoundland will be excluded from all future analysis (reference will therefore be made to the 'Maritime provinces' rather than the

'Atlantic provinces'). Maritime Liberals are also sparsely represented, with only one out of six M.P.'s responding. Therefore regional comparisons within the Liberal party will be limited to Quebec, Ontario and the West. Finally, the West is somewhat less well represented in both major parties than other regions; the sample represents 33.3% of all Liberals and 34.6% of all Conservatives elected West of Ontario. Data from the West will have to be considered less reliable than that from other regions, as far as the major parties are concerned.

In general, then, the data are such as to allow valid comparisons between parties, ethnic groups within parties, and between most regional groups within the major parties, subject to the limitations stated above. We shall proceed, in the following chapters, to a detailed analysis of the data, to discover if there exist any marked intra-party cleavages along ethnic and regional lines within the major parties.

CHAPTER THREE
GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SYSTEM

Four questions attempted to probe the general attitudes and perceptions of Canadian society.

The first probed M.P.'s expectations concerning Canada's future; the second, the nation's 'health' at present; the third asked M.P.'s to specify what they conceived to be Canada's greatest single problem; the fourth asked what economic group had the greatest influence on government.

A. Future Expectations

Answers to the first question showed that optimism among M.P.'s is largely a function of their respective party's electoral success.

TABLE 3.1

"DO YOU THINK LIFE IN GENERAL WILL GET BETTER OR
WORSE FOR CANADIANS OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS?"

(%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Better	95.2	65.5	54.5	44.4	79.3
Worse	3.2	31.0	27.3	55.6	17.1
Undecided	1.6	3.5	18.2	0.0	3.6
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 62)	(N = 29)	(N = 11)	(N = 9)	(N = 111)

Chi-square = 31.090 (significant at the .001 level)

The ethnic variable was applied in order to test the assumption that French Canadians are rather more pessimistic in outlook than English Canadians.¹

TABLE 3.2
FUTURE EXPECTATIONS: BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN
MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Better	64.2	33.3	91.9	100.0
Worse	26.9	66.6	5.4	0.0
Undecided	8.8	0.0	2.7	0.0
<u>Total</u>	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.0
	(N = 29)	(N = 3)	(N = 37)	(N = 25)
Chi-square = 2.013 (insignificant at the .40 level)			Chi-square = 2.130 (insignificant at the .30 level)	

The data do not bear out the assumption. (The unanimity of French Liberals may indicate the leadership of a French-Canadian). No significant relationship was detected between regional background and optimism in either party.

¹See study of public opinion polls by S. Frankel, Political Orientation and Ethnicity in a Bilingual Society. Report to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Division III, Contract No. 1.

B. Evaluation of Present Situation

The second question asked M.P.'s whether Canada's development was basically 'sound' or 'unsound'. The question thus probed the M.P.'s evaluation of Canada's present state, rather than future expectations.

TABLE 3.3

"DO YOU THINK THAT CANADA'S DEVELOPMENT AS A
NATION IS AS SOUND AS IT MIGHT BE, OR IS IT
BASICALLY UNSOUND?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sound	82.3	56.7	14.3	50.0	64.9
Unsound	8.1	30.0	57.1	37.5	21.9
In Between	9.7	13.3	28.6	12.5	13.2
<u>Total</u>	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 62)	(N = 30)	(N = 14)	(N = 8)	(N = 114)

Chi-square = 27.218 (significant at the .001 level)

Not unexpectedly, the Liberal party appeared the most sanguine. Liberals, Conservatives and New Democrats appear less satisfied with the present than optimistic about the future. Only the Creditistes are more sanguine about present development, undoubtedly because of their well-known fears of imminent economic recession.

A breakdown by ethnic group is very revealing.

TABLE 3.4
SOUND DEVELOPMENT: BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN
MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Sound	55.5	66.7	70.3	100.0
Unsound	29.6	33.3	13.5	0.0
Undecided	14.8	0.0	16.2	0.0
<u>Total</u>	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 29)	(N = 3)	(N = 37)	(N = 25)
Chi-square = 0.516 (insignificant at .70 level)			Chi-square = 9.035 (significant at .01 level)	

While responses are fairly evenly distributed among Conservatives of both language groups, the Liberal responses show a significant difference of opinion. Once again, the fact that the Liberal leader is a French-Canadian, committed to protecting French rights and to aiding the poorer regions of Canada (such as Quebec), may explain at least in part the more sanguine outlook of the French-speaking Liberals.

A breakdown by region clarifies the English-speaking Liberals' responses.

TABLE 3.5SOUND DEVELOPMENT: LIBERAL PARTY BY REGIONS (%)

	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
Sound	100.0	81.5	33.3
Unsound	0.0	3.7	44.4
Undecided	0.0	14.8	22.2
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	99.9
	(N = 25)	(N = 27)	(N = 9)

Chi-square = 25.274 (significant at .001 level)

The regional cleavage is immediately obvious. If Ontario and Western Liberals are compared, the chi-square test yields a result of 11.568, significant at the .01 level. Hence, Quebec alone does not account for the considerable divergence of opinion. The deteriorating economic situation of the West might be thought to confirm this phenomenon.

TABLE 3.6SOUND DEVELOPMENT: CONSERVATIVE PARTY BY REGIONS (%)

	<u>Maritimes</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
Sound	60.0	66.7	66.7	37.5
Unsound	30.0	33.3	33.3	25.0
Undecided	10.0	0.0	0.0	37.5
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 10)	(N = 3)	(N = 9)	(N = 8)

Chi-square = 6.049 (insignificant at .40 level)

The Western Conservatives are least impressed with the soundness of Canada's development, but their attitude does not differ significantly from that of other Conservatives. The regional economic conditions may have played some role in determining Western Conservative attitudes, but party membership appears to be the decisive factor.

The Liberal party, then, shows a substantial cleavage where members' evaluation of Canada's present state is concerned. French Liberals show a marked optimism not shared by all their English-speaking compatriots; the difference between French and English Liberals, however, is explained by the very pessimistic response of Western Liberals. The pessimism of Western Liberals is comparable to that of Western Conservatives, indicating that the West's economic difficulties have strongly influenced all these responses. The determining factor in response to this question for the Liberals, then, appears to be regional background.

C. Canada's Greatest Problem

A third question attempted to pinpoint what M.P.'s considered to be the greatest problem facing the country. Five specific choices were given, and a space was left blank for other answers.

TABLE 3.7

"WHICH ONE OF THE FACTORS NAMED BELOW IS THE
GREATEST SINGLE PROBLEM FACING CANADA TODAY?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1) Economic disparity between the provinces	38.5	43.2	7.7	16.7	33.3
2) English-French divisions within Canada	26.2	16.2	0.0	5.6	18.1
3) Foreign control of the Canadian economy	4.6	2.7	69.2	16.7	12.1
4) Possibility of a general economic recession	10.8	10.8	7.7	22.2	12.1
5) Breakdown of authority, decay of guiding moral principles in our society	13.8	24.3	7.7	22.2	17.4
6) Other	6.1	2.7	7.7	16.7	6.9
<u>Total</u>	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.1	99.9
No. of respondents	(N = 61)	(N = 32)	(N = 13)	(N = 9)	(N = 115)
No. of responses	(N = 65)	(N = 37)	(N = 13)	(N = 18)	(N = 133)

Several M.P.'s gave multiple answers, therefore the number of respondents and responses are both indicated. The numbers of multiple answers involved were too great to make a chi-square test of the entire table meaningful; the tests were applied to various sub-groups.

The significance tests were first applied to the Liberal and Conservative responses. A comparison of all Liberal and Conservative responses showed no substantial differences between the two parties

(chi-square = 3.427; insignificant at .60 level). A comparison between Liberal and Conservative responses to the three answers most often given by M.P.'s of these parties (answers 1, 2, and 5) again showed no significant difference in distribution (chi-square = 2.517; insignificant at .50 level). The Liberal and N.D.P. parties are usually both considered 'left-wing' (cf. Kornberg, cited above, Chapter 7); therefore the responses of these two parties were compared to each other to determine if the presumed ideological affinity between them held true. The results showed these parties holding almost diametrically opposed opinions; the answer favoured by most (64.2%) N.D.P. members ("foreign control of the Canadian economy") was the one least often mentioned by the Liberals (4.6%). The result of a chi-square test was chi-square = 36.336, significant at .001 level.

The two 'right-wing' parties, the Conservatives and the Creditistes, were similarly compared; responses were not found to be significantly different (chi-square = 9.367 significant at .10 level). Evidently, the greatest divergence of opinion was that between the N.D.P. and all other parties. The economic nationalism of the N.D.P. is apparently not widely shared.

A breakdown by ethnic group proved highly revealing where the Liberal party was concerned.

TABLE 3.8
GREATEST PROBLEM: BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN MAJOR
PARTIES (%)

<u>Answers to:</u>	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
1) Economic disparity	43.8	50.0	28.9	60.9
2) English-French divisions	15.6	25.0	42.1	4.3
3) Foreign Control	3.1	0.0	5.3	4.3
4) Economic Recession	9.4	25.0	13.2	8.7
5) Breakdown of Authority	28.1	0.0	10.5	21.7
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
	(N = 32)	(N = 4)	(N = 38)	(N = 23)
Chi-square = 2.663 (insignificant at .60 level)			Chi-square = 12.4563 (significant at .02 level)	

The ethnic variable does not seem too important in determining Conservative response. The relatively high rate of Liberal response to "English-French divisions", as we now see, was due almost entirely to English Liberals. The distribution of responses of French Liberals more closely resembles that of the Conservatives (chi-square = 3.354 insignificant at .50 level). The split within the Liberal party may prove to be of considerable practical importance. English and French Liberals undoubtedly recognize the problem of English-French relations, but the French-speaking Liberals apparently regard it as secondary to economic problems; or more specifically, to Quebec's relatively poor economic position. For a number of English Liberals, then, the primary

problem facing Canada is a lack of understanding or good will between French and English Canadians, while for most Liberals, the main problem is that of economic inequality. This divergence of perceptions is indicative of a cleavage that could easily erupt into open conflict at the levels of decision-making and policy formulation.

Regionalism did not appear to play a significant role in determining the perceptions of M.P.'s of either major party. Ontario and Western Liberals' responses were fairly evenly distributed (chi-square = 2.275, insignificant at .70 level). Slightly more Ontario Conservatives gave "breakdown of authority" as the greatest problem than did Conservatives from other regions, but the difference was not statistically significant, even when only the three most often mentioned answers are considered:

TABLE 3.9
GREATEST PROBLEM: CONSERVATIVE PARTY
BY REGIONS (%)

<u>Answers to:</u>	<u>Maritimes</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
1)	63.6	66.6	30.0	57.1
2)	27.3	33.3	20.0	0.0
5)	9.0	0.0	50.0	42.9
<u>Total</u>	99.9	99.9	100.0	100.0
	(N - 11)	(N = 3)	(N = 10)	(N = 7)

Chi-square = 7.940 (significant at .30 level)

In general, then, the greatest variations appear to be that between the N.D.P. and all other parties, and that between English and French-speaking Liberals. the N.D.P. members distinguish themselves from all other groups by their insistence upon the problem of "foreign control of the Canadian economy"; this is in keeping with the party's economic nationalism. English-speaking Liberals distinguish themselves from all other groups and parties by their substantial response to "English-French divisions". This fact may reflect the poor state of English-French relations within the Liberal party, and a pre-occupation in the party with the problem of separatism in Quebec.

D. Group Influence

A fourth question asked M.P.'s which of three large and traditionally important social groups appeared to have the most influence on government.

TABLE 3.10

"AT PRESENT, WHICH OF THESE GROUPS SEEMS TO
YOU TO HAVE THE MOST INFLUENCE ON GOVERNMENT?"
(%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1) Labour Unions	52.0	43.4	0.0	25.0	40.0
2) Big Business	35.4	56.6	100.0	75.0	54.0
3) Farm Organizations	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0
<u>Total</u>	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No. of Respondents	(N = 44)	(N = 28)	(N = 14)	(N = 8)	(N = 94)
No. of Responses	(N = 48)	(N = 30)	(N = 14)	(N = 8)	(N = 100)

Chi-square = 24.162 (significant at .001 level)

There were a few multiple answers, which have been taken into account.² It must be pointed out that there was an exceptionally high rate of 'no-answers' among Liberals (11 'no-answers' out of 62 respondents, compared to three 'no-answers' for all other parties). Evidently, many Liberals were reluctant to admit that their government was influenced by any particular group. Liberal results, then, must be treated with caution.

The N.D.P. gave the characteristic 'left' answer by ascribing most influence to 'Big Business'. The Creditistes were the next most likely to answer 'Big Business', followed by Conservatives and finally by Liberals.

No significant correlations were found to exist, in either major party, between ethnic background or regional background and perceptions of group influence.

Summary

The four questions discussed in this chapter attempted to prove very general attitudes towards, and perceptions of, Canada. Party membership appeared to be the variable most closely correlated with 'future expectations' and perceptions of group influence; no significant intra-party cleavages along ethnic or regional lines were revealed by the data in these two issue-areas. The hypothesis that French-Canadian M.P.'s would be more pessimistic than their English-speaking fellows was not borne out; indeed, the French Liberals appeared

²Most multiple responses came from Liberals; the remainder, from Conservatives. This may indicate the 'pluralist viewpoint of the two major parties.

slightly more optimistic than the English Liberals, perhaps as a consequence of the fact that the Liberal leader is a French-speaking Canadian.

The assessment of M.P.'s of Canada's present state of development did reveal intra-party as well as inter-party divergences. The N.D.P. stood out as the most critical of Canada's present state. Their responses to the question on the 'greatest problem facing Canada' indicate that N.D.P. members are most worried by the problem of foreign control of the Canadian economy. The Conservatives and Creditistes were about equally divided between those who thought Canada 'sound as it could be' and those who perceived it to be 'unsound' or 'in between' the two alternatives. The Liberals were the most convinced of the 'soundness' of Canada, but this was the expected response of the party in power.

The Liberal party, however, did show some cleavage on this question. French-Canadian Liberals appeared most optimistic; English-speaking Liberals significantly less so. A regional break-down revealed that the primary factor in determining the intra-party pattern of response to this question was not ethnic but regional background. Liberals from the West accounted for most of the negative responses, while Ontario Liberals' responses resembled those of French Liberals. The Western Liberals' evaluation of Canada's development resembled that of Western Conservatives, and of Conservatives in general. There is, therefore, a potential threat to Liberal unity in the relative dissatisfaction of the Western contingent of the Liberal party. This dis-

satisfaction is probably accounted for by the West's deteriorating economic situation.

Finally, the perception of the 'greatest problem facing Canada' also showed significant divergences of opinion between members of different parties and within the Liberal party. The greatest inter-party difference was that between the N.D.P. and all others; the N.D.P. members were the only ones to name, by an overwhelming majority, 'foreign control of Canada's economy' as the greatest problem. The other three parties' responses were evenly distributed, although the Liberals named 'English-French divisions' as the greatest problem rather more often than did the Conservatives or Creditistes.

When the ethnic variable was applied to the Liberal party, it was found that English speaking Liberals were far more likely to perceive the 'greatest problem' as being that of 'English French divisions' than were French Liberals: the majority of the latter named 'economic disparity between provinces'. No significant cleavages along the regional lines were revealed in the Liberal party; and no significant cleavages along either regional or ethnic lines appeared among the Conservatives.

We may conclude that the most important intra-party cleavages on attitudes toward the system correlated to ethnic or regional background were within the Liberal party. Western Liberals appeared far less satisfied with Canada's development than all other Liberals; and

English and French speaking Liberals had very different perceptions of the 'greatest problem' that must be solved in Canada today.

CHAPTER FOUR
ATTITUDES TOWARDS SYMBOLS AND INSTITUTIONS

The second general issue-area probed was that of traditional symbols and institutions.

A. The Monarchy

The first two questions dealt with in this section probed the M.P.'s attitudes to the Monarchy. The first question asked M.P.'s whether, in their opinion, the Monarchy contributes to Canadian unity; the second, whether Canadians would look upon an elected President as favourably as they do the Monarch.

Note that the first question does not probe merely the M.P.'s personal attachment to the Monarchy, but ask his opinion of its effect upon Canada. While an M.P. may, for instance, feel very strongly about the Monarchy, he may believe that his own feelings are not the prevailing ones and act according to what he perceives as the popular opinion. The question as stated seeks to discover what assumptions an M.P. is more likely to act upon.

A comparison of responses by party shows, as one might expect, that the Conservative party is most convinced of the Monarchy's ability to create unity.

TABLE 4.1

"DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE MONARCHY MAKES A SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRIBUTION TO CANADIAN UNITY?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	27.4	80.0	21.4	11.1	39.1
No.	72.6	20.0	78.6	88.9	60.9
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 62)	(N = 30)	(N = 14)	(N = 9)	(N = 115)

Chi-square = 29.416 (significant at .001 level)

The difference between Conservatives and all others is striking; furthermore, a breakdown by ethnic group shows an ethnic cleavage among Conservatives, but not among Liberals:

TABLE 4.2

MONARCHY AND UNITY - BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN MAJOR
PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Yes, creates unity	88.9	0.0	35.1	16.0
No, does not	11.1	100.0	64.9	84.0
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 27)	(N = 3)	(N = 27)	(N = 25)

Chi-square = 13.333 (significant
at .001 level)

Chi-square = 2.745
(insignificant at .10 level)

Although the French-speaking wings of both parties appear less favourable to the Monarchy than their English-speaking counterparts, this cleavage is statistically significant only among the Conservatives. The ethnic split among Conservatives is not unexpected; other symbolic issues, such as the 'Flag Debate' of 1966, showed the gap between the English and French-speaking wings of the party.

A breakdown by region shows that in the Conservative party, opinion was evenly distributed in favour of the Monarchy in all regions except Quebec. Within the Liberal party, however, regionalism seemed to play a greater role in determining opinion.

TABLE 4.3
MONARCHY AND UNITY-LIBERAL PARTY BY REGIONS
(%)

	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
Yes, creates unity	12.0	29.6	55.6
No, does not	88.0	70.4	44.4
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 25)	(N = 27)	(N = 9)

Chi-square = 6.778 (significant at .04 level)

The Western Liberals appear more favourable to the Monarchy than those from other regions. The regional difference between Quebec and Western Liberals, in particular, appears statistically significant

(chi-square = 7.087, significant at .01 level). The Liberal split, however, is mitigated by the fact that opinions concerning the Monarchy are probably not intensely felt by Liberals generally, and therefore are not likely to be a serious source of factionalism.

The second question tested the M.P.'s reaction to the prospect of replacing the Monarchy with an elected President. A negative response to the question on the Monarchy does not necessarily imply a positive one on the presidency, nor does a positive reply on the Monarchy question necessarily imply a negative one to the Presidency. That is, an M.P. having a low opinion of the Monarchy's contribution to unity might not support a proposal to create a Presidency. In general, it is assumed that French Canadians are more open to the idea of an elected President.

TABLE 4.4

"IN YOUR OPINION, COULD CANADIANS COME TO HAVE AS
MUCH REGARD FOR AN ELECTED PRESIDENT AS THEY DO
FOR THE TRADITIONAL MONARCH?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	77.4	22.6	50.0	88.9	60.5
No	21.0	74.2	41.7	11.1	36.8
Undecided	1.6	3.2	8.3	0.0	2.6
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
	(N = 62)	(N = 31)	(N = 12)	(N = 9)	(N = 124)

Chi-square = 31.392 (significant at .001 level)

A slightly higher proportion of Liberals and Conservatives thought Canadians would accept a President than gave a negative answer to the question on the Monarchy. The N.D.P. members moved in the opposite direction, expressing skepticism about Canadians' acceptance of an elected President. Their response may have been motivated by a mistrust of a possibly strengthened executive, but the results are ambiguous.

A breakdown by ethnic groups shows that there is general consensus among the Conservatives' and Liberals' respective ethnic groups.

TABLE 4.5

MONARCHY vs PRESIDENCY - BY ETHNIC GROUPS
IN MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Yes, equal regard	17.9	66.7	73.0	84.0
No	78.6	33.3	27.0	12.0
Undecided	3.6	0.0	0.0	4.0
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 29)	(N = 3)	(N = 37)	(N = 25)
Chi-square = 3.713 (insignificant at .20 level)		Chi-square = 3.321 (insignificant at .20 level)		

The differences in terms of ethnicity within each party are not statistically significant.

A regional breakdown again shows no significant regional cleavages among Conservatives, even when Quebec is included. Once more, however, Western Liberals are somewhat at odds with Quebec Liberals.

TABLE 4.6
MONARCHY vs. PRESIDENCY - LIBERAL PARTY
BY REGIONS (%)

	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
Yes, equal regard	88.0	74.1	55.6
No	8.0	25.9	44.4
Undecided	4.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 25)	(N = 27)	(N = 9)

Chi-square = 7.008 (insignificant at .10 level)

The chi-square test shows no statistically significant divergence overall; but if Quebec and Western Liberals are compared to each other, a statistically significant relationship does appear (Chi-square = 6.181 significant at .05 level). The difference is not as strong as it was in the first question, however.

B. The Parliamentary System

A more important pair of questions from the point of view of policy formulation is that dealing with the M.P.'s evaluation of a Parliamentary compared to a Presidential (Congressional) system.

Evidently, the existence of wide-spread divergences of opinion on Parliament itself could call into doubt the legitimacy of the institution.

The data will be used to test the common assumption that French-Canadian M.P.'s are generally less favourable to Parliamentary government (Cf. discussion of Hoffman and Ward, above) and more open to a Presidential 'strong-man' system. Also, Conservatives are expected to be more favourable than others to the Presidential system.

The first question asked whether a Parliamentary system is preferable to a Presidential one. The second attempts to probe the motives for answering the first one positively or negatively; by asking the M.P.'s to evaluate the 'efficiency' of Parliament, the second question determines whether the judgement of the Parliamentary system is made on grounds of pragmatism or on principle.

TABLE 4.7

"IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT A PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM IS PREFERABLE TO A PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM OF
THE AMERICAN TYPE?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	73.8	84.4	100.0	50.0	78.6
No	26.2	15.6	0.0	50.0	21.4
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 61)	(N = 32)	(N = 13)	(N = 6)	(N = 112)

Chi-square = 7.930 (significant at .05 level)

The Creditistes appear the least favourable to a Parliamentary system, and stand apart from the other parties. However, three of the nine respondents declined to answer the question, so that this response has to be treated with caution. The refusal to answer the question may be due to simple indecisiveness, or possibly to ignorance of the American Presidential system.

A breakdown by ethnic groups of the major parties shows that French-speaking M.P.'s share their parties' favourable views of the Parliamentary system.

TABLE 4.8

PARLIAMENTARY vs. PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM:
BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Yes, preferable	86.2	66.6	67.6	83.3
No	13.8	33.3	32.4	16.7
<u>Total</u>	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
	(N = 29)	(N = 3)	(N = 37)	(N = 24)
Chi-square = 0.787 (insignificant at .40 level)		Chi-square = 1.870 (insignificant at .20 level)		

French-speaking Liberals actually appear to be more favourable to the Parliamentary system than their English-speaking counterparts, although the difference is not statistically significant.

A regional breakdown shows no significant relationship between regional origin and attitudes towards the Parliamentary system.

Party membership, then, appears to be the variable most likely to determine attitudes to the Parliamentary system; only the Creditiste group appears to have a relatively unfavourable view of the system. The ethnic variable does not appear to be very significant within the major parties. These results are consistent with the results of Hoffman and Ward.¹

The second question concerning the Parliamentary system offers some clarification.

TABLE 4.9

"IN GENERAL, DO YOU THINK THAT A PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM IS MORE EFFICIENT THAN A PRESIDENTIAL
SYSTEM, LESS EFFICIENT, OR JUST THE SAME?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
More	52.5	64.5	64.3	62.5	58.0
Less	25.4	16.1	7.1	25.0	20.5
Same	22.0	14.4	28.6	12.5	21.4
<u>Total</u>	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
	(N = 59)	(N = 31)	(N = 14)	(N = 8)	(N = 112)

Chi-square = 3.636 (insignificant at .70 level)

¹Hoffman and Ward, op.cit., pp. 231-247.

Evidently, in all parties except the Ralliement des Creditistes, many M.P.'s who considered the Parliamentary system preferable to a Presidential system, did not consider it more efficient than the latter; hence, efficiency was not the main criterion influencing their evaluation. The N.D.P. in particular seems to show that many New Democrats favour Parliament on grounds other than efficiency; undoubtedly the Parliamentary system appears to them to be more democratic and progressive in that it provides to the electors a choice between party programmes rather than merely a choice between individual representatives. Similarly, a number of M.P.'s from other parties (with the exception of the Creditistes) appear to favour the Parliamentary system on principle rather than on grounds of efficiency. Most (70%) of the Liberals and Conservatives who rated the Parliamentary system "not preferable" also considered it "less efficient", but 25% considered it "more efficient", implying that they rejected this system on principle.

The discrepancy in Creditiste response can be explained by the fact that two of the respondents who did not answer the first question on the Parliamentary system answered "more efficient" to the second question.

Breakdown by ethnic groups and regions did not show any significant correlation between these variables and attitudes towards the Parliamentary system.

Summary

The data show some intra-party cleavages among Liberals and Conservatives on questions of symbols and institutions.

On the symbolic issue of the Monarchy, cleavages within the Conservative party can be related to differences in ethnic origin while in the Liberal party the main cleavage on this issue appears to follow regional lines. French-speaking Conservatives are clearly unfavourable to the Monarchy and are very much at odds with the overwhelming majority of English-speaking Conservatives. Within the Liberal party, however, only Western Liberals are favourable to the Monarchy and the difference between their views and those of the most anti-Monarchist Liberals (the Quebec members) is sharp enough to be considered significant. Undoubtedly, this cleavage is mitigated for the Liberal party by the existence of a large Ontario Liberal group which may be considered 'moderate' on the question of the Monarchy, and by the fact that most Liberal members probably do not feel very intensely about the Monarchy in any case.

The practical importance for either major party of cleavages on such symbolic issues must be exaggerated. The Monarchy is not a burning issue for most M.P.'s of any party, and is not likely, under present circumstances, to be a source of factionalism. Nonetheless, sentimental attachments (or objections) to institutions mainly of ceremonial or historical interest do colour one's perceptions and attitudes, and great divergences in sentimental attachments can be an obstacle to

communication and thereby intensify other cleavages. The Flag Debate, at the very least, demonstrated that emotive and sentimental issues, while not necessarily fatal to party unity, can do much to build up a fund of ill-will and misunderstanding.

The differences in perceptions and evaluations of the institution of Parliament did not appear to be related to ethnic and regional differences. Party membership appeared to be the most important deciding factor; Creditistes appeared least favourable to the Parliamentary system, the N.D.P. and Conservative parties, most favourable. The Liberal party was least favourable, next to the Creditistes; but responses were fairly evenly distributed throughout all regions and ethnic groups.

The N.D.P.'s favourable opinion of the Parliamentary system was clearly influenced by party doctrine. The Creditistes' unfavourable opinion may be a function of its minor-party status, or its protest orientation.

In the issue-area of traditional symbols and institutions, then, the greatest differences appear to be inter-party rather than intra-party. The only significant intra-party cleavage discovered was the ethnic split in the Conservative party on the question of the 'monarchy's ability to create unity'. The Conservative party's attachment to the traditional symbols seems to have been preserved intact among English-speaking P.C.'s, and this fact accounted for the principal inter-party differences,

CHAPTER FIVE
CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM

Seven questions attempted to probe the conservatism or liberalism of M.P.'s. This is a particularly critical issue-area with regard to decision-making and policy. As was noted in the Introduction (Cf. quotation from Robert Alford), it has been commonly assumed that Quebec M.P.'s play a role in the Liberal party analogous to that of 'Southern Democrats' in the American Democratic Party; that is, Quebec Liberals are a strongly conservative influence in an otherwise left-oriented party. We will test this hypothesis and see if the data indicate any other cleavages.

A. Causes of Poverty

The first of the 'conservatism-liberalism' questions probed M.P.'s views of the reasons for poverty in Canadian society today.

TABLE 5.1

"IN GENERAL, CONSIDERING THE OPPORTUNITIES
AVAILABLE IN CANADA, WHICH DO YOU THINK IS
MOST OFTEN TO BLAME IF A PERSON IS POOR:
LACK OF PERSONAL EFFORT, OR CIRCUMSTANCES
BEYOND HIS CONTROL?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Lack of Effort	30.0	46.9	0.0	0.0	28.9
Circumstances	58.3	50.0	100.0	75.0	62.2
- Both	11.7	3.1	0.0	25.0	8.8
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(N = 60) (N = 32) (N = 14) (N = 8) (N = 114)
Chi-square = 17.312 (significant at .01 level)

The data showed that, expectedly, the N.D.P. was the most left-oriented party. The Liberals appeared slightly left of the Conservatives, but in fact the difference between the Liberals and Conservatives was less significant (Chi-square = 3.065, insignificant at .20 level) than that between the Liberals and the N.D.P. (chi-square = 8.680, significant at .02 level). The Creditistes, supposedly a 'right-wing' party, appears left of the Liberals; this may be due to the Creditistes' rather unusual economic ideology which combines apparently 'leftist' views on the need for economic and social reform with conservative views on state regulation of private enterprise.

A breakdown by ethnic group does not show the French M.P.'s to be more conservative than their English-speaking counterparts.

TABLE 5.2

REASONS FOR POVERTY: BY ETHNIC GROUPS
IN MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Lack of effort	48.3	33.3	30.6	29.2
Circumstances	48.3	66.6	55.6	62.5
Both	3.4	0.0	13.9	8.3
<u>Totals</u>	100.0	99.9	100.1	100.0
	(N = 29)	(N = 3)	(N = 37)	(N = 24)
Chi-square = 0.417 (insignificant at .80 level)		Chi-square = 0.509 (insignificant at .80 level)		

Neither party, then, showed any significant cleavages along ethnic lines in this question.

A regional breakdown showed the Liberal party to be consistent in its responses through all regions. Within the Conservative party, however, considerable divergences appeared.

TABLE 5.3
REASONS FOR POVERTY: CONSERVATIVE PARTY
BY REGIONS (%)

	<u>Maritimes</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
Lack of Effort	9.1	33.3	77.8	66.6
Circumstances	81.8	66.6	22.2	33.3
Both	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Total</u>	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9
	(N = 11)	(N = 3)	(N = 9)	(N = 9)

Chi-square = 17.2802 (significant at .01 level)

The Conservatives are divided, with Maritime P.C.'s adopting a position actually left of all Liberals; Ontario represents an 'extreme-right' view, and the West is between these extremes. Evidently the widespread poverty of the Maritimes has led Conservatives from this region to adopt a position which is usually considered 'leftist'.

B. Welfare Measures

The previous question only tested general perceptions of the cause of poverty; it did not directly solicit views on government action. The following question probed attitudes towards positive state welfare measures.

TABLE 5.4

"SOME SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT, IN FUTURE, SHOULD DEVOTE MORE EFFORT TO SEE TO IT THAT ALL PEOPLE, RICH OR POOR, SHOULD HAVE ADEQUATE EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, PROTECTION AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT, AND INCOME. DO YOU AGREE?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	91.9	61.3	100.0	100.0	85.3
No	8.1	32.3	0.0	0.0	12.9
Qualified	0.0	6.5	0.0	0.0	1.7
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0	99.9
	(N = 62)	(N = 31)	(N = 14)	(N = 9)	(N = 116)

Chi-square = 21.544 (significant at .001 level)

The parties assume the expected left-right positions, with the Creditistes again appearing left, as in the previous question.

The Liberal party showed cohesion across ethnic and regional lines. The Conservative party, on the other hand, showed serious cleavages when the regional variable was applied.

TABLE 5.5

WELFARE MEASURES: CONSERVATIVE PARTY BY REGIONS (%)

	<u>Maritimes</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
Yes	100.0	100.0	33.3	33.3
No	0.0	0.0	66.7	44.4
Qualified	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.2
	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
	(N = 10)	(N = 3)	(N = 9)	(N = 9)

Chi-square = 18.599 (significant at .01 level)

Once again there is a remarkable spread, with Maritime and Quebec Conservatives on the extreme left, Ontario Conservatives at the far right, and Western P.C.'s in the centre. This division has serious implications for the cohesion of the Conservative party. Furthermore, it suggests that the economic situation of a given region may be a determining factor in the ideological position of Conservative M.P.'s at least.

C. Regulation of Private Enterprise

Welfare measures are only one aspect of governmental measures in the economy. The other side of the coin is regulation of private enterprise.

TABLE 5.6

"SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT BUSINESS ENTERPRISE CAN
CONTINUE TO GIVE US OUR HIGH STANDARD OF LIVING
ONLY IF IT REMAINS FREE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
DO YOU AGREE?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Agree	33.3	64.5	0.0	75.0	40.7
Disagree	63.3	32.3	100.0	25.0	56.6
Qualified	3.3	3.2	0.0	0.0	2.7
<u>Total</u>	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 60)	(N = 31)	(N = 14)	(N = 8)	(N = 113)

The left-right spread is again the expected one, if we keep in mind the Creditistes' 'right-wing' attitude towards state control of private enterprise. The N.D.P. continues to show the greatest degree of cohesion, with 100.0% of the respondents giving the 'leftist' response. What is startling is that both the Conservatives and the Liberals, as well as the Creditistes, appear further right on this question than they did on the 'welfare' question.

For certain Liberals and Conservatives, then, there is apparently no contradiction between supporting welfare measures and rejecting a state-regulated enterprise.

TABLE 5.7

COMPARISON OF "WELFARE" AND "FREEDOM FROM
GOVERNMENT REGULATION" QUESTIONS, LIBERAL AND
CONSERVATIVE PARTIES (%)

	<u>Liberals</u>		<u>Conservatives</u>	
	<u>Welfare</u>	<u>Regulation</u>	<u>Welfare</u>	<u>Regulation</u>
'Leftist' answers	91.9	65.4	65.4	33.3
'Rightist' Answers	8.1	34.5	34.5	66.7
<u>Total</u>	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.0
	(N = 62)	(N = 58)	(N = 29)	(N = 30)
Chi-square = 12.650 (significant at .001 level)			Chi-square = 6.253 (significant at .01 level)	

A breakdown by ethnic groups clarifies some of the Liberal responses.

TABLE 5.8

FREEDOM FROM GOVERNMENT REGULATION-ETHNIC
GROUPS IN MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Agree	67.9	33.3	24.3	47.8
Disagree	28.6	66.7	73.0	47.8
Qualified	3.6	0.0	2.7	4.3
Total	100.1	100.0	100.0	99.9
	(N = 28)	(N = 3)	(N = 37)	(N = 23)
-	Chi-square = 1.827 (insignificant at .40 level)		Chi-square = 3.882 (insignificant at .20 level)	

If Liberal responses to the 'government regulation' questions are compared with responses to the 'welfare' question, we find that French Liberals show greater inconsistency than English Liberals.

TABLE 5.9

COMPARISON OF RESPONSES TO "REGULATION" AND
"WELFARE" QUESTIONS: LIBERAL ETHNIC GROUPS (%)

	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>		<u>Fr. Lib.</u>	
	<u>Welfare</u>	<u>Regulation</u>	<u>Welfare</u>	<u>Regulation</u>
'Leftist' answers	91.9	75.0	92.0	50.0
'Rightist' answers	8.1	25.0	8.0	50.0
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 37)	(N = 36)	(N = 25)	(N = 22)
Chi-square = 3.834 (insignificant at .05 level)		Chi-square = 9.751 (significant at .01 level)		

French Liberals, then, appear to be right of other Liberals on this question, although the difference is not statistically significant. The French Liberals, like the Creditistes, seem to be 'left' on welfare issues and 'right' on the issue of government regulation.

The ethnic division does not appear to be significant in the Conservative party.

Once the ethnicity variable was controlled, the Liberals showed a high degree of consistency on the question of 'government regulation'. Answers to the latter question were more 'right-wing' than answers to the "welfare" question, but not significantly so. The Conservative party, on the other hand, showed a certain regional variation.

TABLE 5.10

FREEDOM FROM GOVERNMENT REGULATION: CON-
SERVATIVE PARTY BY REGIONS (%)

	<u>Maritimes</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
Agree	50.0	33.3	88.9	66.7
Disagree	50.0	66.7	11.1	22.2
Qualified	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.1
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Chi-square = 7.664 (insignificant at .30 level)

The Maritimes and Quebec appear, as on the "welfare" question, on the left, with Ontario P.C.'s again on the right and Western P.C.'s in between the two extremes. The inter-regional divergence, however, is not as great on this question as it was on the "welfare" question. A further comparison shows that Western and Ontario Conservatives were quite consistent in their 'right-wing' attitudes on both questions, while Maritime and Quebec Conservatives were 'left' on welfare and 'right' on government regulation, in a manner similar to that of the French Liberals and the Creditistes.

TABLE 5.11

COMPARISON OF 'WELFARE' AND 'GOVERNMENT REGULATION'
QUESTIONS - CONSERVATIVE PARTY BY REGIONS (%)

	<u>Maritimes & Quebec</u>		<u>Ontario</u>		<u>West</u>	
	<u>Welfare</u>	<u>Govt. Reg.</u>	<u>Welfare</u>	<u>Govt. Reg.</u>	<u>Welfare</u>	<u>Govt. Reg.</u>
Left-Wing Answers	100.0	53.8	33.3	11.1	33.3	22.2
Right-Wing Answers	0.0	46.2	66.6	88.9	44.4	66.7
Qualified	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.2	11.1
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0
	(N = 13)	(N = 13)	(N = 9)	(N = 9)	(N = 9)	(N = 9)
	Chi-square = 7.800 (significant at .01 level)		Chi-square = 1.281 (insignificant at .20 level)		Chi-square = 0.566 (insignificant at .80 level)	

When the responses to the question on "welfare" and that on "freedom from government regulation" are compared, a pattern appears which may explain some of the divergences. The N.D.P. was the only party to be consistently left. For all other parties and language and regional groups within parties, there was a tendency to be further left on the "welfare measures", than on the "government regulation" issue. This pattern was most evident for the Creditistes, and only slightly less so for Maritime and Quebec Conservatives. If one accepts the theory that the Quebec French M.P.'s have a basically conservative orientation, then we find that these three groups - the Creditistes, the Maritime and Quebec P.C.'s, and the French Liberals - show a basic underlying

conservatism mitigated by the fact that all represent economically depressed areas. Hence, the need for some economic stimulus to their respective areas may tend to make them favour government aid, but a fundamentally conservative outlook leads many of them to mistrust government control of private enterprise, perhaps out of fear of socialism, or regimentation. The necessity of reconciling these two sets of 'left-right' attitudes may entail some inner conflict on the part of the M.P.'s in question, although the Creditistes, at least, have melded these two apparently contradictory attitudes into a uniform party ideology.

D. Authoritarianism

French-Canadians are usually considered more authoritarian in their attitudes, because of cultural and historical factors.¹ One question sought to probe the authoritarianism among M.P.'s.

TABLE 5.12

"DO YOU THINK THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING FOR
CANADIAN SOCIETY IF MORE AUTHORITY WERE GIVEN TO
THE FORCES OF LAW AND ORDER, OR DO THEY HAVE
SUFFICIENT MEANS NOW?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
More authority	32.8	40.6	0.0	37.5	31.6
Sufficient Now	67.2	59.4	100.0	62.5	68.4
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 61)	(N = 32)	(N = 13)	(N = 8)	(N = 114)
Chi-square = 7.383 (insignificant at .05 level)					

¹See Trudeau, P.E.; "De quelques obstacles a la democratie au Quebec", in Le Federalism et la Societe Canadienne-Francaise; Editions H.M.H., Montreal 1967.

The only significant divergence among parties seemed to be that between the N.D.P. and all others. A breakdown by language group indicated that French Liberals and P.C.'s did appear slightly more authoritarian than their respective English-speaking counterparts, but at a very low level of statistical significance.

TABLE 5.13

POLICE AUTHORITY - BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN MAJOR PARTIES

	<u>Eng. P.C.'s</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.'s</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
More	37.9	66.7	22.2	48.0
Sufficient	62.1	33.3	77.8	52.0
Total	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
	(N = 29)	(N = 3)	(N = 36)	(N = 25)
Chi-square = 0.931 (insignificant at .50 level)			Chi-square = 4.449 (significant at .04 level)	

It must be kept in mind that there is a substantially higher incidence of violence in Quebec than in other provinces, and that this alone could account for the slightly more authoritarian attitudes of French Liberals. Furthermore, the Creditistes are not substantially more authoritarian than are English P.C.'s or Liberals on this issue. Therefore, the greater 'authoritarianism' of French Liberals on this issue does not seem to be a cultural or 'ethnic' trait of French Canadians.

A regional breakdown showed cohesion in the Liberal and Conservative parties when the ethnic variable was controlled.

E. Attitudes Towards Organized Labour

An important aspect of 'left-right' orientation is that of attitudes towards organized labour. One question asked for an evaluation of labour leadership, whence we can infer general attitudes towards labour.

TABLE 5.14

"DO YOU THINK THAT ORGANIZED LABOUR IS BEING
GENERALLY WELL-LED OR BADLY-LED BY ITS LEADERS?"
(%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R.Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Well-led	18.6	33.3	66.7	12.5	27.5
Badly-led	69.5	63.3	25.0	87.5	64.2
Indifferently led	11.9	3.3	8.3	0.0	8.3
<u>Total</u>	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N=59)	(N=30)	(N=12)	(N=8)	(N=109)

Chi-square = 15.674 (significant at .02 level)

The N.D.P., as expected, is most favourable to labour leadership; the Creditistes appear to take a far 'rightist' anti-labour view. Perhaps surprisingly, the Liberals seem slightly less favourable to labour leadership than the Conservatives; this may be a result of the Liberal government's having to deal directly with labour leaders in hard negotiating.

Both Liberals and Conservatives showed a high degree of consistency across ethnic and regional lines.

F. The Role of Religion

Religion is often thought to play a particularly important role in French Canadian society, to a point where religion is even given a substantial political role.² It is usually seen as a strong conservative force in French Canada. To probe this issue-area of the role of religion in society, two questions were asked. One concerned the role of religious values and religious education in society, while the other concerned the role of church organizations. Hence the two questions compared together may indicate whether religious values and clericalism are differentiated, and, if so, how various groups perceive them. In traditional French Canadian Catholic thought, of course, all aspects of religion are closely bound to the institution of the Church, while this is less true of Protestantism.

TABLE 5.15

"DO YOU BELIEVE THAT SOCIETY WOULD BE IMPROVED
IF THERE WERE MORE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN
SCHOOLS?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	43.4	48.4	14.3	77.8	43.4
No	56.6	51.6	85.7	22.2	56.6
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N=60)	(N=31)	(N=14)	(N=9)	(N=114)

Chi-square = 10.418 (significant at .02 level)

²See Trudeau, op.cit.

If belief in religious instruction as an ameliorating factor in society is considered a conservative trait, then the parties fall along the expected left-right distribution. The Creditistes (all Catholics) appear furthest right, the Liberals and the P.C.'s are in the centre, while the N.D.P. is most skeptical.

A breakdown by ethnic group shows French Canadians in the two major parties to be slightly more favourable to religious instruction in schools than their English-speaking counterparts, but the difference is not significant.

TABLE 5.16
RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION: BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN
MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Yes, would improve	42.9	100.0	36.1	54.2
No	57.1	0.0	63.9	45.8
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N=28)	(N = 3)	(N = 37)	(N = 24)
Chi-square = 3.543 (insignificant at .05 level)			Chi-square = 3.361 (insignificant at .05 level)	

No correlation was found to exist between regional origin and attitudes towards religious instruction. Attitudes towards religious instruction in schools appeared to be most closely related with party membership.

A second question concerning religion probed attitudes toward political activity by religious institutions.

TABLE 5.17

"DO YOU THINK THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF
THE CHURCHES TOOK PUBLIC STANDS ON IMPORTANT
POLITICAL ISSUES?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	30.0	29.0	76.9	12.5	33.9
No	66.7	71.0	15.4	87.5	63.4
Qualified	3.3	0.0	7.7	0.0	2.7
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 60)	(N = 31)	(N = 13)	(N = 8)	(N = 112)

Chi-square = 16.860 (significant at .02 level)

Only the N.D.P. shows a majority in favour of churches taking stands in politics. This may seem an unusual stand for a leftist party, but Canadian socialism has not historically been linked with anti-clericalism, and clergymen have been among the prime figures in the C.C.F.-N.D.P. For the N.D.P., some form of moral leadership by churches may be considered a positive contribution to social responsibility among churchgoers, even though the N.D.P. was most skeptical about the benefits of religion as a part of education.

It is noteworthy that the Creditistes are strongly opposed to Church interference in politics. This may be due to the fact that the party has in the past suffered internal cleavages because of the

ultra-Catholicism of some of its members. The party may thus have been led to favour a strict separation of Church and state, for the sake of party unity.

The anti-clericalism of the Conservatives may be a result of their association of 'church activities' with the activities of the Catholic Church in particular. For many Protestant Conservatives, Catholicism may still constitute a threat to Protestant and Anglo-Saxon tradition and ideals.

The Liberal response is immediately clarified by a linguistic breakdown.

TABLE 5.18

CHURCHES AND POLITICS: BY ETHNIC GROUPS
IN MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Yes	28.6	33.3	44.4	8.3
No	71.4	66.6	55.6	83.3
Qualified	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.3
<u>Total</u>	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9
	(N = 28)	(N = 3)	(N = 36)	(N = 24)

Chi-square = 0.030 (insignificant
at .98 level)

Chi-square = 10.926
(significant at .01 level)

French Liberals resemble the Creditistes and the Conservatives in their anti-clericalism. Undoubtedly, French M.P.'s in general are reacting to the excessive political power that the Catholic Church has long wielded in Quebec. It seems obvious now that French Canadian M.P.'s no longer tolerate clerical interference in politics, even though they appear to cling to the 'conservative' notion that religious education improves society.

Summary and Conclusion

In the broad issue-area of 'conservatism-liberalism' we expected to find certain intra-party cleavages. More specifically we expected French Liberals to be substantially more conservative than English Liberals, as Alford's hypothesis maintains.

A. Economic Issues

On the first three questions, all of which were primarily economic, we did find some intra-party cleavages in both the Liberal and Conservative parties. The first question asked the reason for individual poverty in Canada today. Liberals were highly cohesive, but the Conservatives showed a pronounced regional split, with the Maritime and Quebec P.C.'s appearing far left of Ontario and to a lesser degree, of the Western Conservatives. The Creditistes and the N.D.P. were highly cohesive and both appeared 'left' on this question.

The second question asked if increased welfare measures were desirable. The Creditistes and the N.D.P. again appeared furthest left,

along with the Liberals. Once again, the Liberals showed no cleavages along regional or ethnic lines. The Conservatives, however, showed a regional cleavage similar to that observed in the answers to the "reason for poverty" question. The Maritime and Quebec P.C.'s were both far left; only Ontario Conservatives, and to a lesser degree Western Conservatives, gave predominantly 'right-wing' answers.

Finally, the third question asked if private enterprise should remain free of government regulation. The N.D.P. was, as expected, solidly left, while the Creditistes were furthest right. The Liberals and Conservatives appeared 'left-of-centre' and 'right-of-centre' respectively. A breakdown by ethnic groups showed the French Liberals to be 'right' of the English Liberals on this issue, although the disparity was not statistically significant. (In practical terms, nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that even slight divergences of opinion can take on considerable importance in such an important and delicate issue as that of government economic activities). The Conservatives were divided along regional lines, though the cleavage was less pronounced on this question than on the previous two issues. The ethnic split among Liberals, and the regional split among the Conservatives, accounted for the intra-party cleavages.

In summation, we did find that French Liberals were slightly right of English Liberals on the issue of 'government regulation', but in agreement with them on perceptions of poverty and questions of

increased welfare measures. The split was certainly much less significant than Alford seemed to suggest. A far more serious rift was found among Conservatives, where Maritime and Quebec P.C.'s were consistently left of Western and particularly Ontario Conservatives. This is undoubtedly related to the relative economic positions of these regions.

Some conclusions may be drawn from a comparison between answers to the "welfare" question and the "government regulation" question. The N.D.P., as was expected, was consistently 'left'. We had also expected to find that the Creditistes, because of their peculiar ideology, would be 'leftist' on welfare questions and 'rightist' on government regulation. We were not disappointed. We also found, however, that this same pattern of 'left-and-right' attitudes appeared among French Liberals and Maritime and Quebec Conservatives. Only Ontario and Western Conservatives were consistently right and centre-right, respectively.

We may therefore put forward the hypothesis that the combination of 'left-and-right' attitudes may be a result of a basically conservative ideology which is attempting to come to terms with the reality of regional economic depression. The French-Canadian conservatism of which Alford speaks may have been mitigated by Quebec's unstable economy, just as the Maritime Conservatives have accepted some left-wing measures as a remedy for their economic troubles.

Because of the vital importance of these economic issues, a high degree of agreement is necessary within parties if cohesion is to be maintained. The regional split among Conservatives is so great that some factionalism seems inevitable. The ethnic split among Liberals is less intense, and is limited to the issue of government regulation, but may well make agreement on policies harder to attain and necessitate many compromises.

B. Non-Economic Issues

The question of 'police authority' seemed to show that authoritarianism most closely correlated with party membership. French Liberals did appear rather more authoritarian than English Liberals, but the difference may be explained by the higher incidence of violence in the ridings of Quebec represented by these M.P.'s. Creditistes, representing rural areas which are less plagued by organized crime and political violence, were less authoritarian than French Liberals. Consequently, one could not establish a link between authoritarianism and French ethnic background.

Perceptions of union leadership also appeared to be most closely correlated with party membership; the N.D.P. was most pro-labour, the Creditistes most anti-labour, and the Liberals and Conservatives assumed a median position.

The 'conservatism' of French Canadians is often thought to be closely linked with Catholicism. Two questions concerning religion probed M.P.'s attitudes towards religion and church organizations. The first asked if society would benefit from more religious instruction in schools. A 'left-right' division appeared, with the N.D.P. least favourable to the idea of religious education, the Creditistes most favourable, and the Liberals and Conservatives again occupying a median position. A breakdown by ethnic group showed that French Liberals and Conservatives were slightly more favourable to religious instruction than their respective English-speaking counterparts, but in neither case was the difference statistically significant. No regional cleavages were found.

The question of political activity by churches revealed that the N.D.P. was most favourable to such activity; all Conservatives and all French-speaking Liberals were highly unfavourable. French-Canadians, then, seem to have rejected all political activity by churches, mostly because of the experience of Quebec provincial politics. English Conservatives probably reject such activity because of fear of the Catholic Church in particular. Left-wing politics in Canada has never been anti-clerical outside of Quebec, and organized religion may be perceived by the N.D.P. and some Liberals as capable of providing valuable moral leadership in politics. French-Canadian M.P.'s now seem to reject interference in politics by church organizations; in this regard they have broken with a traditionally conservative influence.

They persist in the conservative notion that religious instruction in schools improves society, but in this French Liberals and Conservatives do not differ significantly from their respective English-speaking fellows. Party membership appears to be more closely correlated with a favourable opinion of religious instruction.

In summation, ethnic background did not seem to be as closely related to 'conservatism-liberalism' as we might have assumed. French Liberals did appear somewhat more conservative than English-speaking Liberals, but only on the issue of "government regulation of private enterprise" and on religious instruction. The Conservatives seemed to be much more seriously disunited than the Liberals; regional background was clearly an important factor in determining attitudes towards economic policies.

The data showed the futility of trying to classify Canadian parties along a 'left-wing' scale, as Kornberg³ did, without any serious qualifications and reservations. Only the N.D.P. appeared consistently (and unanimously) left; the Creditistes were left on some issues and right on others; both Liberals and Conservatives contained important divergent groups. This phenomenon will be further discussed in the general conclusion.

³See above, Chapter One.

CHAPTER SIX
FRENCH RIGHTS AND SEPARATISM

The last two questions tapped perceptions of the status of French Canadians and the value placed on maintaining Confederation. We should expect to find some important intra-party cleavages in this issue-area. We would expect to find an ethnic cleavage, with French-speaking M.P.'s being generally less satisfied with the historical situation of French-Canadians in Confederation, and less committed to maintaining Confederation, than English-speaking M.P.'s. We would further expect to find that English-speaking Conservatives would least accept the proposition that French-Canadians have been disfavoured by Confederation. Finally, we would suppose that English-speaking Liberals would be most committed to maintaining Confederation.

Our data did not altogether confirm these hypotheses.

TABLE 6.1

"THERE IS CONSIDERABLE FEELING THAT FRENCH
CANADIANS HAVE NOT RECEIVED THEIR FULL RIGHTS
UNDER CONFEDERATION. DO YOU AGREE?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Agree	61.3	28.6	57.1	77.8	54.0
Disagree	35.5	67.9	35.7	22.2	42.5
Qualified	3.2	3.6	7.1	0.0	3.5
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.0

Chi-square = 11.762 (insignificant at .10 level)

The Conservative party, not unexpectedly, is least in agreement with the proposition. The N.D.P. and the Liberals hold roughly equivalent positions, while the Creditistes are most inclined to agree. An ethnic breakdown shows some cleavages, but these are of significance only in the Conservative party.

TABLE 6.2
FRENCH RIGHTS - ETHNIC GROUPS IN MAJOR
PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Agree	20.0	100.0	54.1	72.0
Disagree	76.0	0.0	40.5	28.0
Qualified	4.0	0.0	5.4	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 25)	(N = 3)	(N = 37)	(N = 25)
Chi-square = 8.400 (significant at .02 level)			Chi-square = 2.797 (insignificant at .30 level)	

There is a considerable gap between English Conservatives and all French-Canadian M.P.'s, while the Liberal and N.D.P. members seem more more in agreement with the French M.P.'s. The lack of cohesion between French and English-speaking Conservatives that was so painfully obvious during the Diefenbaker years does not seem to have disappeared.

Regional variations within the Liberal and Conservative parties were slight.

The final question tested attitudes towards the possible secession of a province from Confederation. It must be kept in mind that, although Quebec was undoubtedly foremost in the minds of most respondents, the question of secession of an unnamed province could well have other connotations for, say, a Western M.P.

TABLE 6.3

"IF A PROVINCE WERE TO DECIDE, THROUGH ITS LEGALLY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES, TO SEPARATE FROM THE
REST OF CANADA, SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
PREVENT IT FROM DOING SO?" (%)

	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>R. Cred.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Yes	55.0	36.7	38.5	25.0	45.9
No	36.7	53.3	53.8	62.5	45.0
Qualified	8.3	10.0	7.7	12.5	9.0
<u>Total</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
	(N = 60)	(N = 30)	(N = 13)	(N = 8)	(N = 111)

Chi-square = 4.909 (insignificant at .70 level)

The means of preventing secession were not specified; the purpose of the question was rather to test the M.P.'s general commitment to maintaining Confederation. The Liberal party alone showed a majority giving unqualified support to preventing secession, but this majority was very small. A breakdown by ethnic group casts a light on responses.

French-speaking Liberals seem to be the most determined to maintain Confederation. The most plausible explanation for this appears

TABLE 6.4

PREVENTING SECESSION - BY ETHNIC GROUPS IN
MAJOR PARTIES (%)

	<u>Eng. P.C.</u>	<u>Fr. P.C.</u>	<u>Eng. Lib.</u>	<u>Fr. Lib.</u>
Yes	40.7	0.0	41.7	75.0
No	48.1	100.0	47.2	20.8
Qualified	11.1	0.0	11.1	4.2
<u>Total</u>	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(N = 27)	(N = 3)	(N = 36)	(N = 24)

Chi-square = 2.917 (insignificant
at .20 level)

Chi-square = 6.477 (signifi-
cant at .04 level)

to be that French Liberal M.P.'s are among the elements of French-Canadian society most committed to Confederation and are the ones who are most apprehensive about the future of an independent Quebec. As Quebec members of the government party in Ottawa, they also have the most to lose by the departure of Quebec.

There were no significant regional variations within either of the major parties.

Summary

There is no simple French-English cleavage on either attitudes towards French rights or on the issue of separatism. On the question of French rights, only English Conservatives rejected the idea that French Canadians have "not received their full rights". Other English-

speaking M.P.'s were only slightly less receptive to the idea than were French-speaking M.P.'s themselves. There is thus a divergence of opinion that separates English-speaking Conservatives from French Canadians but also from other English-speaking M.P.'s.

On the question of preventing separatism, French Liberals stood apart from all other parties and groups in their determination to maintain Confederation; the reason for this was suggested above.

It is evident, then, that there is an ethnic cleavage within the Conservative party in attitudes towards French rights, a cleavage that could easily erupt into factionalism. The split among Liberals on the question of separatism is not likely to cause factionalism unless the federal government is suddenly faced with the prospect of the secession of a province.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

A. Patterns of Cleavage

The data showed that important inter-party cleavages existed on most questions. We expected to find cleavages between the minor parties, which are more ideological, and the major 'brokerage' parties. Important differences were also found to exist between the two major 'brokerage' parties on a number of issues. This does not invalidate the 'brokerage theory', however, as the theory does not assume that the two major parties hold identical ideologies, but merely that each of them is composed of divergent factions, and that the necessity of achieving compromise between these factions leads the major parties to adopt basically similar, moderate policies.

Our data showed that there are significant ideological cleavages not only between, but also within the major parties, and that many of these cleavages fall along ethnic or regional lines. Where intra-party divisions were found, the lines of cleavage and the intensity of the cleavages varied in each party according to the issues involved. We shall attempt then a synthesis of our findings in order to discover the over-all patterns of cleavages within the two parties, and to evaluate these cleavages in terms of their consequences for party cohesion and factionalism. In the second section of the Conclusion we shall discuss the implications of these cleavages for the party system as a whole.

The study investigated four main issue-areas: first, the perceptions of the Canadian party system; second, attitudes towards traditional symbols and institutions; third, conservatism and liberalism of M.P.'s; fourth, attitudes towards French rights and separatism.

a) Perceptions of the system

In the issue-area of perceptions of the Canadian political system, we might have expected to find a higher degree of cohesion within all parties. We would expect all groups within the government party to be highly optimistic about Canada's future and satisfied with Canada's present state of development, while opposition parties, and groups within parties, would be supposed to be more pessimistic. We would also expect to find general agreement without each party on the question of what constitutes the greatest problem facing Canada, and of what social group or class wields the greatest influence on government.

The data showed that optimism and pessimism about the future did vary according to party in the manner expected; there were no significant intra-party cleavages. Responses to the question probing satisfaction with Canada's present state of development did show regional cleavages within the Liberal party: Western Liberals were far less satisfied than all other Liberals. The existence of this dissatisfied group could be a source of factionalism, as Western Liberals might press for greater reforms, more government spending in the West, and more government action against French separatism.¹

¹The concern of the West with economic and ethnic problems is shown in responses to the "greatest problem" question.

Other Liberals might be less convinced of the urgency of such action. No ethnic cleavage was found in the Liberal party; and no significant ethnic or regional cleavages were found among Conservatives. The opposition parties were, as expected, less satisfied than the government party.

The perceptions of the "greatest problem facing Canada" revealed a significant ethnic cleavage within the Liberal party, contrary to our expectation that general agreement on the question would be found within all parties. A substantial proportion of English-speaking Liberals considered "English-French divisions" to be the main problem facing Canada, while a majority of French-speaking Liberals perceived "economic disparity between provinces" as the greatest problem. This cleavage is important in terms of factionalism among Liberals. Some French-speaking Liberals may simply have been reluctant to admit that an ethnic problem exists, but it seems at least as probable that many French-speaking Liberals consider the main cause of the 'ethnic' problem to be economic disparity, while English-speaking Liberals interpret the problem in terms of misunderstanding, lack of good will, insufficient communication, and so on. These differing interpretations call for very different solutions to the same problem; French-speaking Liberals would emphasize economic measures, while their English-speaking counterparts would stress bilingualism in institutions, unifying national symbols, etc. Consequently, this difference in perceptions may be an important source of factionalism at the policy-making level.

The Conservative party's emphasis in the "greatest problem" question was on "economic disparity" and "breakdown of authority"; there were no significant regional or ethnic cleavages. Because most Conservatives who listed "breakdown in authority" also mentioned "economic disparity between provinces", we may conclude that there is consensus on the "greatest problem" question.

The N.D.P. was highly cohesive on the question. The Creditistes' answers were more evenly distributed, largely because many multiple answers were given; but all the answers centred on economic problems, while "English-French divisions" was rarely mentioned. The Creditistes' answers therefore do not indicate factionalism

Finally, perceptions of class or group influence did not reflect complete agreement within major parties, but no significant cleavages were found between regional or ethnic groups within these parties. The rate of non-response to this question was extremely high among Liberals; this may merely indicate a reluctance on the part of Liberals to admit that the government is influenced by any particular social group or class. The responses of the P.C.'s were fairly evenly divided between "labour unions" and "big business", but this does not necessarily imply the existence of opposing factions. The naming of "big business" as a parliamentary influence does not necessarily imply condemnation; in Conservative thinking, business influence may be considered desirable or at least legitimate. The minor parties, in

particular the N.D.P., seemed to have achieved internal agreement.

The issue-area of perceptions of the Canadian political system, then, revealed cleavages within the Liberal party are of a kind that could have serious effects on party cohesion.

b) Traditional Symbols and Institutions

In the issue-area of traditional symbols and institutions, we would expect that the greatest differences would be those between parties, with the Conservative party being most favourable to the Monarchy and Parliament. We would further expect that French-speaking M.P.'s would be generally less favourable to these symbols and institutions than English-speaking M.P.'s

Our data confirmed that the Conservative party was most favourable to the Monarchy. Liberals, N.D.P., and Creditistes were less favourable. The ethnic factor was found to play a role, as all French-speaking groups were less favourable than all English-speaking groups. This ethnic difference was statistically significant only in the Conservative party, as all French-speaking Conservatives were at odds with the majority of English-speaking Conservatives.

Within the Liberal party, French-speaking M.P.'s were less favourable to the monarchy than English-speaking Liberals, but the overall difference between ethnic groups was not significant. When

the regional variable was applied, however, it was found that Western Liberals were most favourable to the Monarchy, and that the difference between this most 'monarchist' wing and the least 'monarchist' wing, the Quebec group, was significant.

In terms of party cohesion, the ethnic division within the Conservative party is of practical significance. Symbolic issues have divided English and French-speaking Conservatives in the past (as in the Flag Debate). The division between the Western and Quebec wings of the Liberal party is probably of much less significance in terms of factionalism, because feeling about the monarchy is probably less intense for all Liberals than for Conservatives.

The N.D.P. and Creditistes were unified on the question of the Monarchy.

On the issue of a Parliamentary vs. a Presidential system, the main differences were clearly inter-party ones. No significant intra-party cleavages were found.

Inter-party differences, then, predominated in the issue-area of traditional symbols and institutions. The only intra-party cleavage which may be considered important was that between English and French-speaking Conservatives.

c) Liberalism-Conservatism

We would expect to find important intra-party cleavages in this issue-area, at least within the Liberal party, Alford's hypothesis on French-Canadian economic conservatism led us to expect a significant left-right cleavage along ethnic lines among Liberals. The other parties were expected to be more cohesive, with Conservatives appearing right-of-centre, the N.D.P. left, and the Creditistes 'left' on welfare measures but 'right' on other issues, such as government regulation of private enterprise, and religion.

In fact, the data did not confirm most of these expectations, but revealed an unforeseen pattern of cleavages within both Liberal and Conservative parties.

1) Economic Questions

French-speaking M.P.'s of all parties, Creditistes, Conservatives, and Liberals, tended to be 'left' on questions of "welfare statism" but considerably more conservative on the question of government regulation of private enterprise. In this latter question, French-speaking Liberals were 'right' of English-speaking Liberals, but the difference was not statistically significant. (In terms of practical significance, however, we noted that even slight differences of opinion on economic matters could take on considerable importance in policy-making). An accurate evaluation of the 'conservative' influence of French-speaking Liberals will therefore have to await more complete data.

The Conservatives seemed to be seriously divided on economic matters. The Maritime and Quebec were far to the left of Western and particularly Ontario Conservatives on "welfare" issues, and to a lesser degree on the "government regulation" issue. The disagreement is so great, particularly on the "welfare" question, that cohesion must be very tenuous and will be very difficult to maintain over time.

We may discern a pattern in the strange blend of liberalism-conservatism found among French-Canadian M.P.'s and Maritime P.C.'s. All of these M.P.'s represent the regions of Canada that are traditionally conservative and economically depressed. The peculiar combination of 'left-and-right' attitudes may thus be an attempt by certain M.P.'s to reconcile conservative ideologies with the will to improve the depressed economies of the regions they represent.

It is evident from this description of intra-party groups that one cannot accurately classify Canadian federal parties along a conventional 'conservatism-liberalism' scale without making certain important qualifications. We have mentioned earlier the difficulty of classifying the Ralliement des Creditistes as 'left' or 'right' because it professes some leftist and some rightist policies. This study suggests that not only the Creditistes, but also French-speaking Liberals, the Maritime and Quebec Conservatives, conform to this pattern. Thus, any attempt to classify Canadian parties on a 'conservatism-liberalism' scale would have to take into account the

existence of the party factions, and to distinguish between those groups showing consistent 'left' or 'right' attitudes and those which have some elements of both. The existence of the latter type of group in both major parties cannot but have some effect on prevailing party ideology. Maritime and Quebec Conservatives, for instance, appear to be a considerable 'leftist' influence within the Conservative party; French-speaking Liberals may wield a certain 'rightist' influence in the Liberal party on matters of state control of private enterprise and perhaps police authority, but our data are not conclusive.

To classify the Liberal party as 'left-of-centre' and the Conservative party as 'right-of-centre' with no further qualifications, would imply a greater ideological homogeneity than really exists. The 'right-of-centre' stand of the Conservatives, for instance, is probably not the result of a prevailing moderate right-wing ideology shared by all or even most Conservatives; rather, it is a compromise stand between clearly distinguishable right and partly-left, partly-right wings within the party. Similarly, prevailing Liberal ideology would be the result of a compromise between a moderate left (i.e., most English-speaking Liberals) and another partly-left, partly-right group. Evidently, the situations of the Liberal and Conservative between a moderate left (i.e., most English-speaking Liberals) and another partly-left, partly-right group. Evidently, the situations of the Liberal and Conservative parties are not perfectly parallel; the degree of disunity within the Conservative party is appreciable greater than that within the Liberal party.

We may thus attempt to classify the main ideological currents among Canadian federal M.P.'s by adding a dimension to a conventional 'left-right' scale; that is, some provision must be made for groups exhibiting simultaneously left and right attitudes. Our data would indicate that the groups showing attitudes consistent with the conventional 'left-right' scale would be the following:

<u>Left-Wing Groups</u>	<u>Right-Wing Groups</u>
New Democratic Party (left)	Ontario Conservatives (right)
English-speaking Liberals (left-of-centre)	Western Conservatives (right-of centre)

The English-speaking Liberal group appears left-of-centre and the N.D.P. at the extreme left of the Canadian political spectrum; Ontario and Western Conservatives appear right and right-of-centre, respectively.

The remaining groups, those exhibiting both left and right attitudes, are Maritime and Quebec Conservatives, French-speaking Liberals, and Creditistes. These groups may be arranged along a 'conservatism-liberalism' scale showing their position relative to each other; in this case, Maritime and Quebec Conservatives would appear to be the most 'left' of the three groups (i.e., least opposed to state intervention, least authoritarian, having most favourable perceptions of union leadership); French Liberals, slightly to the right of Maritime and Quebec P.C.'s; and Creditistes, furthest right.

The consequences of these cleavages in terms of party cohesion and factionalism are of utmost importance. The Liberal party appears to have achieved a fair degree of ideological unity on economic matters, but the Conservative party is seriously disunited. Economic questions are of such vital importance in policy decisions that any significant disagreement among members of a party is likely to cause open factionalism.

2) Non-Economic Questions

The questions of perceptions of union leadership showed inter-party differences to predominate; French-speaking Liberals, contrary to expectations, did not appear more 'conservative' on this issue. The question of "police authority" also revealed that inter-party differences prevailed. French-speaking Liberals appeared more in favour of increasing police authority than English-speaking Liberals, but this may be explained by the higher incidence of crime in regions represented by French-speaking Liberals.

Finally, we expected that French-speaking M.P.'s would look more favourably on the prospect of a greater role for religion and church organizations in society and in politics than would English-speaking M.P.'s, for religion has been regarded as an important conservative influence on French-Canadians. In fact, inter-party differences prevailed in the question of religious instruction in schools. Ethnic background appeared to be correlated with attitudes towards church activities in politics, but French-Canadian M.P.'s

were actually less disposed to accept a political role for church organizations than were English-speaking M.P.'s. This result probably reflects French-speaking M.P.'s 'reaction to excessive political influence long wielded by the Catholic Church in Quebec. On the issue of religion, then, French-speaking M.P.'s do not appear significantly more conservative than their English-speaking counterparts; and there is scant possibility of intra-party factionalism arising over religious issues.

In the important issue-area of conservatism-liberalism, then, the significant cleavages were those on economic issues. These cleavages were highly significant for the Conservative party, and present, but less significant, within the Liberal party.

d) French Rights and Separatism

We expected to find, in this issue-area, that the significant cleavages would be along ethnic lines, particularly in the Conservative party. The data showed that all French-speaking groups tended to agree with the proposition that French-speaking Canadians have not received their "full rights" under Confederation. Only in the Conservative party, however, was there a significant intra-party cleavage; the majority of English-speaking Conservatives disagreed with the proposition, but all French-speaking Conservatives agree with it. This reflects the lack of sympathy on the part of English-speaking

Conservatives for French-Canadian aspirations, and could lead to factionalism whenever issues pertaining to the extension of bilingualism and the economic or social status of French-Canadians are brought up.

Party membership, rather than ethnicity, appeared to be the factor most closely related with attitudes towards the hypothetical secession of a province. French-speaking Liberals were most favourable to the federal government's preventing the carrying out of secession by a province, while the Creditistes and French-speaking Conservatives were least favourable to the idea. Evidently, French-speaking Liberals are highly committed to maintaining federalism at all costs; this, however, is not likely to cause factionalism (except in the event of an attempt by a province to secede).

The most important intra-party cleavage, then, in this issue-area, is that between English and French-speaking Conservatives on the issue of "French rights". This cleavage could have grave consequences for Conservative party cohesion.

e) Conclusions on Patterns of Factionalism

Both major parties were found to suffer from important internal cleavages in one or more of the issue-areas covered. The Liberal party was unified in the issue-areas of traditional symbols and institutions, French rights, and separatism; it was fairly unified in the issue-area of conservatism-liberalism, but disunited on the questions of percep-

tions of certain important aspects of the Canadian political system. A regional cleavage appeared as Western Liberals were less satisfied with the present development of the country; an ethnic cleavage appeared in the perceptions of the greatest problem facing Canada.

The Conservative party was unified in the issue-area of perceptions of the political system, but showed ethnic cleavages in the issue-areas of traditional symbols and institutions, and of French rights and separatism. There were also regional cleavages in the conservatism-liberalism issue-area.

Clearly, the Conservative party is the most disunited of the major parties. The ethnic cleavages on symbols and on French rights not only present a constant danger of rupture with the Quebec Conservatives, but help alienate French-Canadian electors and thus almost guarantee that the Conservatives will be unable to gain a majority in the House.

While the English-speaking Conservatives at least have preserved unity among themselves on traditional symbols and on their lack of sympathy for French-Canadians, they are disunited on vital economic issues. It seems probable that the growing awareness and concern over the progressively worsening economies of the Maritimes and Quebec have led Conservatives from these regions to adopt a 'leftist' stand on "welfare" issues and a 'moderate right' stand on "government regulation

of private enterprise". The Western and Ontario Conservatives, on the other hand, have retained a 'moderate right' and 'rightist' stand respectively. The further ideological evolution of the Maritime and Quebec Conservatives will undoubtedly depend, for the most part, on the economic evolution of the areas they represent. Any further deterioration or simply stagnation in the economies of these regions may lead these Conservative M.P.'s to adopt a more radical, consistently 'leftist' position. If, on the other hand, the economic situation of Eastern Canada improves, some P.C.'s may return to their more 'natural' rightist ideology, thus helping to unify the party. In the latter case, however, economic development, with resulting urbanization, industrialization, and creation of an urban working class, could create a strong left-wing vote with disastrous results for the Conservative party at the polls.

The Liberal party appears more cohesive at present, but certain cleavages were in evidence that could take on importance in the future. Any further deterioration in the economic situation in the West could result in an intensification of the dissatisfaction we found among Western Liberals, and is likely to hinder the Liberal party at the polls, in the West at least. The significant ethnic cleavages seemed limited, for the moment, to differing perceptions by French and English-speaking Liberals of the greatest problem facing Canada; there was substantial agreement on such important issues as French rights and economic policies. It must be remembered, however, that there are several

factors which are at present contributing to Liberal party unity, and which may decrease in importance in the near future. French-speaking Liberals may be satisfied with the present situation because of the fact that the Prime Minister is a charismatic French Canadian committed to ameliorating the situation of French Canadians and to correcting economic disparities among regions of Canada. The replacement of the present Liberal leader by an English-speaking Canadian less open to French-Canadian aspirations could worsen English-French relations within the party. Also, much of the general unity and satisfaction within the party may be due to the fact that the Liberal party received in the last election its first large majority in a decade. A substantial reverse at the polls could disrupt party cohesion.

Finally, Liberal party cohesion is not immune to the threat of rising French-Canadian nationalism. The failure of French-speaking Liberals to respond to and reflect increasing demands from the French-speaking electorate could result in electoral set-backs in Quebec, or worse, the further rise of separatism. If, on the other hand, French-speaking Liberals try to express increasing French-Canadian demands, a serious ethnic split may develop in the party.

The two major parties have traditionally maintained unity through compromises among the various different and sometimes opposed groups that compose each of them. Though the Conservative party appeared most seriously disunited at present, the unity of the Liberal

party, encouraged for the moment by a new leader and a solid Liberal majority, may be temporary. Greater political awareness on the part of the electorate and the increase in demands from depressed areas and from French-Canadian nationalist elements seem likely to cause difficulties for both of the old 'brokerage' parties in their efforts to preserve their internal unity and their electoral support. The 'brokerage' parties are able to maintain internal unity despite differences of opinion among members, provided that the intensity with which these opinions are held is not too great. The intensity of the convictions of various intra-party groups appears likely to increase in response to developments in Canadian society, and the ability of the 'brokerage' system to survive is not assured.

The minor parties appear far more cohesive, but cohesion is more easily attained in small ideological parties, which also happen to be ethnically homogeneous. The Creditistes will probably remain limited to a marginal 'protest' role. The N.D.P. is a far more serious alternative to the major parties. Its internal unity and ideological consistency may be a major asset at the polls if factionalism weakens the older parties, and if the economic development of Eastern Canada produces a working-class support for the party. The major obstacle to the N.D.P.'s success will remain, as before, a French-Canadian nationalism which will override a Canadian class-consciousness.

3) Conclusions on the Party System

Our data appeared to justify the assumptions upon which rests the 'brokerage' theory of Canadian federal parties. The two major parties did not appear to be ideologically unified; each contained different factions which often corresponded to particular ethnic and regional groups.

The data we have presented cannot offer any final answer to the question of what is the most appropriate party system for Canada. A final answer would seemingly imply some value judgements. One would first have to decide whether sectional interests or national integration should prevail. If the latter alternative is chosen, one would have to decide on the most desirable means of achieving national integration: either through constant compromise, conciliation, and mutual concessions among the various ethnic and regional interests, or through the promotion of class politics and national class-consciousness which might override ethnic and regional differences.

The advocates of the greater expansion of sectional interests could maintain that the ideological cleavages uncovered in this study suggest that the present Parliamentary system, with its rigidly disciplined parties, is inappropriate to a federal system. A Congressional system, according to this argument, would permit various factions to form more 'natural' alliances on specific issues. While this could have positive results, it should be noted that there is always the danger

under such a system of the creation of a true 'permanent minority'. Since there are important ethnic cleavages where most French-Canadians find themselves ranged against most English-Canadians, the former could lose any advantages they now possess as a decisive power bloc in the government party. If French-Canadian M.P.'s found themselves constantly outvoted by an uncompromising English-speaking majority in matters of importance to their ethnic group, the result would be national disintegration.

The apologists of the existing party system might argue that the cleavages discovered in this study show the necessity of the maintenance of the 'brokerage' system to preserve national unity. Only the present system, with its constant compromises between regional and ethnic factions, can hope to create supra-regional, bi-ethnic, 'national' parties. The absence of such parties, according to this argument, could only result in regionalism so strong that Confederation would explode.

There are several answers to this argument. First, 'brokerage' parties which devote most of their time simply to finding day-to-day compromises among widely different groups will tend to be fundamentally conservative and unable to offer more than piecemeal solutions to immediate problems rather than coherent long-term programmes. Secondly, one can question the degree of national integration achieved by the present system. A century of 'brokerage' politics has not brought the various regions and ethnic groups of Canada appreciably closer together.

We may seriously wonder whether the relative success of 'brokerage' politics in preserving Confederation thus far is due to the wisdom and excellence of the system itself, or simply to the fact that the greatest potentially disruptive forces in Canada, regionalism and French-Canadian nationalism, have remained for the most part defensive or dormant. On the few occasions that these forces awakened and became aggressive (as in the first Conscription Crisis, and the Progressive Movement) the 'brokerage' system proved unable to cope. Now that French-Canadian nationalism seems to have fully awakened, and that Western and Maritime demands are finding expression, the 'brokerage' system may well be verging on complete breakdown. If national integration is ever to be achieved, it will probably have to be on another basis. Thirdly, it is increasingly obvious that there is only one major party capable of fulfilling the 'brokerage' function at all, as the Conservative party appears to have hopelessly alienated the French-speaking population. In the present context, accepting the 'brokerage' system virtually implies the dominance of a single party.

Finally, the advocates of class politics would argue that the Parliamentary system with disciplined parties is appropriate, but does not correspond to Canadian social needs. What is needed is a re-alignment of parties to represent class interests, which would hopefully surmount ethnic and regional divisions. The difficulty lies in realising such a re-alignment at a time when French-Canadian nationalism and other regionalisms are extremely strong (the difficulties of the N.D.P. in Quebec are indicative).

Nonetheless, it is this last alternative that offers the most hope for eventual national integration. If the economic disparities between regions and between English and French Canada are attenuated, and if the electorate of these regions becomes more highly politicised, the foundations of class-consciousness and class-politics will be laid. If French-Canadians can be assured that their ethnic and cultural aspirations can be preserved and enhanced within class-based parties, a genuine national integration can be hoped for.

APPENDIX

Following are the English and French texts of the letter of introduction and the questionnaire used in the study. Question '12' in the questionnaire was not used in the study because it was felt, in the final analysis, that the translation of this question was not sufficiently precise.

The Questionnaire

1. Introductory Letter

Cher monsieur,

Le bref questionnaire ci-inclus fait partie d'un projet de recherche que j'entreprend actuellement, en vue d'ecrire ma these de Maitrise en Science Politique a l'universite McGill. La these, a comme but de comparer certaines attitudes et opinions des legislateurs canadiens de differents partis politiques et de differentes regions du Canada.

Il va sans dire que toutes les reponses sont anonymes et confidentielle. Ce projet de recherche est sous la direction de M. Michael Stein, professeur agrege de Science Politique a l'universite McGill, et tout se fait avec la connaissance et l'approbation du departement d'Economie et de Science Politique.

Les quelques minutes que vous mettrez a repondre a ce questionnaire me rendront un tres grand service. Une enveloppe adressee est fournie.

Je vous remercie de votre bienveillante attention.

Bien a vous,

Normand Duern

Dear Sir,

The brief questionnaire enclosed is part of a research project which I am undertaking at the present, with the view of writing a thesis for the Master's degree in Political Science at McGill University. The basic aim of the thesis is to compare certain attitudes and opinions of Canadian legislators from different parties and from different regions of Canada.

Of course, all responses will be anonymous and confidential. This research project is under the direction of Michael Stein, professor of Political Science at McGill University, and all with the knowledge and approval of the Department of Economics and Political Science of the University.

The few minutes which you will spend in answering this questionnaire will be of great service to me. I have included an addressed

envelope for your convenience.

Thank you very much for your kind co-operation.

Yours truly,

Normand Duern

II. The Questionnaire

1. Quelle est votre affiliation politique?
Lib. ____ P.C. ____ N.D.P. ____ R. Cred. ____ Autre ____
2. Dans quelle province votre circonscription se trouve-t-elle?

3. Croyez-vous que la Monarchie contribue de facon importante a l'unite canadienne?
Oui ____
Non ____
4. A votre avis, le peuple canadien pourrait-il avoir autant de respect pour un President élu que pour la Monarchie traditionnelle?
Oui ____
Non ____
5. En generale, pensez-vous qu'un systeme Parlementaire soit preferable a un systeme Presidentiel du type americain?
Oui ____
Non ____

6. En general, pensez-vous qu'un systeme Parlementaire est plus efficace qu'un systeme Presidentiel, moins efficace, ou parfaitement egal?

Plus_____

Moins_____

Egal_____

7. Pensez-vous que, dans les quelques annees a venir, la vie en general s'ameliiorera pour les canadiens, ou est-ce-qu'elle se deteriorera?

S'ameliiorera_____

Se deteriorera_____

8. Estimez-vous que le developpement du Canada en tant que nation est aussi sain qu'il ne pourrait l'etre, ou est-il malsain?

Sain_____

Malsain_____

9. Lequel des facteurs ci-dessous vous semble etre le plus grand probleme faisant face au Canada actuellement?

- i). Inegalite economique entre les provinces_____
- ii). Divisions entre Anglophones et Francophones_____
- iii). Emprises etrangeres sur l'economie canadienne_____
- iv). Possibilite d'une crise economique generale_____
- v). Affaiblissement de l'autorite, manque de principes moraux dans notre societe_____
- vi). Autre_____

10. En tenant compte des opportunitites existants au Canada actuellement, que doit-on blamer le plus souvent lorsqu'un individu est pauvre: un manque d'effort personnel, ou les circonstances qui l'environnent?

Manque d'effort_____ Circonstances_____

11. Croyez-vous que ce serait une bonne chose pour la société canadienne si l'on donnait plus d'autorité aux services d'ordre, ou ont-ils déjà les moyens suffisants?

Plus d'autorité _____

Déjà suffisants _____

12. Quelques-uns disent que la peine capitale pour les assassins est compatible avec les principes chrétiens; d'autres prétendent qu'elle est incompatible avec ces principes; et d'autres encore croient que les principes chrétiens n'offrent pas de solution à cette question. Quelle est votre opinion?

Compatible _____

Incompatible _____

N'offrent pas de solution _____

13. Pensez-vous que la société en général s'améliorerait si l'on augmentait l'instruction religieuse dans les écoles?

Oui _____

Non _____

14. Croyez-vous que ce serait une bonne chose que les églises adoptent publiquement une position précise sur les grandes questions politiques?

Oui _____

Non _____

15. Estimez-vous que les syndicats ouvriers sont bien dirigés ou mal dirigés par leurs chefs, à l'heure actuelle?

Bien dirigés _____

Mal dirigés _____

16. Actuellement, lequel de ces groupes vous semble avoir la plus grande influence sur le gouvernement?

i). Les syndicats_____

ii). Les grandes entreprises_____

iii). Les organisations d'agriculteurs _____

17. Certains disent que les entreprises pourront continuer a nous donner notre niveau de vie eleve seulement si elles demeurent libre de la reglementation gouvernementale. Etes-vous d'accord?

D'accord_____

Pas d'accord_____

18. Quelques-uns pretendent que le gouvernement, a l'avenir, devrait faire plus d'effort pour assurer a tous les canadiens, riches ou pauvres, une bonne education, des soins medicaux, la protection contre le chomage, et un bon revenu. Etes-vous d'accord?

D'accord_____

Pas d'accord_____

19. Il y a a present un sentiment considerable que les canadiens francophones n'ont pas joui de leurs pleins droits a l'interieur de la Confederation. Etes-vous d'accord?

D'accord_____

Pas d'accord_____

20. Si une province, par l'intermediaire de son gouvernement legal, decidait de se separer du reste du Canada, le gouvernement federal devrait-il empecher cette tentative de separation?

Oui_____

Non_____

1. What is your party affiliation?

Lib. _____ P.C. _____ N.D.P. _____ R. Cred. _____ Other _____

2. In what province or territory is your riding located?

3. Do you believe that the Monarchy makes an important contribution to Canadian unity?

Yes _____

No _____

4. In your opinion, could Canadians come to have as much regard for an elected President as they do for the traditional Monarch?

Yes _____

No _____

5. In general, do you think that a Parliamentary system is preferable to a Presidential system of the American type?

Yes _____

No _____

6. In general, do you think that a Parliamentary system is more efficient than a Presidential one, less efficient, or just the same?

More _____

Less _____

Same _____

7. Do you think that life in general will get better or worse for Canadians over the next few years?

Better _____

Worse _____

8. Do you think that Canada's development as a nation is as sound as it might be, or is it basically unsound?

Sound as it might be _____

Unsound _____

9. Which ONE of the factors named below is the greatest single problem facing Canada today?

- i) Economic disparity between the provinces _____
- ii) English-French divisions within Canada _____
- iii) Foreign control of Canada's economy _____
- iv) Possibility of a general economic recession _____
- v) Breakdown of authority; decay of guiding moral principles of our society _____
- vi) Other _____

10. In general, considering the opportunities available in Canada today, which do you think is most often to blame if a person is poor: Lack of personal effort, or circumstances beyond his control?

Lack of effort _____

Circumstances _____

11. Do you think that it would be a good thing for Canadian society if more authority were given to the forces of law and order, or do they have sufficient means now?

More authority _____

Sufficient now _____

12. Some maintain that capital punishment for murderers is compatible with Christian principles; others, that it is incompatible with Christian principles; and still others say that Christian principles are silent on this point. What is your opinion?

Compatible _____

Incompatible _____

Silent _____

13. Do you believe that society in general would be improved if there were more religious instruction in schools?

Yes _____

No _____

14. Do you think that it would be a good thing if the churches took public stands on important political issues?

Yes _____

No _____

15. Do you think that organized labour is being generally well-led or badly led by its leaders?

Well led _____

Badly led _____

16. At present, which of these groups seems to you to have the most influence on government?

i) Labour unions _____

ii) Big business _____

iii) Farm organizations _____

17. Some people say that business enterprise can continue to give us our high standard of living only if it remains free from government regulation. Do you agree?

Yes _____

No _____

18. Some say that the government, in future, should devote more effort to see to it that all people, rich or poor, have adequate education, medical care, protection against unemployment, and income. Do you agree?

Yes _____

No _____

19. There is considerable feeling that French Canadians have not received their full rights under Confederation. Do you agree?

Yes _____

No _____

20. If a province were to decide, through its legally constituted authorities, to separate from the rest of Canada, should the federal government prevent it from doing so?

Yes _____

No _____

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