Finding Faith Between Infidelities: Historiography as Mourning in Shakespeare

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For my Father, Kenneth Earle Britton (1948-2006). Unceasingly mourned.

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Abstract

This dissertation considers early modern historiography as a form of mourning; the mourner's vision of the afterlife for the dead is a fitting parallel to the afterlife of the past in the historiographical text. Protestants comforted the living and the dying with the notion that the dead would temporarily rest after death. The idea of rest was comforting because it was only provisional; the dead would be resurrected by Christ in the future and would be reunited with their loved-ones.

The prospect that the dead rested was comforting, but it could also be unsettling in many ways. The funeral rituals that made the dead appear restful in fact testify to the ongoing effects of decay. Moreover, the mourner did not necessarily wish to put the dead to rest completely; this would constitute a troubling break of a meaningful affective bond. Thus, even as the mourner puts the dead to rest, she launches an ongoing interpretive address to the dead. A history of early modern waking, prophetic utterances and burial materials supplies evidence for this argument. The value of thinking of early modern mourning in this way is that it mirrors the work of history, which is, as Michel de Certeau argues, "a labour of death and a labour against death" (*The Writing of History* 5). Historians, like mourners, attempt to preserve the integrity of the dead even as they acknowledged that the dead could only be preserved in the imaginative and emotional address by the living.

In connecting early modern historiography to mourning, this dissertation argues that many "unhistorical" moments in Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* and Shakespeare and Fletcher's *Henry VIII* are profound considerations of the work of history; this view is supported by thinking of these plays in conjunction with *Richard III*. All three plays test the border between the living and the dead, often by staging burials, and, also, supernatural visitations of ghosts and gods. Shakespeare advances a notion of ethical historiography in which the site of burial is also the site of ongoing interpretive energy.

Abrégé

Cette thèse considère le début de l'historiographie moderne comme une sorte de deuil ; la vision qu'a la personne en deuil, du défunt dans la vie après la mort est un parallèle pertinent à l'au-delà du passé dans le texte historiographique. Les protestants conciliaient la vie et la mort dans l'idée que le mort se reposerait temporairement après son décès. L'idée de repos était réconfortante car elle n'était que provisoire ; les morts seraient ressuscités par le Christ à l'avenir et seraient réunis avec leurs proches.

La perspective que le défunt se reposait était réconfortante, mais elle aurait pu également être troublante à bien des égards ; les rituels funéraires qui montraient le cadavre reposé, en fait, témoignaient de l'effet persistant de la décadence. En outre, la personne plongée dans le deuil ne souhaitait pas nécessairement le repos complet du disparu, constituant une rupture significative du lien affectif. Ainsi, alors même que le trépassé repose en paix, la personne qui le pleure maintient un dialogue interprétatif avec ce dernier. Un éveil dans l'histoire du monde moderne, énonciations prophétiques et préparatifs matériels autour de l'inhumation étayent cette allégation. La valeur de la pensée accordée au deuil dans le monde moderne, en ce sens, est le reflet du travail de l'histoire, qui est, comme le soutient Michel de Certeau : "le travail de la mort et le travail contre la mort", (*L'écriture de l'histoire 5*). Les historiens, tout comme les pleureurs, tentèrent de préserver l'intégrité de la mort alors même qu'ils reconnaissaient que celle-ci pouvait, seule, subsister dans l'imagination ainsi que dans l'émotion des vivants.

En reliant le début de l'historiographie moderne au deuil, cette thèse soutient que beaucoup de moments 'non historiques' comme dans *Cymbeline* de Shakespeare, et dans *Henry VIII* de Shakespeare et Fletcher, sont d'une importance extrême dans l'œuvre de l'histoire, ce point de vue est soutenu par la pensée de ces pièces, en conjonction avec *Richard III*. Ces trois pièces interrogent la frontière entre la vie et la mort, souvent en mettant en scène des enterrements, ainsi qu'en organisant des visites surnaturelles de fantômes et de dieux. Shakespeare avance la notion d'éthique de l'historiographie selon laquelle l'espace de l'inhumation est également celui de l'interprétation d'énergie continue.

Introduction

> Two infidelities, an impossible choice: on the one hand, not to say anything that comes back to oneself, to one's own voice, to remain silent, or at the very least to let oneself be accompanied or preceded in counterpoint by the friend's voice. Thus, out of zealous devotion or gratitude, out of approbation as well, to be content with just quoting, with just accompanying that which more or less directly comes back or returns to the other, to let him speak, to efface oneself in front of and to follow his speech, and to do so right in front of him. But this excess of fidelity would end up saying and exchanging nothing. It returns to death. It points to death, sending death back to death. On the other hand, by avoiding all quotation, all identification, all rapprochement even, so that what is addressed to or spoken of Roland Barthes truly comes from the other, from the living friend, one risks making him disappear again, as if one could add more death to death and thus indecently pluralize it. We are left then with having to do and not do both at once, with having to correct one infidelity by the other. From one death, the other: is this the uneasiness that told me to begin with a plural? (Derrida "The Deaths of Roland Barthes" 45)

In his 1981 tribute to his friend Roland Barthes, Derrida describes, with unusual clarity, the difficult task of speaking of the dead. It is a form of difficulty charted so well by Derrida in his many tributes and eulogies; the mourner longs for a truce between combative impulses but the truce remains elusive because there is no firm middle ground between the living and the dead. Derrida articulates an anxiety shared by many mourners: he feels impelled to eagerly indulge *and* to self-consciously restrain an expression of sorrow which, even if sincere (perhaps, especially if sincere), verges on an embarrassment. Derrida's self-consciousness pays heed to the disturbing knowledge that grief sits beyond the limits of expression. While Derrida underscores his longing for complete silence in the face of this loss, he also speaks relentlessly, asking more questions than he ever manages to answer. Derrida writes from the heart of an irresolvable dilemma that confronts the mourner: does she efface the self from or interpose the self into the act of mourning when both tactics seem incapable of doing justice to the dead? Derrida's tribute describes and enacts its suspension, and the

suspension of all acts of mourning, between these options he terms the "two infidelities": One infidelity is the passive quotation of Barthes's voice when he was living, and the other is an imaginative conversation with Barthes's voice after his death. The former adheres to fact and the latter indulges in fiction. This dialectic can be reframed as opposition between an affirmation and denial of death's absolute power. If Derrida feels that he must do nothing more than quote Barthes, he gives credence to the notion that his friend cannot be recalled, and Derrida will have reinforced the extinguishment of his friend's voice. Moreover, pure quotation without the possibility of response would require the mourner to foreclose any kind of emotional or discursive relationship with the dead; this would be difficult, if not impossible. To pay this kind of tribute, Derrida would be silent and, in some sense, extinguish his voice. If Derrida decides to continue his intellectual engagement with Barthes, to speculate what Barthes would say *if he were still alive*, then Derrida risks creating a distorted version of his friend's voice. He, therefore, worries about negating or creating the past, and neither extreme appeals to a man who is obsessed with the desire to avoid doing further injury to the friend he mourns. Derrida frequently terms the space between these two infidelities a "wound": to move in either direction only extends the initial trauma caused by death.

In his ruminations on grief composed after his wife's death, C.S. Lewis also notices that articulations of mourning inevitably expose the permeability of the border between speaking of the dead and speaking for the dead. He reflects that:

> keeping promises to the dead, or to anyone else, is very well. But I begin to see that 'respect for the wishes of the dead' is a trap. Yesterday I stopped myself only in time from saying about some trifle 'H. wouldn't have liked that.' This is unfair to the others [her children]. I should soon be using 'what H. would have liked' as an instrument of domestic tyranny, with her supposed likings becoming a thinner and thinner disguise for my own. (*A Grief Observed* 8-9)

Entrapment. Unfairness. Tyranny. These are conditions with which Derrida is familiar. A strange hybrid between the dead and living takes form when the mourner makes gestures of respect for the dead, but uses his own desires as the force of animation. Lewis, above all, links the gesture of mourning to judicial transgression that is both cause and effect. In speaking words that his wife might never have uttered, he has failed to do justice to her. This failure, then, makes him "unfair" to those around him. Both the dead and the living are overcome by a "tyrant" who masquerades as a mourner: he seems to serve the best interests of all, but, in fact, manipulates the past to serve his own solipsistic ends. Lewis's admission here, a description of his mourning, is a fine emblem for the movement of mourning in general. Lewis reveals that mourning requires one to make amends for one's slip into infidelities. To mourn, then, is to feel the pressure to honour the rights of the dead, even though the dead cannot explain what these rights might be.

Lewis describes how he resists the allure of tyranny, but inadvertently demonstrates that the mourner in fact lengthens the wound in the process of trying to heal it through writing. After re-reading his initial journal entry, he admits that he is appalled by his previous writings. "From the way I've been talking," he laments, "anyone would think that H.'s death matters chiefly for its effect on myself. Her point of view seems to have dropped out of sight" (17). Writing, it seems, encodes the very immorality it desperately works to avoid. H.'s death, like Barthes's, becomes plural when the tyrant (over the living and the dead) emerges from acts of repentance. Admissions of guilt are, at the same time, repetitions of the crime of self-indulgence, the promotion of the self's concerns over the concerns of the dead. Lewis's description of being "appalled" underlines his inability to step outside of his own feelings. His concern for H.'s

perspective, her "point of view," exists entirely in relation to his own: her eyes have "dropped out of sight," - *his* sight. In the process of condemning his self-absorption, Lewis nests H.'s unique vision directly inside his, repeating the very injury he hopes to rehabilitate. One can imagine Lewis re-reading this second articulation of guilt, reiterating the same sense of horror, and, thus, enlarging the same discursive wound, *ad infinitum*. For Derrida too, the confrontation of the "impossible choice" threatens to go on indefinitely. He perceives that the loved one mourned is, paradoxically, "always at the point – in presenting itself – of presenting itself no longer" (66). Barthes and H. slip away, "out of sight," at the very moment their mourners strain to bring them back into focus. In "respecting" (in the fullest sense of the term, honouring and keeping in sight) their lost loved-ones , Derrida and Lewis stand poised to pluralize death, until, as Derrida describes it, the air "becomes more and more dense, more and more haunted and peopled with ghosts" (66). These ghosts are the resonances of the mourner's struggle to mediate loss; they are versions of the dead that have been brought into existence by an act of infidelity and banished from that existence by corrective gestures.

Yet, perhaps the mourner's struggle to preserve the beloved's point of view tells us more than simply that the wound continues. Derrida's wandering, stream-of-consciousness tribute demonstrates that whatever else it claims to be, mourning *is* the restless movement between holding onto and letting go of the dead. Though Derrida finds no victory for either self or other, life or death, he testifies that mourning is an interminable engagement with the question of how to do justice to the dead. If the mourner cannot do justice fully and finally to the dead, at least complete loss is also deferred.

This is not a study of Derrida or Lewis. The pairing of a deconstructionist philosopher and a Christian theologian and novelist appears entirely ungainly at first glance –a tyrannical hybrid in its own right. Despite the fundamental philosophical differences between these thinkers, their similar views on mourning seem intriguingly helpful. Although they speak solely of a deceased loved one, they could also speak to the difficulty involved in thinking about the dead in general. In both instances, the desire to speak about the dead is hampered by the fact that the dead can no longer approve or disapprove of what is said about them. Both men regard mourning as a mobile point between life and death, as a space that is "dense" with spectres created by the shifting versions of the dead made by the living, and the mourner's heavy sense of responsibility to locate the spectre that resembles the dead loved-one as near as possible. They attend to the force of this ethical conundrum, the necessity of engagement with loss, even when they find themselves incapable of resolving it.

The sense of restlessness that both men feel when trying to locate a faithful memory about the dead impels their writing and unites their bodies with the dead. The living and the dead share the work of conveying the truth about the past. The mourner's discomfort during this process is crucial because it delays closure. The "uneasiness" that directs Derrida to worry about the "deaths" of Barthes provides him with the motivation to write about the dead when no words seem adequate. This sensation of agitation keeps those who remember the dead vigilant over the possible corruption of those memories by too much or not enough fidelity. Lewis begins his journal on mourning by citing the same uneasiness that plagues Derrida. "No one ever told me," he says, "that grief felt so like fear. I am not afraid, but the sensation is like being afraid. The same fluttering in the

stomach, the same restlessness" (3). This agitation of the mind and body impels the mourner to tackle the seemingly unattainable task of putting the dead to rest faithfully, if not fully, in writing.

How does the work of mourning carry over into the writing of history? In *The Writing of History*, Michel de Certeau describes historiography as a "labour of death, a labour against death" (5). He describes this double-labour as a kind of mourning:

> historiography takes for granted the fact that it has become impossible to believe in this presence of the dead that has organized (or organizes) the experience of entire civilizations; and the fact too that it is nonetheless impossible to 'get over it,' to accept the loss of a living solidarity with what is gone. (5)

Historiography's inability to 'get over' the irreducible separation between present and past serves as a vital reminder of the ways that the work of history is much like the work of mourning. The infinite task of "getting over" death stands in nicely for the idea that historiographical work continues because it is constantly and restlessly orients itself between the possibility of the living connecting to the dead and the belief that such a connection is impossible. I am interested in how historiography may no longer "take for granted" this continual mourning of the dead. By affording historians the status as vigilant watchers over the dead, historiography can encourage them to take their work no longer for granted, to see their own contribution as a vital component in the refusal to "get over" irrevocable loss. Writing is the hinge between mourning and historiography. "The imperative to 'write it,'" de Certeau explains, "is connected with the loss of voice and the absence of place. It is the obligation to be passing away and to pass away endlessly" (325). The concept of "passing away [...] endlessly" is vital. It unites the possibility of discursive continuance to the reality of organic endings.

Historiography indeed brings together the living and the dead. As de Certeau also points out,

> [l]anguage exorcises death and arranges it in the narrative that pedagogically replaces it with something that the reader must believe and do [...] More exactly it receives the dead that a social change has produced, so that the space opened up by this past can be marked, and so that it will still be possible to connect what appears with what disappears. (101)

By employing the concept of exorcism, de Certeau magnifies this process of which he speaks, this banishment of death by way of making the dead into a discourse of expectation for future, living actions. De Certeau finds that historiography will "impose upon the receiver a will, a wisdom, and a lesson" (102), and so, "the dead of which [history] speaks become the vocabulary of a task to be undertaken" (103). De Certeau finds this exorcism of death into a language of the dead *for* the living an imposition, but this process need not necessarily take the shape of an imposition. The "will," "wisdom" and "lesson" exchanged between dead and living need not be singular and dogmatic in each case; it is possible to think of wills, wisdoms and lessons emerging from an equitable exchange between those who have disappeared and those who "undertake" them.

Paul Ricoeur describes how the living can engage with the dead and make the site of loss, an "enduring mark." This, he suggests, is the task of historiography; in *Memory, History, Forgetting*, he terms it the "act of sepulcher" and uses it to consider the way in which history takes the dead into account. He observes how the construction of the sepulcher transforms the absent dead to a living presence:

> It is an act, the act of burying. This gesture is not punctual; it is not limited to the moment of burial. The sepulcher remains because the gesture of burying remains; its path is the very path of mourning that transforms the physical absence of the

> lost object into an inner presence. The sepulcher as the material place thus becomes the enduring mark of mourning. (366)

It is important to note that this transformation does not restore the dead to life. Rather, it converts the fact of loss into the act of acknowledging and framing loss. After all, the presence of which Ricoeur speaks is in fact an "inner" presence – a life insofar as it signals intellectual and emotional engagement. The physical memorial may be material, but it symbolizes and makes possible mourning, which is a memorial that evades physical and temporal limits, that must evade those limits to earn its name.

Critical work on early modern historiography in England has focused on the evolution of such work from chronicle to political history, the diverse incarnations of the historian (chronicler, antiquarian, chorographer, biographer to name a few), the efficacy of these works in conveying a sense of national and providential order, and the effect of humanism on all of these topics. Scholarship has also explored the intended audience for early modern historical works. Did the historiographical text, chronicle or otherwise, impart a message to the upper-class or the lower-class, or both? This study will address these broad concerns, but will do so by considering the extent to which an early modern historian, by taking on the role of a mourner of the past, can create a community of affective bodies that cuts across social class.

Daniel Woolf observes that "history maintained the connection between a mortal and the future, rescuing him from oblivion or condemning him to perpetual infamy" (*Idea of History* 12). Woolf's use of the term "mortal" here, and its relation to a kind of historiographical immortality, is vital to an understanding of the relationship of the historian to his subject. The definition of an historian as a force of either rescue or condemnation comes close to signalling the kind of ethical relationship that the historian

must cultivate with the dead. Woolf goes on to define truthful history at a time when truth was not "the kind of precise, literal truth" encouraged much later (12). An honest historian "sought, through diligent research in records and manuscripts, to paint the picture of the past as accurately as possible." The end, Woolf explains, "was not historical truth *per se*, but some external purpose: panegyric of a dead or living nobleman, entertainment, or the edification of the reader" (13). The three aims of the historian may be prioritized differently according to the kind of history and the temperament of the historian; it is the first purpose that this study scrutinizes in detail.

Early modern histories, and the plays that follow in their wake, are more interested in the panegyric of the dead than previous critical work has allowed. The term "panegyric" is also misleading. My attention turns not to formal works of praise, but to related but less formalized expressions of affection for the dead in a wide range of early modern historiographical texts. There is a growing interest in the history of emotions.[1] My study initially touches on the history of emotion as it traces the way in which early moderns addressed grief, and turns to thinking about the place of grief in Shakespeare's history plays.

Annabel Patterson explains that the chroniclers' desire to include as much material in their work as possible, even conflicting accounts of the same event, is not a sign of a failed work. Arguing against F.J. Levy, she suggests that the inclusive nature of chronicles was due to the historians' interest in an "abstract conception of justice" ("Rethinking Tudor Historiography" 191) and their desire to enable a "thoughtful, critical and wary" reading of their works (191). She later terms the writing of the chronicle as a "project of civic consciousness (199). A wide historical perspective that retains troubling

[1] See Barbara H. Rosenwein. "Worrying About Emotions in History."

discrepancies performs a duty to the dead; the historian must undertake and understand this vigilance over the past as a duty also to the reader, who has the right to the fullest possible detail. The text, historian and reader are enveloped by the demand for "civic consciousness" that will not allow relevant material to disappear simply for the sake of the style of the work. Patterson's important revision of the perceived aims of early modern historiography has done much to address such works as meaningfully multivocal rather than hopelessly scattered.

The historians' sensitivity to the rights of the middle-class reader paralleled their desire to do justice to the dead. F.J. Levy describes this care for the subject of history as a particular feature of John Stow's histories:

> Stow's infinite care was the result of a love of the past for its own sake, and by the end of his career he no longer apologized for it. History was still useful to instil morality and patriotism, but it was much closer to the center of life than it had been and was no longer the shamefaced activity of monks who should have been at their prayers nor merchants taking a holiday from their accounts. Stow pursued accuracy because he loved the past enough to do it justice. (194)

There is something radical about calling historiography the "center of life." Levy is astute to recognize that something beyond morality and patriotism motivates the early modern historian. The notion that a historian would write for a "love for the past for its own sake" seems reductive. It is, in fact, a complex form of engagement, similar to those established by acts of mourning , and it can be fruitfully applied to a host of other histories. The assertion that one writes simply because one loves the past in fact critiques a wide range of less noble motivations for producing historiography. The practice of history becomes more meaningful than an intellectual diversion from real life. The bond between the living and the dead, if simple, appears, therefore, deceptively simple. The historiographical text can be the product of an intense, emotional tie between the

historian and her subject; an emotional connection ensures that the historian restlessly, endlessly pursues justice for the dead. Historians might not understand their task solely as a contribution to historical scholarship or a didactic exercise for the moral improvement of their readers; they aim, in writing of the past, to recognize the dead as a community of bodies that must continue to be addressed. Quite simply, the dead must continue to matter in their own right.

How, then, does Shakespeare combine a work of mourning with that of history? Much important and recent work on the early modern literature sees the community it fosters as a product of authors' investment in or rejection of ideological and dynastic forces. Richard Helgerson identifies several "discursive communities" that operated as part of the "Elizabethan writing of England" (5). Helgerson raises the salient question that must be entertained when one speaks of the participants in discursive communities. "Who counts," he asks, "as a member of the nation? Who gets represented?" (10). Stephen Greenblatt answers this question, pointing out that "massive power structures [...] determine social and psychic reality" (*Renaissance Self-Fashioning* 254). What is less clear is whether a shadowy partner to the discursive community can be identified; is there an *affective* community influenced less by power structures and more by one person's contemplation of the mortality of others? Can people separated by class, distance and, most important to this work, time be enveloped by shared (though obviously not identical) feelings about death, and brought in contact with each other by addressing this mortality? Many works have explored early modern understandings of bodily humours and corporeality.[2] The turn to consider an affective community is not an

[2] See Michael C. Schoenfeldt. *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton*.

extension of such studies. I will look at the results when such bodies are viewed together over time, rather than looking at the body itself and the relation of biology to identity. Garrett A. Sullivan Jr. warns readers of his work that he considers memory and forgetting "less purely cerebral processes than modes of behaviour and kinds of bodily deportment" and he advises that "each manifests a relationship not only with the past but with the present and the future" (21). I suggest that historiography can be ethical if it sees itself as "less cerebral" and instead focuses on the kinds of community to which Sullivan refers. If an affective community is identifiable, how does this community influence the social and psychic reality of early modernity? The historian who approaches history as an act of mourning will find that the "center of life" lies somewhere between the living and the dead, and the act of writing manifests the mourner's desire and inability fully to put the dead to rest.

The question of what constitutes ethical recollection can also be answered by considering the belief that many historiographical works were incapable of affecting anyone aside from the historian himself. The work of historiography could be defined, at its worst, as the absorption of dry, dusty scholars in dry, dusty and probably irrelevant material traces of the past. The problem is not that such historians did not love the past; the problem is that they failed to share this experience. Antiquarians and chroniclers earned this reputation in the early modern period. In his *Microcosmographie*, John Earle describes the antiquarian as one who "loves all things [...] the better for being mouldy and worme-eaten" (C2r). Woolf writes that chroniclers were considered "bulky compilers of insignificant fact, bloated peddlers of urban, rather than urbane, trivia" ("Rev. of *Reading Holinshed's Chronicles"* 381). Historians were perceived as inward-looking scholars;

the self-absorbed historian has utterly failed to produce a community that includes the bodies of the past and the future. There is something off-putting about historical scholarship that does not foster an intellectual and emotional engagement between the text and reader.

A work of history can be dry, irrelevant and single-minded; does this necessarily mean that the historian has treated his subject and potential audience unethically? Walter Benjamin would answer "yes." He explains that an ethically-sensitive historiography will reject the impulse to look at the people and facts of the past as if they were under a microscope, or as if they were part of a collection of traces over which the historian dispassionately presides. An ethical historian, indeed, "rescues" the past, to use Levy's term, and does so by considering the treatment of the dead an ongoing responsibility. After all, according to Benjamin, the dead are still at risk in the present. "For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its own concerns," he explains, "threatens to disappear irretrievably" (*Theses on the Philosophy of History* V, 255). The work of history protects the dead by making their fates the historian's own. As Woolf discerns, the advent of humanism encouraged historians to consider that "an understanding of a past reality" required "both scholarly knowledge and imaginative apprehension to be re-created meaningfully in the present" (*Social Circulation* 20). The dead can suffer another death if the historian and reader are not interested in communicating imaginatively with them. Derrida worries about infidelity to the dead that will result in "saying and exchanging nothing" with them. The mark of an ethical historian is that she feels this same worry and writes about the dead to prevent the collapse of exchange. This form of scholarship wishes to preserve the past as urgently as

one might wish to preserve the individual body against the threat of death or, in Benjamin's case, death and political domination. The responsible historian is honest about the limitations to the project of exchange between dead and living, yet refuses, when writing about the past, to, in Derrida's words "send death back to death" or "add more death to death."

In his *Theses on the Philosophy of History*, Benjamin considers this productive combination, something he terms historical materialism, in opposition to historicism; the latter is too wedded to the idea that simple quotation is all that historiography needs to do in order to gain a true picture of the past. Of course, Benjamin writes against a history that speaks only for political victors. He hopes to re-emphasize dead and living stories that are overridden by the political elite and made to disappear. His vision of historical materialism places the dead and living in a continuous and mutually productive relationship defined by endless but always unique moments of recognition. If this relationship makes of the past a restless traveller, one who is always open to reformulations and reinterpretations as it moves, then the moment of the present is, conversely, a moment of stillness; it is a moment when one attends fully to the relevance of the past to present concerns. The only true loss of the past will occur when man fails to open himself to that flash of recognition (the second when the stilled present sees itself as constituting and constituted by the past); each time this flash occurs, a new relationship between the present and the past forms; it is always one that sees past and present as equal contributors to an ethical portrait of the past.[3]

[3] In their introduction to *Loss*, a collection of essays on mourning and melancholy, David L. Eng and David Kazanjian summarise Benjamin's understanding that historiography is a "creative process, animating history for future significations as well as alternate empathies," and they add that Benjamin hopes to

Michel Foucault might not appear to offer a contribution to the notion of ethical historiography as a sustained connection between present and past. Yet, in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, his insistence on attending to moments of discourse as "sudden irruptions" that may be "repeated, known, forgotten, transformed, utterly erased and hidden" (25) mimics Benjamin's description of the image of the past that "flits by" and disappears. Moreover, Foucault urges us to "be ready to receive every moment of discourse" that irrupts in this way; he therefore makes the historian, once again, responsible for her vigilance over the meanings that the past makes possible in the present.

Foucault notes a further distinction that deserves recounting. He describes interpretation as a way of "reacting to enunciative poverty, and to compensate for it by a multiplication of meaning." Foucault suggests that rather than attempt such compensation, the historian should practice analysis of "discursive formation," which is to "seek the law of that poverty [...] to weigh it up" (120). By analyzing rather than interpreting, the historian searches for "value that is not defined by their [statements'] truth, that is not gauged by the presence of a secret content; but which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation" (120). Mourning teaches us that compensation for loss might never be possible. So while Benjamin exhorts the historian to value exchange between past and present, Foucault encourages the historian to weigh evidence for and against these exchanges in the "field of dispersion" of all possible enunciations and silences.

He suggests that an archaeological approach to history "does not treat discourse [...] as an element that ought to be transparent, but whose unfortunate opacity must often

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"induce actively a tension between the past and the present, between the dead and the living" as part of a "continuing dialogue with loss and its remains" (1).

be pierced if one is to reach at last the depth of the essential place in which it is held in reserve" (138). Transparency and opacity, thus, can fulfill the definition of the two infidelities I addressed initially. This possibility would result in the end of the processes of interpretation. Because an ethical historiography esteems each condition as mutually constitutive elements in ongoing exchange, the activities of evaluation never cease. Foucault cautions us against slipping into the seductive comfort offered by the traditional history of ideas. While my study does not seek this comfort, guarding against sentimentalizing history by searching out its potential for ethical recollection has worth. I must not reiterate the practices of traditional history under another disguise. Foucault terms the history of ideas a "fundamental, reassuring inertia" (174) and the "silent sedimentation of things said" (141); these descriptions will serve as touchstones as I diverge from the history of ideas. For, as I began by demonstrating, historiography conceived of as mourning maintains motion, emotionally and intellectually. As I also suggest, this restlessness is anything but reassuring or silent. If anything, it is relentlessly vocal and continually disruptive.

In *Truth and Method*, Hans-Georg Gadamer explains that a work of art contains the possibilities of its future activation in interpretation, and only reaches its fullest expression in the moment it is presented to an attentive reader or spectator. The "ontological interwovenness" of original work of art and presented (and thus interpreted) work of art means it experiences an "increase in being," an "overflow" at its presentation (135). Similarly, when the reader/spectator is fully engaged with the work of art, a form of participation in the creation of that work that is marked by self-forgetfulness, she experiences an "increase in being," or rather a deeper understanding of being in the

process of temporarily forgetting the self. Gadamer, thus, places great value on the vigilant participant, whose participation is not composed of actions in the real world, but rather a retreat from action into stillness. Like Benjamin, Gadamer relates the vigilant body to the motionless body, the "passive" body (122). To fully participate in artistic presentation, there is no space for problem-solving motions. Rather, the participant is "totally involved in and carried away" by the work of art, and, therefore, offers her "full attention to the matter at hand" (122). The participant has the responsibility to give away her sense of self, but in return, she is afforded knowledge about the "moral world in which we live" (124).

According to Pierre Nora, historiography should emerge from the space between unself-conscious memory and critical history. What he terms the "places of memory" (*lieux de memoire*) straddle natural and artificial processes: they are "moments of history torn away from the movement of history, then returned; no longer quite life, not yet death, like shells on the shore when the sea of living memory has receded" (12). The places of history lie between the moment and the movement of history, between event and practice, memory and reconstruction of memory. These places are created because they are threatened by absorption into either memory or history once again, into an unself-conscious present that cannot critique itself, or into a fully self-conscious present that critiques itself too much. The threat of either infidelity means that the places of memory depend on "commemorative vigilance" (12).

Nora calls the lieux the area between the "intractability" and the "disappearance" of the past. This is the space where "every object – even the most humble, the most improbable, the most inaccessible" has been promoted, the space that attends to the

"dignity of historical mystery" (17). Thus, for Nora, as for the other theorists I mention, interpretive complexity advances rather than obstructs forms of ethical remembering. He alludes to the power of "hallucinations of the past," which partake of intractability and disappearance without giving in to either. It is important to note that the places of memory do not fully restore the past; the result of this inquiry is not "genesis" but "instead the decipherment of what we are in light of what we are no longer" (18). Like the funerary monument, the lieux "immortalize death" because they are "mixed, hybrid, mutant, bound intimately with life and death" (19).[4]

In his outline of a hermeneutics of historical consciousness in *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur suggests that the "suspension of the historical – through forgetfulness and the claims of the unhistorical" restores the "strength of the present" and its ability to "have the force to reactivate the unaccomplished possibilities of the past" (240).[5] Interruptions to dry historical scholarship allow the past and present to exert equal *force*, and produce a compound that contains the traces of each temporal state at the same time that it creatively transcends them. The force of this compound enables history to overcome the charge that it amounts to the passive accumulation of "dead deposit[s]."

In addition to encouraging the suspension of history, Ricoeur sees a measured ethical sensitivity to the past as a means of advancing historical consciousness. If dry historical scholarship fails to engage with the past in a meaningful way, then feeling too

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[4] Nora writes that tombs or funerary monuments are not "lieux de memoire" because "they owe their meaning to their intrinsic existence; even though their location is far from arbitrary, one could justify relocating them without altering their meaning" (22). I think Nora overstates the case here. I would suggest that monuments to the dead, if they are not "lieux" themselves, make the *dead body* a place of memory – both "natural and unnatural," and "bound intimately with life and death" (19).

[5] Ricoeur's understanding of the links between the trace and a narrative about the trace here is striking. Drawing from and paraphrasing Nietzsche, he attributes to historical science and culture a blind adherence to fact and objectivity, which turns historians into "library rats" who are "void of any creative instinct." (*Time and Narrative* 238).

much for the past also undermines the generation of historical meaning. Ricoeur notes that historians "are supposed to set aside their own feelings," but "when it is a question of events closer to us, like Auschwitz, it seems that the sort of ethical neutralization [...] is no longer possible" (187). At this point in his discussion of history and fiction in *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur seems genuinely conflicted about how much or how little a historian should feel for her material. He rejects the "ethical neutralization" of the past, but only because there is no other option when speaking of certain pasts. Ethical sensitivity is an obligation, rather than a choice, when one writes of a past that is too traumatic to treat with *detachment*. The yoking of historiography to mourning means that every past we confront is traumatic and requires our deepest feelings. This is not to say that creating a historical text that deals with the Holocaust doesn't require something still deeper than that. But Ricoeur himself, while singling out Auschwitz, also pluralizes its trauma. After all, he identifies pasts "like Auschwitz," possible pasts that are qualified only by their position "closer to us." Perhaps Ricoeur means "closer" in temporal terms, but I think he also conveys the sense that some pasts are closer to us *because* they carry a demand for ethical engagement. Certain pasts, it seems, carry the need for an ethical response, and it is not a matter of the historian's individual desires for, or rejections of, impartiality. The sensitive, attentive historian will respond to a call that is already embedded in the event; she will not ignore the summons because it speaks in the language of an obligation.

Even though Ricoeur is cautious about "reverent commemoration," a term he uses to signal a heightened ethical approach to the past, he does admit that "the elimination of admiration, veneration, and gratitude [is] impossible, and not really desirable" (187).

Once again, the idea of "impossibility" enters the discourse of ethical historiography. Derrida described mourning as the confrontation of impossible choices that represent fidelity to the dead. For Ricoeur, a troubling impossibility also disrupts the historian's control over her response to the past. It seems, in some cases, the impossibility to remain neutral matches the historian's sense that neutrality is not helpful. In these cases, the potential of ethical historiography is fruitfully fulfilled. It demonstrates partiality with a purpose, and encourages a form of engagement in which historiographical vigilance (attention to one's obligation to the past) takes precedence over the desires of the individual historian.

Historical imagination facilitates this measured, ethical approach to the past. It marks a way of "seeing the past" that moves between the infidelities that Ricoeur has addressed in terms of an historical ethics: self- indulgent partiality or unethical impartiality. The combination of imagination and history produces "an illusion of presence, but one controlled by critical distance" (188), and this balance mediates the two extremes that have troubled Ricoeur. Epic writing records unforgettable triumph. An ethical historiography, according to Ricoeur's formulation, will use fiction to produce narratives of unforgettable death. The call to resist forgetting then, responds to "victims whose suffering cries less for vengeance than for narration" (189). Finally, Ricoeur acknowledges that the impossibility to remain ethically neutral occurs because some pasts will, of necessity, transform historians into mourners, and by fulfilling the demands that this transformation makes, historiography will duplicate the call to mourn.

Richard Helgerson claims that Shakespeare's histories were indeed crafted for a community, but a community composed of the elite. Helgerson writes that Shakespeare

and his company hoped to "exclude and to alienate the popular, the socially marginal, the subversive, and the folk" (245). Helgerson also argues that Shakespeare gave the history play genre "a singularity of focus that contributed all at once to the consolidation of central power, to the cultural division of class from class" (245). This, Helgerson adds, is how Shakespeare fashioned himself as "gentleman and poet" (245). If Shakespeare wished to expunge the popular from his histories and therefore expunge the popular from his own history, the expression of mourning in these plays would be oriented to affirming the permanence of the aristocratic classes and the impermanence of those below them. In fact, if Helgerson is correct, death in the history plays would not be the leveller of all, but the means by which the elite further separate themselves from the popular. Evidence abounds that death is not an instrument of separating class from class in the history plays. Hal may exclude the popular from the ruling class literally by rejecting Falstaff at the close of *2 Henry IV*, but he cannot prevent the story of Falstaff's death from shadowing his later exploits in *Henry V*. Moments of exclusion like this are much more complicated than they appear.

Falstaff's deathbed, a site which is excluded from the play, is also unbearably present in the Hostess's remarkably touching recollection of his death. He "went away," she says, "an it had been any christom child" (2.3.11-12). The "chrysom baby," Julian Litten explains, is an infant who has died before reaching one month of life and who is buried in the cloth used to absorb the oil from the head at baptism. If the commoners have been excluded from the heroic action and have been subjected instead to Shakespeare's ridicule, they are emotionally called back, as the comparison of Falstaff's death to the death of a young baby makes clear. One could argue that the comparison is

itself comic, because Falstaff could, in his size and age, never come close to resembling an infant. The Hostess, however, communicates the sense that the moment of death makes the divisions between dissimilar people hard to distinguish (even when it comes to radically dissimilar individuals).

The Hostess is clearly moved by the moment of death when she compares Falstaff to a chrysom baby. The strangeness of the comparison conveys the extent to which death can modify appearances and collapse the easy division of age, class and gender. It is not that Falstaff is an infant; rather, he has been rendered as helpless as an infant by the effects of death. As the hostess informs the others, "I saw him fumble with the sheets and play wi'th' flowers" (2.3.13-14). Shakespeare's description of the moment of death is, at this moment, remarkably realistic, and it foregrounds two important experiences: the moment of death and the witness of the moment of death. The Hostess's history of Falstaff's death is descriptive, but it is also a testimony to the difficult necessity of watching over the dead and dying. Her history produces a feeling community, not simply because the audience hears Falstaff's last moments, but also because they become aware that the Hostess has been disturbed by her witness to it. Falstaff is restless before death and the Hostess, as she becomes his mourner, has encouraged his rest at the cost of her own. After relating the coldness of Falstaff's extremities, the Hostess allows her testimony to dissolve into other conversation. Like Falstaff's life itself, his history has ended not with a bang, but with a whimper. Ultimately, the history is equally about the facts of Falstaff's death and the Hostess's experience of those facts. The audience, then, cannot help but become part of this act of witness. Can this be an act of exclusion of the popular?

A trio of Shakespeare's history plays launch especially profound considerations of what it means to be faithful to the past. *Richard III*, *Cymbeline* and *Henry VIII* each contains surprising supernatural events that, especially in the case of the last two plays, have prompted critics to consider the plays unfaithful to their historical sources. These are not the only history plays that suggest the dead and living might be closer than we think. These are, however, with the exception of *1*and *2 Henry VI*, the only history plays that stage the moment when the worlds of the living and dead actually overlap and are visible to the audience. Shakespeare also stages moments of the supernatural so that he can urge his characters to confront their partialities and their sense of self in time. Shakespeare stages fantastic diversions from history not to reject the past, but to urge others to reconsider what is required to make a work of history a site of exchange. Partiality, the sense that the self is a part of the past that it critically surveys, is the path to historical honesty rather than an obstacle to its realization. History that arouses emotion extends its scope by invited interpretation and transmission of that interpretation.

I begin this study of Shakespeare and the language of mourning in history by facing the dual authorship of one of the plays that is important to this study. This collaboration brings the problem of presence and absence at the centre of my argument to the surface as well. In linking *Henry VIII* to Shakespeare's earlier work, am I not being unfaithful to Fletcher? In severing all links between the earlier histories and *Henry VIII*, I must commit another infidelity, this time to Shakespeare. I, like Derrida, must guard against an "excess of fidelity" to one extreme or another. Shakespeare's hand in *Henry VIII*, even if slight, can legitimize a conversation about the features of historiography between it and Shakespeare's other histories. The study of historiography and mourning

in Shakespeare is, after all, the facilitation of a complex exchange between three plays that, in their different ways, challenge us to reconsider what historiography looks and feels like to a self-conscious historian and a receptive audience. This study is not concerned with charting Shakespeare's dramatic evolution from the early to late plays. Plays wholly attributed to Shakespeare themselves result from a diverse network of influence, from histories to classical myth. In some sense, Shakespeare's collaboration with Fletcher, and the results that reverberate so wonderfully with Shakespeare's own *Richard III* and *Cymbeline*, speaks to ways in which a community of affective bodies applies even at the level of the playwright and his own sense of community with past texts.[6]

The scenes largely attributed to Fletcher are oriented towards addressing the same historiographical complexities as the scenes attributed to Shakespeare.[7] This does not imply that these men thought exactly alike. Rather, my research on many of the scenes of the play demonstrate that whatever their approach to dramatic style, their play carries out a *sustained* consideration of the qualities of the "honest chronicler" – from the prologue to the epilogue, and in much of the material between. Moreover, many early modern

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[6] *Henry VIII* has often been dismissed by critics who write about genre because it consistently straddles the line between history and romance. Although his opinion is long outmoded, E.M. Tillyard's dismissal offers a particularly strong precursor to a long line of rejections of the play in studies of either histories or romances. "I have omitted *Henry VIII*," he asserts in his study of Shakespeare's history plays, "not being convinced that Shakespeare wrote it all [...] Anyhow, Henry VIII is so far removed in date from the main sequence of the History Plays that its omission matters little" (viii). Robert Ornstein includes the play in his 1972 work *A Kingdom for a Stage: The Achievement of Shakespeare's History Plays*. He consistently outlines Fletcher's "preeminent" (203) role in the writing of the play in order to explain why the play "is so lacking in essential substance" (204). Ornstein ascribes the only effective moments in the play to Shakespeare; the rest, the superficial moments, belong to Fletcher. Like Tillyard, Ornstein uses questions of authorship and chronology as mutually supportive examples of the play's superficiality. He even suggests that Cranmer's "sentimental" and "incongruous" prophecy, which promotes "facile optimism," constitutes Fletcher's last desperate bid to prevent the play from "trailing off into insignificance" (220).

[7] The only text of the play derives from Shakespeare's *First Folio*. A full account of attribution of scenes appears in Gordon McMullan's edition of the play. The scene that is integral to my study, Act Four, Scene Two, is attributed to Fletcher by Spedding and Hope, and is attributed to Shakespeare by Hoy.

historiographical texts were collaborative. If anything, the partnership between Fletcher and Shakespeare makes their play more, rather than less, similar to histories of the time. As Annabel Patterson has shown, histories with a wide array of authorship are not necessarily fragmented. In their multivocality, such works contain the seed of exchange for a diverse group of authors that will flourish further with a similarly diverse range of readers.

In *Henry VIII*, Shakespeare and Fletcher produce a community of bodies that are subject to, and vigilant against, forms of "corruption." Characters consistently wonder what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the physical, spiritual and textual body after death. Corruption applies to mourning and historiography, in connecting the inevitable decay of the dead body to unethical ways of remembering the dead. The tomb, like the historiographical text, acknowledges and masks the effects of decay at the same time. In *Henry VIII*, the playwrights allude to a scale between corruption and honesty, but demonstrate that all human bodies and all historiographical texts move along this scale without arriving at one pole or the other.

At the heart of the play's redefinition of historiographical truth lies Griffith's small history of Wolsey in Act Four, Scene Two and Katherine's response to Griffith's careful delivery of that history. Katherine invokes the scale of corruption and honesty to praise Griffith's historiography:

> After my death, I wish no other herald,
> No other speaker of my living actions,
> *To keep mine honour from corruption*
> But such an honest chronicler as Griffith
> Whom I most hate living, thou hast made me,
> With thy religious truth and modesty,
> *Now* in his ashes *honour*. (69-75 my italics).

The key to this notion of honest chronicling is the "keeping" of the dead from corruption. This, like the gestures of mourning which watch, prepare and entomb the body, is the work of the historiographical text. It is a process of continued vigilance rather than a finite gesture. Katherine demonstrates that honest historiography requires a continual engagement between living and dead when she employs the term honour as both noun and verb. Her honour is an object and is still a matter of action; she honours Wolsey "now," when she did not before. Moreover, she hopes her history will receive the same treatment once others confront her ashes. The circulative capacities of Griffith's historiography are represented by the movement of the object "honour" into the act of "honouring."

Of the three plays discussed here (*Richard III*, *Cymbeline* and *Henry VIII*) only *Richard III* has been consistently considered a history play by scholars. *Cymbeline*, labelled a tragedy in the first folio, is grouped with the late romances, and *Henry VIII* has lingered between history and romance genres. Shakespeare's late plays have long provoked heated debates about genre, authorship and chronology. Often these debates have more to say about the critics' understanding of Shakespeare and the quality of his artistry than about the plays themselves.[8] Both of the late plays in this study challenge easy categorisations of genre and attributions of authorship, or both. I do not intend to locate *Cymbeline* and *Henry VIII* as history or romance (poorly executed or otherwise), or recount already exhaustive debates on authorship or chronology. My interest lies in the philosophy of history advanced in these plays in relation to early modern historiography.

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[8] Gordon McMullan charts the investments in these debates admirably in *Shakespeare and the Idea of Late Writing*. His study encourages critics who enter the field of discussion about the late plays to challenge assumptions about how they choose to group the set of plays that begins with *Pericles* and concludes with *The Two Noble Kinsmen*.

Each of these plays balances the hope of a providential force that has mapped out a restful afterlife for the blessed, with the realization that the world contains patterns mostly of material decay and moral decline. In *The Social Circulation of the Past,* Woolf explains that early modern society "appears in many ways to have been obsessed with death, the inescapable decay and ultimate annihilation of the body" (56). As a result, many early moderns "felt a strong ambivalence" about either the "inevitability of decline or the possibility of improvement" (22). By "improvement," Woolf refers to the restoration of "an object to its original, pristine form" (21) and also to "technical progress" (22). But decay and ruin were also opposed by a belief in providential progress, that is, the teleological vision of history in which "motion and change" were "ascribed to a final cause" (*Idea of History* 9). There were many ways to fight decline, both material and spiritual, and often Shakespeare considers the full range of these possibilities in his history plays.

In the trio of plays discussed here, the scales can tip in one direction or the other, but Shakespeare provides no clear endorsement of decay or progress, restlessness or rest. Instead he dramatizes the ambivalence that Woolf describes. The seemingly endless revolutions of political power dramatized in the first tetralogy are put to rest only at the close of *Richard III*, when the ghosts of the past endorse a peaceful sleep for the man that will unite the houses of York and Lancaster. The ghosts tilt the balance back in the favour of a presiding providence that ensures rest for the blessed when they encourage Richmond to "sleep in peace, and wake in joy" because "[g]ood angels guard" him (5.3.156-7). Richmond has certainly described himself as the restorer of the defaced ruin that is England. His claim, though, that his victory will initiate "smooth-fac'd peace, /

With smiling plenty, and fair prosperous days" (5.5.33-4), sounds strikingly similar to Richard's view of time in the first lines of the play. Has England progressed to an outcome preordained by a providential force, or has it simply repeated another violent cycle in a downward spiral of moral decline?

In *Cymbeline* and *Henry VIII*, the negotiation between improvement and decline is often interpreted through the lens of the romance genre. Norman Sanders describes the theme that binds Shakespeare's late plays as "resurrections and rebirths" (2). Critics interpret the romantic reaffirmation of life after loss as a religious force. Death marks an important but transitory point in the progress to, and ultimate achievement of, eternal life. Cynthia Marshall suggests that Shakespeare's use of the "Christian model of time" in the late plays produces "connections between the anticipated endings of himself, his works (individually and collectively), and his world" (1-2). She sees death as the "subject" of each play, and contends that it is "compensated by fantasies of renewal and reunion" (2) that ensure that "[i]n each play, time is transcended in some way" (5). Similarly, David Scott Kastan observes that the romances "reveal a dimension of truth that is unconditional and unchanging" (*Shapes of Time* 137).[9] "Suffering and loss" he explains, are temporary conditions and the romances take the reader "beyond time's annihilating effects" (126). Kastan's observation leads me to wonder how we can overcome "annihilating" time. If a place beyond loss is available, what exactly has time annihilated? This question is asked, too, by mourners. They see the effects of time on the human body, but pay tributes to that body in ways that call for the "unconditional" truth that Kastan locates in the romance genre.

[9] Kastan adds that the tragedies engage with death as a "central and unavoidable fact," and that this "tragic necessity is recognized but located within larger patterns of harmony" in the romances (126).

Derrida worries that an imaginative conversation with his dead friend might extend the initial trauma of death by inadequately representing his friend's true spirit. Recent work on Shakespeare's late plays has emphasized the power of art to produce something real, and will, therefore, help structure a response to Derrida's concerns. More often than not, artistic representation expresses an emotional truth in the late plays; the emotional response that art provokes makes staged and real audiences participants in truth that outlasts the conditions that have given rise to it. Many critics identify the experience of wonder as a defining emotional response to something that lies between the real and unreal; it therefore reveals that the power of art is to extend its effects, and delay resolution of those effects. The plays represent the experience of puzzlement as a valid experience because it engages the audience in the world of art without reducing that experience to the realm of the practical or mundane. Kenneth Semon, when addressing *Pericles*, contends that practical questions are irrelevant in the supernatural world represented in the late plays "[b]ecause nothing is complete, and no possibility is closed off" (96). The late plays encourage their audiences, then, to "embrace the mystery" by using their imaginations. Semon's concept of "embracing mystery" nicely identifies the late plays' interest in producing a form of engagement between play and audience that makes the work of art real in its effects and lasting in its ability to withhold the secrets of those effects. Semon identifies this dynamic as one which invests equal interest in loss and recovery, and neither outcome predominates.[10]

[10] See Kirby Farrell's notion of wonder and "negative capability," which helps us to "overcome our natural penchant for order so that we may be more deeply aware" (36). *Shakespeare's Creation: The Language of Magic and Play*. See also H.W. Fawkner's claim that Shakespeare endorses neither mystification or demystification in the romances. Fawkner claims that "[w]hat Shakespeare ideally requires of his audience is neither of these states, but simply a readiness to suddenly experience the radically other – and to accept that other, unconditionally, for what it is" (21). *Shakespeare's Miracle Plays*.

Robert M. Adams understands Shakespeare's late plays as experiments in the ability of art to produce a sustained emotional bond with those that receive it. According to Adams, in the late plays "Shakespeare relied more on his powers of evocation," and this reliance "puts particular pressure on his interpreters (meaning thereby all those who bestow on him the first gift of attention)" (156). Adams's notion of audience vigilance will become a useful companion to my notion of an ethical and durable historiography as that which produces a vigilant and emotional audience. [11] Adams, however, adds that the audience's affective engagement with art is largely "incurious and uncritical" (121). I would suggest that the audience's compassionate responses do indeed signal, in fact, their critical and ethical investments in the work of art.

T.G. Bishop argues that in the late plays, "a reciprocal and dynamic exchange" (94) occurs between art and spectator, and past and present. Bishop argues that any analysis of the late plays "must carefully work through the turbulent dynamics of a peculiar Scylla and Charybdis: between a credulity that believes too much and a resistance that hardens too fast" (162). Here Bishop restates the infidelities that trouble Derrida in terms of belief in and scepticism about the possibility that the dead can be recovered. Although Bishop suggests that this "turbulent" space must be "worked through," I contend that the "turbulent dynamics" of spectatorship means that the audience remains invested in the artistic representation of fabulous resurrections, unexpected recoveries. Although Bishop believes that audience and scholar must find a path *through* the "between," as he terms it, of "identification and detachment" that characterizes the theatrical experience offered by the late plays, this space between two

[11] Adams contends that the plays' "constructional oddities" encourage the audience to employ their "natural human kindness" (56).

opposing views of resolution ensures an after-life for the performance on future stages.[12] An audience that remains in the heart of a turbulent staging will not be able to put the past to rest for good; they may be compelled, like the Hostess in *Henry V*, to circulate the story and their own experience of witnessing its difficult truths.

If the world of the romances lies beyond the effects of annihilating time, then the world of the histories sits squarely inside those effects. Recent critics of the histories that support this view argue against claims like those made by Irving Ribner, Lily Campbell and E.M. Tillyard, that the histories promote "the concept of divine providence as the ruling force in a well-ordered universe" (Smith 37), and do so to reaffirm the Tudor myth that Elizabeth's rule signifies the culmination of a providential plan to reverse losses sustained in the English civil wars. Kastan argues against this interpretation when he sets the histories in opposition to the romances; he affirms that the history plays are "firmly oriented in the world of time" (*Shapes of Time* 269).[13]

Barbara Kreps points out, when addressing *Henry VIII*, "in addition to itself being a depiction of the past, the play is also very often *about* depicting the past: recounting, examining, interpreting it" (167). This focus on the processes of thinking about the past can be applied to Shakespeare's history plays at large. As John Blanpied argues, "Shakespeare was profoundly concerned with the idea of history" (12). For both Kreps and Blanpied, Shakespeare thinks about history to articulate its position in the space

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[12] I am also in debt to Christopher Cobb's recent exploration of staged romance, especially his suggestion that in dramatic romance, "the resolution of the story is its continuation in the life [...] of the listener" (23). His identification of the qualities of "continuation" in romance structure my interest in historiographical continuation.

[13] See also Phyllis Rackin. "Anti-Historians: Women's Roles in Shakespeare's Histories." Frederick O. Waage Jr. "*Henry VIII* and the Crisis of the English History Play."; Peter L. Rudnytsky. "*Henry VIII* and the Deconstruction of History." Graham Holderness matches Kastan by stating the "medieval conception" of "divine providence and retribution seems simply irrelevant beside the variety of worlds depicted in the plays" (*Play of History* 2).

between known and unknown, historical fact and historiographical narrative. Blanpied sees the "between" of Shakespeare's vision of history as "a category of experience with a distinctive nature, simultaneously implacable and ghostly, undeniable and elusive" (12). Blanpied helps us see that the connections between living and dead, which are simultaneously established and challenged in the late plays, are treated in a similar way in the histories. Kreps agrees, suggesting that the past, in *Henry VIII*, lies somewhere between the "knowable fact" and its "different interpretations" (167).

Dermot Cavanagh extends this line of thinking when he describes Shakespeare's *Henry V* as a "memorial." He contends that making this distinction allows one to focus on the plays' "interest in conflicting process of remembrance," a process that Cavanagh identifies with gestures of mourning (32-33). By referring to Walter Benjamin's work on the origins of German tragedy in the Renaissance mourning play, Cavanagh suggests that mourning situates historical production between pessimism about "loss" and an "open-ended" hope that the unmasking of that loss will give mourners a deeper understanding of their place in a "deficient" world (41). The memorial moves between grief and consolation, and this movement has no foreseeable end.

Like Dermot Cavanagh, John Joughin considers staged mourning in the history play as a condition somewhere between despair and hope, and he suggests that this state requires an ethical response from the audience. According to Joughin "death, then, like history manifests itself as an otherness which both attracts and defies our understanding, presenting us with unimaginable horrors which we nevertheless share an affinity" (52). Moreover, gestures of mourning persist beyond the moment of loss because "[g]rief introduces a disruptive continuum which will continue to haunt us" (51). The disruptive

quality of grief, much like the turbulence that Bishop noticed in the late plays, ensures a continued interpretive engagement. This engagement takes shape between staged suffering and the audience's participation in this process. As Joughin points out, suffering "secretes a type of spectatorship which needs to be interrogated more closely" (44). I will carry out this call and interrogate such "secretions" in the late plays, with particular emphasis on the "ethical impulse" that makes the audience participate in staged acts of mourning.

Philip Schwyzer, in his introduction to *Archaeologies of English Renaissance Literature*, reads images of sunken riches in *Henry V* and *Richard III* as moments when Shakespeare recognizes, rather hopelessly, that "[t]he treasures of time may entice the imagination, but scattered on the inaccessible ocean floor, they are of no practical use to anyone" (1). This statement supports Schwyzer's larger argument that the idea of a lost past seduces because it allows them to be that narcissistic tyrant that Lewis feared – those who study history read their desires into the past. Schwyzer begs his readers to resist "weav[ing] consoling fictions" in response to feeling the inaccessibility of the past (16). I would suggest that Shakespeare's use of the sunken treasure trope to speak about the past in fact marks out a space of potential in the heart of loss, one that coexists with the pessimism that Schwyzer detects. Although Schwyzer dismisses it, the power of history to "entice the imagination" is precisely what Shakespeare describes and calls for in *Richard III*, and he returns to this call most profitably in his late plays. While imaginative creativity in response to loss is prioritized in the late plays, the narratives that are formed by this creativity are in no way "consoling." Rather, tales of the past in these plays help characters and audience to resist consolation, and thereby resist an end to the

fruitful conversation between the living and the dead. In the late plays, mourning keeps the living suspended between complete narcissism and complete impartiality when they remember the dead. Shakespeare (and Fletcher) would never endorse an end to an emotion that keeps both character and spectator invested in the past, an emotion that spans objective realities and subjective impressions of those realities. The experience of utter loss, an unalterable consequence of mortality, can be a positive experience if it is re-described as the living subject's refusal to be consoled into forgetfulness.

Schwyzer moves too quickly through Clarence's dream of the sea floor to note that it is there that history's power to make and be made by an affective community is expressed. Clarence describes the jewels that slip into skulls as "in scorn of eyes" (1.4.31) and he adds that the "reflecting gems" also "woo'd" and "mock'd" the sea floor and the bones scattered on it (31-33). In making inanimate objects responsive with human emotion, Clarence conditions his listener, the keeper, to match this dynamic. The sea floor may be lost in a "practical" sense, but Clarence has offered his audience, and Shakespeare's, a way of transforming the experience of loss into a narrative that offers space for exchange, a place where living emotions are mapped onto the dead and deeper feelings are, as a result, reflected back onto an already-animate listener or spectator. It is then that the listener/spectator becomes the partaker in a "time" that can continue.

My first chapter addresses the similarities between discourses and practices of early modern mourning and historiography. I treat these practices separately but imply they share the aim of putting the dead to rest and engaging in a restless exchange with them. In Chapter Two, I demonstrate that the act of watching the dead symbolizes the responsibility of the mourner and historian to extend the time of mourning and widen the

scope of historiography. Shakespeare dramatizes the act of dreaming in *Richard III*, *Henry VIII* and *Cymbeline* to articulate the connection between sleep and death, life and wakefulness, and to suggest that these spaces of "between" help extend the past. The requirement that an audience remain vigilant over the sleeping dead is explicitly addressed by the epilogue of *Henry VIII*, when it gently chides those who of the audience who "come to take their ease / And sleep an act or two" (2-3). I will also suggest that, for Shakespeare, an ethical historiography requires that the living suffer in place of the dead. The experience of suffering, integral to the act of mourning, combines historicizing with story-telling by emphasizing an emotional and imaginative engagement between the living and the dead. I will link the late plays' interest in tale-telling to their desire to uphold an ethics of history rather than merely, as it has been interpreted, their desire to emphasize the power of art.

Chapter Three recondsiders the function of predestination and prophetic knowledge as they appear in plays about a real past. An ethical historiography will always orient its gaze forward as well as back, just as a mourner makes provisions to ensure that the dead are recollected in the future. Shakespeare alone and along with Fletcher is fascinated by what it means for a promise to be fulfilled. Margaret, Anne and Richard in *Richard III* test the potential and limits of prophecy; they demonstrate that narratives of the future, like narratives of the past, must be emotionally, as well as factually, accurate. I consider prophecies a representative of ethical historiography and its continual, endless exchange between speculation and realization.

In Chapter Four, I turn to the materials of mourning, such as shrouds, flowers, and tombs. My contention is that enigmatic structures, sites of mourning, signal the power of

opacity to convey simple truths, the power of a fixed structure to produce a lasting, living response. The erection of stone monuments in place of the dead invites a continued engagement with the dead. Interpretive complexity, then, promotes rather than inhibits evaluations. Moments of death and burial take varied material shape in *Richard III*, *Cymbeline* and *Henry VIII*, but in each case, materials placed on the body enable the living to perceive the dead as at rest, even as those materials are necessary to respond to the decay of the body. The dressing of the dead also mimics the activities of interpretation: burying the dead is linked to intellectually dressing/addressing the dead. The result is that the care for the dead signals an ethical commitment to "proper" burial and an ethical commitment to honest historiography.

Derrida admits that his words of mourning cannot reach his dead friend. He wonders, then, to whom his words are directed. Although there is no answer to his question, Derrida decides to remember that "Barthes himself is no longer there" (35). The finality of this absence, the silence at the other end of the conversation, motivates the voice of mourning to speak relentlessly. A discomforting awareness of loss that is vital to mourning, even though this comprehension inspires survivors to resist, transform or restate its boundaries. In referencing the irreversible death of Barthes, Derrida explains that "[w]e must hold fast to this evidence, to its excessive clarity, and continually return to it as if to the simplest thing, to that alone which, while withdrawing into the impossible, still leaves us to think and gives us occasion for thought" (35). Here, in the process of speaking about the impossible and creating the testimony of grief, Derrida seems to demonstrate faith between infidelities. Derrida, as the conflicted but loyal mourner, like Shakespeare's "honest chronicler," finds the "occasion for thought" more

important than strict adherence to decorum, when approaching the awful fact of loss. He continues to engage with the dead even when the expression of that engagement inevitably seems either insufficient or too much. In Derrida's words, his mourning constitutes "a duty, a duty toward" his dead friend (55).

Near the end of his writings on his wife, Lewis describes a powerful moment when he seemed to recover his wife. This recovery does not constitute a victory over death, however. It is, like Derrida's "occasion for thought," a victory of intellectual and interpretive engagement. Lewis recalls that this moment was "[j]ust the impression of her *mind* momentarily facing my own [...] not that there was any 'message' – just intelligence and attention" (73). This occasion for thought, defined by intelligence and attention, acknowledges that the bond between living and dead must be radically reconceptualized by the mourner through the process of mourning. He or she must see truth, and honest memorialisation, as a restless motion between mere quotation and imaginative speculation. Sincere respect (respect without the risk of self-indulgent tyranny) may be nourished, rather than corrupted, by creative narratives that extend this faithful attention. Lewis closes his rumination on grief by stating that the conditions that make the resurrection of the body possible are ultimately incomprehensible to the living. Although Lewis deals with the spiritual meaning of this paradox, we can consider, too, that the possibility of the body's resurrection in narratives of the past depends on equally incomprehensible conditions. If we, like Lewis, acknowledge and value this state of incomprehensibility, we will launch a fruitful engagement with the people we have lost - fruitful because there is no terminus for it, fruitful because it creates and multiplies the occasion for thought and repositions the experience of loss as an opportunity to maintain

a community of bodies that are affected by death. By resisting consolation, the grieving subject also resists the possible conclusion to her intellectual and emotional engagement with the dead. To mourn is not to stake one final claim on (or make a concrete conclusion about) the past, but it is to preserve the desire for a wide range of coexistent and ethically-sensitive claims. The starting-point, then, for early modern historians, for Shakespeare and for my own study of their connection, is to return to the "simple place" of which Derrida spoke, and the realisation that, as Lewis phrases it, "[t]he best is perhaps what we understand least" (75).

Chapter One
Bursting the Cerements: Mourning and Historiography in Early Modern England

> tell
> Why thy canonized bones, hearsed in death,
> Have burst their cerements, why thy sepulchre,
> Wherein we saw thee quietly inurned,
> Hath oped his ponderous and marble jaws
> To cast thee up again [...]
> Say, why is this? Wherefore? What should we do? (*Hamlet* 1.4.25-36)

Shakespeare coins the term "cerement" from the "cerecloth" wrapping used to shroud the dead. It is the first recorded use of the term and it is only used much later in echoes of this passage. Julian Litten explains that cerecloth, a "waxed unbleached linen" wrapped, in fact, primarily "embalmed corpses, having been used as an adjunct to such hygienic treatment" (72). Why does this moment, when Hamlet desperately recollects the funeral rites for his father, require a new word that takes a particular funeral material and expands it into something more general? If using cerecloth was one way of establishing a hygienic barrier between the dead and the living, the cerement seems to stand with and for a wide spectrum of techniques used to keep the dead separate from the living, to which Hamlet refers. The *OED* confirms that the term "cerement" is used "in the same loose rhetorical way as urn, ashes, etc." Hamlet dwells on the act of covering the dead body; he mentions the acts of canonization, hearsing, inurning (another Shakespearean coinage) of the body, and refers to the cerements and the sepulcher. His obsessive focus on the covering of the body indicates a certain anxiety about whether or not the hygienic border between the living and the dead has been effective. What exactly worries Hamlet, aside from the general terror of encountering a ghost?

Hamlet stresses that he has participated in the various activities involved in his father's burial; the appearance of the ghost forces him to call his own strategies of

mourning into account. The ghost disturbs because it violates the funeral customs that Hamlet takes so seriously and violates these customs thoroughly; the ghost has not only broken through its burial clothes, it has also breached the containment of the grave. Hamlet is afraid because he is facing a ghost and also because the solemn ceremony that was designed to put the body to rest, ceremony that testifies to the affection and loyalty between the deceased and the living, has been *undone*. Has Hamlet himself failed to ensure his father's rest? Perhaps this explains why Hamlet begs the ghost to explain the haunting, and asks the ghost to tell him, "what should we do?" Hamlet still wants to treat his dead father ethically, that is, according to the demands of the dead man himself. No reader or audience could accuse Hamlet of failing to mourn. We can see that Hamlet's ability to put his father to rest depends on his ability to heed the dead body as the link between ethical burial and ethical memory. His struggle with guilt, however, and the sense that he should have done or should do something more to address the corpse, does convey a wide range of information about mourning in early modern England.

Hamlet has evidence that his father is restless, but he is also ghoulishly agitated himself as he imagines the body exiting the grave. We like to think that the dead are finally at rest. Yet, once we establish a home for them in the grave, those mourners who refuse to stop mourning will disturb the body, making it "burst" its "cerements" again and again in imaginative challenges to the ability of mourning rituals to keep the dead at rest. The apparition symbolizes Hamlet's own intellectual and emotional restlessness, his inability to leave the "inurned bones" in their place and forget his father. In this moving speech, Hamlet experiences the desire for ethical mourning in two contradictory activities: the rituals of burial that contribute to a belief that the dead are at rest, and the

dismantling of the notion of rest in an effort to maintain an ongoing connection between the living and the dead. The former activity offers the dying and the living comfort, and the latter offers the living the sensation of discomfort. Rest and restlessness, and comfort and discomfort, are held in a careful balance for the ethical mourner. Thus Hamlet can plead with the ghost, "rest, rest perturbed spirit" (1.5.190), in one breath, while vowing to retain the ghost's story as a "commandment all alone" in his mind (1.5.102). Michael Neill refers to *Hamlet's* "pervasive nostalgia for the perfected decencies of ritual dying" (36). I will chart the early modern conception of decent treatment of the dead in the spheres of mourning and historiography as a way of responding to Hamlet's own question: "what should we do" with the dead?

The call to revisit the grave and the dead body imaginatively: This impulse unites mourning and memory. The mourner will make more of the grave than a resting-place, and will, thus, reject it as a symbol of forgetting, of dissolving her connection to, the dead. An ethical mourner redefines memory for the dead as a commandment issued by the dead to remember their life-story in a way that honours the dead while educating the living. To bury the dead and, thereby, banish them from memory would be unethical and impossible if the mourner feels sincere sorrow. To leave the physical acts of burial unfinished and refuse to acknowledge the death of a loved-one is equally unethical and probably pathological. Between these two infidelities, the early modern establishes a carefully balanced faith with and in the dead. This chapter will consider how early moderns maintained this balance through the staging of funeral rites and the writing of the historiographical text. Mourners and historians put the dead to rest through

traditional and physical acts of commemoration (entombing and writing), and yet they also retain an ongoing relationship with the dead by imaginatively disturbing that rest.

Early Modern Mourning: Faith Unto The Death

After the Reformation, Protestant theologians may have eradicated the notion of the dead moving restlessly in purgatory, but in the process they gave rise to a presumably immeasurable number of restless living, who struggled to re-conceive their relationship with the dead. Stephen Greenblatt charts Hamlet's relationship to the ghost in terms of lingering power of the idea of purgatory after the Reformation. He points out that "the border between this world and the afterlife was not firmly and irrevocably closed" (18), and that a continued belief in purgatory "gave mourners something constructive to do with their feelings of grief and confirmed those feelings of reciprocity that survived, at least for a limited time, the shock of death" (102-3). I would suggest that the "something constructive to do" need not be limited to a mourner's engagement with Catholic intercessory rituals. Rather, "feelings of reciprocity" between the living and the dead were altered but retained by Protestant orders for burial and the creation of funerary monuments after the Reformation. Indeed, the entire notion of rest and restlessness was given greater emphasis with the eradication of belief in purgatory. The dead were no longer restlessly waiting for their admission into heaven. Instead, a growing body of religious and artistic works conceived of the dead as being in a suspended state of rest after death, until their awakening and resurrection at the final judgement. And the "something constructive to do" was carried on by mourners, but no longer in those

"organized acts of mercy" that Greenblatt calls suffrages (103). Houlbrook points out that the

> notion that the actions of the living can help the dead is not logically dependent upon belief in a specific purgatorial process or place, but the more concrete the conception of the purgatorial punishments undergone by the dead, the more focused and purposeful such actions could be (35).

This chapter will focus on the "actions of the living" to address the dead in the aftermath of the dissolution of "more concrete" conceptions of the afterlife offered by Catholicism.

The dissolution of "organized" ways of dealing with the dead meant that the living had to find new ways to establish a comforting sense of reciprocity. I argue that early modern mourners after the Reformation develop the notion that the dead are at "rest" or "asleep," as a way of simultaneously comforting the living and prescribing for the mourner the role of guardian, insurer, and keeper of this rest. The idea that the dead rest because they have been *put to rest* by the living means that rest is a comforting and unsettling vision of the afterlife. It is comforting to imagine one's loved-one at rest, but the mourner will also experience an attendant, disturbing sense of responsibility to ensure the dead body looks restful at the time of death and burial. The rest is inviting but provisional because the very rituals meant to convey the idea that the body rests also testify to the reality that the physical body always deteriorates. Thus, while the idea that the dead rest offers a much more appealing vision of the afterlife than purgatorial models, it can be just as unsettling an idea to the mourner if the dead body cannot be made to look restful.

The mourner's desire for the dead to rest is undercut by the uncomfortable realities of death and decay. Three broad categories through which the living engage with the dead offer evidence for this dynamic: The ritual of waking, the experience of

feeling and moderating grief, and, finally, the preparation and burial of the body. These methods of interacting with and containing the dead suggest that while funeral rituals attempt to make the body look restful, they also testify to the devastating effects of decomposition. The mourner's speculation about the state of the physical body after death goes directly to the heart of what it means to grieve the death of a loved-one. Houlbrook notes that a mourner's sense of "personal loss" depends on her realization that "[a] living human being, perhaps strong, intelligent and attractive, suffers pain, becomes utterly helpless, and then a lifeless corpse. Any desire to cherish this abandoned residue is savagely thwarted by the repellent processes of decomposition" (220). I will think of early modern funeral rituals that combine the desire to "cherish" the dead with the need to mask the "repellent processes of decomposition." Decay may "thwart" activities of caring for the living being, but it is decay itself that prompts the development of new ways to care for the dead. The shrouding, ornamenting, burying and commemorating of the organic body is thus part of a conventional and practical process to deal with dead bodies indeed, but they are also the means by which an individual can face the effects of personal loss and express sincere, ethical grief.

Houlbrook finds the idea that the rest sleep for a time after death "quite widespread among Protestants" and one that was endorsed by Martin Luther, John Frith and William Tyndale (40). Peter Sherlock confirms that once Purgatory was "taken out of the equation," the parallel between death and sleep was cultivated as a "gentle metaphor that was applied to both body and soul as they awaited their reunion" (74). Sherlock credits the association between death and sleep to *1 Corinthians* 15, which proclaims, "Christ is risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept,"

and to the promise in the 1559 "Order for burial," also from *1 Corinthians* 15, which promised "[w]e shall not all sleepe: but we shall all be changed" (74). The Order's vision of the afterlife illustrates the complexity of the notion of rest. It finds transformation in the heart of continuity. The body of the blessed will merely sleep and thus will continue on after death; but what of the reference to change? The change could refer to the transformation of the physical body into a spiritual body, which is then saved or condemned on the day of judgement; it could also refer to decay itself, which will affect the bodies of even those who rest.

Revelation informed the faithful that they would receive white robes after death and that "they should rest yet for a little season, until their fellow servants also and their brethren, that should be killed as they were, should be fulfilled" (6.11). The quality of this rest depends on the deceased person's history of faith while living. Elsewhere, *Revelation* explains that "[b]lessed are the dead [...] that they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them" (14.13). This section of the revelation sets the rest of the dead in direct relation to the labour, or pious restlessness of the living. The relation is that an individual's labour while living ensures her deep rest after death. But the link is more complex than simple causality. The labour may end, but the work *follows* the living after death. Work is something more than earthly labour; it is the constant application of faith itself that enables the living to hope for rest, and, eventually, resurrection. *Revelation* encourages its readers to "be faithfull unto the death" so that Christ can offer them "the crowne of life" (2.10). What does it mean to be faithful unto the death? The verse ostensibly advises readers to be loyal to Christ until death; this sentiment also carries the sense that all living actions should be framed by and in anticipation of the fact

of death. One can avoid judgement while living, but death ensures that the good are sorted from the bad according to how seriously they have anticipated the ethical force of death.

The metaphor of death as sleep was often employed by those who discussed the best way to mourn the dead. In "The art of patience," Richard Allestree emphasizes that death is merely an "intermission" from life; his account of this time of rest seems to borrow heavily from the long tradition linking death to sleep, including Hamlet's soliloquy:

> [t]he Philosophers were wont to call Sleep the Brother of death: but God says, Death is no other than Sleep it self; a Sleep sure and sweet: When thou liest down at Night to thy Repose, thou canst not be certain to awake in the Morning, as when thou layest thy self down in Death, thou art sure to wake in the Morning of the Resurrection. Out of this Bodily Sleep, thou may'st be started with some noise of Horror, fearful Dreams, Tumults, or alarms of War; but here thou shalt rest quietly in the place of Silence, free from all internal and external Disturbances" (135-6)

Hamlet questions the notion, articulated here much later by Allestree, that sleep after death can be any more restful than the fitful sleep of a dreamer. Hamlet scrutinizes the consolation offered by the metaphor and undermines it by pressing the metaphor to its finest details. The notion that death is like sleep cannot be comforting if a more nuanced understanding of the experience of sleep itself is not comforting. Not all individuals sleep restfully all night or every night. Shakespeare was preoccupied with disturbances of rest long before writing *Hamlet*, perhaps most deeply in *Richard III*. Allestree dismisses the possibility that sleep after death can be disturbing; he initially endorses the metaphor (death is "Sleep itself"), only to dismantle it with the assertion that sleep after death is nothing like sleep while living. By distancing the two states, Allestree thereby preserves the metaphor's message of comfort to the living in a way that Hamlet cannot.

Allestree writes with confidence about the "sure and sweet" sleep, but this certainty in fact undermines the metaphor it helps serve.

William Basse wonders "how many royall bones, / Sleepe within" the tombs that he observes (187-8). The afterlife of a true Christian soul also corresponds to "resting" or "sleeping" with God. This notion, carried on well after the Reformation, demonstrates the persistence of the Catholic Requiem mass, which hopes the dead achieve "eternal peace" and "everlasting light" (Gittings 31). Since, as Maurice J. Quinlan points out, requiem means "rest," these prayers "implore rest, that is eternal life, for the deceased" (306). Ralph Houlbrook confirms that in the early modern period, "[t]he ideal pattern of dying [...] was one of patience in the face of trial, arduous but ultimately successful struggle with fleshly pains and spiritual temptations, - and final quiet sleep in the Lord" (27). In a sermon after the death of Elizabeth, John Hayward records that Elizabeth "fell" into a "sweete sleepe" at her death (D4r). This "peaceable" end, according to Hayward, is notable because it offers "euidence" of her faith "in her weakest times" (D5r). After recounting Elizabeth's good death, Hayward encourages those listening to mingle "heauinesse with our ioy, and ioy with our heauinesse," thereby resorting to the common theme that the mourning of a Christian's death must regulate expressions of sorrow. Hayward demonstrates that the metaphor of sleep allows the dying to reorient suffering at the same time it helps the witnessing mourner to dilute grief; both are given the opportunity to reject the finality of death. Playfere endorses the position that sorrow should not be directed to those who are "asleepe" (79), because the "godly deceased are not lost for euer but left for a time" (80).

While some of this evidence concerns individual responses to the death of a loved one, an individual's response to the loss of a cherished public figure can approach the intensity and sincerity of personal loss. In any case, whether or not the poets, scholars and historians examined here truly feel deep grief over the death of public figures like Elizabeth I and Prince Henry, they certainly express the features of what they take to be decent mourning. They can still make valuable observations on the relationship of care established by the living for the dead even if their own sense of personal loss is less immediate. However, the desire to care for the dead may in fact be intensified when the mourner has less of a claim to intimate knowledge about or familiarity with the deceased. Katherine Verdery suggests that burials of "famous people who were not our friends and kin awaken complex emotions, wherever genealogies have been so successfully integrated into national imagery that people view the famous dead as in some sense also 'ours'" (114). Verdery's suggestion certainly applies to the cultivation of a proud Tudor genealogy, which had influenced English men and women to think of their own family as part of a broad national family. Elizabeth advanced this genealogy most famously in her vow before Parliament in 1559 that she would not marry one man, but would instead make the English people her marriage partner. Whether or not Camden's account is entirely accurate, Elizabeth's sentiment that "every one of you, and as many as are English" were her "children and kinsfolks" (59) must have been affecting. This assertion of course advanced other, subtler motives for Elizabeth, but it does insist on a sense of familial unity between the monarch and her subjects that would have affected the way her subjects viewed her death and their responsibility to mourn her.

Waking

If the dying are termed sleepers in one sense or another, the living are watchers, or wakers. Claire Gittings writes that late medieval rituals, including waking, offset "the alarming feelings of inertia experienced by the bereaved today" (22). Gitting's term for modern detachment from funeral rituals, this "inertia," is remarkably apt and will serve as a guide in the following discussion of various forms of vigilance in early modern conceptions of mourning. Of course, the most obvious example of this vigilance is the formal wake, but the concept also pervades abstract thinking about death and mourning, and is worth considering, therefore, in a much broader sense. Even the formal wake has permutations; it can manifest as vigilance over the deathbed or the days leading to the funeral, or, it can have nothing to do with death and can simply refer to general "abstinence from sleep [...] a night spent in devout watching "on the eve of a festival" (*OED*). In each case, though, the words "wake," "watch" and "vigil" are closely related and are at times used interchangeably. Shakespeare plays upon their close relation when, in Act Four, Scene One of *Romeo and Juliet*, Friar Lawrence promises Juliet that he and Romeo will "watch" her "waking" in the Capulet tomb. The men will witness her waking up at the same time they conduct a wake for her. The line between waking up and waking the dead is at its thinnest point in this play; they are one and the same when the sleeping Juliet performs a false death moments before her actual demise.

It is recorded that a wake was an ongoing formality in the preparation for the funeral of Prince Henry, whose death in 1612 prompted a wave of national mourning. Charles Cornwallis writes that Henry's coffin was watched by "[t]hreescore and ten Gentlemen" in Henry's chamber (83). Ten men would watch the coffin at any given

moment, and those who watched at night would be replaced by another ten the next night. Such revolutions in the watch suggest that Henry's body required alert observation and that tired eyes were not acceptable, even though the object of their watching would never move. The wake that took place in Henry's personal chamber began to move outward. On December 3rd, the coffin was then "removed from the Chamber where it stood all this while, unto the Privy Chamber, there being watched for that night" (84). The watch over Henry's dead body begins in an intimate setting and culminates in the Privy Chamber, the heart of English political governance; the length and movement of the watch supplying the act of vigilance with ongoing relevance to the funeral rituals.

Even though strictly ceremonial in this instance, waking in the early modern period continued a tradition that began in the medieval period and was carried out at all levels of society. Gradually the communal wake, so common in the medieval period, gave way to, as Claire Gittings describes it, "the solitary vigil of the close family" (109). Whether it is a large community gathering or a small family, an important component in literally and symbolically preparing the dead body for burial is the period of vigilance. Gittings suggests that these rituals of waking "emphasise group solidarity and support for the bereaved" (102), and they, therefore, carry the momentum of a sustained experience among the mourners who wish to offset inertia. In some instances, however, the wake was also a practical manoeuvre, as the dead body could still convey vital information if it was watched closely enough. As Gittings explains, "[i]n murder cases, the watchers around the victim's corpse were looking out for any sign as to who the assassin might be" according to the traditional belief that "the corpse would bleed if its murderer approached or touched it" (108-9). There was also potential for a corpse to suddenly become

reanimated and watching was designed to prevent a merely comatose person from being buried alive. The watchers served a vital role in making sure the dead are truly dead as the time between death and burial passes.

The concept of waking works its way into how mourners conceive of, and describe, their duty to the dead. Vigilance conveys the mourner's investment in the dead and illustrates a continued engagement with loved ones; waking represents an embracing of the death image insofar as the waker is completely enraptured by, but also irrevocably detached from, the person she watches. The strange duty of the waker is summarized nicely by Houlbrook's description of attendance at funeral rites. He points out that in each rite, "respect for the memory of the dead person" coincides with "grief at his loss" and these dual concerns "demanded the attendance of relatives, friends, colleagues, fellow parishioners, and members of fraternities" (33). Acts of vigilance thus manifest both respect and grief, and pay equal attention to the permanence of the memory of the dead and the transience of the body.

Thomas Newton incorporates the ritual of waking into his poetic lamentation on the death of Elizabeth. He gives Elizabeth the name "Delia," and positions a range of characters around her to express their grief as her mourners. The Nymphae, the second speakers, describe how they "awak't, and watcht all sleepie houres" until Delia's death (A3r). The third speakers, simply called the Heroes, pick up this reference to waking the dying Delia, and describe how the ritual of waking occurs before and after death. "Our Wits," they say, "that euer were imploy'd to keepe, / Her sacred person safe and still secure: / Our Eyes, that now vpon her Hearce do weepe, / Scarce wink't at all, since first shee seem'd vnsure" (A4r). After death, rituals of waking replace physical security that

military heroes offered Elizabeth while she was alive. Newton links watching to guarding with the word "keep," which also forms a convenient rhyme with weep. Waking's association with "keeping" is more than a matter of poetic convenience, however. Waking operates on the assumption that eyes perform acts of security in service of the dead body, which is in a period of transition until it is interred. Respect for the memory of the dead is simply an offshoot of the vigilant's literal respect (that is, seeing, taking in) for the dead body. Waking combats the unsettling effects of death by sustaining a guard over the vulnerable body. Elizabeth, secured in life, is "still secure" in death because the appropriate mourning activities are performed.[14]

The waker's watch over the corpse may manifest the desire to honour the memory of the dead as the returning of a favour; vigilance still endorses the possibility of continuity, even if the dynamic is slightly different. In his sermon after Elizabeth's death, John Hayward positions mourning as the repayment of Elizabeth's own care for her subjects:

> What a one she was vnto us while she liued, a watchfull keeper, a mercifull iudge [...] who can thinke vpon it, that she was such a one vnto vs while she liued, and not bee touched at the hart with sorrow, that she liues not still, to be still such a one vnto vs? (D3v-r)

This sentiment suggests that the loss of Elizabeth can only be faced if her mourners keep her still, as she kept them. Hayward emphasizes the passage of time with the phrase "while she liued" as a way of impressing upon his audience that, in turn, "she liues not still." Mourning enters the space between "she lives" and "she lives not," and it is the act

[14] The eyes are termed guards in William Worship's *The Christians Mourning Garment*. In this work, which advises the correct way to mourn, Worship states that "God indeed set them [the eyes] in thine head (the tower of thy body) as Espials, and Scoutwatches, to discrie danger a farre of" (A8v). Worship adds that because the eyes are watchers, they ought to be "liberall with weeping" if the occasion deserves it. Openness to mourning is part of the eyes' watch against danger.

of being "still" that bridges that distance. Elizabeth cannot "still" be a "watchfull keeper," and so the listeners are urged to "thinke vpon" the disjunction between the dead and living that this word "still" marks. Stillness, a state of unchanging vigilance, relays a sense of comforting continuity even as it manifests that which no longer remains. It is no great leap to imagine that the wake literalizes the tantalizing appeal of the stillness that death has challenged; the performance of the "watchfull keeper" works toward the re-establishment of a sense of permanence, security and continuity that death has sundered.

The stillness of those watching, an extension of the idea that the dead "still" continue somehow, becomes analogous to the rapt attention of an audience watching a dramatic performance. We will see Shakespeare exploit this connection in his late plays when he constructs his audience as watchers at a wake. Claire Gittings speaks about the dramatic potential of night funerals and the kind of spectacle they provided. It could be argued that this same potential could be maximized in waking with the body at night. Night funerals, Gittings explains, allowed "a drama of great emotion played out by torchlight against a backdrop of darkness" (193), and contends that the night funeral "dramatised the sorrow of the bereaved" (192). The night funeral conveys a similar message to the wake: the mourners assemble and are asked to stay awake at an hour when they might normally sleep. This enforced consciousness challenges and, therefore, magnifies the importance of the rapt attention they owe the body and the memory of the dead. This attentiveness occurs under duress, and is therefore more valuable, and, one might suggest, more sincere. Katherine Verdery describes how the sight of dead bodies can be disorienting for spectators, and yet this disorientation "makes them receptive to arguments, stories, and symbols that seem to give them a compass" (115). The night

funeral and the wake facilitate an extended immersion into an unnatural wakefulness. This disorientation ultimately carries the spectator into a heightened awareness of what it takes to create an ongoing relationship between the living and the dead.

Prophecies of Resurrection and the Moderation of Grief

Early modern funeral rituals stress that the dead body lives on in various ways. The dead body is filled with potential; that is, the living can take it up and interpret it as "still" having effect on the world or their perception of the world. The life of the body may have ended, but the emotional effects of that life continue for the mourner. The sincere mourner must grieve the loss of loved one, but must not share the depth of this grief publicly. The moderation of grief was encouraged because it promoted the view that the dead were only resting and could look forward to resurrection. The moderation of public displays of grief also pointed to a deep sincerity. Hamlet says as much when he describes the extent of his sorrow by expressing what he cannot express: he has "that within which passeth show" (1.2.85). Christian mourners were encouraged to publicly share their joy that the dead would find life after death, and were asked to feel but mask their deepest "sorrow." The mourner's struggle to find the appropriate balance between these two extremes testifies to the reality that a sincere emotional connection between two people could be altered, but not eradicated by death.

The early modern body could find physical ways to live on. During the first days after death, the body was believed capable of coming back to life. In some cases, the dead body was thought to literally interact with the living, and these interactions could be both positive and negative. Gittings writes that "the touch of the hand of someone who

had been publicly hanged was thought to cure a variety of diseases" (67). Bruce Gordon and Peter Marshall point out that the medieval belief that the "dead remained in the vicinity of their bodies" persisted into the early modern period. During a "dangerously liminal time," they explain, "the dead might seek to seize companions from the world of the living to accompany them into the abodes of the deceased" (7). In either case, the dead are thought to possess "some degree of sentience or 'life-force'" and the "boundary between life and death" was not clearly-defined (Gordon and Marshall 7). The corpse was also believed to possess truth-telling capacities. As mentioned previously, the murdered body was watched so that it might help identify its killer. Thus, the sentience of the dead body, its ability to outlive the moment of death, required an ongoing demand for ethical relationship between living and dead that extended past the point of death.

The "life-force" of the dead is also conceptualized in metaphors that dissolve the boundary between life and death. The funeral has been figured as the wedding, the grave to the marriage-bed and the dead body to the virgin on her wedding night. Gittings observes that these symbolic associations served an important role in the process of dealing with death. "[T]he use of flowers," she reasons, "common to both marriages and funerals, pointed to the continuing cycle of human life in which the death of one member was compensated for by the procreation of future generations" (111). She also recognizes this dynamic in the "burials of virgins," which "may be seen in terms of balance; the ritual which legitimises procreation, marriage, is used to counterbalance the annihilating force of death" (69). William Basse perceives mourning as a vital and ethical engagement of the present with the past and *vice versa*. "For tears and sighs," he writes, "are th'issue of true loue: / Our present woes our former ioies imparte. / He loues

the living best, who for the dead mournes most: / He merits not the rest, who not laments the lost" (A4v).

Often those contemplating death deliberately convey a lesson or standard in their deaths as a legacy for the living. Arnold Stein follows the executions of Thomas More and Walter Raleigh and identifies this pattern in their attempts to perform their deaths so that they influence the thoughts, behaviours and feelings of the living. The moment the blade ends their bodily existence, they find new life in the minds of the living. Katherine Verdery suggests that "corpses are effective symbols because they are protean while being concrete" (113). Part of the protean potential of the dead body is that it can mean different things at different times. Thomas Playfere suggests that the want of weeping is damaging because weeping is like "aqua fortis" (11), which can wipe a slate clean and allow for different stories to be told. More's good humour and Raleigh's strange dignity could not have an effect "in any practical and immediate ways" but could indeed have "unknown future" effects on those who witnessed their deaths (30). The engaged mourning of spectators will allow More and Raleigh's death to be written over or above the fact of their execution. Stein also points out that the dying "will leave 'for the example of others not on the trial of their patience but some unexpected flower springing from that solemn ground" (25). Sometimes, this lesson is a *momento mori*: all who live must die. This lesson places death inside life, and life inside death. Stein charts this lesson as it appears in a letter Petrarch writes, which warns, "[w]e are continually dying [...] we are dying forever" (qtd. in *House of Death* 24). This reminder is not simply that the living should not be too proud; in addition, this reminder suggests that even though the moment of death is one of rupture, man's engagement with this trauma is ongoing.

Death is always a vital component of an understanding of life and is thus indeed a "life-force."

It would be impossible to guess what the majority of early moderns felt when they grieved. It is possible to suppose, however, that personal grief was suppressed and expressed in ritualistic funeral activities. Social status determined the degree to which mourners could express themselves. Aristocratic funerals were regulated so carefully by the College of Arms that the expression of personal grief seems to have been of little importance. As Gittings points out, the heraldic funeral required that "mourners had to be of the same sex of the deceased" and because those closest to the deceased were often of the opposite sex, "[t]he ironic situation therefore arose where, at its worst, most of the official mourners had little regret at the passing of the deceased, while the truly bereaved were excluded from any major part of the ceremony" (175). She adds that the heir of an aristocratic deceased was required to participate in strict ceremonies that demonstrated "that the ranks of the aristocracy were once again restored" (179). This meant that the heir could not remain to watch the interment of his father, "whatever private sorrow he may have felt" (179). So, while the heraldic funeral requires specific rituals to convey information, even comforting information, it also suppresses information about the individual's experience of loss.

Even if the mourner is not bound by these heraldic restrictions, personal grief was often required to be hidden; personal grief needed to be *private* grief. G.W. Pigman observes that "Englishmen are acutely anxious about grief" at this time, and that the bereaved "are likely to feel – and be made to feel – that their grief reveals their irrationality, weakness, inadequate self-control, and impiety" (2). Claudius certainly

articulates this view when he advises Hamlet that "to preserver / In obstinate condolement is a course / Of impious stubbornness" and "unmanly grief" (1.2.92-5). Of course, Claudius is an emblem of insincere grief; his speech, which echoes treatises on appropriate mourning at this time, when taken in the context of the play indicates that an appropriate expression of grief is difficult to pin down and that a false appearance of sorrow is just as impious as "obstinate condolement."

Many treatises consider moderation the simultaneous expression and masking of emotion; sincere mourning is always a gesture that holds something back. Some suggest that the expression of grief ultimately concerns the mourner and Christ, and it should therefore be carried out privately. This would allow the mourner to avoid charges of "inadequate self-control and impiety," since the outpouring of personal grief is reserved for a certain time and place and is not motivated by social obligations. When it is private, personal grief can be free. Because it is private, however, it cannot be communicated to others. This leads us to the heart of the mystery of death and mourning. The most sincere sorrow is often the least noticeable or explicable. Similarly, William Worship urges his readers to express their true grief, but explains these expressions should be carried out privately and should therefore go unnoticed by any, save God:

> beware thou looke not sowerly in company to be seene of men, for then thy rewarde is sure to be great in hell. Get thee into thy most retyred closet, let no body (by thy good will) know of it, pull the latch into thee [...] see there be no holes in the dore, no cranies nor clifts in the wall, & then fall grovelling to the earth, thump thy brest, strike vpon thy thigh, wring thy hands, and poure out thy soule before the Lord: so he that seeth thy true humiliation in secret, shal one day rewarde thee openly in the light of his glorious Angels. (A4r)

Worship stresses solitary mourning as the only means by which full expression is also pious. He urges his reader to perform the conventional and therefore easily recognizable

gestures of grief, but the performance has no audience to make those acts of recognition. This private mourning requires absolute isolation. Worship asks that no one sees or even *knows* of this indulgence. Once again, mourning emerges in the space between revelation and obfuscation. Like the absence at the heart of loss, an absence to which the funeral rituals also gesture, the mourner's task always leads further inwards into "the most retyred closet," where the trauma of grief is expressed as something that is inexpressible to others.

Mourners were encouraged to overcome loss by transforming sorrow to joy. If one could express joy in the face of death, this was evidence that the dead had not truly died, but had in fact moved into an everlasting life with Christ. Expressing joy was a means of circumventing the fact of loss entirely, that is, a means of re-evaluating the moment of death as a moment of transition to still greater life. This call to joy was also a method by which the Protestant church regulated mourning activity and promoted their version of Christianity. After all, acts of mourning were often powerfully public displays. An overabundance of sorrow at these events would undermine the Christian faith in life after death and the possibility of resurrection. Turning expressions of sorrow into joy would support the notion that good Christians could achieve everlasting life, and would furthermore support the belief that this afterlife did not include purgatory or require intercessory prayers. The anonymous pamphlet "Weepe with Ioy" explains that "[h]e that weeps in measure, is like a Christian, he that weeps without measure, is like an Heathen." In this instance the author addresses the death of Elizabeth, but this work is not the only one to exhort readers to moderate emotional responses to loss. Thomas Playfere, in his oft-printed treatise *The Meane in Mourning*, encourages Christians to

approach any kind of loss with the emotional restraint described in "Weepe with Ioy." Playfere advises that "sorrow must bee ioyfull, and our ioye must be sorrowfull" (22). John Owen writes to a friend, who has lost her only son, shortly after losing a child of his own. This letter, which becomes the work *Immoderate mourning for the dead*, urges his friend and others readers to exhibit "Decency" in mourning, to not "sorrow like others without hope" (A3v).

It is no surprise that writings in response to Elizabeth's death in 1603 seized upon the general idea that a good Christian mourned with a balance of sorrow and joy. The mourning of a monarch was almost entirely a public event, and the numbers and statuses of official mourners reaffirmed the social currency of the dead and the living. A controlled performance of public mourning could secure one's place in the new social order that assembled around the new monarch. As Gittings points out, "the death of a powerful subject weakened the social hierarchy and had to be compensated for by a display of aristocratic strength [...] the emphasis was on continuity rather than loss, on strength rather than bereavement" (166). The new monarch would be eager to claim mourners' sorrow, which would be mixed with a good dose of joy, as evidence of his strength. The existing aristocracy, modelled into official mourners, would be eager to demonstrate this emotional moderation as proof of their suitability in a new social order. This meant that sorrow for Elizabeth's death was often translated into joy that James succeeded her. This is not to say that Elizabeth's subjects had no real emotional response to her death. Personal grief, however, is often bound up with the mourner's sense of her place in the social organization when it comes to mourning a dead monarch. Katherine Verdery finds that burials of "famous people who were not our friends and kin awaken

complex emotions, wherever genealogies have been so successfully integrated into national imagery that people view the famous dead as in some sense also 'ours'" (114). When Elizabeth described the English people as her husband, one can imagine that she hoped to make her genealogy the family tree of her English subjects. Many writings about Elizabeth's death register a sense that the Queen had indeed shared herself with her subjects; but these same writings also register quickly how that sorrow is transcended by joy over James's succession. They carefully balance genuine emotion with a moderated emotion that serves religious and political ends. A verse poem called "A comforting Complaint" illustrates this careful emotional modulation. The author confirms his emotional ties to Elizabeth initially, but uses this bond to point to a higher bond: the bond between the Christian and God: "[m]y Queene, though dead, now cals me: not to teares [...] But vnto joy, for that her happie life here spent / She rests in heauen, in bosome of her God." (2Ar-3Av). The mapping of these bonds ("my queene" moves onto "her God") provides the author with the source of joy, a natural check to excessive sorrow, because, through Elizabeth, the author becomes part of a new genealogy that culminates with God. The author can expect to one day experience a version of Elizabeth's rest in the "bosome" of God because at the height of his sorrow, he has allowed the thought of this bond to comfort him.

But this is not the only source of his comfort. At the close of his poem he records a second "stay" to grief:

> And that may seeme the proper cure to care
> Is, that the Queene, when death approached her,
> Did stint where all our griefe for he should stay,
> By point vs a King, and that a man
> Accustomed to rule: one of our English blood [...]
> We haue a king to turne our greefe to joy. (2Br)

The poet's use of the term "that may seeme the proper cure to care" is notable here. The phrase records uncertainty about the potential effectiveness of this cure. But because it is "proper," he follows its prescription resolutely until he can finally confirm, with greater confidence, that James can "turne our greefe to joy." He is able to make this assertion because he sees that James is "one of our English blood." The poet thereby lays genealogical claim to James. The death of the head of the English family in Elizabeth leads smoothly into the placement of a new head to the family. Loss is thereby circumvented by the production of familial bonds that support the religious and political tenor of the times.

The role of women in the ritual of mourning also influenced the Protestant project of grief management. On the one hand, women carried out many of the tasks of caring for the dead; their emotional sensitivity was particularly useful in those circumstances. On the other hand, women were accused of being unable to restrain their emotions, and they were encouraged to moderate their grief to match the better mourning carried out by men. Thus, women stood at the heart of the conflict between effective and ineffective expressions of emotion in mourning. S.C. Humphreys summarizes their paradoxical position:

> [m]any societies assign to women the roles which involve the closest contact with the corpse and the most marked detachment from the rhythms of everyday life [...] In ancient Greece, the opposition between men and women was associated with the distinction between emotional control and unrestrained emotional displays [...] emotion was not only non-social, it was antisocial, and its uninhibited release in funerals was dangerous and disturbing. (267)

Gittings confirms that in early modern England "the majority of probate accounts before the Restoration simply mention 'women'" as the undertakers of the shrouding of the body (112). Thus women were a vital part of the preparation of the body, but they were vital

perhaps because this duty was performed privately, where sensitivity to the experience of loss helped literally to address and care for the dead body. As soon as women's mourning practices became socially visible, they were regulated according to the demands for moderation that every good Christian faced. For women, the problem was that they were considered incapable of mastering their grief as efficiently as men. In his letter to his grieving lady friend, John Owen emphasizes the difference between men and women in mourning. "Men," he says, are "always accounted the more hardy and invulnerable, and less liable to the expressions of sorrow than Women, whose very constitution does give a lift and advantage to their Passions" (A6). Owen's description of the long-familiar classification of men and women is ambiguous about the value of masculine and feminine mourning, partly because he rehearses an "account" about gender difference that he never completely endorses. Perhaps Owen's caution when it comes to gendered mourning stems from his own grief over his child's death. One could speculate that the only difference between masculine and feminine mourning is that the social performance of each must come up against these traditional "accounts" that imagine that gender predetermines responses to grief.

These accounts of gender are never straightforward when they are placed under closer scrutiny. Thomas Playfere admits as much when he describes responses to Christ's death in *The Meane in Mourning*. Among those that lamented Christ's death, Playfere contends that "it is certain, both that more women wept then men, and that the women more wept than the men" (2). Playefere explains this phenomenon in ways that challenge the traditional account that Owen cautiously endorses. Playfere says that more women wept at the crucifixion,

> partly by the permission of men, who thought that the womens weeping came rather from weaknes in themselues, then from kindnes towards Christ. Partly by the prouidence of God, who suffered more women to weepe than men, that the women, which bewailed Christes death, might condemne the men, which procured it. (2)

Playfere connects women's physical weakness to a contradictory ethical power to "condemne." It seems these conflicting accounts of women's mourning persist because women claim a unique role in performances of mourning. In its positive form, women's sorrow is ethically sensitive and powerful, and in its negative form, it manifests physical and intellectual weakness. The ethical force of women's mourning, however, is most significant for this study of the link between mourning and historiography. Playfere underlines the ethical force of feminine mourning in this instance, stating "that which was otherwise naturall to them, was here voluntary in them" (2). When mourning is comprised of natural emotion and critical evaluation (that which is voluntary is critical in Playfere's formulation, I suggest), it transcends self-indulgence.

Even if feminine grief was used as a negative standard to regulate expressions of mourning, male poets employed it to register the depth of their sorrow and suggest that submission to unchecked emotion is the necessary starting-point for even moderate and correct mourners. William Basse expresses his grief over Prince Henry's death by claiming "I am turn'd to woman: watrish feares benube / My hearte: my Masculine existence thawes / To teares" (A5r). The key for Basse, and other poets who wish to lament death sincerely but productively, is to channel sorrow into artistic creation. After noticing the "thawing" of his masculinity, Basse urges his tears to "run forth" into "cease less currents of complaining verse" (A5r). In directing tears to "complaining verse," Basse yokes natural, unchecked grief to voluntary, contemplative acts of mourning. In

the act of writing, the "cease-less" quality of mourning becomes useful rather than destructive. Too much sorrow signals weakness, yet the failure to grieve indicates amoral indifference. Good Protestants urge male and female to seek a median between these extremes; the act of writing facilitates this search.

The Materials of Mourning

It must be recalled again that Reformation iconoclasts defaced funerary monuments; Protestants themselves often criticized these acts since they considered protection of the grave and grave-marker vital to the preservation of local and national history. Michael Neill writes that funeral statuary and elaborate tombs displayed "monumental constancy" for those struggling with the fact of death (37). After the Reformation, however, these tombs came to signify much more than constancy in the face of death. Neill explains that the "great memorials of this period were almost entirely retrospective in their appeal" and were

> conspicuously secular substitutes for the liturgical *memento* of the Mass. The more splendid their marble sculpture, the richer their gilding and painting, the more superb their heraldic ornamentation, the more eloquently these shrines of memory spoke of the longing for a species of immortality which, in spite of everything, it might remain in the power of the living to confer. (41)

In terming elaborate tombs "shrines of memory," Neill suggests that the tombs do not simply commemorate a person. The tombs materialize the activity of remembrance and therefore sustain an act that must continue if any "species of immortality" can be identified. Neill's observation helps identify Shakespeare's notion of an ethical historiography that links the site of burial to the historiographical text: both are resting places for the dead and a way of inviting the living to do the work of interpretation. Here,

place becomes act and the dead body becomes material for the living; if the power "remains" with the living "to confer" immortality, then this power is derived from the use they make of the organic remains. The direction of influence is not entirely from living to dead. The production of a "shrine of memory" is the place of an exchange between living and dead. The burial of the dead is, in fact, the only remaining material interaction possible for the living.

Traditional Catholic burial deserves mention here. The body was buried after the requiem mass. Ralph Houlbrook describes that after the grave was blessed, "[t]he priest pronounced words of absolution which he also placed on the corpse's breast written in a parchment scroll," adding that "[t]his service includes a prayer for quiet sleep in the grave and resurrection with all the saints" (256). The Reformation made substantial changes to the burial service; the Protestant burial service retained the emphasis on the body as resting and waiting for resurrection, though not without controversy. Houlbrook contends that a "trace of intercession remained in a prayer that God would hasten his kingdom so that those present might have their perfect consummation and bliss along with the dead person and all others who had departed" (265). Puritans condemned this prayer but, of course, they could not totally eradicate its resonances.

The materials of mourning, such as effigies, shrouds, coffins, flowers and embalming liquids are key ritual objects that, in their various ways, preserve the integrity of the body; in this activity, however, they testify to the unalterable course of physical corruption. They compound the mourner's awareness that the loved-one's body is degrading, and yet, in this capacity, they also become the loci of valuable imaginative work that preserves a durable conversation between the living mourner and dead body.

The mourning materials may be imperfect preservers of the physical body in the first place, fighting the decay of the body only temporarily, but they ensure the preservation of the body in the mind of those who deal with the materials and those who observe those materials and their effect on the physical body. Recall that Juliet thinks of Tybalt "festering" under his shroud. The shroud over the body hides physical decay, but, in masking this truth, it invites onlookers to imagine the body. Jonathan Gil Harris describes the handkerchief in Othello as a material object that is also a "dynamic field whose contours keep shifting, bringing into startling and anachronistic proximity supposedly distant and disparate moments" (169). I suggest that the materials of mourning also compose a "dynamic field" that brings the living and the dead in uncomfortable proximity with each other, and requires the living to speculate about the dead body long after the moment of death.

The simplest material of preparation of the dead body for burial was the shroud. Wealthy deceased would have a shroud and elaborate coffin, while the poor who could not afford a coffin would still wind a sheet around the dead. The shroud was a "voluminous sheet, gathered at the head and foot ends in knot" (Litten, 57). The best visual evidence for shrouding appears in funeral brasses and monuments that show the body wrapped as it would have been before burial. Some illustrations depict the process of wrapping the body in the shroud and burying the shrouded body. At times the body is shown wrapped tightly, completely obscured by the knotted shroud, while a figure representing the deceased as they were in life stands above it. At other times, brasses and statuary depict the shroud falling away from the body, revealing the skeletal body beneath. Litten records the latter as "resurrection figures," because it was believed that

the dead would sleep in their shrouds until the day of judgment, when God would call them to awake.

Litten, Houlbrook and Sherlock cite John Donne's monument as an emblematic resurrection figure. Litten observes that the figure conveys a sense of motion: "Donne steps forward, his arms relaxing as if to balance himself during his first few faltering steps after centuries of rest in the tomb. The loose shroud impedes his progress and his feet strain in vain against the tie of the bottom knot" (66). Litten elegantly describes the literal and symbolic meaning of the shroud, which is a material link between the dead and the living. In such representations, the shroud serves as a temporary sheet, like the sheets of the bed, that protect the sleeping body until it is revived. Donne posed for his monument before his death. The meaning of the statue is thus, to yet a further degree, a connection between the living and the dead. Litten writes that Donne kept drawings of the statue near him and "[d]uring his last agonies [...] was often to glance towards this fearsome drawing" (66). Donne's control over his final representation chills precisely because it places the living and dead in close proximity; in Donne's case, the domains even overlap. The shroud that covers his vulnerable body is emblematic, rather, of his future triumph over this vulnerability. His example merely exaggerates a dynamic that takes place in all shroud-dressings of a dead body: the living dress the dead body as a means of conceding to and simultaneously masking the reality of physical decomposition.

Flowers also served several purposes at the funeral and burial. Like the shroud, flowers were practically and symbolically useful. They helped offset the odour of the decomposing body and became part of the process of dressing the body for burial. Gittings observes that the scattering of flowers over the body accompanied the process of

shrouding. Shakespeare's description of Falstaff's deathbed in *Henry V* attests to the fact that flowers were also strewn over the dying. The symbolic value of flowers was that they asserted the dominance of life over death; they gestured to "the continuing cycle of human life in which the death of one member was compensated for by the procreation of future generations" (Gittings 111). While flowers could remind onlookers of the continuity of life, they were themselves subject to decay, and reasserted the deterioration of the body. Shakespeare stresses this dynamic in his staged burials, particularly in *Cymbeline*, where the grave is dressed imaginatively with ever-increasing numbers and species of flowers as the seasons are imagined passing. In "Sonnet 5" and "6," Shakespeare describes the capturing of the rose's sweetness in rose-water because "never-resting time leads summer on / To hideous winter" (5, 5-6). Strangely enough, rose-water and dried roses had preservative properties. In his treatise on medicinal practices, called "The Charitable Physitian," Philbert Guybert lists the ingredients of several mixtures for embalming the dead body as "dry red roses" (148), among many other herbs and spices; the ingredients for the lineament applied to the body after embalming were "oyle of Olive, Roses or Spike," among others (146). The flower or herb, then, in its own subjection to decay represents the dominance of "never-resting" time. Its preservative qualities, however, allow the body to last beyond its natural life-span.

Funeral effigies and tomb statues are perhaps the most intriguing materials of mourning. They were at times arranged over the dead body vertically, or, at times, they approximated the deceased as though they were sleeping. An effigy was a necessity when the body would decay to the extent that it had to be buried immediately; an effigy

stood in its place at the funeral in these instances. Effigies were largely reserved for aristocratic and royal funerals, and could be crude or sophisticated in construction. Jennifer Woodward attributes the swing between naturalism and functionalism of the effigy to the post-Reformation uneasiness with icons.[15] It is enough to say here that the funeral effigy and tomb statue reconstituted a body that was degrading underneath it. As Woodward argues, each part of the funeral ritual, such as the effigy, "simultaneously celebrates the life and commemorates the death" of the deceased (6). In this manner, the effigy fought against and testified to the process of decay.

Embalming was not a fool-proof method of preservation in the early modern period. It did not guarantee that the body would last through the funeral. Moreover, as Woodward records, many people, women especially, asked, in their will, that their body not be embalmed, as they felt it compromised their modesty. Embalming could certainly appear as a violation of the body. The surgeon initially cut and opened the body, removed the blood and internal organs and packed it with special cloths and spices. The embalmed body would often be placed in a coffin of lead to further prevent decay. Embalming was presumably required in aristocratic and royal funerals; the body would not be immediately buried, but rather was taken through prolonged mourning and funeral rituals. But the thought of embalming, and a fear of it, could affect all classes. Shakespeare makes this comically clear when Falstaff, in the midst of the Battle of Shrewsbury in *1 Henry IV*, reflects on lead and its various meanings. He first describes feeling "as hot as molten lead," yet the simile prompts him to consider what it would mean if he actually became lead, that is, if he actually had artillery embedded in him.

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[15] *The Theatre of Death: The Ritual Management of Royal Funerals in Renaissance England, 1570-1625*. See, in particular, pages 103-117

"God keep lead out of me" he prays, "I need no more weight than mine own bowels" (5.3.33-4). Alongside the understanding of lead as a bullet, is the sense that lead is also used to contain and further preserve an embalmed body, and often its embalmed viscera, such as the heart and bowels. Shakespeare, through Falstaff, perhaps articulates the notion that embalming was necessary only for a privileged few. Gittings observes that embalming had at times been "divorced from its original raison d'etre – to allow time for the preparation of an elaborate or distant funeral – and had become simply a matter of social prestige and snobbery" (92). Falstaff, a comic rendition of these kinds of ambition, sees no use for the enclosure of his body in lead. He unwittingly reveals that his death may result in social obscurity, no matter how close his ties to Hal.

Embalmers maintained the integrity of the body by completely violating and exposing it. The body was literally laid open by the process, which required, in merely its first step, "a long incision from the necke unto the lower belly" (143), according to Guyburt. The head and extremities would receive similar treatment and would be sewn up according, of course, to the talent of the surgeon. The paradox of preservation through violation expresses a contradiction at the heart of the materials of mourning described in this chapter: they fight against the fact of death while, at the same time, reiterating the inevitability of that fact. This is what may cause the living discomfort; but the anxiety provoked by this contradiction ushers in the living to a community of bodies with the dead. In the act of mourning the vulnerabilities of the body are witnessed and experienced at the same time. Shakespeare notices the conflicting strengths of embalming when, in *Othello*, the handkerchief that becomes an imperfect conveyor of truth is described as a preserver of the relationship between the husband and wife.

Othello tells Desdemona that the handkerchief is magical because it was "dyed in mummy, which the skilful / Conserved of maidens' hearts" (3.4.75-77). The embalmed body becomes a source of conservation itself; the reliability of this conservation, however, is affirmed *and* undermined.

Early Modern Historiography: Diligent Inquiries

One need only turn to Edward Hall's dedication to his *Union* to see that the historical text figured as a sleeping body needed dutiful historians to begin the process of resurrection. He praises Monmouth for translating a history, one that "if it had slept a little lenger," a valuable portion of the British past "had ben buried in the poke of Obiuion" (vi). The reverse was also true: the dead body was described as maintaining rest in the memory of the living. William Basse regards the connection between mourning and memory in this direction when, in a poem entitled "A Morning After Mourning," he urges his fellow-mourners, "[l]et Henry now rest in our memories, / And let the Rest, rest in our eies and eares. / Now He hath had his Rites, Let Those haue their adorning / By whose bright beames our Night of mourning ha's a morning" (B4r). Basse compares the laying to rest of the dead body to the laying to rest of the past in the memories of the living. But the living keep the dead in a state of rest by stirring their own senses, their "eies and eares," and literally awakening. The preservation of the deceased through memory is associated with a kind of visual illumination, expressed cleverly in the transition of the living from mourning to morning.

Peter Sherlock explains the territory shared by history and mourning; the "liminal moment of death," he says, "creates a chance to rewrite both history and the future." He

suggests that the combination of monument and memory "can attempt to change the culture it represents as society is reshaped by the reintegration of the living and dead in new roles" (4). Early modern histories envision their work emerging from this space between the living and dying. An ethical historian will work equally for both groups. The features of historiography discussed here (diligence, expectation and material history) support Sherlock's belief that our engagement with the past and future is, to a large extent, the establishment of a relationship between the living and the dead.

Vigilance and Diligence

Those who watch over a dead body assume that their guardianship will ensure that the body remains restful and undisturbed. Historians enact a similar form of vigilance when they claim to simply transmit a past truth, wholly intact, but also indicate that ongoing acts of attention by the writer and reader of history protect this truth from corruption. It was common to define history as a "myrrour of man's life," as Thomas Elyot does in *The Booke Named the Gouernor* (230r). This metaphor articulates the vital role that vision plays in thinking about the task of historiography. The mirror simply reflects the features of reality, or an apparent truth, but only does so as long as the viewer remains in front of it and recognizes the match between reality and the image. If the historiographical text is a mirror, historical truth is thus unchanging *and* provisional at the same time. An observant reader must see the text as a mirror for her life and stand before this mirror long enough to recognize her own features. The historiographical mirror begins to resemble Greenblatt's version of "The Ambassadors" in *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*. The text, like the painting Greenblatt describes, informs us that our gaze is

not only reality-reflecting but "reality-*conferring*" (20, my italics). Historiography thus reflects reality, but also produces it. Walter Raleigh's frontispiece to *The History of the World* declares that "graue history" is "Times Witnesse" ("The Minde of the Front"). The idea of witness captures historiography's middle-ground between passive spectator and active creator. On the one hand, history witnesses time firsthand, by seeing and reporting events; on the other hand, history also constructs the past by acting as witness to some events and not others.

The historian's version of vigilance corresponds to scholarly diligence. The *OED* offers a definition of diligence that makes it nearly synonymous with vigilance. Diligence, it says, is "[c]areful attention [...] to take care, take heed, beware; to take care of or about a thing, to look after it carefully." Early moderns were likely to pair the two words under this kind of definition. Thomas Achelley, in "The key of knowledge," prays for God to bless talented men with "vigilant studie, and careful diligence" (80). Achelley bundles similar words together to make his point; for this study of diligent historians, it is especially helpful to understand vigilance over history as unrelenting care for one's object of work. The unique perspicacity of sight will encourage deeper interpretations of objects of inquiry. Achelley, after all, hopes that God will "illuminate" the "eyes" of the faithful.

Diligence safeguards an object of study, so that it resists the effects of time, so that it is held continually as an object of commemorative acts. Preservation is defined by keeping the valued object at rest, and keeping the diligent observer continually engaged with interpreting that object. In "Mystical bedlam" Thomas Adams encourages his readers to "guard" their hearts with "supervisiting diligence" and urges them to "repose it

in the bosom of thy Sauior" (15). Adams makes supervisory diligence a correlative to repose; it is a combination that helps elucidate why eternal biblical truths can also require timely and sustained interpretive activities. The cultivation of persistent supervision is as important for historians as much as it is for biblical scholars. Rene Rapin encourages historians to be truthful, but to also "ornament" their histories so that the reader's mind will be "kept in a continual posture of vigilance" (101). This reading "posture" ensures that an entire history will be read and, in theory, remembered more easily. Rapin's use of the term "posture" illustrates that a diligent historian and reader can be likened to a guard over a physical object.

Even in its early forms, "diligence" is used as both adjective and noun. One has diligence, diligence is repaid in a legal or obligatory transaction, and one can become a "diligent." Ultimately, at the time that Shakespeare writes, diligence is linked to honesty in industry. He makes this clear in *King Lear* when the Earl of Kent describes the nature of his service to Lear. "I can keep honest counsel," he says, "deliver a plain message bluntly [...] and the best of me is diligence" (1.4.30-3). This is not the only moment in the scene that Kent mentions honesty, and thus the "best" of honesty is, like the "best" of Kent, diligence. Diligence combines honest intention with thorough action. It may then be the "best" of any worker, including the historian. Shakespeare observes the link between "keeping" honesty and acting carefully. He intimates that diligence is ongoing; the sustained loyalty of Kent to Lear in a servant/master dynamic literalizes the idea that diligence is the sustaining of a task or service.

In *The Tempest* Prospero calls Ariel "my diligence" (5.1.241). To perform a task is to wholly become that task in Prospero's address. Indeed, the act of attending should

entirely consume the actor. The word carries the sense of watching over a person or task, or, as the *OED* describes, exhibiting "careful attention," and there is a sense that this is a loving chore; someone with diligence will "take care" of something or someone in a way that demonstrates a deep bond between the care-giver and the attended. The sense of the bond derives from the Latin verb *deligere*, which is to "esteem" or to "value" (*New College Latin Dictionary*). The act of diligence has no foreseeable end as long as this bond remains. Just as the word is both noun and adjective, the performance of diligence is static and dynamic; esteem is concrete and unchanging, while the service that "keeps" this esteem is one that continues actively over time. Once the concrete bond or the fluid attendance upon this bond changes, one can no longer *be* diligent.

Early modern historians, like Shakespeare, use diligence as a noun and adjective, and they use both of these senses to suggest that their writing will become an honest and attentive text because at the same moment they adopt the role of honest and vigilant servant to history. The historian attends to the past just like Ariel attends to Prospero; their honest actions will prove their honest connection to the past and vice versa. By emphasizing their diligence, early modern historians suggest that they have affection for the remote past, just as if they truly are mourners who are doing a service to lost kindred. In his *Summarie*, John Stow elaborates that this kind of bond lies at the heart of the writing and reading of histories. He praises historians who have "diligently [...] marked" and "have beene diligent observers of common wealths" and readers who "imploy their diligence in the honest, fruitfull, and delectable perusing" of histories (22-23). Stow associates meticulous scholarship with the act of carefully viewing a concrete physical object. The historian will "mark," and "observe," and the reader will then "peruse."

According to Stow, the historian keeps a bond with the past analogous to careful inspection, and the reader keeps a bond with the historical text by making a similar commitment to seeing the past with the kind of devotion that the term "diligence" requires. In the first case, the diligence is an adjective that describe the historian's sustained esteem for their subject matter. In the second case, diligence is a way of reading, a kind of service, and a noun. Stow suggests that readers should employ diligence because historians "deserve (at the least) thankes for their paines" (23). Here diligence takes on the legal implications of a debt that is due and a debt that must be repaid; it describes an ethical union of historian and reader to the past.

Stow finds the legal sense of due diligence an effective way to frame his work as honest. In excusing his errors, Stow asks his reader to

> call to remembrance a most gentle and wise law of the politike Persians, wherein it was enacted that a man accused to be in their laws a trespasser, and found guiltie of the crime, should not straightway be condemned, *but a diligent inquirie and search of his whole life and conversation* (no slander imputed unto him as of importance) if the number of his laudable acts did countervaile the contrarie, he was full quit of trespass. The same lawe doe I wish the readers of this my abridged Summary and other my larger Chronicles, to put in vse. (24 my italics)

This anecdote reinforces, in a remarkable way, the value of ethical recollection by mirroring it with a recalled judgement. Stow summons history to defend his history. The past that he asks his readers to remember is itself an example of an acquittal of offense. It is difficult to ignore Stow's defence of his history, couched as it is so cleverly in a history of one particular defence. Stow asks his readers to become another "politike Persian" in weighing the entire course of an historical text before deciding on its value. The "diligent inquirie" that the Persians carry out is extended by Stow's writing and will hopefully be extended by his readers. In its "search" through the Persian's "whole life," due diligence

considers nothing irrelevant. It is thorough and does not weigh the crime alone, but views the entire lifespan of the accused, a sort of mini-history of or eulogy for the living, as necessary to ethical judgment.

Stow is not alone in using the legal sense of diligence to promote a respectful bond between text and reader, reader and past. Holinshed writes that he is "diligent to reforme the errours of other," and sees that his industry should be repaid. He asks his reader, "in recompense" of his hard work, to "iudge the best, and to make a freendlie construction of my meaning".[16] Holinshed also urges his reader "to weigh the causes and circumstances of such faults."[17] Judging of course requires an equitable perspective, but when diligence is added, affirms the bond of esteem between judge and judged. This legal sense of diligence defines fair or merciful judgment as thorough, far-seeing and relentless. This is the best kind of interpretation because it does not focus on minor flaws that have little impact on the course of the entire work. Instead, a diligent interpretation places enough value on the goodness of the text to "outweigh" its flaws. Diligent analysis does not ignore the bad, but rather refuses to pass over the potential benefits of protecting, or keeping, the work. It dedicates itself to careful and care-full vigilance.

By describing ethical historiographical effort as "paines," Stow implies that diligence in historiography relates to bodily experience. Recognizing the suffering of someone, in some sense, mourns them. Honest historiography, as demonstrated by diligent acts of writing and reading, is an intellectual *and* physical engagement with a remote past. Indeed, Stow contends that the past should be "imbraced" (22). This vision

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[16] All quotes from Holinshed come from his unpaginated "Preface to the Reader" in the 1577 edition of the *Chronicles*.

[17] Richard Grafton makes a similar statement in his preface to Halls *Union*. He states that he gathered Hall's works "diligently & truly," and he hopes that his reader will therefore "charitably judge" him (vii).

of loving engagement confirms that diligence bridges the gap between living and dead, loss and recovery.

Many years before Stow, John Leland describes his antiquarian work to Henry VIII as an embrace of the past and a physical immersion in England's antiquities. He informs Henry that he undertook "diligently to search all the libraries of monasteries and colleges" (*English Historical Documents* 153). The committed search that Leland describes requires a fierce bond between historian and subject matter. He writes that after reading "honest and profitable" histories, he was "totally inflamed with a love to see" all of Henry's realm (155). Here Leland finds "many right delectable, fruitful, and necessary pleasures," which he hopes to pass to his readers (155). With astonishing fervour, Leland lists the natural and man-made wonders he has encountered in his "diligent search," beginning with bodies of waters and culminating in cities and buildings. Leland's fixation on his subject may have been a factor in his failure to finish the task he had envisioned. Like any good "diligent," Leland became consumed with his work; eventually, insanity rendered him incapable of finishing. Yet, Leland's diligence persisted with the efforts of John Bale, whose preface to Leland's unfinished work reads like a eulogy for his incapacitated friend. At one point Bale even suggests that Leland's "frenzy" is a kind of death and that "England had yet never a greater loss" (160). Bale records the depth of this loss by honouring Leland's service to the past. After listing Leland's accomplishments, Bales affirms that Leland was "[a] most fervent favourer" and "a most diligent searcher of the antiquities of this our English or British nation" (159). Bale reiterates Leland's own words here. Leland's "diligent search" translates into eulogistic praise in Bale's tribute. The work, however, is not merely a tribute, but a

continuance of Leland's writings. Diligence thus lauds kindred who are lost and continues the work of the lost kindred. At this moment, historiography becomes mourning and mourning becomes historiography.

Aside from diligence, historians convey their vigilance over the past by describing their role as eye-witnesses to the past, or conveyers of eye-witness reports. Vigilance over the writing of history is imagined as the constant direction of the eyes to truth. This is a rejoinder to the assertion that history is the "mirror of man's life." In order to make history a mirror, historians must keep their gaze on the mirror, and they encourage their readers to do the same. In his biography of Elizabeth, William Camden informs the reader that "[t]his I have been carefull of, that, according as Polybius directeth, I might have an Eye to the Truth onely."[18] It is not so important that Camden watches truth. Most early modern scholars, across a wide variety of disciplines, would aspire to write truthfully. What is important is that Camden describes this watchfulness as "carefull" and all-consuming. He describes his vision narrowing until it sees "onely" truth, and he admits that this process requires his constant attention. The writing of the historiographical text is described as an act of sustained observance that overrides any other sights. The invocation of Polybius is difficult but vital here. Polybius's commitment to pragmatic history argues against an emotional tenor to historical writing. Camden's notion of vigilance, therefore, and its implication that there is a "carefull" bond between historian and subject matter seems an unlikely fit with Polybius's mandate. Camden may have invoked Polybius here as a means of emphasizing factual truth (moments later he praises Polybius's use of reason rather than speculation in writing

[18] All quotes from Camden refer to his "From the Author to the Reader," an unpaginated preface in the 1688 publication.

history), but here Camden may be stressing the importance of sustained and unwavering *vision* when writing ethically about the past.[19] Polybius encouraged all historians to value first-hand accounts of events. As translator Edward Grimeston affirms, Polybius "protests that he was present at many of the actions, and receiued the rest from confident persons who were eye-witnesses," and he does so to "justifie the truth" of his work (sig3). Camden may be channelling this definition of true historiography to bolster his own efforts.

Vigilance *is* truth, according to Camden, who makes this case because he indeed writes a history about people who may still be living and who may take exception to his version of events. To position the historian as an eye-witness in this context insists that the historical text treats all people ethically, according to what can be visually verified. He defends his work as truthful by explaining that if one took truth from history, one would "pluck out the Eyes of the beautifullest Creature in the World." Truth and vision are one and the same in this construction. This sentiment comes directly from Polybius as well, but Camden has shifted the analogy slightly. In the first book of his history, Polybius urges

> beleeue me, as the remainder of the Body of a Beast, which hath the eyes pul[led] out, remains vnprofitable: So if truth be wanting in a History, the Discourse prooues fruitless. And therefore when occasion is offered, he must not forbeare to blame his Friends, nor to commend his Enemies. Neither is it likely, that they of whom we write, haue always done well, or err'd continually. (9)

The historian must maintain careful observance over his subject because he may be required to make difficult interpretations (blaming a friend, praising a foe), and the facts that contribute to such interpretations are never permanent or fixed (no one will do well,

[19] Camden is not the only historian to emphasize the importance of eye-witnessing. Holinshed says he interviewed "modern eie-witnesses for the true setting downe" of his history.

or err continually, Polybius points out). Historiographical truth parallels the sense of vision because ethical remembering requires correct perspective *and* continual surveillance. Camden borrows the notion of an eye-less creature to reiterate the link between diligence, honesty and sustained observance. Yet, Polybius's beast has become the "beautifullest" creature by the time it reaches Camden's work. Why this minor change to this analogy? In terming history visually appealing and emphasising the creature's appearance, Camden asserts that history should not only see diligently, it should also be viewed diligently. The process of keeping the past goes on with the reader of history, who, like the historian, is positioned in front of the mirror and ready to see his reflection.

Recollection as Expectation

If the early modern historiographical text looks back to the past, it is equally concerned with how its rendition of this recollection can affect the future. What is the future of the historiographical text? It is the future success or failure of the work itself – how much it is published, how warmly it is received by readers. The text also looks ahead to a future in which readers will be instructed by history to avoid the pitfalls and match the successes recounted in the text. The text therefore fashions a future for itself in which readers themselves guard its messages. In this way, the text becomes prophetic; it charts a destiny that it will certainly fulfill because its messages are flexible enough to affect a wide range of readers. Historiographical prophecy makes the contingency of future events seem necessary, fated to occur, with the wide applicability of its call to readers. The metaphor of historiography as a mirror helps us to understand the prophetic

function of such works. The mirror confers the reality that the reader and text create together. This kind of history will not simply be truthful; it will mark an honest and sincere bond between the past recounted and the narrative made by those in the present. The historiographical prophecy does not anticipate facts, but rather, anticipates inspiring the reader to look back emotionally and intellectual on the past as an foreshadowing of the present. The view of historiography as prophetic works in two contradictory ways; a prophetic text confirms that historical truths are eternal and transcend the passage of time. Yet, these permanent truths are unmasked only if readers sustain an association between their time and the time recounted in the text.

The two letters that precede Hall's *Union* support the view that recollection and anticipation work together; the first, an expression of hope from Hall about the future of his text, is reflected on and anticipated further in Richard Grafton's own letter to the reader. Hall defends the aims of his work by defending histories of the past. It will become increasingly clear that the definition of history as the "setting forth" of fame is a conceptual and verbal key to Hall's dedication. Hall recounts that history languished until "Moses had by deuine inspiracio[n] in the third age, inuented letters, the treasure of memorie, and set furth fiue notable bokes, to the greate comfort of all people liuying at this daie" (v). When Hall refers to Moses's "divine inspiration," he implies the writing of history requires a prophetic vision of the future; Hall legitimates his project by looking back to Moses, yet his recollection is of a Moses that looks prophetically forward and anticipates the need that Hall and others will have for his own literary efforts. The effect is to make a historiographical text the product of a circular relationship between recollection and expectation. To "set forth" is to look back at an interminable line of

source histories and channel them into a work that envisions its own contribution to this lasting production. It is to record the past and predict the future in one act of writing.

Hall continues his obsession with "setting forth." He confirms that "memory by literature is the verie dilator and setter furth of Fame" (v). In the next breath he adds that men of authority and status are "bounde to theim whiche haue so liuely set furth the liues and actes of their parentes" (v). Hall will use the term "set furth" four more times in his short dedication. The term signals the unique middle place of historiography, which carries forward parents through the actions of the child. Historiography gives birth to the past by influencing the actions of those in the present and future; each temporality is an equal contributor to the success of the historiographical work and the duration of the memories it encodes. This leads Hall to insist that "memorie maketh menne ded many a thousand yere still to liue as though thei wer present" (vi). Hall does not mean that historiography brings the dead back to life; rather, he indicates that texts like his establish a durable and ongoing bond between the living and the dead because the example of the dead conditions the actions of the living. The historiographical text becomes, all at once, the parent and the child of the past.

Richard Grafton, an "imprinter" of Hall's work, contributes an addendum to the dedication that echoes Hall's own turn of phrase. His desire to remain faithful to Hall's original vision extends even to his choice of language, which asks "the most gentle reader" to overlook if "ought herin shalbe sene vnto the purpose to bee omitted either not sufficiently delated and set furth" (vii). Grafton perhaps consciously, perhaps unconsciously signals that his compilation of Hall's loose papers is a true child to Hall's parent text, and is also a parent to that text. The phrase "delated and set furth" becomes a

key to understanding the parent-child relationship of historiography and truth. Grafton employs Hall's own phrase in a sentence that concedes his contribution may have *insufficiently* "delated and set furth" Hall's previous effort. The echo that reaffirms Hall's message records its own possible shortcomings. Grafton's contribution thus is both the child of Hall's text, and a parent who reproduces that text anew, and in ways that may not reflect the same truth as Hall's. Grafton's additions are made "as truly" as Grafton can, an admission that records their similarity and difference from the parent text. He claims his addition is "without any addicion"; this paradox is a fitting emblem for the historiographical enterprise at large, which simply reflects past truths and, at the same time, produces new truths according to the receptiveness of present and future readers.

Grafton's appeal to the "gentle reader" to judge his work "truly and charitably" also signals that historiography combines necessity and contingency. If Grafton's work was truly without "any addicion" of his own, then there would be no need for future readers to adopt a perspective of gentility and charity. His plea that readers do just that means that his text has been exposed to contingent readings, both positive and negative. Yet, the appeal to a charitable reader repeats Hall's own wish that Edward VI will accept his text "accordying" to his "accustomed goodnesse" (vii). Once again, Grafton's verbal echo affirms that Hall's text is a parent to *and* product of his own editorial efforts. The request for readers of historiography to be charitable was in part a simple convention, and was not limited to historiographical writing. Most writers at this time worried about the public's reception of their work and often included expressions of goodwill to prevent the response of malice from "backbiters." While this appeal is conventional, it still offers

valuable information about the historian's understanding of his work as one that looks back and forward.

With the plea for "gentle readers," historians try to position their work as an inheritor and creator of a kind of historical truth; this truth relies less on fact and more on good will, making the text honest by balancing its possible faults with good intentions. Such honesty lies somewhere between fact and fiction, and necessity and contingency. Hall refers to Moses's "devine inspiracion" as the origin of writing in general, and historiographical writing in particular. This inspiration pervades Hall's view of his own work. Both texts and readers are in some ways "inspired" by a force beyond the cold, emotionally desolate sphere of factual evidence. Judgement is no longer about correct or false historical material; it is instead a matter of the text's and readers' openness to possible revision. As Holinshed explains, he refuses to use "peremptorie censure" when writing a text, and leaves it open to "each mans judgement" to sort through his unbiased material. Holinshed demonstrates respect for his reader's understanding, and conveys his desire that readers show his text the same respect. He intends to "humblie beseech the skilful to supplie" what his text lacks, and foresees that this will leave his own work open to "further enlargement." What is this enlargement but the very "dilation" and "setting forth" to which Hall refers? The historiographical text provides the conditions for its own enlargement, a supplement that will carry forward and always at least slightly change the content of the history, but never its prophetic voice.

Walter Raleigh situates *The History of the World* between expectation and recollection in complex ways in his preface to the work. He admits that this work could not have been "begotten [...] when the light of common knowledge began to open it self

to [his] younger years: and before any wound receiued, either from Fortune or Time" (sig1Ar). Raleigh reveals that the shape of an historiographical work is itself subject to the passage of time, even as it records this. The "wound" becomes the symbol for the influence of time on the body and the text. His own reflection here, moreover, combines looking back with looking ahead. He recollects his youth and describes his inability to look forward at that time. His perspective, thanks to the wounds of time, has now significantly altered. He has a deeper vision of the future of his own body due to age, and a new understanding of his youth, in comparison. Profound historiographical knowledge derives from the experience of recollection as expectation, and expectation as recollection. The historian writes from somewhere between the "first dawne of day" and "the day of a tempestuous life, drawne on to the very euening" (sig1Ar); these stages of life are co-contributors to Raleigh's view of the place of his body and text in time.

Raleigh further manifests the simultaneity of recollection and expectation when he closes his preface by confronting the issue of potential readership for his text. Here, life and death are close companions as joint stimulants to historiographical writing; this work operates in the uncomfortable place between hope and frustration. At the close of his preface, after worrying about the public as an "inconsiderate multitude" (sigA1r), Raleigh seems conflicted in his faith that the historian can call a charitable reader to life. He admits, "[i]mpossible I know it is to please all," but he does describe one famous reader who was indeed pleased by his writing. Raleigh says

> It was for the seruice of that inestimable Prince Henry, the successiue hope, and one of the greatest of the Christian World, that I vndertooke this Worke. It pleased him to pervse some part thereof, and to pardon what was amisse. It is now left to the world without a Maister. (sigE4v)

Prince Henry not only denotes an ideal reader, but also the tragic rarity of an ideal reader. When he describes Henry's death, Raleigh invites future readers to aspire to Henry's considerate reading, to pleasure and pardon Raleigh's text as "the greatest of the Christian World" has in the past. Raleigh spends much time in "The Preface" outlining the value of "Charity in Christian Men" (sigA1r), which is one of the few qualities that lift mortal men above the public's pack-driven mentality. By linking a good reader to an elite and rare friend, Raleigh, in fact, makes the public a tempting offer: to enter the bonds of friendship, to enter an elite rank. Prince Henry was the "successive hope" for James's crown, Raleigh laments. A feeling public that mimics Henry, then, is the successive hope for Raleigh's historical text; considerate readers, Raleigh's few friends, are called to life even as Henry is laid to rest.

In fact, Raleigh's need for an understanding readership only gains momentum after the mention of Henry. "I do therefore for-beare," he proclaims at the close of "The Preface," "to stile my Readers Gentle, Courteous, and Friendly, thereby to beg their good opinions [...] let vs claw the Reader with neuer so many courteous phrases" (sigE4v). In outright resistance to flattery, Raleigh makes an unmistakable appeal. If his reader is disposed to sympathy, she will not fail to miss this call that masquerades as a non-call; a request for understanding runs beneath the assertion that understanding cannot be enforced, but must be felt. In resisting any "styling" of his readers, Raleigh styles exactly the kind of reader who would appreciate his impulse to at once hope and restrain hope. Raleigh's approach to history is one of profound expectation. His hopes are profound because he seems to admit they will never be realized. Raleigh describes this state of

permanent suspension between recollection and expectation beautifully when it comes to his notion of readership:

> All the hope I haue lies in this. That I haue already found more vngentle and vncourteous Readers of my Loue towards them, and well-deseruing of them, than euer I shall do againe. For had it beene otherwise, I should hardly haue had this leisure, to haue made myself a foole in print. (sigE4v)

Raleigh's act of hope is an act of recollection. He recalls past responses to his writings in order to structure his hope. And yet, in looking back, Raleigh also predicts that he can suffer no worse fate in the future, and so he is also looking forward. This complex dynamic seems productive, even if Raleigh expresses this production in highly ironic terms. He suggests that people who have failed to interpret him correctly in the past have fostered this hope that he can do no worse in the future, and thus he will write freely again, despite the dangers of insulting powerful people. Moreover, his "leisure" to do so is facilitated by his imprisonment in the tower, another product of past interpretations of his actions. Thus, the wish for a diligent reader of his text emerges in the heart of his awareness of past failures of this hope. It is a negative hope, and it is a hope that has been cultivated by the profound limitation of hope; it is a hope prepared for by looking back, and nostalgia inspired by looking forward.

Restless Travel, Variable Materials

The Book of Revelation warns readers against making additions or subtractions to the book of life. Early modern historians want to heed this warning, treating their histories as versions of sacred texts that will not accept creative intervention. They are likewise cautious about rhetorical and poetical adornment, preferring simple to complex expression. Yet, an ethical historiography notices the thin line between simple truth and

complex interpretation, even if the former is most desirable. Many historians vow they will not dress the past with rhetorical abundance; they claim this amounts to the insertion of the passions and affections of the writer into the text, and feel it indicates mere self-indulgence. The historian can risk losing the past entirely if his own creation covers more than the "naked and unshaped" past, as Michel de Montaigne calls it (170). Holinshed therefore asserts that his writing is "plaine, without any rhetoricall shew of eloquence, hauing rather a regard to simple truth, than to decking words." William Harrison, echoing this claim, contends that he writes "truelie and plainelie" rather than with "vaine affectation of eloquence" ("Epistle Dedicatorie).[20] Richard Grafton reassures his reader that he has only "gathered" and "compiled" Hall's paper, and claims to have done so "without any addicion" of his own making (vii).

Hall himself encourages his dedicatee to overlook the material text and focus on its message. He advises against "regardying the thyng," encouraging his reader to regard his "good will" and patriotism. However much Hall might deflect attention from the materiality of history, he frequently employs images of that materiality to stress the importance of writing histories; he worries that the past will be "darkened and defaced" if not recorded by those like him. Hall thus suppresses and acknowledges the effect of time on the material world at the same time. The form of restlessness, rejection and suppression Hall demonstrates in relation to the materiality of his text is a feature of the balancing acts that historiographical writing performs.

Many of these projects often become so large and ungainly that the negotiation between simplicity and complexity is no longer a matter of language. It becomes a matter of sorting through vast, dilapidated and contradictory sources, and the historian

[20] Harrison's words taken from an unpaginated dedication in the 1587 edition of Holinshed's *Chronicles*.

must distil simplicity from this dizzying assortment of raw material. As Edward Hall points out when addressing his sources, "I have read an old proverb which saith, that in many words, a lie or twain soon may escape" (142). The simplicity of the words can no longer convey truth when many words are gathered together and must be pushed to press. Holinshed laments that in his Irish chronicles he could not "exemplifie" the material or "dispose it so orderlie as had beene conuenient, nor pen it with so apt words" because he is in a hurry to send it to the printers. After describing the various factors that impede clarity and order in his work, Holinshed terms his chronicles a "huge volume" and asks that his readers excuse its invariable faults.

William Camden explains his work on his *Annales* of Elizabeth began with his entrance to an archival Mecca, provided by William Cecil. But this collection soon frustrates Camden's good intentions, and the place of history becomes the place of its own deferral for eighteen years. Camden describes the suspension of his text between historical traces (in Cecil's archive) and the real conditions of performing history to his reader:

> in these [Cecil's] papers, if any where, I had confident Hopes to meet the real Truth of Passages lodged, as it were, in so many Repositories [...] at my very first Entrance upon the Task, an intricate Difficulty did in a manner wholly discourage me. For I lighted upon great Piles and Heaps of Papers [...] In searching and turning over whereof whilst I laboured till I sweat again, covered all over with Dust [...] my Industry began to flag.

For Camden, the writing of history combines the illusion that "Truth" resides in one place with the awareness that truth resides in difficult and diverse locations in the physical world. Camden's hope to "meet" truth, imagined as a lodger in the place of the past, is immediately underwritten by his frequent self-restraints: "if any where" and "as it were." The rhythm of Camden's own prose mirrors his experience in the archive. He gains pace

and emphasis with the phrase "I had confident Hopes to meet the real Truth," a string of words that gallops with insistent positivity. However, this surge of optimism is sandwiched between phrases that simultaneously inspire and check its momentum ("if any where," "as it were," "so many Repositories"). Camden's faith in the singular and locatable historical ideal derives from a contradictory realism. History is a real and metaphorical room that inspires and frustrates physical and intellectual motion. Camden enters the "Task" as if expecting to enter a finite room, but discovers that the room contains labyrinth of "intricate Difficulty," and his exertion there is literalized in his reference to perspiration – a physical sign of intellectual effort that seems interminable ("till I sweat again").

Camden's initial entrance into history has no foreseeable exit, and this letter records the long years of his effort with a combined sense of pride and despair. Although discouraged for nearly two decades, Camden did resume the journey and describes the moment of its renewal: "I buckled myself afresh to my intermitted Study, and plied it harder than before." Fittingly, Camden envisions his study as a horse, upon which he must travel again. The place where he once supposed truth lodged, Cecil's archives, was merely a temporary resting-place for a traveller who must find truth further on. At the close of his letter Camden does refer to an arrival of sorts. He dedicates his biography finally "at the Altar of Truth." Yet, with this religious tenor, Camden hints that his text makes merely an offer to truth rather than a discovery of it. In structuring historical truth as a religious deity, Camden suggests that Truth itself may be simple, but it is also distant, inscrutable and approachable only through complex intermediaries.

In his preface to *The History of the World* Walter Raleigh looks forward to the ultimate destination of the human soul and the ability of history to carry that soul to this destination. However, he also conveys a sense that this destination cannot be reached. In effect, Raleigh looks forward and backward by simultaneously cultivating and deferring hope. What kind of hope is involved in the writing of history, according to Raleigh? When most optimistic, he suggests that history provides a passage from earth to heaven: it charts human frailty in order to transcend the place of the corporeal. Earth and heaven may constitute the places of origin and destination for Raleigh's history, but when he describes how rare it is that man can reach eternal joy, or acquire enough wisdom to describe it before death, he reveals that the path from source to destination may be, in fact, a dead end. History's capacity to ferry the reader from the corporeal to heavenly begins to look like a lure when, with an air of hopelessness, he admits that "wee are compounded of earth; and wee inhabit it. The Heauens are high, farre off and vnsearchable" (C3v). Raleigh concedes that one cannot inhabit heaven through the progress of knowledge alone, and, once in heaven, the blessed "cannot admit the mixture of any second or lesse ioy; nor any returne of foregone and mortall affection towards friends, kindred, or children" (C4v). Thus, the living cannot know the place of the eternall and the blessed have no interest in the place of the temporal. The mortal must know the failures of the past so they can move into the "seats of Angelicall affections" (C4v), but the boundaries of the corporeal world resemble the walls of a prison when Raleigh contends that man cannot arrive at the divine on his own intellectual power.

Raleigh also checks his hopeful momentum when describing his reasons for writing the text. He wishes at one point

> to sound a retrait; and to desire to be excused of this long pursuit: and that withal, that the good intent, which hath moued me to draw the picture of time past (which we call Historie) in so large a table, may also be accepted in place of a better reason. (D2r)

Raleigh hereby indefinitely suspends his explanation for writing a history with his own admission that full explanation, or "better reason," may be impossible to find. He knows that good intent facilitates his movement, but there is no hint, in his use of the term "long pursuit," that he will ever reach his destination or that such a destination indeed exists. He moves toward a theory of historical production only to evade further interrogation at the precise moment when he and the reader seem poised to enter the real "place" of the past. This "retrait" is fundamental to Raleigh's maddeningly contradictory description of the place of history.[21] Is history the guide to the eternal or a dry record of the facts of human existence? The only answer is that, for Raleigh, history's domain stretches between the eternal and the temporal. It partakes of both places without ever solidly landing in one or the other. Raleigh's movement towards this illusory goal does afford him the ability to exert himself intellectually, if not physically. The historian's attention to his own performance of the past, his effort to record his potential and its limits, may well define the qualities of a new kind of historical truth; this truth manifests the reciprocal relationship between the difficult conditions of its production *and* the illusion of a "seat Angelicall."

Like Camden and Raleigh, Inigo Jones suggests that the materials of historiographical work, such as ruins, are opaque but inviting; they are appealing precisely because they are also shrouded in mystery. In his work *Stonehenge Restored*,

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[21] D.R. Woolf terms Raleigh's preface "gloomy," and believes it indicative of the "sceptical" and "fideistic" work as a whole (52). Woolf adds that "[n]o sooner does he make what appears, at a glance, to be positive statement, than the reader is abruptly reminded of the lack of conviction behind it" (*The Idea of History* 52).

which he composed as part of his duties as King Charles's survey, Jones illustrates how an observer, when anatomizing the historical ruin, adds to the mystery of the object in the act of trying to resolve it. He decides Romans are responsible for Stonehenge, speculates about their use for it, while revelling in the ruin's irresolvable inscrutability. The simple truth of Stonehenge is sought and deflected in historiographical writing. Jones declares that his ultimate aim is to "waft his Barque" into the "wished Port of Truths discovery concerning Stoneheng" (109). The poetic metaphor for arriving at truth problematizes the ease of this kind of journey. Jones intimates that although he steers his own text, it is, in the end, a matter of which way the wind blows whether he finds the simple truth of the ruin. Jones abstracts his project in the process of representing it as a drifting ship that he cannot entirely control, and the poetic metaphor magnifies this complexity. Jones further invalidates his claim to restore the ruin by leaving his text to future interpreters who may "make a more full and certain discovery" (109). His own text, then, will acquire layers of interpretation in the process of repeated attempts to unmask the ruin. Like the burial urns that Browne addresses, the past is rendered more remote as time passes; Stonehenge is symbolically buried further and further under these ongoing stabs at "simple truth." Yet, this complexity incites rather than frustrates further engagements. Part of the wonder that Jones calls the "magnificent" Stonehenge, is that it invites an unmasking of its mystery that seems to re-textualize this magical quality, extending the process of interpretation.

Mourning, Historiography and Shakespeare's Histories

In *Hamlet in Purgatory*, Stephen Greenblatt makes the crucial observation that even after Reformation theological revisions that abolished purgatory, "[t]he living could

have an ongoing relationship with one important segment of the dead, and not simply a relationship constituted by memory" (19). Greenblatt's articulation of an "ongoing relationship" between living and dead is crucial, but this relationship can emerge in ways that are not limited to the persistence of a belief in purgatory. An exploration of the territory that historiography and mourning share in the early modern period will find new ways to address the possibility of ongoing relationships, and will find a way to see that relationships that are "constituted by memory" are more complex than Greenblatt allows. These relationships, formed in and by historiographical memory, require ethical behaviours that are in no way simple. Verdery writes that reburials of bodies in post-socialist Europe "is about reorienting people's relations to the past" (112). The repositioning of the dead is a "visual and visceral experience that seems to offer true access to the past" (113). Reburial is ultimately, according to Verdery, an ethical commitment that the living make to the dead, which seeks answers to questions like "[w]ho are our true ancestors? Who has been unjustly shunted aside, and who has usurped their place in our lineal self-definition [...] Which ancestors will our history acknowledge, which forget?" (112). I suggest that in linking historiography to mourning, *Richard III*, *Cymbeline* and *Henry VIII* become dramatic reburials that are indeed oriented towards confronting the kinds of ethical questions about the past that Verdery identifies. I consider these plays "reburials" because they represent the moment of death and interment as ongoing; the task of mourning is never finished and new interpretations of the past are means of reburying the dead. In these plays Shakespeare (and Fletcher) dramatize the construction and deconstruction of "cerements" for the dead.

Taking Verdery's conception of "reburial" into the sphere of early modern drama intensifies the ethical power of mourning. Mourning is a kind of performance, and performance is a kind of mourning; the same can be said of history. The theatre is thus a perfect place to stage the engagement between living and dead as a mirror of the relationship between the stage and audience. Tobias Doring explains how the theatre mirrors mourning and magnifies the simultaneity of identification and detachment. He observes that

> [t]he status of the deceased is paradoxical: the corpse embodies the presence of someone who is absent. Visibly different from the living person, the corpse remains and still presents this person's haunting likeness. Every corpse, in fact, is a double. It is such doubleness and troubling duplicity that is not just expressed in mourning, but also haunts theatrical performativity [...] performances of mourning thus always engage with the uncanny power of theatricality" (7).

At the very least, Shakespeare's dramatic reburials point out that ethical questions must accompany any representation of the past, and suggest that historiography must be sensitive to these ethical imperatives. The staged drama allows this ethics of historiography to indeed become "visual and visceral" in such a way that the audience, like watchers at a wake, allow the disorienting presence of the absent, to create a heightened awareness of the kind of honesty that is produced by an ongoing relationship between the living who produce the ritual materials of mourning and the body that bursts these cerements.

Chapter Two
Watching the Dead and "keeping faith with nature"

> Horatio says 'tis but our fantasy,
> And will not let belief take hold of him
> Touching this dreaded sight twice seen of us.
> Therefore I have entreated him along
> With us to watch the minutes of this night,
> That if again this apparition come,
> He may approve our eyes and speak to it. (*Hamlet* 1.1.23-9)

It is fitting that the ghost of Hamlet's father appears to sentinels standing watch over Elsinore. While their watch provides practical security, the sentinels begin to redefine the notion of the watch in the process of encountering Hamlet's dead father. Their guardianship of a building becomes a parallel to another kind of guardianship; the duty of the living to guard and remain sensitive to the message of the dead. It becomes clear that one should not simply see Hamlet's dead father; a good watch will also hear and become a witness to the ghost's story by engaging with it, as Marcellus hopes to do through Horatio. The good watchman will become a protector of a story about the past by communicating with the dead. The Elsinore guards who see the ghost, a list that will grow to include Horatio and Hamlet, contrast starkly to the wakers inside Elsinore who resist sleep in order to celebrate. Claudius notices these two renditions of waking and will describe his own as "mirth in funeral" and Hamlet's as "dirge in marriage" (1.2.12). He hopes to demonstrate to Hamlet that his celebration is merely the opposite side of the coin to mourning. Hamlet and the audience will be asked to consider which form of watching (mirth or dirge) is more appropriate in the circumstances.

Marcellus can help us understand what makes a watch faithful to the dead; his perspective stands somewhere between Horatio's initial scepticism of and Hamlet's later emotional belief in the ghost. A faithful watch feels the need to "approve" her eyes; that is, the visual bond between the dead and the living requires emotional *and* intellectual

endorsement. Indeed, Marcellus recognizes that a thorough watch will also bear witness to a connection between the living and the dead that cannot be empirically substantiated but instead must be emotionally felt. His use of the word "touching" implies that the ghost has affected the watchers emotionally. The communication with the ghost is "dreaded" and "entreated," according to Marcellus. In either case, the vision touches those who are watching, and if it hasn't touched them, they will fail to pursue communication with the dead.

When Horatio finally sees the ghost he challenges it for an explanation of its presence. Marcellus emphasizes the watch's need to address the ghost in a way that will protect rather than sever the connection between the living and dead. The preservation of this bond requires an ethical watch; Marcellus worries that the ghost is "offended" after Horatio's aggressive inquiry causes it to retreat (1.1.49). Marcellus calls his guard of Elsinore a "strict and most observant watch" (1.1.71). In the context of Marcellus's own openness to the ghost, a strict, or faithful, watch is one that extends the moment of contact between the living and the dead; it keeps the dead visible so that an important message can be conveyed and maintained.

The necessity for an ethical watch over the dead carries over to the audience of *Hamlet*. Play-goers are part of their own watch and it remains in their power to join the "most observant watch" of those onstage. Raphael Lyne points out "[t]he question of how we 'see' a play as a set of moral questions is entwined with the question of how we see the play as a visual spectacle [...] belief and disbelief are conscious processes, and a suspension is a decision to accept some or all aspects of the play" (31). An observant audience will find that the play approves efforts of vision that are engaged with and

critical of the play; a stubbornly sceptical or naively unquestioning play-goer will have failed to face the moral questions the play asks and failed to provide witness to the message these questions raise. The middle-perspective Lyne describes and Marcellus illustrates offers the possibility of finding faith between infidelities. Marcellus draws Horatio into the circle of observers who are "taken hold" of by a vision. The play asks the audience to become drawn to this circle as well; if the play-goer is "taken hold" of by the sight of the play, she will also take hold and preserve its unique voice.

An honest, or faithful, connection between the past and the present keeps the gaze of the living trained on the endlessly informative (and persistently expressive) body of the dead. The ethics of believing the impossible, wrapped up as it is with seeing the dead, develops more intensely when translated to the sphere of historical drama. Play-goers may find themselves carried along the spectrum of belief from Horatio to Hamlet when confronted with supernatural moments in plays that depict a *real* past. An historical play with such diversions will question, on several levels, what it means to ethically see and address the dead. In the case of the three history plays discussed here, the audience sees the dead past onstage. Furthermore, it sees supernatural emanations of the dead staged inside the world of the play. In what way does the imaginative speculation that staged ghosts inspire affect the honesty of a play about the dead of the historical past?

Anston Bosman understands the faithful bond between watcher and watched in *Henry VIII* in relation to its maddeningly vague subtitle "All is True." He argues that in this play "[e]ye meets eye not in a contest of 'show' but in a communion of 'honest truth' [...] 'truth' here stresses not correctness of conformity with fact but rather the virtues of sincerity, loyalty, and trust" (469). Shakespeare begins to ponder the ethics of

observation in *Richard III*, with several characters seeing, but refusing to engage with, the dead. In *Cymbeline* and in *Henry VIII* Shakespeare (with Fletcher in the latter play) restages moments of seeing the dead for his characters and his audiences with the intent of fully realizing a dynamic he touched on in his earlier plays.

It has long been acknowledged that Shakespeare's late plays contemplate various forms of loss and recovery, and the movement between these states is articulated by characters' journeys from a hostile to habitable environment. While they acknowledge that death shadows these plays' peregrinations, critics who perceive this dynamic often view the ultimate message of the difficult journey as one of life triumphing over death: the dead are restored to life when acts of providence bridge the place of departure to the place of arrival. David Scott Kastan describes the romance journey as a "movement beyond the tragic" towards "forgiveness and reconciliation" (*Shapes of Time* 127). Douglas L. Peterson agrees, noting that the late plays conclude with an "affirmation of the sustaining, restoring, and renewing powers of human love" (15). There is another way of viewing travellers in the late play, one that respects a balance between loss and recovery, while not definitively tilting the scale in either direction. Death, in the late plays, is expressed as, in Maurice Blanchot's words, an "unsituated, unsituatable" event (67). The journey from hostile place to habitable place is not, after all, an attempt to imagine the movement from death to life; this kind of movement would "situate" death, and, thereby, put an end to, the challenges raised by the unsettling thought of death.

Rather, the traveller's journey from place to place dramatizes the circulation of narrative between past and present; the traveller stands for a story that passes between the dead and the living, or that which is unknown and that which is known. The wisdom that

the traveller bestows to his kin after her homecoming proceeds from the heart of mystery, from the place of the unknown. This kind of information is the source of all storytelling, according to Walter Benjamin. In his essay "The Storyteller," Benjamin esteems the transmission of a story that is an "exchange of experiences" (83). It is the storyteller, rather than the novelist, that can facilitate such exchange, and Benjamin identifies the "archaic representatives" of storytelling as the "resident tiller of the soil" and the "trading seaman" (84-5). These two groups condensed over time, became artisans, and combined the "lore of the past" of the native soil, to the "the lore of faraway places" (85). Thus, the foreign narrative carried from a distant territory is analogous to the domestic narrative carried from a distant time. Each story will traverse a wide space to reach "home," which is a place in the first instance and a temporal present in the second instance. The key to effective storytelling, Benjamin suggests, is the ability to create a home, a shared space, between storyteller and listener. It will be a place where the known and the unknown are mutually constitutive. In order to be at home with the distant and the dead, the storyteller must facilitate the movement between near and far; he must travel it himself and make sure his listeners travel it as well.

The journey is never complete, however. The best tale will circulate rather than proceed along a linear trajectory. Benjamin calls being at home in a distant place or time a dynamic of "counsel" between storyteller and listener, in which "the storyteller takes what he tells from experience [...] And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale" (87). The articulation of a past experience is the production of a new experience. This is the meaning of exchange. The storyteller's narrative will never be duplicated exactly, as a new set of listeners will experience the story differently. A

narrative that is at "home" with a distant place and time does not convey a static outline of what home looks like, but, instead, carries the rich potential of recreating new and future "homes" with new and future listeners.

Even though the thought of "home" comforts, Benjamin reminds his readers that the ultimate shared experience between storyteller and listener is the experience of death; an awareness of death's influence on all organic beings is a necessary feature of the exchange of experience. There is no storytelling without a consistent acknowledgement or, as Benjamin terms it, a keeping of the faith with nature and natural decay. If either storyteller or listener denies that the death of another connects to her mortality, the exchange of experience has failed. The reader of the novel falls short in this way, Benjamin contends, by finding consolation in "the hope of warming his shivering life with a death he reads about" (101). This hope represents a cruel, even unethical detachment from a description of death. In Benjamin's formulation, readers of the novel become deluded voyeurs of decay, and they fail to understand their own subjection to these natural processes. He or she has failed to "keep faith with nature" by stubbornly situating him or herself outside a fable that depicts real processes.

What does it mean to "keep faith with nature"? The idea of "keeping" is essential here. Ethical storytellers and readers will act, according to Benjamin, as those who maintain vigilant respect for the inevitability of death. They will make sure their eyes "do not stray from that dial in front of which there moves the procession of creatures of which, depending on the circumstances, Death is either the leader or the last wretched straggler" (97). The ethical narrator and listener will not only keep their eyes on the inevitable passage of time, they will see every being, the dead who are recounted and the

living that do the recounting, as participants in this journey. Both the living and the dead march with Death. Benjamin registers the strange unity of these seemingly distant groups by terming them all "creatures." This death march seems a highly pessimistic vision of the "exchange of experience," and perhaps it is negative. Ricoeur also sees the unification between living and dead as potentially negative; he suggests that we are anguished by the death of another because it reminds us that an end "awaits Da-sein [being]," and that death "keeps a watch on it, precedes it" and is "always and imminent" (*Memory, History, Forgetting* 356). Ricoeur concedes that this "anguished obsession with death" could "amount to closing off the reserves of openness characterizing the potentiality of being" (357). But this difficult, even traumatic, feeling marks a sincere exchange of experience from teller to listener. Here, in the heart of a seeming foreclosure of possibility, in the heart of anguish, mourning announces a genuine relationship between living and dead. Mourning offers a space where the living cannot ignore the dead because they share a common history, or, are travelling the same path from sight to speculation, known to unknown. As Ricoeur asks,

> [a]re we not able to anticipate, on the horizon of this mourning of the other, the mourning that would crown the anticipated loss of our own life? Along this road of redoubled internalization, the anticipation of mourning that our close relations will have to go through at the time of our disappearance, can help us to accept our own future death as a loss with which we strive to reconcile ourselves in advance. (359)

Mourning requires that the living look at the dead and internalize this sight. Recall that the reader of the novel disengages from the possibility that the protagonist's story is also the reader's story. That reader's consolation is that he or she will step outside narrative and preside over, rather than share in, its knowledge. However, in facing the dead, and feeling the anguish that death causes, the reader will transform sight of the dead body into

interpretive speculation about the meaning of this loss to the living. As Benjamin explains, "not only a man's knowledge or wisdom, but above all his real life – and this is the stuff stories are made of – first assumes transmissible form at the moment of death" (94). Death marks the moment where a life can only continue *as* a narrative, and an ethical storyteller and reader will value the transmission of the dead in this account; they will recognize that the longing for permanent consolation is misguided, and any denunciation of death is an absurd denial of the organic world that encompasses writer, text and reader.

Benjamin points out, "in his [the dying man's] expression and looks the unforgettable emerges" (94). The living who witness the profound "saying" of the dying and dead become keepers of the unforgettable, preservers of the past. Here, observance of the past becomes a matter of an ethical and emotional bond between the living and the dead, between the reader and the text. In this mourning ritual, the vulnerabilities of the human body inspire the act of witness; mourners feel, then push aside their own physical needs in order to testify to the enduring power of the organic body (both theirs and the dead's). The denial of comfort as a form of witness is accomplished when the watcher approaches absolute stillness as recognition of the importance of vision above all other senses. The "inspired insomniac"[22] will also use her emotional or physical sensitivity or suffering as an internalization of the vulnerability of the body represented by the sight of the dead. Finally, the inspiration for seeing and reading the dead body proceeds from a sense of irrevocable separation from the dead loved-one; paying sustained attention to the body approximates a physical connection to the dead in response to the knowledge that

[22] I borrow this term from John Joughin's article on mourning in *Richard II*, in which Joughin himself borrows the phrase from Maurice Blanchot ("Shakespeare's Memorial Aesthetics" 48).

all other physical connections have been terminated. The sincere watcher observes a "core of mystery" in the death process. Ultimately, in witnessing the dead body and suffering alongside it, the mourner keeps faith with nature by recognizing that the dead have embarked on a journey that the living can and cannot share.

Because the sight of death imparts the "unforgettable," it necessarily places the vigilant in the position of protecting memory. Early modern historians self-consciously fulfill this duty, and Shakespeare addresses it continuously in his histories. When the vigilant mourner views the dead body in a state of passive attention, she emphasizes materiality. Yet, the sincere act of witness can also testify to an emotional bond that outlasts the life of the organic body. The watcher must connect with the dead, while also respecting the distance between the living and the dead. Jackson suggests that "[t]o engage history in writing is to engage the always already of difference [...] by preserving an integrity – a vigilant reflexivity – to the present" (472). According to Jackson, an ethical historian will transform sight into insight. He describes this vigilance as an "interminable facing" of the past. It refuses to look away. The ethical historian, like the sincere mourner, will demonstrate vigilance over the dead by not ruling out, as Jackson says, "possibilities" (472). She will resist peremptory actions and instead exhibit intellectual reserve, as he will be aware that an open, patient engagement with the past is more profitable than any "act of closure" (Jackson 473). A "vigilant reflexivity" makes the relationship between historian and subject something more than mere quotation.

Paraphrasing Nietzsche, Ricoeur suggests that historians who blindly adhere to fact and objectivity will become "library rats" who are "void of any creative instinct." (*Time and Narrative*. Vol.3, 238). The best historian, like the mourner who truly feels

the loss of a loved-one, will respect her subject rather than coldly assess it. The sense of the wake as "an exercise of devotion" (*OED*) describes the kind of relationship that a vigilant historian will cultivate with her subject. Beginning tentatively in *Richard III* and continuing intensely in the late plays, Shakespeare considers historical "respect," "admiration" and "reverence" as exercises of devotion to the unforgettable; they manifest the mourner's vigilant watch over the dead, where the present can ethically "face" the past.

Richard III: Defacing Death

The interpretive potential of "vigilant reflexivity" is expressed in Clarence's dream before his murder in *Richard III*. In this dream, Clarence faces the past by experiencing his own immersion into the realm of the dead. In dreaming of dying, and in encountering the dead, Clarence has the opportunity translate sight into insight. However, he refuses to see his own investment in the processes of decay; that investment is his own responsibility for the deaths of others and, in turn, his own mortality. Clarence rejects the post of vigilant mourner of the dead, and the play advances a central theme that political tyranny matches a concurrent refusal to respect the past; Shakespeare will use the word "respect" to convey the necessity for a form of seeing that accompanies recognition of the value of the object viewed. Shakespeare charts the duties of the ethical historian by depicting the abdication of those respectful duties by Clarence and Richard when they encounter the dead. Both men resist the inspiration that an exchange of experience with the dead could offer them. Instead of seeing the dead as alluring, they repeatedly emphasize that death is "ugly" and the sight of the dead body is an "ugly

sight." Clarence and Richard may face death, but in their response to the sight they deface it, therefore rejecting the self-knowledge that the past can offer to the present.

Clarence's dream acquaints him with the sight of others' death and the inevitability of his own. This acquaintance comes in several forms, which shift in scope as the dream progresses. The dream offers a sweeping view of death, from Clarence's own drowning, his passage to the underworld, and his reunion with spirits who have undergone this journey before him. Each view of death replays the significance of the previous, with a different emotional intensity, bringing Clarence to an increasingly deeper understanding of his role in past deaths and the possible significance of his own death in relation to those. The channel crossing begins with Clarence and Richard playing at being historians. They look at the past from an ever-increasing distance, as they cross the channel. The vigilant watcher uses her own bodily stillness in order to prioritize sight over all other bodily senses. Clarence and Richard register their casual observation by refusing "passivity's reading." As Clarence puts it: "we looked toward England and cited up a thousand heavy times / During the wars of York and Lancaster / That had befall'n us" (1.4.13-16). Clarence's perspective of the Wars, from a distance, illustrates the limited scope of his "respect." Richard and Clarence look "toward," rather than "at" England, and this glance suggests their distance from the past by the space of cool observation. The motion of "citing up" this past is scholarly and unemotional. Clarence's claim that the turmoil of the Wars "befell" the two brothers is thus ironic. His studied impartiality prevents a sense that anything profound has befallen him; he remains unaffected. Moreover, in suggesting that the Wars somehow belong only to him and Richard, Clarence undermines the meaning of respect. He closes down the connection

between the past and the present in suggesting that the past "falls" upon the two brothers and no others. In prioritizing himself, he eradicates any significance that the "thousand heavy times" must command on their terms. Thus, in constructing an impartial and distanced perspective in "citing up," Clarence in fact narrows an outlook that would allow one to remember and face the dead who are no longer present.

Shakespeare quickly transforms the dream's representation of respect once Clarence is offered the opportunity to take part in history. By being pushed overboard, Clarence is literally immersed in the history that he was coolly, egotistically perusing moments before. Impartial observation now transforms into subjective experience once Clarence falls into history, rather than history falling on him. The perspective now communicates the sensation of suffering rather than distant glancing. "O Lord," he exclaims, "methought what pain it was to drown, / What dreadful noise of water in mine ears, / What sights of ugly death within mine eyes" (21-23). Clarence stresses his immediate bodily reaction to past wrecks; his own experience of drowning can now shape how he views the wrecks of the past. After sensing the pain of death, somehow hearing its message in the rush of water in his ears, Clarence sees rather than "cites" the past. In experiencing the pain of death, Clarence begins to respect the past, that is, to face it in the way that Jackson describes, and potentially understand that his own death is "constituted by, and in debt to, the past" (Jackson 471). As if to register this new perspective, Clarence plays upon his earlier citation of the "thousand heavy times." This number increases exponentially once he faces the past:

> Methought I saw a thousand fearful wrecks;
> Ten thousand men that fishes gnaw'd upon;
> Wedges of gold, great anchors, heaps of pearl,
> Inestimable stones, unvalu'd jewels,

> All scatter'd in the bottom of the sea.
> Some lay in dead men's skulls, and in the holes
> Where eyes did once inhabit, there were crept –
> As 'twere in scorn of eyes - reflecting gems,
> That woo'd the slimy bottom of the deep
> And mock'd the dead bones that lay scatter'd by. (1.4.24-33)

Marjorie Garber explains that the passage constructs a "striking contrast of mortality and eternity, the obscenely decaying body and the insensate but highly valued jewels which endure unchanged" (200). Shakespeare literally closes the "striking" distance between the mortal and immortal elements in the sea when Clarence notices the jewels have lodged in the skulls. Neither the "dead men's skulls" nor the jewels can convey a message about the past on their own; together, however, they begin to speak. Shifting contexts, that is, the shifting currents that mobilize the jewels, mobilize the message that issues from the dead. The submerged jewels represent the activities of reception and interpretation; they make the dead body, which is itself lifeless, a protean, and therefore, living, creature. These gems, after all, are "reflecting," and they exhibit the desires, demands and emotional investments of the viewer.

Yet, the message Clarence expresses in his appraisal of the dead is a deeply negative one. He interprets the gems as "scorning" and "mocking." They are one with the "slimy bottom." In his distaste for the sight of the dead body that has become one with the sea, Clarence rejects the opportunity to maintain this "facing" of the dead. He, in fact, defaces the dead by rendering them abject. He finds them strange, but not rich, to borrow the construction advanced by Ariel in his description of the dead body that undergoes the "sea change" in *The Tempest*. Clarence does indeed, literally refuse to see richness in the dead. He calls the littered treasure "inestimable" and "unvalu'd." In seeing that the jewels only make the dead ridiculous, Clarence misses the value that a

respectful interpretation of the dead can impart. He also fails to keep faith with the inevitability that he will soon join their ranks. His admission that he "would not spend another such a night" merely emphasizes his rejection of watching the dead.

Clarence's viewpoint, which is a refusal to respect the dead, will carry forward in the dream and influence his reception of the ghosts. The shade of Warwick asks a rhetorical question, one that seems to offer Clarence an opportunity for introspection. When Warwick asks, "[w]hat scourge of perjury / Can this dark monarchy afford false Clarence?" (50-1), Clarence slips past the meaning of this question, its imputation of his heavy guilt. Clarence recounts his dream as if he were a cold observer of his own life. The dream can make a "terrible impression" (63) on the dreamer, according to Clarence, but in his reaction to the dream, it is not clear the dream has impressed on him at all. The dream prompts Clarence to evade the very responsibility that it symbolizes. Clarence registers this divide neatly by informing the Keeper "I have done these things […] For Edward's sake" (66-68). At the precise moment that he sees his responsibility for the dead, he passes it along to Edward. In his appeal to God, Clarence once again claims that he does and does not deserve the scourge of the plaintive ghosts. He admits his "misdeeds" but suggests the punishment for them will only occur if God wilfully ignores his contrition, which is not quite contrition, and "be aveng'd" on Clarence (70). God, as the source of justice to which Clarence appeals, seems somehow unjust and implacable, in his estimation. God, like Edward, fails to recognize that Clarence acts for his sake; he thus makes the very notion of responsibility ridiculous by passing it immediately to those higher than him, authorities that he then dismisses for their lack of generosity to him. He claims to make "deep prayers" to God, but in his response to the dream of reaching the

depth of his responsibility, the "slimy bottom" of his past, Clarence demonstrates his prayers are in fact shallow. The two murderers, one who struggles with his conscience and one who does not, externalize the divide between contrition and remorselessness that destabilizes Clarence's original claim that the dream impressed on him.

Clarence describes his initial impression of the dream as a physical response that combines the dream world with the waking world. He explains to the Keeper that the "howling" of the fiends wakes him and extends the dream:

> a legion of foul fiends
> Environ'd me, and howled in mine ears
> Such hideous cries, that with the very noise
> I trembling wak'd, and for a season after
> Could not believe but that I was in hell,
> Such terrible impression made my dream. (1.4.58-63)

The dream's sensory impression on Clarence lasts, as he admits, only a "season." In claiming that his dream impressed on his waking world, Clarence conversely demonstrates that this is no longer the case. He distances himself from the opportunity for self-knowledge in the dream by limiting the length of his original emotional and physical reaction. When Clarence defends Richard, the first murderer notices this lack of self-knowledge in the chastisement "[c]ome: you deceive yourself" (232). This is a profound irony as the first murderer in fact coaxes the second murderer to ignore the "dregs of conscience" (117) that impress on him physically as a "passionate humour" (113-14). In linking self-reflection, symbolized in the more general idea of conscience, to an emotional and bodily alteration of the humours, the murderers touch on the link between partiality and responsibility. By feeling "afraid" (106) to murder Clarence, the second murderer explores his capacity to act ethically. The first murderer dismantles the ethical space by drawing the second murderer away from this partiality and resituating his

behaviour in terms of financial profit. Clarence mimics this process in relocating responsibility from the intensely personal space of emotional reaction to the externalized figures of Edward and God.

The audience is thus privy to a moral imperative contained in the dream – the exhortation to honesty and responsibility – that the dreamer rejects. Only in the moment that Clarence distances himself from the impression of the dream and skirts responsibility does the dream acquire this power for us. Instead of being a detriment to truth, shifting historical perspective in the dream advances a much deeper conception of truth; an affective engagement with the dream makes this possible. Brakenbury makes this point when he deliberately avoids knowledge of the murderers' intentions in the effort to remain, as he says, guiltless. In attempting to obliterate the obstacles to virtue by avoiding self-knowledge, Brakenbury unwittingly communicates what the dream has already shown us – obstacles are necessary in the search for historical honesty. When we try to eradicate obstacles in the mistaken desire for impartiality, we become amoral, even remorseless. We become Richard.

The imperative to "face" the past culminates in Richard's own dream before the battle of Bosworth. On the surface the shared dream between Richard and Richmond requires Richard to do just this. Now, however, the audience also sees the dream. Even though we are all dreaming, Shakespeare hints that Richard has experienced a slightly different vision. When he awakes he calls for his horse, although the Ghost of Buckingham is the last speaker in the dream the audience and Richmond observes. Richard has dreamt of losing his horse and becoming wounded. When he awakes, he adamantly refuses to face the dead he has seen. He rejects the power of the other in

reasserting "[t]here's none else by; / Richard loves Richard, that is, I and I" (5.3.183-4). The brief contemplation of his guilt that follows this egoism is entirely self-contained. He accuses and absolves himself. His despair after sensing his guilt emerges not from the presence of the other, but from his belief that "no creature loves" him (201). The dream has coaxed Richard to a form of introspection that is reductive rather than productive. We, however, along with Richmond, dream solely of the ghosts of the past. In the dream that we can see, the ghosts in fact urge Richard to dream further still. The play here, in its deepest point of dreaming, is also at its most self-reflexive. The ghosts of the two young princes urge Richard to "[d]ream on thy cousins smothered in the Tower," and the ghost of Buckingham advises Richard to "dream on, dream on" (5.3.152). Richard has refused to "dream on." He recalls the words of the ghosts and their indictment of him, but feeds their words into his concern with the world's opinion of him. Richard's response to his dream confirms his solipsistic perspective of history, as if once again, the entire War of the Roses "befalls" him.

The audience briefly shares Richard's vision, and we, like him, must engage with its message. Richard dismisses "babbling dreams" that function only to "affright […] souls" (37). He fails to realise that the babbling dream of the past, and the impression it leaves, is, itself, a plea to continue respecting the past. The vision insists on looking in upon itself. In these dreamy layers of "vigilant reflexivity," Shakespeare demonstrates the need to keep looking back, even if we receive unsettling information about our own responsibility. In offering the audience the opportunity to see something more in dreams than do Richard or Clarence, Shakespeare explores the possibility that we can still achieve the status of "honest chronicler." If the historian insists on becoming a "library

rat," he or she risks devaluing the powerful self-reflection that can emerge from a personal response to the other of the past. The prominence of dreams and historical dreamers indicates that Shakespeare wants us to resist the devaluation of an enlightened link between exteriority and interiority. The state of self-awareness Clarence abdicates after his own dream is a position we must feel driven to fill once we awake from our dream at the end of the play and think about ways to remain vigilant over its message

Respect for the past becomes a concern as Richard refuses to face the possibilities to which Margaret's prophecies allude. As Margaret denounces Richard and his supporters in Act One Scene Three, Richard registers his disapprobation by asking Buckingham a pointed question:

> Richard: What doth she say, my lord of Buckingham?
> Buck: Nothing that I respect, my gracious lord. (295-6)

Richard is present for Margaret's prophecies, and their meaning is hardly obscure. Why, then, does Richard pose this question to Buckingham? This query defines the limits of "respect." In exchanging signs of deference ("my lord of Buckingham," "my gracious lord"), Richard and Buckingham establish that they respect each other at Margaret's expense. Buckingham does not respect Margaret in that he refuses to "have an eye to, to give heed to" her warnings (*OED*). Beyond that, Buckingham does not "esteem, prize, or value" (*OED*) Margaret when he refuses her the civility of judicious reception that he offers Richard. What he ignores is subsequently deprived of the social authority to which it lays claim. At the same time, what is inherently without value cannot be perceived in the first place. To revoke his respect, therefore, Buckingham must at first offer it as a possibility. His act of ignoring Margaret is thus more profound because he initially pays heed to, but then dismisses, her vision for the future.

The "nothing" that Buckingham casts away from his consideration is *something*. Even though it lies beyond Buckingham's grasp, it carries a meaning that he will come to understand later in the play. The audience can embrace Margaret's prophecy as an alternative to Buckingham's perspective. Margaret's curses are fantastic but rooted, in advance, in the depiction of Richard from historical sources. We cannot dismiss the barrage of curses that Margaret offers because they articulate our own burgeoning knowledge of Richard's inner motivations. Buckingham is not privy to Richard's careful manipulation of his surroundings, but the audience sees them in the play and must acknowledge them as inherent in both Holinshed and Hall.

In stating that he does not "respect" Margaret, Buckingham unwittingly reveals the limits of his historical sensitivity while simultaneously expanding the audience's interpretive capacities. He fails to respect Margaret as part of a conscious dismissal of her evaluation of the past and prediction for the future. Yet, on another level entirely, he invalidates history at large in overlooking the specific self-reflection that it demands. His perspective constricts when the audience's must dilate to accept Margaret's prescient curses. These warnings are anticipatory in the framework of the play but backwards-looking outside of the world of the play, where the historical Richard has long since died. Shakespeare cleverly requires the audience to endorse the fantastical nature of Margaret's prophecies simply because they are part of a dialogue rooted in meaningful narratives inside and outside of the play. This brief dialogue between Richard and Buckingham, a conversation that includes and excludes Margaret, therefore opens a network of dialogue between the spectator and the play. This network calls the audience to reconsider the

scope of its vision by demonstrating that in heeding Margaret we also value the complexities of interpretation.

Yet, almost as soon as Buckingham excludes Margaret from his respect, she finds another way to make an impression on him. After Margaret exits, he admits "[m]y hair doth stand on end to hear her curses" (304). He does respect Margaret, if only on an instinctive, physical level. His reaction confirms that he has been drawn into the history Margaret has described without, at this point, taking the time to reflect on how he figures in it. His physical reaction, a natural outcome when a spectator of historical process recognizes his own part in it, in fact, becomes an essential ingredient of self-reflection. It engages the spectator in ways that are always manifested in and by it. The act of cursing requires a spectator to respect its mode of being on a level that precedes even its content. A curse cannot exist without the truth-claim that shapes it in advance: otherwise it is meaningless. As J.L. Austin points out, certain discursive acts produce consequences, or carry the means of "securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting a response" (118). Buckingham does not endorse the specifics of Margaret's vision at this point, but his affected body confirms that Margaret's words have invited the very response that they intended.

Respect comes to represent the process by which anything is known. The previous meanings at work in Buckingham's exchange with Margaret (to pay attention to and to esteem) underline the idea that respect is always part of a relation between two things. The *Oxford English Dictionary* points out that to "have respect" is to "have regard or relation to, or connection with, something." This, the most fundamental definition of the word, leads to the other meanings. Portia puts it best in *Merchant* when

she realizes that "[n]othing is good I see without respect" (5.5.99). Portia's inclusion of the phrase "I see" in this admission underscores, with some irony, the thrust of her argument. For Shakespeare, respect defines the self in relation to seeing the other. Margaret's prophecy appears in the dialogue between its original emergence and its future manifestations in reality and in the world of the play. Richard himself articulates the relationship between respect and perspective when Buckingham begins to refuse his demands. When Richard senses Buckingham's reluctance he vows

> I will converse with iron-witted fools
> And unrespective boys; none are for me
> That look into me with considerate eyes.
> High-reaching Buckingham grows circumspect. (4.2.28-31)

Here, Richard worries about the fluidity of perspective; he fears that opinions can change and longs for a pre-emptive outlook, the "iron wit," that Buckingham once demonstrated in refusing to "respect" Margaret. Shakespeare loads this aside with adjectives and verbs of perception: "iron-witted," "unrespective," "look," "considerate eyes," and "circumspect." Once again, the audience sees Richard's inner world; however, this separates the audience from those "iron-witted fools" that Richard requires. The spectator differs from a fawning crony. Through this difference Shakespeare impels spectators to activate their own "considerate eyes," by allowing them to dialogue with Richard in a way that Richard will not tolerate with anyone else. In a moment of wonderful dramatic irony, Shakespeare opens up our vision of Richard to a wide-ranging play of meaning at the precise moment he wishes to clad the interpretive capacities of those around him in iron.

Cymbeline: Grief and Patience

In *Cymbeline*, rituals of mourning serve to suggest that vision, however flawed, sustains the bond between the living and the dead. The play devotes much time to confronting appearances. Posthumus holds the "bloody cloth" as proof of Innogen's death, yet, the cloth in fact disguises rather than symbolizes the truth. What then, do we make of Posthumus's mourning of Innogen and his longing to die? The final act of the play finds Posthumus's grappling with the idea that a person ought to have "less without and more within" (5.1.33). This should remind audiences and readers of Hamlet's insistence on mourning, his contention that he has "that within which passeth show," when Gertrude attempts to console him. The idea that we should *feel* more than we *show* brings the entire question of witness to the forefront. How do we witness when every sight is suspect and each person's worth is based on intangible evidence?

Posthumus's death wish in battle, together with his witness of other deaths, makes the "straight" lane he comes through in the battle a space of circulative exchange of experience. He structures his testimony as a grim experience that he feels intensely and one that has direct bearing on his act of story-telling; indeed, his interlocutor's inability to suffer along with the dead and dying angers him. The Lord offers a simple reading of Posthumus's story, and writes death out of it entirely by titling it "[a] narrow land, an old man, and two boys" (5.3.52-3). Posthumus objects to what he sees as the Lord's position above the tale, a position that makes the opportunity to face death a mere "mock'ry" (56). Death is uncomfortable, but it must be faced as an opportunity for self-exploration. This motivates Posthumus's search for death and the history of the battle in which death eludes him.

Posthumus's desire to be imprisoned and bound coincides with his ability to finally *see* truth. He recognizes the wrongs he has committed against Innogen and, indeed, receives his own traumatic familial past, because his body is stilled, oriented toward, rather than away from, suffering. His dream will intensify the process of self-reflection through the suffering of others. Posthumus's dream of his dead relatives mystifies more than it explains. He laments afterwards that he "wake[s] and find[s] nothing" (5.3.223). Posthumus must realize that a vigilant mourner will discover "something" in this "nothing"; in this lack of presence, in the presence of the dead, the watcher maintains a connection between the living and the dead. Posthumous accepts this challenge; in his state of confusion over the dream's message, he vows to "keep" watch over the dead because his act of witness has testified to an emotional, if invisible, exchange of sympathy between past and present.

When Guiderius observes Fidele's melancholy, he marvels that "grief and patience, rooted in him both, / Mingle their spurs together" (4.2.59-60). Arviragus calls grief the "stinking elder" and "perishing root" of patience (61-2). This image of natural emotion, growing so intense that it chokes itself, is remarkable. The grief-stricken person begins to experience the effects of death when overcome by grief. The mourner suffers along with those that suffered before death. The analogy of mourning as overgrown nature echoes Hamlet's vision of the world as an "unweeded garden / That grows to seed" (1.2.135-6). Patience, however, offers a balance to sorrow. It is a means by which the distressing inertia of grief, an inertia that consumes and chokes the mourner, can be channelled into a witnessing passivity, or, a passivity that informs others that death and loss must be acknowledged. Guiderius thereby recognizes the intense mutuality of

mourning and ritual stillness as an expression of patience. Viola also makes this association in *Twelfth Night*, when describing Olivia's mourning for her brother: "[s]he sat like patience on a monument, / Smiling at grief" (2.5.126-7). This attitude is part of Olivia's plan to "keep" her brother "fresh / And lasting in her sad remembrance" (1.2.33-4). Patience softens mourning without accepting comfort or consolation; it prolongs mourning by deferring compensatory action that would cope with loss. Arviragus might wish patience to grow and overtake the "perishing" grief in Fidele, but this would nullify the very idea of patience, which is a deferral of motion. Shakespeare ends this discussion with Belarius's pun that "[i]t is a great morning" (63). There is indeed something captivating about Fidele, who embodies mourning in a space between decay and growth, immobility and mobility. Borrowing from Guiderius, we can name this space patient perishing, a term that parallels de Certeau's notion of historiography as a text that is "passing away endlessly" (325).

Posthumus, like Innogen/Fidele comes to embrace physical restraint as a point of access to a perspective through which he can finally implicate himself in the past. His longing for death is not an impatience to die, but rather a desire to exchange with Innogen the only experience he believes they can now share. The arrest of his body coincides with his desire to "come to dust" (4.2.264), or, his willingness to face the dead. His compliance with his arrest and his submission to execution looks back to his own father's death, who, we learn in the first scene, "took such sorrow" after the death of his two sons, that he "quit being" (1.1.37-8). Posthumus's eagerness to be bound confirms that the act of taking sorrow is an act of denying natural human comfort and flourishing. The vigilant mourner, in denying natural needs and biological rhythms, does indeed "quit

being" for a time. This physical self-deprivation corresponds to a heightened sense of ethical action, because, as Benjamin describes, the dying man imparts words and looks that spectators must remember. Posthumous reasons with himself that "welcome bondage" is a "penitent instrument" (5.3.104). He embraces the limits placed on physical motion because they force his vision inwards, to his conscience and its relation to the "bloody cloth" that stands in place of Innogen's dead body.

Posthumus's surrender to execution in Act Five, Scene Three could appear as an unchristian indulgence in despair. He laments that he "[c]ould not find death [...] Nor feel him where he struck" (5.3.69-70). However, in his effort to find death in the battlefield he hopes to immerse himself in the processes of decay that have also enveloped his family, and, as far as he knows, his wife. It must be noted that Innogen, Posthumus believes, did not die naturally. How is murder different from natural death and does it change the focus of the vigilant mourner at all? Ricoeur writes that the death of a loved one in natural ways (that is, disease or natural decay) can always be understood as a "deliverance, an easing of pain" which is "in accordance with the secret wish of the survivors." The violent death, Ricoeur contends by citing Levinas, "lays bare [...] the mark of nothingness, made by the intention to annihilate" (*Memory, History, Forgetting* 360). This mark cannot be explained away because we feel a "moral impossibility of annihilation" (360). Posthumus feels his own death will correct a transgression that has made annihilation real; it allows him to interpret his own death in relation to the wrongs he committed in the past.

In conceiving of death as a healer, as a "sure physician" (5.3.101), Posthumus makes a deeply ironic observation that there is no cure for physical suffering if the only

source of healing will occur at the precise moment of the complete corruption of the organic body and its cessation. In fact, his acknowledgement that the human body must suffer does suggest that another kind of healing is possible: a re-engagement with the dead when the mourner willingly participates in rituals of suffering. When apart from Posthumus, Innogen decides "[t]hat we two are asunder, let that grieve him," because "[s]ome griefs are "med'cinable" (3.2.32-33). The sundering of Innogen and Posthumus by death allows Posthumus to create a lasting bond with the past by finally abandoning physical strength, and by seeking instead the unique insights that physical vulnerability inspires.

In the letter that accuses Innogen, Posthumus declares that his suspicions do not derive from "weak surmises" but from "proof as strong as my grief" (3.4.23-4). In his mourning for Innogen after receiving "proof" of her death, Posthumus reverses this formula; his grief becomes strong because his proof has perversely made him aware of his own vulnerabilities. In the ritual of mourning, "weak surmises" are as important as strong proof. The mourner begins to see that we can engage with the dead through imaginative speculation. At our most fragile we are open to possibilities; because weak surmises cannot be proved or disproved, they continue to unsettle the mourner. Posthumus registers the transformation of the cloth from "proof" to "surmise" in his mourning soliloquy. "Yea, bloody cloth," he resolves, "I'll keep thee, for I once wished / Thou shouldst be coloured thus" (5.1.1-2). The hard evidence of Innogen's guilt and death has now become a symbol for Posthumus's past. His past certainty only reveals that he created Innogen's guilt; Posthumus will "keep" the cloth because it signals the production of a new version of the past (Innogen's actions, his interpretation of her and

his part in her death). Posthumus refers to the "colour" of the cloth because he now recognizes that even the hardest proof can crumble under the pressure of a different rhetoric. He further embraces the ethical power of the "surmise" when he wonders how many husbands would "murder wives much better than themselves / For wrying but a little!" if they act as he did in the past (4-5). Looking back ethically embraces the sweeping vision of multiple conjectures, which supply a fuller picture than any single piece of evidence.

Posthumus's stillness, in the form of physical imprisonment and deprivation, functions as an ultimate attempt to exchange experience with the "dead" Innogen. "For Innogen's dear life," he vows to sacrifice his own (116). Posthumus will cling to this bond of nature, the faith he holds with Innogen through his own death, until the end of the play. When he reunites with Innogen and embraces her, he asks her to "[h]ang" next to him like fruit, "Till the tree die" (5.4.263). In one sense, Posthumus confirms their union by measuring it only against death, that moment that has divided and united them several times over in the play. Posthumous finally honours nature by articulating an experience defined by death. Here, he recognizes that as long as he sees the fate of the self written in the fates of others, neither tree nor fruit will totally die. Valuing the ethical force of conjecture, Posthumus restores his bond with Innogen by keeping faith with nature (that is, he contemplates his own investment in death when mourning the deaths of others). He vows, "to the face of peril / Myself I'll dedicate. Let me make men know / *More* valour in me than my habits show" (5.1.28-30, my italics). Just as he has read Innogen's death and discovered a new "colour" in it, he offers a vision of his death so that others can read it.

Shakespeare indicates that an historical record survives if it arouses a feeling engagement; the past can continue to mean "more" as long as it enters into a dialogue with the present that receives it, as long as the two exchange experiences. Mark Jackson argues that historiography's attention must be directed to "a structure that one critiques yet inhabits intimately" (474). Shakespeare defines historical durability as a combination between critical and intimate perspectives. In the final act of *Cymbeline*, Posthumus's family appears to him in a dream; this dream expresses the coexistence of identification and detachment when the living visualize the dead. The tablet left behind articulates the notion that a living connection occurs when the branch of the past is grafted to the present:

> 'When as a lion's whelp shall, to himself unknown,
> without seeking find, and be embraced by a piece of
> tender air; and when from a stately cedar shall be
> lopped branches, which, being dead many years,
> shall after revive, be jointed to the old stock and
> freshly grow; then shall Posthumus end his miseries,
> Britain be fortunate and flourish in peace and plenty.' (5.3.232-38)

Posthumus finds this prophecy "a speaking such / As sense cannot untie." Yet he concludes that "[b]e what it is, / The action of my life is like it, which / I'll keep, if but for sympathy" (5.4.242-4). Posthumus unconsciously enacts the prophecy. He "respects" it by joining his own field of knowledge (his own life) to the strange form of knowledge that the dream and the text supplies. In this new enmeshment of sympathies, something beyond the text itself emerges. It becomes a living thing in its own right when Posthumus takes it up and unites its words with his "action," and its broad notion of historical progress with his personal experience. Thus, the text inspires a circular movement of possibility in which Posthumus is embraced by a dream that, in order to

have meaning at all, must be embraced by Posthumus. There is no place to root out an origin in this approach to the discovery of truth. Truth emerges in the junction between the giver and receiver of the text.

As Posthumus awakes from his dream he reflects on what it means to dream of one's past:

> Many dream not to find, neither deserve,
> And yet are steep'd in favours: so am I,
> That have this golden chance and know not why.
> What fairies haunt this ground? A book? O rare one,
> Be not, as is our fangled world, a garment
> Nobler than that it covers. Let thy effects
> So follow to be most unlike our courtiers,
> As good as promise. (5.4.221-31)

Posthumus, in engaging a sense of wonder and uncertainty that requires him to differentiate himself from the deceits of the "fangled world," produces a book worthy of the truth he hopes to find in it. Posthumus fulfills the dream's message when he allows his scepticism of its value to be overcome by this wonder. Like Katherine, Posthumus feels himself unworthy of "favours," like those who "dream not to find." Yet, in this instance Posthumus distinguishes himself from those undeserving others by recognizing that although he does not quite understand the dream, he will respect it. As John Joughin points out, the performance of memory is "simultaneously disconcerting and regenerative" and offers the spectator "openness to alterity, as well as producing a newly evaluative understanding of the spectator's role in conceding the limits of their own historical situation" (16). Posthumus confirms that the dream *must* confound in order to command his respect. Both the past and Posthumus hang in a state between rest and restlessness. By remaining disconcerting, the dream generates his new perspective on his

connection to the past and offers him the opportunity to embrace the past that has already embraced him. Posthumus does indeed "dream to find," and in so doing, creates a dream worth the effort.

Cymbeline is a play obsessed with the capacity of the human eye to see truth. This capacity is tested and undermined by Giacomo's observation of Innogen and his appropriation of the bracelet that will provide visual, although false, evidence of Innogen's infidelity to Posthumus. Giacomo refers subtly and effectively to the watch of the living over the dead; his surveillance of the sleeping Innogen perverts the ethical power that such a watch can produce and severs the bond between the subject and object of vision. Giacomo's gaze parodies the devotional wake, but the parody provides valuable information about faithful vision. The scene suggests that a powerful gaze stays insistently trained on the inert body; the audience must follow Giacomo's eyes, but must use their sustained vision to preserve rather than destroy the integrity of Innogen's body.

Lyne writes that Giacomo's survey of Innogen in Act Two, Scene Two is "awkward to watch, because we are conscious that our own presence in this room replicates and compounds Giacomo's deed" (32). The discomfort perhaps signals that the audience feels it must replicate *and* resist Giacomo's deed; there is something compellingly essential about the gaze on an inert body, but such watching requires an ethical motivation if it wishes to avoid predation. I would suggest that the audience's uneasiness is evidence that the dynamic of the living watch over the dead (or, in this case, sleeping) body combines the desire to keep the body at rest, and the desire to disturb the body by continually addressing it. Giacomo's gaze only violates Innogen's rest; the

audience must ameliorate this by seeing her body, but remaining critically separate from Giacomo's intentions.

Innogen's preparation for sleep links her visually and symbolically to the play's other dead and sleeping bodies. She falls asleep only because she can no longer stay awake. She unwillingly resigns her state of wakefulness, requiring the audience to stand guard over her. Innogen anticipates disruptions to her rest and appeals to forces above her. "To your protection I commend me, gods," she says, "[f]rom fairies and the tempters of the night / Guard me beseech ye" (2.2.8-10). Later in the play, Guiderius hopes that "female fairies" will not disrupt the dead Fidele, and Posthumus will wonder if fairies have disturbed his rest and caused his dreams. The audience cannot make the association between Innogen's sleep and her later burial. Shakespeare, however, begins to chart, at this moment, the shared territory of rest and restlessness; he will pursue this territory persistently as the play continues to observe sleepers.

Innogen makes the specific request to retain the candlelight. "Take not away the taper," she commands, "leave it burning" (2.2.5). Innogen's request that a taper remain lit is more than dramatic necessity. The candle ensures that the audience sees Innogen at the same time that they hear Giacomo describe her. Their vision can share in and depart from Giacomo's if the candlelight enables their interpretive energy as well as his. The guard over Innogen is not simply those amorphous and unreliable "gods" after all; her guard against "tempters" is the candlelight that ensures the audience can see her body separate from Giacomo's verbal catalogue and abusive objectification. The audience may develop into "tempters" themselves if they share Giacomo's vision too closely. The candlelight activates simultaneously the threatening and protective capacities of vision; it

remains in the power of the audience to guard, or tempt the body it watches. Woodward notes that candles were an important component in pre-Reformation funerals. She indicates that they "were deemed to have an apotropaic power, that is they could charm away evil influence" (45). The Reformation unsettled this particular ritual in some ways, with reformers objecting to the superstitious use of light. Woodward finds evidence, however, that the practice was, as many other Catholic rituals, still "widespread" after the Reformation. Torch and candlelight were employed at the increasingly popular night funerals after the Reformation. At James I's funeral, candles were burned around the effigy of the King. "[A] four foot taper of virgin wax," Woodward explains, "burned through the night" (194). Innogen's insistence on a candlelit slumber would make her sleeping body look similar to a dead body that requires light so that observers can maintain their vigil over it.

Giacomo notices the taper and the effect that the living, sleeping woman has on the flame. In a remarkable act of observation, Giacomo notices "[t]he flame o'th' taper / Bows toward her, and would underpeep her lids / To see th'enclosed lights, now canopied / Under these windows, white and azure-laced" (2.2.19-22). Here, several levels of observation become enmeshed. Giacomo observes the taper, which allows him to see Innogen. He pictures the taper flame wishing to "see" Innogen's own eyes. Giacomo imagines her eyes are brilliant, but admits that they are sightless at this moment. He once again affirms her life-force by indicating its suspension in sleep. In terming her eyelids "canopies," Giacomo gestures to the hearse or tomb structure that often simulates a canopied bed. Like the canopy over the dead body, the eyelid covers an eye that is held in suspension by sleep; the eye is and is not, at this moment, the source of sight. The

candle is thus intrinsically symbolic of the space between the living and the dead. When placed near a living person, the candle's flickering proves the existence of life in breath. Yet, the flame's stillness next to a dead body or effigy would also testify to the absence of breath. In Innogen's case, the flame simultaneously proves, while undermining, her vitality; it responds to her breath but intensifies Giacomo's awareness of her passivity, her temporary sightlessness.

Giacomo contributes to the impression that Innogen's sleeping body is vitally alive but *looks* dead to others and is itself in a state similar to death in that she has been deprived of her own powers of observation. In terming her eyelids "white and azure-laced," Giacomo anticipates the observation of the "dead" Fidele by Arviragus. He also notices that her skin is "whiter than the sheets" (2.2.16). The comparative draws attention to the bed sheet, which could be used to shroud the dead body, and to Innogen's bloodless skin, which is itself a shroud over her eyes. Giacomo's desire for Innogen to sleep soundly reveals that his vision of her as dead merely serves his design. Before removing her bracelet he makes this connection. "O sleep," he pleads, "thou ape of death, lie dull upon her, / And be her sense but as a monument / thus in a chapel lying" (2.2.31-3). Giacomo does not wish that Innogen, but rather her "sense," will be "as a monument." This is yet another occasion when Shakespeare designs a complex meeting of forms and levels of observation. On one hand the sense-as-monument simile works; Giacomo hopes that Innogen's senses will be immobile and unchanging. On the other hand, the simile escapes simplicity. The monument "lying in a chapel" seems to refer to a funeral statue that approximates the figure of the deceased. Thus, the monument is another "ape of death," like Innogen's slumber. If Innogen's body and the monument are

both *representations* of a dead body, logic suggests that Innogen's senses are stilled in the same way a statue renders the decomposing body permanent and unchanging. It could also mean that the monument's stillness is as provisional as Innogen's sleep. The living and the dead cross paths in this simile, which locates Innogen's body between the states of rest and restlessness. The simile itself verges on restlessness in its desire but inability to produce a simple equation between Innogen's body and the dead body.

The work of the eyes, in the form of vision or weeping, becomes the instrument of creating and challenging the bond between the present and the absent. While the play asserts that its characters cannot see everything and cannot therefore know truth with any certainty, it also suggests that the act of keeping the eye trained on the absent or distant is an ethical imperative that demonstrates faithfulness. Loyalty can flourish even in the heart of uncertainty and the absence of visible truth. This message contributes to a series of remarkable poetic moments that express the value of trained, persistent observation of a departing or distant loved-one. In Act One, Scene Three, Innogen finds something lacking in Pisanio's farewell to Posthumus. Although Pisanio's account of the event indicates that he has faithfully watched Posthumus leave, it seems inadequate to Innogen. At that moment, Innogen imagines her own observation of Posthumus's departure:

> I would have broke mine eye-strings, cracked them, but
> To look upon him till the diminution
> Of space had pointed him sharp as my needle;
> Nay, followed him till he had melted from
> The smallness of a gnat to air, and then
> Have turned mine eye and wept. (1.3.17-22)

The passage is remarkable because Innogen describes the power of her sight even as she reveals she has not witnessed Posthumus's departure. Derick R.C. Marsh writes that at this moment Innogen's "longing is expressed in the violence of the image of cracking her

eye-strings, which suggest both the way would strain after him, and the final severance of the bond of presence" (31). I would suggest that the entire passage indeed describes "severance" between the absent and present, but extends this moment of severance; the witness of absence manages to retain the lost loved-one by replaying and thereby preserving the moment of departure. The gradual disappearance of a loved-one under the careful gaze of the lover is a transformation from visible bodies to hidden interiority. Paul Yachnin argues that "Shakespearean persons are always in the process of receding into invisibility" (Dawson and Yachnin 72). The watching of a departing body in *Cymbeline* is a way of expressing the "contest between the spectacular and the unseen" that Yachnin notices playing out on the Elizabethan stage. An analysis of this contest in terms of mourning and memory yields fruitful readings of some of *Cymbeline's* most spectacular and puzzling features.

The image of the cracking of the eye-strings in fact initiates a series of images of contraction. Innogen imagines Posthumus becoming as small as her needle, seemingly finishing her thought, only to take up the same sequence again and imagine Posthumus becoming as small as a gnat. Thus, while Posthumus has long since literally disappeared, Innogen restlessly recovers and loses him over again in imaginative thought. Her vision poetically "follows" him in a way that parallels her eyes following his disappearance. Posthumus's departure is extended indefinitely. After all, Innogen has imagined what she "would" do if she were to witness his departure. The power of her sight is thus always a deferred, conditional power. This passage suggests that ethical watching results from the oscillation between keen, persistent observation and sensory annihilation, or between sight and sightlessness. Marsh refers to the breaking of the instrument of vision as a

"final severance" of the bond of presence. At the point when sight fails and Posthumus has vanished, Innogen imagines the bond persevering when the eye becomes an instrument of mourning (that is, weeping) rather than seeing.

When Innogen first learns of Posthumus's accusations, she defends her faithfulness by associating it with wakefulness. "What is it to be false?" she asks, "To lie in watch there and to think on him? / To weep 'twixt clock and clock? / If sleep charge nature, / To break it with a fearful dream of him / And cry myself awake?" (3.4.40-44). At this point, Innogen considers a durable affection between the absent and the present as one in which the body's natural rhythms are ignored. Faithfulness requires uncomfortable persistence through the body's vulnerabilities. The endurance of Innogen's wakefulness indicates that her "thinking" has overridden any other concern. Innogen confirms that waking is an act of devotion to the absent.

Pisanio heeds Innogen's call to see ethically by persistently, relentlessly watching. In Act Three, Scene Four, Innogen demands that Pisanio be "honest" and kill Innogen under Posthumus's direction (3.4.64). Pisanio admits that his reluctance to kill her, an ethical dilemma, kept him awake:

> Pisanio: O gracious lady,
> Since I received command to do this business
> I have not slept one wink.
>
> Innogen: Do't, and to bed then.
>
> Pisanio: I'll wake mine eyeballs out first. (3.4.96-101)

The exchange once again connects ethical actions to observant watching. Pisanio first describes his sleeplessness as a natural result of his anxiety. Yet, when Innogen offers him a means by which to resolve this restlessness, Pisanio suggests that his restlessness

will be an ethical choice, one that avoids an unjust resolution. Pisanio also repeats Innogen's earlier suggestion that if watching is faithful, it enhances sight to its most powerful capacity, and sight then becomes sightlessness. Pisanio promises to stay awake until his eyes fall out of his head. Thus, his conscience has kept him awake, and in turn, he remains awake to protect his conscience.

Innogen describes ethical watching as the ability to detect fine detail by training the eye unremittingly on the departing loved-one. She describes beautifully the object of close watching as the point of a needle or the dot of the gnat in the sky. Belarius employs similar language when urging his sons to care for the stories that he has told them of his past. He urges them to climb a hill in order to gain a certain kind of vantage of their father and his past:

> Consider,
> When you above perceive me like a crow,
> That it is place which lessens and sets off,
> And you may then revolve what tales I have told you [...]
> To apprehend thus
> Draws us a profit from all things we see,
> And often to our comfort shall we find
> The sharded beetle in a safer hold
> Than is the full-winged eagle. (3.3.11-21)

Belarius finds the best history draws the reader's attention to his body's distance from the text; this perspective, strangely enough, brings text and reader closer together. He urges his sons to attain a distant perspective of his body to view those things most important in the message of his story-telling. Belarius explicitly refers to the peculiar power of watching a loved-one disappear. This vantage "lessens and sets off" and therefore produces a balance between seeing and knowing. Although the loved-one disappears, the faithful observer will find that a gradual vanishing of a valued object is a means of

contextualising the moment of loss. In stressing the value of his own past, Belarius encourages his sons to anticipate the guardianship of their own history. Once again, the crux of the matter is how much truth, honesty and knowledge sight can convey. "What should we speak of / When we are as old as you?" Arviragus asks, "[w]hen we shall hear / The rain and wind beat dark December, how, / In this our pinching cave, shall we discourse / The freezing hours away? We have seen nothing" (3.3.35-9). The quality of a discourse that maintains the past depends on sustained vision. Arviragus may claim that he has "seen nothing," but his vision of the future narrows just to such a point that Innogen and Belarius have identified as the most careful form of vision. He sees his world reduced to the "pinching cave," but this kind of intense isolation, at the very limit of sight and sound, is the most conducive to producing, sharing and preserving stories. This condition stirs Mamillius's imagination in *The Winter's Tale*. Belarius affirms the value of a close watch over a body. He rejects the forms of record-keeping in the court and city, instead favouring his own body as a register of history:

> [T]his story
> The world may read in me. My body's marked
> With Roman swords [...]
>
> Then was I as a tree
> Whose boughs did bend with fruit; but in one night
> A storm or robbery, call it what you will,
> Shook down my mellow hangings, nay my leaves,
> And left me bare to weather. (3.3.60-3)

The stormy December night that Arviragus imagines as the setting for his own tale-telling has been redirected into a frame for Belarius's recollection of his unfortunate fall. The association means that Arviragus may preserve Belarius's history because the story-teller has incorporated the world of the listener into the tale. The story is grafted onto the

observed body as well; the world can read Belarius's story in his scarred body, but Belarius has also recounted his story by making his body the centre of attention. The circular effect of reading the past on the body and reading the body through the past is a way of keeping the observer's eye fixed on a body that will change over time, but will continue to influence and be influenced by its capacity to tell a story. Belarius's casual move to include his audience's own inclination with "call it what you will," is more calculated than the wording suggests; it offers his audience entry into a narrative of courtly life that has previously seemed beyond reach to them. Belarius himself seems incapable of finding the right words to summarize his history. He imagines his past through the form of a material body, a laden tree that is shaken in a storm. The past has become material with the simile, but the language of the simile is hardly straightforward. Belarius begins to say the tree lost its "hangings" by the storm. He revises "hangings" to "leaves rather." The "mellow hangings" that have been shaken loose make a better fit with the heavy fruit of the earlier simile. Why should Belarius revise this neat equation to refer to leaves instead, an image which does not complete the simile neatly? He is engaged here in the process of heeding his own advice, or spontaneously "calling it what he will" as the inclination strikes him. His history's message slips around this unpredictable narrative looseness. Ironically, the transfer of the image of fruit to leaves has produced a more fruitful story; it has admitted self-critique and narrative revision into a rehearsal of fact. Belarius's rich life may have been stripped bare over time, but he poetically dresses the tree again, by crafting a historical record that looks backward and forward; narrative abundance emerges, even if the body itself has been one day stripped bare.

Ethical observation involves the contraction and dilation of the field of vision; Belarius supports this interpretation of perception, in Act Four, Scene Two, when he refers to "reverence" as an "angel of the world" and considers it a means of preserving distinction. A reverent historian approaches the past by ensuring high and low bodies, the beetle and the eagle, become equally valuable objects of attention. The speech merits full inclusion here:

> Great griefs, I see, med'cine the less, for Cloten
> Is quite forgot. He was a queen's son, boys,
> And though he came our enemy, remember
> He was paid for that. Though mean and mighty rotting
> Together have one dust, yet reverence,
> That angel of the world, doth make distinction
> Of place 'tween high and low. Our foe was princely,
> And though you took his life as being our foe,
> Yet bury him as a prince. (4.2.244-52)

Belarius's wish to bury Cloten seems incongruous, and the audience of the play has little, if any, respect for Cloten's rank. Why, then, does his burial matter to Belarius? Why do Arviragus and Guiderius accept the task without complaint? The reason is that Belarius has always respected the capacity of the body to inspire reflection; the body must be preserved by acts of recollection, and, as a parallel, buried correctly, because the mean can give us messages just as profound as the mighty. Belarius may not be arguing that Cloten is mighty at all; instead, Cloten's body inspires the kind of observation that contextualizes the bodies of Arviragus and Guiderius as mighty. Cloten may indeed be added to a list of small, but meaningful bodies, that includes crows, wrens' eyes, the point of a needle, a gnat and a beetle.

When Belarius urges his sons to bury Cloten "as a prince," the diction is beautifully ambiguous. The noun "prince" could apply to Cloten or the brothers. The

subtle implication is that the brothers should bury Cloten as if they themselves were princes, and as if they themselves respect rank by imitating princely graciousness. The mighty mobilize their mightiness by respecting small creatures. Once again, Shakespeare prioritizes the dilation and constriction of vision. Belarius's aim in drawing attention back to the body of Cloten is to widen the mourners' perspective so that the death of one cannot override the death of another. Yet, this widening of perspective allows for "distinction," which sorts one body from another in the production of a system of social ranking. A distinct body is separate from others; Belarius's desire to assert a distinction between Cloten and Fidele, however, ensures that mourners remember these distinct bodies that are buried together. The two bodies are united in the act of marking, noticing, their differences. This, according to John Curran, is the play's approach to history-making. He argues that the "wild princes plot teaches us a new method of dignifying the past" (287). According the past the respect it deserves demands the recognition that, even if "drastically reimagined, the past should continue to dignify the present." Cloten's incorporation into the funeral ritual allows the past to hold equal sway with the present. The point is not that bloodlines are more important than a person's conduct. Rather, such acts of reverence "recognize," as Curran notes, "the importance of the role of the discerning reader" in the production of historiographical work (295).

Innogen unites the past and present in the body of the dead when she mistakes Cloten's body for Posthumus's and marks the similarities between the two bodies. The audience of the play is enfolded into the process of distinguishing between bodies because they know Innogen mourns Cloten's, rather than Posthumus's body. Spectators will share in her emotional farewell to her husband, but they will likely feel at least some

check to this emotion with the awareness that the mourned body is distinct from Posthumus. However, this distinction does not render Innogen's mourning less powerful. It informs us subtly that we must consider even Cloten's death in relation to our own mortality; it is a means of seeing the dead as integral to the living. The "mean and mighty" dead have "one dust." The past and the present also share a resting place in historiographical records that refuse to forget, or look away from, the dead.

***Henry VIII*: The Lasting Spring**

As Paul Ricoeur warns in *Time and Narrative*, the "ethical neutralization" of the past is not "possible or desirable" (187). In writing about the past, the historian will embody and pass on the role of witness. Ricoeur puts this best when he suggests that the historian either "counts the cadavers" of the past or "tells the story" (188). Shakespeare makes "telling the story" his aim and his subject in *Henry VIII*. Yet, in translating the past into a shared experience, Shakespeare does not necessarily idealize the power of theatre to create a community that thinks and acts alike. As Yachnin notes, the unique power of the early modern theatre had "more to do with the volatile possibilities of radical individuation than with the experience of sacramentalized collectivity" (Dawson and Yachnin 80). I suggest that Shakespeare prizes individuation and collectivity in the ways that they meet in the reverential act; this deed does not eradicate an individual's subjectivity but implicates it in shared history.

Barbara Hodgdon asserts that Katherine is "the only one who actively orchestrates her own death" in Henry VIII" (216). I propose a bond between the living and the dead (or dying) will be established if they share a narrative that defines itself as

"unforgettable"; in this way, Wolsey and the Duke of Buckingham also orchestrate their deaths. Buckingham recognizes that his history will be saved only if those "living around him" find the moment of his death unforgettable. He therefore structures his speech before execution as a death-bed utterance and requires his listeners to become vigilant mourners who watch over him as a family watches over the dying loved-one. His speech recalls the past, looks to the future and offers fatherly advice as if his audience were offspring gathered around a dying patriarch. Buckingham achieves the authority of the dying by consistently underlining the fact that he is already in the process of dying. He calls his speech the words of a "dying man" (1.2.125). He claims that he is already "half in heaven" (2.1.88), and looks forward almost morbidly to the moment when the "steel falls" on him (2.1.76). There is evidence that the playwrights would have stressed this image with the stage direction that the Tipstave should hold the axe "with the edge towards" Buckingham (2.1.53.1). In looking forward to the moment of his death, Buckingham asks the living to think of his words as last words. In effect, Buckingham writes his own demise in advance in order to secure the transmission of his life past the moment of death; in so doing, he passes to the living the "gift of retelling" his story. Even before Buckingham begins his farewell address, the waiting gentlemen understand that they must stand motionless and hear the departing speech of the condemned man as a profound and unforgettable form of "saying." The first Gentleman admits that the action of the trial is over and, "[a]ll's now done but the ceremony / Of bringing back the prisoner" (2.1.4). He perceives that the remainder of Buckingham's life will be occupied by rituals of departure; the exit on the barge becomes for Buckingham a moment to underline the "greatness of his person" by refusing the "furniture" that fits his title (98-

99). The ceremonial gravity of Buckingham's departure is conversely emphasized by his denial of ceremonial "furniture." The gentlemen sense that they are watching a performance, one that is carefully controlled by the dying man.

The spectators offer more than simply an audience; Buckingham enfolds them in this spectacle of death, and their role is to remain still and become mourners of the Duke. When Buckingham arrives, the first Gentleman commands to the second, "[s]tay there, sir, / And see the noble ruined man you speak of" (2.1.54). The directions "stay" and "see" become vital for the observers. The second gentleman quickly accepts the challenge by vowing to "stand close and behold" Buckingham. Buckingham will capitalize on their absorption. He will appeal to them as his companions and will ask for their response in the form of prayers. The gentlemen thus begin to play the role of mourner, which is distinct from mere observance because it accords the watchers a dynamic role in the performance of memory. In their stillness, the gentlemen who represent the feelings of the "common people" become sensitive to Buckingham's story and their own duty to remember this history.

While Buckingham makes his farewell speech, he depends on his proximity to death to incite an emotional response from the public and thereby make a lasting impression on spectators' memory. The spectators are asked to feel for him. He plays with this feeling, situating his story somewhere between the spectators' identification with and detachment from him. "All good people," he commands, "[y]ou that thus far have come to pity me, / Hear what I say, and then go home and lose me" (2.1.55-7). The line that Buckingham draws between memory and forgetting in fact puts extra emphasis on memory; Buckingham knows that his command to forget his death is likely to inspire

the opposite impulse in his audience. His reference to the "homes" of his audience also ensures that his story becomes a part of their personal history. He cleverly suggests that his death will impact his listeners' intimate lives as surely as if they had lost a loved-one. Buckingham draws attention to the possibility that his listeners can separate emotionally from his death, but does so only to form further lines of identification in their acts of witness. His audience may indeed "lose" him at his death, but when they go home they will not forget his last words.

The only way to ensure his audience remembers him is to establish an emotional bond with them, a bond that testifies to their reluctance to lose him. Buckingham secures this relationship by evoking their "pity." His dependence on their pity replicates startlingly the first Gentleman's description of Buckingham's speech at the trial. The gentleman explains that after his sentence, the Duke pleads to be spared execution. He "spoke, and learnedly for life, but all, / Was either pitied in him or forgotten" (2.1.28-9). The Gentleman believes that Buckingham's words could not alter the death sentence. This description, however, confirms that the Duke was pitied *and* remembered. Pity and memory exist together; a witnessing crowd does not have to choose between them. Pitying someone requires one to acknowledge the extent of her suffering and to share that suffering. Buckingham's speeches, whether discussed or witnessed, have the effect of making those who hear him incapable of losing (that is, forgetting) him because they must lose him to the executioner.

Buckingham refers to pity once again when he uses his farewell speech to mourn the death of his father. In recounting the history of his father's fall, he adds that "Henry the Seventh succeeding, truly pitying / My father's loss [...] Restored me to my honours"

(2.1.113-4). This history has the potential to be restored as well if his audience will "truly pity" him and extend those honours. The notion of restoration is vital; it argues against the idea that he wishes to be lost to his audience once they return to their homes. His act of remembering asks for others to remember him. The play will become increasingly obsessed with honour, which can be corrupted if not preserved by acts of memory.

With his "death-bed" words, Buckingham conveys the possibility that the only grave capable of protecting the memory of honour is the monument "made" when sympathetic union forms between the dying and living. He recalls the death of his father, but he also looks forward to the death of Henry VIII. This anticipation once again underscores the ritual of mourning that his speech performs and hopes to inspire. He regards himself as a relentless mourner so that his audience will become relentless mourners as well. The duty of the mourner is to "tell" others of his speech. He describes modes of oration in his own speech, thereby ensuring the continuance of his history. He asks his audience to "[c]ommend" him to Henry, and cannot resist adding, "if he speak of Buckingham, pray tell him / You met him half in heaven" (2.1.86-7). His story, he suggests, is one that cultivates the act of witness. If the mourner's role is the message of the narrative, then they will not fail to lose him after his death; they have been written into his experience of death from the beginning. As if this command is not enough, he closes his speech with a triumphant crescendo of feeling. He returns to the diction of the beginning of the speech when he urges,

> All good people,
> Pray for me. I must now forsake ye. The last hour
> Of my long weary life is come upon me.
> Farewell, and when you would say something that is sad,

Speak how I fell. I have done, and God forgive me. (2.1.131-5)

These lines balance closure and open-endedness. This is the moment where his audience will lose him, as he admits, "I must now forsake ye" (132). Yet, his death, the moment when he forsakes them, creates an opportunity for the "good people" to not forsake him, that is, to not refuse to take his story home with them. The moment of leave-taking therefore anticipates a future return. History-telling produces a community of people who have been affected by sadness over time; with such affective scholarship, no one will be forsaken.

Buckingham creates the atmosphere of the death-bed to produce emotionally sensitive mourners. Katherine's final scene in the play takes place in a real death-bed, and it represents the offering and acceptance of reverence. Respect, the act of seeing and valuing another, describes the potential for a mutual experience in *Richard III*. In *Henry VIII* Shakespeare employs gestures of "reverence" as a way of manifesting the fulfillment of this potential. Mark Jackson contends the "promise of historical commentary adding new pieces of knowledge to a pile of accumulating progress is an illusionary conceit that protects any text from […] responsible engagement" (474). Katherine's dream does not convey a sense of progress; instead, it performs the circulation of "honour," a dynamic that is literalized when the dream figures pass a crown to each other and offer it to Katherine. Katherine reads the dream as an encouragement to "deserve" such honours in the future, rather than undeniable proof that she has already received such honours.

The giver and receiver contribute to the experience of reverential feeling. There is no beneficiary of honour until someone recognizes distinction. To revere someone, however, is not simply to pay attention to him/her, but to pay attention with a sense of

awe, with a current of admiration that elevates and makes something more of that person.[23] If reverence constitutes a form of "deep respect," it comes close to describing a vigilance that accords both subject and object of sight equal value. Shakespeare expresses the need to abandon impartiality in favour of an interpretive act that begins with a physical and emotional response to the past and produces a map for ethical behaviour in the future.

Shakespeare records subtle shifts in the valences of the word reverence and the gestures that express this feeling, in order to demonstrate that the dream does not stand alone as a simple signifier of Katherine's apotheosis. Her vision in fact continues the representation of reverential feeling first established in Act Three Scene One. This earlier scene occurs, like Act Four Scene Two, in Katherine's private chambers with her attendants. And in both scenes, music expresses Katherine's emotional state. In the earlier scene, Katherine hopes to use the music to "disperse" her sadness (3.1.2). The first stanza of the song relates that

> Orpheus, with his lute, made trees
> And the mountain tops that freeze
> Bow themselves, when he did sing.
> To his music, plants and flowers
> Ever sprung, as sun and showers
> There had made a lasting spring. (3.1.3-8)

Katherine seeks consolation with this music, but the lyrics have less to do with consolation and more to do with mourning. The song insinuates that the organic world may pass away, but in its reaction to art, it can achieve a kind of permanence beyond its transitory nature. The song's endorsement of "lasting spring" registers the possibility that

[23] To revere someone, according to the *OED*, is to "salute a person with deep respect," to "esteem; to value highly," to regard with "veneration as having a divine or sacred character" or as being "an exalted or superior kind."

the organic world can endure beyond death by responding to art. The song also describes the necessity of a reverential relationship between artist and spectator/listener in order to produce this "lasting spring." Orpheus's music commands the prostration of nature in "making" trees bow, but the trees "[b]ow themselves," and the reverential gesture results from the combination of the equal powers of giver and receivers.

When the song refers to the "lasting spring," its message seems complete. The second stanza pursues a strange, possibly unnecessary, extension of this theme; Gordon McMullan writes that in the first stanza the mood is "productive and renewing," while in the second, the mood becomes "soporific and enervating" (n.3 316-7). The mood in the second stanza is mournful, even if it suggests superficially that art is an effective consolation for grief. In the second stanza the image of reverential bowing has deepened to become a hanging of the head and a "laying by" (11). These motions illustrate the resurgence, rather than eradication, of powerful grief. Moreover, the message of the final three lines is that "sweet art" destroys sadness. But the dense, complicated diction of the lines stresses death rather than life. In these lines alone, the words "killing," "care," "grief," and "die" appear. Thus, the song balances life and death at the level of its language. The message of the song is one of enduring life, while the instruments that compose the message emphasize death. The "lasting spring" of art relates thus to the enduring power of death. An awareness of the transitory nature of the organic world is necessary to create art and to create a feeling response to art. Katherine reinforces this awareness when, cornered by Campeius and Wolsey, she turns to her ladies in waiting. She requires a performance of reverential mourning. She asks them--

> Alas, poor wenches, where are now your fortunes?
> Shipwrecked upon a kingdom where no pity,

> No friends, no hope, no kindred weep for me,
> Almost no grave allowed me, like the lily
> That once was mistress of the field and flourished,
> I'll hang my head and perish. (3.1.148-53)

Katherine turns back to Orpheus' song to image herself as a "lily" that can only "hang [its] head and perish" (3.1.151-53). Though she claims to have no "kindred to weep" for her, she cleverly calls for mourners for her situation by weeping for her "poor wenches" who share in that misfortune. She testifies to her own losses by lamenting theirs and demonstrates that mourning facilitates the production of a community of bodies. Wolsey wishes her "more comfort," but the point of the song, and her incorporation of its symbols, is that powerful grief gives rise to a "lasting spring" because it resists temporality; it is, as well, an emotion that links the present to the past. When she imagines herself as a flower that hangs its head, she takes up the song and uses it once again; the message of the song, that something "lasting" is possible, has been affirmed by its own endurance across time.

Katherine's dream in Act Four further broadens Orpheus's song. She will "last" beyond the limits of her vulnerable body when she recognizes that she is not separate from others but entangled with them. Orpheus' song makes the bow, the gesture of affording admiration, the prelude to an equally powerful moment of resurgence: after nature prostrates herself, "plants and flowers […] Ever sprung" (3.1.6-7). Without nature's response, Orpheus' song lacks a message. Without Orpheus' song, nature cannot rise up again as more powerful than before she bowed. Katherine's dream unites history with story-telling; it also dramatizes mourning vigilance as a conveyer of the imaginative engagement of the living with the dead. Here, Yachnin's notion of theatrical exchange in which a spectator derives pleasure from "the sudden glance that opens a new way of

seeing" and "the brief meeting of eyes that confirms a shared viewpoint" (Dawson and Yachnin 80) is particularly fitting. The dream challenges the spectator to see with Katherine, to share her death-bed experience, but also urges each audience member to attend to its effect on them. Shakespeare emphasizes the dream as a "brief meeting of eyes," as it is both powerful and limited. It is a site of communal experience but this shared interiority alters once the dream ends and enters the world of memory. Katherine's attendants admit they have not shared her vision and the audience may see the dream, but it has not seen the actions that she describes, such as the invitation to the banquet. The point is not that her dream is insubstantial. In fact, her dream suggests that meaning, historical and artistic, emerges from a powerful linking of vigilant perspectives. The *truth* lies at somewhere between the symbols displayed in her internal experience and our response to these symbols as watchers of her death-bed dream.

McMullan interprets Katherine's dream as her "apotheosis" after her fall from political prominence (n.82.4). This surface reading fails to consider her response to its symbolic energy, and accords the dream a kind of divine power that pre-empts further reflection. However, the dream itself invites the very reflection that McMullan misses. The vision is not simply an anticipation of Katherine's attainment of "eternal happiness" (4.2.89); it suggests, rather, that this glory is itself a condition of the meeting between the dream's presentation of Katherine and our interpretation of her in light of this dream. The vision, in fact, replays funeral rituals and is therefore rooted in the reality of the inevitable decay of the organic body. Her interpretation of her dream funeral, a response that will also condition the audience's feeling about her, produces a durable narrative that engages creatively with the fact of death. The six personages fulfill the obligations of the

vigilant mourner and mimic the activities of those who watch her sleep, such as Patience and Griffith. Both the real and imagined watchers make gestures of reverence to her that will testify to her enduring life, her "lasting spring" in transmissible stories.

Her dream is a vision of her own funeral and a response to her concern that she is "perishing" without an appropriate burial, without "kindred" who will "weep" for her. Her dream dramatizes the vital importance she accords to mourning. Indeed, before falling asleep, she asks for a "sad note" from the musicians; they should recognize the song to which she refers because she reminds them it is the song she has already named her "knell" in a conversation the audience has not specifically witnessed (78-9). Here, the death knell binds the past and present, and witness and non-witness. She could be referring to Orpheus' song in Act Three, Scene One. In that event, the audience has witnessed her knell. Yet, because she is vague about the particular song, the audience cannot be certain. The director of the play will make a decision about whether to resurrect Orpheus' song or not. In any case, the text itself remains ambiguous, and, at the very least, the audience has certainly not witnessed the moment when Katherine nominates the song as her "knell."

Her request does indicate that since Act Three, Scene One, she has been meditating on more than "celestial harmony" (4.2.80). She has planned her funeral; her dream conjures a weeping, witnessing kindred for a woman who has, throughout the play, lamented her friendlessness in England. The six, white-robed women carry a complex array of symbols. McMullan refers them back to *The Book of Revelation*, where the blessed receive white robes. In fact, Thomas Playfere's treatise on mourning does associate funeral attire with *The Book of Revelation*. He suggests that a good Christian

will rejoice at the death of another Christian because "seeing (as it is in the Reuelation) they weare white long robes in token of triumph" (81). The presence of these white-clad women also bears similarity to the early modern funeral ritual that the official mourners of an unmarried woman are, as Gittings recounts, six women, also unmarried. Gittings quotes a 1650 ballad that describes the ceremony: "[a] garland fresh and fair / of lilies there was made [...] Six maidens all in white / did bear her to the ground" (qtd. in Gittings 117). Katherine's dream-"personages" thus embody the ceremonial mourner and such mourners carry symbols that convey the social identity of the dead.

Unlike the ballad mourners, Katherine's dream-mourners do not carry lilies; Katherine, however, has already conceived of herself as a deteriorating lily in Act Three, Scene Two. Moreover, the dream-mourners do carry garlands, a funeral practice to which Shakespeare may have referred earlier in *Hamlet*. Maurice J. Quinlan notes that Ophelia is "allowed her 'virgin crants,'" which are "generally taken to the garlands hung up in church or borne before the bier of an unmarried woman" (304). What of the materials that compose the garlands in Katherine's dream? The bays "indicate celebration" according to McMullan (n.82.3-5). This reading does not necessarily argue against the theme of the dream as mourning, since the good Christian mourner was encouraged to feel joy, in addition to sorrow. McMullan offers no possible interpretation of the palms. Again, Thomas Playfere offers a potential answer. The death of Christ, he suggests, is symbolized by the palm tree, which has "many waights at the top, and many snakes at the roote" but endures nonetheless, with the message, "I am neither oppressed with the waights, nor distressed with the snakes" (38-9). According to Playfere, both Christ and the palm "did most florish" when "most afflicted" (30). This again supports

the directive that death should be met with joy and sorrow, and underlines Katherine's belief that her dream represents the emergence of "eternal happiness" at the moment of physical, emotional and political decline. The women illustrate the swing between joy and sorrow because, although the women dance around Katherine, the stage directions indicate that they should enter "solemnly" (4.2.82.1).

The dream consistently emphasizes the set motions of the "personages" in the dream. The six women dance in groups of two and four; two women offer the garland to Katherine and the remaining four curtsy. This process repeats itself until each woman has both offered a garland and curtsied. What this dance must look like onstage is the dissolution and formation of the group of six women in a continuous pattern. The entire effect would emphasize change and continuity together, an emphasis that the early modern funeral often hoped to produce. As Claire Gittings points out, the passage of items from one mourner to another featured in heraldic funerals. The arms and "various banners, pennons and standards" was passed from pairs of mourners to the minister and then to the heir of the deceased (177). The minister would give these items to the heir "with reverence, symbolically investing him" (177). The dream's formation of women in pairs, and their transmission of the garland to Katherine with "reverence" sounds strikingly similar to the practices carried out in the heraldic funeral.

The total number of women relates, perhaps, to the number associated with women in particular, in funeral practices. This number would convey important information about the dying and deceased to those who watched and listened. Six maidens usually accompanied the coffin of a dead virgin. Moreover, the strokes of the "passing bell" warned the early modern neighbourhood of an impending death. There

were conventionally nine strokes of the bell for men, and six for women, followed by a toll for each year of the person's life (Gittings 133). The dress of the dream personages also echoes the dress of official mourners of deceased females. The "vizards" that the dream women wear resemble the obscuring costume: the barbe, or cloth, covered half of the face. At the funeral of Lady Berkeley, Gittings recounts, "[a]ll the principal mourners were women" and each one wore both the barbe and a "lined hood of black" (174). This adornment must have nearly obscured the facial features of the mourners. Thus, while their dress conveyed important information about their status as official mourners, they would lack distinction from each other. The dream "personages" would appear this way onstage. Heavily laden with symbols that will inform other mourners of the status of the deceased, they are also mysterious; they reveal and obscure at the same time.

Reverence, and its physical manifestation in the bow or curtsy, features in the stage directions that order Katherine's dream. These directions suggest that the six figures of the dream "first conge unto" Katherine and then by turns each pair "make reverend curtsies" (4.2.82.6-8). Shakespeare once again exhibits a preoccupation with reverence; the word cannot be verbalized to the audience, but it is instead rendered visual. These dream-figures continually bestow the "spare garland" to Katherine in gestures of subordination, but retain their unique power to do this bestowing in wearing their own garlands and never finishing the act of apparelling Katherine in hers. Those who revere Katherine retain the power to make this gesture.

Katherine finally comprehends this dynamic and articulates it after awaking. The esteem she receives in her vision is not simply given, or even demanded by her; Katherine realizes she must work to be *worthy* of reverence in order to inspire that

reaction from those who remember her. Katherine realizes that this shared authority is crucial in a sincere "promissory gesture" from one who reveres to one who deserves this reverence:

> Saw you not even now a blessed troop
> Invite me to a banquet […]
> They promised me eternal happiness
> And brought me garlands, Griffith, which I feel
> I am not worthy yet to wear. I shall assuredly. (4.2.87-92)

In this act of honest "self-research," realizing she is not yet worthy, Katherine becomes worthy of the permanence she dreams. She invites the attention of the audience at this moment by realising that her worth cannot exist without their participation in its composition.

At the same time, reverence must be freely offered when the subject deserves it. In placing Katherine in the position to recognize her need to be "worthy" of her "eternal happiness," Shakespeare immediately shifts this imperative onto those who address her. Katherine objects to the Messenger's brusque address, asking "[d]eserve we no more reverence?" (4.2.111). Here Katherine is close to death and commands no political power. McMullan sees this demand for reverence as Katherine's innate dignity asserting itself despite her condition. Yet, her question also requires the Messenger to reflect on his own reasons for dismissing her. He admits that "haste" made him "unmannerly" (105). Katherine succeeds in forcing the Messenger to consider the civility of his approach, both in the way he physically conducts himself and the way that speed can be interpreted ethically, as "unmannerly." Thus, Katherine asks herself whether she merits the esteem that the angelic troop offers her, but she asks her audience to direct the same question inward. Are we, like the dream figures, ready to enter a community of bodies

that includes Katherine? We have seen the dream, when Griffith and the others have not. The sense, in the dream, that reverence is a communal performance invites the spectator to become more than a spectator; the audience can decide whether they wish to join the "troop" that blesses the dying Katherine.

Chapter Three
The Predestined Body and Honest Prophecy

> "We defy augury. There's a special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not to come. If it be not to come, it will be now. If it be not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all. Since no man knows aught of what he leaves, what is't to leave betimes?" (*Hamlet* 5.2.166-70)

What is the special providence to which Hamlet speaks as he faces his mortality? It is a means of finding comfort in the absence of comfort and certainty in the face of uncertainty. Hamlet has no faith in anything beyond the present moment and the inevitability of death; this, strangely enough, is an expression of faith that comes close to resembling religious faith in an afterlife. "Readiness" implies a mental state that enables a person to remain comfortable with the thought of impending mortality; it can also describe a physical state in which the body accepts all pangs, pleasurable or painful. In this chapter, I suggest that prophetic knowledge does not derive from special access to God's providential design. Instead, I argue that prophecy or predestination is honest only if it is approved emotionally and over time by a sensitive (and human) body. Change and fate are two ways that a man or woman can understand the "mortal accidents," as Jupiter terms them in *Cymbeline*, which compose the narrative of a life. The body's "readiness" to accept mortality gives it a means of predicting the future that is not divine, but is nonetheless powerful; in this sense, the body's "readiness" is indeed "all" because it rules out neither chance nor fate. Prediction and fulfillment of eternal truth is instead an expression of hope and hindsight made by the body physically and emotionally. The power to which Hamlet refers, while acknowledging that some events truly do seem mysterious, does not deny that the human body influences a person's perception of "mortal accidents."

Critics, as Alan Sinfield summarizes, interpret this passage as an expression of faith or lack of faith in Christian providence (89). Sinfield himself decides that, at this moment, "we see Hamlet proposing a high degree of divine intervention and suggesting predestination" (93). *Matthew* 10 advises "do not fear those who kill the body, but are unable to kill the soul; but rather fear Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (*Matt*. 10.28). God directs the life and afterlife of every body, significant or small. The Gospel goes on to ask "[a]re not two little sparrows sold for a penny? And yet not one of them will fall to the ground apart from your Father" (*Matt*. 10.29). Hamlet also echoes Calvin's observation that God commands a special "providence" over all creatures, even the sparrow. Calvin claims that God's providence is caring, rather than mechanical: God preserves "not by stirryng with an vniuersall motion as wel the whole frame of the worlde, as all the partes therof, but by susteynyng, cherishing & caring for, with singular prouide~ce euery one of those thinges y^{t} he hath created eue~ to y^{e} least sparrow" (57v). The belief in predestination provides the living and the dying with the comforting sense that the events of our lives are arranged by God. Calvin offers a more comforting interpretation of this divine direction than *Matthew*. Calvin urges his readers to think of God's control as protective, even paternal. As Calvin explains, a belief in providence also eases those who "feareth fortune (66r); he therefore makes the idea emotionally appealing in order to make it intellectually convincing. Calvin not only revises the tenor of divine control, from fearful to comforting, but he also places different emphasis on the sparrow. *Matthew* refers to the fall of the sparrow to convince believers that their own misfortunes are much greater and God's concern is much greater. Calvin sees the sparrow is as important as the human, to suggest that God's care covers all

bodies equally; the sparrow does not fall in Calvin's version. Shakespeare combines these two accounts when referring to "special providence" and the "fall of the sparrow."

This notion of providence can produce anxieties of its own, however. What place does human agency have in a universe where man can control as much or as little as a sparrow? Calvin comforts believers that God cares for them, but is vague when it comes to what this care actually looks and feels like. How can we accrue knowledge about the past, present and future if time constitutes the mysterious material of God's inscrutable design? Hamlet indeed embraces fully the powerlessness of the human body in the face of death, yet in accepting this powerlessness he asserts a kind of faith that reconsiders the relation between the physical body and the future. After all, it is not that he cannot anticipate upcoming events, but it is rather that he "defies" such knowledge. Hamlet finds faith in seeing the inevitability of death as timeless, as an event that spans past, present and future and creates a community of bodies. This form of faith also enables the living to believe in a comforting providential force and still be capable of acquiring knowledge about the future and its ties to the past.

When referring to the sparrow, Hamlet channels Matthew and Calvin. He includes the bird's "fall" from the Bible, but takes the idea of a "special" providence that includes the sparrow from the *Institutes*. This combination allows Hamlet to see history as a shared story between "mean and mighty," as Shakespeare phrases it in *Cymbeline*. There is no death, either big or small, that will not influence thinking about the past, present and future. Prophetic knowledge comes from thinking about possible random events through a narrative eye; the narrative crafts evidence of an inalienable link between the past and future. Of course, the story is produced after the fact, in acts of

recollection that assert these links selectively and with an overarching idea of what the narrative should say, but it offers the reader a sense that the array of "mortal accidents," is mapped out before they occur. In response to Sinfield's faith/non-faith binary, I contend that Hamlet believes that the emotional human, in recognising that fears and hopes about death are powerful influences on life, can acquire knowledge about the future that may or may not be divine, but certainly is honest.

In *The Road to Delphi*, Michael Wood makes the connection between prophetic knowledge and story-writing as a way of demonstrating how prophetic knowledge works or does not work. In thinking about divine foreknowledge, Wood suggests that "we find ourselves, [...] in a place where predictions have to become stories, where the prediction depends on its place in a plot, acquires its final meaning only because of that placing" (36). He suggests that "[p]rophecies are neither true nor false at the time of their utterance. They are awaiting confirmation [...] The question is not which interpretation [of a prophecy] is right, since many interpretations could be that. The question is which interpretation *counts* once the results are in" (37). In dealing with prophecies in the history plays, Shakespeare details what people believe about the future, and what people make of these beliefs once the "results are in," that is, once the predicted event has become an object of reflection rather than anticipation.

The vulnerable human body will find an afterlife if the audience of the play, or the recipients of a story, interpret the significance of one body in relation to past and future bodies. The body will become the site of prophetic thought, not because the future can be divined, but because it is indivisible from its predecessors and ancestors. Hamlet admits he cannot know what kind of evidence he will leave (after all, his story will be told in acts

of recollection after his death has occurred), but he does recognize that something will be left. The events of his life will be collected in ways that will make the outcome of his life seem as though it were predestined. This narrative eye will interpret random events, like the fall of a sparrow, as signs of something greater; a reader that looks back will naturally gravitate to the comforts provided by the idea of providence.

Hamlet's dying words express confidence that his body will be refashioned after the moment of his death in acts of retrospection. He carefully orchestrates a sense of predestination at a time of greatest uncertainty:

> O God, Horatio, what a wounded name,
> Things standing thus unknown, I *leave behind me*!
> If thou didst *ever* hold me in thy heart,
> Absent thee from felicity awhile,
> And in this harsh world *draw thy breath in pain*,
> To tell my story [...]
>
> O, I die, Horatio.
> The potent poison quite o'ercrows my spirit.
> I cannot live to hear the news from England,
> But *I do prophesy th'election lights*
> On Fortinbras. He *has my dying voice*.
> So tell him, with the occurrents, *more and less*,
> Which have solicited – the rest is silence. (5.2.297-311, my italics)

The belief that the events of his life are "left behind" is essential to Hamlet's faith in a predestined body. The body itself is "left behind" when interpretive work begins. The moment of death is indeed made eternal by Hamlet's self-conscious hope that Horatio will tell his story with a voice that will "draw" its "breath in pain." Those who recollect will infuse Hamlet's past, even at the beginning, with the knowledge of its conclusion in pain.

Hamlet offers his "dying voice" to Horatio and to Fortinbras, conveying the belief that last words are the most truthful. This is not simply so that Horatio and Fortinbras

will describe the "occurrents" of his life. Hamlet hopes they will *have* his dying voice so that any utterance they make is shaped in advance by the fact of his death. Hamlet conceives of the afterlife as one in which the sensations of his body are transmitted to the story-teller. Hamlet's appeal to Horatio looks forward but it also reaches back. He appeals to the sympathy Horatio has already demonstrated in the past ("if thou didst ever hold me") as an instrument to preserve Hamlet's body and story. Horatio's emotional hold of Hamlet could be visualized onstage as Horatio's embrace of the dying man. Hamlet expresses uncertainty that Horatio's hold of him can last; after all, he asks for Horatio's fidelity to this cause only for "awhile." Hamlet therefore balances the hope for an eternal and certain power with the acknowledgment that the body itself is transitory.

His prophecy of Fortinbras's succession in Denmark strikes a similar balance. He anticipates that the "election lights" on Fortinbras. Hamlet's own endorsement ("he has my dying voice") suggests that he has access to the knowledge that others may not at this moment. But if an election "lights," or falls, on someone, can it be predestined at all, or is it a matter of chance? For readers and playgoers who will see Fortinbras take the succession shortly, Hamlet's words will indeed rise to the level of prophecy. The uncanny knowledge he possesses only becomes uncanny in our recollection of the way the present matches his prediction.

Horatio will take on Hamlet's voice of prophecy, as he vows to inform the "unknowing world" of the play's events, which he has boiled down to "carnal, bloody and unnatural acts" (5.2.332-4). "All this," he affirms, "I can truly deliver" (338). The role of the prophet, Horatio's words suggest, are to not only describe events, but to emotionally relive them. In telling Hamlet's story by assuming the prophetic voice,

Horatio brings Hamlet's story into being. Hamlet's revision of the notion of providence gives the body an afterlife in narratives that make sense out of senselessness; Hamlet locates immortality in the circulation of his body in historical narratives that address the mortal body over time. The body, endlessly "ready" to be shaped by hope and hindsight, has a life-force that makes the moment of death eternal. Hamlet's final line – "the rest is silence" – indicates that, aside from his directives, there is nothing else that should or can be voiced. It also indicates that his feverish vocality before death will fade to silence after death. It could also refer to the belief that a body will rest after death. Hamlet's body will "rest" as if asleep, but the work of vocality, the call to restlessness, will continue with Horatio.

Do we determine our shape, or does our shape determine us? In Shakespeare's late histories, and indeed, earlier in *Richard III*, prophecies emerge from a space between the powerful and the powerless body, between the body that can change itself and its future, and between the body that is powerless to pursue possibilities outside a predetermined fate. Shakespeare often depicts prophecies that are uttered and then fulfilled, but the link between the utterance and its fulfillment is never simple. Is a visionary declaration an articulation of an event that will certainly occur or an expression of subjective hope, an expectation for the future? Is the fulfillment of foresight the culmination of predetermined action, or is it a reading of the past with the benefit of hindsight? Shakespeare certainly makes answering these questions difficult. He does make clear, however, that words carry a life-force beyond the moment of their articulation. How does this conception of divination become a contributor to Shakespeare's notion of ethical historiography? Shakespeare's prophecies point to the

coexistence of contingency and necessity; the fulfillment of a prophecy is a moment when the present renegotiates the facts of the past. The discrepancy between prediction and fulfillment is a contributor to ethical historiography; if the present fulfills perfectly a forecast from the past, there is no need to remember and no need to engage with moments that have already passed.

Shakespeare locates the permanence and continuity described by prophetic language in the unpredictable hopes of the human mind and the variable desires of the human body. Shakespeare makes the body and its sensitivity prophetic, but not because it contains immutable and timeless knowledge. The body is predictive because it anticipates the future and remembers the past in a way that, even if it is factually inadequate, is emotionally honest. As Wood observes, "sometimes the sheer feel of prophecy is more significant than what is prophesied. An impression of imminent revelation may linger in the memory as a form of truth even when the prophecies have failed or faded or worn themselves out through reinterpretation" (120). Shakespeare relies on the "sheer feel" of divine anticipation to make prophecies true, no matter how strictly they conform to fact.

Knowledge, subject to the capacities of the human body, can live and die. In *Richard III*, Elizabeth wishes to replace her "dull" words with Margaret's, which are "sharp" and will "pierce" (4.4.124-5). Prophetic words seem to possess this power to pierce the listener; but what is this power? On the one hand, they flourish beyond the moment of their utterance at the moment they are voiced by fashioning a map for the future. On the other hand, prophetic words continue to haunt listeners because their fulfillment is delayed. They capitalize on the deepest human hopes, desires and fears

because their promise is made and withheld at the same time. Prophetic words will also overflow the boundaries of the original prognostication. Even the simplest phrase will direct listeners to read in the "correct" way; and, even the simplest phrases can be misread. In their mysterious claim to knowledge (mysterious because its wording sounds precise but is actually vague when interpreted), prophecy can be fulfilled and refashioned at the same time.

Shakespeare compresses the spheres of foreknowledge and hindsight together in one reflective activity, which is the history play itself. In some sense, Shakespeare treats events through the lens of hindsight only. His characters, like Calvin's elect, are predestined to a certain kind of afterlife because they have already lived and died and the facts of their life cannot be radically transformed by a drama that hopes to call itself a history play. Yet, in another sense, inside the frame of hindsight, Shakespeare allows his characters to test their status as dramatic characters rather than inert shapes from the past that can be moved mechanically here and there on the stage. The fates of history's dead have been decided, yet history's dramatic characters also challenge predestination by acquiring a life of their own on the stage. Shakespeare's characters watch and reflect on their own life and death in the process of acting them out. The history play thus mimics history itself, which is an object and a practice, which, as de Certeau argues "doubles the doing both as its trace and as its interrogation" (48).

Paul Ricoeur sees continuity and its interruptions together as contributors to knowledge about the past. He espouses the continuous interplay between the belief in an unchanging historical fact (the trace) and the knowledge that the fluid conditions of the present give historiography its power to transcend mere inventory. We can also think of

Shakespeare's prophecies in relation to Nora's *lieux de memoire*, which stand between memory and history, and are "mixed, hybrid, mutant" because they are "bound intimately with life and death, with time and eternity" (19). Wood writes that oracular knowledge emerges at an intersection of "contingency and necessity, the site of the irrevocable deed that wasn't irrevocable until it occurred" (73). As Shakespeare suggests, historiographical knowledge, like oracular knowledge, always emerges after the fact (that is, after the event has occurred in time) and every event that it records, therefore, fulfills some kind of expectation from previous historical texts and the historian's hindsight. *Richard III* and the late plays dramatize the acquisition of historiographical knowledge at the crossroads between "contingency and necessity," in a position Wood terms "displaced hindsight," which is "hindsight uncannily dressed as foreknowledge" (29). Prophecies in these plays evade the purely factual in favour of the interpretive potential involved when one makes the ongoing experience of time an important constituent of historical fact.[24]

Wood informs us that oracles employ "double speech," or "amphibology," as a means of making even the most simple statement complex (51). Richard uses this "double speech" in *Richard III* when he admits to promoting the prophecy that Edward will be "disinherited" by "G" (1.1.57). Richard deploys the prophecy falsely to entrap Clarence, while the other meaning, that Richard (Gloucester) will disinherit Edward, runs menacingly underneath, unobserved by Clarence and Edward, and even by Richard himself. He disdainfully calls the prophecy a "toy," but a great deal of dramatic irony

[24] See H. Stuart Hughes, in *History as Art and as Science: Twin Vistas on the Past*. He echoes Ricoeur's notion of the "unaccomplished possibilities of the past" when he suggests that the historian's work contains or anticipates "sequels of which the historian himself may not be consciously aware," and these sequels "form part of the endless reciprocity between present and past – between the historian and his subject matter – whose full complexity the idealist metaphor of 're-enactment' is powerless to convey" (13). See also Walter Benjamin's *Theses on the Philosophy of History* in *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*. He explains that "[h]istory is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now" (XIV, 261).

underlines this assertion; this double meaning would have been clear to those in the audience who were familiar with Richard's history or had read the *Mirror for Magistrates*, which mentions the prophecy and records Richard's responsibility for Clarence's death.

Because the prophecy is uncertain until it is read as fulfilled, fulfillment is a contingency and necessity; a prediction will be read according to the hopes of the reader and will be fulfilled according to hindsight that sees necessity *in* the narrative. As Wood comments, oracles "play a verbal card, and the card is picked up by both the player and the whole universe of available names" (53). Richard stresses the idea that prophetic language plays a verbal card that must be then "picked up" in diverse ways; he remarks that Edward has "from the cross-row pluck[ed] the letter G" (54). The verbal card, in this case, is the letter "G" and though the alphabet has been pared down to one letter and interpretation seems limited, Richard's own ability to fit into this prophecy, in the place of Clarence, as Gloucester, supports the idea that the simplest sign can be mysterious when different people, with different expectations read it.

***Richard III*: The "abortive child" and the "heavy mother"**

In *Richard III*, Richard is constantly the subject of curses and prophecies; those who make these predictions contend that his untimely birth foretold his poor character in the present and that his actions in the present have likewise fulfilled the negative signs that attended his birth. In one way or another, Richard's enemies argue that he has been predestined for vice, and therefore, in their logic, is predestined for a shameful fall. Irving Ribner shares these assumptions in his assessment of the play at large. "[T]he

primary purpose of the play," Ribner claims, "is to terminate a tetralogy [...] to emphasize the role of providence in history, and to show how God's grace enabled England to rise out of the chaos of the Wars of the Roses" (60). I argue, against Ribner, that Shakespeare concentrates on Richard's predestination in order to suggest that people refer to divine providence to express a need for continuity between past and future. Characters may attribute their feeling of continuity to "God's grace," but Shakespeare relocates that ethical power to an emotional, rather than a religious, association between the past and future.

Prophetic thinking about Richard places his body squarely between hope and hindsight in the play, and Shakespeare replicates these states of mind for an audience who looks back on Richard even as he "halts" before them on the stage. Shakespeare uses these perspectives of time, challenging his audience to confront their own expectations for a character that enters the theatre already formed (or mis-formed) by a long line of historical records. Though clearly villainous, Richard exhibits an unsettling abundance of charisma that questions whether a dramatic character is ever predestined, even a character in an historical drama. Barbara Hodgdon writes that Richard's subjectivity to curses, especially in the context of the blessing of Richmond before Bosworth, "conceives and spatializes history as a theatrical spectacle of opposition" and a subjectivity that will "transform him [Richard] from a figure who opposes, ignores, or denies history to one who is its contested subject" (114). Richard's shape is predetermined by history, but is refashioned on the stage as one that, Hodgdon claims, has "moral potential and physical vitality" (116). The prophecies and curses levelled at Richard in the play put particular

emphasis on Richard's body as a contest between predetermination and individual freedom.

In *The Book Named the Governor*, Thomas Elyot explains that memory is an image that remains as long as it is "consolidate, pure, manyfeste, or playne, and withoute blemmyshe" (222r). At times, however, the image may be compromised "eyther by the length of tyme, or by soem other myshappe or iniurie" (222v). In that case, the missing portion of the image will be returned to the remaining portion, so that the entire image will be "redemed or restored"; this activity is called "remembraunce" (222v). By stirring memory, the mind activates remembrance, which Elyot views as a process of putting a fractured or misshapen image back together in the mind. Thus, while Richard and others lament his misshapen form, we can think of recollection as a means to redeem forms. Shakespeare plays with this idea in his own manipulations of memory. If Richard recalls the past, but makes something more of it, can a body predestined for malformation be redeemed by new acts of remembrance of the audience?

In the opening soliloquy of *Richard III*, Richard laments that he is "[d]eform'd, unfinish'd," and sent "before" his "time" (1.1.20). Richard's retrospection invites the audience to see his deformity as a manifestation of divine injustice by claiming that he was "curtailed" of "fair proportion" and "[c]heated of feature" (1.1.18-19). Richard associates his untimely entrance into the world with unethical behaviour by a higher, outside force. Who exactly has "curtailed" and "cheated" Richard? Has a Calvinist God unfairly left Richard out of the elect? In the opening soliloquy, Richard tests the limits of religious (and historical) predestination when he ponders whether he can control his destiny.

Richard imagines that he has not only been prevented from looking pleasing, he has also been kept from situating his body in time, from experiencing an emotional connection to the temporal moment he inhabits. The soliloquy obsesses that the present is a one segment of a larger picture of history, and emphasizes Richard's inability to fit his body into the full picture. His form does not suit the "piping time of peace" (24), and he cannot command the "well fair-spoken days" (29). Richard describes his untimeliness:

> Why, I, in this weak piping time of peace,
> Have no delight to pass away the time,
> Unless to spy my shadow in the sun,
> And descant on mine own deformity.
> And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover
> To entertain these fair well-spoken days,
> I am determined to prove a villain
> And hate the idle pleasures of these days. (1.1.24-31)

The passage perceives a season of rest through the perspective of someone who cannot rest. While Richard envisages the "delight" of this historical moment as celebration, a "piping time," the language of this vision offers a negative view of pleasure; it begins to look more like indolence. If the adjectives that describe this historical moment are gathered together, they form an overwhelming picture of physical repose and verbal restraint: weak, fair, well-spoken, idle. Richard suggests that he is simply passing time, but his rest, compared to others' "idle pleasures," actually involves restless physical and verbal movement. The notion of "passing away" is crucial to Richard's sense that his vitality keeps him outside the lazy present, and his belief that he self-consciously watches himself work in a history that does not fit him. He imagines seeing his shadow in the sun, which conveys his mobility, his presence in the world. While doing so, he "descants," or speaks relentlessly, on his favourite topic. To descant means to "make

remarks, comments, or observations," but it also means to "enlarge upon a theme" according to the *OED*. Richard's only source of leisure is to speak more, to speak longer, to extend his shrunken body verbally; he makes something more of a body that is an ill-fit for the present by making it the inspiration for articulate self-reflection.

Even as this restlessness works to critique the historical record that Richard the dramatic character has inherited, it also derives from that record itself. Historians make much of Richard's inability to sleep and his subjection to troubling dreams. Hall records that after the murder of the two princes, Richard's "restless heart continually tossed and tumbled with the tedious impression and stormy remembrance of his abhominable murther and execrable Tyrannie" (211). While More recounts Richard's restlessness as a fact, he acknowledges that this "credible report" comes from "such as were secret with his chamberers" (210). Shakespeare cleverly enfolds this information into his Richard's sense of self at the start of the play. Richard's restlessness is a matter of historical precedent, yet Shakespeare expands this theme, and has made him uncomfortable with the shape of his body in time. Richard's belief that he cannot settle down in this first soliloquy argues against the historical record that has sealed his fate, yet anticipates that same record with its description of his troubled mind after the murder of the princes. Shakespeare replicates More's speculation when staging Richard's restless sleep as a direct relation to his "abhominable murther[s]." Shakespeare's Richard, however, critiques this report by offering the audience another way of looking at his restlessness.

The dynamic of factual rest and interpretive restlessness that takes place in Richard's first soliloquy is played out in the historical sources that Shakespeare used. Holinshed claims in the preface to the *Chronicles* that where accounts differ, he includes

both. Holinshed may have inherited this perspective from More, who does and does not validate the accounts of Richard that discuss his unfortunate appearance. After listing Richard's physical traits ("ill featured of limmes," "crooke backed," "hard fauoured of visage"), More lists his character defects ("malicious," "wrathfull," "enuious"). Yet, More cautions that "men of hatred" could be responsible for the description of Richard's form and character (6). If the report is true, then the rule holds true in this case, but More cannot be certain that the report is true. He sets this uncertainty aside, saying "this I leave to God's judgment" (6). He therefore supports the notion of a divine marriage between signs and events in general, but cautions readers to consider other possible interpretations of Richard's story.

Holinshed goes one step farther than More in wondering about the equation between the external and internal traits and the possibility of a "full confluence" of "defects of fauour and amiable proportion" manifested by Richard's body. Holinshed finds irresistible the belief that the outer and inner are connected. Richard's case supports the "rule" that "[d]istor tum vultum sequitur distorsio morum (the distortion of the appearance is next followed by the distortion of the character)" (712).[25] Holinshed, however, omits More's reference to leaving the final decision to "God's judgement." In this later account, divine providence is diluted, although not necessarily overruled, by the impression that a general precept, or observation, binds the past and present.

Richard decides that because he cannot "prove a lover" he will "prove the villain," and, in doing so, opens his presumably predetermined shape to interpretive re-formation by the play's characters and the play's audience. The act of proving requires

[25] Unlike the previous quotes from Holinshed in this dissertation, this passage comes from the 1586 edition of the *Chronicles*.

retrospective judgment; the present reads back into the past for signs that contribute to an understanding of an event. The *OED* also explains that to "prove oneself" as something is to "show oneself by trial, action, of experience, to be the thing specified." The rest of the play will stage this trial, but will come up with unexpected results. Richard will prove he is indeed a lover, as well as a villain. Shakespeare questions the notion that the play will prove anything definitively by highlighting the slipperiness of signs as proof. Richard's "determination" expresses Shakespeare's exploration of fate and freedom. Richard will "show" himself in many ways, but none that establish for certain that he has escaped or fulfilled the fate that history has determined for him.

As if he has some choice in the matter, Shakespeare's Richard decides to be a villain. The irony is that Richard has no choice. The historical drama will replay a villainy that has already been established by the long line of historical records that describe his reign. Richard feels he is trapped inside a historical record that will fail to restore him with an act of full remembrance, as Elyot's description of memory describes. Richard can only "pass away the time," that is, observe another rendition of the story of his misshapen body play out. Shakespeare cleverly confirms Richard's historical reputation while having the subject of this history critique it at the same time. He never redeems Richard from this reputation because the playwright cannot entirely reverse a historical fact when writing historical drama. He can, however, urge the audience to scrutinize their reception of these facts, as Richard himself does. Shakespeare makes it clear that we pick up verbal cards, and the expectations that motivate the act of picking them up is at least as important as the sign on the card. The play itself explores creative possibilities while still adhering to the sealed off, that is, already-completed, version of

Richard's fall. The drama retains the aura of truth, even while creatively reworking past facts; it gives the impression that theatrical Richard is a creditable version of the historical Richard.

Richard acquires the adjective of "abortive" as the play progresses. Anne wishes an "abortive child" on him at their first encounter in the play. Not long after, Margaret turns her full fury on him, issuing several curses before composing a string of insults. She calls him

> Thou elvish-marked, abortive, rooting hog,
> Thou that wast seal'd in thy nativity
> The slave of Nature, and the son of hell;
> Thou slander of thy heavy mother's womb,
> Thou loathed issue of thy father's loins,
> Thou rag of honour, thou detested – (1.3.228-33)

At this point, Richard interrupts Margaret's barrage with the clever redirection of her curses to her own name. The use of the strange term "abortive" in relatively quick succession in the play deserves attention. Margaret's use of the term echoes Anne's. It is, at once, a fulfillment and extension of Anne's prophetic curse in Act one Scene Two. Richard, in Margaret's fury, is indeed a "loathed issue," but he issues from previous interpretations of him that have increasingly hardened into a rendition that is "seal'd." Here, hindsight is the only perspective emphasized. In looking back at Richard's birth, Margaret also looks back at Anne's curse, which was itself a prophetic image of Richard's future. The term "abortive" registers that Richard himself is untimely, but because the curse spans expectation and recollection, it has suspended time; the present becomes untimely because it looks back to Richard's birth, and also reiterates, in a new context, Anne's forward-reaching curse.

The untimely nature of Richard's birth intensifies with the audience's potential to remember it mentioned in performances in *3 Henry VI*. The idea that his birth prophesied his unnatural usurpation of the throne is important not because it is factually fulfilled, but because this conception of time is created the present in terms of the past and *vice-versa*. Richard repeats the story of his birth as predictive because it allows him to defend his present actions. He recalls

> I have often heard my mother say
> I came into the world with my legs forward.
> Had I not reason, think ye, to make haste,
> And seek their ruin that usurped our right?
> The midwife wondered and the women cried,
> 'O Jesus bless us, he is born with teeth!'
> And so I was, which plainly signified
> That I should snarl, and bite and play the dog. (5.6.68)

The birth-narrative begins as a reiterative, second-hand memory ("I have often heard my mother say"). Once Richard makes the memory a prophecy, he begins to claim the memory as his own. The story is no longer filtered through the perspective provided by the qualifier, "my mother says." Instead, Richard describes his birth directly and even quotes the witnesses of the actual event. This allows him to read the memory as a "plain signifier" of his fate to "play the dog." Richard implies that visionary knowledge slips between necessity and possibility when he uses the verb "play." He is not fated to act viciously if he now performs this behaviour. Rather, his misshapen body and strange birth has made him suited to a role that he can choose to take or not take. Richard's claim on his history undermines the idea that any signifier can be "plain." Even knowledge that seems authorized by prophecy can slip between fate and choice, memory and interpretation of memory. The belief that Richard's birth is prognostic continues to matter to those who interpret Richard. The prophecy gives the past a "life-force," an

ability to be newly created in interpretation just as mourning gives life to the dead body by linking it to continuing interpretation. Richard's birth is an event that is fully finished, completed, but it continues to occur because it provides onlookers with a way to rewrite the past. The story of Richard's birth, like Richard's body at the time of his birth, is never fully finished, and never completely shaped.

Richard's birth is recalled so many times that each version offers a slightly different perspective on his physical deformities. He becomes increasingly difficult to visualize by a reader of the text as each ensuing rendition draws on, but changes, the previous description. The discussion that develops in Act Two Scene Five between the young York and his grandmother concerns whether or not the future can be predicted by reading the signs of the present. Prophecy and memory are entwined when York looks back on his conversation with Richard by recalling yet another tale of Richard's strange birth. The act of recollection coincides with the birth of a new narrative. The idea that Richard's behaviour could be in some way linked to the pace of his physical development puts the question of hindsight in the forefront. Do we see what we wish to see when a prophecy is fulfilled, or has it been destiny all along? Is truth fulfilled, or is expectation fulfilled when we read signs past signs as germinative seeds for present growth?

York and the Duchess ponder how they can predict present signs to acquire knowledge for the future. The proverbial claim, that "'[s]mall herbs have grace; great weeds do grow apace'," is not strictly a prophetic assertion. Yet, it is read as such by Richard, the Duchess and young York. Each one believes that the pace of growth carries predictive value. As York recalls the conversation with Richard on this subject, he remembers that Richard uses this proverb as a warning to his young nephew to stay

"small," that is, stay politically insignificant. Richard validates prophetic knowledge in order to advance his own causes. He does not necessarily believe the proverb but relies on others' belief in its veracity to dictate their actions. The proverb is true and false at the same time. The Duchess also considers the truth-value of predictive thinking when she responds that Richard himself did not fulfill its terms since he is both "wretched" and "long-a-growing" (18-19). Either the proverb is not true because Richard is evil and slow, or it is true and Richard has not fulfilled its dictates. In either scenario, Richard's growth is unnatural because it defies expectation.

Moreover, the proverb describes effectively that prophecy functions in a circular exchange between expectation and recollection. The proverb suggests that the plant's shape carries the signs of its eventual flourishing and vice versa. We know the weed because it overtakes the garden; at the same time, its overtaking is proof of its low quality. The herb's rarity is a sign of its grace, and its grace explains its rarity. The future can be determined in advance by reading the present signs appropriately, and the present can be considered a flourishing of the seeds of the past.

Richard further re-writes the narrative of his birth by calling into question his own legitimacy in order to invalidate Edward's sons' claim to the throne. Certainty and contingency are exemplified by his "slither" between a "seal'd" past and the past that he makes possible when interpreting it in a different way. His new rendering of his own past demonstrates remarkable temerity. He composes the story that Buckingham will transport to Guildhall:

> [t]here, at your meet'st advantage of the time,
> Infer the bastardy of Edward's children [...]
> Tell them, when that my mother went with child
> Of that insatiate Edward, noble York

> My princely father then had wars in France,
> And by true computation of the time
> Found that the issue was not his-begot [...]
> Yet touch this sparingly, as 'twere far off;
> Because you know my mother lives. (3.5.73-93)

Richard's suggestion that Buckingham use the "advantage" of time, that is, find a fitting time, also reminds us that Richard looks back at the past in order to promote his own cause. He offers a new "vantage" of the past by adjusting the terms of a "true computation" of time. In the process, he may in fact reveal that there is no "true" computation of time. Buckingham unwittingly underlines this revelation. When "convincing" Richard to take the throne, Buckingham urges him, "draw forth your noble ancestry / From the corruption of abusing times / Unto a lineal, true-derived course" (3.7.197-99). The irony is heavy here because Richard has undermined this "noble ancestry" in the course of re-writing the past. The corruption that Buckingham laments continues, rather than resolves, in Richard's ascent to the throne. Time itself can be "abusing" to those who live in it; however, in this case, Richard has demonstrated that time can also *be abused*. When Richard abuses time by writing his nephews out of their "noble ancestry" and by producing a new source for his own "true-derived course," he reflects processes that have already been undertaken when others describe him. Shakespeare does not simply malign Richard; he suggests that people produce history as ongoing interpretations of what a "true-derived course" can mean. Every historical record, like Richard himself, aspires to giving the historical trace/body rest in one secure "determination"; these same records recognize, however, the inevitability of restless interpretation as the dramatic character confronts and tests the limits of predetermination.

Richard wants to outlast, or pass through, the "time of peace." He wishes to insert himself into a temporal picture that suits his body, one that makes his deformity a strength rather than a liability; he becomes nostalgic for "[g]rim-visag'd War" because it is a time that matches his physical shape. Yet, Richard also places himself into the "well-spoken days" by successfully wooing Anne. He divides himself between the role of villain and lover, and fully inhabits each character because the root of both of these roles is his desire, as he phrases it, "to spy my shadow in the sun, / And descant on mine own deformity" (1.1.26-7). Each role draws his deformity into consideration; the role of lover is unsuited to his shape and the role of villain is suited to his shape. These acts of comparing a shape to an act perpetuates this "descanting." Richard doubles his body by seeing his shape as a closed and open sign. He cannot change the fact of his birth. Yet, in promoting its presence in these flourishing descants, Richard makes it a site of unknown potential (this startling potential is tapped when he successfully woos Anne). Richard's flaw (one of, perhaps, many) is that he fails to see that the splitting of his body can offer him important self-knowledge. Just as he uses prophecy without believing it responsible for his own actions, he capitalizes on his potential doubleness without seeing the wealth of knowledge that it could offer him. He ridicules the notion that he is comparable to others, and, in so doing, loses his grip on the powerful potential of comparing his shape to another's. In doubling Richard's body as a site of "excess closed upon itself" and a site also "open to the full range of its possible significations," to borrow Nora's description of the *lieux*, Shakespeare yokes the past to the future. Richard may "abuse" the times, but in splitting Richard's shape into two performances, Shakespeare assumes the duty of an ethical historian, which is, as Mark Jackson

describes, “to act as a hinge or articulation between a conception of what was, for a conception of the to-be” (472). Shakespeare expresses this hinge through Richard. If we, the audience, are ethical historians ourselves, we will value the knowledge offered by the hinging of past and future, even if, and particularly because, Richard himself does not.

The audience can also find an example of the relationship between prophetic thinking and prophetic feeling through Anne. By including Henry VI’s funeral in the play, Shakespeare develops a strange symmetry between Richard and Henry. The dead king’s corpse brings Henry and Richard together (literally in Richard’s wooing of a grieving Anne). The two men are also enfolded in the prophecy Anne composes over Henry’s body and her recollection of this utterance much later in the play. In the second scene of the play, Richard capitalizes on Anne’s grief to replace it. Anne, in Act Four, Scene One however, recognizes that her grief cannot be replaced as easily as her husband. Her own prediction offers Anne a way to frame the endlessness of sorrow, and a way to consider the expression of sorrow a potentially powerful observation of how the past influences the present and future. The refashioning of Richard through Henry’s corpse guides Anne toward a deeper understanding of her own transgressions. Her journey is an ethical one, prompted by the expectation and recollection involved in fulfilling prophecies.

Anne’s mourning for Henry becomes a complex network of thoughts regarding birth and death, hope and grief. Anne begins by offering fluids to the corpse as a way of symbolically reanimating it; she imagines pouring her tears into the body’s eyes in order to challenge the idea that the body is merely a “bloodless remnant” (1.2.7). Ultimately, her tears are merely “helpless balm” (13). Henry’s body becomes a place where a

"remnant" can be formed into another being. Anne indeed reanimates the corpse, but does so by connecting it to Richard in a series of curses that match the dead body and its lifeless parts to the living Richard and his active body. She compares Henry's wounds to Richard's hands, Henry's blood to Richard's blood. Her curses become so enthusiastic they begin to overshadow the body that serves as their inspiration. In the scope of Anne's perspective, Henry has indeed been replaced by Richard. In the previous scene Richard is optimistic that he can marry Anne and replace her dead loved-ones by "becom[ing] her husband, and her father" (1.2.156). Anne's diatribe over the corpse of her "father" justifies this earlier optimism: Anne wishes to "invocate" Henry's ghost at the beginning of her lamentation, but by the end, she has succeeded in conjuring Richard symbolically and literally.

Anne refers to the belief that the body of a murder-victim bleeds in the presence of the offender. Shakespeare uses this tradition to once again emphasize that the dead body is not merely a "remnant" as long as it continues to carry the potential to transmit knowledge. The exchange of fluids between the mourner and corpse symbolizes this transmission of experience. Anne imagines pouring her tears into the body, but fails to truly digest the knowledge this exchange offers; after all, she thinks her tears are "helpless balm." On the surface she means that they cannot awake the dead, but the underlying meaning might well be that her tears cannot help Anne herself, since she invests so little hope in them. Similarly, Anne knows the corpse's blood proves Richard's guilt, but she allows her obsession with Richard's blood to occlude this knowledge. She sees that Richard's presence "exhales this blood," but this causes her to focus on Richard and urge him "[b]lush, blush" (57). This obsessive turn to Richard

means that Anne will see Henry's body as "cold and empty" (59), rather than bursting with materials for interpretation.

Richard capitalizes on Anne's failure to exchange experience with the body – he makes his exchange of fluids with Anne overpower Anne's own tears. Richard appropriates Anne's "helpless balm" and names them "repentant tears" (219) after a long digression in which Richard demonstrates that he and Anne can communicate through mourning in ways that she cannot with Henry. Richard makes this connection explicit:

> Those eyes of thine from mine have drawn salt tears,
> Sham'd their aspects with *store* of *childish* drops;
> These eyes, which never shed remorseful tear, [...]
> And what these sorrows could not thence *exhale*,
> Thy beauty hath, and made them blind with weeping. (1.2.157-70, my italics)

What is initially striking about this rhetorically fine description of mourning is the term "store." Richard implies that Anne has unlocked a source of plenty that has been held in reserve. This metaphor makes Anne the vital key to accessing Richard's own emotional expression. Moreover, tears are combined overtly with breath when Richard calls them an exhalation. Tears testify to the body's life-force, and Anne may believe, then, that she has animated Richard in a way that she could not animate Henry.

Anne predicts that "ill rest" will "betide" Richard's chamber, where he "liest" (115). The prophecy straddles the line between "hoping" and "knowing," two mental activities Anne and Richard claim when they contemplate the likelihood of the prediction's fulfillment. The slip of this foreknowledge between necessity (knowing) and contingency (hoping) forms the key to this scene and its partner in Act Four. On one hand, Anne's assertion conforms to facts; historical sources record that Richard suffered regularly from nightmares. Shakespeare's Richard is thus fated to fulfill that expectation,

and his claim that he "knows" this fact is a deeply reflexive moment. On the other hand, in the world of the play, other potential meanings shadow the simple phrase; this curse will fold back on Anne in ways that she has yet to imagine. The forecast, outwardly straightforward, will acquire new meanings once Anne becomes Richard's wife. She has predicted "ill rest" for Richard's "chamber," but does not specify that Richard himself will suffer; as his wife, Anne occupies that chamber and experiences the very restlessness that she has wished on Richard. Yet, Shakespeare keeps to the letter of the prediction when he makes Richard restless as well, particularly before the Battle of Bosworth. It is not that the simple prophecy does not come true. Rather, the prophecy is truthful in a number of ways. Indeed, prophecies tend to be fulfilled to the letter *and* by coming true in other, unforeseen ways. We may know Richard's fate before he has spoken his first word onstage, but Shakespeare urges us to reassess this knowledge after experiencing its unforeseen manifestations.

Anne remembers her curse in Act Four Scene One. At this point, her memory becomes a remarkably poor match for the curse she voiced in the first Act. The features of this ill-fitting match deserve closer attention. In Act One, Scene Two, she wishes, "More direful hap betide that hated wretch / That makes us wretched by the death of thee [...] If ever he have wife, let her be made / More miserable by the death of him / Than I am made by my young lord, and thee" (26-8). Anne's curse will retain its emphasis on death, but the balance between death and marriage shifts significantly. These are the terms by which she remembers her earlier curse:

> 'Be thou', quoth I, 'accursed
> For making me, so young, so old a widow;
> And when thou wed'st, let sorrow haunt thy bed;
> And be thy wife – if any be so mad –

> More miserable by the life of thee
> Than thou hast made me by my dear lord's death.' (4.1.71-76)

The most obvious difference between the original curse and the recollected curse is the former does not specifically name Richard and is delivered before Richard has entered the scene, while the latter addresses Richard directly, as if he had in fact been present for this particular portion of her speech. The original curse is part of a speech that addresses the dead Henry. Anne's memory that she "quotes" to Richard in fact argues against the accuracy of the quote itself. The remembered curse deviates so noticeably from its source because Shakespeare is interested in the effect of hindsight on prophetic knowledge.

By no means does the difference between the actual and remembered curses invalidate either one. Time's passage, and unforeseen contingencies, will re-make the prophecy so that its fulfillment is not a strict copy of the original but a performance of the past. Anne admits as much when she recalls, "Lo, ere I can repeat this curse again, / Within so small a time, my woman's heart / Grossly grew captive to his honey words, / And prov'd the subject of mine own soul's curse" (4.1.77-80). Shakespeare suggests that one cannot strictly "repeat" a curse because time, even a "small" space of time, will have effects on it. The curse or prophecy may be fated to come true, but because its fulfillment occurs in the domain of personal memory, it may come true in unexpected ways. Anne becomes the subject of her curse because it has transformed over time and widened its borders to envelop her. Anne recalls "growing" to accept Richard's wooing; she has also grown to fulfill her own words. The curse has made Anne as much as she has made it.

The original curse predicted that Richard's wife would be "made" miserable by his death. Anne's recalls instead that she said Richard's wife will *be* miserable by his

life. The slip between "making" and "being" explains how prophetic knowledge is formed from hope and hindsight. Anne can "be" miserable in the recollected curse because hindsight now constructs the curse and its truth is sealed. The anonymous wife of the first curse will conversely be "made" over the passage of time. The more general first curse has been left open-ended, so that its requirements can be made, and thus fulfilled, in more specific ways.

The only manner of confirming the accuracy of both curses involves assessing their "feel," or rather, the emotional effects they continue to inspire even after the original's precise wording changes. Shakespeare plants echoes of the first curse in the second so that, perhaps even unconsciously, the audience will remember their similarities and forget their differences. The differences between the two curses are noticeable on paper, when set side by side. These same differences would be far less noticeable for an audience that must rely on memory alone to make the connection between the past and the present. After learning that Richard takes the throne, Anne curses the crown that she will acquire. "Anointed let me be," she wishes, "with deadly venom, / And die ere men can say 'God save the Queen'" (61-2). The "deadly venom" she craves is Richard's own cruelty; she later admits that Richard will welcome her death, and implies that he will arrange it himself (86). Here, in her reference to being "anointed" in "venom," Anne truly fulfills the expectations of her previous curse. Earlier she wished, using strikingly vague language, "more direful hap" to "the hated wretch / That makes us wretched," than she can "wish to adders, spiders, toads, / Or any creeping venom'd thing that lives" (1.2.17-20). There is a strange circularity here. The hated wretch makes those around him wretched. This is the effect Richard will have on Anne – not because he makes her

grieve for lost loved-ones, but because she is doomed to become the subject of her own curse. She, like Richard, is wretched.

Recall that Anne termed her tears for Henry "helpless balm." These ineffectual liquids are rendered more potent by Richard, who makes a lengthy speech about his own weeping in the process of successfully wooing Anne. Anne combines the idea of balm with that of venom in order to fulfill her final wish to be "anointed" with "deadly venom," and thereby die before being named Queen. Anne predicts her demise by stringing together the language of her previous curse and once again becoming its subject. In the first scene, Anne imagines her sorrow is helpless. Yet, in mapping out her own fate in the language of her past curse, Anne realizes a more powerful grief. She may have been subject to her own curse, and she may have experienced the more "direful hap" that she wished for Richard, but she will have the last word. Her last words, fittingly, are another curse: against herself, yes, but in service finally for her own freedom. Richard mentions her death in Act Four, Scene Three. In a deeply ironic moment, Richard informs us that Anne has "bid this world good night" (39). This will remind the audience that Anne found herself incapable of sleeping with the restless Richard. She lamented the loss of the "golden dew of sleep" in Act Four Scene One. In finally attaining the "golden dew," Anne's potent balm and her deadly venom are one in the deep sleep of death.

A cursory interpretation of Margaret's sustained prophecies supports a providential notion of historical progress. Yet, Margaret is a strangely awkward presence in the play, and many productions, both film and theatrical, simply remove her. The effort of explaining this remnant of the earlier plays to the audience requires too much extra effort. Dominique Goy-Blanquet explains that Margaret, whom she aptly terms the

"heavy mother of rhetoric," was cut from productions because "her litanies were difficult to naturalize, hardly compatible with a sceptical reading of the play, and not strictly necessary to the plot" (206).[26] Even those who admit that Margaret provides an important sub-text to the main action of the play concede that she does not work well on stage.[27]

The content of Margaret's prophetic visions and the emotional force they carry are less important than the ways her visions become instruments of dialogue between two different characters: an interrelation that is doubled when the prophetic narrative emerges again at later moments in the play. The dialogic quality of Margaret's prophecies intensifies their status as a representation of time that *means* more than it simply transmits. Margaret directs curses at Elizabeth and Buckingham at Act One, Scene Three. These curses are further examples of Shakespeare's interest in prophetic rhetoric as a dramatic tool. And they remain uncomplicated, although dramatically powerful, rhetoric until they enter the text again, as they are realized in Act Four, Scene Four and Act Five, Scene One. The prophecies acquire different interpretive weight in their later representation in a way that parallels the circulation of the past from one text to another. What seems at first like needless repetition of Margaret's vision of history in the late scenes, in fact, registers that the writing of history combines fact and interpretation of fact.

Margaret's prophecies engage in a form of sensory play of their own. If Margaret's prophecy of Elizabeth's future contrition in Act One Scene Three was meant

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[26] Goy-Blanquet includes a fascinating albeit brief history of twentieth-century productions of *Richard III* in Chapter Six of *Shakespeare's Early History Plays: From Chronicle to Stage*.

[27] Goy-Blanquet notes that Ian McKellen believed that Margaret was "absolutely necessary to the play" but found that she "had to be cut out of his film, for 'her powerful presence would not compensate for the time spent in explaining clearly who she is and has been" (206).

to set the stage for a providential unfolding of time, then it would be unnecessary to return to the language of the prophecy and replay it in a different ways. This, however, is exactly what Shakespeare does in Act Four Scene Four. The original forecast of Elizabeth's future reads like any other simple prediction in the history plays:

> Poor painted queen, vain flourish of my fortune:
> Why strew'st thou sugar on that bottled spider,
> Whose deadly web ensnareth thee about?
> Fool, fool; thou whet'st a knife to kill thyself.
> The day will come that thou shalt wish for me
> To help thee curse this poisonous bunch-back'd toad (1.3.241-46)

The prophecy is less about Richard's triumph over Edward and more about the discursive moment when another dialogue between Margaret and Elizabeth will add to this first one. The play between the present and an imagined future is primarily a play of words and the circulation of utterances.

Margaret confirms this textually structured notion of history as Elizabeth does indeed entreat her to teach her to curse in Act Four Scene Four:

> Eliz.: O, thou didn't prophesy the time would come
> That I should wish for thee to help me curse
> That bottled spider, that foul bunch-back'd toad.
>
> Marg: I call'd thee then vain flourish of my fortune;
> I call'd thee, then, poor shadow, painted queen,
> The presentation of but what I was;
> The flattering index of a direful pageant […]
> A dream of what thou wast; […]
> A sign of dignity; a breath, a bubble;
> A queen in jest, only to fill the scene. (4.4.79-91)

Margaret rehearses the general point of her original divination, but there are several subtle shifts in emphasis from the past to the present. The crux of both discourses is the phrase "poor painted queen, vain flourish of my fortune" (1.3.241). In her memory of that phrase, Margaret breaks up the sentence, and punctuates it with her self-conscious

assertion that "I call'd thee, then" (82, 83). If Margaret was the "heavy mother of rhetoric" in her earlier prophecy, this latter rendition takes her even further; the earlier sentence has shifted into a perspective that lies outside and inside that assertion. The original sentence has disintegrated, and it is reformed in ways that call attention to the temporality of the original and its representational strategies.

Moreover, Margaret seizes upon this single sentence in the original prophecy and allows it to become the main argument for her memory of that declaration, which in fact contained a much more straightforward condemnation of Richard. Margaret excludes Richard from the argument of the remembered prophecy. Instead, the focus shifts to the presentation of Elizabeth as a theatrical, rather than real, queen. Margaret's emotional rhetoric picks up on the theme of the first sentence and refashions it. Still rooted in its past, it now begins to acquire an existence of its own, a meaning that points elsewhere. Gadamer speaks of a heightening of essence in the act of imitation, which he calls "revelatory" (114). This new rendition of "vain flourish" is a self-conscious elaboration of the meaning of this term.

In deriding Elizabeth as "[a] dream of what thou wast," Margaret plays upon the various significations of the vision/dream. This statement emphasizes that the past haunts both women. Even though Margaret couches her argument as a perspective that is past tense, with "I call'd thee," the rest of the speech shifts into the present with the addition of new terms that build upon, in the present, what was already established with the first prophecy. Moreover, Margaret describes Elizabeth as a "flattering index of a direful pageant" (85). Here she identifies two separate Elizabeths; both are represented in theatrical terms. The past Elizabeth is the prologue without substance and the present

Elizabeth is now the play that carries real emotional force. Margaret's historical perspective narrows with the first lines "I call'd thee then" but then opens up into a real "flourish" of temporality: Margaret always implies herself and her own past sufferings in her predictions for Elizabeth. Margaret's interlocutor is not only Elizabeth but also the Margaret of the past who has suffered those wrongs, which now serve as the field of comparison. Multiple levels of "respect" open up in Margaret's presentation of Elizabeth, one that recalls a "direful pageant" in the process of producing a new one.

To respect is to heed or admire in *Richard III*, but when it comes to prophetic assertions in the play, it is helpful to recall that to respect is "to have [...] connection with something" or "have comparison with" (*OED*). The uttered prophecy will inspire acts of comparison to the reiteration of that prophecy upon its perceived fulfillment. Margaret self-consciously initiates comparison as a means of translating her fate to the fate of those who triumph over her; she embeds her sorrow in their joy. In weaving her sorrow with others' emotions, Margaret requires those around her to once again observe, heed, and even esteem, her past losses. Comparison of one loss with another thus ensures that the past loss continues to carry a "life-force."

Margaret capitalizes on the life-force of comparison in Act Four, Scene Four. She establishes symmetry between her losses and Elizabeth's losses, a "right for right" (15), in order to obtain the approbation she seeks. The process is reciprocal, because Margaret sees her own grief in Elizabeth's sorrow, but also sees Elizabeth's sorrow in her grief; in fact, she urges Elizabeth to "[t]ell your woes again by viewing" hers (39). These comparisons reiterate the past, but also reiterate Margaret's prophecies from Act One, Scene Three. The two scenes themselves attain a kind of symmetry when Margaret is

taken into account. In both this scene and Act Four, Scene Four, Margaret begins away from the conversation, and her first words are delivered in asides. In the earlier scene, Margaret makes the act of comparing an important instrument in her prophetic vision of Elizabeth's future:

> Edward thy son, that now is Prince of Wales,
> For Edward my son, that was Prince of Wales,
> Die in his youth, by like untimely violence.
> Thyself, a queen, for me that was a queen,
> Outlive thy glory like my wretched self:
> Long may'st thou live to wail thy children's death,
> And see another, as I see thee now,
> Deck'd in thy rights, as thou art stall'd in mine. (1.3.199-206)

The moment when Margaret realizes this prophecy, in Act Four, Scene Four, is in fact a repetition of this speech. Elizabeth will not precisely see another woman usurp her place in that scene, just as Margaret sees Elizabeth "now"; Elizabeth will, however, face Margaret once again; Margaret extends her prophecy, rather than witnesses its exact fruition. Margaret will interpret Richard's seizure of the throne as that act of usurpation that she predicted, but Anne will not relish being "deck'd" in Elizabeth's rights and there will be no confrontation between Anne and Elizabeth as a fulfillment of Margaret's vision. In fact, Elizabeth's and Anne's meeting in Act Four, Scene One is marked by the women's shared distress. As quickly as Anne is "installed" in the crown, she wishes it would "sear" her "to the brains" and cause her death (4.1.60).

Thus, the fulfillment of Margaret's prophecy lies with Margaret herself. She predicts the future in terms of her experience of grief, and thus, it is her experience with grief that will complete the prophecy. Margaret prophesied that another would usurp Elizabeth as Margaret was usurped. Instead, Margaret confronts this dynamic once again when she wonders if Elizabeth has usurped the "just proportion" of her "sorrow" along

with her "place" (109-110). In fact, Margaret has always required those around her to "respect" her sorrow, and so this performance of rage reveals that the divide between the women has never been large. Margaret has fostered a close connection between them from the beginning, and this final confrontation simply protracts that dynamic. Margaret asks those around her in Act Four, Scene Four, to "bear" with her (61). She will make this process of handing over sorrow to others explicit when she describes it as a "yoke" that she now passes to Elizabeth (111). Margaret's naming of Elizabeth as the "Queen of sad mischance" (114) describes beautifully the role that she herself has assumed. Elizabeth has not usurped Margaret's sorrow, but become its heir; Margaret has retained her power over the past and the future by creating and passing to another this strange throne.

Finally, Margaret admits that acts of interpretation create and fulfill a prediction, by mobilising a respect that will frame the present with the past and vice versa. This revelation emerges in her lesson to Elizabeth on "how to curse" (4.4.123). Margaret explains, "[c]ompare dead happiness with living woe; / Think that thy babes were sweeter than they were, / And he that slew them fouler than he is: / Bettering thy loss makes the bad-cause worse" (4.4.119-22). This lesson is the key to understanding Margaret's prophecies and the key to understanding that truth may be objective, but emotional honesty is subjective. The formula could be describing disingenuous acts but, in fact, they mark Margaret's honest, and therefore, ethical revelation of her own processes up to this point. She suggests that an intensification of feeling will allow speech to convey knowledge about the future. This explains her indulgence in long, weighty speeches. The power of her body is allied with the ferocity of her acts of comparison. Elizabeth

understands this process, although the Duchess of York does not. Elizabeth vows to let words "have scope" (130). In the language of comparison that she uses to combine the past, present and future, Margaret has widened the play's understanding of historical "scope."

Cymbeline: Re-collection and Recollection

When Posthumus discovers the tablet on his chest that contains a prophecy in Act Five, Scene Three, he addresses it with the hope "[l]et thy effects / So follow to be most unlike our courtiers, / As good as promise" (5.3.229-31). The tablet ostensibly refers to Posthumus; it names him explicitly. Philharmonus, the Soothsayer, interprets the tablet at the end of the play in a way that seems needlessly obtuse. Either Shakespeare takes strangely unnecessary pains to demonstrate that a prophecy has been fulfilled by the final outcome staged in Act Five Scene Four, or he confronts what it means for "effects" to be "good as promise." The construction of harmony between promise and effects provides a way to construct a narrative that includes the past and the present. In adding the soothsayer's reductive reading of the prophecy, Shakespeare seems to undermine the value of such harmony at the very point in the play when the reunion of separated characters endorses a broadly realized notion of familial and political accord. Shakespeare suggests a different way of understanding harmony between the past and the present; it is not found in the absolute equivalency of promise and effects. Instead, a harmonious bond between the past and present makes the present an emotional rather than factual realization of a promise; a truly prophetic bond between past and present is

established when the interpreter is *sympathetic* to a narrative that she will never fully comprehend.

The tablet that describes Posthumus's fate retains a vital but vexed connection to the dream that precedes its materialization. It would be fitting if the tablet manifested or advanced the content of the dream, but while the dream visualizes a history that has not been staged but only described in the play, the tablet summarizes the dramatized action. Moreover, the dream looks backward to the past and the tablet looks forward to the future. What, if any, is the link between these two perspectives? Jupiter's speech that describes his control over the course of "mortal accidents" addresses the dream and the tablet, but his logic for informing Posthumus and the audience of his fate is problematic at best. He calms the ghosts with the assertion that those who are "more delayed" are more "delighted" (5.3.194). Yet, in informing us of Posthumus's eventual reunion with Innogen before the fact, Jupiter ignores his own advice. When it comes to the dramatic action, it seems, timing is more important than fact. We see a rapid increase in the pace of accretion of knowledge at the very moment when the value of "delay" is introduced. Shakespeare teases the audience, making them aware of their expectations and frustrating those expectations in one breath. He challenges the notion that the effects can be "as good as promise" by unmasking the almost pedestrian, mechanical, qualities of dramatic hope and fulfillment on the stage. Jupiter's odd and invasive descent onto the stage fulfills the audience's desire for knowledge about the play's outcome, but drains this fulfillment from the delight it should occasion by bringing it too early, in an abstract that gives away the end of the play. Shakespeare suggests that while divine providence may

control the "mortal accidents," it does not necessarily have the capacity to produce an emotionally powerful revelation.

The content of the tablet reaffirms the unsettling simultaneity of progress and delay. It explains the outcome of the play in terms that are not mysterious enough to puzzle the audience. The prophecy does, however, baffle Posthumus, and his bewilderment defers the resolution it reputedly anticipates. Even as the tablet explains all, Posthumus's reaction indicates that it has withheld something crucial, a detail for which the audience must wait:

> 'Tis still a dream, or else such stuff as madmen
> Tongue, and brain not; either both, or nothing,
> Or senseless speaking, or a speaking such
> As sense cannot untie. Be what it is,
> The action of my life is like it, which I'll keep
> If but for sympathy. (5.3.239-44)

Posthumus dense diction in his response to reading the tablet mystifies rather than elucidates his reaction; the verse comes close to resembling the "senseless speaking" he finds in tablet. The language does simulate the confusing period between dreaming and fully waking. Strangely enough, after waking to find a tablet lying on his chest, Posthumus seems sceptical of its power to divine the future. He retains the prophecy not because he believes it a powerful predictor of future events, but because it bears some similarities to the previous "action" of his "life." Thus, while the prophecy looks forward, Posthumus values it only by looking backward at his history. His mobilisation of "sympathy" is fitting. It points to the correspondence between the past and the prophecy, and it describes the guardianship of this honesty in the future as an emotional feeling rather than an intellectual endeavour or providential intercession.

Posthumus's scepticism about the tablet may have nothing to do with the content of the prophecy. His reaction to both dream and tablet indicates that he finds the dream more surprising than the materialized tablet. The dream is so baffling he wonders if fairies have tampered with him during his sleep. When he discovers the tablet, his reaction demonstrates less surprise than hope. "A book?" he asks, "O rare one, / Be not, as is our fangled world, a garment, / Nobler than that it covers" (5.3.227-29). One quality unites his reaction to both dream and tablet: Posthumus recognizes them as valuable without knowing why. He terms the dream a "golden chance" and this phrase points away from a providential power over the unfolding of events and time and towards the random unfolding of "accidents" that has worked in fortunate ways for Posthumus.

The passage of time, which ought to enable Posthumus to understand the prophecy at long last, is unhelpful. At the close of the play, when the various reunions occur and Posthumus reunites with Innogen, the prophecy continues to trouble Posthumus. He could reflect, look back, and glory in the fulfillment of the tablet's promise, and affirm that the events recorded in the rare book have been achieved. Instead, Posthumus looks to the tablet with yet more hopeful expectation. He describes the tablet to Lucius in a way that replays rather than fulfills his earlier experience:

> Call forth your soothsayer. As I slept methought
> Great Jupiter, upon his eagle backed,
> Appeared to me with other spritely shows
> Of mine own kindred. When I waked I found
> This label on my bosom, whose containing
> Is so from sense in hardness that I can
> Make no collection of it. Let him show
> His skill in the construction. (5.4.427-34)

Once again, the dream and tablet are enmeshed in Posthumus's experience. Once again, both dream and tablet are puzzling and Posthumus questions the honesty of both. He

emphasizes the purely imaginative qualities of the dream when he employs the qualifier "methought." Moreover, he thinks he has witnessed a performance of his family by "spritely shows." Posthumus intensifies the dream's status as something insubstantial when he contends that his dead loved-ones were merely a show within the dream. They are even more remote than the dream itself if sprites are masquerading as his family inside the dream.

Moreover, in this scene, as in its predecessor, even though the dream and tablet are part of one experience, they are not joined by any interpretive work on Posthumus's part. He lists them as if they were sequential accidents rather than contributors to his knowledge about his past and how it relates to his present. There are three note-worthy terms here: "containing" and "collection" and "construction." According to Posthumus, the soothsayer must demonstrate some "skill" in these activities of interpretation. Posthumus therefore reveals that prophetic truth is not available without interpretive effort and talent. Divine truth may be eternal, but the signs we use to unmask these truths are temporary, troubling and subject to individual readings. So while truth is contained in the tablet, it also is loosed from containment by the ongoing mysteriousness of its signs.

The soothsayer interprets the tablet's prophecy in a way that makes each image equivalent to an event or action in the play. Yet, the reading is inadequate. The soothsayer plucks nouns from the passage and translates them as nearly separate from the prophecy as a whole; he seizes on the terms "lion's whelp," "tender air," and the "cedar" and explains each of these in reasonable, and yet, reductive ways. He declines "tender air" until it is "mulier," and therefore finds it representative of Innogen. Yet, another possible reading of the image is that the "tender air" refers to Posthumus's dream. The

prophecy says he "without seeking find[s]" and is "embraced" by the "tender air" (5.4.437-8). This phrase echoes Posthumus's own assertion upon awaking that "[m]any dream not to find, neither deserve, / And yet are steeped in favours; so am I" (5.3.224-5). The dream is a fitting gloss to the image of "tender air," because Posthumus confirms that his dream was unsought but affective.

The soothsayer's understanding of the "stately cedar" as a symbol of Cymbeline is the most reasonable interpretation, but it is by no means the only one. The two severed branches could refer to Innogen and Posthumus, as both have believed the other dead. When they reunite, Posthumus urges Innogen to stay in his embrace like a piece of fruit hangs "[t]ill the tree die" (5.4.263). Moreover, when Cymbeline hears the fates of his Queen, Cloten and the others, he exclaims that the "fierce abridgement / Hath to it circumstantial branches which / Distinction should be rich in" (5.4.383-5). The severed branches described in the prophecy could therefore refer to the portions of the story that have remained unresolved until the reunions of this last scene have knit them back onto the tree.

Compromising containment and deferring collection affords prophetic knowledge a longer life; a mysterious, rather than straightforward, prediction produces further acts of interpretation rather than resolution. It is fitting that the play ends with a prophetic narrative that has produced and undermined the closure of the dramatic action. After asking for a "collection" of the prophecy, Posthumus utters no further words. Shakespeare does not have him confirm verbally whether or not he endorses the soothsayer's interpretation. In keeping Posthumus's response from the dialogue, Shakespeare leaves the staging of the reception of the prophecy to individual directors

and performers. Even if directors include gestures of acceptance by Posthumus, they cannot give him a voice at this moment. His silence will markedly affect the power of any physical gestures he could make to register approval of the interpretation. By withholding Posthumus's response, Shakespeare prioritizes the response to divination rather than its content. The most important moment in the scene, the moment when Posthumus might finally pierce through the "hardness" of the prophecy that has troubled him from the moment he read it, more mysterious. There is no single collection, but rather, endless re-collections of prophetic truth.

Shakespeare conveys the idea that prophetic knowledge is not a science, but a way of encompassing the living and the dead in story that addresses both groups. The soothsayer's predictions underline the possibility that prophecy can be unethical. In fact, Shakespeare seems, with this nearly unnecessary character, to follow Hamlet's advice to "defy augury" rather than endorse it. In Act Four, Scene Two, the soothsayer describes his prediction for the fate of Rome after he "fast, and prayed" for "intelligence" from the gods (347-8). The soothsayer sounds authoritative and secure in the knowledge he obtained from this experience, but the audience will discover that Posthumus does not seek his prophecy through fasting and praying. He does not seek it at all.

Shakespeare therefore endorses knowledge that does not aspire to factual truth but emotional honesty. A prophecy that pretends to factual accuracy is also one that can be used unethically. The soothsayer conveys his vision with the warning that it will be true "[u]nless" his "sins abuse [his] divination" (352). Not only is prediction potentially unethical, it is also attended by the prophet's lack of self-knowledge. Posthumus will honour his dream with the mobilisation of "sympathy" between the dream and his life

experience. The soothsayer records a fundamental lack of sympathy between his divine intelligence and self-knowledge. Lucius compounds this division by wishing that the soothsayer will "[d]ream often so, / And never false" (354). The prophecy is thus haunted by its unethical potential from its source to its reception. The content of the tablet will not be haunting in this way. It does not have the potential to be unethical because Posthumus has not asserted that it is true; rather, he has asserted only that it *feels* true to him.

The soothsayer's vision of the eagle, a portent of Roman victory in his view, makes a better portent of Posthumus's dream. In any case, the soothsayer resurrects the eagle vision at the close of the play. He does not simply allude to the vision, but reiterates it with slight changes. The modifications are not significant enough to change the sense of the passage, but they do indicate that over time the prophecy has shifted according to the ability of the memory to retain either the original vision or the initial description of that vision.

The second iteration of the vision is more detailed than the first in some places, and less detailed in others. The eagle's motion in the second description is more elaborate than in the first. In Act Four, Scene Two the soothsayer recounts the eagle "winged / From the spongy south to this part of the west, / There vanished in the sunbeams" (349-51). In Act Five, Scene Four, the soothsayer alters this description to de-emphasize the location of the flight and emphasize the manner of the eagle's flight and its gradual disappearance. He recounts, "the Roman eagle, / From south to west on wing soaring aloft, / Lessened herself, and in the beams o'th' sun / So vanished" (471-4). The "spongy south" and "this part of the west" have been shortened to "south" and

"west" in the final version of the prophecy. The more detailed geographical description in the first utterance, while not intensely detailed, does draw attention to the physical location of the Roman army before the battle. These real facts have been diluted in the second version in order to emphasize the quality of the eagle's flight and her slow disappearance. The image of the eagle being "lessened" in sight until vanishing completely repeats the other occasions, mentioned in Chapter Two, when an object is described as fading from view. In the first prophecy, the eagle vanishes. In the second prophecy, the eagle becomes smaller until it vanishes. The difference is subtle but important. The purpose of this image in previous instances encourages mourners to interpret the moment of death or loss as an ethical imperative to remain vigilant over the departing object. So while the soothsayer's aim is to seal the play with a tidy interpretation of the tablet, the image of the eagle destabilizes resolution by linking prophetic thinking to the mourner's continuous engagement with loss.

The original "intelligence" offered to the soothsayer leads him to predict a Roman victory. The same set of signs in his vision now leads him to reflect on the new accord between Rome and Britain. In the first case, hope constructs the prophecy, and in the second case, hindsight. Shakespeare indicates that knowledge about the future combines expectation and recollection in a complex weaving of past, present and future signs. Shakespeare undermines the notion that a prophecy can ever achieve the "full accomplishment" that the soothsayer celebrates (471). The vision has altered over time to suit the peace between Rome and Britain, rather than the original direction of the prophecy: Roman victory. The soothsayer, perhaps unconsciously, betrays that his analysis has originated entirely from his own desire. He states that "the powers above do

tune / The harmony of this peace" (5.4..467-8). His own name, Philharmonus (Greek for 'lover of harmony'), suggests that the achievement of peace is due to his desire to discover this peace in ambiguous signs, rather than being due to the divine fulfillment of his previous vision. Once again, the soothsayer is incapable of viewing his own investment in the prophecy; he has indeed abused the knowledge he obtained from the vision by refusing to admit that context shapes, even creates, a fact.

I have already noted that small changes to passages that claim to be matched would be less obvious to an audience, than a reader, of the play. A playgoer might well believe that the soothsayer has quoted his previous vision to the word. The audience's belief that a prediction has been fulfilled is valuable, though. It brings the past and the present into sympathy in the audience's memory, even if the two prophecies jar when set side by side. Our memories, after all, are no less vulnerable than the soothsayer's. The audience will *feel* that a past declaration has come to fruition, despite deviations in the second account, because the desire for closure will extend from Philharmonus to the audience. Shakespeare brilliantly suggests that the soothsayer's announcement of a "full accomplishment" of the prophecy stages our own expectation that the end of the play will result in the end to dramatic action and interpretation. We are complicit in the partial perspective offered by hindsight, but we are saved from unethical recollection if we, like Posthumus, withhold a final judgment of the prophecy and the play. Posthumus's silence must stand for our own, as we realize we have participated in merely one re-collection, which is subject to the variable and unpredictable strength of recollection.

***Henry VIII*: "Great-bellied women"**

As Buckingham presses Norfolk and Abergavenny for a description of the Field of the Cloth of Gold in the first scene of *Henry VIII*, he explains his absence from the spectacle. "An untimely ague," he informs them, "[s]tayed me prisoner in my chamber when / Those suns of glory, those two lights of men, / Met in the vale of Andres" (1.1.4-7). The historical Lord Buckingham in fact attended this event. Aside from justifying the exposition of an event that is easier to describe than stage, Buckingham's absence from the field challenges traditional history and its belief that one can resurrect the past in writing.[28] Buckingham's use of the term "untimely" is clever here, because he announces that his fever was an unfortunate obstacle, and also an illness that never actually occurred. It is impossible to affirm how many members of the audience knew this historical detail and noticed the double accuracy of "untimely." This word, however, initiates a series of "untimely" events that the audience could not fail to apprehend, most notably Katherine of Aragon's dream vision. In these moments, Shakespeare and Fletcher problematize, rather than prove the existence of a locatable, retrievable and finite historical truth.[29]

Shakespeare and Fletcher explore the interaction between the "factual" place of the past and the "creative" place of the performance of the past. The play's interest in the physical experience of inhabiting a place (expressed in stagings and descriptions of ceremonies) interrogates historiography's place between absence and presence, between the place of the past and the place of writing (or performing) the past. Shakespeare and

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[28] To define traditional history, I borrow Walter Benjamin's notion of historicism in his *Theses on the Philosophy of History*: "[h]istoricism rightly culminates in universal history [...] Universal history has no theoretical armature. Its method is additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the homogenous, empty time" (XVII, 262)

[29] For a description of which scenes are attributed to Shakespeare see McMullan's Arden edition (180-199). Opinions vary on attribution; collaboration, however, makes no difference to my argument. I am considering the play's overall contribution to a historiographical mood at the time, rather than a single playwright's notion of history.

Fletcher reconsider this interplay in order to endorse the subtitle "All is True," and to advance a new way of understanding the task of historiography that accounts for the play's untimely qualities. By affording equal value to the points that join and the spaces that divide the past and present, the play suggests that history is a field for endless intellectual exertion rather than a succession of points on a finite line. Shakespeare and Fletcher encourage interpretative wealth rather than factual accretion, and they respond, I will suggest, to efforts made by early modern historians to define historical truth.[30] The "untimely" ague that keeps Buckingham away from the Field may be unhistorical, but, as a fitting example of history's rich "inbetween-ness" in this period, the ague is timely indeed.

The prologue of *Henry VIII*, like the aforementioned early modern histories, suggests that historiography produces a community of bodies that feel together. Buckingham's fever is one instance among many when Shakespeare and Fletcher employ images of heat to describe the suspension of historical trace and historical performance in one, powerfully excited state. These images of heated crowd-going in fact dramatize interplay between the illusion of historical re-enactment and a critique of that illusion. The prologue exhorts the audience to imagine the historical figures "[a]s they were living [...] And followed with the general throng and sweat / Of thousand friends" (27-29). The prologue invites a presumably crowded audience to see themselves in a similarly crowded play. Eyewitnesses confirm that the Globe was packed tightly for early

[30] I group Tudor and Early Stuart historians together, although I do believe this grouping needs further consideration and refinement. As Daniel Woolf points out, the discipline of history was continually transforming as it began to further define itself after the death of Elizabeth. A great divide separates the Elizabethan chronicle and the Jacobean political history. This divide and the evolution of the discipline are topics too great for this discussion and are handled masterfully by Woolf. I am interested, for the purposes of this study, in the ways that historians of all kinds, conceive of their own task in broader terms than those set out by studies of historical genre. And I concentrate on histories and treatises that contribute to an historical atmosphere of which Shakespeare and Fletcher were a part.

performances of *Henry VIII*.[31] The crowded Globe audience unites with the past and with each other by participating in the "general throng and sweat" of the play and the Globe pit or stalls. The playwrights introduce the illusion that the past can be resurrected, but they, by no means, argue that it is therefore finite.

Differences between the past and present are an important part of this formation, the playwrights suggest, because the only contact available is that produced by shared and limitless interpretation. These bonds prove more durable than superficial similarities in status. The common ground of interpretation performance offers does not elide the differences between the past and present (or history and spectator), but funnels those differences into a reconfiguration of the past and present as a shared time and force. The trope of perspiration also allows the playwrights to make a pun of the word "rank" in effective ways. For Hall, history supports a system of rank that divides the "noble prince" from the "poore begger" (v). In *Henry VIII*, the shared space of history and performance suspends the process of social ranking, and the linear ordering that comes with it, and replaces it with unifying acts of interpretation. The odour, or rankness, that signals an effective theatre experience, dismantles social rank from the inside out.

The playwrights rank "weighty" matters (2) higher than "fool and fight" (19), and expects a union with his audience when they make a similar choice. The playwrights construct a social group of "gentle hearers" (17); they appeal to social gentility in order to translate it into perceptual, interpretive gentility. Rank is no longer a noun but a verb in this compelling picture of the mutual perspicacity of history and audience. The prologue then follows the verb of "rank" with the noun when he flatters the audience that they are

[31] According to playgoer Henry Bluett, "there came many people to see" the performance of *Henry VIII* during which the Globe burnt down, "insomuch that the house was very full" (qtd. in "Introduction." *Henry VIII* 58).

"[t]he first and happiest hearers of the town" (24). The audience itself is now ranked as the best in London, but they are the best because they are able to rank, or sort, the play's message of sorrow above "fool and fight" (19). To rank here means to interpret, and it is not a social given, inherited before it is sought, but a thoughtful choice between different ways of responding to a representation of the past. Moreover, a crowd-goer's physical awareness of heaviness that comes from being pressed in a crowded space literalizes the play's hope for an intellectual sensitivity to the play's "weighty and serious" (2) message.

In Act Four, Scene One, after Anne Boleyn passes over the stage on the way to her coronation, the playwrights return to the trope of heated crowd-going and the pun on "rank." The first gentleman poses a leading question to a newly-arrived spectator: "Where have you been broiling?" (56). The inquiry suggests that the third gentleman gives off an odour that announces his participation in a crowd before any verbal description has been offered. The term "broiling" is laden with meanings that suggest crowd-going requires a suspension between incorporation and detachment, and a suspension between belief and scepticism. As *Henry VIII* editor Gordon McMullan notes, "broil" carries the senses of contradictory forces either combining or dividing. The verb indicates"[t]o mix or mingle confusedly," or "to become heated with excitement." The noun instead indicates a "struggle, irregular fight or strife [...] a quarrel" (*OED*). When the third gentleman describes the experience of watching the coronation with the crowd, he covers the full range of these definitions of "broil"; the third gentleman is at once present at, and critical of, the frenzied spectacle. As he phrases it, the gentleman has been broiling "[a]mong the crowd i'th' Abbey, where a finger / Could not be wedged in more." He adds, "I am stifled / With the mere rankness of their joy. (4.2.57-9). Once

again, the playwrights turn to notion of ranking to situate the suspension of history in the very heart of interpretation. By indicating his distaste for the odour of the crowd, the third gentleman critiques an experience in which he also fully participated; the rankness he dislikes has already been established as a marker of his own "broiling" in the crowd by the initial question. The third gentleman also uses the present tense ("I am stifled") to explain that this play between participation and critique of participation persists beyond the moment of the ceremony. To what extent would this description have made the Globe theatre-goers doubly aware of their own position as a "sweat and throng" that watches history, like the third gentleman, and senses their own movement between inclusion into the past and the critique of that experience?

The crowd's place between past and future is exemplified by the third gentleman's description of the "[g]reat-bellied women / That had not half a week to go," who were like "rams / In the old time of war" (76-8). The crowd moves together when the pregnant women "shake the press" (78). The "general sweat and throng" predicted by the prologue is fulfilled in complex ways in this description. It is, after all, not a staging of the crowd, but a description of the crowd. The prophecy, therefore, is and is not realized. The "great-bellied" women, who are pregnant but have yet to give birth, embody this state of deferred fruition. The prologue indicates that the play will show the "throng." What the play has done is restated this promise. The true fulfillment of the Prologue will occur if the audience recognize their own participation in a crowd while it is described.

The third gentleman's involvement as witness of the ceremony and his simultaneous critique of his experience as witness (the odour that he carries with him,

which he dislikes, is a fitting sign of both of these positions) exhorts a similar scheme for those watching *Henry VIII*. It is not enough for the audience to imagine the historical figures "[a]s they were living" (*Henry VIII* Prologue 27). The play asks the audience to pay equal attention to the experience of witnessing history, the *force* of the present, if the appropriate "ranking" of truth can occur and continue. And the "rankness" that stays with the crowd-goer long after the ceremonial moment is an effective symbol of a durable interpretive sensitivity that ensures history and history-makers are mutually constitutive; this undeniable odour, a sign of participation that begins inside the staged history and continues outside it among the Globe audience, signals that when we animate the traces of the past, these traces animate us in return.

The prophecy that concludes *Henry VIII* is Shakespeare and Fletcher's last nod to the "untimely" in the play, even if Cranmer claims its source in a providential force that presides over the passage of time. Cranmer's suggestion that he divines the future because "heaven now bids" him has led critics, such as Ivo Kamps, to assume that "Cranmer's providential account of royal genealogy appropriates and reorders the discontinuous elements of Tudor (and Stuart) royal history under the all-embracing rubric of God's plan for England" (Kamps 197). Kamps is dubious that Cranmer's account achieves the kind of "historical closure" he believes it seeks, but the point of the prophecy is, nonetheless, to "erase or, at the very least, suppress the ambiguities that sprout from that [historiographical] diversity" (197). I suggest that the idea of prophetic knowledge is itself rife with ambiguities in Shakespeare's work, and that Shakespeare employs such language at this point in the play to emphasize rather than neutralize the slip of historiographical knowledge between openness and closure. Historians can

acquire this knowledge, in fact, when they recognize that their work proceeds from an understanding of the past in terms of the future and the future in terms of the past. The language of prediction encourages this kind of understanding.

Peter L. Rudnytsky observes that "Cranmer's prophecy highlights a distinctive feature of the temporal structure of *Henry VIII*: events that lie in the future for the characters of Shakespeare's play exist in the past for Shakespeare and his audience" (54). This observation deserves some clarification. What Rudnytsky calls a "distinctive feature" in *Henry VIII* is in fact present in any history play. What might be "distinctive" in *Henry VIII*, however, is that this feature becomes the play's central theme; the enmeshment of past and future for the audience is in fact an ongoing concern for characters in the play as well.

Cranmer predicts that Elizabeth will offer England "a thousand thousand blessings" and adds that time will bring these blessings "to ripeness" (5.4.20). Cranmer, who is already in prophetic mode when introducing the "promises" that Elizabeth will make, hardly needs to qualify that time will fulfill her promise. Should this not be implicitly understood as a fundamental feature of divination? Cranmer may be heavy-handed, but he reveals that his prophecy's accuracy needs further validation by time, over time. Prophecy will be true if the events it predicts occur, but another kind of truth emerges at its fulfillment when the past is recalled and affirmed. Foresight and hindsight together produce a true forecast. Shakespeare and Fletcher require just these perspectives from their audience. Cranmer's words are factually true, but the playwrights require the audience to look back at the events it describes and verify them factually *and* emotionally. Elizabeth's ascension to the throne, her death and James's succession

cannot be denied. The honesty of the prophecy, however, depends on whether the audience feels that these facts represent the "thousand thousand blessings" that Elizabeth's birth has "promised." Perhaps the audience will not feel the emotional tenor of this prophecy, the "joy" that Cranmer mentions when baptising Elizabeth (5.4.6). In this case, the facts will remain accurate but the "honesty" of the utterance will dissolve, and it will not fully attain the status of prophecy.

Something of this joy begins to affect Cranmer's manner of speaking too. The speech itself is rather halting; at the beginning of the prophecy, Cranmer inserts small phrases that seem more like asides than important contributors to the meaning of the prophecy. At this point, Cranmer seems to be interpreting his own statement as he vocalizes it. He is not only conscious of the effect it might have on his audience; he is sensitive to the emotional effect it is having – even on him. This is the key to visionary knowledge. It ultimately deflects the precise details of Elizabeth's qualities in order to emphasize the effect of her rule on others. She is a "pattern" to princes (22), an embodiment of "[a]ll princely graces" (25), and those around her will "read the perfect ways of honour" (37). The enthusiasm of this praise is equalled only by the vagueness of the virtues to which it refers. The prophecy continues this strange deflection of specific historical facts and events with the description of James. He will be "in great in admiration" (42) as Elizabeth, and will "rise in great in fame as she was" (46). The comparison is hardly useful given the vague description of Elizabeth's reign Cranmer has recently offered. Cranmer's brief history avoids a string of dates and facts, then, and its encouragement of an audience's emotional responsiveness may well be the point of the prophecy inside and also outside the play; the audience must confront a version of the

recent past that has the capacity to amaze or alienate them. Shakespeare and Fletcher deliberately test the line between engagement and disengagement because an emotional response to the historical record will be an honest response.

Cranmer's words have a strange effect on Henry. Rather than giving him a sense of his continuity over time, his endurance in historical records by his succession to Elizabeth, the prophecy makes Henry aware of his materiality. He informs Cranmer, "[t]hou hast made me now a man" (63). He also terms the prophecy an "oracle of comfort" (65). Henry could ostensibly mean that Cranmer's prediction has made him comfortably certain of the course of future events. However, the word "comfort" is fraught. It implies that we look to prophecies with expectations that it will make mortal bodies immortal rather than a belief that it conveys divine truth. Henry, in fact, has received Cranmer's message by receiving comfort in it. Cranmer addresses Henry and Anne before he makes the prophecy, and wishes that Elizabeth will offer them "[a]ll comfort, joy [...] Heaven ever laid up to make parents happy" (6-7). Cranmer's prophecy fulfills this wish.

Cranmer's speech has the ability to produce an audience capable of fulfilling its promise. The "honesty" of the utterance produces a receptive audience, and a receptive audience, in turn, makes the prophecy true in retrospect. In predicting and fulfilling the sensation of comfort, Cranmer's words create a receptive audience. Henry confirms that the prophecy has "made" him and he has "made" the prophecy:

> O lord Archbishop
> Thou hast *made* me now a man. Never before
> This *happy child* did I get anything.
> This oracle of comfort has so pleased me
> That when I am in heaven I shall desire
> To see what this child does and *praise my maker*. (5.4.63-7 my italics)

In the act of praising Cranmer, Henry envisions future acts of praise directed to his "maker." Admiration ensures that the words *and* their effect on others will continue. The prophecy will "make" an audience capable of continuing its message. Henry's use of the term "get," then, is remarkably fitting. He "gets," or receives and understands, the blessings described, and in being responsive to this gift, he "begets," or produces Elizabeth once again. Elizabeth makes and is made by the prophecy, just as Henry is refashioned in the process.

The notion of verbal praise becomes a key to understanding the content of the prophecy and its relation to Henry's reaction. Though vague on specific details about Elizabeth's reign (and therefore seeming "unhistorical"), it establishes a careful balance between birth and death in order to suggest that the material body may decay, but it can be reborn over and over again when people express their "admiration" of or "wonder" for descriptions of that body in speech and text. In the process of seeming "untimely," prophetic knowledge advances an understanding of historiography that includes its emotional effect. But is this effect therefore also ethical? The possibility that Shakespeare and Fletcher represent an ethical response to history through Henry verges on the absurd. But then, is not the representation of Henry as a feeling, intuitive listener itself "untimely" or "unhistorical" and therefore a mirror of the prophecy which represents Elizabeth in surprising, challenging ways? Cranmer's words are not mere quotation or summary of historical certainty. They have not precisely "made" the historical Henry, but they have "made" him a certain kind of man, and Shakespeare and Fletcher have done the same. Their play has re-made the Henry, and also revised the definition of historiographical truth. Cranmer predicts that "all princely graces" will

"mould" Elizabeth into a "mighty piece" (24-5). His prediction is realized by the play at large, which seeks moments of the untimely in order to "mould" the historical records into one "mighty piece."

Cranmer cycles between images of the mutable, organic world, and references to a stable and permanent world of "endless goodness" (5.4.1). Time brings the prophecy's blessings "to ripeness"; the prophecy mirrors this development by emphasizing organic growth when describing Elizabeth's life. When Elizabeth's death is described, the organic image gives way to spiritual images. The phoenix hinges the organic and non-organic streams of Cranmer's thoughts. Corn, vines and plants give way to "sacred ashes" and stars. Yet, throughout the entire speech, organic images in fact represent spiritual qualities. Her materiality is stressed in metaphorical language that refers to her non-material virtues, like truthfulness and goodness. These qualities transcend the physical body, but are also rooted deeply in it. At the point where the prophecy describes Elizabeth's apotheosis, strangely enough, Cranmer refers to the material world as a "cloud of darkness" (44). Shakespeare and Fletcher reverse the formula, so that the heavenly now represent the earthly. With the ascendance of James, the prophecy turns back to the material world; the vine returns. It has wound its way through the speech just as Cranmer envisions it winding from Elizabeth to James. The organic world passes away, but it does return.

The phoenix, of course, embodies the idea of resurrection. The symbol does convey the idea that those that die will be reborn, but this dynamic needs closer attention. Another important feature of the mythical phoenix is that it lives for five hundred years and thus comes to symbolize "longevity," in addition to resurrection ("Longer Notes"

McMullan 439). According to Thomas Playfere, the palm tree and phoenix both signify that "Jesus the iust one did most florish when he was most afflicted" (38). Playfere becomes even more specific when he qualifies that "Iesus the iust one did most liue, when hee seem'de most to be dead" (39). The two words that are linked and enmeshed are "florish" and "afflicted," and "liue" and "dead." They must appear together in order to describe how Christ's death could truly be a triumph. Thus, when Cranmer predicts that James will "flourish" like a "mountain cedar" (52-3), he may conversely points to James's future affliction, his future death. They are indeed one and the same. The cedar, in fact, is associated with the phoenix by way of the palm tree. In *Psalm* 92, as McMullan observes, both trees are mentioned: "the righteous shal florish like a palme tre, & shal growe like a cedre in Lebanon" ("Longer Notes," 439). The verses that follow pay particular attention to the ways that images of the organic world can be used to represent the continuing potency of the soul after death. Righteous men, like the palm and cedar tree are "planted in the house of the Lord," and "[t]hey will still yield fruit in old age; / They shall be full of sap and very green" (92.13-14). The psalm foregrounds endurance over time and yet it is not simply about endurance. It encourages men to continue to develop, or "yield fruit" even as their bodies begin to decay and decline.

Chapter Four:
The Resting Place and the Imperfect Materials of Mourning

> To die, to sleep –
> No more, and by a sleep to say we end
> The heartache and the thousand natural shocks
> That flesh is heir to; ' tis a consummation
> Devoutly to be wished – to die: to sleep –
> To sleep, perchance to dream – ay, there's the rub,
> For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
> When we have shuffled off this mortal coil
> Must give us pause. (*Hamlet* 3.1.59-67)

S.C. Humphreys describes a long tradition that imagines death as a form of sleep. "The idea that the dead are asleep," he says, "occurs in ancient Egypt and is hinted at in early Greek thought by the idea that Death and Sleep are twin brothers, children of Night, and by Homer's reference to profound sleep as 'sleep like death'" (274). He adds that for pagans, "sleep implied freedom from the cares of life," while for Christians, "it was a peaceful way of waiting for the Resurrection" (274). While the metaphor offers a comfortable vision of death, it also links the dead to the living in unsettling ways that, as Hamlet says, "[m]ust give us pause" (3.1.67). In fact, Hamlet's reference to a "pause" is remarkably fitting. The Christian notion of death as simply a pause, or temporary rest, before resurrection explains why the analogy of death as sleep is so comforting to the dying and living alike. Both death and sleep are considered temporary states, which can refresh the weary. At the heart of this comforting sameness, however, there is a *terrifying* sameness; Hamlet pursues something disturbing about death through the parallel image of dreams that disturb sleep.

Hamlet challenges the analogy by locating the possibility of restlessness inside the state of the death-sleep. The "consummation" of sleep with death, the living with the

dead, may be wished for, but it is also frighteningly difficult to imagine; the amorphousness of the "undiscovered country" prevents Hamlet from deciding whether "to be or not to be." The metaphor actually inhabits a middle-space where it expresses the notion that death can be thought of as a kind of rest, but if one thinks of death in this way, the metaphor will also convey a sense of restlessness. Hamlet conceptualizes the dead body as a dreaming body; in doing so, he acknowledges that the experience of death (by the living that anticipate it or deal with its aftermath) balances a hope for eternal rest for the dead with the necessity of the living to remain interpretively restless as they try to envision the features of this rest. The dreamer, then, represents the amalgamation of dead and living bodies during the ritual of mourning; he is present and absent. The dreamer's body reposes while her mind travels through a landscape in which meaning is convoluted, if available at all. Likewise, at the heart of the mourning, the dead body reposes and is made to look restful, while the living mourner requires astounding mental energy to create and affirm this vision of death and the afterlife.

Earlier in the play, Hamlet informs Rosencrantz and Guildenstern that he could be "bounded in a nutshell" and consider himself the "king of infinite space" if not for his "bad dreams" (2.2.252-4). Once again, Hamlet is drawn to the possibility of a kind of rest in which a man is not aware of the limitations of his existence (such as mortality). His bad dreams, which express his subjection to cognitive restlessness that he cannot control, make him aware of his mortality and aware that an existence in "infinite space" is in fact unattainable. Hamlet sees the world through its limitations. He claims he is bound in one place by the conditions of his world, but these circumstances are composed, in fact, by restless thoughts about his place in that world; his agitated thinking may mean

that his thoughts moves ceaselessly, but they move indifferently – from a prison to the "confines, wards, and dungeons" that are simply alternative descriptions of the same prison. The prison is an activity; Hamlet's sense of confinement results from his troubled thoughts about that confinement.

Juliet provides precedent for Hamlet's struggles with unsettling thoughts about death, and about inhabiting a space between life and death. When she contemplates drinking the poison in Act Four, Scene Two of *Romeo and Juliet*, Juliet deconstructs the metaphor of death as sleep. At first, dhr fears she will suffocate in the tomb, but she ponders a circumstance worse than this:

> Or, if I live, is it not very like
> The horrible conceit of death and night,
> Together with the horror of the place –
> As in a vault, an ancient receptacle,
> Where for this many hundred years the bones
> Of all my ancestors are packed;
> Where bloody Tybalt, yet but green in earth,
> Lies festering in his shroud [...]
> O, if I wake, shall I not be distraught,
> Environed with all these hideous fears? (4.3.36-50)

Through the lens of the sleep/death analogy, Juliet imagines the death that she will mimic by taking poison. She is horrified by the thought of lying with bodies; yet she reveals her investment in the dead, a point of intimacy, that recognizes them as her "ancestors" and one of the bodies, Tybalt, retaining its individuality in her vision. Juliet is reluctant to address the dead, and her fears of waking up with them expresses the difficulty the mourner faces when she must become familiar with the disturbing process of dying and decaying. The mourner must physically and mentally put the dead to rest, but these rituals require daunting, even oppressively difficult, acts of physical and mental engagement with the body. Juliet's battle is not only with the difficult work of mourning,

but also with the thoughts of what is required to mourn. Her distress with being surrounded by dead bodies translates, by the end of the speech, to the sensation of being "environed" by "hideous fears." The thought of the dead is as disturbing as the bodies of the dead; Juliet, like Hamlet, sees herself contained in a prison of her own thinking.

If the "conceit" of death as sleep horrifies in the world of tragedy, it has a more positive effect on those who envision it in the history play. The analogy gives Shakespeare a chance to dramatize the "pause," when the contemplation of the mortality of the organic body stops being relentlessly off-putting and brings the living into meaningful contact with the dead. Juliet may recognize her connection to the dead by terming them her "ancestors," but she is uncomfortable with her potential proximity to the "packed" bones. Thinking of one's ancestors as a line that stretches back allows one to think of the present as continuous with the past. Thinking as Juliet does, seeing one's ancestors assembled together in one space and time, is unnatural and understandably unsettling. Those who encounter the dead in the history plays I have discussed feel firstly alienation from and then vital connection to the bodies they mourn. Then they move beyond the fear of fear and find ways to integrate their bodies with the bodies of the dead.

In these plays the space for integration is created by acts of physical, intellectual and emotional charity or mercy towards the dead. The cultivation of generosity towards the body allows the mourner to overcome the kind of revulsion that marks Juliet's speech; it allows the mourner to sustain intimacy even if it is uncomfortable. Care for the dead, in the form of the physical wrapping and burial of the body parallels the mourner's compassion toward the deceased through ongoing symbolic address. Dressing and

addressing the dead require mourners to adorn the dead, literally help them to rest, and symbolically disturb that rest by continuing to think of them.

What will become vital to Shakespeare's sense of historiography as ethically redemptive is his understanding that just as those who feel individual grief must put the body to rest by shared acts of interpretation, readers of history must be given a place to experience the past as a corporeal community– a kinship of living and dead bodies. The place where the dead "rest" coincides with a place where something else flourishes. The "rest" inspires and is inspired by *restlessness*. The place of burial, when it acquires the status of monument by inspiring and localising rituals of mourning and memorialisation, becomes the "act of sepulcher" that Paul Ricoeur describes as a path of mourning that takes an "external absence" to an "internal presence" (366). Mark Jackson defines ethical historiography as "one which mourns" with a "descriptive restlessness" that "resists reducing the singularity or alterity of the past to some homogenizing conceit of linear, mimetic history" (468). One would think that localizing grief at the site of the burial would constitute a homogenizing impulse; the sepulcher is not a space of mimesis of the dead, though. It inspires the kind of "descriptive restlessness" that Jackson values.

I will concentrate on the murdered princes in *Richard III*, Innogen in *Cymbeline* and Wolsey and Katherine in *Henry VIII*. Each of these characters merge in some way or another with the materials of mourning in order to define the "pause" for thought that Hamlet describes when thinking about his own mortality. The materials of mourning are imperfect, but usefully so. They aspire to make the dead body appear to rest; when they fail, however, to fully convey this comforting notion, they inspire the living to engage restlessly and continually with the dead. The discomfort caused by the address of the

body through material object is a vital sensation. It connects the living body with the dead body and produces a community of bodies that, because they share territory, continue to inspire each other. The scope of this inspiration is evidenced enough in wills that dictate how the early modern wishes the body to be treated after death. At times these requests were ignored, but the fact that they were made at all demonstrates that the treatment of the dead by the living conveyed the concerns of the living for their own treatment in the future. When Shakespeare produces a connection between the living and the dead in the history plays, he suggests that the ethical historian will modify Hamlet's vision of the mourner as an imprisoned dreamer; even if she is indeed "bounded in a nutshell," the ethical historian can also, when she acknowledges and values the strange value of the materials of mourning, make the act of mourning the visualisation of an "infinite space" between the living and the dead.

Richard III: The "rough cradle"

If you visit Ludlow Castle today, you will read in its pamphlet that the "Tudor Lodgings" is a later addition to an area once called the "Pendover Tower." Of the original tower, the booklet explains, only the staircase remains. The survey goes on to explain that "[t]here is a tradition that Prince Edward and Prince Richard ('the little princes in the Tower') [...] lived on this site for some years before their removal to London" (9). The phrasing of this explanation is notable in the ways that it marks the transformation of the castle into a ruin by terming a specific area at first a tower, then lodging and, finally, a site. This contributes to the notion that a ruin is a product of an interaction between physical place and the traditions that begin to assemble around it and

imaginatively "re-edify" it, to borrow a phrase used to describe the passage of Tower of London through time in *Richard III*. The play focuses on the Tower as a place where history is located, and, conversely, a place where it disappears. It becomes a burial site for the princes, but it also contains an irresolvable mystery that leave those princes open to continued interpretation. The tower, the space of their burial, can attain the status of Nora's *lieux* if it represents what is known and what remains unknown about the past. The imprisonment of the princes in the Tower before their disappearance becomes a vital part of a tradition that informs this understanding of the Tower as a *lieu*. The Ludlow pamphlet describes the Princes' journey from Ludlow castle to the Tower of London as a "removal." This word gestures rather obliquely to their mysterious disappearance, what is understood as their death at Richard's command. The site of the "removal," the Tower, is a place where a lack of information contributes to a surplus of interpretation. The disappearance of the boys becomes a tradition that edifies and obscures historiographical work that will attempt to explain the "removal" by prioritizing one version of the possible events. This version of their death can be informative in many ways, but it can never resolve the mystery. In this way, the Princes' disappearance can stand for the work of historiography itself; the writing of the past always moves outward from an inscrutable core of mystery. As time passes, this mystery is addressed and deepened by the creation of new historiography. The facts of the past can degrade over time, like the vulnerable portions of a physical structure. But the intriguing remains, like the staircase at Ludlow castle that testifies to the building's rich past, will inspire the historian to contribute to a durable tradition that makes a "site" of a physical place.

When Tyrrel describes the Princes' death, he relies on second-hand information supplied by Dighton. Shakespeare often relies on such reports to describe events that are difficult to stage. The murder of the princes, however, could offer the playwright an opportunity to evoke a highly emotional response from his audience. The history plays are rife with such moments. The murder of Rutland in *3 Henry VI* is but one example from the first tetralogy, and the murder of *Richard II* another from the second. And even if he pushes the moment of death offstage, Shakespeare makes the death-bed speech, such as Henry IV's affecting words to Hal before his removal from the stage, particularly evocative. Even in *Richard III*, the moments before death, such as Clarence's murder and Hasting's and Buckingham's executions, are pressed to their full potential in the ways they contribute to the expression of the play's overriding concerns. The curious reality is that this emotional vein remains untapped in the case of Edward's sons. As editor Antony Hammond points out, Shakespeare "resolutely banished offstage" the murder of the princes and thereby missed the staging of an event that could "give rise to genuine pathos" ("Introduction" 96). Shakespeare himself makes reference to such potential when Tyrrel calls the murder of the princes "[t]he most arch deed of piteous massacre / That ever yet this land was guilty of" (4.3.2-3). Yet even here, Tyrrel evades specific details of the murder in the process of describing it and situating it as exemplary. Richard's guilt, which the play insistently highlights, has been displaced to the "land," in a rather weak grammatical structure that finds the sentence ending with a conjunction. The declaration itself, an odd fragment, hovers between the more declarative assertions that the murder has been accomplished and Dighton and Forrest are the murderers. In fact, Shakespeare's evasive and detailed treatment of the Princes' death accords with the

description of the Princes' fate once they were removed from Ludlow to London in More's history of Richard (which is replicated by Hall and Holinshed). There, More records that the princes were carried "through the cytee honorably into the tower," but "after that daie they never came abrode" (fol.xiiir). More's version of their fates is more detailed at a later point in the history. He explicitly records Richard's guilt, the identity of the murderer and the details of their death and burial in the Tower. Why, then, does Shakespeare carry forward an account that is both vague and descriptive? The reasons for Shakespeare's inclusion and evasion of this "arch deed" in the play and in this strange speech by Tyrrel are worth considering alongside the description of the Princes' deaths.

The description of the scene prior to the murder anticipates not only their death, but also the rituals that respond to this death, and makes a lasting narrative of organic material. Tyrrel explains that Forrest found them "girdling one another / Within their alabaster innocent arms; / their lips were four red roses on a stalk, / And in their summer beauty kiss'd each other. / A book of prayers on their pillow lay" (4.3.10-14). Forrest's interpretation of their position of repose, heavily laden with poetic flourish, emphasizes their youth at the expense of the mature wit that marked their previous scenes. The metaphor of lips as roses that display "summer beauty," however, is at odds with the description of the princes embracing each other as innocent, nearly infantile, children. The red, summer roses point away from innocence; they may allude to an organic body in its prime, but surely a summer rose has reached the limit of its growth and faces only decline and death. In the sonnets, spring is often figured as the time of innocence and youth, while summer coincides with growth or beauty at its highest point before the decline of fall and the ravages of winter. The first lines of *Richard III* gesture to the close

link between summer and winter; one gives way to the other. The description of the princes as both youthful draws from More, while the subtle reference to maturity may be Shakespeare's addition. In More's version of the events, the princes are termed "innocent tender children" (208) and "silly children" (205). In this context, the adjective "silly" or "sely" would mean innocent, small or helpless. Shakespeare prioritizes *and* undermines this emphasis on innocence with Tyrrel's description.

In fact, flowers often form an important focal point in the funeral ritual, and, for Shakespeare, the flowers' own growth and decline on the gravesite serves as a fitting emblem for the growth and decline that the human body has already undergone. In *Cymbeline*, mourners pay close attention to the flowers they strew on the grave. The body is addressed physically with the flowers, while the body is addressed verbally with a discussion of the flowers and the weight of mourning that they carry. That the Princes' lips are likened to flowers "on a stalk" need not point away from the funeral flowers. It is precisely the flowers' organicism, their growth from and decay on that "stalk," that confirms they fittingly represent the life cycle. The roses' placement on the stalk emphasizes their rootedness in the earth and its rhythms of flourishing and decay. The Princes' lips have been vehicles of their uncanny, seemingly ageless wit until this point in the play. Now, Shakespeare reaffirms that they are part of the vulnerable, "tender" human body.

The Princes' connection to the summer rose signifies, yet again, that they are "untimely." They, like the tower they die in, become material palimpsests of different ages. Their youth does not overwrite their maturity, nor does their maturity triumph over their youth. These bodily states coexist as a testimony to their status as living, youthful

bodies in the play, but also to their status as mysterious, defined-by-death historical figures outside the world of the play. The description compares the Princes' living bodies are funeral effigies, but life and death exist together in the "alabaster innocent arms." Tyrrel's description is "after-the-fact" in more ways than one. He is describing a past event, but the present tense he recalls is itself rooted in the past. The description of the princes as death statuary visualizes the living princes as if they have always-already passed, or as if they are not even fully alive in an imagined present.

The princes are evacuated from the text at the moment they provide the fullest evidence of Richard's ruthlessness as it is described in Shakespeare's historiographical sources. The Princes' "removal" from Ludlow leads to a removal of another kind by the events in the Tower and the representation of these events in the play. This removal is of a piece with the notion that the Princes are, like history itself, contained in death and uncontainable through the circulation of narratives. The image of the near-death princes lying together with lips like "summer roses" intriguingly blends innocence with maturity, youth with age. This combination has been a preoccupation of the play from the moment the Princes take the stage. It is integral to their characters and integral to their association with the Tower of London, an edifice that becomes their tomb and a tomb that becomes a kind of site or monument in historiographical work that nominates them, after the fact, as "the princes in the Tower." The entombment, a theory widely accepted, of the Princes in the Tower in a sense gives rise to a new set of Princes, those who find an afterlife in narrative of their mysterious death.

The youths display their mature wits in Act Three, Scene One, and this maturity supports the notion that they enter the play not so much as live bodies, but bodies that

have already-always been interred in the Tower. The princes are not simply mature in this scene and its partner Act Two Scene Four. They are mature enough to reflect on the processes that bring youth to maturity. They may be engaged in this process, but they are also outside it and can reflect on it critically. It is almost as if their conversation records their place outside of time, as if their anxious discussion about the appropriate pace for growth from youth to age manifests the knowledge that they will not reach bodily maturity. In the earlier scene the young York hopes to grow slowly since "sweet flowers are slow" (2.4.15). The princes grapple with the sense of a flower as a symbol of growth and a reminder of the transience of organic life; decay is necessary part of life's transience. In anticipating the brevity of their own lives, they adorn their speeches with flowers that register this anxious awareness of their mortality, and one that seems informed, before-the-fact, by their place in history as "the princes in the tower."

The comparison of the Princes to *summer* roses embeds the notions of transience and decay in an image that otherwise stresses the permanence of their bodies in this similarity to tomb statues. This dynamic is sustained in the scene that immediately follows Tyrrel's description of their death. Margaret announces that "now prosperity begins to mellow, / And drop into the rotten mouth of death" (4.4.1-2). The announcement makes an obvious parallel to Richard's opening soliloquy and his identification of the passage from winter to "glorious summer" (1.1.2). In the course of four acts, the play has passed symbolically from summer to autumn. The princes are caught in the passing of their seasons, although the space between their spring and winter has been unnaturally short. In an attempt to recuperate their lost season, Elizabeth terms her sons "unblow'd flowers" and "new-opening sweets" (4.4.10). Although Elizabeth

cannot recover the organic body that has been subjected to death's winter, her speech does accomplish a flourishing of another kind. The referral to the Princes as "new-opening" is accurate because their death has taken their resting bodies and has inspired "laments" by the living that circulate these bodies verbally and textually.

Elizabeth imagines her sons drifting in purgatory. The image is a disturbing address from the living to the dead, and it re-conceives the state of the body. "If yet your gentle souls fly in the air," she begs, "And be not fix'd in doom perpetual, / Hover about me with your airy wings, / And hear your mother's lamentation" (4.4.11-14). This could be read as a vestige of a Catholic ritual; it could also be read as a Catholic ritual channelled into a metaphor for the mourner's need to put the dead body to rest, and to preserve the memory of that body in free and open-ended interpretive engagement. Elizabeth does not fear the amorphous space of purgatory; instead, she re-visualizes it as a space of exchange between the living and the dead, a space where both groups are set free by a shared discourse. In calling the dead bodies of her sons "new-opened," Elizabeth initiates a vision of their dead bodies "un-fixed" from the short season for their bodies and made them "new-appearing" in the circulation of memory by mourning lamentation.

The act of embalming the dead offers the body a strange second life. The process of embalming, however, would have looked like a complete violation of the body, rather than an act of preservation. Moreover, embalming was by no means widespread or reliable in the early modern period. As stated above, the act of embalming summarizes the two functions of mourning: the first was to maintain the body's integrity and imagine the body as untouched, undisturbed by death; the second was to lay the body open and

make it the object of continued speculation and to continue to address the body in its vulnerable and changeable condition. Anne's lament over the body of Henry VI in Act One, Scene Two is intriguing precisely because it describes the dead monarch as if his embalmed body is visible. "Poor key-cold Figure of a holy king," she says, "Pale ashes of the House of Lancaster, / Thou bloodless remnant of that royal blood" (1.2.5-7). There are several ways to interpret this address. Anne could refer to an effigy of the king atop the coffin that hides his real body. Editor Capell believed Anne could see Henry's body and added in the stage direction that the King is "born in an open coffin" (n.S.D. 135). Henry's body could also be visible under the canopied hearse, but in this case, his body would require embalming. Another possibility, and one which is particularly intriguing, is that Anne cannot see Henry's body, nor is there an effigy for her to view, but the closure of the body in the coffin has inspired her to imagine, address and interpret its physical appearance as part of a wider narrative about the history of the Wars. It seems likely that Henry is enclosed in a coffin given Anne's command to the pall-bearers to "set down" their "honourable load / (If honour may be shrouded in a hearse)" (1-2). There is a sense, then, that the body is obscured from sight.

Even if Anne imagines rather than sees the body, she imagines it as embalmed to some degree. She describes it as cold, pale and bloodless. An important stage of the embalming process would have been the removal of remaining blood from the body. Yet even a non-embalmed body could potentially deserve these adjectives. Anne indicates that the pall-bearers are weary from their journey with the body to Chertsey. If a body was to travel any great length between the time of death and burial, some methods of preservation would have been necessary. The point need not be belaboured. Whether or

not Henry has been embalmed, Anne clearly has something of this process on her mind as she surveys the body's wounds and envisions pouring tears, which she terms "helpless balm," into these "windows" (12-13). The metaphor of tears as a form of embalming liquid can be traced to the New Testament. Mary's tears were said to have embalmed Christ's body. Anne's use of this metaphor betrays a deep pessimism about the ability of a mourner to fully preserve a dead body; her balm is "helpless" after all. It also signals to the reality that embalming could not guarantee the preservation of the body.

Shakespeare returns to the idea of embalming at the close of the play in order to describe a connection between the living and the dead that is no longer "helpless," as Anne's is at the start of the play. The Princes return to haunt Richard before Bosworth and the effect they wish to have on him is notable. "Dream on thy cousins, smother'd in the Tower," they demand, "[l]et us be lead within thy bosom, Richard, / And weigh thee down to ruin, shame, and death" (5.3.152-4). The princes have now become the agents of embalming. They continue to circulate their story by calling for the preservation of Richard's body as it is at this moment, as a testament to his misdeeds. They imagine Richard's own circulatory system to be closed so that his body and its accomplishments can go no further.

Even though the Princes' death colours Tyrrel's characterization of them from the start, and thereby emphasizes their pastness, they attain a strange afterlife in the elaboration of "deaths' sad story" through the murderers, Tyrrel, and again as they appear as ghosts later in the play. The princes continue to fade in and out of the play, often associated, after their death, with a powerful and pervasive groundlessness. Their bodies are linked to the wind, to the air and to whispering in ways that demonstrate that their

enclosure in the nutshell of death has opened them up as kings of infinite space in popular imagination. The knowledge that this groundlessness imparts is not rooted in cold fact; it is a knowledge that finds honesty in variable, fluid, and feeling interpretation by bodies that are made aware that they are part of a community of bodies that have witnessed, experienced or imagined death. Hall himself writes of this intuitive knowledge when he suggests that after the enclosure of the princes in the Tower, "mennes hertes [...] misgeveth theim, as the southwynde sometime swelleth of hym selfe before a tempest" (xiiir). The very mysteriousness of the Princes' disappearance inspires the populace to heed an alternate way of knowing; at least in Hall's estimation, the removal of the Princes gives rise to a way of knowing that feels before it sees.

The boys find rest in the tower in two senses of the word. Shakespeare plays with the metaphor of death as sleep in making the sleeping princes look like tomb statuary, and by describing the place of their death, conversely, as a bed, or, a "rough cradle" (4.1.100). Shakespeare makes the connection between burial and rest earlier in the play when Anne conveys Henry VI to Chertsey. She encourages the pall-bearers to "set down" their "honourable load" (1.2.1). The reason for the stop is not clear at this point. Anne wishes to "obsequiously lament" Henry, but there is no indication why a moment of rest in the procession would be necessary. Only later in the speech does Anne discover the pall-bearers are fatigued and themselves require rest. "And still," she encourages, "as you are weary of the weight, / Rest you, while I lament King Henry's corse" (31-2). The pall-bearers' moment of respite coincides with Anne's desire to mourn the body in a state of stillness, a state that anticipates the projected rest of the body at Chertsey. Houlbrook points out that Catholic burial services traditionally required the pall-bearers to set down

the body "at wayside crosses on the way to church" (266). Thus, in the very act of moving the body, a provision is made to assert the need for the body to rest. This practice was banned after the Reformation, and thus provides a possible explanation for why Anne stops on her own accord to lament the body, and why she then stops for practical, or less superstitious, reasons.

The balance between rest and motion as states of the dead body and the mourner applies to the Princes' journey from Ludlow to London. Richard insists that they will find rest in the Tower, and thus ironically employs the death-as-sleep metaphor as a kind of menacing subtext. Richard speculates that Prince Edward is "weary" after his journey. Edward extends Richard's subtext without knowing he is doing so when he admits "our crosses on the way / Have made it tedious, wearisome, and heavy" (3.1.4-6). Although the term crosses refers to troubles and obstacles, the sensation that it provokes, one of heaviness, is often associated in the play with ruin, death and shame. It would be difficult to prove that Shakespeare had the Catholic practice of stopping at crosses with the corpse in mind at this moment. In the light of Anne's own "tedious, wearisome, and heavy" journey from St Pauls to Chertsey, however, a good case could be made.

The subtext that the tower is a place of repose and burial continues when Edward inquires about the history of the tower and its origins. He claims that even if the origin of the Tower were not explicitly recorded, "the truth should live from age to age, / As 'twere retail'd to all posterity, / Even to the general all-ending day" (3.1.76-78). Edward imagines that the tower symbolizes immortality. When he references the "all-ending day," he refers to the moment when the dead will be resurrected. As I have mentioned, this notion was integral to the comforting conceit that the dead were merely sleeping.

Edward may in fact be comforting himself with this vision of the Tower. Moments earlier he expresses discomfort with resting at the Tower, complaining "I do not like the Tower, of any place" (68). Later the young York foresees that he will not "sleep in quiet in the Tower" (142). Thus, the space of repose for the weary is also a space of rest for the dead, and finally, a place of restlessness for those who contemplate it.

Cymbeline: Bedfellows

The veiling and unmasking of mystery occurs insistently in *Cymbeline*. Richard David describes this feature of the play as a "shattering effect" when "simplicities [...] suddenly shine out from its complexities and obscurities" (188). Scholars often attribute this effect to the play's romantic elements, even though they consider it generally a less successful romance that *The Winter's Tale*. Scholars have also been uncomfortable terming it a successful history play. As a history play, however, it not only dramatizes events recorded in Holinshed's chronicles; it also crafts a nuanced critique of the process of making history and emphasizes the importance of an ethical approach to these processes. This critique is problematic and unsettling, composed in part, as it is, in relation to the Queen and Cloten. Their expressions of British pride, or, depending on which scholar you read, ignorant xenophobia, becomes a useful starting-point for a consideration of the ethical historiography encouraged by the play. In urging Cymbeline to withhold the tribute promised to Julius Caesar, the Queen makes the impassioned assertion:

> Remember sir, my liege,
> The kings your ancestors, together with
> The natural bravery of your isle, which stands
> As Neptune's park, ribbed and paled in

> With oaks unscalable and roaring waters,
> With sands that will not bear your enemies boats,
> But suck them up to th' topmast. A kind of conquest
> Caesar made here, but made not here his brag
> Of "came and saw and overcame.' (3.1.16-24)

The Queen rehearses history in order to offer Cymbeline a fixed place in these records of the past; but this rehearsal shifts as rapidly and unpredictably as the quicksands that she imagines swallowing enemy ships. The Queen crafts an interpretation of the British past that claims to be truth. She asks Cymbeline to remember the "natural bravery" of the inhabitants and implies that this bravery is an unalterable truth because it parallels the land and seascape. In writing history as a claim to factual truth, rather than an interpretation of facts, the Queen forecloses and denies the possible value of debate. Her vision of the island is thus the vision of the ideal history: the island's defences prevent corruption, just as the ideal history prevents outside or future readers and contributors from submitting its supposedly stable truth to revision.

Yet the Queen cannot be credited with ethical thinking at any other point in the play and her vision of an ideal history must be scrutinized. Her rendition of the past in fact reveals that an historical fact secure in some sense; facts cannot be debated at a basic level. And yet, the historical fact is also restless, is always caught up in the restless interpretive motion. The Queen makes this almost comically clear when she concedes, "a kind of conquest Caesar made here, but made not here his brag / Of 'came and saw and overcame'." What Caesar does accomplish in Britain is framed by a fundamental absence. Her version of history refers to events beyond its scope, thereby demonstrating that the entire speech does indeed have a scope, or a certain way of dressing the past to advance a desired interpretation. Moreover, Caesar's brag is itself a miniature

historiographical text. It demonstrates a form of bravado when reciting past facts, a form of bravery the Queen accords to the British only. Caesar's words have invaded the Queen's own rendition of the past, almost against her will, indicating that her history is susceptible to unwanted revisions. Caesar may have made a "certain kind of conquest of Britain, but he has also made a conquest of the Queen's speech, which is a "certain kind" of history. The entire effect of the speech is to produce a historiographical text that aspires to an impermeable, or unalterable, truth, but reveals itself as permeable, or subject to revision. The Queen's inability to see her history as one "kind" of history prevents her from making the past an ethical force in the present. It can help the audience or readers of the play question the ethical force of other engagements between the living and the dead in the play.

Roger Warren writes that Innogen's burial in Act Four, Scene Two "lures the audience further into the experience of apparent death and funeral ritual" (45). This effect is achieved, Warren suggests, in part by the wording of the funeral dirge, which is "specifically relevant to Innogen herself in its detail [...] and yet expressed in general terms which make it seem applicable to everyone" (45). The song is often understood as a particularly touching and effective expression of consolation. Following Warren, however, I suggest that the song is effective because it makes the audience participants in the funeral act; it does not comfort, but extends grief. The burial of Innogen as Fidele is a celebration of life, shadowed by the uncomfortable reality that organic bodies degrade.

If the historiographical text balances closure and openness, rest and restlessness, the act and materials of burial in *Cymbeline* mirror this form of balancing. The grave is conceived of as both the resting-place for the dead body, and also a place of restlessness

for those who attend to the grave. Shakespeare places the burden of this exploration on the dressing of the body by materials of mourning. The mourners self-consciously describe activities that take place on the grave, whether the product of natural processes or human ritual (or both at once), as a way of visualising and preserving their ethical treatment of the past, which is an ongoing address to the dead across time. The dressing of the body by and in the grave or tomb is a means of addressing time itself, and the investments we should make in the past and the future. In *Untimely Matter*, Jonathan Gil Harris writes that "temporality is not simply a property intrinsic to a material object. It is also generated by the work we do with that object, and how we read and rework its polychronic marks of different times" (16). The material object can be placed to rest, but this activity requires that the living read and rework the dead body into a lasting narrative.

Gil Harris suggests that the past "speaks with and from assemblages within which [...] the past is always potentially alive" (25). I suggest that Arviragus and Guiderius represent the two approaches to the past that constitute the extremes, or infidelities, that Derrida contemplates. Guiderius wishes to end the engagement between the living and dead by accomplishing fully and finally the act of the laying the dead to rest. He stresses the importance of completing the rituals of physical care for the dead and moving on to other tasks in the world. Arviragus expresses the impulse to lay the body open to interpretive speculation and labour, to extend its life in poetry that echoes and moves beyond the physical act of entombment. Innogen herself, first a body, then a mourner of a body, represents the consummation of these two energies and an example of the ways in

which, as Harris suggests, the past that has been laid to rest can also be "potentially alive."

Arviragus responds to the loss of Fidele with the imaginative wish that he could exchange his body for hers. "I had rather" he claims, "[h]ave skipped from sixteen years of age to sixty, / To have turned my leaping-time into a crutch / Than have seen this" (4.2.199-202). The wish is mind-bendingly dense. Fidele dies before his natural time, and Arviragus imagines sacrificing the natural progression of his maturation in a kind of exchange that would secure that very progression for Fidele. In "skipping" fifty-four years, Arviragus hopes to trade his mortality for Fidele's; the body is both powerful and powerless in this imagined wish. Transferred between Arviragus and Fidele is the fulfillment of the body's potential, and the strength of the natural body itself across time in the face of evidence of the body's powerlessness in time. The realisation of the body's vulnerability and the hope for its endurance combine in the Arviragus' speculation about Fidele's dead body.

The burial and mourning of Fidele follows this dynamic closely. The act of burial aims for a symbolic triumph of durable memory over transient organicism, but the natural world begins to take on the air of durability and begins to seem like the a preserver of memory as the ritual moves from the moment of death to the contemplation and achievement of burial. As with the Princes in *Richard III*, Fidele marks the slip between life and death by positioning her sleeping body as funeral statuary. Arviragus's description of the body stresses this parallel. He recalls that Fidele's "right cheek" was "reposing on a cushion" and his "arms thus leagued" (4.2.212-14). The wonderful irony is that funeral statuary were meant to mimic a sleeping, living body over and above the

dead body, and Fidele's sleeping, living body mimics a funeral statue. Similarly, funeral monuments represent a belief that the dead body continues to live in other ways, and Fidele's sleeping body ushers in the brothers' realisation that living bodies do not carry on endlessly.

If the mourning and burial of Fidele convey important truths about the body's passage from life to death, these rituals also suggest that the act of burying that body attempts to fix and free the past from the fact of death. Both mourning and remembering are and should be recognized as self-conscious activities that respect the opacity of the monument while planning for and imagining the engagement of the living with this inscrutability extending into the future. The grave marks a place where the dead are put to rest, and also a place where the living are made aware of their own restlessness and their ethical duty to continue the emotional and intellectual disturbance of the present in terms of the past.

The past death of Arviragus and Guiderius's mother Euriphile provides an important touchstone to the burial of Fidele. The brothers must bury Fidele, but they must also do so self-consciously aware that their reading of the dead body is in fact a rereading of the past. Euriphile represents a part of the past that has been put to rest, but has continued to influence acts of interpretation in the present. Fidele begins to look like a complement to the body of Euriphile, and she becomes a representation that mimics but differs from Euriphile. Guiderius hears Arviragus's "solemn music" and instinctively uses it to recall Euriphile's funeral. "What does he mean?" (4.2.191) Guiderius asks upon hearing this music, and his inquiry is crucial, because the meaning of the solemn music will be constructed in the funeral rites that link the past and the present, Euriphile

with Fidele. Thinking of Fidele's funeral in terms of Euriphile's funeral allows the brothers to recognize that the present sustains continuity with the past even as this continuity is ruptured by the fact of death.

The brothers' mourning becomes increasingly a study of the most effective way to address Fidele's body with the burial and address Euriphile's burial with Fidele's body. The brothers' contradictory perspectives combine when Arviragus's invitation to the song matches Guiderius's suggestion that Fidele be buried next to Euriphile:

> And let us, Guiderius, though now our voices
> Have got the mannish crack, sing him to th' ground
> As once our mother; use like note and words,
> Save that Euriphile must be Fidele. (4.2.235-39)

Both song and grave grapple with the inescapability of loss and the hope for preservation of the past. Arviragus asserts that Fidele's dirge will echo Euriphile's, but an echo is not an exact match, and both brothers heed the inevitability of change at the moment they pursue the comforting notion of the permanence of the human body. When Arviragus says that "Euriphile must be Fidele," he emphasizes the convergence of and separation between the past and the present. The grammar of this acknowledgement that the two bodies are not one reads as remarkably ambiguous. He essentially notes that the song that once paid homage to Euriphile will now pay homage to a different body, to Fidele. But he constructs this observation of difference through a strange equation between the two bodies that is formed by their proximity to each other in the speech and the use of the phrase "must be" to denote their difference; if the words surrounding the two names are taken away, all that remains is assertion that Euriphile "must be" Fidele. Arviragus means that the name Fidele must be spoken instead of Euriphile. But the vague wording,

wording that leaves out all extraneous detail, minimizes the difference that Arviragus intends to emphasize.

And what of the decision to make the brothers speak rather than sing the song? The "mannish crack" that divides the mature brothers from their youth is more than just an effective way to sidestep singing by actors that cannot sing - one theory for the brothers' strange decision to avoid singing. The transformation of their voices over time means that they cannot sing the same song twice; difference is embedded into the instrument of vocalism. Moreover, while Belarius fetches Cloten's body, Arviragus decides "[w]e'll say our song the whilst" (4.2.255). Arviragus here suggests that the brothers can use the song to protract, or delay, the end of the burial service. The song spans past and present at the very moment that it articulates a vision of an unbridgeable gap between the living and dead.

Arviragus's solemn music at the discovery of Fidele's body anticipates or matches Guiderius's insistence on a "serious" treatment of Fidele's burial. It hardly appears, however, that the brother's are well-matched in their grief at all. Arviragus addresses the dead Fidele as if he was still living in a touching and eloquent speech:

> With fairest flowers
> Whilst summer lasts and I live here, Fidele,
> I'll sweeten thy sad grave. Thou shalt not lack
> The flower that's like thy face, pale primrose, nor
> The azured harebell, like thy veins; no nor
> The leaf eglantine, whom not to slander
> Outsweetened not thy breath. The ruddock would
> With charitable bill – O bill sore shaming
> Those rich-left heirs that let their fathers lie
> Without a monument! – bring thee all this,
> Yea, and furred moss besides, when flowers are none,
> To winter-ground thy corpse. (4.2.219-29)

The speech masterfully describes a surplus of mourning through the lens of "lack," or absence. This dynamic nicely summarizes Arviragus's approach to mourning, which is to make Fidele flourish at the moment of frailty, to create at the moment of negation. Fidele "will not lack" and will not be "outsweetened": the double negatives work to express a form of power that the organic body achieves even when it is irrevocably lost. This power mimics the very poetry that makes something out of this nothing. Arviragus's addresses Fidele as if the dead youth still lived. He achieves the tending to the dead in this address, just as the ruddock attends to the grave by, conversely, disturbing it. Arviragus enacts the charity he imagines, by remaining unwilling to "let" Fidele "lie."

Fidele has already merged with the absent Euriphile; with this speech, Fidele's body merges with the flowers that furnish the materials of mourning. Far from being restful, Fidele's body begins to grow with the flowers that dress her. Yet at the moment she merges with the flowers, these flowers themselves begin the process of decay. The absence that Arviragus hopes to fill with material adornment reasserts itself when these very materials "are none" (228). Fidele's body is thus only provisionally preserved in its association with the flowers that are "fairest" in summer and dead by winter. Fidele's body is preserved in another way, however; Arviragus's poetry envelops time's passage itself, so standing beyond summer and winter, observes these seasons pass.

Guiderius's reaction to Arviragus's speech seems to undermine its perspective. Guiderius finds Arviragus's vision of the grave over time a "play" in "wench-like words" (231). He turns their attention, instead, to their "due debt," which is to bury the dead (233). The idea of burial as a repayment of an enforced debt marks a substantial shift

from Arviragus's notion of burial as a charitable, freely-given gift. Guiderius indeed wishes to let Fidele lie; Arviragus's "protraction" of the process of burial means that the repayment of debt is delayed indefinitely. The brothers thus seem opposed in their attitudes toward appropriate grief. Yet it is there, in the space between gift and debt, imagination and reality, contingency and necessity, the brothers demonstrate together an ethical treatment of the past. The full picture of appropriate mourning cannot be rendered through the perspective of just one brother. In fact, Arviragus's increasingly passionate description of the grave as it might appear in the future does not oppose, but rather complements Guiderius's focus on performing the ritual in the present. Arviragus establishes a poetic monument that is powerful and ethical because it supports the value of a physical monument that is maintained over time. Arviragus informs us that the task of burying the dead should be protracted, or ongoing; Guiderius informs us that this drawing out of the act of burial should not distract the mourner from completing the physical rites in the present as an acknowledgment of irreparable rupture between the living and the dead.

The song balances the comfort provided by the notion of rest with discomfort caused by the potential for restlessness. The vulnerability of the organic body is described as a positive quality because it provides an escape from various earthly burdens. The break wrought by death is a release in the first stanzas of the song. And yet, the song also alludes to the afterlife of the body as a negative outcome. It refers to those who could potentially disturb the body by violating the separation between living and dead, such as exorcizers, witches, or ghosts. It revels in the positivity of mortality and negativity of immortality, a reversal of the normal Christian notion of mourning,

which celebrates the afterlife as a vast improvement on the toils that the mortal body must face. So, while affirming the power of death and the power of life after death, the song considers which of these is most powerful. In the end, neither force outdoes the other. The closing couplet refers to the ceasing and continuing of the burial ritual in a way that places value on the mortal body in terms of its immortal spirit and vice versa. The brothers conclude "Quiet consummation have, / And renowned by thy grave" (4.2.281-2). The "quiet consummation" of a body that is laid finally, and fully, to rest, is balanced nicely by the notion of "renknown," which points to the endless, or "restless" address of that body through historiographical or biographical writings. A person achieves fame through the ongoing treatment of her story in historiographical writing; it is therefore, an activity of writing, rather than a state that can be definitively achieved. "Fear no more" is therefore supplements, rather than clearly reverses, the Christian attitude towards mourning. It offers equal emphasis to death and life, through the process of burying and addressing the dead.

After the recitation of "Fear no more," Guiderius asserts that they have "done" their "obsequies" (283). Belarius, seeming to fulfill the role of Catholic priest presiding over a Catholic burial service, offers a small address to the grave and then confirms that the bodies have returned from the ground that "gave them first" (290). He provides a sense of completion of the service and the progress of the body from dust to dust. The burial and mourning rituals have in fact contributed to this ideal of completion, but they have also countered it, and, of course, Fidele's deep sleep is merely an approximation of death. The brothers' obsequies may be done, but Innogen's begin when she awakes beside Cloten. In "Fear no more" the brothers hope that a "ghost unlaid" will not meddle

with Fidele's body; when Innogen awakes and vacates the spot of burial, she herself becomes a body "unlaid." Where the song makes the distinction between the resting and the restless body, Shakespeare combines them in Innogen. And this combination holds firm when Innogen, a body that was once laid to rest and an object of mourning rituals, becomes the performer of similar rituals.

Shakespeare prolongs the analogy between sleep and death when the dead Fidele becomes the sleeping and waking Innogen. The analogy is powerful because the equation of the dead body to the sleeping body is a way of ameliorates the trauma of death. It allows us to conceive of death as a prelude to the awakening of the soul into another life. Her mourning of the body she assumes to be Posthumus emphasizes that death brings about a strong communion of bodies over time that the rupture of death cannot fully interrupt. Sleep is a way of conceptualizing the dead body, and it is also a way of conceiving of the past. There, in the activity of slumber, death and history share territory; each use the metaphor of sleep as a means of demystifying that which is abstract or unknown. The result is that both the dead body and the dead past are much more complicated than any simple analogy might suggest; explaining these domains with reference to sleep further mystifies that which is being explained. Innogen hopes that the past is as remote to her as sleep is to the waking, but when she likens the past to a dream she inadvertently expresses a product of sleep that links the past and the present, sleeping and waking. She laments, "[t]he dream's here still. Even when I wake it is / Without me as within me; not imagined, felt" (307-8). Here, Innogen experiences her body as a place of exchange between sleeping and waking, past and present. Her body, and its ability to feel that which is no more, does not constitute a clean border between past and present,

but mingles them. If the dream that goes on signifies a messy border-line between the living and dead, then Innogen as the object of mourning, as the dead body, also expresses this grey area. She is not dead, but Fidele, the young boy the brothers have mourned, has passed away with Innogen's reanimation. Their mourning of Innogen may not have registered her true identity, but their mourning has been sincere, nonetheless. Sincerity without strict and total factualism forms a durable connection between the living and the dead without one in bondage to the other.

Innogen mourns Posthumus, and, as a part of this process, she refuses to put the past to rest. In fact, although Innogen finds the body "no bedfellow" for her (296), her anatomizing of the body in relation to her own does indeed make bedfellows of the living and the dead. Innogen reads the body as Posthumus by opening Cloten's body to poetic interpretation. This inventory works cleverly in the space between known and unknown, explication and mystification, dead body and living mourner:

> this is his hand
> His foot Mercurial, his Martial thigh,
> The brawns of Hercules; but his Jovial face –
> Murder in heaven! How? 'Tis gone. Pisanio,
> All curses madded Hecuba gave the Greeks,
> And mine to boot, be darted on thee! (4.2.310-15)

The strange blazon mystifies that which it describes, thereby making the place of rest a place to begin interpretive inquiry. This effect is achieved partly because the descriptives are vague and incongruous. We do not tend to recognize identity through the foot, the thigh and, even more generally, the "brawn." The catalogue confirms the identity of the body for Innogen, but they hardly make sense as absolute identifiers. The site of individual identity and the site of acts of identification of that identity is the face, the eyes. Their absence from the body here makes Cloten a fitting symbol of the grave itself,

which does and does not convey knowledge about the unique identity for which it stands. Innogen is unsettled that she can no longer exchange the moment of recognition with her husband by looking into his eyes and seeing them looking at her; she searches for this recognition in places that cannot approximate the power of vision. Innogen's struggle stands for the struggle of any mourner who searches for, but cannot locate, the point where two distinct people come together in the shared gaze.

Innogen feels her past is, like a dream that is particularly difficult to forget, "within" and "without" her. So too, the dead body is both within and without Innogen as she inventories its parts. She implicates herself as a bedfellow of the body by comparing the body parts to classical gods and comparing herself to Hecuba. "All curses madded Hecuba gave the Greeks, / And mine to boot, be darted on thee!" she challenges Pisanio, the imagined perpetrator of the imagine crime. Innogen voices the imagined curses through the loose classical narrative that has helped her describe the body. This analogical structure works to make the dead body and the living mourner sharers of a durable narrative. Hecuba is associated with powerful grief. Ovid describes her sorrow over the death of daughter Polyxena in graphic detail. She "beat her own woe-seasoned breast and swept / Her white locks in the clotted gore and wailed" (309). If Hecuba is notable for grieving the deaths of her children and husband rather gruesomely, she is also notable, in Ovid, for her expressions of grief that long outlast the instant of death. Hecuba herself mourns that "[m]ighty Illium lies low" (and so does, for that matter, her dead loved-ones). Yet, she also observes that for her, "Troy lives" because her "woes stream on" (310). What exactly is this "streaming on" of woe? For Ovid, Hecuba's "howling with sorrow" has impressed itself on the place of its utterance so deeply that

Hecuba, and her particularly potent grief, are preserved in memory. "The place / Remains today, named from what happened there," Ovid concludes, and "[t]hat fate of hers stirred pity in the hearts / Of friend and foe, Trojans and Greeks alike, / And all the gods as well" (312). The preservation of the place of mourning parallels the preservation of the act of mourning by those who hear her story afterwards. Hecuba is an effective analogue for the mourner because her grief inspires others to share in that experience; she reproduces her sorrow and, in effect, Ovid and his readers join the rank of fellow-mourners if they are "stirred" to "pity" by his harrowing rendition of her losses.

Shakespeare capitalizes on this dynamic when he uses Hecuba's grief to test the power of theatre to do as Hecuba does, and inspire the audience to share in emotion. The player describes in *Hamlet*, that Hecuba is unforgettable because she has the power to envelop all in the ritual of mourning. Like Ovid's Hecuba, the player's Hecuba inspires all witnesses to mourn with her. He rehearses for Hamlet that the "mobled queen [...] Would have made milch [that is, made weep] the burning eyes of heaven / And passion in the gods" (2.2.455-6). In *Troilus and Cressida*, Cassandra describes Hecuba's response to Hector's death (5.3.80-87). In *The Rape of Lucrece*, the heroine looks at a depiction of a grieving Hecuba to "find a face [...] where all distress and dolour dwell'd" and thus find a way to convey her own grief (1444-6). In *Titus Andronicus*, young Lucius recalls reading that Hecuba "ran mad through sorrow" and believes Lavinia is doing the same (4.1.20-1). In these contexts, Shakespeare references Hecuba's grief to frame another's experience with sorrow. In inserting Hecuba into her lamentation for Posthumus, Innogen aspires to the kind of memorable mourning, charted in and by classical writing, that occurs when the Trojan queen inspires those around her to, in effect, situate their

own mourning as a parallel to hers. Innogen does not exactly wish to be Hecuba; rather, she wishes her curses to resound like Hecuba's. Innogen's utterance can impress upon a line of listeners that stretches from the moment of death to the future, and this power acts as a guarantor of the longevity of mourning. Shakespeare employs Hecuba's restless and ongoing articulations of grief to frame Innogen's speech, rather than pressing any similarity between the circumstances in which each woman mourns.

The headless body, like the gravesite itself, inspires readings that will address but never fully "delve [...] to the root" (1.1.28) of the dead, to borrow the gentlemen's phrase from the first scene of the play. Innogen reads the body, and although it is a misreading, she begins the work of mourning; she imagines a grave that will continue to address the dead by modifying bodily rest with interpretive restlessness. Each person to address the grave in this scene will envision a unique combination of flowers and plants that will either be deliberately placed on the grave or will naturally grow on the grave over time; in each case, however, the flowers point towards an ongoing thriving of life at the site that monumentalizes the absolute cessation of life. The gravesite becomes a space that Harris terms "an untimely aggregation of matter, agents, and historical traces" (20) by accumulating materials that prove the reality of decay and the hope for permanence.

This aggregation of matter, agents and traces occurs explicitly when Innogen drapes herself over Cloten. The act suggests that while the death of the body prevents moments of recognition, it cannot prevent the living and the dead from becoming a bedfellow to a mourner who pursues a relationship beyond recognition. For Innogen, the body's blood, though a testament to the truth that body is no longer alive, supplies the materials of, ongoing, persistent mourning. Innogen immerses herself in this blood and

makes it constitutive of her own body as a way of challenging the natural distaste that the living may feel for the dead body. "Give colour to my pale cheek with thy blood," she asks the body, "That we the horrider may seem to those / Which chance to find us" (4.2.331-33). The act is one of incorporation of the living with the dead, the making of one body out of two bodies seemingly divided by an unbridgeable gulf. And they are bridged in the act of interpretation by passers-by. Innogen becomes the material of burial; she mimics the shroud, flower or effigy that stands over the dead, puts the dead to rest and opens the dead up to speculation. Recall that Ovid describes Hecuba dragging her hair in her daughter's blood. Both this image, and the image of Innogen lying on Cloten's body, confronts the distaste that the living may feel for the dead body. An ethically powerful form of mourning asks us to feel and then set aside this distaste; mourning is most powerful when the very funeral rituals that are used to construct a sanitary distance between the living and the dead also question this distance. The literal overlap of dead and living argues against the security that the living can ever fully separate themselves from the dead or ever fully put the dead to rest. Innogen responds this way to death in order to reach beyond the grotesque; Shakespeare affords the dead body the power to inspire interpretation rather than simply revulsion.

Shakespeare invites the audience to feel distaste for the sight, through Lucius's response to the image. And yet, in articulating this distaste with the deceptively simple analogy of death as sleep, Shakespeare requires us to rethink our initial aversion. At first Lucius reads the Innogen-Cloten-Posthumus aggregate as two separate bodies; their conjunction is repugnant:

> Soft ho, what trunk is here
> Without his top? The ruin speaks that sometime

> It was a worthy building. How, a page,
> Or dead or sleeping on him? But dead rather;
> For nature doth abhor to make his bed
> With the defunct, or sleep upon the dead. (4.2.354-58)

Once again, the metaphor of death as sleep is a reminder of the complicated relationship between the living and the dead. Innogen is merely sleeping, and Cloten is dead. Death, therefore, can and cannot be similar to sleep. It is similar because Innogen and Cloten look the same at this point and Lucius cannot tell whether Innogen is sleeping or dead. It cannot be similar because Innogen and Cloten are separated by the irreversible break of death and, as Lucius himself points out, Innogen is *either* sleeping *or* dead; she cannot be both at once. And yet, the either-or opposition collapses when Lucius reasons that "nature doth abhor to make his bed / With the defunct, or sleep upon the dead." Here the "or" hinges two thoughts that are nearly identical. It functions more as an "and" rather than an "or," as the second clause confirms the logic of the first.

Innogen imagines that the aggregate of her body and Cloten's body will seem "horrider" to witnesses than Cloten's body alone. The term, although awkward-sounding, is vital to the work that Innogen is carrying out with her gestures of mourning. She desires to produce an emotional response that both catches and repulses the viewer's sympathy. Ros King observes that Cloten and Innogen are buried only by flowers, and this practice "would normally strike most Europeans (then and now) as both insanitary and gruesome." Yet, this unconventional burial "is presented as natural, time-honoured, and even beautiful" (131). Shakespeare achieves a similar effect when Innogen drapes herself on the body. This dressing of the dead body guarantees that Lucius will be appalled by the sight but intrigued by its history. Cloten's body alone cannot secure Lucius's interpretive interest. It is the strange attachment of the living to the dead that

ensures the continuing power of the body to affect the viewer. In Cloten's body alone, Lucius sees the pastness of the past. "The ruin speaks," he says, "that sometime / It was a worthy building" (355-6). Like a ruined building, the dead body testifies to what it once was and no longer is. However, Innogen's presence on this ruin inspires Lucius to pose a series of questions that suggest that Cloten's body is not finished speaking; it has a rich past because, with Innogen's literal and emotional attachment to it, it has a rich present life as well. The ritual of mourning mimics Lucius's movement from the acknowledgement of the gulf between the living and dead, to an awareness that the dead body finds a new life in the interpretive restlessness of the witness of the dead. Indeed, Lucius exhibits this interpretive restlessness when Innogen awakes; he poses no less than six questions in succession:

> Who is this
> Thou mak'st thy bloody pillow? Or who was he
> That, otherwise than noble nature did,
> Hath altered that good picture? What's thy interest
> In this sad wreck? How came't? Who is't?
> What art thou? (4.2.363-68)

In feverishly searching out Innogen's "interest" in the body, Lucius demonstrates the awakening of his own interest, which supplies yet more material for the untimely aggregate of material and agents that accrues on the site of the grave.

When Innogen awakes, Lucius begins to register that a defunct body can become a bedfellow perceive it as open to interpretive address. The death/sleep metaphor emphasizes the similarity of the two bodies, their taking up on one state rather than two. Lucius describes the body as a "bloody pillow," and believes that Innogen has "made" it such a material. In reality, Lucius himself makes the mourner and the material bedfellows by dressing them in one simile. Once Innogen expresses her commitment to

mourning the body, which mentally parallels her physical closeness to the body, Lucius begins to read Innogen and Cloten as one body. Lucius asks for the specifics of the body's past – how it was disfigured, and ultimately, "who is't" (367). The body's name, strangely enough, is the last thing that Lucius wishes to know. In some sense, Lucius gives the experiences undergone by the body that lead to the question of identity more of his attention. The history of the body is what produces identity, rather than identity determining the history of the body *a priori*. Shakespeare underscores this perception of identity when Innogen finally answers the question of "who is't" deceptively. The body has never been called "Richard du Champ," yet it also does not own the name Posthumus. At this point, the body's real identity as Cloten is nearly irrelevant. All three names are honest in one way or another.

Innogen's response compounds the amorphousness of the body's identity. She describes the body in terms of its interest to her, thereby explaining little, but feeling much about the deceased. "This was my master," she informs Lucius, "I may wander / From east to occident, cry out for service, / Try man, all good; serve truly; never / Find such another master" (369-74). Innogen maintains the anonymity of the body at the same time that she emphasizes its individuality and exemplarity. Her means of expressing this exemplarity, fittingly, is to describe her own restlessness, a future of wandering without respite. Her gesture of mourning, which puts the dead to rest, also imagines her desire, but inability, to come to rest herself. The nature of the relationship between the dead and the living is likened to the relationship that outdoes even the relationship between "good" men and true servants. When Innogen states that she could "try" good men and find no one parallel to Posthumus, her intention is to value a kind of ethical relationship that goes

beyond established fact, beyond the sphere of "sceptre, physic or learning," to borrow the definition of human knowledge and power advanced in "Fear no more."

The image of Innogen wandering from "east to occident" without finding a master like Posthumus is a striking contribution to the notion of home as a place of rest in the play. Innogen links Posthumus to place, his body to her home. The, "deprivation and recuperation of the dwelling place" in the romance genre, Heather Dubrow explains, is one way to "mediate and moderate the stresses of loss" (70). For Dubrow, the romance genre recuperates the implied losses, while tragedy merely emphasizes their irreversibility. A history play like *Cymbeline* works between absolute recuperation and absolute loss of the past; Innogen's sense of restlessness at the place of the grave considers a different way of defining recuperation. The dead cannot be recuperated in any literal sense. Historiography can recuperate them meaningfully, if only provisionally, by finding a home in the heart of loss; it is the work of history to restore the dead by "making" them again and again in ongoing interpretive processes, to make the return home simply the start of yet another journey. Claire Gittings provides another way of looking at Innogen's beautiful tribute to Posthumus. Gittings explains that tomb inscriptions in the sixteenth and seventeenth century often included an "explicit acknowledgement that a particular individual, once dead, can never be replaced on earth" (147). Innogen's speech, therefore, in citing Posthumus's exemplarity borrows from the act of sepulcher. Innogen's sense that she has lost an irreplaceable loved-one is one way that *many* mourners pay tribute to the dead. This is a unique and common experience; Shakespeare therefore underlines the point that recuperation and loss are different sides of the same coin.

The scene's funeral dirge balances the mourner's hope that a secure home for the dead can be created with the mourner's unsettling sense that such a home is impossible to construct. In "Fear no more," death is initially expressed as a homecoming after a day of work. The living are labourers, the dead are labourers who have finished their "worldly task," have "taen [their] wages" and reached a night of rest (261-2). The metaphor is comforting because death releases the labourer from work and stills arduous activity. Yet, if this arduous activity has ceased for the dead, it carries on for the living. The brothers conclude the song by suggesting that the rest of the dead must be actively maintained by the living. "No exorcizer harm thee," they warn, "Nor no witchcraft charm thee. / Ghost unlaid forbear thee. / Nothing ill come near thee" (276-80). The brothers work to preserve the dead from being unsettled in various ways. Bruce Gordon and Peter Marshall write that "[i]n the lands where the Reformation took hold, the place of the dead had to be fundamentally reviewed and renegotiated" (9). This renegotiation was carried out conceptually, and physically. Graves and tombs were desecrated in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the growing suspicion of icons and symbols, much to the dismay of historians (even Protestant historians). Elizabeth was forced to issue a proclamation in the second year of her reign to prevent further degradation of "spoiled, broken, and ruinated" tomb and grave monuments, which she considered vital to preserve the "posterity of the persons there buried" ("A Proclamation against breaking or defacing of Monuments"). Even once the religious turmoil had subsided, the dead were often disturbed, or "unlaid," to "make room for new graves," an outcome that was "inevitable," Gittings observes, "in densely populated urban parishes" (139). The brothers' incantation is more than mere superstition.

Innogen extends the link between mourning and work, this laying to rest of another by imagining her own restlessness, by anticipating her tender care of Posthumus's grave over time, just as, moments before, Arviragus imagined the future life of Fidele's grave. Her anticipation combines the allure of an end to mourning with a gesture to continuance. The act of burial of the dead is the occasion for yet another journey by the living. In placing Posthumus in his final home, Innogen commits to her own homelessness and her act of mourning is closely linked to her sense that her "wordly task[s]" (261) must continue. Her promise to "follow" Lucius fulfills her expectation that she will serve many good men but find no other master like Posthumus. The sentiment of the grave inscription is itself inscribed in the actions of the living. Her servitude to the Roman army is, strangely enough, yet another way that Innogen pays tribute to the dead because it reinforces, and therefore preserves, the bond between Innogen and her previous, unmatched master.

Innogen promises to pay the grave "a century of prayers" (392). The meaning of "century" here is vital, because in addition to referring to a quantity of one hundred, the term was used, as Roger Warren notes, to refer to a "division" of one hundred men in the Roman army (215). Shakespeare uses the word in *King Lear* and *Coriolanus* in this latter sense. Here, at the very moment Innogen enters the service of the Roman army under Lucius, she conceptualizes her prayers as a division of this army. Burial and mourning is a kind of service indeed, one that continues on for the living as they carry out worldly tasks that respect the past.

Shakespeare further blurs the line of demarcation between sleeping and the dead when Posthumus dreams of his family in Act Five, Scene Three. Jupiter's command to

the ghosts make the metaphorical connection between death and sleep, and waking and resurrection, rest and restlessness. He orders rather imperially,

> Poor shadows of Elysium, hence, and *rest*
> Upon your never-withering banks of flowers
> Be not with mortal accidents oppressed;
> No care of yours it is, you know 'tis ours.
> Whom best I love, I cross, to make my gift,
> The more delayed, delighted. Be content.
> Your *low-laid son* our godhead will uplift.
> His comforts *thrive*, his trials well are spent [...]
> This *tablet lay upon his breast*, wherein
> Our pleasure his full fortune doeth *confine*. (5.3.191-204, my italics)

Jupiter's speech is itself retrospective. Although Posthumus's story and his life are not complete, Jupiter speaks as though they are, as if Posthumus has already died. Like the characterization of the Princes in *Richard III*, the characterisation of Posthumus is shaped in advance by his association with death. His father died before his birth, and Posthumus's birth coincided with his mother's death. Strangely enough, Posthumus's mother appears as an "ancient matron" (123.3-4) in his dream. It is touching to think that Posthumus has imagined her aging in time as if she had lived, and it is equally touching that this rumination winds its way into his dream. It does convey the idea that Posthumus's bond with his mother has continued after her death, that he has imaginatively added to "old stock" and made it "freshly grow" (236).

The ghosts return the favour of Posthumus's enduring affection. They intervene with Jupiter in order to defend their son; they circle him and lament that they could not "shield" him from "earth-vexing smart" (136). The ghosts recount the rather large list of "smarts" that have struck Posthumus, a list that includes not only his loss of them, but also his loss of Innogen. The shield they could not provide after death is realized in the tablet that covers Posthumus's breast after the dream dissolves. Their protection of

Posthumus in the dream transforms into the record that preserves Posthumus's own history; the tablet supplements the history of "mortal accidents" with the consolation that Posthumus will one day "end his miseries" (237). This sounds suspiciously like the tablet looks forward to Posthumus's death. In any case, Posthumus's shield now, and in the future, is the translation of the emotional bond (between the ghosts and Posthumus) into the material record (the tablet). The irony of this scene is that the ghosts' rhythmical, emotional address to Posthumus sounds very much like a eulogy for him. The dead mourn the living, and the reversal of the usual direction of grief implicates the audience, who are also, in some sense circling Posthumus, in the protective act of addressing the dead.

The tablet Jupiter places on Posthumus's chest is a prophetic assertion. Onstage, however, the outstretched, sleeping man, with a stone tablet resting on his chest, must resemble a funeral effigy or tomb statue. Moreover, the entire sequence parallels the Catholic burial service, in which a written absolution is placed on the chest of the dead body before its burial. Jupiter's speech insistently balances images of the body's stillness (and similarity to a tomb statue) with its anticipated liberation. Jupiter commands the dead to "rest" on "never-withering" banks of the afterlife. Posthumus himself will follow this command, as he will "thrive" and in some ways transcend the narrative on the tablet.

If the dead rest where they are supposed to, referred to imaginatively by Jupiter as Elysium, but with a gesture to the literal resting-place of the dead body in the ground, the living who come mourn will be fruitfully rest-less, that is actively and continuously engaged with the dead and productive of a growing community of bodies that spans past, present and future. Jupiter contends, crucially, that Posthumus's crosses, that is, his

many “accidents,” will help make Posthumus a “gift”. For whom is the gift created and by whom will it be delivered? The cross, which is a word for trouble, but also an object that marks a grave, becomes a gift, that is, a space of exchange between the living and the dead. The strange interaction between the ghosts and Jupiter touches on the full range of feelings that the mourner can expect to feel for the dead: hope in and comfort from the notion of an immortal afterlife where the living and the dead can be consummated, and anxiety about the likelihood of this possibility that inspires impatience. The ghosts, as forces of that disturb rest, balance Jupiter, who advances interpretive closure.

Posthumus expresses his new-found connection to the resting-place of the dead and the restless activity of the mourner by awaking and wondering “what fairies haunt this ground?” (5.3.227). The question, a mark of curiosity, echoes Guiderius’s own response to Fidele’s death in Act Four, Scene Two. There he denies and acknowledges the fact of death in strikingly similar terms. “Why, he but sleeps,” Guiderius assures himself and other, “If he be gone he’ll make his grave a bed. / With female fairies will his tomb be haunted. / And worms will not come to thee” (217-19). Guiderius betrays a conflicted response to death; he refuses the fact of death, but reveals that he cannot avoid it in the flux between the ground as grave, then bed, then tomb. For Guiderius, and for Posthumus too, the resting place is a place of restless motion between comfort and discomfort. While Guiderius channels this restlessness into the completion of the burial activities, Posthumus leaves the ghosts and the tablet open to future interpretation. He refuses a final explanation that would “untie” the interpretive knots he reads in the tablet, thereby leaving the address of the dead, to use Jupiter’s logic, more delayed and, in the process, more delightful, or affective.

Henry VIII: Weary Bones

The deaths of Buckingham, Wolsey and Katherine in *Henry VIII* (along with the deaths of Anne Boleyn, Henry VIII and Elizabeth, which are foreshadowed) are not simply historical realities that the playwrights must dramatize in the process of elucidating a larger history: they *are* the history. Shakespeare and Fletcher deliberately choose to ruminate on the ends of lives, an emphasis that impels editor William Winter to lament in his 1878 play-text that "there is more of suffering than of action" in the play (Preface). In fact, the death of each character is woven intensely into the experiences of those that remain on the stage and in the audience; each demise asks survivors and mourners to confront their own feelings about the past. A particularly effective example of this entanglement occurs when Wolsey blesses Thomas More, his replacement as Lord Chancellor. The blessing, ironic and quixotic, anticipates the arc of More's life, while it enacts the formation of a historical narrative to frame that journey even before it has occurred. Neither movement, the actual journey through life and the process of relating that journey, is linear or finite. When he learns More has replaced him, Wolsey immediately looks ahead to his death:

> May he continue
> Long in his highness' favour, and do justice
> For truth's sake and his conscience, that his bones,
> When he has run his course and sleeps in blessings,
> May have a tomb of orphan's tears wept on him.
> What more? (3.2.395-98)

Wolsey wishes that a "tomb of orphans' tears" will be "wept on" More after his death. The diction of the phrase is difficult at best.[32] In this strange image, the materials of

[32] Arden editor Gordon McMullan calls this a "curious image" in his notes to this line (358).

mourning, the tomb, merges with the expression of grief. For Shakespeare, the dead are immobilized and mobilized by the mourner's address, which span the placing of the dead in the tomb and the carrying out of funeral activities around that tomb. The dead find "continuance," or longer life, through the unchartable emotional response that places of mourning inspire long after the body is rendered inert in the monument.

The audience will know that More already sleeps, has in fact slept for many years before Shakespeare and Fletcher write *Henry VIII*. Wolsey also sleeps by the time the actor voices this speech. Both men sleep in blessing; they become entangled in narratives of prospection and retrospection in Wolsey's staged blessing, which is both history and prophecy for both historical figures at this moment. Moreover, at the very moment Wolsey blesses More's bones, he resists acknowledging that death marks the cessation of the life of those bones when he turns to the metaphor that they "sleep."

Despite his death, More is destined for future awakening. It seems, then, that the material body can never fully "run" its "course"; and history, itself suspended between anticipation and recollection, never finishes its work. Wolsey's imaginative suspension of More's body between life and death puts extra stress on the initial lines of the blessing ("May he continue / Long"), which self-reflexively enacts a form of continuance as the phrase runs from the first to the second line. At the end of the blessing, Wolsey`s query of Cromwell, "what more?", which seems an abrupt request for more information after the blessing. In fact, this question carries out the task of continuance. "What more" is a clever reminder that the historical narrative (here in the form of a blessing) carries on after the death of the historical figure. The end of history's narration (at first a task that seems to have run its course when Wolsey's blessing ends) marks the beginning of future

response, narrativisation and query. The question figuratively opens up More's tomb once again. The blessing is thus a surplus to the life it describes, rather than a passive mirror of that life; it is "more" than More. When Wolsey inquires of Cromwell, "what more?," he orients his audience, both staged and real, to the surplus available when those who remember the past envision the dead as resting and restless.

Wolsey anticipates the arc of More's life. Shakespeare pays attention to the full arc of Wolsey's own life, even though the play dramatizes only his attack on Katherine and his fall. Wolsey's decline has less to do with the specifics of the politics involved than the opportunity it offers Wolsey to feel the frailty, or weariness, of his body, imagine its rest after death and prepare for its resurrection in future historical narratives. The remarkable shift Wolsey makes from villain to hero is a source of much debate among critics of the play. Some cite this transformation in the process of arguing that the play is dramatically weak. Others indicate the change is evidence of the play's interest in the rapid rise and fall of political favour. Wolsey's political rise and fall underlines the natural rise and fall of the human body as it passes through the natural world and faces the possibility of an afterlife in a spiritual world.

Rudnytsky argues that Shakespeare "gathers up and comments self-consciously on the overriding problem confronting historical writers," which is a wealth of contradictory accounts of the past (49). Wolsey's speeches after his fall concentrate heavily on the process of confronting the death of the physical body and considering how it should be recalled in future historical accounts. In a rhetorically powerful speech in Act Three Scene Two Wolsey comes to terms with his impending ruin. "I have *touched* the highest point of all my *greatness*," Wolsey admits, "And from that *full* meridian of

my glory / I haste now to my setting" (223-25 my italics). Wolsey's decline from the zenith of political influence should be read also as his body's decline and its advancement towards death. In fact, the political reading of his words is the surface reading. Underneath this obvious recounting of his political demise lies Wolsey's own confrontation with the life-cycle, death and afterlife of the human body, which is a deeper way of understanding the play's interest in images of rise and fall. Wolsey reflects on the "state of man" and this reflection is not about a political state, but the state of the body across time. He informs the audience in soliloquy,

> This is the state of man. Today he puts forth
> The tender leaves of hopes; tomorrow blossoms [...]
> The third day comes a frost, a killing frost,
> And when he think, good easy man, full surely
> His greatness is a-ripening, nips his root
> And then he falls, as I do. (3.2.352-8)

Wolsey explains the states of the body in growth and decline; each state, or "day" advances decay and makes the hope for resurrection more urgent. Yet, Wolsey describes no summit to the rise; the body is in the process of "a-ripening" when it falls. His perspective is that the body itself lies between the rise and fall; growth and decay are indivisible. When Wolsey explains the "state" of man, he in fact refers to plural states that have no defined beginning, aside from "today," which evades a sense of origin by looking back at the birth of the plant in the present-tense.

Moreover, the fall, which ought to signal the end of the life-cycle, in fact inspires another rise. At the moment when he is most conscious of the finitude of earthly existence, Wolsey exclaims that he "feel[s]" his heart is "new opened" (366). The act of reflecting on the "state of man" has produced another state, a way of resurrecting the human body through a sustained engagement with its strength *and* weakness. At the start

of this powerful soliloquy, Wolsey in fact refuses to return the parting nicety of "farewell" offered by Norfolk. In another indication that his "end" will be deferred, Wolsey hopes instead for a "long farewell" (351). Like Arviragus, Wolsey sees value in protracting the leave-taking. This narrative protraction, delay of the end through the crafting of "long" interpretations of the end, sees Wolsey anticipate an afterlife for his body in the memorial constructions of others.

Wolsey prepares an afterlife for his body by encouraging Cromwell, strangely enough, to think about his dead body. He asks Cromwell to cease weeping in a clever bid to inspire yet more sorrow. In fact, the entire speech attempts to secure memory without seeming to require it by situating this memory in the heart of the act of mourning. Wolsey asks an end the shared sorrow between the two men as they weep together, a sympathetic union between two living friends. He instead anticipates Cromwell's interpretation of a dead friend. Shakespeare and Fletcher reorient the bond that links the living together to an association through the remembrance of the dead. The rhetoric of this reorientation is sophisticated:

> Let's dry our eyes, and thus far hear me, Cromwell,
> And when I am forgotten, as I shall be,
> And sleep in dull cold marble, where no mention
> Of me more must be heard of, say I taught thee.
> Say Wolsey, that once trod the ways of glory
> And sounded all the depths and shoals of honour,
> Found thee a way, out of his wreck, to rise in
> A sure and safe one, though thy master missed it. (3.2.431-8)

When Wolsey refers to his dead body as entombed, and thereby calls into practice a wide range of beliefs that accompany entombing. In the silent rest of death that Wolsey imagines, restless interpretive work carries on. The act of mourning requires that the living remember the deceased; it looks back at the past with a specific narrative to protect

about that past. Wolsey envisions Cromwell rising out of Wolsey's "wreck," but in securing this narrative for future re-telling, Wolsey will be spoken of, and his own body will rise out of the "dull cold marble" of anonymity and forgetfulness. Wolsey's imagined body lies at the heart of the negation of an individual's life-story by death and the production of an individual's history in the rituals that attend to the dead. In the image of entombment, Wolsey finds a way to describe his "long farewell." The "sure and safe" rest of a body that remains untouched by human attention, is disturbed by the continued meaningfulness of the body to those who recall the dead. The body is entombed by the "dull and cold marble", and it is, at the same time, continually addressed by the invested, and therefore anything-but-dull, mourner.

Wolsey jettisons his ties to the world of materials and offers Cromwell an "inventory" of his belongings (3.2.451). His last words to Cromwell are recorded as a death-bed speech in Cavendish. In Shakespeare and Fletcher's play, the discovery of Wolsey's treason, the king's condemnation of Wolsey, Wolsey's fall and lament of the fall are compressed into one great scene. A vast range of years play on stage in a rapid succession. In one sense, this hurries Wolsey's "farewell," yet in another sense, it lengthens it; Wolsey's actions while very much alive read as a part of a long prelude to his death. All of his speeches in this scene, then, have been cast in the light of the death-bed speech because there is no clear division between Wolsey living and Wolsey dying. Thus, Wolsey's disposition of his material goods sounds like the preparation of a will by the dying man. The "inventory" of bequeathed materials becomes an important parallel to the inventory of Wolsey's character, which is passed to Cromwell by Wolsey himself and, later in the play, to Katherine by Griffith.

Wolsey also contends that his last and only possessions are his "robe" and "integrity to heaven" (452-3). The robe, the final material link between Wolsey and his former "honour," could establish a further association between honour and corruption if it is understood as a burial shroud. Shakespeare and Fletcher connect the dressing of the dying and dead in their last material possessions, to the address of the dead by historiographical and biographical writings. The wrapping of the dead body in shrouds and winding-cloths conceals the body's corruption from witnesses before the body is buried. It also symbolically prepares the body to rest, or sleep, in the grave until the body is resurrected. Yet these wrappings are also an undeniable mark of the dominance of organic corruption; they supplement a body that deteriorates rapidly. Similarly, the historiographical text can preserve the life-stories of the dead; but because there is no one truthful version of the story in source material, and because the process of writing and printing such stories is not without error, textual corruptions will inevitably occur. As Hall admits, "in many words, a lie or twain soon may escape" (vi). The text that aspires to comprehensiveness will inevitably include more errors; corruption and truth are co-contributors of historical honesty.

Shakespeare and Fletcher's play seizes the dynamic of which Hall writes, and Wolsey defines corruption as a malicious opinion. In his spate of biblical advice to Cromwell, he exhorts "[c]orruption wins not more than honesty / Still in thy right hand carry gentle peace / To silence envious tongues" (444-6). While Wolsey argues against corruption, his construction of the phrase is awkward, and places the word "corruption" in greater prominence than the intended emphasis, which is "honesty." If he hopes to assert the dominance of honesty over corruption, Wolsey produces a text that challenges

this assertion; he claims honesty by suggesting that corruption "wins not more." In the battle between honesty and corruption, it appears there is no clear resolution, but rather a careful balance in which corruption could potentially win "as much as" honesty, though not more. Like the burial shroud that conceals corruption of the body at the same time that it testifies to its undeniable presence, Wolsey's speech argues against textual corruption at the same time that it inadvertently testifies to its inevitability.

Wolsey's aspiration to a restful sleep after death for his physical body requires a sustained interpretive engagement by those who tell his story. The "sure and safe" path he endorses depends on Cromwell's ability to preserve the integrity of Wolsey's example; Wolsey's story can only be sustained if its future interpreters read it as a vital conditioner of their own actions. He encourages Cromwell's continued attention in the future as he commands it in the present. The story, therefore, is never fully finished; it has prepared for its own preservation by making the future a part of the full history. Cromwell is thus indefinitely tied to Wolsey through the union of their individual experience in one narrative.

Wolsey cultivates a sustained connection between his history and the bearers of that history by noticing that the vulnerabilities of his body are part of the "state of man." He finds a stillness and lightness at the moment of feeling the most oppressive weight on his body. He explains this state to Cromwell:

> Never so truly happy, my good Cromwell.
> I know myself now, and I feel within me
> A peace above all earthly dignities,
> A still and quiet conscience. The King has cured me,
> I humbly thank his grace, and from these shoulders,
> These ruined pillars, out of pity, taken
> A load would sink a navy – too much honour.
> O, 'tis a burden, Cromwell, 'tis a burden

Too heavy for a man that hopes for heaven. (3.2.377-85)

Thus, he conceives of his body as achieving rest finally, but only by passing the weight of "too much honour" to Cromwell for his protection. Thus, the balance between corruption and honour asserts itself. Cromwell glories in the state of his deteriorating body, envisioned as a "ruin," because it allows him to relinquish his desire for political triumph; his glory can have an afterlife, but only if others are willing to share the burden.

An important distinction remains. Wolsey finds this "peace above all earthly dignities" only after he has lost those dignities. Wolsey's gracious acceptance of stillness could read as a disingenuous flinging away of ambition in the moment that he realizes it will no longer serve him. Yet, even in this whole-hearted embrace of a "quiet conscience," Wolsey is by no means certain of his fate. He only "hopes" that he has employed honour in a "right use" (386-7). Honour then, the kind of honour Wolsey obtains from turning away from ambition, is still vulnerable to unforeseen corruptions. Wolsey sees this, and it motivates his demand that Cromwell learn from his example. Wolsey does not erase the history of "earthly dignities" that have contributed to his fall, but rather wishes to employ this story to educate future readers. One does not fully and finally rise to a state of honour or fall to a state of corruption; if one is lucky, those who look back on your life will incorporate it into their own lives – this is the way that Shakespeare and Fletcher define the "right use" of honour and the "right use" of history.

In Act Four, Scene Two, Griffith implies a relationship between Wolsey's physical weariness and the strength of his story when he recounts the Cardinal's arrival at, and death in, the abbey in Leicester. Griffith, unaccountably, knows fine details about

Wolsey's death, and helps contribute further to Wolsey's "long farewell." Wolsey, Griffith says, informs the abbot that

> 'An old man, broken with the storms of state,
> Is come to lay his weary bones among ye.
> Give him a little earth, for charity.' (4.2.21-23)

The rest from travel supplies a nice metaphor for the rest of the body from worldly toil at death. Wolsey longs for rest for his living body and, at the same time, searches for a resting-place for his dead body. The long farewell continues because Wolsey is doubly present in this moment; his use of the present tense "[i]s come" extends the moment of arrival at the abbey indefinitely. The verb breaks through the past narrative to acquire further emphasis as Wolsey reappears in Griffith's dialogue with Katherine. Wolsey hopes to find "a little earth, for charity" before his death, but this need carries forward as an ethical impetus that Griffith heeds. Griffith's narrative becomes another space of "charitable earth" for Wolsey, whose story arrives in this scene as an echo of his arrival at the abbey. Wolsey is held in the process of coming and going, a fluctuation that avoids complete relativity by demanding that Katherine treat the past ethically by conceiving of her own demise as supplement and response to the death of another in the past.

Griffith describes Wolsey's final days with information that is and is not faithful to the account contained in Holinshed's Chronicles:

> About the hour of eight, which he himself
> Foretold should be his last, full of repentance,
> Continual meditations, tears and sorrows,
> He gave his honours to the world again,
> His blessed part to heaven, and slept in peace. (4.2.25-30)

Holinshed records Wolsey's prophetic sense about the time of his death. Holinshed explains that Wolsey death "caused some to call to remembrance how he said the daie

before, that at eight of the clocke they should loose their master" (qtd. in McMullan n.26-30, 376). Holinshed's version of the event stresses that the prophecy has the effect of making mourners remember Wolsey. In framing his death in a prophetic context, Wolsey ensures at least a temporary hold over mourners' responses to his death. Shakespeare and Fletcher incorporate this dynamic in their description of the event through Griffith. When Wolsey anticipates the hour of his death, information that had to be circulated in order to reach Griffith's ears, he once again cultivates the long farewell. To think and talk to others about an impending death means to widen the space between life and death.

Wolsey's history contributes to Katherine's own "long farewell" in the long scene that stages her advancement towards death. At the beginning of Act Four, Scene Two, the lengthy scene that contains her dream, Katherine expresses the sensation of physical and political decline that also marked Wolsey's last speeches. Wolsey imagines his life as the arc of a rising and setting sun. Katherine sees her body on a similar trajectory when she sees her body as a tree branch drooping to the ground:

> My legs like loaden branches bow to th'earth,
> Willing to leave their burden. Reach a chair.
> So. Now, methinks, I feel a little ease. (4.2.2-4)

The act of sitting prepares Katherine to hear and share in the story of Wolsey's death. She must exchange her sensation for his in this instant. As Griffith phrases it, Katherine could not give "ear" to Wolsey's story before this moment "[o]ut of the pain" she suffered (8). The act of resting the body prepares Katherine to takes on Wolsey's experience. This act in turn shapes the story of Wolsey's own death. Griffith recounts Wolsey's physical deterioration and notes that he "grew so ill / He could not sit his mule" (14-15). This detail prompts Katherine to interject in Griffith's story for the first time

("Alas, poor man"), simply because it signifies a point of connection between the opposed individuals. The space in which the physical body hopes to rest is re-imagined as a space for a narrative to flourish, a dialogue to occur. Shakespeare culls this information, Wolsey's inability to sit his mule, from Holinshed. Thus, in a wider sense, the history of Wolsey's death prompts Shakespeare to write Katherine's decline in a particular way. This construction in turn shapes how Wolsey is remembered *inside* the play. This must be a conscious effort on Shakespeare's part to underscore the dialogic exchange of histories both outside and inside the play's world.

Katherine makes the connection between the charitable earth of the grave and the generous dialogue of an honest and reverential history when she begs Griffith, "give me leave to speak him / And yet with charity" immediately after the description of Wolsey's death. Katherine hopes to prepare another sepulcher for Wolsey. Yet, Katherine is incapable of producing a charitable ground for Wolsey's story with her own discourse. Arden editor Gordon McMullan calls attention to the irony of Katherine's claim to a charitable rendition of Wolsey's past, a rendition that quickly slips into a "frank appraisal of the Cardinal's failings" (n. 31-3). Yet, the negativity of Katherine's version is essential because it provokes a balancing response from Griffith. He must complement Katherine's "frank appraisal" with his intention to "speak [Wolsey's] good" (47). The point is that a charitable description of the past negotiates between the "brass" and "water" that records "evil manners" and "virtues" respectively (45-46). This kind of description falls somewhere between solid and fluid, certain and slippery, mean-spirited and flattering. And it is only possible when the producers of history set aside the demand for impartiality. Anston Bosman points out that between Cromwell and Wolsey, tears

represent a "communion of 'honest truth'" that has nothing to do with "conformity with fact," and which signifies an "embodied reciprocity" (469). This same reciprocity develops between Katherine in Wolsey once Katherine respects Wolsey's death in facing her own.

Moreover, the "little earth" for which Wolsey begs becomes a symbolic ground for the grave that Katherine plans for herself at the close of the scene. Her farewell speech is less about how she wishes to be buried than the message that she hopes her women will cultivate through the dressing of her body. Katherine asks of them,

> Let me be used with honour. Strew me over
> With maiden flowers, that all the world may know
> I was a chaste wife to my grave. Embalm me,
> Then lay me forth. (4.2.168-71)

Katherine envisions a process in which the honour with which her women prepare her body is absorbed and reflected back into the world. Once again, Katherine values the circularity of impression. The act of passing from the world is re-imagined by Katherine as a circulation of meaning in which the work and spectator share equal responsibility to recognise, respect and perpetuate "honour."

Katherine's requests for burial have the effect of laying her open to speculation; this impulse goes against the wish of many early modern women. The flowers produce a narrative of marital integrity that seems reasonable enough, but these flowers are legible for "all the world." Even more startling is Katherine's request for embalming. Even if upper-class women had the means to make such a request, they commonly mandated that their body not be embalmed. Elizabeth I refused embalming, although it was required due to the elaborate and long funeral held for her. Katherine wishes to preserve her body, but beyond that, she wishes to preserve a narrative connected to that body. The "laying

forth" of Katherine's body is matched by the message that envelops this activity. The imagined funeral is a vital part of Katherine's own "long farewell"; Shakespeare and Fletcher extend the farewell even longer by leaving Katherine's funeral outside of the play's scope.

Moreover, Katherine literalizes this kind of circularity in her message from Caputius to Henry: "[r]emember me / In all humility unto his highness. / Say his long trouble *now is passing* / Out of this world" (160-63 my italics). Katherine's use of the present tense here recalls Wolsey's words to the abbot ("[a]n old man […] is come") and extends the reach of her words. Katherine's "passing" means more than her death; the word itself registers her reception of Wolsey's history, her ethical configuration of his story through shared feeling, and her transfer of this directive to Caputius and her women. Katherine, like Wolsey, will always be coming and going, endlessly passing, in the ways that her story is continued by others.

Katherine's appreciation for Griffith's measured historicization of Wolsey, the cultivation of this charitable earth, is prepared for in advance by Wolsey himself. For both characters, prominence and power increase until they exhaust themselves. Yet at this moment of the exhaustion of political power, Wolsey finds another kind of power in the play itself. Wolsey "touches" in another way. He finds a dramatic and emotional intensity that the audience cannot help but feel. This explains why Wolsey, at first represented in the play as an arrogant enemy of Katherine, can somehow emerge from the play with traces of the tragic about him. Shakespeare demonstrates the power of historical imagination, and the emotional intensity upon which it thrives, by situating this effect in a figure for which the audience is already disposed to feel nothing but contempt.

Wolsey himself participates in this establishment of a strange and powerful form of charity after Surrey levels several charges against him. "How much, methinks, I could despise this man," Wolsey comments, "But that I am bound in charity against it" (297-8). Once again the editor of the Arden edition points to the irony embedded in this statement, because Wolsey has been nothing close to charitable in the play. Both Katherine and Wolsey make these expressions of charity, however, in order to establish the ethical demand for "honest chronicling" in situations that are most difficult for the audience to digest. What Wolsey feels for Surrey, the audience has felt for Wolsey. Wolsey recognizes that he is "bound in charity" in order to prompt the audience to realize that we are too "bound in charity" to a character that we could so easily "despise."

Shakespeare establishes this charity by providing Wolsey with emotionally powerful speeches and by linking him closely to Katherine. Rudnytsky reluctantly confronts the character's power. "Wolsey appears at first to be the diabolical agent," he argues, "but after his undoing he becomes a powerfully sympathetic figure" (48). Rudnytsky terms this "reversal of perspectives" a "veiling of truth" (48), but I suggest that through the mobilisation of audience sympathy, Shakespeare discovers the value of such acts of veiling. The moments of uncomfortable discrepancy between what we have seen, and what we must feel only emphasizes how crucial it is to maintain an open-ended engagement with the past. These two versions of Wolsey cannot fully reconcile except in the space that the "honest chronicler" opens up between the living and the dead, and the past and the present.

Conclusion:
Passing Through Nature to Eternity

Gertrude: Thou knows't 'tis common – all that lives must die,
Passing through nature to eternity

Hamlet: Ay, madam, it is common.

Gertrude: If it be,
Why seems it so particular to thee?

Hamlet: Seems, madam? Nay, it is, I know not 'seems'.
'Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
Nor customary suits of solemn black,
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
Nor the dejected haviour of the visage,
Together with all forms, moods, shows of grief,
That can denote me truly. These indeed seem,
For they are actions that a man might play.
I have that within which passeth show
These but the suits and trappings of woe. (Hamlet 1.2.76-84)

Hamlet has haunted this study of historiography and mourning from the beginning. He must have the final word. In Hamlet's defence of his grief to his mother, there are two prominent words: "is" and "seems." The line between "is" and "seems" is one that Shakespeare dissolves in his history plays to impress his audience with a sense that the past, and the dead of the past, are forcefully present and lamentably absent. Even though Hamlet claims to "know not 'seems'," unfortunately, the audience can *only* know what his grief seems to be. The "is" of mourning must belong solely to each mourner; the "seems" represents what others can see but cannot confirm as sincere. Yet, Shakespeare pays great attention to the "shows of grief," giving them powerful scope and expecting indeed that the audience will begin to craft their own sense of Hamlet's grief from the evidence of these "shows."

Hamlet, after all, produces yet another "show" of grief with this speech. He begins the speech by asserting that he does not know the state of "seeming," yet after listing the markers of mourning he confirms that "these indeed seem." Hamlet testifies that he feels more deeply than his mourning garments can express, yet what exactly he holds inside himself is never explicitly revealed. Hamlet's expression of grief therefore achieves its power by signalling that it can and cannot be shared by those who listen to it. Hamlet does not, after all, claim that physical manifestations have no place in mourning rituals; he in fact says that they cannot convey the full experience of grief.

Houlbrook describes the very dynamic at play in Hamlet's description of mourning and sorrow. "Grief," Houlbrook explains, "is the suffering caused by deprivation and loss [...] Mourning embraces all grief's outward behavioural manifestations" (220). Hamlet's speech informs us that this division is not so easily discerned. He points out that mourning is powerful because it can be seen, but it is limited because it cannot offer incontrovertible proof of the presence of suffering. Internal suffering, on the other hand, is powerfully undeniable according to the body that is suffering, but the sufferer is incapable of proving this condition to others because it cannot be seen. What is required to "denote" a mourner "truly," is to find faith that what "is" corresponds to what "seems." In this, the mourner and the body that is mourned are the same.

The fundamental link between truth and appearance is the notion of "passing." Recall that de Certeau describes the work of history as the duty to be "passing away endlessly." Gertrude recognizes that the fact of death is universal; each of us is "passing through nature to eternity." She uses this fact to recommend Hamlet cease his mourning.

This, however, is missing the point of the powerful realization that the dead and the living are part of a shared passage through the natural world to their afterlife. Hamlet's point is that this common experience means that those of us who mourn a "particular" loss today will one day furnish the material for others to mourn in similar ways. The moment of each particular loss becomes part of an ongoing mourning. As William E. Engel observes

> an individual's history can be expressed through, and in terms of, the history of the world and that of humanity universally. This double history of the world is haunted, even as it is directed, by the biting question: 'Shall not the portion of my days come soone to an end?'(4).

Gertrude cannot recognize that there is something like a "double history" moving Hamlet in his grief. Hamlet already cultivates a much more sophisticated notion of the ability of grief and mourning to situate the individual in history and find a history for the individual. We pass from mourner to mourned, and each role is defined by the ways in which we share and cannot share this experience with others. Hamlet is disturbed by the particular death of his father. As the play makes clear, though, he is also disturbed by the fact that his history will converge with his father's at the moment of death.

Gertrude also fails to recognize the value of a conjunction between individual and communal grief. If each person experienced grief in the same manner, there would be no need to test the discrepancy between seems and is. Because the experience is particular to each person, each person must testify to the honesty of their feeling. If each person experienced grief in the same manner, there would be no need to share this experience or challenge its sincerity. Discourse and interpretive activity flourishes at the point where the particular and common meet.

When Lucius discovers Innogen draped over Cloten's dead body, he discovers the power of a mourning that "seems." Innogen-Cloten, a hybrid of the dead and living at this moment, provokes witnesses to make the passage from appearance to reality to determine the particulars of a scene that "seems" to suggest deep grief on the part of Innogen. It is fitting that Lucius makes this discovery at the moment of his own passing-by of the scene. Lucius himself is in motion and it is the sight of the body and mourner that diverts his journey into Innogen's journey. "Young one," Lucius asks, "Inform us of thy fortunes, for it seems / They crave to be demanded" (4.2.361-3). Lucius requests a history of Innogen's connection to the body simply because the sight of her draped over the body is so provocative. Innogen herself has become the suit of woe over Cloten's body. The spectator will then have to pass beyond this picture to discover the full extent of the grief that has inspired it.

Innogen explains the depth of her grief by informing Lucius that she will never find a match for Posthumus. This "particular" slant to her account of mourning does not alienate Lucius, but, rather, draws him into the common space of mourning. " 'Lack, good youth," he exclaims, "Thou movs't no less with thy complaining than / Thy master in bleeding. Say his name, good friend" (375-7). Lucius has made the passage from the world of appearance to the world of subjective emotion along with Innogen. Lucius's response to Innogen's grief records that the body and the mourner of the body are equally capable of moving those who watch them. Alone they are each affecting; together, when the mourner is so close to the dead that she immerses her own body in the remnants of the dead body, the spectator can find the faith that the interior world of human suffering matches its physical representation. With his request for the body's name, though, and

with Innogen's deceptive reply, the friendship produced by mourning becomes yet more complicated. Shakespeare allows this irony to mirror the irony that the body does not even belong to Posthumus and that the entire scene is a performance by actors. Innogen and Lucius's communion here is in fact a "show," even though neither realizes it. There is honest grief in a performance of mourning, it seems; the audience of *Cymbeline* must carry on the task, as their brief journey through the space of the theatre becomes intricately linked to the individuals and the history that passes by onstage.

Hamlet hopes that spectators will "denote" him "truly." Katherine of Aragon has a similar hope in *Henry VIII* when she informs Griffith "[a]fter my death I wish no other herald, / No other speaker of my living actions, / To keep my honour from corruption / But such an honest chronicler as Griffith" (4.2.69-72). Hamlet is a mourner and Katherine anticipates becoming the body that is mourned; both are concerned about maintaining the integrity of the dead. Shakespeare's achievement, particularly striking in the three plays of this study, is that he takes new measure of what it means to be an honest historian. The ethical historian becomes so enmeshed with his material that the facts of the past become "living actions" once more.

Practices of mourning have been marshalled here to suggest that the living maintain contact with the dead by making gestures of fidelity to death. What is fidelity to death, or fidelity to the dead? It acknowledges the inevitability of mortality for all, and uses this fact as a starting-point in crafting a narrative about the body that testifies to its enduring relevance over time; the body's vulnerabilities *make* history—by manifesting the passage of time, marking the passing of one generation to another, and by inspiring the living to think and write about the past. The awareness of an overlap between the

"common" fact of death and the "particular" experience of mourning a loved-one produces a community of bodies. The living continue to the feel for the people of the past and, in turn, the people of the past continue to speak.

The act of maintaining vision on the departing body transforms an emotional connection between two living bodies into a physical connection between the living body and the dead body. The desire to face the dead body is, after all, a desire to pay tribute to the history of that body. A feature of the physical connection between the living and the dead is the experience of suffering. A mourner may refuse her own bodily requirements as part of a watch that extends hours, perhaps days. The point is not that the mourner steps into the place of the dead by trying to experience or imagine the pangs of death. Rather, the mourner experiences her physical limitations as part of the larger inevitability of the decline of the body. The dead and the living are bound up in the same processes, and yet the living still maintain a critical perspective of this journey. The watch encapsulates this doubled experience of the work of time.

Prophetic knowledge in the history play facilitates another doubled experience of time. Prophecies that look forward in the world of the play derive, in fact, from an act of hindsight pn the part of the playwright and audience. What is truly powerful and predictive about these moments of divining the future is that the characters' emotional reaction to their utterance and realization can be reinforced by the audience. There is still something contingent about a prophecy; contexts can be uncertain, but their power to evoke an emotional response means that they continue to inspire narratives that interpret the past. The prophecy enables an exchange between the past and the future, and they, therefore, constitute an example of the birth of historiographical work.

Like prophetic language, the address of the living to the dead at the resting place enables a productive exchange between the past and the present. The mourner deftly crafts narratives about the dead in ways parallel to the activities of preserving the body or adorning the grave. The body is prepared to look restful even as the mourner launches a restless interrogation of the processes of decay. The materials that dress the body and grave are not capable of inhibiting fully these processes. Yet, it is their imperfection that invites the interpretive activity of the mourner. If there was not something unsettling about the thought of the body in the cerements or the grave, then the living could finish the work of wondering about the overlap between the temporal and spiritual worlds. Their inability to finish the work of mourning contributes to Shakespeare's vision of a kind of remembering that is deeply invested in the past, but also critically aware of the fact that this investment must be maintained over time because the materials of mourning, the grave-clothes, and the grave itself are no more exempt from decay than is the body of the deceased itself.

Posthumus expresses his loyalty to Innogen at the beginning of *Cymbeline* by comparing it to the "bonds of death" (1.1.118). This is a strange way of describing devotion, but it is beautifully expressive in light of the play's emphasis on keeping faith with nature. Posthumus contends that his love, like the unassailable power of death, is incapable of being undermined. He takes this connection a step further in offering up his future embracements to be "cered up" (117), so that they cannot be given to another. At this moment, Posthumus locates his greatest strength at the site of his greatest vulnerability: his death. The cere-cloth that will wrap his body becomes an emblem for his steadfastness. He will refer to this dynamic at the end of the play when he imagines

his arms that surround Innogen as tree-limbs that will one day perish. All at once he demonstrates "faith unto death" by being loyal to Innogen until he dies and also by maintaining the fact of death by speculating about it. Innogen does the same at the start of the play when comparing her separation from Posthumus to death. "There cannot be a pinch in death / More sharp than is this" she decides (1.1.131). Although her view of the death is more negative than Posthumus's, Innogen sees an equal power in it. She ruminates on the "sharpness" of separation by imagining Posthumus as departing and, thereby, shrinking in her vision to a point "as sharp" as her "needle" (1.3.19). These descriptions of death and separation only underscore each character's unusual fidelity. Shakespeare translates this personal fidelity to the broader "bonds of death" that unite the living with the dead.

As part of paying heed to the "bonds of death," the living have a duty to enact funeral rituals that keep watch over the dead, look forward to the future, and invite imaginative interpretation from mourners and passers-by. As Arviragus laments when burying Fidele, there are far too many "rich-left heirs that let their fathers lie / Without a monument" (4.2.227-8). In sharing an affective bond with those who mourn and are mourned on the stage, the audience becomes the "rich-left heirs" of Shakespeare's dramatic histories. If we care for the dead as Arviragus does, we will confirm that Shakespeare's profound consideration of ethical historiography is a legacy worth preserving.

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