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The politics of Northern Ontario:
An analysis of the political divergences at the provincial periphery

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment
of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts

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To my family

CONTENTS

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ABSTRACT

From the outset, Northern Ontario has existed as an exploited natural resource region, vulnerable to the vicissitudes of a "boom and bust" verity. This has had profound effects on its ensuing political patterns and political processes. This thesis describes how and why the politics of Northern Ontario are different. This thesis demonstrates that the politics of Northern Ontario, unlike Southern Ontario, are distinguished by disaffection, dependency, domination, pragmatism, and parochialism. This thesis also argues that the North's divergent development and natural resource based economy, as well as pernicious provincial government policies and extensive interventions, provoked the differences apparent in its politics. These differences are evinced in the North's disparate political culture, political priorities, and political structure. Furthermore, this thesis confirms that Northern Ontario politics feature a low level of political efficacy which is primarily the result of its "centre-periphery" connection with Southern Ontario.

Dès son début, le Nord-Ontarien a existé à titre d'une région exploitée pour ses ressources naturelles qui s'avéra vulnérable aux vicissitudes des "marées économiques" du secteur industriel. Conséquemment, la procédure et les modèles politiques que ont évalué dans le Nord subirent un effet considérable. Cette thèse décrit pourquoi et comment la politique du Nord de l'Ontario s'avère particuliere. Il sera démontré que contrairement à la politique Sud-Ontarienne, la politique Nord-Ontarienne se distingue par la désaffectation, la dépendance, la domination, le pragmatisme, et l'esprit de clocher. De plus, il sera argué que le développement divergent du Nord, son économie à base de ressources naturelles ainsi que les politiques pernicieuses et les interventions fréquentes du gouvernement provincial, sont tous des facteurs qui ont provoqué les différences apparentes dans sa politique. La culture politique disparate, les priorités politiques, et la structure politique du Nord mettent en évidence ses distinctions. En outre, cette thèse confirme que la politique du Nord de l'Ontario exhibe très peu d'efficacité politique en conséquence de son bien "centre-péripherie" au sud de l'Ontario.

INTRODUCTION

Ensconced at the provincial periphery, in a wilderness of rocks, waters, and woods, it is discerned that the politics of Northern Ontario were formed by both internal and external factors. Internally, by its risky natural resource based economy and, externally, by pernicious provincial government policies and extensive interventions. From the outset, Northern Ontario has existed as an exploited natural resource hinterland for the financial and manufacturing heartland of Southern Ontario, and has been forever vulnerable to the vicissitudes of a "boom and bust" verity. Northern Ontario is dependent on natural resource industries for its subsistence. This dependency has provoked several significant problems for its society and has had profound effects on its ensuing political development. As Oiva Saarinen confirms, the North's close dependency on natural resource industries has imbued its communities with a number of common characteristics which include small populations, slow growth rates, a narrow economic base, domination by powerful exogenous economic forces, isolation, instability, uncertainty, as well as poorly developed physical, cultural, and social infrastructures.[1]

Divergences in the political development of Northern Ontario have produced disparate political patterns and political processes which serve to differentiate the region from Southern Ontario. Indeed, the politics of Northern Ontario are different and this has caused many complications for the region and for the province. A recognition of these inherent differences by the provincial government, however, has been rendered only recently and rather reluctantly. Subsequently, Northern Ontario, with its own specific problems, has remained dissatisfied with its diminutive position within the province. Continuing to disregard the North and its distinct concerns and issues, however, will continue to distance the region and ensure that it remains at the periphery of provincial politics.

The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to discern the fundamental differences in the politics of Northern Ontario. In the process, it seeks to elucidate the ways in which the North can overcome its dependency. Thus, this thesis poses the following questions:

How are the politics of Northern Ontario different? Why are the politics of Northern Ontario different? In response, this thesis demonstrates that the politics of Northern Ontario are different primarily because of its divergent development. Quite simply, the North did not develop like the South. In contrast to the growth which occurred in Southern Ontario, which was slow and cultivated from a relatively resilient, but stable, agricultural and manufacturing base, the growth of Northern Ontario was rapid and germinated from the exigencies of natural resource discoveries and demands. Unlike the South, the development of the North was determined by provincial government policies and extensive interventions which were designed to perpetuate the exploitation of natural resources in the region and inhibit economic diversification. Industrialists and their lucrative natural resource industries provided the profits from which were procured the funds that the provincial government used to finance elaborate projects and expenditures in the South. This was facilitated by the fact that the North was essentially comprised of Crown lands and, consequently, the provincial government had proprietary rights over these lands and could administer them as it saw fit; leasing the land to the natural resource industries, ostensibly, in the interests of Ontarians. As a function of its development around a relatively unstable natural resource economic base, the politics of Northern Ontario have become distinguished by unique traits which are not prevalent in Southern Ontario, namely, dependency, domination, disaffection, pragmatism, and parochialism. Furthermore, the politics of Northern Ontario are different from those of Southern Ontario in terms of its disparate political patterns, that is, its political culture, political priorities, and political structure.

The predominance of natural resources in the North, however, did not determine the political patterns that ensued. But its subordinate position as a natural resource hinterland for the South, protracted by a progression of provincial governments and industrialists, did cause these political patterns to be distinct. The divergent development of Northern Ontario created a natural resource based economy from which emerged the differences which are now evident in its politics. These political differences are not necessarily the products of its natural resource basis, rather, they are the products of its

divergent development. Discontent in the North, emanating from serious social, economic, and political inequalities, induced a high level of dependency and a low level of political efficacy which was perpetuated by a "centre-periphery" connection with the South. Essentially, Northern Ontario developed in a way which ensured that the majority of the benefits, both economic and political, percolating from the exploitation of its natural resources would be filtered off and given to Southern Ontario. The benefits were not equitably shared. The repercussions from this distorted economic system have had a substantial impact on Northern Ontario politics. Thus, the centre-periphery perspective is the theoretical lens through which this thesis will examine the differences evinced in the politics of Northern Ontario.

This thesis seeks to explicate how and why the politics of Northern Ontario are different. In doing so, it seeks to provide a comprehensive and contextual analysis of the politics of Northern Ontario. Some contrasts and comparisons are made with the politics of Southern Ontario as well. This thesis is divided into four chapters. In Chapter One, the political environment of the North is described and discussed. This includes a delineation of the geographic, demographic, and economic setting within which the politics of Northern Ontario have transpired. In Chapter Two, the political and historical development of the North is outlined. This chapter traces the evolution of Northern Ontario from the period prior to European penetration of the region in the seventeenth century to the present, and illustrates the importance of natural resources throughout. In Chapter Three, the political patterns that are distinct to the North are appraised. This chapter analyzes how the politics of Northern Ontario are different. In Chapter Four, the centre-periphery connection between the North and the South is examined. The centre-periphery perspective is then used to explain why the politics of Northern Ontario are different. This chapter concludes by arguing that the centre-periphery connection between the North and the South will likely persist. The provincial government and the natural resource industries still have a vested interest in sustaining the subjugation and exploitation of Northern Ontario. While it is conceded that the provincial government has, in recent years, attempted to ameliorate, or at least mitigate, many of the negative

effects of the natural resource economy of Northern Ontario, it has not made any efforts to correct the underlying centre-periphery connection. Thus, the provincial government has perpetuated its domination of the North. Vulnerability was, and always will be, therefore, the verity of Northern Ontario's existence at the provincial periphery.

INTRODUCTION: NOTES

1. Oiva W. Saarinen, "Single Sector Communities in Northern Ontario: The Creation and Planning of Dependent Towns," *Power and Place: Canadian Urban Development in the North American Context*, Gilbert A. Stelter and Alan F. J. Artibise, eds. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press; 1986), 228.

CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Fundamental to discerning the differences in the politics of Northern Ontario, this chapter focuses on the political environment of the North, that is, its geographic, demographic, and economic setting within which the politics of the region are rendered. In the process, this chapter demonstrates that this part of the province is different. These differences are primarily the products of its divergent development and, invariably, are associated with its function as a natural resource frontier. This chapter begins by outlining the geography of Northern Ontario, then progresses to its demography, and concludes by describing its economy.

GEOGRAPHY

With regards to regionalism in the province, R. H. MacDermid elucidates that "[o]nly one's imagination limits the number of ways one can divide up a pie. And seen from afar, rather than experienced up close, Ontario can seem to be all of one slice or divisible into many."[1] Northern Ontario, however, is the only region in the province to be officially recognized in Ontario law. The region used to be generally regarded as consisting of all the districts north of the French River and Lake Nippissing, but in 1988, the provincial government redefined Northern Ontario to include all ten districts in the province: Algoma; Cochrane; Kenora; Manitoulin; Nippissing; Parry Sound; Rainy River; Sudbury; Thunder Bay; and Temiskaming.[2] Nevertheless, Northern Ontario is typically divided into three subregions: the Northeast; the Northwest; and the Far North.[3] Given the predominance and portent of the exploitation of natural resources in the North, it is not surprising that the divisions between these three regions is usually based on their primary economic pursuits. The Northeast is primarily dependent on the mining industries, while the Northwest is primarily dependent on the forestry industries. The Far North, consisting of the territory beyond 50 degrees latitude, is dependent on the fishing, hunting, and fur trapping industries.

Northern Ontario is vast. It encompasses 88.4 percent of the total land area of Ontario, or more precisely, 810, 411 square kilometres of the total 916, 734.[4] To put this vastness into perspective, in terms of total land area, Northern Ontario is smaller than Quebec, which has a total land area of 1, 540, 700 square kilometres, and British Columbia, which has a total land area of 948, 596 square kilometres, but is larger than the other provinces in Canada.[5] The northwestern part of Northern Ontario has a total land area of 287, 159 square kilometres which is approximately the same size as Italy (i.e. 294, 000 square kilometres), whereas the northeastern part of Northern Ontario has a total land area of 294, 000 square kilometres which is about the same size as France (i.e. 547, 000 square kilometres).[6] More than 90 percent of this vast area, or nearly 730, 000 square kilometres, is publicly owned in the form of Crown lands, and its use is regulated, ostensibly in the interests of Ontarians, by the provincial government.

As Geoffrey Weller reveals, to refer to Northern Ontario as the "North" may be somewhat misleading, although it is north of the "golden horseshoe" of Southern Ontario, because the majority of the North is, in actuality, west of the South.[7] Only a small portion of the region extends east of 80 degrees longitude which is far from the easterly provincial boundary at 74 degrees longitude, while a large portion of the region extends west past Lake Superior to the westerly provincial boundary at 95 degrees longitude.[8] References to "Northern Ontario" may also be misleading because the North is not really that north in comparative terms. In fact, most of the region is south of the southern boundaries of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia. Thunder Bay, for example, is at the same latitude as Paris, France, while the most northerly point in Northern Ontario at Hudson Bay is at the same latitude as Edinburgh, Scotland.[9] As Weller affirms, it is Northern Ontario's physiographic rather than its geographic location which has endowed it with its distinctive "northern ambience."[10]

Northern Ontario comprises two diverse physiographic regions: the Canadian Shield and the Hudson Bay Lowlands. The rugged Canadian Shield, rising north from a horizontal line drawn roughly at Georgian Bay, is punctuated with a profusion of rocks, woods, and waters. The Canadian Shield region consists of thin, acidic soils, a plethora

of lakes and rivers, rocky outcrops, and expanses of Boreal forests. Reflecting on the historical importance of the Canadian Shield to Northern Ontario, Donald Creighton eloquently concedes that

> [t]he Shield, the enormous irregular triangle of rocky, ravaged upland, had been both a barrier to economic progress and a bulwark of economic development. These ancient, worn-down rocks, with their vast stretches of towering conifers, their elaborate mazes of lakes, lakelets, rivers, falls, rapids, and spillways, had been the basis of both the fur trade and the timber trade. There had been two great "crops" in the Precambrian Shield. Men had exploited its animals and forests; but now they were to tear out wealth and power from its soils, and rocks, and waters. The North became the great new impulse of Canadian life. It filled men's pockets and fired their imaginations.[11]

For the iconoclastic W. J. Eccles, however, the "muskeg, moose-pasture, and black-fly country north of the Great Lakes" had convinced him that "Canada stood sorely in need of some judicious editing."[12] In contrast to the Canadian Shield, the swampy Hudson Bay Lowlands are not nearly as illustrious. Swirling around the shores of the Hudson Bay, the flat Lowlands descend only slightly south and are permeated with poorly drained soils, peat bogs, mire, scanty shrubbery, and few trees.[13]

Aside from its geology, the northern ambience of Northern Ontario is created by its brisk climate. According to L. J. Chapman and M. K. Thomas, the climate of Northern Ontario consists of cool summers and cold winters and may be classified as "modified continental," which is partly due to the proximity of the Great Lakes in the south and the Hudson Bay in the north.[14] As air masses pass over these immense water bodies and into the region, the air is cooled which thus produces a brisker climate in the North.[15] As well, there is a persistent pattern of relatively high winter precipitation and low summer precipitation, though not to the extent that it historically exists in the Prairies.[16] With regards to the geology and climate of the region, Weller notes that the physiographic features of Northern Ontario have had marked effects on settlement patterns, which consist primarily of scattered pockets of population huddled around natural resource extraction sites and associated transportation hubs.[17]

DEMOGRAPHY

The population of Northern Ontario is approximately 826, 000, or nearly 8 percent of the provincial total.[18] Of these Northern Ontarians, over 75 percent reside in only five communities, Sudbury, Thunder Bay, Sault Ste. Marie, North Bay, and Timmins; and of those Northerners, over 33 percent reside in the two largest communities: Sudbury and Thunder Bay.[19] Weller indicates that outside of these "major" communities, the population of Northern Ontario resides in 162 municipalities, 50 of which are single-industry natural resource communities, and over 60 percent of which have fewer than 2500 residents.[20] While the provincial population has been increasingly rapidly, the population of Northern Ontario has been steadily decreasing. In the last twenty years, for example, the North's proportion of the Ontario population declined over 2 percent.[21] The population of Northern Ontario is highly diverse, ethnically, racially, and religiously, which is one of its most unique virtues.[22] This is a function of the time at which immigration took place and of the type of economic development which occurred in the North. At the turn of the twentieth century, the allure of fortunes to be made exploiting the natural resources in the Northern Ontario frontier incited the eagerness of industrialists willing to invest, as well as the eagerness of immigrants willing to work. These immigrants, mostly of Finnish, German, Italian, and Ukrainian descent, along with the initial Aboriginal, French, and British inhabitants of the region, imparted to Northern Ontario an indelibly distinctive character which has persevered up to the present. The natural resource economy of the North is another of its distinctive, but often deleterious, attributes.

ECONOMY

Wrought with the bare hands of Northern Ontarians, calloused, bruised, and broken, the economy of the North has been bolstered by the extraction and exportation of its natural resources. The dominant industries in Northern Ontario all revolve around the

exploitation, either directly or indirectly, of natural resources: mining; forestry; hydroelectric generating; transportation (e.g. railways, trucking); tourism; fishing; hunting; and fur trapping. Although there is some agriculture (e.g. silage corn, hay, barley, and potatoes are cultivated near New Liskeard in the Great Clay Belt area) and some manufacturing (e.g. mining tools and equipment are manufactured near Sudbury) these industries are very limited in the North.[23] Weller insists that the economy of Northern Ontario has been "largely structured on the needs of Southern Ontario" and this is easily evinced in the transportation network of the North which was designed to expedite the exploitation of natural resources to the South, rather than to encourage travel and communication within the region.[24] This lack of economic self-sufficiency and regional integration is exacerbated by the North's dependency. This is primarily because the natural resource industries are owned and controlled by industrialists and corporations based outside of the region, as well as by a legacy of pernicious provincial government policies which have discouraged economic diversification in the North.

CONCLUSION

In constructing and comprehending the politics of Northern Ontario, one of the most important components is an understanding of its distinct political environment. The politics of Northern Ontario are different; the effects of which have imbued every aspect of its setting: its geography; its demography; and its economy. Fundamentally, however, Northern Ontario has been an exploited natural resource region. Its political environment has been structured, by a progression of provincial governments and industrialists, solely for this function. As a result, the North is now one of the most distinct and damaged parts of the province of Ontario.

CHAPTER ONE: NOTES

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2. Ontario, *Hansard: Official Report of Debates* (Toronto: Legislative Assembly of Ontario; June 9, 1988), 4214-4215.

3.Geoffrey Weller, "Politics and Policy in the North," *The Government and Politics of Ontario*, Fifth Edition, Graham White, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 1997), 285.

4. Statistics Canada, *National Overview: 1996 Census of Canada* (Ottawa: Minister of Industry; 1997), 99-114.

5. Rand Dyck, *Provincial Politics in Canada: Towards the Turn of the Century*, Third Edition (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada; 1996), 31, 85, 121, 167, 211, 431, 495, 569.

6. Weller, 286.

7. Ibid, 286.

8.Ibid, 286; and Ontario, *1986 Ontario Statistics* (Toronto: Ministry of Treasury and Economics; 1986), 8-9.

9. Weller, 286.

10. Ibid, 286.

11. Donald Creighton, *Dominion of the North: A History of Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan; 1957), 472-473. Although the term "Canadian Shield" is more predominant, this physiographic region is sometimes fastidiously referred to as the "Precambrian Shield" and the "Laurentian Shield," which are both geologically accurate as well.

12. Ernest Epp, "Northern Ontario: History and Historiography," *The Historiography of the Provincial Norths*, Ken Coates and William Morrison, eds. (Thunder Bay: Lakehead University Centre for Northern Studies; 1996), 83.

13. Royal Commission on the Northern Environment, *North of 50°: an atlas of far Northern Ontario* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 1985), x-xii.

14. L. J. Chapman and M. K. Thomas, *The Climate of Northern Ontario: Climatological Studies #6* (Toronto: Department of Transport Meteorological Branch; 1968), 2.

15. Ibid, 2.

16. Ibid, 2.

17. Weller, 286.

18. Statistics, 99-114.

19. Weller, 287.

20. Ibid, 287.

21. Ibid, 287.

22. Ibid, 287.

23. Rand Dyck, "The Socio-Economic Setting of Ontario Politics," *The Government and Politics of Ontario*, Fifth Edition, Graham White, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 1997), 26-27.

24. Weller, 288.

CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Peering through the theodolite towards the province's pernicious past, it is evident that the divergent development of Northern Ontario had etched an indelible impression on the political landscape of the region. The patterns and processes which are now visible in the politics of Northern Ontario are primarily the products of its peculiar historical evolution. Surveying the history of Ontario, it is obvious that the divergent development of Northern Ontario had been conditioned by three formative influences: its geography; its economy; and extensive provincial government intervention in the region.

First, while Southern Ontario slowly sojourned as an agrarian frontier, Northern Ontario rapidly evolved as an industrial frontier. The profusion of natural resources in the North, as well as the immense profits which could be procured from them, provided the impetus for its development. Fundamentally, the historical evolution of Northern Ontario has followed a progression of natural resource exploration and exploitation: fur trapping; logging; and mining. Second, while the economy of Southern Ontario ripened to fruition to become the agricultural, financial, and manufacturing heartland of the province, the economy of Northern Ontario did not ripen and remained green, relegated to the role of a natural resource hinterland for the province. The development of the North, consequently, had produced many sparse and scattered communities which are settled around a single industry and the extraction of a single natural resource. These communities are susceptible to decisions made in distant corporate headquarters which are oblivious to the devastating effects their decisions may have on the community. Also, these communities are vulnerable to vacillating international natural resource markets and are prone to the verities of a "boom and bust" existence: rapid periods of economic growth punctuated by equally rapid periods of economic decline and stagnation. Nevertheless, while geographic and economic factors certainly contributed to the divergent development of Northern Ontario, they could not operate alone. It is only in combination with the third factor which made them deleterious elements in the historical evolution of the north. Provincial government intervention in the region ensured that

Northern Ontario would abide as a natural resource hinterland from which the province could obtain revenues imperative to funding infrastructure construction and other similar initiatives in Southern Ontario. While assuring its authority over the North, the provincial government acquired a lucrative hinterland from which its heartland, Toronto, could begin to compete with Montreal for economic predominance in the country.

Observing the importance of these three influences, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a survey of the political and historical evolution of Northern Ontario. This chapter demonstrates how the natural resource economy of the North, as well as profound provincial government policies and interventions, have impacted its development. Moreover, this chapter focusses on how the divergent development of Northern Ontario shaped the political patterns and processes which have since manifest in the region. This chapter commences with the period prior to European penetration of the region in the seventeenth century and then proceeds onwards to the present.

NORTHERN ONTARIO PREHISTORY

Appropriately, the history of Northern Ontario begins with the progression of the Aboriginals who were its original inhabitants. Although often overlooked, maligned, and manipulated by those who have subsequently settled in Ontario, the generations of Aboriginals that abided in the North were imperative to its early inception and had contributed significantly to its historical development. Unfortunately, however, it was the historical development of Northern Ontario and its ensuing exploitation which initiated and perpetuated the mistreatment of the Natives. The aversions of both the federal and provincial governments to try to ameliorate the grievances of the Aboriginals has been apparent in the politics of Northern Ontario. This is particularly disconcerting, especially when it is considered that for more than 97 percent of the time that people have inhabited the territory that became Ontario, the Aboriginals were in sole possession.[1]

According to James V. Wright, archaeologists have divided the 11, 000 years which preceded the European penetration of Northern Ontario into four precise periods:

the Paleo period (9, 000 BC to 5, 000 BC); the Archaic period (5, 000 BC to 1, 000 BC); the Initial Woodland period (1, 000 BC to 1, 000 AD); and the Terminal Woodland period (1, 000 AD to European contact).[2] The Terminal Woodland Period ended once the Europeans entered Northern Ontario. Over 11, 000 years ago, however, the area which was to become Northern Ontario was encompassed by enormous masses of ice; incredibly immense continental glaciers composed of compacted and recrystallized snow.[3] As these continental glaciers advanced across the North, the abrasiveness of the moving ice sheets scoured the surface of the land, smoothed over hills, gouged depressions in the rocks, carved out rivers and streams, and scraped off the topsoil.[4] As these continental glaciers retreated, the thawed snow and ice exposed a vast, but very void land, imbued by a rocky and rugged terrain into which the melted waters flowed and filled up a myriad of little lakes, as well as many large lakes which would later prove vital in the exploration and exploitation of the North.[5] But in the early history of Northern Ontario, it was these lakes which provided the initial basis for the subsistence of its original Native inhabitants.

Approximately 9, 000 years ago, the ancestors of the present Native peoples penetrated the North from the plains located to the west and to the south and settled along the nascent shores of Lake Superior and Lake Huron which were then no longer covered by continental glaciers.[6] By the seventeenth century, the Natives had fully developed a seasonal woodland lifestyle which was based on fishing, hunting, and gathering, as well as trading with other Aboriginal groups. The Natives, and their "woodsy" lifestyle, proved to be a profound divinity for the Europeans who subsequently permeated the North and forever altered its wilderness.

EUROPEAN EXPLORATION

European explorers from France and Great Britain first entered Northern Ontario at the beginning of the seventeenth century. As these explorers adventured farther into the North, they became aware of, and astonished by, the abundance of natural resources which were available. Of particular significance to these explorers was the prevalence of

fur bearing animals in the region, as well as the apparent willingness of the Aboriginals to trap and then trade these furs in exchange for European trinkets and manufactured goods. Neither of the European empires, however, pressed for proprietary, colonial control over the North until 1670, when King Charles II of Great Britain conferred to Prince Rupert and to the Hudson's Bay Company an exclusive trading charter which encompassed all of Hudson Bay and extended more than 3 million square miles (i.e. 4.8 million square kilometres) across North America.[7] Afterwards, a fur trade rivalry was fomented in the North between France and Great Britain which lasted for almost a century. The competition concluded following the Conquest of New France by the British in 1763. The fur trade, however, persisted in vogue for another two centuries, while the perception of Northern Ontario as merely a region where an abundance of natural resources was met with only an abiding avarice would last forever after. For when the fur trade in the North eventually subsided at the end of the nineteenth century, the potential profitability of other natural resources, such as lumber and minerals, were already being speculated upon. Thus, it was the fur trade which provided the impetus for the initial development of Northern Ontario and provoked the exploration and exploitation which inevitably ensued.

The first European penetration of the North occurred in the northern portion of the region. In 1610, a British expedition led by Henry Hudson sailed into the big bay which now bears his name: Hudson Bay.[8] The Hudson expedition had been searching for a shorter sea route to the Pacific Ocean and Asia. Although the Hudson expedition failed to authenticate the existence of such an amenable sea route, it did establish the fact that a substantial inland sea existed in the northerly part of the North American continent.[9] An earlier expedition by Sebastian Cabot around 1508 had merely articulated the supposition of the existence of Hudson Bay, but the Hudson expedition had unequivocally confirmed its existence.[10] According to Glyndwr Williams, the Hudson expedition endured the winter months on the shores of Hudson Bay during which time they encountered a solitary Native with whom they traded for several deer skins and a few pelts of beaver fur.[11] In retrospect, it can be discerned that the Hudson expedition was only marginally

successful since, in the period immediately subsequent to the Hudson voyage, the lustre of the discovery of the Hudson Bay became increasingly tarnished. Following the Hudson expedition, independent surveys of Hudson Bay by Luke Foxe in 1631 and by Thomas James in 1632 provided proof that the infamous inland sea was, in fact, a landlocked bay.[12] A shorter sea route to the Pacific Ocean and onwards to Asia was not to be found there. The disappointment precluded further British expeditions to the Hudson Bay for the next forty years. It would be the French, though, who would later realize the strategic significance of the Hudson Bay.

FUR TRADE

The French had been as fervent as the British in their search for a shorter trade route to the Pacific Ocean and Asia. Williams explains that unlike the perilous and profitless early expeditions of the British to the north, the French probes along the southern parts of the St. Lawrence River were accompanied by the beginnings of the permanent settlements of New France and trade with the Aboriginals in furs.[13] The French traded for furs with Aboriginal intermediaries who obtained the furs from other Aboriginals further inland where the furs were more plentiful. The French, in turn, exported these furs to France. Williams affirms that during their trade with the Natives, the French learned of a significant sea to the north which they eventually identified as the big bay which had been discovered by Henry Hudson.[14] Subsequently, several attempts were made to reach the Hudson Bay by the French. In 1615, Samuel de Champlain joined the indigenous Hurons and embarked upon an inimitable canoe journey from the Ottawa River to the Mattawa River, across Lake Nippissing to the French River, and then on to Georgian Bay located at Lake Huron.[15] According to Philip Albanese, Champlain was perhaps the first European to ever set his sights on the Northern Ontario territory.[16] From his experiences, Champlain concluded that further explorations inland could only be conducted with the help of the Aboriginals and, of course, their canoes.[17] He formulated several other formidable insights as well. Champlain contended that to make

any substantial accomplishments through explorations inland, it was absolutely necessary to establish sturdy alliances with the Natives, to solicit their assistance as guides and purveyors of geographical information, and to build a permanent base of operations inland.[18] The Natives were fundamental to the fur trade. They not only supplied the fur traders with furs, but also consumed their manufactured goods, such as kettles, hatchets, knives, and cloth, acted as interpreters, and constructed the canoes, toboggans, and snowshoes which were the essential modes of transportation at the time.[19] The insights derived by Champlain from his voyages with the Hurons proved to be favourable to the French as they pushed the fur trade farther inland towards the Great Lakes and the industry became increasingly profitable. In fact, many of the conclusions that Champlain conceived became the eventual cornerstones of the illustrious French fur trade industry. As participation in the fur trade became more lucrative, however, there were increased frictions between Native groups, specifically, between those who participated and those who did not. The succeeding strife provoked a profound shift in the patterns of the fur trade towards what is now Northern Ontario.

As indicated by Albanese, the indigenous Hurons were the original intermediaries of the early fur trade with the French.[20] As such, the Hurons occupied a very envious position in the operation of the fur trade and obtained many of the benefits. This prompted considerable resentment amongst the contiguous Native groups, especially the Iroquois. Throughout the 1640s, the Iroquois inexorably attacked the Hurons. The Iroquois incursions literally decimated the Hurons and compelled the French to make changes to the configuration of the fur trade around the Great Lakes. Albanese explains that the destruction of the Huron population prompted the development of a new fur trade path, as well as the emergence of a different group of Aboriginals with whom the French traded for furs.[21] Before the conflicts, the French obtained their furs from the Hurons at Georgian Bay. After the Hurons were destroyed, however, the French were forced to travel further inland to trade with the Ojibwa that were situated along the shores of Lake Huron and Lake Superior.[22] The Ojibwa obtained their furs from the Cree in Northern Ontario. Slowly, but steadily, the French rebuilt the shattered structure of the fur trade in

the Great Lakes area. Two of the most conspicuous individuals that contributed to this reconstruction were Médard Chouart des Groseilliers and Pierre Esprit Radisson. In retrospect, it can be discerned that Groseilliers and Radisson helped both the French and the British procure some profit from the fur trade. Regardless of their vacillating allegiances, however, the significance of Groseilliers and Radisson remain in their inadvertent instigation of the exploration and ensuing exploitation of Northern Ontario.

According to Conrad Heidenreich, one of the most obstinate proclamations of the circumspect colony of New France was the requirement that all individuals aspiring to leave the colony had to first apply for permission from the governor to do so.[23] The French feared that if this law were not in effect, many of the people residing there would try abandoning the colony in the summertime to go out trading and exploring, rather than staying to help grow the crops and protect it from intermittent Iroquois raids.[24] In 1659, Groseilliers and Radisson applied to Governor Lauson to leave the colony, but they were refused.[25] They decided to leave anyhow. Groseilliers and Radisson adventured as far as Lake Superior. As they travelled, talked, and traded with the Aboriginals of the Great Lakes area, they learned that the source of some of the finest furs that they received came from the Cree near the Hudson Bay.[26] Determined to eliminate the intermediaries from whom they had been trading with, Groseilliers and Radisson discerned that the fur traders should be dealing directly with the Cree. They concluded that the fur trade should be focussed on the Cree in the north, that is, in the territory which is now Northern Ontario. Moreover, Groseilliers and Radisson were convinced that the furs should not be extracted following the arduous and tortuous canoe route from the Great Lakes to the St. Lawrence River, but from the Cree themselves on the shores of the Hudson Bay. Endowed with these insights, Groseilliers and Radisson enthusiastically returned to New France in 1660 to recapitulate what they had discovered. The authorities in New France, however, were not very impressed. For abandoning the colony to embark on an expedition that was not approved by the governor, Groseilliers and Radisson faced serious punishment in the form of fines and, for a while, imprisonment. Bruised, but not broken from their experiences, Groseilliers and Radisson both believed that a different audience might be

more attentive to what they had to say about the fur trade, and in 1665, they departed for Great Britain. The British were very interested in what they had to say.

In 1667, a consortium of British investors had clustered to provide the financial support for an expedition to Hudson Bay. Later, in 1668, two British ships set sail for Hudson Bay to test the theories put forth by Groseilliers and Radisson. Although one of the ships, the Eaglet, was forced back, the other ship, the Nonsuch, persevered and made it to the shores of Hudson Bay, and its crew endured the harsh winter there without too much difficulty.[27] According to Williams, in the spring, there were no fewer than three hundred Cree that came to the shores of the Hudson Bay to trade their furs with the British.[28] The expedition was a success. It had vindicated the promises made by Groseilliers and Radisson and had proved that furs could be procured through trade from the shores of the Hudson Bay.[29] The success of the expedition, however, could be measured in many ways. The fact that the crew of the Nonsuch survived the voyage, made it safely to the shores of the Hudson Bay, weathered the winter, traded with the indigenous peoples without any hostilities arising, and then returned to Great Britain with a substantial amount of furs are all salient points and, at the time, provided verification that it was feasible for the British to return to Hudson Bay and reassert its initial claim made by Henry Hudson himself. In 1670, King Charles II of Great Britain granted a trading charter to the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) that encompassed the immense Hudson Bay drainage basin.[30] Although it articulated colonizing as one of its objectives, in actuality, the HBC was primarily preoccupied with its commercial operations.

HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY

From the outset, the French were wary that the establishment of the HBC would have a deleterious effect on their fur trade. They were correct to have been concerned. Almost immediately after its inception, the HBC constructed forts on the shores of the Hudson Bay and the British fur traders began the business of luring the Natives who had traded furs with the French to come north to trade furs with them. When the French

finally realized what was transpiring, they did not delay in travelling north, into what is now Northern Ontario, to try to intercept these Aboriginals as they made their way to the Hudson Bay.[31] The route to get there, however, was a wandering and weakening one. The French route followed the St. Lawrence River to the Great Lakes, and from there, followed the rivers flowing north to James Bay and to Hudson Bay. It was a precarious and painful path which involved more than two hundred portages. Within some time, though, the French were operating efficiently along this route, had intercepted many of the Native groups going to the Hudson Bay, and had managed to lure some of the fur trade away from the brazen British.[32] Despite their efforts, the French did understand that the British posts were attracting a lot of the Aboriginals to trade their furs there, and they eventually did come to understand that the British posts were perfectly placed to export the furs on sailing ships to Europe. Consequently, the French made the decision to challenge the British position at Hudson Bay.

In 1686, Governor Denonville of New France authorized a military assault on the HBC posts.[33] Under the command of Chevalier de Troyes, the French attacked the unsuspecting few British forts at Albany, Rupert, and Moose Factory.[34] The British were unprepared for such an aggressive attack and they were quickly defeated. The former British forts were taken over by the French who continued to trade for furs with the Natives. With the elimination of the British competition in the fur trade, the French were able to acquire many more furs. By 1696, however, a gross surplus of beaver had developed in the French fur industry. As a result, fur trading operations in the North, as well as the explorations which were associated with it, were temporarily curtailed.[35] Further conflicts between the British and the French, both internally and externally, subsequently determined the future direction of the development of Northern Ontario.

The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, which ended the war that had been waged between Great Britain and France since 1702, indicated the reparations which were to be endowed to the triumphant British. Of particular significance to the history of Northern Ontario is that the Treaty of Utrecht specified that all titles to the Hudson Bay territory were to be returned to the British.[36] The French did not have any deeds to the Hudson Bay area and

they were compelled, under the terms of the peace agreement, to give back the Hudson Bay posts that they had taken from the HBC. When the surplus of furs subsided in 1714, the fur trade was renewed in the North and both the British and the French participated as intensely as they had before. The HBC continued to squeeze staunchly to the shores of the Hudson Bay, but they also moved inland and established interior fur trading posts from which they could try to ward off competition, and the wily voyageurs continued to speed up and down the rivers which flowed out from the Hudson Bay in search of Natives to trade with. The ferocious fur trade remained unabated in the North until about 1756. At that time, another war between France and Great Britain was ignited. In retrospect, it can be observed that the ensuing Seven Year's War had portentous implications for the eventual development of Northern Ontario as the British vanquished the French. The 1763 Treaty of Paris, the subsequent peace settlement, explicated the total elimination of France from North America. This placed all of Northern Ontario into the possession of Great Britain directly, as well as indirectly through the HBC. Furthermore, Great Britain had procured proprietary rights over all the territory and natural resources in the North.

The succeeding Royal Proclamation of 1763 explicitly sectioned off the territory that Great Britain had acquired, and it also stated the legal rights that the Natives now possessed under British authority. As well, the Royal Proclamation contended that, in territory demarcated exclusively for the Natives, land could not be purchased or settled without prior approval by the British government, or more specifically, without a prior treaty between the British government and the Aboriginals concerned.[37] The importance of the Royal Proclamation to the history of Northern Ontario was that it ensured that the colonization of the North would not occur in an individually appropriative, unlawful way, but rather, it would occur in an orderly, lawful manner. Moreover, the Royal Proclamation necessitated the need to arrive at agreements with the Aboriginals for their land before colonization occurred.

Although the elimination of France from North America after 1763 endowed Great Britain with a veritable monopoly in the fur trade, the exclusive tenure of the HBC was challenged by the emergence of an ebullient entrepreneurial alliance based in

Montreal. In 1779, the North West Company (NWC) was created to compete against the HBC in the fur trade.[38] The NWC was formed from an alliance of affluent Montrealers who were all anxious to procure a portion of the annual profits from the fur trade. To achieve this, the NWC employed the inimitable French Canadian voyageurs who had an intimate knowledge of the forests, rivers, and rapids of the protracted fur trade route which stretched inland from the St. Lawrence River, as well as a keen understanding of the Natives and how to trade with them for furs. In the intense fur trade which followed, the NWC and the HBC aggressively adventured throughout the North, proceeding to match each other post-for-post, and augmenting the number of furs acquired through trade with the Aboriginals.[39]

The fiery fur trade rivalry was the most intense in the North following the introduction of a new company, Sir Alexander Mackenzie's XY Company (XYC), to the competition in 1798.[40] In 1804, the XYC was absorbed into the NWC.[41] The consequences of the competition between the HBC, the NWC, and XYC were considerably adverse. First, the competition caused the Natives to over-exploit the fur bearing animals, almost to the point of extinction, in an attempt to satiate the demands of the fur traders, as well as their own wanton demands for European manufactured goods. Second, the fur traders encouraged the Aboriginals to supply sustenance and provisions for the posts. At this time, there were more individuals engaged in the fur trade and this put a stress on the supplies at the post. The fur traders, therefore, traded with the Natives for food, such as caribou and moose meat, to augment the provisions at the posts. The traders also required caribou and moose hides to wrap the fur pelts into bundles prior to overseas shipment. This eventually led to the over-exploitation and imminent extinction of these animals as well. Third, the competition incited the Natives to develop an increased reliance on the fur traders and their European manufactured goods for their own subsistence and survival. Since the Natives devoted most of their time to fulfilling the demands of the fur traders, they did not have much time to provide for themselves. The paucity of wildlife which was becoming apparent in the Northern Ontario forests during this period made it even more difficult for the Natives to procure the commodities that

they needed for their survival, such as fur and leather for clothing and hunting equipment, and animal meat for consumption. Paradoxically, as the Aboriginals became more dependent on, and more debauched by, the fur traders for their food, clothing, and equipment, the very currency with which they used to purchase these items, that is, furs, was further perpetuating and exacerbating their situation. Although the Natives desperately needed the furs, the furs were becoming much harder to find in the forests of Northern Ontario. Consequently, the Natives were finding themselves unable to ameliorate their situation and were ascending into a degenerative condition. According to Charles Bishop, between 1770 and 1820, the Natives in the North became increasingly desirous of European manufactured goods, and so long as the rivalry between the fur trading companies remained ardent and the furs abundant, they could obtain these commodities without too much effort.[42] As the furs became more depleted, however, the native peoples had much more difficulty doing so.[43]

Inevitably, the costs of the fur trade competition became too extreme to endure any further. The fur trade had become too costly not only in terms of the toll it had taken on the fur bearing animals in the North, but in terms of the immense expenditures which were depleted in an effort to sustain the fur trade rivalry, to maintain the expansive fur trade routes, as well as the numerous fur traders. The HBC and the NWC had both been suffering from the strains of the fur trade industry. An amalgamation of the two companies appeared to be the only alternative to their impending insolvencies. Since the HBC was relatively less strained than the NWC, its stance in the subsequent negotiations was much stronger.[44] Thus, in 1821, the HBC absorbed the NWC into its operations.[45] But the basis of those operations, though, were at Hudson Bay and, increasingly, pushing west past the Red River operations into what is now Manitoba. Therefore, the operations along the interior lakes and rivers of Northern Ontario, fostered first by the French and then by the NWC, were forsaken following the merger.

When the fur trade routes which followed the Great Lakes to the St. Lawrence River and then to Montreal were abandoned in 1821, Northern Ontario was temporarily isolated.[46] Although the fur trade persisted, its prominence had diminished. Furs were no

longer as fashionable. Despite the decline in the fur trade, however, the HBC remained salient in the historical development of Northern Ontario. As interest in furs decreased, interest in the territory from which the furs were obtained increased. The HBC owned a lot of that territory. Of particular significance to the development of Northern Ontario is the relationship between the HBC and Rupert's Land. The HBC possessed the proprietary rights to Rupert's Land which encompassed the northern portions of the territory that would later on become the North. Interest in Rupert's Land escalated in the mid-1800s when it was discovered that furs were not the only natural resource which could be exploited there. There were also towering crops of timbers, as well as glittering outcrops of minerals which could be profitably exported. Proprietary rights to the southern portions of the territory that would later on become Northern Ontario had been conferred to the Crown following the Constitutional Act of 1791.[47] But even though the statutes stated that the government of Upper Canada was responsible for the North, it took no interest. In the early 1800s, it seemed the only interest in Northern Ontario was limited to inaugural missionary activity. As indicated by Edward S. Rogers, at that time, assiduous missionaries from the Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist faiths invaded the North and attempted to preach to the Aboriginals.[48] Although virtuous, for those clerics managed to covert many of the Natives and also managed to establish a permanent, albeit nascent, church presence in the North, the most profound revelation occurred when people ultimately became baptised with the knowledge of the abundance of natural resources in Northern Ontario, as well as of the economic potential of those natural resources if they were effectively exploited.

NATURAL RESOURCE DISCOVERIES

In the period prior to the discovery of the profusion of natural resources in Northern Ontario, the region remained relatively secluded. Aside from the populations of Aboriginals and fur traders who had adapted and eventually carved out an existence for themselves in the northern wilderness, the inexorable black flies, marshes, rocks, forests,

lakes, and rivers repelled easy access to the interior and the North remained obstinate to penetration by outsiders. As perceptions about Northern Ontario began to become altered, although motivated primarily by the avariciously inspired recognition of the economic wealth which could be accrued from its natural resources, the barriers which had previously inhibited invasion by outsiders became mere obstacles which had to be overcome. Once this tacit understanding was accepted, an assault on the natural resources of Northern Ontario was initiated in earnest. This allegorical assault was launched by the logging industry as it inevitably encroached into the North in an attempt to placate its insatiable need for lumber for the production of hewn timber and woodpulp, which was both highly demanded and rapidly consumed. In the mid-1800s, the logging companies began to march into the North from three directions. In the east, the logging companies moved west from operations in the Ottawa River area to the Mattawa River, and then north to Lake Temiskaming.[49] In the south, they moved north from lumber operations in the Muskoka area to Georgian Bay at Parry Sound and Penetanguishene.[50] In the west, the logging companies proceeded from Southern Ontario and the United States to Manitoulin Island in Lake Huron.[51] At the same time as this battle with the northern forests was being waged, the mining industry began to proceed into the North to exploit the mineral discoveries which had been made near Georgian Bay at Bruce Mines and near Lake Superior at Michipicoten.[52]

In anticipation of these advancing industries, the Canadian government authorized W. B. Robinson, the commissioner of native affairs, to negotiate with the Aboriginals for title to their land, as was mandatory in the aftermath of the Royal Proclamation of 1763.[53] The first treaty, the Robinson-Superior Treaty, stated that the Natives had to surrender all titles to their land in the Lake Superior area, specifically, from Batchawana Bay west to the Pigeon River, in exchange for land reserves, cash payments, and annual subsidies.[54] The second treaty, the Robinson-Huron Treaty, affirmed that the Aboriginals had to give up all titles to their land in the Lake Huron and Georgian Bay area, in particular, from Batchawana Bay east to Penetanguishene, in exchange for reparations similar to those provided for in the preceding treaty.[55] Other agreements with the Aboriginal peoples

included Treaty Three, signed in 1873, which comprised all territory west of Lake Superior, and Treaty Nine, signed in two stages in 1905 and 1929, which covered all the remaining territory in Northern Ontario.[56] The Robinson treaties, as with the other treaties that followed, not only assuaged the legal obstacles that were in the way of advancing logging and mining industries, but also the barriers that had previously obviated the progression of settlers into Northern Ontario too. Nevertheless, although the treaties with the Natives proved to be profound examples of the purported orderly and legally legitimate development of Northern Ontario, more typically, the onslaught of industrialization and colonization occurred with such rapidity that land was often acquired without previous negotiation or prior approval from the Aboriginals.[57] These experiences still remain contentious issues in the politics of Northern Ontario.

The discovery of natural resources in the North prompted several developments. The most prominent of which was the deluge of industrialists, prospectors, miners, loggers, surveyors, and incipient settlers that poured into the region. These permeations were facilitated by the improvements which were made to the transportation system and structure which connected Northern Ontario to contiguous regions, such as Southern Ontario and the United States. In 1855, the United States government constructed a canal and a series of locks at Sault Ste. Marie which permitted the smooth passage of sailing ships to and from Lake Superior.[58] In the same year, a railway link between Toronto and Collingwood, the Northern Railway, was completed which expedited the development of the northern Great Lakes area.[59] Interest in Northern Ontario during this period swelled. The HBC, as the proprietor of the expansive Rupert's Land property, suddenly found itself in a peculiar and precarious position. Rupert's Land had become a conspicuous protrusion in the northern landscape.

RUPERT'S LAND

Quite simply, with the coming of settlers and industry, Rupert's Land had become too valuable to be destined to be the imminent domain of transient fur traders. The HBC

was now obligated to determine the extent to which it was willing to preserve its proprietary interests in the North. Since the 1821 merger, though, the HBC had not demonstrated any interest in Northern Ontario. Fur had been eradicated from the northern forests and was replaced by the auspicious western plains past Red River. The population of the fur bearing animals in the North had been decimated by over-exploitation which meant that fur trading and the continued presence of the HBC there was becoming unprofitable and, therefore, unrealistic.[60] Nevertheless, the HBC still retained an interest in Rupert's Land because it had made substantial investments there building fur trade posts, cultivating the lands surrounding the fur trade posts, and nurturing alliances with the Natives there from whom they had obtained their furs.[61] The process of the fur trade in the North had been well developed, but the practice itself was no longer tenuous. Eventually, although reluctantly, the HBC relented and gave in to one of its own enduring tenets: the fur trade must retreat in the face of industrialization and colonization.[62]

In 1853, the British government established a Select Committee of the House of Commons to inquire into the positions and practices of the HBC.[63] While its fur trade practices were not fervently challenged, the Select Committee did insist that the HBC relinquish its claims to the Red River, Saskatchewan, and Vancouver Island colonies, as well as those portions of Rupert's Land which were suitable for settlement.[64] It did not have to surrender all portions of Rupert's Land. Ensuing negotiations involving the Canadian government, however, resulted in the total relinquishment of Rupert's Land by the HBC in 1870.[65] Although this dispute had been resolved, it incited another conflict between the two recipients of this vast and lucrative territory regarding which level of government should have responsibility over it. Neither the Ontario government nor the Canadian government were willing to give up what they perceived to be their inherent rights to the former Rupert's Land territory. The controversy which followed proved to be pivotal in the development of Northern Ontario.

CANADIAN CONFEDERATION

According to Matt Bray, the Confederation of the British North American colonies in 1867 did not have much of an impact on Northern Ontario, although it did confirm that the Great Lakes drainage basin was now part of the new province of Ontario.[66] Bray contends that the acquisition of Rupert's Land from the HBC in 1870 had much more of an impact on the North because it reunited, after exactly two hundred years of political separation, the territory to the north and south of the main height of land, that is, the territory on either side of the watershed division which demarcates the Great Lakes and Hudson Bay drainage basins.[67] However, Northern Ontario was still not fully reunited politically. Controversy arose after Rupert's Land had been appropriated because it had not been made clear in the agreement whether the newly acquired lands were under the jurisdiction of the provincial government or the federal government.[68] Bray concedes that since prestige and power over the large, indeterminably valuable logging and mining resources were at stake, both levels of government were intent on prevailing.[69] The ensuing polemics resulted in a protracted dispute between the Ontario government and the Canadian government which, inevitably, had portentous implications for the North.

ONTARIO BOUNDARY DISPUTE

The complexities and uncertainties of the HBC's extensive claims to the territory above the height of land, Rupert's Land, ensured that the northern and western boundaries of the nascent province of Ontario were ambiguously demarcated at the time of Confederation in 1867. The impending transfer of that territory in 1870, therefore, provided the province with the perfect opportunity to try to resolve the confusion. In 1869, the Ontario government articulated in its Speech from the Throne that is was anxious to take action to define the provincial boundary in anticipation of, and in accordance to, the imminent acquisition of Rupert's Land by Canada.[70] The Ontario government, though, was not the only group interested in securing that territory for

themselves, the Canadian government was also interested. Ostensibly, both groups were enthraled by the potential prestige and power that they could procure for themselves through prosperity obtained from the natural resources found in that territory.

In 1871, the Ontario government and the Canadian government each appointed a commissioner to attempt to adjudicate a decision on the boundary line. After much bickering, the two commissioners arrived at two different versions of where the boundary line ought to be which were 275 miles (i.e. 442.6 kilometres) apart.[71] Not surprisingly, the Ontario government suspended the negotiations in 1872. With the election of the Alexander Mackenzie federal Liberal government in 1873, Oliver Mowat's provincial Liberal government received more sympathy and support for its boundary quandary. In 1874, the Ontario and Canadian governments agreed this time to appoint three commissioners to adjudicate the boundary line. Interestingly, they also agreed in advance to ratify whatever decision might result from the adjudication process.[72] In 1878, the commission pronounced their decision and it was entirely in Ontario's favour. The provincial government was more than pleased, it was ecstatic, and it immediately ratified the decision in the legislature and awaited reciprocal ratification from the federal government. The timing of the decision, however, was not particularly auspicious. It was not proclaimed early enough to have been ratified in the federal legislature before the 1878 federal election, and the succeeding John A. Macdonald Conservative government that won that election refused to honour the preceding Liberal government's promise and did not ratify the decision. The federal government further exacerbated the situation in 1881 when it unilaterally decided to extend the boundaries of the province of Manitoba to a point at which they encroached on Ontario's boundaries which effectively dragged Manitoba into the dispute.

The federal government claimed that the disputed territory ought to be awarded to Manitoba, but its actions were not in any way altruistic. When the Canadian government created Manitoba in 1870, it retained control over the natural resources of that province. The chance that it could acquire the disputed territory from Ontario, therefore, presented the federal government with the possibility of procuring substantial revenues from the

development of the natural resources which were to be found there. For Manitoba, obtaining possession of the disputed territory presented them with the opportunity of acquiring control over its own shipping ports on Lake Superior which would have helped the province to retain a significantly larger share of the profits generated by its burgeoning wheat industry.

Once Manitoba became involved in the controversy, the Ontario government began to assert its authority in the disputed territory in earnest. The Ontario government augmented its presence in the disputed territory by establishing a police force, a magistrate's court, and a municipal government for the largest community in the area, Rat Portage (i.e. now known as Kenora), and by preparing polls for the upcoming provincial election in the area.[73] Interestingly, in 1883, the citizens of Rat Portage voted in both the Ontario and Manitoba provincial elections.[74]

By 1884 it had become obvious that a settlement was needed in regards to the disputed territory. The Ontario and Manitoba governments reached an agreement which committed each province to a joint reference of the boundary question to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Great Britain for final and binding adjudication.[75] Once again, as in 1878, the ruling was entirely in Ontario's favour. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council established the western boundary of Ontario at the northwest angle of the Lake of the Woods and the northern boundary at the Albany River and the English River.[76] The federal government, however, refused to implement the ruling. In 1888, another reference to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was made and once more it ruled in favour with Ontario.[77] Exasperated, the federal government eventually relinquished and Ontario's territorial rights received the sanction of an imperial statute in the 1889 Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act.[78] The boundaries of the province were finally demarcated in 1912 when the territory north of the Albany and English rivers, the District of Patricia, which until then had been a part of the Northwest Territories, were ultimately transferred from the federal government to the Ontario government.[79] With the addition of the District of Patricia, the province attained its present size which was more than triple its original size at the time of Confederation.[80]

As S. J. R. Noel affirms, the resolution of the Ontario boundary dispute marked an important turning-point in the evolution of the provincial political economy and in the development of Northern Ontario.[81] The expansion of the provincial boundaries primarily added an enormous expanse of natural resources to the province which were swiftly seized by the logging, mining, and hydroelectric generating industries. The exploitation which ensued was expedited not only by the fact that the entire Great Lakes transportation system was enclosed within the boundaries of the province, but more importantly, by the fact that the Ontario government proved to be an eager promoter of the natural resources found in the region and encouraged the rapid relocation of those natural resource industries to Northern Ontario. To induce those industries, however, another route into Northern Ontario was needed, in addition to the Great Lakes route, which could supply and support the endeavours of those industries throughout the whole year, without much consideration to the season or climate. Fundamental to the formative development of Northern Ontario was the construction of the railways across the region which provided a reliable and sustainable transportation system that was imperative to the induction of industry in the North. It was during the construction of the railways that the verities of the vast extent of natural resources in Northern Ontario were truly evinced. Indeed, it was the construction of the railways which prompted the most lucrative natural resource discoveries in the region and provoked the most profound period of development in the political and historical evolution of the North.

RAILWAYS

In the late 1860s, in an attempt to promote the initial development of the North, the provincial government inaugurated a "roads-to-resources" program in which it allocated considerable funds to the construction of colonization roads from the Muskokas to Northern Ontario.[82] The topography of the North, however, with its seemingly endless swamps, streams, rivers, lakes, dense forests, rocky outcrops, and cliffs, prevented such facile penetration. The difficulties and distress which inevitably ensued in the

construction of the colonization roads made it apparent that the program was futile. Eventually, the provincial government discerned that only the railways could penetrate the region and provide it with a practical and proficient transportation system. It was the federal government, though, that built the first railway across Northern Ontario.

In 1871, as a condition of British Columbia's entry into Confederation, the federal government conceded to the construction of a transcontinental railway. Of particular significance to the development of Northern Ontario was that the federal government persisted in assuring that the railway line would follow an entirely Canadian route. The railway contractors had originally considered routing the railway line from Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan to St. Paul, Minnesota where there was already a railway line to Selkirk, Manitoba.[83] They later yielded to the determination of the Canadian government and agreed to built the railway line north of Lake Superior. As Ernie Epp explains, the decision to build an entirely Canadian transcontinental railway was "one of the most important decisions ever made" in the history of Northern Ontario, since the region could have been bypassed in favour of easier routes, because it made the region more accessible and it led to more lucrative natural resource discoveries.[84]

In Northern Ontario, the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) occurred in two sections. The first section, the western portion of the railway line from Thunder Bay to Winnipeg, was built between 1875 and 1882, while the second section, the eastern portion of the railway line from Thunder Bay to Mattawa, was built between 1882 and 1885.[85] As the construction of the railway line progressed through the northern wilderness, new communities exploded into existence as natural resources were discovered and as railway contractors capriciously selected locations for their transient work camps.[86] As indicated by Bray, the permanent existence of many of the new communities which grew around the work camps depended upon the role that the CPR ascribed to them which was often determined by a simple mathematical calculation: at that time, the optimal interval between railway terminals was approximately 130 miles (i.e. 209 kilometres) which was the distance that a train could travel before it had to stop to refuel.[87] The type of railway terminal that was decided upon also influenced the type

of community which developed in the North. An elaborate "home terminus," such as Chapleau, served as a storage and maintenance station, required extensive repair shops, as well as labourers and supervisory personnel, while an "away terminus," such as Cartier, served simply as a turnaround station with minimal permanent facilities and personnel.[88]

As a development tool for Northern Ontario, the CPR was most successful at its western and eastern extremities where it proceeded through previously unchartered territory, primarily because it exposed natural resources along the way from which new communities, such as North Bay, Sturgeon Falls, Sudbury, and Sault Ste. Marie, emerged.[89] Conversely, the middle section of the railway line between Marathon and Thunder Bay is considered to have been less successful in promoting the development of the North because the railway line followed the Lake Superior shoreline very closely and it did not open many new lands. Consequently, it did not provoke many permanent settlements along its path.[90]

In retrospect, it can be discerned that the CPR had an inimitable role in the development of Northern Ontario. The pervasive effects of this role, however, have been seemingly portentous. Directly, the construction of the railway line prompted the discovery of some of the most vast and valuable natural resource claims in the North, and it also expedited the integration process for people living in the Northern Ontario. Indirectly, though, the railway line had instigated the pernicious industrialism now evident in the region, the exploitation of its natural resources, and the perpetuation of that exploitation through its role in the transport of the raw natural resource products for export. While the exploitation prompted by the CPR remains significant to the evolution of the North, its effects were far exceeded by the railway companies which followed that were devoted exclusively to facilitating the exploitation of Northern Ontario's natural resources. Often contrived from altruistic objectives, these companies were awarded financial assistance from the provincial government to construct railway lines that would further the development of the North and ideally, in the age of the agrarian myth, foster the development of its agricultural basis and accompanying values, such as those espoused by Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis which postulated that an agrarian

existence invariably established hard working and egalitarian ethics.[91] Once these railway companies began their operations, though, those altruistic objectives were quickly abandoned in favour of utilizing the railways as a means of exporting the North's natural resources to markets in Southern Ontario and the United States. For instance, in 1899, industrialist Francis Hector Clergue created the Algoma Central Railway (ACR) for the purpose of linking the mills in Sault Ste. Marie with the mines in the Michipicoten area.[92] Construction of the ACR line commenced in 1899 and concluded in 1914. Funding for the construction of the railway line was provided by the provincial government. The provincial government proclaimed that the ACR was a great agricultural development project because Clergue had promised that in return for provincial financial assistance, the railway company would ensure the settlement of 10, 000 people along its length.[93] The terrain through which the ACR travelled, however, was not at all conducive to agricultural endeavours and Clergue's promise went unfulfilled. Although the railway line was built, there were no settlements which transpired. Moreover, when Clergue's enterprises in Sault Ste. Marie began to suffer financial hardships, he fled, leaving the community devastated and in disarray. As has happened rather frequently in the development of Northern Ontario when private enterprises have struggled, the provincial government was asked to intervene to ameliorate the situation. The George Ross provincial government answered with immediate assistance to Sault Ste. Marie. The response, though, was not entirely unexpected because, at the time, the Ontario government had been assisting similar private sector developments in the Lake Temiskaming area with incredibly prolific results. Once again, it was the construction of the railway line there which had prompted the discovery of natural resources and had provided the impetus for governmental action.

In the late 1890s, Charles Cobbald Farr began promoting the development of the Great Clay Belt area, a vast tract of arable land which was contiguous to a portion of property which he had purchased in 1885 on the northwestern shore of Lake Temiskaming which he named Haileybury. Inexorably, through a sundry of speeches and pamphlets, Farr extolled the logging, mining, agricultural, and even recreational

possibilities of the area in the hopes of attracting settlers to Haileybury, but his efforts were inhibited by the lack of accessibility to the area. Farr appealed to the provincial government for assistance and the Ross administration responded with a major initiative to resolve the problem. In 1900, in an attempt to authenticate the claims made by Farr about the Great Clay Belt area, the Ontario government commissioned an extensive survey of the territory north of the CPR line. The surveyors final report sketched "a picture of potential wealth beyond the wildest imagination" in timber reserves, mineral deposits, and agricultural lands.[94] The report generated tremendous excitement, not only from the provincial government who was eager to procure some of the natural resource revenues, but from the prospective settlers in the province who were eager to find suitable farm lands since there were no more to be had in Southern Ontario. Thus, in 1901, the Ontario government sent out more surveyors to determine potential routes for the construction of a railway from North Bay to New Liskeard, located 5 miles (i.e. 8 kilometres) to the north of Haileybury.[95] Afterwards, though, the provincial government could not find a private company willing to assume the arduous task of constructing the railway through the Northern Ontario wilderness and, with "an election in the offing and promises to keep," the provincial government decided to undertake responsibility for the construction of the railway itself.[96]

In 1902, construction commenced on the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway (TNO).[97] By the time the railway reached New Liskeard in 1905, the objectives for which it had been built were already being realized. The TNO had become much more than a mere colonization route for settlers, it had evolved into a conduit through which natural resources flowed from the northern forests to the southern factories. Prompting this realization was the discovery of an immense, spectacular silver deposit in the Cobalt area, south of Haileybury. The silver strike provoked a frenzy of prospecting to the north and west of Cobalt and led to the discovery of gold in the Porcupine area near Timmins and Kirkland Lake. The enormous amounts of natural resources and revenues being extracted from these areas encouraged the provincial government to build a branch line of the TNO to these communities and to continue the main line further north as

rapidly as possible. By 1906 the railway line had reached Englehart and by 1909 the TNO had extended to Cochrane, piercing the core of the Great Clay Belt. Aside from instigating the establishment of a myriad of mining communities, the TNO also incited the creation of a number of logging communities involved in the production of hewn lumber, pulp, and paper, such as Latchford, Elk Lake, and Iroquois Falls.

At the same time as the TNO emerged in the eastern portion of Northern Ontario in the early 1900s, the construction of the Canadian Northern Railway (CNR) penetrated the western portion of the region south of the Lake of the Woods as it progressed from Minnesota to Rainy River and Fort Frances. While less prolific than its transcontinental competitor, the CPR, the CNR followed a more northerly arc across the region and founded its share of precisely spaced railway communities, such as Hornepayne, Gogama, and Capreol, as well as a nominal amount of natural resource discoveries which later became agricultural, logging, hydroelectric generating, and pulp and paper communities like Kapuskasing, Hearst, and Smooth Rock Falls. According to Bray, by 1915 the railway revolution in Northern Ontario had subsided and there was no further railway expansion in the region, except for the TNO which, in 1932, extended its railway line from Cochrane to Moosonee.[98] The provincial government aspired to construct a seaport on James Bay which could offer an alternative outlet to Europe that would be able to compete with the seaports at Montreal and New York, but those aspirations were never realized. With few exceptions (e.g. the Cold War hastened creation of the uranium rich Elliot Lake area during the 1950s being the most notable), the communities which now exist in Northern Ontario were at that time established. Byproducts, in one way or another, of the construction of the railways, the ensuing development of these communities was manifest within the parameters of these steel ribbons.[99]

The construction of the railways endures as one of the most crucial components of the development of Northern Ontario. Initially, the railways were intended to facilitate the agricultural settlement of the region, but as the construction of the railways proceeded, immense mineral deposits, tracts of timbers, and raging rivers were evinced which significantly altered those early ambitions from the limited agricultural prospects

to the more financially lucrative opportunities presented by natural resource exploitation: mining; logging; and hydroelectric generating.[100] The railways exposed Northern Ontario both physically and psychologically to the insidious influences of the provincial government and Southern Ontario industry.[101] By the beginning of the twentieth century, Toronto had been ensconced as the predominant metropolis of Southern Ontario and it exerted its economic influence over the adjacent agricultural hinterland. The construction of the railways extended that hinterland to Northern Ontario, expedited the exploitation of its natural resources, and then changed the character of the early metropolitan-hinterland relationship between Toronto and Southern Ontario, as the former provided the requisite finances, facilities, and techniques for the latter to engage in the industrial consumption of those natural resources.[102] Consequently, Toronto became more than a mere provincial metropolis, but rather a national metropolis.

In retrospect, it can be discerned that the prodigious rise in Toronto's stature was initiated by the provincial government which, in addition to providing funding for the construction of the railways, intervened considerably in the development of Northern Ontario to promote and support the exploitation of its natural resources by Toronto, and specifically, Southern Ontario industries.[103] The North became a hinterland of the South and from its rocks, waters, and woods derived the wealth which would finance the creation of an economic centre at Toronto which could at last compete with Montreal.[104] As A. R. M. Lower affirms, the extraordinary expansion of Toronto during the early twentieth century, in wealth, population, and influence, "was largely based on Northern Ontario."[105]

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

From the late nineteenth century onwards, the provincial government had a substantial presence in the development of Northern Ontario. This presence derived from the desire to provide the most congenial conditions within which the exploitation of the natural resources of the region could occur, as well as the urge to ensure that all

subsequent revenues resulting from the extraction of those natural resources were procured for the provincial coffers. For the provincial government perceived the natural resources intrinsic to Northern Ontario not in terms of its potential value to the region, but in terms of its value to Southern Ontario, that is, the region where its political power was based, where the people whose interests they represented resided, and whose intellectual and cultural outlooks they shared.[106] The provincial government's development policies for the North have consequently been imbued by this southern bias and have been structured to provide the most benefits for the South. Moreover, the provincial government possessed the means to maintain a pronounced presence in the North to pursue those benefits. The development of Northern Ontario has thus been distinguished by profound levels of provincial government intervention because the province owns the rights to the Crown lands which comprise the region. As H. V. Nelles explains, there was no need for any Ontario government to invent the concept of an interventionist, positive state since that concept had always been a part of the provincial political culture, a product of its colonial heritage and unique economic history, and latently persists in the term "Crown" lands.[107] Nelles avows that, from its inception, Northern Ontario had been thought of solely in proprietary terms, it existed to be governed in proportion to the prevailing interests of the province, either as a repository for settlers or as a source of revenue.[108] Furthermore, the Ontario government guaranteed that the industries and settlers which subsequently situated in the North neither possessed nor had prior rights to the precious rocks, waters, and woods, instead, the lucrative Crown lands remained the exclusive property of the province and rights to them were not in any way implicitly conveyed when lands were sold or transferred.[109]

The extensive intervention of the provincial government in the development of Northern Ontario at the end of the nineteenth century can be attributed to the fact that, following Confederation, the province's potential sources of revenue were reduced to licences, fees, direct taxes, and the Crown lands.[110] Encouraging the exploitation of the natural resources on the Crown lands, therefore, provided the province with a seemingly expedient way to obtain the funds necessary for urgent projects, such as the construction

of roads, railways, schools, hospitals, and government offices, as well as programs and services.[111] Not surprisingly, the Ontario government was reluctant to relinquish ownership of the Crown lands and intervened in the development of the North to ensure that they could retain control over the natural resources of the region, stimulate the rapid and efficient exploitation of the natural resources, regulate the industries involved, prevent the emergence of monopolies and speculators, and, of course, secure a consistent source of revenue for the province.[112] While promulgating conservative principles, successive Ontario governments successfully convinced the people to abandon their appropriative, avaricious, and individualistic notions about exploiting the Crown lands themselves and instead, encouraged them to espouse the ascriptive notions which endorsed the extension of provincial government intervention in the North in the collective interests of Ontarians.[113] These ideological pretences, however, were only a facade, for it was evident that provincial government intervention in Northern Ontario was typically precipitated by at least three material factors. First, the rugged northern terrain imposed certain limitations upon the use to which the land could be put. This not only obviated the extension of a unitary, agrarian conception of the province, given the scarcity of arable land in the North as compared to the formative influences that agriculture had in the South, but it prompted the provincial government to get involved in the North once the exploitation of the natural resources on its Crown lands commenced.[114] Second, the industries immersed in the extraction of the natural resources chose to protect and foster their vested interests in the Crown lands by defending rather than challenging provincial government intervention in the North.[115] Since they did not own the land that they exploited, but only leased it from the provincial government, they supported the ambitions of the proprietor to ensure that their interests were preserved and protected too. Indeed, it was a reciprocal relationship, the provincial government and industry worked together so that they could both procure a substantial profit from the ordeal as easily as possible. Third, an initial aversion to direct taxation provoked the provincial government to intervene in the development of Northern Ontario to make sure that the natural resource exploitation was profitable enough to produce sufficient

revenues to meet the costs of its improvement projects.[116] As Nelles asserts, Ontarians and the Ontario government were prone to regard the natural resources of the North as the proper source of revenues to relieve them of the "bugbear" of direct taxation, at least for a while.[117] This aversion to direct taxation stemmed from a realization that other sources of revenue were available to the province. The Ontario government intervened in the development of the North because the province realized that revenues from the exploitation of its natural resources could delay, or temporarily deflect, the incidence of direct taxation.[118] While provincial government intervention in Northern Ontario remained persistent throughout the nineteenth century, by the twentieth century its policies began to have a more prominent impact on the North's development.

As the twentieth century rapidly unfolded, the province of Ontario began to behold itself as "Empire Ontario" and bestowed upon the northern regions the name "New Ontario," for it was believed that the natural resource discoveries in the North had provided the impetus for the discovery of a dynamic industrial paradigm emerging in the province which was based on the extraction of natural resources in the northern hinterland and the ensuing manufacturing of those natural resources in the southern heartland.[119] Contemporary scientific innovations, such as improvements to hydroelectric generating and transmission methods, ore smelting procedures, and pulp and paper processing, had made the obstinate features of the Northern Ontario terrain, which had at one time obviated penetration, the new foundations for the province's inimitable and prodigious economic ascension. The technological and industrial revolution which was transpiring had imparted an even greater value to Northern Ontario which actuated the provincial government and industry to anxiously form an alliance to undertake the further exploration of, as well as the reappraisal of, the natural resources which were to be found on the Crown lands and to prepare for the exploitation of those vast mineral, timber, and water reserves.[120]

As Ontarians accumulated an awareness of the North in the late 1800s and early 1900s, attempts were made to advance the development of New Ontario in a manner which was in accordance to that which had manifest in the South. As Nelles professes, it

"is entirely to be expected that a predominantly agricultural community would define its new lands in its own image."[121] These agrarian, Southern Ontarian aberrations, however, were not amenable to the agricultural realities of Northern Ontario; for the application of which was sometimes perilous for the unsuspecting settlers. For instance, in 1868, the Ontario government passed the Free Grants and Homestead Act which allocated free lands in the Algoma and Nippissing areas for settlement. Absorbed in the arduous tasks of clearing, cultivating, and constructing which were necessary to receive and then retain the grant lands, the settlers had an awful time trying to eke out an existence in the first few years of their arrival in the barren North.[122] Nevertheless, agriculturally inspired colonization schemes seemed to be the extent of the provincial government's pertinacious policies for Northern Ontario development. In the late 1880s, the Mowat government pursued a program of building colonization roads, subsidizing railway construction, establishing immigration bureaux in Great Britain, and maintaining experimental "showcase" farms in the North in an attempt to attract settlers.[123] Although the program enticed some settlers, the geographic and climatic conditions made agricultural endeavours difficult and assured that the settlers would not stay. Similar initiatives, such as the 1901 land allocation scheme for veterans of the Boer War and the 1917 Ontario Returned Soldiers and Sailors Settlement Act, set aside specific sections of land in the North to be made available to settlers, but these failed as well. Eventually, it was accepted that New Ontario was not an agricultural frontier, but an industrial frontier, and that development in the region ought to be based on the exploitation of its inherent natural resources. Reeling from reciprocity with the United States, industrialists in the province, of course, agreed with this understanding of the region and pressed the Ontario government to use its power to promote further exploitation of the natural resources in the North and to protect, through its control over the Crown lands, the manufacturing sector in the South. This resulted in the introduction of the "manufacturing condition" in Ontario.

In 1898, the Arthur Hardy Liberal provincial government enacted a statute which required that all pine timber cut on Crown lands be sawn into lumber in Ontario before

being exported; in 1900, this requirement was extended to spruce pulpwood as well.[124] According to Nelles,

> Ontario had embarked upon its program of encouraging the final manufacture of its raw materials within the boundaries of the province not out of any systematically worked-out theory, and not under the pressure of any overwhelming popular mandate (though certainly the climate of opinion was such that the policy could be enthusiastically supported), but rather because special interest groups who stood to gain from such a policy had managed to impress their opinions upon the government.[125]

Increasingly, the development of Northern Ontario became both a private and public enterprise. In exchange for undertaking the natural resource exploitation of the North and for providing tax revenues to the province, the Ontario government legislated the manufacturing condition and then rendered the following to industry at public expense: improved accessibility to natural resource reserves (e.g. railways); provided lavish and flexible land permits (e.g. purchase, lease, or exploration); prepared research reports on the engineering and economics of natural resource exploitation; purchased and then rented out specialized equipment (e.g. diamond drills) to expedite the extrication of the natural resources; established assay offices in the North to assist in the immediate analysis of minerals and core samples; maintained education programs to familiarize prospective industrialists with the rigours and requirements of the extraction industries; and perhaps most importantly, in the early 1900s, the Department of Lands and Forests founded permanent schools of mining and forestry at the college (e.g. Forest Ranger's School) and university (e.g. University of Toronto School of Forestry) levels.[126]

Although the manufacturing condition was not imposed on the mining industry, it had an immense impact on the logging industry. As American dominance in the forestry sector decreased, the development of Northern Ontario hastened as industrialists from Southern Ontario increased their investments in the construction of pulp and paper mills in communities such as Sturgeon Falls, Espanola, Fort Frances, and Dryden.[127] Since the pulp and paper mills required tremendous amounts of electricity in their operations, the

construction of mills often coincided with the construction of hydroelectric facilities.[128] These facilities generated electricity for the mills and for the contiguous communities which further augmented the revenues being reaped from the remunerative North for the South. The North, however, was not experiencing the same benefits. According to Livio Di Matteo, between 1871 and 1911, "Northern Ontario contributed disproportionately to Ontario government revenues" as profits procured from natural resources from the North were used to subsidize Ontario government expenditures in the South.[129] Once the population of Northern Ontario increased, however, the provincial government did direct more of the revenues to the North, but the revenues were used primarily to build and improve transportation routes which only bound the North more closely to the South.[130] Many indignant Northern Ontarians became wary of the revenues persistently being wrenched from the region and began to question why they were not directly receiving any of the benefits from these revenues. They also began to question why decisions affecting them were being made in distant Southern Ontario. Vexed by the unwillingness of the provincial government to confront these concerns, secessionism was promulgated as a possible solution.

SUBDUING SECESSIONIST SENTIMENTS

The first call for secession came in 1875 when Simon James Dawson, a member of the provincial parliament for the riding of Algoma, proposed that Northern Ontario should become a separate province.[131] Subsequent calls, following the formation of the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905, were even stronger. Inevitably, as almost 30 percent of its total income during this period derived from the exploitation of the natural resources found in Northern Ontario, the provincial government pledged to try to improve the predicament of Northern Ontarians.[132] In 1905, Conservative premier James Whitney ceremoniously recognized the region's contributions to the province by selecting the first provincial government minister from Northern Ontario, Frank Cochrane of Sudbury, to serve as the Minister of Lands, Forests, and Mines. In 1911, Cochrane

proceeded from provincial politics to federal politics to serve as the Minister of Railways in the Conservative government of Robert Borden. He was replaced by William Hearst of Sault Ste. Marie who, in 1914, became the first provincial premier from Northern Ontario. Between 1912 and 1917 the Whitney and Hearst governments spent over $10 million on the construction of roads, railways, and other infrastructure projects to encourage colonization in the region through the Northern Development Act of 1912.[133] In the mid-1920s, the Conservative government of Howard Ferguson spent over $15 million on improvement projects to try to stimulate settlement in the region; moreover, in 1926, they created the Ministry of Northern Development to demonstrate that they were committed to resolving Northern Ontarian's emerging discontent.[134] While these initiatives seemed to quell secessionist sentiments in the region, World War I and the Depression became much more portentous preoccupations for Northern Ontarians at this time.

WORLD WARS AND DEPRESSION

The economic verities of Northern Ontario's existence, as well as the dubious exigencies from which its development had derived, were easily evinced during the early 1900s. This period remains salient in the political and historical development of Northern Ontario because it was at this point that the strategic significance and susceptibilities of the region's natural resource based subsistence were truly evident. While the North still remained the hinterland of the South, the provincial government was no longer the only influence in the development of the region; increasingly, the impetus for development in the North descended from international economic circumstances. It was a profound period of both highs and lows for Northern Ontario which provided an initial indication of the "boom and bust" sequences which would later predominate and inhibit its evolution.

World War I prompted a period of tremendous economic growth in the North. After the outbreak of war in 1914, the natural resource industries in the region promptly

recalibrated and targeted the production of commodities which were essential to the war effort, such as steel from Sault Ste. Marie, paper from Espanola, and nickel from Sudbury. Allied demands for these commodities were extremely high which induced unprecedented production levels and brought immediate prosperity to the region. When World War I ended, this prosperity persisted as demands for natural resources from the North remained high and peacetime production levels surpassed those set at wartime.[135] In the 1920s, Northern Ontario was booming and its population increased 39 percent which was, in terms of percentage, "the largest population increase of the modern era."[136] As the red-hot railways steamed back and forth, from north to south, carrying capacity cargoes of mineral ore, lumber, and pulp and paper products, both the North and the South rapidly expanded, especially Toronto. According to J. M. S. Careless, by the end of the nineteenth century, Toronto had firmly established itself as the metropolis of prosperous agricultural and industrial Southern Ontario; by the beginning of the twentieth century, however, it added control of the immense mineral deposits in Northern Ontario "so that successive opulent suburbs of Toronto spell out a veritable progression of mining booms."[137]

As far as the North was concerned, the reverberations from these economic booms were simply too unpredictable. The vicissitudes of its natural resource based economy made it particularly vulnerable to sudden oscillations in the international commodities markets and when the Depression hit in the 1930s, most of the region was susceptible to an inevitable bust. As the preceding flow of prosperity receded from the region, the Depression tide gushed through the North and in its wake surfaced economic confusion, industry closures, dramatic declines in natural resource production, layoffs, increased incidences of unionization, as well as labour-management strife.[138] With regards to the development of the North, the provincial government attempted to mitigate the worst effects of the Depression, primarily unemployment, by instigating massive infrastructure projects in the region, such as the building of gravelled roads which, by 1950, provided the first, albeit rudimentary, all season automobile routes across the region.[139] Other attempts made to avert the effects of the Depression in Northern Ontario included the

introduction of the Relief Land Settlement Act in 1932 by the George Henry government which offered to those on relief the opportunity to have a free farm on the Northern Ontario frontier. Most of these farms, though, were abandoned at the outset of World War II and afterwards when more lucrative employment opportunities returned to the natural resource sector.[140]

In contrast to the preceding Conservatives, the actions of the ensuing Liberal government of Mitch Hepburn are considered to have been detrimental to the development of the North. Hepburn abolished the Ministry of Northern Development, abandoned the manufacturing condition, reduced expenditures on conservationist initiatives like forest fire regulation and control, and announced, in 1935, that the provincial government was "going out of the business of colonization" and cancelled all assistance to programs promoting settlement in Northern Ontario.[141] Despite negligible improvements in the North's economy in the mid-1930s, brought on by a resurging mining industry bolstered by pre-war posturing and a demand for nickel for armaments, the development of Northern Ontario languished during the Depression era.
Following the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the natural resource industries resumed full production to meet the demands of the Allied forces and the North was imparted with tremendous prosperity. As had happened in World War I, the Northern Ontario communities which benefited the most from this prosperity were those which possessed the natural resources and industries which were deemed vital to the war effort. Also, as before, the federal government assumed a dominant role in the North's natural resource sector because of its strategic significance to the Canadian war effort. After the war, though, the programs and policies of the provincial government once again had the most impact on the progress of the region.

BOOM AND BUST

In the ebullient post-war era, the exploitation of Northern Ontario proceeded with incomparable fervour as the provincial government and industry sought to solidify the

subjugated position of their natural resource hinterland. Unlike what had transpired following World War I, demands for natural resources did not diminish after the war, production remained high, industry expanded, and there was much prosperity for all involved. As indicated by K. J. Rea, in the 1940s and 1950s, provincial government policies regarding natural resources emphasized economic growth rather than conservationism.[142] Although the Ontario government assiduously declared that its intention was to "preserve and protect renewable resources and the natural environment in general, it is difficult to find instances of conservation being placed ahead of tangible and immediate economic benefits."[143] For example, in 1947, the George Drew government restored the manufacturing condition in the lumber industry which caused timber production to triple in only two years.[144] In the mining industry, mineral production in the North doubled between 1945 and 1951, and employed over 20 percent of the available workforce by the end of the decade.[145] In the mid-1900s, Ontario was booming and its residents were experiencing a period of unparalleled economic prosperity. Perhaps the most prominent feature of this period, however, was the transformation which occurred in the provincial economic structure from one based on small capital and individuals, to one based on large capital and organizations.[146] The transformation was evident in the development of Northern Ontario as many of the natural resource industries in the region were voraciously consumed by international conglomerations. Unfortunately, the protracted period of prosperity in the province had obscured the ominous implications of this transformation for Northern Ontarians. For when the economic boom turned to bust as international natural resource markets destabilized in the 1970s, many Northern Ontario communities faced an indefinite future. As the devastating list of industry closures and job losses grew, grieving workers and communities found no sympathy or support from these conglomerations that were only interested in bolstering their bottom line. The provincial government was then prompted to provide some stability for the North.

As Angus Gilbert affirms, the 1970s were a worrisome period for Northern Ontario.[147] In an attempt to alleviate this distress, as well as to assuage the secessionist

sentiments which had once again manifest in the region, the provincial government instigated a series of studies ostensibly intended to point the way to mitigating or removing the causes of despondency in Northern Ontario.[148] In 1971, the provincial government instigated the Design for Development study which succinctly reported that

> the region as a whole has a narrow and relatively slow-growing economic base. This is the case in most of the larger centres and is particulary so in the many smaller communities. If, under these conditions, the dominant industry declines, substantial hardships follow because few, if any, alternative forms of employment are available.[149]

Indeed, as Carl Wallace confirms, the "single-resource community, vulnerable to the loss or depletion of its resource or its market is classic Northern Ontario."[150] The Design for Development studies, however, were of slight help to the North. The suggestions they proffered were never implemented and became irrelevant once the province-wide planning process, of which they were a part of, was halted by the provincial government. The other prominent study initiated during this period was the Royal Commission on the Northern Environment which "ended up as the longest-running and very nearly the most expensive provincial inquiry ever."[151] Of significance to the development of Northern Ontario, the inquiry report elucidated that the

> North serves and is dominated by Ontario's more populated industrial South. This reality underlies the environmental degradation and social malaise that has characterized the exploitation of Northern natural resources. Because the bulk of development benefits have flowed south, the North and the people living there have been left to cope with the long term consequences of resource development. That burden has often been greater than any benefits derived from short term employment or business opportunity. The North has not shared equitably in the profits that have flowed from the exploitation of its natural resources.[152]

In 1977, the provincial government established the Ministry of Northern Affairs to provide assistance to northern communities and to facilitate their further development. In 1985, it assumed responsibility for the mining industry from the Ministry of Natural Resources and its name was changed to the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines

to demonstrate the provincial government's emphasis on promoting economic, social, and community development in the North, as well as encouraging and regulating the development of its most profitable natural resource sector. The impetus for this name change may have been at least partially precipitated by the Ontario government's decision to later move the headquarters of that ministry, along with the Ontario Geological Survey, to Sudbury in 1986. In an attempt to stimulate economic diversification and growth in other Northern Ontario communities, the David Peterson government then moved several other ministries to the region, including the forestry branch of the Ministry of Natural Resources to Sault Ste. Marie, the headquarters of the Ministry of Correctional Services to North Bay, and the students awards branch of the Ministry of Colleges and Universities to Thunder Bay. At the same time, the provincial government founded the Northern Ontario Heritage Fund to endow funding to communities in the North for tourism and infrastructure improvement projects. These initiatives provided the provincial government with a profound presence in the North and were readily accepted with much appreciation. According to Matt Bray and Ashley Thompson, governmental activism in Northern Ontario during the 1980s reflected "a belated recognition by governmental authorities of a fundamental inequity in Ontario's development process."[153] Nevertheless, Northern Ontario remained a natural resource hinterland. When the province became stuck in the muck of recession in the early 1990s, Northern Ontario's inability to extricate itself manifest not only the defects intrinsic to its past development, but the deficiencies of its present situation too. Its present predicament has not improved.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, the development of Northern Ontario has been distinguished by a significant shift in the economic structure of the region.[154] Although the natural resource sector remains predominant in the North, it has endured perilous declines. In the 1990s, the service and government sectors of the Northern Ontario economy had demonstrated discernable increases, but they are now dwindling as well. The optimism which had once

provoked the development of Northern Ontario has now been displaced by a piercing sense of desperation, despondency, and dependency. Across the North natural resource industries are downsizing and closing, commercial retail operations are consolidating and withering, governmental presence and participation is disappearing, infrastructure is deteriorating, and natural resources are steadily depleting as their values are decreasing.[155] Employment figures provide further evidence that prospects for development in the North are rapidly diminishing. As indicated by Michael Atkins, between 1995 and 1998, over 381, 000 jobs were created in Ontario while Northern Ontario lost more than 10, 000 jobs.[156] Moreover, the unemployment rate in the North has constantly risen, even though more people are migrating out of the North to seek jobs elsewhere.[157] It is these realities, inexorably repeated throughout its history, which are the products of its unique, uneven, divergent development and which have imbued the politics of Northern Ontario with its peculiar grievous, envious, greenish hues. Furthermore, it is these conditions which have incited the discontent so prevalent in the politics of Northern Ontario. Thus, it is evident that the political and historical development of the North has been divergent. The natural resource economy of the North, as well as pernicious provincial government policies and interventions, have had a profound effect on the development of Northern Ontario.

CHAPTER TWO: NOTES

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CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL PATTERNS

As Rand Dyck declares, for many years it was frequently articulated that Ontario was an easy province to govern.[1] This assertion emanated from the fact that Ontario was purported to have been a relatively homogenous province, particularly in terms of the demands promulgated by Ontarians, as well as from the fact that the prosperity of the province readily provided the provincial government with the funds to placate those demands.[2] Dyck avows, however, that it is inaccurate to assume that Ontario is a homogenous province; in actuality, it is a heterogenous province which is increasingly diverse culturally, socially, economically, and most significantly, politically.[3] In reality, Ontario never was and never will be an easy province to govern. Dyck argues that amongst the most salient manifestations of the political diversity of the province, regional disparities remain the most portentous and pertinacious.[4] This argument is augmented by Sid Noel who affirms that there are "profound regional differences" in the politics of the province, the most prominent of which exist in Northern Ontario which is an "exception to most generalizations about the province as a whole."[5] This argument is further substantiated by Morris Zaslow who states that the politics of Northern Ontario have distinctive regional attributes which can be differentiated from those of Southern Ontario.[6]

Thus, while abrogating all assumptions about how easy and uniform Ontario politics are alleged to be, it may be ascertained that there are abiding differences in the politics of the disparate regions across the province. Ostensibly, the most obstinate of these political differences can be discerned in the dichotomy between Northern Ontario and Southern Ontario. Compared to the political patterns that are apparent in the South, which are often assumed to be indicative of the entire province, the political patterns that are apparent in the North appear much different. But in which ways? How are the politics of Northern Ontario different? What political patterns in the North are distinct from those in the South?

Through a concise comparison of the political patterns of the province, it is

evinced that the politics of Northern Ontario differ from those of Southern Ontario in three ways: its political culture; its political structure; and its political priorities. Overall, though, it can be observed that the politics of Northern Ontario are distinguished by persistent feelings of disaffection, dependency, and domination, as well as by parochialism and pragmatism. Cast in a dim, undulating pool of indignation, the politics of Northern Ontario reflect the region's discontent and its realization that it has been alienated, isolated, and exploited throughout its historical evolution. It is the unique ways in which Northern Ontarians have tried to overcome this despondency which are the most predominant features of the political patterns that have surfaced in the region. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate how the politics of Northern Ontario are different by delineating the distinctions in the political patterns in the North, specifically, and in the South. This chapter begins with a discussion of the deviations prominent in the political cultures of the two regions. It then proceeds to a description of the divergences evident in the political structures of local government in the North and the South. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the disparities in the political priorities of Northern Ontario and Southern Ontario.

POLITICAL CULTURE

While those in other provinces often perceive Ontario as the most predominant, prosperous, and presumptuous province in Canada, Ontarians themselves possess almost no provincial consciousness.[7] Most Ontarians, in fact, perceive themselves primarily as Canadians, not as Ontarians. Consequently, they demonstrate traits which are typically associated with the Canadian political culture: collectivism; conservatism; elitism; deference; stability; and social order.[8] Since these are the traits which are most prevalent in the Ontario political culture, most analyses of the provincial political culture have been confined to an emphasis of these conspicuous traits which are comparable to the Canadian political culture. Unfortunately, however, within the domain of the Ontario political culture, these traits are more representative of the South than of the North. It is

often assumed that Ontario has only one political culture. This is because the political culture of Southern Ontario is much more prevalent in the more populated South and eclipses the political culture of Northern Ontario. Nevertheless, it can be demonstrated that there are two political cultures in Ontario, one in the South and one in the North. As Dyck confirms, Ontario has always been characterized as having a single political culture, but there is a distinctive political sub-culture evident in the North which is distinguished by "alienation, dependence, handouts, and frustration, based on isolated settlements, distance from Toronto, poor communications, and inadequate services."[9] By outlining and then contrasting the political cultures of both Southern Ontario and Northern Ontario, it is shown that the politics of the North are much different. An understanding of what political culture actually refers to, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to fully comprehending how the politics of the North differ.

The term "political culture" is inherently complex, but it has the potential to provide tremendous insights into the political patterns of Northern Ontario and Southern Ontario. The term was introduced in 1956 in an essay entitled "Comparative Political Systems" by Gabriel Almond.[10] In the essay, Almond asserts that the term political culture improved upon previously conceived terms like "character and custom" which had "diffuse and ambiguous meanings" and inevitably led to analyses that were inundated with "exaggeration and oversimplification."[11] The term political culture, in contrast, could confer why "formally similar institutions operated in radically different ways" within specific states and societies.[12] While the "political" aspect of the term implicitly referred to the realm of politics, Almond decided to define "culture" in a way which would allow him to have access to the conceptual frameworks and approaches established in anthropology, psychology, and sociology, because they enabled him to then make use of related concepts such as "socialization, culture conflict, and acculturation."[13] Almond eventually embraced a definition of culture which had been devised by Talcott Parsons which claimed that culture was the "psychological orientations towards social objects," while orientation was the "internalized aspects of objects and relationships."[14] Parsons identified three types of orientations: affective (e.g. feelings and emotions); cognitive

(e.g. knowledge and belief); and evaluative (e.g. judgments and opinions).[15] While the notion of orientations remained integral to his evolving definition of political culture, the concept itself needed to be further refined.

In 1963, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba elaborated upon the political culture concept in their classic study entitled *The Civic Culture.*[16] Almond and Verba delineated three ways in which to categorize political cultures: a "parochial" political culture is one in which people are essentially unaware of the political system of which they are a part of; a "subject" political culture is one in which people are aware of the political system, inform themselves about its operations, realize that it has some impact on their lives, but undertake few initiatives to influence it; and a "participant" political culture is one in which people are aware of the political system and actively attempt to influence it.[17] While all societies are an inevitable amalgam of all three political cultures, the society which has a predominantly participant political culture is referred to as a "civic culture" and is considered to be the ideal towards which other societies should aim.[18] Almond and Verba subsequently defined political culture as "the specifically political orientations -- attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."[19] Although their definition of the term political culture was widely accepted, their study, *The Civic Culture*, was criticized because it utilized a "synchronic" approach which relied heavily on data gathered at a single moment in time, rather than a "diachronic" approach which would have utilized data gathered over several moments in time and which would not have ignored the changes that can occur over long periods.[20] Notwithstanding that criticism, however, their definition has remained intact and has provided the impetus and support for further inquiries into political culture.

Converging on Canadian politics, possibly one of the most profound analyses of political culture has been proffered by David Bell in his study entitled *The Roots of Disunity*. Bell defines political culture as the "ideas, assumptions, values, and beliefs that condition political action."[21] It is the political culture of a society which affects the ways in which people interpret and use politics, in particular, the ways in which they confront social problems and the solutions that they develop to resolve them.[22] Thus, in

accordance with the definitions described above, this analysis will interpret the term political culture as the political or politically relevant attitudes, beliefs, values, orientations, and opinions of the people of a particular province or society.[23]

In comparison, the political culture of Southern Ontario can be classified as a subject political culture since most people from the region tend to be aware of the provincial political system, but choose to concentrate on the federal political system instead.[24] Overall, the political culture of the South can be described, as Donald MacDonald describes it, as "progressive conservative" or "conservatism with a progressive component."[25] MacDonald defines conservatism as a part of the political culture which represents contentment with the status quo and an inclination to resist change; while "progressive" means a part of the political culture that may initially have limited support from the provincial population, but eventually comes to be accepted by the people until even the provincial government, likely opposed from the outset, becomes willing to allow and implement the changes.[26] As Seymour Martin Lipset maintains, the origins of this progressive conservatism can be traced back to the counter-revolutionary consequences of the 1776 American Revolution when the United Empire Loyalists fled the American colonies to come settle in Upper Canada, that is, Southern Ontario, so that they could continue living under the auspices of the British Empire and in accordance with its ideological precepts, primarily toryism.[27] The "tory touch" which the Loyalists introduced had an instantaneous effect on the political culture of Southern Ontario because there were no other ideological predilections yet established in the South.[28] Although the ensuing progressive conservatism influenced the development of the politics and political institutions of the province, toryism did not permeate the North and it did not influence its political culture; it was unique to the South. The political culture of Northern Ontario was influenced by its own divergent development. This development was based on the role that Northerners played in the physical extraction of natural resources and was imbued by all the uncertainties which those endeavours entailed, namely, persistent feelings of being exploited, dependent, dominated, alienated, and isolated. Unable to overcome these struggles on their own, and realizing that the

provincial government was unwilling to help them transcend their situation, a distinctive political culture developed in the North which reflected their mounting dissatisfaction with their place in the provincial political system. As a result, most Northerners did not worry about politics, rather, they worried about those matters which influenced them the most: working and surviving in the volatile natural resource industry. Subsequently, following the framework founded by Almond and Verba, the political culture of Northern Ontario can be classified as parochial because most people from the region tend to be largely unaware of the provincial political system of which they are a vital part of. The Northern Ontario political culture also tends to be pragmatic in that the politics of the region invariably revolve around concerns which are of immediate and practical consequence to the North. Overall, the political culture of Northern Ontario can be described, as Geoffrey Weller describes it, as revealing "disaffection."[29] This disaffection is manifest in a variety of ways, such as: distinct voting patterns; an ideological propensity for supporting working class movements; secessionist sentiments; and overt patronage.

With regards to voting patterns in Northern Ontario, it is evident that the "North votes with the government" at both the provincial and federal levels.[30] Provincially, this voting pattern is evinced by the fact that Northern Ontario supported the Progressive Conservative Party throughout its forty-two year reign in the province between 1943 and 1985. When the Liberal Party was elected in 1985, the region switched to support them. Then when the New Democratic Party (NDP) was elected in 1990, support in the region switched again. An aberration within this voting pattern has recently occurred, however, following the election of the Conservatives under Michael Harris in 1995, as Northern Ontario maintained its majority support for the NDP. Nevertheless, this voting pattern generally deviates from the expected reaction of voters in hinterland regions who are normally regarded as being likely to vote for opposition or third parties as a means of changing their situation.[31] Weller states that this tendency to vote for the party in power represents an implicit attempt by Northern Ontarians to make the region useful politically to the government in the hopes that they will obtain a few handouts in return.[32] With only

10 of 103 seats in the Ontario legislature, the North simply does not possess the political leverage to intimidate the government to any significant extent. Despite this diminutive political clout, however, the protracted periods of single party dominance in the province have made this voting pattern seem rather reasonable. Although it may have led to the government assuming support in the region, this voting pattern did garner some goodwill for the North, and many in the North understand that they should be reliant on nothing more than goodwill from the government.[33]

Another distinctive characteristic of the disaffection evident in the Northern Ontario political culture has been an ideological propensity for working class movements. This is apparent in the abiding support for the NDP at both the provincial and federal levels, which has traditionally been the second party in the region, as well as in support for other labour-oriented political parties which are further to the left, such as the Communist Party.[34] Weller insists that support for these political parties indicates that there is an element of protest voting in the North, although it is not the dominant pattern.[35] There has been, however, undercurrents of radical political protest which have manifest in substantial support for union organizations like the International Workers of the World and the One Big Union.[36] Anthony Rasporich notes, though, that these union organizations have given ethnics and socialists of both sexes a profound presence in the politics of the region which is a notable feature of the political culture of Northern Ontario.[37]

Yet another aspect of this radical political protest in Northern Ontario has been the periodic calls for secession. The earliest call for secession came in 1875 when Simon James Dawson, a member of the provincial parliament for the riding of Algoma, proposed that Northern Ontario should become a separate province.[38] Subsequent, but very insignificant, calls for separation persisted throughout that period to the early 1900s and then subsided during the period of the World Wars and the Depression. Secessionist fever permeated from the pores of Northern Ontario politics again after 1950. Weller points out that the preceding calls for secession during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were based on a "spirit of optimism" and a feeling that a separate province

would be a powerful economic entity and contribute immensely to the burgeoning Canadian federation.[39] Conversely, those calls for secession after 1950 were based on a "spirit of rebellion" against a subservient hinterland status which had developed in Northern Ontario.[40] In 1950, Hubert Limbrick declared that the North was isolated and neglected by the provincial government and the only way to ameliorate this situation was to create a new province (i.e. to be called Aurora).[41] The ambiguity of the Aurora concept, however, coupled with the apathy of Northerners, assured that the movement would fail. In 1973, Edward Diebel created the Northern Ontario Heritage Party (NOHP) after concluding that the only way that the concerns of the whole region could be addressed would be to have a political party that represented the North at Queen's Park in Toronto.[42] The NOHP also advocated a new province in the North and was also met with the same apathy from the Northern Ontario electorate and failed. The most recent call for secession has come from the Northern Ontario Coalition (NOC). The creation of NOC was provoked by the provincial government's decision to cancel the 1999 spring bear hunt in the North, without consultation, compensation, or warning; ostensibly as a gesture to Southern Ontario voters, which had "much more to do with re-electing Harris Tories in southern ridings than it does with sound wildlife management" prior to a provincial election that spring.[43] As Mick Lowe confirms, "[e]ver-expendable Northerners, outnumbered ten-to-one and never great Tory supporters anyway, are once again sacrificed on the bed of Southern Ontario political expediency. It is a century-old fight that the North can never win, because our destiny is determined elsewhere."[44] While the NOC aspires to achieve party status within the province, it is likely that its fortunes will be as ill-fated as those of its predecessors.

A final, but important corollary to the Northern Ontario political culture has been the preponderance of overt patronage in the politics of the region. As the natural resource hinterland to Southern Ontario metropolitan hegemony, the political culture of the North had "inevitably developed a colonial flavour of dependency and domination" which reinforced patronage and brokerage politics.[45] Since political and economic power was wielded from elsewhere, intermediaries that could inextricably link the North to these

metropolitan sources of power became essential elements of the political patterns which emerged in the region.[46] Not surprisingly, Sid Noel attests, political party allegiances in Northern Ontario have always tended to be formed for the "short run" and fused by cynical calculations of "quid pro quo."[47] Indeed, Northerners were, and are, "brutally frank and insistent" in their demands to their politicians, however small those demands are in proportion to the larger demands that are routinely delivered to Southern Ontario.[48] While often temporarily mitigating the circumstances created by the volatile natural resource based economy, these initiatives in the North are primarily intended to retain or obtain the allegiance of voters and are not intended to ameliorate the conditions which had initially caused the disaffection. The political culture of Northern Ontario, that is, disaffection, has had an enormous impact on the political patterns which have developed in the region.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Another way in which disaffection has manifest in the political patterns of the North has been in the avoidance of provincial politics altogether and a concentration on local politics.[49] While in many ways indicative of the pragmatic and parochial nature of Northern Ontario politics to focus on immediate, close concerns, this emphasis on local politics seems quite legitimate considering that there are many more problems at the municipal level in the North than in the South. These problems can be partially attributed to the fact that there are vastly different local government political structures in the North and in the South. According to Oiva Saarinen, when the northern boundaries of the province were finally established in 1912, the provincial government was compelled to make a decision regarding the system of local government to be established in the North.[50] Rather than implementing the "county" system which had been previously established in Southern Ontario, the provincial government chose to retain the "district" system in Northern Ontario. Local government in the South was based on the Baldwin Act of 1849 which included rural municipalities (e.g. hamlets, townships, villages, and

towns) into the county system, but excluded urban municipalities (e.g. cities).[51] Hence, there is a two-tier system in the rural areas, and a one-tier system in the urban areas. This system was not extended to Northern Ontario.

Northern Ontario has a slightly different system of local government. When the provincial government was required to determine the municipal political structure for the region, it used the rudimentary districts which had already been demarcated by the federal government and were intended to be "embryonic provinces."[52] Consequently, the North came to contain no counties, but rather a myriad of townships, villages, towns, and cities situated within massive, sparsely settled districts.[53] Moreover, instead of having elected municipal councils like in the counties, the districts were administered by provincial civil servants.[54] Thus, with the exception of Sudbury, which in the 1970s experimented by becoming a two-tier regional municipality, there is a one-tier political structure in the North. The districts, unlike the counties in the South, have no local government function. In further contrast to the South, in the 1940s, the provincial government created two political structures which are exclusive to the North: improvement districts and unorganized territories. As David Siegel explains, improvement districts are essentially probationary forms of local government which have all the powers of a township, but their politicians are appointed and are subjected to provincial supervision concerning by-laws and financial matters.[55] The improvement districts are intended for previously unsettled areas in the North where a nascent natural resource based community is in need of some form of "instant" local government.[56] Unorganized territories are even more elementary. They are not necessarily local political structures, but small settlements in which services are provided by the provincial government directly, or indirectly by specialized committees (e.g. school, road, or recreation committees).[57]

Many of the problems faced by local governments in the North are primarily the result of their positions as natural resource based communities. While Southern Ontario communities grew slowly from relatively stable agrarian roots, Northern Ontario communities evolved rapidly because of natural resource induced economic booms. While most of the communities in the South developed diversified economic structures,

most in the North did not and, as a result, remain vulnerable to economic busts induced by breakdowns in international natural resource markets. This perilous cycle of boom and bust has placed severe financial and social strains on local governments in the North.[58] Also, since these natural resource based communities are often small, supporting mainly the workers and their families, they do not have a very extensive tax base and must rely on the provincial government for financial assistance.[59] Moreover, since the province's peculiar tax assessment regulations historically restricted the local government's ability to tax the natural resource industries, the tax revenues were accrued by the federal and provincial governments and were not retained by the communities in the North.[60] For instance, as Carl Wallace elucidates, in the mining communities of Sudbury and Timmins, the mining companies could not be taxed by the local government until the 1970s which deprived these communities of their only source of industrial taxation.[61] It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a high level of insolvency and a low level of social services in many of the communities in Northern Ontario. These communities often have a poor infrastructure system (e.g. water lines, roads, sewers) and inadequate social services (e.g. doctors, dentists, psychologists). Not only are these communities isolated from these imperative social services, huddled in the wilderness around the flickering fires of a natural resource industry, they are confronted with higher costs for basic essentials, such as food, fuel, electricity, and clothing because they are so remote. These are only a few of the problems which have manifest in the politics of Northern Ontario. The political patterns that are evident in the North are in many ways a function of its divergent local political structure. Local government in Northern Ontario has imbued the politics of the region with its own unique problems. These problems have thus been a primary part of the subsequent political priorities that have been expressed in the North.

POLITICAL PRIORITIES

Finally, Northern Ontario politics are different because the region has disparate political priorities. Of particular significance are those issues relating to the environment, Aboriginals, Franco-Ontarians, and extensive provincial government interventions in the region, which stand in stark contrast to those issues in Southern Ontario. With regards to the environment, it can be discerned that Northern Ontarians and their politicians, as well as natural resource industries and the Ontario government, are all increasingly aware of the environmental devastation which the North has endured as an historical frontier of natural resource exploitation: acid rain; soil erosion; mercury pollution; radioactive tailings; and dangerous dioxin emissions. As Tom Miller reveals, pollution in the North has always been a major problem, but it is a product of its immutable natural resource basis, evident in the acrid effluence and scum in the rivers in pulp and paper communities; in the vast tracts of levelled forests in logging communities; and in the precarious tailings ponds and denudation in mining communities.[62] Fortunately, however, community, industry, and provincial government instigated groups have all made more of an effort in recent years to improve the environment in the region. These initiatives, for example, have ranged from modest community tree planting projects and pamphlet programs exhorting environmental awareness to massive land reclamation projects undertaken by industry and stricter fines for polluters imposed by the provincial government. Nevertheless, to a far greater extent than in Southern Ontario, protecting and preserving the environment remains a top priority in the politics of Northern Ontario not only because the region's industries are based on natural resources vulnerable to pollution, but because those industries themselves are inexorable polluters, and that pollution invariably has a perilous personal impact. One of the most prominent of these incidences occurred in the 1970s and involved the poisoning of the Aboriginals situated along the English and Wabigoon river systems by the Reed Paper Company in Dryden, which had been dumping toxic mercury waste into the water.[63] The mercury was absorbed by the plants and fish in the water which were ultimately consumed by the

Aboriginals, unknowingly, with devastating consequences. Not surprisingly, although environmental issues are important to the politics of Northern Ontario, Aboriginal issues also predominate.

While both "status" and "non-status" Aboriginals abide throughout the province, they are most prominent in Northern Ontario; particularly those of the Cree and Ojibwa dialects.[64] The Aboriginal population, though, is very small and mostly sparsely scattered in the Far North. Authority for status Aboriginals residing on designated reserves is assumed by the federal government, and complications inevitably arise between the Canadian and Ontario governments over arrangements and obligations as to who ought to provide, or more accurately, why services have not been provided, to the Natives. The Aboriginal population is continually in a crisis. The Natives often credit this crisis to the "cultural disintegration" that they have endured within the existing political structure in which their "traditions, stifled within this foreign system, could no longer guide or support" them and, as a result, they have been belied by desperation and despair.[65] However, the verities of their existence also exacerbates their situation and produces problems which permeate the politics of Northern Ontario. For instance, most of the Natives on these reserves are engaged in a low level of economic activity which is based on traditional hunting, fishing, fur trapping, and wild rice harvesting pursuits, but which does not provide them with a substantial income and must be supplemented by federal subsidies and financial support.[66] Furthermore, these federal reparations have often been paltry which has resulted in a low level of services for the Natives, especially in health services, which has compounded some of the social problems already prevalent amongst the Aboriginal population, namely, alcoholism and violence.[67] It is conceded, however, that contemporary crusades towards Native self-government have the potential to redress these problems and to augment their sense of self-respect.[68] Thus, in anticipation of these changes, Aboriginal problems and priorities have remained prominent in Northern Ontario politics.

Francophones are another predominant group in Northern Ontario and, like the Aboriginals, have imbued the politics of the region with their own distinctive problems

and priorities. As expected, the majority of these issues revolve around preserving the edification of French in the province. The proportion of Franco-Ontarians in the North, particularly in the Northeast, is much higher than in the South.[69] Subsequently, their issues have been more salient in the region. Converging mostly in communities contiguous to Quebec, in places such as Mattawa, New Liskeard, and Kirkland Lake, their density, combined with their access to the Quebec media, has made it much easier for Franco-Ontarians in the North to conserve their language and ebullient culture.[70] Francophones also have access to French-language educational facilities at all levels, most notably at the university level at Laurentian University and at its satellite campus in Hearst.[71] Nevertheless, these achievements in education have not come without considerable complications and conflicts. For instance, both the creation of bilingual Laurentian University, as well as the provision of provincial funding for the creation of French-language secondary schools, did not occur until the late 1960s. Furthermore, as Don Scott affirms, in many cases, the creation of these French-language schools was either opposed or obstructed by English-speaking local Board of Education members or provincial Ministry of Education employees.[72] As a result, Franco-Ontarians in the North, striving to ensure the survival of their French culture, have promoted their linguistic and educational priorities primarily through political means. The protracted, persistent campaigns for French-language schools has caused "frustrations, animosities, and lingering divisions" in many Northern Ontario communities which have been evident in the political patterns in the region.[73] Moreover, as Weller verifies, in recent years a "Franco-Ontarian societal movement has arisen that, while not markedly asserting itself at the electoral level, has produced powerful political undercurrents that are difficult for any government to completely ignore."[74] The "French fact" in Northern Ontario has, therefore, been a vital part of the politics of the region and is visible in the disparate political patterns and priorities promulgated in the North.

Extensive provincial government interventions into Northern Ontario society have also produced divergent political patterns and priorities which are different from those in Southern Ontario. Ostensibly, one of the most overt differences is that the North is the

only region to be officially recognized in Ontario law. The region used to be generally regarded as consisting of all districts north of the French River and Lake Nippissing, but in 1988 the provincial government redefined Northern Ontario to include all ten districts in the province: Algoma; Cochrane; Kenora; Manitoulin; Nippissing; Parry Sound; Rainy River; Sudbury; Thunder Bay; and Temiskaming.[75] The inclusion of the Nippissing and Parry Sound districts now allows a larger portion of the region to benefit from specific provincial government policies and programs oriented to the particular priorities of the North.[76] Furthermore, the North is the only region to have its own provincial government ministry, the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines. The provincial government also operates the Northern Ontario Development Corporation and the Northern Ontario Heritage Fund. In 1985, David Peterson's Liberal government initiated the Northern Ontario Relocation Project which involved the transfer of several provincial government operations (e.g. the Ontario Geological Survey was moved to Sudbury) to the North which helped diversify its natural resource based economy and briefly sparked its construction sector too. In 1986, the Liberals introduced the Northern Health Travel Grant in an attempt to attract medical specialists to the North.

In addition, Northern Ontario politics are also distinguished by special rules for election spending, politician's spending allowances, and, until recently, special consideration in the distribution of seats in the provincial legislature. These initiatives were intended to assist in assuaging the biases which distance, dispersion, and sparseness had on the politics of the region. For example, the terms of reference of the 1996 Ontario Election Boundaries Commission established that there should be a minimum of fifteen constituencies in the North, "even if the population of the region did not really justify them."[77] In 1996, however, the Harris government eliminated this over-representation when it reduced the overall number of representatives in the provincial legislature, purportedly to make it more efficient, but it gave Northern Ontario an even less effective role in the politics of the province.

Prior to the Harris period, though, it can be discerned that the provincial government had intervened extensively in the politics of the North to ensure that its

problems and priorities were slightly mitigated. But, as Geoffrey Weller explains, most of the provincial government's initiatives have tended to reinforce the reality of the region's natural resource basis.[78] The Ontario government has provided generous subsidies to the mining and logging industries, and has funded elaborate infrastructure projects (e.g. airports, bridges, highways, fibre-optic telecommunication systems) which further perpetuate the function of extracting and exporting natural resources from the North.[79] Weller points out that few of the provincial government's development initiatives have really helped to diversify the Northern Ontario economy.[80] Realizing that the mining and logging industries are becoming increasingly capital-intensive, the provincial government has begun to emphasize the development of the tourist industry in the North, regardless of the fact that this is a low paying, seasonal industry.[81] Essentially, these initiatives have not dramatically altered the political priorities of the region. The North remains perennially disaffected, pivoting on its precarious natural resource platform, and dependent on provincial government interventions in the region. Unstable, the prospects for Northern Ontario do not seem very good. In the Harris period, provincial government interventions in the economy and society of the North have been severely subdued. While this has had a positive effect on Southern Ontario, it has had a largely negative effect on Northern Ontario because it is more reliant on provincial government initiatives. Thus, it is evident that the political priorities of the North are vastly different from those of the South.

CONCLUSION

Ontario is obviously not an easy province to govern. The portentous and pertinacious regional disparities which exist in the province provide proof that there are profound differences in the politics of Northern Ontario and Southern Ontario. Diverging from the political patterns of the South, it is evinced that the politics of the North are distinguished by feelings of disaffection, dependency, and domination. These differences are explicit in the political culture, political structure, and political priorities of the region.

Perhaps the most important of these differences is the distinct Northern Ontario political culture. In contrast to the South, the political culture of the North is characterized by parochialism and pragmatism. This is manifest in voting for the political party in power, both provincially and federally, an ideological propensity towards supporting the NDP and other socialist, labour-oriented movements, union radicalism, secessionist sentiments, overt patronage, as well as an emphasis on local political matters. With regards to local politics, the political structure of the North is different in that it possesses districts, improvement districts, and unorganized territories, while the South has counties. Communities in the North are committed either directly or indirectly to the exploitation of natural resources, while those in the South are extremely economically diverse. Consequently, Northern Ontario communities are compelled to endure a boom and bust existence. Improvements are constricted by uncertainty, isolation, costly essential commodities, crude infrastructures, poor tax bases, and paltry social services. Finally, the politics of Northern Ontario are different in that the region has disparate political priorities. In contrast to the South, issues relating to the environment, Aboriginals, Franco-Ontarians, and provincial government intervention are all particularly prominent. The predominance of these issues in the politics of Northern Ontario have provided the region with its distinct political patterns. While some parallels in the political patterns of the North and South do exist, it can be discerned that the politics of Northern Ontario are fundamentally different. These differences are the result of its divergent development.

CHAPTER THREE: NOTES

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6. Morris Zaslow, "Does Northern Ontario Possess a Regional Identity?," *Laurentian University Review*, V:4 (September 1973), 15-20.

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12. Ibid, 10.

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18. Almond and Verba, 29-30.

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20. Bell, 12.

21. Ibid, 187.

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23. Rand Dyck, *Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches*, Second Edition (Toronto: Nelson; 1996), 281; and Dyck, *Provincial*, 4.

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CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL PROCESSES

Northern Ontario politics are notably different. This is apparent in its disparate political patterns, in particular, its distinct political culture, political priorities, and political structure. While the previous chapter was concerned with discerning the differences in the political patterns of the North, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the underlying political processes which have provoked those differences. This chapter, therefore, poses the following questions: Why are the politics of Northern Ontario different? What are the reasons why the politics of Northern Ontario are distinct from those of Southern Ontario?

In response, it may be proposed that the politics of Northern Ontario are different primarily because of its divergent development. From the outset, the North has existed as an exploited natural resource hinterland, a veritable "warehouse" of raw goods to be gorged for the manufacturing heartland in the South, and inexorably vulnerable to the vicissitudes of a "boom and bust" verity. The growth of Northern Ontario, both in terms of its future and its function, was dominated by deleterious decisions, pernicious policies, and protracted interventions exerted from elsewhere, from the offices of a progression of provincial governments and industrialists, which were isolated and impervious to their effects on the North. The profusion of natural resources in the region did not directly determine the political patterns which ensued, but its subordinate position within the province, perpetuated by a series of provincial governments and natural resource industries, did ensure that these political patterns were indeed distinct. The divergent development of Northern Ontario has created inequalities in economic and political power in the province, evident in the North's feelings of disaffection, dependency, and domination, which are perhaps the most prevalent parts of its politics. It is these inequalities, manifest as "asymmetrical absolute properties" and "hierarchical interaction relations," which have inhibited the North's ability to autonomously alter its vulnerability. Moreover, it is these inequalities which have actuated the differences which are now apparent in its politics and have imparted the region with its distinctively low level of

political efficacy. Thus, it is discerned that the politics of Northern Ontario are different because of its divergent development which provoked the emergence of an exploited natural resource based economy and the ensuing inequalities in economic and political power. It was the provincial government and natural resource based industries which initiated the development of Northern Ontario and subsequently sustained its subjugation. Hence, the North did not develop like the South.

As Geoffrey Weller purports, the most useful theoretical framework for examining the politics of Northern Ontario is the "centre-periphery" perspective.[1] This chapter begins with a description of the precursors of the centre-periphery approach and then progresses to an discussion of the centre-periphery theory as a political process. It then proceeds to an examination of this political process with reference to the political patterns in Northern Ontario in an attempt to elucidate why its politics are different. This chapter concludes by conceding that the centre-periphery connection between Southern Ontario and Northern Ontario will continue to persist.

POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVES

To begin, the centre-periphery perspective places an emphasis on discerning the importance of the state and market in its analyses and is a derivative of the study of political economy. As Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh assert, the study of political economy seeks to explore the production (i.e. extent of goods and services produced in a society) and distribution (i.e. apportioning of income for those involved in production, as well as apportioning of goods and services produced in society for consumption) of societal resources.[2] The study of political economy also explores two institutional mechanisms which are used to determine how those societal resources will be expended: the state (e.g. the Ontario government) and the market (e.g. the Northern Ontario economy).[3] Hence, it is this unique combination of state and market institutions within a specific society which constitutes its political economy. Howlett and Ramesh contend that the study of political economy reveals how a society functions because it focusses on

how different individuals and groups within the society benefit in disparate ways from the use of state and market institutions which are then used to regulate and control the creation and allocation of wealth.[4] Political economy also peruses the ensuing biases in the structures and processes of the state and market institutions; it is these biases which systematically favour some segments of society and not others.[5] Howlett and Ramesh claim that there are essentially three objectives to the study of political economy: to discover how a particular fusion of state and market forces came about; to determine the capabilities of both state and market actors to alter this combination; and to discern who benefits the most and how they caused those changes to occur.[6] Thus, in this chapter the connections between the state and the market will be examined, that is, the direct and indirect effects of the provincial government and the Northern Ontario natural resource based economy will be examined to evaluate their influences on the divergent development of the North and its ensuing politics. While surveying the political economy of Northern Ontario, however, the centre-periphery framework will be utilized. The precursors of the centre-periphery perspective include two of the most influential and illustrious political economy theories in Canada: the staples theory and the metropolitan-hinterland theory. These theories will be discussed in turn.

THE STAPLES THEORY

Proponents of the staples perspective have proffered an inductive and indigenous historical interpretation of the economic development of the Canadian state. The staples theory postulates that Canadian economic development has been dependent on the extraction and exportation of a progression of natural resource products, or "staples" (e.g. fish, fur, timber, wheat, and minerals), which are primarily unprocessed and are inextricably linked to the exigencies of foreign markets and external industrial centres.[7] Ostensibly, the most conspicuous contention amongst staples theorists is whether or not this natural resource exploitation has been a positive or negative experience. These varying varieties of the staples approach are most commonly expressed in either

Mackintoshian or Innisian terms.

The initial advocates of the staples approach in the historiography of Canadian political economy were W. A. Mackintosh and H. A. Innis. Mackintosh believed that the staples industries ought to be the basis for economic development in Canada and that the exploitation of natural resources was an inevitable and necessary part of the push towards progress and prosperity for the country.[8] Mackintosh maintained that Canada had an international comparative advantage in its abundance of natural resources and, eventually, the technology acquired and the revenues accumulated from the exploitation of those natural resources would lead to investments in manufacturing industries as well.[9] Innis, in contrast, argued that the exploitation of natural resources had truncated the development of Canada and its continued dependence on the staples industries had precluded its prospects for progress and prosperity, and had made it increasingly susceptible to fluctuations in international economic markets.[10] Innis' focus on the sundry facets of dependency are particularly salient to this study of Northern Ontario. As Neil Bradford and Glen Williams indicate, Innis delineated a staples-led pattern of development which consisted of the following: cumulative concentration of societal resources to staples exploitation; expanded public expenditures and incurred debts to underwrite the extensive costs of constructing the infrastructure (e.g. roads, railways, airports, mills) needed to expedite the export of those natural resources; pronounced vulnerability to oscillating external economic markets, with the ensuing effects of the "adjustment crises" distributed unequally across regions; and, finally, extensive governmental intervention to implement policies to support the staples industries and to mildly mitigate the "rigidities" and "disturbances" inherent in this staples-led development pattern.[11] Innis determined that Canada's development was not necessarily incremental, but it was rapid and very unpredictable.[12] With regards to the "regional unevenness" evident in the economic and political development of Ontario, Innis noticed that the natural resource industries enabled the province to proceed towards "an efficient, balanced, and relatively elastic economy," despite the fact that this was achieved largely at the expense of Northern Ontario.[13] In acknowledgement of this, Innis remarked that

> the emergence of Ontario to maturity has brought problems for the province as well as for the Dominion. The elasticity of the economy of Ontario has been based on a wealth of developed natural resources and has been obtained in part through inelastic developments which bear with undue weight on less favoured areas of the Dominion. The strength of Ontario may emphasize the weakness of the federation.[14]

Bradford and Williams explain that when Innis referred to "elasticity," he meant the capacity, based on economic diversification, to make rapid institutional adjustments or adaptations in response to unanticipated external economic shocks.[15] Although the staples theory seems to be applicable for an analysis of the divergent development of Northern Ontario, Bradford and Williams also explain that Innis did not provide a systematic theoretical interpretation of the political processes which influenced the development of distinct political patterns.[16] Innis imparted great importance to geographic factors in determining development, but he insufficiently surmised the significance of both social and political factors in the process of development. As Janine Brodie declares, perhaps the most fundamental flaw in Innis' staples theory is that it is "dehumanized" since it offers scant coverage of the impact of politics and policy in sustaining the uneven development, and places the consequences of the staples trade as its conceptual priority.[17] Nevertheless, the staples theory did provide a good grounding for other inquiries into Canadian political economy, namely, the metropolitan-hinterland approach.

THE METROPOLITAN-HINTERLAND THEORY

The metropolitan-hinterland theory was initially intended for analyses of the political economy of Western Canada, however, it has since been applied to interpretations of suspected uneven development patterns in other regions as well. The metropolitan-hinterland approach posits that the hinterland (e.g. the West) was created as an internal colony of the heartland (e.g. central Canada or the "metropolis"). A subordinate and dependent relationship subsequently ensued between the heartland and

the hinterland which was perpetuated by government policies that were inspired by the metropolis. These policies confined those in the hinterland to staples production and, at the same time, compelled them to purchase manufactured products from the heartland.[18] Moreover, the development of the hinterland was controlled and constrained by banking, business, and political elites all based in the metropolis area and acting in the interests of the heartland.[19] As a result, the theory attests that the development of the hinterland economies was historically thwarted and kept vulnerable to the uncertainties of the boom and bust of international natural resource markets, while the metropolis and its elites reaped all of the economic benefits.[20] With reference to the uneven development of Northern Ontario, J. M. S. Careless confirms that on the "Canadian lumbering and mining frontiers, in our present northern expansion, the directing, extending, organizing, and exploiting functions of metropolitan interests are evident."[21] Careless contends that "Toronto, which controls wealthy Southern Ontario," is "steadily advancing its empire in the mining North."[22] The metropolitan-hinterland theory, though, received considerable criticisms for its inability to take into account alterations in the dependency relationship in its analysis. As Brodie affirms, the metropolitan-hinterland theory has trouble explaining the changes which may manifest and modify this relationship; in effect, the possibility that the dominance of the metropolis might subside or stop entirely by factors totally unrelated to this relationship are ignored.[23] Once a metropolitan-hinterland relationship is observed, the theory assumes that it is self-sustaining.[24] Nevertheless, the metropolitan-hinterland theory is an important precursor to the centre-periphery perspective because it helps to further highlight the function of the provincial government and the natural resource based economy of the North in determining its distinctive political patterns and divergent development.

THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY THEORY

According to Geoffrey Weller, Nelson Wiseman, and Ernest Epp, the centre-periphery perspective has proven to be the most useful theoretical framework for

interpreting the divergent development and distinctive political patterns intrinsic to Northern Ontario.[25] This is primarily because the centre-periphery theory focuses on the fundamental concept of dependency, that is, the inherent inequalities in the capacity for autonomous growth.[26] While centre regions (e.g. Southern Ontario) are capable of autonomous expansion, peripheral regions (e.g. Northern Ontario) can grow only as a consequence of that expansion.[27] As Elisabeth Gidengil explains, the distortions which ensue when the peripheral economy is structured to meet the needs of the centre are integral components of dependency, the most important component being the functional incompleteness of the peripheral economy and its lack of integration.[28] Gidengil insists that this functional incompleteness is not merely a matter of having to rely on external actors for the provision of goods, rather, it entails having to rely on external actors for the completion of basic economic processes.[29] Complex as it may be, it is this dependency connection which the centre-periphery perspective tries to discern. It is these inequalities, moreover, manifest as both absolute properties and interaction relations, which have inhibited the North's ability to autonomously alter its political and economic vulnerability.

As Weller avows, the centre and the periphery are both geographical regions which are distinguished by two sets of criteria: absolute properties (e.g. individual income levels, number of individuals engaged in natural resource industries); and interaction relations (e.g. economic trade between North and South).[30] The theory contends that the centre procures all of the advantages from its interaction relations with the periphery and the inequalities which manifest are apparent in the disparate absolute properties between the regions. Weller contends that the centre dominates the periphery through asymmetrical and hierarchical structures of economic interactions.[31] The asymmetrical interactions are demonstrated through the unequal disposition of trade between the region whereby manufactured goods are exchanged for natural resource goods to the economic benefit of the centre, not only directly, but in terms of the greater degree of processing which occurs there with its concomitant technological benefits too.[32] With time, these unequal trade benefits exacerbate and enhance the disparities between

the regions and a vertical set of relations eventually emerges. Weller argues that these hierarchical interactions have two portentous results: first, the centre attempts to "protect" its periphery by limiting the periphery's access to alternative import and export trade partners, effectively precluding the diversification of the periphery's economic base; and second, the centre compels the periphery to specialize in the natural resource industries specifically, especially those which provide the raw goods needed by the manufacturing industries in the centre, again, effectively truncating the expansion of the periphery's economic base.[33] Thus, it is evident that the centre-periphery connection is characterized by dependency as the periphery does not have the capacity to autonomously alter its vulnerability. In the succeeding section, the centre-periphery connection between Southern Ontario and Northern Ontario is examined to explain why the politics of the North are different.

ANALYSIS AT THE PROVINCIAL PERIPHERY

The politics of Northern Ontario are different primarily because of its divergent development. The North did not develop like the South. In contrast to Southern Ontario, the discovery of natural resources in Northern Ontario converted its fortunes and circumstances. It was the actions of avaricious provincial governments and eager industrialists, anxious to tap the lucrative sap of revenues dripping from those natural resources, which provoked the exploitation of the region and compelled the creation of natural resource industries intended to provide the raw goods for manufacturing industries elsewhere. The fact that the North was conceived out of Crown lands, as well as the fact that these Crown lands contained some of the most valuable tracts of mineral and timber deposits in the world, assured that it could not escape the extended influence of the provincial government. The provincial government's proprietary rights over these Crown lands allowed it to develop the region as it saw fit. As a result, revenue producing natural resource industries rapidly proliferated in the North and the extraction of raw goods has since continued generally unabated. Moreover, the Ontario government's ownership of

the vast northern expanse ensured that no Northerner would willingly be imparted with profitable portions of the region that contained natural resources which they could then exploit themselves to somehow ameliorate their situation. As proficient managers, in a province that lauded managerial proficiency, the provincial government's authority over the periphery allowed it to acquire the economic prosperity and political power with which it could challenge the metropolitan dominance of other Canadian centres, namely, Montreal. This fight was financed utilizing its natural resource frontier in the North. Thus, to sustain this fight, the provincial government sought the specialization of industries in the North, extracted natural resources, revenues, and people from the region to serve its interests, and established transportation and communications systems which deterred regional cohesiveness and integration, solely to facilitate this exploitation.[34] Consequently, the North was conferred a natural resource based economy, sparse and scattered single-industry communities, and a disparaging, diminutive, and unequal position within the province which was augmented by its dependency on the provincial government for its economic sustenance. Furthermore, those interests, vested in the natural resource industry and extraction function of the region, were far too forceful for Northerners to overcome. The fate of Northern Ontario was largely determined elsewhere and its own interests, usually encumbered by the more earnest obligations of work and family, could not change this. The narrow natural resource based economy in the North endowed it with its peripheral status and its ominous vulnerability to external elements, such as oscillating commodity markets and oblivious decision-making. It was this enveloping futility which permitted the centre-periphery connection to work.

The politics of Northern Ontario are different because the North could not overcome its constraints. As Weller asserts, any attempts to conquer this centre-periphery connection were futile for three reasons: first, any changes to this political process go against the vested interests of the centre "which is dominant and unlikely to be altruistic;" second, the periphery has no real political, economic, or social power with which to pressure the centre for change; and third, there is an abiding ambivalence amongst Northern Ontarians about the allure of changes as they cannot seem to agree on what

changes to make.[35] The North's precarious natural resource industries have preoccupied the interests of its small and simple population. A rudimentary realization that the region is essentially a powerless part of the provincial scheme has prompted the pursuit, with few exceptions, of one primary objective: survival. This is the verity of the vulnerable periphery. Quite simply, the North lacks political clout.[36] Considering all the changes which have recently occurred in Ontario politics, it might be expected that the condition of the North would have changed as well, yet, as Nelson Wiseman intimates, the centre-periphery connection "that has not changed perceptibly is the one between Northern and Southern Ontario. The North, past and present, appears a relatively remote, dependent, passive, and alienated satellite caught in the orbit of the magnetic, dominant, affluent Southern heartland."[37] However, since Northern Ontario now has only 10 of 103 representatives in the provincial legislature, following the latest electoral redistribution in Ontario in 1996, it is not entirely surprising that the North lacks the political impact to make any substantial changes to its situation. Given its slight significance, it will be even more difficult for Northern Ontario politicians to convince the provincial government to introduce budgets, policies, and statutes which will benefit the North. Thus, it is revealed that the politics of Northern Ontario are different because the North is constrained in a centre-periphery connection with the South. This is apparent in its political structure as its divergent development, asymmetrical absolute properties, and hierarchical interaction relations have provided the region with few benefits.

The futility inherent in the political structure of Northern Ontario is manifest in its political priorities as attempts are made to make fundamental changes in its peripheral status, but are never actually fulfilled. Deriving from its divergent development, as well as the natural resource based economy and the extensive authority and avarice of the provincial government in the region, the North exhibits many of the asymmetrical absolute properties which are indicative of a periphery. In contrast to Southern Ontarians, Northern Ontarians have historically been not only less financially affluent, but have been belied by comparatively inadequate educational services, welfare services, and healthcare services, despite the apparent abundance of natural resource wealth which abounds in the

region and could be directed towards ameliorating these inauspicious circumstances.[38] The politics of Northern Ontario are different because these inequalities have made it more difficult for the North to autonomously alter its vulnerability. For example, with regards to healthcare services, Chris Southcott reveals that several studies have shown that the health status of those residing in Northern Ontario is inferior to those residing elsewhere in the province.[39] In the majority of the studies, the main explanation for those inequalities was simply that the North lacks satisfactory healthcare services.[40] Southcott insists that the lower social and economic status, higher minority group status (i.e. Aboriginals typically have lower levels of health), and geographical isolation of Northern Ontario are all determining factors in explaining the region's scant healthcare services.[41] Another factor which contributes to the lower level of healthcare services in the North is that the region has trouble attracting and retaining healthcare professionals. This is particularly portentous since the natural resource based economy of Northern Ontario necessitates sufficient and specific healthcare services. Aside from the stresses associated with residing in single-industry communities constantly eclipsed by the threat of closures, research by Charles Reasons, Lois Ross, and Craig Paterson has demonstrated that the rates of work-related fatalities and injuries are highest in the forestry and mining industries, that is, the mainstays of the Northern Ontario economy.[42] Related to its distinct natural resource based economy, the paucity of healthcare services in the North is also the product of its sparse and scattered population. It would no doubt be very expensive and extremely difficult to provide the same level of healthcare services as Southern Ontario in Northern Ontario since its population is so much more diminutive and dispersed. Thus, it is rendered once more that the politics of the region are different. The political priorities of the North, encompassed within its centre-periphery connection with the South, do not permit the region to access the authority needed to repress its vulnerability and vanquish the vassalage of its subordinate peripheral status. The asymmetrical absolute properties, evinced in the political priorities of the North (e.g. health, welfare, education, and employment issues), invariably exacerbate and enhance the disparities already apparent between the periphery and the centre.

Finally, the nature of the centre-periphery connection necessarily instigates hierarchical interaction relations which have left the North frustrated and with a low level of political efficacy. The sense of frustration which has shivered across the surface of the politics of Northern Ontario is seen in the prickled feelings of disaffection, dependency, and domination which are prevalent in the political culture of the region. The frustration persists because of the fundamental political, social, and economic inequalities of the North which have made it unable to autonomously alter its fate. Indeed, the fate of the periphery has been largely determined by the interests and aspirations of the centre. It is construed, therefore, that the growth of the North has generally occurred as a consequence of the growth of the South. From this distortion in the periphery's economy emerges the grievances which are predominant in the political culture of Northern Ontario. Northerners know that they are dependent on the largesse of the provincial government and industrialists, as well as on the climate of the international commodity markets, for their subsistence. As a result, most Northerners are apathetic about their politics, insisting that there is not much that they themselves can do to change their condition.[43] With no credible leadership cadre, no optimistic outlook, and no prospects promulgated for ameliorating or at least mitigating their problems, it is likely that these conditions will continue. The hierarchy inherent in the centre-periphery connection ensures that Northern Ontarians possess a low level of political efficacy. Many Northerners, though, maintain that the present political system serves them well and rely on their local politicians to pressure the provincial government to bring back benefits to their community; although these benefits are sometimes essential services (e.g. electricity, airfields, hospitals) which are presented as "gifts" by the provincial government, when other regions receive them as a right.[44] Most Northerners, however, are unwilling to get involved in political concerns or their community, choosing to immerse themselves instead in the tasks and tribulations of their jobs.[45] The politics of Northern Ontario are different because the centre-periphery connection between the North and the South has stifled political efficacy in the region, creating a dependent and indifferent population.

CONCLUSION

According to Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson, recent efforts by the provincial government to bolster the fortunes of Northern Ontario (e.g. transfer of ministries to the region, environmental conferences) reflects a belated recognition of the "fundamental inequity" in Ontario's development process which attempts to "reverse a long-standing and unjust draining of wealth from the region."[46] Indeed, wealth derived from the exploitation of the mines and forests in the natural resource hinterland in the North was historically funnelled off to develop the manufacturing and financial heartland in the South.[47] Now the North is increasingly dependent on the provincial government for its preservation. The divergent development of Northern Ontario had produced a natural resource based economy which is now in need of support. As the natural resource industries decline, as employment drops, and as outmigration leads to population decreases, Northerners will likely look to the provincial government to help ward off the deleterious effects of its deteriorating economic base. Thus, Northern Ontario's dependency will be preserved and its centre-periphery connection with Southern Ontario will be sustained. Moreover, aside from the few initiatives recently taken by the provincial government to assist the North, "no change has really taken place in the fundamental centre-periphery relationship" and it is "not likely that new policies will be started which will change this situation."[48] The occasional provincial government initiatives may help the North to repair some of the damages incurred from its asymmetrical absolute properties and hierarchical interaction relations with the South, but the region will still remain dependent and vulnerable because these efforts are not extensive enough and do not overcome the critical consequences of the centre-periphery connection. Northern Ontario does not have the capacity to autonomously overcome its circumstances. Therefore, the centre-periphery relationship between the North and the South will persist. Northern Ontario will invariably exist as an exploited natural resource hinterland at the provincial periphery.

CHAPTER FOUR: NOTES

1. Geoffrey Weller, "Political Disaffection in the Canadian Provincial North," *Bulletin of Canadian Studies*, IX:1 (Spring 1985), 61.

2. Michael Howlett and M. Ramish, *The Political Economy of Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart; 1997), 9-10.

3. Ibid, 10.

4. Ibid, 10.

5. Ibid, 10.

6. Ibid, 10.

7. Ibid, 92.

8. Ibid, 93.

9. Ibid, 97.

10. Ibid, 95-96.

11. Neil Bradford and Glen Williams, "What Went Wrong? Explaining Canadian Industrialization," *The New Canadian Political Economy*, Wallace Clement and Glen Williams, eds. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press; 1989), 56.

12. Ibid, 57.

13. H. A. Innis, "An Introduction to the Economic History of Ontario from Outpost to Empire," *Profiles of a Province: Studies in the History of Ontario*, Edith G. Firth, ed. (Toronto: The Ontario Historical Society; 1967), 155.

14. Ibid, 155.

15. Bradford and Williams, 58.

16. Ibid, 56-59.

17. Janine Brodie, "The Political Economy of Regionalism," *The New Canadian Political Economy*, Wallace Clement and Glen Williams, eds. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press; 1989), 146.

18. Janine Brodie, "The New Political Economy of Regions," *Understanding Canada: Building on the New Canadian Political Economy*, Wallace Clement, ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press; 1997), 246.

19. Ibid, 246.

20. Ibid, 246.

21. J. M. S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXV:1 (March 1954), 20.

22. Ibid, 20.

23. Brodie, "Political," 148.

24. Ibid, 148.

25. Weller, "Political," 61; Nelson Wiseman, "Change in Ontario Politics," *The Government and Politics of Ontario*, Fifth Edition, Graham White, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 1997), 436; and Ernie Epp, "Northern Ontario: History and Historiography," *The Historiography of the Provincial Norths*, Ken Coates and William Morrison, eds. (Thunder Bay: Lakehead University Centre for Northern Studies; 1997), 189.

26. Elisabeth Gidengil, "Centres and peripheries: the political culture of dependency," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 27:1 (February 1990), 29.

27. Ibid, 29.

28. Ibid, 29.

29. Ibid, 29.

30. Weller, "Political," 61.

31. Ibid, 61.

32. Ibid, 61.

33. Ibid, 62.

34. Geoffrey Weller, "Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario," *Provincial Hinterland: Social Inequality in Northwestern Ontario*, Chris Southcott, ed.

(Halifax: Fernwood; 1993), 8.

35. Ibid, 13-14.

36. Tom Miller, "Cabin Fever: The Province of Ontario and its Norths," *The Government and Politics of Ontario*, Second Edition, Donald C. MacDonald, ed. (Toronto: Van Nostrand Reinhold; 1980), 239.

37. Wiseman, 436.

38. Stephen McBride, Sharon McKay, and Mary Ellen Hill, "Unemployment in a Northern Hinterland: The Social Impact of Political Neglect," *Provincial Hinterland: Social Inequality in Northwestern Ontario*, Chris Southcott, ed. (Halifax: Fernwood; 1993), 29-30, 42.

39. Chris Southcott, "Hinterland Healthcare Inequalities: An Analysis of Health in Northwestern Ontario," *Provincial Hinterland: Social Inequality in Northwestern Ontario*, Chris Southcott, ed. (Halifax: Fernwood; 1993), 51.

40. Ibid, 51.

41. Ibid, 51-52, 56.

42. See Charles Reasons, Lois Ross, and Craig Paterson, *Assault on the Worker: Occupational Health and Safety in Canada* (Toronto: Butterworths; 1981).

43. Morris Zaslow, "Does Northern Ontario Possess a Regional Identity?," *Laurentian University Review*, V:4 (September 1973), 19.

44. Weller, "Hinterland," 18.

45. Zaslow, 19.

46. Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson, "Introduction," *At the End of the Shift: Mines and Single-Industry Towns in Northern Ontario*, Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson, eds. (Toronto: Dundurn; 1992), x.

47. Ibid, x-xi.

48. Weller, "Political," 84.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be discerned that the politics of Northern Ontario are different. This thesis has demonstrated that the differences evinced in the political patterns and political processes of the North are primarily the products of its divergent development. The divergent development of the region has often evoked two opposing and belying images. The first of which is that of the "rugged" North and is perhaps the most obvious. The inexorable profusion of shivering woods, undulating waters, and protruding rocks, as well as of biting mosquitos, toiling beavers, growling bears, and staring moose, have all roused images that the Northern Ontario wilderness is, indeed, "wild." But slowly, however, Northern Ontario is becoming increasingly complex and erudite. Economic diversification, therefore, is a fundamental prerequisite for the North's future. Undoubtedly, the North will retain its role in the exploitation of natural resources, but to become diversified, it must conquer, or at least comfortably and convincingly conceal, its image as a rustic natural resource hinterland. Recent initiatives in the telecommunication, governmental, and technological sectors are tenuous, but are promising beginnings nonetheless.

Progressing towards economic diversification, though, invariably encroaches into the other image of Northern Ontario, that of the "neglected" North. Northern Ontario has been indelibly imparted with the pernicious effects of a natural resource based economy. Uneven development within the province has left the North with a comparatively inadequate level of education, health, and welfare services, lower wages, less employment, paltry infrastructures, rampant pollution, and economic hardships. The region is dependent on the provincial government and the natural resource industries for its subsistence. Unfortunately, however, neither has provided the North with its share of the benefits from the exploitation of its indigenous natural resources which would have given the region substantially greater economic stability. Experiments, though, with employee ownership of dwindling steel, woodpulp, and paper mills in the North have proven profitable and provide good examples of the types of initiatives needed to improve

the North's prospects for the future.

In discerning how the politics of Northern Ontario are different, this thesis has shown that the North's political patterns, that is, its political culture, political priorities, and political culture, are all distinct. As well, the politics of Northern Ontario are distinguished by persistent feelings of disaffection, dependency, and domination, as well as by pragmatism and parochialism. In determining why the politics of Northern Ontario are different, this thesis has demonstrated that there exists a pertinacious centre-periphery connection between the North and the South. This centre-periphery connection, perpetuated by considerable asymmetrical absolute properties and hierarchical interaction relations, has prompted the differences which are evident in the politics of Northern Ontario. These disparities have been provoked by the North's natural resource based economy and by provincial government policies and interventions. It is only with the optimism of knowing that a new day will bring new possibilities for Northern Ontario that it can be conjectured that reconciling and correcting those contrasting images of the North will do much to help it in overcoming the detrimental consequences of its divergent development.

APPENDIX: MAP OF NORTHERN ONTARIO



SOURCE: Matt Bray and Ernie Epp, eds., *A Vast and Magnificent Land: An Illustrated History of Northern Ontario* (Toronto: Ministry of Northern Affairs; 1984), 205.

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