The Islamic Revolution in Syria from the Rebels' Perspective

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August 2020

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts

Contents

Abstract

This thesis is a history of the Islamic Revolution in Syria (1976–1982) from the point of view of the rebels. It examines the way the revolution unfolded through a reconstruction of the events as seen through the eyes of some of its leaders. It shows how the rebels' political action was the product of ideologies rooted in specific religious traditions and a dynamic understanding of Syrian politics. The thesis also highlights the continuities and ruptures between competing visions of the revolution among rebels. Through an analysis of Arabic memoirs, religious treatises, letters, and manifestos, it examines how the activism of a handful of individuals throughout the 1950–1960s became an armed revolt in the 1970s, coalescing around two separate organizations: the Fighting Vanguard and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The first steps of this evolution are detailed by looking at the trajectory of one of the main intellectuals of the revolt, Sa'īd Ḥawwā. The thesis closely narrates Ḥawwā's political activism and development as an intellectual in order to provide a deeper understanding of the historical and ideological background of the Islamic Revolution. It then offers a detailed account of the armed struggle against the Ba'th regime by recounting the emergence of Marwān Ḥadīd's group, which later became the Fighting Vanguard. The memoirs of Ayman al-Shurbajī, one of the few original members who survived the revolt, are used to uncover the complicated evolution of this understudied organization. The thesis shows that while the beginning of the rebels' armed operations cannot be divorced from a context of increasing state repression, it was also the product of a unique culture of militancy developed by Ḥadīd and his followers. The mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood is charted by a meticulous analysis of the writings of its leader at the time, 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn. The resulting narrative reveals a dynamic history of disagreements, competition, and fraught alliances between two fundamentally different organizations. It also exposes the crucial role of specific individuals who transcended the logic of their organizations to shape the revolt at key moments such as the massacre at the Aleppo Artillery School. Finally, the thesis reconstructs the events of the Hama Massacre in relation to the armed confrontations who took place in the context of the Islamic Revolution in Syria.

Résumé

La présente thèse retrace l'histoire de la Révolution islamique en Syrie (1976–1982) du point de vue des rebelles. Elle examine le déroulement de la révolution en reconstruisant les événements tels que vécus par certains de ses dirigeants. Elle montre comment l'action politique des rebelles était le produit d'idéologies ancrées dans des traditions religieuses spécifiques et des conceptions dynamiques de la politique syrienne. Cette thèse souligne aussi les continuités et les ruptures entre des visions opposées de la révolution chez les rebelles. Par une analyse des mémoires, traités religieux, lettres, et manifestes écrits en arabe, elle examine comment l'activisme d'une poignée d'individus au cours des années 1950–1960 s'est transformé en révolte armée lors des années 1970, s'articulant autour de deux organisations différentes : l'Avant-garde combattante et les Frères musulmans syriens. Les premières étapes de cette évolution sont retracées à travers le parcours d'un des intellectuels principal de la révolte : Sa'īd Ḥawwā. Cette thèse explique l'activisme politique de Ḥawwā et son développement en tant qu'intellectuel pour mieux comprendre les origines socio-politiques et idéologiques de la révolution. Elle offre par la suite un récit de la lutte armée contre le régime ba'th en racontant l'émergence du groupe de Marwān Ḥadīd, qui deviendra plus tard l'Avant-garde combattante. Les mémoires d'Ayman al-Shurbajī, un des seuls dirigeants de l'organisation ayant survécu la révolte, sont utilisés pour dévoiler l'évolution complexe de cette organisation clandestine. Cette thèse montre que le commencement des opérations armées ne peut être divorcé de la répression politique de l'état syrien, mais qu'il est aussi le fruit d'une culture de militantisme unique développée par Ḥadīd et ses disciples. La mobilisation des Frères musulmans est reconstruite à travers les mémoires de son dirigeant à l'époque, 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn. Le narratif qui en résulte est une histoire dynamique de désaccords, compétition, et difficiles alliances entre deux organisations fondamentalement différentes. Il démontre aussi le rôle crucial d'individus spécifiques qui ont transcendé la logique de leur organisation à des moments déterminants de la révolte, tel le massacre de l'école d'artillerie d'Alep. Finalement, cette thèse reconstruit les événements du Massacre d'Hama en relation avec les affrontements armés de la Révolution islamique en Syrie.

Acknowledgements

As I read the pages of this thesis while making my final edits, I am struck by how much of the inestimable support I can see in my words from the many people with whom I shared the past two years. This dissertation would not have been possible without them. Their support has shaped this intellectual project and is reflected in every chapter of this thesis.

The financial support I received in the past two years has been crucial to the conduct of research activities that were essential to this dissertation. The Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University has provided me with financial support at various stages of this research, including through the Cedrick Goddard Prize. I want to specifically thank Professor Michelle Hartman and Professor Khalid Medani for making these resources accessible to graduate students like myself. I was also supported by the Graduate Mobility Award of McGill's Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies Office. This award allowed me to attend an intensive Arabic programme at the *Institut Français au Proche-Orient* in Beirut. My summer at the *Institut* was a wonderful experience where I significantly improved my Arabic skills pertinent to this research, thanks to passionate teachers like Alice Kourani and Fadi Al-Sahu.

McGill's Institute of Islamic Studies has proven to be an incredible environment for graduate students to conduct research. I am indebted to the administrative staff for their support throughout my studies, particularly to Zeitun Manjothi and Katrin Dinkel, who were always happy to help me navigate and understand the inner-workings of the university's administration. I also want to thank Freddie from the Facilities Management Office for making the Institute a welcoming space and for his great kindness. I am grateful to the staff at the Islamic Studies Library, especially Ghazaleh Ghanavizchia, Samah Kasha, and Charles Fletcher, who gave me access to sources critical to this thesis and who made the library a stimulating environment where important parts of this research were written.

I benefitted throughout this thesis from the help and advice of many scholars working on the modern history of Syria. I want to thank Naomì Dìaz Ramìrez and Raphaël Lefèvre for

their encouragement and for directing me to relevant primary sources. I am also indebted to Line Khatib for a long conversion about my research topic and her thoughtful suggestions. Finally, Thomas Pierret made detailed comments in his review as external examiner which helped clarify some important points of this thesis.

Several professors and students at the Institute of Islamic Studies have helped me in more ways than I can recount in formulating the ideas of this thesis and in acquiring the knowledge and skills necessary for this project. I am grateful to Professor Khalid Medani for helping me think about contemporary Syrian politics and Professor Rula Abisaab for providing me with the training required to understand the intricate details of treatises of Islamic law. I am forever indebted to Professor Shokry Gohar and Professor David Nancekivell for their patience, passion, and dedication in teaching me Arabic. I also want to thank all the students who took an interest in my research and made valuable suggestions, especially Zayn al-Attar and Sherwan Ali, who were always eager to help me decipher difficult Arabic passages.

This thesis is first and foremost indebted to my supervisor, Professor Laila Parsons. Her mentorship and guidance have shaped my development as a historian and as a thinker more generally in invaluable ways. I learned many precious lessons about the modern history of the Middle East as a subject and as a discipline through her supervision, our discussions, and her own work. Her incisive questions, attentive comments, and rigorous thinking have made me a better scholar and writer. I could simply not have written this thesis without her support and her encouragement.

Lastly, I want to thank the members of my family, who, through all these years, were always understanding and eager to follow me in my latest unusual endeavour. Thanks to my parents, Michael and Danièle, for always believing in me and helping me without any hesitation when I most needed it. Thanks to my brother and my sister, Samuel and Mègann, for being so nice to and supportive of their older brother. And finally, thanks to my partner, Brittany, who made decisive contributions to this thesis by discussing its central ideas and patiently editing every single word of the following pages. Brittany was the best companion I could ever hope for to embark on the difficult journey of a joint academic transition towards new professional dreams. We are finally making it.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my friend Jared Maillet, who tragically passed away on Mount Snowdon when such a bright future laid ahead of him. The hopes, the dreams, and the ambitions we shared the weeks before in the forests of Scotland and on the top of its summits still animate me to this day. You climbed mountains better than anyone ever could, and I am sure it would have been the same with graduate school.

Transliteration

The transliteration conventions followed in this thesis have been chosen in order to minimize any confusion with the names of the numerous protagonists it contains. The different ways Arabic proper names are transliterated sometimes makes difficult the identification of the same individual across works, e. g. ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, Adnan Said ed-Din, Adnan Saadeddine. The matter is further complicated when researchers combine Arabic and non-Arabic sources, e. g. Huwaydī, Houweidi; Huḍaybī, Hudeibi. As a result, the present study systematically transliterates Arabic proper names of individuals according to the methodology proposed by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. The only exception to this rule is Gamāl ʻAbd al-Nāṣir, for whom the characteristic Egyptian "G" sound is preserved.

For consistency, common Arabic nouns have been systematically transliterated, italicized, and pluralized with their Arabic plural forms, e. g. *shaykh* (pl. *shuyūkh*), *ʻālim* (pl. *ʻulamāʼ*), *sūq* (pl. *aswāq*), *Qurʼān*, *sharīʻa*. Dual forms have been omitted because of their awkwardness in English, e. g. *two shuyūkh*, and not *two shaykhān* or *two shaykhayn*. The only exceptions are "Sunni," " ʻAlawi," and "Sufi," which I keep for their natural English plural forms.

However, since proper names of locations do not give rise to the same confusions as proper names of individuals, common English names of locations have been used, e. g. Aleppo, not Ḥalab; Damascus, not Dimashq; Hama, not Ḥamā. Locations with no common English names are transliterated like proper names of individuals, but without the diacritics, e. g. al-Barudiyya, not al-Bārūdiyya or Barudiyya; ʻAliliyyat, not ʻAlīliyyāt.

Finally, the titles of books and important documents written in Arabic have been fully transliterated and capitalized. An English translation is given the first time their titles are mentioned, and a shortened version of the Arabic is used afterwords, e. g. *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, *Jund Allāh*. The only exception is the programme of the Islamic Revolution, which I refer to as "the programme of the Islamic Revolution," and not *Bayān al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya wa-Minhājuhā*, in order to emphasize the role and the importance of the document in English. All other expressions are given in English, with relevant Arabic words in parentheses, e, g. The Protest of Defiance (*al-taḥaddī*).

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The Syrian Revolution and Memories of Hama

On June 3rd 2011, large crowds descended towards the al-'Asi square of Hama.[1] It was not the first protest in the city that year, but it certainly stood out by its size. Women, children, and men were marching in the streets chanting slogans such as, "Peacefully, peacefully, we only want liberty," and "No to sectarianism, yes to national unity!" The march was held simultaneously with many other demonstrations across the country under the banner, "Children of Freedom" (*aṭfāl al-ḥurriyya*), in the name of the children killed by security forces the weeks before during similar events. The protestors reached the front of the large building of the Ba'th party's headquarters. All of a sudden, the police and members of the regime in civilian clothes fired live-ammunition at the crowd.[2] Hamawis ran in every direction, trying to shelter from the gunshots. Some fell to the ground, hit by bullets. Others carried the injured on their shoulders or scooters to safe places where they could receive medical treatment, preferably not at the local hospital surveilled by the regime. Shortly after the event, the internet connection of the city was cut.[3] It was only the day after that Syrians and the world could gauge the extent of what had happened: around 70 civilians had been killed.[4]

As tanks were amassing around the city, Hamawis organized even larger demonstrations. On June 5th, activists were able to upload videos of the march and the subsequent killings by the regime. Later that day, a large crowd walked towards the city centre in a demonstration called, "The Protest of Defiance (*al-taḥaddī*)."[5] Protestors had signs expressing key ideas of the unfolding Syrian Revolution such as, "Hama wants freedom, not sectarianism."[6] But the death of so many Hamawis brought into the open painful memories deeply suppressed, in the form of new and provocative rallying cries: "Ḥāfiẓ and Rif'at – 1982 Hama Massacre; Māhir

and Bashār – 2011 Deraa Massacre."[7] There had been silence for thirty years surrounding the Hama Massacre or, as it was most commonly referred to, "the events" (*al-aḥdāth*). In 2011, activists broke that silence by reappropriating the language of *massacre* in a revolutionary context. The killing on June 3rd of so many Hamawis was a significant moment of the revolution and is still remembered today in rebel-controlled Idlib as, "The Friday of the Children of Freedom Massacre."[8] For many Syrians, the belated entrance of Hama in the revolution represented a powerful accomplishment that liberated a difficult history.

The Hama massacre of 1982 was the culmination of years of profound tensions between the regime of Ḥāfiẓ Asad and an important part of the Syrian population. On February 2nd 1982, after two months of siege, regime forces and militias made of Ba'th loyalists launched an invasion of the older neighbourhoods of the city. They were stopped by rebels, who had set up ambushes to protect their stronghold. Shortly after, weapons were distributed across neighbourhoods, as rebels and civilians organized the defence of their city. What followed were three weeks of fighting, destruction, rape, killings, torture, and mass graves. Neighbourhoods of the city were shelled night and day with tanks and helicopters. Reports by Amnesty International estimate that between 10,000 and 25,000 Syrians died during these events.[9] Relationships between Syrians and their government had changed forever.

From that moment onwards, the Ba'th regime tried to present these events as the state liberating the country from fanatic terrorists paid by foreign countries who wished to destroy the nation. The exercise of state power over popular memory and its efforts to erase all dissenting narratives also carried an implicit message: Any attempt to challenge the Asad regime would be met by brutal force and sheer horror.[10] After June 3rd 2011 however, the roles were reversed by street protests in Hama, as Syrians were now the ones using memories of the 1982 Hama Massacre against the regime. Many Hamawis took to the streets calling for the regime's downfall in the name of their parents who had been killed in 1982.[11] Pictures of the siege of Hama in 1982 surfaced on the internet for the first time, as protestors called for preserving the memory of the victims.[12] Some survivors recounted their own experiences of the events and the subsequent destruction of their city for the first time.[13] More than an object of remembrance, the Hama Massacre became a lens through which Syrians could reflect upon their own political action.[14] Many outside of Syria also studied the massacre in order to understand the trajectory of the ongoing Syrian Revolution.[15]

If the rediscovery of the Hama Massacre became so political in 2011, it was in part because the silencing of its history for many years had been itself a political act of great significance. The complete erasure of any trace of the siege of Hama, through the destruction of the city and the burying of countless ruins and bodies in a matter of weeks, was the most visible use

of power to silence the past.[16] What became clear to those uncovering the artifacts of "the events" was that beyond the current revolutionary appropriations of Hama, beneath layers of destruction and erasure, the Hama Massacre carried at the time its own political undertones echoing past struggles of resistance. In other words, the Hama Massacre, like The Friday of the Children of Freedom Massacre, hid a movement of opposition to the Ba'th regime, albeit much different in scope and nature from the events of 2011 and onwards. The revolution that led to the massacre in Hama in 1982 is lesser known and not well understood. Telling its story has now become more important than ever and many inside and outside Syria have devoted efforts to do so. This thesis takes part in this endeavour by offering a detailed history of the Islamic Revolution in Syria that draws closely on the writings of the revolutionaries themselves to open up our understanding of these crucial years in Syrian history.

1.2 The Ba'th Regime and its Discontent

It is certainly more common to talk of the tensions leading to the Hama Massacre as an uprising, a revolt, or an insurgency. My reasons for looking at them as a revolution will be made clear in the last section of this chapter. All of these terms capture crucial dimensions of the political confrontations that occurred at the time. To review the knowledge accumulated from previous academic works and better situate the contribution of this study, the next two sections offer a literature review of what many call, "the Syrian Islamic revolt of the 1970s."

A large number of studies about contemporary Syrian politics unsurprisingly focus on the nature of the Ba'th regime and the Syrian political economy. Hinnebusch's "Modern Syrian Politics" (2008), which reviewed scholarship on the subject, illustrates this trend quite well. The Ba'th parties in Syria and Iraq both took control of the state in 1963 and remained in power for most of the twentieth century. Both parties brought about fundamental political and social changes to their respective countries. More significantly in Syria, the Ba'th regime profoundly transformed the domestic economy through its wide-ranging economic policies. Moreover, both Ba'th regimes developed into some of the most powerful, enduring, and brutal authoritarian regimes in the world. Not only were they by far the most important actors in Syria and Iraq, they also actively prevented the emergence of other dissenting voices in their respective countries. Hence, it is no surprise that the Syrian Ba'th regime has been the centre of attention of many researchers as early as the late 1960s.[17] Many of their publications discuss the Islamic uprising from the perspective of the Ba'th regime, and present it as both a product of and a challenge to the regime of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad.

A first dynamic of the revolt commonly highlighted by this literature is the sectarian composition of the regime, as discussed by Drysdale (1982), Deikmejian (1995), and van Dam (2011). For them, the revolt was a response to the dominant position of power members of the ʻAlawi community held in the authoritarian Syrian state. This was especially pronounced in the two most important institutions of the regime throughout the 1970s, the armed forces and the Baʻth party. The situation was not brought about by design but, rather, emerged as the product of distinct and self-reinforcing historical processes. French colonial policy and the difficult economic situation of many ʻAlawi families had led to their overrepresentation in the army.[18] In parallel, the ideology of the Baʻth party attracted many ʻAlawis, who were exposed to its tenets in the new public school system.[19] Individuals at the intersection of these two institutions became increasingly powerful as the army's presence in politics grew and the Baʻth party's popularity increased, culminating in the 1963 Baʻth Revolution.[20] The consolidation of the fragile new regime through purges of suspected dissidents and appointments based on family ties entrenched members of the ʻAlawi faith's control over the state.[21] Following the November 13th 1970 coup that made Ḥāfiẓ Asad President, the sectarian composition of the regime was noticeable in most of its institutions.

According to Drysdale, Deikmejian, and van Dam, sectarian differences in themselves were not sufficient to spark the Islamic uprising. What made sectarianism central to the revolt was rather its embodiment in an authoritarian regime that brutally suppressed dissent, tolerated high-levels of corruption, fostered religious-based inequalities, struggled to sustain steady economic growth, and took unpopular foreign policy decisions. As more and more Syrians grew dissatisfied with their government, vocal dissidents claimed that the ʻAlawi rule over the state was the source of the country's troubles. This diagnostic grew in popularity among Sunnis, some of whom reframed the political situation as the tyranny of a government of unbelievers waging a war against Islam.[22] In this way, the sectarian composition of the regime gave rise to a series of sectarian assassinations of ʻAlawis by members of the emerging Islamic uprising, culminating in the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre of ʻAlawi cadets in 1979. The regime's subsequent massacre of Sunni prisoners in the Palmyra Prison put Syria on the break of a sectarian civil war. In short, these scholars see the Islamic revolt of the 1970s as a response to the authoritarian nature and sectarian composition of the Baʻth regime.

A second highlighted dynamic of what is commonly referred to as the Islamic revolt is the structure of the country's political economy, as discussed by Batatu (1982), (1999), Hinnebusch (1982), (1988), (2001), Lawson (1982), Dekmejian (1995), Perthes (1995), Moaddel (1996), and Haddad (2012). While acknowledging the sectarian composition of the regime, these scholars also argue that the socialist-inspired policies of the Baʻthist regime created a

powerful economically-based opposition confronting the state. This narrative of the Syrian political economy has been at the heart of numerous studies and merits a brief exposition. The creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) on February 1st 1958 had been pushed by Syrian Ba'thists who wished to break the influence of landowner and capitalist classes and to build strong state institutions to lead the industrialization of the economy along an egalitarian reformist agenda.[23] During the UAR's short-lived existence, Gamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir furthered these two goals, and at the same time deepened the state's involvement in the regulation of the agricultural sector and the management of work relations through a government-led corporatist approach. An important legacy of the short-lived republic was the development of an increasingly powerful state with greater abilities to control the private sector and shape the country's overall economy in an authoritarian manner.

In September 1961, a coalition of landowners and capitalists with links to the officer corps forced the breaking of the UAR. The new separatist government in Syria attempted to revive the independent private sector but faced strong opposition from peasants, workers, the new salaried class, and influential members of the military. This culminated in the March 28th 1962 coup and the March 8th 1963 coup that initiated the Ba'th regime. In its fierce competition with the landowner and capitalist classes, the new Ba'th regime quickly relied on the strong state institutions inherited from the UAR experiment to marginalize its opponents.[24] It did so by first reorganizing the state bureaucracy and ensuring that the party controlled most of the state's institutions. The regime then set out to assert the state's control over the economy. Between 1963 and 1965, financial institutions, insurance companies, most major industrial companies (metalworking, chemical, fertilizers, etc), mining, and electricity were nationalized.[25] From 1963 to 1977, the proportion of public brute capital formation went from 32.4% to 71.3%.[26] With the exception of chocolate, textile, cotton, soap, and some kitchen appliances, industrial production in the country was entirely or predominantly publicly owned, e. g. 88% of underwear manufacturing, 88% of alcohol production, and 87% of rubber shoes manufacturing was publicly owned. In 1972, the number of employees in public industries was 57,338, while only 10,992 worked in private industries. Progress in phosphate and oil extractions in the 1970s only increased the state's domination of the economy.

One of the most important changes to the economy that the Ba'th regime brought about was its reforms to the agricultural sector. Among the objectives of the land reforms were to cut the economic and political power of landowning classes and create a class of "modern socialist peasants" as a basis of support for the new populist regime.[27] Key decision-making positions over agricultural jurisdiction were within the Ba'th party leadership organ and attributed to many Syrians of rural and peasant origins. Building on reforms initiated during

the UAR, ownership of land was capped at somewhere between 80-300 hectares for non-irrigated lands and 15-55 hectares for irrigated lands, depending on annual amounts of rain received in a given region. Landowners above this limit had their land seized by the government and redistributed, with some compensation. The Peasant Union of 1964 strengthened the position of small owners, farmers, and agricultural workers in relation to large owners. Farmer cooperatives increased the accessibility to loans by financing the Agricultural bank and facilitated relations between peasants and the large state bureaucracy. The 1970 Five Year Plan implemented a system of planned economy where production and prices were established by the government in an attempt modernize and increase productivity.

Researchers arguing that Syria's political economy played a role in the Islamic revolt claim that these large economic transformations paved the way for what they call "the social base" of the rebels. In their view, the increasing state control over many economic spheres and the substantial agrarian reforms had greatly infuriated the merchant, manufacturers, and landowning classes, most predominantly in urban centres.[28] Cities like Hama were especially vulnerable to the state's economic policies since they were far removed from the patronage systems of the regime in Damascus.[29] Similarly, the regime's industrialization policies fostered the development of large factories around Hama which greatly hurt local manufacturers.[30] To this picture, these scholars also add the large number of students and young professionals within the rebel movement.[31] Looking at the regional background and occupation of key rebel figures, one finds that they all came from urban centres and had a religious or professional occupation (i. e. lawyer, engineer, dentist, teacher, etc). Scholars hypothesized that rebels from all these different classes were united around the fact that they worked outside the vast state bureaucracy and often even competed with it. As a result, rebels called for measures that would secure their own economic situation and constrain the state's power: strong property rights, the rule of law, freedom of expression and of assembly, the separation of powers, and a strong judiciary. The difficult economic situation of Syria in the second half of the 1970s exacerbated these tensions and pushed the rebels to openly confront the regime.

In sum, previous research on the Syrian state has portrayed the Islamic revolt as a response to the structure of the regime and the profound changes it initiated in the country's economy. Many of the works cited above are from political scientists and historical sociologists. Their understanding of the revolt reflects the traditions of structural explanations popular in their disciplines during the 1970s and 1980s.[32] These traditions focus on how economic and political structures interact with the development of state policies and institutions. While Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (1979) is the most famous example of this tradition, Kay Trimberger's *Revolution from Above* (1978) had a significant

influence over many studies of the Ba'th regime. Hinnebusch has relied on Trimberger's notion of *revolutions from above*, as made clear by the title of his *Syria: Revolution from Above* (2001). Working within these traditions, these works describe the revolt as a macro-level play on the stage of regional Middle East politics with the regime as its main actor.

While the structural and state-centric approaches of previous studies of Syria have made invaluable contributions to our understanding of the broader context of the Islamic revolt, they leave unanswered several important dimensions of these events. First, their state-centric bias limits their accounts of relevant non-state actors. Rebels are inevitably described in relation to the Syrian state. They are portrayed as Sunnis disenfranchised from the 'Alawi regime, pro-Palestinians opposing al-Asad's intervention in Lebanon, or landowning and capitalist classes reacting to Ba'thist economic reforms. These relational descriptions might capture some of the dynamics between the regime and the rebels, but they say very little about processes happening within rebel institutions and their own internal logic.[33] One cannot understand rebel movements, their relevance and significance, by ignoring how they develop goals and strategies, interact among each other, and set certain chains of events into motion. For example, none of these works explain how Syrian rebels organized themselves, recruited members, decided on strategies, acquired weapons, or mobilized against the regime.

Second, the structural accounts of these researchers sometimes fall prey to the criticism that they disregard the agency and the crucial role of specific individuals within social movements.[34] For example, in the case of the Islamic revolt in Syria, an inquiry conducted by the rebels after the events found that Sa'īd Ḥawwā, through his important role in military affairs, was largely responsible for how the events unfolded, something he reluctantly acknowledged himself.[35] Yet, most researchers have ignored this reality. Similarly, the rebels' disagreements over many issues throughout the conflict are too often erased by macro-level analyses of the state and the economy. Rebels were not simply passive objects of larger structural dynamics, but were themselves agents of change and had different perceptions of the ongoing events. Opening space for agency is crucial for understanding the way in which the revolt was set into motion, how it unfolded through time, and why it ended the way it did.

Finally, taking into account the Cultural Turn in the humanities from the 1990s, researchers must no longer ignore questions about the role of culture and ideologies in social movements.[36] In sociology and political science, the turn came with a rejection of the idea that culture is simply a product of larger economic and political configurations. Culture also came to be seen as a potential cause of various social phenomena and as an object of study itself. It is no longer seen as a mere reflection of social reality, but rather analyzed from a variety of different point of views. Since the studies mentioned above happened before the

cultural turn, or simply had a different focus, all of them fail to offer any serious reflection on the culture of the rebels, such as their ideology, religious practices, literary production, etc.[37] One overlooked cultural aspect of the Islamic revolt that is of great importance is the transnational conversations rebels had with Muslim thinkers and their reflections on modern ideologies such as capitalism, communism, secularism, materialism, and socialism.

1.3 Syrian Islamic Movements and the Revolt

Scholars working on Sunni Islam in modern Syria have provided us with many important works that shed light on various historical traditions and developments that have informed the Islamic revolt. Studies of modern Islamic movements, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in particular, give a richer portrait of the rebels who carried out the revolt. The first major work devoted to the rebel movement was Umar Faruk Abd-Allah's *The Islamic Struggle in Syria* (1983). Quite critical of "Western perspectives" on Islamic movements and unreservedly supportive of the rebels, the author sees his book as part of a broader effort at bridging "the gap between the Western reader and the Muslim world." Written a few months before the siege of Hama, the book attempts to provide "an accurate portrayal of the ideology and program of the Syrian Islamic Front," an important rebel institution founded on October 1980. However, academic reviews have heavily criticized the work for its obvious partiality and shallow research.[38] The book still contains valuable insights about the rebels, notably because of the many interviews the author conducted with them. Researchers have tended to treat this work more as a primary source of information than as a piece of scholarship.

A more rigorous work written only one year after the siege of Hama is Thomas Mayer's "The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961–1982." In this article, Mayer attempts to trace the history of the rebel movement with special attention to its guiding ideology. By using a wide variety of journalistic sources in English and Arabic, he succeeds in providing a general chronology of important events in the escalation of the conflict with the Ba'th regime. In particular, Mayer is one of the first scholars to articulate the thesis that members of the Brotherhood eager to confront militarily the Ba'th regime slowly took control of the organization after its leader, 'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār, was exiled from Syria in 1964. He argues that 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn and Sa'īd Ḥawwā, in particular, played a crucial role in pushing for an armed struggle against the regime, notably by supporting the armed group the Fighting Vanguard (*al-ṭalī'a al-muqātila*) and in leading the Syrian Islamic Front. However, Mayer's study still suffers from the scarcity of information at his disposal, which prevents him from making a

convincing case of the Brotherhood's radicalization in the 1970s. Moreover, his analysis of the Islamic Front's ideology is built upon a vague and generic conception of "Islamic fundamentalism" that obscures our understanding of the rebels' ideas and remove the revolt from its historical context. This is most visible when he wrongly claims that the rebels' program "had been proposed by Islamic fundamentalist thinkers [such as] Ḥasan al-Bannā, Sayyīd Quṭb, Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, and Abū al-'A'lā Mawdūdī."

A much longer and more careful study of the rebels by Michel Seurat (under his pseudonym Gérard Michaud) was published in French the same year. In "Le mouvement islamique en Syrie (1963–1982)," Seurat theorizes the doctrines of the "Syrian fundamentalist (*intégriste*) movement" as a particular view about the legitimacy of the modern state arising in the context of a Sunni majority under an autocratic 'Alawi regime. Appealing to Ibn Khaldūn's famous notion of *'aṣabiyya*, he depicts the conflict as one between two religious and social groups, one in control of the state's instruments, deploying brutal natural (*ṭabī'ī*) forms of power to assert its domination; the other moved as a response by a rational political (*siyāsī*) conception of sovereignty. Added to his other writings on the Syrian regime, collected posthumously in his *Syrie, L'État de barbarie*, Seurat paints the Ba'th regime as destroying any possibility of a national state for all Syrians, thus leaving the door open for rebels to present such a vision in their program for the Islamic Revolution. Seurat also offers a detailed analysis of some of the rebels' writings in their proper historical context, including articles published in their journal, *al-Nadhīr*, and the Manifesto of the Syrian Islamic Front. While empirically informed and theoretically rich, Seurat's analysis suffers from a temporal proximity to the events, which greatly limits the primary sources available to him.

In his *Radical Islam, Medieval Theology, and Modern Politics* (1985), Emmanuel Sivan focuses on influential Islamic intellectuals like Sa'īd Ḥawwā. Having previously written about jihad in the Middle Age, Sivan's approach to what he calls, "Islamic Radicalism," is to see it as a "holding operation against modernity" and its push for a more secular, materialist, and individualistic society. Islamic radicals instead call for a return to an Islamic society as prescribed by a reinterpreted "medieval theology." For Sivan, the intellectual genealogy of this movement starts with al-Mawdūdī's writings on jihad and Islamic governance, then moves to Sayyīd Quṭb's further elaborations on the Islamic state, and naturally reaches Ḥawwā, who was "a Syrian disciple of Sayyīd Quṭb." To Sivan's credit, his work is an informed engagement with contemporary works of theology and politics. Nonetheless, his analysis of these works is sometimes brief and rarely coupled with discussions of their historical contexts. In addition to there being little evidence that Ḥawwā was a disciple of Quṭb, Sivan's claim suggests that he was more interested in describing an alleged unified movement against modernity, than

to discuss the complex evolution of each one of these thinkers.

At the same time as he was writing about the historical sources of reformism in Syria, thus showing significant gaps in Sivan's narrative, Weismann also published two articles about Ḥawwā's life and thoughts in, "Sa'id Hawwa: The Making of a Radical Muslim Thinker in Modern Syria," and "Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba'thist Syria." These articles confirm that Ḥawwā's writings have more to do with local religious and political dynamics than with Sayyīd Quṭb. Using Ḥawwā's recently published autobiography, Weismann shows the important role that Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid, local Sufi *shaykh* from Hama and one of the founders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, played in his upbringing. As head of the Hama branch of the Naqshabandī order, al-Ḥāmid met Ḥawwā in his popular Sufi study circles at the al-Sultan Mosque, before convincing him to join the Brotherhood and attend the College of Islamic Law at the University of Damascus. Ḥawwā's more traditional education contrasted in important ways with the modernist approaches of not only Quṭb, but also the Syrian Brotherhood's leader, al-Sibā'ī, with whom al-Ḥāmid disagreed deeply over his works on socialism and Islam. Weismann depicts Ḥawwā as exemplifying a diverging intellectual trend within the Muslim Brotherhood that was influential in Hama and Aleppo.[39] Although a major step in the direction of understanding the rebels' perspective, these two articles unfortunately ignore several works of Ḥawwā and fail to contextualize those it cites within his intellectual project, clearly stated in his *Allāh Jalla Jalāluhu (God, Exalted be He)* (1969). Moreover, the choice of separating Ḥawwā's life from his writings prevents Weismann from offering a full picture of his role in the revolt as a political leader and a military planner.

In his "Islamic Ideology and Secular Discourse: The Islamists of Syria" (1991), Lobmeyer makes the surprising argument that the conflict "[was] not so much about Islam," since in the rebels' discourse, "Islamic political values [were] subordinated to secular ones." The "secularization of the discourse amount[ed] to a depoliticization of Islam, which [was] the catalyst for but not the cause of the conflict." Until the 1970s, the conflict between regime and the rebels was one over the place of religion in politics: the Ba'th party's secularism against the "Islamist" call for establishing the *sharī'a*.[40] Through an analysis of rebels' journals, articles, and manifestos, supplemented with interviews conducted in Syria, Lobmeyer concludes that after 1973, rebels critized what they perceived to be the minority 'Alawi regime that took control of the state for its own benefit. Given that the Manifesto of the Islamic Front also included demands for economic and political freedoms, he argues that the rebels' ideology was more the expression of a modern liberal project framed in an Islamic language rather than of a theocratic utopia as Seurat argues. Offering a great challenge to strictly religious readings of the Islamic revolt, Lobmeyer nonetheless has a hard time explaining the centrality

of Islam in the institutions from which the rebel movement emerged. Contrary to Weismann who mostly studied Ḥawwā's theological works, Lobmeyer's focus on political documents prevents him from appreciating the many religious dimensions of the rebel movement. An analysis combining both theological treatises, political manifestos, and rebel memoirs would show how artificial the distinction between religion and politics was to the rebel's worldview.

Jamal Barut's study, "Sūriyya: Uṣūl wa-Ta'arrujāt al-Ṣirā' bayna al-Madrasatayn al-Taqlidiyya wa-l-Rādīkāliyya (Syria: Origins and Winding Road of the Conflict between the Traditional and Radical Schools)" (1999), stands out by his extensive use of a wide variety of primary sources, including rebel memoirs, letters, manifestos, and in-person interviews. Barut shows how these sources can be assembled together to reconstruct in great detail some key moments of the Islamic revolt and of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood more generally. As a result, his account of the organization's history is in many ways the most accurate and precise one written to this day. Echoing Mayer's thesis, Barut narrates the Brotherhood's history as the opposition between a liberal school, supportive of formal political institutions, and a radical school, revolutionary in nature and inclined to use violence. For him, the story of the Islamic revolt is the story of the radical school's ascendency over its more moderate counterpart. While this dichotomy might highlight different trends in the Brotherhood's history, it runs the risk of obscuring its evolution throughout rapidly changing political contexts. For example, Barut attributes both the strike of 1964, the constitutional protests of 1973, and the political assassinations of 1976 as instances of the radical school's influence. However, all these political activities are considerably different in nature and took place in very different contexts. A greater attention to how members of the Brotherhood conceived of their actions would result in a richer and more dynamic understanding of the revolt.

Several years later, Line Khatib published *Islamic Revivalism in Syria* (2011), a study explaining the recent revival of Islamic movements in Syria with many chapters directly addressing the Islamic revolt. She first portrays the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as a diverse group incorporating elements of Sufism, pro-democracy sensibilities, and socialist and secularist inclinations up to the mid-1960s. She claims that as the Ba'th regime pushed for a more rigid implementation of secularism and for stronger state interventions in the economy, the Brotherhood became more confrontational and morphed into a more Salafi and exclusionary religious movement. To this ideological conflict, Khatib adds an economic dimension by relying on works cited in the previous section. One important innovation of her study is the use of Social Movement Theory to explain the precise mechanisms behind the rebel's decision to militarily confront the regime. Building on Wiktorowicz's call (2004) for studying Islamic movements with this framework, she utilized these main ideas: (1) grievances are produced

by macro-level factors; (2) available resources and institutions determine a group's success in mobilizing; (3) exogenous factors determine a group's opportunities; (4) cultural elements like self-perception and communication influence mobilization. Khatib explains the rebel's resort to assassinations as the product of state repression foreclosing peaceful opportunities for a well-mobilized group promoting strong anti-regime discourses, thereby linking macro-level factors with specific properties of the rebel movement. However, as the revolt itself is not the only focus of her book, she narrates these events in only fourteen pages with mostly secondary sources. A closer look at the rebels' writings, like Ḥawwā's books or the Syrian Islamic Front's manifesto, also raises serious doubts that the rebels' project was informed by militant Salafi vision. Moreover, her work offers some insight into why rebels opposed the regime with a large organization, but says little about the ways they accomplished this.

In 2013, Thomas Pierret published *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, which attempts to understand the historical evolution of the Sunni religious elite and its relations with the Syrian regime. While orthogonal to the focus of the present study, this work sheds an important light on several aspects of the revolt by highlighting the numerous interactions between rebels and *'ulamā'*. In a chapter devoted to the role of *'ulamā'* during the Islamic Revolution, Pierret explains how key rebel figures were either related to influential religious scholars, or directly recruited in religious societies in Aleppo and Damascus. As the regime's indiscriminate violence intensified, these societies became favourable environments for the recruitment of many new fighters. In another chapter, Pierret examines the differences between how Islamists and *'ulamā'* conceived of and interacted in the political sphere. While Islamists aimed at changing the fundamental structures of the state, *'ulamā'* preferred influencing specific policies that touch upon issues they see as belonging to their own religious jurisdiction. Despite this sectorial approach to politics, Pierret finds several instances when Islamists and *'ulamā'* collaborated, notably when Ḥawwā organized a petition signed by multiple *'ulamā'* against the 1973 Constitutional Reforms. Given that Pierret's study focuses on Aleppo and Damascus, this productive look at the relations between religious elites and rebels could be further extended to Hama in order to understand the trajectories of leading rebels like Ḥawwā himself.

The same year, Raphaël Lefèvre's *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (2013) offered a unique perspective on the revolt from inside the rebel movements.[41] This book did much to uncover some of the key debates and decisions made by the leaders of the revolt through many interviews conducted with ex-leading figures of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood between the 1960s and the 1980s. Lefèvre reinterprets the thesis of the Brotherhood's radicalization by highlighting the importance of internal debates between the more

militant "Aleppo wing" and the conciliatory "Damascus wing." The victory of the former in 1969 marked a shift in the group's ideology, which culminated with the nomination of ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn as leader and the empowerment of the "Hama clan," including Ḥawwā. Lefèvre also provides many details about pivotal moments that made the armed confrontation more likely to happen: Marwān Ḥadīd's founding of the Fighting Vanguard; ʻAdnān ʻUqla's leadership of the same group in June 1979; the Muslim Brotherhood endorsing armed resistance in October 1979; the formation of a Joint Command between the two organizations; etc. His work shows the importance of the Muslim Brotherhood's internal politics and the influence of a handful of key figures in the events leading to the Islamic revolt. Lefèvre's book nonetheless says little about the ideological context of these intra-rebel debates and rarely engages with important religious and political writings by the rebels. Moreover, he does not engage with the memoirs of Saʻd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā, the two most central figures of the narrative around the thesis of the Brotherhood's radicalization.

Recently, Brynjar Lia wrote an article that aimed at analyzing how the Islamic revolt unfolded, in "The Islamist Uprising in Syria, 1976–1982: The History and Legacy of a Failed Revolt" (2016). He does so by constructing a narrative that pays close attention to the chronology of some of the revolt's important events. Lia emphasizes the complicated relationship between the Fighting Vanguard and the Muslim Brotherhood, which were separate organizations but cooperated to various degrees throughout the revolt. One virtue of his account is his use of newspapers and media of the time to precisely track some developments of the revolt, especially between 1979 and 1982. Doing so allows him to bring important elements of the larger political context, such as the anti-regime protests in Northern Syria in 1980, the subsequent deployment of regime troops in Hama and Aleppo, the effects of the amnesty campaign for Brotherhood members in 1981, and the series of confrontations which led to the Hama Massacre. Lia bases his interpretation of the Islamic revolt mainly on secondary sources, which allows him to rapidly summarize large portions of its history. However, in his introduction, he mentions that the Islamic revolt demands more study, especially in light of the many memoirs written by rebels that are accessible today. In addition, his article is an invitation for a more thorough engagement with the perspective of the rebels.

In her book, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (2018), Naomì Ramìrez Dìaz attempts to remedy the weaknesses of previous works that focus on organizational and political developments without looking at the ideological history of the group. Like Lia, she notes that few works up to this day seriously considered many primary works by rebels themselves. Dìaz accordingly devotes a chapter to the writings of two important figures: Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʻī and Saʻīd Ḥawwā. She explains how, with the advent of the authoritarian Baʻth regime, Ḥawwā's

call for an Islamic government and for more expedient means of establishing it became more popular and widespread within the Muslim Brotherhood than al-Sibā‘ī's. Dìaz also spends a short chapter describing the events leading up to the siege of Hama by using, in part, the memoirs of some rebels. The most interesting portions of the chapter are the nine pages she devotes to describing important moments of the revolt — such as the June 16th 1979 Aleppo Artillery School Massacre — through the eyes of members of the Muslim Brotherhood and of the Fighting Vanguard. Since her book studies the Brotherhood's history until today, she does not spend more time discussing the Islamic revolt. Moreover, her discussion of rebel religious writings is brief, non-exhaustive, and done in abstraction from the rebels' actions (speeches, protests, armed operations, etc). While she makes an important step in adding rebel voices to the picture, more can be done by focusing solely on the Islamic revolt.

Finally, as I was writing the present study, Dara Conduit published a fascinating book offering a reinterpretation of the Muslim Brotherhood's history, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (2019). The book proceeds with a similar intention to revisit the organization's evolution in light of the Arab Spring and the availability of many untouched primary sources. Nonetheless, the orientation of Conduit's study differs from the present one in that she aims to explain the Brotherhood's political action in the past to better understand its involvement in the Arab Spring. In contrast, the topic of the present thesis is not the Muslim Brotherhood *per se*, but the Islamic revolt of the 1970s. This distinction, while subtle, leads to significant differences in how we use the same primary sources. While Conduit is interested in uncovering the characteristics of the Brotherhood as an organization, I am interested in the Brotherhood as a political institution out of which emerged rebels confronting the Ba‘th regime. As a result, Conduit's book offers great insights about the history of the Brotherhood, but says little about the worldview and ideas of some of its members who became central to the rebellion, like Sa‘īd Ḥawwā. More fundamentally, Conduit's main thesis is that the Brotherhood must not be understood as an organization motivated by a religious ideology, but as a political group involved in Syrian politics. This claim, shared by Lobmeyer (1991) and Batatu (1982), rests on a distinction between religion and politics, ideology and practice, which needs to be challenged by a fresh look at the rebels of the Islamic revolt.

This brief assessment of academic works on Sunni Islam in Syria shows that a thorough discussion of the Islamic revolt from the point of view of the rebels has yet to be written. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find a copy of Lobmeyer's influential *Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien* (1995), which focuses on the Islamic uprising and undoubtedly makes great contributions. Still, many precious memoirs such as those of ‘Adnān Sa‘d al-Dīn, leader of the Brotherhood for most of the revolt, were only published after Lobmeyer's book. As

Lia suggests, a study of the rebels' memoirs and writings would be of much value for our understanding of Islamic revolt. For example, a careful analysis of their religious and political writings, understood as intellectual productions emerging from the particular Syrian Islamic scene and embedded in the country's political history, would help identify some of the ideological roots of their political project and clarify which of the many disputed labels better describe it, (e. g., fundamentalism, Salafism, jihadism, Islamism, radicalism, reformism, etc). Relying on memoirs to construct a precise narrative of the revolt would also help answer debated empirical questions such as the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with the Fighting Vanguard, the role of sectarianism in the eyes of the rebels, and the specific ways in which the armed revolt was planned and carried out.

1.4 The Need for Microhistories of Rebel Movements

The project of this thesis is to reconstruct the Syrian Islamic revolt of the 1970s drawing primarily on rebel sources. The goal is to paint a detailed and intimate portrait of the revolt from the perspective of the rebels. I use *perspective* here in a broad sense: the rebels' beliefs, motivations, perceptions, decisions, disagreements, hopes, and fears, as shaping and being shaped by the events of the revolt. Narrating the Islamic revolt this way requires approaching it in a more anthropological than sociological way. The distinction I want to capture can perhaps be put in terms of Clifford Geertz's famous notion of *thick description*. Although it is now an older anthropological approach, Geertz's influential concept has been very helpful for articulating the orientation of this thesis. In addition to explaining how and why rebels mobilized, organized, and waged an armed rebellion, my aim is to describe their movement as a purposive endeavour in *webs of significances* within a specific historical context. In other words, my goal is to uncover the rebels' constructions and interpretations of what they were doing and trying to achieve. This should not be done by identifying key elements of their ideology and relating them in a static and schematic fashion. The rebels' actions "must be attended to, and with some exactness, because it is through the flow of behaviour — or more precisely, social action — that cultural forms find articulation."[42]

Developing such a rich understanding of the Islamic revolt can only be done by focusing on a handful of main characters. It is only by being embodied in specific individuals situated in their own context that perspectives of this sort acquire their full meaning. Moreover, broader historical transformations within Syria will not be merely described from the outside, but also seen and read through the eyes of the rebels. In a field dominated by *longue durée* accounts,

this research will rather use a microhistorical approach to deepen our understanding of the history.[43] While recognizing that historians divide time in different ways depending on the level of analysis they use, this study denies that the *longue durée* approach that takes place over decades is necessarily more valuable than the *histoire événementielle* of everyday life. Instead, I propose that we recognize the pertinence of the history of specific individuals developing on a day-to-day basis, but also accept that the significance of micro-level descriptions of events is informed by larger macro-level transformations.

Emerging in France, but especially in Italy with the works of Carlo Ginzburg and Giovanni Levi, microhistory centres around the idea of doing history by crafting meticulous descriptions of specific individuals throughout the different social contexts where they evolve.[44] Taking concrete persons as starting points allows for making new observations and discovering new meanings between the gaps, spaces, and changes left open by overlapping structures. It suggests a change of scale as a tool for historians, but not as a denial of the importance of macro-level considerations.[45] In fact, one conviction behind earlier works of microhistory is the idea that looking at individuals in their everyday interactions can be seen as an "experiment" where one can understand larger social and political dynamics.[46] For example, in his famous *The Cheese and the Worms* (1976), Ginzburg reconstructs the ideas, beliefs, and attitudes of a sixteenth century miller who was tried and condemned to death by the Inquisition. This experiment allowed him to find precise ways that popular culture was lived, manifested, and transmitted at the time, and ran contrary to existing historical and anthropological conceptions of peasant social life.

The similarities between microhistory and Geertz's thick descriptions make them both pertinent orientations to capture the Islamic revolt from the perspective of the rebels.[47] The two approach their objects of study not as a set of data that ought to be organized into patterns devised by theoretical considerations, but as a collection of symbols and gestures whose meanings should be interpreted and conveyed through appropriate mediums. As a consequence, the *Annales* movement's use of social sciences as the means to ask and answer questions guiding historical inquiry will be discarded in favour of a greater openness to the multiple directions where the primary sources can lead.[48] Instead of looking for regularities, microhistorians meticulously study specific signs and clues in search of the hidden realities they conceal. This is why in his famous paper, "Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method" (1980), Ginzburg compares historians to doctors making conjectures about patients' diseases based on symptoms or, more colourfully, to Sherlock Holmes tracking Moriarty with his acute sense of observation for extraordinary details concealed in the most banal scenes of daily life.[49]

A microhistorical approach to studying the rebels of the Islamic revolt stands out from previous analyses of Islamic movements. This is especially so given the increasing popularity of Social Movement Theory and the call by Wiktorowicz (2004) for its application to "Islamic activism." Many studies of Islamic movements have been since then written by drawing on the theory's most recent developments.[50] As Wickham (2002) argues, one advantage of this framework is that it helps explaining how Islamic movements successfully mobilize in large numbers and what role religion plays in generating opportunities, resources, and motivations to the members of the group. The resources of Social Movement Theory are a significant advancement in comparison to what she calls "grievances models," in which these movements are reduced to responses to socio-economic or political environments (much like the structural accounts described in the second section). As such, applying the paradigm of Social Movement Theory to the Syrian Islamic revolt could yield valuable contributions to the academic literature, as Khatib does in her book on Islamic revivalism in Syria.

Despite its strengths, there are reasons to be worried by an exclusive reliance on Social Movement Theory in approaching Islamic movements. For example, in her study of recruitment into Islamic groups in popular neighbourhoods of Cairo, Wickham (2004) argues that in an appropriate context and carried by charismatic leaders, Islamic ideologies can *frame* people's goals and values in particular ways and cause them to participate in Islamic movements. She builds on the *framing processes* literature which originated during the Cultural Turn and aimed at explaining why individuals participate in social movements by looking at their *schema of interpretation* of the world, i. e. their frame.[51] Since this approach is explicitly concerned with including ideas in explanations of mobilizations, it is bound to think of ideologies as something which facilitates mobilization, and nothing else. For example, Wickham highlights the role the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology plays in modifying the political preferences of young Egyptians joining the organization. But limiting my understanding of the rebels' ideology by these kinds of theoretical considerations is precisely what I want to avoid. Instead, I will approach the rebels' ideas as providing some of the keys to understanding the webs of significance in which they navigated and by which they conceived of their own struggle against the Ba'th regime. This close attention to their own constructions of themselves takes seriously rebel voices and contextualizes them within their own history.[52]

Another way this study distinguishes itself from previous scholarship is through its conscious use of narrative as a medium. Ginzburg has described his own works as studies where not only the protagonist's history is put in a narrative form, but also where "the [historian's] hypotheses, doubts, uncertainties bec[o]me part of the narration."[53] The inevitable "obstacles interfering with [historical] research" that are more frequent in exercises of microhistory

make the use of this medium even more appropriate. This particular kind of narration differs greatly from traditional forms of narrative history. When Stone (1979) wrote about the resurgent use of narrative in history, he immediately noticed that many techniques of the genre no longer imitated typical academic writings, but were more inspired by modern narrative innovations in literary fictions, e. g. Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse*, and Queneau's *Exercises de style* that tells a brief story in 99 different ways.[54]

For philosophers of history like White, the exchanges between literature and history are a much waited-for development.[55] However, parallels between literature and narrative history also raise the skeptical question of whether, after all, microhistory is nothing but a kind of fiction done by academics. Barthes (1967) was one of the first to argue that historical discourse is an "ideological elaboration" with its distinct literary devices, and nothing more. If "the death of authors" occurs with the publication of their book, after which they become a mere "literary construct," then it is no surprise that historians and their facts are mere literary devices of their own writing genre.[56] A more general and influential articulation of this idea was Lyotard's *La condition postmoderne* (1979), which argued that with the advent of postmodernism came the end of grand narratives justifying the intellectual supremacy of scientific discourses, including history.[57] Building on Lyotard and on these new similarities between fiction and history, postmodern historians stress that historical discourse is only one among many others, and that there is no neutral point of view from which it could be singled out for its special reliability in representing the past.[58] Celebrating the new possibilities opened by professing the legitimacy of an infinite number of perspectives on the past, historians like Ankersmit (1989) have interpreted microhistory as one of the first and best examples of postmodern history.

However, microhistorians like Levi (1991) and Ginzburg (1993) explicitly reject the conclusion reached by Ankersmit and the adjective 'postmodernist' to describe their work. For Ginzburg, "the distinctive quality of Italian microhistory must be looked for in this cognitive wager[:] [the] accentuation of the constructive moment inherent in the research [combined] with an explicit rejection of the skeptical implications (postmodernist, if you will)." By the early 1980s, Ginzburg had already pointed out that scholars highlighting the literary parallels between fiction and history to reach relativist conclusions were unfairly reducing the latter to a mere discourse, devoid of a practice engaging rigorously with sources and methodologies.[59] It is precisely the historians' awareness of the construction of their research which forces them to develop new approaches like microhistory "to correct our actual imaginings, our expectations, and our ideologies." Historical evidence is not abandoned, but transformed and seen from another light by the adoption of new narrative schemes. Getting rid of his-

torical reality because of difficulties arising from interpreting documents, as White argued throughout his career, always seemed to Ginzburg as an unjustified and pessimistic epistemological position, and a dubious moral stance.[60] In using a microhistorical approach, this thesis is in line with Ginzburg's commitment to a rigorous epistemological engagement with the sources in an attempt to produce new narrative schemes.

1.5 Doing History with Rebel Sources

The microhistory of the Syrian Islamic revolt developed in the present study was shaped in important ways by the sources at my disposal. In trying to understand the perspective of the rebels, it was essential to look at the writings of Sa'īd Ḥawwā, the central intellectual of the revolt. Fortunately, of all rebels, Ḥawwā is the one who not only published the largest number of treatises, but who also wrote the most personal and intimate autobiography, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)* (1987). In it, Ḥawwā recounts his childhood in Hama, his education and religious upbringing, his first years as an young activist in the Muslim Brotherhood, the political and social context which led him to write his first theological treatises, and the tensed years of confrontation with the Ba'th regime, including the five years he spent in prison. His memoirs are a precious source that can help understand Ḥawwā's personal journey to becoming an intellectual whose books were immensely popular among rebels, especially *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*. Contrary to Weismann, I have tried to understand the two texts in relation to each other and analyze *Jund Allāh* as a work inscribed in the specific historical context of Ḥawwā's exile in Saudi Arabia after the 1964 Hama Strike. I have also paid a close attention to the overarching intellectual project in which he situates *Jund Allāh*, as a continuity to his earlier treatises, *Allāh Jalla Jalāluhu (God, Exalted be He)*, *al-Islām (Islam)*, *al-Rasūl Ṣallā Allāh 'alayhi wa-Salam (The Prophet, Peace be Upon Him)*.

The second main source of this thesis is the five volume memoirs of 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn, leader of the Brotherhood between 1975 and 1980, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories)*.[61] These memoirs are both personal recollections of Sa'd al-Dīn's engagement in the Brotherhood and his own history of the organization. As such, while they are an incredibly rich source of information, it is sometimes hard to tell if one is reading Sa'd al-Dīn as the leader of the Brotherhood or its historian, who sometimes even engages in debates with secondary literature. I have tried to distinguish between the two as much as possible in both my assessment of historical evidence and in my writing. Sa'd al-Dīn also did a long interview with

Ahmad Mansur on Al-Jazeera in eight episodes, *Shāhid ʻalā al-ʻAṣr: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… ʻAṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Sūriyā, (Witness of the Age: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria)*. Mansur's meticulous preparation for the interview and his sharp questioning make it an invaluable source of information.

The third main source of this study is the relatively unknown memoirs of a leader of the Fighting Vanguard, Ayman al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalīʻa al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī ʻAhd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*. Al-Shurbajī's memoirs pose difficult challenges for historians. They have not been officially published and are available today only in the form of documents transcribed on a computer word processor and distributed through Islamic militant websites. They have been nonetheless used with caution by scholars like Conduit, Lefèvre, and Benkorich. These memoirs are by far the best source available on the activities of the Fighting Vanguard. I have also been able to verify many important claims al-Shurbajī makes with other memoirs, newspapers, and academic works. In general, al-Shurbajī is a reliable source of information who also reveals crucial details about the armed operations of the Muslim Brotherhood, a subject often omitted in Ḥawwā and Saʻd al-Dīn's writings. Interestingly, the version of al-Shurbajī's memoirs distributed in a Word version ends abruptly in 1981, "to preserve the safety of those mentioned in the remaining parts of the book," as the editor explains. However, most surprisingly, on October 10th 2011, Syrians from Homs, the heart of the Revolution at the time, started publishing al-Shurbajī's memoirs on a website called `Homs Revolutions`.[62] To my great surprise, these young revolutionaries published the complete version of the memoirs, way beyond what had been released by the Brotherhood. I have indicated in the footnotes when I used the full version released by activists.

The fourth main source of this thesis is the long study of the Islamic revolt published by Abū Muṣʻab al-Sūrī under the pseudonym ʻUmar ʻAbd al-Ḥakīm, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*. I believe this source needs to be treated with more caution than many scholars do. As Lia's biography of al-Sūrī makes clear, al-Sūrī was quite young when he joined the Islamic revolt in the second half of 1980.[63] Al-Sūrī left Syria in early 1981 to join training camps of the exiled Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and did not take part in any fighting after. Accordingly, his own experience of the revolt is significantly limited, especially when compared to how voluminous his study is — more than 900 pages. Most of his study appears to be based on testimonies and documents he collected during the revolt, but also possibly later in Afghanistan. Hence, while al-Sūrī's book provides incredibly valuable documents like letters and speeches written by rebels, it

is sometimes inaccurate and reflects later perceptions of the revolt after it happened. In particular, parts of al-Sūrī's account of the Brotherhood during the 1960s are easily proven false. Nonetheless, it would be unfair to deny the rigour he displays and the amount of details he includes in his discussion of the Islamic Revolution, especially between 1980 and 1982.

In addition to these four main primary sources, I have relied selectively on three memoirs to discuss key moments of the rebellion. In keeping with a microhistorical approach, my use of these memoirs has been paralleled with the introduction of their authors as secondary characters in the narrative. 'Abd Allāh Abū 'Izza, a Palestinian member of the Brotherhood, reveals important details about the Brotherhood's participation in the armed struggle of the *fidā'iyyīn* in the West Bank in the late 1960s in his *Ma'a al-Ḥaraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya (With the Islamic Movement in the Arab Countries)*. Since many Syrian Brothers joined the fight with the *fidā'iyyīn*, this episode is crucial to understanding the beginning of armed operations in Syria, as we will see. Muḥammad Salīm Ḥammad, a young Jordanian member of the Brotherhood, wrote a book about his imprisonment in the Palmyra Prison during the revolt, titled *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)*.[64] What led to his imprisonment was his involvement in the rebellion as a courier between the exiled leadership of the Brotherhood in Jordan and its emerging cells in Damascus. Ḥammad's brief narrative of his time as a rebel gives an interesting glimpse of how the revolt was organized, and many important details he gives are corroborated in al-Shurbajī's memoirs. Finally, 'Azīza Julūd recently published a memoir of her life with her husband, Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif, who organized the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre that resulted in the death of around 60 'Alawi cadets in 1979. Her book, *Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif wa-Ṣafḥāt min Tārīkh al-Ṭalī'a al-Muqātila fi Sūriyā (Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif and Pages from the History of the Fighting Vanguard in Syria)*, also features an interview her husband gave to a Kuwaiti newspaper, which has been helpful in understanding the political meaning he attributed to the massacre.

The last important primary source used in the present thesis is the Muslim Brotherhood's substantive report on the Hama Massacre, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-'Aṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*. The report is a meticulous day-by-day reconstruction of the massacre, supplemented by analyses of several key dynamics of the events. The visible care its authors took in recording numerous specific details of the massacre make it an invaluable source for understanding how the Islamic Revolution in Syria ended. Despite its publication one year after the events, the Brotherhood's report has not been used by researchers writing on the modern history of Syria. Discussions of the Hama Massacre usually suffer from a paucity of information one also finds human rights reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.[65] In comparison, the much more detailed reports on the massacre by the Syrian Human Rights

Committee appear to have relied the Brotherhood's own report.[66] Given the horrifying and tragic nature of these events, an engagement with the Brotherhood's detailed study in the context of the Islamic Revolution in Syria is more pertinent than ever.

While the extensive use of rebel sources undoubtedly provides rich material for historical writing, it also raises several important methodological issues. Firstly, the preservation and the distribution of these sources is not the product of a neutral attempt to record history. Many sources mentioned so far are distributed by the Muslim Brotherhood's website `IkhwanWiki`. In the cases of Abū 'Izza and Ḥammad's autobiographies, I have only been able to access these sources through this website. Researchers accordingly need to be aware that they can use these sources in part because they are compatible with the vision of the group that makes them accessible. Secondly, writings by protagonists of a conflict often project stories about the justice of their cause and the depravity of their enemies. At some point, the historian will almost certainly find it impossible to make a distinction between a rebel recounting an event and intentionally distorting what had happened. This is not even taking into account the obvious fact that in narrating, rebels are also constructing their own understanding of the revolt. Or more simply, the sources might at some point reflect the fragmented knowledge rebels had of the ongoing events.

I have accordingly tried to systematically challenge the narratives of the rebels. Doing so was helpful not only in correcting the stories they provide, but also in identifying which issues they were most likely to obscure and distort in their own writings. One effective way to do so has been to compare how specific events were recounted in different memoirs. Fortunately, some of the sources used in this thesis provide a crucial perspective of the Islamic Revolution that opposes in several ways the narrative pushed by the Muslim Brotherhood. This has proven particularly fruitful in trying to understand the Brotherhood's participation in armed operations, which is almost absent from Ḥawwā and Sa'd al-Dīn's memoirs but thoroughly discussed by al-Shurbajī, al-Sūrī, and, to a lesser extent, Ḥammad. I have also tried to independently verify most episodes of the regime's repression discussed by the rebels. Daily summaries of newspaper reports collected in the book, *Chronology of Arab Politics: January–March, 1964*, have been helpful in following the 1964 strike in Hama. Reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Syrian Human Rights Committee are also rich and independent sources of information about political repression. Finally, I followed accounts of various armed attacks carried out between 1976 and 1982 as they appeared in newspapers of the time, in order to verify al-Shurbajī's own versions of these events.

The narrative I have constructed of the Islamic Revolution is in three parts. Given the centrality of Ḥawwā in these events and the quality of his writings as primary sources, his life

experience and his works are the focus of the first two chapters. These two chapters can be seen as an attempt to understand Ḥawwā as a complex and multi-faceted character who wrote books about Islam and politics shaped by his personal experiences as a young Islamic activist and intellectual from Hama. Taking seriously the chronology of his life, Chapter 2 covers his birth to the aftermath of the 1964 Hama Strike, a turning point in his life. It attempts to paint a portrait of Ḥawwā inscribed in the unique political and religious context of Hama in the 1950s. The result is an account of his early life which defies many interpretations of Islamic politics in Syria: born in a poor family with close affinities to socialist and anti-landlord movements, Ḥawwā's intellectual curiosity led him to the study of Islam and, later, to become a passionate activist defending Islamic traditions by engaging in mass-politics. Chapter 3 proposes a rigorous study of his most influential work, *Jund Allāh*, understood in the context of his forced exile to Saudi Arabia after the strike. Unlike previous scholars, I attempt to understand Ḥawwā's writings in light of his specific political experiences and I place them in the broader context of his series of books on various aspects of Islam, as he intended. I also pay a great deal of attention to uncovering the scholars who influenced his thought, which reveals that Ḥawwā was an intellectual who engaged with both classical scholars and modern reformists. Finally, instead of divorcing his ideas from his activism, I offer an interpretation of the 1973 constitutional protests he led as an implementation of the vision he articulates in *Jund Allāh*.

Chapter 4 reconstructs the Islamic Revolution from the perspective of some of its main actors. It offers an account of the events that led Marwān Ḥadīd to found an armed movement in Syria through the eyes of those who knew him. This story, I believe, is intrinsically linked to his experience as a fighter with the *fidā'iyyīn* in Jordan. I then attempt to reconstruct the revolt as lived by members of two distinct institutions: al-Shurbajī, from the Fighting Vanguard, and Sa'd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā, from the Brotherhood. Treating the two groups as separate reveals two unique organizational contexts that overlapped and collaborated with great difficulty. This section also reconstructs the events of the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre from the perspective of its main perpetrators. Al-Yūsif, like Ḥadīd, shows how, at key moments, individual rebels were historical actors of greater significance than the movements from which they came. Nonetheless, their actions cannot be separated from the institutional and ideological context in which they operated, as I show that al-Yūsif's conception of his own violence was directly shaped by Ḥawwā's *Jund Allāh*. Finally, I try to narrate how the Muslim Brotherhood and the Fighting Vanguard both participated in the armed rebellion and built common spaces to organize the fall of the Ba'th regime.

Chapter 5 concludes by giving an account of the Hama Massacre and its relation to the

Islamic Revolution. It offers a new reading of these events departing from previous accounts, which portray them as either the product of intrinsic features of the Ba'th regime's political repression, or as a precipitated reaction to a large-scale uprising in Hama. Instead, this chapter argues that the massacre should be understood as the regime's response to the revolution after six years of confrontations with rebels. It does so by revisiting the final moments of the Islamic Revolution in the rebels' memoirs. Inscribing the Hama Massacre within the Islamic Revolution can help explain why the violence deployed by the regime took the form of indiscriminate mass-killings, why it happened in February 1982, and why it took place in Hama. Finally, the chapter closes with a reconstruction of the Hama Massacre. Unfortunately, none of the rebels this study follows directly witnessed the massacre. Instead, I have tried to give an idea of the magnitude and significance of the historical moment the massacre represented by relying on the Brotherhood's detailed recording of these events.

One of the main lessons of this study is that taking seriously the ideas and discourses of rebels helps to understand the meaning of their political action and their significance. As such, while rebels disagreed on many things, all of them agreed that their struggle had to be understood as a broader and more fundamental historical change in Syria. In their minds, they were fighting for a revolution, the second revolution in Syria after the one that led to the independence of the country. Accordingly, this study will privilege the use of the phrase *the Islamic Revolution in Syria*, or Islamic Revolution more simply, to better convey the perspective of its revolutionaries. In addition to being the exact expression used by rebels, I believe that it is more appropriate than 'Syrian Islamic Revolution,' which wrongly suggests that it represented a broad-based social movement the way the 2011 Syrian Revolution or the 1979 Iranian Revolution were. However, the Islamic Revolution in Syria was still very much Syrian in that it emerged from Islamic traditions specific to Syria. The Islamic Revolution was neither the product of an ahistorical and fixed understanding of Islam, nor a consequence of the emerging Islamic Republic of Iran exporting its own conception of the Iranian Revolution as Islamic. The central idea of this thesis is rather that the Islamic Revolution in Syria was very much embedded in the contested political context of post-independence Syria.

Chapter 2

Street Activism and Mosque Politics

2.1 A Childhood among the Socialists of Hama

At the beginning of his autobiography, Saʿīd Ḥawwā explains that, "I started writing these memoirs when I approached fifty years old, as the fourteenth century of the Hijra calendar was ending and the fifteenth was starting."[1] At the end of the 1970s, he had made the decision to record the important events of his life. This moment occurred shortly after his release from the al-Mazza military prison in Damascus in January 1978, where he had been since 1973.[2] A few days later, he met with ʿAdnān Saʿd al-Dīn in Hama, who was by then the leader (*al-murāqib al-ʿāmm*) of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Saʿd al-Dīn informed him that the leadership of the organization outside the country had agreed that Ḥawwā should leave Syria. While he initially refused, Ḥawwā promised he would do so after Saʿd al-Dīn's insistence that the exiled Brothers had already prepared his trip. Ḥawwā then explains that following this discussion, he had a vision in which a friend, who had recently passed away, warned him that his journey in Amman would be a perilous one. In effect, members of the Brotherhood were developing parallel institutions in Jordan to pursue their work amid a dramatic increase in regime repression since 1976. As he was preparing to leave, Ḥawwā came across another friend working for a publishing company. He gave him a draft of *Min Ajl Khuṭwa ilā al-Amām ʿalā Ṭarīq al-Jihād al-Mubārak (For the Sake of a Step Forward on the Path Towards the Blessed Jihad)*, a book he had written in prison and which would soon be widely distributed among rebels in both Syria and Jordan.

The precise context in which Ḥawwā started writing his memoirs is important. Most significantly, he would never go back to Syria again after his departure for Jordan. In all likelihood, the growing tension between the regime of Ḥafiẓ al-Asad and the Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood, which culminated in the Hama Massacre, made him suspect that this was a real possibility. His memoirs contain only a few pages after his discussion of the revolt, thus the revolt appears as the culmination of his life story. In an interview with Chris Kutschera from *Le monde diplomatique* a year after the events, Ḥawwā discussed vague plans of establishing an Islamic state with an alliance for the "national liberation of Syria."[3] But it is hard to believe he that envisaged this possibility seriously. On the other hand, during the first four years of his exile, he was at the heart of an intricate web of rebel movements in Syria directed partly from Jordan. Through his letters, declarations, articles in the Brotherhood's journal *al-Nadhīr*, and especially the dissemination of his books *Min Ajl Khuṭwa* and *Jund Allāh (Army of God)* in underground reading circles, Ḥawwā became a leading intellectual of the Islamic Revolution. His autobiography reflects in many ways the nostalgia for the country he would never see again, the passioned outrage of a rebel, and the dismay of a tragic ending.

Dissecting Ḥawwā's connection to the Islamic Revolution in Syria is essential to understanding it from the point of view of its rebels. Ḥawwā's understanding of Syrian history and his political vision influenced a generation of younger activists. He was a key figure in organizing the final stages of the Islamic Revolution. His seniority, compared to most rebels at the time, makes him a protagonist whose personal history sheds a particularly rich light on some of the more deeply-rooted tensions lying behind these events. Following Hama's history, and Syria's more broadly, through the eyes of Ḥawwā will bring us to the eve of the conflict with an appreciation of where its main actors and their worldviews came from.

Sa'īd Ḥawwā was born in 1935 in the 'Aliliyyat neighbourhood, the largest quarter (*maḥalla*) of Hama.[4] Owing to the al-'Asi (or Orontes) river which takes its source from the Beqaa Valley and flows into the Mediterranean Sea near what is today southern Turkey, Hama has a history of at least three thousand years of recorded human settlements.[5] The Ottomans took control of the city during their conquest of greater Syria in 1516 from the Mamluk for both strategic and commercial considerations.[6] In virtue of its location between Damascus and Aleppo, Hama was then incorporated into the large trading routes from the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to European markets.[7] From the 18th century onward, Hama was integrated into the province of Damascus, where the Ottoman administration was centralized.[8] Dominant social positions in Damascus at the time were a product of social prestige, economic influence, and access to the Ottoman authorities, which Albert Hourani calls, "the politics of the urban notables."[9] Social hierarchies in Hama were an extension of the Damascene politics of the notables, where local elites had direct connections to Ottoman officials or urban notables.[10] For instance, the Kaylānī and 'Alwānī were prominent notable families in Hama and both occupied official religious positions in the Ottoman administra-

tion, such as judge (*al-qāḍī*) and mufti. Members of the ʻAẓm family held important positions in the Ottoman military and bureaucracy, notably as governors in Damascus.[11]

The 19th century saw a consolidation of the economic and political power of the notables throughout Syria, and especially in Hama. Their responsibility for collecting agricultural taxes (*iltizām*) on behalf of the state, coupled with their ability to lend money, had already placed them in an empowered position over farmers.[12] Moreover, despite the availability of *sharīʻa* courts to settle debt, land, and property disputes, records show that ordinary Hamawis were substantially less likely to go to court for such matters than residents of other districts.[13] Their mistrust of governmental institutions was exacerbated by Ibrahim Pasha's brief rule of Greater Syria, as it was characterized by high levels of taxes and military conscription.[14] As a result, when the time came to register property titles to facilitate the state's claim to land revenues after the promulgation of the 1858 Land Code, the vast majority of lands were not claimed by peasants, but by notables.[15] Moreover, the increased international demand for agricultural products and raw exports in the 19th century lead to the consolidation of the privileged notables into a strong landowning elite.[16] For the orientalist Gertrude Bell, who visited the town in 1905, Hama was characterized by a powerful landowning elite.[17]

During the mandate period, French colonial officers tried to break the power of the landowning elite by implementing land reforms.[18] The policy was motivated by a romantic vision of a free and independent landowning peasantry, and by a desire to weaken the influence of the nationalist landowning elite. The complexity of the process of land registration in a context of wide suspicion of the colonial power, and sometimes outright hostility, coupled with failed tax reforms, only increased the strong position of large landowners. While the percentage of medium-sized privately owned land (10 to 100 acres) increased from 15% to 33% between 1913 and 1945, small ownership (fewer than 10 acres) decreased from 25% to 15% across Syria, reaching a stunning 1% in Hama.[19] In 1932, 92 out of 114 villages in Hama were entirely owned by four families, and more than half of the cultivated lands were owned by absentee landlords a decade later.[20] Notable families such as the Kaylānī and Barāzī even lead the young union movement in the province, which spread after the Great Syrian Revolt, more as a way to participate into national politics than to defend workers' rights.[21]

The ʻAliliyyat neighbourhood of Hama, where Ḥawwā was born, was one of the richest since the 18th century, in part due to its effervescent commercial activity and the presence of the notable ʻAlwānī family.[22] However, it was also the largest quarter at the center of the city, which is why many of its residents also came from more modest backgrounds. Such was the case of Ḥawwā. Like the majority of urban Hamawis, he grew up in a Sunni family and encountered Ismaʻilis, Greek Orthodox Christians, and ʻAlawis living in the city and its

surroundings.[23] He describes his milieu as "ignorant, but concerned with noble causes, and poor, but virtuous."[24] His mother passed away when he was only two years old, and his father spent most of his time working as an intermediary between the orchards of farmers and the souk of the city. Ḥawwā explains that his father and uncle were indignant at "the injustices of the landowners (*al-mallākīn*) and their entourage." One day, his father got into a physical altercation sparked by his outrage at these large economic disparities, and he hit a man who later died from his injuries. He then fled to the al-Jazira province (today al-Hasaka) for a few years and spent one year in prison when he came back to Hama. This incident did not diminish his indignation, for he later joined with Ḥawwā's uncle the newly founded Arab Socialist Party in the province, headed by the young Akram al-Ḥawrānī.

From a young age, Ḥawwā had lasting experiences of his precarious economic situation in a society dominated by powerful landowners. He recalls in his journal that the principal of his elementary school threatened him with expulsion if he did not replace his ragged clothes.[25] As his grandmother did not have the means to buy him clothes, other relatives from his family had to bring him suitable garments. When his father left prison, Ḥawwā had to leave school to help him sell vegetables at the market and keep the books of his business. This did not prevent him from developing impressive intellectual skills. He became skillful at doing quick computations, handling money, and keeping records. Ḥawwā also claims that his father encouraged him to develop an interest in reading, which he quickly picked up, surprising his own family by his precocious literary abilities. His interest in reading (*muṭā'ila*) proceeded from "a deeply felt [intellectual] ambition rarely found in a milieu like ours, and this ambition grew stronger until I entered the Muslim Brotherhood many years later." This is a significant claim, given that he devoured many books during his teenage years, from Plato, Aristotle, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, to works about the French revolution, Sufism, morality, and the novels of Jurjī Zaydān, an important figure of the Nahḍa movement.[26]

Ḥawwā's recounting that the writings of the Muslim Brotherhood gave him unparallel intellectual satisfaction could very well be true. But it is hard not to suspect that it also pushes forward an unfavourable comparison with a new ideological movement popular in Hama in the early 1950s. Ḥawwā describes Hama as possessing a strong religiosity (*al-tadayyun*) and a unified morality (*ikhlāqiyya wāḥida*), despite its religious diversity.[27] Because of this religious character, it is "impossible for Hamawis to reflect about politics, and they are hence more receptive to the ideas of the Socialists and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, who move them further away from their religion and Arabism." The "heart-felt slogans" and "effective techniques" of al-Ḥawrānī gained in popularity in poorer quarters and spread throughout the province. For example, "he called for the fight against the oppression represented by the

rich families, whom he called 'the feudal landlords' (*al-iqṭā'iyyīn*)." Ḥawwā was closely acquainted with the influence of socialist ideals in Hama, for his father and uncle were devoted members of al-Ḥawrānī's party. They even formed a group of young socialists that defended the more vulnerable residents of his neighbourhood.

Al-Ḥawrānī had become a central figure in the political life of Hama in the 1940s. A lawyer who graduated from the faculty of law of the Syrian University in Damascus, al-Ḥawrānī was born in 1911 in a modest land owning family from Hama.[28] After a few years of involvement with the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, he joined the Youth Party in Hama founded by his relative 'Uthmān al-Ḥawrānī in 1936. One of the party's main goal was to challenge the landowning establishment.[29] Through 'Uthmān, who had helped Fawzī al-Qāwuqjī in the 1925 Hama rebellion against the French, Akram al-Ḥawrānī went to Baghdad in May 1941 to fight with the supporters of the Kaylānī coup.[30] After his return to Hama, he successfully ran for a seat in parliament with the National Bloc in June 1943. As Ḥawwā wrote in his memoirs, his slogan, "Fetch the basket and the shovel to bury the Agha and the Bey!" (*hātū al-quffa wa-l-karīk li-na'sh al-āghā wa-l-bīk*), directly attacked the powerful landlords and created a vast commotion in the city, resulting in protests and riots aimed at the rich 'Azm family. For the first time, economic inequalities were discussed in national politics. After winning a second electoral victory in 1947, al-Ḥawrānī joined the Arab Liberation Army (*jaysh al-inqādh*) in early 1948 to fight in Palestine under the command of al-Qāwuqjī. With the defeat of the Arab armies in Palestine, he became increasingly convinced that the socio-economic hierarchies in many Arab countries needed to crumble, and that the army was an effective institution to bring about that change. When Ḥawwā's father joined al-Ḥawrānī's Arab Socialist Party, the latter had occupied many important positions in the different governments brought about by the three military coups of 1949.[31]

Ḥawwā's criticisms in his memoirs directed at al-Ḥawrānī seem odd at first. One suspects that they do not necessarily reflect his views at the time, but more his understanding of Syria's history as he was writing his memoirs. For example, it is hard to see how al-Ḥawrānī in the 1950s could have diverted Hamawis away from Arab unity, since he traveled to Iraq to fight the British, participated in raids against French positions at the end of WWII, and enlisted in the Arab Liberation Army in Palestine. Ḥawwā himself remembers "the heroism" (*al-buṭūla*) of the volunteers who joined al-Qāwuqjī's troops in Palestine, including al-Ḥawrānī.[32] His charge that the Arab Socialist Party moved people away from religion is further developed in the series of lessons he draws at the end of the chapter about this period of his life.[33] Ḥawwā explains that "al-Ḥawrānī and those around him were the first to recognize social and economic problems, and to propose solutions to them." However,

"when political action is not tied to religion, it leads to the emergence of future conflicts between politics and religion, which is what happened in Syria." Observing closely the party's activities through his father's political activism, Ḥawwā concludes that there was a need at the time for an Islamic political movement rivalling its organization and planning.

But this opposition between socialism and religion exaggerates how secular al-Ḥawrānī's party was, and ignores how the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had appropriated socialism at the time. That al-Ḥawrānī's ancestors founded the influential Rifā'ī Sufi order in Hama and that his father was a well-known *shaykh* (pl. *shuyūkh*) partly explains the credibility he had in the eyes of many Hamawis.[34] Moreover, while organizing peasant protests against landlords with the Arab Socialist Party, he made speeches casting them as rooted in the Islamic reformism of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad 'Abduh.[35] Around the same time, in November 1949, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood announced the creation of the Islamic Socialist Front (*al-jabha al-islāmiyya al-ishtirākiyya*), which was to run for the elections of the Constituent Assembly.[36] The front's program barely referenced Islam, but decried corruption and supported social equality, progressive taxation, land reform, limitation of ownership (*tahdīd al-milkiyya*), and workers' rights. The leader of the Brotherhood, Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, reiterated in 1954 that, "the Ikhwan preach Islamic socialism (*al-ishtirākiyya al-islāmiyya*) and call for justice for the oppressed classes (*al-ṭabaqāt al-maẓlūma*)."[37] His famous work, *Ishtirākiyyat al-Islām (The Socialism of Islam)* (1960), confirms how directly opposing socialism and Islam in the 1950s was not as simple as Ḥawwā portrays it in his memoirs.

Ḥawwā's interpretation of the Arab Socialist Party's history rightly conveys the weakness of the Brotherhood as a political party in Hama at the time. But this chapter of his memoirs is sometimes more a polemical engagement with al-Ḥawrānī, who joined the Ba'th party in late 1952, than an account of why he himself did not share his father's enthusiasm for socialism. In fact, the young Ḥawwā seemed at the time quite uninterested in politics. He entered the Abu al-Fidā' and Ibn Rushd preparatory schools (*al-madāris al-i'adādiyya*) after working during the day with his father and completing evening classes at a local elementary school.[38] Student politics at Ibn Rushd was dominated by three parties: the Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Arab Socialist Party. The latter was allegedly the most popular at the school, and its members considered Ḥawwā one of theirs. Eager to try everything, he even attended a meeting of the Communist Party, and was given a party member card. But his involvement did not go further. The pivotal moment which marked the beginning of his activism was rather his encounter with one of the teachers of the school, *shaykh* Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid. The world that al-Ḥāmid opened to the young Ḥawwā was at the confluence of modern intellectual currents, which we ought to turn to

in order to understand the context of his early Islamic activism. Doing so will allow us to better appreciate the traditions out of which emerged the rebels who staged an armed revolt against the Ba'th regime in the 1970s.

2.2 A Genealogy of Syrian Reformist Movements

The ideas of reformist thinkers flourished in Syria in the late 19th century and further developed during the first half of the 20th century. Importantly, reformist ideas did not simply travel across Syria in the books of scholars. They also combined with local traditions to form novel social and political ideals around which new social movements were built. These dynamics gave rise to a rich associational life after the Great Revolt, when many Syrians had to rethink how to organize their resistance to French colonialism. The effervescent political landscape in Syria after independence featured many actors and associations which had come about during the mandate period. The Muslim Brotherhood and many religious circles in which Ḥawwā was involved in the 1950s had their roots in the reformist movements of the mandate period. In particular, Ḥawwā's activism needs to be understood within an ideological context and an organizational history sensitive to the specificities of Hama.

Reformist thinkers in the 19th century had in common that they questioned the established sources of authority in Islam. They criticized practices which they deemed either ill-suited for Islam to respond to the challenges of their time, or simply misguided and straying from the right path of the religion, or both. On the other hand, reformist thinkers came from all around the Muslim world, and thus their reforms cannot be captured by a single set of doctrines. One should instead appreciate the competing directions they wished Islam would take, and the different reforms they thought would accomplish that. Through their writings, teachings, travels, and students, they exchanged ideas, argued, and even formed movements to further their reforms. The thinkers most relevant for the Ottoman Syrian context illustrate how these discussions traveled across different countries and interacted with a dynamic local religious scene, giving rise to movements lasting throughout the 20th century.

One important source of these new understandings of Islam was Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. He traveled across the Ottoman and British empires to convince Muslims that they should revisit their own history and traditions to meet the political, economic, and technological challenges posed by European powers.[39] Given his strong interest in Islamic philosophy, he continuously stressed the central role reason should play in this endeavour. Throughout his teachings across his many travels, al-Afghānī inspired many people to develop new reason-based Islamic readings of contemporary events. Most famous among them is Muḥammad

'Abduh.[40] 'Abduh also believed that traditional doctrines should be reinvestigated with a greater use of reason. He drew some of his inspiration from the rationalist Mu'tazilī school of early Islamic philosophy.[41] 'Abduh called for reviving independent reasoning (*ijtihād*) in Islamic law and for rejecting interpretations of religious sources that conflict with reason.

Reformist ideas made their way to Damascus not only from Egypt, but also from Iraq and India.[42] A key circle of influence was the al-Ālūsī family of scholars from Baghdad. In his eclectic exegesis of the Qur'an, Abū al-Thanā' Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ālūsī combined elements of independent opinion (*ra'ī*), Sufism, and Ḥanbalī approaches to theology drawn from the famous Ibn Taymiyya.[43] His use of *ra'ī* and Ibn Taymiyya's ideas provided many intellectual tools for reformists, since they expressed a distrust of the reliance on established religious authorities (in Islamic law, *taqlīd*), and promoted a return to Islamic sources interpreted through *ijtihād*.[44] His son, Nu'mān Khayr al-Dīn al-Ālūsī, published a treatise which played an important role in recovering and popularizing Ibn Taymiyya's works.[45] Nu'mān Khayr al-Dīn had previously met the Indian reformist Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān.[46] His son, 'Alī 'Alā al-Dīn al-Ālūsī, studied with Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān in India before working in Baalbek in Lebanon, where he then met with Damascene reformers. His other son, Maḥmūd Shukrī al-Ālūsī, exchanged letters with scholars following the revived interested in Ibn Taymiyya and independent reasoning for the sake of reforming Islam.

Syrian reformists shared other reformists' distrust of traditional authorities.[47] They appropriated 'Abduh's novel use of reason and were encouraged to rediscover Ibn Taymiyya's corpus, especially in Damascus where he died. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī, who lead the Algerian resistance to French colonialism before his exile to Syria, is the first important figure.[48] Like al-Afghānī, he believed that attributing a greater role to reason in theology and Islamic law was necessary in order to master European sciences and resist colonialism. His student, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Bīṭār (d. 1917), shared his broader reformist project and rejection of *taqlīd* in Islamic law.[49] However, the growing influence of Ibn Taymiyya made al-Bīṭār suspicious of al-Jazā'irī's strong Sufi inclinations, which we can see from his scepticism towards Ibn 'Arabī theosophy and the popular Sufi belief in the powers of saints. Disagreements over of Sufi doctrines would later figure prominently in debates among reformists, especially in Hama. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī, another central figure of Syrian reformism, visited 'Abduh in 1903 with al-Bīṭār to exchange ideas about new hermeneutical approaches they were developing.[50]

Islamic reformism in late Ottoman Syria can thus be seen as a set of new hermeneutical approaches prompted by a desire to bring Islam up to the political and scientific challenges of the time. It was influenced by different reformist trends built around the belief that one's

own reason should play a role in interpreting religious texts and not simply defer to the authority of *'ulamā'*. Al-Qāsimī illustrates this new intellectual paradigm by combining forceful appeals to *ijtihād*, a rejection of *taqlīd*, and a rediscovery of Ibn Taymiyya. He famously defended the July 24th 1908 restoration of constitutional government with great enthusiasm by using *ijtihād* and appealing to Ibn Taymiyya.[51] Another example is Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), who knew well al-Bīṭār, al-Qāsimī, and al-Jazā'irī, and helped draft the liberal Syrian-Arab Constitution of Fayṣal's government.[52] But more than specific works of intellectuals, it is the embodiment of this reformism in Islamic societies during the Mandate period that formed the institutions from which sprang rebel institutions of the Islamic Revolution.

Before situating these Islamic societies, it is important to explain why I will not follow many scholars of the period and use the noun 'Salafism' to describe a unified reformist "*salafiyya* movement" in late Ottoman Syria. The Arabic noun *salafiyya* ('Salafism' in English) is meant to refer to the set of doctrines of those who claim to follow the pious predecessors (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*) from the first generations of Muslims. As Lauzière argues, the problem with this intellectual history of Salafism is that none of the thinkers mentioned above, from al-Afghānī to Riḍā, used *salafiyya* to describe their views.[53] While they often used the adjective *salafī*, or the phrase *madhhab al-salaf* (school of the predecessors), these usages were never meant to capture these reformist ideals under an umbrella term. Instead, their use of the root *salaf* traced back to the practice of scholars from the 12th century onwards to refer to certain theological views as "those of the *salaf*."[54] In large part, these views were associated with the Ḥanbalī theological tradition of the 11th century, especially for questions arising from the interpretation of verses affirming the attributes of God.[55] This approach to theology was defended by none other than Ibn Taymiyya during his trial.[56] With the renewed interest for Ibn Taymiyya among reformists of the late Ottoman period, it is not surprising that they also used *al-salaf* to describe specific theological views. For example, when Riḍā described al-Qāsimī as "the reformer (*mujaddid*) of the *madhhab al-salaf*," he meant it as one of many titles ascribed to al-Qāsimī, not as an all-encompassing one. Nowhere in his discussion of al-Qāsimī's "attempt to break the gates of *ijtihād*" does the root *salaf* appear.[57]

As Lauzière suggests, there are good reasons to think that the noun *salafiyya* emerged as a creation of Orientalist scholars. The first scholar who spoke of a "*salafîyah* movement" was Louis Massignon in a 1919 article about the origins of Wahhabism.[58] Stoddard also explicitly adopted Massignon terminology, and added al-Afghānī to the story of Salafism, despite the complete lack of connections between him and the Wahhabi movement.[59] Henri Laoust's influential studies of Ibn Taymiyya added the latter to the history of the "orthodox reform of the *salafîyah*."[60] Through the later works of Massignon, Berg, Gibb, and Maḥmaṣṣānī, Riḍā

and ʻAbduh were included to this heteroclite group of proponents of Salafism.[61] This short overview illustrates some of the issues scholars of intellectual history face when they develop neologisms not used by the thinkers they study. By creating new labels, one can be misled to think that historical connections existed between thinkers from widely different traditions. Moreover, if we take the genealogy of ideas seriously, there is a significant difference between holding a diverse set of reformist ideas, and uniting them under the single label 'Salafism.' The use of an umbrella term presumes an ideological fixity and cohesiveness, which was most likely not present in early 20th century Ottoman Syria. Describing reformists as Salafis also tends to downplay the importance of Sufism for many Syrian reformist thinkers.

Reformist ideas gained in importance and influence during the Mandate period. In *Colonial Citizens* (2000), Elizabeth Thompson describes the rise of what she calls "Islamic populists" in the 1930s, who organized into broad-based social movements to mobilize against the nationalist and sometimes secularist political elites during the Mandate period. While Thompson is right to notice the rise of Islamic populist politics, she overestimates the rupture it represented with older reformists. A good example of the continuity between reformists and these social movements is the Islamic Civilization society (*al-tammadun al-islāmī*) founded in Damascus on May 5th 1935.[62] Reformist thinkers such as Muḥammad Bahjat al-Bīṭār, grandson of ʻAbd al-Razzāq, Muḥammad Ibn Kamāl al-Khātīb, ʻAlī al-Ṭanṭāwī, and members of the al-Shaṭṭī and al-Khānī families, played important roles in founding the society.[63] Through publications, conferences, and education, the society aimed at reviving the Islamic civilization in Syria so that it could confront colonial powers in the broader Middle East.

Ḥawwā's first teacher, Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid, was an important figure among these new Muslim populists. Muḥammad's father, Maḥmūd al-Ḥāmid, was the head of the Naqshabandī Sufi order in the city.[64] Maḥmūd was from the Khālidiyya branch of the order, whose ideas had inspired early reformists in Syria, including ʻAbd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī.[65] Before the 1930s, Hama had seen many religious controversies between reformists skeptical of "the exaggerations" of various Sufi practices, and leaders of the Qādiriyya, Rifāʻiyya, and Naqshabandiyya orders in the town.[66] These debates took a new significance when leaders of Sufi orders, especially the Khālidiyya branch, founded new Islamic societies.[67] Most prominently in Hama was The Islamic Guidance Society (*jamāʻat al-hidāya al-islāmiyya*), headed by a member of the landowning Kaylanī family.[68] Muḥammad's uncle, Saʻīd al-Jābī, was at the forefront of anti-Sufi polemics with his attacks on the practices of the Islamic Guidance Society. During his studies of Islamic law in Hama and Aleppo, Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid developed affinities with the al-Khālidiyya branch through an influential *shaykh*, to the despair of al-Jābī. However, instead of taking part in these polemics, al-Ḥāmid helped found a society which aimed

at transcending Sufi and anti-Sufi reformism: the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was a product of the fusion in 1946 of many of these societies, especially the branches of the Muslim Youth, also referred to as *al-shubbān muḥammad*.[69] Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid, Muḥammad al-Mubārak, and Ma'rūf al-Dawālibī were the main figures behind this fusion. In addition to having participated into reformist societies like the Muslim Youth and Islamic Civilization, the first two went to study Islamic law at al-Azhar in Cairo in 1933. There, they met the exiled Syrian reformist Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khāṭīb and the leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Bannā.[70] We know very little about al-Sibā'ī and al-Ḥāmid's stay in Egypt. All we know is that shortly after they came back, they helped unite many local societies and founded the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. One important element of the Egyptian context is that al-Bannā had been interested in opening branches of the organization throughout the Muslim world since the early 1940s at least.[71] The new Syrian society can thus be seen as a national organization inspired by its Egyptian counterpart, but built on indigenous reformist societies.

'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn, the leader of the Brotherhood from 1975 to 1981, has an account of the Hama branch of the Brotherhood's formation in his memoirs.[72] His narrative illustrates the interaction between al-Bannā's organization and local Syrian societies. In late 1938, a group of influential *shuyūkh* from the city gathered to form an Islamic society which "would be responsible for carrying out the obligations of the *sharī'a*, preaching Islam, and enacting social reforms." When the time came to choose a name, they consulted al-Ḥāmid, who was in Egypt back then, and he suggested that they use *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* to mirror al-Bannā's society. The *shuyūkh* accepted, and al-Ḥāmid informed al-Bannā, who allegedly sent a letter congratulating them. Al-Ḥāmid was appointed guide (*murshid*) of the society since "he was tantamount to our spiritual father." At a conference in Yabroud in 1946, the sixth of its kind since 1936, the Hamawi Brotherhood joined societies from across the country to officially create the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.

According to Sa'd al-Dīn, members of the newly founded Syrian Brotherhood agreed that the society should have the following four goals: (1) liberate and unite the *umma* while preserving its faith by building a social, economic, and cultural organization upon Islamic foundations; (2) fight colonialism in all its forms; (3) cooperate with all members of the *umma*, irrespective of their schools, and disregard all attempts to create class divisions, which is to be considered as a destructive manoeuvre used for colonial purposes; (4) reform (*iṣlāḥ*) the state system, with a special attention to education, morality, the economy, agriculture, and manufacturing.[73] In addition to these principles, the leader (*al-muraqib al-'āmm*) of the society, al-Sibā'ī, spelled out the more precise objectives that would allow the society to reach

its four goals. The document outlining these objectives first explained that "Islam has all the ingredients for the desired renaissance (*al-nahḍa*), since it comes with a comprehensive method (*manhaj*) for reform." Al-Sibā'ī's plan suggested reforms at five different levels: the individual, the family, the society, the countries occupied by colonial powers, and then all Muslim communities, with a special attention to the Arab nation. These goals and objectives were similar in many ways to how al-Bannā had described the mission of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in his series *al-Risā'il al-Thalāth (The Three Treatises)*, a popular reading for new members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, as Ḥawwā attested.[74]

The founding members of the Brotherhood engaged in different kinds of political activities to further the goals and objectives of the society. Initially, al-Ḥāmid and al-Sibā'ī fought the French in Syria after WWII and planned to join the Arab Liberation Army in Palestine (only the latter went). However, al-Ḥāmid later settled in Hama to teach in mosques and schools, while other members participated in national politics in Damascus. Al-Sibā'ī, al-Mubārak and al-Dawālibī ran in 1947 for the League of 'Ulamā' (*rābiṭat al-'ulamā'*), opposing Shukrī al-Quwatlī and the National Bloc, and were elected to parliament.[75] The last two would later obtain seats in the first cabinet following Adīb al-Shīshaklī's coup in 1949. The Brotherhood also ran for seats in the constitutional assembly of November 1949 under the banner of the Islamic Socialist Front. Al-Sibā'ī played an important role in debates around the new constitution and initially pushed for an article recognizing Islam as the state religion (*dīn al-dawla*).[76] In early 1950, he argued that such article would not only be a rampart against the dangers of materialism and atheism to the Arab nation, but also that it was democratic that Syria did so because of its Muslim majority.[77] However, strong opposition convinced him to instead accept two other articles stipulating that the president's religion should be Islam and that "Islamic law shall be the main source (*al-maṣdar al-ra'īsī*) of law."

Focused on his study circles at the al-Sultan mosque in Hama and his teaching at the Ibn Rushd school, al-Ḥāmid left the Muslim Brotherhood in early 1950. Al-Shīshaklī had just overthrown the one-day old government headed by al-Dawālibī, and tensions between the government and the Brotherhood led to the imprisonment of many members, including al-Mubārak, al-Dawālibī, and al-Sibā'ī.[78] But more than repression, disagreements about substantive issues were at the source of al-Ḥāmid's decision. He seems to have been uneasy with the socialist orientation of the Brotherhood, to the point of writing a book responding to al-Sibā'ī's *The Socialism of Islam*.[79] Al-Ḥāmid also seemed to favour a greater role for Sufism in the Brotherhood, more than other founding members did. These two disagreements might have brought him closer to the influential Khālidiyya Islamic Guidance Society in Hama, whose leaders included members of the powerful landowning families who opposed socialism.

In addition to this political divergence of opinion, one can also speculate whether al-Ḥāmid agreed with the League of 'Ulamā' and rejected al-Sibā'ī's constitutional compromise.

Al-Ḥāmid's rejection of socialism, defence of Sufism, and probable agreement with the League of 'Ulamā', are all views Ḥawwā expressed in his memoirs. While there is not enough evidence to definitively conclude that he held these beliefs because of al-Ḥāmid, the specific ideological position he occupied at the time among reformists is rooted in al-Ḥāmid's own intellectual trajectory. After all, Ḥawwā himself describes al-Ḥāmid's study circles in the al-Sultan mosque as "the greatest influence in my life."[80] As he puts it, "I felt in my heart that I had a strong spiritual connection to him, to the point that I was prepared to sacrifice my own life." Moreover, throughout his studies with al-Ḥāmid, he developed a "deep love for Muslim jurists (*fuqahā'*) and *'ulamā'*." Ḥawwā's "adherence to the authority of the *sharī'a* and the texts was such that I broke off relationships with people I loved […] because they adopted deviant (*shādhdha*) views about the Messiah, peace be upon him, or about the Antichrist." This greater respect for traditional scholars of Islam, while far from an explicit rejection of the reformist belief in the need to transcend traditional authorities, might also have been at the source of a different approach to religious activism, to which we now turn.

2.3 A Young Activist Competing with the Socialists

In the summer of 1952, Ḥawwā visited *shaykh* Ibrāhīm al-Ghalāyīnī in a small village near Qatana in southern Syria, a few kilometres from the Lebanese border.[81] He had set out on this trip at the recommendation of *shaykh* Muḥammad al-Hāshimī. The latter was an important figure of the al-Darqāwiyya reformist order, known for his works on Ibn 'Arabī's theosophy and his anti-colonial activities, notably in the League of 'Ulamā'.[82] Ḥawwā trusted and valued al-Hāshimī's opinion because of his reputation as a scholar, but perhaps also because of his activism. After going from one village to another and asking locals about al-Ghalāyībī, he managed to find him in a small village only reachable by foot. In the course of a long discussion with al-Ghalāyīnī, the *shaykh* recommended that Ḥawwā live a pious life of isolation, probably like he himself did in this remote village. It is unclear how much Ḥawwā considered and reflected upon the *shaykh*'s advice. However, a few weeks later, he decided to join the Muslim Brotherhood, following instead the advice of Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid.

Ḥawwā's entrance in the Brotherhood marked the unexpected beginning of a very political life. The young student focused on reading philosophy books, novels, and religious treatises, uninterested in the fierce competition fought by political parties at his school, was soon to

organize demonstrations and rallies. Even more surprising is that he chose the Brotherhood, and not the Arab Socialist Party, which was very popular among poor families in ʻAliliyyat. Ḥawwā's father had contracted heavy debts, to the point that "I decided that we would not cook in our house any food purchased [at the market] until we paid our debts, and my father agreed."[83] In addition to selling vegetables at the market, Ḥawwā even took another job with local farmers to help his father. This situation put them under such financial stress that he confessed he still had a hard time borrowing money many years later. The poverty in which his family was living had convinced many in the neighbourhood who were in a similar situation to join the Arab Socialist Party, like his father and uncle.[84]

Ḥawwā describes his decision to join the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood as a "formidable transformation" (*inqilāb hā'il*).[85] He says it was "a kind of discovery of the collective ego (*al-anā al-jamāʻī*) in myself," which created "a turmoil in my heart, the first of its kind in my life." He had "determined that my destiny was towards God, and towards work for His sake; and that my fate was connected with those who work for the goal that Islam and the Islamic community play a leading role in the world." A striking feature of these descriptions of Ḥawwā's feelings is that they vividly convey a profound conviction that the time had come for action. He had found his direction (*wujhatī*), and his fate (*maṣīrī*) now required that he act (*ʻamal*). But far from abandoning his intellectual curiosity, Ḥawwā explains that this new situation "made my heart reflect upon the principles of faith, and I began to be immersed in contemplation and reflection night and day." One suspects that it is precisely his interest in studying and his respect for learned scholars which brought Ḥawwā to al-Ḥāmid's study circles, and then to the Brotherhood. Al-Ḥawrānī was not a learned scholar the way al-Ḥāmid, or even Michel ʻAflaq, was. Nonetheless, it is still not fully unclear why socialist study groups on campus did not appeal to Ḥawwā the way al-Ḥāmid's circles did.

In entering the Muslim Brothers, Ḥawwā was assigned Muṣṭafā al-Ṣayrifī as "official supervisor."[86] Al-Ṣayrifī was one of the most influential member of the Brotherhood in Hama. The others were ʻAbd al-Karīm ʻUthmān and ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn. The three gave lectures and speeches that displayed their "great experience in political and organizational thinking." Camps were also organized every year, featuring renowned figures of contemporary Islamic movements such as Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī, al-Bannā's successor, and even Abū al-Aʻlā al-Mawdūdī.[87] Ḥawwā and other members of the group learned about what the Brotherhood called "Islamic culture," and studied the Qur'an to memorize it as much as they could. It is at this stage of his life that were laid "the principles of the theory upon which I later developed my approach to Qur'anic exegesis." This new effervescent intellectual environment was one in which Ḥawwā was particularly at ease, and many noticed the oratory skills he displayed

in giving speeches at local mosques or during demonstrations. He rapidly rose in the ranks of the organization and gained more and more responsibilities. Starting as a member of a family (*usra*), he became leader (*naqīb*), and then representative (*nā'ib*) responsible for the Ibn Rushd school, to finally become the person responsible for all students in Hama.[88]

Early on, Ḥawwā and young members of the Brotherhood became "fascinated with the concept of jihad and weapons, but the leadership of the society in Hama was afraid of this direction."[89] Since he does not give further details about the concept of jihad, or about which books and authors he read, it is unclear exactly how Ḥawwā understood jihad at the time. Did he and his friends read al-Bannā's *Risālat al-Jihād (Treatise on Jihad)*? Did they meticulously study the Egyptian Brother Sayyīd Sābiq's famous legal work *Fiqh al-Sunna (Jurisprudence of the Sunna)*? In very different styles, both works relate the notion of jihad to the principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong. This principle has a long theological, judicial, and practical history that goes through centuries of debates and conversations about when and how individual Muslims are permitted to act in order to prevent evil from happening.[90] The application of the principle could take on different political meanings depending on the context. A good example are the campaigns against the admission of women in cinemas in the 1930s across many towns in Syria, including Hama, which both carried anti-colonial and patriarchal connotations.[91]

There is evidence that part of Ḥawwā's interest in jihad at this stage should be seen as a similar struggle to enforce a certain conception of morality. The small group of Brothers interested in jihad that he was part of undertook several campaigns of "obstructing singing and dancing parties, which had the effect of preserving Hama from dances and similar entertainments for a long period of time."[92] These actions were quickly interrupted by the leadership of the society, which did not wish to encourage such acts. However, Ḥawwā's fascination with weapons also went in a different direction. He and his friends "bought arms of various kinds, and started thinking about training and setting up camps for that purpose."[93] A member of the Egyptian special apparatus (*al-jihāz al-khāṣṣ*), an armed wing of the Brotherhood, who had settled in Hama gave them a basic military training and showed them how to properly use their weapons. One purpose of this training was quite obvious: "we clashed more than once with al-Ḥawrānī's group […] and I sometimes fired at them with my weapon." An example of such incident occurred in Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, a few kilometres north of Hama, when members of the Arab Socialist Party allegedly threw bottles of wine on the mosque where Sayf Ramaḍān was giving the Friday sermon. Ḥawwā and his friends rushed to the town with their weapons to fight back, but the perpetrators had left.

Armed confrontations between different political groups in the streets of Hama in the

1950s need to be understood in a context of growing political tensions. At the centre of many disputes were the vast inequalities perpetuated by the economic and political dominance of the powerful landlords. In June 1950, al-Ḥawrānī toured many villages around Hama to discuss with peasants, give speeches, and recruit members for his newly founded Arab Socialist Party.[94] He encouraged many to organize rent strikes, calling for political reforms to address economic inequalities. In this effervescent moment, some peasants drove away landowning families from their lands. Clashes ensued, and several were killed in the confrontations. When al-Ḥawrānī launched the campaign "The Land Belongs to the Peasants" the next year, strikes, demonstrations, and attempts to expels landowners spread in the farming lands to a level unseen before. Skirmishes also occurred in the cities of Hama and Aleppo in the summer of 1951. Hence, Ḥawwā's interest in weapons and training reflected one of the ways political struggles in the city were expressed and experienced at the time.

Ḥawwā's passionate engagement with the Brotherhood surprised many in 'Aliliyyat, his father first and foremost.[95] Members of the Arab Socialist Party were unhappy with the presence of the Brotherhood in the neighbourhood. Some went to Ḥawwā and asked him to leave the society, and instead "take part in the establishment of a religious wing (*janāḥ mutadayyīn*) within the party." Meetings with his father were organized to convince him to leave the Brotherhood. Ḥawwā's response was: "I will persist in looking for the truth, and I will not turn away from my conviction." This answer confirms the hypothesis that Ḥawwā's entry into the Brotherhood had been partly motivated by his intellectual curiosity. The whole episode illustrates how siding against the Arab Socialist Party in this neighbourhood was a choice of great significance. Ḥawwā recognizes that "were it not for their admiration for my father and my family, I would have been in great danger." The competition between the Brotherhood and al-Ḥawrānī's party extended way beyond the streets of 'Aliliyyat. Socialists were surprised to see the Brotherhood's increasing presence in Ibn Rushd threaten their control of student politics. According to Ḥawwā, by the fall of al-Shīshaklī in February 1954, Syrian Brothers were the strongest political force on campuses in Hama.

Reading the political landscape of the time, al-Ḥāmid conjectured that the control over one institution in particular should be at the centre the Muslim Brotherhood's rivalry with the Arab Socialist Party: the army.[96] In effect, the end of French colonialism had weakened the privileged position of urban notables in the state and opened new terrains where new players could engage in politics.[97] Key among these institutions where political competition was now possible were the growing bureaucracy and the army, especially after the three military coups of 1949.[98] The army was also seen by many, like al-Ḥawrānī, as an instrument to bring about much needed change in the country, especially after the defeat of Arab armies

in Palestine. Towards the end of the 1940s, he started encouraging some of his supporters to enter the army for that purpose.[99] In response, al-Ḥāmid urged members of the Brotherhood like Ḥawwā to also join the army. Al-Ḥāmid also suspected that 'Aflaq's Ba'th party had its eyes on the ministry of education. This is further indication that the competition between parties and the Brotherhood was fierce and multi-levelled in the mid-1950s.

It is nonetheless hard to precisely understand the points of tension between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Socialist Party in Hama. Weismann suggests that al-Ḥāmid supported the landowning elite, which would have placed him in a direct political conflict with al-Ḥawrānī.[100] But this issue is never mentioned in Ḥawwā's memoirs. It would also hardly make sense that Ḥawwā was a passionate defender of powerful landowners, given that he grew up, and still lived, in a very poor in environment. His memoirs sometimes suggest that questions around the proper place of religion in politics were the main area of contention with socialists. But this cannot be the sole reason, for secularism was neither at the centre of the Arab Socialist Party's program, nor of local politics in Hama more generally. After all, Ḥawwā was offered to start the religious wing of the party in the city. Moreover, Ḥawwā remarks that the Brotherhood was not successful at recruiting new members in the countryside, because of its lack of a competing "cultural, educational, organizational, or political ideology suited for the situation in Syria."[101] On the other hand, he notices that the mere competition with other parties on campus brought many new members. Hence, we should probably see this rivalry more as a political competition between social movements of different traditions and origins, and not as a deeply-rooted ideological conflict.

The historical significance of the competition between the Arab Socialist Party and the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama can be further appreciated by placing it in the context of Syria's recent independence from French colonialism. The burgeoning political landscape of the late mandate period acquired a new relevance after French troops left the country for good in 1946. Freed from interference by outside powers into domestic politics, the possibilities to directly shape the future of Syria were many, and so were the competing directions many Syrians wished their country would take. But the emergence of new political forces in an important historical moment also threatened the power and influence held by religious authorities, be they reformists or more traditional *'ulamā'*. In addition, for reformist societies like the Brotherhood, this context was an opportunity to further extend their influence into the liberated sphere of mass-politics, which played an increasingly important role in political life since the 1930s. As such, confrontations with the Arab Socialist Party were not merely disagreements over specific political issues, but a new competition for power between distinct traditions and social networks at a crucial historical moment. As a lawyer trained

in secular law who advocated for socialist politics, al-Ḥawrānī symbolized a very different future for Syria than did religious scholars who were developing political projects based on new interpretation of the *sharī'a*. Enforcing a conception of proper gender interactions was a way for Ḥawwā to affirm the power of the tradition to which he belonged.

In Ḥawwā's opinion, the lack of a strong program and a clear political strategy were significant weaknesses of the Brotherhood.[102] For example, during the elections of 1954 initiating Syria's democratic years, the leadership first decided to forbid its members from running as candidates.[103] This new approach to politics reflected in part the rise of Gamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir's popularity throughout the Arab world at the expense of the Muslim Brotherhood, following his escape from an assassination attempt on October 4th 1954 which was blamed on the society.[104] Not only did these events affect the support for the Syrian Brotherhood, but Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī, the Egyptian leader of the organization, recommended to al-Sibā'ī that they focus their activities on educational and charity work to preserve the organization from the unfavourable political climate.[105] Moreover, the ascent of Gamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir coincided with the Ba'th party's growing membership and increasing importance on the Syrian political scene, especially after its fusion with the Arab Socialist Party the year before. In this context, al-Mubārak and al-Dawālibī quit the Brotherhood to run for a seat in parliament. The society initially distanced itself from its former members, but then mobilized to help them win in the 1957 elections. This inconsistent approach illustrated for Ḥawwā a lack of clear political strategy. The Ba'thist Riyāḍ al-Mālikī's victory over al-Sibā'ī in the elections of 1957 was further evidence that something had to change within the Brotherhood.

Ḥawwā left local politics in Hama to go study at the Islamic law faculty of the University of Damascus in 1956.[106] The faculty been founded two years earlier by *'ulāma'* like al-Sibā'ī who wished to make autonomous the study of *sharī'a* from the increasingly secular law faculty.[107] Ḥawwā recalls that many of his professors asked them to "work for the defence of Islam in its [current] struggle against its opponents." This period of his life shared many continuities with his past in Hama. His financial situation was still difficult despite the money his father sent him and the teaching job he took in a small local school. He still took part in school politics by joining the university branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and competing with leftist groups on campus. Ḥawwā recounts an episode when he and his friends attended a meeting from a literary club run by leftist students on campus. One participant "delivered a poem in which he insulted the prophets [...] and the matter lead to a physical altercation." After everyone had returned to their seats, Ḥawwā asked if he could speak and was granted the opportunity to do so. With his great oratory skills, he improvised a "fiery speech" arguing that sacred matters should not be insulted. Immediately after the incident, he successfully

petitioned the administration to allow for the establishment of a competing club.

Overall, however, Ḥawwā's studies in Damascus marked the beginning of a retreat from politics. Debates about the Baghdad pact, the question of Arab neutrality, and foreign interferences were making national politics increasingly divided and unstable until the United Arab Republic was proclaimed on February 1st 1958.[108] Ḥawwā seemed more disillusioned than impassioned by the political intrigues of the time, from the assassination of ʻAdnān al-Mālikī in 1955, to the Iraqi conspiracy of 1956, and the American interventions of 1957, which he does not mention in his memoirs. After president Ṣabrī al-ʻAsalī banned student groups on campus, and after all political parties were banned in the leading up to the union, Ḥawwā retreated from the Brotherhood's activities and immersed himself more into Sufism.[109] He studied the Qur'an with shuyūkh in Damascus, most significantly ʻAbd al-Karīm al-Rifāʻī.[110] The latter led one of the emerging Naqshabandī movements which aimed at spreading Sufi teachings in mosques to fight the spread of secular ideas (*al-nahḍa al-ʻilmiyya*).[111] He was also the founder of the Zayd movement in Syria which aimed to provide a sound Islamic education to Syrians across the country.[112] Al-Rifāʻī left a profound impression on Ḥawwā, who saw him as leading a "movement for the renewal of Islam which had to gain a strong popular support." Ḥawwā followed his advice and ran Sufi circles in Damascus and Hama, with Muḥammad al-Hāshimī. He gathered with members of his student group to recite the *Qur'ān*, read books of Islamic law, discuss modern scientific works, and perform Sufi rituals of recollection (*ḥalqat al-dhikr*).[113]

Ḥawwā graduated shortly after the dissolution of the United Arab Republic.[114] When the United Arab Republic collapsed in 1961, he remembers the cheerful marches on the street and the delight of many Syrians at the prospect of recovering the freedoms severely restricted under Gamāl ʻAbd al-Nāṣir. Ḥawwā then obtained a teaching job in a school in the province of al-Hasaka. He spent his days teaching at school, giving lessons at a mosque in the evenings, and sometimes giving the Friday sermon. According to Ḥawwā, the poverty of Muslims in the province prevented them from engaging in any kind of activism, so he contented himself with his various teaching duties, and with his study and practice of Sufism. He then moved back to Hama to teach at a school which had many students from ʻIsmaʻili and ʻAlawi families. Ḥawwā observes that members of what he referred to as "minorities" tended to favour secularism and support secular parties like the Baʻth, the Syrian Social Nationalist, and the Communist party. He briefly explains that his religious classes led to some opposition on campus, but through discussion and debates, tensions were dissolved.

In January 1963, Ḥawwā started his compulsory military service of one year.[115] The portrait he makes of his experience is one of repeated conflicts with other colleagues in the

army and with his superiors. He describes his stay as "finding myself in a group of wolves, which stirred in me desires of provocation." When one of Ḥawwā's friend was surrounded by a hostile group from another dorm, Ḥawwā rushed to his defence, creating lasting tensions with other conscripts that had him summoned by the officer in charge of their group more than once. He was also scolded by an officer who was unhappy with the lack of discipline and organization in Ḥawwā's brigade. Ḥawwā systematically mentions the religion of the officers with whom he was in conflict and indirectly hints that the origins of the disputes were religious. One altercation he describes featured another conscript who, in his dispute with a *shaykh*, insulted all men with religious education. When Ḥawwā confronted him, the conscript responded "I did not mean you." Ḥawwā also mentions how the administration very reluctantly allowed Muslims to hold prayers in the courtyard. These moments were precious in allowing him to preach and reach out to fellow Muslim conscripts. His overall perception of the army was that it had a culture hostile to conscripts who wished to lead an observant and pious life. He suspects that behind this situation was a conscious policy to exclude Sunnis from the army, which seemed to also be al-Ḥāmid's opinion.

Ḥawwā's perceptions of the political preferences of minority communities and of the exclusionary environment of the army both hinted at wider changes in Syria that were about to profoundly transform the country. Reflecting upon the situation of Syria at the time, he describes the country as embroiled with disputes and divisions permeating through all its institutions.[116] "One of the manifestations of this situation was that the security forces could not even be bothered to protect parliamentary life under one single command." In this uncertain atmosphere, a group of officers carried a coup on March 8th 1963. The important figures behind the coup came from the same disenfranchised minority groups with secular leanings whom Ḥawwā had taught in al-Hasaka. They were also part of political circles in the army which worried al-Ḥāmid, and which Ḥawwā possibly encountered during his military service. More importantly, they were all active members in the political movements Ḥawwā had been competing against since the beginning of his political life.

2.4 The Great Strike of Hama

The coup of March 8th 1963 inaugurated the Ba'th regime in Syria. A group of young officers with links to the Ba'th party had convened in Egypt during the short-lived United Arab Republic to discuss their dissatisfaction with the Ba'th leadership's decision to push for the union. At the core of this Military Committee were Aḥmad al-Mīr, Muḥammad

'Umrān, Ṣalāḥ Jadīd, and Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad.[117] These officers were all part of the new salaried middle-class which had developed after independence. The economic boom of the 1950s had allowed the state to develop its bureaucracy, especially its education system and army, and a corresponding new social class emerged at the same time.[118] Members of minorities, in particular, benefited from these social changes because of the greater access to education.[119] The Ba'th party recruited many of these new students through its increasing popularity among local teachers.[120] These young Ba'th party members from the new salaried class, and often from ethnic minorities in rural areas, moved the party's discourse in a direction which openly advocated for the overthrowing of the older political order after the fall of the union.[121] The March 8th coup of was their chance to carry out their political project.

The officers of the Military Committee behind the coup rapidly set up the National Council of the Revolutionary Command as the supreme authority of the state, with the cabinet as its executive.[122] They quickly secured control of the military and the main state institutions. Tensions with Gamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir's supporters led to repression, purges in the military, and forced resignations of pro-Nāṣir members of the cabinet. Ba'thists from the Military Committee then took control of the Ba'th party. They did so by empowering an emerging Marxist wing of the party at the expense of the older elite during the Sixth National Congress in September. Their vision of the Ba'th party was outlined in the resolutions the congress adopted and in a document titled *Ba'ḍ al-Munṭalaqāt al-Naẓariyya li-Ḥizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī (Some Theoretical Premises of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party)*. More concerned with articulating a new economic understanding of socialism, the two documents said little about how the state should deal with religious matters. The latter only mentioned that under this new kind of socialism, "the education of citizens will be a socialist and scientific education, liberating them from all structures inherited social traditions, and underdevelopment (*muta'akhkhira*), in order to create a new Arab man with an open-minded scientific reason who appreciates socialist dispositions (*ikhlāq*) and believes in collective values."[123]

Some scholars have read *Ba'ḍ al-Munṭalaqāt al-Naẓariyya* as asserting a strong secularist project in continuation with the Ba'th's ideology.[124] They also suggest that it illustrated the source of the conflict with the Brotherhood that was soon to come. In effect, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood looked at the emerging Ba'th regime with suspicion. However, they seem to have been initially more concerned with its authoritarian tendencies than with its secularism. 'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār, who had replaced al-Sibā'ī as leader of the Brotherhood in 1961, spoke against the direction taken by the Ba'th regime as the party's Sixth Conference was ongoing.[125] His impassioned Friday sermons at the mosque of the Islamic Law faculty

of the Damascus University attracted vast crowds and new members for the Brotherhood from the late 1950s onwards.[126] In a speech against the new Ba'th regime, al-'Aṭṭār recalls arguing that "the only system which would protect our country is a democratic one [...] while dictatorships cause harm in all their facets."[127] He added that "past tyrants (*ṭughā*) fell one after the others under our feet [...] new tyrants will end up where older ones went." Demonstrations and clashes with security forces are said to have ensued after his sermon.

A strong belief in democracy is also recurrent in the sections of Ḥawwā's memoirs about this time period.[128] Ḥawwā claims that elections were favourable to Islamist parties since they shared the values of the population. In effect, following the fall of the United Arab Republic, al-'Aṭṭār and nine other members of an Islamic coalition won seats in parliament.[129] 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn shared similar worries about the absence of democracy following the 1963 coup. He describes the political landscape after the coup as "proving grounds for military adventurers."[130] In the first weeks after the coup, he was preoccupied with the suspension of the constitution in the name of a national emergency and the purges in the army. Increasingly worried, Sa'd al-Dīn asked to meet an officer he knew from elementary school in Hama who had just been nominated for a position in the *mukhābarāt*. The officer asked Sa'd al-Dīn and the two other Brothers attending for their help to lift the current ban on political parties. The best way to do so, he said, was to stage a large demonstration in the streets of the city. When Sa'd al-Dīn asked him what slogans they should chant, the officer responded "Liberty, Unity, and Socialism," the slogan of the Ba'th. This was further confirmation for him of the increasing authoritarian direction of the new regime.

Ḥawwā remembers that everyone in Hama was displeased with the new Ba'th regime.[131] Religiously observant Hawamis (*al-mutadayyinūn*) "considered the regime's [ideas] to be deeply-rooted in secularism." Rumours were spreading that the Ba'th regime was considering banning religious courses from public school education. The events that followed in April 1964 would shock local residents, leave an indelible mark in the minds of the Brothers who witnessed them, and see the rise of an iconic Muslim leader from the city. They would later become a key moment in the narratives crafted by the rebels who would make speeches all around the country to argue for the necessity of an Islamic revolution in Syria.

There are many versions of the sequence of events leading to the confrontation between the army and local activists in Hama. The *Chronology of Arab Politics*, a series of books summarizing political events in Arab countries from local newspapers collected on a daily basis, provides a useful point of reference.[132] On April 5th, a student from the 'Uthmān al-Ḥawrānī high school was sentenced to one year in prison for challenging the statement of one of his professors. Ḥawwā adds that the student allegedly wrote slogans against the

main figures behind the Ba'th regime on the board.[133] He also explains that several religious schools in the city had been vandalized by supporters of the regime, and that *shaykh* 'Abd al-Karīm al-Rifā'ī had been assaulted. The day after, newspapers reported that students from the al-Ḥawrānī high school threatened to strike if their fellow-student was not released.

Protests spread from the school to mosques. On Friday the 10th, newspapers also reported that imams across the town had given sermons arguing that "the Ba'th was leading the masses against imperialist pacts, dictatorship, and the secessionist bourgeoisie." Ḥawwā describes the atmosphere in the city as like a "volcano about to explode." He recounts that local members of the Brotherhood sought to obtain permission from the leadership to participate and help organize the movement against the new Ba'th regime. Students decided that a large demonstration would be held the day after. The governor of Hama called the army to intervene in the city, fearing the situation could degenerate. In Ḥawwā's version, the army came into the city shouting slogans against Islam and the Prophet, which was "one of the manifestations of the new ruling party in Syria." In the protest and clashes with security forces that ensued, he reports that one student was killed by a solider who fired at him. Local newspapers corroborated this event. On Sunday the 12th, a city-wide strike was organized to protest against the actions of the security forces. In this highly charged atmosphere, one group of students headed to the great al-Sultan mosque, where *shaykh* al-Ḥāmid usually gave his lessons. Using the mosque's speakers, one of them made a passionate speech against the Ba'th regime and its attempt to cancel religious classes. Hundreds of Hamawis gathered in the square to listen to the speech, cheering against the regime and supporting the students. The man speaking from the mosque's minaret was Marwān Ḥadīd.

We know very little about Ḥadīd's personal history. Important details about his life in academic publications are false or misleading. The secrecy surrounding his activities and the legendary status he reached after his death partly explain this situation. For example, Umar Faruk Abd-Allah is taken by many scholars as an important source of information about Ḥadīd since he interviewed many Syrian rebels during the revolt.[134] He explains that Ḥadīd was born in a modest family in Hama and attended al-Ḥāmid's circles, before going to Egypt to study engineering. 'Abd-Allah's claim, repeated by other scholars, that Ḥadīd became a close friend of the Egyptian Brother Sayyīd Quṭb, who was a famous Islamic intellectual by then, is most certainly false. This allegation is important, because it is often presented as a key moment in narratives of Ḥadīd as a devoted follower of Quṭb's revolutionary writings. But Quṭb was in prison between January 1955 and May 1964, and very few people could visit him. In his biography of Quṭb, John Calvert speculates that the two met right after Quṭb was released, which is also implausible given that Ḥadīd was himself in prison around the

same time.[135] Batatu suggests instead that Ḥadīd encountered supporters of Quṭb in Cairo and was attracted to their ideas. While this hypothesis is more plausible, claims of Quṭb's influence on Hadīd before the strike in Hama should be taken with caution, especially since Quṭb's famous work *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq (Milestones)* was published after the events.

The little-known work of an Egyptian journalist sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, Jābir Rizq, presents Ḥadīd's involvement with the Brotherhood as pre-dating his trip to Egypt.[136] However, Sa'd al-Dīn heavily criticized Rizq's book for fabricating the details of Ḥadīd's first years in the organization.[137] Sa'd al-Dīn is a more trustworthy source on this subject since, at the time, he was in charge of introducing new members like Ḥadīd to the organization, something Ḥawwā confirms in his memoirs. Sa'd al-Dīn explains that Ḥadīd was recommended to him by *shaykh* 'Adnān al-Za'īm, despite the fact that, like Ḥawwā, Ḥadīd came from a family of supporters of Akram al-Ḥawrānī. In 1950, Ḥadīd joined one of the first small group (*usra*) of young Brothers who provided a model for how new members would be integrated into the organization. They held study sessions of al-Bannā's texts, organized long outdoor expeditions, fasted together, and raised money to help some of them study abroad. According to Sa'd al-Dīn, when Ḥadīd was in Egypt studying agriculture, he was struck not by Quṭb's supporters, but by Gamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣr's brutal repression of the Brotherhood.[138] The suffering of Egyptian Brothers affected him deeply, and he allegedly started worrying that a similar fate awaited their Syrian counterparts.

When he headed a group of students who occupied the al-Sultan mosque on April 12th 1964, Ḥadīd must have seen himself as resisting a regime that could potentially imprison and torture hundreds of his comrades. For many Hamawis, this was a spectacular endeavour that symbolized the opposition of Sunni organizations to the regime. However, as Ḥawwā recounts, the political mobilization at the time extended way beyond Ḥadīd's group.[139] Meetings were held in the mosques and houses all around the city. The regime arrested two *shuyūkh* and negotiated their release with the *'ulamā'*, asking in exchange that they issue statements demanding the end of Ḥadīd's occupation of the mosque. Newspapers reported that the general and president Amīn Ḥāfiẓ came to Hama, and offered to release the student jailed for opposing the Ba'th in class and to give compensations for the families of students killed on the 11th.[140] But Ḥawwā and other protestors gathered in the house of a man named 'Uthmān al-Amīn, where they took the decision to reject the regime's attempts to negotiate and break the opposition. Ḥawwā suggested that the residents of Hama make a pact that "the city would stand united behind any individual, regardless of their political or religious orientations, in case they were attacked." Local committees were established in every neighbourhood to ensure that despite the strike and the city being surrounded by the army, residents had

enough food to eat. Ḥawwā was elected as the head of a delegation who would negotiate with other political factions to strengthen the strike, including with al-Ḥawrānī's followers.

Ḥawwā woke up on April 13th at al-Amīn's house where he had spent the night.[141] In his own words, the house had become the equivalent of an "operation room" for the strike movement. News came to Ḥawwā that the road between Damascus and Aleppo had been completely shut down. The organizers of the strike were angry because they hoped that the movement would spread to other cities. Later during the day, more worrying news came. The army had exchange fire with protestors throughout the city, most violently with Ḥadīd's group at the al-Sultan mosque. As more news reached al-Amīn's house, the situation looked even more grim. Radio Damascus confirmed the worst: after fierce resistance against the army by Ḥadīd and the students, tanks had shelled the al-Sultan mosque. Its minaret had been severely damaged, with many students inside. According to local medias, between 50 and 65 of them died when the mosque collapsed. Sa'd al-Dīn writes that local residents around the area attacked the soldiers in response and skirmishes lasted throughout the night.[142] For many Hamawis, the symbolism was hard to miss: the last army to attack protestors in the city centre was the French army in the final moments of the mandate in 1946. The survivors were arrested and sent to a prison in Homs, and then transferred to Palmyra.

Ḥawwā heard on the radio that the regime was looking for those involved in the protests and confiscating their properties.[143] The announcer also read a list of names of people suspected of having collaborated with the students in the al-Sultan mosque. His name was among them, as was probably those of most people in al-Amīn's house. One of them suggested that they go to Iraq to get more weapons and munitions to fight. Al-Amīn suggested to the others that they should remain and continue the strike in Hama. Doing otherwise, he said, would be to act like cowards fleeing a fight. Ḥawwā was conflicted at first. For, he said, "I did not represent only myself in this situation, but also the Muslim Brotherhood." In the end, he decided to stay in al-Amīn's house, with the others, citing a desire to pursue the fight and possibly become a martyr (*istishhād*). What this last remark precisely meant, and how much it captured how Ḥawwā envisaged his opposition to the regime is something impossible to know. However, he and the others were acutely aware of the danger of what they were doing. They agreed to keep hiding and made a schedule for guarding the house.

On April 14th, the atmosphere in Hama was strangely calm. The Ministry of Information sent a declaration explaining that "all feudalist criminals responsible for this rebellion have been arrested and are to be convicted before a military tribunal, charged with conspiring against the state and its socialist principles and with conniving with imperialism."[144] Negotiations between the regime and influential figures from the city, including *shaykh* al-Ḥāmid,

had been launched to prevent further escalation. But the confrontation was not over. Ḥawwā and others who had been at al-Amīn convened a meeting to decide what to do next.[145] They agreed on a plan: "We would travel to Iraq, seize the opportunity of this more quiet situation, […] and bring back weapons and munitions to the people in case they were forced into a similar confrontation." The destruction of the al-Sultan mosque and the death of so many students was clearly still a shock to them. It is likely that Ḥawwā did not know if Ḥadīd and other members of the Brotherhood he had befriended had survived. It had now become urgent to amass weapons and prepare for self-defence against a regime that did not hesitate to shell religious sites and kill large numbers of its civilians.

Ḥawwā left Hama with four other Hamawis: Fu'ād al-Aswad, 'Uthmān al-Amīn, Ḥājj Aḥmad al-Amīn and Hārūn Khiṭāb. A Christian family of the city agreed to let them use their Land Rover for their trip, thus "connecting their fate to the faith of Muslims forever."[146] They drove to the desert with a few old riffles and some munitions. They spent one night with a Bedouin tribal whose leader welcomed them and slaughtered a sheep for dinner. With the help of a commercial truck from Hama traveling to Iraq, they reached the border. The Iraqi authorities were apparently already aware of what had happened in Hama a few days earlier, and they sympathized with their plan. They were even received by someone from the security services in Baghdad to discuss possible arm transfers and military operations at the border. However, quickly, governmental officials informed Ḥawwā's group that they would not provide them with any help. After forty days in Iraq, the group moved to Jordan to look for support, but in vain. One day, they heard on the radio a telegram written by *shaykh* al-Ḥāmid thanking government officials for the release of prisoners and the permission to return to Syria for those who had left after the events in Hama.[147] They made their way back to the city, where the strike had ended after fifty days of opposition to the regime.

Ḥawwā returned to his teaching life in Hama, almost as if nothing had happened. But beneath the surface, something fundamental had changed. Ḥawwā noticed that the movement in Hama had accomplished some of its goals: preserving religious education in schools, stopping the removal of religious endowments, increasing the consideration for Islam in the government. But somehow, he felt that something more profound had change. The seeds of a deeper conflict had been planted. Marwān Ḥadīd had miraculously survived. He was in prison in Palmyra awaiting his trial with others who had joined him at the al-Sultan mosque. Among them was Sa'd al-Dīn's brother, who told him after his release about the horrific treatment they suffered: prisoners were beaten with electric cables, prevented from washing themselves, fed only snacks, and refused medical treatment.[148] As their military trials were about to start, the regime chose to hold them in public. This decision gave to

Ḥadīd a platform unhoped for. Ḥawwā remembers that his interrogation ignited passions in Hama.[149] Parts of it can be found in 'Azzām's work and Sa'd al-Dīn's memoirs.[150]

The Minister of Defence, Muṣṭafā Ṭalas, who had directed the military operations in Hama and conducted the trials, asked Ḥadīd: "Why did you collect weapons and revolted against the state?" Ḥadīd responded: "There is a Nusayri (derogatory term for 'Alawi) dog whose name is Salāḥ Jadīd, and there is another dog related to the people of the Sunna whose name is Muṣṭafā Ṭalas, and they both want to eradicate Islam in this country; but we refused this, and we will fight for Islam as long as we are alive!" As security guards rushed to seize Ḥadīd and escort him away from the journalists witnessing the scene, Ṭalas accused him of being the agent of a foreign government. The regime had been using this tactic to delegitimize the protest movement in Hama since the early days of the strike.[151] Ḥadīd threw back at him: "The real agents are known, and at the forefront of them is your party leader Michel 'Aflaq, who received money from 'Abd al-Nāṣir, as stated in the talks in Cairo!" The trial resumed, and Ḥadīd was seen several times smiling, laughing and mocking the officials conducting it. When one of them threatened him with a death sentence, he responded: "If I knew that you owned my death and my life, I would serve you; but you cannot be certain of that, and perhaps you might even die before me?"

Ḥadīd's sectarian language undoubtedly shocked many Syrians, including those who protested in Hama. There is little evidence that many protestors opposed the new Ba'th regime because they thought that it was governed by Syrians from religious minorities. The process by which the reins of power became increasingly dominated by 'Alawis was noticeable to Syrians mostly after the 1966 coup, which excluded once and for all the old guard of the Ba'th party from the regime. It is true that both Ḥawwā and Sa'd al-Dīn refer to the Ba'th regime of this period as sectarian (*ṭā'ifī*), or ruled by minorities (*aqalliyyāt*). Ḥawwā's memoirs show that he perceived the Ba'th even before its rise to power as a party popular in minority communities. But nothing in their memoirs suggest that the strong presence of minorities in the regime was one of the main reason behind the protests and strike of April 1964. Besides, accusations that the young Ba'th regime was sectarian or dominated by 'Alawi could very well reflect the rhetoric of the 1970s projected into the early years of the regime. This rhetoric, and the violent sectarian language used by Ḥadīd, would be most visible in the rebel group he would found in 1973: the Fighting Vanguard (*al-ṭalī'a al-muqātila*).

As for Ḥawwā, genuine concerns about authoritarianism and fears about secularism seem to have been at the heart of his opposition to the new Ba'th regime. Ḥawwā perceived the regime this way because of its repression of dissidents, especially Nasserites, and because of rumours about the secularization of education. But his perception was also shaped by the

intellectual traditions he joined after meeting al-Ḥāmid. Ḥawwā was deeply worried by the rumours about the end religious classes because Sufism, study circles, and teaching Islam were so central to his life. Moreover, the Ba'th regime's authoritarianism threatened in the most powerful way the religious authorities he had spent his life defending. Once immersed in the society, Ḥawwā spent many years competing at school and in the streets of Hama with people now at the centre of the state. For him and for other Hamawis, it was normal to relate their activism with armed skirmishes, which is probably why some brought weapons to the demonstrations and the al-Sultan mosque during the strike. However, this time, they did not face zealous young socialists with old rifles, but tanks and automatic weapons of a modern army. The death of more than fifty activists was bound to shock the city and transform the ways in which activists like Ḥawwā approached politics. The break that the events of April 1964 represented was made even more pronounced by 'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār's complete disavowal of the protest movement in Hama. Ḥawwā's understanding of Syrian politics and relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood were to be fundamentally rethought in the years to follow.

Chapter 3

A Program for an Islamic State

3.1 The Exile in Saudi Arabia

Ḥawwā and others who had witnessed the events of Hama in April 1964 were shocked by the violence deployed by the regime to crush the strike movement. He remembers that "we spent the years [following these events] living on our nerves [...] and in constant fear."[1] No day would pass without it crossing their minds that they might see the regime's security forces storming their house, workplace, or even mosque, in order to arrest them. One day, after teaching at a local high school, a car pulled over next to Ḥawwā and the driver asked him to get in the car. The man introduced himself as the head of the *mukhābarāt* in Hama. He drove Ḥawwā to his office in the city. After waiting for several hours, the man informed Ḥawwā that he was wanted at the headquarters in Damascus. As they set out to reach the capital, rain started pouring and the car stopped running. Not knowing if the weather had affected the car's engine or the driver's willingness to make the long journey from Hama to Damascus, Ḥawwā was driven back to Hama. When he reached the city, people gathered around the car, anxious about what had happened to him. Among them was Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid, with whom he later speculated about the motives behind the *mukhābarāt*'s actions. Al-Ḥāmid suspected that they intended to send Ḥawwā a message: that he should stop teaching lessons at the local al-Mas'ud mosque, which he had started doing after the strike.

After the events of Hama and similar protests in Homs and Aleppo, the Ba'th regime attempted to imprison, intimidate, and force into exile several leading figures of the different opposition movements. In Hama, security forces targeted the leader of the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uthmān. 'Uthmān's father, Maḥmūd, was an influential *'ālim* in the city and a close friend of Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid.[2] He was part of

the group of *'ulamā'* who founded the Muslim Brotherhood of Hama in 1938. Maḥmūd's important status within the Brotherhood can be gauge by his special relationship with the Egyptian leader Ḥasan al-Bannā, with whom he corresponded until his death. His son, 'Abd al-Karīm, followed his father's steps and participated in the society's activities from his early age. In 1947, the leadership of the Brotherhood in Hama suggested that he go study at Fu'ad University in Cairo, where he also allegedly befriended Ḥasan al-Bannā. After completing his degree in literature, he taught philosophy in various schools of northern Syria and became close to leading figures of the Brotherhood in Hama, including 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn. 'Abd al-Karīm's erudition and intellectual skills attracted the attention of the society's leader, Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, who appointed him to a select group of Brothers carrying out his orders while he was exiled in Lebanon. 'Abd al-Karīm went back to Egypt for his graduate studies and was active in Islamic intellectual circles. When he became leader of the Hama branch after the strike, he was a recognized intellectual authority in the Brotherhood, which probably explains why the regime forced him into exile in Saudi Arabia.

Before 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uthmān left, he delegated to Ḥawwā his responsibilities in the Hama branch of the society.[3] The trust 'Uthmān placed in Ḥawwā and the status the latter subsequently acquired in the Brotherhood illustrate an important dynamic within the organization. Whereas many of its important members came from influential religious families in Hama like the 'Uthmān and al-Ḥāmid, status and reputation within the organization were on a merit basis, and did not require a pre-existing social standing. The comparison between 'Abd al-Karīm's father, an influential *'ālim* and teacher who founded the society and had connections to al-Bannā, and Ḥawwā's, a poor trader involved with the Arab Socialist Party, illustrates this reality quite well. The egalitarian environment within the Brotherhood was a distinct characteristic of the organization from its inception in the 1930s in Egypt.[4]

With his new status, Ḥawwā participated in the elaboration of the Brotherhood's program (*minhāj*).[5] He explains that, for a long time, the leadership had been disagreeing about whether this program should be a general plan for action, a detailed outline of its implementation in the current political context, or a cultural, educational, and moral syllabus for new members in the organization. Ḥawwā wrote a short proposal of about twenty pages which captured all three orientations, and circulated the document among influent members. We do not know what the program he wrote said. However, it allegedly produced such a good impression that senior members in Damascus invited him to a meeting with the Consultative Assembly.[6] After the meeting, Ḥawwā was tasked with spelling out the details of this new program. His appointment created some opposition within the organization, in part because of the competing visions for the society. Notably, 'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār, the Brotherhood's new

leader, had sent his own plan from Beirut, where he was exiled since the protests in Hama.

Ultimately, the Ba'th regime placed the Brotherhood under such pressure that it had little time to seriously engage in drafting a new program. Many in the organization saw the 1966 internal Ba'thist coup as a consolidation of the regime's authoritarian and exclusive nature. Tensions between the camps of Amīn al-Ḥāfiẓ and Ṣalāḥ Jadīd led to a direct confrontation in the streets of Damascus on February 23rd 1966.[7] After his victory, Jadīd accelerated the process of appointing Syrians loyal to him in the army, the party, and the government to strengthen his hand on the state. This led to an increased 'Alawi representation and Sunni marginalization in the regime's main institutions.[8] For Ḥawwā, this episode marked the beginning of a government ruled by minorities (*aqalliyāt*).[9] Jadīd displayed even less restraint in his use of repression to silence civilian opposition to the regime. In Hama, where military forces close to al-Ḥāfiẓ were stationed, residents feared that clashes would ensue if officers refused to recognize the coup. In this uncertain context, many considered arming themselves for self-protection. The Brotherhood had already declined president 'Abd al-Nāṣir's offer to send weapons after the events of April 1964 in Hama.[10] After Jadīd's coup, Uthmān al-Amīn, with whom Ḥawwā had traveled to Iraq to obtain weapons, suggested that they make arms available in the city to every resident who wished to defend themselves.

In all likelihood, the repression two years prior had made many in Hama reluctant to engage in protests and acts of resistance against the regime. People close to al-Amīn turned down his offer to distribute arms to local residents.[11] The local branch of the Brotherhood and many *'ulamā'* in the city preferred instead to focus on the society's historical activities: teaching and preaching. They organized schools and seminaries for young Hamawis of all ages and genders. In Ḥawwā's opinion, the lessons were so popular that they signalled the emergence of a new generation of pious Hamawis. Whether this was true or not, the schools attracted the attention of the regime, who decided to force many of its teachers to move outside of Hama, probably by appointing them to teaching positions in public schools in other provinces. In addition to dismantling these networks in Hama, the regime increased the pressure on its opponents. Most dramatically, Ḥawwā interpreted al-Amīn's death after these events as a targeted assassination by regime security forces.

In this context of increased repression and surveillance, one of Ḥawwā's friends suggested to him that he travel to Saudi Arabia for some time, as 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uthmān had done.[12] Ḥawwā explains that since his name was associated with the events of April 1964, he was afraid that the new regime of Ṣalāḥ Jadīd would consolidate its power by imprisoning or even assassinating potential opponents. The Ministry of Education approved his request to study and teach abroad, perhaps because the regime saw an opportunity to get rid of an

activist for a few years. Interestingly, Ḥawwā also felt the need to consult the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama. They accepted his proposal on the basis that it gave him a chance to study and complete the program he had been commissioned to write. A few days later, he left for Saudi Arabia with other Hamawis fleeing the difficult political context.

Many Muslim activists from all around the Islamic world had moved to Saudi Arabia fleeing repression in their home country.[13] The first wave came from Egypt after ʻAbd al-Nāṣir's rise to power in 1954. His repression of the Muslim Brotherhood extended to Syria during the United Arab Republic, and some sought refuge accordingly in the Saudi kingdom. Tensions at the international level brought these exiled intellectuals to the forefront of the development of the Saudi state. The kingdom's acceptance of the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957, the policy of offering economic and military aid to Arab countries willing to acknowledge the threat of communism, strained its relations with Egypt, who rightly saw it as a means to counter its own foreign policy.[14] The military intervention of Egypt to support the Yemeni revolutionaries behind the September 26$^{\text{th}}$ 1962 coup extended ʻAbd al-Nāṣir and prince Fayṣal's rivalry to opposite sides of a long civil war.[15] Fayṣal, who became king in 1964, developed a new vision for the development of Saudi Arabia with the goal of increasing the power and influence of the country to counter the standing and popularity of ʻAbd al-Nāṣir in the Arab world.[16] King Fayṣal's project included the creation of radio and television stations, the inauguration of the World Muslim League, and the establishment of the Islamic University of Medina. Exiled Muslim Brothers were placed at the centre of these new initiatives to challenge the ideological ascendancy of ʻAbd al-Nāṣir's Arab nationalism.

Ḥawwā reached Saudi Arabia in 1966 when Fayṣal's modernization plan for the state was being implemented. He himself remarks that "[the country] was full of surprises, and I was hoping that Saudi Arabia would not go through such big changes, because I believed that they would bring Mecca, Medina, and the land of Arabs into uncharted and dangerous territories."[17] Due to the prominent role leaders from the Muslim Brotherhood played in the development of the Saudi education system, Ḥawwā found himself in the midst of a rich and effervescent intellectual environment. Muslim Brothers were a majority at the King ʻAbd al-Azīz University in Jeddah and Mecca, including Muḥammad al-Mubārak, one of the founders of the Syrian Brotherhood.[18] Important Egyptian Brothers also taught at this university, such as Muḥammad al-Quṭb, the brother of Sayyīd; Sayyīd Sābiq, the author of the famous legal work *Fiqh al-Sunna*; and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī. At Muḥammad bin Saʻūd University in Riyadh were ʻAbd al-Fatāḥ Abū Ghudda and Muḥammad Abū al-Fatḥ al-Bayānūnī, two Syrian Brothers. These scholars undoubtedly enjoyed a status as intellectuals which Ḥawwā did not have, since he had not written any treatise yet and had no teaching

experience in universities. Like other members of lower stature in the organization, he instead taught at religious high schools (*ma'āhid 'ilmiyya*) in Hofuf and Medina.[19]

Ḥawwā says very little in his memoirs about his stay in Saudi Arabia. He mentions that he gave guest lectures in universities and for various religious associations.[20] He claims that he sent some suggestions for the development of the country to King Fayṣal, where they were received positively. Some of Ḥawwā's writings were cited in the first university textbooks of the kingdom.[21] But other than that, his memoirs say nothing about his activities or about the people he met. When he wrote that "in five years in Saudi Arabia, many things happened," he was looking at national politics in Syria and internal divisions within the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. He seemed impressed by the capacity of Israelis "to unite [under a system] in between democracy and some kind of socialism," and despite a large number of parties and associations in the country, develop technologically, scientifically, and militarily to defeat Arab armies in 1967. He also discusses the November 13th 1970 coup which brought Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad to power with his Corrective Movement.

The quiet and perhaps lonely life Ḥawwā led with his children and young kids in Saudi Arabia, as depicted in his memoirs, hides one of the most important developments of his life as an Islamic intellectual: the publication of his first books about Islam. These voluminous works were more than the simple fulfilment of his assignment to write the program of the Brotherhood. They represented the crystallization of his understanding of the world and of his vision for the future. They were written in a stimulating intellectual environment, to which Ḥawwā was receptive and in which he might have taken part at times. More importantly, while these books were written in Saudi Arabia, his heart and mind were most certainly in Syria. It is against the background of his involvement in the Muslim Brotherhood and of the rise of the authoritarian Ba'th regime, symbolized by its brutal repression in April 1964 of the strike movement in Hama, that we now turn to Ḥawwā's intellectual production.

3.2 Islam as a Comprehensive and Universal System

The books Ḥawwā wrote while he was in Saudi Arabia form a coherent whole, where the ideas and arguments of each one build upon those of the books preceding. He divided them into two series. The first one is *Silsilat al-Uṣūl al-Thalātha (The Series of the Three Foundations)* and contains the following works in this order: *Allāh Jalla Jalāluhu (God, Exalted be He)*; *al-Rasūl Ṣallā Allāh 'alayhi wa-Salam (The Prophet, Peace be Upon Him)*; *al-Islām (Islam).* The second one is *Jund Allāh (Army of God)* and is also made of three works: *Jund Allāh:*

Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics); *Jund Allāh: Tanẓīman (Army of God: Organization)*; *Jund Allāh: Takhṭīṭan (Army of God: Planning)*. The first book of *Jund Allāh* was published after his return to Syria and became a popular reading widely shared in Syria and in other Islamic circles outside the country. It was most notably distributed in mosques around Hama during the years leading up to the revolt in February 1982.[22] It was also the heart of the political vision which Ḥawwā further articulated in 1979 in his *Min Ajl Khuṭwa ilā al-Amām ʻalā Ṭarīq al-Jihād al-Mubārak (For the Sake of a Step Forward on the Path Towards the Blessed Jihad)*. As we will see in the next chapter, some ideas of *Jund Allāh* shaped the perspective of many who revolted against the Asad regime at the time.[23]

Understandably, more than *Silsilat al-Uṣūl al-Thalātha*, *Jund Allāh* has attracted the attention of scholars of modern Islamic movements.[24] However, the few who took Ḥawwā's writings seriously have unfortunately ignored the crucial and systematic aspect of his work. To uncover the role Ḥawwā's writings played in the Hama revolt, one cannot simply read the first book of *Jund Allāh* in isolation, since he explicitly meant it as a continuation of *Silsilat al-Uṣūl al-Thalātha*. In his own words, the latter was a construction (*al-binā'*) upon which the former was built.[25] He even refers to the former in the latter, and vice versa. The analysis of his intellectual production below will accordingly first attempt to understand the overarching project Ḥawwā lays out in the first books of his series, before assessing the significance of *Jund Allāh*.

In the first book of *Silsilat al-Uṣūl al-Thalātha*, Ḥawwā explains that, "I wanted to specify the three principles which Muslims are required to know and believe if they are to be Muslims at all."[26] He claims that, contrary to many who wrote about this topic before, he had set himself the task to write "a comprehensive research of these foundations" and not merely discuss some of their aspects in isolation. The three foundations Ḥawwā identifies are reflected in the titles of his books: God, the prophet, and Islam. The first two books take a more argumentative approach. They contain "long discussions […] debating, justifying, demonstrating, and persuading [the reader] based on the voice of reason, in order to address all their doubts and suspicions." Ḥawwā clearly exhibits a concern for skeptical readers in his audience, perhaps in response to polemical discussions he had in Syria. The last book is more explanatory, "for once the reader has been convinced of the existence of God and His prophet, there is nothing left for him but submitting to his religion and the *sharīʻa*."

Ḥawwā's treatment of the divine nature of God in his book *Allāh* is striking by the traditional issues it concerns itself with, and by the central role it attributes to reason. In outlining the structure of the book, he says that it "first determines the way to reach rational knowledge (*al-maʻrifa al-ʻaqliyya*); then, it builds this knowledge by means of evidence,

before reaching knowledge of God's attributes and names by means of reason; and, finally, it proves that what reason has arrived to is what true revelation (*al-waḥī al-ṣaḥīḥ*) has revealed."[27] The starting point of Ḥawwā's argument for God's existence is the premise that each individual can be acquainted with the "divine being" (*al-dhāt al-ilahiyya*). The existence of God is inferred by applying the law of causation (*qānūn al-sababiyya*), since "this principle is the foundation upon which rational faith and rational knowledge of God are based." The prominent role of reason in Ḥawwā's theology confirms for believers the rationality of their faith. For skeptics, Ḥawwā shows that rational deliberation leads to the exact same place as God's revelation. The overall structure of *Allāh* and *al-Rasūl*, in which important claims are defended by arguments before serving themselves as a basis for further conclusions, reflects his attempt to convince readers of the truth of Islam by portraying it as a rational religion.

Ḥawwā's voluminous *al-Islām*, of more than 800 pages, outlines his understanding of the more concrete aspects of the religion brought by God and His prophet. The book is not meant as a typical exegesis of the Qur'an, as an exposition of Islamic law, nor as a treatise on Sufism, but more as a work presenting Islam as a "comprehensive and complete system" (*niẓām shāmil wa-kāmil*).[28] This endeavour is motivated by the observation that, "[i]n our time, Islam has come to face many philosophical theories, upon which are based systems of life, or scientific conducts (*sulūk 'ilmī*); and thus we find today social, political, and economic theories, as well as philosophies of the good and of liberty, in constitutions and in laws; and in front of all of this, it is necessary to present Islam in a comprehensive book explaining its principles, methods, and foundations, which can meet the challenges of these news ideas." Citing the verse, "We have sent down the Book to you as an explanation of everything" (16:89), Ḥawwā maintains that there are no issues that God has provided no guidance for as to whether it was permissible, forbidden, condemnable, desirable, or obligatory.

Ḥawwā insists that Islam is more than its five pillars, the shahada, the five prayers, zakat, hajj, and fasting during Ramadan. To give an idea of how comprehensive the system of Islam is, he provides an example of one way all the issues it addresses can be divided. They can be captured by six categories: doctrines, including sovereignty (*ḥukm*) and authority (*sulṭān*); acts of worship, including prayer, zakat, fast, pilgrimage, and jihad; manners, including morals (*al-akhlāq*); transactions, including property, family law, litigation, deposits, inheritance; and punishments, including retribution, robbery, adultery, blasphemy, apostasy.[29] Ḥawwā cites the 19$^{\text{th}}$ century Ḥanafī scholar Ibn 'Ābidin as the source of this division.[30] This shows that Ḥawwā took seriously the authority of Syrian scholars relatively unknown outside of the country. During his time at the Islamic Law Faculty of Damascus University, Ḥawwā's teacher of Ḥanafī law, Fawzī Fayḍ Allāh, had left a strong impression on him, and

they most likely discussed some of Ibn ʻAbidin's works.[31] Ḥawwā also explains that the last three categories can be put under the term "methods for life" (*manāhij al-ḥayā*), in which he includes political, social, economic, military, and educational methods.

These methods for life are what make Islam a complete system. While Islam has the five pillars as foundations, its structure is made of rulings (*aḥkām*) developed from these "independent methods," or programs (*manāhij mustaqilla*).[32] For example, "Islam has an independent political program, which [implements] the unique perspective of Islam (*naẓrat al-islām al-munfarida*) onto the topics of the *umma*, the nation, the highest political offices, the procedure of consultation (*shūrā*), the judiciary, the executive system, administration, etc." Similarly, according to Ḥawwā, Islam has a social program for dealing with men, women, the family, and social interactions; a moral program for all aspects of life; an educational program for life on Earth and in the Hereafter; a military program "for [planning] the goals, aspirations, mobilization, implementation, training, foundations, concepts, and rules;" and, finally, an economic program organizing ownership, state treasury, and solving domestic and international economic challenges. These programs ensure that no issue is left unaddressed by the complete and universal system of Islam, which has a ruling for every situation.

Ḥawwā's articulation of the idea that Islam forms a complete system has more to do with the ideas of reformists from the 20$^{\text{th}}$ century than with those of a 19$^{\text{th}}$ century Ḥanafī scholar. The emphasis he puts on reason as the basis for knowing God, his attributes, the prophet, and Islam, make him closer to the approaches of al-Afghānī and ʻAbduh than to the Ḥanbalī theology of reformists interested in Ibn Taymiyya. However, it would be misleading to see Ḥawwā as pursuing al-Afghānī or ʻAbduh's program, for he does not seem to have been trained in Islamic philosophy like them. Ḥawwā's argument for the existence of God relies on the idea that verses from the *Qur'ān* are signs (*āyāt*) of God, and can thus give us knowledge of His existence.[33] He does not rely on sophisticated distinctions about different ontological categories of existence, like ʻAbduh does in *Risālat al-Tawḥīd*. To better understand the traditions and the context behind Ḥawwā's ideas, it is more pertinent to start by looking at the intellectual environment where he taught, studied, and engaged in politics.

Muḥammad al-Mubārak was most likely an important influence for Ḥawwā. After studying secular law at Damascus University and Ḥanafī law in local mosques, al-Mubārak completed a Bachelor's in Literature in Paris in the 1930s.[34] Back in Syria, he became a founding member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and was involved in educational reforms with the Ministry of Education. He successfully ran for a seat in parliament several times between 1947 and 1958, and held positions in different cabinets throughout the 1950s. Al-Mubārak was also one of Ḥawwā's professors of Islamic law in Damascus, where he had been teaching

since the foundation of the faculty in 1958. In the 1960s, he participated in the development of the educational programs of various governments in Egypt, Sudan, Iran, and Pakistan. Finally, al-Mubārak chaired the King ʻAbd al-Azīz University in Jeddah from 1969 to 1973, which was a few hours away from Medina where Ḥawwā taught from 1968 to 1971. In addition to having this important stature as a scholar and a member of the Brotherhood, al-Mubārak was a prolific writer. In part because of his studies in France, he was very interested in comparing what he called the "Islamic and Western cultures, or ideas."[35]

One example of al-Mubārak's interest in this comparison is his *al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Ḥadīth fī Muwājahat al-Afkār al-Gharība (Modern Islamic Thought in Opposition to Western Ideas)*, which was published in 1968, a year before Ḥawwā's *al-Islām*. In it, al-Mubārak uses a language very close to Ḥawwā's: "Islam brings about a social system (*niẓām ijtimāʻī*) which guarantees man's personal, material, and spiritual advancement; and this social system contains a system of government (*ḥukm*), whose foundations are consultation (*shūrā*), equality, justice, responsibility; and it also contains an economic system built upon justice and solidarity."[36] Al-Mubārak even uses the adjectives *shāmil* (universal) and *kāmil* (comprehensive) to describe the system of Islam, as Ḥawwā did. This conception of Islam as *niẓām* was so important to al-Mubārak that he further developed it in a series of four books titled *Niẓām al-Islām*, the first one of which was published in 1968 also.[37] In *Niẓām al-Islām: al-ʻAqīda wa-l-ʻIbāda (The System of Islam: Faith and Worship)*, the first of the series, he explains that *niẓām* highlights the principles and doctrines of Islam as opposed to *ḥaḍāra* (civilization), which refers to the specific forms it took in different historical contexts.[38] With his knowledge of French, he advises that *niẓām* be translated as *système*. He also explains that when he was a member of the faculty of Islamic law in Damascus, he suggested that this conception of Islam be taught to students, which was accepted by the other members of the faculty. We can conclude from this that Ḥawwā most likely heard of the idea of Islam as *niẓām* when he was an undergraduate student, perhaps for the first time.

But the understanding of Islam as *niẓām* predates al-Mubārak. It does not figure prominently in al-Sibāʻī's writings, though a more thorough study would be needed to confirm this.[39] The challenges accessing the writings of the Egyptian leader of the Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Huḍayabī, makes it difficult to ascertain whether or not he adhered to this notion.[40] This is unfortunate, since Ḥawwā mentions al-Huḍayabī as a source of inspiration in the opening pages of *Allāh*. However, a look at some of Ḥasan al-Bannā's pamphlets shows that he clearly made the notion of *niẓām* central to his vision. He does not do so in his *Kitāb al-ʻAqā'id* (Book of Doctrines), which Ḥawwā cites as a reference. But in *al-Risā'il al-Thalāth (The Three Treatises)*, which Ḥawwā read with enthusiastic young Brothers when he joined

the society, al-Bannā explains that, "[w]e believe that Islam has a universal (*shāmil*) meaning, regulates (*yantaẓim*) every aspect of life, adjudicates on every matter, and prescribes for it a coherent and precise order (*niẓām*)."[41] Al-Bannā fully fleshes out this idea in *Niẓām al-Ḥukm (The System of Government)*, which Ḥawwā might have also read.

For al-Bannā and Ḥawwā, conceiving of Islam as a system allowed them to claim its superiority to other modern ideologies and to motivate their opposition to different political actors. Al-Bannā denounced British colonialism and the privileged Egyptian elite as materialist.[42] For Ḥawwā, the Ba'th party exemplified materialism. The appeal of this conception of Islam as *niẓām* was in all likelihood increased by the greater interest in Abū al-A'lā al-Mawdūdī's works in the Arab world, following the translations of some of his books into Arabic in the 1950s.[43] His student, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Nadawī, also helped disseminating his ideas by writing books in Arabic, most notably his *Mādhā Khasira al-'Ālam bi-Inḥiṭāṭ al-Muslimīn (What Has the World Lost with the Decline of Muslims?)* first published in 1947. We also know that al-Mawdūdī's works were printed in Damascus in the 1960s.[44] Interestingly, Ḥawwā also attended lectures by both al-Mawdūdī and al-Nadawī in Aleppo in the early 1950s.[45] Throughout his writings, al-Mawdūdī had taken seriously the task of comparing Islam to capitalism, socialism, communism, and liberal democracy.[46] He insisted that Islam was "a complete system encompassing intellectual, moral, and practical aspects."[47] Its divine nature and the values at its heart made Islam superior to any other ideology.

Many scholars have argued that Sayyīd Quṭb was the main influence on Ḥawwā's writings.[48] There is no clear evidence that this is the case, for Ḥawwā does not mention Quṭb in his memoirs nor in *Silsilat al-Uṣūl al-Thalātha*. Nonetheless, there are similarities between the two thinkers. Through his later writings, Quṭb illustrates the growing popularity of al-Mawdūdī's ideas, and the appropriation of his key innovations in the Arab world. William Shepard has shown that through subsequent re-editions of *al-'Adāla al-Ijtimā'iyya fī al-Islām (Social Justice in Islam)*, Quṭb emphasized the idea that Islam was a *niẓām* which came with a method or program (*manhaj*) governing all aspects of human society.[49] This intellectual transformation coincided with his discovery of al-Mawdūdī and his student al-Nadawī's writings.[50] While al-Mawdūdī did not discuss materialism, Quṭb made the opposition between materialism and Islam central to the last chapter of *al-'Adāla al-Ijtimā'iyya fī al-Islām*. It is likely that Quṭb was influenced here by al-Bannā, for he shared his view that materialism was anathema to Islam in that it negated any form of spirituality.[51] Materialism could not serve as a foundation for the political and economic orders of countries like Egypt.[52] Quṭb further developed this idea in subsequent works before and after his imprisonment in 1954.[53] In addition to Quṭb's notoriety, the influence of his brother Muḥammad, who came to Saudi

Arabia shortly after Ḥawwā, could explain how the latter came across his writings.

One could be tempted to exaggerate the similarities between Quṭb and Ḥawwā, since they not only saw Islam as a system, but, unlike al-Mubārak, also spoke of its programs or methods. In fact, both spoke of Islam as providing a "method for life," (*manhaj al-ḥayā*). Quṭb's use of the notion of *manhaj* would find its way into his most famous works, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq (Milestones)* and *Fī Ẓilāl al-Qur'ān (In the Shade of the Qur'an)*.[54] If one were to follow Shepard and see Quṭb's choice of *manhaj* as reflecting his more "systemic tendencies" in the 1950s, one could conclude that Ḥawwā borrowed the term from him, which would show that Quṭb was a significant inspiration. Assessing Ḥawwā's relation to Quṭb is important because scholars often emphasize Quṭb's *Milestones* on Muslim intellectuals to the detriment of other thinkers. However, there are two reasons to be skeptical of the centrality of Quṭb's ideas in Ḥawwā's conception of Islam. Firstly, while Quṭb uses *manhaj* and its plural *manāhij*, Ḥawwā uses more frequently *minhāj* and *manāhīj*. Muḥammad Quṭb suggested that his brother's preference for *manhaj* was a result of the term's more practical connotation related to the implementation of a system (*niẓām*), translated as a method or procedure in English.[55] Ḥawwā's *minhāj* would thus be closer to the plans or programs of a system regulating an order (*niẓām*). This might explain why Quṭb speaks of Islam's single *manhaj* (method) implementing its *niẓām*, while Ḥawwā instead lists Islam's *manāhīj* (programs) dictating the many rulings of Islam's *niẓām*. If Quṭb is interested in the practical implementation of Islam, Ḥawwā seems more concerned with the multiple theoretical resources of the complete system of Islam. Secondly, Shepard does not mention that Quṭb was, again, not the first to use *manhaj*, since al-Bannā spoke several times of Islam's *manhaj* and *minhāj*.[56] Hence, Ḥawwā could very well have picked up the term *minhāj* from al-Bannā and not Quṭb.

The vision of Islam as a system can rightly be described as an ideologization of Islam, the construction of an Islamic discourse that interprets a differentiated social world and legitimizes a political order, with the modern state at its center.[57] One of its main consequences was to place Islam on the same level as other modern political and economic ideologies, such as capitalism, liberalism, communism, and socialism. That is, Islam as *niẓām* no longer simply regulated Muslims' relationship with God and with other Muslims: it also prescribed an order for entire societies transformed by modern economic and social changes. Crucially, the system of Islam offered a vision for the modern bureaucratic state and a theory for the legitimacy of its power, as we shall see. As scholars have argued, the genesis of this conception of Islam is intimately tied to European colonialism and the intellectual resistance it sparked in many Muslim intellectual circles.[58] What Ḥawwā and others who further developed these ideas show is that this ideologization of Islam provided fertile intellectual material from

which new visions of politics could be developed after independence.

3.3 The State as an Instrument of Islam

An important innovation in the way Ḥawwā constructs the system of Islam is that he includes a lengthy discussion of the instruments which ensure that the Islamic order is implemented, what he calls *mu'ayyidāt al-islām*. The term *mu'ayyidāt* comes from the transitive verb *ayyada*, which means to support, strengthen, or help. A *mu'ayyid* is usually a supporter or a partisan of something, with *mu'ayyidāt* as its plural. In this context, Ḥawwā does not have in mind people, but mechanisms which strengthen and support Islam's implementation. This is why the approximate translation 'tools' or 'instruments' is appropriate. He introduces the importance of these tools by noting that, "man, by its own nature, does not wish to bear the cost and abide by the limitations to his environment, appetites, desires, and liberty."[59] To ensure compliance with Islam, Ḥawwā describes three kinds of instruments: natural (*fiṭriyya*), divine (*rabāniyya*), and human (*bashariyya*).[60] The natural ones are "the instinctive and spontaneous punishments which follow from contradicting the command of God." The divine ones include rewards in Paradise and punishments in Hell. The human ones are "the state, commanding right and prohibiting wrong (*amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-l-nahī 'an al-munkar*), and jihad." Commanding right and prohibiting wrong serves to implement Islam in Muslim societies, while jihad serves to "impose (*faraḍa*) the legal authority (*al-sulṭān al-sharī'a*) of God to the world outside the borders of the Islamic homeland."

Ḥawwā's use of the term *mu'ayyidāt* is curious. To the best of my knowledge, it is not used by either al-Mawdūdī, al-Bannā, al-Huḍaybī, al-Mubārak, or Quṭb. Neither do jurists cited by Ḥawwā, like Ibn 'Ābadin or the Egyptian Brother Sayyīd Sābiq use the term. The only use of the term I have found is in al-Sibā'ī's *Ishtirākiyyat al-Islām*.[61] Al-Sibā'ī spends an entire section of his book titled "al-Mu'ayyidāt" discussing the implementation of the principles of social solidarity (*al-takāful al-ijtimā'ī*) inherent in Islam through laws. In his view, the *mu'ayyidāt* are precisely what will ensure this implementation. He explains that they correspond to what jurists called "restrictions" (*zawājir*), or "incitement and dissuasion" (*al-targhīb wa-l-tarhīb*). Al-Sibā'ī unfortunately does not provide more details as to what constitutes *mu'ayyidāt*. Instead, he divides them into four kinds: doctrinal, moral, material, and legal. The two first stem from the essential doctrines of Islam and its "moral system." Material *mu'ayyidāt* range from punishments (*ḥudūd*) and retribution (*qiṣās*) when people violate Islamic rulings, to commanding right, prohibiting wrong, and jihad. Legal ones include

retribution, custom, and interest. Hence, while Ḥawwā and al-Sibā'ī's *mu'ayyidāt* both ensure the implementation of Islam, they follow different divisions and include different elements.

Ḥawwā devotes one of the four sections of *al-Islām* specifically to the instruments of Islam. In this portion of the book, he only discusses natural and divine instruments, for "the details of the human instruments of Islam have already been discussed in section three of this book, and in the book *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan*."[62] Section three, "The State: Its Pillars, Policies, and Institutions," describes in more than 300 pages the contours of an Islamic government. It is clear from this that for Ḥawwā, the state is the central human instrument by which Islam is to be implemented. Indeed, the introduction of this section contains a series of arguments supporting the claim that the Islamic system necessitates the establishment of an Islamic government (*ḥukūma*).[63] For example, an Islamic state is necessary for the preservation and the protection of Islam to face the great dangers posed by outside threats. Moreover, an Islamic government could ensure that Muslims perform the acts of worship they ought to, since "those too lazy to pray would be disciplined; those who abstain for zakat would be reprimanded; those who abandon fasting would be punished; those who abstain from pilgrimage while they are able to would be scolded." Ḥawwā uses verse 23:71 to support his claim: "Had the Truth followed their desires, the heavens and the Earth would have surely fallen apart [along] with those who are in them."[64]

Ḥawwā asserts that the modern state "in our time has come to believe that it has the right to interfere in all matters of the lives of its citizens, which means that it can impose upon them the beliefs and doctrines it wants."[65] However, an Islamic state would not use all the powers of modern states merely to ensure that individual Muslims practice their religion correctly. It would also work for the progress (*taqaddum*) of Muslims, in that it would manage their affairs for their own good, and would guide them in their own quest for moral progress. As such, an Islamic state does more than simply surveilling its citizens: it also manages and regulates the entire society. In other words, it is the perfect instrument for the implementation of the system of Islam. We see how powerful the idea of Islam as *niẓām* can be. If Islam is a universal and comprehensive system, then a modern state is undoubtedly necessary to implement its total moral order. Ḥawwā further justifies this political vision of the Islamic state by using several times the modern idea that only an Islamic state could "emanate from the will (*irāda*) of Muslims."

Ḥawwā's writings regarding the relation between Islam and the state reveals an understanding of popular sovereignty that is characteristic of modern Islamist thinkers.[66] The end of the 19th century saw the gradual integration of the *umma* into accounts of political sovereignty by Muslim intellectuals. As a result, the legitimacy of a government came to be

seen as deriving from the consent of the *umma*. This Islamic conceptualization of popular sovereignty provided new foundations for the Islamic state in the works of numerous intellectuals, most prominently Rashīd Riḍā and al-Mawdūdī. It raised new questions about the source and nature of political authority. Whereas pre-modern writers devoted great energies to theorize political authority as a balanced relation between the ruler's discretionary powers and scholars interpreting the religious law, many modern thinkers grappled with how the *umma*'s consent and the *sharī'a* were to be combined into a legitimate form of government. As we will see, this concern with the consent of the *umma* as a source of political legitimacy appears at several places in Ḥawwā's writings about the Islamic state.

Ḥawwā's arguments that an Islamic state is necessary to implement Islam are similar to some arguments made by al-Mawdūdī.[67] Part of his originality is in providing details about how the state relates to Islam as a system. He explains that, "the people is the Islamic *umma*, and it has a homeland (*waṭan*) which is the abode of Islam; from the [*umma*] comes a representative government in the form of the caliphate; and the latter has a clear legislative agenda."[68] This agenda is made of policies (*siyāsa*) about economic, political, educational, and military affairs. To carry out these policies, the institutions (*ajhiza*) of the state need to follow the programs (*manāhīj*) of Islam, integral parts of the religion's system. Ḥawwā spends a lot of effort and pages detailing each one of these programs. There is no need to go into their details for our purposes, but it is still informative to highlight some of the issues they concerned themselves with. The economic program, by far the longest, discusses property and its acquisition, collective and individual rights, taxation, religious endowments, importations and exportations, and economic planning from the state's perspective. The military program addresses munitions, trainings, and military planning, while the political or criminal program lists crimes, their nature, responsibility, and the various forms of punishment.

Beyond the programs guiding Ḥawwā's Islamic state, its most distinctive feature is undoubtedly that it would take the form of a caliphate. Ḥawwā's vision of the caliphate borrows extensively from the famous 10$^{\text{th}}$ century jurist al-Māwardī and his *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya (Statutes of Government)*. Like al-Māwardī, he argues that the *umma* cannot faithfully implement Islam without an Imam enshrined in the institution of the caliphate.[69] This caliphate was a prophetic (*nubuwwa*) one in Muḥammad's time, but the following caliphates were his successors (*khalīfa*), with their authority based on representation or deputyship (*niyāba*), Ḥawwā believes that the appointment of caliphs after Muḥammad needs to be done by consultation (*shūrā*). This was also al-Māwardī's view, though he conceived the number of electors to be around five maximum.[70] Instead, Ḥawwā broadens the set of eligible voters, and uses the term used to refer to modern elections *intikhāb* in addition to al-Māwardī's

ikhtār, meaning choice or selection. Relying on the verse, "And their affairs are dealt by consultation among themselves" (42:38), Ḥawwā concludes that the Imam has to be chosen in an electoral process in which "every Muslim has the right to vote." This is one crucial manifestation of Ḥawwā's concern with including the *umma* as a source of political legitimacy. Still, the caliph needs to fulfil some conditions for his candidacy to be eligible, e. g. that he be a Muslim man from the Quraysh tribe, that he be just and knowledgeable, and that he be capable of leading the *umma*.[71]

The elected caliph acts as "the head of the state." His main responsibilities are the establishment of Islam and its order, and their execution.[72] Citing al-Māwardī, Ḥawwā lists eight more duties of the caliph, including preserving territorial integrity, guaranteeing the rights and safety of citizens, administrating taxes, and waging jihad to those who reject Islam until they convert or enter into a *dhimma* covenant. Most importantly, he departs from al-Māwardī by insisting that governance, the management of the state (*idārat al-dawla*), be done in consultation with the citizens. His reasoning is that "since Islam makes consultation obligatory for Muslims, rulers are required to consult the ruled (*al-maḥkūmūn*) in all matters of the state, and to follow their opinion or the opinion of the majority if they do not agree." By broadening *shūrā* to include all members of the *umma*, and by extending its application to all matters of governance, Ḥawwā makes an important innovation from many classical theories of the caliphate, perhaps inspired again by modern ideas about representative government.

In many ways, Ḥawwā's view of the Islamic state is both meticulously detailed and surprisingly vague. Its economic and social programs, as well as its criminal justice system are thoroughly discussed. But many fundamental questions about the state's structure are barely addressed. Ḥawwā's interchangeable use of 'state' and 'government' shows how uninterested he was in outlining the constitution of the state, notably with regards to questions about the separation of power. While the caliph's main duty is to execute the law (*tanfīdh*), is he also in charge of legislating by interpreting religious texts and developing the *sharī'a*? Are judges simply presiding courts over criminal matters? Ḥawwā's discussion of the limitations on the caliph's power illustrates his lack of interest in questions around the way in which power operates within the state. For Ḥawwā, checks on the caliph come from broadening the scope of *shūrā*, and replicating al-Māwardī's idea that unjust and forbidden behaviours could be grounds for removing him.[73] But the unjust behaviours he cites are individual sins like drinking alcohol, not political offences like abusing state power. Even his remarks on *shūrā* say little about how and when exactly Muslim citizens should be consulted regarding matters of the state. Ḥawwā devotes a lot of his energy to describing what the Islamic state does, that is, implementing the system of Islam and its programs. But he does not explain

what the Islamic state looks like and how it is supposed to work.

Of course, questions surrounding the power of the modern state are central to liberal thinkers, which Ḥawwā certainly was not. But Muslim intellectuals like al-Mubārak and Ma'rūf al-Dawālībī, another founder of the Syrian Brotherhood, built theories of the Islamic state on a more detailed constitutional basis. They both discussed representative political systems and the separation between the legislative (*al-tashrī'iyya*), the executive (*al-tanfīdhiyya*), and the legislative (*al-qaḍā'iyya*).[74] Whereas al-Mubārak and al-Dawālībī saw the state as a source of difficult political questions in virtue of its power, Ḥawwā sees it as a tool to implement a deeply moral order. His focus on the theoretical system of Islam, as opposed to the concrete ways modern states operate, might explain why Ḥawwā took the caliphate so seriously, while al-Mubārak reduced it to "nothing more than a president for Muslims."[75] Ḥawwā did not seriously envision the possibility that the caliph could do injustice in his exercise of power, since he envisioned him as implementing the right ethical system. Hence, Ḥawwā's Islamism is primarily construed as a utopian vision for a modern Islamic state. Only after, does he offer a separate reflection on modern politics through Islam.

For Ḥawwā, the duty to implement Islamic state is strong, for Muslims cannot faithfully live under a non-Islamic government. They would then face "the danger of being forced to obey [a ruler] and sin God, and this contradiction between the Islamic creed and their behaviour will lead them to depravity."[76] Hence, "establishing an Islamic state is an individual duty (*farḍ al-'ayn*) on all Muslims, since a collective duty (*farḍ al-kifāya*) remains individual until it is undertaken." This last inference from collective to individual duty would undoubtedly surprise most jurists, including al-Māwardī who saw the caliphate as a collective duty like jihad. To fully appreciate the urgency behind his call for its establishment, we must now have a look at his reading of contemporary Muslims' affairs and his famous *Jund Allāh*.

3.4 A Revolution Against Apostasy

Ḥawwā wrote the first book of the series *Jund Allāh* while he was in Saudi Arabia.[77] *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan* was the only one of its series to be published before the Hama revolt. Its 500 pages make it the heart of the series. In his article devoted to Ḥawwā's thought, Weismann, citing Sivan's *Radical Islam, Medieval Theology, and Modern Politics*, depicts Ḥawwā as being primarily concerned with the decline of Muslim countries in comparison to the West.[78] He subsequently argues that Ḥawwā's remedy consists in reforming Islam by reviving a delicate balance between the wisdoms of Sufism and the moderation of Salafism.

This reformed Islam should then serve as a basis for the establishment of Islamic states, through the use of force if necessary. Unfortunately, Weismann and Sivan's portraits of Ḥawwā are misleading in important ways. Their claim that the "lamentable state of Islam in the modern world" is Ḥawwā's point of departure looks more like a projection of the concerns of late 19th and early 20th century reformist thinkers. Moreover, Weismann's characterization of Ḥawwā's intellectual concerns and innovations is built through an odd collage of passages taken from many books from different time periods and on widely different topics.

A more careful look at Ḥawwā's life and at the context of his writings suggests a very different picture of *Jund Allāh*. Since the early 1950s, Ḥawwā was engaged in the bitter political rivalry between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba'th Party, initially the Arab Socialist Party in Hama. His activism took place after the country's independence, and was directly shaped by the competition for the control of the state among different national political movements. Accordingly, he was not interested in explaining how the decline of Islam had opened the door for European colonialism. Instead, Ḥawwā was concerned with showing how Islam could supply the intellectual resources necessary for formulating a vision guiding a new country finally freed from colonialism. This is why a narrative of Islam's decline hardly figures in *Silsilat al-Uṣūl al-Thalātha* or in *Jund Allāh*. If we understand the latter in continuation with the former, as Ḥawwā meant, we see how his writings in fact express a political vision and the route to take to ensure its implementation. The ideologization of Islam identified in *al-Islam* outlines this political vision, while *Jund Allāh* explains how to take control of the state to put this vision into practice in the current political context.

Ḥawwā's book *al-Islām* contains a short interpretation of contemporary political events that provides greater context for his call to establish an Islamic state. The world as he sees it is made of two competing systems, that of Islam based on knowledge, and that of *jāhiliyya* based on ignorance.[79] While the former is "pure perfection" (*al-kamāl*), the latter is "pure deficiency" (*al-naqṣ*). More perniciously, the confrontation is everywhere: "Islam and *jāhiliyya* are found in doctrines, acts of worship, morals, manners, politics, education, war, peace, society, laws, etc." For Ḥawwā, partisans of *jāhiliyya* are trying to uproot Islam from most of the Muslim world today. They include those who preach "evangelization, Shi'ism, the philosophy of permissiveness, non-Islamic political parties, labour movements for unbelievers in the name of progress, reactionary wars, etc." Their voices are amplified by "the ignorance of Islam by Muslims" and by "colonial governments and their replacement by people who supported them ideologically or politically: this is an organized conquest of *jāhiliyya*."

Ḥawwā's use of *jāhiliyya* is the strongest evidence that he was familiar with Quṭb and al-Mawdūdī's ideas. The term *jāhiliyya* was traditionally used to refer to the period in Arabia

before the advent of Islam. Al-Mawdūdī was the first to refer to aspects of modern societies as *jāhilī*. The new meaning he attributed to the term was "every such conduct which goes against Islamic culture, morality, and the Islamic way of thinking and behaving."[80] Ḥawwā borrowed al-Mawdūdī's diagnostic that the Muslim world was a mixture of *jāhiliyya* and Islam.[81] Muḥammad Quṭb also discussed this idea at length in his *Jāhiliyya al-Qarn al-'Ashrīn (Jahiliyya of the Twentieth Century)* in 1964, in which he identified *jāhiliyya* and corruption (*fasād*) in behaviour, politics, economics, societies, relations between the sexes, arts, or, more simply, in everything (*fī kull shay'!*). Ḥawwā shares Muḥammad's diagnostic that *jāhiliyya* poses an urgent challenge in contemporary Muslim societies. However, in *Silsilat al-Uṣūl al-Thalātha*, Ḥawwā does not oppose *jāhiliyya* to *ḥākimiyya* (God sovereignty) as Sayyīd Quṭb famously does in his later works.[82] For Sayyīd Quṭb, "*jāhiliyya* is the rule of man by man, since it involves making some men subservient to others, rebelling against devotion to God, rejecting His divinity (*ulūhiyya*), and in view of this rejection, ascribing divinity to some men and serving them apart from God," thus rejecting His *ḥākimiyya*.[83]

A striking feature of Ḥawwā's *Jund Allāh* series is that he replaced the notion of *jāhiliyya* with that of *ridda* (apostasy). The book opens with a discussion propelled by the following question: "Is there *ridda* in the Islamic world?" Ḥawwā answers affirmatively and sets to discuss its meaning and implications. He cites two verses to motivate his use of *ridda*:

> Those who turned their backs to what had become clear to them after being guided, Satan enticed them and seduced them with false hopes.
>
> This is because they said to those who loathe what God has revealed, "We will obey you in some matters." (47:25–26)
>
> And those who do not judge by what God has revealed — it is they who are unbelievers. (5:44)

Ḥawwā is explicit that "*ridda* falls on those who obey the unbelievers, even if they do so only for certain matters."[84] Coupled with the second verse, he warns that excommunication (*takfīr*) awaits those to whom *ridda* can be applied. For him, examples of *ridda* can be found throughout the Muslim world: "those who call for the implementation of something other than God's judgement, like allowing adultery, debauchery, prostitution, figure-like images (*tamāthīl*), the rejection of mandated punishments (*ḥudūd*), [etc]." Similarly those who "consider God's decrees retrograde and deride Islam in the name of progress" are apostates. Such people can be found in politics, government, newspapers, associations, and schools. As a result, in Ḥawwā's opinion, no government in the Islamic world today is strictly Islamic.

At this point, in another surprising turn, Ḥawwā moves explicitly closer to Quṭb by relating *ridda* to God's sovereignty (*ḥākimiyya*), a word he first uses in *Jund Allāh*. He appeals to two verses which Quṭb also relied on:

> Sovereignty (*ḥukm*) is for God only. He has commanded you to worship none except Him. This is the true religion. (12:40)
>
> All creation and command belong to Him. (7:54)

From these, Ḥawwā concludes that, "God's sovereignty (*ḥākimiyya*) is limited to Him, the Great and the Sublime — thus he is the absolute ruler — and any departure from this sovereignty, dissent from His orders, or refusal to submit means a lack of faith."[85] The application of only a few verses of the *Qur'ān* is one of the many kinds of unbelief. For Ḥawwā, this situation is widespread in Muslim countries throughout the world and could lead to apostates, hypocrites, or unbelievers ruling over all Muslims. Evidence of this comes from the fact that no governments are currently applying the Islamic methods (*manāhij*) prescribed by Islam. As a consequence, the entire system of Islam could retreat from the lives of individual Muslims. Implementing an Islamic state with its caliphate is thus the supreme obligation of all Muslims to establish His sovereignty and prevent the extinction of Islam.

Ḥawwā's choice of the opposition *ridda*/*ḥākimiyya* over Quṭb's *jāhiliyya*/*ḥākimiyya* is not innocent. As Weismann notes, the language of apostasy allows Ḥawwā to precisely target individuals or groups who oppose his Islamic vision by claiming that they were apostates.[86] Unlike Quṭb, Ḥawwā does not vaguely label entire societies as *jāhilī*. He insists that "we do not judge the majority of societies that form the Muslim world as societies of unbelievers, for if we judged them as such, we would have considered them altogether as part of the abode of war (*dār al-ḥarb*)."[87] Ḥawwā prefers describing these societies as "sinful because they are governed by a majority of apostates, hypocrites, or unbelievers" who push them towards complete *ridda*, the negation of the entire system of Islam.

The narrative Ḥawwā constructs of the modern history of *ridda* in the Arab world allows for a better understanding of how it manifested itself in the Syrian political context of the time.[88] It provides an origin story of the historical forces behind what Ḥawwā sees as the dominating position of apostasy in current day Syria. Since colonization, Western governments have extended their influence in the Middle East by empowering specific segments of the local populations. These groups facilitated the colonizers' rule and maintained their grip on the state after independence. The main institution where this phenomenon occurred in most countries was the army. As a result, members of minorities or non-observant Muslims

are still to this day in leading positions of those armies. The parallel with religious minorities in the French *troupes spéciales* during the mandate and their strong representation the army after independence is hard to miss. More importantly, "the corruption of the armies led to the corruption of the *umma*, and corruption in the army is the main obstacle to Islam and its people." In addition, the situation of Muslims was worsened by the geopolitical consequences of colonialism. Arab countries are today more politically and ideologically fragmented than ever in their history. Their economy is dependent on the importation of everyday goods, technologies, and even weapons from the West. In sum, the legacies of colonialism have contributed to both the weakening of Muslims in the Arab world and to the empowerment of political forces other than Islam, which explains the pervasive presence of *ridda* today. As a result, after anti-colonial revolutions, a "second revolution," longer and more difficult, is needed to rid Muslim countries of *ridda* once and for all.[89] Nothing symbolized the necessity of this second revolution better than the al-Sultan mosque, which had seen bombardments by the French army in 1945 and the Ba'th regime during the Hama Strike in 1964.

Ḥawwā's understanding of *ridda* combines theological concepts taken from traditional sources and a political history of colonialism. It shows that his concern was not the decline of Islam relative to Europe, but the politics of Islam in the newly independent post-colonial world. For this reason, describing Ḥawwā as a revivalist like Weismann does is misleading.[90] He was not concerned with an Islamic revival in the same way that late 19th and early 20th century reformists like al-Afghānī, 'Abduh, Riḍā, and al-Bannā were. While thinkers like al-Sibā'ī described the Brotherhood's program as aiming for a revival of Islam (*nahḍa*) through reform (*iṣlāḥ*), Ḥawwā did not use either of these terms to describe his political vision.[91] He certainly studied in the tradition of reformist or revivalist scholars, but he did not write as one of them. On the other hand, Ḥawwā shared the conviction of many reformists, especially within the Brotherhood, that foreign powers were conspiring against Islam, though in a different context.[92] In his section "A Frightening Conspiracy (*ta'āmur*)," he argues that Western governments are plotting against Muslim countries because they fear Islam more than communism, and because they are interested in taking control of their oil reserves.[93]

The road for preserving Islam from *ridda* and from the interference of Western powers starts with the establishment of the "party of God."[94] As one of his other innovations, Ḥawwā argues for the necessity of the party of God from these three verses:

> O you believers! Should any of you abandon (*yartadda*) his religion, God will soon bring a people (*qawm*) whom He loves and who loves Him, [a people] humble towards the faithful, unforgiving of the unbelievers, and waging jihad in the path

> of God, not mincing words. This is God's grace which He grants to whomever He wishes, as God is omniscient.
>
> Your guardian is God only, His messenger, and the faithfuls who perform prayer and pay zakat as they bow down.
>
> Whoever accepts the authority of God, His Apostle and the faithful, indeed the party of God (*ḥizb allāh*) is victorious. (5:54–56)

On the basis of verse (5:54), Ḥawwā argues that if *ridda* (from the same root as *yartadda*) were to surface among Muslims, God would send a people to triumph over it. The people sent by God would have to be a collective group, since "God said a 'people' (*qawm*), and did not say an 'individual' (*fard*)." Ḥawwā uses the term *ḥizb* ('party' in modern Arabic) to refer to those people because the word occurs in (5:56). He characterizes the Party of God with a strong moral vocabulary. Since "God helps those who help him, those whom if given the power over the Earth would implement prayer, pay zakat, and command right and forbid wrong" (22:40–41), the Party's members must be exemplary Muslims. To protect their moral integrity, Ḥawwā deploys a concept that would become a central idea of Salafi-jihadism in the late 1980s: disavowal (*al-barā'*) of the enemies of God and his prophet, and loyalty (*al-walā'*) to other Muslims.[95] He adds that whoever gives loyalty or friendship to a non-Muslim, especially if he is a ruler, cannot be in the Party of God. Disavowal and loyalty thus mean not only moral solidarity, but also opposition to un-Islamic governments. To my knowledge, of all the intellectuals mentioned so far, Ḥawwā is the first one to use the concept of loyalty and disavowal. Contemporary research on its genealogy suggests that it has a strong history in Saudi Arabia among Wahhabi scholars since the second Saudi state (1824–91).[96]

For Ḥawwā, the general orientation of the Party of God can still be captured by variations on al-Bannā's famous slogan: "God is our goal, the prophet our leader, the *Qur'ān* our constitution, jihad our way, death for God our greatest hope."[97] To further detail the purpose of the Party of God, he lists its five main objectives to be reached in this precise order. The first one is the formation of an "Islamic character" (*shakhṣiyya islāmiyya*) by acquiring fundamental dispositions (*akhlāq asāsiyya*) and learning about Islamic culture. While Islamic culture includes traditional Islamic subjects with a few modern additions like contemporary Islamic world and "the conspiracies against Islam," the dispositions Ḥawwā has in mind cover the love of God, mercy towards Muslims, opposition of unbelievers, jihad, and loyalty. In line with the Muslim Brotherhood's focus on teachings and education, he sees the Islamic character as a prerequisite to the second objective of creating Islamic states in every Muslim country. The third and fourth goals are to unite all Islamic states into one single state and to revive the caliphate. Ḥawwā recognizes that the former might sound surprising at first.

But he points to large countries like the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and India, to justify both the possibility and the necessity of uniting Muslims into one single state. The brevity of his discussion might suggest an implicit Arab-centric view of Islam, discarding the option of an Islamic state ranging from Indonesia to Senegal. However, his last goal is to submit the entire world to the world of God and create a single Islamic state on Earth.

The Party of God's final objective, that a single Islamic state would rule over the entire world, illustrates how Ḥawwā's position differed from other modern conceptions of jihad as being strictly defensive. Like other proponents of offensive jihad, he uses the verse, "Fight them until there is no more persecution (*fitna*) and religion belongs to God only," (8:39) to justify the imposition of God's rule on Earth.[98] Instead of reproducing 'Abduh and Riḍā's views, who favoured a peaceful coexistence between Islamic and non-Islamic states, Ḥawwā followed al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb in their vision of a revolutionary struggle to free the world from un-Islamic systems.[99] Al-Mawdūdī notably called the group of Muslims carrying out this jihad "soldiers of God" from His Party (*hizb Allāh*), like Ḥawwā.[100] In *al-Salām al-'Ālamī wa-l-Islām (World Peace and Islam)* (1951), Quṭb also used (8:39) to argue that world peace requires the establishment of God's reign on Earth and the eradication of tyranny (*ṭurā*).[101] Moreover, chapter four of his *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq* famously argues for offensive jihad to fight against *jāhiliyya* throughout the world.[102]

Importantly, like al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb, Ḥawwā's understanding of jihad is more than a mere armed struggle. Jihad is "the main character trait of the Party of God, in all its kinds which are necessary to implement the word of God on Earth."[103] In Ḥawwā's moral conception of the Party of God as being loyal to Muslims and hostile to unbelievers, jihad is the means by which these virtuous traits are transferred into action. He even lists fighting for God as one of the ten components of the love (*maḥabba*) of God, a fundamental character trait of the Party of God.[104] In a crucial move, Ḥawwā further develops the idea dear to many pre-modern scholar that there is a close relation between jihad and the duty of commanding right and prohibiting wrong.[105] For Ḥawwā, the two are in fact identical when carried out in the land of Islam. Like many before him, he divides jihad into five kinds, though with different categories: argumentative, educational, physical, political, and financial jihad. Jihad against *ridda* within Muslim countries should be waged on all of these levels. One significant consequence of Ḥawwā's reasoning is that physical jihad (*jihād bi-l-yad wa-l-nafs*) can be fought domestically. This allows him to reach a conclusion that would turn out to be immensely important for the future Islamic Revolution in Syria: That Muslims are permitted to fight everyone who opposes Islam in its land, including those who govern them.[106]

The care and the rigour Ḥawwā shows in making this argument reveal how much he took

traditional works of Islamic law seriously in his writings. This sets him apart from many other modern intellectuals, notably Quṭb and al-Bannā. There were strong legal arguments against his view that jihad was required to ensure the establishment of Islamic states within Muslim countries. An important one was that *'ulamā'* have historically argued that permission of the Imam was required to wage war or to kill another Muslim on moral grounds, more generally.[107] This is why Ḥawwā spends considerable time discussing *aḥādīth* (sing. *ḥadīth*) that suggests that physically preventing someone from committing a sin can be done without the Imam's permission, from which he concludes that an armed rebellion against *ridda* is permissible. He also brings the opinion of Ibn 'Ābadin and cites a long passage from al-Ghazālī's famous *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn (The Revival of Religious Sciences)* to justify his view that fighting *ridda* is an individual obligation for all Muslims even without the ascent of the Imam. Al-Ghazālī's account of commanding right and prohibiting wrong was historically quite influential among jurists.[108] A few paragraphs later, Ḥawwā also cites one of Ibn Taymiyya's *fatāwā* to further justify the use of force without permission in Muslim lands.

Our overview of Ḥawwā's writings while he was in Saudi Arabia between 1966 and 1971 is undoubtedly synoptic. Nonetheless, the contour of his political vision should be relatively clear by now. It is built upon the fundamental claim that Islam is a complete system with its own methods, and that it can compete with modern ideas on the field of political ideologies. This belief most likely traces back to the teaching of Ḥawwā's professors, but its significance could not have been more real for a young activist who had been competing with socialists in Hama since the late 1940s. The ideologization of Islam put the control of state and the revival of the caliphate at the centre of his politics. Like Quṭb, he used the concept of *ḥākimiyya* to urge Muslims to establish Islamic states. But the revolutionary nature of his writings comes more from his interpretation of the post-colonial world as a struggle between Islam and *ridda*. The language of apostasy allowed him to precisely target individuals or groups who oppose his Islamic vision by claiming that they were apostates. The precise legal meaning of *ridda* naturally suggested that it was permissible to kill these individuals. Moreover, *ridda* allowed Ḥawwā to use classical sources about the duty to command right and prohibit wrong to justify waging domestic jihad against rulers who failed to implement Islam. He conveniently avoided traditional discussions of rebellion (*muḥāraba*), a more negative category in Islamic law.[109] To be sure, Ḥawwā made clear that properly constructing the "Islamic character" of Muslims and conducting jihad by educational means come before armed jihad against apostates. Still, it is important to note that Ḥawwā had designed new powerful intellectual tools to resist the Ba'th regime taking root by calling for a *second revolution* in Syria.

3.5 Return to Syria and Constitutional Politics

While he was in Saudi Arabia, Ḥawwā sent copies of his book to some scholars and friends he had back in Syria.[110] ʻIṣām al-ʻAṭṭār, leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, allegedly wrote him a positive review in a letter, and suggested that parts of Ḥawwā's books be circulated in Brotherhood circles. When an unnamed member of the group performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, he met with Ḥawwā and they discussed the publication of his works. Ḥawwā claims that he insisted he would not make profits from the sales. Instead, they agreed to ask for money to publish the first book, *Allāh*, and use the profits made in selling it to pay for the printing of the next one. They succeeded in publishing Ḥawwā's works this way, up to the first book from the *Jund Allāh* series. He claims that his books became somewhat popular after their release, but it is hard to assess how influential they were initially.

Ḥawwā returned to Syria in 1971 and obtained a teaching position in a high school in Maʻarrat al-Nuʻman.[111] He successfully ran for the elections of the Brotherhood's branch in Hama. According to Ḥawwā, the organization tried to recruit more members on university campuses, and its membership among younger Syrians increased as a result. But one of the main challenges the Muslim Brotherhood faced in Syria at the time was the many internal disagreements. As Lefèvre describes in his book on the Brotherhood, the society went through a difficult leadership crisis between 1969 and 1971.[112] Many members favoured the replacement of the organization's leader, ʻIṣām al-ʻAṭṭār, who had been in exile since the strike in Hama in 1964. The opposition to al-ʻAṭṭār coalesced around a Northern axis with members from Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia, opposed to the Damascene wing made of al-ʻAṭṭār's supporters. Pulling from 2011 interviews conducted with members of the Brotherhood present at the time, Lefèvre argues that the internal division was caused more by internal party competition than by substantive political or religious disagreements.

Ḥawwā's memoirs, which Lefèvre did not consult, correct his account in important ways. First, Ḥawwā explains that the opposition to al-ʻAṭṭār was mostly concentrated in Aleppo, and members from Hama remained neutral in the dispute.[113] Moreover, while Ḥawwā was resentful of the decision by the Brotherhood's leadership to distance itself from the 1964 strike in Hama, he certainly did not oppose al-ʻAṭṭār, and instead became increasingly closer to his circle after these events. We see this from the fact that the leadership tasked Ḥawwā with spelling out a new program for the Brotherhood after the events in Hama. While he was in Saudi Arabia, Ḥawwā wrote a new program that suggested the organization adjust itself to the increasingly authoritarian nature of the new Baʻth regime in Syria.[114] He sent his proposal to al-ʻAṭṭār, who accepted it with small modifications and transmitted it to the

leadership inside Syria. Unfortunately for Ḥawwā, the internal debates within the organization prevented his reforms from behind seriously discussed and implemented.

'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn's memoirs suggest that the appointment of al-'Aṭṭār as leader of the Brotherhood after al-Sibā'ī's death in 1964 had been controversial from the start.[115] His appointment had apparently not been officialized by the consultative body (*majlis al-shūrā*). Sa'd al-Dīn confirms that the Aleppo branch was at the centre of the dispute and had been calling for his resignation since then, claiming al-'Aṭṭār had not been elected. Members of the Aleppo branch started campaigning across and outside Syria for the dismissal of al-'Aṭṭār, while his supporters organized a counter-campaign. They argued that given al-Sibā'ī's death, al-'Aṭṭār could be the leader for a few years until there were new elections. The conflict became so fierce that some of the most important figures in the Brotherhood intervened, including the leader of the organization, Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Nadawī, and even Abū al-A'lā al-Mawdūdī. They formed a committee to investigate the situation, and a decision was made that al-'Aṭṭār would remain the leader until the next elections.

Ḥawwā describes a parallel grass-root attempt to solve the dispute that initiated in Hama.[116] He first wrote a short document suggesting a way out of the deadlock and shared it with both sides. He argued that they were both wrong and that an urgent meeting was required to solve the underlying tensions behind the disagreements. Ḥawwā clearly did not have the same degree of influence as al-Huḍaybī, and his proposal came to nothing. However, shortly after, Ḥawwā was elected to the Hama branch, and took the matter in hand with other members. Most surprisingly, a meeting was held for this purpose at the house of Marwān Ḥadīd, who had led the strike movement at the al-Sulṭān mosque in 1964.[117] Scholars tend to define Ḥadīd as a "radical," "jihadi," "Salafi," or "Qutbist" activist leading a "fringe movement" in the Brotherhood.[118] The choice of these terms is unfortunate, given that we know very little about Ḥadīd and that he seemed quite committed to the associational life of the Brotherhood up to the early 1970s. Ḥadīd, Ḥawwā, and others tried to organize a meeting with all branches of the Brotherhood to agree on early elections. Ḥadīd travelled to Damascus to start a dialogue with the Damascus wing, while Ḥawwā went to Aleppo. In the end, their plan was overshadowed by the work of the committee set up by al-Huḍaybī.

Following Ḥafiẓ al-Asad's rise to power, the political and economic reforms carried out by his new regime brought the Muslim Brotherhood, and Ḥawwā in particular, to the forefront of national politics. Al-Asad sought to distance himself from the unpopular policies of Ṣalāḥ Jadīd, who had developed powerful state institutions to foster economic development along a strong egalitarian agenda for lower economic classes.[119] Once a pillar of the Ba'th regime, class-based populism was weakened by the economic stagnation of the late 1960s and the

failure to develop lasting productive economic capabilities through a strong state involvement in the economy. Al-Asad sought to broaden the support-base of the regime by relaxing the class-based project of his predecessor and opening various sectors of the economy to private businesses and foreign investments.[120] His new approach to gain support also included local governorate elections for local councils that advised governors. Ḥawwā and Sa'd al-Dīn claim that the Brotherhood in Hama and in other provinces did not participate in these elections because they suspected that power rested in the Ba'th party and feared that these councils would lead to a division of Syria along religious and ethnic lines.[121]

More than local elections, the new constitution, whose draft was published in January 1973, provoked a strong opposition in many circles.[122] The constitution aimed in part at enshrining the new political system Asad was building since he came to power. In 1971, he attributed for himself the office of president, validated it in a referendum, and set up the People's Council as parliament. When Ḥawwā read the first draft of the constitution, he saw it as a secular project by which the ideology of the Ba'th was enshrined into a constitution.[123] Article 21 stipulated that, "the education and cultural system aims at creating an Arab, nationalist, socialist, and scientific generation with a conscience connected to its history, its land, proud of its heritage, filled with the spirit of struggle to establish the nation's goals of Unity, Freedom, and Socialism, and to contribute to the service and progress of humanity." Ḥawwā interpreted this as meaning the end of religious classes at school. He also thought the constitution attacked Islamic regulations for personal status law (article 44), the primordiality of Islamic law as a source of law and of Islam as the president's religion (article 3), and freedom of religion (article 35). Interestingly, he worried about the concentration of "the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers in the hands of the president," despite the fact that concerns about the separation of power were absent from his works.

Interpreting Ḥawwā's opposition to the new constitution through his early writings helps us understand better the significance of his mobilization against it. For him, the secular project of the 1973 constitution was an important step towards the eradication of Islam in Syria. It signified moving away from the requirement that the state implement the system of Islam in education, legislation, governance, and personal status law. It was another victory of *ridda* over Islam, whereby a foreign ideology was used as a basis to teach younger Muslim generations, regulate a Muslim land, and prevent the flourishing of Islamic values. It was the continuation of colonialism by domestic forces. When Ḥawwā says that the constitution "brought Syria into a phase unknown before on its path to becoming a dictatorship, and that Islam as a result would be completely liquidated," we should interpret his words as an expression of his worldview, and not as a rhetorical and inflammatory speech.[124]

Ḥawwā immediately started organizing the opposition to the new constitution.[125] He thought the movement would be more effective if it proceeded in the name of the *'ulamā'*, and if it succeeded in building a large coalition of different political groups, such as the Nasserites, the socialists, and the supporters of Ṣalāḥ Jadīd. The Brotherhood, in this case, should try to lead from behind. This large movement would try to obtain some concessions on the part of President al-Asad, or to at least "teach him a lesson for the future about the duty to respect Islam." Ḥawwā was aware that his greatest difficulty would be to unite a large number of people, and especially the *'ulamā'*, around a strong political message, since many feared the regime greatly. To do so, he wrote a short text and a *fatwā* denouncing the constitution and asked *'ulamā'* he knew in Hama to contact other *'ulamā'* in Homs and Aleppo for a meeting. To make it seem as if the initiative arose purely out of religious considerations and did not serve a broader political project, Ḥawwā tried to involve Muḥammad al-Shāmī, an *'ālim* known for being close to the regime. In Ḥawwā's own words, "it was important that the matter not be concealed, and I felt that *shaykh* al-Shāmī would give a green light to this kind of movement of *'ulamā'* to make these demands."

Ḥawwā planned a big meeting in Hama with *'ulamā'* from Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, where they would discuss the new constitution and how to best oppose its controversial articles.[126] Unfortunately, the delegation from Aleppo was delayed, and everyone but Ḥawwā had left when they arrived in town. The delegation was uncertain about Ḥawwā's proposal to sign his petition, and they suggested that he instead travel back to Aleppo with them to discuss the matter to a greater audience. He did so in a local mosque, with al-Shāmī and small group of influential scholars such as Muḥammad al-Nabhān. The presence of al-Shāmī seems to have convinced the *'ulamā'* to sign Ḥawwā's petition, and he returned to Hama surprised by how successful his plan was. Unfortunately, the *'ulamā'* of Hama found the tone of the petition too harsh, and Ḥawwā was forced to write a milder version. He then traveled to Homs with the two versions of the text and asked the city's *'ulamā'* which one they would prefer to endorse. It is not hard to imagine Ḥawwā's frustration when they told him they found the Aleppo version too harsh and the Hama version to soft. He then wrote a third moderate version, and managed to get the signatures of around fifteen *'ulamā'*. This third version was also endorsed by *'ulamā'* from Hama and Homs.

In parallel, Ḥawwā and other members of the Hama branch of the Brotherhood decided to push the matter to the forefront of national politics in a covert way.[127] They wished to spread the perception that strong political forces were set in motion against the regime's constitutional project. Doing so would both frighten the regime and encourage other movements to join the opposition. To accomplish that, they wrote a carefully worded tract that

denounced the new constitution in a strong language that could be used by multiple different political groups. They mailed the tract to many associations across the country, including themselves and other branches of the Brotherhood. Allegedly, the text was widely distributed and commentated on. It was discussed at Friday sermons with the petition signed by *'ulamā'* from Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. Socialists and Nasserites reportedly organized strikes and used the tract to mobilize their members. Members of the Brotherhood spread the rumour that Akram al-Ḥawrānī was its author. The *mukhābarāt* suspected Ḥawwā was its instigator, but they released him after an inconclusive interrogation.

In the meantime, Ḥawwā made his way to Damascus with some of the *'ulamā'* who had signed his petition.[128] As Pierret explains, Ḥawwā ambitiously aimed at getting the support of one of the city's most important *'ālim*: Ḥasan Ḥabannaka.[129] Born in 1908, Ḥabannaka studied in Damascus under 'Alī al-Daqr and founded the prestigious school, *al-Tawjīh al-Islāmī (The Islamic Orientation)*, in the Midan in 1946. Since his participation in the Great Revolt, he had led many political fights in addition to his regular teaching duties. He mobilized against the French's new personal status law in 1938, and against al-Shīshaklī's decision to impose a uniform on clerics in 1952. He had the support of most of Damascus' *'ulamā'* in 1964 to become Grand Mufti, but the Ba'th party ensured Aḥmad Kaftārū won the position instead. Ḥabannaka defied the regime's 1965 order that he stop preaching and attracted large crowds enthused by an *'ālim* challenging the regime. He was also briefly incarcerated in 1967. Ḥabannaka was certainly an influential figure, whose support for Ḥawwā's petition would significantly increase the weight behind its demands. Ḥawwā describes Ḥabannaka during his meeting as "having the stature of a mountain, and given his knowledge, dignity, clarity, experience, and strong personality, the old, the young, the rulers, and the ruled were all his students." After carefully studying the petitions, Ḥabannaka signed the softer Hama version, and many other *'ulamā'* of the city signed the petition following him.

A day or two later, al-Asad added an article in the constitution stipulating that the president's religion had to be Islam.[130] Al-Shāmī, who was close to the regime, informed Ḥawwā of the president's decision and told him that he considered the whole constitutional issue settled. In reality, it was not. Protestors descended into the streets of Hama, asking for the resignation of President al-Asad, ripping pictures of him, and chanting anti-regime slogans. The day after, the crowd attacked the Ba'th party's headquarters, burned offices of organizations related to the party, and destroyed coffee houses selling alcoholic beverages. The army soon made its way to the city and cut it off from the rest of Syria to prevent the protests from spreading throughout the country. Ḥawwā explains that the demonstrations had been sparked by the anonymous tract he had sent to different political groups, but

it is hard to know if the protests attracted many Nasserites or socialists. As the city was being shut down, Ḥawwā sent his petition for publication with the names of the *'ulamā'* who had signed it. Remarkably, the versions published in the Lebanese newspaper *al-Ḥayā* on February 23rd and 24th were most likely altered by Ḥawwā, who referred to the authors of the constitution as "an enemy backed by colonialism" and called on Muslims to "fight the partisan and sectarian domination."[131] He made sure this hardened petition was distributed in mosques and universities, even reaching Damascus via student members of the Brotherhood.

Now that Ḥawwā's religious petition and political tract were circulating around the country and being distributed at rallies, his two parallel tactics had intersected. He seemed really enthused by the success of his whole plan. One member of the Brotherhood allegedly came to another Brother who was secretly involved in the distribution of the petition, and told him that the whole operation seemed so skillful that only the CIA could have organized it.[132] Ḥawwā and his colleagues in the Hama branch became so confident that they started planning for the strike movement to reach Damascus, perhaps with a march headed by Ḥabannaka. But the regime had had enough. The whole time, Ḥawwā had continued his teaching duties at a local high school near Hama. One day, he heard that some *'ulamā'* who had signed the petition were being arrested by the regime. He secretly planned to leave the province after his day at school, not informing any friends or colleagues of his intentions. As he left school building, security forces from the regime arrested him and interrogated him for many hours. He would spend the next five years of his life in a military prison.

The plan Ḥawwā developed and carried out to confront the regime reveals two important trends that defined him as an activist and intellectual from the moment he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. His mobilization of *'ulamā'* across the country around a petition shows that he valued and respected their knowledge and authority in political matters. This had been visible since the early 1950s, when the lessons of al-Ḥāmid and the teachings other *shuyūkh* in Hama or Damascus were nourishing his intellectual curiosity, and providing the primary ingredients of his own development as a scholar. We also see this in his books, where the opinions of eminent traditional jurists like Ibn 'Ābadin, al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya are discussed and used to justify Ḥawwā's own positions. Ḥawwā's political tract and the demonstrations he helped spark reveal how deeply involved he was in the practices of mass politics. From his first speeches at protests, his participation in student politics, to the 1964 Hama strike, he was an activist pushing a political project. It should not come as a surprise that the ideologization of Islam was so central to his writings. More than most Islamist thinkers before him, including al-Mawdūdī, al-Bannā, al-Mubārak, and Quṭb, Ḥawwā represented a synthesis of Islamic traditions and reforms with modern politics.

Chapter 4

An Islamic Revolution

4.1 The Creation of an Armed Movement

Marwān Ḥadīd left prison after the 1967 War.[1] He had been there since his controversial trial screened on national television, following the 1964 strike in Hama. The military tribunal initially sentenced him and others who had taken part in the events to death. Shortly after his condemnation, a group of *'ulamā'* from the city gathered to try to reverse the court's decision. At the head of this group was Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid, one of the most famous scholars of the city who had taught both Ḥadīd and Ḥawwā. 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn narrates the work of the *'ulamā'* in his memoirs based on his conversations with al-Ḥāmid.[2] The delegation was received by President Amīn al-Ḥāfiẓ, who was allegedly horrified by the violence displayed by the regime in Hama. Al-Ḥāfiẓ, a Sunni officer from Aleppo, had been made the forefront figure of the new Ba'th regime by the Military Committee that led the coup.[3] He was an outsider from the group of officers carrying out the Ba'thist revolution, and his appointment was a way for the new regime to deflect criticisms by making al-Ḥāfiẓ the focal point of attention. He was imprisoned and exiled after al-Jadīd's 1966 coup.

As Sa'd al-Dīn recounts, al-Ḥāfiẓ acknowledged the demands of the *'ulamā'* and met with his cabinet to discuss possible accommodations. He came back with a promise to issue a pardon for all prisoners and cancel their death sentences. *Shaykh* al-Ḥāmid secured that the pardon be extended to those who had left the country after the regime's repression. At the time, Ḥawwā was exiled in Iraq, where he was unsuccessfully looking for weapons to bring back into Syria. He returned to Hama after reading a telegram from al-Ḥāmid thanking the authorities for issuing a general pardon to everyone involved in the strike.[4] The cabinet had agreed to al-Ḥāmid's demands, and a delegation paraded through Hama a few days later

with a group of prisoners from the al-Baluti prison. However, those in the Palmyra prison were not released, and al-Ḥāmid requested to the governor of the region that prison guards refrain from torturing the prisoners. His plead was apparently successful. Al-Ḥāmid visited the families of those still imprisoned to inform them of these developments, including Sa'd al-Dīn', whose brother had been captured by the regime.

Sa'd al-Dīn hints that Ḥadīd was immensely frustrated that his imprisonment prevented him from taking part in the 1967 War.[5] After his release, this sense of having missed a crucial historical moment opened a path that would shape the future of his activism against the Ba'th regime. Ḥadīd decided to join the *fidā'iyyīn* in Jordan to fight Israeli troops in Palestine. After the defeat of Arab countries, the leadership of Fatah, most notably Yāsir 'Arafāt and Khalīl al-Wazīr, saw an opportunity to continue the struggle for the liberation of Palestine independently from Arab countries.[6] They first attempted to organize a rebellion from inside the West Bank, inspired by the guerrilla warfare of the Viet Cong in Vietnam. But Israel's military control of the West Bank forced Fatah to move its centre of operation to the East Bank in Jordan at the beginning of 1968. In March, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) crossed the Jordanian river and fought the Jordanian army, Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). The IDF took control of Karama and destroyed most of the town before retreating to the West Bank. Despite the defeat, Fatah's performance was seen as a vindication of its guerrilla strategy and a proof of the IDF's weakness. As a result, volunteers from all around the Arab world gathered in Jordan to join the *fidā'iyyīn* movement.

Among these volunteers were some members of the Muslim Brotherhood from all around the Muslim world. The Brotherhood and Fatah had historically maintained somewhat positive relations since the latter's creation in 1958. Many of its founding figures like 'Arafāt and al-Wazīr had been members of the Brotherhood. They fought with the Brotherhood during the 1948 War and participated in its operations against the British along the Suez Canal.[7] The memoirs of the Brother 'Abd Allāh Abū 'Izza shed some light on how the two organizations collaborated in Jordan around 1967.[8] When Abū 'Izza became the first Palestinian member of the society's Executive Office in the summer of 1965, he developed a strong relationship with the Syrian leader of the organization, 'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār. One day, after leaving al-'Aṭṭār's house, Abū 'Izza encountered al-Wazīr, who was coming to see al-'Aṭṭār. Abū 'Izza was completely taken by surprise, especially since the Palestinian Brotherhood barely engaged with Fatah at the time. What he found out was that non-Palestinian members of Executive Bureau had warm relations with Fatah. After the battle of Karama, many of them were eager to join the *fidā'iyyīn* movement and reached out to Fatah to organize the matter.

The Executive Bureau of the Brotherhood held long and difficult sessions during which

members debated how to support the *fidā'iyyīn* in Jordan.[9] The Sudanese, Egyptian, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi delegations wanted to support the movement financially and even form a battalion of Muslim Brothers. Representing Syria, al-ʻAṭṭār was more hesitant, citing financial difficulties and the Syrian regime's pressure on the organization as impediments to a full participation. The Palestinians were the most opposed to joining the *fidā'iyyīn* in Jordan. They thought that a revolt within Palestine would be more effective and would gain a greater support from Arab states. In the end, the insistence of the majority and the enthusiasm of younger members of the Brotherhood across the Muslim world weighed in favour of joining the *fidā'iyyīn*. An agreement was reached with Fatah that it would give permission to the Brotherhood to establish its own camps in Jordan under the supervision and banner of Fatah.[10] Fatah would provide munitions, supplies, and equipment like it did for other organizations, and the Brotherhood would manage the camp and take care of military training.

Al-ʻAṭṭār was still reluctant to fight with the *fidā'iyyīn*.[11] He claimed that the Syrian Executive Bureau would reject the agreement reached with Fatah. But in the end, he promised the other delegations that the Syrian branch would also commit to the armed struggle in the West Bank.[12] Abū ʻIzza recounts that, as al-ʻAṭṭār had predicted, he immediately became under tremendous pressure from Syrian Brothers who wanted him to rescind his promise. However, many other Syrians were more than eager to join the *fidā'iyyīn*. Among them was Marwān Ḥadīd. We know very little about when he left for Jordan and how he got there. He reportedly played an important role in convincing many Syrians to follow him.[13] Some historians believe that Syrians formed the largest group of foreign fighters, with 950 of them in total, 250 from the Brotherhood, and 160 from Hama, according to one estimate.[14] One reason to be skeptical of these numbers is that the Bases of the Shuyūkh (*qawāʻid al-shuyūkh*), where the Brotherhood resided, were probably too small to accommodate more than 200 combatants.[15] Ḥadīd, like other Syrians in the camps, followed a military training supervised by veterans such as ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz ʻAlī, a member of the Egyptian Secret Apparatus.[16] They then participated in raid operations against Israeli forces in the West Bank.

The presence of many Hamawis in the Bases of the Shaykhs can be seen from their high representation among fighters killed in combat. ʻAbd Allāh ʻAzzām, who would later become the central figure of the Afghan Arabs, identifies several of them in his memoirs.[17] In the summer of 1970, the Hamawis Mahdī al-Idlibī al-Ḥamawī, Nāṣir ʻIsā, and Zuhayr Qayshū all died fighting the IDF. ʻAzzām even recounts bringing the body of Qayshū back to Hama in Syria. He stayed a few days as a guest of Marwān Ḥadīd and even assisted to ʻIsā's funeral, whose brother Rashīd had also fought with ʻAzzām in Palestine. Hence, while we know little about Ḥadīd's participation in the *fidā'iyyīn* movement, we can reasonably speculate that

he managed to recruit many fighters from Hama. This situation could be a product of the enthusiasm of many Syrians for the fighting, but also of the notoriety and the followers Ḥadīd had acquired as a result of the 1964 Strike. Importantly, he came back to Syria in 1970 with military skills acquired through his training and his combat experience.

A letter found in Usāma bin Lādin's Abbottabad's compound in 2011 by US Special Forces highlights the importance of Ḥadīd's participation in armed operations with the *fidā'iyyīn*.[18] Probably a draft prepared by bin Lādin himself, the letter mentions that the experience with handling weapons and the self-confidence Ḥadīd had acquired in Palestine played a role in his decision to organize an armed movement against the Syrian regime. But we know too little about the context surrounding this letter to use it as a reliable source regarding Ḥadīd's motivations back in Syria. Still, other sources tend to confirm the significance of his experience in Jordan. The Egyptian Brother, Jābir Rizq, writes that Ḥadīd came back from Jordan heading a small group of fighters.[19] Worried of what he would do, the Syrian regime imprisoned him for four months. According to Rizq, when Ḥadīd was released, he was even more firm in his conviction that a small group of combatants, with faith and patience, could bring down an oppressive regime. He was also obsessed with ideas of armed jihad and martyrdom. The young pious activist of the al-Sultan mosque had become a daring fighter marked by the regime's torture and strong in his belief in the justice of his cause.

As discussed in the previous chapter, we know from Ḥawwā's memoirs that Ḥadīd was invested in the internal politics of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1972. But Ḥawwā also reports that the leadership of the Brotherhood was weary of Ḥadīd's vocal activism against the regime. During the celebrations of the Prophet's birth in 1972, Ḥadīd took advantage of the general anti-regime sentiment to give a fiery speech in a mosque exhorting Hamawis to join Islamists and oppose the state.[20] The leadership asked Ḥadīd to refrain from making such speeches, preferring instead that religious celebrations cultivate the religiosity of Syrians, who would then naturally become sympathetic to the Brotherhood's message. This disagreement with the Brotherhood might have led Ḥadīd to develop his activism in a more independent manner. Ḥawwā does not mention Ḥadīd's involvement in the opposition movement to the 1973 constitution. Rizq confirms that Ḥadīd watched the events from a far.[21] It is in this context that Ḥadīd gathered fighters to start training for armed combat.

Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī's account of the foundation of Ḥadīd's group also stresses that his disagreements with the leadership of the Brotherhood led him to establish his own movement.[22] He adds that Ḥadīd was adamant that the Brotherhood should follow a more military path in its engagement with the regime, an option that the leadership rejected. One must take al-Sūrī's version of this episode with a grain of salt, since he did not know Ḥadīd at the

time.[23] Nonetheless, Ḥadīd's fascination for weapons had already been noticed by ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn in the 1960s.[24] Saʻd al-Dīn recounts that after Ḥadīd miraculously survived the bombardment of the al-Sultan mosque in 1964, he would walk around Hama in white clothes and show bullets to any passer-by, claiming that they had pierced his body without causing him any injury. Ḥadīd would always conclude by saying that his faith was in God's hands, and that he was ready to die for His cause. After coming back from Jordan, Saʻd al-Dīn also mentions that Ḥadīd became increasingly at odds with the Brotherhood's leadership. He tried to dissuade him from his new military orientation, but to no avail.

Scholars have usually identified Ḥadīd's group as the Fighting Vanguard (*al-talīʻa al-muqātila*), though they disagree as to when precisely Ḥadīd founded it.[25] The Baʻthist documents analyzed by Batatu suggest that the group was formed in 1973. The memoirs of Aymān al-Shurbajī, which have not been previously studied thoroughly, corroborate Batatu's suggestion.[26] However, al-Shurbajī claims that the name 'Fighting Vanguard' was used for the first time in 1980.[27] This would explain why Saʻd al-Dīn repeatedly claims that Ḥadīd had not founded the Fighting Vanguard.[28] To bring to light the importance of the organization's name, which will be crucial later, my usage will mirror that of the rebels' memoirs. Al-Shurbajī explains that he had long conversations with Ḥadīd in Damascus, during which Ḥadīd explained to him the vision of his new organization. He subsequently joined a Damascus cell of the armed group. He confirms that Ḥadīd was acting on his own because of his conviction that the Baʻth regime's increasing control over the country could only be stopped by armed action. Jihad was the means by which an Islamic state should be established in Syria. For Ḥadīd, preparing for jihad was in keeping with the essence of al-Bannā's teachings, captured by his slogan "God is our goal, the Prophet our strength, the Qur'an our constitution, jihad our path, and death for God's sake our hope." Moreover, jihad was also necessary to liberate (*taḥarrur*) the Syrian people (*al-shaʻb al-sūrī*) from the sectarian (*ṭā'ifī*), unbelieving (*kāfir*), and tyrannical (*ṭughā*) regime in place. A sectarian narrative of Muslim oppression by a non-Muslim regime was central to his project of armed resistance.

In addition to being known for his impassioned speeches, Ḥadīd was recognized among his companions for being a man of action.[29] The armed group was built around a key number of Syrians who had gone with him in Jordan to fight with the *fidā'iyyīn*, most notably ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Zaʻīm, who was known for his skilful manipulation of rocket-propelled grenades during a few operations in the West Bank.[30] The leadership of the organization was secretly meeting in houses around Damascus to plan the development of the organization. Replicating their experience in Jordan, they decided to organize training camps in the coastal mountains. One of their chief concerns was to obtain weapons and military equipment for their new

members. Ḥadīd requested financial support for these equipment from Sa'd al-Dīn.[31] When Ḥadīd received Sa'd al-Dīn's emissary to discuss, he asked for the highest amount of money possible to "prepare the youth for the resistance" (*muqāwama*). It is unclear if Sa'd al-Dīn gave money to the emerging armed group.

Al-Shurbajī says little about how the training in the camps was organized and conducted. At the end of 1974, small cells (*khalāyā*) made of trained combatants where dispersed in Damascus, Aleppo, and Hama.[32] The cells were asked to recruit new members in each city to increase the ranks of Ḥadīd's organization. We also know very little about how the cells attempted to promote their activities for recruitment purposes while at the same time remaining clandestine to avoid raising the regime's suspicions. On the other hand, thanks to al-Sūrī's voluminous study of the revolt, we have a declaration by Ḥadīd enjoining other Islamic movements to join the armed resistance movement.[33] This invaluable document has not yet been thoroughly studied and sheds a much-needed light on how Ḥadīd presented his political project to attract new members. He opened his declaration with the following verse:

> There was already a good example for you in Abraham, and those who were with him, when they said to their people: "We repudiate you and whatever you worship other than God. We disavow you, and between you and us has emerged enmity and hate forever, unless you come to believe in God alone." (60:4)

Ḥadīd asks *'ulamā'* and his fellow Muslims if they have been applying this verse in their own lives. His political understanding of the verse is manifest from the series of questions he then asks: Are the rulers of their country ruling by God's book and the Prophet's *sunna*? Have they implemented a constitution following the *Qur'ān*? Or, more incisively, "Are they disbelievers, or not? Enlighten us, O *'ulamā'* of Islam!" Ḥadīd's contempt for what he perceives to be the inaction of scholars is only surpassed by the urgency of his call for action. He provocatively compares the situation of being ruled by unbelievers in Syria to an occupation in the same way as Israel occupies Palestine. Through rhetorical questions around the imperative to oppose tyranny and establish an Islamic state, Ḥadīd places his audience in a position where armed struggle (*qitāl*) is a matter of complying with the most fundamental duties of Islam.

Ḥadīd's speech mocks the excuses traditional jurists (*fuqahā'*) could rely on to avoid fighting the regime of unbelievers occupying (*iḥtilāl*) the land of Islam. He derides concerns about the vast imbalance in capabilities between unbelievers and Muslims. He ridicules the requirement that permission from jurists, fathers, and masters must be granted for Muslims, sons, and slaves in order to fight. His attacks on the authority of *ulamā'* who disagreed with his call for armed operations against the regime is powerful and merciless. Ḥadīd depicts any

restriction on the duty to fight as choosing to live a sinful life under tyranny, which inevitably leads to Hell in the Hereafter. Dying while fighting for God, however, leads to Heaven. With the struggle against the Ba'th regime understood this way, "With what excuse, O Muslims, do you exempt yourselves from fighting, [dear] leaders of Islamic societies and Sufi orders [?]"

Ḥadīd notably attacks the natural response from many within the Muslim Brotherhood that Islamic education (*tarbiyya*) and preaching (*da'wa*) are more appropriate strategies to spread Islam than armed struggle. Not only does he question the primacy of education over combat, but he also infers the necessity of fighting from the political nature of Islamic societies themselves: "What is the mission of an organization which would refrain from fighting for its own preservation? Organizations, political parties, and societies are all based on the idea of taking control (*sayṭara*) of the state [...] in order to rule by their principles and implement their goals." The divine imperative behind Ḥadīd's political project, that is, establishing an Islamic state and fighting unbelief, functions in his speech as a rhetorical device that not only legitimizes, but also requires armed struggle as a necessary means to an end. But even more importantly, the divine nature of armed struggle itself, *qitāl*, understood as a form of *jihād*, ensures for Ḥadīd that it is also an end in itself. In Ḥadīd's own words: "It is known with great clarity that man progresses in life whenever he gets closer to his pre-ordained death (*ajal*), so why do you aspire for the Earth and do not demonstrate God's rule, and fight towards the day of your death to win martyrdom?" This is where we start to see Ḥadīd's fascination with death and martyrdom, which Sa'd al-Dīn and others had noticed.

Ḥadīd's declaration was more an attempt to recruit new members than an exposition of his political vision for Syria. The audience he addressed in his speech primarily consisted of Syrians who gravitated towards Islamic societies. His objective was clearly to convince as many as he could to join the armed movement. This is why he first attempted to weaken the authority of traditional *'ulamā'* before arguing that *qitāl* is obligatory. Ḥadīd then moved on to listing the many possible ways in which people can prepare for the revolt. Military training was to be preferred whenever possible, but financial support for buying weapons and munitions was also welcomed. Ḥadīd made sure that every member of his audience knew they had the obligation to participate in one way or another. We do not know how his description of the political tensions at the time, as a fight between a regime of unbelievers and Islam, was received. Nor do we know how successful he was in convincing young activists to join his organization. As events moved faster than he could envision, Ḥadīd himself would never know how popular his organization would become. In early 1975, the regime raided a house in Damascus and made Ḥadīd prisoner, leading to a fierce exchange of fire with other militants of his armed group.

4.2 The Ritual of Torture and Assassination

Ḥawwā was moved from five different prisons before he was sent to the military prison al-Mazza.[34] He was interrogated by the *mukhābarāt* who wanted to know more about the protest movement against the new constitution and his involvement. Members of the Hama branch of the Brotherhood had been preparing for the eventuality that they would be imprisoned. They had all learned a false story about the organization which they were expected to recite if interrogated. The consistency of their accounts would provide greater plausibility to their testimonies while preserving most of the organization's members and institutions. This is exactly what Ḥawwā did. For forty days, he was questioned and tortured physically and psychologically. He explains that he will not "mention the humiliations and torture [him and his inmates were subjected to], since we bore these hardships for God alone."[35] The *mukhābarāt* was slowly getting a better picture of the protests. Several other inmates confessed that Ḥawwā was the instigator of the protest movement. To protect the Hama branch of the Brotherhood, Ḥawwā told his interrogators that he was the sole person responsible for organizing the demonstrations. Through resistance to torture and ruses of this kind, he claims that most of the Hama branch was left intact throughout his imprisonment.

Ḥawwā was then moved to a dormitory with other prisoners, some of whom were members of the Brotherhood, others Nasserites, nationalists, and Ba'thists.[36] The inmates' common fate created an atmosphere of solidarity and camaraderie, despite their very different political allegiances. Some of them asked Ḥawwā to give lessons about the exegesis of the *Qur'ān* and Islamic law, and he happily did so. His stay in prison was overall an intellectually stimulating and productive period. At night, when most people were asleep, Ḥawwā read and wrote many books on topics he touched upon during his lessons.[37] Two years into Ḥawwā's imprisonment, members of Ḥadīd's group surfaced in the prison. They were also severely tortured, but Ḥawwā and his inmates "could not do anything to help them but pray." Ḥawwā's relationship with Ḥadīd, built over the years around activism within the Brotherhood, was now further strengthened by their shared experience as prisoners, even though they were kept in different cells. When the regime offered Ḥawwā the opportunity of being released if he wrote a letter to President al-Asad apologizing and imploring his pardon, Ḥawwā demanded that Ḥadīd also be released. He would spend three more years in prison as a result.

One day, prison guards moved Ḥawwā to another dormitory with other inmates.[38] A few minutes later, many members of Ḥadīd's intimate circle were brought into the same cell. Then the news came in: Marwān Ḥadīd was dead. Later rumours would surface that the regime had poisoned him.[39] Ḥawwā understood that he had been placed with Ḥadīd's

followers to calm their reaction after hearing about their leader's death. He led the morning and evening prayers, gave his daily lessons, and conducted a long discussion about how they should properly respond to this event. They decided to refrain from mounting a strong response to the news and avoided discussing the matter with anyone outside the prison. For some reason, Ḥawwā says very little about their rationale for this decision and about the effects of Ḥadīd's death on himself and on his followers. Instead, they all focused their efforts on improving their detention conditions through hunger strikes and prayers. By that point, it appears that Ḥawwā and his inmates preferred shortening their stay in prison and alleviating the increasing pressures the guards were placing on their prisoners.

Ḥawwā left prison in January 1978 after influential *'ulamā'* like Ḥasan al-Ḥabanaka pressured the President al-Asad to do so.[40] Ḥawwā was also required to write a letter asking for President al-Asad's forgiveness in exchange for his release. The most difficult thing for him to do was to pledge not to participate in any of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities. He nonetheless did so and was released shortly afterwards. He recounts leaving his inmates with great sadness, and he tried unsuccessfully to have some of them released. After five years in prison, the spirit of solidarity with other prisoners and his intellectual production had allowed Ḥawwā to survive the torture and intimidation of the regime. He was driven back to Hama, where an officer from the *mukhābarāt* was assigned to him for surveillance purposes.[41] Ḥawwā quickly realized that the atmosphere in the country was politically charged. Celebrations around the birth of the Prophet drew large crowds in Hama shouting political slogans, which led to many arrests. When the new leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, met with him to discuss the political situation of the country and the formation of an exiled leadership of the Syrian Brotherhood in Jordan, Ḥawwā must have been shocked by the scale of the changes Syria underwent during his imprisonment. What had happened?

A look at Saʻd al-Dīn's memoirs can help us understand the political climate the way leaders of the Brotherhood did at the time. In his view, the 1973 constitutional reforms of President al-Asad were the continuation of the construction a tyrannical (*istibdādī*) regime in Syria since the Baʻthist revolution.[42] New forms of repression deployed by the regime were particularly striking for activists in Hama. Ḥasan ʻUfūr, deemed a model of piety in some of the city religious circles, was imprisoned and tortured to death in 1974. Aḥmad Zalf was chased by the *mukhābarāt* and killed in a park of Hama around the same time. In addition to Marwān Ḥadīd, Ghufrān Anīs and Ghazwān ʻAlwānī, from the Hama branch of the Brotherhood, were also killed in 1976.[43] As Saʻd al-Dīn explains, the imprisonment and assassination of Syrian citizens took on a particularly revolting meaning as the Syrian regime was negotiating with Israel following the 1973 War. Resolution 338 of the United Nations

Security Council, calling for a general ceasefire and the termination of military operations, was reluctantly accepted by al-Asad and perceived as humiliating for many Syrians.[44] The subsequent amnesty for suspected Israeli spies and the negotiations for the release of Israeli soldiers made the repression and assassination of Syrians even more outrageous.[45]

The Syrian invasion of Lebanon in June 1976 during the civil war further alienated Syrians like Sa'd al-Dīn from the Asad regime.[46] At the beginning of the conflict, al-Asad feared that the early successes of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) over the Lebanese army would prompt Israel to invade Lebanon.[47] He also saw the Lebanese civil war as a crisis where he could assert his ascendency at a time when Syria was gaining influence in the region.[48] In early June 1976, 12,000 Syrian troops had crossed into Lebanon to fight back the influence of the LNM and the PLO. The Syrian army notably collaborated with the Lebanese Front (LF) in maintaining its sieges of Palestinian refugee camps, most famously the Tal al-Za'tar camp in eastern Beirut. The siege ended on August 12th 1976 with the massacre of at least 1,500 residents of the camp.[49] Strong criticisms against Syria's intervention were heard throughout the Arab world after the fall of Tal al-Za'tar. Syrians like Sa'd al-Dīn accused al-Asad of not only killing Palestinians and Lebaneses, but also of supporting the establishment of another minority-led regime in Lebanon, and of pushing forward the peace plan of the United States and Israel.[50]

It is against this background of long-standing political frustrations with the Asad regime's domestic and foreign policies that Sa'd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā's accusations that the regime was sectarian (*niẓām ṭā'ifī*) must be understood. Both had referred to the government of the 'Alawi General Ṣalāḥ Jadīd, which replaced the Sunni President Amīn al-Ḥāfiẓ after the 1966 coup, as one of minorities (*aqaliyyāt*).[51] State power had been concentrated in the hands of members of the 'Alawi communities as a result of their disproportionate representation in the army and in the Ba'th party, the two institutions at the heart of the Ba'th regime.[52] As this situation perdured in the 1970s, Sa'd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā denounced the salience of sectarian identity in the construction, accessibility, and administration of the state and its exercise of power.[53] For them, the central problem was that this sectarian regime was necessarily authoritarian, since it was built upon the exclusion of non-'Alawis from power and the use of repression to maintain its domination over them. Their diagnostic of the Ba'th regime as both sectarian and authoritarian explained why the regime pursued policies at odds with the majority, like negotiating with Israel and fighting the PLO in Lebanon. This is why Sa'd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā were so concerned with elections, constitutional politics, an independent judiciary, and human rights (*ḥuqūq al-insān*), especially for prisoners.[54]

In the meantime, Sa'd al-Dīn had become the leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.

Lefèvre and Conduit describe this election as a key moment in the "political and ideological radicalization" of the Brotherhood towards a posture of open confrontation with the Ba'th regime.[55] But the writings of Sa'd al-Dīn and Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī tell a more complicated story. In the summer of 1975, when Sa'd al-Dīn was on a vacation in Beirut, a delegation of high-ranking members of the society came to visit him to ask if he would consider the position of leader of the Brotherhood.[56] The current leader, 'Abd al-Fatāḥ Abū Ghudda, had expressed his wish of leaving his position to focus on his work as an academic. Ghudda had been worn out by the internal feuds within the organization and the difficult political climate in the country. One of the latest debates within the organization was raised by a young member who was gaining more and more attention: Marwān Ḥadīd. As we know, at the time, Ḥadīd was trying to convince members of the Brotherhood that armed struggle was the only way to oppose the Asad regime. Since the Brotherhood's official position was to oppose any military action, dissent was growing within its ranks. Sa'd al-Dīn and al-Sūrī confirm that Ḥadīd was successful at recruiting an important number of Brothers to join his group.[57] When an extraordinary session of the Executive Bureau elected Sa'd al-Dīn as a new leader, he knew this would be an important issue he would have to grapple with.

When Sa'd al-Dīn became leader, high-ranking members of the Brotherhood suggested that he maintain the policy of non-confrontation with the regime. Contrary to Lefèvre and Conduit's claims that Sa'd al-Dīn pushed for confrontation, he accepted their advice.[58] In fact, when he found out that the Consultative Council had approved the request for military training and weapon storing for some members, he offered his resignation unless the decision was reversed. He instead favoured greater cooperation with the burgeoning Islamic organizations within the country. He spent a lot of efforts into building larger coalitions for preaching and educating Syrians in matters of Islam. He also noticed a parallel trend in the organization's membership: more and more Syrians were joining the Brotherhood. The number of members had allegedly grown eight times in Aleppo and even more in Hama. Interviews with Hamawis suggest that joining the Brotherhood was an act of opposition to the state for many.[59] If the members leaving for Ḥadīd's group were replaced by a larger influx of new recruits, perhaps Sa'd al-Dīn could simply ignore the emerging armed movement? Unfortunately, a series of political assassinations quickly showed him that he could not.

The armed movement, which still called itself "Ḥadīd's organization," was not as successful as the Muslim Brotherhood in avoiding the disruption of its networks after the imprisonment of its members. Al-Shurbajī explains that after taking a few prisoners following the capture of Marwān Ḥadīd, the regime was able through torture to obtain the names and addresses of many members.[60] This led to the imprisonment of more than thirty members

of the organization in Damascus only, a similar number in Hama, and to the dismantlement of many cells. For al-Shurbajī, "the battle [during which Ḥadīd was captured] did not only result in losing members of the leadership like Ḥadīd, but was also a turning point which almost eliminated the entire organization because of the number of prisoners, hostages, and martyrs that followed." Despite this setback, the remaining fighters were determined to organize an armed resistance movement. Due to a lack of sources, it is hard to understand the worldview shaping their dedication and resilience. Al-Shurbajī believes that " [our] training based on the belief in God allowed us to overcome the hardships upon His path and make the substantive sacrifices for the sake of this religion." Perhaps Ḥadīd's framing of the conflict on a theological basis, as a fight between Islam and unbelievers, coupled with his fascination with martyrdom, informed some of the fighters' perspectives. In any event, a new leadership emerged, with ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Zaʻīm at its head, and the remaining members managed to buy more weapons and train in the forests and mountains neighbouring Damascus.

More and more fighters from Ḥadīd's organization were getting arrested and put in jail by the regime.[61] *Shaykh* ʻIrfān, in charge of the Damascus wing, was arrested in a raid on a safe house the regime identified by relying on confessions of imprisoned members. He was replaced by Muwaffiq ʻAyyāsh, who had followed Ḥadīd in Jordan to fight with the *fidā'iyyīn*. ʻAyyāsh had developed an expertise in carrying out covert military operations within Palestine. His experience and the skills he had acquired helped the Damascus cell recover from its losses and shaped the organization's first operations. ʻAyyāsh secured new safe houses and established new protocols to ensure greater levels of secrecy around the organization. Like al-Zaʻīm in Hama, he trained his fighters to carry out hit-and-run operations in small groups and run away from open confrontations with the regime. This tactic would avoid putting too many fighters at risk during one single operation. After carefully choosing specific targets, Ḥadīd's organization was preparing its first series of attacks.

Muḥammad Ghurra was the head of a military intelligence branch in Hama.[62] He was also a nephew of President al-Asad. In the first months of 1976, when Ghurra was in front of his house, a group of fighters conducted a raid and killed him with three of his friends. The fighters escaped before the regime's security forces could find them. This was the first political assassination carried out by the organization. As al-Shurbajī describes it, the killing was highly symbolic, since Ghurra represented both the much-feared *mukhābarāt* and the grip on state power of al-Asad's entourage. The armed group also assassinated Sudīf al-Ḥamawī, who had tortured members of the organization in prison. Al-Shurbajī thought that the Syrian population supported these killings because they also profoundly disliked the regime. The success of these operations also shattered perceptions that the regime was invincible.

Sa'd al-Dīn maintains that he did not know anything about who was behind these attacks.[63] To him, Muḥammad Ghurra was known to most Hamawis for the immense power he exercised in the province and the fear he inspired among citizens. Hence, many people could have plotted his assassination. This claim is plausible. The diverse political backgrounds of the prisoners Ḥawwā encountered suggests that repression had indeed targeted a variety of organizations. Sa'd al-Dīn explains that many within the Brotherhood were surprised by the assassinations and feared that they would be perceived as acts of provocation that would prompt an indiscriminate and forceful response from the regime. As leader of the Brotherhood, he ordered an investigation into who was carrying out these assassinations. The findings were that three groups in Damascus, Hama, and Aleppo were responsible for them. These cities match those where cells from Ḥadīd's organization were dispersed, as al-Shurbajī describes. More worrying for Sa'd al-Dīn might have been the revelations that in the last two cities, high-ranking members from the branches of the Brotherhood were implicated.

Sa'd al-Dīn claims that he ordered the Hama and Aleppo branches cease their participation in any armed operations.[64] How could so many members of the organization take part in military preparations, possibly in cooperation with Ḥadīd's group, and the leadership of the Brotherhood not be aware of it? Could the head of the Hama branch have been actively preparing for armed struggle without the leadership knowing, as Sa'd al-Dīn claims? Or perhaps, as al-Sūrī suggests, had the Brotherhood secretly started its own para-military branch to avoid losing members to Ḥadīd's organization?[65] A simpler explanation is that weak links between the exiled leadership and local branches allowed local members to take such initiatives. Boundaries between Ḥadīd's organization and the Brotherhood were more porous at lower hierarchical levels.[66] For example, al-Shurbajī recounts that a member of the Damascus branch, 'Abd Allāh al-Shamā', provided shelters and logistical support to members of the Ḥadīd's organization. What is sure is that the Brotherhood and Ḥadīd's organization would take two very different paths after the first series of political assassinations.

In the second half of 1976, 'Ayyāsh, leader of al-Shurbajī's cell in Damascus, was captured and tortured to death by the regime.[67] Communications with the leader of the armed movement, 'Abd al-Sattār al-Za'īm, were cut off. However, thanks to the Brother al-Shamā', al-Shurbajī was able to reach al-Za'īm in Hama. This further illustrates how interconnected members of the two organizations were at the time. Al-Za'īm managed to reach Damascus two or three weeks later to discuss the cell's future plans. In the course of a few meetings, al-Za'īm decided that the regime's increasing pressure in Hama on the organization meant that operations had now to be carried in Aleppo and Damascus. Al-Shurbajī suggested what he thought was the perfect target: Muṣṭafā Jīrū, a suspected spy for the regime. Al-Shurbajī

had observed Jīrū a few months ago and wrote a report concluding that he was not only a spy, but also the source which had led to Ḥadīd's arrest in Damascus the year before. Al-Za'īm refused categorically, explaining that the armed movement would not benefit much from Jīrū's assassination and would unnecessarily attract the regime's attention.

Al-Za'īm instead asked al-Shurbajī to find two Damascenes close to the centres of power, one military and one civilian.[68] He added the requirement that the two be 'Alawis, "since Sunnis are not cornerstones of the regime and easily susceptible to change [their allegiances]." That al-Za'īm preferred to kill two 'Alawis instead of the man responsible for Ḥadīd's death speaks volume for the meaning he conferred to the assassinations. Their violence inscribed a political worldview of confrontation against an oppressive regime onto the bodies of their victims.[69] Carefully selecting the individuals who would be assassinated was a way to construct a narrative of resistance against the *ultimate* sources of the regime's tyranny. In al-Za'īm's view, the perfect subjects for target were not only members of the *mukhābarāt* or the Ba'th party, but also 'Alawis. After all, had Marwān Ḥadīd not said that 'Alawis were unbelievers who subjected Syrians the same way Israel rules Palestine? The killings needed to speak to Syrians' frustrations with the regime and direct their attention to what was the main cause of their oppression. These political assassinations engraved theological injunctions to fight disbelief (*kufr*) and manifestos of revolutionary politics on the bodies of key regime figures. Their deliberate sectarian symbolism was both shocking and disruptive.[70] On February 22nd 1977, al-Za'īm stormed the University of Damascus and fired several rounds with his automatic weapon at Muḥammad al-Fāḍil, the Dean of the university and a prominent 'Alawi lawyer who drafted the 1973 constitutional reforms.[71] On June 19th 1977, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Razzūq, in charge of the missile corps, was gunned down in front of his house.

The regime accused the Iraqi Ba'th regime of being behind these assassinations.[72] But it most likely knew who was really organizing them. The Damascene Brother al-Shamā' was arrested and his house raided by the regime, where they found weapons and documents about the organization.[73] Shortly after, large numbers of fighters were captured in Damascus by the regime, who managed to gather more and more information about the organization. Most prisoners were allegedly tortured to death. Al-Shurbajī and al-Za'īm agreed that training was no longer possible in the short term. But they wanted revenge. The Damascus cell asked for the help of the more experienced Hama cell to conduct a spectacular operation. Improvise explosive devices where sent to various offices of the Ba'th party. Pamphlets mirroring those praising the regime were distributed around the city, with the slogan, "Yes, to freedom, democracy, and the unity of the people; No to disloyalty, treason, and Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad." And when fighters had retreated, multiple explosions resonated throughout Damascus.[74]

4.3 Massacres and The Generation of Death

By mid-1978, the assassinations carried out by Marwān Ḥadīd's group had altered the dynamics of the opposition between the Muslim Brotherhood, other Islamic societies, and the regime. Kidnapping, torturing, and killing local activists were all practices the Asad regime was engaged in before Ghurra was assassinated in front of his house. In a country where the army and politics were deeply intertwined, what was new was the emergence of a military organization from within civil society. Ḥadīd's own experiences, his religious activism in Hama, the regime's shelling of the al-Sultan mosque, his imprisonment, his time with the *fidā'iyyīn*, his frustrations with the direction taken by the Brotherhood, all shaped his decision to organize an armed movement. This movement was also made possible by the interest of many Syrians in armed struggle, first against Israel, and then against the Ba'th regime. Even though these new trends emerged from within the institutions of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, they were in large part distinct and parallel to the worldview of the society's leadership. These developments revealed some new vulnerabilities for the regime and pushed it to react even more fiercely in its attempts to silence civilian opposition. But the most significant rupture the assassinations represented was how it forced activists to rethink the nature of their political engagement. Armed operations brought a whole new vocabulary and grammar from which they could borrow in redefining their resistance to oppression.

The relationship between Ḥadīd's organizations and the leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was complicated from the start. Sa'd al-Dīn's memoirs and interviews offer some insights into how they viewed each other.[75] Sa'd al-Dīn was already forbidden from entering Syria when he became leader of the Brotherhood. However, he was still able to visit Syria secretly many times to meet with leaders of the various branches of the organization. On one of these trips in 1977, he informed members in Hama of his policy that anyone who took part in the activities of Ḥadīd's organization could not remain in the Brotherhood.[76] He also asked that this decision be transmitted to al-Za'īm. A few days later, al-Za'īm met with Sa'd al-Dīn. Al-Za'īm wanted to discuss a proposal that his organization become part of the society, that it acts as the "shield (*dir'*) of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood." He seems to have left a good impression upon Sa'd al-Dīn, who later described him as a determined, organized, and meticulous man. Surprisingly, he did not dismiss al-Zaīm's request out of hand, but instead told him that he would present the question to the Executive Bureau.

Why did Sa'd al-Dīn suddenly question his own directive that the two organizations remain distinct? This question is important, since al-Zaīm and Sa'd al-Dīn subsequently met several times, as the latter himself admitted.[77] Most significant was their meeting in Beirut

in early 1978, where the Executive Bureau heard al-Za'īm's proposal and discussed the relation between the two organizations.[78] A point of contention for the members present was whether military activities would conflict with the society's established approach to activism. For this reason, the Executive Bureau rejected al-Za'īm's idea that Ḥadīd's group merge with the Brotherhood. Instead, they agreed to provide minimal financial support for members of Ḥadīd's organization who were in prison or chased by the regime.[79] In Sa'd al-Dīn's story, it is hard to understand why al-Za'īm went from being completely rejected by the Brotherhood's leadership to having discussions with the Executive Bureau and obtaining financial support. Perhaps there is some truth to the rumours, which Sa'd al-Dīn forcefully rejects, that the Brotherhood was interested in collaborating with Ḥadīd's group in matters of training and weapon supply.[80] Moreover, could Sa'd al-Dīn fail to realize that the organization he was giving money to was behind high-profile assassinations like that of Muḥammad al-Fāḍil?

The Brotherhood's discussions with Ḥadīd's organization happened at the time when a program outlining the society's new vision was being adopted.[81] The motivation for a new programme grew out of a need to "move the society from a stage of preaching through sermons, reports, and gatherings, to a stage of building a programme and planning [for its implementation]." The document stated that the three fundamental missions of the Brotherhood are to spread (*ta'rīf*) the divine command from family members to the rest of the world; to build Islamic institutions (*takwīn*), from local societies to the Islamic state; and to implement (*tanfīdh*) Islam throughout the world. These missions took upon a more concrete meaning when combined with an analysis of the current historical context. Echoing Ḥawwā's language, the document explains that "modern *jāhiliyya* is leading the fight to eradicate the remaining forces of Islam in the land of peace, and elements of *ridda* work to achieve that goal in every Muslim country." In Syria, *ridda* took the form of a tyrannical government by a religious minority. Instead of offering theological arguments that the Ba'th regime violated God's sovereignty, the document offers a political critique of its authoritarian character as the main issue. How should the Brotherhood's missions be carried out in that context?

The answer depends on which stage of its programme the Brotherhood believed it had reached: preparation (*i'adām*), including preaching and building solid foundations for the society; empowerment (*taṭwīr al-quwā*) to oppose forces contradictory to its message; or implementation (*tanfīdh*), including the establishment of Islam's sovereignty (*siyāda*) in the form of Islamic states. In the Brotherhood's opinion, they were still at the first stage, which meant that the organization still needed to focus on its outreach to new members, on teaching its message, publishing works about Islam, building local branches, reaching out to other Islamic organizations, etc. According to this reading, the immediate consequence of the situ-

ation of the society was that any form of active resistance to the Ba'th regime was premature. In particular, any form of jihad was reserved only for the last stage. The Brotherhood was well aware that state surveillance and repression were the most important impediments to their activities, but thought that working around them to gain greater popular support was the path to take. It had thus chosen a strategy different from the one of Ḥadīd's group.

In March 1978, al-Shurbajī was waiting in a car across the street from Ibrāhīm al-Na'āma's house.[82] Al-Na'āma was a member of the National Committee of the Ba'th Party, President of the Syrian-Soviet Friendship Society, and Head of the Federation of Syrian Dentists. He was also a cousin of Ḥafiẓ al-Asad. Half an hour later, al-Na'āma got off his Peugeot 504 and walked towards his entrance door. Hishām Jumbār hurried behind him and fired five shot with his pistol armed with a silencer. "Al-Na'āma fell onto the ground, convulsing, and we were able to retreat quietly." The assassination allegedly shocked the President deeply. He put Nājī Jamīl, who had commanded the Syrian Air Force during the 1973 War, in charge of stopping the killings. Jamīl ordered that anyone suspected of being related to Ḥadīd's organization be arrested and questioned. Through mass imprisonment and torture, he managed to put his hand on a number of important members of the armed movement. Al-Shubarjī himself barely escaped a raid on a safe house where he had originally planned to stay. In his own words, the regime's success was a severe blow to the organization. Nonetheless, the violence of the regime had convinced an even larger number of people to join the armed movement.

Members of Ḥadīd's group were eager to mount a response to the regime's actions.[83] But al-Za'īm urged them to be patient. The regime was on high alert, and any high-profile operation would risk losing even more fighters. Instead, he asked his fighters to carry out acts of destruction on important private and public buildings associated with the regime. The success of these operations made al-Za'īm confident that he could resume the campaign of political assassinations. The murder of Aḥmad Khalīl al-Salmān, a cousin of the President working for the Interior Ministry, brought about a familiar ritual of repression and waves of new members for Ḥadīd's organization, "a new generation of death," as al-Shurbajī put it. Many of these new members were recruited in local Islamic societies.[84] A few weeks later, al-Za'īm informed al-Shurbajī that the organization would decentralize its military command to evade the regime's increasing surveillance.[85] In Damascus, al-Shurbajī was offered a seat on the military committee which was headed by Yūsif 'Abīd. Among the first operations the committee organized in April 1979 was the assassination of the Alawi Attorney General 'Ādil Mīnī, in response to the torture of many suspected members of Ḥadīd's organization.

The regime's increasing repression, in the form of mass imprisonment and systemic torture, led many Islamist activist to quit Syria.[86] When Ḥawwā settled in Jordan, many mem-

bers of the Brotherhood had been arrested a few days before.[87] He had just finished giving lectures in the Persian Gulf, Europe, and the United States. The leadership of the Brotherhood had formally decided to move to Jordan. Ḥawwā was asked to be part of it. The leadership aimed at restoring the organization's institutions within Syria, financially support political prisoners and their families, and develop relations with Islamic organizations outside the country. Probably because of his reputation as an intellectual, Ḥawwā was put in charge of developing relations with international organizations. He flew to Pakistan, where he spoke with al-Mawdūdī and discussed issues regarding the emerging jihad in Afghanistan. He then left for Iran with a delegation in May 1979, shortly after the revolution. Ḥawwā first visited Ebrahim Yazdi, the Foreign Minister of Bazargan's government, with whom he had insightful discussions about the Iranian Revolution. He later sat with Ayatollah Khomeini, who told him that he was following the events in Syria and that he would speak with President al-Asad. Ḥawwā's memoirs suggest that he merely wanted to develop relations and better understand the new Iranian government. It is unclear whether he was looking for Khomeini to help spread his Islamic Revolution into Syria, as some claim.[88]

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's plans and political programme would soon be completely shattered. In the spring of 1979, while Ḥawwā received news of the imprisonment of fellow-members of the Brotherhood with great sadness, Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif was in a state of constant fear in Aleppo, as his wife ʻAzīz Julūd recounts in her memoirs.[89] Al-Yūsif came from a poor family from the small village of Tadef near Raqqa and made a career as an artillery soldier. The young married couple overcame their difficult financial situation through a shared passion for reading and discussing ideas, particularly books about Islam, culture, and politics. They attributed much of their difficulties to the Baʻth regime. Julūd remembers that her husband expressed great frustration at what he perceived to be discrimination in favour of ʻAlawis in the army, visible in the unequal distribution of medals given to soldiers after the war. The disciplinary measures al-Yūsif faced after praying in a moment deemed inappropriate by his assigned officers particularly shocked him. As his relations with his superiors worsened, he met more regularly with his childhood friend, who also shared his frustrations with how the regime treated its Sunni population. In January 1977, his friend suggested that he join a secret movement to fight the Baʻth regime. The movement was Ḥadīd's organization, and the friend, ʻAdnān ʻUqla, would soon become its next leader.

In her memoirs, Julūd encloses a newspaper interview conducted with her husband that reveals the contours of his understanding of the political situation in Syria.[90] When asked to describe the origins of the political movement against the regime, al-Yūsif explains that "we can call the revolution against imperialism the First Revolution; and as for the current one,

it is directed against what followed imperialism, what it left behind." In his view, while the First Revolution was directed against foreigners who could be easily identified by Syrians as unbelievers, the Second Revolution faces more pernicious enemies who wage a secret war against Islam. Accordingly, these apostates (*murtaddīn*) needed to be removed with a jihad even greater than the one Syrians fought against French troops. To support his view, al-Yūsif explains that he took these ideas from the works of a famous Muslim intellectual, from whom he then cites a few lines without providing a name. As it turns out, these lines were taken verbatim from Ḥawwā's *Jund Allāh*.[91] This is one of the best pieces of direct evidence that Ḥawwā's writings were read in Islamic circles across the country.[92] Al-Yūsif's own experiences of discrimination and humiliation within the army, as well as his outrage at the imprisonment and torture of other Sunni comrades, were understood through the lens of Ḥawwā's narrative of a post-colonial apostate regime. Adding Ḥadīd's provocative language, al-Yūsif describes this apostate regime as a foreign occupation introduced in Syria by colonial powers in the same way as Israel occupies Palestine today.

Julūd explains that her husband's mission for Ḥadīd's organization first consisted in writing surveys about the officers from the artillery school in Aleppo where he worked.[93] He also regularly met with local leaders of the organization to discuss his observations and attend religious lessons. The incessant reports of Sunni prisoners being tortured to death in the regime's prisons led al-Yūsif and ʻUqla to construct a plan responding to the repression. They decided to take advantage of al–Yūsif's position at the Aleppo artillery school. In both Judūl and her husband's story, the initial plan was to gather all ʻAlawi recruits and keep them hostage in exchange for Sunni prisoners in the regime's jails. The assailants would be divided into five groups: the first would gather students in the courtyard; the second would take control of the guardhouse; the third would gather ʻAlawi officers in the courtyard; the fourth would find the ʻAlawi general; and the fifth would take control of the radio. On the day of the operation, Al-Yūsif initially managed to get his group inside the school. Relying on his military seniority, he gathered the students in the courtyard. He separated out ʻAlawis from the other cadets. Shortly afterwards, the officers in charge, who were temporarily outside the school, knocked at the main door to come in. Al-Yūsif's comrades rushed to keep them outside. The students started realizing that something odd was happening. For what followed, Judūl alleges that one ʻAlawi student suddenly rushed towards al-Yūsif, forcing a change of plan. Al-Yūsif contends that his group suddenly realized that the regime would never answer their demands. But both versions are barely believable. The plan was never to take hostages. Al-Yūsif yelled, "We are Marwān Ḥadīd's organization, the Muslim Brotherhood!" By the end, around sixty ʻAlawi students were killed before al-Yūsif's group retreated.[94]

Despite being a shocking and unprecedented event, the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre was the culmination of several trends in the escalation of violence. It was a transformation of the logic behind the assassinations ordered by al-Zaʿīm, who targeted figures central to the Baʿth regime of the ʿAlawi faith. The victims were killed as individuals who combined a particular political identity with a specific religious affiliation. Al-Yusīf similarly aimed to kill members of an institution central to the regime, but no longer selected specific political subjects. Instead, he abstracted the power exercised by key individuals from the regime to all members of one of its powerful institution. Al-Yūsif kept the sectarian ethics of killing, but collectivized the guilt and ascribed symbolism to all ʿAlawis related to the regime. This collectivization cannot be separated from the regime's escalating repression at the time, which took the form of mass-imprisonment and torture of suspected members of Sunni religious societies.[95] The sectarian collectivization of the state's violence for domination, which so angered al-Yūsif, was reformulated into a horrific massacre of young ʿAlawi military students.

While the regime withheld any news about the operation for a week, al-Zaʿīm confirmed the massacre to al-Shurbajī three days after it had happened.[96] Al-Zaʿīm explained that no one in the organization was aware that this operation had been planned. This is perhaps not too surprising, given that he had decentralized the decision-making to local military councils. Moreover, nowhere in Judūl and al-Yūsif's accounts are al-Zaʿīm or their local commanders mentioned.[97] In fact, al-Zaʿīm recommended to al-Shurbajī that, "we continue following our initial plan and that we carry out assassination operations, such as hitting members of the *mukhābarāt* from time to time in a disciplined way only." He insisted that they target "central figures of the regime (*ruʾūs al-niẓām*), those who are criminals and responsible (*masʾūlūn*) for everything that has happened." Al-Shurbajī agreed, fearing that the escalation could lead to events like the 1964 shelling of the al-Sultan mosque with Ḥadīd and other activists inside.

The regime directly accused the Muslim Brotherhood of being behind the massacre.[98] Had al-Yūsif not shouted that he was from the Brotherhood? Judūl explained that her husband invoked the Brotherhood to signal ideological affinity, not organizational continuity.[99] This is keeping in touch with Ḥadīd's insistence that his organization was true to al-Bannā's message, something that had struck al-Shurbajī.[100] Appealing to al-Bannā was also in line with al-Zaʿīm's proposal that his organization be "the shield of the Brotherhood." But in reality, the massacre had no immediate connections, both organizationally and ideologically, to the Muslim Brotherhood. Saʿd al-Dīn claims that he knew none of the fighters implicated in the operation.[101] In the same way as Ḥadīd's organization emerged out of the Brotherhood without being its creation, al-Yūsif's operation was an unplanned outgrowth of al-Zaʿīm decentralization tactics. Still, in addition to being a product of the violence imbedded in the

Syrian political climate, the worldview of those carrying out the massacre of young ʻAlawis had been shaped by the writings of the Brotherhood's main intellectual: Saʻīd Ḥawwā.

4.4 Illusions of Grandeur and the Art of Covert Revolts

The leadership of the Brotherhood quickly released a declaration distancing itself from the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre.[102] The declaration reacted specifically to the accusations by the Interior Minister, ʻAdnān Dabbāgh, that the Brotherhood had carried out the attack and the assassinations throughout the country.[103] It refuted these allegations by first reversing the regime's association between the Brotherhood, Israel, Camp David, and any foreign plot. It also noted sarcastically that the regime had previously attributed these attacks to the Iraqi Baʻth regime. The Brotherhood then exposed its own version of what had happened at the artillery school. It claimed that the assailants had left documents explaining that they were from a group calling itself a vanguard (*al-ṭalīʻa*), which was clearly separate from the Brotherhood. It might have been referring to an alleged graffiti painted on the wall of the school saying "The Fighting Vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood – Battalion of Marwān Ḥadīd."[104] The Brotherhood also hinted that, "the imbalance [of power] in Syria between the Alawi-Nusayri ruling sect […] and the other sects […] is perhaps the main reason behind Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif's motivation to take the path which led to this event."

In Ḥawwā's view, despite this declaration, the massacre changed everything for the Brotherhood.[105] Saʻd al-Dīn makes the same point in his memoirs, when he explains that it prevented the Brotherhood from carrying out the new programme it had adopted.[106] It was now impossible for the society to preach its religious vision through speeches, publications, and sermons. What impeded the Brotherhood's activities was the state's subsequent campaign of mass-imprisonment on a scale unseen before. The Brotherhood's new journal *al-Nadhīr* identified 194 Syrians arrested by the regime in its first issue. Human Rights Watch later estimated that at least 6,000 Syrians were detained in the summer of 1979.[107] The regime's imprisonments had completely negated the Brotherhood's efforts to build an experienced leadership. More importantly, the massacre gave a chance to and a justification for the regime's attempt to eradicate the organization. In Saʻd al-Dīn's words, it "gave the regime a public justification as well as the courage and impudence to indulge in murder, and to drown the entire Syrian society into bloodbaths and massacres." This new approach to repression was immediate and spectacular: many Syrians suspected of being members of Islamic societies were quickly executed, including fourteen who feature in Saʻd al-Dīn's memoirs.[108]

The memoirs of Sa'd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā are strangely silent about which course of action the Brotherhood took as a response to the new political context in Syria. The interviews Lefèvre conducted with members of the Brotherhood leave little doubt that by October 1979, the Consultative Council had endorsed an armed resistance against the Ba'th regime.[109] Ḥawwā curiously mentions in his memoirs the central role a man previously unknown to the reader, Abū 'Āmir, played in organizing the Brotherhood's response to the Ba'th regime.[110] But given Abū 'Āmir's responsibilities, it is almost certain that he was in fact none other than Sa'd al-Dīn, something al-Sūrī confirms.[111] However, Sa'd al-Dīn distances himself from the decision to fight the Asad regime by explaining that he was in Indonesia when it was taken.[112] In his memoirs, he describes at length the Brotherhood's diplomatic efforts to gather international attention to the deteriorating human rights situation in Syria.[113] But he and Ḥawwā are visibly uncomfortable recounting how the Brotherhood prepared for an armed resistance movement against the Ba'th regime. The sudden waves of repression and imprisonments also seem to have caught the Brotherhood by surprise, which could explain the confusion surrounding this crucial moment in the history of the Brotherhood.[114]

If traces of an armed resistance cannot be found in the memoirs of important leaders, those of younger members can help us understand some of the ways in which it unfolded. The Palestinian Muḥammad Salīm Ḥammād was 17 years old when he attended a summer camp for fitness and religious lessons run by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in 1977.[115] There, Ḥammād met Syrian Brothers for the first time and heard about their tensed relationship with the Ba'th regime. Many exiled Syrians were running the camp and leading lessons on various topic related to Islam. Ḥammād claims that he attended a lecture given by Ḥawwā, probably in 1978. But the person who really impressed him was 'Adnān Shaykhūnī, who spoke about Syrian politics and the sectarian nature of the Ba'th regime. Ḥammād also heard about Marwān Ḥadīd and his organization, perhaps from Shaykhūnī. After all, Shaykhūnī had taken part in the unauthorized armed groups that had emerged from within the Brotherhood in the mid-1970s.[116] More importantly, when the Brotherhood started its armed struggle against the regime, Shaykhūnī became the leader of its new armed wing.[117]

When the young Ḥammād heard the news of the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre, he took part in heated conversations with Jordanian Brothers about "the sectarian Syrian regime and its injustices and attacks against Islamists."[118] Younger members were impassioned by the cause of their Syrian neighbours, and the recent Iranian Revolution added to their excitement that revolutionary changes were possible. Ḥammād and other members secretly started military training with weapons in preparation for jihad. He also offered his help to the Syrian leaders he knew. Ḥammād was asked to act as a courier between Jordan

and Syria. Conveniently, he had been accepted at the Engineering School of Damascus University. In the first months of 1980, he transmitted messages between the exiled leadership in Jordan, including ʻAlī al-Bayānūnī, who replaced Shaykhūnī as commander after his death in February, and pre-arranged contacts in Damascus.[119] During his first missions, Ḥammād helped the Brotherhood establish a new military branch in Damascus with a leader, Ghālib al-Alūsī, a military commander, Fārūq Abū Tawq, and an intelligence chief, Abū Faraj.

The figures of Ghālib al-Alūsī, Abū Tawq, and Abū Faraj reveal crucial details about the armed struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood that are omitted or erased from Ḥawwā and Saʻd al-Dīn's memoirs. In addition to a retrospective unease with organized violence, this situation also reflects the localized and decentralized nature of how the Brotherhood's armed struggle unfolded.[120] Abū Faraj's real name was Sālim al-Ḥāmid, the youngest son of Muḥammad al-Ḥāmid, the famous *shaykh* from Hama who had taught Ḥawwā and Ḥadīd.[121] Ḥammād speculates that his family relations might have been a reason for the important status he played in the Brotherhood. Part of Abū Faraj's responsibilities included finding safe houses to hide fighters and store weapons. He was also in charge of communications between Jordan and Syria, a unique role Ḥawwā insisted he play. To secure what the Brotherhood needed in Damascus, Abū Faraj contacted the only experienced armed group in the city, Ḥadīd's organization. And the man he spoke with in early 1980 was al-Shurbajī.

To understand the first instance of cooperation between the Brotherhood and Ḥadīd's organization in Damascus, it is important to appreciate the context that al-Shurbajī's cell was in after the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre. Al-Zaʻīm had initiated a number of coordinated attacks in Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus after the first series of imprisonments and assassinations carried out by the regime.[122] The Damascus cell also assassinated Maḥmūd Shaḥāda Khalīl in early August 1979, the president's own neurologist who had allegedly testified that Ḥadīd had died from natural causes. This assassination greatly shocked President al-Asad.[123] On September 17th 1979, al-Shurbajī was waiting for a meeting with al-Zaʻīm, on his way to Damascus from Hama.[124] As usual, Al-Zaʻīm travelled across the country in public buses under a fake identity. When military personnel stopped his bus to control the identity of the passengers on board, he knew they were looking for him. After exchanging fire with soldiers surrounding him, al-Zaʻīm detonated a grenade to avoid being captured.

In many ways, the death of al-Zaʻīm was the most severe blow to Ḥadīd's organization, even more so than Ḥadīd's own death. For members like al-Shurbajī, al-Zaʻīm was the leader who transformed the organization into an effective and disciplined organization implementing Ḥadīd's vision.[125] This appreciation of al-Zaʻīm as the real engineer behind Ḥadīd's organization was shared by Saʻd al-Dīn.[126] In his four years as a leader, al-Zaʻīm had

succeeded in developing competent and independent cells in Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus. The main loss that his death brought about was, in al-Shurbajī's opinion, that coordination among the different provinces was made increasingly difficult. As each local cell was carrying out more attacks, the absence of a uniting figure like al-Za'īm became a problem.[127] The regime's large-scale imprisonments and house searches, often conducted by the army, made the group's activities more dangerous and resulted in large numbers of civilians being imprisoned. The increasing number of recruits also made local cells more vulnerable to imprisonment and disruptive confessions under torture. Some of these new recruits did not fear death, which led to open skirmishes that departed from the organization's previous covert operations. But the different military councils could not agree on how to adjust to this new reality.

By 1980, the military councils changed their name to "the Fighting Vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood." Short publications with this new designation were dispersed in mosques and mailboxes of many cities, denouncing the Ba'th regime.[128] Al-Sūrī claims that the adoption of the name was the idea of 'Adnān 'Uqla, the emerging commander from Aleppo who took part in the Artillery School Massacre.[129] This change reflected in a symbolic way the increasing influence of 'Uqla in the organization.[130] Like Hishām Junbāz, commander in Hama, 'Uqla saw in the escalation of attacks and subsequent regime crackdowns a successful strategy to fight the state. The more civilians were exposed to the fighting and to the state's violence, the more likely the entire population would revolt. In Damascus, however, the military council was in favour of pursuing the guerrilla warfare and the tactics put in place by al-Za'īm.[131] Like his commander Yūsif 'Abīd, al-Shurbajī thought that his cell had too few men, too few weapons, and that the regime was too strong in the capital. However, the combined pressure from 'Uqla, Junbāz, and new local members forced 'Abīd to head a new group that pushed for greater confrontations with the regime. Some of its members were quickly imprisoned by the regime, and their torture led to the capture of 'Abīd.

The imprisonment of 'Abīd was a loss of profound consequences for the Damascus cell. As al-Shurbajī explains, 'Abīd was one of the most experienced members in Damascus and had showed great abilities in leading the military council.[132] For al-Shurbajī, 'Abīd's death was a conclusive illustration of the perils of adopting the escalating approach of 'Uqla and Junbāz in Damascus. Members of the Fighting Vanguard in Damascus needed better weapons, better training, and better preparation. Only a few weeks after 'Abīd's imprisonment, al-Shurbajī had his first meeting with Abū Faraj, who represented the exiled Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.[133] The meeting had been approved by the military councils in Hama and Aleppo, and by 'Abīd before his imprisonment. Discussions with the leadership of the Brotherhood

had been previously conducted by al-Zaʿīm and confined to financial support. Al-Shurbajī's meeting with Abū Faraj represented not only a change in the nature of their cooperation, but also of its geographical scope. In some ways, it was long overdue, given the many members of the Brotherhood in Damascus looking for ways to participate in the armed struggle after their leadership in exile had abandoned them. But in the unique insurgency context of Damascus, for al-Shurbajī, the presence of the Brotherhood in Damascus was bad news.

The Brotherhood was trying to build institutions for the armed revolt that were parallel to the already present cells from the Fighting Vanguard.[134] Abū Faraj first offered al-Shurbajī a large sum of money, saying that the Brotherhood had done the same thing in Hama and Aleppo.[135] However, Abū Faraj asked al-Shurbajī to find and buy three safe houses for the new armed groups from the Brotherhood and keep what would be left from the amount. Al-Shurbajī responded that the Fighting Vanguard in Damascus would benefit more from using the entire sum of money for buying weapons and new safe houses for itself. Developing new armed groups in the city would be costly, ineffective, and would risk further undermining the precarious situation of the Damascus cell. Clearly, al-Shurbajī's reasoning was informed by his recent disastrous experience of how enthusiastic and inexperienced fighters had led to the capture of Yūsif ʿAbīd, the commander-in-chief in Damascus.

The first disagreement in Damascus between the Fighting Vanguard and the Muslim Brotherhood was followed by another familiar one: Abū Faraj was pressuring al-Shurbajī to increase the pace of attacks. This demand from the Brotherhood came after even more ambitious members, such as the military commander Abū Tawq, had been removed by Ḥawwā himself for having planned reckless operations, such as blowing up entire buildings that held Russian personnel advising the regime.[136] Al-Shurbajī was adamant that more attacks carried out by inexperienced fighters in Damascus would lead to a major catastrophe for the fight against the regime. The Brotherhood should instead support experienced leaders to pursue the armed struggle in a disciplined and covert way. There was no need to rush the fight; after all, they had been fighting since 1975 with Marwān Ḥadīd as a leader. Al-Shurbajī's position expressed the unique guerrilla experience of the Damascus cell and his own attachment to the strategic vision of the former leader al-Zaʿīm.[137] The rebellion had a different logic in the capital, which neither ʿUqla from the Vanguard in Aleppo, nor Abū Faraj from the Brotherhood seemed to appreciate. Ultimately, al-Shurbajī's plea to the exiled leadership was successful and Abū Faraj was removed from the negotiation process.[138]

The next man who discussed with al-Shurbajī was Ghālib al-Alūsī, leader of the military branch of the Brotherhood in Damascus.[139] Al-Alūsī was a long-time member of the

Brotherhood and had positive exchanges with Ḥadīd's organization in its earlier years. Unfortunately for him, he was imprisoned for two years after al-Shurbajī's cell assassinated Ibrāhīm al-Na'āma. He joined the exiled leadership in Jordan after his release and now directed negotiations with the Fighting Vanguard in Damascus. Despite winning the sympathy of al-Shurbajī, al-Alūsī still insisted that the Brotherhood establish its own armed groups in the city. Al-Alūsī also proposed that the Damascus cell of the Fighting Vanguard pledge allegiance to the leadership of the Brotherhood. Al-Shurbajī refused for the same reasons, but also added that his cell would become loyal to the Brotherhood if the other cells in Hama and Aleppo did so. This suggests that despite its setbacks, the Fighting Vanguard still had a vertical command structure, whose highest echelons were in Hama and Aleppo.

At the same time as it was failing to reach an agreement with the Fighting Vanguard, the leadership of the Brotherhood was projecting itself as the leading figure of the armed revolt against the Ba'th regime. The Brotherhood published in the middle of 1980 a "Declaration of the Islamic Revolt in Syria." This text meant to express an alternative vision of Syria when the wheels of violence had reached a point of no return. After a failed assassination attempt on President al-Asad the day before, soldiers were ordered on June 27th to kill suspected members of the Brotherhood in their cells of the Palmyra prison.[140] More than 1,000 Syrians were killed and their bodies dumped in a mass grave.[141] On July 7th 1980, the regime passed Law No. 49, whose Article 1 read "Each and everyone belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood is considered a criminal who will receive a death punishment."[142] In this context, Sa'd al-Dīn initiated the writing of a programme for an Islamic revolution in Syria which involved thinkers from all around the Muslim world.[143] Completed in August, the declaration introduced a much longer programme for the country that would follow the Islamic Revolution.[144]

The programme of the Islamic Revolution attacked the Ba'th regime as an oppressive, sectarian, and fascist form of government foreign to the Syrian people. Its vision was articulated through a political theory joining some form of popular sovereignty with the supremacy of God's law: "the first pillar in saving our country and recovering our *umma* — after our faith (*i'timād 'alā*) in God — is the participation of our entire people through its ideas and visions for the future it wishes to pursue." This dual theory of sovereignty could claim that Islam should serve as a foundation for the Syrian state *because* most Syrians were Sunnis. In this way, it reproduced some of Ḥawwā's arguments for the necessity of an Islamic state. Positioning itself against the authoritarian nature of the Ba'th regime, this proposed Islamic state was structured around a constitutional project which shared many similarities with classical liberalism: equality of citizens, respect of political freedoms, separation of powers,

direct elections, protections for minorities.[145] Like Ḥawwā had done in his works, it avoided the term 'democracy' and used *shūrā* instead because of its long Islamic history.

Contrary to what Batatu and Lobmeyer claim, the revolutionary programme did not simply express the interests of a Sunni urban commercial class. Appealing to the familiar idea of Islam as a complete system so dear to Ḥawwā, the programme outlined an economic platform which claimed to stand between Western capitalism and socialism. As Seurat highlights, this economic platform contained several progressive policies, such as agrarian reforms, protections for the public sector, measures to facilitate access to property for workers, and the nationalization of several natural resources.[146] It borrowed ideas developed previously in al-Sibā'ī's *Ishtirākiyyat al-Islām (The Socialism of Islam)*, but also Ḥawwā's *al-Islām*. Moreover, the programme's vision of the future Islamic state included many more dimensions ignored by Batatu and Lobmeyer: military affairs, education, public health, social issues, Arab unity, the Palestinian issue, the Islamic world, and foreign relations. It was an assemblage of a set of ideals, many of which were defined in opposition to the authoritarianism of the Ba'th regime, and were written from within the intellectual traditions of the Brotherhood.[147] These ideals were expressed in a language meant to appeal to a broader Syrian population that would join the struggle against the regime. Whether this was the case is hard to assess, but the Islamic Revolution's programme empowered the Brotherhood in another unexpected way. For members of the Iraqi Secret Services, the programme was a good indication that the Brotherhood had no connections to Khomeini, whose new Islamic Republic of Iran was at war with Iraq. In an interview, Sa'd al-Dīn explained that the programme played an important role in convincing the Iraqi secret services to support the Syrian Brotherhood.[148]

The relations between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th regimes had been strained since Syrian Ba'thists opposing al-Asad had taken refuge in Baghdad in the 1970s.[149] Syria and Iraq's support for opposing regimes during the Iranian Revolution, which extended to Syria's siding with Iran during the First Gulf War, prompted the Iraqi regime to try to take advantage of the ongoing revolt in Syria.[150] Caught in between the two, Jordan chose Iraq, and tolerated the burgeoning world of Syrian rebels near Amman.[151] Members of the Iraqi Secret Services offered the Brotherhood weapons, money, a radio-station called *The Voice of the Mujāhidīn*, and military instruction in Iraq.[152] Sa'd al-Dīn explains that he also met with President Ṣaddām Ḥusayn to briefly discuss the future of a post-revolutionary Syria. After hesitation, the Brotherhood accepted the offer, and most members who later came back from Iraq had had a positive experience training with Iraqi Ba'thist officers. Ḥawwā then conducted religious lessons with the newly trained fighters to complete their preparation. Armed with military and religious training, money, weapons, and a programme for an Islamic Revolution,

the Brotherhood felt powerful and confident in its capacity to confront the Syrian regime.

On the ground in Damascus, this translated into an influx of young fighters and weapons in the group led by al-Alūsī.[153] Al-Shurbajī was immensely worried by the expansion of the Brotherhood's inexperienced armed wing — and he was right. Its fighters were using their money, weapons, and revolutionary programme to loudly recruit new members in the city. Even al-Alūsī was starting to fear that a catastrophe was looming. Then, events unfolded: an informant from the regime helped capture a new fighter, which confessed under torture the locations of three safe houses. The Brotherhood escalated by conducting a large number of operations. The day after, safe houses were raided one after the other, leading to the killing and imprisonment of hundreds of fighters. Abū Faraj was taken prisoners in a raid and tortured to death. Al-Shurbajī implored al-Alūsī to have his men stop their operations and hide. Seeing his armed group crumble, al-Alūsī allegedly decided to quit the Brotherhood for the Fighting Vanguard. But on his way to a meeting at the al-Mansur mosque, a Mercedes rushed towards him and two members of the *mukhābarāt* tried to pull him in. In a chaos of grenades and gunshots, al-Alūsī died along with the Brotherhood's armed wing.[154]

4.5 A Joint Command for Different Revolutions

The disintegration of the Muslim Brotherhood's armed wing in Damascus came at an unfortunate moment in the fall of 1980. In October, the Islamic Front in Syria (*al-jabha al-islāmiyya fī sūriyā*) issued its first declaration. It claimed to be a broad-based union of Islamic societies in the country.[155] The Front also boasted that it had the support of many *'ulamā'* in the country, including its leader Abū al-Naṣr al-Bayānūnī. When it published its charter a month later, it became clear to attentive observers that the Brotherhood was the main organizer behind the Islamic Front, since the charter was almost identical to the programme of the Islamic Revolution. 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn and Sa'īd Ḥawwā also signed the charter as the Islamic Front's commanders. In al-Sūrī's opinion, the Islamic Front was a way for the Brotherhood to extend its support into Syria and present itself as the alternative to the Ba'th regime.[156] Working with influential *'ulamā'* had been a powerful way for Ḥawwā to organize political opposition against the 1973 constitution. In 1980, the Front was the Brotherhood's way to compete with the regime for the support of renowned scholars.[157]

But as the Islamic Front and the Brotherhood's military wing were trying to take root in Syria, the dismantling of al-Alūsī's armed group was an important setback. It is hard to know how significant the Brotherhood's military presence in Hama and Aleppo was in

comparison to Damascus. However, there are reasons to think its leadership was very invested in Damascus. Al-Shurbajī explains that many fighters from the Brotherhood came from other cities to accelerate the fighting in the capital.[158] One of them was ʻUmar Maraqa, who was responsible for one of the groups of young fighters whose ambition and inexperience led to the dismantling of the armed wing. In an interview, Saʻd al-Dīn claims that Maraqa was a commander in Hama and never went to Damascus.[159] But al-Shurbajī is clear in his memoirs that Maraqa was partly responsible for the Brotherhood's catastrophic performance in Damascus, having been killed there by the regime shortly before al-Alūsī. In light of evidence that Maraqa was a senior commander from Hama, it seems that the Brotherhood had aimed to build a powerful armed group in the capital, the heart of the regime.[160]

The Brotherhood's political and military assertiveness in Syria in 1980 created frustrations in the Fighting Vanguard's ranks beyond Damascus. In June, ʻAdnān ʻUqla wrote a furious letter to the exiled leadership.[161] ʻUqla claimed that the Fighting Vanguard was "the true representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in the way of al-Bannā and Quṭb." While the Fighting Vanguard "was the sole one responsible for the historic decision to confront *jāhiliyya*," the Brotherhood had done nothing. How could the Brotherhood be presumptuous enough to ask the Fighting Vanguard to submit to its leadership? Echoing Ḥawwā, ʻUqla declared that jihad in Syria was an individual obligation (*farḍ al-ʻayn*) and asked rhetorically what the Brotherhood's leadership was doing in Jordan. By contrasting its military operations waged inside Syria with the Brotherhood's exiled public relation operations in Jordan, ʻUqla was presenting his movement as the real leader of the armed struggle.

Most of ʻUqla's letter was a response to a series of arguments Ḥawwā had written to convince him to recognize the leadership of the Brotherhood. That Ḥawwā initially sent such a letter to the Fighting Vanguard is another indication of how powerful and confident the Brotherhood felt. It thought it could impose its leadership on an organization that had been fighting on its own for almost five years. Ḥawwā's arguments, which we only have through ʻUqla's response, are interesting because they offer a re-interpretation of the Vanguard's history as an intrinsic part of the Brotherhood. For example, Ḥawwā claimed that Ḥadīd had never left the Brotherhood and that al-Zaʻīm had a formal agreement with its leader, Saʻd al-Dīn. The claims were true, but not in a way that would warrant Ḥawwā's conclusion. ʻUqla dismissed these arguments as fabrications and consistently brought up the fact that the Brotherhood "had not yet fired any bullets in Syria." The Aleppo Artillery School Massacre was another delicate issue, for ʻUqla reproached the Brotherhood for judging the actions of a *mujāhid*, al-Yūsif, from their comfortable villas in Jordan. He even questioned Ḥawwā's appropriation of the funds that other international branches of the Brotherhood were sending

to Syria, since the Fighting Vanguard was the real representative of the Brotherhood in Syria.

The disagreements between the Fighting Vanguard and the Brotherhood seemed unbridgeable. Politically, 'Uqla rejected the Brotherhood's ambition to lead the Islamic Revolution after his organization had been on the frontlines for so long. Moreover, martyrdom was central to 'Uqla's motivation for armed struggle against the regime, perhaps in continuation with Ḥadīd's fascination with death, but also as a result of his many years of fighting. This stood in sharp contrast with the Brotherhood's approach of building political coalitions through delicate diplomatic efforts. 'Uqla repeatedly blamed Ḥawwā for overestimating the negative political and military consequences of armed operations, and downplay the benefits of martyrdom. In addition, contrary to Ḥadīd, 'Uqla had adopted some of Quṭb's worldview of a total fight between God's sovereignty and *jāhiliyya*, which differed from Ḥawwā's narrower vision of a struggle against the hidden forces of *ridda* within the country. Moreover, 'Uqla's reading of the political situation in Syria did not square at all with the programme of the Islamic Revolution. Despite all these differences, the two organizations collaborated together at the end of 1980. Al-Sūrī explains in his book on the revolt that the Fighting Vanguard was suffering substantial losses in Aleppo at the time, with a number of killed fighters reaching as far as 600 killed or more.[162] Having joined the organization in June, his fate most likely followed that of the few rebels who managed to escape.[163] Instead of joining the cells in Hama, or Damascus, they fled to Jordan to join the training camps of the exiled Brotherhood. This new reality profoundly reshaped the landscape of the rebellion.

Al-Sūrī's experiences in the rebellion after he left Syria show how developed the exiled Brotherhood's preparations were for the Islamic Revolution. After a brief stay in Amman, he joined a training camp with other rebels in Baghdad run by officers from the Iraqi army.[164] There, he met veterans from the Egyptian Brotherhood who gave lessons to the young recruits. One of them was 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Alī, a member of the Egyptian Secret Apparatus who had trained Marwān Ḥadīd and his companions in Jordan to fight with the *fidā'iyyīn*. 'Alī gave al-Sūrī courses on explosives and al-Sūrī later became an instructor in Baghdad and Amman. Al-Sūrī's entry into the small world of Islamist militants was quite successful, as he was sent to an elite clandestine paramilitary training in Egypt for urban guerrilla warfare. The institutions developed by the Brotherhood combined the efforts of its branches in different countries, involved three different governments, and mobilized significant resources for the armed struggle against the Ba'th regime. Al-Sūrī would later say that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's training camps were better organized than the Afghan Arabs' camps.

In late 1980, Sa'd al-Dīn, Ḥawwā, and representatives from 'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār's group, who lived in exile in Germany at the time, all met in the city of Medina in Saudi Arabia. They

discussed the possibility of forming a Joint Command (*wifāq*) to oversee the armed struggle against the Ba'th.[165] The respect and influence al-'Aṭṭār still had within the Brotherhood made him a useful figure for the leadership to collaborate with in Jordan. Broadening their popular support within Syria was an essential part of the exiled leadership's approach to the revolution. Another reason for inviting Al-'Aṭṭār's group might have been his positive relations with 'Uqla, which subsequently facilitated the negotiations with the Fighting Vanguard.[166] In al-Sūrī's view, the defeat of 'Uqla's cell in Aleppo and his urgent need of money led him to consider cooperating with the wealthy and well-connected leadership of the Brotherhood.[167] After long discussions involving the three parties in Amman, a Joint Command of twelve people, four from each group, was established, including: Ḥawwā, Sa'd al-Dīn, 'Uqla, and the new leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Huwaydī, from al-'Aṭṭār's group. For many at the time, the appointment of al-Huwaydī was symbolic at best, and Sa'd al-Dīn remained the effective leader of the Brotherhood.[168]

It is very hard to know the extent to which the Joint Command transformed the dynamics of the armed revolt in Syria. The memoirs of Sa'd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā say almost nothing about the matter, perhaps because of the sensitive questions arising from the Brotherhood's direct involvement in military operations and collaboration with 'Uqla, one of the men behind the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre. This makes it hard for historians to reconstruct the evolution of the revolt in 1981 from the perspective of the Brotherhood. Still, documents collected by al-Sūrī uncover a strategy its leadership pursued in continuation with its general orientation of building a large support-base for the revolt in Syria.[169] After declaring the Islamic Revolution, forming the Islamic Front, and building a Joint Command, the Brotherhood attempted to form a coalition with Syrian political parties. Sa'd al-Dīn drafted a plan to initiate this effort which contained a list of points to be agreed upon with other parties concerning the situation in Syria after the Islamic Revolution: a transitional government, a constituent assembly, the reconstruction of the army, and commitments to Palestine, Arab unity, political freedoms, and Islam as the source of legislation.

The Brotherhood's concern with building popular support for the revolution was in line with its political experience, notably Ḥawwā's mobilization against the constitutional reform of 1973. However, it was at odds with the Fighting Vanguard's focus on armed struggle. In March 1981, 'Uqla sent an angry letter to the Brotherhood after discovering its plan to reach out to political parties.[170] For 'Uqla, many of these non-Islamic parties were unbelievers, and it was impermissible to enter into an alliance with them even for the goal of establishing an Islamic state. Moreover, he opposed the idea of a constituent assembly, arguing that it was equivalent to requiring man's permission for God's rule. His repeated use of *jāhiliyya* in

making these arguments suggest that 'Uqla was taking Quṭb's later writings seriously when thinking about the Fighting Vanguard's goals and strategies.[171] In a subsequent letter, 'Uqla continued to criticize the Joint Command for failing to engage in concrete military action by explaining that if failed to carry out the neglected duty (*al-farīḍa al-ghā'iba*), jihad. This was a possible allusion to Muḥammad 'Abd al-Salām Faraj's recently published *al-Jihād: al-Farīḍa al-Ghā'iba*, which argued for overthrowing the Sadat regime through armed jihad.[172]

As the Joint Command experienced difficulties, operations on the ground were more daring and destructive. Al-Shurbajī had agreed to the Joint Command with the hope that it would foster coordination with the Brotherhood.[173] In the spring of 1981, probably as a result of the Brotherhood's financial resources, he received large quantities of weapons from Tamīm al-Shuqaqī, the new leader of the Hama cell. Al-Shuqaqī explained that the regime was deploying levels of violence unseen before in Hama in order to force the rebels into an open confrontation. Large numbers of Hamawis had been taken prisoner, including numerous doctors, engineers, and other liberal professions. He added that while the Aleppo cell was still in a precarious situation following its dismantlement, the Hama cell was becoming stronger. Al-Shuqaqī was confident that his forces could "take control of the city" if he wanted. Nonetheless, he insisted that the organization slow down its activities to preserve its fighters and continue its campaign of targeted assassinations, keeping with the ideals of a guerrilla warfare coordinated across multiple cities like al-Za'īm had developed. In his view, an open confrontation with the army would provide "the criminal al-Asad with a golden opportunity to destroy the city and commit the most heinous crimes against its people." Al-Shuqaqī's suggestions marked the last attempt to renew the spirit of al-Za'īm's military strategy, as he was captured and killed by the regime shortly after meeting al-Shurbajī.

Before al-Shuqaqī's death, al-Shurbajī had agreed with him that the Fighting Vanguard should focus its operations in Damascus. They thought that the repression Hamawis suffered on a daily basis required that the Hama cell transfer some of its fighters to Damascus in order to ease the pressure of the regime in the city. They wanted greater military and financial support sent to the Damascus cell, who could then strike the regime at its heart. With new resources at his disposal, al-Shurbajī started to plan attacks on a scale unseen before. His efforts to smuggle and hide large amounts of explosives were almost uncovered when the regime conducted large raids against safe houses of the Fighting Vanguard in July 1981.[174] The operation led to violent armed confrontations with the Syrian army, during which buildings were destroyed and more than 100 fighters died from both sides. The morale of al-Shurbajī's men was low, but at least they still had the resources to avenge the deaths of their brothers. A year earlier, faced with a similar situation, al-Shurbajī had noticed that

many in his cell were eager to carry out suicide operations against key figures of the regime. At the time, they did not have the means to mount such operations. In the summer of 1981, with the Fighting Vanguard's greater resources, it was possible. The heritage of the guerrilla warfare developed by al-Za'īm, so dear to his second successor in Hama, al-Shuqaqī, and al-Shurbajī in Damascus, had now morphed into a new kind of operation.

On August 17th 1981, an operation named after 'Abd al-Sittār al-Za'īm was put into place.[175] It was meant to be "the biggest operation Syria had ever witnessed until this day." Members of al-Shurbajī's cell scouted the Prime Ministry building to make sure that ministers had gathered there for a special meeting. Once it was confirmed, a large red truck drove towards the entrance of the building. The driver had planned to break through the gates securing the entrance as soon as the guards tried to stop him. To his great surprise, the building was not guarded. He parked the car and looked at the timer. Two minutes left. The driver decided to walk back to the main door, where he still saw no guards. Once he reached the outside, he started running. A few seconds later, 200 kilograms of dynamites and numerous gas cylinders in the red truck went off, and a massive explosion was heard throughout the city. Parts of the building crumbled, killing more than 30 Ba'thist officials.[176]

The regime was completely taken by surprise. Desperate, it set up multiple checkpoints across the city and conducted house searches at gun-point for a full month. Yet, it could not find those behind the attacks. Then, on September 3rd, the operation Yūsif 'Abīd, named after another commander of the Damascus cell, was put into motion. A second car packed with dynamite drove into the Air Force headquarters. The location was particularly symbolic, given that President al-Asad himself had spent his military career in the Air Force, which still operated under his command. The driver of the car was only twenty years old, but he knew he was about to die. Once inside the building, he drove his car towards a group of soldiers, opened the side door, and threw hand grenades at them. After an intense exchange of fire, he was on the ground, hit by multiple bullets. Soldiers and officers approached his body to make sure he was dead. Suddenly, 400 kilograms of dynamite packed in the car went off. More than twenty Ba'thist officials were killed in an instant.[177] On October 5th, a Suzuki carrying 600 kilograms of dynamite blew up a building hosting Russian experts advising the regime. This was not merely al-Za'īm's vision carried out with bombs against regime institutions; it was a tactical use of suicide bombings to destabilize the regime at its core and divert its attention from Hama, a new stage in the group's culture of martyrdom.

Around October 1981, al-Shurbajī met a high-ranking officer who spied for the Joint Command, Khālid al-Shāmī.[178] Al-Shāmī had already been introduced to al-Shurbajī by al-Shuqaqī at the end of 1980, when negotiations for the Joint Command were ongoing.[179] At

the time, al-Shāmī was working with the exiled leadership of the Brotherhood to attempt to resolve its disagreements with the Fighting Vanguard. His connections to the Brotherhood remains a matter of controversy. Sa'd al-Dīn denies that al-Shāmī was anything more than a supporter of Brotherhood who had received small amounts of money from the organization.[180] But his role as an emissary is also mentioned by al-Sūrī.[181] The similarities between al-Shurbajī and al-Sūrī's account of al-Shāmī's activities, added to the Brotherhood's unease with discussing details of their armed struggle, suggest that al-Shāmī was at the centre of the Joint Command's communications in 1981. In fact, in his memoirs, Ḥammad explains that al-Shāmī was one of the few individuals he met in 1980 in Damascus when transmitting sensitive messages from the exiled leadership in Amman.[182] Al-Shāmī's reputation as a successful merchant allowed him to move freely between Jordan and Syria without raising suspicion. But more than a simple courier, al-Shāmī was important for the Joint Command because he headed a secret group of officers sympathetic to the revolution.

We know very little about how the group of officers sympathetic to the revolution was formed. Sa'd al-Dīn suggests that it had existed for a long time and had connections to 'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār's group.[183] As a result, al-Shāmī would have been in contact with the leadership in Jordan when the Joint Command was created, which coincides with al-Shurbajī's first meeting with him. Al-Shāmī's freedom of travel allowed him to contact not only the Damascus cell of the Fighting Vanguard, but also the Hama cell, with al-Shuqaqī and his successor, 'Umar Jawād, as leaders. Al-Shurabjī's meetings with al-Shāmī were precious moments where he could receive news from the Hama cell and the exiled leadership. When the two met in October, al-Shāmī informed him of the latest developments in Hama.[184] Al-Shurbajī was worried, because Jawād did not share his predecessor's admiration for al-Za'īm's approach to guerrilla warfare. Jawād had previously told al-Shurbajī that the regime was killing and torturing so many Hamawis that his cell would soon have to wage an open war to defend the city, regardless of the consequences. Al-Shurbajī had urged him to stick to hit-and-run operations, for fear that it would lead to the deaths of too many fighters and civilians. Al-Shāmī's news were not good. He explained that the recent car bombings in Damascus had led the regime to carry out even greater repression in Hama to provoke the local cell to fight openly in the streets. Al-Shurbajī asked al-Shāmī to tell everyone in Hama to remain quiet and bring him more dynamite to strike the regime in retaliation for its killings in Hama.

Al-Shāmī also briefly told al-Shurbajī about a plan titled, "Ḥasm" (Determination), that the exiled leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood was preparing. The plan did not seem to capture much of al-Shurbajī's attention. He did not mention it again in his memoirs, and the Joint Command did not seem to have asked al-Shurbajī to play a leading role in it. More

generally, while his cell was formally part of the Joint Command, al-Shurbajī was in full control of his men and rarely seemed to coordinate with the exiled leadership. The suicide bombings his fighters had carried out were local initiatives, perhaps done in coordination with the Hama cell, but not with the broader Joint Command, as it is often claimed.[185] So what was the Ḥasm plan and why did al-Sāmī mention it? The secrecy around the plan might explain why it has not been discussed or even mentioned by researchers up to this day. It does not figure in the memoirs of Ḥawwā or Sa'd al-Dīn. Our best source of information is through al-Sūrī, who might have been close to some influential members among the exiled leadership in Amman due his specialized military training.

Al-Sūrī claims that the details of plan Ḥasm as he describes it ultimately trace back to Ḥawwā himself.[186] The plan required that the exiled leadership supply the Hama and Damascus cells with weapons and ammunitions in order to secure a pledge of allegiances (*bay'a*) from their leaders, Jawād and al-Shurbajī. Al-Sūrī seems to think that this first step had been completed, but nothing of this sort is suggested in al-Shurbajī's memoirs. The second step was to establish smaller cells in other cities of the country. The third step was to establish direct communications with the secret group of officers in the army to which al-Shāmī belonged.[187] The fourth step consisted in training and arming large numbers of fighters in Jordan and Iraq. The final step needed to be executed rapidly and precisely. The Damascus and Hama cells would simultaneously push regime forces into an open confrontation in the streets of their cities. Smaller cells dispersed across Syria would do the same, joined by the fighters trained Iraq and Jordan. The secret group of officers would then take advantage of the chaos to stage their coup d'état and take control of the state.

In al-Sūrī's view, the plan's main issue was that key decisions were made by the exiled leadership, which lacked any fighting experience. Moreover, while he estimated the Fighting Vanguard's fighters at around 5,000 in Syria, he thought that fighters in Jordan and Iraq numbered 1,000 at best and were poorly trained. What al-Sūrī could not see was that plan Ḥasm faced an even more fundamental issue: leaders of the Fighting Vanguard had to agree to it. As we know from following al-Shurbajī's cell, it is extremely unlikely that the Brotherhood managed to convince him to openly confront the regime, if they tried at all. Years of fighting had convinced al-Shurbajī that guerrilla warfare was the only way to fight the regime. In his eyes, his campaign of suicide bombings was too successful to be abandoned. On November 29th, one of his men drove a car bomb to the Azbakiyah neighbourhood and killed at least 64 near a complex of intelligence agencies.[188] Al-Shurbajī was committed to relieve the pressure on the Hama cell by striking the regime in Damascus; he was not preparing for plan Ḥasm.

According to al-Shurbajī, what brought plan Ḥasm to an abrupt end was the inexperience

and carelessness on the part of the exiled leadership. This failure is best told through the curious story of Nabīl Ḥabash, whose religious activism represents in many ways the fatal and unbridgeable differences between the Fighting Vanguard and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The recent publication of the sensitive portions of al-Shurbajī's memoirs by activists in Homs allows a reconstruction of important parts of Ḥabash's life in the 1970s. Born in the Maydan neighbourhood, Ḥabash joined the Brotherhood at a young age and integrated a family whose leader was none other than Ghālib al-Alūsī.[189] In this family, Ḥabash also met Ma'mūn Qabbānī, an *'ālim* who gave lessons at the al-Ghawwas mosque.[190] Through the Brotherhood, al-Shurbajī befriended Ḥabash and Qabbānī in 1973, but he stopped seeing them after he joined Ḥadīd's organization.[191] In 1979, Ḥabash and Qabbānī became increasingly interested in the armed operations carried out by a secret organization in Damascus. When they found out that al-Shurbajī was part of the organization, they asked him if they could join Ḥadīd's organization. Al-Shurbajī and other leaders of the group refused, explaining that it would expose Qabbānī's numerous students at the al-Ghawwas mosque to unnecessary risks. This reasoning would soon prove prescient. As discussed above, in 1980, the exiled leadership of the Brotherhood tried to establish an armed wing in Damascus, with al-Alūsī as its commander. When al-Alūsī was killed and the armed wing collapsed, the regime arrested large numbers of Damascenes suspected of having ties to the Brotherhood. Qabbānī and many of his students from the al-Ghawwas mosque were detained and tortured.

Ḥabash was lucky enough to have escaped the regime's campaign of mass imprisonments. He was eager for vengeance, and joined the Damascus cell of the Fighting Vanguard. Al-Shurbajī selected a target and gave him a chance to carry out an assassination. At the last moment, Ḥabash hesitated. He did not think he could do it. After he witnessed raids against safe houses conducted by the regime, Ḥabash secretly left Syria without telling anyone, even his mentor Qabbānī, who had by that point joined the Fighting Vanguard. Ḥabash's travels brought him to Amman, where he was welcomed as a brave combatant by the exiled leadership of the Brotherhood. With this illusory reputation, Ḥabash met Ḥawwā and Sa'd al-Dīn, and started participating in the Brotherhood's armed struggle. He was privy to sensitive information, including the existence of a secret group of officers led by al-Shāmī and their plan to stage a coup. When al-Shurbajī heard of Ḥabash's role in Amman, he sent a message to the Brotherhood warning them of his unreliability, but to no avail. On a trip to Cyprus, Ḥabash was arrested by the regime and quickly confessed the existence of a plot to take control of the state. Al-Shāmī was subsequently arrested, along with 400 officers.

For al-Shurbajī, the most dramatic consequences brought about by the arrest of al-Shāmī in January 1982 was not the end of plan Ḥasm. It was the loss of a crucial courier between

Damascus, Hama, and Amman. Communications with Jawād, the leader of the Hama cell, were cut. After the regime uncovered the officers' plan to stage a coup, the isolation of the Damascus cell and the disorganization of the exiled leadership of the Brotherhood are key features of the rebellion without which the events that followed in early 1982 cannot be understood. Tanks from the Asad regime were amassing around Hama shortly after al-Shāmī had been imprisoned. Al-Shurbajī could not follow how Jawād and his fighters were about to react to the massive deployment of troops in their city. Ḥawwā and Sa'd al-Dīn scrambled to mount an appropriate response. The Hama Massacre was about to begin.

Chapter 5

Epilogue: The Massacre

Broadly, there are two kinds of accounts of the Hama Massacre found in the academic literature. In the first, the massacre is presented as a response made by the Ba'th regime to a large-scale uprising in Hama.[1] According to this version of events, rebels initiated a disruptive uprising by calling out to the townspeople from the city's minarets and distributing to them weapons. Some reports even suggest that they then killed dozens of Bath party officials in their own homes or subjected them to mock Islamic trials.[2] From this perspective, the massacre that ensued was a consequence of the regime's responsive actions in order to regain control of a city that had been overtaken by a powerful armed uprising. The second kind of account of the Hama Massacre focuses on intrinsic features of the Ba'th regime to explain why the brutal political repression it carried out in Hama took the form of mass-killings. One version of this view put forward by Michel Seurat and Yassin al-Haj Saleh relies on Ibn Khaldun's writings to explain the regime's violence as brutal and natural (*ṭabīʿī*) forms of power deployed by a sectarian group (*ʿaṣabiyya*) in order to maintain its control of the state and assert its domination.[3] Another explanation by Salwa Ismail borrows on Foucault's idea of politics as merely another form of perpetual war to highlight how authoritarian regimes can naturally be led to commit massacres.[4] Recently, appealing to Agamben's work on the state of exception, Yasser Munif has described this aspect of the Syrian regime as the suspension of the rule of law for the purpose of reducing opposition to *bare life*, in other words, to humans devoid of political standing who can be killed at will by the sovereign state.[5]

These two kinds of accounts highlight important elements of the Hama Massacre: the presence of an important number of rebels in the city and the brutal nature of the Ba'th regime. However, they also appear to be in tension with one another. Put simply, between the rebels and the regime, who is ultimately responsible for the countless deaths of civilians

in Hama? Did rebels push thousands of Hamawis to their own death by inciting a large proportion of them to take part into a doomed uprising? Or were the mass killings an inevitable consequence of the Ba'th regime's authoritarian nature, regardless how it would be opposed in Hama? Scholars like Nikolaos van Dam resolve this puzzle by claiming that both the regime and the rebels decided to stage a final confrontation in Hama at the exact same time.[6] But this answer immediately raises the further question of why the regime and the rebels would simultaneously make the decision to confront each other in the same city.

The main contribution of this epilogue is to provide a new account of the Hama Massacre by inscribing it in continuity with the narrative of the Islamic Revolution in Syria developed in the preceding chapters. In this final section, the thesis first builds a precise chronology of the weeks leading up to the Hama Massacre from the perspective of the rebels. What emerges from this exercise is a new understanding of the decisions made by rebels in the final moments of the Islamic Revolution. In particular, this chapter suggests that accounts of the massacre built around a call for arms in Hama do not provide a satisfactory explanation of the role of rebels in the moments leading up to the massacre. Instead, I argue that to properly understand the Hama Massacre from the perspective of the rebels, scholars should focus on a little-known call for a rebellion made by the Joint Command itself in Amman and Baghdad six days after the start of the massacre. The resulting picture of the final moments of the rebellion is one of great urgency, despair, and improvisation.

This epilogue also tries to situate the Ba'th regime's actions in Hama by building a parallel detailed chronology of how it dealt with the rebellion. Inscribing the Hama Massacre within the Islamic Revolution from the regime's perspective enriches previous accounts of the massacre centered on the regime's authoritarian nature. I show how the way the revolt unfolded from 1980 shaped the regime's decision to carry out a brutal campaign of repression in Hama two years later on a scale unseen before. In particular, the siege of Aleppo in 1980 ensured that rebels were mostly concentrated in Hama. It also provided a model for how the final eradication of the rebellion in Hama would be carried out. Moreover, this chapter explains how repression in Hama assumed a distinct character in light of the sectarian composition of the regime, the local Sunni majority, and the logic of the rebellion.

Once the Hama Massacre is inscribed within the Islamic Revolution from both the rebels and the regime's perspective, the tensions between previous accounts of the massacre dissolve. Closely following the weeks leading up to these events shows how they should be understood both as a response to the rebellion and as a form of brutal political repression. However, the Hama Massacre was not a response to a specific call for arms issued from the top of the city's mosques. As I argue, it should instead be viewed as an attempt by the regime to

suppress, once and for all, the Islamic Revolution and any form of political dissent in the most abominable and horrific ways. This can be seen in the too often forgotten fact that the massacre began on February 2nd when regime forces tried to invade a specific neighbourhood of Hama *after more than two months of siege of the entire city.*[7] The day-by-day recounting of the Hama Massacre developed in this chapter also confirms that it was an event set in motion by forces way beyond the control of rebels in Hama. The massacre reflected first and foremost the Ba'th regime's horrific brutality, its desperate attempt to quash the six-years old rebellion, and the culmination of sectarian dynamics exacerbated by years of confrontations.

5.1 Hasty Uprising at a Desperate Time

None of the rebels this thesis follows were present in Hama in February 1982. A narrative of the immediate context leading up to the Hama Massacre from the perspective of the rebels can only be done by relying on indirect testimonies of those who watched the events unfold from afar. The writings of al-Sūrī and Sa'd al-Dīn help clarify the crucial series of decisions made by rebels before the Syrian army invaded the city. Most sources highlight that one rebel who played a crucial role during the events leading up to the Hama Massacre was 'Adnān 'Uqla. His status within the Fighting Vanguard had been gaining in importance since he participated in the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre. Assuming a role of leadership within the Aleppo cell, 'Uqla was removed from the battlefield after the almost complete eradication of his cell in late 1980. Perhaps with great frustration, he was then forced to concentrate his efforts on the political sphere, where he negotiated the creation of the Joint Command with the exiled leadership of the Brotherhood. He appears to have stayed in Amman for much of 1981, where he held the title of Head of Military Affairs of the Joint Command.[8] Al-Sūrī, who was moving between the Brotherhood's training camps in Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt at the time, reports that 'Uqla's relations with the leadership of the Brotherhood were very difficult. As discussed in the previous chapter, 'Uqla was vehemently opposed to the Brotherhood's strategy of building a coalition with non-Islamic Syrian political parties. At the end of the year, 'Uqla had enough of his collaboration with the Brotherhood.

In December 1981, 'Uqla wrote a declaration expressing his deep dissatisfaction with the work of the Joint Command and enjoining rebels to dissolve the institution.[9] This letter is important because it marks a breaking point in the attempt to build an inclusive body that could oversee the planning of the revolt and centralize its resources. What upset 'Uqla was the disproportionate place diplomatic efforts to build coalitions was taking in comparison

to direct military campaigns. He claimed that "under the sinister Joint Command, the fight has been transformed from a battle of spilled blood and avenged bullets, to a battle of communication, made up of interviews from newspapers and television, and flowery articles." He still strongly resented the Brotherhood's invitation to non-Islamic parties and accused it of trying to take control of the armed struggle initiated by the Fighting Vanguard for its own agenda. In his eyes, this represented "a distortion of the march of jihad from its original path, which was traced by the greatest commander, our master Muḥammad, peace be upon him; it is the path upon which the martyred brother Marwān Ḥadīd walked and which we must rectify today." As a result, 'Uqla called upon all Muslims, in Syria and beyond, to support the *mujāhidīn* fighting the Ba'th regime on the ground. While his declaration signalled a rupture between the Brotherhood and the Vanguard, it did not end their cooperation, as we will see. 'Uqla's attempt to shift the balance of power towards his own organization ultimately damaged the fragile trust between the two groups at an unfortunate time.

'Uqla secretly travelled to Syria shortly after making this declaration.[10] As al-Sūrī narrates, 'Uqla's goal was to examine the situation in Syria through his own eyes, especially in Damascus and Hama, where the Fighting Vanguard was still present. 'Uqla was worried by the news that the regime had moved troops all around Hama and cut off the city from the outside world a few weeks before it uncovered the officers' plot to stage a coup. He made his way into the city and met with Jawād, the leader of the Vanguard's local cell. Jawād explained how dangerous the situation had become. It appeared to him that the regime was trying to force the fighters into an open confrontation, as it had tried to do in the past. But how it did so was very different this time. It was bombing houses and buildings with artillery and conducting mass arrests of many local residents. Jawād suspected that the army would soon be aware of the locations of most of his fighters' safe houses and would then move to destroy them one after another. If things were left the way they were, the army would destroy large portions of the town, kill and arrest most of its citizens, and decimate the Fighting Vanguard without its fighters being able to confront the regime. Jawād saw only one solution: organize a popular uprising against the regime in Hama and fight the Syrian army. Doing so could lead to a more general rebellion across the country and convince Sunni regime soldiers to defect. Jawād told 'Uqla he was planning the uprising for January 25th.

Al-Sūrī's account of 'Uqla's visit differs from those of Lefèvre and Conduit, who claim that 'Uqla himself initiated the planning for an uprising.[11] It is hard to know exactly who pushed for the uprising, but it is important to remember that local commanders of the Fighting Vanguard like Jawād and al-Shurbajī were powerful figures in their respective cities. Knowing their environment, having fought the regime for many years, and directing fighters

whose lives depended upon their decisions, Jawād and al-Shurbajī would not and could not simply accept the decisions of 'Uqla, who had far less combat experience than them. Where al-Sūrī and Lefèvre agree is that both 'Uqla and Jawād thought it was imperative that the Brotherhood take part in the uprising with their resources and fighters. Jawād wrote a letter to the exiled leadership describing the situation and asking for their urgent help. 'Uqla told Jawād to postpone the uprising and wait for his return after he carried the letter to Jordan.

What happened in Amman when 'Uqla and the Brotherhood discussed Jawād's letter is still a matter of controversy among scholars and rebels. After interviewing members of the Brotherhood, Badaro and Lefèvre concluded that the leadership decided to send a letter back to Jawād asking him to postpone the uprising to better organize their troops. Conduit confirms this version, citing a member of the Brotherhood who claimed that they did not have the resources to support Jawād. Barut also makes this assessment of the Brotherhood's decision, adding that they requested Jawād and his men to leave Hama for their own safety. These reconstructions of how the decision was taken are brief and not entirely satisfactory. Lefèvre claims that the Brotherhood was already planning for a country-wide uprising that it did not want to rush. He cites as evidence a document prepared by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency.[12] However, the document contains many important mistakes that reveal the poor knowledge of the rebellion by its authors.[13] Moreover, the plot that the authors were alluding to was most likely plan Ḥasm, which the leadership had already abandoned when al-Shāmī and the other officers were imprisoned by the regime. After all, it was the failure of plan Ḥasm which further accelerated the Syrian army's siege to Hama. Instead, the context in which the Brotherhood decided to restrain Jawād's ambition to organize an uprising in Hama must have been one of confusion, urgency, and improvisation.

Al-Sūrī provides a more detailed reconstruction of how the Brotherhood came to decide that it would not support an uprising in Hama.[14] While his sharp criticisms of the Brotherhood balance the point of views of members of the exiled leadership, al-Sūrī's account still raises many questions, especially regarding how he was privy to these sensitive details. 'Uqla is said to have met with the Brotherhood on the 25th of January 1982 in Amman. The leader of the Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Huwaydī, told 'Uqla that the Brotherhood would consider sending soldiers to help Jawād in Hama only if 'Uqla swore allegiance to the leadership of the Brotherhood. In al-Sūrī's view, this was a ridiculous condition given the urgency of the situation. However, this condition probably reflected the leadership's reluctance to engage so openly in military operations on the basis of 'Uqla's testimony. After all, he had heavily criticized the Brotherhood and left the Joint Command only one month ago after claiming that they were not committed enough to confronting the regime militarily.

According to al-Sūrī, ʻUqla refused to pledge allegiance and the meeting with the leadership of the Brotherhood ended. To pressure the organization, ʻUqla then circulated among fighters from the Brotherhood the letter Jawād had written about the desperate situation of his men in Hama. The trick worked, and many members of the Brotherhood were now eager to enter Syria and fight alongside the Fighting Vanguard. The leadership had to respond. In al-Sūrī's words, "the leadership set up an improvised committee that formed armed divisions, which it called suicidal (*intiḥāriyya*), that would intervene in Syria if the situation required it." The committee was led by al-Huwaydī, Ḥawwā, and Saʻd al-Dīn. They told their fighters in Jordan that "the letter brought by ʻAdnān ʻUqla had not revealed anything new, we were already aware of what was happening [in Hama], and we have been preparing [an appropriate response] since then." They asked their fighters to wait for their orders as they flew to Baghdad to discuss with the Iraqi government about the appropriate course of action.

Al-Sūrī's claim that the Brotherhood convened with the Iraqi government is plausible given their close collaboration since 1980. It was in Iraq that most fighters were trained and given weapons. Al-Sūrī does not mention any letter sent by the leadership to Jawād in Hama requesting that he suspend his plan to stage an uprising. But the intention behind this letter, as explained by members of the Brotherhood, seems to coincide with the mood that prevailed in al-Sūrī's retelling of the leadership's response after their meeting with ʻUqla: Delay any call for action in order to plan for a general uprising. Given the recent failure of plan Ḥasm, the fact that the leadership took this decision seems plausible. The Brotherhood needed to urgently convene with the Iraqi government *because it no longer had a plan.*

The centrality of the Iraqi government for the planning of the uprising is further illustrated by al-Sūrī's description of ʻUqla's visit to Hama.[15] Before entering Syria, ʻUqla allegedly met with Ṭaha Yāsīn Ramaḍān, who was First Deputy Premier to President Ṣaddām Ḥusayn since 1979 in virtue of their long-standing and trusted relation.[16] Ramaḍān seems to have been the highest official in charge of relations with Syrian rebels at the time. He promised ʻUqla that the Iraqi government would provide any military support required to the Syrian rebels fighting Asad, short of tanks and aircrafts. As al-Sūrī points out, the Iraqi government was more eager than ever to assist the rebels because of Syria's support for Iran in its war against Iraq. The promise of substantial Iraqi support made ʻUqla and Jawād more confident that their fighters in Hama could oppose the Asad regime if provided heavy weapons, and especially if fighters training in Jordan and Iraq later joined them. Despite ʻUqla's profound disdain for any form of cooperation with non-Islamic parties, the benefits of direct military support from the Iraqi government were too important for him to reject. He was not willing to throw away this alliance on the basis that it was a pact with a *jāhilī*

Ba'thist regime who violated *ḥākimiyya*, God's sovereignty, by not applying the *sharī'a*.

After the failure of plan Ḥasm and the start of the siege of Hama, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's decision to convene with the Iraqi government to plan an appropriate response was the single most important decision of the organization prior to the Hama Massacre. Debates around the Brotherhood's responsibility for the massacre usually revolve around the letter sent to Jawād asking him to postpone his uprising.[17] This debate can be observed during the last episode of Sa'd al-Dīn's interview with Ahmad Mansur.[18] It appears that Jawād never received this letter, which has prompted some to question whether it was sent in the first place. Did key members of the leadership, like Ḥawwā and Sa'd al-Dīn, not instead secretly wish for a direct military confrontation with the regime? Did they pretend to send the letter but in fact did not do so, knowing that it would lead Jawād to initiate the uprising against the regime? Like other members of the Brotherhood, Sa'd al-Dīn is clear that the letter was sent to Jawād. In any event, this focus on a single letter is misguided because it is only one part of the Brotherhood's response to the situation. Sa'd al-Dīn confirms that the leadership asked 'Uqla to postpone the uprising and wait until they discussed with the Iraqi government in Baghdad. In reality, the Brotherhood was preparing for an uprising, but wished to control when and how it would be launched in coordination with Baghdad.

One consequence of the Brotherhood's meetings with the Iraqi government was the marginalization of the Fighting Vanguard's role in shaping the revolt outside Hama after January 25th. The Iraqi government rescinded its promise to 'Uqla that they would supply him with the necessary weapons to supply his fighters in Hama.[19] Al-Sūrī also claims that Sa'd al-Dīn prevented the Fighting Vanguard from sending combatants in Aleppo to prepare for a parallel uprising in the city, something which Sa'd al-Dīn denies.[20] Nonetheless, the Brotherhood's greater influence over the Iraqi government created a dynamic which removed 'Uqla from any military planning. In Iraq, control over how it would be directed was carefully vested in the hands of the few key figures of the exiled leadership sitting on the newly formed committee for military affairs. Sa'd al-Dīn explains that he met several high-ranking figures in the Iraqi government in Baghdad, including the President Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, to discuss how far they were willing to support the rebellion.[21] After long discussions, the Iraqi government decided to provide weapons and trucks to facilitate the movement of troops in the desert between Iraq and Syria. It would not help the rebels with any of their own soldiers or with direct military coordination, for fear of the repercussions this escalation could have. According to al-Sūrī, the plan the Brotherhood and the Iraqi government developed first required that fighters from Syria and around the world, including neighbouring countries, the Gulf states, Europe, and the United States, gather in Iraq. When ready, they would join

local cells dispersed in Syria to carry out operations to spread the uprising.

On February 8th, the Brotherhood called for an uprising against the Asad regime.[22] According to al-Sūrī, the Brotherhood's new plan was implemented on February 16th, with most combatants converging towards Aleppo.[23] Al-Sūrī highlights many difficulties faced in its execution: lower numbers of fighters than expected, lack of contacts inside Syria, shortage of weapons, poor training of soldiers, difficult supply-lines, and erratic decision-making from the exiled leadership. It was still remarkable that between their meeting with ʻUqla on January 25th and February 8th, the exiled leadership had managed to draft a plan with the Iraqi government, gather fighters, and distribute weapons. However, the logistics of a large-scale operation of this kind were simply too complicated for the Brotherhood's rushed planning and execution to be successful. So why did the leadership deploy such an ambitious plan with unrealistic expectations? For al-Sūrī, the incompetence and lack of military experience of the exiled leadership was to blame. But it is important to replace the Brotherhood's actions within the dramatic context of the time. The siege of Hama and the fall of plan Ḥasm had created a deep sense of urgency to act, especially, one might presume, for both Ḥawwā and Saʻd al-Dīn, who were from Hama. In retrospect, the most important consequence of the Brotherhood's decision was the delay it created between learning about the situation in Hama on January 25th and its call for an uprising on February 8th.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's late call for arms happened six days after Jawād and his fighters started fighting the regime's troops. With little information about what was going on in Hama, the Brotherhood could not know that the uprising had already commenced on February 2nd.[24] Since the officers' plot to stage a coup had been uncovered by the regime in January, events on the ground were moving too quickly for the Brotherhood to adapt. That their response was both rushed and late is explained by both the failure of plan Ḥasm and the ongoing siege of Hama. More importantly, the Hama Massacre, which also started on February 2nd 1982, had been set in motion by events way beyond the control of the Brotherhood. Not only could the exiled leadership (or even ʻUqla himself) not control Jawād's decisions; the Asad regime was already preparing for the murder of more than 20,000 of its own civilians, to which we now turn.

5.2 Prelude to a Massacre

To better understand the Hama Massacre, it is important to also inscribe it within the Islamic Revolution from the perspective of the regime. Several dynamics were at play when the Syrian

army surrounded Hama in December 1982. The Asad regime had been facing substantial opposition since the late 1970s from many different segments of Syria's civil society, including political parties, professional associations, and even elements from the Ba'th party and the army.[25] The formation of a new government on January 15th was interpreted by Syrians of all horizons as a desperate attempt to deal with the numerous challenges the government faced.[26] As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, dissatisfaction with the regime was especially widespread in Hama. The difficult economic situation in Syria disproportionately affected the private sector in Hama. The Sunni majority in the city felt particularly alienated from a regime whose institutions were dominated by 'Alawis. Nonetheless, the regime's response was much more than an attempt to silence citizens' frustrations with the regime in Hama. It was a new stage in the conflict between rebels and the Asad regime.

The way the revolt developed since 1980 shaped the regime's decision to carry out a brutal campaign of repression in Hama on a scale unseen before. The suppression of the powerful Aleppo cell of the Fighting Vanguard in late 1980 forced the organization to focus its efforts on Damascus and Hama. Since Hama became the city where the Vanguard was the strongest, the regime turned its attention to this remaining centre of the rebellion. The regime's experience in eliminating the organization in Aleppo also provided a model for how the rebellion could be quashed in the other cities. After a series of demonstrations, clashes with security forces, and attacks against governmental and Ba'th party buildings, around 30,000 troops surrounded Aleppo in April 1980 and cut it out completely from the outside world.[27] Residential neighbourhoods were shelled with tanks and houses were systematically searched by units from the Special Forces. In retaliation from attacks on Syrian troops, checkpoints were set up throughout Aleppo, stopping cars and killing any male passengers who seemed older than 15 years old. In August, at least 83 male residents of al-Mashariqa quarter were forced to walk to a nearby cemetery and shot dead next to Ibrāhīm Ḥanānū's tomb. When the occupation ended in February 1981, several hundred civilians had been killed and the city had run out of prisons for all Syrians arrested and tortured by the regime.

An important dynamic of the revolt in the spring of 1981 was that both rebels and the regime were striking their enemy where they thought they were most vulnerable. As explained in Chapter 4, for al-Shurbajī and al-Shuqaqī, the leader of the Hama cell at the time, it was clear that the regime was displaying greater levels of repression in Hama, which it saw as the heart of the rebellion, than in Damascus. In response, al-Shurbajī and al-Shuqaqī decided to carry out spectacular operations in the capital to target key institutions of the regime. This dynamic created new recursive forms of violence whereby repression in Hama was met with reciprocal car bombs in Damascus, and vice versa. While the two kinds of

violence took on different shapes and meanings, they were nonetheless defined by a logic of escalation embedded in the revolt. Ignoring these chronological details about the unfolding of the revolt obscures the evolving approaches to the management of violence by both rebels and the regime. Suicide bombings expressed the fighters' devout dedication to their cause, but also their attempts to affirm the vitality of their armed movement by destabilizing a regime that killed their brothers by the hundreds in Hama. Similarly, in 1981, the regime's violence in Hama assumed a distinctive character it did not have before or anywhere else.

For example, on April 24th 1981, units from the Special Forces and the 47th Brigade carried house-to-house searches in Hama.[28] As one male resident explained, just after midnight, two helicopters landed in a nearby cemetery. Soldiers came out and sealed off the entire neighbourhood. He heard the movement of troops, house searches, gun shots, and cries until 9:00 am in the morning. The man thought that soldiers had fired in the air all night to scare local civilians like they had done the year before. He thought he had been lucky that they forgot to search his house. As he found out later, soldiers had entered every single household of the neighbourhood and asked the men to follow them outside. The men obeyed, probably thinking they risked a few days in prison at worst. At 11:00am, the resident heard his brother crying in the street, shouting, "They didn't leave a man or a boy in the neighbourhood!" As he recounts, "I went downstairs and took just a few steps before coming onto a pile of corpses, then another… I looked at them a long time without being able to believe my eyes. In each pile there were fifteen, twenty, thirty bodies… They were every age from fourteen on up, in pyjamas or galabiya, in sandals or barefoot." Around 350 Hamawis had been killed.

The systematic and arbitrary character of the regime's killings marked them as distinct forms of violence deployed by the regime in Hama. At the same time, it fit the emerging pattern of the regime's approach to repression as a means of fighting rebels in their own cities, like it had done during the 1980 al-Mashariqa massacre in Aleppo.[29] Entering its fifth year of a conflict with a growing field of rebels, the regime was at a loss to mount an appropriate strategy to deal with the revolt. The fragmented and sectarian composition of its coercive institutions only made this failure more dramatic. While the design of these coercive institutions, the army and the secret services in particular, was useful to ensure some forms of loyalty and prevent coup d'états, it was poorly suited to manage popular unrest, which normally requires more inclusive and socially embedded institutions.[30] Such inclusive institutions allow for better intelligence gathering, which was crucially missing for the regime in Hama. Desperate to quash a rebellion about which it had little knowledge, the Asad regime's repression became more brutal and indiscriminate.[31] In return, indiscriminate violence probably deepened the sense of alienation from the state among Hamawis, further

impeding the regime's capacity to gather information about the rebels.[32]

In October 1981, Jawād had already informed al-Shurbajī that the regime was trying to provoke his fighters in ways unseen before in order to force them into an open confrontation.[33] The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's book on the Hama Massacre, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-'Aṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*, provides greater details about the regime's plan to quash the rebellion inside the city once and for all. October was also the month that the regime's security forces started organizing a military intervention in Hama.[34] Branches of the *mukhābarāt*, Special Forces, the Defence Brigades, the 47th Armoured Brigade, and armed militias of the Ba'th party made their way to Hama by early December.[35] Checkpoints were set up throughout the city to check the identities of local residents and collect information about the rebels. Hamawis were subjected to a variety of abuses at these checkpoints: men were insulted, beaten with the butt of guns; women in hijabs were forced to uncover and were harassed; some suspects were told to line up against a wall with hands in the air for hours while soldiers questioned them; and some Hamawis were reported to have had some of their hair and beards forcibly shaved, or even burnt with lighters. Passers-by were sometimes stopped and asked to chant in favour of President Asad, with the threat that they would be tortured or shot if they did not obey.

The checkpoints were merely the first part of a broader plan to comb through the entire city to eliminate any opposition once and for all. Hama was surrounded from every direction by troops, and all roads coming in and out were blocked.[36] With all residents trapped in the city, the regime now only needed to find the rebels. Hamawis were taken from the street for interrogation by the *mukhābarāt*. "Women would inspect their husbands after the Friday prayer, since the regime usually surrounded mosques and forced men inside their military convoys after their prayer in order to extract confessions under brutal torture about the *mujāhidīn*, other citizens, and regime opponents; the men, old and young, would return home broken, holding their shoes in their hands, and incapable of walking with their bloodied and swollen feet." Beating the feet of prisoners with sticks, whips, clubs, and electric cables was one of the most reported form of torture used by the Asad regime.[37]

On the basis of these forced confessions, houses of suspected rebels or their collaborators were identified by the security forces. Al-Sūrī and the Brotherhood allege that the regime would not search these houses, but instead shell them with artillery.[38] The Brotherhood lists fifteen houses that were blown up by the regime with the names of their owners and the neighbourhood in which they were located as examples of a wide-spread pattern. The regime's tactic of bombing houses was one of the reasons why Jawād was so worried that his fighters needed more advanced weapons and help from the Brotherhood to confront the regime. The

Brotherhood distributed official statements accusing the regime of using mortars against civilians through its networks in the Middle East and Europe in late December 1981.[39] The foiled attempt to stage a coup by a secret group of officers only catalyzed a massacre that was already in the making, whether or not there would be a rebellion in the city.

5.3 The 1982 Hama Massacre

The Muslim Brotherhood's report on the Hama Massacre is an attempt to remember and understand what happened between February 2nd–28th 1982. In a voluminous book of four hundred pages, the Brotherhood covered a wide variety of facets and dimensions of the events, which it divides into three sections: Hama before the massacre, a chronology of the events of the massacre, and a series of analyses on important dynamics of the massacre. The numerous details it includes in each one of these sections make it by far the richest source of information about the massacre. While its authors express their opposition to the Asad regime and praise the rebels' resistance as heroic throughout the report, more often than not, their writing emulates the rigour and descriptive tone of reports by human rights organizations. One striking feature of the report is its widespread use of specific names and numbers to meticulously record the unfolding of the massacre. It provides lists about houses of residents that were bombed, individuals who were imprisoned in the different camps, civilians who were killed in the different neighbourhoods, the number of weapons of the different military forces present in the city, etc. However, one important weakness of the report is its almost complete silence about how it gathered the information it presents, which contrasts with the methodology of most human rights organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood's report nonetheless presents an invaluable account of the Hama Massacre and reveals many key dynamics that have not been discussed by scholars until this day.[40]

The following is an attempt to briefly outline how the massacre happened by relying on the Brotherhood's report and other sources. It uses the map of Hama drawn by the Brotherhood to help visualize the movement of troops and the locations of mass-killings. Names of specific neighbourhoods that appear on the map are given in Arabic calligraphy when they are first mentioned, in order to help non-Arabic speakers follow the events by identifying these locations on the map.

In the first hours of a rainy night on February 2nd 1982, 500 members of the Defence Brigade and the *mukhābarāt* raided houses in the al-Barudiyya (البارودية) quarter of Hama (see the map on the next page).[41] They blew up houses in which they suspected members



Figure 5.1: Map of Hama drawn by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (North $\leftarrow\!\prec \oplus \succ\!\rightarrow$ South)

of the Fighting Vanguard were hiding without warning the occupants. However, rebels had been expecting the raid and were ready. They sprung from their hideouts and attacked the regime's troops, forcing them to retreat temporarily from al-Barudiyya. Jawād's men had been preparing for this moment. They pre-emptively attacked the union workers' building across the al-'Asi River in the al-Shari'a (الشريعة) Quarter to prevent additional troops from the Defence Brigade to take part in the raids in al-Barudiyya. At the same time, armed Ba'th party loyalists were proceeding towards al-Barudiyya from the east in al-Sharqiyya (الشرقية). They were ambushed by rebels who awaited them under a bridge and destroyed several of their cars. Some of the party loyalists fired at civilians living in al-Barudiyya and its surrounding. They were surprised when civilians fired back at them with weapons of their own, which delayed the loyalists' attempt to meet the Defence Brigade's forces.

In the Brotherhood's narrative, this rapid series of events marked the first stage of the confrontations between the regime and the rebels. It confirms al-Sūrī's account that Jawād had been expecting and preparing his fighters for a desperate fight against the regime. It also suggests that many civilians took up arms against regime forces when the invasion of al-Barudiyya started. Local residents made the choice to join the armed resistance movement in a dramatic moment for a wide variety of reasons, not necessarily because they sympathized with the Fighting Vanguard. One factor behind this decision was the horrific ways the regime had treated civilians since the start of the siege. After more than two months marked by intimidation at checkpoints, arbitrary arrests, brutal torture, and shelling of residential neighbourhoods, many Hamawis were on fighting the regime on the side of the rebels. The Brotherhood's report suggests that many residents reached the same conclusion as the rebels: That they would rather die fighting than waiting helplessly for their homes to be levelled by shells.[42] After Ba'th loyalists fired at local citizens in al-Bayad (البياض), they allegedly took control of a storehouse in which police forces stored large piles of weapons and distributed them to ensure the protection of their neighbourhood.

The next stages of the confrontation occurred as regime forces realized they faced more resistance than initially planned.[43] Thousands of Syrian armed forces converged with tanks and helicopters towards al-Barudiyya and its surrounding quarters in the morning of February 2nd. Planes flying more troops from Damascus to the western part of Hama were reported by residents. From the east, Special Forces descended upon Ghaba al-Thawra (غابة الثورة), Hayy al-Hamidiyya (حي الحميدية), and 'Uthman al-Hawrani (عثمان الحوراني), neighbourhoods adjacent to al-Barudiyya. Rebels set up barricades in al-Sharqiyya and captured soldiers from the Defence Brigade making their way to the front. Not far away, rebels attacked tanks and heavy armed special forces with rocket-propelled launchers. In the south, rebels climbed

the Finance Directorate building to prevent the *mukhābarāt* from using it to store weapons. Forces from the 47th Armoured Brigade secured the southern part of the city and positioned their tanks to prepare for shelling the city centre. They indiscriminately bombed houses in al-Bayad and Suq al-Shajara (سوق الشجرة). They also secured strategic locations along the Sa'id al-'As Road (ش. سعيد العاص) which runs through Hama from south to north and bordered the west side of al-Barudiyya. The experienced 47th Armoured Brigade also entered from the Aleppo road (طريق حلب) in the north and attempted to isolate al-Barudiyya by taking shelling areas on the other side of the river, such as al-Kaylaniyya (الكيلانية).

On February 3rd, these clashes between regimes forces, rebels, and civilians continued.[44] After succeeding in taking control of a building where regime forces stored weapons, rebels distributed them among Hamawis willing to resist the invasion. Rebels strengthened their defences around al-Shajara and Tall al-Dibagha (تل الدباغة). This important area was on the opposite side of the river and the Sa'id al-'As Road from al-Barudiyya. Regime forces converged towards the area in an attempt to further isolate rebels in al-Barudiyya for a final push. Tanks moved from the barracks (الثكنة) towards the citadel (القلعة), where they encountered resistance from rebels firing with rocket-propelled grenades. More troops moved from al-Bayad and Karam al-Hawrani (كرم الحوراني) to establish outposts on the top of buildings and fire rockets in densely populated areas. Shelling of al-Kaylaniyya in the north by the 47th Armed Brigade continued throughout the day. Heavy fighting in the south was reported as rebels thwarted the army's efforts to move towards al-Shajara. Bombs and rockets were fired at houses, killing civilians hiding from the fighting.

On February 4th, troops from the 21st Brigade, which had taken part in the siege of Aleppo in 1980, made their way to Hama. Combat intensified along the Sa'id al-'As Road.[45] Rebels initially tried to block the road with trees and debris from exploded armed vehicles. But this only prompted regime tanks to intensify their shelling of the neighbouring quarters. Intense fighting took place around al-Kaylaniyya, Zanbaqi (زنبقي), and 'Asida (عصيدة), just on the other side of Sa'id al-'As road from al-Barudiyya. The large number of thanks and helicopters converging towards al-Shajara forced the rebels to retreat to Tall al-Dibagha. The Defence Brigades further pushed the rebels back into the old part of Hama, around al-Barudiyya and al-Hamidiyya, where they were exposed to shells and rockets launched by regime fighters positioned in higher buildings overlooking the city. A shell fell nearby the leader of the Fighting Vanguard in the city, 'Umar Jawād, who later died from his injuries. Rebels were quickly losing ground to the much superior firepower of the regime.

So far, this narrative of the three first days of the Hama Massacre presents the rebels as resisting an invasion of the narrow parts of the city where they were confined after a

siege of two months. It stands in contrast to previous accounts of the massacre viewed as a response to a large-scale uprising in the city. Such accounts typically suggest that Jawād launched a planned uprising on February 2nd by calling local residents to rise up against the regime from speakers installed on the minarets of the town's mosques.[46] No uprising of this kind figures in the Brotherhood's report. One difficulty in including this call for arms in the Brotherhood's narrative is that most minarets in Hama were systematically destroyed by the regime on the first day of the invasion.[47] On the other hand, al-Sūrī mentions Jawād's call for arms from the city's mosques in his brief version of the Hama Massacre.[48] However, it is important to remember that the fighting which started on February 2nd was the beginning of an invasion of al-Barudiyya, where rebels were concentrated, after more than two months of siege. While the Syrian Armed Forces might have been surprised by rebel ambushes, it is simply implausible to describe this resistance as a full-scale insurrection that brought panic to Damascus and shook the regime, as Patrick Seale does in his account. Accordingly, it is possible that Jawād called for an uprising on February 2nd, but the nature of this call was most likely to enjoin Hamawis to defend themselves from an imminent invasion.

Accounts of the Hama massacre insisting on the centrality of an uprising in the city usually add that rebels killed dozens of Ba'th party officials, even staging Islamic tribunals to issue death sentences.[49] These killings are said to have prompted a fierce response from the regime, which culminated in the Hama Massacre. However, the reports of Ba'th party officials being killed in their homes by rebels are hard to believe. They imply that many regime loyalists were still around al-Barudiyya on February 2nd, despite the regime's arbitrary shelling, which had been ongoing for more than two months, and the hundreds of armed rebels in the neighbourhood eager to confront the Syrian Army. Most of these reports trace back to Seale's interviews with regime officials, who might have had an interest in dramatizing the challenges posed by the rebels. Another report making this claim is the dubious document prepared by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency mentioned earlier. More interestingly, Seale cites as evidence of the killing of Ba'thist officials some of the Brotherhood's own statements issued on radio stations from Iraq. But as al-Sūrī explains, these declarations were fabricated propaganda aimed at convincing Syrians to rise up against the Ba'th regime after the Brotherhood's call for arms on February 8th.[50] One possible explanation for the origin of these reports is the killing of many members of the *mukhābarāt* and party loyalists who marched with the Syrian Army towards al-Barudiyya on February 2nd. The deaths of so many regime loyalists and the realization of the strength of the rebels' resistance on the first day of the massacre seems to have caught the regime by surprise. Party loyalists did not play a significant role in the fighting afterwards. Their deaths could have been portrayed by

regime officials as murders of civilians by rebels.

One virtue of the Brotherhood's report over other sources is the vast amount of specific details it includes for each day of the massacre. Moreover, its central thesis that regime forces initially concentrated their fighting around al-Shajara while continuously shelling al-Barudiyya, the quarter where rebels were hiding, is independently confirmed by other sources. Sam Dagher's recent reconstruction of the Hama Massacre on the basis of the testimony of Khaled Khani, who survived the massacre with his mother, describes the early evolution of the massacre in similar terms.[51] Moreover, Khani recounts how regime forces took control of high buildings in the city to fire at civilians with snipers, as does the Brotherhood's report.

A significant event that took place on February 4th was the first organized mass-killing of Hamawis by the regime in new Hama (حماة الجديدة), south of the municipal stadium (الملعب البلدي).[52] A witness to the massacre explained that the regime's armed forces had planned to use the area for their own troops since the space was removed from the fighting. However, after the second day of fighting, many residents had sought refuge in new Hama. Defence Forces reportedly told citizens that they would be safe if they did not oppose any security forces. However, a few hours later, all displaced residents in new Hama were gathered in the middle of a field and shot dead. Houses in the neighbourhood were subsequently raided in a pattern that would soon repeat itself: husbands were executed in front of their families, followed by their older sons, which often included younger children. The Brotherhood gives a list of around 100 Hawamis who died, with their names, ages, and occupations, but estimates that 1,500 were executed in total. A wounded survivor reportedly sought medical attention at a local hospital, where he was stabbed to death by a member of the Defence Brigades.

On February 5th, fighting intensified in Zanbaqi and 'Asida, across the river form al-Barudiyya.[53] After rebels managed to sneak between regime forces and destroy a tank, shelling intensified and numerous houses were bombed. In the Brotherhood's narrative, this period marks the beginning of the complete destruction of Zanbaqi and 'Asida. Near the road leading to Aleppo, rebels were pushed towards al-Sakhana (السخانة) by regimes forces, including war planes firing at them. They made their way back to al-Kaylaniyya at night by moving from house to house, sheltering from air strikes. Regime forces chasing them blew up houses in al-Sakhana one after the other and moved their tanks towards al-Kaylaniyya. On the northern front, rebels destroyed a series of military vehicles by putting munitions on a burning tank, which exploded when two other tanks came close to clear the road.

On February 6th, events unfolded in continuation with those of the previous day.[54] Helicopters brought more troops from Special Forces near the Aleppo Road in the north, Ghaba al-Thawra in the east, and the citadel in the west. Shelling of al-Barudiyya was constant, as

regime forces were trying to make their way into the neighbourhood where most rebels were located. Special Forces entered several houses, killed all male occupants, and used the buildings as advanced bases for the siege. When regime forces made their way into al-Shajara, they divided the area into different zones with cables to avoid getting lost in the narrow alleys of the market. They searched the houses of the first alley, lined up twenty-five men against the wall of the mosque, and shot them dead. In the next alley, they lined up fifteen men next to the mill, and shot them dead. After they had inspected the entire *sūq*, hundreds of bodies laid in the streets of the quarter. Not far from there, soldiers gathered around seventy Hamawis, men, women, and children, in a store selling grains from Aleppo, before firing at them with automatic weapons and setting the store on fire. The Brotherhood collected the names, ages, and occupations of thirty of them. Regime forces then tried to make their way into Zanbaqi and ʻAsida, but they had difficulty moving tanks in the narrow alleys of the neighbourhood and met strong opposition from rebels.

On February 7th, rebels managed to frustrate the regime's attempts to advance in Zanbaqi and ʻAsida.[55] They kept control of al-Kaylaniyya, despite running low on munitions. Rebels relied on improvised explosive devices which they installed at strategic locations in the streets and detonated when tanks came nearby. The regime conquered Tall al-Dibagha but unsuccessfully tried to take control of the strategically located citadel, which oversaw most of the neighbourhoods where fighting was ongoing, including al-Barudiyya.

On February 8th, the Defence Brigades and Special Forces almost succeeded in taking al-Hamidiyya and Ghaba al-Thawra, after a heavy bombardment which destroyed a large number of buildings.[56] Rebels from al-Barudiyya made their way to al-Hamidiyya and helped regain control of the neighbourhood. Areas conquered by the regime the day before, such as Tall al-Dibagha, *sūq* al-Tawil (سوق الطويل), and al-Murabit (المرابط), saw numerous mass-killings of citizens who had been kidnapped from their houses. For example, thirty-five Hamawis were gathered in the store of ʻAbd al-Razzāq al-Rays, were ordered to lie down on the ground, and shot dead one after the other. When rebels lost control of al-Bashura (الباشورة), regime forces entered all houses in the neighbourhood one after the other and killed everyone inside. Entire households were murdered, such as the al-Dabbāgh family, from the father Fahmī to his eight-years old daughter Qamar and his six-years old son Aḥmad.

On February 9th, rebels faced increasing artillery fire in al-Barudiyya.[57] They took advantage of the smoke coming from burning houses to ascend to the top of high buildings without being seen by regime forces. From there, they succeeded in slowing the advance of regime troops in al-Barudiyya. Similarly, in Zanbaqi and ʻAsida, fighting was stalling despite the regime's continuous shelling. Later during the day, news of the mass-killings

reached the world outside Hama. The massacres had already been discussed in Beirut and Israel the day before, but the United States State Department issued a statement expressing its concerns about the unfolding situation in Syria.[58] The Brotherhood's report explains that Hamawis themselves in the al-Wadi area of al-Shajara heard the reports and mounted an uprising against the armed forces around their neighbourhood. Residents of al-Wadi must have already known that mass-killings were happening in the city, since they lived near the neighbourhoods of al-Shajara were Special Forces carried out numerous executions on February 6th. However, it is possible that these residents heard for the first time that similar mass-killings had happened in Hama since February 4th, when more than a hundred Hamawis were killed at the municipal stadium. They battled the Defence Brigades and Special Forces in the area, who were initially taken by surprise, but then managed to quash the rebellion.

From February 10th–12th, the 21st Brigade succeeded in taking control of al-Amiriyya (الأميرية), the quarter north of al-Barudiyya.[59] Rebels were losing grounds on the northern front and facing an increasing number of incursions in al-Barudiyya. The regime was also advancing in 'Asida, which it managed to control almost in its entirety on the 13th. Shortly after, around forty civilians taken from their houses were gathered in a public square and immediately executed by regime forces, most of them from the al-Miṣrī family.

On February 13th through the 15th, the regime took control of small parts of al-Barudiyya after several successful raids. The Syrian army fully captured al-Hamidiyya after house-to-house fighting which destroyed a large number of homes in the neighbourhood.[60] The 21st Brigade and the Defence Brigade then proceeded to gather large groups of men in front of a building. A first group was ordered to line up and face the wall, and soldiers shot them dead. A second group was ordered to place the bodies on their backs in order that they face the sky. Standing in front of the bodies of their neighbours, men from the second group were shot dead by soldiers. The third group was asked to place the bodies in front of them face-to-face. The men were then shot in a similar way by soldiers. Officers ordered that the remaining men be sent to prison instead of being executed after soldiers from the 21st Brigade expressed their disgust at how the killings were conducted. Hundreds of Hamawis were killed the same day in areas to the north of al-Barudiyya by regime forces executing entire households.

Between February 16th to the 18th, rebels tried to concentrate their troops on al-Barudiyya to prevent the regime from entering their stronghold.[61] However, the regime's control of large parts of Hama forced many fighters to remain hidden in the neighbourhoods where they had last fought, such as in al-Kaylaniyya. In neighbourhoods immediately east to al-Barudiyya, soldiers searched houses, rounded up all male residents, gathered them in the al-Sharqiyya mosque, and blew the building up with everyone inside. Communications between rebels

dispersed in different quarters were cut as the Syrian army was using tanks and bulldozers to make its way into al-Barudiyya. The bombardment of the few areas where rebels remained intensified. A school where injured civilians and rebels were seeking shelter was destroyed by regime artillery. In the morning of February 18th, tanks and soldiers made their way into al-Barudiyya, taking cover in destroyed buildings.

From February 19th to 21st, rebels faced an even greater number of tanks making their way into al-Barudiyya.[62] It was increasingly difficult for rebels to fight back against regime forces, since they were running low on munitions that could pierce the tanks' armour. At this point in the Brotherhood's report, daily descriptions of the regime's invasion of Hama are vague and brief, which might reflect the greater difficulties the organization faced in finding survivors who could testify about what happened. Skirmishes between the Defence Brigade and rebels were reported across the city. Regime forces systematically blew up the houses of several streets, as it was regaining most of al-Barudiyya.

Between February 22nd and 24th, the regime consolidated its grip on al-Barudiyya by meticulously bombing buildings in the areas where the remaining rebels were hiding.[63] Regime forces divided the portions of the city still under rebel control into two parts and proceeded to advance with their tanks. Armed with only rifles, rebels were incapable of preventing the Syrian Army's invasions, and many were killed by the tanks' shelling. Survivors hid in the basements of buildings, hoping that the regime would not find them. If they managed to escape the ruins of their hideouts after the Defence Brigade had bombed it, they ran into the streets and across crumbled buildings to find another place to shelter. Some residents who had remained in al-Barudiyya were killed in the most horrible ways, like a pregnant mother from the 'Uthman family, whose womb was cut open by soldiers.

By February 25th, the regime had asserted its total control over the entire city of Hama.[64] For the next three days, mosques still standing were blown up with explosives. The Brotherhood reports the names, locations, and causes of destruction of 61 mosques in Hama during the invasion of the city.[65] Members of the regime forces were freely roaming around the city, looting abandoned and destroyed homes. If they encountered local residents on their way, they either killed the men and imprisoned the women, or simply brought everyone to the nearest prison camp. The regime had set up fourteen prison camps throughout the siege to imprison thousands of civilians.[66] Hundreds of these prisoners died from the poor conditions in the camps and the torture inflicted upon them by the regime. Other prisoners were brought to the Sirīḥayn cemetery, where one survivor described what happened as follow.[67]

> [The regime] ordered us to descend by Sirīḥayn, so we proceeded. The first thing we saw were hundreds of shoes scattered on the ground. It was clear to all of

> us that this meant that hundreds of citizens, the sons of our country, had been killed. Our own deaths were approaching. Shortly after, we were searched, and they took from us every single penny we had, including our watches. Then, members of the regime ordered us to march towards a deep trench that stretched for a long distance in front of us. They ordered a part of the group to descend into another trench next to ours. When I reached the trench, I saw bodies piled on the top of each other, covered in warm blood. It was a horrifying scene which I could not bear, so I turned my eyes away from it and gathered my senses to fight my fear of falling to the ground. What happened was predictable. They fired innumerable bullets at us and everyone fell down in the trenches covered in their own blood. As for those who had descended in the trench, they were shot dead inside the trench. […] My injuries were only light, and God decreed that I would be saved by patiently waiting until the butchers had left the place. I fled with great difficulties because of my wounds. God saved me from the fate of dying under the corpses with the others who were injured.

In the Brotherhood's own estimates, around 25,000 Syrians died during the Hama Massacre.

5.4 Conclusion

To conclude this epilogue, it is important to summarize how inscribing the Hama Massacre within the larger context of the Islamic Revolution sharpens our understanding of what happened in Hama in February 1982. Previous scholarship has tended to present the Hama Massacre as a precipitated response from a regime shaken by the scale of a large uprising in the city. Instead, I have argued that this account should be revised. It is misleading to see a call to arms issued from the mosques of Hama as having caused, led to, or even opened the door to the Hama Massacre. Not only did the siege of Hama long precede the massacre and any real or alleged revolt in the city; the thousands of civilians murdered in their homes and the streets of Hama had very little to do with any kind of uprising. What led thousands of bodies to being dumped in large trenches were the methods used by the Asad regime to crush dissent. My emphasis on the role of the Asad regime in the Hama Massacre aligns with the works of scholars mentioned earlier who analyze the Ba'th regime to explain the origins of the massacre. However, this epilogue shows that the regime's repression in Hama cannot be separated from key dynamics of its confrontations with rebels since 1980. As a result, this chapter argues that the Hama Massacre should be viewed as an attempt by the Asad regime to put an end once and for all to the Islamic Revolution in Syria.

This chapter's reconstruction of the Hama Massacre suggests that the brutal repression witnessed in Hama was a continuation of the regime's approach to the rebellion since the

siege of Aleppo in 1980. This approach first reflected the recursive patterns of violence set in motion by rebels and the regime, when both tried to strike the other where they thought it was most vulnerable. In Hama, the regime's political repression also took upon a new meaning intimately related to the sectarian politics of the regime and the Islamic Revolution. The predominance of ʻAlawis in key positions of power and the oppression of Sunnis was seen by rebels as a fundamental problem of the Baʻth regime. This belief had shaped their decision to initiate the revolution by assassinating ʻAlawi regime officials in 1976. After six years of armed operations targeting ʻAlawis and disproportionate repression of Sunnis, mistrust, fear, and hostility ran high between many Hamawis and the regime. This aspect of the conflict made it difficult for the regime to precisely separate rebels from civilians in Hama. It also made it more tempting to carry out horrific forms of collective punishment.

The effects of years of sectarian violence could also be seen in the regime's choice of troops that would be sent to Hama to crush the revolt. Units with predominantly ʻAlawi officers played a leading role in the fighting and the numerous mass-killings, especially the Defence Brigade, the 47th Armoured Brigade, the Special Forces, and the 21st Brigade.[68] For ʻAlawi soldiers battling a Sunni rebellion entrenched in the narrow streets of Sunni-majority neighbourhoods, the fighting took upon an almost existential nature. From their perspective, they were putting an end to an opposition movement that had at the centre of its political vision to eradicate the ʻAlawis. From the rebels' perspective and that of many residents, ʻAlawi-led troops in Hama were another manifestation of the oppressive rule of a minority-led regime. This sectarian dimension of the regime structured the Islamic Revolution from its inception to the Hama Massacre. It led to the systematic killing of Hamawis in several neighbourhoods, on the presumption of their tacit support for the Sunni rebellion. In sum, the Islamic Revolution and the political conflicts in which it was embedded were essential elements of the historical context that shaped the mass atrocities committed by the regime.

Given that this new account of the Hama Massacre relies on a new understanding of the rebellion as an Islamic Revolution, it is appropriate to summarize here the central findings of this thesis developed in the preceding chapters. The present study has reconstructed the unfolding of the Islamic Revolution in Syria as seen from the perspective of the rebels who carried it out. It began with a new narrative of the life of Saʻīd Ḥawwā, who was the most important intellectual figure of the Islamic Revolution. Through Ḥawwā's biography, we see how Islamic study circles and reformist traditions, more than socio-economic forces, could lead young and intellectually curious Syrians to become involved in Islamic politics at a time of effervescent political debates after the country's independence. Like many other Syrian activists, Ḥawwā and his comrades were forced to rethink their own political engagement

with the rise of the authoritarian Ba'th regime in the 1960s. This was most dramatically experienced in the 1964 Hama Strike, which saw the regime shell protestors in the al-Sultan mosque. Among the protestors who survived the collapse of the mosque was Marwān Ḥadīd. The trajectories that the lives of Ḥawwā and Ḥadīd would take after the Hama strike shed light on the genesis of the two main organizations that would later push for the Islamic Revolution. Ḥawwā went into exile in Saudi Arabia and joined many influential intellectuals within the international Brotherhood movement. From there, Ḥawwā participated in his own way in the evolution of the Brotherhood's ideological orientations by writing his first works on Islam and politics. On the other hand, Ḥadīd was imprisoned by the regime immediately after the strike by the regime. In these prisons, Ḥadīd experienced in the most intimate ways the depths of the regime's violent oppression, which paved the way for the development of his own new approach to Islamic politics in the 1970s.

The second part of this study focused on Ḥawwā's intellectual production in Saudi Arabia. It showed how Ḥawwā's work was an attempt to present Islam as a comprehensive system that provides guidance in the realm of politics, much like other modern ideologies. In developing this idea, Ḥawwā did not merely reproduce theses of Sayyīd Quṭb, as often claimed. Ḥawwā's writings show a thorough engagement with the works of Syrian reformists such as Muḥammad al-Mubārak and Muṣṭfā al-Sibā'ī, as well as with the works of classical scholars like al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn Taymiyya. While his conception of the Islamic state reflects an original engagement with a diverse array of authors, Ḥawwā's interpretation of modern politics in Syria under the Ba'th regime appropriates some of the concepts popularized by al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb, notably the idea of modern politics as a struggle between God's sovereignty (*ḥākimiyya*) and the state of ignorance (*jāhiliyya*). However, Ḥawwā's interpretation of this framework in the case of Syria reflects once again his interest in both contemporary and classical writers. He reframed the fight for *ḥākimiyya* as the need for a second revolution after the country's independence from colonialism in order to liberate Syrians from the oppression of the forces of apostasy (*ridda*). In retrospect, Ḥawwā's reading of Syrian politics, more than his theory of the Islamic state, might explain the popularity of his works, especially *Jund Allāh*. Ḥawwā's own words struck the imagination of a new generation of activists in the 1970s, including militants from the Fighting Vanguard like Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif, who masterminded the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre.

The last part of this study has reconstructed the genesis and unfolding of the Islamic Revolution in Syria. Doing so required a better understanding of the emergence of Ḥadīd's armed movement in 1973 Syria. The story of this armed movement was seen through the eyes of one of its rare fighters who survived the entire revolution, Ayman al-Shurbajī. It is

the story of a group of Syrians coalescing around Ḥadīd that developed a new culture of armed militancy and martyrdom that gradually became at odds with the orientation of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. This culture and experience of armed militancy was born in Jordan alongside the *fidā'iyyīn* fighting the Israeli Defence Forces in the West Bank in 1970. The Brotherhood's involvement in the PLO-led armed struggle resulted in the creation of a small group of experienced fighters who then transposed their armed resistance into the Syrian context. The beginning of the Islamic Revolution in Syria can be seen as a product of the ambitions of these young rebels and the brutal waves of repression waged by the Asad regime. Through rituals of arrests, torture, and political assassinations, the Islamic activism of former members of the Brotherhood had been transformed into a covert revolt to organize the fall of an oppressive regime of unbelievers.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's own involvement in the Islamic Revolution can only be understood as a series of choices forced by the unfolding of the confrontation between Ḥadīd's organization and the Asad regime. Previous studies have presented the Brotherhood as an organization slowly highjacked by radical members from Hama who pushed for an armed conflict with the regime. However, the memoirs of its leader at the time, ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, show how on 1978 the organization was still concentrating its efforts on building a strong associational life in Syria and strengthening its connexions to other international Islamic organizations. It is the situation in Syria which moved the Brotherhood into another direction. Years of fighting and repression led to the emergence of more radical forces within the rebels, who planned for attacks that combined the sectarian logic of their political assassinations with the regime's use of collective forms of repression, especially through torture and mass-imprisonment. Both the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre in 1979 and the shift of name from *Ḥadīd's Organization* to *the Fighting Vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood* represent the culmination of the confrontations between rebels and the regime in the first half of the Islamic Revolution. These events also propelled the armed struggle against the Baʻth regime into a new stage. The subsequent repression that followed forced the entrance of the Brotherhood into the revolt, articulated by a program for the Islamic Revolution that aimed at offering a meaningful political alternative to the Baʻth regime.

Despite their shared goals, the Fighting Vanguard and the Brotherhood never managed to meaningfully combine their forces for the revolt. The unbridgeable differences between an experienced and resource-poor covert guerrilla movement on the ground in Syria and an inexperienced and resource-rich exiled political movement shaped how the Islamic Revolution developed. These tensions are most visible in the Brotherhood's failed attempt to replicate the Vanguard's armed groups in Damascus in 1980, to the great despair of its leader al-

Shurbajī. Tensions were also raised in the works of the young rebel, Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, who moved between the two organizations inside and outside of Syria. In addition to different organizational dynamics, the large-scale repression in Syria carried out by the regime made the revolution a fast-moving historical movement on the ground. When the Vanguard and the Brotherhood formally combined their efforts into a Joint Command in 1981, the escalation of violence from the rebels and the regime put the events largely out of control from the leaders planning the revolt in Amman and Baghdad. The Brotherhood's plan for bringing about the fall of the regime, plan Ḥasm, was uncovered before it could be meaningfully put into place. It is in that context of great urgency that the Brotherhood reacted to their failed plan by rushing a call to arms while the Hama Massacre was ongoing.

A microhistorical approach to the Islamic Revolution in Syria like the one used in this study reveals many complex features of this revolutionary movement that have been ignored in previous studies. Exposing the layers of meaning in the rebels' political actions uncovers new dynamics which have been missed by previous studies that focus on the sectarian nature of the Syrian state and its political economy. In the minds of rebels, the revolution was not a struggle over sectarian differences, economic grievances, secularist inclinations, nor fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. Instead, the Islamic Revolution was at its core a struggle waged by deeply pious activists against an authoritarian exercise of power. For this reason, the narrative of the Islamic Revolution in Syria reconstructed in the present thesis is one of Islamic activism, brutal authoritarian repression, political assassinations, religious manifestos, competing political visions, and evolving approaches to the management of violence. It is a narrative that reflects the multiple rebel perspectives of the revolt, with their conflicting understandings, hopes, visions, disagreements, and decisions. This combination of different agencies gave the revolt a rhythm too fast for anyone to control. The Islamic Revolution was at the same time both the product of the agencies of key rebel and regime figures, and an escalation of political confrontations beyond anyone's reach.

The present study of the Islamic Revolution in Syria helps better appreciate the significance of the Syrian Revolution (2011), which took place more than thirty years later. While the two revolutions had very little in common, the way the regime repressed its population during the Hama Massacre marked generations of Syrians up until the Arab Spring. Activists who took to the streets in 2011 knew that they were exposing themselves to great dangers, either because they had witnessed the brutal repression of the 1980s, or because their parents had warned them about the horrific ways Bashar al-Asad's father had previously crushed any form of political opposition. Nonetheless, distinctive features of the failed Islamic Revolution can help understand why the later Syrian Revolution posed a much more powerful

and fundamental challenge to the Ba'th regime. The Islamic Revolution was set in motion by a narrowly-based covert organization that carried out acts of political violence recreating the regime's sectarian violence. In comparison, the Syrian Revolution was at its core a grass-root movement led by peaceful activists who explicitly opposed any form of sectarian politics. These differences help explain why a broad-based revolutionary movement was built in 2011 and why, despite the regime's attempts to force a sectarian reading of the Syrian Revolution, it was impossible for Bashar al-Asad to silence this movement like his father Ḥāfiẓ had done. The peaceful protesters chanting songs of freedom throughout the country were much more disruptive to the Ba'th regime than the Fighting Vanguard's fighters that killed 'Alawi regime officials. Examining the failures of the Islamic Revolution reveals how powerful the slogans, "Peacefully, peacefully, we only want liberty," and "No to sectarianism, yes to national unity," were when Hamawis marched in the Children of Freedom protest on June 3rd 2011, in a city where old revolutionary ideals had been buried.

Notes

Chapter 1. Introduction

1. A large number of videos from the demonstration can be found online. See, for example, CrAzY-MaN, "بداية مظاهرات حماة نزلة الجزدان جمعة أطفال الحرية 3-6," *Youtube,* June 5th (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4E3s8uSWL98; MrSyria75, "تسونامي حماة جمعة اطفال الحرية 3-6-2011," *Youtube,* June 5th (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUIZ2sbYbH4.

2. See hh8190, "مظاهرات حماة أمام مبنى الحزب جمعة أطفال الحرية 3/6/2011," *Youtube,* June 8th (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4E3s8uSWL98; freesyria20112011, "مظاهرات حماة جمعة اطفال الحرية 3-6-2011," *Youtube,* June 5th (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4E3s8uSWL98.

3. See Agence France Presse, "34 Shot Dead in Hama as Protests Sweep Syria," *Agence France Presse,* June 3rd (2011).

4. See Liam Stack, "At Site of '82 Massacre, Syrians Brave for a New Assault; Protestors Killed Friday in Hama are Mourned, as Tanks Mass Outside the City," *The International Herald Tribune,* June 6th (2011): 6; Céline Hennion, "Hama, "ville martyre" de 1982, rejoint à son tour la révolte syrienne," *Le Monde,* June 7th (2011).

5. See Revo Syria, "مظاهرات مدينة حماة جمعة التحدي6-5-2011," *Youtube,* June 6th (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uf6A0Dg55Lo; Revo Syria, "مظاهرات جمعة التحدي حماة 6 5 2011," *Youtube,* June 6th (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YB6zAVP3BGo.

6. See alhamoui, "حماة|| حي الحاضر|| مظاهرات جمعة التحدي 06.05.2011," *Youtube,* June 6th (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vGJSRqWxhyU.

7. See Revo Syria, "يافطت مظاهرات حماة," *Youtube,* June 6th (2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l36p2i9vdKw.

8. See Shabaka al-Durar al-Shāmiyya, "فعالية ثورية لذكرة مجزرة جمعة أطفال الحرية التي وقعت في مدينة حماة," *Youtube,* June 4th (2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l36p2i9vdKw.

9. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic* (London: Amnesty International Publication, 1983), p. 37. The report was published after the Syrian government failed to respond to this briefing: Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Briefing: Syria* (London: Amnesty International Publication, 1979). See also Amnesty International, *Syria: An Amnesty International Briefing* (London: Amnesty International Publication, 1983); Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1982* (London: Amnesty International Publication, 1982), p. 345–348; Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1983* (London: Amnesty International Publication, 1983), p. 328–331; Human Rights Watch, *Human*

Rights in Syria (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990); Middle East Watch, *Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1991). In 2006, the Syrian Human Rights Committee published their own report about the events Syrian Human Rights Committee, *Majzarat Ḥamā: Shubāṭ (Fibrāyīr) 1982 Jarīmat Ibāda Jamā'iyya… wa-Jarīma diḍḍ al-Insāniyya (The Hama Massacre: Shubat (February) 1982 Crime of Collective Extermination… and Crime Against Humanity)* (Damascus: Syrian Human Rights Committee, 2006), `https://www.shrc.org/?p=8427`. In English, Syrian Human Rights Committee, *Massacre of Hama (February 1982): Genocide and a Crime Against Humanity* (Damascus: Syrian Human Rights Committee, 2006), `https://www.shrc.org/en/?p=20252`.

10. For a discussion of memories, power, repression, and the Hama massacre of 1982, see Salwa Ismail, *The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory, and Government in Syria* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), ch. 4.

11. See Basma Atassi, "Breaking the Silence over Hama Atrocities," *Al-Jazeera* February 2th (2012), accessed August 8, 2019, `https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/02/20122232155715210.html`; Samar Yazbek, *A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution* (London: Haus Publishing, 2012), p. 210–216; Rania Abouzeid, *No Turning Back: Life, Loss, and Hope in Wartime Syria* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), p. 20–25; Sam Dagher, *Assad or We Burn the Country* (New York: Little, Brown, & Company, 2019), p. 240–245.

12. See Deborah Amos, "30 Years Later, Photos Emerge from Killings in Syria," *NPR* February 2th (2012), accessed August 7, 2019, `https://www.npr.org/2012/02/01/146235292/30-years-later-photos-emerge-from-killings-in-syria`. Pictures of the siege can be found here: `https://t.co/9y4ELkD8Jq?amp=1` (accessed August 24th, 2020).

13. See Barā' al-Sarrāj, "Seven Hours in Hama," *Jadaliyya,* February 6th (2012), `https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/25220/Seven-Hours-in-Hama`; Barā' al-Sarrāj, "Hama: Post-Massacre," *Jadaliyya,* March 7th (2012), `https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/25345`. See also al-Sarrāj's book about his own imprisonment in the Palmyra prison: Barā' al-Sarrāj, *Min Tadmur 'ilā Hārfārd (From Palmyra to Harvard)* (Chicago: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016).

14. A good example is Amjad Sālim's detailed discussion connecting the rebels and regimes of the two conflicts. See Amjad Sālim, "Ḥiwārāt al-Asad (Dialogues of Asad)," *al-Jumhuriyya,* February 2nd (2013), `https://www.aljumhuriya.net/ar/821`.

15. Nora Benkorich and Aron Lund were among the first to do so in the first months of the Syrian Revolution. See Nora Benkorich, "La tentation de la lutte armée contre le pouvoir baasiste en Syrie," *Le Débat* 1, no. 168 (2012): 155–167; Nora Benkorich, "Trente ans après, retour sur la tragédie de Hama," *La Vie des idées* February 16th (2012), `https://laviedesidees.fr/Trente-ans-apres-retour-sur-la.html`; Aron Lund, *The Ghost of Hama: The Bitter Legacy of Syria's Failed 1979–1982 Revolution* (Stockholm: Silc förlag, 2011).

16. See Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989), p. 86–87. This discussion of how the Ba'th regime silenced the past is informed by Trouillot's study of power and the construction of history. See Michel-Ralph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).

17. Works on the Syrian Ba'th party published in the 1960s and early 1980s include the following: Kamel Abu Jaber, *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966); Avraham Ben-Tzur, "The Neo-Ba'th Party of Syria," *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 3 (1968): 161–181; Gordon H. Torrey, "The Ba'th: Ideology and Practice," *Middle East Journal* 23, no. 4 (1969): 445–470; Nabil M. Kaylani, "The Rise of the

Syrian Ba'th, 1940–1958: Political Success, Party Failure," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no. 1 (1972): 3–23; Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963–1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1972); John F. Devlin, *The Ba'th Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966* (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1976); Robert W. Olson, "The Ba'th in Syria 1947–1979: An Interpretative Historical Essay (Part One)," *Oriente Moderno* 58, no. 12 (1978): 645–681; Robert W. Olson, "The Ba'th in Syria 1947–1979: An Interpretative Historical Essay (Part Two)," *Oriente Moderno* 59, no. 6 (1979): 439–474; Olivier Carré, "Le mouvement idéologique ba'thiste," chap. 6 in *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, ed. André Raymond (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans, 1980), 185–206; Robert W. Olson, *The Ba'th and Syria, 1947 to 1982: The Evolution of Ideology, Party, and State, from the French Mandate to the Era of Hafiz al-Asad* (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1983).

18. For the colonial *troupes spéciales*, see N. E. Bou-Nacklie, "Les Troupes Speciales: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment, 1916–1946," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25, no. 4 (1993): 645–660; Daniel Neep, *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space, and State Formation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ch. 2. As Bou-Nacklie points out, one needs to be careful in explaining France's recruitment policy in terms of "majorities" and "minorities," for there were no numerical majorities in Syrian and Lebanon at the time. More importantly, the two terms have political connotations related to the emergence of the modern state, which complicates their application to colonial Syria. See Itamar Rabinovich, "The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918–1919," *Journal of Contemporary History* 14 (1979): 693–712; James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of the Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Benjamin Thomas White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East : The Politics and Community in French Mandate Syria* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). For the economic opportunities of the army for 'Alawis, see Eliezer Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 331–340; Alasdair Drysdale, "Ethnicity in the Syrian Officer Corps: A Conceptualization," *Civilisations* 29, no. 3 (1979): 359–374; Michel Seurat, "Les populations, l'état et la société," chap. 3 in *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, ed. André Raymond (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans, 1980), 87–141; Hanna Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance," *Middle East Journal* 35, no. 3 (1981): 331–344. For a discussion of the situation in rural areas, see Jean Hannoyer, "Le monde rural avant les réformes," chap. 8 in *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, ed. André Raymond (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans, 1980), 273–295.

19. For the Ba'th party's ideology appealing to 'Alawis, see Michael H. van Dusen, "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria," *Middle East Journal* 26, no. 2 (1972): 123–136; Devlin, *The Ba'th Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966*, ch. 3; H. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), ch. 38; Carré, "Le mouvement idéologique ba'thiste"; Mahmud A. Faksh, "The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force," *Middle East Studies* 20, no. 2 (1984): 133–153; Hanna Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), ch. 11; Nikolaos van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, 4th ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), ch. 2. For the economic situation of Syria in the 1950s leading to the creation of a public school system and a new salaried class, see Rizkallah Hilan, *Culture et développement en Syrie et dans les pays retardés* (Paris: Anthropos, 1969), ch. 10; Élisabeth Longuenesse, "The Class Nature

of the State in Syria: Contribution to an Analysis," *Middle East Research and Information Project*, no. 77 (1979): 3–11; Élisabeth Longuenesse, "L'industrialisation et sa signification sociale," chap. 10 in *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, ed. André Raymond (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans, 1980), 327–358; Raymond Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), ch. 3; Raymond Hinnebusch, *Syria: Revolution from Above* (New York: Routledge, 2001), ch. 2. For 'Alawis and the new public school system, see Seurat, "Les populations, l'état et la société"; Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1989), ch. 3; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 142; Fabrice Balanche, "'Go to Damascus, My Son'," chap. 4 in *The Alawis of Syria: War, Faith, and Politics in the Levant*, ed. Michael Kerr and Craig Larkin (Oxford University Press, 2015), 79–106. For the class struggle developing from the late 1940s until the 1960s, see Steven Heydemann, *Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946–1970* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), ch. 2–3.

20. For the increasing importance of the army in Syrian politics since independence, see Gordon H. Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military 1945–1958* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964); Amos Perlmutter, "From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba'th Party," *The Western Political Quaterly* 22, no. 4 (1969): 827–845. For the Ba'th party's history leading up to the 1963 Revolution, see Monte Palmer, "The United Arab Republic: An Assessment of Its Failure," *Middle East Journal* 20, no. 1 (1966): 50–67; Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963–1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis*, ch. 1–2; Nājī 'Alūsh, *al-Thawra wa-l-Jamāhīr: Marāḥil al-Niḍāl al-'Arabī wa-Dawr al-Ḥaraka al-Thawriyya 1948–1961 (The Revolution and the Masses: Episodes in the Arab Struggle and the Role of the Revolutionary Movement, 1948–1961)*, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī'a li-l-Ṭabā'a wa-l-Nashr, 1973); Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics*, 2nd ed. (Yale: Yale University Press, 1987); Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 1–6; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, ch. 12.

21. See Ben-Tzur, "The Neo-Ba'th Party of Syria"; George M. Haddad, *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States — Part I: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan*, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara: University of California, 1971), ch. 4; Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963–1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis*, ch. 3–8; Raymond Hinnebusch, "Local Politics in Syria: Organization and Moblization in Four Village Cases," *Middle East Journal* 30, no. 1 (1976): 1–24; Olson, "The Ba'th in Syria 1947–1979: An Interpretative Historical Essay (Part Two)"; Raymond Hinnebusch, "Political Recruitment and Socialization in Syria: The Case of the Revolutionary Youth Federation," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11, no. 2 (1980): 143–174; Élisabeth Picard, "La Syrie de 1946 à 1979," chap. 5 in *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, ed. André Raymond (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans, 1980), part 2; Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Political Elite, 1966–1976: A Spatial and Social Analysis," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no. 1 (1981): 3–30; Raymond Hinnebusch, "Syria Under the Ba'th: State Formation in a Fragmented Society," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (1982): 177–199; Faksh, "The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force"; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 7; Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria*, ch. 6; Eberhard Kienle, "Entre jama'a et classe. Le pouvoir politique en Syrie contemporaine," *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 59–60 (1991): 211–239; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, ch. 12; Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, ch. 2; Raymond

Hinnebusch, "Sectarianism and Governance in Syria," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 19, no. 1 (2019): 41–66.

22. For the sectarian discourse of Sunni dissidents, see Alasdair Drysdale, "The Asad Regime and Its Troubles," *Middle East Research and Information Project* 12, no. 110 (1982); Hans Günter Lobmeyer, "Islamic Ideology and Secular Discourse: The Islamists of Syria," *Orient* 32, no. 3 (1991): 395–418; Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, ch. 7; Raphaël Lefèvre, "The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's Alawi Conundrum," chap. 6 in *The Alawis of Syria: War, Faith, and Politics in the Levant*, ed. Michael Kerr and Craig Larkin (Oxford University Press, 2015), 125–138.

23. See Heydemann, *Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946–1970*, ch. 4–5.

24. See ibid., ch. 7.

25. See Michel Chatelus, "La croissance économique : mutation des structures et dynamisme du déséquilibre," chap. 7 in *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, ed. André Raymond (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans, 1980), part 2.

26. These numbers and the following come from Longuenesse, "L'industrialisation et sa signification sociale," part 3.

27. See Françoise Métral, "Le monde rural syrien à l'ère des réformes (1958–1978)," chap. 9 in *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, ed. André Raymond (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans, 1980), part 1; Raymond Hinnebusch, *Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba'thist Syria: The Political Economy of Rural Development* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989), ch. 2. The description of the new Ba'th regime's agricultural policies comes from Métral's article.

28. See Hanna Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren," *Middle East Research and Information Project* 12, no. 110 (1982); Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, ch. 22; Volker Perthes, *The Political Economy of Syria under Asad* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995), p. 103–105, 135–139.

29. See Hinnebusch, *Syria: Revolution from Above*, ch. 5.

30. See Fred H. Lawson, "Social Bases for the Hama Revolt," *Middle East Research and Information Project* 12, no. 110 (1982); Bassam Haddad, *Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), ch. 3–4.

31. See Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren."

32. The usual demarcation between political science being concerned with *revolutions* and sociology with *social movements* is much less strict since McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly popularized the umbrella term "contentious politics." See Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, "Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolutions," chap. 10 in *Comparative Politics*, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 260–290; Jack A. Goldstone, "Social Movements or Revolutions? On the Evolution and Outcomes of Collective Action," chap. 6 in *From Contention to Democracy*, ed. Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 125–145; Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Sidney Tarrow, "Contentious Politics," chap. 4 in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 86–107; Jack A. Goldstone and Daniel P. Ritter, "Revolutions and Social

Movements," chap. 39 in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, 2nd ed., ed. David A. Snow et al. (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2019), 682–697. For a general discussion of structural accounts of revolutions in political science, see Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, "Structural Theories of Revolution," chap. 2 in *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997), 71–98. Structural accounts are also sometimes referred to in the historiography as "third generation theories of revolution": see Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolutions: The Third Generation," *World Politics* 32, no. 3 (1980): 425–453; Jack A. Goldstone, "The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions," *Annual Review of Sociology* 8 (1982): 187–207; John Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?," *Sociological Inquiry* 11, no. 1 (1993): 1–20; Jack A. Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 139–187. One finds similar theorizing in sociology in the "classical" or "political process" theories of social movement: see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff, "Introduction: Social Theory, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology," chap. 1 in *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*, ed. Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 15–22; and Steven M Buechler, *Understanding Social Movements: Theories from the Classical Era to the Present* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2011), ch. 8.

33. For a similar discussion of some limitations of state-centric approaches, see Jeff Goodwin, "State-Centered Approaches to Social Revolutions: Strengths and Limitations of a Theoretical Tradition," chap. 1 in *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 21–24.

34. Since the 1990s, political scientists and historical sociologists working within the structural tradition expressed doubts about the project of explaining social changes by appealing only to structures and ignoring more micro-level factors. See Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," *Politics & Society* 17, no. 2 (1989): 115–162; Eric Selbin, "Revolutions in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In," chap. 5 in *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997), 118–132; Ira Katznelson, "Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in Comparative Historical Social Science," chap. 8 in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 270–302; Adams, Clemens, and Orloff, "Introduction: Social Theory, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology," p. 22–30; Elisabeth S. Clemens, "Afterword: Logics of History? Agency, Multiplicity, and Incoherence in the Explanation of Change," chap. 17 in *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*, ed. Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 493–515; Jack A. Goldstone, "From Structures to Agency to Process: The Evolution of Charles Tilly's Theories of Social Action as Reflected in His Analyses of Contentious Politics," *The American Sociologist* 41, no. 4 (2010): 358–367.

35. See Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power* (London: Saqi, 2013), p. 85–86; Saʿīd Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)* (Cairo: Dar al-Tawfiq al-Namūdhajiyya, 1987), p. 138.

36. Sewell was one of the firsts to raise this objection to Skocpol: William H. Jr. Sewell, "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," *Journal of Modern History* 57, no. 1 (1985): 57–85. See also Swidler's influential claim that culture is a "tool kit" from which people construct "strategies of action": Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (1986): 273–286. See also Jack A. Goldstone, "Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, and the Process of Revolution," *Theory and Society* 20, no. 4 (1991): 405–

453; Jeff Goodwin, "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions," *Theory and Society* 23, no. 6 (1994): 731–766; John Foran, "Discourses and Social Forces: The Role of Culture and Cultural Studies in Understanding Revolutions," chap. 8 in *Theorizing Revolutions*, ed. John Foran (London: Routledge, 1997), 197–220; Adams, Clemens, and Orloff, "Introduction: Social Theory, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology," p. 37–45. The New Cultural History movement of the same period also set out to study cultures and the various forms they took in specific historical contexts. For an important collection of essays setting out a program for the New Cultural History, see Lynn Hunt, "Introduction: History, Culture, and Text," chap. 0 in *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California, 1989), 1–22. See also Peter Burke, *What Is Cultural History?*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

37. For a discussion of the importance of culture in Islamic militant group, see Thomas Hegghammer, "Introduction: What Is Jihadi Culture and Why Should We Study It?," chap. 1 in *Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists*, ed. Thomas Hegghammer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–21.

38. See Yahya Sadowski, "Reviewed Work: The Islamic Struggle in Syria by Umar F. Abd-Allah," *Middle East Journal* 38, no. 1 (1984): 148; Nikolaos van Dam, "Reviewed Work: The Islamic Struggle in Syria by Umar F. Abd-Allah," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 18, no. 1 (1984): 58–59.

39. See also his Itzchak Weismann, "The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis, and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37 (2005): 39–58. For the intersection of Sufism and reformism in Syria, see also Eric Geoffroy, "Soufisme, réformisme et pouvoir en Syrie contemporaine," *Égypte/Monde arabe* 29 (1997): 11–22; Paulo G. Pinto, "Soufisme, pratiques morales et espace public en Syrie," *Revue du monde musulman* 115 (2006): 155–171; Paulo G. Pinto, "Le sacré dans la ville : Soufisme, subjectivités religieuses et identité urbaine à Alep," *Maghreb – Machrek* 198, no. 4 (2008): 42–52.

40. Talhami and Rabil extend this analysis up to the Islamic revolt in Syria. See Ghada Hashem Talhami, "Syria: Islam, Arab Nationalism and the Military," *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 4 (2011): 110–127; Robert G. Rabil, "The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood," chap. 5 in *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement*, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 73–88.

41. See also Raphaël Lefèvre, "Révolution et violence en Syrie : L'héritage des Frères musulmans," *Maghreb – Machrek* 213 (2012): 55–71.

42. See Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," chap. 1 in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3–30.

43. In some sense, this study can be seen as a reversal of Fernand Braudel's *histoire totale*. See Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1949); Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966); Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV^{e}–XVIII^{e} siècle : Les structures du quotidien*, vol. 1 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967); Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV^{e}–XVIII^{e} siècle : Les jeux de l'échange*, vol. 2 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1979); Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV^{e}–XVIII^{e} siècle : Le temps du monde*, vol. 3 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1979). See also his publications on methodologies in history: Fernand Braudel, "Histoire et Sciences sociales : La longue durée," *Annales. Économies, sociétés, civilisations* 13, no. 4 (1958): 725–753; Fernand Braudel, *Écrits sur l'histoire* (Paris: Flammarion, 1969). The similarities between structural explanations in

social sciences and Braudel from the French *Annales* movement is exemplified in this article by the sociologist Jack A. Goldstone in a volume on the fiftieth anniversary Braudel's *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen a l'époque de Philippe II*: Jack A. Goldstone, "The *Longue Durée* and Cycles of Revolt in European History," chap. 7 in *Early Modern History and the Social Sciences: Testing the Limits of Braudel's Mediterranea*, ed. John A. Marino (Kirksville: Truman State University Press, 2002), 169–190.

44. This is why Ginzburg and Poni stress the importance of using proper names in historical research. See Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni, "La micro-histoire," *Le Débat* 10, no. 17 (1981): 133–136; Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni, "The Name and the Game: Unequal Exchange and the Historiographic Marketplace," chap. 1 in *Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe*, ed. Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 1–10. Microhistory arose in response to the predominance of Braudel's structural approach in the French *Annales* movement. See Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929–89* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); André Burguière, *L'école des Annales: Une histoire intellectuelle* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2006). For the origins of microhistory, see Anne Jacobson Schutte, "Carlo Ginzburg," *The Journal of Modern History* 48, no. 2 (1976): 296–315; Giovanni Levi, "On Microhistory," chap. 5 in *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, ed. Peter Burke (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 97–119; Carlo Ginzburg, "Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know about It," *Critical Inquiry* 20, no. 1 (1993): 10–35; Edoardo Grendi, "Repenser la micro-histoire?," chap. 10 in *Jeux d'échelles : La micro-analyse à l'expérience*, ed. Jacques Revel (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 233–243; Jacques Revel, "Micro-analyse et construction du social," chap. 1 in *Jeux d'échelles : La micro-analyse à l'expérience*, ed. Jacques Revel (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 15–36; Dale Tomich, "The Order of Historical Time: The *Longue Durée* and Micro-History," chap. 1 in *The Longue Duree and World-Systems Analysis*, ed. Richard E Lee and Immanuel Wallerstein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 9–34; Matti Peltonen, "What Is Micro in Microhistory?," chap. 8 in *Theoretical Discussions of Biography*, ed. Hans Renders and Binne de Haan (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 105–118. Among the earliest works of microhistory are Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou, village occitan de 1294 à 1324* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975); and, first written in Italian, Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller* (London: Routledge / Kegan Paul, 1980).

45. Levi makes this point quite explicitly: Levi, "On Microhistory," p. 99–102. The title of Revel's edited volume conveys this idea elegantly: *Jeux d'échelles*. See also Giovanni Levi and Olivier Christin, "Les usages de la biographie," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 44, no. 6 (1989): 1325–1336; Matti Peltonen, "Clues, Margines, and Monads: The Micro-Macro Link in Historical Research," *History and Theory* 49 (2001): 347–359.

46. See Levi, "On Microhistory," p. 97–98; Ginzburg, "Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know about It," p. 23.

47. The parallel between Geertz and microhistory has been highlighted and discussed by Levi, "On Microhistory."

48. The question of the relation between social sciences — more often called "theory/ies" after the 1970s — and history became extremely important for many historians after the decline of Braudel's popularity in the 1970s, what some have called the "Third Generation" of the *Annales*. See Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929–89*, ch. 4; Burguière, *L'école des Annales: Une histoire intellectuelle*, part III. See also an interesting text by the editors of the *Annales* in 1989 problematizing the relationship between theory and history: Les Annales, "Tentons l'expérience," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 44, no. 6 (1989): 1317–1323. For examples of post-1970s works on theory and history, see Peter Burke, *History and Social Theory*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 2005); William H. Jr. Sewell, *Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

49. See Carlo Ginzburg, "Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method," *History Workshop Journal* 9, no. 1 (1980): 5–36; see also the French translation: Carlo Ginzburg, "Signes, traces, pistes : Racines d'un paradigme de l'indice," *Le Débat* 6, no. 6 (1980): 3–44.

50. Here are a few examples of Social Movement Theory being used in the study of Islamic movements: Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Janine A Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Line Khatib, *Islamic Revivalism in Syria* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Abdullah al-Arian, *Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

51. The framing processes literature builds on the sociologist Erving Goffman's work: Erving Goffman, *Framing Analysis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). For examples, see David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–481; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611–639; David A. Snow, "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields," chap. 17 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 380–412; David Snow and Scott Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements," *Mobilization: An International Quaterly* 12, no. 2 (2007): 119–136.

52. I believe that the theoretical limitations imposed by the framing process literature also inform al-Anani's interdisciplinary approach to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and, in particular, to how the organization's institutions produce a certain form of identity, *ikhwanism*, which is essential to understanding the Brotherhood's longevity. See Khalil al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 2, 7.

53. See Ginzburg, "Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know about It," p. 23–24.

54. See also Peter Burke, "History of Events and the Revival of Narrative," chap. 12 in *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, ed. Peter Burke (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 283–300.

55. See Hayden White, "The Burden of History," *History and Theory* 5, no. 2 (1966): 111–134; Hayden White, "The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory," *History and Theory* 23, no. 1 (1984): 1–33.

56. See Roland Barthes, "La mort de l'auteur," *Manteia* 5 (1968).

57. For a short history of postmodernism, see Perry Anderson, *The Origins of Postmodernity* (London: Verso, 1998).

58. See for example Keith Jenkins, *Re-Thinking History* (London: Routledge, 1991); Keith Jenkins, *Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline* (London: Routledge, 2003); Beverley Southgate, *Postmodernism in History: Fear or Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Willie Thompson, *Postmodernism and History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

59. The following article was originally published in Italian in 1982: Carlo Ginzburg, "Proofs and Possibilities: Postcript to Nathalie Zemon Davis," chap. 4 in *Threads and Traces: True False Fictive*, ed. Carlo Ginzburg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 54–71.

60. For White's relativism, see Hayden White, "Interpretation in History," *New Literary History* 4, no. 2 (1973): 281–314; Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," *Critical Inquiry* 7, no. 1 (1980): 5–27. For Ginzburg's discussion of White, see Carlo Ginzburg, "Just One Witness: The Extermination of the Jews and the Principle of Reality," chap. 11 in *Threads and Traces: True False Fictive*, ed. Carlo Ginzburg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 165–179.

61. See ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Mā Qabla al-Ta'sīs wa-ḥattā ʻām 1954 (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – From before the Foundation until the year 1954)*, vol. 1 (Amman: Dar Ammār, 2006); ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Min Raḥīl al-Shīshaklī ilā al-Infiṣāl (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – From the Departure of al-Shishakli to Secession)*, vol. 2 (Amman: Dar Ammār, 2006); ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Baʻthī (al-ʻAlawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Baʻthist (Alawi) Rule)*, vol. 3 (Amman: Dar Ammār, 2007); ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Sanawāt al-Majāzir al-Murʻiba (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Years of Terrible Massacres)*, vol. 4 (Amman: Dar Ammār, 2008); ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-ʻAlāqāt al-Siyāsiyya li-Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān fī Thamānīniyyāt al-Qarn al-ʻAshrīn (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Political Relations of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s)*, vol. 5 (Amman: Dar Ammār, 2009).

62. See `https://homsrevolution.wordpress.com/2011/10/09/sharbaji-memos-1/`.

63. See Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Musʻab Al-Suri* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

64. The Syrian Human Rights Committee published an English translation of Ḥammad's memoirs in 2017. See Muḥammad Salīm Ḥammād, *Tadmur: Witnessed and Observed* (Damascus: Syrian Human Rights Committee, 2017), `https://www.shrc.org/en/?p=29107`.

65. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria.*

66. The Syrian Human Rights Committee's reliance on the Brotherhood's report can be seen by the list of massacres it provides and by how it discusses them. See Syrian Human Rights Committee, *Majzarat Ḥamā: Shubāṭ (Fibrāyīr) 1982 Jarīmat Ibāda Jamāʻiyya… wa-Jarīma diḍḍ al-Insāniyya (The Hama Massacre: Shubat (February) 1982 Crime of Collective Extermination… and Crime Against Humanity).*

Chapter 2. Street Activism and Mosque Politics

1. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 5.

2. See ibid., p. 130–132.

3. See Chris Kutschera, "L'opposition démocratique et la difficile intégration du mouvement islamique," *Le monde diplomatique,* March (1983): 12–13.

4. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 7.

5. See Mohamed al-Dbiyat, *Homs et Hama en Syrie centrale* (Damas: Presses de l'Institut Français au Proche-Orient, 1995), ch. 1. For a history of Hama until the Crusades, see Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ṣābūnī, *Tārīkh Ḥamā* (Cairo: Mu'assasat Hindāwī li-l-Ta'līm wa-l-Thaqāfa, 2013).

6. See James A Reilly, *A small town in Syria : Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002), ch. 1.

7. See Thomas Philipp, "The Economic Impact of the Ottoman Rule in *Bilad al-Sham*," in *Syria and Bilad al-Sham under the Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq*, ed. Peter Sluglett and Stefan Weber (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 101–114.

8. See Karl K Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), ch. 1.

9. Hourani used the term "politics of the notable" for the first time in this article: Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 41–68. This article figures in this collection Hourani essays: Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). For the paradigm of the notables applied to the Levant during the Ottoman and Mandate periods, see Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758*, ch. 2; Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860–1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Seale also used it in his study of post-independence Syria: Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics*. For discussions of the paradigm of the notables, see Philip S. Khoury, "The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited," *Revue du monde musulman* 55–56 (1990): 215–232; James L. Gelvin, "The "Politics of Notables" Forty Years After," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 40, no. 1 (2006): 19–29.

10. See Ruth Michal Roded, "Tradition and Change in Syria During the Last Decades of Ottoman Rule: The Urban Elite of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama, 1876–1918" (PhD diss., University of Denver, 1984), ch. 2; Reilly, *A small town in Syria : Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, ch. 2, 6.

11. See Dick Douwes, *The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), ch. 3; Reilly, *A small town in Syria : Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, ch. 2. For a discussion of official religious positions in Ottoman Syria, see Roded, "Tradition and Change in Syria During the Last Decades of Ottoman Rule: The Urban Elite of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama, 1876–1918," ch. 4. For the 'Aẓm rule in Damascus, see Abdul-Karim Rafeq, *The province of Damascus, 1723-1783* (Beirut: Khayats, 1966).

12. See Jean-Paul Pascual, "La Syrie à l'époque ottomane (le XIX^{e} Siècle)," chap. 2 in *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui*, ed. André Raymond (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de recherches et d'études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans, 1980), 31–53; Douwes, *The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression*, ch. 7; Reilly, *A small town in Syria : Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, ch. 5.

13. See ibid., p. 109–112. For a look at the legal status of tenants and sharecroppers on arable land in Ḥanafī law in Ottoman Syria, see Sabrina Joseph, *Islamic Law on Peasant Usufruct in Ottoman Syria: 17th to early 19th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

14. See Douwes, *The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression*, ch. 8.

15. See Pascual, "La Syrie à l'époque ottomane (le XIX^{e} Siècle)," par. 70–74; Reilly, *A small town in Syria : Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, p. 113–114. For the 1858 Land code, see Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "The Application of the 1858 Land Code in Greater Syria: Some Preliminary Observations," in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1984), 409–421.

16. See Pascual, "La Syrie à l'époque ottomane (le XIX^{e} Siècle)," § 3; Reilly, *A small town in Syria : Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, ch. 6; Abdul-Karim Rafeq, "The Economic Organization of Cities in Ottoman Syria," chap. 4 in *The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950*, ed. Peter Sluglett (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 104–140.

17. See Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Syria: The Desert and the Sown* (London: William Heinemann, 1907), ch. 10.

18. See Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945*, p. 60–66.

19. See Hannoyer, "Le monde rural avant les réformes," par. 60.

20. See Jean Gaulmier, "Note sur la propriété foncière dans la Syrie centrale," *Bulletin mensuel du Comité de l'Asie française* 309 (1933): 130–137; Anwar Naaman, "Précisions sur la structure agraire dans la région de Homs-Hama," *Bulletin de l'Association des Géographes Français* 208 (1950): 53–59.

21. See Jean Gaulmier, "Notes sur le mouvement syndicaliste à Hama," *Revue des études islamiques* 6 (1932): 95–125.

22. See Reilly, *A small town in Syria : Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, p. 55, 66, 72.

23. See Nikolaos van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 21.

24. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 7–10.

25. See ibid., p. 7–11.

26. See ibid., p. 22.

27. See ibid., p. 11–12.

28. For a portrait of al-Ḥawrānī, see Jonathan Owen, "Akram al-Hourani: A Study of Syria Politics, 1943–1954" (PhD diss., The John Hopkins University, 1992); Elizabeth F. Thompson, *Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), ch. 8.

29. In addition Thompson's portrait of al-Ḥawrānī, see Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers*, p. 728–729; Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945*, p. 426; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, ch. 10.

30. See Joel D. Parker, "The Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani Revolt and Syrian Youth: An Insider's Account," *The Journal of Middle East and Africa* 6, no. 2 (2015): 147–163. For 'Uthmān al-Ḥawrānī's support to Fawzī al-Qāwuqjī in the 1925 Hama rebellion, see Owen, "Akram al-Hourani: A Study

of Syria Politics, 1943–1954," p. 22; Laila Parsons, *Commander: Fawzi Al-Qawuqji and the fight for Arab independence, 1914-1948* (New York: Hill / Wang, 2016), p. 263. For the Great Hama Revolt, see N. E. Bou-Nacklie, "Tumult in Syria's Hama in 1925: The Failure of a Revolt," *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 2 (1998): 273–290; Michael Provence, *The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), ch. 5; Parsons, *Commander: Fawzi Al-Qawuqji and the fight for Arab independence, 1914-1948*, ch. 2.

31. See Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military 1945–1958*, ch. 4–7; Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics*, ch.5 10.

32. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 19–20.

33. See ibid., p. 16–18.

34. See Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 126.

35. See Thompson, *Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in the Middle East*, p. 221.

36. See Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood and the 'Struggle for Syria', 1947–1958: Between Accomodation and Ideology," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 3 (2004): p. 140–142. See also Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945–1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology," *Middle East Journal* 65, no. 2 (2011): 213–233.

37. See Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī, "al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn," chap. 1 in *al-Aḥzāb al-Siyāsiyya fī Sūriyā* (Damascus: Dār al-Ruwwād, 1954), p. 31–32.

38. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 22–24.

39. See Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), ch. 5. For a thorough biography of al-Afghānī, see Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

40. For a biography of Muḥammad 'Abduh, see Mark Sedgwick, *Muhammad Abduh* (New York: Oneworld Publications, 2014).

41. See Charles C Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muḥammad 'Abduh* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1933), ch. 5–7; Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, ch. 6; Harun Nasution, "The Place of Reason in 'Abduh's Theology" (PhD diss., McGill University, 1968). For example, 'Abduh argued in his *Risālat al-Tawḥīd (Treatise on the Unity of God)* that the existence of God is knowable by both reason and revelation.

42. See David Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), ch. 2; Itzchak Weismann, "Between Ṣufi Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A Reappraisal of the Origins of the Salafiyya from the Damascene Angle," *Die Welt des Islams* 41, no. 2 (2001): 206–237; Itzchak Weismann, "The Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya and the Salafi Challenge in Iraq," *Journal of the History of Sufism* 4 (2003): 229–240.

43. See Basheer M. Nafi, "Abu al-Thana' al-Alusi: An Alim, Ottoman Mufti, and Exegete of the Qur'an," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34 (2002): 465–494.

44. For Ibn Taymiyya, see ʻAbd al-Ḥakīm Ibn Ibrāhīm Maṭrūdī, *The Ḥanbalī school of law and Ibn Taymiyyah : Conflict or Conciliation* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Christopher Melchert, "The Relation of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya to the Ḥanbalī School of Law," chap. 2 in *Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya*, ed. Aliana Kokoschka, Birgit Krawietz, and Georges Tamer (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 146–161; Kokoschka, Krawietz, and Tamer, *Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya*. For a discussion of Ibn Taymiyya's student Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) and his rejection of *taqlīd*, see: Abdul Rahman Mustafa, "Introduction," chap. 0 in *On Taqlid: Ibn al-Qayyim's Critique of Authority in Islamic Law*, ed. Abdul Rahman Mustafa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1–60.

45. See Basheer M. Nafi, "Salafism Revived: Nuʻamān al-Alūsī and the Trial of the Two Aḥmads," *Die Welt des Islams* 49, nos. 49–97 (2009).

46. For Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān, see Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). The latter had been a student of Muḥammad Ibn ʻAlī al-Shawkānī, see Bernard Haykel, *Revival and Reform in Islam: the Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

47. See Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria*; Itzchak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

48. For ʻAbd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī's anti-colonial struggle, see Raphael Danziger, *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1977). For a recent biography of his life, see Tom Woerner-Powell, *Another Road to Damascus: An Integrative Approach to 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri (1808–1883)* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017). For his religious circle in Damascus, see Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria*, ch. 2; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus*, ch. 6; Woerner-Powell, *Another Road to Damascus: An Integrative Approach to 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri (1808–1883)*, ch. 5.

49. See Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria*, ch. 2–3; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus*, ch. 6, p. 275–282; Weismann, "Between Ṣufi Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A Reappraisal of the Origins of the Salafiyya from the Damascene Angle."

50. See Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria*, ch. 5–6.

51. See ibid., ch. 7.

52. See Elizabeth F. Thompson, "Rashid Rida and the 1920 Syrian-Arab Constitution: How the French Mandate Undermined Islamic Liberalism," chap. 15 in *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates*, ed. Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan (London: Routledge, 2015), 244–257.

53. See Henri Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).

54. For example, ʻAbd al-Karīm al-Sharastānī (d. 1153), and later Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406), used *al-salaf* to refer to scholars who took a specific position in the question of the status of God's attributes (*ṣifāt*). They claim that *al-salaf* affirmed some attributes of God, like knowing, power, and living, but preferred literal readings of the relevant verses without interpretations derived through reason. See Tāj al-Dīn Abū al-Fath Muḥammad Ibn ʻAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, *Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-Niḥal* (≈1127), p. 25, 76; Ibn al-Khaldūn, *Muqaddima* (1377), II, p. 36–37. For a discussion of the

debate about God's attributes, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), ch. 2.

55. One issue stemmed from the need to interpret two kinds of conflicting verses: those denying that God is like humans in any respects (*tanzīh*) such as "Nought is there like Him" (42:9); and those likening God to humans in some respects (*tashbīh*) such as "The hand of God is over their hands" (48:1).See W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey* (Edinburgh: University Press Edinburgh, 1985), ch. 14. For Ibn Ḥanbal's views on anthropomorphism, attributes, and reason, see Wesley Williams, "Aspects of the Creed of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal: A Study of Anthropomorphism in Early Islamic Discourse," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34 (2002): 441–463; Christopher Melchert, "The Adversaries of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal," *Arabica* 44, no. 2 (1997): 234–253; Gavin Picken, "Ibn Ḥanbal and al-Muḥāsibī: A Study of Early Conflicting Scholarly Methodologies," *Arabica* 55 (2008): 337–361. For the formation of the Ḥanbalī school, see Saud al-Sarhan, "The Responsa of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and the Formation of Ḥanbalism," *Islamic Law and Society* 22 (2015): 1–44; Ziāuddin Aḥmad, "Abū Bakr al-Khallāl – The Compiler of the Teachings of Imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal," *Islamic Studies* 9, no. 3 (1970): 245–254; Christopher Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.* (New York: Brill, 1997), p. 133–144; Nimrod Hurvitz, "Schools of Law and Historical Context: Re-Examining the Formation of the Ḥanbalī Madhhab," *Islamic Law and Society* 7, no. 1 (2000): 37–64.

56. See Ibn Taymiyya's *Majmū' Fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya*. For discussion, see Donald P. Little, "The Historical and Historiographical Significance of the Detention of Ibn Taymiyya," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4 (1973): 311–327; Sherman A. Jackson, "Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial in Damascus," *Journal of Semitic Studies* XXXIX, no. 1 (1994): 41–85; Jon Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya's Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism* (Boston: Brill, 2007); Anke von Kügelgen, "The Poison of Philosophy: Ibn Taymiyya's Struggle For and Against Reason," chap. 3 in Kokoschka, Krawietz, and Tamer, *Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya*, 253–328.

57. See Rashīd Riḍā, "Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī," *al-Manār* 17 (1917): p. 558. For 'Abduh and Riḍā's legal theories, see Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Political and Legal Theories of Muḥammad 'Abdu and Rashīd Riḍā* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

58. See Louis Massignon, "Les vraies origines dogmatiques du Wahhabisme ; liste des oeuvres de son fondateur," *Revue du monde musulman* XXXVI (1919): p. 322, 325. The term made its way into English when *The Moslim World* (1922) translated another of Massignon's articles (1920).

59. See Lothrop Stoddard, *The New World of Islam* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), p. 26–27, 86.

60. See Henri Laoust, "Le réformise orthodoxe des 'Salafiya' et les caractères généraux de son orientation actuelle," *Revue des études islamiques* 2 (1932); Henri Laoust, "Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taḳī-D-Dīn Aḥmad B. Taimīya" (PhD diss., Université de Paris, 1939).

61. See Louis Massignon, "Africa," chap. 2 in *Whither Islam?*, ed. Hamilton A. R. Gibb (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932), p. 88; C. C. Berg, "Indonesia," chap. 5 in *Whither Islam?*, ed. Hamilton A. R. Gibb (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932), p. 267; Hamilton A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947), p. 29, 35, 133; Sobḥī Maḥmaṣṣānī, "Muslims: Decadence and Renaissance Adaptation of Islamic Jurisprudence to Modern Social Needs," *The Moslem World* 44, nos. 3–4 (1954): p. 188.

62. See Ahmad Mouaz al-Khatib, "al-Tamaddun al-Islami: Passé et présent d'une association réformiste damascène," *Maghreb – Machrek* 4, no. 198 (2008): 79–89. For Islamic societies during the mandate in general, see Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945*, p. 604–612; Thomas Pierret, "Les cadres de l'élite religieuse sunnite : Espaces, idées, organisations et institutions," *Maghreb – Machrek* 4, no. 198 (2008): 5–17; Thomas Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), ch. 1.

63. See al-Khatib, "al-Tamaddun al-Islami: Passé et présent d'une association réformiste damascène," 83–84; Arnaud Lenfant, "L'évolution du salafisme en Syrie au XX^{E} siècle," chap. 8 in *Qu'est-ce que le salafisme?*, ed. Bernard Rougier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 161–178. For Muḥammad Bahjat al-Bīṭār, see David Commins, "Wahhabis, Sufis, and Salafis in Early Twentieth Century Damascus," chap. 10 in *Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: 'Ulama' in the Middle East*, ed. Meir Hatina (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 241–244. For the al-Shaṭṭī, al-Khānī, and al-Khātīb families, see Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria*; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus.*

64. See Itzchak Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa: The Making of a Radical Muslim Thinker in Modern Syria," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 4 (1993): p. 607–611.

65. See Brutus Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshabandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century," *Die Welt des Islams* 1, no. 4 (1982): 1–36; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus*, ch. 1–3; Itzchak Weismann, *The Naqshabandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi Tradition* (New York: Routledge, 2007), ch. 5–8.

66. See Weismann, "The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis, and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah." For anti-Sufi debates in the modern period, see Geoffroy, "Soufisme, réformisme et pouvoir en Syrie contemporaine"; Elizabeth Sirriyeh, *Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1999).

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68. See Weismann, "The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis, and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah"; Elizabeth F. Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 105.

69. See ibid., p. 106; Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945–1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology"; Raphaël Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), ch. 1–2.

70. See Weismann, "The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis, and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah," p. 51–53; Lenfant, "L'évolution du salafisme en Syrie au XX^{E} siècle," p. 165–168; Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945–1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology," p. 214–216. For Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khāṭīb, see Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen, "Les débuts d'une revue néo-salafiste : Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib et *al-Fath* de 1926 à 1928," *Revue d'étude du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée* 95 (2002): 227–255. For Ḥassan al-Bannā and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, see Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998).

71. See Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 172–174; Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942*, p. 154–156; Martyn Frampton, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), p. 125–134.

72. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Mā Qabla al-Ta'sīs wa-ḥattā 'ām 1954 (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – From before the Foundation until the year 1954)*, p. 71–78.

73. See ibid., § 13–14.

74. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 30.

75. See Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood and the 'Struggle for Syria', 1947–1958: Between Accomodation and Ideology." For the League of 'Ulamā', see Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 167–169. For Shukrī al-Quwatlī and the National Bloc, see Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945*.

76. See Majid Khadduri, "Constitutional Development in Syria: With Emphasis on the Constitution of 1950," *Middle East Journal* 5, no. 2 (1951): 137–160; Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 174–175.

77. See R. Bayly Winder, "Islam as State Religion: A Muslim Brother's View from Syria," *The Muslim World* 44, no. 3 (1954): 215–226.

78. For Adīb al-Shīshaklī's autocratic politics, see Kevin W. Martin, "Speaking with the "Voice of Syria": Producing the Arab World's First Personality Cult," *The Middle East Journal* 72, no. 4 (2018): 631–653.

79. See Muḥammad al-Ḥamid, *Naẓrāt fī Kitāb Ishtirākiyyat al-Islām (A Look at the Book Socialism of Islam)* (Damascus: Maṭba'at al-'Ilm, 1963).

80. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 23, 25.

81. See ibid., p. 29–30.

82. See Itzchak Weismann, "The Shâdhiliyya-Darqâwiyya in the Arab East (19th–20th Century)," in *Une voie soufie dans le monde : la Shâdhiliyya*, ed. Éric Geoffroy (Paris: Éditions Aïni Bennaï, 2005), p. 261–265; Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 169.

83. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 24–25.

84. See Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 128.

85. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 25–26.

86. See ibid., p. 26–27.

87. See ibid., p. 33–34.

88. The organizational structure of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood seems to mirror that of its Egyptian counterpart. See Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, §2; al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics*, ch. 6–7.

89. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 27–28.

90. See Michael Allan Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

91. See Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*, ch. 12.

92. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 27.

93. See ibid., p. 30–31, 34.

94. See Owen, "Akram al-Hourani: A Study of Syria Politics, 1943–1954," p. 113–119; Thompson, *Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in the Middle East*, p. 220–226.

95. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 27–28.

96. See ibid.

97. See Albert Hourani, "A Note on Revolutions in the Arab World," in *Revolution in the Middle East and Other Case Studies*, ed. P. J. Vatikiotis (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972), 65–72. For a similar point, see Michael H. van Dusen, "Syria: Downfall of a Traditional Elite," in *Elites and Political Development in the Middle East*, ed. Frank Tachau (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), 115–155; Philip S. Khoury, "Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 5 (1991): 1374–1395; Hinnebusch, *Syria: Revolution from Above*, ch. 2; Jonathan Viger, "Class, Political Power, and Nationalism in Syria: A Historical Sociology of State-Society Relations," *Dialectical Anthropology* 42 (2018): 373–389.

98. For the increasing importance of the army in Syrian politics since independence, see Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military 1945–1958*; Perlmutter, "From Obscurity to Rule: The Syrian Army and the Ba'th Party."

99. See Dusen, "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria," p. 313–314.

100. See Weismann, "The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis, and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah," p. 52–53.

101. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 32–33.

102. See ibid., p. 36.

103. See Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood and the 'Struggle for Syria', 1947–1958: Between Accomodation and Ideology." For Syria's "democratic years," see Kevin W. Martin, *Syria's Democratic Years: Citizens, Experts, and Media in the 1950s* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015).

104. For the relationship between Gamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, see Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, ch. 5; Fawaz Gerges, *Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

105. See Umar Faruk Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), p. 100.

106. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 44–45, 50.

107. See Bernard Botiveau, "La formation des oulémas en Syrie : la Faculté de sharîᶜa de l'Université de Damas," chap. 5 in *Les Intellectuels et le Pouvoir : Syrie, Egypte, Tunisie, Algérie*, ed. Gilbert Delanoue (Le Caire: Centre d'études et de documentation économique, juridique et sociale, 1985), p. 67–73. For an overview of the evolution of Islamic law in Syria in the first half of the twentieth century, see Bernard Botiveau, "Le mouvement de rationalisation du droit en Syrie au cours de la première moitié du XXᵉ siècle," *Bulletin d'études orientales* 35 (1983): 123–135.

108. See Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics*, ch. 16–22.

109. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 46–47.

110. See ibid., p. 46–48, 53–55.

111. See Thomas Pierret, "Sunni Clergy Politics in the Cities of Ba'thi Syria," chap. 470–84 in *Demystifying Syria*, ed. Fred H. Lawson (London: London Middle East Institute, 2009), p. 72.

112. See Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik, "Limits of "Authoritarian Upgrading" in Syria: Private Welfare, Islamic Charities, and the Rise of the Zayd Movement," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41 (2009): p. 603, 606.

113. For circles of recollection, see J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), ch. 7 and Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 176. For recollection in the Naqshabandī order, see Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus*, p. 37–40.

114. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 56–58.

115. See ibid., p. 58–59.

116. See ibid., p. 67–68.

117. See 'Alūsh, *al-Thawra wa-l-Jamāhīr: Marāḥil al-Niḍāl al-'Arabī wa-Dawr al-Ḥaraka al-Thawriyya 1948–1961 (The Revolution and the Masses: Episodes in the Arab Struggle and the Role of the Revolutionary Movement, 1948–1961)*, p. 102–106; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 5; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, ch. 12. For the Ba'th party's role in the creation of the United Arab Republic, see Palmer, "The United Arab Republic: An Assessment of Its Failure"; Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics*, ch. 22.

118. For the economic growth of Syria in the 1950s, see Longuenesse, "L'industrialisation et sa signification sociale"; Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria*, ch. 3; Hinnebusch, *Syria: Revolution from Above*, ch. 2. For the new salaried-class, see Longuenesse, "The Class Nature of the State in Syria: Contribution to an Analysis."

119. For migration of 'Alawis from the mountains to rural and (sub)urban areas in the twentieth century, see Balanche, "'Go to Damascus, My Son'." See also Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 3. For the development of Syria's education system after independence, see Hilan, *Culture et développement en Syrie et dans les pays retardés*, ch. 10.

120. See Dusen, "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria"; Devlin, *The Ba'th Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966*, ch. 3; Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists,*

Ba'thists, and Free Officers, ch. 38; Carré, "Le mouvement idéologique ba'thiste"; Seurat, "Les populations, l'état et la société"; Faksh, "The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force"; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, ch. 11; Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, ch. 2.

121. For the class struggle developing from the late 1940s until the 1960s, see Heydemann, *Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946–1970*, ch. 2–3.

122. See Ben-Tzur, "The Neo-Ba'th Party of Syria"; Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963–1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis*, ch. 3–4; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 6–7.

123. See Ḥizb al-Ba'th, *Niḍāl al-Ba'th fī sabīl al-Waḥda wa-l-Ḥurriya wa-l-Ishtirākiyya: Wathā'iq Ḥizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī (The Struggle of the Ba'th for Unity, Liberty, and Socialism: Documents of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party)*, vol. 6 (Beirut: Manshūrāt Dār al-Ṭalī'a, 1965), p. 282.

124. See Khatib, *Islamic Revivalism in Syria*, ch. 2–3; Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, ch. 3.

125. See Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963–1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis*, p. 101.

126. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 92.

127. See Ashraf 'Ayd al-'Antabalī, "'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār: Jihād wa-Ghurba ('Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār: Jihad and Exile)," *Ikhwan Wiki*, `https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1`.

128. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 48–66.

129. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 86–87.

130. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 33–42.

131. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 79–80.

132. See Walid Khalidi and Yusuf Ibish, *Chronology of Arab Politics: January–March, 1964*, vol. II, 1 (Beirut: Political Studies / Public Administration Department, American University in Beirut, 1964), p. 178–182.

133. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 79–80. 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām, governor of Hama at the time, has a slightly different version, see Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 45.

134. See Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, p. 104–107. For scholars relying on Abd-Allah's story about Ḥadīd, see Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa: The Making of a Radical Muslim Thinker in Modern Syria," p. 617, 620; Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 99–100; Naomì Ramìrez Dìaz, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: The Democratic Option of Islamism* (New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 44.

135. See John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), p. 239. It is also doubtful that Ḥadīd would have offered Qutb "salutations from 'Iṣām al-'Aṭṭār."

136. See Jābir Rizq, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-Mu'āmara 'alā Sūriyā (The Muslim Brotherhood and the Consipracy Against Syria)* (Cairo: Dār al-'Ulūm li-l-Ṭibā'a, 1980), p. 137–147.

137. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 383–386.

138. One story corroborating Ḥadīd's aversion for Gamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣr comes from 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām, who was a leader of the Arab Afghan *mujāhidīn* against the Soviet invasion and mentor of Usāma bin Lādin. 'Azzām explains that Ḥadīd wrote a letter to the president 'Abd al-Nāṣir arguing that he should establish an Islamic government in Egypt. He apparently signed his letter and gave his address, perhaps because he was expecting an answer. A few days later, Ḥadīd was followed and arrested by the Egyptian *mukhābarāt*, who deported him from the country. See 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām, *Fī Ẓilāl Sūrat al-Tawba (In the Shade of the Sura "The Repentance")* (Peshawar: Markaz al-Shahīd 'Azzām al-I'lāmī, 1975), p. 21–25.

139. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 71–72.

140. See Khalidi and Ibish, *Chronology of Arab Politics: January–March, 1964*, p. 178–182.

141. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 72–73.

142. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 43–44.

143. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 73–74.

144. See Khalidi and Ibish, *Chronology of Arab Politics: January–March, 1964*, p. 180–181.

145. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 74–76.

146. See ibid.

147. For a description of the negotiations between *'ulamā'* from Hama and the regime, see Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, §1.4.

148. See ibid.

149. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 76.

150. See 'Azzām, *Fī Ẓilāl Sūrat al-Tawba (In the Shade of the Sura "The Repentance")*, p. 21–25; Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, §1.4.

151. See Khalidi and Ibish, *Chronology of Arab Politics: January–March, 1964*, p. 181.

Chapter 3. A Program for an Islamic State

1. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 85.

2. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 341; 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn, "'Abd al-Karīm 'Uthmān," *Ikhwan Wiki*, `https://ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85_%D8%B9%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86`.

3. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 80–81.

4. See Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942*; al-Anani, *Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics*, ch. 7–8.

5. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 81–82.

6. For the organizational structure of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, see al-Sibā'ī, "al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn." For the Egyptian structure, see Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, ch. 6.

7. See Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'th 1963–1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis*; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 101–103.

8. See Faksh, "The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force"; Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, ch. 3.

9. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 82–83

10. See ibid., p. 80–81.

11. See ibid., p. 83–84.

12. See ibid., p. 84–85.

13. See David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), ch. 5; Stéphane Lacroix and George Holoch, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), ch. 2.

14. See Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), ch. 4.

15. See Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

16. See Joseph A. Kéchichian, *Faysal: Saudi Arabia's King for all Seasons* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008), ch. 6.

17. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 89.

18. See Lacroix and Holoch, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*, p. 43–44.

19. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 89.

20. See ibid., p. 89–91.

21. See Lacroix and Holoch, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*, p. 47–48, 290.

22. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 98.

23. Insiders and observers at time shared this view: Raymond Hinnebusch, "The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime," chap. 7 in *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, ed. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (New York: Praeger, 1982), 138–169; Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*; Michel Seurat, "Le mouvement islamique en Syrie (1963–1982)," chap. 2 in *Les Frères Musulmans (1928–1982)*, ed. Olivier Carré and Michel Seurat (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), 123–204; Raymond Hinnebusch, "Syria," chap. 3 in *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter (Washington: Center for Strategic / International Studies, 1988), 39–56.

24. See Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam, Medieval Theology, and Modern Politics* (London: Yale University Press, 1985); Jamāl Bārūt, *Yathrib al-Jadīd: al-Ḥarakāt al-Islāmiyya al-Rāhina (The New Yathrib: Contemporary Islamic Movements)* (London: Riyāḍ al-Rayyis al-Kutub wa-l-Nashir, 1994), p. 160–174; Itzchak Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba'thist Syria," *Studia Islamica*, no. 85 (1997): 131–154; Dìaz, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: The Democratic Option of Islamism*, ch. 2.

25. See Sa'īd Ḥawwā, *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, 4th ed. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Wahba, 1992), p. 4.

26. See Sa'īd Ḥawwā, *Allāh Jalla Jalāluhu (God, Exalted be He)* (Beirut: Dār al-Da'wa, 1969), p. 3–5.

27. See ibid., p. 7–11.

28. See Sa'īd Ḥawwā, *al-Islām (Islam)* (Beirut: Dār al-Da'wa, 1969), p. 3–4.

29. See ibid., p. 8–9.

30. For a discussion of Ibn 'Abidin, see Haim Gerber, *Islamic Law and Culture 1600–1940* (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

31. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 44. It is unclear which books Ḥawwā cites, though this division roughly follows Ibn 'Abidin's most famous book, *Radd al-Muḥtār 'alā al-Durr al-Mukhtār*.

32. See Ḥawwā, *al-Islām (Islam)*, p. 10–12.

33. See ibid., p. 17–22.

34. See Muḥammad al-Mubārak, *al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Ḥadīth fī Muwājahat al-Afkār al-Gharība (Modern Islamic Thought in Opposition to Western Ideas)* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1968), p. 21–23.

35. See titles of al-Mubārak's books in the listed bibliography, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, "Muḥammad al-Mubārak… al-'Ālim wa-l-Mufakkir al-Dā'iyya (Muḥammad al-Mubārak… The Scholar and Intellectual Preacher)," *Ikhwan Wiki*, `https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83`.

36. See al-Mubārak, *al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Ḥadīth fī Muwājahat al-Afkār al-Gharība (Modern Islamic Thought in Opposition to Western Ideas)*, p. 63–64.

37. See Muḥammad al-Mubārak, *Niẓām al-Islām: al-'Aqīda wa-l-'Ibāda (The System of Islam: Faith and Worship)* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1968).

38. See ibid., p. 21–24.

39. Al-Sibā‘ī mentions a social system (*niẓām*) implemented by Islam in an article summarizing the Brotherhood's history in Syria. See al-Sibā‘ī, "al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn."

40. Zollner, in her work on al-Huḍaybī, seems to suggest indirectly that he does not see Islam as a system. See Barbara H. E. Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology* (London: Routledge, 2009), ch. 3.

41. For Ḥawwā reading al-*Risā'il al-Thalāth (The Three Treatises)*, see Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 30. For the citation from al-Bannā, see *Dawātuna (Our Mission)* in *al-Risā'il al-Thalāth (The Three Treatises)*. In this collected volume of al-Bannā's pamphlets, see Ḥasan al-Bannā, *Majmū‘at Rasā'il al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā (Collection of Pamphelts by the Martyred Imam Ḥasan al-Bannā)* (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1990), p. 100–101.

42. For discussions of al-Bannā's political views, see Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, ch. 8–10; Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942*, ch. 2.

43. See Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 174; Jan-Peter Hartung, *A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 5.

44. See the bibliography of Eran Lerman, "Mawdudi's Concept of Islam," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no. 4 (1981): 492–509.

45. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 33–34. For al-Nadawī in Aleppo, see Sa‘d al-Dīn, "'Abd al-Karīm 'Uthmān."

46. See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and The Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 5.

47. See Hartung, *A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam*, p. 96–99. See also Lerman, "Mawdudi's Concept of Islam."

48. See Sivan, *Radical Islam, Medieval Theology, and Modern Politics*, p. 43; Weismann, "Sa‘id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba‘thist Syria," p. 135.

49. See William E. Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Justice in Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), p. xxxiv–xlvii. See also William E. Shepard, "Islam as a 'System' in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb," *Middle Eastern Studies* 25, no. 1 (1989): 31–50.

50. See Sayed Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 147–150; Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, p. 157–158; Hartung, *A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam*, ch. 5.

51. For al-Bannā, see his pamphlet *Bayna Ams wa-l-yawm (Between Yesterday and Today)*, in al-Bannā, *Majmū‘at Rasā'il al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā (Collection of Pamphelts by the Martyred Imam Ḥasan al-Bannā)*, p. 201–234. For Quṭb, see Sayyid Quṭb, *al-'Adāla al-Ijtimā‘iyya fī al-Islām (Social Justice in Islam)* (Cairo: Dār Iḥyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1949), p. 241.

52. See Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Justice in Islam*, p. li–lii; Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb*, ch. 7; and Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, ch. 3.

53. See Quṭb's *al-Salām al-'Ālamī wa-l-Islām (World Peace and Islam)*; *Ma‘ālim fī al-Ṭarīq (Milestones)*; and *Fī Ẓilāl al-Qur'ān (In the Shade of the Qur'an)*.

54. For a thorough study of *Fī Ẓilāl al-Qur'ān*, see Olivier Carré, *Mystique et politique : Le Coran des islamistes - Commentaire coranique de Sayyid Qutb, 1906–1966*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Cerf, 2004).

55. See Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Justice in Islam*, p. xlvii.

56. See al-Bannā's *al-Risā'il al-Thalāth (The Three Treatises)*, *Hal Naḥnu Qaw 'Amaliyyūn? (Are we a Capable People?)*, and *Niẓām al-Ḥukm (System of Government)*. I read Shepard's article on *niẓām* in Quṭb's thought as providing further evidence that he thought about Islam in a different way than Ḥawwā. See Shepard, "Islam as a 'System' in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb."

57. My account of the ideologization of Islam is inspired by Geertz's discussion of ideologies, see Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," chap. 8 in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 193–233. It also shares Ricoeur's insight that, following Weber, ideologies legitimize political orders. See Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), ch. 11–12, 15.

58. Wilfred Cantwell Smith makes this point. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (Toronto: The New American Library of Canada, 1964), p. 105–107.

59. See Ḥawwā, *al-Islām (Islam)*, p. 11–12.

60. See ibid., p. 639.

61. See Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, *Ishtirākiyyat al-Islām (The Socialism of Islam)*, 2nd ed. (Cairo: al-Dār al-Qawmiyya li-l-Ṭabā'a wa-l-Nashr, 1960), p. 137–158.

62. See Ḥawwā, *al-Islām (Islam)*, p. 639.

63. See ibid., p. 331–333.

64. See ibid.

65. See ibid., p. 332.

66. My discussion of the question sovereignty in modern Islamic thought is informed by Andrew F. March's recent book. See Andrew F. March, *The Caliphate of Man: Popular Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019).

67. See Nasr, *Mawdudi and The Making of Islamic Revivalism*, p. 80–83.

68. See Ḥawwā, *al-Islām (Islam)*, p. 334–335.

69. See ibid., p. 360–363.

70. See al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya wa-l-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyya (The Statutes of Government and the Religious Guardianship)* (Kuwait: Maktabat Dār Ibn Qutayba, 1989), § 1. For al-Māwardī's political thought, see Henri Laoust, "La pensée et l'action politiques d'al-Māwardī," *Revue des études islamiques* 26 (1968): p. 27–31; Ann K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), ch. 6; Hanna Mikhail, *Politics and Revelation: Māwardī and After* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995).

71. See Ḥawwā, *al-Islām (Islam)*, p. 377–381.

72. See ibid., p. 372–374, 395–397.

73. See ibid., p. 391.

74. See Ma'rūf al-Dawālībī, *al-Dawla wa-l-Sulṭa fī al-Islām (State and Power in Islam)* (Paris: Unesco, 1982); Muḥammad al-Mubārak, *Niẓām al-Islām: al-Ḥukūma wa-l-Dawla (The System of Islam: The Government and the State)* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1973). For discussion, see Itzchak Weismann, "Democratic Fundamentalism? The Practice and Discourse of the Muslim Brothers Movement in Syria," *The Muslim World* 100, no. 1 (2010): 1–16.

75. See al-Mubārak, *Niẓām al-Islām: al-Ḥukūma wa-l-Dawla (The System of Islam: The Government and the State)*, p. 55.

76. See Ḥawwā, *al-Islām (Islam)*, p. 332–333.

77. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 89.

78. See Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba'thist Syria."

79. See Ḥawwā, *al-Islām (Islam)*, p. 15–18.

80. See Abū al-A'lā al-Mawdūdī, *The Meaning of the Qur'an*, ed. A. A. Kamal (Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1975), p. 10:106. See also William E. Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of *Jāhiliyya*," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35 (2003): p. 525.

81. See al-Mawdūdī, *The Meaning of the Qur'an*, p. 10:106 This distinction between Mawdudi and Qutb is also made here: Shepard, "Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of *Jāhiliyya*," p. 525.

82. See ibid., p. 534; Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb*, p. 168–169; Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of jahiliyya* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, p. 217–220.

83. See Sayyid Quṭb, *Fī Ẓilāl al-Qur'ān (In the Shade of the Qur'an)* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1977), 2:904. See also Sayyid Quṭb, *Ma'ālim fī al-Ṭarīq (Milestones)* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Wahba, 1964).

84. See Ḥawwā, *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, p. 5–7.

85. See ibid., p. 7–12. See also Quṭb, *Ma'ālim fi al-Ṭarīq (Milestones)*, p. 107, 98.

86. See Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba'thist Syria," p. 135–137.

87. See Ḥawwā, *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, p. 11–12.

88. See ibid., p. 12–26.

89. See ibid., p. 54–56.

90. See Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba'thist Syria." The term 'neo-revivalist,' while it highlights the continuity between early reformists and Islamists from the 1960s, is problematic for the same reason that it assumes that neo-revivalists were concerned with reviving Islam. See John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 5.

91. See al-Sibā'ī, "al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn," p. 19. See also the declaration of the Syrian Brotherhood's program, Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Mā Qabla al-Ta'sīs wa-ḥattā 'ām 1954 (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – From before the Foundation until the year 1954)*, ch. 13–14.

92. Frampton discusses the many conspiracies involving the West throughout the Muslim Brotherhood's history. See Frampton, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement*.

93. See Ḥawwā, *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, p. 17–26.

94. See ibid., p. 26–33.

95. For a history of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, see Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 6–7.

96. See Joas Wagemakers, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: al-wala' wa-l-bara' in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi," in *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, ed. R Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 81–106; Joas Wagemakers, "The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44 (2012): 93–110.

97. See Ḥawwā, *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, p. 32–42. See Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, p. 190–195.

98. See Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005), ch. 8.

99. See Richard Bonney, *Jihād: From Qur'ān to bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), ch. 8.

100. See Nasr, *Mawdudi and The Making of Islamic Revivalism*, ch. 5.

101. See Sayyid Quṭb, *al-Salām al-'Ālamī wa-l-Islām (World Peace and Islam)* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1951), p. 23–25.

102. Quṭb also argues for offensive jihad in *Fī Ẓilāl al-Qur'ān*. See Carré, *Mystique et politique : Le Coran des islamistes - Commentaire coranique de Sayyid Qutb, 1906–1966*, ch. 10. For a discussion of Quṭb and jihad, see also Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, p. 221–227.

103. See Ḥawwā, *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, p. 31.

104. See ibid., p. 292–298.

105. See ibid., p. 432–434. For a historical overview of commanding right and prohibiting wrong, see Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought*.

106. See Ḥawwā, *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, p. 454–464.

107. Cook makes this claim in his study of the principle of commanding right and prohibiting freedom. See Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought*.

108. See ibid., p. 508. Cook wrongly claims that Ḥawwā does not discuss Ibn Taymiyya. See next sentence.

109. See Khaled Abou el-Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

110. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 97–98.

111. See ibid., p. 99–100.

112. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, ch. 5. See also Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power*, ch. 2.

113. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 99–100.

114. See ibid., p. 97.

115. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, § 4.9–4.10.

116. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 100–101.

117. Ḥadīd's involvement in attempts to reconcile different factions within the Brotherhood is also mentioned by Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī. Al-Sūrī was not involved in the Brotherhood at the time and must have heard these stories from other people, which might explain why he gets many dates for this period wrong (e. g. the speaks of the Hama strike of 1965, while it occurred in 1964). See Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)* (Unknown location: Unpublished, n.p.), p. 71.
118. See Khatib, *Islamic Revivalism in Syria*, p. 48–49, 68–69; Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 98–101; Dara Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 95–103. Some of the information about Ḥadīd comes from Abd-Allāh's book, which should be treated with caution. See Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, p. 104–105.
119. See Heydemann, *Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946–1970*, ch. 5–7.
120. See Kais Firro, "The Syrian Economy under the Assad Regime," chap. 3 in *Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 36–68; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 12; Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria*, ch. 5; Raymond Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27 (1995): 305–320; Hinnebusch, *Syria: Revolution from Above*, ch. 3–5; Perthes, *The Political Economy of Syria under Asad*.
121. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 102; Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, § 4.1. Pierret reports that the members of the Muslim Brotherhood participated in some local elections. See Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 184.
122. See A. R. Kelidar, "Religion and State in Syria," *Asian Affairs* 5, no. 1 (1974): 16–22; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 172; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 260–262; Radwan Ziadeh, *Power and Policy in Syria: Intelligence Services, Foreign relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), p. 15–26; Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 184–188.
123. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 104–105.
124. See ibid., p. 105.
125. See ibid., p. 105–106.
126. See ibid., p. 107–108.
127. See ibid., p. 109.
128. See ibid., p. 110–111.
129. See Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 44–46, 182–188.
130. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 111–113.
131. See Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 187–188.
132. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 113.

Chapter 4. An Islamic Revolution

1. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 126. Other sources mention that Ḥadīd left prison in 1966, but the details given by Sa'd al-Dīn about Ḥadīd being in prison during the 1967 War make his version more compelling. See Rizq, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-Mu'āmara 'alā Sūriyā (The Muslim Brotherhood and the Consipracy Against Syria)*, p. 141; al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, "Marwān Ḥadīd… Aḥad Qiyādāt al-Ikhwān fī Sūriyā (Marwān Ḥadīd… A Leader of the Brotherhood in Syria)," *Ikhwan Wiki*, `https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF`.

2. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 46–48.

3. See Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 80–84.

4. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 75.

5. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 126.

6. See Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: Power, People, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), ch. 3; Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997), ch. 6.

7. See ibid., ch. 3.

8. See 'Abd Allāh Abū 'Izza, *Ma'a al-Ḥaraka al-Islamiyya fī al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya (With the Islamic Movement in the Arab Countries)* (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī', 1986), §3.

9. See ibid.

10. See Muhsin Muhammad Salih, *al-Ṭarīq ilā al-Quds (The Road to Jerusalem)* (Bayrūt: Markāz al-Zaytūna li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Istishārāt, 2012), p. 163–165; Ghasan Muhammad Du'ar, *Qawā'id al-Shuyūkh: Muqāwama al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ḍidd al-Mashrū' al-Ṣahyūnī (Camps of the Shaykhs: The Muslim Brotherhood's Resistance to the Zionist Project)* (Beirut: Markāz al-Zaytūna li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Istishārāt, 2018), p. 53–55.

11. See 'Izza, *Ma'a al-Ḥaraka al-Islamiyya fī al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya (With the Islamic Movement in the Arab Countries)*, §3; Du'ar, *Qawā'id al-Shuyūkh: Muqāwama al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ḍidd al-Mashrū' al-Ṣahyūnī (Camps of the Shaykhs: The Muslim Brotherhood's Resistance to the Zionist Project)*, p. 50.

12. Khatib explains that al-'Aṭṭār forbade Syrian Brothers from joining the *fidā'iyyīn*, but this runs contrary to the sources mentioned above. See Khatib, *Islamic Revivalism in Syria*, p. 49.

13. See Du'ar, *Qawā'id al-Shuyūkh: Muqāwama al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ḍidd al-Mashrū' al-Ṣahyūnī (Camps of the Shaykhs: The Muslim Brotherhood's Resistance to the Zionist Project)*, p. 67–68.

14. See Salih, *al-Ṭarīq ilā al-Quds (The Road to Jerusalem)*, p. 163–164; Du'ar, *Qawā'id al-Shuyūkh: Muqāwama al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ḍidd al-Mashrū' al-Ṣahyūnī (Camps of the Shaykhs: The Muslim Brotherhood's Resistance to the Zionist Project)*, p. 66. For the estimate, see Muḥammad

al-Ḥasan, *Mawqif al-Islāmiyyīn min Qaḍiyat Filasṭīn (The Position of Islamists about Palestine)* (Qatar: Matabat al-Fataḥ Maktabat al-Ghazālī, 1995), p. 139.

15. See Thomas Hegghammer, *The Caravan: Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 51, 56.

16. See Du'ar, *Qawā'id al-Shuyūkh: Muqāwama al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ḍidd al-Mashrū' al-Ṣahyūnī (Camps of the Shaykhs: The Muslim Brotherhood's Resistance to the Zionist Project)*, p. 62–65.

17. See 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām, *Ḥamās: al-Judhūr al-Tārīkhiyya wa-l-Mithāq (Hamas: Historical Roots and the Charter)* (Amman: Unknown, 1990), p. 71–73. I came across some of this information while reading Hegghammer's biography of 'Azzām. See Hegghammer, *The Caravan: Abdallah Azzam and the Rise of Global Jihad*, p. 59.

18. See Unknown, *SOCOM-2012-0000017* (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2012). For discussion, see Nelly Lahoud et al., *Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?* (West Point: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012), p. 58.

19. See Rizq, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-Mu'āmara 'alā Sūriyā (The Muslim Brotherhood and the Consipracy Against Syria)*, p. 141–143.

20. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 103.

21. See Rizq, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-Mu'āmara 'alā Sūriyā (The Muslim Brotherhood and the Consipracy Against Syria)*, p. 142.

22. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 72–73.

23. See Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri*, ch. 1.

24. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 386–387.

25. See Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 262; Khatib, *Islamic Revivalism in Syria*, p. 47–50; Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 101; Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power*, ch. 2; Dìaz, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: The Democratic Option of Islamism*, p. 52; Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 98–100.

26. See Ayman al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)* (Unknown location: Unpublished, n.p.), p. 20–21. The memoirs of 'Azīza Judūl also suggest that the organization was still referred to as "Marwān Ḥadīd's organization" in 1977. See 'Azīza Julūd, *Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif wa-Ṣafḥāt min Tārīkh al-Ṭalī'a al-Muqātila fī Sūriyā (Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif and Pages from the History of the Fighting Vanguard in Syria)* (Germany: Akādīmiyya al-'Ilm wa-l-Salam, 2019), p. 24. Al-Sūrī claims that 'Adnān 'Uqla is the one who suggested the name 'Fighting Vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood' sometime in 1980. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 100.

27. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 62.

28. See ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, "Shāhid ʻalā al-ʻAṣr: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… ʻAṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 4 (Witness of the Age: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 4)," *Al-Jazeera,* October 3rd (2012). For a transcription of Saʻd al-Dīn's interview, see the Brotherhood's website `IkhwanWiki`, with the entry عدنان سعد الدين.. عصر الإخوان في سوريا ج4.

29. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalīʻa al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī ʻAhd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 21–22.

30. See Duʻar, *Qawāʻid al-Shuyūkh: Muqāwama al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ḍidd al-Mashrūʻ al-Ṣahyūnī (Camps of the Shaykhs: The Muslim Brotherhood's Resistance to the Zionist Project)*, p. 67–68, 91, 96.

31. See Saʻd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Baʻthī (al-ʻAlawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Baʻthist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 387–388.

32. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalīʻa al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī ʻAhd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 22–23.

33. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fi Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 74–89.

34. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 114–116.

35. For an analysis of torture in Syrian prisons through the memoirs of prisoners, see Ismail, *The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory, and Government in Syria*, ch. 1.

36. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 120–125.

37. One important book which would gain some attention from members of the Brotherhood later the following: Saʿīd Ḥawwā, *Min Ajl Khuṭwa ilā al-Amām ʻalā Ṭarīq al-Jihād al-Mubārak (For the Sake of a Step Forward on the Path Towards the Blessed Jihad)* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Wahba, 1979).

38. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 125–126.

39. See Saʻd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Baʻthī (al-ʻAlawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Baʻthist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 290. Seale claims that Ḥadīd died at a hospital after starting a hunger strike. See Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 525.

40. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 126–127.

41. See ibid., p. 130–132.

42. See Saʻd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Baʻthī (al-ʻAlawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Baʻthist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 273–288.

43. These names are also mentioned by Ḥawwā. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 128.

44. See Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 14; Moshe Ma'oz, *Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-Making* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 6.

45. For a look at Syria and Israel's treatment of prisoners during the 1973 War, see Amnesty International, *Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to Investigate Allegations of Ill Treatment and Torture* (London: Amnesty International Publication, 1975).

46. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 303-317.

47. See Raymond Hinnebusch, "Syrian Policy in Lebanon and the Palestinians," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (1986): 1–20; Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle over Lebanon* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), ch. 13; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 17; Raymond Hinnebusch, "Pax-Syriana? The Origins, Causes, and Consequences of Syria's Role in Lebanon," *Mediterranean Politics* 3, no. 1 (1998): 137–160; Karol R. Sorby, "Syria and the 1975–76 Civil War in Lebanon," *Asian and African Studies* 20, no. 2 (2011): 193–213.

48. See A. I. Dawisha, "Syria's Intervention in Lebanon, 1975–1976," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 3 (1978): p. 246–248; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Limits of Military Power: Syria's Role," chap. 3 in *Lebanon in Crisis*, ed. P. E. Haley and L. W. Snider (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 55–74; A. I. Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis* (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), part IIII; Marius Deeb, *The Lebanese Civil War* (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 133–134; Picard, "La Syrie de 1946 à 1979," part 3; Naomy Joy Weinberger, *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975–1976 Civil War* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 2; Itamar Rabinovich, "The Changing Prism: Syrian Policy in Lebanon as a Mirror, an Issue, and an Instrument," chap. 10 in *Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 179–190. Lawson also suggests that intervening in Lebanon could improve Syria's economic situation by stabilizing Lebanon's economy and giving the Syrian regime access to much needed Lebanese capital and workforce. See Fred H. Lawson, "Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War, 1976: A Domestic Conflict Explanation," *International Organization* 38, no. 3 (1984): 451–480; Fred H. Lawson, *Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), ch. 3.

49. See Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: Power, People, and Politics*, p. 71–74; Petran, *The Struggle over Lebanon*, p. 206–210.

50. See Itamar Rabinovich, "The Foreign Policy of Syria: Goals, Capabilities, Constraints, and Options," *Survival* 24, no. 4 (1982): 175–183; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 286–287; Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 72.

51. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 82–83; Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 57–76.

52. For a discussion of 'Alawis in the army, see Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*, p. 331–340; Drysdale, "Ethnicity in the Syrian Officer Corps: A Conceptualization"; Hannoyer, "Le monde rural avant les réformes"; Seurat, "Les populations, l'état et la société"; Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for Its Dominance"; Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, ch. 3–4.

53. This corresponds to the sub-national dimension of sectarian identity discussed by Haddad. See Fanar Haddad, *Understanding 'Sectarianism': Sunni-Shi'a Relations in the Modern Arab World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 100–112.

54. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, §4.4; Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 127. Van Dam also argues that the authoritarian nature of the Ba'th regime was a key feature of the political context that made sectarian tensions so vivid in the eyes of the Brotherhood. However, I believe that Sa'd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā's accusations of sectarianism expressed in many ways their own understandings of the political context; it was not merely a political discursive tool for mobilization. See Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, ch. 7. My characterization of Sa'd al-Dīn and Ḥawwā's political critique of authoritarianism agrees in some respect with Lobmeyer's, though I do not find his division between "enlightened, Western understanding of democracy" and "politico-Islamic content" quite adequate. See Lobmeyer, "Islamic Ideology and Secular Discourse: The Islamists of Syria," p. 409.

55. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 96–101. See also Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 108–109.

56. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 352–356.

57. See ibid., §4.10; al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 89–90.

58. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 380–382. Al-Sūrī confirms that Sa'd al-Dīn pursued a non-confrontational approach to the regime. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 89–90.

59. See Ismail, *The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory, and Government in Syria*, p. 144–145.

60. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 24–25.

61. See ibid., p. 25–26.

62. See ibid., p. 27–28. Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 378; Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 129.

63. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 378–380.

64. See ibid., p. 380–382.

65. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 89–90. Sa'd al-Dīn explicitly rejected al-Sūrī's claim in an interview. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 4 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 4)." Sa'd al-Dīn also mentions that 'Adnān Shaykhūnī was part of these unauthorized armed group from the Brotherhood, a name which al-Sūrī also mentioned. See 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr:

‘Adnān Sa‘d al-Dīn… ‘Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz’ 5 (Witness of the Age: ‘Adnān Sa‘d al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 5),” *Al-Jazeera,* October 10th (2012). For a transcription of Sa‘d al-Dīn’s interview, see the Brotherhood’s website `IkhwanWiki`, with the entry عدنان سعد الدين.. عصر الإخوان المسلمين في سوريا ج5.

66. Regarding the permeability of the two organizations in Hama, see also Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 124.

67. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī‘a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fi ‘Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 29–30.

68. See ibid., p. 30–33.

69. My conception of political assassinations is informed by Feldman’s discussion of killings in Northern Ireland. See Allen Feldman, *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), ch. 3.

70. I believe that the sectarian violence of Ḥadīd’s organization cuts across most usual attempts to distinguish religious from political spheres. For example, I do not think that it inserts itself squarely within either the doctrinal or sub-national dimensions of sectarian identity discussed by Haddad. See Haddad, *Understanding ‘Sectarianism’: Sunni-Shi‘a Relations in the Modern Arab World*, ch. 3–4. For a discussion of these assassinations, see Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, p. 72–74.

71. For some reasons, al-Shurbajī gives the wrong date of July 11th 1976 for the assassination. See The Associated Press, “No Headline,” *The Associated Press,* February 22nd (1977).

72. Two Syrians were even executed by the regime for being Iraqi spies behind Muḥammad al-Fāḍil’s assassination. See Reuters, “Syria Hangs 2 Alleged Iraqi Agents,” *New York Times,* June 14th (1977): 4.

73. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī‘a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fi ‘Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 33–34.

74. Al-Shurbajī explains that the regime attempted to silence any mention of these explosions, which might be why it is hard to find any mention of them in newspapers of the time.

75. See Sa‘d al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba‘thī (al-‘Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba‘thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 377–392; Sa‘d al-Dīn, “Shāhid ‘alā al-‘Aṣr: ‘Adnān Sa‘d al-Dīn… ‘Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz’ 5 (Witness of the Age: ‘Adnān Sa‘d al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 5).”

76. Sa‘d al-Dīn’s version of how the Brotherhood initially dealt with Ḥadīd’s organization is supported by ‘Alī al-Bayānūnī in the following interview: Mahan Abedin, “The Battle within Syria: An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ali Bayanouni,” *Terrorism Monitor* 3, no. 16 (2005).

77. See Sa‘d al-Dīn, “Shāhid ‘alā al-‘Aṣr: ‘Adnān Sa‘d al-Dīn… ‘Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz’ 5 (Witness of the Age: ‘Adnān Sa‘d al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 5).”

78. See Sa‘d al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba‘thī (al-‘Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba‘thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 389–392. For the date of the meeting, see Batatu, *Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 267.

79. Sa'd al-Dīn repeated this version of his support for Ḥadīd's organization in an interview. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Sūriyā, juz' 5 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 5)." Conduit's interview with 'Alī al-Bayānūnī confirms Sa'd al-Dīn's version. See Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 109.

80. Batatu (p. 267, 1999) claims that "[i]nterrogations of captured militants also yielded information that at a subsequent point, Za'īm and Sa'd al-Dīn agreed on other things which they kept secret and of which no one else [in the Brotherhood] was apprised." Pargeter (p. 78, 2013) argues that a man named Riyath Jamour "Riyath Jamour […] was the secret link between the two groups." Her claim is echoed by al-Sūrī (p. 93, n.p.), and further discussed by Dìaz (p. 55–57, 2018). However, none of the sources I consulted confirm these allegations.

81. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, §5.

82. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 35–38. See also Thomas W. Lippman, "Slayings in Minority Sect Shake Syria," *The Washington Post,* April 7th (1978).

83. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 38–41.

84. See Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 66-68.

85. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 41–44.

86. See ibid., p. 44.

87. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 135–137.

88. Ghattas provides interesting details about this visit to the new Iranian government, but possibly misinterpret the Syrian context of Ḥawwā's visit. See Kim Ghattas, *Black Waves: Saudi Arabia, iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry that Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt / Company, 2020), p. 44-45.

89. See Julūd, *Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif wa-Ṣafḥāt min Tārīkh al-Ṭalī'a al-Muqātila fī Sūriyā (Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif and Pages from the History of the Fighting Vanguard in Syria)*, p. 11–25.

90. See ibid., p. 31–48.

91. See Ḥawwā, *Jund Allāh: Thaqāfatan wa-Akhlāqan (Army of God: Culture and Ethics)*, p. 54.

92. In his interview with Conduit, Zuhayr Sālim, a later influential intellectual from the Brotherhood, explains that some members of the Brotherhood "kinda worshiped Ḥawwā." See Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 111.

93. See Julūd, *Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif wa-Ṣafḥāt min Tārīkh al-Ṭalī'a al-Muqātila fī Sūriyā (Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif and Pages from the History of the Fighting Vanguard in Syria)*, p. 24–49.

94. The number of 32 'Alawi students seems to be based documents produced by the regime Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 266;

Thomas Mayer, "The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961–1982," *Orient* 24 (1983): p. 589; Home Service Damascus, "Attack at Syrian Army Barracks," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* June 25th (1979). Hinnebusch claims that there were more than 50 victims, see Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria*, p. 293. The Washington Post reported at the time around 60 victims, see Edward Cody, "Concealed Tensions Surface in Syria; Savage Murder of Cadets Raises the Spectre of Political and Sectarian Dissidence," *The Washington Post,* July 7th (1979): A16. The number of 83 victims, cited by Seale (1989, p. 317), Lefèbre (2013, p. 73), and Pargeter (p. 79–80, 2013), is most likely taken from Michel Seurat, see Seurat, "Le mouvement islamique en Syrie (1963–1982)," p. 135; Michel Seurat, "Vague d'agitation confessionnelle en Syrie," *Le monde diplomatique,* October (1979): 7.

95. My discussion of the competing collectivizations of violence is also informed by Feldman's work. See Feldman, *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*, ch. 4.

96. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 47–48.

97. Lefèvre's interviewers suggested that the Aleppo military council of Ḥadīd's organization would not have agreed to al-Yūsif's operation. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 105.

98. See Damascus, "Attack at Syrian Army Barracks."

99. See Julūd, *Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif wa-Ṣafḥāt min Tārīkh al-Ṭalī'a al-Muqātila fī Sūriyā (Ibrāhīm al-Yūsif and Pages from the History of the Fighting Vanguard in Syria)*, p. 27.

100. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 21.

101. Sa'd al-Dīn says that al-Za'īm promised him that he would not carry out operations targeting innocent (*abriyā'*) civilians. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Sanawāt al-Majāzir al-Mur'iba (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Years of Terrible Massacres)*, §4.6.

102. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 96–99. Interestingly, many claims made in the Brotherhood's declaration can be found in Sa'd al-Dīn's memoirs. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Sanawāt al-Majāzir al-Mur'iba (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Years of Terrible Massacres)*, p. 78–80.

103. For Dabbāgh's speech, see Damascus, "Attack at Syrian Army Barracks."

104. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 96. Khatib mentions a formal statement that was issued by the Fighting Vanguard after the massacre. See Khatib, *Islamic Revivalism in Syria*, p. 74. Van Dam claims that the journal *al-Nadhīr* was related to al-Yūsif's group, while in fact it belonged to the Brotherhood. See Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, p. 89–90.

105. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 136.

106. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Sanawāt al-Majāzir al-Mur'iba (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Years of Terrible Massacres)*, p. 76–78.

107. See Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, p. 15. Seurat also cites the same number, see Seurat, "Vague d'agitation confessionnelle en Syrie." For testimonies of Brothers who were detained and tortured in 1979, see Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 110–115.

108. Al-Shurbajī also gives an impressive list of names of members of Ḥadīd's organization who were killed. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 50-51.

109. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 110–115. Al-Sūrī claims that the Brotherhood joined the armed struggle shortly after the Aleppo artillery school massacre. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 102.

110. See Ḥawwā, *Hādhihi Tajribatī, Hādhihi Shahādatī (This is my Experience, This is my Testimony)*, p. 134–140.

111. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 241.

112. See 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 6 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 6)," *Al-Jazeera,* October 17th (2012). For a transcription of Sa'd al-Dīn's interview, see the Brotherhood's website `IkhwanWiki`, with the entry عدنان سعد الدين.. عصر الإخوان في سوريا ج6.

113. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Sanawāt al-Majāzir al-Mur'iba (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Years of Terrible Massacres)*, §5.1.6.

114. This argument is made by Pargeter. See Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power*, ch. 2.

115. See Muḥammad Salīm Ḥammād, *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)* (Damascus: Ikhwan Wiki, 2011), p. 5.

116. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 5 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 5)." See also al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 89–90.

117. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 115.

118. See Ḥammād, *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)*, p. 6–7.

119. For al-Bayānūnī being the military leader of the Brotherhood, see Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 115. For Shaykhūnī's imprisonment and trial, see Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Sanawāt al-Majāzir al-Mur'iba (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Years of Terrible Massacres)*, p. 94.

120. For example, in an interview, Sa'd al-Dīn recognizes that branches of the Brotherhood were set up after June 1979, but denies that the exiled leadership in Amman played an important in directing their operations. See 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the

Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)," *Al-Jazeera,* November 1st (2012). For a transcription of Sa'd al-Dīn's interview, see the Brotherhood's website `IkhwanWiki`, with the entry ..عدنان سعد الدين عصر الإخوان في سوريا ج7.

121. See Ḥammād, *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)*, p. 7–8; al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 94.

122. See ibid., p. 51–56.

123. See Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 317.

124. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 57; The Associated Press, "No Headline," *The Associated Press,* September 17th (1979).

125. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 58–59.

126. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – al-Ḥukm al-Ba'thī (al-'Alawī) (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Ba'thist (Alawi) Rule)*, p. 389–392; Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 5 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 5)."

127. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 70–72.

128. See ibid., p. 62.

129. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 100.

130. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 249, #55.

131. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 72–76. Al-Sūrī also notices the different dynamics in Damascus. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 101.

132. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 75–76.

133. See ibid., p. 94–95.

134. See Ḥammād, *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)*, p. 7.

135. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 94–95.

136. See Ḥammād, *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)*, p. 7.

137. In many ways, the management of non-state armed groups proceeds from very different logics in contexts of covert insurgency, as opposed to full-blown civil war. Al-Shurbajī's insistence that fewer fighters be admitted in the ranks of the Fighting Vanguard and that foreign fighters be turned away is an interesting example. For a discussion of the management of armed groups in contexts of civil war, see Vera Mironova, *From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists: Human Resources of Non-State Armed Groups* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

138. Perhaps Abū Faraj's own recklessness, which according to Ḥammad lead to his capture, was becoming apparent to Ḥawwā. See Ḥammād, *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)*, p. 8–9.

139. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 96–98.

140. See Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 329.

141. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, p. 35; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, p. 19.

142. See Syrian Human Rights Committee, *Special Report: Repressive Laws in Syria* (London: Syrian Human Rights Committee, 2003).

143. See Sa'd al-Dīn, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī Sūriyā: Mudhakkirāt wa-Dhikrayāt – Sanawāt al-Majāzir al-Mur'iba (The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: Memoirs and Memories – The Years of Terrible Massacres)*, §5.3.

144. For the date of the declaration, see Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)." While Umar Faruk Abd-Allah (1983, ch. 4) discusses a version published in November 1980, I believe that it was completed around August. This would not only explain Sa'd al-Dīn's acquiescence to the interviewer's claim that it was published in August, but would also better fit in the series of events discussed above, from the support of the Iraqi security services, to the Brotherhood's first attacks, and to the dismantlement of its armed wing in Damascus around October 1980. See also Jean Gueyras, "La Syrie "citadelle de fermeté" II. - L'impossible alternative," *Le Monde,* April 13th (1981).

145. Batatu and Lobmeyer also make this claim. See Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren"; Lobmeyer, "Islamic Ideology and Secular Discourse: The Islamists of Syria."

146. See Michel Seurat, *Syrie, L'État de barbarie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012), ch. 4.

147. This is how Sa'd al-Dīn justifies the length of the revolution's programme. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 6 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 6)."

148. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)."

149. For a discussion of Syria and Iraq relations after 1968, see Amazia Baram, "Ideology and Power Politics in Syrian-Iraqi Relations," chap. 7 in *Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 125–139; Eberhard Kienle, *Ba'th v. Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968–1989* (London: I. B.

Tauris, 1991). International events had periodically placed Syria and Iraq on opposite sides of rival blocs since World War II. See Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics*.

150. See Kienle, *Ba'th v. Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968–1989*, p. 158–163. For Syria's relation with Iran, see Yair Hirschfeld, "The Odd Couple: Ba'athis Syria and Khomeini's Iran," chap. 6 in *Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 105–124; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, ch. 21; Jubin M. Goodarzi, *Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006), ch. 1.

151. See Joseph Nevo, "Syria and Jordan: The Politics of Subversion," chap. 8 in *Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks*, ed. Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 140–155; Curtis R. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), ch. 11.

152. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)," al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 106–107, 193.

153. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 98–103.

154. Like al-Shurbajī, al-Sūrī identifies the fighters' inexperience and the lack of coordination with the Fighting Vanguard as important reasons behind the military failures of the Brotherhood. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 139–142. This is a more convincing explanation of the Brotherhood's military failures than Conduit's claim that the exiled leadership had no military training. After all, military training for the Brotherhood's fighters was done by professional Iraqi military personnel and, in some cases, experienced members of the Brotherhood such as 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Alī. See Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 118–120.

155. See Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, ch. 4.

156. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 105–106. Khatib claims that the Islamic Front served military objectives, but she seems to confuse the Islamic Front with the Joint Command. See Khatib, *Islamic Revivalism in Syria*, p. 78.

157. See Pierret, *Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution*, p. 188–190.

158. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 98–106.

159. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)."

160. See Samer A. Badaro, "Class Relations, Sectarianism, and Soci-Political Cultural in a National Progressive State" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1987), p. 212–213.

161. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 110.

162. See ibid., p. 130–135.

163. See Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri*, p. 39–40.

164. See ibid., p. 40–46.

165. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)."

166. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 118.

167. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fi Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 150–151.

168. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 118.

169. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fi Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 162–164.

170. See ibid., p. 165–168.

171. 'Uqla's letter denouncing the alliance with political parties supports Lefèvre's claim that the Joint Command's unity was hampered by the ideological conflicts between the Fighting Vanguard and the Brotherhood. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 119–120.

172. See Muḥammad 'Abd al-Salām Faraj, *al-Jihād: al-Farīḍa al-Ghā'iba (The Neglected Duty)* (np, 1982). For discussion, see Aaron Y. Zelin, "*al-Farīda al-Ghā'iba* and al-Sadat's Assassination, A 30 Year Retrospective," *International Journal for Arab Studies* 3, no. 2 (2012): 1–34.

173. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fi 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 138–140.

174. See ibid., p. 142–152.

175. See ibid., p. 152–154.

176. See ibid., p. 152–159. See Baghdad Voice of Arab Syria, "The 17th August Explosion at the Syrian Prime Ministry," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* August 27th (1981).

177. See Booby-Trapped Car Kills 20 Outside Syrian Air Force Headquarters, "No Headline," *The Associated Press,* September 4th (1981).

178. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fi 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 166–167.

179. See ibid., p. 139.

180. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)."

181. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fi Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 199. See also Jamal Barut, "Sūriyya: Uṣūl wa-Ta'arrujāt al-Ṣirā' bayna al-Madrasatayn al-Taqlidiyya wa-l-Rādīkāliyya (Syria: Origins and Winding Road of the Conflict between the Traditional and Radical Schools)," chap. 3.1 in *al-Aḥzāb wa-l-Ḥarakāt wa-l-Jamā'āt al-Islāmiyya (Islamic Parties, Movements, and Societies)*, ed. Jamal Barut and Faysal Darraj (Damascus: al-Markaz a-'Arabī li-l-Dirāsāt al-Istrātījiyya, 1999), p. 299.

182. See Ḥammād, *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)*, p. 7.

183. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)."

184. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 166–167.

185. See Mayer, "The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961–1982," p. 604. Van Dam's claim that these attacks were carried out by the Islamic Front is also mistaken. See Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, p. 108.

186. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 196–198.

187. Al-Sūrī mentions that a man named Taysīr Luṭfī played an important role for that step, a name Sa'd al-Dīn also mentions when discussing the organization of the coup by the secret group of officers. See Sa'd al-Dīn, "Shāhid 'alā al-'Aṣr: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… 'Aṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 7 (Witness of the Age: 'Adnān Sa'd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 7)." See also Barut, "Sūriyya: Uṣūl wa-Ta'arrujāt al-Ṣirā' bayna al-Madrasatayn al-Taqlidiyya wa-l-Rādīkāliyya (Syria: Origins and Winding Road of the Conflict between the Traditional and Radical Schools)," p. 299.

188. See al-Markaz al-I'alāmī li-Da'm Thuwwār Ḥims, "Mudhakkirāt al-Qā'id al-Shahīd Ayman Shurbajī Raḥimahu Allāhu (23): al-Mu'āmara al-Kawniyya 'alā al-Sūriyyīn wa-Āthār 'Amaliyyat al-Azbakiyya (Mā Ashbahu al-Layla bi-l-Bāriḥa) (Memoirs of the Martyred Leader Ayman Shurbajī, God Have Mercy on his Soul, (23) The Universal Conspiracy Against Syrians and the Consequences of the Azbakiyah Operation (What Resembled Yesterday's Night))," *Mā Lā Yasa'u Sūrī Jahlahu* December 17th (2011), `https://homsrevolution.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/%d9%85%d8%b0%d9%83%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d9%87%d9%8a%d8%af-%d8%a3%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%a8%d8%ac%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d8%ad%d9%85%d9%87-%d8%a7-4/`; The Associated Press, "Bomb Explosion in Syria Kills 64 And Hurts 135 in Crowded Area," *New York Times,* November 30th (1981): 1.

189. See al-Markaz al-I'alāmī li-Da'm Thuwwār Ḥims, "Mudhakkirāt al-Qā'id al-Shahīd Ayman Shurbajī Raḥimahu Allāhu (25) wa-Tastamirru Qāfilat al-Shuhadā' wa-l-Asrā, wa-Muhājimat Qā'idat Mafriq Ḥarasatā (Memoirs of the Martyred Leader Ayman Shurbajī, God Have Mercy on his Soul, (25) The Caravan of Martyrs Continues, and the Attack on the Harasata Junction Base)," *Mā Lā Yasa'u Sūrī Jahlahu* December 26th (2011), `https://homsrevolution.wordpress.com/2011/12/27/sharbaji-memos-25/`.

190. See al-Markaz al-I'alāmī li-Da'm Thuwwār Ḥims, "Mudhakkirāt al-Qā'id al-Shahīd Ayman Shurbajī Raḥimahu Allāhu (24) Iistimrār Āthār 'Amaliyyat al-Azbakiyya, wa-Istimrār Qawāfil al-Shuhadā' wa-l-Mu'ataqalīn (Memoirs of the Martyred Leader Ayman Shurbajī, God Have Mercy on his Soul, (24) Continuation of the Consequences of the Azbakiyyah Operation, and Continuation of the Caravans of Martyrs and Prisoners)," *Mā Lā Yasa'u Sūrī Jahlahu* December 22th (2011), `https://homsrevolution.wordpress.com/2011/12/22/%d9%85%d8%b0%d9%83%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d9%87%d9%8a%d8%af-%d8%a3%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%a8%d8%ac%d9%8a-%d8%b1%d8%ad%d9%85%d9%87-%d8%a7-5/`.

191. See also al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalī'a al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī 'Ahd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 121–123.

Chapter 5. Epilogue: The Massacre

1. Lefèvre articulates one of the most detailed a convincing version of this account of the Hama Massacre. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 122–128. Using a wide variety of sources including the Brotherhood's own report, Batatu offered one of the earliest versions of the Hama Massacre as a response to an uprising. See Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren," p. 20; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 274–275. I believe Barut's accounts also falls into that category, though he claims that the regime lured the rebels into staging a revolt and openly confront the Syrian army. See Barut, "Sūriyya: Uṣūl wa-Ta'arrujāt al-Ṣirā' bayna al-Madrasatayn al-Taqlidiyya wa-l-Rādīkāliyya (Syria: Origins and Winding Road of the Conflict between the Traditional and Radical Schools)," p. 299–301. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch present similar versions of these events. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, 36–38; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, p. 22. Seale offers perhaps the most dramatic rendering of this account, insisting that the uprising brought panic to Damascus and shook the regime. See Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 332–333.

2. The use of these reports is widespread in the academic literature. Their plausibility will be discussed further below. Mentions of these reports can also be found in human rights reports. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, p. 36–37; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, p. 22. To the best of my knowledge, the ultimate source for the reports about mocked Islamic trials is Seurat. See Seurat, *Syrie, L'État de barbarie*, p. 113.

3. See ibid., §1.1, §2.2; Yassin al-Haj Saleh, *The Impossible Revolution: Making Sense of the Syrian Tragedy* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), §3, §10.

4. See Ismail, *The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory, and Government in Syria*, p. 54–64. For Foucault, see his lecture on the 21th of January 1976, in Michel Foucault, *"Il faut défendre la société : Cours au Collège de France, 1976* (Paris: Gallimard, 1977).

5. See Yasser Munif, *The Syrian Revolution: Between the Politics of Life and the Geopolitics of Death* (London: Pluto Press, 2020), ch. 1. For Agamben, see Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* ℵ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Munif also draws from Achille Mbembe's work on what he calls *necropolitics*. See Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," *Public Culture* 15, no. 1 (2003): 11–40.

6. See Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, p. 111–115.

7. I believe that the siege of Hama is the single most important event that preceded the massacre. For other researchers who recognize the importance of the siege, see Badaro, "Class Relations, Sectarianism, and Soci-Political Cultural in a National Progressive State," p. 216–220; Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 123–127.

8. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 161–162.

9. See ibid., p. 169–176.

10. See ibid., p. 208–211. Lefèvre also narrates 'Uqla's secret visit to Hama based on interviews with members of the Brotherhood. See Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 125–126.

11. Barut and Badaro identify Jawād as the person who initiated the uprising, the former relying in part on al-Sūrī's account, the latter on the Fighting Vanguard's magazine *al-Jihād*, which I have not been able to check.

12. See United States of America Defense Intelligence Agency, "Syria: Muslim Brotherhood Pressure Intensifies," *Cable DDB-2630-34-B2 (Secret),* April 22nd (1982).

13. For example, the authors believe the Fighting Vanguard was the Syrian Brotherhood's secret apparatus; that the Brotherhood organized the Aleppo Artillery School Massacre; that "Said Hawi [*sic*] had served as an assistant to shaykh Marwan Haddad [*sic*];" etc. Moreover, the document describes an implausible plot organized by the Brotherhood to topple the Asad regime by forging an alliance with former President Ṣalāḥ Jadīd and his supporters, the former being in jailed since Ḥafiẓ Asad's 1970 coup. There was such a group of officers loyal to Jadīd at the time, but cooperation with the Brotherhood seems unlikely in light of their history of confrontation and profound ideological disagreements. See Seurat, *Syrie, L'État de barbarie*, ch. 3. See also this interview with ʻAlī Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Bayānūnī, a member of the Brotherhood from Aleppo, who mentions the possibility of a coup staged by officers loyal to Jadīd but does not discuss it in relation to the Brotherhood. See Éric Rouleau, "Un entretien avec un dirigeant de la confrérie," *Le Monde,* May 13th (1981).

14. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fi Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 210–211.

15. See ibid., p. 208–209.

16. See Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography* (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan, 1991), p. 118–119. For Ramaḍān's exchanges with rebels, including the Brotherhood, see also Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 130.

17. See Badaro, "Class Relations, Sectarianism, and Soci-Political Cultural in a National Progressive State," p. 217; Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 127

18. See ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn, "Shāhid ʻalā al-ʻAṣr: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… ʻAṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 8 (Witness of the Age: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 8)," *Al-Jazeera,* November 11th (2012). For a transcription of Saʻd al-Dīn's interview, see the Brotherhood's website `IkhwanWiki`, with the entry عدنان سعد الدين.. عصر الإخوان في سوريا ج8.

19. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fi Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 212.

20. See ibid., p. 213; Saʻd al-Dīn, "Shāhid ʻalā al-ʻAṣr: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… ʻAṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 8 (Witness of the Age: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 8)."

21. See ibid.

22. The date is taken from ibid. Al-Sūrī places this date around February 9th. Barut also identifies February 8th as the day the Brotherhood called for an uprising. See Barut, "Sūriyya: Uṣūl wa-Taʻarrujāt al-Ṣirāʻ bayna al-Madrasatayn al-Taqlidiyya wa-l-Rādīkāliyya (Syria: Origins and Winding Road of the Conflict between the Traditional and Radical Schools)," p. 301.

23. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fi Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 233–240.

24. See Saʻd al-Dīn, "Shāhid ʻalā al-ʻAṣr: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… ʻAṣr al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi Sūriyā, juz' 8 (Witness of the Age: ʻAdnān Saʻd al-Dīn… The Age of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, part 8)"; al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fi Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi*

Revolution in Syria), p. 244. Conduit also makes this point. See Conduit, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 124–125.

25. See Seurat, *Syrie, L'État de barbarie*, ch. 3.

26. See Lucien George, "Après la formation du nouveau gouvernement, le président Assad doit lutter contre l'insécurité, le marasme économique et la dégradation des institutions," *Le Monde,* January 16th (1981).

27. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, p. 35–36; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, p. 18–19; Syrian Human Rights Committee, *Thirty-Five Years on the Mashariqa Massacre: Blood which Hasn't Yet Dried* (Damascus: Syrian Human Rights Committee, 2015), `https://www.shrc.org/en/?p=25565`.

28. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, p. 36; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, p. 20–21. See also this interview with ʻAlī Ṣadr al-Bayānūnī about these events, Rouleau, "Un entretien avec un dirigeant de la confrérie."

29. The Muslim Brotherhood makes the same point in their report on the Hama Massacre.

30. This is the main argument of Greitens' book, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *Dictators and their Secret Police* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

31. The feeling of urgency to end the rebellion in Hama is expressed in Seale's biography of Asad. See Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 332–333. For an argument that the scale of repression varies inversely with quality of knowledge in authoritarian regimes, including the Iraqi Baʻth regime, see Martin K. Dimitrov and Joseph Sassoon, "State Security, Information, and Repression: A Comparison of Communist Bulgaria and Baʻthist Iraq," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 2 (2014): 3–31.

32. For a similar argument made in the case of the Iraqi Baʻth regime, see Lisa Blaydes, *State of Repression: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

33. See al-Shurbajī, *Mudhakkirāt al-Ṭalīʻa al-Mujāhida fī Sūriyā ḍidd al-Niẓām al-Nuṣayrī al-Mujrim fī ʻAhd al-Hālik Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad (Memoirs of the Mujahid Vanguard in Syria in their Fight against the Criminal Nusayri Regime during the Time of the Deceased Hafiz al-Asad)*, p. 166–167.

34. See Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-ʻAṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)* (Cairo: al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, 1983), p. 25–30.

35. See ibid.; Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, p. 36–37; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, p. 21–23.

36. See Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-ʻAṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*, p. 25–30.

37. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, p. 22–31; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, ch. 5. Muḥammad Salīm Ḥammad describes how he was tortured by guards using the "magic carpet" technique, whereby he would be attached on a flat table with his head down as guards beat his feet with metal cables. See Ḥammād, *Tadmur Shāhid wa-Mashhūd (Palmyra: Witness and Testimony)*, p. 16.

38. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 208–211; Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-ʻAṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*, p. 27–28.

39. See Le Monde, "Des sanglants combats auraient opposé Frères musulmans et forces de l'ordre," *Le Monde,* December 31th (1981).

40. Nikolaos van Dam is one of the few scholars who briefly uses the Brotherhood's report to trace some of the sectarian dynamics of the massacre. Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism, and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1980*, p. 111–115.
41. See Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-'Aṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*, p. 51–53.
42. See also ibid., p. 157–160.
43. See ibid., p. 53–59.
44. See ibid., p. 60–64.
45. See ibid., p. 65–69.
46. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, 36–38; Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 332–333; Barut, "Sūriyya: Uṣūl wa-Ta'arrujāt al-Ṣirā' bayna al-Madrasatayn al-Taqlidiyya wa-l-Rādīkāliyya (Syria: Origins and Winding Road of the Conflict between the Traditional and Radical Schools)," p. 299–301; Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, p. 274–275; Lefèvre, *Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*, p. 122–128.
47. See Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-'Aṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*, p. 55–56.
48. See al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 245.
49. See Amnesty International, *Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic*, p. 36–37; See Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*, p. 332–333; Human Rights Watch, *Human Rights in Syria*, p. 22; Seurat, *Syrie, L'État de barbarie*, p. 113.
50. See al-Sūrī's discussion of the Brotherhood's declarations after their call for an uprising, which includes a few examples, al-Sūrī, *al-Thawra al-Islāmiyya al-Jihādiyya fī Sūriyā (The Islamic and Jihadi Revolution in Syria)*, p. 214–233.
51. See Dagher, *Assad or We Burn the Country*, p. 232–233.
52. See Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-'Aṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*, p. 69–74
53. See ibid., p. 75–77.
54. See ibid., p. 78–85.
55. See ibid., p. 86–88.
56. See ibid., p. 89–102.
57. See ibid., p. 103–106.
58. See David Bernstein, "Reports from Beirut say: Syria crushes civil rising; hundreds dead," *The Jerusalem Post* February 8th (1982): 1; The Associated Press, "Hundreds dead in eight day of Syrian revolt," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* February 11th (1982): 2. See also Brynjar Lia, "The Islamist Uprising in Syria, 1976–1982: The History and Legacy of a Failed Revolt," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 2016, p. 14.
59. See Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-'Aṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*, p. 107–113. In Dagher's account of the Hama Massacre, Khaled al-Khani reached al-Amiriyya around February 8th and heard bombings on the next day, which would coincide with the regime taking control of the neighbourhood around that time. See Dagher, *Assad or We Burn the Country*, p. 235.
60. See Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥamā: Ma'sāt al-'Aṣr (Hama: The Tragedy of our Times)*, p. 114–121.
61. See ibid., p. 122–128.
62. See ibid., p. 129–133.
63. See ibid., p. 133–139.
64. See ibid., p. 140–142.
65. See ibid., p. 168–170.
66. See ibid., p. 241–261.
67. See ibid., p. 285–288.
68. See ibid., p. 143–156.

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