It's not what you know, it's who you know: an event history analysis of human rights treaty ratification from the perspective of acculturation theory

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Abstract (English)

Various scholars have made theoretical suppositions as to why states ratify human rights treaties. While some qualitative and quantitative empirical testing of these theories has ensued, there are deficiencies in the current research. The qualitative case studies are often difficult to generalize to the body of potential ratifiers as a whole, while the large n analysis of empirical work often fail to appropriately account for acculturative effects and accordingly suffer from omitted variable bias which undermines confidence in their results. In this research, I use both qualitative and quantitative methods to challenge the existing assumptions of the literature, demonstrate how acculturative effects may function, and show that acculturation must be appropriately modelled by scholars when estimating state ratification probabilities concerning human rights treaties. Beginning with a case study of the earliest human rights instrument of the post-war era, the Genocide Convention, I use existing legal scholarship to demonstrate the substantial (and partially self-imposed) pressure the United Kingdom faced due to its deviant stance on the treaty. I then turn to a large N event history analysis of the majority of the major UN human rights instruments of the post-war era (ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, CRC, CAT, CPED), employing a set of spatial lag variables in addition to a number of covariates consistent with other theorization in the literature to assess whether acculturation influences state ratification probability, as well as assess whether the other theories of ratification are robust to the addition of variables that account for acculturative processes. I find that both the quantity and quality of social pressure, as well as its duration seems to consistently influence the probability of state human rights treaty ratification.

Abstrait (Français)

Divers recherches ont fait des suppositions théoriques sur les raisons pour lesquelles les états ratifient les traités sur les droits la personne. Bien que certains recherches empiriques qualitatifs et quantitatifs de ces théories se soient ensuivis, la recherche qui suit ont souvent des carences. Les études des cas qualitatifs sont souvent difficiles à généraliser à l'ensemble des candidats à la ratification, alors que la vaste analyse des travaux empiriques ne tient souvent pas compte des effets d'acculturation et souffre par conséquent d'un biais variable omis qui mine la confiance dans leurs résultats. Dans cette recherche, j'utilise des méthodes qualitatives et quantitatives pour remettre en question les hypothèses existantes de la littérature, montrer comment les effets d'acculturation peuvent fonctionner et montrer que l'acculturation doit être modélisée de manière appropriée par les spécialistes lors de l'estimation des probabilités de ratification des états relatives aux traités relatifs aux droits de la personne. En commençant par une étude de cas du premier instrument de défense des droits de la personne de l'époque après-guerre, la Convention sur le Génocide, j'utilise de recherche juridique existante pour démontrer les pressions considérables (et partiellement auto-imposées) subies par le Royaume-Uni en raison de sa position déviante à l'égard du traité. Je passe ensuite à une vaste analyse de l'historique des événements de la majorité des principaux instruments des Nations Unies relatifs aux droits des personnes de la période après-guerre (ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, CRC, CAT, CPED), en utilisant un ensemble de variables de retard spatial avec des covariables compatibles avec d'autres theories de la littérature afin de déterminer si l'acculturation influe sur la probabilité de ratification par les états, ainsi que de déterminer si les autres théories de la ratification sont robustes à l'ajout de variables qui tiennent compte des processus d'acculturation. Je trouve que la quantité et la qualité de la pression sociale, ainsi que sa durée, semblent influer de manière constante sur la probabilité de la ratification d'un traité d'État relatif aux droits de la personne.

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Writing any academic paper is certainly no easy pursuit. As I have learned, this is even truer of a MA thesis. This project, in its current form at least, would never have come to fruition without the contributions of numerous individuals, and I would like to acknowledge each of them in turn.

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While my work has been substantially improved by the valuable comments, criticisms, and suggestions of numerous individuals, the writing and analysis in this thesis is my own. I have not worked with any co-authors to produce any of the sections which comprise this thesis. While the quantitative work in this thesis is also my own, I have relied on several pre-existing databases constructed by others. These have been cited in the format specified by their creators. Any errors or shortcomings in the subsequent work are mine and mine alone.

1.0 Introduction

In 1987, the Colombian government under the stewardship of President Virgilio Barco Vargas ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The Vargas government was fighting a counter-terrorism campaign against violent organized crime, beset by numerous assassinations of prominent public figures by drug lords and paramilitary groups, confronted with a failing ceasefire with FARC, and engaged in an ongoing urban guerilla conflict with the 19th of April movement. Vargas was following a South American trend established by Argentina when it became the first South American state to ratify the nascent convention in late 1986. Uruguay and Colombia soon followed, as did Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in the following year. Brazil followed in 1989, and by the conclusion of 1991, Bolivia was the only major South American state who had not ratified. In contrast, Jamaica has faced none of the issues the Vargas government contended with in the decades after the CAT was opened for ratification but has not ratified the convention to this day. Why did Colombia ratify the convention in such adverse circumstances, and yet Jamaica has resolutely avoided doing so for over three decades?

The countries are ostensibly not dissimilar in ways one might think would influence their ratification decision: Jamaica represents a strong democracy, having consistently accrued Polity scores no lower than 9 throughout the period in which it could have ratified, indicating the presence of strong democratic institutions. Colombia was also considered to be a strong democracy by the polity rankings, having attained a ranking of 8 in the year it ratified. Barco was a center-left President, having been elected on a campaign of social reform, while Jamaica also has been governed by a left wing executive for much of the period in which it had the opportunity to ratify, with the democratic socialist People's National Party in office from 1989-2007 in Jamaica (and again from 2011-2015). Jamaica differs from Colombia in respect to its human rights record, but while it is imperfect it has consistently had significantly higher ratings in its ability to protect physical integrity rights than did Colombia in the year it ratified. The true noteworthy difference between the states is the attitude of their geographic neighbors toward the treaty. The CAT seems to have been widely endorsed by South American states, with the majority of states in the region ratifying in quick succession to one another. Jamaica on the other hand comes from a region of the globe with far fewer ratifications. Of the states in Central

America and the Caribbean, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Saint Kitts and Nevis have all failed to ratify the convention. Those states in the region who did ratify tended to do so much later. Mexico and Belize ratified early in 1986, and Panama joined it in 1987, but following these ratifications there was a substantial delay until any of their regional peers deemed it necessary to join them as parties to the Convention. Costa Rica and Antigua and Barbuda finally ratified in 1993. Cuba waited until 1995. Honduras and El Salvador joined it in ratifying in 1996, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ratified in 2001, Nicaragua held out on ratification until 2005 and the Dominican Republic dallied until 2012. Looking at this anecdotal evidence, one cannot help but wonder if social pressure has substantial influence on state ratification choices, or whether the underlying cause Colombia's ratification and Jamaica's indifference lies in some other unconsidered variable.

Relational dynamics among states are increasingly becoming a subject of study in international relations. Recent work has illuminated the impact of the positional structure of multilateral diplomacy on practices in international organizations,[1] as well as the relationship between power dynamics in external networks and relationships of dependence in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting.[2] Relational positions are also an important element in diffusion theory, which generally rejects the proposition state policy decisions are formed independent of the choices of other actors.[3] Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett suggest that through international policy diffusion, states may be influenced by their peers, positing that this occurs when "...government policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries".[4] Why such diffusion occurs is a matter that merits study, for as Gilardi rightly notes, the process of diffusion is more interesting than the outcome alone.[5]

In the study of human rights treaties, scholars have variously presented arguments contending ratification can be explained by processes of normative persuasion (learning) or the exertion of (usually) material pressures (coercion). As outlined below, these arguments tend to perform poorly in predicting the ratification of human rights treaties. Alternative theories

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[1] Vincent Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 193-253.
[2] Deborah E. de Lange, *Power and Influence: The Embeddedness of Nations* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 189-200.
[3] Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, "Introduction: The diffusion of liberalization," in *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy*, eds. Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 7.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Fabrizio Gilardi, "Four Ways We Can Improve Policy Diffusion Research," *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 16 no. 1 (2016): 9.

stressing social emulation of cultural trends are either overly broad (world polity institutionalism) or have yet to be convincingly tested across a number of major human rights treaties (acculturation). Accordingly, my research question will assess whether relational structure (field effects) at the international level influence human rights treaty ratification patterns. I will assess this question through empirical analysis of acculturation theory, controlling for existing explanations provided in the literature. This will allow me to determine whether existing findings in the literature are robust to the addition of acculturation variables to these models. It will also allow me to analyze whether acculturation itself plays a substantial role in determining state ratification choices. By situating the theorized causal link between existing levels of theorization I aim to provide greater explanatory power than the existing structural theories while offering greater generalizability than accounts that emphasize the domestic politics of treaty ratifiers. To facilitate this analysis, I will employ an event history analysis on the ratification trends of various global human rights treaties. In doing so, I will aim to contribute to the literature on acculturation theory, as well as that on human rights and treaty ratification more broadly.

2.0 Literature Review

Existing accounts of human rights treaty ratification tend to operate at one of two levels. Scholars focus on either structure or on the state itself to explain ratification. Both of these levels are imperfect in explaining the observed patterns, for reasons that will be outlined below. While much of my subsequent empirical testing will be on my operationalizations of acculturation theory, I nevertheless am of the view it is useful to cover the entirety of the existing explanations for human rights treaty ratification. There are several reasons for doing so. The first is that by informing the readers of potential alternatives to acculturation theory, they can more readily assess whether such explanations are compelling alternatives to the results I present on acculturation specifically. Second, by covering the existing research, I can properly contextualize the contribution I am making to a gap in the literature that I identify below. Third, and most importantly, as existing work does not properly account for acculturation in its tests of other explanations, it suffers from potential omitted variable bias. In effect, we should not be entirely confident of the results that other scholars covered below are reporting when they are failing to consider (and rule out) a theoretically plausible alternative logic of ratification. Where quantitative analysis is concerned, the failure of these authors to account for this possible mechanism may bias the models they are reporting. This would suggest that in revisiting existing models through the addition of acculturation variables, I am not simply producing a result that shows if acculturation is a statistically significant variable with substantive coefficients, but I am also assessing whether other theories hold up when tested with this omitted variable. In this sense, I am producing knowledge not just about acculturation, but about the various logics of treaty ratification covered subsequently.

2.1 Rational Choice Explanations of Treaty Ratification

Beginning at the state level, several scholars have given rationalist accounts of compliance with international law. Guzman, for instance, has proposed a theory of treaty compliance based on reputational payoffs for compliance that states calculate will improve opportunities for future cooperation. This is expected as since "...states cannot rely on external enforcement, reputation...[becomes]...one of the few ways to make promises credible".[6] Improving one's reputation yields value by offering states higher payoffs in bargaining as they

[6] Andrew T. Guzman, *How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 35.

can more easily make credible commitments to potential partners and extract more gains in negotiations.[7] Accordingly, states are expected to only enter into agreements that maximize their utility.[8] Guzman then expects states to continue to comply with their commitments on the basis of future reputational payoffs and benefits the treaty accords, so long as these payoffs outweigh alternative benefits from defection.[9] However, his theorization cannot explain why states would enter human rights treaties, as unlike a treaty on trade or arms control, these treaties bring them no instrumental benefits and in many cases promise no reputational payoffs for states with poor human rights records or capacities.[10]

Goldsmith and Posner similarly offer a rationalist account of human rights treaty ratification, substituting the reputational concerns of Guzman for altruistic motives in certain states conceived of as rational interests. Given the difficulty of adequately solving cooperation and coordination games through customary interaction, they theorize that states turn to treaties to ensure optimal outcomes.[11] When it comes to human rights treaties, Goldsmith and Posner posit that western democracies have an interest in ascribing a "code of conduct" to other states, regulating certain behaviors they consider morally reprehensible and providing protection for their co-ethnics and co-religionists living abroad. [12] Other states have an incentive to ratify because they gain small benefits from avoiding criticism and potential sanction from the liberal originators of the treaties, while the treaties are relatively "costless" as there are already external rights monitoring mechanisms that report on their conduct irrespective of their treaty status.[13] However, this game-theoretic explanation cannot adequately account for why many states do not ratify certain treaties, and why even widely ratified treaties have in many cases experienced significant delays before many of their parties ratified them. Further, western sympathy for co-ethnics or co-religionists cannot account for why states would enter a multilateral human rights treaty as opposed to forming various bilateral agreements with states who have citizens they care about, while avoiding undertaking obligations to other states.[14]

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[7] Ibid, 35-6, 74.
[8] Ibid, 121.
[9] Ibid, 74-75, 121. See also, Alex Geisinger and Michael Ashley Stein, "Review: Rational Choice, Reputation, and Human Rights Treaties," *The Michigan Law Review Association* 106 no. 6 (2008): 1136-7.
[10] Ibid, 1137.
[11] Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, *The Limits of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 62-5.
[12] Ibid, 82.
[13] Ibid, 94.
[14] Ibid, 82.

Hathaway offers complementary theorization to that of Goldsmith and Posner, arguing treaties play both an instrumental and an expressive role for states. She believes treaties are expressive in so far as they both establish what is considered appropriate conduct in international society, and also allow states to express their positions on these standards through ratifying or ignoring them.[15] Treaties are instrumental in so far as when they include substantive monitoring and enforcement elements they facilitate both expressions and conduct in support of the protected rights from states. When treaties lack a meaningful monitoring and enforcement regime, the expressive and instrumental roles of treaties may diverge, allowing states to take positions they do not support as non-compliance will either go undetected or undeterred.[16] Human rights treaties represent a particularly strong example of such treaties, as unlike most international treaties horizontal deterrence (retaliation) is not possible, nor do states have strong desires to invest in other forms of punishment over the treatment of foreign nationals.[17] Furthermore, evidence suggests the monitoring systems created by most human rights treaties have been poor.[18]

In instances such as these, states experiencing (internal or external) pressure to improve human rights performance can relieve that pressure through the expressive position taking that accompanies treaty ratification without needing to alter their behavior. If this is the case, ratifying a treaty that a state cannot or does not intend to abide by is no longer an unexplainable behavior, as it was in Guzman's theorization.[19] Similar to Goldsmith and Posner, Hathaway theorizes that in low-monitoring and low-enforcement regimes, treaty ratification brings small benefits (as states are rewarded for position-taking by their peers and NGOs, and may also signal reliability to investors) with few costs. However, while Posner and Goldsmith focus on the benefits of avoiding various sanctions from western states in their understanding of ratification as states playing cooperation or coordination games, Hathaway's theorization suggests that ratifying treaties may in fact be the optimal option for certain states independent of the actions of other actors. However, while Hathaway can account for why non-compliant states ratify treaties that prescribe behavior counter to their future intentions, her work cannot satisfactorily explain

[15] Oona Hathaway, "Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?" *The Yale Law Journal* 111 (2002): 2006.
[16] Ibid, 2006.
[17] Ibid, 2007.
[18] Ibid, 2007-2008.
[19] Ibid, 2007.

why some rights violating regimes opt to benefit from such expressive acts, whereas other repressive regimes avoid them.[20]

2.2 Social Theories of Compliance

The inability of these rationalist and state level theories to explain the ratification of human rights treaties by a broad array of states has seen some scholars turn to a modified conception of reputation, which they characterize as esteem to explain treaty ratification.[21] According to Geisinger and Stein, if cooperation is generally advantageous, then consistently cooperating with one or more partner states will lead a state to desire the partners one cooperates with to perceive them in a positive light. Accordingly, states which have a history of cooperative behavior will enter into treaties out of a desire to remain esteemed, rather than the capacity of those treaties to bring them positive material benefits.[22] This desire for esteem is not considered to be inherent in all states though. It is an artifact of cooperation. Per Geisinger and Stein, non-cooperative states do not develop a desire for esteem, as esteem-seeking follows from iterated cooperation.[23]

2.2.1 World Polity Institutionalism and Treaty Ratification

In the understanding of Geisinger and Stein, this process feeds back into the dynamics of the international community. Esteem-seeking states garner esteem from their peers by abiding by group norms, and this leads the peers whose esteem is sought to esteem the esteem seeker and conceive of it as part of their group. Regrettably, Geisinger and Stein conceive of "global society" as a homogenous single group to which states either wish to belong to, or whose esteem they do not seek.[24] This makes their theorization structural rather than relational, and causes it to become overly broad and unable to account for states that deviate from the expectations derived from the structure. This problem is also inherent in the work of the various world polity

[20] Hathaway is also subject to a potent critique by Simmons, who questions whether the expressive benefits accrued would really be as substantial as Hathaway believes. See Beth Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 60.

[21] Geisinger and Stein, "Review," 1138.
[22] Ibid. Note how this is different from Guzman, who sees the desire for esteem as a part of the cost benefit analysis states perform, not a separate good valued above it.
[23] Ibid, 1138-1139.
[24] Ibid, 1140.

institutionalists.[25] These authors join Stein and Geisinger in contending that theorization understanding state action as locally constructed by diverse capacities and traditions fails to offer a coherent account of the structural isomorphism that exists worldwide across numerous issue areas. Nor, they allege, can such theories explain the substantial "decoupling" that exists between the declaratory and official stances of states and their local practices. These authors point to the influence of worldwide models which establish, shape, and justify the actions of agents (including states) to explain homogeneity in international practices on state managed childhood, the subjects taught and time devoted to them in primary education, and the development of math and science focused curricula in nearly all states (including ones that as late as the mid twentieth century perceived them as peripheral subjects in the education of their secondary students).[26] Further, Quinn and Toyoda have demonstrated that global ideological positions influence state policy choices on the liberalization of finances.[27]

World polity institutionalists contend that state action is in fact the product of the institutionalization of worldwide models and scripts (henceforth scripts) which define the broad moral order by organizing and legitimizing certain practices, creating a taken for granted understanding of "the way things work" and how particular actors act.[28] The modern world is full of such shared understandings, the collective and transcendental nature of which has substantially expanded throughout the modern era.[29] Culture outlines shared expectations which are codified or constructed as scripts of how the world operates.[30] Once codified and legitimized,

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[25] Terminology derived from Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, *Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[26] John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation State," *American Journal of Sociology* 103 no. 1 (1997): 145. See also John W. Meyer, John Boli, and George M. Thomas, "Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account," in *World Society: The Writings of John W. Meyer*, eds. Georg Krucken and Gili S. Drori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 67. For the examples see in turn John Boli-Bennett and John W. Meyer, "The Ideology of Childhood and the State: Rules Distinguishing Children in National Constitutions, 1870-1970," *American Sociological Review* 43 (1978): 797-812; Aaron Benavot, Yun-Kyung Cha, David H. Kamens, John Meyer, Suk-ying Wong, "Knowledge for the Masses: World Models and National Curricula, 1920-1986," in *School Knowledge for the Masses: World Models and National Primary Curricular Categories in the Twentieth Century*, eds. John Meyer, David Kamens, and Aaron Benavot (London: Routledge, 1992) , 48-60. David H. Kamens and Aaron Benavot, "A Comparative and Historical Analysis of Mathematics and Science Curricula, 1800-1986," in *School Knowledge for the Masses: World Models and National Primary Curricular Categories in the Twentieth Century*, eds. John Meyer, David Kamens, and Aaron Benavot (London: Routledge, 1992) , 101-123.

[27] Dennis P. Quinn and A. Maria Toyoda, "Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of Financial Globalization," *American Journal of Political Science* 51 no. 2 (2007): 344-363.

[28] This as opposed to the common understanding in social science of action as "internally generated and autonomous choice and motivation". Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, "Ontology," 68. See also, John Meyer, "Reflections: Institutional Theory and World Society," in *World Society: The Writings of John W. Meyer*, eds. Georg Krucken and Gili S. Drori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 37. See also Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, "Ontology," 67-8.

[29] John Meyer, "Reflections," 37, 44-5. This is an alternative to constructivist understandings of norms as being internalized by actors.

[30] Gili S. Drori and Georg Krucken, "World Society: A Theory and a Research Program in Context," in *World Society: The Writings of John W. Meyer*, eds. Georg Krucken and Gili S. Drori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6. See also John Meyer, "Globalization: Sources and Effects on National States and Societies," in *World Society: The Writings of John W. Meyer*, eds. Georg Krucken and Gili S. Drori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 158.

these values are advantaged in dialectic processes, for arguments that carry the greatest weight according to communicative action theory are those that appeal to or are grounded in existing deeply rooted and collectively recognized ideas and values.[31] These legitimized and discursively advantaged institutions embody the basic rules of global society, defining both who actors are and what they ought to do to attain standing.[32] As actors in an environment with developed institutions, states are conditioned to be sensitive to and employ external criteria of worth.[33] Global culture defines the ontological value of actors and actions, and ritualized compliance with the social expectations and conventions of culture constructs actors.[34]

The proliferation of these scripts has led to the creation of a global culture of legitimate conduct based on universal claims in which states are deeply embedded.[35] Through their network connections states create a "sacred canopy" of associational mutual comprehension, enhancing the influence of the universalized scripts diffused by global culture.[36] The success of these diffusion processes is a function of the target state's embeddedness in the networks of world society.[37] For instance, Bearce and Bondanella have shown that socialization may occur through participation in intergovernmental organizations, with shared IGO memberships leading to greater interest convergence between states.[38]

In acting in accordance with these diffused scripts, which formalize means to enact the transcendental values which have replaced transcendental deities, states reveal the extent to which symbolic and dramaturgical forces, operating at the level of societal macrostructure, drive their identity and behavior far more than the pursuit of rational action in accordance with material interests.[39] Meyer, Boli, and Thomas write that social structure is not:

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[31] Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," *International Organization* 51 no. 4 (1997): 564.
[32] Drori and Krucken, "World Society," 21. See also Meyer, "Reflections," 48.
[33] See John Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," in *World Society: The Writings of John W. Meyer*, eds. Georg Krucken and Gili S. Drori (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 95, 98-100.
[34] Rather than a conscious decision to accept these norms as legitimate. See Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, "Ontology," 74.

[35] Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation State," 146-8.
[36] Ibid, 10
[37] Ibid, 14. See also Meyer, "Reflections," 49, 51-4. See also Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, "Ontology," 70.
[38] David H. Bearce and Stacy Bondanella, "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence," *International Organization* 61 no. 4 (2007): 708, 715.
[39] Drori and Krucken, "World Society", 13, 15, 21-2. See also Meyer, "Reflections," 38-9, 49. See also Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez, "World Society," 151. 15. As Meyer, Boli, and Thomas note, realists ascribe all purposive activity to the actor and treat integration as a property of the actor rather than the system. Further, when realists acknowledge interactive effects, actors are held to be distinct from their environments. This is a product of social scientific assumptions having been based on enlightenment philosophy, which has tended to overlook the

> ""...the assembly of patterns of local interaction but...ideological edifices of institutionalized elements that derive their authority from more universal rules and conceptions. The disjuncture between social structure and observable patterns of activity and interaction...makes sense in this light. The formal structure of society, ranging from the definition and properties of the individual to the form and content of....states, arise from, or are adjusted to fit, very general rules that often have worldwide meaning and power."[40]

DiMaggio and Powell's 'mimetic isomorphism', which posits that actors incorporate institutional rules reflexively, offers an explanation for the radical decoupling seen across many issue areas.[41] Policy prescriptions diffused from world culture are often modeled on the basis of "universal" scripts that work on a high level of abstraction and are ill suited for local particularities.[42] These models are constantly elaborated by professionals who make it their task to offer states guidance on implementing them.[43] While such scripts are substantially decoupled from local needs, they are coterminous with "appropriate" action for the rationalized modern state, the form of actorhood determined to grant legitimate authority by global culture, and are either mimetically adopted by states without serious reflection, ceremonially adopted as indicators of legitimate action, or deliberately adopted to assist states in meeting the demands for conduct they are expected to meet.[44]

If world polity institutionalists are correct, then ratification of human rights treaties occurs not due to instrumental concerns related to self-interest, but rather is itself a reflection of the far reaching changes to the social role of the state and the diffuse authority of international cultural understandings of universalistic rights that have occurred throughout the twentieth and twenty first centuries.[45] An alternative to ratifying human rights treaties may be unimaginable to states in the social environment that has socialized them, leading to internalizations of the practice as the only possible one.[46]

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construction of actors by custom and habit, due to its assumption that actors are rational and purposive masters of both the natural and social orders. See Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, "Ontology," 71, 77. See also Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, "Ontology," 80.

[40] Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, "Ontology," 80.

[41] Meyer, "Reflections," 41.

[42] Drori and Krucken, "World Society," 154.

[43] Meyer, "Reflections," 50.

[44] Drori and Krucken, "World Society," 158-9. See also Meyer, "Reflections," 41, 50. See also Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations," 90. See also Meyer, "Globalization," 160. See also Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations," 89, 97.

[45] Drori and Krucken, "World Society," 16.

[46] This draws from Reus-Smit's discussion of the effects of norms of procedural justice on institutional design. See Reus-Smith, "Constitutional Structure," 569.

2.2.2 Practice Theory and Treaty Ratification

Indeed, this is the argument that would be advanced by Glas, van der Linden, Hoffmann, and Denemark, that the making of multilateral treaties has become "...a taken-for-granted practice of the international system, constitutive of both state actors and the international system itself".[47] The authors suggest that practices associated with competent statehood change over time; while war was a constitutive practice in the early modern period, new practices deemed to constitute legitimate statehood, including participation in multilateral treaties, have emerged over time.[48] While engagement in the products of multilateralism (treaties) does not dispel social hierarchies, it does (according to the authors) signify and legitimize states as members of the international system; to create a multilateral treaty with other states is to implicitly recognize an equal sovereign relationship among the parties involved.[49] Accordingly, instrumental benefits aside, states also constitute themselves as legitimate actors in the international system through multilateral treaty-making.[50]

Empirical support for these contentions are provided by the authors who employ a mixed method of social network analysis and diplomatic history to reveal at critical junctures the USSR after its revolution, and former colonies after decolonization, relied on multilateral treaty making rather than alternatives as a primary means of legitimizing themselves in the international system, while the U.S. and the European states also continued the practice even though other elements of the old European state system were delegitimized following the world wars.[51] In the case of human rights treaties, this logic seems to apply less well. If ratifying the treaties constitutes a constitutive practice of international politics, then one would expect the number of ratifications to remain relatively steady, if not increase, over time. However, this is not the case. While some more recent treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) have

[47] Aarie Glas, Clifton van der Linden, Matthew J. Hoffmann, and Robert A. Denemark, "Understanding Multilateral Treaty-Making as Constitutive Practice," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 3 no. 3 (2018): 339.
[48] Ibid, 340.
[49] In effect, while not all seats at the table are equal, simply having a seat carries constitutive value, even if input opportunities are limited by social structure. This is consistent with the argument of Pouliot that the value of the practice of multilateralism extends beyond its substantive outputs. For instance, practices of multilateralism may moderate and structure the preferences of participants. See Ibid, 341-3. See also, Vincent Pouliot, "Multilateralism as an End in Itself," *International Studies Perspectives* 12 (2011): 19-20, 22-23. For elaboration on the social hierarchies in multilateral diplomacy see Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders*.
[50] Bilateral treaties are excluded as they are often unequal, exploitative, or technical in nature and are thus not constructed with the intention of conferring legitimacy upon their parties. Further, the instrumental and constitutive qualities of treaties need not be mutually exclusive. Multilateral treaties on the other hand can both serve state interests while also constituting parties as legitimate actors and constituting further practices and expectations in the international system more broadly. Ibid, 340-1.
[51] Ibid, 347-354.

attracted broad ratification, others such as the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED) and the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families have not attracted broad ratification. While it could be argued the latter treaties are newer, and thus states have not had as long to make ratification decisions as with older treaties, if ratification is a constitutive process one would not expect treaty age to be significant. It would seem, based on this observation, that either the content of the treaties, the length of time the treaty has existed (opportunities for diffusion), and/or the other parties to the treaty are important in some way.

2.2.3 Acculturation Theory and Treaty Ratification

Both Geisinger and Stein and world polity theorists fail to account for the differentiation inherent in the global community by approaching ratification from a structural level and drawing their hypothesis from their conception of a general structure that states are subordinate to. While constitutional structures may exist in international society, these are not unchallenged. As Reus-Smit observes "...it is not uncommon for...actors to oppose the dominant interpretation of what constitutes...appropriate state behavior".[52] Simmons similarly critiques world polity institutionalism, noting "[t]he mere availability of externally validated scripts does not provide much guidance as to why some governments find world culture alluring while others simply do not. Local cultures have in some cases resisted global trends fairly vigorously...".[53] In other words, various sub-groups exist whose esteem may be sought. Furthermore, network analysis has revealed that the relational dynamics of the world polity (when examining shared IGO memberships) do not resemble the interconnected structure predicted by the world polity theorists. Rather, it reveals that while states have increasingly joined IGOs, there has been a significant regionalization of the IGO field broadly, in the aftermath of the Second World War and establishment of the UN system. From this point on, "the world polity gr[ew]...more disintegrated, more centralized, more structurally uneven, and more fragmented by increasingly regionalized IGOs. It resembles less and less one small world...".[54] Classification of IGOs by type (general purpose, military/political, economic, and social/cultural), reveals that this

[52] Reus-Smit, "Constitutional Structure," 568.
[53] Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 64.
[54] Jason Beckfield, "The Social Structure of the World Polity," *American Journal of Sociology* 115 no. 4 (2010): 1048.

regionalization holds across all forms of IGOs.[55] While universal IGOs exist that bind all states together, increasingly regional or exclusive IGOs have emerged, fragmenting the network and suggesting the assumption of a "world polity" is flawed.

This is the advantage of relational theorization, which operates between the levels of states and the structure of which they are a part. Agreeing that actors are embedded in social environments that shape their preferences, Goodman and Jinks have argued that acculturation, the process whereby actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture, need not function solely at the global culture level.[56] They note that world polity institutionalists fail to recognize the fact "...all actors at any given moment occupy multiple roles, identify with multiple reference groups, pursue multiple incompatible purposes, and enact multiple highly legitimated scripts for social action".[57] There is empirical evidence to support such a contention. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett show that "...despite the global trend toward liberalism, there were important differences in the trajectories of different parts of the world-differences across regions, over time, and among different dimensions of liberalism".[58] While states would seem to not implement policies independently, these findings suggest decisions may not exclusively derive from world culture, but rather result from attention to the decisions of peers in the international system.[59]

The importance of communities to the agents that constitute them, and their influence upon their members, has long been recognized in political philosophy. Aristotle posited that humans cannot exist in the absence of communal belonging; to him a person who acts out of pure self-sufficiency is "either a beast or a god".[60] Aristotle posited the polis as the teleological end for man; it was only in this well-developed community that dialectic explanations of moral concepts could occur. Those who utilized their reason to come to common understandings on moral action found their end in their community. Communal belonging is treated as a means of ensuring participation in the administration of judgment (eg. justice) by their peers which is the

[55] Ibid, 1050.
[56] More specifically they are formal organizations embedded in institutional settings which structure them and their interests. Such environments imbue values into these organizations beyond the functional requirements for their designated tasks. Goodman and Jinks, *Socializing States*, 2-4, 10-11.
[57] Ibid, 5.
[58] Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, *Global Diffusion*, 7.
[59] Ibid, 2-3, 7, 9.
[60] Aristotle, *Aristotle's Politics*, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 15.

end that derives from their dialectic capacity.[61] The Romans concurred that individuals and community belonging was synonymous, and this was reflected in their very language. The Romans used "to live" and "to be among men" synonymously, as they did with their language about dying (death was "to cease to be among men").[62] This view persisted with the major Christian writers, with Aquinas mimicking Aristotle in his declaration that "man is by nature political, that is, social".[63] Many modern theorists agree. For Arendt, our political life (eg. sociality amongst peers) facilitates action, which is the uniquely human process that extends beyond biology (labour) or artifice (work).[64]

Goodman and Jinks have written on the importance of communities to states, finding fault with inclusion of acculturation in the broad category of social construction, which also includes learning.[65] For them, identification with any particular reference group is theorized to generate cognitive and social pressures to conform with the group's behavior and practices.[66] Some of this may be imposed through social pressure from the reference group while some may be self-imposed out of a desire to reduce cognitive dissonance.[67] As Johnson puts it, the cognitive discomfort associated with diverging from the pro-norm behavior of one's reference group can result in a trauma to an actor's self-esteem causing them to reduce their behavioral 'discrepancies'.[68] These pressures need not be consciously recognized for influence to result.[69] Greater degrees of identification with reference groups will generate pressure for conformity at greater strengths (and vice versa).[70] Conformity may also be influenced by the importance of the group to the actor, size of the reference group, and position of the state in the network and it's

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[61] Ibid.
[62] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7-8.
[63] Derived from Ibid, 23, 27-8.
[64] Arendt, *The Human Condition.*
[65] Goodman and Jinks, *Socializing States*, 34.
[66] There are both cognitive and social advantages to conformity and disadvantages to non-conformity. Cognitively, social-psychological costs to non-conformity and social-psychological benefits to conformity both influence actors. Socially the reference group may engage in shaming or shunning of those not displaying correct behavior, or may publicly approve of actors who act as they are expected to. As actors desire (consciously or subconsciously) social legitimacy and status, and have cognitive and social preferences to avoid disapproval, they are likely to emulate their reference group. Of course, states are a different form of actor than other individuals, or organizations. However, the theorization of acculturation theory does not presume that states need be treated with the same ontological status as people. Macro-level structures influence individual actors within the state apparatus. As these individuals are socialized to advance the perceived interests of the state, which is constructed as a bounded rational actor, these actors in turn change state policy to align with what they perceive the state's "interests" to be. See Ibid, 12-3, 27-8, 40-1.
[67] Both of these pressures are ultimately a product of the social environment in which an actor finds itself. Simply put, the environment induces actors to adopt the beliefs and practices of actors they perceive to be similar to them. Ibid, 2-4, 26.
[68] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly* no. 45 (2001): 500.
[69] Goodman and Jinks, *Socializing States*, 26.
[70] Ibid.

immediacy to the reference group (opportunities for it and its preferences to be exposed to the target actor).[71]

The micro-process of identification is one social affect posited by acculturation theory. It proposes that actors accept group influence as a means to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship with the reference group in question.[72] While the actor embraces the legitimacy of the actions that are adopted to increase homogeneity with the group, their content is irrelevant. It is not the substance of the behavior or rule, but rather who else is practicing it that convinces the actor of its legitimacy.[73] Marsh and Coleman have offered similar theorization, suggesting that "[w]hen a number of persons are in interaction over an extended period of time, mutual expectations and norms develop for their behavior, and their actions are not independent of these norms and expectations. This proposition emphasizes interaction and implies that different norms may be expected to develop in different groups."[74] They demonstrate at an individual level that group practices in agriculture (in Kentucky in 1950) were likely to be emulated by other members of the reference group (in this case other locals), and that even group leaders were unlikely to significantly diverge from other group members in their innovation.[75]

Another example of identification at the individual level would be Adolf Eichmann and his position on the final solution. While Eichmann later contended he had harbored personal doubts about the final solution, these were eliminated by the Wannsee Conference, where "the most prominent people had spoken [in favor of genocide]...at that moment I sensed a kind of Pontius Pilate feeling, for I was free of all guilt".[76] If Eichmann is assumed to be speaking truthfully, the support of the policy from the party and civil service elites suggested that

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[71] Ibid, 28, 48. This comes from social impact theory. Greater importance is predicted to lead to greater conformity. The same applies to exposure. Group size is theorized to increase conformity (to a point). Social network analysis is particularly well suited to capture these group qualities. Where exposure is concerned, the causal mechanism is posited as the socialization of domestic actors. Greater exposure offers greater opportunities for domestic actors to align with the foreign norm or practice and shift domestic politics toward it. See Ibid, 47. I find this proposed mechanism problematic as it fits better with a learning than an acculturation account.

[72] Wendt offers an understanding of identification that theorizes both positive and negative identification, with negative identification producing a situation wherein the actor defines its interests without consideration of the other. Positive identification on the other hand, at an extreme refers to a situation in which the welfare of another becomes viewed as an extension of the self. Due to the corporate differentiation of actors, such an ideal form of positive identification is rarely witnessed in practice. However, actors may still come to define their interests with empathy for the concerns of positively identified others. This "is a basis for feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty, and thus for collective definitions of interest". See Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88 no. 2 (1994): 385.

[73] Put otherwise, social structure rather than normative content matters. Ibid, 26, 29.

[74] Again, it is worth noting that group membership rather than normative content is the primary independent variable in conformity here. See C. Paul Marsh and A. Lee Coleman, "Group Influences and Agricultural Innovations: Some Tentative Findings and Hypothesis," *American Journal of Sociology* 61 no. 6 (1956): 588-9.

[75] Ibid, 588-594. See also C. Paul Marsh and Minnie M. Brown, "Facilitative and Inhibitive Factors in Training Program Recruitment Among Rural Negroes," *Journal of Social Issues* 21 no. 1 (1965): 110-125.

[76] Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 114.

judgment of the content of the policy should be foregone, for his own thoughts on the matter were of little import given the obvious legitimacy of the policy that had been socially expressed by his reference group.[77]

Social liking is another phenomenon that may produce acculturative effects. Research in social psychology has shown that the strength of the social bond between product provider and product purchaser can be as much as twice as likely to determine purchasing behavior than the consumer's preference for the actual product.[78] Indeed, in some cases the impact of social liking may completely negate considerations of utility. As Cialdini reports:

> "...I hate to be invited to Tupperware parties. I've got all the containers I need; and if I wanted any more, I could buy another brand cheaper in the store. But when a friend calls up, I feel like I have to go. And when I get there, I feel like I have to buy something. What can I do? It's for one of my friends."[79]

In his example, Cialdini neither has the rational incentive to purchase, nor does he have an internalized belief about the inherent superiority of Tupperware products. Social influence rather than utility or social learning are clearly driving this behavior.[80] Even in the realm of international politics, similarity can increase the effects of social liking. As de Lange theorizes:

> "...[a dyad pair's] knowledge that they have similar views may cause them to respect each others' decisions and reactions such that they influence each other without direct communication or, when they communicate, it is more influential than when they discuss the same matters with others who do not share the same politics; this makes them politically embedded. A similar dynamic could occur when countries know they share the same culture."[81]

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[77] Ibid. This example has value in several aspects. First, the sociological examples relied on theorization of repeat interaction to explain the emulation. In each instance people were neighbors and were theorized to have been socialized to the norms through consistent exposure to such a cultural setting and interaction with similarly socialized people. Whether such theorization can be wisely applied to states, and whether their reference groups can be said to operate in a similar fashion is doubtful. Arendt's theorization on Eichmann is different and the situation more closely resembles that of states. Eichmann did not have regular interaction with many of the individuals in his reference group (Eichmann was the lowest ranking individual socially and officially at the conference, and the opportunity to interact with these "high personages" was reportedly completely novel to him. The opportunity to socialize with Heinrich Muller and Reinhard Heydrich after the conference concluded was also entirely unprecedented), nor was he socialized in a normative culture favorable to the final solution (he was unaware this would be policy until the conference, and the majority of his fellow bureaucrats were not party members), and immediately amended his position on the issue to align with that of his reference group. This would indicate that iterated socialization may not be as necessary as Marsh, Brown, and Coleman theorize, and that the simple taking of positions by others in a reference group may produce powerful social effects. Furthermore, the example highlights that acculturation need not always be a positive process. Depending on the content of the institutional environment an actor finds itself in and the reference groups they wish to emulate, normatively or morally negative behavior may be adopted to 'fit in'. See Ibid, 112-114.

[78] Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009).

[79] Ibid.

[80] See discussion in subsequent section.

[81] de Lange, *Power and Influence*, 20.

Similarity in political preferences or culture are theorized to be more likely to lead to influence than dependencies.[82] Elsewhere, Zukin and DiMaggio offer similar theorization, suggesting the shared collective understandings that derive from cultural embeddedness can influence economic strategies and objectives,[83] while Baccini and Koenig-Archibugi have noted that in the issue area of International Labor Organization (ILO) convention ratifications, "the values that state agents choose to affirm by making international commitments are not entirely endogenous; they are likely to be influenced by the norms expressed by other states, particularly by states that they consider to be peers".[84] Their survival analysis utilizing Cox proportionate hazard models finds support for this hypothesis, as shared IGO memberships with states who had ratified increased the likelihood of adoption of the ILO Conventions on Minimum Age for Employment, Equal Remuneration, Collective Bargaining, Freedom of Association, and Forced Labor, even when accounting for competitive ratifications.[85]

Finally, consistency theory posits that an agent's perception that they are perceived as inconsistent with their past actions or commitments by their reference group will cause them to respond with greater conformist behavior to demonstrate role consistency. Furthermore, positive self-perception results from acting in a manner with the role or behavior one is assigned by in-group expectations.[86] As Wendt wrote; "[i]t is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions. Actors acquire identities—relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self—by participating in such collective meanings".[87] Some collective meanings or identities, those which Wendt was primarily referring to, are generally self-perpetuating. One does not need to reinforce with their behavior their assigned role of father to remain a father in the eyes of others. Of course, perhaps a limit exists whereby their engaging in truly transgressive behavior might result in the state interceding to take their child. But even then a claim to fatherhood can still be made, since a component of the collective understanding of the father identity as it currently exists is simply the material fact of having

[82] Ibid, 20-1.
[83] Sharon Zukin and Paul DiMaggio, *Structures of Capital: The social Organization of the Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 14-22.

[84] Leonardo Baccini and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, "Why do States Commit to International Labor Standards? Interdependent Ratification of Core ILO Conventions, 1948-2009," *World Politics* 66 no. 3 (2014): 447.
[85] Ibid, 464-8.
[86] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," 500.
[87] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 no. 2 (1992): 397.

successfully procreated. Other identities, however, are not given, but are assigned or earned through behavior alone. Just because one was a "good democracy" at one point does not mean one will be perceived as such in the future if behavioral changes give others cause to question one's capacity to perform their assigned role. For these roles to be successfully performed and maintained, agents must act in a manner consistent with their given role. Wendt made this clear in a subsequent article wherein he observed that "[s]ocial identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object... social identities have both individual and social structural properties, being at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine "who I am/we are" in a situation *and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations*".[88]

2.3 Social Learning vs. Acculturation

Of course, acculturation is not the only mechanism through which social or normative pressures, commonly referred to as persuasion effects in the literature, may produce policy change in states. While constructivist theorization generally shares the common assumption that the presence of conditions unique to social groups produce change, the specific mechanisms through which these changes occurs are often underspecified, insufficiently demonstrated as causal, or clumped together in the single category of 'persuasion' despite significant differences in the processes through which change is produced.[89] On the third of these issues, Johnston has noted that vast variation exists in what scholars are talking about when they use the term persuasion. For some, persuasion is meant in the conventional usage of the word; what Johnston defines as "...the noncoercive communication of social understandings that are internalized by actors such that new courses of action are viewed as entirely reasonable and appropriate. Elsewhere Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger have offered a more rigorous definition:

> "...parties...enter a discourse where they try first to bring about agreement concerning the relevant features of a social situation and then advance reasons why a certain behavior has to be avoided. These reasons - as far as they are

[88] Emphasis mine. Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the Nation State," *The American Political Science Review* 88 no. 2 (1994): 386. Similarly, Fearon defines the social aspect of identity as "...a social category...to have a particular identity means to assign oneself to a particular social category or perhaps just to be assigned to it by others... Social categories have two distinguishing features. First, they are defined and by implicit or explicit rules of membership, according to which individuals are assigned or not to the category... Second, social categories are understood in terms of sets of characteristics– for example, beliefs, desires, moral commitments, or physical attributes– thought typical of members of the category, or behaviors expected or obliged of members in certain situations". See James Fearon, "What is Identity (As We Now Use The Word)?" (Unpublished Working Paper, Stanford University, 1999), 13-14.

[89] Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly* no. 45 (2001): 487, 492.

> convincing - internally motivate the parties to behave in accordance with the previously elaborated interpretations and the justified expectations of others. Behavior is thus not coordinated by external incentives but by common understandings of what a given situation requires social actors to do."[90]

It is this process that Finnemore and Sikkink refer to in the first stage (norm emergence) of their famous theorization on the "norm life cycle", wherein individual norm entrepreneurs contest the correctness of existing understandings of legitimacy in some context.[91] In effect, persuasion relates to an internalized assessment of the specific content of an argument about proper behavior made by another actor.[92] If the argument or message is deemed to be correct, then the persuasion has succeeded. In other words, we can say that social learning has occurred, as one agent has been "taught" through some discursive process, that a particular behavior is legitimate in some given context. If the argument advanced is rejected, persuasion has been attempted but has not succeeded. Put otherwise, we might say that social learning has not occurred, for the targeted agent has rejected the normative teaching.

Johnston theorizes that three reasons exist that may cause an agent to internally embrace a behavioral standard as a result of what I call social learning. The first is through the actual content of the message conveyed. With this mechanism, the actor engages in a cognitive assessment of the message conveyed. If the argument made is related to existing attitudes or behaviors of the 'taught' actor, the more likely social learning is to occur.[93] The second mechanism is the relationship of the norm conveying agent to the norm receiving agent. I will discuss this in the subsequent section, as I believe Johnson has miscategorized it. The final mechanism related to social learning is the openness of the target to the socialization. As Johnston writes, the features of an agent may either "...retard [or]...propel socialization".[94] Johnston theorizes these three factors influence whether social learning occurs.

Social influence (or acculturation) on the other hand is defined by Johnston to be "a class of microprocesses that elicit pro-norm behavior through the distribution of social rewards and

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[90] Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge, Cambirdge Universtiy Press, 1997), 176-177.
[91] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* vol. 52 no. 4 (1998): 897-898.
[92] Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," 496.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid, 497.

punishments".[95] By rewards, Johnston does not mean material incentives, but rather "psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectations", all things that the actor takes upon themself as a result of their social connections rather than has imposed on them.[96] This self-imposition is equally true of some of Johnston's "punishments", such as "dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity", and while "shaming, shunning, exclusion, and demeaning" all come from external actors, the importance that is ascribed to them by the actor is not externally given.[97] Unlike material sanctions, social sanctions have no inherent negative meaning outside of that ascribed to them by the target. This differentiates social punishment from other forms of coercion, and means it is best treated as an acculturative process.

The issue with Johnston's understanding of social influence is that it assumes that compliance is necessarily a result of a desire to conform, for esteem, or to reduce cognitive dissonance, and that any adoption of the norm or behavior ascribed to by esteemed peers is not genuine.[98] In my estimation, acculturation need not make a claim as to whether adoption of the norm is due to internalization or not. If the mechanism that facilitates adoption is a social aspect external to the actor, I believe this is best understood as an acculturative process. While at the level of internalization, there exists a difference between an actor who adopts exclusively due to in-group pressure, and one who adopts because they associate the advocate(s) of the norm with legitimacy, the external and behavioral outcomes are the same - actors comply because of social effects caused by their reference group. For this reason, I place Johnston's second logic of social learning, whereby "the persuadee looks for cues about the nature of [their]... relationship [to the persuading agent(s)] to judge the legitimacy of counterattitudinal arguments", in the category of social influence rather than social learning. Even though genuine internalization results, the mechanism is not a purely internal one (actor traits, or assessment of the quality of argumentation), but actually follows from the social relationship the taught subject holds with a member or members of their reference group.

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[95] Ibid, 499.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] See also Fearon, who presents the notion that "[o]ne might be motivated to follow the norm because one desires the approval of others, irrespective of any actions they might take", separate from his argument about compliance as a product of internalization. See Fearon, "What is Identity," 28.

The problem with understanding social influence as "public conformity without private acceptance", as Johnston and others do, is that such an understanding of social influence is unduly restrictive and fails to distinguish true persuasion from adoption due to relational factors.[99] As my coverage of the literature on acculturation above indicates, there's no assumption made by acculturation that the agents subject to it are universally not genuine compliers. The simple adoption of a norm should not be assumed to derive from either individual traits or internal cognitive assessments. Indeed, Johnston himself suggests this is not the case when he argues that agents attempting persuasion are more likely to succeed if they belong to an in-group in relation to their target.[100] In some cases the assumption acculturated actors are not genuine compliers may be true; an actor may be neutral or adverse to what is advocated and modify their behavior nonetheless for social esteem. But if the actor modifies their behavior because their social esteem of a member of their reference group leads them to embrace the legitimacy of their teacher's practice without concern for the content of the behavior, this would also fit the logic of acculturation that social structure supersedes normative content in driving the actions of agents.[101] This is not the case with social learning, whereby the content of the advocated norm interacting with individual features of the subjects of socialization determines their adoption or non-adoption of the advocated behavior.

Indeed, Finnemore and Sikkink offer support for such an understanding of social learning. While the initial states in their norm life cycle are genuine adopters who are convinced by social learning conducted through the campaigns of norm entrepreneurs (generally operating at a domestic level), subsequent ratifications are theorized to be driven not by assessments of the nature of the content of the normative message, but rather through a process they label "socialization". Socialization is too broad a term; what they are in fact referring to is social influence when they write:

> "Up to the tipping point [eg. roughly the first third of ratifiers], little normative change occurs without significant domestic movements supporting such change.

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[99] F. J. Booster, "Commentary on Compliance-gaining Message Behavior Research," in *Communication and Social Influence Processes*, eds. C. R. Berger and M. Burgoon (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 96.

[100] Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments", 497.

[101] Fearon then, is incorrect in his argument that compliance as a result of "...following the norm...[due to a belief it is] the right thing to do, whether because of early socialization or one's independent judgement and experience" is necessarily the logic that precedes "...[following] the norm because one would think badly of oneself otherwise–failing to follow the norm would undermine one's pride, dignity, or self-respect". Certainly, actors who have internalized the norm will feel a possible loss of self-respect for transgressing what they believe to be correct behaviour. But equally, a loss of pride or self-respect may follow from transgressing group expectations, even if the first step posited by Fearon (internalization) is not in effect. See Fearon, "What is Identity," 28.

> After the tipping point has been reached, however, a different dynamic begins. More countries begin to adopt new norms more rapidly even without domestic pressure for such change….[after this point] international and transnational norm influences become more important than domestic politics for effecting norm change….the primary mechanism for promoting norm cascades is an active process of international socialization intended to induce norm breakers to become norm followers. Kenneth Waltz suggested some of the ways socialization in [sic] occurs: emulation (of heroes), praise (for behavior that conforms to group norms), and ridicule (for deviation). In the context of international politics, *socialization involves diplomatic praise or censure, either bilateral or multilateral*, which is reinforced by material sanctions and incentives..."[102]

For Finnemore and Sikkink these norms may become internalized, even amongst actors who initially performed the expected behavior only due to social pressures, through "iterated behavior and habit".[103]

Effectively, the difference between social learning and acculturation can be summarized in the following manner. Social learning causes the state to become convinced that the object in question is correct or legitimate. This belief produces a behavioral change. In acculturation, on the other hand, it is the other subject(s) rather than the object that convinces the state that the practice or norm should be adhered to. Actors are not complying out of recognition of the object, but rather their social connection to the other subjects who outwardly express their support for the object.

2.4 How Might Acculturative Pressures Create Change in States?

To understand why the logics of acculturation, which are inspired by psychological literature concerned with the study of individuals may be understood as applying to states, one can offer several potential mechanisms. Status offers a powerful starting point. There is disagreement in the literature on why states pursue status. Some have argued that it is pursued as a means of attaining power. As status is a social object that generally does not bring material benefits, this claim rests on unsteady footing (traditionally associated with power in International Relations).[104] Furthermore, those who treat status as an instrument states acquire to gain advantages in future (generally cooperative) interactions neglect the rarity with which having a

[102] Emphasis mine. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 902.
[103] Ibid, 905.
[104] Johnston, *Treating International Institutions as Social Environments*, 500.

good image translates into opportunities for leverage on linked issues.[105] Treating status, on the other hand, as a social good pursued for its own end avoids these shortcomings. In accepting this understanding of status seeking behavior, one accepts the premise that states, along with other entities, wish to be respected and considered by their peers as beings of worth.[106] If worth is a social object, then it cannot be self-bestowed. Speaking on excellence (*arete/virtus*), Arendt observes:

> "[e]xcellence itself...has always been assigned to the public realm where one could excel, could distinguish oneself from others...for excellence, by definition, the presence of others is required, and this presence needs the formality of the public, constituted by one's peers, it cannot be the casual, familiar presence of one's equals or inferiors."[107]

If states are esteem seekers, to be an actor of worth in the international community would similarly require the recognition of other states that your behavior is "worthy". Status is not something one can bestow on themself, be they a human actor or a state. Accordingly, status seeking states will be compelled to engage in esteem seeking behaviors relative to their reference group. As Johnston notes:

> "...pro-social behavior motivated by status maximization is not altruistic or pro-group per se. Rather it reflects an actor's egoistic pursuit of social rewards and avoidance of social sanctions... But these rewards and sanctions cannot exist without the prior existence of a group and without a common understanding of the value or meaning that the group places on putative status markers."[108]

Acculturation theory may still hold even if one does not conceive of the state as a unitary actor, or rejects the notion that such a unitary actor would be subject to the same relational pressures that affect humans. Turning to analytical liberalism, although Moravcsik's liberal predictions concern the constituents of states rather than states themselves, his theorization allows that state preferences (eg. the preferences of dominant coalitions within the state) may shift in accordance with transnational interaction. According to Moravcsik, "[w]hile state preferences are (by definition) invariant in response to changing inter-state political and strategic

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[105] Ibid.

[106] This flows from an adherence to the premise forwarded by Harré that respect is not an emotive position, but rather a "...socially marked relation...one who has respect... [ha]s dignity". In effect Harré is arguing that for human agents, public social reputation is not something that is self-constructed, but rather is given to one by their peers as a result of one's actions in the world. See Rom Harré, *Social Being*, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge Ma., Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 29-30.

[107] Here Arendt is speaking of human beings and distinguishing the polis, and the ability to pursue excellence there from the inability to do so in social, but apolitical communities. See Arendt, *Human Condition*, 48-49.

[108] Johnston, 502.

circumstances, they may well vary in response to a changing transnational *social* context...the position of particular values in a transnational cultural discourse may help define their meaning in each society".[109] To this Alderson has added in his discussion of normative internalization the role that attitudinal change at an individual level may produce on the state, writing:

> "Attitude change on the part of judges, business leaders, politicians, students and members of the public is part of what we mean when we say that a state 'internalizes' norms arising elsewhere in the international system. Actions which previously appeared justified—from slavery to torture to tolerating pollution—come to be seen as improper, illegitimate, and morally distasteful. Individual internalization can produce dramatic results when the individuals acquiring new principled beliefs are very influential (for example, Gorbachev or de Klerk)."[110]

Goodman and Jinks find this consistent with acculturation in so far as it offers a mechanism for policy change. The individuals who fill roles in the state are socialized to perceive it as a bounded, rational actor and attempt to act in accordance with its interests, preferences, and reputation in mind. Changing understandings of a social issue in connected states may diffuse between one another and lead domestic actors to align with new norms, shifting domestic policy toward it in their society.[111] Further, changes in the preferences of the domestic constituency may weaken the resolve of a state to resist what other states determine to be legitimate conduct.[112]

2.5 Existing Research on Acculturation and Human Rights

Wotipka and Ramirez's study on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) offers possible support for the applicability of acculturation to human rights treaty ratification.[113] The authors suggest variability in linkages and experiences with specific reference groups is one factor that can explain responsibility for states ratifying treaties at different times and rates.[114] In trying to make their theorization consistent with world polity institutionalism, the authors suggest that this comes from the varying levels of access states have to the correct norms and scripts, which in turn is a product of

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[109] Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51 no. 4 (1997): 523.
[110] Kai Alderson, "Making Sense of State Socialization," *Review of International Studies* 27 no. 3 (2001): 418.
[111] Goodman and Jinks, *Socializing States*, 40-1, 47.
[112] Derived based on Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," 524.
[113] The authors attribute the spread of ratifications to world polity theory, but some of their theorization and evidence suggests there also may have been acculturative processes at work.
[114] Christine Min Wotipka and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World society and human rights: an event history analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women," in *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy*, eds. Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 304-5.

their embeddedness.[115] This gives ontological priority to the west as a reference group and discounts the existence of various possible reference groups advocating different standards of conduct in world society. Wotipka and Ramirez's observation of regional differences in ratification trends lends credence to the possibility ratifications are driven not simply by embeddedness with world culture, but also by the preferences of their (in this instance regional) reference group. Such an assumption would be supported by the "important and positive influence" (on likelihood of ratifying) of the number of overall treaty ratifications in the region of the potential ratifier found in their event history analysis.[116]

2.6 Domestic Preference Based Theories of Treaty Compliance and Omitted Variable Bias

Finally, Beth Simmons, has offered a different state level account of why states ratify human rights treaties.[117] She theorizes that treaty ratification is a product of the proximity of the treaty to the state's preferences, a history of democratic governance, societal acceptance of enlightenment values, and the preferences of the governing coalition in the state. [118] She predicts that constitutional and legal structures within the state may impact the speed, form, and likelihood of ratification, with states with many veto players, federal systems, or common law expected to impose costs on potential ratifiers.[119] Finally, she expects states whose preferences diverge from the treaty content may still ratify strategically if they miscalculate the costs of ratification or if they prioritize short term payoffs rather than the net long term costs.[120]

While the state level predominates in Simmons' theorization, she also suggests the regional level may be important in producing ratifications from states who are not normatively committed to the treaty content. She explains this by observing:

> "Regional emulation may also provide a possible explanation for false positives...one way to avoid criticism is to practice 'social camouflage': select policies that do not differ significantly from those of surrounding neighbors. Local ratification trends are important because the fewer the holdouts, the more

[115] Ibid, 309, 315.
[116] While country level indicators performed inconsistently, it should be noted that other exogenous variables such as world density and conferences on women's rights in the year in question also performed well in the models. However, Wotipka and Ramirez's assumption that conferences on women's rights are an indicator of world culture is not necessarily accurate. Social pressures at such events might not come from the attendees as a whole, but rather those socially important attendees who have ratified on the issue of the conference and who exert social pressure to do similarly. Put simply, the dummy variable for conferences cannot convincingly distinguish between world polity intuitionalism and acculturation as the mechanism at work. Ibid, 321-334.
[117] This is not presented with the above state level accounts as the criticism that can be made of it with acculturation theory requires acculturation theory to be presented first.
[118] Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 65-7.
[119] Ibid, 68-77.
[120] Ibid, 77-80.

> nonratification is interpreted as resistance to the substance of the treaty in question. Local ratification density is also important because the fewer the holdouts, the more focused the pressure campaign to ratify is on the remaining few. On the other hand, nonratification by a large number of countries creates only very diffuse pressure to ratify. Indeed, the expectation of public adherence may be so diffuse as to constitute no social or political pressure at all. Social camouflage is a rational response to perceived social pressure in a normatively charged situation…In most cases, the benefits of socially motivated ratification will not be great enough to overcome domestically generated preferences, but at the margins it could produce false positives. The more some *crucial reference group* ratifies a particular treaty, the greater the pressure for any individual government to do so..."[121]

Simmons recognizes that her theorization of these ratifications as strategic " ...that is, as resulting from a logic of consequences rather than a logic of appropriateness", cannot be proven by her analysis, since "...the unconditional proportionate hazard rates for the density of regional ratifications alone cannot easily distinguish strategic from more normative behavior".[122] She offers an account of why such ratifications are in fact strategic based on inferences about how observed patterns suggest strategic behavior rather than normative persuasion.[123] However, in focusing only on proving that conditions for social learning are weak, she leaves unaddressed the possibility that the processes are acculturative rather than strategic. Simmons' finding of the importance of regional ratifications suggests the possible relevance of acculturation in this case. It is theoretically plausible that the regional ratifications could have an impact on the observed hazard rate as the states in the region consist of the state's reference group, and state ratifications are not in fact strategic decisions to "blend in" in areas of high ratification, but rather stem from identification with the reference group and the psychological and social pressures for conformity thereby generated. While Simmons presents an argument against social learning and in favor of strategic ratification in regions of high density in ratifications, she has not adequately addressed the possibility that identification with ratifiers may be relevant. Accordingly her model may suffer from omitted variable bias.

[121] Ibid, 88-90. Italics added for emphasis.
[122] Ibid, 90.
[123] Ibid, 91.

3.0 Qualitative Empirical Support for Acculturation Theory and Treaty Ratification

Qualitatively, examples abound regarding the social influence of peers on state ratification choices concerning human rights treaties and conventions. In relation to ILO conventions, African states were pressured by their peers through resolutions adopted at the 1960 African Regional Conference in Lagos where a resolution was passed by a large majority making a "solemn appeal" to fellow African states to ratify the existing ILO norms, with ratification and implementation of the ILO human rights Conventions declared to be a "question of honour and prestige" for these newly independent states.[124] Ratifications dramatically increased in the 1960-1964 period subsequent to this appeal.[125] Britain's ratification of the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention followed the commitment of several peer states. Baccini and Koenig-Archibugi have found that in this case, ratifications of the Convention "by states with which Britain shared many IGO memberships, peaked at the beginning and then again at the end of the 1960s. The first peak triggered the start of an insistent shaming campaign on the part of equal pay advocates in the UK, while the second peak coincided with the government's decision to ratify the Equal Remuneration Convention".[126] Of course, the importance of social peers to the ratification processes of these ILO conventions does not necessarily indicate a similar process would occur for the United Nations human rights treaties. Below, drawing from the work of A.W.B. Simpson on the subject, I detail how acculturative processes also seem to have been at work in a major power throughout the drafting process, debates in government on whether ratification should occur, and ultimately in its final decision to ratify the Genocide Convention.

From the early stages of drafting, the British Foreign Office held the position that ratification of the Convention was not in the United Kingdom's interests. The reasons for this were initially several. First, the draft's articles on 'cultural genocide' did not align with the Foreign Office's post-war stance against minority protection. Second, the referral of cases of genocide to an international court was a component of the draft the Foreign Office objected to. Finally, the extremely broad language employed by the convention caused concern within the Foreign Office that ratification might leave the British government open to charges of

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[124] Daniel Roger Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: the International Labour Organization, 1940-70*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 260.
[125] Ibid, 260-261.
[126] Leonardo Baccini and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, "Why do States Commit to International Labor Standards? Interdependent Ratification of Core ILO Conventions, 1948-2009," *World Politics* 66 no. 3 (2014): 475.

genocide.[127] Furthermore, the Foreign Office found itself skeptical of the practical use of the Convention. It noted that Genocide was already criminal in current International Law, and the Nuremberg trials had acted as a recent precedent to support this. Furthermore, as Genocide was a crime that could not occur (in the conception of the Foreign Office) without the complicity of the state, the Convention was seen as something that would bind non-Genocidal parties with its vague language and do nothing to deter states with actual genocidal intentions.[128]

In the General Assembly, the United Kingdom voiced these objections through their representative, noting that if all states failed to accede to the Convention it would weaken the currently existing convention in International Law against Genocide. They then outlined that because of the poor wording within the document and the decision of its drafters to take the scope of the Convention " ... beyond biological genocide...[using] the guise of codification... to create an entirely new body of international law [relating to cultural genocide]", it would not receive their support.[129]

The production of a second draft shifted the Foreign Office's position as it was seen as a significant improvement on the first, but the notion of cultural genocide remained, to the dissatisfaction of the Foreign Office staff.[130] As the drafting process continued, the Foreign Office began to take an active role in negotiations to avoid being seen as indifferent to the issue of Genocide, and to produce a Convention more amenable to British preferences. At this point the Home Office began to express reservations about the Convention, for it would be obliged to modify domestic law if the UK acceded to the Convention in its present form.[131] The Home Office became concerned that with the Foreign Office now constructively engaged in negotiations, a Convention might be produced out of a desire to maintain British prestige internationally which was inattentive to the reality British law would be have to modified to ensure full compliance with the Convention.[132] The Home Office indicated that as Genocide did not occur in Britain, the Foreign Office should refrain from lending any support to a Convention that would impose demands for modification of domestic law on Britain.

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[127] Germans in occupied Berlin and the British zone of West Germany, the Jewish occupants of Palestine, and some of Britain's colonial subjects were identified as possible causes of concern. See A.W.B. Simpson, "Britain and the Genocide Convention," *British Yearbook of International Law* 73 no 1 (2003): 9.
[128] Ibid, 10.
[129] Ibid, 11.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid, 14.
[132] Ibid, 16.

By October, the British representative had indicated British willingness to adhere to the Convention in the 6th Committee of the General Assembly, provided that the Convention reflected with clear language those commitments on curtailing genocide the majority of states endorsed. The Home Office was appalled by this commitment, particularly as the Foreign Office had not consulted it on the matter.[133] While the Home Office managed to curtail their Foreign Office counterparts domestically following a series of meetings in which unacceptable parts of the existing draft were agreed upon, the Foreign Office representatives continued to take their own line in negotiations. Sir Gladwyn Jebb responded with disdain to the continued efforts of the Home Office to limit that which the British representatives could agree to in negotiation, remarking:

> "The whole subject [of persistent Home Office protestations] is utterly unreal and we cannot think it is going to matter much whether, in the ultimate event, we become parties to this Convention or not. On the other hand, the general attitude we take up here does matter and it is difficult for the United Kingdom Delegate to avoid taking up a fairly definite attitude of some kind."[134]

The Home Office's insistence that the British delegation amend the Convention to make Genocide a non-extraditable offence (to ease the Home Office's obligations to modify domestic law), was something that in the eyes of the foreign office would "incur odium" from the other states, given the clearly political nature of genocide in the eyes of the Foreign Office. Fitzmaurice, the Deputy Foreign Office Legal Adviser confirmed this view in a letter stating:

> "I have spoken to the Attorney-General about omitting the passage which provides that genocide should not be considered a political crime but he feels, and I must say I agree with him, that we should never get away with this, and it would indeed be destructive of the whole obligation to extradite, because, in fact, genocide in its more serious forms nearly always *is* a political crime...personally I do not share the fears of the people at home on this matter..."[135]

The Foreign Office position was effectively that due to the flaws that continued to exist in the Convention (in its estimation), it was unlikely that Britain would ratify. However, the Home Office's insistence that the Foreign Office request in negotiations for the removal of sections so clearly connected to the nature of the crime in question would have the effect of

[133] Ibid, 21-22.
[134] Ibid, 28.
[135] Ibid, 27.

severely damaging the British diplomatic reputation with their peers.[136] Paul Mason, head of Britain's political department at the UN wrote the Home Office confirming that the British did not support subsequent ratification of the treaty but that the Home Office's demands would have serious repercussions if the delegation acted upon them. He opened his letter, declaring that "I imagine that there is practically no chance of our becoming parties to the Convention which is beginning to emerge".[137] He then went on to indicate the Home Office should leave the delegation "as free a hand as possible. Unreal as the whole topic is, it excites powerful political feelings in various quarters in that strange Assembly atmosphere. The Delegation have to take account of all this in deciding their day to day tactics".[138]

Further negotiation effected the retention of a colonial applications clause, which soothed prior concerns that had existed in the Colonial Office (and had been reflected in the Foreign Office stance), and the removal of the concept of cultural genocide from the draft. However, Article VII on extradition remained, much to the chagrin of the Home Office.[139] On the whole, the British delegation still seemed to have little intention to actually ratify the treaty that emerged, writing that they saw the current draft as:

> "virtually powerless to prevent or punish genocide. This would be a perfectly good reason...for which we could if necessary fail to sign the Convention, on the ground that it would only entail a number of vexatious and difficult alterations of our domestic law, without serving any really useful purpose or doing anything effective to control genocide."[140]

The Convention was still being negotiated, but Britain was already forming excuses as to why it could avoid ratification. Evidence of such an attitude abounded within the Home Office. They informed the Foreign Office that it was "more than doubtful" that the government would be willing to enact the necessary legislation to allow ratification of the Convention. The Home Office now conceded that in negotiations, "tactical considerations" could be made by the diplomats, they advised the delegation to not vote in favor of the Convention. Frank Newsam, Permanent Under-Secretary of the home office reiterated that the British delegation could not support the Convention, declaring that Britain "...certainly must not be committed to support[ing]

[136] Ibid, 28.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid, 29.
[139] Ibid, 30.
[140] Ibid, 30-31.

this draft Convention".[141] On account of this pressure, the British delegation abstained in the final vote taken on the draft in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on the first of December. The British delegation explained the abstention as deriving from the ineffectiveness of the Convention, but was unhappy that the Home Office had forced it to abstain, as its failure to vote for the draft placed it in the undesirable company of the Soviet bloc and South Africa, something that the British diplomats considered to be embarrassing.[142]

This led them to send a telegram to the Foreign Office protesting the instruction to not vote for the Convention. They informed the Foreign Office the Convention was attracting broad support and that apart from them only the Soviet bloc (led by the USSR who had recently perpetrated a Genocide) had abstained. Even though the delegation recognized that Britain had no desire to ratify the final product, they informed the Foreign Office that this vote:

> "....went very much against the grain, and enquiries have elicited that our attitude is likely to be misinterpreted in the sense that our legislative difficulties will be taken as a mere excuse masking opposition to the principle of the Convention itself. We are by no means the only country which has stated that it anticipates legislative difficulties. We feel therefore that we should give serious consideration to the possibility of voting in favour...We realise that it is our practice to adopt a scrupulous attitude in these matters, and not to vote in favour of Conventions to which we do not see our way clearly to becoming parties. We have little doubt however, that a number of other countries which will vote in favour...will either not sign and ratify, or will delay doing so for a long time..."[143]

When this objection was passed on to the Home Office a meeting was convened between the Ministers of State for the Foreign Office and the Home Office, whereby the Foreign Office conceded to the Home Office position that the delegation be required to abstain again in the General Assembly plenary.[144] This instruction was conveyed to the delegation who, attentive of their reputation amongst their peers, protested once more, in even stronger terms. A cable was written directly to the Foreign Secretary by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney-General. He wrote that:

> "I must say in the most emphatic terms that I am shocked to find that it is proposed that the United Kingdom should abstain from supporting the draft Convention on genocide which will be voted upon in the Assembly on Monday.

[141] Ibid, 31.
[142] Ibid, 32.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.

> In adopting this course we shall find ourselves in a minority consisting of the Slav States and South Africa and we shall lay ourselves open to severe and, I think myself, justified criticism both in the Assembly and at home... ...[the Convention's] practical results, so far as our own law is concerned are insignificant. All of the acts now proposed to be condemned as genocide are, by different names, already criminal under our own law...we cannot possibly take up at the Assembly the position that any such odious crimes should be excluded from existing extradition arrangements on the ground that they were committed for political motives. I can see no ground on which we justify abstention...The fact that the Slav States will not commit themselves to forbidding them should provide an excellent argument in support of our thesis that the Slav system is a backward one, rather than providing an occasion for us to line up with the Slav States against every progressive and right thinking country in the world. I urgently suggest that our position should be reconsidered and that we should be authorised to support the Convention, stating that in our understanding it involves no alteration in our existing law and practice."[145]

The delegation voted in favour of the Convention on December 9th. Had they failed to do so they would have been the only state to not vote in favour.[146] However, the Foreign Office remained in agreement with the Home Office that the Convention was of little value and should not be ratified, maintaining this view through much of 1950.[147] By late 1950, however, the Foreign Office was beginning to succumb to the internal and external pressures it faced over its lack of signature and ratification of the Convention. The Foreign Office position was that "[w]e have already been subjected to fairly heavy criticism from respectable bodies for not becoming a party to date and this criticism is likely to mount as time goes on", hence accession to the Convention appeared increasingly desirable to ensure Britain's reputation was preserved.[148] The Home Office remained concerned of the domestic costs of accession (modification of laws), and did not agree with the Foreign Office's assessment that Britain's reputation should be valued over the political costs of modifying laws. The Home Office took advantage of the referral to the International Court of the USSR's reservations to the convention to stall the debate domestically, much to the chagrin of the Foreign Office.[149] When the issue returned to consideration in mid-1951, the Cabinet did not find the Home Office objections compelling, and asked the Home Office and Foreign Office to compile information on what laws would need to be amended in the event of ratification. The Home Office resorted to delaying tactics, and as a result of their

[145] Ibid, 33-4.
[146] Ibid, 35.
[147] Ibid, 39.
[148] Ibid, 44.
[149] Ibid, 46.

interpretive disagreements with the Foreign Office on the legal interpretation of salient articles of the Convention, no report was produced for Cabinet, preventing the government from being able to assess whether ratification should occur.[150] In mid-1952, the government (now Conservative) had become increasingly committed to accession, with Anthony Eden and David Maxwell-Fyfe, heading the Foreign and Home Offices respectively, issuing a memorandum to the effect that accession was becoming increasingly a necessity as:

> "[t]he Convention commands considerable support at home and abroad and we should be giving useful propaganda to the Communists if we failed to support a measure which had on the face of it such laudable intentions and had already been accepted, for all its limitations, by 38 States. A failure to accede might be exploited by the ill-disposed, and might confuse the ill-informed with regard to the Government's attitude to the crime of genocide."[151]

However, the Home Office remained concerned about the necessity of modifying domestic law, and the Foreign Office ceded to their stance that no decisions on accession should be made until a bill had been passed establishing the United Kingdom's right to refuse extradition in cases of extradition requests deemed to be political in nature.[152] Eden faced repeated questions in Parliament on when the government would be acceding to the Convention. By the conclusion of 1952, Australia, Canada and Sri Lanka (all Commonwealth members) had all acceded, and Eden faced further questions as to when Britain would do so.[153] The Home Office continued to stall the production of the extradition bill into 1953, and by February of that year international and domestic pressure prompted the Foreign Office to demand the Home Office take the matter seriously, for:

> "Since the Convention was unanimously accepted by the United Nations in December 1948 over 41 countries have either acceded to it or ratified it, and it is over two years since it came into force. Our own inability hitherto to take a decision one way or the other about accession to the Convention is becoming more difficult to defend and we have already been subjected to a certain amount of Parliamentary pressure which is not likely to disappear until a decision is finally taken."[154]

[150] Ibid, 47.
[151] Ibid, 48.
[152] Ibid, 48-9.
[153] Ibid, 49.
[154] Ibid, 50.

The bill was finally prepared by the middle of 1953, but the Home Office succeeded against the Foreign Office's protestations as to the necessity of acceding by convincing the government to defer a decision. In 1953, the General Assembly made an appeal to the non-party states to accede. However, the Home Office continued to stall the process through 1954 and 1955. The Foreign Office officials were now "seriously embarrassed", and H.J.M Pink of the United Nations Political Department urged the government to make a decision on whether accession would occur or not, writing:

> "I do not think it matters a great deal whether or not H. M. Government accede to this Convention, as there is in practice no risk of genocide being committed by any British government-and it is a crime which cannot be committed except by, or with the sanction of the Govt. [sic] of the country in question. But I do feel that the delay in deciding one way or another is both undignified and politically inconvenient."[155]

Fitzmaurice concurred, declaring the Foreign Office would have counseled the government to accede "long ago" were it not for the persistent and substantial obstruction of the Home Office.[156] The Home Office continued these obstructive tactics through to 1961, taking "as long as six months to answer letters".[157] In discussions on the matter in 1962, the Foreign Secretary was convinced to support the Home Office's position in spite of the Foreign Office Minister of State's assertion that continued failure to accede might lead to criticism of the United Kingdom. This concluded all discussion of the matter until the Conservative government was replaced by a Labour government who had made an electoral commitment to accession.[158] It was only at this point that the Home Secretary concurred with the need for accession, and legislation began to be produced culminating in the Genocide Act in 1969 to bring the United Kingdom's laws into conformity with what their obligations would be under the convention and address the extradition concerns that had plagued discussion of the matters from the beginning. Accession to the Genocide Convention followed on April 30th, 1970.

While bureaucratic politics are readily apparent throughout this process, it is noteworthy the Foreign Office's position, from the second draft of the Convention on, was driven by concerns regarding its reputation and the "embarrassment" it believed Britain faced on the international (and domestic) stage(s) for not acting in a manner perceived as appropriate. The

[155] Ibid, 53.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid, 55-56.
[158] Ibid, 59.

government's persistent delaying of a decision as the Convention garnered an increasing number of ratifications was reported by the UN Political office as being "politically inconvenient", and this reflects that stance taken in the reports of the diplomatic personnel throughout the process emphasizing "the general attitude we take ...does matter", the Home Office's demands the negotiating team solicit the removal of integral components of the Convention was something they would "never get away with", and the persistent reports the attitude being taken was "very much against the grain" reveals that the Foreign Office staff were attentive to the perceived effects Britain's divergent position was having on its reputation.

Even though the Foreign Office personnel seem to have nearly universally lacked the belief the Convention had substantive merit (eg. they were not subject to social persuasion), they were advocating for ratification based on reputational concerns (as acculturation theory would expect). The strongest example of this is likely Shawcross' comments on how the delegation being forced to isolate itself diplomatically and take an action supported by only "the Slav States and South Africa" (two states that Britain defined itself against rather than with) would result in Britain being subjected to "severe and...justified criticism both in the Assembly and at home...". Even though the Convention was held by Shawcross of having little merit, to not support it would be "against every progressive and right thinking country in the world". For Shawcross this was sufficiently unacceptable as to make ratification the only logical course of action, and he advises this accordingly in the communication quoted above.

While these details seem to suggest the relevance of acculturative pressures at work in the UK when considering the Genocide Convention, they do not establish whether these findings are generalizable beyond the UK or this treaty. To assess this, I turn to survival analysis in the subsequent section.

4.0 Quantitative Empirical Analysis – Event History Modeling

The first section of my quantitative analysis will employ Cox proportionate hazard models to review the findings of the third chapter of Beth Simmons' *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. I will revise Simmons' models through the presentation of more parsimonious survival models that account for many of the domestic preference, domestic constraint, coercion, and embeddedness potentialities covered in her work, while expanding the models by accounting for acculturative processes and spatial effects, both of which were insufficiently accounted for in her models. In doing so, I will be able to assess both whether Simmons' findings are robust to the addition of these variables, but also whether there exists any empirical support for the hypotheses of acculturation theory beyond the possible positive result found in relation to the CEDAW as incompletely covered by the work of Wotipka and Ramirez.[159]

4.1 Survival Analysis Variables and Data

I will follow Simmons in employing a Cox proportionate hazard model. Unlike other proportional hazards models, the Cox model does not assume a particular parametric form (the baseline hazard is assumed to be unknown). I do not have strong assumptions about the baseline hazard rate in these models. Further, given the variance of treaty topics, ratification trends, and periods of introduction, I suspect there may be substantial variance among cases regarding the baseline hazard. As a result, the Cox model is suited to my purposes. To determine hazard rates, the following equation is employed:

$$hi(\mathrm{t}) = h0(\mathrm{t})exp\ (\beta'x)$$

where:

$hi(\mathrm{t})$= hazard rate for individual i at time t
$h0(\mathrm{t})$ = baseline hazard function
$\beta'x$ = the covariates/regression parameters

In this case $\beta'x$ includes the spatial lag variable(s) related to the treaty, the type of government system employed by *i*, whether *i* has an executive coded as politically left, the extent to which *i* is a federal state, the years remaining in the term of *i's* government, the democracy

[159] See section 2.5. Christine Min Wotipka and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World society and human rights," in *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy*, eds. Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, 304-5.

level in *i*, whether *i* had a common law legal system, whether *i* used IMF credits, the level of overseas development assistance (ODA) received by *i* relative to its GNI, and the three spatial lag variables' values relative to *i*. The *t* variable is operationalized in yearly intervals.[160]

The lack of specification of a baseline hazard means the model has no intercept term. Thus, in scalar form the model is as follows:

$$hi(\mathrm{t}) = exp(\beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \ldots + \beta_k x_{ki}) + h0(\mathrm{t})$$

I used the 2016 version of the COW State System Membership List to create a conditional variable for each unit's origin and entry status by treaty. If the state entered the international system prior to or during the year the treaty was opened for signature, it receives an origin and entry status of the year the treaty was opened for signature. If it entered the system after the year the treaty was opened for signature, it receives origin and entrance variables for that treaty coded in accordance with the year of its system entry. States that exited the system in the period of analysis had all observations removed subsequent to the year in which they were coded as "exiting" by the COW State System Membership List prior to the analysis being conducted. The dependent variable for each treaty is its ratification status. States are consider to fail, or "die" if they ratify the treaty being analyzed. Subsequent observations of the state after failure were dropped. As indicated above, I have used the United Nations Treaty Collection treaty repository to code ratification dates by state for each of the treaties I assess.

4.1.1 Spatial Weighting Matrices and Social Reference Group Variable Construction

Failure to account for spatial dependence when addressing research questions in which behavior is dependent on external stimuli given by peer actors will lead to omitted variable bias if the spatial effects would have been correlated with another variable used in the analysis and the dependent variable.[161] Drawing inspiration from other work utilizing spatial weight matrices, such as that of Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, as well as that of Baccini and Koenig-Archibugi, the acculturative reference group variables will be a spatial weight matrix.[162] In international politics, states seek various forms of utility. In many cases this utility is a product of the actions

[160] It was originally my intention to conduct this analysis with t varying by day but creating spatial lag matrices and multiply imputing across multiple variables on such a large dataframe was too computationally intensive to be viable for this project.
[161] Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plumper, "Making spatial analysis operational: Commands for generating spatial-effect variables in monadic and dyadic data," *The Stata Journal* 10 no. 4 (2010): 3.
[162] Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000," *International Organization* 60 (2006): 811-846. See also Baccini and Koenig-Archibugi, "Why do States Commit," 446-490.

of others. In such cases, the actions of a state may be driven by material or social pressure, a search for competitive advantages over fellow agents, or out of a necessity to respond to changes in their payoff structures induced by peer action.[163] Even more generally, Neumayer and Plumper observe that spatial dependence exists (and modeling must account for it) "...whenever the expected utility of one unit of analysis is influenced by the choices of other units of analysis".[164] As I posit states are influenced by their social peers for sociological reasons, my operationalization of this concept must account for spatial proximity.

While spatial dependence is a concept often used to account for geographical contiguity, it need not represent physical distance. As Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons note, it can also be used to account for "economic, cultural, or political distances among countries".[165] The type of spatial dependence I posit is the first of the three types given in the typology of Nemayer and Plumper; namely a situation in which "the dependent variable in other units of analysis exerts an influence on the dependent variable in the unit under observation".[166] In my case, I am theorizing that the treaty ratification status of peer units influences the decision of a state whether to ratify the same treaty or not.

Accordingly, I utilize a spatial lag model. In scalar notation this model is specified as :

$$y_{it} = \propto + p \sum_{k} w_{ikt} y_{kt} + \beta X_{it} + \in_{it}$$

In this model:[167]

y_{it} = the dependent variable.
i = the unit of observation.
t = time.
$\sum_k w_{ikt} y_{kt}$ = the spatial lag.
X_{it} = explanatory variables including the lagged dependent variable.
$\in_{it}$ = an independent and identically distributed error term

The spatial lag is constructed using an NxNxT block-diagonal spatial weighting matrix and an NxT matrix. This matrix "measures the relative connectivity between N number of units i and N number of units k in T number of time periods in the off-diagonal cells of the matrix". The

[163] Neumayer and Plumper, "Making spatial analysis operational," 3.
[164] Ibid, 2.
[165] Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, "Competing for Capital", 830.
[166] Neumayer and Plumper, "Making spatial analysis operational," 5.
[167] Derived from ibid.

second component is the NxT matrix of values of the dependent variable.[168] I operationalize the variables monadically, meaning that the spatial dependence does not emanate from the dyadic relationships the unit of analysis shares, but rather that the spatial dependence is a product of all other units (excluding the observed unit) and which is then weighted using a connectivity variable.[169] Each of my weighting matrices are undirected as UN voting affinity, and shared social group membership are the same for both pairs of a dyad.[170] I row standardize the weighting matrix of each of the created variables, which is to say that the row-standardized weighting matrix does not represent absolute values of the weight unit but rather the share of the total possible weight in that dyad pair. This decision is theoretically justifiable as my theory suggests the entirety of the reference group is relevant, not a select few states (as might be the case with social learning). This in turn implies states would be (unconsciously) attentive to the shares of the reference groups that are exerting positive pressure for ratification upon them.

To create the weighting matrix for the linguistic and colonial reference group variables I relied on data from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) GeoDist database. The language reference group variable was constructed on the basis of the official language variable therein, which indicates the official language(s) of the state in question. Reference group variables were created for languages that were spoken officially in more than one state. The logic of this is that one cannot have a reference group without other actors in it. The following languages were official languages in multiple states, and thus created as dichotomous reference groups (coded as member/non-member): Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Hindi, Italian, Persian, Portugese, Romanian, Russian, Serbo-Coratian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish.[171] I then created a shared linguistic reference group indicator coded as 1 if a dyad pair shared one of the above official languages and 0 if they did not. Using this weighting matrix, I then applied the connectivity variable using the NxT matrix of the treaty status of the treaty in question.

I also relied on the GeoDist data as the starting point for my colonial reference group variables. Colonial heritage is a dichotomous variable coded by CEPII as one if one member of the dyad "...governed the other over a long period of time and contributed to the current state of

[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid, 7.
[170] See below for further detail on the variables.
[171] I split Serbian and Croatian into separate, unshared linguistic groups.

its institutions". The following states were colonizers according to the colonial heritage variable, and I constructed a dummy colonial reference group variable for each of: Austria, Australia, Belgium, China, Germany, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey, USA, and South Africa. I diverged from the original CEPII coding by including the colonizer in the reference group of the states it colonized. I then created a shared colonial reference group indicator coded as 1 if a dyad pair shared one of the above official languages and 0 if they did not. I then applied the connectivity matrix of the relevant treaty as described above.

For the diplomatic reference group variable, I created the weighting matrix using the ideal point scores in Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey's "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data" version 18.[172] The ideal point score is chosen rather than alternative measures to capture voting similarity at the UN such as an affinity of nations or S score, as it more clearly distinguishes between changes in UN agenda and changes in specific state policy preferences than the alternative measures.[173] The absolute ideal point difference of the dyad (a lower score indicates closer policy affinity) was subtracted from the range of the maximum variation in possible ideal point scores (5.817) to produce a range of weighting values from 5.817 (perfect affinity) to 0 (no affinity). I then interacted this weighting matrix with the connectivity matrix as previously detailed.

4.1.2 Additional Controls

The type of Government System, Left Executive, Federalism, and Years Remaining in Government Term variables were derived from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions. I used the data from the July 2017 version of this database as it was the most up to date at the time of writing. The government system variable is a nominal variable coded 1-3 in my database, with values of 1 representing Presidential systems, 2 representing mixed systems (eg. legislative elected presidents), and 3 representing parliamentary systems. The Presidential system is the reference group in the subsequent analysis (eg. results for the other two groups are interpreted comparatively to the presidential baseline). The Left Executive variable is ordinal with values of 1 and 2, with 2 representing a politically left executive, and 1 representing all

[172] Erik Voeten, Anton Strezhnev, Michael Bailey, 2009, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data", https://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/12379, Harvard Dataverse, V18, UNF:6:xkt0YWtoBCThQeTJWAuLfg==

[173] Micheal A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Eric Voeten, "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 no. 2 (2017): 430-456.

other party affiliations who held power. To create the federalism variable, I follow Simmons in creating an additive index composed additively using the following sub-indices of federalism in the World Bank Database of Political Institutions: whether or not there are autonomous regions (0 or 2); whether municipal governments are locally elected (0 - 2); whether state or provincial governments are locally elected (0 or 1); whether states/provinces have authority to tax and spend (0 or 1); and whether states/provinces are the constituencies of senators (0 or 1). This amounted to a variable ranging from 0-7 (1-8 once converted to an ordinal measure), with higher values representing more federal states and lower values representing less federal states. The years remaining in government term variable is a numerical variable reflecting how many years remain in the governing party's term.

The democracy scores are derived from the POLITY IV database Polity2 scores. The 2017 version of the POLITY IV database was used as it was the most current data available at the time of writing. The Polity2 variable is an ordinal variable with a range of -10 to 10. -10 represents the most autocratic states, and 10 represents the most democratic states. Democracy itself entails many normative commitments. Simmons writes that democractic governance reflects the "... values of civil and political liberties, equality of opportunity, and individual rights" enshrined in many of the human rights treaties, implying democratic governments should be more likely than their less democratic counterparts to ratify.[174] She further observes that even in the case of newer democracies, a strong preference will be exhibited for ratifying these treaties as a means to "...complement the domestic rule of law and 'lock in' democratic gains, individual rights, and limited government".[175] Furthermore, the values contained in the treaties are often contrary to autocratic interests as the granting of individual liberties may serve to undermine autocratic regimes.[176] Accordingly, democracy should be a strong indicator of domestic preferences.

Another such indicator should be the presence of a politically left executive (variable detailed above). Many of the debates of modern politics increasingly center around concern on the role of the government in balancing "order versus dissent, property rights versus

[174] Beth Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 65.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid. See also Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

consumption rights, or ethnic/social privileges versus nondiscrimination and equality".[177] Left leaning coalitions are much more likely to endorse the latter principles than their centrist or right wing counterparts. Ratification of the treaties is not only consistent with the political beliefs of left leaning executives, but also offers them an opportunity to appeal to their domestic constituency and demonstrate their commitments to the values they rhetorically endorse.[178]

Finally, the years remaining in government term variable may be a good indicator for domestic preferences. It is well documented in the literature that rights violating regimes may ratify treaties near the conclusion of their terms in an effort to gain domestic support by signaling their commitment to reform, while simultaneously reducing external and NGO criticism. Further, even non-rights violating regimes may see treaty ratification as a means to gain short term popularity heading into elections, while leaving their successors to bear the costs of treaty implementation.

The extent to which a state is federal on the other hand represents a political constraint that might be theorized to delay ratification. In federal systems, the federal government faces higher political costs associated with ratification due to their need to satisfy a greater quantity of "...quasi-veto players".[179] As Simmons writes, "[w]hether or not state or provincial representatives get a direct vote...powerful local governments can create resistance that most central governments will have to take into account. Treaty ratification raises political controversies in many federal polities. Political friction is likely to arise when treaties signed and negotiated by the national government encroach on the authority of the subnational unit".[180]

The legal tradition variable was derived from the Mobilizing for Human Rights Through Chapter 8 Database.[181] It is an ordinal variable representing whether or not a state has a common law legal system. A value of 1 represents any other legal system, whereas a value of 2 represents a common law system. As changing to or from a common law system would require a constitutional change to take place, and such changes are rare, I used last observation carried forward and last observation carried backward imputation of the variable to fill the gaps in the

[177] Ibid, 67.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid, 69.
[180] Ibid.
[181] I would like to convey my thanks to Beth Simmons for making this data available to me.

data for the years not originally included in the Simmons data.[182] The common law variable is included as in common law systems there generally exists a philosophical stance the national law which has organically evolved to suit the particular needs of the time and to which a long backlog of precedent exists for ought to be shielded from "externally negotiated political agreements that are not likely to be a good match with organically grown precedent".[183] Furthermore, as civil law systems allow the government greater control over how law shall be interpreted, governments of common law systems are likely to exhibit substantial caution before committing themselves to treaties with provisions subject to interpretation.[184] Finally, the type of government system itself may be a barrier to ratification, with divided government systems (eg. Presidential systems) facing a more complex ratification process than those systems in which the executive consistently controls the legislature.

The GDP, GDP per capita, ODA as a percentage of GNI, and use of IMF credit variables were derived from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. I utilized the April 24, 2019, version of this database. The GDP variable is a numeric variable measured in constant 2010 US dollars. The GDP per capita variable is also numeric and operationalized in constant 2010 US dollars. The GDP and GDP per capita variables were solely used in the prediction matrix in the multiple imputation (see below). The ODA variable represents the share of ODA received by the state relative to its Gross National Income. This variable is also numeric, and was logged to correct for skewedness in the distributions.[185] Finally, the Use IMF variable is an ordinal variable with a value of 2 if the state received IMF credits in that year, and 1 if it did not. The IMF and ODA are employed to capture possible coercion effects, the logic being that states that are dependent on income from external actors may find the external actors leveraging their material strength and their dyadic partner's dependent position to obligate them to adjust their policy in accordance with the dominant actor's wishes.[186]

The embeddedness variable is summation of the treaties a state has ratified of the following: the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials (Florence Agreement); the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTB); the Convention

[182] My preference would have been to avoid such a process, but regrettably the McGill data librarians were unable to locate any superior dataset with coding for type of legal system that would cover the majority of states in my analysis for the majority of my period of analysis.
[183] Ibid, 71-2.
[184] Ibid.
[185] I used LogBound in Chris Adoplh's simcf package in R to preserve true 0s in the data.
[186] Indeed, this is partly what Posner and Goldsmith were suggesting.

Concerning Customs Facilities for Touring (Touring Convention); the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES); Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention); the Istanbul Convention on Temporary Admission (Istanbul Convention); the UNESCO World Heritage Convention (World Heritage Convention); the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention). This sum is then divided by the maximum number of treaties a state could have been a party to in the year in question. These treaties cover a wide range of issue areas that states might be exposed to or limit their exposure to "worldwide scripts" of appropriate behavior. They also cover a wide range of dates, ranging from the Touring Convention and Florence Agreement having opened to ratification well before my period of analysis began in the 1950s to the Istanbul Convention and CNTB having opened to ratifications in the 1990s following the Cold War. All the treaties have been open for ratifications for at least several decades at this point, so states have had ample opportunity to ratify them and further embed themselves in the alleged world polity. Furthermore, the treaties cover both treaties in force and treaties that have not yet entered into force (the CNTB).

Finally, the Judeo-Christian variable is an extension and reformulation of the various religion variables contained in Simmons' *Mobilizing for Human Rights* dataset, which was compiled on the basis of CIA World Factbook country profiles concerning what was the most practiced religion in a state. I first extended the Simmons data by updating the variable for countries who had benefitted from more developed country profiles since Simmons coded her variable. This resulted in the addition of religion data for 64 states (or other entities).[187] As the Simmons data suffered from substantial missingness and covered a period shorter than my own I extended the last observed values of her religion variables for states (as well as my additions) backward and forward in time to reduce missingness. This relied on the assumption that the primary religion practiced by citizens in a state was not subject to substantial variation in a fifty

[187] Specifically, the states (or other entities) that were coded as NA in the Simmons data and were added in mine were: Hong Kong, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Luxembourg, Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Norway, Denmark, Gambia, Mauritania, Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Djibouti, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Namibia, Eswatini, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen, Yemen People's Republic, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Singapore, and Timor-Leste.

year period.[188] This assumption is supported by the fact no state saw a change in values in the period covered by the original Simmons data. I then re-categorized the Catholic, Islam, and Protestant variables from Simmon's dataset into a single Judeo-Christian dichotomous variable. Israel, together with states with primarily Catholic and Protestant religious practitioners received a score of one in this variable. This is a more parsimonious and theoretically consistent operationalization of Simmons' expectations about these religions proxying for acceptance of enlightenment values (see discussion below).

4.2 Multiple Imputation

While I had no missingness in my spatial lag variables, nor did I have any in my dependent variables, it was difficult to obtain theoretically sound covariates that did not have substantial missingness. As the Cox model runs on only complete cases, I determined it was preferable to multiply impute my missing values rather than lose the majority of my observations. To fill my missing values I relied on multiple imputation using the Amelia package in R. I ran 7 imputations on the data using linear time effects with variance across the cross section of states.[189] It was necessary to set a ridge prior of 0.1% of the rows of my dataframe to allow the imputation to proceed without difficulty given the substantial missingness in the data and the correlation between some variables used for prediction. The ridge prior shrinks the covariances of the data, but retains the means and variances. Setting the ridge prior at 0.1 is consistent with a conservative use of the prior and falls well below the moderate and high limits of 5 and 10 percent of the rows in the data. Apart from the dependent variables (eg. the treaty status variables), all variables were included in the prediction matrix. Upper and lower bounds were set for the variables consistent with my theoretical expectations of where their ranges would be confined to. In the numerical variables this ranged from 0 to infinity, whereas I bounded the nominal and ordinal variables within their prior ranges.

[188] Of course, it would have been preferable to have time series data on religious demographics for all states of interest across the entirety of my period to avoid such assumptions altogether. Unfortunately neither I nor the data librarians at McGill University could find such a data source.

[189] m = 5 is consistent with standard practice in multiple imputation. I ran two additional imputations beyond the m = 5 threshold. While running even more imputations, eg. m = 100 would be certainly desirable in further increasing confidence in the results, this was not feasible due to time constraints as I did not have the resources or time to check 100 datasets for violations of the proportional hazards assumption in my Cox models (detailed subsequently).

4.3 Case Selection

In selecting human rights treaties as my cases, I hope to contribute to understandings of human rights treaty ratification and contribute to addressing deficiencies in the existing literature. But there are also several methodological merits to picking cases in human rights rather than another area. It is highly unlikely that competition drives human rights treaty ratification, as it might in areas of economic policy diffusion. Unlike the diffusion of market oriented policy, there is no clear competitive benefit to be accrued by imposing additional obligations on oneself in respect to one's population.[190] By selecting human rights as a case, I should in theory be limiting the possible number of alternative mechanisms that could be driving ratification diffusion (if it is found).

For my specific cases, I will examine the times taken by states to ratify all major United Nations human rights treaties with the exception of the Genocide Convention, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICMW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Unfortunately I am not able to include the Genocide Convention in my analysis due to limitations of data availability in the majority of my variables prior to 1965. By assessing all major United Nations Treaties from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) through to the most recently introduced International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), I will cover a range of treaties from widely adopted (such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to those with limited ratifications such as the CPED). I will also cover an array of trends in ratification speed; for instance the ICCPR saw almost a decade passed between when it was signed and when it gained sufficient ratifications to come into force. In the case of the CRC on the other hand, many ratifications were obtained within the two year period after it was signed. By assessing an array of cases with

[190] The argument that such obligations might be undertaken in a competitive process through which investors might be attracted is also unconvincing, as for many years in the period of analysis democracy and improvements in human rights were considered to put foreign capital at risk of expropriation, and more broadly cause general instability which would both have been seen as detriments rather than advantages by foreign investors. Since investors often lack the information to meaningfully distinguish between internalized and symbolic adoptions of human rights treaties signing such treaties would have either brought no competitive advantage as they would have been rejected as a valuable source of information by investors who believed them to be ceremonial in function, or have produced a negative perception in investors who assumed ratifications were signs of legitimate intentions to comply. This expands on the observation found in Geoffrey Garrett, Frank Dobbin, and Beth A. Simmons, "Conclusion," in *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy*, eds. Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 350-1.

variance in their diffusion trends, I hope to better understand the impact that reference groups may play on diffusion (or non-diffusion). My case selection also provides coverage of much of the modern human rights regime, covering 1967-2014.[191] This facilitates the testing of acculturation in a variety of international fields, as the treaties in question were created and ratified at points in history from the middle of the Cold War, to the conclusion of the Cold War, to the modern international system.[192] The cases also cover an array of human rights, allowing assessment of whether the content of the human rights treaty has an independent effect on the process of ratification (presumably through endogenous factors).

4.4 Survival Analysis Results: Unimputed Data

As an initial step, I model the spatial lag variables alone, using the unimputed data. This is the first model in each of the following regression tables. Unfortunately, controls cannot be added, as the Cox model requires complete cases and only approximately 1% of my entire dataframe is comprised of complete rows across all variables of interest. Since I have no missingness in the spatial lags, I am able to conduct an analysis using them alone without facing this problem. The results reveal that with the exception of the ICCPR, at least one of the reference group spatial lags are always statistically significant at the 0.05 level (the 0.01 level excepting the ICESCR results). In all cases but the CPED, it is the diplomatic reference group spatial lag that is significant. I have tested for violations of the proportional hazards assumption and corrected as necessary for time variance.[193] The results are displayed below.

[191] Data limitations in the UN voting spatial lag variable prevented me from extending the analysis beyond 2014.
[192] While it would have been desirable to begin with an early post-war treaty such as the genocide convention expanding the scope of the project across the entirety of the modern human rights regime, data limitations precluded this from being a possibility.
[193] When time variance is accounted for this is displayed in the subsequent regression tables as the variable name followed by "(tvc)".

4.5 Survival Analysis Results: Imputed Data

4.5.1 ICCPR Results

Figure I displays the cumulative Kaplan-Meier survival curve for the ICCPR. The y axis represents the proportion of units in the risk set (eg. states who exist and can ratify the treaty in question), and the x axis represents the number of years the unit has been at risk (eg. how long the state has been capable of ratifying, in years). Small notch marks are made at intervals in the graph indicating when right censoring occurred for units. The number above the notch indicates how many states experienced right censoring following that number of years at risk. The graph for the ICCPR reveals that 10 states were in the risk set for the entire period and did not experience the event (ratification of the ICCPR). It also reveals a number of states were in the risk set for a shorter period of time before their data became right censored (eg. states who entered the state system after the ICCPR was opened for ratification and never ratified, or who exited the state system without ratifying prior to being at risk for the maximum number of years a state was in the data). The cumulative survival curve for the ICCPR reveals that after having been at risk for two decades, a state (neglecting all other variables) had a probability of having ratified the ICCPR slightly over 50%.

Having run an unimputed model first, with some of these variables (the spatial lags) ignored by the Kaplan-Meier survival curve, I then turn to the imputed data to allow analysis with the addition of further covariates. I begin with a Cox proportional hazard model using multiply imputed data on ratification of the ICCPR. I begin by running the spatial lag variables on the unimputed data. I then proceed through the imputed data running each spatial lag variable with controls, and then the spatial lag variables collectively on the imputed controls. I then run models to account for the alternative explanations of embeddedness and strategic ratifications (not accounted for in my base models). I repeat this practice for each treaty.

Figure I: ICCPR Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Survival Curve



In the case of the ICCPR, only the diplomatic spatial lag variable was statistically significant when run without controls (model 1). Both the diplomatic and liguistic spatial lags are significant when run individually with my base set of controls for country preferences and coercion. In model 2, while the diplomatic spatial lag carries with it a substantial estimated effect of a 46.2% increase in ratification likelihood as one transitions from no diplomatic social pressure to maximum diplomatic social pressure, at around a 0.01 threshold of statistical significance. The colonial reference group variable is not significant when run on its own, but the linguistic spatial lag variable also shows a substantial estimated effect; 582% positive, at a 0.05 level of statistical significance.

Table I: ICCPR Event History Models

	ICCPR Event History Models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Diplomatic Spatial Lag	1.368***	1.462***			1.437***	1.476***	1.361***	1.374***
	(3.08)	(3.77)			(3.53)	(3.58)	(2.97)	(3.08)
Colonial Spatial Lag	1.088		2.717		1.090	0.944		
	(0.11)		(1.49)		(0.11)	(-0.07)		
Linguistic Spatial Lag	1.425			5.823**	2.519	2.208		
	(0.41)			(2.06)	(1.01)	(0.85)		
Mixed Government System		0.586*	0.540**	0.589*	0.616	0.586*	0.606*	0.657
		(-1.78)	(-2.07)	(-1.74)	(-1.59)	(-1.75)	(-1.69)	(-1.41)
Parliamentary System		0.487***	0.516***	0.496***	0.488***	0.458***	0.652	0.646*
		(-2.85)	(-2.63)	(-2.76)	(-2.79)	(-2.97)	(-1.62)	(-1.68)
Politically Left Executive		1.204	1.204	1.232	1.224	1.200		
		(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.97)	(0.93)	(0.85)		
Years Remaining in Term		1.009						
		(0.00)						
Extent Federal		1.009	0.979	0.986	1.010	0.999		
		(0.13)	(-0.32)	(-0.21)	(0.14)	(-0.02)		
Legal Tradition							0.636**	0.633**
							(-1.98)	(-2.02)
Polity Score		1.010***	1.092***	1.097***	1.103***	1.098***	1.074***	1.073***
		(6.52)	(6.09)	(6.36)	(6.71)	(6.31)	(4.42)	(4.35)
Net ODA by GNI		1.061	1.058	1.034	1.051	1.079	1.108*	1.115*
		(1.04)	(0.95)	(0.56)	(0.85)	(1.23)	(1.80)	(1.92)
Received IMF Credits		0.897	1.041	1.018	0.887	0.887		
		(-0.52)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(-0.57)	(-0.56)		
Embeddedness						2.637**	3.033***	3.225***
						(2.44)	(2.77)	(2.94)
Fariss Human Rights							0.990	0.904
							(-0.10)	(-0.98)
Regional Ratifications							4.230***	5.527***
							(2.71)	(3.85)
Bottom Half Human Rights States							0.885	
							(-0.29)	
Strategic Ratification (Half)							2.297	
							(1.41)	
Bottom Quarter Human Rights States								0.526
								(-1.34)
Strategic Ratification (Quarter)								2.966
								(1.54)
Legal Tradition (tvc)		0.982*	0.980*	0.981**	0.980**	0.979**		
		(-1.87)	(-1.94)	(-1.98)	(-1.96)	(-2.04)		
Term (tvc)			1.004	1.003	1.003	1.003		
			(1.24)	(1.13)	(1.03)	(1.09)		
Observations	3197	3197	3197	3197	3197	3197	3197	3197

Note: t statistics in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

When running the spatial lag variables together with the imputed controls, only the diplomatic reference group variable retains statistical significance, again at a 0.01 level, and the effect is relatively robust to the addition of the controls. The legal tradition, parliamentary

system, and polity variables are the only controls to attain significance at the 0.05 level or above in these models, with the former at a 0.5 level, and at a 0.01 level for the two latter variables. In the case of polity scores and legal tradition, the results are signed as expected, with common law systems seeming to suffer slight delays in ratification (based on the majority of the models; model 7 and 8 predict a more substantial probability of delay) and more democratic states predicted as being more likely to ratify across all the models. Specifically, the models predict a one unit increase in democracy score will have between a 7-10% likelihood of increasing a state's ratification of the ICCPR. While mixed systems do not necessarily carry with them an expected signage, since they comprise diverse types of systems, they are generally predicted at a low 0.1 level of statistical significance in the models to deter ratification decisions by a probability of approximately 40% compared to Presidential systems. However, parliamentary systems, which are theoretically expected to ease ratification show the same negative predicted effect across models 2-6, with a substantially reduced likelihood of ratifying compared to Presidential systems predicted (ranging from around 49-51%).

Moving on to model 6, the addition of embeddedness does not substantially change the results of the previously substantive controls. Embeddedness itself is a statistically significant predictor of ratification of the ICCPR, estimating a 163% increase in probability of ratification for fully embedded states relative to their completely unembedded peers. In models 7 and 8, I include an additional array of controls to assess whether the effects found above were due to states strategically camouflaging themselves from region based criticism, or whether it is, as theorized, truly the social effects influencing ratification choices. I omit the spatial lag variables that were not significant in the prior models as well as the variables that consistently did not attain significance across the models of all treaties (and do so across models 7 and 8 for all treaties). While Simmons simply used the extent of regional ratifications as her proxy for strategic behavior, I sharpen her identification strategy by interacting the percentage of regional ratifications with whether a state fell in the bottom quarter or half of all states in relation to human rights practices in that year. To operationalize this, I rely on Christopher Fariss' Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 3.01 Database to create the control variable for state human rights practices. The Fariss' database is preferred to the Freedom House alternative as it accounts for changes in human rights monitoring and standards over time. The logic of my interacted variable is that using Simmons' logic, states with decent to good human rights

practices should not feel compelled to camouflage themselves in relation to their regional peers. It is only rights violating states that would feel subject to this pressure. Accordingly, if the interaction of being a rights violating state and finding oneself in a region where ratifications are occurring is significant, this would support the theorization of strategic behavior. If it is not, that lends support to the theorization of more socially constructed ratifications (assuming the reference group spatial lag variable retains its significance).

In the case of the ICCPR, the strategic interaction variable is not significant in the new models when modelling strategic interaction for the bottom half of states in respect to their human rights scores (in that particular year). The individual state's human rights scores uninteracted are also not a significant predictor of ratification. Interestingly, regional ratifications alone prove a strong predictor of ratification, with an estimated 323% increase in the likelihood of ratifying as one moves from being in a region with no ratifications to one where the state is the only non-ratifier. In the 8th model, only the bottom quarter of states are treated as potential strategic ratifiers and the results are similar, with the spatial lag for the diplomatic reference group retaining its significance at a 0.01 level. In both model 7 and 8, the hazard rate of the diplomatic spatial lag variable decreased slightly compared to the earlier models with controls, but continues to carry a noteworthy 36-7% estimated probability of increased ratification likelihood. Once again, in model 8, the results suggest the strategic interaction is not a significant predictor of ratification as it fails to attain even a 0.1 level of significance. Again, the simple regional ratifications uninteracted with rights abusers is a strong predictor of ratifying the ICCPR, this time with an estimated 452% increase in ratification likelihood at the extreme of complete regional ratifications. In both models 7 and 8, the significance of the parliamentary system variable is diminished below the 0.05 significance threshold. Embeddedness also remained a substantive predictor of ratification in both models 7 and 8, with a slightly increased estimated effect relative to model 6 at the same level of statistical significance. Across all models, the other domestic preference and domestic constraint variables (excepting type of parliamentary system, legal tradition, and polity score) failed to attain significance at a 0.05 level, as did both coercion variables.[194]

[194] Regrettably neither Stata nor R offered a function to test for a violation of the proportional hazards assumption of the Cox model with multiply imputed data. The proportional hazards assumption requires the hazard rate to be equivalent over time across groups, and can be verified with a test of Schoenfeld residuals, with a null result indicating there is no violation. I tested the Schoenfeld residuals on an identical

4.5.2 ICESCR Results

The Kaplan-Meier cumulative curve for the ICESCR is similar to that of the ICCPR, indicating a relatively gradual decrease in the likelihood a state had not experienced the event (ratification) the longer it remained exposed to risk. Nine states were present throughout the entirety of the period of analysis and didn't ratify, while the right censored intervals for other states are marked in Figure II.

Figure II: ICESCR Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Survival Curve



model run on each of the 7 imputed datasets individually (results in Appendix). In cases where 4 or more of the datasets returned a violation of the proportional hazards model when the Schoenfeld residuals were tested, I accounted for time variance in that variable in the models presented. This was my practice across the models for all treaties. For details about in how many dataframes the proportional hazards assumptions were violated for any of the models or any of the treaties, or to access the output for the entirety of the robustness checks run, please contact henry.smith@mail.mcgill.ca.

Turning to the Cox proportionate hazards model results, in the unimputed first model in Table II, the diplomatic spatial lag is again the only variable to attain significance, with a modest estimated effect of a 29.5% increase (0.01 level of significance) in ratification likelihood as one moves from no diplomatic pressure to complete diplomatic pressure. When run alone with the base array of controls, the diplomatic spatial lag is similarly substantial and highly statistically significant (0.01 level), with a higher positive estimated effect of 35.6%. This is not the case for either of the other two spatial lags. The diplomatic spatial lag retains its substantial effect and significance when run in conjunction with the other two spatial lags and the imputed controls for the ICESCR. The result is effectively the same when run with embeddedness as an additional control in the 6th model. Across models 2-6, the legal tradition and polity variables are once again significant at the 0.01 level. Polity is consistently significant at or above the 0.01 level through models 7-8, while legal tradition loses significance above the 0.05 level in those models. The hazard rates predicted are consistent with theoretical expectations for both variables, with common law states predicted as being over 50% less likely to ratify in the models in which it is estimated as being statistically significant, while polity carries an insubstantial hazard in models 3 and 4, where its violation of the proportional hazards assumption was corrected. In the other models where there was no violation the direction of the estimated hazards remained positive, but the hazard estimated was higher, similar to the levels estimated for the ICCPR (7-9%). The diplomatic spatial lag for the ICESCR in models 7 and 8 carry slightly reduced hazard rates comparable to that of the unimputed model, and maintaining the 0.01 level of statistical significance. Embeddedness is once again a substantive predictor of ratification likelihood, although at lower levels of statistical significance than was the case with the ICCPR. When the interaction of the bottom half of rights protecting states is interacted with regional ratifications in model 7 and model 8, the strategic interaction fails to attain statistical significance. Again, the regional ratifications alone are estimated as having a large and statistically significant effect on ratification likelihood in both models (544-747%). The coercion variables perform poorly in the models with the base set of domestic preference and domestic constraint controls, but when run together with external variables such as the proportion of regional ratifications and embeddedness in models 7 and 8 the ODA variable attains a 0.01 levels of significance with small estimated effect of 1.160 per unit increase in reliance on ODA (the variable has a roughly ten unit range). IMF credit usage on the other hand fails to attain significance in every model in

Table II: ICESCR Event History Models

	ICESCR Event History Models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Diplomatic Spatial Lag	1.295***	1.356***			1.348***	1.362***	1.290***	1.300***
	(2.73)	(3.18)			(3.06)	(3.03)	(2.60)	(2.69)
Colonial Spatial Lag	0.890		2.245		1.297	1.358		
	(-0.16)		(1.25)		(0.36)	(0.43)		
Linguistic Spatial Lag	0.803			1.604	1.086	0.927		
	(-0.25)			(0.56)	(0.09)	(-0.08)		
Mixed Government System		0.732	0.659	0.676	0.732	0.702	0.837	0.843
		(-1.10)	(-1.45)	(-1.34)	(-1.09)	(-1.24)	(-0.65)	(-0.62)
Parliamentary System		0.580**	0.945	0.920	0.589**	0.574**	0.624*	0.632*
		(-2.08)	(-0.24)	(-0.34)	(-2.00)	(-2.07)	(-1.80)	(-1.77)
Politically Left Executive		1.139	1.174	1.181	1.145	1.127		
		(0.61)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.64)	(0.56)		
Years Remaining in Term		0.981	0.972	0.969	0.981	0.983		
		(-0.32)	(-0.45)	(-0.51)	(-0.31)	(-0.28)		
Polity		1.094***			1.094***	1.090***	1.077***	1.077***
		(6.02)			(5.99)	(5.69)	(4.68)	(4.68)
Extent Federal		0.969	0.968	0.973	0.968	0.959		
		(-0.39)	(-0.43)	(-0.35)	(-0.40)	(-0.53)		
Legal Tradition		0.493***	0.478***	0.504***	0.479***	0.471***	0.695	0.681*
		(-3.34)	(-3.27)	(-3.14)	(-3.27)	(-3.30)	(-1.64)	(-1.76)
Net ODA by GNI		1.085	1.079	1.069	1.086	1.108*	1.160***	1.158***
		(1.41)	(1.31)	(1.14)	(1.38)	(1.66)	(2.62)	(2.59)
Received IMF Credits		1.149	1.240	1.235	1.151	1.154		
		(0.66)	(1.07)	(1.04)	(0.67)	(0.67)		
Embeddedness						2.227**	2.149*	2.251**
						(2.04)	(1.94)	(2.09)
Fariss Human Rights							0.961	0.879
							(-0.36)	(-1.24)
Regional Ratifications							6.445***	8.470***
							(3.39)	(4.77)
Bottom Half Human Rights States							0.878	
							(-0.31)	
Strategic Ratification (Half)							1.877	
							(0.99)	
Bottom Quarter Human Rights States								0.651
								(-0.91)
Strategic Ratification (Quarter)								1.655
								(0.73)
Polity (tvc)			1.002***	1.002***				
			(2.90)	(2.94)				
Observations	3042	3042	3042	3042	3042	3042	3042	3042
Note: t statistics in parentheses				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

which it was included, as do the other country level controls with the exception of the parliamentary system variable which has low levels of statistical significance in the models in

which it is run with the diplomatic spatial lag, with a hazard rate once again contrary to the theoretical expectations of parliamentary systems not delaying ratification.

4.5.3 CERD Results

Figure III: CERD Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Survival Curve



Figure III reveals that compared to the ICCPR and ICESCR, states were likely to ratify the CERD earlier in their risk period. At ten years of risk, holding all else constant the figure reveals a state was less than 50% likely to not have experienced the ratification event yet. The right censoring indicators reveal only seven states in the risk set were at risk for the entirety of the period of analysis without ratifying. A number of others, although less than in the ICCPR and ICESCR cases, experienced right censoring at other time intervals, as shown above.

In the Cox proportionate hazard models for the CERD shown in Table III, the diplomatic spatial lag variable is statistically significant and carries with it a substantive effect when run both with and without the other spatial lags. Across the models the diplomatic spatial lag consistently predicts a 36-44% increase in ratification likelihood for a state experiencing strong social pressure from their diplomatic peer group. This is also true of the colonial and linguistic spatial lags which carry massive hazard rates (predicting an increase in ratification likelihood at the variable maximum relative to its minimum of 341% and 726% respectively), although only attain a 0.05 level of statistical significance in the case of the colonial spatial lag in model 3. When running the spatial lags collectively with the imputed controls, only the diplomatic spatial lag retains significance at the 0.01 level, although the linguistic reference group variable is close to meeting the 0.05 threshold. Across the models, no other domestic level preference or constraint covariate or coercion covariate is consistently statistically significant at a 0.05 level or above with a strong effect. In relation to the other external variables, these once again perform better. Embeddedness has a strong positive effect on ratification likelihood in each model in which it is included, estimating 178-317% increases in ratification probability. The proportion of ratifications in the region is also estimated as having a marked impact on state ratification choices, with estimated effects from moving to the minimum to maximum level in the region of 628-904%. The net ODA variable does attain a 0.1 level of statistical significance in the models where the linguistic spatial lag is run, in addition to model 8, but the estimated effect is signed contrary to theoretical expectations in every model, with greater reliance on ODA making a state less likely to ratify the treaty based on the model predictions. The legal tradition variable on the other hand is signed as expected and predicts a 31-45% decrease in ratification likelihood for common law states, but the variable loses statistical significance altogether in models 7 and 8. State human rights performance once again does not effectively predict ratification according to the models, nor does the strategic ratification variable when interacted with either the bottom half or bottom quarter of physical integrity right providers.

Table III: CERD Event History Models

	CERD Event History Models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Diplomatic Spatial Lag	1.367***	1.442***			1.397***	1.420***	1.392***	1.412***
	(2.85)	(3.10)			(2.77)	(2.75)	(2.56)	(2.64)
Colonial Spatial Lag	1.194		4.411**		1.569	1.302		
	(0.26)		(2.18)		(0.58)	(0.35)		
Linguistic Spatial Lag	1.826			8.260***	4.342*	3.984*		
	(0.81)			(2.94)	(1.89)	(1.79)		
Mixed Government System		0.834	0.740	0.810	0.876	0.844	1.154	1.152
		(-0.63)	(-1.07)	(-0.72)	(-0.45)	(-0.58)	(0.48)	(0.47)
Parliamentary System		0.798	0.823	0.771	0.820	0.754	0.890	0.867
		(-0.77)	(-0.64)	(-0.88)	(-0.66)	(-0.93)	(-0.38)	(-0.48)
Politically Left Executive		1.064	1.018	1.069	1.090	1.059		
		(0.32)	(0.09)	(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.29)		
Years Remaining in Term		1.009	1.011	1.006	1.006	1.011		
		(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.20)		
Extent Federal		1.041	1.020	1.026	1.037	1.017		
		(0.65)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.58)	(0.27)		
Legal Tradition		0.696*	0.575**	0.565***	0.548**	0.551**	0.933	0.923
		(-1.84)	(-2.39)	(-2.65)	(-2.52)	(-2.44)	(-0.33)	(-0.39)
Polity Score		1.032*	1.022	1.030**	1.034**	1.026*	1.002	1.003
		(2.20)	(1.51)	(2.06)	(2.26)	(1.72)	(0.16)	(0.20)
Net ODA by GNI		0.917	0.913	0.890**	0.899*	0.909	0.929	0.929*
		(-1.48)	(-1.51)	(-1.97)	(-1.79)	(-1.53)	(-1.25)	(-1.24)
Received IMF Credits		1.109	1.201	1.271	1.141	1.117		
		(0.48)	(0.85)	(1.10)	(0.60)	(0.74)		
Embeddedness						2.789***	4.049***	4.178***
						(3.13)	(4.17)	(4.31)
Fariss Human Rights							1.065	1.086
							(0.62)	(0.93)
Regional Ratifications							7.281***	10.043***
							(3.34)	(4.40)
Bottom Half Human Rights States							0.564	
							(-1.25)	
Strategic Ratification (Half)							2.798*	
							(1.55)	
Bottom Quarter Human Rights States								0.635
								(-0.87)
Strategic Ratification (Quarter)								2.568
								(1.20)
Observations	2174	2174	2174	2174	2174	2174	2174	2174

Note: t statistics in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.5.4 CEDAW Results

Figure IV: CEDAW Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Survival Curve



CEDAW ratification was even more likely early in the risk period for the CEDAW than it was for the CERD, as shown in Figure IV. States were only approximately 40% likely to still be at risk ten years into being exposed to potential CEDAW ratification, and come the conclusion of the period of analysis a similar number of states as in the CERD case were withholding ratification. In the case of the CEDAW Cox models, the diplomatic spatial lag variables are statistically significant at a 0.01 level and carry substantive effects across all of the models, ranging from a 35-47% estimated increase in ratification probability. The colonial spatial lag variable is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level when run independently with the base set of covariates, and carries with it a hazard rate of 8.104. However, when run together with the diplomatic spatial lag in models 5 and 6 it loses significance. In these models the diplomatic

Table IV: CEDAW Event History Models

	CEDAW Event History Models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Diplomatic Spatial Lag	1.353***	1.473***			1.447***	1.478***	1.469***	1.464***
	(2.95)	(3.23)			(3.01)	(3.02)	(3.11)	(3.03)
Colonial Spatial Lag	2.046		8.104**		4.579	4.110		
	(0.79)		(2.39)		(1.53)	(1.43)		
Linguistic Spatial Lag	0.255			1.642	0.442	0.288		
	(-1.30)			(0.48)	(-0.73)	(-1.09)		
Mixed Government System		1.181	1.170		1.244	1.284	1.120	1.265
		(0.68)	(0.63)		(0.87)	(1.00)	(0.76)	(0.98)
Parliamentary System		1.214	1.385		1.364	1.311	1.258	1.252
		(0.73)	(1.19)		(1.14)	(0.98)	(0.89)	(0.87)
Politically Left Executive		1.213	1.258	1.312	1.224	1.236		
		(1.04)	(1.25)	(1.50)	(1.09)	(1.15)		
Years Remaining in Term		1.017	1.021	1.008	1.019	1.019		
		(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.13)	(0.31)	(0.30)		
Extent Federal		1.008	0.967	0.991	0.999	0.993		
		(0.13)	(-0.54)	(-0.14)	(-0.01)	(-0.11)		
Legal Tradition		0.582***	0.496***	0.597**	0.540***	0.578***	0.869	0.873
		(-2.59)	(-3.05)	(-2.40)	(-2.58)	(-2.31)	(-0.64)	(-0.62)
Polity		1.033**	1.017		1.028*	1.022	0.989	0.988
		(2.13)	(1.08)		(1.82)	(1.36)	(-0.63)	(-0.67)
Net ODA by GNI		0.953	0.943	0.948	0.957	0.969	0.973	0.978
		(-0.91)	(-1.06)	(-0.97)	(-0.81)	(-0.57)	(-0.53)	(-0.45)
Received IMF Credits		1.189	1.393*	1.335	1.230	1.234		
		(0.85)	(1.64)	(1.45)	(1.01)	(1.01)		
Embeddedness						2.349**	2.883***	3.075***
						(2.19)	(2.80)	(2.95)
Fariss Human Rights							1.057	1.017
							(0.56)	(0.16)
Regional Ratifications							15.400***	16.007***
							(5.01)	(5.71)
Bottom Half Human Rights States							1.178	
							(0.38)	
Strategic Ratification (Half)							1.110	
							(0.17)	
Bottom Quarter Human Rights States								0.915
								(-0.19)
Strategic Ratification (Quarter)								1.366
								(0.44)
Mixed Government System (tvc)				0.975				
				(-0.76)				
Parliamentary System (tvc)				1.039				
				(1.60)				
Polity (tvc)				1.000				
				(-0.23)				
Observations	1641	1641	1641	1641	1641	1641	1641	1641

Note: t statistics in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

spatial lag was estimated as having a 44-47% effect on ratification probability (moving from the minimum to the maximum of the variable). Once again the coercion variables are insignificant, and the only domestic level variable to attain a level of significance consistently is the legal tradition variable, which once again has the expected negative effect on ratification. It loses significance in models 7 and 8. The hazard rates for regional ratification are extremely high once again (at a 0.01 level of significance) in the case of the CEDAW, estimated as having a 1440% and 1500% increase in ratification likelihood moving from regions without ratifications to regions with complete ratification with the exception of the state in question. As before, strategic ratification does not seem to have motivated ratification. Embeddedness varies in statistical significance from 0.05 in model 6 to 0.01 in models 7 and 8. It estimates a positive effect on ratification for more embedded countries, as before. Also as was the case for previously covered treaties, the country's human rights performance do not predict ratification in the models.

4.5.5 CRC Results

Figure V reveals states were at the greatest risk of ratifying in the years immediately following the CRC being opened for ratification, and states who resisted the trend of quick ratification were unlikely to subsequently ratify. For the CRC's event history models, the diplomatic and colonial reference group spatial lags are statistically significant and carry substantive effects (especially so in the case of the colonial reference group variable, although its level of statistical significance is a lower 0.05) when run independently with the base controls. The linguistic spatial lag fails to attain statistical significance when run alone, or when run with the other spatial lags. In model 5 and model 6, when run with the other spatial lags, the colonial reference group variable loses significance. The robustness of the diplomatic spatial lag variable is particularly apparent across the models as the variance in the predicted hazard rates is relatively low irrespective of the covariates it is run with. It is highly statistically significant (consistently a 0.01 level) with a significant estimated effect (25-32% for a one unit change depending on the model) on treaty ratification across all of the models. Regional ratifications are also substantive and significant once again, predicting a sizably larger likelihood of ratifying the CRC if the state is the sole non-ratifier in its region. No other domestic preference, domestic constraint, or coercion covariate attains significance at or above the 0.05 level in more than a

Figure V: CRC Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Survival Curve



single model displayed in Table V. As before, the strategic ratification variables were not statistically significant predictors of ratification in the presented models, nor was the country's human rights record estimated as influencing ratification choices. Embeddedness was statistically significant at a 0.05 level in model 6 and 7, and increased in statistical significance in model 8. It estimated a 137-188% increase in ratification probability for a fully embedded relative to a non-embedded one.

Table V: CRC Event History Models

	CRC Event History Models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Diplomatic Spatial Lag	1.323***	1.324***			1.304***	1.309***	1.259***	1.255***
	(3.24)	(3.15)			(2.91)	(2.89)	(2.65)	(2.60)
Colonial Spatial Lag			6.156**		3.498	3.110		
			(2.46)		(1.48)	(1.34)		
Linguistic Spatial Lag	0.479			0.889	0.363	0.242		
	(-0.90)			(-0.14)	(-1.10)	(-1.50)		
Mixed Government System		0.842	0.761		0.829	0.814	0.893	0.893
		(-0.60)	(-0.97)		(-0.64)	(-0.71)	(-0.42)	(-0.42)
Parliamentary System		0.782	1.070		0.885	0.834	0.992	1.004
		(-1.01)	(0.28)		(-0.48)	(-0.70)	(-0.03)	(0.01)
Years Remaining in Term		1.055	1.047	1.047	1.058	1.065		
		(0.90)	(0.78)	(0.79)	(0.94)	(1.05)		
Politically Left Executive		0.874	0.870	0.887	0.859	0.840		
		(-0.70)	(-0.73)	(-0.64)	(-0.78)	(-0.90)		
Extent Federal		1.037	1.012	1.011	1.034	1.027		
		(0.58)	(0.20)	(-0.05)	(0.54)	(0.44)		
Legal Tradition		0.765	0.586**	0.773	0.692	0.728	0.819	0.812
		(-1.41)	(-2.37)	(-1.29)	(-1.58)	(-1.37)	(-1.05)	(-1.10)
Polity		1.028*			1.019	1.013		
		(1.90)			(1.25)	(0.84)		
Net ODA by GNI		1.054	1.060	1.055	1.069	1.089	1.026	1.026
		(0.99)	(1.07)	(0.99)	(1.22)	(1.51)	(0.51)	(0.50)
Received IMF Credits		1.081	1.156	1.247	1.113	1.096		
		(0.40)	(0.74)	(1.13)	(0.54)	(0.45)		
Embeddedness						2.379**	2.577**	2.883***
						(2.14)	(2.33)	(2.69)
Fariss Human Rights							1.046	0.920
							(0.47)	(-0.86)
Regional Ratifications							7.312***	8.107***
							(2.80)	(3.69)
Bottom Half Human Rights States							1.318	
							(0.48)	
Strategic Ratification (Half)							1.078	
							(0.10)	
Bottom Quarter Human Rights States								0.974
								(-0.05)
Strategic Ratification (Quarter)								0.786
								(-0.29)
Colonial Spatial Lag (tvc)	1.007							
	(0.03)							
Polity (tvc)			1.000	0.999			0.999	0.999
			(-0.06)	(-0.21)			(-0.16)	(-0.21)
Mixed Government System (tvc)				0.854				
				(-1.45)				
Parliamentary System (tvc)				1.044				
				(0.58)				
Observations	571	571	571	571	571	571	571	571

Note: t statistics in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.5.6 CAT Results

Figure VI: CAT Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Survival Curve



The Kaplan-Meier cumulative survival curve shown in Figure VI demonstrates the CAT is a less widely ratified treaty than many of the others covered, with 24 states present throughout the entirety of the risk period experiencing right censoring at its conclusion. Returning to the Colombia anecdote covered in the introduction, the curve reveals Colombian ratification in that year was extremely unlikely (assuming it was an average state), with states in their third year of being at risk estimated as having a roughly 80% probability of still being at risk (not having ratified). The fact that almost every major South American state ratified in the first six years seems even more unlikely to be by chance.

Turning to the event history models displayed in Table VI, this intuition is confirmed, as the diplomatic spatial lag variable is once again statistically significant at a 0.01 level with

substantive estimated effects on ratification across each of the models. The colonial spatial lag variable is significant at a 0.05 level in the unimputed model but does not attain significance in any others. The polity and legal tradition variables are also highly significant at a 0.01 level in models 2-6. While the polity estimate appears insubstantial it bears remembering that polity is scaled from -10 to 10 and the estimate is based on moving one point in a positive direction on the scale. Legal tradition is reduced to a 0.05 level of statistical significance in models 7 and 8, and polity loses significance in these models altogether. Unlike other in the models for the other treaties covered, the extent to which a state was federal was estimated as having an impact on ratification probability in models 2-6. However, not only was the level of statistical significance low at 0.1, but the estimated effects were contrary to theoretical expecations, with each unit increase in the federalism scale being estimated as increasing rather than decreasing the probability of ratification by 11-14%, depending on the model. While IMF credit use is once again insignificant, net ODA by GNI consistently attains a 0.05 (or higher) level of statistical significance across the models with a negative estimated effect on treaty ratification for states more dependent on foreign aid (contrary to theoretical expectations). As in the case of the other treaties, regional ratifications has a very large estimated effect on ratification likelihood at a high level of significance. Model 7 estimates a 443% increase in ratification likelihood and model 8 estimates a 668% increase in ratification likelihood in regions with complete levels of ratifications (excepting the state in question). The parliamentary system variable is reduced in statistical significance in models 7 and 8 relative to models 2, 5, and 6, with a theoretically inconsistent hazard rate predicted in all of the models at varying strengths, as was the case in the earlier treaties. As has consistently been the case, neither the state's human rights scores nor strategic ratification are compelling predictors of ratification in the models presented for the CAT. Embeddedness appears to be a major contributor to CAT ratification, attaining a 0.01 level of statistical significance in models 6-8, with a positive estimated effect on ratification likelihood ranging from 806-887%.

Table VI: CAT Event History Models

	CAT Event History Models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Diplomatic Spatial Lag	1.620***	1.719***			1.679***	1.923***	1.646***	1.659***
	(3.36)	(3.64)			(3.44)	(3.69)	(3.06)	(3.09)
Colonial Spatial Lag	2.617		6.844**		3.213	2.448		
	(0.96)		(2.17)		(1.23)	(0.96)		
Linguistic Spatial Lag	0.124**			3.068	1.114	0.756		
	(-2.11)			(1.17)	(0.11)	(-0.28)		
Mixed Government System			1.134	1.110			1.132	1.194
			(0.47)	(0.39)			(0.48)	(0.68)
Parliamentary System			0.767	0.659*			0.526**	0.496***
			(-1.01)	(-1.59)			(-2.41)	(-2.65)
Politically Left Executive		1.005	1.028	1.061	1.009	1.064		
		(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.29)	(0.04)	(0.30)		
Years Remaining in Term		1.072	1.066	1.063	1.070	1.070		
		(1.06)	(0.99)	(0.95)	(1.02)	(1.02)		
Extent Federal		1.139	1.115*	1.117*	1.141**	1.127*	1.102	1.104
		(2.00)	(1.71)	(1.71)	(2.04)	(1.89)	(1.51)	(1.53)
Legal Tradition		0.558***	0.425***	0.471***	0.517***	0.503***	0.617**	0.603**
		(-2.63)	(-3.56)	(-3.31)	(-2.77)	(-2.88)	(-2.13)	(-2.26)
Polity		1.063***	1.058***	1.065***	1.063***	1.047***	1.025	1.025
		(4.54)	(3.84)	(4.20)	(4.46)	(3.24)	(1.58)	(1.53)
Net ODA by GNI		0.878**	0.897**	0.886**	0.879**	0.879**	0.867***	0.871**
		(-2.40)	(-2.00)	(-2.22)	(-2.32)	(-2.13)	(-2.58)	(-2.45)
Received IMF Credits		0.713	0.844	0.839	0.704	0.713		
		(-1.57)	(-0.80)	(-0.77)	(-1.63)	(-1.48)		
Embeddedness						9.879***	9.130***	9.068***
						(4.89)	(4.96)	(5.00)
Fariss Human Rights							1.122	1.092
							(0.98)	(0.79)
Regional Ratifications							5.433***	7.687***
							(2.97)	(4.25)
Bottom Half Human Rights States							0.993	
							(-0.02)	
Strategic Ratification (Half)							2.128	
							(1.12)	
Bottom Quarter Human Rights States								1.030
								(0.06)
Strategic Ratification (Quarter)								1.688
								(0.67)
Mixed Government System (tvc)		1.022			1.023	1.019		
		(0.99)			(1.04)	(0.84)		
Parliamentary System (tvc)		0.938***			0.940***	0.926***		
		(-2.78)			(-2.82)	(-3.33)		
Observations	2125	2125	2125	2125	2125	2125	2125	2125

Note: t statistics in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.5.7 CPED Results

Figure VII: CPED Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Survival Curve



Figure VII reveals the CPED represents the treaty least likely to have been ratified by a state having been exposed to the risk for around a decade, with an estimated roughly 75% percent chance of remaining at risk after exposure for 8 years. The CPED also represents the least ratified treaty of those covered, with 123 states having been exposed to the entirety of the (admittedly brief) risk period and experiencing right censoring at its conclusion. The short time period in which the treaty was open for ratification in my period of analysis as well as the limited number of events (eg. ratifications) that occurred in the covered period are worth bearing in mind when assessing the CPED results.

Table VII: CPED Event History Models

	CPED Event History Models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Diplomatic Spatial Lag	1.772	1.879			1.747	1.870		
	(1.36)	(1.03)			(0.98)	(0.97)		
Colonial Spatial Lag	20.014***		7.613*		7.120*	11.330**	4.222	2.931
	(3.35)		(1.82)		(1.73)	(2.02)	(1.16)	(0.83)
Linguistic Spatial Lag	0.182			1.211	0.864	0.874		
	(-0.89)			(0.11)	(-0.08)	(-0.07)		
Mixed Government System		0.893	0.959	0.829	1.025	0.885	0.989	1.013
		(-0.06)	(0.05)	(-0.27)	(0.03)	(-0.17)	(-0.02)	(0.02)
Parliamentary System		0.873	1.181	0.830	1.222	1.003	0.795	0.948
		(-0.31)	(0.35)	(-0.43)	(0.42)	(0.01)	(-0.47)	(-0.11)
Politically Left Executive		1.528	1.427	1.596	1.395	1.312		
		(1.30)	(1.07)	(1.43)	(0.99)	(0.79)		
Years Remaining in Term		1.078	1.076	1.082	1.075	1.068		
		(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.68)	(0.62)	(0.57)		
Extent Federal		1.039	1.026	1.030	1.038	1.015		
		(0.33)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.14)		
Legal Tradition		0.174***	0.173***	0.170***	0.185***	0.226**	0.212**	0.232**
		(-2.88)	(-2.90)	(-2.92)	(-2.78)	(-2.43)	(-2.52)	(-2.39)
Polity		1.077**	1.069*	1.085**	1.063*	1.034*	1.008	1.027
		(2.21)	(1.95)	(2.42)	(1.72)	(0.87)	(0.19)	(0.69)
Net ODA by GNI		0.842*	0.889	0.843*	0.889	0.941	1.013	0.931
		(-1.82)	(-1.15)	(-1.79)	(-1.11)	(-0.53)	(0.11)	(-0.60)
Received IMF Credits		0.955	1.031	1.11	0.906	1.190		
		(-0.11)	(0.07)	(0.25)	(-0.24)	(0.38)		
Embeddedness						12.119**	12.799	12.044
						(2.40)	(2.44)	(2.30)
Fariss Human Rights							0.789	0.769
							(-1.17)	(-1.23)
Regional Ratifications							174.514**	40.646**
							(2.55)	(2.18)
Bottom Half Human Rights States							0.504	
							(-0.91)	
Strategic Ratification (Half)							0.530	
							(-0.31)	
Bottom Quarter Human Rights States								0.259
								(-1.50)
Strategic Ratification (Quarter)								6.135
								(0.69)
Observations	1172	1172	1172	1172	1172	1172	1172	1172
Note: t statistics in parentheses					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Turning to the event history models, as shown in Table VII only the colonial spatial lag variable is a statistically significant predictor of ratification behavior in the unimputed model, and it is significant at a 0.01 level. The colonial spatial lag variable carries with it in this model a massive hazard rate, estimating a 1901% increase in ratification likelihood if all other members of the state's colonial group have ratified the CPED. The hazard rate is reduced to about a third

of that (and a mere 0.1 level of statistical significance) in models 3, 5 and 6, and loses significance altogether in models 7 and 8. The lack of robustness suggests the CPED may be the first treaty of those covered where the spatial lag variables are not compelling predictors of treaty ratification, at least in the brief initial years of risk covered in this analysis. Legal tradition and regional ratifications are the only two variables that are consistently statistically significant at even the 0.05 level. Polity scores are significant throughout models 2-6 as well, but generally only attain a 0.1 level of statistical significance. The hazard rates associated with the polity variable are not dissimilar to those reported for other treaties in which polity was a substantive predictor of increased ratification probability. Interestingly, the CPED appears to be the first treaty in which there was also not a strong effect found for the state's embeddedness, with that variable only attaining statistical significance in one of the models. On the whole, given the very short time span of risk covered and the limited number of ratifications accrued in that time period, caution is in order when drawing inferences about factors impacting CPED ratification based on these results.

4.6 Controlling for Enlightenment Values: Further Models

To account for the potentiality the results in my external influence (eg. the diplomatic spatial lag, embeddedness, and regional ratification variables) were a product of an omitted domestic preference variable in my prior models, I then ran a further model for each treaty using only its previous consistently statistically significant covariates along with the Judeo-Christian state variable. Simmons has offered enlightenment values as another domestic preference that would contribute to a government's ratification calculus. She notes that "[t]he willingness to use law as a means to empower the individual vis-a`-vis the government or society has roots in the Western European Enlightenment and... resonates most clearly and deeply within that cultural context".[195] Accordingly, it follows that governments that represent populations with philosophical commitments to the values of the enlightenment should be more willing to commit themselves to such values even at the cost of some of their sovereignty.[196] While I have hesitated in including Judeo-Christian states in my initial set of models due to the fact the variable is not a precise means of capturing the extent of a population's commitment to enlightenment thought, I follow Simmons in doing so now to account for a factor that I may have overlooked in the earlier

[195] Beth Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 66.
[196] Ibid.

models and ensure my results are robust.[197] With the exception of the CEDAW, being a Judeo-Christian majority state is not estimated as being statically significant in predicting treaty ratification based on the models in Table VIII. In the case of the CEDAW, states with Jewish or Christian majorities were estimated as being 48.3% more likely to commit themselves to the CEDAW than their peers (at a 0.05 level of statistical significance).

The addition of the Judeo-Christian variable generally did not impact the substance or significance of the other variables. For the ICCPR, the estimated effect of polity was marginally diminished, and embeddedness also suffered a reduced effect as well as a reduction to a 0.05 level of statistical significance. The estimate of the impact of regional ratifications roughly doubled on the other hand, while the spatial lag variable was robust to the addition. For the ICESCR, the spatial lag variable as well as the polity, legal tradition, embeddedness, and regional ratifications variables were all relatively unchanged. The ODA by GNI variable on the other hand suffered a slightly reduced hazard rate and a diminished level of significance (to the 0.05 level). In the CERD model the three substantive results were relatively unchanged by the addition. The spatial lag was once again robust in the CEDAW model, as was the regional ratifications variable. Embeddedness was once again reduced in significance and slightly in substance as well by the addition of the Judeo-Christian variable, again to a 0.05 level. This was also the case for the CRC, in which the spatial lag and regional ratifications variables did not suffer such losses in hazard rate or statistical significance. In the CAT case, all the significant results were robust to the addition, with the exception of the regional ratifications variable which saw a slightly increased hazard rate following the addition of the proxy for enlightenment values. Conversely, as there was large variance in the regional ratifications hazard rates reported in the earlier CPED models, it is difficult to simply establish the effect of the addition of the Judeo-Christian variable. The hazard rate in this model was far larger than that reported in model 8 of

[197] I also do not mean to suggest that non-Jewish or non-Christian individuals can't or aren't likely to endorse values of the enlightenment on an individual level. I simply follow Simmons in assuming on the aggregate level states with a greater history of exposure to these ideas in their populations are more likely to have populations that, on the whole, are more accepting of enlightenment values as a product of their socialization.

Table VIII: Enlightenment Values Event History Models

	Enlightenment Values Control Event History Models						
	ICCPR	ICESCR	CERD	CEDAW	CRC	CAT	CPED
Diplomatic Spatial Lag	1.401***	1.324***	1.420***	1.478***	1.289***	1.640***	
	(3.20)	(2.84)	(2.74)	(3.14)	(2.86)	(3.05)	
Colonial Spatial Lag							5.033
							(1.44)
Mixed Government System	0.689	0.861				1.156	
	(-1.27)	(-0.54)				(0.56)	
Parliamentary System	0.680	0.619*				0.515***	
	(-1.48)	(-1.81)				(-2.65)	
Extent Federal				0.974		1.100	
				(-0.43)		(1.49)	
Legal Tradition	0.657*	0.679*	0.916	0.916	0.820	0.592**	0.232**
	(-1.86)	(-1.77)	(-0.43)	(-0.41)	(-1.06)	(-2.30)	(-2.40)
Polity Score	1.060***	1.068***	1.004	0.990	1.000	1.027*	1.000
	(3.68)	(4.18)	(0.30)	(-0.73)	(0.03)	(1.73)	(-0.01)
Net ODA by GNI	1.091	1.148**	0.929	0.966	1.025	0.871**	0.989
	(1.55)	(2.45)	(-1.28)	(-0.69)	(0.47)	(-2.48)	(-0.10)
Embeddedness	2.702**	2.225**	4.175***	2.428**	2.482**	9.221***	12.175**
	(2.41)	(2.02)	(4.35)	(2.26)	(2.14)	(5.02)	(2.53)
Regional Ratifications	8.190***	9.760***	12.667***	16.439***	7.367***	8.709***	52.334**
	(4.97)	(5.46)	(5.38)	(6.29)	(3.90)	(4.84)	(2.45)
Judeo-Christian State	1.399*	1.080	1.079	1.483**	1.074	0.955	1.406
	(1.70)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(2.12)	(0.35)	(-0.23)	(0.84)
Observations	3197	3042	2174	1641	571	2125	1172

Note: t statistics in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table VII above, but extremely reduced compared to that of model 7. In terms of the other significant variables, the results for legal tradition were relatively unaltered, and contrary to the other treaties embeddedness gained in statistical significance (to a 0.05 level) and positive hazard rate. All told, with the exception of embeddedness in the case of several treaties and several variables idiosyncratic to the particular treaty in question, the results (particularly those of the diplomatic spatial lag) were robust to the addition of this additional control for domestic preferences. The decline in statistical significance of the embeddedness variable in the ICCPR, CEDAW, and CRC models is interesting, particularly given there is only a very weak positive correlation between embeddedness and Judeo-Christian states. Put otherwise, the correlation plots shown in the appendix suggest Judeo-Christian states were not substantially more embedded than their average peer.

4.7 When does Acculturation Matter?

The findings suggestive of acculturative effects beg a follow up question. When does acculturation matter in a state's risk period? Are states consistently at the same level of risk due to acculturative forces, or does the strength of the social effect change throughout the period of risk. Theory of course would indicate the higher the weight of the social effect, the greater likelihood of inducing compliance in the social peer, but it is less overtly specific on whether the length to which a state is subject to social pressure might matter. Nevertheless, logic and the qualitative results discussed above would seem to lend a theoretical answer. If acculturation is driving ratifications, we should expect not just the weight of the social force to matter, but also the timing to which a state has been subject to it. In the case study on Britain and the genocide, the discomfort of the Foreign Office personnel with their self-perceived behavior deviant from that of the states they identified with increased in strength over time, as did the vociferousness of their appeals for initially supportive, and then compliant, behavior to those in the Home Office delaying ratification.

Theory would seem to imply the same. Consider for instance consistency theory; while an agent might be able to excuse their actions as not inconsistent with their identity in cases of short-term deviance from group norms, the longer a state engages in norm transgressing behavior, the more difficult it likely becomes to have a sense of conformity to expected behavior. Similarly, if social liking is producing the acculturative effect, one might expect more exposure either to the normatively appropriate behavior in esteemed social peers, or to requests for the state to bring itself into conformity with peer group standards would lead to a greater likelihood of mimicry or of resignation to the requests of social peers. With identification, states might be expected to withhold ratification initially if the peer group's public acceptance of the treaty is non-homogenous (eg. not all ratify) but over time as homogeneity in treaty acceptance increases within the peer group so too will the pressure mount to engage in consistent action. Conversely, while initially in the risk period it may be unclear to a state that its peer group rejects the content of the treaty (after all, all peer groups start out with no members having ratified) over time the lack of ratifications will more soundly establish the peer group's disdain or apathy toward treaty ratification and reinforce the withholding of ratification by a state who holds membership in such

a group. Thus, whatever the specific mechanism of acculturation, there exists a logical reason to believe in each case that time might matter in addition to the magnitude of the social pressure.

Testing whether these theoretical expectations are met not only will improve empirical awareness of how acculturative pressures might work in the human rights treaty ratification context, but they also allow a potential criticism of the diplomatic spatial lag composition to be addressed. A critic might point out that similarity in UNGA voting might not actually capture social similarity between states, but instead simply be capturing similarities of domestic preferences that I have failed to control for. For instance, the social similarity between state voting patterns in the UNGA may actually only be an intervening variable through which specific shared domestic preferences are expressed. Of course the spatial weighting matrix is not solely created using this variable; the ratification status of the dyadic partner determines whether the voting affinity is given weight at all or not. It is difficult to align the significance of the variable given erstwhile similar states in regard to domestic preferences do not uniformly ratify or not ratify the treaty. Some similar dyadic pairs will have their voting weighted in a given year because one partner ratified, whereas other domestically similar dyadic pairs may not because neither partner did.[198] However, if in spite of this the diplomatic spatial lag variable has still transpired to simply be an intervening variable for uncontrolled domestic preferences, a theory of domestic ratification would expect to see relatively consistent effects over time. After all, if a state has a preference for ratifying the treaty, there is no reason theoretically that one would expect a preference of the same weight to have a greater probability of inducing ratification after a decade of being at risk. Theoretically, it is domestic constraints, not pondering when to act on a preference, which delays ratification in states that are on paper compelling candidates for ratification. Thus if the results below are time varying, not only will this provide valuable insights into how acculturation functions temporally, but should also soundly dispel the notion the variable is simply a mis-operationalization truly capturing only some unaccounted for domestic preferences of states.

[198] Of course the spatial weighting matrix is not solely created using this variable; the ratification status of the dyadic partner determines whether the voting affinity is given weight at all or not. It is difficult to align the significance of the variable given erstwhile similar states in regard to domestic preferences do not uniformly ratify or not ratify the treaty. Some similar dyadic pairs will have their voting weighted in a given year because one partner ratified, whereas other domestically similar dyadic pairs may not because neither partner did. Nevertheless, the subsequent empirical results would further seem to suggest the criticism is unfounded, and it is worth presenting them.

To obtain empirical results on how acculturation might function temporally, as well as verify I am not simply capturing domestic preferences with the diplomatic spatial lag, I took the yearly mean of the diplomatic spatial lag variable. States with values above this mean in the year in question (the variable was calculated separately for each individual year) received scores of 1, whereas states below the mean received scores of 0. I then plotted Kaplan-Meier survival curves for this new dichotomized version of the diplomatic (or colonial in the case of the CPED) spatial lag, showing the estimated differences between the groups subject to more and less social pressure in the year in question. While this is obviously an imperfect way of showing acculturative effects, given one would expect the states farthest from the mean in either direction to have stronger effects than ones narrowly split by the mean, plotting more than two lines would make the graphs difficult to interpret and also reduce the tightness of the confidence intervals due to limited data. Furthermore, as my method likely underestimates rather than overestimates the differences between states more and less subject to acculturation some insights can still be gained.

Beginning with the ICCPR, the results reveal there are statistically significant differences that emerge after the initial few years of risk (where there are insufficient ratifications to generate the requisite social pressure) between the states above and below the yearly mean in the spatial lag variable. The statistical significance of the difference between the estimated survival rates vanishes around the tenth to thirtieth years at risk, subsequently re-emerging after that point. While it is difficult to determine what is causing these changes, one might posit the initial increased risk stems from willing compliers seeing their similar social peers also ratifying and determining it is both socially desirable and consistent with their internal preferences to ratify. Once these states have ratified, the twenty year period in which there are not significant differences between the groups might be explained by the fact the willing compliers have largely already ratified, and this results in reduced variance in the level of social pressure states face. Over this period, more states ratified, leaving new states, this time those whose preferences may not have been as well aligned with the treaty, subject to mounting social pressure from their reference groups. The early difference might also be explained by the emergence of numerous post-Soviet states who identified with the West, a group who had largely ratified the ICCPR by the 1990s, even though this represented the initial years of risk for many newly emerging eastern

European states. A similar effect can be seen for the ICESCR in Figure IX, and similar explanations can be posited for those results as well.

Figure VIII: ICCPR Kaplan-Meier Diplomatic Spatial Lag Survival Curve



Figure IX: ICESCR Kaplan-Meier Diplomatic Spatial Lag Survival Curve



The CERD Kaplan-Meier curve follows a different pattern, with statistically significant differences between the groups emerging roughly four years into the risk period and the difference in estimated survival rates remaining over time. Given the widespread and relatively rapid ratification of the CERD by diverse states, it would seem in this case the initial social pressure was not simply concentrated in some reference groups, but rather most states were exposed to this pressure. This would account for the difference being maintained through the middle years of risk, and the fact that by the conclusion of the risk period covered, the survival rate of states who had been exposed to a substantial level of social pressure was extremely low. The CRC curve shown in Figure XII follows a similar pattern, and was also a treaty that, relatively speaking, was broadly and quickly adopted.

Figure X: CERD Kaplan-Meier Diplomatic Spatial Lag Survival Curve



The CEDAW also follows the expected pattern of social pressure resulting in increased ratification probability later in the risk period. There is no significant difference between the two groups until over fifteen years of risk, at which point it appears sufficient social pressure has accumulated in the reference groups of non-genuine compliers to induce an increased ratification probability. As was the case of the prior treaties, the estimates for states below the yearly mean in the spatial lag variable were less precise, with a wider confidence interval across time.

The CAT follows a similar pattern to the ICCPR and the ICESCR, and it is also like them in that it accrued ratifications more gradually over an extended period of time. The difference is that its total risk period is shorter, as it was opened for ratification later than those two treaties. Again, there is a brief period in which there is a statistically significant difference between the groups in the initial years of risk, likely driven by either internally motivated ratifiers aligning themselves with their peers and/or the ratifications of the newly created post-Soviet states. The difference then disappears until roughly fifteen years into the risk period when a statistically significant difference once again emerges between those states exposed to more and less social pressure from their peer groups.

Figure XI: CEDAW Kaplan-Meier Diplomatic Spatial Lag Survival Curve



Finally, while the CPED acculturation variable in the form of the colonial spatial lag was not particularly robust in the presented models above, the just discussed results for the relationship of time to acculturative effects for the other treaties gives an indication of why this might be the case. Generally the effect of acculturation seems to grow over time for the states subject to more social pressure. Given the CPED had a risk period of a mere eight years in this analysis, it is probable there was insufficient time for acculturative pressures to produce widespread behavioral changes. Nevertheless, even seven years into the risk period, one can see in Figure XIV that statistically significant differences between the higher pressured and lower pressured states are beginning to emerge. Inferring from the results attained for the other treaties, a scholar who repeated this analysis fifteen to twenty years into the risk period could reasonably hypothesize statistically significant differences would be seen between the two groups of substantive size at that point, assuming that acculturation does not function differently given the substantive content of the CPED with its relatively high breach visibility.

Figure XII: CRC Kaplan-Meier Diplomatic Spatial Lag Survival Curve



Figure XIII: CAT Kaplan-Meier Diplomatic Spatial Lag Survival Curve



Figure XIV: CPED Kaplan-Meier Diplomatic Spatial Lag Survival Curve



In sum, the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the spatial lag variables presented above seem to imply that acculturation is not simply a matter of strength, but also of time. With the exceptions in several cases of differences in the early years of risk likely driven by some combination of post-Soviet ratifications and internally motivated ratifiers aligning themselves with their early ratifying peers, there is a relatively weak to non-existent distinction between states subject to more and less social pressure in the results presented above in the early-middle portions of the risk periods. Substantive, prolonged, and significant differences between the higher and lower pressured states generally only began to reveal themselves well into the risk periods. This suggests that my acculturation variable is not simply capturing domestic preferences, as the effect of being a state with higher values in the variable is not stable over time. Furthermore, it indicates that scholars studying acculturation should be sensitive not solely to the quantity/quality of social pressure a state is subject to, but also to how long it has been applied. The optimal conditions for producing human rights treaty ratifications would appear to be prolonged and substantial social pressure.

4.8.0 Event History Analysis Discussion

Across the event history models, at least one of the spatially lagged reference groups were consistently statistically significant and substantial predictors of treaty ratification. In all models save the CPED models, the diplomatic reference group model performed much better than did the cultural (eg. colonial and linguistic) peer group models, which did not attain statistical significance in the models where they were run together with the diplomatic spatial lag. This is likely due to the diplomatic reference group being a much more precise and up to date manner of accounting for peer influence than the other two models. Both the colonial heritage and linguistic reference group models are artifacts of the era of colonialism. While some states may positively identify with their peers in the Commonwealth or la Francophonie (among others), it is both possible and probable not all states in these groups hold all their fellow members in high esteem. Indeed, these are not groups that states joined by choice (with the exception of the former metropole). To borrow from Wendt, membership in these groups is assigned rather than enacted. It is likely that this assignation reduces social pressure for group conformity. Whether one is a well behaved member of the Commonwealth or not, one remains a

member of the Commonwealth.[199] Indeed, this may also have the effect of encouraging well behaved states to disassociate themselves from these reference groups. If being a member of a reference group with a substantial quantity of rights violating members means being associated with some rights abusing regimes, rights desiring regimes may not attach significant weight to the behavioral trends in these reference groups.

In the diplomatic reference groups on the other hand, one's membership is necessarily the result of constant enacting of the appropriate practices. If one wishes to retain good diplomatic relations with another state, these relations will be harmed by deviant behavior. Unlike the other two reference groups, in the diplomatic reference groups agents must consistently align their behavior with the role assigned by their in-group peers to retain membership in that group. This likely creates much greater pressure to conform. This is reinforced by the results across the treaties (with the exception of the CPED). However as the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the relevant spatial lag variables show, this may have been a product of insufficient time having accrued for social pressure to induce behavioral change in the CPED's case. The diplomatic reference group variable also benefits from much more precise data (the weighting matrix is composed of more than a dichotomy) and is updated annually reflecting social change in the international field (unlike the static colonial and linguistic groups in which membership is largely static across time). In effect, it is a superior operationalization of the theory than the other two variables, and this seems to be reflected in its superior performance relative to them.

In respect to other theories, the results were equally illuminating. World polity institutionalism consistently predicts increased ratification probability at a 0.05 level or higher in the models in which my embeddedness variable was included. Despite my operationalization of embeddedness differing from that of Simmons as well as that of Wotipka and Ramirez, I was still able to find compelling evidence in support of the positive effect of embeddedness.[200] In fact, embeddedness performed far better in my models than those run by Simmons, who only found statistically significant positive effects for embeddedness in her models for the ICESCR,

[199] Barring rare and exceptional circumstances that generally solely result in temporarily suspended membership, or through a self-invoked withdrawal as occurred with Zimbabwe.

[200] My embeddedness variable did have noteworthy overlap with that used by Simmons. Both operationalizaitons relied on the ratification status of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Culture and Natural Heritage, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna. Simmons completed her variable using the ratification status of the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the total number of preferential trade agreements a state had, while I operationalized my variable with the ratification status of six further treaties/agreements selected for reasons detailed in section 5.1.2.

CAT, and CEDAW. However, caution is still in order in attributing the causal effect of embeddedness to some of the mechanisms offered by the world polity institutionalists. For instance, their claim that world conferences and meetings in human rights produce ratifications through their "articulation of global standards" to the assembled audiences of states should not be accepted without caution.[201] While conferences may indeed serve as "opportunity structures for the professional delineation of [global]...standards and their policy ramifications by diverse epistemic communities...[and] as moral revitalization sites for international norm entrepreneurs [to socialize states to the correct standards of behavior]", this may not be the sole causal mechanism that facilitates greater levels of ratification following the conferences. The upswing in ratifications may in fact be a product of the cognitive dissonance experienced as a result of policy diverging from the expectations of the state's perceived social reference group encountered at these conferences.

While I did not test the effect of conferences because the mechanism for a positive effect is so difficult to establish, my analysis utilizing the other mechanism posited by many world polity institutionalists, namely that greater levels of embeddedness (be it through international organization memberships, or experience in international treaty ratification) in the broader world will produce greater levels of norm consistent behavior, did produce results consistent with their hypothesis.[202] While my embeddedness variable does not account for international organization memberships (although, like conferences, these are problematic as indicators for embeddedness given that they are environments in which the social learning predicted by world polity institutionalists, but also the social emulation predicted by acculturation theorists, could and likely does occur), the above models demonstrate that even simple experience in international treaty ratification processes does seem to be a mechanism that has significant explanatory power in assessing treaty ratification behavior in the domain of the human rights treaties covered above.

Equally interesting is the fact a state's human rights performance is not predicted to impact ratification choices of any of the human rights treaties covered. This seems to offer some disconfirmation of the notion advanced by Simmons the "proximity of the treaty to the state's preferences" should speed ratification. If ratification follows from domestic preferences, the treaty content concerns human rights, and the state consistently safeguards the physical integrity rights of individuals within its borders, one would suspect the state in question has a preference

[201] Wotipka and Ramirez, "World Society and Human Rights," in *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy*, 314.
[202] Ibid, 315.

for human rights and higher scores in this variable should correspond with greater incidence of treaty ratification if the theory that state preferences on the subject matter of the treaty determine ratification. Of course, it is possible that states may have sterling human rights records across the majority of human rights areas but perform poorly in the one in question (for example, a state that does not respect the equality rights of women but endorses physical integrity rights). In such an instance, the Fariss human rights score may not be a good indicator of the state's specific preferences on that subset of human rights. However, one would still expect it to predict efficaciously for the human rights treaties in issue areas in which the state is genuinely socialized to endorse the rights in question, such as the physical integrity rights treaties covered. The fact the state's human rights record so consistently fails to predict ratification preferences in the models presented for seven treaties covering diverse subsets of human rights with varying levels of commitment required suggests the notion that domestic preferences are the primary determinant of ratification should be treated with caution and subjected to further empirical study.

The polity scores, on the other hand, fare somewhat better in their ability to predict ratification across the models. For the ICCPR, they are strong predictors of ratification and are accompanied by the positive effects on ratification that advocates of a domestic preference theorization of human rights would predict with substantive probabilistic increases of ratification in the range of 7-10% per positive step up the polity scale taken. The results for the ICESCR models where the variable didn't violate the assumptions of proportional hazards are similar, but when time variance is controlled for the substantive effect of the variable is lost. In the case of the CAT, polity scores continue to serve as statistically significant and substantive predictors of increased ratification likelihood in five of the seven models in which they are included. The hazard rates associated with the variable are smaller though than they were in the case of the ICCPR, ICESCR, and CPED, predicting increased probability of ratification in the range of 5-6% per step up the scale, as opposed to the larger 7-10% of the other models. In the CERD, CEDAW, CPED, and CRC models, the polity scores are generally not estimated as having meaningful impacts on ratification likelihood. It is noteworthy that with the exception of the CPED (which is limited by the very brief period it was open for ratification in my period of analysis) each of these treaties represent treaties guaranteeing the rights of specific subgroups. The CERD and CRC represent special protections treaties and the CEDAW represents an

equality rights treaty. The treaties in which the level of democracy is estimated as influencing ratification probability include several treaties protecting physical integrity rights (the CAT, and to an extent the ICCPR) as well as treaties that are generally concerned with enforcing general or universal rights (broad civil and political rights; broad economic, social and cultural rights; for the ICCPR and ICESCR respectively). Given that democratic government is often lauded as being the political form best suited for the protection of minorities from the tyranny of the majority it is interesting to see democratic governments are not more likely to ratify treaties protecting the rights subsets of their populations than are other governments. This is particularly confusing given breach visibility of some of these treaties is very high and states not committed to upholding equality rights can reasonably expect to be subjected to criticism for failing to comply. The CEDAW offers a good example of this, with CEDAW treaty commitments obligating states to:

> " embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle..."[203]

and to:

> "...take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women..."[204]

in addition to committing them to:

> "... accord[ing] to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals…"[205]

The CERD contains similar obligations requiring revision of national legislation and the guaranteed provision of specific legal and civil rights.[206] On the other hand, the other special protections treaty has lower breach visibility. With the exception of clauses guaranteeing protection from economic exploitation and certain legal rights in court, many of the enumerated

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[203] UN General Assembly, *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html [accessed 10 July 2019].
[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid.
[206] United Nations General Assembly, *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html [accessed 10 July 2019].

rights in the CRC are not readily apparent to observers in the cases of breaches, as they may occur in the private sphere or be subject to state interpretation of the clause. Given not all states in the world are providers of equality rights for women it is difficult to reconcile ratification of the CEDAW with an explanation centered on domestic preferences, given states are committing themselves to providing easily detectable rights they may not wish to grant to their female citizens. While states may (and do) attempt to circumvent such obligations while gaining the expressive benefits of ratification through the making of reservations, ratifying a treaty only to make reservations that are counter to the core rights the treaty advances is not consistent with ratifying because of one's domestic preference to do so. In the case of the CERD and CRC, there are far fewer states who would contest publicly the rights those treaties seek to guarantee children and victims of racial discrimination. In those cases then, the normative content of the treaty may explain the lack of difference in ratification likelihood seen between democracies and other states. In the CEDAW, however, the lack of difference would seem more plausibly connected to external factors (social pressure being one). The greater willingness of democracies to commit to upholding physical integrity rights is less difficult to explain, and is consistent with the expectations of a theory of domestic preference driven ratification.

Casting further doubt on the theorization the domestic level is the primary determinant of human rights treaty ratification choice is both the politically left executive and years remaining in term variables fail to attain statistical significance at even a 0.1 level in any of the above models (for any treaty covered). For theoretical reasons outlined above, the ratification preferences of the governing coalition of a state as well as the years remaining in the government's term should both reasonably be suspected to influence whether and when ratification occurs. But governments one would theoretically expect to be predisposed to ratification do not have a greater probability of ratifying any of the treaties on the basis of the models above, nor do governments later in their term appear more likely to seek the short term gains of ratification at the expense of potential long term costs that might be paid by political opponents if they lose office. Finally, the addition of the Judeo-Christian proxy for enlightenment values only attained statistical significance when predicting CEDAW ratification probability.

The domestic constraint variables have an equally spotty performance relative to the expectations of theory, with the exception of the legal tradition variable. The Parliamentary system variable did not behave consistently with the expectations of the theory that Presidential systems might be a greater constraint to ratification, with statistically significant negative predicted effects on ratification probability (compared to Presidential systems) in some of the models for each of the ICCPR, ICESCR, and CAT. It failed to attain statistical significance in any model for the CERD, CEDAW, CRC, or CPED. The level of federalism in the state in question also did not have the expected effect of delaying ratification (at higher levels of federalism), with no statistically significant results at or above a 0.05 level accrued in any model for any of the covered treaties. The sole domestic constraint variable to perform in a manner relatively consistent with the domestic constraint theoretical expectations was the legal tradition variable. States with common law legal histories were found to have (for the most part) significantly lower probabilities of ratifying the treaties through models 2-6 for every treaty with the exception of the CRC (and the models in which it was treated as time varying for the ICCPR). These results were not, however, robust to the addition of the strategic ratification, state human rights record, and regional ratification percentage variables, as the legal tradition variable failed to attain a 0.05 level of statistical significance in model 7 and 8, as well as the models in which a Judeo-Christian control was added, for all treaties except the CAT and CPED (where it retained its effect at a 0.05 level).

Moving on to the coercion variables, the use of IMF credits was never a significant predictor of treaty ratification behavior at a 0.05 level. If the models are correct, then if coercive influence plays a role in compelling treaty ratifications from fiscally weaker states it does not (consistently) occur through the mechanism of IMF loan conditionality. The ODA as a percentage of state GDP attains statistical significance at a 0.1 level in two of the ICCPR models, once at a 0.1 level and twice at a 0.01 level in the ICESCR models, once at a 0.05 level and once at a 0.1 level in the CERD models, six times at a 0.05 level and once at a 0.01 level for the CAT, and twice at a 0.1 level for the CPED. However, the hazard rates reported were not consistently aligned with theoretical expectations. While the two significant results for the ICCPR, and the three for the ICESCR carried the expected positive hazard rates (implying greater reliance on ODA increased the probability of ratification), in the three models to attain significance for the CERD and the seven to attain significance for the CAT, the results were contrary to the theory's

expectations. For these treaties, states with greater dependence on foreign assistance were estimated as being less, not more likely to ratify the treaties. Finally, the variable failed to attain statistical significance altogether in the models for the CEDAW and CRC. On the whole, the majority of the results to attain significance were contrary to the expectations of the theory, and the variable was insignificant altogether for two of the treaties covered. When it attained statistical significance in a hazard rate consistent with theoretical expectations in the ICCPR and ICESCR cases, it was generally below the conventional threshold of statistical significance. Thus coercion does not seem to have played a primary role in producing treaty ratifications on the basis of these results. Of course one cannot altogether discount the possibility of coercion occurring through channels not tested here, but these two particular variables represent some of the more common used operationalizations of coercive processes in the literature.

On the matter of regional diffusion, the results were highly substantive across all of the covered treaties. The diffusion literature has reported mixed results on regional emulation to date. The evidence for regional policy diffusion within the United States in the literature has been limited. While some scholars have reported effects for regional policy diffusions,[207] others have challenged these findings, or found null results when testing other policy areas.[208] Internationally, the empirical record is more favorable, with research having found competitive emulation in BIT treaty making and IMF Article VII ratification, and regional social learning in OECD state healthcare and welfare policy.[209]

While I did not believe it to be probable that decision makers were waiting on information regarding policy performance in peer states (as was the case in the OECD diffusion cases) in the issue area of human rights treaty ratification, particularly given the politically left executive variable in the above models had seemed to establish that left wing executives did not demonstrate empirically distinguishable preferences relative to their centrist and right wing

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[207] Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry, "State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 84 no. 2 (1990), 410.

[208] Christopher Z. Mooney, "Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Diffusion," *Political Research Quarterly* 54 no. 1 (2001), 107-117. See also, William D. Berry and Brady Baybeck, "Using Geographic Information Systems to Study Interstate Competition," *American Political Science Review* 99 no. 4 (2005), 515-6. See also Carol Ann Traut and Craig F. Emmert, "Death Penalty Exemptions for Juveniles: An Event History Analysis of State Policy Adoption," *Politics and Policy* 31 no. 2 (2003): 297-312.

[209] Beth Simmons, "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," *American Political Science Review* 94 no. 4 (2000), 821-825. See also Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons. "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000." *University of Illinois Law Review* 2008 no. 1 (2008), 277-281. See also Fabrizio Gilardi, Katharina Fuglister, Stephane Luyet, "Learning From Others: The Diffusion of Hospital Financing Reforms in OECD Countries," *Comparative Political Studies* 42 no. 4 (2009), 549-573. See also, Fabrizio Gilardi, "Who Learns from What in Policy Diffusion Processes?" *American Journal of Political Science* 54 no. 3 (2010): 650-666.

peers, I did run an additional set of models not shown above that included an interaction of the extent of regional ratifications and whether a state had a politically left executive. This was done to determine whether political predispositions influenced how they perceived the experience of their ratifying peers to have been, as seems to have been the case with the OECD states on unemployment policy. As I expected, I found no statistically significant effects for the interaction variable (substantive effects of other variables were largely unchanged), with one exception. In the case of the CEDAW, the interaction of politically left executives and the extent to which the CEDAW was ratified by other states in the region produced a markedly negative effect, with such states being estimated as being approximately 83% less probable to ratify the CEDAW compared to those with non-left leaning governments (at a 0.01 level of statistical significance). I am unsure what would cause this effect in the case of the CEDAW and not the other treaties, particularly given the Soviet Union and many of the countries in the eastern bloc were amongst the early ratifiers of the treaty.

On the matter of explaining the extremely substantive effects for regional ratifications more broadly, it is entirely possible that regional blocs represent less diffuse reference groups than those I have operationalized with my spatial lag variables. Each of my reference group variables, diplomatic, colonial, and linguistic, has the potential to treat states at great geographic distances from one another as peers. This is defensible if states conceive of their reference groups based primarily on cultural or social factors. However, it is also possible states conceive of their peers with reference to geography instead. If states are not only responding to social cues from culturally and socially similar states, but also their geographically proximate peers, this could explain the consistent findings of positive effects on treaty ratification across the treaties covered for both the spatial lag variables as well as the regional ratification percentage ones.

Alternatively, it is possible that there is an internal characteristic of states in certain regions that is positively affecting ratification that I have failed to control for. I find this alternative somewhat less plausible, as I would expect the inclusion of country level human rights scores (regarding the protection of physical integrity rights of citizens) as well as the Judeo-Christian religious majority variables to both proxy fairly well for acceptance of enlightenment values. Of course it is also possible that a specific and separate factor at the domestic level drives ratification for each different treaty (eg. state level attitudes toward gender

equality for the CEDAW, prevalence of racism/racist values for the CERD, etc), but I find this difficult to reconcile with the highly substantial and statistically significant finding for the regional ratifications variable across each treaty. If it is different national level idiosyncrasies that explain the vast increase in ratification likelihood based on the proportion of ratifications in one's region, it would seem very unlikely to find such strong and significant effects across every treaty. Furthermore, it is not a simple region variable, but rather the percentage of ratifications in the region to which the state in question belongs. Thus quantities in the variable vary across treaties and years. Whereas if idiosyncratic qualities of states (clustered in particular regions) are the cause of ratification these qualities would likely be subject to much less variance across time. Finally, it is possible the regional variance is a product of broader space for civil society and NGO activism to pressure national governments to ratify and the true cause of regionally clustered ratification is the varying abilities of these groups to advocate in different areas of the globe. Unfortunately, I was not able to attain data on the NGOs operating in each state across each year in the time period, verify the issue area they advocated on, and collect the necessary data to weigh these groups by their level/extent of their relevant advocacy work. In sum, I do not have sufficient data to confidently establish the mechanism that would explain this result, although the possibilities covered above would all appear to be promising avenues for future research.

Overall, the (material) coercion variables only attained limited statistical significance and did not consistently behave according to theoretical expectations. Some of the domestic preference and domestic constraint variables played a role in explaining ratifications in the above models, the quality of the democracy of the state in question, and whether the state had a common law legal heritage specifically (although neither of these were as robust as the external factor variables). Overall though, the results suggest acculturation theory can make a substantial contribution to our understanding of why states ratify human rights treaties. The proportion of geographically proximate ratifications also played a major role according to the models for each of the treaties, although whether this particular finding represents further evidence of acculturation cannot be established with the data available. Regional ratifications aside, the effect of the acculturation spatial lag variables alone do offer sound evidence of acculturative effects as they were consistently substantive across the models and were robust in additional models accounting for different potential violations of the proportional hazards assumptions.

5.0 Shortcomings, Implications, and Avenues of Future Research

While my empirical work has offered a large n analysis of acculturation theory across multiple major human rights treaties, which is something that has been lacking in this literature to date, it has some imperfections. The major shortfall worth noting is that as the spatial lag variables are neither exogenous, nor randomly assigned the evidence produced in favor of acculturation is correlatory rather than causal. There is still substantial value in the correlatory approach, as this is used in much of the literature on the subject and a lack of a result for the acculturation variables would have still disproven the theory, so the finding suggests at the very least that further work that explores (or at least accounts for) acculturative pressures in the ratification of human rights treaties is merited. For those interested in establishing acculturation from a causal inference perspective could either try to find a form of social network that is entirely exogenous to the treaty ratification choice, or operationalize social relationships between states in a way that is not entirely exogenous to the treaty ratification process, but find an exogenous shock that affects the network structure but not treaty ratification choices. While I do not believe the first option is particularly feasible, the second option might present an interesting research avenue for a creative scholar able to find a suitable exogenous shock.

While evidence of diffusion through the diplomatic spatial networks for each of the treaties may be indicative that reference groups may play a role in treaty ratification decisions, the question remains as to whether acculturative pressures solely facilitate ratifications, or also produce greater compliance on the substantive content of the treaty. Unfortunately, this question cannot be addressed by analyzing whether improvement occurs in the human rights scores of states suspected of having been subject to acculturation, as the alternative of unintentional non-compliance has been raised by Abram and Antonia Chayes. The Chayes observe states may be unequally placed to implement human rights reforms, precluding weaker states from doing so even if they desire to.[210] If the Chayes' assumption is correct that non-compliance with human rights treaty obligations is deviant rather than expected behaviour, then a simple analysis of human rights performance before and after the treaty may under report the influence of acculturation because while states may have a desire to comply, they may fail to do so for reasons unrelated to deliberate non-compliance.

[210] Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance", *International Organization* 47 no. 2 (1993): 178-83, 188, 193-5, 204.

In cases of noncompliance, the Chayses argued there are three reasons states might deviate from their treaty obligations. The first is over issues of ambiguity. The Chayses observe that "[t]reaties...frequently do not provide determinate answers to specific disputed questions".[211] When treaty language is broad and general there are a range of possible ways in which states might interpret their obligations. The second reason for non-compliance is capacity. The success of compliance depends on the capacity of the state to create the domestic regime necessary to secure the treaty objectives. When treaties involve affirmative commitments, the state may lack the capacity to see those commitments realized; "...[s]cientific and technical judgment, bureaucratic capability, and fiscal resources" are all necessary to make treaty commitments a reality.[212] Poorly endowed states may struggle to create effective domestic enforcement regimes, even in cases where they are attempting to comply with their treaty obligations. The third reason is temporal. Treaties may mandate significant changes in social or economic systems within a state and such change may require time for the state to enact.[213] Accordingly, case studies on states in which acculturative processes have influenced the ratification decision may be useful in assessing whether acculturative pressures continue to influence a state's behavior on the provision of treaty content or if they cease once the expressive action of ratification has appeased the state's international peer group. There is also value in further qualitative research on to what extent the quantity, quality, and duration of acculturative pressure on states influences their ratifications. The Kaplan-Meier survival curves produced suggest that all these aspects of acculturative pressure are relevant, but confirming this using case study research and assessing how such pressures interact with various domestic specificities could significantly deepen the existing knowledge on acculturation.

Despite the limitations outlined above, I believe my research has contributed to the study of human rights treaty ratification in several ways. I have demonstrated that a number of variables conventionally associated with producing ratifications in the literature are either not particularly robust to the addition of variables accounting for factors external to the state (the spatial lags, the quantity of ratifications in the region, measures of embeddedness). This suggests that in the future scholars will need to appropriately account for each of these alternative explanations for why states might ratify the treaties in their modelling strategies or their models

[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.

will likely suffer from omitted variable bias, undermining confidence in their results. While also correlatory in nature (ratifying treaties unrelated to human rights is not entirely exogenous or random to subsequent human right treaty ratification) I have found a consistent effect across the treaties for the effect of embeddedness, providing support for world polity institutionalism beyond the individual treaties such as the CEDAW that were tested by world polity institutionalists such as Wotipka and Ramirez. I have also outlined how future world polity institutionalist research needs to take greater care in the mechanisms they provide for ratification, since the method in which they posit things such as conferences or institutional membership might produce ratifications are also places in which acculturation rather than social learning might be at work. Demonstrating a positive coefficient and statistical significance for such variables is insufficient for proving world polity institutionalism is the mechanism.

Finally, despite the evidence being correlatory rather than causal, I have offered a comprehensive quantitative test of acculturation theory across a number of major human rights treaties. My results have not disconfirmed acculturation theory, and suggest further work on social pressure and human rights treaty ratification is in order. The analysis conducted also sheds some potential light into how and when we might expect acculturation to work, with states subject to greater levels of social pressure and states subject to social pressure for extended durations both more likely to ratify, with states subject to both being the most likely. Further I have demonstrated that not all social relationships are equal, with linguistic and colonial peers generally not producing the requisite level of social pressure on their peers to compel ratifications. Using the theorization of Alexander Wendt, I have proposed that peer groups in which membership is enacted rather than conferred are more likely to produce compliant behavior, implying future research on acculturation should be sensitive to this fact. A poor operationalization of acculturation that uses conferred group memberships should not be taken as proof of acculturation not having an influence on ratification behavior but rather as a confirmation states take less seriously socially those social peers who do not earn their social positions through norm compliant behavior.

Returning then to the anecdote that introduced my research question, the results I have found would suggest that Colombia and Jamaica's ratification choices were not randomly assigned, but were rather at least partly influenced by their exposure (or lack thereof) to social

pressure from esteemed peers. Colombia made its ratification without reservation, and its lack of objections to any reservations made by other states as well as the consistent reports that torture continues to occur in Colombia are suggestive that the ratification was not driven by social learning. It is equally unlikely that the continued lack of enforcement stems from a lack of comprehension of the requirements of the treaty, which are both regularly reiterated in the UN Committee Against Torture's reports on Colombia, and also seem to be implicitly recognized given Colombia's 2000 amendment of its criminal code to seriously penalize torture as a crime.[214]

While a number of the human rights violations in Colombia do occur due to a lack of state capacity to protect physical integrity rights in various parts of the country, the Colombian police and armed forces continued to violate physical integrity rights on a large scale in 2004. In that year, 281 complaints for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 15 for torture made against the National Police. A further 98 reports of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and 17 reports of torture were made against the Armed Forces.[215] The perniciousness of physical integrity right violations by state employees had not decreased the following year, with 306 complaints of physical integrity right violations attributed to the National Police, 104 to state employed prison staff, 75 to members of the military and 23 to individuals acting with "the support, consent or tolerance of civil servants".[216] Little had improved by 2010, where in its *Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Colombia* the UN Committee Against Torture noted the "incidence of torture in the State party remains high and shows specific patterns that point to widespread practice" and additionally observed that impunity for torture was "prevalent" in Colombia.[217] It is difficult to contend that the Colombian state has lacked the capacity to improve the culture and training of state employees 20-25 years after its initial ratification, and the long time period in which it has failed to effectively implement its treaty obligations would certainly render irrelevant the temporal possibility for non-compliance proposed by the Chayses. This would seem to imply that Colombia either ratified due to

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[214] UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), *Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention: Fourth periodic reports of States parties due in 2001 - Addendum - Colombia*, 21 February 2008, CAT/C/COL/4, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4efc535e2.html [accessed 27 July 2019], 19.

[215] Ibid, 20.

[216] Ibid.

[217] UN Committee Against Torture, *Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Colombia, 4 May 2010, CAT/C/COL/CO/4,* available at: https://www.refworld.org/publisher,CAT,,COL,4bfcef362,0.html [Accessed 27 July 2019], 3.

domestic preferences, although these were generally not strong or significant indicators of ratification when external factors were included in my models, or acculturative/regional pressures which would be consistent with my findings in the presented event history models. In conclusion then, while not causal, I have shown substantial evidence suggestive of acculturative processes, both in specific cases such as the United Kingdom's ratification of the Genocide Convention and Colombia's ratification of the CAT as well as my large n analysis of the ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, CRC, and CAT using event history models.

Appendix A: Reference Group Details

Table IX: Colonial Reference Group Memberships

Colonial Reference Group	Members
Austrian	Austria, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia
Australian	Australia, Papua New Guinea
Belgian	Belgium, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Chinese	China, Mongolia
German	Germany, East Germany, West Germany, Poland, Burundi, Rwanda, Namibia, Papua New Guinea, Micronesia, Samoa
Danish	Denmark, Iceland
Egyptian	Egypt, Sudan
Spanish	Spain, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, United States, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Mexico, Philippines, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Micronesia
French	France, Canada, United States, Dominican Republic, Mali, Senegal, Benin, Mauritania, Niger, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Republic of), Djibouti, Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Vanuatu
British	United Kingdom, Guyana, Hong Kong, United States, Canada, Ireland, Bahamas, Malta, Cyprus, Gambia, Sierra Leonne, Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Jamaica, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Somolia, Barbados, Eritrea, Dominica, Grenada, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, St Lucia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Belize, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Fiji, Tonga
Greek	Greece, Cyprus
Haitian	Haiti, Dominican Republic
Hungarian	Hungary, Slovakia, Czechoslovakia
Italian	Italy, Somalia, Libya
Japanese	Japan, Micronesia
Dutch	Netherlands, Suriname, Luxembourg, South Africa, Indonesia
Portuguese	Portugal, Brazil, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique
Russian	Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
Swedish	Sweden, Finland, Estonia
Turkish	Turkey, Albania, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Armenia, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Israel
American	United States, Philippines, Micronesia
South African	South Africa, Namibia

Table X: Linguistic Reference Group Members

Linguistic Reference Group	**Members**
Arabic	Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman
Burmese	Bhutan, Burma
Chinese	China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore
Dutch	Netherlands, Belgium, Suriname
English	United Kingdom, Guyana, Hong Kong, United States, Canada, Ireland, Bahamas, Malta, Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Jamaica, Tanzania, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, Somalia, Barbados, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Dominica, Grenada, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, St Lucia, South Africa, Namibia, St Vincent, Lesotho, Botswana, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Antigua and Barbuda, Mauritius, Seychelles, St Kitts and Nevis, Israel, India, Pakistan, Belize, Singapore, Philippines, Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Soloman Islands, Kiribati, Fiji, Tonga, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Samoa
French	France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Haiti, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Benin, Niger, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Djibouti, Dominica, Madagascar, Comoros, Mauritius, Seychelles, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Vanuatu
German	Germany, East Germany, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria
Greek	Greece, Cyprus
Hindi	India, Surinam
Italian	Italy, Switzerland, San Marino
Persian	Iran, Qatar, Afghanistan
Portuguese	Portugal, Brazil, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique
Russian	Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan
Serbian	Yugoslavia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian	Croatia, Bosnian and Herzegovina
Spanish	Spain, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama
Sweden	Sweden, Finland
Turkey	Turkey, Cyprus

Appendix B: Multiply Imputed Survival Data Correlation Plots, Descriptive Statistics, and Variable Distributions

My dataset contained a total of 7,666 rows. The data was formatted as time series data organized by state/year, with subsequent columns representing observations in my variables for that state in that year. Prior to imputation, the dataset had only 303 complete rows. As the survival functions in both R and Stata require complete observations, multiple imputation was necessary. Seven distinct datasets were imputed (M=7), wherein 7,363 rows of previously incomplete data were imputed. The number of observations imputed for the variables used in the analysis are shown below.

Table XI: Number of Imputed Observations

Variable	Number of Observations Imputed
Type of Government System	1502
Extent Federal	6950
Politically Left Executive	1597
Years Remaining in Term	2762
Common Law	480
Polity 2 Score	589
ODA by GNI	336
Use of IMF Credits	838
Fariss Human Rights Score	291
Bottom Quarter Rights Providers	291
Bottom Half Rights Providers	291

The extent of missingness in the data prior to imputation for the full date range used to impute is outlined below in Table XII and XIIa. Specifics on the percent missing prior to imputation in the years used for the analysis are provided in the subsequent Table Ia. Unlisted variables had no missingness.

Table XII - Percent Data Missing for data of all Years Used in Multiple Imputation

Imputation

Variable Name	Percent Missingness
Type of Government System	20.122%
Politically Left Executive	21.515%
Years Remaining in Term	35.887%
Extent Federal	90.539%
GDP (2010 USD)	17.457%
GDP per Capita (constant 2010 USD)	17.493%
Net ODA received (as percent of GNI)	6.159%
Use of IMF Credits	12.186%
Official Population	6.555%
Common Law	6.159%
Polity 2 Rating	9.269%
Fariss Latent Mean State Human Rights Score	5.511%
Mean Regional Human Rights Score	1.957%
Worst Quarter Violating Human Rights States	5.511%
Worst Half Violating Human Rights States	5.511%
Judeo-Christian	6.868%

Table XIIa - Percent Data Missing (in range of 1967-2014) Prior to Multiple Imputation

Variable Name	Percent Missingness
Type of Government System	19.593%
Politically Left Executive	20.832%
Years Remaining in Term	36.029%
Extent Federal	90.660%
GDP (2010 USD)	16.423%
GDP per Capita (constant 2010 USD)	16.462%
Net ODA received (as percent of GNI)	4.383%
Use of IMF Credits	10.931%
Official Population	4.774%
Common Law	6.261%
Polity 2 Rating	7.683%
Fariss Latent Mean State Human Rights Score	3.800%
Mean Regional Human Rights Score	0.013%
Worst Quarter Violating Human Rights States	3.800%
Worst Half Violating Human Rights States	3.800%
Judeo-Christian	6.953%

Table XII: Descriptive Statistics Unimputed Data

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	min	max	kurtosis
CPED Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.71	31.87
CPED Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.31	30.65
CPED Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.83	1.85	0.00	5.35	4.18
ICCPR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.56	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.06
ICESCR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.58	0.49	1.00	2.00	1.10
CERD Ratification Status	7666.00	1.71	0.45	1.00	2.00	1.85
CEDAW Ratification Status	7666.00	1.53	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.02
CRC Ratification Status	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
CAT Ratification Status	7666.00	1.37	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.29
CPED Ratification Status	7666.00	1.03	0.16	1.00	2.00	37.75
Type of Government System	6164.00	1.70	0.89	1.00	3.00	1.55
Politically Left Executive	6069.00	1.32	0.47	1.00	2.00	1.57
Years Remaining in Term	4904.00	2.06	1.51	0.00	7.00	2.25
Extent Federal	716.00	6.56	2.33	1.00	9.00	2.43
ODA by GNI	7330.00	0.46	1.63	-7.71	4.55	4.15
IMF Credit Use	6828.00	1.51	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
Legal Tradition	7186.00	1.30	0.46	1.00	2.00	1.74
Polity	7077.00	0.96	7.42	-10.00	10.00	1.32
Fariss Human Rights Score	7375.00	-0.16	1.46	-3.77	5.13	3.18
Bottom Quarter Human Rights	7375.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	1.88
Bottom Half Human Rights	7375.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.07
Regional Proportion ICCPR	7666.00	0.56	0.34	0.00	1.00	1.68
Regional Proportion ICESCR	7666.00	0.58	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.89
Regional Proportion CAT	7666.00	0.37	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.51
Regional Proportion CERD	7666.00	0.71	0.26	0.00	1.00	3.09
Regional Proportion CEDAW	7666.00	0.53	0.40	0.00	1.00	1.39
Regional Proportion CRC	7666.00	0.48	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.09
Regional Proportion CPED	7666.00	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.54	20.85
Mean Regional Economic Freedom	3386.00	6.39	0.88	3.69	7.67	2.68
Embeddedness	7666.00	0.44	0.28	0.00	1.00	2.20
CAT Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.75	3.73
CRC Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.72	4.32
CEDAW Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.61	3.45
CERD Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.87	3.25
ICESCR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	9.81
ICCPR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	10.11
CAT Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.42	3.64
CRC Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.43	4.06
CEDAW Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.41	3.11
CERD Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.53	2.25
ICESCR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.22
ICCPR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.33
CAT Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.82	2.37	0.00	5.16	1.14
CRC Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.50	2.45	0.00	5.44	1.03
CEDAW Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	3.37	2.24	0.00	5.22	1.72
CERD Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.47	1.26	0.00	5.25	10.71
ICESCR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.30	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
ICCPR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.29	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
Judeo-Christian Religious Majority	7133.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
Spatial Dummy ICCPR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.09
Spatial Dummy ICESCR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.07
Spatial Dummy CERD	7666.00	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	2.33
Spatial Dummy CEDAW	7666.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.05
Spatial Dummy CAT	7666.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.01
Spatial Dummy CRC	7666.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.17
Spatial Dummy CPED	7666.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	6.73

Table XIII: Descriptive Statistics Imputed Dataframe I

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	min	max	kurtosis
ICCPR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.56	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.06
ICESCR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.58	0.49	1.00	2.00	1.10
CERD Ratification Status	7666.00	1.71	0.45	1.00	2.00	1.85
CEDAW Ratification Status	7666.00	1.53	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.02
CRC Ratification Status	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
CAT Ratification Status	7666.00	1.37	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.29
CPED Ratification Status	7666.00	1.03	0.16	1.00	2.00	37.75
Type of Government System	7666.00	1.74	0.88	1.00	3.00	1.51
Politically Left Executive	7666.00	1.36	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.36
Years Remaining in Term	7666.00	2.18	1.62	0.00	7.00	2.48
Extent Federal	7666.00	6.41	1.65	1.00	9.00	3.59
ODA by GNI	7666.00	0.50	1.62	-7.71	4.55	4.18
IMF Credit Use	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
Legal Tradition	7666.00	1.30	0.46	1.00	2.00	1.73
Polity	7666.00	0.80	7.31	-10.00	10.00	1.35
Fariss Human Rights Score	7666.00	-0.18	1.46	-3.99	5.13	3.22
Bottom Quarter Human Rights	7666.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	1.85
Bottom Half Human Rights	7666.00	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.07
Regional Proportion ICCPR	7666.00	0.56	0.34	0.00	1.00	1.68
Regional Proportion ICESCR	7666.00	0.58	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.89
Regional Proportion CAT	7666.00	0.37	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.51
Regional Proportion CERD	7666.00	0.71	0.26	0.00	1.00	3.09
Regional Proportion CEDAW	7666.00	0.53	0.40	0.00	1.00	1.39
Regional Proportion CRC	7666.00	0.48	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.09
Regional Proportion CPED	7666.00	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.54	20.85
Mean Regional Economic Freedom	7666.00	5.89	0.99	2.28	8.04	2.13
Embeddedness	7666.00	0.44	0.28	0.00	1.00	2.20
CAT Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.75	3.73
CRC Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.72	4.32
CEDAW Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.61	3.45
CERD Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.87	3.25
ICESCR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	9.81
ICCPR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	10.11
CAT Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.42	3.64
CRC Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.43	4.06
CEDAW Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.41	3.11
CERD Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.53	2.25
ICESCR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.22
ICCPR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.33
CAT Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.82	2.37	0.00	5.16	1.14
CRC Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.50	2.45	0.00	5.44	1.03
CEDAW Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	3.37	2.24	0.00	5.22	1.72
CERD Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.47	1.26	0.00	5.25	10.71
ICESCR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.30	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
ICCPR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.29	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
Judeo-Christian Religious Majority	7666.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
CPED Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.71	31.87
CPED Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.31	30.65
CPED Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.83	1.85	0.00	5.35	4.18
Spatial Dummy ICCPR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.09
Spatial Dummy ICESCR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.07
Spatial Dummy CERD	7666.00	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	2.33
Spatial Dummy CEDAW	7666.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.05
Spatial Dummy CAT	7666.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.01
Spatial Dummy CRC	7666.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.17
Spatial Dummy CPED	7666.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	6.73

Table XIV: Descriptive Statistics Imputed Dataframe II

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	min	max	kurtosis
ICCPR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.56	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.06
ICESCR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.58	0.49	1.00	2.00	1.10
CERD Ratification Status	7666.00	1.71	0.45	1.00	2.00	1.85
CEDAW Ratification Status	7666.00	1.53	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.02
CRC Ratification Status	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
CAT Ratification Status	7666.00	1.37	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.29
CPED Ratification Status	7666.00	1.03	0.16	1.00	2.00	37.75
Type of Government System	7666.00	1.73	0.87	1.00	3.00	1.54
Politically Left Executive	7666.00	1.35	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.38
Years Remaining in Term	7666.00	2.12	1.59	0.00	7.00	2.48
Extent Federal	7666.00	6.39	1.66	1.00	9.00	3.61
ODA by GNI	7666.00	0.50	1.62	-7.71	4.55	4.16
IMF Credit Use	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
Legal Tradition	7666.00	1.30	0.46	1.00	2.00	1.74
Polity	7666.00	0.83	7.30	-10.00	10.00	1.35
Fariss Human Rights Score	7666.00	-0.18	1.46	-3.77	5.13	3.22
Bottom Quarter Human Rights	7666.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	1.86
Bottom Half Human Rights	7666.00	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.07
Regional Proportion ICCPR	7666.00	0.56	0.34	0.00	1.00	1.68
Regional Proportion ICESCR	7666.00	0.58	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.89
Regional Proportion CAT	7666.00	0.37	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.51
Regional Proportion CERD	7666.00	0.71	0.26	0.00	1.00	3.09
Regional Proportion CEDAW	7666.00	0.53	0.40	0.00	1.00	1.39
Regional Proportion CRC	7666.00	0.48	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.09
Regional Proportion CPED	7666.00	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.54	20.85
Mean Regional Economic Freedom	7666.00	5.91	0.98	2.83	7.93	2.04
Embeddedness	7666.00	0.44	0.28	0.00	1.00	2.20
CAT Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.75	3.73
CRC Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.72	4.32
CEDAW Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.61	3.45
CERD Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.87	3.25
ICESCR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	9.81
ICCPR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	10.11
CAT Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.42	3.64
CRC Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.43	4.06
CEDAW Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.41	3.11
CERD Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.53	2.25
ICESCR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.22
ICCPR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.33
CAT Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.82	2.37	0.00	5.16	1.14
CRC Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.50	2.45	0.00	5.44	1.03
CEDAW Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	3.37	2.24	0.00	5.22	1.72
CERD Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.47	1.26	0.00	5.25	10.71
ICESCR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.30	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
ICCPR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.29	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
Judeo-Christian Religious Majority	7666.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
CPED Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.71	31.87
CPED Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.31	30.65
CPED Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.83	1.85	0.00	5.35	4.18
Spatial Dummy ICCPR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.09
Spatial Dummy ICESCR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.07
Spatial Dummy CERD	7666.00	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	2.33
Spatial Dummy CEDAW	7666.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.05
Spatial Dummy CAT	7666.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.01
Spatial Dummy CRC	7666.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.17
Spatial Dummy CPED	7666.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	6.73

Table XV: Descriptive Statistics Imputed Dataframe III

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	min	max	kurtosis
ICCPR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.56	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.06
ICESCR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.58	0.49	1.00	2.00	1.10
CERD Ratification Status	7666.00	1.71	0.45	1.00	2.00	1.85
CEDAW Ratification Status	7666.00	1.53	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.02
CRC Ratification Status	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
CAT Ratification Status	7666.00	1.37	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.29
CPED Ratification Status	7666.00	1.03	0.16	1.00	2.00	37.75
Type of Government System	7666.00	1.73	0.88	1.00	3.00	1.52
Politically Left Executive	7666.00	1.36	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.35
Years Remaining in Term	7666.00	2.16	1.59	0.00	7.00	2.46
Extent Federal	7666.00	6.42	1.67	1.00	9.00	3.58
ODA by GNI	7666.00	0.50	1.62	-7.71	4.55	4.21
IMF Credit Use	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
Legal Tradition	7666.00	1.30	0.46	1.00	2.00	1.73
Polity	7666.00	0.82	7.29	-10.00	10.00	1.36
Fariss Human Rights Score	7666.00	-0.18	1.46	-3.77	5.13	3.22
Bottom Quarter Human Rights	7666.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	1.85
Bottom Half Human Rights	7666.00	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.07
Regional Proportion ICCPR	7666.00	0.56	0.34	0.00	1.00	1.68
Regional Proportion ICESCR	7666.00	0.58	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.89
Regional Proportion CAT	7666.00	0.37	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.51
Regional Proportion CERD	7666.00	0.71	0.26	0.00	1.00	3.09
Regional Proportion CEDAW	7666.00	0.53	0.40	0.00	1.00	1.39
Regional Proportion CRC	7666.00	0.48	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.09
Regional Proportion CPED	7666.00	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.54	20.85
Mean Regional Economic Freedom	7666.00	5.89	1.00	2.50	7.90	2.19
Embeddedness	7666.00	0.44	0.28	0.00	1.00	2.20
CAT Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.75	3.73
CRC Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.72	4.32
CEDAW Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.61	3.45
CERD Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.87	3.25
ICESCR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	9.81
ICCPR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	10.11
CAT Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.42	3.64
CRC Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.43	4.06
CEDAW Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.41	3.11
CERD Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.53	2.25
ICESCR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.22
ICCPR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.33
CAT Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.82	2.37	0.00	5.16	1.14
CRC Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.50	2.45	0.00	5.44	1.03
CEDAW Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	3.37	2.24	0.00	5.22	1.72
CERD Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.47	1.26	0.00	5.25	10.71
ICESCR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.30	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
ICCPR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.29	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
Judeo-Christian Religious Majority	7666.00	1.51	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
CPED Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.71	31.87
CPED Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.31	30.65
CPED Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.83	1.85	0.00	5.35	4.18
Spatial Dummy ICCPR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.09
Spatial Dummy ICESCR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.07
Spatial Dummy CERD	7666.00	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	2.33
Spatial Dummy CEDAW	7666.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.05
Spatial Dummy CAT	7666.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.01
Spatial Dummy CRC	7666.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.17
Spatial Dummy CPED	7666.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	6.73

Table XVI: Descriptive Statistics Imputed Dataframe IV

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	min	max	kurtosis
ICCPR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.56	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.06
ICESCR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.58	0.49	1.00	2.00	1.10
CERD Ratification Status	7666.00	1.71	0.45	1.00	2.00	1.85
CEDAW Ratification Status	7666.00	1.53	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.02
CRC Ratification Status	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
CAT Ratification Status	7666.00	1.37	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.29
CPED Ratification Status	7666.00	1.03	0.16	1.00	2.00	37.75
Type of Government System	7666.00	1.74	0.88	1.00	3.00	1.49
Politically Left Executive	7666.00	1.36	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.35
Years Remaining in Term	7666.00	2.17	1.61	0.00	7.00	2.53
Extent Federal	7666.00	6.40	1.66	1.00	9.00	3.66
ODA by GNI	7666.00	0.50	1.62	-7.71	4.55	4.19
IMF Credit Use	7666.00	1.49	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
Legal Tradition	7666.00	1.30	0.46	1.00	2.00	1.73
Polity	7666.00	0.80	7.30	-10.00	10.00	1.35
Fariss Human Rights Score	7666.00	-0.18	1.46	-3.77	5.13	3.22
Bottom Quarter Human Rights	7666.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	1.85
Bottom Half Human Rights	7666.00	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.07
Regional Proportion ICCPR	7666.00	0.56	0.34	0.00	1.00	1.68
Regional Proportion ICESCR	7666.00	0.58	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.89
Regional Proportion CAT	7666.00	0.37	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.51
Regional Proportion CERD	7666.00	0.71	0.26	0.00	1.00	3.09
Regional Proportion CEDAW	7666.00	0.53	0.40	0.00	1.00	1.39
Regional Proportion CRC	7666.00	0.48	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.09
Regional Proportion CPED	7666.00	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.54	20.85
Mean Regional Economic Freedom	7666.00	5.87	1.02	2.50	8.05	2.16
Embeddedness	7666.00	0.44	0.28	0.00	1.00	2.20
CAT Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.75	3.73
CRC Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.72	4.32
CEDAW Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.61	3.45
CERD Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.87	3.25
ICESCR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	9.81
ICCPR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	10.11
CAT Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.42	3.64
CRC Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.43	4.06
CEDAW Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.41	3.11
CERD Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.53	2.25
ICESCR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.22
ICCPR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.33
CAT Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.82	2.37	0.00	5.16	1.14
CRC Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.50	2.45	0.00	5.44	1.03
CEDAW Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	3.37	2.24	0.00	5.22	1.72
CERD Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.47	1.26	0.00	5.25	10.71
ICESCR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.30	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
ICCPR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.29	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
Judeo-Christian Religious Majority	7666.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
CPED Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.71	31.87
CPED Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.31	30.65
CPED Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.83	1.85	0.00	5.35	4.18
Spatial Dummy ICCPR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.09
Spatial Dummy ICESCR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.07
Spatial Dummy CERD	7666.00	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	2.33
Spatial Dummy CEDAW	7666.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.05
Spatial Dummy CAT	7666.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.01
Spatial Dummy CRC	7666.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.17
Spatial Dummy CPED	7666.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	6.73

Table XVII: Descriptive Statistics Imputed Dataframe V

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	min	max	kurtosis
ICCPR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.56	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.06
ICESCR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.58	0.49	1.00	2.00	1.10
CERD Ratification Status	7666.00	1.71	0.45	1.00	2.00	1.85
CEDAW Ratification Status	7666.00	1.53	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.02
CRC Ratification Status	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
CAT Ratification Status	7666.00	1.37	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.29
CPED Ratification Status	7666.00	1.03	0.16	1.00	2.00	37.75
Type of Government System	7666.00	1.74	0.88	1.00	3.00	1.50
Politically Left Executive	7666.00	1.36	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.35
Years Remaining in Term	7666.00	2.12	1.59	0.00	7.00	2.46
Extent Federal	7666.00	6.41	1.66	1.00	9.00	3.64
ODA by GNI	7666.00	0.50	1.62	-7.71	4.55	4.18
IMF Credit Use	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
Legal Tradition	7666.00	1.30	0.46	1.00	2.00	1.74
Polity	7666.00	0.78	7.30	-10.00	10.00	1.35
Fariss Human Rights Score	7666.00	-0.18	1.46	-3.89	5.13	3.23
Bottom Quarter Human Rights	7666.00	0.29	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.83
Bottom Half Human Rights	7666.00	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.07
Regional Proportion ICCPR	7666.00	0.56	0.34	0.00	1.00	1.68
Regional Proportion ICESCR	7666.00	0.58	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.89
Regional Proportion CAT	7666.00	0.37	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.51
Regional Proportion CERD	7666.00	0.71	0.26	0.00	1.00	3.09
Regional Proportion CEDAW	7666.00	0.53	0.40	0.00	1.00	1.39
Regional Proportion CRC	7666.00	0.48	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.09
Regional Proportion CPED	7666.00	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.54	20.85
Mean Regional Economic Freedom	7666.00	5.90	0.99	2.84	8.24	2.15
Embeddedness	7666.00	0.44	0.28	0.00	1.00	2.20
CAT Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.75	3.73
CRC Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.72	4.32
CEDAW Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.61	3.45
CERD Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.87	3.25
ICESCR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	9.81
ICCPR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	10.11
CAT Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.42	3.64
CRC Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.43	4.06
CEDAW Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.41	3.11
CERD Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.53	2.25
ICESCR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.22
ICCPR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.33
CAT Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.82	2.37	0.00	5.16	1.14
CRC Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.50	2.45	0.00	5.44	1.03
CEDAW Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	3.37	2.24	0.00	5.22	1.72
CERD Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.47	1.26	0.00	5.25	10.71
ICESCR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.30	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
ICCPR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.29	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
Judeo-Christian Religious Majority	7666.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
CPED Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.71	31.87
CPED Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.31	30.65
CPED Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.83	1.85	0.00	5.35	4.18
Spatial Dummy ICCPR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.09
Spatial Dummy ICESCR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.07
Spatial Dummy CERD	7666.00	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	2.33
Spatial Dummy CEDAW	7666.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.05
Spatial Dummy CAT	7666.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.01
Spatial Dummy CRC	7666.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.17
Spatial Dummy CPED	7666.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	6.73

Table XVIII: Descriptive Statistics Imputed Dataframe VI

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	min	max	kurtosis
ICCPR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.56	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.06
ICESCR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.58	0.49	1.00	2.00	1.10
CERD Ratification Status	7666.00	1.71	0.45	1.00	2.00	1.85
CEDAW Ratification Status	7666.00	1.53	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.02
CRC Ratification Status	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
CAT Ratification Status	7666.00	1.37	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.29
CPED Ratification Status	7666.00	1.03	0.16	1.00	2.00	37.75
Type of Government System	7666.00	1.73	0.88	1.00	3.00	1.52
Politically Left Executive	7666.00	1.36	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.35
Years Remaining in Term	7666.00	2.18	1.60	0.00	7.00	2.49
Extent Federal	7666.00	6.39	1.66	1.00	9.00	3.50
ODA by GNI	7666.00	0.51	1.62	-7.71	4.55	4.17
IMF Credit Use	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
Legal Tradition	7666.00	1.30	0.46	1.00	2.00	1.74
Polity	7666.00	0.81	7.31	-10.00	10.00	1.35
Fariss Human Rights Score	7666.00	-0.18	1.46	-3.77	5.13	3.22
Bottom Quarter Human Rights	7666.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	1.85
Bottom Half Human Rights	7666.00	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.07
Regional Proportion ICCPR	7666.00	0.56	0.34	0.00	1.00	1.68
Regional Proportion ICESCR	7666.00	0.58	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.89
Regional Proportion CAT	7666.00	0.37	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.51
Regional Proportion CERD	7666.00	0.71	0.26	0.00	1.00	3.09
Regional Proportion CEDAW	7666.00	0.53	0.40	0.00	1.00	1.39
Regional Proportion CRC	7666.00	0.48	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.09
Regional Proportion CPED	7666.00	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.54	20.85
Mean Regional Economic Freedom	7666.00	5.90	1.00	2.66	7.95	2.18
Embeddedness	7666.00	0.44	0.28	0.00	1.00	2.20
CAT Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.75	3.73
CRC Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.72	4.32
CEDAW Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.61	3.45
CERD Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.87	3.25
ICESCR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	9.81
ICCPR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	10.11
CAT Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.42	3.64
CRC Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.43	4.06
CEDAW Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.41	3.11
CERD Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.53	2.25
ICESCR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.22
ICCPR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.33
CAT Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.82	2.37	0.00	5.16	1.14
CRC Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.50	2.45	0.00	5.44	1.03
CEDAW Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	3.37	2.24	0.00	5.22	1.72
CERD Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.47	1.26	0.00	5.25	10.71
ICESCR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.30	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
ICCPR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.29	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
Judeo-Christian Religious Majority	7666.00	1.51	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
CPED Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.71	31.87
CPED Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.31	30.65
CPED Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.83	1.85	0.00	5.35	4.18
Spatial Dummy ICCPR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.09
Spatial Dummy ICESCR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.07
Spatial Dummy CERD	7666.00	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	2.33
Spatial Dummy CEDAW	7666.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.05
Spatial Dummy CAT	7666.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.01
Spatial Dummy CRC	7666.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.17
Spatial Dummy CPED	7666.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	6.73

Table XIX: Descriptive Statistics Imputed Dataframe VII

Summary statistics

	N	Mean	St.Dev	min	max	kurtosis
ICCPR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.56	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.06
ICESCR Ratification Status	7666.00	1.58	0.49	1.00	2.00	1.10
CERD Ratification Status	7666.00	1.71	0.45	1.00	2.00	1.85
CEDAW Ratification Status	7666.00	1.53	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.02
CRC Ratification Status	7666.00	1.48	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.01
CAT Ratification Status	7666.00	1.37	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.29
CPED Ratification Status	7666.00	1.03	0.16	1.00	2.00	37.75
Type of Government System	7666.00	1.74	0.88	1.00	3.00	1.50
Politically Left Executive	7666.00	1.35	0.48	1.00	2.00	1.41
Years Remaining in Term	7666.00	2.15	1.59	0.00	7.00	2.44
Extent Federal	7666.00	6.41	1.67	1.00	9.00	3.66
ODA by GNI	7666.00	0.50	1.62	-7.71	4.55	4.19
IMF Credit Use	7666.00	1.49	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
Legal Tradition	7666.00	1.30	0.46	1.00	2.00	1.74
Polity	7666.00	0.81	7.30	-10.00	10.00	1.35
Fariss Human Rights Score	7666.00	-0.18	1.46	-3.77	5.13	3.22
Bottom Quarter Human Rights	7666.00	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	1.84
Bottom Half Human Rights	7666.00	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.07
Regional Proportion ICCPR	7666.00	0.56	0.34	0.00	1.00	1.68
Regional Proportion ICESCR	7666.00	0.58	0.32	0.00	1.00	1.89
Regional Proportion CAT	7666.00	0.37	0.37	0.00	1.00	1.51
Regional Proportion CERD	7666.00	0.71	0.26	0.00	1.00	3.09
Regional Proportion CEDAW	7666.00	0.53	0.40	0.00	1.00	1.39
Regional Proportion CRC	7666.00	0.48	0.46	0.00	1.00	1.09
Regional Proportion CPED	7666.00	0.03	0.08	0.00	0.54	20.85
Mean Regional Economic Freedom	7666.00	5.91	0.96	2.99	8.00	2.00
Embeddedness	7666.00	0.44	0.28	0.00	1.00	2.20
CAT Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.08	0.10	0.00	0.75	3.73
CRC Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.72	4.32
CEDAW Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.61	3.45
CERD Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.15	0.13	0.00	0.87	3.25
ICESCR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	9.81
ICCPR Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.13	0.12	0.00	1.00	10.11
CAT Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.42	3.64
CRC Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.05	0.10	0.00	0.43	4.06
CEDAW Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.07	0.10	0.00	0.41	3.11
CERD Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.53	2.25
ICESCR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.09	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.22
ICCPR Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.10	0.11	0.00	0.44	2.33
CAT Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.82	2.37	0.00	5.16	1.14
CRC Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	2.50	2.45	0.00	5.44	1.03
CEDAW Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	3.37	2.24	0.00	5.22	1.72
CERD Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.47	1.26	0.00	5.25	10.71
ICESCR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.30	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
ICCPR Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	4.29	1.46	0.00	5.81	7.37
Judeo-Christian Religious Majority	7666.00	1.51	0.50	1.00	2.00	1.00
CPED Colonial Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.71	31.87
CPED Linguistic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.31	30.65
CPED Diplomatic Spatial Lag	7666.00	0.83	1.85	0.00	5.35	4.18
Spatial Dummy ICCPR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.09
Spatial Dummy ICESCR	7666.00	0.73	0.44	0.00	1.00	2.07
Spatial Dummy CERD	7666.00	0.75	0.43	0.00	1.00	2.33
Spatial Dummy CEDAW	7666.00	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.05
Spatial Dummy CAT	7666.00	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.01
Spatial Dummy CRC	7666.00	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.17
Spatial Dummy CPED	7666.00	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	6.73

Figure XV: Variable Distributions from Unimputed Data



Figure XVI: Variable Distributions from Multiply Imputed Dataframe I



Figure XVII: Variable Distributions from Multiply Imputed Dataframe II



Figure XVIII: Variable Distributions from Multiply Imputed Dataframe III



Figure XIX: Variable Distributions from Multiply Imputed Dataframe IV



Figure XX: Variable Distributions from Multiply Imputed Dataframe V



Figure XXI: Variable Distributions from Multiply Imputed Dataframe VI



Figure XXII: Variable Distributions from Multiply Imputed Dataframe VII



Figure XXIII: Correlation Plots of Variables of Interest from Unimputed Data



Figure XXIV: Correlation Plots of Variables of Interest from Multiply Imputed Dataframe I



Figure XXV: Correlation Plots of Variables of Interest from Multiply Imputed Dataframe II



Figure XXVI: Correlation Plots of Variables of Interest from Multiply Imputed Dataframe III



Figure XXVII: Correlation Plots of Variables of Interest from Multiply Imputed Dataframe IV



Figure XXVIII: Correlation Plots of Variables of Interest from Multiply Imputed Dataframe V



Figure XXIX: Correlation Plots of Variables of Interest from Multiply Imputed Dataframe VI



Figure XXX: Correlation Plots of Variables of Interest from Multiply Imputed Dataframe VII



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