The Enfranchisement of Non-Citizen Residents: Explaining Varied State Practices

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June 2018

A thesis submitted to

McGill University in partial fulfillment of the

requirements of the degree of Master's in Political Science.

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Abstract

The reasons behind varied state practices of non-citizen enfranchisement remain poorly understood and understudied. Prior research has identified national political processes and cross-national convergence processes as the two main explanations for different state practices regarding non-citizen suffrage. Some of these explanations have been found to work well in Western contexts but have proved to shed little light on divergent practices of alien suffrage in non-Western contexts. In the light of this gap, this study makes three main contributions to the literature on democracy and citizenship. It is the first empirical study that tests the explanations on a large sample of non-Western as well as Western contexts; it uses a new and improved methodology; and it examines the effect of immigrant proportions on a state's non-citizen enfranchisement policies. Using a Cox proportional hazards method for a sample of 60 countries between 1975 and 2015, this thesis examines the different explanations for the extension of voting rights to non-citizen residents. The results suggest a key role for national political processes within the Western states in determining policies with respect to immigrant voting rights, whereas explanations related to the effects of globalization on national policies are more important in accounting for different practices of alien suffrage in non-Western contexts.

Résumé

Bien que les pratiques étatiques d'émancipation politique des non-citoyens diffèrent, peu d'étude se sont penchées sur ces divergences et les raisons de celles-ci demeurent donc encore mal comprises. Les rares recherches sur le sujet ont pointé deux principaux éléments pour expliciter les différences constatées: le rôle des processus politiques nationaux et celui des processus de convergence transnationaux. Si certaines de ces explications se sont révélées pertinentes dans le contexte des pays occidentaux, elles n'éclairent cependant que peu la particularité de l'exercice du suffrage, et plus généralement les pratiques étatiques d'émancipation, des étrangers, au sein des pays non-occidentaux. Cette étude permet de combler cette lacune, contribuant ainsi à trois égards aux réflexions sur la démocratie et la citoyenneté. Il s'agit de la première étude qui vérifie empiriquement les hypothèses soulevées dans des pays à la fois occidentaux et non-occidentaux. Elle recourt à un échantillon plus large et une nouvelle méthodologie. Enfin, elle prend en considération l'effet des proportions d'immigrants sur les politiques d'émancipation des non-citoyens d'un État. Plus spécifiquement, en utilisant la méthode des hasards proportionnels de Cox avec un échantillon de 60 pays entre 1975 et 2015, l'analyse menée dans ce mémoire questionne les différentes explications entourant l'octroi du droit de vote aux résidents non-citoyens. Dans le cas occidentaux, les résultats pointent le rôle crucial de la politique intérieure des Etats-membres dans l'octroi du droit de vote aux non-citoyens, tandis que dans les contextes non-occidentaux, les explications relatives à l'effet des processus de globalisation sur les politiques nationales restent prédominantes.

Acknowledgements

There are many people I wish to thank for helping me to complete this thesis. My primary thanks go to Elisabeth Gidengil, who has profoundly influenced my thinking and supervised the overall thesis. From the beginning of this project, she has been an endless source of support. My thesis would be next to nothing without her contributions. I feel privileged to have had the opportunity of working with her and knowing her.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Leonardo Baccini for his extremely helpful comments, suggestions, and guidance throughout the course of the model testing process.

This acknowledgment would be incomplete without thanking Caroline Patsias who made this world a better place with her kindness and presence in my life as a mentor and friend.

I am also grateful to many friends, Ipek Mehmetoglu, Meltem Al, Dilek Sayedahmed, and Saewon Park for their support. I would not have been able to survive in my final year if they had not made my graduate life more enjoyable. Elif Tektas, Umran Gul Ayvalik, and Hazal Varol, are deserving of considerable thanks for their meaningful friendship and being next to me through all the good and tough times in life.

A very personal appreciation goes to Efe Gul, for always being there with his patience and support and to make me smile in times of discouragement and frustration. I have no words to express my gratitude to you, Efe.

I dedicate this study to my family, Sevin, Ugur, and Egemen Erdilmen, whose affection, faith in me, and encouragement to do something I really like has always been boundless. I know that nothing could have been ever accomplished, without you.

Preface

This dissertation is original, except where acknowledgements and references are made to previous studies, unpublished, independent work by the author, Merve Erdilmen. All chapters of this thesis and the data analysis in Chapter 4 are my original work.

I.   Introduction

The traditional conceptualization of state boundaries and citizenship has changed as a result of global and international processes. With the ubiquity of supranational organizations and free human movement, non-citizen residents constitute a challenge to the traditional understanding of the democratic polity. While traditionally only citizens were counted as part of a given polity, and hence, voting rights were seen as a privilege of citizenship, today we witness a "postnational" (Soysal (1994, p. 3) understanding of citizenship with the increasing claims and growing practices of enfranchisement of non-citizens (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Blatter, Schmid, & Blättler, 2017; Earnest, 2014; Galloway, 2001; Hayduk, 2004; Kondō, 2001; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). The recently emerging practice of allowing "permanent resident aliens" (Earnest, 2014) to vote in municipal elections in cities of immigration like Vienna, Toronto, New York, and San Francisco has brought scholarly attention back to a discussion of whether non-citizen residents should be allowed to vote (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Bauböck, 2005; Earnest, 2014, 2015; Galloway, 2001; Hayduk, 2004; Schrauwen, 2013; Siemiatycki, 2014).

The decision on the scope of voting rights reflects an implicit judgment on who is counted as a part of a given polity. Whereas the core principle of democracy is that those subject to the law should have a voice in its formulation (Bauböck, 2007; Beckman, 2006; Fox, Johnston, & Manley, 2016; Hayduk, 2004; Raskin, 1993; Rodriguez, 2010), migration and other transnational citizenship practices create populations within nation-states that are bound by laws over which they have no direct control.[1] Hence, failure to recognize the equal political rights of

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[1] The only focus of this study is the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents; however, this study is a part of a larger body of work on democratic belonging. Immigration produces two important groups of people who pose a challenge to the traditional conceptualization of democracy according to which only citizens who reside in the country are eligible to vote: People who are citizens but not residents and residents but not citizens are

resident aliens is inconsistent with the democratic criterion of inclusion. There is no theoretical

and normative consensus on the boundaries of the political community and democratic inclusion.

This is mirrored in wide-ranging state practices concerning alien enfranchisement. On the one

hand, there are some democracies still denying voting rights to non-nationals, like Germany,

France, Cyprus, Panama, and Japan. On the other hand, Scandinavian countries granted voting

rights at the local or provincial level to non-citizen residents in the 1970s (Aleinikoff &

Klusmeyer, 2002; Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Earnest, 2014; Groenendijk, 2008; Schrauwen,

2013; Tung, 1985). Meanwhile, Chile, Iceland, and the United States phased out the franchise for

specific groups of declarant aliens in the 1920s (Earnest, 2008; Escobar, 2015; Hayduk, 2004).

While some countries impose lengthy residency requirements, like the twenty years of

residency required in Lithuania, others, such as New Zealand, grant voting rights after the first

year of residency in the country (Bauböck, 2005; McMillan & Barker, 2014; Reilly & Torresi,

2016). There are also some specific citizenship requirements in order for resident aliens to vote,

depending on their country of origin. For example, European Union (EU) citizens can vote in

local or EU elections in any EU-member country, whereas third country nationals (TCNs) are

not granted the same right (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Groenendijk, 2008; Schrauwen, 2013). By

the same token, in some countries only resident aliens from specific countries, such as Brazilians

living in Portugal and citizens from Commonwealth countries residing in the United Kingdom

(Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, 2002; Bauböck, 2005, 2015; Earnest, 2008; Fox et al., 2016), are

allowed to vote. Last but not least, retraction of the voting rights of aliens is a phenomenon

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actually two sides of the same theoretical literature on the relationship between democracy, state borders, citizenship, and political rights. In this sense, although state practices regarding the extension of voting rights to non-resident diaspora members complements our questioning of the boundaries of political belonging, I chose to explain the practices of non-citizen enfranchisement as explanations for these two-related phenomena are not generally the same.

experienced in the United States, Canada, and Australia, which are well known as traditional immigrant-attracting countries (Earnest, 2008, 2014).

Considering the lack of consensus on the boundaries of the polity and the principle of democratic inclusion, there clearly needs to be more attention to why non-citizens voting rights are granted, or not (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Earnest, 2015; Schrauwen, 2013). Relatedly, this thesis asks three connected questions: *What are the reasons behind varied state practices of enfranchisement of non-citizen residents? Why have some democracies granted voting rights to non-citizens, while others have rejected this right altogether? To what extent can international factors explain domestic state policies?*

This study has two main findings: Overall, international factors, except membership in a transnational organization, i.e. the African Union, are weak determinants of domestic state policies. The boundaries of the polity are shaped mainly by concerns related to the nation state. Secondly, different factors are found to work differently in various parts of the world, suggesting the importance of geographical divides. While factors related to traditional state-society relations, such as judicial independence, are important in explaining why Western states extend the franchise to non-citizens, factors related to supranational institutions, i.e. membership in an international organization, the degree of political globalization, and vote-maximizing incentives, especially whether an election is upcoming, appear to be more determinant of the alien enfranchisement policies of states located outside the traditional West.

For the purposes of this study, the terms 'immigrants', 'migrants', 'resident aliens', 'aliens', 'alien residents', 'foreign-born', 'foreigner residents', 'non-nationals', 'non-national residents', 'non-citizens', and 'non-citizen residents' refer to the same group of people and are used interchangeably. All these terms imply the idea that the primary concern of the thesis is populations who fall outside of the legal category of citizenship but have settled in the host

society and have legal permanent residency. However, one term fits our research puzzle especially well: 'non-citizen residents'. This term best captures both non-citizen voting practices in the world today and the nature of the democratic principle of inclusion.

As most states treat residency as a prerequisite to be entitled to vote, the adjective "resident" evokes this legal requirement. States generally allow only those with permanent residency status in some form to cast a ballot in elections (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Earnest, 2008; Tung, 1985). Some scholars also define a specific period of time for non-citizens to be residents as a normative prerequisite to be granted the right to vote in the countries of destination. Blatter et al. (2017, p. 450), for example, specifically draw the normative line at five years of residency. Thus, students and temporary workers are not included in the definition of 'non-citizen residents'.

Similarly, since theoretical discussions regarding the boundaries and inclusiveness of democracy revolve around the people who are residents but not citizens, to focus only on "settled" or permanent non-citizens makes theoretical sense. As discussions of the democratic boundaries emphasize the necessity of specifying the subjects whose interests are affected by state decisions, a non-citizen who is not living in a particular country for a particular period is not counted as a non-citizen resident.

Relatedly, the terminology of non-citizen residents has two connotations: First, it refers to populations who are subject to the laws of the host country and, hence, qualify for social, economic, and political rights. Second, the 'residents' part of the term refers to the permanence of those populations in the destination country. These connotations distinguish permanent human movements from temporary ones. In this way, tourists, international students, temporary worker visa holders, refugees with no permanent residency, and populations who are authorized to stay

in the host-country's territory only for a limited period of time are excluded from the question of "non-citizen voting rights".

There are, however, several distinct categories of immigrants, the main distinction being legal versus illegal or undocumented immigrants. Other categories of visa holders include asylees, refugees, and 'non-immigrant' foreigners, such as students, tourists, and diplomats. Following Earnest (2008, 2014, 2015) and others' (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Bauböck, 2015; Hayduk, 2004; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016; Schrauwen, 2013; Tung, 1985) operationalization, non-immigrant foreigners are outside of the study's empirical and theoretical scope.

Prior research has identified national political processes and cross-national convergence processes as the two main explanations for different state practices regarding non-citizen suffrage (Blatter et al., 2017; Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Earnest, 2008, 2014, 2015; Escobar, 2015; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016; Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012; Pedroza, 2015; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). The national political processes thesis relates divergent non-citizen enfranchisement practices to various internal state mechanisms whereas the cross-national convergence thesis puts more emphasis on supranational institutions and the diffusion of liberal norms (Earnest, 2014; Janoski, 2010; Simmons & Elkins, 2004).

Some of these explanations have been found to work well in specific contexts, such as the spillover effect in Europe and South America, but others have proved to shed little light on divergent practices of non-citizen suffrage, such as the ideology of governments (Bale, 2008; Earnest, 2015; Eisenberg, 2014) and regional citizenship and nationhood trajectories (Escobar, 2015; Koopmans et al., 2012). Different studies have come up with contradictory results on the impact of the very same mechanisms in explaining the alien franchise, such as the effect of free judiciaries (Earnest, 2015; Koopmans et al., 2012; Lijphart, 2012) and the degree of integration

into the international market (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Escobar, 2015), mainly because the geographical span of the research was not wide enough to cover some less-studied parts of the world and their sample sizes were small. While many have tested explanations for the non-citizen suffrage in the Western context on the basis of the national processes and cross-national convergence theses (Koopmans et al., 2012; Rodriguez, 2010; Schrauwen, 2013), few have focused on the sources of non-citizen enfranchisement in non-Western contexts, especially in Asia and the Middle East (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Earnest, 2014, 2015; Hartmann, 2015; Kashiwazaki, 1999; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016). Moreover, prior research has typically been based on fewer than 30 countries (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Earnest, 2014, 2015; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016; Koopmans et al., 2012). A larger and more diverse sample may make it easier to produce some generalizations about the factors behind the granting (or not) of non-citizen voting rights.

Given this, this thesis looks at the causes of divergent state practice with respect to the alien franchise in both Western and non-Western contexts.[2] Testing the explanations in non-Western as well as Western contexts is this study's main contribution to the literature on democracy and citizenship. Furthermore, this research contributes to the literature on non-citizen voting rights by expanding the sample size. Combining five different datasets, I test both the national political processes and the cross-national convergence theses in a wider spectrum of democracies. I expand the sample by examining alien franchise regimes globally in sixty democracies. These democracies have been chosen on the basis of scores on the Freedom House Freedom in the World index between 2013 and 2017.

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[2] This thesis focuses only on non-citizen resident enfranchisement for the purposes of national elections, rather than enfranchisement at local and/or provincial/state levels. However, it is important to note that different explanatory factors may shed light on the varied dynamics of alien suffrage at the local and/or provincial/state levels, such as a city's familiarity with foreigners and multicultural policy experiences.

The main independent variables that the study uses are the proportion of immigrants, the partisan composition of the government, judicial independence, whether a country is a member of one or more of the three main international inter-governmental organizations (the European Union, the African Union, and the Commonwealth of Nations), colonial legacies as a facilitator of the extension of non-citizen suffrage, and international political globalization.

The time frame of the study is from 1975 to 2015. Earlier quantitative studies on the alien suffrage have covered a maximum of 35 years, i.e. Earnest's 2015 article, while others look at the impact of various factors on non-citizen voting rights for 28 years (Koopmans et al. 2012) or for 30 years (Earnest 2014); most recently, Koopmans and Michalowski (2016) look at the impact of different factors only in 2008. Extending the time frame provides an opportunity to measure if the effect of some variables, such as political globalization, have changed over time. The longer the time coverage of the study, the easier to solve the problems of right and left-censoring in the datasets (Box-Steffenmeir & Jones, 1997). The problems of right and left-censoring occur when two events that happened in different times are treated same. For example, we might have two observations, one that happened after the last time observed in the dataset (right-censoring) or before the study's time frame (left-censoring), and another that happened within the time frame, yet these events are likely to be treated equally in studies with shorter time spans. When the time span is extended, the probability of right and left-censoring lessens. A longer time span may also change the results as some of the independent variables may have become more influential over the course of time.

In addition to extending the range of countries and the time span, this is the first quantitative study that tests the effect of a country's immigrant proportion on the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents. Seidle (2014) looks at the impact of the foreign-born share of the population on local voting rights for non-citizens in Sweden, the Netherlands, and

Belgium, but his study is qualitative and focuses on local voting rights only in those three countries. There is no quantitative study that takes into consideration the impact of immigrant proportions in a country on the enfranchisement of non-citizens. This might be due to the difficulty of finding appropriate datasets. This thesis solves that problem by creating a new dataset on the basis of two immigration-related databases. Hence, another of the contributions to the study of alien voting rights is the inclusion of a new independent variable, a country's immigrant proportions.

Following Turcu and Urbatsch's (2014) work on the enfranchisement of non-resident citizens, I use a Cox proportional hazards model to explain the reasons for the different practices of non-citizen voting across 60 countries. This is the first empirical study of non-citizen voting rights to use a Cox hazards model. Previous studies have typically used a time-series-cross-section (TSCS) research design to account for the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents. As a Cox proportional hazards model makes no assumptions regarding the type of relationship between the variables, it may well provide different results than the previous TSCS studies. More importantly, a Cox proportional hazards model prevents the bias related to right-censoring and left truncation in longitudinal studies.

Thus, this thesis makes four overall contributions to the scholarship on democracy and immigration policies: the longer time span and larger sample size, a new independent variable that has not been used in earlier quantitative studies of immigrant rights, the application of a novel method that has never been used in non-citizen enfranchisement studies, and the finding that previously tested variables actually work differently in different parts of the world.

II.   Organization

The next chapter, Chapter 2, provides a detailed review of the literature on the challenges posed to democratic theory by the question of non-citizen resident voting rights. It goes on to review the two main theoretical frameworks that have been used to explain variation in the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents: the national political processes thesis and the cross-national convergence model. On the basis of these models, the key variables are identified, and six hypotheses are formulated. This chapter not only illustrates the importance of different schools of thoughts on the alien suffrage but also describes why particular lines of enquiry are worth pursuing.

Chapter 3 introduces the research design. The chapter starts with a detailed explanation of the five different databases that are used as well as the operationalization of the dependent, independent, and control variables. Following that, the Cox proportional hazards model and its fit to this thesis's research questions are discussed.

Chapter 4 presents the descriptive and multivariate regression results and focuses on the interpretations of these results.

The concluding chapter, Chapter 5, returns to the explanatory factors identified in the second chapter and discusses which ones are most important for understanding the variation in state practices. Here, I pay special attention to the implications of the results for the meaning of citizenship, political rights, state boundaries, and democracy today. Questions about the meaning of citizenship, non-citizen political rights and what the different implicit conceptions of the scope of the *demos* imply regarding the nature of democracy and democratic boundaries are addressed. This chapter also briefly summarizes the main findings of this study and how the thesis contributes to the scholarship on democracy, immigrants' political participation, and international relations.

<center>**Chapter 2**</center>

I.   Theoretical Overview

The main interest of this chapter is to understand (a) the ways in which non-citizen enfranchisement challenges the principles of democracy, i.e. the problem of boundaries, and (b) the theoretical determinants of divergent state practices with respect to alien suffrage. After presenting the problem of boundaries, I elaborate on explanations of variation in the granting of alien suffrage by focusing on two models: the national political processes model and the cross-national convergence model, as Koopmans et al. (2012) have termed them.

The boundaries of the political community, or polity, are seen as one of the main constituents of the idea of democracy and democratic governance (Bauböck, 2005; Dahl, 1989; Eisenberg, 2014; Rodriguez, 2010; Schrauwen, 2013). The scope of the suffrage is fundamental to the evaluation of democratic mechanisms today as non-citizens in many countries are the largest populations within nation states without the political right to shape the democratic process (Earnest, 2008). This leads to the problem of boundaries. The term 'boundary problem' was first used by Frederick Whelan (1983) to refer to the question of who are the people. It is thus related to the question of how we should conceptualize the political community or *demos* (Song, 2012).

The issue of voting rights for non-citizens is at the core of the problem of democratic boundaries. Since the French Revolution, states have typically granted rights to vote only to citizens (Earnest, 2008). The democratic legitimacy of extending the franchise to non-citizen residents raises important questions about the relationship between democracy, political

belonging, and voting rights, which need to be clarified (Abizadeh, 2008; Bauböck, 2005; Earnest, 2008; Eisenberg, 2014; Lardy, 1997; Owen, 2012).

Several democratic theorists have studied ways to solve the problem of boundaries and provided a normative basis for pro or anti-alien-suffrage practices. Dahl's principles of 'coercion' and 'all affected interests' (1989, 1990) and Bauböck's principle of 'stakeholdership' (2007) address various ways to locate the enfranchisement of non-citizens within the normative democratic framework.

Robert Dahl (1989, 1990) defines the boundaries of the political community in terms of the state territory, subjection to the laws, and lastly, having interests in the election results. The principle of coercion restricts the political community to populations who are bounded by the state laws. As the domestic state laws' validity is defined by the state territories, only those subject to the coercion of the state should have political rights to determine by whom they are governed. To draw the boundaries of the demos in terms of the state's coercive power provides a strong starting point to answer the question of "how is the demos constituted" (Song, 2012, p. 39). However, it remains ambiguous regarding the meaning of being exposed to the state's coercive power (Schrauwen, 2013; Song, 2012). Should we look at the number of laws that people are subject to? If so, how can we enumerate and compare the laws that bind citizens and non-citizens within the host state's boundary? I answer these question in line with Owen (2010, p. 52): "entitlement to a vote is not a function of the degree to which you are subject to government (say, the number of laws that practically apply to you or the significance of the interests affected by them) but of the fact that you are so subject".

The second criterion that Dahl proposes to solve the problem of boundaries is the principle of 'all affected interests' (Dahl, 1990; Lardy, 1997; Song, 2012). The people whose interests are affected by the decisions of the government should have a say over those decisions.

This principle has been criticized by a variety of scholars because of its over-inclusiveness and the ambiguity of the term 'interests' for determining belonging in a polity (Bauböck, 2007; Owen, 2012; Schrauwen, 2013). In one view, 'all' refers to anyone affected by the decisions of the government, which leads to critiques of the over-inclusiveness of the 'all affected interests' principle (Beckman, 2006, p. 154). Furthermore, Dahl does not specify the type of interests that need to be shaped by the government. What kind of interests are at stake? Economic? Political? Survival interests? Are these current interests, long-term interests or future interests? These questions motivate democratic theorists' call for better-defined boundaries of the democratic principle of inclusion (Lardy, 1997; Schrauwen, 2013).

Rainer Bauböck attempts to solve the problems of ambiguity and over-inclusiveness by narrowing down the scope of coercion and the definition of being affected. He suggests that the notion of the "stakeholder community" (Bauböck, 2007, p. 2420) clarifies the seemingly contradictory relationship between democracy and alien suffrage. Rather than assuming that the members of the demos have interests only in the outcomes of elections, Bauböck argues that the value of participating in the democratic process (p. 2422) should be taken into consideration in order to answer the question of who are the people. Bauböck also specifies the qualities of interests to be affected: "Individuals whose circumstances of life link their future well-being to the flourishing of a particular polity should be recognized as stakeholders in that polity with a claim to participate in collective decision-making processes that shape the shared future of this political community" (Bauböck, 2007, p. 2422).

There have been a variety of resolutions suggested to the challenges posed by non-citizen resident enfranchisement to democratic theory (Bauböck, 2007; Dahl, 1989; Eisenberg, 2014; Owen, 2012; Rodriguez, 2010; Schrauwen, 2013; Song, 2012). At the same time, many have also pointed out that the challenges posed by non-citizen voting cannot be fully comprehended

without a closer look at the main mechanisms that account for varied state practices of alien voting rights (Earnest, 2008). Hence, the following two sections discuss the two main models that have been proposed to explain different state practices with respect to the enfranchisement of non-citizens: the national political processes and the cross-national convergence models.

II.   Explaining Immigrant Enfranchisement

The national political processes thesis and the cross-national convergence hypothesis dominate the discussion of how the differences between states' voting rights practices can be explained. It is important to note that there are many region-specific explanations proposed by scholars (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Escobar, 2015; Koopmans et al., 2012; Rodriguez, 2010; Seidle, 2014), like the role of the Latin American Free Trade Organization (LAFTA) in shaping the alien suffrage in South America and the European Union impacting member states' policies toward non-citizen voting. These kinds of region-based explanations of divergent non-citizen voting practices fall generally under the scope of the cross-national convergence hypothesis (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Escobar, 2015) because regional practices and institutions are the main factors that bring about similar sanctions and principles in socio-geographically similar countries. Although it is relatively easy to categorize region-specific explanations under the cross-national convergence hypothesis, distinguishing clearly between the two main accounts for the alien suffrage remains harder.

Earnest (2008) warns us that the national political processes and the cross-national convergence theses are located on a continuum and can complement each other, rather than being contradictory theories. Similarly, Koopmans et al. (2012, p. 1203) point out the blurry line between the two models and emphasize the necessity of focusing on their distinctive features:

As is often the case in theoretical debates, the two perspectives come in different variants and are not always clearly demarcated from one another, and many authors combine elements drawn from both of them (e.g., Botecheva and Martin 2001; Heckmann and Schnapper 2003). Nevertheless, for heuristic reasons it is useful to emphasize the distinctiveness of the two approaches, because they imply different predictions regarding trends in immigrant rights and identify different causal mechanisms behind change.

The main distinction between the national political processes and the cross-national convergence models lies in what they see as the main drivers of different practices regarding immigrant rights. Proponents of national political processes look at how traditional state characteristics, such as specific forms of state-society relations and the development of domestic citizenship practices, affect the rights granted to non-citizens. Cross-national convergence theorists, on the other hand, put the main emphasis on the ways in which international organizations, norms, collaborations, and agreements shape state policies on migration. Koopmans et al. (2012, p. 16) refer to these international influences as "denationalizing pressures" because of the assumed erosion of state sovereignty on migrant issues.

Ironically enough, however, both the national political processes and the cross-national convergence theses see the state as the main institution that shapes how immigrants are treated. Yet, they conceptualize the role of the state differently in shaping migrant policies. While advocates of national political processes treat the state as the protector of national sovereignty and traditional nation-state relations (Earnest, 2008), cross-national convergence theorists conceptualize the state as losing its sovereignty and hindering the transmission of international humanitarian norms (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). A detailed look at each theory will hopefully

clarify the ways in which the conceptualization of state boundaries and sovereignty in a globalized world influences the political rights of non-citizens.

III.   National Political Processes Thesis

National political processes models explain divergent state practices with respect to immigrant rights on the basis of traditional political structures, historical state-society relations, and domestic interest groups. Studies of immigrant rights generally theorize the rights granted to immigrants as a bundle, rather than focusing on specific types of non-citizen rights, such as voting rights (Freeman, 2006; Joppke, 1998; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016; Koopmans et al., 2012).

Proponents of the national political processes thesis have proposed a broad range of internal political mechanisms, including contestations at the state level among societal actors and power groups (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; Cianetti, 2014; Freeman, 1995), party competition (Earnest, 2015; Koopmans et al., 2012; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014), left-right party ideology (Earnest, 2015; Eisenberg, 2014; Janoski, 2010; Jones-Correa; Sainsbury, 2012; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014), the amount of judicial freedom (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Earnest, 2014, 2015; Joppke, 1999; Lijphart, 2012), the degree of immigrant integration and associated xenophobic backlash (Earnest, 2008; Escobar, 2015; Freeman, 1995; Neuman, 1992; Raskin, 1993; Togeby, 1999), the composition of immigration flows and types of immigrants (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Cianetti, 2014; Escobar, 2015), country-specific citizenship traditions (Barrington, 1999; Brubaker, 1992; Cornelius, Martin, & Hollifield, 1994; Neuman, 1992), the framing of non-citizen enfranchisement as a policy issue (Jacobs, 1999; Pedroza, 2013, 2015), the immigrant share of electorate or the total population (Hayduk, 2004; Koopmans et al., 2012; Money, 1999;

Sainsbury, 2012; Seidle, 2014), and systems of government (federal versus unitary) (Earnest, 2014; Escobar, 2015).

Political development theorists like Lijphart, Marshall, Rokkan, and Hammar, collective action scholars, such as Joppke, Freeman, Money, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, and Caramani and Grotz, and lastly, political culture theorists including Brubaker, Escobar and Barrington have all contributed to the national political processes model. Each of these theoretical strands gives priority to different state-led factors that affect the inclusiveness of rights accorded to non-citizens, yet their main source for explaining variation in state policies regarding immigrant rights is how state-society relations have traditionally developed (Earnest, 2008).

The political development literature focuses on how state formation and nationhood took specific forms in different contexts and eras. Marshall (1964), for instance, explains the political rights of non-citizen groups as a result of claim making by immigrants who have already gained social and civil rights, but lack political rights. Distinguishing between three different understandings of belonging to a nation and citizenship, namely, civil, political, and social (Marshall, 1964, p. 10), Marshall claims that non-citizens first acquired formal social rights and protections, specifically labor-related ones. By the 19th century, he continues, the "principle of individual economic freedom was accepted as axiomatic" (Marshall, 1964, p. 17). Following social rights, all European states granted civil and legal protections to non-citizens, which enabled immigrants to make claims to political rights. Political rights are seen as the phase of belonging to a nation and citizenship (Marshall, 1964). For Marshall, political rights in general and enfranchisement in particular can thus be seen as a "secondary product" of already gained civil and social rights (Marshall, 1964, p. 21).

Other political development scholars argue that the enfranchisement of non-citizens does not depend on immigrants' claim making and is not necessarily preceded by social and civil

rights. The reasons for and the timing of voting rights are rather a product of each state's unique historical regime development (Earnest, 2008). Rokkan claims that each state's particular institutional development paved the way for divergent practices with respect to the extension of voting rights. The timing of industrialization, the subjection of states to empires, the dominance of capitalist classes, the strength of working class movements, for example, are some of the determinants of the scope of political rights and the political incorporation of different social groups (Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle, & Urwin, 1999; Rokkan & Torsvik, 1981; Rokkan, Urwin, & European Consortium for Political Research., 1983). As each European state has a unique history of state-nation relations, the political rights of different social groups can be explained by looking at the history of institutional developments. Tilly (1981) aptly summarizes the impact of particular institutional developments on political rights in Rokkan's work. He takes into account Rokkan's explanatory factors for the extension of voting rights and refers to them as "historical choice-points" (Tilly, 1981, p. 3).

In a similar vein, Lipset (1959) addresses the importance of states' unique trajectories of economic development and their impact on democracy and the scope of political rights. Specific paths of economic development change state-society relations and influence institutionalization, which shapes the timing and reasons for the political incorporation of non-citizens. Both Lipset and Rokkan criticize Marshall's "unilinear argument" (Earnest, 2008, p. 49) and argue that the timing and the main state-based-determinants of the alien suffrage are different in each state because of each country's *sui generis* history of institutional development.

Influenced by Rokkan and Lipset's emphasis on the historical relationship between the nation and the state, Hammar (1985) compares six Western European immigration countries policies —France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland — towards migrants. By specifically tracing the timing of state formation for each case, Hammar

shows that specific historical trajectories shape the nature of immigration policies, which are either inclusive or exclusive. States that precede nations are expected to be more pro-immigrant due to their less bounded definitions of nationhood. Conversely, establishing a state by demarcating the state territories upon an already existing nation is expected to bring more restrictive immigration policies because of the peculiar historical way through which state-society relations formed. Hammar further explains France's more inclusive immigration laws compared to Germany as a result of state-nation timing. In the case of Germany, the German nation, which is defined on the basis of common German descent, is claimed to antecede the formation of the state. In France, on the other hand, the state formed before the nation did and this temporal antecedence of the state over the nation led to pro-immigrant political development.

Some scholars challenge the power of political development theory to explain the voting rights of non-citizens. Earnest (2008), for instance, raises the question of how to account for divergent non-citizen suffrage practices in countries that have analogous trajectories of development. Freeman (2006, p. 242) and Koopmans and Michalowski (2016, p. 44) similarly point out that countries with a similar historical pattern of political development differ in terms of their immigration policies.

Collective action theorists try to answer Earnest's criticism of the political development literature: "How can states with similar political development such as France and Denmark take different paths to resident alien voting" (Earnest, 2008, p. 53)? They focus more on competition between various social groups, the political agency of immigrants, and the electoral calculations of parties. Freeman (1995), Money (1999), Caramani and Grotz (2015), and Koopmans et al. (2012) take account of the relevance of social cleavages to the extension of the franchise. They perceive state receptivity to immigrant rights to be a function of organized societal interests that

include a broad array of domestic groups favoring or opposing immigration and their relative power, such as business organizations, unions, civil liberties groups, and ethnic groups. Money (1999) finds that immigrants tend to reside in similar geographical parts of the state, which makes it easier for them to achieve and defend their political interests. This concentration of immigrants in the same location, however, creates both pro and anti-immigrant groups in different electoral districts. For Money, hence, the formation and location of pro and anti-immigrant groups can explain the reasons behind various alien suffrage practices. If the anti-immigrant groups are strong and large enough to constitute viable coalitions in the competition for political power, then immigrant suffrage remains less likely. From this perspective, the size of immigrant populations, immigrant levels and the corresponding social backlash are important influences on the varied state practices regarding the alien suffrage (Escobar, 2015; Raskin, 1993; Soysal, 1994).

Koopmans et al. (2012), Freeman (1995), and Soysal (1997) also point out the importance of a country's immigrant proportions as a counterbalancing factor to the pressures from various anti-immigrant social and political interest groups. The immigrant group might have political leverage in different actors' interest-calculations if a country's immigrant population is large enough to voice and defend its interests. Also, mainstream parties may adopt liberal policies to gain the immigrant vote, if immigrant-origin populations constitute a significant portion of the electorate. Commonwealth citizens and members of the second generation, for instance, make up a considerable proportion of the voters in the United Kingdom, which is argued to impact the interest-calculations of different social and political actors (Koopmans et al., 2012, p. 1207). Although the effect of the immigrant electorate on the rights granted to non-citizens might be expected, immigrants without electoral rights also significantly affect the immigration policies and rights in a country. The large size of immigrant populations makes them important agents in

society. The 2006 immigrant protests in the United States show how immigrants without voting rights can impact state policies (Menjivar, 2010; Voss & Bloemraad, 2011; Weffer, 2013). Immigrant populations marched for their rights in the spring of 2006 in Chicago and Los Angeles protesting against the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437), which then failed to pass through the Senate (Weffer, 2013). As there is no previous quantitative study that measures the impact of immigrant proportions on the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents, this thesis provides the first much-needed test of the hypothesis that the size of the immigrant population matters. This leads to the first national political processes hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Voting rights are more likely to be extended to non-citizen residents in countries with higher proportions of immigrants because political parties hope to gain their support.

Like Money, Soysal, and Koopmans et al., Freeman (1995) focuses on various domestic groups' interests with respect to immigrants and finds them to be the main determinants of whether immigrants are granted voting rights. The most significant group that supports the presence of and rights for immigrants in host countries has been labor unions, Freeman states (1995, p. 888). Likewise, Caramani and Grotz (2015) and Koopmans et al. (2012) point out the importance of social cleavages and their associated interests for the scope of rights accorded to non-citizen residents. Although both Caramani and Grotz, and Koopmans et al. find that the interests of relevant actors impact the scope of political rights, their regional focuses are different. While Caramani and Grotz provide more insights into non-Western contexts, Koopmans at el. illustrate the driving mechanisms behind the alien suffrage in Western countries. The interests of relevant actors are found to shed light on relatively more inclusive immigrant political right practices in Latin America and Western Europe. Hence, the vitality of

organized social interests is found to be significant for a variety of collective action theorists in explaining the alien suffrage.

Political parties are also interpreted as special societal actors that shape the boundaries of political membership. A group of collective action scholars seeks to understand if party ideology has an impact on the state's reaction to immigrants' political rights claims. Specifically, scholars of democracy have pointed to the importance of the ideological composition of the government for a state's immigration policies (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Arrighi & Lafleur, 2017; Bird, Saalfeld, & Wüst, 2011; Cianetti, 2014; Earnest, 2014, 2015; Hammar, 1990; Howard, 2005; Joppke, 2003; Koopmans et al., 2012; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). The expectation has been that there will be differences between left-leaning and right-leaning governments' policies toward non-citizens.

Joppke (2007), Tung (1985), and Koopmans et al. (2012) believe that left-leaning parties advocate more for liberalizing immigration policies and the extension of the electorate. Leftist support of the alien suffrage can be explained both by the left's expected electoral gains if immigrants are enfranchised and "the leftist ideology of international solidarity in which both native and immigrant workers are seen as part of a common working class suppressed by a dominant capitalist class (Rath 1990: 142)" (Jacobs, 1999, p. 655). In a similar vein, Joppke explains why left-leaning governments might be more likely to enfranchise non-citizens: "The political left, true to its universalist vocation, generally supports de-ethnicized citizenship rules, which lower the threshold of citizenship acquisition for immigrants" (Joppke, 2003, pp. 431-432). Given that leftist ideology favors liberal views on social policy (Benoit & Laver, 2006, p. 150) and is against social inequality (Jacobs, 1999; Rath, 1990), it can be expected that states with left-leaning governments will tend to grant voting rights to non-citizens. However, while some scholars have found that states with left-leaning governments are more open to according

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more generous rights to immigrants than states with right-leaning governments (Bale, 2008; Bird et al., 2011; Earnest, 2015; Freeman, 1995; Hammar, 1990), others have found that party competition to attract voters is more important than party ideology (Earnest, 2014; Jacobs, 2001; Tung, 1985).

Jacobs (2001) and Earnest (2014) have argued that electoral competition affects parties' policy choices. If immigrants are seen as an important potential bloc of voters, parties may treat citizenship and voting rights as electoral tactics, regardless of their ideology (Earnest, 2014). Jacobs (1999), for example, shows how the enfranchisement of non-nationals was initially a left-wing political demand but was supported by right-wing parties as well because of expected electoral gains. Cianetti (2014) similarly illustrates how the right supported the non-citizen suffrage in Estonia for the purposes of broadening their electorate. Others prioritize the strength of anti-immigrant parties over left-right ideology in shedding light on varied state practices with respect to non-citizen voting rights. According to Bale (2008) and Eisenberg (2014), support for anti-immigrant parties is the main determinant of the scope of rights accorded to non-citizens in Europe.[3]

Interestingly enough, Earnest has found two contradictory results regarding the effect of the partisan composition of the government in two consecutive studies (Earnest, 2014, 2015). While his 2014 study showed that left-leaning governments are less likely to grant voting rights to alien residents, his 2015 study, which focuses on the same twenty-five, mainly European,

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[3] This study does not take account of radical right-wing parties' impact on the enfranchisement of non-citizens for two main reasons: First, the significance of anti-immigrant parties for the non-citizen suffrage is a highly Western phenomenon. The literature on the radical right's impact on immigration policies is based on Europe, leaving the impact of these parties in question for non-Western parts of the world. Latin American countries, for example, are still welcoming and in need of more immigrants for economic development, suggesting that it will be difficult for anti-immigrant political tendencies to gain support. Second, the rising importance of radical anti-immigrant parties in the West is a relatively new phenomenon. Before the 2000s, many of today's anti-immigrant states, such as Hungary, did not have anti-immigrant parties with substantial vote shares. As this study looks at 40 years, including a variable that is only relevant for the last 15 years of the period would bias the results.

countries over a longer time span, found that left-leaning governments tend to enfranchise non-citizens more than right-leaning governments. The 2014 study covers the years between 1975 and 2005, whereas the 2015 article's time span is from 1975 to 2010. The five-years-longer time span might have affected the outcome of the tests as some Eastern European countries passed the law that grants voting rights to third country residents in the EU after 2005. There is no consensus, then, among scholars regarding the impact of the ideological composition of the government on the alien suffrage. However, this explanation needs to be tested in a wider array of countries for a longer time period. This study covers sixty countries for forty years. Drawing on the literature which suggests that the majority of the governments that granted voting rights to non-citizens were leftist governments (Bird et al., 2011; Earnest, 2008; Koopmans et al., 2012), I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2: Left-leaning governments are more likely to enfranchise non-citizens than right-leaning governments.

Other collective action theorists point to the relevance of immigrant sources and types of immigrants for enfranchisement policies, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean. Earnest (2008), Cianetti (2014), and Escobar (2015) use the composition of immigrant groups as an explanatory variable in their studies. They find that governments prioritize some groups of immigrants and immigrant types over others. European immigrants in Latin America in the nineteenth and twentieth century were prioritized over South American immigrants (Escobar, 2015). Similarly, the Russian speaking populations in Estonia are treated better by the Estonian government in comparison with a similar population in Latvia (Cianetti, 2014), because Russians in Estonia compose a qualified workforce. The retraction of immigrant voting rights in the U.S.

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has also been tied to the changing composition of immigrant flows in the late nineteenth century (Earnest, 2008; Hayduk, 2004; Raskin, 1993).

To be more specific, Escobar (2015) addresses different practices of immigrant suffrage in the Americas and the role of various immigrant sources. The early enfranchisement of non-citizen residents in Chile in 1925 and Uruguay in 1934 in comparison with no voting rights for immigrants in geographically and culturally similar countries, like Mexico, is explained by the composition of immigrant populations in each country. Residents in Chile and Uruguay in the twentieth century were generally from Western Europe and both countries greatly benefitted from the qualified work force of European immigrants and their high socio-economic status. Hence, the governments provided more inclusive rights to non-citizens to attract them (Escobar, 2015, p. 943). In contrast to the "desired" European immigrants in Chile and Uruguay, non-citizen populations in Mexico were generally coming from neighboring countries with the purpose of moving to the United States. The transitory nature of these large immigrant populations is assumed to have hindered the Mexican state's consideration of more inclusive immigration policies. Additionally, the immigrants in Mexico were not as desirable as the ones in other Latin American countries, because they did not constitute a quality workforce (Escobar, 2015).

Another branch of the literature on collective action focuses on the impact of national constitutional regimes and courts on immigrants' political rights. Scholars, such as Joppke, Cornelius and Hollfield, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, Hollifield, and Triandafyllidou, argue that courts can shape the scope of the *demos*. Domestic, as well as universal human-rights-based, opportunities and interests shape the ways in which national courts consider the extension of political rights and protections to non-citizen residents. Joppke (1999) sees courts as the main social group that defends the political rights of immigrants. He illustrates how Western

democracies exhibit a "rights-based liberalism" (1998), manifested in particular by the "court-driven liberalization" (1999) of immigration, whereby powerful independent judiciaries liberalize immigrant rights. Arrighi and Lafleur (2017, p. 627) similarly explain the role of national courts in shaping the extension of voting rights as "the epistemic community of lawyers who acted as the guardians of liberal principles of democratic states". Cornelius et al. (1994) and Earnest (2008) also argue for the liberalizing role of courts' collective action opportunities in shaping immigration policies in general and immigrants' rights specifically. Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2002), in particular, have argued that strong judiciaries have a liberalizing effect on alien rights. Judiciaries have been found to enforce human rights norms and to be more receptive to immigrants' claims, whereas legislatures have proved to be more restrictive regarding immigrant rights (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, 2001; Earnest, 2015; Lijphart, 2012).

In some countries, however, courts acted contrary to the theoretical expectations of collective action scholars. Courts in France (Earnest, 2008), Japan (Kashiwazaki, 1999), Germany (Guild, Groenendijk, & Carrera, 2009; Neuman, 1992), and Greece (Arrighi & Lafleur, 2017; Koopmans et al., 2012; Triandafyllidou, 2014) blocked the non-citizen suffrage. Earnest (2015) reported, contrary to theoretical expectations, that strong judiciaries can actually hinder the rights of non-citizens (p. 866). In the case of non-citizen enfranchisement initiatives in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein in Germany, for example, the courts obstructed the proposed change in voting rights (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, 2002; Brubaker, 1992; Neuman, 1992). Clearly, there is no agreement yet regarding whether the courts have a liberalizing effect on the enfranchisement of immigrants. However, a broad range of scholars argue for the direct impact of the judiciary system and judicial independence on the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents.

Although the larger question of judiciaries' liberalizing impact on migrant rights in general is beyond the scope of the proposed thesis, the liberalizing role of the courts may explain why migrants have the right to vote in some countries. If judiciaries do have a tendency to liberalize migrants' rights, including political rights, one would expect countries with independent judiciaries to act in favor of a common set of rights for non-citizens. This leads to Hypothesis 3:

Hypothesis 3: Democracies with independent judicial systems are more likely to enfranchise non-citizens than are democracies with weak judiciaries.

Political culture is another significant influence on immigration policies. Unlike political development and collective action scholars, political culture theorists depend on different socio-political definitions of the citizenry, the nation, and the state. Cultural conceptualizations of citizenship, the nation, and the state not only represent how historical understanding of the components of the state have been shaped, they also illustrate how today's citizenship and immigration policies have been influenced by these cultural variables. Brubaker (1992), for example, makes a distinction between two different understandings of citizenship: birthright citizenship (*jus soli*) and citizenship by ancestry/blood/descent (*jus sanguinis*) to illustrate different immigration and citizenship policies in two European countries.

Whereas Hammar (1985) used France and Germany as cases to illustrate the relevance of historical political development for immigration policies, Brubaker chooses the same cases to evaluate a different explanation for varied immigration policies. According to Brubaker (1992), France's higher naturalization rates can be explained by focusing on each states' different cultural definitions of citizenship. France has a tradition of citizenship by birth and so any person who is born on French soil is eligible to hold citizenship status, but in Germany the only path to

citizenship is to have German ancestors (*jus sanguinis*). In France, nationality depends on the place of birth, rather than the citizenry of the parents. The German state and people, on the other hand, define their national identities and citizenship policies on the basis of having a common ancestry (Calhoun, 2002; Martin, 2014, p. 227). How each state and its people culturally construct their national identities is assumed to directly influence these different citizenship traditions. *Jus soli* states are found to be more likely to adopt liberal migration policies and grant easier access to citizenship, whereas *jus sanguinis* states are claimed to be restrictive in both respects. Although most jurisdictions today adopt citizenship laws involving combinations of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* principles, the main distinction between different nationality traditions sheds light on the ways through which culturally defined understandings of citizenship impact migration policies.

Barrington (1999), Stepan (1994), Caramani and Grotz (2015), and Escobar (2015) similarly point out the importance of various cultural understandings of the link between state and nation. Comparing citizenship policies in the Baltic states, Barrington asserts that there are different conceptualizations of the state that affect how states formulate the inclusiveness of their citizenship and immigration laws. He proposes two important factors that shape immigration practices. The first is if the national identity is defined on the basis of a common ethnic identity or political territorial identity, which is named "a civic idea of the nation" (Barrington, 1999, p. 279). The second factor is different national and state identity formations. Estonia and Latvia are two of many countries where the state is defined on the basis of a shared common understanding of nationhood. The Estonian government's policies of excluding non-ethnically-Estonian populations, mainly Russian speaking minorities, from citizenship rights has been attributed to the Estonian state's national self-definition (Barrington, 1999; Stepan, 1994). Lithuania and Ukraine, by contrast, are states that define themselves multiethnically. Barrington (1999) notes

the Lithuanian Department of Nationalities' Vice-Director Severinas Vaitiekus' words regarding the Lithuanian state's cultural self-identification: "In our blood we have no such idea of 'Lithuania for Lithuanians.' Our history taught people to live together in a multicultural society" (p. 281). By comparing how different nation and state identities shape the inclusiveness of the *demos*, Barrington concludes that different constructions of national (ethnic versus political) and state (national versus multinational) identities are important influences on migration policies and laws.

This study does not look at the impact of citizenship traditions on the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents since there is no dataset that classifies citizenship traditions. Another difficulty in using citizenship traditions and specific situational and historical factors that shape state formation as a hypothesis to be tested is the fact that citizenship traditions in non-Western contexts are more diverse than the *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* traditions of the West. Koopmans and Michalowski (2016) address this problem and acknowledge that only a couple of non-Western countries were formed on the basis of clear territorial boundaries, secessionist movements, or wars of national unification. They state that "Virtually all non-European countries resulted from independence movements that did not challenge the haphazardly drawn territorial boundaries that resulted from the vagaries of competition among the colonial powers (Austen, 2004)" (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016, p. 44).

All these subtypes of the national political processes model see the relationship between the state, the nation, and citizenship as the source of current immigration policies and the scope of immigrant rights. Just as citizenship laws, naturalization policies, the rights accorded to non-citizen residents, and state identities reflect specific trajectories of state and nationhood, similarly, global humanitarian norms, international organizations (IOs) and international non-governmental organizations' (INGOs) pressures on nation-states, and the importance of the

status of the state in the international arena can tell us much about why states have implemented varied alien suffrage practices. Although the state is still the only body that decides the scope of the political rights granted to non-citizens and the state territory lays the groundwork for any kind of rights of residents and citizens, this "hegemony of the nationalist logic" (Earnest, 2008, p. 50) has been accepted to eroded by globalization and transnational processes. This shift from the dominance of state-based explanations regarding immigrant policies paves the way for the relevance of the cross-national convergence model for explaining non-citizen enfranchisement.

IV. Cross-National Convergence Thesis

Unlike the national political processes thesis, the cross-national convergence model focuses on supranational socio-economic, political, and cultural transformations. The role of globalization, international organizations (IOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), international humanitarian values and norms, and socio-economic, political, and cultural collaboration between states are seen as having eroded the traditional nation-based conceptualization of the citizenry. Proponents of the cross-national convergence model expect to find a convergence between states' responses to immigrants. A common set of liberalized immigrant policies in different parts of the globe would reflect the erosion of the traditional conceptualizations of the state and citizenry. This section first illustrates the main emphasis of the cross-national convergence model, then discusses the different subsets of the model, and derives three hypotheses based on the cross-national convergence thesis.

Castles and Davidson (2000) define globalization as a process of:

… the formation of regional economies and markets characterized by the free movement of capital, goods, and labor across nation-states' borders, the development of supra-

national institutions and legal norms to regulate economic and political relations, the growing significance of democracy and human rights as near-universal norms of governance in the international community, and the emergence of a global commitment to a common set of values and standards of the Good as a result of global information transfer and cross-cultural awareness. (p. 4)

Similar to Castles and Davidson's (2000) emphasis on the increasing connectedness of the world, the cross national convergence thesis has grown in importance with the rise of transnationalism (Earnest, 2015; Rodriguez, 2010; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). The proponents of the cross-national convergence thesis have been critical of the exclusive focus on the role of national political processes. The traditional understanding of the nation-state and political belonging only in the form of citizenship is assumed to have been weakened by the external forces of globalization, especially since the post-World-War-II-era. The traditional model of citizenship and the reserving of political rights only to citizens was dominant at the turn of the 20th century. The configurations of power in the international arena were assumed to have fundamentally changed with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar liberal world system (Jourde, 2016). As the world became more interrelated with the rise of human movement, increasing inter-state collaborations, and the ubiquity of transnational corporations and global markets for capital and goods, the state's sovereignty with respect to domestic politics has been diminished, if not totally eroded. These changes have led to a new model of citizenship that challenges the traditional practices of "rights-holding" (Kramer, 2016, p. 1). The discourse of universal human rights, liberal values, and the image of the state in the international arena as adopting those values have become the norm of today's democratic governance (Carvalho & Neumann, 2014).

Immigration-related issues are particularly important in light of the rising reliance of states on transnational values and collaborations, due to the nature of immigration as an inter-state phenomenon. The rights once reserved only for citizens become universal human rights that are codified as personal rights, irrespective of citizenship. This on-going process highlights the relevance of transnational politics to states' practices with respect to non-citizen suffrage.

The main cross-national convergence factors can be listed as follows: The extent to which countries are integrated in and committed to supranational institutions, conventions, and treaties (Barrington, 1999; Castles & Davidson, 2000; Freeman, 1995; Kashiwazaki, 1999; Koopmans et al., 2012; Soysal, 1994; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014), the degree of commitment to liberal democratic principles and human rights (Barrington, 1999; Neuman, 1992; Raskin, 1993; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014), the spill-over effect of learning from neighbor-states (Janoski, 2010; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014), the globalization of the marketplace and social relations (Earnest, 2008, 2014; Rodriguez, 2010), the impact of regional historical trajectories of nationhood (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Escobar, 2015; Raskin, 1993), or more specifically, whether the country has a colonial past, as either a colonial settler country or a formerly colonized country (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014; Fox et al., 2016; Janoski, 2010; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016; Koopmans et al., 2012; Lardy, 1997), and lastly, the sending state's effect on the host state's immigration policies in the form of diaspora politics (Cianetti, 2014; DeSipio & De la Garza, 1998; Earnest, 2008; Lee, Ramakrishnan, & Ramírez, 2006).

A vast international relations literature examines how commitment to and membership in international organizations and non-governmental organizations affect a state's domestic policies. With the collapse of the bipolar configuration of powers of the Cold War era, liberal democracy and related human rights values became a norm which most countries had to adopt (Jourde, 2016). The rise of "post-national citizenship" (Soysal, 1994) furthered the role of

humanitarian rights and norms as strong determinants of the expansion of rights to non-citizens (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016; Soysal, 1994; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). As immigrants have started to formulate their claims for rights on the basis of human rights and the norms promulgated by international inter-governmental organizations, states have also given more weight to the international norms and rights recognized by multiple international organizations (DeSipio & De la Garza, 1998; Earnest, 2014; Lee et al., 2006). Hence, many argue that international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and international liberal norms "spread across borders through waves of diffusion and emulation" (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014, p. 412) and shape countries' citizenship and voting practices (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Barrington, 1999; Castles & Davidson, 2000; Kashiwazaki, 1999). As states' citizenship practices may have international consequences, such as refugee flows and civil strife, IOs have shown an interest in individual states' voting, citizenship, and immigration regimes. Many IOs and INGOs have been found to moderate states' treatment of non-citizens and try to prevent the state's tendency to discriminate against minorities (Earnest, 2008).

Likewise, Koopmans and Michalowski (2016) argue that starting with the post-war period, participation in international organizations has shaped states' policies toward immigrants and minority groups. EU membership and compliance with its rules and liberal norms, for instance, was one of the most important determinants of the spread of non-citizen enfranchisement practices and "supranational" citizenship in Europe (Barrington, 1999; Earnest, 2015; Klusmeyer & Aleinikoff, 2000; Meehan, 1993). Countries that identify themselves as part of the European community, such as Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia (Barrington, 1999; Smith, 2003), were encouraged to implement more inclusive immigration policies through mechanisms ranging from the sanctions imposed by the EU member states to the danger of having an anti-human-rights image.

Kashiwazaki (1999) also discusses Japan's changing immigration and citizenship policies in terms of Japan's accession to UN conventions on human and minority rights. The grant of Japanese citizenship to a large Indochinese population is believed to depend on Japan's accession to UN human and minority rights conventions. The role of the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Commonwealth membership in the extension of similar immigrant policies across countries is also highlighted (Achiume & Landau, 2015; Fox et al., 2016; Maseko, 2010).

Although IOs have been found to play a significant role in the Western context, there is no common agreement regarding the impact of IOs and international norms in non-Western states. Accordingly, the question of the impact of membership in IOs on non-citizen voting practices awaits a more complete answer. In order to test the impact of membership in international organizations in non-Western contexts, it is necessary to find some relevant IOs, whose membership has been deemed to be important for non-citizen rights. The African Union (AU) is one example. Achiume and Landau (2015) have shown that the African Union member states tend to share common citizenship practices, yet there is no quantitative study so far that tests the effect of AU membership on the rights accorded to non-citizens, though it would make sense to assume that the African Union members tend to adopt more generous voting rights for alien residents. The Commonwealth of Nations is another IO which has a considerable number of non-Western member countries (Earnest, 2014; Putnam, 2014; Shanahan, 1999). According to some, the Commonwealth of Nations is not a strong IO in the traditional sense (Karatani, 2003), while according to others, Commonwealth members have sought to construct similar citizenship and immigration policies, if not perfectly common citizenship rights (Earnest, 2014; Shanahan, 1999). The United Kingdom's practice of granting voting rights only to Commonwealth member states' citizens, such as Barbadians residing in the Kingdom, and an exceptional enfranchisement

of the British citizens in Australian local and Canadian provincial elections in Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan were for a long time explained by the importance of Commonwealth membership for suffrage practices (Earnest, 2014).

Hypothesis 4: Countries that are committed to and members of a larger number of international organizations are more likely to extend the suffrage to non-citizens than countries that belong to a smaller number of international inter-governmental organizations.

H4 (a): EU member states tend to adopt more generous voting rights practices regarding non-citizens than non-EU members.

H4 (b): African Union member states are more likely to grant voting rights to alien residents than non-member states.

H4 (c): Commonwealth of Nations members are more likely to have alien voting rights than non-member democracies.

Closely related to the rising importance of international organizations and international non-governmental organizations is the way through which shared belief in international norms and the discourse of human rights shape the rights granted to non-citizen residents. States are expected to commit to liberal values and human rights norms in order to be part of the global economy and to have a more respected international status, as the newly emerging international relations literature on status reminds us (Neumann & Carvalho, 2015). The ubiquity of the discourse of human rights enables pro-liberalization state actors to justify their claims and policy decisions more easily, especially with the legalization of human rights regimes. Referring to Sassen, Earnest (2008, p. 62) summarizes this process as follows: "Instruments of the international human rights regime such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights not only enable individuals and NGOs to seek legal recourse in international courts against nation-states,

they also provide national courts with the legal basis to challenge or change domestic citizenship laws". In like manner, Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis points out the convergence between states as a result of commitment to universal norms. The victory of Western-democracy and capitalism carries its values of human rights, and liberalism. These values will erode the ideological differences between states and different cultures, and consequently politics and states will converge: "Rather than a thousand shoots blossoming into as many different flowering plants, mankind will come to seem like a long wagon train strung out along a road." (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 338). In contrast to Fukuyama's pessimistic interpretation of the impact of global norms on states, Turcu and Urbatsch (2014) point to the adoption of liberal humanitarian norms as the drivers of democratizations for many states. As the discourse of human rights and liberal values is at the center of issues of immigration today, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010, p. 119) characterize immigrants as "agents of democratic diffusion". Influenced by this emphasis on the role of international forms of collaboration, this study tests the relevance of IOs.

A variety of cross-national convergence theorists assume that one can find similarities between two neighboring states' immigration policies and the scope of the rights accorded to non-citizen residents. The fact that migrants tend to come from neighboring countries in most parts of the world, due to geographical proximity between neighbors and the ease of moving across the common borders for non-citizens, is assumed to explain similar state practices with respect to immigrant rights (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). Large groups of immigrants coming from neighboring countries put the host state in a closer relationship with its neighbors and creates opportunities for policy diffusion between states. If a policy implemented in the neighboring state has positive consequences and is seen as a successful practice, neighboring countries are more likely to mimic those policies. This mimicking provides a shortcut for neighboring governments, facilitating the adoption of policies that have already

proved to be effective. Most locally successful policy experiments, then, are imported from a neighboring state. This peer learning brings about a convergence of immigration practices. Recently, Arrighi and Bauböck (2017), Earnest (2014), Escobar (2015), and Turcu and Urbatsch (2014) have all demonstrated the positive effects of peer learning on voting rights practices. However, the spillover effect on the alien suffrage will not be examined here since it requires the calculation of geographical proximity as well as identification of the number of similar policies adopted by the sample states, which is very challenging when sixty countries are included in the research.

Other proponents of the cross-national convergence model claim that socio-economic and political globalization shape states' domestics policies towards their non-citizen populations. The increasing significance of international economic integration, the proliferation of multinational corporations, the emergence of intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and larger political units, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), multilateral treaties, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the rise of multiculturalism and trans-border activities, and lastly, the ease and ubiquity of communication networks have all accelerated the profound interconnectedness of the world (Held & McGrew, 2003; Ougaard, 2004; Schirato & Webb, 2003).

This interconnectedness creates winners and losers of globalization since countries that are better adapted to the new global world system have benefitted extensively from it, whereas the latecomer states have been harmed more than helped by transnational processes. Many traditional responsibilities of the state, like defense, the management of the economy, and controlling immigrant flows in the territories of a state, have been shifted to larger political bodies and are governed by a set of common treaties and decisions. These developments have led

scholars to introduce the idea of the politicization of the global order in a new way. The change in state-international relations can be termed political globalization.

On the basis of Goryakin, Lobstein, James, and Suhrcke (2015) and Dreher, Gaston, Martens, and Boxem (2010) conceptualization, this study operationalizes political globalization in terms of a composite measure of the number of embassies located in a country, which is seen as an indicator of the extent of relationships between countries, the number of memberships in transnational political and economic organizations, ranging from NATO to IMF, the number of signed international treaties and conventions, and participation in United Nations Security Council missions. Political globalization refers to the interconnectedness of states through international organizations and their degree of embeddedness in the global system of governance. Seeing whether the degree of political globalization increases a country's likelihood of granting voting rights to non-citizens may add an important aspect to the discussion of the ways in which globalization affects domestic policies.

Countries that are more globalized, in the sense of having more frequent and intense political interactions with others, are expected to be more likely to enfranchise alien residents. International relations with other states in the form of political globalization, such as the number of embassies located in the country, the degree of participation in various international treaties, and the diffusion of ideas and information, have been the main indicators of the international embeddedness of states (Earnest, 2014, 2015; Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Soysal, 1994; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). Several studies have found a positive correlation between political globalization and the enfranchisement of non-citizens (Earnest, 2014; Simmons & Elkins, 2004; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). Greater interaction among states has been assumed to increase the likelihood of the spread of citizenship and immigration policies from one nation state to states with which it has reciprocal political ties, such as a common commitment to international treaties.

Accordingly, we could expect to find a positive correlation between a country's level of political globalization and the likelihood of non-citizen suffrage:

Hypothesis 5: The more politically globalized the country, the greater the likelihood of alien enfranchisement.

In the cross-national convergence thesis, special emphasis is given to the effect of colonial legacies on states' current immigration policies. As the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century European nation-states dominated and colonized other parts of the world, the imposition of the West's economic, social, and cultural values was inescapable. This convergence between the West and non-Western parts of the world transformed "all the disparate societies and brought them into a global system" (Castles & Davidson, 2000, p. 3). The United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Japan were the main colonial empires that transformed economic and social practices in the colonized countries (Bandeira & Pinto, 2015).

Although the colonial powers' economic, socio-cultural, and political effects on the colonized world are acknowledged by many, the main concern of this study is whether the former colonial powers and colonized states are more likely to have similar policies with respect to the alien suffrage. Fox et al. (2016), Arrighi and Bauböck (2017), Janoski (2010); Koopmans and Michalowski (2016), Caramani and Grotz (2015), and Escobar (2015) all predict that colonized states and their colonizers have similar types of immigration policies due to their shared socio-cultural and political history. Colonial legacies are also expected to lead to reciprocal policies (Lardy, 1997). The right to vote for Commonwealth citizens residing in the United Kingdom and the special agreement between the Spanish and Colombian governments that grants reciprocal rights to vote exemplify how colonial histories and the "pre-existing rights

of colonial subjects" (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016, p. 45) lead to the liberalizing of state policies with respect to immigrants' political rights.

Prior research findings have differed, however, when it comes to the impact of a country's colonial history on the alien suffrage (Caramani & Grotz, 2015; Howard, 2005; Janoski, 2010; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). Colonial histories were found to explain non-citizen enfranchisement in some contexts, like Latin America and the Caribbean, but their effect on the alien suffrage in Asian countries was found to be insignificant (Caramani & Grotz, 2015). In a recent study, Koopmans and Michalowski (2016) confirm the relevance of colonialism as a facilitator of extended immigrant rights for 29 countries. Turcu and Urbatsch (2014, p. 421), on the other hand, have found that an imperial past has no noticeable effect on the extension of voting rights to non-resident citizens. There is clearly no consensus regarding the effect of colonialism on non-citizen voting rights.

Both Janoski (2010) and Howard (2005) have argued that the settler countries historically granted variety of rights to their colonized subjects, including the right to vote, in order to protect their shared cultural affinity and guarantee the loyalty of the colonized. Drawing on this, Koopmans and Michalowski (2016) argue that in order to control the colonized territories and prevent possible rebellions, the colonizers had to implement more inclusive policies especially towards the native elites and soldiers. The cooperation of local elites was of special importance for the continuation of the colonial empires as without their support the colonized populations would not be controlled. To keep the local elites satisfied, the colonial powers generally provided them training opportunities in the colonial metropolises, like London, and also granted them a wide range of rights, such as the right to vote and citizenship (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016, p. 45). Furthermore, the military support of the colonized countries in the form of having soldiers to fight in wars was another important need for the colonial empires. The way to guarantee both

the collaboration of local elites and military support was to provide the basis for strengthening the cultural affinity between the colonizers and colonized by granting rights to the colonized people that integrated them into the colonial empires.

Given shared colonial history and similarity between the colonized and colonizer states' legal arrangements (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016; Lijphart & Aitkin, 1995), it is worth comparing colonized and colonizer states with a larger sample of countries that have neither colonized nor been colonized. Hypothesis 6 can be formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 6: Former colonial and colonialized states are more likely to extend voting rights to non-citizen residents than countries that have never been colonized and have never colonized others.

Last but not least, some studies have discussed the participation of sending states in the politicization of migrants in host countries. Lee et al. (2006), Cianetti (2014), and Earnest (2008) show that the immigrant sending states become more and more involved in the politics of the host states through diaspora mobilization. Sending states may seek to mobilize the diaspora for a variety of reasons ranging from the contribution of remittances to their economies to lobbying for expatriate voting (Earnest, 2008). While the reasons behind the increasing advocacy of sending states for diaspora rights are still contested, the fact that sending states encourage their expatriates to participate in political decision-making processes in both their countries of origin and their host countries is accepted broadly. Many Latin American states give special importance to the mobilization of their expatriates in the U.S because of both the financial benefits of remittances and the considerable number of expatriates and the impact of their votes on elections in their countries of origin (DeSipio & De la Garza, 1998). For the purposes of gaining more inclusive immigrants' rights, the Latin American governments implemented various policies and collaborations with the government of the U.S. (Escobar, 2015). In Asia and Europe, similar

involvement of sending states in the politics of the host countries is also observed. The South Korean government insisted on the grant of voting rights for South Koreans residing in Japan (Kashiwazaki, 1999), even though their pressure remains limited. Turkey also pushed the German government to implement more inclusive policies regarding Turks residing in Germany and second generation Turkish-Germans.

Transnational politics in the form of sending states' involvement in the host countries' policy-making processes has resulted in a number of innovative policies regarding immigrants' social and economic rights. However, whether the sending states' involvement in the politics of the host countries affects the voting rights of non-citizens is still not clear. The main source of this ambiguity is the difficulty of tracing the sources of immigration policies and identifying the actors that were involved in policy making. Scholars emphasize that it is extremely hard to be certain that the involvement of sending states really influenced the policies of the host states (Earnest, 2008). Furthermore, the involvement of countries of origin in policy making with respect to immigrants has been found to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the extension of voting rights to non-citizens in the host countries. Earnest (2008) shows that the sending states have very little leverage to affect immigrant political rights in the countries of destination, if their expatriates are geographically dispersed in the host states. The more geographically diverse the immigrant population from the same country, the harder it is for the sending state to advocate for their political rights. Measuring the involvement of sending states in the host states' immigration policies is also deemed to be very difficult, especially since no dataset provides information on inter-governmental involvement in domestic policies. Considering these factors, this study does not look at the participation of sending states in advancing the political rights of their expatriates.

This thesis contributes to the understanding of how and in what ways the suggested explanations for varied state practices of non-citizen enfranchisement work in a larger sample of countries. Testing both the national political processes and the cross-national convergence models on the basis of the six hypotheses specified above provides us with information regarding the factors that shape domestic state policies with respect to immigrant rights, while testing whether growing transnational pressures to liberalize non-citizen rights erode the traditional state's sovereignty in decision-making processes, as some expect.

Chapter 3

I.   Research Design

This chapter provides, first, a detailed explanation of the selection of countries, the study's time span, and the independent, dependent, and control variables, as well as the datasets used to test the hypotheses and, second, a discussion of the suitability of a Cox proportional hazards model for this research.

The study covers sixty democracies from 1975 to 2015. These democracies have been chosen on the basis of the Freedom House "Freedom in the World" index. The Freedom House Index has been widely used by scholars working on voting rights and electoral rules (Earnest, 2008, 2014, 2015). The index provides a useful tool for selecting countries, given that it is conventional in studies of alien enfranchisement to focus only on free or democratic countries in the world (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017; Earnest, 2014, 2015; Koopmans et al., 2012).

To choose the countries, I first established a list of all countries with the two highest scores (1 or 2) (1 indicating the freest and 7 indicating the least free countries worldwide according to the Freedom House Index) on political rights (PR) for the last five consecutive years from 2013 to 2017. Selecting countries that have consistently scored 1 or 2 over a five-year period provides a more accurate indication of the extent of political rights in each country. This gave me a group of eighty-eight countries. From that group, I omitted countries with a population of less than 100,000 and countries where the necessary legal information was not accessible in English or Turkish. This led me to drop twenty-eight countries.[4] The population of 100,000 was chosen as

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[4] The list of dropped out countries can be found in Appendix D.

the cutoff following previous studies using the Freedom House Index (Blais, Massicotte, & and Yoshinaka, 2001). As a result of this selection process, I came up with sixty countries. [5] [6]

As the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents can happen only once, the appropriate research design is a survival analysis and, more specifically, a Cox proportional hazards model (see below). Accordingly, the dependent variable equals 1 in the year when a country first granted the right to vote to non-citizens in their territories and 0 for other country-years.

The independent variables are based on the six hypotheses that have been derived from the national political processes and the cross-national convergence models. The independent variables are as follows: immigrant proportion (continuous variable that ranges from 0.07% to 43.96%), the partisan composition of the government (right-wing, left wing, a coalition in which a left party is dominant, and a coalition with a left party as a minority partner), judicial strength (continuous variable ranging from -2.7 to 3.3 on the basis of the Varieties of Democracy Project's rule of law index), whether a country is a member of the three main international inter-governmental organizations (membership dummy variables for the EU, the African Union, and the Commonwealth of Nations), colonial history (whether the country was a colonizer or colonized), and international political embeddedness (continuous variable ranging from 8 to 99 out of a possible 100).

The original dataset for the proportion of immigrants in each country between 1975 and 2015. [H1] is created on the basis of the World Bank's International Migrant Stock database (2012)[7] and the Migration Policy Institute's (MPI) "International Migrant Population by Country

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[5] The list of countries is provided in Appendix E.

[6] Taiwan is still legally part of the China. For that reason, there was no information on the size of Taiwan's immigrant population in the relevant datasets. The missing information for Taiwan was collected through two main sources: the Taiwan Statistical Data Book (2016) and Wang's article (2011) "Immigrant Trends and Policy Changes in Taiwan".

[7] The World Bank. (2012). "International Migrant Stock (% of Population) dataset". Retrieved on March 25, 2018 from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL.ZS
 The explanation of the statistical concept and methodology that was used to calculate the immigrant proportion can be found in the following link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL

of Destination, 1960-2017" interactive data source[8]. The World Bank's International Migrant

Stock database defines "international migrant stock" as the proportion of people who were not

born in their countries of residence (Bank, 2012).[9] The International Migrant Stock database

provides the proportion of immigrants in all of the selected countries from 1990 to 2015 for

every five years except for eight post-Soviet states. While Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia were

part of the former Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia seceded from Czechoslovakia.

Similarly, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are post-Soviet republics. The World Bank data do not

provide any information for these countries between 1980 and 1990 as they were still part of the

former states, but the database does provide immigrant proportions for Yugoslavia,

Czechoslovakia, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from 1980 to 1990 in five-

year intervals. The missing information for the eight European states' immigrant proportions

between 1980 and 1990 was estimated on the basis of immigrant proportions in each former

state. This is a reasonable proxy as many studies on the Baltic and Eastern European states use

similar estimations for factors related to the pre-independence data (Brunarska, Nestorowicz, &

Markowski, 2014; Budryte, 2005; Rudolph, 2006; Tishkov, Zayinchkovskaya, & Vitkovskaya,

2005).

The Migration Policy Institute's "International Migrant Populations by Country of

Destination, 1960-2017" is an online interactive webpage that includes information on the

migrant share of the total population. The advantage of the MPI's interactive data over the World

Bank dataset is that it also covers immigrant proportions between 1975 and 1990 in five-years

intervals.

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[8] The Migration Policy Institute. (2017). "International Migrants by Country of Destination, 1960-2017".
Retrieved on March 25, 2018 from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/international-migrants-country-destination-1960-2017
[9] When data on the foreign-born population are not available, data on foreign population--that is, people who
are citizens of a country other than the country in which they reside--are used as estimates.

As both the World Bank and MPI datasets only provide immigrant proportion in a country at five-year intervals, the missing information for the intervening years is imputed on the assumption that each year within a five-year interval experienced an equal increment of change. The new dataset is created by combining information from the two data sources.

The left-right positioning of the governing parties [H2] is determined based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (Dinas & Gemenis, 2009). The database includes information on party families, the parties forming the government, total seats taken by each party, the left-right positioning of the parties forming the government, and the percentage of votes that each party gained in the general and presidential elections, if a country holds presidential elections. The left-right (L-R) positioning of the parties is based on a content analysis of party manifestos along twenty policy dimensions. Ideological composition is measured in terms of the party with the highest proportion of the votes, i.e. whether or not a left-wing party was in power or was the dominant coalition party (Koopmans et al., 2012, p. 1218). In addition to differentiating between left party versus non-left dominance, it is necessary to make a distinction between a coalition in which the leftist party is the majority partner and a coalition in which a left party is the minority partner. The distinction between a leftist-majority coalition and a leftist-minority coalition is important because each coalition provides different stakes and opportunities for the leftist party to advocate for more liberalized immigrant rights. While a left party that is dominant in a coalition may be constrained by the need to appease coalition partners, a left party that is a minority coalition partner may be able to exercise leverage over the dominant party. The ideological composition of the government is coded as a series of dummy variables with right-leaning governments serving as the reference category. The first dummy is leftist government, the second dummy stands for a coalition in which the leftist party is the majority partner (left-

majority coalition), and the third dummy represents a coalition in which a leftist party is in the minority (left-minority coalition).

The Manifesto project provides information for approximately fifty countries from 1945 to today.[10] The Bahamas, Barbados, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Namibia, Panama, Peru, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay are not covered by the Manifesto database. For each of these countries, information on the parties in the government and their vote shares in all elections between 1975 and 2015 was collected through secondary sources. Each government's ideological position was then coded in accordance with the coding rule for the government's ideological composition. The coding is composed of three steps: First to find the relevant election information data, i.e. the winning party or the parties and the percentage of the vote gained by them, the second, to check if the government was a coalition, and last, the positioning of the winning party or parties on the left-right ideological spectrum. The positioning of the parties is based on the party family, such as socialist parties. The main sources are countries' national election databases, like IndiaVotes, the African Elections database, the Election Guide, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU Parline database), and the Open Election Data Initiative.

Data version 6.2 from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (2016)[11] is used to measure judicial independence [H3]. The V-Dem Project's high court independence variable codes the strength of the rule of law. The responses to the question "When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the

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[10] The Manifesto Project's codebook can be found on https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/
[11] Varieties of Democracy Data, Version 6.2. Retrieved on March 25, 2018 from https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-6-2/

legal record?" are scored from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating the strongest judicial freedom.[12] As the

Project's 2016 data covers one-hundred-seventy-three countries between 1900 and 2016, the V-

Dem data is an appropriate source to use in this research.

Membership in international intergovernmental organizations [H4] is represented by

membership in three relevant organizations: the European Union (EU), the African Union, and

the Commonwealth of Nations.[13] As this study extends the sample beyond European countries to

African, Asian, Pacific and Latin American countries, these three organizations provide an

appropriate way of measuring membership in international intergovernmental organizations.

Following Earnest (2014) and extending his study, the study uses simple EU, African Union, and

Commonwealth membership dummy variables. Although the African Union is a strong IO

operating in the non-Western context and its role has been cited to explain the convergence of

policy practices in Africa (Makinda & Okumu, 2008; Murray, 2004; Welz, 2013), no

quantitative study has tested the effect of membership in the African Union on the immigration

policies of the member states. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, is not classified as a

strong IO by some, yet the majority of earlier studies of immigrant rights used Commonwealth

membership as an important influence on state practices with respect to immigrant and minority

rights (Earnest, 2014; Hanagan & Tilly, 1999; Shanahan, 1999).

The *Konjunkturforschungsstelle* (KOF) Globalization Index (2018)[14] is used to measure

political globalization [H5]. The index was developed at the Swiss Federal Institute of

Technology in Zurich (ETHZ). The index provides indicators of globalization for two-hundred-

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[12] Varieties of Democracy Project. (2016). "Code book: High court independence", p.202. Retrieved on March 26, 2018 from https://www.v-dem.net/files/42/Codebookv6.pdf
[13] The list of the EU members states is accessible on the following webpage: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en .
The African Union member states can be reached through https://au.int/memberstates
The Commonwealth countries can be found on the following webpage:
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/country/
[14] The KOF Globalization Index. (2018). Retrieved on March 20, 2018 from
https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html

and-seven countries between 1970 and 2018, covering economic, social, and political globalization. The political globalization component counts the number of international organizations of which each country is a member, the number of times a country has participated in United Nations (UN) Security Council missions, the number of international treaties to which the country is a signatory, and the number of embassies located in a country. The political globalization score for each country is an aggregate score on the listed components. This makes the KOF's political globalization component a good fit to measure political globalization (Earnest 2014). The scores in 2018 range from 1 (the Channel Islands) to 99.26 (Italy) where 1 indicates the least politically globalized country and 100 would indicate the most politically globalized country.[15]

Lastly, following Turcu and Urbatsch (2015) and Treisman (2000), the impact of colonial history on alien suffrage [H6] is gauged by identifying both colonizer and colonized states. The countries colonized by British, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Belgian, German, Italian, and Japanese settlers are coded 1, while countries with no colonial histories are coded 0. If a country was colonized by more than one colonial power, that state is coded 1 since being colonized multiple times is part of a general category of being colonized. The colonizers are also coded 1 as being a settler country also denotes colonial legacies. A state is identified as colonized if most of a state's territory was under the control of colonial empires and if the settlers had control over the politics, economy, and social life of the country (Go, 2007; Kohn & Reddy, 2017; Thomas & Thomson, 2007; Young, 2011). I use mainly Blackwell's Encyclopedia

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[15] The list of indices and variables used in the KOF Index of Globalization can be found on the following links:
https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2018/Structure_2018.pdf
https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2018/Variables_2018.pdf

of Sociology (Go, 2007), Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Kohn & Reddy, 2017), and

Thomas and Thomson (2007) study to collect the necessary information on colonial legacies.

It is important to include controls for some important factors that could confound the

effects of the independent variables on the voting rights of non-citizens. One such factor is a

state's electoral system. Proportional representation systems (PR) are known to facilitate

minority rights (Earnest, 2014, 2015; Lijphart, 2004; Lijphart & Aitkin, 1995; Moser, 2008;

Reynolds, Reilly, Ellis, & International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance., 2005).

Since PR systems allocate seats proportionately to the votes cast, it enhances the probability that

minorities will be represented. Moser (2008) argues that proportional representation systems are

more egalitarian than other types of electoral system, such as single member districts (SMD),

mixed electoral systems, reserved seats for minorities, and alternative vote systems, and produce

more liberalizing policies for minority groups and immigrants. Lijphart summarizes the ways

through which PR systems foster more pro-immigrant and minority policies by stating that the

"beauty of PR is that in addition to producing proportionality and minority representation, it

treats all groups—ethnic, racial, religious, or even noncommunal groups—in a completely equal

and evenhanded fashion" (2004, pp. 99-100). Considering the consensus in the literature

regarding the importance of electoral systems for minority representation and immigrant policies,

it is essential to control for this potentially confounding factor. Accordingly, a dummy variable is

included, coded 1 for proportional representation systems and 0 for mixed and majoritarian

systems based on information from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset.[16]

A dummy variable for the years when eight countries — Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, the

Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — were part of the Soviet bloc is also

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[16] Varieties of Democracy Project. (2016). "Code book: 3.61 Lower chamber electoral system (A)", p. 106. Retrieved on March 24, 2018 from https://www.v-dem.net/files/42/Codebookv6.pdf

included to the model as being part of a communist state might impact both the scope of rights accorded to non-citizens and the immigrant proportions of these countries.

Some countries' scores on the Freedom House Index dropped below two in some years prior to 2013. Accordingly, a dummy variable is added to account for years when political rights in a given country were restricted in order to avoid confounding the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable.

A majority of electoral politics specialists have argued that upcoming elections will encourage the incumbents to develop strategies to attract new voters and to gain the goodwill of others (Earnest, 2014; Hammar, 1990; Jacobs, 2001; Layton-Henry, 1990). Many governments, including several South American states in the 1970s, have provided more rights to immigrants, including the right to vote before the upcoming elections. The anticipation of upcoming elections may affect both the scope of rights granted to non-citizens, especially when immigrants compose a significant proportion of the total population, and the alignment between parties. A categorical variable of "years left in current term" ranging from 0 to 13 is added to control for this potentially confounding factor. The coding depends on the Database of Political Institutions (DPI)'s "years left in current term" variable.[17] This variable indicates the number of years to the next national election. The DPI data covers only until 2012 elections. The remaining three years are coded on the basis of secondary sources for each country, if a state held elections between 2012 and 2015.

Lastly, Koopmans et al. (2012) and Cornelius et al. (1994) have also shown that economic growth affects the scope of rights accorded to immigrants. Economic recessions might lead to anti-immigrant sentiment and governments might be less likely to grant more rights to non-

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[17] The Database of Political Institutions. (2012). "Changes and variable definitions". Retrieved on January 12, 2018 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-1107449512766/DPI2012_Codebook2.pdf

citizens. The World Bank's National Accounts data has a "GDP growth (annual %)" variable which accounts for the annual economic growth for more than a hundred countries.[18] The average annual level of GDP growth and GDP per capita are included in the model as economy-related control variables using the information from the World Bank data.

II.   The Cox Proportional Hazards Model

The Cox proportional hazards model was developed in 1972 by David Cox in his article "Regression Models and Life Tables" (Cox, 1972; Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014, p. 417). The main interest of survival methods in general and Cox proportional hazards regression more specifically is in understanding the types, patterns, and reasons for a change, such as the adoption of certain public policies, joining an IO, signing treaties, government stability, the outbreak of a civil war, or the enfranchisement of non-resident citizens. In terms of this study's research question, the time when an event happens—the grant of voting rights to non-citizens for the first time in a country— is of special significance for understanding the causes of the adoption of this policy. We want to know how long it takes before each country enacts the enfranchisement of non-citizens— and "how duration spent in one social state affects the probability some entity will make a transition to another social state" (Box-Steffenmeir & Jones, 1997, p. 1414).

Although the typical practice in studies of the alien suffrage has been to use panel data with a time series cross sectional (TSCS) design, the application of the TSCS to an event that occurs only once raises some methodological problems and limits the credibility of the study's results. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, prior to the Cox hazards model, the leading

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[18] The World Bank, National Accounts, "GDP growth (annual %)" variable can be accessed through https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG .

approach to enfranchisement analysis was the parametric model, which requires the researcher to know exactly the nature of the distribution being studied. This also requires making sure beforehand that the chosen model does not violate the assumptions regarding certain types of parametric distributions. Parametric models, then, are only desirable if the analyst expects the failure event to exhibit some specific form. However, in the study of the alien suffrage, we do not know if the event has a specific distribution, such as enfranchisement being more likely as time passes, which is not the case as we know from current voting rights practices. The Cox regression, on the other hand, does not require such information and is a distribution-free method (Guo, 2010; Yamaguchi, 1991)

Secondly, the Cox proportional hazards model is a semi-parametric or partial likelihood model, which does not require the researcher to have a baseline hazard function. The only assumption the Cox model makes is that hazards rates over time for groups must be equivalent (Box-Steffenmeir & Bradford, 2004; Box-Steffenmeir & Jones, 1997; Box-Steffenmeir & Zorn, 2001; Guo, 2010), which is the assumption of a constant ratio of the hazards for any two units. This assumption can be tested using the Schoenfeld Residuals Test. As we do not have a baseline model or an expectation regarding the time that passes before the event occurs, the Cox regression is well suited to the objectives of this research because the Cox model does not require assumptions about the underlying distribution of survival times.

Lastly, the problem of right-and-left-censoring is solved in the Cox proportional hazards model, which is especially important for events that happened before, or might happen after, the time span of the study. The problem of right-censoring refers to the same treatment of events that have not happened— the adoption of an event might be after the last time period observed in the dataset— and have happened within the study's time period. For example, whereas Denmark granted the right to vote in Danish elections to non-EU citizens in 1981, Germany had not

granted such a right as of 2018. These two fundamentally different events are treated equivalently in traditional regression models. Unlike linear regression models, survival methods distinguish between censored observations (observations do not happen at least for the duration of the study) and failure events (events happen within the study's time frame) and incorporate information from both of them (Despa, n.d; Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008). Since the dependent variable in survival models is a combination of time and event and/or censoring, this method is more sensitive to the problem of censoring. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones summarize the methodological problem here by stating that "Inclusion of right-censored observations in the model implicitly treats them as having experienced the event (policy adoption) when in fact they have not. And since we cannot foretell the future, we do not know how much longer (if ever) censored observations would go before experiencing an event" (1997, p. 1416). As the Cox method differentiates these two observations, it solves the problem of right-censoring.

The problem of left-censoring is very similar to that of right-censoring with the only difference being that in the case of left-censoring we have two observations, one that happened before the study's time frame and another that happened within the time frame. An example would be including Chile, which granted the right to vote to all non-citizens in 1925, and Sweden, which enfranchised third-country-nationals living in Sweden in 1975, in the same model and failing to differentiate between the two observations. The left-censoring is especially important for non-repeatable events, like non-citizen enfranchisement, and it means that units with the problem of left-censoring have to be dropped from the regression.

The advantages of the Cox proportional hazards model over the traditional TSCS model lead us to prefer the Cox method for this study. Considering the solution of the left and right-censoring problems with the Cox model, we can expect to have different results from previous

studies regarding the effect of already tested variables, such as the role of EU membership, on enfranchisement.

Turcu and Urbatsch (2014) employed a Cox proportional hazards model in a similar study that focuses on the voting rights accorded to non-resident citizens. By looking at two-hundred-and-ten countries' enfranchisement of non-resident citizens practices on the basis of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)'s 2013 database (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014, pp. 416-417), Turcu and Urbatsch provided a novel application of a Cox model to the study voting rights. Drawing on the contributions of Turcu and Urbatsch's (2014) work to the literature on expatriate voting, this thesis is the first study to use a Cox model in the study of alien enfranchisement and broaden the use of a Cox proportional hazards model in the field of political science.

The following chapter provides the regression analysis and discusses the implications of the findings for the study of democracy and immigrant policies in detail.

Chapter 4

I.   Descriptive Statistics and Discussion

I present estimates (as hazard ratios) from two specifications of the model in Table 1. The table expresses estimates as hazard ratios rather than coefficients for ease of interpretation. Similar survival studies by Turcu and Urbatsch (2015), Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006), and Earnest (2015) also reported hazard ratios. The hazard ratios basically mean the probability of failure, that is, granting voting rights to non-citizens, and are proportional to the baseline hazard rate. More specifically, a hazard ratio is the probability that the event —enfranchisement— will happen at time t given that an observation —a state— is at risk at time t —the study's time span from 1975 to 2015. Being at risk at time t means that an observation is in the sample, or in terms of the concern of this study, a state has neither granted voting rights nor been dropped from the sample because of lack of information between 1975 and 2015. Hazard rates usually change over time (Box-Steffenmeir & Jones, 1997). A hazard ratio of greater than one indicates a greater likelihood of failure (i.e. enfranchisement), while ratios between 0 to 1 represent a decreasing likelihood and a negative effect on the odds of non-citizen enfranchisement.

The first model represents hazard ratios derived from a Cox proportional hazards regression of all independent and control variables, whereas the second model reports the results of the Weibull distribution estimates. Unlike the Cox proportional hazards model, the Weibull distribution makes one assumption about the event. The assumption is that the probability of the event varies over time (Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 2004). Weibull survival estimates are viewed as more valid in studies that use time varying dependent variables (Earnest, 2015; Elkins

et al., 2006). The probability of non-citizen suffrage probably varies over time as global political pressures and national political concerns to liberalize non-citizen rights change (Earnest, 2015; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2016). The model specifications also use robust estimates of the standard errors for hazard ratios to account for heterogeneous variances among cross sections in the dataset. Larger standard errors imply a lower likelihood of finding significant effects.

Table 1: Estimated Hazard Ratios for the Enfranchisement

Variables	*Model 1 - Cox PH*	*Model 2 – Weibull*
National Political Processes		
Immigrant Proportion	0.84 (0.43) ***	0.87 (0.05) **
Right-Wing Government	(Base category)	(Base category)
Leftist Government	4.27 (2.94) **	2.91 (2.19)
Left-Majority Coalition	3.84 (3.06) *	3.23 (2.85)
Left-Minority Coalition	6.75 (5.86) **	3.28 (2.92)
Judicial Independence	1.81 (0.55) *	1.82 (0.56) *
Cross-National Convergence		
European Union Membership	1.04 (0.65)	0.74 (0.38)
African Union Membership	2.04 (0.90) ***	8.72 (0.90) ***
Commonwealth Membership	0.59 (0.48)	0.70 (0.52)
Political Globalization	0.95 (0.15) ***	0.96 (0.22)
Colonial Legacies	1.02 (0.49)	0.93 (0.48)

	Control Variables	
Electoral System	0.99 (0.37)	1.00 (0.35)
Freedom House Score	1.33 (1.08)	0.91 (0.99)
Communist Period	3.44 (1.10)	4.10 (5.09) ***
Years Left in Current Term	0.72 (0.15)	0.76 (0.12) *
GDP Per Capita	2.12 (0.61) ***	1.65 (0.42)
Annual GDP Growth	1.00 (0.05)	0.95 (0.47)
Constant		0.00 (0.00) ***
Observations	1,236	1,236

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Both models provide strong support for the national political processes thesis, whereas support for the cross-national convergence model is weak. The immigrant proportions are significant in both the Cox and Weibull specifications. The hazard ratio of immigrant proportions is smaller than 1 in both specifications (ratio of 0.84 and 0.87 in the Cox and the Weibull distributions, respectively), suggesting that higher proportions of immigrants decrease the chances of non-citizen enfranchisement. This means that Hypothesis 1 must be rejected.

As the substantive interpretation of survival models can be difficult, Figure 1 displays the information visually. The figure shows the survival estimates for otherwise identical states, one that has no immigrants (the difference between the mean and standard deviation of the immigrant proportions variable) and the other having an immigrant proportion of 14% (the sum of the immigrant proportion variable's mean and standard deviation). This graph visualizes the negative relationship between higher immigrant proportions and the probability of survival —the event that countries do not enfranchise non-citizen residents.

Figure 1: Survival Estimates of Non-Citizen Enfranchisement by Using Cox Specification
Note: Predictions derived from the model in Table 1's first column.

Similarly, Figure 2 (below) presents the survival estimates for a state with no immigrants and another state with 14% immigrants on the basis of the Weibull specification. Once again, the negative relationship between the proportion of immigrants and the probability of enfranchisement is clear. The figure also shows how the survival estimates decrease as the time-span under analysis gets longer, suggesting that there is an overall increasing likelihood for states to grant voting rights to non-citizen residents.

Considering the countries where immigrants compose at least 13% of the total population, such as Australia, Canada, the United States, France, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, this finding is not surprising since none of these countries has enfranchised non-citizens. Although the theoretical expectation of a positive relationship between immigrant proportions and state practices of alien enfranchisement is logically sound, it only applies to a few countries with high immigrant proportions, like New Zealand, Israel, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. As this is the first quantitative study that looks at the effect of immigrant

proportions on the rights granted to non-citizens, assessing the reliability of this finding by

comparing it with previous studies is not possible.[19]

Figure 2: Survival Estimates of Non-Citizen Enfranchisement on the
Basis of the Weibull Specification
Note: Predictions derived from the model in Table 1's second column.

The ideological composition of the government is found to be significant only in the Cox

proportional hazards regression model. In the Cox model, left-leaning governments, left-majority

coalitions, and left-minority coalition governments all have statistically significant effects (p-

values are 0.035 for the left government, 0.091 for the left-majority coalition governments, and

0.028 for the left-minority coalitions). In both models, having a more leftist government

increases the likelihood of non-citizen enfranchisement as the ratios are greater than 1. To be

more specific, left-leaning governments, left-dominant coalitions and left-minority governments

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[19] It is also important to note here that when a fixed-effects linear regression is run, the immigrant proportions
are found to be positively related to the enfranchisement of non-citizens. If the inclusion of fixed-effects
changes the direction of the relationship between the dependent variable and an independent variable, then the
sample may be suffering from the problem of heterogeneity across countries. As the fixed-effects regression
erases the across-group variation over time, finding the expected relationship between immigrant proportions
and alien suffrage may imply that there is important variation across the chosen countries.

all face a greater hazard —enfranchisement— than right-wing governments. As all of these hazard ratios are greater than 1, having a leftist party in power, either alone or in a coalition, increases the likelihood of the alien suffrage. The second hypothesis is thus confirmed, though some caution is warranted, given that some of the ratios are suspiciously high (6.75 for left-minority coalitions in the Cox specification). This finding supports Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel (2012) and Earnest's (2008, 2015) findings on the effect of the ideological composition of the government.

The degree of judicial independence is statistically significant in both specifications as expected. Hazard ratios for judicial independence are very close in both specifications, 1.81 in the Cox model and 1.82 in the Weibull specification. Greater judicial independence appears to have increased the rate at which a given country grants voting rights to non-citizens. Hence Hypothesis 3 is also accepted. This study yields further confirmation of earlier findings of studies by Cornelius et al. (1994), Joppke (1999), Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2002), Earnest (2008), Lijphart (2012), and Arrighi and Lafleur (2017).

Overall, the political processes factors appear to significantly explain the reasons behind non-citizen enfranchisement practices, even though the impact of immigrant proportions on the suffrage is found to work in a theoretically unexpected way.

Among the variables associated with the cross-national convergence thesis, only African Union membership is statistically significant in both specifications while the degree of political globalization is only significant in the Cox model (though the hazards ratios are very similar). The estimated effect of African Union membership derived from both the Cox and the Weibull specifications appears to be consistent with theoretical expectations, suggesting that African Union member states are more likely to enfranchise non-citizen residents. Interestingly, the degree of political globalization seems to be important but not in the theoretically expected way.

A quick glance at the Cox proportional hazards estimation for political globalization suggests that the higher the political globalization, the lower the probability of alien suffrage. Yet the absence of significance of the political globalization variable in the Weibull estimations warrants caution. Accordingly, the fifth hypothesis is rejected.

Neither European Union nor Commonwealth membership, nor colonial legacies have significant effects. The finding with respect to European Union membership may seem surprising considering the European Union's Article 10(3), which grants the right to vote to EU nationals that reside in other EU member countries (Schrauwen, 2013). However, this study takes account of whether third-country nationals (TNCs) who do not have an EU passport can cast a ballot. Hence, it confirms that EU membership does not affect the probability of states granting voting rights to third-country nationals who dwell in an EU member state. Hypothesis 4 is thus only partially confirmed (in the case of the African Union).

It can be argued that membership in an IO is not a good predictor of more liberalized alien suffrage practices, since only African Union membership is found to have explanatory power in both models. In both specifications of the model, the hazard ratios for the African Union membership are greater than one. However, the hazard ratio derived from the Weibull specification is suspiciously high (8.72). African Union membership increases the odds of alien suffrage in a country by only 100% when the Cox proportional hazards model is applied (the hazard ratio is 2.04). This inconsistency between the two specifications might be because only a small number of countries in the sample — Ghana, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia— are African Union members.

Hypothesis 6 fails to be confirmed: colonial legacies do not help us to account for different practices of non-citizen enfranchisement. This empirical finding also challenges the theoretical assumptions of Lijphart and Aitkin (1995), Janoski (2010), Caramani and Grotz

(2015) and Howard (2005), as well as the empirical findings of Koopmans and Michalowski (2016). However, this study's findings are in line with Turcu and Urbatsch (2014)'s finding regarding the relationship between shared colonial trajectories and non-resident citizen enfranchisement. On the basis of both studies, it can be concluded that colonial histories do not have an important impact on the enfranchisement of either non-citizen residents or non-resident citizens.

The fact that only one of the cross-national convergence hypotheses could be even partially accepted may mean that increasing globalization and international connectedness are not shaping national state policies, especially policies that impact the outcome of elections, when the countries are considered as a whole. Shared normative commitments do not appear to be pushing states to implement more liberalized and similar policies. This does not mean that international norms, organizations, collaborations are deemed to be insignificant in the context of rising nationalism around the world today, but it is clear that national political considerations and calculations carry more weight when considering the scope of state policies, at least with respect to enfranchising non-citizens. More broadly, it can be claimed that globalization and international networks do not undermine the traditional links between the state and the polity, contrary to what one might expect.

Finally, in terms of control variables, Communist period, years to next election, and GDP per capita are found to be significant. In the Weibull specification, being a former Communist-bloc country increases the predicted likelihood of enfranchisement. This is in line with Turcu and Urbatsch (2014) findings. The effect of years to the next election confirms theoretical expectations but is found to be significant only using the Weibull distribution. As years left in the current term decreases, states become more likely to extend voting rights to non-citizens (hazard ratio is 0.76, indicating a negative relationship between years left in the current term and

the probability of non-citizen enfranchisement). This suggests that governments grant voting

rights tactically, especially in anticipation of upcoming elections. As modernization theory

argues (Dahl, 1971; Londregan & Poole, 1996), countries with higher GDPs are expected to be

more democratic in the sense of lessening inequalities between different segments of the

population. The findings here are also in line with earlier studies (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014)

suggesting that GDP per capita has a noticeable effect on the enfranchisement of non-citizens

(hazard ratio of 2.12 using the Cox distribution).

The electoral system, the effects of the years when countries were scored less than 2 on

the Freedom House Index, and annual GDP growth are significant in none of the models. While

earlier studies expected the electoral system to be an important determinant of policies regarding

immigrant and minority rights, our findings do not support this.

In addition to these two model specifications, both specifications were also applied to

sub-samples of Western and non-Western countries.[20] The geographical divide provides

important insights regarding which explanatory variables are more relevant in certain parts of the

world than others. As previous research on non-citizen resident enfranchisement has focused on

predominantly Western contexts, comparing this study's findings for non-Western countries with

the Western countries provides further insights into how different explanations for alien suffrage

work in different regional contexts.

The statistical significance and the direction of the impact (negative or positive effect on

the alien suffrage) of immigrant proportions and the level of judicial independence hold when

both the Cox and Weibull specifications are run for the Western countries. Similar to the findings

for the sample of all countries, immigrant proportions work contrary to theoretical expectations

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[20] The category of Western countries refers to European countries and Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United States of America. Non-Western countries are all other countries.

(hazard ratios of 0.77 and 0.89, respectively, for the Cox and Weibull distributions): the lower the proportion of immigrants, the higher the odds of non-citizen enfranchisement.

Similar to the results for all 60 countries, judicial independence confirms theoretical expectations, suggesting that higher levels of judicial independence result in a greater likelihood of non-citizen voting rights.

Having a left-minority coalition is a good predictor of non-citizen enfranchisement when the Cox specification used. The finding that left-minority coalitions are more likely than right-wing governments to grant voting rights to non-citizen conforms to theoretical expectations. A leftist party may be able to exert pressure on the majority coalition partner in order to liberalize immigrants' rights. However, this is the only one of the ideological composition variables that is statistically significant. Nonetheless, the ideological composition variables all have positive effects in both models (hazard ratios of 3.12 and 4.04 for leftist governments, 3.41 and 3.87 for left-majority coalitions, and 10.16 and 6.17 for left-minority coalitions in the Cox and Weibull specifications, respectively). It is possible that having a left party in the government would impact the policies of alien suffrage in the West if the data included larger sample of countries for a longer time-span.

Among the cross-national convergence variables, the degree of political globalization and Commonwealth membership both have significant effects, but the effects are only significant in the Cox specification. Similar to the previous application of the models to the whole sample, higher levels of political globalization appear to result in lower odds of non-citizen enfranchisement. However, the effect of Commonwealth membership runs counter to theoretical expectations since it appears to lower the odds of non-citizen enfranchisement. This finding may be because Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are the only Commonwealth members in the Western sample. Lastly, it is important to state that the effect

sizes for political globalization and Commonwealth membership are similar in both specifications but fall short of statistical significance in the Weibull model.

Regarding the control variables, GDP per capita is significant using the Cox specification, while the years when a country scored less than 2 on the Freedom House Index and being a former Communist country are only significant in the Weibull specification. The effect sizes for the years when a country scored less than 2 on the Freedom House Index are similar in both specifications (2.66 and 2.20) but fall short of statistical significance in the Cox model. Being a former Communist country appears to increase the odds of non-citizen enfranchisement (hazard ratio is 3.00). This is a surprising finding considering the policies implemented in the Communist countries.

Table 2: Estimated Hazard Ratios for Enfranchisement for Western Countries

Variables	*Cox PH for Western States*	*Weibull for Western States*
National Political Processes		
Immigrant Proportion	0.77 (0.70) ***	0.89 (0.05) *
Right-Wing Government	(Base category)	(Base category)
Leftist Government	3.12 (3.06)	4.04 (4.89)
Left-Majority Coalition	3.41 (1.60)	3.87 (5.21)
Left-Minority Coalition	10.16 (9.59) **	6.57 (8.83)
Judicial Independence	3.60 (1.60) ***	2.25 (0.95) *
Cross-National Convergence		
European Union Membership	3.05 (2.88)	0.83 (0.46)
Commonwealth	0.43 (0.07) *	0.37 (0.47)

Membership

Political Globalization	0.87 (0.04) **	0.96 (0.03)
Colonial Legacies	0.92 (0.66)	0.96 (0.64)

Control Variables

Electoral System	0.04 (0.39)	0.86 (0.56)
Freedom House Score	2.66 (0.3)	2.20 (2.34) ***
Communist Period	0.02 (0.6)	3.00 (3.43) ***
Years Left in Current Term	0.76 (0.27)	0.84 (0.16)
GDP Per Capita	5.33 (2.82) ***	1.54 (0.61)
Annual GDP Growth	0.76 (0.15)	0.93 (0.06)
Constant		0.00 (0.00) **
Observations	658	658

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

When both specifications are applied to the non-Western countries, three of the national

political processes variables have a significant effect on the dependent variable. The effect of

immigrant proportions and left-minority coalition governments are significant in both

specifications. Similar to the findings for the whole sample and only Western countries,

immigrant proportions are negatively related to the probability of non-citizen suffrage in non-

Western parts of the world. Furthermore, the effect of left-minority coalitions is statistically

significant in both models for the non-Western countries. The size of the effect is similar in both

specifications (hazard ratio of 1.23 and 1.86, respectively, in the Cox and Weibull

specifications). A left-dominant coalition substantially increases the odds of granting voting

rights to non-citizens (hazard ratio of 13.87), but it is only significant in the Cox specification.

However, the degree of judicial independence does not have a significant effect. This finding is not surprising as the relevant literature on judicial freedom is derived mainly from Western states. It is clear that there are other mechanisms that explain the enfranchisement of non-citizens in non-Western contexts.

African Union and Commonwealth membership as well as political globalization are significant cross-national convergence variables in both specifications. African Union membership increases the chance of granting voting rights to non-citizens, as the effect is significant at p-value less than 0.01. However, similar to the findings for the Western countries, the effect of Commonwealth membership is at odds with theoretical expectations as the hazard ratios are less than 1 (0.37and 0.25, respectively, in the Cox and Weibull specifications). The impact of political globalization on the alien suffrage also runs counter to theoretical expectations, which is similar to the findings derived from the whole sample and the Western states only. The colonial legacies variable is dropped due to lack of variation. All non-Western countries in the study have colonial legacies.

In contrast to the results for the whole sample and for Western countries only, annual GDP growth is significant in both models. Similar to the finding for the whole sample, years left in current term is also significant for non-Western states. As the hazard ratios of years left in current term are between 0 and 1, it can be concluded that the closer the elections, the more likely the government is to grant voting rights to non-citizen residents. This is in line with expectations. Thus, electoral tactics seem to be more relevant for non-Western countries. Lastly, annual GDP growth works as expected using the Cox specification (hazard ratio of 1.1) but in the opposite way than expected when the Weibull estimation is specified (hazard ratio of 0.85). Although GDP per capita was found to be important for Western countries only, it is not a good predictor for non-Western contexts.

Table 3: Estimated Hazard Ratios for Enfranchisement for Non-Western Countries

Variables	Cox PH for Non-Western States	Weibull for Non-Western States
National Political Processes		
Immigrant Proportion	0.87 (0.22) **	0.57 (0.15) **
Right-Wing Government	(Base category)	(Base category)
Leftist Government	6.40 (9.69)	1.38 (2.27)
Left-Majority Coalition	13.87 (1.30) **	2.00 (2.79)
Left-Minority Coalition	1.23 (1.28) ***	1.86 (2.48) ***
Judicial Independence	0.67 (0.18)	0.92 (0.65)
Cross-National Convergence		
African Union Membership	2.31 (6.64) ***	1.93 (1.23) ***
Commonwealth Membership	0.37 (0.89) ***	0.25 (0.58) ***
Political Globalization	0.93 (0.05) **	0.83 (0.07) **
Control Variables		
Electoral System	2.50 (4.52)	0.41 (0.39)
Freedom House Score	0.8 (1.6)	2.43 (4.28)
Years Left in Current Term	0.34 (0.18) **	0.61 (0.21) ***
GDP Per Capita	1.03 (0.21)	2.73 (2.21)
Annual GDP	1.11 (0.30) ***	0.85 (0.07) *

Growth		
Constant		1.99 (1.80) **
Observations	538	538

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Taken together, the analyses suggest complementary patterns of state practices with respect to voting rights for non-citizen residents. When considering the geographical divide between Western countries and the rest of the world, the findings provide more insights. Judicial independence is found to be an important factor only for Western states and only one of the partisan composition of the government variables, a left-minority coalition, is significant for both Western and non-Western countries. While the effects of the cross-national convergence factors remain relatively unimportant in the West (as only Commonwealth membership and political globalization are significant and only in one of the specifications), they are important for non-Western countries. Both African Union and Commonwealth membership and political globalization have significant effects on the extension of the franchise to non-citizens in these countries, though only African Union membership works in the expected direction. Furthermore, electoral gain-calculations and tactics in the face of upcoming elections and economic growth appear to be relevant in non-Western contexts.

Chapter 5

I.   **Conclusion**

The boundaries of democracy and belonging to a polity have been in question since the end of World War II with the growing importance of international organizations and collaborations. Globalization, freer human movement, and the ubiquity of supranational organizations have been assumed to erode the traditional conceptualization of the state in which citizens are the only legitimate actors when it comes to shaping political decisions (Castles & Davidson, 2000; Soysal, 1994). This understanding of nation-state relations implies that belonging to a political community is defined on the basis of citizenship. Yet, the spread of liberal norms, human rights discourse and supranational institutions has been assumed to challenge the state's sovereignty within its borders and to constrain traditional nation-state relations. If these assumptions regarding the state's weaker sovereignty to regulate membership in a polity are true, it can be said that the meaning of democracy is changing, and the traditional understanding of democracy is facing an important challenge: in contrast to traditional conceptualizations, membership in a nation is no longer necessarily a criterion for membership in a political community. The enfranchisement of non-citizens lies at the intersection of rising transnational pressures and state sovereignty. Accounting for the reasons for varied state practices of alien suffrage is thus a good way to assess the assumptions regarding weaker state sovereignty.

Testing a variety of national political processes and cross-national convergence hypotheses, this thesis has aimed to contribute to ongoing discussions about democracy and citizenship in three ways: First, this study extends the sample size of previous studies of non-citizen enfranchisement, making it possible to test the validity of different explanatory factors in

different geographies. Second, it seeks to advance the discussion of factors that shape states'

decisions on the scope of the polity by using a new research method, a Cox proportional hazards

model. Third, it has tested the effect of a factor — immigrant proportions —that has been studied

mainly qualitatively, on the decision to grant the right to vote to aliens.

This research finds that despite global liberal norms' challenges to the traditional

understanding of democracy and political belonging, the state is still the main agent that shapes

the boundaries of belonging. Each democracy responds to the transnational challenges in unique

ways that reflect the importance of domestic political institutions and how nation-state relations

were formed.

These findings are also related to the discussion on democratic boundaries i.e. questions

of how one should conceptualize the political community and who the people are. This

discussion emphasizes the paradoxical relationship between non-citizen residents with no voting

rights and the idea of sovereign states with defined territories and people who have a say on how

they are governed. State sovereignty requires self-governance with exclusionary boundaries that

differentiate between those who are counted as members of the sovereign state and those who are

not. Yet, those boundaries result in the exclusion of a group of people who meet almost all of the

duties of citizenry, including paying taxes and compulsory military service in some countries, for

instance in the U.S.[21]. Growing globalism seems unlikely to solve this paradox of borders in the

near future as each sovereign state's socio-political characteristics remain more important than

transnational practices when it comes to enfranchising non-citizen residents. A recent study by

Arrighi and Bauböck (2017) similarly shows that citizenship status is the main determinant of

granting the right to vote to non-citizen residents at the national level.

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Our results show that when considering all sixty democracies, national political processes are important predictors of the scope of the political community. While the effect of the proportion of immigrants is found to be significant, it works contrary to theoretical expectations. The larger the immigrant proportion, the less likely states are to enfranchise non-citizens. On the other hand, as predicted, the partisan composition of the government and the degree of judicial independence are the main drivers of more liberalized non-citizen enfranchisement regimes. However, membership in an international organization, levels of political globalization, and colonial histories have all proved to be relatively weak determinants of alien suffrage.

When the socio-geographical divide between different parts of the world is considered, the findings provide important qualifications. Immigrant proportions, the ideological composition of the government, and judicial freedom are important predictors of non-citizen enfranchisement in Western countries. Even though Commonwealth membership and political globalization are significant predictors of the non-citizen enfranchisement regime, their effects run directly counter to the cross-national convergence thesis. Moreover, European Union membership and colonial legacies are found to shed no light on varied state practices of alien suffrage in the West. For non-Western states, on the other hand, the most important determinants of the boundaries of the polity appear to be cross-national convergence factors, namely membership in the African Union and/or the Commonwealth and the degree of a country's political globalization. Previous research found that membership in international organizations is important in Western contexts but did not gauge the impact of membership on non-Western states' enfranchisement regimes. However, this study shows that, whereas membership in IOs is actually a good determinant in the non-Western context, it is a weak predictor of enfranchisement-regimes in the West. Given that different factors work differently in the

Western and non-Western contexts, it is important to emphasize the need to refine the suggested explanations for alien suffrage with the help of further quantitative and qualitative studies.

Future research might also look at the impact of policy diffusion between geographically close countries, as some recent studies focus more on policy diffusion and conceptualize globalization's effects on nation states in terms of regional variations (Turcu & Urbatsch, 2014). Although a strong focus on regional proximities is likely to disregard the larger process of globalization, regional policy diffusion and the degrees of political globalization might have common effects on states' immigration policies. The practices of alien suffrage in Latin America provide an illustrative example of the impact of regional dynamics on immigration policies. Escobar (2015) showed how three regional markets in Latin America result in increased inter-state human and worker movement within the region, which led to more liberalized immigration policies in the Latin American states. Successful immigration policies in Colombia and Bolivia, for instance, provided a good opportunity for peer-learning and policy diffusion for Ecuador (Escobar, 2015, p. 941). This brought about similar immigration policies in the region.

Additionally, the effect of immigrant proportions on the rights accorded to non-citizens is an important area for future research. Although the main immigrant-attracting countries have not enfranchised their non-citizen residents yet, the impact of immigrant proportions should be tested on a wider range of rights in a larger sample of countries.

Related to immigrant proportions' impact on voting rights regimes, the strength of anti-immigrant parties, especially in Europe in the last two decades, is also a fruitful field for complementing the research on immigrant rights. Immigrant proportions have not only increased significantly since the turn of the century, but this upward trend has happened rapidly. The rapid increase in the immigrant share of the population has led to major policy problems for states and paved the way for stronger far-right parties with anti-immigrant stances. The strength of radical

right-wing parties is especially noticeable in the West in the last two decades. Many European anti-immigrant parties have secured significant support. The National Front in France, Alternative for Germany in Germany, the Finns Party in Finland, Jobbik in Hungary, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Danish People's Party in Denmark, and the Progress Party in Norway are all good examples of radical right-wing parties with substantial vote shares. Although almost all of the above-mentioned European states are important supporters and beneficiaries of an interconnected world, globalization and international human rights agreements, the growing political impact of the radical right and anti-immigrant stances also show the centrality of the state regarding immigration policies.

Studying the explanations for enfranchisement at different levels of government could also be an important complement to this research. The democratic theory literature suggests that there are factors that are specific to different levels of government and empirical studies are well suited to testing the effects of the suggested factors at the subnational level. Previous theoretical studies claimed that the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents is a local-level-specific phenomenon, while the enfranchisement of non-resident citizens is a nation-level practice (Arrighi & Bauböck, 2017). Further empirical studies could test whether this is the case and if so, why it is so and what different factors contribute to the decisions regarding alien suffrage at different levels of government.

I would like to conclude on a more theoretical note. This study fits in a complementary way vis-à-vis the broader body of political theory literature on the paradoxical relationship between the need of borders for the definition of democracy and the challenges posed by state boundaries to political belonging. While the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents raises important theoretical questions about the conceptualization of the *demos* and the functions of state borders when considering political belonging, the practice of granting voting rights to non-

resident citizens also touches on the same complex relation between democracy, borders, and political belonging. The enfranchisement of non-citizen residents and non-resident citizens should be handled together in future research. Discussion of the democratic boundaries and political belonging revolves as much around the suffrage for non-resident diaspora members as the enfranchisement of non-citizen residents. While the majority of empirical studies of voting rights focus either on non-citizen suffrage or on the enfranchisement of emigrants, our understanding of the ways through which traditional democracy has been affected by globalization may benefit from empirical studies that take account of both phenomena.

Appendix

Appendix A: Summary Statistics for Non-Citizen Enfranchisement Data

Summary Statistics for Non-Citizen Enfranchisement Data

Variables	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent Variable					
Voting Rights Granted to Non-Citizens	2,460	0.332	0.471	0	1
Independent Variables					
Immigrant Proportion	2,460	7.140	7.474	0.07	43.96
Right-Wing Government	2,460	0.310	0.463	0	1
Leftist Government	2,460	0.425	0.494	0	1
Left-Majority Coalition	2,460	0.105	0.306	0	1
Left-Minority Coalition	2,460	0.160	0.367	0	1
Judicial Independence	2,337	1.139	1.283	-2.766	3.302
European Union Membership	2,460	0.270	0.444	0	1
African Union Membership	2,460	0.0695	0.254	0	1
Commonwealth Membership	2,460	0.25	0.433	0	1
Political Globalization	2,460	70.00	21.32	8.232	99.54
Colonial Legacies	2,460	0.633	0.482	0	1
Control Variables					
Electoral System	2,460	0.611	0.488	0	1
Freedom House Score	2,460	0.238	0.426	0	1
Communist Period	2,460	0.0699	0.255	0	1
Years Left in Current Term	2,460	1.927	1.526	0	13
GDP Per Capita	2,185	15,283	17,187	10.78	119,225
Annual GDP Growth	2,123	2.999	3.771	-14.81	26.14

Appendix B: Correlation Table

Correlation between Independent and Control Variables

Immigrant Proportion	
Right-Wing Government	(Base category)
Leftist Government	1.06
Left-Majority Coalition	1.17
Left-Minority Coalition	1.18
Judicial Independence	0.60*
European Union Membership	-0.29
African Union Membership	-16.25***
Commonwealth Membership	-0.35

Political Globalization	-0.03
Colonial Legacies	-0.06
Electoral System	0.00
Communist Period	-17.01***
Freedom House Score	-0.09
Years Left in Current Term	-0.26*
GDP Per Capita	0.50*
Annual GDP Growth	-0.04
Observations	2460

Note: * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.

Appendix C: The Coding Rule for The Years and Levels of Enfranchisement

The coding rule for the sample countries' practices of non-citizen enfranchisement, years and

levels of enfranchisement:

Country	Year of the enfranchisement	Level of the enfranchisement
Argentina	2012	Local elections
Australia	—	No enfranchisement
Austria	—	No enfranchisement
Bahamas	—	No enfranchisement
Barbados	1991	Local elections
Belgium	1973	Local elections
Brazil	2001	Local elections
Bulgaria	—	No enfranchisement
Canada	—	No enfranchisement
Chile	1925	National elections
Costa Rica	—	No enfranchisement
Croatia	—	No enfranchisement
Cyprus	—	No enfranchisement
Czech Republic	2001	Local elections
Denmark	1981	Local elections
Estonia	2002	Local elections
Finland	1991	Local elections
France	—	No enfranchisement
Germany	—	No enfranchisement
Ghana	—	No enfranchisement
Greece	—	No enfranchisement
Guyana	1996	Local elections
Hungary	1990	Local elections
Iceland	1920	Local elections

India	—	No enfranchisement
Indonesia	—	No enfranchisement
Ireland	1963	Local elections
Israel	1960	Local elections
Italy	—	No enfranchisement
Jamaica	1900	Local elections
Japan	—	No enfranchisement
Latvia	—	No enfranchisement
Lithuania	2001	Local elections
Luxembourg	2003	Local elections
Malta	1993	Local elections
Namibia	—	No enfranchisement
Netherlands	1985	Local elections
New Zealand	1975	National elections
Norway	1983	Local elections
Panama	2009	National elections
Peru	1993	Local elections
Poland	—	No enfranchisement
Portugal	2000	Local elections
Romania	—	No enfranchisement
Sao Tome and Principe	—	No enfranchisement
Senegal	—	No enfranchisement
Serbia	—	No enfranchisement
Slovakia	2003	Local elections
Slovenia	2002	Local elections
South Africa	—	No enfranchisement
South Korea	2006	Local elections
Spain	2011	Local elections
Switzerland	—	No enfranchisement
Sweden	1976	Local elections
Taiwan	2007	National elections
Trinidad and Tobago	1967	Local elections
Tunisia	—	No enfranchisement
United Kingdom	2000	Local elections
United States of America	—	No enfranchisement
Uruguay	1952	National elections

Appendix D: The List of Countries That Dropped for The Study

The list of countries having scores of 1 to 2 on the Freedom House Index from 2013 to 2015, but

needed to be dropped for this study:

1. Andorra	2. Angola	3. Antigua and Barbuda	4. Belize
5. Benin	6. Cape Verde	7. Dominica	8. El Salvador
9. Grenada	10. Kiribati	11. Lesotho	12. Liechtenstein
13. Marshall Islands	14. Mauritius	15. Micronesia	16. Monaco
17. Mongolia	18. Nauru	19. Palau	20. Saint Kitts and Nevis
21. Saint Lucia	22. Saint Vincent and Grenadines	23. Samoa	24. San Marino
25. Suriname	26. Tonga	27. Tuvalu	28. Vanuatu

Appendix E: The List of Countries Included in The Study

The list of countries included in this study:

1. Argentina	2. Australia	3. Austria	4. Bahamas	5. Barbados
6. Belgium	7. Brazil	8. Bulgaria	9. Canada	10. Chile
11. Costa Rica	12. Croatia	13. Cyprus	14. Czech Republic	15. Denmark
16. Estonia	17. Finland	18. France	19. Germany	20. Ghana
21. Greece	22. Guyana	23. Hungary	24. Iceland	25. India
26. Indonesia	27. Ireland	28. Israel	29. Italy	30. Jamaica
31. Japan	32. Latvia	33. Lithuania	34. Luxembourg	35. Malta
36. Namibia	37. Netherlands	38. New Zealand	39. Norway	40. Panama
41. Peru	42. Poland	43. Portugal	44. Romania	45. Sao Tome and Principe
46. Senegal	47. Serbia	48. Slovakia	49. Slovenia	50. South Africa
51. South Korea	52. Spain	53. Sweden	54. Switzerland	55. Taiwan
56. Trinidad and Tobago	57. Tunisia	58. United Kingdom	59. United States of America	60. Uruguay

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