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**Islamic Values
&
Their Reflection in the
Iranian Elementary Textbooks:
Islamization in Post-Revolutionary Iran**

Mohammad J. Zarean

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Culture and Values in Education
Faculty of Education
McGill University, Montréal

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*"In the Name of Allah, the Beneficial, the Merciful
 O You whose name is the highest name to begin with,
 How can I uncover a letter without it? A Poem by Nazam"*



A passage from Fārsī, 3rd Grade, 1372 [1993], p.1.
 See p. 127.

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ABSTRACT

Author: Mohammad J. Zarean
Title: Islamic values and their reflection in the Iranian elementary textbooks: Islamization in post-Revolutionary Iran
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Degree sought: Ph.D.

Virtually from the outset of the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran, scholars began to study the event from different social, political and economic angles. Yet, the rapid speed of the Revolution, its predominantly Islamic character, and the numerous changes that have occurred during the last nineteen years remain sources of mystery to many students of this area. The goals and philosophy of education and its relation to the basic foundations of the Revolution is one issue however that has been given less consideration.

This thesis is an attempt to identify and study the cultural foundations and those religious values underlying the educational system of today's Iran. The study examines some of the elementary school textbooks from both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic eras, contrasting Pahlavi educational policy, which tended towards secularization, Westernization and de-Islamization of the country, with the attempt of the Islamic Republic to Islamize all aspects of society, including schools. The study especially looks at the relation between Islamic culture, religion and the curriculum. The study stresses that school plays a fundamental role in the Islamization of the post-Revolutionary Iranian society. How one defines Islamization, however, is crucial. This concept is clarified through a scrutiny of the process of Islamization visible in textbook reform by focusing on the spiritual, moral, social and political values in some school texts.

RÉSUMÉ

Auteur: Mohammad J. Zarean
Titre: Les valeurs islamiques et leur reflet dans les manuels de l'école primaire: l'Islamisation en Iran post-révolutionnaire
Département: Département de la Culture et des Valeurs en Éducation, Université McGill
Diplôme: Doctorat ès Philosophie

Depuis le début de la Révolution Islamique de 1978-79 en Iran, les spécialistes ont virtuellement entrepris l'étude de l'évènement à partir d'angles sociaux, politiques et économiques différents. Cependant, le développement rapide de la Révolution, son caractère islamique prédominant ainsi que les nombreux changements qui sont survenus durant les dix neuf dernières années demeurent un mystère pour de nombreux étudiants en ce domaine. Les objectifs et la philosophie de l'éducation, ainsi que sa relation avec les bases fondamentales de la Révolution est une question qui ne fut guère considérée.

Cette thèse tentera d'identifier et d'analyser les fondements culturels ainsi que les valeurs religieuses sous-jacentes du système éducationnel de l'Iran d'aujourd'hui. L'étude examine quelques manuels de l'école primaire, datant à la fois de l'époque Pahlavi et de la République Islamique, tout en contrastant les politiques éducationnelles des Pahlavis, qui visaient la sécularisation, l'occidentalisation et la déislamisation du pays, avec le principal effort de la République Islamique dont l'objectif est non seulement l'islamisation des écoles, mais aussi tous les aspects de la société. La recherche portera une attention particulière à la relation étroite existant entre la culture islamique, la religion et le curriculum adapté par le système d'éducation. L'étude insistera aussi sur le rôle fondamental de l'école dans l'islamisation de la société iranienne post-révolutionnaire. La question définissant l'islamisation est donc cruciale à cet égard. Ainsi, le concept devient plus clair grâce à un examen du processus d'islamisation, visible dans la réforme des manuels scolaires et ce, en se concentrant sur les valeurs spirituelles, morales, sociales et politiques de certains de ces textes.

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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION

The system of transliteration used in this thesis is the one employed by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, with the exception that Arabic prepositions are joined with the article “al” whenever they are followed by it.

	Arabic	Persian
ا		
ب	b	b
پ		p
ت	t	t
ث	th	s
ج	j	j
ح		ch
خ	h	h
د	kh	kh
ذ	d	d
ز	dh	z
ر	r	r
س	z	z
ش		zh
ص	s	s
ض	sh	sh

	Arabic	Persian
س	s	s
ض	d	z
ط	t	t
ظ	z	z
ع	c	c
غ	gh	gh
ف	f	f
ق	q	q
ك	k	k
ج		g
ل	l	l
م	m	m
ن	n	n
ه	h	h
و	w	w
ي	y	y

short vowels	ا a	إ i	و u
alif maqṣūrah	أ á		
long vowels	إ iya		
with tashdīd	أ ūwa		

long vowels	أ ā	إ ī	و ū
diphthongs	أ ay	أ aw	
tā marbūṭah in idāfah	أ ah		
	at		

However, those Arabic or Persian words that are used in English dictionaries are not transliterated in this thesis. Accordingly we will employ the spelling “ayatollah” and not “āyatullāh.” Also, there are some famous names and words that are frequently used in this thesis and are not transliterated. The exact transliteration of these names and the way they will be employed in this study is as follows:

Khumaynī	☞	Khomeini
Miṣbāh (Yazdī)	☞	Mesbah (Yazdi)
Muṭahharī	☞	Motahhari
Muḥammad Riḍā Shāh	☞	Mohammad Reza Shah
Ṭabāṭabā`ī	☞	Tabataba`i
Riṣā Shāh	☞	Reza Shah
‘ulamā`	☞	ulama

Introduction

Iran and the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution

Literature Review

This Study

Objectives and Questions

Scope of the Study

Methodology

Significance and Limitations

A Brief Overview of the Chapters

Socialization through Textbooks

Moral Values

Gender Role

Political Attitude

Critical Thinking Approach

INTRODUCTION

The Ministry of Education of Iran is of the view that education is a way of worshipping God, a concept which clearly indicates the relationship between education and religion. The motivation for this dissertation emanates from a desire to show and highlight the importance of this relationship, its merits and demerits in Iranian society. One way to examine this relationship is through an analysis of the actual texts used in Iranian schools. In this thesis I will analyze textbooks presently in use on "Persian language," "social studies" and "religious studies" from the first to the fifth grades at the elementary level. The study of the texts will illustrate what the Islamic Republic has been trying to accomplish in its attempt to establish Islamic religious values through educational institutions.¹

¹ Another consideration that induced me to undertake a study of Islamic education in present-day Iran has been the different depictions and understandings of both Islam and Iran. Despite the key role of religiosity in the Revolution it is given very little attention in most studies related to the 1979 Revolution. Moreover, because of different interpretations, personal beliefs and misunderstandings, the Revolution has not been properly weighed. Some examples of this approach towards Islam, Shi'ism and Iran may be found in H. Ozmon and Craver (1990), *Philosophical foundations of*

To do so, I will first give a brief account of Iran and the legacy of the 1978-79 Revolution, as well as an exposition of the transformation of values in education following that change in political system. I will also try to present in this introduction the argument of this thesis and a survey of its structure, including a literature review of the topic and an assessment of the objective, scope and methodology of this study. The last segment of this introduction elaborates on the reasons why this issue should be studied, focusing on the importance of studying “socialization through textbooks.”

IRAN AND THE 1978-79 ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Twenty years ago, on a cold January day, the city of Qum² in Iran was witness to an angry demonstration against an article printed in one of the state-run daily newspapers.³ The anonymous author⁴ claimed that the opposition to the monarchy was composed of a combination of “red” and “black” revolutionary groups. For the author of the article, “red” signified the communist parties who were dependent on the Eastern Bloc, mainly the USSR at that time. The “black” reactionary groups were, on the other hand, those religious groups and ulama (clerics) who were opposed to the monarchy and its Westernizing policies. The author of the article then applied some harsh epithets to Ayatollah Khomeini,⁵ one of the most

education, 4th ed. (Columbus: Merrill) p. 99; C E. Farah (1987), *Islam: Beliefs and observances*, 4th ed. (New York: Barron's), pp. 175-6, and S.D. Tansey, (1995), *Politics: The basics*, (New York: Routledge), p. 83.

² The city of Qum, located 150 km. to the south of Tehran, is the second holiest city of Iran, due to the presence there of the shrine of Fāṭima Maṣūma, sister of Imam ʿAlī al-Riḍā, the eighth Shīʿī Imam. The city is also the site of a major Shīʿī Islamic seminary.

³ *Intilāʾāt*, (Tehran) [a daily newspaper], no 15506, 17 Diy 1356 [7 January 1978].

⁴ The author was identified in the newspaper by the pen name Aḥmad Rashīdī Muṭlaq.

⁵ Ayatollah Sayyid Rūḥullāh Mūsawī Khomeinī (1900-1989), known as Imam Khomeini, was an Iranian Shīʿī leader and head of state (1979-1989). Arrested (1963) and exiled (1964) for his

respected clerics in the eyes of Iranians, then living in exile in Iraq. Parts of the article read:

Once again, on the occasion of the month of *Muḥarram* and the day of *‘Āshūrā*, the Red and Black colonies or, in other words, the cooperation of the new and old colonies, attracted all attention.... They looked for a cleric to be dependent on the colonizers... and they found him in Rūḥullāh Khomeini.⁶

The anger fuelling the protest lasted until the next day, when, at least on the surface, it came to an end. A few were killed and many were wounded, but what sets it apart was that it began a movement that was to end, one year later, with the deposition of the Pahlavi dynasty⁷ and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

There had been numerous similar occurrences in Iran during the previous century. However, certain aspects of the events of the 1978-79 Revolution have attracted the attention of scholars in different fields. Rapid change in the system, the participation of the majority of Iranians in demonstrations, the role of women, the leadership of clerics, and above all the establishment of a new political system in the country have been some of the major focuses of attention.

Politically, the Iranian Revolution ended the rule of a 2500 year-old monarchy, replacing it with a system of religious theocracy, officially known as the “Islamic Republic.” R. Graham describes the Revolution as one of the most stunning *political* reversals of the century.⁸ To

opposition to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's regime, he returned to Iran on the Shah's downfall (1979) and established a new constitution based on Islamic observations.

⁶ *Iḡlāl-ā' (Tehran)*, no 15506, 17 Dey 1356 [7 January 1978].

⁷ The Pahlavis were the dynasty that ruled Iran from 1926 to 1979.

⁸ R. Graham (1979), *Iran: The illusion of power*, (New York: St. Martin's Press), Italics added.

portray the event as merely a change in political structure, however, would illustrate only a small part of the effects of the Revolution. The impact of this event on every aspect of Iranian society has been far-reaching. The cultural foundations of the Revolution, which not only provided the basis for the Revolution, but also continued to play a role in forming the values of Iranian society, need to receive more consideration. The relationship between cultural values and education is one aspect of this, and an important one, particularly in the case of an Islamic state where education plays a key role in society. According to D. Menashri, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, was "a great believer in education -in its power both to destroy (if controlled by the imperialist powers) and to advance the people and the country (if employed by an Islamic regime).⁹ Considering these points, it is the intention of this thesis to focus on this aspect of the Revolution and the role of education in the years that have elapsed since there.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Besides the numerous political studies that discuss the Iranian Revolution,¹⁰ a considerable number of studies have also been written in reference to the cultural background of this uprising. Most of the authors of these works make a concerted effort to explain the causes of the Revolution through a theoretical consideration of the political culture of Iran. Some

⁹ D. Menashri (1992), *Education and the making of modern Iran* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 308.

¹⁰ See for instance M. Milani (1994), *The making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From monarchy to Islamic Republic*, (Boulder: Westview Press); A. Ehteshami (1995), *After Khomeini: The Iranian second republic*, (New York: Routledge); and S. A. Arjomand (ed.) (1988), *Authority and political culture in Shi'ism*, (Albany: State University of New York).

important studies have analyzed the relationship between politics and ideology¹¹, the role and influence of the religious order in the Iranian political process¹², and the political features of Iranian culture, nationalism¹³ and social change.¹⁴ Although these studies are helpful in understanding the Iranian Revolution, their predominantly political approach, as well as their neglect of the relationship between culture and education, are two important points that press for the undertaking of the research proposed here.

The studies that concentrate particularly on Iranian education suffer from the same -or even graver- defects. There are, nonetheless, a few useful works on this topic. David Menashri¹⁵ has presented a comprehensive analysis of the process of education in the course of the last 100 years of Iranian history. The author concentrates mainly on the Pahlavi era. However, his short analysis of education in post-Revolutionary Iran in the epilogue of his book provides some helpful clues. A comparison between Japan and Iran,¹⁶ and some short discussions regarding philosophy and trends in post-Revolutionary Iranian education are some of the limited works in this area.¹⁷

There is also some research regarding Iranian textbooks and the changes they have undergone after the Revolution. An article written by

¹¹ See e.g. H. Amirahmadi and M. Parvin (eds.) (1988), *Post-revolutionary Iran*, (Boulder & London: Westview Press).

¹² See e.g. M. R. Behnam (1986), *Cultural foundation of Iranian politics*, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press).

¹³ See e.g. M. M. Salehi (1988), *Insurgency through culture and religion: The Islamic Revolution of Iran*, (New York: Praeger Publishers).

¹⁴ See e.g. M. Kamrava (1990), *Revolution in Iran: The roots of turmoil*, (London: Routledge).

¹⁵ Menashri (1992), *Education and the making of modern Iran*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

¹⁶ F. Shahnazari (1992), *Modernization of education: A comparison of Japan and Iran*, (Japan: The Institute of the Middle East Studies).

¹⁷ B. Mohsenpour (1988), "Philosophy of education in post-revolutionary Iran," *Comparative Education Review*, 32 (1), pp. 76-86; F. Shahnazari (1992), *Modernization of education: A*

Mobin Shorish is a short but informative one, written in 1988.¹⁸ This research which is, according to the author, "about the effect of the 1979 Islamic Revolution on Iran's educational system,"¹⁹ "is based on an analysis of significant themes in a sample of the textbooks published in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) during the 1984-1985 academic years."²⁰ The author focused his examination in this study on Fārsī language texts for grades 1-5 at the elementary level, and some religious studies texts for grades 2-5 for both majority faith and religious minorities, as well as texts for the second year of the guidance cycle and Islamic perception texts (bīnīsh-i Islāmī) for *Dabīristān* (years 1-3 of the senior high school). Given the vast scope of the subject, the article is too concise to cover all the details. However, the author elaborates on the main alterations that took place after the Revolution.

"This fascinating issue," however, as D. Menashri argued in 1992, "has not been sufficiently studied yet."²¹ Moreover, in spite of these valuable studies, the question of the relationship between Iran's cultural background and the values of the current educational system in Iran can still be raised. As mentioned earlier, this aspect of education in Iran or even in Islam in general has been under-represented in recent scholarly work. Moreover, I can say that the study of Iranian textbooks, by and large, is still an untravelled path. It is hoped that the findings of this study will clarify some

comparison of Japan and Iran; R. E. Rucker (1991), "Trends in post-revolutionary Iranian education," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 21 (4), pp. 455-468.

¹⁸ M. Mobin Shorish (1988), "The Islamic revolution and education in Iran," *Comparative Education Review*, 32 (1), pp. 58-72.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Menashri, (1992), p. 320, footnote 62.

of the unknown areas in this field. Let us now look in more detail at the structure of this thesis.

THIS STUDY

Considering the above-mentioned studies in relation to Iran and its educational system under the Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic, and particularly in relation to textbooks, it is my intention to study the spiritual, moral, social and political Islamic values and their impact on education, particularly on textbooks, in modern Iran.

Objectives and Questions

This thesis aims to identify the cultural foundations and values of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 in order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the educational goals of Iran today. My interest in writing this dissertation is to establish a relationship between the dominant cultural patterns of Iranian society and the form and function of its educational system. In other words, it will be an attempt to elaborate on the relationship between culture, religion, politics and the educational system in Iran at this time. It will examine the ways in which certain cultural norms and orientations influence education in Iran.

Keeping this goal in mind, the first part of this study will examine the Iranian Revolution and its religious and particularly Islamic foundations. In its focus on education, the study will study the following questions:

1. What was the philosophy of education inherent in the culture of pre-Revolutionary Iran?
2. What educational philosophy is inherent in the culture of post-Revolutionary Iran?

3. Have political changes transformed social values in post-Revolutionary Iran, and if so, how?

4. What evidence, if any, exists in educational policy statements and in school textbooks to indicate an actual shift in the Iranian educational system?

5. If there has been a new value, then what impact has the new value paradigm had upon the Iranian educational system?

6. Does the educational system, irrespective of certain justified critiques, implement the values of the Revolution? In other words, are the "values of the Revolution," which is called Islamic by its leaders, and "Islamic values" identical? Does this system accurately mirror the present religious culture of the Iranian people?

Scope of the Study

The focus of this study is post-Revolutionary Iran. This period, however, cannot be studied in isolation from the pre-Revolutionary era. A comparison between these two periods would reveal a clearer picture of the current situation in Iran. Based upon this goal, I limit my study to the period of 1921-1997 (1300-1376 A.H.S.), i.e., the seventy-six years that have passed since the turn of the 20th century according to the Iranian calendar. It is also important to consider the long history of Islamic culture in this country as it plays a key role in understanding modern Iran. Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis will discuss Iran before Islam.

In terms of the topic, this study will focus on the history of Iran and Islam only from an educational and cultural perspective; it will examine only those transformations that were likely to have had an impact on the educational system in post-Revolutionary Iran.

Methodology

Due to the complexity of cultural studies, particularly in a country like Iran with its long and convoluted history, the task of trying to understand the role of culture in society is not an easy matter. To accomplish this, I will first of all draw upon my personal experience in Iran, where I lived for over thirty years under the governments of both regimes. The first eight years of my schooling -including five years in elementary level and three years in secondary level- constitute my direct experience in the field of education under the Pahlavi era. During these years I grew up studying the same texts which I will examine in this investigation. The content of these texts formed my childhood memories and structured my basic understanding of the world. Just prior to the end of the secondary level of my education I witnessed the occurrence of the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution and the participation of people in demonstrations. Finally, my higher educational experience occurred at the time of the first years of the Islamic Republic, when I had an opportunity to witness the struggle of the Iranian people against the Pahlavi regime and their efforts at establishing an Islamic government. These years of experience and observation allowed me to encounter different ideas and approaches towards social and educational problems in my country, Iran.

My educational background will, I believe, help me in terms of the Islamic points of view that this thesis must necessarily refer to. What further allows me to deal with educational issues from an Islamic point of view is a long period of study in the field of Islam. This has consisted of more than ten years of study in Iran and at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill

University,²² where I received my M.A. in this domain.²³ With the help of my personal experience and also my educational background, both in Islamic studies and education, I will combine the following methodologies in pursuing this topic.

First of all, a brief *historical review* of Iran and Islam's interaction may enable us to obtain a clearer picture of the background of the Iranian culture and of the Revolution. Besides some valuable studies which have been written on this topic, there is a great deal of useful information available in both historical literature and government documents for this purpose. Although the historical survey will not form a major part of the thesis, a brief overview will provide an essential foundation for the remainder of the discussion.

Content analysis forms the essence of this study, allowing us to highlight and evaluate the application of Islamic goals and philosophy in the curriculum. For this purpose I will analyze a selection of state-published textbooks from the time of the Pahlavis, and selection of state-designed textbooks used in the Islamic Republic today. Due to the Pahlavis' long reign, on the one hand, and in order to have a more comprehensive approach towards those texts, on the other, I have chosen at random a selection of textbooks used in the first to the fifth elementary

²² The Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University is one of the most important centers in this field in North America. The library of the Institute, with a collection of nearly one hundred thousand volumes provides a rich resource for research into Islamic civilization.

²³ My own MA thesis was written in the field of Islamic philosophy. See M.J. Zarean, "Sensory and imaginory perception according to Mullā Ṣadrā" (McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1996).

school grades during the period 1942 to 1978, as representative of the pre-Revolutionary period.²⁴

Among the texts brought out under the Islamic Republic, those for Persian Language (*kitāb-i Fārsī*) for grades 1-5 and religious studies (*ta'limāt-i dīnī*) and social studies (*ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī*) for grades 2-5 at the elementary grades (*dabistān*), which were published between the 1990 and 1994 academic years, are analyzed. The reason for choosing the textbooks of these years is that all of them constitute revised textbooks incorporating the most recent changes and final policies on the process of Islamization. Iranian students in elementary level grades, with some exceptions,²⁵ study five main texts, i.e. فارسی (*Fārsī* or Persian Language texts), علوم (*ulūm* or science), ریاضی

²⁴ The following is a more detailed descriptive reference regarding the texts that I used from the pre-Revolutionary period: 1. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1321 [1942], Kitāb-i Awwal Ibtidā'ī, 1st grade, Tehran: Kitfurūshī Muẓaffarī; 2. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1321 [1942], Kitāb-i Duwwum Ibtidā'ī, 2nd grade, Tehran: Shirkat-i Maṭbū'āt; 3. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1322 [1943], Kitāb-i Siwwum-i Ibtidā'ī, 3rd grade, Tehran: Shirkat-i Maṭbū'āt; 4. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1323 [1944], Kitāb-i Chahārum-i Ibtidā'ī, 4th grade, Tehran: Shirkat-i Maṭbū'āt; 5. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1330 [1951], Kitāb-i Duwwum-i Ibtidā'ī, 2nd grade, Tehran: Shirkat-i Maṭbū'āt; 6. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1344 [1965], Kitāb-i Awwal, 1st grade, Tehran: Sipāh-i Dānish; 7. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1343 [1964], Kitāb-i Duwwum, 2nd grade, Tehran: Sipāh-i Dānish; 8. Wizārat-i Amūzish wa Parwarish [Ministry of Education], 1345 [1966], Fārsī wa Dastūr, 5th grade, Tehran: Shirkat-i Sahāmi-yi Tab' wa Nashr-i Kitābhā-yi Darsī-yi Irān; 9. Wizārat-i Amūzish wa Parwarish [Ministry of Education], 1345 [1966], Fārsī wa Dastūr, 6th grade, Tehran: Shirkat-i Sahāmi-yi Tab' wa Nashr-i Kitābhā-yi Darsī-yi Irān; 10. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1321 [1942], Kitāb-i Panjum-i Ibtidā'ī Pīsarān, 5th grade, Tehran: Shirkat-i Maṭbū'āt; 11. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1340 [1961], Kitāb-i Siwwum, 3rd grade, Tehran: Sazmān-i Shāhanshāhī Khadamat-i Ijtimā'ī; 12. Wizārat-i Farhang [Ministry of Culture], 1340 [1961], Kitāb-i Chahārum, 4th grade, Tehran: Sazmān-i Shāhanshāhī Khadamat-i Ijtimā'ī; 13. Wizārat-i Amūzish wa Parwarish [Ministry of Education], 2536 [1977], Fārsī, 2nd grade, Tehran: Sazmān-i Shāhanshāhī Khadamat-i Ijtimā'ī; 14. Wizārat-i Amūzish wa Parwarish [Ministry of Education], 2536 [1977], Fārsī, 3rd grade, Tehran: Sazmān-i Shāhanshāhī Khadamat-i Ijtimā'ī; 15. Wizārat-i Amūzish wa Parwarish [Ministry of Education], 2537 [1978], Fārsī, 3rd grade, Tehran: Sazmān-i Shāhanshāhī Khadamat-i Ijtimā'ī; 16. Wizārat-i Amūzish wa Parwarish [Ministry of Education], 1357 [1978], Fārsī, 4th grade, Tehran: Sazmān-i Shāhanshāhī Khadamat-i Ijtimā'ī.

²⁵ There is no religious or social studies textbook designated for the first grade.

(*riyāḍī* or math), تعلیمات دینی (*ta'limāt-i dīnī* or religious studies) and تعلیمات اجتماعی (*ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī* or social studies). Social Studies include history, geography and civil studies. As already mentioned, we will be looking at the textbooks for *Fārsī*, *ta'limāt-i dīnī* and *ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī* at the elementary level (grades 1-5).²⁶ Let us look at some more details regarding these three textbooks.

Fārsī is a text that deals with the Persian language and explains some simple principles of grammar. Examples of some parts of the text are provided in Appendix A. The *Fārsī* text usually includes some poems from the great Persian poets, some stories on various subjects, some general information regarding different issues and some excerpts from classical writings. After each lesson there is an explanation of a list of new vocabularies and grammar, as well as some questions regarding the given topic. At the end of each lesson, related homework is given.

The *Ta'limāt-i dīnī* (religious studies) textbook is devoted to teaching Islamic doctrine. Some samples from the text are illustrated in this thesis where we analyze them, and also in Appendix B. The book is normally divided into four parts. The first part discusses Islamic principles (*uṣūl-i dīn*), while the second section focuses on Islamic morality and behavior. The third part deals particularly with the issue of the imamate²⁷ and the Imāms' lifestyle, and the last part consists of an explanation about Islamic rituals. There is no course in religious studies for the first grade.

²⁶ For these texts see Jumhūrī-y- Islāmī-yi Irān, Wizārat-i Amūzish wa Parwarish [Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Education], (Tehran: Sāzmān-i Kitābhā-yi Darsī).

²⁷ There would be more explanation about this issue in our discussion on Shi'ism in the next chapters.

The *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī* (social studies) textbook includes three main parts, i.e. geography, history, and civic studies. Some samples from this textbook are also shown in Appendix C.²⁸ The texts, as already indicated, are state-published and are used in all regions of the country. Under the supervision of a particular organization,²⁹ the texts are re-published every year with occasional alterations in both content and form. While some of these changes are related to the necessity for diversity, their main justification may be traced back to newly acquired experiences and different interests on the part of the government and cultural administration. The authors of the texts are usually male or female scholars who are either teachers or specialists in the field. In some cases, where the author is unknown, the text is ascribed to a group of specialists working within the Organization of Textbooks. The authors of religious texts are mostly clerics who have a background in Islamic studies.

The content of these books, their chosen themes, and their general message will be analyzed in this thesis. In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding for each topic of spiritual, moral, social, and political values, I will first study the related text(s) separately to discern the subjects, themes, and lessons. I will, then, gather all related concepts dealing with each of the above-mentioned values in a table that shows the application of the concepts in the texts. The table will show, in addition, the percentage of the application. From this analysis, I will then proceed with discussion of

²⁸ The last part of the *Ta'limāt-i Ijtimā'ī* (social studies) textbook is devoted to some political issues, which we will discuss in Chapter Seven of this thesis.

²⁹ The Office of Planning and Compiling Textbooks (*daftar-i barnāmirizī wa ta'līf-i kitābhā-yi darsī*), under the Ministry of Education, is in charge of compiling textbooks for all grades.

the concepts that appear frequently in the texts. At the same time, I will examine the relation between the applied concept and the Islamic standpoint on that subject. For instance, in spiritual values, I will study the values expressed and their relation to the basic principles of Islam, i.e. *uṣūl al-dīn*.

Finally, a *philosophical inquiry* will be used to take the study beyond the texts. By this I mean that I will scrutinize the religious, theological, and rational arguments that underpin educational policy in today's Iran. I will analyze the philosophy behind the 1978-79 Revolution, and also the philosophy of education in Iran today, which is based on the Islamic philosophy of education. Some notions pertaining to this issue have been explicitly stated by Iranian government officials. Analysis will be made based on these declarations. There will be a focus, in presenting the Islamic point of view, on the theories and standpoints of the most recent Muslim scholars in Iran who have contributed to the field of education, namely Sayyid Moḥammad Ḥusein Ṭabāṭabā'ī (hereinafter Tabataba'ī) (1892-1981)³⁰, Murtaḍā Muṭahhari (hereinafter Motahhari) (1920-1979)³¹, and Mohammad Taqī Mesbah Yazdi (hereinafter Mesbah) (1934-),³² as well as a number of others.

³⁰ Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusein Ṭabāṭabā'ī (1892-1981), known as Allama Ṭabāṭabā'ī, is a celebrated exegetist and philosopher among modern Shī'ī scholars. He was born in 1892 in Tabriz, Iran. Besides his more than forty books and treatises in different Islamic fields, his famous commentary on the *Qur'ān* entitled *al-Mīzān* in twenty volumes is one of the most notable in its field. For more information about his life, writings and philosophy see Nasr, S. H. (1969), "Introduction to Shī'a dar Islām" (Qum: Dār al-Tabligh); al-Awsī (1991), *The method of Ṭabāṭabā'ī in al-Mīzān*, translated into Persian by Mirjalili, (Tehran: Sazman Tablighat-i Islami).

³¹ Ayatollah Murtaḍā Muṭahhari was born in Mazinān, Mashhad. He was a religious scholar, philosopher and a influential ideologue of the Islamic Revolution. He was murdered immediately after the Revolution by a terrorist group. His written works, which exceed fifty titles in different fields of Islamic thought, are being greatly considered now in Iran.

³² Ayatollah Muhammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī (hereinafter Mesbah) was born in the city of Yazd, Iran. He carried out his elementary education there. He then went to Najaf, Iraq, then to Qum (where he lives

The combined historical and philosophical overview will provide a comparative perspective on the philosophy of education during the Pahlavi era and in the time of Ayatollah Khomeini. To accomplish this, I will concentrate on the words and policies of the political leaders of both eras, i.e. the Shah and Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini's thoughts are analyzed from a collection of his sayings and writings entitled *Dar justujū-yi rāh-i Imām az kalām-i Imām* [Seeking the way through the Imām's words].³³ For the Shah's ideas, besides some documents and historical sources, I will refer to his book *Ma'mūrīyat barāyi waṭanam* [A mission to my country].³⁴ This will involve a comparison between the general characteristics of these two eras on the one hand, and their different philosophy regarding Islamic education on the other.

Significance and Limitations

A research topic can be a matter of interest and significance due to various factors. Among others, the novelty of a topic is one of the criteria. A great transformation, a noted movement, a leading ideology or the like may also justify one's attention. The importance of the topic under study, because of its crucial role in a society, can be another element in this regard.

All of the above-mentioned elements come together in the case of the educational system of post-Revolutionary Iran. On the one hand, despite different studies of the social history of this period, the shifts in the educational system are

at present) to complete his high Islamic Studies. He studied with teachers such as Ayatollahs Khomeini and Tabataba'i in subjects like jurisprudence, philosophy and exegesis of the *Qur'ān*. He is the author of more than twenty books, the most important of which are *The teaching of the Qur'ān* in 8 volumes and *Teaching Philosophy* in 2 volumes.

³³ A Group of editors (1982), *Dar justujū-yi rāh az kalām-i Imām*, [Seeking the way through the Imam's words (a collection of Ayatollah Khomeini's lectures and statements)], Tehran: Amīr Kabīr.

³⁴ Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza (1966), *Ma'mūrīyat barāyi waṭanam* [A mission to my country], (Tehran)

given little consideration. On the other, one can hardly isolate the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution from its ideological principles or the religious values that appear presently in the textbooks. This interrelation between ideological beliefs and values, on the one hand, and educational goals on the other, is the essential subject of this study.

The official slogan of the Islamic Republic defines the country as a "non-Western, non-Eastern (non-Marxist), Islamic Republic."³⁵ The term "Republic," however, according to this way of thinking, is not derived from the traditional idea of republican government. In other words, the Revolution was not simply an alteration from a monarchical system to a presidency. Rather, it was meant to express the notion of a totally different society, distinct from that of pre-Revolutionary Iran, in which social organization, culture, law, and even the definitions of human being and society themselves are understood in an entirely different way.³⁶ While in the pre-Revolutionary period, Iranian citizens, based on the policy of nationalism and secularism, were subjected to a policy of de-Islamization, the educational goals of the Islamic Republic look to the creation of the Islamic person, who is God-fearing, learned and brave.³⁷ This study reveals the differences and provides a comprehensive understanding of Iranian culture, society and education.

Despite its significance, certain factors may set a limit to the study to some extent. This may be due either to the nature of the topic or the sources.

³⁵ The slogan was used by people in their demonstration against the Pahlavi regime and is now inscribed on the main entrance of the Foreign Ministry of Islamic Republic.

³⁶ M. M. Salehi (1988), *Insurgency through culture and religion: The Islamic Revolution of Iran*, p. 11.

³⁷ M. Mobin Shorish (1988), "The Islamic revolution and education in Iran," *Comparative Education Review*, 32 (1), p. 60.

Limitations include the following:

1. The nature of the new state and its revolutionary character have caused some instability in various aspects of education. Some of the textbooks, particularly the elementary school ones, were revised after the success of the Revolution. However, in many cases, these changes have continued year after year, and changes are still being implemented. Our ability to reach a final conclusion is tempered by the fact that our sources continue to change.

2. Some valuable studies are available which examine Iranian culture, but work on the impact of culture on education has been less widely considered. This gap in the background knowledge of the study may cause some limitations to our understanding; at the same time filling this void presents one of the most pressing motives for the completion of this study.

3. Various factors, including textbooks, national education policy and the role of religious and social institutions were of considerable importance in the process of transforming values after the Revolution. Our main concern in this study, however, where the focus is on textbooks, prevents us from extending our attention to these other fields. Nevertheless we have dedicated a small part of chapters four to seven to a discussion of the educational goals and policies under the Islamic Republic.

A Brief Overview of the Chapters

As this research is designed to be, on the one hand, a comparative study of two periods in the contemporary history of Iran, and on the other, an analytical study of the philosophy of education in post-Revolutionary Iran and its reflection in Iranian elementary textbooks, I have divided the whole study into two parts.

The first part discusses the religious identity of Iranians and reviews educational goals and policies both before and after the Revolution. The second part consists of a more detailed treatment of the main purpose of this study, which is to discuss the issue of Islamization of education and its impact on values in textbooks. Chapters four to seven will be devoted to discussing different aspects of Islamic values included in the textbooks. Spiritual, moral, social, and political values are the four main subject areas that will be studied in these chapters respectively.

SOCIALIZATION THROUGH TEXTBOOKS

The relationship between society and the individual is an important subject for educational researchers who study the social, political and economic impacts of education on people, and especially the ways in which successive generations are influenced by education. To quote Michael Apple,

Education is deeply implicated in the politics of culture. The curriculum is ... always part of a *selective tradition*, someone's selection, some group's vision of legitimate knowledge. It is produced out of the cultural conflicts, tensions, and compromises that organize and disorganize a people.³⁸

Educational institutions serve as one of the fundamental building blocks of a society, and are among the most influential channels for socializing children according to the desired values and attitudes of a particular society. A number of different agents in the educational domain facilitate this socialization. Textbooks, which may contain the most direct information impacting on a child's value system, can be considered among the most

³⁸ M. W. Apple (1996), *Cultural politics and education*. (New York: Teacher College Press), p. 22.

important agents, specifically in case of those educational systems having an authoritarian structure.³⁹

Developmental psychologists believe that two major factors form the personality of a human being. The first is the inherited or genetic factors and the second is environmental factors; both interact continuously to develop a human being.⁴⁰ Speaking of the many complex ways in which human beings develop into individuals and members of society, William R. Avison and John H. Kunkel hold that:

Socialization refers to such additional factors as the acquisition and acceptance of the ideas, beliefs, behaviors, roles, motives, and thought patterns of a particular culture -and various subcultures- at a certain time in history.⁴¹

Using the concepts of acquisition and acceptance, this definition underlines the active role human beings play in the process of socialization. As Joan E. Sieber states, "beginning with birth an individual learns the expectations of society, acquires sensitivity to the pressures and obligations of group life, and learns to get along with others."⁴² In the recent work of DeMarrais and LeCompte (1995), *The way schools work*, socialization refers

³⁹ For more information about this issue see e.g. Lin J. (1991), *The Red Guards' Path to Violence*, New York: Praeger and Charles Price Ridley, et al. (1971) *The making of a model citizen in communist China* (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution Press).

⁴⁰ The debate in social sciences, for many years, "has centered on the extent to which human behavior is affected by biological factors as opposed to social or environmental influences." Avison and Kunkel have examined the debate about *nature verses nurture* in their informative article. See William R. Avison and John H. Kunkel (1991), "Socialization," in Teevan, J. J. (ed.) *Introduction to sociology: A Canadian focus*, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada), pp. 55-87. For more information about this psychological debate see R. L. Atkinson et al. (1987), *Introduction to psychology*, 9th ed. (USA: HBJ), p. 62.

⁴¹ Avison and Kunkel (1991), "Socialization," in Teevan, J. J. (ed.) *Introduction to sociology: A Canadian focus*, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada), p. 55.

⁴² Joan E. Sieber (1980), "A social learning theory approach to morality," in Myra Windmiller et al. (eds.) *Moral development and socialization* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon), p. 156.

to "the process of teaching and learning behaviors, values, roles, customs and the like considered appropriate in a society."⁴³

Language and learning are two major factors in socialization. *Language*, first as a product of socialization and later as a tool for further cultural learning plays a significant role. Children begin learning language several years before they encounter textbooks in schools. Nevertheless, textbooks help them improve both writing ability and verbal communication once they enter school. During the years of schooling, textbooks, as a direct and continuous method of imparting information to children, influence them more than any other source. To a great extent, teachers base the lessons they give on these written materials; as a result, children may communicate with their teachers through the texts. The second process of socialization, inseparable from language, is *learning*. Through the process of learning children acquire specific beliefs that influence their behavior in daily life.⁴⁴

Textbooks integrate these two elements, that is language and learning. On the one hand, they function as a tool for improving language, while on the other, they serve as silent teachers in the process of imparting knowledge to the children who read them. As they participate in a process which enables children to understand language, typifying and stabilizing meaning in accordance with the common reality shared by other members of society, textbooks also transmit socially shared rules to the individual's belief system.⁴⁵

⁴³ K. B. DeMarrais, and M. D. LeCompte (1995) *The way schools work: A sociological analysis of education*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman), p. 322.

⁴⁴ Avison and Kunkel (1991), p. 62.

⁴⁵ See C. A. Bowers (1977), "Cultural literacy in developed countries," *Prospects*, 7(3), pp. 323-335.

Since modeling and imitation play a significant role in learning, textbooks offer an important opportunity to present the desired model which can then modify child behavior through vicarious reinforcement; just as children will imitate behavior they have observed at home or in the classroom, they will imitate behavior they have read about in textbooks. Based on the close link between textbooks and modeling and imitation, I think it is worthwhile to consider textbooks seriously and to study their essential role in socializing children.

In addition to paying attention to the role of the basic elements of heredity and environment in a child's development and socialization, the role of the child as an independent human being should not be ignored. Every human being possesses some innate characteristics, including, in my view, free will, which she or he can use to offset or overcome the influence of society. It is in this sense that while environmental and biological factors are the main factors in forming the personality, they do not have absolute power over a human being, as his or her own free will, may change their effect. Socialization may negate or compress the intrinsic tendencies (including innate capacities and desires) of human beings as it may also actualize and develop them. It cannot, however, create or destroy such tendencies. Simply put, society cannot replace innate characteristics, although it may interfere with the natural development of these characteristics in either negative or positive ways.

Socialization, based on cultural values, may also modify the object of natural human characteristics. For instance, every human being appreciates beauty in the world around us; this can take the form of a delicate rose, a gorgeous sunset, a precious Ming vase, or it may be all three that attract an individual's attention; it

may be something else entirely. Social or cultural influence may directly play a role in helping the individual to choose the subject of his/her innate drive: the drive itself, however, is not created by socialization. These limitations on socialization, however, are in need of further explanation and interpretation, a study that lies beyond the scope of this paper.

Textbooks are only one of the ways through which different social institutions expose children to social values. Other institutions may also exercise a direct influence on children. The family, the media, popular culture or political and social institutions -directly or indirectly- may affect their value system. Given the role of government in most educational systems, influences on education may come largely from dominant groups,⁴⁶ and may render the school one of those agencies that prevent alternative views from gaining an audience or establishing their legitimacy.⁴⁷ Schoolbooks, as a part of the educational institution, have a considerable effect on students. They are, in turn, influenced by other political, economic, religious and cultural institutions. To quote Reynolds, "the textbooks of a nation are generally a reflection of the values, goals, and essential priorities of that particular society." Nevertheless, it is also evident that they are influenced by the knowledge and beliefs of the people who write them.⁴⁸ In the case of textbooks that are not published by the state, publishers try to make their books appear as current as possible to increase their market appeal. However, state-published textbooks, formed by powerful political and economic forces, are more likely to reflect specific chosen values.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ De Marrais and LeCompte (1995), pp. 17-18.

⁴⁷ See McLaren (1984), *Life in school* (New York: Longman).

⁴⁸ John C. Reynolds (1981), "Textbooks: guardians of nationalism," *Education* 102 (1), pp.37-42.

⁴⁹ See D. Glynis (1996), "The forest-related content of children's textbooks: 1950-1991," *Sociological Inquiry*, 66 (1), p. 85.

Textbooks may be considered from another angle, as an active agent in transferring the effects of social institutions to children. It is acknowledged that schools play a significant role both in reproducing social structure and in the transmission of ideology. Textbooks form a central part of the academic curriculum.⁵⁰ Daniels quotes an observer who said:

The teacher explained some points and added a touch of personal experience, but spent most of the time directing the attention of the students to the information contained in the readings.⁵¹

It is worth mentioning that textbooks do not act in an explicit and outspoken way; on the contrary, they exert their influence in a quiet, subtle manner, imprinting their beliefs and ideology through the most effective method, that of silence. Although textbooks look simple, they speak to children in a fluent and powerful way, using inexplicit but complex means such as content, the size and breadth of text, pictures, questions, and colors. Textbooks may in fact be called a child's closest companion. A textbook accompanies the child at home, in school and in fact all the time. It does not leave the child's mind even when the child leaves it in her/his bag, at home or in school. The child may think about the text, dream about it, talk to it; in short, the child lives and grows with the textbook. The impact of textbooks in transmitting social values, beliefs, customs, etc. to children pertains especially in the following areas, although it is important to keep in mind that this is not an exhaustive list.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 86.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Moral Values

The question of socialization and moral values is related to other questions such as whether or not values can be taught and whether or not it is feasible to introduce moral education into a school curriculum.⁵² The question is not a new one. Some theorists neither believe in teaching values, nor do they see the school as a moral transmitter. The school of Values Clarification, which associates teaching values with such words as 'inculcating,' 'instilling,' 'fostering,' 'moralizing,' 'imposition,' and 'brainwashing' is one manifestation of this attitude.⁵³

Others, among them modern structuralists such as Kohlberg and Piaget, however, acknowledge the possibility of moral education programs.⁵⁴ In some ways, the question of socialization and moral values is related to the issue of relativism versus absolutism in ethics. It is my view, in fact, that based on the approach of absolutism in ethics, moral values *can* and *should* be taught to children. It is worth mentioning that this is not incompatible with developing a critical spirit in our children. It simply recognizes the fact that every society has its own values, and that members of that society have the right to preserve these values by transmitting them to future generations. To paraphrase Gabler and Gabler, "a nation that does not teach its values to its youth is committing intellectual suicide."⁵⁵ At the same time, by maintaining a critical viewpoint, every society can benefit from new perspectives provided by children to improve their

⁵² For more information about the relationship between morality and socialization see Myra Windmiller et al. (1980), *Moral development and socialization*, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon).

⁵³ Chazan (1985), *Contemporary approaches to moral education: Analysing alternative theories*, (New York: Teacher College Press), p. 60.

⁵⁴ A short but informative study on the relation between morality and socialization has been done by Myra Windmiller (1980) in introduction to *Moral development and socialization*, pp. 1-33.

⁵⁵ M. Gabler and N. Gabler (1982), "Mind control through textbooks," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 64 (2), p. 96.

culture. Read in this way, textbooks can serve as useful and appropriate tools for this kind of transmission.

Gender Role

The ways in which forces like family, peers, school and society at large tend to socialize young people, in relation to gender role, need to be considered in a socio-educational context. In her discussion of this issue, Greenglass considers books to be important agents of gender socialization. She then adds:

Books do provide children with gender-role models or examples of what they should strive for, along with clear instructive messages about normative or acceptable behavior. In particular, the messages in children's books convey quite clearly the differential evaluation of females and males that is found in our society.⁵⁶

Recent researchers have investigated the role of textbooks in this field more than in any other area. They challenge today's textbooks, which they say present a clearly biased and sexist view of society and social roles based on gender.⁵⁷ In order to examine factors that may deter girls' interest in science, Potter and Rosser analyzed five seventh-grade life-science textbooks for sexism in language, images and curricular content, as well as for features of activities that have been found to be useful in motivating girls.⁵⁸ They concluded that although overt sexism was not apparent, there were subtle forms of sexism in the selection of language, images.

⁵⁶ Greenglass, Esther (1982), *A world of difference: Gender roles in perspective* (Toronto: John Wiley & sons), p. 58.

⁵⁷ Studies done by researchers show that textbooks take thoroughly different approaches towards girls and boys. An American study of 134 elementary school readers and 2760 stories indicates that sexist stereotypes of boys and girls are reflected in more than fifteen characters. Ibid., pp. 59-63.

⁵⁸ Ellen F. Potter and Sue V. Rosser (1992) "Factors in life science textbooks that may deter girls' interest in science," *Journal of Research in Science Teaching*, 29 (7), pp. 669-689.

and curricular. According to them, “none of the five textbooks is ideal; all suffer from several forms of sexist bias.”⁵⁹ This underlying sexism has a direct influence on the social behavior of girls. Considering textbooks to be a part of the “hidden curriculum,” Bazler and Simonis assert that textbooks carry subtle messages about science and science careers. In explaining the effects of these messages, they add: “at the age of 9, girls express more interest in science-related activities than boys; yet, by age 17, boys are the predominant gender in elective physical science courses.”⁶⁰

Gender and textbook will be one of the objectives of our study. We will see in some of the subsequent chapters how textbooks play a role in presenting different values, particularly social values, to both male and female students.⁶¹

Political Attitude

Even in the so-called democratic countries one can easily notice the impact of political attitudes on textbooks.⁶² Apple asserts:

In fact the most powerful economic and political groups in the United States and similar nations have made it abundantly clear that for them a good education is only one that is directly tied to economic needs (but of course, only as these needs are defined by the powerful).⁶³

This impact is most obvious in the case of state-published textbooks. While state control over educational materials may have both positive and

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 682.

⁶⁰ Judith A. Bazler and Doris A. Simonis (1990), “Are women out of the picture?: sex discrimination in science texts,” *The Science Teacher*, 57(9), p. 25.

⁶¹ For more informatio see e.g. chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁶² For more on the role of the state in education see De Marrais and LeCompte (1995), pp. 17-18 and chapter 6.

⁶³ M. W. Apple (1996), p. 5.

negative aspects, it is obvious that these kinds of texts exhibit a clear reflection of state policies and goals in general, particularly in education.⁶⁴ This impact may be purely political or may at times appear in the form of a combination of political and non-political ends. In the case of China, for example, "the emphasis in the *Readers*," according to Ridley et al. "is, essentially, divided between attempts to mold those characteristics required in a modernizing nation and those characteristics required for a realization of a thorough political and social revolution."⁶⁵

Nationalism is probably the most common and explicit subject of political interest that textbooks promote in every nation. The close relationship between textbooks and nationalism, as a global phenomenon, indicates the role of education in general, and textbooks in particular, in political efforts. Unlike Reynolds,⁶⁶ I believe that in addition to textbooks in reading, social studies and literature, all other school textbooks, including even mathematics, chemistry and physics books are concerned with promoting nationalism. Images of the national flag, the state currency and national stamps are some examples from mathematics texts. Introducing and discussing only the contributions of native scientists while ignoring those of non-native scientists is another way in which nationalism is introduced into science books.

⁶⁴ Some applications of this kind of impact in the case of China may be seen for example in J. Lin (1991). *The red guards' path to violence* (New York: Praeger), pp. 86 ff.

⁶⁵ Charles Price Ridley, et al. (1971) *The making of a model citizen in communist China* (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution Press.), p. 10. See also pp. 39 and 87 on the same issue.

⁶⁶ John C. Reynolds (1981), "Textbooks: guardians of nationalism," *Education*. 102(1), p.37.

Critical Thinking Approach

The processes of socialization and critical thinking can be connected. Critical thinking can be studied as a product of social interactions, both in schools and in other types of social institutions. By playing a transformative role or stimulating more questions, textbooks may influence the student's experience of encountering social phenomena. I think the use of rational thought is an innate feature of every human being, based on which humankind differs from animals. By creating a more critical atmosphere, textbooks may allow individuals to access this innate characteristic. A critical person must possess initiative, independence, courage and imagination. As Passmore explains, to encourage the critical spirit, schools, teachers and texts must develop an enthusiasm in students for the give-and-take of critical discussion.⁶⁷

The critical approach, however, may also be considered from a completely different angle in which one can see the impact of the individual on society. Socialization is a successful process whenever a human being -consciously or unconsciously- imitates his/her society in different ways. The impact of society on the individual contrasts with the impact of the individual on society, in the sense that individual can change, in some cases, societal principles and attitudes. It is beyond the limitations of this study to analyze this process. However, it is through freedom of thought and/or the critical spirit of an individual that a society experiences change and development. Unlike philosophers, such as

⁶⁷ See John Passmore (1989), "On teaching to be critical," in R. S. Peters, (ed.) *The concept of education*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 198. For more information on this topic see also

Hegel,⁶⁸ Spencer⁶⁹ and Marx,⁷⁰ who see limited role for the individual in social change, but justify all changes on the basis of historical rules, almost all sociologists today believe that the individual has this ability in relation to her/his society and even to the whole world as a greater society. This is a reasonable result of the critical approach.

Finally, there are a number of minor points worthy of note in connection with the process of the impact of textbooks on children. Although textbooks determine both the content and structure of the major part of classroom instruction, they are not the only factor, nor do they have much impact without the guidance of teachers, parents or even the whole of society. Teachers play a crucial role in transforming the meanings, interpreting the texts and highlighting certain parts rather than others. Other influential factors also have an effect on a child and offer her/him new models of behavior. Take just one component of this societal curriculum: television. According to one estimate, by the time of graduation, the average US high school senior will have spent 12,000 hours in the classroom and 15,000 hours in front of the television set.⁷¹ The question must then be raised as to

Harvey Siegel (1980), "Critical thinking as an educational ideal," *The Educational Forum*. XLV(1), pp. 7-23.

⁶⁸ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), a German philosopher, proposed that truth is reached by a continuing dialectic. His major works include *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1817) and *The Philosophy of Right* (1821).

⁶⁹ Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), a British philosopher, attempted to apply the theory of evolution to philosophy and ethics in his series *Synthetic Philosophy* (1855-1893).

⁷⁰ Karl Marx (1818-1883), a German philosopher, economist, and revolutionary, wrote with the help and support of Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) and *Das Kapital* (1867-1894). These works explain historical development in terms of the interaction of contradictory economic forces. They form the basis of all communist theory, and have had a profound influence on the social sciences.

⁷¹ Carlos E. Cortés, and Dan B. Fleming. (1986). "Introduction: Global education and textbooks." *Social Education* 50(5), p. 342.

whether all these institutions are directed toward the same goal and offer the same kind and quality of guidance.⁷²

The children in a given classroom may encounter the same text featuring the same content, pictures and questions. However, from a hermeneutic point of view, they may not arrive at the same meaning. Here again the role of teachers, peers and others, especially the child's background information regarding the concept, play a notable role in elaborating the meaning and weakening the impact of textbooks.

According to Cortés, "Textbooks obviously have an impact on students' attitude"⁷³; indeed one of their major functions is to teach societal norms to children. But, as Cortés further states, "they do not monopolize the educational process."⁷⁴ The role of society in transferring values can sometimes overcome the role of textbooks. The student comes to school with a functional knowledge of many aspects of the culture which has been learned through interaction with others.⁷⁵ No textbooks in any society invite students, for instance, to become involved with drugs or commit crimes, yet these problems continue to plague many societies, however. Alongside textbooks and schools, the informal societal curriculum of family, peer groups, neighborhoods, religious centers, organizations, mass media and other socializing forces "educate" all of us throughout our lives.⁷⁶

⁷² De Marrais and LeCompte (1995), p. 123.

⁷³ Cortés and Fleming (1986), p.342.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Bowers, C.A. (1977). "Cultural literacy in developed countries," *Prospects*. 7(3), p. 328.

⁷⁶ See Carlos E. Cortés. (1981) "The societal curriculum: implications for multiethnic education," in James A. Banks (ed.) *Education in the 80's: Multiethnic education*. (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association), p. 24.

Part I

Social Change & the Context of Islamization of Iranian Education

The first part of this thesis is intended as an explanation of the foundation and evolution of Iranian culture in recent decades. As an introduction to the discussion, I will proffer in the first chapter a general view of Iranian culture from the Sassanid period, when Zoroastrianism predominated, to the emergence of Islam and then down to the present time. The second chapter will examine the culture and values, and based on them, the educational goals and policies under the Pahlavis. Finally the third chapter will explore the same issue in post-revolutionary Iran.

Chapter 1

IRAN, PEOPLE AND IDENTITY

INTRODUCTION

I begin this thesis with a chapter on Iranian identity in order to elaborate those values and cultural characteristics that propelled the Iranian people to resist the Pahlavi regime and eventually stage the Revolution in 1978-9. According to the most recent estimate, 99% of Iran's sixty million people are Muslim,⁷⁷ and 98.2% of the electorate voted for an Islamic system in 1980.⁷⁸ This high rate of religiosity in the population suggests that, in our discussion of the culture and values of the society, we should scrutinize the relationship between religion (particularly Islam) and Iranian identity. Evaluating the position that religion occupies in the lives of Iranians is

⁷⁷ The latest census, taken in October 1991 by the Statistical Center of Islamic Republic of Iran, put the total population at 55,837,182 persons. Iranian Shi'ites represent 91 percent of the entire population. Iranian Sunnis constitute 7.8 per cent of the population. See *Iran: Year book 1996*, (Germany: Bm Druk Service), pp. 18.

⁷⁸ At the time of the referendum for choosing a political system for Iran, there were many different suggestions such as "Republic of Iran," "Islamic State" or "Islamic Democratic Republic of Iran." It is also said that there were some irregularities in this referendum. Defending the concept of Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini resisted the other suggestions, which were, according to him, a sort of derogation from the power of Islam or the people. He announced his idea, "Islamic Republic, neither more nor less;" 98.2 percent of people, following him, voted for an Islamic Republic. See for more data: A. Khomeini's lecture on June 11, 1979 in *Dar justujū-yi rāh az kalām-i Imām: Education and culture*, (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr), v. 22, p. 122.

essential to our purpose, especially as we will be dealing with cultural issues in that society. We will be examining in particular the impact of Islamic values on education during a specific period of Iran's history as well as the process of Islamization of education. In light of this goal, the relation between culture and religion will be discussed at the outset of this chapter.

It goes without saying that a comprehensive historical investigation is beyond the limitations of this study. We will therefore restrict our analysis to the social, cultural and religious situation in Iran before the coming of Islam, its reception in the country, and its emergence as a key part of Iranian culture.

IRANIAN IDENTITY: DIFFERENT VIEWS

Although a national identity in the modern sense developed in Iran only in the last two centuries, Iranian identity has had a long history, going back, in its comprehensive sense, to the Sassanid era (C.E. 224-651).⁷⁹ From that time on, Iran was known as an independent entity vis-à-vis Tūrān. Tribal custom and beliefs, and the specific history and geographical position of Iran shared in this identity. There was, however, a turning point after the emergence of Islam in Iran beginning in the 7th century (A.D.). In the space of two centuries, Iran became an integral part of the Islamic world, an event which was followed by political independence and the development of Shi'ism under the Šafavids⁸⁰ in the 16th-18th centuries. Modernization and Westernization, which have occurred in more recent times, and finally

⁷⁹ "A pre-Islamic Persian dynasty that ruled a large part of western Asia from A.D. 224 until 651." For more see M. Morony, "Sāsānids," in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, s.v. "Sāsānids."

⁸⁰ A dynasty that founded by Ismā'il Šafawī at the end of the fifteenth century (1499) and ruled in Iran to 1731.

Islamization after the Revolution may be considered as the last features of this process. All of these developments in the long history of Iran have caused scholars to form different views regarding Iranian identity.

One may group these views into the four following categories. The first may be seen as the *liberal national approach*. According to this approach, which may be observed for instance in the case of the Constitutional Revolution (*Inqilāb-i Mashrūṭa*) of 1905-1909,⁸¹ an Iranian citizen is first an Iranian and then a Muslim. There is a separation, in this view, between religion and state and a reflection of Iranian nation's dependence on Western liberalism or socialism. To maintain this Iranian identity, according to this approach, a Western model of development must be followed.⁸²

Theoretically similar to the first view is the second approach, which may be called the *Western-kingdom approach*. Many of those who were in favor of Iranian nationalism supported this view. Ancient nationalism, severe animosity towards Islamic values, an anti-Arab approach, belief in a central power in the form of a king or system of monarchy, and Westernization are some of the major elements of this view. This view was presented by a number of Iranian intellectuals, and translated into reality by the Pahlavi dynasty in recent decades. This view was inculcated through various means including the media,

⁸¹ Among the different movements against the monarchy was the Constitutional Movement or Revolution which took place between 1905 and 1909. As Salehi states: "The Constitutional Revolution was Iran's attempt to establish a democracy." For more in this regard see E. Browne (1910), *The Persian revolution of 1905-1909* (London: Cambridge University). For a shorter discussion see also Salehi (1988), *Insurgency through culture and religion: the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, pp. 61-75.

⁸² For more information about nationalism in Iran, from different point of views see for instance: Richard W. Cottam (1964, 1979), *Nationalism in Iran*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press); S. Ḥasan Āyat (1984), *Chihri-yi ḥaqīqī-yi Muṣaddiq al-Saltāna*, (Tehran: Daftar-i Intishārāt-i Islāmī)

and the state-controlled educational system. According to this view, "for more than 25 centuries monarchy provided the central element in Iran's national identity."⁸³ For supporters of this idea, "the Arab conquest of Iran and the advent of Islam only momentarily interrupted the mythologies [mythical] relationship between Iranians and their kings."⁸⁴

The *Marxist-Leninist approach* constitutes the third category of views. The holder of such a theory, in keeping with Marxist political doctrine believe that the Iranian people are under the tyranny of nationalism and that they must be released from this condition through the rise of a new class.⁸⁵

In contrast to the aforementioned theories is the *religious* or *national religious approach*, which is favored mostly by Islamic scholars, ulama (clerics)⁸⁶ and some intellectuals. The foundations of Iranian identity, according to this view, consist in those values and cultural concepts that are common among the Iranian people. Considering the great position of Islam in the eyes of all Iranians, the supporters of this view conclude that there is no separation between the Islamic and national identities of the people of Iran. Discussing the development of Shi'ism in Iran, Motahhari, a modern Iranian scholar who has dealt extensively with this issue, puts it this way:

and Nahdat-i Āzādī-yi i-Īrān (ed.) (1984). *Ṣafaḥātī az tārikh-i mu'āṣir-i Īrān: Asnād-i Nahdat-i Muqāwamat-i Īrān*, (Tehran: Nahdat-i Āzādī-yi I-Īrān), v. 5.

⁸³ Amir Tahiri (1991), *The unknown life of the Shah*, (London: Hutchinson), p. 191.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ For more information about this approach, see for instance, B. Jazani (1980), *Capitalism and revolution in Iran (selected writings of Bizhan Jazani)*, translated into English by Iran Committee, (London: Zed Press).

⁸⁶ The term '*ulamā*' علماء (sometimes transliterated as Ulema) is a plural of the Arabic, '*ālim*', which means one who is knowledgeable, particularly about the religion and its law. For more see R. C. Martin (1982), *Islam*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall), p. 143.

The reason for the development of Islam in Iran is that Iranians found themselves to be spiritually in agreement with Islam; they found what they had been missing in this religion.⁸⁷

In his writings on the problem of the Iranian identity, 'Alī Shari'atī⁸⁸ (1933-1977) also expresses this idea:

In the fourteen centuries in which Iran and Islam have been in company, a rich and expansive culture has been formed in such a way that separation is impossible now.⁸⁹

Islam, as the main pillar of Iranian identity, serves to mobilize society, according to this approach, and can provide appropriate answers to social problems since there is no separation between religion and state. The main disturbing force, according to this view, for Iranian identity, is Western thought, introduced into the country for the most part by intellectuals. For supporters of the fourth approach, Iranian identity need not depend on the cultural values of others in order to survive and flourish.

It is out of the scope of this chapter to explore each of the aforementioned views in detail. Briefly put, the third option was little more than a political play by foreign leftists to gain a foothold in Iran; there was no relation between Marxist doctrine and Iranian identity. The collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989 brought an end to these efforts. And although the first and second views regarding nationalism were given official recognition under the Pahlavis, they were swept away by the revolutionary religious movement in 1978-9. To examine the fourth idea in more detail,

⁸⁷ M. Motahhari (1981), *Khadamāt-i mutaqābil-i Islām wa Irān*, 8th ed. (Tehran: Daftar-i Intishārāt-i Islāmī), v. 1, p. 112.

⁸⁸ 'Alī Shari'atī, was an intellectual and a sociologist who, before the 1979 Revolution, had a major influence on younger educated class.

⁸⁹ A. Shari'atī (1977), *Bāz shināsī-yi huwiyyat-i Irānī-islāmī*, (Tehran: Ilhām Pub.).

we must first review the process of the entrance of Islam into Iranian culture.

IRAN BEFORE ISLAM

As the history of Iran shows, Iranians (= Persians) generally believed, from the very beginning, in natural gods who were either good or evil. "The bright heavens, light, fire, the winds and the life-giving rain-storm were all worshipped as divine beings, whereas darkness and drought were held to be accursed demons."⁹⁰ By the time of the emergence of Zoroaster,⁹¹ and particularly later under the Sassanid dynasty, Zoroastrianism⁹² was made the official state religion by the monarchy.⁹³ Two main powers, the Sassanid kings and the *mubads* (Zoroastrian clerics), together ruled the country for several centuries. Central political power and

⁹⁰ Sir Percy Sykes (1915, reissued in 1969), *A history of Persia*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 100. For more information see also *ibid.*, pp. 95 f.; R. C. Zaehner (1961), *The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons); R. Ghirshman, (1954) *Iran from the earliest times to the Islamic conquest*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books); R. Isfahānī (1987), *Iran, az Zartusht tā qīyāmhāyi Irānī*, (Tehran: Ilhām Pub.), pp. 21-35.

⁹¹ There is much discussion on the date of Zoroaster's birth and death. As Sykes declares, some authorities consider his birth to have occurred in about 1000 B.C., whereas the traditional view places his birth in 660 B.C. and his death in 583 B.C. For more see Sykes (1915), p. 105 and Isfahānī (1987), pp. 44-5.

⁹² "With a history of some three thousand years," as Gnoli explains, "Zoroastrianism is one of the most ancient living religions. It is the most important and best-known religion of ancient, or pre-Islamic, Iran." Its founder is Zarathushtra (Zoroaster), "who probably lived around the beginning of the first millennium BCE." Gnoli says: "The primary innovation of Zoroastrianism, which sets it apart from the religions of other Indo-European people in the Near East and Central Asia, is its emphasis on monotheism. Its outstanding feature, in the religious context of the entire Indo-Mediterranean world, resides in its radical dualism. Both aspects are fundamental to Zarathushtra's philosophical and religious doctrine." For a concise review of Zoroastrianism, see G. Gnoli, "Zoroastrianism" in M. Eliade (ed. in chief) (1987), *Encyclopedia of Religion*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company). For more information also see R. C. Zaehner (1961), *The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons); F. M. Kotwal and J.W. Boyd (eds. and trans.) (1982), *A guide to the Zoroastrian religion*, (Chico, California: Scholar Press).

⁹³ See R. C. Zaehner (1961), *The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism*, pp. 284 f.; and R. Ghirshman, (1954), p. 314.

Zoroastrian beliefs, as well as some local myths about the history and geographical position of Iran formed some of the important elements of "Iranian identity" of that time. Under the absolute power of the Zoroastrian clerics, which operated as an extension of the kings' power, no other religion could emerge in Iran. Christianity gained some ground at times, but generally suppressed. Religious movements led by Mānī,⁹⁴ in the third century A.D., and Mazdak,⁹⁵ in about 500, were able to spread only in the regions where Zoroastrian was at its weakest.⁹⁶ These movements were, however, strenuously opposed by the Zoroastrian establishment. The lack of religious tolerance by Zoroastrians and the close relationship between the kings and Zoroastrian priests (magi) stifled the society. L. N. Carter puts this well when he says: "True religious reform or social change could not come from within the Iranian system because of the entrenched power of the magi and because the monarchy benefited from the tight control the magi gave them over the populace."⁹⁷

Another characteristic of pre-Islamic Iranian society was that of extreme class distinctions. The king (*shāh*) was at the top of the social hierarchy, under whom there were seven distinguished classes to be found, and then five more regular classes. As A. Christiansen asserts:

⁹⁴ Mānī, son of Pātik, born in southern Mesopotamia in 216 A.D., protected and encouraged by Shapur I (A.D. 241-272), and martyred under the Sassanid Bahrām I in 274, 276 or 277. See E.J. Brill's *First Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1987 (Leiden: E. J. Brill), v. 6, p. 421 s.v. "Mānī."

⁹⁵ Mazdak was the leader of a revolutionary religious movement in Sassanid Iran, during the reign of Shah Qubād, son of Fīrūz. For more information see E.J. Brill's *First Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1987 (Leiden: E. J. Brill), v. 6, pp. 949-952, s.v. "Mazdak."

⁹⁶ Richard F. Nyrop, (ed) (1978) *Iran, a country study*, (Washington, D.C.: The American University), p. 114.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 115

Race and ownership were the two pillars which supported Iranian society... Generally, passing from one class to another was not permissible.⁹⁸

Education was one of the main axes of this discrimination. The only classes that were literate or could hope to receive an education were the noble classes,⁹⁹ who formed a small minority of the whole population of the Iranian people.¹⁰⁰ According to S. Nafisi, "in this period, education and learning current knowledge were restricted to nobles' and *mubads*' children; the great majority were deprived of education."¹⁰¹ The great Persian poet Firdawsī superbly illustrated this attitude in the following story. Once, when a shoemaker -who was considered in that society a member of the lower classes- proclaimed his readiness to support financially the army of the Shah, in return for permission from the Shah for his son to study, the Shah rejected the proposal, on the justification that this would be against the rules of the society and religion.. Firdawsī¹⁰² put the king's words in this way:

The Shah made answer saying: "O wise man!
How hath the Div perplexed thy vision! Go,
And lead the camels back, for God forbid
That we ask him for silver and for pearls.
How should the merchant's son become a scribe,
Accomplished, learned, and mindful though he be?
Our son when he shall sit upon the throne
Will need a scribe whose fortune will prevail.
If this young boot-seller attain distinction,

⁹⁸ Arthur Christensen (1971), *L'Iran sous les Sassanids*, (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard), pp. 316 and 320. For more information see also *ibid.*, pp. 15-83; 97-140 and 316 f.

⁹⁹ See e.g. D. Şafā, (1984), *Tārīkh ādabīyāt dar Irān*, (Tehran: Firdawsī Pub.), v. 1, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰ At that time the Iranian Empire had a population of one hundred forty million people. According to an estimate, only one and half million of these enjoyed all freedoms, while the others were denied all natural rights. For more information see İsfahānī (1987), p. 149.

¹⁰¹ See İsfahānī (1987), p. 149.

¹⁰² Manşūr ibn Ḥasan Abu al-Qāsim Firdawsī, known as Ḥakīm Firdawsī (329-30/940-1 to 411/1020) was a Persian poet, one of the greatest writers of epic and the author of *Shāhnama* [*The book of kings*]. For more data on him see V.L. Ménage, "Firdawsī" in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 2, pp. 918-921.

And my son look to him and list to him,
 That man of wisdom and of noble birth
 Will have but discontent and chilling sighs,
 The sage will be held lightly by my son,
 Receive no praise for what he answereth,
 And we shall be accursed, when we are dead,
 For having introduced this precedent.
 Our ration must be got by honest means.
 Ask not his money, talk not of our needs,
 Dispatch the camels back upon their way,
 And ask shoemakers for supplies no more.¹⁰³

People were also financially oppressed. To quote Ghirshman:

The fiscal system of the State was without mercy. Reviving Hellenistic tradition, it burdened the land and the individual with exactions that were beyond human capacity and extorted payment by force. Indirect taxes levied by customs, octrois, and tolls further increased the pressure on the people.¹⁰⁴

The following description by R. Dozy reveals the corruption that lay beneath the glittering surface of Sassanid society:

During the first half of the seventh century everything followed its accustomed course in the Byzantine as in the Persian Empire...; they were, to all outward appearance, flourishing; the taxes which poured into the treasuries of their kings reached considerable sums, and the magnificence, as well as the luxury of their capitals had become proverbial. But all this was in appearance, for a secret disease consumed both empires; they were burdened by a crushing despotism; on either hand the history of the dynasties formed a concatenation of horrors, that of the state a series of persecutions born of dissensions in religious matters.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Arthur G. Warner and Edmond Warner (1923), *Shāhnāma of Firdausī*, v. VIII, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.). *Dīv* in Persian is the name of the spirit of evil and of darkness. For more information see the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 2, pp. 322-323, s.v. "*dīv*."

¹⁰⁴ Ghirshaman (1954), p. 345.

¹⁰⁵ R. Dozy, cited by E.G. Browne (1956), *A literary history of Persia* (London: Cambridge University Press), v. 1, p. 185. See also R. Dozy (1966), *Essai sur l'histoire de l'Islamisme* (Amsterdam: Oriental Press).

THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAM IN IRAN: BLESSING VS. VIOLENCE

It is essential to our discussion to clarify first of all whether the emergence of Islam in Iran was a blessing for the people of that time or purely a hostile occupation of the country by Arab invaders.¹⁰⁶ Many believe that the people of Persia readily accepted Islam and applied it in their life. Others however hold that Islam was a religion forced on the people, who resented the fact. This issue may be beyond our subject, and yet I think that an unclouded evaluation of the issue will help us in our examination of Iranian culture as it exists in the present day, since a major aspect of Iranian culture is Islam. We will not have a clear understanding of Iranian society today, unless we are thoroughly informed about the cultural background of this religious society.

According to the sources, Salmān-i Fārsī, a resident of the city of Isfahān, was the first Iranian to accept Islam. For both the Shī'ī and Sunni sects, Salmān became one of the most revered companions (*aṣḥāb*) of the Prophet. His becoming a Muslim no doubt had a great impact on making Iranians more familiar with this new religion.¹⁰⁷ Besides this individual conversion, there is the example on a social level of Yemen and Bahrain, two former territories of the old Persian Empire, which peacefully accepted Islam during the Prophet's lifetime.¹⁰⁸

In Persia itself, however, there was some serious fighting between Muslims

¹⁰⁶ For more information on this issue see e.g. J.K. Choksy (1997), *Conflict and cooperation: Zoroastrian subalterns and Muslim elites medieval Iranian society*, (New York: Columbia University Press).

¹⁰⁷ See Sykes (1915), p. 536.

¹⁰⁸ See, for more information, Browne (1929), p. 201; Motahhari (1981), v. 1, p. 59, Isfahānī (1987), p. 163 f.

and the Sassanid state. Taking these struggles into consideration, some writers claim that Iranians accepted Islam through fear of the sword. Others, however, disagree. E. G. Browne, the great British historian, asserts that although certain towns which resisted the Muslims did not escape retribution, "still it does not appear that the Zoroastrians as such were subjected to any severe persecution, or that the conversion of Persia to Islam was mainly effected by force."¹⁰⁹ According to this view, the people of Persia were given the option by Muslims to choose one of three options, namely, accepting Islam, paying a poll-tax (*jizya*), or resisting militarily.¹¹⁰ As Browne explains:

It is often supposed that the choice offered by the warriors of Islam was between the *Qur'an* and the sword. This however, is not the fact, for Magians, as well as Christians and Jews, were permitted to retain their religion, being merely compelled to pay *jizya* or poll-tax; a perfectly just arrangement, inasmuch as non-Muslim subjects of the Caliphs were necessarily exempt both from military service and from the alms (*ṣadaqāt*) obligatory on the Prophet's followers.¹¹¹

The oppressive situation engendered by both the Sassanid rulers and Zoroastrian priests, made it more likely that Islam should be welcomed by the Iranians. Browne quotes T. W. Arnold, former professor at the College of Aligarh, saying, "The intolerance of the priests, not only towards those of other religions, but towards nonconformist Persian sects, Manichaeans, Mazdakite, Gnostic and the like, had made them widely and deeply

¹⁰⁹ Browne (1921), p. 202.

¹¹⁰ For more details see Isfahānī (1987), p. 172.

¹¹¹ Browne (1929), pp. 200-201.

disliked.”¹¹² Oppressed Iranians who were receiving different pressures from the state and the religious authorities, were ready to accept any new religion as an alternative to Zoroastrianism. For the same reason, Christianity, according to M. Motahhari, lost a good opportunity to expand in that region.¹¹³ Besides, the simplicity and elasticity of Islam was another significant element in the emergence of Islam in Iran. These two main factors commended Islam to many, and, as Browne declares, “it is quite certain that the bulk of conversions” which created an Islamic culture in Iran, “were voluntary and spontaneous.”¹¹⁴ Even those who were in favor of the monarchy believed that “the emergence of Islam, the religion of brotherhood and equality, was a good news for Iranians who were tired from the Zoroastrian and monarchy.”¹¹⁵ For these writers, “in a very short time, Iranians left Zoroastrianism and took refuge in Islam. They accepted Islam in such a way that there was no need of conquest or war.”¹¹⁶ To paraphrase Jalāl Āl-i-Aḥmad (1923-1969), a well-known Iranian intellectual,

Furthermore, we invited Islam to come. Let us leave aside Rustam Farrukhzad’s desperate defense of Sasanian chivalry and of a petrified Zoroastrianism. The people of Ctesiphon thronged in the lanes of the city, bread and dates in hand, to meet the Arabs as they went to plunder the royal palace and the “Baharistan” carpet. And Salman Farsi had fled from Jay near Isfahan and taken refuge in Islam years before Yazdigird fled to Marv. Salman had a role in the creation of Islam unrivaled by any the astrologer Magi had in the creation of

¹¹² Browne (1921), p. 202. See also T. W. Arnold (1896, fourth reprint 1979), *The Preaching of Islam: a history of the propagation of the Muslim faith*, (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf), p. 209.

¹¹³ M. Motahhari (1981), v. 1, p. 151.

¹¹⁴ Browne (1921), p. 202.

¹¹⁵ *Kitab Pahlavi*, p. 29.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Christianity. Accordingly, one cannot consider Islam a conqueror in the sense Alexander, for instance, can be considered one.¹¹⁷

Islam was widely accepted in Iran for several reasons. The invitation of Islam to brotherhood and equality was good news for Persians who long suffered discrimination and class distinctions. When Rustam Farrukhzād, the Persian commander, asked a Muslim messenger about his religion, he replied: "The essential base of our religion is to worship one God and accept the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad." Then he added: "It is the Muslims' duty to relieve human beings from worshipping others. All human beings are equal. They should be brothers; none of them should be worshipped by others."¹¹⁸

One of the manifestations of this equality appears in the field of education. Earlier we noted extreme discrimination in the educational system under the Sassanids. According to Islamic teachings however, seeking knowledge is not merely a right, but an obligation for all men and women.¹¹⁹ Knowledge and wisdom are considered in Islamic tradition as essential to believers. It is well known that Muslims are encouraged and recommended to

¹¹⁷ Al-i Ahmad, j. (1984), *Occidentosis, (Gharbzadigī)* translated into English by R. Campbell (Berkeley: Mizan Press), p. 41.

¹¹⁸ See Isfahānī (1987), p. 174

¹¹⁹ The Prophet reported is to have said: "seeking knowledge is an obligation for all men and women." He also said: "Seek for knowledge, even if it is in China!" (اطلبوا العلم ولو في الصين) i.e., even if you must travel a great distance to obtain it. This same meaning may be found in another tradition cited from the fourth Shī'ī Imām al-Sajjād who had said: "Were people aware of what lies in the acquiring knowledge, they would pursue it even though they had to make voyage and endanger their lives to obtain it." For more information about the first and the second traditions see M. B. Majlisī, *Biḥār al-anwār*, (Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Wafā'), v. 1, pp. 177-180, v. 2, p. 32 and v. 108, p. 15. For the third tradition see al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, (Tehran: Daftar-i Nashr-i Farhang-i Ahl al-Bayt), v. 1, p. 35. The English translation for the third tradition is from S. K. Faqih Imānī, *A bundle of flowers*, translated by S.A. Sadr-'ameli, (Isfahan: Amir-ul-Mu'mineen Ali Lib.), p. 72.

seek knowledge from cradle to grave.¹²⁰ It was also common in wars between Muslims and their enemies to release those captives who were able to teach at least ten Muslims.¹²¹ To sum up, seeking knowledge is a sort of worship, and is even of greater value than rituals. This approach toward knowledge would have been good news to such people as the aforementioned shoemaker who was ready to spend his whole fortune to win permission from the king for his only son to study.

A natural tendency towards justice in relations between human beings was another factor in attracting people towards Islam. Iranians who were in need of this priceless commodity, found what they had lacked in the message of Islam. The following quotation, taken from one of the letters ^cAlī,¹²² the fourth Caliph for Sunnīs and the first Imām of the Shiʿites, wrote to his governor in Baṣra (today in Iraq) indicates the importance of justice in the view of Islam.

O' Ibn Hunayf, I have come to know that a young man of Basra invited you to feast and you leapt toward it. Foods of different colors were being chosen for you and big bowls were being given to you. I never thought that you would accept the feast of a people who turn out the beggars and invite the rich...

If I wished I could have taken the way leading towards (worldly pleasures like) pure honey, fine wheat and silk clothes but it cannot be that my passions lead me and greed take me to choosing good meals while in Ḥijāz or in Yamāmah there may be people who have no hope of getting bread of who do not have a full meal...

¹²⁰ "اخذلوا العلم من المهد الى اللحد" Some believe it as a tradition. However, it is not found in standard books of traditions. See Katip Celebi, *Kashf al-zunūn*, (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1964), v. 1, p. 51.

¹²¹ For more information on this issue see Motahhari (1981), v. 2, p. 73 f.

¹²² For more facts about Imam ^cAlī see e.g. Ḥ. Amīn (1970), *Islamic Shiʿite encyclopedia*, (Beirut: Salim Press), v. 11, pp. 96-206.

Shall I be content with being called Amir al mu'minin (The Commander of the Believers), although I do not share with the people the hardships of the world? ¹²³

Freedom of choice was another effective element in this regard. We mentioned earlier that "the Zoroastrians were not offered the choice between Islam and sword, as is generally supposed, but were permitted to retain their religion on the payment of a poll-tax."¹²⁴ Provided they did not resist, of course this tax, which was far less than in the time of the Sassanids, was an obligation only for those who were able to pay. In return, Muslims were obliged to guard the taxpayers and their properties.¹²⁵ In light of this freedom, "the fire temples and Zoroastrian communities existed in many parts of Persia until comparatively recent times."¹²⁶ There are still some Zoroastrians in Iran, one of the main minorities under the Islamic Republic.

Considering all the religious, cultural, social, fiscal and political crises on the one hand, and the blessing of Islam on the other, one still cannot agree with R. N. Frye, a professor at Harvard University, who is unable to see why Persians had to abandon their religious tradition, stating:

There is evidence from Arabic works that many *dihqāns*¹²⁷ and leaders among the Persians accepted Islam, but this was generally over a long period since there was no immediate reason for conversion at the time of the conquests.¹²⁸

¹²³ Al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha* [A collection of Imam Alī's sermons and letters], (Washington, D.C.: Majma' Ahl al-Bayt), p. 233-234.

¹²⁴ Sykes (1915), p. 536.

¹²⁵ Isfahānī (1987), p. 196.

¹²⁶ Ibid. p. 537.

¹²⁷ A *dihqān* "was the head of a village and a member of the lesser feudal nobility of Sāsānian Persia." See the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 2, p. 253, s.v. "*dihkān*."

¹²⁸ Richard N. Frye (1962), *The heritage of Persia*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson), p. 241.

From this short historical analysis, one may conclude that Persians were inclined to accept Islam since they did so in the time of the Prophet or after him. In spite of some resistance, they were not forced to believe in this new religion; rather, it was the tyranny of the kings, the Zoroastrian religious authorities and class discrimination on the one hand, and the simplicity of Islamic teachings on the other, that called Persians to Islam, a religion of brotherhood and equality. To paraphrase Motahhari, "The great majority of Iranians sincerely accepted Islam and served it more than any other nation, including Arabs."¹²⁹ Based on the same understanding, T. W. Arnold states further that in many Persian subjects, "persecution had stirred up feelings of bitter hatred against the established religion and the dynasty that supported its oppressions, and so caused the Arab conquest to appear in the light of a deliverance."¹³⁰ Acknowledging this fact, it is striking that Şafā considers the metamorphosis in Iran from Zoroastrianism to Islam as a shift from supremacy to captivity.¹³¹

Role of Iranians in Expanding Islam

Returning to our previous discussion about the Iranian responsiveness to Islam, we may also refer to the great contributions that Iranian scholars made to the development of Islamic teachings after the emergence of this religion in Iran. During the first three centuries after its arrival in the country, Arabic-speaking Iranians contributed far more than Arabs themselves did to the increase of knowledge in all fields including literature, law, politics,

¹²⁹ Motahhari (1981), v. 2, pp. 14-15

¹³⁰ T. W. Arnold (1896), p. 209.

¹³¹ Safa (1984), p. 9.

philosophy and mysticism. Let us elaborate a little more on this fact by taking the process of collection of Hadith as an example of this contribution.

The prophetic *sunna* (tradition), which includes his words (*qawl*), behavior (*fi'l*) and stipulations (*taqrīr*) is the second major source, after the *Qur'ān*, of Islamic teachings. The prophetic tradition, which was reported by his companions to later generations is called *ḥadīth*. *Aḥādīth* (s. *ḥadīth*) were collected by scholars in the field and preserved for further generations. We previously quoted two examples of these *aḥādīth* in relation to the significance of knowledge in Islam.¹³² Iranians played a significant role in this field, to the extent that some scholars consider them to have been the founder of *ʿilm al-ḥadīth* (the science of tradition).¹³³

There are six major collections of *aḥādīth* among the Sunnis (i.e., *al-Ṣiḥāḥ al-Sitta*) and four among the Shīʿīs (i.e., *al-Kutub al-Arbaʿa*), which contain the most reliable traditions cited from the Prophet or Imāms. Interestingly enough, the authors of all these ten books were Iranian.¹³⁴ Moreover, there were hundreds of other Iranian scholars who contributed in this regard. As Motahhari explains, the field of culture and knowledge was one in which Iranians contributed the most to developing Islam.¹³⁵

Even if it were to be shown that force played a role in the Islamization of Iran, these educational and cultural contributions by Iranians indicates the

¹³² See footnote 111 of this thesis.

¹³³ ʿAṭārūdī, (1981) "Islamic activity of Iranians" in M. Motahhari, *Khadamāt-i mutaʿābil-i Irān wa Islām*, v. 2, p. 19.

¹³⁴ Ṭūsī, Muslim, Nisāi, Bukhārī, Tirmidī, and Abi Dāwūd were from Khurāsān. Ṣadūq was from Qum, Kulayni from Rayy, near Tehran, and Ibn Mājih from Qazwin.

¹³⁵ M. Motahhari (1981), v. 2, p. 63.

great role of Islam in Iranian culture.¹³⁶ Furthermore, the role of Iranians in expanding Islam to different regions such as India at the time of Ghaznavids, Kashmir, China, South Asia and Africa is another indication of the compatibility between Iranian identity and Islamic teachings. Thus having tried to show the role of Islam as the main part of the Iranian culture, it is now time for us to examine another aspect of this culture i.e., Iranian national identity.

Iranian National Identity

Previously, we looked at *nationalism* as an element in Iranian identity. Although Iranian identity, before the appearance of Islam in this country, was a unified one, after the spread of Islam and its integration with the new culture, a long discussion began. What is the relation between these two cultures? Let us here explore the issue briefly. Generally, there are two opposite theories regarding the relation between nationalism and Islam in Iran, as well as other countries.¹³⁷ According to some, being Iranian is in contradiction to being Muslim. This view, which was emphasized by some writers at the time of the Pahlavis, holds the idea that Islam was imposed upon Persians, forcing them to abandon their culture for several centuries. From this point of view, Iranians never accepted Islam voluntarily, but under threat of the sword. To preserve Iranian identity, therefore, Islam should be jettisoned.

From the completely opposite position, an extreme religious approach may

¹³⁶ For more details see *ibid.*, v. 2, pp. 78 f.

¹³⁷ For general information on the issue of nationalism see A.K.S. Lambton, "Kawmiyya" [Nationalism] in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, s.v. "*kawmiyya*." See also Arjomand (1984), *From nationalism to revolutionary Islam*, (Albany: State University of New York Press).

be seen in some ideas regarding the concept of *umma* (Islamic community),¹³⁸ based on which Islam rejects any territorial boundaries. The concept of *umma* includes all Muslims, wherever they may live, whatever language they may speak and whoever they may be. A small manifestation of this *umma* appears every year during the *hajj* ceremony, when a great number of Muslims gather in Mecca.

If one takes a moderate religious approach, however, I believe that there is no contradiction between these two identities; rather, they are inseparable. Instead of its being a question of this *or* that, such an approach looks at the possibility of combination. Besides the Islamic facet of Persian culture, which expanded greatly after the emergence of Islam, the national Iranian identity, according to this view, has lasted and remains as strong as ever. In spite of the dominance of Islamic tradition within the country, Iranians succeeded in maintaining their identity as Iranians even while accepting Islam. Simply put, Iranians never became Arab, nor did they accept pure Arabic tradition from the time of ignorance (*jāhilīya*). To quote Frye, "While many *dihqāns* became Muslims they also preserved the old tradition and epic literature of Persia. Their patronage of the arts and of minstrels, in

¹³⁸ The word 'umma' is a Quranic term, referring to the religious nation of Islam. This word occurs more than forty times in the *Qur'ān* as well as a number of other times in two other forms, i.e., *ummatukum* (your *umma*) and *umam* (different *ummas*). The passages that contain the word *umma* "are so varied that its meaning cannot be rigidly defined." But is the term in its Quranic concept to be identified with what R. Paret refers to as always referring "to ethical, linguistic or religious bodies of people who are the objects of the divine plan of salvation"? For more see R. Paret, (1987), "umma" in *The First Encyclopedia of Islam*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill), v. 8, p. 1015. See also S. A. Rahnamai, (1996), *Islam and Nationalism*, (an unpublished paper submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies).

short their customs were Persian not Arab. They preserved their social position, and Islam weighed lightly upon them."¹³⁹

Evidence of the differences between Islam as a religion and Arab tradition may be seen in those movements that were supported or even initiated by Persians in order to attain an independent Islamic Iran. Decades after the establishment of Islam in Iran, two major developments were initiated by Iranians. The first involved replacing the Umayyad¹⁴⁰ caliphs with the Abbasids¹⁴¹ and the second, the foundation of an independent Iranian state. Taking these events into consideration, some believed that these were signs of enmity towards Islam. Neither of these movements, however, was against Islam itself, but rather against deviations from Islamic teachings on the parts of certain caliphs. Interestingly enough, Iranians made a special effort to establish Islamic law after their political independence, far more than they had under the Arabs.

After centuries, it is hardly possible now to differentiate between Islam and Iranian identity. The development of Islamic art, culture and literature in the form of Persian poetry and prose have combined to fashion an Islamic-Iranian identity for this society. True, there are still some nationalists (*millī garāyān*) who disputes this viewpoint. Never having accepted Islam as the country's religion, they regard Muslim leaders and Imāms as strangers who have occupied Iran and ought to have left by now. We will consider the

¹³⁹ Frye (1962), p. 244.

¹⁴⁰ The dynasty of the caliphs from 41/661 to 132/750. The founder of the dynasty was Mu'āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān. For a brief explanation see E. J. Brill's *The first encyclopedia of Islam 1913-1936*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill), v. , p. 998 f. s.v. "*Umayyads*."

¹⁴¹ The dynasty of the caliphs from 132/750 to 656/1258. For more data see the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 1, pp. 15 f. s.v. "*Abbasids*."

issue of nationalism, one of the values that was rejected after the Revolution, in chapter three of this study.

Shi'ism

Quite early in the history of Islam, a disagreement on the issue of who should be the successor of the Prophet Muhammad divided Muslims into two main sects, i.e. Sunnī and Shī'ī. In other words, the issue of *imāmat* (leadership) after the death of the Prophet may be considered as the essential reason for the emergence of Shi'ism. Accordingly, Shi'ism, from within, that is from the point of view of Shī'ī scholars, evolved out of a theological issue and at the time of the prophet.¹⁴² Over ninety per cent of Iranians today are followers of *Ithnā'asharī* (twelver) Shi'ism, a sect, which, unlike the majority of Sunnī Muslims,¹⁴³ regards 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib as the immediate successor to the Prophet Muhammad, appointed by him. They also believe in the Prophet's family (Fātima Zahrā, the prophet's daughter, 'Alī, the Prophet's cousin and son in law, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, Fātima's and 'Āli's sons and nine sons descendant from Ḥusayn) as the *Ahl al-Bayt*, and therefore infallible.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² There are many Prophetic traditions cited by Shī'ī traditionalists that introduce the twelve imams. In some of these traditions, the Prophet names the twelve imāms one by one. For more see Majlisi, *Biḥār al-anwār*, v. 23, p. 97; v. 24, p. 240; v. 36, pp. 227 and 244; and v. 37, p. 87. Despite this doctrine, many Western scholars, as well as the Sunnis, consider Shi'ism to have arisen as a result of a political dispute after the death of the Prophet, which ended with the election of 'Umar as the first caliph.

¹⁴³ According to Sunnī Muslims, the Prophet did not appoint a successor, and accordingly, Abū Bakr was elected by some as the first Caliph.

¹⁴⁴ For a brief account of Shi'ism see W. Madelung, "Shī'a" in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v.s. "Shī'a." For more information in general and particularly in the case of Shi'ism in Iran see, for instance, Ṭabāṭabāī, *Shī'a dar Islam* (Qum: Daftar-I Tablighāt-I Islāmī), M. Momen (1985), *An introduction to Shī'ī Islam*, (New Haven: Yale University Press); H. Halm (1991), *Shiism*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press); Dwight M. Donaldson (1933), *The Shi'ite religion: A history of Islam in Persia and Irak* (London: Luzac & Company). S.H. Nasr et al (eds.) (1988), *Shi'ism: Doctrines, thought, and spirituality*, (Albany: State University of New York Press). For Shi'ism in Iran and its relation to political issues, see e.g. H. Algar (1969), *Religion and state*, (Berkeley: University of California Press).

A family tree showing the line of descent of the Shī'ī Imāms is illustrated in Figure 1-1 on the following page.

There is great appreciation, in the twelver Shī'ī school, for the daughter of the Prophet, Fātimah Zahrā. She is regarded as infallible and was the mother of all Shī'ī Imāms except her husband 'Alī, the first Imām.

After 'Alī, who was appointed by the Prophet as his successor,¹⁴⁵ Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, 'Alī's sons, became the second and the third Imāms. At the time of Ḥusayn and as a result of Ḥusayn's revolt against the Ummayyad Caliphate, there was fighting between the Shī'ī Imām and his followers on the one hand, and Yazīd,¹⁴⁶ the Umayyad Caliph, on the other, which resulted in the martyrdom of Imām Ḥusayn in Karbalā, Iraq in 680. However, "far from suppressing the movement, Husayn's murder by the Umayyad caliph Yazīd gave impetus to the Shī'ite cause."¹⁴⁷

Shī'ism in Iran was made the official state religion under the Ṣafavids.¹⁴⁸ The majority of Iranians before that had been Sunni. Some attempts have been made to relate Shī'ism in Iran to the marriage of the third Shī'ī Imām (Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī) to Shahrbanū, an Iranian princess, thus making the subsequent imāms descendants of Iranian royalty.¹⁴⁹ The story.

¹⁴⁵ According to traditions reported through both the Sunnī and Shī'ī schools, the Prophet Muhammad, on his return from Mecca and at a place called Ghadir Khumm, appointed 'Alī as his successor. For more information on this issue see Amīnī (1952), *Kitāb al-Ghadir*, (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Isliyya).


¹⁴⁶ Yazīd, the son of Muāwiya was the second caliph of the Umayyad dynasty.

¹⁴⁷ R.C. Martin (1982), *Islam*, p. 56

¹⁴⁸ The dynasty founded by Ismā'il Ṣafawī at the end of the fifteenth century (1499) which ruled in Iran until 1731. As T.W. Haig writes, Ismā'il was the first ruler to make Shi'a doctrine the state religion in Iran, although it had always been popular in Persia. For more information see E.J. Brill's *First encyclopedia of Islam*, 1987, (Leiden: E. J. Brill), v. 7, pp. 54-55.

¹⁴⁹ Citing Gobineau and confirming him, E. G. Browne was one of those who emphasized this point. See Browne (1902), v. 1, p. 130. See also, among more recent writings, Cottam (1979), p. 134.

Figure 1-1: The Shi'i Imams



however, is not documented.¹⁵⁰ For M. Motahhari, it was the justice of the Prophet's family that attracted Iranians to Shi'ism, just as it was the factor that attracted people toward Islam.¹⁵¹ Despite the significance of justice in Islamic teaching,¹⁵² many caliphs did not take it into consideration; there was much discrimination under them. It was the family of the Prophet, particularly Imām 'Alī, according to historians, both Muslim and non-Muslim, which provided the best exemplars of justice.

ISLAM IN MODERN IRAN

In spite of the first unpleasant experience of Islam in its encounter with the Persian monarchy, almost all Iranian kings after the independence of Iran, intentionally or not, recognized Islam as the main religion in the country. And later, from the time of the Ṣafavids onward, Shi'ism gradually played a more and more significant role in Iranian culture. However, there was a tendency from the time of the Qajars (1796-1925)¹⁵³ to eliminate or at least to reduce the role of Islam in society and politics. This was the policy followed by the Pahlavis, too. For it was the intention of both the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties, who were interested in developing the country according to a Western model, to remove what they saw as a barrier to modernization and/or Westernization. There will be a detailed discussion in the next two chapters about the position of religion under the Pahlavis and the Islamic

¹⁵⁰ See Motahhari (1981), v. I, p. 108.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., v. I, pp. 112-113.

¹⁵² One of the Five Pillars of Shi'ī Islam is justice. The others are monotheism (unity of God), Prophecy, imamate and resurrection day.

¹⁵³ The dynasty that ruled Iran, before the Pahlavis, i.e. from 1796 to 1926. It was founded by Āqā Muḥammad Khān Qajar. For more information see A.K.S. Lambton (1987), *Qajar Persia*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.).

Republic. Here, however, our intention is to give an introductory explanation of the issue to complete our examination in this chapter.

The Pahlavis were influenced by Iranian nationalism, which began to develop in the late nineteenth century and which prized the heritage of pre-Islamic Iran.¹⁵⁴ As we will see later on, in keeping with this general goal that the Pahlavis tried to revive pre-Islamic Iran's traditions as much as possible. They well understood that Islam, and particularly Shī'ism was an established religion in Iran. It would have been politically unwise, therefore, for them to resist the faith, and so they took measure to weaken it in an indirect way. On this basis they made an attempt to show themselves as the guardians of Islam in the country, even while they continuously strove to decrease the role of religion and the extent of religious faith in the society.

While maneuvering to gain power in 1920s, Reza Shah¹⁵⁵ followed the same policy. He feigned an interest in Islam and Shī'ism by performing pilgrimages to the holy cities of Iran like Mashhad, and by participating in religious ceremonies. He took an oath on the *Qur'ān*, Islam's holy book, to support Islam in Iran. Once he had consolidated his position, however, his true agenda was made clear. Considering religious rituals to be anti-modern activities, he started to ban them one by one. Unveiling women was his most serious attack on the laws of Islam.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ See Nikki R. Keddie (1995), *Iran and the Muslim world*, (Hampshire: Macmillan), p. 149-150.

¹⁵⁵ Reza Shah Pahlavi was born in 1878 and ruled Iran from 1925 to 1941. He died in exile in 1944.

¹⁵⁶ See for example Madani (1990) v. 1, p. 239:

The same pattern was repeated by Mohammad Reza,¹⁵⁷ the son of Reza Shah. His reign began by meeting ulama, making trips to holy cities and so on. Having won absolute power, however, he began to change his strategy towards Islamic symbols, including the official Islamic calendar of Iran. We will see in the third chapter how this approach was translated into educational policy under the Pahlavis. A confidential report done by the US Embassy in Iran is illustrated with two photographs of the Shah, the first in the uniform of a Muslim pilgrim to Mecca, and the other in Western dress. Under the first we find the caption: “as he would like to be remembered (pilgrimage to Mecca),” while under the latter is written: “[The Shah] as his enemies see him; a deranged hangman.”¹⁵⁸

Interestingly enough, an attempt was made by the Shah’s supporters to maintain this policy after his downfall. Shapur Bakhtiyar, a national figure who tried to continue the monarchy at the time of the Revolution, stated during the ceremony of his swearing-in as Prime Minister,

I swear to support Islam in my country, while I appreciate other religions as well.¹⁵⁹

This attitude towards Islam reflects the very strong religious foundations of the country. Otherwise, the Pahlavis, who both personally and politically

¹⁵⁷ Mohammad Reza Shah (1919-1980), the son of Reza Shah, was born 26 Oct., 1919 and ruled Iran from 1941 to 1979, i.e. until the time of the Islamic Revolution. He was exiled from Iran by Muṣaddiq in 1953 and came back soon after a military coup d’état. The king was married Farah Dībā in 1959. In 1963, he announced his White Revolution and formally crowned in 1967. He celebrated the twenty- fifth century of monarchy in Iran in 1971. After a relatively short illness, he died in 1980.

¹⁵⁸ Dānishjūyān-i Musalmān-i Payrow-i Khaṭṭ-i Imām (hereafter DMPKI), *Asnād-i lāni-yi jāsūsī: Rawābiḡ-i Āmrīkā wa Shāh*, (Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Asnād-i Lāni-yi Jāsūsī), v. 7, p. 54.

¹⁵⁹ Madani (1990), v.2, p. 418.

disliked religion, would not have been compelled to behave in an insincere way.

The 1978-79 Islamic Revolution

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, officially called “the Islamic Revolution,” marked a return to Islamic values. Although there were many different sources of opposition to the Pahlavis during the Revolution, the main leadership, the slogans, and the specific times and places for meetings all show that the core of the Revolution was based on Islamic, and particularly Shī‘ī, teachings. ‘*Āshūrā*, the day commemorating the martyrdom of the third Shī‘ī Imām, was a particular focus for revolutionary activities. The scope of this thesis does not allow us to provide a detailed and comprehensive look at all the political, social and cultural aspects of the Revolution and its motivations. I will therefore focus only on those issues that are related to our subject. Simply put, Islam played an essential part in the event. The role of a high-ranking ‘*ālim* (religious cleric) in leading the Revolution was, in the first place, crucial to its success. Of the clerical hierarchy, Salehi has written: “At the very top are a few clergymen known as ‘grand ayatollahs,’ meaning ‘evidence of God.’ They are also called ‘reference[s],’ (*marja*‘) because people refer to their religious rulings. The grand ayatollahs assume ultimate authority to make religious prescriptions... People are free to choose one of the top ayatollahs as their reference...No force is exerted upon the faithful to guarantee that they obey, except that their voluntary actions are constrained by their religious consciousness.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ Salehi (1988), p. 54.

Ayatollah Khomeini, who was considered one of these grand ayatollahs, focused his opposition to the Shah on the latter's divergence from Islamic teachings. In most of his messages, particularly in his earliest ones and in his critiques of the Pahlavis, he emphasized this concept. Previously we pointed to the article appeared in one of Iran's state-run daily newspapers in which the author accused Ayatollah Khomeini of being an obscure individual who was opposed to the modernization of the country. It was the harsh language of the article against a religious leader that motivated the people of Qum, and then other cities, to support their religious leaders, a movement which lasted for one year and which eventually culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Moreover, from the beginning of the Revolution, one of the popular slogans used by the people, and later on by the Islamic state, labeled Iran: "non-Western, non-Eastern (non-Marxist), Islamic Republic."¹⁶¹ For Islamic leaders, the Islamic Republic is considered another opportunity for Iranians, who have practiced Islam for centuries, to experience religion in their lives.

CONCLUSION: IRANIAN ISLAMIC IDENTITY

Earlier we reviewed four different assumptions regarding Iranian identity. In a comparison between these four ideas, it was shown that some scholars believe that the liberal-national and Western kingdom approaches failed due to a lack of understanding of Iranian society.

¹⁶¹ In Persian "*na sharqi, na gharbi, jumhūr-i islāmī*," (نه شرقی، نه غربی، جمهوری اسلامی)

The Islamic Revolution, for them, marked an end to these analyses.¹⁶² The third approach was also weak to begin with and failed utterly with the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The fourth approach, however, was seen to be much closer to the Iranian identity. The easy conquest of Iran by Muslims could be a reasonable indication of this. Although there are different ideas and theories for its success, I think it would not have happened without the cooperation of the Iranians themselves.

Nevertheless, one should realize that although the religious approach has been amended, to a great extent, in describing Iranian identity, it has not shown itself in a comprehensive way in Iran. To put it another way, a close relationship between culture and religion in Iran is undeniable; however, there are still many traces of Iranian heritage, surviving even from the time of Zoroastrianism, in this culture, that seem irrelevant to Islamic teachings. A calendar based on the solar system, the names of the months, New Year's day, and many social customs in relation to the new year, are just some of the traces of the time of Zoroastrianism.¹⁶³ Many people still give pre-Islamic names to their children. And there is still some respect shown to light and fire, the enshrined symbols of the Zoroastrianism.

There are two points worthy of consideration. First, the Iranian people, in practicing these customs, are either unaware of their relation to history, or do not see these customs as contradicting Islam. Second, the main effort

¹⁶² For more information see J. Haqqpanah (1997), "Huwiyyat-i Irānī, chand bardāsh" in *Kayhān-i Farhangī*, no. 135, pp. 70-71.

¹⁶³ See Nafisi, (1966), *Tārīkh-i mu'āṣir-i Irān*, (Tehran: Furūghī Press), p. 93.

under the Pahlavis was to revive and renovate the pre-Islamic traditions.¹⁶⁴ They were successful to a great extent in this effort, though it was brought to an end by the Revolution. This last point will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

¹⁶⁴ Under the reign of Reza Shah an adaptation of the old Zoroastrian solar calendar, replaced the other calendars including the Islamic lunar one (ibid., pp. 94-95). This has lasted to the present time.

Chapter 2

IMPERIAL EDUCATION IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of the reign of Cyrus I in 550 BC and the ensuing advent of the Achaemenid dynasty down to the reign of the Pahlavis, Iran experienced some twenty five hundred years of monarchy under different rulers. As mentioned earlier, during this long period of monarchy, a turning point occurred when the people of Iran finally converted to Islam and accepted it as their own religion. Like a fellow-traveler, the prolonged line of monarchy continued to exist alongside the new faith, until only recently. In their treatment of Islam, the kings, behaved very differently. Some of them rejected it outright, as may be seen in the case of Khusrew Parviz,¹⁶⁵ who tore up the letter of invitation to Islam sent to him by the Prophet Muhammad. According to legend, others observed it carelessly, or, like the Safavids, embraced it

¹⁶⁵ Khusrew Parviz (591-628 A.D.), a Sassanid emperor, and the last great ruler of this dynasty before the invading Arabs overthrew the Persian Empire. For more see the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 8, p. 277 s.v. "Parvīz."

formally but superficially,¹⁶⁶ while others were serious in their allegiance to Islam and Shi'ism. Islam, in a sense, has been a very crucial trial for the Iranian monarchs in their attempts at adapting to the culture of the people. The Pahlavi, as the last link in this chain, faced the same dilemma.

Following our discussion in the last chapter, and in order to understand those changes that happened in educational policy-making after the 1978-79 Revolution in Iran, we will examine in this chapter the philosophy of education during the Pahlavi era. This approach can show the process of cultural and social change and shifts in values during this segment of Iran's history. There are numerous writings that have dealt with the same period,¹⁶⁷ mostly focusing on the political activities of the Pahlavi dynasty which may, in one way or another, bear on our topic; however, the main purpose of this study is to elaborate on the educational policies of the regime with a focus on the cultural aspects of the society. There will inevitably be some general points to be made that will strengthen the basis of our examination.

EDUCATION UNDER THE PAHLAVIS

Modernizing Iran and leading it toward the so-called "Great Civilization" was a dream of the Pahlavis. We may trace the first efforts at the modernization, education and Westernization of the country's institutions to the last years of the eighteenth century under the Qajar dynasty, when

¹⁶⁶ Earlier we mentioned that Shi'ism was made the official state religion under this dynasty.

¹⁶⁷ See, for instance: Salehi (1988), *Insurgency through culture and religion* (New York: Praeger); Milani, M. (1994), *The making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From monarchy to Islamic Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press); D. Menashri (1992) *Education and the making of modern Iran*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press) and J. Amuzegar (1991), *The dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: the Pahlavi's triumph and tragedy*, (New York: State University of New York Press).

steps were taken to bring the military up-to-date.¹⁶⁸ At that time, the majority of Shī'ī Iranians identified very closely with their religion. This was expressed in the positive relationship between the faithful and the ulama (learned clerics).¹⁶⁹ In theory, the ulama believed that Islam encourages people to try to achieve progress and development in their worldly affairs only insofar as their efforts do not harm their religious faith or duties. However, according to them, true development was possible only through a return to Islamic values.¹⁷⁰ Westernization, in their view, might bring some blessing for the country, but at the same time it could seriously undermine the cultural and religious values of the people. The conflict between the ulama and the ruler was always based, particularly in relation to culture and values, on differing notions as to education and the spiritual and moral issues facing Iranian society.

Ultimately, the Qajar rulers, who personally were not practicing Muslims and were more interested -directly or not- in the West, were unable to challenge thoughtfully these Islamic values. Despite the rise of Westernization in the military, and then in the diplomatic and economic fields, formal education in Iran was largely based on religion, i.e. Shī'ite

¹⁶⁸ For more data about the educational system and policies under the Qajar see e.g. Menashri (1992), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 23 f.

¹⁶⁹ We discussed to some extent this issue in the first chapter. For more information on this relationship under the Qajars, see Algar (1969) *Religion and state*, (Berkeley: University of California Press). For the same issue under the Pahlavis see Menashri (1992), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 20.

¹⁷⁰ The status of knowledge and science in Islam should be discussed in detail somewhere else. It should, however, be briefly noted that the above-mentioned approach does not contradict learning from others, even non-Muslims who have experience in different fields. The same standpoint is more or less dominant in today's Iran. The rulers, however, hold the idea that a nation will be successful only if it tries to progress independently while keeping to Islamic values. For more on the relationship between science and religion in Islam see, for instance, Nasr, S. H. (1968), *Science and civilization in Islam*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

Islam, at least until the 1920s. Even then only a minority of the population was educated, and their education provided them with training for religious service, not for employment in a modern capitalist economy.¹⁷¹

This emphasis on religious education was, however, discouraged by the Pahlavi kings. Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza both devalued religion, especially Islam, and emphasized Western secular subjects in the school system. It was Reza Shah's main understanding that development cannot be based on religion. Therefore, he tried to introduce modernization through imitating the West. According to Salehi:

His [Reza Shah] policies of modernization existed on two levels -organizational and cultural. Organizationally, he helped to make Iran's administration highly efficient... He established modern educational institutions at all levels. His policy was the universalization of education, copied from the West... These attempts at modernization may have caused no serious resistance, but his cultural reforms certainly did.¹⁷²

Generally speaking, the foremost goal of education at that time was to modernize and develop Iran by exhorting the Iranian people to adopt a European lifestyle.¹⁷³ The thirty-seven years of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign (1941-1979) promoted the same kinds of pro-Western policies; a Westernized sub-culture grew in size during his reign,¹⁷⁴ although different methods were employed to achieve this.

¹⁷¹ Rucker, Robert E. (1991), "Trends in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Education" in: *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 21(4), pp 455-468. See also Menashri, (1992), part one.

¹⁷² Salehi, (1988), p. 85.

¹⁷³ See for instance Mohsenpour, Bahram, 1988, "Philosophy of education in post-revolutionary Iran". in: *Comparative Education Review*, 32(1), pp. 76-86. and Salehi, (1988), p. 86.

¹⁷⁴ Salehi, (1988), p. 90.

Although modernity is ambiguous and therefore difficult to define,¹⁷⁵ modernization in the time of the Pahlavis had a specific and obvious meaning; some scholars preferred to call it "Pahlavization." This attitude acknowledged the fact that there were many factors behind modernization efforts, namely nationalism, Westernization and de-Islamization. As Milani suggests, for Reza Shah, nationalism and the glorification of pre-Islamic Persia was the ideological basis for modernization. "The selection of the name 'Pahlavi,' the language of pre-Islamic Persia, the changing of the country's name, from Persia to Iran in the early thirties, and the emphasis on Iran's Aryan heritage, were symbols of Reza Shah's brand of jingoism."¹⁷⁶ In addition, the primary model for Reza Shah in the process of modernization was the West, and particularly Europe. In his autobiography, Mohammad Reza frequently refers to his father's efforts, expressing his appreciation of them, although for different reasons.¹⁷⁷ Although modernization and even Westernization connote other concepts such as development and novelty which are in harmony with the Islamic stand point, these concepts were applied by the Pahlavis as a means of removing the influence of Islam. Modernization, therefore, from a religious perspective, threatened to destroy

¹⁷⁵ There are different definitions of modernity. The use of the concept in sense of an alteration in thought, opposing traditional one, may contradict, in some cases, religious approaches. For J. Amuzegar, "modernization, or modernism, defined as deliberate, self-consciousness break with past and a search for new and better forms of thought, expression, and action (translated into Persian as *tajaddud khāhī* or *naw-garā'i*) has always been a prime national objective among most Iranians throughout the nation's modern history." See J. Amuzegar (1991), p. 39.

¹⁷⁶ Milani (1988), p. 60.

¹⁷⁷ See Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza (1966), *Ma'mūrīyat barāyi waṭanam* [A mission to my country], (Tehran: ?), pp. 249f.

Islamic morals and culture in the society. Atatürk's Turkey,¹⁷⁸ where the policy of de-Islamization was well known, also served as a model of modernization for Reza Shah.¹⁷⁹ For these reasons "the greater part of Shi'ī Muslim ulama were upset at the domination of this kind of modernization over traditional morals."¹⁸⁰

For the Pahlavi monarchs, one of the major barriers in the process of modernizing Iran was the Islamic culture of Iran. In their eyes, the people, who adhered to the old traditions and the lessons of their ancestors (in the form of Islamic guidance), were backward and living in darkness. The solution to this problem, as Mohammad Reza expresses it, was to replace this philosophy.

In my father's view, the first educational duty was to create the spirit of patriotism [i.e., worshipping the home] in the heart of the young generation...For him, extracting the new civilization and culture meant not only construction of buildings, railroads and asphalt streets, but a total change in the spirits and culture of people.¹⁸¹

Significantly, Mohammad Reza then adds: "From 1320 [1941], when I started my reign, I followed the same general principles in education."¹⁸² A discussion of the educational progress attained during the Pahlavi era would

¹⁷⁸ Muṣṭafā Kemāl Atatürk, the founder and the first president of the Turkish Republic, was born at Salonica 1881 and died at Istanbul on 10th November 1938. For brief information see R. Mantran "Atatürk" in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition (1960, in progress), v. 1, pp. 734-735.

¹⁷⁹ See Milani (1988), p. 60

¹⁸⁰ Dānishjūyān-i Musalmān-i Piyrow-i Khaṭṭ-i Imām [Muslim student following the Imam's thought] (1987), *Az zuhūr tā suqūt: A collection of the confidential documents of the Embassy of the United States of America in Iran*. (Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Asnād-i Lāni-yi Jāsūsī), v. 1, p. 332.

¹⁸¹ Pahlavi, (1966), pp. 488-9

¹⁸² Ibid. p. 489.

be valuable, though it is beyond the limitations of this study. Here we will restrict ourselves to a review of the theoretical aspects of the problem.

GOALS AND DREAMS

Casting a slight glance at the official statements, including the nation's constitution framed by the Pahlavis and the policies formally announced by the Shah and others, one can see that the progress of the country, its modernization and its development lay at the heart of the nation's educational goals. There were, however, other "hidden policies," which may be considered as the foundations of the modernist thought of that time. Some of these policies may now be examined in more detail.¹⁸³

a. Persian Nationality

For Reza Shah, education was the most effective force in maintaining the unity of the nation and of the Persian culture. In a general sense, patriotism (*mihan-parastī*), national unity (*waḥdat-i millī*) and national independence (*istiqlāl-i millī*) were the elements that Reza Shah's educational system was designed to promote.¹⁸⁴ A chronological analysis of the educational reforms indicates the extensive efforts undertaken in this regard. In 1922, the government formed the Supreme Council of Education; in 1925, the Department of Public Education was introduced; in the mid-1920s, a uniform syllabus was prepared for all elementary and secondary schools; in 1928 standard textbooks for all regions were

¹⁸³ I have especially benefited from the work of David Menashri in developing this part of the study. For more information see D. Menashri (1992), *Education and the making of modern Iran*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press).

¹⁸⁴ Menashri (1992), p. 94.

brought out, followed by the publication of a modified series of textbooks in 1939.¹⁸⁵

Nationalism in the sense of unity of the country and nation, unity of the language, i.e. Persian, and the independence of the country, was on the surface a central consideration in the educational goals of the Pahlavis. For the religious opposition, however, this same emphasis on nationalism was merely a disguised means of eliminating Islam as a force in the country. Menashri puts this well when he says that the most important characteristic of the educational system of the Pahlavi era was its contribution in fostering national identification. He reinforces this point by adding that national identification was powerful enough "to last even when the basic tenets of the Islamic regime would have suggested that they be reserved."¹⁸⁶ In order to clarify this point, I will elaborate on the role of national identification in the Islamic Republic in the next chapter.

There is no doubt that education, as ʿĪsā Ṣadīq, a prominent educator in the Pahlavi era, stressed, must create national solidarity through appreciation of the common culture and spiritual heritage of the nation's past.¹⁸⁷ Nevertheless, the method and motivation for this creation were much more important. Besides the appearance of national unity in Reza's educational system, there were still other motivations that led him to emphasize the issue of nationalism. The centralization of decision-making was one of these motivations. Earlier we referred to the

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 303.

¹⁸⁷ Sadīq, *Modern Persia*, cited in Menashri (1992), p. 112

publication of a modified series of textbooks as one example of the efforts in the push to modernize. As Menashri indicates, it was of great academic value, for until then there had been no government supervision of textbooks; henceforth however, the new books were tailored to fit the regime's needs.¹⁸⁸ Personal loyalty to the monarchy and the Shah was among these hidden policies, as was national loyalty to the monarchy as an institution and to the Shah as the key figure in that structure.¹⁸⁹

By looking at a typical second grade Persian text issued in different years, for example, one may see the evolution of the meaning of nationality and its relation to the kingdom. In the 1942 edition we simply find the concept of "loving one's country".

Iran is our country. Our ancestors lived in Iran; we also live in this land. Iran is our home. Every one should love one's home.¹⁹⁰

In the edition from the year 1951, there is still no mention of the Shah and his kingdom. There is only a poem about Iran and its development almost at the end of the book.¹⁹¹ There is also a poem on the theme of the development of Iran in the text of 1964¹⁹² followed, first, by a lesson entitled "Iran," and then by a lesson entitled "the kingdom of Iran." This is illustrated also by pictures of the Shah and his son, which relates Iran to its monarchical system¹⁹³ (see Figure 2-1 in the following page). In the version

¹⁸⁸ Menashri (1992), p. 95.

¹⁸⁹ Menashri (1992), p. 166.

¹⁹⁰ *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, 1321 [1942], p. 140.

¹⁹¹ *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, 1330 [1951], p. 161.

¹⁹² *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, 1343 [1964], p. 70.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-8.



سین خوشن را کیم آباد
کودکان این زمین آید
یادداشت را که داشت بر
است و ست هم بر باد
باز خواند که بگوید
نمایند و در آید

Lesson 22, "Let's develop Iran"





کشور ما ایران است
ایرانیان از هر آن سال پیش
در این سرزمین زندگی می کردند
و امروز از ایران

Lesson 23, "Iran"





شاهنشاهی ایران
ایران از زمان بسیار قدیم پادشاه داشته است
از پادشاه پسر به ارث می رسد به پسر بزرگ پادشاه و
می گویند شاهنشاهی ما علیحضرت محمد رضا
است و ولیعهد ما شاهپور رضا پهلوی نام دارد
هر ایرانی که به سن هجده برسد می تواند سرباز

Lesson 24, "Imperial of Iran"



Figure 2-1 : Text of *Farsi*, 2nd grade, 1343 (1964), lessons 22, 23 and 24.
Farsi, 2nd Grade, 1343 [1964], pp. 71-79.

that was produced in the following year, the same poem is retained in its place, but is followed only by a lesson entitled "The King of the kings and the Crown Prince."¹⁹⁴ There is, finally, a greater change in the 1977 version, in which lessons on the birthday of the Shah, his crowning and the Crown Prince take priority. The poem about the development of Iran comes after them¹⁹⁵ (Figure 2-2 in the following page).

b. The West as an Ideal

For Iranians, the development and progress of the nation have often seemed an unobtainable dream during the country's long history. Iran has, after all, faced many problems in this regard and has experienced many ups and downs in its path to development. Despite its ancient civilization and its comparative equality to the West in the past, the span of the last three centuries has marked a period of decline for the country. In light of the technological and scientific development in the West, the West has come to be considered one of the great symbols of development for many people, including intellectuals and certainly the recent kings of Iran.¹⁹⁶ To become like the West was a great wish of these kings, both for themselves and for the nation. This wish accounted, at first glance, for the development, modernization and industrialization of the country as well as corresponding manifestations of this modernization. However, the eagerness to resemble

¹⁹⁴ *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, 1344 [1965], p. 81 f.

¹⁹⁵ *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, 2536 [1977], pp. 19 f.

¹⁹⁶ To study the relationship between the West and the East and those events that led to present conditions is beyond the limit of this thesis. For more information on this issue in the case of Iran see for example Jalāl-i Āl-i Aḥmad (1968), *Dar khidmat wa khāyanat-i rüşanfikrān*, (Tehran: Nashr-i Rawāq) and Ḥāiri, A. (1988), *Nakhustīn rūyārūyihāyi andīshagarān-i Iran bā du rūyi-yi tamaddun-i burzhuwāzī-yi gharb*, (Tehran: Amīr Kabir).




 <p>چهارم آبان میلا و شامگاهش و روز ناسنگداری</p> <p>چهارم آبان میلا و شامگاهش و روز ناسنگداری</p>	<p>تـ حـ ر ا ب پـ س ز ا فـ ر ا ب پـ س ۱- ا م ر ش ا گ ر و ن ا م ی نه ک ل ا ی ش ا م ی ا ی د چ د ی ی ک ن د ۲- م ح س ن ح ش ن م ا ک ن ح ش ن ی چ د ح ش ن ا ف ت ۳- م ر و س س ا ن ش ا ح ش م ر م ر گ ل چ م گ و نه م ر گ ر ا ف ت ج- نه م ر ن گ ا ز ا ی ن ک ن د ه ا ن گ ح ش ل م س ا ر ی د د س ا ن ح ش ل م س ا ر ی د م ا ک ن م ز ا ف ح ا ح ا ح ا ح ی ر ن گ ش م س ح ش م ر و د م ر م ج</p>	<p>Lesson 6, "Fourth of Ābān"</p>
<p>Lesson 7, "Prince Crown"</p>		<p>و شامگاهش ۱- ا م ر ش ا گ ر و ن ا م ی نه ک ل ا ی ش ا م ی ا ی د چ د ی ی ک ن د ۲- م ح س ن ح ش ن م ا ک ن ح ش ن ی چ د ح ش ن ا ف ت ۳- م ر و س س ا ن ش ا ح ش م ر م ر گ ل چ م گ و نه م ر گ ر ا ف ت ج- نه م ر ن گ ا ز ا ی ن ک ن د ه ا ن گ ح ش ل م س ا ر ی د د س ا ن ح ش ل م س ا ر ی د م ا ک ن م ز ا ف ح ا ح ا ح ا ح ی ر ن گ ش م س ح ش م ر و د م ر م ج</p>
	<p>Lesson 8, "Let's develop our country."</p>	

Figure 2-2: : Text of *Fārsī*, 2nd grade, 1977, lessons 6, 7 and 8.
Fārsī, 2nd Grade, 2536 [1977], pp. 19-29.

the West did not end at this level; it extended to the different social, moral and spiritual values, the culture, and even to language, clothing and customs. As a matter of fact, some of this interest had its roots in the reality of the modern developed world and the backwardness of Iranian society in these areas; however, Iranian ignorance of the social situation in the West caused them to exaggerate the advantages of this culture. They saw the West as a paradise. They are, nevertheless, still committed to their Iranian identity.

The contradiction between the two cultures is a problem that showed itself in all aspects of society during our period. Certain portions of a confidential report prepared in the last decade of Pahlavi rule in Iran for Americans who were being sent to Iran, indicate some aspects of this issue:

The long experience of foreign intervention in Iran's affairs and the change in central power has affected deeply the national personality of the people, ... and it is only a monarchy that can bring people together, *although aversion to that and the tendency to maintain Iranian identity will remain as a time bomb.*¹⁹⁷

The report then adds:

Loss of identity and the decline of traditional social ceremonies, which appear along with Westernization, have created a kind of *false identity* in the cities... There is change in the appearance of city life. Iranians used to have contact with each other in the streets and/or mosques. There would be a decrement, through industrialization, in these contacts.... Although these changes are justified in acceptable ways, they

¹⁹⁷ Report no. I-1, June, 1, 1970 in *Dānishjūyān-i Musalmān-i...* (1987), v. 1, pp. 7-8, italic added.

would demolish the basic Persian culture. Now, Iranians are strangers to themselves even in their own home. ... In their geographical thought, Europe is much closer to them than Kirmān [a city in Iran] ... *This forced Westernization is strange to Iranian society...* Finally it should be understood that most of the administrative staff in this period are those who studied in the west and are Westernized. In other words, they are not familiar enough with the home culture.¹⁹⁸

The tendency toward Westernization was prevalent in all aspects of Reza Shah's educational policy. He once explicitly stated that the goal of sending students abroad was not only to acquire Western knowledge but also to acquaint students with *Western cultural values*.¹⁹⁹ We already cited Mohammad Reza who, showing great sympathy for his father's view, said that the latter understood that the country's genuine Westernization and modernization required changes in the basic Persian culture and psychology.²⁰⁰ Mohammad Reza, after all, inherited the general philosophy of education from his father.

Living and studying in the West caused the Pahlavis rulers to become themselves more Western in their outlook. The kings' interest in the West increased, particularly once they started to visit Europe. Writing about his education in Switzerland, Mohammad Reza, expresses the view that: "during my four years studying in Switzerland, next to my father's spirit, the democratic and totally Western environment impressed me spiritually and morally more than anything else."²⁰¹ His father was already impressed by the

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Menashri (1992), pp. 105-6 For more information on Iranian students sent abroad see *ibid*, pp. 125-142.

²⁰⁰ Pahlavi (1966), pp. 488-9.

²⁰¹ Pahlavi (1966), p. 100.

West, a fact that many others had already observed. In his confidential report from the Embassy of the United States in Iran to the American Foreign Secretary, J. D. Stempel describes Mohammad Reza's personality as follows:

Though outwardly and by education thoroughly Westernized, the Shah is by heritage and outlook Persian and in fact his success in running such a country is largely due to the fact that he is a Persian politician. Although he does well in a Western situation, he is able as a Westernized Iranian to know how to apply the art of adaptation. He, therefore, with help of his understanding of Western criteria, interprets Western decisions and statements as a Persian.²⁰²

According to another report, which describes Mohammad Reza's wife, Farah Pahlavi, the queen was "a woman with two worldviews, each totally different from the other. She, who was born in Iran and studied in the West, has implanted many Western human and social values in the king's family and has tried to establish those values in the life-style of all Iranians."²⁰³ The report adds: "Farah Pahlavi is an Iranian woman with a European style... All her efforts, wishes and hopes for people are [combined] reflections of the Western and Iranian values, that one see in those who return to Iran from abroad. Farah is a woman who may recite Sa^cdi²⁰⁴, but she is Westerner. She has never attempted to read Persian texts. She loves common people, a characteristic which is Western, too."²⁰⁵

²⁰² DMPKI (1987), v. 1, p. 188.

²⁰³ DMPKI (1987), v. 1, p. 279.

²⁰⁴ Shaykh Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Sa^cdi was a poet and prose writer of the 7th/13th century. He was "one of the most renowned authors of Persia." For more information see R. Davis, "Sa^cdi," in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 8, pp. 719-723, s.v. "Sa^cdi."

²⁰⁵ DMPKI (1987), v. 1, p. 284.

These personal characteristics of the king and his family, besides their effect on the nation's direction as a whole, deeply affected educational policies. Dispatching students to Europe in 1930 was key to Reza Shah's pursuit of the goal of Westernization.

Some scholars believe that encouraging girls to go to school was also another step in the Westernization of education in Iran.²⁰⁶ They see the low number of girl students in Iranian schools before the Pahlavi reign as proof of this. It is understandable that the West should have provided an example to the king in this area. While in the West girls commonly went to school from an early age, in Iran the enrollment of female students in schools was quite low. It may also be correct to say that the traditional system discouraged any increase in the number of female students. However, there were other elements in the ulamas' reluctance to increase the number of girls in school. One of the main reasons was that the process of de-Islamization had the effect not only of expanding female education, but it also led to moves to abolish the veil. The Shah, on embarking on the latter course, said: "Because of our women's custom to wear the veil, due to their ignorance and illiteracy, the Europeans have always taunted and despised us. Discarding the veil and educating women would change that."²⁰⁷

Iranians, however, were reluctant to accept this process. Regardless of Islamic and religious tendencies, Iranians were proud of their own culture. According to a confidential report done by Ernest R. Oney: "In this country education has become more and more Western in thrust, bringing on

²⁰⁶ Menashri (1992), p. 106.

²⁰⁷ Menashri (1992), p. 108.

conflicts with values developed over the centuries by a society which has absorbed, been changed by foreign influences, but never overwhelmed by them”²⁰⁸ The report adds: “The contemporary Western-educated Iranian bureaucrat often finds on return to work in his homeland that he is facing, and perhaps being frustrated by, an institution far older than the Harvard Business School.”²⁰⁹

c. De-Islamization

Some scholars claim that secularization was one of the major goals of the educational reforms under the Pahlavis.²¹⁰ It is true that secularization, in the sense of a separation between politics and religion, and in granting some limited rights for the private observance of religion, was a goal at that time. There was, nonetheless, a deeper goal underlying Pahlavi moves in relation to education. For them, Islamic culture was a considerable obstacle in the way of modernization. De-Islamization, instead of pure secularization, seems to be a more appropriate label to describe Pahlavi efforts in relation to education. Notwithstanding this point, one should realize that from an Islamic perspective, it is impossible to separate the concept of secularization from Westernization, for one of the foundations of modern Western culture is secularism. However, the concept should be discussed separately in order to gain a better understanding of the regime’s efforts in this direction.

The backwardness of the country, the domination of common sense by superstition, and alienation from basic Islamic laws on the one hand and the development of secular Western countries on the other, led the kings of Iran

²⁰⁸ DMPKI (1987), v. 1, p. 18.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ See for instance Menashri (1992), p. 98 f.

to see all problems as being rooted in religion, and all solutions as derivable from the West. For them, Westernization could, at the same time, relieve the country from those problems which have been created, in their minds, as a result of the domination of religion. Thinking in this way, they made every effort to remove Islamic symbols from the country, insofar as this could be achieved without harming their political goals.

According to some scholars and historians, the movement of de-Islamization in Iran may traced back to the years of emergence of intellectualism in the country. S. H. Ruḥānī, who wrote a history of Iranian Revolution, believes that the mission of intellectualism in reconsidering the roots of Islam and in replacing it by Western values and thought started in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Westerners first began to come to the Middle East for different purposes.²¹¹ Thereafter, both the political and intellectual powers made an effort to reduce the power of Islam and the ulama, and to increase in turn the validity of Western values in the society.²¹²

The Pahalvi dynasty took the same path. It should be noted, however, that none of the Pahlavi kings disagreed with Islam openly. They never issued a statement that explicitly indicated their hostility to religion, particularly Islam. As mentioned in the last chapter, they even, by contrast, tried to show themselves as Islamic leaders whose efforts were directed toward the development of Islam in the country. This was more true specifically in the case of Mohammad Reza; some of his writings indicate this fact.²¹³

²¹¹ For more see S. H. Ruḥānī, *Nahdat-i Imām Khomeini* (Tehran: Markaz-i asnād-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī), v. 3, pp. 37f.

²¹² The problem of intellectualism in the Middle East, Muslim countries, and particularly in Iran, is a controversial issue that should be studied separately.

²¹³ See, for instance, Pahlavi (1966), pp. 12, 22, 73, 88,

However, both the father and the son undertook some policies that, directly or not, harmed the foundations of Islam in Iran.

The ulama (clergy), as the most distinguished symbol of Islam among the Iranian people, became the target of persecution from the government. They in turn accused the Shah of planning to establish a secular society in opposition to Islam. They defended their idea by claiming that Americans, Zionists and Bahais, who all aimed to remove the influence of Islam, supported the Shah's plans.²¹⁴ In his effort at centralizing his power, Reza Shah rejected any kind of opposition and resolved to eliminate the political power of the clergy. His first move was to prohibit the ulama from wearing their religious uniform. All ulama who wished to wear such clothing had to do so in private. A theology department was created at Tehran University in order to break the ulama's monopoly on teaching religion.²¹⁵ This is reflected in the words of Mohammad Reza, who proudly states:

Also, at the time of my father, the ulama were largely prohibited from interfering in the education of the people. He placed this duty on the shoulders of the state.²¹⁶

In December of 1928, as Avery declares, "a sumptuary Act implied a further attack on religion. Uniform attire on European lines was prescribed for men, a peaked cap replacing the brimless hat worn by Muslim so that their foreheads can touch the ground in prayer."²¹⁷

Mohammad Reza followed the same policy; the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in explicit opposition to the regime, was exiled to Turkey and then

²¹⁴ DMPKI (1987), v. 1, p. 87.

²¹⁵ Milani (1988), p. 61.

²¹⁶ Pahlavi (1966), pp. 322-3.

²¹⁷ Peter Avery (1965), *Modern Iran*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub.), p. 289.

to Iraq, while others remained under control. There were, however, some ulama who entered the field of education and who were even able to contribute to the writing of religious textbooks, although evidently not without the state exercising some control. Beheshti,²¹⁸ the head of judiciary after the Revolution, and Bahunar,²¹⁹ the second Prime Minister after the Revolution, were among these people.

Previously we discussed Reza Shah's plan to forbid the wearing of the *hijāb* in the country as one element in the process of Westernization. After his visit to Turkey in 1934, where he was impressed by the expansion of girls' education, "he underscored the link between education and the evolution of women's status in January 1936, when he decided to mark the abolishing of the veil with a ceremony at the training college for women teachers."²²⁰ As M. Salehi believes: "the climax of his policies was the unveiling of women,"²²¹ an act designed to emphasize the Western and specifically non-Islamic direction of the government; the Islamic dress code for women was not merely a matter of fashion, but was viewed as a religious imperative by all Muslim scholars.

²¹⁸ Ayatollah Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥuseini Bihishtī (1928-1981) was born in Iṣfahān. Besides his seminary studies, he received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Tehran, Iran. After the Islamic Revolution, he was appointed as the head of the juridical Section. He, along with seventy-two other statemen, was murdered in 1981 in a bomb attack planned by the terrorist organization Mujāhidīn-i Khalq.

²¹⁹ Ḥujjatul-Islām Moḥammad Jawād Bāhunar (1942-1981) was born in Kirmān. He, besides his studies in seminaries as a clergyman, received his Ph.D. in education from Tehran University, Iran. After the Islamic Revolution, he was appointed as Minister of Education and then as Prime Minister. In 1981, and after one month in his last job, he, too was killed in the bomb attack engineered by the Mujāhidīn-i Khalq.

²²⁰ Menashri (1992), p. 108.

²²¹ Salehi, (1988), p. 86.

²²² Salehi (1988), p. 86.

This last act of Westernization and secular behavior introduced by Reza Shah seriously hurt the Iranian clergy and their followers, whose subsequent opposition the Shah tried to crush by force. For the ulama and most of the general population, this was Reza Shah's major crime against the Islamic nation and Quranic law, according to which all women should cover their beauty from strangers.²²³ In their view, this would lead to the corruption of the people, and would propagate immorality and sexual promiscuity. In keeping with the new situation in the country, many Muslim girls and women were forced either to appear with no veil or stay at home all day and night. Therefore, immediately after the fall of Reza Shah from power in the early 1940s, when the allied forces occupied Iran, a large segment of the population returned to the traditional dress which they had been forced to abandon,²²⁴ and began rejecting Western mannerisms. Many women changed their dress styles, wearing the *chadour* once again.²²⁵

As a result of the new law, illustrations of females in textbooks had to leave out the *hijāb*, a law which remained on the books until the time of the 1978-79 Revolution (See Figure 2-3 in the following page). Thus, after several years, this process made unveiling a norm, especially in the city of Tehran and some other large cities, for the new generations; yet, the majority of Iranians still resisted it. Although the behavior of Mohammad Reza was much different, particularly in the first decade of his reign, the ulama maintained the same view regarding his policies in regard to religion. According to another confidential report:

²²³ For more see footnote 291 of this thesis.

²²⁴ Avery (1965), *Modern Iran*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub.), p. 292.

²²⁵ Salehi (1988), p. 89.




Figure 2-3: Women's dressing before and after the Revolution.
(Left) *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, (2536) [1977], p. 1. — (Right) *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, (1374) [1995], p. 7.

From their (the ulama's) point of view, Mohammad Reza has been traitorous to his most important duty, i.e. to support Islam. The religious leaders, in addition to the present generation, believe that the present king made up his mind to make Islam disappear, as his father did.²²⁶

It goes without saying that the above-mentioned policies were much easier for the new king to re-introduce, since many of the obstacles had already been removed and because people had also grown more flexible than they used to be during the time of Reza Shah.

The Pahlavi efforts at reviving twenty-five centuries of monarchy accompanied the process of de-Islamization. For, after all, de-Islamization

²²⁶ DMPKI (1987), v. 1, p. 24. Report no. 1-2.

would leave a vacuum which had to be filled. For the Iranian people, Islam was so far the only source of their identity, and this had to be changed to another conception. The twenty-five hundred year-long monarchy in Iran was seen as the best alternative.

Writing about Reza Shah's efforts in trying to weaken the ulama and reduce their role in running society, P. Avery asserts:

This is what Reza Shah proceeded to do, while it was intended that secular education and nationalist propaganda, in which pre-Islamic Iran was the model, would weaken the people's religious loyalty...²²⁷

For Avery, the programme went on in different ways, and included "millenary celebrations for the great poet, Firdawsī, whose epic, the *Shāhnāmah*, enshrines the pre-Islamic Iranian legend."²²⁸

The replacement of the Islamic calendar by the imperial calendar was done as part of the road to de-Islamization by the Pahlavis under Mohammad Reza. The Islamic calendar begins with the (*hijra*) immigration of the Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD. The rotation of the following years was estimated according to either the solar or lunar systems; the latter is about ten days shorter than the solar one. The former which is called Solar Hijrī (*hijrī Shamsī*), was (and still is) used as the formal calendar of Iran, while the other, which is called Lunar Hijrī (*hijrī Qamarī*) was used more in religious and traditional applications. Close to the end of his rule, in March, 15, 1976, the Pahlavi king decided to replace this Islamic calendar with an imperial one referring back to the kingdom of the

²²⁷ Peter Avery (1965), *Modern Iran*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub.), p. 286.

²²⁸ Ibid.

Achamenids. The year 1355, according to Islamic reckoning, became 2535 Imperial. The people and administrative staff were forced to apply this new calendar in their daily affairs. For Muslims, opposition to this anti-Islamic action was predictable. We can read of this in a secret report from the US embassy in Iran to the US foreign secretary. According to this report "the more complicated issue for the regime is religious conservatives... In addition, the merchants, peasants and Muslims of all regions feel tired of the regime. Two recent events have declared this fact. First is the replacement of the Islamic calendar by the Persian imperial one... and second is the death of Ayatollah Shams Ābādī, a religious and popular figure, in Isfahan."²²⁹

Despite the retreat of the Shah in announcing that religious holy days would remain as they were, there were serious objections to his policies from both the ulama and the people alike. For them it was an attack on the prophetic tradition of Islam and a new step in removing Islamic symbols from the people's mind. This thought was emphasized in a statement of the Shah at the inauguration of the parliament in 1976, where the law changing the calendar was passed.

It is very important for the social change process in present-day Iran to remove the indecent features and appearances of the past period of moral and social decline. The long history of our country experienced several attacks or occupation by foreign powers. These events naturally resulted in some spiritual and cultural domination of our country's thought and spirit, which contradicted pure Iranian identity...Our

²²⁹ DMPKI (1987), v. 1, p. 212. Ayatollah Shams Ābādī was an influential and popular scholar among the people of Isfahan. He was mysteriously murdered in 1977. People attributed his murder to the regime's agents. The murderer was, however, a young religious student who was called Mehdi Hashemi. He was executed after the Revolution for the same crime.

nation...has the spiritual responsibility to remove these from the face of Iranian values.²³⁰

The plan for de-Islamization through changing the calendar was immediately reflected in the textbooks. A note appeared in the prefaces to all textbooks advising teachers on how to change the date according to the new imperial calendar. The note reads: "The imperial date approved by Parliament, in the month of Esfand, 1354 [March 1976] to be the beginning of the Iranian calendar. The imperial calendar begins with the establishment of the Achaemenid state by the Great Cyrus...Since there was not enough time to correct this shift during the publication of these textbooks, teachers should notice this change and oblige their students to change the date wherever they find it in their books."²³¹

This plan of reviving the monarchy's history, as Avery points out in relation to the celebration for *Firdawsī*, "had, of course, little effect on the masses."²³² and was always rejected by the majority of Iranians and the ulama, specifically Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers. In his reaction to the imperial celebrations for the twenty-five century of monarchy in Iran, held by the Shah in 1970, and in one of his messages to those embarking on the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1969, Ayatollah Khomeini said:

This dictatorial system, with help of Muslim finances, celebrates those kings who tortured people in every era; who fought with the religion of the people, who were the serious enemies of Islam and who have torn the noble letter of the Prophet.²³³

²³⁰ Madani (1990) *Tārīkh-i sīyasī-yi mu'āssir-i Iran*, (Tehran: Daftar-i Intishārāt-i Islāmī), p. 308.

²³¹ *Fārsī*, third Grade, 2536 [1978], introduction.

²³² Avery (1965), p. 287.

²³³ Rūḥānī (1993), v. 3, p. 548.

Generally speaking, the Shah, who saw the religious spirit of the people as a serious barrier for his plans in the country, decided to weaken and eliminate any Islamic symbol as much as possible. It is interesting to note that in some of the Shah's plans, Islam was used to weaken itself. The unsuccessful efforts at establishing a religious mission [*Sipāh-i Dīn*], and an Islamic University were some examples in this regard.

d. The Centrality of Monarchy

It has already been mentioned that one of the aims of education in Iran was to emphasize the national background of the country, which extends back over twenty five centuries of monarchy. National loyalty, based on this policy, was introduced as a great social value. "To the Shah," however, as Menashri states: "national loyalty meant loyalty to the monarchy as an institution and to him personally."²³⁴ The Pahlavi's efforts were to make a link between the loyalty to the system of monarchy loyalty to the country and also loyalty to the Shah. Those who were against the Shah, from the point of view of the Shah, were enemies of the country.

The Shah was introduced in elementary textbooks as the father of the nation; the nation, therefore, was obliged to love him.²³⁵ In one of the texts published at the end of Reza Shah's reign, entitled "Shah," children read:

Every family lives in a house. The father of the family is the boss, who works to fulfill the family's needs...To compare Iran to a family, Iran would be the home and the chief of this great house would be the Shah. The Shah is as a kind father to Iranians, and we all are his children...Our Shah is his majesty, the king of all kings, Pahlavi. We love him and listen devotedly

²³⁴ Menashri (1992), p. 165.

²³⁵ *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, 1321 [1942], pp. 116-117.

to his orders. Our ancestors were always worshipping the
Shah and advised their children that first God, second Shah....

O Shah to love you, is our belief;
worshipping your name is our religion... ²³⁶

This passage also utilizes traditional values, as it presents the Shah as the "chief patriarch" in a patriarchal society. Although, due to some political problems there was a halt for some years in spreading this concept, after the establishment of his kingdom Mohammad Reza was introduced as the third most beloved after God and country. M. Mehran, the Minister of Culture [*vazir-i farhang*] of the Shah, in his introduction to the Persian text of the third grade, wrote: "the Ministry of Culture...has reviewed this text...and tried to improve it so that it can serve as a text for teaching children a lifestyle...and for strengthening the spirit of faith and worshipping of God, love for the Shah and patriotism in children."²³⁷ Accordingly, the first lesson of the third grade of the elementary school starts with a poem entitled "God, Home, Shah."²³⁸ Finally, the status of the Shah was raised to the second level, that is immediately beside God, and even the shadow of God.

The birthday of the Shah was one of the most lavishly celebrated days in the country; nothing, even religious ceremonies, could equal it.²³⁹ The birthdays of the Shah's son, the Shah's wife, and the day of coronation were also celebrated throughout the country, especially in schools. Illustrated by a picture of the Shah and his wife,²⁴⁰ the followings passage was what children of the second grade used to read about these events.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ *Fārsī*, 3rd Grade, 1340 [1961], introduction.

²³⁸ *Fārsī*, 3rd Grade, 1340 [1961], p. 1.

²³⁹ See Madani (1990), p.610.

²⁴⁰ See figure 2-3, the first picture entitled "Forth of Ābān."

The fourth of Ābān [Oct. 26] is the birthday of the Shāhanshāh Āryāmihr. Iranians light up the cities on this day. The name of Shāhanshāh Āryāmihr is Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Shāhanshāh Āryāmihr is the son of the Great Reza Shah...Shahanshah loves all of us...People all around the world appreciate Shāhanshāh Āryāmihr's thought.... Shāhanshāh Āryāmihr and Shahbānū were crowned on the 4th of Ābān. On this occasion, Iranians, who long wished to have this day, celebrate it greatly.²⁴¹

As is clear from the above phrase “people all around the world appreciate Shāhanshāh Āryāmihr's thought,” the king took international recognition for granted.

STEP-BY-STEP CHANGE

The contradiction between theory and practice on the one hand, and between different theoretical statements seems, at first glance, to be a confusing problem, especially as regards the goals and policies of the Pahlavi era. One of the reasons for this contradiction may be found in the so-called policy of “step-by-step change.” I use the expression step-by-step only to emphasize the political aspect of a gradual process of implementation of policies during the fifty years of Pahlavi rule. By it, however, I do not mean either the usual gradual progress over a long time, nor do I mean the positive aspects of a development.

The policy of gradual change was more apparent at the time of Mohammad Reza, although his father should be considered as the founder of that policy. Besides the lack of stability of the kingdom in the first stages, the religious atmosphere of the society was one of the factors that caused the kings to apply this hypocritical approach. Aware of the close relations that existed between the ulama

²⁴¹ *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, 2536 [1977], pp. 19-20.

and the people, Reza Shah, on a trip to Qum, tried to convince the ulama of the implications of his goals in the first years of his rule. Soon after the establishment of the state, he rapidly continued to reduce their power in all fields. On the celebration of coronation, the Shah said:

I have to declare, at this time, my intentions in improving the country...to be regarded as a schedule for the others. First, my specific attention would be given to maintaining and strengthening the foundations of religion...²⁴²

After obtaining power, however, he changed his manner. One may see the same behavior in the case of Mohammad Reza. Most of his outwardly religious actions, namely meetings with ulama and trips to the holy cities of Iran, including Mashad, were in the first years of his kingdom; when he was at the height of the power, he tried to remove Islamic symbols, and among these was the Islamic calendar.

Earlier we discussed the concept of the centrality of the Shah in the context of nationalism. Explaining this concept, Menashri elaborates on this progress in educational policies this way:

Already as crown prince he asked teachers at the Tehran Teachers Seminar to foster in their students "the spirit of devotion to God (*Khoda-parasti*), love of the Shah (*Shah-dusti*), and patriotism" -as an inseparable triad. This theme came through most explicitly almost forty years later, in 1975, when he established the Rastakhiz party.²⁴³

The Revolution of 1978-79 brought an end to the process of Pahlavization of the country and particularly educational system. We will

²⁴² Akbar Rafi'i Tihri, *Kitāb-i Pahlavi*, (a special issue of *Ijtihād* which was published on the occasion of the coronation of the Shah), p. 157.

²⁴³ Menashri (1992), p. 166.

follow our discussion in the next chapter by focusing our attention on policy-making under the Islamic regime.

Chapter 3

1978-79 IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION: A REVOLUTION IN VALUES

INTRODUCTION

Quite recently, the current Iranian leader, Ayatollah S. ^ʿAli Khāmeneī²⁴⁴ brought up the issue of Islamization in education. In a speech to university students, he declared that Iranian Islamic higher education still has a long way to go, in spite of the fact that it has been eighteen years since the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

Today, the country is in need of a university which is truly Islamic. In an Islamic university, knowledge accompanies religion, academic effort accompanies ethics, controversial discussions accompany tolerance, a variety of fields accompany unity of purpose, ...and to sum up, the world accompanies hereafter.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴Ayatollah Sayyid ^ʿAli Khāmeneī, the present leader of the Islamic Republic, was born in Mashhad in 1939. During the Pahlavi reign he was one of the active oppositionists in the city of Mashhad. In 1978 was appointed as one of the members of the Revolutionary Council. In 1981, while he was seriously injured by a bomb explosion planned by the terrorist group of Mujāhidin Khalq, he was elected by Iranian people as the third president of the Islamic Republic. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 29, June 1989, he was selected by the *Majlis Khobrigān* (Ulama's Assembly) as the leader of Islamic Revolution. For more see "Khamenei" Ettelaat Online <<http://www.SalamIran.org/DCI/iran/mashahir>> [Accessed 12 January 1998].

²⁴⁵ *Payām-i Āshnā*, v. 2, no. 29, Sep. 1996.

More than political issues, it was the lack of the values and specifically Islamic values that motivated Ayatollah Khomeini to lead the Revolution of 1978-79 against the monarchical system in Iran. "In the near future," the Ayatollah said in the first years after the Revolution, "we will replace the colonial culture of the former regime with an independent Islamic culture."²⁴⁶ Consequently, the educational system and its policies were among the primary targets for the Ayatollah in his effort to replace the regime; it was one of the essential changes that happened after the Revolution. The Islamic leader was already insisting on the same purpose years before the victory of the Revolution. A chronological review of his lectures, writings and statements indicates that, for the Ayatollah, "the way to purify a country is to do it so through its education; purification should start from education" as "colonization achieved its goals in the country through the same means."²⁴⁷

Despite its significant role in the Revolution, the role of values in general and the process of Islamization and the application of Islamic values in education in particular were given little consideration. The 1978-79 Revolution led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic and consequently to the Islamization of education. What has been the result of the application of Islamization in education since then? And what does the Islamic republic mean by Islamization of education?

Before engaging the issue of education in Islam from a religio-cultural approach, we will first try to delineate in this chapter those goals taken into

²⁴⁶ A. Khomeini in *Dar justujū-yi rāh az kalām-i Imām*, (hereafter DJR) [Seeking the way through the Imam's word (a collection of Ayatollah Khomeini's lectures and statements)], edited by a group of editors (1982), v. 22, pp. 34-35

²⁴⁷ A. Khomeini (September 12, 1980) in DJR, v. 22, p. 21

consideration after 1979 in the light of the Revolution. This will be accomplished through a review of Ayatollah Khomeini's views regarding Iranian culture and the role of religion in educational policies. In general, one finds there an emphasis on Islamization as the main vehicle of change. Its impact on educational goals and its reflection in textbooks is another aspect that this chapter will address. However, questions such as the definition of Islamic education, and whether or not it is the same as religious education, the issue of the Islamic value system and also the religious and philosophical roots of this field will be discussed in the chapters that follow.

IRAN UNDER THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

With the 1978-79 Revolution the Westernizing tendencies that had until then prevailed in Iran were reversed. In contrast to pre-Revolutionary society, post-Revolutionary Iran dissociated itself from both Western and Eastern-bloc countries. Earlier we mentioned the popular slogan of the time that described Iran as a "non-Western, non-Eastern (i.e. non-Marxist) country, but rather the Islamic Republic." However, this opposition was not limited to a political sense; its foremost goal was ideological and cultural. The Revolution was a lesson learned from Iran's experience in previous years, in the opposition to Reza Shah and his son, indicating a serious conflict between secularism and religion, between Islam and Westernization. To paraphrase Salehi, "the secularist modernizers for nearly half a century paved the road for the rise of the pro-clergy forces to power."²⁴⁸ Clerics and their faithful followers were looking to create an atmosphere in which to establish an Islamic state.

²⁴⁸ Salehi, (1988), p. 91.

The connection between Revolution and Islam is most visible in the alliance between the people and the religious leadership. Although it is a political analysis, the following confidential report that discusses the relations between the ulama and the regime supports this claim:

As regards the interest of America, the important issue is the enmity of a great and powerful group [i.e. ulama] who always have had access to the majority of population.²⁴⁹

What happened in Iran during the years 1978-1979 was the result of the combination of a number of opposition groups, an alliance, which culminated in such an attractive Revolution.²⁵⁰ However, it was an *ayatullāh al-ʿuzmāʾ*,²⁵¹ the highest rank within the Shiʿite clerical hierarchy, who dominated the leadership. This was the result of several independent variables, the most important of which was the legitimacy that the Ayatollah Khomeini derived as a religious leader. Kamrava describes the tridimensional relationship between religion, people, and leadership in this way:

Socially, his religious background and training enabled him to understand and communicate with the masses, a blessing no other opposition group could match.²⁵²

Disassociation from the West and even the East has always been one of

²⁴⁹ DMPKI (1987), *Az zuhūr tā suqūṭ: a collection of the documents of the Embassy of US in Iran*. (Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i asnād-i Lāni-yi Jāsūsi-yi Āmrīcā) v. 1, p. 91.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ The word ayatollah (āyat al-Allah) literally means the grand evidence of God. It is a title for the highest rank of *fuqahā* among the Shiʿi Muslims, particularly among Iranian people. The title for the same rank in some other countries is *imām* in the sense of leader. The Sunnis use the title of imām for even lower ranks. For the first time in Iran, during the 1979 Revolution, the title of Imām applied for the Ayatollah Khomeini, known as Imām Khomeini.

²⁵² M. Kamrava (1990), *Revolution in Iran: the roots of turmoil*, (Routledge, London).

the characteristics of the ulama, of the Islamic nature of the Revolution and finally of the Islamic Republic established later. In one of his confidential reports, Stample points to the influence of ulama and asserts that "since America has been a serious supporter for the Shah, and the ulama disagreed with the rule of foreigners in the country, there could be a serious reaction on the part of the people against America."²⁵³ This has led the Islamic government to make a major effort to strip away the cultural influences of the West.²⁵⁴

In his writings prior to the Revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini mentioned the government of God; after the victory of the Revolution, he often asserted that all institutions should be Islamic and function according to the rules and regulations of Islam.²⁵⁵ "Our Revolution is a Revolution in values." This slogan, the Imām's own words, indicates the significant role of values in making Iran an Islamic. "Westernization", "fear before the European," dependency," "lack of Islamic values," and "forgetting Iranian identity" were some of the factors that, for Ayatollah Khomeini, harmed the country. The solution, for the Ayatollah, was to replace these factors. A few years before the Revolution, he addressed some of the Iranian students who were studying in Europe, saying "you have to make effort to evaluate this present culture, awaken all the nations and, by the help of God, try to replace it with an Islamic, human culture, according to its method, which is humanity and justice, so that future generations may be educated."²⁵⁶

²⁵³ DMPKI (1987), v. I, p. 155.

²⁵⁴ Salehi (1988), p. 90.

²⁵⁵ A. Aghajanian "Post-revolutionary demographic trends in Iran" in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin, *Post-revolutionary Iran*, (Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1988), p. 153.

²⁵⁶ A. Khomeini (April 26, 1971), in DJR, v. 22, p. 184.

One of the best tools in the process of replacing rejected values with Islamic ones was education. As has happened in many countries that have undergone revolutions, and to some extent as also happened in Iran under the Pahlavis, education became a vital means for this propose. Education for Iranian children became an essential means for Islamization, just as it had previously been an essential means for Westernization. One thing that both the Pahlavis and Islamic leaders had in common was that both pointed to the importance of education and its role in cultural change.

GOALS AND POLICIES

The educational system, one of Iran's most significant and influential institutions, attracted the immediate attention of the Islamic leaders in the years following the Revolution. Based on their understanding of Islam, as well as the goals of the Revolution and its relationship to the modern world, Islamic leaders, and specifically Ayatollah Khomeini made an effort to establish an Islamic institution of education, the objective of which is the creation of the Islamic person. Education, at all levels, has been taken into consideration. While a progressive plan is presently being applied in the elementary and secondary schools,²⁵⁷ steps toward the Islamization of higher education began in September 1980. This Islamization focused on the

²⁵⁷ Since the process of Islamization in the primary and secondary schools was less conspicuous but no less significant, some scholars such as Menashri considered it as a moderate task with no major difficulties, which is finished in the first two years or so after the Revolution. (See D. Menashri, (1990) *Iran: a decade of war and revolution*, New York: Holmes and Meier) I think the better justification for this progressive course is less political engagement of the students of these levels. While there were some of the university students and staff, including leftists who formed a few different political and ideological groups, almost all the primary and secondary students were Muslim children who either were in favor of the Revolution or did not have obvious participation in political activities. It was the same problem for the higher education that led the leaders for a cultural revolution in 1981, by closing the universities for almost three years.

personality of the students and staff, the curriculum and also the general Islamic atmosphere of the campuses. For the Ayatollah Khomeini, the universities under the Pahlavis "were colonial [institutions]" bastions of Western and Eastern thought,²⁵⁸ and had to be changed.

For the Islamic leaders, the other levels of education were in more or less the same position before the Revolution. The chief aim of education under the Islamic Republic has been the creation of an Islamic person or, in the case of recognized religious minorities, the development of a commitment to one God.²⁵⁹ The High Council of Education lists among the basic goals of education religious and spiritual ones first, followed by scientific and cultural, social, political, and finally economic goals.²⁶⁰ These reflect the major elements in the thought of Ayatollah Khomeini regarding education, some of which may now be examined. Islamization, from Ayatollah Khomeini's point of view specifically contains three elements:

a. Independence

Beside political independence, independence in *culture* is one of the main goals expressed in the government's revolutionary statements. Although independence was considered one of the political and educational policies of the Pahlavi regime, the opposition believed that Western notions - first those of Europe and then those of the United States- had an undue influence in the fields of both politics and culture. Culture at the time of the

²⁵⁸ A. Khomeini (November 17, 1980), in DJR, v. 22, p. 144.

²⁵⁹ Higgins, Patricia J. and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari, "Women's education in the Islamic republic of Iran," in: Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl (eds.) (1994), *In the eye of the storm: Women in post-revolutionary Iran*, (New York: Syracuse University Press).

²⁶⁰ See the list in: Shari'atmadari, 'Ali (1994), *Jāmi'a wa ta'lim wa tarbiyat [society and education]*, 12th ed. (Tehran: Amir Kabir Pub).

Pahlavis, in Ayatollah Khomeini's view, was a "colonial and dependent culture."²⁶¹ "The West" in his words, "captured our thought and spiritual independence," which was, in comparison to economic, agricultural and other forms of dependency, much more significant.²⁶² Insisting on the danger of spiritual dependency, the Ayatollah adds: "it is possible to bring an end to military dependency; economic dependency may feasibly be compensated; but spiritual and human dependency is very crucial."²⁶³ By the same understanding, the Imām rejected intellectuals who were still, according to him, dependent to the West.²⁶⁴ In his statement announced at the beginning of the academic year 1982-83, the Islamic leader clearly asserts that: "our country can no longer endure Westernized or Easternized [Marxist] thought. We have to obtain cultural independence, which is the foundation for an independent, free country."²⁶⁵

The reflection of this goal, that is independence, is clearly visible in today's school textbooks. We will have a more detailed discussion on this in Chapter Seven about political values and their teaching in elementary textbooks. Briefly, the Persian texts, for all the elementary grades, include at least one lesson about the Islamic Revolution. In all of these lessons, the slogan of the Revolution, namely "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic" is repeated. In one of the last lessons of the first grade Persian text, which is

²⁶¹ A. Khomeini (May 29, 1979), in DJR, v. 22, p. 117.

²⁶² Ibid.


²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., P. 118.

²⁶⁵ A. Khomeini (September 25, 1982), *ibid.*, p. 268.

illustrated by pictures related to the Revolution (see Figure 3-1 below), the students read:

It was the year 1357 [1979]. Iranian Muslims, were upset at the Shah's tyranny. Imām Khomeini was, at that time, out of the country. People wanted, by the help of the leadership of Imām Khomeini, to dismiss the Shah. They yearned for "independence, freedom and Islamic Republic."²⁶⁶



One may see more or less the same content in the Persian texts of the second and third grades.²⁶⁷ The back covers of these books are also illustrated

²⁶⁶ *Fārsī*, 1st Grade, 1375 [1996], p.108.

²⁶⁷ See *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade 1374 [1995], pp. 240-241 and *Fārsī*, 3rd Grade, 1372 [1993], p. 210.

for some years²⁶⁸ by a portrait of a group of boys and veiled girls. At the top of the covers is written: "By faith in God, by purification and virtue, by seeking knowledge, by devotion and economy, we guard our independence, freedom and the Islamic Republic of Iran." The cover, however, was changed in the further years.²⁶⁹

Independence in Ayatollah Khomeini's view cannot be disassociated from the divinely-based ideology. An Islamic country should be strong enough to fulfill its needs independently. For the same reason, in his final discourse the Ayatollah writes: "I advise all generations, present and future, who want to witness the continued life of the divine rule and witness the end of the influence of colonialists and exploiters, in their land, to preserve the same theocentric feelings which the Supreme Lord has emphasized in the Holy *Qur`ān*."²⁷⁰

b. Self-confidence

The concept of "self-confidence," parallel to the notion of independence, is frequently taken into account in Ayatollah Khomeini's writings and speeches. The Ayatollah believed that at the conclusion of a long period of dependency, the Iranian nation, which had lost everything, needed most of all its *self-confidence*. The nation, therefore, needs time to acquire it again. For him, self-confidence is a solution for all the East in its journey towards development. In one of his lectures, the Ayatollah says:

²⁶⁸ See for instance textbooks that are published in the years 1372, 1373 and 1374 [1993, 1994 and 1995].

²⁶⁹ See, for instance, *Fārsī*, 1st Grade, 1375 [1996]. The previous pattern was replaced by a portrait about cleanness and using soap in order to avoid illness.

²⁷⁰ Ayatollah Khomeini, *Final discourse*, (Tehran: Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture), p. 8.

As long as the nations of the East do not understand that they are also existent, that they are also nations, and that the East also is a region, they cannot acquire independence. The East lost and missed itself in the presence of the West; it lost its thought; it lost Islam, which is at the pinnacle of all the schools of thought.²⁷¹

“One of the calamities [that kings and their supporters] created for this nation,” the Ayatollah believes, “is that they made this nation pessimistic with regard to itself....This is the sense in which we forfeited ourselves before the West...”²⁷² “Their plan was to make us inattentive to what we are.”²⁷³ “Our culture,” therefore, “is a colonized culture; we should follow our own culture.”²⁷⁴

The Western model of development has been for many years a matter of debate between intellectuals and religious scholars in Iran. The former label ulama as being against the grain of modernization. According to them, religious scholars, particularly ulama, are fundamentalists who want to turn back the centuries, to the time of the beginning of Islam.²⁷⁵ There were, however, some intellectuals such as Jalāl Āl-i Aḥmad, who, in opposition to their colleagues, confirmed this religious approach or at least saw religion as a component of nationalism.²⁷⁶ The ulama, on the other hand, declare that intellectuals have lost their confidence, religion and beliefs in the face of the Western industrial and materialistic development. To

²⁷¹ A. Khomeini (January 10, 1979), in DJR, v. 22, p. 137.

²⁷² A. Khomeini (April 7, 1979), *ibid.*, p. 115.

²⁷³ A. Khomeini (September 20, 1979), *ibid.*, p. 133.

²⁷⁴ A. Khomeini (October 11, 1978), *ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁷⁵ In some of his lectures, Ayatollah Khomeini referred to this concept and said: “You intellectuals want us not to return to the education of fourteen centuries ago! You fear if we educate our young according to Islamic education, which demolished two great empires just by a small number of Muslims, we would be reactionary!” See A. Khomeini, in DJR, v. 11, pp. 18-19.

²⁷⁶ See Jalāl Āl-i Aḥmad, *Gharbzadegi* [Westernization], (Washington: Iranbooks), pp. 71 f.

paraphrase the Iranian leader,

when colonial countries, through their scientific development, or through colonization of Asian and African nations, acquired wealth and luxuries, some of our people lost their confidence. They thought the only way to development was to leave their own laws and beliefs. When, for instance, they could go to the moon, these people thought they should leave their own laws. What is the relationship between going to the moon and Islamic laws? Do they not see those countries with contradictory social laws and systems can still compete in science.²⁷⁷

For Ayatollah Khomeini, studying in the West was one of the ways that this mentality was created. For him, those who went to the West became Westernized; “they do not let this nation find itself and understand that it is from this part of the world, and that the East is developed.”²⁷⁸ After the Revolution, however, because of its scientific needs in different fields, the Islamic Republic decided to revive the practice of sending thousands of students to Western countries in order to help the country’s economic and development. Although for some scholars like Menashri, this effort was an indication of a process of moderation in the Islamic leaders’ policies,²⁷⁹ one may explain it in differentiating between Western technology and Western values and ideas.

c. Purification

Besides the goals of building independence and self-confidence, another educational goal, even more important, is “purification” (*tahdhib* or *tazkiya*)

²⁷⁷ A. Khomeini, in DJR, v. 11, p. 12.

²⁷⁸ A. Khomeini (September 20, 1979), in DJR, v. 22, 136.

²⁷⁹ Menashri, (1992), p. 315.

of the souls of human beings. There is a verse in the *Qur`ān* that says:

He is Who raised among the illiterates an Apostle, who recites to them His communications and purifies them, and teaches them the Book and the Wisdom, although they were before certainly in clear error.²⁸⁰

In its lexical meaning *tazkiya* (from the Arabic “z.k.w”) is to purify.²⁸¹ Scholars of Islamic ethics use this Quranic concept in the sense of purifying the soul of inappropriate attributions. In his commentary on the *Qur`ān*, Tabataba`i says, regarding this verse, “*tazkiyah* is to clean [the soul] from contamination and impurity; cleanness includes being cleansed of wrong beliefs such as polytheism and denying God, of inappropriate spiritual moods such as pride and jealousy, and also of evil behavior such as murder and adultery.”²⁸² As mentioned earlier, the main goal of Islamic guidance is to make the individual closer to God. The priority given to the purification of knowledge in the verse, according to Tabataba`i and Khomeini, indicates the precedence of *tazkiya* over *ta`līm* (teaching).²⁸³

Reciting once more the above-mentioned verse of the *Qur`ān*, Ayatollah Khomeini emphasizes this mystical aspect of education.²⁸⁴ According to Islamic teaching, human beings are a combination of external and internal aspects. The former, which is body, is a purely materialistic existence, which

²⁸⁰ The *Qur`ān*, 62 (Jumu'a), verse 2. M. H. Shakir's translation into English.

²⁸¹ See Lane, (1863), *Arabic-English Lexicon*, (London & Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate) v. 1, s.v. “z.k.w.”

²⁸² Tabataba`i (1991), *Al-Mġān*, Persian translation by Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī, 4th ed. (Tehran: Bunyād-i `Ilmī wa Fikrī-yi `Allama Ṭabāṭabāī), v. 1, p. 461.

²⁸³ Ibid., v. 19, p. 535. For more details about the Ayatollah Khomeini's idea see, for instance, his lecture on July, 1, 1980 to the principles of the educational boards, DJR, v. 22, p. 316.

²⁸⁴ See for instance lectures on Jan, 8, 1980, ibid., v. 22, p. 366; June, 24, 1979 ibid., v. 22, p. 304; and July, 17, 1979, ibid., v. 22, p. 307

is visible to every one. The internal aspect or the soul is immaterial. As one should take care of one's body, one must also train the soul, which is the real part of a human being. Islamic teaching refers in the main to this aspect of the human being, although it does not reject, but rather encourages seeking knowledge in relation to the materialistic aspect, i.e. the whole of nature, including the human body.

For Ayatollah Khomeini, lack of purification is the source of all miseries and calamities.²⁸⁵ He believes that as long as people do not try to purify themselves of wrong ideas, beliefs, behavior, etc., their knowledge will not lead the way for human beings to reach their true destination. This is the case, according to him, even for the clergy and those who engage in Islamic and religious knowledge.²⁸⁶ For the Ayatollah, "freedom alone is not prosperity; independence alone is not happiness; ...these would be so only in the light of divine spirituality." This divine spirituality, in his view, is certainly the same as Islamization.

Based on the same understanding, Ayatollah Khamenei, the present leader, highlights this concept of Islamization as an end of education. In his view, "the most important concept which should be heeded in education is that of Islamic belief and practices."²⁸⁷ He then adds that besides these, Islamic morality is also a pillar of education. "A Muslim," according to him, "should not be jealous, stingy, fearful, or hostile."²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ A. Khomeini (September 19, 1982), in DJR, v. 22, p. 3

²⁸⁶ Khomeini, *Jihād-i Akbar*, edited by Hasan Hanafi (S.L.: s.n., 1980?), p. 28.

²⁸⁷ Ayatollah Khamenei's speech to the Minister and vice presidents of Education on January 1991, (Tehran: Ministry of Education), p. 4.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

The above view of Islamic purification is reflected in a wide range of elementary school textbooks. In the discussion in the next part of this study, which focuses on the spiritual and moral values reflected in the textbooks, we will explore this concept in greater detail.

RESISTANCE AND CONTROVERSIES

At the first years of the Revolution, the Islamic leaders' statements regarding Islamization were widely accepted in the Iranian society among both people and elite. After all, 98.2% of the Iranian population, in a referendum at the very beginning of the Islamic State, had voted yes for the Islamic Republic. Moreover, they had already accepted an *ayatollah*, a highly ranked religious scholar as their political leader. It was, therefore, reasonable that the Iranian people accept his main religio-political idea about the transmission of values, i.e. Islamization of the country. It is also true, however, there was some resistance from some different groups who were in small minority, but active. The Communist groups such as *Hizb-i Tūdi* and *Fadā'iyān-i Khalq* were among them. There was no justification for them, based on their anti-Islamic direction, to support this alternation. Likewise, those who supported the concept of kingdom and particularly Pahlavi supporters were politically, and mostly not ideologically, against the process of Islamization. They protested in form of a few demonstrations in Tehran against *hijāb* as a state law.

There were also diverse viewpoints regarding the definition of Islamization of the country. Some scholars believe that the definition of various institutional elements described with the adjective "Islamic" has not

yet been clarified.²⁸⁹ They maintain that, based on the possibility of different interpretations, every one may give his/her own definition.

Another complicated issue is the belief in *wilāyat-i faqīh* (the authority of an Islamic jurist as the leader of the country and Revolution). While this principle of *wilāyat-i faqīh* is considered by many to be a political item enshrined in the constitution,²⁹⁰ it is still the focus of some disagreement from various quarters. A major opposition toward the issue comes from intellectual side. The idea of this authority traced back to the absolute authority of infallible Imāms in Shī'ī school. Those Islamic jurists who are both knowledgeable and pious are considered the Imām's temporary successors in certain fields. There was both an expansion and more explanation about the theory by Ayatollah Khomeini. His effort in establishing the idea was to the extent that some considered him as the founder of this theory. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the one among eligible Islamic jurists, who has chosen by people as the leader of the country has the authority over the country.

²⁸⁹ A. Aghajanian (1988), "Post-revolutionary demographic trends in Iran" in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin, *Post-revolutionary Iran*, (Westview Press, Boulder and London), p. 153f.

²⁹⁰ The article 107 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran declares: "Whenever one of the *fuqahā* possessing the qualifications specified in Article 5 of the Constitution is recognized and accepted as *maja'* and Leader by a decisive majority of the people -as has been the case with the eminent *marja' taqlid* and leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah al-'Uzmā Imam Khomeynī- he is to assume [the office of] the *wilāyat al-amr* and all the functions arising therefrom..." The Article 5 says: "During the Occultation of the Wali al-'Asr (may God hasten his reappearance), the *wilāya* and leadership of the *Ummah* devolve upon the just [*'ādil*] and pious [*muttaqī*] *faqih* who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people...." See The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization), 1981. It should be noted that these articles faced some changes in the last revision.

For some in the opposition, including certain intellectuals, the above-mentioned authority is not acceptable. The argument is that this kind of authority will inevitably develop into the kind of dictatorship that they escaped from in recent years. Moreover, there seem to have been deeper disagreements between the intellectuals and ulama on different issues, including the implications of the role of Islamic law in society, the process of Westernization of the country, and the relation between religion and politics. The appointment of a virtuous and just *faqīh*, for the ulama, on the contrary is not a way to dictatorship. According to them, the very condition of "justice" is enough to obviate dictatorship.

The issue of women forms another controversial debate. Previously I mentioned that according to the Islamic point of view, *hijāb* (veiling) is a religious obligation for women.²⁹¹ Due to this observation, there was no notable participation by religious women in social activism during the Pahlavi era. At the time of the Revolution, however, Iran observed great and effective participation by women in revolutionary activities such as in public demonstrations. According to the Islamic leaders, this participation was the first step for women in finding their position in society. From the time of the Revolution onward, however, there have been numerous discussions concerning its religious aspect and form of veiling.

²⁹¹ According to the *Qur'ān*, *Aḥzāb* [The Clans] (33) .59, all women, in a process of obtaining chastity are religiously obliged to wear their beauty from the strangers, that excludes relatives both in consanguinity and in law such as husband, father, brother, son, grandfathers, and son of the brother and sister. The obligation is for men, too, to avoid unnecessary relations, staring to the strange women for pleasure and so on. For more information on the philosophy of this law, see for instance M. Motahhari (1989), *The Islamic modest dress*, translated into English by Laleh Bakhtiar, (Albuquerque, NM: Abjad).

In all, despite some resistance, the idea of Islamization was pursued after the Revolution in the educational policy of the country and consequently in the textbooks. In the next part of this study we will scrutinize the implication of this notion in the elementary school textbooks.

REJECTED VALUES

Previously, in the discussion of values under the Pahlavis, I referred to three items, namely nationalism, Westernization and secularization, as the main educational goals of that system. In the transformation of the system after the Islamic Revolution, none of these have survived in the educational system. Figure 3-2 below presents a general comparison between the Pahlavi and the post-Revolutionary approach to the educational system.

Educational Goal & Values Under the Pahlavis	Educational Goal & Values Under the Islamic Republic
Pahlavization	Islamization
Modernization + Westernization	Modernization + Independence
West as a model	Self-confidence
Integration into the Western economic and political system	Independence
De-Islamization	Islamization & Purification

Figure 3-2: A comparison between the concepts of Pahlavization and Islamization.

Secularity, Westernization and Pahlavi-style nationalism are in contradiction to what Islamic leaders have wished to stress since the period of Revolution. The question, however, remains whether the new regime still considers any of these approaches in reality and whether any of these concepts have been

taken into consideration in the textbooks in some way or another. In order to answer this question, let us review each of these concepts separately.

a. Nationalism

Overall, the notion of the Islamic umma or community is an Islamic principle opposing to the concept of nation. From an Islamic point of view, there is no preference or difference between black or white, Arab or non-Arab, or between other people because of race, gender, or geographic origin. Islam, according to Muslim scholars, is a worldwide religion for all people with no limitation of time or place. An Iranian Muslim is a religious sister or brother to any other Iranian, just as s/he is to a Turk, Arab, or Kurd outside of her or his country. This is the same view that is held by the Islamic leaders in Iran.²⁹²

From Ayatollah Khomeini's point of view, racism and nationalism "are a big trick which has been played by the West and which has influenced Islamic states," creating discrepancies between Islamic nations.²⁹³ As M. Motahhari asserts: "the concept of nationality and of encouraging people's national emotion may be helpful in relation to their political independence; it, however, can cause disagreement and discrepancy between Islamic countries."²⁹⁴ This trick, the Ayatollah Khomeini adds, "has been planned by the superpowers."²⁹⁵ Accordingly, he advised his people, in the early years after the Revolution, to reject this colonial legacy.²⁹⁶ Therefore, when the

²⁹² See A. Khomeini, in DJR, v. 9, pp. 665 f.

²⁹³ A. Khomeini, *ibid.*, v. 11, p. 11

²⁹⁴ M. Motahhari (1981), *Khadamat-i mutaqabil-i Islam wa Iran*, 8th ed. (Teahran: Sahami Aam) v. 1, p. 35.

²⁹⁵ A. Khomeini, in DJR, v. 11, pp. 22-23.

²⁹⁶ A. Khomeini (February 3, 1979), *ibid.* p. 17.

National Front [*Jibhi-yi Milli*],²⁹⁷ the clearest manifestation of nationalism in Iran, invited people to protest against the Islamic law of *qiṣās*,²⁹⁸ the Ayatollah declared the organization to be *murtadd*,²⁹⁹ i.e. those who refused Islam.³⁰⁰

According to Ayatollah Khomeini there is no reconciliation between nationalism and Islam. However, this is so, only when nationalism is considered as an alternative to Islam, i.e. a rejection of Islam. Such concepts as love of one's country and independence, therefore, are not only accepted, but also appreciated in this approach.³⁰¹ It may be said that the tension is recognized and dealt with by re-defining nationalism, although the nationalist spirit is still present. Concepts such as love of one's country and independence, according to Khomeini, can only be realized when based on one's faith and religion. Years before the Revolution, at the time of Reza Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini wrote in his book, *Kashf al-asrār*: "Love of country [*mīhan dūstī*] and a spirit of devotion should emanate from the spirit of faith in God and the invisible world"³⁰² A Muslim's love for her/his birthplace, village, city or country is a natural love. This is the "true nationalism" in Khomeini's mind. Writing about education in his final discourse, he says:

If pious individuals with Islamic belief and *national feeling*, in its true sense -not as what is opposed to Islam-, had found

²⁹⁷ *Jibhi-yi milli* (The National Front) was an organization founded by Dr. Mosaddeq and eighteen other nationalists in Nov. 1949. It was supported, at the beginning of its establishment, by Ayatollah Kāshānī. For more see Madani (1990), v. 1, p. 347.

²⁹⁸ An Islamic law of retaliation, according to which the subject should receive the same punishment in return. There are some conditions that should be considered in its performance. For more information see C. E. Bosworth et al (eds.) (1993 in Progress), the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill), v. 5, s.v. "*kiṣās*."

²⁹⁹ *Murtadd* is "one who turns back especially from Islam, an apostate." See for more details *ibid.*, v. 7, s.v. "*murtadd*."

³⁰⁰ A. Khomeini, in DJR, v. 11, p. 53.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³⁰² A. Ruhullah Khomeini, *Kashf al-asrar*, (Qum: Intishārāt-i Muṣṭafawī), p. 247.

their way from the universities to the three state authorities,
then we would have a different time, a different country ...³⁰³

One may see clearly the reflection of this point of view in the Iranian textbooks after the Revolution. While nationalism is absolutely rejected by the policy makers in Iran, the love of the country still is in the texts. However, there have been some significant changes in this regard. The term *mīhan parastī* or to *worship* the country has been changed to *mīhan dūstī*, i.e. to *love* the country. According to the Islamic point of view, the only allowable object of worship is God. The reality of love for one's home is also connected with the values of the Islamic Revolution: it had been integrated with the love of the Shah in the Pahlavi era. Previously we reviewed the issue in our survey of the texts from the pre-Revolutionary period. By contrast, one of the texts found in a post-Revolutionary textbooks reads:

O Iran, O my home, I love you!. The height of your skies, the roar of your rivers, the beauty of your tulips, the bravery of your children, the shout of your warrior, the resistance of your captives, all of this I love... I love the beauty of your tulips which remind us of the blood of thousands martyrs... I love the shout of your warriors, who overturned the palace of dictatorship by their cries of *Allahu akbar* [God is the Greatest]. O Iran, O my home, ... O the land of Islam and the faith... I love you.³⁰⁴

Under the nationalism of the Pahlavi period, many pre-Islamic values, were revived. An effort was made to replace Islamic values with the values of the monarchy, as can be seen, for example, in the case of the calendar

³⁰³ Ayatollah Khomeini, *Final discourse*, p. 24.

³⁰⁴ *Fārsī*, 5th Grade, 1373 [1994], pp. 50-51.

change. Some Zoroastrian names and customs such as the *Mihrgan* festival were emphasized in the textbooks.³⁰⁵ The Revolution brought an end to this process and began, in its turn to revive the Islamic values. Some of the customs, however, are more controversial than others. For instance, the beginning of Spring in most parts of Iran is a beautiful event. Iranians used to celebrate this day as the first day of the New Year [*‘Id-i Nurūz*] for centuries. This festival is also appreciated by the Islamic leaders to the extent that the leader and president give a yearly lecture on the same day and congratulate people on that occasion. There were, however, attempts after the Revolution to suppress some pre-Islamic customs, or to assimilate them to revolutionary themes, e.g. *bahār-i āzādī* in the aforementioned case.

b. Westernization

There is no question that the 1978-79 Revolution in Iran against the Pahlavis represented a denial of the more than fifty years of Western involvement in the country, particularly that of the United States, and especially under the Pahlavi kingdom. The aforementioned motto of “no Western, no Eastern” declared by the people in their demonstrations clearly indicates this trend. The political relationship between Iran and the United States is another sign in this regard. Consequently, the process of Westernization, which was followed by the Pahlavis in its different social, cultural, economic aspects, came under fire.

Westernization in culture was the “mother (source) of disease” (*umm-ul-amrāz*) from Khomeini’s standpoint.³⁰⁶ For him, the Pahlavi kings were appointed by

³⁰⁵ See, for instance, *Fārsī*, 2nd Grade, 2537 [1978], pp. 11 and 14.

³⁰⁶ A. Khomeini, April 26, 1971, in DJR, v. 22, p. 106.

the superpowers to turn Iranian culture into a colonial culture.³⁰⁷ He adds:

They were dictating to us. They changed our culture to the extent that all things are changed now; are Westernized; we talk in the Western manner; the names of the streets are Western; the names of the people are Western; Roosevelt street, Kennedy street; this is Westernization...They (the Westerner) do not have Pahlavi street... our customs are Western, too.³⁰⁸

Education under the Pahlavis, in Ayatollah Khomeini's view, was neither [acceptable] teaching [*āmūzish*] nor training [*parwarish*]. Its teaching was merely designed to lead our young towards the West and East; its purpose training was to make them careless [toward Islamic values]. "They started," Khomeini adds, "from the schools to Westernize children; to make a person who believed in the West and disagreed with Islam."³⁰⁹

The Ayatollah's attack on the intellectuals is based on the same understanding. For him, as a result of the long period of Westernization in the country, the universities were totally Westernized. "The Islamization of the universities", then, according to his view "is to have universities independent from the West and the East." Khomeini continues that "we fear colonized universities. We fear those universities that educate students in order to serve the West or Communism."³¹⁰

Besides the Westernization of culture and values, Westernization in the sense of modernization was also a matter of concern for the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khomeini, however, states that:

³⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 112-113

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ A. Khomeini (September 2, 1980), *ibid.*, pp. 142-3.

³¹⁰ A. Khomeini (April, 21, 1980).

We want to revive the justice of fourteen centuries ago. It is not in the sense that we want to have the same conditions of life, no, we accept all the manifestations of civilization. But these [the activities of the Pahlavis] are not civilization. Is it civilized to murder people?³¹¹

It seems that there is no objection to modernization as long as it does not harm the independence of the country or Islamic values. In one of his lectures in Paris, Khomeini said: "We want to go back fourteen centuries; this does not mean, however, that we should follow that old lifestyle; no, we embrace all the manifestations of civilization..."³¹²

Appeals for modernization, in the sense of development, became more evident after the eight-year imposed war. Sending students abroad has continued to the point that there are still more than two thousand students studying in the West. Just recently, the Islamic leader, faced with different problems, including economic ones, has brought the issue into consideration. Celebrating foreign scholars and inventors in elementary textbooks is another indication of this approach. In the book of Fārsī (Persian text) of the fifth grade, Iranian students read about Edison (1847-1931),³¹³ an American inventor as follows:

On the morning of one of the days of 1862, farmers who were working in a field near one of the cities in America, saw an amazing event.³¹⁴

³¹¹ A. Khomeini (October 22, 1978), in DJR, v. 22, p. 110.

³¹² A. Khomeini (October 11, 1978), *ibid.*, p. 110.

³¹³ Thomas alva Edison, American inventor and physicist, born in Milan, Ohio, the most prolific inventor the world has ever seen. For more see M. Magnusson (ed.), *Chambers Biographical Dictionary*, (New York: Chambers), s.v. "Edison."

³¹⁴ *Fārsī*, 5th Grade, 1373 [1994], p. 181.

The story continues over five pages with an explanation of Thomas Alva Edison and his inventions. The lesson ends with this sentence: “undoubtedly, as long as people around the world use electric machines and light bulbs, we will not forget the name of Edison and remember that this great inventor made a very valuable contribution to the world of science and industry.”³¹⁵

It is interesting that this story is one of the longest lessons in the text. It used to be presented also in the textbooks during the Pahlavi era. In the Islamic Republic, however, this story is immediately followed by the next lesson, which is about Jābir ibn Ḥayyān,³¹⁶ a great Muslim scholar who lived in the eighth century. This could be intended to show to students that there are Muslim scholars who should be appreciated besides Western ones. The juxtaposition of the two may suggest that science is value free, since technology is the property of all.

c. Secularization

A sort of reconciliation, through the aforementioned interpretations, may be found between Islam, on the one hand, and nationalism and Westernization -or in a more appropriate concept, modernization- on the other. The conception of secularism, however, is more complicated. There is an ambiguity in the definition of secularism. “Secularis” in Latin, taken from “seculum,” means “of the world” in opposition to the “hereafter.” Secularity, in a philosophical and social expression, is used in the sense of separation between church and worldly affairs, including the state and whatever relates to that. Education is therefore no exception. From a secular approach, there is no room for religion in education. There is a possibility, of

³¹⁵ Ibid., p. 185.

³¹⁶ A mathematician and astronomist of the second century A.D. For more information about him see S Muḥsin Amin, *A'yān al-Shī'a*, (Beirut: Dār al-Ta'aruf), v. 4, pp. 30-39.

course. of having religious education, but only in order to teach rituals and religious content. The other fields of study, however, are not affected by religion.

It is out of the scope of this concise study to enter into a philosophical discussion of the issue. However, it should be noted that, from a philosophical point of view, there is a serious conflict even between Muslims scholars over whether religion can interfere in any sort of knowledge. For many intellectuals, knowledge should be secular. Based on experimentalism, humanism and individualism, these intellectuals assume a complete separation between religion and knowledge.

Recent Muslim religious scholars in Iran, among them Mesbah, on the other hand, hold to the idea of religious knowledge. For them the subject of all human knowledge including psychology, economics, sociology and education is the human being, who has a specific position in Islamic context. Like other Muslim ulama, the Ayatollah Khomeini believed that it is necessity to consider Islamic concepts in relation to education. It does not make sense, in his view, to be a religious individual, and yet at the same time follow a secular education.

CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS

In this part, my primary goal has been to elaborate concisely the relationship between culture and education in Iran during the last few decades. A great majority of Iranians appreciate Islam as a religion and respect it in different aspects of their daily life. Islam is not merely a religion of worship for them; rather, is a religion that has a role in all aspects of life from birthdays to weddings to funerals, from rituals to jobs and trades, from home and family to all social relations, to education and to politics. Education as the base of this relationship between religion and life has always been a matter of consideration.

Although the Pahlavi kings were concerned with having an Islamic reputation, the trend of education during their era was not in the same direction of Islam -if not in fact directly opposed to it. Internally, the idea was to replace Islamic values, over a period of time, with pre-Islamic Iranian values. Western culture was an imported alternative to Islamic preferences. I mentioned earlier in this study that the Pahlavis did not challenge Islam in a direct or explicit way. There were many traces of Islamic teachings in the textbooks even when they were at the highest of their power. However, they tried to reach their goal first through reducing the ulama's standing in the sight of the people and by reducing their power in the society. Second, they attempt to weaken the significance of Islamic values through different means including the advancement of corruption in the Iranian society.

The Islamic Revolution, at least in one of its more important aspects, was a revolt against this anti-Islamic policy. The idea of an Islamic Republic or Islamic state, of necessity, would be expected to bring Islamic values back to Iranian society and education. A review of Ayatollah Khomeini's final discourse in relation to education indicates this fact. He writes:

Another extremely important social and cultural determinant is the status of educational institutions ranging from kindergartens to colleges and universities, which I would like to point out again, due to its extreme importance. The ravaged people of Iran must know that during the past fifty years Iran and Islam have suffered more with regard to the universities than they have suffered from anything else. If our universities and our other educational centers had a curriculum and status consistent with Islam and our national interests, our country would not be swallowed by England and later on by the US and the soviet Union; and in that case predatory agreements would never be imposed upon our nation; never would foreign advisers find their way to Iran; never would the wealth and the black gold [oil] of this suffering people be pocketed by the

satanic world powers, and never would the Pahlavi dynasty and their dependents be able to plunder the wealth of the people with which to build palaces in and outside of our country on the bodies of oppressed masses and fill foreign banks with the plundered wealth of those tyrannized people or spend the same for their corrupt fun-making and for the hedonistic orgies of their dependents.

If our parliament, our cabinets, our judiciary power, and our other organs had been manned by graduates of Islamic and national universities, then our nation today would not have to tackle with such ruinous problems; if upright personalities with Islamic belief and with national belief in its true sense -not as opposed to Islamic mentality today - had found their way from the universities to the three powers of the state, then we would have different things today, and a different nation...

If our universities were conceived with Islamic, human and nationalistic values then they could have produced hundreds of educators for the Iranian society. But it is unfortunate and saddening that our colleges and universities and our high schools were supervised and our youngsters were educated -except for an oppressed minority- by people who were West-struck or East-struck and there being no other alternative...³¹⁷

There are many Islamic concepts that appear in today's textbooks, and children are encouraged to read them, memorize them and finally pass an examination on them. In contrast, however, there are many other values that are still neglected. Equality, for instance, is one the major Islamic preferences that is not often explicitly stated as a goal in school textbooks, although it is considered part of its educational policies. Overall, one may say that the Islamic trend in the country reflects the culture of the Iranians.

³¹⁷ Ayatollah Khomeini (1983), *Imam's Final discourse*, (Tehran: Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture), p. 44.

Part II

The Process of Islamization and Its Impact on Textbooks

The process of Islamization in Iran and its impact on the change of values in society will be examined in these chapters. Spiritual, moral, social, cultural and political values will be scrutinized respectively. In each chapter, there will be first an examination of the textbooks and then a review of the Islamic approaches toward the related values.

Chapter 4

ISLAMIC SPIRITUAL VALUES & THEIR TEACHING IN TEXTBOOKS

INTRODUCTION

My purpose in the preceding section was to clarify general policies that guided the educational system in Iran both before and after the 1978-79 Revolution. While the Pahlavis made every effort to revive pre-Islamic traditions in Iran, the post-Revolutionary period witnessed a process of Islamization in all institutions, including educational ones. Concepts such as independence, self-confidence and purification emphasized by the Ayatollah Khomeini in his speeches and writings, accompanied the process of Islamization in the country. In this section the impact of this process on spiritual, moral, and social values will be examined. In my explanation of Islamic concepts, I will focus on the thought of a number of contemporary Iranian Shi^ci scholars³¹⁸ whose arguments form the basis of the policies of the Islamic Republic. If it leads to a debate that yields a better alternative

³¹⁸ For more information about these scholars, see p. 15 of this thesis.

explanation. I shall be well satisfied. What I offer here can provide only some illumination on the issue of Islamization.

The purpose of this chapter in particular is to clarify the Islamic spiritual standpoint and its relation to and impact on education from the point of view of the aforementioned scholars. By focusing on spirituality, I will not exclude religious beliefs and rituals; rather I will try to elaborate the spiritual aspects of Islam in their religious context. The relation between spirituality and religion will also be clarified. From some religious standpoints, spirituality is more or less synonymous with religion. In Islam, although spirituality, in a sense, is only one side of the coin, it is one of the main facets of this religion and, in a sense, it is one of the foundations based on which the other aspects may be understood. At the same time, it does not contradict in any way the so-called worldly aspects of the faith, such as social and political doctrines.

This chapter will pursue the discussion in three parts. The first part will be a thematic analysis of spiritual values in the textbooks. The second part will be a short review of educational policy in Iran regarding this specific subject, and the third part will throw light on the definition and reality of spirituality in Islam and the relation between Islamic spirituality and education.

I. A THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Besides the books of *Ta'limāt-i dīnī wa farhang-i Islāmī* [religious studies and Islamic culture], which are devoted to religious foundations, beliefs and rituals, books on Fārsī (Persian language) bear to a large extent the responsibility of transferring religious and spiritual values to children. In

order to observe the impact of Islamic spiritual values in school textbooks, I will focus my analysis on the concepts related to spirituality in these texts.

First, however, we must define the spiritual concepts that we will be looking for. Perhaps the most important of these is the belief in monotheism or God-centrality. This provides the foundation for the other principles of Islam, among the most important of which are belief in the prophethood of Muhammad and the Day of Resurrection. The idea that Islam completes all other religions and that the *Qur'ān* is the last message sent from God is a key concept as well. Finally, it is firmly believed that the Prophet Muhammad and the infallible Imams were appointed to guide people towards God. These principal beliefs, which are the primary ones encountered in textbooks on religious studies and on Fārsī, are listed in Figure 4-1. The check marks in the table indicate the presence of clear references to each belief in the related text.

God-centrality

A general glance at the table in the following page indicates that the concept of God-centrality is one of the main themes among the others in spiritual values field. This concept informs almost every page of these texts. Faith in one God is the goal of education, as it is the goal of every Muslim. What follows are portions of the preface to the religious textbooks written for the second and third year primary school, which clearly reflect this perception:

The purpose of this book and teaching is not to memorize and answer things correctly. The essential aims are to develop the spirit and life and to complete the lives of children... The aim is the internalization of correct religious belief... The aim is to

Figure 4-1: Spiritual items in the elementary textbooks for the Persian and religious subjects published under the Islamic Republic

	Spiritual Items ³¹⁹	1 st Grade	2 nd Grade	3 rd Grade	4 th Grade	5 th Grade
		Religious Studies text	Religious Studies text	Religious Studies text	Religious Studies text	Religious Studies text
1	Islam (the last religion)		✓	✓		
2	Faith				✓	
3	Piety					
4	Purification					✓
5	Religious obligation (<i>taklif</i>)			✓	✓	
6	God (His Attributions)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
7	God (His blessing)		✓		✓	✓
8	God (worship)	✓				
9	God (thank to Him)	✓	✓	✓		
10	God (in His name)		✓	✓	✓	✓
11	Prophethood (philosophy of)		✓	✓	✓	✓
12	Prophethood (Infallibility)			✓	✓	✓
13	Prophets		✓		✓	
14	The Prophet Muhammad (life of)		✓	✓	✓	✓
15	The Prophet Muhammad (love of)	✓			✓	
16	The Prophet Muhammad (<i>uswa</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	
17	The <i>Qur`ān</i> (the word of God)	✓	✓	✓		✓
18	The <i>Qur`ān</i> (and morality)	✓				✓
19	Imamate (infallibility)				✓	
20	Imamate (leadership)			✓	✓	
21	Imamate (<i>uswa</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
22	Imamate (life of Imams)				✓	✓
23	Resurrection Day		✓	✓	✓	✓
24	Rituals (prayer)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
25	Rituals (fast)			✓	✓	✓
26	Religion and Morality				✓	✓
27	Religion and Reason					✓
28	Religion and Social values					✓


³¹⁹ The purpose of this table is to show those spiritual values that mostly are inserted in the textbooks.

develop from the children of today men and women who are (socially) worthy, committed, constructive, goodwilled, kind, highly chivalrous, and God-loving.³²⁰

All the textbooks, without exception, start by mentioning the name of God in its Arabic form i.e. “بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ.” All the Fārsī books (Persian language), start with a lesson about God and His attributes, including the unity of God. This first lesson more or less attracts children’s attention to God and His attributes, blessings and the duty of people toward Him.

The first grade is obviously an exception, given the fact that children that young are unable to read. The book however makes up for this at the end, when children are sufficiently able to read the text. Usually, this first lesson appears in the form of a poem compiled by one of the great Iranian poets such as Ḥāfiẓ, Saʿdī, Firdawsī and Niẓāmī. It is besides a traditional religious custom for Muslims to start any action, without exception, in the name of God. The first lesson in the third grade textbooks published in 1993, is an example of this. As shown in Figure 4-2 in the following page, this is a picture of a boy and a girl, who are looking toward the sky as they are by heart talking to God, while they are surrounded by the *Qurʾān* and Persian textbooks. There is also a girl who is going to school along a road that ends in the sky on one side with text on the other side; the text then reads:

³²⁰ Mobin Shorish, M. (1988), “The Islamic Revolution and Education in Iran”, in: *Comparative Education Review*, 32(1), pp. 58-72.



In the name of God, the Beneficial, the Merciful.

O You Whose name is the best name to begin with! How can I uncover a letter without your name? [A poem by Nizāmī]

O God, now that I have grown up and reached a higher level, I thank you. I ask you help me to worship just you and act only for your sake.

I ask you help me to appreciate my parents and my teacher.

I ask you help me to be kind to my friends and not to forget their kindness.

I start this year in your name. I hope I will successfully bring it to a conclusion with your help.³²¹

Islam

While there is an appreciation of other religions, Islam is introduced to children as the only true religion among the others. A lesson for the second elementary grade, which is, in fact, the first religious teaching for elementary students, entitled "Religion of Islam, the best religion for the best life," introduces Islam as the best and the most complete religion.³²² It is the same message directed towards the third, the fourth and the fifth grades, which introduces Islam as the last, the best, and the universal religion.³²³

Prophethood

The objective from the early stage of schooling is to familiarize children with the personality of the all prophets, especially the Prophet Muhammad as the best sample for human beings. Students in the first grade read about this as follows:

A teacher teaches us. A teacher loves us... A teacher leads us to behave in a good way... A prophet is a teacher. God has sent prophets to guide human beings toward prosperity. We love all the prophets. Our Prophet is His Excellency the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him).³²⁴

After a section on the unity of God, all the elementary religious teaching texts open with a section on prophethood, which introduce the prophets Noah (*Nūḥ*), Abraham (*Ibrāhīm*), Moses (*Mūsā*), Jesus (*ʿĪsā*), and Muhammad as the best ones. Based on the idea of Islam's superiority,

³²¹ *Fārsī*, 3rd Grade, 1372 [1993], p. 2

³²² *Tāʿlimāti-dīnī*, 2nd grade (1372) [1993], p. 35.

³²³ See *Tāʿlimāti-dīnī*, 3rd grade (1374) [1995], p. 27, 4th grade (1369) [1990], p. 54 and 5th grade (1373) [1994], pp. 48-49.

³²⁴ *Fārsī*, 1st Grade. (1375) [1996], p. 89.

however, the prophet Muhammad is introduced as the best prophet among the others. "All have a mission from God; we appreciate all of them, but our prophet, the Prophet Muhammad is the best among all."³²⁵

The Qur`ān

The *Qur`ān* is one of the main sources for Islamic teachings. A major part of the material in religious textbooks is devoted to teaching the *Qur`ān* to children. It includes instruction on how to read the *Qur`ān*, which is in the Arabic language, to understand the meaning of it and also to know some more about the contents. There are also some parts of the *Qur`ān* that are proposed for memorization by students. There is a tradition among Muslims to memorize as much of the *Qur`ān* as possible. The *Qur`ān* teaching part, which starts from the third grade, begins with a tradition from the Prophet Muhammad who said: "The best among you is who learn the *Qur`ān* and teach it to others."³²⁶ Parents encourage their children in this regard. After the Revolution in Iran, memorizing the *Qur`ān* turned to an act of great value. Addressing teachers, the preface written to this part of the third grade text states:

This is a great blessing from God who enabled you and gave you the opportunity to teach the *Qur`ān* to students.³²⁷

³²⁵ *Ta'limāti-dīnī*, 2nd grade (1372) [1993], p. 31.

³²⁶ See e.g. *Ta'limāti-dīnī*, 3rd grade (1374) [1995], p. 31. For more on the tradition see for instance, M. B. Majlisi, *Bihār al-anwār*, v. 92, p. 186.

³²⁷ *Ta'limāti-dīnī*, 3rd grade (1374) [1995], p. 71.

In order to be more attractive and engaging, this part of the text is illustrated with beautiful portraits related to the verses of the *Qur`ān* being taught in the texts. Figure 4-3, shown below, is an example picture related to story of the Prophet Abraham when he, according to the *Qur`ān*,³²⁸ went to the idol-temple and destroyed all the idols except the biggest one and left his ax with the idol.

Since the purpose of learning the *Qur`ān*, as the text indicates, is to “understand it and act according to its commands,”³²⁹ in the upper grades, the text includes more details about the meaning and even some simple interpretation of the Muslim holy book.




Figure 4-3: A simple illustration of the story of the Prophet Abraham.
Ta'limātī-dīnī, 3rd grade (1374) [1993], pp. 116-117.

³²⁸ *The Qur`ān*, Anbya' [The Prophets], (21), 57-70.

³²⁹ *Ta'limātī-dīnī*, 4th grade, p. 50.

Resurrection Day

Reflection on the concept of *ma'ād* (the day of hereafter, when (and/or where) human beings will return to God) is another feature of Islamic teachings textbooks under the Islamic Republic. The second grade religious textbook elaborates on the issue as follows:

People are divided into two groups: One group is that of believing, righteous and kind people. The other group is made up of non-believers, evil-doing and bad tempered people. Are they equal in your opinion? Are they equal before God? Will not righteous people see their reward? Will not evil-doing people be punished? God loves the first group and dislikes the others.³³⁰

The day of *ma'ād* is considered as the day on which people will see the results of their behavior, whether good or bad. "Since God is wise," one of the texts states, "He does not perform useless things." "Creating people with no resurrection day is useless."³³¹ the text adds. The *Qur'ān* says:

What, did you think that We created you only for sport [in vain],
and that you would not be returned to Us?³³²

Imamate

The other Islamic principle inserted in the textbooks is the concept of *imāmat*. Imām, an Arabic word, means leader. The religious, political, social and cultural leadership of twelve infallible Imāms, who are the descendants of the Prophet, is a concept particular to Shī'ī Islam. According to this

³³⁰ *Tā'limāti-dīnī*, 2nd grade, (1372) [1993], p. 25.

³³¹ *Tā'limāti-dīnī*, 5th grade, (1373) [1994], p. 15.

³³² The *Qur'ān*, Mu'minūn [The Faithful] (23), 115. Arberry translation into English. Parenthesis added.

concept, the word and act of these twelve infallible people, who are introduced by God through His Prophet Muhammad are the examples (*uswa*) of lifestyle for every Muslim.

The life and the behavior of the Imāms form a considerable part of the both religious and Persian texts. One part of the religious studies text of all the elementary grades is entitled "Being informed about the Imāms and their admirable behavior." The texts of the third, fourth and fifth grades introduce four Imāms respectively. In the next chapter, when we are talking about moral values, we will points to this issue in more detail.

Besides Islamic ideological principles, texts are assigned to make students familiar with Islamic rituals. This starts from the third grade, when students are almost nine years old. According to the Islamic teachings, this is the age that children should start their rituals, particularly daily prayer (*ṣalāt*). Some major parts of the daily prayer, as appeared in the fourth grade text reads:

In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful.
Praise belongs to Allah, who is the Nourisher of the worlds.
The Compassionate, the Merciful.
Master of the Day of Judgment.
You alone we worship and from you alone we seek help.
Guide us on the straight path.
Path of those whom you have favored.
Not the path of those upon whom is your wrath, not of those
who go astray.³³³

³³³ *Farhang-i Islāmī wa ta'limātī-dini*, 4th Grade, p. 4 of the last part. English translation cited from *Salat, The Ritual Prayer*, (Dar Rahe Haq Foundation, Qum, 1994), pp. 36-37.

II. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S EDUCATIONAL GOALS AND POLICIES RESPECTING SPIRITUAL VALUES

Educational trends, particularly Islamization in post-Revolutionary Iran, have been presented through different channels. Elementary school textbooks, which are the central point of this study, form the main components of Islamization. In the following four chapters, therefore, we will attempt to reveal this process in respect to spiritual, moral, social and political values. Besides textbooks, however, policies and institutions also play a role in conveying values to a new generation. In order to complete our discussion, it is both necessary and appropriate to undertake a concise review of those policies that influence the educational system of Iran as regards the trend of Islamization of education. Notwithstanding, issues such as the influence wielded by organizations and policy makers, and the role of socio-religious institutions in Iranian education, require a more detailed discussion that we suggest be set aside for further study.

We pointed, in the last chapter, to some of the major educational goals presented by Ayatollah Khomeini in his writings and speeches during the Islamic Revolution and in the years afterward. After the establishment of the state, however, these goals, besides other aims, were systematized in different forms, including the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, and in policies announced particularly by the Ministry of Education.³³⁴

Islamic culture and ideology are, first of all, considered in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which is the major source of the cultural and educational values in Iran. According to it:

³³⁴ For more information see: *Tarḥ-i kulīyāt-i niẓām-i āmūzish wa parwarish-i jumhūrī-yi islāmī-yi īrān*, Tehran, 1367.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets forth the cultural, social, political, and economic institutions of Iranian society on the basis of Islamic principles and norms, which represent the earnest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah.³³⁵

For the Constitution, "the basic characteristic of the Islamic Revolution, which distinguishes it from other movements that have taken place in Iran during the past hundred years, is its ideological and Islamic nature."³³⁶ According to the second article of the Constitution, the Islamic Republic is a system based on:

1. Belief in one God (as expressed in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands.
2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws.
3. The return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief in the course of man's ascent towards God.
4. The justice of God in creation and legislation.
5. Continuous leadership (*imāmat*) and perpetual guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the Revolution of Islam.
6. The exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom coupled with responsibility before God.³³⁷

The list indicates the essential role that religion plays in this system. The above items are basically the same ones that we saw earlier, in Figure 4.1 expressed as those spiritual values which are inserted in the elementary

³³⁵ Preamble of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. See <<http://iranol.com/Government>> [Accessed 12 June 1998].

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

school textbooks. The same items, more or less, are those laid out in the list of spiritual goals declared by the Ministry of Education.³³⁸ Based on the Islamic objective of the country, in which education plays a considerable part, the educational system has the responsibility of transferring to new generations Islamic values, among them spiritual values, through school textbooks. Accordingly, an announcement made by the Ministry of Education after the Revolution³³⁹ asserts the goals of education based on faith in the same concepts.

The unity of God is the key spiritual concept on the list announced by the Ministry and finds itself not surprisingly at its head. Some of the more considerable attributes of God, particularly His justice, as well as divine revelation and its central role in law are heeded as well. Other major principles of Islam (*uṣūl al-dīn*) such as the Day of Resurrection and its creative role in the journey of a human being toward God, as well as Imamate and continuing leadership, are all subjects which are listed. Dignity, freedom and the responsibility of human beings towards God are the other notions that are presented as the spiritual goals in education.

Based on this apprehension, the table of educational goals puts spiritual and moral goals among the first objects of education. The others are cultural, family, social, political, and military (defensive), and economic goals. Ten items under the category of spiritual goals details the goals as follows:

1. To know God.
2. To worship God and ask His help.

³³⁸ For more information about the list of the educational goals announced by the Ministry of Education see e.g. *Pi-ywand*, (1362), no. 44.

³³⁹ *Ibid*.

3. To remember God and fear Him [His punishment based on His justice].
4. To love God and be humble before Him.
5. To thank Him (*shukr*).
6. To obey Him and be eager to meet Him.
7. To adapt oneself to the traditions of creation (*sunan-I Āfarīnīsh*).
8. To believe in the invisible (*ghayb*).
9. To believe in, to love and to appreciate all prophets, and obey the Prophet Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, the twelve Imāms and juridical authority (*maqām-i wilāyat-i faqīh*).
10. To believe in the Day of Resurrection.³⁴⁰

God-centrality is never absent from each of the items in the above list. Islamic spiritual principles are visible everywhere in education under the Islamic Republic. The title of the Ministry of Education in the Islamic Republic, which appears on the cover of all textbooks, is illustrated in Figure 4-4.




Figure 4-4 : The title of the Ministry of Education in the Islamic Republic

³⁴⁰ See 'Ali Shari'atmadāri (1994), p. 183 f.

³⁴¹ The symbol of the country is the monotheistic phrase of Islam, i.e. "there is no god but Allah," which is illustrated in an artistic form.

The reflection of Islamic spirituality in education, and consequently in school textbooks may be easily seen from this title. The slogan “education is an act of worship” indicates the direction of this curriculum toward the development of the spirituality of children, in its Islamic sense.

The “Purification of the soul” (*tazkiya*) is another Islamic spiritual teachings reflected in the school textbooks. Earlier we elaborated on this objective from the point of view of Ayatollah Khomeini. Accordingly, the preface to one of the secondary textbooks reads:

The [essential] goal of this book, besides teaching, which is an introductory one, is to teach and train the spirit of faith and piety of students. The basic goal is to invite students to “faith, righteousness, rectitude, piety, and struggle toward truth.”³⁴²

III. ISLAMIC SPIRITUALITY

What we have just examined in textbooks and the government’s educational policies reflect the reality of spirituality in Iran and reveal the relation between Islamic spirituality and education. The following section aims to convey an understanding of spirituality in the Islamic context. It is both fitting and desirable for our discussion here to identify those characteristics that distinguish Islamic spirituality from its counterparts in order to better understand the underlying philosophy in the textbooks.

Foundations of Islamic Spirituality

The *Qur`ān* is central to Islamic spiritual discourse and the primary foundations of Islamic

³⁴² *Farhang-i Islāmī*, 2nd grade, secondary school, (1371) [1992], preface.

spirituality is the *Qur`ān*. According to Muslims, the *Qur`ān* is the direct word of God, which was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. It is to be noted regarding this source that the *Qur`ān* is not a particular essay in spirituality, nor is it a systematic manual for other fields. Rather, as the *Qur`ān* itself states,³⁴³ it is a source book for faith and guidance (*hidāya*) that contains the general principles of the religion, Islam. It is therefore left to the interpreters of the *Qur`ān* to try to grasp the lesson it contains for different realms. One of the problems with the use of this source, therefore, is the variety of interpretations to which it has been subjected. To a large extent, interpretation of the *Qur`ān* depends on the second source in Islam, which is *aḥādīth* (traditions).

Next to the *Qur`ān*, the Prophetic *aḥādīth* are the main source of spirituality in Islam. The words (*qawl*), deeds (*fi`l*) and even the silence of the Prophet before events (*taqrīr*) are reliable sources for Muslims. The sayings of the Imāms, particularly in the Shī`ī school, have a weight equivalent to those of the prophet. Among the great spiritual leaders of early Islam, `Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the Prophet's son in law, the fourth caliph and the first Shī`ī Imām has a specific standing. Almost all Sufīs, who focus mainly on the spiritual aspects of the religion, consider `Alī as the highest-ranking spiritual leader.

Religious textbooks try to convey these two main Islamic sources to children. The majority of their contents is devoted to teaching the *Qur`ān* and hadith to students. This is in addition to the Arabic texts that appear in the curriculum in the upper grades at the secondary level.

³⁴³ The *Qur`ān*, *Baqara* [The Cow] (2), 2.

Finally, human reason has authority to a varying extent in a number of areas of concern to Islam, including spirituality. Reason may be considered, in a sense, the key source, prior even to the *Qur`ān* and traditions, for belief in God. His prophets and also the *Qur`ān* is based on this rationality. As Motahhari says: "From an Islamic point of view, there is nothing except for reason that can rightly explain the principles of religion."³⁴⁴ Reason, according to some Islamic traditions is an interior prophet, besides exterior ones, such as the prophets; each in fact complements the other.³⁴⁵

Religious-Colored

Admittedly, spirituality is a common feature in many different tendencies and schools with no religious base. "There are," James Moffett argues, "secular meanings of spiritual and spirituality that do not necessarily entail belief in God, immortality, the soul, and other metaphysical realities."³⁴⁶ What identifies the spirituality of Islam, then, is its close relationship to its religious substructure, including the beliefs, principles of religion and revealed law. There is a close relation between the main principles of Islam, i.e. the Unity (of God), Prophethood, and belief in the Day of Resurrection in both the Sunni and Shi`i schools and the Imamate and Divine Justice in the Shi`i school, on the one hand, and Islamic spirituality on the other. Moreover, at a practical level, there is no separation between Islamic rituals and Islamic spirituality, rather, spirituality only

³⁴⁴ Motahhari, M., (1983), *Insān-i kāmīl [Perfect human being]*, (Qum: Daftar-i Intishārāt-i Islāmī), p. 123.

³⁴⁵ Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, v. 1, "Kitāb al-`aql," ḥadīth 12, p. 16.

³⁴⁶ James Moffett (1994), *The universal schoolhouse: Spiritual awakening through education*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Pub.), p. 18.

arises out of regular observance of daily rituals and worship. This religious-based spirituality is not simply a *Cosmic Consciousness* as Richard M. Bucke (1837-1902) expressed it long time ago.³⁴⁷ Nor is it even a pure mystical approach as one may see in some mystical approaches. For the same reason, some groups of Muslims such as Sufis are condemned by other scholars for focusing on this aspect of religion and neglecting the other facets. According to Motahhari, although Sufis and mystics serve Islam, they make a mistake in this regard.³⁴⁸

For scholars of ethics in Islam, the first and foremost element in spiritual development is to know the "self," based on which the process of *self-actualization* is achievable. Based on Imām 'Alī's declaration that: "Whoever knows him/herself, knows his/her God,"³⁴⁹ Motahhari explains that "the human being is him/herself a gate of spirituality towards [knowing] him/herself."³⁵⁰ The idea of the "perfect human being" (*insān-i kāmīl*), which has long been a matter of debate among the Islamic thinkers, revolves around the same issue.

To gain a clearer understanding of spiritual and even moral development in Islam, let us explore the concept of *taqwā* in this regard. According to Edward Lane's definition, *taqwā* derived from the Arabic root *w-q-y* means to protect.³⁵¹ A *muttaqī*, a person who has *taqwā*, is therefore a person who

³⁴⁷ Richard Bucke (1901, reprinted in 1991), *Cosmic consciousness: A study in the evolution of the human mind*, (New York: Viking Penguin).

³⁴⁸ Motahhari (1995), *Tā'lim wa tarbiyat*, (Tehran: Sadra), p. 205.

³⁴⁹ Khawnsāri, J. M. (1960) *Sharḥ bar Ghurar al-Ḥikam wa Durar al-kalim*, (Tehran: Tehran University Press), v. 2, p. 301.

³⁵⁰ Motahhari (1983), *Insān-i Kāmīl*, p. 70.

³⁵¹ E W. Lane (1963), *An Arabic-English lexicon*, (London: Williams and Norgate) v. 7-8, p. 3059, s.v. "w-q-y."

protects himself/herself from whatever is forbidden by God's command, as s/he does observe God's command. In order to obtain a more tangible explanation of the concept and see its results at a more practical level, I prefer to make reference to some parts of one of the Imām 'Alī's long sermons in which he lists some of the characteristics of a believer. This sermon, which details more than one hundred characteristics, may give us a clearer meaning of the concept according to the Shī'ī understanding, although it would be a long passage to quote in full. When one of his companions asks the Imām to explain the characteristics of a person who has *taqwá*, Imām 'Alī defines them as follows:

Now then, Allāh the Glorified, the Sublime, created (the things of) creation. He created them without any need for their obedience or being safe from their sinning... Then, the God-fearing, in it are the people of distinction. Their speech is to the point, their dress is moderate and their gait [manner] is humble. They keep their eyes closed to what Allāh has made unlawful for them, and they put their ears to that knowledge which is beneficial to them. They remain in the time of trials as though they remain in comfort... The greatness of the Creator is seated in their heart, and, so, everything else appears small in their eyes. The peculiarity of anyone of them is that you will see that he has strength in religion, determination along with leniency, faith with conviction, eagerness in (seeking) knowledge in forbearance, moderation in riches, devotion in worship, gracefulness in starvation, endurance in hardship, desire for the lawful, pleasure in guidance and hatred of greed... He admits truth before evidence is brought against him... He does not call others bad names, he does not cause harm to his neighbor, he does not feel happy at others' misfortunes...³⁵²

³⁵² Sharif Raḍī, *Nahj al-Baligha*, (A collection of Imām 'Alī's word), (Washington: Majma' Ahl al-Bayt), Sermon 193, pp. 165-167.

These qualities are what the Shī'ī school looks for, at least in theory, in its followers. Shī'ī Muslims believe that 'Alī himself exhibited these characteristics and invited his followers to shape their behavior accordingly. In short, this is the framework for Islamic education, again in theory. According to Islamic history, there were also some people among the companions of the Prophet, as well as others, who manifested these characteristics. At the present time, this is the educational goal that Islamic leaders, at least in Iran, claim is theirs. For this reason, the same approach is followed in presenting the content of the textbooks in general, and particularly the religious texts. To cite but one example, the same concept of *taqwá* that we just talked about, is presented in different forms, such as in the 17th lesson of the religious textbook for the fifth grade. After attempting to define what a real Muslim is, the lesson ends with this well-known verse of the *Qur'ān*: "The best of you before God, is the most pious of you."³⁵³ However, questions still remain as to the level of practical application of *taqwá* and its manifestation in society.

Resistance to Secularization

The religious background of Islamic spirituality naturally leads to a resistance against secularism. Regardless of the various cultures and religions around the world with which it has come into contact, the religion of Islam has shown itself to be resistant to secularization. For Gellner,³⁵⁴ Islam is the only exception among the other religions which is

³⁵³ *Ta'limāt-i dīnī*, 5th grade (1373) [1994], pp. 62-63

³⁵⁴ Ernest Gellner is a professor of social anthropology at the U. of Cambridge. His books include *Words and Things*, *The Devil in modern philosophy, cause and meaning in social science and postmodernism, reason and religion*.

merely secularization-resistant.³⁵⁵ This characteristic of anti-secularism has colored all aspects of Islam, with no exception, including ethics and morality. Here is not the place to enter into a long discussion of secularism. However, in order to clarify this concept and see its status in Islamic thought we should review briefly the definition and philosophical foundations of secularism in today's world. This will help us to some extent to understand better the basis of Islamic spirituality and its position regarding secularism.

One may summarize the basic constituents of secularism in the following key concepts.³⁵⁶ "Rationalism" is one of the essential components of secularism. It is in the sense that reason with no divine help and religious teaching is able to manage a human being's life. The human being who is rational, does not need any other guide, such as religion. This concept emphasizes the *sufficiency* of rationality, which is something other than appreciation of reason, as only one of several sources of guidance. "Humanism" is the other component of the secular approach, according to which human beings, instead of God, are the source and axis of all values. Thus it is *we* human beings who originate, formulate and evaluate values. "Individualism" also forms another pillar of the school of secularism, according to which the individual vis-à-vis society has the greater

³⁵⁵ E Gellner (1992). *Postmodernism, reason and religion*. (London & New York: Routledge), p. 6. For Gellner, "At the end of the Middle Ages, the Old World contained four major civilizations [Christianity, Sinic World, Indian world and Islam]. Of these, three are now, in one measure or another, are secularized.... But in one of the four civilizations, the Islamic, the situation is altogether different."

³⁵⁶ For more information on the foundation of secularism see e.g. Himmatī, H. (1996) "Nākāmī dar tabyīn-i ma'nā wa Mabnā-yi sekulārism" in *Kitāb-i Naqd*, (Tehran: Mu'assasa-yi Farhangī-yi Andisha), v. 1, p. 194; Himmatī, H. (1996) "Sekulārism wa andisha-yi dīnī dar jahān-i mu'āşir" in *Qabasāt*, (Tehran) v. 1, pp. 90-103; Nurūzī (1996) "Mabānī-yi fikrī-yi sekulārism: in *Ma'rifat*, (Iran, Qum), no. 22, pp. 22-34.

authenticity. A further element of secularism, in relation both to cognition and (moral) values, is "relativism." Given the possibility of error in a human being's cognition, secularism admits that his/her perception is limited, temporary and relative.

Secularism also entails "scientism." According to this idea, scientific findings are the absolute criteria for our judgment. Experimental findings, for a secularist, are enough to determine policy in society. Secularism also accompanies "modernity" or anti-traditionalism. And finally, it goes without saying that atheism and laic approach are often necessary requirements of secularism. These are some of the essential pillars of secularism, which contradict religion. All the aforementioned concepts are rejected in one way or another in the Islamic approach. The main task of the religious textbooks, therefore, is to explicate the essential role of religion in its relation to reason, as well as its role in morality and social life. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, there are also certain absolute values that are frequently emphasized in the texts, and children are encouraged to follow them in their life. In essence, the dedication of an entire textbook to religious issues is a clear indication of the importance of religion in this curriculum.

Divinism (God-centrality) in Islam

In contrast to secularism, it is the concept of divinism or God-centrality in Islam, which rejects the above-mentioned concepts.³⁵⁷ Monotheism is the core of Islam in the sense that the development of a human being in any

³⁵⁷ See for more information Mesbah, *At-Tawhid or monotheism: As in the ideological and the value system of Islam*, (Tehran: IPO).

respect depends on. This was what the Prophet Muhammad invited people of his and future ages to accept with the following statement:

Say "there is no god but one God [*lā ilāha illā Allāh*]" to be saved.³⁵⁸

As early as the second grade, when the first religious textbook makes its appearance in the curriculum, the concept of monotheism begins to be spelled out. The first part of the textbook for each grade in fact consists of some lessons about God and His attributions.

For many Muslim scholars, this characteristic of Islam forthrightly opposes major secular tendencies such as humanism, rationalism, relativism and atheism. God is the axis in this approach. Reason is appreciated, but as a phenomenon that needs revelation in many cases. While it is basis for accepting revelation, it needs revelation to find the way to the truth. God, instead of human beings is the criterion. There are absolute values and there is certainly a divine command. In this approach such concepts as knowledge, science, reason, human rights, freedom and human dignity are appreciated in their specific meanings. In the relation between spirituality and rational thinking, or to paraphrase P. J. Palmer, in the cooperation between the "eye of the mind" and "the eye of the heart",³⁵⁹ Muslim scholars see no contradiction in the end result, but in the method.

Furthermore, reason, according to Islamic mysticism, stops at a certain level, where the heart is able to continue toward God. M. T. Ja'fari (d. 1998), a modern Iranian scholar, states:

³⁵⁸ Majlisi, *Bihār al-anwār*, v. 18, p. 202.

³⁵⁹ Parker J. Palmer, (1983), *To know as we are known: A spirituality of education*, (New York: Harper San Francisco), p. xi.

The present development of science and technology in the West is not a result of the detachment of the society from a divine religion, rather it is the result of expelling those who interpreted religion according to their own wishes... The West put that part of religion aside, which was in contrast to science, knowledge, reason, justice and dignity of human being.³⁶⁰

This process, he adds, could not be considered in Islam, which is grounded, in essence, on these concepts [i.e., science, knowledge, reason, justice and dignity of human being]. We will discuss some of the most significant of them as they apply in an Islamic context in the chapters to be followed.

As regards the relationship between a human being and his or her surroundings, the unity of God is one of the ends. God is after all where human being has come from. The other end is the human being's final destination and where she or he will eventually go. The day of *Resurrection* is another way of expressing this concept.

The position of "intention" (*nīyah*) is likewise based on the concept of God's centrality. According to mystical Islamic sources, rituals and worship, which are not done for the sake of God are absolutely useless.

Spirituality and Social and Worldly Affairs

The emphasis on the role of worship in education may raise a question regarding the relation between spirituality and social activity. Another element, according to the Islamic point of view, which distinguishes Islamic spirituality from that of some other religions, schools and theories is its harmonious relation with social and worldly affairs. To put it another way, spirituality is only one of the aspects of perfection. For Motahhari, "a perfect

³⁶⁰ *Naqd wa Nazar*, no. 2, p. 33

human being is a person who develops in all human values."³⁶¹ Not only is there no contradiction between spirituality and worldly affairs, but the latter is the only field in which a person may develop in spirituality. In other words, an individual who wants to develop his or her spirituality should not sequester him/herself from society. Rather, as Motahhari explains:

A Muslim human being is [expected to be] a comprehensive person; Alī [ibn Abī Ṭālib] is the example. He, who was a mystic in his private life, was the most active person in performing social responsibilities.³⁶²

Although there are some Muslim groups, particularly among the Sufis, who tend to foster merely the mystical aspect of Islam, Motahhari disagrees with this tendency and considers it simply an excuse to escape from social responsibilities. The greater part of the fifth grade textbook for social studies deals with those social activities that are recommended for an Islamic society.³⁶³ Cooperation between individuals and mutual assistance is, according to this text, one of the values chiefly recommended by the *Qur'ān*.³⁶⁴ We will follow some of the themes in chapter six. Social activities, to a great extent, are considered as worshiping God, if they are pursued for His sake. An individual may develop her/his spiritual aspect of *self* while carrying out a purely social responsibility. The only condition is to do it for God's sake. For the same reason, to serve people is one of the greatest forms of worship, far more valuable in fact than private worship.

³⁶¹ Motahhari (1983) *Insān-i kāmīl*, p. 28.

³⁶² Motahhari (1995), *Ta'lim wa tarbiyat*, p. 337.

³⁶³ Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i, 5th grade, (1374) [1995], p. 200.

³⁶⁴ The Quran, Māidah (5) 2.

Spirituality and Morality

Unlike Palmer, who considers such virtues as humility and reverence among the list of spiritual virtues.³⁶⁵ Muslim scholars mostly attempt to differentiate between spirituality and morality. This is in the sense that, in this approach, moral behavior is insufficient as the only means toward perfection, although it is one of the essential parts of perfection. To put it another way, morality can only lead toward perfection when it is based and integrated with spiritual development. The ultimate goal is Divine contentment (*riḍā*): moral behavior is only one of its particulars.

The role of worship in spiritual development is an indication of the interrelation between spirituality and religion and its variance from morality. In his discussion regarding the elements in education, Motahhari considers worship to be one of the major factors.³⁶⁶ Taking his cue from C. Jung, who considered religious potentiality as innate in human being, Motahhari regards religious tendency to be something other than morality or pure search for truth. According to him:

This is a feeling of worship that calls a human being to greet a complete existence with humility and respect, to talk to Him and sanctify Him.³⁶⁷

Ascent in Spirituality: Stages

The other aspect of Islamic spirituality, which it shares with some other religions, is its possibility that development will occur as a human being grows. There are various stages in this process, and each human being may reach at least some of them. One may find some such hierarchy in any form

³⁶⁵ Palmer (1989), p. 108.

³⁶⁶ Motahhari (1995), *Ta'lim wa tarbiyat*, P. 324 f.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 69

of spirituality. However, it is the pole of this spirituality, i.e. God centrality that makes this approach unique. In our study of the role of education in transferring Islamic spiritual values to children, this point should be heeded. According to a *ḥadīth* (tradition) from Imām ʿAlī ibn Mūsā al-Riḍā (the eighth Shīʿī Imām), cited by Kulāynī:

The *īmān* (faith) is above Islam by one stage, *taqwā* (piety) is above the *īmān* by one degree, and *yaqīn* (certainty) is above *īmān* by one level.³⁶⁸

Islam, faith (*īmān*), piety (*taqwā*) and certainty (*yaqīn*), according to this tradition, are four stages in the development of spirituality in a Muslim believer's journey toward his creator, Allah. In adaptation of these four stages, an educational researcher in Iran has suggested a scheme according to the age of the believer, as illustrated in Figure 4-5.

Stage of Spiritual Development	Range of Age
First introductory stage	1-7
Second introductory stage	7-puberty
Islam	Second decade
Faith (<i>īmān</i>)	Third decade
Piety (<i>taqwā</i>)	Fourth decade
Certainty (<i>yaqīn</i>)	Fifth, sixth and seventh decades
	Eighth decade -

Figure 4-5: Adaptation of stages of spirituality with different ages.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁸ Kulaynī, *al-Kāfī*, v. 2, p. 51.

³⁶⁹ See Baqeri, K. (1991) *Nigahi dubāri bi tarbiyat-i Islāmi*, (Tehran: Madrisah Pub.), p. 193.

My problem with this table is first that it devotes one of the most important periods of life and learning, i.e. the period before puberty, to nothing more than introduction, when it is clearly the case that a child acquires most of his or her values at this time. Secondly, there is no exact justification for the adaptation of age to different stages of spiritual development. However, the table could serve as grounds for better understanding of the process of development.

As is illustrated in Figure 4-6 in the following page, Tabataba'i divides the spiritual stages into eight.³⁷⁰ In his explanation, each of the stages of Islam has an advanced stage of *īmān*, which is at the same time consonant with Islam at that stage. While the highest stages are more or less applicable only to few distinguished people, the first stages consist merely in a familiarity with the basic elements of Islam, and a simple belief in its foundation, namely monotheism and the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad. This stage, which is considered only as an introduction to a complete religion, is what elementary education takes care of. For some scholars, the first stage of Islam starts at the time of puberty. Before that, however, education is considered only as a tool to prepare children for the first stage of Islam.³⁷¹


EDUCATION FOR SPIRITUALITY

We already referred to the concept of *taqwá*, as one of the key points in relation to the spirituality of Islam. Although it is a concept which covers all

³⁷⁰ See Tabataba'i (1984), *al-Mizān fī tafsīr al-Qurān*, English Translation by S. S. A. Rizvi, (Tehran: WOFIS), v. I, pp. 125-128.

³⁷¹ Baqeri (1991), p. 172 f.

Figure 4-6: Tabataba'i's view regarding spiritual stages (See Tabataba'i (1984), *al-Mizān*, English Translation by S. S. A. Rizvi, (Tehran: WOFIS), v. 1, pp. 125-128.)



aspects of a Muslim's life. it has a distinct meaning in relation to education, which is implied in the notion of *purification*.

Purification

Previously we referred to this concept as one of the key points emphasized in the educational program of Ayatollah Khomeini. Purification of the soul is a goal obtainable through *taqwā*. The concept "*tazkiyah*" or purification, from the Arabic root *zkw*, connotes purifying something of superfluities in order to achieve better growth (*numuww*).³⁷² In its Quranic meaning, as Tabataba'i explains, it is used in the sense of familiarizing people with virtues and good deeds in order that he/she may grow up in an appropriate manner, which guarantees their prosperity both in this world and in the hereafter.³⁷³ Education in its Islamic meaning is a combination of teaching (*ta'lim* in Arabic, *āmūzish* in Persian), which deals with knowledge, reason and thinking, while it is training (*al-tarbiyah* in Arabic, *parwarish* in Persian) which deals with behavior. Purification, of course according to Islamic teachings, plays an essential role in the domain of behavior, or training. According to Muslim thinkers, *Ta'lim* and *tarbiyah* are two inseparable pillars of Islamic education. Deficiency in either of these two areas may harm the whole structure of education.

Moreover, purification before knowledge is the second point that should be heeded in this relation. Earlier we referred to some of the Quranic verses that, according to various interpretations, take this point into consideration. The *Qur'ān* says:

³⁷² Lane (1963), v. 3-4, p. 1240, s.v. "z k w."

³⁷³ Tabataba'i (1984), *Al-Mizān fī tafsīr al-Qurān*, v. 19, p. 265.

He is who raised among the illiterates an Apostle from among themselves, who recites to them His communications and purifies them, and teaches them the Book and Wisdom, although they were before certainly in clear error.³⁷⁴

For Muslim thinkers such as Tabataba'i, the priority that the above-mentioned verse gives to purification is an indication to its significance over teaching in education.³⁷⁵ There is however another verse in the *Qur'ān* treating the same concept, but, because it is a demand from God, it does not retain the same order of priority. According to this verse

Our Lord! and raise up in them an Apostle from among them who shall recite to them Thy communications and teach them the Book and the Wisdom, and purify them; surely Thou art the Mighty, the Wise.³⁷⁶

We will consider the relation between spirituality and morality in the next chapter in more detail. A major part of purification is integrated with moral values. Because of this close interrelation, some have considered spiritual development to be purely moral development. Returning to the hierarchy that was established by Tabataba'i, elementary education is expected to take care of the first stages of this process as the primary steps toward purification. Although the first two stages, i. e. the first stage of Islam and the first stage of imān provide only a sort of theoretical familiarity with the general Islamic rules, it prepares a practical atmosphere, which habituates children to Islamic practices.

³⁷⁴ *The Qur'ān, Jum'a* [Friday] (62), 2.

³⁷⁵ Tabataba'i, (1984), *Al-Mizān fī tafsīr al-Qurān*, v. 19, p. 265.

³⁷⁶ *The Qur'ān, Baqara* [The Cow] (2), 129. Shakir's Translation into English.

Concluding Remarks

Our analysis of Iranian elementary school textbooks reveals the significant role that spirituality plays in these works. Great portions of the texts, particularly religious studies textbooks, are saturated with religious issues. Topics related to the major principles of Islam (*uṣūl al-dīn*) are visible in almost every page. This tendency, at the same time, denotes a thoughtful integration between spirituality and education. The appearance of spiritual values in different cases and their integration with other topics, including education emanates from the principle of God-centrality in Islamic teachings. Bearing this point in mind, one may differentiate between “religious education” and religious “education.”

In an Islamic context, there are indeed some teachings that relate directly to religious concepts. “Religious Studies” textbooks (*taʿlīmāt-i dīnī*) in Iran are examples of this. The purpose of these texts is to familiarize children with Islamic rituals, law, ceremonies, morality and some other related concepts. This kind of teaching in the above-mentioned cases can positively be called “religious education,” or, let us say, religious studies.

Notwithstanding, textbooks in fields other than religious studies may also be *religious* in the sense that they are directed toward some religious goals. According to this meaning, any kind of education in an Islamic context could be “religious” education. Different areas of education such as science, mathematics, history, art can take on a religious purpose in this sense. Based on this approach, which is emphasized in Ayatollah Khomeini’s various writings and statements, differentiating between spirituality and

education would be meaningless. "Working hard in the search for knowledge." can be beneficial only when it accompanies "spirituality, morality and good behavior." For him, "a person who combines these qualities is an efficient and helpful person for Islam and his or her country."³⁷⁷

³⁷⁷ *Ta'limāt-i ijtīmā'ī*, 4th grade, (1374) [1995], preface.

Chapter 5

ISLAMIC MORAL VALUES & THEIR TEACHING IN TEXTBOOKS

INTRODUCTION

Moral concepts have always formed a substantial part of the elementary school textbooks in Iran. In a simple comparison between the textbooks published at the Pahlavi era and in the time of the Islamic Republic, one finds, nevertheless, striking differences in the emphasis and relations of these concepts to Islamic teachings. Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, believed that under the Pahlavis, besides the spiritual life of the society, Islamic moral values had come under serious attack.³⁷⁸ For him, a true moral behavior was that of Islamic-based one. Hence, there is a substitutive usage, in the Ayatollah's words, of the terms *akhlāq*

³⁷⁸ A. Khomeini, (May, 29, 1980) and (July, 9, 1980), in DJR, v. 22, pp. 116 and 124 respectively.

(morality), *Īmān* (faith) and *Islamic tarbiyat* (Islamic education, or training).³⁷⁹ According to him, “the first and the foremost goal of the prophets was to educate people according to a true morality, true belief.”³⁸⁰ Morality as well as spirituality plays a significant role in a Muslim’s life. Both moral and intellectual education are the major goals in an Islamic society.

This chapter is not intended to serve as an extensive discussion on Islamic morality, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, we have to elaborate, to some extent, on those elements that are significant in Islamic teachings, based on which Islamic Republic of Iran has prepared the elementary textbooks in this field. As in the former chapter, we will follow this discussion in three main parts. First we will examine the Iranian school textbooks from this perspective and then point to the educational goals and policy of the Islamic Republic in this regard. In the third part, we will return to the main particulars of Islamic morality to discover the relation between these theories and its practice in the textbooks.

I. A THEMATIC ANALYSIS

A review of the elementary school textbooks of Iran in recent decades shows a predominant concern with moral values. There is no text specifically for moral teaching. However, most of the lessons of such textbooks as *Fārsī* and Religious studies from both the pre- and post-Revolutionary periods deal –directly or not– with moral concepts. Nevertheless, besides the difference in religious emphasis,

³⁷⁹ See, for instance, *ibid.*, p. 76

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 74. See also *ibid.*, pp. 75 and 77.

there has been a great change in the methodology of teaching values in recent years. Direct advice to children about moral values was a norm during the last years of the Qajar dynasty. Such phrases as “do this,” “don’t do that” were usual. Later on this method gradually transferred to a combination of direct and indirect teaching. The followings are some translations from the textbooks of different years to illustrate this trend.

Lesson two of the second grade language text (1301/1922), of the end of the Qajar dynasty entitled “Advice” (*naṣā’ih*) includes over twenty direct pieces of advice. Some parts read as follows:

O children, your first duty is to worship God, who is the creator
of the whole world. Follow His law in order to prosper
Appreciate the Prophet's words.
Seek knowledge seriously, for he who knows is always
celebrated and who does not know is abject.
Love your parents and teacher and obey them.
Do not waste your costly time.
Avoid laziness, which will be your misfortune.
Never tell a lie. ³⁸¹

More or less, the same method was followed at the earlier time of the Pahlavis. One of the texts of the year 1301/1925, therefore reads:

Give up hope of others' money, do not to be greedy.
There is no honor better than trustworthiness. The trustworthy
person is always appreciated. ³⁸²

As a minor innovation, however, some of the lessons consist of stories followed by a clearly stated moral principle. One of these cases is a story of

³⁸¹ Aḥmad Sa’adat, (1301) [1922], *La’ālī al-adab*, prepared according to the schedule of Ministry of Ma’ārif for the second grade elementary schools, (Tehran: Iran Lib.), p. 3.

³⁸² Mīrzā Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān Muẓaffarī, (1304) [1925], *Akhlāq-i muṣṣawwar*, prepared according to the schedule of Knowledge Ministry [wizārat-i Ma’ārif] for the second grade of the elementary schools (Tehran: Muẓaffariyya Lib.), v. 1, p. 5.

a mouse that is captured by a lion. The mouse asks the lion's mercy and the lion lets it go. Subsequently, years after, the lion is trapped and the mouse, in return, helps it to win its release. The lesson comes to an end with the following:

Conclusion: This story teaches us that mercy has its own reward.

Questions: Who has to be advised and who has to be punished? What is the result of forgiveness? Explain the story of the mouse and the lion. ³⁸³

Trends towards a change continued at the time of the Pahlavis. In one of the stories in the second grade Persian language textbook (2536/1977) a girl who does not care about her book finally finds the book wet under rain. She starts crying, but finally she thinks for a while and takes a decision. The story ends with the question "what was her decision?"³⁸⁴ More or less the same indirect process has continued in the Islamic Republic, as the same story, with a difference in the picture, has appeared in recent texts (1374/1995). For a clearer picture see Figure 5-1 in the following page.

Besides teaching methods, a major difference between two eras of Pahlavis and Islamic Republic, from a philosophical perspective, is the relation between morality and religion. Under the Islamic Republic, religion plays the main role in all domains and morality is not an exception.

³⁸³ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

³⁸⁴ *Farsi*, 2nd Grade (2536) [1978], p. 34-36.



تقصیم کُری

روزی مادر کُری به دخترش گفت: کُری جان، برو کتاب دست و ساز و تراپید بخوان. کُری خوشحال شد و شُراح کتابش را هر چه گفت توانست آن را پیدا کند. بیج کتابها، سانسارها و حتی لُنها را گفت ولی کتاب داستان را نفیید. مادرش پیشی مادرش برگشت و گفت: کتاب بیست کسی آن را برداشته است!

مادرش با تعجب پرسید: چه کسی کتاب تو را برداشته است؟

خبر من و پدرت کسی دیگر در این خانه نیست. دوست فکر کن.

پس آن را کجا گذاشته‌ای آن را با خودت به بازار برده‌ای؟

چرا سرم به بازار؟ نه، حتماً آنجا نیست.

آن را روی پشت‌بام خانه گذاشته‌ای؟

نه مادر، من این روزها آنجا برده‌ام.

ناگهان کُری با دُش آمد که دیروز دو حیاط، زیر دوست،

Under the Pahlavis



تقصیم کُری

روزی مادر کُری به او گفت: کُری جان، برو کتاب داستان را ساز و تراپید بخوان. کُری خوشحال شد و شُراح کتابش را هر چه گفت توانست آن را پیدا کند. بیج کتابها، سانسارها و حتی لُنها را گفت ولی کتاب داستان را پیدا نکرد.

کُری پیشی مادرش برگشت و گفت: کتاب داستان بیست شما آن را برداشته‌اند!

مادر با تعجب گفت: نه، دوست فکر کن پس آن را کجا گذاشته‌ای؟

کُری لحظه‌ای فکر کرد ناگهان با دُش آمد که دیروز در حیاط نشسته بود و کتابش را می‌خواند. به طرف حیاط دایه از دور کتابش را

Under the Islamic Republic

Figure 5-1: Indirect teaching of moral values.

Ta'limāt dīnī, 2nd Grade, above: (2536) [1977], p. 34-35 - bottom: (1374) [1995], pp. 24-25.

Regardless of its theoretical and philosophical justifications, from the Shī'ī point of view, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, the behavior of the Prophet and twelve infallible Imāms are the best example to be followed. They are, as indicated in the *Qur`ān* in relation to the Prophet,³⁸⁵ the fine model for all Shī'ī Muslims. Accordingly, there are many lessons in the texts that present moral issues in form of the stories of the Imāms' lifestyle and their behavior to other people.

In categorizing those moral values that appear in the elementary textbooks, we may refer to two kinds: individual and social moral values. A summary of those moral topics that are most often found in the elementary school textbooks in Iran is shown in Figure 5-2 in the next page. The check marks in the table indicate the frequency with which a specific value is touched on in the pages of the textbooks indicated.

A quick review of the texts and particularly Figure 5-2 leads us to conclude that moral topics frequently appear in Persian and Religious textbooks. As the figure shows, more than forty topics –directly or not– are spoken of in the texts. Yet, the table does not cover all items in detail. In addition, other texts, such as those in social studies, which are not considered in this table, present moral values. We will consider some examples of these textbooks in our investigation of social values in the next chapter.

In simple terms, we can divide the moral concepts in the texts, shown in Figure 5-2, into the two categories of individual and social morality. Such items as patience, hard work, and self-confidence are chiefly related to

³⁸⁵ The *Qur`ān*, Aḥzāb [The Clans] (33), 22.

Figure 5-2: Moral topics inserted in the elementary textbooks (*Farsi & To'limat-I din*)

		1st	2nd		3rd		4th		5th		
		Grade	Grade		Grade		Grade		Grade		
Numbers	Moral Items	Farsi	Religious	Farsi	Religious	Farsi	Religious	Farsi	Religious	Farsi	Religious
		There is no religious textbook for the first grade									
1	Fellowship	✓		✓	✓	✓			✓		
2	Sincere relationship between child and parents	✓									
3	Trustworthiness	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
4	Help parents and appreciation to them	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
5	Health principle	✓			✓						
6	Care and kindness to animals	✓		✓	✓						
7	Care and kindness to plants	✓				✓		✓			
8	Cleanness	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
9	Help others	✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
10	Cooperation	✓		✓		✓	✓				
11	Order	✓		✓	✓						
12	Following the law			✓				✓		✓	✓
13	(Warning against) pride			✓			✓	✓			✓
14	(Warning against) tyranny and oppression			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
15	(Warning against) lie			✓	✓				✓		✓
16	Keep promise			✓	✓					✓	
17	Observation of bonds of relationship			✓					✓		
18	Thank to God	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
19	(Warning against) swearing			✓			✓				
20	Unity			✓				✓			
21	(Warning against) jealousy										✓
22	Fellowship and appreciation to teachers	✓			✓	✓	✓				✓
23	Considering others' right					✓					
24	Enjoin the good										✓
25	Justice					✓				✓	✓
26	Patience					✓				✓	
27	Devotion					✓		✓		✓	✓
28	Striving, (Warning against) laziness				✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
29	Good nature (Affability)				✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
30	Self-confidence									✓	
31	(Warning against) tale-bearing									✓	
32	Help poor people				✓		✓		✓	✓	
33	(Warning against) mock								✓		
34	(Warning against) hoarding							✓			
35	Cutting others' word								✓		
36	(Warning against) love of wealth										✓
37	(Warning against) prodigality							✓			
38	(Warning against) overcharging							✓			
39	(Warning against) haste						✓				✓
40	(Warning against) obstinacy						✓				
41	(Warning against) gluttony				✓						
42	Generosity						✓				

the individual. Social concepts are those which are applicable in the relations between an individual and others, including God, people, animals, and nature. Those moral concepts which are related to social behavior are dominant in the textbooks. Integration between religion and morality emanates from one of these relationships, i.e., the relation between the individual and his/her creator. Gratitude towards God, therefore, is one of the items that frequently appears in the texts. A glance at Figure 5-2 indicates that this concept is repeated in all of the five grades.

It is to be noted that, while they are entirely moral values, almost all of the concepts mentioned in the figure have a religious background, too; they are emphasized in some Quranic verses, as well in statements and sayings by the Prophet or Imams.

Furthermore, as the same figure shows, textbooks are saturated with warnings against those values which are considered, from an Islamic point of view, a disavowal of and harmful to human beings' spiritual development. Warnings against jealousy, lies, haste and tyranny are just some examples of this reaction.

Moral values are taught to children through different forms of teachings including narratives, poems and even illustrations.³⁸⁶ Previously we pointed to the methodology of teaching. The process of indirect teachings traced back, on the one hand, to the influential role of the narration and poem in Persian literature. Iran may truly be called the land of poem. On the other hand, it traced back to the influence of Islam in this region.

³⁸⁶ Pictures in the textbooks play an important role in transferring the values. The limitation of the scope of this chapter does not let us analyze them here.

Textbooks, accordingly, are full of the Persian poems and religious stories. From thirty-seven lesson of the Persian text (Fārsī) for the fifth grade (1994), eleven lessons, i.e. near 30% of all, are poems. The poems are cited from both old (like Sa^cdī and Firdawsī) and new (like Mardānī) poets as from both male and female (like Parwīn I^ctišāmī) ones. In this particular text (Fārsī for the fifth grade), the poems deal with moral subjects such as patience, effort, appreciating parents, peace, condemning tyranny, helping the oppressed, contentment and taking care of animals.

Taking the same text into consideration, we find that lessons in the form of religious narratives are just as common as those in verse. Narratives are more frequently encountered in religious studies texts where moral values are expressed in the form of accounts describing the Imāms' lifestyle. The following passage entitled "Darkness of the night" is an example in this regard:

On a dark night I saw Imām Ṣādiq who was carrying a heavy sack. I followed him. Suddenly I heard a sound as if his sack had fallen. I went close to him. He recognized me and asked me: Are you Mu^callā? I said yes! He asked me to help him. The bag contained food. He took the bag again and went to the region of Banī Sā^cida where poor people lived. He distributed food among them while they were asleep. Nobody was even aware of who had helped them.³⁸⁷

The text then quotes a verse of the *Qur`ān*, which says:

Expend of what We have provided you before that death comes upon one of you and he says, O my Lord, if only Thou wouldst defer me unto a near term, so that I may make

³⁸⁷ *Ta^clīmāt-i dīnī*, 4th Grade, 1376 {1997}, p. 54

freewill offering, and so I may become one of the righteous.³⁸⁸


In a comparison with the textbooks published under the Pahlavis, one hardly finds a great change in the number of moral values or their contents. However, as was mentioned, the relation between the values and religion has been subjected to frequent change. Insertion of many moral concepts in religious studies texts during the Islamic Republic affirms this claim. Although Persian texts include different moral concepts, the main part of the religious texts, entitled "Familiarity with Islamic moral and rules," also carries these concepts. In addition, many other parts of the religious text in some way connect moral issues to religion. This may be through reciting a related verse of the *Qur`ān* or learning about a tradition from the Prophet or behavior of one of the Imāms.

In order to clarify this integration, let us have a look at some passages of the lessons for second graders. Regarding the position of teacher, the text has a picture of a class in which students stand up before their teacher (see Figure 5-3 in the following page), a usual behavior in all classrooms in Iran. It begins this way:

Our Prophet Muhammad said: "I am the teacher for the people and teach them religion." Imām `Ali said: "to appreciate your teacher, stand up before him/her." ... We follow this guidance. We love our teacher and appreciate him/her.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁸ *The Qur`ān*, Munāfiqūn [Hypocrites] (63), 10.

³⁸⁹ *Ta`limāt dinī*, 2nd Grade. (1372) [1993], pp. 44-45.



Another passage from the fourth grade teaches that students should behave to their mother in a nice way. The lesson is a story about a Christian youth who, at the time of the sixth Imām (Ja'far al-Ṣādiq) converted to Islam. He asked the Imām how to behave with his mother who was still a Christian and the Imām replied:

Islam is a religion of love. It recommends you to treat your father and mother in the best way. Take care of your mother and be kind to her, even more than before.³⁹⁰

Starting from the second grade there is shift from a sheer focus on virtues to a disclosure of vices. Discussions on vices such as pride, tyranny and lying are exposed in this grade and continue to be touched on to some

³⁹⁰ *Ta'limāt dīnī*, 4th Grade, (1369) [1990], pp. 67-69.

extent in the next levels. In addition, some lessons regarding virtues also indirectly warn against vices. However, the dominance of the praise for virtue over condemning vice is visible in these school textbooks. The policy of focusing on virtues rather than naming vices has the added benefit of keeping vices out of sight of children. It has also a religious justification, according to which Muslims are recommended not to proclaim corruption and indecency in society.³⁹¹ Nevertheless, since children may hear about them in their daily experience, there is a need to maintain a balance in this process.

Condemnation of tyranny is the only exception that is repeated in all grades. Its political connotations may be traced back to the Shī'ī approach. As was mentioned in the second chapter, according to the Shī'ī history, the third Imām, Ḥusain ibn 'Alī was murdered for his resistance against the tyranny of Umayyad dynasty. This event is well remembered among the Shī'a, as one may easily find the impact of that in the Iranian textbooks.³⁹²

Based on this background, tyranny is seriously condemned among the Shī'ī Muslims. One of the lessons of the second grade recites a poem from Sa'dī, who said:

What a nice saying had Ferdawsi,
 God blesses him, when he said:
 "Do not bother an ant, which carries a seed.
 The ant, after all, has a life and life is pleasant."
 Do not oppress poor people,
 as you would be oppressed, like an ant, before them.

³⁹¹ According to a verse of the *Qur'ān*, "Those who love that slander should be spread concerning those who believe, theirs will be a painful punishment in the world and the Hereafter." The *Qur'ān*, Nūr [The Light] (24), 19.

³⁹² See for instance, *Fārsī*, 3rd Grade, (1372) [1993], pp. 203-204.

If some people are weaker than you,
there are also some people who are stronger than you.
God forgives a person from whom people are in rest.³⁹³

Distribution of moral materials in five elementary grades is also a matter of consideration. As the table 5-2 indicates, five items, that is cleanliness, appreciation to parents, helping other people, condemnation of tyranny, and thankfulness to God, are repeated at most of the levels and in most texts. This could be an indication of the importance of these five values, each of which relates to one of the aspects of individual and his/her relation to others. Cleanliness is an individual moral value, which has a high position in Islam. Appreciation of one's parents indicates the importance of the status of family in this context. To help other people is a social value and condemnation of tyranny a political one. Finally, thankfulness to God is a basic spiritual value for all the other values.

Progress in applying more abstract moral values at higher levels is another feature of the application of morality in the texts. First grade students deal mostly with simple values, while the higher levels deal with more abstract ones. Generosity, self-confidence and enjoining the good, for example, are inserted only in textbooks for the third grade upwards.

Based on the ideology of Islamic Republic, there are some values that one might expect to see in the texts. However, the case is quite the opposite. Previously we have brought up the Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas regarding education, which fall into three categories. Self-confidence was one of the main goals that the Ayatollah used to emphasize. However, except for one case, there is no direct reference to this goal in these texts.

³⁹³ *Fārsī*, 3rd Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 123.

Moral values are taught at the elementary level through the teaching of language. A lesson in the first grade, which teaches the letter “L,” used in the Persian language for the words “flower” (*gul*), “cloth” (*libās*), “glass” (*līwān*), “class” (*kilās*), and “hello” (*salām*),³⁹⁴ introduces a *good* child as follows:

Amīn is a good student. He keeps his clothes clean. He does not cut flowers. He drinks with his own glass. He says hello to others whom he meets. Amīn and Jalāl clean the classroom.³⁹⁵

In upper grades, higher moral values are being taught. In one of the lessons in the Persian textbook of the third grade, students are discussing the choice of a representative for the class. The following is a portion of this discussion, in which students give their opinions about the necessary characteristics for a representative.

The teacher asked Muhammad to come write the students' opinions on the board.

“A representative should be just and trustworthy,” said Ali.

“A representative should be serious in his study,” said Hasan.

“A representative” said Sa‘īd, “should be skillful and meritorious.

“A representative should be orderly and punctual,” said Reza.

One of the students said: “A representative should be beloved by the others.”

Muhammad added, “A representative should be patient.”³⁹⁶

Although these are only a selection of the criteria according to which a good child may be known, they do give us an overall impression of the

³⁹⁴ Interestingly enough, all the mentioned words have the same letter of L in English language.

³⁹⁵ *Fārsī*, 1st Grade, (1375) [1996], p. 56.

³⁹⁶ *Fārsī*, 3rd Grade, (1372) [1993], pp. 37-38.

qualities that are seen as desirable. Having formed a more or less clear picture in our mind of the moral values stressed in the textbooks, let us now turn our attention to the policies and plans of the Islamic Republic in relation to moral education.

II. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S EDUCATIONAL GOALS AND POLICIES RESPECTING MORAL VALUES

A systematic manifestation of the moral values that we observed in our analysis of the textbooks is observable both in the Constitution of the country and in the list of educational goals in the Islamic Republic announced by the Ministry of Education. There is almost no separation between faith and morality in the Constitution. Previously, in our discussion about spirituality, we brought up the second article of the Constitution, which laid emphasis on faith and spirituality. The third article then makes an attempt to clarify the paths towards that goal. One of the ways that in which article three allows for attaining the objectives specified in article two is: "the creation of a favorable environment for the growth of moral virtues based on faith and piety and the struggle against all forms of vice and corruption."³⁹⁷

Likewise, a survey of the list compiled by the Ministry evidently indicates once again the close relationship between moral values and Islamic teachings and spirituality, especially as it indicates the existence of some absolute values, which facilitate, according to the manifesto, the development of human beings. Previously we mentioned that spiritual and

³⁹⁷ Article three of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. See <<http://iranol.com/Government>> [Accessed 12 June 1998].

moral values are considered primary and essential educational goals in this system.³⁹⁸

It is in keeping with this concern for moral values that, according to the announcement of the Ministry of Education, education is regarded as the best way for a child to acquire different capacities and develop the potential to know him or herself, as well as the divine aspect of one's humanity and one's great dignity (*karāmat*). Purification (*tazkiya*) of the self and spiritual development that follows a divine path is another goal indicated in the list. The relation between morality and spirituality is understandable as well, particularly when we see how the list considers one of the educational goals is to foster virtues, particularly honesty (*amānat*), truthfulness (*ṣidāqat*), fidelity (*wafādārī*) and uprightness (*durustkāri*) in the light of faith in God and the Day of Resurrection.

Some of the other goals in respect to moral values are to purify the soul of vices (*radhāil*) and indecent habits, to develop a spirit of attention (*murāqabat*) and control of self behavior, to develop a spirit of order and discipline, to develop a spirit of patience and resistance against the difficulties and effort in solving them, and to develop feeling of responsibility before God and His creatures.

Besides spiritual ground for moral values, some of the other values indicated in the list are to consider "cleanliness" as an Islamic rule and to apply it in one's life, to be informed about the health principles for both body and soul, and their application in life, and finally, be

³⁹⁸ See chapter 4, p. 133 under the same headings.

informed about using God's blessings in order to be healthy, lively and strong.³⁹⁹

However, there is no clear distinction between spirituality and morality in these principles or goals. This may be reasonable in the sense of the close relation between the two fields. Notwithstanding, one should consider that spirituality is clearly distinguished both in Islamic teaching as well as in the educational system of Islamic Republic. Purification of soul (*tazkiyah*), for instance, is purely a movement toward spiritual development, although its application may bring the same results that morality is expected to produce.

Also, there is much repetition of principles in the above list. Some of the listed items are simply different facets or stages of one principle. The third item, which talks about purification, the fourth item, which talks about obtaining virtues and the fifth one, which again speaks about purification of the soul from vices are simply different sides of one concept. The same concept is repeated in the sixth item, which is, of course, one of essential ways for purification.

Moreover, in spite of the fact that the above list is an effort to categorize moral values, it contains only a few of many values that Islam stands for. Some of the moral values, however, fall under other categories such as family or social goals.

In terms of the relation between religion and morality, one may see clearly this interrelation in the Iranian textbooks of today. Besides separate textbooks, which are available for religious studies, the Persian textbooks

³⁹⁹ For a full list see Shari'atmadari (1994), p. 183 f.

take care of the duty of teaching spiritual values to children. In return, religious textbooks are also full of moral and ethical instructions. Parts of the prefaces to religious studies textbooks, set for the second and third years of primary school, read like this:

The aim is to develop from the children of today men and women who are (socially) worthy, committed, constructive, goodwilled, kind, highly chivalrous, and God-loving.⁴⁰⁰

Despite the desired integration of moral and spiritual concepts both in theory and practice, one may still find lessons in these textbooks that teach morality with no religious base, although the same moral concept may be found in religious texts.⁴⁰¹ This is particularly obvious in case of those lessons, which are translated from foreign sources and introduced in the time of the Pahlavis.

III. ISLAMIC MORALITY: ROOTS & DEFINITION

The moral values that we saw emphasized in the list of the educational goals and consequently in textbooks are rooted in Islamic ethical philosophy. This requires a more in-depth explanation. The *Qur`ān*, the sacred book of the Muslims, is not an essay in moral or spiritual discourse, as it is not a work of systematic theology. However, it carries –directly or not– many conceptions of morality.⁴⁰² Hence, Islamic ethics is based primarily on the *Qur`ān* and then on other religious sources. The prophetic traditions (*aḥādīth*) are used as an expansion of what *Qur`ān* says in this regard.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ta`līmāt-i dīnī*, 5th Grade, (1373) [1994], preface.

⁴⁰¹ See e.g. *Fārsī*, 2nd G. (1373) [1994], pp. 24-25; 204-206 and 276-278.

⁴⁰² See F. Rahman (1985), "Law and ethics in Islam" in R.G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Ethics in Islam*, (California: Undena Pub.), p. 8 and F.M. Denny (1985), "Ethics and the *Qur`ān*: Community and world view" in *ibid.*, p. 103.

Despite this reliable source for Muslims, there has been a long debate among Muslim scholars on the question of a specific source for the evaluation of goodness (*ḥusn*) and badness or evil (*qubḥ*). It was as a result of one of the most significant discussions in Islamic theology, i.e. the problem of justice (*ʿadl*),⁴⁰³ that discussion about the roots of good and evil in ethics was first brought up in Islamic theology. In other words, unlike Aristotelian philosophy, which essentially discussed the problem in an ethical domain, Islamic theologians discussed the issue in ethics as a result of their discussion on the theological problem of justice and its relation to God. Two trends of thought emerged from these debates, Ashʿarism and Muʿtazilism. Simply put,⁴⁰⁴ for Ashʿarites, according to different sources, the grounds of right and wrong lay in the Divine will. This meant that, for them, the only source according to which one could recognize good and evil was God's command. Whatever God considered as good, would be good, and whatever He prohibited would be bad.⁴⁰⁵ The Muʿtazilites, on the other hand, held to the principle of rational morality. According to these first genuine moralists of Islam, reason is sufficient to recognize the criteria of goodness and

⁴⁰³ The two main discussions in Islamic theology are unity of God and His justice. The latter has divided Muslim theologians into two different groups, i.e. *ʿAdliya*, on the one hand, which includes Muʿtazilids and Imamids (Shiʿites), and *non-ʿAdliya* on the other. For more details on this issue, see, e.g. Motahhari (1981), *al-ʿadl al-ilāhī*, (Tehran: Daftar-i Intishārāt-i Islāmī).

⁴⁰⁴ A detailed discussion about the Ashʿarites and Muʿtazila is obviously beyond this short study. For more information about this issue see for instance: Majid Fakhry (1991), *Ethical theories in Islam*, (New York: E.J. Brill); G. Hourani (1971), *Islamic rationalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press); G. Hourani (1985), "Divine justice and human reason in Muʿtazilite ethical theory", in R.G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Ethics in Islam*, (California: Undena Pub.), pp. 73-83; J. Subḥānī, J. (1989), *Ḥusn wa qubḥ-i ʿaqlī* (Tehran: Muʿassisa-yi Mutālīʾāt wa Taḥqīqāt-i Farhangī).

⁴⁰⁵ M.T. Mesbah believes that this would be a weak understanding of Ashʿarite's idea. For him, there are some other justifications that may be applied in this regard. For more details see Mesbah (1987), *Durūs-i falsafa-yi akhlāq [Courses in philosophy of ethics]*, (Tehran: Iqbalāʾāt Pub.), pp. 36-38.

badness.⁴⁰⁶ The Shī'ī school, in this conflict, supports the latter doctrine. Given this diversity, one can hardly agree with P. Johnstone who says: "The emphasis [of Islamic ethics] is on conformity to the law: an action is commanded or forbidden by God, rather than inherently right or wrong."⁴⁰⁷


Nevertheless, there are some criteria that one should consider in one's definition of Islamic morality. These criteria are mainly based on the relations between Islamic morality and the Islamic world view respecting God, human beings and the world. Let us put in a philosophical context. J. P. Thiroux considered ethics, in his definition of morality, to be one of the areas of study in philosophy having the most to do with values and values judgment in human affairs. He added that ethics, or the study of morality, deals with the question: What is good, bad, right, or wrong in a *moral* sense?⁴⁰⁸ This general explanation instantly leads us toward another issue i.e., the definition of *good* and *evil*. Generally we may define goodness and badness as the strong or weak relation of a human being to what a given philosophy considers to be the ultimate perfection for a human being. I illustrate this understanding in Figure 5-4 in the next page. This ultimate perfection would be the key that determines and evaluates behavior as being either good or bad. Different philosophical and ethical schools then set out to define what is meant by ultimate perfection.

⁴⁰⁶ We will continue this discussion in chapter ten where we will discuss about the status of reason and rational thinking in Islamic teachings.

⁴⁰⁷ Johnstone, P. (1980), "Islamic ethics," in James F. Childress and John Macquarrie (eds.), *The westminster dictionary of Christian ethics*, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press), p. 314.

⁴⁰⁸ J.P. Thiroux, (1990), *Ethics: Theory and practice*, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan Pub.), P. 8

Figure 5-4: A Definition of good and evil in a general view.



Some schools, for instance linguistic ones, see no reality behind moral concepts. For David Hume (1711-1776) to cite an early example,⁴⁰⁹ and G. E. Moore (1873-1958),⁴¹⁰ who represents this thought trend in more recent

⁴⁰⁹ Hume, who is considered the primal source of this theory, believed that moral concepts differ from descriptive ones (*ikhbārī*), which indicate a real existence in the world; they are performative (compositive) propositions. For more information about Hume's moral theory see e.g. Ingemar Hedenius (1937), *Studies in Hume's ethics* (Uppsala & Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri); John B. Stewart, (1963), *The moral and political philosophy of D. Hume*, (New York: Columbia University Press); J. Harrison, (1970), *Hume's moral epistemology*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press); and J.L. Mackie, (1980), *Hume's moral theory*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

⁴¹⁰ For more information about G.E. Moor's thought see e.g. P.A. Schilpp (ed.) (1942), *The philosophy of G.E. Moore*, (Chicago: Northwestern University); R. P. Sylvester (1990), *The moral philosophy of G.E. Moore*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press); and Tome Regan (ed) *G.E. Moore, The element of ethics*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).

times, ethical propositions are performative concepts that are merely mirrors of our emotions, which appear in the form of commands; they do not indicate any reality. To some extent, one may find similar ideas in the theological doctrines of the Ash'arites, who attributed good and evil to the command of God, although the command of God, unlike our emotions, is real.

Still other schools, in determining the source of moral concepts, saw the ultimate end either in nature or in supernatural existence. Such goals as personal pleasure or interest, social pleasure or interest, emotion, power, and conscience are examples of the first category. Goals of the second category vary one from another. There are those schools that emphasize the conscience of a human being with its relation to God, as J.J. Rousseau believed. Kantian philosophy is another approach, which emphasizes intention and duty. There are also such religions as Buddhism and Hinduism who see the perfection of a human being as lying in complete abandonment of material and worldly affairs. Having this concise review of different ethical schools in mind, we may be able to understand Islamic ethical philosophy more clearly.

According to the Islamic world view, the ultimate goal is beyond the boundaries of this world. This world is only an introduction and a ground for developing potentialities. The ultimate perfection in this world view is the relation of the individual to God at its highest level (*qurb ilā Allāh*)⁴¹¹ The first step in obtaining this ultimate goal is to avoid polytheism (*shirk*) and worship the one God. For the same reason, the very first lesson in almost all Fārsī and religious textbooks presents this train of thought. This is more

⁴¹¹ For more data on Islamic goals in spiritual and ethical development of human being see e.g. J. S. Hawley (ed.), (1987), *Saints and virtues*, (Berkeley: University of California Press); J. Renard (1996), *Seven doors to Islam: Spirituality and the religious life of Muslims*, (Berkeley: University of California Press); M.T. Mesbah Yazdi, (1996), *Akhlaq dar Qur'ān*, (Qum: Imam Khomeini Research Institute).

visible in religious texts, where the first lesson discusses the idea of monotheism in great detail and explains human beings' relations with and obligations to the one God. The second grade religious studies text, in fact, which is the first religious studies textbook encountered by elementary level students, contains eight lessons on this theme. This approach both reflects and reinforces the close relation between religion and morality.

RELIGION AND MORALITY: ARE THEY DIFFERENT?

Are religion and morality two different things? Not if we judge how the two spheres are related to one another in elementary school textbooks in Iran today. The religious textbooks we analyzed focus in part on purely theological subjects, but also on Islamic morality and behavior.

Theoretically, however, there are in general two contradictory approaches to answering this question in ethics. On the one hand, as Frankena explains in his article in the *Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, "For many religious people, morality and religion are the same or inseparable; for them either morality is part of religion or their religion is their morality."⁴¹² There are, on the other hand, a variety of opinions according to which one may distinguish between religion and morality. The aforementioned author believed that: "Conceptually and in principle, morality and a religious value system are two distinct kinds of value systems or action guides."⁴¹³ He, however adds that: "it still may be that morality is dependent on religion" or even if it is not dependent on religion, "they may

⁴¹² Frankena, W. (1989), "Morality and religion (Relations of)," in James F. Childress and John Macquarrie (eds.), *The westminster dictionary of Christian ethics*, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press), p. 400.

⁴¹³ Ibid., p. 401.

be related in a number of significant ways.”⁴¹⁴ A similarity of moral codes and a diversity of religious beliefs are another sign, for some scholars, of the distinctness of morality from religion.⁴¹⁵ According to them, “it is one thing to say that religion affects moral character, quite another to say that religion either prescribes or sanctions moral duties.”⁴¹⁶

Those philosophies that see the ultimate perfection in nature obviously have no problem in denying the relation between religion and morality. Such goals as pleasure, felicity or conscience could be found in non-religious morality, too. In contrast, those who believe in taking moral concepts directly from God’s command have no choice but to confirm an unbroken relation between religion and morality. Abstractly, as Paul Helm explains,

Religion poses two sorts of problems in relation to ethics. It may, in the first place, claim to be the authoritative source of moral truths or requirements, even to the extent of claiming that the only possible grounding of morality is in religion. Secondly, it may hold that a religious life provides new or more effective or better motives for living a moral life than morality itself does.⁴¹⁷

At first glance, as we saw previously its implication in the religious studies textbooks, one may find it impossible to distinguish between Islam as a divine religion and Islam as a school of moral teachings.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 401-402.

⁴¹⁵ See e.g. Patrich H. Nowell-Smith (1967), “Religion and morality” in P. Edwards (ed. In chief) *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co Ltd. & The Free Press), v. 7, p. 152.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., p. 153.

⁴¹⁷ Paul Helm (1992), “Religion” in L. Becker (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, (New York: Garland Pub.), v. 2, pp. 1080-1081.

A tradition handed down from the Prophet says:

I am appointed to complete the [announcement] of virtues.⁴¹⁸

According to this tradition, the goal of prophetic mission is moral. However, this is not the final word as to unity of morality and religion in an Islamic context. Previously, we referred to the diversity of opinions that existed in the history of Islamic theology as well as in ethics. Although the issue is still a matter of debate, recent Shi'ī philosophers, who on the one hand give more room to reason and rational thinking, and on the other, base their ideas on the *Qur'ān* put the issue in another way.

For Tabataba'i, whose philosophical thought and Quranic exegesis have a great influence in educational thought in Iran today, the relationship between religion and morality is not naturally a matter of debate. According to him, the principles of ethics and morality depend on our goal in life. In other words, it is the preeminent goal in life that forms our moral framework. A divine morality, then, bases itself on God's commands to His prophets, wherein admirable behavior is considered to be one, which reflects religious goals and ends. In Islam, as he explains, the perfect goal of life is servitude to God. This goal has two manifestations, one in belief and the other one in behavior. Moral behavior is the manifestation of worshipping God through good behavior.⁴¹⁹

Based on his theory of Islamic ethics, M. T. Mesbah Yazdi, a contemporary Iranian scholar and pupil of Tabataba'i, believed that in an ethical approach, and not a philosophical one, one may hold the idea of

⁴¹⁸ Majlisi, *Biḥār al-anwār*, v. 70, p. 372.

⁴¹⁹ Tabataba'i, (1970), *Al-Mizān*, (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiya), v. 6, pp. 256 f. See also Tabataba'i, (1995), *Philosophy of ethics*, (Beirut: Dār al-Ṣafwa) pp. 18-19.

separation between religion and morality. "Those who base morality," Mesbah adds, "on personal pleasure, social interest, conscience or the like could argue for this discreteness."⁴²⁰ According to him, the rational connection between a form of behavior and its ultimate goal is not a principle that one should grasp in religion. However, religion may play a significant role in introducing the concept of ultimate perfection. In Islamic ethics, which sees closeness to God as the ultimate perfection, religion is the basis. Moreover, religion may determine the ways through which one may reach the goal.⁴²¹ According to this idea, reason is not in itself able to recognize the ultimate goal or the paths that lead to it, although it is a basis for recognizing the necessity of religion for human beings. Accordingly, the religious studies textbooks, as well as some passages in Farsī texts, attempt to convey this ultimate goal on the basis of a review of the exemplary lives of the imams, for instance, or through passages in the *Qur'ān* and other fundamental Islamic sources.

Mughnīya, a Shī'ī Arab writer, puts the issue another way: For him "Besides reason, revelation, for us, is one of the sources of ethics." He adds that although there are some differences between morality and religion, we must believe that religion supports morality and strengthens it. Finally, Mughniya concludes that, in terms of the sources, one may also find religion and morality as one thing. For, on the one hand, He is God who created reason and revealed religion, while on the other hand, it is reason that demands that we worship God and obey Him.⁴²²

⁴²⁰ M.T. Mesbah, (1987), p. 196.

⁴²¹ Ibid., p. 199-201

⁴²² M.J. Mughnīya (1977), *Falsafat al-akhlāq fī al-Islām*, (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm), pp. 15-18.

“One of the many things” Paul Helm says, “that are slogan ‘morality depends upon religion’ might mean is that only religion can provide the necessary motivation to live a sincere moral life.”⁴²³ One may also see this kind of approach in Shī‘ī writings. For Motahhari, even if morality can be supposed without religion, it has a vital need for religion at a practical level. “Experience shows” Motahhari adds, “that morality has been backward wherever it has appeared without religion.” For him, therefore, faith at least is a valuable notion as a support for morality.⁴²⁴

To sum up, the above Shī‘ī scholars believe in a close relation between religion and morality. For them, although rationally speaking morality is something other than religion, the latter does help morality by first introducing the ultimate goal, and second the ways through which that goal may be attained. In other words, it is reason that as a first step, suggests the necessity of a goal in life, but it is religion that gives a definition of that goal. “This fact,” Fazlur Rahman, explains, “was acknowledged by the Mu‘tazila Rationalists, who, while insisting that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (i.e. moral truth) were knowable by natural reason without the aid of Revelation, nevertheless believed that Revelation was not superfluous but helped motivate people to pursue goodness.”⁴²⁵

Manifestations of Islamic Morality

Morality forms the subject matter of a notable portion of the Islamic traditions (*aḥādīth*). The words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad are the major source in this regard. There are in addition numerous collections of

⁴²³ Paul Helm (1992), “Religion” in L. Becker (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, (New York: Garland Pub.), v. 2, pp. 1080-1081.

⁴²⁴ See Motahhari, (1995), *Ta’līm wa tarbiyat dar Islam [Education in Islam]*, pp. 118-119.

⁴²⁵ F. Rahman (1985), p. 8.

prophetic traditions entitled *Sīrat al-Nabī* or *Makārim al-akhlāq* that deal with the moral behavior of the Prophet Muhammad himself. The Shīʿī traditions detailing the behavior and words of the Imāms are even more extensive. These traditions cover almost every aspect of the behavior of the Prophet and Imāms, to the extent that a Muslim may clearly arrange his or her lifestyle according to them. Some of these traditions shape the last section of the religious studies textbooks. Students are, on a weekly basis, asked to memorize them just as they are encouraged to practice them in their daily behavior.⁴²⁶


Based on these traditions and on what we have said about the roots and philosophical analysis of Islamic morality, Muslim scholars make an attempt at offering a practical framework in this regard. Tabatabaʿī puts forward this framework in his *Ethical Philosophy in the Qurʾān* as follows. According to Tabatabaʿī's classification, there are four kinds of virtues, namely intellectual (*al-ʿaqlīya*), spiritual (*al-rūḥīya*), soul-related (*al-nafsīya*) and social (*al-ijtimāʿīya*), each of which has various subcategories.⁴²⁷ (see Figure 5-5 in the following page). Thinking and speech are the intellectual virtues. For him, intellectual virtues are the introductory means for a human being to recognize truth from falsehood. This is again another example of Ṭabāṭabāī's emphasis on the status of intellect in morality. He continues that: "How it is

⁴²⁶ Each of the traditions is introduced as the maxim of the week. Some of the mottoes are: 1. Self struggle; 2. Appreciation of one's teacher; 3. Friendship; 4. Appreciation of and kindness towards parents; 5. Greeting (salām); 6. Prayer; 7. Patience; 8. Trustworthiness; 9. Cleanliness; and 10. The Qur'an. For more information see e.g. *Taʿlīmāt-i dīnī*, 3rd to 5th grades.

⁴²⁷ See Tabatabaʿī (1995), *Falsafa al-akhlāq*, pp. 22-66.

possible for an individual who does not believe in the the other world, to consider piety as his/her goal?"⁴²⁸

Figure 5-5: Virtues in Tabataba'i's view.



⁴²⁸ Ibid., p. 24.

Spiritual or soul-related virtues include piety (taqwá), resistance (*istiqāma*), humility [towards God] (*khushūʿ*), thanksgiving [to God] (*shukr*), trust [in God] (*tawakkul*), and patience (*ṣabr*). Fear [of sin] (*khawf*), hope [in God's forgiveness] (*rajāʿ*) and Love (*ḥubb*) are three ways of obtaining piety. Among the terms describing individual virtues, Tabataba'i considers righteousness (*birr*), sincerity (*ikhlās*), divination of good (*tafāʿul*), and truth (*ṣidq*) as the most essential ones. Brotherhood (*ukhuwwa*) and prodigality (*infāq*) are two social virtues in this classification.

In addition to what philosophers have stated in this regard, there are some particular approaches regarding education that specifically set out the moral behavior for a master and a pupil and their relations to each other.⁴²⁹ Books entitled *Adab al-mufīd wa al-mustafīd* (morals of master and pupil) are numerous in the history of Islamic education. Usually these writings begin with some explanations about the high status of knowledge in Islam and continued to explore the duties of master and pupil in their personal spiritual and moral development, and their relations to each other in their study.

Modeling

As was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, children are gradually socialized in different ways, such as through identification, which is, from a socio-psychological perspective, one of the main means of the socialization process. For many psychologists, influenced by Freud's

⁴²⁹ See for example Zayn al-dīn ʿĀmilī (Known as Shahīd al-Thānī), *Munyat al-murīd*. Persian translation by S. M. B. Hujjati, (1980), (Tehran: Daftar-i Nashr-i Farhang-i Islāmī).

psychoanalytic theory, identification is "a defense mechanism consisting of the imitation of others in an effort to master too intense stimuli."⁴³⁰ In this mechanism, "a motive deprivation or motive frustration not previously in its present intensity is diminished by adopting one or more motives of other persons."⁴³¹ This however is a topic that would lead far beyond the boundaries of my subject in this thesis.

Identification carries another meaning, which simply means "seeing oneself as similar to someone else and adapting that person's values and attitudes."⁴³² Identity is one of the essential concepts of Erik Erikson's theory in the field of psychological development. For Erikson the child must identify with many people, indeed the successful development of its personality depends on this.⁴³³

In social learning theory there is an emphasis on *modeling* in the process of socialization.⁴³⁴ A model in social psychology is anyone whose behavior is imitated by someone else.⁴³⁵ This leads us to the concept of imitation in identification. Based on experiments in animals, children and adults, social psychologists believe that "observed behavior of a model may provoke more or less similar behavior in the observing subject, even when the latter did not show similar behavior patterns before this learning."⁴³⁶ Imitation in this sense

⁴³⁰ B.B. Wolman (1973), (ed.). *Dictionary of behavior science*. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold), p. 186.

⁴³¹ Eysenck (ed.) (1972) *Encyclopedia of psychology*, (New York: Herder & Herder), p. 101.

⁴³² Stuart Sutherland (1995), *The International dictionary of psychology*, 2nd ed. (New York: Mcmillan Press Ltd.), p. 216.

⁴³³ R. Harre & Roger Lamb (eds.) (1986). *The dictionary of developmental and educational psychology*, (Blackwell Reference), p. 119.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ Stuart Sutherland (1995), *The International dictionary of psychology*, 2nd ed., p. 278.

⁴³⁶ Eysenck (ed.) (1972) *Encyclopedia of psychology*, p. 104.

is an innate tendency to mimic or copy others.⁴³⁷ Although the transition from imitation to identification is not clear, according to Miller & Dollard, it is clear that “continuing imitation, in particular of forms of behavior based on longer established and more complex motives, becomes identification.”⁴³⁸

Disregarding the reality of this type of imitation, whether it is grounded on conscious will or not, it is clearly the case that we tend to do what we see others doing, if we also observe the satisfactory outcomes of their behavior.

For some religious scholars, one may find the same concept of identification in the *Qur`ān* under the word *uswa* (example). “Muhammad himself,” Johnstone says “is described in the *Qur`ān* as ‘a fine example’ (33:21) and one who possesses ‘high moral excellence’ (68:4).”⁴³⁹ “As such,” he adds, “he has been taken as a model of good conduct, and his practice (*sunna*) followed in minute detail.”⁴⁴⁰ The *Qur`ān* states:

Certainly you have in the Apostle of Allah an excellent exemplar (*uswa hasana*) for him who hopes in Allah and the later Day and remembers Allah much.⁴⁴¹

Uswa, in its lexical meaning, as Raghib Iṣfahānī explains, is a disposition by which a human being follows the others. There are three cases of the usage of the word *uswa* in the *Qur`ān*.⁴⁴² However, there is little interpretation of it in the words of commentators (*mufasssirin*). As Tabataba`i briefly explains, according to this verse, it is a necessity for those who

⁴³⁷ R. J. Corsini (ed.) (1994). *Encyclopedia of psychology*, (New York: Wiley), v. 2, p. 187.

⁴³⁸ Eysenck (1972). *Encyclopedia of psychology*, p. 101.

⁴³⁹ Johnstone, P. (1980), “Islamic ethics” in James F. Childress and John Macquarrie (eds.), *The westminster dictionary of Christian ethics*, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press), p. 314.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ The *Qur`ān*, Aḥzāb [The Clans], (33), 21.

⁴⁴² The *Qur`ān* Aḥzāb, [The Clans] (21) and Mumtaḥana, [The Woman Tested], (60), 4 & 6.

believe in the prophethood of the Prophet, to take him as an example in their behavior and speech.⁴⁴³ He adds that taking the Prophet a model is a perfect characteristic and a sure sign that a person is a true believer (*mu`min*).⁴⁴⁴

The idea of modeling in Islam is based on the assumption of the possibility of the existence of a perfect human being. For some intellectuals, "no one can be a perfect exemplar for others."⁴⁴⁵ According to this view, "unlike the Sufi standpoint, there are more than one type of perfect human being."⁴⁴⁶ Anyone, therefore, could be a perfect example to others. According to the *Qur`ān*, however, there are some people who may serve as perfect exemplars for others. The Prophet Muhammad is explicitly designated to be such an example. In addition, unless one believes in a limited effectiveness for the whole *Qur`ān*, there is no limitation of time or space on this example. Two other cases of the usage of the word *uswa* are found in case of the prophet Abraham (Ibrahīm). A verse reads:

Indeed, there is for you a good example in Ibrahim and those with him...⁴⁴⁷

Another verse after that says:

Certainly there is for you in them a good example, for him who fears Allah and the last Day; and whoever turns back, then surely Allah is the self-sufficient, the Praised.⁴⁴⁸

Identification is a natural tendency in human beings that starts early in life and continues to its end. Considering this fact, Islam introduces models

⁴⁴³ Tabataba`i, *Al-Mizān*, v. 16, pp. 288-289.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ A. Soroush (1997), "Širāṭhā-yi mustaqīm," in *Kiyān*, no. 36, p. 14.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ The *Qur`ān*, Mumtaḥana [The Woman Tested] (60), 4. (M.H. Shakir translation into English).

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

to fulfill this need in a right way. This is an idea which may be obtained from the three following premises. First, the notion of *fiṭra*,⁴⁴⁹ taken from the following Quranic verse: "The nature of God based on which He created people"⁴⁵⁰ declares that a human being by his/her very nature⁴⁵¹ created possessing certain potential tendencies (desires) and knowledge. The expression *fiṭra* thus means "a kind or a way of creating or of being created,"⁴⁵² as it literally means convention with no imitation. This notion used for the first time in this sense by the *Qur'ān*,⁴⁵³ indicates some specific characteristics in the nature and creation of human being.⁴⁵⁴ Second, the *Qur'ān* introduces some of the prophets as perfect examples for human beings to follow. This emulation, according to the *Qur'ān*, is a characteristic of those people who fear Allah and the last Day. The stories of many other prophets, moreover, may be applied in the people's lifestyle. Thirdly and finally, according to the Islamic standpoints, there is a close relationship between the nature of human beings and the commands of God.

In conclusion one may say regarding these three premises that human beings are, according to the *Qur'ān*, naturally searching for a model after whom they might pattern their own lives. This example should be perfect, reliable enough to warrant following. This is one and the same *uswa*, which

⁴⁴⁹ For more see M. Motahhari (1995), *Fiṭrat*, (Tehran: Sadra). For a concise review see D. B. Macdonald (1965), "Fiṭra," in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 2, pp. 931-932.

⁴⁵⁰ The *Qur'ān*, Rum [The Romans] (30), 30.

⁴⁵¹ Translating of the word *fiṭra* into English into such concepts as 'innate,' 'nature,' 'very nature,' or 'inborn' does not suggest the exact meaning.

⁴⁵² D. B. Macdonald "Fiṭra," in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 2, pp. 931-932.

⁴⁵³ There are some signs among them the famous tradition of Ibn 'Abbas that suggests this idea. For more see Motahhari (1995), *Fiṭrat*, pp. 14 & 22.

⁴⁵⁴ The concepts *sibgha* and *hanif* are two other words. used by the *Qur'ān*. carry almost the same connotation. For more see Motahhari, (1995), p. 24.

is manifested in the existence of the Prophet Muhammad.

Imitation and Rational Thinking

It is essential, from an Islamic point of view, to consider the role of reasoning in the process of identification. Although it is an unconscious procedure, modeling according to language of the *Qur`ān* always accompanies a sort of warning against blind imitation. The first warning is the definition of an acceptable model by adding the adjective *hasana* (fine, excellence) in the verse. A model may possibly be good or evil. In the *Qur`ān*, however, as some scholars have mentioned, the word *uswa* has, for this very reason, been limited by the adjective *hasana*. Secondly, in the imitation of models, one always encounters those verses that indicate the free will of human beings. Moreover, as in the first warning, one should consider those numerous verses in the *Qur`ān* that explicitly forbid people from following evil examples. In the following verses we read:

But those who led easy lives in it said: Surely we found our fathers on a course, and surely we are followers of their footsteps. [The Warner] said: What! even if I bring you a better guide than that on which you found your fathers?⁴⁵⁵

Although the common expression "monkey see, monkey do"⁴⁵⁶ is applicable in the case of many individuals, the nature of a human being, according to the Quranic understanding, is generally above this level. Human beings, through free will, may choose and act according to their choice. By the same token, the *Qur`ān* explains in more detail the nature of the models, making it clear that prophets are not models only by virtue of their

⁴⁵⁵ The *Qur`ān*, Zukhruf [Ornaments of God] (43), 23 & 24.

⁴⁵⁶ For more see Corsini, *The Encyclopedia of psychology*, v. 2, p. 187.

personality, but rather because of the guidance (*hidāya*) that has been granted them. It reads:

These are they whom Allah guided, therefore *follow their guidance*.⁴⁵⁷

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Regardless of philosophical debate, Islamic ethics maintains certain values as absolute ones, which are, according to Muslims, the key points in developing and leading human beings towards truth and reality. The very direction of this development is *qurb*, i.e. a close spiritual relation between a human being and God. Religion and morality, therefore, are united at least at a practical level. Accordingly, religious figures, models and narratives play an essential role in teaching moral values to children.

It is not surprising therefore to see examples established for children to model themselves upon in order to adapt the desirable Islamic moral values, the most fundamental of which are to know oneself, to know one's relation to God and to foster one's relations with herself or himself, as well as others (people, animal and nature), appropriately.⁴⁵⁸ The moral concepts inserted in the textbooks, some of which were shown in this study, are illustrations of how individuals are helped towards this purpose.

⁴⁵⁷ The *Qur'ān*, An'ām [Cattle] (6), 90, Shakir's translation. (Italic added).

⁴⁵⁸ The similar concept may be found in the course of storytelling described by W. K. Kilpatrick. Considering the work of such psychologists as Bruno Bettelheim, Robert Coles and Jerome Bruner, Kilpatrick emphasizes on the role of story in the process of teaching: See, for more information, W. K. Kilpatrick (1992) *Why Johnny can't tell right from wrong*, (New York: Touchstone), chapter 7.

Chapter 6

ISLAMIC SOCIAL VALUES & THEIR TEACHING IN TEXTBOOKS

INTRODUCTION

Textbooks on social studies form a great part of the curriculum of the third to the fifth grades of the elementary level in Iran. These texts include three main parts, i.e. natural geography, history and civil studies regarding the domestic and international social issues. This chapter is intended to deal with the last part of these texts, that is, civil studies.

Once more, as has been our method in the foregoing chapters, I will first examine through a thematic analysis the school elementary textbooks on social studies and scrutinize the implications of the Islamic policy for these textbooks currently being used in Iran. I will then proceed to a discussion of the educational goals and policies as regards social values under the Islamic Republic. Finally, in order to see the theoretical background for these

policies, I will examine some of the primary social values from an Islamic perspective.

I. A THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Textbooks on social studies (*ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i*) are the main sources for transferring social values to children. One of the main aspects of these texts, as was mentioned, is related to civil studies (*ta'limāt-i madanī*) which discusses issues related to society, law and social relations. These textbooks are among those texts that underwent a wholesale change after the Revolution. The reason for this change has been spelled out in a guide to using these books:

At the time of the *ṭāghūt* [=Devil, i.e., the Pahlavis] none of the texts were so strange to Islam as the texts of social studies were... Generally, there was a serious contradiction between the content of the texts of social studies of the time of the Pahlavis on the one hand, and Islamic thought on the other.⁴⁵⁹

Although there are some social values expressed in other textbooks such as Fārsī texts, here we will concentrate on the texts dealing specifically with social studies. Generally we may categorize the issues discussed in the texts on social studies into two categories, that is institutions and values. In comprehensively analyzing these elementary texts, we will continue our review in these two parts with which the texts deal. from the third to the fifth elementary grades.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁹ Ministry of Education (1990), *How to teach social studies*, (Tehran: Ministry of Education), p. 70.

⁴⁶⁰ It should be noticed that the curriculum of the first and the second levels do not include texts of social studies.

1. Institutions in the Textbooks

Among social, economic and religious institutions, family, school and mosque are the three major institutions that are discussed in these texts. There are also some political institutions such as leadership, constitution and state that the texts elaborate on in the context of social studies, which we will look at in our discussion about political values in the next chapter. These three institutions are those major ones highlighted in the texts on social studies.

a. Institution of Family

Family in an Islamic society is considered as both a small society and a social value in itself. The whole textbook on social studies used in the third grade is the story of a family which used to live in Kazerun⁴⁶¹ and, which due to the father's having to change job, must leave that city and move to Neishabūr.⁴⁶² The story is all about this trip. The book consists of twenty-two lessons, each of which deals with a separate social topic. The first lesson of the book, which is illustrated by a picture of the family (Figure 6-1 in the following page) is intended to highlight the significance and holiness of family in an Islamic society.

As the Figure 6-1 shows, the model family of the story consists of the couple, a boy, a girl and their grandmother (the father's mother). There is a compassionate relationship among them all, as the grandmother receives considerable appreciation from all the other members. The guide

⁴⁶¹ Kazerun is a southern city in Iran.

⁴⁶² One of the northern cities in Iran.



to this text emphasizes: “An Islamic society is a society that preserves the foundation of family.” Describing a Western family as follows, the authors of the guide attempt to contrast its values with those of an Islamic family, by casting the former in an unfavorable light.

The foundations of the Western family are lax; its members are strangers to each other. As soon as they grow old, parents will simply be considered as consumers and, to a great extent, lose the appreciation of their children and the whole society. For the same reason they mostly have to live in old houses, or live alone in their own houses...A considerable number of children do not even know whether they have grandparents or who are they or what their names are. Economic considerations, in a Western family take precedence over emotional ones. Children prefer to spend

their own income for their own entertainment and personal enjoyment, rather than for their parents.⁴⁶³

Strong family foundations, the sanctity of the family, appreciation of its aged members,⁴⁶⁴ appreciation of parents, equality between girls and boys, chastity, simplicity of life, cooperation between parents on the one hand, and between them and children on the other, and the participation of the all members in the family economy, are some of the values that the first lesson of the texts intends to highlight in relation to the family. One passage reads:

Ali's parents are kind to each other and they love their children...In Hashemi's family, all members help each other. The father provides for home; the mother does sewing for people and has a small income; the grandmother helps in cooking. Ali enjoys planting and Maryam helps her mother in her work.⁴⁶⁵


Some of the more complicated concepts with regard to the family are elucidated in the fourth grade textbook. Defining society as a group of people who live together for a long time, the second lesson of the fourth grade text deals with the concept of family. Interestingly, the lesson is illustrated by almost the same picture of the third grade. Here, in this picture, there is one more girl in the family (see Figure 6-2 in the next page). The students become acquainted with some of the related concepts such as marriage, thinly and thickly populated families, relations between family members and Islamic values within a family. It says: "In a family, parents

⁴⁶³ Ministry of Education (1990), *How to teach social studies*. (Tehran: Ministry of Education), p. 88.

⁴⁶⁴ According to the latest statistical report, 91% of the aged in Iran live with their children. See <http://www.ettelaat.com>.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i*, 3rd Grade, (1372) [1993], pp 2-3.

love children and guide them in their life, as younger members appreciate their elders and help them.”⁴⁶⁶ Once more the text emphasizes that: “Family has a significant status in Islam. Members of a family have certain responsibilities to each other; in fact all relatives, according to Islamic teachings, are advised to meet each other once in a while.”⁴⁶⁷



Basically, the father is portrayed as financially responsible to his family and the mother as being in charge of the management of the family's domestic affairs. One more glance to the Figures 6-1 and 6-2 indicates the position of father in family. Regarding veiling, it should be

⁴⁶⁶ *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], pp 166-7.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

noticed that women do not wear *hijāb* at home, however, all the females illustrated in the texts are veiled. The text also points to how women often work outside the family both in rural and urban areas in order to help their family financially. Nevertheless, the main message from an economic point of view in relation to the responsibilities and the status of the father and mother in society is that:

Women, in some families, work outside the home. In rural areas women help their husbands through farming, rug weaving and animal husbandry. In urban areas, they work in schools, hospitals, factories and administrative offices. All people in an Islamic society should work and perform the duties that they have to each other. When every Muslim, either woman or man, wants to start her or his job in the morning, that person should think about how to solve people's problems. In some societies, women, needlessly and just for the sake of an extended income, work outside the home. A Muslim woman, however, works in the home or outside it only to help people and to perform her duty towards the society. ⁴⁶⁸

In explaining the content of the text in relation to the above-mentioned idea, the authors write: "In fact, our goal is to provide a correct notion about women's work outside the home. One should not forget that a woman above all is a mother and that her first responsibility is to train children. This is one concept that the West and the Communist countries have forgotten."⁴⁶⁹

"Order" and "law" are the two other concepts that are frequently considered in the heart of the lessons as two essential duties for the members of a family. Order in place, time, and responsibility is the message of the

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 171.

⁴⁶⁹ Ministry of Education (1990). *How to teach social studies*. (Tehran: Ministry of Education). p. 129.

following passage:

In the home, everything has its own place...Every task has its own time. Sport, entertainment, sleep and prayer should be performed at their specific times. We have to keep order in our life.⁴⁷⁰

b. Institution of School

School is the second most important social institution after family, and is called in the textbooks as the second home for children. The concept of school is being inculcated in the last lessons of the third grade, although briefly. In the fourth grade however, there is more detail provided regarding the concept. Values such as responsibility, order, law, friendship and cooperation are introduced to children in this regard. However, one of the predominant ideas in relation to school is the status of teachers and their relationship with students. A related part reads:

The responsibility of a teacher is a weighty one. His/her duty is like that of the prophets. As a prophet trains larger societies, a teacher trains students. Children are a divine trust that God has given to their parents. Parents should care of them and put them under the care of an appropriate teacher.⁴⁷¹

The “future” is another concept that is generally related to education, particularly in terms of schooling. Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Revolution, frequently insisted on this point. According to his saying, which appears in the preface of some of the textbooks: “These children, whom you send to school, are my beloved and are the hope for the country’s future. See

⁴⁷⁰ *Tāʿlimāt-i ijtimāʿī*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 170.

⁴⁷¹ *Tāʿlimāt-i ijtimāʿī*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], pp 173-4.

to their Islamic and human training.”⁴⁷² This very idea is reflected in the textbooks this way:

Today's students are the women and men of future. They will build the future with their faith, knowledge and effort. Students are in fact the future makers.⁴⁷³

Another issue in relation to schools is gender segregation. The idea of gender segregation has a religious background. There are different psychological or social justifications for gender segregation in some schools in various countries. An increment in the development of girls' potentialities is one of these. Confirming this point, the main reason for this segregation in Iran, however, is religious observance. Relations between male and female should be limited to the necessary.⁴⁷⁴ From the early years children learn this regulation through their schooling. In one of the lessons in the third grade text, when the family arrives in the new city, the parents decide to register their children in school. The mother, with her daughter, goes to a girls' school. The principal of the school is a woman. She is veiled and is pleased with the girl's *hijāb*. Mr. Hashemī, the father, goes with his son to a boys' school, where the principal is a man (Figure 6-3).

Finally, the literacy Movement (*nahdat-i sawād-āmūzī*) is another institution that is discussed in the texts. According to statistics, at the end of the Pahlavi dynasty, more than fifty percent of Iranians were illiterate. This

⁴⁷² See for example *Tā'limāt-i dīnī*, 4th Grade, (1369) [1990], preface.

⁴⁷³ *Tā'limāt-i ijtīmā'ī*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 175.

⁴⁷⁴ This “necessity,” however, has different interpretations and cases. In contrast to traditional societies, modern life, for instance, requires more relations between male and female. This limitation, therefore, has not band cooperation between different genders in social tasks.




caused the leadership of the revolution to found a new institution for this purpose. This institution is introduced in the text as one of the tasks related to mosques.

c. Institution of Mosque

The mosque represents in Iranian Islamic society, especially in recent years, a place where spiritual, moral, social educational and political activities are combined. According to history, this was so at the time of the establishment of Islam in Medina.⁴⁷⁵ Almost all the quarters of cities and villages in Muslim countries have a mosque. It is a place, first of all, for

⁴⁷⁵ Medina (madina) a city in Saudi Arabia is the second holy city, after Mecca, for Muslims. The first Islamic State established in this city by the hand of the Prophet Muhammad.

prayer. At specific times, and in some places, at any time, people can go to the mosque and perform their prayers there. Most prayer in the mosques, while gender segregated, is in-group form, which is called *jamā'a*. This of course strengthens the relations between people. One of the lessons of the fourth grade social studies textbooks, which is illustrated by a picture of a mosque, is intended to introduce this socio-religious institution to children (Figure 6-4).



Explaining the spiritual value of a mosque, the text reads:

A mosque is a school, in which all people, women and men, old and young, gather and remember God. They talk and

consult there with one another on topics related to their better future. A mosque is a small example of an Islamic society in which one may find worship of God, kindness, cooperation, order, leadership, effort and education.⁴⁷⁶

A more populated institution, similar to mosque is Friday Prayer.⁴⁷⁷ This prayer which is made on every Friday, is a more political prayer, usually done by the leadership of a more political figure. One of the lessons of the third grade social studies text is an effort to explain this institution. The explanation is all about the Friday prayer in Tehran, the capital. The prayer is leaded by the leader of the country, Ayatollah Khamenei. Again in the fourth grade students are encouraged to attend Friday prayer as one of the tasks on Fridays.

As mosques, the shrine of the Imāms and their sons and daughters have the same holiness and position among the Shi'its. Cities of Mashahd and Qum in Iran are two holy ones that are introduced in the third grade social studies textbook.⁴⁷⁸

2. Major Social Values in Textbooks

As was mentioned earlier, there are other political institutions discussed in the texts that we will deal with in the next chapter. There are also some political values, which are brought up in these social studies texts, and we will deal with these later as well. Here we will continue our examination by studying those social values that the texts on social studies deal with outside of these latter.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 178.

⁴⁷⁷ It should be noted that the official weekend in Muslim countries is Friday.

⁴⁷⁸ See *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i*, 3rd Grade, (1372) [1993], pp. 24-26 and 72-80.

While the texts in the third and forth grades mostly deal with the institutions and partly with some simple social values, the textbook on social studies in the fifth grade particularly deals with some more complicated issues regarding social values. "Behavior of an individual in an Islamic society" is the title of one such lesson. As indicated in this lesson, faith in God is the first thing expected of such an individual, whose behavior God watches over. Accordingly, they themselves, before the police, are *responsible* for their behavior. In relations with the other people, according to the text, a Muslim individual is kind and aware. He or she, as well as his or her environment is clean. The property and lives of other people are appreciated by an individual Muslim. There is no wastage (*isrāf*) by Muslims. Economy and avoidance of excess is a religious obligation for all Muslims.

The other lessons deal with such concepts as unity (*waḥdat*), consultation (*shūrā*), responsibility (*mas'ūliyat*), cooperation (*ta'āwun*), and self sacrifice (*īthār*). Let us examine these concepts in some more detail.

Based on a verse of the *Qur'ān*, which calls people to be united,⁴⁷⁹ unity (*waḥdat*) is introduced as one of the most significant characteristics of an Islamic society. The text adds that: "There is no reason for Muslims, who have one God, one prophet, one book and one prayer direction, to be separate from each other."⁴⁸⁰ Unity is emphasized, as it is the secret of victory against the enemies. This unity must be strengthened as it facilitates consultation on

⁴⁷⁹ The *Qur'ān*, Al-i 'Imrān [The House of Imran] (3), 103.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1994], p. 194.

issues. Consultation (*shūrā*) entails such notions as election and participation of people in social and political issues. This, however, is circumscribed in at least one respect:

However, consultation is not conceivable in all issues. We obey those issue that are clearly stated in the *Qur`ān*, or declared by the Prophet, Imāms, or the leader of the Islamic society.

Based on counsels to “enjoin the good” (*al-amr bi al-ma`rūf*) and “forbid indecency,” (*nahy-i `an al-munkar*), the concept of responsibility in an Islamic society is another issue that is explained in the fifth grade textbook, where there is cited the verse of the *Qur`ān* stating:

You are the best nation ever brought forth to men, bidding to honour, and forbidding dishonour, and believing in God.”⁴⁸¹

The texts add that in an Islamic society, Muslims reflect each other’s behavior and are responsible to each other. This notion is introduced to children through the following story. Once upon a time some people were traveling on a ship. One of the passengers started to make a hole in the ship on his own seat. His friends protested to his act. He replied I am making a hole in my own place! Finally the ship was sunk. “According to the Prophet,” the text states, “the society is like a ship whose passengers are the people.” All are responsible to what happens in the society.⁴⁸²

Cooperation (*ta`āwun*) between the members of a society is introduced into the text as another characteristics of an Islamic society. One more time, the concept is borrowed from the *Qur`ān*, which says: “Help one another to

⁴⁸¹ The *Qur`ān*, Āl-‘Imrān (3), 110. Arberry’s translation.

⁴⁸² *Ta`līmāt-i ijtimā`i*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1994], p. 199.

piety and godfearing; do not help each other to sin and enmity.”⁴⁸³ Members of a society, according to this text, are like the limbs of a body, whenever one of them hurt, the others will be harmed.

Cooperation has various appearances in its Islamic context. From their earliest years, students are made familiar with the Islamic concepts of prodigality (*infāq*), endowment (*waqf*) and self-sacrifice (*īthār*) for the sake of Islam, Muslims and Islamic country. *Infāq* is to help the other people from your income and property. To work more than the expected time is also considered a kind of prodigality. By the same definition, the act of those teachers who voluntarily help the institution of Literacy Movement is considered *infāq*. Endowment (*waqf*) is another manifestation of cooperation in an Islamic society. This is to give or build different buildings such as school, hospital and library for the use of the public.

Another sample of cooperation in Iran, as it is introduced in the text, is the institution of “Construction Movement” (*jihād-i sāzandī*), which is established after the Revolution. The text reads:

The Construction Movement is one of the significant results of the Islamic Revolution. Through this institution, people make their efforts to improve and flourish the situation and help poor people in far spots of the country.”⁴⁸⁴

Self-sacrifice (*īthār*) is the last concept that is introduced in social studies texts as one of the cases of cooperation in an Islamic society. The concept has a highly moral meaning in itself that is to give priority to others

⁴⁸³ The *Qurʾān*, Māʾida [The Table] (5), 2.

⁴⁸⁴ *Tāʿlimāt-i ijtimāʿī*, 5th Grade. (1374) [1994], pp. 203-4.

before yourself. There are different levels of this sacrifice, the highest one is to be ready to be killed in sake of the others, which is called *shahādat*.

SOME REFLECTIONS

1. As we already mentioned, social justice is considered one of the main pillars of social values in an Islamic society. It is one of the two columns in Mesbah's model of an Islamic utopia. However, the reflection of this concept in the textbooks is not at the same level of concentration. The first appearance of the concept of social justice is in the third grade textbook, where there is a description and rejection of the aristocratic life of the Pahlavi kings. The lesson, which is entitled "The Devil's Palaces" and illustrated by some pictures of the former royal palaces, on the one hand, and the caves of the poor people, on the other, is meant to highlight the caste system that existed in the time of the Pahlavis. It reads:

While many Iranians had no shelter, no power, no water and no health facilities, the Shah and his family lived in these palaces.⁴⁸⁵

In spite of its social message, the lesson is more a political one rather than an effort to introduce the concept of social justice. There is also no clear indication of the concept of justice in the text on social studies in the fourth and the fifth grades. In one of the lessons in the text for fifth grade students, entitled "The Duties of the State in an Islamic Society," the author attempts to identify the concept of the state and its duties to the people. Guarding Islam, independence of the country, education and removing poverty are the main subheadings of the lesson.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i*, 3rd Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 57.

2. At first glance, one may easily find a close relationship between the social aspects of Islamic teachings and social values. The spirituality of Islam, monotheism and the relation between God and His people are the foundations of an Islamic society. We will see this point in Mesbah's model. The reflection of this approach is also clear in the social studies textbooks. This close relationship implies the rejection of any secular social system. This is more than a rejection of some specific values, as we observed in case of the institution of the family. In other words, Western approaches to social system and values, which are mostly secular-based, are rejected from this standpoint, simply because they are secular.

3. The contradiction between the role of people in discharging social and political duties, on the one hand, and their role in performing their Islamic obligations, on the other, is one of the most controversial issues under debate. We already pointed to some related topics. This is made particularly clear in the passage already quoted, i.e.: "However, consultation is not conceivable in all issues. We obey those issue that are clearly stated in the *Qur'ān*, or declared by the Prophet, Imāms, or the leader of the Islamic society." The Islamic state in Iran is called the Islamic Republic, which is expected to follow Islamic rules, for it is *Islamic*. It is also expected to listen to the people, for it is a *republic*. The combination of these approaches is likewise a matter for considerable debate.

II. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S EDUCATIONAL GOALS AND POLICIES RESPECTING SOCIAL VALUES

After our discussion of how textbooks convey social values, let us, as we have done in the previous chapters, review those educational goals that are

related to social values taught in the textbooks. The Constitution itself stresses, in addition to moral virtue, certain social virtues which are essential to a people that wishes to base society upon belief in God. "In order to attain the objectives specified in article 2," article three of the Constitution says. "the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of directing all its resources to the following goals."⁴⁸⁶ Some of these goals are as follows:

1. Raising the level of public awareness in all areas, through the proper use of the press, mass media, and other means.
2. Free education and physical training for everyone at all levels, and the facilitation and expansion of higher education.
3. Strengthening the spirit of inquiry, investigation, and innovation in all areas of science, technology, and culture, as well as Islamic studies, by establishing research centers and encouraging researchers.
4. The complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence.
5. The elimination of all forms of despotism and autocracy and all attempts to monopolize power.
6. Ensuring political and social freedoms within the framework of the law.
7. The participation of the entire people in determining their political, economic, social, and cultural destiny.

⁴⁸⁶ Article three of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. See <<http://iranol.com/Government>> [Accessed 12 June 1998].

8. The abolition of all forms of undesirable discrimination and the provision of equitable opportunities for all, in both the material and intellectual spheres.

The list, published by the Ministry of Education,⁴⁸⁷ consequently bases social values on six main concepts, which are: 1) the holiness of the family; 2) social, economic and cultural justice; 3) Islamic brotherhood and cooperation; 4) a spirit of calling people to goodness; 5) respect for the law; and 6) the significance of education.

Other virtues, based on the above-mentioned goals, are mentioned in the list, as well. Observing others' rights and acting justly in one's treatment of one's fellow beings is at the top of these goals. While an appropriate relation with people of all faiths is important, a particular consideration should be paid to relations with one's fellow Muslims. Developing kind, dedicated, and forgiving relations with other Muslims, fostering a spirit of caring about the problems faced by one's co-religionists, creating a spirit of brotherhood among all Muslims and encouraging equal treatment are emphasized on the list. In keeping with the respect for faith and knowledge in Islam, appreciating all believers (*mu'minīn*), particularly learned people, is another quality that is highlighted as a positive social value.

Values related to appropriate interaction and communication form another part of the list. Developing a spirit of cooperation in social matters and welfare, a spirit of responsibility towards others, and a spirit of tolerance and mutual agreement are all taken into consideration.

⁴⁸⁷ See *Piyywand*, (1362), no. 44.

Justice is another value which is evident in the list. The list specifically states that one of the social values is developing a spirit of justice, even in cases where this may harm the interests of an individual or his /her relatives. Likewise, creating a spirit of inflexibility in dealing with injustice –to the extent that Islamic law allows–, and of refusing to oppress people and supporting those who have suffered oppression is part of the same trend. The list then adds that making an effort to create peaceful relations between people and resistance against tyranny and aggression is another goal.

Bringing moral and social values closer together, the list encourages a spirit of inviting people towards goodness (*khayr*), truth (*ḥaqq*) and patience (*ṣabr*), of recognizing vice (=evil) (*munkar*) and virtue (= good) (*ma'rūf*) and of accepting the responsibility of enjoining the good (*al-amr bi al-ma'rūf*) and prohibiting evil (*al-nahy 'an al-munkar*). The role of spiritual values is also evident, when the list emphasizes performing Islamic religious rites and strengthening the position of religious institutions in society. Finally, there is a stress on creating the habit of order and discipline in all individual and social relations.

Family Goals

Besides the above list of social goals, long as it is, there is another separate list in relation to family goals, making obvious the substantial position of family in this society. The position of family in Iran is an interesting issue that is out of the scope of this study. Here we suffice by mentioning some of the family goals indicated both in the constitution and in the list announced by the Ministry of education.

“Family” for the Constitution, “is the fundamental unit of society and the main center for the growth and edification of human being.” Having that, a passage of the preamble of the constitution reads:

Compatibility with respect to belief and ideal, which provides the primary basis for man's development and growth, is the main consideration in the establishment of a family. It is the duty of the Islamic government to provide the necessary facilities for the attainment of this goal. This view of the family unit delivers woman from being regarded as an object or as an instrument in the service of promoting consumerism and exploitation. Not only does woman recover thereby her momentous and precious function of motherhood, rearing of ideologically committed human beings, she also assumes a pioneering social role and becomes the fellow struggler of man in all vital areas of life. Given the weighty responsibilities that woman thus assumes, she is accorded in Islam great value and nobility.⁴⁸⁸

Consequently article ten adds: “Since the family is the fundamental unit of Islamic society, all laws, regulations, and pertinent programs must tend to facilitate, the formation of a family, and to safeguard its sanctity and the stability of family relations on the basis of the law and the ethics of Islam.”⁴⁸⁹

According to the Ministry of Education, the above goal in respect to the family requires the school system to educate children based on the following aims:⁴⁹⁰

1. Recognizing the necessity and holiness of making a family.

⁴⁸⁸ Article three of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. See <<http://iranol.com/Government>> [Accessed 12 June 1998].

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁰ For more information about the list see *ibid.*

2. Recognizing the role of couples in the sense that each party completes the other.
3. Recognizing the necessity of having a warm and loving relationship.
4. Emphasis on the responsibility of the husband to take care of family.
5. Emphasis on having children and on raising them.
6. Emphasis on the role of the mother in training honest and responsible children.
7. Recognizing the role of the family in presenting Islamic culture.
8. Creating an appropriate situation for developing children's potential.
9. Treating children, especially girls with kindness and affection.
10. Emphasis on consultation between all the members of the family.
11. Developing the spirit of cooperation between all members of a family.
12. Appreciation of all members of a family, particularly the mother.
13. Recognizing the principle of appreciation one's elders and being compassionate to younger members.
14. Emphasis on strengthening blood-kinship (*şili-yi raḥim*).

The above list is an attempt to design a particular framework for the family in an Islamic society. Besides the importance and essential role of family in the society, each of the members of the family bears certain responsibilities towards each other, as well as all of society. The chief responsibility of parents is to raise and educate their children to be honest, responsible and familiar with Islamic culture and to develop their potential. In return, children are expected to appreciate their parents for their help.

Both parents and children are then expected to form a micro-society filled with such values as kindness, appreciation, and responsibility. All the

above-mentioned values and characteristics of the social and family framework, however, can only be fully understood when one is acquainted with the philosophy of social values in Islam, a point that we are going to deal with, to some extent in the following section.

III. ISLAM AND SOCIAL VALUES

Islam, being a way of life for societies and individuals as much as it is a personal religious faith or means of spiritual development, can be studied from a wide range of social perspective. There are in fact numerous writings that deal with this aspect of Islam.⁴⁹¹ Our purpose here, however, is to discover some of those major elements of Islamic sociology and social values that stand as foundations for the educational policies in the Islamic Republic and for the concepts used in the elementary textbooks in Iran today.

Regarding this last part of the discussion, I will give a short explanation of the concept of utopia in an Islamic context. This so-called theoretical or ideological examination, while covers almost all aspects of the subject, will help us to apprehend more clearly the issue.

UTOPIA

Despite disagreement among philosophers over the format of the ideal society, philosophers have for thousands of years written extensively on the subject, a sign of mankind's wish to create an ideal society. Plato's *Republic*⁴⁹² a classic work from ancient times.

⁴⁹¹ For more information on this issue see e.g. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, (1981), *Islamic life and thought*, (London: George Allen and Unwin); and Nasr, (1987), *Traditional Islam in the modern world*, (London KPI).

⁴⁹² See Plato (1994), *Republic*. (Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press).

Augustine's *The City of God*⁴⁹³ among Christians writings, and Fārābī's *Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila*⁴⁹⁴ in Islamic literature, are a few examples of how thinkers have elaborated on the highest of social values and their impact on societies. In order to form an idea of the social values in an Islamic context, here I will develop this issue from the point of view of a modern Iranian thinker, M.T. Mesbah Yazdi, who offered a more or less organized model for an ideal society. This may not be a detailed clarification of the question, as it was not the author's intention to design a utopia, but it does introduce to us some information on the topic.

Mesbah's Model of an Islamic Utopia

One of the issues that M. T. Mesbah discusses in his *Society and History* is the "ideal society."⁴⁹⁵ He then presents a model for an Islamic ideal society. Rejecting philosophers like Popper,⁴⁹⁶ who see any kind of discussion about utopias as useless, the author believes that a successful model can be developed as long as it has three characteristics:

- a. It must be realistic.
- b. It has to show *how* a society can achieve that ideal.
- c. It should have a hierarchy of goals starting from simple to more complicated ones. Most unsuccessful models of an ideal society share in one

⁴⁹³ Augustine, Saint (1871), *The city of God*, (Edinburgh: Clark).

⁴⁹⁴ Fārābī (1985), *Ārā'-u ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila*, (Oxford: Clarendo Press; New York: Oxford University Press).

⁴⁹⁵ See M. T. Mesbah, (1989), *Society and history*, (Tehran, IPO), chapter 11, pp. 409-422.

⁴⁹⁶ Karl R. Popper, (1902-1994) British philosopher known for his contributions to the understanding of scientific reasoning and his attacks on historicism. His works include *The logic of scientific discovery* (1931) and *The open society and its enemies* (1945).

deficiency, i.e., they fail to show how one may reach that ideal. Mesbah continues his discussion under three further headings.

1. Islamic Utopia: A Divine Promise

According to this point of view, since an Islamic utopia is a divine promise, it will surely come to pass. It is revealed in the *Qur`ān* that God promised to those who believe in Him that He will establish their religion for them on this earth. The *Qur`ān* says:

God has promised those of you who believe and do righteous deeds that He will surely make you successors in the land, even as He made those who were before them successors, and that He will surely establish their religion for them that He has approved for them, and will give them in exchange, after their fear, security: 'They shall serve Me, not associating with Me anything.'⁴⁹⁷

For Mesbah, based on his understanding of this Quranic verse, the only element that distinguishes an ideal Islamic society from other kinds is its unique world view and ideology, based on which people find their true perfection.⁴⁹⁸

2. Relationships

Mesbah explains that a human being relates to four fronts in this world and that these relationships are critical to the formation of a utopia. Here we shall explain each, in partial illustration of Figure 6-5.


Relation with Almighty God

In an Islamic utopia, every individual believes in one God as his or her creator and as an existence in His own right, from which he or she has obtained his/her existence. The individual also believes in revelation and

⁴⁹⁷ The *Qur`ān*: Nūr [Light] (24), 55, Arberry's translation.

⁴⁹⁸ M. T. Mesbah, (1989), *Society and history*, (Tehran, IPO), chapter 11, p. 415.

Figure 8-5: Mesbah's model of an Islamic utopia.



du'ā (prayer) as two ways⁴⁹⁹ establishing relations between human being and God. He or she also believes that God is the source of glory and majesty (*jalāl*), and that the servant is in absolute weakness before Him, as He is the source of grace, before which the servant should be thankful. Mesbah adds:

Briefly, one may say that in an Islamic ideal society, every person is a believer (*mu'min*) and monotheist (*muwaḥḥid*), and rejects polytheism (*shirk*) and disbelief (*kufr*).⁵⁰⁰

The most important characteristic of an Islamic ideal society, according to this modern philosopher, is monotheism, as he believes that the major goal of creation and essential goal of social and individual affairs is to develop as close as possible a relation with God.

Relation with Self

Both the body and the soul of an individual, from this standpoint, are Divine trusts. The individual must deal with these two Divine trusts, in the same way as he or she would treat any other trust. He or she has no right to handle them simply in any way that he or she desires, but is instead obliged (*mukallaf*) to treat them in a way that God allows His people to do.

Relation with Nature

There are two standpoints for human beings, in this model, in their relation to nature, i.e., trustfulness and their role as God's vicars (*khalīfat al-Allāh*). On the one hand, based on his or her responsibility, the individual is obligated to care for nature in order to preserve it from being destroyed. On the other hand, based on his or her position as vicar of God, the individual has to make every effort to develop the potential of this nature to its

⁴⁹⁹ Revelation, which is the God's command, is directed from God to His servants (top to down) and *du'ā*, which is a request from God by people, is directed from the servants to God (down to top).

⁵⁰⁰ Mesbah, (1989), p. 416.

maximum. Accordingly, people should try to be familiar with both Divine law and modern science and technology.

Relation with the Other People

The fundamental groundwork of the relation between an individual and others, from this standpoint, are two principles i.e., "justice" (*qisṭ*) and "kindness" (*iḥsān*). The necessary requirement of justice, which is, according to him, much more significant than the latter, is to consider her/his own and others' rights (*ḥuqūq*) and duties (*takālīf*). Evil-doing or oppression (*ẓulm*) is one of the major causes that destroy societies, as God says in the *Qur'ān*: "shall any be destroyed, except the people of the evildoers?"⁵⁰¹

3. Institutions

Since the relations between human beings often take place through social institutions, the third part of the discussion in Mesbah's model is devoted to the definition of each of the institutions in an Islamic ideal society. Family, economics, politics, law and education are five institutions that the author explains in his model. He in fact restricts himself to discussing only their significance in society. Regarding political institutions, Mesbah maintains that familiarity with religion, piety and justice are the main criteria in choosing people to occupy different positions in government. The leader according to this model, therefore, would be the most knowledgeable, pious, devoted and just individual.

Education in an Islamic Utopia

All the above-mentioned institutions ultimately depend on an educational institution. Comparing social institutions and rejecting the theories of Marx, who considers economics as the foundation of a society,

⁵⁰¹ The *Qur'ān*, An'ām [Cattle] (6), 47.

Mesbah believes that education is the most significant institution, based on which the other institutions will function.⁵⁰² He gives four reasons for this claim as follows:

1. Human beings operate on two levels for the most part, i.e. an animal-nature level and a human level. Rationality is the bridge from the former to the latter. In other words, it is reason (*ta'qqul*) and rational cognition that bring a human being up from the first level to the upper level. The only institution that provides the tools necessary for this, according to Mesbah, is education.

2. Unlike most thinkers who see material satisfaction as the final goal of this life, Mesbah believes that the ultimate goal is spiritual development. Accordingly, for this author, education stands at the top. For it is education that takes on the responsibility for transferring cognitive ideas to people.

3. Any change in educational institution may be observed to result in changes to other institutions.

4. Education is an institution through which people are informed with social laws, just as they are encouraged to follow the law of the land and to cooperate with other social institutions.⁵⁰³

Education in an Islamic utopia is responsible for teaching people how they may form their relation with God, themselves, other human beings and nature: it trains them so as not to be dissuade from their ideological, moral and practical position. It also teaches people to respect the right of others in

⁵⁰² Mesbah, (1989), p. 315.

⁵⁰³ Mesbah, (1989), pp. 315-317.

their social relationship. Educational institutions, in an Islamic ideal society, teach individuals an Islamic worldview and ideology.⁵⁰⁴

A Reflection

A number of points are worthy of note in connection with Mesbah's model of an Islamic utopia.

According to the principle of monotheism and its position in Islamic teachings as a paramount doctrine, Mesbah attempts to incorporate Islamic utopia in a model: all relations and institutions in this model therefore revolve around monotheism. Likewise, the main purpose of the Islamic ideal society, according to the verse quoted above is to establish the idea of monotheism in the world. This is in the sense that an ideal society could not be formed, unless it should be in the form of an Islamic one. In other words, religion, and particularly Islam, plays the main role in this model. A secular society, therefore, is by nature incapable of becoming an ideal society, and may even be in direct contradiction of the same.

Although it is not explicitly stated, Mesbah's reason for making this claim probably is that the above-mentioned social values cannot be formed unless an individual supports his or her morality with a faith. In relations with other people, for example, justice and kindness are the two main principles, but these cannot exist without the social foundation of a religious faith.

This idea is, of course, but one reflection of the relationship between religion and moral values. As we mentioned earlier in chapter five, some believe that moral values, while not religious, are guaranteed and supported

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

by religion. For Motahhari, even if morality can be supposed without religion, it has a vital need for religion at a practical level. "Experience shows," Motahhari adds, "that morality has been backward wherever it has appeared without religion." For him, therefore, faith at least is to be valued as a support for morality.⁵⁰⁵

Another considerable point to be heeded is the significant role that education plays in the model society. It is both a substructure for all other social institutions and a key establishment for the improvement of other institution.

In spite of Mesbah's criticism of other models of an ideal society to the effect that they are not practical, the same criticism may be applied to his own. The history of Islamic societies indicates that no Muslim society, except for that which existed for a few years in the time of the Prophet and 'Alī, has ever been successful in practicing Islamic teachings entirely. Of course, the Shī'ī school holds that the appearance (*zuhūr*) of the twelfth Imām will usher in an ideal society. This, however, is a theological question that should be pondered in its turn.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Islam is a religion of life. It is so in the sense that Islamic teachings deal with all individual and social aspects of human beings. Social items and values, therefore, form a great portion of its agenda. Various verses of the Qur'ān, as well as numerous traditions, deal with this aspect of human beings' life. These verses and traditions talk about the different social institutions, social relationships and social responsibilities of human beings.

⁵⁰⁵ See Motahhari, *Ta'lim wa tarbiyat dar Islām* [Education in Islam], pp. 118-119.

Educational policy after the Islamic Republic represented an attempt in this direction, in order to apply Islamic social teachings in society. Elementary school textbooks, as the main agent in this field, aimed at mirroring this philosophy in today's Iranian educational system. Family, as the first and the most essential institution of an Islamic society, is frequently taken into consideration. Lessons related to this topic go into great detail about the goal of a family, its role in wider society as well as the responsibility held by each of the members of family. Explanations of the institution of family are followed by certain discussions about other institutions such as schools and mosques. Observing an other's right, appropriate relations between people, appreciating those who have served others in one way or another, and justice, are the major social values that are taught in this regard.

Chapter 7

ISLAMIC POLITICAL VALUES & THEIR TEACHING IN TEXTBOOKS

INTRODUCTION

Due to the often-intimate connection between political and social issues, discussing political topics separately from social or cultural issues may not at first glance to be a useful exercise. The problem for our discussion in particular would be greater, as the related texts do not distinguish between these two concepts either in method or content. Yet, in order to focus more sharply the political aspects of the texts, I have had to delay the discussion of political values to this chapter. This, in spite of possible overlapping and omissions, may help us to gain a clearer understanding of the concept.

Following the pattern of previous chapters, I will first attempt to disclose those major political values expressed in elementary school textbooks. In this regard, I will concentrate on social studies texts of the third to the fifth grades, which are more or less the main texts dealing with socio-political

issues. I will then take a look at the educational policies of the Islamic Republic with respect to the teaching of such values, and finally discuss the subject from an Islamic point of view with an emphasis on the Shī'ī perspective.

I. A THEMATIC ANALYSIS

As was mentioned earlier, the textbooks on *ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i* (social studies), which contain sections on *jughrāfī* (natural geography), *tārikh* (history) and *ta'limāt-i madanī* (civil studies), are the main sources for teaching socio-political values. For in addition to social values, the sections on *ta'limāt-i madanī* (civil studies) in the fourth and the fifth grades deal particularly with political values. Moreover, the third grade text on social studies, although not divided by subject as in the above schemes, deals with some political concepts in a simpler language.⁵⁰⁶ Moreover, the sections on history for the fourth and fifth elementary grades, which are mostly devoted to political developments, contain a considerable amount of such material. During our discussion we may refer also to some other texts such as those on Fārsī to gain a more complete picture

Those sections of the elementary textbooks dealing with political history and civil studies deal mostly with two main categories, that is *political institutions* and *political values*. As with other concepts and values, certain political conceptions and values are repeated in the texts of the third to fifth grades, although in a progressive manner moving from a simple language to increasingly more complicated ideas. For the sake of a more organized discussion, I prefer to proceed here with a discussion of the texts according

⁵⁰⁶ There is no social studies textbook in the curriculum of the first and the second elementary grades.

to these two categories. I do not pretend that this division is either exact or exclusive; it merely serves to assist us in clarifying our subject.

1. Political Institutions in Elementary School Textbooks

What I mean here by “institution” are those complexes and organizations that form the basic structure of an Islamic state. There are some institutions that may be found in any political system; some of them, however, are unique to the Islamic environment and coincidentally carry certain Islamic values.

The Islamic State

The history textbook for the fifth grade begins with the issue of the appearance and development of Islam in the Ḥijāz (today’s Saudi Arabia). After furnishing some general information about the land of the Ḥijāz, the Prophet Muhammad’s life and the conflicts between him and various unbelievers, the text continues with a lesson entitled: “The Prophet’s Immigration and the Establishment of the Islamic State.” This is the first and the only explicit statement in the elementary textbooks regarding the foundation of Islamic State. Accompanied by an illustration of the Prophet’s mausoleum, (see Figure 7-1 in the following page) a passage in the text reads:

The Prophet’s immigration to *Madīna* (Medina, Saudi Arabia) was the introduction of the establishment of *ḥukūmat-i Islāmī* (Islamic State). From this time on, the Prophet’s immigration was considered as the beginning of the Islamic calendar.⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁷ *Tāʾlimāt-i ijtimāʿī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], p. 98.



مسجد پیامبر (ص) در مدینه

از مخالفت و جنگ با مسلمانان پرنمی‌داشتند. آنان سرانجام پیمان صلحی را که با پیامبر بست بودند، شکستند. حضرت محمد (ص) تصمیم به یاری و دفاع از مسلمانان گرفت و در سال هشتم هجری به طرف مکه حرکت کرد. ابوسفیان سردسته مخالفان پیامبر در مکه، چون ارتش نیرومند اسلام را مشاهده کرد، مقاومت را بی نتیجه دید و ناچار دین اسلام را پذیرفت. به دنبال او، مخالفان دیگر نیز تسلیم شدند و به این ترتیب، آخرین سنگر کفار و بت پرستان درهم شکست و شهر مکه بدون خونریزی به دست مسلمانان، فتح شد.

Figure 7-1: The Prophet's mausoleum in Medina, where the first Islamic State created.
Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], p. 99

Leadership

At the same time as the discussion about the establishment of the Islamic State, there are references in the text to the question of leadership of this system. Obviously, the leader of the state at the time of the Prophet was none other than the Prophet himself who had already invited people to accept Islam and had for the first time created the Islamic state in Medina. The text refers to this point while discussing such issues as the Prophet's struggle against unbelievers, his emigration from Mecca to Medina, and his invitation to the kings of the world to accept Islam.⁵⁰⁶

There follows, however, a clear and detailed discussion about the issue of the caliphate and the succession of the Prophet. In a previous chapter we referred to the issue of imāmat as constituting the focus of disagreement

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 91-101.

between the two schools of Islam, i.e. Shi'ism and Sunnism. Referring to this concept, the lesson entitled "The Caliphate of Abū Bakr" reads:

After the departure of the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ)⁵⁰⁹ a disagreement arose among some Muslims over the *khilāfat*, that is, the Prophet's succession. Some, based on what the Prophet had said, considered 'Alī as his successor. Others, in spite of the Prophet's word, did not accept 'Alī's succession. Finally, Abū Bakr was chosen.⁵¹⁰

Following this lesson, which discusses in brief the caliphate of Abū Bakr, as well as those of 'Umar, 'Uthmān and 'Alī, the rest of the text deals with the history of Islam under the rule of later caliphs and then surveys the different Islamic states that have existed in Iran. Basing itself on Shi'ī theory, according to which 'Alī was the rightful successor to the prophet, the text reads:

After 'Uthmān, Muslims persistently asked 'Alī, who was an example of justice, to be their caliph.⁵¹¹

The interesting point here, in relation to the leadership of the state, is the role of people in confirming or rejecting that leadership. Such events as choosing Abū Mūsā Ash'arī as a referee in the conflict between 'Alī and Mu'āwiya, the rise of the Khawārij, the role of hypocrites during Imām Ḥasan's time and the people's position with respect to Imām Ḥusayn, the third Shi'ī Imām are only some examples of the populism as reflected in the text. The concept of *bay'at*,⁵¹² which refers to the participation of

⁵⁰⁹ The letter "ﷺ" represents the sentence "ṣallallāhu 'alayhi" which means God's peace be upon him.

⁵¹⁰ *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], p. 104.

⁵¹¹ *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], p. 106.

⁵¹² "An Arabic name denoting, in a very broad sense, the act by a certain number of persons, acting individually or collectively, recognize the authority of another person. Thus the *bay'at* of a Caliph is the act by which one person is proclaimed and recognized as head of the Muslim State." (E. Tyan, in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 1, pp. 1113-1114).

people in recognizing leadership. has also been heeded in different places in the text.

Umma

Another Islamic institution that is touched upon substantially in the elementary texts is the institution of the *umma* (Muslim Community). More than once, during this thesis, particularly in our discussion of nationalism, we have encountered this term. It is a concept that considers all Muslims around the world to be sisters and brothers in faith and ultimately members of one society, i.e. Islamic society. Being a member of a family, a school, a city, and a country, every Muslim, included in a greater circle that is without geographical borders, is a member of the larger society that is the Islamic *umma*. A text that deals with this notion in detail is a section on civil studies in the fourth grade social studies. One of the last lessons of the text, which is illustrated with a picture of the *hajj* ceremony as a great manifestation of the Islamic *umma* (see Figure 7-2 in the following page), states:

We are Muslims and our religion is Islam. Every Muslim, wherever he or she is, has the same beliefs as other Muslims. The Islamic *umma* is a society that consists of all Muslims from around the world. All Muslims, whether black or white, whether Fārs, Turk or Arab, whether African, Asian or even European and American, are part of this *Umma*. All are equal.⁵¹³

According to this textbook, there are certain criteria that unify all members of this vast community. These are in fact the same basic principle

⁵¹³ *Ta' limāt-i ijtimā'i*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 199.



of Islam, i.e.: believing in one God (Allāh, in its Islamic language), believing in His Prophet Muhammad, and in His word, the *Qur`ān*, as well as observing the direction of prayer, which is *Ka`ba*⁵¹⁴ in Mecca.

Islamic Revolution


Following a detailed history of Iran and a discussion about such dynasties as the Ṣafavids, the Afshārids,⁵¹⁵ and the Zand,⁵¹⁶ the history textbook for the fifth grade goes on to relate the history of Iran under the Qajars and Pahlavis. The main emphasize of the lessons is

⁵¹⁴ *Ka`ba* is a sacred cube building covered by a black fabric, located in the middle of the Holy Mosque in Mecca, toward which Muslim face when they perform the ritual prayer and circumambulate it when they perform the *hajj*.

⁵¹⁵ A dynasty before Afshar dynasty, founded by Nādir Shāh

⁵¹⁶ A dynasty before Qajar, founded by Karim Khān Zand and ruled Iran from 1784 to 1814.

to introduce the kings who were ineligible for appointment as leaders of the country but who received the support of superpowers of the time. Likewise, it attempts to highlight people's and religious leaders' movements against the kings. In a short discussion and simple language, one lesson, which is illustrated with pictures of such persons as Amīr Kabīr (1807-1852),⁵¹⁵ (see Figure 7-3 below), Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn,⁵¹⁶



⁵¹⁵ Mīrzā Taqī Khān Amīr Kabīr was the first grand vizier of Naṣir al-Dīn Shah during 1848-1852 and "the most prominent reformist statesman of 19th century Iran." For more see A. Hairi, "Amir Kabīr," in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, supplement, fascicles 1-2, p. 70. For his religious policy see M.J. Zarean (1995), "The Life of Amīr Kabīr: religious policy," an unpublished paper submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.

⁵¹⁶ Sayyī Jamāl al-Dīn Afghānī (1254/1838-9) (Asadābādī, for Shī'ī writers) "was one of the most outstanding figures of nineteenth century Islam." For more details see I. Goldziher, "Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī" in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 2, pp. 416-419.

and Mīrzā Riḍā Kirmānī,⁵¹⁷ (see Figure 7-4 below) focuses on Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's⁵¹⁸ reign, the Tobacco Movement⁵¹⁹ which was leaded by religious leaders, especially Ayatollah Mīrzā-yi Shīrāzī (1230-1312/1815-1895),⁵²⁰ and then the Constitutional Revolution and the role of such clerics as Sayyid Muhammad Ṭabāṭabāī 1837-1879),⁵²¹ Sayyid ʿAbdullāh Bihbahānī



⁵¹⁷ Mīrzā Riḍā was a religious scholar who, influenced by Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn, assassinated Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah.

⁵¹⁸ One of the Qajar kings who ruled Iran during 1848-1897.

⁵¹⁹ "Tobacco Movement was a movement that took place in Iran in 1891-1892 against the concession of a Tobacco Monopoly to an English company. For more see Nikki R. Keddie, (1966), *Religion and Rebellion in Iran*, (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd.).

⁵²⁰ Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥasan known as Mīrzā-yi buzurg [great Mīrzā], born in Shīrāz and studies in Isfahan and Najaf. He became an absolute *marjaʿ* after the great Shīʿī scholar Shayḥ Murtaḍā Anṣārī (d. 1218/1864). He is best known for his *fatwā* in opposition to Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's effort in giving Tobacco Monopoly to an English Company in 1891. (See Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, 1785-1906 (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 210 f.

⁵²¹ One of the religious leaders of Constitutional Movement.

(1840-1908)⁵²⁴ and Shaykh Faḍlullāh Nūrī (1843-1909)⁵²⁵ in these movements.⁵²⁶ The same method is followed in relation to the Pahlavis. Again, there is here an emphasis on the dependence of the country, in the time of Pahlavis, on superpowers and the role of people's movement, mostly led by clerics against the kings. A passage reads in this regard as follows:

Finally, in order to fulfill her goal, the state of England succeeded to empower Rizā Khān, a person who was crude and illiterate. He knew nothing about running the country and was obedient to the state of England. People were angry both with him and with the interference of strangers in their country. They looked for some to resist such strangers. The movements of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī and Mirzā Kūchak Khān emerged at this time.⁵²⁷

The text, which is illustrated with pictures of Khiyābānī, Mirzā Kūchak Khān, and Ayatollah Sayyid Ḥasan Mudarris (1867-1937),⁵²⁸ (see Figure 7-4 in the following page), also points to the role of Mudarris in the struggle against Reza Shah and also those of Ayatollah Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim Kāshānī (1880-1962),⁵²⁹

⁵²⁴ One of the religious leaders of Constitutional Movement.


⁵²⁵ Ḥājī Shaykh Faḍl al-allāh Nūrī, (1843-1909) "the most notable of the anti-constitutionalist 'ulamā' in the Revolution of 1906. For a brief information see V. Martin, "Nūrī," in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition, v. 5, p. 140, s.v. "Nūrī."

⁵²⁶ *Tal'īmāt-i Ijtimā'ī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], pp. 145-150. For more information about the Tobacco Movement see Nikki R. Keddie, (1966), *Religion and Rebellion in Iran*, (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd.).

⁵²⁷ *Tal'īmāt-i Ijtimā'ī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], p. 154.

⁵²⁸ Ayatollah Sayyid Ḥasan Mudarris was one of the oppositions to Reza Shah. For more information about him see e.g. A Khāji Nūrī (1980), *Bāzīgārān-i 'aṣr-i ḥalā'ī* (Tehran: Jāwīdān); Aqīqī (1985), *Ten decades of ulama's struggle* (Tehran: IPO).

⁵²⁹ Ayatollah Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim Kāshānī was an Iranian Shī'a scholar who was one of the chief organizers of mass support for Dr. Muṣaddiq' National Front at the beginning of its activity. He was also an active 'ālim in supporting the group of *Mujāhidīn-i Islām*. See H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran," in Nikki R. Keddie, (ed.) (1972), *Scholars, saints, and sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, (Berkeley: University of California), pp. 235-255.



and Dr. Muhammad Muṣaddiq⁵²⁸ at the time of Muhammd Reza Shah.

After this long background of tyrannies and the people's resistance against them, the last lesson in the history section for the fifth grade presents a fully illustrated and detailed discussion of the Islamic Revolution. Referring to the “Movement of 15 Khordād, 1342 [1963]”⁵²⁹ as the beginning of the Islamic Revolution against the Pahlavis, a passage reads:

The Iranian people, retaining the bitter experiences of the past, learned that as long as the imperial system existed, religion, freedom and independence were meaningless... Frequently, people moved to grasp freedom, but they were always suppressed by the kings... From 1342 [1963], people's

⁵²⁸ Muḥammad Muṣaddiq (1882?-1967), Persian nationalist politician and Prime Minister in the period 1951-1953.

⁵²⁹ Fifteenth of Khordād 1344/1963 was the starting time of the Ayatollah Khomeini's movement against the Pahlavi dynasty.

movements under the leadership of Imām Khomeini took a new form; it was against the monarchical system.⁵³²

Although the fifth grade textbook explain the issue in a more complicated language, by that time students have already repeatedly read about the Revolution in different textbooks.

The Islamic Republic

The Islamic Republic is introduced to children in the civil teaching portion of social studies texts as a successful outcome of the Islamic Revolution. In the upper grades, however, more analytical explanations are presented. The fifth grade text refers to the establishment of an Islamic Republic based on the vote of more than ninety eight percent of Iranians in a referendum held in 1358 [1979]. There is also an ideological justification given for the system. According to the text,

The Islamic Republic is a system which is based on belief in God. We believe that the world has a God who is the creator of all existence, and that human beings should only follow Him. His commands are revealed to people through His prophets. The prophet is the leader of an Islamic society. Obedience to him is the obedience to God. After the prophet, religious leaders shoulder this responsibility. In our time, this is the duty of those who know Islam well and are examples of sincere Muslims.⁵³³

A state designed as an "Islamic Republic." features, according to this text, two characteristics, which is Islamic law (the constitution) and the leadership of a person who is learned in Islam. For the same reason, two separate lessons are devoted to these qualities.

⁵³² *Tal'īmāt-i ijtīmā'ī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], pp. 159-160.

⁵³³ *Tal'īmāt-i ijtīmā'ī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], pp. 179-180.

a. Constitution

One lesson in the fifth grade text is devoted to an explanation of the Constitution. The students are familiar with this notion from the previous grade.⁵³⁴ In this more detailed presentation, however, it is emphasized that, in running any society, small or large, people need a law. The basic and the most significant law of every country is its constitution. The text then continues to say that, according to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, government responsibilities are divided between the parliament, the executive and the judicial branch. The leader has the highest position, and oversees the three above-mentioned powers of the government.

b. Leadership

As the second characteristic for an Islamic Republic, perhaps the most important one for a society, the fifth grade text emphasizes the issue of leadership. According to this text,

The leader of an Islamic society should be an example of a sincere Muslim. The leader should not only be a knowledgeable person, but also just and obedient to Islamic law.⁵³⁵

Already in fourth grade texts it is declared that the leader should be a *faqīh*, that is, a religious scholar who knows Islamic *sharīʿa* (law).⁵³⁶ The fifth grade text mentions that the first leader of the Islamic Republic was Ayatollah Khomeini, on whose death, Ayatollah Khāmini'ī (Khamenei) took up the position. The text is also illustrated with a portrait of the present leader.

⁵³⁴ *Tal'īmāt-i ijtimā'ī*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 189.

⁵³⁵ *Tal'īmāt-i ijtimā'ī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], p. 185.

⁵³⁶ *Tal'īmāt-i ijtimā'ī*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 196.

Iran & Iranians

A lesson on the Iranian nation appears in the fourth grade social studies text. Although a discussion about the country may be expected in such a text, the relation between its content and the Islamic Revolution is even more considerable. The lesson is illustrated with a picture of the country, while Iranian people from different ethnic background hold its flag together (Figure 7-6). Defining the concept of a country, the text reads:



Figure 7-6: Iranian people from different ethnic background hold its flag together.
Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 188.

The Iranian people have a common story. These people, for centuries, starved together under the kings' tyranny; they resisted against it and in all respects defended their religion and land. These people shared in all happiness as well as sorrows. They have had common hopes and wishes.⁵³⁷

The text then adds that the Islamic Revolution is the best example of the unity of the Iranian people in that they liberated themselves from earlier oppression. According to the text, believing in God, the Constitution, the flag, national anthem and the calendar of the country are common factors in creating an Iranian identity. All Iranians start their New Year from Nurūz, the first day of Farwardīn (=21 March) and they bring it to a close at the end of Esfand. Islam's status as the official religion of the country and the Fārsī language as its official language are introduced to children. The lesson comes to an end with a final emphasis on the role of the Islamic Revolution in allowing the country to flourish.

2. Political Values in Elementary School Textbooks

Besides political institutions, some of the content in different texts highlights certain political values. The following are only some of them.

Justice

Based on the Islamic approach, social justice, regardless of the state system, must be considered one of the main values of a society. I mentioned in the last chapter that, in spite of this theoretical significance, there is in fact insufficient attention in the Iranian elementary textbooks paid to the concept of social justice.

However, there is more emphasis laid on the concept of justice from a political point of view. The texts attempt to highlight and reject the

⁵³⁷ *Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'i*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p189.

continuous existence of class distinction in the history of the world and particularly in Iranian society. Briefly put the essence of what the textbooks say is that in the course of human history and especially during the history of Iran, there has always been a struggle between two levels of society: the oppressing and the oppressed. The oppressive class, including the wealthy, the so-called nobles and kings have long been examples of tyranny, dictatorship, violation of right, and illegality. They used to oppress people to their own advantage. On the other hand, there have been some brave and honorable people among the oppressed, who resisted this oppression and devoted themselves to its eradication. Following the prophets of God, these men and women helped the oppressed, while they followed a simple lifestyle for themselves.

The second part of the social studies textbook for the fourth grade, which is about history, starts by these words:

History is the mirror of our ancestors' lives... History is a story of the lives of the prophets and Imāms who lived before us and we commemorate their good names... whose simple life is an example for us. They never considered themselves better than others... History is a story of the followers of the prophets and imāms who ...used to shelter the oppressed. History, on the other hand is a story of the unjust and tyrannical kings and rulers who lived before us and we remember their bad names. Their story could be a warning to us. History is a story of those truth-seeker people who fought for truth and taught people to fight with tyranny.⁵³⁸

The four lessons following the above passage are devoted to stories about the prophet Noah and his argument with the rich people, the prophet Abraham and his fight with Nimrod, the prophet Moses and his struggle with Pharaoh, and the prophet Jesus and his conflict with the Jewish people of his

⁵³⁸ *Ta'limāt-i ijtīmā'i*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], pp. 104-106.

time. Immediately after this, students read about the reigns of various kings over Iran and their totalitarian governments. The lesson, which is illustrated with two comparative pictures, one showing the living conditions of the Pahlavis and the other depicting the living conditions of the poor people of their time (see Figure 7-7 in the following page), reads:

Before the victory of the glorious Islamic Revolution in Iran, the kings ruled over this land. For the same reason, the history of our country, from olden times, was written in the form of the history of kings. Court historians attempted to introduce the kings as elected, clever and just people. However, authentic historians have shown that most of the kings were oppressors who ruled people by force.⁵³⁹

The rest of the text, which deals with the history of Iran before Islam, carries the same message. A passage from one of the lessons regarding the Sassanid period asserts: "Under the Sassanids, as in previous eras, people were treated unjustly. The people of the court had many advantages from which most of the people had no benefit. The common people paid more tax than anyone, and less than every one could enjoy blessing given by God."⁵⁴⁰ The lesson is illustrated by a picture of *Ṭāq-i Kasrá* (a Sassanid palace), under which is written: "ruins of *Ṭāq-i Kasrá* or *Iywān-i Madā'in*, one of the works from the Sassanid period, and the results of the hard work of thousands of poor Iranian people."⁵⁴¹ Almost the same story forms two lessons of the social studies text for the third grade.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁹ *Tā'limāt-i ijtimā'ī*, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 122.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 152.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., p. 153.

⁵⁴² *Tā'limāt-i ijtimā'ī*, 3rd Grade, (1372) [1993], pp. 51-61.




Figure 7-7: Illustration of two different standards of living. [above] Pahlavi' Palace, [below] the poor.
Ta'limāt-i ijtimā'ī, 4th Grade, (1372) [1993], p. 123.

Independence and Freedom

One of the major slogans used during the Revolution was “*istiqlāl, āzādī, Jumhūrī Islāmī*”⁵⁴³ (independence, freedom, Islamic Republic). Previously we quoted a passage which declared that the Iranian people had finally come to understand, after years of experience, that the kings were the agents of the Western superpowers. The main goal of the revolutionaries, therefore, was to be autonomous. The concepts of independence and freedom, more than once, are being used in the texts. At the beginning of the school year, children in the first grade are being familiarized with these concepts as soon as they are able to read and write.⁵⁴⁴ The fifth grade social studies text, however, deals with them in a more detailed way. In a lesson entitled “independence,” the text first cites an example: “If we want to have a comfortable home, in which we live for our own interests, we have to protect it and not let others enter it without permission.”⁵⁴⁵ Consequently, it says:

Our country is our home... The meaning of independence is that we, ourselves, can decide for our own country. If a stranger interferes in our affairs, we have lost our independence.⁵⁴⁶

“Before the Revolution,” the text adds: “strangers interfered in our country...They appointed the king, the Prime Minister and the representatives in parliament...Our educational policy and our universities were under their supervision. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the

⁵⁴³ In *Fārsī*: “استقلال، آزادی، جمهوری اسلامی”

⁵⁴⁴ *Fārsī*, 1st Grade, 1375 [1996], pp. 108-109.

⁵⁴⁵ *Tā‘līmāt-i ijtimā‘ī*, 5th Grade, (1374) [1995], p. 173.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-4.

people, under the leadership of Imām Khomeini, were able to win independence.”

Freedom is also a matter of consideration in different levels of elementary education. Again the fifth grade text devotes lesson to this purpose. Freedom according to the text, however, has its special meaning, which points to the religious background of Iranian culture. The border of this freedom is Islamic law. The text states:

Muslim Iranians were looking, in their combat with the Shah, for independence...and the freedom to be able to run the country according to Islamic law.⁵⁴⁷

In the Islamic Republic, the text asserts, people participate in running the country and have the right to participate in elections, to criticize and to present their own ideas to the people of administration, as they are the real owners of the state. The text then adds: “In the Islamic Republic freedom exists; however, this is not in the sense that anybody can do whatever he or she desires. This is not in the sense of the lack of law. Every society has a law. The law of our country is Islamic law.”⁵⁴⁸

II. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC’S EDUCATIONAL GOALS AND POLICIES RESPECTING POLITICAL VALUES

Let us one more time return to the list of educational goals in respect to political aims announced by the Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic. As moral and social values, political goals are in connection with faith and religious directions. The absolute authority of God is the very basic foundation of these aims. Besides this, cooperation and mutual agreement

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 176.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 176-7.

between all countries, particularly Muslim countries, political independence and refusing any kind of oppression are other dominant factors that are considered in the statement of the Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic as political goals. These goals are in fact reflection of what appeared already in the Constitution of the Country. Based on these principles, the political goals are divided into domestic and foreign categories as explained below:

a. Domestic Policies

First of all, the aim, regarding domestic policy is to develop the ability of children to understand political issues and recognize valid political trends from false ones in order to be able to resist oppression. The valid trend, according to the list, however, consists of acceptance of the principle of Divine leadership and the entire relationship between politics and religion. Developing a spirit of dependence on God, and of individual, social and political independence from all that is other than God, is the goal of this same trend.

The political concept of the "Islamic Republic" is taken into consideration as well. This involves appreciating the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, retaining the principle of the Islamic Revolution, and benefiting from the political freedom in that these have engendered.

Developing a spirit of responsibility before the social and political fate of the individual and society, a spirit of organized social and political cooperation, and a spirit of unity and mutual understanding in solving political issues, are the other political goals in the list. Furthermore, Shī'ī thought is evident insistence on retaining and developing a spirit of

expectation (*intiẓār*) and readiness for the coming of Imām Mahdī as one of the political goals.

b. Foreign Policies

Some of the political goals and values of the Islamic Republic are expressed in the form of foreign policies. Maintaining the principle of independence, while at the same time having relations with all other societies based on justice and mutual consideration, is the chief of these goals.

Some of the political goals accord with certain religious considerations. Implicitly dividing all the nations into three categories, i.e., Muslim nations, non-Muslims religious nations and non-religious nations, the list expresses the following goals: 1. having brotherly relations with Muslim nations, in order to create the Islamic *Ummah*; 2. having relations with other believers based on common beliefs such as worshipping God, and believing in the Day of Resurrection; and 3. developing friendly relations with those countries which do not oppose Islam and Muslims.

Finally, the goal of education in respect to political values is to train children to oppose any kind of oppression and to support oppressed people all over the world, while making an effort to introduce Islam to spread justice in the whole world.

III. AN ISLAMIC APPROACH TO POLITICAL INSTITUTION AND VALUES

In order to have a clear understanding of the background of what appeared in the elementary textbooks under the Islamic Republic, and why textbooks reflect the goals of Iranian policy makers, let us here turn the direction of the discussion toward some theoretical analysis of Islamic

concepts regarding political issues. It is obvious that such a short study cannot cover all aspects of the topic. However, it may give us some helpful clues to a deeper discovery the texts.

Religion and Politics

We have frequently mentioned in this thesis that there is an intimate relationship between different aspects of an Islamic model in relation to the social life. One can hardly, in this context, differentiate between spirituality and morality, social relations or politics. This is not because these different aspects are integrated, but because they indicate the existence of certain principles in all these domains, isolating the field from those principles that would lead it to non-Islamic values. Of all other relations, the relation between religiosity (*diyānat*) or spirituality on the one hand, and politics (*siyāsat*) on the other hand, the so-called church and state relation, is a matter of significance in the modern world.

Based on this interrelation among the different aspects of an Islamic model, one can see that religion not only extends to all aspects of life, but to all lifestyles. Holding this idea, the Islamic leaders in present-day Iran were able to establish a religiously-based state by virtue of the help of the religious interests of the people. The majority of the people who appeared on the scenes and demonstrated against the Pahlavis did so even as they pursued their religious duties. They also participated in the main referendum, the result of which converted the system to an Islamic one, as they obeyed the religious command of Ayatollah Khomeini who announced this participation to be a religious obligation (*wājib*). The same interrelation may be seen in previous activities against the Pahlavis. In a well-known quotation from Sayyid Hasan Mudarris, a clergy leader in opposition to Reza Shah Pahlavi,

he said: Our politics is precisely our religion and our religion is precisely our politics.

The same concept is followed by the present leaders of the Islamic Republic, as it appears on one of the demonstrations of paper currency which bears a portrait of Mudarris and this same message (Figure 7-8).




Figure 7-8: A currency in Iran, illustrated by a portrait of Ayatollah Mudarris and his well-known motto, "Our politics is precisely our religion and our religion is precisely our politics."

To a large extent, the relation between politics and religion in Iran may be traced back to the political background of Shī'ism. Let us, therefore, review the first appearance of Shī'ism.

Political Background in Shī'ism

One can hardly isolate Shī'ism from its political roots. Although, it originated in the lifetime of the Prophet,⁵⁴⁷ historically, Shī'ism developed

⁵⁴⁷ This is one of the crucial discussions even among the Western scholars. Following the Sunni resources, for almost all the Western scholars of this field, Shī'ism was created as a result of a political disagreement after the death of the Prophet. (see e.g. M. Zonis "Shī'ism as interpreted by Khomeini: an ideology of revolutionary violence" in M. Kramer (1987), *Shī'ism, resistance, and revolution* (London: Westview Press), p. 48. There are, however, for Shī'ī scholars, some arguments, according to which it created at the time of the Prophet. For more see: Tabataba'i (1992), "The origin of Shī'ā" in Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī (ed.), *Majmū'a-yi maqālāt wa pursishhā wa pasukhhā*, (Tehran: Daft-e Nashr wa Farhang-i Islāmī), pp. 171-198.

and strengthened “because of a controversy over who ought to succeed Prophet Muhammad in leading M[o]slims and in ruling the Islamic state.”⁵⁵⁰ A few decades later, the Shī‘a was strong enough to mount an opposition to the tyranny and corruption of the Ummayyad dynasty, which were marked by the Karbalā incident (680 A.D.).⁵⁵¹

After the death of Mu‘āwiya, his son and successor Yazīd, called upon the Prophet's grandson and the third Shī‘ī Imām, Ḥusain ibn ‘Alī, to swear allegiance (*bay‘a*) to him. For the Shī‘a, Yazīd was a corrupt person, who ruled with no Islamic motive, goal or symbol. His government, Shī‘is believed was a corrupt empire, which was hypocritically called Islamic. Husain therefore rejected Yazīd's demand as well as his qualifications for this position, and rose up with a few of his followers against his caliphate. The incident drives its name from the city of Karbalā, Iraq, where the uprising took place. Due to the small number of Husain's followers (some seventy-two people, including his family), they were all murdered in a one-day battle on ‘Ashūrā.⁵⁵² and their women taken captive.

Imam Husain's uprising against Yazīd, sometimes called the “Revolution of Karbalā” or “Husain's Revolution,” was, according to the Shī‘ī school a fight against injustice, oppression, illegitimacy and anti-religious direction. This Imam is reported to have said:

⁵⁵⁰ Salehi (1988), p. 49.

⁵⁵¹ For more information on the issue of Karbalā in Shī‘ism see e.g. Ayoub, M. (1978), *Redemptive suffering in Islam: A study of the devotional aspects of Ashura in Twelver Shi‘ism*, The Hague: Mouton; J. R. I. Cole and N. R. Keddie (eds.) (1986), *Shi‘ism and social protest*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press); Tabataba‘i (1992), “The Imam's knowledge and the movement of Karbalā” in Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī (ed.), *Majmū‘a-yi maqālāt wa pursishhā wa pasukhhā*, (Tehran: Daft-e Nashr wa Farhang-i Islāmī), pp. 157-170.

⁵⁵² The tenth of the month of *Muḥarram*, the first month in Arabic calendar.

I do not conceive death [for the sake of justice] anything but prosperity, no more than I regard life under injustice as anything but meanness.⁵⁵³

Although the incident silenced the Shī'a for a while, its influence in empowering Shī'ism afterwards was considerable. Uprisings following the Karbalā incident finally brought an end to the Ummayyad dynasty. Moreover, it strengthened the political aspect of Shī'ism forever, to the extent that it became a slogan for Shī'is that "It would be better to be dead than to compromise with injustice."⁵⁵⁴ This "death" of course is not for Shī'ī followers a usual death, but rather a form of martyrdom (*shahādat*), which had in turn a high spiritual position in this school. Although the concept of martyrdom is not absent from Sunni thought, it is not as central as it is in Shī'ism. "Sunni Islam does not derive inspiration from the example of a religious figure who dies for his faith."⁵⁵⁵

In the commemoration of the Karbalā Revolution which is honored every year in Islamic countries, and particularly in Shī'ī communities, the political message of the Revolution is always reviewed. Accordingly, the impact of the message delivered during the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran could be considered. M. Salehi explains the relation this way:

In the recent Iranian Revolution, highly emotional protesters who faced machine guns and became agitated when they saw their friends shot would shout the slogan "Every place is Karbalā! Every day is Ashura!" (the day Imām Hosein was beheaded). They imagined themselves, in signing this slogan, in the state of holy revolution - a revolution with Imām Hosein

⁵⁵³ Muqarram, *Maqal al-Husayn*.

⁵⁵⁴ See Salehi, (1988), p. 50.

⁵⁵⁵ M. Kramer (1987), *Shī'ism, resistance, and revolution* (London: Westview Press), p. 55.

at their side. They regarded their fight as a continuance of the Hosein's holy war against the rule of injustice and illegitimacy.⁵⁵⁶

The issue of political Shī'ī Islam will be more easily understood after our discussion of two other items regarding this school, i.e., the future of Shī'ism, and the concept of leadership.

Shī'ism and the Future

As in its past history, the future of Shī'ism too, seems to lead to a political domain. A substantial component of Shī'ī thought is the belief in occultation and *expectation (intizār)* and *hope* for the appearance of the twelfth Imām, who according to this school, will appear and spread justice over all around the whole world.⁵⁵⁷ The essential point in this hope and expectation is that the idea does not lead Shī'ism to calmly expectancy of a savior: rather its followers are encouraged to prepare the conditions for the arrival of the Imām. This preparation is of both an individual and a social nature. The individual way for a Shī'a is to make oneself ready through piety and obedience to God, for the followers of the Imām are the most pious Muslims.

There is, still, a dispute regarding the social aspect of the issue. Some of the Shī'ī scholars "have argued that since the Islamic community cannot be governed legitimately until the return of the twelfth Imām, all states are necessarily usurpatory."⁵⁵⁸ Most, however, including the Islamic leaders in

⁵⁵⁶ Salehi, (1988), p. 50.

⁵⁵⁷ For more information on the issue of Imām Mahdi from a philosophical point of view see Motahhari, M. (1978), *Qiyām wa inqilāb-i Mahdī az didgāh-i falsafah-yi tārikh*, (Tehran: Sadra).

⁵⁵⁸ M. Zonis "Shī'ism as interpreted by Khomeini: an ideology of revolutionary violence" in M. Kramer (1987), *Shī'ism, resistance, and revolution* (London: Westview Press), p. 50.

present day Iran, believe that it is the ulama's duty, at the time of the great occultation (*ghaybat-i kubrā*) to shoulder, as the general successors (*nā'ib al-‘amm*) of the infallible Imām, the responsibility of guiding the Islamic society.⁵⁵⁹ The social preparation, from this point of view is to make the society ready by rendering it as Islamic as possible. In fact the real Islamic State is the one that will exist at the time of the twelfth Imām; indeed, the present Islamic State is considered, even in Iran, a temporary and introductory preparation for that time. The idea of establishing an Islamic state eventually leads us to another issue, i.e., leadership, which is considered an essential item in holding a state together.

Shi'ism and Leadership

Previously we looked at the concept of *umma* in Islamic sociology. Although the concept may be viewed from several different angles, especially in its relation to nationalism, it may be also reevaluated in terms of its relation to the notion of leadership in Islamic thought. One of the main elements of social structure in Islam is this item. The *umma* is a large group of people who gather around and follow one person. In Quranic language, "the people of Abraham, Noah, Moses and Jesus were ummas."⁵⁶⁰ This is virtually in the sense that Abraham, Noah, Moses and Jesus, who were prophets, were imāms for their respective people. There is a relation between two words in their literal meaning. An *umma* cannot exist without an imām

⁵⁵⁹ Based on a verse of the *Qur'ān* which states: O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you..."(Nisā [women] (4), 59) Shi'ism believe in the authority of twelve infallible imams as who are in authority. For those *ulama*, who believe in Islamic State at the time of the occultation, *ulama*, are the successors of the imams and not those who are essentially in authority. Despite this fact, some of the scholars misunderstood the problem. For more details see S. A. Arjomand, (1988) "Ideological revolution in Shi'ism," in S. A. Arjomand (ed), *Authority and political culture in Shi'ism*, (Albany: State University of New York Press), pp. 178-209.

⁵⁶⁰ R.C. Martin (1982), *Islam*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall), p. 142.

and vice versus.⁵⁶¹ Muslims, accordingly, are called the *umma* of Muhammad. that is, the Prophet Muhammad is their *Imām*.

It was formerly mentioned, too, that the main characteristic of Shi'ism, even for those who see it as a purely political party, is the concept of *imamate*. In its lexical meaning, *Imām* means "any exemplar or object of imitation such as head, chief or leader."⁵⁶² This leadership is not bounded by spiritual or moral domains; rather, it is based on the idea of the necessity of the establishment of an Islamic State, it covers even social and political ones.

Also, it should be noted that there is a close relationship between leadership and the concept of *wilāyah*⁵⁶³ in Islam, particularly in Shi'ism. One modern Shi'ī scholar who has dealt extensively with the concept is Tabataba'i.⁵⁶⁴ For him, the concept of *wilāyah*, (in Persian *wilāyat* or *sarparastī*) is one of the necessary requirements for any society. Human beings by nature (*fīṭra*)⁵⁶⁵ understand that certain tasks in a society need the inspection of an eligible person. Every society, therefore, besides given customs, laws and rules, assigns a position to a person to run that society. Positions offered to different individuals, from a simple one such as the position of a father or mother in a family, to a greater one such as the status of a king or a president in a bigger society, in order to run those societies, are examples of the concept of *wilāyah*. Referring to the Islamic State as an

⁵⁶¹ The words *umma* and *imām* conjugate from the same root, i.e. "ʾ-m-m."

⁵⁶² Lane's Arabic English Lexicon, v. 1, p. 91. s.v. إمام

⁵⁶³ The word *wilayah* from the Arabic root *wala* means to govern, to rule and to protect someone. The concept is derived from the verse 62, chapter 4: "O ye who believe, obey God and obey the prophet and those in authority amongst you." (For more see *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. *wilaya*.) For Shi'ī Islam, the twelve infallible Imams are those who have the real authority.

⁵⁶⁴ For his detailed discussion, see Ṭabāṭabāī, (1992), "The Issue of *wilāyat* and *zi'āmat*" in Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī, (ed.), *Majmū'a-yi maqālāt wa pursishhā wa pasukhhā*, (Tehran: Daftar-i Nashr wa Farhang-i Islāmī), pp. 125-155.

⁵⁶⁵ The concept *fīṭra* declares that human beings by their very nature are created in such a way that they carry potential tendencies (desires) and knowledge. This Quranic expression means "a kind or a way of creating or of being created."

indubitable fact, Tabataba'i adopts a historical approach in pointing to the beginning of Islam. when non of the Muslims questioned the necessity for a leadership and *wilāyah*, neither at the time of the Prophet nor after his departure.

For this Muslim scholar, there are two kinds of rules that, as in all democratic societies, a leader can apply. Some of the rules are supported explicitly by the society in the form of a constitution and an immutable law. A leader, in this relation, has only the right and the responsibility to apply the law. Besides, there are also certain rights possessed by the leader, in order to run the society in the best way, to decide according to an advisable way. The former, which is called, the unchangeable (*thābit*) rules, consists in Islam of those divine rules that were revealed by God through His prophet. The latter are changeable (*mutaghayyir*) rules, which are implanted according to the interest of the time and place. The major difference between Islam and democratic societies, in relation to unchangeable rules is that in Islam the founder of rule on this earth is God and not the people. This is almost the same process in relation to the changeable rules, although in that people and consultation play a role, the basic element is truth and not purely majority control, even if turns to a false result.

Who should be the leader, then? Following his discussion of the issue of *wilāyah*, Tabataba'i proceeds to a discussion of this question. According to him, there is no dispute among Muslims that the Prophet Muhammad had this position for the first time. Disagreements, however, were raised after his departure. There are, for the Shī'a, vis-à-vis the Sunnis both rational and traditional reasons that the Prophet appointed 'Alī ibn abī Ṭalib as his successor. Tabataba'i, then adds that, even at the time of the occultation of

the Imām, society is in need of this kind of leadership. Accordingly, there is a hierarchical scheme for this leadership starting with the Prophet Muhammad, then the Imāms, and then ending with certain eligible people at the time of the occultation (Figure 7-9 in the following page).


There are three possible categories proposed by Tabataba'i for the position of leadership: All Muslims, the just people among them, or *faqīhs*. Choosing to remain silent about the details and leaving the discussion on it for *fiqh* debates, Tabataba'i briefly suggests that the leader be the one who is the most pious, has prudence and knows the societal situation, for this purpose for this position.

According to some *fuqahā'* (religious scholars), including Ayatollah Khomeini, however, the issue is clearer, as they, based on certain rational arguments and some reported traditions,⁵⁶⁶ presumed that the position should be reserved for a certain *'ālim* (specifically a *faqīh*), i.e., one who is the most knowledgeable among the others and is aware of social and political issues. It is, however, worth mentioning that "the [Ulema] perform no sacral function" in an Islamic climate. For the same reason "in Islam there is no priesthood and thus no institution comparable to the church. The [Ulema] perform duties as a body of learned ones of Islam; no ordination, sacral office, or priestly function is involved."⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁶ According to a tradition, the twelfth Imam reported to have said: "...But for the incidents that happen (for Muslims), refer to the narrators of our traditions, (i.e. scholars), because they are my witnesses upon you and I am the witness of Allah upon them." Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, (1975), *Kamāl al-dīn*, (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya), p. 484. English translation by S. A. Sadr-^cameli, *A bundle of flowers*, p. 225.

⁵⁶⁷ R.C. Martin (1982), *Islam*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall), p. 143.

Figure 7-8: Leadership in Shi'ism



Freedom

It would not be an exaggeration if one were to say that one of the most controversial topics in a political discussion is the question of freedom. The topic would even be more crucial when it is discussed in a religious context. The concept of freedom may be viewed, from an Islamic point of view, from different perspectives. For jurisprudence (*fuqahā*), freedom is a result of personal submission to the Divine law (*sharʿa*). An individual has certain obligations toward God. To fulfill these obligations, s/he gains certain rights and freedom, which are again outlined by the Divine law. For theologians (*mutakallimīn*), the discussions appears under the title of *ikhtiyār* (free choice, or freedom) in opposition of *jabr* (determination). Unlike the Ashʿarites, the Muʿtazilite and Shīʿī schools believed in human freedom in its theological sense. Islamic philosophy, particularly political philosophy has also dealt with the issue. For philosophers again, although freedom is a reality for human beings, it is in the context of a religious society and not a secular one.⁵⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the core of all these explanation seems to be one thing. Almost all of the aforementioned Islamic scholars, whatever their theological approach, agree that a human being is defined by his or her relation to God.

One of the reasons for the controversy over of the discussion is the variety of the definitions of *human being*, for which this *freedom* is granted. Taking this point into consideration, S. H. Nasr writes:

⁵⁶⁸ Nasr, (1981), pp. 17-20.

West today is so deeply influenced by the Renaissance and post-Renaissance notion of man as a being in revolt against Heaven and master of the earth that it is difficult to envisage the very meaning of freedom in the context of a traditional civilization such as that of Islam. It is necessary, therefore, to resuscitate the concept of man as understood in Islam in order to be able to discuss in a serious way the meaning of freedom in the Islamic context.⁵⁶⁹

We have already mentioned that Divinism or God-centrality is the essence and the main spirit of Islam. Every thing revolves around this core. Human beings, therefore, would be defined according to this principle. *Allah* is the creator of all things from nothing. His creatures, therefore, are no doubt dependent on Him, both at the beginning of their existence and in continuity of that. Whenever He decides, He takes this existence back. In this spiritual meaning, so "Personal freedom lies in fact in surrender to the Divine will and in purifying oneself inwardly to an ever greater degree so as to become liberated from all external conditions, including those of the carnal soul (*nafs*), which press upon and limit one's freedom."⁵⁷⁰

One may say that this kind of explanation is too spiritual and not appropriate as a solution to social problems. That is true; however, because of the close relation between different aspects of Islam, including spirituality and politics, political problems would be seen in the same context. Here is what Tabataba'i elucidates in this regard. Based on the existence of free will in human beings, love of freedom for such persons is an innate love. Every

⁵⁶⁹ S H Nasr, (1981) *Islamic life and thought*, (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 16.

⁵⁷⁰ Nasr, (1981), p. 17.

human being likes to be liberated to do whatever he or she likes to do. On the other hand, since human beings have a social existence, they must accept some social laws and agreements in this regard, and, in the meantime, have to limit their absolute freedom to some extent. In other words, it is impossible to suppose absolute freedom in a social context; rather it is relative freedom.⁵⁷¹

The main difference between Islamic teaching and that of a non-Islamic nature, according to Tabataba'i is the foundation of the *law* that limits freedom. Due to the materialistic approach and the essentially of material pleasure in a secular civilization, people, free of any kind of religious and moral principles, are allowed to do whatever they like so long as their behavior is not unlawful. In the Islamic approach, however, the core of the law is first of all a belief in monotheism and second in virtue. There are individual and social religious laws that limit people in their behavior.⁵⁷² Nasr puts this concept well when he says: "We are not free to do anything we wish with our own lives, which we have not created."⁵⁷³ According to this idea, those who are psychologically dependent on any kind of worldly affairs such as position, wealth, and title, are in fact obliged in some way even if they see themselves free to do whatever they like. Let us bring this topic to an end by quoting a poem from Ḥāfiẓ cited by Nasr in this regard. Ḥāfiẓ says:

⁵⁷¹ Tabataba'i, (1992), "Islam and freedom" in Sayyid Hādī Khusrushāhī, (ed.), *Majmū'a-yi maqālāt wa pursishhā wa pasukhhā*, (Tehran: Daft-e Nashr wa Farhang-i Islāmī), pp. 209-213. For the issue of Freedom according to Tabataba'i see A. Sajedi Bidgoli (1995), *Revelation and reason in the thought of Ṭabāṭabā'ī with special reference to the question of freedom in Islam*, (McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, M.A. Thesis.), pp. 74-102.

⁵⁷² Ibid., pp. 210-213.

⁵⁷³ Nasr, (1981), p. 18.

غلام همت آنم که زیر چرخ کبود ز هر چه رنگ تعلق پذیرد آزاد است

I am the slave of the spiritual will of him who under the azure
wheel

Is free from whatever possesses the color of dependence.⁵⁷⁴

Justice

God's justice (*al-ʿidāla*) is one of the five principles of religion. Shiʿis believes.⁵⁷⁵ Regardless of its theological aspect, the manifestation of this attribute of God in Islamic moral and social regulation is notable. There are, to put it short, two kinds of justice: individual and social. As Tabatabaʿi explains:

Individual justice means that one abstain[s] from lying, backbiting, and other major sins and not persist in committing other sins.⁵⁷⁶

Accordingly, individual justice takes the form of religious observation of one's lifestyle. A Muslim should make his or her effort to acquire this faculty. A just person, then is a pure one, whom people can trust. Individual justice is the very first requirement for many social tasks. In addition to certain other conditions, a Muslim, first of all, should be a "just" (*ʿādil*) person to be able to be witness, to lead a group prayer, to judge, to be governor, to be a marjaʿ, to be trusty and so on. "Someone not characterized by individual justice cannot hold such positions, even if he is a great scholar."⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁴ Hāfiz, cited from Nasr, (1981), p. 20.

⁵⁷⁵ Sunni Muslims believe in three principles of religion, i.e. monotheism, prophethood, and resurrection; Shiʿism holds two more items, i.e. justice and imamate as religious principles.

⁵⁷⁶ Tabatabaʿi, (1989), *Islamic teachings: an overview*, translated into English by R. Campbell, (New York: Mostazafan Foundation of New York), p. 175.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

Social justice is almost equivalent to individual self-observation, but at a social level and in relation to human rights. To paraphrase Tabataba'i again:

Social justice means that we not transgress against others' rights but that we regard everyone as equal under God's law.⁵⁷⁸

Through different sources one may grasp the significance of social justice in Shi'ism. 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, who was the first Shi'ī spiritual, social and political leader after the Prophet, is known historically as the best example of justice. Previously, in the first chapter, we cited a passage from his letter to Ibn Ḥunayf, his governor in Baṣra.⁵⁷⁹ He also wrote in a long designating letter to Malik as his governor to Miṣr:

Habituate your heart to mercy for the people and to affection and kindness for them. Do not stand over them like greedy beasts who feel it is enough to devour them, since they are of two kinds, either your brother in religion or one like you in creation...Do justice for Allah and do justice towards the people, as against yourself, your near ones and those of your people for whom you have a liking, because if you do not do so you will be oppressive, and when a person oppresses the creature of Allah then, instead of His creatures, Allah becomes his opponent.⁵⁸⁰

Also, social justice forms one of the main elements behind the re-appearance of the last Imām who is now in occultation. The Prophet is reported to have said:

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 176.

⁵⁷⁹ See chapter I., p. 47 of this thesis.

⁵⁸⁰ Al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, *Nahj al-balāgha* [A collection of Imam Ali's sermons and letters], (Washington, D.C.: Majma' Ahl al-Bayt), pp. 238-239.

Allah will raise a man from my progeny, from my Ahl al-Bayt, by whom the earth will be filled with justice thoroughly the same as it has been filled with injustice and oppression.⁵⁸¹

Oppression and injustice from this point of view is seriously rejected in its turn. Tabataba'i, who is considered one of the most eminent Shī'ī scholars in the field of interpretation of the *Qur'ān* says: "God Most High censures oppression in hundreds of verses as an ugly quality fit only for beasts of prey."⁵⁸² He then adds that experience shows conclusively that the palace of oppression although it may stand for a while, will not endure; sooner or later it will collapse upon the oppressors.

Another manifestation of social justice in Islam is in its rejection of ethnic discrimination. Under the patronage of the concept of *umma*, people from all variant ethnic groups and different nationalities are equally the members of this great community. Theoretically, there is no difference between black and white, man and woman, Arab or non-Arab. The question, however, remains with respect to practice.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Despite debates about the relation between politics and religion, Muslim leaders in today's Iran uphold the interrelation of these two fields, both in theory and practice. This direction, for them, emanates from the Prophet Muhammad's first Islamic state after his migration from Mecca to Medina in 580 A.D., where the religious leader of the society established a political state. According to the Shī'ī point of view, this Prophet's responsibility was transferred to the Imams and then to clerics during the period of occultation

⁵⁸¹ Al-Ḥafīẓ Abūbakr al-Ṣan'ānī, (1970), *al-Muṣannif*, (Beirut), v. 11, p. 371, cited and translated into English by S. A. Sadr-ʿameli, *A bundle of flowers*, p. 219.

of an infallible Imam. The Iranian educational policy with respect to political values is grounded on this philosophy, as we pointed out earlier the list of the educational goals which maintains developing a spirit of expectation and readiness for the coming of Imam Mahdī as one of the objectives.⁵⁸²

Besides Fārsī religious studies and social studies textbooks, consequently, reflect this interrelation in their discussions on political points. Unlike the Pahlavis era, works of history reflect the emergence and development of Islam in great detail. They also give emphasis to the issue of leadership, particularly the religio-political one which began under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. The texts place an accent on Iranian institutions as often as they mark such general Islamic institutions like the Islamic state and *ummah*. This is in the sense that today's Iranian institutions, for local leaders, are either Islamic one or, at least, certain steps towards that. The texts likewise highlight certain values such as justice, independence and freedom, as Islamic social values, among which justice forms the core of the discussions.

⁵⁸² Tabataba'i, (1989), p. 176.

⁵⁸³ See p. 241.

Conclusion

CONCLUSION

REFLECTIONS

I initiated this study with a series of questions related to the philosophy of education inherent in the culture of pre- and post-Revolutionary Iran. I aimed to discern whether political changes have transformed various values in post-Revolutionary Iran and, if so, how. I questioned whether the new post-Revolution value paradigm has had an impact upon the Iranian educational system and, if so, what. I also considered whether this educational system in fact reflects the present culture and values of the Iranian people.

One of the means of answering these questions and of discovering the transformations that took place after the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran is to examine textbooks as mirrors reflecting the events of that time. Obviously, the issue is too wide for any single thesis to cover all its aspects. My intention in this study, therefore, was to determine whether shifts in

values could be observed, i.e. in spiritual, moral, social and political values, as these are represented in a selection of elementary school textbooks. Moreover, I investigated whether, and if so, what evidence exists in past and current educational policy statements and in school textbooks to indicate an actual shift in the Iranian educational system. If what has been presented in this thesis is to be considered convincing, then we may conclude the following.

1. The Iranian nation retains an Iranian-Islamic identity.

The major components of the Iranian identity are "Iran" and "Islam." A clearer understanding of the educational philosophy of both pre- and post-Revolutionary Iran is possible only when one first of all takes this issue into consideration. A country's educational policy, after all, cannot be isolated from the identity and culture of her people. In a debate⁵⁸⁴ over the identity of Iranian citizens, each of the disputants tries to introduce those major elements which, based on his or her interpretation, form the Iranian identity. One component which they hold is present in an Iranian, as opposed to a non-Iranian, is the sense of having a distinctive history, which may be traced back to the Aryans, the first tribe who settled in this region. Islam is the other major element that, according to most of the participants in the debate (e.g. Motahhari, 1981),⁵⁸⁵ has formed from an early period the identity of the habitants of this country.

Briefly stated, besides other factors such as Iranian nationality, I have

⁵⁸⁴ For more information on the four approaches see pp. 38-40 of this thesis.

⁵⁸⁵ Except Marxist-Leninist approach, which clearly opens no room for religion, none of the other theories rejected the role of Islam in Iranian identity. National religious approach, however, is the only one that considers a great position for religion in this regard. See *ibid.*

discerned in this study that religion –and particularly Islam– forms a great part of present-day Iranian culture. From the earliest discussions of modern Iranian history, the emergence of Islam in this country has been seen in one of two contradictory ways. While some (e.g. Browne, 1929; Āl-i Ahmad, 1984; Motahhri, 1981; Iṣfahānī, 1987) have perceived its appearance as a blessing for Iranians oppressed by the tyranny and class system of the Sassanids and the Zoroastrian establishment, some others (Maskūb, 1989) have regarded Islam's arrival as a defeat suffered by Iranians at the hands of Arabs. Based on what we discussed in chapter one regarding Iranian identity, we can conclude that the typical Iranian citizen is essentially both *Iranian* and *Islamic*. There is an intimate interrelation between religion and Iranian identity to the extent that religion now forms one of its key components. I believe that, due to the same fact, and due to the spiritual interests of Iranians, Islam was in position to launch a revolution in this country. Even those who are convinced that Islam occupied Iran by force believe that dissociating today's Iranian culture and the Islamic faith would be an impossible task.

As evidence of this, the relation between religion and Iranian identity can perhaps best be observed in two areas. The first is the affiliation between the people and religious scholars, namely clerics (ulama). The ulama, as the main interpreters of Shī'ī Islamic thought in Iran, have always received the profound appreciation of the people. Accordingly, one of these ulama, an *ayatollah*, could exclusively lead the 1978-79 Revolution against the Pahlavi regime. The key to this appreciation is the attachment of the ulama to Islam and its commands, just as the intellectuals were appreciated as long as they

were in favor of Islam. Accordingly, whenever any of the clergy or intellectual class was perceived as an enemy of Islam, she or he quickly lost status with the majority of people.

However, the relationship between Islam, and consequently the ulama, on the one hand, and the people of Iran, on the other, is given little attention by scholars and researchers in the field. For this reason, the so-called experts on Iran were unable to predict the Revolution of 1978-79, which was a direct result of the dynamic between the people and their religious leaders. As Milani says: "I know of no expert who perceived of the Shī'ī ulama as a threat to the Shah."⁵⁸⁶ Hamid Algar,⁵⁸⁷ proves the exception, however, for he wrote, several years before the Revolution: "Protests in religious terms will continue to be voiced and the appeals of men such as Ayatollah Khomeini to be widely heeded."⁵⁸⁸

The second area in which one may observe the role of religion and its relation to the Iranian identity is the presence of religion in the national educational agenda over the past years and even under the de-Islamization policy at the time of the Pahlavis. The presence of religious studies textbooks in the educational curriculum under the Qajars and also in the Pahlavi era, as well as the Islamic Republic time, is telling evidence in support of the active role of religion in Iranian culture. The religious

⁵⁸⁶ Milani, M.M. (1994) *The making of Iran's Islamic revolution: from monarchy to Islamic Republic*. (Boulder and London: Westview Press), p. 11.

⁵⁸⁷ Hamid Algar is a professor at Berkeley University. He is the author of several books regarding Islam, Shī'ism and Iran.

⁵⁸⁸ Hamid Algar (1972) "The oppositional role of the ulama in twentieth century Iran," in N. Keddie (ed.), *Scholars, saints, and sufis: Muslim religious institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 255.

studies textbook. from its first appearance in the curriculum, has been one of the most constant elements in the educational program.

2. There is a contradiction between the pre- and post-Revolutionary educational values, and this is mainly based on the policy of de-Islamization vs. Islamization of the country.

Here we may return to our first two questions regarding the educational policy of the Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic and their differences. The discrepancy between the two eras can be made clear via an analysis of the methods and content that the textbooks featured. Already, in the second chapter, we pointed to the policy of de-Islamizing the country as having been one of the major goals of Pahlavis. Although the Pahlavis did not explicitly disagree with religion on an individual or private level, for them the social manifestation of religion was a serious barrier to the development of the country and, therefore, they made an attempt to segregate it from the social affairs. Despite their intention, the Pahlavi kings never succeeded in removing religious textbooks from the curriculum. From the very appearance of state-published textbooks, religious studies texts formed some part of the curriculum. They appeared either as sections in other texts, for example in Persian Literature (*Fārsī*), or as texts on their own. However, the Pahlavi kings attempted to make the subject as colorless as possible, by, for example, removing such inspired writers on religion as Beheshti and Babonar from their positions on the board editing these texts.⁵⁸⁹

By contrast, under the Islamic Republic, religious texts play a significant role in the curriculum. Religious studies textbooks are the primary texts dealing with religious issues. Besides that, certain other texts such as the

⁵⁸⁹ See p. 83 of this thesis.

Persian language textbook (Fārsī) carry the same message, i.e. the *Islamization of education*. This Islamization policy is what most distinguishes the shift in the Iranian educational system after the 1978-79 Revolution. All efforts of alteration have aimed at converting the curriculum to an Islamic approach. Even such values as independence, self-confidence and purification, which we dealt with in the third chapter as the main educational policy under the Islamic Republic, are understandable in this sense. The goal of the second and the third chapters of this study was mainly to prove this trend and to determine the precise meaning and process of Islamization.

3. Islamization is grounded in the sense of a relation between religion and the people at a social practice level as well as an individual level.

A glance at the recent history of Iran indicates that the relation between religion and the people, although it has long existed at an individual level, has not always manifested itself at the social level. With the exception of some rebellions against the monarchical system during the last century, which were mostly suppressed, religion has largely been an individual pursuit. From the ulama's and the Iranian people's point of view, therefore, Iran could not be described as an Islamic country. Rather, they were Shī'ī Muslims who lived together in a land governed by non- or even anti-Islamic forces.

The same situation continued into the Pahlavi era. The Pahlavi kings were, however, unsuccessful in their goals at "Pahlavizing" the country by extracting Islam from Iranian culture and replacing it with an imperial, pre-Islamic and Western one. The Iranian people could not endure this imported culture, largely because of their Islamic

background. The imperial educational system, in addition to other attempts at social engineering, tried to educate Iranian children to favor the monarchy, but the same students turned out to be serious opponents of the Pahlavis. Children were in favor of the dynasty, but only superficially. At the same time they were being won over to Islam, in their homes, mosques, and during religious occasions such as the months of Ramaḍān and Muḥarram. To put it another way, children and students were the king's devoted servants in schools, but were religious individuals at home and in society. For these reasons, among others, students turned out in great numbers for the demonstrations against the Shah during the 1978-79 Revolution.

Accordingly, the primary goal of Islamization after the Revolution was, in a sense, to bring Islam from the individual level to the social level. As already noted, there was no problem with Islam at the individual level, as even the Pahlavis had pretended to this sort of faith as much as possible. The Shah himself showed this tendency towards Islam on different occasions, such as the fact that he went to Mecca on pilgrimage. He was proud of his own name and the name of his father and his son, for they were all called Rezā, the name of the eighth Shī'ī Imam. However, at the level of society, and in different social and political spheres, they consistently rejected Islam. In a sense, accordingly, the Revolution was a return to a forgotten culture, and Islamization has been the message of this Revolution by bringing Islam to the level of social practice.

4. Values of Islam are clearly evident in educational policies and school textbooks in post-Revolutionary Iran.

Returning to the fourth and fifth questions we raised at the very beginning of this study, we may conclude that Islamization developed within the educational curriculum in two different ways. The first external manifestation is through the presentation of Islamic ideas and beliefs in the textbooks. My focus in this study was to examine these external manifestations in the four fields of spiritual, moral, social and political values in order to determine whether there exists a shift in the Iranian educational system after the Revolution, and if so, to provide evidence.

After the Revolution, spiritual and moral values received only little modification, as compared to the Pahlavi era, in terms of content. For example, some of the Islamic rules, which were present in the earlier texts and disappeared gradually from the pre-Revolutionary texts, have progressively been re-introduced into recent editions. Illustration of females wearing the *hijāb* is one example of this change. These texts are, however, quite different in terms of the way in which values had been portrayed prior to the Revolution. There is also more of an emphasis on the social role of Islamic spiritual and moral concepts in contemporary texts. Besides spiritual values, moral values are given a spiritual meaning; one example is how the lifestyle of the Imams is introduced as an exemplar of moral behavior.

Social and political values are the ones that have undergone the most essential changes. The pre-Islamic period of Iran, highly regarded under the Pahlavis as a period of glory and eminence, is considered in today's textbooks as a period of backwardness and an era of tyrants who unjustly ruled Iran for centuries. Some pre-Islamic

customs such as the Mihrigān Festival, which were encouraged in pre-Revolutionary textbooks, have been replaced by either Islamic occasions or other reasons for celebrations. Pre-Islamic personal names have been replaced with either Islamic ones or some less controversial names. Islamic history, which had been allowed to fall into oblivion under the Pahlavis, has received consideration in the recent years to a great extent.

The appearance of political concepts in post-Revolutionary texts is the most obvious case of alteration of the textbooks. It goes without saying that these concepts in the state-published textbooks could not have remained the same after a total change in the political system of the country. A considerable number of pages in various modern textbooks are devoted to such concepts as justice, freedom, independence, and the victory of the Revolution over the tyranny of the Shah and imperialism. In the pre-Revolutionary texts, the Shah was the core of almost all discussion, and the monarchical system praised as the best of systems. By contrast, it is the role of the people, although in an Islamic framework, that is emphasized in the recent textbooks.

Besides the simple external impact of Islamization on text, there is a deeper and more fundamental impact of this concept on education and on the curriculum. Previously we pointed to the two terms "Pahlavization" and "Islamization" as the major educational goals of Pahlavi and Islamic regimes, respectively. Both terms, however, are too general and vague to be correctly grasped at the glance.

During Pahlavization, the Pahlavi kings held to a specific procedure. Based on the Shah's various statements, four items, i.e. nationalism, Westernization, de-Islamization and the Shah-centrality were components of this notion. Modernization, which was emphasized during this time, was definable in this format. Accordingly, almost any Islamic phenomenon, especially at the level of society, was counted as a barrier to modernism.

Islamization, by contrast, involves rejecting previous values and replacing them with new concepts. In this new approach, those values that contradict Islam, whether by nature or consequence, are rejected. Nationalism, Westernization and pre-Islamic values, therefore, are acceptable only so long as they are in harmony with Islamic values, while secularism and de-Islamization are totally refused, since they are in direct opposition with Islam. There are also values like independence, self-confidence, and purification that Ayatollah Khomeini accented in his approach towards education. These are the values that are given added weight -directly or indirectly- on different occasions in the textbooks.

To sum up, since their first appearance in curriculum, the role of the state-published textbooks in transferring values to children has been an unavoidable fact in Iran. The Pahlavi regime employed this instrument in order to establish monarchical values among people, as to eliminate, as much as possible, Islamic values from the society. The new system of the Islamic Republic operates in the same way, to the extent that textbooks are used to vehicle Islamic values. The content of the transferred message, however, is the point of difference between two eras. From the very beginning of the

first year of the elementary cycle, the students in Islamic Republic begin to learn about Islam from different directions. While they learn spiritual and moral aspects in an individual domain, they learn how to apply these values in their social and even political life. At the same time, they are trained to oppose those pre-Revolutionary values that were magnified by the Pahlavis and still, to some extent, are evident in society.

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In this study we dealt with certain Islamic values and their exposition in the textbooks. We also reviewed to some extent the Islamic ideological background of each value. We concluded that a balance *could* exist between what the textbooks teach as Islamic values and what Islamic philosophy considers as acceptable values. The issues of the role of the teacher in teaching values and teaching methods, however, were beyond the scope of this thesis and we have therefore avoided dealing with them. Notwithstanding, there emerge from this study crucial questions, in relation to teaching values, that should be addressed in further research. The following are the major ones:

1. Is teaching Islamic values to children an instructive course or a sort of indoctrination?

The first question, related to the process of teaching values, is whether it is possible to instruct students in the teachings of Islam in a reasonable and rational way, or whether Islam, taught in schools as it is, would be seen as constituting a sort of indoctrination. Education can easily turn into indoctrination without the presence of the element of rationality, just as it can proceed without risk of indoctrination by maintaining this rationality in the content and method (intention). There is no difference in this process

between moral, religious or political education. Any of these can be indoctrinating if they disregard the individual's right to think critically.

The inculcation of Islamic values has been one of the primary tasks that the nation's leaders sought to accomplish in the years following the Revolution in Iran. While spiritual (religious) and moral values were their first concern, other values, particularly cultural ones, were also taken into consideration. Textbooks, which function as children's companions, and teachers as the interpreters of texts and as guides for children in education have actively carried out this task during recent years. Transferring values and teaching Islamic materials to children have been their essential objective. Nevertheless, for some, the process of Islamization may raise the issue of indoctrination, specifically when it is applied in a religious context. The essential question is related to the position of reason in Islam and whether or not the trend of Islamization and the transmission of values are legitimate.

2. In addition to textbooks, what is the role of the teacher in the teaching of values in present time?

The second question, besides teaching methods, connects to the position of the teacher in theory vs. practice. The development of values in an Islamic educational system is based, to a great extent, on the role of the teacher. Although the individual plays a key role in determining his/her success or failure in the learning process, it is the teacher (and in a general sense this also includes parents and other possible models) who is, from an Islamic point of view, the foremost model for students. The teacher's responsibility is to behave in accordance with Islamic teachings in order to provide an

acceptable model for his/her students. Addressing teachers, it is mentioned in the preface to one of the religious textbooks that:

In order to form a practical commitment after learning, students should learn from your conduct, just as they learn from your assertions.⁵⁹⁰

This quotation clearly shows what is expected of teachers in Islamic education. According to this understanding, teachers play a highly consequential role in delivering values to children. It follows that a failure to provide appropriate teachers is, in a sense, a failure in the educational system. Today's teachers in Iran are mostly graduates of a system, which, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, were originally involved in an effort which aimed at corrupting the society. Such teachers are hardly qualified to teach children what the Islamic Republic has designated as its educational priorities, unless they can be educated and re-qualified under a new system with new conditions. This tension, and the challenges inherent in it, would need to be addressed in further research.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

Appendixes

APPENDIXES

To understand more clearly the textbooks presented in this study, I have chosen to reproduce certain parts from them that I feel are representative of their format and content. The following points should be borne in mind, however, when perusing them:

1. Almost all the pictures in the actual texts are colored. Due to technical limitations in producing this thesis, however, they are shown here in black and white.

2. All the elementary textbooks are published in a 16.5 cm × 23.5 cm. format.

3. The length of the textbooks varies based on the topic, level and year of publication. *Fārsī* runs from between 110 and 240 pages from the first to fifth grades respectively. *Talīmāt-i dīnī*, including the part on Quranic studies, is about 60 to 110 pages in length depending on the grade. And the section on social studies in *Talīmāt-i ijtimā'ī* textbook is about 30 to 35 pages for the fourth and fifth grades.

APPENDIX



**Sample pages from the
Fārsī (Persian Literature) textbook
for elementary grade.**


بتوانیم می‌کنیم. فیل گفت آآن می‌آیم تمام خانه‌های شما را خراب می‌کنم، بیستم چه کار می‌توانید بکنید.

کاکلی برگشت و به گنجشکها گفت: فیل حرف حق را گوشت نمی‌دهد و دارد می‌آید. باید به او نشان دهیم که اینجا جای زورگرایی نیست.



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راه پیروزی



دسته‌ای گنجشک، در مخلی، آشیانه* داشتند. فیل زورمندی* هم

در آن نزدیکی زندگی می‌کرد.

یک روز فیل عمداً* آشیانه چند گنجشک را خراب کرد.

گنجشکها ناراحت شدند و با خود گفتند اینجا وطن ماست، ما باید از

وطن خود دفاع کنیم.

کاکلی، که از همه گنجشکها باهوش‌تر بود، گفت: بهتر است اول

با فیل حرف بزنیم، اگر حرف حق* را قبول کرد که دعوا نداریم و گر نه با

او مبارزه خواهیم کرد.

آن‌گاه کاکلی رفت و حرفهایش را با فیل زد. فیل گفت: هر کاری

دلم بخواهد می‌کنم. کاکلی جواب داد ما هم آرام نمی‌نشینیم و هر کاری

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مقررات عبور و مرور *

امروزه در تمام شهرهای بزرگ و کوچک و حتی در دهکده‌ها بیشتر مردم برای اینکه از جایی به جایی بروند و با بار و حیوانات خود را حمل کنند، از وسایل نقلیه موتوری مانند اتوبوس، اتومبیل، کامیون، موتورسیکلت و وسایل نقلیه غیر موتوری مانند دوچرخه استفاده می‌کنند.

در شهرهای بزرگ، بیشتر مردم نمی‌توانند صبحگاهان بی‌وسيلة نقلیه به محل کار خود بروند. هر روز که می‌گذرد، بر شماره وسایل نقلیه افزوده می‌شود، زیرا از یک طرف جمعیت پیوسته در حال افزایش است و از طرف دیگر، بر اثر پیشرفت صنعت، وسایل نقلیه آسانتر و ارزانتر در دسترس مردم قرار می‌گیرد.

حال اگر رانندگان این همه وسایل نقلیه و حتی عابران پیاده بخواهند بدون رعایت نظم و ترتیب و مقررات و به دلخواه خود به حرکت درآیند، دیری نمی‌گذرد که وضع شهرها به هم می‌خورد، صدها تصادف روی می‌دهد و هزاران نفر کشته یا مجروح می‌شوند.

برای احتراز از این خطرها و جلوگیری از بی‌نظمی به هنگام عبور و مرور، رعایت مقررات و قوانین راهنمایی و رانندگی بر همه واجب است. هر کس که از این مقررات سرپیچی کند، متخلف^{*} شمرده می‌شود و باید به مجازات برسد.

عابران پیاده که به جای عبور از پیاده‌رو در سواری و حرکت می‌کنند و از لایه اتومبیلها می‌گذرند و برای گذشتن از یک سوی خیابان به سوی دیگر، از جاهای معینی خط‌کشی شده عبور نمی‌کنند، مرتکب خلاف می‌شوند. این

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برتری به چیست؟

پیامبر گرامی ما با چند زن از اصحاب^{*} در مسجد نشسته بودند و با هم

گفتگو می‌کردند. سلمان فارسی، یکی از یاران پیامبر، وارد مسجد شد. پیامبر

با خوشرویی او را نزد خود خواند. این رفتار مهرآمیز پیامبر موجب تاراحتی

یکی از اصحاب شد. او گفت: سلمان از مردم فارس است و ما عرب هستیم.

او نباید در جمع ما و بالای دست ما بنشیند. باید در جایی پایین‌تر از ما بنشیند.

پیامبر از سخن این مرد خشنگیر شد و فرمود: نه، چنین نیست! فارس

بودن و یا عرب بودن مایه برتری و بزرگی نیست. رنگ و نژاد موجب

تفضیلت نیست. آنچه نزد خدا مایه برتری است تقوا^{*} و ایمان^{*} و عمل

صالح^{*} است. هر که با تقوا است نزد خدا گرامیتر است.

* * *

براساس این رهشود^{*} ارزشمند، ما مسلمانان خود را با هم برابر و

برادر می‌دانیم. لهجه و زبان ما را از یکدیگر جدا نمی‌کند. مکان زندگی و نژاد

و رنگ موجب جدایی ما نمی‌شود. ما هیچ چیز جز تقوا و ایمان را مایه برتری

نمی‌شماریم.


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به کاو آهین ویل کند زرد
هم ایجا، هم آجا و هر جا که بود
قصد اراد آن سال از آن خوب تخم
زهر تخم بر خاست بنه و تخم
نشد کنج پیدا ولی زبختان
چنان چون در کشت شد خشتان

موتی باد

ریخ و کنج
برو کاری کن کو حست کار
کنز تا که دبتان دانا چه کنت
که میرا شت خود را بایده دوست
من آن را خاتم اذر کجاست
چو شد مهره کشته بز کنند
نمانده نمانده جایی ز باغ
پدر مرد و پوران به امید کنج

که سرمایه جادوانی است کار
به فرزندان چون بی خوست خشت
که کنجی ز ششمان اذر اوست
پژوهیدن و یافتن با شاست
همه جای آن زیر و بالا کنند
کمیرد از آن کنج بر جا سرائف
به کاویدن دشت بزود رنج



APPENDIX


B

**Sample pages from the
Religious Studies (ta^clīmāt-i dīnī) textbook
for elementary grade.**

درس بازردهم

حضرت محمد با کودکان مهربان بود

پیامبر گرامی ما کودکان را دوست می‌داشت و با آنها بسیار مهربان بود. او کودکان را بر دوش خود سوار می‌کرد و با آنها راه می‌رفت. کودکان، شاد و خوشحال می‌شدند و می‌خندیدند. پیامبر هم از شادی و خنده زیبای کودکان خوشحال می‌شد و لبخند می‌زد. روزی دو



درس چهاردهم

کودکی حضرت محمد

حضرت محمد در مکه به دنیا آمد. نام پدرش «عبدالله» و نام مادرش «آمنه» بود.
پیش از آن که او از مادر متولد شود، پدرش از دنیا رفت. وقتی به دنیا آمد مادرش او را به دایه‌ای سپرد. نام دایه محمد «حلیمه» بود. حلیمه، محمد را به صحرا برد تا او را در هوای آزاد پرورش دهد.
محمد چهارساله شد. روزی می‌خواست با چوپانها به صحرا برود. حلیمه موهای او را شانه زد. لباس نو به او پوشاند و یک گردنبند که چند مهره سبز رنگ داشت به گردنش انداخت.
محمد پرسید: این گردنبند برای چیست؟ حلیمه گفت: برای اینکه تو را در بیابان از خطر حفظ کند.
محمد آن را از گردن خود باز کرد و گفت:
کسی هست که مرا از همه خطرها حفظ می‌کند. از این گردنبند و مهره‌های آن کاری ساخته نیست.
حلیمه پرسید: چه کسی تو را از همه خطرها حفظ می‌کند؟
محمد گفت: خدایی که ما را آفریده است. او نگاهدار همه ماست.

پیشکش بر شما:

- ۱ - نام پدر، مادر و دایه حضرت محمد چیست؟
- ۲ - چرا حضرت محمد آن گردنبند را از گردن خود باز کرد؟

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درس یازدهم

با مادرم چگونه رفتار کنم؟

زکریا مسیحی بود و در شهر کوفه زندگی می کرد. پدر و مادر و همه خویشان این جوان مسیحی بودند. زکریا در اثر رفت و آمد و معاشرت با مسلمانان به دین اسلام علاقه مند شد. رفتار نیک و اخلاقی پسندیده، راستی و درستی و پاکیزگی و نماز و عبادت مسلمانان را از نزدیک می دید. با قرآن آشنا شد و در آیات آن می اندیشید، بعد از تحقیق و کنجکاوی دین اسلام را پذیرفت و مسلمان شد.


سپس برای مراسم حج، به مکه سفر کرد. در مراجعت از سفر، در مدینه خدمت امام صادق — علیه السلام — رسید و عرض کرد: من مسیحی بودم و تازه مسلمان شده‌ام. امام پرسید علت مسلمان شدنت چه بود؟ گفت: در آیات قرآن تفکر کردم. فکر می کردم چگونه یک فرد اتمی و درس نخوانده می تواند چنین آیات زیبا و بر معانی را بیابد؟ و از همین راه اطمینان پیدا کردم که قرآن از جانب خدا نازل شده و محمّد پیامبر خدا می باشد. بعد از تحقیق مسلمان شدم.

امام صادق برای او دعا کرد و فرمود: خدا با دلش را نورانی کن. آن گاه زکریا گفت: ای فرزند خدا! رسول خدا! پدر و مادر و همه خویشان من مسیحی هستند چگونه با آنها رفتار کنم؟ مادری دارم پیر و بایبنا و به پرستار احتیاج دارد. چه کنم؟ آیا ارتباطم را با وی قطع کنم؟

امام صادق علیه السلام فرمود: اسلام دین مهر و محبت است. در باره خویشان مخصوصاً پدر و مادر سفارشها دارد. ای جوان! مواظب مادرت باش و هر چه می توانی از او بپذیرایی کن. پیش از پیش با او مهربان و خوش رفتار باش.

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Religious Studies (talmat-i dini) 4th grade (1369)[1990], p. 67



درس چهاردهم

نخستین امام

حضرت امیرالمؤمنین، امام علی علیه السلام

نخستین امام ما، حضرت امیرالمؤمنین امام علی — علیه السلام — است. پیشبر بزرگ اسلام، به فرمان خدا، حضرت علی را به مردم معرفی کرد و سرپرستی امت اسلامی را به او سپرد، تا بعد از خودش امام و پیشوای مردم باشد و آنان را رهبری کند.

حضرت علی — علیه السلام — روز سیزدهم ماه رجب، در شهر مکه به دنیا آمد. نام پدرش ابوطالب و نام مادرش فاطمه (دختر آسَد) است.

حضرت علی پس عمری پیشبر بود. او از کودکی به خانه پیشبر آمد و زیر نظر او آداب زندگی را به خوبی یاد گرفت. و در آن خانه بزرگ شد.

حضرت علی (ع) پس باهوش و زرنگی بود. گفتهای پیشبر را خوب می فهمید و عمل می کرد. هرگز دروغ نمی گفت، با ادب و شیرین زبان بود. به مردم احترام می گذاشت، درستکار و پاکیزه بود. در کارها به پیشبر کمک می کرد. پس شجاع و نیرومندی بود. با کودکان دوست و مهربان بود. آنها را اذیت نمی کرد، اما هیچ کس هم جرأت نداشت او را اذیت کند.

۱- ذکر تاریخ ولادت و وفات آئینه اطهار و نیز سلسله تولد و من آنها در کتاب: تنها جهت آوازیں اطلاعات عمومی دانش آموزان می باشد و حفظ کردن آنها الزامی نیست.

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Religious Studies (talmat-i dini) 3rd grade (1374)[1995], p. 36.



الحمد لله الذي هدانا لهذا الذي كنا لنهتدي لولا أن هدانا الله



۱. در این کتاب، که در سال ۱۳۰۲ هجری قمری در تهران چاپ شده است، به بررسی و تفسیر آیه ۱۱۲ سوره بقره پرداخته شده است. این آیه یکی از آیات مهم در مورد عتق و آزادی است.

۲. مؤلف این کتاب، که نامش در این نسخه ذکر نشده است، به بررسی لغوی و فقهی این آیه پرداخته و سعی کرده است تا به معنای صحیح آن دست یابد.

۳. در این کتاب، به بررسی و تفسیر آیه ۱۱۲ سوره بقره پرداخته شده است. این آیه یکی از آیات مهم در مورد عتق و آزادی است.

۴. مؤلف این کتاب، که نامش در این نسخه ذکر نشده است، به بررسی لغوی و فقهی این آیه پرداخته و سعی کرده است تا به معنای صحیح آن دست یابد.

۵. در این کتاب، به بررسی و تفسیر آیه ۱۱۲ سوره بقره پرداخته شده است. این آیه یکی از آیات مهم در مورد عتق و آزادی است.

۶. مؤلف این کتاب، که نامش در این نسخه ذکر نشده است، به بررسی لغوی و فقهی این آیه پرداخته و سعی کرده است تا به معنای صحیح آن دست یابد.

۷. در این کتاب، به بررسی و تفسیر آیه ۱۱۲ سوره بقره پرداخته شده است. این آیه یکی از آیات مهم در مورد عتق و آزادی است.

۸. مؤلف این کتاب، که نامش در این نسخه ذکر نشده است، به بررسی لغوی و فقهی این آیه پرداخته و سعی کرده است تا به معنای صحیح آن دست یابد.


۹. در این کتاب، به بررسی و تفسیر آیه ۱۱۲ سوره بقره پرداخته شده است. این آیه یکی از آیات مهم در مورد عتق و آزادی است.

۱۰. مؤلف این کتاب، که نامش در این نسخه ذکر نشده است، به بررسی لغوی و فقهی این آیه پرداخته و سعی کرده است تا به معنای صحیح آن دست یابد.

APPENDIX



**Sample pages from the
Social Studies (ta^ʿlīmāt-i ijtimā^ʿi) textbook
for elementary grade.**

	<p>آگاهی بانشیم و کشور خود را با تلاش و کوشش بسازیم و آباد کنیم.</p> <p>دانش‌آموزانی که امیدهای آینده کشورند باید آموزش علم را وظیفه خود بدانند و در خدمت به انقلاب اسلامی و مبارزه با دشمنان از همه کوشا تر باشند.</p> <p>وقتی نماز به پایان رسید، مردم در حالی که شمار می‌دادند، از هر طرف</p>	<p>آقای حامی گفت متبادم که نماز جمعه تهران علمی باشد.</p> <p>به سوی خانه‌های خود به راه افتادند. خانواده علی و خانواده خاله او برای رفتن به خانه منتظر اتوبوس بودند. اما راننده یک ماشین سواری که او هم از نماز جمعه برمی‌گشت، آنها را سوار کرد و را بگایان به مقصد رساند.</p> <p>شب، وقتی همه در خانه بودند، تلویزیون مراسم نماز جمعه را نشان داد. مریم گفت: امروز من هر چه نگاه کردم، نتوانستم آخر جمعیت را پیدا کنم.</p>	۴۸	۴۹
Social Studies (ta'limat-i ijtimā'i), 3 rd grade (1372)[1993], pp. 48-49				

درس ۹

سورا

چنان که در درس قبل گفتیم، مسلمانان با یکدیگر متحدند و به هم اعتماد دارند. مسلمانان، همان طور که در انجام کارها، از نیروی دست و بازوی یکدیگر استفاده می کنند در تصمیم گیری نیز با یکدیگر مشورت می کنند و از نیروی فکری یکدیگر بهره مند می شوند. خداوند در قرآن فرموده است که «مسلمانان کارهای خود را از طریق ... انجام می دهند»^۱.

اگر ما در کارها، با برادران و خواهران مسلمان خود مشورت کنیم می توانیم از فکر آنها استفاده کنیم و در نتیجه بهتر تصمیم بگیریم.



۱- «الَّذِينَ شَرُّوا يَتَكَلَّمُونَ بِأَفْهَامٍ مَشْجُونَةٍ...» سورة شوری - آیه ۳۷

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وقتی کارها از طریق سورا انجام شود، عده بیشتری می توانند نظر خود را اظهار کنند و این باعث دلگرمی همگان خواهد شد و وحدت میان آنها را بیشتر خواهد کرد.

البته درباره همه مسائل نمی توان از طریق سورا تصمیم گرفت. اگر در مسائلی حکم خداوند در قرآن بیان شده باشد و یا از طریق پیامبر و ائمه و با رهبر جامعه اسلامی به ما دستوری رسیده باشد، ما همگان از آن دستور اطاعت می کنیم.

؟

پرسش:

- ۱- مسلمانان برای آنکه از نیروی فکری یکدیگر بهره مند شوند چه می کنند؟
- ۲- مشورت با دیگران چه فایده هایی دارد؟
- ۳- درباره چه مسائلی، نمی توان از طریق سورا تصمیم گرفت؟

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b. Textbooks published in 1940s:

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d. Textbooks published in 1970s:

- Wizārat-i Amūzish wa Parwarish [Ministry of Education], 2536 [1977], Fārsī, 2nd grade, Tehran: Sazmān-i Shāhanshāhī Khadamat-i Ijtimā'ī.
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3. Ta^clīmāt-i Ijtimā^ci

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